Source: https://ouclf.iuscomp.org/the-tobacco-industrys-strategic-use-of-freedom-of-information-laws-a-comparative-analysis/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:19:06+00:00

Document:
Accountability and transparency of government, as fundamental principles underpinning western liberal democracies, are markedly improved and promoted by access to government information. However, in various jurisdictions, evidence is increasing that tobacco companies are using laws ensuring freedom of information (‘FOI’) in order to disrupt government agencies’ allocation and use of public resources. FOI requests are but one strategy employed by the tobacco industry in its ‘vigorous, sophisticated and well-coordinated’1 response to worldwide efforts to enhance tobacco control policy and regulation. Tobacco companies have been known to conceal their identities by making FOI requests through law firms, public relations firms, consultants or front organisations such as smokers’ rights groups.2 The irony in the tobacco industry’s prolific use of FOI requests lies in the industry’s history of suppressing information and evidence on the health risks associated with the use of its products.3 That history alone provides a basis for scrutinising the extent and legitimacy of the tobacco industry’s use or misuse of FOI laws.
The tobacco industry uses FOI for various reasons, including: to inundate government agencies with FOI requests that are so broad as to divert them from their primary regulatory functions; to obtain access to raw scientific data in order to challenge the scientific basis of reports concluding that tobacco has deleterious health effects or that certain tobacco control measures are effective; to attack scientists who publish reports showing that tobacco is harmful; to resist tobacco regulation by accusing anti-tobacco groups of engaging in illegal activities, such as lobbying; and to gather information to better anticipate regulatory developments in order to resist them. A significant challenge arises for FOI administrators in distinguishing between legitimate requests and requests that may amount to deliberate abuse of the FOI system.
In Australia, the world-first introduction of standardised (or so-called ‘plain’) tobacco packaging from December 2012 has been a focal point of attention in the tobacco control and broader public health communities around the world, as well as an area of concern for marketing executives and some intellectual property lawyers. Australia’s measure has led to enhanced tobacco industry use of FOI requests,4 in addition to numerous legal and other challenges to the legislation.5 As we have explained elsewhere, the Australian FOI regime has significantly improved access to government information, but the structure of the legislation and charging system has enabled abuse by the tobacco industry and points to the need for reform.6 The federal Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) operates alongside state FOI legislation.7 In 2010, the federal legislation was amended in an attempt to further entrench a pro-disclosure culture across government.8 In April 2014, the Australian Attorney-General’s Department denied a request made by news service International Arbitration Reporter under the relevant federal legislation for access to Australia’s statement of defence in the investment treaty claim brought against Australia by Philip Morris Asia Limited. The Department referred to the public interest and legal professional privilege in refusing access to the information sought,9 expressing the view that release of the statement of defence could be detrimental to the ongoing proceedings under international investment law10 and within the World Trade Organization.11 More recently, the Australian government announced a plan to reverse some of the major reforms to FOI introduced by the previous Labor government, including the disbandment of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner,12 in order to generate financial savings.13 These changes have been criticised on the basis of their reduction of government scrutiny;14 whether they will address the difficulties arising from tobacco industry FOI requests in Australia remains to be seen.
Part II of this article explains the social and historical context and current operation of the FOI legislation in the UK, New Zealand, and the US (which has the oldest FOI regime). Part III examines how the tobacco industry has used FOI laws in these jurisdictions, revealing the challenges that tobacco industry FOI requests pose to government agencies and regulation. Part IV demonstrates in more detail the administrative burden placed on government in complying with FOI laws in each jurisdiction, including discussion of: how many requests are being filed and by whom; financial costs of compliance; and challenging time limits for responding to FOI requests. Part V of this article then evaluates the effectiveness of these FOI systems in addressing tobacco industry requests, through avenues such as refusing overly broad or improper requests, imposing financial charges for making FOI requests, and handling vexatious applicants and applications. In conclusion, we offer suggestions for reform that may enhance the capacity of governments to counter the misuse of their FOI systems by the tobacco industry, while upholding the primary purpose of FOI: accountability through transparency. In particular, appropriate reforms could include introducing a ceiling on the cost or size of requests, revising the approach to charging for requests to reduce the proportion of the financial burden borne by government for large requests, and allowing greater consideration of the identity of the requester and the purpose of the request.
The tobacco industry has also used FOI requests as a ‘competitive weapon’ to challenge and stifle tobacco-related research of academic institutions in the UK.98 In 2009-2010, solicitors acting on behalf of Philip Morris International (‘PMI’), submitted three separate information requests to the University of Stirling in Scotland.99 The first was for information about a project, entitled ‘Piloting the Use of Plain Packs in a Real Life Environment: Experiences of Young Adult Smokers’, being undertaken by the University’s Centre for Tobacco Control Research (‘CTCR’).100 The second request was for information from a survey entitled ‘Cancer Research: UK CTCR survey of adolescents’ reactions to tobacco marketing’, referred to in a report produced by the CTCR.101 In each instance, the University refused to comply with PMI’s request on the ground that it was vexatious under section 14(1) of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (‘FOISA’). PMI was dissatisfied with the outcome of a review of the University’s decision and applied to the Scottish Information Commissioner (‘SIC’) for a decision.
In order to put the tobacco industry’s use of FOI into context, this section discusses the administrative and resource burdens involved in the administration of FOI requests: in particular, the costs for government agencies of complying with requests within legislatively imposed time limits. Understanding the administrative burden experienced by governments in administering their FOI systems as a whole offers a contextual setting for Part V of this article, which examines options for dealing with burdensome FOI requests, and particularly those that are made by the tobacco industry.
The UK Ministry of Justice publishes national statistics on the handling of requests for information under the UK FOIA.153 The number of FOI requests increased by 63% between the third quarter of 2006 and the third quarter of 2014.154 In 2012, monitored central government bodies received 49,464 ‘non-routine’ FOI requests, a 5% increase on the number received in 2011.155 This increase was generated almost entirely by a surge in the volume of requests to government departments, particularly to the Department of Health and the Department of Work and Pensions regarding their introduction of ‘controversial policies’.156 In the case of the Department of Health, this ‘controversial’ policy was the proposed plain packaging of tobacco products, confirming the significance of FOI for tobacco control.
In its 2006 review of the operation of the UK FOIA, Frontier Economics identified ‘five key categories’ of FOI requester: journalists, members of Parliament, campaign groups, researchers, and private individuals.157 In 2013, the Scottish government received 1,597 FOI requests under the FOISA — the highest on record since the Act came into force.158 The majority of requests were made by individual members of the public (48%), followed by the media (19%), organisations including companies and interest groups (15%), researchers (8%), elected representatives (5%) and solicitors (3%).159 The alliances of any of these requesters to particular industries or companies is unknown.
Little information exists on the number of requests and the profile of requesters under the OIA in New Zealand. A 2001 study by Dave Clemens found that ‘the evidence remains effectively hidden’.160 Government agencies surveyed for Clemens’ study were generally unable to confirm trends in the literature that estimated high use of the OIA by certain groups or categories of requesters (such as news media and political parties), because such information was not held by most agencies or was not readily accessible.161 This absence of data precludes a cogent analysis of the detailed statistics compiled by the New Zealand Office of the Ombudsman regarding the proportion of requesters, or groups of requesters, seeking review of decisions made under the OIA.162 These deficiencies impair the ability of researchers to assess the effectiveness of the New Zealand FOI system in addressing tobacco industry requests, as such requests cannot be situated in the context of the overall volume of FOI requests made.163 A similar dearth of data also prevents a precise analysis of the proportion of FOI requests and costs attributable to the tobacco industry in the UK and the US.
According to the UK Ministry of Justice FOI statistics for 2013, 91% of FOI requests were responded to ‘in time’, meaning that they received a response within the twenty-day deadline or were subject to a permitted deadline extension. Departments of State responded to 85% of requests within the twenty-day time limit in 2013.194 In Scotland, 24% of appeals made to the SIC in 2013 were due to dissatisfaction with the timeliness of responses to FOI requests.195 Delay in responding to FOI requests is a problem in a ‘significant number’ of cases in the UK, even where complaints are made to the Information Commissioner.196 Birkinshaw has noted that ‘outright defiance’ is not common, owing to the severity of the penalties involved; however, limited funding and resources for FOI are a challenge for government departments and agencies in complying with the statutory time limits.197 As in New Zealand and the US, public data are not available on the extent to which tobacco industry FOI requests are subject to delayed responses, or the relationship between delays and the scope of requests. Nevertheless, it may be expected that larger requests (and especially overly broad requests, as discussed below) will hamper administrative attempts at meeting time limits.
Delays in responding to requests under the New Zealand OIA represent a continuing problem.198 In 2013-14, 31% of OIA complaints to the New Zealand Ombudsman concerned delays by agencies.199 Complaints to the Ombudsman may themselves take considerable time to process.200 Responders to FOI requests have suggested that meeting the statutory time frame for responding to FOI requests is particularly challenging and even unrealistic where the request is large or complex, possibly requiring consultation amongst several government departments, or where decisions involve careful judgment.201 In its 2012 review of the OIA, the New Zealand Law Commission received submissions that the time limit for responding to requests should be reduced from twenty working days to five or ten working days.202 The Law Commission concluded that it would be ‘problematic’ to reduce the twenty-working day time limit, as this would impose additional pressure on government agencies, and that it would be ‘unrealistic’ to reduce the maximum timeframe when government resources for FOI were being reduced or not increased.203 The Law Commission therefore recommended retaining the twenty-working day limit.
Review procedures and enforcement mechanisms are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the FOI system and to provide recourse for dissatisfied requesters. Nevertheless, these various procedures and mechanisms also add to the administrative burden of compliance with FOI regulations.
Part IV of this article highlights the significant resource constraints experienced by government departments and agencies in administering their FOI systems. The challenge, then, is for FOI legislation to address the burdens imposed by the tobacco industry’s use of FOI requests without deterring legitimate requests by that industry or any other. In the following sections of the article, we consider the effectiveness of the FOI systems in the UK, New Zealand, and the US in resisting illegitimate requests, by refusing overly broad or improper requests, imposing charges for requests, or dealing with vexatious applications or applicants.
The New Zealand experience emphasises the difficulty in labelling a request illegitimate simply on the basis of its size. Providing a discretion for refusal in relevant circumstances may allow the relevant decision-makers to use their expertise and experience in distinguishing illegitimate from legitimate requests. However, the disruptive and time-consuming requests made by the tobacco industry to the New Zealand Ministry of Health suggest that New Zealand’s broad discretion to refuse requests on this basis does not prevent the time-wasting effects of information requests.243 Although the inclusion of such a discretion may be important in preventing deliberately large requests, unless the discretion is exercised in practice, it may have little impact.
Unlike the New Zealand OIA, the FOI laws in the US and the UK lack express provisions enabling government agencies to refuse large FOI requests. Instead, such requests are addressed through FOI charges, as discussed in the following section.
In all three jurisdictions examined in this article, charging fees is designed to discourage abuse of FOI systems, but none appears to have a charging regime that achieves this aim: ‘fees recovered generally represent a fraction of … the cost’.244 Agencies are often unclear about when it is appropriate to impose a charge, what charge should be imposed, and how much time and effort should be invested in responding to an FOI request before it can be refused. Many of these issues require the consideration of a range of factors in all the circumstances and subjective decision-making by government officials.
In the UK, the amount that a public authority may charge a requester depends on whether the cost of complying with the request has exceeded the ‘appropriate limit’. Costs and fees are set out in the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 (UK) (for the UK) (‘UK Fees Regulations’) and in the Freedom of Information (Fees for Required Disclosure) (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (for Scotland) (‘Scotland Fees Regulations’). The UK Fees Regulations set the ‘appropriate limit’ and explain how this should be calculated, and also outline the maximum fee that a public authority may charge a requester when the cost of responding to a request exceeds the appropriate limit. This appropriate limit is £600 for requests to central government and £450 for requests to any other public authority.
In New Zealand, the United States and the UK, the costs to government of implementing and complying with the FOI regime are extensive. These costs must be borne in part by the government in view of the public interest in transparency and accountability. However, if the costs begin to outweigh the benefits and are subject to abuse by particular industries, changes may be required. The United States’ imposition of some fees that vary according to the nature of the requester (commercial, educational or other) provides one example of a mechanism that could be used to reform charging practices in order to reduce commercial incentives to make requests for improper reasons. The UK’s allowance of refusals on the basis of excessive costs may also provide an appropriate basis for limiting the financial burden of requests. The precise nature of optimal charging reforms may differ in these three jurisdictions, but the experience of each may be relevant in assessing the options available.
The Frontier Economics review of the UK FOIA noted that the provision for handling vexatious requests but not vexatious requesters causes problems for some government departments that receive requests from individuals who have been declared vexatious litigants by the court, but who are not considered so for the purposes of the UK FOIA. The review identified vexatious requesters — being a subset of serial requesters who made repeated requests for information ‘with the aim of disrupting the work of an organisation or harassing the individuals within it — as particularly problematic for certain government agencies, including the Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers and the Treasury Solicitor’s Department.289 It recommended that the government consider changing the wording of section 14 of the FOIA to focus on vexatious ‘requesters’ rather than vexatious ‘requests’.290 However, this recommendation was not implemented.
The apparent reluctance to identify particular requesters or even particular requests as vexatious, including the creation of barriers such as the need for a court order in order to do so, may reflect an understanding in these three jurisdictions that such a power can be easily abused, undermining the purpose of the FOI regime. Nevertheless, a greater focus on the purpose, identity and history of the requester could provide a legitimate means of managing inappropriate requests and thereby reducing the financial and human resource burdens they create. While more prescriptive criteria for identifying vexatious requests or requesters may not be available, easing the ability of decision-makers to exercise their discretion in particular kinds of circumstances may make this a more viable means of handling such requests. At the same time, given the ability of corporate requesters such as tobacco companies to use alternative identities such as subsidiaries or allied organisations, a focus on the identity of the requester alone will not eliminate vexatious requests.
The extensive use of FOI laws in the US, the UK and New Zealand, combined with the history of FOI use by the tobacco industry in general, suggests that the burden imposed on the UK government by tobacco industry-sponsored FOI requests is likely to be significant in the coming years, particularly in view of the introduction of standardised tobacco packaging. FOI requests by the tobacco industry may be further generated by domestic, regional or international litigation commenced by the industry in response to standardised packaging or other tobacco control measures. While FOI requests to support valid litigation may be appropriate, at least some of the industry’s legal actions are ill-founded, commenced purely as part of a global strategy of hindering tobacco control through whatever means possible,311 and thus casting a shadow on associated FOI requests. The burden of these requests will be felt in both financial terms and human capacity terms, at both the request and review stages, especially given the twenty working day limit on responding to requests. That twenty day time limit represents a commonality between the FOI systems in the UK, New Zealand, and the US, with each jurisdiction facing challenges in meeting the limit while various stakeholders call for even faster resolution of requests, including through complaints to the relevant overseeing bodies.
The theoretical (if rarely used) ability of a New Zealand authority to refuse a request for official information under section 18(f) of the OIA on the ground that the request is overly broad (that is, the information ‘cannot be made available without substantial collation or research’)312 represents an important tool for New Zealand agencies to deal with improper requests, whether from the tobacco industry or otherwise. The absence of such a provision in UK and US law places a greater emphasis on FOI charges to act as a deterrent to overly broad requests. Yet in all three jurisdictions the government’s costs of administering the FOI system far outweigh the charges imposed on FOI requesters, and changes to the charging approach are likely to be difficult. Also in all three jurisdictions, provisions for refusing vexatious FOI requests are limited, and the focus of these provisions is on the nature of the request rather than the identity or conduct of the requester. Thus, the fact that a request is made by a tobacco company or tobacco industry representative is essentially irrelevant. This may be the only way to ensure sufficient access to the FOI system and transparency of government information, but it might need reconsideration should evidence accumulate against particular requesters.
Together with a greater focus on the nature of the requester, the nature and purpose of the request might also be analysed, with a view to allowing the refusal of a request that is contrary to the spirit of the legislation. In its 2012 review of the OIA, the New Zealand Law Commission canvassed but rejected the possibility of requiring FOI requesters to disclose their purpose in seeking information. It outlined the potential benefits for agencies in having knowledge of the requester’s purpose, including in determining whether a request is vexatious, whether release of the information would be in the public interest and whether charging the requester would be appropriate.314 FOI legislation in the UK, New Zealand, and the US does not presently require requesters to disclose their purpose in seeking information and the use to which they propose to put that information.315 However, requesters in some instances disclose the purpose of their request voluntarily, and in others the purpose is clear from the identity of the requester (such as a journalist) or the nature of the request.316 A difficulty with relying on purpose is that the purpose of a request may be difficult to determine (even if a particular purpose is declared), and an overly subjective standard may provide too much leeway to refuse to disclose information that is embarrassing to the government.
* We gratefully acknowledge the generous financial support provided for this research by Slater and Gordon and Melbourne Law School, as well as the advice and assistance of the McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer. We also thank Sonja Zivak for extensive research and editorial assistance, Catherine Gascoigne and Katherine Gardiner for research assistance in the preparatory stages, and Irene Han for research and editorial assistance upon finalisation of the article for submission. The Law Research Service at Melbourne Law School also provided targeted research assistance, and anonymous reviewers offered helpful advice. The views expressed here and any errors or omissions are ours.
** PhD candidate and researcher, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne. Email (gdimopoulos@student.unimelb.edu.au).
*** Australian Research Council Future Fellow (2014-2018); Professor, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne. Email (a.mitchell@unimelb.edu.au).
**** Professor and former Associate Dean (Research), Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne; Former Legal Officer, Appellate Body Secretariat, World Trade Organization. Email (tania.voon@unimelb.edu.au).
1 Jenny White and Lisa Bero, ‘Public Health Under Attack: The American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST) and the Tobacco Industry’ (2004) 94 American Journal of Public Health 240, 246.
2 Emily Savell, Anna Gilmore and Gary Fooks, ‘How Does the Tobacco Industry Attempt to Influence Marketing Regulations? A Systematic Review’ (2014) 9 PLoS One 1, 3 accessed 29 September 2015; Steve Connor, ‘Smoke and mirrors: how the tobacco industry hides behind lobbyists’, The Independent (London, 3 September 2011) accessed 29 September 2015.
3 See, eg, Pascal Diethelm, Jean-Charles Rielle and Martin McKee, ‘The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth? The Research that Philip Morris Did Not Want You to See’ (2005) 366 (9479) The Lancet 86; Monique Muggli et al, ‘Waking a Sleeping Giant: The Tobacco Industry’s Response to the Polonium-210 Issue’ (2008) 98 American Journal of Public Health 1643.
4 See Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon, ‘Someone to Watch Over Me: The Use of FOI Requests by the Tobacco Industry’ (2014) 22 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 18: . The current article does not duplicate or paraphrase that Australian-focused article, or our other works referenced below, which address other legal issues (eg international trade law, international investment law, and Australian constitutional law rather than administrative/FOI law). See also Simon Chapman and Stacy Carter, ‘“Avoid Health Warnings on All Tobacco Products for Just as Long as We Can”: A History of Australian Tobacco Industry Efforts to Avoid, Delay and Dilute Health Warnings on Cigarettes’ (2003) 12 (Supplement 3) Tobacco Control 13.
5 See generally Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell and Jonathan Liberman with Glyn Ayres (eds), Public Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes: Legal Issues (Edward Elgar 2012); Tania Voon, ‘Acquisition of Intellectual Property Rights: Australia’s Plain Tobacco Packaging Dispute’ (2013) 2 European Intellectual Property Review 113.
6 See Mitchell and Voon, ‘Someone to Watch Over Me’ (n 4 above).
7 See Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW); Information Act 2002 (NT); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Qld); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA).
8 Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth).
9 See Jarrod Hepburn, ‘Australia Denies Access to its “Plain Packaging” Arbitration Defence under Freedom of Information Law’ Investment Arbitration Reporter (Santa Monica, 12 May 2014) accessed 29 September 2015.
10 See Philip Morris Asia Limited v Australia (Procedural Order No 11 Regarding the Parties’ Requests for the Production of Documents), UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, PCA Case No 2012-12 (23 September 2014).
11 See, eg, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging: Tobacco Products and Packaging – Communication from the Chairperson of the Panel, WTO Doc WT/DS434/14 (14 October 2014).
12 Freedom of Information Amendment (New Arrangements) Bill 2014 (Cth). See also Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘OAIC to Remain Operational until Further Notice’ (8 December 2014) accessed 29 September 2015.
13 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Freedom of Information (New Arrangements) Bill 2014 (Cth).
14 Paul Farrell, ‘Budget 2014: Freedom of Information Framework Faces Radical Surgery’ The Guardian Australia (Sydney, 13 May 2014) accessed 29 September 2015.
15 Department of Health (UK), ‘Consultation on Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products’ (12 July 2013) accessed 29 September 2015.
16 HC Deb, 12 July 2013, vol 556, col 679 and HC Deb, 16 July 2013, vol 556, col 893, cited in Lorraine Conway, ‘Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products’ (Standard Note SN/HA/6175, House of Commons Library, 3 October 2013) 15-16.
17 Department of Health (UK), ‘Tobacco control update’ (28 November 2013) accessed 29 September 2015.
18 Sir Cyril Chantler, Standardised packaging of tobacco: Report of the independent review undertaken by Sir Cyril Chantler (3 April 2014) accessed 29 September 2015.
19 Department of Health (UK), ‘Government backs standardised packaging of tobacco’ (21 January 2015) accessed 29 September 2015.
20 Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC, 2014 OJ (L 127) 1, art 29(1).
21 ‘Tobacco firms win legal right to challenge EU rules’ BBC News (London, 3 November 2014) accessed 29 September 2015.
22 Peter Evans, ‘British American Tobacco to sue UK government if plain packaging becomes law’ Wall Street Journal (New York, 26 February 2015) accessed 29 September 2015.
23 ‘Tobacco firms challenge plain packaging law’ BBC News (London, 22 May 2015) accessed 29 September 2015; Philip Morris International, ‘Philip Morris International Files Suit Against Standardized Packaging Regulations in the UK’ (Press Release, 22 May 2015) accessed 29 September 2015.
24 See, eg, Benjamin Hawkins, Chris Holden and Jim McCambridge, ‘Alcohol Industry Influence on UK Alcohol Policy: A New Research Agenda for Public Health’ (2012) 22 Critical Public Health 297; David Miller and Claire Harkins, ‘Corporate Strategy, Corporate Capture: Food and Alcohol Industry Lobbying and Public Health’ (2010) 30 Critical Social Policy 564; William Wiist, The Bottom Line or Public Health: Tactics Corporations Use to Influence Health and Health Policy, and What We Can Do to Counter Them (OUP, 2010); Kelly Brownell and Kenneth Warner, ‘The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar is Big Food?’ (2009) 87 Milbank Quarterly 259. See also (in relation to the mining industry) Linda Rosenstock and Lore Jackson Lee, ‘Attacks on Science: The Risks to Evidence-Based Policy’ (2002) 92 American Journal of Public Health 14, 16.
25 See Tom McClean, ‘Who Pays the Piper? The Political Economy of Freedom of Information’ (2010) 27 Government Information Quarterly 392.
26 Ben Worthy, ‘More Open but Not More Trusted? The Effect of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 on the United Kingdom Central Government’ (2010) 23 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 561, 561-2. See also Patrick Birkinshaw, ‘Freedom of Information in the UK: A Progress Report’ (2000) 17 Government Information Quarterly 419.
27 Patrick Birkinshaw, ‘Freedom of Information and its Impact in the United Kingdom’ (2010) 27 Government Information Quarterly 312, 312; Worthy (n 266) 563. See also Raymond Lee, ‘The UK Freedom of Information Act and Social Research’ (2005) 8 International Journal of Social Research Methodology 1, 2; Patrick Birkinshaw, ‘Freedom of Information in the UK and Europe: Further Progress?’ (2002) 19 Government Information Quarterly 77; Tony Blair, Speech at the Campaign for Freedom of Information’s Annual Awards Ceremony, 25 March 1996, cited in Worthy (n 26) 563.
28 See Freedom of Information Act 2000 (UK) (‘FOIA 2000 (UK)’), ss 19-20.
29 Continental Research Ltd, Freedom of Information: Three Years On (Information Commissioner’s Office (UK) 2008) 1.
30 See Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), ‘Publication Scheme Plan for 2013-14’ (11 June 2013) 1.
31 See FOIA 2000 (UK), s 1.
34 Continental Research Ltd (n 29) 8.
35 Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), ‘Publication Scheme Plan for 2013-14’ (n 300) 1.
36 UK Government, ‘Publications: Transparency Data’ accessed 29 September 2015.
37 UK Government, ‘About’ accessed 29 September 2015.
38 Worthy (n 26) 563-4, 577. See also 566-577.
39 Committee on Official Information (NZ), Towards Open Government 1: General Report (Government Printer 1981) 8, 21. See also Nicola White, Free and Frank: Making the New Zealand Official Information Act 1982 Work Better (Institute of Policy Studies 2007) 21; Committee on Official Information (NZ), Towards Open Government 2: Supplementary Report (Government Printer 1981).
40 Official Information Act 1982 (NZ) (‘OIA 1982 (NZ)’), s 4.
41 White (n 39) 22.
42 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 5.
43 See Ian Eagles, Michael Taggart and Grant Liddell, Freedom of Information in New Zealand (OUP 1992) ch 9.
44 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 9(2)(b).
48 See Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman  1 NZLR 385, 391.
49 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 6(a).
54 Peter Waller et al, ‘Understanding the Formulation and Development of Government Policy in the Context of FOI’ (Report for the Information Commissioner’s Office, The Constitution Unit (UCL) 2009) 112.
55 Marie Schroff, ‘The Official Information Act and Privacy: New Zealand’s Story’ (FOI Live Conference, London, United Kingdom, 16 June 2005) 13.
56 Rick Snell, ‘The Kiwi Paradox: A Comparison of Freedom of Information in Australia and New Zealand’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 575, 575.
57 Steven Price, ‘The Official Information Act 1982: A Window on Government or Curtains Drawn?’ (New Zealand Centre for Public Law 2005) 50.
58 Leo Donnelly, ‘Access to Policy Advice Held by Government Agencies Using FOI Legislation (What New Zealand has Learned from its 25 Years’ Experience)’ (5th International Conference of Information Commissioners, Wellington, New Zealand, 26-29 November 2007) 6 as cited in Waller et al (n 54) 111 [D.15].
59 White (n 39) 91-93, 298, 231.
60 Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC § 552 (‘FOIA (US)’).
61 Wendy Ginsberg, ‘The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Background, Legislation and Policy Issues’ (CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 23 January 2014) 2.
62 The US FOIA replaced the ‘Public Information’ section of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Subchapter II.
63 Ginsberg (n 61) 3.
65 This does not include requests made by a foreign government entity for intelligence records kept by agencies: see FOIA (US) § 552(a)(3)(e).
66 The requirements of the US FOIA apply only to an ‘agency’: 5 USC § 551.
67 FOIA (US) § 552(a)(3A).
68 Department of the Air Force v Rose, 425 US 352, 361 (1976). See also OPEN FOIA Act of 2009.
69 Other than the exemption pertaining to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law, which must be protected from disclosure: see FOIA (US) § 552(b)(3).
77 Ginsberg (n 61) 1.
78 Patrick Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2010) 466.
79 Ginsberg (n 61) 3.
80 John Ashcroft, ‘Memorandum for the Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies: The Freedom of Information Act’ (Department of Justice (US), 12 October 2001).
81 President Barack Obama, ‘Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Freedom of Information Act’ (74 Fed Reg 4683, The White House, 21 January 2009); Office of the Attorney General (US), ‘Attorney General Holder’s Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Freedom of Information Act’ (74 Fed Reg 51879, Office of the Attorney General (US), 8 October 2009); Department of Justice (US), OIP Guidance: President Obama’s FOIA Memorandum and Attorney General Holder’s FOIA Guidelines – Creating a New Era of Open Government (17 April 2009) accessed 29 September 2015; Office of Management and Budget (US), Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines 1987 (Guidelines, Fed Reg 52, Office of Management and Budget (US), 27 March 1987) 10,017.
82 The Open Government Partnership: Second Open Government National Action Plan for the United States of America (5 December 2013) accessed 29 September 2015.
83 Department of Justice (US), ‘About the Office’ .
84 Office of Government Information Services (US), ‘OGIS Policy Recommendations for Improving Freedom of Information Act Procedures’ (13 March 2013) accessed 29 September 2015.
85 Office of Government Information Services (US), ‘OGIS Recommendations to Improve the FOIA Process’ (June 2014) accessed 29 September 2015.
86 Savell, Gilmore, and Fooks (n 2) 3. See also Katherine Smith, Emily Savell and Anna Gilmore, ‘What is known about tobacco industry efforts to influence tobacco tax? A systematic review of empirical studies’ (2013) 22 Tobacco Control 144; Anne Landman and Stanton Glantz, ‘Tobacco Industry Efforts to Undermine Policy-Relevant Research’ (2009) 99 American Journal of Public Health 45, 54.
87 See, eg, Connor (n 2); Stella Aguinaga and Stanton Glantz, ‘The Use of Public Records Acts to Interfere with Tobacco Control’ (1995) 4 Tobacco Control 222, 225.
89 See Department of Health (UK), ‘Healthy Lives, Healthy People: A Tobacco Control Plan for England’ (Policy Document, 9 March 2011) accessed 29 September 2015.
90 Conway (n 16) 1.
91 Department of Health Tobacco Programme (UK), Consultation on Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products: Summary Report (Department of Health (UK) 2013) 8.
93 See Department of Health Tobacco Programme (UK), Consultation on the Introduction of Regulations for Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products: Summary Report (Department of Health (UK) 2015).
94 Department of Health (UK), ‘FOI Release – Correspondence about the Government’s Consultation on the Packaging of Tobacco Products’ (16 October 2012) accessed 29 September 2015.
95 Department of Health (UK), ‘FOI Release – Correspondence between DH, Other Government Departments and Organisations regarding Tobacco Control and Packaging of Tobacco Products in the 12 Months Preceding 25 October 2012’ (17 January 2013) accessed 29 September 2015.
96 Department of Health (UK), ‘Response to FOI Request’ (Letter DE00000734767, 21 November 2012).
97 Gurjit Degun, ‘Tobacco giant fails to overturn ban on ad criticising plain packaging evidence’ Campaign (London, 7 January 2015) accessed 29 September 2015.
98 Gerard Hastings, The Marketing Matrix: How the Corporation Gets Its Power–And How We Can Reclaim It (Routledge 2013) 139-43. See also Alexander Fowler and others, ‘The UK Freedom of Information Act (2000) in healthcare research: a systematic review’ (2013) 3 BMJ Open 1, 5.
99 See Kevin Dunion, Scottish Information Commissioner, ‘Philip Morris International and the University of Stirling’ (Decision 129/2011, Scottish Information Commissioner, 30 June 2011) (‘Decision 129/2011’); Kevin Dunion, Scottish Information Commissioner, ‘Philip Morris International and the University of Stirling’ (Decision 142/2011, Scottish Information Commissioner, 22 July 2011) (‘Decision 142/2011’). The Scottish Information Commissioner determined that the original information request was invalid because it was made by Clifford Chance LLP on behalf of PMI but did not name PMI, as required by section 8(1)(b) of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.
102 Decision 129/2011, ; Decision 142/2011, .
103 Decision 129/2011, ; Decision 142/2011, -.
104 Decision 129/2011, ; Decision 142/2011, .
107 Decision 129/2011, ; Decision 142/2011, .
108 Decision 129/2011, ; Decision 142/2011, .
109 Tobacco Tactics, ‘FOI: University of Bath’ accessed 29 September 2015.
110 Silvy Peeters and Anna Gilmore, ‘How online sales and promotion of snus contravenes current European Union legislation’ (2013) 22 Tobacco Control 266.
111 Tobacco Tactics (n 109).
112 George Thomson and Nick Wilson, ‘The Tobacco Industry in New Zealand: A Case Study of the Behaviour of Multinational Companies’ (Public Health Monograph Series No 6, Department of Public Health, Wellington School of Medical and Health Sciences, University of Otago, February 2002) 20.
113 Grace Wong, Ben Youdan and Ron Wong, ‘Misuse of the Official Information Act by the Tobacco Industry in New Zealand’ (2010) 19 Tobacco Control 346, 346.
116 Tariana Turia, ‘Moving Towards Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products’ (Media Release, 19 April 2012) accessed 29 September 2015; Cabinet Office (Wellington), ‘Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products’ (Cabinet Minute of Decision CAB Min 13(4/16), Office of the Associate Minister of Health (NZ), 27 November 2012) 1-2; New Zealand Ministry of Health, ‘Proposal to Introduce Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products in New Zealand’ (Consultation Document, New Zealand Ministry of Health, July 2012).
117 Tariana Turia, ‘Government Moves Forward with Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products’ (Media Release, 19 February 2013) accessed 29 September 2015. See Cabinet Office (Wellington) (n 116) .
118 Smoke-free Environments (Tobacco Plain Packaging) Amendment Bill 2013 (NZ). This Bill had its first reading on 11 February 2014.
119 Sam Sachdeva, ‘Tobacco Firms Use Stalling Strategy’ (Auckland, 13 January 2013) Stuff.co.nz accessed 29 September 2015.
120 Ibid. See n 236 and corresponding text.
123 Aguinaga and Glantz (n 87) 222.
124 Ibid 226-7. See also Stanton Glantz and Edith Balbach, Tobacco War: Inside the California Battles (University of California Press 2000) 177-80, where the authors refer to ‘[t]he tactic of using the freedom of information act as a form of harassment’: 179.
125 Myron Levin, ‘Legal Weapon’ Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, 21 April 1996) accessed 29 September 2015.
126 Anne Landman, ‘Push or be Punished: Tobacco Industry Documents Reveal Aggression against Businesses that Discourage Tobacco Use’ (2000) 9 Tobacco Control 339, 342.
128 Beatriz Carlini et al, ‘The Tobacco Industry’s Response to the COMMIT Trial: An Analysis of Legacy Tobacco Documents’ (2006) 121 Public Health Reports 501, 502.
130 Stella Aguinaga Bialous, Brion Fox and Stanton Glantz, ‘Tobacco Industry Allegations of “Illegal Lobbying” and State Tobacco Control’ (2001) 91 American Journal of Public Health 62, 62.
131 White and Bero (n 1) 241.
132 See letter from Mark Bender (Attorney) to Walter Young, Colorado Health Department, 16 March 1994.
133 Memorandum from Samuel D Chilcote Jr to the Members of the Executive Committee, 9 October 1991.
135 ‘Funding Needed to Pursue ASSIST’, Memorandum from Bob McAdam to Pat Donoho, 2 February 1995.
138 Aguinaga Bialous, Fox, and Glantz (n 130) 62.
142 Robert Kahn & Co, ‘“Freedom of Information Belongs to Everyone”: Local Tobacconist Asserts’ (Draft Press Release, 6 July 1995) 3.
143 Aguinaga Bialous, Fox, and Glantz (n 130) 64.
145 See ibid, 63-4. See also Memorandum from Robert Kahn to Linda Mapes, 16 October 1995.
146 White and Bero (n 1) 240.
149 Tobacco Institute, ‘1996 ASSIST Research Plan’, undated.
152 White and Bero (n 1) 240, 242, 244, 246; Aguinaga Bialous, Fox and Glantz (n 130) 63.
153 See Ministry of Justice (UK), ‘Government FOI Statistics’ accessed 29 September 2015.
154 Ministry of Justice (UK), ‘Freedom of Information Statistics: Implementation in Central Government: July—September 2014’ (Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of Justice (UK), 11 December 2014) 6.
155 Ministry of Justice (UK), ‘Freedom of Information Statistics: Implementation in Central Government: 2012 Annual and October—December 2012’ (Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of Justice (UK), 25 April 2013) 3.
157 Frontier Economics, Independent Review of the Impact of the Freedom of Information Act: A Report Prepared for the Department of Constitutional Affairs (October 2006) 2, 27.
158 Scottish Government, 2013 Annual Report: Information Request Handling (June 2014) 5, 9.
160 Dave Clemens, ‘Requests Made under the Official Information Act 1982: A Survey at the Agency Level’ (Masters Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2001) 27. See also Alastair Morrison, ‘The Games People Play: Journalism and the Official Information Act’ in Legal Research Foundation, The Official Information Act Seminar Papers: General Overview of Official Information and the Official Information Act (February 1997) 30.
161 Clemens (n 160) 33.
162 See Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Annual Report 2013/2014 (2014) 110-15.
163 Clemens (n 160) 33.
164 See Department of Justice (US), ‘FOI Data at a Glance: FY 2008 through FY 2013’ accessed 29 September 2015.
166 Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (n 78) 468-9.
169 See, eg, Ministry of Justice (UK), ‘Freedom of Information Statistics: Implementation in Central Government: 2013 Annual and October–December 2013’ (Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of Justice (UK), 24 April 2014).
170 See Frontier Economics (n 157). For criticism of the report see Anna Colquhoun, ‘The Cost of Freedom of Information’ (Report, Constitution Unit, UCL, December 2010) 3, citing Martin Rosenbaum’s BBC blog and the official Complaint from Guardian News & Media submitted to Campaign for Freedom of Information .
171 Frontier Economics (n 157) 1, 19, 37.
173 See Scottish Government, Corporate Analysis: Freedom of Information Costing Exercise 2012 (2012).
174 See Scottish Government, 2013 Annual Report (n 158) 16.
175 Clemens (n 160) 11. Clemens describes this ‘statistical void’ as ‘a fundamental oversight and lack of evaluative planning by government’: at 11.
176 Law Commission (NZ), The Public’s Right to Know: Review of the Official Information Legislation (Law Commission, June 2012) 203 [10.145].
177 Office of the Ombudsmen (NZ), Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year Ended 30 June 2005 (Office of the Ombudsmen (NZ), 2005) 45.
178 Department of Justice (US), Summary of Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal Year 2013 (2014) 20.
180 FOIA 2000 (UK), s 10(1).
181 Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (Scot) (‘FOISA 2002 (Scot)’), s 10(1).
182 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 15(1).
189 Office of Government Information Services (US), ‘Requester Best Practices: FOIA and Government Databases’ accessed 30 September 2015.
190 FOIA (US) § 552(a)(6)(B)(i).
194 Ministry of Justice (UK), ‘Freedom of Information Statistics: Implementation in Central Government: 2013 Annual and October – December 2013’ (n 169) 2, 10.
195 Scottish Information Commissioner, 2013/14 Annual Report: Taking FOI Forward (September 2014) 61.
196 Patrick Birkinshaw, ‘Regulating Information’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (7th edn, OUP 2011) 365, 391.
198 White (n 39) 91-93, 228.
199 See Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Annual Report 2013/2014 (n 162) 34.
200 Ibid 39; Nicky Hager, ‘A Researcher’s View of New Zealand’s Ofﬁcial Information Act’ (International Symposium on Freedom of Information and Privacy, Auckland, New Zealand, 28 March 2002) 2.
201 White (n 39) 142.
202 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 174 [10.8].
204 Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (n 78) 468.
205 See Department of Justice (US), ‘Glossary’ accessed 30 September 2015. A ‘pending’ request is a request in relation to which the agency ‘has not yet taken final action in all respects’. A ‘backlogged’ request is ‘pending beyond the statutory time period for a response’.
206 Ginsberg (n 61) 7.
208 Department of Justice (US), Summary of Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal Year 2012 (2013) 2-3.
209 Department of Justice (US), Summary of Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal Year 2012 (2013) 8.
210 Ginsberg (n 61) 7.
211 FOIA 2000 (UK), ss 50(1), 57.
213 Jonathan Brown, ‘Information Commissioner Says Ministers’ “Routine” Use of Veto Threatens to Undermine the Public’s Right to Know About Crucial Decisions’ The Independent (London, 3 September 2012) accessed 30 September 2015.
214 Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), Ministerial Veto on Disclosure of the Department of Health’s Transition Risk Register (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2012) [8.2].
215 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 253 [12.6].
217 OIA 1982 (NZ), ss 28(3), 3(A).
223 cf the UK Information Tribunal.
224 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 34.
225 FOIA (US) § 552(a)(6)(A).
227 Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation v US Department of the Interior, 88 F3d 1191, 1202.
228 Kissinger v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 US 136, 150 (1980).
229 See FOIA (US) § 552(a)(4)(B).
231 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 12(2).
232 Committee on Official Information (NZ), Towards Open Government 2: Supplementary Report (n 39) 69.
233 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 155 [9.23].
234 Law Commission (NZ), Review of the Official Information Act 1982 (Wellington, R40, October 1997) [E4].
235 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 152 [9.4]-[9.5].
236 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 18(f). See also s 18A(2); Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Part 2A – Administrative Reasons for Refusing Requests (Practice Guidelines) 9.
237 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 18A(1).
239 Price (n 57) 37; Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Administrative Reasons (n 236) 9-11.
240 See, eg, Price (n 57) 38; Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 158 [9.32]. See also Eagles, Taggart and Liddell (n 43) ch 9.
241 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 154 [9.16].
242 Ibid 153 [9.10]-[9.11], [9.13].
243 See Wong, Youdan, and Wong (n 113).
244 Robert Hazell, ‘Freedom of Information in Australia, Canada and New Zealand’ (1989) 67 Public Administration 189, 207.
245 See Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), Fees that May be Charged When the Cost of Compliance Does Not Exceed the Appropriate Limit (Guidance, 20 November 2013).
246 Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limits and Fees) Regulations 2004 (UK) (‘UK Fees Regulations 2004’) reg 6(2). See also Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), Fees that May be Charged (n 245) 3-4.
247 Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), Fees that May be Charged (n 245) 3.
249 See ibid; FOIA 2000 (UK), s 12(1).
250 FOIA 2000 (UK), s 13(1).
251 UK Fees Regulations 2004, reg 7. See also Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), Fees that May be Charged (n 245) 3.
252 See Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), ‘Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) Decision Notice’ (Decision Notice FS50403403, 31 January 2012) (‘ICO Decision Notice’). The complainant is not identified in the decision notice.
253 See FOIA 2000 (UK), s 35(1)(a).
254 ICO Decision Notice (n 252) .
258 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 15(1A), (2).
260 Ministry of Justice (NZ), Charging Guidelines for Official Information Act 1982 Requests (Guidelines, Ministry of Justice (NZ), 18 March 2002).
263 Ibid 5 [7.1]. See also 5−6 [7.2].
264 See Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Annual Report 2013/2014 (n 162) 111.
265 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 202 [10.139]. See also 204 [10.151]-[10.152].
266 Ibid 163 [9.58], 202 [10.142]. See also 205 [10.159]-[10.160]; White (n 39) 227.
267 FOIA (US) § 552(a)(4)(A)(i). For a detailed discussion of fees and fee waivers under the US FOIA, see Department of Justice (US), Guide to the Freedom of Information Act – Fees and Fee Waivers (2014) (‘Guide – Fees’).
268 See FOIA (US) § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I)-(III).
269 See ibid § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I); see also Office of Management and Budget (US), Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines 1987 (Guidelines, Fed Reg 52, Office of Management and Budget (US), 27 March 1987) 10,017 (‘US Fee Guidelines’); Department of Justice (US), Guide – Fees (n 267) 108-110.
270 See FOIA (US) § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II).
271 See ibid § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III).
272 The OPEN Government Act of 2007 amended the US FOIA to create the OGIS, essentially an FOIA Ombudsman: Office of Government Information Services (US), ‘The Office of Government Information Services’ accessed 30 September 2015.
273 FOIA (US) § 552(a)(4)(b).
274 See ibid § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(I)-(II).
275 See ibid § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(I); see also US Fee Guidelines (n 269) 10,012, 10,018.
276 See FOIA (US) § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(II); US Fee Guidelines (n 269) 10,018-19.
277 See Hall v Central Intelligence Agency, (DDC 2006 WL 197462, No Civ A 04-00814, 25 January 2006) 3, n 4, where the court recognised that it would be improper for agencies to inflate fees to discourage requests.
278 FOIA (US) § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii), (iv)-(vi), (viii).
279 See Department of Justice (US), Guide – Fees (n 267) 122-137.
280 OPEN Government Act of 2007 (US), Public Law No 110-175, § 3, §6, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
281 Department of Justice (US), Summary of Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal Year 2013 (2014) 20.
282 FOIAonline is an online portal that enables the public to lodge FOIA requests electronically and track the progress of their requests, and allows agencies to provide records to the requester (and to the general public).
283 Office of Government Information Services (US), ‘OGIS Policy Recommendations’ (n 84) 2. See also Office of Government Information Services (US), ‘OGIS Recommendations to Improve the FOI Process’ (June 2014) accessed 30 September 2015.
284 FOIA 2000 (UK), s 14(1), (2). See also FOISA 2002 (Scot), s 14.
285 Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), Dealing with Vexatious Requests (Section 14) (Guidance, 14 May 2013) 4 (emphasis in original). See also Information Commissioner v Devon County Council & Dransfield  UKUT 440 (AAC) (28 January 2013) .
286 Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), Dealing with Vexatious Requests (n 285) 3, 5 . See also Scottish Information Commissioner, Vexatious or Repeated Requests (Briefing, 2013) 2 accessed 30 September 2015.
287 Information Commissioner v Devon County Council & Dransfield  UKUT 440 (AAC) (28 January 2013) .
288 Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), Dealing with Vexatious Requests (n 285) 6 .
289 Frontier Economics (n 157) 31.
291 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 18(h).
292 Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Administrative Reasons (n 236) 12.
293 See Young v Holloway  P 87; Norman v Matthews [1916 – 1917] All ER 696. See also Re Vernazza  1 All ER 183; Riches v DPP  2 All ER 935; Attorney-General v Hill (1993) 7 PRNZ 20, cited in Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Administrative Reasons (n 236) 12.
294 Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Administrative Reasons (n 236) 12.
298 Ombudsmen Act 1975 (NZ), s 17(2).
299 See Office of the Ombudsman (NZ), Annual Report 2013/2014 (n 162) 113.
300 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 165 [9.66], [9.68].
301 Ibid 165 [9.67]. See also Scottish Information Commissioner, Vexatious or Repeated Requests (n 286).
302 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 166 R43.
303 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 89K; Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 166 [9.72]-[9.73].
304 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 167 R46.
306 In re Powell, 851 F2d 427, 434 (DC Cir 1988); cf Zemansky v EPA, 767 F 2d 569, 573-74 (9th Cir 1995) (cited in Department of Justice (US), Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act – Litigation Considerations (Discussion Paper, 2014) 824).
307 Department of Justice (US), Guide – Litigation (n 306) 824-5, citing numerous case examples in n 358. See, eg, Goldgar v Office of Administration, 26 F 3d 32, 35-36 & n 3 (5th Cir 1994); Peck v Merletti, 64 F Supp 2d 599, 603 (ED Va 1999); Crooker v US Marshals Service, 641 F Supp 1141, 1143 (DDC 1986).
308 (2d Cir 2011 WL 3890446, No 09-4684, 6 September 2011).
309 Robert v Department of Justice (EDNY 2005 WL 3371480, No 052543, 12 December 2005) 12-15.
310 Robert v Department of Justice, No 09-4684, 2011 WL 3890446 (2d Cir 6 September 2011).
311 See, eg, Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell, ‘Time to Quit? Assessing International Investment Claims Against Plain Tobacco Packaging in Australia” (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 515; Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell, ‘Face Off: Assessing WTO Challenges to Australia’s Scheme for Plain Tobacco Packaging’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 218.
312 OIA 1982 (NZ), s 18(f).
313 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 202 [10.141]. See also Robert Hazell, Ben Worthy and Mark Glover, The Impact of the Freedom of Information Act on Central Government in the UK: Does FOI Work? (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 264.
314 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 167 [9.76]. See also Law Commission (NZ), Review of the Official Information Act 1982 (n 234) .
315 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 167 [9.77].
317 Robert Hazell and Ben Worthy, ‘Assessing the Performance of Freedom of Information” (2010) 27 Government Information Quarterly 352, 353.
318 Birkinshaw, ‘Regulating Information’ (n 196) 387.
319 Law Commission (NZ), Public’s Right to Know (n 176) 154 [9.17].
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