Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83293:57289&catid=1585&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:13:06+00:00

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MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, EDUARDO U. MANESE AND NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, Petitioners, v. HENRY M. SIMBAJON, Respondent.
We resolve in this petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the June 8, 2012 decision2 and the September 11, 2012 resolution3 (assailed CA rulings) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118610. These assailed CA rulings annulled and set aside the August 31, 2010 decision4 and the December 30, 2010 resolution5 (NLRC rulings) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR LAC No. 10-000244-07 (NLRC NCR Case (M) 05-08-01988-00). The NLRC rulings in turn reversed and set aside the July 9, 2007 decision6 of the labor arbiter (LA).
On October 4, 2004, Simbajon again consulted the company-designated doctor and his illness was found to be asymptomatic. Nonetheless, the attending physician advised him to continue with his medication.
Simbajon also claimed entitlement to a Grade I (120%) impediment rating28 notwithstanding the Grade VI (50%) rating given to his disability by Dr. Vicaldo. Citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,29 he argued that his inability to work as a result of his illness lasted for more than 120 days.
The CA reversed the NLRC’s ruling and granted Simbajon’s petition for certiorari.35 For an illness or injury to be compensable, it is enough that reasonable proof of work-connection and not direct causal relation be proven by the claimant.36 This was what Simbajon did.
Notwithstanding the findings of the company-designated physician that Simbajon was already “fit to work,” the CA ruled that Simbajon must still be declared to have permanent and total disability. He was not able to perform his customary work for more than 120 days.
The CA subsequently denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, prompting them to come to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45.
We therefore contend with the following principal question: did the CA correctly rule that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that Simbajon is not entitled to disability benefits?
An examination of the surrounding facts and circumstances regarding Simbajon’s sickness will show that the third condition from the above enumeration is absent in this case.
Simbajon started exhibiting the symptoms of DM Type II barely six days after embarkation. If his disease had been acquired because of his exposure to different kinds of work-related stress, it is very unusual that it developed in a very short span of time.
He claimed in his comment that as a seafarer, he had already finished three previous contracts with NCL. In effect, he argues that his exposure to the work-related risks had been long enough to trigger his DM Type II. Unfortunately, Simbajon failed to state the respective dates and durations of his three previous employment contracts with NCL. The absence of this evidence leaves the Court at a loss for supporting data on when he started working for NCL or if there had been long intervals in between his previous contracts to break their continuity. The records do not even disclose how long the interim period was in between his last and most present contract with NCL. To our mind, there is always the possibility that he acquired his disease at some other time when he was not on board and working in any of NCL’s vessels.
Thus, Simbajon cannot rely on his PEME results alone to support his claim that his disease only developed after embarkation. This is particularly true since several points during his treatment, his DM Type II was found to be asymptomatic, i.e, as symptomless or presenting no subjective evidence of disease.60 Thus, it is probable that Simbajon’s disease was already pre-existing even before he boarded NCL’s vessel; his diabetes was not detected because it was asymptomatic.
For failure to prove that his disease was contracted within his six days of service because of factors necessary to contract it, we cannot support Simbajon’s assertion that his DM Type II was a work-related disease that should merit compensation from the petitioners.
We now resolve the issue of the conflicting findings of the petitioners’ designated physicians and Simbajon’s own physician. The company-designated physicians have declared Simbajon as “fit to work” after 172 days of treatment from his disembarkation on August 15, 2004. On the other hand, Simbajon’s chosen physician, Dr. Vicaldo, came out with the findings that Simbajon’s illness had rendered him “unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity,” with a Grade VI (50%) disability rating.
Similarly, we note that Simbajon was the only one who knew of the conflicting results between Dr. Vicaldo’s findings with that of the petitioners’ designated physicians. The petitioners had no reason to consider a third doctor because they were not aware that Simbajon secured a separate independent opinion regarding his disability. Thus, the obligation to comply with the requirement of securing the opinion of a neutral, third-party physician rested on Simbajon’s shoulders. By failing to observe the required procedure under the POEA-SEC, he clearly violated its terms, i.e., the law between the parties. And without a binding third-party opinion, the fit-to-work certification of petitioners’ designated physicians prevails over that of Dr. Vicaldo’s unfit-to-return-to-work finding.
Lastly, we have observed that Dr. Vicaldo only examined Simbajon once. We take this is in comparison with the series of tests and treatments made by Magsaysay’s designated physicians to Simbajon. Between the two, the latter’s medical opinion deserves more credence for being more thorough and exhaustive.
We now resolve Simbajon’s claim that his inability to resume his usual work as a cook for a period exceeding 120 days, automatically entitles him to permanent and total disability benefits based on a Grade I (120%) impediment rating.
Simbajon bases his claim in our ruling in Crystal Shipping, where we characterized permanent disability as the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.66 On the other hand, the petitioners claim that the reckoning period for a declaration of permanent and total disability should not be 120 but rather 240 days.67 In short, the petitioners claim that Crystal Shipping is no longer the governing case law for the fact situation of this case.
Under this ruling,69 a finding by the company-designated doctor that the seafarer needs further treatment beyond the initial 120-day period results in the extension of the period for the declaration of the existence of a permanent partial or total disability to 240 days. Thus, contrary to Simbajon’s claim, his inability to resume work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered his illness does not by itself automatically entitle him to permanent and total disability benefits.
In the present case, Simbajon’s several consultations with the company-designated doctors revealed that his DM Type II was asymptomatic. Because of this finding, the company-designated doctors had to conduct further treatments and prescribe his continuous medication before finally concluding that he was fit to return to work on February 2, 2005, or 172 days from his disembarkation. The period is 68 days short of the 240 days provided in Vergara. Within this period, the company can continue to treat the employee or conduct an observation period (while continuing to pay his total temporary disability pay), before the Vergara deadline is reached.
the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said periods.
Thus, even assuming that Simbajon’s illness is work-related, he is still not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because his situation does not fall in any of the foregoing circumstances.
In his motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, Simbajon raised the issue that petitioners failed to rehire him despite the declaration of Magsaysay’s designated physician that he is already “fit to resume work”.
Simbajon’s POEA-SEC shows that the period of his employment with NCL is for ten months.71 His contract effectively started on July 21, 2004 – the date he boarded NCL’s vessel. Thus, his contract should have only ended on May 17, 2005 or 300 days from his embarkation.
Simbajon was subsequently declared fit to resume work on February 2, 2005. Hence, he should have been taken back by petitioners since he still had 104 days left before his contract’s expiration. But as alleged by Simbajon, he was not hired again. He contended that his non-rehiring shows that his disability was really permanent and total.72 We find this contention untenable.
We can only surmise petitioners’ reasons for not reemploying Simbajon despite the effectivity of his contract. However, we cannot accept his argument that his non-rehiring translates to the permanent and total character of his disability.
For one, we have already determined that his DM Type II was not a work-related disease for failure to comply with the POEA-SEC’s requisites for compensability. Not being work-related, it cannot be the basis of any disability claims. The findings of Simbajon’s chosen physician cannot also be considered due to the absence of the medical opinion of a third independent physician.
We further note that this argument was only raised in Simbajon’s motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. This was never reiterated in his pleadings with the CA and in his comment to the present petition.
At the very least, Simbajon could have used his non-rehiring to support the argument that his contract was prematurely terminated by petitioners. He was declared fit to work but he was not reaccepted in his former or a similar position despite the remaining 104 days in his contract.
But Simbajon never made an issue out of this. Even at the level of the labor tribunals, his pleadings focused solely on the classification of his disability as permanent and total. Premature contract termination and entitlement to permanent and total disability benefits are two different labor issues. One is based on the untimely termination of the contract without any just or valid cause, while the other is on the compensation that the law aims to give to seafarers who are rendered unable to resume sea service due to work-related disease.
Thus, we cannot rule that Simbajon’s contract had been pre-terminated without any just or valid cause, and hold him entitled to payment of his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract.73 Otherwise we would be violating petitioners’ due process rights. Petitioners never controverted such claim precisely because Simbajon never raised it as an issue. Moreover, the CA and the labor tribunals’ rulings never touched on this. Hence, it is beyond the ambit of our review.
In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
The above amendment finally clarifies the basis for the declaration of a temporary or permanent disability of a seafarer. For work-related illnesses acquired by seafarers from the time the 2010 amendment to the POEA-SEC took effect, the declaration of disability should no longer be based on the number of days the seafarer was treated or paid his sickness allowance, but rather on the disability grading he received, whether from the company-designated physician or from the third independent physician, if the medical findings of the physician chosen by the seafarer conflicts with that of the company-designated doctor.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Court of Appeals’ decision dated June 8, 2012 and resolution dated September 11, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 118610. We thus, REINSTATE the decision dated August 31, 2010 and the resolution dated December 30, 2010 of the National Labor Relations Commission. No costs.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Ricardo R. Rosario; Id. at 32-45.
4 Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, and concurred in by Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco; Id. at 269-275.
6 Penned by Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandog; Id. at 197-203.
11Temporary Rollo, Comment on the Petition, p. 2.
18 TemporaryRollo, Comment on the Petition, p. 4.
24 G.R. No. L-56191, 226 Phil. 33 (1986).
25 G.R. No. L-69572, July 28, 1986, 143 SCRA 151.
29 G.R. No. 154798, 510 Phil. 332 (2005).
43Temporary Rollo, Comment on the Petition, p. 1-52.
50Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., v. Serna, G.R. No. 172086, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 676, 683.
52 Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Escaño, Jr., G.R. No. 190994, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 306, 314.
53Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334, 343; emphasis ours; italics supplied.
54Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tanawan, G.R. No. 160444, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 255, 265.
55Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 172933, 588 Phil. 895, 908-909 (2008).
57 Section 32-A, DOLE Department Order No. 4, series of 2000, Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels.
58 G.R. No. 179177, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 668.
60 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, 1993, p. 136.
61 G.R. No. 194362, June 26, 2013, 700 SCRA 53, 65.
63 See Magsaysay Maritime Corp. and/or Dela Cruz, et al., v. Velasquez, et al., G.R. No. 179802, 591 Phil. 839 (2008); Musnit v. Sea Star Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 182623, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 743; Francisco v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 190545, November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA 660; Jebsens Maritime, Inc., v. Undag, G.R. No. 191491, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 670; Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 194758, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 587; and Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc., v. Nazal, G.R. No. 177103, June 3, 2013, 697 SCRA 51.
64 Supra note 61, at 65-66; emphasis ours.
66Supra note 29, at 340.
68Supra note 55, at 912; citations omitted; emphasis ours; italics supplied.
70 G.R. No. 193679, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 296, 315.
73Skippers United Pacific, Inc., v. Doza, et al., G.R. No. 175558, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 412.
74 Section 20-A (6), POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of 2010, Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, October 26, 2010.

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