Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/16/16massappct998.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 16:15:47+00:00

Document:
CUSTODY OF A MINOR (No. 3).
James M. Delaney for the parents.
Peter M. Gately for Department of Social Services.
Mary K. Ryan for the minor.
his daughter, Delia, then three and a half months old, as he felt he could not safely leave her at home with the mother, Caroline. Having served as baby-sitters with Delia while Thomas was attended to, and observed the situation of father and child, hospital personnel admitted Delia for custodial care; and on April 26 a representative of the hospital filed a "care and protection" petition in Boston Juvenile Court. Upon preliminary hearing on May 2, legal custody, pending investigation, was granted to the Department of Public Welfare; [Note 2] physical custody of the child was left with the parents, who were to receive public assistance in caring for her (visiting nurse, homemaker, social worker). The court-ordered investigative report, G. L. c. 119, Section 24, was submitted on the return date, June 28, and the court thereupon granted permanent custody to the department. G. L. c. 119, Section 26. The child was placed in a foster home where she remained for some six months, and in January, 1979, she was transferred to a "legal risk" adoptive home. [Note 3] She has lived there to date.
From the judgment of the Superior Court the parents filed a timely notice of appeal to this court, but their long delay in docketing the appeal (following lengthy delay in filing the transcript) resulted in an order of the Superior Court dated December 23, 1982, dismissing their appeal for "inexcusable neglect." See Mass.R.A.P. 10(c), as amended, 367 Mass. 919 (1975). At bar is an appeal from that order, and, if it should succeed, an appeal from the custody judgment, the two appeals having been finally docketed on March 10, 1983.
dismissing it in order that so vital a matter for parents and child shall not fail of a review here on the merits. See Mass.R.A.P. 3(a), as amended, 378 Mass. 927 (1979); Tammaro v. Colarusso, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 44 , 48-49 (1980).
2. Regarding the merits, the judge of the Superior Court had before him the full investigative report submitted to the Boston Juvenile Court, the further investigative report he had ordered, and the statements of experts evaluating the physical and emotional condition of the child. Authors of these studies testified in person. There was testimony from the professionals -- social workers and nurse -- who were active in the case from the beginning through the period of the child's placement in the legal risk home. The first foster mother was also called. In addition, hospital records were received comprising the medical and psychiatric histories of the parents over a period of years. On the part of the parents, counsel cross-examined Commonwealth witnesses but did not affirmatively offer professional or expert evidence except for testimony by a pediatrician who had early treated the child. Thomas testified, as did a neighbor.
child to her natural parents and the prognosis for her was unfavorable if such a course was taken.
"[T]he critical question is whether the natural parents are currently fit to further the welfare and best interests of the child." Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563 , 576 (1980). The record herein provides "clear and convincing" evidence in the negative about the several factors that are tributary to a conclusion, see Petition of the Dept. of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass. 573 , 587-592 (1981); Custody of a Minor, 383 Mass. 595 , 601 (1981), and so the judge held. [Note 9] We note further: First, "care and protection" may serve a preventive as well as a remedial purpose, see Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 378 Mass. 712 , 720 (1979); Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 876 , 882-883 (1979), thus it is no novelty for the Commonwealth to assert its interest and concern when the child at risk is very young. See Custody of a Minor (No. 2), supra at 713; Petition of the Dept. of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 901 (1982). Second, besides weighing the capacities of mother and father as individuals, the court is to try to envisage how they interact to constitute a unitary household for the care of the child. See Bezio v. Patenaude, supra at 574; Wilkins v. Wilkins, 324 Mass. 261 , 264 (1949).
We have to add that the judge's findings could have been improved by more detail and a more calculated sequence or arrangement. See Custody of a Minor (No. 2), supra at 722. The record, however, is so strong and so lacking in substantial contradiction as to the essential issues that the formal weaknesses in the findings can be safely overlooked. Cf. Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234 , 236-238 (1980); Commonwealth v. Myers, ante 554, 555 (1983); New Palm Gardens, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commn., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 785 , 794-795 (1981). Our ruling in the present case, we hasten to say, is not intended to signal a relaxation of the standards established for demonstrative findings in child custody cases; on the contrary, we reemphasize their importance.
involved which it is the aim of the statute to protect against unconsented to disclosure. Anyway, this witness's testimony added nothing of consequence to the testimony of the three other social workers, who testified without objection. We need not decide whether the evidence in question fell within the exception of Section 135(b) for "communication[s]" regarding "commission . . . a harmful act." See Petition of the Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 903. See generally Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424 (1982).
(c) The foster parents at the legal risk home were allowed to file an appearance by leave of court but took minimal part in the proceedings; they were not allowed to introduce evidence or object to its admission or examine witnesses. There was no error in permitting such participation. See Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 13 Mass. App. Ct. 290 , 302-303, vacated on other grounds, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1088 (1982); Care & Protection of Two Minors, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 867 , 869 (1981).
(d) At the time the care and protection proceeding was begun in Boston Juvenile Court, the child was physically present in a hospital in Boston, within the territorial purview of that court. That presence, we think, was enough to vest "jurisdiction" in the court in the sense in which the term is used in G. L. c. 119, Section 24, as appearing in St. 1972, c. 731, Section 8, although the parents then resided in Watertown, Middlesex County. Cf. Murphy v. Murphy, 380 Mass. 454 , 458 (1980). It follows that there was "jurisdiction" for the appeal by trial de novo in the Superior Court, Suffolk County. See G. L. c. 119, Section 27, as amended by St. 1973, c. 1005.
Objections to the jurisdiction of both courts, taken at the trial, were rightly overruled.
(e) An attack, largely adjectival, was launched by the parents on the constitutionality of G. L. c. 119. It is enough to refer to Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 378 Mass. at 716-719, dealing with the validity of Sections 24 and 26.
[Note 1] Names of parents and child are fictitious.
[Note 2] Later renamed Department of Social Services. See St. 1978, c. 552.
[Note 3] So called because the arrangement looks forward to adoption by these foster parents, but adoption at that point is not legally assured.
[Note 4] Appeals now go direct to the Appeals Court. G. L. c. 119, Section 27, as appearing in St. 1981, c. 715, Section 1.
[Note 5] The Commonwealth was opposed by the parents. The child also appeared, separately represented by appointed counsel. Counsel, after independent inquiry, sided with the Commonwealth in supporting the custody judgment appealed from.
[Note 6] A proceeding for dispensing with parental consent to adoption had been commenced by petition in Probate Court and was tried in May and August, 1980, but it was dismissed in September, 1982, as care and protection was still being contested. See Adoption of a Minor, 386 Mass. 741 , 748-749 (1982).
[Note 7] Thus a foot patrolman in Watertown, where the parents resided, testified that he saw Thomas drunk on the streets on some ten to twelve occasions in the period July-September 1980; he had once to be taken into "protective custody."
[Note 8] During the time the parents had physical custody of Delia, a cousin of Thomas filed an "abuse or neglect" report under G. L. c. 119, Section 51A. She referred to Thomas's drinking.
[Note 9] The judge below anticipated the decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-770 (1982), which requires proof at the "clear and convincing" level before care of a child is withdrawn from the biological parents. Cf. Petition of the Dept. of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 916 , 917 (1983); Petition of the Dept. of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 975 (1983).
[Note 10] The 1981 amendment added clauses (d) and (e) to Section 135, tending to align Section 135 with G. L. c. 233, Section 20B, including provision for hearing in chambers (see infra).

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