Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82576:56452&catid=1577&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:52:37+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013 - WILGEN LOON, JERRY ARCILLA, ALBERT PEREYE, ARNOLD PEREYE, EDGARDO OBOSE, ARNEL MALARAS, PATROCINO TOETIN, EVELYN LEONARDO, ELMER GLOCENDA, RUFO CUNAMAY, ROLANDO SAJOL, ROLANDO ABUCAYON, JENNIFER NATIVIDAD, MARITESS TORION, ARMANDO LONZAGA, RIZAL GELLIDO, EVIRDE HAQUE,1 MYRNA VINAS, RODELITO AYALA, WINELITO OJEL, RENATO RODREGO, NENA ABINA, EMALYN OLIVEROS, LOUIE ILAGAN, JOEL ENTIG, ARNEL ARANETA, BENJAMIN COSE, WELITO LOON AND WILLIAM ALIPAO, Petitioners, v. POWER MASTER, INC., TRI-C GENERAL SERVICES, AND SPOUSES HOMER AND CARINA ALUMISIN, Respondents.
WILGEN LOON, JERRY ARCILLA, ALBERT PEREYE, ARNOLD PEREYE, EDGARDO OBOSE, ARNEL MALARAS, PATROCINO TOETIN, EVELYN LEONARDO, ELMER GLOCENDA, RUFO CUNAMAY, ROLANDO SAJOL, ROLANDO ABUCAYON, JENNIFER NATIVIDAD, MARITESS TORION, ARMANDO LONZAGA, RIZAL GELLIDO, EVIRDE HAQUE,1 MYRNA VINAS, RODELITO AYALA, WINELITO OJEL, RENATO RODREGO, NENA ABINA, EMALYN OLIVEROS, LOUIE ILAGAN, JOEL ENTIG, ARNEL ARANETA, BENJAMIN COSE, WELITO LOON AND WILLIAM ALIPAO, Petitioners, v. POWER MASTER, INC., TRI-C GENERAL SERVICES, AND SPOUSES HOMER AND CARINA ALUMISIN, Respondents.
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,2 filed by petitioners Wilgen Loon, Jerry Arcilla, Albert Pereye, Arnold Pereye, Edgardo Obose, Arnel Malaras, Patrocino Toetin, Evelyn Leonardo, Elmer Glocenda, Rufo Cunamay, Rolando Sajol, Rolando Abucayon, Jennifer Natividad, Maritess Torion, Armando Lonzaga, Rizal Gellido, Evirde Haque, Myrna Vinas, Rodelito Ayala, Winelito Ojel, Renato Rodrego, Nena Abina, Emalyn Oliveros, Louie Ilagan, Joel Entig, Arnel Araneta, Benjamin Cose, Welito Loon, William Alipao (collectively, the petitioners), to challenge the June 5, 2009 decision3 and the August 28, 2009 resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 95182.
Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the respondents). The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents’ behalf.5The respondents’ counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July 5, 2001.6However, the respondents neither filed any position paper nor proffered pieces of evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of the pendency of the case.
However, the LA denied the petitioners’ claims for backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium pays. The LA observed that the petitioners failed to show that they rendered overtime work and worked on holidays and rest days without compensation. The LA further concluded that the petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from employment because they did not show any notice of termination of employment. They were also not barred from entering the respondents’ premises.
Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioners disputed the LA’s denial of their claim for backwages, overtime, holiday and premium pays. Meanwhile, the respondents questioned the LA’s ruling on the ground that the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
On January 3, 2003, the respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards.11They also attached documentary evidence showing that the petitioners were dismissed for cause and had been accorded due process.
On January 22, 2003, the petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion12 where they asked for the deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered from infirmities. First, the supplemental appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of appeal with memorandum on appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the respondents’ filing of a responsive pleading until December 18, 2002.13Third¸ the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged signatures.
They reiterated these allegations in an Urgent Motion to Resolve Manifestation and Motion (To Expunge from the Records Respondents’ Supplemental Appeal, Reply and/or Rejoinder) dated January 31, 2003.14 Subsequently, the petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation with Reiterating Motion to Strike-Off the Record Supplemental Appeal/Reply, Quitclaims and Spurious Documents Attached to Respondents’ Appeal dated August 7, 2003.15 The petitioners argued in this last motion that the payrolls should not be given probative value because they were the respondents’ fabrications. They reiterated that the genuine payrolls bore their signatures, unlike the respondents’ photocopies of the payrolls. They also maintained that their signatures in the respondents’ documents (which showed their receipt of thirteenth month pay) had been forged.
In a resolution dated November 27, 2003, the NLRC partially ruled in favor of the respondents.16 The NLRC affirmed the LA’s awards of holiday pay and attorney’s fees. It also maintained that the LA acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents through their voluntary appearance.
However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal on the ground that they had been deprived of due process. It found that the respondents did not actually receive the LA’s processes. It also admitted the respondents’ unverified supplemental appeal on the ground that technicalities may be disregarded to serve the greater interest of substantial due process. Furthermore, the Rules of Court do not require the verification of a supplemental pleading.
The NLRC also vacated the LA’s awards of salary differential, thirteenth month and service incentive leave pays. In so ruling, it gave weight to the pieces of evidence attached to the memorandum on appeal and the supplemental appeal. It maintained that the absence of the petitioners’ signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their authenticity. It pointed out that the payment of money claims was further evidenced by the list of employees with ATM cards. It also found that the petitioners’ signatures were not forged. It took judicial notice that many people use at least two or more different signatures.
The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners were lawfully dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct and willful disobedience. It found that the petitioners failed to comply with various memoranda directing them to transfer to other workplaces and to attend training seminars for the intended reorganization and reshuffling.
The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling. The CA held that the petitioners were afforded substantive and procedural due process. Accordingly, the petitioners deliberately did not explain their side. Instead, they continuously resisted their transfer to other PLDT offices and violated company rules and regulations. It also upheld the NLRC’s findings on the petitioners’ monetary claims.
5) Whether the petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees.
In the present case, the respondents filed a surety bond issued by Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (Security Pacific) on June 28, 2002. At that time, Security Pacific was still an accredited bonding company. However, the NLRC revoked its accreditation on February 16, 2003.24 Nonetheless, this subsequent revocation should not prejudice the respondents who relied on its then subsisting accreditation in good faith. In Del Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc.,25 we ruled that a bonding company’s revocation of authority is prospective in application.
The CA also correctly ruled that the NLRC properly gave due course to the respondents’ supplemental appeal. Neither the laws nor the rules require the verification of the supplemental appeal.26 Furthermore, verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. It is mainly intended for the assurance that the matters alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not of mere speculation.27 Also, a supplemental appeal is merely an addendum to the verified memorandum on appeal that was earlier filed in the present case; hence, the requirement for verification has substantially been complied with.
The respondents also timely filed their supplemental appeal on January 3, 2003. The records of the case show that the petitioners themselves agreed that the pleading shall be filed until December 18, 2002. The NLRC further extended the filing of the supplemental pleading until January 3, 2003 upon the respondents’ motion for extension.
Guided by these principles, the CA grossly erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily admitting and giving weight to the respondents’ pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal.
It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRC’s proposition that “[i]t is of common knowledge that there are many people who use at least two or more different signatures.”37 The NLRC cannot take judicial notice that many people use at least two signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners themselves disown the signatures in the respondents’ assailed documentary evidence.38 The NLRC’s position is unwarranted and is patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.
Based on the above considerations, we reverse the NLRC and the CA’s finding that the petitioners were terminated for just cause and were afforded procedural due process. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee from his employment rests upon the employer. The employer’s failure to discharge this burden results in the finding that the dismissal is unjustified.40 This is exactly what happened in the present case.
However, the CA was correct in its finding that the petitioners failed to provide sufficient factual basis for the award of overtime, and premium pays for holidays and rest days. The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for holidays and rest days rests on the employee because these are not incurred in the normal course of business.43 In the present case, the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence that would show that they actually rendered service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day, and that they in fact worked on holidays and rest days.
As a final note, we observe that Rodelito Ayala, Winelito Ojel, Renato Rodrego and Welito Loon are also named as petitioners in this case. However, we deny their petition for the reason that they were not part of the proceedings before the CA. Their failure to timely seek redress before the CA precludes this Court from awarding them monetary claims.
All told, we find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting and giving probative value to the respondents’ evidence on appeal, which errors the CA replicated when it upheld the NLRC rulings.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen,*JJ., concur.
1 Evirdly Haque in the Court of Appeals’ decision; rollo, p. 55.
* Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose P. Perez per Special Order No. 1627 dated December 6, 2013.
2Rollo, pp. 18-54; dated October 23, 2009 and filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3 Id. at 55-65; penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Japar B. Dimaampao.
In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages, attorney’s fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
9 Id. at 781-879; the payroll sheets cover the periods from November 1, 1998 to December 30, 1998; from November 1, 1999 to December 30, 1999; and from November 1, 2000 to February 28, 2001.
11 Id. at 880-985; the payroll sheets cover the periods from November 1, 2000 to December 30, 2000, and from January 1, 2001 to February 15, 2001.
15 CA rollo, pp. 249-254.
16Rollo, pp. 148-180. Penned by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Ernesto C. Verceles.
22Oca v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 696, 702 (2002).
23Catubay v. National Labor Relations Commission, 386 Phil. 648, 657 (2000); and Borja Estate v. Spouses Ballad, 498 Phil. 694, 706 (2005).
24 Per Certification dated August 22, 2013 of Mr. James D.V. Navarrete, OCA Assistant Chief of Office, Legal Office.
25 G.R. No. 181516, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 515, 522-523.
26 NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule 1, Section 3, in relation to RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Section 4.
27Roy Pasos v. Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394, July 3, 2013; and Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 184362, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 708, 713-714, citing Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 157966, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 344, 356-357.
28Casimiro v. Stern Real Estate Inc., 519 Phil. 438, 454-455 (2006); and Iran vs. NLRC, 352 Phil. 264-265, 273-274 (1998).
29Iran v. NLRC, supra, at 274.
30Tanjuan v. Phil. Postal Savings Bank, Inc., 457 Phil. 993, 1004-1005 (2003).
31Favila v. National Labor Relations Commission, 367 Phil. 584, 593 (1999).
34 NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule 3, Sections 4 and 6(e).
35Nicario v. NLRC, 356 Phil. 936, 941 (1998).
36 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(e).
38 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Section 2.
39The Coca-Cola Export Corporation. v. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 377, 400-401, citations omitted.
40Eastern Overseas Employment Center, Inc. v. Bea, 512 Phil. 749, 759 (2005).
41Pigcaulan v. Security and Credit Investigation, Inc., G.R. No. 173648, January 16, 2012, 663 SCRA 1, 14-15; and Building Care Corp. v. NLRC, 335 Phil. 1131, 1139 (1997).
42Villar v. NLRC, 387 Phil. 706, 716 (2000).
43Lagatic v. NLRC, 349 Phil. 172, 185-186 (1998).
44 LABOR CODE, Article 111.

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