Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/1994/1471crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:07:13+00:00

Document:
DeLucia v. Robert Modena d/b/a Robert’s Coiffures et al.
The claimant appeared pro se at the trial level but did not appear before the Compensation Review Board.
Respondent Robert Modena d/b/a Robert’s Coiffures was represented by Frank M. Grazioso, Esq., Grazioso & Hosen, 746 Chapel Street, New Haven, CT 06510. Joseph Cavaliere d/b/a Cavaliere’s Beauty Shop was represented by Charles B. Angelo, Esq., Antollino, Angelo & Scalesse, 500 East Main Street, Suite 334, P.O. Box 875, Branford, CT 06405. Respondent Brenda Goclowski d/b/a Unique Techniques was represented by David N. Rosen, Esq., 400 Orange Street, New Haven, CT 06511.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Robin L. Wilson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120.
These Petitions for Review from the July 21, 1992 Finding and Award, November 23, 1992 Supplemental Finding and Award and the December 14, 1992 Supplemental Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Third District were heard April 30, 1993 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Commissioners Frank J. Verrilli, James J. Metro and Angelo L. dos Santos.
ANGELO L. dos SANTOS, COMMISSIONER. By Finding and Award dated July 21, 1992, the Third District Commissioner found that the claimant sustained a right shoulder injury at work due to repetitive trauma caused by her duty as a hairdresser with the three respondent-employers, Joseph Cavaliere d/b/a Cavaliere’s Beauty Salon (Cavaliere), Brenda Goclowski d/b/a Unique Techniques (Unique), and Robert Modena d/b/a Robert’s Coiffures (Robert’s). The commissioner also found that the claimant was last employed by Robert’s and, pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 31-299b1, ordered Robert’s to “administer the claim and make any payments ordered.” Robert’s was therefore ordered to pay $63 to the claimant for prescription bills she paid. The issues of apportionment of liability among the various employers and the claimant’s entitlement to temporary total and/or permanent partial benefits, were left to further hearings.
By Supplemental Finding and Award dated November 23, 1992, the commissioner found that the claimant had been totally disabled for several months in 1990 and that she has a 25% permanent partial disability of the right arm with a maximum medical improvement date of May 4, 1992.2 The commissioner also found that the claimant had incurred additional prescription costs and a medical bill. The commissioner therefore ordered Robert’s to pay the claimant temporary total benefits and permanent partial benefits, to pay the claimant’s outstanding medical bill and to reimburse the claimant for the additional prescription costs incurred by her.
By Supplemental Finding and Award dated December 14, 1992, the commissioner ordered Robert’s to pay scarring benefits. The commissioner also denied a claim for temporary partial benefits under General Statutes Sec. 31-308(a).
In their appeals, Cavaliere and Unique each challenge the commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s repetitive trauma injury was causally related to the claimant’s employment with their business. Both respondents raise identical claims on appeal, and we address their appeals together.
The claimant alleged that her injury occurred due to her employment at Robert’s only. She testified that she sustained no work-related injury while in the employ of Cavaliere or Unique. She stated that she first experienced shoulder pain due to her employment while subsequently employed at Robert’s. She also testified that she worked more hours and her duties more often involved arm and shoulder flexion (e.g., shampooing, blow drying, hanging wet towels) while employed at Robert’s as compared to her work at Cavaliere and Unique.
Whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment with a respondent-employer is a factual determination for the trial commissioner to make. Pinto v. B.C. Hardware Superior Company, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 210, 1351 CRD 6-91-12 (1993). The conclusions of the trial commissioner “must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988); Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107, 118 (1979).
The commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury was causally related to her employment with Cavaliere and Unique, as well as with Robert's, was dependent on the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence. We will not disturb conclusions which are so based. Neal v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 1199 CRD-8-91-3 (1992). Because we do not retry the facts, it was within the province of the trial commissioner to resolve any inconsistencies or contradictions in the evidence. See Miller v. Kirshner, 225 Conn. 185, 198-99 (1993). The commissioner clearly grounded his finding and conclusion on this point in large part in the report of Dr. Margolis. Cavaliere’s and Unique’s challenge to the use of that report notwithstanding, we conclude that a fair and complete reading of the report, and the opinion of Dr. Margolis contained therein, amply supports the commissioner’s decision. See Aurora v. Miami Plumbing & Heating Inc., 6 Conn. App. 45, 46 (1986) (no “magic words” required to state expert medical opinion); see also Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 104 Conn. 709, 714 (1926) (medical testimony as to causation must be stated in terms of reasonable medical probability, not possibilities).
Accordingly, the appeals by Cavaliere and by Unique are without merit.
We note that neither Robert’s nor the Second Injury Fund filed a motion to correct the commissioner’s factual finding in support of his Sec. 31-299b order. See Administrative Regulation Sec. 31-301-4. Where the appellant has failed to file a Motion to Correct, the trial commissioner’s factual findings must stand. Mack v. Blake Drug Co., 152 Conn. 523, 525 (1965); Marzano v. Luis, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 129, 1181 CRD-5-91-2 (1992).
Accordingly, the appeals by Robert’s and by the Second Injury Fund are without merit.
We, therefore, affirm the trial commissioner and deny the respondents’ appeals.

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