Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180326_0000626.NIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 17:18:30+00:00

Document:
FindACase | Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc.
Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc.
BLACKBAUD, INC., et al., Defendants.
AMY J. ST. EVE, UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE.
After the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' earlier-filed motions to dismiss,  Plaintiff Mission Measurement Corporation (“Mission Measurement”) brought the present nine-count Third Amended Complaint against Defendants Blackbaud, Inc. (“Blackbaud”), MicroEdge, LLC (“MicroEdge”), Vista Equity Partners Management, LLC (“Vista Management”), VFF I AIV I, L.P. (“Vista I Fund”), VFF I AIV I-A, L.P. (“Vista I-A Fund”), Bregal Sagemount I, L.P. (“Sagemount”), and individual Defendants Todd Laddusaw, Preston McKenzie, Benny Melumad, Phil Montgomery, Kristin Nimsger, and Charles Vanek (“Individual Defendants”) alleging violations of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1831, et seq., as well as state law claims, including an Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”) claim, 765 ILCS 1-65/1, et seq.
Before the Court is individual Defendants Laddusaw's and Melumad's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendants Laddusaw, Melumad, as well as Vista I Fund and Vista I-A Fund (collectively “Vista Funds”), also seek to dismiss Plaintiff's state law tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claims as alleged in Counts VII and VIII, as well as Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim alleged in Count VI pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants' Rule 12(b)(2) motion because Plaintiff has fulfilled its burden of establishing a prima facie case of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants Melumad and Laddusaw. The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In particular, the Court grants Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to the Vista Funds and dismisses the funds as Defendants from this lawsuit. Otherwise, the Court denies the remainder of Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) tests whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Younan Prop., Inc., 737 F.3d 465, 467 (7th Cir. 2013). Although the “plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, ” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017), when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss based on the submission of written materials, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Northern Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2014). In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing, courts accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true. Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012).
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Hill v. Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2017). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pursuant to the federal pleading standards, a plaintiff's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When determining the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor.” Park Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2017).

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