Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/120/274/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:15:50+00:00

Document:
Where a district court in the Territory of Utah refuses to issue a writ of habeas corpus involving the question of personal freedom, an appeal lies to this Court from its order and judgment of refusal.
The offense of cohabiting with more than one woman, created by § 3 of the Act of Congress of March 22, 1852, c. 47, 22 Stat. 31, is a continuous offense, and not one consisting of an isolated act.
(1) There was but one entire offense for the continuous time.
(2) The trial court had no jurisdiction to inflict a punishment in respect of more than one of the convictions.
(3) As the want of jurisdiction appeared on the face of the proceedings, the defendant could be released from imprisonment on a habeas corpus.
(4) The order and judgment of the court below must be reversed and the case be remanded to that court with a direction to grant the writ of habeas corpus prayed for.
This was an appeal from an order of court refusing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
"at the County of Box Elder, in the said district, territory aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, and on divers other days and times thereafter, and continuously between said 1st day of January, A.D. 1883, and the 31st day of December, A.D. 1883, did then and there unlawfully live and cohabit with more than one woman, to-wit, with Adeline Snow, Sarah Snow, Harriet Snow, Eleanor Snow, Mary H. Snow, Phoebe W. Snow, and Minnie Jensen Snow, and during all the period aforesaid at the county aforesaid, he, the said Lorenzo Snow, did unlawfully claim, live, and cohabit with all of said women as his wives."
"and on divers other days and times thereafter, and continuously between said 1st day of January, A.D. 1885, and the 1st day of December, A.D. 1885, did then and there unlawfully live and cohabit with more than one woman, to-wit, with"
"and on divers other days and times thereafter, and continuously between said first day of January, A.D. 1884, and the thirty-first day of December, A.D. 1884, did then and there unlawfully live and cohabit with more than on woman, to-wit, with"
claim, live, and cohabit with all of said women as his wives."
At the time of filing each indictment, it was properly endorsed "a true bill, etc., and with the names of the witnesses." The same sixteen witnesses were examined before the grand jury, "on one oath and one examination, as to the alleged offense during the entire time mentioned in all of said three indictments, and" they were found "upon the testimony of witnesses given on an examination covering the whole time specified in said three indictments." On the 11th of December, 1885, the defendant was arraigned on each of the three indictments, and interposed a demurrer to each, which being overruled, he pleaded not guilty to each.
Indictment No. 742 was first tried, covering the period from and including January 1, 1885, to December 1, 1885. On the 31st of December, 1885, a verdict of guilty was rendered, and the court fixed the 16th of January, 1886, as the time for passing sentence.
Indictment No. 743 was next tried, covering the period from and including January 1, 1884, to December 31, 1884. The defendant orally put in an additional plea in bar, setting up his prior conviction on Indictment No. 742, and that the offense charged in all of the indictments was one continuous offense, and the same offense, and not divisible. On an oral demurrer to this plea, the demurrer was sustained. On the trial by the jury, a verdict of guilty was rendered on the 5th of January, 1886, and the court fixed the 16th of January, 1886, as the time for passing sentence.
Indictment No. 741 was next tried, covering the period from and including January 1, 1883, to December 31, 1883. The defendant orally put in an additional plea in bar, setting up his prior convictions on indictments Nos. 742 and 743, and that the offense charged in all of the indictments was one continuous offense, and the same offense, and not divisible. On an oral demurrer to this plea, the demurrer was sustained. On the trial by the jury, a verdict of guilty was rendered on the 5th of January, 1886, and the court fixed the 16th of January, 1886, as the time for passing sentence.
"[Title of Court and Cause]"
"The defendant, and his counsel, F. S. Richards and C. C. Richards, Esq'rs (of counsel), came into court. The defendant was duly informed of the nature of the indictments found against him on the 5th day of December, 1885, by the grand jury of this court, for the crime of unlawful cohabitation, committed as stated in said indictments, and during the time, as follows, viz., Indictment No. 741, between the 1st day of January, A.D. 1883, and the 31st day of December, A.D. 1883; Indictment No. 742, between the 1st day of January, A.D. 1885, and the 1st day of December, A.D. 1885; Indictment No. 743, between the 1st day of January, A.D. 1884, and the 31st day of December, A.D. 1884; of his arraignment and plea of not guilty as charged in said three indictments, on the 16th day of December, A.D. 1885; of his trial and the verdicts of the juries; Indictment No. 742, 'Guilty as charged in the indictment,' on December 31, 1885; Indictment No. 743, 'Guilty as charged in the indictment,' on January 5, 1886; Indictment No. 741, 'Guilty as charged in the indictment,' on January 5, 1886."
"The said defendant was then asked if he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he replied that he had none, and no sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the court, thereupon the court renders its judgment that whereas said Lorenzo Snow having been duly convicted in this Court of the crime of unlawful cohabitation, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said Lorenzo Snow be imprisoned in the penitentiary of the Territory of Utah for a period of six months, and that he do forfeit and pay to the United States a fine of three hundred dollars, and the costs of this prosecution, and that he do stand committed into the custody of the U.S. marshal for said territory until such fine and costs be paid in full. (As to Indictment No. 741.) "
"And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that at the expiration of the sentence and judgment rendered on said Indictment No. 741, said Lorenzo Snow be imprisoned in the penitentiary of Utah Territory for a period of six months, and that he do forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of three hundred dollars, and the costs of this prosecution, and that he do stand committed into the custody of the U.S. marshal for said territory until such fine and costs be paid in full. (As to Indictment No. 742.)"
"And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that at the expiration of the sentence and judgment as last above rendered on said Indictment No. 742, said Lorenzo Snow be imprisoned in the penitentiary of Utah Territory for a period of six months, and that he do forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of three hundred dollars, and the costs of this prosecution, and that he do stand committed into the custody of the U.S. marshal for said territory until such fine and costs be paid in full. (As to Indictment No. 743.)"
"The said defendant, Lorenzo Snow, is remanded into the custody of the United States Marshal for Utah Territory, to be by him delivered into the custody of the warden or other proper officer in charge of said penitentiary, and said warden or other proper officer of said penitentiary is hereby commanded to receive of and from the said United States marshal, him, the said Lorenzo Snow, convicted and sentenced as aforesaid, and him, the said Lorenzo Snow, keep and imprison in said penitentiary for the periods as in this judgment ordered and specified."
being the record of said matters in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the Territory of Utah,"
"upon more than one of the indictments or records referred to in its said judgment, for the reason that the offense therein set out is the same as that contained and set out in each of the other said indictments and records, and the maximum punishment which the court had authority to impose was six months' imprisonment and a fine of three hundred dollars;"
and "that by his said imprisonment, your petitioner is being punished twice for one and the same offense." The prayer is for a writ of habeas corpus to the end that the petitioner may be discharged from custody.
"The petition of Lorenzo Snow for a writ of habeas corpus having been presented to the court, with the exhibits attached as a part thereof, and the court having fully considered the application and petition and the exhibits attached, finds that the facts alleged and shown by the petition and exhibits are insufficient to authorize the issuance of the writ, and the court being of the opinion, from the allegations and facts stated in the petition and exhibits, that, if the writ be granted and a hearing given, the petitioner could not be discharged from custody, it is ordered and adjudged by the court that the said application for a writ of habeas corpus be, and the same is hereby, refused, to which ruling and refusal applicant, by his counsel, excepts."
From this order and judgment, the petitioner has appealed to this Court.
as set forth in its order and judgment refusing to issue the writ, was, so far as an appeal is concerned, equivalent to a refusal to discharge the petitioner on a hearing on the return to a writ, and that under § 1909 of the Revised Statutes an appeal lies to this Court from that order and judgment. It is contended for the United States that as the court which tried the indictments had jurisdiction over the offenses charged in them, it had jurisdiction to determine the questions raised by the demurrers to the oral pleas in bar in the cases secondly and thirdly tried; that it tried those questions; that those questions are the same which are raised in the present proceeding; that they cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus by any court, and that they could only be reexamined here on a writ of error, if one were authorized. For these propositions the case of Ex Parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, is cited. But for the reasons hereafter stated, we are of opinion that the decision in that case does not apply to the present one.
not a separate judgment in each case, but only one judgment in form was rendered for all the cases. The judgment says on its face that the proper officer of the penitentiary is to imprison the defendant therein "for the periods as in this judgment ordered and specified" -- that is, for three successive periods of six months each, the first period to apply to the indictment thirdly tried, the second period to apply to the indictment first tried, and to begin when the sentence and judgment on the indictment thirdly tried should expire, and the third period to apply to the indictment secondly tried, and to begin when the sentence and judgment on the indictment secondly tried should expire. No case is cited where what has been done in the present case has been held to be lawful. But the uniform current of authority is to the contrary, both in England and in the United States.
"That no tradesman or other person shall do or exercise any worldly labor, business, or work of their ordinary calling on the Lord's day, works of necessity and charity only excepted."
three last convictions. How, then, can there be a doubt but that the plaintiff might take this objection at the trial?"
"But what could the justification have been in this case if any had been attempted to be set up? It could only have been this: that because the plaintiff had been convicted of one offense on that day, therefore the justice had convicted him in three other offenses for the same act. By law, that is no justification. It is illegal on the face of it, and therefore, as was very rightly admitted by the counsel for the defendant in the argument, if put upon the record by way of plea, would have been bad, and on demurrer must have been so adjudged. Most clearly, then, it was open to the plaintiff, upon the general issue, to take advantage of it at the trial. The question does not turn upon niceties, upon a computation how many hours distant the several bakings happened, or upon the fact of which conviction was prior in point of time, or that for uncertainty in that respect they should all four be held bad. But it goes upon the ground that the offense itself can be committed only once in the same day."
from imprisonment under the illegal judgment. These considerations distinguish the case from that of Ex Parte Bigelow, ubi supra, and bring it within the principle of such cases as Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 71 U. S. 131; Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 85 U. S. 178, and Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417.
A distinction is laid down in adjudged cases and in text writers between an offense continuous in its character, like the one at bar, and a case where the statute is aimed at an offense that can be committed uno ictu. The subject is discussed in 1 Wharton's Criminal Law, 9th ed., §§ 27, 931, and the cases on the subject are cited.
The principle which governs the present case has been recognized and approved in many cases in the United States. Washburn v. McInroy (1810), 7 Johns. 134; Mayor v. Ordrenan (1815), 12 Johns. 122; Tiffany v. Driggs (1816), 13 Johns. 253; State v. Commissioners (1818), 2 Murph. 371; United States v. McCormick (1830), 4 Cranch.C.C. 104; State v. Nutt (1856), 28 Vt. 598; State v. Lindley (1860), 14 Ind. 430; Sturgis v. Spofford (1871), 45 N.Y. 446; Fisher v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad (1871), 46 N.Y. 644; State v. Egglesht (1875), 41 Ia. 574; United States v. New York Guaranty & Indemnity Co. (1875), 8 Benedict 269; United States v. Erie Railway Co. (1877), 9 Benedict 67, 68.
The case of Commonwealth v. Connors, 116 Mass. 35, gives no support to the view that a grand jury may divide a single continuous offense running through a past period of time into such parts as it may please, and call each part a separate offense. On the contrary, in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 126 Mass. 259, it is said that the offense of keeping a tenement for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors on a day named and on divers other days and times between that day and a subsequent day is but one offense, even though the tenement is kept during every hour of the time between those two days, such offense being continuous in its character.
the writ of habeas corpus prayed for and to take such proceedings thereon as may be in conformity with law and not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.

References: § 3
 § 1909
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