Source: http://airportnoiselaw.org/cases-4.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:11:00+00:00

Document:
Arapahoe County Public Authority v. Centennial Express Airlines, Colo. 1998  Centennial Airport, a general aviation airport built in 1967, had never permitted scheduled passenger flights. Nevertheless, Centennial Express Airlines peremptorily began passenger service on December 20, 1994. The next day the airport filed suit for an injunction prohibiting Centennial Express from conducting passenger flights out of the airport. The trial court granted the injunction, and the Supreme Court upheld the injunction.
Aviation Cadet Museum v. Hammer, Ark. 2008  Owners of property near a private, public-access airport filed a claim against the airport as a nuisance. The trial court determined the airport was a nuisance and ordered that the airfield not be used for take off and landing. It said the injunction was to remain in effect until such time, if any, that the airport owners could demonstrate to the court that it could operate the airfield in a manner that would not constitute a nuisance, would not trespass on the plaintiffs' property, and would otherwise be operated in conformity with the law. The state supreme court upheld the decision.
Note: In Skysign International, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu (2002) the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that federal law does not preempt a Honolulu ordinance banning aerial advertising and distinguishes Banner (see FN 6).
Bormann v. Board of Supervisors in and for Kossuth County, Iowa 1999  A state statute creating immunity from nuisance actions results in a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, thus violating the U.S. and Iowa constitutions. The statute authorizes County Boards of Supervisors to designate property as an "agricultural area" in order to protect agricultural land from nonagricultural development. The statute includes an immunity provision that gives property owners in a designated "agricultural area" the right to create or maintain a nuisance over neighboring property, in effect creating an easement. The court's opinion includes a nice overview of takings jurisprudence. (584 N.W.2d 309).
Note:The U.S. Court of Appeals 9th Circuit relied on this decision in Vacation Village v. Clark County, Nevada (2007) to determine that a county ordinance created a taking of property under the Nevada Constitution even though no taking occurred under the U.S. Constitution.
Note: This decision is a good example of the "battle between experts". Different real estate appraisers testified for plaintiffs and defendant; the trial judge believed the testimony of the defendant's witness and expressly discredited that of the plaintiffs' witness.
Note: The U.S. Supreme Court refused to review this decision (409 U.S. 919, 93 S.Ct. 218, 34 L.Ed.2d 181); see the dissent of Justice Douglas, in which he argues that the Ohio court's decision is contrary to the weight of precedent following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Causby (1946).
Benton et al. v. Savannah Airport Commission, Ga. App., 1999  Property owners sued for damages to their property, allegedly caused by increased air traffic and noise. Plaintiffs based their claims on a number of statutory and common law grounds, including inverse condemnation and nuisance. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims for inverse condemnation and nuisance on the grounds the claims were barred by the statute of limitation. The court characterized the airport noise as a permanent (rather than continuing) nuisance, and therefore the injury to the plaintiffs' property was "complete and capable of being fully compensated" at the time the airport's runway became operational at its present length. (525 S.E.2d 383).
City of Atlanta v. Starke, Ga. Ct. App., 1989  Owners of residential property next to city-owned airport sued the city for trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation. Held: property owners could prevail on inverse condemnation even though the value of their properties had increased due to overall increases in property value in plaintiffs' neighborhood. (384 S.E.2d 419, 192 Ga.App. 267).
Parachutes, Inc. v. Township of Lakewood, N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972  The township adopted an ordinance prohibiting sound over 50 decibels at night and 60 decibels during the day. Plaintiffs operated a sport parachuting center at an airport within the township. This operation required pilots to stop the airplane's engine in mid air over the airport just before a parachutist jumps, and to restart the engine after the jump. The noise from the repeated starting of engines, which continued from morning until dark, violated the township's ordinance. Parachutes, Inc. challenged the ordinance, claiming it was vague and overly broad and also was preempted by federal law. The trial court ruled the ordinance was lawful and the appellate court affirmed. (121 N.J. Super. 48, 296 A.2d 71).
Thul v. State of Minnesota, Minn. Ct. App., 2003  Helicopter pilot was cited for flying to and from his own property in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting helicopter operations in residential districts. The court upheld the ordinance, concluding that it saw no conflict between the city's regulatory power over land use and federal regulation of airspace.
Barnes v. City of Hillsboro, Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals, 2010  City of Hillsboro rezoned a large area near an airport, imposing various limitations on uses and new development, including the requirement of an avigation easement for new subdivisions. Some property owners who objected to the ordinance appealed to the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), a nonjudicial forum and the first of its kind in the United States. LUBA found the avigation easement to be an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation and reversed the rezoning ordinance. LUBA's decision was upheld by the state court of appeals.
Centennial Express Airlines v. Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth., Federal Aviation Administration, 1998-1999  After Arapahoe Airport, a general aviation airport near Denver, Colorado, banned commercial passenger operations, Centennial Express filed a complaint with the Federal Aviation Administration. In this series of hearings the FAA ordered the airport to accomodate scheduled passenger service by Centennial; if the airport did not comply, it would be ineligible for new FAA grants. One interesting issue was whether the FAA had to respect the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court upholding a permanent injunction against commercial passenger service at the airport (Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth. v. Centennial Express Airlines). The FAA's decision was upheld by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in 2001 (Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth. v. FAA).
Naples (Florida) Municipal Airport, Federal Aviation Administration, 2001 - 2003 (FAA Docket No. 16-01-15)  The Naples Airport Authority instituted a ban on stage-2 aircraft after complying with the FAA's Part 161 requirements (which implement the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990). The ban was challenged in U.S. District Court and upheld (see National Business Aviation Assn. v. City of Naples Airport Authority, 162 F.Supp.2d 1343, Aug. 8, 2001). The FAA then issued a notice of investigation into whether the stage-2 aircraft ban was consistent with "assurances" given by the airport when it received Airport Improvement Program (AIP) funds. The FAA issued its final decision on Aug. 25, 2003, the first formal interpretation by the FAA of its Part 161 requirements. The Naples Airport Authority challenged the decision in federal court. In 2005 the court vacated the FAA's decision, ruling that the Authority had produced ample evidence to justify the ban.
New York North Shore Helicopter Route, Federal Aviation Administration, 2010 - 2013 (FAA Docket FAA-2010-0302)  In 2008 the FAA published a flight path for helicopter pilots flying near residential centers in Long Island, New York. The path was intended to avoid noise over populated areas of Long Island and was voluntary. On July 6, 2012 the FAA adopted a final rule changing the status of the path from voluntary to mandatory. The path will be mandatory until 2014, when the FAA will review whether to continue the path as mandatory or revert to voluntary compliance by pilots. The Helicopter Association International challenged the rule but the court denied the petition for review. The court ruled that the FAA's power to "prescribe air traffic regulations on the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for ... protecting individuals and property on the ground� (49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(2)) was broad enough to include the power to require specific flight patterns for the sole purpose of reducing the impact of aircraft noise on residential communities.
Sutherland v. Vancouver Int. Airport Authority, Court of Appeal for British Columbia, 2002  More than 300 residents near the airport filed an action for nuisance arising from operation of a new runway, i.e., noise from air traffic. Their application for certification as a class was denied by the trial court (see Sutherland: denial of class proceeding). Three of the plaintiffs went forward with their case as a test, hoping to resolve issues common to all plaintiffs. The trial court found the airport liable for a noise nuisance (see Sutherland: trial court judgment for plaintiffs). The appellate court, however, reversed on the grounds that construction of the runway was authorized by statute. Under Canadian law, an activity does not give rise to liability for nuisance if it is authorized by statute and the defendant proves that the nuisance is an "inevitable result" or consequence of exercising that authority. That is, if a statute authorizes an act that causes injury to a private person, and is silent respecting compensation for the injury, no compensation for the injury is payable.
Hatton v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), 2001  Residents near Heathrow Airport in London alleged violation of the European Convention on Human Rights after the government relaxed restrictions on nighttime flights in 1993. The court held that the government "failed to strike a fair balance between the United Kingdom�s economic well-being and the applicants� effective enjoyment of their right to respect for their homes and their private and family lives," thus violating Article 8 of the Convention. Other, related issues were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs by the court's judgment. Notably, the court concluded that the scope of review of the nighttime restrictions by the U.K. courts did not provide an effective remedy and therefore was a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. The scope of review by the domestic courts focused exclusively on traditional English law and did not allow consideration of whether the increase in night flights under the 1993 scheme represented a justifiable limitation on the right under the Convention to respect for the private and family lives or the homes of those who lived in the vicinity of Heathrow airport.
Hatton v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), 2003  On appeal (see above), the court held that the British government's relaxation of restrictions on nighttime flights at Heathrow Airport did not violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights but did violate Article 13. The court further held that the mere finding of a violation of Article 13 constituted sufficient satisfaction to the plaintiffs.
Powell and Raymer v. The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 1990  People bothered by noise from air traffic at Heathrow Airport asked the court "to find that they have been the victims of a violation of Articles 6 and 8 (art. 6, art. 8) of the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] and that the lack of any effective remedy before a national authority itself violates Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention". Article 8 of the Convention concerns a right to respect for private life and home; Article 6 a right of access to the courts in civil matters; and Article 13 a right to an effective remedy under domestic law for alleged breaches of the Convention. The court ruled it has no jurisdiction on grievances under Articles 6 and 8 independently of their relevance within the context of Article 13. It then ruled there had been no violation of Article 13 in respect of either applicant.

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