Source: https://asadakhan.wordpress.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 19:19:21+00:00

Document:
The Court of Appeal recently dismissed a Pakistani immigrant’s appeal against the refusal of his judicial review claim challenging the decision to cancel his Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) in the UK. Controversially, the ruling imports into immigration law the legal test in Ladd v Marshall  EWCA Civ 1 applicable to the admission of new evidence in private law cases and, on the basis of an anonymous tip-off, it unlocks the door to the finality of unappealed tribunal decisions which are meant to be binding on the parties. Despite the present Pakistani appellant’s fraudulent behaviour, which probably justifies the harsh result in his case, the outcome will allow the Home Office to simply disregard tribunal decisions where it lost and did not bother to appeal. The approach is problematic because it enables decision-makers to unilaterally change settled judicial findings without affording any right of appeal. Ladd v Marshall articulates a three-part test. First whether the evidence now relied upon could with reasonable diligence have been discovered earlier prior to the trial. Second, whether that evidence was likely to have had an impact on the case, i.e. that it had an important if not necessarily decisive influence in the decision. Third, the evidence must be apparently credible although not incontrovertible. Mr Rehmat Ullah applied for ILR in November 2011 on the basis of having been in the country for 14 years. The application was refused in March 2012.
In relation to the proper construction of paragraph 391(a) of the Immigration Rules, which concerns the continuation of deportation orders in relation to those individuals sentenced to less than four years’ imprisonment, the Court of Appeal has held that the question of revocation of a deportation order will depend on the circumstances of the individual case. In a judgment given by Sir Ernest Ryder (Senior President of Tribunals) and Davis and Haddon-Cave LJJ, the court found that there is no presumption in favour of or against revoking a deportation order after 10 years had elapsed after the order had been made. EYF, a Turkish citizen, entered the UK with his family in 2000 and claimed asylum which was refused and the appeal dismissed in 2001. He went to Manchester Airport with his wife and seven-year old daughter on 11 February 2003 and outside the airport’s entrance he set various immigration papers alight. When police officers arrived he dowsed himself, his wife and his daughter in petrol and threatened to set himself and his family on fire. He also threw petrol at the officers. In March 2003, he was convicted of affray and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Thus, the Home Office wished to deport him and in November 2004 his appeal was dismissed and permission to appeal was refused. Thereafter, he became appeal rights exhausted and in September 2005 he was deported to Turkey. Subsequently, in January 2008 he applied for entry clearance in Turkey.
The Supreme Court’s decision in KO (Nigeria)  UKSC 53 (discussed here) was a seminal judgment. Yet it was seen as “deeply unsatisfactory” in some respects because Lord Carnwath left open the question of “reasonableness” by holding that the best interests assessment must be conducted in “the real world in which the children find themselves.” In doing so his Lordship endorsed the approach in SA (Bangladesh) 2017 SLT 1245 and EV (Philippines)  EWCA Civ 874 that the child’s right to remain does not automatically guarantee that the parents will be granted leave to remain as well. In the present case, Mr Justice Lane held that section 117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 requires a court or tribunal to hypothesise that the child in question would leave the UK, even if this is not likely to be the case, and ask whether it would be reasonable to expect the child to do so. He rejected the idea that paragraphs 18 and 19 of KO (Nigeria) support a construction of section 117B(6)(b), whereby the application of subsection (6) depends upon a tribunal finding, on the particular facts of the case, that the child will be expected to leave the UK if the person concerned is removed. Instead, he preferred the submission that such a construction is not possible, purely as a matter of statutory interpretation, and that nothing in KO (Nigeria) permits the tribunal to hold otherwise. The Court of Appeal has upheld his core reasoning in AB (Jamaica)  EWCA Civ 661.
In this judgment concerning appeal rights, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed a Jamaican national’s appeal but it took the opportunity to express serious concern about the huge pressures confronting the appeals system and the complexities of the Immigration Rules. Highlighting the Law Commission’s consultation paper Law Commission: Simplification of the Immigration Rules; CP 242, 21 January 2019, Lord Lloyd-Jones lamented that “the structure of both primary and secondary legislation in this field has reached such a degree of complexity that there is an urgent need to make the law and procedure clear and comprehensible.” Aged only seven, Mr Jamar Robinson arrived in the UK from Jamaica in October 1998 with six months’ leave to enter and then overstayed. Among his criminal convictions were two robberies that led to a deportation order being issued in July 2013. Lengthy deportation proceedings ensued and his appeal to the FTT was dismissed, it being accepted at the time that there was no family life in play. Permission to appeal to the UT was refused. He became appeal rights exhausted in May 2015 when further representations were made to the Home Office since his then partner was pregnant but the representations did not expressly seek the revocation of the deportation order and did not refer to human rights. The decision-maker refused to revoke the deportation order and concluded that deportation would not breach article 8 of the ECHR.
The CJEU has confirmed AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona’s opinion that a child in the guardianship of an EU citizen under the kafala system in Algeria cannot be regarded as a “direct descendant” of that citizen within the meaning of article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2004/38/EC (the Citizens’ Directive). The court held that the EU citizen’s member state of residence must facilitate, following an assessment, the minor’s entry to and residence in its territory pursuant to article 3(2)(a). The eight-year-old child in question, SM, or “Susana” as Lady Hale preferred to call her when making the reference in SM (Algeria)  UKSC 9 (see here), was left in a period of lengthy legal limbo because her case has been in litigation since 2012. Earlier she was placed into the legal guardianship of Mr and Mrs M, French nationals resident in the UK unable to have children, pursuant to Algerian law. She had been abandoned at birth and parental responsibility was transferred to them by decree and they were deemed “suitable” to take a child and pursuant to a judicial act they undertook to give Susana “an Islamic education … keep her fit morally and physically, supplying her needs, looking after her teaching, treating her like natural parents, protect her, defend her before judicial instances [and] assume civil liability for detrimental acts.” They are entitled to remove her from Algeria and the surname on her birth certificate was changed to their surname.
In response to the reference made by the Supreme Court in SM (Algeria)  UKSC 9 (see here), AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona advised the CJEU to declare that a child in the legal guardianship of an EU citizen under the Algerian kafala system cannot be classed as a “direct descendant” of that citizen within the meaning of article 2(2)(c) of the Directive 2004/38/EC (the Citizens’ Directive). However, following an assessment, the member state in which the EU citizen is resident must facilitate the entry and residence of the child in its territory. The child in the present case, a little girl who Lady Hale had called “Susana”, was placed into the legal guardianship of Mr and Mrs M pursuant to Algerian law. She was abandoned at birth in 2010 and parental responsibility was transferred to them by decree. The couple hold French passports and sought entry clearance for Susana as the adopted child of an EEA national under regulation 12(1), or alternatively 12(2) of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006. However, entry clearance was refused on two grounds. Firstly, Algerian guardianship was not recognised as an adoption in UK law as Algeria was not a party to the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption 1993 and was not named in the Adoption (Designation of Overseas Adoptions) Order 1973 then in force. Secondly, no application had been made for intercountry adoption under section 83 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.

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