Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/21/595.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:43:47+00:00

Document:
Paul Halvonik, State Public Defender, Charles M. Sevilla, Chief Assistant State Public Defender, and Kent L. Richland, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Robert Jimenez appeals following judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), three counts of armed robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)).
Among other contentions, defendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted the prosecution to introduce into evidence defendant's tape-recorded confession, on the grounds that (1) the record does not reflect that the trial judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary, which defendant argues is the standard of proof required under California law, and (2) that defendant's confession was involuntary because it was induced by promises of leniency. For the reasons set forth below, we agree that the prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. We also conclude that the defendant's confession was involuntary, having been induced by promises of leniency. It was therefore prejudicial error to admit his confession and defendant's conviction must be reversed.
On January 11, 1976, about 3 p.m., defendant and another man entered the El Norteno bar in El Monte. They sat down at the bar and ordered beer which they were served in a bottle by Mrs. Maria Insunza. After they drank their beer, both men left, but returned shortly thereafter. Defendant sat at the bar near the cash register and ordered another bottle of beer. His companion again left the building, but returned momentarily carrying a firearm. He fired one shot at the ceiling, telling everyone to stand still, and fired another shot at Mr. Soto, a customer. This shot went over Mr. Soto's head. Defendant then led Mrs. Insunza by the arm to the cash register and ordered her to open it and give him the money which it contained. Defendant removed approximately $70 from the opened cash drawer. Mrs. Insunza observed that defendant was not armed.
The wallets of several customers were also taken. One of these customers, Portunato Rodriquez, started to leave the bar through the back door. He was warned to stop, and was then shot by defendant's companion. He later died as a result of the gunshot wound. After [21 Cal. 3d 601] shooting Mr. Rodriquez, defendant's companion called defendant by his first name, Robert, and said they should leave. Both men then ran out of the bar. Police arrived shortly thereafter and Mrs. Insunza gave them the beer bottle from which defendant had been drinking. Defendant's fingerprints were found on the bottle.
Although this court has never decided the issue of the degree of proof by which the prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a confession, a number of decisions in the California Courts of Appeal have addressed the issue. Prior to 1972, these decisions uniformly concluded that the prosecution must establish proof of the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Stroud (1969) 273 Cal. App. 2d 670, 678 [78 Cal. Rptr. 270]; People v. Daniels (1969) 1 Cal. App. 3d 367, 374 [81 Cal. Rptr. 675]; People v. Jackson (1971) 19 Cal. App. 3d 95, 100 [96 Cal. Rptr. 414]; People v. Superior Court (Bowman) (1971) 18 Cal. App. 3d 316, 320-321 [95 Cal. Rptr. 757] (dictum).) This conclusion apparently was based on what was thought to be the rule under the federal Constitution as implied in Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368 [12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205], in which the United States Supreme Court held that an accused is entitled to a clearcut and reliable determination of the voluntariness of his confession before it can be introduced against him at trial.
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court held, in Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477 [30 L. Ed. 2d 618, 92 S. Ct. 619], that for purposes of the federal Constitution, the prosecution need only prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. In Lego, application of the reasonable doubt standard had been urged on two separate grounds: (1) that this result was mandated by In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068], which requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the offense [21 Cal. 3d 603] charged, and (2) that those values that exclusionary rules are designed to serve can only be protected by application of the reasonable doubt standard.
Rejecting the contention that Winship required application of the reasonable doubt standard in determining the voluntariness of a confession, Justice White, writing for the majority in Lego, analyzed Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. 368, and concluded that the hearing required by Jackson was not designed to enhance the reliability of jury verdicts so as to make application of the reasonable doubt standard necessary and that Jackson had neither implied nor suggested to the contrary.
The majority in Lego also rejected the contention that the reasonable doubt standard should be applied in order to safeguard the high value that our society places on the right of the individual to be free from coerced self-incrimination. Observing that federal constitutional rights appeared to be adequately protected by existing exclusionary rules which preclude use of coerced confessions against the accused at trial, the majority concluded that it was unnecessary to require application of the reasonable doubt standard in determining the preliminary question of the admissibility of confessions. At the same time, however, the majority made clear that the states, pursuant to their own law, would be free to adopt a higher standard of proof and could differ as to the resolution of the values they find at stake.
In the context of the present case, where the question to be decided is the appropriate standard of proof for determining the voluntariness of a confession, the admissibility of which has been challenged on constitutional grounds, we must consider the nature and purpose of the voluntariness hearing and the policies underlying the constitutional right [21 Cal. 3d 605] involved, here, the privilege against self-incrimination, in order to determine what impact an erroneous determination of the voluntariness question would have.
Although a defendant must be allowed to present such evidence of coercion to show why his confession should not be believed, he is not, however, necessarily assured that in so doing he will prevail. For it cannot be denied that a confession, which admits every element of the prosecution's case, is ordinarily given overwhelming weight by the jury, and therefore, the defendant may not always be able to convince the jury to disregard this most devastating evidence of his guilt which emanated [21 Cal. 3d 608] from his own mouth (People v. Stroud, supra, 273 Cal. App. 2d 670, 678), even when this evidence should, in fact, be viewed with distrust.
For the above reasons, we are convinced that a rule requiring the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt reflects sound judicial policy; we therefore disapprove People v. Barrow, supra, 60 Cal. App. 3d 984, 990; People v. Moreno, supra, 61 Cal. App. 3d 688; People v. Chen, supra, 37 Cal. App. 3d 1046 (dictum) and People v. Hutchings, supra, 31 Cal. App. 3d 16 (dictum) to the extent those decisions are inconsistent with this holding. The rule which we have enunciated today requiring the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt, although it may have a different basis than did the pre-Lego California decisions (People v. Stroud, supra, 273 Cal. App. 2d 670, 678 [78 Cal. Rptr. 270]; People v. Jackson, supra, 19 Cal. App. 3d 95, 100; People v. Superior Court (Bowman) (1971) (dictum) 18 Cal. App. 3d 316, 320-321 [95 Cal.Rptr. 757]), nevertheless reaches the same result; thus, any uncertainty that may have existed in the years after Lego as to the appropriate standard of proof in California for determining the voluntariness of a confession will now be eliminated and continuity will be restored to the law on this issue.
 We have further determined that judicial reliance on post-Lego decisions can hardly have been significant, given the uncertainty in the six years following Lego as to whether California law required a standard of proof more stringent than the federal rule articulated therein. Therefore, in view of the important purposes served by the rule of criminal procedure which we announce today, we see no reason to deny the benefit of this rule to defendants whose cases are now pending on appeal. [21 Cal. 3d 609] (See People v. Gainer, supra, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 853; People v. Charles (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 330, 333-337 [57 Cal. Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545] and the cases cited therein.)  Furthermore, given the uncertainty as to the appropriate standard of proof in California in the years following Lego, we do not think it can be presumed that the trial court applied the correct standard in those cases in which the record is silent in this regard. (See People v. Jetter (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 407, 408-409 [124 Cal. Rptr. 633, 540 P.2d 1217].) However, since any error as to the standard of proof applied in determining the voluntariness of a confession relates only to a question of preliminary fact, we have concluded that the effect of any such error should be measured in accordance with the standard enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818, 837 [299 P.2d 243]; thus when it appears after looking at the whole record of the voluntariness hearing that there is no reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error, the trial court's finding of voluntariness should be sustained on appeal. In the context of the present case, however, it is not necessary to apply this rule, for, as we explain below, it must be concluded on the record before us that both of the defendant's confessions were involuntary as a matter of law, and that their admission into evidence constitutes reversible error.
In the present case the record indicates that much of the testimony at the admissibility hearing was in conflict and that testimony will not be considered here. However, the testimony that follows is pertinent to our inquiry.
Sergeant Sett, the People's first witness, testified on cross-examination that after the defendant had indicated a willingness to talk about the case, Sett as part of a psychological ploy, told Officer Mascorro, within the presence and hearing of the defendant, that he did not want to talk to the defendant because the defendant would only give a self-serving statement by putting the blame on the codefendant, and that they already had enough on the defendant without his statement. Officer Mascorro indicated in response that he would like to talk to the defendant if the defendant was interested. Sergeant Sett then had mentioned that this was a serious case, in which the death penalty would be involved and that the defendant, who was 25 years old at the time of the crime, would be subject to the death penalty but Sett did not think that the codefendant would because he was only 18. Sergeant Sett knew at the time that it was the codefendant and not the defendant who had shot and killed Portunato Rodriquez. Sergeant Sett indicated that the defendant gave his first confession after this conversation with Mascorro and the tape-recorded statement was made several hours later.
The defendant, in his testimony, confirmed the fact that before the defendant had made any statement, Sett had mentioned the death penalty and had indicated that the defendant would be subject to it, but the codefendant would not because of his youth. The defendant testified that he was scared by this talk about the death penalty and that he made his statements to the officers because Sett had told him that if he talked about the case, Sett would tell the jury and the jury would go lighter on him.
Although Officer Mascorro was called as a rebuttal witness by the People, he was not asked any questions about whether either he or Sett had told the defendant that things would go better for him with the jury if the defendant told the officers about the case, nor was Sergeant Sett recalled as a witness to specifically rebut the defendant's testimony to this effect. With regard to the death penalty, Officer Mascorro was asked only whether he had threatened that the defendant would get the death penalty and he replied in the negative.
[12a] With these considerations in mind and after examining the uncontradicted facts of the present record, we conclude that defendant's first confession was involuntary as it resulted from a promise of leniency. The fact that such a promise had expressly been made was not contradicted by the testimony of either Officer Mascorro or Sergeant Sett. Contrary to the People's contention, we are unpersuaded that Sergeant Sett's failure to recall such a promise constituted an implied denial that the promise had in fact been made. The meaning of his response to defense counsel's questions was, at best, equivocal, and did not constitute a sufficient answer to the question posed.  We have said in another context that a witness' testimony that he does not recall making a statement represents only a present failure to recollect, and therefore does not constitute a contradiction of a prior statement. (See People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 194, 208-210 [77 Cal. Rptr. 804, 454 P.2d 700].) We see no reason to depart from this rule here. The prosecution, which had the burden of proof on the issue, could either have asked Sergeant Sett on redirect examination whether, to the best of his recollection, a promise of leniency had or had not been made, or the prosecution could have asked Officer Mascorro, who had been present during the entire interrogation, what was said to the defendant in this regard. This the prosecution failed to do; thus, although some of the defendant's testimony was disputed, his testimony that he was told that he might get leniency from the jury if he gave a statement about the case to the police officers, remained uncontradicted.
The People urge that even if the defendant's claim that promises had been made was not specifically contradicted by the police officers, the trial court's resolution of the voluntariness issue in favor of the People should nonetheless be sustained. They point to the overall conflict in the evidence and the inherent improbability of other aspects of the defendant's testimony in suggesting that, as a matter of assessing the credibility of witnesses, the trial court had good cause to disbelieve and obviously did disbelieve the defendant's testimony that promises of leniency had in [21 Cal. 3d 613] fact been made. For this reason, the People urge that when the trial court's finding of voluntariness is based on credibility assessments, that finding should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is palpably erroneous. The People rely on People v. Carr, supra, 8 Cal. 3d 287, and the cases cited therein in support of this contention. In Carr, the testimony relating to whether promises had been made was in conflict, and therefore, we accepted the findings of the trial court which we said had obviously disbelieved the testimony of the defendant. In this case, however, the evidence relating to promises is not in conflict; therefore, if we were to adopt the rule suggested by the People, we would in effect be abrogating our duty to independently determine from the uncontradicted facts whether the confession was voluntary. We think that this would be unwise, given the importance of the constitutional rule involved.  Moreover, as it has been stated in another context, "[d]isbelief [of a witness' testimony] does not create affirmative evidence to the contrary of that which is discarded." (Estate of Bould (1955) 135 Cal. App. 2d 260, 264 [287 P.2d 8, 289 P.2d 15]; see also People v. Blakeslee (1969) 2 Cal. App. 3d 831 [82 Cal. Rptr. 839].) Applying this rule to the present case, where the People had the burden of proof on the issue of the voluntariness of defendant's confession, it is apparent that disbelief by the trial court of defendant's testimony would not suffice as a substitute for an affirmative showing by the People sufficient to discharge their burden.
We further conclude that defendant's subsequent tape-recorded confession was also involuntary.  The rule has been long and well settled in this state, that when an accused who has been subjected to improper influences makes a confession, and shortly thereafter again incriminates himself, "... there is a presumption that the influence of the prior improper treatment continues to operate on the mind of the defendant and that the subsequent confession is the result of the same influence which rendered the prior confession inadmissible, and the burden is upon the prosecution to clearly establish the contrary. [Citations.]" (People v. Jones, supra, 24 Cal. 2d 601, 609; see also People v. Sanchez, supra, 70 Cal. 2d 562, 574.) [12c] In the present case, no evidence at all was presented showing that the tape-recorded confession was free from the taint of the prior confession. Therefore, it was error to have admitted the tape-recorded confession, and the judgment of conviction must be reversed.
For the guidance of the court on retrial, we would indicate that in considering any motion to exclude the in-court identification of the defendant on the ground that it was tainted by an allegedly unduly suggestive pretrial photographic identification, the trial court should take into account, in addition to the other strong points of dissimilarity between defendant's photograph and those of the other individuals displayed, the fact that the defendant's first name appeared on his photograph and that name was used by the codefendant in reference to the defendant during the course of the robbery.
In Part I, the majority discuss the question whether the standard of proof for determining voluntariness of a confession should be by preponderating evidence or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, ultimately endorsing the more difficult test as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. In Part II, however, the majority conclude defendant's confessions were involuntary as a matter of law, rendering Part I dictum.
FN 1. Defendant and his companion had previously been arrested for a different crime and their "mug shots" had been taken on that occasion. These photos were shown to Mrs. Insunza shortly after the robbery and her positive identification of the defendant led to his arrest on January 23, 1976.
FN 2. Defendant's extrajudicial statement, admitting as it did all the facts necessary to constitute the offense of felony murder and robbery, constituted a confession of those offenses. With regard to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon on Mr. Soto, however, defendant's statement constituted only an admission. Nonetheless, inasmuch as the evidence on that charge was not strong, and the commission of this offense was integrally bound to the commission of the offenses to which the defendant had confessed, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's confession of those offenses did not influence the jury's verdict on the assault with a deadly weapon charge. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710-711, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) The prejudicial effect of letting in the statement with regard to the deadly weapon offense was thus the same as it was with respect to the other offenses. For the purposes of this opinion, therefore, defendant's tape-recorded statement will be generally referred to as a confession.
FN 3. Section 405 of the Evidence Code provides: "With respect to preliminary fact determinations not governed by Sections 403 or 404: (a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, the court shall indicate which party has the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof on the issue as implied by the rule of law under which the question arises. The court shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the preliminary fact and shall admit or exclude the proffered evidence as required by the rule of law under which the question arises.
"(b) If a preliminary fact is also a fact in issue in the action: (1) The jury shall not be informed of the court's determination as to the existence or nonexistence of the preliminary fact. (2) If the proffered evidence is admitted, the jury shall not be instructed to disregard the evidence, if its determination of the fact differs from the court's determination of the preliminary fact."
FN 4. The actual interchange between defense counsel and Sergeant Sett was as follows:"
Q. And did you further convey or indicate to Officer Mascorro that things may well go better for Mr. Jimenez if he talked with you and attempted to clarify the situation?"
A. He had already agreed to talk. Perhaps Mascorro mentioned something about that."
Q. Do you recall either one of you saying things would get better for him in terms of the death penalty if the facts could be clarified as to who had the gun -- who fired the fatal shot?"
A. In my mind -- Mascorro's mind, we know who had the gun, and we knew who fired the shot."
Q. Did you indicate to Mr. Jimenez that if he clarified that with you, if he told you that, that the jury would be told that, and things might go easier for him?"
A. I don't recall saying that."
Q. Do you recall any conversation about what, if any, way it would help him if he talked with you?"
A. I don't recall, Counselor."
Q. Do you recall Officer Mascorro at any time, or any officer, in your presence, indicating to Mr. Jimenez that he would be better off if, in fact, he cooperated and talked, so that it was understood that he was not the trigger man?"
A. I don't recall that. As I mentioned before, we knew who shot the gun."

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