Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/miranda/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 03:59:16+00:00

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The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Barrios on Monday, January 28, 2019.
In this case, the supreme court considered whether a juvenile’s Miranda advisement waiver was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. The court held that the police detective complied with the provisions of the juvenile Miranda waiver statute, C.R.S. § 19-2-511, and that the concerns identified by the trial court do not undermine the reliability of the waiver. Because both the juvenile and his legal guardian were fully advised of all the juvenile’s rights and the juvenile issued a reliable waiver, his statements to police should not be suppressed. Accordingly, the trial court’s order suppressing the juvenile’s statements was reversed.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Verigan v. People on Monday, June 11, 2018.
Suppression of Statements—Two-Step Interrogation—Plurality Supreme Court Opinions—Miranda Warnings.
This case required the supreme court to decide (1) whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), created a precedential rule that could be applied to future cases, and (2) whether statements made by petitioner after she was given Miranda warnings should be suppressed because the statements were made after petitioner provided unwarned, incriminating statements to the police.
The court concluded that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Seibert, which created an exception to the framework established in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), for cases involving a deliberate two-step interrogation aimed at undermining the efficiency of the Miranda warning, is the controlling precedent to be applied. Applying Justice Kennedy’s test here, the court concluded that the officers in this case did not engage in a two-step interrogation in a deliberate attempt to undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings provided to petitioner. Therefore, the court concluded that the Elstad framework applies, and because petitioner’s pre- and post-warning statements were indisputably voluntary, the court concluded that the division correctly determined that petitioner’s post-warning statements were admissible.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Jaquez on Thursday, May 31, 2018.
Criminal Law—Voice Identification—Fifth Amendment—Custodial Interrogation—Agent of the State—Miranda.
The victim of an armed robbery was directed by the police to speak with defendant while he was in custody to see if defendant would say anything to the victim. At the time, defendant was handcuffed in the backseat of a police vehicle with the window closest to him rolled down. Defendant was not warned of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona. Unlike a typical voice identification procedure, defendant was not merely asked to repeat the words heard by the victim during the robbery. Instead, defendant and the victim had a brief conversation during which defendant made statements that were nearly identical to the statements made by the robber. The victim identified defendant as the robber and based on this identification, he was arrested and charged with armed robbery. Defendant moved to suppress both the out-of-court voice identification and the statements he made during the voice identification procedure. The trial court denied the motion. The statements were admitted at defendant’s criminal trial as substantive evidence of his guilt. Defendant was convicted as charged.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when it admitted the statements he made to the clerk during his voice identification. Here, the statements were made during a custodial interrogation, and the clerk was acting as an agent of the state because he was acting at the specific direction of law enforcement officials. Further, the words spoken by defendant were not merely a voice exemplar used to identify him but were volitional statements used by the prosecution as substantive evidence of his guilt. Therefore, the admission of defendant’s statements made during a one-on-one voice identification procedure not preceded by Miranda warnings violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. This error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Bryant on Thursday, April 19, 2018.
While high on PCP, defendant assaulted two teenagers. After defendant’s arrest, police officers interviewed him and he admitted that he was under the influence of PCP, which he initially referred to as “sherm.” Defendant told officers that they could retrieve the substance from his sock, which they did. Before trial, defendant filed several motions to suppress. The court denied all of the motions, ruling that defendant’s statements were made voluntarily and that he had validly waived his Miranda rights. Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and two counts of third degree assault.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred by ruling that his statements to the police were voluntary. He argued that the police exploited his intoxicated state during their interrogation. Here, by the time they reached the police station, defendant was calm, coherent, and cooperative. The interview lasted no more than 15 minutes; there was no evidence that defendant’s demeanor changed during the interview; and there was no evidence of psychological coercion. The trial court did not err by finding that defendant’s statements to police were voluntary.
Defendant also contended that his statements should have been suppressed because police failed to obtain a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. Defendant contended that he was so intoxicated and confused when he was advised of his Miranda rights that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. The record supports the trial court’s finding that defendant was not intoxicated when he waived his Miranda rights. The trial court did not err by finding that defendant validly waived his Miranda rights.
Defendant also contended that the trial court reversibly erred by allowing Officer Fink to testify as a lay witness regarding the meaning of the term “sherm.” This testimony was not based on Officer Fink’s personal knowledge or investigation of defendant’s case, but was based on his training and experience as a police officer. Although the trial court erred by allowing Officer Fink to testify as a lay witness, the error was harmless because the testimony was cumulative of other evidence presented at trial that served to prove the “knowingly” element of the possession charge.
Defendant next contended that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury. First, the instruction that voluntary intoxication was not a valid defense to the charged crimes could not have confused the jury, particularly because it was a brief and correct statement of the law. Second, the pattern instruction on mens rea was legally correct and informed the jury to apply a subjective standard rather than on objective standard. There was no error in the manner in which the trial court instructed the jury.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Garcia on Monday, December 11, 2017.
In this interlocutory appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the interactions between law enforcement officers and defendant inside her home and in her front yard did not constitute custody for Miranda purposes. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have believed her freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s suppression order.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Sampson on Monday, October 30, 2017.
In this interlocutory appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a conversation between defendant and a law enforcement officer that took place in a hospital did not constitute custody for Miranda purposes. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have believed that his freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Assuming without deciding that giving Miranda warnings can be considered in determining whether a suspect is in custody, the court concluded that defendant was not in custody during any part of his conversation with the law enforcement officer. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s suppression order.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Nguyen on Monday, October 2, 2017.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that a translated Miranda warning stating that if the suspect waived his right to be silent, “[a]ll you say will and may be used as evidence in court,” reasonably conveyed to defendant that anything he said could be used against him in court. By informing him that his statements could be used in court, the translation included the concept that the statements could be used against him (as well as for him) in court. The court also held that a Miranda warning stating that “if you do not have money to hire an attorney the court will instruct you, will appoint a person to you at no cost to represent you before asking questions” adequately conveyed the right to an appointed attorney.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Kutlak on Monday, January 11, 2016.
Criminal Law—Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel—Invoking the Right to Counsel—Suppression of Statements.
The Supreme Court clarified that in determining whether a suspect in custody has made an unambiguous request for counsel, the proper standard under Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), is whether “a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Applying this standard, the Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. Because defendant did not invoke his right to counsel, and because he otherwise validly waived his Miranda rights before making incriminating statements, his statements should not have been suppressed.

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