Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/aaronson-v-new-haven-94-conn-690-1920/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:17:05+00:00

Document:
ABRAHAM AARONSON vs. THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN.
PRENTICE, C. J., WHEELER, BEACH, GAGER and CASE, Js.
then by asking the court to propound special interrogatories to the jury and thus ascertain upon which one or more they based their verdict.
ACTION to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s automobile and for the loss of its use, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the maintenance of one of its highways, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $567, and appeal by the defendant No error.
it had been toppled over and rolled into the traveled roadway. The case was tried to the jury on a general denial, and a general verdict for the plaintiff was rendered and accepted. A motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence was denied. Defendant appeals from the refusal of the court to grant a new trial, and for errors in the charge and in the admission of evidence.
William L. Bennett and Thomas R. Robinson, for the appellant (defendant).
Kenneth Wynne, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The complaint alleges that in the course of the transaction described therein the city committed two breaches of legal duty toward the plaintiff: first, in placing a dangerous obstruction at the intersection of these highways without securely anchoring it; and second, by leaving it unguarded in the traveled roadway after notice that it had become displaced and after reasonable opportunity to remove it.
the signal was knocked down and rolled into the traveled roadway about 6:30 p. m. on the day of the accident, that notice of the fact was given to the officer in charge of the nearest police-station about 7 p. m., that it would require not to exceed twelve minutes to walk from the police-station to the place of the accident, and that the device lay in the roadway until about 7:30 p. m., when the accident occurred.
v. Leppert, 93 Conn. 247, 249, 105 A. 615.
In this connection, we think the evidence of the witness Church, to the effect that other accidents of which the city had notice had been caused by this silent policeman being displaced, was admissible as tending to show knowledge of conditions affecting the degree of diligence which might reasonably be required of the defendant in removing it from the traveled roadway after notice.
which the penalty arises exists as defined by statute.”Upton v. Windham, 75 Conn. 288, 292, 53 A. 660. The only remedy given by the statute is that expressed in § 1414: “Any person injured in person or property by a defective road or bridge may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair.” There must be a defective highway. When in the course of events leading up to the injury to the plaintiff’s automobile did this highway become defective? Not by the mere installation of a silent policeman at the intersection of two highways for the purpose of directing traffic and of requiring travelers to obey § 26 of Chapter 233 of the Public Acts of 1919. There is no allegation that so long as it remained in place it failed to serve its intended purpose as an aid to traffic. The specification of negligence on this branch of the case is that it was not securely anchored in place, and although described in one paragraph of the complaint as a dangerous obstruction upon the highway, the context requires that phrase to be construed as an allegation that it was potentially dangerous because liable to be displaced.
But, irrespective of the allegations of this complaint, it cannot be said that a sufficiently conspicuous guidepost for traffic, placed at the intersection of two streets, makes the highway defective. We take judicial notice of the common use of such devices at such locations, and that they do serve a useful purpose in directing traffic and promoting obedience to the law.
policeman in its proper place in a highway is not a defect. The fact that it is liable to be displaced and to become an obstruction to travel is relevant only as it imposes on the defendant city a commensurate degree of diligence in inspecting the device or in removing it after it is displaced.
The rule laid down in Boucher v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 456 Carstesen v. Stratford, 67 Conn. 428, 35 A. 276 Cummings v. Hartford, 70 Conn. 415, 38 A. 916, an Fitch v. Hartford, 92 Conn. 365, 102 A. 768, to the effect that when a city authorizes third parties to do work within the limits of a highway which will necessarily cause a defect therein, it must use reasonable care to protect travelers against the negligence of its licensees by a reasonable supervision and control of the work, applies to the case of a silent policeman which is known to be liable to become a dangerous obstruction in the highway. The city is required to exercise reasonable supervision and control of silent policemen on its highways, but no breach of legal duty giving rise to a cause of action can occur unless and until the highway becomes defective. And then the city is not liable unless it has either failed to use reasonable care in discovering the existence of the defect, or has failed after actual notice or constructive notice to use reasonable care in repairing it. Fitch v. Hartford, 92 Conn. 365, 102 A. 768. “`Notice of another defect, or of the existence of the cause likely to produce the defect, is not sufficient.'” Carl v. New Haven, 93 Conn. 622, 628, 107 A. 502. The jury should have been charged that the city was not liable unless it failed to use reasonable care in discovering the obstruction after it existed, or failed to use reasonable care in removing it after notice.
Another question remains to be considered. As already stated, the verdict was a general one and it imports that the jury has found all the issues for the plaintiff.
In such cases the defendant may protect itself from any possible injustice, when the complaint contains two or more counts, by asking for a separate verdict upon each count, or when two or more issues are presented in one count, by asking the court to propound special interrogatories to the jury.

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