Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/460/729/580690/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:07:15+00:00

Document:
ARGUED: Samuel J. Harris, Cookeville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Philip H. Wehby, Assistant United States Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Samuel J. Harris, Cookeville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Philip H. Wehby, Assistant United States Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: SILER, SUTTON, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Thomas Philp appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss count one of his indictment charging him with being a felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 and 922(g) (1). Philp asserts that his breaking and entering of an unoccupied dwelling conviction from 30 years ago cannot support the felon-in-possession charge because, under Michigan law, his "civil rights were restored" by operation of law and therefore his breaking and entering conviction cannot be considered a "conviction." Thus, the question we must address is whether "breaking and entering of an unoccupied building" is a "specified felony" under MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.224(f). Conviction of a specified felony requires that a person apply for the right to possess firearms, which Philp concedes he did not do. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmatively decided this question in Tuggle v. Michigan Department of State Police, 269 Mich. App. 657, 712 N.W.2d 750 (2005),1 we AFFIRM his conviction and the district court's denial of Philp's motion to dismiss.
(v) The felony is burglary of an occupied dwelling or breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, or arson.
The Government argues that Philp's felony was a "specified felony" and that those convicted of the "specified felonies" must apply to have their rights restored to a Concealed Weapon Licensing Board in the county of their residence. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.424. Philp admits that he did not apply and concedes that he loses if breaking and entering of an unoccupied dwelling is a specified felony.
The district court ruled that Philp's conviction of breaking and entering includes the element of "breaking," Michigan law holds that the "breaking" element is satisfied by evidence of "slight force," and, thus, his felony meets the criteria for a "specified felony." It noted Philp's argument that "slight force" does not equate to "physical force" as used in the "specified felony" definition but rejected it on the grounds that "slight force certainly requires use of physical force," which is "physical force" against the person or property of another contained in the "specified felony" definition. The district court concluded that Philp committed a "specified felony," which required him to have applied for restoration of his firearm rights, which he admittedly did not do. Thus, it denied his motion to dismiss.
We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on legal grounds. United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). We apply state law as decided by the Michigan Supreme Court. When an issue is yet to be decided by the Michigan Supreme Court, we look to "relevant data," including state appellate decisions. See Kingsley Assocs., Inc. v. Moll PlastiCrafters, Inc., 65 F.3d 498, 507 (6th Cir. 1995). "Relevant data include decisions of the state appellate courts, and those decisions should not be disregarded unless we are presented with persuasive data that the Michigan Supreme Court would decide otherwise." Id. at 507.
We are aware of only two persuasive cases directly addressing what constitutes a "specified felony" under Michigan law. The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2000) (attempted larceny from a motor vehicle is not a specified felony), and the Michigan Court of Appeals in Tuggle v. Dept. of State Police, 269 Mich.App. 657, 712 N.W.2d 750, 756 (2005) (breaking and entering of unoccupied dwelling is a specified felony), reach irreconcilable results.
We will accept the holding of a state intermediate appellate court with respect to state law unless we determine the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 n. 3, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 99 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1988). Without demonstrating that the Michigan Supreme Court would decide that breaking and entering of an unoccupied dwelling is not a specified felony, we are "not at liberty to depart from the state appellate court's resolution" of this issue of state law. Id. at 629. There is no evidence that the Michigan Supreme Court would decide contrary to Tuggle. "In order to determine the Michigan law, we thus turn to the decisions of the Michigan intermediate courts, which are binding authority in federal courts in the absence of any Michigan Supreme Court precedent." Hampton v. United States, 191 F.3d 695, 701-02 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
The crime of breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling unquestionably is a felony that [,] by its nature, involves substantial risk that physical force against the property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. Therefore, this Court holds that this felony is a "specified felony."
Tuggle, 269 Mich.App. 657, 712 N.W.2d 750, 756-56. Tuggle appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which declined to negate the "physical force against the person or property of another" portion of the definition of specified felony. The court held that breaking and entering was a specified felony because of the plain language of the statute and the likelihood that felonies could easily fall within one or more categories of the definition of specified felonies under MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 750.224f(6).
Philp relies on Tait where the Eleventh Circuit addressed our issue of interpreting Michigan law regarding a "specified felony" in the context of Tait's attempted-larceny-from-a-motor-vehicle conviction. 202 F.3d at 1325. The Tait court held that "Tait's civil rights were unreservedly restored to him by operation of Michigan law, and Tait was not subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1)." The court upheld the district court's determination that "a logical interpretation of the statute would be that physical force is not required."
The government distinguishes Tait as being an analysis of an offense for auto larceny without a "breaking." We agree that the defendant in Tait committed a different crime so the differing elements must factor into the assessment of the applicability of the Tait opinion. Because there is no indication that the Michigan Supreme Court would not follow Tuggle, we hold that breaking and entering of an unoccupied dwelling is a specified felony. Philp failed to restore his right to possess a firearm and thus illegally possessed that firearm. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.224f(2); People v. Brown, 249 Mich. App. 382, 642 N.W.2d 382, 383 (2002).

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