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Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:54:44+00:00

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FindACase | Schwartz v. I.C. System, Inc.
Schwartz v. I.C. System, Inc.
DORA L. IRIZARRY, Chief United States District Judge.
Defendant moves for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that would entitle Plaintiff to the relief requested in the Complaint. (See Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mot.”), Dkt. Entry No. 16.) Plaintiff opposed the motion, (See Memorandum in Opposition (“Opp.”), Dkt. Entry No. 18.), and Defendant replied. (See Reply in Support (“Reply”), Dkt. Entry No. 17.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but “only if there is a ‘genuine' dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The nonmoving party, however, may not rely on “[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation.” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998). “When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Dister v. Cont'l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1988)).
The FDCPA was enacted to “protect consumers from a host of unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt collection practices without imposing unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors.” S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 1696 (1977). “[B]ecause the FDCPA is primarily a consumer protection statute, we must construe its terms in liberal fashion to achieve the underlying Congressional purpose.” Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To determine whether a given communication runs afoul of the FDCPA, courts apply an objective standard measured by how the “least sophisticated consumer” would interpret the communication. See Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318-20 (2d Cir. 1993).
Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a “debt collector” from using any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” The sixteen subsections of § 1962e set forth a non-exhaustive list of practices that fall within this ban. Avila, 817 F.3d at 75.
Section 1629f of the FDCPA states, “[a] debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1629f. Section 1629f(1) prohibits “[t]he collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge or expense incidential to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” A debt collection agency “may impose a service charge if (i) the customer expressly agrees to the charge in the contract creating the debt or (ii) the charge is permitted by law.” Tuttle v. Equifax Check, 190 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1999).

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