Source: http://nsclcarchives.org/index.php/nd-ohio-denied-motion-to-dismiss-medicaid-delay-case/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:46:55+00:00

Document:
In a case involving failure to timely process Medicaid applications, the Ohio district court held that even though each of the named plaintiffs had obtained a decision, the problem of delays was capable of repetition and not moot.
The court denied a motion to dismiss claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, preemption, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and due process. The Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. Lumpkin, 2011 WL 767878 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2011). The judge was nominated by Clinton. The plaintiffs are represented by Advocates for Basic Legal Equality.
The 9 named plaintiffs applied for Medicaid based on their disabilities. Many of their applications were not processed for over a year. Six of them were not processed until after the litigation was filed. The court held that the claims of 2 plaintiffs were moot, due to their having been found disabled by the Social Security Administration and thereby not needing to reapply. The court held that the other plaintiffs’ claims were not moot. Some were given a period of eligibility and would have to reapply in the future. Therefore, for these plaintiffs, the problem of untimely processing was capable of repetition. One person’s claim was denied, and he was likely to reapply. Another was explicitly told to reapply. The court further found that the plaintiffs met the standing requirement, since prospective relief would remedy delays in their future applications. The court also held that The Ability Center of Greater Toledo had associational standing to sue on behalf of its members and rejected the state’s contention that the organization lacked prudential standing.
The court summarily rejected the state’s contention that the claims could not be pursued under § 1983. The court relied upon the holding in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006), that claims under 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8) and (10) were enforceable via § 1983. The court held that regulations which provide the authoritative interpretation of a statute are enforceable under the § 1983 private right of action.
Nevertheless, the court denied the motion to dismiss with regard to plaintiffs’ claims that the state failed to reasonably accommodate their disabilities, explaining that a reasonable accommodation “may exist.” The court held that it was premature for the state to allege, during a motion to dismiss, that accommodation would be difficult and costly.

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