Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/478/1301/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:55:44+00:00

Document:
An application by a daughter and son-in-law of former President Marcos of the Philippines to stay the District Court's contempt order, requiring their incarceration if they failed to testify on July 22, 1986, before a federal grand jury investigating alleged corruption relating to arms contracts made with the Philippine Government, is granted, conditioned upon applicants' filing a petition for certiorari by August 5, 1986. Applicants contended that requiring them to testify would violate their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because their testimony might be used against them in related criminal proceedings currently pending in the Philippines. The District Court granted the United States' motion to give applicants use and derivative use immunity as to criminal prosecutions in the United States, and also entered a restrictive order to protect the secrecy of their testimony, holding that the constitutional question was not presented because they had not demonstrated a real and substantial danger of prosecution abroad. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, finding that applicants faced a substantial possibility of prosecution in the Philippines; that the District Court's restrictive order was insufficient to protect against disclosures to the Philippine Government; that therefore the constitutional question was presented; and that the Fifth Amendment privilege was not violated simply because compelled testimony might be used in a foreign prosecution. The application for a stay is granted because (1) there is a reasonable probability that four Justices will vote to grant certiorari to consider the issue whether the Fifth Amendment privilege protects a witness from being compelled to give testimony that may later be used against him in a foreign prosecution; (2) there is a fair prospect that a majority of the Justices will decide the issue in applicants' favor; and (3) a balancing of the equities weighs in applicants' favor.
Applicants, a daughter and son-in-law of former President Ferdinand Marcos, ask that I stay a contempt order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requiring their incarceration if they fail to testify before a grand jury on July 22. They contend that requiring them to so testify would violate their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because their testimony might be used against them in related criminal proceedings currently pending in the Philippines. They assert they will file a petition for certiorari on this issue.
Soon after their arrival in the United States, applicants were served with subpoenas requiring their testimony before a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia to investigate alleged corruption relating to arms contracts made with the Government of the Philippines. The District Court denied the applicants' motion to quash the subpoenas on Fifth Amendment grounds, and granted instead the Government's motion to give the applicants use and derivative use immunity as to prosecutions in the United States. The court also entered a restrictive order designed to protect the secrecy of their testimony, and held that no constitutional question was presented because the applicants had not demonstrated a real and substantial danger of prosecution abroad.
compelled testimony might be used in a foreign prosecution. The court denied rehearing on July 3.
The requirements for obtaining a stay pending certiorari are well established. Such a stay should be granted only when (1) there is a reasonable probability that four Justices will vote to grant certiorari; (2) there is a fair prospect that a majority of the Justices will find the decision below erroneous; and (3) a balancing of the equities weighs in the applicant's favor. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents, 463 U. S. 1311, 1313 (1983) (WHITE, J., in chambers); Gregory-Portland Independent School District v. United States, 448 U. S. 1342 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U. S. 1306, 448 U. S. 1308 (1980) (BRENNAN, J., in chambers). In assessing whether each of these factors has been met, a Circuit Justice acts as a "surrogate for the entire Court." Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U. S. 1304, 414 U. S. 1313 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., in chambers).
"matters that might incriminate him under foreign law and pose a substantial risk of foreign prosecution, . . . then a constitutional question will be squarely presented."
Id. at 406 U. S. 481.
Against this background, it is more likely than not that at least five Justices will agree with the Court of Appeals that the applicants face the kind of risk found lacking in Zicarelli, and will therefore reach and decide the question reserved in that case. And although such matters cannot be predicted with certainty, I conclude there is a "fair prospect" that a majority of this Court will decide the issue in favor of the applicants. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), contains dictum which, carried to its logical conclusion, would support such an outcome. That case held only that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness against compelled disclosures in state court which could be used against him in federal court, or vice versa. However, the Court also discussed with apparent approval several English cases holding that the privilege protects a witness from disclosures which could be used against him in a foreign prosecution. See id. at 58-63, 77; United States v. McRae, 3 L.R. 79 (Ch.App. 1867); Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Vessen. 244, 28 Eng.Rep. 157 (Ex. 1750-1); East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Vessen. 246, 27 Eng.Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749).
depend, in part, on what protection is afforded to accused persons under Philippine law.
The Government and the public plainly have a strong interest in moving forward expeditiously with a grand jury investigation, but, on balance, the risk of injury to the applicants could well be irreparable, and the injury to the Government will likely be no more than the inconvenience of delay. Accordingly, I grant the stay, conditioned upon applicants' filing their petition for certiorari by August 5, 1986. This should permit the Court to act on the petition during its first conference of the coming Term.
* Compare Mishima v. United States, 507 F.Supp. 131, 135 (Alaska 1981); United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (ED Pa.1981); and In re Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. 1080, 1085-1086 (Conn.1972), with In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1070 (CA10 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U. S. 96 (1970); and Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402, 413 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.