Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103902/scott-vs-kentucky-parole-bd
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:57:32+00:00

Document:
his interest in any controversy with his parole board. [ Footnote 3 ] This case, however, is not moot, as a brief reference to the facts will demonstrate.
as the court might consider appropriate. Without bothering to effect service on the defendants, the District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unreported order and this Court granted certiorari, 423 U.S. 1031.
"that the litigant show the existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present interest."
review is repeatedly evaded. [ Footnote 5 ] Delay in deciding the merits will affect not only these litigants, but also other pending litigation and parole procedures in every jurisdiction in the country. A suggestion of mootness which this Court can readily decide should not be permitted to have such far-reaching consequences.
Its manifest importance is demonstrated by (a) the vast number of parole release decisions that are made every year; (b) the importance of each such decision to the person affected by it; and (c) the extensive litigation, with varying results, which has developed in the federal courts. The conflict in the Circuits over this question is more than evident. Compare the present case, Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board, No. 74-1899 (unpublished order Jan. 15, 1975), in which the Sixth Circuit held that the requirements of due process are not applicable to parole release hearings, with the following: Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (CA5 1976) (due process does not apply); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (CA7 1975) (due process applies to the extent that a written statement of reasons must be given for denial of parole), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914; Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (CA4 1974) (due process applies), vacated as moot, 423 U. S. 147 ; Childs v. U.S. Board of Parole, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 511 F.2d 1270 (1974) (due process applies to the extent that reasons must be given); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (CA2 1974) (due process applies to the extent that reasons must be given), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015; Scarpa v. U.S. Board of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (CA5 1973) (en banc) (due process does not apply), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 414 U.S. 809, dismissed as moot, 501 F.2d 992 (1973); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (CA2 1970) (due process does not apply to parole hearings; questioned in United States ex rel. Johnson, supra ), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023. See also Burton v. Ciccone, 484 F.2d 1322 (CA8 1973) (parole board must follow its own rules, but implicitly holding that due process does not apply).
The briefs and argument fully discuss the mootness issue as well as the merits.
"It is undisputed that respondent was temporarily paroled on December 18, 1974, and that this status ripened into a complete release from supervision on March 25, 1975. From that date forward, it is plain that respondent can have no interest whatever in the procedures followed by petitioners in granting parole."
423 U.S. at 423 U. S. 148 . This rationale is, of course, inapplicable to this petitioner, who remains in legal custody. See In re Sturm, 11 Cal.3d 258, 264-265, 521 P.2d 97, 101 (1974); Ramer v. Saxbe, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 83, 91-9, 522 F.2d 695, 703-704 (1975); Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201, 1208 (CA9 1974); Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 1336 (CA7 1973), adhered to en banc, 494 F.2d 85 (1974). This Court has noted that 35%-45% of all paroles are revoked. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 , 408 U. S. 479 . As long as a parolee faces such odds, he retains a continuing interest in the procedures which will be followed at future parole release hearings.
He contends that he should have received the procedural safeguards encompassed in an adjudicatory-type hearing, including notice concerning the issues and information the Board would be considering; access to the file and other information the Board would rely upon; the opportunity to present evidence and arguments to justify release and challenge or interpret evidence already before the Board; representation by an attorney or lay advocate; a transcript or summary of testimony from the hearing; and a reasoned decision by the Board. If the Court should hold that the Due Process Clause is applicable, it would not, of course, follow that petitioner would be entitled to all of the claimed safeguards. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 408 U. S. 488 -490.
Scarpa v. U.S. Board of Parole, supra; United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, supra; Bradford v. Weinstein, supra.

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