Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1985/12/31/ranasinghe-v-premadharma-and-others/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:34:35+00:00

Document:
SHARVANANDA, C. J, WANASUNDERA, J., WIMALARATNE. J.. COUN-THOMl. J.AND RANASINGHE. J.
S.C. APPEAL No. 14/84 – C. A. No. 174/80 (F> – D.C. KANDY No. 877/RE.DECEMBER 10, 1984.
Landlord and Tenant – Rent and Ejectment – Denial of tenancy – Is tenant entitled tonotice ?.
In a salt for rent and ejectment the tenant claimed he had constructed the premises andwas entitled to occupy them free of rent until the cost was set off. In effect he claimed ajus retentionis and denied tenancy.
The tenant is not entitled to notice because he had repudiated his tenancy. In such acase the landlord need not establish any one or more of the grounds of ejectmentstipulated in section 22 of the Rent Act No. 7 of 1972 for success in Ns suit forejectment.
Edirisinghe v. Patel (1973) 79(1) NLR 217 not followed.
Kandasamyv. Gnanasekeram S. C. Appeal No. 60/82 (CA. Appeal No. 629/79 – S.C.Minutes of 16.6. 1983) followed.
Edinsinghev. Patel (1973) 79(1) NLR 217.
Kandasamy v. Gnanasekeram, $.C. Appeal No. 60/82 (C.A. Appeal No. 629/79,D C. Colombo 2096/RE, S.C. Minutes of 16.6.1983.
Muttu Natchia v. Patuma Natchia (1895) 1 NLR 21.
Sundra Ammal v. JuseyAppu (1934) 36 NLR 400.
Pedrick v. Mendis (1959) 62 NLR 471.
Hassan v. Nagaria (1969) 75 NLR 335.
Mansoorv. Umma(l984) 1 SriLR 151.
Subramaniam v. Pathmanathan (1984) 1 SriLR 252.
Doe v. Prowd (1828) 4 Bing. Reports 655.
Where the plaintiff institutes action for the ejectment of thedefendant, his tenant, from premises governed Tsy the Rent Act, andwhere the defendant denies the tenancy, is the court precludedfrom granting an order of ejectment of such defendant unless theplaintiff establishes any one or more of the grounds for ejectmentstipulated in section 22 of the Rent Act ?
The plaintiff, by her plaint dated 24.3.1977, claimed arrears ofrent, damages and ejectment of the defendants, husband and wifefrom the premises in suit, which are admittedly governed by theprovisions of the Rent Act. She averred that she had rented out thepremises to the defendants at a monthly rental of Rs. 16 and that theyhave failed to pay rent since August 1972 and that by notice dated27th*November, 1976, she had requested them to quit and deliverpossession of the premises on or before the end of February 1977The defendants in their answer took up the position that they hadconstructed the house standing on the premises at a cost of Rs.
and that they were entitled to remain in occupation thereof freeof rent until the said amounts are set off. The defendants thus basedtheir right to occupation of the premises not on any tenancy under theplaintiff but on an independent title of their own – namely jusretentions. By way of reconvention they claimed this amount for theimprovements effected by them. They also denied both the receiptand the validity of the notice to quit pleaded by the plaintiff. It is clearfrom the answer that they denied the tenancy of the premises of theplaintiff, though they had in fact in an earlier action No. 10192/L,between the parties taken up the position that they were in facttenants of the plaintiff.
Are the defendants in occupation of the premises asmonthly tenants ?
Did the plaintiff oh 27.11.76, send the defendants a noticeto quit the premises on or before end of February 1977 ?
If the issues to be decided are concluded in favour, of theplaintiff, is plaintiff entitled to eject the defendants ?
(13) Was there a valid notice to quit given to the defendants ?
What sum is due as arrears of rent and damages ?
Did the defendants construct a house which is described inthe schedule to the plaint ?
The learned Additional District Judge by his judgment dated 30thApril 1980 held that the 2nd defendant occupied the premises as amonthly tenant of the plaintiff. He however rejected the copy of thenotice to quit, on the ground that as the last portion of it was missing,there was nothing to show as to who sent it. He however proceededto hold that as the defendants disclaimed tenancy under the plaintiff itwas in law not necessary for the plaintiff to have given notice oftermination of the tenancy. He held that the defendants were inarrears of rent and entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff in termsof the prayer of the plaint and directed that they be ejected from thepremises.
It would appear from the proceedings that the plaintiff had in theearlier action No. 10192/L, sued the defendants for a declaration oftitle and ejectment from the premises on the basis that they weretrespassers. The defendants in that case pleaded that the 2nddefendant was the tenant of the premises under the plaintiff and thatshe was entitled to protection from ejectment under Rent Act No. 7 of1972. The position of the defendants was upheld in that case and theplaintiff&apos;s action was dismissed.
The defendants preferred an appeal against the judgment enteredagainst them in this action. The Court of Appeal by its judgment, dated20.1 1984, allowed the defendants&apos; appeal and while upholding thatpart of the judgment entered in favour of the plaintiff for the sum of Rs.816 being arrears of rent up to the end of February 1977, set asidethe order of ejectment of the defendants. In the Court of Appeal theDistrict Judge&apos;s finding that the tenancy of the premises was underthe plaintiff was not challenged by the defendants. The judgment ofthe Court of Appeal was founded on the ground that since thedefendant was a tenant under the plaintiff of rent controlled premises,the plaintiff could succeed in getting a decree for ejectment on theground of arrears of rent, only if she established the requirements ofsection 22(3) and 22(6) of the Rent Act. The court held that since theplaintiff had failed to establish that she had given three months noticeof the termination of the tenancy to the defendants the court had nojurisdiction to grant the relief of ejectment of the defendants. Thecourt held that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to given notice oftermination of tenancy to the tenant as required by section 22(3) (a) ofthe Rent Act even though the tenant had repudiated the contract oftenancy and did not claim the benefit of the Rent Act. In reaching thisconclusion the Court of Appeal followed the judgment of the lastSupreme Court in Edirisinghe v. Patel (1) which held that the denial ofthe tenancy by the defendants will not relieve the plaintiff of the burdenof establishing the statutory requirement upon which an order forejectment could be made.
Is the defendant the tenant of the premises in suit ?
In denying the tenancy, is the defendant acting in collusionwith Sittampalam ?
(b) What damages is the plaintiff entitled to ?
Are the said premises reasonably required for the use ancloccupation of the plaintiffs as their residence ?
If issue 4 is answered in the negative, are the plaintiffs entitledto the relief prayed for in the plaint ?
Even if the premises are not required by the plaintiffs for theirresidence and if issue (1) is answered in the affirmative, as thedefendant denies tenancy are plaintiffs entitled to judgment asprayed for ?
If issue (1) is answered in the affirmative.and issue (4) in thenegative can the plaintiffs have and maintain this action ?
plaintiff was entitled to the order of ejectment of the defendant on thebasis of the defendant’s defence that he was never a tenant of thesaid premises.
&apos;The position remained unaffected whatever be the plea of thedefendant."
requirements upon which an order for ejectment could be made. Thecourt distinguished the case of Kandasamy v. Gnanasekeram (supra)on the ground that the plaintiffs in the latter case abandoned, at thestage of framing issues, their claim for an order of ejectment undersection 22(2)(b) of the Rent Act on the ground of reasonablerequirement and confined their claim for ejectment on grounds otrtlrthan those contemplated by section 22 of the Rent Act.
I find it difficult to follow the distinction drawn by the Court ofAppeal. With all respect to that court I cannot perceive any substancein the distinction sought to be drawn by that court. In Kandasamy&apos;scase, in view of the denial of the defendant that he was a tenant of theplaintiff the plaintiff raised the issue, is the defendant a tenant of tbepremises in suit ? And that issue was answered in the affirmative bythe trial Judge. There was no dispute that the premises in suit in thatcase were governed by the provisions of the Rent Act. On the basis ofthe judgment of Pathirana, J., and Sirimanne, J. in Edirisinghe v. Patel(supra), the plaintiff&apos;s action should have been dismissed. Accordingto that judgment, as the plaintiff had come into court averring that thedefendant was his tenant and had established the fact, then the"defendant cannot be ejected from the premises unless the landlordsatisfies the requirements of any one of the grounds set out in section13 or section 9 of the Rent Restriction Act".
The reconciliation by the Court of Appeal of the two cases namely.Edirisinghe v. Patel (supra) and Kandasamy v. Gnanasekeram (supra)is untenable. The latter case is. in my opinion, in conflict withEdirisinghe v. Patel, and departs from the ruling in that case.
The court in Edirisinghe v. Patel had adopted a Very literalinterpretation of the language of section 9 and 13 of the RentRestriction Act. In doing so it had not taken into consideration a veryrelevant principle of law ‘which has its basis in common sense dhdcommon justice, that a man should not be allowed to blow hot andcold, to affirm at one time and deny at another" as stated by VictorRerera, J. in Kandasamy v. Gnanasekeram (supra). It does not appearto me to be sound law to permit a defendant to repudiate a contractand thereupon specifically to rely upon a statutory defence arising onthe contract which he repudiates.
contract; the doctrine of "approbate and reprobate’ forbids this. It isonly when the defendant admits the contract that he can claim thebenefits of the contract.
In Muttu Natchia v. Patuma Natchia, (3) Browne, J. with Lawrie.J., agreeing, held that a tenant who disclaims to hold of hislandlord and puts him at defiance is not entitled to have the actionagainst him dismissed for want of a valid notice to quit. This ruling hasstood the test of time and has been accepted as part of our law – videSundra Ammal v. Jusey Appu (4), Pedrick v. Mendis (b,Hassan v.Nagaria (6), Mansoor v. Umma (7). Subramaniam v. Pathmanathan(8).
&apos;a notice to quit is only requisite where tenancy is admitted onboth sides and if a defendant denies the tenancy there can be nonecessity for a notice to end that which he says has no existence."
When the defendant disclaims the tenancy pleaded by the plaintiff hestates definitely and unequivocally that there is no relationship oflandlord and tenant between the plaintiff and him to be protected bythe Rent Act.
The rationale of the above principle appears to be that a defendantcannot approbate and reprobate. In cases where the doctrine ofapprobation and reprobation applies, the person concerned has achoice of two rights, either of which he is at liberty to adopt, but notboth. Where the doctrine does apply, if the person to whom thechoice belongs irrevocably and with full knowledge accepts the one hecannot afterwards assert the other; he cannot affirm and disaffirm.Hence a defendant who denies tenancy cannot consistently claim thebenefit of the tenancy which the Rent Act provides. For the protectionof the Rent Act to be invoked the relationship of landlord and tenant,between the plaintiff and him which is governed by the Rent Actshould not be disputed by the defendant.
the Rent Act must be construed reasonably with a view to promote theobject of the Act and not to defeat its purposes. Where literalinterpretation would tend to defeat the obvious intention of thelegislature or to lead to a wholly unreasonable result, it is to berejected in favour of a purposive construction. This process mayinvolve putting a construction which modifies the literal meaning of thewords of the Act. in order to produce a reasonable result. Where thedefendant by his conduct or pleading makes it manifest that he doesnot regard that there exists the relationship of landlord and tenantbetween the plaintiff and him, it will not be reasonable to include him inthe concept of "tenant* envisaged by section 22 of the Rent Actalthough the court may determine, on the evidence before it, that he isin fact the tenant of the plaintiff. Since such a person had by his wordsor conduct disclaimed the tenancy which entitles him to the protectionof the Rent act, it will be anomalous to grant him the protection of atenancy, which, according to him, does not exist. Invito beneficiumnon datur (D50. 17. 69) said the Romans-the law confers upon aperson no right or benefit which he does not desire. Whoeverabandons or disclaims a right will lose it. The defendant has to blamehimself for this consequence.
The decision in Edirisinghe v. Patel (supra) has erred in overlookingthe above principles and in holding the conduct of the defendant asirrelevant. Hence it was not correctly decided and should not befollowed. I prefer to follow the judgment of Victor Perera, J. withwhom Wimalaratne, J. and Colin-Thome J. agreed, on the question inissue. As the 2nd defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff and as shehad wrongfully denied the tenancy, she was not entitled to th€ benefitof the provisions of the Rent Act. It was not necessary to give anynotice of termination of the tenancy to her. Hence, the plaintiff isentitled to judgment as prayed for. The Court of Appeal on a wrong 1conception of law has reversed the judgment of the District Judgedirecting the ejectment of the defendants.
I set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and allow the appealand restore the judgment of the District Court. Thedefendant-respondents will pay the costs of the plaintiff in all threecourts.
I regret that I cannot agree to the judgment subscribed by the majority.
There is undoubtedly a series of old decisions to the effect that atenant who disclaims the contract of tenancy would not be entitled toplead the want of a valid notice to quit. But these cases were decidedin the context of the common law. The question now before us is :Have the statutory provisions of the Rent Act, No. 7 of 1972, madeinroads into this principle ? I am inclined to think they have.
Under the common law relating to periodic tenancies, a notice toquit is required to bring the tenancy to an end prior to the filing of anaction for ejectment. The Rent Act has created a statutory relationshipbetween landlord and tenant drastically altering some common lawconcepts and has been designed to ensure a great measure ofsecurity and protection to tenants.
It is evident from the above that this statutory provision is in thenature of a bar preventing the court from entertaining or proceedingwith a matter in the absence of a requisite notice, which itself has tobe computed and is made dependent on the existence of certain othercircumstances. There is a duty on the court to give effect to thisprovision and it is incumbent on the court to see that the requirementsset out in the statute are established to its satisfaction. Having regardto these statutory provisions, there is no room for the application of*the principle laid down in the cases referred to in the majorityjudgment.
In this view of the matter, I am of the view that Edirisinghe v. Patel.&apos;(1) decided by Pathirana. J. and Sirimanne, J. has been rightly decidedand the Court of Appeal has also come to a right conclusion.
For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

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