Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/168/410/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:48:47+00:00

Document:
The district court and the circuit court of appeals concurred in finding the Victory grossly in fault, and we see no reason for arriving at any other conclusion. In our opinion, the collision was the direct consequence of the Victory's disregard of the rule of the road, and her reckless navigation.
In any aspect of the case, the rule of the road was to keep to the right.
And this was proven to be the usage in the navigation of the Elizabeth River, and known to the master of the Victory.
"in coming out from Lambert's pier, gone over to the west of the channel, near to red buoy No. 22, and had not, after doing so, recrossed the channel to reach its position near buoy 9, as claimed by the Victory's counsel. The tide was not strong enough to force her over there, and it would have been out of her course to have gone there. The testimony is conclusive to that effect."
there, while the testimony of the Victory's pilot indicated that his object in heading over for the easterly side of the channel was to cut off some of the distance into port, by passing close to buoys Nos. 7 and 9.
Moreover, as immediately after straightening down, the Plymothian ported a little, and then hard ported, even if the Victory had been heading at a gradual angle across the channel all the way from Craney Island, the vessels would have been approaching each other from an oblique direction, which would have brought the inspectors' second rule into play, that vessels so situated "shall pass to the right of each other as if head and head, or nearly so."
The starboard-hand rule had no application. Although, when the Plymothian started from the pier, her starboard side must necessarily have been down stream as she turned, the vessels were never starboard to starboard after she had rounded buoy 9 and straightened down the channel, and the Victory had passed Craney Island and straightened up S. 1/2 W. Indeed, the rule applicable when two vessels "are crossing so as to involve risk of collision," that "the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way," is ordinarily inapplicable to vessels coming around bends in channels, which may at times bring one vessel on the starboard of the other. It has often been held as a general rule of navigation that vessels approaching each other in narrow channels, or where their courses diverge as much as 1 1/2 or 2 points, are bound to keep to port and pass to the right, whatever the occasional effect of the sinuosities of the channel. New York & Baltimore Transportation Co. v. Philadelphia & Savannah Steam Navigation Co., 22 How. 461; Union Steamship Co. v. New York Steamship Co., 24 How. 307; The Vanderbilt, 6 Wall. 225; The Johnson, 9 Wall. 146; The John L. Hasbrouck, 93 U. S. 405; The Berkshire, 74 F. 906.
Lambert's Point near the buoy, and proceeded on her course north one-fourth east. She was struck by the Pennsylvania, coming up, by reason of the Pennsylvania's putting her helm to starboard, instead of keeping her proper course, or porting when it became known that the Jamestown was approaching, and it was held that the Pennsylvania was solely to blame.
"in narrow channels every steamship shall, when it is safe and practicable, keep to that side of the fairway or mid-channel, which lies on the starboard side of such ship,"
which is Article 25 of the regulations adopted August 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 320, c. 802, and put in operation, after some postponements and amendments, in 1897, 29 Stat. 885, 893, and of the Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 96, c. 4.
In The Pekin (1897), App.Cas. 532, Articles 21 and 22 of these regulations were considered. Article 21 is given above, and Article 22 read as follows: "Where by the above rules one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course."
is clear that, when near the Old Dock buoy, the Pekin ported, and that at or about the same time the Normandie starboarded. The Normandie afterwards endeavored to port, but her helm failed to act owing to what is termed the 'Chow Chow' water, which is, it would appear, a well known area of eddies or whirlpools off Pootung Point. The result was that a collision occurred well to the north of the river, and somewhat to the eastward of Pootung Point, the stem of the Normandie striking the port bow of the Pekin."
"The evidence is not clear as to the whistles given by the two vessels. The learned Chief Justice of the supreme court has found that"
"at the same time, two blasts of the Normandie's whistle were blown as a signal to the Pekin, those on board the Pekin simultaneously blew one blast of her whistle."
"Those on the Pekin dispute the double blast of the Normandie, but their lordships think that, accepting, as they do, the above finding as correct, it may well be that one of the two whistles of the Normandie coincided with the one whistle of the Pekin, and so those on the Pekin heard only one whistle from the Normandie, and believed that only one was given."
to involve risk of collision, it would be completely mistaken to take the same view of two vessels in the same positions and distances in the reaches of a winding river. The reason, of course, is that the vessels must follow, and must be known to intend to follow, the curves of the river bank. But vessels may, no doubt, be crossing vessels, within Article 22, in a river. It depends on their presumable courses. If at any time two vessels, not end on, are seen, keeping the courses to be expected with regard to them, respectively, to be likely to arrive at the same point at or nearly at the same moment, they are vessels crossing, so as to involve risk of collision; but they are not so crossing if the course which is reasonably to be attributed to either vessel would keep her clear of the other. The question therefore always turns on the reasonable inference to be drawn as to a vessel's future course from her position at a particular moment, and this greatly depends on the nature of the locality where she is at that moment."
"Their lordships have restated these propositions because they appear to them decisive of this part of the present case. They are advised by their assessors, and it appears to them clear, that, having regard to the features of the locality at the time the Pekin ported her helm (that is to say, when she was near the Old Dock buoy), the vessels were not crossing vessels, within the meaning of Article 22. It was reasonable for those on the Pekin -- as, without fault on their part, they did not hear the double blast of the Normandie before they took action with their helm -- to assume that the Normandie would take the outside channel, in which case their courses would not cross, or would take the southern side of the inside channel, in which case their courses would indeed cross, but not so as to involve risk of collision."
We ought to add that, in the case before us, even if the steamers had been so far on the starboard of each other as to justify the pilots in considering that they were not meeting "head and head," or nearly so, there was no pretense of an agreement to go starboard to starboard, under Inspectors' Rule I; nor was this a case for the application of Rule III.
plainly in fault for not keeping to the right and in attempting to cross the Plymothian's course, and her speed renders her conduct still more blameworthy. It does not seem to be controverted that at the time of leaving the lighthouse her speed was five and one-half knots through the water, and there was a tide force of two knots, which would make seven and one-half knots over the ground. The circuit court of appeals found that, from Craney Island up, her speed through the water was six or seven miles an hour, with a two-mile tide assisting her, which would make her speed over the bottom eight or nine miles. Certainly she must be held to have known that she was approaching the Plymothian so as to involve the risk of collision, and should have slackened her speed, under Rule 21, and have stopped and reversed sooner than she did, when she was informed by sight and hearing that her effort to crowd the Plymothian off her rightful course must be unsuccessful.
If she could not port and keep on her own side, she should have reversed at least as early as when her second two-blast signal was blown and not assented to by the Plymothian, yet it was the Plymothian that immediately reversed on hearing that signal, and blew three danger signals, while the Victory did not blow her danger signals until after that, and manifestly did not reverse as early as the Plymothian. At the collision, the Plymothian's headway had been stopped, but the Victory had such headway on that she threw the Plymothian's bows around to starboard, while her own bows cut through the Plymothian's three decks and stringer plates, a distance of at least fifteen inches, and were damaged as far back as three feet.
but her captain and pilot admitted that they did not force the Victory out of her course, and they were passed near Craney Island, or the lighthouse, or far below the place of collision. So there were two or three schooners in the channel, but both the courts below found that they did not prevent the Victory from doing her duty by porting and keeping to the right, and her presence near them at all was attributable to her having left the western side of the channel.
We need not elaborate, in view of the concurrence of the courts below, and have gone so far into the evidence on this branch of the case because it illustrates the point on which those courts were at variance.
As between these vessels, the fault of the Victory being obvious and inexcusable, the evidence to establish fault on the part of the Plymothian must be clear and convincing, in order to make a case for apportionment. The burden of proof is upon each vessel to establish fault on the part of the other.
"Indeed, so gross was the fault of the Umbria in this connection that we should unhesitatingly apply the rule laid down in The City of New York, 147 U. S. 72, 147 U. S. 85, and The Ludvig Holberg, 157 U. S. 60, 157 U. S. 71, that any doubts regarding the management of the other vessel, or the contribution of her faults, if any, to the collision, should be resolved in her favor."
"Collision" was an exception in all the bills of lading, and, laying out of view the "negligence" and "flag" clauses, as the damage was occasioned by collision, and within the exception, it rested upon the underwriters in this case to defeat the operation of the exception by proof of such negligence on the part of the Plymothian as would justify a decree against her if sued alone. Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272, 53 U. S. 280; Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129; The City of Hartford and The Unit, 97 U. S. 323, 97 U. S. 325; The Ludvig Holberg, 157 U. S. 60.
merely the result of the limitation of liability acts, the value of the Victory not being sufficient to pay the entire damages sustained.
The circuit court of appeals and the district court arrived at different conclusions in respect of the Plymothian's entire freedom from fault. The district court held that the Plymothian was without blame, while the circuit court of appeals was of opinion that she was not wholly blameless, because she kept her course "without taking any precaution whatever until too late, and when the pending collision became inevitable." Whether she may not have been slightly in fault may be a close question. This is often so when subsequent knowledge of what might have prevented disaster tends to qualify the inquiry as to the prior duty to aver it. But, after all, the question is, as pointed out by Mr. Justice McLean in Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 101, whether it was the duty of the master, in the exercise of due care and caution in the management of his vessel, to give a particular order. And on a careful consideration of the evidence, we think that the Plymothian was not bound to change her course or to stop and reverse earlier than she did, and these are the only elements of fault imputed to her.
Were the position and course and signals of the Victory such that the Plymothian was bound to change her course, or to stop and reverse sooner than she did?
The Plymothian, in passing the buoy, straightened down the channel course on the easterly side. The only change she made after straightening down was by porting her helm, which put her closer to the easterly edge of the channel at the time of the collision. She left her pier at 4 o'clock p.m., under half speed, until she rounded the buoy, when the engines were put full speed ahead, 767 yards from the point of collision. The full speed of the Plymothian was seven knots. The tide was running against her with a force of two knots. She had her engines at full speed against the tide perhaps five minutes, and both the courts below found her speed over the ground was about four miles an hour. The Victory blew two double blast signals and a three-blast signal before the collision.
The evidence of her crew was that the two-blast signals were sounded within a half a minute or a minute of each other, when the steamer was halfway between Craney Island and buoy No. 7, and that the three blasts followed a minute or so later. The Plymothian heard only one two-blast signal and the three-blast signal at that time, as appeared from disinterested evidence on both sides. None of these independent witnesses heard two double blasts and a three-blast signal from the Victory in short succession. All of them who saw or heard the first two blasts testified that that signal was blown when the Victory was to the north of or about Craney Island. And in her petition for limitation of liability, the Victory claimed to have blown that signal "soon after passing Craney Island Light," and placed the Plymothian at that time as "apparently starting down the river from opposite Lambert's Point." But if she blew two blasts twice, where her captain and pilot said she did, they were blown close together. The Plymothian's evidence showed that she heard but one, and, if the Victory blew two blasts twice within such a short interval as she claims, it would seem that one of them overlapped the whistle from the Plymothian, or it may be that the last two blasts were overlapped by the Plymothian's danger signal.
been followed by any change of course, and if there were two two-blast signals within a half a minute, then it is fair to conclude, on the evidence, that one of them was overlapped by the whistle of the Plymothian. The Plymothian acted immediately and effectively on hearing the two-blast signal she did hear, and succeeded in stopping her headway, and this when the risk of collision first appeared, which was when the Victory last starboarded. The course of the Victory was, we have said, along mid-channel, or to the west of it, and did not involve a risk of collision until she made a change to port under a starboard helm, just before sounding the two-blast signal heard by the Plymothian. Her witnesses admit that they were starting straight up the channel after passing Craney Island Light, heading S. 1/2 W. The channel course below Craney Island, as shown by the chart, was S. by E., and in heading S. 1/2 W., her helm must have been ported, and the vessels were port to port. The testimony of the Plymothian's officers and crew was to the effect that the Victory was on their port bow all the way up from below Craney Island to the point where she changed her course just before blowing a two-blast signal, and they are corroborated by independent and disinterested witnesses. The Victory's witnesses testified to starboarding for two or three schooners who were near the point of collision, and this would account for her sheer to port, as observed on the Plymothian, when she took her precautions for safety. Each of these vessels was entitled to presume that the other would act lawfully; would keep to her own side; if temporarily crowded out of her course, would return to it as soon as possible, and that she would pursue the customary track of vessels in the channel regulating her action so as to avoid danger. The Servia, 149 U. S. 144; The City of New York, 147 U. S. 72; Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674.
The rule applicable to them was that each should keep to her own starboard side of the channel. So long as the vessels were port to port, the Plymothian, proceeding at moderate speed, was not bound to stop and reverse on the chance that the other vessel might depart from the rules of navigation.
Nor would the Plymothian necessarily have been bound to stop and reverse at once if she had heard a two-blast signal from the Victory at the time when the Victory claims to have blown it. That was, the Victory says, halfway between buoy No. 7 and Craney Island, which would be six hundred yards from the buoy, while the Plymothian was three hundred yards above the buoy, which would make the distance between the vessels nine hundred yards, or a half a mile, as the district judge found. The Plymothian was entitled to rely on her repeated single blast to correct the error of the Victory until it was made apparent by a further cross signal, or from a change of heading, that she was persisting in her wrongful course.
as she was then seen to be under a starboard helm, the Horton's whistle blew a short blast, and her engines were set full speed astern, but the Stephanotis struck the Horton, doing her great damage.
men to do what no man ought to be expected to do under such strange circumstances. Therefore, with great deference, I disagree with the severity of their sentence, and think the Stephanotis ought to be held solely to blame."
Similar views were expressed by Judge Brown, of the Southern District of New York, in The Florence, 68 F. 940.
In respect of both these vessels, the captain was acting as lookout on the bridge, but there was no lookout stationed on the bows. Can it be said that the absence of such a lookout on the Plymothian contributed to the injury? Her captain, pilot, and third officer were all on the bridge, and the view was clear and unobstructed. Would a lookout on the bows have heard or seen more than they did? The bearing of this inquiry is, of course, on the failure of the Plymothian to detect the first alleged two-blast signal blown by the Victory. We have already indicated that the evidence is, to our minds, satisfactory that that two-blast signal was blown when the Victory was below Craney Island Lighthouse. If so, the vessels were a mile and one-eighth apart, and the Victory was on the Plymothian's port bow. The Plymothian blew three single-blast signals after that time, and neither of them was dissented from by the Victory until the last one, and the proper maneuvers to avoid the risk then created were promptly taken. But if it were assumed that the first two-blast signal was blown when the Victory was halfway between Craney Island and buoy No. 7, the vessels were still half a mile apart, with room to correct the proposed erroneous course. And if the Victory blew her second two-blast signal inside of a half minute after the first, as her witnesses testified, and the Plymothian, upon hearing one of the two, immediately acted on it, the failure to hear the other cannot be considered a fault under the circumstances.
the Victory was wholly to blame, and that the Plymothian was free from fault.
Decree of the circuit court of appeals reversed; the costs of that court to be equally divided between the owners of the Victory and the underwriters. Decree of the district court affirmed, costs in this Court for preparing and printing the record to be paid by the owners of the Victory, all other costs in this Court to be divided equally between the owners of the Victory and the underwriters.
"Rule I. When steamers are approaching each other 'head and head' or nearly so, it shall be the duty of each steamer to pass to the right or port side of the other, and the pilot of either steamer may be first in determining to pursue this course and thereupon shall give as a signal of his intention one short and distinct blast of his steam whistle, which the pilot of the other steamer shall answer promptly by a similar blast of his steam whistle, and thereupon such steamers shall pass to the right or port side of each other; but if the course of such steamers is so far on the starboard of each other as not to be considered by pilots as meeting 'head and head' or nearly so, the pilot so first deciding shall immediately give two short and distinct blasts of his steam whistle, which the pilot of the other steamer shall answer promptly by two similar blasts of his steam whistle, and they shall pass on the left or on the starboard side of each other."
"Note. In the night, steamers will be considered meeting head and head so long as both the colored lights on each are in view of the other."
"Second Situation. Here, the green light only will be visible to each, the screens preventing the red light from being seen. They are therefore passing to starboard, which is rulable in this situation, each pilot having previously signified his intention by two blasts of the steam whistle."
"Rule II. When steamers are approaching each other in an oblique direction (as shown in diagram of the fourth situation), they shall pass to the right of each other, as if meeting head and head or nearly so, and the signals by whistles shall be given and answered promptly as in that case specified."
"Rule III. If when steamers are approaching each other, the pilot of either vessel fails to understand the course or intention of the other, whether from signals being given or answered erroneously, or from other causes, the pilot so in doubt shall immediately signify the same by giving several short and rapid blasts of the steam whistle, and if the vessels shall have approached within half a mile of each other, both shall be immediately slowed to a speed barely sufficient for steerageway until the proper signals are given, answered and understood, or until the vessels shall have passed each other."

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