Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180319_0000377.SIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:45:33+00:00

Document:
RICHARD BROWN, TERESA LITTLEJOHN, RICH LARSEN, CORIZON HEALTH INC., WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Defendants.
The complaint names the following defendants: 1) Richard Brown, 2) Teresa Littlejohn, 3) Rich Larson, 4) Corizon Health, Inc. (“Corizon”), and 5) Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his loss of vision in one eye, delaying treatment which resulted in permanent vision loss. The loss of vision interferes with his ability to read, work, and avoid potential altercations with other inmates. He alleges that Corizon and Wexford have a policy, enforced by Richard Brown, of delaying treatment for inmates outside the age range of 19-62 years because treatment costs for those inmates are not offset by the HIP 2.0 Medicaid expansion program.
He further alleges that Teresa Littlejohn violated Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) policy by requiring inmates to request grievance forms from their caseworkers and by failing to investigate grievances. Finally, he alleges that Rich Larson, Wabash Valley's Public Information Officer, responded to a grievance the plaintiff had filed complaining about how Teresa Littlejohn handled his medical grievances. In that response, Mr. Larson summarized the status of the plaintiff's vision problems. The plaintiff alleges that release of his medical records to Mr. Larson violated Wexford and Corizon policy, HIPAA laws, and his right to privacy. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.
First, the claims against Teresa Littlejohn are dismissed. The Seventh Circuit has “specifically denounc[ed] a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to an inmate grievance procedure.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2008). As explained in Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430-31 (7th Cir. 1996), “any right to a grievance procedure is a procedural right, not a substantive one. Accordingly, a state's inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 1430-31(internal citations omitted). Because Mr. Russelburg had no expectation of a particular outcome of his grievances or complaints there is no viable claim which can be vindicated through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 349 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (without a predicate constitutional violation one cannot make out a prima facie case under § 1983).
Furthermore, the factual allegations do not support a deliberate indifference claim against Ms. Littlejohn. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference medical claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate two elements: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) the defendant knew about the plaintiff's condition and the substantial risk of harm it posed, but disregarded that risk. Id. at 837; Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014). “[C]onduct is ‘deliberately indifferent' when the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., “the defendant must have known that the plaintiff ‘was at serious risk of being harmed [and] decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.'” Board v. Freeman, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir. 1998)). The complaint alleges that Ms. Littlejohn is a grievance specialist and there is no indication that she has any legal training or was otherwise responsible for making medical decisions regarding Mr. Russelberg's treatment. There are no allegations that Ms. Littlejohn was made personally aware of Mr. Russellburg's vision issue before he saw an outside specialist, so she could not have been deliberately indifferent to his medical condition.
Second, the claims against Richard Brown are dismissed for the same reasons the claims against Ms. Littlejohn are dismissed. In addition, his alleged enforcement of Corizon and Wexford policy is insufficient to raise a deliberate indifference claim against Mr. Brown. “Individual liability under § 1983… requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.... A causal connection, or an affirmative link, between the misconduct complained of and the official sued is necessary.”)). Whether supervisory personnel at a prison are sufficiently involved in an alleged constitutional violation such that they may be liable for damages often depends on that person's knowledge of, and responsibilities regarding, the alleged harm. The complaint contains no allegations that Mr. Brown was aware of Corizon or Wexford's alleged policy of delaying treatment for particular inmate, nor that he was aware of Mr. Russelburg's vision issue.

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