Source: https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/weekly-summaries-decisions/summary-nlrb-decisions-week-august-22-26-2016
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:44:39+00:00

Document:
Public Service Company of New Mexico (28-CA-022655, 28-CA-022759, 28-CA-022997 and 28-CA-023046; 364 NLRB No. 86) Albuquerque, NM, August 22, 2016.
A unanimous Board panel adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally implementing a policy limiting the Union’s access to its facility and by failing to provide certain requested information, and did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by taking certain other unilateral actions and by not providing other information (finding some unrequested). The panel also unanimously adopted the judge’s finding that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by removing and investigating a union steward for his conduct at a training meeting. However, a Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member Hirozawa reversed the judge to find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide information the Union requested related to this investigation.
Additionally, the same panel majority reversed the judge and found that the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) by: announcing a unilateral change to its respiratory fit-test rule, which required employees to be completely “clean-shaven”; failing to provide the Union with information related to the new “clean-shaven” rule or to issue a retraction if no such rule existed; failing to provide the Union with a contract so that the Union could determine whether to proceed with a grievance alleging the Respondent’s use of a contractor employee violated the collective-bargaining agreement; failing to provide the Union with an HR representative’s interview notes, which the majority found the manager considered in making his decision to terminate two employees; and failing to provide information regarding its reasons for including employees on its cyber-security list to enable the Union to monitor compliance with the Respondent’s cyber-security policy, established by an arbitrator’s decision. Finally, the majority reversed the judge and found that a supervisor’s removal and disposal of a Union flyer from a bulletin board in front of employees violated Section 8(a)(1).
Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part, would not join his colleagues in finding the additional Section 8(a)(5) violations above. He would find that no “clean-shaven” rule was promulgated and therefore the Respondent had no duty to provide information to the Union about a nonexistent rule. Further, he would find that the Respondent had no obligation to provide the Union with the contract, because the Union failed to demonstrate the relevancy of the information sought; the HR representative’s interview notes, because he does not view the Union’s request as covering those notes; and information regarding the inclusion of employees on the cyber-list, because he would find that the Respondent’s decisions with regard to the cyber-security list are within its sole discretion under his reading of the arbitrator’s decision. Finally, he would dismiss the Section 8(a)(1) confiscation-of-union literature violation on the grounds that it was an isolated and marginal incident.
Charges filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 611, AFL-CIO. Administrative Law Judge William L. Schmidt issued his decision on February 17, 2012. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
Seattle University (19-RC-122863; 364 NLRB No. 84) Seattle, WA, August 23, 2016.
Applying Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014), a Board panel majority consisting of Members Hirozawa and McFerran denied review of the Regional Director’s determination that the University’s contingent faculty are generally covered by the Act and that a unit comprising those faculty is appropriate for bargaining. However, the majority granted review and reversed the Regional Director’s determination to include in the unit those faculty who teach in the University’s Department of Theology and Religious Studies and in its School of Theology and Ministry because the University holds them out “as performing a specific role in creating and maintaining the school’s religious educational environment” within the meaning of Pacific Lutheran. Contrary to the dissent, the majority emphasized that in excluding these contingent faculty from the unit, they had not assessed the religious content of courses taught by the faculty or otherwise compared the content of those courses to those taught by faculty in other departments and schools. Rather, they had assessed only the University’s presentation of those courses to the faculty, students, and public at large.
Dissenting, Member Miscimarra would grant the University’s request for review in its entirety. First, in his view, the instant case illustrates the First Amendment problems created by the Board majority test in Pacific Lutheran, in which he dissented. He stated that it now appears that, under Pacific Lutheran, the Board majority will scrutinize the content of courses to determine whether to assert jurisdiction, contrary to the teachings of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Second, as in Pacific Lutheran, he believes that when determining whether a religious school or university is exempt from the Act’s coverage based on First Amendment considerations, the Board should apply the three-part test articulated by the D.C. Circuit in University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Third, even assuming that Pacific Lutheran applies, his view is that a substantial issue is raised by the Regional Director’s denial of the Employer’s attempt to introduce evidence concerning the University’s religious purpose, and limiting other evidence to the second prong of the Pacific Lutheran test.
Petitioner – Service Employees International Union, Local 925. Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
Saint Xavier University (13-RC-022025; 364 NLRB No. 85) Chicago and Orland Park, IL, August 23, 2016.
Based on similar facts and for reasons similar to those expressed in Seattle University, 364 NLRB No. 84 (2016), above, a Board panel majority consisting of Members Hirozawa and McFerran applied Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014), to deny review of the Regional Director’s determination that the University’s part-time faculty are generally covered by the Act and that a unit comprising those faculty is appropriate for bargaining. However, as in Seattle University, the majority granted review and reversed the Regional Director’s determination to include in the unit those faculty who teach in the University’s Department of Religious Studies because the University holds them out “as performing a specific role in creating and maintaining the school’s religious educational environment” within the meaning of Pacific Lutheran. Contrary to the dissent, the majority emphasized that in excluding these part-time faculty from the unit, they had not assessed the religious content of courses taught by the faculty or otherwise compared the content of those courses to those taught by faculty in other departments and schools. Rather, they had assessed only the University’s presentation of those courses to the faculty, students, and public at large.
Petitioner – St. Xavier University Adjunct Faculty Organization, IEA-NEA. Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York (02-RC-143012; 364 NLRB No. 90) New York, NY, August 23, 2016.
A full-Board majority consisting of Chairman Pearce, Member Hirozawa, and Member McFerran reversed the Board’s 2004 decision in Brown University, which categorically excluded student teaching and research assistants from the Act’s coverage. Instead, the Board held that student teaching and research assistants are employees under the Act if they meet the Act’s broad definition of an employee, which encompasses individuals who meet the common law test for employment. Further, the Board found no policy reasons for excluding student assistants, noting that there is no basis to conclude that the Act’s coverage will interfere with laws or practices pertaining to university education. The Board noted that collective bargaining has been successfully carried out in the public sector without infringement on academic concerns. Applying the common-law test, the Board found that Columbia’s student assistants were employees, as they performed services under the direction of their university in exchange for compensation. Finally, the Board determined that, in view of their substantial community of interest, a unit of undergraduate, Master’s, and Ph.D. assistants is an appropriate unit, and that none of those categories should be excluded as temporary employees. The Board remanded the matter to the Regional Director for appropriate proceedings in connection with the Union’s petition to represent Columbia’s student assistants.
Dissenting, Member Miscimarra urged that Brown University should be upheld. He argued that, in view of the substantial financial investment of students in postsecondary education and the long-term importance of their university education, collective bargaining rights, with their attendant prospects of strikes or other labor conflict, pose too great a risk to warrant extending such rights to student assistants. He further observed that various protections and procedures that the Act provides to unions and employees would be at odds with the traditional educational relationship between students and universities. He also asserted that differences in tenure and job duties among the various petitioned-for classifications negated the appropriateness of the unit.
Petitioner – Graduate Workers of Columbia–GWC, UAW. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of The United States, its Territories and Canada, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 838 (Freeman Decorating) (27-CB-093060; 364 NLRB No. 81) Salt Lake City, UT, August 23, 2016.
A Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member Hirozawa dismissed the complaint, finding that the Union did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining an attendance rule that conditions hiring hall users’ eligibility for job referral upon the payment of assessments to the Union for noncompliance with that rule. The majority found that, because the Union’s rule affects referents’ employment status, the General Counsel established a rebuttable presumption that the rule would encourage union membership. Nonetheless, the majority found that the Union rebutted this presumption by showing that the rule: (1) did not violate the Union’s duty of fair representation; and (2) is necessary to the Union’s effective performance of its function of representing its constituency.
With regard to the Union’s duty of fair representation, the majority emphasized that there is no indication that the Union’s policy is arbitrary, discriminatory, or has been applied in bad faith. As to the Union’s necessity rebuttal, the majority found that the Union’s rule is reasonably designed to serve its stated objective of ensuring “the effective performance of its hiring hall referral function so as to preserve Respondent’s reputation and relationship with employers to which it supplies labor.” The majority reasoned that, given that trade shows last for only a short time, “it is surely rational for the Union to take preemptive measures to deter hiring hall users from committing attendance infractions, in order to facilitate the referral of available workers, to allow for the potential removal of offenders from the eligible pool upon nonpayment, and to cover administrative costs.
Dissenting, Member McFerran argued that, on the stipulated record, the Union had failed to carry its burden to show that its denial of employment was “necessary to the effective performance of [the union’s] function of representing its constituency” —i.e., the effective operation of the hiring hall. In so doing, she emphasized that the Union’s denial of employment was being used solely to punish users’ failure to pay fines to the Union, rather than to address the underlying attendance issues.
Charge filed by an individual. Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran participated.
Aliante Gaming, LLC d/b/a Aliante Casino and Hotel (28-CA-126480; 364 NLRB No. 80) Las Vegas, August 23, 2016.
Applying Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), the Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by disciplining and subsequently discharging an employee because she was a union officer and engaged in union activity. However, the Board reversed the judge to find that the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling that employee not to discuss her discipline with other employees. The Board reasoned that the restriction impinged upon the employee’s Section 7 right to discuss discipline with her fellow employees, and that the Respondent had failed to present any business justification for the restriction.
Charge filed by Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 and Bartenders Union Local 165, a/w UNITE HERE. Administrative Law Judge Kenneth W. Chu issued his decision on March 17, 2015. Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran participated.
King Soopers, Inc. (27-CA-129598; 364 NLRB No. 93) Denver, CO, August 24, 2016.
A full Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by unlawfully interrogating an employee about her protected, concerted activity, and by twice suspending and discharging that employee for engaging in protected, concerted activity. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Member Miscimarra joined in all of the unfair labor practice findings except for the majority’s finding that the employee’s first suspension was unlawful.
Additionally, the Board adopted a new remedial policy of awarding search-for-work and interim employment expenses regardless of discriminatees’ interim earnings and separately from taxable net backpay, with interest. Previously, the Board treated discriminatees’ search-for-work and interim employment expenses as an offset against interim earnings. A full-Board majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran explained that the Board had never provided an explanation or reasoned policy rationale for its traditional treatment of search-for-work and interim employment expenses. Further, the majority found that the practical result of the Board’s traditional approach has been less than make-whole relief for the most seriously aggrieved victims of unlawful conduct, contrary to the central remedial principle underlying the Act. The majority noted that its traditional approach has not only failed to make victims of unlawful conduct whole, but also may have discouraged discriminatees in their job search efforts. The majority found that modifying its treatment of search-for-work and interim employment expenses to eliminate the offset will bring these payments in line with the Board’s treatment of similar expenses incurred by discriminatees. Finally, the majority explained that awarding search-for-work and interim employment expenses separately from taxable net backpay, with interest, will avoid potential tax complications caused by the Board’s traditional approach. This new remedial policy was applied retroactively in this case and will be applied to all pending cases.
Member Miscimarra dissented from the remedial changes adopted by the majority. In his view, the majority’s revised remedial approach will produce a windfall in certain cases, and therefore, exceeds the Board’s remedial authority. Additionally, Member Miscimarra believes that awarding search-for-work and interim employment expenses separately creates a substantial risk of protracted litigation that will delay the availability of backpay awards. Finally, Member Miscimarra would find that the Board’s traditional approach is consistent with the practice of other agencies.
Charge filed by an individual. Administrative Law Judge Amita Baman Tracy issued her decision on October 22, 2015. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
The Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School (04-RC-143831; 364 NLRB No. 87) King of Prussia, PA, August 24, 2016.
A full-Board majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran reaffirmed and applied the Board’s longstanding test, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600 (1971), and found that the School is not exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction as a “political subdivision” of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. Nor did the majority find any persuasive reason for the Board to exercise its discretion to decline to assert jurisdiction over the School or all charter schools under Section 14(c)(1). The majority stated that it was not announcing a bright-line rule asserting jurisdiction over charter schools by its decision.
Applying the two-pronged Hawkins County test, the majority found the School fails the first prong because it was not “created directly by” the Commonwealth to be “an administrative arm” of government, but by private individuals as a nonprofit corporation, which holds a charter to operate as an independent public school, more like a subcontractor than a governmental department. Under the second prong of the Hawkins County test, the majority, adopting the reasoning in Charter School Administration Services, 353 NLRB 394 (2008), found that the dispositive inquiry is whether a majority of individuals who administer the School, the governing board, are appointed by and subject to removal by public officials. Applying that test, the majority found that the School fails this prong because its board is a self-perpetuating entity where the appointment and removal of members are acted upon by a majority vote of the members, none of whom are public officials. Further, the majority declined to discretionarily assert jurisdiction over all 14 cyber charter schools in Pennsylvania under Section 14(c)(1), as the Employer requested, or over charter schools as a category, as their dissenting colleague would do. The majority rejected the School’s and the dissent’s argument that charter schools do not have a substantial effect on commerce, noting that the School itself serves 3000 students and its operating budget is in the millions of dollars annually. Further, the majority found that, even though charter schools may be subject to state and local regulatory oversight, they are similar to government contractors, over which the Board has routinely asserted jurisdiction. The majority was not persuaded by the dissent’s argument that the fact-specific inquiry required under Hawkins County would provide parties with no way to reliably predict whether they will be subject to the Board’s jurisdiction and would lead to instability and confusion, reasoning that, as more cases are decided, predictability will emerge.
Dissenting, Member Miscimarra did not address the majority’s finding that the School fails to constitute a political subdivision under the Hawkins County test. Rather, in his view, the Board should decline to exercise jurisdiction over charter schools because charter schools have an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce and because asserting jurisdiction would result in instability and confusion about whether parties fall under the Act’s coverage.
Petitioner – PA Virtual Charter Education Association, PSEA/NEA. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
American Baptist Homes of The West d/b/a Piedmont Gardens (32-CA-025247, et al.; 364 NLRB No. 95) Oakland, CA, August 24, 2016.
The Board denied the Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the Board’s Decision and Order reported at 364 NLRB No. 13 (2016). The Board found that the Respondent had not identified any material error or demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances” warranting reconsideration. A Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member Hirozawa disagreed that the Board had applied new law, but nevertheless addressed the Employer’s argument regarding retroactivity. Member Miscimarra, adhering to his dissent in the underlying decision, concurred only in the majority’s conclusion that the Respondent had not established “extraordinary circumstances” warranting reconsideration under the Board’s rules.
Charges filed by Service Employees International Union, United Healthcare Workers-West. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local 860 (Headlands Contracting & Tunneling, Inc.) (08-CD-087934; 364 NLRB No. 76) Cleveland, OH, August 24, 2016.
In this jurisdictional dispute, the Board awarded the work to employees represented by the Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local 860, rather than employees represented by the Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio Regional Council of Carpenters.
Charge filed by Headlands Contracting & Tunneling, Inc. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and McFerran participated.
Hyde Leadership Charter School – Brooklyn (29-RM-126444; 364 NLRB No. 88) Brooklyn, NY, August 24, 2016.
This is a companion case to the full-Board decision in Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School, 364 NLRB No. 87 (2016), above, and similarly involves the issue of whether the Board has jurisdiction over a charter school. A Board panel majority consisting of Members Hirozawa and McFerran applied the Supreme Court’s test in Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600 (1971), and found that the School is not exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction as a “political subdivision” of the State of New York under Section 2(2) of the Act. Nor did the majority find any compelling reason to discretionarily decline to assert jurisdiction over New York charter schools or all charter schools under Section 14(c)(1).
Applying the two-pronged Hawkins County test, the majority found that the School is not a political subdivision under the first prong because the School was not “created directly by” any New York government entity, legislation, or public official, but instead by private individuals. Specifically, the majority found that it was the School’s executive director’s initiative and the School’s founding board’s preparatory work, including the promulgation of the School’s governing and operating documents, that “created” the School, not the approval of the charter and incorporation of the School by the Board of Regents, the governing body of the State’s Department of Education. Moreover, the majority found that the School was not created as an arm of government under the first prong because, while the state charter school law labels charter schools as political subdivisions, it is federal, not state law, that governs the determination of whether an entity created under state law is a political subdivision. Further, the majority noted that two decisions of New York’s highest court support their interpretation that charter schools are not political subdivisions. Finally, the majority noted that it was not persuaded by the dissent’s argument that the structure and operation of the School (e.g., that the School receives public funding or that the School is under the Board of Regents’ oversight) compels a finding that the School is an arm of government. Under the second prong, the majority found that the record contains no evidence that any public official was involved in the selection or removal of any members of the board of trustees. Rather, the School’s executive director identified the initial trustees in her charter school application, who became the governing board and incoming board members have since been appointed by the sitting board members. The majority found that the Board of Regents’ limited authority to remove a trustee for malfeasance or the New York City School Chancellor’s limited authority to appoint trustees, insufficient to constitute direct personal accountability to public officials under Hawkins County. Further, the majority found no persuasive reason to discretionarily decline jurisdiction over all charter schools in New York, as the Union and amici requested, or over all charter schools, as their dissenting colleague would do, for the same reasons stated in Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School. In addition, the majority rejected the argument that charter schools are analogous to the horse racing and dog racing industries, over which the Board has declined jurisdiction, reasoning that the racing industries are unique in character and involve extensive involvement of state regulatory bodies to preserve the integrity of those activities.
Dissenting, Member Miscimarra would find that the record establishes that the School is a political subdivision of the State of New York under both prongs of the Hawkins County test. Under the first prong of Hawkins County, Member Miscimarra would find that the School was created directly by the Board of Regents when it approved the charter school application and incorporated the School. Further, Member Miscimarra would find that the School was created as an arm of government because the state characterizes charter schools as “political subdivisions” under its charter school law, the School receives most of its funds from the state and federal government, and the Board of Regents exercises continued oversight over the School. Member Miscimarra would also find that the School meets the second prong of Hawkins County because the Board of Regents appointed the initial board of trustees and because, under certain circumstances, the Board of Regents may remove and the Chancellor may appoint trustees. For the same reasons he articulated in his dissent in Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School, Member Miscimarra believes that the Board should discretionarily decline to exercise jurisdiction over charter schools under Section 14(c)(1).
Petitioner – Hyde Leadership Charter School-Brooklyn. Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
Aliante Gaming, LLC d/b/a Aliante Casino and Hotel (28-CA-145644; 364 NLRB No. 78) North Las Vegas, NV, August 25, 2016.
The Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by unlawfully suspending and discharging an employee for her union activity (primarily handing out union authorization cards). The Board rejected the Respondent’s argument that the General Counsel had failed to show animus so as to meet his initial burden under Wright Line; the Board agreed with the judge that several factors, including the pretextual nature of the Respondent’s asserted reason for the suspension and discharge (“dishonesty” and “filing a false report”), its disparate treatment of a security supervisor who had engaged in blatant dishonesty, and its failure to apply progressive discipline all evinced animus. The Board found the Respondent’s numerous failures to follow its own internal procedures in the course of its investigation to be particularly compelling evidence of animus.
Charge filed by Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 and Bartenders Union Local 165, a/w UNITE HERE. Administrative Law Judge Gerald M. Etchingham issued his decision on October 30, 2015. Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran participated.
UNITE HERE! Local 5 (Hyatt Corporation d/b/a Hyatt Regency Waikiki) (20-CB-127565 and 20-CB-127695; 364 NLRB No. 94) Honolulu, HI, August 25, 2016.
A Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member Hirozawa affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s dismissal of the Section 8(b)(1)(A) allegation. They found that a letter the Respondent sent to both members and nonmembers requesting payment of dues arrearages (not core representational fees) for a time when no union-security clause was in effect did not restrain or coerce nonmembers in the exercise of their statutory rights. The majority relied on the fact that, in requesting dues payment, the Respondent’s letter did not invoke a union-security clause but its own internal bylaws, and that the stated consequence for nonpayment of dues was suspension from the Union, which nonmembers would not reasonably find to be coercive. Because the letter refers only to the Respondent’s internal processes, the majority found the only reasonable understanding nonmembers could have had of this letter was that it was sent to them by mistake.
Dissenting, Member McFerran found that the Respondent’s letter could reasonably be construed as coercive because it demanded dues from employees who did not owe them and made clear that the Respondent would take steps to collect the money it erroneously claimed they owed.
Charges filed by individuals. Administrative Law Judge John J. McCarrick issued his decision on September 18, 2015. Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran participated.
Brunswick Bowling Products, LLC (07-RD-169464; 364 NLRB No. 96) Muskegon, MI, August 25, 2016.
The Board granted the Requests for Review of the Regional Director’s Decision and Order filed by the Employer and the Petitioner, as they raised a substantial issue solely with regard to the preclusive effect of the Union’s untimely statement of position under the Board’s Rules and Regulations. The Board found, pursuant to Section 102.66(d) of the Board’s Rules, that the Regional Director erred by receiving into evidence the Union’s statement of position, which was untimely served on the Employer and the Petitioner by 3 hours and 20 minutes, and by not precluding the Union from raising the contract bar issue. The Board noted that the Union did not file a motion for an extension of time to file and serve its statement of position and that it provided no explanation for failing to serve its statement of position in a timely manner. However, the Board concluded that the Regional Director’s error in failing to apply the preclusion provision to the Union did not affect the validity of her conclusion that the petition was barred by the collective-bargaining agreement between the Employer and the Union. The Board explained that Section 102.66(d), the preclusion provision, specifically precludes a defaulting “party” from raising an issue it was required to but failed to timely raise, but the rule does not preclude any other party from raising an issue and it does not preclude the regional director from addressing an issue. Thus, the Board concluded that the Regional Director did not abuse her discretion in receiving evidence regarding the existence of a contract bar, and did not err in finding that the petition was barred by contract, because the contract bar issue was raised by the Petitioner on the face of the petition, the Regional office then obtained a copy of that contract in the course of its prehearing investigation, the Petitioner and the Employer further confirmed the existence of the contract before the opening of the hearing when they signed a stipulation to that effect, and the stipulation was received into evidence with no objection by any party before any mention of the Union’s statement of position. Once a petition is filed, the regional director is charged with the responsibility to investigate the petition and determine whether a question concerning representation exists. Accordingly, the Regional Director appropriately dismissed the petition based on the contract bar.
Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part, addressed the issues in more detail and stated that the Board’s decision represents an important clarification and significant improvement regarding the Election Rule’s treatment of the statement-of-position requirement and principle of preclusion. However, he adhered to his dissenting views regarding the Board’s Election Rule generally.
Petitioner – an individual. Union – District Lodge 60, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
S. Freedman & Sons, Inc. (05-CA-121221, 05-CA-132227 and 05-CA-138025; 364 NLRB No. 82) Landover, MD, August 25, 2016.
A unanimous Board panel affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4) and (1) by terminating an employee for participating in Board proceedings and subsequently converting the termination into a suspension. The panel also unanimously adopted the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by terminating the same employee a couple of months later for invoking his contractual right to refuse overtime work.
A Board panel majority consisting of Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa reversed the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by conditioning the employee’s reinstatement on signing a settlement agreement that included a confidentiality clause. The majority found that the settlement agreement contained a narrowly tailored waiver and the employee received the benefit of reinstatement for that waiver. Member McFerran, dissenting in part, found that the confidentiality agreement was not narrowly tailored in that it potentially impacted the ability of the employee, a union steward, to help other employees with their grievances.
Charges filed by the Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 639 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Administrative Law Judge Michael A. Rosas issued his decision on March 31, 2015. Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
Equinox Holdings, Inc. (20-RC-153017; 364 NLRB No. 103) San Francisco, CA, August 26, 2016.
A Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member Hirozawa denied the Employer’s Request for Review of the Regional Director’s Decision and Certification of Representative on the ground that it raised no substantial issue warranting review. Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part, would have granted the Employer’s Request for Review as to a portion of the Employer’s Objection 2, regarding a Union observer who brandished a gun in the presence of other employees and was escorted out of the facility by the police. Contrary to the majority, Member Miscimarra would find that the Union observer’s service warranted overturning the election. He would further find it unnecessary to pass on whether the Regional Director properly denied the Employer’s request to reopen the record or for rehearing with respect to its allegation that Union observers created the impression of surveillance. Member Miscimarra joined his colleagues in denying review in other respects.
The majority noted that the Union observer did not engage in any misconduct during his service as an election observer. The majority also noted that the Employer’s manager’s uncorroborated hearsay testimony did not establish that the alleged gun-brandishing incident actually occurred, whether it occurred within the critical period, and whether it had anything to do with the union campaign.
Petitioner – Service Employees International Union, Local 87. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
IMI South, LLC, d/b/a Irving Materials (09-CA-073769 and 09-CA-080462; 364 NLRB No. 97) Louisville, KY, August 26, 2016.
A Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member Hirozawa reversed the Administrative Law Judge and found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally transferring a portion of bargaining unit work from union-represented mechanics at the Respondent’s facility in Louisville, Kentucky to unrepresented employees at its facility in New Albany, Indiana. The majority found that neither the language of the collective-bargaining agreement nor extrinsic evidence, including bargaining history, established that the Union clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the relocation of work. The majority also reversed the judge and found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by failing to reinstate mechanics who engaged in an economic strike.
Dissenting, Member Miscimarra found that, under Dubuque Packing, 303 NLRB 386 (1991), enfd. 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the Respondent had no obligation to bargain over its decision. Although Member Miscimarra would find that the Respondent had a potential obligation to bargain over the effects of its decision, he found that the Union waived its right to bargain by failing to request bargaining. He also dissented from the finding that the Respondent unlawfully failed to reinstate striking mechanics.
Charges filed by General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 89 a/w the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Administrative Law Judge Arthur J. Amchan issued his decision on December 18, 2012. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
Paragon Systems, Inc. (05-CA-127523; 364 NLRB No. 75) Washington, DC, August 26, 2016.
The Board reversed the Administrative Law Judge and found that the Respondent was not a “perfectly clear” successor under NLRB v. Burns Intl. Security Services, 406 U.S. 272, 294–295 (1972), and Spruce Up Corp., 209 NLRB 194, 195 (1974), enfd. per curiam 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975). Because the Respondent was not a “perfectly clear” successor, the Board found that it did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by changing certain terms and conditions of employment when it began operations without giving the Union notice or the opportunity to bargain, and the Board therefore dismissed the complaint.
Charge filed by National Association of Special Police and Security Officers. Administrative Law Judge Eric M. Fine issued his decision on September 30, 2015. Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran participated.
David Saxe Productions, LLC and Vegas! The Show, LLC, Joint/Single Employers and Fab Four Live, LLC, Joint/Single Employers (28-CA-075461 and 28-CA-084151; 364 NLRB No. 100) Las Vegas, NV, August 26, 2016.
The Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s findings that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) by, during a meeting on December 13, 2011: (1) prohibiting employees from engaging in protected concerted activity and by disparaging employees; (2) impliedly threatening employees with discharge; and (3) threatening employees with unspecified reprisals because they engaged in protected concerted activity. The Board agreed with the judge’s dismissal of the allegation that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) during the December 13 meeting by promulgating and enforcing an overly broad and discriminatory rule prohibiting employees from complaining about wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.
A Board panel majority consisting of Members Hirozawa and McFerran also adopted the judge’s finding that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) in a December 21, 2011 email by threatening that failure to cease engaging in protected activity would result in discharge, and by maintaining the “non-union” provision in their employment agreements, which requires employees to acknowledge that their employment is not under the jurisdiction of any union, with penalties for breaching this provision. Contrary to the judge, the majority found that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) by discharging an employee from Vegas! The Show and The BeatleShow for engaging in protected concerted activity.
Dissenting in part, Member Miscimarra disagreed with the majority’s findings that: (1) the Respondents’ December 21, 2011 email constituted an unlawful threat; (2) the “non-union” clause is unlawful; and (3) the employee’s discharge was unlawful.
Charges filed by an individual. Administrative Law Judge Eleanor Laws issued her decision on May 7, 2013. Members Miscimarra, Hirozawa, and McFerran participated.
G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. (28-CA-023380; 364 NLRB No. 92) Tempe AZ, August 26, 2016.
The Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by: (1) instructing and threatening employees not to talk to other employees or supervisors about the Union at work; (2) creating an impression of surveillance; and (3) threatening not to rehire employees who were in favor of the Union. The Board also adopted the judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging an employee, but did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by promulgating or reinforcing an overbroad confidentiality rule during the employee’s unemployment compensation hearing. Reversing the judge, the Board found that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by: (1) maintaining the portion of its confidentiality rule that restricts the use or disclosure of “G4S or client information”; or (2) telling an employee that it had a problem with her because she called in sick multiple times.
A Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member Hirozawa adopted the judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by: (1) maintaining a confidentiality policy that prohibited employees from discussing “wages and salary information,” and “giv[ing] or mak[ing] public statements about the activities or policies of the company” without written permission; (2) maintaining a handbook rule prohibiting employees from wearing “insignias, emblems, buttons, or items other than those issued by the company” without permission; and (3) maintaining a social networking policy that prohibits employees from commenting on “work-related matters without express permission of the Legal Department,” and posting on any social networking site “photographs, images, and videos of G4S employees in uniform or at a G4S place of work.” In doing so, the majority found that a federal contractor’s posting of a required notice of employee rights under the Act by itself is insufficient to clarify an otherwise unlawful ambiguity in a challenged work rule. Dissenting in part and concurring in part, Member Miscimarra stated that he would apply the test set forth in his dissenting opinion in William Beaumont Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 162 (2016), to find the prohibition against talking about “wages and salary information” unlawful and the remaining rules lawful.
Finally, the same majority (Member Miscimarra dissenting) adopted the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by disciplining an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity.
Charge filed by International Union, Security, Police, and Fire Professionals of America (SPFPA). Administrative Law Judge Eleanor Laws issued her decision on March 29, 2012. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
Creative Vision Resources, LLC (15-CA-020067; 364 NLRB No. 91) New Orleans, LA, August 26, 2016.
A Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member Hirozawa, reversing the Administrative Law Judge, found that the Respondent was a “perfectly clear” successor under NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972) and its progeny, and therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing, as of June 1, 2011, to provide the Union with notice or an opportunity to bargain before imposing initial terms and conditions of employment for the unit employees. Citing Spruce Up Corp., 209 NLRB 194 (1974), enfd. per curiam 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975), and related cases, the majority found that an examination of the successor’s plans regarding the retention of the predecessor’s employees, and the timing and clarity of the successor’s expressed intentions concerning existing terms and conditions of employment, established that the Respondent was a “perfectly clear” successor. Further, the majority rejected the Respondent’s and the dissent’s position that, even assuming the Respondent was a “perfectly clear” successor, the bargaining obligation was not triggered until the Union demanded bargaining on June 6.
Dissenting in part, Member Miscimarra found that the facts established that the Respondent was not a “perfectly clear” successor under Spruce Up. He would find, in agreement with the judge, that the Respondent provided timely notice to the unit employees of its intention to set new terms and conditions of employment. Further, he found that the Union’s failure to demand recognition or bargaining until June 6 independently precluded a finding that the Respondent was a “perfectly clear” successor on or before June 2. In his view, a demand for recognition or bargaining cannot be dispensed with in the “perfectly clear” successor context.
Charge filed by Local 100, United Labor Unions. Administrative Law Judge Keltner W. Locke issued his decision on January 7, 2013. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
Novelis Corporation (03-CA-121293, et al.; 364 NLRB 101) Oswego, NY, August 26, 2016.
The Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by: (1) restoring Sunday premium pay and unscheduled overtime pay; (2) threatening employees that, if they selected the Union: (a) the Respondent would lose business; (b) employees would lose jobs; (c) wages would be reduced; and (d) more onerous working conditions would be imposed; (3) maintaining an overly broad work rule that unlawfully interferes with employees’ use of the Respondent’s email system for Section 7 purposes; (4) selectively and disparately enforcing the Respondent’s posting and distribution rules; (5) prohibiting employees from wearing union insignia on their uniforms while permitting employees to wear antiunion and other insignia; (6) interrogating employees; (7) threatening employees by telling them that they did not have to work for the Respondent if they were unhappy with their terms and conditions of employment; (8) impliedly threatening an employee with layoff if employees selected the Union; (9) soliciting employees’ complaints and grievances and promising employees improved terms and conditions of employment if they did not select the Union; and (10) maintaining and giving effect to its overly broad unlawful social media policy.
The Board modified the judge’s finding that the Respondent threatened employees with plant closure if they voted for union representation, finding that the Respondent threatened employees with the loss of their jobs. The Board also modified the judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawfully disparaged the Union when it falsely represented to employees that the Union filed charges seeking the rescission of Sunday premium pay and unscheduled overtime, finding that the Respondent’s conduct constituted interference, restraint and coercion that unlawfully tended to undermine the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
The Board agreed with the judge that, on four occasions, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by removing union literature from break areas. However, a Board panel majority consisting of Members Hirozawa and McFerran found the violations because the Respondent removed union literature from a mixed use area, rather than adopting the judge’s rationale that the conduct was unlawfully discriminatory. Chairman Pearce agreed with the judge’s rationale.
In addition, the Board affirmed the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by demoting an employee because of his protected concerted and union activities in posting comments on Facebook reflecting continuing support of the Union and discontent with existing conditions of employment. However, the Board did not rely on the judge’s analysis under Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. on other grounds 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). The Board further agreed with the judge that, under Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31 (2014), affd. 629 Fed. Appx. 33 (2d Cir. 2015), the employee’s Facebook posting did not lose its protected status under the Act, but did not rely on the judge’s invocation of NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), and Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), because the case did not involve any issues regarding disparagement or disloyalty.
Finally, the Board agreed with the judge’s recommendation to issue a Gissel bargaining order, reasoning that the Respondent committed numerous unfair labor practices, including three particularly serious violations. The Board emphasized that: (1) the Respondent granted a substantial benefit to employees by restoring Sunday premium pay and unscheduled overtime pay to thwart the organizing campaign; (2) during captive audience meetings, the Respondent threatened employees with job loss; and (3) the Respondent demoted the leader of the organizing effort shortly after the election because of his protected social media posting. Finally, the Board denied the Respondent’s motions to reopen the record to proffer evidence of alleged substantial employee and management turnover since the judge recommended the Gissel order.
Charges filed by United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers, International Union, AFL-CIO. Administrative Law Judge Michael A. Rosas issued his decision on January 30, 2015. Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran participated.
Marist College (03-RC-127374) Poughkeepsie, NY, August 23, 2016. The Board adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations to sustain the Petitioner’s challenges to the ballots of 33 dual-function adjuncts who are employed by the Employer both as adjuncts and in other positions. The Board found that the parties unambiguously intended to exclude such dual-function adjuncts from the stipulated unit. Additionally, even assuming that the meaning of the stipulated unit was ambiguous, the Board found that an examination of extrinsic evidence resolved any ambiguity. The Board also adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations to sustain the Petitioner’s Objections 7 and 10, but clarified that the correct standard to apply in this case was whether the Employer’s conduct had the tendency to interfere with the employees’ freedom of choice. The Board found it unnecessary to pass on the Petitioner’s Objection 8. Petitioner – Service Employees International Union, Local 200 United. Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran participated.
Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. (07-RC-163178) Sterling Heights, MI, August 25, 2016. The Board denied the Employer’s motion to reopen the record, which sought to introduce evidence of alleged changes to the bargaining unit since the close of the representation hearing. The Board found that the evidence at issue did not provide a basis for reopening the record. Petitioner – Local 324, International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE), AFL-CIO. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
MHA, LLC d/b/a Meadowlands Hospital Medical Center (22-CA-086823) Secaucus, NJ, August 22, 2016. The Board denied the Respondent’s request for special permission to appeal from four of the Administrative Law Judge’s orders, without prejudice to the Respondent’s right to renew its arguments before the Board on any exceptions that may be filed to the judge’s decision. The Board granted the Respondent’s request for special permission to appeal the judge’s March 28, 2016 Order revising March 11 Order on privilege log and remanded to the judge to provide a more detailed rationale, based on record evidence, for finding that certain documents are privileged based on attorney-client privilege. Charge filed by Health Professionals and Allied Employees, AFT/AFL-CIO. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and McFerran participated.
UPS Ground Freight, Inc. d/b/a UPS Freight (15-CA-166828) Little Rock, AR, August 22, 2016. The Board denied the Employer’s petition to revoke an investigative subpoena duces tecum. The Board found that the subpoena sought information relevant to the matter under investigation and described with sufficient particularity the evidence sought, and that the Employer failed to establish any other legal basis for revoking the subpoena. The Board stated that, in considering the petition to revoke, it evaluated the subpoena in light of the Region’s clarifications regarding the scope of the subpoena. Charge filed by an individual. Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran participated.
Nexeo Solutions, LLC (20-CA-035519) Fairfield, CA, August 22, 2016. The Board denied Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Board’s Decision and Order reported at 364 NLRB No. 44 (2016), on the ground that the Respondent had not identified any material error or demonstrated extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration. Member Miscimarra, while adhering to the views expressed in his partial dissent in the underlying decision, agreed that there were no grounds for granting the motion for reconsideration. Charge filed by Brotherhood of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 of Alameda County, a/w the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
Nexeo Solutions, LLC (20-CA-035519) Fairfield, CA, August 22, 2016. The Board denied the Union’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Board’s Decision and Order reported at 364 NLRB No. 44 (2016), on the ground that the Union had not identified any material error or demonstrated extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration. The Board declined to impose the additional remedies requested by the Union, finding that the Union had not shown that the additional remedies proposed in its exceptions and motion for reconsideration are necessary to ameliorate the effects of the violations committed by the Respondent. Member Miscimarra, while adhering to the views expressed in his partial dissent in the underlying decision, agreed that there were no grounds for granting the motion for reconsideration. Charge filed by Brotherhood of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 of Alameda County, a/w the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
La Jomac Group, Inc., Jag Premier, Inc., Data Processing Specialists, Pangea Industries LLC, Barrios Street Realty, LLC, and Pangea Enterprises, Inc. (15-CA-137333 and 15-CA-137337) Houma, CA, August 23, 2016. A Board panel majority consisting of Chairman Pearce and Member McFerran denied Pangea Enterprises, Inc.’s petition to revoke an investigative subpoenas duces tecum. The majority found that the subpoena sought information relevant to the matter under investigation and described with sufficient particularity the evidence sought, and that the Employer had failed to establish any other legal basis for revoking the subpoenas. Dissenting, Member Miscimarra found that the General Counsel had not set forth a sufficient objective basis for requesting documents regarding the Employer’s status as a joint employer. Charges filed by an individual. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and McFerran participated.
Wisconsin Bell, Inc. (AT&T Wisconsin) (18-CA-147635 and 18-CA-163323) Fond du Lac and Sheboygan, WI, August 24, 2016. No exceptions having been filed to the July 12, 2016 decision of Administrative Law Judge Charles J. Muhl’s finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices, the Board adopted the judge’s findings and conclusions, and ordered the Respondent to take the action set forth in the recommended Order. Charges filed by Communications Workers of America, Local 4622.
Sazerac Distillers, LLC d/b/a Barton Brands of California, Inc. (21-CA-162489) Carson, CA, August 24, 2016. No exceptions having been filed to the July 13, 2016 decision of Administrative Law Judge Ariel L. Sotolongo finding that the Respondent had not engaged in certain unfair labor practices, the Board adopted the judge’s findings and conclusions, and dismissed the complaint. Charge filed by Food, Industrial & Beverage Warehouse, Drivers and Clerical Employees, Local 630, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
United States Postal Service (05-CA-119507) Baltimore, MD, August 26, 2016. The Board denied Respondent’s motion for reconsideration and/or reopening the record. In doing so, the Board found that that the Respondent had not identified any material error or demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances” warranting reconsideration. As for reopening, the Board found that the Respondent sought to introduce evidence of events that postdated the close of the hearing. Member Miscimarra, while adhering to his views in the underlying decision, agreed that the Respondent failed to present any evidence warranting reconsideration or the reopening of the record. Charge filed by American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
Tarlton and Son, Inc. (32-CA-119054 and 32-CA-126896) Fresno, CA, August 26, 2016. The Board denied the Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the Board’s Decision and Order reported at 363 NLRB No. 175 (2016). The Board found that the Respondent had not identified any material error or demonstrated extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration. Member Miscimarra, while adhering to his dissent in the underlying decision, agreed that the Respondent failed to present any evidence warranting reconsideration of that decision. Charges filed by an individual. Chairman Pearce and Members Miscimarra and Hirozawa participated.
Hobson Bearing International, Inc. (14-CA-156114; JD-78-16) Diamond, MI, August 24, 2016. Errata to the August 19, 2016 decision of Administrative Law Judge Christine E. Dibble. Errata Amended Decision.
Ingredion, Inc. d/b/a Penford Products Co. (18-CA-160654 and 18-CA-170682; JD-77-16) Cedar Rapids, IA. Administrative Law Judge Mark Carissimi issued his decision on August 26, 2016. Charges filed by BCTGM Local 100G, a/w Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers, and Grain Millers International Union, AFL-CIO.
Metalsa Structural Products, Inc. (25-CA-165965; JD-80-16) Owensboro, KY, August 26, 2016. Administrative Law Judge Charles J. Muhl issued his decision on August 26, 2016. Charge filed by United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC.

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