Source: http://tx.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180328_0000599.STX.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:12:53+00:00

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v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Defendant.
Plaintiff Maria R. Manzano (“Ms. Manzano”) seeks review of the denial of her request for disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). The Parties consented to have this Court conduct all proceedings in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 11, 12, 13. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion, GRANTS the Commissioner's motion, and DISMISSES the action with prejudice.
Ms. Manzano is a 50 year old woman. R. 153. She last worked as a small parts assembler at Kemlon Products and Development Group from 2006 to 2011. R. 45-46, 159-60. She purportedly left because she had arthritis and difficulty walking. R. 52. On January 24, 2013, Ms. Manzano first filed an application under Title II seeking benefits beginning on April 1, 2011, when the effects of a 1996 hip surgery became disabling and she stopped working. R. 27. She filed another application on the same basis on February 14, 2013. R. 153-54. On May 17, 2013, the Commissioner denied Ms. Manzano's claim. R. 87-90. On May 21, 2013, Ms. Manzano requested reconsideration of her claim, alleging her high blood pressure condition as an additional basis for her claim. R. 92, 173-77. On June 28, 2013, her claim was again denied. R. 84, 93-95. On July 26, 2013, Ms. Manzano requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). R. 96.
The ALJ Katherine W. Brown conducted a hearing on December 9, 2014. R. 38-66. Ms. Manzano appeared by telephone. R. 27, 111. A vocational expert, Mr. Michael L. Stinson, also testified. R. 38-66. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 47 years old. R. 45. Although Ms. Manzano originally claimed the onset date of her disability was April 1, 2011, at the hearing she amended this date to November 5, 2012. R. 44. In addition to the effects of her hip surgery and hypertensive blood pressure, Ms. Manzano testified that arthritis of her hands, fingers, and knees; headaches; and antihypertensive medication side effects of dizziness, nausea, and fatigue also contributed to her inability to work. R. 38-66. On March 27, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision, denying Ms. Manzano's application for benefits. R. 21-37.
On May 22, 2015, Ms. Manzano requested the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision. R. 17-18. On August 1, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Manzano's request for review. R. 4-11. On October 24, 2016, the Appeals Council sent Ms. Manzano another letter notifying her that they received and reviewed additional medical evidence regarding her claim, but found no basis to reopen and change the ALJ's decision, thereby rendering the ALJ's decision final. R. 1-3; see Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106 (2000) (explaining that when the Appeals Council denies the request for review, the ALJ's opinion becomes the final decision). On November 22, 2016, Ms. Manzano commenced this civil action.
(1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence; and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. See Id. (“The findings of the Commissioner … as to any facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive….”); Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence” means “that quantum of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000). It is “something more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Id; Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002).
A reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence in the record, retry the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner, not the courts, to resolve. Id. At the same time, however, judicial review must not be “so obsequious as to be meaningless.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The “substantial evidence” standard is not a rubber stamp of the Commissioner's decision. It involves more than a search for evidence supporting the Commissioner's findings. Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985); Singletary v. Brown, 798 F.2d 818, 822-23 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he substantial evidence test does not involve a simple search of the record for isolated bits of evidence which support the [Commissioner's] decision.”). Rather, a reviewing court must scrutinize the record as a whole, taking into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence supporting the Commissioner's findings. See Cook, 750 F.2d at 393. A court “may affirm only on the grounds that the Commissioner stated for [the] decision.” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014).
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a); Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2007). Before moving from Step Three to Step Four, the Commissioner assesses a claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) based on “all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). A claimant's RFC is the most she can still do despite her physical and mental limitations. Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1). At Step Four, the Commissioner uses the claimant's RFC to determine whether the claimant can still perform past relevant work. The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps of this inquiry. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2005). At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must show that, in light of the claimant's RFC, she can perform other substantial work in the national economy. Id. If the Commissioner makes that showing, the burden shifts back to the claimant, who must rebut the Commissioner's finding. Id.
The ALJ determined that Ms. Manzano was not disabled at Step Four of the sequential analysis. R. 33. She found Ms. Manzano to have a severe left hip injury, and a combination of numerous other non-severe impairments: hypertension, headaches, temporomandibular joint disorder (“TMJ”), neck pain, obesity, and a knee injury. R. 29-30. However, the ALJ found these impairments do not rise to the level of severity of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 30. She found Ms. Manzano has the RFC to perform light work, including lifting or carrying up to twenty pounds; standing, walking, or sitting for up to six hours; unlimited ability to push and pull; and no other limitations. R. 30. The ALJ determined Ms. Manzano's statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely credible or not fully supported by the medical evidence, and she would still be capable of performing her past work as a small products assembler. R. 33.
Ms. Manzano insists the ALJ erred because: (1) the ALJ's RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ failed to consider Ms. Manzano's complaints; (3) the ALJ failed to properly develop the record by failing to refer the claim to a vocational rehabilitation agency or for consultative examination; (4) the ALJ gave the non-examining state agency physician's opinions more weight than Plaintiff's treating physician's; and (5) the ALJ used an inaccurate RFC assessment and presented incomplete hypotheticals to the vocational expert.
1. Plaintiff claims the ALJ's RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), (c)(2)-(3).
a. Plaintiff's medical records reflect her physical examinations were normal and fail to show an impact on daily activities.
Under the listings of impairments that could be considered disabling, impairments of the musculoskeletal system are marked by “signs of limitation of motion or other abnormal motion of the affected joint(s)” and/or “inability to ambulate [or move] effectively.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing 1.01 et seq. Ms. Manzano's medical records do not show such limitations. Nor do the medical records document any such complaints from Plaintiff. To the contrary, all of her physical examinations were essentially normal; she had a normal range of motion in her extremities; normal motor and sensory functions, reflexes, gait, coordination, and upright posture; and she was able to independently perform all activities of daily life. See, e.g., Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992). The records do not reflect Plaintiff ever complained she was unable to perform her daily activities or care for herself.

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