Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83908:58652&catid=1589&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:15:29+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 186455, November 19, 2014 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ROSALINDA CASABUENA, Respondent.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ROSALINDA CASABUENA, Respondent.
This is an appeal filed by appellant Rosalinda Casabuena assailing the June 25, 2008 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02575. The CA decision affirmed the November 16, 2007 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Laoag City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
That on or about the 4th day of February, 2004, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell in a buy bust operation to Armando Joaquin acting as the poseur-buyer 0.0139 gram of shabu, a dangerous drug, contained in one plastic sachet, without any license or authority to sell the same, in violation of the aforecited law.
The appellant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge laid.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses in the trial that ensued: Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Rovimanuel Balolong; Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Mary Ann Nilo Cayabyab; Armando Joaquin; and SPO2 Loreto Ancheta.
The appellant and Reynante Abian testified for the defense.
When the team arrived there, they positioned themselves 15 meters from the appellant’s compound. Armando followed them after receiving a call from SPO1 Balolong. Armando entered the appellant’s house when he arrived; he went out after two (2) minutes and made the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team. Immediately after, SPO1 Balolong, PO1 Mangapit, and PO1 Celso Pang-ag went inside the appellant’s house.
Once inside, Armando handed the sachet of shabu to SPO1 Balolong. Armando then led the police to the bathroom, and there, Armando grabbed the left hand of the appellant. SPO1 Balolong, for his part, “forced open” the appellant’s right hand and took two P100 bills from her.6 SPO1 Balolong informed the appellant of her constitutional rights, and then ordered PO1 Mangapit to arrest her.
Armando declared on the witness stand that in the afternoon of February 4, 2004, he reported to SPO1 Balolong that the appellant was selling shabu. SPO1 Balolong handed him P200.00, and told him use the money in buying shabu from the appellant. SPO1 Balolong and his team then went to the target area, while the appellant was left at the police station. Afterwards, SPO1 Balolong called Armado on the phone, and told him to come to the target area. Armando rode a tricycle, alighted at Ablan Avenue, and went inside the appellant’s house.
The defense presented a different version of the events.
The appellant testified that on February 4, 2004, she was in front of the bathroom of her house, and about to take a bath, when she saw Armando talking with Abian. The appellant called Abian and requested him to buy shampoo.17 Thereafter, Armando entered the appellant’s house, approached the appellant, and tried to give her money. The appellant refused to accept the money, and returned to the bathroom to take a bath.
In its decision dated November 16, 2006, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered her to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA held that the prosecution was able to prove that the appellant sold shabu to the poseur-buyer. It found Armando to be a credible witness, in the absence of any showing that there was ill motive on his part to falsely testify against the appellant. It also ruled that Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 965 had been “dutifully followed” when the police conducted a field test of the drugs recovered had been made, and forwarded it and the marked money to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
In her brief and supplemental brief, the appellant essentially maintains that the chain of custody over the seized drug was broken. She added that the integrity and evidentiary value of the object evidence had not been preserved.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the sale of the shabu between the appellant and the civilian informant had been established. It further argued that the police followed the procedures in the handling and safekeeping of the seized drugs.
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.22 The outlined procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the seized evidence. The testimonies of SPO1 Balolong, SPO2 Ancheta, and Armando all showed that the police did not inventory or photograph the seized shabu either at the place where it was seized or at the police station. Notably, no photographs or certificate of inventory of the confiscated items appear in the records.
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification why it failed to inventory and to photograph the seized items. The Court cannot simply presume what these justifications are. Contrary to the CA’s ruling, the so-called “field test of the drugs recovered” and its turn over to the crime laboratory together with the marked money are not the procedures mandated by Section 21 and its IRR.
In the present case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.
A vital link in the chain of custody is SPO1 Balolong’s possession of the plastic sachet at Barangay 5, Laoag City and his delivery of this sachet at the police station. We point out that SPO1 Balolong did not mark the plastic sachet; it was SPO2 Ancheta who allegedly placed markings when the plastic sachet was handed to him at the police station.
It bears noting that SPO2 Ancheta was already the third person (after Armando and SPO1 Balolong) to get hold of the seized shabu from the time it was allegedly sold by the appellant to the poseur-buyer. While marking at the police station is permissible following our ruing in People v. Resurreccion,26 we express doubts whether the seized sachet had really been marked, and if so, whether the marked shabu was the same shabu taken from the appellant and eventually presented in court.
Will you look again at Exhibit “B” and please tell the Court if you can find the initial or signature of the accused ROSALINDA CASABUENA?
So, you do not know of your own personal knowledge from whom the specimen ordinarily called shabu came from?
I understand that after your laboratory examination of the specimen[,] another Officer or expert in your Office made another examination, did I understand you right?
Sir, I was the only one who examined the specimen.
x x x x27 (Emphasis supplied).
P/Sr. Insp. Cayabyab’s testimony is inconsistent the claim of SPO2 Ancheta that he marked the seized sachet with, among others, “RC” which stands for the appellant’s initials. We are puzzled why the specimen presented to SPO2 Ancheta bore the initial “RC” while the item presented to P/Sr. Insp. did not have the appellant’s initials.
Notably, while the Initial Laboratory Report stated that the specimen submitted contained “markings,” it did not specify what these marking were. Unlike the usual chemistry reports, Chemistry Report No. D-011-2004 likewise did not state what markings the police placed on the plastic sachet submitted for laboratory exam. In the absence of any evidence, we cannot assume that the markings being referred to in both the Initial Laboratory Report and in the Chemistry Report were the same markings allegedly placed by SPO2 Ancheta. We cannot assume a matter not stated in the records.
We also note that there is a discrepancy between the quantity of shabu stated in the Request For Laboratory Examination (0.1 gram) and in the Chemistry Report No. D-011-2004 (0.0139 gram). It is dangerous to assume that the police merely rounded off the weight of the shabu when it made the Request. At any rate, common sense and fair play dictates the police to state the exact quantity of the drug or drugs being requested to be examined since shabu, by its very nature, is susceptible to alteration, tampering, substitution, and exchange.
x x x The presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. There is indeed merit in the contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members of the buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed their duty, but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular. People v. Dulay and People v. Ganenas in fact both suggest that the presumption of regularity is disputed where there is deviation from the regular performance of duty. Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.
We also find it highly unusual that the police would allow a civilian walk-in informant like Armando to transact with the appellant on his own. During the sale, all the police officers were positioned outside appellant’s house, such that Armando even had to step out of the house in order to give the pre-arranged signal to them. SPO1 Balolong also admitted that he did not witness the appellant hand the shabu to the poseur buyer. While police are given wide leeway in the manner of conducting their entrapment operations, the ideal scenario would have been to have a member of the police act as a poseur buyer, so that a member of the police could be part of, and be a witness to, the transaction.
In sum, we hold that the appellant’s acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt with moral certainty. Corollarily, the prosecution's failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the June 25, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02575. Appellant Rosalinda Casabuena is hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
1Rollo, pp. 2-8; penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, and concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino, Arturo G. Tayag, and Sixto Marella, Jr. Associate Justice Lucenito Tagle dissented.
2 CA rollo, pp. 14-24; penned by Judge Conrado A. Ragucos.
3 Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
5 TSN, May 28, 2004, pp. 4-5.
8 TSN, July 13, 2004, p. 14.
11 TSN, September 29, 2004, pp. 3-5.
14 TSN, January 19, 2005, pp. 2-7.
15 TSN, January 20, 2006, pp. 2-10.
17 TSN, May 12, 2000, pp. 4-8.
21 See People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029, August 19, 2010, 627 SCRA 309, 318.
22 See People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 304-305.
23People v. Garcia, 599 Phil. 416, 431 (2009), citing People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214 (2008).
24Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 185460, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 541.
25 See People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 170213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92, 102, citing Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632.
26 G.R. No. 186380, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 510.
27 TSN, July 13, 2004, p. 9.
28 See People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010, 637 SCRA 791, 822.
29 G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140.
30 See People v. Santos, 562 Phil. 458, 472 (2007), citing People v. Tan, 401 Phil. 259, 273 (2000).

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