Source: https://www.longbeachlaw.com/stephanie-loftin
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 17:17:50+00:00

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I was born in Chattanooga Tennessee and have been an attorney at law since 1990. Since then, I have gained significant Family, Criminal and Civil Law experience as I am admitted to all state courts in California as well as the federal district court of appeal.
We practice in all courthouses in the five counties of Los Angeles, Orange County, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego but have also had cases in Martinez, Ventura County, Indio and El Centro. I recently traveled to Bakersfield for a successful Contempt defense.
More than 20 years, I have provided my volunteer services to the Long Beach Superior Court Family Law Mediation Program. In addition I founded the Legal Clinics at Rainbow Battered Women's Shelter in San Pedro, empowering women to get restraining orders; dissolutions, and to file Paternity actions so their children could be fed and clothed.
I was also Trial Counsel for Beth C. vs. Marcia B., Non-published, upheld in Second District, Division 7. Non-RDP, Non-Marital Partner of a lesbian relationship found to be parent under F.C. 7611(d).
In the published case of Ellis v. Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000 which established Putative Spouse rights for Registered Domestic Partners, 11 days before the In Re Marriage Cases, served as Co-Counsel.
If you would like to inquire about presentations regarding legal rights pertaining to LGBT individuals, couples and families, please contact our office (562) 621 6300.
In 2002, Supervisor Don Knabe appointed me a to the County of Los Angeles Commission on Alcoholism, where I served for seven years; two years as Chair.
I sat Judge Pro Tem for Los Angeles Superior Court in Traffic, Unlawful Detainer, Small Claims, Domestic Violence Restraining Orders and Family Law Divisions.
PROPOSITION 47: Certain persons currently serving felony sentences may Petition the sentencing court to have their sentences reduced to misdemeanors. In addition, certain offenders who have already completed a sentence for a felony that qualifies under the new law may apply to the sentencing court to have their felony conviction designated a misdemeanor.
My approach is to be your counselor at law. I will provide competent, caring, legal counseling to get you through some of your most difficult and trying times.
I do my Family Law practice for the children. They have no voice. They will be together with their parents forever...until the parents die or all of the children are dead, because the child(ren) of the parties will want their parents to attend ALL of their major life events: marriages; graduations; births of babies; holidays; you name it. If it is important to your child, you should be there for them! I try to get the parties into a working relationship for the best interest of their child(ren). If there is not TOO much conflict, then the kids benefit from the parents ability to co-parent.
Recognized by Cal State Long Beach, “Legal Aid Center” in 1994-1995.
Women Lawyer's of Long Beach - received Attorney of the Year Award and Pro Bono Service Provider.
Ellis v. Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000 which established Putative Spouse rights for Registered Domestic Partners, 11 days before the In Re Marriage Cases!
IN RE: the DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP OF Darrin ELLIS And David James Arriaga. Darrin Ellis, Appellant, v. David James Arriaga, Respondent.
We hold: Under the California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 (Stats.2003, ch. 421) (the Domestic Partner Act), and consistent with the rationale of our Supreme Court in Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 115 P.3d 1212 (Koebke ), a person's reasonable, good faith belief that his or her domestic partnership was validly registered with the California Secretary of State entitles that person to the rights and responsibilities of a registered domestic partner, even if the registration never took place.
The California Legislature's stated purpose in enacting the Domestic Partner Act was to extend to registered domestic partners all the rights, benefits, and obligations of married persons, with the exception of the rights, benefits, and obligations accorded only to married persons by federal law, the California Constitution, or initiative statutes. Under the equitable putative spouse doctrine, a person's reasonable, good faith belief that his or her marriage is valid entitles that person to the benefits of marriage, even if the marriage is not, in fact, valid. The doctrine is not accorded by federal law, the California Constitution, or a voter initiative. It therefore extends to those who intended to register their domestic partnerships under the Domestic Partner Act and had a reasonable, good faith belief that the registration had occurred, despite the failure to properly complete the registration. As a result, a person may plead and attempt to prove that he or she is entitled to the rights and responsibilities of a registered domestic partner under these circumstances.
In this case, the trial court dismissed a petition for dissolution of a domestic partnership because the domestic partnership had never been registered with the California Secretary of State. Appellant submitted a declaration in opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss the petition stating he believed his partner had completed the registration process with the state after they signed and had notarized the necessary documents. We conclude the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss the petition without permitting appellant an opportunity to plead and prove a reasonable, good faith belief in the existence of a registered domestic partnership; we therefore reverse.
We decide this case by applying well-settled and uncontroversial principles of statutory construction, driven by the Legislature's express stated intent in enacting the Domestic Partner Act. We do not reach other, broader issues urged by appellant.
On September 8, 2006, Darrin Ellis filed a petition for dissolution of his domestic partnership with David James Arriaga. Ellis alleged the domestic partnership had been registered on August 14, 2003.
Arriaga filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing the declaration of domestic partnership, which he and Ellis signed and had notarized on August 14, 2003, had never been filed with the California Secretary of State, and no domestic partnership had therefore been formed.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding putative status was unavailable to domestic partners who had not registered with the California Secretary of State.
To summarize, the Domestic Partner Act provides: (1) it must be construed liberally to give registered domestic partners the same rights and obligations as married couples, to the extent permissible by law; and (2) the same rights, protections, and benefits are to be granted to registered domestic partners dissolving their domestic partnership as are granted to spouses dissolving their marriage. As explained, ante, the law of this state is that an individual with a reasonable, good faith belief in the validity of his or her marriage, even if that marriage is void or voidable, is entitled to protection as a putative spouse. (Fam.Code, § 2251, subd. (a).) Given the intended reach of the Domestic Partner Act, we conclude that a person with a reasonable, good faith belief in the validity of his or her registered domestic partnership is similarly entitled to protection as a putative registered domestic partner, even if the domestic partnership was not properly registered.
Here, the trial court erred in its conclusion that the putative spouse doctrine could only apply if Ellis and Arriaga had registered their domestic partnership. The whole point of the putative spouse doctrine is to protect those whose marriage was not or could not be properly formalized, or was void, voidable, or otherwise invalid. The Domestic Partner Act was intended by the Legislature to extend to registered domestic partners the legal rights and responsibilities held by married couples to the extent permitted by law. The putative spouse doctrine is not a right or obligation accorded by federal law, the California Constitution, or voter initiative, and therefore is not excluded from the rights granted and obligations imposed under the Domestic Partner Act. There is no sound reason under California statutory law to deprive domestic partners of the rights granted to registered domestic partners if they reasonably believed they were so registered.
Similarly, here, we are convinced that the legislative intent of the Domestic Partner Act is to apply the equitable putative spouse doctrine codified in Family Code section 2251 to persons with a reasonable, good faith belief in the validity of their registered domestic partnerships, enabling them to plead and prove they reasonably believed they were registered domestic partners.
Given our holding, we need not reach other issues urged by Ellis, namely, whether a contrary decision would violate federal or state constitutional guarantees of equal protection, or that we should equitably read into existing statutes the language necessary to equalize the statuses of married couples and registered domestic partners.
Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154 is inapposite. To the extent it is inconsistent with our holding, we disagree with that decision.
To the extent Velez is inconsistent with our conclusions, we respectfully disagree with its conclusion regarding putative domestic partnerships. The court in Velez stated that if the Legislature had intended the putative spouse doctrine to apply to registered domestic partnerships, it would have expressly said so. (Velez, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1174, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 642.) As explained in detail ante, however, the Domestic Partner Act was specifically designed by the Legislature to make the rights and responsibilities of registered domestic partners as similar to the rights and responsibilities of married couples as permissible under California law, without actually recognizing a right of gay and lesbian couples to marry. The Domestic Partner Act marked a sea change in the manner by which rights were extended by law to registered domestic partners.
Finally, perhaps in part because of its holding that the Domestic Partner Act could not be applied retroactively, the court in Velez, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1154, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 did not consider or analyze Family Code section 299, subdivision (d), which provides: “The superior courts shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to the dissolution of domestic partnerships, nullity of domestic partnerships, and legal separation of partners in a domestic partnership. The dissolution of a domestic partnership, nullity of a domestic partnership, and legal separation of partners in a domestic partnership shall follow the same procedures, and the partners shall possess the same rights, protections, and benefits, and be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties, as apply to the dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, and legal separation of spouses in a marriage, respectively ․” (Italics added.) If the dissolution of a registered domestic partnership is to follow the same procedures, and the “partners” involved are to have the same rights as the parties in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, then how can the equitable putative spouse doctrine not be included in the rights of a domestic partner who had a reasonable, good faith belief he or she had complied with the registration requirements imposed by the State of California? To give effect to the statute, Ellis must have the right to plead and prove his case.
The judgment is reversed. Because respondent did not oppose the appeal, both sides shall bear their own costs on appeal.
2. In his amicus brief, the Attorney General does not take a position whether the putative spouse doctrine should be recognized under the Domestic Partner Act. Instead, the Attorney General argues this court should recognize a putative registered domestic partnership doctrine in the exercise of our equitable powers. The Attorney General's criticism of the Velez case is made in this context.
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, Acting P.J., and IKOLA, J.
Audrey "Stephanie" Loftin was born in Chattanooga Tennessee. After attending the University of Texas at El Paso, majoring in finance and accounting, minor in real estate, she attended Western State University School of Law. After founding Long Beach Law in 1990, she served as President of Women Lawyers of Long Beach, the Family Law Section of the L.B. Bar, and is a lifetime member of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and California Women Lawyers.
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