Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96804/united-states-vs-borden-co
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 17:15:47+00:00

Document:
2. The construction of an indictment by the District Court binds this Court on an appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act. P. 308 U. S. 194 .
3. A decision of the District Court holding that an indictment failed to charge an offense under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act because of the effect on that Act of later statutes, held a construction of the Sherman Act and reviewable under the Criminal Appeals Act. P. 308 U. S. 195 .
4. Repeals by implication are not favored. When there are two Acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible. P. 308 U. S. 198 .
5. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 does not operate to repeal the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in its application to agreements of producers, distributors and others, restricting interstate commerce in milk, when such agreements are not participated in or directed by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the former Act. Pp. 308 U. S. 196 -202.
6. A license issued by the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to the marketing of milk in a given area is not a defense to an indictment under the Sherman Act for conspiracies in restraint of that commerce, alleged to have been continued after the license had expired. P. 308 U. S. 202 .
7. An order issued under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act regulating marketing of milk is not a defense to an indictment of producers, distributors and others under the Sherman Act charging conspiracies engaged in before the period covered by the order. P. 308 U. S. 202 .
8. The Capper-Volstead Act, in authorizing producers of agricultural products, including dairymen, to act together in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling and marketing their products in interstate and foreign commerce, and to have marketing agencies in common and make necessary agreements to effect these purposes, did not authorize a conspiracy of dairymen with distributors, labor officials, municipal officials, and others, to maintain artificial and noncompetitive prices to be paid to all producers for all fluid milk produced in Illinois and neighboring States and marketed in the Chicago area, which would compel independent distributors to exact a like price from their customers and would control the supply of fluid milk permitted to be brought to the city. P. 308 U. S. 203 .
9. Under § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to determine, subject to judicial review, whether any such cooperative association monopolizes or restrains interstate trade to such an extent that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced, and to issue a cease and desist order. But this qualifying procedure was not intended to replace, postpone, or prevent prosecution under § 1 of the Sherman Act for the punishment of conspiracies by producers and others such as are described in the last preceding paragraph. P. 308 U. S. 205 .
10. Where the District Court has based its decision on a particular construction of the underlying statute, the review here under the Criminal Appeals Act is confined to the question of the propriety of that construction. Distinguishing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304 . P. 308 U. S. 206 .
First. The first two of these principles, as the Government concedes, preclude our review of the decision below as to count three. For that count was held bad upon the independent ground that it is defective as a pleading, being duplicitous and also lacking in definiteness. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370 , 211 U. S. 397 -399; United States v.
Carter, 231 U. S. 492 , 231 U. S. 493 ; United States v. Hastings, 296 U. S. 188 , 296 U. S. 192 -194. The appeal as to count three must be dismissed.
The District Court further summarized the allegations in these counts as to the methods by which the alleged conspiracies were intended to be effected. 28 F.Supp. pp. 179-181. This construction of the indictment is binding upon this Court on this appeal. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525 , 226 U. S. 535 , 226 U. S. 540 ; United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 , 250 U. S. 301 ; United States v. Schrader's Son, 252 U. S. 85 , 252 U. S. 98 ; United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S. 450 , 256 U. S. 461 ; United States v. Hastings, supra, p. 296 U. S. 192 .
of the effect of the later statutes, these counts did not charge an offense under § 1 of the Sherman Act. This was necessarily a construction of the Sherman Act. United States v. Patten, supra; United States v. Birdsall, 233 U. S. 223 , 233 U. S. 230 ; United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 , 302 U. S. 217 . We are not impressed with the argument that the court simply construed the later statutes. The effect of those statutes was considered in determining whether the Sherman Act has been so modified and limited that it no longer applies to such combinations and conspiracies as are charged in counts one, two and four. Thus, the Sherman Act was not the less construed because it was construed in the light of the subsequent legislation.
The court invoked the Capper-Volstead Act, [ Footnote 3 ] as its judgment shows, only in relation to certain defendants, that is, the Pure Milk Association, an agricultural cooperative organization, and its officers and agents. We shall consider later the effect of that statute upon the charge against those defendants.
See also Posados v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497 , 296 U. S. 504 .
actual party to the agreements. § 8b. [ Footnote 7 ] The orders are also to be made by the Secretary for the purpose of regulating the handling of the agricultural commodity to which the particular order relates. § 8c(3)(4). [ Footnote 8 ] That the field covered by the Agricultural Act is not coterminous with that covered by the Sherman Act is manifest from the fact that the former is thus delimited by the prescribed action participated in and directed by an officer of government proceeding under the authority specifically conferred by Congress. As to agreements and arrangements not thus agreed upon or directed by the Secretary, the Agricultural Act in no way impinges upon the prohibitions and penalties of the Sherman Act, and its condemnation of private action in entering into combinations and conspiracies which impose the prohibited restraint upon interstate commerce remains untouched.
These explicit provisions requiring official participation and authorizations show beyond question how far Congress intended that the Agricultural Act should operate to render the Sherman Act inapplicable. [ Footnote 13 ] If Congress had desired to grant any further immunity, Congress doubtless would have said so.
We have no occasion to decide whether, in any particular case, an indictment under the Sherman Act, by reason of its particular terms, would be subject to demurrer, or to a motion to quash, upon the ground that the indictment ran against the provisions of such an agreement or order. We have no such situation here. There is indeed a contention that there was a license (No. 30) issued by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1934, amended in January, 1935, and in force until March 2, 1935, which related to the marketing of milk in the Chicago area, and hence that defendants operating under that license were not subject to the charges of the conspiracies alleged to have begun in January, 1935. But the allegations of the indictment are that the unlawful conspiracies continued throughout all the period mentioned in the indictment, that is, up to the time of its presentment in November, 1938. This clearly imports that the conspiracies were operative after the license came to an end, and thus in the absence of any license. A conspiracy thus continued is, in effect, renewed during each day of its continuance. United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601 , 218 U. S. 607 , 608; Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347 , 225 U. S. 369 ; Brown v. Elliott, 225 U. S. 392 , 225 U. S. 400 . It is also said that there is a recent marketing order under date of August 29, 1939, [ Footnote 14 ] which relates to the Chicago marketing area, and hence that this cause is moot. But that order affects a period subsequent to the time covered by the indictment. These contentions are unavailing in relation to the question before us.
(2) There remains the question whether the court below rightly held that the Capper-Volstead Act [ Footnote 15 ] had modified the Sherman Act so as to exempt the Pure Milk Association, a cooperative agricultural organization, and its officers and agents from prosecution under these counts.
We are unable to accept that view. We cannot find in the Capper-Volstead Act, any more than in the Agricultural Act, an intention to declare immunity for the combinations and conspiracies charged in the present indictment. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, [ Footnote 16 ] had authorized the formation and operation of agricultural organizations provided they did not have capital stock or were conducted for profit, and it was there provided that the antitrust laws should not be construed to forbid members of such organizations "from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof." They were not to be held illegal combinations. The Capper-Volstead Act, enacted in 1922, [ Footnote 17 ] was made applicable as well to cooperatives having capital stock. The persons to whom the Capper-Volstead Act applies are defined in § 1 as producers of agricultural products, "as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers." They are authorized to act together "in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce" their products. They may have "marketing agencies in common," and they may make "the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes."
of the charge. For it is well settled that, where the District Court has based its decision on a particular construction of the underlying statute, the review here under the Criminal Appeals Act is confined to the question of the propriety of that construction. United States v. Keitel, supra; United States v. Kissel, supra, p. 218 U. S. 606 ; United States v. Miller, 223 U. S. 599 , 223 U. S. 602 ; United States v. Carter, supra; United States v. Colgate & Co., supra; United States v. Schrader's Son, supra; United States v. Hastings, supra. The case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 299 U. S. 304 , is not opposed, as there, the decision of the District Court was not based upon a particular construction of the underlying statute, but upon its invalidity, and the jurisdiction of this Court extended to the consideration of the rulings of the District Court which dealt with that question.
See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U. S. 49 , 286 U. S. 61 .

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