Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/175/148.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:09:02+00:00

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[175 U.S. 148, 148] This was an action at law brought by Augustin Daly, and prosecuted since his death by the executors of his will, for [175 U.S. 148, 149] the violation of a dramatic copyright. In 1867 Daly was the owner of a dramatic composition entitled 'Under the Gaslight,' and in that year he took out a copyright therefor in the United States.
On the 20th of May, 1889, Daly brought a suit in equity against the plaintiff in error herein, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, in which he prayed that the defendant might be perpetually enjoined from the further performance of the play 'After Dark,' upon the ground that the performance was an infringement of the copyright of his play 'Under the Gaslight,' and he asked for an accounting for all money and profits received by the defendant in that suit by reason of the performance of the play 'After Dark' and of the railroad scene therein.
Subsequently, upon application to the of appeals, where it was reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to enter the usual decree for an accounting and a perpetual injunction, the circuit court of appeals holding that the plaintiff's copyright was valid, and the railroad scene in his play was itself a dramatic composition and protected by the plaintiff's copyright, which had been infringed by the defendant in the production of the play 'After Dark' with the railroad scene therein. Daly v. Webster, 1 U. S. App. 573, 56 Fed. Rep. 483, 4 C. C. A. 10. The only charge of infringement consisted in the production of that scene.
Pursuant to the mandate of the circuit court of appeals, a decree for a perpetual injunction was entered by the circuit court November 5, 1892, and it was referred to a master to take proof of the number of nuauthorized performances of the play 'After Dark,' with the railroad scene, which had been given by the defendant. The court did not direct the master, either in the decree or in the order of reference, to ascertain anything in regard to profits; no evidence was offered before him upon that subject, and no finding was made thereon. A final decree in the case, accepting the master's report and making his findings the findings of the court, was entered on April 1, 1893, but no decree for profits was asked or rendered.
Another appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals, and the decree affirmed, with costs, June 7, 1893. 11 U. S. App. 791, 8 C. C. A. 681.
The mandate of the circuit court of appeals on this second appeal was filed in the circuit court June 14, 1893, and a decree in conformity therewith duly entered. The defendant attempted to obtain a review of the judgment against him by appealing to this court, but his appeal was dismissed for the reasons stated in Webster v. Daly, 163 U.S. 155 , 41 L. ed. 111, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 961.
The answer of the defendant denied the infringement and set up various defenses which are noticed in the following opinion. A jury trial was waived, and the court found the facts as above stated, and held that the copyright obtained by Daly was good and valid and covered and protected the railway scene already described; that the acts of the defendant were in disregard of the copyright and of plaintiff's exclusive rights therein.
It was also found by the court that the evidence did not authorize an increase of the damages above the minimum amount provided for by 4966 of the Revised Statutes, and that it had no power to establish a rule of damages below the minimum amount provided for therein, and that such section should be construed as penal rather than remedial in its character. The only testimony in this action on the hearing before the master as to the number of representations which the defendant Brady had given that were infringements of the plaintiff's copyright, and upon which a judgment for damages could be based, was the evidence of the defendant in the equity suit above mentioned, and introduced before the master in this action, and such evidence the court decided was inadmissible for that purpose, upon the ground that evidence obtained from a party by means of judicial proceedings could not be used against him for the enforcement of a penalty; and because of the absence of all legal evidence as to the number of representations the defendant was entitled to judgment, refusing any recovery for damages. [175 U.S. 148, 152] Subsequently, upon application to the court, the cause was opened and testimony, entirely independent of that of the defendant in the plaintiff's examination of him in the accounting before the master in the equity suit, was presented as to the number of times the play of 'After Dark' had been produced by the defendant, with the railroad scene in it, and upon that evidence a finding was made that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the defendant of $50 for each performance falling within the period of two years prior to the commencement of the action; that is to say, for 126 performances, or the sum of $6,300 with costs. The court restricted the plaintiff's right to damages to two years, because it held that the action was brought to recover a penalty, and that the two years' statute of limitations applied. The defendant brought the case by writ of error before the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit, where the judgment was affirmed (Brady v. Daly, 51 U. S. App. 621, 83 Fed. Rep. 1007, 28 C.C.A. 253), and he then sued out a writ of error from this court, and the case is now here for review.
Messrs. David Gerber and A. J. Dittenhoefer for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Stephen H. Olin for defendants in error.
The first objection made by the plaintiff in error to the judgment in this case is that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the action because it was brought to recover a penalty or forfeiture under 4966 of the Revised Statutes, and it was contended that the district courts of the United States have by law exclusive jurisdiction over that class of actions.
Section 101 of chapter 230 of the Statutes of 1870 (16 Stat. at L. 198, 214) re-enacted the provision of the act of 1856, [175 U.S. 148, 154] giving damages to the proprietor of any dramatic composition against any person wrongfully representing the same. Then came the revision of the statutes, and 4966 embodies the provisions contained in the above- mentioned acts of 1856 and 1870, in regard to the recovery of damages.
These statutes, it will be perceived, all use the word 'damages' when referring to the wrongful production of a dramatic composition. No word of forfeiture or penalty is to be found in them on that subject. It is evident that in many cases it would be quite difficult to prove the exact amount of damages which the proprietor of a copyrighted dramatic composition suffered by reason of its unlawful production by another, and yet it is also evident that the statute seeks to provide a remedy for such a wrong, and to grant to the proprietor the right to recover the damages which he has sustained therefrom.
The idea of the punishment of the wrongdoer is not so much suggested by the language used in the statute as is a desire to provide for the recovery by the proprietor of full compensation from the wrongdoer for the damages such proprietor has sustained from the wrongful act of the latter. In the face of the difficulty of determining the amount of such damage in all cases, the statute provides a minimum sum for a recovery in any case, leaving it open for a larger recovery upon proof of greater damage in those cases where such proof can be made. The statute itself does not speak of punishment or penalties, but refers entirely to damages suffered by the wrongful act. The person wrongfully performing or representing a dramatic composition is, in the words of the statute, 'liable for damages therefor.' This means all the damages that are the direct result of his wrongful act. The further provision in the statute, that those damages shall be at least a certain sum named in the statute itself, does not change the character of the statute and render it a penal instead of a remedial one. The whole recovery is given to the proprietor, and the statute does not provide for a recovery by any other person in case the proprietor himself neglects to sue. It has nothing in the natue [175 U.S. 148, 155] of a qui tam action about it, and we think it provides for the recovery of neither a penalty nor a forfeiture.
If, upon the trial of such an action, the court should find from the evidence that the plaintiff had, in fact, sustained a greater amount than the minimum sum of damages provided in the statute, and should direct judgment in his favor for the sum so proved, would that judgment be for a penalty? On the contrary, it would be for the actual amount of damages which the evidence showed had been sustained by the plaintiff, and his recovery of that sum would be the recovery provided by the law for the wrong which he had suffered. When the evidence does not warrant a greater than the minimum recovery, the amount named in the statute still constitutes the remedy provided by the law, which plaintiff can pursue.
So, a statute which makes a person liable for his wrongful neglect or default by which the death of another person is caused, and which gives a right of action to the administrator for the benefit of the widow and next of kin, to recover damages for the pecuniary injuries resulting from his death, thus altering the common law and imposing a new liability, has been held by this court not to be penal, and to be enforceable in a state other than the state in which the statute was [175 U.S. 148, 157] passed, and in which the wrongful act and death occurred. Dennick v. Central R. Co. 103 U.S. 11 , 26 L. ed. 439; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593 , 36 L. ed. 829, 12 Sup. Ct Rep. 905; Stewart v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 168 U.S. 45 , 42 L. ed. 537, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105.
In Chatterton v. Cave, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 483, 492, the court in speaking of this provision for damages said that the same 'was no doubt fixed, because of the difficulty of proving with definiteness what amount of actual damage had been sustained by perhaps a single performance at a provincial theater of a work belonging to a plaintiff, while at the same time his work might be seriously depreciated if he did not establish his right as against all those who infringed upon it.' This does not look as if that statute were regarded by the English courts as one of a penal nature, but, on the contrary, as one of a remedial kind providing for the recovery of the damages sustained by the plaintiff, and providing for the recovery of a minimum sum for the reason, as stated by the court, of the difficulty of proving with definiteness in all cases the amount of damages which plaintiff really had suffered. [175 U.S. 148, 158] The court below was, as is stated in the opinion, somewhat influenced in its decision of this question by the belief that if this were not a penal statute there was no Federal statute of limitations applicable to it, and said that it could hardly be supposed that it was the intent of Congress to permit such a statutory rate of damages to run without Federal statutory limitation. If there were no such Federal statute, then the state statute would apply. Although not an action to recover a statutory penalty or forfeiture, still, in the absence of any Federal statute of limitations, it would be limited by the limitation existing for the class of actions to which it belongs, in the state where the action was brought. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614 , 39 S. L. ed. 280, 281, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 217.
Another objection made is that 4966 renders defendant liable only when substantially the whole of a copyrighted play is produced, and not when merely a single incident in one of the acts is represented.
Upon the trial of the issues the complainant succeeded, and obtained a decree which established the validity of his copyright, and determined that the railroad scene in the complainant's play, apart from the dialogue which accompanied the scene, was a dramatic composition, and entitled to protection under the copyright laws. Daly v. Webster, 1 U. S. App. [175 U.S. 148, 159] 573, 56 Fed. Rep. 483, 4 C. C. A. 10. It determined also that there could be an infringement of the copyright when the only part of plaintiff's play that was produced was the railroad scene, and that the defendant had in that manner infringed the copyright of the plaintiff. An injunction was decreed and a reference made to the master to ascertain the number of times, etc., that the infringement had occurred.
In the opinion of the court, the case of Daly v. Palmer,1 6 Blatchf. 256, where the same question arose in regard to the same scene, was referred to and followed. The judgment record in the equity suit was introduced in evidence in this case, and it was conclusive upon the matters which had been in issue in the suit as between these parties, and neither of them can ever again raise such questions between themselves. Southern P. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 , 42 L. ed. 355, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18. We have, therefore, the fact conclusively established by that record that this railroad scene was a dramatic composition, protected by the plaintiff's copyright. The section (4966) of the Revised Statutes covers such a case. Any person publicly performing or representing any dramatic composition protected by copyright, under the circumstances named in that section, is liable for the damages sustained by the proprietor, and as the fact is conclusively established between these parties that the railroad scene is a dramatic composition, and that it is protected by copyright, the statute covers such a case, and makes the plaintiff in error liable for the production of that scene.
The question, as an original one, of how far a copyright of a play protects any particular scene therein from being publicly produced or represented by another, aside from the dialogue contained in the play, is not before us, because the judgment in the equity suit between these same parties establishes the fact of the copyright, and also that the railroad scene is a dramatic composition protected by that copyright.
It does not appear herein that the record in the equity suit was admitted for the purpose stated. The record was admis- [175 U.S. 148, 160] sible for the purpose of showing the validity of the copyright, and that the railroad scene was a dramatic composition protected by it. The bill of exceptions herein shows that the record was not used for the purpose of proving the number of times the play of 'After Dark' had been represented containing the railroad scene, nor in any way to show the amount of damages which the plaintiff had sustained by reason of the defendant's infringement of his copyright.
The further objection, that the answer of the defendant in the equity suit was inadmissible for the purpose of proving any admission of the defendant therein which might tend to render him liable for a penalty or forfeiture, becomes immaterial by our holding that the statute under which this action is brought is remedial and not penal. It appears, however, in this record that, although the answer was received as a part of the whole record in the case between these parties in the equity suit, it was not, nor was any evidence given by defendant, used upon the final hearing, in any way whatever, for the purpose of showing any admission on his part, but, on the contrary, evidence outside and independent of any admission or evidence of the defendant was produced, and it was with reference wholly to such independent evidence that the recovery was granted. There was no error in this procedure.
The equity action was brought to enjoin the defendant from performing the play of 'After Dark' with the railroad scene in it, taken from the plaintiff's play 'Under the Gaslight,' and the injunction was asked for on the ground that plaintiff's injuries could not be accurately ascertained or computed, and compensation for such injury could not be made by damages, and as a portion of the relief complainant asked that the defendant be decreed to render a full and true account of all money and profits received by him. The decree in that case, however, did not direct the master to ascertain anything in [175 U.S. 148, 161] regard to profits, no evidence was offered upon that subject, no finding was made thereon, and upon the coming in of the master's report no final judgment or decree for profits was ever asked or rendered.
Conceding that he might in the equity suit have recovered profits if there had been an accounting concerning the same, and that a decree for their recovery would be a bar to a proceeding under the statute, yet the plaintiff was not bound to take such remedy; and when in fact he did not take it, and there was no accounting for profits in the equity suit, no decree made in regard to them and no recovery had, we see nothing to prevent the plaintiff in this action from recovering under the statute the damages which he has sustained by reason of the infringement of his copyright by the defendant.
Our ruling in this case, if it had obtained upon the trial, might have permitted a larger recovery than the plaintiff secured, because, the statute upon which the action is founded not being of a penal character, the two years' statute of limitations to which the plaintiff was limited in his recovery does not apply. But as the plaintiff did not seek to review the correctness of the decision of the trial court, and contented himself with the recovery actually obtained, his executors have now no cause of complaint on that account and they assert none.
Upon a full review of the case, we are of opinion that there was no error committed prejudicial to the plaintiff in error, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.
[ Footnote 1 ] Fed. Cas. No. 3,552.

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