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Timestamp: 2016-10-24 20:16:04+00:00

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HARMAN c. ROYAUME-UNI
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche HARMAN c. ROYAUME-UNI
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 5-4 ; Non-violation de l'art. 5-1 ; Préjudice moral - constat de violation suffisant ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure nationaleNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10038/82Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1984-05-11;10038.82 Analyses : (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 5-3) JUGE OU AUTRE MAGISTRAT EXERCANT DES FONCTIONS JUDICIAIRES, (Art. 5-4) INTRODUIRE UN RECOURS, (Art. 5-4) ORDONNER LA LIBERATIONParties : Demandeurs : HARMANDéfendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE No 10038/82 Harriet HARMAN v/the UNIT ED KINGDO M Harriet HARMAN c/ROYAUME-UN I
DECISION of 11 May 1984 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 11 mai 1984 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Article 7 of the Convention : Allegedly unforeseeable conviction for the contempt of court (Complaint declared admissible). Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention : Official documents produced in the course ofdiscovery proceedings : solicitor found guilty of contempt of coun notwithstanding that the documents had been read out in open court. Question of violarion of right to impart infonnation (Complaint declared admissible) . Article 7 de la Conven(ion : Application prÃ©tendument imprÃ©visible pour l'imÃ©ressÃ© d'une sanction pour .conrempt of courtÂ» (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) . Articles 10 et 14 de la Convention : Soliciror reconnu coupable de â¢contempt of courr . pour avoir montrÃ© Ã un journaliste des documents d'origine officielle dont l'apporr avait Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ© par le tribunal dans un procÃ©s (â¢discove ry â¢), mais qui avaient Ã©rÃ© lus en audience publique . Y a-r-il eu violation du droit de communiquer des informations ? (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) .
(franÃ§ais : voir p . 63)
The applicant, Ms Harriet Hartnan, bom in 1950, is a solicitor by profession and at present resides in London . She is represented in proceedings before the Commission by Messrs Siefert Sedley & Co ., solicitors, and Mr Anthony Lester, QC and Mr Andrew Nichol, of counsel .
The applicant has been a solicitor since 1975 and since 1978 has been employed as the Legal Officer of the National Council of Civil Libe rties ( NCCL) . One of her responsibilities in this position is the conduct, as a solicitor, of a number of civil actions on behalf of clients whose cases have been taken up by the NCCL . One of the cases in which the applicant was involved on behalf of NCCL was that of Michael Williams against the Home Office . While serving a term of imprisonment, Mr Williams had spent six months in a special "control unit" which was part of the prison regime based on solitary confinement for prisoners who were considered particularly disruptive by the prison authorities . He initiated legal proceedings claiming damages for false imprisonment against the Home Office and also sought a declaration that such control units were unlawful and ultra vires . In the course of the proceedings Mr Williams applied for "discovery" of certain Home Office documents . In litigation where the Crown is a party an express court order for discovery must be sought . Such orders were granted by the court on three occasions, namely 25 January and 25 October 1 979 and 29 January 1980 . On the latter occasion the Home Office opposed the application for discovery in relation to 23 of the documents . The Secretary of State for the Home Department signed a certificate claiming that no orders should be made because a disclosure would be injurious to the public interest . After reading the documents, Mr Justice McNeill ruled that five of the documents should be produced to Mr Williams (I) . In the course of his decision the judge stated as follows : "Risks attendant on inspection and production as postulated by Lord Reid are in any event minimised in two ways . FirsUy, if after inspection the court orders production, the order may provide for production of part only of a document, the remainder being sealed up or otherwise obscured . Secondly, it is plain from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Riddick v Thames Board Mills (1977) QB 881 if it was not plain before, that a party who disclosed the document was entitled to the protection of the Court against any use of the document otherwise than in the action in which it is disclosed . As Lord Denning MR put it (at page 896) :'The Court should, therefore, not allow the other party, or anyone else, to use the document for any ulterior or alien purpose . . . In order to encourage openness and faimess, the public interest requires that documents disclosed on discovery are not to be made use of except for the purpose of the action in which they are disclosed ." ' Prior to the second order of discovery the applicant had received a letter from the Treasury Solicitor, seeking assurances that the documents disclosed would only be used for the purposes of the legal action . The letter indicated that the Home Office was concerned at the risks of improper use of the documents and sought assurances that the documents would be returned at the end of the trial ; that Mr Williams woul d (1) williams v . Home Office (1981) 1 ALL E .R . 1151 .
not retain the disclosed documents except for the purpose of giving instructions to the applicant ; that if the applicant or another officer of the NCCL ceased to represent the plaintiff he would return the documents in his possession ; and that witnesses would retu rn disclosed documents and any copies to the applicant . The letter continued : "My client does, however, require that inspection of the disclosed documents and dissemination of their contents should be limited to the legal officers of NCCL and their assistants at any time concerned with the conduct of this action, except insofar as wider inspection or dissemination is strictly necessary for the conduct of the action . In other words my client would not wish the documents to be used for the general purposes of the NCCL outside your function as a solicitor for the plaintiff. " In her reply, the applicant stated as follows : "As far as the documents which have been shown to potential expe rt witnesses are concemed, we have in the nortnal way warned those witnesses that the only purpose for which the documents are to be used is for preparing their evidence in this case . As far as ' the general purposes of NCCL' is concerned you may rest assured that, as a solicitor, I am well aware of the rule that requires that documents obtained on discovery should not be used for any other purpose except for the case in hand . " In consequence of the three orders of discovery, the Home Office produced to Mr Williams and his legal advisers about 6,800 pages of documents of which 800 were selected to be used in evidence at the trial of the action and collated into two exhibit bundles . At the hearing of the action, which began on 25 February 1980 and which continued for 22 days, the material parts of these 800 pages were read out in court during the plaintiff's opening address . However, the admissibility of the documents was not agreed by the Home Office and the judge ruled that most of them were inadmissible as evidence . The trial was attended by journalists and subsequent newspaper reports contained references to the material that had been read out . At the end of the hearing on 20 March 1980 the applicant was visited by Mr David Leigh, a joumalist, working with the Guardian Newspaper . He asked to see the exhibit bundles which had been read out in open court . The applicant considered that since all material parts had been read aloud, the documents were no longer confidential and she believed that both her implied undertaking to the court and her express undertaking to the Home Office in her letter of 17 October 1979 had terminated . Accordingly, she permitted Mr Leigh to attend her office and inspect the documents . He was only given access to those documents which had been exhibited and read aloud in open court at the public hearing . He did not take them away or photocopy them and no payment was made . He subsequently wrote an article which was published in the Guardian on 8 April 1980 . It provided an account of the control units and their subsequent closure . It described how, during the process of sening
up the units, civil servants had made them into a punishment regime which was to be particularly rigorous and where the staff were to be deliberately distant . The article quoted some of the documents read out in the WiBiams action to show that the Home Office was aware of possible conflict with the prison rules . It described measures taken by the Home Office to maintain secrecy about the setting up the units and to forestall criticism of the scheme . The action, brought by Mr Williams against the Home Office, was dismissed by Mr Justice Tudor Evans on 9 May 1980 . It was held that he did not have any cause Ã´f action notwithstanding that his detention in the control unit for six months was contrary to the prison rules (2) . On 12 June 1980 the Home Office applied to the Divisonal Court for the applicant to be punished, other than by conunittal, for contempt of court . It was alleged that, in allowing Mr Leigh to look at the documents which had been read aloud in open court, she had broken her undertaking not to use the documents produced on discovery for a collateral or ulterior purpose . On 27 November 1980 Mr Justice Park found in favour of the Home Office and ruled that the applicant had acted in contempt of court . He accepted that she had acted in good faith and imposed no punishment and made no order as to costs . An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed with costs on 6 February 1981 and a further appeal to the House of Lords was also dismissed with costs on I I February 1982 (3) . It had been argued inter nlia by the applicant before the House of Lords that the implied undertaking temlinated once the documents had been read in court . It was further submitted that the decision of the lower court violated her rights under Art . 10 of the Convention . The majority of the House of Lords (Lords Diplock, Keith and Roskill) were concemed for the privacy of litigants who had been required to reveal their confidential documents by the process of discovery . They held that the good administration ofjustice required that the implied obligation continued, notwithstanding the use of the documents in the course of a trial open to the public . In the course of his speech, Lord Keith stated as follows : . . . Discovery constitutes a very serious invasion of the privacy and confidentiality of a litigant's affairs . It fortns part of English legal procedure because the public interest in securing that justice is done between parties is considered to outweigh the private and public interest in the maintenance of confidentiality . But the process should not be allowed to place on the litigant any harshe r (2) Williams v . Home Office (No . 2) (1981) I ALL E .R . 1211 . (3) Home Office v . Hemun (1981) 2 WLR 310 (Divisional Coun) : (1981) 2 WLR 321 (Coun of Appeel) : (1982) 1 ALL E .R . 532 (House of Lords) .
or more oppressive burden than is strictly required for the purpose of secu ring that justice is done . In so far as that must necessa rily involve a certain degree of publicity being given to private documents, the result has to be accepted as part of the p rice of achieving justice . But the fact that a certain inevitable degree of publicity has been brought about does not, in my opinion, warrant the conclusion that the door should therefore be opened to widespread dissemination of the mate ri al by the other party or his legal advisers, for any ulte rior purpose whatsoever, whether altruistic or aimed at fi nancial gain . The degree of publicity resulting from a document being read out in open cou rt is not necessarily very great . There may be nobody p re sent apart from the parties and their legal advisers . The argument for the appellant, however, goes the length that because the public are notionally present, and anyone might have come in and noted down the contents of any discovered document which is read out, the implied obligation against improper use cothes to an end . That is not a proposition which I can find acceptable on any rational ground consistent with the proper administration of justice . The theo ry behind the pro position is that the reading out of the document destroys its confidentiality, and that, apart from consideration of copy ri ght and defamation, the law does not prohibit the dissemination of documents which are not confidential . The implied obligation not to make improper use of discovered documents is, however, independent of any obligation existing under the general law relating to confidentiali ty . It affords a particular protection accorded in the interests of the proper administration of justice . It is owed not to the owner of the documents but to the court, and the function of the court in seeing that the obligation is obse rv ed is directed to the maintenance of those interests, and not to the enforcement of the law relating to conf-identiality . There is good reason to apprehend that, if the ar gument for the appellant we re accepted, there would be substantially increased temptation to a litigant to destroy or conceal the existence of relevant documents which would fall properly within the ambit of discovery . There is also reason to apprehend the introduction into proceedings of tactical manoeuv ri ngs on either side designed to secure that discovered documents were or were not read out in full . Both these developments would be undesirable from the point of view of the proper administration of justice" . (loc . cit . pp .540-41 ) Lord Diplock did not consider that the case concemed freedom of speech, freedom of the press, openness of justice or documents coming into 'the public domain' . He was of the opinion that the case did not call for consideration of any of the rights and freedoms contained in the European Convention on Human Rights . It was accepted by the majority that had the applicant communicated a copy of the transc ript or mechanical recording of the trial to a party unconnected with the proceedings she would not have been guilty of contempt of court .
There was disagreement, however, as to whether communicating the exhibited documents to an official law reporter or other reporter who sought to check details with a view to publishing an accurate account of the proceedings would constitute contempt of court . Lord Keith considered that if there was any reason to doubt that the party who had disclosed the documents would approve of their being shown to a journalist, it should not be done without such approval (loc . cit .- p . 542) . Lord Diplock considered that such a practice was at most a technical contempt (ibid ., pp . 539-540) . Lord Roskill did not consider that such a practice, related as it was to the day-by-day reporting of court proceedings, could be regarded as a contempt (ibid ., p . 555) . In a dissenting speech by Lords Scarman and Simon it was accepted that the duty of a recipient of discovered documents to keep them confidential and to use them only for the purposes of the action terrninated when the documents were used in an open trial . Referring to Art . 10 of the Convention, Lord Scartnan stated "that it could hardly be argued that there was a pressing social need to exclude the litigant and his solicitor from the freedom enjoyed by everyone else to treat such documents as public knowledge" . (loc . cit ., p .547) . In their view both the nature and duration of the obliga(ion to maintain confidentiality could not be determined merely by referring to the requirements of the law relating to discovery of documents in civil litigation . Regard was also to be had to the requirements of the general law protecting freedom of communication . In this regard, Lord Scarrnan stated tha t " . . .A balance has to be struck between two interests of the law, on the one hand the protection of a litigant's private right to keep his documents to himself notwithstanding his duty to disclose them to the other side in the litigation and on the other the protection of the right, which the law recognises, subject to certain exceptions, as the right of everyone, to speak freely, and to impart information and ideas, on matters of public knowledge . In our view, a just balance is struck if the obligation endures only so long as the documents themselves are private and confidential . Once the litigant's private right to keep his documents to himself has been overtaken by their becoming public knowledge, we can see no reason why the undertaking given when they were confidential should continue to apply to them ." Qoc cit ., p .544 )
COMPLAINTS AND SUBMISSIONS Article 1 0 I . It is submitted that the decisions of ehe English courts conceming the applicant constituted an interference with her freedom of expression and freedom to impart inforrnation .
As a result of imparting information to Mr Leigh by allowing him to inspect the two exhibit bundles of documents she was found guilty of a serious contempt . This is a grave maner for a solicitor who is an officer of the Supreme Court . In addition, she has had to bear her own costs of the whole proceedings and those of the Home Office in respect of the two appeals . Finally, should the applicant impart similar information in similar circumstances she could expect to be punished more severely . Her future freedom to impart such information is thus restricted . It is argued that the restriction imposed on the applicant is not "prescribed by law" . In this respect, reference is made to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sunday Times case and in particular the requirement that "a norm cannot be regarded as a law unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct . . ." (para . 49) . The applicant could not have predicted with reasonable certainty that her conduct would be held to be in contempt . In this regard the following submissions are made : A . At the relevant time-April 1980-it was established in the case law that the courts would not restrain the use of information imparted in confidence which had since become public knowledge . B . As the evidence of lawyers and joumalists before the Divisional Court showed, it had been a long-standing practice for lawyers to allow exhibited documents used in court to be seen by joumalists at their request . In no case had this led to contempt proceedings or any suggestion that the practice was improper .
C . It is submitted that in predicting what restrictions would continue to apply on her freedom to impart information after the hearing had terminated, the applicant was entitled to have regard to the absence of any restrictions on reporting . The court has power to order in circumstances that evidence should not be disclosed or reported outside the courtroom . D . It has been recognised in some cases that there might be a public interest in favour of disclosure which would overtule the public interest in the administration of justice and the preservation of confidentiality . (Distillers Co . (Biochemicals) Ltd . v . Times Newspapers Ltd . (1975) QB 613, 625) . E . Even if it could have been predicted that the discovery rule continued indefinitely in litigation between two private parties, the same could not have been said with reasonable certainty where one of the parties was a Government department, and where it was alleged that the depanment had acted unlawfully towards those subject to its control . In such circumstances the applicant should have been able to rely on her act coming within the public interest exception referred to above .
2 . The applicant submits that the restriction of her rights under Art . 10 could not be justified under the second paragraph with reference to a pressing social need and in the atternative was disproportionate to the interest which was being protected . Once the documents had been used at a public hearing they lost their confidentiality . Anyone present at the trial might have taken a shorthand note of what was said . Any person might have purchased a transcript of the proceedings either from the official shorthand writer or from anyone who had arranged to have their own transcript prepared . The information so obtained might have been freely imparted and received . The applicant accepts that the documents in question were initially received by her in confidence . However, she submits that such a justification only applies if the information continues to be confidential at the time when it is imparted . For the restriction to continue after the information hxs been made public makes it unjustifiable and disproportionate . Nor can it be submitted that the restriction is justified as necessary for the protection of the rights of the Home Office . Their right of confidentiality terminated once the documents had been used in open court . The restriction cannot be justified as necessary for the protection of the rights of future litigants . While they may find that their opponents are reluctant to make full discovery because of the risk of publicity, this is a risk which has always existed . The restriction imposed on the appticant had no bearing on the authority or impartiality of the judiciary .
Article 14 in coqjunction with Arâ¢ticle 1 0 It is claimed in this context that the restriction was discriminatory for the following reasons : 1 . That at least one member of the majority in the House of Lords (Lord Diplock) stated that if she had shown the documents to a law reporter or to any other reporter for the sole purpose of producing an accurate repon of what was actually said in court, she would at most have been guilty of a technical contempt, meriting neither punishment nor an adverse order as to costs . 2 . That the restriction only applied to her, her client and to other legal advisers . Anyone else in court could have imparted the same information to Mr Leigh . Indeed, she herself could have imparted the same information from a transcript of the hearing rather than the discovered documents themsetves . 3 . The restriction was only applied to her because the information she imparted was used to write an article critical of the policies of the Home Office . It is inconceivable that had she shown the documents to a journalist who had used them to write a laudatory feamre article, proceedings would have been brought against her .
Article 7 It is submitted that the applicant was in substance found guilty of a criminal offence, notwithstanding that the Home Office took proceedings for civil as opposed to criminal offences . A civil contempt also involves an obstruction of the fair administration of justice for which the court can impose penal sanctions . Until the rulings of the couns in her proceedings, it was not an offence to show a journalist discovered documents after they had been read out in court . The interpretation of the implied undertaking given by the couns was entirely unpredictable . In this regard the applicant refers to decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the field of due process (Bouie against the City of Columbia 378 U .S . 347 (1964) and Marks against United States 97 S .CT . 990 (1977) ; a decision of the European Court of Justice Defrenne against Sabena and the admissibility decision of the Convnission in Application No . 8710/79 (D .R . 28, 77) where it was stated that "existing offences should not be extended to cover facts which previously clearly did not constitute a criminal offence" .
OBJECT OF THE APPLICATIO N The applicant seeks a decision or judgment that (a) her rights as set out above have been violated by the decision of the English courts ; (b) the law of the United Kingdom as stated by the House of Lords is in violation of these provisions of the Convention . She also seeks just satisfaction under Art . 50, including compensation for violation of her rights under the Convention and reimbursement of her legal costs .
THE LA W The applicant, who was found guilty of contempt of court, complains firstly that she has been found guilty of an act which does not constitute a criminal offence under the law of the United Kingdom at the time it was committed, contrary to Art . 7 para . I of the Convention . She maintains in this respect that until the decisions of the courts in the proceedings against her it was not considered to be an offence to show a journalist discovered documents after they had been read out in court . She submits in essence that the courts have developed a new criminal offence in her case . She further complains that the decision of the courts in her case have breached her right to freedom of expression, and in particular her freedom to impart information, contrary to Art . 10 para . 1 . She contends that such an interference with he r
freedom to impart information cannot be justified under the second paragraph of this provision since once the documents in question have been read out in court they entered the public domain . Accordingly, it could not be argued that the restriction of her rights was necessary to prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence . Furthermore, the decision of the courts that she was guilty of contempt of court in such circumstances would be disproponionate to Lhe interests sought to be protected . Finally, she contends that such restriction was not "prescribed by law" since she could not have predicted with reasonable certainty that her actions would be constrUed as contempt of court . The applicant also alleges that Lhe restriction imposed on her freedom of expression was discriminatory contrary to Art . 14 of Lhe Convention . In this regard she maintains that had she shown the documents to a law reporter, or to any other reporter for the purpose of producing an accurate report of what was said in court she would at most have been guilty of a technical contempt . Moreover, the restriction did not apply to anyone else in court who could, with impunity, have imparted the same information to any joumalist . FinaOy, she alleges that the restriction was only applied to her as the journalist in question had written an article which was critical of the Home Office . The respondent Government submit that she was not convicted of a criminal offence within the meaning of Art . 7 para . I since the courts found that she had committed a civil as opposed to a criminal contempt of court . It is argued that Lhe purpose of the penalties which can be imposed for civil contempt is not to punish the contemnor but to ensure respect for undertakings given to a court . They further contend that Lhe decision of the court in the applicant's case did not involve the creation of a restrospective criminal offence, since the courts were applying generally accepted .principles of law to a factual simation which they had not previously had to consider . It is further submitted that to the extent that there has been a restriction of her freedom of expression including her freedom to impart information, it is prescribed by law and justified under the second paragraph of Art . 10 as necessary for the protection of the rights of others, and for the prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence as well as for the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary . It is argued that the information did not cease to be confidential when it had been read out in open court . The continued conridentiality of Lhe documents is necessary for the proper functioning of civil litigation in a common-law jurisdiction . It is necessary, in order that cases may be disposed of quickly and fairly with a minimum of costs, that Lhe litigant who discloses confidential documents to his opponent is assured that they will not be given any wider dissemination than is strictly necessary for the purpose of disposing of the action . If a litigant did not have such an assurance, he would be tempted to withhold or otherwise dispose of relevant documents .
Finally, the respondent Government deny that there has been discrimination, contending that the distinctions between the applicant and law reporters or members of the public present at the hearing finds a reasonable and objective justification in the public interest in a proper administration of justice . The Commission has made a preliminary examination of the parties' submissions and considers that the application raises important and complex issues under the Convention which should be determined in an examination of the merits of the case . It does not consider that the application can as a whole be rejected as manifestly ill-founded . It concludes, therefore, that the application is, as a whole, admissible without prejudice to the merits . For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T La requÃ©rante, Mlle Harriet Harman, nÃ©e en 1950, exerce la profession de solicitor et rÃ©side actuellement Ã Londres . Elle est reprÃ©sentÃ©e devant la Commission par MM . Siefert Sedley and Co ., solicitor, Me Anthony Lester QC et Me Andrew Nichol, avocats . La requÃ©rante est solicitor depuis 1975 et, depuis 1978, conseiller juridique du Conseil national des libertÃ©s civiles (National Council of Civil Liberties - NCCL) . L'une de ses attributions, dans cette fonction, consiste Ã mener, en qualitÃ© de solicitor, des procÃ©dures civiles entreprises par des clients dont la cause a Ã©tÃ© prise en main par le NCCL . L'une des causes desquelles la requÃ©rante a eu Ã s'occuper pour le NCCL est celle de Michael Williams contre le ministÃ©re de l'IntÃ©rieur . Alors qu'il purgeait une peine de prison, M . Williams avait Ã©tÃ© placÃ© pendant six mois, dans un quartier spÃ©cial (. Control unit - ) destinÃ©e aux dÃ©tenus que la direction de la prison tenait pour particuliÃ©rement difficiles . Il entama une procÃ©dure rÃ©clamant des dommagesintÃ©rÃªts pour dÃ©tention abusive contre le ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur et demanda que l'on dÃ©clarÃ¢t la crÃ©ation de tels quartiers illÃ©gale et ultra vires . Au cours de la procÃ©dure ,
M . W illiams sollicita communication (â¢ discoveryâ¢) de certains documents du ministÃ©re de l'IntÃ©rieur . Dans les litiges oÃ¹ la Couronne est l'une des parties, une telle communication est soumise Ã une ordonnance expresse du tribunal . Celui-ci a rendu des ordonnances en ce sens en trois occasions : les 25 janvier et 25 octobre 1 979, et le 29 janvier 1980 . A cette demiÃ©re date, le ministÃ©re s'opposa Ã la communication de 23 des documents . Le vice-ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur signa un certificat selon lequel aucune ordonnance ne devrait Ãªtre rendue parce qu'une divulgation serait contraire Ã l'intÃ©rÃªt public . AprÃ¨s lecture des documents, le juge MeNeill dÃ©cida que cinq d'entre eux devaient Ãªtre communiquÃ©s Ã M . Williams (1) . Le juge dÃ©ctarait, dans sa dÃ©cision : â¢ Les risques que comporteraient l'examen et la communication, tels qu'ils sont postulÃ©s par Lord Reid, sont en tout cas rÃ©duits de deux maniÃ¨res . D'abord, si aprÃ¨s examen le tribunal ordonne la communication, l'ordonnance peut prÃ©ciser une communication d'une partie seulement d'un document, le reste demeurant cachÃ© ou autrement oblitÃ©rÃ© . DeuxiBmement, il ressort de la dÃ©cision de la cour d'appel dans Riddick contre Thames Board Mills (1977) QB 881 - si ce n'Ã©tait dÃ©jÃ Ã©vident - qu'une partie communiquant un document selon la procÃ©dure dite de â¢ discovery â¢ a droit Ã la protection du tribunal contre tout usage du document Ã des fins autres que celles du procÃ¨s pour lequel il est communiquÃ© . Comme le dit Lord Denning MR (page 896) :'La cour ne doit donc permettre Ã l'autre partie, ni d'ailleurs Ã personne, d'utiliser le document Ã des fins plus amples ou Ã©trangÃ¨res Ã l'affaire . . . pour encourager la franchise et la loyautÃ©, l'intÃ©rÃªt public exige que les documents divulguÃ©s ne soient utilisÃ©s qu'aux fins de la procÃ©dure pour laquelle ils ont Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ©s .' Avant la deuxiÃ¨me ordonnance de communication, la requÃ©rante avait reÃ§u une lettre de l'avocat du Gouvemement (â¢Treasury Solicitorâ¢) demandant qu'on l'assurÃ¢t que les documents communiquÃ©s ne serviraient qu'aux fins de la procÃ©dure en cours . La lettre indiquait que le ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur s'inquiÃ©tait du risque d'abus des documents et demandait Ã Ãªtre assurÃ© que ces derniers lui seraient rendus Ã la fin du procÃ¨s ; que M . Williams ne les conserverait pas, sauf pour donner des instructions Ã la requÃ©rante ; que si cette demiÃ©re ou un autre agent du NCCL cessait de reprÃ©senter le plaignant, il rendrait les documents en sa possession ; et que les tÃ©moins rendraient les documents communiquÃ©s et toutes copies Ã©ventuelles Ã la requÃ©rante . La lettre poursuivait : â¢ Mon client demande cependant que l'examen des documents communiquÃ©s et la diffusion de leur contenu soient limitÃ©s aux juristes du NCCL et Ã leurs assistants part icipant Ã n'import e quel moment Ã la conduite de cene procÃ©dure, sau f ( I) Williams contre Home Office (1981), I ALL E .R . 1151 .
et uniquement dans la mesure oÃ¹ celle-ci exigerait un examen ou une diffusion plus large . En d'autres terrnes, mon client ne souhaite pas que les documents soient utilisÃ©s pour les objectifs gÃ©nÃ©raux du NCCL en-dehors de sa fonction de re prÃ©sentant du plaignant . Dans sa rÃ©ponse, la requÃ©rante disait : - Pour ce qui est des documents qui ont Ã©tÃ© montrÃ©s Ã des experts Ã© ventuels, nous avons, selon la coutume, averti ces tÃ©moins que les documents ne devaient serv ir qu'Ã la prÃ©paration de leurs tÃ©moignaies dans la prÃ©sente affaire . Quant Ã la question des 'objectifs gÃ©nÃ©raux du NCCL', vous pouvez Ãªtre assurÃ© qu'en tant que solicitor, je connais bien la rÃ¨gle qui exige que les documents divulguÃ©s ne se rvent pas Ã d'autres fins que l'affaire en cause . â¢ ContorrnÃ©ment aux trois ordonnances de communication, le ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur foumit Ã M . Williams et Ã ses conseils environ 6 .800 pages de documents, dont 800 ont Ã©tÃ© choisies pour servir de preuves dans le procÃ¨s, et rÃ©unies en deux recueils de piÃ¨ces . Lors des dÃ©bats sur l'affaire, qui se sont ouvens le 25 fÃ©vrier 1980 et ont durÃ© 22 jours, les parties pertinentes de ces 800 pages ont Ã©tÃ© lues au tribunal, pendant l'exposÃ© introductif du demandeur . NÃ©anmoins, la recevabilitÃ© de ces documents n'a pas Ã©tÃ© acceptÃ©e par le ministÃ©re de l'IntÃ©rieur et le juge estima que la plupart d'entre eux n'Ã©taient pas recevables Ã titre de preuve . Le procÃ¨s a Ã©tÃ© suivi par des journalistes et des rapports parus ultÃ©rieurement dans les joumaux faisaient rÃ©fÃ©rence aux documents qui avaient Ã©tÃ© lus . A la fin des dÃ©bats, le 20 mars 1980, la requÃ©rante a reÃ§u la visite de M . David Leigh, joumaliste au Guardian, qui demanda Ã voir les recueils de piÃ¨ces lues devant le tribunal . La requÃ©rante considÃ©ra que, puisque toutes les panies importantes avaient Ã©tÃ© lues Ã haute voix, les documents n'avaient plus un caractÃ¨re confidentiel, et elle pensa que son engagement implicite envers le tribunal et son engagement explicite le 17 octobre 1979 vis-Ã -vis du ministÃ¨re de l'intÃ©rieur, Ã©taient devenus caducs . Elle autorisa donc M . Leigh Ã venir Ã son bureau pour examiner les documents . Il n'eut accÃ¨s qu'aux documents qui avaient Ã©tÃ© soumis comme preuve et lus Ã haute voix en audience publique . Le journaliste ne les a ni emportÃ©s ni photocopiÃ©s, et il n'y a eu aucune rÃ©munÃ©ration de service . II rÃ©digea par la suite un article qui parut dans le Guardian du 8 avril 1980 et dÃ©crivait les quartiers spÃ©ciaux (control units) et leur suppression ultÃ©rieure . 11 expliquait comment, au cours du processus de crÃ©ation de ces quartiers, des fonctionnaires en avaient fait des instruments de sanction particuliÃ¨rement rigoureux, dans lesquels le personnel devait se montrer dÃ©libÃ©rÃ©ment distant . L'article citait certains des documents lus Ã haute voix dans l'affaire Williams, pour montrer que le ministÃ©re de l'IntÃ©rieur n'ignorait pas un conflit possible avec le rÃ¨glement des prisons . Il dÃ©crivait les mesures prises par ce ministÃ¨re pour conserver le secret sur la crÃ©ation des quartiers et pour prÃ©venir toute critique du systÃ¨me .
M . Williams a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©boutÃ© de son action contre le ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur par le juge Tudor Evans le 9 mai 1980 . Ce dernier estima que l'intÃ©ressÃ© n'avait pas lieu de se plaindre, mÃªme si sa dÃ©tention en quartier spÃ©cial pendant six mois Ã©tait contraire au rÃ¨glement des prisons (2) . Le 12 juin 1980, le ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur demanda Ã la Divisional Court que la requÃ©rante fÃ»t pÃ»nie, sans privation de libertÃ©, pour outrage Ã magistrat (contempt of coun) . 11 allÃ©guait qu'en permettant Ã M . Leigh de voir les documents qui avaient Ã©tÃ© lus Ã haute voix en cour, elle avait rompu son engagement de ne pas utiliser les documents divulguÃ©s Ã des fins accessoires ou Ã©trangÃ¨res . Le 27 novembre 1980, le juge Park prononÃ§a conformÃ©ment aux conclusions du ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur et dit que la requÃ©rante s'Ã©tait rendue coupable d'outrage Ã magistrat . II reconnut qu'elle avait agi de bonne foi, ne prononÃ§a pas de peine ni de condamnation aux dÃ©pens . Un recours Ã la cour d'appel a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ© avec suite de dÃ©pens le 6 fÃ©vrier 1981 et un nouveau recours Ã la Chambre des Lords a Ã©galement Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ© avec suite de dÃ©pens le 11 fÃ©vrier 1982 (3) . La requÃ©rante a soutenu notamment devant la Chambre des Lords que l'engagement implicite Ã©tait devenu caduc dÃ¨s l'instant que les documents avaient Ã©tÃ© lus au tribunal . Elle ajouta que la dÃ©cision de l'instance infÃ©rieure avait violÃ© les droits que lui reconnait l'anicle 10 de la Convention . Une majoritÃ© des membres de la Chambre des lords (Lords Diplock, Keith et Roskill) se sont inquiÃ©tÃ©s du droit au respect de la vie privÃ©e de plaideurs invitÃ©s Ã divulguer leurs documents confidentiels par voie de la procÃ©dure dite â¢ discovery â¢ . Selon eux, une bonne administration de la justice exigeait que l'obligation implicite subsistÃ¢t en dÃ©pit de l'utilisation des documents dans le cours d'un procÃ©s ouvert au public . Dans son intervention, Lord Keith dÃ©clara : . . . La communication par "discovery" constitue une invasion trÃ¨s sÃ©rieuse de la vie privÃ©e et des affaires conf-identielles d'un plaideur . Elle fait partie de la procÃ©dure judiciaire anglaise parce que l'intÃ©rÃªt du public Ã ce que justice soit faite entre les parties est tenu pour supÃ©rieur Ã l'intÃ©rÃªt privÃ© et public au maintien du secret . Mais on ne doit pas permettre que le procÃ©dÃ© impose aux plaideurs un fardeau plus rigoureux ou oppressif qu'il n'est strictement requis pour que justice soit faite . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ cela implique nÃ©cessairement que l'on donne un cenain degrÃ© de publicitÃ© Ã des documents privÃ©s, le rÃ©sultat doit Ã¨tre acceptÃ© comme faisant partie du prix Ã payer pour aboutir Ã la justice . Mais le fait qu'un certain degrÃ© inÃ©vitable de publicitÃ© a Ã©tÃ© atteint ne justifie pas, Ã mon avis, la conclusion que la porte doit Ãªtre largement ouverte Ã la diffusio n (2) Willlems rontre Home Ofrice (No . 2) (1981) I ALL E .R . 1211 . (3) Home Office conue Harnan (1981) 2 WLR 310 (Divisionel Coun) . (1981) 2 WLR 321 (Cour d'appel) ; (1982) I AII E .R . 532 (Chambre des Lords) .
des documents par l'autre partie ou ses conseils, Ã quelqu'autre fin que ce soit, altmiste ou intÃ©ressÃ©e . Le degrÃ© de publicitÃ© rÃ©sultant de la lecture d'un document devant le tribunal n'est pas nÃ©cessairement trÃ¨s Ã©levÃ© . Dans certains cas, seuls sont prÃ©sents les panies et leurs conseils . L'argumentation prÃ©sentÃ©e par l'appelante, cependant, va jusqu'Ã dire que, puisque le public Ã©tait en principe prÃ©sent et que n'importe qui pouvait assister aux dÃ©bats et prendre note du contenu de tout document communiquÃ© et lu Ã haute voix, l'obligation implicite d'Ã©viter tout usage irrÃ©gulier devenait caduque . Ce n'est pas lÃ une proposition qui me paraisse acceptable selon quelque critÃ¨re rationnel que ce soit, ni compatible avec une bonne administration de la justice . La thÃ©orie dont s'inspire la proposition est que la lecture Ã haute voix du document en dÃ©truit le caractÃ¨re secret et que, toute considÃ©ration de droit d'auteur et de diffamation mise Ã pan, la loi n'interdit pas la diffusion de documents qui ne sont pas confidentiels . L'obligation implicite de ne pas mÃ©suser des documents communiquÃ©s est cependant indÃ©pendante de toute obligation dÃ©coulant du droit gÃ©nÃ©ral concemant le secret . Elle assure une protection particuliÃ¨re octroyÃ©e dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t d'une bonne administration de la justice . C'est une obligation non visÃ -vis du propriÃ©taire des documents mais vis-Ã -vis du tribunal, et ce demier veille au respect de cette obligation dans ledit intÃ©rÃ¨t, et non dans celui de l'application du droit au secret . II existe de bonnes raisons de craindre que, si l'argument de l'appelante Ã©tait acceptÃ©, la tentation serait sensiblement plus grande pour un plaideur de dÃ©tmire ou de cacher l'existence de documents pertinents qui pourraient faire l'objet d'une procÃ©dure de communication . On pourrait Ã©galement craindre que s'introduisent dans la procÃ©dure des tnano .uvres tactiques, d'un cÃ´tÃ© ou de l'autre, destinÃ©es Ã assurer que les documents communiquÃ©s soient ou ne soient pas lus en entier . Ces deux consÃ©quences seraient indÃ©sirables au regard d'une bonne administration de la justice . -(loc . cit . pages 540-41) . Lord Diplock n'estimait pas que l'affaire intÃ©ressÃ¢t la libenÃ© de parole, la libertÃ© de la presse, la transparence de la justice ni le passage de documents au Â«domaine publicâ¢ . Il Ã©tait d'avis que l'affaire ne demandait Ã Ã©tre examinÃ©e Ã la lumiÃ¨re d'aucun des droits ou libenÃ©s proclamÃ©s par la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . La majoritÃ© des lords a reconnu que si la requÃ©rante avait communiquÃ© un exemplaire de la transcription ou d'un enregistrement mÃ©canique du procÃ¨s Ã une partie non liÃ©e Ã celui-ci, elle n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© coupable d'outrage Ã magistrat . Il y avait cependant dÃ©saccord sur la question dÃ© savoir si la communication des documents soumis au tribunal Ã un chroniqueur judiciaire officiel ou Ã un autre journaliste cherchant Ã vÃ©rifier des dÃ©tails en vue de publier un compte rendu prÃ©cis de la procÃ©dure constituerait un outrage Ã magistrat . Lord Keith a estimÃ© que s'il y avait quelque raison de douter que la partie qui avait initialement communiquÃ© le s
documents en .discovery â¢ approuverait qu'on les montrÃ¢t Ã un joumaliste, on ne devait pas le faire sans une telle approbation (1oc . cit ., p . 542) . Lord Diplock considÃ©rait quant Ã lui que cet acte n'Ã©tait tout au plus qu'une infraction de caractÃ¨re technique (ibid ., p . 539-540) . Lord Roskill, enfin, n'estimait pas que cette maniÃ¨re de faire, liÃ©e comme elle l'Ã©tait Ã la chronique judiciaire, pouvait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme un outrage Ã magistrat (ibid ., p . 555) . Dans leur opinion dissidente, Lord Scarman et Lord Simon acceptaient que l'obligation de la personne qui a reÃ§u communication de documents de les garder secrets et de ne les employer qu'aux fins de l'action en justice, prenait fin lorsque ces documents Ã©taient utilisÃ©s dans un procÃ¨s public . Se rÃ©fÃ©rant Ã l'article 10 de la Convention, Lord Scarman prÃ©cisait : Â«On peut difficilement soutenir qu'il existait un besoin social impÃ©rieux de refuser au plaideur et Ã son conseil la libertÃ© dont jouit chacun de traiter de tels documents comme chose de notoriÃ©tÃ© publique . . (loc . cit ., p . 547) . A leur avis, ni le caractÃ©re ni la durÃ©e de l'obligation de garder le secret ne pouvaient Ãªtre dÃ©terrninÃ©s par unique rÃ©fÃ©rence aux exigences de la loi sur la communication de documents dans les affaires civiles . 0 fallait Ã©galement considÃ©rer les exigences du droit gÃ©nÃ©ral qui protÃ¨ge la libertÃ© de communication . A cet Ã©gard, Lord Scatman dÃ©clara : . . . . Il faut parvenir Ã un juste Ã©quilibre en tre deux intÃ©rÃªts dont se prÃ©occupe la loi, d'une part la protection du droit personnel d'un plaideur de conse rv er ses documents p ar devers lui nonobstant son obligation de les divulguer Ã l'autre part ie au litige, et d'autre part la protection du droit, reconnu par la loi moyennant certaines exceptions, que possÃ¨de chacun de s'exp rimer librement et de communiquer des inforrrtations et des idÃ©es sur des questions dÃ©jÃ connues du public . A notre avis, ce juste Ã©quilibre est a tt eint si l'obligation ne subsiste que dans la mesure oÃ¹ les documents eux-m@mes sont pri vÃ©s et confidentiels . Lorsque le droit personnel d'un plaideur de conse rv er ses documents secrets est dÃ©passÃ© par le fait que lesdits documents sont devenus publics, nous ne voyons aucune raison qu'un engagement pri s lorsque les documents Ã©taient confi dentiels continue de leur Ã©tre applicable .â¢ ( loc . cit ., p . 544) .
GRIEFS ET ARGUMENTATIO N Sur l'artfcle 1 0 I. Il est allÃ©guÃ© que les dÃ©cisions des tribunaux anglais concernant la requÃ©rante ont constituÃ© une violation de sa libertÃ© d'expression et de la libertÃ© de communiquer une information .
Pour avoir communiquÃ© une information Ã M . Leigh en lui permettant d'examiner les recueils de piÃ¨ces produites au tribunal, elle a Ã©tÃ© reconnue coupable d'un grave outrage Ã magistrat . C'est un fait grave pour un conseil attachÃ© Ã la Cour suprÃªme . Elle a d'autre part dÃ» assumer ses propres frais dans toute la procÃ©dure, ainsi que ceux du ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur pour les deux appels . Enfin, si la requÃ©rante communiquait une infortnation analogue dans des circonstances analogues, elle pourrait s'attendre Ã Ã¨tre sanctionnÃ©e plus sÃ©vÃ¨rement . Sa libertÃ© future de communiquer une telle information se trouve ainsi restreinte . Il est allÃ©guÃ© que la restriction imposÃ©e Ã la requÃ©rante n'est pas -prescrite par la loi Â» . A cet Ã©gard, il est fait rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã l'arrÃ¨t de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire du Sunday Times, et en particulier Ã l'observation selon laquelle Â«une norme ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme loi que si elle est formulÃ©e avec une prÃ©cision suffisante pour perrnettre Ã un citoyen de rÃ©gler sa conduite . . . (par . 49) . La requÃ©rante ne pouvait pas prÃ©dire avec une cenitude suffisante que son action serait considÃ©rÃ©e comme un outrage Ã magistrat . A cet Ã©gard . il est allÃ©guÃ© ce qui suit : A . A l'Ã©poque des faits - en avril 1980 - il Ã©tait de jurisprudence constante que les tribunaux ne restreignaient pas l'utilisation de l'information communiquÃ©e confidentiellement mais entrÃ©e par la suite dans le domaine public .
B . Comme en ont tÃ©moignÃ© avocats et joumalistes devant la Divisional Court, les avocats ont depuis longtemps l'habitude de laisser voir aux journalistes, Ã leur demande, des documents produits au tribunal . Jamais cette pratique n'a conduit Ã une procÃ©dure pour outrage Ã magistrat, voire Ã une observation quelconque sur l'incorrection de cette coutume . C . En supputant quelles restrictions pourraient continuer de s'appliquer Ã sa libertÃ© de communiquer des informations aprÃ¨s la fin des dÃ©bats, la requÃ©rante Ã©tait en droit de tenir compte de l'absence de toute restriction sur le reportage . Le tribunal a en effet le pouvoir d'ordonner, dans certaines circonstances, que des tÃ©moignages ne soient pas divulguÃ©s ni rapportÃ©s en-dehors de la salle d'audience . D . Il a Ã©tÃ© reconnu, dans certains cas, qu'il pouvait y avoir un intÃ©rÃ¨t public Ã la divulgation, qui l'emporterait sur l'intÃ©rÃ©t public Ã une bonne administration de la justice et Ã la protection du secret (Distillers Company (Biochemicals) Ltd, contre Times Newspapers Ltd (1975) QB 613, 625) . E . MÃªme si l'on avait pu prÃ©voir que les rÃ¨gles attachÃ©es Ã la communication en justice seraient maintenues indÃ©finiment dans un litige entre deux particuliers, on ne pouvait en dire autant avec une suffisante certitude lorsque l'une des parties Ã©tait un ministÃ¨re du Gouvernement et lorsqu'il Ã©tait allÃ©guÃ© que ce ministÃ¨re avait agi d e
faÃ§on illÃ©gale vis-Ã -vis de personnes qui se trouvaient en son pouvoir . Dans de telles circonstances, la requÃ©rante devait pouvoir compter que son action relevait de l'exception d'intÃ©rÃ©t public prÃ©citÃ©e . 2. La requÃ©rante affirrne que la restriction Ã ses d roits garantis par l'article 10 ne pouvait Ãªtre justifiÃ©e par le deuxiÃ©me paragraphe, qui se rÃ©fÃ¨re Ã un besoin social impÃ©rieux et, en tout cas, Ã©tait dispropo rt ionnÃ©e Ã l'intÃ©rÃ©t Ã protÃ©ger . ' DÃ©s lors que les documents avaient Ã©tÃ© utilisÃ©s en audience publique, ils avaient perdu leur caractÃ¨re sec ret . Toute personne prÃ©sente au procÃ¨s aurait pu prendre le contenu en stÃ©nographie . Toute personne aurait pu acheter une tr anscription de la procÃ©dure, soit auprÃ¨s du stÃ©nographe officiel, soit auprÃ¨s de toute autre personne qui se serait donnÃ© la peine de faire sa propre transc ri ption . L'information ainsi obtenue aurait pu Ãªtre lib re ment communiquÃ©e et reÃ§ue . La requÃ©rante admet que les documents en question avaient Ã© tÃ© initialement reÃ§us par elle sous le sceau du secret . Elle ajoute cependant que cette justification ne s'applique que si l'infomtation est toujours secrÃ¨te au moment oÃ¹ elle est communiquÃ©e . Le maintien de la restri ction lorsque l'information est devenue chose publique la rend injustifiable et disproportionnÃ©e . On ne saurait non plus allÃ©guer que la rest ri ction est justifiÃ©e par la nÃ©cessitÃ© de sauvegarder les droits du ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ© ri eur . Son droit au secret a pris fin lorsque les documents ont Ã©tÃ© utilisÃ©s en audience publique . La restriction ne peut pas non plus se justifier comme nÃ©cessaire pour la protection des droits de futurs plaideurs . Ils peuvent certes penser que leurs adversaires hÃ©sitent Ã faire une pleine communication Ã cause du risque de publicitÃ© mais c'est lÃ un risque qui a toujours existÃ© . La restriction imposÃ©e Ã la requÃ©rante est sans rapport avec l'autoritÃ© et l'impartialitÃ© du pouvoir judiciaire .
Sur l'article 14 combinÃ© avec l'article 1 0 Il est allÃ©guÃ©, Ã ce sujet, que la restriction Ã©tait discriminatoire, pour les raisons suivantes : 1 . Au moins un membre de la majoritÃ© de la Chambre des Lords (Lord Diplock) a dÃ©clarÃ© que si la requÃ©rante avait montrÃ© les documents Ã un chroniqueur judiciaire ou Ã quelque autre journaliste dans le seul but de pertnettre une relation prÃ©cise de ce qui avait Ã©tÃ© dit effectivement au tribunal, elle aurait tout au plus Ã©tÃ© coupable d'une infraction d'ordre technique, ne mÃ©ritant ni sanction ni condamnation aux dÃ©pens . 2 . La restriction ne s'appliquait qu'Ã elle, Ã son client et aux autres conseils . Toute autre personne prÃ©sente au tribunal aurait pu communiquer la mÃ©me information Ã -70-
M . Leigh . En fait, elle aurait pu elle-mÃªme communiquer l'information Ã partir d'une transcription de l'audience plutÃ´t que des documents eux-m@mes . 3 . La restriction ne s'appliquait Ã elle que parce que l'information communiquÃ©e avait servi Ã la rÃ©daction d'un article critiquant la politique du ministÃ©re de l'IntÃ©rieur . On ne conÃ§oit pas qu'une procÃ©dure e0t Ã©tÃ© engagÃ©e contre elle si elle avait montrÃ© les documents Ã un journaliste qui s'en serait servi pour chanter les louanges du ministÃ©re .
Sur l'article 7 On fait observer que la requÃ©rante a Ã©tÃ© en substance dÃ©clarÃ©e coupable d'une infraction pÃ©nale nonobstant le fait que le ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur a engagÃ© une procÃ©dure au civil, et non au pÃ©nal . Un outrage Ã magistrat au civil implique Ã©galement une obstruction Ã une bonne administration de la justice, que le tribunal peut sanctionner pÃ©nalement . Jusqu'Ã la dÃ©cision des tribunaux dans son procÃ¨s, ce n'Ã©tait pas un dÃ©lit que de montrer Ã un journaliste des documents communiquÃ©s, lorsque ces documents avaient Ã©tÃ© lus Ã l'audience . L'interprÃ©tation donnÃ©e par les tribunaux Ã l'engagement implicite Ã©tait entiÃ©rement imprÃ©visible . La requÃ©rante se rÃ©f2re Ã ce sujet Ã des arrÃªts de la Cour suprÃªme des EtatsUnis relatifs au principe du procÃ©s Ã©quitable ( Bouie contre ville de Columbia, 378 U .S . 347 (1964) et Marks contre Etats-Unis, 97 S .C .T . 990 (1977)), ainsi qu'Ã un arrÃªt de la Cour de justice des CommunautÃ©s europÃ©ennes en cause Defrenne contre Sabena, et Ã la dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte No 8710/79 (D .R . 28 p . 77), oÃ¹ il Ã©tait dit que Â« la dÃ©finition des dÃ©lits existants ne doit pas Ãªtre Ã©tendue pour couvrir des faits qui, auparavant, ne constituaient Ã©videmment pas des infractions pÃ©nales . .
OBJET DE LA REQUÃTE La requÃ©rante conclut Ã la constatation (a) que ses droits tels que dÃ©finis ci-dessus ont Ã©tÃ© violÃ©s par la dÃ©cision des tribunaux anglais ; (b) que le droit du Royaume-Uni, tel qu'Ã©noncÃ© par la Chambre des lords, constitue une violation des dispositions prÃ©citÃ©es de la Convention . Elle rÃ©clame Ã©galement une juste satisfaction conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 50, y compris une indemnisation pour violation des droits que lui reconnaÃ®t la Convention, et le remboursement de ses frais .
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EN DROI T La requÃ©rantc, qui a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ©e coupable d'outrage Ã magistrat (contempt of court), se pLaint en premier lieu d'avoir Ã©tÃ© .dÃ©clarÃ©e coupable d'un acte qui ne constituait pas une infraction pÃ©nale en vertu du droit du Royaume-Uni au moment oÃ¹ il a Ã©tÃ© commis, ce qui constitue une violation de l'article 7 par . 1 de la Convention . Elle soutient Ã cet Ã©gard que jusqu'aux dÃ©cisions des tribunaux dans la procÃ©dure dirigÃ©e contre elle, le fait de montrer Ã un joumaliste, aprÃ¨s leur lecture Ã l'audience, des documents communiquÃ©s ne constituait pas une infraction . Elle allÃ¨gue essentiellement que les tribunaux ont dÃ©fini pour elle une nouvelle infraction pÃ©nale . Elle se plaint en outre que les dÃ©cisions rendues par les tribunaux dans sa cause ont violÃ© son droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression, en particulier son droit de communiquer des infortnations, et ce au mÃ©pris de l'article 10 par . I . Elle prÃ©tend qu'une telle ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice de sa libertÃ© de communiquer des informations ne peut se justifier en vertu du deuxiÃ¨me paragraphe de cette disposition, puisque dÃ¨s le moment oÃ¹ les documents en question avaient Ã©tÃ© lus publiquement Ã l'audience, ils entraient dans le domaine public . On ne peut donc prÃ©lendre que la restriction apportÃ©e Ã ses droits Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire pour empÃªcher la divulgation d'une information reÃ§ue confidenliellement . En outre, la dÃ©cision des tribunaux la reconnaissant coupable d'outrage Ã magistrat dans de telles circonstances Ã©tait hors de proportion avec les intÃ©rÃªts Ã protÃ©ger. Elle prÃ©tend enfin qu'une telle restriction n'Ã©tait pas Â« prÃ©vue par la loi . car rien ne lui pertnettait de prÃ©voir avec une certitude suffisante que ses actes seraient interprÃ©tÃ©s comme un outrage Ã magistrat . La requÃ©rante allÃ¨gue Ã©galement que la restriction imposÃ©e Ã la libertÃ© d'expression Ã©tait discriminatoire, au sens de l'article 14 de la Convention . A cet Ã©gard, elle soutient que si elle avait montrÃ© les documents Ã un chroniqueurjudiciaire ou Ã tout autrejournaliste aux fins de publication d'une relation exacte de ce qui avait Ã©tÃ© dit au tribunal, elle aurait Ã©tÃ© coupable tout au plus d'une infraction de caractÃ©re purement technique . D'autre part, la restriction ne s'appliquait Ã aucun autre individu qui, ayant assistÃ© Ã l'audience, aurait pu en toute impunitÃ© communiquer la mÃªme information Ã un joumaliste quelconque . Elle soutient enfin que la restriction ne lui a Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©e que parce que le joumaliste en question a Ã©crit un article critiquant le ministÃ¨re de l'IntÃ©rieur . Le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur soutient qu'elle n'a pas Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ©e pour une infraction pÃ©nale au sens de l'article 7 par . 1, puisque les tribunaux avaient conclu qu'elle avait commis un dÃ©lit de caractÃ©re civil et non pÃ©nal vis-Ã -vis du tribunal . Il explique que le but des sanctions qui peuvent Ãªtre imposÃ©es pour un dÃ©lit civil n'est pas de punir le contempteur mais d'assurer le respect des engagements pris vis-Ã -vis d'un tribunal . Le Gouvernement affirme en outre que la dÃ©cision du tribunal dan s
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la cause de la requÃ©rante ne crÃ©ait pas rÃ©trospectivement une infraction pÃ©nale, les tribunaux s'Ã©tant contentÃ©s d'appliquer des principes juridiques gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus Ã une situation de fait qu'ils n'avaient pas eu Ã considÃ©rer auparavant . Le Gouvernement fait Ã©galement observer que, dans la mesure oÃ¹ il y avait eu restriction de la libertÃ© d'expression de l'intÃ©ressÃ©e, y compris sa libe rtÃ© de communiquer des informations, cette restriction Ã© tait prÃ©vue par la loi et justifiÃ©e en vertu du 2Ã¨me paragraphe de l'anicle 10, comme nÃ©cessaire pour assurer la protection des droits d'autrui et prÃ©venir la divulgation d'informations confidentielles, ainsi que pour garantir l'autoritÃ© et l'impa rt ialitÃ© du pouvoir judiciaire . Il soutient encore que l'information n'a pas cessÃ© d'Ãªtre confidentielle lorsqu'elle a Ã©tÃ© lue publiquement Ã l'audience . Le maintien du caractÃ¨re confidentiel des documents est nÃ©cessaire pour le bon fonctionnement de la procÃ©dure civile dans unejuridiction de .commonlaw . . Il est nÃ©cessaire pour que les causes puissent Ãªtre entendues rapidement et Ã©quitablement, avec un minimum de frais, et pour que le plaideur qui communique des documents confidentiels Ã son adversaire soit assurÃ© que ces documents ne seront pas diffusÃ©s plus largement qu'il n'est strictement nÃ©cessaire aux fins de la procÃ©dure en cours . Si un plaideur n'avait pas cette assurance, il serait tentÃ© de retenir ou d'Ã©liminer de quelque maniÃ¨re des documents pe rtinents . Enfin, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur nie qu'il y ait eu discrimination et prÃ©tend que les distinctions Ã© tablies entre la requÃ©rante et les chroniqueurs judiciaires ou des personnes du public prÃ©sentes Ã l'audience trouvent une justification raisonnable et objective dans l'intÃ©rÃ¨t public d'une bonne administration de la justice .
La Commission a procÃ©dÃ© Ã un examen prÃ©liminaire de l'arguthentation des part ies, et considÃ¨re que la requÃªte soulÃ¨ve, dans le cadre de la Convention, des problÃ¨mes impo rt ants et complexes qui doivent Ãªtre rÃ©solus par un examen du fond de l'affaire . Elle ne considÃ¨re pas que la requÃ©te puisse, dans son ensemble, Ãªtre rejetÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e . Elle estime donc que la requÃªte est, dans son ensemble, recevable, tous moyens de fond rÃ©servÃ©s . Par ces motifs, la Commission DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE .
- 73 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 11/05/1984Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 14
 l'article 1
 l'article 7
 l'article 50
 l'article 7
 l'article 10
 l'article 14
 l'article 7