Source: https://cal-employment.com/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:02:17+00:00

Document:
First, it changed the damages sought from $44,082.22, as pleaded in the complaint, to $312,260 in attorney fees and $16,851.95 in costs under the Litigation Agreement, plus an additional $27,777.36 in attorney fees and $8,155.13 in accrued interest under the Administrative Agreement, for a total of $365,044.44. . . . Second, had Forrest known about the new damages theory before the discovery cutoff date, she could have used one or more discovery methods to determine if Duchrow had in fact spent 800.65 hours on the prior suit. . . . Third, Forrest could have retained an expert on attorney fee awards, and called him or her as a witness at trial to testify about whether $312,260 was a reasonable amount of attorney fees. . . . Fourth, if Forrest had known earlier about Duchrow’s new theory of liability, she would have given more thought to accepting his offer to compromise (see Code Civ. Proc., § 998) or would have seriously considered settling the case. . . . Fifth, Forrest was a transactional attorney with no litigation experience. . . . If Forrest had known before trial that Duchrow would ask the jury to award him $360,796.94, she would have retained counsel. . . . Last, if Duchrow had made a timely motion to amend, Forrest would have conducted legal research and argued that paragraph 9 was unenforceable. As noted, paragraph 9 permitted Duchrow to recover attorney fees for “all time spent” on a case if he was discharged by a client or if he withdrew from representation for good cause.
Presiding Justice Robert Mallano issued the opinion for the Court, with Associate Justices Frances Rothschild and Jeffrey W. Johnson concurring.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Alan S. Rosenfield, Judge.
Ernestine Forrest, in pro per, for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of David J. Duchrow and David J. Duchrow for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Today, the Ninth Circuit issued a per curiam opinion in Petersen v. Boeing Company, No. 11-18075, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2013). Plaintiff Robin P. Petersen is a former Navy pilot recruited to work in Saudi Arabia for Boeing International Support Services. Plaintiff alleged he was required to sign a preliminary employment agreement that did not contain a forum selection clause, but that on arrival in Saudi Arabia, he was forced to sign a second employment agreement—which he was not given time to read and which he was told he must sign or else return immediately to the United States at his own expense. The agreement contained a forum selection clause requiring any contractual disputes to be resolved in the Labor Courts of Saudi Arabia. Petersen alleged he signed the second agreement without reading it, his passport was then confiscated, and he was effectively imprisoned in his housing compound.
Plaintiff submitted evidence that he could not afford to travel to Saudi Arabia for litigation, that he was afraid to return there because he had been kept a virtual prisoner during his employment, and that his ability to obtain a fair trial there was in question because he was a foreigner, an employee challenging a powerful employer, and a non-Muslim.
The district court dismissed on the basis of the forum selection clause without holding an evidentiary hearing as to whether Petersen was induced to assent to the forum selection clause through fraud or overreaching.
The Ninth Circuit panel held that the evidence submitted and the allegations made by Petersen were more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the forum selection clause at issue is enforceable, and reversed the district court.
Circuit Judges Harry Pregerson, Stephen Reinhardt, and William A. Fletcher.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Chief District Judge Roslyn O. Silver, Presiding.
Robin P. Petersen, pro se, Warner Robins, Georgia, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Geoffrey M.T. Sturr, Thomas L. Hudson, and Kathleen Brody O’Meara, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees.
Second District Orders Published Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc.
Today, the Second District ordered published Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc., et al., No. B237363, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (filed Mar. 21, 2013, modified Apr. 19, 2013). At the trial court level, the court denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, finding the agreement to arbitrate lacked mutuality. Defendants argued that the requisite mutuality was provided by the bilateral arbitration provisions in the employee handbook, incorporated by reference into the arbitration agreement. The trial court rejected this argument because defendant could change the handbook at its sole discretion and without notice. The Second District reversed.
However, because the agreement incorporated the arbitration policy in the employee handbook, the Court concluded that this “salvages the agreement by establishing an unmistakable mutual obligation on the part of CSI and Serpa to arbitrate ‘any dispute’ arising out of her employment.” Plaintiff argued that the while the arbitration policy in the handbook establishes a bilateral obligation to arbitrate, she insisted that the mutual obligation is illusory because, the employer is authorized to alter the terms of any policy contained in the handbook at its sole discretion and without notice. The Court disagreed, reasoning that the right to alter the terms was limited by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.
Presiding Justice Perluss delivered the opinion for the court, with Associate Justices Woods and Jackson concurring.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Judge Ruth Ann Kwan.
Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton, Fred M. Plevin, Jeffrey P. Ames and Matthew R. Jedreski for Defendants and Appellants, California Surety Investigations, Inc., Two Jinn, Inc., Aladdin Bail Bonds and Peter Holdsworth.
Stevens, Carlberg & McMillan and Daniel P. Stevens for Plaintiff and Respondent Valerie Serpa.
On Monday, the Second District affirmed a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler, et al., No. B237044, __ Cal.App.4th __ (2d Dist. Apr. 15, 2013). Some defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the remaining defendants did not. Slip Op. at 2. The trial court denied on the grounds of waiver and the possibility of inconsistent rulings.
A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.
[N]ot every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission. Otherwise, a plaintiff would conclusively establish the facts of the case by merely alleging them, and there would never be any disputed facts to be tried. Rather, a judicial admission is ordinarily a factual allegation by one party that is admitted by the opposing party. The factual allegation is removed from the issues in the litigation because the parties agree as to its truth. Thus, facts to which adverse parties stipulate are judicially admitted. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hahn (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1238-1239.) Similarly, in discovery when a party propounds requests for admission, any facts admitted by the responding party constitute judicial admissions. (See, e.g., Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 978-979; Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410.) And when an answer admits certain factual allegations contained in a complaint or cross-complaint, those facts are likewise judicially admitted.2 (See, e.g., Valerio, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1271.) A judicial admission is therefore conclusive both as to the admitting party and as to that party’s opponent. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 454, p. 587.) Thus, if a factual allegation is treated as a judicial admission, then neither party may attempt to contradict it—the admitted fact is effectively conceded by both sides.
In a ruling that was expected to have a broad impact on mandatory employment arbitration agreements, the Ninth Circuit today compelled arbitration in Kilgore v. Keybank, National Association, but avoided a broad ruling vitiating the Broughton-Cruz rule. Kilgore v. Keybank, National Association, No. 09-16703, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2013) (en banc). The appeal involved a putative class action by former students of a failed flight-training school who seek broad injunctive relief against the bank that originated their student loans among others. The en banc court held that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable under California law and reversed and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration.
IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM, NEITHER YOU NOR I WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM . . . . FURTHER, I WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. . . . I UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER RIGHTS I WOULD HAVE IF I WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. . . .

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