Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/401/77/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:22:32+00:00

Document:
Appellees brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of various Illinois statutes under some of which certain appellees had been arrested and all of which they claimed were being used to intimidate them in the exercise of their First Amendment rights. A three-judge District Court declared invalid for overbreadth and enjoined enforcement of a statutory provision (under which no appellee had been arrested or charged) that prohibited intimidating a person by threats to "[c]ommit any criminal offense."
Held: Since no appellee suffered, or was threatened with, great and immediate irreparable injury and the future application of the statute to any appellee was merely speculative, the District Court was not warranted in interfering with state law enforcement by the issuance of an injunction or declaratory judgment. Younger v. Harris, ante, p. 401 U. S. 37; Samuels v. Mackell, ante, p. 401 U. S. 66. Pp. 401 U. S. 80-81.
280 F.Supp. 938, reversed and remanded.
BLACK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and HARLAN, STEWART, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., concurred in the result. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, ante, p. 401 U. S. 58.
temporary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the pending and any possible future prosecutions under the statutes in question.
The defendants answered by opposing the convening of a three-judge court and the issuance of a temporary injunction, and moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others, that (1) as to those plaintiffs against whom prosecutions were then pending, there was an adequate remedy at law in that they would be able to present their constitutional challenges to the statutes involved in the pending criminal proceedings, and that, as to such plaintiffs, the court was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 from issuing an injunction against state court proceedings, [Footnote 6] and that (2) as to those plaintiffs without matters pending in the state courts, there were no facts alleged in the complaint showing that any of those plaintiffs were threatened with prosecution under any of the challenged statutes, or that they would suffer any irreparable injury if they were required to defend any prosecution that might be brought against them in state court.
more persons to do an unlawful act . . . ," [Footnote 8] and one subsection of the intimidation statute which prohibited intimidating a person by threats to "[c]ommit any criminal offense. . . ." [Footnote 9] These last two subsections were declared invalid on the grounds that they were overly broad, and might sweep within their scope conduct that could not constitutionally be made criminal. The court decreed that the defendants -- city and county officials -- "be and they are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from the enforcement of or the prosecution under" the two statutory subsections it declared unconstitutional. The defendant officials did not appeal the three-judge court's declaration and injunction invalidating the challenged subsection of the mob action statute, and that holding is therefore not before us. We have before us only the court's declaration of the unconstitutionality and injunction against the enforcement of one subsection of the intimidation statute.
the court below held unconstitutional. All the charges of the complaint deal broadly and generally with all the state statutes and city ordinances that the appellees originally challenged. In fact, the complaint contains no mention of any specific threat by any officer or official of Chicago, Cook County, or the State of Illinois to arrest or prosecute any one or more of the plaintiffs under that statute either one time or many times. Rather, it appears from the allegations that those who originally brought this suit made a search of state statutes and city ordinances with a view to picking out certain ones that they thought might possibly be used by the authorities a devices for bad faith prosecutions against them. There is nothing contained in the allegations of the complaint from which one could infer that any one or more of the citizens who brought this suit is in any jeopardy of suffering irreparable injury if the State is left free to prosecute under the intimidation statute in the normal manner. As our holdings today in Younger v. Harris, ante, p. 401 U. S. 37, and Samuels v. Mackell, ante, p. 401 U. S. 66, show, the normal course of state criminal prosecutions cannot be disrupted or blocked on the basis of charges which in the last analysis amount to nothing more than speculation about the future. The policy of a century and a half against interference by the federal courts with state law enforcement is not to be set aside on such flimsy allegations as those relied upon here.
For the reasons set out above, and for those set out at greater length today in Younger and Samuels, we reverse.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concur in the result.
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 21 (1967).
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 31-1.
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 12-2.
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 12.
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 16.
The District Judge found that the challenges to various city ordinances were not appropriate for determination by a three-judge court, and these claims were not certified to the three-judge court. In addition, the plaintiffs abandoned their challenge to the constitutionality of the Illinois aggravated assault and aggravated battery statutes.
"(a) Mob action consists of any of the following: "
"(2) The assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act. . . ."
"(a) A person commits intimidation when, with intent to cause another to perform or to omit the performance of any act, he communicates to another a threat to perform without lawful authority any of the following acts:"
"(3) Commit any criminal offense. . . ."

References: v. 
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 § 2283
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 § 21
 § 31
 § 12
 § 12
 § 16