Source: https://employingalabama.com/tag/eleventh-circuit/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:21:11+00:00

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An employee was ordered to pay $235,249.80 in legal fees after filing a frivolous discrimination claim.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals just gave employees a reason to think twice before filing a frivolous law suit. The Court required an employee to pay his employer $235,249.80 for filing a frivolous employment discrimination claim. See Hamilton v. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc., No. 16-10667, 2017 WL 2665040 (11th Cir. Jun. 21, 2017)(“Hamilton II“). This was the second time that Dr. Dwain Hamilton filed an appeal with the Eleventh Circuit.
In 2015, the Court affirmed dismissal of Dr. Hamilton’s discrimination claims against his employer, Sheridan Healthcorp. See Hamilton v. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc., 602 Fed. App’x 485 (11th Cir. 2015)(“Hamilton I“). In Hamilton I, Dr. Hamilton claimed that he was transferred from a night shift position to day shift, and later terminated, because of his race. But, the trial court and the Eleventh Circuit both found that he was unable to establish a basic, prima facie, case of discrimination. Dr. Hamilton also attempted to claim that he was terminated in retaliation for complaining about discrimination. Yet, the Eleventh Circuit found that he offered no evidence to support that claim, and actually changed his testimony in an after-the-fact attempt to create a claim.
After prevailing, Sheridan Healthcorp asked the trial court to award it $235,249.80 in attorneys’ fees spent defending Hamilton I. Employers rarely win such requests, because fees can only be awarded if an employee’s claim is “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). Courts are usually reluctant to call any claim “frivolous,” but that’s exactly what the trial court did in Hamilton II. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the trial court’s decision and affirmed in Hamilton II.
Hamilton II provides a warning to employees: Think carefully before filing that employment discrimination claim. If a court finds that claims are frivolous, then the employee is potentially on the hook for the employer’s legal fees.
Judge Abdul Kallon recently found that an employee with a hearing impairment posed a direct threat to himself or others under the ADA.
A recent decision from an Alabama federal judge provides guidance to employers who are attempting to determine if an employee’s disability is a “direct threat” under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Lewis v. United States Steel Corp., No. 2:14-cv-01965-AKK (N.D. Ala. Dec. 20, 2016). Alonzo Lewis was an “oiler” at U.S. Steel’s Fairfield, Alabama plant. U.S. Steel used audiovisual warning systems to alert employees that cranes, forklifts and/or trailcars were in motion in the plant.
Lewis is hearing impaired and admitted that sometimes he could not hear alarms in the plant. After a supervisor noticed that Lewis did not react to an alarm, U.S. Steel required him to undergo a hearing test. When Lewis failed the test, U.S. Steel refused to allow him to enter the facility and began the process of attempting to find a reasonable accommodation. Unfortunately, U.S. Steel could not identify any jobs in the facility which did not involve exposure to the mobile equipment. As a result, U.S. Steel terminated Lewis’s employment.
United State District Court Judge Abdul Kallon provided employers with an important distinction from Judge Haikala’s analysis of the direct threat defense. In Judge Haikala’s case, there was no “individualized or objective proof” that the employee posed a direct threat to himself or others. In the Lewis case, however, Judge Kallon found that the failed hearing test was “objective, individualized evidence” that could be relied upon by U.S. Steel to make an employment decision. Because Lewis was a direct threat, Judge Kallon found that his ADA case should be dismissed.
Judge Kallon also provided an alternative basis for dismissal. He found that U.S. Steel possessed a nondiscriminatory reason for termination: “safety concerns due to his inability to hear warning signals.” Lewis failed to demonstrate that U.S. Steel’s safety concerns were not legitimate concerns, so Judge Kallon found another reason for dismissal.
Judge Kallon’s reliance on “individualized, objective evidence” provides effective guidance for employers when considering whether an employee poses a direct threat to himself or others. If an employer possesses individualized, objective evidence that the employee poses a danger, then the employer is more likely to win an ADA discrimination case.
Indefinite Leave Is Not a Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA.
Employers are not required to give indefinite extensions of leave as a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Luke .v Board of Trustees of Fla. A&M Univ., No. 15-13995, 2016 WL 7404677 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016). In Luke, the plaintiff was a patrol office for the Florida A&M University police department. She injured her knee and took leave in September 2013. On June 10, 2014, after an approved nine-month leave, she requested an extension of leave based upon her doctor’s assessment that she would be unable to work patrol shifts for “at least another six months.” Florida A&M denied that request and terminated her employment.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the patrol officer’s ADA law suit. Among other things, the officer claimed that Florida A&M failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation, when it refused to extend her leave. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument: “While a leave of absence might be a reasonable accommodation in some cases … an accommodation is unreasonable if it does not allow someone to perform his or her job duties in the present or in the immediate future.” Luke, 2016 WL 740467 at *3 (emphasis added). The Court found that the six-month extension request did not satisfy the “present or immediate future” requirement.
Luke provides some guidance to employers — a six month leave request does not meet the “present or immediate future” requirement. For shorter leave requests, however, employers should proceed with caution, because the Eleventh Circuit has not provided guidance on the “immediate future” requirement.
An inability to work in summer heat can make an employee unqualified to perform the essential functions of a job under the ADA.
If an employee cannot work outside in the summer heat, she is unqualified for a job that requires outside work and cannot file a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. This point was confirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Perry v. City of Avon Park, No. 15-14525, 2016 WL 6819669 (11th Cir. Nov. 18, 2016). As discussed below, Perry provides at least two tips for employers to follow. First, a written job description helps establish the essential functions of a job. If the employee cannot perform the essential functions found in a job description, it is very difficult to win a claim under the ADA. Second, employers are not required to change their job descriptions as an accommodation to employees with medical conditions.
In Perry, the employee was employed as a maintenance technician/assistant. Her primary duties took place outside doing manual labor in Avon Park, Florida. Ms. Perry was recovering from breast cancer and also suffering from mental health issues. A physician placed work restrictions on Ms. Perry to avoid direct sunlight and to work no more than four hours outside in temperatures above 50 degrees and below 80 degrees.
The City actually tried to accommodate Mr. Perry and gave her a thermometer with instructions to return to City Hall if temperatures exceeded her threshold. Because Avon Park is located in South Florida, the temperature restriction was exceeded almost immediately. When the City asked Ms. Perry’s physician if there was any possibility of accommodating Ms. Perry’s restrictions, the physician stated that there was no way Ms. Perry could work unless the temperature restrictions were met.
The City terminated Ms. Perry’s employment, and she sued under the ADA. The Eleventh Circuit found that Ms. Perry was not qualified for her position because she could not perform the essential functions listed in her written job description — the majority of which required outside work. The Court also rejected two “reasonable accommodations” proposed by Ms. Perry.
First, the Court found that Avon Park was not required to change her job description to eliminate the essential function of outside work. Second, the Court found that Avon Park was not required to abide by the physician’s restrictions, because those restrictions would prevent Ms. Perry from performing the essential function of outside work on a consistent basis.
Perry demonstrates that written job descriptions are extremely important to defending ADA claims. If an employee cannot perform the essential functions of a job as listed in a job description, it will be very difficult for them to establish a claim for disability discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an employer does not commit race discrimination by prohibiting African-American employees from wearing dreadlocks. See EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 4916851.
Catastrophe Management Solutions (“CMS”) interviewed Chastity Jones for a position as a customer service representative. During the interview, Ms. Jones wore a blue business suit and wore her hair in short dreadlocks. During a meeting after the interview, CMS’s Human Resources Manager offered a group of employees (including Ms. Jones) positions as customer service representatives. After that meeting, Ms. Jones spoke to the HR Manager about scheduling issues, and the HR Manager informed Ms. Jones that CMS could not hire her “with the dreadlocks.” Allegedly, the HR Manager said: “they tend to get messy, although I’m not saying yours are, but you know what I’m talking about.” When Ms. Jones refused to cut her hair, the HR Manager requested that Ms. Jones return her hiring paperwork.
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued CMS for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the concept of “race” today might be different from the concept of race when Title VII was enacted in 1964. Indeed: “It may be that today ‘race’ is recognized as a ‘social construct’ … rather than an absolute biological truth.” Catastrophe Management Solutions, 206 WL 4916851 at *7. Nevertheless, the Court declined to adopt a more-contemporary concept of race: “But our possible currently reality does not tell us what the country’s collective zeitgeist was when Congress enacted Title VII half a century ago. ‘That race is essentially only a very powerful idea and not at all a biological fact is, again, an emerging contemporary understanding of the meaning of race.'” Id.
Utilizing a contemporary concept of race, the EEOC argued that a ban on dreadlocks amounted to race discrimination: “black persons choose to wear dreadlocks because that hairstyle is historically, physiologically, and culturally associated with their race.” Id. at *9. But, the Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument by relying upon cases from the 1970’s holding “that Title VII protects against discrimination based upon immutable characteristics.” Id. at *8.
The court then extended that rationale to find that “Title VII protects person in covered categories with respect to their immutable characteristics, but not their cultural practices.” Id. at *9. The court concluded: “That dreadlocks are a ‘natural outgrowth’ of the texture of black hair does not make them an immutable characteristic of race.” Id. “[D]iscrimination on the basis of black hair texture (an immutable characteristic) is prohibited by Title VII, while adverse action on the basis of black hairstyle (a mutable choice) is not.” Id.
Catastrophe Management Solutions should not be interpreted as carte blanche authority for employers to terminate African-American employees on the basis of hairstyle. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that “the distinction between immutable and mutable characteristics of race can sometimes be a fine (and difficult) one ….” Nevertheless, this case provides employers with increased protection if they possess a race-neutral grooming policy which is uniformly enforced without regard to race.
A managerial decision to “clean house” in order to eliminate workplace disruptions is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee under Title VII. Holmes v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 15-15198, 2016 WL 4056029 (11th Cir. 2016). Holmes arose from the Information Technology department of the Jefferson County School District. That department hired a black female, April Holmes, in 2009 and a black male, Kenneth Mitchell in 2011. A white male, Kenneth Stubbs, had worked in the department for roughly 30 years. In 2011, substantial conflicts arose between Ms. Holmes and Mr. Stubbs, leading to two meetings with the District’s Superintendent.
In 2012, a new Superintendent, Albert Cooksey, was elected. Mr. Cooksey was aware of the conflicts in the IT department and decided, in his words, to “clean house.” He terminated Ms. Holmes and Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Cooksey retained Mr. Stubbs because of his greater level of experience and because Cooksey believed Stubbs was not a part of the conflicts. Ms. Holmes sued and claimed that her termination was based upon her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Holmes recognizes that an employer’s desire to limit workplace disruptions is a valid defense to Title VII claims. Obviously, that defense is rebuttable by the employee, so employers should not generically rely upon a desire to “clean house” as a defense in all Title VII claims. Instead, if an employer possesses adequate documentation of the workplace disruptions, it will possess a good starting point for obtaining dismissal of the Title VII claims.

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