Source: http://md.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180314_0000406.DMD.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:13:15+00:00

Document:
On September 18, 2015, a jury convicted Petitioner Lincoln Normando Moquete of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841. (ECF Nos. 26 and 80.) On December 15, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to 144 months to run concurrent on each count. (ECF No. 100.) Petitioner subsequently appealed his conviction, raising several arguments, which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (ECF Nos. 102 and 115); see also United States v. Moquete, 669 Fed.Appx. 179 (4th Cir. 2016).
On November 1, 2017, Moquete, now incarcerated at FCI Williamsburg in Salters, South Carolina, filed this action to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 118.) The Government responded in opposition to Moquete's motion to vacate. (ECF No. 120.) Having reviewed the parties' submissions, this Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's Motion (ECF No. 118) is DENIED.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody may seek to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence where: (1) “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, ” (2) the court lacked “jurisdiction to impose the sentence, . . . [(3)] the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [(4) the sentence] is otherwise subject to a collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. “[A]n error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
A freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be asserted for the first time in a § 2255 petition. United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1991). In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). First, Petitioner must show that his counsel's performance was deficient such that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In assessing whether counsel's performance was deficient, courts adopt a “strong presumption” that an attorney's actions fall within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Second, Petitioner must show that his counsel's performance was prejudicial, meaning the defendant was “depriv[ed] . . . of a fair trial.” Id. at 687. To demonstrate such prejudice, Petitioner must show there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding[s] would have been different.” Id. at 694. Both of these prongs must be satisfied for the Petitioner to obtain the relief he is seeking. Id. at 687.
Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert to rebut the Government's fingerprint evidence. Petitioner claims that an expert was needed to “present evidence to the jury on how fingerprint impressions could have been made on the packaging around the cocaine without actual, direct contact by Moquete.” (ECF No. 118-1.) According to Petitioner, such expert testimony would have “given the jury pause about Moquete's culpability.” (Id.) This argument constitutes an attack on counsel's trial strategy. United States v. Terry, 366 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2004) (characterizing trial counsel's decision not to call a defense witness as a “strategic decision” and affording “enormous deference”) (quoting United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 813 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203, 209 (4th Cir. 2003). When attacking a strategic choice made during trial, a petitioner must “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.'” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). In deciding whether Petitioner has met this burden, this Court must make a “fair assessment of attorney performance, ” which “requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Id.

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