Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97352/miles-vs-illinois-central-r-co
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:25:18+00:00

Document:
Respondent illinois Central R. Co.
Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act prevents a state court from enjoining, on the ground of the inconvenience or expense to the railroad, a resident citizen of the State from prosecuting or furthering an action under the Act (or receiving the proceeds of any judgment therein) in a state court of another State which has jurisdiction under the Act. P. 315 U. S. 705 .
The effect of section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act [ Footnote 1 ] on the power of a state court to enjoin its citizens, on the ground of oppressiveness and inequity to the defendant carrier, from suing on a FELA claim in the state courts of another state, furthering such a suit in any manner, or receiving the proceeds of any judgment so obtained, is before us for decision.
The real point of controversy here is whether that portion of section 6 of the FELA which holds litigation in the state court where it is instituted prevents the court of another state from enjoining citizens, within its jurisdiction, from continued prosecution of the suit on grounds of inequity. Here, as in Kepner's case, there is no question but what the Missouri court has venue of the proceeding. Here, too, we need to look no farther into Tennessee law than the opinion of the state's highest court in this record to conclude that, under state law, a court of equity may enjoin a resident citizen from attempting to enforce his rights, oppressively and inequitably, [ Footnote 4 ] and that the expense and inconvenience hereinbefore set out resulted in oppressiveness and inconvenience in the eye of the state court.
the land, binding on every citizen and every court and enforceable wherever jurisdiction is adequate for the purpose. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 56 -59. The Missouri court here involved must permit this litigation. To deny citizens from other states, suitors under FELA, access to its courts would, if it permitted access to its own citizens, violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Constitution, Art. IV, § 2; McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 230 , 292 U. S. 233 . [ Footnote 6 ] Since the existence of the cause of action and the privilege of vindicating rights under the FELA in state courts spring from federal law, the right to use in state courts of proper venue where their jurisdiction is adequate is of the same quality as the right of sue in federal courts. It is no more subject to interference by state action than was the federal venue in the Kepner case.
Judicial Code § 237(b). Southern Ry. Co. v. Painter, 314 U. S. 155 , 314 U. S. 159 -160: "If a state court proceeds as the Chancery Court of Tennessee acted, the ultimate vindication of any federal right lies with this Court." Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 , 314 U. S. 52 .
Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21 . Cf. International Milling Co. v. Columbia Co., 292 U. S. 511 , limiting Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Co., 262 U. S. 312 ; Atchison Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 , and Michigan Central R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 , to the rule that suits upon extra-state causes of action under FELA burden commerce and will not be permitted in courts of states where the defendant carriers do no more than maintain facilities for solicitation of business. The three cases last mentioned and the Foraker case were all written by the same justice within the space of a few years.
Cf. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U. S. 142 , 207 U. S. 149 .
Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U. S. 142 , or Douglas v. New York, N.H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 , do not impinge upon this principle. In the former case, an Ohio statute forbade suits in its courts for wrongful death occurring in another state unless the decedent was a citizen of Ohio. This Court saw no discrimination against personal representatives of any decedent, since their right to sue did not depend upon their citizenship, but upon the citizenship of their decedent. In the latter case, a statute of New York which gave only discretionary jurisdiction to suits by nonresidents but compulsory jurisdiction to suits by residents was held valid because it treated citizens and noncitizens alike, and tested their right to maintain an action by their residence or nonresidence.
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211 , 241 U. S. 222 .
And the statute books are replete with instances in which Congress has acknowledged the existence of this jurisdiction in the state courts unless explicitly withheld from them. See the discussion of Mr. Justice Bradley in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 , 93 U. S. 139 , 93 U. S. 143 . The essence of Section 6 is merely that the state courts are open to a plaintiff suing under the Act, and that, if he chooses to bring suit in a state court, the defendant may not remove the cause to a federal court. So far as language conveys ideas , the Act affords no intimation that Congress intended anything more.
had the power to do what she has done here. For, while the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, secures to citizens of other states such right of access to the courts of state as that state gives to its own citizens, Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U. S. 142 , 207 U. S. 148 ; McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 230 , 292 U. S. 233 , it does not take away from a state its historic power to prevent unjust resort to the courts of another state. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 . Moreover, the Constitution would not prevent Missouri from declining to entertain a suit to vindicate a federal right, such as was brought here, if an action to enforce a similar nonfederal right would also not lie in her courts. The availability of state courts for the enforcement of federal rights has not resulted in putting federal rights on any different footing from state rights. "A state may not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws," McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., supra, at 292 U. S. 234 , but neither the Constitution nor Congress has compelled the states to discriminate in favor of federal rights. And this Court has expressly held that the rights created by the Federal Employers' Liability Act are not different, in this respect, from other federal rights.
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., supra, at 279 U. S. 387 .
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211 , 241 U. S. 218 , and see Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 56 . The mere fact that a federal right is the basis of suit cannot, therefore, deprive the state courts of the power to use their customary procedures for the achievement of justice. In simply taking advantage of the facilities afforded by the courts of the states, Congress cannot be deemed to have altered the settled jurisprudence of the states so as to operate more favorably for federal rights than for similar rights created by the states themselves. Such drastic inroads upon the authority of the states should be made only upon clear Congressional mandate.
279 U.S. at 279 U. S. 387 . And again, in McKnett's case, 292 U.S. at 292 U. S. 233 , the Court emphasized that "Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide courts for the enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liability Act." In short, every time the question has arisen, this Court has recognized that, by the 1910 amendment, Congress did not write a new chapter in judicial history, nor did it modify the historic function of state courts as agencies for the enforcement of federal rights employing the same instruments for achieving justice as they employ when enforcing rights having their source in state law.
This doctrine of equitable power has been universally accepted by American courts. See, e.g., Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, Mass. 545, 550; Cole v. Young, 24 Kan. 435, 438; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Co., 74 N.J.Eq. 457, 473, 71 A. 153. And the power has been exercised by the state courts generally to enjoin oppressive suits brought under the Act in other state courts. See Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Central R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794; Chicago, M. & St.P. R. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N.W. 218; State ex rel. New York, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 55 S.W.2d 272; Kern v. Cleveland, C., C. & St.L. R. Co., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446. Of course, since a federal right is involved, no state court can screen denial of or discrimination against a federal right under the guise of enforcing its local law. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22 ; Southern Ry. Co. v. Painter, 314 U. S. 155 , 314 U. S. 159 -160.

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