Source: https://mynation.net/docs/appreciation-of-evidence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:21:07+00:00

Document:
FIR is not an encyclopedia. It is only to set the law in motion. It need not elaborate but should contain necessary allegations to constitute cognizable offences.
Section 154, Cr.P.C – Use of FIR – FIR is not a substantial piece of evidence – It can only be used for corroborating or contradicting its maker – It cannot be used to corroborate or contradict other witnesses –Baldev Sings vs. State of Punjab – (1990) 4 SCC 692 ; State of Gujarat vs. Anirudhsing – (1997) 6 SCC 514.
Section 154, Cr.P.C. – FIR – Evidentiary value – Corroboration of its maker is permissible – But the first information report cannot be used as substantive evidence or corroborating a statement of third party – State of M.P. vs. Surbhan – AIR 1996 SC 3345.
Delay in FIR – The inordinate and unexplained delay in dispatching the first information report to the Magistrate – The difference in the account given by the prosecution witnesses and appearing from the first information report of the occurrence – the absence of any statement in the first information report as to the injuries received by some of the accused, and the non-examination of material witnesses – Conviction cannot be sustained – Ishwar Singh vs. State of U.P – AIR 1976 SC 2423.
No proper explanation – Fatal to the prosecution case – State of Rajasthan V. Sheo Singh (AIR 2003 SC 1783). Similar view was taken earlier in Awadesh V. State of M.P. (AIR 1988 SC 1158) and in State of Rajasthan V. Teja Singh (2001 SCC (Cri) 439).
General diary containing – General diary containing a noting of a report regarding cognizable offence, cannot be treated as FIR – Telephonic information to investigating officer – Such information not in nature of FIR – Animireddy Venkata Ramana vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh – (2008) 5 SCC 368.
The Inquest report is merely to ascertain whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or unnatural death, and if so what is the apparent cause of the death. Details of the attack of the deceased are not necessary to be mentioned. – State of U.P vs. Abdul (AIR 1997 SC 2512).
The purpose and object of inquest report and Section 172 of Cr. P. C. has been stated as follows – Section 174 read with 178 of Cr. P. C. – Inquest report is prepared by the Investigating Officer to find out prima-facie the nature of injuries and the possible weapons used in causing those injuries as also the possible cause of death – Non-disclosure of name of assailants by eye-witnesses – Merely on this ground eye-witnesses cannot be disbelieved – Suresh Rai vs. State of Bihar (AIR 2000 SC 2207).
“As rightly submitted, the inquest report need not contain the names of all the witnesses”.
Section 161 of Cr. P. C. – Statement recorded under S.161 Cr.P.C. shall not be used for any purpose except to contradict a witness in the manner prescribed in the proviso to Section 162 (1) – Further the First Information Report is not a substantial piece of evidence – Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab (1990 (4) SCC 692 = AIR 1991 SC 31).
Sections 161 and 162 of Criminal Procedure Code – The Witness not confronted with the statement – The Court cannot subsequently use the statement even for drawing any adverse impression against the witness – Dandu Lakshmi Reddi vs. State of A.P. (AIR 1999 SC 3255).
Sections 161 and 162 – Statement of witness – If thumb impression or signature obtained – Such statements are unreliable – Gurnam Kaur vs. Bakshish Singh and others – AIR 1981 SC 631.
Section 161 – Signing of statement – It merely puts the Court on caution and may necessitate in depth scrutiny of the evidence, but the evidence on this account cannot be rejected outright – State of U.P vs. M.K. Anthony – AIR 1985 SC 48.
(a). What is Confession ?
A ‘‘Confession’’ must either be an express acknowledgement of guilt of the offence charged, certain and complete in itself, or it must admit substantially all the facts which constitute the offence.
“42. Section 24 provides, though in the negative form, that ‘Confession’ can be treated as relevant against the person making the confession unless it appears to the Court that it is rendered irrelevant on account of any of the factors, namely, threat, inducements, promises etc. mentioned therein. Whether the ‘Confession’ attracts the frown of Section 24 has to be considered from the point of view of the confession of the accused as to how the inducement, threat or promise from a person in authority would operate in his mind. (See Satbir Singh V. State of Punjab (1977 (2) SCC 263)). “Confession has to be affirmatively proved to be free and voluntary. (See Hem Rah Devilal v. State of Ajmer (AIR 1954 SC 462)). Before a conviction can be based on “confession”, it has to be shown that it was truthful.
Admission – Incriminating fact without establishing the guilt of the maker is not a confession – Kanda Padayachi vs. State of Tamil Nadu – AIR 1972 SC 66.
Confession – Co-accused – Confession of co-accused can be taken into consideration but it is not substantive piece of evidence – Ram Chandra vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1957 SC 381).
Confession – Corroboration – Co-accused – Joint trial of more than one accused – The confession is not irrelevant against co-accused but it is a matter of practice that it is not ordinarily acted upon without corroboration – Ram Prakash vs. State of Punjab – AIR 1959 SC 1.
Confession may be judicial and extra judicial. If confession recorded by Magistrate it is judicial and if made to any other person it is said to be extra judicial Confession.
Extra-judicial confession needs corroboration and satisfaction of procedure related thereto – State of Tamil Nadu vs. Manmatharaj – 2009 (1) Supreme 455.
Extra judicial Confession – It is a weak piece of evidence – Reliance cannot be placed unless it is plausible and inspires confidence – State of Punjab vs. Bhajan Singh – AIR 1975 SC 258.
Extra judicial confession – It may or may not be a weak evidence – Each case should be examined on its own facts and circumstances – Siva Kumar vs. State – 2006 (1) SCC 714.
Extra judicial confession – Probative value – Such confession cannot be presumed in law to be a weak type of evidence – It depends of the facts and circumstances of each case – Narayan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. – AIR 1985 SC 1678.
Extra judicial confession – Accused not acquainted with witness – Witness not having a status in society – No reason shown as to why accused went to house of witness to confess their crime – Confession cannot be believed – Sandeep vs. State of Haryana – AIR 2001 SC 1103.
The prosecution has to show how the accused reposed confidence on a particular person to give the extra judicial confession (Jaspal Singh vs. State of Punjab (1997 SCC (Cri) 358.
Extra judicial confession – Section 24 – Murder – Alleged to be made before two prosecution witnesses – One of them was known to brother of deceased – He was neither a sarpanch nor a ward member – Therefore, there was no reason for the accused to repose faith in him to seek his protection – Similarly, other prosecution witness admitted that he was not even acquainted with the accused – Thus said evidence can be said to be unnatural and unbelievable – State of Rajasthan vs. Kashi Ram – 2006 AIR SCW 5768.
Confession – It was wholly unlikely that the accused would make extra judicial confession to a person whom they never knew – Deepak Chandrakant Patil vs. State of Maharashtra – (2006) 10 SC 151.
Ultimately the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that conviction cannot be based on his doubtful testimony.
READ Judicial officer can be tried and charged.
12. The aforesaid position was again highlighted in Prabhoo vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1963 SC 1113).
14. The expression “Provided that” together with the phase “whether it amounts to a confession or not” show that the section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. it is not necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to any extent Section 24 also. It will be seen that the first condition necessary for bringing this Section into operation is the discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information received from a person accused of an offence. The second is such that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third is that at the time of the receipt of the information the accused must be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is that only “so much of the information” as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word ‘distinctly’ means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’, ‘unmistakably’. The word has been advisably used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase ‘distinctly’ relates ‘to the facts thereby discovered’ and is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered. (see Mohammed Inayuttillah vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1976 SC 483)).
15. At one time it was held that the expression ‘fact discovered’ in the section is restricted to a physical or material fact which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact, now it is fairly settled that the expression ‘fact discovered’ includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, as noted in Pulukuri Kottaya’s Case and in Udai Bhan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1116).
Section 27 – Disclosure statement by accused – Robbery and Murder – Confessional statement by one of the accused mentioning that “and I am wearing the pant which I washed (after commission of the offence) – Disclosure statement by another accused persons mentioning that “I can recover the (looted) property” – Objection to bracketed words and plea that statements hit by sections 24 and 26 of Evidence Act Section 162 of Cr. P. C – Not tenable – more so when consequent upon disclosure statements articles mentioned therein where actually recovered at instance of accused from place where such articles had been hidden by them – words objected to, do not implicate accused with commission of crime but refer only to nature of property hidden by them.
Recovery of stolen property – Disclosure statements by accused proved by testimony of natural witness, a brother of deceased present during investigation when accused have made such statements – Fact that no independent witnesses were associated with recoveries – Not sufficient to create doubt in prosecution version. – Sanjay vs. State (NCT of Delhi) – AIR 2001 SC 979.
Section 27 – Recovery of incriminating articles – From place which is open and accessible to others – Evidence under S. 27 would not be vitiated on that ground.
There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles are made from any place which is “open or accessible to others”. It is a fallacious notion when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which is open or accessible to others it would vitiate the evidence under section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried on the main roadside or if it is concealed, beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disinterred its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses the fact to any other person. Hence the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in several cases that there is no bar for basing conviction solely on the Dying Declaration but the same should be tested about the voluntaries and truthfulness.
Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 – Dying Declaration – Must be wholly reliable – In case of suspicion, the Court should seek corroboration – If evidence shows that statement of deceased is not wholly true it can be treated only as a piece of evidence but conviction cannot be based solely upon it.
“3. … The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. …. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.
“S.32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872 – Dying Declaration – Evidentiary value – Multiple dying declarations – Inconsistencies – Discrepancies in the last dying declaration making it doubtful – Held, it would not be safe to convict the appellant – Penal Code, 1860, Ss.302 and 34.
Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If there are more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.
Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Recorded in translated version – Reliability – Declaration made by deceased in Telugu – translated by the duty doctor in Tamil and recorded by the Magistrate in Tamil – Statement so recorded was read over and explained by doctor to deceased – Deceased admitted it to be correct – As regards translation none was cross examined – No material to show that it was a result of tutoring – Declaration corroborated by evidence of sister-in-law of deceased – is trustworthy and credible – Ravi Kumar alias Kutti ravi vs. State of Tamil Nadu – 2006 AIR SCW 1037.
Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Contradiction with accident register – Declaration stating that accused put deceased on fire – Case of suicide, however, recorded in accident register – Doctor who made entry, however, explained that entry was so made on presumption since cause of injuries was not informed to him at that time – Evidence of doctor clear and unambiguous – Defence case of suicide cannot be accepted on face of two dying declarations recorded by Magistrate and Police Constable and their clear evidence – Ravi Kumar alias Kutti ravi vs. State of tamil Nadu – 2006 AIR SCW 1037.
Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Deceased wife not keeping good relations with accused-husband – was labouring under belief that husband was having an affair – Deceased was suffering from depression – Had made an earlier attempt for suicide – All prosecution witnesses stating that deceased bolted doors of room from inside – Witnesses along with accused had forced open room and doused fire – Accused himself had taken her to hospital – Circumstances brought on record clearly point out that what might have been stated in dying declaration may not be correct – Conviction based only on dying declaration is not proper –P. Mani vs. State of Tamil Nadu – 2006 AIR SCW 1053.
Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Deceased was assaulted by accused with sword, axe etc. – Presence or non presence of eye-witness or non-mentioning of name of said eye-witness in dying declaration – Has no connection with ascertainment of veracity and creditworthiness of dying declaration – Thus disbelieving dying declaration of deceased recorded by doctor on ground that deceased did not mention presence of eye-witness in dying declaration – Not proper – Heeralal Yadav vs. State of M.P. – 2006 AIR SCW 3425.
Section 32 – Dying declaration – Recording of – Only because a dying declaration was not recorded by a Magistrate – Same by itself may not be a ground to disbelieve entire prosecution case –Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab – 2006 AIR SCW 4950 (A).
Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Death by burning – victim in her dying declaration recorded by doctor stating that her husband had put kerosene oil upon her and upon igniting, locked door of bathroom from outside – Victim in second dying declaration before investigating Officer not only named her husband but also her mother-in-law – Evidence of witnesses stating how deceased received maltreatment at hands of accused persons for their demand of dowry – Conviction of accused husband under section 302, proper – In view of inconsistencies between two dying declarations, benefit of doubt given to accused mother-in-law – Conviction of both under section 498-A, proper – Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab – 2006 AIR SCW 4950 (B).
Section 32 – Dying declaration – Reliability – possibility of deceased becoming instantaneously unconscious – Expressed by doctor conducting post mortem – No ground to disbelieve dying declaration – There is a difference between something possible and something possible or certain – More so, when dying declaration was recorded before deceased reached hospital – Gangaram Shantaram Salunkhe vs. State of Maharashtra – 2006 AIR SCW 5918 (A).
Section 32 – Multiple dying declarations – Reliability – Accused was named in all dying declarations as per who poured kerosene on deceased and set him on fire – Dying Declarations though more than one not contradictory to and inconsistent with each other – Evidence of witnesses corroborating dying declarations – reliance can be placed on such dying declarations – Vimal vs. State of Maharashtra – 2006 AIR SCW 5953.
Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Conviction can indisputably be based on a dying declaration but before it cannot be acted upon, the same held to have been rendered voluntarily and truthfully – Consistency in the dying declaration is the relevant factor for placing full reliance thereupon – Mehiboobsab Abbasafi Nadaf vs. State of Karnataka – 2007 (5) Supreme 713.
i. There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [Munnu Raja and another vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 673)].
ii. If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. [State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Sagar Yadav and Others AIR 1985 SC 416 and Ramavati Devi vs. State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 164].
iii. The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased has an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [ K. Ramachandra Reddy and another vs. The Public Prosecutor (AIR 1976 SC 1994)].
iv. Where the dying declarati0on is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [Rasheed Beg vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) SCC 264)].
v. Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [ Kala Singh vs. State of M.P. (AIR 1982 SC 1021)].
vi. A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [ Ram Manorath and others vs. State of U.P. (1981 (2) SCC 654)].
vii. Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [State of Maharashtra vs. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu (AIR 1981 SC 617)].
viii. Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [Srajdeo Oza and Others vs. State of Bihar ( AIR 1979 SC 1505)].
ix. Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declatation looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [ Nanahau Ram and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912)}.
x. Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [State of U.P. vs. madam Mohan and others (AIR 1989 SC 1519)].
xi. Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted [ Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC 839) and Mohan Lal and others vs. State of Haryana (2007) (9) SCC 151)].
Samadhan Dhudaka Koli vs. State of Maharashtra 2008 (8) Supreme 719 – when a contradictory and inconsistent stand is taken by deceased in different dying declarations they should not be accepted on their face value.
Section 172(2) – Case diary – Evidentiary value – Held, a criminal Court can send for the police diaries of a case under trial in such Court, and may use such diaries, not as evidence of the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial – Case diary cannot be utilized as evidence to corroborate the statement of the prosecution witness – In the instant case, the IO had migrated to Pakistan and had died there, hence could not be examined by trial Court – In such circumstances trial Court looked into the case diary as a additional factor to test the veracity of the witnesses – Since the witnesses confronted with the previous statements, that was not prejudicial to the accused in peculiar facts of the case – Bachan Singh vs. State of Bihar – (2008) 12 SCC 23-A.
Common Intention – Appellants and the co-accused came together and left together and the appellants restricted the movement of the deceased – As such liable u/s 304 (ii) r/w 34 IPC – Surinder Singh V. State of Punjab – 2006 AIR SCW 5454.
Common Object – Section 149 IPC – A person can be convicted for his vicarious liability if he is found to be a member of the unlawful assembly sharing the common object in spite of the fact whether he had actually participated in the commission of the offence – Bhagwan Singh Vs. State of M.P. -AIR 2002 SC 1836 = AIR 2002 SC 1621.
Common Object – S.149 IPC – Overt act need not be proved – Attribution of definite role of accused also not necessary – Only requirement is to be found in unlawful assembly – Dani Singh Vs. State of Bihar – 2005 SCC (Cri.) 127.
Common Object – Attack with lathies by six persons – Only one accused caused fatal blow – Other accused could not be intended to kill the deceased – S.149 cannot be invoked –Bharosi Vs. State of M.P. – AIR 2002 SC 3299.
Section 34 – To attract section 34, IPC, it has to be established that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence – Pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but before commission of the crime. – Kilari Malakondiaah @ Malayadri and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh – 2009 (1) Supreme 487.
Section 34 – Common intention – Proof of – It is question of fact which is subjective – It can also be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case which includes the conduct of the accused persons acting in concert to commit the offence – Maqsoodan and others vs. State of U.P. – AIR 1983 sc 126.
Section 34 – common intention – Proof of – the common intention to bring out a certain result may develop on the spot itself – Kirpal and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh – AIR 1954 SC 706.
Section 34 – Common intention – Scope – Mention of Section 34 IPC in judgment is not requirement of law for conviction – Narinder Singh and another vs. State of Punjab – AIR 2000 (SC) 2212.
Section 34 – Common intention – Sudden fight – The fatal blow caused on the head – The accused who caused fatal injury not established – The accused persons are not liable for common intention to murder. – Shri Kishan and others vs. State of U.P. – AIR 1972 SC 2056.
Sections 34 and 149 – Common intention – Non framing of separate charge – Accused charged with Section 300 read with Section 149 IPC – no charge framed under Section 34 IPC – Common object of the accused persons not proved – However, common intention which was not initially in existence formed during transaction on the spot, proved – Conviction of the accused for the major offence read with Section 34 – Is permissible – Madhu Yadav and others vs. State of Bihar – AIR 2002 SC 2137.
Section 34 and 300 – Common intention – Overt act – Infliction of solitary blow on the neck of deceased with sharp edged weapon – Acquittal of co-accused persons – No evidence on record to prove as to who delivered the fatal blow – The accused in question cannot be convicted for sharing the common intention to murder – Ramachandra Ohdar vs. State of Bihar – AIR 1999 SC 998.
9. “Common object is different from a Common intention as it does not require prior concert and common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and as they act as an assembly to achieve that object. The common object of an assembly is to be an ascertained from the acts and language of the members composing it, and from consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. For determination of the common object of the unlawful assembly, the conduct of each of the members of the unlawful assembly, before and at the time of attack and thereafter, the motive for the crime, are some of the relevant considerations. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under the law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the same must be translated into action or be successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled may subsequently become unlawful. It os not necessary that the intention or the purpose, which is necessary to render an assembly an unlawful one comes into existence at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent is not material. An assembly which, at its commencement or even for some time thereafter, is lawful may subsequently becomes unlawful. In other words it can develop during the course of incident at the spot co instanti.
It is well settled that from the very nature a conspiracy must be conceived and hatched in complete secrecy and it is impossible and very rare to get direct evidence. It is also equally well settled that it is not necessary that each member to conspiracy must know all the details of the conspiracy.
“To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act bi illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every details of conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that every one of the conspirators takes active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implications. In most of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence; as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. The existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually deducted from the circumstance of the case and the conduct of the accused involved in the conspiracy.” – V. Thiagarajan and Others vs. State rep. by Inspector of Police, SPE/CBE/ACB, Chennai.
Identification Parade – Identification by witness – It is not safe to place implicit reliance on the evidence of fleeting glimpse of the accused – It is extremely risky to place implicit reliance on identification for the first time before Court – State of Maharashtra vs. Sukhdev Singh – AIR 1992 SC 2100.
No I.D.Parade – Accused not known to the witness – Identification accused cannot be believed beyond doubt – Chander Pal vs. State of Haryana – AIR 2002 SC 989. – D. Gopalakrishnan vs. Sadanand Naik – AIR 2004 SC 4965 [Similar view].
The identification parade – identification of more than one accused in same parade – Effect – Placing of accused husband and wife in same identification parade, held, was contrary to the Criminal Manual issued by the High Court – Hence, the Courts below rightly disbelieved the identification of the accused in that identification parade – State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran – 2007 (2) SCC (Cri) 162.
Identification Parade – Accused unknown to witness and witness identifying the accused for the first time before the Court and there is no identification parade – No value could be attached to such evidence –Kanan and others vs. State of Kerala – 1980 MLJ (Cri) 1.
Belated identification in Court – No identification parade held – witness cannot be believed – State of Maharashtra vs. Sukhdev Singh – AIR 1992 SC 2100.
Identification Parade value – Person required to identify an accused should have had no opportunity of seeing him after commission of the Crime and before identification – Budhsen vs. State of U.P. – AIR 1970 SC 1321.
If the witness already seen the accused after the arrest and before identification parade, no value could be attached to such evidence – Budhsen vs. State of U.P. – AIR SC 1321.
Section 9 of The Evidence Act, 1872 – Test Identifiction Parade cannot be the decisive factor for recording conviction – Identification do not constitute substantive evidence – Mahabir vs. The State of Delhi – 2008 (3) Supreme 111.
A person can be identified even in darkness from manner of speech, style of walking and other peculiar features – State of M.P. vs. Makhan – (2008) 10 SCC 615-B.
Doctor’s opinion about the weapon through theoretical, cannot be totally wiped out – Anwarul Haq vs. State of U.P. – (2005) 10 SCC 581.
Section 45 – Expert evidence – Medical evidence – Conflict between the medical evidence and ocular evidence about the type of murder weapon used – Conviction on such evidence is not permissible – Mohar Singh and others vs. State of Punjab – AIR 1981 SC 1578.
Conflict between medical and ocular testimony – Ocular testimony should be preferred – State of Punjab vs. Hakam Singh – (2005) 7 SCC 408.
Section 45 – Expert evidence – Admissibility – It must be shown that expert had necessary skill and adequate knowledge before relying such evidence – State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Jai Lal and others – 1999 AIR SC 3318.
Section 45 – Expert evidence – Ballistic expert – Appreciation of opinion – Expert failing to categorically say whether the two injuries could have been caused by single shot – The direct evidence of eye-witness could not be doubted on account of such oscillating opinion – Anvaruddin and others vs. Shakoor and others – AIR 1990 SC 1242.
Section 45 – Expert evidence – Ballistic expert – Inconsistency with ocular evidence – No explanation for inconsistency discredit the entire case – Ram Narain vs. The State of Punjab – AIR 1975 1727.
Section 45 – Expert evidence – Dog tracking – Evidentiary value – Scientific knowledge of dog tracking even if admissible is not much weight in evidence – Abdul Razak Murtaza Dafadar vs. State of Maharashtra – AIR 1970 SC 283.
Section 45 – Expert evidence – Foot print evidence – Identification by foot-print – Identification of foot print is not a fully developed science – Mohd. Aman and another vs. State of Rajasthan – AIR 1997 SC 2960.
Section 45 – Expert evidence – Handwriting expert – Evidentiary value of opinion – The opinion is not conclusive – Conviction solely on such opinion is normally not sufficient – The State of Gujarat vs. Vinaya Chandra Lal Pathi – AIR 1967 SC 778.
(1) Yusufalli Esmail Nagree vs. State of Maharashtra – AIR 1968 SC 147.
(2). R.M. Malkani vs. State of Maharashtra – AIR 1973 SC 157.
(3). Mahabir Prasad Verma vs. Dr. Surinder Kaur – (1982) 2 SCS 258.
Scientific Test – Brain mapping test – Dinesh Dalmia V. State (2006 (1) MLJ (Cri.) 411.
Sections 112 and 4 of IEA, 1872 – Conclusiveness of presumption under section 112, held, cannot be rebutted by DNA test – DNA test value of – Banarsi Dass vs. Teeku Dutta – (2005) 4 SCC 449.
DNA test – A party to a proceeding cannot be compelled against his/her wish to undergo any such (DNA) test the Court on its own could not have imposed a condition without any condition whatsoever – Amarjit Kaur vs. Harbhajan Singh – (2003) 10 SCC 228.
Section 3 – Medical Evidence – Alleged variance with ocular evidence – Eye-witnesses account found to be credible and trustworthy – Medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not to be accepted as conclusive – 2008 AIR SCW 5578.
Evidence – Appreciation of – Prosecution can solely based on the circumstantial evidence – Principles of appreciation of circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt can be drawn.
IV. The chain of evidence should not have any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.
“10. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952.
The Hon’ble Apex Court re-iterated the above principles in Baldev Singh V. State of Haryana reported in 2008 (8) Supreme 544.
Circumstantial evidence – Appreciation of – Court should not cull out one circumstance from the rest to give a different meaning to it – Gade Lakshmi Mangraju alias Ramesh vs. State of Andhra Pradesh – AIR 2001 SC 2677.
Circumstantial Evidence – Appreciation of – Circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence – Circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and circumstances must be conclusive in nature to connect the accused with the crime. Court should not get swayed by emotional considerations – Balwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab – AIR 1996 SC 607.
Conditions for reliance – Tests to be satisfied before convicting an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. The circumstantial evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence – Gambhir vs. State of Maharashtra – AIR 1982 SC 1157.
Missing link to connect the accused – Non explanation of the accused as to what happened on the fateful night – section 313 statement – Chain of circumstances completed – Witness may lie, Circumstances will not – Joseph vs. State of Kerala – (2000) SCC (Cri) 926.
Circumstantial Evidence – Evidence must be compete and incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused – Reddy Sampath Kumar vs. State of A.P. – (2005) 7 SCC 603.
Circumstantial Evidence –Last seen theory itself sufficient to connect the accused in the absence of any other links in the chain of circumstantial evidence – Jaswant Gir vs. State of Punjab – (2005) 12 SCC 438.
Circumstantial Evidence – Bride burning – All the circumstances must conclusively established – If there is any break in the link of chain, accused entitled for the benefit of doubt – Sarojini vs. State of M.P. – 1993 Supp (4) SCC 632.
Section 3 of Evidence Act, 1872 – Eye-witness not disclosing name of assailant for a day and half-credibility – State of Orissa vs. Brahmananda – AIR 1976 SC 2488.
Eye-witness – not informing about the incident till the third day to anyone – Unnatural conduct – Unsafe to rely upon their testimony – Harbans Lal vs. State of Punjab – 1996 SCC (Cri) 312.
Eye-witness not disclosing the fact to anybody that he being an eye-witness till the next day conduct unnatural – not safe to sustain conviction – Joseph vs. State of Kerala – 2003 SCC (Cri) 356.
Section 3 – Conduct of witness – Mere consistent version of the witnesses not sufficient to show the truthfulness and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the conduct of the witnesses is such that it renders the case of the prosecution doubtful or incredible, or that their presence at the place of occurrence as eye-witness is suspect, the Court may reject their evidence – Badam Singh vs. State of M.P. – AIR 2004 SC 26.
The conduct of the accused would be relevant under section 8 of the Evidence Act if his immediate reactions to the illegal overture of the complainant or his action in inserting unwanted something in his pocket were revealed in the form of acts accompanied then and there are immediately thereafter by words or gestures reliably established – Maha Singh vs. State (Delhi Administration) – AIR 1976 SC 449.
Appreciation of Evidence – An inferential conclusion without any evidence to show participation of the accused cannot be sustained – Suresh @ Hakla vs. State of Haryana – 2008 (3) Supreme 182.
Accused injuries –Non explanation of injuries – fatal – genesis and origin suppressed –Lakshmi Singh Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1976 SC 2263.
3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case.
Section 3 – Injuries to accused – Non-explanation – Effect – Murder case – Witnesses vividly described incident and part played by each of accused – All witnesses were injured and their presence at spot cannot be doubted – Injuries suffered by accused were simple – Non-explanation thereof would not dislodge prosecution case, which is established by evidence of credit worthy witnesses – Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab – 2006 AIR SCW 1610.
Murder – Non-Explanation of injuries – Minor and superficial injuries would not affect prosecution case –Shahjahan vs. State of Kerala – 2007 AIR SCW 2123.
Section 3 – Sole eye-witness to murder – Evidence of – credibility – Failure to prove motive is not fatal if evidence of witnesses appears to be truthful and convincing – Thumb mark of eye-witness, mother of deceased was taken five times on blank sheet of paper and after first information report was lodged she was never questioned by police – Absence of blood stains on clothes of eye-witness/ mother and younger brother of deceased suggests that they had not witnessed occurrence – Absence of blood stains explained by saying that she only touched body of the deceased to find out whether he was alive, unnatural – Improvement made by mother in an attempt to project presence of younger brother from very beginning of occurrence, which is not true – Testimony of solitary eye-witness, mother is not of sterling quality – Not safe to base a conviction solely on testimony of that witness – Benefit of doubt given to accused. – Bhimappa Chandappa Hosamani vs. State of Karnataka – 2006 AIR SCW 5043.
It is well settled that the Court can place reliance on a solitary witness provided the same inspires confidence. If such evidence of a single witness is clear, cogent and consistent and there is no other infirmity, there is absolutely no impediment in placing reliance on such evidence and the Court need not seek for corroboration.
Evidence of the injured and other eye-witness – when to be labelled as interested witness?
“We have independently scrutinized the evidence of the material witnesses in the teeth of the rival contentions of the parties. On reappraisal and scrutiny of the evidence of the injured witnesses Shekharappa (PW 2), B.G. Shivamurthaiah (PW3) and B.G. Prakashaiah (PW 4), they have fully established the case of the prosecution against A-2, A-3, A-17,A-19and A-20, although there were certain discrepancies in their testimony and in comparison to the versions of Prosecution witnesses, the eye-witnesses, in regard to the weapons of the offence individually used by A-1, A-3, A-17, A-19 and A-20 for inflicting injury on the person of each of the injured witnesses as also on the person of the deceased. The discrepancies, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, are minor and insignificant. The occurrence took place on 5-7-1995 and the witnesses were examined in the court after about a gap of almost five years. The evidence on record further shows that the injured witnesses had been subjected to lengthy and searching cross- examination and in such type of cross- examination, some improvements, contradictions, and omissions are bound to occur in their evidence, which cannot be treated as very serious, vital and significant so as to disbelieve and discard the substratum of the prosecution case. The evidence of the injured witnesses and other eye witnesses has been rightly re appreciated and accepted by the High Court and we find no cogent and sound reason to differ from the well- reasoned judgment upholding the order of the trial Court. There is, therefore, no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the evidence of the injured witnesses and other eyewitnesses should be labelled as the evidence of the interested witnesses. On the other hand, we find that the evidence of all the eye witnesses including injured persons is quite natural, convincing and trustworthy. There is no material on record from which an inference can be drawn that the material witnesses have implicated the appellants Karibasappa (A-2), Halanaika (A-3), B.K. Manjunatha (A-!7), B.K. Parmeshwarappa (A-19) and B.K. Shivarajappa (A-20) in a false case.
Section 3 – Hostile Witness – Evidence cannot be rejected in toto merely because prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him – But can be accepted to the extend his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. – 2006 AIR SCW 421(B).
Section 3 – Proof of guilt – fact that prosecution witness held hostile – May be act of dishonesty on their part – But not sufficient to prove guilt of accused –Vikramjit Singh alias Vicky vs. State of Punjab – 2006 AIR SCW 6197 [F].
Section 3 – Inimical Witness – Reliability – Enmity not denied – Prosecution case itself alleging that accused persons came to beat complainant – Evidence of Witnesses, who are injured, cannot be rejected on ground of enmity –Kallu alias Masih vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh – 2006 AIR SCW 177[E].
Section 3 – Interested Witness – Evidence otherwise reliable – Witness has also received injury in incident – His evidence cannot be discarded merely on ground that ne is interested person – 2006 AIR SCW 1302.
Section 3 – Interested Witness – Evidence of – Credibility – Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness – Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made – 2006 AIR SCW 3680 (A).
Section 3 – Interested Witness – Evidence of – Credibility – Murder case – Nothing elicited in cross-examination of eye-witnesses – Their evidence corroborated by complaint and medical evidence and weapon seized on disclosures made by accused – Cannot be rejected even though they were closely related to deceased and inimically disposed towards accused – 2006 AIR SCW 4143.
Section 3 – Non examination of independent witness – When Fatal – What is necessary for proving prosecution case is not quantity but quality of evidence – Offence is committed in a village over a land dispute – Independent witnesses may not come forward – However, some of witnesses examined by the prosecution are independent – Their evidence is more or less consistent – Nothing has been pointed out to discredit their testimonies – Testimonies of said witnesses cannot be rejected on grounds that all witnesses are not examined – 2006 AIR SCW 4186 [A].
Appreciation of evidence in dowry death cases and domestic violence cases medical neglgence cases, atrocity cases is differnet than other I.P.C. cases. The appreciation of evidence in thos cases is required close scuritiny coupled with other circumstances.

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