Source: https://www.ptab.us/2009/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:36:21+00:00

Document:
“To satisfy the written description requirement in the case of a chemical or biotechnological genus, more than a statement of the genus is normally required. One must show that one has possession, as described in the application, of sufficient species to show that he or she invented and disclosed the totality of the genus.” Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. , 541 F.3d 1115, 1126 (2008).
Ex Parte Mizushima et al SMITH 102(b)/102(e)/103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
To anticipated Appellants’ claimed invention, a reference must lead one of ordinary skill in the art to a product which falls within the scope of the claim "without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference." In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972).
Ex Parte Ramsden et al COLAIANNI 103(a) Carestream Health, Inc.
umbrella effect. Prima facie obviousness is a legal conclusion, not a fact.
531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (CCPA 1976).
Ex Parte Tsuzaki et al SMITH 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
“[T]he PTO has the initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure.” In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, it is “[o]nly after the PTO provides evidence showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the invention's asserted utility.” Id.
skill and ingenuity which constitute the essential elements of every invention.
If when combined, the references "would produce a seemingly inoperative device," then they teach away from their combination. In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 587 (CCPA 1969); see also, In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding no suggestion to modify a prior art device where the modification would render the device inoperable for its intended purpose).
A proposed modification or combination of the prior art that would change the basic principles under which the prior art invention was designed to operate weighs against a conclusion of prima facie obviousness. In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959).
[W]e note that working examples are not required to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (CCPA 1982).
In other words, “[t]he patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production.” SmithKline, 439 F.3d at 1317.
However, if the words of limitation can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process used to obtain it, then the limitation is commonly interpreted in its structural sense. See, e.g., 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp. , 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(“[E]ven words of limitation that can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process of manufacture are commonly and by default interpreted in their structural sense….”); Hazani v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Com’n. , 126 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that claims to a plate having a “chemically engraved” surface are best characterized as pure product claims, since the “chemically engraved” limitation, read in context, describes the product more by its structure than by the process used to obtain it); see also In re Garnero, 412 F.2d 276, 278-79 (CCPA 1969)(noting that past-tense verbs such as “ ‘intermixed,’ ‘ground in place,’ ‘press fitted,’ ‘etched,’ and ‘welded,’ all … at one time or another have been separately held capable of construction as structural, rather than process, limitations.”).
Ex Parte Logtenberg SCHEINER 112(1) TRASKBRITT, P.C.
“The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did not.” Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. , 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Ex Parte Yang et al MILLS 102(e)/103(a) VIDAS, ARRETT & STEINKRAUS, P.A.
The claims are not to be confined to the embodiments found in the Specification, and it is improper to import limitations from the Specification into the claims. In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp. , 498 F.3d 1290, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
As set forth in In re Hiniker Co. , 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998), "[t]he name of the game is the claim."
All can agree that 20% is not "25% by weight or greater".
But, does "about 20%" read on "25% by weight or greater"?
Use of "about 20%" would lead one skilled in the art to believe that Mleziva was not limiting the amount of reclaimed polymer to "20%". In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (use of "about" in a claim shows that the applicant does not intend to limit the claimed ranges to their exact end-points). "About" generally means "approximately." Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 395 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
The following helpful analysis concerning "about" in claims appears in Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp. , 543 F.3d 1351, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008): The word about does not have a universal meaning in patent claims, and its meaning depends on the technological facts of the particular case. When about is used as part of a numeric range, the use of the word about avoids a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter. Its range must be interpreted in its technologic and stylistic context. In determining how far beyond the claimed range the term about extends the claim, we must focus on the criticality of the numerical limitation to the invention.
While most of the cases focus on the meaning of "about" in a claim, this case involves the meaning of "about" in a prior art reference.
Ex Parte Pfister et al TURNER 102(b) Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
Thus, in an obviousness rejection, the prior art must provide a reference process as well as evidence that the modifications necessary to obtain the claimed process would have been obvious. (Cf. the role of the requirement, under some circumstances, that the prior art provide a “lead compound” when considering the obviousness of a chemical compound, discussed in Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. , 492 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
Ex Parte HSU et al CRAWFORD 103(a) FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
The Examiner has not addressed the evidence in Specification Example 1 in considering Appellant’s position. See generally Ans. Thus, the Examiner has not based the conclusion of unpatentability set forth in the Answer on the totality of the record. See, e.g., In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument.”) (citing, inter alia, In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 707 n.3 [sic - n.4] (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also, e.g., In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and cases cited therein (applicant’s rebuttal evidence must be considered). Indeed, the Examiner’s failure to consider the evidence in Specification Example 1, properly relied on by Appellant, is clear error. See, e.g., Sullivan, 498 F.3d at 1355.
Ex Parte Scheifele McCARTHY 103(a) BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C.
Ex Parte Komatsu et al WARREN 103(a) PAULY, DEVRIES, SMITH & DEFFNER, L.L.C.
Ex Parte Deeds DIXON 103(a) BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD.
Ex Parte Hand SONG 103(a) Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone P.L.C.
“By using the term ‘consisting essentially of,’ the drafter signals that the invention necessarily includes the listed ingredients and is open to unlisted ingredients that do not materially affect the basic and novel properties of the invention.” PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp. , 156 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998). To construe the phrase “consisting essentially of,” it is “necessary and proper to determine” the interpretation that the Specification reasonably supports. In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551 (CCPA 1976). Furthermore, Appellant has the burden of showing that unclaimed limitations in a prior art reference would materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed invention. In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 874 (CCPA 1964).
Evidence related solely to the number of units sold, without any indication as to whether this represents a substantial quantity in the market, provides a very weak showing of commercial success, if any. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Even assuming an applicant has sufficiently demonstrated commercial success, that success is relevant in the obviousness context only if it is established that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention (i.e., a nexus between the sales and the merits of the claimed invention), as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to the quality of the claimed subject matter. Id. See also Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp. , 776 F.2d 309, 315-16 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (commercial success may have been attributable to extensive advertising and position as a market leader before the introduction of the patented product).
Ex Parte Kapur HAHN 103(a) Ryan, Mason & Lewis, L.L.P.
The context of the surrounding words of the claim must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms. ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Ex Parte Oddsen STAICOVICI 103(a) DESIGN IP, P.C.
An overly broad interpretation, as the Examiner suggests, would eviscerate the meaning of the phrase integrally formed because it would mean that all components of APA’s channel 14 as modified by the boss of Matsubara or Schwartztrauber are integrally formed merely because they are interconnected to each other in some manner. See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim constructions which render phrases in claims superfluous).
The description requirement found in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement of that provision. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The purpose of the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is to convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. Id.
Ex Parte Kaylor et al McCARTHY 102(b)/103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.
Ex Parte Ashcraft et al HOMERE 103(a)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) DUKE W. YEE YEE AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Ex Parte Fisher et al CRAWFORD 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) O'BANION & RITCHEY LLP/ SONY ELECTRONICS, INC.
Ex Parte Marsh BAHR 102(e)/103(a) KINNEY & LANGE, P.A.
Ex Parte VanderVelde et al STEPHENS 103(a) PANDUIT CORP.
In other words, Claim 1’s “if” statement sets forth a necessary prelude to reordering the requests. Thus, the “if” statement must be given weight. “[E]very limitation positively recited in a claim must be given effect in order to determine what subject matter that claim defines.” In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450 (CCPA 1970). See also In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) (“All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art.”); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (the court can not ignore a plethora of meaningful limitations).
Ex Parte Grundfest MOHANTY 103(a) SCHWEGMAN, LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A.
Lastly, Appellants challenge the basis for our declining to follow the precedential Board decision Ex parte Eggert, 67 USPQ2d 1716 (BPAI 2003). Request, at 13-14. Although Appellants contend otherwise, we maintain that Eggert is inconsistent with the rationale expressed in the subsequent Federal Circuit decision, North Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Pkg., Inc. , 415 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Decision, at 14 n.5. We therefore decline to follow this conflicting older Board precedent. See Standard Operating Procedure 2, Publication of Opinions and Binding Precedent (“SOP 2”), § VI(D) (BPAI Mar. 23, 2008), at 6 (“All judges, including the Chief Judge, are bound by a published or otherwise disseminated Precedential opinion of the Board unless the decision supported by the opinion is . . . inconsistent with a decision of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . .”) (emphases added).

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