Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81784:194994&catid=1569&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:59:14+00:00

Document:
EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, v. EMERSON S. CARLOS, Respondent.
Before us is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 filed by Emmanuel A. de Castro (petitioner) seeking to oust respondent Emerson S. Carlos (respondent) from the position of assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2010.
On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued Office Order No. 106,5 designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner was then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager. The service vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other employees.
Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the Office of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24,6 which in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 as basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.
Petitioner sought a clarification7 from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper classification of the position of AGMO. In her reply,8 Executive Director Maria Anthonette Allones (Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated that the position of AGMO had not yet been classified and could not be considered as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). She further stated that a perusal of the appointment papers of petitioner showed that he was not holding a coterminous position. In sum, she said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2.
Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank.
However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA.11 On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.
Petitioner filed his Reply on 17 November 2011.
(3) Whether or not respondent should pay petitioner the salaries and financial benefits he received during his illegal tenure as AGMO of the MMDA.
Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the security of tenure of employees in the civil service. He further argues that his appointment as AGMO is not covered by OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, since it is not a CES position as determined by the CESB.
On the other hand, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES; thus, in order to have security of tenure, petitioner, must be a Career Executive Service official (CESO). Respondent maintains that the function of an AGM is executive and managerial in nature. Thus, considering that petitioner is a non-CESO occupying a CES position, he is covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent likewise raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted by the urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable need for stability in the civil service and the protection of the rights of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the Philippines is the appointing authority, petitioner doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against a presidential appointment.
Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.16 The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit.
The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which applies to all non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO, avers that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-CES position.
In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the contentious position of AGMO of the MMDA.
Sec. 4 Metro Manila Council. x x x.
The Council shall be headed by a Chairman, who shall be appointed by the President and who shall continue to hold office at the discretion of the appointing authority. He shall be vested with the rank, rights, privileges, disqualifications, and prohibitions of a Cabinet member.
Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds that an AGMO holds a career position, considering that the MMDA Charter specifically provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure – the core characteristic of a career service, as distinguished from a non-career service position.
2) The holder of the position is a presidential appointee.
Records show that in reply29 to Chairperson Tolentino’s query on whether the positions of general manager and AGM of the MMDA are covered by the CES,30 the CESB — thru Executive Ditrector Allones — categorically stated that these positions are not among those covered by the CES.
However, contrary to Executive Director Allones’ statement, the CESB, through Resolution No. 799 already declared certain positions meeting the criteria set therein as embraced within the CES.
It is worthy of note that CESB Resolution No. 799 was issued on 19 May 2009, even prior to petitioner’s appointment on 29 July 2009. Moreover, as early as 31 May 1994, the above classification was already embodied in CSC Resolution No. 34-2925, circularized in CSC Memorandum Circular 21, Series of 1994.
iii.) The duties and responsibilities of the position require performance of executive and managerial functions.
Without a doubtm the AGMO position is not one of those enumerated in the above-cited paragraph(a) but it clearly falls under paragraph(b) considering that it belongs to a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. The nature of AGMO is clear from the provisions of the MMDA Charter.
First, we have already determined that an AGMO is a career position that enjoys security of tenure by virtue of the MMDA Charter.
Third, a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals that the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and managerial functions.
Operate a central radio communication system.
He shall perform such other duties as are incidental or related to the above functions or as may be assigned from time to time.
An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance, leadership, and supervision.
For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.
Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within the CES. In this case, petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his appointment to the position of AGMO was merely temporary.
We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.
With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the requisite civil service eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board and the subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. Once a person acquires eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has previously been appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his appointment to the position was permanent.
Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. This rule, according to De Leon v. Court of Appeals, Dimayuga v. Benedicto, Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso v. Macaraig, is invariable even though the given appointment may have been designated as permanent by the appointing authority.
Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board x x x.
Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of AGMO in a permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was temporary and “co- terminus with the appointing authority.”39 In Carillo v. CA,40 this Court ruled that “one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause.” Therefore, we find no violation of security of tenure when petitioner was replaced by respondent upon the latter’s appointment to the position of AGMO by President Aquino.
WHEREAS, on November 23, 2010, the Supreme Court in the case of PCSO v. CSC, G.R. NO. 185766 and G.R. No. 185767 limited the coverage of positions belonging to the CES to positions requiring Presidential appointments.
WHEREAS, in the same vein, CES positions have now become synonymous to third level positions by virtue of the said ruling.
For career service positions requiring Presidential appointments expressly enumerated under Section 7(3), Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 namely: Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, and Chief of Department Service, no classification of position is necessary to place them under the coverage of the CES, except if they belong to Project Offices, in which case a position classification is required, in consultation with the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
iii.)The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and managerial functions.
Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term ended on 30 June 2010, petitioner’s term of office was also deemed terminated upon the assumption of President Aquino.
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of courts and petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure to sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to the position of AGMO of the MMDA.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
7 Id. at 31-32, Letter dated 5 November 2010.
8 Id. at 33-34Letter dated 12 November 2010.
13 Rodrigo, Berenguer & Guno.
14 Entry of Appearance (With Prayer to Adopt Comment dated 13 September 2011).
16Capalla v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 201112, 201121, 201127, 201413, 13 June 2012.
17Vergara Sr. v. Suelto, 240 Phil. 719,732 (1987).
18Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Ignacio, 500 Phil. 673, 676 (2005).
19Ouano v. PGTT, 434 Phil. 28, 34 (2002).
20Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633; and People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418, 427 (1989).
21Mendoza v. Allas, 362 Phil. 238, 244 (1999).
23 An Act Creating The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining Its Powers And Functions, Providing Funding Therefor And For Other Purposes.
24 Administrative Code, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec. 6.
25 Administrative Code, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec. 7.
26 Administrative Code, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec. 9.
27 Administrative Code, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec. 7.
28 G.R. Nos. 185766 and 185767, 23 November 2010, 635 SCRA 749, 765.
29Rollo, p. 41, Letter dated 8 September 2010.
30 Id. at. 35-40, Letter dated 28 August 2010.
31 Supra at note 6.
32 Supra at note 7.
35 Administrative Code, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec. 8.
36Abella Jr. v. CSC, 485 Phil. 182, 204 (2004).
37 Memorandum Circular 37, s. 1998, dated 20 October 1998; Memorandum Circular 1, s. 1997, dated 24 January 1997.
38 G.R. No. 170093, 29 April 2009, 587 SCRA 160, 167-169.
39Ong v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 184219, 30 January 2012, 664 SCRA 413, 418-419.
40 167 Phil. 527, 533 (1977).
41 See Civil Service Commission v. Engineer Ali Darangina, 542 Phil. 635 (2007).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.