Source: http://www.lmick.com/item/the-ethics-of-civil-practice-investigations-part-i
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:13:50+00:00

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If you follow the business news, you heard a great deal about the Hewlett-Packard board of directors’ flap involving an investigation ordered by the chairman of the board to determine who was leaking confidential board meeting discussions. The investigation was conducted by private investigators under the supervision of a senior house counsel in HP’s general counsel office. Among other investigative methods, the private investigators used pretexting (using someone else’s identity to obtain information, goods, or services) to get telephone records of members of the board of directors. The end result was that the chairman of the board, the senior house counsel, and several of the private investigators were indicted under California law for fraudulent wire communications, wrongful use of computer data, and pretexting. The chairman of the board defended herself by asserting that she had been advised by house counsel that all investigative methods used were lawful.
This high profile case resulted in new emphasis on the ethics of what has been called deceptive lawyering.1 What are the legal and ethical implications of use of misrepresentation, subterfuge, tape recording, undercover operatives, surveillance, eavesdropping, and dumpster diving when investigating a matter? Does it make a difference if the lawyer is doing the investigating or nonlawyers are employed to conduct the investigation? If the investigative method is legal, but unethical, does a lawyer’s duty to his client override professional responsibility rules? The answer to these and other questions are muddled by the confusion of laws that might apply to a given investigation, inconsistent professional responsibility rules, renewed aggressiveness by government officials in enforcing privacy and consumer protection laws, and the likelihood of new laws and regulations in the future.
Part I begins with an overview of lawyer investigative competence. It includes a brief review of the risks an incompetent investigation can create and addresses the question “Are the methods of investigation legal?” Part I concludes with a review of the question “Are the methods of investigation ethical?” concerning the ethical issues a lawyer faces as an investigator.
Part II, to be published in the next edition of the Bench & Bar, completes consideration of the question “Are the methods of investigation ethical?” by reviewing the ethics issues when a lawyer supervises an investigation. It then covers the question “Are the methods of investigation smart?” Part II concludes with suggestions for investigation risk management. Not considered in this article are criminal or government investigations and those aspects of civil investigations covered by rules of civil procedure.
When applying these investigative skills lawyers face several risks. Using illegal investigative methods can lead to criminal indictment as the HP case illustrates. Methods that violate the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC)3 risk bar disciplinary action. An inadequate (read negligent) investigation will draw a malpractice claim. Intrusive investigations that overstep privacy and consumer rights open the door to civil suits. Investigative techniques that offend a judge can result in evidence suppression, disqualification of the lawyer, and court-ordered sanctions. From this fierce list of what can go wrong in an investigation, it is obvious that lawyers must know what they are doing when conducting or supervising an investigation — or face the consequences.
Answering whether an investigative method is legal involves that most difficult of all research problems – determining that no law forbids it. A number of federal and state laws could be implicated by any given investigation (e.g., criminal laws, telecommunications laws to include the Internet, consumer protection laws, and laws that protect the right of privacy). What follows is information on some of the laws concerning pretexting, consumer protection, and eavesdropping. A review of all possible laws that might apply to investigations is beyond the scope of this article and as practical matter may not be feasible.
Pretexting is the practice of getting your personal information under false pretenses. Pretexters sell your information to people who may use it to get credit in your name, steal your assets, or to investigate or sue you. Pretexting is against the law.
Pretexters use a variety of tactics to get your personal information. For example, a pretexter may call, claim he’s from a survey firm, and ask you a few questions. When the pretexter has the information he wants, he uses it to call your financial institution. He pretends to be you or someone with authorized access to your account. He might claim that he’s forgotten his checkbook and needs information about his account. In this way, the pretexter may be able to obtain personal information about you such as your SSN, bank and credit card account numbers, information in your credit report, and the existence and size of your savings and investment portfolios.
Obtaining credit information for a divorced wife’s use in child visitation litigation (Bils v. Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, 880 P.2d 743, Ariz. App. Div. 2, 1994).
KRS 526.020 Eavesdropping. (1) A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he intentionally uses any device to eavesdrop, whether or not he is present at the time. (2) Eavesdropping is a Class D felony.
KRS 526.030 Installing eavesdropping device. (1) A person is guilty of installing an eavesdropping device when he intentionally installs or places such a device in any place with the knowledge that it is to be used for eavesdropping. (2) Installing an eavesdropping device is a Class D felony.
KRS 526.060 Divulging illegally obtained information. (1) A person is guilty of divulging illegally obtained information when he knowingly uses or divulges information obtained through eavesdropping or tampering with private communications or learned in the course of employment with a communications common carrier engaged in transmitting the message. (2) Divulging illegally obtained information is a Class A misdemeanor.
Paragraph (c) provides that it is misconduct to: “Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; ….” Note that there are no exceptions in Paragraph (c) thus seemingly forbidding any guile in pursuing an investigation.
KRPC 4.1, Truthfulness in Statements to Others. The Rule provides: “In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.” Note that this Rule has materiality as a qualifier, but KRPC 8.3 (c) does not.
Another example of a violation of Rule 4.4 is requesting a credit report in violation of the FCRA.
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any other person whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization. Prior to communication with a nonmanagerial employee or agent or an organization, the lawyer should disclose the lawyer’s identity and the fact that the lawyer represents a party with a claim against the organization. See Rule 4.3. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule.
In researching whether a member of an organization or business entity may be contacted begin with Shoney’s, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W. 2d 514 (Ky., 1994). This case covers much of how Rule 4.2 applies to the corporate setting. Also read the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Opinion 95-396, Communications With Represented Persons (1995). This opinion is a comprehensive analysis of Rule 4.2. covering many additional issues to those in Shoney’s.
The inconsistencies in the professional conduct rules and the tension between adhering to ethical conduct and providing the client with every advantage the law allows make the investigating lawyer’s situation problematic to say the least. One authority in considering Rules 4.1, 4.3, and 8.3(c) summarizes the standard as “In sum, an attorney must identify himself and the interest he represents and must not engage in trickery or overreaching to obtain information or neutralize a potential witnesses (footnotes omitted).” Then goes on somewhat ambivalently to observe “The reality, however, is that some misrepresentation and overreaching are accepted and perhaps even required if one is to adequately represent a client. The rub is to define the boundary between the acceptable and the unacceptable.”14 It seems clear that at minimum lawyers in conducting an investigation should not break the law, lie, or misrepresent themselves.
See, Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 577 (2005). Available on the Internet at http://www.law.uc.edu/lawreview/.
Cited information is a paraphrase of relevant material in ABA Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional Development – An Educational Continuum (1992), page 138; and The MacCrate Report — Building The Educational Continuum (1994), page174, West Publishing Co.
See generally, Proof of a Claim Involving Alleged Violation of State Consumer Protection or Similar Statute Against Physician or Attorney, 79 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199.
See generally, Mallen and Smith, Legal Malpractice, 2007 Ed., § 30.28.
Wisconsin’s Rule 1.1 and Comment  are identical to Kentucky’s.
In Re Nunnery, 725 N.W.2d 613 (Wis., 2007).
An Unnamed Attorney v. Kentucky Bar Association, 186 S.W.3d 741 (Ky., 2006).
Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619, 625 (Ky., 2000).
ABA Formal Opinion 01-422 (6/24/2001), Electronic Recordings by Lawyers Without the Knowledge of All Participants, is the latest consideration of this issue by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. In the opinion the Committee withdrew a prior opinion that held that a lawyer ethically may not record any conversation by electronic means without the prior knowledge of all parties to the conversation.
For more guidance on this issue see Fortune, Underwood, Imwinkelreid, Modern Litigation and Professional Responsibility Handbook, 2d Ed., 2002, §§ 4.5, the Attorney Investigator, and 5.7, Interviewing Witnesses.
Fortune, Underwood, Imwinkelreid, Modern Litigation and Professional Responsibility Handbook, 2d Ed. 2002, § 5.7, Interviewing Witnesses, p. 230.

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