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Timestamp: 2018-10-20 16:40:22+00:00

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Poszczególne numery czasopisma w wersji PDF.
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Kreacja przez eliminację w prawie autorskim
O konstrukcji intelektualnych dóbr osobistych
Prawnoautorska kwalifikacja gier komputerowych - program komputerowy czy utwór audiowizualny?
Prawnoautorskie aspekty udostępniania utworów w działalności bibliotek
Cywilnoprawna ochrona korespondencji
Ewa KACPEREK, Piotr ZAWADZKI
Prawo właściwe dla zobowiązań pozaumownych wynikających z naruszenia praw własności intelektualnej i zasad uczciwej konkurencji - uwagi na tle rozporządzenia Rzym II
Czy współautorstwo może polegać na usunięciu z utworu niektórych zdań? W tym właśnie duchu orzekł Sąd Najwyższy (dalej jako SN) w wyroku z 25.05.2011 r., uznając wkład twórczy trzech lekarzy, którzy z artykułu naukowego usunęli kilka tez nieznajdujących potwierdzenia w obecnej wiedzy medycznej. W poniższym artykule rozważono ogólną kwestię, czy osoba, której działanie polega na eliminacji, może być uznana za współautora w świetle polskiej ustawy prawnoautorskiej, a także zagadnienie bardziej szczegółowe - jak można zakwalifikować taki wkład pracy w przypadku utworu naukowego.
Twórczość intelektualna ma różne oblicza. Działalność kreacyjna może - w zależności od zastosowanych metod twórczych, a nade wszystko charakteru uzyskanego rezultatu - przybrać w szczególności postać twórczości naukowej, artystycznej, wynalazczej czy racjonalizatorskiej (art. 23 kodeksu cywilnego). Mimo, niekiedy zasadniczych, odmienności koncepcyjnych, w każdym przypadku wspólnym mianownikiem tego rodzaju aktywności intelektualnej pozostaje pierwiastek twórczy, będący niepowtarzalną emanacją osobowości twórcy. Celem niniejszej publikacji jest przybliżenie i usystematyzowanie ujęcia konstrukcji dóbr osobistych twórców wartości niematerialnych oraz poszukiwanie odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy zasadne może być wyróżnianie szczególnej zbiorczej kategorii, której autor proponuje nadać roboczą nazwę "intelektualne dobra osobiste". Ukazanie struktury odnośnego przedmiotu badań zostanie poprzedzone ogólnymi refleksjami poświęconymi definicji dobra osobistego oraz analizą relacji autorskich i intelektualnych dóbr osobistych do dóbr osobistych powszechnego prawa cywilnego.
Gry komputerowe są przeważnie postrzegane jako programy komputerowe. Mimo to, gdy gra taka jest wyświetlana na ekranie monitora, może być ona uznana za rodzaj interfejsu użytkownika, co umożliwia poszukiwanie innych środków ochrony niż w przypadku programów. Ponadto, podobieństwo współczesnych gier do utworów filmowych pozwala na rozważenie możliwości stosowania do nich przepisów dotyczących utworów audiowizualnych. Skuteczna ochrona gier komputerowych wymaga ich precyzyjnej kwalifikacji. Temu właśnie zagadnieniu zostały poświęcone poniższe szczegółowe analizy. Poza prawem polskim uwzględniają one orzecznictwo amerykańskie, francuskie i niemieckie, a przede wszystkim - modele wciąż ewoluujących gier komputerowych i ich różnorodność. Po sformułowanej na końcu propozycji ich kwalifikacji następuje zaś określenie konsekwencji przyjętego stanowiska, m.in. w odniesieniu do praw poszczególnych twórców, naruszeń tych praw oraz dozwolonego użytku.
Rozwój Internetu i digitalizacja utworów umożliwiły tworzenie zasobów bibliotecznych on-line i korzystanie z nich na odległość. Spowodowało to konieczność dokonania zmian w funkcjonowaniu bibliotek. Zarazem powstały też problemy prawne dotyczące elektronicznego zwielokrotniania i udostępniania utworów w ramach działalności tych instytucji. Choć przepisy polskiego prawa autorskiego zawierają dotyczące tych kwestii regulacje, zagadnienia te nadal są źródłem niesłabnących kontrowersji w literaturze prawniczej. Aby wskazać przyczyny tych sporów, w niniejszym artykule zostaną szczegółowo omówione najważniejsze problemy związane z udostępnianiem utworów przez biblioteki.
Dominujące obecnie podejście do ochrony korespondencji rodzi poważne wątpliwości. Obarczone błędami przepisy i zbudowana na nich koncepcja ochrony korespondencji przyznają m.in. zbyt duże uprawnienia nadawcy, a ponadto, prowadzą czasem do nieracjonalnych konsekwencji. W poniższym artykule została przedstawiona obecna, a następnie proponowana przez autora koncepcja ochrony korespondencji w prawie cywilnym. W ramach szczegółowych analiz została rozważona ochrona korespondencji na płaszczyznach: dóbr osobistych (prawa do prywatności i tajemnicy korespondencji), zgody adresata na rozpowszechnianie korespondencji oraz praw autorskich.
11.01.2009 r. weszło w życie rozporządzenie nr 864/2007/WE Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z 11.07.2007 r. dotyczące prawa właściwego dla zobowiązań pozaumownych (Rzym II). Tym samym od przeszło trzech lat obowiązuje kolejny, niezwykle istotny element jednolitego, europejskiego systemu prawa kolizyjnego. Ideę harmonizacji w tej dziedzinie należy przyjąć z zadowoleniem. Jednak ponieważ regulacja ta wciąż jeszcze jest nowa, warto z uwagą przeanalizować jej przepisy i wskazać problemy, które mogą z nich wynikać. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaś zasygnalizowanie trudności, które mogą wystąpić podczas stosowania przepisów rozporządzenia w sprawach z zakresu szeroko pojętej własności intelektualnej.
Creation by elimination in copyright law
On the construction of intellectual personal interests
Copyright law qualification of computer games - computer programs or audio-visual works?
Copyright aspects of making works available in the activity of libraries
Protection of correspondence under civil law
The law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of infringements of intellectual property rights and the rules of fair competition - remarks under the Rome II Regulation
Creativity by elimination means rejecting certain, initially determined, contents of a work. This article presents arguments to support lack of copyright law protection for deleting fragments of somebody else's scientific work. The essence of such "negative creativity" is that although one can definitively and specifically determine the scope of activity of a reviewer, i.e. a person who removes, with author's approval, untrue theses from his/her work, and to assess such activity from the point of view of copyright law, in an objectivised manner (i.e. outside the sphere of author's and reviewer's perception) the work does not demonstrate such input. The results of "negative creativity" can be seen, in principle, only in statu nascendi and are ephemeral in nature. The input cannot be petrified in the sense that third parties becoming familiar with the modified version of the work, disclosing the co-authorship, will be unable to determine such input.
Due to the actual role of a reviewer, this person's status can be defined as a scientific consultant who is not, however, a co-author, while removing the scientifically dubious fragments resembles informing, exclusively the author, about the mistaken character of the removed theses. Thus, the reviewer's activity results are reduced to an idea expressed by negation of certain theses. This idea, in turn, can be common to an unspecified group of people and can be expressed positively (by objectively new contents) or negatively (by removing contents through deletion of the form expressing them). Whereas the first attempt of scientific negation can, and usually does, assume a form with individualized features (the work), the eliminating negation can only have one manifestation, which excludes it from among works.
On the basis of arguments quoted in the article, one should in particular regard as wrong the judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 25 May 2011 stating that review of an academic work, consisting in removing from it scientifically dubious fragments, entitles to co-authorship.
This article is devoted to the issues related to the construction of personal interests of the creators of intangible assets in the general sense.
There is no synthetic legal definition of a personal interest in the Polish legal system. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the Civil Code only refer to certain typologically arranged freedoms and values which may be defined as personal interests. The legal basis for the construction of moral rights and personal interests is undoubtedly Article 30 of the Constitution, which refers to the dignity of the human being. The normative category identified above integrates all the values which are comprised in the individual. The superiority/subordination relationship, which occurs between the dignity of a human being and various personal interests, affects not only the perception of the genesis of the specific personal interests, but also their legal existence and substance.
Personal interests are intangible values inherent in their subject, which express the dignity of the human being and ensure the position due to him or her in interpersonal (social) relations. The analysis of the structure of a personal interest in the context of exceptionally great achievements of the civil law doctrine and judicature, prompts one to opt for an objectivised definition of personal interests. That construction is based on the balanced coexistence of subjective and objective elements. The subjective factors constitute the axis of the above structure which makes reference to the internal world, individual sensitiveness, experience and emotions of a person. In turn, the objective criteria, which should be understood as the patterns of behaviours or attitudes typical of an external observer taken as the model of an average, prudent, rational and unbiased person not willing to express strong opinions, ensure a social context of the definition, such a context being necessary to exclude the cases of unjustified extension or narrowing of the scope of protection.
There are many personal interests and subjective rights corresponding to them, and the list of the interests in question remains open. Personal interests are a peculiar function of the place and time and are determined by social, economic and political factors and dependent on the level of law consciousness, sensitivity and morality recognised by a society.
Authors' personal interests should be understood as a special category of personal interests comprised by universal civil law. Consequently, a similar relationship occurs between subjective rights protecting both categories of values. The above observation has a universal character and is valid in relation to all personal interests vested in the creators of intangible assets in consideration of the object of the creative activity of those creators. Whilst intellectual creative activity has various shapes, the creative element, which is the manifestation of the author's unique personality, is always the common denominator. Every single intellectual personal interest is a sui generis projection and emanation of the creator's self and his or her dignity as the source of all personal interests vested in the creator.
Based on the above assumptions, one collective category of personal interests vested in the creators irrespective of the field of their creative activity may be constructed by taking the authors' personal interests as an example. It is suggested that that category should be called "intellectual personal interests" in view of the creative element, which is indispensable, common and characteristic of all the creations of the mind. The values distinguished in such a comprehensive way would constitute a kind of superior structure in relation to the classes of interests in the form of scientific, artistic, inventive and rationalising creative activity, which interests are referred to in Article 23 of the Civil Code, and captured in relations to specific creations of the human intellect. De lege ferenda, it would be reasonable to rephrase the formula used in the Code by replacing the analytical phrase "scientific, artistic, inventive and rationalising creative activity" with the synthetic phrase "intellectual creative activity". In addition to the departure from the casuistic method, which is redundant in this case, such a legislative measure would allow enriching the contents of the provision of Article 23 of the Civil Code in relation to a broad definition of intellectual property included in Article 2 item viii of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. After rephrasing the challenged fragment, it would become obvious prima facie that the generalised formula in the Code comprises all the values related to creative activity - both in the subjective and functional meaning - also with reference to those types of that activity, which have not been mentioned expressis verbis in Article 23 of the Civil Code. Introducing the proposed collective notional category would also contribute, in the process of applying the law, to drawing the interpreter's attention to, and focussing it on, common components of creative activity, which are significant from the point of view of the construction of the object and rules of protection, without entailing at the same time the blurring of the limits delineating the areas of the various classes of values characteristic of various areas of creative activity.
The value determined de lege lata in Article 23 of the Civil Code by means of the general formula of "scientific, artistic, inventive and rationalising creative activity" (de lege ferenda: "intellectual creative activity") integrates, as a matter of fact, three categories of personal interests: firstly, creative activity understood as the bond between the creator and the specific creation of his or her intellect; secondly, creative activity in the meaning of the freedom of the creation process; and thirdly, creative activity as the achievements of the creator in the meaning of all intangible assets created by him or her. Whilst the first of the above manifestations of creative activity may be the object of protection only on the basis of various acts governing the protection of intellectual property (in particular, the Copyright and Neighbouring Right Act and the Industrial Property Law Act), the other two aspects are subject to protection on the basis of the provisions of the Civil Code as the personal interests covered by universal civil law.
Computer games as works of authorship are usually classified as multimedia works. There is no separate legal regime for the protection of multimedia works, so the rules for their protection should be constructed on a case by case basis. Computer games are seen mostly as computer programs, even though the rules for protection of computer programs do not allow for protection of a key element to them, which is - without a doubt - the screen displays. The game displayed on a monitor may in fact be seen as a kind of user interface, which, like the typical graphical user interfaces, is outside the protection accorded to computer programs. Consequently, computer games should also be protected under other provisions of the Act on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights. Screen displays, as a manifestation of creative activity, can be successfully protected on the basis of the general provisions, but the content of modern games can be best described as "audiovisual", which allows one to consider applying the provisions relating to audiovisual works. The dual classification of computer games and their protection on the basis of provisions concerning computer programs and audiovisual works allow for possibly complete protection, although the standpoint presented in this article is just one of the many that are possible. The main assumption was to balance the interests of creators, producers and users of computer games. On the one hand, it assumes an intense computer code protection, which is crucial for protecting the economic interests of creators, on the other hand, it allows fair use in relation to audiovisual content, which is important for the players and ensures their access to cultural goods.
In the from copyright point of view. The key problem, in this perspective, is the legal status of libraries in Polish law, which can be assessed differently depending on various branches of law, such as civil or administrative law. Furthermore, the contents and scope of competence of libraries to make works available was discussed, not only of those which were recorded by libraries in a material form (that is as copies). The author also presents a complicated issue of libraries making works available in digital version, via terminals of information systems which are located in the area of activity of those units. The article discusses also issue of operation of entities which perform similar functions to libraries (so-called search engines), which place hyperlinks on websites to places in which works are located. The issues which are discussed in the article are presented with references to foreign legal literature and judicial decisions.
This article describes the prevailing conception of correspondence protection and indicates the need to liberalise it. To this end, an attempt at a new interpretation of provisions on this issue is presented.
The author points out lack of definition of correspondence and creates his own one, based on two conditions (fixation before the addressee familiarizes his- or herself with its contents and a specific group of persons being addressees). The author shows a different understanding of the right to correspondence confidentiality, by narrowing down its scope. This solution enables protecting the information contained in correspondence in the relationships between the sender and the addressee on the basis of the right to privacy (in practical terms, this interpretation corresponds more closely to the intuitions and the scope of permitted behaviours connected with correspondence and the information it contains).
The following part is an analysis of Art. 82 of the Polish Act on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights of 1994. It should not confer on the addressee greater rights than those connected with protection of moral rights on the basis of Art. 23 of the Polish Civil Code. The aim of Art. 82 of the Polish Copyright Act is, according to the author, prolonging the protection of addressee's privacy also for a period of 20 years after his/her death. As we know, moral rights expire upon death. Thanks to this regulation, persons listed in that Article will obtain the right to protection against dissemination of correspondence of a deceased addressee to the same extent as would result from the addressee's right to privacy is the person was still alive.
In the next part, the author presented copyright law problems relating to correspondence. The regulation adopted in copyright law does not match the peculiarities of correspondence. From this results the need for functional interpretation of many provisions of this Act. In particular, there was a need for a clear definition of the scope of author's economic rights in a work (including definition of the term "use" used in Art. 17 of the Polish Act on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, determining the scope of the notion of "lending for use" and clarifying which behaviours do not fall within the scope of author's economic rights in a work, in particular making the work available non-publicly), as well as attention had to be drawn to issues relating to provisions on permitted use (the basic problem concerned the impossibility of applying personal permitted use to most correspondence because the condition of the work being disseminated was not met).
A comparison of Arts. 4.1, 6.2, and 8.1. of the Rome II Regulation may lead to serious doubts as regards determining the law applicable to unfair competition cases which, at the same time, also constitute infringements of intellectual property.
Under the Regulation, the law of the country for which protection is claimed (lex loci protectionis) applies to intellectual property torts such as copyright, trademark, patent, and database right infringements etc., whereas unfair competition cases, in particular where an act of unfair competition affects only the interests of a specific competitor, are governed by the law of the country in which the damage occurs (lex loci damni). In addition, under the preamble to the Regulation, the aim of the lex loci damni concept is to unify various European regulations covering non-contractual obligations and, in particular, to substitute the concept of the lex loci delicti comissi, i.e. the applicability of the law of the country where the tort was committed.
The Regulation, therefore, provides that if the tort is an infringement of an IP right, the effects of such infringement and the place where such effects occurred, are irrelevant. However, if the IP right infringement is also perceived as an act of unfair competition, the place of the direct effect of such tort, i.e. the damage incurred by the right holder, becomes of importance. It should be noted that even direct damages may sometimes occur (locus damni) in countries different than the country where, for example, a trademark is protected and where the infringement took place. A direct economic loss may occur in a country where the registered office of the trademark holder or its main assets, or core business are located and which is not the country where the right holder was granted protection by the local patent office.
As a consequence, if a right older brings a civil action against the infringer, the choice of the legal basis for such claims (e.g. trademark law vs. unfair competition law) may change the law applicable even if protection is sought for exactly the same right, i.e. the trademark right and related interests.
The above doubts may be resolved if Art. 8.1 of the Regulation (the lex loci protectionis rule) is consequently treated as an exception from the general rule provided by Art. 4.1 and Art. 6.2, Art. 8.1 should therefore be interpreted as covering all situations in which an act of unfair competition may also be qualified as an infringement of an intellectual property right and the application of Arts. 4.1 and 6.2 should be limited to those unfair competition acts which may not be qualified as IP right infringements.
In addition, a further analysis of the lex loci protectionis rule leads to the conclusion that in cases of IP right infringements, the country for which the protection is claimed is usually the same as the country where the tort was committed. The IP rights (except for Community Trademarks and Designs) are generally protected only within certain territories of states. The applicable laws will therefore be the laws of those countries where such rights legally existed, i.e. were protected and, as a consequence, might have been infringed. From this perspective, the lex loci protectionis concept is equal to that of lex loci delicti comissi.
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References: sui generis
De lege ferenda
de lege lata
de lege ferenda
 Art. 82
 Art. 23
 Art. 82
 Art. 17
 Art. 8
 Art. 4
 Art. 6
 Art. 8