Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/acceptance%20of%20responsibility/arias.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:40:52+00:00

Document:
This appeal arises from a criminal proceeding involving the defendant-appellant, xxxxxxxxxx, and the plaintiff-appellee, the United States of America. As these are the only parties who appeared below, they are also the only ones on appeal. There are no amici.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court (Honorable Royce C. Lamberth), dated February 8, 1994, adjudging appellant guilty after his plea of guilty to a charge of possession with the intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. In this appeal, appellant seeks review of the sentence, consisting of a term of imprisonment of 108 months, followed by a term of supervised release of 5 years, and a special assessment of $50.00, imposed on him by the district court (Lamberth, J.) on February 8, 1994. In arriving at this sentence, the district court denied appellant's request for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. This ruling has not been reported.
There are no related cases and the instant case has not previously been before this Court.
I. Whether the district court erred in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 without adequately weighing all pertinent factors where the circumstances of the case were extraordinary, justifying adjustments both for acceptance of responsibility and obstruction of justice.
The pertinent statutes and Sentencing Guidelines appear in the addendum to this brief.
This Court has jurisdiction over this direct appeal of a final judgment in a criminal case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court had jurisdiction over the case under 18 U.S.C.§ 3231.
(i) Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below.
On July 24, 1991, Mr. xxxxxxxx pled guilty to Count One, and pursuant to a plea agreement, the government dismissed Count Two. (7/24/91 Tr. 2-3). After entering his guilty plea, he was released to the District of Columbia Department of Corrections Work Release Program pending sentencing. Thereafter, on September 7, 1991, he failed to return from his place of employment to the halfway house and was placed on escape status. He remained in escape status until his arrest on August 30, 1993, for a traffic violation. (8/30/93 Tr. 2).
The case arose from the execution of a search warrant at xxxxx Irving Street, N.W., Apartment 4, Washington, D.C., on May 17, 1991 (7/24/91 Tr. 6). During the search of the apartment, which was occupied by Mr. xxxxxxxx, Metropolitan Police officers recovered a quantity of cocaine base.
After receiving a series of threats, Mr. xxxxxxxx fled the country. [A. 19-20] He went to xxxxxxx to care for his elderly grandfather who was suffering from tuberculosis. (PSR 3) Upon his return to the United States on June 10, 1992, Mr. xxxxxxxx lived in Maryland with his father. (PSR 3) He remained a fugitive until his arrest for a traffic violation on August 30, 1993.
Although Mr. xxxxxxxx entered an early guilty plea and acknowledged responsibility for the charged offenses, the district denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, where extraordinary circumstances exist, a defendant may be entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility even when s/he receives an enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. However, the sentencing court failed to weigh all of the factors pertinent to the acceptance of responsibility determination. Instead, the judge only considered Mr. xxxxxxxx's obstructive conduct -- his flight -- in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Thus, the court did not weigh adequately the considerations set forth in the Application Notes to § 3E1.1, which are relevant to a determination of whether the case is "extraordinary," thereby warranting adjustments for both obstruction and acceptance of responsibility. For these reasons, a remand for resentencing is necessary.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING A REDUCTION FOR ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 WITHOUT ADEQUATELY WEIGHING ALL PERTINENT FACTORS WHERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE WERE EXTRAORDINARY, JUSTIFYING ADJUSTMENTS BOTH FOR ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.
Mr. xxxxxxxx was punished harshly for his flight and failure to return voluntarily to court, which resulted in a two-level increase in his offense level for obstruction of justice and the denial of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Notwithstanding his guilty plea and cooperation with the police, Mr. xxxxxxxx essentially received a four-level adjustment in his offense level due to his flight and failure to return to court. Given a Criminal History Category II, the range for offense level 30 (adjusting for obstruction of justice only) is 108-135 months; for offense level 28 (adjusting for both obstruction of justice and acceptance of responsibility), the range is 87-108 months. Thus, there is a significant difference between the applicable guideline ranges depending upon whether the acceptance of responsibility adjustment is applied.
§ 3C1.1 and § 3E1.1 was reached without weighing all of the factors relevant to that determination. Therefore, a remand for resentencing is necessary.
The district court's denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 is entitled to "due deference," a standard of review falling between de novo and clearly erroneous. United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (court of appeals shall give due deference to district court's application of guidelines to facts; citing 18 U.S.C.
B. The Extraordinary Circumstances of This Case Justify a Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility.
Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Willfully Obstructing or Impeding Proceedings) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases, in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply. Appendix C, Amendment 258 (November 1, 1989). The Commission noted that the purpose of the amendment was "to provide for extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both § 3C1.1 and § 3E1.1 are appropriate . . .." Id.
Regrettably, in amending Application Note 4, the Sentencing Commission did not provide courts with any guidance in identifying those "extraordinary cases" in which § 3C1.1 and § 3E1.1 adjustments may apply. Not surprisingly, the decisions applying the amended guideline are somewhat inconsistent. Compare United States v. Khang, 36 F.3d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1994) (obstructing justice by lying about motive to obtain downward sentencing departure does not preclude reduction for acceptance of responsibility); United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1993) (obstructing justice by providing false information to probation officer conducting presentence investigation does not preclude reduction for acceptance of responsibility where defendant "early on" agreed to plead guilty and does not obstruct justice until post-plea stage of proceedings) and United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 884-885 (4th Cir. 1991) (obstructing justice by flight from arrest that endangered police does not preclude reduction for acceptance of responsibility where defendant's cooperation after arrest resulted in recovery of drugs abandoned during flight) with United States v. Amos, 984 F.2d 1067, 1072-1073 (10th Cir. 1993) (obstructing justice by post-plea escape attempt justifies denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility) and United States v. Yeo, 936 F.2d 628, 629 (1st Cir. 1991) (obstructing justice by post-plea flight justifies denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
Although these decisions cannot be reconciled easily, a few guiding principles can be gleaned from them. First, the cases recognize that by amending 3E1.1, the Sentencing Commission contemplated that there would be cases where an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice and a downward one for acceptance of responsibility would be proper. Clearly, the term "extraordinary cases" in Application Note 4 allows for exceptions to the general rule that obstruction of justice disqualifies a defendant from an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. United States v. Khang, 36 F.3d at 80.
Next, the courts that have found cases to be "extraordinary" have weighed the timing and nature of both the obstructive conduct and the conduct evidencing acceptance of responsibility. For example, in United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d at 1123, the court noted that the defendant had demonstrated his acceptance of responsibility by agreeing to plead guilty in the early stages of the proceedings and had not obstructed justice until after his guilty plea when he provided false information to the presentence report writer. Similarly, in the instant case, Mr. xxxxxxxx entered a timely guilty plea and immediately thereafter began cooperating with law enforcement authorities. His obstructive conduct -- flight from the halfway house -- did not occur until less than three weeks before his sentencing date. Moreover, unlike the obstructive conduct that occurred in the cited cases, Mr. xxxxxxxx's flight was in response to what he perceived to be life-endangering threats. In that respect, the mitigating circumstances surrounding Mr. xxxxxxxx's obstruction of justice, juxtaposed with his early acceptance of responsibility and substantial assistance to authorities, are more "extraordinary" than the circumstances in the cited cases.
comment. (n.1(e)). Similarly, in United States v. Amos, 984 F.2d at 1073, the court denied an acceptance of responsibility reduction where it found that the defendant's post-plea escape attempt was evidence that he had not withdrawn from criminal conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 comment. (n.1(b)). In contrast, in the instant case, Mr. xxxxxxxx truthfully admitted his offense conduct (n.1(a)), terminated his criminal conduct (n.1(b)), and provided assistance to authorities (n.1(e)). Given these circumstances, Mr. xxxxxxxx's acceptance of responsibility in this case clearly was more "extraordinary" than the acceptances of responsibility by the respective defendants in the cited cases in which § 3E1.1 reductions were granted.
C. The District Court Failed to Weigh All Relevant Factors.
I find that the two points addition for obstruction of justice, due to the defendant's flight and failure to ever voluntarily return, and his absence for the two years, is an appropriate addition, and he should have two points added for obstruction of justice.
I also deny the defendant's request for a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. I agree that he accepted responsibility at the time he entered his plea. However, he did not adhere to that when he fled, and even if I accept his version that he fled in response to some threats, the failure to ever return after a period of years, does not create the type of extraordinary circumstance that would allow the Court to award points for acceptance of responsibility when he has clearly obstructed justice by his flight and failure to return.
Without considering other pertinent factors, such as, Mr. xxxxxxxx's early guilty plea, his assistance to authorities, and his withdrawal from criminal conduct, the court denied the acceptance of responsibility reduction for the same reason that it granted the obstruction of justice enhancement -- the flight and failure to return to court. This methodology renders meaningless the amended application note to § 3E1.1 that provides for exceptions to the general rule that obstruction of justice disqualifies a defendant from an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. If, in determining whether a reduction for acceptance of responsibility should apply together with an adjustment for obstruction of justice, the sentencing court only considers the obstructive conduct and not the circumstances surrounding the defendant's acceptance of responsibility, it will be precluded from ever finding that a case is "extraordinary" under the amended guideline. The amendment clearly was intended to give the sentencing judge discretion to weigh all of the relevant factors in determining when a case is sufficiently extraordinary to warrant adjustments for both obstruction of justice and acceptance of responsibility.
By denying Mr. xxxxxxxx a reduction for his acceptance of responsibility based solely upon a consideration of his obstructive conduct, the sentencing court failed to exercise this discretion. For this reason, its denial of the reduction under § 3E1.1 is not entitled to "great deference on review." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 comment. (n.5). Because the district court failed to weigh all of the relevant factors in concluding that this was not an extraordinary case warranting adjustments for both obstruction of justice and acceptance of responsibility, its sentence was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of § 3E1.1. Therefore, the case should be remanded for further sentencing proceedings with appropriate instructions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1).
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. xxxxxxxx's sentence should be set aside and his case remanded for resentencing.
I hereby certify that the foregoing brief for appellant, Alexander xxxxxxxx, does not exceed the number of words permitted pursuant to D. C. Circuit Rule 28(d).
I hereby certify that on December 21, 1994, I have served by hand two copies of the foregoing Brief for Appellant Alexander xxxxxxxx and one copy of the accompanying Appendix on John R. Fisher, Chief, Appellate Section, United States Attorney's Office, 555 4th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001.
1. " A." refers to the appendix filed with this brief. "PSR" refers to the presentence report filed under seal with this brief. "Tr." refers to certain portions of the transcript of the proceedings in the district court that are cited in this brief but are not included in the appendix (e.g., "7/24/91 Tr.___").
2. For the Court's convenience, the entire transcript of the presentencing hearing held on February 3, 1994, is set forth in the appendix at A. 10 - A. 39.

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