Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/419/428/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:51:42+00:00

Document:
U.S.C. § 554(a), which prohibits commingling prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in agency proceedings, and generally applies to "every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," 5 U.S.C. § 551(7), defining "adjudication" as "agency process for the formulation of an order," and § 551(6), defining "order" as "the whole or a part of a final disposition . . . of an agency in a matter other than rule making."
Held: The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554, does not govern proceedings conducted under § 10(k) of the NLRA. Pp. 419 U. S. 441-448.
(a) The § 10(k) determination is not itself a "final disposition" within the meaning of "order" and "adjudication" in the APA. When Congress defined "order" in terms of a "final disposition," it required that "final disposition" to have some determinate consequences for the party to the proceeding, and here the Board does not order anybody to do anything at the conclusion of the § 10(k) proceeding. Pp. 419 U. S. 441-444.
(b) Nor is such determination "agency process for the formulation of an order" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 551(7). Although important practical consequences in the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding result from the Board's determination in the § 10(k) proceeding, they do not alone make the § 10(k) proceeding related to the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding in a manner that would make the former "agency process" for the formulation of the order of the latter. The § 10(k) proceeding is unlike the typical hearing before an administrative law judge, which is then subject to consideration by the agency. The issues in a § 10(k) proceeding are similar to, but not identical with, the focus of the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding. The standard of proof is different, and the inquiry in a § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding is whether the union engaged in forbidden conduct with a forbidden objective. The proceedings are separate, and the agency makes the determination in each of them. Pp. 419 U. S. 444-448.
486 F.2d 863, reversed and remanded.
that resolution of jurisdictional disputes was more important to industrial peace than the imposition of unfair labor practice sanctions, NLRB v. Radio Engineers, 364 U. S. 573, 364 U. S. 576-577 (1961) (hereinafter CBS), Congress at the same time enacted 10(k), 29 U.S.C. 160(k), [Footnote 2] to induce unions to settle their differences without awaiting unfair labor practice proceedings and enforcement of Board orders by courts of appeals.
whose employees are represented by respondent. Second, by a process known as "terminating the cable," the cable would be connected to the telephone instruments. Petitioner planned to have its OWI technicians, who were represented by the CWA, perform this work.
"Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158(b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed."
the Board in the § 10(k) proceeding. The trial examiner concluded that respondent had violated § 8(b)(4)(D), and he recommended that it be ordered to cease its unlawful conduct; exceptions were filed with the Board [Footnote 10] which it overruled in ordering respondent to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct. 197 N.L.R.B. 879 (1972).
parties had "admitted that § 554 applies to § 10(k) hearings," 486 F.2d at 867, and regarded the participation by Schulson in both proceedings as a violation of 5 U.S.C.
"it was not improper for the same person to perform the functions of hearing officer and subsequently prosecute an unfair labor practice charge based upon the evidence adduced at that hearing,"
"the hearing officer's rulings at the § 10(k) hearing largely determine what evidence the Board will have to consider at the Unfair Labor Practice Hearing. . . ."
486 F.2d at 866-867. With that perspective, the Court of Appeals found the attorney's participation to be "plainly inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Act." Id. at 868.
further observed that the Act "contains many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some ambiguities." Id. at 339 U. S. 40-41. Because it was designed to regulate administrative proceedings throughout a wide spectrum of agency activities, its language is necessarily abstract in many places. The more we may know about the particular agency proceeding to which the Act is sought to be applied, the better we will be able to apply it.
"that it is more important to industrial peace that jurisdictional disputes be settled permanently than it is that unfair labor practice sanctions for jurisdictional strikes be imposed upon unions."
CBS, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 577. Voluntary and therefore prompt resolution of such jurisdictional disputes is encouraged both by the 10-day grace period following notice of the filing of an unfair labor practice charge and by the dismissal of such a charge if the union complies with the Board's adverse § 10(k) determination. 29 CFR § 101.36.
statement of the pertinent facts as may be necessary for a determination of the issues by the Board. All parties are afforded full opportunity to present their respective positions and to produce evidence in support of their contentions. The parties are permitted to argue orally on the record before the hearing officer. At the close of the hearing, the case is transmitted to the Board for decision. The hearing officer prepares al analysis of the issues and the evidence, but makes no recommendations in regard to resolution of the dispute."
"the decision in the proceedings under Section 10(k) is a preliminary administrative determination made for the purpose of attempting to resolve a dispute within the meaning of that section; the unfair labor practice itself is litigated at a subsequent hearing before a Trial Examiner in the event the dispute remains unresolved."
The Board concluded from this analysis of the nature of the § 10(k) proceeding that the provisions of the Act governing adjudications were not applicable. While an agency's interpretation of the Act may not be entitled to the same weight as the agency's interpretation of its own substantive mandate, see United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U. S. 224, 410 U. S. 236 n. 6 (1973), its characterization of its own proceeding is entitled to weight, and that characterization may, in turn, have relevance in determining the applicability of the Act.
section to such hearings. 486 F.2d at 867. Petitioner and the Board contend that the Court of Appeals was mistaken with respect to any such concession, and state that they argued both in their principal briefs and in their petitions for rehearing that 554 was not applicable. Respondent acknowledges that no such concession was made, [Footnote 14] and we therefore address the issue on its merits.
If one were to start with the proposition that all administrative action falls into one of two categories, rulemaking or adjudication, the § 10(k) determination certainly is closer to the latter than to the former. But such light as we have on the intention of Congress when it enacted the Act does not indicate that this is a sound starting point. Knowledgeable authorities in this field observed shortly after passage of the Act that "certain types of agency action are neither rulemaking nor adjudication." Ginnane, "Rule Making," "Adjudication" and Exemptions Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 621, 633 (1947); Netterville, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Interpretation, 20 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1, 33 (1951); cf. Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 40 (1947).
U.S.C. § 551(7), defines "adjudication" as "agency process for the formulation of an order"; "order" is in turn defined as "the whole or a part of a final disposition . . . of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing," 5 U.S.C. § 551(6). While one might argue that an intermediate proceeding within an agency is necessarily a "part" of a "final order," we think a sounder interpretation of the language Congress used is that the phrase "whole or a part" refers to components of that which is itself the final disposition required by the definition of "order" in § 551(6). Intermediate proceedings within an agency may be subject to the provisions of § 554, however, by virtue of the fact that they are "agency process for the formulation of an order", rather than because their product is a "part" of the final disposition. Thus, if the Board's § 10(k) determination is itself a "final disposition" of a Board proceeding or is "agency process for the formulation" of an order in a resulting § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding, then the § 10(k) proceeding is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 554.
"[I]nvestigatory proceedings, no matter how formal, which do not lead to the issuance of an order containing the element of final disposition as required by the definition, do not constitute adjudication."
Court noted in Plasterers' Union, 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 126, that "the 10(k) decision standing alone, binds no one." We conclude, therefore, that the § 10(k) determination is not itself a "final disposition" within the meaning of "order" and "adjudication" in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6), (7).
Respondent's principal argument for affirmance of this case rests on the contention that, although the § 10(k) determination may not itself be a "final disposition," and therefore an "order," it is "agency process for the formulation" of the ultimate § 8(b)(4)(D) order that the Board may issue.
way to implement the Board's § 10(k) decision."
(Footnote omitted.) But we do not think that such practical consequences alone make the § 10(k) proceeding related to the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding in a manner that would make the former "agency process" for the formulation of the order in the latter. The prototype of an intermediate proceeding that is "agency process for the formulation of an order," is a hearing before an administrative law judge who makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, initially decides the case, and whose recommended decision "becomes the decision of the agency . . . unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). All of the parties to this case, for instance, agree that the § 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice hearing before the trial examiner (now administrative law judge) was subject to § 554, since it was "agency process for the formulation of an order."
in new evidence at the § 8(b)(4)(D) stage, although often, as in the present cases, the parties agree to stipulate the record of the § 10(k) hearing as a basis for the Board's determination of the unfair labor practice. Finally, to exercise its powers under § 10(k), the Board need only find that there is reasonable cause to believe that a § 8(b)(4)(D) violation has occurred, while, in the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding itself, the Board must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the picketing union has violated § 8(b)(4)(D). International Typographical Union, supra, at 761 n. 5 (1959)."
In each case, it is the agency itself, the National Labor Relations Board, which makes the ultimate determination. The same issues will generally be relevant, the record of the earlier proceeding will be admitted in the later one, 29 CFR § 102.92, and the Board's ruling on the merits of those issues which are common to the two proceedings is likely to be the same in the one as in the other. But the proceedings are nonetheless separate; the same tribunal finally determines each of them.
10(k) are therefore not governed by the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554.
"(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles. materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is --"
"(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class, rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work."
60 Stat. 237, as codified by an Act to enact Title 5, United States Code, 80 Stat. 378. Slight modifications in the Act sections under consideration in this case were made at the time of codification, but no substantive changes were intended. H.R.Rep. No. 901, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965); S.Rep. No. 1380, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1966).
The division was organized to take advantage of a ruling by the Federal Communications Commission that private telephone systems could be interconnected with an operating telephone company system. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
197 N.L.R.B. 879, 881 (1972).
The respondent's business agent had been notified the previous evening that petitioner's employees would begin their work on December 3. When petitioner's two employees reported to the basement telephone room for work, two of respondent's members, who were employed by the Illinois Bell Telephone Co., packed up their tools and left because they would not work with CWA members. Respondent's steward entered the room and demanded to see petitioner's employees' union cards. When they could not produce Local 134 membership cards, the steward announced, "I can't work here" or "we can't work here." Ibid. After this comment, four or five employees of the Johnson Electric Co., who also were members of Local 134, drifted away. At a coffee break a few moments later, the steward told all the assembled members of Local 134 that he was going home because he did not want to work with "nonunion" men. The other Local 134 members also left the jobsite at that time, and none worked on the job for the rest of the day.
Petitioner's employees remained off the job until December 21, at which time they returned and performed the terminating work. Respondent's members, who had worked on the project as employees of Riley, Illinois Bell, and the Johnson Electric Co., had completed their work by December 21, so that no second confrontation occurred.
The Board's regulations provided that a "hearing officer" is "the agent of the Board conducting the hearing in a proceeding under section 9 or in a dispute proceeding under section 10(k) of the act." 29 CFR § 102.6 (1971). A hearing officer "normally is an attorney or field examiner attached to the regional office, but may be another qualified official." 29 CFR § 101.20(c). The "hearing officer" is to be distinguished from a "trial examiner," who presides over unfair labor practice proceedings. 29 CFR § 102.6. The Board's current regulation is identical to the regulation in force at the time of the § 10(k) proceeding of the present case except that the term "trial examiner" has been changed to "administrative law judge," 29 CFR § 102.6 (1974). See 37 Fed.Reg. 16787 (1972).
The Board's regulations, 29 CFR § 101.34, require the hearing officer to transmit the record to the Board, but provide that he shall make "no recommendations in regard to resolution of the dispute."
Exception 16 brought to the Board's attention the failure of the trial examiner to address respondent's argument that the Act had been violated by the participation of attorney Schulson in both the § 10(k) and § 8(b)(4)(D) proceedings. Since the issue of the applicability of the Act was presented to the Board, the Court of Appeals was entitled to consider the objection, and so are we. 29 U.S. C §§ 160(e)-(f).
"(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved -- "
"(1) a matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in a court;"
"(2) the selection or tenure of an employee, except a hearing examiner appointed under section 3105 of this title;"
"(3) proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections;"
"(4) the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions;"
"(5) cases in which an agency is acting as an agent for a court; or"
"(6) the certification of worker representatives."
"(b) Persons entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of --"
"(1) the time, place, and nature of the hearings;"
"(2) the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; and"
"(3) the matters of fact and law asserted."
"When private persons are the moving parties, other parties to the proceeding shall give prompt notice of issues controverted, in fact, or law; and in other instances agencies may by rule require responsive pleading. In fixing the time and place for hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives."
"(c) The agency shall give all interested parties opportunity for --"
"(1) the submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment when time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit; and"
"(2) to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine a controversy by consent, hearing and decision on notice and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title."
"(d) The employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 557 of this title, unless he becomes unavailable to the agency. Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, such an employee may not -- "
"(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; or"
"(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency."
"(e) The agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty."
"It is well established that Section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for the issuance of the initial decision by the hearing officer, does not apply to a proceeding under Section 10(k). Under Section 101:30 of the Statements of Procedure and Section 102.80 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 7, the hearing under Section 10(k) is nonadversary in character and, according to the procedure adopted therefor, conducted in the same way as a hearing in a representation proceeding. The Board adopted such procedure because the decision under Section 10(k) is a preliminary administrative determination made for the purpose of attempting to resolve a dispute within the meaning of that section. The unfair labor practice itself is litigated at a subsequent hearing before a Trial Examiner if the dispute remains unresolved. It is to the subsequent adversary proceeding, which leads to a final Board determination, that Section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act applies. The primary function of the hearing officer, who is acting under the delegation of authority from the Board, in a nonadversary proceeding is to insure that the record contains a full statement of pertinent facts as may be necessary for the determination of the dispute by the Board. The hearing officer makes no recommendations in regard to the resolution of the dispute. While we think it better practice not to assign a Board agent who has previously engaged in the performance of investigative and prosecuting functions for the Agency to act as a hearing officer in the same or in a related case, we find that the Longshoremen in the instant case was not prejudiced by such assignment. The Longshoremen does not allege that it was denied the opportunity to present evidence in support of its contentions, or that it was prejudiced in any other manner by the conduct of the hearing officer."
(Footnotes omitted.) In General Ore, unlike the present case, the hearing officer had previously represented the General Counsel in proceedings factually related to the § 10(k) proceeding at which he later presided.
The Board, which did not join with petitioner in seeking review of this case but which is nevertheless a party to the case under this Court's Rule 21(4), urges that, even if the § 10(k) proceeding is an "adjudication" under the Act, the language in § 10(k) directing the Board "to hear and determine the dispute" is not sufficient to bring the proceeding within the language of 5 U.S.C. § 554, which operates in the case of adjudications "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." In light of our disposition of the case it is unnecessary to address this contention.
"In a jurisdictional dispute context, the Board is not charged with finding that a violation did, in fact, occur, but only that there is reasonable cause to believe that there has been a violation. On this testimony, and without ruling on the credibility of the testimony in issue, we are satisfied that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(D) has occurred."
191 N.L.R.B. at 830 (footnotes omitted). By contrast, a union can be found guilty of committing an unfair labor practice only if a violation is established by a preponderance of the evidence. 29 U.S. C § 160(c).
"[i]t is not general practice to use the same person who hears the Section 10(k) case to investigate and prosecute the subsequent Section 8(b)(4)(D) case."
Memorandum for the NLRB 4 n. 4.
There is a suggestion in the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the Board's order should not be enforced even if the Act does not govern the § 10(k) proceeding, because the commingling of functions was "incompatible with the accepted norms for the proper administration of justice." 486 F.2d 863, 868. Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950). In the present case, however, attorney Schulson prosecuted the case for the General Counsel after he had presided at the § 10(k) proceeding. Even if it be assumed that his function at the § 10(k) proceeding was judicial in nature, it is hard to see how this sequence of events would present the danger of commingling which the Court of Appeals saw. The Court of Appeals may have confused "hearing officers" with "trial examiners" or "hearing examiners" (now "administrative law judges") who are ordinarily required to make recommended decisions, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), and who must be appointed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3105. 486 F.2d at 867 n. 3.

References: § 554
 § 551
 § 551
 § 554
 § 10
 § 10
 § 10
 § 551
 § 8
 § 10
 § 10
 § 8
 § 10
 § 10
 § 8
 § 8
 v. 
 § 10
 § 8
 § 554
 § 10
 § 10
 § 10
 § 101
 § 10
 v. 
 § 10
 § 551
 § 551
 § 551
 § 554
 § 10
 § 8
 § 10
 § 554
 § 10
 § 10
 § 8
 § 10
 § 10
 § 8
 § 557
 § 8
 § 554
 § 8
 § 10
 § 10
 § 8
 § 8
 § 8
 § 102
 § 554
 § 102
 § 101
 § 102
 § 10
 § 102
 § 101
 § 10
 § 8
 § 10
 § 10
 § 10
 § 554
 § 160
 § 10
 v. 
 § 10
 § 10
 § 557
 § 3105