Source: https://www.carterdeluca.com/news/consisting-not-narrow-think/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 05:04:10+00:00

Document:
Conventional wisdom would seem to indicate then, that the use of the phrase “consisting of” would not merit further evaluation. However, as evidenced in Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corporation (“Multilayer”), “consisting of” still raises issues that bewilder practitioners and the court alike, particularly in the context of Markush claim language. Such is the uncertainty, that Multilayer produced a dissent and a denied petition for sanctions by Berry Plastics Corporation (“Berry”) against Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holding, Inc. (“Multilayer”) for “ ‘bas[ing] its entire pre-suit investigation on a frivolous claim construction that flies in the face of well-settled patent law.’ ” What then, is the effect of the phrase “consisting of” on claim breadth when used in the context of Markush claim language? The answer, according to the court in Multilayer, is it depends.
The court qualified this statement by noting that although the phrase “consisting of” “creates a very strong presumption that the claim element is ‘closed’ and therefore ‘exclude[s] any elements, steps, or ingredients not specified in the claim’ ” and “is at least a century old and has been reaffirmed many times by our court and other courts,” a patentee may “overcome the exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is closed to unrecited elements . . . [if] the specification and prosecution history . . . unmistakably manifest an alternative meaning.” Therefore, the use of the phrase “consisting of” is not terminal to the breadth of the claim.
An unintended result of Multilayer’s argument is that the claim construction announced by the court necessitated that claim 10 be found invalid. Much to the chagrin of Multilayer, the court stated “[a] dependent claim that contradicts, rather than narrows, the claim from which it depends is invalid.”  Since the court found that “[i]ndependent claim 1 excludes LDPE from the inner layers, while dependent claim 10 includes it . . . claim 10 is inconsistent with claim 1 and, indeed, contradicts claim 1,” claim 10 (along with claims 18 and 19) must be found to be invalid.
Moreover, the specification of the ’055 patent provided further evidence that element (b) is open to blends of the resins recited in the Markush group, with the court noting, amongst other instances, “[a]ccording to the patent’s Abstract, ‘[t]he resins used in the film composition . . . may be blended to achieve a desired range of physical or mechanical properties of the final film product.” The court found that this intrinsic evidence was strong enough to overcome the presumption that the element (b) is closed to blends, and therefore, “the Markush group of element (b) must be read as open to blends of the four listed resins.” In view of the above analysis and conclusion that claims 1 and 28 are open to blends of LLDPE, VLDPE, ULDPE, and mLLDPE, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further consideration.
Multilayer illustrates that claim construction revolving around the transitional phrase “consisting of” is a complicated and thorough endeavor. While it is well settled that “consisting of” “excludes any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the claim,” it is clear that there is a general misconception that “consisting of” is per se closed to elements not listed in the claim, rather than a presumption.
But what lessons can practitioners glean from Multilayer? The initial reaction is to avoid the use of “consisting of” and Markush language altogether. In the majority of instances this would be a wise approach. However, in certain instances the use of such claim language still has value, particularly in the chemical context or in dependent claim format to avoid excess claim fees. Additionally, MPEP § 2111.03 states that “[w]hen the phrase ‘consists of’ appears in a clause of the body of a claim, rather than immediately following the preamble, it limits only the element set forth in that clause; other elements are not excluded from the claim as a whole.” In this manner, if used with precision, “consisting of” or Markush language can be a useful tool to prevent a claim from reading on prior art.
While it may seem prudent to add as much evidence in the specification as possible that the group is not to be limited to those elements listed in the claim, Multilayer does not clearly define how much evidence is required to overcome the presumption that the claim is closed to any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the claim. Therefore, practitioners should utilize “consisting of” only in those instances where the forthcoming elements are to be construed as being limited solely to those elements listed after “consisting of.” Further, practitioners should try to limit the use of Markush language to dependent claims to obtain the broadest interpretation of independent claims and to ensure that dependent claims are not rendered invalid for being inconsistent with the independent claim.
If nothing else, Multilayer reminds practitioners that they should be mindful of how they draft claims. If “consisting of” or Markush language must be used, practitioners should be comfortable with the claim being limited to those elements listed after “consisting of” and should pay particular attention to whether or not they intend to claim blends or mixtures of the recited elements, in which case “and mixtures thereof” or other similar language should be utilized.
 See e.g., CIAS, Inc. v. All. Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, 460 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F. 3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Parmelee Pharm Co. v. Zink, 285 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1961); In re Davis and Tuukkanen, 80 USPQ 448 (Board of Patent Interferences 1949); In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520 (CCPA 1931); Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 212 F. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1913).
 MPEP § 2111.03, quoting Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371-73, 74 USPQ2d 1586, 1589-91 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
 MPEP § 2111.03, quoting In re Gray.
 Slip Op. at 27, citing Cross-Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1.
 U.S. Patent No. 6,265,055 C2, Col. 1, line 43 – col. 2, line 3 (as corrected by the Certificate of Correction of July 14, 2009).
 Id., citing AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., Inc., 239 F.3d 1239, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
 Slip Op. at 13-14, citing Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Environmental International, 460 F.3d 1349, 1359 n. 4 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
 See, e.g., Slip Op. at 14-16.
 Ortho-Mcneil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
 Slip Op. at 16, quoting N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
 Id., quoting N. Am. Vaccine at 1577.
 Id. at 20-21, citing 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) (requiring that ‘a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed’ (emphasis in original)).
 Slip Op. at 21, emphasis added.
 Slip Op. at 22, citing Abbott Labs. V. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
 See, e.g., Slip Op. at 22, quoting Abbott at 1281 (citing Meeting Held to Promote Uniform Practice In Chemical Divisions, [28 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 849, 852 (1946)]).
 citing Mannesmann DemagCorp. V. Engineered Metal Products Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986), emphasis added.

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