Source: http://connecticut-appeals.com/tag/medical-malpractice/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:36:05+00:00

Document:
Reviews of Supreme Court advance release opinions about medical malpractice.
Gagliano v. Advanced Specialty Care – There was sufficient evidence for jury to find that surgical resident was hospital’s actual agent, making hospital vicariously liable for resident’s malpractice.
Levin v. State – While on an approved home visit from a state mental-health facility, patient stabbed his mother to death. Claims commissioner granted mother’s administratrix permission to sue state for medical malpractice. Trial court struck the complaint. Supreme Court affirmed, finding that plaintiff’s claim violated Jarmie, which bars medical malpractice claims by nonpatients. And, even if plaintiff’s claim sounded in ordinary negligence as opposed to medical malpractice, it exceeded the scope of permission to sue that the claims commissioner had granted and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it.
Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about debt collection, divorce, eviction, medical malpractice, and municipal law.
Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Pineda – If a note provides for postmaturity interest, and the lender has not waived it, lender is entitled to postjudgment interest at the rate specified, and if no rate is specified, at the legal rate. This is true regardless of whether the judgment expressly provides for postjudgment interest.
Hall v. Hall – Trial court held plaintiff in contempt for withdrawing money from a bank account in violation of court order, and denied a joint motion to open and set aside the contempt judgment. Appellate Court rejected plaintiff’s claim that he relied on counsel’s advice in withdrawing the money as unsupported by the record. For the same reason, Appellate Court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that vacating the contempt judgment served substantial justice because it could interfere with his employment prospects – there was no evidence of any such interference in the record.
Lyons v. Citron – If a landlord withdraws a summary process action for nonpayment of rent, intending to start the process all over again with a new notice to quit, landlord must wait the nine statutory grace period before serving the new notice to quit because the withdrawal reinstates the tenancy.
Peters v. United Community and Family Services, Inc. – Doctor who wrote opinion letter was board certified in defendant’s specialty, but his letter did not say so. Plaintiff tried to correct the deficiency with an affidavit in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss. Trial court dismissed because plaintiff submitted the affidavit after the limitations period had expired, making the affidavit too late to fix the problem. Appellate Court affirmed.
Nichols v. Oxford – Nichols petitioned under CGS § 13a-103 for an order directing Town to repair and maintain unimproved sections of highway. Trial court denied the petition, finding that the sections had been abandoned if they had ever even been part of a highway. Appellate Court affirmed.
Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about breach of contract, child support, custody and visitation, divorce, medical malpractice, and mortgage foreclosure.
Bracken v. Windsor Locks – Breach of a settlement agreement. In 1994, Town settled an employment dispute with Bracken by reinstating him as a cop as of June 1993, and giving him a seniority date of September 1987. Bracken understood that to mean that he was entitled to pension credit for the period between his September 1987 seniority date and his June 1993 reinstatement date. Town had the right to buy pension credit for Bracken for that period from the Connecticut Municipal Employee Retirement System any time up until Bracken started receiving benefits. Under the pension plan, Bracken would not be eligible to receive benefits until October 2017. In late 2002 or early 2003, Bracken learned that the Town had not purchased pension credit. Over the ensuing years, Bracken tried to get Town to buy the credit, but Town seemed to prefer to wait. As of 2014, Town still had not bought the credit. Bracken started the action, claiming that the Town had breached the express terms of the settlement agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Trial court concluded that the 6-year statute of limitations, and laches, barred the action because the breach occurred with reinstatement in 1993. Appellate Court reversed, noting that since Town could buy pension credit up until October 2017, Bracken’s 2014 action was for anticipatory breach, and Town had not established laches.
Bolat v. Bolat – Judgment entered on parties’ agreement which gave sole legal and primary physical custody of three children to husband, and required no child support from wife. Wife later moved to modify custody. Trial court denied that motion, but found that wife’s income had increased substantially since the original judgment. Husband then filed a motion to modify child support based on the trial court’s finding as to wife’s income and his own loss of employment. His motion asked the court to “see attached,” which appeared to be a motion for child support that included a child support worksheet and wife’s financial affidavits. While that motion was pending, wife filed a motion for contempt, asserting that husband had failed to pay his share of agreed expenses for children’s extracurricular activities. In denying husband’s motion to modify, trial court found that defendant had not properly raised anything other than his own loss of income and declined to consider evidence of the change in wife’s income. Trial court granted wife’s motion. Appellate Court reversed as to both, finding that (1) husband had properly raised wife’s increase in income by asking the court to see the motion for child support attached to his motion to modify; and (2) husband did not wilfully disobey order about extracurricular expenses because they weren’t “agreed expenses” – he had told wife that he could not agree because he could not afford them.
Kyle S. v. Jayne K. – Appellate Court affirmed trial court’s orders granting Jayne K custody of T (the child) and a relief from abuse restraining order against Kyle S, finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Kyle S presented an immediate and present risk of physical danger or psychological harm to T, and that a change in custody was warranted. But, Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s order, that the child psychologist was to determine the scope of Kyle S’s visitation with T, as an improper delegation of judicial authority.
Hamburg v. Hamburg – Divorce decree required husband to pay into education accounts for the two children. He did, but later raided the accounts for his own purposes. While he and wife were fighting about that and other things in court, wife was murdered. Trial court granted her administrator’s motion to substitute as plaintiff. Trial court then ordered husband to pay some $324,000 to wife’s estate to replace the money he took from the education accounts. Trial court also later granted daughter’s motion to intervene. Husband then moved to dismiss, arguing that neither administrator nor daughter had standing to pursue claims for the education money. Trial court denied the motion. Appellate Court reversed as to the administrator’s standing, but affirmed as to the daughter’s. The administrator lacked standing because the claim for education money belonged to the children, not the estate. For the same reason, daughter had standing to intervene.
Zilkha v. Zilkha – This is actually a tale of two appeals. In the first one, trial court found that husband fraudulently failed to disclose an employment dispute and ordered him to escrow the settlement money he received. Trial court later ordered some of that money be disbursed to pay the fees and retainers of the guardian ad litem, children’s attorney, and experts. Husband appealed claiming that trial court lacked authority to issue that order since it wasn’t in connection with a motion to open. Appellate Court agreed and vacated the order. But Appellate Court did not order any of the recipients to return any money. In the second appeal, trial court denied husband’s request that the recipients return the money. Husband appealed, arguing that by refusing to order return of the money, trial court had violated the Appellate Court’s ruling in the first appeal. Appellate Court affirmed because it had not ordered anyone to return anything – it just vacated the order directing payments that had already been made. Appellate Court also found that husband had failed to show that any equitable basis for ordering the money returned.
Labissoniere v. Gaylord Hospital, Inc. – Defendant doctors were board certified internists. Opinion letter was by a board certified surgeon. Trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss because a surgeon and internists are not similar health care providers, and the complaint did not allege that internists were acting outside the scope of their specialty. Appellate Court affirmed.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Pollard – Yawn. Per curiam decision affirming the trial court’s conclusion that Pollard’s eight-count counterclaim was legally insufficient because it did not go to the making, validity, or enforcement of the note or mortgage.
The Bank of New York Mellon v. Horsey – Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) trial court did not abuse its discretion in opening dismissal for failure to prosecute because the record suggested a reasonable cause for plaintiff’s delay (waiting for prior counsel to return original documents necessary for judgment); (2) defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his judicial bias claim because he never raised it in the trial court; (3) defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that plaintiff failed to timely file certain documents necessary for judgment because never raised in the trial court; (4) summary judgment as to liability was proper because plaintiff’s proof established a prima facie foreclosure claim and defendant did not offer any evidence that created a fact issue; (5) defendant failed to preserve, and inadequately briefed, his claim that plaintiff should have been nonsuited under Practice Book § 17-19 for failing to comply with the trial court’s deadline for filing summary judgment motion; (6) defendant inadequately briefed his claim that plaintiff rendered note and mortgage unenforceable by separating them from each other; (7) defendant could not prevail on his claim that plaintiff lacked standing because defendant failed to rebut the presumption of ownership arising from plaintiff’s holder status; and (8) there was no evidence supporting defendant’s claim of fraud on the court.
Reviews of Connecticut Appellate Court advance release opinions about child support, civil procedure, divorce, insurance, medical malpractice, and underinsured motorist benefits.
Asia A. M. v. Geoffrey M. – This is one that I normally would not review, but I found it interesting. Geoffrey executed a written acknowledgment of paternity under CGS § 46b-172(a)(1). More than two years later, state filed a petition for support against Geoffrey in Asia’s name. Geoffrey then moved to open the paternity acknowledgment under § 46b-172(a)(2) for fraud, mistake of act, and duress, claiming essentially that he signed it only because Asia had lied to him that he was the father; a DNA test proved that he was not the biological father; and it was in the child’s best interests to establish the biological father. Family support magistrate concluded that Geoffrey failed to establish any of the statutory bases for opening the acknowledgment – fraud, mistake, or duress – because the evidence showed that he knew that he was not the biological father when he signed it. But, magistrate nonetheless opened the judgment, concluding that magistrates have the inherent authority to open judgments in the child’s best interests. Trial court affirmed on the state’s appeal. Appellate Court reversed because (1) the statutory grounds are the only grounds for opening a judgment deriving from a § 46b-172(a)(1) paternity acknowledgment; and, redundantly in my view, (2) magistrate did not have authority to open the acknowledgment in the best interests of the child. Judge Keller concurred to suggest amending the paternity acknowledgment statute to require DNA testing before an acknowledgment could be accepted.
Battistotti v. Suzanne A. – Trial court awarded Suzanne sole custody; gave Battistotti, a New York resident, parenting time that had to be spent in Greenwich; and ordered Battistotti to pay child support in the amount suggested by the guidelines. On appeal, Battistotti claimed that the trial court should have deviated from the support guidelines to account for his additional expenses in maintaining a Greenwich apartment to comply with the visitation order. Appellate Court agreed, and remanded for a new hearing on child support. Battistotti also claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in restricting his parenting time to Greenwich. Appellate Court disagreed, and affirmed on that point.
Plainville v. Almost Home Animal Rescue and Shelter, Inc. – Town seized animals from defendant under a criminal search and seizure warrant and tried recover its animal care expenses from defendant under negligence per se and unjust enrichment theories. Trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike both counts. Appellate Court affirmed, finding that (1) Town was not an intended beneficiary of CGS § 53-247 so that statute was not a basis for Town’s negligence per se claim; (2) CGS § 22-329a provided Town with an adequate remedy for recouping its animal care costs so it could not recover in unjust enrichment; and (3) trial court did not apply an improper standard in deciding the motion to strike.
In husband’s appeal, trial court found that husband’s job loss was his own fault and denied his motion to reduce alimony. Appellate Court reversed on that point, finding that the record did not support the trial court’s conclusion. But Appellate Court affirmed trial court’s determination that husband’s obligation to pay pension benefits to wife started on the date of dissolution, and was not delayed by the delay in determining the marital-portion calculation method.
General Ins. Co. of America v. Okeke – Some cases break your heart not because of the court’s ruling, but because of the facts that led the parties to litigation. This is one of those cases. Fifteen year old Michael allegedly assaulted, stabbed, and beat an elderly woman, in her home. The woman sued Michael and his mother, Agatha, in separate actions. Agatha’s homeowner’s insurer initially appeared for Michael, but then withdrew his appearance. It appeared for Agatha under a reservation of rights. Michael was defaulted for failure to appear. After a hearing in damages, the court awarded the woman more than $407,000 in Michael’s case. While the woman’s actions were pending, Agatha’s homeowner’s insurer brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a decree that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Michael or Agatha. Trial court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment, and decreed that it had no duty to defend or indemnify either defendant. Appellate Court affirmed in a per curiam opinion adopting the trial court’s memorandum of decision.
Ugalde v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, Inc. – Appellate Court found that trial court (1) properly dismissed claim for lack of personal jurisdiction because opinion letter was deficient for want of doctor’s qualifications and plaintiff could not amend it because statute of limitations had expired; and (2) properly denied plaintiff’s motion to re-argue the denial of her motion to set aside the nonsuit that entered for her failure to comply with discovery.
Puente v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co. – Puente had an LLC, and the LLC had an auto insurance policy. Puente was hit after exiting the LLC’s truck. Trial court granted insurer summary judgment, finding that there was no dispute that Puente was not a named insured, and that he was not “occupying” the truck when he was hit because he wasn’t in physical contact with it. Appellate Court affirmed.

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