Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=33838:g-r-no-105371-november-11,-1993-philippine-judges-association,-et-al-v-pete-prado,-et-al&amp;catid=1308&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:25:16+00:00

Document:
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati and Pasay, Metro Manila ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President, REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari’a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, Petitioners, v. HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., Respondents.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
d)	to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners’ contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
(2)	No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care (or attention) was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments of the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents’ conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippine Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mails as the Judiciary).
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter, like exemption from taxes, customs and tariff duties. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is the free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the tax exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege by the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is allotted to the Judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Registers of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
1.	Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., pp. 295-296; State v. Dolan, 14 L.R.A. 1259; State v. Doherty, 29 Pac. 855.
2.	Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 8 A.L.R. 466.
3.	Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297.
5.	Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 737.
6.	City of Winona v. School District, 41 N.W. 539.
8.	Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.
12.	Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155; Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654; Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 375.
13.	International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.
14.	Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 7354.

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