Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321207187/United-States-v-Smith-4th-Cir-2011
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:57:38+00:00

Document:
2d; and the second ___, after F. Supp. 2d is deleted.
Before KING, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
that an accused enjoy "the Assistance of Counsel."
a substantial showing that his guilty plea was involuntary.
Pirus, a subset of the Bloods gang.
was in the group assigned a trial date of July 6, 2009.
that counsel was "so mad . . . my defense will be sabotaged."
to the court: that he was "not happy with my representation."
matter" were three: "Learn to work with [appointed trial counsel], hire a lawyer, or represent yourself." J.A. 62.
in this case, and hes not doing it," the court inquired further.
permit Smith to consider hiring alternate counsel.
with the representation of my attorney." J.A. 77, 84.
offense level 16 (after acceptance of responsibility credit) to 29 (same).
"worked out those ups and downs," Smith replied, "Yes." Id.
The court also asked Smith why he was pleading guilty.
Im guilty." J.A. 103-04. The court asked, "Well, which is it?"
doing everything that I can for him." J.A. 104-05.
Smiths sentencing hearing was held on August 14, 2009.
judges chambers, a "Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing,"
that hes withdrawing from being my counsel.
issues in this case." J.A. 113.
told Smith his only choices were to hire an attorney, to proceed with the same appointed counsel, or to represent himself.
Smith said a few words about "asking for another chance,"
elected not to enforce that provision.
and then twice orally in the course of the subsequent hearings.
F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (requiring a "meaningful opportunity").
reconsideration qualified as an opportunity to object."
plea by failing to renew the objection as he entered that plea.
involuntariness claim does not apply.
upon entering a guilty plea.
source of the right to substitute counsel.
derived from the right to "be afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure counsel of his own choosing." United States v.
when voluntariness is attacked based on the constructive denial of counsel.
was involuntary under Fifth and Sixth Amendments)).
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
have a "meaningful relationship," Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S.
between the attorney and the defendant . . . .
U.S. 1011 (1992), and cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007 (1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (cited with approval in United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 918 (4th Cir. 1995)).
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
defense. Indeed, the text of the Amendment makes this clear.
defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added).
receiving "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
the same token, when a breakdown in attorney-client communication is so severe that it "prevents" even "the ability to conduct an adequate defense,"
true whether counsel is retained or appointed.
se Sixth Amendment violation under Cronic); Mitchell v.
"constructive denial of counsel" under Cronic and consequently presumed prejudice. Id. at 744.
would "add an extra layer of litigiousness to ineffective assistance law." Glover v. Miro, 262 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2001).
some broad-brush presumption of prejudice."
prejudice attaches. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60.
refusal to cooperate demonstrates unreasonable contumacy.
Id. at 1198 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
ordinary standard of review to its factual findings: clear error.
See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir.
attempts to obtain new counsel by a desire to delay his trial").
a case, it cannot be said that a defendant did not "
appointed attorney was allowed to withdraw).
his appointed trial counsel was a deliberate tactical maneuver.
mounting of an adequate defense.
Smiths interceding guilty plea. We said in United States v.
act[ ] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
"could seek an appellate remedy for the constitutional violations" if convicted. 591 F.3d at 280.
effect, no assistance of counsel is provided" at all.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 n. 11.
and [is] not simply an error in the trial process itself."
of assistance of counsel is made unassailable by an uncounseled plea would be unfathomable.
F.3d at 289, for "applying Cronic to the guilty plea context").
constructively denied counsel, then that "protective device"
749, as guided by the prescriptions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
which we might find involuntariness, we affirm his conviction.
establish a breakdown in communication.
mounting an adequate defense would have been frustrated.
hearing, the pair had weathered "some disagreement and dissatisfaction . . . earlier" and were "now back on track." J.A.
doing everything that I can for him." J.A. 105.
"prevent[ed] the ability to conduct an adequate defense,"
doing it," the judge asked, "What do you want him to do?"
then questioned counsel about the petition at some length.
of your questions," "done anything you told him not to do,"
or "refused to do something that you told him to do." J.A. 91.
"worked out those ups and downs," and Smith said they had.
Smith answered that he hadnt, it moved on. J.A. 92.
issues, and the court ended its questioning there.
substitution during the Rule 11 proceedings was "timely," Br.
entirely distinct motion, and consequently find it untimely.
the courts denial of his motion for substitution.
a bar when a substitution claim is otherwise meritorious.
. . . lies with the government, not with [the defendant]." Mullen, 32 F.3d at 896.
(emphasis added). Thus it cannot "easily be said that . . .
Smith abandoned any request for substitute counsel . . . ." Br.
renewed complaints merely dilatory would be wholly unwarranted.
Smiths opportunity for a complete presentation at sentencing.
was June 29 (as he says he told Smith at the June 24 meeting).
to the court at sentencing.
Smith answered, "Yes. I read it, Your Honor." J.A. 119.
counsel" before explaining to the court that the PSR incorrectly stated that he had requested a "mental health program,"
when he had asked for a "drug treatment program." J.A. 119.
both of which counsel presented to the court. J.A. 123.
Mullen the day before trial, when Mullen refused to see him.
consult with counsel during the trial.
not have brought to counsels attention additional facts relevant to his sentencing.
was prevented from rendering genuinely effective assistance.
inquiry and, when appropriate, to appoint substitute counsel.
error the district courts underlying factual findings." Slip op.
law, it has by definition committed an abuse of discretion.
not be taken as other than dicta or have precedential value.
have observed, cases like this one are "notoriously" factspecific. United States v. Jones, 977 F.2d 105, 111 (4th Cir.
this is not and need not be that case.
that identified in part II.B.2.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment as to Part II.B.

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