Source: http://www.joeldufresnecase.com/supreme-court-opinions-federal/abortion-opinions/bigelow-v-virginia-421-u-s-809-1975
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:48:17+00:00

Document:
Appellant, the managing editor of a weekly newspaper published in Virginia, as the result of publishing a New York City organization's advertisement announcing that it would arrange low-cost placements for women with unwanted pregnancies in accredited hospitals and clinics in New York (where abortions were legal and there were no residency requirements), was convicted of violating a Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor, by the sale or circulation of any publication, to encourage or prompt the processing of an abortion. The trial court had rejected appellant's claim that the statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth as being facially overbroad and as applied to appellant. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, also rejecting appellant's First Amendment claim and holding that the advertisement was a commercial one which could be constitutionally prohibited under the State's police power, and that, because appellant himself lacked a legitimate First Amendment interest inasmuch as his activity "was of a purely commercial nature," he had no standing to challenge the statute as being facially overbroad.
1. Though an intervening amendment of the statute, as a practical matter, moots the overbreadth issue for the future, the Virginia courts erred in denying appellant standing to raise that issue, since "pure speech", rather than conduct, was involved, and no consideration was given to whether or not the alleged overbreadth was substantial. Pp. 815-818.
2. The statute as applied to appellant infringed constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment. Pp. 818-829.
(a) The Virginia courts erred in assuming that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection and that appellant had no legitimate First Amendment interest, since speech is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in the form of a paid commercial advertisement, and the fact that the advertisement in question had commercial [p810] aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial interests did not negate all First Amendment guarantees. Pp. 818-821.
(b) Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience consisting of not only readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also those concerned with the subject matter or the law of another State, and readers seeking reform in Virginia; and thus appellant's First Amendment interests coincided with the constitutional interests of the general public. Pp. 821-822.
(c) A State does not acquire power or supervision over another State's internal affairs merely because its own citizens' welfare and health may be affected when they travel to the other State, and while a State may seek to disseminate information so as to enable its citizens to make better informed decisions when they leave, it may not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that State, as the placement services here were at the time they were advertised. Pp. 822-825.
(d) Virginia's asserted interest in regulating what Virginians may hear or read about the New York services or in shielding its citizens from information about activities outside Virginia's borders (which Virginia's police powers do not reach) is entitled to little, if any, weight under the circumstances. Pp. 826-828.
214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680, reversed.
An advertisement carried in appellant's newspaper led to his conviction for a violation of a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor, by the sale or circulation of any publication, to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion. The issue here is whether the editor appellant's First Amendment rights were unconstitutionally abridged by the statute. The First Amendment, of course, is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
Abortions are now legal in New York.
It is to be observed that the advertisement announced that the Women's Pavilion of New York City would help women with unwanted pregnancies to obtain "immediate placement in accredited hospitals and clinics at low cost" and would "make all arrangements" on a "strictly confidential" basis; that it offered "information and counseling"; that it gave the organization's address and telephone numbers; and that it stated that abortions "are now legal in New York" and there "are no residency requirements." Although the advertisement did not contain the name of any licensed physician, the "placement" to which it referred was to "accredited hospitals and clinics."
Appellant was first tried and convicted in the County Court of Albemarle County. He appealed to the Circuit Court of that county where he was entitled to a de novo trial. Va.Code Ann. §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-136 (1960). In the Circuit Court, he waived a jury, and, in July, 1971, [p814] was tried to the judge. The evidence consisted of stipulated facts; an excerpt, containing the advertisement in question, from the weekly's issue of February 8, 1971; and the June, 1971 issue of Redbook magazine, containing abortion information and distributed in Virginia and in Albemarle County. App. 3, 8. The court rejected appellant's claim that the statute was unconstitutional, and adjudged him guilty. He was sentenced to pay a fine of $500, with $350 thereof suspended "conditioned upon no further violation" of the statute. Id. at 5.
to ensure that pregnant women in Virginia who decided to have abortions come to their decisions without the commercial advertising pressure usually incidental to the sale of a box of soap powder.
Id. at 196, 191 S.E.2d at 176. The court then turned to Bigelow's claim of overbreadth. It held that, because the [p815] appellant himself lacked a legitimate First Amendment interest, inasmuch as his activity "was of a purely commercial nature," he had no "standing to rely upon the hypothetical rights of those in the non-commercial zone." Id. at 198, 191 S.E.2d at 177-178.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, on such reconsideration, but without further oral argument, again affirmed appellant's conviction, observing that neither Roe nor Doe "mentioned the subject of abortion advertising" and finding nothing in those decisions "which in any way affects our earlier view." [n5] 214 Va. 341, 342, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). Once again, Bigelow appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction in order to review the important First Amendment issue presented. 418 U.S. 909 (1974).
attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own [p816] conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-521 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971), and id. at 619-620 (WHITE, J., dissenting); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). The Supreme Court of Virginia itself recognized this principle when it recently stated that "persons who engage in nonprivileged conduct are not precluded from attacking a statute under which they were convicted." Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 638639, 179 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1971).
For, in appraising a statute's inhibitory effect upon [First Amendment] rights, this Court has not hesitated to take into account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that at bar.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 432. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 844, 847-848 (1970).
danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
Of course, in order to have standing, an individual must present more than "[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill.'" There must be a "claim of specific present objective [p817] harm or a threat of specific future harm." Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972). That requirement, however, surely is met under the circumstances of this case, where the threat of prosecution already has blossomed into the reality of a conviction, and where there can be no doubt concerning the appellant's personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The injury of which appellant complains is one to him as an editor and publisher of a newspaper; he is not seeking to raise the hypothetical rights of others. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641 (1951). Indeed, unlike some cases in which the standing issue similarly has been raised, the facts of this case well illustrate "the statute's potential for sweeping and improper applications." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 532-533 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting).
Declaring a statute facially unconstitutional because of overbreadth "is, manifestly, strong medicine," and "has been employed by the Court sparingly, and only as a last resort." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). But we conclude that the Virginia courts erred in denying Bigelow standing to make this claim, where "pure speech", rather than conduct was involved, without any consideration of whether the alleged overbreadth was or was not substantial. Id. at 615, 616.
The Supreme Court of Virginia placed no effective limiting construction on the statute. Indeed, it characterized the rights of doctors, husbands, and lecturers as "hypothetical," and thus seemed to imply that, although these were in the noncommercial zone, the statute might apply to them, too.
In view of the statute's amendment since Bigelow's conviction in such a way as "effectively to repeal" its prior application, there is no possibility now that the [p818] statute's pre-1972 form will be applied again to appellant or will chill the rights of others. As a practical matter, the issue of its overbreadth has become moot for the future. We therefore decline to rest our decision on overbreadth, and we pass on to the further inquiry, of greater moment not only for Bigelow but for others, whether the statute, as applied to appellant, infringed constitutionally protected speech.
A. The central assumption made by the Supreme Court of Virginia was that the First Amendment guarantee of speech and press are inapplicable to paid commercial advertisements. Our cases, however, clearly establish that speech is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in that form. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973); 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
Although other categories of speech -- such as fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), or obscenity, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), or obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-485 (1957), 354 U.S. 476, 481-485 (1957), Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973), or libel, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973), or libel, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323"]418 U.S. 323 (1974), or incitement, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), or incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) -- have been held unprotected, no contention has been made that the particular speech embraced in the advertisement in question is within any of these categories.
That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.
B. The legitimacy of appellant's First Amendment claim in the present case is demonstrated by the important differences between the advertisement presently at [p822] issue and those involved in Chrestensen and in Pittsburgh Press. The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material of clear "public interest." Portions of its message, most prominently the lines, "Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no residency requirements," involve the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion.
Moreover, the placement services advertised in appellant's newspaper were legally provided in New York at that time. [n8] The Virginia Legislature could not have [p823] regulated the advertiser's activity in New York, and obviously could not have proscribed the activity in that State. [n9] Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892). [p824] Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain those services or, as the State conceded, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, prosecute them for going there. See United States v. Guest, 38 U.S. 745, 757-759 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631 (1969); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 200. Virginia possessed no authority to regulate the services provided in New York -- the skills and credentials of the New York physicians and of the New York professionals who assisted them, the standards of the New York hospitals and clinics to which patients were referred, or the practices and charges of the New York referral services.
A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State. It may seek to disseminate information so as to enable its citizens to make better informed decisions when they leave. But it may not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar [p825] a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that State.
Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm'n, supra; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). [n11] To the extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged. Advertising is not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.
The Court has stated that "a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429. Regardless of the particular label asserted by the State -- whether it calls speech "commercial" or "commercial advertising" or "solicitation" -- a court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation. The diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech "commercial" in widely varying degrees. We need not decide here the extent to which constitutional protection is afforded commercial advertising under all circumstances and in the face of all kinds of regulation.
The task of balancing the interests at stake here was one that should have been undertaken by the Virginia courts before they reached their decision. We need not [p827] remand for that purpose, however, because the outcome is readily apparent from what has been said above.
In support of the statute, the appellee contends that the commercial operations of abortion referral agencies are associated with practices, such as fee-splitting, that tend to diminish, or at least adversely affect, the quality of medical care, and that advertising of these operations will lead women to seek services from those who are interested only or mainly in financial gain apart from professional integrity and responsibility.
The State, of course, has a legitimate interest in maintaining the quality of medical care provided within its borders. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954). No claim has been made, however, that this particular advertisement in any way affected the quality of medical services within Virginia. As applied to Bigelow's case, the statute was directed at the publishing of informative material relating to services offered in another State, and was not directed at advertising by a referral agency or a practitioner whose activity Virginia had authority or power to regulate.
To be sure, the agency-advertiser's practices, although not then illegal, may later have proved to be at least "inimical to the public interest" in New York. S. P. S. Consultants, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 333 F.Supp. 1373, 1378 (SDNY 1971). [n12] But this development would not justify a Virginia statute that forbids Virginians from using in New York the then legal services of a local New York agency. Here, Virginia is really asserting an interest in regulating what Virginians may hear or read about the New York services. It is, in effect, advancing an interest in shielding its citizens from information about activities [p828] outside Virginia's borders, activities that Virginia's police powers do not reach. This asserted interest, even if understandable, was entitled to little, if any, weight under the circumstances.
No claim has been made, nor could any be supported on this record, that the advertisement was deceptive or fraudulent, [n13] or that it related to a commodity or service that was then illegal in either Virginia or in New York, or that it otherwise furthered a criminal scheme in Virginia. [n14] There was no possibility that appellant's activity would invade the privacy of other citizens, Breard v. Alexandria, supra, or infringe on other rights. Observers would not have the advertiser's message thrust upon them as a captive audience. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra; Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932).
The strength of appellant's interest was augmented by the fact that the statute was applied against him as publisher and editor of a newspaper, not against the advertiser or a referral agency or a practitioner. The prosecution thus incurred more serious First Amendment overtones.
the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential. . . .
2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed.).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
We conclude that Virginia could not apply Va.Code Ann. § 18.1-63 (1960), as it read in 1971, to appellant's publication of the advertisement in question without unconstitutionally infringing upon his First Amendment rights. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is therefore reversed.
1. His brief describes the publication as an "underground newspaper." Brief for Appellant 3. The appellee states that there is no evidence in the record to support that description. Brief for Appellee 3 n. 1.
2. We were advised by the State at oral argument that the statute dated back to 1878, and that Bigelow's was the first prosecution under the statute "in modern times," and perhaps the only prosecution under it "at any time." Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. The statute appears to have its origin in Va.Acts of Assembly 1877-1878, p. 281, c. 2, § 8.
18.1-63. If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or through the use of a referral agency for profit, or in any other manner, encourage or promote the processing of an abortion or miscarriage to be performed in this State which is prohibited under this article, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
It is to be observed that the amendment restricts the statute's application, with respect to advertising, to an abortion illegal in Virginia and to be performed there. Since the State's statutes purport to define those abortions that are legal when performed in the State, see Va.Code Ann. §§ 18.1-62.1 and 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1975), the State at oral argument described the pre-1972 form of § 18.13 as "effectively repealed by amendment," and, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the statute, as amended, as limited to an abortion performed by a nonphysician. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-39. In any event, there is no dispute here that the amended statute would not reach appellant's advertisement.
4. See Note, The First Amendment and Commercial Advertising: Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 60 Va.L.Rev. 154 (1974).
There is some doubt concerning whether the "commercial speech" distinction announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen . . . retains continuing validity.
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n. 6 (1974) (dissenting opinion). See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 393 (1973) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); id. at 398 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); id. at 401 (STEWART, J., dissenting).
7. It was argued, too, that, under the circumstances, the appearance of the advertisement in the appellant's newspaper was "an implicit editorial endorsement" of its message. Brief for Appellant 29.
Medical referral services, organized as profit-making enterprises within this state, have been . . . in violation of the standards of ethics and public policy applicable to the practice of medicine and which would be violations of standards of professional conduct if the acts were performed by physicians. . . . It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state . . . that such profit-making medical referral service organizations be declared to be invalid and unlawful in this state.
No person, firm, partnership, association or corporation, or agent or employee thereof, shall engage in for profit any business or service which in whole or in part includes the referral or recommendation of persons to a physician, hospital, health related facility, or dispensary for any form of medical care or treatment of any ailment or physical condition. The imposition of a fee or charge for any such referral or recommendation shall create a presumption that the business or service is engaged in for profit.
A violation of the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not longer than one year or a fine of not more than $5,000 or both. § 4502(1). Article 45 expressly is made inapplicable to a nonprofit corporation exempt from federal income taxation under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c). § 4503.
The 1971 statute has been upheld against constitutional challenge. S. P. S. Consultants, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 333 F.Supp. 1373 (SDNY 1971).
in any business which in whole or in part includes the referral or recommendation of persons to a physician, hospital, health-related facility, or dispensary for any form of medical care or treatment of any ailment or physical condition.
Acceptance of a fee for any such referral or recommendation "shall create a presumption that the business is engaged in such service for profit." Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not longer than one year or a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
(13) Advertises to the general public directly or indirectly in any manner his professional services, their costs, prices, fees, credit terms or quality.
See also Va.Code Ann. §§ 54-278.1 and 54-317(4), (5), and (6) (1974).
We, of course, have no occasion to comment here on whatever constitutional issue, if any, may be raised with respect to these statutes.
10. We have no occasion, therefore, to comment on decisions of lower courts concerning regulation of advertising in readily distinguishable fact situations. Wholly apart from the respective rationales that may have been developed by the courts in those cases, their results are not inconsistent with our holding here. In those cases, there usually existed a clear relationship between the advertising in question and an activity that the government was legitimately regulating. See, e.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121 (CA5), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); Rockville Reminder, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 480 F.2d 4 (CA2 1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
Nor need we comment here on the First Amendment ramifications of legislative prohibitions of certain kinds of advertising in the electronic media, where the "unique characteristics" of this form of communication "make it especially subject to regulation in the public interest." Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.Supp. 582, 584 (DC 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). See also Banzhaf v. FCC, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
Our decision also is in no way inconsistent with our holdings in the Fourteenth Amendment cases that concern the regulation of professional activity. See North Dakota Pharmacy Bd. v Snyder's Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
11. See also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-294 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-576 (1941).
12. See State v. Abortion Information Agency, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 825, 323 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1971); see also Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak, 335 F.Supp. 738 (ED Mich.1972).
13. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 1191, 1197-1198 (1965); Developments in the Law -- Deceptive Advertising, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1005, 1010-1015 (1967).
14. We are not required to decide here what the First Amendment consequences would be if the Virginia advertisement promoted an activity in New York which was then illegal in New York. An example would be an advertisement announcing the availability of narcotics in New York City when the possession and sale of narcotics was proscribed in the State of New York.
15. The State so indicated at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. It, however, was never so applied. In the light of its "effective repeal," as the State's counsel observed during the oral argument, "[w]e will never know" how far, under appellee's theory, it might have reached. Id. at 38.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 18
 § 8
 § 18
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 4502
 § 501
 § 501
 § 4503
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.