Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40448:g-r-no-131367-august-31,-2000-hutchison-ports-phil-limited-v-subic-bay-metropolitan-authority,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:47:24+00:00

Document:
HUTCHISON PORTS PHILIPPINES LIMITED, Petitioner, v. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES INC., ROYAL PORT SERVICES INC. and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.
3.	The re-evaluation must be limited to the parties’ financial bids.
3.1	Considering that the parties’ business have been accepted (passed), strictly follow the criteria for bid evaluation provided for in pars. (c) and (d), Part B (1) of the Tender Document.
4.	In the re-evaluation, the COA should actively participate to determine which of the financial bids is more advantageous.
5.	In addition, all the parties should be given ample opportunity to elucidate or clarify the components/justification for their respective financial bids in order to ensure fair play and transparency in the proceedings.
The recommendation of CPLC Cayetano was approved by President Ramos, and a copy of President Ramos’ handwritten approval was sent to the SBMA Board of Directors. Accordingly, the SBMA Board, with the concurrence of representatives of the Commission on Audit, agreed to focus the reevaluation of the bids in accordance with the evaluation criteria and the detailed components contained in the Tender Document, including all relevant information gleaned from the bidding documents, as well as the reports of the three international experts and the consultancy firm hired by the SBMA.
With the preceding parameters for the evaluation of bidder’s business plan, the respondents were fairly guided by, as they aligned their judgment in congruence with, the opinion of the panel of experts and the SBMA’s Technical Evaluation Committee to the effect that HPPL’s business is superior while that of ICTSI’s appeared to be unrealistically high which may eventually hinder the competitiveness of the SBMA port with the rest of the world. Respondents averred that the panel of World Bank experts noted that ICTSI’s high tariff rates at U.S. $119.00 per TEU is already higher by 37% through HPPL, which could further increase by 20% in the first two (2) years and by 5% hike thereafter. In short, high tariffs would discourage potential customers which may be translated into low cargo volume that will eventually reduce financial return to SBMA. Respondents asserted that HPPL’s business plan offers the greatest financial return which could be equated that over the five years, HPPL offers 1.25 billion pesos while ICTSI offers P0.859 billion, and RPSI offers P.420 billion. Over the first ten years HPPL gives P2.430 billion, ICTSI tenders P2.197 billion and RPSI has P1.632 billion.
Complainant HPPL alleged and argued therein that a binding and legally enforceable contract had been established between HPPL and defendant SBMA under Article 1305 of the Civil Code, considering that SBMA had repeatedly declared and confirmed that HPPL was the winning bidder. Having accepted HPPL’s offer to operate and develop the proposed container terminal, defendant SBMA is duty-bound to comply with its obligation by commencing negotiations and drawing up a Concession Agreement with plaintiff HPPL. HPPL also pointed out that the bidding procedure followed by the SBMA faithfully complied with existing laws and rules established by SBMA itself; thus, when HPPL was declared the winning bidder it acquired the exclusive right to negotiate with the SBMA. Consequently, plaintiff HPPL posited that SBMA should be: (1) barred from conducting a re-bidding of the proposed project and/or performing any such acts relating thereto; and (2) prohibited from negotiating with any party other than plaintiff HPPL until negotiations between HPPL and SBMA have been concluded or in the event that no acceptable agreement could be arrived at. Plaintiff HPPL also alleged that SBMA’s continued refusal to negotiate the Concession Contract is a substantial infringement of its proprietary rights, and caused damage and prejudice to plaintiff HPPL.
(1)	Upon the filing of this complaint, hearings be scheduled to determine the propriety of plaintiff’s mandatory injunction application which seeks to order defendant or any of its appropriate officers or committees to forthwith specify the date as well as to perform any and all such acts (e.g. laying the ground rules for discussion) for the commencement of negotiations with plaintiff with the view to signing at the earliest possible time a Concession Agreement for the development and operation of the Subic Bay Container Terminal.
2.3.	Ordering defendant to pay for the cost of plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in the amount of P500,000.00, or as otherwise proven during the trial.
During the pre-trial hearing, one of the issues raised and submitted for resolution was whether or not the Office of the President can set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of plaintiff HPPL and if so, can the Office of the President direct the SBMA to conduct a re-bidding of the proposed project.
While the case before the trial court was pending litigation, on August 4, 1997, the SBMA sent notices to plaintiff HPPL, ICTSI and RPSI requesting them to declare their interest in participating in a rebidding of the proposed project. 17 On October 20, 1997, plaintiff HPPL received a copy of the minutes of the pre-bid conference which stated that the winning bidder would be announced on December 5, 1997 18 Then on November 4, 1997, plaintiff HPPL learned that the SBMA had accepted the bids of ICTSI and RPSI who were the only bidders who qualified.
Plaintiff maintains that by voluntarily participating in this proceedings, the defendant and the intervenors "have unqualifiedly agreed to submit the issue of the propriety, legality and validity of the Office of the President’s directive that the SBMA effect a rebidding" of its concession contract or the operation of the Subic Bay Container Terminal. As such, the status quo must be maintained in order not to thwart the court’s ability to resolve the issues presented. Further, the ethics of the profession require that counsel should discontinue any act which tends to render the issues academic.
SECTION 21.	Injunction and Restraining Order. — The implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations are urgent and necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
During the hearing on October 30, 1997, SBMA’s counsel revealed that there is no law or administrative rule or regulation which requires that a bidding be accomplished within a definite time frame.
Truly, the matter of the deferment of the re-bidding on November 4, 1997 rests on the sound discretion of the SBMA. For this Court to issue a cease-and-desist order would be tantamount to an issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. (Prado v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 98118, December 6, 1991).
The Court notes that the Office of the President has not been heard fully on the issues. Moreover, one of the intervenors is of the view that the issue of jurisdiction must be resolved first, ahead of all the other issues.
WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
(3)	Ordering respondents to pay for the cost of suit.
The instant petition seeks the issuance of an injunctive writ for the sole purpose of holding in abeyance the conduct by respondent SBMA of a rebidding of the proposed SBICT project until the case for specific performance is resolved by the trial court. In other words, petitioner HPPL prays that the status quo be preserved until the issues raised in the main case are litigated and finally determined. Petitioner was constrained to invoke this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction and authority by virtue of the above-quoted Republic Act 7227, Section 21.
At the outset, the application for the injunctive writ is only a provisional remedy, a mere adjunct to the main suit. 24 Thus, it is not uncommon that the issues in the main action are closely intertwined, if not identical, to the allegations and counter allegations propounded by the opposing parties in support of their contrary positions concerning the propriety or impropriety of the injunctive writ. While it is not our intention to preempt the trial court’s determination of the issues in the main action for specific performance, this Court has a bounden duty to perform; that is, to resolve the matters before this Court in a manner that gives essence to justice, equity and good conscience.
While our pronouncements are for the purpose only of determining whether or not the circumstances warrant the issuance of the writ of injunction, it is inevitable that it may have some impact on the main action pending before the trial court. Nevertheless, without delving into the merits of the main case, our findings herein shall be confined to the necessary issues attendant to the application for an injunctive writ.
First. That the petitioner/applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right.
Second. That there is a material and substantial invasion of such right.
Finally, we focus on the matter of whether or not petitioner HPPL has the legal capacity to even seek redress from this Court. Admittedly, petitioner HPPL is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. While the actual bidder was a consortium composed of petitioner, and two other corporations, namely, Guoco Holdings (Phils.) Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc., it is only petitioner HPPL that has brought the controversy before the Court, arguing that it is suing only on an isolated transaction to evade the legal requirement that foreign corporations must be licensed to do business in the Philippines to be able to file and prosecute an action before Philippines courts.
The maelstrom of this issue is whether participating in the bidding is a mere isolated transaction, or did it constitute "engaging in" or "transacting" business in the Philippines such that petitioner HPPL needed a license to do business in the Philippines before it could come to court.
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel a foreign corporation desiring to do business within the Philippines to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state and to enable the government to exercise jurisdiction over them for the regulation of their activities in this country. 31 If a foreign corporation operates a business in the Philippines without a license, and thus does not submit itself to Philippine laws, it is only just that said foreign corporation be not allowed to invoke them in our courts when the need arises. "While foreign investors are always welcome in this land to collaborate with us for our mutual benefit, they must be prepared as an indispensable condition to respect and be bound by Philippine law in proper cases, as in the one at bar." 32 The requirement of a license is not intended to put foreign corporations at a disadvantage, for the doctrine of lack of capacity to sue is based on considerations of sound public policy. 33 Accordingly, petitioner HPPL must be held to be incapacitated to bring this petition for injunction before this Court for it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the requisite license.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, the temporary restraining order issued on December 3, 1997 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., concurs in the result.
1.	Annex "A" ; Rollo, p. 16; February 12, 1996 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Business World, Lloyd’s List and 2 newspapers of local circulation in Olongapo City.
(iii)	Mr. Thong Yoy Chuan, General Manager for Operations, Container Terminal of Penang, Malaysia.
3.	Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" ; Rollo, pp. 22-80.
4.	Annex "G" ; Rollo, p. 82.
5.	Supra., Rollo, p. 82.
6.	Supra., Rollo, p. 84.
7.	Annex "A" ; Rollo, pp. 230-232.
8.	Annex "B" ; Rollo, pp. 233-236.
9.	Annex "J" ; Rollo, pp. 89-90.
10.	Annex "17" of SBMA’s Answer to the Complaint.
11.	Annex "E" ; Rollo, p. 240.
12.	Annex "D" ; Rollo, p. 239; Memorandum dated January 2, 1997.
13.	Annex "2" ; Rollo, pp. 304-312.
14.	Annex "M" ; Rollo, pp. 93-100, Civil Case No. 243-0-97.
15.	Annex "P" ; Rollo, pp. 113-121; Annex "13" ; Rollo, pp. 427-433; Annex "14" ; Rollo, pp. 435-438.
16.	Complaint, Rollo, p. 99.
17.	Annex "Q" ; Rollo, p. 122.
18.	Annex "R" ; Rollo, pp. 123-128.
19.	Annex "S" ; Rollo, pp. 129-132.
20.	Annex "T" ; Rollo, p. 133-134.
21.	Petition, Rollo, p. 10.
22.	Petition, Rollo, p. 11.
23.	Supreme Court Resolution, Rollo, p. 144.
24.	PAL, Inc. v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672, 680 (1998).
25.	Versoza v. CA, 299 SCRA 100, 108 (1998); Arcega v. CA, 275 SCRA 176, 180 (1997); Teotico v. Agda, Sr., 197 SCRA 675, 696 (1991).
27.	Inter-Asia Services Corp. (International) v. CA, 263 SCRA 408, 419 (1996).
28.	Mentholatum Co. v. Mangaliman, 72 Phil. 524, 528 (1941).
29.	Avon Insurance PLC v. CA, 273 SCRA 312, 321 (1997).
30.	Granger Associates v. Microwave Systems, Inc., 189 SCRA 631, 640 (1990).
31.	Eriks Pte., Ltd. v. CA, 267 SCRA 567, 580 (1997).
32.	Granger Associates v. Microwave Systems, Inc., supra., p. 642.
33.	National Sugar Trading Corp. v. CA, 246 SCRA 465, 470 (1995).

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