Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/743-n-2d-719-613941830
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:21:18+00:00

Document:
Party Name: Michael Allen LAMBERT, Appellant (Petitioner below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent below).
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent below).
Rehearing Denied May 9, 2001.
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Thomas C. Hinesley, Kathleen Cleary, Deputy Public Defenders, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Priscilla J. Fossum, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Michael Allen Lambert was sentenced to death for the murder of a Muncie police officer. His conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal and on rehearing. We now affirm the denial of Lambert's petition for post-conviction relief, finding that this Court did not engage in what Lambert calls "unconstitutional appellate sentencing," the post-conviction judge did not err by declining to disqualify himself, and Lambert's trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective.
We affirmed Lambert's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See Lambert v. State, 643 N.E.2d 349 (Ind.1994). A second opinion, issued on rehearing, recognized that the trial court had improperly admitted victim impact evidence during sentencing but upheld Lambert's death sentence after independent review of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind.1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1255, 117 S.Ct. 2417, 138 L.Ed.2d 181 (1997). Lambert petitioned for post-conviction relief and now appeals the denial of that petition.
Under the post-conviction rules, the trial court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented in the petition. See Ind. Post Conviction Rule 1(6). Our review on appeal is of these findings and conclusions. See Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind.1993). The post-conviction procedures do not provide a petitioner with a "super-appeal" or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original trial court committed error. Such claims are available only on direct appeal. Williams, 724 N.E.2d at 1076.
Although these principles are familiar, we cite them for a particular reason here. It is not our practice to use our opinions to critique the performance of counsel. We feel constrained, however, to say that Lambert's brief is for the most part organized and written with disrespect for these principles of post-conviction review. The brief consists of 83 pages of argument, the first 61 of which contain claims framed as trial court error. Only the final 22 pages and a seven-page supplemental brief challenge decisions of the post-conviction court. The final 22 pages and the supplemental brief incorporate by reference much of the material in the first 61 pages, sometimes in only the most general way. Briefs so organized and written hinder appellate review.
A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief--such as Lambert--appeals from a negative judgment. "This is because at the trial on the petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner has the burden of establishing any grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Miller, 702 N.E.2d at 1058. See also Ind. Post Conviction Rule 1(5) ( "The petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence."). "When a petitioner appeals from a negative judgment, he or she must convince the appeals court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the trial court." Miller, 702 N.E.2d at 1058. Stated slightly differently, "[t]his Court will disturb a post-conviction court's decision as being contrary to law only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion." Id.
Where we find an irregularity in a trial court's decision to impose the death sentence, this Court has various options, as correctly noted by the defendant. Among these are: 1) to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination; 2) to affirm the death sentence if the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and 3) to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level.
642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind.1994) (emphasis added). We have invoked this power in several death penalty cases. See Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 909-10 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1148, 119 S.Ct. 1046, 143 L.Ed.2d 53 (1999); Bivins, 642 N.E.2d at 957. Cf. Bellmore v. State, 602 N.E.2d 111, 129-30 (Ind.1992) (recognizing option of independent review but choosing instead to remand). As set forth above, Lambert's claim for relief on this issue is grounded in his assertion that it was beyond our authority under Indiana law to review the propriety of Lambert's sentence and affirm it after finding trial court sentencing error. We reaffirm that our review of and decision to affirm (or modify or reverse) a sentence under such circumstances is an exercise of our constitutional authority to "review and revise" sentences. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4; Bellmore, 602 N.E.2d at 130 ("This Court has long recognized and exercised its authority under our state constitution and statutes to conduct an independent reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the appropriateness of a death penalty.").
Lambert also contends that our decision on rehearing violated the federal Constitution. But the United States Supreme Court has explicitly approved this type of independent reweighing. For example, that Court has held that "[i]n a weighing State, when a reviewing court strikes one or more of the aggravating factors on which the sentencer relies, the reviewing court may, consistent with the Constitution, reweigh the remaining evidence or conduct a harmless error analysis." Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991). See also Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 741, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990).

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