Source: https://www.ptab.us/2012/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:04:08+00:00

Document:
These arguments are largely speculative and not persuasive because a determination of obviousness does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements or a showing that the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of a primary reference or physically combined with another reference. In re Mouttet, 2012 WL 2384056, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 26, 2012) (citations omitted).
And because human color perception is a subjective mental process (abstract idea), the “single most reasonable understanding is that [Appellant’s] claim is directed to nothing more than a fundamental truth or disembodied concept,” i.e., subjective human color perception. See CLS Bank Int’l v Alice Corp. Pty, LTD, No. 2011-1301, 2012 WL 2708400, at *10 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 2012). In light of the evolving state of §101 case law, the Examiner should review all claims for patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101, consistent with current USPTO guidance regarding recent court decisions, including Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Notably, Wikipedia disclaims the validity of the website’s content and is unreliable. See Techradium, Inc. v. Blackboard Connect, Inc., 2009 WL 1152985, *4 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
This argument is also unavailing because the fact that a specific embodiment is taught to be preferred is not controlling in an obviousness determination, since all disclosures of the prior art must be considered. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Labs. Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)).
“[T]he PTO can require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his [or her] claimed product . . . . Whether the rejection is based on ‘inherency’ under 35 U.S.C. § 102, on ‘prima facie obviousness’ under 35 U.S.C. § 103, jointly or alternatively, the burden of proof is the same,” In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 70 (CCPA 1980) (quoting In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 (CCPA 1977)).
Any special meaning assigned to a term “must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.” Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
“[W]hen the PTO shows sound basis for believing that the products of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.” In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971)). In this case, however, the Examiner has not shown a sound basis to shift the burden to Appellants.
We first note that Appellant employs the Markush group format in claim 5 by reciting “selecting an operation from the group consisting of accessing data . . . , posting data . . . , updating data . . . , deleting data . . . , and combinations thereof.” See MPEP § 2173.05(h)(I). Accordingly, Xu discloses the “selecting” step if Xu discloses selecting one of the recited operations in the group. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1298 (2009) (“[T]he entire element is disclosed by the prior art if one alternative in the Markush group is in the prior art.”) (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
The presence or absence of a reason "to combine references in an obviousness determination is a pure question of fact." In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
Although the teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test is no longer a rigid rule post KSR, "the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art references." Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999.
We see no error in this position, for “[i]t is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet, --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 2384056, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that the criterion for obviousness is not whether the references can be physically combined, but whether the claimed invention is rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole)).
In this regard, while it is generally a matter of obviousness for the skilled artisan to determine the optimum value within a disclosed range, In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (CCPA 1980), it may not have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to find an optimum value that is significantly outside the range taught by the prior art. See In re Sebek, 465 F.2d 904, 907 (CCPA 1972).
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 969 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The two-way test is only appropriate in the unusual circumstance where, inter alia, the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") is 'solely responsible for the delay in causing the second-filed application to issue prior to the first.'”) (quoting In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998), emphasis added by the Eli Lilly court).

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