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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:47:31+00:00

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4 2 "collected from the crime scene or the victim of the offense." Here, the court of appeals ruled that a letter that had been written by the perpetrator, and which the perpetrator mailed to a local television station days after he committed the double murders in this case, qualified for testing under the statute because, while the letter itself (i.e. a piece of paper and an envelope) is not biological material, it might have biological material on it. Emerick, at It came to that same conclusion regarding used paper towels that were found in the bathrooms of the bar where the murders were committed. Id. The court of appeals also concluded that the letter qualified as having been "collected from the scene of the crime" - not because the letter was found at the crime scene or even written at the crime scene - but because the court believed that the writing of the letter was "an extension of the crime scene by the perpetrator." Id. at 55. hi the end, the court of appeals' decision serves to improperly permit the litigation of issues that could have been raised, and should have been raised, in an initial application for postconviction DNA testing, but which the defendant chose, perhaps deliberately, not to raise in his initial application for no explicable reason. And by doing so, the court of appeals (1) created an acceptance criteria for successive applications for post-conviction DNA testing that is essentially limitless, and that is contrary to R.C ; and (2) created a category of evidence that would be available for post-conviction DNA testing (any item of evidentiary value, regardless of where it is found or where it is recovered, and regardless of its form, that might potentially have biological material on it) that is likewise contrary to R.C Therefore, it is a matter of public and great general interest that this Court clarify the extent to which principles of res judicata apply to post-conviction applications for DNA testing, and clarify the intended scope of the statutory requirement that the evidence subject to testing be "biological material" collected "from the crime scene or the victim of the offense."
6 4 which is located within three miles of the murder scene, and where Emerick is a regular customer. She testified that Emerick called her at work on the day of the murders to say he was running late in picking up his laundry, and that Emerick eventually arrived shortly after the laundromat closed at 2:00 p.m. She further testified that Emerick parked his car across the marked parking spaces, and that after Emerick left she saw a silver two-wheeled dolly with a rounded handle near where the right rear of Emerick's car was parked when he picked up his laundry, and that the dolly was not there before Emerick picked up his laundry. The dolly later disappeared from the area of the business where she had placed it after Emerick left. She identified the dolly as looking similar to the dolly depicted in State's Exhibit a flyer created by Dayton Police seeking information about the dolly stolen from Sloopy's. 6. Stolen from Sloopy's: (A) A gray safe on rollers, weighing approximately 150 pounds and measuring approximately 2 x 2 x 3 feet; (B) A metallic silver dolly, with rounded handles over the top and two solid rubber wheels; and (C) Paper currency, taken from inside a pried-open cigarette machine. 7. Recovery of the Sloopy's Safe: Found exactly one week after the murders near the Handyman Hardware Store, which is located within three miles of the murder scene, and within four blocks of the laundromat where Emerick and the dolly were seen. 8. The Testimony of Forensic Scientist Cindy Dean: That a gray paint smear, found on the right passenger doorjamb of Emerick's car, was "similar in tint and color" to the gray paint collected from the recovered Sloopy's safe. 9. The Testimony of Forensic Scientist Timothy Duerr: That a tire iron collected from inside Emerick's car made the tool marks on the pried-open Sloopy's cigarette machine, to the exclusion of all other tools.
9 7 evidentiary hearing and extensive briefing by the parties, the trial court overruled Emerick's application for further DNA testing. On October 28, 2011, the Second District Court of Appeals issued an Opinion and Final Entry reversing the trial court and ordering that Emerick's second application for DNA testing be granted as well. The court of appeals held that the principles of res judicata did not prevent the consideration of Emerick's second application, and that the items Emerick sought to have tested qualified for testing under R.C (C)(1), because the items were either biological material, or were non-biological material but might have biological material on them; and were either collected from the crime scene, or were connected with a non-descript extension of the crime scene. The State now appeals to this Honorable Court. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITION OF LAW Proposition of Law No. 1: Res Judicata bars an offender, in a successive application for post-conviction DNA testing, from seeking the testing of evidence that was known and available to him for testing at the time the offender filed his initial application. The doctrine of res judicata is a proper basis for dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing. State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d Res judicata operates to preclude a defendant, who in a prior post-conviction petition had unsuccessfully raised a claim, from raising that same claim again in a subsequent petition. State v. Castro (1979), 67 Ohio App.2d 20, 21, 425 N.E.2d 907. A key public policy concern of the doctrine of res judicata is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and its principle objectives is to give finality to prior judgments and to put an end to litigation. Westwood Chem. Co., Inc. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6' Cir.1981). Accordingly, to overcome the res judicata bar, the defendant must demonstrate that he could not have raised the claims he is now raising in his original proceedings. State v. Lawson (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 307, 659 N.E.2d 362.
11 9 Ohio App.3d 168, 2009-Ohio-6069, 923 N.E.2d 654. The court in Ayers found that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is applicable to petitions for postconviction relief" Id. at 16, citing State v. Perry, supra. The court nevertheless concluded that applications for post-conviction DNA testing are a "specialized situation" for which the application of res judicata is generally improper. Ayers at 25. But the rationale that the court relied upon in Ayers in arriving at that conclusion, even assuming it is valid, is distinguishable from the case here. In Ayers, the defendant applied in 2004 to have DNA testing performed on pubic hair and other biological material found on the victim, but the trial court denied the application because Ayers failed to demonstrate that DNA testing would be "outcome determinative" as defined in R.C (L). Id. at 3-5. Then, in 2008, Ayers filed a second application for DNA testing of the same evidence. The trial court denied the second application on the basis of res judicata, stating that it had previously held, in denying the first application, that DNA testing of the items would not be outcome determinative. Id. 6. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to the second application, but only because the statutory definition of "outcome determinative" had been amended, in 2006, between the time of Ayers's first application and his second application.' Thus, because of the timing of the two applications in Ayers, the court of appeals found it improper to apply the doctrine of res judicata to bar a second application for DNA testing where the standard for reviewing such applications had changed. Id But that rationale does not apply here, because changes in the definition of "outcome determinative" have nothing to do with why Emerick filed his second application, and nothing to 'The effect that the 2006 amendment to the definition of "outcome determinative" has on successive petitions for post-conviction DNA testing is one of the issues raised in State v. Noling, Case No , which was recently accepted for review by this Court.

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