Source: https://apanewslaw.wordpress.com/2014/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:57:49+00:00

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An individual who enters a hospital to receive medical treatment is not in a Charter- free zone.
R. v. Taylor 2014 SCC 50 – this decision was reported earlier today. The accused was arrested for impaired driving causing bodily harm when he lost control of his vehicle, injuring three of his passengers. At the time of his arrest, he was informed of his Charter rights, including his right to counsel, and was asked whether he wanted to call a lawyer. The accused responded that he wanted to speak both to his father and to his lawyer. At no time was the accused given access to a phone while at the scene of the accident. As a precaution and in accordance with normal practice, the accused was taken by ambulance to the hospital for examination. At the hospital, a nurse took five vials of blood from the accused. The police later demanded and obtained a second set of samples of the accused’s blood for investigative purposes. At no point during the accused’s time in hospital did the police attempt to provide him with an opportunity to speak to his lawyer or determine whether such an opportunity was even logistically or medically feasible. The police successfully applied for a warrant to seize the first vials of blood the hospital took from the accused.
The trial judge agreed with the Crown that the second set of blood samples were taken in violation of the accused’s s. 10(b) rights, but found that there was no breach of the accused’s s. 10(b) rights prior to the first samples being taken. This was based on the trial judge’s assumption that where an accused is awaiting or receiving medical treatment, there is no reasonable opportunity to provide private access to the accused to a telephone to implement his right to instruct counsel. The first set of blood samples were admitted at trial. On the basis of this evidence, the accused was convicted of three counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm. A majority in the Court of Appeal in Alberta allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred when he concluded that there was no reasonable opportunity to facilitate access to a lawyer prior to the taking of these blood samples. The evidence was excluded, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.
This is a case about the police informing an individual about his right to counsel as soon as he was arrested, then promptly forgetting to implement it throughout his detention, including during his stay in a hospital. While he was at the hospital, blood samples were taken which were used as evidence at trial to convict him of impaired driving causing bodily harm.
Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees that detained or arrested individuals have the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. In R. v. Manninen,  1 S.C.R. 1233, this Court recognized that this imposes a corresponding duty on the police to ensure that individuals are given a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right. This appeal is about the scope of that duty when a detained individual is receiving medical treatment. The question before us is whether the police’s failure to take any steps to implement or facilitate access to counsel is a breach of s. 10(b) in the circumstances. In my view, it is and the evidence should be excluded.
A majority in the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred when he concluded that there was no reasonable opportunity to facilitate access to a lawyer prior to the taking of the first set of blood samples. In its view, Mr. Taylor’s s. 10(b) rights were violated, and this resulted in Mr. Taylor’s “inability to exercise a meaningful and informed choice as to whether he should or should not consent” to the taking of blood samples by the hospital. The evidence was excluded, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered. The SCC agreed with the majority of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion.
The purpose of the s. 10(b) right is “to allow the detainee not only to be informed of his rights and obligations under the law but, equally if not more important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise those rights”: Manninen, at pp. 1242-43. The right to retain and instruct counsel is also “meant to assist detainees regain their liberty, and guard against the risk of involuntary self-incrimination”: R. v. Suberu,  2 S.C.R. 460, at para. 40. Access to legal advice ensures that an individual who is under control of the state and in a situation of legal jeopardy “is able to make a choice to speak to the police investigators that is both free and informed”: R. v. Sinclair,  2 S.C.R. 310, at para. 25.
The duty to inform a detained person of his or her right to counsel arises “immediately” upon arrest or detention (Suberu, at paras. 41-42), and the duty to facilitate access to a lawyer, in turn, arises immediately upon the detainee’s request to speak to counsel. The arresting officer is therefore under a constitutional obligation to facilitate the requested access to a lawyer at the first reasonably available opportunity. The burden is on the Crown to show that a given delay was reasonable in the circumstances (R. v. Luong (2000), 271 A.R. 368, at para. 12 (C.A.)). Whether a delay in facilitating access to counsel is reasonable is a factual inquiry.
This means that to give effect to the right to counsel, the police must inform detainees of their s. 10(b) rights and facilitate access to those rights where requested, both without delay. This includes “allowing [the detainee] upon his request to use the telephone for that purpose if one is available” (Manninen, at p. 1242). And all this because the detainee is in the control of the police and cannot exercise his right to counsel unless the police give him a reasonable opportunity to do so (see Brownridge v. The Queen,  S.C.R. 926, at pp. 952-53).
Until the requested access to counsel is provided, it is uncontroversial that there is an obligation on the police to refrain from taking further investigative steps to elicit evidence (R. v. Ross,  1 S.C.R. 3, at p. 12; R. v. Prosper,  3 S.C.R. 236, at p. 269).
The majority in the Court of Appeal was of the view that in light of Cst. MacGillivray’s acknowledgement that he could have provided his own cell phone, the “‘mistake’ in failing to provide it” gave rise to a breach of s. 10(b). The Crown takes issue with this finding, and I agree that in light of privacy and safety issues, the police are under no legal duty to provide their own cell phone to a detained individual.
But the police nonetheless have both a duty to provide phone access as soon as practicable to reduce the possibility of accidental self-incrimination and to refrain from eliciting evidence from the individual before access to counsel has been facilitated. While s. 10(b) does not create a “right” to use a specific phone, it does guarantee that the individual will have access to a phone to exercise his right to counsel at the first reasonable opportunity.
There may well be circumstances when it will not be possible to facilitate private access to a lawyer for a detained person receiving emergency medical treatment. As this Court noted in Bartle, a police officer’s implementational duties under s. 10(b) are necessarily limited in urgent or dangerous circumstances. But those attenuating circumstances are not engaged in this case. As the trial judge found, the paramedic “did not feel there was anything wrong with the Accused”, but took Mr. Taylor to the hospital only “out of an abundance of caution, and in accordance with normal practice”. And once at the hospital, it was 20 to 30 minutes before the hospital took any blood from Mr. Taylor, more than enough time for the police to make inquiries as to whether a phone was available or a phone call medically feasible.
The duty of the police is to provide access to counsel at the earliest practical opportunity. To suggest, as the trial judge did, that it is presumptively reasonable to delay the implementation of the right to counsel for the entire duration of an accused’s time waiting for and receiving medical treatment in a hospital emergency ward, without any evidence of the particular circumstances, undermines the constitutional requirement of access to counsel “without delay”.
Not everything that happens in an emergency ward is necessarily a medical emergency of such proportions that communication between a lawyer and an accused is not reasonably possible. Constitutional rights cannot be displaced by assumptions of impracticality. Barriers to access must be proven, not assumed, and proactive steps are required to turn the right to counsel into access to counsel.
An individual who enters a hospital to receive medical treatment is not in a Charter– free zone. Where the individual has requested access to counsel and is in custody at the hospital, the police have an obligation under s. 10(b) to take steps to ascertain whether private access to a phone is in fact available, given the circumstances. Since most hospitals have phones, it is not a question simply of whether the individual is in the emergency room, it is whether the Crown has demonstrated that the circumstances are such that a private phone conversation is not reasonably feasible.
With regards to the Charter-infringing state conduct, Justice Abella said that the record indicates that the s. 10(b) breach was not the result of a wilful disregard for Mr. Taylor’s rights. Nevertheless, Cst. MacGillivray’s failure to facilitate Mr. Taylor’s s. 10(b) rights constituted a significant departure from the standard of conduct expected of police officers and cannot be condoned. In short, at no point did the police do anything to facilitate Mr. Taylor’s access to counsel at the hospital, either before the initial hospital samples were taken or when they demanded a blood sample.
Can the police question drivers about other matters when they are stopped for the purpose of a road side check and where the police do not have reasonable grounds to do so?
Check stop programs result in the arbitrary detention of motorists. The programs are justified as a means aimed at reducing the terrible toll of death and injury so often occasioned by impaired drivers or by dangerous vehicles. The primary aim of the program is thus to check for sobriety, licences, ownership, insurance and the mechanical fitness of cars. The police use of check stops should not be extended beyond these aims. Random stop programs must not be turned into a means of conducting either an unfounded general inquisition or an unreasonable search.
Of course, all kinds of issues can come into play (such as informed consent as discussed in R. v. Wills,  O.J. No. 294, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 529 (Ont. C.A.)), but that is not the reason for this post. So, you may ask why I’m citing the SCC case of Mellenthin from 1992 on my blog? Well, this same issue has come up again in a 2014 case named R. v. Koczab 2014 SCC 9.
In Koczab, the accused, while driving his vehicle from British Columbia to Ontario, was pulled over for speeding in Manitoba. The police officer requested his driver’s licence and registration. He noticed that the vehicle was registered to the accused in British Columbia and that his driver’s licence was issued in Ontario. The officer questioned the accused as to why he had different addresses on his licence and registration. The accused answered that he worked in the movie industry and lived at both places. The driver, the vehicle, and the explanation for the different addresses seemed very familiar to the police officer. He returned to his cruiser to conduct the routine police checks relating to the documentation. They revealed that the accused had been fingerprinted in the past for theft and drug charges. His record showed only one criminal conviction for theft. The officer testified that he did not feel that these entries were of any concern. He went back to the accused’s vehicle, returned his documents, gave him a verbal warning for his speeding and told him that he was free to go. Ten minutes had elapsed since the beginning of the traffic stop.
The police officer, believing he may have stopped the accused on a prior occasion, asked him if he would mind answering a few questions. The accused replied, “Yeah go ahead.” This led to a series of questions about the movie industry and the Ontario licence plate. The answers to these questions evoked memories which caused the officer to conclude that he had stopped this accused in the past and had been provided with the same story, which he felt was rehearsed. He then asked the accused whether he had been stopped before. The accused replied “No.” He asked him whether he had any convictions. The accused replied that he had been caught with a couple of grams of cocaine. This answer again evoked memories and the officer was now positive that he had stopped the accused previously.
The officer then asked the accused what he had in his back seat. The accused replied that he had a couple of suitcases. He asked whether he had any liquor, drugs, or large amounts of cash in the vehicle. The accused answered no to all three questions. The officer asked “So what’s in the suitcases?” The accused responded “Clothes, do you want to see?” The officer said “Sure.” Immediately before the accused opened the back door, the officer asked the accused again, “You sure you don’t have any drugs in the vehicle?” The accused replied “Yeah.” The officer asked “You are letting me look?” and the accused said “Yes.” The officer told the accused that, if he found drugs, he may be charged. The accused replied that he had learnt his lesson and would not be doing that again.
Without being prompted, the accused then proceeded to open the back door and, again unprompted, opened the suitcases. The officer did not search the suitcases, but observed clothes in them. At that point, the officer noticed that the carpet had been altered near the back seats. This fact caused the officer to think that there might be a hidden compartment located there. The officer had considerable experience in detecting and locating such compartments, as he had personally investigated and discovered hidden compartments in approximately 50 other cases. As the officer was now thinking that he might detain the accused for a further criminal investigation, he thought it prudent to call for back up for officer safety. He told the accused “I just have to go to my car for a minute.” He then went to his car and called for back-up.
3) Do the back seats fold down? Answer: Yeah, I’ll show you.
Again, without being asked, the accused proceeded to fold the back seats forward. Once folded, the officer noticed more damage to the carpet and smelt the strong odour of fresh silicone. As the officer knew that silicone is not used in factory installations in vehicles, he believed that the fresh smell of silicone could only be explained by a recent use to create a sealed hidden compartment that may contain drugs. The officer then arrested the accused for drug possession and advised him of his right to counsel. He declined to contact counsel. Back-up arrived at that point. The vehicle was searched incidental to arrest and 17 one-kilogram bricks of cocaine were found in a silicone-sealed hidden compartment underneath the backseat. Having discovered the cocaine, the officer returned to the accused to advise him that he was now under arrest for trafficking in cocaine. He was again given his right to counsel and again the accused declined to contact anyone.
At trial, the validity of the traffic stop and the questions related to the traffic matters were not challenged at trial. Moreover, the trial judge concluded that, as the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was a drug courier before he called for back-up, his detention was not arbitrary within the meaning of s. 9 of the Charter. However, the trial judge found that the accused was detained when the officer asked him the last three questions. He concluded that the accused’s rights under s. 10 of the Charter had been violated because he had neither been advised of the reason for his detention, nor of his right to counsel before answering the questions. Finally, the trial judge excluded the evidence following a s. 24(2) analysis.
The Crown appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which ruled that the trial judge applied an analysis that focussed on the officer’s non-communicated thoughts and intentions. As a result of this misapplication of the law, the trial judge overemphasized the officer’s intentions to call for backup and to arrest Koczab. This resulted in a finding there had been a detention that was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence. There was a nexus between this legal error and the verdict. Even if there had been a Charter breach, the evidence would not have been excluded pursuant to s. 24(2). A new trial was ordered by the Court.
The accused appealed to the SCC. The SCC, in reaching it’s decision, adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice M.M. Monnin J.A in the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision, thereby allowing the accused’s appeal and excluded the evidence, restoring the acquittals for trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking.
(a) The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the police were providing general assistance; maintaining general order; making general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling out the individual for focused investigation.
After that point in time, I figured that [the accused] was a drug courier, from what I observed. I went and told [the accused] I’d be back. I walked back to my police car. I radioed for a second car to attend.
For backup. I believed that I was going to do a drug investigation.
Q — and do you recall that question?
Q Was that answer the truth?
Q Now, I’m then going to suggest to you that you, that prior, prior to [another officer] attending, that you also, in your mind, concluded that [the accused], in fact, was detained and not free to leave?
A Prior to [another officer] attending?
A I was getting real close, yeah.
THE COURT: You, you were what?
THE WITNESS: Getting real close to if he said no, I’m leaving, no I probably wouldn’t have let, let him leave, yeah.
Q So as far as you were concerned, he was detained?
A At that point in time, if he said I’m leaving, yes, I would have stopped him from leaving.
Q You decided he wasn’t free to go, but you never told him that; is that correct?
Q You had decided, in your mind, he was detained, but you never told him that; is that correct?
Q You, in your mind, after deciding in your mind that he was detained and not free to do, go, didn’t provide him with his legal rights; is that correct?
Q Right to counsel or right to silence?
Q And I’m sure you’re well aware, either on a detention or an arrest, that, that if a person is given their legal rights, you’re not to continue questioning until they’ve had an opportunity to exercise them; is that correct?
A If they wish to execute (sic) yes.
Q Correct. So you have to hold off questioning until they’ve been given at least an opportunity to see if they wish to contact counsel?
Q And you’re well aware of that principle; is that correct?
“In the totality of the circumstances, [the accused] was detained when [the officer] formulated the intention to detain, said he would be right back, returned to his car, telephoned for a back-up, and came back to the SUV to ask the first question. Before being asked the question, [the accused] had the right under subss. 10(a) and 10(b) to be advised that he was being detained, the reason for it, and of his right to counsel.” ….
In Justice Monnin’s view, a reasonable person, having been questioned aggressively on issues relating to drug convictions and whether he was currently involved in drug trafficking, having previously been told he was free to go, but then indirectly told to stay where he was, would likely conclude that he was not free to go and had to comply with that directive. “It would take a brave soul in the circumstances to defy the state actor and go merrily on his way. He would, no doubt, soon be involved in a police chase,” said the Justice.
Applying the criteria in Grant, the circumstances giving rise to the encounter had clearly moved to the singling out of the individual for focused investigation. The fact that the accused was in potential jeopardy was confirmed by the police officer’s own evidence that he was conducting a drug investigation. That the accused was in jeopardy is not determinative of the issue (see Grant at para. 41). However, as in this case, jeopardy can be a factor supporting a finding that a detention has occurred, especially in a situation where a person is the subject of a criminal investigation, a time when the availability of his s. 10 rights are important.
The line between general questioning and focussed interrogation amounting to detention may be difficult to draw in particular cases. It is the task of the trial judge on a Charter application to assess the circumstances and determine whether the line between general questioning and detention has been crossed. While the trial judge in this case did not have the benefit of the test refined in Grant, his findings on the facts, supported by the evidence, lead to the view that a reasonable person in the circumstances would have concluded that the initial encounter was preliminary investigative questioning falling short of detention.
The trial judge’s finding that the initial part of the encounter was of a preliminary or exploratory nature on its face does not support the contention that Mr. Suberu was under detention within the meaning of the Charter at this point. It suggests rather that Constable Roughley’s conduct indicated that he was engaged in a general inquiry and had not yet zeroed in on the individual as someone whose movements must be controlled. Looking at the matter through the lens of the detention analysis proposed in Grant, the trial judge’s conclusion that the circumstances did not trigger the right to counsel cannot be said to be in error. There was no right to counsel because there was no detention.
Two other officers approached, flashing their badges and taking tactical adversarial positions behind Cst. Gomes. The encounter developed into one where Mr. Grant was singled out as the object of particularized suspicion, as evidenced by the conduct of the officers. The nature of the questioning changed from ascertaining the appellant’s identity to determining whether he “had anything that he should not”. At this point the encounter took on the character of an interrogation, going from general neighbourhood policing to a situation where the police had effectively taken control over the appellant and were attempting to elicit incriminating information.
In the case at hand, Justice Monnin said the implied direction not to leave after questioning upon potential drug trafficking would have given a reasonable person cause to believe that he was not free to leave. The questioning upon return to the vehicle turned to whether modifications had been done to the vehicle. While stated by the officer as being for the purpose of allowing the accused to give an innocent explanation for the suspected modifications to the vehicle, it was, nevertheless, part of the officer’s criminal investigation and was for the purpose of eliciting information which could be incriminating. Further, said Justice Monnin, while there was no physical contact and the discussions were polite and cordial, the accused was never directly told that he had a choice not to answer. He was asked if he would mind answering a few questions, but at no time was he advised that he need not and that no consequences would follow. The conduct which was of concern to the trial judge and which he considered in the assessment of the s. 24(2) application was that the officer was aware that he would be detaining the accused based upon a hunch that he was an individual that he had stopped previously.
The trial judge concluded that the officer’s conduct was “neither inadvertent nor minor. It was wilful and egregious” (at para. 36). He then commented on the fact that, in his cross-examination, the officer was evasive and he found that the breach was not made in good faith.
Deciding when a detention triggers Charter rights requires a balancing between an individual’s rights and the collective interest in ensuring that the police are able to investigate and prevent crime (see Grant, and Suberu, 2009 SCC 33 at para. 24,  2 S.C.R. 460).

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