Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/snead-v-society-prevention-cruelty-animals-pennsylvania
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:40:54+00:00

Document:
This Pennsylvania case involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which defendant SPCA, was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff Snead, who was awarded damages in the amount of $154,926.37, including $100,000 in punitive damages. The facts stemmed from a seizure several dogs at a seemingly abandoned property owned by Snead where Snead was arrested on dog fighting charges, which were then dropped the next day. However, Snead was not aware that the charges were dropped and that the dogs were therefore available to be reclaimed. The dogs were ultimately euthanized after Snead went to reclaim them. On appeal, this court first held that the SPCA does not operate as a branch of the Commonwealth and therefore, does not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity or protection under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The court held that there was sufficient evidence presented for Snead's Sec. 1983 to go to the jury that found the SPCA has inadequate procedures/policies in place to safeguard Snead's property interest in the dogs. As to damages, the court found the there was no evidence to impute to the SPCA evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of Snead sufficient for an award of punitive damages.
*1 ¶ 1 This matter involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which defendant, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania (“SPCA”), was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff, Laila Snead (“Snead”). The jury awarded Snead $154,926.37, including $100,000 in punitive damages. We affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2 The procedural history of this case is somewhat complicated and the facts involving the condition of the dogs at the heart of this case are very disturbing. Although we will repeat several times infra that under Pennsylvania law, the animals are considered property, this court clearly recognizes that dogs as pets hold a unique place in many people's lives as friend, companion, and family member.
(7) knowingly permits any place under his control or possession to be kept or used for animal fighting.
This subsection shall not apply to activity undertaken in a normal agricultural operation.
(j) Seizure of animals kept or used for animal fighting.-Any police officer or agent of a society or association for the prevention of cruelty to animals incorporated under the laws of this Commonwealth, shall have power to seize any animal kept, used, or intended to be used for animal fighting. When the seizure is made, the animal or animals so seized shall not be deemed absolutely forfeited, but shall be held by the officer or agent seizing the same until a conviction of some person is first obtained for a violation of subsection (h.1).
FN4. Snead was later convicted of the summary offense of animal cruelty, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(c).
*2 ¶ 6 Snead initially filed suit in municipal court in 2001, contending that SPCA illegally destroyed her dogs. Snead sought judgment for $8,450, the alleged value of the dogs. The municipal court granted judgment in favor of Snead on March 5, 2001, and SPCA appealed on March 22, 2001. The appeal was listed for a trial de novo in the court of common pleas; and on June 19, 2001, Snead filed a civil complaint, alleging trespass, conversion, negligence, and violations of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The case was transferred to compulsory arbitration; and on January 15, 2003, the arbitrators entered their report finding in Snead's favor on all counts. SPCA filed an appeal from the arbitrators' award on February 10, 2003.
¶ 7 The case proceeded to a jury trial on October 22, 2003, at the conclusion of which SPCA made an oral motion for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion by order entered October 30, 2003. Snead filed post-trial motions arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by granting SPCA's motion for directed verdict because Snead had presented sufficient evidence to prove each count raised in her complaint. Snead's post-trial motions were denied; and on February 3, 2004, Snead filed notice of appeal with this court.
FN5. This court also addressed several evidentiary issues raised in Snead's post-trial motions, such as evidence introduced at the first trial that Snead had been involved with pit bull dog-fighting activities. This court determined this evidence too prejudicial to be introduced at retrial. Id. at 15-19.
¶ 9 On July 6, 2005, a second jury trial commenced, following which the jury rendered the verdict described above. SPCA's post-trial motions were denied. Snead's post-trial motion for delay damages in the amount of $1,544.50 was granted; however, her post-trial motion for counsel fees was denied. Both parties filed timely notices of appeal FN6 and have complied with the trial court's order directing them to file concise statements of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.1925(b). On February 1, 2006, the Honorable Edward E. Russell filed opinions addressing the issues raised in both appeals.
FN6. SPCA initially filed its appeal December 9, 2005 in Commonwealth Court. On January 24, 2006, the appeal was transferred to Superior Court.
1. Because the Legislature, when it charged the SPCA with police power to prevent cruelty to animals, intended to vest the SPCA with immunity from common law causes of action, did the trial court err when it refused to dismiss Snead's conversion and negligence claims?
2. Because the trial evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's findings that the SPCA violated Snead's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the SPCA was negligent, and that the SPCA was liable for conversion in its handling of Snead's dogs-and indeed, where the evidence proved: (1) at most, that the SPCA may have inaccurately represented the status of eleven (11) dogs that had been euthanized; and (2) overwhelmingly, that the near-death condition of the animals resulted from them being under the custody and ‘care’ of Snead-did the trial court err when it denied the SPCA's Motion for Post-Trial Relief?
3. Because there was no evidence that the SPCA was reckless, had evil intent, or demonstrated callous indifference in its handling of Snead's dogs, and because the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive and a violation of due process, did the trial court err by upholding the jury's $100,000 punitive damages award?
FN7. Additional claims raised in SPCA's 1925(b) statement, including whether the trial court erred in granting Snead's motion in limine to exclude evidence of her summary conviction for animal cruelty, have been abandoned on appeal.
FN8. We note that in granting Snead's motion to transfer to this court, Commonwealth Court apparently determined that SPCA was not a Commonwealth party for jurisdictional purposes. However, an entity may be a Commonwealth party for sovereign immunity purposes but not for jurisdictional purposes. Gory v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 579 Pa. 26, 855 A.2d 669 (2004).
[T]he sovereign immunity provisions of the Judicial Code were enacted to insulate the Commonwealth and its agencies from liability except in certain specified circumstances so that state governmental assets are not subject to depletion through multiple lawsuits. See Jones v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 772 A.2d 435, 438-40 (Pa.2001). Thus, in determining whether an entity is a Commonwealth agency for sovereign immunity purposes, the important factors to be considered are whether the entity was created by the state to perform a state function so that a judgment against it would, in essence, injure the state.
*4 Gory v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 579 Pa. 26, 39, 855 A.2d 669, 677 (2004) (footnote omitted).
¶ 13 It is apparent from the record that SPCA is a private, not-for-profit corporation, not a “Commonwealth agency.” Its officers and directors are not appointed by the Commonwealth, but rather elected by the corporation. The Commonwealth does not have control over its operations or assets. SPCA adopts its own by-laws and manages its own affairs. SPCA is not funded by public monies. SPCA has not been recognized by our legislature as an “agent” or “instrumentality” of the Commonwealth.FN9 Although SPCA and its qualified agents have been empowered to enforce those statutes pertaining to animals, this does not make SPCA a “Commonwealth agency” for immunity purposes. We determine, as a matter of law, that sovereign immunity does not apply to SPCA.
FN10. We note that this argument was not raised in the court below, nor in SPCA's Rule 1925(b) statement. However, a defense of governmental immunity is an absolute defense and is non-waivable; it may be raised at any time, even at the appellate stage. Taylor v. City of Philadelphia, 692 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), affirmed, 548 Pa. 568, 699 A.2d 730 (1997) (footnote and citations omitted).
The overall purpose of the Tort Claims Act, of course, is to limit governmental exposure to tort liability for its acts. See, e.g., Lory v. City of Philadelphia, 544 Pa. 38, 43, 674 A.2d 673, 675-76 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 870, 117 S.Ct. 184, 136 L.Ed.2d 123 (1996). See also Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 512 Pa. 129, 139, 516 A.2d 306, 311 (1986) (plurality opinion) (‘preservation of the public treasury as against the possibility of unusually large recoveries in tort cases, is, self-evidently, an important governmental interest’).
Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 566 Pa. 541, 548, 782 A.2d 510, 515 (2001).
Our inquiry begins with an examination of the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions. See 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1903(a), 1921(b); Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18, 24, 669 A.2d 883, 886 (1995) (when language of statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect in accordance with its plain and common meaning); Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co., 531 Pa. 500, 502-03, 614 A .2d 218, 220 (1992) (the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly; the best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute). The Tort Claims Act comprises Subchapter C of Chapter 85 of the Judicial Code, the chapter which addresses ‘Matters Affecting Government Units.’ The definition section of Chapter 85 defines a ‘local agency’ as ‘[a] government unit other than the Commonwealth government.’ 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. The general definitions section of the Judicial Code, which applies in the absence of further specific definitions, defines a ‘government unit’ as, inter alia, ‘ “any government agency....’ Id. § 102. A ‘government agency,’ in turn, is defined by the Judicial Code as ‘[a]ny Commonwealth agency or any political subdivision or municipal or other local authority, or any officer or agency of any such political subdivision or local authority.’ Id. (emphasis supplied). See also Guinn, 531 Pa. at 502 n. 2, 614 A.2d at 220 n. 2.
*5 Although the Judicial Code does not define ‘local authority,’ the Statutory Construction Act does. It provides that the phrase ‘local authority,’ ‘[w]hen used in any statute finally enacted on or after January 1, 1975,’ means ‘a municipal authority or any other body corporate and politic created by one or more political subdivisions pursuant to statute.’ 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991. Both the Judicial Code and the Tort Claims Act were enacted after January 1, 1975; hence, both are subject to this overarching definition.
Id. at 545-546, 782 A.2d 513 (citation omitted).
In the instant case, [SPCA's] directors and officers are not appointed by the Commonwealth, but rather, elected by the corporation. The Commonwealth does not exercise control over its operations or have an interest in its assets. [SPCA] adopts its own by-laws and manages its own affairs. The Commonwealth is not its sole source of income, nor does it provide benefits or indemnity. Under the expanded inquiry set forth in Sphere Drake, supra, [SPCA] does not qualify as a Commonwealth party or employee.
Trial court opinion, 2/1/06 at 7. We agree and will not disturb the trial court's determination. See Tabaj v. Fayette Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc., 53 Pa.D. & C.4th 399 (Fayette 2001), affirmed, 828 A.2d 409 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 575 Pa. 698, 836 A.2d 123 (2003) (Fayette County SPCA not entitled to local agency immunity under the Tort Claims Act). Compare Vonstein v. SPCA, 24 Pa.D. & C.4th 474 (Lycoming 1993) (SPCA agents, while statutorily authorized to initiate criminal proceedings, not entitled to official immunity from suit).
¶ 17 Having found that SPCA is not immune from liability, we proceed to its remaining claims. SPCA argues that the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain Snead's claims. We disagree.
¶ 18 First, we examine Snead's Section 1983 civil rights claims.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The statute ‘ “is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method of vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’' ‘ Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)).
Wagner v. Waitlevertch, 774 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super.2001).
To properly state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of the United States by a defendant acting under color of law. Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support of Court of Common Pleas, 820 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir.1987) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)). There are two essential elements necessary to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983:(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the Plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Johnson v. Desmond, 441 Pa.Super. 632, 658 A.2d 375 (1995), appeal denied, 543 Pa. 713, 672 A.2d 308 (1995).
The first step in evaluating a Section 1983 claim is to ‘identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated’ and to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.’ County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998).
FN11. SPCA argues that, in the prior appeal, this court held against Snead on her Fourth Amendment claim. However, a close reading of our prior memorandum reveals we held only that Snead had no legitimate privacy interest in the house at 713 East Hilton Street, as the uncontested evidence indicated it was abandoned. Therefore, as she had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the structure, she could not maintain a Fourth Amendment claim for Officer Beltram's warrantless search of the property. Snead I, supra at 14. This is a separate question from whether or not the subsequent killing of Snead's dogs constituted an unreasonable seizure.
FN12. We note that a defendant can be acting under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes, as SPCA was when it seized and then euthanized Snead's dogs, and yet not be a government party or entity for jurisdictional or immunity purposes. Although the color of law requirement necessarily excludes all merely private conduct, no matter how wrongful or discriminatory, there is no simple formula for defining state action, and Section 1983 includes within its scope superficially private actions which have a sufficiently close nexus with the State as to be fairly treated as those of the State itself. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 822 (2003) (citations omitted).
A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61-65, 113 S.Ct. 538, 543, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). A seizure of property sufficient to implicate Fourth Amendment rights occurs where the seizure is unreasonable. Id. In determining whether a government seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, the seizure must be scrutinized for its overall reasonableness. Id.
Wagner, supra at 1254. The killing of Snead's dogs is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Van Patten v. City of Binghamton, 137 F.Supp.2d 98, 107 (N.D.N.Y.2001) (citation omitted). However, a seizure alone does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation; the question is whether this seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. Id., citing Soldal, supra, 506 U.S. at 61-62.
FN13. SPCA argues that as a “government unit,” Snead would have to show that its employees/agents were acting pursuant to an official policy or custom. (SPCA's brief at 25.) However, we have already determined for the reasons discussed supra that SPCA is not a government party.
¶ 21 Next, we turn to Snead's due process claim. To prevail on her procedural due process claim, Snead must demonstrate: (1) that she possessed a protected property interest; and (2) that she was deprived of that interest without due process. Van Patten, supra at 104 (citation omitted). Pennsylvania law considers dogs to be personal property. DeSanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 757, 818 A.2d 504 (2003), citing 3 P.S. § 459-601(a); Price v. Brown, 545 Pa. 216, ----, 680 A.2d 1149, 1153 n. 3 (1996). Therefore, we find Snead did have a protected property interest in her dogs.
*7 ¶ 22 We must next determine to what amount of legal process she was entitled.
In determining what process is due, a court must balance three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Van Patten, supra at 104 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 23 As in Van Patten, we find that Snead had a significant property interest in her dogs. As stated supra, Pennsylvania law considers dogs as property. In addition, although there was evidence the animals were unhealthy and suffered from neglect, Snead testified at length concerning her love and devotion to the animals and her efforts to nurse them back to health, and we must credit this testimony as the jury apparently did.
¶ 29 The foregoing was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that SPCA had inadequate procedures/policies in place to safeguard Snead's property interests in the dogs. Although unlicensed dogs are only held for 48 hours after they are no longer needed as evidence in a criminal investigation, there is no standard procedure by which to notify an owner that charges have been dismissed or withdrawn and his or her dogs are available to be reclaimed. Although Snead was known to SPCA and her phone number was in its computer, she was never contacted by telephone, nor was notice sent by mail.
¶ 30 As in Van Patten, we recognize SPCA's interest in protecting the public from dangerous or sick animals, and the costs involved in housing animals for extended periods of time. Van Patten, supra at 107. However, additional safeguards such as notice by mail or telephoning the owner, where her identity and address/phone number are known or ascertainable, would not be overly burdensome or costly.
¶ 31 Next, SPCA challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Snead's negligence and conversion claims.
To establish a cause of action sounding in negligence, a party must demonstrate they were owed a duty of care by the defendant, the defendant breached this duty, and this breach resulted in injury and actual loss. Brisbine v. Outside In Sch. of Experiential Educ., Inc., 799 A.2d 89, 93 (Pa.Super.2002), citing Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, 755 A.2d 36, 40 (Pa.Super.2000).
McCandless v. Edwards, 908 A.2d 900, 903 (Pa.Super.2006).
[T]he determination of whether an act or failure to act constitutes negligence, of any degree, in view of all the evidence has always been particularly committed to determination by a jury. Colloi v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 332 Pa.Super. 284, 481 A.2d 616 (1984); East Texas Motor Freight v. Lloyd, 335 Pa.Super. 464, 484 A.2d 797 (1984). It is an issue that may be removed from consideration by a jury and decided as a matter of law only where the case is entirely free from doubt and there is no possibility that a reasonable jury could find negligence. Id.
Bloom v. Dubois Regional Medical Center, 597 A.2d 671, 679-680 (Pa.Super.1991).
*9 ¶ 33 We now address Snead's conversion claim.
The classic definition of conversion under Pennsylvania law is ‘the deprivation of another's right of property in, or use or possession of, a chattel, or other interference therewith, without the owner's consent and without lawful justification.’ McKeeman v.. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 659 n. 3 (Pa.Super.2000). Although the exercise of control over the chattel must be intentional, the tort of conversion does not rest on proof of specific intent to commit a wrong. Id.
L.B. Foster Co. v. Charles Caracciolo Steel & Metal Yard, Inc., 777 A.2d 1090, 1095 (Pa.Super.2001).
¶ 34 SPCA deprived Snead of her use and possession of the dogs, which are considered property in Pennsylvania, when it euthanized them. When Snead came to the shelter on January 27, 1999, three days before the dogs were put down and after the dog-fighting charges had been dropped, she was entitled to seek return of the dogs.FN15 (Notes of testimony, 7/6/05 at 172.) SPCA failed to give Snead the opportunity to retrieve her dogs after the charges were dropped and they were no longer needed as evidence, thereby unlawfully depriving her of her chattel.
¶ 35 Next, SPCA argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for remittitur. SPCA argues that Snead failed to establish SPCA acted with an evil motive or reckless indifference such that would support the imposition of punitive damages. With this proposition, we agree.
Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. Further, [P]unitive damages are penal in nature and are proper only in cases where the defendant's actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton or reckless conduct. Because punitive damages are intended to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future, [t]he state of mind of the actor is vital. The act, or the failure to act, must be intentional, reckless or malicious.
Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 896 A.2d 1260, 1265 (Pa.Super.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
*10 Id. at 1266, quoting Hutchison v. Luddy (“Hutchison IV”), 582 Pa. 114, 123-124, 870 A.2d 766, 771-772 (2005) (additional citations omitted) (emphasis in Hutchison IV). “Therefore, an appreciation of the risk is a necessary element of the mental state required for the imposition of such damages.” Id.
Id., quoting Hutchison IV, supra at 124, 870 A.2d at 772, citing Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 508 Pa. 154, 171-172, 494 A.2d 1088, 1097-1098 (1985) (plurality).
¶ 36 Certainly, for the reasons discussed above, we agree the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find SPCA was negligent; however, the evidence does not support a conclusion that Spencer and/or Beltram acted with intent or malice in euthanizing Snead's dogs. Although, as the prevailing party in the court below, we must accept Snead's testimony that she went to the shelter on January 27, 1999 and was erroneously informed by Spencer that her dogs were dead,FN16 this establishes nothing more than mistake or accident on Spencer's part. Indeed, Spencer testified that he was responsible for approximately 40,000 animals per year, and that on January 23, 1999, when the dogs were brought in by Officer Beltram, he was informed that Snead was involved but was not aware that they actually belonged to her. (Notes of testimony, 7/6/05 at 62, 67, 130.) Furthermore, because the dogs did not bear license tags ( id . at 122-124), they were considered strays and it was SPCA's policy that they only need to be held for 48 hours; as of January 27, 1999, four days after they were brought in and after the dog-fighting charges were dropped, Spencer may simply have assumed that they had been put down. Spencer testified that, in his opinion, the animals were not in a condition to be adopted. ( Id. at 131.) At any rate, there is simply no evidence to impute to Spencer or SPCA evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of Snead. Even accepting Snead's testimony as true and resolving all reasonable inferences in her favor, we cannot say that SPCA acted in conscious disregard of a risk of harm to Snead when it euthanized the animals. Therefore, we reverse the award of $100,000 in punitive damages and will re-enter judgment accordingly.
¶ 37 SPCA also argues that the punitive damages award should be reduced because it bears no reasonable relation to Snead's actual damages and is constitutionally excessive. Obviously, this issue is rendered moot by our disposition of the previous issue, and we need not address it.
¶ 38 Now, we turn to Snead's cross-appeal, seeking attorney's fees. The trial court denied Snead's post-trial motion for imposition of attorney's fees, finding that she was adequately compensated by the jury's award of damages and noting that there was evidence of record that the dogs had been mistreated. (Trial court opinion on cross-appeal, 2/1/06 at 3.) We are constrained to disagree and determine that because Snead prevailed on the Section 1983 civil rights claim, which we have affirmed for the reasons discussed supra, she is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.
*11 ¶ 39 Courts have authority to award attorney's fees in civil rights cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which provides that in any action to enforce a provision of Section 1983 of that title, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” In interpreting Section 1988, the United States Supreme Court has stated that as a general rule, a prevailing plaintiff should recover attorney's fees unless special circumstances exist that would render such an award unjust. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). Although the Supreme Court has not articulated a bright-line rule for determining when special circumstances are present, other courts have observed that “special circumstances should not be easily found.” Cleveland v. Ibrahim, 121 Fed.Appx. 88, 90 (6th Cir.2005), citing Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989); see also Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 177 (3d Cir.1983).
¶ 40 In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), the Supreme Court discussed the factors that should guide a court's decision to award attorney's fees in a civil rights action. In that case, the plaintiffs sought $17 million in damages for alleged civil rights violations, but a jury awarded them one dollar based on its determination that the defendant's misconduct was not “a proximate cause of any damages” sustained therein. Id. at 106. The federal district court awarded the plaintiffs $280,000 in counsel fees, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that award, reasoning that the plaintiffs did not actually prevail at trial because they sued purely for monetary damages, requesting $17 million, but recovered only one dollar. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
¶ 41 In reviewing the Fifth Circuit's ruling, the Supreme Court clarified that counsel fees can be awarded to any party that prevails on the merits of a civil rights claim because “[l]iability on the merits and responsibility for fees go hand in hand....” Id. at 109, quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). However, the Court also reiterated that attorney's fees are not recoverable in every instance where a civil rights violation has occurred, stating that “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, ... the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. at 115. In accordance with that principle, the Farrar Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's denial of counsel fees, observing that the jury awarded nominal damages in that case because the plaintiffs failed to prove proximate causation, which was an essential element of the underlying cause of action.
*12 In the instant case the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find a Section 1983 violation, but justice does not require that [Snead] should benefit by an additional award of attorney's fees. [Snead] mistreated her dogs both at the time immediately preceding the civil rights violation as well as in the past. The jury could not weigh that factor with respect to their verdict, but this Court finds it necessary to do so at this juncture. Given the underlying facts of this case, the violations against [Snead's] civil rights do not rise to the level of egregiousness contemplated by the statute. The totality of the circumstances, and the amount of the award, show a fair result without allowing [Snead] to recover what it cost her to sue in the first place.
Trial court opinion, 2/1/06 at 3.
¶ 43 The decision to deny counsel fees based on Snead's misconduct is inappropriate because it violates United States Supreme Court precedent and undermines the legislative intent behind the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that counsel fees are to be awarded based on the extent of the plaintiff's success in proving that his civil rights were violated. See Farrar, supra at 114-116. Thus, if the plaintiff establishes that his rights were violated in a manner that caused “actual, compensable injury,” a reasonable fee should be awarded. Id. at 115. The plaintiff's character should not factor into this determination, and fees should not be awarded or withheld as a punitive measure.
¶ 44 In Simpson v. Sheahan, 104 F.3d 998 (7th Cir.1997), the Seventh Circuit further elaborated on the proper purpose for the award of attorney's fees in civil rights actions. In determining that an award of attorney's fees as a sanction against a defendant is an improper purpose, the court explained that Congress enacted Section 1988 in an effort to induce competent attorneys to litigate meritorious civil rights claims on behalf of individuals who often cannot afford to hire private counsel. Id. at 1002-1003. Moreover, attorney's fees are not a substitute for compensatory or punitive damages. Id. at 1003. As the district court violated this rule by crafting a fee award that was punitive in nature, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for calculation of a new award.
¶ 45 Under the reasoning of Farrar and Simpson, we find that the trial court erred in denying counsel fees based on its determination that: (1) Snead did not deserve to recover such fees because she abused the dogs; (2) the civil rights violation herein was not sufficiently egregious to support an award of attorney's fees; and (3) the $54,000 compensatory damage award was “a fair result.” (Trial court opinion, 2/1/06 at 3.) This was an abuse of discretion, as the proper inquiry was whether Snead proved all of the material elements of her cause of action and demonstrated a compensable injury. Farrar, supra. Since Snead established a constitutional violation and received $54,000 in compensatory damages, she was successful in proving her case against SPCA and therefore should have recovered reasonable attorney's fees under Farrar and its progeny. Compare id. at 117 (where a prevailing plaintiff has achieved only a Pyrrhic victory that can be characterized as purely technical or de minimis, no fees can be awarded) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
*13 ¶ 46 Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for entry of judgment on compensatory damages and counsel fees. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
¶ 47 McEWEN, P.J.E. files a Concurring and Dissenting Statement.
¶ 1 The author of the Opinion in the case has so perceptively analyzed and sagaciously addressed the substantive issues of these appeals that I join in the decision of the majority with but the single exception that I agree with the ruling of the eminent Judge Edward E. Russell that denied counsel fees to plaintiff Snead.

References: § 5511
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 8501
 § 102
 § 1991
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 459
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1988
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1988
 v.