Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/303/54
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 19:01:33+00:00

Document:
Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and Robert B. Watts, of Washington, D.C., for respondents.
The Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company is a Virginia corporation engaged in the construction, overhaul, and repair of ships at its plant in that State. In June, 1937, the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America filed with the National Labor Relations Board the charge that the company was 'dominating and interfering with the employees' right of self organization by dominating, interfering with and lending financial support to a so-called labor organization' at said plant known as 'Representation of Employees:; that the Company had discharged and refused to reinstate several employees at the plant 'because they joined and assisted a labor organization of their own choosing and engaged in concerted activities with fellow employees for collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection'; and that by so doing the company was engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of section 8, subsections (1), (2) and (3), of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(13). Thereupon the Board, through its regional director for the Fifth Region, Bennett F. Schauffler, filed a complaint against the company and gave notice of a hearing pursuant to section 10(b) of the act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(f).
The company did not answer the complaint. Before the date assigned for the hearing, it brought, in the federal court for Eastern Virginia, this suit, in which it sought to enjoin Schauffler, Jacob Blum, the regional attorney for the Fifth Region, both citizens of Maryland; and the trial examiner designated or to be designated, from holding the hearing and taking further proceedings under the act. There were prayers for both an interlocutory and a final injunction and for a declaratory judgment that the act as applied to the company's business and its relations to its employees is unconstitutional. As the basis for this relief, it alleged facts similar to those set forth in the bill of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Limited, in No. 181, decided this day, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638. It alleged, specifically, that neither the company's business nor its relations with its employees affected interstate or foreign commerce; that it had not engaged in any unfair labor practice; and that it would be irreparably damaged by the holding of the hearing of the Board and the taking of any action in connection therewith. Among the elements of irreparable injury alleged were that the company would be held up to scorn as a violator of a law of the United States and so would incur for as long as the proceedings lasted the odium and ill will of the public and of its own employees; that its officials would be compelled to produce evidence of a confidential nature; and that the pendency and holding of the Board's proceedings, regardless of their outcome, would impede the company in exercising its right to bargain freely with its employees.
The case was heard by the District Court upon the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction and the defendants' motion that the bill be dismissed on the ground, among others, that the company had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and that granting the relief prayed would be an usurpation of the authority exclusively vested by the act in the Circuit Court of Appeals. The court denied the temporary injunction and dismissed the bill on the ground that the company had 'a plain, adequate and exclusive remedy under the terms of the Act itself, that no irreparable damage is threatened, and that this (the District) Court has no jurisdiction of the controversy presented by the bill.' That decree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held that the company 'has an adequate remedy under the statute and may not apply for relief in equity until it has exhausted the administrative remedy there provided.' 91 F.2d 730, 731.
Second. The company urges that, since the Board can have jurisdiction only over businesses engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, since the company denies that it is so engaged, and the Federal Constitution does not permit vesting in an administrative body exclusive power to determine its own jurisdiction, the District Court must have power to pass upon that issue. The act does not purport to leave the determination wholly to the Board. It confers upon the Board exclusive initial power to make the investigation, but provides for judicial review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 As the only question here involved is the power of the Board to make the investigation, we have no occasion to consider the extent of the review provided.
It is suggested that, while the Board has the right and duty to make, under section 5 of the act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 155, a preliminary informal inquiry before public action, for the purpose of informing itself whether a particular concern is subject to its authority, the District Court may entertain a suit to prevent the Board from conducting a public investigation under section 10, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160, if the concern claims that it is not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. The limitation suggested would, in large measure, defeat the purpose of the legislation. There is no basis in the act for such a contention.
Compare Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 469470, 10 S.Ct. 149, 33 L.Ed. 426; Pierce Oil Corporation v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 500, 39 S.Ct. 172, 63 L.Ed. 381; Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 324, 325, 55 S.Ct. 428, 429, 79 L.Ed. 907, 95 A.L.R. 1346; Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 184, 185, 56 S.Ct. 159, 162, 163, 80 L.Ed. 138, 101 A.L.R. 853.
Section 10(a), (e), (f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a, e, f). See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 47, 57 S.Ct. 615, 629, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. Ltd., supra.

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