Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/88104/gibson-vs-mississippi
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 17:10:22+00:00

Document:
See also In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278 , 140 U. S. 284 .
In his petition for the removal of the prosecution into the circuit court of the United States, the defendant also states that notwithstanding at the time of selecting the grand jurors for the said December term, 1892, there were in the five supervisors' districts of the County of Washington 7,000 colored citizens competent for jury service, and 1,500 whites qualified to serve as jurors, there had not been for a number of years any colored man summoned on the grand jury in that county, and that colored citizens were purposely, on account of their color, excluded from jury service by the officers of the law charged with the selection of jurors. It is clear in view of what has already been said that these facts, even if they had been proved and accepted, do not show that the rights of the accused were denied by the constitution and laws of the state, and therefore did not authorize the removal of the prosecution from the state court. If it were competent in a prosecution of a citizen of African descent to prove that the officers charged with the duty of selecting grand jurors had, in previous years and in other cases, excluded citizens of that race because of their race from service on grand juries -- upon which question we need not express an opinion -- it is clear that such evidence would be for the consideration of the trial court upon a motion by the accused to quash the indictment, such motion being based upon the ground that the indictment against him had been returned by a grand jury from which were purposely excluded, because of their color, all citizens of the race to which he belonged. United States v. Gale, 109 U. S. 65 , 109 U. S. 69 . But there was no motion to quash the indictment. The application was to remove the prosecution from the state court, and a removal, as we have seen, could not be ordered upon the ground simply that citizens of African descent had been improperly excluded because of their race, and without the sanction of the Constitution and laws of the state, from service on previous grand juries, or from service on the particular grand jury that returned the indictment against the accused.
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 , 111 U. S. 637 .
nor alter the legal rules of evidence in order to convict the offender. These are the general tests for determining whether a statute is applicable to offenses committed prior to its passage. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 3 U. S. 390 ; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221 , 107 U. S. 228 ; Duncan v. State, 152 U. S. 377 , 152 U. S. 382 . The provisions in question related simply to procedure. They only prescribed remedies to be pursued in the administration of the law, making no change that could materially affect the rights of one accused of crime theretofore committed. The inhibition upon the passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed. The mode of trial is always under legislative control, subject only to the condition that the legislature may not, under the guise of establishing modes of procedure and prescribing remedies, violate the accepted principles that protect an accused person against ex post facto enactments. In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 , 110 U. S. 589 , a statute that permitted the crime charged to be established by witnesses who, by the law at the time the offense was committed, were incompetent to testify in any case whatever was adjudged not to be ex post facto within the meaning of the Constitution, the court observing that such a statute did not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients of the offense, nor the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt, but related "to modes of procedure only, in which no one can be said to have a vested right, and which the state, upon grounds of public policy, may regulate at pleasure." Hence it has been held that a general statute giving the government more challenges than it had at the time of the commission of a particular offense was constitutional. Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B.Mon. 15, 39.
Without stopping to consider whether the particular order complained of was in accordance with correct practice, it is only necessary to say that the objection presented by the assignment of error raises no question of a federal nature. The conduct of a criminal trial in a state court cannot be reviewed by this Court unless the trial is had under some statute repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or was so conducted as to deprive the accused of some right or immunity secured to him by that instrument. Mere error in administering the criminal law of a state or in the conduct of a criminal trial, no federal right being invaded or denied, is beyond the revisory power of this Court under the statutes regulating its jurisdiction. See Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 , 156 U. S. 276 ; Bergemenn v. Backer, 157 U. S. 655 , 157 U. S. 659 . Indeed, it would not be competent for Congress to confer such power upon this or any other court of the United States.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.