Source: http://www.origsix.com/forum2.asp?topicid=174&p=8
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:41:35+00:00

Document:
I almost wrote under the topic "Another US Citizen goes Foreign" but I haven't left yet....because I still have some fight in me.
Yet...I sit here and witness ignorance, passivity, capitulation, dilution of principal, to name a few symptoms of our otherwise former fighting sovereign nation of freedom fighters and defenders of the Constitution.
Where and when can we mount a Constitutional challenge to this aggregious mess?
George would be the first to knock down the door. Both of them.
1. Too few miners in senior management (accountants, lawyer types).
2. Poor or declining property.
3. Big challenges due to quality of assets.
4. Trouble in financing acquisitions.
5. Poor decisions on engineering and execution of engineered plans.
6. Non mining, political interferences.
These six companies share the bulk of volume (share trading) in the marketplace with about 2.5 trillion shares outstanding.
Another story about the serious problems of counterfeit coins (see 12/02/08 entry below) was released by the American Numismatic Association in Colorado Springs, Co. Full story found at its web site, www.money.org.
The shareholders of the Sixteen to One along with the company, like others in the country, are being subjected to cash flow problems as income slows down for a myriad of reasons, not to mention the shrinking value of our money as a result of the continuing trials of expanding inflation.
The day is coming when debt, if not eliminated or reduced to manageable levels, will control our destiny. If debt continues then it will only become magnified as our purchasing power shrinks to levels where we may not be able to service it in the future which is coming sooner that most believe.
Its really quite ironic that the banks get so much help. Rothschild of western Europe is worth $500 trillion which is half the world's wealth and their right hand in the U.S., being represented by the privately owned Fed and J.P. Morgan a large recipient of bailout funds. The Fed and J.P. Morgan should be asking Rothchild for money, not us. Can you imagine one thing that $500 trillion couldn't buy(government reprsentatives?).
Our debt that people owe the banks was never their money, they were allowed to print it based on consumer deposits and collected interest from us based on someone else's money. This is the reason that gold is manipulated, so the public is turned off by it thus leaving their savings in the bank for them to profit by.
Rothschild over their long history have made their money off the people like us along by using their influence to hand pick presidents, crashed stock markets(gold and silver shares?), bankrupted nations, orchestrated wars and have impoverished millions.
As shareholders we are owners of gold in the ground as opposed to the Rothschld's massive gold holdings in their underground vaults. We still have a chip in the big game with some other rich owners of gold but we must eliminate any risk of losing it by kicking out our debt responsibilities before they get out of hand.
I remember Boomtown just across I80 in Nevada has display cases of memorabilia including Silver. Why not ask them or other casino/hotels in Reno if they would be interested in any of our specimens for lobby displays? Why not contact large owners of gold companies in the western U.S. to see if they might have an interest?
If we can't sell our specimens or statues, the next step may be to saw them down for jewelry. I understand that this market is in short supply.
It appears that the board needs to make some immediate decisions concerning the elimination of our debt exposure.
During this same time period the board should be contacting mining or exploration gold companies to do a private placement with them for the cash we require to go on.
Three months ago I reported on the growing awareness that coin collectors were buying fake rare or high dollar gold coins. Many in the numismatic crowd feel secure with the coins in their possession and many felt that way because “professionals” gave them assurances that the coins were genuine. Even after a serious collector purposely purchased a fake coin in China, got it certified by an expert and told his story, collectors did not wish to believe the evidence.
Beth Deisher, editor of Coin World in the 12/15/08 edition, writes, “It’s up to collectors, dealers and grading services to fight the scourge of counterfeit coins from China, not the federal government with its limited resources.” I agree.
When I decided to seek out and add gold to my assets (1974), I studied all the ways to accomplish that desire. Owning an interest in a producing gold mine rose to the top of the list.
Coins are worthy because you can hold them, look at them and know that no matter what they are yours (assuming you take possession). Paying a huge premium above spot goes with the trade. I don’t like that. Now with the full-blown awareness that counterfeit coins are in the market place, I wonder how the coin business will deal with this serious problem. As an aside, the gold mining industry was alerted that counterfeit Krugerrands were in the market place, bought, sold and stored by unsuspecting gold bugs thirty years ago. It hardly made a ripple in their interest. This coin issue may be different.
What a dunce I can be.
The following three people are public servants working in Sacramento as lawyers. Tom Green’s title is “Chief Assistant Attorney General”. Under his supervision is Mary E. Hackenbracht. Her title is Senior Assistant Attorney General. I have no idea if the adjective “Senior” implies she is at the top of the hierarchy, just below Tom Green. Are their “Junior Assistant Attorney Generals”? Finally William N. Brienger signs on as a “Deputy Attorney General”. Are all three participants involved in the decision to launch an Amicus Brief against the parties damaged by lawlessness. After all, the top name on the list is Bill Lockyer, who signs on as “Attorney General of the State of California”. Did William write it, investigate its merits or initiate the action? Did Tom and Bill read prove and sign off before submitting the document to the appeals court?
Here is why I raise the above questions. The document says its position supports the lawless defendants. It recognizes that a law was broken. Then quickly words jump into a general assertion that the reason for filing the brief is “to assist district attorneys”. The writers want “to underscore the importance of prosecutorial immunity in fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement”. I have no problem nor does our case bump against those goals. Immunity, however, is qualified that it must be “unflinching and impartial law enforcement”. The brief does not say unflinching or impartial. It says unflinching and impartial. The actions of the defendants broke laws. The actions of Gale Filter, et al., proved not to be impartial upon reviewing the grand jury transcript. Also documents in the Superior Court filings in Sierra County provide evidence that their impartiality was more wide spread than merely withholding exculpatory evidence.
It is a big leap to believe that Tom and Bill failed to stop the misguided position of their co-signed brief. But, what about Mary? As Senior Assistant, does she report to Tom? Does her position require a review over a Deputy Attorney General? Can a Deputy Attorney General file a brief in the Appellate Court on his own without a final review?
If you want to read the full amicus of the attorney general, it follows below . If anyone out there can help with the answers to these questions about the chain of accountability and responsibility, please educate me.
Now to the question of money, which was asked in the entry before this. The amicus brief comments that a lot of money is at issue. In the Statement of the Case it tells the appellate court that our suit seeks over $51 million. Yes, a recovery of that or a lesser amount can fund the mine’s development. I cannot recall determining this amount but certainly support its legitimacy. What if the suit sought $200 million or $1.00? Does the amount affect “unflinching and impartial law enforcement”? With so much written about case before the appellate judges, why did William fill his limited space with $51 million in damages?
Okay, I admit that this is a hard entry to read; however, remember the above named people are your public servants, who earn their salary by working for your best interests. Remember also, its all for the right to mine, the mine and its shareholders. So, get informed. Cut down some ignorance and help me learn. If you do not want to respond on the FORUM, do it with a feedback click.
Just curious if settlement offers seem like a possibility, for all the usual reasons (and to provide an influx of some cash soon).
as the "world's oldest profession".
“When you ain’t got nothen’, you got nothen’ to lose”. Bob Dylan.
The defendants lost their excuses for immunity in the Superior Court. They now appeal to the Cal Appellate Court for amnesty from accountability on the same notion. It is my belief that the defendants have nothen’ in the law, facts, evidence and story to support their defense of wrong doings. They may think they have nothen’ to lose but are delusional.
Following is the answer to the amicus brief filed by California’s Attorney General. Klaus has clearly presented our views without any prejudice towards the opinion of the Attorney General’ lawyers.
Government Code, Title One, section 810.2 says: “Employee” includes an officer, judicial officer as defined in Section 327 of the Election Code, employee or servant whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor. Section 811.4 says, “Public employee” means an employee of a public entity.
The Law Revision Commission comments are, “Liability and immunity provisions in Division 3.6 are often made to “public employees.” These provisions will not be applicable to independent contractors since the term “employee” is defined in section 810.2 to exclude independent contractors.
The carpetbaggers did not follow the law in seeking the privilege to practice prosecution in little Sierra County. It is not a mere technicality that the law was not followed. What about the Miranda Rights law? Is it a mere technicality that should be brushed aside when an accused criminal is not read his rights? Killers have walked free because of a lapse of a “technicality.
Comments welcomed or suggestions on how to broaden the awareness that members of the California State Bar expect absolute immunity from abusing the meaning of our laws and the dignity of our courts. The AG's brief can be read on this topic, entered on 10/17/2006. Here is Klaus’s brief.
The Attorney General submitted its Amicus Curiae Brief (“ACB”) in support of the Appellants “to underscore the importance of prosecutorial immunity in fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement,” and because the Attorney General perceived that the Sierra County Superior Court improperly focused on defendants’ failure to comply with “technical details” and “procedural niceties” rather than on “the prosecutorial function they performed.” ACB 1, 9.
Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., shares the Attorney General’s goal of fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement. Impartial law enforcement would have prevented the serious harm to Respondent that gave rise to this action.
Respondent also agrees with the Attorney General’s argument that “[t]he purpose of providing immunity for prosecutors and judges is to provide a prompt procedural escape hatch, so that public servants are not exposed to time-consuming personal attacks based on their public service.” ACB 3 [italics added]. However, the Attorney General’s argument that prosecutorial immunity depends solely on whether a defendant allegedly carried out a “prosecutorial function” obviously goes too far, particularly when it is applied to private parties, who have financial incentives and ulterior motives that are inconsistent with public service. The Attorney General’s suggestion that prosecutorial immunity depends solely on whether someone purported to carry out a “prosecutorial function” would automatically immunize all actions of private bounty hunters and vigilantes, and the conduct of those who unlawfully impersonate police officers or district attorneys. Such a rule would clearly be inconsistent with the Attorney General’s and the Respondent’s goal of fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement.
The Attorney General argues that “[t]he public is best served when public servants are free from fear.” ACB 5. However, the Attorney General does not cite any reason or authority that suggests that the public is best served when private parties are automatically immunized from all consequences when they wrongfully assume the powers of public officials, and misuse those powers for financial gain and ulterior motives. Under those circumstances, the public is better served when “the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts ... prevail[s].” Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 792-93, quoting Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692.
Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine respectfully suggests that the Attorney General, in his rush to protect prosecutorial immunity for public officials, has not focused on the procedural context for this appeal. This is not an appeal from a trial, in which a trier of fact has found true only those facts alleged by defendants. This appeal arises from an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, filed by defendants after only minimal discovery by either party, in which the Court must credit any admissible evidence, or any reasonable inferences from that evidence, submitted by plaintiff/respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine.
The Attorney General’s argument appears to be predicated on the assumption that the only difference between defendants and a duly appointed deputy district attorney is that the defendants’ appointment papers were not properly filed – a “shortcoming” in defendants’ appointments that “can best be described as a technicality ....” ACB 1, 2, 8, 9. The Attorney General’s argument therefore assumes as true one of defendants’ arguments, and ignores all of the other evidence submitted by Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine.
(5) CDAA then initiated an improper prosecution and improperly obtained an indictment, which the Superior Court subsequently dismissed due to CDAA’s misconduct (1 C.T. 81-88), and which the newly elected District Attorney chose not to pursue (4 C.T. 827, 992-993; 2 C.T. 280).
Finally and most importantly, the Attorney General’s Amicus Brief makes no attempt to even address defendants’ burden of proof on an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. No matter how important prosecutorial immunity may be to the Attorney General, an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss cannot be converted into an appeal of a motion for directed verdict or trial judgment merely because the Attorney General has determined that “the record is sufficiently well developed” to dismiss the defendants based on their claim of immunity. ACB 3, 9. The Attorney General’s suggestion that the Court ignore defendants’ burden of proof on an anti-SLAPP motion and simply dismiss the claims against defendants because “judicial economy favor[s] expeditious resolution of the immunity question by the Court of Appeal, rather than remanding for a subsequent summary judgment” is totally without merit, completely contrary to the California Supreme Court’s directions on how the anti-SLAPP statute should be applied, and would violate plaintiffs’ rights to due process.
A. Neither the CDAA Defendants’ Nor The Attorney General Are Permitted To Use An Anti-SLAPP Motion To Seek Dismissal Unless They First Prove That This Action Arises From Protected Speech Or Petitioning Activity.
Neither defendants nor the Attorney General is entitled to even reach the “minimal merit” phase of anti-SLAPP review – the phase in which defendants’ claims of prosecutorial immunity become relevant – unless defendants first prove that their conduct at issue “arises from protected speech or petitioning activity ....” Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89. As the Supreme Court affirmed in Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 313, “[t]he ‘scope of [section 425.16] is not without limits, as demonstrated in . . . cases finding lawsuits were not within its protection.’ [Citations omitted.]” In Flatley, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed earlier cases that found that undisputably unlawful activity is not constitutionally protected, and therefore does not qualify for the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 320.
In this case, the Superior Court correctly concluded that defendants’ conduct of unlawfully assuming the powers of a district attorney to improperly criminally prosecute the plaintiffs was not conduct protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech or petition. See Respondent’s Brief at 21-38. The Attorney General’s Amicus Brief does not even address this prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, and instead appears to suggest that the Court simply skip ahead and dismiss the claims against defendants based on the Attorney General’s definition of prosecutorial immunity, regardless of whether or not this action qualifies for the anti-SLAPP statute. See, e.g., ACB 9.
successful demurrer, and had nothing to do with the anti-SLAPP statute. In Buford, the Court of Appeal sustained a demurrer because Govt Code §854.8 immunized public entities from any injury proximately caused by a patient of a mental institution. Although respondent had not cited the same statute below, the Buford court noted that a demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend if there is no reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment, even if a certain “defects of substance” are raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 818, 826.
Contrary to Equilon’s assertion, our conclusion will not allow the anti-SLAPP statute itself to become a weapon to chill the exercise of protected petitioning activity by people with legitimate grievances. The anti-SLAPP remedy is not available where a probability exists that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits. (§425.16, subd. (b).) “The Legislature, moreover, has provided, and California courts have recognized, substantive and procedural limitations that protect plaintiffs against overbroad application of the anti-SLAPP mechanism.” (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1122-1123).
In Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 324, the Supreme Court again resisted an argument that the anti-SLAPP statute be extended to protect policies (the litigation privilege) that are not part of the statute.
Similarly, the purpose of section 425.16 is not on “shielding prosecutors from civil suits arising from their work ...,” even if the Attorney General believes “the record is sufficiently well developed” to adopt the broad interpretation of prosecutorial immunity urged in the Amicus Brief. ACB 3, 9. Unless defendants or the Attorney General first prove that defendants’ conduct in unlawfully assuming the powers of a district attorney to wrongfully prosecute Respondent was in furtherance of their valid exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and petition, the Attorney General must wait for another motion in another forum to argue for expanding the scope of prosecutorial immunity. For the reasons already set forth in Respondent’s Brief at 21-38, neither defendants nor the Attorney General are entitled to reach the issue of prosecutorial immunity in this case, because this case does not arise from conduct by defendants that is protected by the constitutional rights of free speech or petition.
B. The Attorney General’s Arguments For Applying Prosecutorial Immunity To This Case Improperly Ignore Plaintiff’s Evidence.
As noted above, the Attorney General’s argument for applying prosecutorial immunity to defendants in this case appears to be predicated on the assumption that the only thing distinguishing these defendants from any duly elected or appointed district attorney is a “technicality” or some “shortcoming” with respect to “procedural niceties.” ACB 1, 2, 8, 9. In so doing, the Attorney General has assumed as true defendant’s version of the facts, and ignored all of the other evidence submitted by Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine. The Attorney General’s argument thereby again ignores the requirements of the anti-SLAPP statute.
It is well-settled that a court applying this summary-judgment-like procedure to an anti-SLAPP motion “may not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence.” Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 105; Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 823. An anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss therefore must be denied if the plaintiff has presented admissible evidence, “and all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence, ...” that show “a probability exists that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits. (§425.16, subd. (b).)” C.C.P. 437c subd. (c); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at 65.
(1) CDAA is a private entity, with a financial incentive to initiate prosecutions. For example, at about the same time that CDAA obtained a preliminary hearing on the criminal charges it filed against Respondent, CDAA sent a letter to the California Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) referring to efforts to extend its contract with DIR, and cited its prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine as an example of the progress CDAA was making. 4 C.T. 813, 827, 840, 974-982.
(2)	CDAA pressed for a criminal prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine despite the fact that the state and federal agencies responsible for investigating worker safety at the mine had concluded that there were no “willful” violations of any safety regulations at the Mine (3 C.T. 476, 481-84; 4 C.T. 810, 818, 829-830, 899-909; RJN Exs. 2, 3).
(3) The Sierra County District Attorney did not request assistance from CDAA and expressed no desire to prosecute Original Sixteen-To-One Mine during the almost thirteen months between the date of the accident and the date CDAA representatives personally “presented” their proposed criminal prosecution to the District Attorney. A jury could infer that the November 16, 2001 letter that was personally “presented” to the Sierra County District Attorney by CDAA defendants contained an implicit direction that the District Attorney cooperate with CDAA defendants. 3 C.T. 465. This inference is supported by the District Attorney’s subsequent admission that: “CDAA came to her with a completed investigation proposing to file criminal charges ... She told me that she disliked CDAA and how they forced their way into Sierra County and how they behaved. She said it was a powerful organization that could do what it wanted.” (4 C.T. 810, 812; 3 C.T. 465; 2 C.T. 449, 436).
(4)	The CDAA did not carry out its prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine under the supervision and control of the elected District Attorney, as required by state law and its contract with DIR (3 C.T. 453-56), but rather pursued the prosecution despite the fact that the elected District Attorney “wanted nothing to do with the issue and saw no crime ...” and “said she was not participating in the case ....” 4 C.T. 810, 812-13. The District Attorney told several witnesses, including the local newspaper, words to the effect that: “Oh, I don’t know anything about that [the prosecution of Original Sixteen-To-One Mine]. You’ll have to ask the California District Attorney’s Association lawyer.” 2 C.T. 270; 4 C.T. 778-780, 812-813; 819-820, 843. The declarations of CDAA defendants submitted in support of the motion confirm the fact that CDAA defendants knew they were not supervised by the District Attorney – the CDAA declarations can barely come up with any communications between the District Attorney and CDAA defendants during the entire prosecution of Respondent, from CDAA defendants’ first meeting with the District Attorney on November 27, 2001, until CDAA defendants obtained the improper Grand Jury Indictment on October 29, 2002. 2 C.T. 422 - 450, see Respondent’s Brief at 10-14.
(5) CDAA defendants initiated an improper prosecution and improperly obtained an indictment, which the Superior Court subsequently dismissed due to CDAA’s misconduct (1 C.T. 81-88), and which the newly elected District Attorney chose not to pursue (4 C.T. 827, 992-993; 2 C.T. 280). Among other things, CDAA defendants abandoned the preliminary hearing that they had set once it became clear that Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., intended to present exculpatory evidence, and CDAA defendants then failed to present known exculpatory evidence to the Grand Jury. 1 C.T. 81-88; 2 C.T. 426, 3 C.T. 450; 4 C.T. 784-86; 813-14, 817-18, 827, 844-46, 859-98, 969-70, 998; see generally, Respondent’s Brief at 15-18.
C. The Attorney General’s Authorities Do Not Support Extending Prosecutorial Immunity To CDAA Defendants.
Respondent has no quarrel with most of the Attorney General’s review of the history and purposes of prosecutorial immunity. Respondent does not dispute that prosecutorial immunity serves a valuable purpose when applied to public employees. However, Respondent parts company with the Attorney General to the extent the Attorney General wishes to extend the reach of prosecutorial immunity beyond the plain language of Government Code section 821.6, and grant automatic and complete immunity to private actors whenever they claim to be carrying out a prosecutorial function.
A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.
California Supreme Court has been particularly reluctant to expand the plain meaning of statutes when it comes to claims of immunity by alleged government actors. Thus in Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 40 Cal.3d at 792-93, the Supreme Court held: We have also held that, “in governmental tort cases ‘the rule is liability, immunity is the exception’ .... Unless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail.” (Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692.
As the Attorney General notes, most of the recent cases cited by the Attorney General in support of the application of prosecutorial immunity are cases that apply Govt Code §821.6. All of those cases cited by the Attorney General apply prosecutorial immunity to persons who are conceded to be “public employees” acting within the scope of their duties. For example, Tur v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 897, 900, found immunity under Govt Code §821.6 for firefighters, and held that immunity under that statute was not limited to peace officers, but applied to various other public officials who performed prosecutorial functions. Jenkins v. County of Orange (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 278, 284, applied Govt Code §821.6 to a county social worker acting within the scope of her employment who initiated child custody proceedings. Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1437, found that public employees who performed prosecutorial functions in connection with a disciplinary proceeding were also immunized under Govt Code §821.6.
In each of these cases, courts looked at whether a defendant was performing “prosecutorial functions” after the courts had already concluded that the defendant was a public employee acting within the scope of his or her employment. None of those cases suggest that “prosecutorial function” could substitute for status as a “public employee” to qualify for absolute immunity under Govt Code §821.6.
Citations to cases that discuss immunity in the context of a federal civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, such as Greene v. Zank (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 497, and Horowitz v. Board of Medical Examiners (10th Cir. 1987) 822 F.2d 1508, do not help the Attorney General’s arguments about the interpretation of Govt Code §821.6 either, because immunity under section 1983 depends on federal law.
Bradley v. Medical Board (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 445, 454. Even California cases involving section 1983 claims do not attempt to use Govt Code §821.6 to define the scope of immunity. See, e.g., Bradley, supra; Greene v. Zank, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at 503-09. Moreover, under federal law, even duly appointed prosecutors may be entitled to only qualified immunity, rather than the absolute prosecutorial immunity provided by Govt Code §821.6, depending on the precise function they were performing at the time. Bradley, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at 454.
Finally, the Attorney General makes fleeting reference to the “de facto” officer doctrine in an apparent effort to extend the prosecutorial immunity of Govt Code §821.6 to CDAA defendants in this case. However, none of the cases cited by the Attorney General holds that alleged status as a “de facto” officer qualifies a non-public employee for absolute immunity for his or her wrongful acts, either under Govt Code §821.6, or otherwise. Instead, the cases cited in support of the “de facto” officer doctrine, such as County of Ventura v. Barry (1929) 207 Cal.App.189, 190, and People v. Kempley (1928) 205 Cal. 441, 445-46, simply hold that the otherwise proper or “lawful” acts of a “de facto” officer are not subject to collateral attack. Neither of these cases holds that a “de facto” officer is automatically and completely immune for wrongful or unlawful acts committed while acting as a de facto officer, nor do these cases suggest that a “de facto” officer who is not a public employee qualifies for absolute immunity under Govt Code §821.6.
Moreover, as noted in Respondent’s Brief at 41-48, and as determined by the Superior Court (11 C.T. 2780), major factual issues remain about whether CDAA defendants meet the criteria required to qualify as “de facto” officers. See, e.g., In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill (1964) 61 Cal.2d 21, 42 (holding that the “lawful acts” of a de facto officer are not subject to collateral attack). Among other things, CDAA defendants themselves have submitted evidence that at least some members of the public – including plaintiffs and the local newspaper – did not “acquiesce” in CDAA’s attempt to assume the role of district attorneys. See, e.g., CDAA’s motion for change of venue, 1 C.T. 241 - 2 C.T. 333; 6 C.T. 1374-1577. CDAA defendants certainly admit that plaintiffs objected to CDAA defendants’ attempts to exercise the powers of the Sierra County District Attorney at the time CDAA carried out its wrongful prosecution. 3 C.T. 604-607, 619, 621; 4 C.T. 812-13, 839, 846; Appellants Opening Brief at 35-39. Further, plaintiffs’ evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence are sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that CDAA defendants had actual knowledge that they were acting outside the scope of their legal authority, as defined in CDAA’s contract with DIR, in that CDAA defendants did not act at the request of the local District Attorney, did not act under her supervision and control, and did not defer to the District Attorney’s charging, filing and settling authority. See Respondent’s Brief at 44-48.
The Attorney General explained that he filed an Amicus Brief in this case to “underscore the importance of prosecutorial immunity in fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement.” ACB 1. Respondent shares the Attorney General’s goal. However, the Attorney General’s concerns about prosecutorial immunity are misplaced in the context of this appeal.
First, as an appeal of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, the defendants claims to prosecutorial immunity only become relevant if defendants first show that their conduct at issue arises out of the valid exercise of their constitutional rights of free speech or petition. For reasons set forth above and more fully in Respondent’s Brief, Respondent maintains that defendants do not have a constitutional right to wrongfully assume the powers of a district attorney and criminally prosecute a fellow citizen.
Second, the Attorney General’s concerns about a supposed erosion of prosecutorial privilege appear to be based on CDAA defendants’ version of the facts, and ignore the evidence submitted by plaintiffs. The Attorney General’s concerns are therefore based on assumed facts that do not reflect the actual misconduct at issue in this case.
In the final analysis, the Attorney General has no reason to be concerned about Respondents’ claims against CDAA defendants in this case. Nothing about Respondents’ claims will interfere with the ability of the Attorney General or any properly appointed or elected District Attorney to carry out his or her lawful duties. To the contrary, the Attorney General should support Respondent’s efforts to ensure that only duly elected or appointed public officials wield the extraordinary power that the California Constitution delegates to the Attorney General and the elected District Attorney for each County. Similarly, the Attorney General should support Respondent’s efforts to hold those who are not properly elected or appointed responsible for the injury and damages they cause when they assume powers to which they are not entitled, and then abuse those powers for ulterior or improper purposes.
In any event, Respondent respectfully submits that the Attorney General’s Amicus Brief does provide any reason to stretch the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute to deny Respondent the opportunity to prove its claims at trial. The CDAA defendants’ misconduct at issue in this case still does not arise from constitutionally protected free speech or petition rights, and Respondent has already demonstrated that its claims have the “minimal merit” required to avoid an early motion to dismiss. Respondent Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., therefore again respectfully requests that the order of the Sierra County Superior Court denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion be affirmed.
The text of ANSWER OF RESPONDENT ORIGINAL SIXTEEN-TO-ONE MINE, INC., TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL consists of 5,376 words, as counted by the Corel WordPerfect version 9 word-processing software I used to generate this Brief.
Adding real social benefits from a successful outcome of plaintiffs’ suit does not hinder or compromise our mining effort to daylight gold from the Sixteen to One vein. The pursuit of compensation, justice and accountability from some evil legal/political machinations is a positive undertaking, similar to that which was successfully undertaken against MSHA. Success will benefit shareholders’ equity, value and potential to exploit their exceptional mineral deposit. The effort is worth the reward or the reward is worth the effort.
The crew sacked high-grade last Tuesday, gold in two places showing, two slab rounds but, like most of our mining, the continuation and value of the pocket will not be known until after it is mined. Kind of reminds one of some of the problems associated with the study of geology; however, you will never know unless you go.
get over it and get back to mining.
Most every adult in California and the United States of America know and have expressed their discontent with lawyers in modern times. It was not always this way. In fact sixty years ago people believed that lawyers were right up there with doctors in trust and social stature. What happened? Most importantly, what can be done about the sorry state of affairs regarding our lives, as lawyers continue to stink up the environment?
Is it true that the lawyers who form sentences with colorful words and metaphors will be the ones to subjugate the rules of society? Will they be the winners over the evidence and the law? A number of new TV shows seem to have this theme. Lawyers certainly do not add to America’s gross national product with many of their antics. An example of such drivel just passed into my hands in the form of Mr. Tom Knox’s reply brief to the august California Court of Appeals, 3rd District in Sacramento.
For those of you following the self serving, law breaking (misleading a grand jury), antics of the California District Attorneys Association and four of their non government employees, you know that I have the greatest respect for our legal system and hold many practicing lawyers in the highest esteem. Four of my former attorneys are Superior Court judges.
I write about this case with the hope that honorable men and women of law will seize this case with the passion they once held for lawyering. Remember years ago when every comedian, analyst and the average Joe or Joanne bantered lawyer joke after lawyer joke. The trade must have recognized the pit they were in. Jokes subsided but the root causes of America’s feelings about lawyers did not change. Today people have moved on to other target of scorn or sadly came to the conclusion that improvement would not materialize. No, no, no. Improvement is nearby. Improvement is vital for our society to keep pace with the microeconomics of a global economy. The bleeding of money into nonproductive work must stop. All that separates our American society from slavery are guns and the judges seated in our courtrooms. My bet goes with the courtroom.
So, what is the improvement to clean the scene lurking nearby? Fortunately, in California there is a State Bar with rules of conduct legislated into law by our elected representatives. There are consequences for misbehavior: disbarment and criminal prosecution if probable cause exists. Lawyers are like doctors in that they hate to testify let alone prosecute one of their own. Why is beyond me. This is how we survive as a free and independent country. I know that the code was broken for doctors two decades ago. I had such an experience with a doctor who was knowledgeable about the death of my seven-year-old son at the University of California at Davis hospital in Sacramento and not afraid or too busy to speak out. Because of him and because of what I did about his disclosure, changes were made that may have saved seriously injured children in an emergency room.
So today another opportunity exists to improve the American or at least the Californian judicial system. You should be outraged at Mr. Tom Knox’s assertions along with his arrogant style of presentation to the 3rd Appellate Court.. You will be, but that may not be enough. The CDAA gang worked to infiltrate a small rural public office; they solicited business through its non profit corporation of taxpayers money, they played politics with the law; they violated the trust of Californians and sought to privatize prosecution and criminalize accidents; they indicted without probable cause, knowingly, I might add. Now they want to get a pass on the theory that they are not responsible for their behavior, are immune from accountability and free to continue to screw up people’s lives and businesses.
You should be outraged. You should also recognize that opportunities to correct the long-standing decline in professional behavior of lawyers are before the Court. Lloyds of London is paying for Mr. Knox. We do not have that luxury. What we do have is the law and the truth of the sinister lawyering performed by Gale Filter, who led an inexperienced subordinate and two others to conspire in Sierra County. Help me change the course of unacceptable behavior.
This brief is 39 pages. I’m not sure how to get it broadly distributed. I will make copies and mail to anyone asking until we find another way. Here is the thrust and tone of Mr. Tom Knox’s fictional prose. It is in his conclusion. “The conduct of Appellants that forms the gravamen of Respondent’s case – the prosecution – falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute. Appellants’ conduct as prosecutors was not illegal…… As to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test, Appellants are entitled to the benefit of prosecutorial immunity and the litigation privilege.” If in the minds of the defendants they are “entitled to the benefit” they hold themselves out to be a privileged class of Californians, something the constitution speaks directly to.
So, why did the Attorney General step into this case? Here is one answer that few know. CDAA recently admitted that several counties in California failed to properly swear deputy DA’s as required by law. When a new DA is elected, his or her deputies must be appointed in writing under strict rules. Think about how disruptive this could be for convicted inmates when they learn that the man or woman prosecuting them was not authorized to do so. Oh, my goodness! What a mess! What a potentially costly mess! Fortunately for California, the issues of our case will not set a precedent for others to barter a new trial. Why? (CDAA likely did not tell the AG’s office as they lobbied to get it to write an amicus brief in support of their unlawful activities in Sierra County) Why? In other counties the other deputy DA’s are government employees. The CDAA gang is non-government employees, a big difference.
When I learned about the admissions by a CDAA employee about the plight of real deputy DA’s, I too became concerned. It is my intentions to improve the law not find a reason for others to circumvent real crime. I telephoned my old attorney, who represented me in Santa Barbara in 1969. He is a Superior Court judge now. I explained the situation (he knew about the criminal indictment filed against me and the mine). He said, “Mike, that is not your problem or concern. Do what you need to do. Let the legal ramifications fall where they will.” It was free advice and good advice. What are the next steps to take?
All that aside, I am struck by the complete ambiguity of how the brief filed by the sworn AG of our State of California et al assumes that the CDAA in this case believes that as defendant it is a representative of the people, aka District Attorneys, elected with jurisdiction to represent.
"We the people" look at it this way. We don't consider that un-sworn appointments trump representation in any case. Why would we?
The prosicurtorial immunity for representational office is respected from us, the private sector, because we understand the functional role it plays. We want our representation to be true to form.
Non-representational definition of a public official is not right, and should never be immune from a punitive position. Stated above, it is in direct conflict with intent. The AG in this brief assumes we believe such appointment of the defendant CDAA to be a legal representation. Clearly, it is not.
Isn't this designation the entire argument?
This speaks to the direct issue of representation under Constitutional authority.
To all of you lawyers out there, this is what we the people are most concerned about: The Intent Of The Law.
The Attorney General files this brief in support of Appellants pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 13 (c)(6). The California Constitution gives the Attorney General “direct supervision over every district attorney,” and further charges the Attorney General to assist any district attorney when required by the public interest. (Cal. Const. art V, § 13.) To assist district attorneys, the Attorney General files this brief to underscore the importance of prosecutorial immunity in fostering unflinching and impartial law enforcement.
The office of public prosecutor is one which must be administered with courage and independence. Yet how can this be if the prosecutor is made subject to suit by those whom he accuses and fails to convict?
(Pearson v. Reed (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 277, 287.) Although California courts have consistently applied prosecutorial immunity in a broad fashion, focusing on the functions being performed rather than procedural niceties, the trial court in this case denied immunity, focusing on technical details regarding the prosecutors’ appointments as deputies, and ignoring the prosecutorial function they performed. In the interest of firm and fair law enforcement, the Attorney General respectfully asks this Court to correct that error.
The elected district attorney of Sierra County appointed four deputies in 2001 and 2002; each signed an oath of office and took an oral oath administered by the Superior Court. [2 CT 422-423, 436-437, 442-443; 3 CT 450.] Despite a requirement in section 24102, subdivision (a) of the Government Code, no written documents appointing the four prosecutors were filed with the county clerk.
prosecutorial privilege did not apply. [CT 2779-2780] This appeal followed.
The purpose of providing immunity for prosecutors and judges is to provide a prompt procedural escape hatch, so that public servants are not exposed to time-consuming personal attacks based on their public service. Lawsuits against prosecutors or judges have the potential to chill the exercise of discretion meant to be exercised on the public’s behalf.
In this instance, the record is sufficiently well developed to allow a court to conclude that the four individual defendants [Appellants] are entitled to a dismissal of the action based on their immunity from civil suit. This Court has discretion to make that order or to remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with a declaration regarding the scope of prosecutorial immunity. In light of the time since this action was first filed, we encourage this Court to enter an order of dismissal.
The public is best served when public servants are free from fear. As the Court of Appeal has noted, exposure to civil litigation would result in timidity that would be hard to detect. (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 852 [discussing quasi-judicial immunity of a court-appointed psychologist].) That rationale applies with equal force in the case of prosecutors. In fact, prosecutorial timidity would be even harder to detect, because many prosecutorial decisions are made in private. In any event, someone wrongly accused by a criminal prosecutor is protected by a trial judge, a jury, and the appellate courts.
The strong underlying policies “favor a liberal application of immunity.” Achelman v. Pope (9th Cir. 1986) 793 F.2d 1072, 1078. The cases discussed below reflect the immunity’s breadth.
A. What conduct is immunized?
B. Who Is Entitled to Immunity?
C. What claims Are Barred?
The purpose of shielding prosecutors from civil suits arising from their work requires a prompt determination in this case that Appellants enjoy immunity. Any shortcoming in the prosecutors’ appointments as deputy district attorneys can best be characterized as a technicality that must yield to the robust public policy favoring prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors must be free to fearlessly enforce the law on the public’s behalf.
I just looked at the amicus curiae brief filed by our public servants in the offices of the California attorney General. I agree with the conclusion. Fortunately the law and the facts of this case do not support consideration of the conclusion. I always believed that the highest lawyers in the California scene looked after Californians. This argument does not meet that threshold. So, can we now ask, “For whom does Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, Tom Greene, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Hackenbracht, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and William N. Brieger, Deputy Attorney General work for and receive taxpayer money to represent?” Interestingly, the signature page also says, “Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants”. Please explain, someone.
If memory serves me right, Bill Lockyer was a writer of the Slapp stuff when he was a legislature. He above all other lawyers should recognize that the appeal before the California Appellate Court is for the mine and me taking away the constitutional rights of the bad guys. The amicus brief is not consistent with the intent of California LAW. If I am reading this friendly brief right, the signers support lawbreakers. Please explain, someone.
A puzzling communication was sent to Klaus (Sixteen to One attorney), who forwarded it to me yesterday. Maybe someone out there can shed some light of the following. Klaus questioned the actual form or process the author of the filing used. I am questioning several other points.
Mr. Brieger’s first statement is disingenuous and misleading. You know how much I hate lawyers to misrepresent a position to the court. They can stretch truth or lie to each other, but everyone must protest when they mislead the court. Mr. Brieger likely has a good reason why he wrote that he could not find me. Maybe Brenda Wong, Kathleen Lewis or Rhonda (support staff for Mr. Brieger) were assigned the duty but did not try very hard. None were working today, but all three left a message on their answer machines at the AG’s office: none were in the office or plan to be in the office for a while. I was unable to find out why Mr. Brieger said he could not reach me. I am very easy to find, by the way.
An Amicus Brief results from a third party, unrelated to the case, with a serious interest in supporting one side against the other addressing the court. I tried to get some of the big mining companies to write an Amicus Brief to present to the US Court of Appeals in our appeal with the US Secretary of Labor and MSHA. None seemed interested, even though the issue of a lead miner defined as management would throw the entire domestic mining industry into a tizzy. Fortunately, the Court upheld our position and overturned the Secretary of Labor and those nasty little minds at MSHA without the support of big mining companies.
What do we have here? What is going on? How did Mr. Brieger discover this case? Do you think he is an advocate of the mine or CDAA? Is there a connection between Mr. Brieger, CDAA, Gale Filter or Lloyds of London? I do not know him and neither does anyone associated with the mine, so his interest did not come from me. Now that the AG’s office is aware of the case it could be an invitation to us cite all the laws that were broken by the defendants and others associated with the case. for a review.
Klaus J. Kolb filed our Brief of Respondent Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc for the appeal of Tom Knox and his five customers yesterday. Words to tell you my thoughts are not readily forthcoming. Please spend time with the following brief yourself. I encourage you to print it and read it for its clarity, logical progression and above all how Klaus meets and addresses each and every claim raised in Tom Knox’s appeal to the Court. You will get the flavor of how Tom Knox presented his case to the appellate judges from how Klaus framed his argument.
It is an honor to be associated with a member of the California State Bar who has the background, education and personal ethics and integrity to practice law in our great state. Klaus was such a delight at the US Ninth Court of Appeals in San Francisco. If there are oral arguments in Sacramento for this anti-SLAPP motion, I will announce it.
With over 200,000 members of California’s State Bar, you and I know that the majority of these lawyers lack the professional characteristics we Californian should be demanding of them when they go before one of our Courts. Lawyers can lie to or mislead each other but, when they enter the courtroom, our statutes (those passed by the legislative branch) demand that they DO NOT MISLEAD THE COURT. I, along with you, anxiously wait for the day when we see some of these bar members brought before the Court and tried as lawbreakers. We may not have to wait much longer.
The central issue presented in this appeal is whether a private entity and its employees can unlawfully pose as Assistant District Attorneys, maliciously bring criminal charges against individuals and a small corporation, and then use the anti-SLAPP statute to seek immediate dismissal of any lawsuit challenging their conduct, on the ground that the defendants were only exercising their constitutional rights to free speech and petition and are immune as a matter of law for any damages they caused.
The Plaintiff and Respondent in this action, the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., was the victim of an illegal attempt by Defendant California District Attorneys’ Association, Inc. (“CDAA”), and several of its employees to effectively take over the Sierra County District Attorney’s office and to maliciously bring unwarranted criminal charges against plaintiffs based on an unfortunate mining accident. Defendants’ attempted criminal prosecution of plaintiffs was ultimately dismissed by the Sierra County Superior Court due to defendants’ misconduct before the grand jury, and the citations initially issued by state and federal mining authorities were eventually either dismissed, found to be non-accident- related, or were invalidated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as unsupported by substantial evidence. However, defendants’ illegal conduct has had a predictable, severe and ongoing impact on the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc. (“Mine”), and its president and manager, Michael M. Miller. Among other things, the cash-strapped corporation had to divert limited resources from its business to its defense, and defendants’ malicious prosecution interfered with the Mine’s ability to retain experienced personnel and virtually precluded the Mine from obtaining critical financing, leaving the Mine barely able to survive.
Plaintiffs Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., and Michael M. Miller sought compensation for the damages they suffered and punitive damages for the defendants’ malicious conduct by filing a civil action for malicious prosecution and related causes of action in Sierra County Superior Court. Defendants responded with demurrers, a motion to disqualify the assigned trial judge, and eventually an anti-SLAPP motion to strike brought against the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc.,1 all of which were denied below.
Defendants’ evidence here fails to meet the required standard of defeating plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law. There are major factual disputes as to whether defendants can claim to be de fact officers and it is highly questionable that the law cited for the fact that de facto officers may be entitled to absolute immunity of 821.6 applies. ... It is not the law that individuals who are not properly appointed may act as officers and then claim immunities for illegal acts or conduct.
11 C.T. 2780 (Sierra County Superior Court Order, December 1, 2005).
As defendants’ concede in their Appellants’ Opening Brief, defendants anti-SLAPP motion is based entirely on their claimed affirmative defenses of prosecutorial immunity and litigation privilege. Appellants’ Opening Brief (“AOB”) at 1, 29. For purposes of defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and this appeal, plaintiffs and the Superior Court therefore were entitled to assume that plaintiffs could prove their claims of malicious prosecution and related tort causes of action but for defendants’ affirmative defenses. Defendants properly concede that they bear the burden of proving their affirmative defenses if they are to prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion. AOB at 28-30; Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc., v. California (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 477. An independent review of the record will confirm the Sierra County Superior Court’s conclusion that defendants have not presented admissible evidence sufficient to prove their affirmative defenses of immunity and privilege as a matter of law – even assuming that defendants’ conduct qualifies them to use the anti-SLAPP procedure in the first place.
[E]lected District Attorneys will, as appropriate, deputize these attorneys and investigator to handle criminal and civil investigations and prosecutions within the respective participating counties.
The Contract required the State of California to compensate CDAA for actual expenditures incurred in accordance with the rates specified in the Contract, which are listed as $65,000 for each Circuit Prosecutor, plus an additional 25% of the applicable salary for benefits. 3 C.T. 459, 456. The Contract had a term of slightly over two years, with an evaluation of the Circuit Prosecutor program scheduled for June 30, 2003, “to determine whether to continue the project.” 3 C.T. 458.
A few months before CDAA obtained its Contract with the Department of Industrial Relations, a tragic accident occurred at the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine site in Alleghany, Sierra County, California, which provided CDAA with an opportunity to demonstrate its value to the Department of Industrial Relations and to earn substantial fees pursuant to the Contract. 4 C.T. 974-982. On November 6, 2000, Mark R. Fussell, died after he backed a small electric locomotive into an old ore chute. 3 C.T. 467-68; 4 C.T. 821-25. At the time of his accident, Mr. Fussell was an experienced “lead miner” who had been assigned the task of rehabilitating an abandoned portion of the mine, so that other miners could safely begin work there. 4 C.T. 810-11, 821-825, 930-941 (940); 10 C.T. 2446-49, 2454-56, 2467-68.
The unfortunate and tragic death of a miner at the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine naturally and properly resulted in an investigation of the Mine and of the circumstances leading to Mr. Fussell’s death. Although state and federal mine inspectors recognized that a series of mistakes made by Mr. Fussel were the primary cause of his death (RJN3, Exhibit 2, at 2, 4-5; Exhibit 3, at 3-4), it is not surprising that the Mine received citations as a result of that investigation.
On January 12, 2001, the United States Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) issued two citations against the Mine for conditions at the Mine that contributed to Mr. Fussell’s fatal accident. 3 C.T. 533-537; RJN Exhibit 2, at 2.
... determined that the facts surrounding the violations that were alleged did not meet the threshold of a willful failure to comply with the law, nor did any evidence support a finding that wilful failure to abate a hazard that presents a risk of injury to employees existed.
As noted above, the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine appealed each of the citations issued by Cal-OSHA and MSHA with respect to the accident. The MSHA citations relating to the accident were ultimately overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a Memorandum decision entered on March 30, 2006 (RJN Exhibit 2). The Ninth Circuit’s decision acknowledges the undisputed fact that Mr. Fussell’s negligence caused his accident, and held that there was not substantial evidence to support MSHA’s attempt to impute Mr. Fussell’s negligence to the Operator of the Mine. RJN Exhibit 2 at 5. The Cal-OSHA citations were ultimately settled after Cal-OSHA reclassified the citations as “Non Accident related” and acknowledged that evidence provided by the Mine indicated that the cause of the accident was that Mr. Fussell was “inattentive just prior to the incident.” RJN Exhibit 3, at 3.
The report on the above-referenced case is being forwarded to your office pursuant to section 6315 of the Labor Code. Based upon the investigation conducted by the Bureau of Investigations (Bureau), this report is being referred for consideration of criminal charges for violations based upon statutory provisions of the Labor Code.
The Report of Investigation will be presented in person by Gale Filter, Project Director, or Kyle Hedum, Worker’s Safety Circuit Prosecutor, with the California District Attorney’s Association, who are in the process of scheduling an appointment with your office.
Thank you for the opportunity of working with you in referral of this matter so as to make the workplaces safer for the employees of this State.
3 C.T. 465 (Italics added). The letter to Ms. O’Sullivan showed that it was copied to CDAA employees Gale Filter and Kyle Hedum.
According to their declarations, Mssrs. Filter and Hedum followed up on the November 16, 2001 letter with a personal visit to District Attorney (“D.A.”) O’Sullivan’s office in Downieville on November 27, 2001. 2 C.T. 449, 436. It is undisputed that up to the time of this meeting – which took place more than one year after Mr. Fussell’s tragic accident – Ms. O’Sullivan had not requested any assistance from CDAA, nor had she ever given any indication of an intent to criminally prosecute the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., or its managers.
She [D.A. O’Sullivan] told me that CDAA came to her with a completed investigation proposing to file criminal charges against Michael Miller and Jonathan Farrell [general manager of the Mine at the time of the accident]. She said that she knew nothing about the issue, wanted nothing to do with the issue and saw no crime and told me that was her representation to CDAA. She told me that she disliked CDAA and how they forced their way into Sierra County and how they behaved. She said it was a powerful organization that could do what it wanted. Sharon said she was not participating in the case and my complaint about the dishonest indictment is between CDAA and me. She was very bitter about Larry Allen, a CDAA lawyer, who ran against her and won. She complained that her office was overrun with three CDAA employees. She also said she was leaving as soon as she gets another job.
Nevertheless, when asked why she had preferred the felony charges, rather than two other criminal complaint options, O’Sullivan told The Messenger “Oh, I don’t know anything about that. You’ll have to ask the California District Attorneys Association lawyer.” 2 C.T. 270; 4 C.T. 778-780.
4 C.T. 812-13; 843. Ms. Mejlszenkier was a CDAA employee who had graduated from law school in 2000, been admitted to the California State Bar in December 2001, began working for CDAA in January 2002, and was assigned by CDAA to work on the prosecution of plaintiffs in June 2002. 2 C.T. 422, 10 C.T. 2643.
The declarations submitted by defendants in support of their anti-SLAPP motion are also consistent with what Ms. O’Sullivan twice told Mr. Miller. Defendants submitted lengthy declarations from CDAA prosecutors Mejlszenkier, Hedum, Patchett and Filter. 2 C.T. 422, 434, 442, and 3 C.T. 446. Although CDAA’s Contract calls for CDAA to “assist” rural District Attorneys who request such assistance, and although the Contract expressly requires that: “Participating District Attorneys ... will retain charging, filing, and settling authority within each county,” (3 C.T. 453-56), what is conspicuously missing from all four declarations is any evidence that Ms. O’Sullivan played any role in supervising the work of the CDAA attorneys who were prosecuting plaintiffs.
For example, Ms. Mejlszenkier’s declaration recites two conversations with Ms. O’Sullivan before the grand jury presentation, including the conversation in which Ms. O’Sullivan allegedly agreed to appoint Ms. Mejlszenkier, and the conversation in which Mr. Filter allegedly persuaded D.A. O’Sullivan to present evidence to a Grand Jury instead of proceeding with a preliminary hearing before the Court. 2 C.T. 422-424. Mr. Hedum’s declaration recites two conversations with Ms. O’Sullivan, including the one in which Mr. Filter presented the Cal-OSHA report and allegedly offered CDAA’s assistance, and a subsequent conversation in which Ms. O’Sullivan allegedly requested Mr. Hedum to handle the preliminary hearing in a child molestation case. 2 C.T. 434-437. Mr. Patchett recalls meeting Ms. O’Sullivan when she allegedly said she was appointing him as a Sierra County Deputy District Attorney, and several subsequent conversations during the two days that Mr. Patchett was in Sierra County serving as Grand Jury Advisor, including a conversation in which Ms. O’Sullivan invited the CDAA attorneys to use her office during the Grand Jury proceedings. 2 C.T. 442-443. Mr. Filter’s declaration recalls four specific in person conversations with Ms. O’Sullivan, two of which occurred at conferences that both happened to attend. The two substantive discussions referenced in Mr. Filter’s declaration were the initial meeting at which Mr. Filter allegedly suggested a criminal prosecution of plaintiffs and offered CDAA’s assistance, and a subsequent conversation in which Mr. Filter allegedly suggested proceeding with a Grand Jury instead of a preliminary hearing. 3 C.T. 449, 450.
Although all four individual CDAA defendants allege that Ms. O’Sullivan orally appointed them as Sierra County District Attorneys, it is undisputed that no formal appointment documents were ever signed by Ms. O’Sullivan and filed with the county clerk, as required by Government Code §24102, subd. (a). 1 C.T. 11-17, 44-45; 4 C.T. 810, 811-12, 836-37. All four individual CDAA defendants allege that they swore an oath of office, but the oaths were administered and witnessed by the clerk for the Sierra County Superior Court, not by D.A. O’Sullivan. 2 C.T. 422-23, 425; 434, 437, 439; 442, 443, 445; 3 C.T. 446, 450, 592. The clerk of the Court, Ms. Jan Hamilton, confirmed that she received no written authorization to appoint any of the defendants as deputy district attorneys, and she most likely received instructions to administer the oath from Ms. O’Sullivan’s secretary. 8 C.T. 1964-1965. Defendants Mejlszenkier and Hedum also refer to being issued identification cards that referred to them as “Deputy DA” for Sierra County, but none of those identification cards were signed or attested to by Ms. O’Sullivan either. 2 C.T. 423, 425B-1, 441.
Despite the lack of any formal appointments, CDAA employees proceeded to initiate a criminal prosecution of Michael Miller, Jonathan Farrell and the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine. On June 7, 2002, CDAA attorney Kyle Hedum signed a felony complaint against Miller and Farrell. 2 C.T. 437, 440. By this time, D.A. O’Sullivan had lost an election and was serving as a “lame duck” incumbent until newly elected D.A. Larry Allen took could take office in early 2003. 2 C.T. 270, 277, 280, 4 C.T. 810, 812, 827, 992.
4 C.T. 782, 10 C.T. 2439,6 10 C.T. 2643-49. Based on the information and argument presented to the Grand Jury, on October 29, 2002, the Grand Jury returned a two count indictment against Michael Miller, Jonathan Farrell and the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc. 2 C.T. 424, 431-32.
On November 20, 2002, Michael Miller and Jonathan Farrell filed a motion to set aside the indictment on the grounds that CDAA prosecutors Filter, Mejlszenkier and Patchett knowingly and willfully misled the Grand Jury as to the existence of exculpatory evidence and presented the Grand Jury with inadmissible evidence. 1 C.T. 81-87. On February 13, 2003, the Sierra County Superior Court granted the motion to set aside the indictment and dismissed the criminal case. 1 C.T. 88. Newly installed District Attorney Larry Allen declined to file new charges against Miller, Farrell or the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine. 4 C.T. 827, 992-993; 2 C.T. 280, AOB at 2. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action one year later. 1 C.T. 1.
Plaintiffs Michael Miller and Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., filed their original complaint against CDAA and the individual CDAA employees who prosecuted plaintiffs – Gale Filter, Denise Mejlszenkier, Anthony Patchett, and Kyle Hedum (collectively, “CDAA defendants”) – on February 13, 2004. 1 C.T. 1. Defendants responded with a demurrer, claiming absolute immunity as public employees. 1 C.T. 19-26, 28-29. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint, to which defendants also demurred. 1 C.T. 94-106, 118-128, 130-132, 173-188. The parties stipulated to permit plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint, which was filed on January 7, 2005. 1 C.T. 197-221, 222-238. The Third Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for malicious prosecution, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent employment and supervision. 1 C.T. 222-238.
On February 28, 2005, Michael Miller took the default of defendants. 1 C.T. 239-240. The Sierra County Superior Court’s Order granting Defendants’ Motion To Set Aside Default was not entered until December 29, 2005. 11 C.T. 2782-84. In the meantime, defendants filed a motion for change of venue (on February 28, 2005), their motion to set aside the default taken by Mr. Miller (on March 7, 2005), and their anti-SLAPP motion to strike (on March 9, 2005). 1 C.T. 241-242; 2 C.T. 244-333; 2 C.T. 334-403; 2 C.T. 404- 3 C.T. 741. Defendants did not file a separate anti-SLAPP motion against Mr. Miller after the default was set aside, and Mr. Miller did not participate in the briefing or hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion that gives rise to this appeal. R.T. 57-121.
On March 28, 2005, defendants filed an “Ex Parte Application For Order Continuing The Date Of Hearing To Hear (1) Motion To Set Aside Default; and (2) Motion To Strike Pursuant To Code Of Civil Procedure Section 425.16,” based in part on their stated intention to file a Motion to Recuse the assigned judge pursuant to C.C.P. §170.1, subd. (a)(1). 5 C.T. 1067-1073. In their motion to continue the hearing date, defendants argued: “That motion to recuse must be heard, based on this new evidence described by Mr. Miller, before the Change of Venue and the Motion to Strike.” 5 C.T. 1071.
Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the assigned Sierra County Superior Court judge was answered on April 11, 2005, and denied as “specious” on May 23, 2005. 6 C.T. 1578, 1614-1619. The Court rescheduled the hearing on defendants’ motions for change of venue and the anti-SLAPP motion to strike for June 23, 2005, then rescheduled the hearing for the convenience of counsel to July 8, 2005, then rescheduled the hearing several times again on its own motion and due to the death of plaintiff’s former counsel of record in an automobile accident on September 12, 2005. 7 C.T. 1911; 8 C.T. 1960; 10 C.T. 2682; 11 C.T. 2747; R.T. 36-38. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike was ultimately heard on November 16, 2005, and denied by the Sierra County Superior Court on December 1, 2005. R.T. 57-121; 11 C.T. 2777-2781. This appeal followed.
A. CDAA Defendants’ Unlawful Impersonation Of A District Attorney And Criminal Prosecution Of Plaintiffs Is Not “an act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public issue,” As Defined In The Anti-Slapp Statute.
As noted, the purpose of section 425.16 is to prevent the chilling of “the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances” by “the abuse of the judicial process.” (§425.16, subd. (a).) As a necessary corollary to this statement, because not all speech or petition activity is constitutionally protected, not all speech or petition activity is protected by section 425.16.
The Legislature obviously did not intend for the anti-SLAPP procedure to apply to every action. The statute therefore sets up a two-step procedure in which the defendant bears the initial burden of making “a threshold prima facie showing that the defendants’ acts, of which plaintiff complains, were ones taken in furtherance of the defendant’s constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.” Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1364, disapproved on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68, fn. 5; Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 646.
If – and only if – CDAA defendants show that they are entitled to the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute, then the anti-SLAPP statute requires plaintiffs to present competent and admissible evidence showing “a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Briggs v. Eden Council For Hope & Opportunity, (1997) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1122 (emphasis added.).
Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute – i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning activity and lacks even minimal merit – is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.
Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89. “The anti-SLAPP statute is a procedural statute, the purpose of which is to screen out meritless claims.” Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (7/26/06) 39 Cal.4th 260, at *278.
In this case, CDAA defendants based their anti-SLAPP motion entirely on their affirmative defenses of privilege and immunity. As CDAA defendants recognize (AOB at 29-30), defendants bear the burden of establishing their affirmative defenses.
A trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion is subject to independent or de novo review by the Court of Appeal. See, e.g., Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055.
2.	CDAA defendants do not qualify for the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute because they have no constitutional right to illegally impersonate district attorneys or to conduct a criminal prosecution of plaintiffs.
The Anti-SLAPP Statute Does Not Apply to Speech and Petitioning Activity That is Illegal as a Matter of Law, and Therefore, Not Constitutionally Protected.
We agree with Paul that section 425.16 cannot be invoked by a defendant whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of law and, for that reason, not protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition. A contrary rule would be inconsistent with the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute as revealed in its language. ... Moreover, it would eviscerate the first step of the two-step inquiry set forth in the statute if the defendant’s mere assertion that his underlying activity was constitutionally protected sufficed to shift the burden to the plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing where it could be conclusively shown that the defendant’s underlying activity was illegal and not constitutionally protected.
Flatley v. Mauro, supra, at *33-35 (citation and quotation omitted).
As in Paul and Flatly v. Mauro, CDAA defendants’ conduct complained of in this case is illegal as a matter of law, and, as a matter of law, is not protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition. CDAA defendants’ conduct therefore does not qualify them to use the anti-SLAPP statute or procedure in this case.
The Legislature shall provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, and elected district attorney, ... and an elected governing body in each county.
Every county or district officer, except a supervisor or judicial officer, may appoint as many deputies as are necessary for the prompt and faithful discharge of the duties of his office.
(a) A written appointment by the deputy’s principal is filed with the county clerk.
(b) A copy of the appointment is filed with the county auditor, if the auditor has so requested.
(c) The deputy has taken the oath of office.
In this case, the undisputed evidence shows that despite Government Code sections 24101 and 24102 requirement that there be a written appointment, there was no such appointment. Defendants” contention that signing the oath is the “functional equivalent” of a written appointment is unpersuasive. The statute requires a written appointment by the appointing authority. The statute also requires an oath. The oath is not the functional equivalent of the written appointment. Consequently, defendants’ actions were illegal as a matter of law. The motion is properly denied on this ground.
On appeal, CDAA defendants argue that their failure to comply with Government Code §§ 24101 and 24102 was not really “illegal,” that the rule of Paul, Huntingdon, and presumably now Flatley v. Mauro, should only be applied to “intentional criminal conduct,” and that defendants “emphatically do not concede their conduct in prosecuting the case on behalf of Sierra county was criminal.” AOB at 24-27. Each of these arguments misses the point.
Paul, supra, as quoted in Flatley, supra, at (emphasis added).
Flatley, supra, at (emphasis added).
In the second part of their brief, defendants alternately contend that they complied with the relevant Government Code sections, or that they are entitled to claim the benefits of having complied even if they did not, under the theory that they were at least “de facto” district attorneys. AOB at 32-35. Both of these arguments can be rejected as a matter of law on the undisputed evidence presented to the Superior Court.
People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151 (citations omitted).
CDAA defendants have offered no authority or reason for ignoring the plain language of the appointment statute and for collapsing two separate requirements set forth by statute into a single requirement for only an oath. Moreover, CDAA’s attempt to reinterpret the statute defeats its obvious purpose – to require a clear and formal record when a district attorney attempts to delegate his or her powers to someone else. CDAA’s suggested interpretation of the statute encourages exactly the type of ambiguity about who has authority to act on behalf of the government that caused the damages at issue in this case.
The purpose of section 425.16 is to protect the valid exercise of constitutional rights of free speech and petition from abuse of the judicial process (§425.16, subd. (a)), by allowing a defendant to bring a motion to strike any action that arises from any activity by the defendant in furtherance of those rights. (§425.16, subd. (b)(1).) By necessary implication, the statute does not protect activity that, because it is illegal, is not in furtherance of constitutionally protected speech or petition rights. (Wilcox v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 819 [“If the defendant’s act is not constitutionally protected how can doing the act be ‘in furtherance’ of the defendant’s constitutional rights?”].) Thus the rationale for applying the litigation privilege to some forms of illegal conduct – like perjury – because the occasional bad result is justified by the larger goal of access to the judicial process is simply not transferable to the anti-SLAPP statute because the latter statute does not promote the same goals as the former. Moreover, by its very terms, section 425.16 does not apply to activity that is not in furtherance of the constitutional rights of free speech or petition and this would necessarily include illegal activity that falls outside protected speech and petition rights.
The “de facto” doctrine upon which CDAA defendants rely has even less to do with the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute than does the litigation privilege. Whether or not it applies is simply irrelevant to the inquiry of whether CDAA defendants have met their burden of making the “threshold prima facie showing that the defendants’ acts, of which plaintiff complains, were ones taken in furtherance of the defendant’s constitutional rights of petition or free speech ....” Paul, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at 1364.
Supreme Court noted that “[e]xtortion is not a constitutionally protected form of speech.” Flatley, supra, at *61. Neither is impersonating a district attorney and bringing unwarranted criminal charges against a fellow citizen.
In Flatley, the Supreme Court reviewed the evidence of defendant’s conduct and determined that it “was extortion as a matter of law, and therefore, not constitutionally protected activity for purposes of section 425.15.” Flatley, supra, at *72 Likewise, the undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates, as a matter of law, that the CDAA defendants’ unlawful impersonation of district attorneys was not a “valid exercise of constitutional rights of free speech and petition.” C.C.P. §425.16, subd. (a). The Sierra County Superior Court correctly concluded that, because defendants did not comply with Government Code sections 24101 and 24102 and did not have a written appointment to act as deputy district attorneys, their conduct in initiating and pursuing unwarranted criminal charges against plaintiffs was illegal as a matter of law, and therefore was not protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition, and did not qualify for the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute.
3. CDAA defendants have not carried their burden of meeting the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test – even if the rule of Paul and Flatley did not apply to this case.
The rule of Paul and Flatley discussed above applies when defendants have otherwise met their burden of making a threshold prima facie showing that the conduct complained of arises from speech or petition activity, but the specific activity at issue was illegal, and therefore not constitutionally protected. In this case, however, CDAA defendants have not even carried their burden of making the initial showing that the conduct complained of arises from otherwise protected speech or petition activity.
Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1415.
CDAA defendants argue that the “principle thrust or gravamen” of plaintiffs’ complaint is that plaintiffs were damaged as a proximate result of actions CDAA defendants took during the course of judicial proceedings. AOB 22. CDAA defendants go on to assert that the alleged conduct on which plaintiffs base their complaint is “very similar to conduct that has been held in other cases to be protected activity under section 425.16.” AOB at 22-23.
Rather than engaging in free speech or petitioning the government for some action, CDAA defendants took over a portion of the government, and misused the government’s prosecutorial powers to initiate and pursue criminal charges against plaintiffs. The harm suffered by plaintiffs did not occur because CDAA defendants communicated with or petitioned the Sierra County District Attorney; it occurred because CDAA defendants assumed the powers of the elected District Attorney for Sierra County and negated her legal authority to control the criminal proceedings brought against plaintiffs in Sierra County.
In this case, the CDAA defendants’ activity that gave rise to plaintiffs’ damages and this action is that defendants unlawfully assumed the powers of the Sierra County District Attorney, in violation of the law and in violation of the express requirements of their Contract with Cal-OSHA. The defendants’ acts underlying plaintiffs’ cause of action do not constitute protected speech or petitioning, they were not committed “before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other proceeding authorized by law,” nor were they made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by such a proceeding, nor were they committed “n a place open to the public or in a public forum ....” Defendants’ acts therefore do not fit within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, as defined in C.C.P. §425.16, subd. (e)(1) through (e)(3). Defendants’ underlying acts also not qualify for the “catch all” provision of §425.16 subd. (e)(4), because they were not “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech,” and they were not “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” at the time defendants committed the conduct, more than one year after Mr. Fussell’s unfortunate accident.
Simply put, CDAA has not met its burden of making the “threshold prima facie showing” required by the anti-SLAPP statute before defendants can invoke the protections of that statute. Paul, supra; Equilon Enterprises, supra; Navellier v. Sletten, supra.
B.	CDAA Defendants Have Not Proven That They Will Prevail On Their Affirmative Defenses Of Immunity And Privilege As A Matter Of Law.
As noted above, CDAA defendants’ affirmative defenses only become relevant to this appeal if CDAA defendants first meet their threshold burden of showing that the conduct on which plaintiffs base their complaint arises from protected speech or petitioning activity. CDAA defendants have not met that burden. Moreover, CDAA defendants also have not met their second burden of proving their affirmative defenses of privilege and immunity. Because CDAA defendants’ based their anti-SLAPP statute entirely on their affirmative defenses and effectively assumed that plaintiffs had a probability of prevailing absent those defenses, CDAA defendants must prove that they will prevail on their affirmative defenses as a matter of law. Anything less would require the Court to assume that plaintiffs still had a probability of success on their claims, and that their claims therefore had at least the “minimal merit” required to proceed to trial. Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 89; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, supra (describing §425.16 as “a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation”); C.C.P. §437c, subd. (o)(2) and (p)(2), placing the burden on defendants to prove their affirmative defenses to prevail on summary judgment.9 CDAA defendants appear to concede this burden of proof. See, e.g., AOB at 30, 52.
1. CDAA defendants are not government employees and therefore are not entitled to claim prosecutorial immunity under Government Code §821.6.
CDAA defendants argue that “[t]he doctrine of prosecutorial immunity bars every cause of action in the Third Amended Complaint,” and cite Government Code §821.6 as support. AOB at 31.
In its Contract with the DIR, CDAA agreed over and over again that its employees would not be considered “public employees,” and that: “The Circuit Prosecutors and Investigator shall be employed by and supervised by the California District Attorneys Association.” 3 C.T. 456, 453. CDAA defendants clearly do not qualify for prosecutorial immunity under the plain language of Government Code §821.6.
In another attempt to avoid the plain language of a statute, CDAA defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity because they engaged in conduct that would have been covered by the statute, had they been public employees. AOB at 32. The obvious problem with CDAA’s argument is that the statute only confers immunity on “public employees” and CDAA expressly agreed that its employees would not be deemed public employees when CDAA entered into its Contract with the State.
Marine Forests Soc. v. California Coastal Com’n (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 54; see also People v. Kempley (1928) 205 Cal. 441, 447; Oakland Paving Co. v. Donovan (1912) 19 Cal.App. 488, 495; AOB at 28, 34.
Plaintiffs do not dispute the de facto doctrine as recited above. The problem with CDAA defendants’ reliance on the de facto officer doctrine is that it does not apply to this case, because this case does not involve a third person challenge to the validity of the acts done by CDAA within the apparent scope of the district attorney’s office. As the Supreme Court recognized in Marine Forests Soc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at 54-55: “the doctrine contemplates that a valid challenge to the officer’s qualifications must be raised in a separate proceeding.” This action is such a separate proceeding.
CDAA defendants have cited no California authority that supports their contention that a “de facto” officer is entitled to absolute immunity for his unauthorized and wrongful acts. Branson v. Martin (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 300, 307, relied on by defendants (AOB at 50), has nothing to do with immunity for “de facto” officers. In Branson,the Court of Appeal noted that “a court commissioner is a government employee and is thus covered by the general grant of judicial immunity. (Gov. Code, §821.6 ...)” Id. The Branson court went on to hold that the commissioner’s acts complained of were not “in the complete absence of jurisdiction,” and were therefore within the scope of his immunity. Id.
CDAA’s attempt to expand the immunity afforded to public employees by statute to “de facto” officers who are not public employees conflicts with the general rule that California courts will not imply immunities if they are not set forth by statute, particularly in the area of purported government actors.
We have also held that, “in governmental tort cases ‘the rule is liability, immunity is the exception’ .... Unless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail.” (Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692.
Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 792-93. CDAA defendants have offered no reason why the “important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful and negligent acts” should be ignored in this case. CDAA’s citation to authorities in other jurisdictions, based on other facts, and other laws and “societal goals” not persuasive. See, e.g., White v. Gerbitz (6th Cir. 1989) 892 F.2d 457, 462 (applying Tennessee law in federal civil rights action). CDAA’s conduct of unlawfully prosecuting California citizens for monetary gain or other ulterior motives is not conduct that should be encouraged. Moreover, CDAA willingly accepted the benefits of a contract in which CDAA promised that its representatives would “be deemed to be employees of [CDAA].” CDAA defendants have offered no reason for the courts to relieve them of their contractual obligations or of their legal obligations to citizens they have injured through their misconduct.
2. CDAA defendants have not carried their burden of proving that they qualify as “de facto” officers as a matter of law.
As CDAA defendants acknowledge (AOB at 35-48), their claim to de facto officer status depends on a number of facts, including the hotly contested factual allegation of whether or not CDAA defendants were acting “under color of a known election or appointment.” See, e.g., Oakland Paving Co. v. Donovan, supra, 19 Cal.App. at 495. As summarized in the “Statement Of Facts” at pp. 5-19 above, plaintiffs have presented evidence that the elected District Attorney of Sierra County never requested CDAA assistance, never authorized or supervised CDAA’s prosecution of plaintiffs, and did not “retain charging, filing and settling authority,” as required by CDAA’s Contract and the California Constitution. Plaintiff’s evidence also allows at least the reasonable inference that CDAA defendants knew that their actions were unauthorized, as evidenced by the admissions of District Attorney O’Sullivan, the circumstances under which CDAA representatives presented themselves to D.A. O’Sullivan, they fact that the Contract expressly required CDAA employees to be properly deputized and to be supervised by elected district attorneys after a district attorney requested assistance from CDAA, and the fact that CDAA represented itself as exclusively well-qualified to accept the Contract to provide assistance to rural district attorneys. 2 C.T. 270,449, 436; 3 C.T. 453, 455, 465, 778-80; 4 C.T. 812-13, 819-20, 829-840, 843; 9 C.T. 2260-2264. Plaintiffs’ evidence, and the reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor that can be drawn from that evidence, are enough to demonstrate that plaintiffs have “a probability” of prevailing against CDAA defendants’ affirmative defense of absolute immunity.
CDAA defendants’ attempts to overcome plaintiffs’ evidence are clearly without merit. CDAA defendants first argue that their response to an inartfully drafted request for admission should preclude plaintiffs from contesting a “fact” admitted by defendants. As they concede, C.C.P. §2033.410 provides that: “Any matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission ....” The plain language of the statute means that CDAA defendants are bound by their admission, but plaintiffs are not. CDAA argues, without authority, that §2033.410 should be read to mean something other than what the plain language of the statute says, because that plain meaning could not be what the Legislature meant. However, CDAA’s interpretation of C.C.P. §2033.410 is not only contrary to the plain meaning of the statute; it is also contrary to the intent of the Discovery Act. The purpose of a request for admission is to bind the party making the admission; it is not to recreate a “trial by ambush” procedure that results in a forfeiture of the requesting party’s substantive legal rights due to a typographical error in the wording of a discovery request.
(b) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of such authority or, in the court’s discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the admission of such evidence.
CDAA defendants argue that their criminal prosecution of plaintiffs was at all times conducted pursuant to the direction and control of D.A. O’Sullivan, and have offered declarations of each of the individual CDAA defendants asserting that the conduct complained of by plaintiffs was done pursuant to the direction of D.A. O’Sullivan. See, e.g. 2 C.T. 437, 443; 3 C.T. 450. Pursuant to CDAA defendants’ arguments, D.A. O’Sullivan was therefore clearly authorized by CDAA defendants to make statements about their criminal prosecution of plaintiffs, and her role in it.
CDAA defendants finally attempt to argue that the Court should adopt their interpretation of disputed evidence and the inferences that can be derived from that evidence. AOB 41-42; 44-48. Once again, CDAA defendants are simply wrong. See, e.g., C.C.P. §437c, subd. (c)) (“... summary judgment may not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence, which raises a triable issue as to any material fact.”) For example, past correspondence and previous legal claims by plaintiff Miller do not require a finding that plaintiffs have admitted that CDFA defendants were duly authorized to criminally prosecute plaintiffs. AOB 35-39. Mr. Miller was simply doing his best to protest an unwarranted prosecution, and to exercise his constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of his grievances. The fact that defendants were, for a time, successful in impersonating district attorneys should not mean that plaintiffs are deprived of a remedy for the damage they suffered during that time.
There are major factual disputes as to whether defendants can claim to be de facto officers and it is highly questionable that the law cited for the fact that de facto officers may be entitled to the absolute immunity of 821.6 applies.
2. CDAA defendants have not carried their burden of establishing that their conduct is covered by the litigation privilege as a matter of law.
CDAA defendants acknowledge that the litigation privilege – even if it were otherwise to apply to this case – does not apply to plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution cause of action. AOB at 52; Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 1057.
The litigation privilege is codified as part of Civil Code §47.
Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 1057.
Plaintiffs have already explained and demonstrated that CDAA defendants were not “participants authorized by law” to initiate or prosecute the criminal action against plaintiffs. At the very least, whether CDAA defendants were “participants authorized by law” is a factual dispute that can only be resolved at trial.
Further, CDAA defendants’ conduct in impersonating district attorneys and initiating and maintaining an unlawful criminal prosecution against plaintiffs goes far beyond what has been considered “communicative conduct” and covered under the litigation privilege in previous cases. See examples summarized in Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 1057-58.
[T]he result urged by plaintiffs, an extension of section 47(2) to unlawful conduct undertaken to obtain evidence in anticipation of litigation, would lead to unacceptable consequences. ... If a prospective plaintiff, in anticipation of litigation, burglarized defendant’s premises in order to obtain evidence, plaintiffs here would apparently apply the privilege to protect the criminal conduct. Such an extension of section 47(2) is untenable. The instant case and the example are comparable in that both involve violation of a penal statute, and in both cases the offending party seeks immunity from civil liability. In both, the claim must fail.
Kimmel v. Goland, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 212.
As in Kimmel, supra, CDAA defendants’ conduct in this case was unlawful, potentially involved the violation of penal statutes (e.g., Penal Code §182 making it a felony to conspire to falsely and maliciously indict another for a crime), and go far beyond mere communicative conduct. In this case, as in Kimmel, Civil Code §47(2) should not be extended to immunize the offending party’s unlawful conduct.
This action by the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc. and Michael M. Miller raises important issues about the power of a private entity to assume the power and authority that the California Constitution reserves for elected District Attorneys. The legal and factual issues raised are important enough that they should be resolved through the normal process of discovery, motion practice, and, if appropriate, trial.
The California District Attorney’s Association’s attempt to use the anti-SLAPP statute to dismiss this action at its inception is a misuse of that statute. CDAA’s unlawful attempt to criminally prosecute plaintiffs cannot be recast as “the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” Neither the California nor the U.S. Constitution provides a private entity with a constitutional right to criminally prosecute a fellow citizen.
Since the conduct that gives rise to this action is not constitutionally protected, there is no reason to stretch the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute to force an early determination of plaintiffs’ claims against CDAA. In any event, the Original Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., has already presented enough evidence to demonstrate that its claims have at least the “minimal merit” required to avoid an early motion to dismiss. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Respondent Original-Sixteen-To-One Mine, Inc., respectfully requests that the order of the Sierra County Superior Court denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion be affirmed.
Please Access NEWS on this web site for another attorney’s view and position on CDAA and Gale Filter. While his client’s situation is different from ours, he raises some thought provoking issues. Many lawyers have lost faith in the integrity of their profession just as most Americans. One on one I am hearing more complaints by lawyers that fit the CDAA style of courtroom procedures. Next the person pauses and says, “It has been going on for a long time. How can it be stopped?” The option to clean up the courtroom is before all 200,000 members of the California State Bar Association with our lawsuit in Superior Court. Get involved. Spread the word about this Sierra County case. Where is the LA Times? Misleading a grand jury, misleading a judge, preempting the administrative process to prosecute Americans without evidential probable cause, private (non-government) lawyers wanting to be immune form illegal acts, lawyers infiltrating duly elected prosecutors as well as constitutional abuses (SLAPP), should be more interesting to LA Times readers than the deceiving front page article on the mine that was features a few years ago.
Please plough through the motion. Take some action. We need the public and the non-threatened lawyers to step up to the forefront of this battle.
If you need a refresher on this topic or any other. I recommend you go back to the first entry and read from first to last in order. Better yet, new lawyer lovers and lawyer haters, read the whole factual and proceedural entries dealing with the CDAA affair.
Scenario entitled “Enforcement of Criminal Law Based Upon the Crime of an Officer of the Court Misleading a Judge”. It is a crime in California. Its enforcement and prosecution approach nil. Why?
Misleading a sitting judge (court in session) is something more than a breach in the Lawyer's Code of Ethics. What and which code covers this crime? Do ethics have a place in law anymore?
The bad guys lawyer, Tom Knox, wrote and signed an appeal to the third court of appeals in Sacramento that fails the smell test for legal credibility. The Company’s brief is due on July 11, 2006. It is difficult to read because of its nonsense.
I am not a lawyer and do not approve of a professional code that abuses Californians’ trust in the sanctity of lawyer's behavior. They are State Officers of the Court. It is our third branch of gonvernment and just as important to our freedom as the Executive and Legislative branches. Lawyers who commit perjury before a magistrate, lawyers who knowingly mislead a judge and lawyers who do not approve of these behaviors should speak out. They need to know that the stage is set to continue the game of words. This was how George described it, “Remember, it is a game of words”. We are expanding. I remember.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §854
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §821
 v. 
 §821
 v. 
 §821
 v. 
 §821
 §821
 §1983
 v. 
 v. 
 §821
 v. 
 §821
 v. 
 §821
 §821
 §821
 v. 
 v. 
 §821
 § 13
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §24102
 §170
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §425
 v. 
 §425
 §425
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §425
 §437
 §821
 §821
 §821
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §821
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §2033
 §2033
 §2033
 §437
 v. 
 §47
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §182
 §47