Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180331_0000710.NIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 17:25:11+00:00

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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.
Plaintiffs Bennett Sapia, Joel Passmore, and Annette Hall claim they were let go from their tenured teaching positions by Defendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago (“Board”) without receiving the benefit of mandated procedures for terminating tenured teachers. Plaintiffs assert that this denial amounts to a violation of their due process rights and so they have filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary damages and declaratory relief. Now before the Court are the following motions: the Board's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 188), the Board's motion to strike and dismiss portions of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Dkt. No. 136), Plaintiffs' motion for leave to issue notice to absent class members (Dkt. No. 122), Plaintiffs' motion to strike certain affirmative defenses (Dkt. No. 141), and Plaintiffs' motion to set aside or modify the Magistrate Judge's May 15, 2017 order (Dkt. No. 160). The Court addresses each of the motions below.
Plaintiffs were working as tenured teachers in the City of Chicago's public school system when they received layoff notices-Passmore in July 2012, and Sapia and Hall in October 2012. Plaintiffs claim that throughout their careers they received consistently good performance evaluations; but then, in June of 2012, they were rated “unsatisfactory” and shortly thereafter they were fired. The parties do not dispute that in deciding which teachers would be let go, the Board looked first to those with unsatisfactory ratings, including tenured teachers, before considering others with less seniority and no tenure. Plaintiffs assert that the Illinois School Code prohibits the removal of tenured teachers except for cause and also mandates specific pre-termination evaluation and decision procedures plus administrative review of any adverse decision. See 105 ILCS 5/24A-5, 5/34-85. Thus, according to Plaintiffs, by firing them and exposing them to the resulting stigma, the Board deprived them of a protected property interest without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
although Plaintiffs do not state a claim for relief with the bare allegation that the Board used performance ratings to determine their eligibility for layoff, they do state a sufficient claim to the extent they allege that the Board's actions against them were not the result of a layoff necessitated by economics or enrollment, but instead were prompted by individual animus towards them.
Plaintiffs next sought leave to amend their complaint again to remove the class allegations and to issue notice to absent class members pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(1). (Dkt. No. 122.) The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file the SAC, which is now the operative complaint, but deferred ruling on the notice issue at that time. (Feb. 21, 2017 Minute Order, Dkt. No. 125.) The SAC asserts the following claims: Count I alleges denial of due process based on Plaintiffs' pre-termination rights; Count II alleges denial of due process based on Plaintiffs' post-termination rights; and Count III claims a due process violation based on injuries to Plaintiffs' reputations.
The Court first considers the Board's motion for judgment on the pleadings, as a ruling in the Board's favor could dispose of the case in its entirety. To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” ADM All. Nutrition, Inc. v. SGA Pharm Lab, Inc., 877 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing such a motion, the Court draws all reasonable inferences and view all facts in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
For its motion, the Board argues that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of a final decision on the merits and stipulation of dismissal with prejudice entered in 2012 in Chicago Teachers Union v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, No. 10-cv-04852 (N.D. Ill.) (“CTU case”). Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Barr v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Ill. Univ., 796 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). Res judicata blocks a second lawsuit if there is (1) an identity of the parties in the two lawsuits; (2) a final judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit; and (3) an identity of the causes of action in the two lawsuits. Id. at 840. The third element is satisfied if the claims comprise the same core of operative facts giving rise to a remedy-in other words, the two lawsuits must be based on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations. Id.
In contrast, the CTU case dealt with layoffs surrounding a 2010 budget deficit. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, No. 10-cv-04852, 2010 WL 3927696, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2010). On the eve of the 2010-2011 school year, the Board laid off nearly 1, 300 teachers. Id. at *1. The layoffs were implemented through a series of resolutions-the June 15, 2010 resolution authorized the “honorable termination” of tenured teachers and the June 23, 2010 resolution authorized schools to first lay off teachers who were under remediation or whose most recent performance ratings were negative. Id. Although the Board suggested to the media that the layoffs involved teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations, the majority of the laid-off teachers had good ratings. Id. The Board later announced plans to dismiss more teachers. Id. By August 31, 2010, the Board had laid off nearly 1, 300 teachers. Id. at *2. Those teachers received notice of their terminations but were not provided an opportunity to demonstrate their qualifications for retention within the school system. Id. The Board later restored some of the teachers to their positions due to an increase in federal funding. Id.
While previous complaints in the present case might have presented a res judicata issue in light of the CTU case, in ruling on the motion to dismiss the FAC, this Court limited the claims allowed to proceed to those encompassing allegations that Plaintiffs lost their teaching positions in 2012 due to individual animus against them. In contrast, the CTU case did not relate to layoffs in 2012 due to the personal animus towards the three Plaintiffs in the present case. Hence, the CTU case involves a different core of operative facts than the present case and res judicata does not apply. The Board's motion for judgement on the pleadings is accordingly denied.
The Court next considers the Board's motion to strike and dismiss portions of Plaintiffs' SAC. As with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “must construe [the complaint] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a district court “may strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Courts have considerable discretion in striking such matter. See Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009). But motions to strike are generally disfavored as they potentially serve only to delay a case. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). Thus, “the movant must show that ‘the allegations being challenged are so unrelated to plaintiff's claim as to be void of merit and unworthy of any consideration' and that the allegations are unduly prejudicial.” Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc. v. Peters, 983 F.Supp. 787, 798 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, when motion to strike removes unnecessary clutter from the case, it can help to expedite, not delay the case. Heller Fin., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1294.
The Board argues that Plaintiffs' reputational harm claims based on the Board's 2010 Resolution and 2011 Layoff Policies are time-barred. Although a complaint need not anticipate affirmative defenses such as the running of the statute of limitations, if a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to establish the defense, the district court may dismiss the complaint on that ground. O'Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015). The limitations period for § 1983 claims is based on state law-in Illinois, it is two years. Id. The date on which the claim accrues (and the limitations period starts) is a matter of federal law, however, and generally occurs when a plaintiff knows the fact and the cause of an injury. Id. The determination of accrual is a two-step process: the court first identifies the injury and then determines when the plaintiff could have sued for that injury. Draper v. Martin, 664 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 2011).

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