Source: http://www.usptotalk.com/the-alice-trajectory/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:03:34+00:00

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In the absence of any guidance in Alice for specific guidance about this critical determination, where else can we look?
I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL, Inc.
McRO (Planet Blue) v. Activision Blizzard, et al.
Open Text SA v. Alfresco Software Ltd.
Walker Digital, LLC v. Google, Inc.
However, this review proves unhelpful for this analysis… because, together, these cases have a 100% invalidation rate under 35 USC 101. Today, over three months past the issuance of Alice v. CLS Bank, the courts have yet to find any patent that satisfies the rationale of Alice / Mayo.
Moreover, these opinions often characterize the 101 eligibility decision as a broad reference to “good patents” and “bad patents,” before invariably casting the present patent into the latter bin. The overall trend looks like: “There are lots of patent-eligible inventions out there! – just not this one… or this one… or any of these…” And the longer this trend continues, the more the “patent-eligible invention” comes to resemble a mythical entity.
Rationale presented in other cases.
If we don’t have an example of a patent-eligible claim, can we at least identify a common theme as to the reasons given for invalidation? Digging beneath the term “abstract,” is there a small set of factors or criteria cited in these cases that enable a consistent determination?
To consider this question, I reviewed each of the above-listed cases, and pulled out the rationale cited by each court as the basis for holding the claims invalid.
What can we make of this tangled mass of rationale?
Every rationale is conclusory. There is no objective analysis behind a statement that a claim is “abstract” or “preemptive” or “non-limiting”; the judges simply said it was so. One cannot present objective evidence of any argument for or against “the claim is preemptive,” any more than one can present objective evidence that “disco is tacky” or “curry is delicious.” Every statement is simply an empty opinion – and is susceptible only to the similarly empty opinions of the courts higher up the appeal chain.
“The claim doesn’t provide a field of use,” vs. “The claim provides a field of use that we consider non-limiting,” vs. “The claim identifies a field of use that has long been known to humans,” etc.
None of the rationale are based on the text of the Patent Act. Not one of the decisions cites legislative history, or a more specific teaching than section 101, to support its interpretation of the law. A few decisions make vage reference to “what the patent system was intended to protect,” but inevitably without citation to any source of such conjecture. Rather, the decisions invariably cite other court opinions. This is perhaps not surprising, as not one word of 35 USC 101 has changed since it was passed in 1952.
These statements are troubling, because the judiciary has no authority, responsibility, or proficiency in the areas of economic policy and business.
According to the federal separation of powers, judges have exactly one power: to apply the text of the law and the express intent of Congress to the facts of a lawsuit. They are not empowered to protect commerce or guide the economy. Judges are neither elected by the public, nor accountable to it, thanks to lifetime judicial appointments. Moreover, judges typically have no training or experience in business, economics, or technology – most have careers exclusively limited to law and academia. On what basis do judges assume the mantle of “protectors of the technology economy” in making sweeping economic policy decisions?
Technology fields. Can we assert that Alice only applies to patents in certain technical fields? Maybe “only” routine software, or “only” business methods?
First, the Alice rationale, on their face, are completely field-agnostic. The same rationale – dissecting a claim into “abstract” and “conventional”; finding a “preemptive effect”; providing “not enough detail” – can be readily applied to inventions in any technical field.
While Alice certainly has been used more frequently to target patents involving business methods (buySAFE, CMG, Loyalty Conversion, EPC) and purely nominal computing inventions (DietGoal, Planet Bingo), there is no explicit or inherent limitation on its use in other fields. These frequencies seem more likely driven by litigation volume, and popular opinion (noting the frequency with which opinions applying Alice cite trendy views about “protecting the economy” types of rationale), than by any inherent limitation of the Alice rationale to these fields.
Second, Alice is already overrunning the borders between the categories of “business methods” and “routine software” to other areas. McRO involves a software technique with enough substance to warrant publication in an academic journal. Cote relates to semiconductor fabrication process control. Ex parte Jung and Genetic Tech, like Mayo and AMP v. Myriad, involve biotechnology and drug development – as did the pre-Alice case of In re Roslin, which is cited with approval in the USPTO’s guidelines to examiners for applying Alice in biotech.
Other factors suggest a broad use of Alice across all fields of technology. Anecdotal evidence indicates that USPTO examiners currently are using Alice in more than just business method, computer, and biotech-related art units – even in low-tech areas, such as basic mechanical products. Like the ubiquitous “inequitable conduct” threats in the 00’s, patent litigation will inevitably include a ubiquitous use of “patent-ineligible as per Alice” in every case going forward. And a future USPTO Talk post will discuss the widespread but misplaced confidence in perceived differences between claim styles and disclosure sufficiency among technology areas.
Structural vs. functional language. Can we at least limit Alice to the types of claims that involve functional language?
Ignore such elements as “conventional elements of the field” that do not add “something more” to the claim.
Characterize such elements as indefinite: “a ‘database’ can be anything, including a locked file cabinet.” Cite thing like the “broadest reasonable interpretation” to interpret a plain term like a “nail” as also possibly encompassing a staple, or an adhesive (“Liquid Nails”), or a bolt.
Find a method claim invalid, and then characterize a structurally specified claim as covering “basically the same thing” in a nominally different form.
“Using a temperature differential to generate motion” (the Stirling engine).
“Converting ambient electromagnetic energy to stored energy” (inductive charging).
“Adapting a protein to match the binding site of a selected target” (drug development).
Draw a big circle around the elements of the claim that relate to the identified abstract concept, and draw a big, red X through them. Cite preemption as a problem, and dismiss any specific configuration as irrelevant to the 101 determination.
Look at the remainder of the claims, and dismiss it as a collection of “conventional” steps that fail to provide “something more” than the abstract idea.
This moment is a turning point for patent law. Either the judiciary will acknowledge and grapple with the monstrosity that Alice is becoming; or the judiciary will stand idly by as Alice arbitrarily tramples the patent landscape. Passivity may even prompt Congress to step in and rescue the judiciary from its own ill-conceived mess… just as it did in 1952.

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