Source: http://legaldb.freemedia.at/international-standards/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 07:56:35+00:00

Document:
Our advocacy work on defamation laws is supported by international standards on freedom of expression and the protection of reputation developed in recent years by international human rights bodies such as the U.N. Human Rights Committee; the European Court of Human Rights; the Council of Europe; and the special representatives on freedom of expression of the U.N., the OSCE, the OAS and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). These standards are also informed by the rulings of prominent national courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as the work of civil society organisations, such as the London-based Article 19.
The resource and training manual “Freedom of Expression, Media Law and Defamation”, published in 2015 by IPI and the Media Legal Defence Initiative, also offers a detailed overview of defamation standards as related to Europe, with a particular focus on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The manual is also accompanied by a video and audio e-learning series.
A growing number of international authorities on freedom of expression have called on governments to abolish or consider abolishing criminal defamation. These authorities include the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which is responsible for interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the special representatives on freedom of expression of the U.N., the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Organization of American States (OAS). While the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has never explicitly ruled out the use of criminal laws in defamation cases, it has criticised their use and suggested that the appropriate space for their use, if any, is narrow. In any case, the ECtHR has joined a very clear international consensus against even the possibility of prison sentences in defamation cases. Further abroad, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights have also issued decisions criticising the application of criminal defamation laws.
In a 2007 resolution, the Assembly “welcomed” efforts to decriminalise defamation. Although the resolution itself did not expressly call for decriminalisation, it did urge states to guarantee that criminal provisions are not misused, to abolish prison sentences, and to define the concept of defamation more precisely to avoid arbitrary application of the law.
• If defamation is part of the criminal law, the criminal standard of proof – beyond a reasonable doubt – should be fully satisfied.
• Convictions for criminal defamation should only be secured when the allegedly defamatory statements are false – and when the mental element of the crime is satisifed. That is: when they are made with the knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard as to whether they were true or false.
• Penalties should not include imprisonment – nor should they entail other suspensions of the right to freedom of expression or the right to practice journalism.
• Should not resort to criminal law when a civil law alternative is readily available.
For example, the Court has consistently that the imposition of a prison sentence in a defamation case will amount to a violation Art. 10 regardless of whether or not the finding of liability itself was justified.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly ruled criminal libel unconstitutional. However, as early as 1964 (in the case Garrison v. Louisiana) it viewed favourably both the suggestion both that criminal prosecutions for defamation could no longer be justified in modern times and that any existing criminal defamation laws should be narrowly tailored to target only speech that vilified particular groups or that was likely to lead to public disorder.
International human-rights bodies and courts agree unanimously that defamation laws should reflect the principle that public officials must be more, not less, tolerant of criticism and scrutiny.
“[D]efamation laws should reflect … the principle that public figures are required to accept a greater degree of criticism than private citizens; in particular, laws which provide special protection for public figures, such as desacato laws, should be repealed.” ().
Heads of state are, generally speaking, subject to the principles as public officials, as explicitly stated by the U.N. Human Rights Committee (see above under “Defamation of Public Officials”).
There is widespread agreement on international experts and human-rights bodies that government bodies, state institutions, state symbols such as flags and anthems, and the State itself should never be protected by defamation laws.
The Committee has that it “deplores the existence of the offence of “defamation of the State”.
“(1) Public bodies of all kinds – including all bodies which form part of the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government or which otherwise perform public functions – should be prohibited altogether from bringing defamation actions.
The same observations under “Defamation of Public Officials” and “Defamation of the State and its Symbols” generally apply here.
IPI considers that a person should not be able bring an action for defamation on behalf of a deceased person, unless the impugned material directly and intentionally also damages the reputation of that (living) person. In any case, the statute of limitations should be limited to one year in order to prevent potential abuse and historical revisionism.
• “Harm to reputation is direct and personal. Unlike property, it cannot be inherited; any interest surviving relatives may have in the reputation of a deceased person is fundamentally different from that of a living person in their own reputation.
As noted in the manual “Freedom of Expression, Media Law and Defamation” published by IPI and the Media Legal Defence Initiative in 2015, in a recent ruling the Court stated that it “can accept … that the reputation of a deceased member of a person’s family may, in certain circumstances, affect that person’s private life and identity, and thus come within the scope of Article 8”. However, the court’s ruling suggested that a defamation suit on behalf of a deceased person would only succeed if the living claimant had been directly affected by the impugned publication.
IPI opposes the existence of blasphemy laws, which IPI defines as any measure that prohibits offence towards particular belief systems and their practices, dogma, deities, and objects of worship or that protects the “religious feelings” of individuals or groups. No belief system, however strongly held, should be accorded protection from criticism.
There is no logic to blasphemy laws in democratic societies; given the existence of freedom of religion and conscience, there is no adequate basis for determining which belief systems merit such protection. Moreover, as religion continues to exert a strong influence on contemporary society and political structures, critical coverage of a religion’s practices are a legitimate matter of public interest.
IPI fundamentally rejects the notion of a clash between freedom of expression and freedom of religion, which are, in fact, versions of the same right. Religious belief is essentially a form of self-expression.
“The concept of ‘defamation of religions’ does not accord with international standards regarding defamation, which refer to the protection of reputation of individuals, while religions, like all beliefs, cannot be said to have a reputation of their own. Restrictions on freedom of expression should be limited in scope to the protection of overriding individual rights and social interests, and should never be used to protect particular institutions, orabstract notions, concepts or beliefs, including religious ones.” ().
“Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect fora religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Such prohibitions must also comply with the strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3, as well as such articles as 2, 5, 17, 18 and 26. Thus, for instance, it would be impermissible for any such laws to discriminate in favour of or against one or certain religions or belief systems, or their adherents over another, or religious believers over non-believers. Nor would it be permissible for such prohibitions to be used to prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets of faith.” (General Comment 34, par. 48).
For as long as criminal defamation laws must continue to exist, IPI urges states to ensure that public officials have no procedural advantages in criminal defamation cases. In many countries, while private individuals must bring criminal cases to court on their own (private prosecution), public prosecutors can argue or even initiate cases on behalf of public officials.
“Public authorities, including police and public prosecutors, should take no part in the initiation or prosecution of criminal defamation cases, regardless of the status of the party claiming to have been defamed, even if he or she is a senior public official.” (Article 19, Defining Defamation).
In principle, filing a civil claim for damages can be a proportionate response for harm to reputation. This is only the case, however, under certain conditions. For example, defendants must have the opportunity to present a proper defence, including pleas of truth, reasonable publication, opinion, privileged reporting, and reporting the statements of others. Further, any sanctions awarded must be proportionate to the harm done and procedural elements, such as the burden of proof and legal costs, should not present unreasonable barriers to justice.
The intergovernmental rapporteurs on freedom of expression in “expressed concern” over “laws which penalise true statements”.
The European Court of Human Rights “has held that truth is an absolute defence to a suit of defamation. That is, if something is true, it cannot be defamatory.” (Freedom of Expression, Media Law and Defamation Manual).
The intergovernmental rapporteurs on freedom of expression have declared: “It should be a defence, in relation to a statement on a matter of public concern, to show that publication was reasonable in all the circumstances”. ().
Article 19, Defining Defamation: “Even where a statement of fact on a matter of public concern has been shown to be false, defendants should benefit from a defence of reasonable publication.
The intergovernmental rapporteurs on freedom of expression have declared: “No one should be liable under defamation law for the expression of an opinion.” ().
Article 19, Defining Defamation: “No one should be liable under defamation law for the expression of an opinion. An opinion is defined as a statement which either (1) does not contain a factual connotation which could be proved to be false or (2) cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts given all the circumstances, including the language used (such as rhetoric, hyperbole, satire or jest).
v. Any document ordered to be published by a legislative body; and vi. A fair and accurate report of the above.
It is widely accepted that disproportionate compensation for non-pecuniary damage can produce a chilling effect on the media, particularly given that such compensation is, by nature, subjective and not measurable. Following some international human rights bodies and observers, IPI considers that reasonable fixed limits on compensation may help prevent abuse of civil defamation laws.
Condemned “abusive recourse to unreasonably large awards for damages and interest in defamation cases and points out that a compensation award of a disproportionate amount may also contravene Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights”.
“The Court accepts that national laws concerning the calculation of damages for injury to reputation must make allowance for an open-ended variety of factual situations. A considerable degree of flexibility may be called for to enable juries to assess damages tailored to the facts of the particular case […] While this is an important element to be borne in mind it does not mean that the jury was free to make any award it saw fit since, under the Convention, an award of damages for defamation must bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality to the injury to reputation suffered.” (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. UK, 1995).
“The Court notes on the one hand that the sums eventually awarded in the present case (GBP 36,000 in the case of the first applicant and GBP 40,000 in the case of the second applicant), although relatively moderate by contemporary standards in defamation cases in England and Wales, were very substantial when compared to the modest incomes and resources of the two applicants […] In conclusion, given the lack of procedural fairness and the disproportionate award of damages, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.” (McVicar v. UK, 2002).
Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Administration of Justice, Commercialisation and Freedom of Expression, and Criminal Defamation, 2002.
Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten key challenges to freedom of expression in the next decade, 2010.
See, for example, the cases Belpietro v. Italy (2013), Mika v. Greece (2013), and Maripori v. Finland (2013).
Joint Declaration on Censorship by Killing and Defamation, 2000.
See, e.g. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on Mexico, CCPR/C/79/Add.109, 27 July 1999.
Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions, and Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Legislation, Dec. 2008.

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