Source: https://www.nlelp.org/maryland-tsrp-february-blog-reasonable-articulable-suspicion-or-probable-cause-what-is-the-standard-for-a-traffic-stop/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:00:24+00:00

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Maryland TSRP February Blog: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion or Probable Cause: What is the Standard for a Traffic Stop?
Home/Maryland TSRP February Blog: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion or Probable Cause: What is the Standard for a Traffic Stop?
A commonly misunderstood, misinterpreted and misapplied tenet of law is the level of suspicion that is required to make a routine traffic stop. Is it reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS)? Is it probable cause (PC)? Both? Neither? No matter where you look – the Supreme Court of the United States, federal opinions or Maryland appellate decisions – you can find cases citing one or the other, or oftentimes mixing the two in the same opinion. The objective of this month’s blog is to try and clear up any confusion.
Everyone agrees that a routine traffic stop, for purposes of briefly investigating whether a minor traffic offense has taken place, such as speeding, negligent driving or failing to stop at a stop sign constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention might be very brief and for the most part, a minor inconvenience, traffic stops are nonetheless seizures. That being said, the operative word there is “stop.” There must be a stop effectuated by the police. The Fourth Amendment isn’t implicated when the vehicle in question was already stopped. The police may certainly pull in behind a vehicle which is already stationary and approach the driver (though obviously so long as it is not merely stopped at a red light or stuck in traffic.) Approaching a stopped vehicle merely qualifies as an “accosting” and requires no level of suspicion on the part of law enforcement to do so.
The Supreme Court in Illinois v Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) held that a “routine traffic stop is a relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a Terry stop…than a formal arrest.” The Court quoted from Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), quoting from Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
So what does Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) have to do with traffic stops? Terry authorizes the police to stop and frisk an individual when there is a “reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the suspect is armed and dangerous and poses a threat to the officer or others.” While Illinois v. Cabellas holds that a routine traffic stop is analogous to Terry in the sense that “criminal activity” is analogous to a traffic violation, it obviously does not require a reasonable belief that the suspect be armed and dangerous. The Terry “reasonable suspicion” standard is akin to “reasonable articulable suspicion”, and is a lower standard than “probable cause.” But how much lower?
From a mathematical point of view, preponderance of the evidence can be as little as 50.1%, or, in other words, more likely than not, which is the same standard as required for probable cause. As probable cause is the standard required for arrest, clearly reasonable articulable suspicion is a lesser standard of suspicion than is probable cause. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an investigative detention based upon reasonable articulable detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop. In other words, if a reasonable suspicion stop lasts too long, it can turn into an arrest and an arrest requires probable cause.
They further addressed the issue in U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002), holding that the process of making a reasonable suspicion determination allows officers to draw on their own experiences and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” In other words: training, knowledge and experience. We’ve all heard those words before so don’t hesitate to delve into your officer’s background. The better he can explain to the court the basis of his suspicions, the greater the chance of getting past a motion to suppress.
In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws….
…Here the District (Trial) Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible, and the upholding of the convictions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit correct.
Here, the Court applied the probable cause standard to the stop, basing it on a motorist being stopped at a stop sign for an unreasonably long time, turning suddenly without signaling, and taking off at an unreasonable speed.
The following cases are cited (in chronological order) to point out the apparent inconsistency between reasonable articulable suspicion and probable cause when determining the level of suspicion that is required to justify a traffic stop.
Rowe is best known for holding that the momentary crossing of the edge line of a roadway and later touching of that line did not amount to an unsafe lane change or unsafe entry onto the roadway, conduct prohibited by TR § 21-309, and thus, wouldn’t support the traffic stop.
“Criminal activity afoot” is the same terminology as used in Terry v. Ohio and requires reasonable articulable suspicion.
While it is apparent that one can find a number of opinions employing either (or both) RAS and PC in justifying a traffic stop, a good rule of thumb when arguing a suppression motion for a traffic stop in an impaired driving case is that reasonable articulable suspicion is the level of suspicion that is required, not probable cause.
When the stop is based upon a clear cut violation of the traffic code such as speeding, stop sign and red light violations, passing on a double yellow, etc., it certainly can’t hurt to argue that the officer actually had probable cause to stop the vehicle, which is over and above reasonable suspicion.
If the suspect vehicle was already stopped on its own volition, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated and the officer can develop his RAS to detain based upon personal contact.
Obviously, the more observations the officer makes, the stronger the case in the development of reasonable articulable suspicion. Encourage your officers to make as many observations as possible and to be sure and document them in their reports. When the case comes to trial some months later, they can always refer to their reports in order to refresh their recollection.
Special thanks go out to the American Bar Association Judicial Division and Center for Professional Development. I recently participated in a webinar entitled “The Fourth Amendment in Impaired Driving and Other Motor Vehicle Offenses: Case Law Review and Update. The Honorable Karl Grube, Senior Trial Court Judge from the State of Florida and the Honorable Earl Penrod of the Gibson Superior Court of Indiana were the moderators of that webinar. Their power point presentation was extremely helpful in shaping the direction of this blog. They are much smarter than I when it comes to Fourth Amendment issues.
The following are some additional resources on conducting traffic stops.
NLELP Webinar: Now That I’ve Stopped Them, What Can I Do?

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