Source: https://www.newyorkprobateestateadministration.com/pro_49/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:08:35+00:00

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The Surrogate’s Court found that there was no proof to justify a finding that the wife had fraudulently destroyed the will, and that, therefore, the proponent’s proof was insufficient to overcome the presumption of revocation that attaches to a lost or destroyed will (see, SCPA 1407). Accordingly, the court properly refused to admit to probate a conformed copy of the will. The Surrogate held, however, that the presumption of revocation does not apply to contracts precluding the revocation of a will, and that the revocation of a will does not extinguish the contractual obligations of the parties. Finding that at the time of the decedent’s death, the agreement was still in force and had not been revoked, the Surrogate went on to rule that the parties, acting upon mutual consideration, clearly intended to bind themselves by contract to a certain disposition of their estate as specified in their mirror wills.
“As a will an instrument is revokable at pleasure, but as a contract, if supported by adequate consideration, it is enforceable in equity”. Thus, there is an important distinction between a contract obligating an individual to execute a reciprocal will and the will itself. A contract to make a testamentary provision is separate and distinct from the will itself, as the contract may be enforceable in equity even though, from a technical standpoint, it has no effect on the will’s status as a legal instrument (see, 9D Rohan, NY Civ Prac, EPTL p 13-2.1. Concisely stated, it is the contract, and not the will, which is irrevocable (see, 38 NY Jur 2d, Decedents’ Estates, § 324; see also, Glass v. Battista, 43 N.Y.2d 620, 403 N.Y.S.2d 204, 374 N.E.2d 116). Thus, when two or more persons have executed a joint will containing language sufficiently explicit to evidence an agreement not to revoke it, either party at pleasure, may revoke the instrument as a will, but it is enforceable in equity as a contract, if supported by adequate consideration (see, Glass v. Battista, supra; Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 223 N.Y.S.2d 477, 179 N.E.2d 489; 1 Fingar, Bookstaver & McQuaid, NY Wills & Trusts, § 4:09 [2d ed. 1984]; 2 Williston, Contracts, § 356, at 832-833 [3d ed.]; 11 Williston, Contracts, § 1420, at 712-713; 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 796; 7B Warren’s Heaton Surrogates’ Courts, § 100 [6th ed.]; Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal.2d 469, 45 P.2d 198; Seat v. Seat, 172 Tenn. 618, 113 S.W.2d 751; Watkins v. Covington Trust & Banking Co., 303 Ky. 644, 198 S.W.2d 964, 966; Pearce v. Meek, 780 S.W.2d 289; Estate of Shepherd v. Shepherd, 130 So.2d 888. Here, it is no less true, considering that the parties had not only mirror wills, but a separate contract ancillary to their wills.
We conclude that, although the decedent’s will was found to be presumptively revoked, the contract is still enforceable in equity. The Surrogate made a point of flatly rejecting, on credibility grounds, the testimony of the wife’s witnesses who claimed that the decedent and his wife had revoked the contract shortly before his death. We afford great weight to the factual finding of the Surrogate that the contract had not been revoked or altered prior to the decedent’s death and that it was, therefore, binding upon the decedent’s estate.
The Surrogate correctly concluded that the contract was enforceable in equity as a means of validating the contractually expressed objectives of the couple, and that those objectives could not be thwarted merely because the will could not be found after the decedent’s death. The creation and execution of a contract was the device the couple used to guard against such an eventuality. Thus, the Surrogate properly imposed a constructive trust (see generally, Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 480 [2d ed]. He erred, however, by imposing a [187 A.D.2d 587] constructive trust on the decedent’s entire estate. Thus, the decree of the Surrogate should be modified to impose a constructive trust on only that portion of the decedent’s estate that will not pass to the wife outright under the will (see, Tutunjian v. Vetzigian, 299 N.Y. 315, 320-321, 87 N.E.2d 275).
We agree with our colleagues in the majority that the Surrogate correctly found that the proponent did not offer sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the will had been revoked. However, we disagree with our colleagues’ finding that the contract is enforceable. Although a joint or mutual will which expressly recites within its provisions, or by a separate instrument, that it cannot be altered or revoked, is contractually binding upon the survivor (see, Margulis v. Teichman, 125 Misc.2d 729, 732, 479 N.Y.S.2d 953; see also, 9D Rohan, NY Civ Prac p 13-2.1, the enforceability of such a contract is dependent upon the existence of a valid and enforceable will. Here, however, the Surrogate found that the presumption that the will had been revoked was not rebutted. To allow the will to be enforced contractually is not only inconsistent, but allows the proponent of the will to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. Therefore, we vote against imposing a constructive trust on any portions of the decedent’s estate.
Accordingly, the court held that the decree is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which impressed a constructive trust upon the entire estate, and substituting therefor a provision impressing a constructive trust only on that portion of the decedent’s estate which was not to pass to the decedent’s [187 A.D.2d 585] widow outright under the will; as so modified, the decree is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the respondent, payable by the appellant personally.
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References: § 324
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 § 4
 § 356
 § 1420
 § 796
 § 100
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 § 480
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