Source: https://www.capcitytechlaw.com/blog/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:41:31+00:00

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U.S. patent numbered 10,000,000 was issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on Tuesday. Joseph Marron is the solo inventor of the “Coherent LADAR Using Intra-pixel Quadrature Detection” technology assigned to Raytheon.
Both the 1 Millionth and the 10 Millionth patent are, on a certain level, concerned with a basic need, transportation. The 1 Millionth patent addressed shortcomings of those new-fangled pneumatic tires, which were replacing solid rubber tires, with an improved puncture resistant tire construction design. Here, the 10 Millionth patent is directed to a laser detection and ranging method that can be used on self-driving cars which presumably are equipped with pneumatic tires!
At a time when less than 30% of all patents issued had only one inventor listed, and more than 45% have 3 or more inventors listed, the 10 Millionth patent lists just one inventor.
The increasing rate at which patents are being granted can be seen in the decreasing time between each millionth patent grant in the chart below.
Is Inter Partes Review Constitutional?
The Monday after Thanksgiving a presumably well-fed and rested Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, a Constitutional challenge to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board inter partes review (IPR) system.
can be extinguished by a non-Article III tribunal, such as the judges making up the PTAB panels.
that Article II describes the powers of the Executive branch, and that Article III of the Constitution sets forth the basic parameters of the judicial branch.
With passage of the America Invents Act in 2011, Congress replaced inter partes reexamination with inter partes review, a procedure which allows for more third party intervention and more litigation like actions. The review process leads to a “trial” in front of a panel of at least three administrative law judges as selected by the Director of the PTO from a pool of over 200 judges, which includes the Director himself.
So, should the IPR regime be viewed as a full-on adversarial judicial proceeding without the protections afforded by the Article III district courts, or as a permissible administrative law proceeding focused on improving patent quality by cancelling patents that slipped through the PTO system?
With respect to the definition of the property right involved in a patent, the issue revolves around whether patents are “public” or “private” property rights. In view of the Court’s recent statements in Stern v. Marshall (564 U.S. 462 (2011)) (the Anna Nicole Smith estate case), it seems likely that the Court will view patents as granting private property rights. However, even the Court recognizes that “our discussion of the public rights exception…has not been entirely consistent, and the exception has been the subject of some debate…” Stern 564 U.S. at 488.
On the other hand, the patent code sets forth that patents “shall have the attributes of personal property,” 35 U.S.C. § 261, so perhaps disputes over the validity of patent claims, personal property, should be adjudicated by Article III courts.
Should the Court find that IPR is unconstitutional, the proverbial wrench would be thrown into the cogs of the U.S. patent system; stay tuned.
The sale of a patented article anywhere in the world will exhaust the patent holder’s patent rights.
The Supreme Court has strengthened the doctrine of patent exhaustion, based on the common law concept of not allowing restraints on alienation of chattels. Once a patented article is sold, inside the U.S. or internationally (outside the reach of U.S. patent law,) a patent owner no longer has any patent rights on that article. The Court’s decision was issued Tuesday May 30, 2017, and except for Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence and dissent in part, was unanimous. (Justice Gorsuch did not take part in the consideration or decision.) The Court’s opinion can be found at Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.
This case grew out of a dispute between Lexmark and Impression over the domestic sale of Lexmark laser printer toner cartridges refurbished by Impression. The cartridges were initially sold by Lexmark domestically and overseas.
In an attempt to control the re-sale of their cartridges, Lexmark ran a “Return Program,” which offered a 20% discount in exchange for signing a contract agreeing to use the cartridge once only, and to return the empty cartridge to Lexmark. Cartridges sold under the Return Program had microchips installed to prevent reuse of empty cartridges. Remanufacturers developed ways to counteract the microchips, refill, and resell the tagged cartridges.
Lexmark sued Impression for patent infringement on its practice of purchasing used Lexmark toner cartridges in both the U.S. and overseas, refilling with toner, and reselling the refurbished cartridges to consumers in the U.S. at a significant price reduction.
An analogy was drawn by the Court to their recent copyright case regarding foreign sales (Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 591 (2013)) to reason that it would “make little theoretical or practical sense” to differentiate between the patent exhaustion and copyright first sale doctrines, and therefore they included foreign sales under the patent exhaustion doctrine.
The impact of this decision on chattels such as life changing pharmaceuticals covered by U.S. patents which are frequently sold at lower prices abroad, especially in third world countries, will be interesting. Which party will suffer the most, U.S. patentees or the foreign ill?
A patent owner planning an infringement suit against a U.S. corporate entity now could likely be forced to file suit in the state where the alleged infringer is incorporated.
The Supreme Court placed tight restrictions on where a patent owner can sue a domestic corporation for patent infringement in their unanimous decision issued Monday May 22, 2017. (Justice Gorsuch did not take part in the consideration or decision.) The TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC decision reversed the Federal Circuit, and now having a defendant subject solely to personal jurisdiction will not be enough to permit a patent owner to bring an infringement suit.
The Federal Circuit, since 1988 when Congress changed 28 U.S.C. §1391, had looked at §1391(c) as controlling venue with respect to patent infringement cases, and thus a finding of personal jurisdiction was the determining factor. However, the Supremes found that Congress, in both 1988 and 2011, had not, in their judgment, changed §1400(b)’s definition and scope of “resides,” as further interpreted by an older Supreme case, Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). So, “patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business,” as stated in §1400(b).
This decision should greatly affect the number of suits filed in the current epicenter of patent litigation, the Eastern District of Texas. Approximately 35% of all the country’s patent infringement suits are filed in this district with the quaint town of Marshall gaining some renown for its hospitality. It is anticipated that Delaware litigators soon will be much busier.

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