Source: https://habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas_corpus_blog/discovery/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:56:07+00:00

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When we last checked in on Quezada v. Brown -- the groundbreaking habeas case in which authorization to file a second petition and a request for discovery were granted -- the State had moved for reconsideration of the DJ's order granting discovery.
The good news is that, back on October 19, the DJ denied Respondent's motion for reconsideration on both procedural and substantive grounds. First, the DJ faulted Respondent for filing the motion in an untimely fashion. The DJ rejected all of Respondent's excuses for the late filing.
More important, the DJ rejected the arguments on the merits. And it's an important decision. As mentioned in the prior post, the State had argued that Pinholster had changed the law and discovery was no longer appropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding as the 2254(d)(1) analysis only focuses on the facts that were before the state court.
The DJ disagreed. First, the DJ concluded that Pinholster did not change the law on discovery as that decision did not mention discovery, the rule that covers discovery (RGHCCUS2254 6) or even mention the leading Supreme Court case on the issue, Bracy v. Gramley. The DJ believed that, if Respondent was correct, it would render Rule 6 meaningless and would require the DJ to find that Bracy is no longer good law. The DJ also noted that petitioner's claims was pursuing claims beyond a 2254(d)(1) claim.
*Just to note, discovery continued while the motion for reconsideration was pending. I guess it just continues to continue.
Habeas Corpus - District Court Review - An End to Discovery?
Back in February, I had written about the case of Quezada v. Brown (previously known as Quezada v. Smith). It's a groundbreaking case in which the Second Circuit has already issued a published opinion interpreting several aspects of the second or successive 2244 statute for the very first time.
After the Second Circuit granted authorization to allow petitioner to bring a second or successive petition raising a Brady claim and a claim that the prosecution knowingly presented false evidence, petitioner made a request for discovery in the district court and the DJ granted it. Discovery in the case proceeded forward.
While the parties were engaged in discovery, Pinholster was decided. Relying upon that case, Respondent moved for reconsideration of the order granting discovery, arguing that Pinholster prevents any further discovery in a habeas corpus proceeding. Their argument: if the 2254(d)(1) analysis is restricted to the record before the state court, then there is no need for discovery in federal court.
Petitioner responded that Pinholster was not a discovery case, so it was not a change in law justifying reconsideration. In other words, Pinholster had not changed the standard for when discovery should be ordered. He also argued that there were other reasons in a habeas case for ordering discovery beyond the question of whether or not petitioner had met the 2254(d)(1) standard, including (but, of course, not limited to) whether or not petitioner could establish a miscarriage of justice to overcome a procedural default.
The district court has yet to issue an opinion on the State's reconsideration motion.
This is a really important question that has resulted in a split in the district courts around the country. But it does make me really worried. If Pinholster can be read as stifling discovery (especially in a case like Quezada where it just seems so clear from the smoke that there's a fire), it's just another way in which Pinholster has created inequity in habeas law.
Back in 2010, the Second Circuit took the unusual step of granting a petitioner's request to file a second or successive habeas petition. In addition to granting the request, the case was notable because the court issued a published opinion in which it interpreted, for the first time, certain aspects of the second or successive authorization provision.
The name of that opinion was Quezada v. Smith and I talked about it here.
Now, in the district court, the case has taken an unusual and fascinating turn.
Just to briefly go over the relevant facts again, petitioner was convicted of murder based primarily on the testimony of Sixto Salcedo. However, Salcedo later recanted. In addition, another person, Freddy Caraballo, had come forward and stated that petitioner had not been the one who pulled the trigger.
At a hearing in state court, Salcedo testified that contrary to his trial testimony, he had not seen the shooter's face. He also testified that, prior to the trial, a time when he was on parole, a detective had told him that he had to testify against Quezada or else he would put him away for 10 years. Salcedo also testified that the detective kept him confined in a hotel during the trial.
Turning back to the habeas part of the case . . .
In December 2010, after the Second Circuit granted authorization, petitioner filed a habeas petition in EDNY raising two claims (and these are taken directly from the habeas petition): (1) "The use of perjured testimony to secure Mr. Quezada's conviction violated his right to due process"; and (2) "The State's failure to disclose the coercive conditions under which Sixto Salcedo testified at trial violated Mr. Quezada's right to due process."
The case is now called Quezada v. Brown, 08-CV-5088 (EDNY) (KAM).
Shortly after filing the petition, petitioner moved for discovery. Discovery in habeas cases does not happen all that often. It is governed by Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254 (yes, those rules exist and that is the actual full name of the rules; I'll just say RGHCCUS2254 from here on out).
The rule allows for discovery with leave of the court if good cause is shown. The request for discovery must be specific and provide the reasons for the request. It also must include "any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents." The Supreme Court has stated that this rule was intended to effectuate its 1969 decision in Harris v. Nelson, in which it stated, "where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry."
Here is where the case took a really unusual turn. In response to the discovery request, the State acknowledged for the first time that it possessed documents that actually supported Salcedo's claims about his pre-trial conditions as a witness. Specifically, the State acknowledged that they had documents showing that they did seek and obtain a material witness order for Salcedo. In addition (and even more shockingly in my mind), the State admitted that they had excerpts from a log book entitled "Hotel Custody."
So, in response to the discovery motion, the State completely validated the reasons for why discovery should occur! These documents provided corroboration for Salcedo's prior testimony in the hearing. As a lawyer, it is just so rare to see your adversary make your arguments look even better than they were when you started.
In his reply, petitioner explained exactly why these admissions were just so shocking. Back in the state court proceeding where Salcedo made all of his claims about his pre-trial conditions, the State argued that his testimony was incredible. But these documents tend to show that they were far from incredible. More like pretty credible. The documents, as petitioner points out, strongly suggests that the State may have other stuff to validate Salcedo's claims.
In response to the motion, the DJ held oral argument last Tuesday. Someone recently asked me if oral argument in the district court is rare in habeas corpus cases. It's a good question. I have previously noted that Judge Gleeson in EDNY holds oral argument on almost every petition. But outside of that judge, in my experience, it is pretty rare to see a DJ or MJ hold oral argument in a habeas case.
And the big news is that, as reflected on the docket sheet, the judge granted the motion for discovery at the end of the hearing, "subject to petitioner narrowing and specifying his requests to the extent possible." That qualification seems consistent with RGHCCUS2254 Rule 6.
So an interesting twist in an already groundbreaking case. So far, the district court proceedings have more than validated the Second Circuit's decision to grant authorization. I will be keeping a close eye on this case.

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