Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19801009-838678
Timestamp: 2016-12-02 18:21:52+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; Partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8386/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1980-10-09;8386.78 Analyses : (Art. 35-1) EPUISEMENT DES VOIES DE RECOURS INTERNES, (Art. 35-3) RATIONE TEMPORIS, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION /REQUE,`PE NÂ° 8386/78 X . v/the UNITED KINGDO M X . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 9 October 1980 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 9 octobre 1980 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention : Examination by the Commission, on the basis of the transcript of the lrial, of the question whether an accused has been given a'fair tria!", where he has, through his own behaviour, pmvoked the withdrawal of his counsel and refused to conduct his own defence. Article 6, paragraph 3 (b) and ( d), of the Convention : An accused who has declared that he is not prepared ta take any further pan in the proceedings, cannot complain about a violation of these provisions. Article 6, paragraph 3(c), of thÃ© Conventlon : The right for an accused to be assisted by counse(, especial/v in a complex crimina l trial, is an essential ingredient of a 'fair trial ". However he has to take the consequences of his own obstinate behaviour in demanding that his counsel acts in a manner inconsistant with his professiona l duty, which led the latter to withdraw from the case. The refusal by the trial judge to appoint a fresh counsel is in conformity with the interests of justice, if he offers the accused all necessary facilities for the preparation of his own defence.
Artlcle 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : Sur la base du compte rendu d'audience, examen par la Commission du point de savoir si !'accusÃ© a bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un proeÃ¨s Ã©quitable, alors qu'i/ a, par son comportement, provoquÃ© le retrait de son avocat et a refusÃ© de se dÃ©fendre seul .
Article 6, paragraphe 3, lilt . b) el .d), de la Convention : Ne peut se plaindre d'une violation de ces dispositions l'accusÃ© qui a dÃ©clarÃ© renoncer Ã prendre part Ã la procÃ©dure . - 126 -
Article 6, paragraphe 3, litt . c), de la Conventlon : Le droit d'un accusÃ© Ã Ã©tre assistÃ© d'un dÃ©fenseur, notamment dans une affaire complexe, est un Ã©lÃ©men( essentiel d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable. L'accusÃ© suppo rt e toutefois les consÃ©quences de son obstination Ã exiger de son conseil un compo rt ement contraire aux rÃ¨gles dÃ©ontologiques, de telle sorte que ce conseil renonce Ã son mandat. Est conforme aux intÃ©rÃ©ts de la justice le refus du juge de dÃ©signer alors un autre avocat . en proposant Ã l'accusÃ© toutes facilitÃ©s pour qu'il assure seul sa dÃ©fense .
(francais : noir p. 112)
The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1932, and at present detained in H .M . Prison B ., England . He is represented before the Commission by Masser & Eccleston, a firm of solicitors based in Nottingham . On . . . November 1976 the applicant was convicted on charges of theft, forgery and criminal deception and was sentenced to five years imprisonment . At his trial the prosecution alleged that the applicant, together with two codefendants . was involved in a widespread fraud on the Post Office, the applicant being the forger who altered a number of Post Oftice Savings Books in order to niake it appear that certain accounts were thÃ© subject of large credits . His codetÃ©ndants, who pleaded guilty, were the users of the books which they presented u : the Post Office in order to make withdrawals . The prosecution's evidence against the applicant, who pleaded not guilty, consisted of a written statement and subsequent verbal admissions which the applicant made when he was being questioned by the police . In these statements the applicant was said to have provided details as to how the forgeries were carried out and what instruments he had used .
On the first day of the trial counsel for the applicant, who was in receipt of legal aid, sought to challenge the statements made by the latter on the grounds that they were not made voluntarily and that the applicant, who is a heavy smoker, had been pressurised to make them by not being provided with cigarettes during his interrogation . The jury were asked to retire while the applicant's counsel sought to challenge the voluntariness of the statements . In the course of this procedure : known as the Voire dire, the applicant, who gave evidence, seemed to admit that certain of the statements he had made concerning details of the forgeries were true but alleged that he had been induced to make them_. At the end of the Voire dire the judge ruled that the various statements were all made voluntarily, so the jury returned and the trial proceeded . The next witness called was a police ofi cer whom counsel began to cros s examine on a line which the judge considered was contradicted by the previou s - 127-
teslimony of the applicant in that he sought to challenge the Iruth of'statements concerning the forgeries which the applicant had previously admitted . The judge . in the absence of the jury, asked the shorthand writer to read out the admissions niade by the applicanl in the course of the Voire dire . Counsel sought to argue that Ihese admissions concerning details of how the forgeries took place, concerned previous offences for which the applicant had alreadv been convicted . The judge however pointed out that sonie of the statentents cor.cerned the two co-accâ¢used in the present Irial . As a result of this exchange, counsel for the applicant announced to the court ihat since his client did not want to change his plea he felt in an enibarrasing position to carry on with the defence and was thus nbligcd tn w'ilhdraw . The judge then explained to the applicant that, his counsel having wilhdrawn, he would have to conduct his defence hintself . He explained that he was prepared to give him every assistance he required and asked him if he wanted his solicilors In continue to represent hint and provide necessarv legal advice . The applicant refused this o1Ter and insisted on his right to be affordeI anolher counsel . The judge was nol prepared to accede to this requesl . taking the view that any new cnunsel would be . sintilarly "entbarrassed" as a result of the applicant's iestimonv . The applicant's solicitor and counsel then withdrew and ihc applicant staled thal he wish@d lo take no part in the trial . The judge refused hini permission io return to the cells and the jury was recalled . The prosecution witnesses were Ihen called . After each wilness had tesiilied the judge asked ihc applicant it he would like io exercise his right of cross-exantinalion . The applicani, repeating his view Ihal he was not legally qualitied and wanted another barrisler tn presenl his defcnce . refused . The applicant then took no further part in Ihc irial .
AI the close of the prosecution's case the trial judge informed the applicant ihat he could present his case to the jury either by making an unsworn statement or a statement from the dock on oath or to call any witnesses on his behalf . The applicant again declined the offer . The judge then summed up the evidence, pointing out to thejury inter alia lhat the onus of proof rested on the prosecution and that the defendant did not have to prove anything . He also directed the jury lo acquit the applicant in respect of three of the counts with which he was charged . After the jury had returned a verdict of guilty in respect of the rentaining charges . the judge invited the applicant to make a plea in mitigation . The applicant repeated his request for counsel and refused . The applicant appealed lo the Court of Criminal Appeal, submitting that he .chmtld have been given a fresh counsel . In the course of their decision of . . . December 1977 the Court stated as follows : . . Ihe learned judge has a discretion in the matter . He was clearly right . As regards the proposition thal if an accused ntan refuses to accept the advice of his counsel which in the circumstances appeared lo Ihe learne d - 128 -
iudee to be sensible advice and required his counsel to continue a defence which he could not prove without a clear breach of counsel's duty, in those circunistances the learnedjudge was clearly right in refusing the attempted insistence nf Mr X . to be represented by another counsel . " The applicant then applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal on . . . May 1978 for leave to appeal to the House of Lords . The Court was of the opinion that there was no ground for certifying a point of law of general public importance and refused leave to appeal .
THE LAW ( Extract) 1 . The applicant complains principally under Article 6 (3) (c) of the Convention that, as a consequence of the trial judge's decision not to grant him fresh counsel, he was denied legal assistance and was not given a fair t ri al . 2 . Article 6 (3) (c) provides as follows : "Everyone charged with a c ri minal offence has the following minimum rights :
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance to be given it free when the interests of justice so requir e
3 . The applicant submits that the admissions made on oath in the course of his trial did not in any way relate to the offences charged in the indictment but concerned different matters . Thus, he contends that he should have been assigned new counsel to challenge the alleged context of his admission statement . In the circumstances he maintains that to expect him to assume his own defence in a complicated criminal trial was unreasonable . 4 . The respondent Government submit that since the applicant had admitted he had made the statement and, moreover, that it was substantially true . a new counsel could not conduct an inconsistent defence, having regard to the rules of Professional etiquette . S . The Commission recalls tirst of all that the rights contained in paragraph 3 of Article 6 are specifc components of the guarantee of a fair trial in Article 6(1) . As the European Court of Human Rights has said in the Artico Case, "when compliance with paragraph 3 is being reviewed, its basic purpose must no( be forgotten, nor must it be severed from its roots" (judgment of 13 Mav 1980 . para . 32) .
6 . The Commission considers that the right to counsel, especially in a complex criminal trial, must normally be considered an essential ingredieni of a fair trial . In this regard . Article 6 (3) (c) ntakes it clear that an accused has the right to "legal assistance of his own choosing" or if he has not sufticient nteans, to be "given it free when the interests of justice so requirÃ©" . However, an accused person cannot require counsel to disregard basic principles ol' his professional duty in the presentation of his defence . If such an insisience results in the accused having to conduct his own defence . any consequent "inequalitv of arms" can only be attributable to his own behaviour . 7 . In the presenl case the app)icant, who was in receipt of legal aid . was denied further representation by counsel . However, any diRcu)ties which arose in the course of the trial were due to the applicant's own testimony . He substantiallv admitted the truth of certain incriminating stalements bul continued to insist ihat his counsel should conduct his defence on the basis that they were untrue .
It enterge .c front the tria) transcript that the judge took the view that . given the nature of the incriniinating statements ntade by the applicant, Ihere was no positive benefit in being assigned new legally aided counsel and that it was in the inierests of justice to order the trial lo continue with the applicant providing his own defence . 8 . The Coniniission has exantined the transcript and in particular the allegedlv incriniinating testiniony of the applicant and the exchanges between the app)icani and the trial judge after the withdrawal of counsel . It can only conclude thai . such was the nature . scope and specificity of the ineriniinaiing si .uenienis made bv the applicant . il was not unreasonable for the trial judge w have fornted the opinion ihat fresh counsel could noi continue to act on his behalf in a nianner consistent with his professional duty not to mislead the courl :
9 . The applicant has argued that it would have been open to fresh counsel io cross-examine the parties as to the context of his statement . Huwever, again an examinaiion of the transcript leaves no doubt that his admission related to ihc charees in the indictntent and provides a reasonable basis for thc judge's vicw thai a new counsel would have been unavoidably "entbarassed" by ihc extent io which the applicant had undermined his own defence . 10 . The Contmission is therefore of the opinion that the decision bv the trial judge that he not be assigned fresh counsel was "in the interests of justice" and consequently did not deny the applicant his rights under Article 6 (3) (c) . 11 . The applicant has further-complained that, following the decision of his counsel io withdraw he did not have adequate time and facilities for ihe preparation of his defence as required by Article 6 (3) (b) . or ihe opportunity "tn cxantine or have exaniined witnesses against him . . ." as provided under Article 6 (3) (d) .
I? . 'Ihe Commiission nules frunt Ihe transcripl of the trial Ihal when it was niade clear lu ihe applicant that he was not going to be assigned fresh O aur.cl . lie dcclared that he was not prepared to take any further part in the prnccedinqs . In these circunt .stances . the Commission considers Ihat it is nut upen to Ihe applicanl to complain ihat he was not given sufficiem time ur tacilities for Ihe preparation of his defence . Similarly, it is clear thal Ihe applicanl was given every opportunity by the trial judge after counsel wilhdrew, lo ex ;unine witnesses against him and call witnesses on his behalf . 13 . Finally, the applicant complains that as a consequence of not being assigned fresh cotinsel, and having adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, he was denied a fair trial under Article 6(1) .
14 . It is Irue that Article 6(1) of Ihe Convention guarantees, inrer alia that, in the determination of any criminal charge against hini, everyone is entilled In a fair and public hearing wilhin a reasonable time by an independent and intpartial tribunal established by law . 15 . The Commission, in its exantination of the applicant's complaints under Article 6( 3 ) (b) and (c) and (d) has taken into account the fairness of the proceedings in general and has concluded in substance that, because of the conlradictory stand of the applicant . the conduct of the proceedings could not be considered as unfair . Ib . Nevertheless Ihe Comntission considers that in such a situation Article 6 requires Ihat the applicant be given every opponunity to present his defence and to challenge evidence presented by the prosecution . However, it is clear ihat the judge niade every possible effort to ensure that the accused's defence was put In the jury . In this regard the Commission notes that the trial judge offered the applicant every assistance and advice in the presentation of his case . Mnrcover . Ihe Comntission attached weight to the following factors :
- Ihat he was allowed the assistance of his solicitors who were present and available to advise the applicant on his position after the withdrawal of crnin .scl : - Ihal he was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine and to call "iincsses : - ihat the trial judge provided him with the option of presenting his dcliâ¢nce to Ihe jury either Ihrough a sworn statenient or an unsworn statentent trum the doc k
- that the trial judge in his summing up to the jury made it clear Ihal Ihe burden of proof rested on the prosecution and that the defendant was not o bliged lo disprove the accusation against him : - that the trial judge directed the jury to return a verdict of "not guilty" in respect of three counts in the indictment .
The Commission considers that any inequality of arms may have resulted front the applicant's unwillingness to co-operate and take advantage of the opportunities to present his defence cannot, in such circumstances be attributed to the Court .Finaly; the applicant states that the authorities were withholding an important document relating to his defence . However, the applicant has not substantiated the claint that such a document, even if it existed, was being withheld . Moreover . the Commission notes that the applicant did not raise this complaint before the Court of Criminal Appeal .
Accordingly, the Commission is of the opinion that the applicant has had a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6(1) . 17 . The Commission concludes that the applicant's complaints under the above provisions of Article 6 of the Convention must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded under Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
(TNA!)UC7 7 ON)
EN FAIT (Extrait ) Le requÃ©rant, ressortissant britannique nÃ© en 1932 . est actuellement dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de B . . Angleterre . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par MM . Masser et Eccleston, solicitors Ã Nottingham . Le . . . novembre 1976 le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable de chefs de vol, faux et escroquerie et condamnÃ© Ã cinq ans de prison . Lors du procÃ¨s . l'accusation a allÃ©guÃ© que le requÃ©rant . ainsi que deux co-accusÃ©s . Ã©taient impliquÃ©s dans une vaste escroquerie Ã l'encontre des postes- le requÃ©rant ayant falsifiÃ© plusieurs livrets d'Ã©pargne postale de faÃ§on que certains comptes soient crÃ©diteurs de sommes importantes . Ses co-accusÃ©s, qui ont plaidÃ© coupable . Ã©taient les porteurs des livrets, qu'ils prÃ©sentaient au bureau de poste afin d'effectuer des retraits . Les preuves de l'accusation contre le requÃ©rant, qui a plaidÃ© non coupable, consistaient en une dÃ©claration Ã©crite et des aveux verbaux ultÃ©rieurs que le requÃ©rant avait faits alors qu'il Ã©tait interrogÃ© par la police . Dans ces dÃ©clarations le requÃ©rant aurait donnÃ© des dÃ©tails quant Ã la maniÃ¨re dont il avait procÃ©dÃ© pour les falsifications et quant aux instruments qu'il avait utilisÃ©s . Le premier jour du procÃ¨s, l'avocat du requÃ©rant, lequel bÃ©nÃ©ficiait de l'assistance judiciaire, a voulu contester les dÃ©clarations faites par ce dernie r
au nmtif qu'il ne les acait pas fornwlÃ©es de son plein grÃ© mais s~~us l'effet de pressions : gros funteur . il s'Ã©tait ru refuser des cigarettes au cours re l'intcrrogatoire . Le jury a Ã©tÃ© inritÃ© Ã se retirer pendant que l'avocat du rcquÃ©rant cherchait Ã contester le caractÃ¨re spontanÃ© des dÃ©clarations . Au cours de cette procÃ©dure . connue sous le nom de - Voire dire Â» . le requÃ©rant . dans sa dÃ©position . a sentblÃ© admettre que certaines des dÃ©clarations qu'il cvait faites concernant des dÃ©tails de falsifications Ã©taient vÃ©ridiques, mais a prÃ©tendu avoir Ã©tÃ© incitÃ© Ã les faire . A la fin du â¢ Voire dire Â» . le juge a admis que les dicerses dÃ©clarations avaient loutes Ã©tÃ© faites spontanÃ©ntent ; le jury rentra dans la salle et le procÃ¨s se poursuivil . Le tÃ©moin suivant fut un officier de police que l'avocat commenÃ§a Ã contre-interroger dans un sens que le juge estima conlrairc Ã la dÃ©position antÃ©rieure du requÃ©rant en ce qu'il cherchait Ã contester la vÃ©racitÃ© des dÃ©clarations concernant les falsifications, que le requÃ©rant avait prÃ©cÃ©denintent adntise . Le juge . en l'absence du jury . dentanda au stÃ©nographe de lire les aveux passÃ©s par le requÃ©rant au cours du â¢ Voire dire â¢ . L'avocat chercha Ã¹ arguer que ces aveux relalifs aux dÃ©lails du procÃ©dÃ© des falsifications portaient sur des infractions prÃ©cÃ©dentes pour lesquelles le requÃ©rant avait dÃ©jn Ã©iÃ© condamnÃ© . Le juge releva toutefois que certaines des dÃ©clarations concernaieut les deux coaccnsÃ©s au procÃ¨s en cours . A la suite de cet Ã©change de vues . l'avocat du requÃ©rant annonÃ§a au tribunal que puisque son client ne voulait pas changer de ntoven de dÃ©fense . il se trouvait dans une situation embarra sanle'icou Ã assurer la dÃ©fense et se voyait donc contraint de renoncer Ã son mandat . Le juge expliqua alors au requÃ©rant que, son avocat s'Ã©tant retirÃ©, il devrait assurer sa dÃ©fense IuintÃ©me . II lui expliqua qu'il Ã©tait prÃ©t Ã !ui accorder toute assistance donl il pourrait avoir besoin et lui ilema~~ .la s'il souhaitait que ses solicilors continuent Ã le reprÃ©senter et Ã lui fnurnir les conseils juridiques nÃ©cessaires . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clina cette offre et insista sur son droit Ã avoir un autre avocat . Le itige n'Ã©tait pas disposÃ© Ã dccÃ©der Ã cette dentande, estimant que tout nouvel avocat serail lui aussi ~ embarrassÃ© - en raison de la dÃ©position du requÃ©rant . Le solicitor et l'avocat du requÃ©rant sÃ© retirÃ¨rent alors et le requÃ©rant dÃ©clara qu'il entendait ne prendre aucune part au procÃ¨s . Le joge lui refusa l'autorisation de retourner dans sa cellule et le jury ful rappelÃ© . Les tÃ©nmins de l'accusation furent alors appelÃ©s . AprÃ¨s que chaquc lÃ©nmin eut dÃ©posÃ© . le juge demanda au requÃ©rant s'il souhailail exercer son droit de conlre - interrogatoire . Le requÃ©rant, rÃ©pÃ©tant qu'il n'Ã©tait pas juridiquentent qualifiÃ© et souhailait qu'un autre avocal prÃ©sentÃ¢t sa dÃ©fense, refusa . Il ne prit plus part au procÃ¨s .
A la fin du rÃ©quisitoire . le juge informa le requÃ©rant qu'il pouvait prÃ©senter sa cause au jury soit en faisant tine dÃ©clar,uion non certifiÃ©e, soit en falSant une dÃ©claration sous serment du banc des accusÃ©s, soit en citant des tÃ©nioins Ã dÃ©charge . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clina Ã©galement cette offre . Le jug e
rÃ©sunia alors les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve en indiquant au jury . notamnient, que la charge de la preuve incombait Ã l'accusation et que le dÃ©fendeur n'avait rien Ã prouver . Il invita aussi le jury Ã acquitter le requÃ©rant de trois des chefs d'accusation . AprÃ¨s que le jury eut rendu un verdict de culpabilitÃ© pour les chefs d'accusation restants . le juge invita le requÃ©rant Ã plaider pour une attÃ©nuation de la peine . Le requÃ©rant renouvela sa demande d'un avocat et dÃ©clina cette offre . Le requÃ©rant interjeta appel auprÃ¨s de la cour des appels criminels (Court of Crimiaa! Appeal) soutenant qu'il aurait d0 se voir att ri buer un nouvel avocat . Dans sa dÃ©cision du . . . dÃ©cembre 1977, la cour dÃ©clare ce qui suit :
. . . L'Ã©minent juge jouissait d'un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire en la matiÃ¨re . Il a manifestement agi Ã bon droit . Pour ce qui est du cas oÃ¹ un accusÃ© a rÃ©fusÃ© d'accepter les conseils de son avocat qui dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce ont paru raisonnables Ã l'Ã©minent juge, et demandÃ© Ã son avocat de poursuivre une dÃ©fense qu'il ne pouvait Ã©tayer par aucune preuve sans manquer de faÃ§ on flagrante Ã son devoir d'avocat, dans ces circonstances c'est manifestement Ã bon droit que l'Ã©minent juge a rejetÃ© la demande rÃ©pÃ©tÃ©e de M . X . d'Ãªtre reprÃ©sentÃ© par un autre avocat . â¢ Le requÃ©rant sollicita alors auprÃ¨s de la cour des appels c ri minels le . . . mai 1978 l'auto risation d'introduire un recours devant la Chambre des Lords . La cour estima qu'il n'y avait pas Ã vÃ© ri fier un point de droit revÃªtant un intÃ©rÃªt public gÃ©nÃ©ral et refusa d'autoriser le recours .
EN DROIT (Extrait ) 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint Ã titre principal, en invoquant l'article 6 . para . graphe 3 c) de la Convention, que par suite de la dÃ©cision du juge du jugement de ne pas lui accorder un nouvel avocat, il s'est vu dÃ©nier l'aide judiciaire et n'a pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . 2 . L'article 6, paragraphe 3 c) stipule que : â¢ Tout accusÃ© a droit notamment Ã :
(c) se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃªme ou avoir l'assistance d'un dÃ©fenseur de son choix et . s'il n'a pas les moyens de rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur, pouvoir Ãªtre assistÃ© gratuitement par un avocat d'office . lorsque les intÃ©rÃªts de la justice l'exigent :
3 . Le requÃ©rant soutient que les aveux faits sous serment au cours du procÃ¨s ne se rapportaient nullement aux infractions reprises dans l'acte d'accusation ntais concernaient des questions diffÃ©rentes . Il prÃ©tend ainsi qu'il aurait dÃ» Ã©tre pourvu d'un nouvel avocat pour contester le contexte dans lequel ses aveux avaient Ã©tÃ© faits . Dans ces circonstances, il ntaintient qu'il Ã©tait dÃ©raisonnable de s'attendre qu'iI assure lui-ni@me sa dÃ©fense dans un procÃ¨s pÃ©nal compliquÃ© . 4 . Le Gouvernentent dÃ©fendeur soutient que puisque le requÃ©rant avait admis qu'il avait fait la dÃ©claration et en outre qu'elle Ã©tait vÃ©ridique en substance, un nouvel avocat ne pouvait, vu les rÃ¨gles de la dÃ©ontologie, assurer une dÃ©fense incohÃ©rente . 5 . La Comntission rappelle que les droi(s consacrÃ©s par le paragraphe 3 de l'article 6 sont des Ã©lÃ©ments spÃ©cifiques de la garantie d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable contenue Ã l'article 6 . paragraphe I . Comme la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Hontnte l'a dit dans l'Affaire Artico . â¢ en veillant Ã (l')observations (du paragraphe 3) . il ne faut pas perdre de vue sa finalitÃ© profonde ni le couper du truur conumne auquel il se rattache - (arrÃªt du 13 mai 1980, par . 32) . 6 . La Commission estime que le droit Ã un dÃ©fenseur, en particulier dans un procÃ¨s pÃ©nal complexe, doit normalement Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme un Ã©lÃ©ment essentiel d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . A cet Ã©gard l'article 6 . paragraphe 3 c) prÃ©cise qu'un accusÃ© a droit Ã - l'assistance d'un dÃ©fenseur de son choix â¢ ou, s'il n'en a pas les moyens . d'â¢ Ãªtre assistÃ© gratuitement par un avocat d'office, lorsque les intÃ©rÃ©ts de la justice l'exigent . . Toutefois, un accusÃ© ne peut exiger d'un avocat qu'il nÃ©glige les principes fondamentaux de son devoir professionnel lorsqu'il prÃ©sentera sa dÃ©fense . Si cette insistance aboutit Ã ce que l'accusÃ© doive assurer sa dÃ©fense lui-mÃªme, toute â¢ inÃ©galitÃ© des armes - qui s'ensuit ne peut Ã¨tre imputable qu'Ã son propre comportement .
7 . En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant, qui bÃ©nÃ©ficiait de l'assistance judiciaire s'est vu refuser l'assistance d'un nouvel avocat . Cependant . toutes les difficultÃ©s qui ont surgi au cours du procÃ¨s provenaient de la dÃ©position du requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme . Il a admis en substance la vÃ©racitÃ© de certaines dÃ©clarations qui l'incriniinaient mais il a persistÃ© Ã exiger de son avocat qu'il conduise sa dÃ©fense en partant du principe qu'elles Ã©taient niensongÃ¨res . D'aprÃ¨s le contpte rendu du procÃ¨s, le juge a estimÃ© que . vu la nature des dÃ©clarations formulÃ©es par le requÃ©rant et qui l'accusaient lui-mÃªme . celui-ci n'aurait eu aucun avantage Ã sa voir dÃ©signer un nouvel avocat d'office et qu'il Ã©tait de l'intÃ©rÃªt de la justice d'ordonner la poursuite du procÃ¨s, le requÃ©rant assurant lui-mÃªme sa dÃ©fense . 8 . La Commission a exantinÃ© le contpte rendu du procÃ¨s . en particulier la dÃ©position prÃ©tendument auto-accusatoire du requÃ©rant et les Ã©changes de vues entre le requÃ©rant et le juge aptÃ¨s le retrait de l'avocat . Force lui est d e
conclure que vu la nature . la po rtÃ©e et la spÃ©cificitÃ© des dÃ©clarations autoaccusatoires forntulÃ©es par lerequÃ©rant, il n'Ã©tait pas dÃ©raisonnable que le juge eslimÃ t qu'un nouvel avocat n'aurait pu continuer ' Ã agir pour le compte du requÃ©rant conformÃ©ment Ã son obligation professionnelle de ne pas induire le Iribunal en erreur . . Le requÃ©rant a fait valoir qu'il aurait Ã©tÃ©doisible Ã un nouvel avocat d e "9 contre-interroger les parties sur les circonstances de sa dÃ©claration . Toutefois . ici encore, aprÃ¨s un examen du compte rendu du procÃ¨s . il ne fait pas de doute que ses aveux portaient sur les accusations reprises (i ans l'acte d'accusation et fournissaient une base raisonnable Ã l'idÃ©e du iuge qu'un nouvel avocat n'aurait pas manquÃ© d'Ãªtre â¢ embarrassÃ© . quand il se serait aperÃ§u combien le requÃ©rant avait compromis sa propre dÃ©fense .
10 . La Commission estime donc que la dÃ©cision du juge de ne pas dÃ©signer un nouvel avocat Ã©tait conforme aux â¢ intÃ©rÃªts de la justice - et n'a donc pas pri vÃ© le requÃ©rant des droits que l'article 6, paragraphe 3 c) lui reconnaÃ®t . II . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre de n'avoir, aprÃ¨s la dÃ©cision de son avocat de se retirer, disposÃ© ni du temps et des facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense comme l'exige l'ar ( icle 6 . pÃ ragraphe 3 b), ni de la possibilitÃ© d' Â« interroger ou (de) faire interroger les tÃ©moins Ã charge . . . comme Ic prÃ©voit l'article 6, paragraphe 3 d) . 12 . La Commission relÃ¨ve qtie d'aprÃ¨s le compte rendu du procÃ¨s, lorsqu'il a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©cisÃ© au requÃ©rant qu'un nouvel avocat ne lui serait pas dÃ©signÃ©, il a dÃ©clarÃ© ne plus vouloir participer Ã la procÃ©dure . Dans ces conditions, la Commission estime qu'il ne lui est pas loisible de se plaindre de ne vas avoir disposÃ©du temps et des facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense . De mÃªme il est clair que le juge a donnÃ© au requÃ©rant, aprÃ¨s le retrait de son avocat, toute possibilitÃ© d'interroger les tÃ©moins Ã charge et de citer des tÃ©moins Ã dÃ©charge . 13 . Enfin, le re quÃ©rant se plaint que . comme il n'a pas euun nouvel avdcat et n'a pas disposÃ© du temps et desfacilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense ; il n'a pasbÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . au sens de l'article 6 . paragraphe 1 . 1-0 . Certes, l'article 6, paragraphe I de la Convention affirme, notamment, que toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial . Ã©tabli par la loi, qui dÃ©cidera du bien-fondÃ© de toutÃ© accusatitin en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle .15 . Lorsqu'elle a exaniinÃ© les griefs du requÃ©rant sur le terrain de l'article 6 . paragraphe 3 b) . c) et d), la Commission a tenu compte de l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure en gÃ©nÃ©ral et elle a conclu en substance qu'en raison de l'attitude contradictoire ' du requÃ©rant, la conduite de la procÃ©dure ne pouvait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme inÃ©quitable .
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Ib . La Cummission estinte nÃ©anmoins que dans pareille situation . l'ariicle h cxige quc le requÃ©rant ait toute prc;s ;bilitÃ© de prÃ©senter sa dÃ©fense el de contesler les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve produits par l'accusation . fl est loutefois clair que le juge a fail lout ce qui Ã©tait en son pouvoir pour que la dÃ©fense de l'accusÃ© soit prÃ©sentÃ©e au iury . A ccl Ã©gard, la Coniniission note que le juge a proposÃ© au requÃ©rant Ioutc l'assistancr et tous les conseils pussibles rlans la prÃ©sentation de sa cause . La Conimission a Ã©galenient accordÃ© de l'iniportance aux Ã©lÃ©mcnts suivants :
- le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© aumrisÃ© Ã bÃ©nÃ©ficier de l'assistance de ses solicitor .c . qui Ã©taient en fait prÃ©sents ei disponibles pour le conseiller sur sa situation aprÃ¨s le retrait de son avocat ; - il a bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© de la facultÃ© de contre-interroger cl de citer des tÃ©moin s - le jugc lui a offert lu facultÃ© de prÃ©senter sa dÃ©fense au jury sous la forni e d'ime dÃ©claratinn sous serment ou d'une dÃ©claration non certifiÃ©e faile du banc des accusÃ©s : - dans son rÃ©sumÃ© au jury le juge a prÃ©cisÃ© que la charge de la preuve incombait Ã l'accusation et quc le dÃ©fendeur n'Ã©tait pas lenu de faire la preuve contraire de l'accusation portÃ©e contre lui ; - le juge du jugement a invitÃ© le jury Ã rendre un verdict de non-culpabilitÃ© sur (rois chefs d'accusation . La Commission estime que toute inÃ©galitÃ© des armes qui peut avoir rÃ©stiltÃ© de la nmuvaise volontÃ© du rcquÃ©rant pour coopÃ©rer et pour se prr,aluir de la facultÃ© de prÃ©senter sa dÃ©fense, ne peut dans les circonstance .c de l'espÃ¨ce Ãªtre iniputÃ©e au tribunal . Enfin . le requÃ©rant dÃ©clare quc les autoritÃ©s ont refusÃ© de conununiquer un docunienl iniportanl relatif Ã sa dÃ©fense . Il n'a toutefois fourni aucun Ã©lÃ©ment Ã rappni (le son grief sclon lequel pareil document, Ã snpposer qu'il cxistÃ¢t, avail Ã©tÃ© retenu . La Comnii .sion relÃ¨ve du reste que le requÃ©rant n'a pas forninlÃ© ce grief devant la cour des appels criminels .
Elle ectime dnnc que le requÃ©rant a tu un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable au sens de l'article 6 . paragraphe I . 17 . La Comniission arrive Ã la conclusion que les griefs du requÃ©rant tirÃ©s des dispositions prÃ©citÃ©es de l'article 6 de la Convenlion doivent Ãªtre rejetÃ©s comme nianifestement ntal fondiâ¢s . au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention .
- 137 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 09/10/1980Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 6
 L'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27