Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2d/68/810.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 20:21:28+00:00

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GERALD ALLEN CARTER, Defendant and Appellant.
Matthew M. Kearney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Elizabeth Miller and Barry H. Lawrence, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On September 28, 1966, at 7:40 p.m. Officer Ronald Martin of the California Highway Patrol went to a street intersection in the San Bernardino area in response to an accident call. At the scene he observed defendant's car in a flood control ditch near the intersection. Defendant was sitting behind the wheel of the car, the engine was racing, and the rear wheels, which were lifted off the ground, appeared to be spinning.
Officer Martin requested defendant to get out of the car and asked him what had happened. Defendant replied that he had had too much to drink. He had a strong odor of alcohol about him, was unsteady on his feet, and had staggered when alighting from the vehicle. He was unable to walk up the slight incline of the ditch by himself and had to be assisted by Martin. Upon the arrival of a second highway patrol officer, Barton Brubaker, standard field sobriety tests were administered to defendant. When he failed these utterly, he was arrested for being drunk in a public place, advised of his constitutional rights to silence and counsel, frisked for weapons, and placed in the rear of the patrol car.
As defendant was seating himself in the patrol car, Officer Brubaker noticed a billfold lying on the doorsill and asked defendant if it was his. Defendant replied that it was. The officer then noticed two papers lying on the ground beneath the doorsill, and upon examining them found that they were Goodyear Rubber Company payroll checks protectorized in the sums of $219.10 and $119.20 respectively but bearing neither the name of a payee nor the signature of a maker. Defendant was asked whether the checks were his. He replied that he had never seen them before. Sheriff's officers were then summoned, and a search of defendant's person by such officers disclosed, among other things, another blank Goodyear Rubber Company check protectorized in the amount of $119.20. The three checks were numbered respectively 1059, 1088, and 1092.
There was evidence at the trial that in March 1966 defendant had been temporarily employed as a carpenter at the Goodyear factory in Cucamonga; that in April of 1966 that establishment had been burglarized and blank payroll checks numbered consecutively from 1034 to 1100 had been taken; and that the cover of the factory's check protector had been removed and a number of keys depressed.
Defendant testified in his own defense that on the afternoon of September 28, after visiting an employment office to see about a job as a carpenter, he began to drink wine and beer in [68 Cal. 2d 813] various bars in the Mt. Vernon area; that he was drinking heavily and did not remember leaving the third bar that he visited; that the next thing he remembered was talking to the arresting officers; that his memory of that conversation was vague; that he had no payroll checks in his possession when he began to drink that afternoon; and that he did not recall anyone handing him such checks or engaging in conversations relative to checks.
After a trial that consumed a day and a half, the jury commenced its deliberations at 11:45 a.m. on January 11, 1967. At 1:45 p.m. the jury returned to the courtroom for the purpose of having certain testimony read, and thereafter retired to continue its deliberations. At 6 p.m. the jury again returned to the courtroom. At this time the judge inquired whether there was a possibility that further deliberation would produce a verdict, and upon receiving an affirmative answer he sent the jury to dinner with instructions to continue deliberation after dinner.
Thereupon, at 8:55 p.m., the jury again retired to continue its deliberations. Ten minutes later at 9:05 p.m., it returned its verdict of guilty.
Defendant's principal contention is that the jury's verdict was the result of coercion by the court.
 We begin with a general principle, given appropriate expression in Wissel v. United States (2d Cir. 1927) 22 F.2d 468, 471: "The cases all recognize that the surrender of the independent judgment of a jury may not be had by command or coercion. It is not enough to cure the error to conventionally say that it is the function of the jury to decide questions of fact.pressure of whatever character, whether acting on the fears or hopes of the jury, if so exerted as to overbear their volition without convincing their judgment, is a species of restraint under which no valid judgment can be made to support a conviction. No force should be used or threatened, and carried to such a degree that the juror's discretion and judgment is overborne, resulting in either undue influence or coercion. A judge may advise, and he may persuade, but he may not command, unduly influence, or coerce."
It is quite clear, however, that such adjurations of the trial court, which would be entirely proper under some circumstances, may under others operate to overbear the independence of the jury and produce a verdict tainted by compromise or concession to expediency. To advert again to our language in People v. Burton, supra, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 356, the question of coercion is of necessity "peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case."
The rationale peculiar to these cases, and to cases in which the court's remarks more directly show its preference for a particular verdict (see People v. Kindleberger (1893) 100 Cal. 367 [34 P. 852]; People v. Carder (1916) 31 Cal. App. 355 [160 P. 686]; People v. Conboy (1910) 15 Cal. App. 97 [113 P. 703]), is not applicable to the case now before us. [5a] In the instant matter the judge whose remarks are alleged to [68 Cal. 2d 817] have had a coercive effect on the jury, was not the judge who had tried the case. His remarks could not reasonably have left the impression upon the jury that his view of the evidence was in agreement with the majority of jurors. fn. 4 Moreover, the judge in question was not advised as to how many jurors favored a guilty verdict. fn. 5 Thus, if the remarks in question had a coercive effect upon the single dissenting juror, that effect did not derive from his impression that the court, upon its own consideration of the evidence, favored a guilty verdict.
 It is clear, however, that coercion of the jury can occur absent any intimation, express or implied, that the court favors a particular verdict. The basic question, as we have indicated above, is whether the remarks of the court, viewed in the totality of applicable circumstances, operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency. Such a displacement may be the result of statements by the court constituting undue pressure upon the jury to reach a verdict, whatever its nature, rather than no verdict at all.
[5b] Turning to the case at bench, we have concluded that in the light of the surrounding circumstances the statements of Judge Knauf (see fn. 1, ante) were coercive of the jury and require reversal of the judgment. Although it may not be argued, since Judge Knauf did not preside at the trial, that his remarks reflected his view of the evidence or his predilection for a particular verdict, their effect was to exert extreme pressure upon the lone dissenting juror to conform his opinion to that of his fellow jurors. To begin with, it is significant that the dissenter was singled out in open court and questioned as to his understanding of certain instructions reread [68 Cal. 2d 820] by the court. Without interruption the court then forthwith proceeded to an inquiry as to the probability of an agreement, calling for a show of hands by the jury as to whether "there is any chance to reach a verdict." (See fn. 1, ante.) While the judge failed to have the record show the results of this inquiry, a fair reading of the transcript indicates that the jury felt there was a chance of agreement and at that point the foreman appears to have offered a suggestion as to the time it would take-- "Two or three hours?" Added to the foregoing was the court's observation, apparently based solely upon the fact that the taking of testimony had consumed only one day, that the case was not "complicated." Finally, we are faced with the judge's response to the foreman's suggestion and to the information received from the prosecutor that the case had taken only one day to try. While we realize that a "cold" record may not do justice to the best of intentions, we cannot overlook the exasperated and peremptory tone reflected in the transcript by the judge's statement to the jurors that he was not willing to remain for the indicated length of time and by his stern admonition, couched almost in terms of a threat, that the jurors would be locked up for the night if a verdict were not reached within a half hour. The effective pressure of all these remarks was clearly concentrated upon the lone dissenting juror.
 We have observed above that the task of the judge, when dealing with a jury experiencing difficulty in reaching agreement, is in any case an extremely delicate one. The sensitivity of that task is augmented when it appears that a small number of jurors opposes the views of the majority, for the tendency of the majority to attempt to impose its will on the minority by means other than rational persuasion can only be made greater, and therefore more pernicious, by intemperate adjurations from the bench. In such circumstances, when the court has determined that a "reasonable probability" of agreement exists in spite of present disagreement, the appeal for agreement which is demanded of him must be couched in terms of conscientious judgment and rational persuasion.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred when it failed to give sua sponte an instruction to the effect that defendant's intoxication could be considered by the jury in determining whether he possessed the mental element requisite to the charged offense. The Attorney General appears to concede that the mental element here in question, to wit, [68 Cal. 2d 821] actual knowledge of the stolen character of the property, fn. 8 is one to which the terms of section 22 of the Penal Code fn. 9 are applicable, and that an instruction based on that section would have been proper if offered by defendant. Since there must be a new trial herein, and the defendant will presumably offer the indicated instruction, we need not here consider whether the failure to give that instruction sua sponte was error.
I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice McCabe in the opinion prepared by him for the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two (People v. Carter, 4 Crim. 2786, filed January 9, 1968, certified for nonpublication).
FN 1. "The Court: Ladies and gentlmen of the jury, have you reached a verdict?
"The Foreman: No, we have not, your Honor.
"The Court: Without stating which way you stand, will you tell me how you stand numerically?
"The Court: Mr. Foreman, is there some question that the Court can help on?
"The Foreman: Yes. I have the two pages marked there that I gave to the bailiff that one of the jurors would like your interpretation on or for you to elaborate on the interpretation of that page. There is a blue X on the page, sir.
"The Court: About the only thing I can do is read you the instruction together with the second instruction that goes with it. I can't change the law necessarily.
"The Foreman: Can you elaborate, your Honor?
"Now, I take it that you had both of those instructions with you?
"The Court: Does that help any? To read the two instructions together gives you some meaning of the law that you don't get by reading the one.
"The Foreman: I don't know whether it's proper or not, your Honor, but possibly maybe the juror who is in doubt here, maybe he could ask you that question. Is that proper?
"The Court: Well, let me ask the juror if he understands the two instructions now?
"Mr. Hippel: I understand the instructions. I'm confused as to the precise definition of moral evidence.
"The Court: Moral evidence in this use means that produced by human persons, either direct evidence from the witness stand or exhibits or writings or whatever may be produced in the way of some object. The question is then whether or not there is sufficient evidence that would produce conviction in an unprejudiced mind. And that must be read with the other instruction.
"I'd like to ask the jurors again if they feel that there is any chance to reach a verdict in this matter. If you do not think there is, please raise your hand. If you do think there is an opportunity to get a verdict in this matter, please raise your hand if you do think there is an opportunity.
"The Foreman: Two or three hours?
"The Court: No, sir, I'm not going to stay up here two or three hours, that I'll tell you.
"How long did this case take to try, Mr. District Attorney?
"Mr. Burns [District Attorney]: We began the case yesterday morning at 10:00 o'clock, your Honor.
"The Court: Certainly it wasn't a long and complicated case, that's for certain.
"Mr. Burns: That's when we began to select the jury at that time.
FN 2. See generally Annot. 85 A.L.R. 1420; Annot. 100 A.L.R.2d 177.
FN 3. The division of the jury in terms of votes for conviction and acquittal has no bearing upon the question of reasonable probability of agreement and therefore is of no concern to the court. The effect of the judge's knowledge of the number of jurors for conviction and acquittal will be discussed below as it relates to coercion.
FN 4. We reject as wholly without foundation in the record defendant's suggestion that Judge Knauf was advised as to the merits of the case during a presumed conference with the judge who had presided at trial.
FN 5. We are not prepared to accept the suggestion that an 11 to 1 division of the jury indicates that the lone dissenting juror favors acquittal. Similarly, the interest of that juror in the presumption of innocence and the concept of moral certainty, as evidenced by his inquiries following the court's reading of instructions on those subjects, does not indicate his bent on the ultimate issue, for a lone juror holding out for conviction might well evince a similar concern.
FN 7. In Savage the court was informed that the jury stood 11 to 1, but was not informed as to how many favored conviction, when it delivered its adjuratory remarks. The Court of Appeal, reversing the conviction, stated that the trial court must have known "or had reason to believe that the 11 jurors stood for conviction, ..." We think that this statement reflects a misunderstanding to the effect that jury coercion cannot be found unless it can be inferred that the trial court through its remarks is advocating conviction. (See also People v. Beaugez (1965) 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 660 [43 Cal. Rptr. 28]; People v. Nails (1963) 214 Cal. App. 2d 689, 696 [29 Cal. Rptr. 671]; People v. Diaz (1962) 208 Cal. App. 2d 41, 50 [24 Cal. Rptr. 887].) As we have shown, this view represents too narrow a concept of jury coercions.
FN 9. Section 22 provides: "No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the act."

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