Source: http://ksrau.czweb.org/411-binding-precedent-essay-definition.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 11:53:51+00:00

Document:
Originally published in (1987) 2:2,3 Legal Research Update 11 and republished with permission.
It gives away no secret to observe that lawyers have their own unique discipline and approach to the resolution of legal problems. Not surprisingly, there are laws about determining the law. One of the most important of these laws is the law of precedent or stare decisis. That doctrine and its significance in practical terms are the subject matters of this paper. This paper is also about how a lawyer in everyday practice answers a legal question and how that lawyer evaluates and formulates legal arguments. The paper is only to a very limited extent concerned about the practical problems of how to find or look up the law; rather, the concern is how a lawyer should deal with the authorities that he or she finds. Because different legal systems have different approaches to the proper way of deciding a legal point, the perspective will be Canadian and primarily that of Ontario.
The operation of the doctrine of stare decisis is best explained by reference to the English translation of the Latin phrase. “Stare decisis” literally translates as “to stand by decided matters”. The phrase “stare decisis” is itself an abbreviation of the Latin phrase “stare decisis et non quieta movere” which translates as “to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters”.
What the doctrine of precedent declares is that cases must be decided the same way when their material facts are the same. Obviously it does not require that all the facts should be the same. We know that in the flux of life all the facts of a case will never recur, but the legally material facts may recur and it is with these that the doctrine is concerned.
It follows from William’s analysis that the addition of fact D to a future case means that conclusion X may or may not follow. In other words, the presence of a new fact D may have the effect of distinguishing the future case from the precedent or conversely the precedent may be extended to apply to the future case.
Keeping with the practical approach of this paper, we will now leave aside this debate and consider the practical problems of dealing with the doctrine as it exists for the practising lawyer. Let us then consider the example of a lawyer preparing legal argument for court.
The lawyer will be appearing before a particular court and the first thing that the lawyer must do is to note the rank of that court in the hierarchy of courts. This is necessary for two reasons: first, because a higher ranking court is not bound to follow the decision of a lower court and second, because some courts do not apply the rule of stare decisis with respect to their own prior decisions.
A decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is not binding24 although where there is conflict it may be appropriate to refer the case to the Court of Appeal.25 It should be noted that in certain circumstances, the District Court may have co-ordinate jurisdiction with the High Court and not be obliged to follow the decision of the otherwise higher court.26 Similarly, it seems that with respect to procedural matters, the Master’s Office and the District Court may be considered to be co-ordinate courts.
I think Hogg J. stated the right common law principle to be applied in his judgment in Rex ex rel. McWilliam v. Morris,  O.W.N. 447 at 448-9, where he said: “The doctrine of stare decisis is one long recognized as a principle of our law. Sir Frederick Pollock, in his First Book of Jurisprudence, 6th ed., p. 321: “The decisions of an ordinary superior court are binding on all courts of inferior rank within the same jurisdiction, and though not absolutely binding on courts of co-ordinate authority nor on the court itself, will be followed in the absence of strong reason to the contrary…”.
I think that “strong reason to the contrary” does not mean a strong argumentative reason appealing to the particular judge, but something that may indicate that the prior decision was given without consideration of a statute or some authority that ought to have been followed. I do not think “strong reason to the contrary” is to be construed according to the flexibility of the mind of the particular judge.
Thus noting the court ranking of the judge before whom the lawyer will be appearing and guided by the doctrine of stare decisis, the lawyer will then prepare his or her argument. Usually, the best position for the lawyer occurs when there is a precedent case supporting his or her client’s case. The lawyer will then argue that the court is either bound, or that the court, if not actually bound, ought to be persuaded by the precedent case to find in the client’s favour. In his or her research, the lawyer will therefore look for cases with results which support the client’s position and the lawyer will prepare to argue that the ratio decidendi of those precedent cases covers the facts of the case at bar. However, just locating and evaluating the prospects of precedent cases is not easy since it is often difficult to determine and articulate the authority of a case. Moreover, skill is necessary to analyze and organize the material facts of both the precedent case and the case at bar. That said, more difficult problems of legal reasoning and legal argument occur when the lawyer is unable to find a close case or any case at all or, worse yet, when a case presents itself which appears to be unfavourable. How does the lawyer deal with these problems?
To get around an apparently unfavourable case, there are a number of tools and techniques available to the lawyer. The lawyer may not simply ignore the unfavourable case and hope that the other side does not discover the authority. This is unethical28 and with respect it may be submitted that it is also unethical and intellectually dishonest for a judge in deciding a case to simply ignore a precedent case which stands in the way of the decision that the judge wants to make. This is not to say that lawyers and judges must deal with every case that remotely touches on a subject but only that there should be an honest effort to play by the rules.
The lawyer can argue that while the precedent case does stand for the legal proposition for which it has been cited, the case has been effectively overruled by a decision of a high court or by the introduction of a new statute. Examples of this kind of legal argument will obviously occur after significant decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. For instance that Court’s decision in Kamloops v. Nielsen35 did away with the distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance in negligence actions against municipalities and many old cases which turned on that distinction can no longer be relied upon.
Non-restrictive distinguishing occurs where a court accepts the expressed ratio decidendi of the earlier case, and does not seek to curtail it, but finds that the case before it does not fall within this ratio decidendi because of some material difference of fact. Restrictive distinguishing cuts down the expressed ratio decidendi of the earlier case by treating as material to the earlier decision some fact, present in the earlier case, which the earlier court regarded as immaterial.
An example of restrictive distinguishing may be noted in the House of Lords decision in Peabody Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson Ltd.,36 where the Court restricted the application of Anns v. Merton London Borough.37 The Anns case is cited as authority for the proposition that a municipality may be liable in negligence where it fails to properly inspect building plans. In the Peabody Fund case, by defining the duty of the municipality as being owed to owners and occupiers threatened with the possibility of injury to safety or health, the House of Lords specified and made less general, the scope of the municipality’s responsibility as it had been defined in the Anns case. In the result, the Court did not allow a claim by the developer of a housing project who suffered damages when the municipality’s drainage inspector failed to point out that the drainage system was not being installed in accordance with the approved design.38 Thus, in Peabody Fund the element of restrictive distinguishing is the introduction of the requirement of the possibility of injury to safety or health.
An example of non-restrictive distinguishing may be noted in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Town of the Pas v. Porky Packers Ltd.39 In this case, the Court noted that the authority of Hedley Byrne Co. Ltd. v. Heller40 required the plaintiff in a negligent misrepresentation claim to show that he relied on the skill and judgment of the party from whom he had received incorrect information. In the Porky Packers case the plaintiff had received incorrect zoning advice from municipal officials but the plaintiff’s representative was a former municipal council member who had more expertise in planning matters than the officials. In these circumstances, there could be no reliance and the doctrine or authority of Hedley Byrne by its own criteria was not available. The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. The material fact of the plaintiff’s lack of reliance provided the element for non-restrictive distinguishing of Hedley Byrne.
The Fisken decision is again not cited but its principle that the later of two conflicting cases should be followed is acknowledged but qualified by the requirement that the later case be more consistent with general principles. Thus, to the extent that there is any inconsistency between Fisken v. Meehen with Woolfrey v. Piche, the Fisken case directs that Woolfrey be followed. If the Woolfrey rule is used to resolve any conflict in authority between the cases, it must come down on its own side or it would not be an authority. If there is no inconsistency between the cases because of the qualification or explanation noted by LeBel J.A. then again the Woolfrey rule will be followed.
The above seven types of legal argument are the principle techniques used to get around an apparently binding precedent and we can turn next to the problem of not being able to find a precedent case. Because there is considerable room for imagination and creativity in responding to this problem, it is more difficult to identify the main techniques. Nevertheless, some typical responses may be identified. Below we will consider three classical types of legal reasoning used in these circumstances. Again the doctrine of stare decisis, this time in spirit, may be noted.
Where a lawyer cannot find a binding precedent, he or she may form a legal argument from first principles. This approach identifies legal principles from decided cases and argues that while the factual circumstances of the cases may appear different, analytically they are the same. This kind of legal argument is often used with respect to determining the measure of damages. For example, without any reference to its particular facts, Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co.51 is often cited as authority for the legal principle that where there is a breach of contract then as far as money can do so, the injured party is to be placed in as good a position as if the contract had been performed. The general principle is then applied to the particular facts of the immediate case.This type of approach may be noted also with respect to the issue of liability; for example, Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller, supra, has frequently been cited as applying to fact situations which do not remotely resemble the facts of that case. This kind of argument does not purport to extend or develop the law; rather, the sense of it is just the opposite. The underlying premise is that the judge will be applying and will not be departing from decided law. The spirit of stare decisis may be noted here.
Thus, McAlister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson does not offend the letter or spirit of the doctrine of stare decisis and provides a classic example of legal reasoning and legal argument in circumstances where there was no near precedent for the case.
This paper has focused on one aspect of legal reasoning and argument, that of the use of precedent. However, it must be conceded that stare decisis is only a part of this topic. There is much more. There are substantive rules for the interpretation of statutes and there are special rules and considerations when the statute is a tax act or a criminal code or a constitutional document. There are special and often difficult rules for the interpretation of contracts and testamentary instruments. There are unique considerations when principles of the law of equity are involved and problems caused by the evidentiary rules of onus of proof or of rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions. yet, while the multitude of these rules provides the lawyer with a large variety of other tools and techniques for legal reasoning and legal argument, it also has to be conceded that stare decisis continues to play the pivotal role.
1. Gerald L. Gall, The Canadian Legal System, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1983) at 220. This text includes an excellent bibliography on this subject including a lengthy list of cases and articles.
2. The reference is to Goodhart, “Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case”, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law (1931) 1.
3. Glanville Williams, Learning the Law, 9th ed. (1973) at 67-68. See also S.M. Waddams, Introduction to the Study of Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 102-118.
4. For example, The Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, The Discipline of the Law (London: Butterworths, 1979) at 285-314; Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1921) at 9-50; Friedman, “Stare Decisis at Common Law and under the Civil Code” (1953) 31 Can. Bar Rev. 722; MacGuigan, “Precedent and Policy in the Supreme Court of Canada” (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 627; Weiler, “Legal Values and Judicial Decision Making” (1970) 48 Can. Bar Rev. 1 and Bale, “Casting Off the Mooring Ropes of Binding Precedent” (1980) 58 Can. Bar Rev. 255.
5. The quote is from W.G. Miller, The Data of Jurisprudence, at 335.
6. See Cardozo, supra, note 4 at 33-34.
9. William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973) at 49.
10. See Denning, supra, note 4 at 292.
11. 23 & 24 Geo. V, c. 53, s. 17.
12. 13 Geo. VI, c. 37.
13. See for example, R.S.O. 1927, c. 88, s. 31(2).
14. Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent),  1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.).
15. Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act,  2 S.C.R. 1198; A.V.G. Management Science Ltd. v. Barwell Developments Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 43; Min. of Indian Affairs & Northern Dev. v. Ranville (1982), 141 D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.), rev’g (1980), 115 D.L.R. (3d) 512 (Ont. C.A.) which aff’d (1980), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 632 (Ont. S.C.).
16. See Bale, supra, note 4 at 260.
17. Wolf v. The Queen (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 741 (S.C.C.).
18. Re Ward (1975), 5 O.R. (2d) 35 (Div. Ct.).
19. Wolf v. The Queen, supra, footnote 9.
20. R. v. Eakins,  O.R. 199 (C.A.); R. v. McInnis (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.); Re Hardy Trust,  5 D.L.R. 10 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Godedarov (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 23 (C.A.); Ex parte Pickett (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 195 (C.A.).
21. See Gall, supra, note 1 at 226, and authorities there cited.
22. Re Canada Temperance Act: Re Consolidated Rule of Practice,  O.R. 570, aff’d (sub. nom. A.G. Ont. v. Can. Temperance Federation)  A.C. 193 (P.C.); R v. Morris,  O.W.N. 447.
23. Bedard v. Isaac,  2 O.R. 391. Rev’d on other grounds (sub.nom. Issac v. Bedard) 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481; Re Commonwealth of Virginia and Cohen (No. 2) (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 262; R. v. Guertin,  2 O.R. 505 (Co. Ct.); R. v. Beaney,  2 O.R. 71 (Co. Ct.); Norris v. Hamilton,  O.W.N. 566; Xerox Can. Inc. v. Neary (1984), 43 C.P.C. 274 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
24. R. v. Nor. Elec. Co.,  O.R. 431; R. v. Groves (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 65.
25. See R. v. Nor. Elec. Co., supra, note 25 and Rule 22, Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure and formerly s. 34, Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 223.
26. Masse v. Dietrich,  3 O.R. 359.
28. Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook, Rule 8, Commentary 1(h) and authorities there cited.
30. (1985), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 132 (S.C.C.).
32. Landreville v. Gouin (1884), 6 O.R. 455.
33. R. v. Sellars,  1 S.C.R. 527; Ottawa v. Nepean,  3 D.L.R. 802 (Ont. C.A.); Re McKibbon and R. (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 185, aff’d 35 O.R. (2d) 124 aff’d on other grounds (sub nom. R. v. McKibbon,  1 S.C.R. 133; Woloszcuk v. Onyszczak (1976), 1 C.P.C. 129 (Ont.).
34. Stuart v. Bank of Montreal (1909), 41 S.C.R. 516, rev’g 17 O.L.R. 436, aff’d  A.C. 120 (P.C.); 6 C.E.D. (Ont. 3rd) Courts, para. 389.
35.  5 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
36.  2 W.L.R. 953 (H.L.).
38. The law in Canada may be different. See an article by the writer published in the Advocates’ Quarterly: “Common Law Negligence and the Liability of Governments and Public Authorities”.
39. (1976), 65 D.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
40.  2 All E.R. 575.
41.  A.C. 535, and see the discussion in Friedman, supra, note 4 at 736-737.
42.  A.C. 535 at 553.
43. (1876), 40 U.C.Q.B. 146.
47. (1920), 47 O.L.R. 359.
48. (1958), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 605.
50. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 1.
The doctrine of binding precedent or stare decisis, refers to the fact that, the decision of a higher court will be binding on a court lower than its hierachy. Judicial precedent can be applied on cases and to be treated similiarly when the material facts of the cases are identical.
Through judicial precedent, lower courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts, hence based on the statement it is accurate to say that the doctrine of binding precedent does ensures both certainty and flexibility in the common law. It creates certainty in the sense where like cases are treated alike if the material facts are identical, and this will enable the lawyers and their clients to predict what the likely outcome of a particular case through previous judicial decisions. It also creates flexibility, where this refers to the fact that judges can manipulate the common law provided, then with an opportunity to develop law in a particular areas without waiting for parliament to enact legislation. Judges can be subsequently overruled or distinguished the decision whether it is applicable or simply not applicable to the instant case.
Judicial precedent provides consistency, when like cases are decided on a like basis and are not apparently subject to the whim of the individual judge deciding the case in question. This aspect of formal justice is important in justifying the decisions taken in particular cases.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.