Source: http://wa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180719_0004981.WWA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 03:53:41+00:00

Document:
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants.
Before the court is Defendant David Daleiden's motion to strike Defendant and Crossclaim Defendant University of Washington's (“UW”) affirmative defenses to the crossclaim. (Mot. (Dkt. # 171).) The court has reviewed the motion, the submissions the parties filed in support of and opposition to the motion, the other relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,  the court DENIES the motion.
On March 26, 2018, UW answered Mr. Daleiden's crossclaims. (UW Ans. to CC (Dkt. # 163).) UW asserted three affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (3) Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Id. at 4.) On April 16, 2018, Mr. Daleiden moved to strike these affirmative defenses based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (See Mot. at 1 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f)).) The court now considers Mr. Daleiden's motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court may, on its own or on a motion, “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). The court may only strike material from a pleading if it falls within one of those five categories. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2010).
Mr. Daleiden argues that the court should strike UW's affirmative defenses of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” and “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” because they fail to give him “fair notice” of the “specifics” of these two defenses. (See Mot. at 2.) The Ninth Circuit, however, recently held that “the ‘fair notice' required by the pleading standards only requires describing . . . [an affirmative] defense in ‘general terms.'” Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1274 (3d ed.1998)). In so holding, the Ninth Circuit implicitly declined to apply the Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standard to the pleading of affirmative defenses. See Walker v. Charter Commc'ns Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00556-RCJ-VPC, 2016 WL 3563483, at *3 (D. Nev. 2016) (finding no reason to alter its position that the Iqbal standard does not apply to affirmative defenses); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Vemma Nutrition Co., No. CV-15-01578-PHX-JJT, 2016 WL 3548762, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2016) (concluding that the Twombly standard does not apply to affirmative defenses). The court therefore denies Mr. Daleiden's motion to strike because UW sufficiently describes its affirmative defenses in “general terms.” See Kohler, 779 F.3d at 1019.
In addition, UW may raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any point during the proceedings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). As a practical matter, striking this affirmative defense only to later permit Doe Plaintiffs to raise it wastes judicial resources. Further, Mr. Daleiden has not demonstrated that he will suffer any prejudice. Hernandez v. Balakian, No. CVF06-1383OWW/DLB, 2007 WL 1649911, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2007) (quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1381 (3d ed. 1998)) (“Rule 12(f) motions often are not granted in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the moving party.”). Thus, the court also denies Mr. Daleiden's motion to strike Doe Plaintiffs' “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” affirmative defense on this ground as well.

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