Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/355/426/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:24:12+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 355 › Kernan v. American Dredging Co.
A seaman lost his life on a tug which caught fire when an open flame kerosene lamp on the deck of a scow it was towing on a river at night ignited highly inflammable vapors lying above an accumulation of petroleum products spread over the surface of the river. The lamp was not more than three feet above the water, and the vapor would not have been ignited had the lamp been carried at the height of eight feet required by Coast Guard regulations. There was no collision or fault of navigation.
Held: under the Jones Act, which incorporates the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the seaman's employer was liable, without a showing of negligence, for his death resulting from a violation of the Coast Guard regulations pertaining to navigation. Pp. 355 U. S. 427-439.
(a) The decisions of this Court in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act based upon violations of the Safety Appliance Acts and the Boiler Inspection Act establish that a violation of either Act creates liability without regard to negligence if the violation in fact contributes to the death or injury, without regard to whether the injury flowing from the breach was the injury the statute sought to prevent. Pp. 355 U. S. 430-436.
(b) The basis of liability established in those decisions is not confined to cases involving the Safety Appliance Acts or the Boiler Inspection Act, but extends also to deaths resulting from a violation of the Coast Guard regulations here involved. Pp. 355 U. S. 436-439.
(c) Under §1 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, when a statutory violation results in a defect or insufficiency in appliances or other equipment, liability ensues without regard to whether the injury flowing from the violation was the injury the statute sought to guard against. Pp. 355 U. S. 437-439.
(d) The Jones Act expressly provides for seamen the cause of action -- and consequently the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability -- granted to railroad workers by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. P. 355 U. S. 439.
35 F.2d 618, 619, reversed and remanded.
In this limitation proceeding brought by the respondent under §§ 183-186 of the Limited Liability Act, R.S. §§ 4281-4289, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-196, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the petitioner's claim for damages filed on behalf of the widow and other dependents of a seaman who lost his life on respondent's tug in a fire caused by the violation of a navigation rule. 141 F.Supp. 582. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 235 F.2d 618, rehearing denied, 235 F.2d 619. We granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 965.
the vapor would not have been ignited if the lamp had been carried at the required height.
"the Coast Guard regulation had to do solely with navigation, and was intended for the prevention of collisions, and for no other purpose. In the present case, there was no collision, and no fault of navigation. True, the origin of the fire can be traced to the violation of the regulation, but the question is not causation, but whether the violation of the regulation, of itself, imposes liability."
waters, [Footnote 4] based on unseaworthiness, whether derived from federal or state law. The petitioner assumes that, under today's general maritime law, the personal representative of a deceased seaman may elect, as the seaman himself may elect, between an action based on the FELA and an action, recognized in The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 189 U. S. 175, based upon unseaworthiness. In view of the disposition we are making of this case, we need not consider the soundness of this assumption.
"by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment."
hold that under this clause, a defect resulting from a violation of either statute which causes the injury or death of an employee creates liability without regard to negligence. San Antonio & A.P. R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U. S. 476, 241 U. S. 484. Here the defect or insufficiency in the flotilla's lighting equipment due to a violation of the statute resulted in the death of the seaman. The question for our decision is whether, in the absence of any showing of negligence, the Jones Act -- which in terms incorporates the provisions of the FELA -- permits recovery for the death of a seaman resulting from a violation of a statutory duty. We hold that it does.
"to insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing the 'human overhead' which is an inevitable part of the cost -- to someone -- of the doing of industrialized business."
this change has been embodied in Workmen's Compensation Acts. In the railroad and shipping industries, however, the FELA and Jones Act provide the framework for determining liability for industrial accidents. But instead of a detailed statute codifying common law principles, Congress saw fit to enact a statute of the most general terms, thus leaving in large measure to the courts the duty of fashioning remedies for injured employees in a manner analogous to the development of tort remedies at common law. But it is clear that the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery for injured workers, Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 352 U. S. 508-510, and it is also clear that Congress intended the creation of no static remedy, but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty toward its workers.
Acts or the Boiler Inspection Act, the Court has held that a violation of either statute creates liability under FELA if the resulting defect or insufficiency in equipment contributes in fact to the death or injury in suit, without regard to whether the injury flowing from the breach was the injury the statute sought to prevent. Since it appears in this case that the defect or insufficiency of the flotilla's lighting equipment resulting from the violation of 33 U.S.C. § 157, actually caused the seaman's death, this principle governs and compels a result in favor of the petitioner's claim.
In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, a railroad employee on one of five freight cars loaded with coal was thrown to the track and injured when an engine pushed a stock car into the last of the loaded cars and drove the five cars against a standing train. Neither the stock car nor the car which it struck was equipped with automatic couplers, as required by the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Had the cars been so equipped they would have coupled when they came together, and the five cars would not have run against the standing train. The stated purpose of the automatic coupler requirement was to avoid "the necessity of men going between the ends of cars," and the railroad contended that this showed that the Congress intended the requirement only for the benefit of employees injured when between cars for the purpose of coupling or uncoupling them. The Court rejected the argument and affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff.
judgment against the railroad although the injury was not one which the Safety Appliance Act aims to prevent.
". . . can recover if the failure to comply with the requirements of the [Safety Appliance] Act is a proximate cause of the accident, resulting in injury to him while in the discharge of his duty, although not engaged in an operation in which the safety appliances are specifically designed to furnish him protection."
Id. at 263 U. S. 243.
In Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 294 U. S. 529, a freight brakeman was releasing a tightly set hand brake at the end of a tank car. Release of the hand brake required the application of considerable force to the brake wheel. The brakeman put his left foot on the running board and his right foot on the grab iron to set himself better to put pressure on the brake wheel. The foot pressure exerted on the grab iron caused the plank to which it was attached to split and one of the bolts securing the grab iron to be pulled through. As a result, the brakeman lost his balance and was seriously injured in a fall in front of the moving car. The railroad contended, unsuccessfully, that it was not liable because the grab iron had been used by the brakeman for a purpose for which it was not intended, arguing that the duty to supply grab irons was intended by Congress in order to provide employees with an appliance to grasp with the hands, not to provide a foot brace or support to secure leverage in releasing a hand brake.
another direction crashed into the train; all of these circumstances were inseparably related to one another in time and space. The jury could have found that decedent's death resulted from any or all of the foregoing circumstances."
Id. at 337 U. S. 195. The purpose of the requirement was to provide sand for traction. A fireman employed by the railroad for almost thirty years sued to recover damages for silicosis allegedly contracted from the inhalation of silicate dust emitted by allegedly broken or faulty adjusted sanders into the decks and cabs of the many locomotives on which he had worked. The railroad contended that the ICC rule was designed to ensure an adequate auxiliary braking system, not to protect employees against silicosis, and therefore the employee could not recover for an injury not of the kind the ICC rule sought to guard against. The Court rejected the argument as resting on general tort doctrine inapplicable to this case.
creates a special relationship between the FELA and the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts. Several answers may be given to this contention.
First, § 4 relates entirely to the defense of assumption of risk, abolishing this defense where the injury was caused by the employer's negligence or by "violation . . . of any statute enacted for the safety of employees. . . ." It is § 1 of the FELA which creates the cause of action, and this section, on its face, is barren of any suggestion that injuries caused by violation of any statute are to be treated specially. In formulating the rule that violation of the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts creates liability for resulting injuries without proof of negligence, the Court relied on judicially evolved principles designed to carry out the general congressional purpose of providing appropriate remedies for injuries incurred by railroad employees. For Congress, in 1908, did not crystalize the application of the Act by enacting specific rules to guide the courts. Rather, by using generalized language, it created only a framework within which the courts were left to evolve, much in the manner of the common law, a system of principles providing compensation for injuries to employees consistent with the changing realities of employment in the railroad industry.
required of him by this Act, and his fault, in whole or in part, causes injury, liability ensues. And this result follows whether the fault is a violation of a statutory duty or the more general duty of acting with care, for the employer owes the employee, as much as the duty of acting with care, the duty of complying with his statutory obligations.
We find no difficulty in applying these principles, developed under the FELA, to the present action under the Jones Act, for the latter Act expressly provides for seamen the cause of action -- and consequently the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability -- granted to railroad workers by the FELA. The deceased seaman here was in a position perfectly analogous to that of the railroad workers allowed recovery in the line of cases we have discussed, and the principles governing those cases clearly should apply here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed with direction to remand to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
"Scows not otherwise provided for in this section on waters described in paragraph (a) of this section shall carry a white light at each end of each scow, except that when such scows are massed in tiers, two or more abreast, each of the outside scows shall carry a white light on its outer bow, and the outside scows in the last tier shall each carry, in addition, a white light on the outer part of the stern. The white light shall be carried not less than 8 feet above the surface of the water, and shall be so placed as to show an unbroken light all around the horizon, and shall be of such a character as to be visible on a dark night with a clear atmosphere at a distance of at least 5 miles."
The Commandant is empowered by 30 Stat. 102, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 157, to establish rules "as to the lights to be carried . . . as he . . . may deem necessary for safety. . . ." This section was contained in the Act of June 7, 1897, the purpose of which was to codify the rules governing navigation on inland waters and to conform them as nearly as practicable to the revised international rules for preventing collisions at sea adopted at the International Marine Conference in October, 1889. 30 Cong.Rec. 1394; H.R.Doc. No. 42, 55th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
The Harrisburg disapproved lower federal court cases, among them a decision of Chief Justice Chase at Circuit, The Sea Gull, 21 Fed.Cas. 910, No. 12,578a, which had given a right of action for wrongful death. Reliance was placed on the fact that English admiralty law did not recognize the cause of action, although continental maritime law did. By statute, English admiralty courts now entertain a cause of action for wrongful death. 23 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed. 1936) § 979.
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury, the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and, in such action, all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. [I.e., Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60.] Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located."
Where death occurs beyond a marine league from state shores, the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768, provides a remedy for wrongful death. Presumably any claims, based on unseaworthiness, for damages accrued prior to the decedent's death would survive at least if a pertinent state statute is effective to bring about a survival of the seaman's right. See Holland v. Steag, Inc., 143 F.Supp. 203; cf. Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207; Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383. Claims for maintenance and cure survive the death of the seaman. Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 190 F.2d 449. For a discussion of the applicability of a state wrongful death statute to an action for death of a nonseaman based upon a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, see Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 252 F.2d 14.
36 Stat. 913, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34.
"A statute or ordinance may be construed as intended to give protection against a particular form of harm to a particular interest. If so, the actor cannot be liable to another for a violation of the enactment unless the harm which the violation causes is that from which it was the purpose of the enactment to protect the other."
Since it has been my general practice for on to a decade to refrain from participating in the substantive disposition of cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Jones Act that have been brought here on writ of certiorari, a word explaining my participation today is in order.
improvidently granted. See my opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 352 U. S. 524. All these cases involved evaluation of evidence: evidence on what constitutes "negligence," i.e., the common law conception of negligence which Congress adopted, subject to qualifications regarding "causation" and withdrawal of common law defenses, and which remains the statutory requisite for liability. It has become the practice for this Court to review evidence where trial courts have considered it their duty to take cases from juries or to set aside jury verdicts, or where appellate courts have reversed trial court decisions as to what are allowable verdicts by juries. This manifestly ceased to be the function of this Court after Congress, by the Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726, abolished appeals to the Court in Federal Employers' Liability Act cases and restricted review of lower court decisions in such cases to the confined scope of our general certiorari jurisdiction.
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 318 U. S. 602-603 (dissenting opinion).
This case is different in kind from those in which I have felt it my duty to abstain from consideration on the merits. This is a case which involves a serious question of construction of a statute of nationwide importance. Such questions of construction are among the most important issues for final determination by this Court. I therefore reach the merits, and, on the merits, I join the opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE BURTON, and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER join, dissenting.
I share the view of the Court that, under existing law, a cause of action for wrongful death does not lie on principles of unseaworthiness, and that therefore respondent's liability for the death caused by this unfortunate accident depends entirely on the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, which incorporates the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, and thereby reflects the principles of negligence upon which the FELA is explicitly based.
at a minimum height of eight feet above the water, [Footnote 2/1] the court held that this violation did not, of itself, give rise to liability in negligence, because the sole purpose of the statute authorizing the regulation, 30 Stat. 102, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 157, was to guard against collisions, and not to prevent the type of accident which here resulted.
This holding, as the Court seems to recognize, was in accord with the familiar principle in the common law of negligence that injuries resulting from violations of a statutory duty do not give rise to liability unless of the kind the statute was designed to prevent. Indeed, that principle, which is but an aspect of the general rule of negligence law that injuries in order to be actionable, must be within the risk of harm which a defendant's conduct has created, see Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 72, 90-92 (1942), was established as long ago as 1874 by a leading English case, Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125, and has been followed in this country almost without exception. Restatement, Torts, § 286; Prosser, Torts (2d ed. 1955), § 34; Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 Minn.L.Rev. 361, 372-377 (1932); cf. The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 212 U. S. 476 (under admiralty law).
The Court neither casts doubt on the District Court's finding that respondent was not negligent in carrying the tug's lantern at three feet above the water surface nor disputes that the sole purpose of the Coast Guard regulation was to guard against the risk of collision, but it nevertheless decides that violation of the regulation, in and of itself, rendered the respondent liable for all injuries flowing from it. This holding is said to follow from the decisions of this Court in a series of FELA cases based on violations of the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, and the Boiler Inspection Act, 36 Stat. 913, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34. These decisions, as the Court here properly states, have created under the FELA an absolute liability -- that is, a liability "without regard to negligence" -- for injuries resulting from violations of the other Acts. From this, the Court concludes that there is no reason not to extend this absolute liability to cases based on the violation of a statutory duty which are brought under the Jones Act.
This conclusion I cannot share. A reading of the cases relied upon by the Court demonstrates beyond dispute that the reasons underlying those decisions have no application in the context of this Coast Guard regulation and the Jones Act. It follows that liability can be impressed on respondent only because of negligence, the theory upon which the Jones Act is founded.
A.P. R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U. S. 476; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66; Southern R. Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U. S. 398; Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 317 U. S. 481. Second, was the defendant's liability for the injuries suffered limited to those within the character of the risks which these statutes were designed to eliminate? Except for St. Louis & S.F. R. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U. S. 243, which stands alone and has never since been followed, the answer here has also been "no." Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239; Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 294 U. S. 529; Brady v. Terminal Railroad Assn. 303 U. S. 10.
have made clear in the O'Donnell case that that term is a confusing label for what is simply a violation of an absolute duty."
"Once the violation is established, only causal relation is in issue. And Congress has directed liability if the injury resulted 'in whole or in part' from defendant's negligence or its violation of the Safety Appliance Act."
"expressly provides for seamen the cause of action -- and consequently the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability -- granted to railroad workers by the FELA."
The Court thus reads these decisions to establish a doctrine under the FELA that injuries following any violation of any statute, not simply the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts, are actionable without any showing of negligence, and it is this doctrine which, the Court argues, the Jones Act absorbs.
neither of these safety Acts gives rise to a private cause of action of its own force, see, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, supra, at 337 U. S. 188, has read the FELA to provide the private remedy to enforce the absolute liability which the Court considered the other Acts to establish. The Court's opinion here makes no effort to show either that the statute authorizing the Coast Guard regulation was intended to give rise to an absolute liability for injuries resulting from its violation or that the Jones Act, a statute founded on negligence, was intended to be the medium of enforcement of such a liability.
"An Act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads by compelling common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to . . ."
follow the rules of each Act, 27 Stat. 531; 36 Stat. 913; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Williams, 242 U. S. 462, 242 U. S. 466-467; Urie v. Thompson, supra, at 337 U. S. 190-191. In keeping with this statement of purpose, two sections of the Safety Appliance Act expressly refer to the civil liability of employers to injured employees by abrogating the common law defense of assumption of risk and by preserving such civil liability over a particular exception to the general liability for fines payable to the United States which is imposed on carriers for violation of the provisions of the Act. 27 Stat. 532, 45 U.S.C. § 7. 36 Stat. 299, 45 U.S.C. § 13.
the defense of assumption of risk not only with respect to actions grounded on negligence but also "in any case where the violation . . . of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of" an employee. This quoted clause is included also in § 3 of the Act, 35 Stat. 66, 45 U.S.C. § 53, which substitutes for the absolute common law defense of contributory negligence what is, in effect, a rule of comparative negligence, but bars this defense completely in actions based on the violation of such a statute. The phrase "any statute enacted for the safety of employees" of course refers to the Safety Appliance Act, Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 U. S. 205, 291 U. S. 210, and to the Boiler Inspection Act, Urie v. Thompson, supra, at 337 U. S. 188-189. The use of this phrase in juxtaposition with the term "negligence" in these sections confirms the congressional purpose to accord special treatment to employees injured by violations of these Acts.
"If [the Safety Appliance Act] is violated, the question of negligence in the general sense of want of care is immaterial. . . . [T]he two statutes [Safety Appliance Act and the FELA] are in pari materia, and where the [FELA] refers to 'any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,' etc., it clearly is the legislative intent to treat a violation of the safety appliance act as 'negligence,' . . . "
"In this view, the Safety Appliance Acts, together with the Boiler Inspection Act, are substantively, if not in form, amendments to the [FELA]. . . . [They] cannot be regarded as statutes wholly separate from and independent of the [FELA]. They are, rather, supplemental to it, having the purpose and effect of facilitating employee recovery. . . ."
Finally, as noted above, the Court, in Carter v. Atlanta & St. A.B. R. Co., supra, at 338 U. S. 434, observed that "Congress has directed liability" under the FELA for injuries resulting from negligence or from violation of these Acts.
In short, I think it is evident that this Court's past interpretation of the FELA to provide a cause of action based on absolute liability for injuries traceable to violations of these two particular safety statutes has rested entirely on its view of congressional intent, and that no general rule of absolute liability without regard to negligence for injuries resulting from violation of any statute can fairly be said to emerge from these decisions.
"The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard shall establish such rules to be observed on the waters mentioned in the preceding section by steam vessels in passing each other and as to the lights to be carried on such waters by ferryboats and by vessels and craft of all types when in tow of steam vessels . . . as he from time to time may deem necessary for safety. . . . [Footnote 2/3]"
available to seamen under the Jones Act by a cause of action based on absolute liability for damages suffered in consequence of a violation of this Coast Guard regulation. In these circumstances, the argument that such a cause of action arises because the Jones Act "expressly provides for seamen the cause of action . . . granted to railroad workers by the FELA" seems to me an empty one.
"the theory of the FELA is that, where the employer's conduct falls short of the high standard required of him by this Act, and his fault, in whole or in part, causes injury, liability ensues . . . whether the fault is a violation of a statutory duty or the more general duty of acting with care. . . ."
Thus, the Court in effect reads out of the FELA and the Jones Act the common law concepts of foreseeability and risk of harm which lie at the very core of negligence liability, and treats these statutes as making employers in this area virtual insurers of the safety of their employees.
"The section [§ 1 of the FELA] does not define negligence, leaving that question to be determined . . . 'by the common law principles as established and applied in the federal courts.' . . ."
"We recognize . . . that the Federal Employers' Liability Act is founded on common law concepts of negligence and injury, subject to such qualifications as Congress has imported into those terms. [Footnote 2/5]"
I cannot agree that Congress intended the federal courts to roam at large in devising new bases of liability to replace the liability for negligence which these Acts imposed on employers.
This finding must rest on the assumption of the District Court that the regulation forbade respondent to carry any signal light at a height of less than eight feet above the water. However, it is questionable whether the regulation had the effect of proscribing a light at three feet, as well as requiring a light at a minimum height of eight feet. That is, the violation of the regulation may have consisted solely in the absence of a light eight feet above the water, not in the presence of a light three feet above the water, in which case the accident could not be attributed to violation of the regulation. For the purpose of this opinion, I shall assume, as the District Court necessarily concluded, that the violation of respondent consisted in carrying the light at three feet, and was thus the factual cause of the accident.
". . . and shall be so placed as to show an unbroken light all around the horizon, and shall be of such a character as to be visible on a dark with a clear atmosphere at a distance of at least 5 miles."
This section, 30 Stat. 102, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 157, appears under Chapter 3 of Title 33, which bears the title "Navigation Rules for Harbors, Rivers, And Inland Waters Generally." Other sections under Chapter 3 refer to sound signals (33 U.S.C. § 191), speed in fog (33 U.S.C. § 192), and ascertainment of risk of collision (33 U.S.C. § 201). Section 157 was originally enacted as part of the Act of June 7, 1897, and the clear purpose of that Act was simply to effect a codification of all rules governing navigation on inland waters so that they would conform in the highest possible degree to prevailing international rules for the prevention of collisions at sea. H.R.Doc. No. 42, 55th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
"Every pilot, engineer, mate, or master of any steam vessel . . . and every master or mate of any barge or canal boat who neglects or refuses to observe the provisions of . . . the regulations established in pursuance of [§ 157, text at note 3, supra] . . . shall be liable to a penalty of one hundred dollars, and for all damages sustained by any passenger in his person or baggage by such neglect or refusal: Provided, That nothing herein shall relieve any vessel, owner, or corporation from any liability incurred by reason of such neglect or refusal."
As originally drafted, preceding its enactment in 1897, present § 158 read substantially as it does now, except that it did not contain the last "Provided" clause. H.R.Doc. No. 42, 55th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9. In the House debates concerning the Act of 1897, discussion was directed in part to this section and the question was raised whether its effect might be to impose liability for injury to passengers exclusively upon officers of the vessels, who might be financially irresponsible. 30 Cong.Rec. 1395. To end these doubts, the section was amended prior to its enactment by addition of the "Provided" clause. Representative Payne stated that the amendment's purpose was to make clear that liability of the vessel or owner of the vessel for damages would remain entirely unaffected by the section. 30 Cong.Rec. 1465. In other words, the Act of 1897 was not intended either to define to any extent liability of a vessel or its owner or to advance the remedies or broaden the rights of seamen, but simply afforded passengers remedies against officers personally liable because of breach of regulations.
The qualifications, of course, refer to those provisions of the FELA, not applicable to the facts of this case, which modify or abrogate the common law defenses of contributory negligence, § 3, 35 Stat. 66, 45 U.S.C. § 53, and assumption of risk, § 4, 35 Stat. 66, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 54.

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