Source: https://www.mass.gov/decision/john-ocallaghan-v-boston-retirement-board-cr-06-613-dala-2008
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:37:00+00:00

Document:
Appearance for Petitioner: Michael C. Akashian, Esq.
Appearance for Respondent: Edward McKenna, Esq.
Pursuant to G.L.c.32, §16(4), the Petitioner, John O'Callaghan, is appealing the calculation of his accidental disability retirement allowance. Mr. O'Callaghan filed an appeal by letter of September 11, 2006 after determining from a breakdown of his retirement allowance, that certain income items he received through his collective bargaining agreement (CBA) were not included in the calculation of his retirement allowance. (See, Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5) A hearing was held September 9, 2007, at the offices of the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA), 98 North Washington Street, 4th Floor, Boston, MA 02114, pursuant to G.L.c.7, §4H.
Various documents are in evidence. (Exs. 1 - 8. Exhibit 8 was filed post hearing and is an affidavit with attached letter of Edward J. O'Brien, Jr., the Boston Retirement Board's Manager of Client Services.) One tape was used. The parties entered into some stipulations of facts. ("A") Mr. O'Callaghan testified. The record was held open to find out what income items were included and which ones were excluded from Mr. O'Callaghan's retirement calculation. ("B") This was received by October 26, 2007 when the record closed. Both parties made arguments on the record.
There are two prior cases on point with Mr. O'Callaghan's circumstances: Robert T. O'Brien v. Boston Retirement Board,CR-06-60 (DALA, 3/2/07) (No CRAB Decision); and, Gary Bolles v. Boston Retirement Board, CR-06-389 (DALA, 9/14/07) (No CRAB Decision). Both Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Bolles were COs in the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department. Both were employed subject to a CBA like Mr. O'Callaghan was. Both retired like Mr. O'Callaghan with accidental disability retirement benefits. Mr. O'Brien retired effective November 30, 2001. Mr. Bolles retired effective February 27, 2004. Both received, like Mr. O'Callaghan did, shift differential additional payments along with holiday pay, longevity pay, uniform allowance, and fitness allowance. The calculations of their retirements by the Boston Retirement Board contained the same exclusions of such payments as Mr. O'Callaghan's did. These exclusions were upheld as valid in both cases other than the failure to include the longevity annual payments and the uniform annual allowances. Mr. O'Callaghan's appeal has the same outcome.
in the public service, whichever date last occurs.
In terms of the various pay differentials Mr. O'Callaghan received, the Boston Retirement Board acted properly in including his annualized night differential as well as his annualized public safety differential. This is consistent with Boston Association of School Administrators and Supervisors v. Boston Retirement Board, 383 Mass. 336 (1981), which explains how such pay differentials have to be routine, regular, repeat, predictable, and automatically given out, and not just to one employee, to be regular compensation. Whether or not retirement deductions were taken from the amounts received for the differentials each year is not dispositive of whether or not the payments were regular compensation. Bower v. CRAB, 393 mass. 427 (1984) The more recent case of Bulger v. CRAB, 447 Mass. 651, 656 and 658 (2006) re-affirms the determinations made in these two cases as to what regular compensation can include, while recognizing how employees may be paid for their work in distinct ways.
These considerations apply as well to Mr. O'Callaghan's annual longevity payments and to his annual uniform allowance. The longevity payment was regular compensation as it was paid out automatically to all COs according to a set system that reflected only their years of service. It was not paid out in a higher amount once the employee gave notice of retirement, and was not a bonus. It was regular compensation because it was routinely and regularly paid, even if paid just annually and not in regular amounts during the year, and even if it was received by COs who were retiring. See, Christenson v. CRAB, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 544 (1997). Likewise, the annual uniform allowance was paid out annually and automatically to all COs on a routine and regular basis. It was not a bonus. It was not triggered by the CO retiring. Both of these payments were regular compensation erroneously excluded from the calculation of Mr. O'Callaghan's retirement allowance.
In contrast were the fitness payments and the holiday payments. The fitness payment was not paid out automatically. Rather, it was only received when the CO passed the annual fitness test. The employee had to earn it. As per G.L.c.32, §1's definition of regular compensation, holiday pay can be regular compensation only for police officers, fire fighters and other employees of municipal departments who work as signal operators or signal maintenance repairmen. CO employees of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department do not satisfy that very specific criteria. Otherwise, Section 1 treats holiday pay as overtime pay which is excluded from being regular compensation. Mr. O'Callaghan cannot have such holiday pay be part of his retirement calculation.
Consistent with the foregoing determinations, the case is remanded to the Boston Retirement Board to re-calculate Mr. O'Callaghan's accidental disability retirement allowance to include, in addition to what the Board has already included above and beyond his base salary at the time of his accident, his longevity payments and his uniform allowances.

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