Source: https://www.defenselitigationinsider.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:59:53+00:00

Document:
While the test is well established, it is “’not susceptible of mechanical application” and requires a highly fact-specific inquiry. Particularly, the Supreme Court’s efforts to provide guidance in the application of “purposeful availment” prong to foreign manufacturers has resulted in competing variations of the so-called “stream-of-commerce” test. The Supreme Court first set forth the “stream-of-commerce” standard in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, stating that a “forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.” In Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct., Justice O’Connor, writing for three other justices, stated that placing a defective product into the stream of commerce combined with “an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State” satisfied purposeful availment. This “stream-of-commerce plus” standard, sought “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant” to “indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State.” Examples included designing the product for the market in the forum state, advertising in the forum state, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum state, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum state.
In a concurrence, Justice Breyer rejected the plurality’s “strict rules that limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not intend to submit to the power of a sovereign and cannot be said to have targeted the forum.” He observed that the case could be decided merely by applying the Court’s existing precedents and did not require the Court to promulgate a new standard. Justice Breyer noted that the Court had never held that a single isolated sale is sufficient. Thus, McIntyre was not subject to the court’s jurisdiction because there was no evidence of a “regular flow or regular course of sales in New Jersey” nor the examples of “something more” identified in Asahi. Courts have subsequently recognized Justice Breyer’s opinion as the narrowest grounds for the Court’s decision, and thus the binding opinion.
The Knox matter involves an individual who was injured in Massachusetts in October 2016 while operating a metal folding machine manufactured by a German company, Schechtl Maschinenbau GmbH (“Schechtl”). The machine had been sold to the Plaintiff’s Massachusetts employer by MetalForming, Inc. (“MetalForming”), a Georgia-based company who served as Schechtl’s exclusive distributor in the U.S.
Schechtl is headquartered in Germany and maintains no operations in the U.S. Schechtl sells its machines to U.S. customers through MetalForming, an independently owned distributor. Each U.S. customer places an order with MetalForming who in turn sends a purchaser order to Schechtl. When a machine is ready, Schechtl delivers it to a transport agency in Germany, at which point ownership passes to MetalForming. MetalForming then installs the machine at the purchaser’s site. Schechtl also required MetalForming to pass information to customers received from Schechtl concerning Schechtl’s products and their proper use, including safety and instructional manuals which accompanied each machine. The instruction manuals direct purchasers to contact Schechtl (and not MetalForming) for inquiries, additional machine parts, troubleshooting, and additional training, and provide Schechtl’s direct contact information (phone number, fax number, mail and email address). As to the machine at issue, MetalForming provided Schechtl with a purchase order including the machine’s specifications and the name of the Plaintiff’s employer. Schechtl supplied the machine and accompanying manuals to MetalForming, who delivered them to the Massachusetts site of Plaintiff’s employer in 2001.
$1.5 million (1.35% of Schechtl’s machine sales in the U.S.).
The Plaintiff sued MetalForming and Schechtl in Massachusetts Superior Court. After the matter was removed to federal court based-on diversity, Schechtl moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The U.S. District Court of Massachusetts granted the motion, finding that evidence of purposeful availment was lacking. The Plaintiffs and MetalForming appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the dismissal upon finding that Schechtl had purposefully availed itself of the forum by selling substantial goods to Massachusetts and establishing channels of communication with Massachusetts customers. The First Circuit reaffirmed that Justice Breyer’s concurrence is the binding opinion of J. McIntyre, but noted the totality of Schechtl’s activities, voluntarily undertaken, satisfied the tests articulated in the concurrence as well as Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion.
To begin, the First Circuit rejected the Schechtl’s argument and the District Court’s holding that the exercise of jurisdiction required a showing that Schechtl designated Massachusetts “for special attention” or specifically “targeted buyers within Massachusetts. “Supreme Court precedent does not establish specific targeting of a forum as the only means of showing that the purposeful availment test has been met.” “Purposeful availment analysis will vary with the quality and the nature of the defendant’s activity.” Depending on the facts, a defendant’s regular flow or regular course of sale in the forum could make the exercise of jurisdiction foreseeable to the defendant. Likewise, jurisdiction could be foreseeable based on “something more” than this, evidencing an intent to serve the forum.
The First Circuit’s opinion in Knox provides instructive guidance in applying the Supreme Court’s varying articulations of the “stream-of-commerce” / purposeful availment tests to foreign manufacturers. The decision reaffirms that the analysis requires a highly fact-specific inquiry and that no formulation of the test can be mechanically applied. The Court distinguished a manufacturer who merely places of a product into the stream-of-commerce resulting in a single sale to the forum state from a manufacturer who establishes a regular course of sales and channels of communication with forum customers, albeit through an independent distributor and as part of a nationwide sales effort. Most importantly, the Knox decision affirms that a foreign manufacturer, who seeks to engage forum customers, cannot avoid jurisdiction from product liability suits merely by asserting that it did not target the forum specifically.
 Case Nos. 18-1550, 18-1551 (Opinion of Lynch, J., joined by Stahl, J. and Barron, J.).
 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
 PREP Tours, Inc. v. Am. Youth Soccer Org., No. 17-1223, 2019 WL 126221, at *4 (1st Cir. Jan. 8, 2019).
 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
 Id. at 889 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 111-12, 117, 122 (1987) (O’Connor, J.) (requiring “something more” than simply placing “a product into the stream of commerce,”); (Brennan, J.) (arguing that jurisdiction should lie where a sale in a State is part of “the regular and anticipated flow”, but not where that sale is only an isolated occurrence); (Stevens, J.) (indicating that “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character” of a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry and emphasizing Asahi’s “regular course of dealing”).
 Plixer Int’l, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)); Williams v. Romarm, SA, 756 F.3d 777, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 178 & n.14 (5th Cir. 2013); AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
 Knox, Opinion of Lynch, J., Jan. 30, 2019, at 13, 15 (internal quotations omitted).
 Id. at 13 (internal quotations omitted).
 Id. at 14 (quoting Plixer, 905 F.3d at 9).
 Id. at 18 (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); PREP Tours, 2019 WL 126221, at *6).
 Id. (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 111-12 (O’Connor, J.)).
Synopsis: The six year statute of repose barring negligent construction and design claims applies even in cases involving damages arising from diseases with extended latency periods such as mesothelioma. A recent decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) affirms the legislative intent and comprehensive reach of the statute of repose, G.L. c. 260, § 2B (“§ 2B”). The decision highlights the importance and need for certain defendants entrenched in personal injury asbestos litigation within Massachusetts to evaluate their potential standing under the statute.
Overview: In Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, SJC-12544 (March 1, 2018), the SJC was tasked with answering a certified question for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The federal district court initially denied a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of repose in a sweeping opinion that sought to address a matter of first impression under state law. Following a motion for reconsideration and a request for certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the federal district court appropriately yielded to the Commonwealth’s highest court and certified the question of whether § 2B “can be applied to bar personal injury claims arising from diseases with extended latency periods, such as those associated with asbestos exposure, where defendants had knowing control of the instrumentality of injury at the time of exposure.” Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 15-13490 RWZ, 2018 WL 2227991 (D. Mass. May 12, 2018).
A 12-hour public hearing was held on the proposed rule titled, “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Reconsideration,” on November 14, 2018 in Denver, Colorado. The public was welcome to provide comments, feedback and concerns through December 17, 2018.
While the proposed revisions to the New Source Performance Standards still need to be enacted and codified, these revisions are one of many steps the Trump administration has taken to reduce environmental regulations. If these modifications are passed into law, environmental attorneys would be required not only to take note of the changes in federal regulations, but they would also be wise to revisit state regulations that in the past were trumped by federal law.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2
 v. 
 § 1292
 § 2
 v.