Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/399/267/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 05:43:17+00:00

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is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.
1. The decision below was not one "arresting a judgment of conviction." Pp. 399 U. S. 280-287.
(a) In granting a motion in arrest of judgment under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 34, which preserves the common law requirement, a district court must not look beyond the face of the record, and thus a decision based on evidence adduced at trial cannot be one arresting judgment. Pp. 399 U. S. 280-282.
(b) The District Court clearly went beyond the "face of the record" in reaching its decision, as the court's factual findings concerning appellee's sincerity and opposition to fighting in Vietnam are essential to its disposition of the case. Pp. 399 U. S. 283-284.
(c) Even assuming, arguendo, that the parties could secure review under the "motion in arrest" provisions of § 3731 on the basis of a stipulation, there certainly was no formal stipulation here, and the most that can be said is that, after the lower court's decision, the Government chose to accept the opinion's findings of fact. Pp. 399 U. S. 284-287.
2. The indictment here was not insufficient, as it recited the necessary elements of an offense, and did not allege facts that themselves demonstrate the availability of a constitutional privilege. Pp. 399 U. S. 287-288.
3. Since the disposition below was based on factual conclusions not found in the indictment, but resulting from evidence adduced at trial, the decision was, in fact, an acquittal rendered after the jury's verdict of guilty, and not, as characterized by the trial judge, an arrest of judgment. Pp. 399 U. S. 288-290.
4. The legislative history of the Criminal Appeals Act, rather than manifesting a broad congressional directive to this Court to review important legal issues, shows a legislative policy to provide review in only certain cases and to restrict it to those instances. A primary concern of the Act is that no appeal be taken by the Government from an acquittal, no matter how erroneous the underlying legal theory. Pp. 399 U. S. 291-299.
5. This Court does not have jurisdiction in this case under the "motion in bar" provision of § 3731. Pp. 399 U. S. 299-307.
(a) A motion in bar cannot be granted on the basis of facts that would necessarily be tried with the general issue in the case, and, here, the District Judge based his findings on evidence presented in the trial of the general issue. Pp. 399 U. S. 301-302.
(b) An appeal from a motion in bar cannot be granted after jeopardy attaches, and, in light of the compromise origins of the Criminal Appeals Act, the concern of some Senators over retrial of a defendant whose trial ended after the jury was impaneled, and the long-time consistent interpretation by the Government, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn. Pp. 399 U. S. 302-307.
to be Sisson's rights of conscience as a nonreligious objector to the Vietnam war, but not wars in general, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The District Court's primary conclusion, reached after a full trial, was that the Constitution prohibited "the application of the 1967 draft act to Sisson to require him to render combat service in Vietnam" because, as a "sincerely conscientious man," Sisson's interest in not killing in the Vietnam conflict outweighed "the country's present need for him to be so employed," 297 F.Supp. 902, 910 (1969).
As a predicate for our conclusion that we have no jurisdiction to entertain the Government's appeal, a full statement of the proceedings below is desirable.
A single-count indictment charged that Sisson "did unlawfully, knowingly and willfully fail and neglect and refuse to perform a duty" imposed by the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 and its regulations, in violation of § 12 of the Act, 81 Stat. 105, 50 U.S.C.App. 462(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), because he failed to obey an order by his local draft board to submit to induction.
"At the time I refused to submit to induction into the armed forces, I believed, as I believe today, that the United States military involvement in Vietnam is illegal under international law as well as under the Constitution and treaties of the United States. I believed then, and still believe, that my participation in that war would violate the spirit and the letter of the Nuremberg Charter. On the basis of my knowledge of that war, I could not participate in it without doing violence to the dictates of my conscience. "
"the defendant reasonably believes . . . cannot be raised in the way that you propose . . . , because that does not appear on the face of the indictment."
"Point 2 is plainly premature, because nobody can test the issue as to whether defendant reasonably believes the government's military involvement in Vietnam is illegal without knowing what he reasonably believed, and what he believed is a question of evidence, and not a question which appears on the face of the indictment."
(App. 52.) (Emphasis supplied.) Defense counsel did not dispute the District Court's analysis, and noted that he had raised the issue in his motion to dismiss only "in the interest of economy," because "[i]t was not clear at the time I filed the motion that the government would challenge this fact." (App. 52.) The court expressed doubts concerning the Government's willingness to concede this fact, and, when asked by the court, the government counsel specifically stated his opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court thereupon found the "second ground" of the motion to dismiss without merit.
an undeclared war, or could order Sisson to fight in the allegedly "genocidal war."
"offer evidence to show that [Sisson] properly refused to be inducted on the basis of his right of conscience, both statutory and constitutional."
"to elicit a ruling whether the First Amendment precludes the Congress from requiring one who has religious conscientious objections to the Vietnam war to respond to the induction order he received. If the Court rules favorably to defendant on the Constitutional issue of law, then both defense and prosecution are entitled to submit to the trier of fact evidence relevant to the question whether defendant indeed is a religious conscientious objector to the Vietnam war."
There was evidence submitted at the trial that did bear on the conscientious objector issue, however. When asked why he had refused induction, Sisson emphasized that he thought the war illegal. He also said that he felt the Vietnam war was "immoral," "illegal," and "unjust," and went against "my principles, and my best sense of what was right." The court asked Sisson what the basis for his conclusions was, particularly what Sisson meant when he said the war was immoral. Sisson said that the war violated his feelings about (1) respect for human life, (2) value of man's freedom, and (3) the scale of destruction and killing consonant with the stated purposes of American intervention. Sisson also stated, in response to the trial judge's question, that his "moral values come from the same sources [the trial court had] mentioned, religious writings, philosophical beliefs."
on the court's pretrial ruling that Sisson's beliefs concerning the war were irrelevant to the question of whether his refusal to submit to induction was willful, [Footnote 3] the government counsel concentrated on showing that Sisson had refused induction deliberately, of his own free will, and knowing the consequences. The prosecution also brought out that Sisson had failed to appeal his I-A classification when it had been issued, and that he had accepted, as an undergraduate, a II-S student classification.
The instructions to the jury made no reference to a conscientious objector claim, and the jury was not asked to find whether Sisson was "sincere" in his moral beliefs concerning the war. Instead, the trial court told the jury that the crux of the case was whether Sisson's refusal to submit to induction was "unlawfully, knowingly and willfully" done. [Footnote 4] The jury, after deliberating about 20 minutes, brought in a verdict of guilty.
argued that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction under Article III and the Due Process Clause to try the defendant for an offense to which the illegality of the war might provide a defense.
The District Court, in granting what it termed a motion in arrest of judgment, did not rule on the jurisdictional argument raised in the defense motion. Instead, the court ruled on what it termed defendant's "older contention" [Footnote 6] that the indictment did not charge an offense based on defendant's "never-abandoned" Establishment, Free Exercise, and Due Process Clause arguments relating to conscientious objections to the Vietnam war.
"Sisson's table of ultimate values is moral and ethical . . . [and] reflects quite as real, pervasive, durable, and commendable a marshalling of priorities as a formal religion."
"What another derives from the discipline of a church, Sisson derives from the discipline of conscience."
". . . Sisson bore the burden of proving by objective evidence that he was sincere. He was as genuinely and profoundly governed by his conscience as would have been a martyr obedient to an orthodox religion."
"unconstitutionally discriminated against atheists, agnostics, and men, like Sisson, who, whether they be religious or not, are motivated in their objection to the draft by profound moral beliefs which constitute the central convictions of their beings."
invalid. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *393; 3 H. Stephen, New Commentaries on the Laws of England 628 (1st Am. ed. 1845); 2 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure 1285 (2d ed.1913).
"[A] motion in arrest of judgment can only be maintained for a defect apparent upon the face of the record, and the evidence is no part of the record for this purpose,"
id. at 112 U. S. 608. See Carter v. Bennett, 15 How. 354, 56 U. S. 356-357 (1854); United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 (1930).
The court below clearly went beyond the "face of the record" in reaching its decision. As noted earlier, the opinion explicitly relies upon the evidence adduced at the trial, including demeanor evidence, for its findings that Sisson was "sincere" and that he was "as genuinely and profoundly governed by his conscience" as a religious conscientious objector.
Second, the Government argues that, even though the District Court made findings on evidence adduced at trial, the facts relied on were "undisputed." Adopting the language used by the court below, the Government claims that, "in substance, the case arises upon an agreed statement of facts." 297 F.Supp. at 904. The Government then goes on to argue that decisions of this Court have "recognized that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case" can be relied on by the District Court without affecting the jurisdiction for an appeal, citing United States v. Halseth, 342 U. S. 277 (1952), and United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S.
146 (1961). The Government then concludes that it would be exalting form over substance to hold there was no appeal in a case where the Government has not contested the facts, and yet allow an appeal to lie from a motion to dismiss resting upon a stipulation of the parties.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that this Court has never held that an appeal lies from a decision which depends not upon the sufficiency of the indictment alone, but also on a stipulation of the parties. In Halseth, the parties did enter into a stipulation for purposes of a motion to dismiss. But the facts in the stipulation were irrelevant to the legal issue of whether the federal anti-lottery statute reached game not yet in existence. Therefore, neither the District Court in dismissing the indictment nor this Court, in affirming its decision, had to rely on the stipulation. And, for purposes of deciding whether jurisdiction for an appeal under § 3731 existed, the Court obviously did not have to decide -- and it did not discuss -- whether reliance on a stipulation would make any difference. Insofar as United States v. Fruehauf, supra, the other case cited by the Government, is relevant at all it seems to point away from the Government's contention. In Fruehauf, this Court refused to consider the merits of an appeal under § 3731 from a District Court decision dismissing an indictment on the basis of a "judicial admission' culled from a pretrial memorandum" of the Government by the District Judge. Rather than penalizing the Government by dismissing the appeal, however, the Court simply exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 by setting aside the ruling below and remanding the case for a new trial on the existing indictment.
was ineffective to import an issue as to the sufficiency of the indictment, or an issue of fact upon the question of guilt or innocence,"
because of "the rule that nothing can be added to an indictment without the concurrence of the grand jury," id. at 281 U. S. 622. While it is true that Norris is complicated by the fact that the defendant had entered a guilty plea, the Court said that, even "[i]f [the stipulation had been] filed before plea and [had been] given effect, such a stipulation would oust the jurisdiction of the court," id. at 281 U. S. 622-623. Norris, together with the policy, often expressed by this Court, that the Criminal Appeals Act should be strictly construed against the Government's right to appeal, see, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 308 U. S. 192 (1939), makes it at least very doubtful whether the parties should, on the basis of a stipulation, be able to secure review under the "motion in arrest" provisions of § 3731.
it would still be intolerable to allow direct review whenever the District Court labels its decision a motion in arrest, and the Government merely accepts the lower court's factual findings made after a trial -- for this would mean the parties and the lower court simply could foist jurisdiction upon this Court.
"The arrest of judgment . . . on which an appeal lies is not a general motion covering all the grounds on which a judgment may be arrested. It is simply for arrest of judgment because of the insufficiency of the indictment -- that is, the failure of the indictment to charge a criminal offense."
below rests on affirmative defenses which the court thought Sisson could claim because of his beliefs. It has never been thought that an indictment, in order to be sufficient, need anticipate affirmative defenses, United States v. Fargas, 267 F.Supp. 452, 455 (D.C. S.D.N.Y.1967) ("Any questions as to the validity of the local board's refusal to grant conscientious objector exemption are matters of defense . . . [that] [t]here is no necessity for the indictment to negate. . . ."). Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, the correctness of the District Court's constitutional theory that sincere nonreligious objectors to particular wars have a constitutional privilege that bars conviction, the facts essential to Sisson's claim of this privilege do not appear from any recitals in the indictment. As the District Court itself said before trial, "[W]hat [Sisson] believed is a question of evidence, and not a question which appears on the face of the indictment." (App. 52.) In short, this indictment cannot be taken as insufficient, for, on the one hand, it recites the necessary elements of an offense, and, on the other hand, it does not allege facts that themselves demonstrate the availability of a constitutional privilege.
The same reason underlying our conclusion that this was not a decision arresting judgment -- i.e., that the disposition is bottomed on factual conclusions not found in the indictment, but instead made on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial -- convinces us that the decision was, in fact, an acquittal rendered by the trial court after the jury's verdict of guilty.
"If you find defendant Sisson to be sincere, and if you find that he was as genuinely and profoundly governed by conscience as a martyr obedient to an orthodox religion, you must acquit him, because the government's interest in having him serve in Vietnam is outweighed by his interest in obeying the dictates of his conscience. On the other hand, if you do not so find, you must convict if you find that petitioner did willfully refuse induction."
"Mark this: it is not proposed to give the Government any appeal under any circumstances when the defendant is acquitted for any error whatever committed by the court."
"The Government takes the risks of all the mistakes of its prosecuting officers and of the trial judge in the trial, and it is only proposed to give it an appeal upon questions of law raised by the defendant to defeat the trial and if it defeats the trial."
"The defendant gets the benefit of all errors in the trial which are in his favor, and can challenge all errors in the trial which are against him." 41 Cong.Rec. 2752.
any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence,"
"As the law now stands . . . it is in the power of a single district judge, by quashing an indictment, to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government. [Footnote 24]"
With all these amendments, the Senate passed the bill without division on February 13, 1907, [Footnote 44] but the House, after referring the Senate's version to its Judiciary Committee, [Footnote 45] disagreed with the Senate bill and proposed a conference. [Footnote 46] The conference committee, apart from divesting the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear any government appeals, adopted the Senate version of the bill with merely formal changes. [Footnote 47] Both the Senate and the House approved the bill reported out by the committee, [Footnote 48] and, with the President's signature, the Criminal Appeals Act became law.
"evidence adduced at trial can be considered by a district court as the basis for a motion in arrest of judgment when that evidence is used solely for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the charging statute as applied,"
post at 399 U. S. 314 (dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE).
in certain instances, but no less a congressional policy to restrict it to the enumerated circumstances.
Were we to throw overboard the ballast provided by the statute's language and legislative history, we would cast ourselves adrift, blind to the risks of collision with other policies that are the buoys marking the safely navigable zone of our jurisdiction. As we have shown, what the District Court did in this case cannot be distinguished from a post-verdict acquittal entered on the ground that the Government did not present evidence sufficient to prove that Sisson was insincere. A primary concern of the bill that emerged into law was that no appeal be taken by the government from an acquittal, no matter how erroneous the legal theory underlying the decision. Moreover, going beyond the present case, the theory of those in disagreement would allow a trial judge to reserve to himself the resolution of disputes concerning facts underlying a claim that, in particular circumstances, a speech or protest march were privileged under the First Amendment, a practice plainly inconsistent with a criminal defendant's jury trial rights.
Quite apart from the arresting judgment provision, it is also argued that we have jurisdiction under the "motion in bar" provision of the Criminal Appeal Act. We think it appropriate to address ourselves to this contention, particularly in light of the fact that we asked the parties to brief that issue, [Footnote 52] even though our holding that the decision below was an acquittal is sufficient to dispose of the case.
Government's right to appeal except for motions in arrest of judgment -- to situations in which a jury has not been impaneled, even though there are cases in which a defendant might constitutionally be retried if appeals were allowed after jeopardy had attached. Because the court below rendered its decision here after the trial began, and because that decision was not, as we have shown, an arrest of judgment, we therefore conclude there can be no appeal under the other provisions of § 3731.
"The Department of Justice has consistently taken the view that the plea in bar section limits the government's right of appeal to the granting of such pleas before a jury has been sworn. Soon after passage of the original Act, the 1907 Report of the Attorney General urged that the omission in the Act of a governmental right to appeal from post-jeopardy rulings be remedied by revising the Act so as to require counsel for the defendant to raise and argue questions of law prior to the time when jeopardy attached,"
"The then Solicitor General, being of the view that the statute barred appeals from the granting of motions in bar after jeopardy had attached, moved to dismiss the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed (336 U.S. 934). The Department of Justice has thereafter adhered to that position, and the government has never sought to appeal in these circumstances. [Footnote 61]"
This interpretation, in our view, deserves great weight.
In light of (1) the compromise origins of the statute, (2) the concern with which some Senators viewed the retrial of any defendant whose trial terminated after the jury was impaneled, and (3) the interpretation placed on the Act shortly after its passage [Footnote 62] that has been consistently followed for more than 60 years by the Government, we think that the correct course is to construe the statute to provide a clear, easily administered test: except for decisions arresting judgment, there can be no government appeals from decisions rendered after the trial begins.
"there are few problems which occur so frequently or present such extreme technical difficulty in the Solicitor General's office [as] in the proper construction of the Criminal Appeals Act. [Footnote 66]"
We share his dissatisfaction with this statute. Nevertheless, until such time as Congress decides to amend the statute, this Court must abide by the limitations imposed by this awkward and ancient Act.
We conclude that the appeal in this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the judgment of the Court and Part IIC of the opinion.
* MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins only 399 U. S. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join the entire opinion.
We have today granted certiorari in Gillette v. United States (No. 1170), and Negre v. Larsen (No. 1669, Misc.), in order to consider the "selective" conscientious objector issue that underlies the case now before us but which we cannot reach because of our conclusion that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this direct appeal.
"'Wilfully,' as used in the indictment, means intentionally, deliberately, voluntarily. If the Government proves defendant intentionally refused to comply with an order of his draft board, in accordance with the statute, to submit to induction, it is not open to defendant to offer as an excuse that he regarded the war as illegal, that is, contrary to either domestic Constitutional law or international law. . . . [I]n a prosecution for willfully refusing to obey an induction order, evidence with respect to belief is admissible only to the extent it bears upon the issue of intent, as distinguished from motive or good faith."
"The only question which, as a matter of law, a Jury has a right to consider is whether the defendant, if he failed to perform an act required under the statute and regulations, was acting knowingly in the sense of with mental awareness [and] willfully in the sense of intentionally and with free choice."
"He may have all the views he likes of a political, ethical, religious or legal nature. They may be as reasonable as sometime dissents of the Supreme Court are reasonable, and sometime the majority Opinions are reasonable, but, as long as the law stands as it now stands, his motivation, his good faith, and the like are not in the least relevant to the question whether he is guilty or not."
Defendant first submitted a motion in arrest of judgment March 26 -- five days after the trial. Two days later, he substituted an amended motion in arrest "in lieu of" his original motion. This first amended motion differed only in detail from the original. Both were based on the jurisdictional argument described in the text, and neither made any claim based on the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause.
The District Court was apparently referring to Sisson's pretrial "offer [of] evidence" with reference to Sisson's "right of conscience." See supra at 399 U. S. 273; 294 F.Supp. at 519. It does not appear that any contention based on Sisson's right of conscience was raised at trial, or made in the motion to arrest judgment, see supra, n 5. Possibly in recognition of this, the District Court noted in its opinion that "[i]t would have been better practice" for Sisson's attorney to have made "a more detailed reference" in his motion in arrest to his "earlier" arguments. The court stated that, "[n]o doubt, defendant will seasonably make his motion in arrest even clearer." On April 3 -- two days after the District Court's decision -- Sisson's attorney moved to amend his motion in arrest to make the requested grounds conform with those already stated in the opinion. The District Court granted this motion to amend nunc pro tunc as of April 1 -- the date of its opinion.
Because we conclude that the District Court's decision was not in fact, one arresting judgment, see infra, we have no occasion to decide whether the District Court incorrectly characterized these issues as having been raised by the defendant, and if so, whether the 1966 amendment to Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 34, requiring that a motion in arrest of judgment be granted "on motion of a defendant," precludes a district court from granting such a motion on an issue not raised by the defendant's motion.
For the text, see n 20, infra.
"'arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment . . . [which] is based upon the invalidity . . . of the statute upon which the indictment . . . is founded'"
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and that the Government could therefore take a direct appeal to this Court.
The label attached by the District Court to its own opinion does not, of course, decide for us the jurisdictional issue, however.
"We must be guided in determining the question of appealability of the trial court's action not by the name the court gave [its decision] but by what in legal effect it actually was,"
United States v. Waters, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 128, 175 F.2d 340, 341, appeal dismissed on Government's motion, 335 U.S. 869 (1948); United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740, 742 (C.A.2d Cir.), appeal dismissed on Government's motion, 336 U.S. 934 (1949); see United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 320 U. S. 536 (1944); United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 384 U. S. 254 (1966).
Although all three conditions must be met for the Government to appeal a case directly to this Court, as long as the first requirement is met, the Government can appeal to a Court of Appeals under a separate provision of § 3731 allowing an appeal "[f]rom a decision arresting a judgment of conviction except where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided. . . ."
It i arguable that the third requirement is not met, since the District Court's decision was not "based upon the invalidity or construction" of 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) -- the statutory provision "upon which the indictment . . . is founded." As a matter of sound construction, however, "statute upon which the indictment . . . is founded" should be read to include the entire statute, and not simply the penalty provisions. See United States v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 252 F.2d 420 (C.A. 1st Cir.), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 356 U.S. 925 (1958); cf. United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431 (1960); see also Friedenthal, Government Appeals in Federal Criminal Cases, 12 Stan.L.Rev. 71, 75 (1959).
In early days, the "face of the record" simply included the material found on the "judgment roll." See United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d at 742. In a criminal case today, it has been thought to include "no more than the indictment, the plea, the verdict . . . and the sentence." United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 201 (C.A.2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952).
This Court first recognized the existence of motions in arrest of judgment in United States v. Cantril, 4 Cranch 167 (1807).
"The court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if the indictment or information does not charge an offense or if the court was without jurisdiction of the offense charged. The motion in arrest of judgment shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty, or after plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period."
United States v. Zisblatt, supra, at 742.
United States v. Lias, supra, at 687.
None of the cases relied on by the Government even hints that evidence presented at the trial can be the basis for a motion in arrest of judgment. In United States v. Green, 350 U. S. 415 (1956), there was no disagreement between the majority and dissenters on the rule that direct review is impossible if the decision below is based upon facts arising from the trial. Instead, the majority and dissent simply disagreed as to whether the District Court's decision had relied on evidence at the trial. Compare the majority opinion, 350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 418 and 350 U. S. 421, with the dissent, 350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 421. In United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (155), also cited by the Government, the indictment specified that the appellee had made a fraudulent claim against the Disbursing Office of the House of Representatives in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which forbids the willful falsification of any material statement "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." The District Court arrested judgment on the ground that the House Disbursing Office was not a "department or agency" for purposes of the statute, and, on appeal, this Court reversed. Neither the District Court nor this Court relied in any way upon the evidence submitted at the trial in determining the scope of the statutory phrase "department or agency" found in 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Finally, the Government refers to United States v. Waters, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 175 F.2d 340 (1948). In that case, the District Court held an indictment did not charge an offense because it alleged only that the appellee was carrying a gun, and not that he was carrying a gun without a license. However, the District Court called its opinion the grant of a motion of acquittal. The United States appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held that the decision was a motion in arrest, stating that the "question of appealability" turned not on "the name the [district] court gave [the decision], but by what, in legal effect, it actually was." The Court of Appeals then certified the case to this Court, since it felt the motion in arrest involved an "interpretation" of the underlying statute, but the appeal was dismissed on the motion of the United States, 335 U.S. 869 (1948).
The factual determinations would also appear essential for the District Court's alternative ground of decision based on the Establishment Clause. That holding rests necessarily upon the finding that Sisson, though nonreligious, "was a genuinely and profoundly governed by his conscience as would have been a martyr obedient to an orthodox religion." Without this finding, Sisson would have no standing to assert the underinclusiveness of § 6(j) of the Act as a defense to his prosecution. Whether factual determinations made only for purposes of deciding questions of standing, particularly if made before trial, would offend the requirements that motions in arrest must be based on errors on the face of the record is an issue inappropriate for decision in this case. Because of our determination that the District Court's free exercise holding was, in effect, an acquittal, there is no need to decide whether the alternative Establishment Clause ruling would be appealable if it stood alone.
"That on or about April 17, 1968, at Boston, in the District of Massachusetts, JOHN HEFFRON SISSON, JR., of Lincoln, in the District of Massachusetts, did unlawfully, knowingly and willfully fail and neglect and refuse to perform a duty required of him under and in the execution of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 and the rules, regulations and directions duly made pursuant thereto, particularly 32 Code of Federal Regulations 1632.14, in that he did fail and neglect and refuse to comply with an order of his local draft board to submit to induction into the armed forces of the United State; in violation of Title 50, Appendix, United States Code, Section 462."
This principle would dictate that, after this jurisdictional dismissal, Sisson may not be retried.
Our conclusion does not, as suggested in dissent, post at 399 U. S. 327 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE), rest on the fact the District Court "might have" sent the case to the jury on the instruction referred to in the text, but, instead, on what it did do -- i.e., render a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at the trial relating to the general issue of the case, see infra at 399 U. S. 301. Neither dissenting opinion explains what "large and critical" difference, post at 399 U. S. 329, exists between its expansive notion of what constitutes a decision arresting judgment and a post-verdict acquittal entered by the judge after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty pursuant to Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 29.
"would amount to an acquittal because the judge might have given the case to the jury under instructions that it should acquit if it found the facts necessary to sustain the defendant's privilege -- e.g., that he was not one of the registered marihuana dealers whose conduct was legal under state law,"
post at 399 U. S. 327 (emphasis in original). As we note, infra, n. 56 what the District Court did do in Covington was to dismiss an indictment before trial without an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, in disposing of the Government's contentions on the merits, this Court held that there was no need in that case for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss (much less a need to submit any factual issue to a jury) because (1) "there is no possibility of any factual dispute with regard to the hazard of incrimination", and (2) "the Government [had] never alleged the existence of a factual controversy" concerning appellee's nonwaiver of his privilege against self-incrimination, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 61.
"An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instance: "
"From the decision or judgment sustaining a 'motion in bar', when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy."
The statute goes on to provide for (1) Government appeals to the courts of appeals for all other decisions (a) setting aside or dismissing indictments, or (b) arresting judgments; (c) granting a pretrial suppression motion; (2) release on bail; (3) transfer of cases from this Court to a court of appeals or vice versa when an appeal has erroneously been taken to the wrong court.
". . . That a writ of error may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district or circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases, in the following instances, to-wit: "
"From a decision or judgment quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a demurrer to, any indictment, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity, or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded."
"From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment, where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded."
"From the decision or judgment sustaining a special plea in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy."
Between 1907 and the present day, Congress has amended the Act several times. These include a 1948 amendment that brought the procedural vocabulary of the statute into formal conformity with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 62 Stat. 844. Although "special plea in bar" thus became ""motion in bar"," and "decision . . . quashing . . . or sustaining a demurrer to, any indictment" became "decision . . . dismissing any indictment," the Reviser's Notes plainly show that this amendment was not meant to change the Act's coverage, H.R.Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A177; see United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F.2d 747, 755 (C.A. 9th Cir.1959).
A 1942 amendment did increase this Court's jurisdiction under the Act by including cases involving informations as well as indictments, 56 Stat. 271. Other amendments have (1) abolished review by writ of error and substituted the right of appeal, 45 Stat. 54 (1928); (2) given the courts of appeals jurisdiction for appeals from decisions in the same common law categories as those originally provided, but which do not involve the construction or validity of the underlying statute, 56 Stat. 271.
See the Attorney General's Annual Reports for 1892, pp. xxiv-xxv; for 1893, p. xxvi; for 1894, p. xxix; for 1899, p. 33; for 1900, p. 40; for 1903, p. vi; for 1905, p. 10; for 19, p. 4. See generally Kurland, The Mersky Case and the Criminal Appeals Act: A Suggestion for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 419, 446-449 (1961); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 114-117 (1928).
United States v. Armour Co., 142 F. 808 (D.C. N.D. Ill.1906).
. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra, n 23, at 117; Kurland, supra, n 23, at 449.
Kurland, supra, n 23, at 450.
The text of the House bill appears at 40 Cong.Rec. 5408. It gave the United States the same right of review by writ of error as was then accorded a criminal defendant, but further provided that, if, on appeal, any error were found, the defendant should retain the advantage of any verdict in his favor. With neither debate nor a division, the bill passed the House on April 17, 1906. Ibid.
See S.Rep. No. 3922, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906).
41 Cong.Rec. 1865; S.Rep. No. 5650, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. (1907).
41 Cong.Rec. 2190-2197; 2744-2763; 2818-2825.
"I have in the amendment no such words as 'acquitted by the jury.' I have nothing to do with the jury. He may be acquitted by a magistrate. . . . I do not care by what tribunal he is acquitted. . . ."
See infra at 399 U. S. 302-307.
See 41 Cong.Rec. at 2822, 2823.
See H.R.Rep. No. 8113, 59th Cong., 2d Sess.
It appears that the dissenters have not only "outgrown" the statutory limitations of a "decision arresting a judgment" for purposes of § 3731, but also the limitations of Rule 34.
"a compromise among several divergent forces. The division in the Senate was primarily between those who wanted limited review and those who wanted none. The division between the House and Senate was between those who wanted complete review and those who wanted limited review."
Kurland, supra, n 23, at 454.
See, e.g., 1907 Rep.Atty.Gen. 4. See infra at 399 U. S. 306.
See 396 U.S. 812 (1969).
At common law, a special plea in bar was ordinarily used to raise three defenses -- autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon -- and there is language in some of our cases that indicates that, apart from these defenses, a plea in bar was not appropriate "to single out for determination in advance of trial matters of defense either on questions of law or fact," United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 284 U. S. 151 (1931). There are cases consistent with the narrow common law definition that indicate, for example, that a defense based upon the statute of limitations could not be raised by a "special plea in bar," United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 218 U. S. 610 (1910); United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72, 219 U. S. 78-79 (1911). On the other hand, it appear the Court accepted jurisdiction under § 37311 in appeals from decisions granting special pleas in bar based on a statute of limitations defense, with no explanation of the apparent inconsistency. See United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 277 U. S. 236-237 (1928); see also United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78 (1915). And, in United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431 (1960), there was no decision of the Court on what was a "motion in bar", and the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART indicated disagreement on this issue. Compare 361 U.S. at 361 U. S. 441-443 with id. at 361 U. S. 455-458. To add to the uncertainty, arguably in United States v. Murdock, supra, and certainly in United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 384 U. S. 253-254 (1966), and United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, 395 U. S. 59 n. 2 (1969), the Court took jurisdiction and considered the merits of appeals from district court dismissals based on self-incrimination defenses on the ground that the decisions below had sustained "motion in bar" for purposes of the Criminal Appeals Act -- even though Murdock itself stated that this defense is not appropriately raised by a special plea in bar. 284 U.S. at 284 U. S. 151.
In United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431 (190), there was no decision of the Court concerning what approach should be taken. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN suggested that the category include any decision that barred reprosecution if upheld, id. at 361 U. S. 441-443, while MR. JUSTICE STEWART thought the provision should be confined to those decisions that would fall within the compass of the common law "special plea in bar," id. at 361 U. S. 455-458. See generally Kurland, supra, n 23.
The dismissal provision of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12, which MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, in his Mersky concurrence, saw as having "swept away the old pleas," 361 U.S. at 361 U. S. 442, itself limits a dismissal to those defenses "capable of determination without the trial of the general issue," Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(1).
Nowhere does United States v. Covington, supra, suggest, as argued in dissent, that there might be jurisdiction under the "motion in bar" provision of § 3731 in circumstances where the parties "tr[ied] facts to the judge that were relevant to the motion in bar, and separate from the general issue," post at 399 U. S. 332 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE). Our Brother WHITE reaches this conclusion by taking a quotation from Covington out of context, and confusing that opinion's disposition of the merits of the Government's appeal with the Court's jurisdictional holding.
"If the dismissal rested on the ground that the Fifth Amendment privilege would be a defense, then the decision was one 'sustaining a motion in bar.' See United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931),"
395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 59 n. 2.
"whether such a plea of the privilege [against self-incrimination] may ever justify dismissal of an indictment, and, if so, whether this is such an instance,"
"Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) states that: 'Any defense or objection which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.' A defense is thus 'capable of determination' if trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the defense. Rule 12(b)(4) allows the District Court, in its discretion, to postpone determination of the motion to trial, and permits factual hearings prior to trial if necessary to resolve issues of fact peculiar to the motion."
Id. at 395 U. S. 60.
Taken in full context, the quotation used by MR. JUSTICE WHITE, post at 399 U. S. 332, plainly had reference to a district court's power under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12 to dismiss an indictment, and nothing whatsoever to do with the quite distinct issue of the scope of the jurisdictional provisions of § 3731.
That the Court was there concerned with only the merits of appeal is clear from what follows. After suggesting that, in most circumstances, a motion to dismiss an indictment brought under 26 U.S.C. § 4744 would not require any factual inquiry, the Court stated that, once a defendant asserted his privilege, a trial court should dismiss the indictment without an evidentiary hearing "unless the Government can rebut the presumption [of nonwaiver of the privilege] by showing a need for further factual inquiries." Id. at 395 U. S. 61. In applying that principle to the merits of the case before it, the Court affirmed the District Court's action below because: (1) "there [was] no possibility of any factual dispute with regard to the hazard of incrimination", and (2) "the Government has never alleged the existence of a factual controversy" concerning the issue of whether "appellee [had] waived his privilege." Ibid.
The Court in Covington did not say that a defense based on the privilege against self-incrimination where there were facts in dispute could, in all cases, be decided without consideration of the general issue. And, more importantly for present purposes, nowhere does the opinion in Covington even hint that a dismissal requiring a pretrial evidentiary hearing, or a dismissal motion properly deferred to the trial of the general issue would be appealable under the "motion in bar" provision of the Criminal Appeals Act. The Court in Covington had no such jurisdictional issues before it, and the opinion does not discuss such issues.
See 40 Cong.Rec. 9033. In this exchange, Senator Spooner said: "I understand this [bill] applies only to questions which arise before the impaneling of the jury." Senator Nelson agreed that the bill was so limited, and, obviously thinking he was saying the same thing, said the bill applied only "[w]here the party has not been put in jeopardy." After being reminded of the "arrest of judgment" provision, Senator Nelson acknowledged that this was an exception, but, obviously trying to minimize the scope of the exception, he pointed out that the only motions in arrest of judgment that could be appealed were those granted "for insufficiency of indictment; not for any other ground." Ibid.
See 41 Cong.Rec. 2191 (Sen. Nelson) ("I wish to say further that, where a jury has been impaneled and where the defendant has been tried, an appeal does not lie"), id. at 2748 (Sen. Patterson) ("[A] motion in arrest of judgment . . . is the only one of the three cases in which there can have been a trial. . . . [I]n the other two cases . . . , the motions must ex necessitati be made before jeopardy attaches"); id. at 2752 (Sen. Patterson) ("These proceedings are all defendant's acts before a verdict to prevent a trial, except the motion in arrest of judgment, which is defendant's act after a verdict against him to defeat a judgment on the verdict") (emphasis supplied).
Without explaining his inconsistency, Senator Patterson later expressed the view that, under the proposed bill, the Government would have been able to appeal the decision in the famed Chicago Beef Trust Case, because the jury's verdict was based on the "special plea in bar filed" in that case, not on the defendants' guilt or innocence, id. at 2753. Underlying this conclusion -- later disputed by Senator Nelson, see id. at 2757 -- was Patterson's expectation that, "in the case of a special plea in bar that went against the Government, the defendant had not been in jeopardy on the merits of the case," id. at 2753 (emphasis supplied). Unlike the defendants in the Beef Trust Case -- who Patterson understood not to have been tried on the general issue of their guilt or innocence -- plainly Sisson has been put "in jeopardy on the merits of the case." Our Brother WHITE admits as much by suggesting he could not be retried. Therefore, even under Patterson's broader reading of the statute, an appeal would not lie in this case.
See, e.g., 41 Cong.Rec. 2745-2763.
See, e.g., 40 Cong.Rec. 9033; 41 Cong.Rec. 2192; id. at 2751.
The provision granting an appeal from a decision dismissing or setting aside an indictment does not contain a similar phrase limiting appeals to cases where the defendant has not yet been put in jeopardy, but we agree with the conclusion reached by the Government that the same limitation applies. See n. 57 supra.
Brief 19. It should be noted that, at the Government's request, a proposed Amendment to § 3731 has been introduced in Congress to remove this limitation. The proposed statute, which avoids common law terminology, would allow an appeal from a decision made after the jury was sworn in all cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause would permit it. See H.R. 14588, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong.Rec. H10274 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1989).
See 1907 Rep.Atty.Gen. 4; see also Hearing on Granting Appeals by the United States from Decisions Sustaining Motions to Suppress Evidence, before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 83 Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, p. 11 (1954).
Motions in bar, for example, can only be appealed to this Court irrespective of whether the case involves the validity or construction of a statute.
See, e.g., United States v. Zisblatt, supra; United States v. Brodson, 234 F.2d 97 (C.A. 7th Cir.1956). See generally Friedenthal, supra, n 9, at 83-88.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting.
"[f]rom a decision  arresting a judgment of conviction  for insufficiency of the indictment or information,  where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded."
In rejecting the arguments of the parties, the Court holds that we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal, opting for the view that the "arrest of judgment" clause carries with it all of its common law antecedents, and the the present case does not meet the criteria required by the common law. My disagreement with the Court's result and rationale is prompted by a fundamental disagreement with the Court's mode of analysis and its excessive reliance on ancient practices of common law England long superseded by Acts of Congress.
Section 3731 appears to set three requirements for jurisdiction in this Court: (1) the decision from which the appeal is taken must be one "arresting a judgment of conviction"; (2) the decision must be engendered by the "insufficiency of the indictment or information", and (3) it must be "based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded."
"the Court ought not to arrest judgments upon matters not appearing upon the face of the record, but are to judge upon the record itself, that their successors may know the grounds of their judgment."
"nothing more than the judgment roll, and indeed, the common law knew nothing of the evidence taken at a trial until the Statute of Westminster allowed exceptions to be sealed and a bill of exceptions to be brought up with the roll on writ of error."
United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740, 741-742 (C.A.2d Cir.) (L. Hand, C.J.), appeal dismissed on Government's motion, 336 U.S. 934 (1949).
Much, if not all, of the common law learning was transplanted to the United States. As early as 1807, the Court recognized the existence of the motion in United States v. Cantril, 4 Cranch 167 (1807). And, in 1820, Chief Justice Marshall stated for the Court that "judgment can be arrested only for errors apparent on the record. . . ." United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144, 18 U. S. 149 (1820). See also Carter v. Bennett, 15 How. 354 (1854); Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604 (1884).
whether it is viewed as simply looking to the standards of Rule 34, Fed.Rules Crim.Proc., [Footnote 2/1] the Court has indicated that it believes that the decision of the District Court here was not one "arresting a judgment" because it was based on evidence adduced at the trial, notwithstanding the precise -- and I suggest, purposeful -- delineations of an astute District Judge quite as familiar with history and the background of this statute as are we.
"in granting appellee's motion, did not base it action wholly on the allegations of the indictment, but used as a partial predicate for its constitutional rulings the undisputed fact, which appeared from the evidence at trial, that appellee is a non-religious conscientious objector to participation in the Vietnam conflict. [Footnote 2/2]"
class of cases all of the niceties of what might or might not have been included in the "judgment roll" at common law. We have outgrown those formalisms.
I conclude that evidence adduced at trial can be considered by a district court as the basis for a motion in arrest of judgment when that evidence is used solely for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the charging statute as applied. I do so because the legislative history surrounding the passage of the Criminal Appeals Act abundantly shows Congress contemplated review by this Court in such a case. The reasons for the Court's "face of the record" limitation, in the technical common law form of an arrest of judgment, have long since disappeared, and the Court's reliance on a policy disfavoring appeals under the Criminal Appeals Act is misplaced.
"left all federal criminal legislation at the mercy of single judges in the district and circuit courts. This defect became all the more serious because it became operative just at the beginning of the movement for increasing social control through criminal machinery. [Footnote 2/6]"
proposals until a federal district court rendered its decision in United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (D.C. N.D. Ill.1906), sustaining a motion to dismiss and ending a Sherman Act prosecution in which President Theodore Roosevelt had a great interest.
"[S]ometimes an indictment is set aside on the ground that the law under which the indictment was found is held to be unconstitutional. The object [of this bill] is to allow the Government to take the case up and get a ruling of the Supreme Court."
40 Cong.Rec. 8695 (1906) (emphasis added). The bill was then put over in the absence of unanimous consent for consideration. When the bill returned to the floor, questions were raised with respect to the arrest of judgment provision regarding the prohibition against double jeopardy. Unanimous consent to proceed again was withdrawn, and the bill was again put over. 40 Cong.Rec. 9033 (1906).
"In England, the Crown always had the right to an appeal in a criminal case. In my own State, since its foundation, the right has been conceded."
Ibid. The manifest, overriding concern of the Senate was with enacting legislation that would permit appeals as to important legal questions always subject to the bar against double jeopardy, [Footnote 2/7] and this concern carried over to the arrest of judgment provision. [Footnote 2/8] Indeed, the major limiting amendment adopted by the Senate restricted the right of review by the Government in criminal cases to constitutional issues and questions of construction of the statute under which the charge was brought. See 41 Cong.Rec. 2819-2820 (1907).
"Provided, That if upon appeal or writ of error it shall be found that there was error in the rulings of the court during the trial, a verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be set aside."
Ibid. The proponent of the amendment, Senator Rayner, expressed the view that the amendment was directed toward a "verdict of not guilty, whether by the court or the jury. . . ." 41 Cong.Rec. 2747 (1907) (emphasis added). Here, of course, Sisson was not acquitted, but was found guilty by the jury. Further, the Court's use of the Rayner amendment to support a narrow reading of the "arrest of judgment" provision is incongruous in the extreme in light of the fact that the amendment had no substantive effect, and was later deleted from the Act. See MR. JUSTICE WHITE's opinion, post at 399 U. S. 344 n. 11.
certainly not too much when he attacks the trial itself or the law under which it is conducted to give the people the right to a decision of their highest courts upon the validity of statutes made for their protection against crime."
41 Cong.Rec. 2752 (1907) (remarks of Senator Knox).
"The motion in arrest of judgment can only be made -- it is wholly inapplicable to any other condition than that of conviction -- to a verdict of guilty. It is interposed after a verdict of guilty and before judgment for an alleged legal reason that will arrest the court in pronouncing judgment upon the verdict."
41 Cong.Rec. 2753 (1907) (remarks of Senator Patterson).
The Senate passed the bill with the acquired floor amendments on February 13, 1907. 41 Cong.Rec. 2825 (1907). The House insisted on a conference, but the conference committee adopted the Senate version. The resulting conference committee bill was ultimately adopted. 41 Cong.Rec. 3994, 4128 (1907).
criminal statutes in different parts of the country, with no opportunity under existing law for resolution in this Court. The Government was to have a chance to "settle the law as to future cases of like character." 41 Cong.Rec. 2194 (1907) (emphasis added).
It is difficult to imagine a case more closely fitting into this rationale than that now before us. The class of nonreligious conscientious objectors is not likely to be a small one. Indeed, under the impetus of this holding, it is likely to grow. Yet whether or not a member of that class can constitutionally be punished for refusing to submit to induction now depends on where that person is tried, and by whom. That one district judge may entertain a different view of the Constitution than does another is an extraordinary reason for differing results in cases that rationally ought to be decided the same way -- and with appellate review available to insure that end. The conclusion that this is not a "motion in arrest," insulates the judge's constitutional decision from review anywhere -- here or in the Court of Appeals. That, I submit, is precisely the situation Congress thought it was correcting with the Criminal Appeals Act. It is remarkable that the Court finds it so easy to ignore the explicit and meaningful legislative history which refutes its strained reading of the statute and history.
Court in this case obviously has no such problem in providing appellate review. The records before us contain complete transcripts of the trial proceedings as a matter of course.
Accordingly, while the District Court admittedly looked to evidence, including demeanor evidence, for its findings that Sisson was "sincere" and was "genuinely and profoundly governed by his conscience," this use for that purpose should not now bar this Court from considering the District Court's action as an arrest of judgment. As long a the evidence was used to test the constitutionality of the charging statute as applied to the defendant, and not to test the sufficiency of the proof against the allegations in the indictment, the use of the evidence was consistent with the purposes of an arrest of judgment.
about the interpretation or construction of the statute, the judge's action will be an "arrest of judgment" even though he labels it an "acquittal." United States v. Waters, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 175 F.2d 340 (1948).
I cannot believe that Congress, fully aware that no appeal was available for a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v., contemplated that this form of judicial action should be accorded the same nonappealable status. Moreover, the sophisticated District Judge could have entered a judgment n.o.v. if he wanted to avoid review or if he thought that he was indeed passing on the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the allegations of the indictment. Of course, his views are not controlling, but I am comforted by his appraisal, and quite satisfied he knew precisely what he was doing -- or thought he did on the assumption that his action was reviewable under well established principles the Court now ignores.
case, [Footnote 2/9] the more so when it is a constitutional holding of great moment.
Selective Service Act of 1967 and the rules, regulations and directions duly made pursuant thereto, particularly 32 Code of Federal Regulations 1632.14, in that he did fail and neglect and refuse to comply with an order of his local draft board to submit to induction into the armed forces of the United States in violation of Title 50, Appendix, United States Code, Section 462. [Footnote 2/10]"
Yet this allegation subsumes in its terse language a myriad of elements that the Government may be called upon to prove if the defense makes an appropriate challenge. Prosecutions for refusing to submit to induction are unusual because they incorporate into the judicial proceeding much that has occurred in the administrative processes of the Selective Service System. All of the courts of appeals have compensated for the administrative proceedings by holding that the Government need not plead and prove many elements that would normally be a part of its case-in-chief. The courts of appeals have devised a presumption of regularity which attaches to the official acts of the local boards that, standing alone, is sufficient to preclude reversal of a conviction when a given element is not raised at trial. See particularly Yates v. United States, 404 F.2d 462 (C.A. 1st Cir.1968) (presumption of regularity attaches to the "order of call" requirement). However, if the defendant succeeds in making a prima facie case against the presumption, the Government is put to its proof on the particular element of the offense. See United States v. Baker, 416 F.2d 202 (C.A. 9th Cir.1969).
defendant can challenge the classification at trial if he has preserved his claim, and force the Government to prove that there was indeed a "basis in fact," for the classification. Thus, establishing the appropriate classification is actually an element of the Government's case, but because of the deference given to the administrative process that preceded the criminal proceedings, the Government has been excused from pleading and proving it in the indictment. Since the general allegations in the indictment actually do subsume the element that the District Court held was based on an invalid statute as applied to Sisson, that court's decision was based on the "insufficiency of the indictment" within the meaning of § 3731.
The Court also appears to assume that an indictment may be "insufficient" because the acts charged cannot constitutionally be made an offense, e.g., where they show the existence of a constitutional privilege that bars conviction. But the Court concludes that "this indictment . . . does not allege facts that themselves demonstrate the availability of a constitutional privilege." Ante at 399 U. S. 288.
In my view, the Court's suggestion is simply the same argument, differently approached, as the argument that a motion in arrest can be based only on facts appearing on the face of the record. In both cases, the single question, as I see it, is whether Congress drew a distinction, for purposes of appeal by the Government, between cases in which the district court found the entire statute unconstitutional and cases in which the court found the statute unconstitutional as applied.
urgings addressed to the Congress to correct this situation have gone unheeded. But the Court's holding today is a powerful argument to spur corrective action by Congress.
United States v. Lias, 173 F.2d 685 (C.A.4th Cir.1949), supports the view that the standards are the same for Rule 34 and § 3731.
"The court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if the indictment or information does not charge an offense or if the court was without jurisdiction of the offense charged. The motion in arrest of judgment shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or after plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period."
As the Court's opinion indicates, see ante at 399 U. S. 274-276, the evidence of conscientious objection that was admitted at trial was subject to cross-examination and was discussed during the closing arguments, but solely in the context of Sisson's "willfulness" in refusing induction, not respecting whether Sisson was or was not, in fact, a sincere conscientious objector.
Both the Halseth and Fruehauf cases involved dismissals of indictments before trial. In Halseth, the parties had entered into a stipulation for purposes of a motion to dismiss. The indictment charged in the words of the statute an unlawful use of the mails to deliver "a lottery or scheme." It was stipulated that the particular lottery involved would come into existence only if the addressee put the paraphernalia into operation. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute did not apply to lotteries, such as defendant's ,that were not yet in existence. This Court affirmed, necessarily relying on the particular facts about the particular mailing under attack. See 342 U.S. at 342 U. S. 280-281. In United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U. S. 146 (1961), the indictment charged the appellant, again in the words of the statute, with unlawfully delivering money to a union representative. The District Court ruled that a trial memorandum filed by the Government constituted a judicial admission that a transaction at issue was a loan, and concluded that the statute did not cover a loan. The Government appealed that construction of the statute. The Court refused to consider that the "admission" had clearly foreclosed the Government from proving at trial that the loan was a sham, or otherwise constituted a transfer of something of value apart from an ordinary loan, thus violating the statute. Accordingly, it refused to pass on the merits of the appeal, and remanded the case for a trial on the existing indictment.
Halseth and Fruehauf are inconclusive authorities on the issue of whether a stipulation can supplement an indictment and generate a basis for review under § 3731. While the majority recognizes that the issue has not been resolved, and although it purports not to resolve it here, it does rely on United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 (1930), and a policy of construing the Criminal Appeals Act narrowly to express doubt that the Solicitor General's argument should be accepted.
Norris, however, is not a persuasive precedent. There, the defendant was permitted to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the charge contained in the indictment. When he appeared for sentencing, a stipulation of facts was filed, and he then submitted a motion for arrest of judgment which relied on the stipulation. The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the indictment was insufficient in light of the stipulation. This Court, in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that, after pleading guilty, a defendant may not then stipulate facts to test the constitutionality of his conviction. There was no suggestion that an appeal would not lie where a statute was held unconstitutional as applied to stipulated facts. Indeed, the Court's opinion seems at one point to suggest that, if the defendant had withdrawn his plea, and then questioned the constitutionality of his conviction on stipulated facts, the question would have been open to consideration. 281 U.S. at 281 U. S. 623.
Further, the majority's ultimate conclusions about the Act necessarily lead it into uncomfortable distinctions. For if the Government or the parties want a constitutional ruling about the applicability of a statute to a particular set of facts, it is only necessary to set out those facts as a part of the indictment or information.
See Kurland, The Mersky Case and the Criminal Appeals Act: A Suggestion for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 419, 446 449 (1961).
F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 114 (1928).
"The Government takes the risks of all the mistakes of its prosecuting officers and of the trial judge in the trial, and it is only proposed to give it an appeal upon questions of law raised by the defendant to defeat the trial and if it defeat the trial."
"[A motion in arrest of judgment] is a case in which the defendant has been tried, in which he has been found guilty on the merits of the case, and, by reason of some technicality, if I may use the term in its broad sense, the hand of the court is arrested from imposing the penalty upon him."
41 Cong.Rec. 2753 (197) (remarks of Senator Patterson).
"the record does not contain the evidence upon which the [district] court acted. . . . We rule only on the allegations of the indictment. . . ."
350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 421. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom Chief Justice Warren and MR. JUSTICE BLACK joined, dissented on the ground that the District Court's "order granting the motions in arrest of judgment rested at least in part upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction." Ibid. But neither the position adopted by the majority nor that taken by the dissenters in Green is remotely dispositive of the present case. Here, in contradistinction to the dissenters' view of the circumstances in Green, evidence adduced at trial was used by the District Court solely for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of a statute as applied; the District Court's opinion concedes the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict if the constitution views expressed in the opinion are not sustained.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE Douglas join, dissenting.
the Selective Service Act unconstitutionally overbroad because it purported to subject to the draft in violation of the Free Exercise Clause sincere, nonreligious objectors, this Court would clearly have jurisdiction and would face the question whether Sisson could raise the claim without showing that he was a member of the allegedly protected class. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). If such a showing had to be made, as the judge here held it did, the question of standing and the facts relevant to that question are surely distinct from the question of whether the defendant committed the offense, or the question of the validity vel non of the statute. [Footnote 3/3] Cf. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 (1970).
We asked the parties in this case to consider whether 18 U.S.C. § 3731 confers jurisdiction on the ground that the lower court had sustained "a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy." The majority, after a lengthy discussion of the "motion in arrest" provision, condescends to address a few remarks to this question, with the suggestion that it really need not discuss the issue at all, since it has concluded that Judge Wyzanski's action amounted to "an acquittal." As MR.
JUSTICE BLACK's concurrence indicates, the lengthy discussion of the "motion in arrest" provision is equally superfluous if indeed it is so clear that Sisson has been "acquitted." In reality, the bald assertion that Sisson has been "acquitted" simply begs the matter at issue: until one knows what a "motion in bar" is, as well as a "motion in arrest," and how the granting of such motions differs from granting a judgment of acquittal, one cannot confidently attach any label to Judge Wyzanski's action.
The difference between "what might have been" and what actually happened in this case is large, and critical. Where the jury actually "acquits" under an erroneous instruction, a successful appeal leading to reversal and a new trial would raise serious constitutional problems by placing the defendant through the hazards of another trial for the same offense. In this case, however, there is no possibility of subjecting Sisson to another trial, or of overturning a factfinder's decision that, whatever the law, Sisson should go free. If Judge Wyzanski's legal theory is incorrect, the jury's verdict of guilty -- with judgment no longer "arrested" -- simply remains in effect.
of law raised by the defendant to defeat the trial." The distinction is also reflected in the majority's quotation from United States v. Ball, ante at 399 U. S. 289-290, where the question of what constitutes an "acquittal" is tied to the question of whether the defendant would be put "twice in jeopardy" by an appeal.
I suspect that the Court's reluctance to discuss the "motion in bar" provision and to distinguish the granting of such motions from an acquittal stems from the fact that, unlike the "motion in arrest," there is no doubt that a "motion in bar" properly sets forth an affirmative defense, which necessarily requires resort to facts not found in the indictment or on the face of the "record." Thus, most of the majority's argument that this case is not appealable as a "motion in arrest" because "[t]he decision below rests on affirmative defenses," ante at 399 U. S. 287-288, is simply irrelevant as far as the "motion in bar" is concerned.
immunity, see 41 Cong.Rec. 2753. The most thorough discussion of the "motion in bar" in this Court occurs in the concurring and dissenting opinions in United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431 (1960). MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN argued that a motion in bar would encompass every possible affirmative defense that would prevent retrial. MR. JUSTICE STEWART argued for a narrower interpretation, similar to the concept of a plea in confession and avoidance, i.e., a plea that "did not contest the facts alleged in the declaration, but relied on new matter which would deprive those facts of their ordinary legal effect." Id. at 361 U. S. 457.
Even under the narrower interpretation of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, Sisson's plea qualifies as a "motion in bar." For as the majority's opinion makes clear, the crux of the case against Sisson was simply whether or not he had willfully refused to submit to induction; the question of his sincerity was "new matter" relied on to deprive the fact of his willful refusal of its ordinary legal effect. See majority opinion, ante at 399 U. S. 276; United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 384 U. S. 254 (1966) (HARLAN, J.). Just as our cases have permitted the "motion in bar" to embrace limitations pleas, see, e.g., United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229 (1928), and pleas of constitutional privilege, see United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931), so too they permit the "motion in bar" to reach cases of this sort, attacking the validity of the statute as applied to the defendant. See United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57 (1969) (HARLAN, J.); United States v. Blue, supra, at 384 U. S. 254 (HARLAN, J.).
"[a] defense is thus 'capable of determination' [without trial of the general issue] if trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the defense."
moved for dismissal of the indictment on the basis of an affirmative defense -- in that case, the statute of limitations. There, as here, the judge reserved ruling on the motion until after the jury had returned a verdict of guilty. There, as here, the judge then granted the defendant's motion, relying on matters "outside the record." The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the question became whether or not the appeal should have been taken directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act. Judge Learned Hand, in deciding that the trial court's action amounted to sustaining a motion in bar, made short shrift of the argument that the case was indistinguishable from the case of a directed verdict of acquittal.
"Had the trial judge directed a verdict, so that it would have been necessary upon reversal to subject the defendant to trial before a second jury, that would be 'double jeopardy,' but, although the Constitution gives an accused person the benefit of any mistakes in his favor of the first jury he encounters, whether it has passed upon his guilt or not, it does not extend that privilege to mistakes in his favor by judges. Indeed, were the opposite true, all appeals from decisions in arrest of judgment would be constitutionally futile, because no judgment of conviction could be entered when they were reversed."
The sole question, then, in this case as in Zisblatt, is whether the defendant has been "put in jeopardy" as that phrase is used in the Criminal Appeals Act. That question, in turn, centers on whether the phrase is to be read literally, in which case a defendant would be in jeopardy as soon as a jury was impaneled, or whether the phrase is to mean "constitutional" or "legal" jeopardy, in the sense that, even if the Government were to succeed on appeal, it would be unable to take advantage of its success in new proceedings against the defendant. Although the Government has chosen to read the statute in the former, literal, sense, this Court has never resolved the issue. Judge Learned Hand thought there was a "more than plausible argument" for the latter, "legal jeopardy," view, but the Government dismissed its appeal to this Court before the question could be decided. United States v. Zisblatt, supra, at 742.
does not bind this Court; [Footnote 3/8] even more certainly, it is no excuse for the majority's failure to conduct its own examination of the relevant debates.
"The question is whether it subjects a man under any aspect of it to the danger of double jeopardy."
"I am content to leave it, under the bill, if it shall become a law, to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is their function to determine what is jeopardy. It is their function to protect the citizens of the United States against any invasion of the constitutional guaranty as to double jeopardy. I think we can rely upon the court to protect as far as the Constitution requires it all defendants. . . ."
41 Cong.Rec. 2762-2763 (remarks of Sen. Spooner).
"I aimed to put the bill in such a form that it would cover exactly those cases in which the defendant had not been put in jeopardy under the Constitution of the United States. I believe that the bill is limited strictly to that matter."
41 Cong.Rec. 2757 (emphasis added).
"That is not what the law means by being put in jeopardy at all. The words 'being in jeopardy' are entirely a technical phrase, which does not relate to the fact that a man is in danger as soon as an indictment is preferred against him."
law officers of the Government with reference to their business that gave the district attorney information which enabled him to bring about the indictments and to help in their prosecution. That had no reference to the guilt or innocence of the accused. It was a pleading of fact that was independent of the crime for which those packers had been indicted."
"Therefore, Mr. President, there could be no jeopardy in a case of that kind where there was a decision upon the special plea in bar, because it is not under a plea of guilty or not guilty that the insufficiency of a special plea in bar is determined; it is non obstante whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty."
under the immunity law because they had furnished Mr. Garfield and the officials of his Bureau information was submitted to the jury, and the jury, under instructions of the court, found for the defendants. In that case, the defendants, under the Constitution, had been in jeopardy, and, in that beef-trust case, no appeal could lie."
41 Cong.Rec. 2757 (emphasis added). See 41 Cong.Rec. 2750 (remarks of Senator Nelson).
Senator Nelson was thus talking about the majority's "might have been case" -- the case where the judge gives the motion in bar issue to the jury under his novel view of the law, so that a successful government appeal would require retrying the defendant. In the immediately following passage, Senator Nelson makes clear that, if the facts pleaded in the special issue are not submitted to the jury, but tried to the judge, there would be no bar to taking an appeal. But, in both cases, Senator Nelson, like Senator Patterson, is quite obviously giving his views as to what "constitutional jeopardy" means.
"The Senator [Rayner] says he does not care whether it is double jeopardy or not. Even if a man under the Constitution may properly and lawfully be put on trial again, if he has been tried once, even though it were a mistrial, if he had been for a moment in jeopardy, he insists that we shall provide by law, no matter what the case may be, that he shall not be tried again; that he shall go acquit."
a law, to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is their function to determine what is jeopardy. It is their function to protect the citizens of the United States against any invasion of the constitutional guaranty as to double jeopardy. I think we can rely upon the court to protect -- as far a the Constitution requires it -- all defendants, without supplementing the Constitution by the Senator's amendment to this bill."
Spooner, and every other Senator participating in the debate -- completely undercuts the majority's assertion that Congress thought there could be no appeal once the jury had been impaneled. Indeed, in the face of the argument over the meaning of "jeopardy" and Senator Rayner's vigorous attack on the vagueness of that term, it is nothing short of incredible for the majority to suggest that Congress left that language in the Act intending it to be interpreted as providing "a clear, easily administered test," ante at 399 U. S. 307. If Congress had intended the majority' interpretation, it would have been both simple and logical to explicitly limit appeals to cases "where the jury has not yet been impaneled," thus avoiding the possibility of confusion which had been the very topic of discussion for three full days of debate.
The plain fact of the matter is that the majority's post hoc rationalization of the Act simply was not that of Congress. While the debates show considerable disagreement about the meaning of "jeopardy" in the legal sense, there is not the slightest suggestion anywhere in the legislative history that "jeopardy" is being used in any other sense. Even where references occur to the impaneling of the jury as the moment when jeopardy attaches, it is clear that jeopardy is still being used in its legal sense -- after all, as the majority itself notes, ante at 399 U. S. 305, the impaneling of the jury does, in fact, often become the constitutionally relevant point in determining that "legal jeopardy" has attached to prevent a reprosecution. But the one point on which there was unanimous agreement -- even from Senator Rayner, see, e.g., 41 Cong.Rec. 2748 -- about the meaning of "jeopardy" was that, where a convicted defendant, on his own motion, had secured the arrest of a jury's verdict of guilty, he had not been placed in "jeopardy."
shall be ordered, because it is giving to the defendant a new opportunity to go acquit when, under the trial that was had, he had been convicted."
"So long as the verdict of guilty remains as a datum, the correction of errors of law in attaching the proper legal consequences to it [does] not trench upon the constitutional prohibition."
while paying scant attention to the reason for trying to make the fit in the first place, with the result that Judge Wyzanski's action is to be given the no less distorting label of "acquittal."
The question in this case should simply be whether or not a judge who upholds a claim of constitutional privilege, thereby declaring the statute unconstitutional as applied, has entered a judgment that Congress intended this Court to be able to review. Surely, in a statute as unclear and ambiguous as the majority says this unhappy Act is, the "words" of the statute are only the first place to start the task of interpretation. The primary guide to interpretation should be the statute's purpose, as indicated by the evil that prompted it, and by the legislative history.
The Act was passed to remedy the situation that gave a single district judge the power to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government, and to annul, as unconstitutional, attempts by Congress to reach a defendant's specified conduct through the use of the criminal machinery. Over and over, this theme is repeated in the debates on the bill, dominating every other topic of discussion except the concern for safeguarding the defendant's privilege against double jeopardy. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion details, it is difficult to imagine a case more closely fitting the type of case in which Congress intended to allow an appeal than the instant one.
while Congress was concerned to protect the defendant's rights, it had no doubt that those rights were not invaded where a defendant had been found guilty, and the Government appealed the judge's decision that, for legal reasons, the verdict could not stand. The majority, in short, pays lip service to the policies of the Act without ever applying those policies to the question presented in the case before it. Judge Wyzanski, anxious to do his duty as he saw it and yet aware that ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue properly belongs in this Court, had two means of passing on the issue while still protecting Sisson's rights: he could have granted Sisson's motion after a pretrial hearing, see United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, 395 U. S. 60; Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(4), or he could, as here, grant the motion only after the jury's verdict of guilty forced him to reach the constitutional question. In either case, none of the interests reflected in the jeopardy provisions of the Constitution -- protecting defendants from repeated and harassing trials for the same offence -- is in any way endangered. In fact, Sisson's interests if anything are less in jeopardy in the second case than the first, where the Government's appeal would force a long delay in beginning the trial itself.
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970); Toussie v. United States, 397 U. S. 112 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163 (1965). Compared to some of these examples of "statutory construction," it is child's play to conclude that Congress did not really mean to limit "motion in arrest" to its old common law meaning, or that, at least, if it did, it thought decisions such as Judge Wyzanski's would have been appealable under some other provision, such as the "motion in bar" as long as there was no danger of encroaching on the defendant's jeopardy interests.
Admittedly, the issues raised by Sisson are difficult and far-reaching ones, but they should be faced and decided. It is, to be sure, much more comfortable to be able to control the decision whether or not to hear a difficult issue by the use of our discretion to grant certiorari. But that is no excuse for ignoring Congress' clear intent that the Court was to have no choice in deciding whether to hear the issue in a case such as this. The fear expressed in the prevailing opinion that, if we accept jurisdiction, we shall be "cast adrift" to flounder helplessly, see ante at 399 U. S. 299, has a flavor of nothing so much as the long-discarded philosophy that inspired the old forms of action, and that led to the solemn admonition in 1725 that "[w]e must keep up the boundaries of actions, otherwise we shall introduce the utmost confusion." Reynolds v. Clarke, 93 Eng.Rep. 747, 748 (K.B. 1725). I cannot agree. I would find jurisdiction.
Failure to set out the elements of a valid offense against the named defendant is the only way an indictment could ever be "insufficient" because of the unconstitutionality (as opposed to the construction) of the underlying statute.
The majority, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion makes clear and as I discuss in more detail later, infra at 399 U. S. 331-332 and n. 6, 399 U. S. 331-334, repeatedly ignores this difference between the facts necessary to secure relief for Sisson on his constitutional claim and the facts relevant to the offense of willfully refusing induction.
The majority seems to recognize that it would have difficulty justifying a refusal to hear an appeal challenging Judge Wyzanski's ruling on the Establishment Clause, simply because findings had to be made as to the defendant's standing to raise the issue. See ante at 399 U. S. 284 n. 16. But there is no real difference in this respect between Judge Wyzanski's free exercise and establishment rulings: both -- as the majority concedes, ibid. -- require factual determinations that Sisson belongs to the class that is entitled to raise the constitutional claim that is being asserted. If the ruling on the first is "an acquittal," so is the ruling on the second, since the judge might have sent the establishment issue to the jury too. See infra at 399 U. S. 327-328.
Consistently applied, the majority's theory would make no criminal case appealable to this Court. For even where a judge dismisses an indictment or grants a motion in arrest because of defects "on the face of the record," it is always true that he might have sent the case to the jury, instructing it to acquit if it found the facts alleged in the indictment, thus insulating the case from renew because of the intervening jury acquittal.
The majority's protest that its conclusion does not rest on "what might have happened," ante at 399 U. S. 290 n.19, simply serves to highlight the ipse dixit nature of its opinion. For the plain fact is that no other reason is ever given to explain why Judge Wyzanski's action amounted to a post-verdict directed acquittal. The question in this case is whether an affirmative defense, relying on facts developed at trial and sustained by the trial judge after a jury verdict of guilty, can amount to an appealable "motion in bar." It is no answer to this question simply to repeat that this is a case in which Judge Wyzanski, after a verdict of guilty, sustained Sisson's defense on facts developed at the trial -- a clearer case of question-begging can hardly be imagined. Such a simple restatement only poses the question that is to be decided: does such action amount to a nonappealable "acquittal" and, if so, why?
One answer to this question is suggested by the majority in its citation to United States v. Ball, ante at 399 U. S. 289-290. An acquittal is the type of judgment that cannot be reviewed without putting the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, in violation of the Constitution. Indeed, the legislative history shows that Congress was well aware of the Ball decision, and strongly suggests that Congress thought that nonappealable "acquittals" were only those in which review was incompatible with the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., 41 Cong.Rec. 2193. But despite the citation, I cannot believe that the majority really means to suggest that Congress could not constitutionally authorize an appeal in a case precisely parallel to this one in accordance with currently sought legislation. That would indeed be throwing the baby out with the bathwater in order to declare this case an "acquittal," and thus avoid being forced to reach the merits now.
What other reason is there for deciding that this is a case of "acquittal"? One obvious suggestion is that the question of whether a judge's action amounts to an "acquittal" admits of no single answer, but depends on the reasons for making the inquiry in the first place. Here, the inquiry is whether Congress meant to allow an appeal where a statute had been held invalid as applied to a class within its reach and where the defendant's constitutional jeopardy interests are in no way threatened by the appeal. The majority's absolute refusal to discuss or respond to the legislative history on this question, set out below, see infra at 399 U. S. 335-346, indicates that this approach would also lead to the conclusion that Judge Wyzanski granted an appealable "motion in bar," rather than an "acquittal."
The only other noncircular answer that I can find in the majority's opinion is that this is an acquittal because the judge "might have" sent the case to the jury under his novel instructions, resulting in a verdict of not guilty from which an appeal would indeed jeopardize the defendant's constitutional interest. That answer, as the majority's discomfiture indicates, is not a very good one.
One will search the majority's opinion in vain for an explanation as to why "motion in arrest" must be pinned to its common law meaning, while "motion in bar" -- which the majority also concedes had a unique meaning at common law, see ante at 399 U. S. 300 n. 53 -- has never been so confined. See United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57 (1969) (HARLAN, J.); United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 (196) (HARLAN, J.).
The majority concedes that the judge's instructions to the jury excluded the question of Sisson's sincerity from the question of Sisson's guilt under the Act. See ante at 399 U. S. 276. Indeed, Sisson's sincerity could not possibly bear on whether Sisson had willfully refused induction: since Sisson did not seek a I-O classification, he could not even argue his "sincerity" to show "no basis in fact" for his I-A classification. Moreover, as the majority again points out, ante at 399 U. S. 274 n. 2, even Sisson recognized that his "selective" objection to war foreclosed him from obtaining C-O status under the Act. Sisson's sincerity was thus relevant only to his constitutional defense, and was as distinct from the issue on the merits as would have been a claim that the prosecution was time-barred. In that sense, the factual questions relevant to Sisson's motion were not part of "the general issue." I do not read THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion, which discusses Sisson's defense in a wholly different context, as suggesting anything different. The majority's suggestion, ante at 399 U. S. 299, that a defense of privilege in a speech case may involve facts inextricably intertwined with the general issue, and the majority's reference to United States v. Fargas, ante at 399 U. S. 301, are perfect examples of repeated refusal to come to grips with the facts of this particular case where the issues were not and could not have been intertwined. Whether Sisson might have demanded a jury trial on the facts relevant to his motion is also a question not presented here, anymore than it was in United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57 (1969) (HARLAN, J.).
"entered on the ground that the Government did not present evidence sufficient to prove that [Covington] was [not faced with a substantial possibility of incrimination]."
Majority opinion, ante at 399 U. S. 299.
See majority opinion, ante at 399 U. S. 306-307, n. 61. Of course, the legislation that the Government sought shortly after the Act was passed -- requiring a defendant to raise his defenses before trial -- does not necessarily mean that the then-Attorney General interpreted "jeopardy" to mean literal jeopardy. The legislation would have been equally needed to prevent defendants from waiting until "constitutional jeopardy" had attached, before securing relief on a motion in bar. Indeed, it is because it was thought that "constitutional jeopardy" had attached in the Beef Trust Case (United States v. Armour Co.), 142 F. 808 (D.C.N.D.Ill.1906) that no appeal was thought to lie. See infra at 399 U. S. 341-342. Since the Beef Trust Case was the motivating force behind the Criminal Appeals Act, it would be natural for the Attorney General to seek legislation that would force a similar defendant to raise and get a decision on his plea in bar before trial began, thus avoiding any possibility that the defendant would escape by being placed in legal jeopardy.
To argue that the statute was enacted for the benefit of the Department of Justice hardly justifies relying on the Government's concession as additional authority for the proper interpretation of the Act. The relationship of the Department of Justice to the Criminal Appeals Act is not that of an agency to the statute creating the agency and charging it with enforcement of the Act's provisions. Indeed, when it comes to the question of this Court's jurisdiction, no institution has special authority for exploring and determining that question other than this Court. The Solicitor General in this case is simply one of the litigants; to give special weight to his strategy in arguing this case, at the very least, does a disservice to Sisson, who -- seemingly contrary to his own interests -- has also made a concession: namely, that this Court does have jurisdiction under both the "motion in bar" and "motion in arrest" provisions. The views of the Justice Department on the "motion in bar" provision are entitled to precisely the same weight as the majority extends to Sisson's views and to the Justice Department's views on the "motion in arrest" provision.
This interpretation is reinforced at other points in the debate in a manner that also explains why the "jeopardy" language occurs in the "motion in bar" provision, and not in the other provisions. The Senators thought that indictments would normally be dismissed before trial began, so there would be no "jeopardy" problems in allowing appeals in such cases. Similarly, a motion in arrest after judgment was thought to involve no jeopardy problems because the defendant made the motion himself, in an attempt to overturn a verdict of guilty. See 41 Cong.Rec. 2753. But it was recognized that the motion in bar could be granted after trial had started, see 41 Cong.Rec. 279, and it was not obvious whether, in such a case, "jeopardy" would have attached in the constitutional sense to prevent retrial. Hence, the "jeopardy" language was added, "out of abundance of caution," to make clear that Congress was simply bringing that provision into line with the other provisions: i.e., appeals were to lie only where "constitutional jeopardy" had not attached; but jeopardy, not the impaneling of the jury, was to be the test of appealability in the case of the motion in bar, just as in the case of the motion in arrest. See 41 Cong.Rec. 2191 (remarks of Senator Bacon); 41 Cong.Rec. 2756 (remarks of Senator Nelson) ("out of extreme caution, and, to put it exactly in harmony and in line with the provisions of the three preceding paragraphs, we have expressly provided that, where the defendant has been put in jeopardy, he cannot be reindicted").
The majority's apparent willingness to accept Senator Patterson's suggestion that the Beef Trust Case could have been appealed, ante at 399 U. S. 304 n. 57, virtually concedes the issue. For the whole point is that, in distinguishing between the plea and the issue on the merits, the Senator was plainly giving his views as to what constitutes "legal jeopardy."
It should be noted that even Senator Rayner's amendment did not purport to narrow the scope of cases in which the Government could appeal; it only sought to remove any "double jeopardy" problem by declaring that the defendant should retain a favorable decision, whatever the result on appeal.
"Provided, That if upon appeal or writ of error it shall be found that there was error in the rulings of the court during the trial, a verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be .et aside."
"Provided, That no writ of error shall be taken by or allowed the United States in any case where there has been a verdict in favor of the defendant."
Subsequent amendments to the Act omitted the proviso altogether (which no longer appears in the current version), thus vindicating the arguments of Senator Rayner's opponent that the amendment had no substantive effect.

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