Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/420/515/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:41:58+00:00

Document:
The United States, to the exclusion of defendant Atlantic Coastal States, held to have sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean, lying more than three geographical miles seaward from the ordinary low-water mark and from the outer limits of inland coastal waters, extending seaward to the outer edge of the Continental Shelf, that area, like the seabed adjacent to the coastline, being in the domain of the Nation, rather than of the separate States. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19; United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699; United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707. And this rule that the paramount rights to the offshore seabed inhere in the Federal Government as an incident of national sovereignty is confirmed by both the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953. Pp. 420 U. S. 519-528.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except DOUGLAS, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
"[T]he United States is now entitled, to the exclusion of the defendant State, to exercise sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean, lying more than three geographical miles seaward from the ordinary low-water mark and from the outer limit of inland waters on the coast, extending seaward to the outer edge of the continental shelf, for the purpose of exploring the area and exploiting its natural resources."
overruled. They offered, and the Special Master received, voluminous documentary evidence to support their claims that, contrary to the Court's prior decisions, they acquired dominion over the offshore seabed prior to the adoption of the Constitution and at no time relinquished it to the United States. At the conclusion of the proceeding before him, the Special Master submitted a Report (hereinafter Report) which the United States supports in all respects, but to which the States have submitted extensive and detailed exceptions. The controversy is now before us on the Report, the exceptions to it, and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties.
In his Report, the Special Master concluded that the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases, which he deemed binding on him, governed this case and required that judgment be entered for the United States. Assuming, however, that those cases were open to reexamination, the Special Master went on independently to examine the legal and factual contentions of the States and concluded that they were without merit, and that the Court's prior cases should be reaffirmed.
We fully agree with the Special Master that California, Louisiana, and Texas rule the issues before us. We also decline to overrule those cases as the defendant States request us to do.
the Crown of England title to all lands within their boundaries under navigable waters, including a three-mile belt in adjacent seas; and that, since California was admitted as a state on an 'equal footing' with the original states, California at that time became vested with title to all such lands."
"separately acquired ownership to the three-mile belt or the soil under it, even if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the English Crown by their revolution against it."
Id. at 332 U. S. 31. As the Court viewed our history, dominion over the marginal sea was first accomplished by the National Government, rather than by the Colonies or by the States. Moreover, the Court went on to hold that the "protection and control of [the marginal sea] has been and is a function of national external sovereignty," id. at 332 U. S. 34, and that, in our constitutional system, paramount rights over the ocean waters and their seabed were vested in the Federal Government.
title or ownership in the conventional sense. California, like the thirteen original colonies, never acquired ownership in the marginal sea. The claim to our three-mile belt was first asserted by the national government. Protection and control of the area are indeed functions of national external sovereignty. 332 U.S. pp. 332 U. S. 31-34. The marginal sea is a national, not a state, concern. National interests, national responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The problems of commerce, national defense, relations with other powers, war and peace focus there. National rights must therefore be paramount in that area."
339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 704. Louisiana had "no stronger claim to ownership of the marginal sea than the original thirteen colonies or California had," id. at 339 U. S. 705; and its claim, like theirs, gave way to the overriding rule that "the three-mile belt is in the domain of the Nation, rather than that of the separate States," ibid. A fortiori, the waters and seabed beyond that limit were governed by the same rule.
to the marginal sea is subordinated to this full paramount power of the United States on admission, there is or may be, in practical effect, a subtraction in favor of Texas from the national sovereignty of the United States. Yet neither the original thirteen States (United States v. California, supra, pp. 332 U. S. 31-32) nor California nor Louisiana enjoys such an advantage."
339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 719.
The Special Master was correct in concluding that these cases, unless they are to be overruled, completely dispose of the States' claims of ownership here. These decisions considered and expressly rejected the assertion that the original States were entitled to the seabed under the three-mile marginal sea. They also held that, under our constitutional arrangement, paramount rights to the lands underlying the marginal sea are an incident to national sovereignty, and that their control and disposition in the first instance are the business of the Federal Government, rather than the States.
"purely legal principle . . . , the Constitution . . . allotted to the federal government jurisdiction over foreign commerce, foreign affairs and national defense,"
the federal government has paramount rights in the marginal sea."
"assume that, as a Republic, she had not only full sovereignty over the marginal sea, but ownership of it, of the land underlying it, and of all the riches which it held. In other words, we assume that it then had dominium and imperium in and over this belt which the United States now claims."
"When Texas came into the Union, she ceased to be an independent nation. She then became a sister State on an 'equal footing' with all the other States. That act concededly entailed a relinquishment of some of her sovereignty. The United States then took her place as respects foreign commerce, the waging of war, the making of treaties, defense of the shores, and the like. In external affairs, the United States became the sole and exclusive spokesman for the Nation. We hold that, as an incident to the transfer of that sovereignty, any claim that Texas may have had to the marginal sea was relinquished to the United States."
to be overruled in all respects, as foreclosing the present efforts of the States to demonstrate error in the Court's understanding of history in the California case.
Assuming the possibility, however, that the Court might reexamine the constitutional premise of California and similar cases, the Special Master proceeded, with admirable diligence and lucidity, to address the historical evidence presented by the States aimed primarily at establishing that the Colonies had legitimate claims to the marginal sea prior to independence and statehood, and that the new States never surrendered these rights to the Federal Government. The Special Master's ultimate conclusion was that the Court's view of our history expressed in the California case was essentially correct, and that, if prior cases were open to reexamination, they should be reaffirmed in all respects.
might not, as it did by the subsequently enacted Submerged Lands Act, grant to the riparian states rights to the resources of the federal area, subject to the reservation by the federal government of its rights and powers of regulation and control for purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs."
"whether the state or the Federal Government has the paramount right and power to determine in the first instance when, how, and by what agencies, foreign or domestic, the oil and other resources of the soil of the marginal sea, known or hereafter discovered, may be exploited."
332 U.S. at 332 U. S. 29. The decision there was that the National Government had the power at issue, the Court declining to speculate that "Congress, which has constitutional control over Government property, will execute its powers in such a way as to bring about injustices to states, their subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their permission." Id. at 332 U. S. 40.
United States, and the jurisdiction and control of which by the United States is confirmed."
"the Act concededly did not impair the validity of the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases, which are admittedly applicable to all coastal States. . . ."
"It is quite obvious that Congress could reserve to the federal government all the rights to the seabed of the continental shelf beyond the three-mile territorial belt of sea (or three leagues in the case of certain Gulf states) only upon the basis that it already had the paramount right to that seabed under the rule laid down in the California case."
as provided in this subchapter."
43 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The Act then proceeds to set out detailed provisions for the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in the area and for the leasing and development of the resources of the seabed.
and 8.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas were extracted daily from the Outer Continental Shelf. [Footnote 7] Exploitation of our resources offshore implicates a broad range of federal legislation, ranging from the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, incorporated into the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, to the more recent Coastal Zone Management Act. [Footnote 8] We are quite sure that it would be inappropriate to disturb our prior cases, major legislation, and many years of commercial activity [Footnote 9] by calling into question, at this date, the constitutional premise of prior decisions. We add only that the Atlantic States, by virtue of the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases, as well as by reason of the Submerged Lands Act, have been on notice of the substantial body of authoritative law, both constitutional and statutory, which is squarely at odds with their claims to the seabed beyond the three-mile marginal sea. Neither the States nor their putative lessees have been in the slightest misled. Judgment shall be entered for the United States.
The State of Connecticut was not made a defendant, apparently because that State borders on Long Island Sound, which is considered inland water, rather than open sea.
The United States also demanded an accounting for all sums that the States may have derived from the area in question. This claim the Special Master recommends be denied for failure of proof. The United States does not except to this recommendation, and we approve it.
The State of Florida claimed that, by virtue of the Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73, Congress had approved the maritime boundaries for that State, which, at certain places, included more than three miles of the Atlantic Ocean and had thereby granted to the State all of the seabed within those boundaries. Florida also claimed in its answer that the Florida Straits were not in the Atlantic Ocean, as claimed by the United States, but in the Gulf of Mexico. Subsequently, the controversy between the United States and Florida was severed and consolidated with the proceeding in No. 9, Original, which was then concerned with the seabed rights of the State of Florida in the Gulf of Mexico, 403 U.S. 949, 950 (1971). The consolidated proceedings were given a new number -- No. 52, Original. We have acted on the Special Master's Report in that case. See post, p. 420 U. S. 531.
The States of Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Georgia each submitted an additional special defense applicable only to itself. We agree with the Special Master's rejection of these special defenses, and they will not be mentioned further.
The Submerged Lands Act was held constitutional in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272 (1954).
86 Stat. 1280, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. II). For a summary of legislation affecting the Outer Continental Shelf, see Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development and the Coastal Zone, Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 55-58 (Comm.Print 1974).
We have long held that the doctrine of stare decisis carries particular force where the effect of reexamination of a prior rule would be to overturn long-accepted commercial practice. See, e.g., 22 U. S. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheat. 598, 22 U. S. 602 (1824); Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. W. A. Gaines & Co., 246 U. S. 312, 246 U. S. 320 (1918).

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