Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/417/433
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:37:25+00:00

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1. The police conduct in this case, though failing to afford respondent the full measure of procedural safeguards later set forth in Miranda, did not deprive respondent of his privilege against self-incrimination since the record clearly shows that respondent's statements during the police interrogation were not involuntary or the result of potential legal sanctions. Pp. 446 452.
2. The evidence derived from the police interrogation was admissible. Pp. 446452.
(a) The police's pre-Miranda failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel under all the circumstances of this case involved no bad faith and would not justify recourse to the exclusionary rule which is aimed at deterring willful or negligent deprivation of the accused's rights. Pp. 446448.
(b) The failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel had no bearing upon the reliability of Henderson's testimony, which was subjected to the normal testing process of an adversary trial. Pp. 448449.
(c) The use of the testimony of a witness discovered by the police as a result of the accused's statements under these circumstances does not violate any requirements under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments relating to the adversary system. Pp. 449450.
L. Brooks Patterson, for petitioner.
Edward R. Korman, for the United States, an amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
Kenneth M. Mogill, Detroit, Mich., for respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.
Roman S. Gribbs, Detroit, Mich., for the Detroit Bar Association, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
* On the morning of April 19, 1966, a 43-year-old woman in Pontiac, Michigan was found in her home by a friend and coworker, Luther White, in serious condition. At the time she was found the woman was tied, gagged, and partially disrobed, and had been both raped and severely beaten. She was unable to tell White anything about her assault at that time and still remains unable to recollect what happened.
While White was attempting to get medical help for the victim and to call for the police, he observed a dog inside the house. This apparently attracted White's attention for he knew that the woman did not own a dog herself. Later, when talking with police officers, White observed the dog a second time, and police followed the dog to respondent's house. Neighbors further connected the dog with respondent.
The police then arrested respondent and brought him to the police station for questioning. Prior to the actual interrogation the police asked respondent whether he knew for what crime he had been arrested, whether he wanted an attorney, and whether he understood his constitutional rights. 3 Respondent replied that he did understand the crime for which he was arrested, that he did not want an attorney, and that he understood his rights. 4 The police further advised him that any statements he might make could be used against him at a later date in court. 5 The police, however, did not advise respondent that he would be furnished counsel free of charge if he could not pay for such services himself.
Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court. That court, noting that respondent had not received the full Miranda warnings and that the police had stipulated Henderson's identity was learned only through respondent's answers, 'reluctantly' concluded that Henderson's testimony could not be admitted. 13 Application of such an exclusionary rule was necessary, the court reasoned, to protect respondent's Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. The court therefore granted respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless petitioner retried respondent within 90 days. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, 414 U.S. 1062, 94 S.Ct. 568, 38 L.Ed.2d 467 (1973), and now reverse.
Although respondent's sole complaint is that the police failed to advise him that he would be given free counsel if unable to afford counsel himself, he did not, and does not now, base his arguments for relief on a right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nor was the right to counsel, as such, considered to be persuasive by either federal court below. We do not have a situation such as that presented in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), where the policemen interrogating the suspect had refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer who was then present at the police station. As we have noted previously, Escobedo is not to be broadly extended beyond the facts of that particular case. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S., at 733734, 86 S.Ct., at 1780 1781; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1424, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969). This case also falls outside the rationale of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), where the Court held that counsel was needed at a post-indictment lineup in order to protect the 'right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against (the defendant) might be meaningfully cross-examined.' Henderson was fully available for searching cross-examination at respondent's trial.
Respondent's argument, and the opinions of the District Court and Court of Appeals, instead rely upon the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the safeguards designed in Miranda to secure that right. In brief, the position urged upon this Court is that proper regard for the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination requires, with limited exceptions not applicable here, that all evidence derived solely from statements made without full Miranda warnings be excluded at a subsequent criminal trial. For purposes of analysis in this case we believe that the question thus presented is best examined in two separate parts. We will therefore first consider whether the police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right. We will then consider whether the evidence derived from this interrogation must be excluded.
The history of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination, and the evils against which it was directed, have received considerable attention in the opinions of this Court. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, supra; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426, 76 S.Ct. 497, 500, 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195, 35 L.Ed. 1110 (1892). At this point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of the provision that reads: 'No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . ..' This Court's decisions have referred to the right as 'the mainstay of our adversary system of criminal justice,' Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, 384 U.S., at 729, 86 S.Ct., at 1779, and as "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized." Ullmann, supra, 350 U.S., at 426, 76 S.Ct., at 500. It is not surprising that the constitution of virtually every State has a comparable provision. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (hereinafter Wigmore).
The importance of a right does not, by itself, determine its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark back to the historical origins of the privilege, particularly the evils at which it was to strike. The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was developed by painful opposition to a course of ecclesiastical inquisitions and Star Chamber proceedings occurring several centuries ago. See L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1968); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn.L.Rev. 1 (1949); 8 Wigmore § 2250. Certainly anyone who reads accounts of those investigations, which placed a premium on compelling subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their own lips, cannot help but be sensitive to the Framers' desire to protect citizens against such compulsion. As this Court has noted, the privilege against self-incrimination 'was aimed at a . . . far-reaching evila recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality.' Ullmann, supra, at 428, 76 S.Ct., at 501.
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony, the right has been given broad scope. Although the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might be construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so limited. The right has been held applicable to proceedings before a grand jury, Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra; to civil proceedings, McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 45 S.Ct. 16, 69 L.Ed. 158 (1924); to congressional investigations, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957); to juvenile procedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); and to other statutory inquiries, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). The privilege has also been applied against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid.
In more recent years this concernthat compelled disclosures might be used against a person at a later criminal trialhas been extended to cases involving police interrogation. Before Miranda the principal issue in these cases was not whether a defendant had waived his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination but simply whether his statement was 'voluntary.' In state cases the Court applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to determine whether the processes were so unfair or unreasonable as to render a subsequent confession involuntary. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 60 S.Ct. 1032, 84 L.Ed. 1342 (1940); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963). See also 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 815 et seq. (Chadbourne rev. 1970). Where the State's actions offended the standards of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, the State was then deprived of the right to use the resulting confessions in court.
'In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. . . . To be sure, the records do not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.' 384 U.S., at 457, 86 S.Ct., at 1618, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
Thus the Court in Miranda, for the first time, expressly declared that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable to state interrogations at a police station, and that a defendant's statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles.
'Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.' Ibid.
The Court said that the defendant, of course, could waive these rights, but that any waiver must have been made 'voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.' Ibid.
Id., at 467, 86 S.Ct., at 1624.
The suggested safeguards were not intended to 'create a constitutional straightjacket,' ibid., but rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.
A comparison of the facts in this case with the historical circumstances underlying the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the police conduct here did not deprive respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda. Certainly no one could contend that the interrogation faced by respondent bore any resemblance to the historical practices at which the right against compulsory self-incrimination was aimed. The District Court in this case noted that the police had 'warned (respondent) that he had the right to remain silent,' 352 F.Supp. 266, 267 (1972), and the record in this case clearly shows that respondent was informed that any evidence taken could be used against him. 17 The record is also clear that respondent was asked whether he wanted an attorney and that he replied that he did not. 18 Thus, his statements could hardly be termed involuntary as that term has been defined in the decisions of this Court. Additionally, there were no legal sanctions, such as the threat of contempt, which could have been applied to respondent had he chosen to remain silent. He was simply not exposed to 'the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.' Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S., at 55, 84 S.Ct., at 1596.
Our determination that the interrogation in this case involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self-incrimination does not mean there was not a disregard, albeit an inadvertent disregard, of the procedural rules later established in Miranda. The question for decision is how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard shall be. This Court said in Miranda that statements taken in violation of the Miranda principles must not be used to prove the prosecution's case at trial. That requirement was fully complied with by the state court here: respondent's statements, claiming that he was with Henderson and then asleep during the time period of the crime were not admitted against him at trial. This Court has also said, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), that the 'fruits' of police conduct which actually infringed a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be suppressed. 19 But we have already concluded that the police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the proplylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege. Thus, in deciding whether Henderson's testimony must be excluded, there is no controlling precedent of this Court to guide us. We must therefore examine the matter as a question of principle.
Just as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require that policeman investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose.
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deterto compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669) (1960).' 20 Ibid., 94 S.Ct., at 620.
We consider it significant to our decision in this case that the officers' failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in Miranda. Although we have been urged to resolve the broad question of whether evidence derived from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place, 21 we instead place our holding on a narrower ground. For at the time respondent was questioned these police officers were guided, quite rightly, by the principles established in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), particularly focusing on the suspect's opportunity to have retained counsel with him during the interrogation if he chose to do so. 22 Thus, the police asked respondent if he wanted counsel, and he answered that he did not. The statements actually made by respondent to the police, as we have observed, were excluded at trial in accordance with Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966). Whatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those statements may have had, we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of the witness Henderson as well.
When involuntary statements or the right against compulsory self-incrimination are involved, a second justification for the exclusionary rule also has been asserted: protection of the courts from reliance on untrustworthy evidence. 23 Cases which involve the Self-Incrimination Clause must, by definition, involve an element of coercion, since the Clause provides only that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. And cases involving statements often depict severe pressures which may override a particular suspect's insistence on innocence. Fact situations ranging from classical third-degree torture, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936), to prolonged isolation from family or friends in a hostile setting, Callegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962), or to a simple desire on the part of a physically or mentally exhausted suspect to have a seemingly endless interrogation end, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 1357, 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949), all might be sufficient to cause a defendant to accuse himself falsely.
But those situations are a far cry from that presented here. The pressures on respondent to accuse himself were hardly comparable even with the least prejudicial of those pressures which have been dealt with in our cases. More important, the respondent did not accuse himself. The evidence which the prosecution successfully sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by respondent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by respondent, but rather the testimony of a third party who was subjected to no custodial pressures. There is plainly no reason to believe that Henderson's testimony is untrustworthy simply because respondent was not advised of his right to appointed counsel. Henderson was both available at trial and subject to cross-examination by respondent's counsel, and counsel fully used this opportunity, suggesting in the course of his cross-examination that Henderson's character was less than exemplary and that he had been offered incentives by the police to testify against respondent. 24 Thus the reliability of his testimony was subject to the normal testing process of an adversary trial.
Respondent contends that an additional reason for excluding Henderson's testimony is the notion that the adversary system requires 'the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load.' 8 Wigmore § 2251, p. 317; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n 378 U.S., at 55, 84 S.Ct., at 1596; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 460, 86 S.Ct., at 1620. To the extent that this suggested basis for the exclusionary rule in Fifth Amendment cases may exist independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness rationales, we think it of no avail to respondent here. Subject to applicable constitutional limitations, the Government is not forbidden all resort to the defendant to make out its case. It may require the defendant to give physical evidence against himself, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973), and it may use statements which are voluntarily given by the defendant after he receives full disclosure of the rights offered by Miranda. Here we deal, not with the offer of respondent's own statements in evidence, but only with the testimony of a witness whom the police discovered as a result of respondent's statements. This recourse to respondent's voluntary statements does no violence to such elements of the adversary system as may be embodied in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
In summary, we do not think that any single reason supporting exclusion of this witness' testimony, or all of them together, are very persuasive. 25 By contrast, we find the arguments in favor of admitting the testimony quite strong. For, when balancing the interests involved, we must weigh the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce. In this particular case we also 'must consider society's interest in the effective prosecution of criminals in light of the protection our pre-Miranda standards afford criminal defendants.' Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 221, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 1681, 23 L.Ed.2d 253 (1969). These interests may be outweighed by the need to provide an effective sanction to a constitutional right, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), but they must in any event be valued. Here respondent's own statement, which might have helped the prosecution show respondent's guilty conscience at trial, had already been excised from the prosecution's case pursuant to this Court's Johnson decision. To extend the excision further under the circumstances of this case and exclude relevant testimony of a third-party witness would require far more persuasive arguments than those advanced by respondent.
'Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfied legal standards.' Id., at 224, 91 S.Ct., at 645.
In joining the opinion of the Court, I add only that I could also join Mr. Justice BRENNAN'S concurrence. For it seems to me that despite differences in phraseology, and despite the disclaimers of their respective authors, the Court opinion and that of Mr. Justice BRENNAN proceed along virtually parallel lines, give or take a couple of argumentative footnotes.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL joins (concurring in the judgment).
Frank acknowledgment that retroactive application of newly announced constitutional rules of criminal procedure may have a serious impact on the administration of criminal justice has led us, since Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), to determine retroactivity in terms of three criteria: (1) the purpose served by the new rules; (2) the extent of law enforcement officials' justifiable reliance on prior standards; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rules. See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 51, 93 S.Ct. 1966, 1967, 36 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 410418, 86 S.Ct. 459, 461467, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966). We have as a general matter limited our discussion of the relevant 'purpose' of new rules to their functional value in enhancing the reliability of the factfinding process. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971); id., at 663, 91 S.Ct., at 1157 (concurring opinion); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249250, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 10331034, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 1922, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1968); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra; Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S., at 638639, 85 S.Ct., at 17421743. This limiting approach has been taken in recognition that '(t)he basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth,' Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra, 382 U.S., at 416, 86 S.Ct., at 465; see Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S., at 297298, 87 S.Ct., at 1970 1971, and that the principal legitimate interest of a convicted defendant is therefore assurance that the factfinding process at his trial was not unduly impaired by adherence to the old standards.
In Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, the Court was called upon to determine whether the newly announced procedures in Miranda v. Arizona should be retroactively applied to upset final convictions based in part upon confessions obtained without the prior warnings required by Miranda. Aware that Miranda provided new safeguards against the possible use at trial of unreliable statements of the accused, we nonetheless concluded that the decision should not be retroactively applied. 2 The probability that the truth-determining process was distorted by, and individuals were convicted on the basis of, coerced confessions was minimized, we found, by the availability of strict pre-Miranda standards to test the voluntariness of confessions. 384 U.S., at 730, 86 S.Ct., at 1779. In addition, we recognized that law enforcement agencies had justifiably relied on our prior rulings and that retroactive application would necessitate the wholesale release and subsequent retrial of vast numbers of prisoners. Id., at 731, 86 S.Ct.At 1779. Then, in statements unnecessary to our decisionsince all of the convictions of the petitioners in Johnson had long since become final at the time of our decision in Mirandawe went on to say that our newly announced Miranda rules should be applied to trials begun after the date that decision was announced. Id., at 732, 86 S.Ct., at 1780.
The conclusion that the Miranda rules should be applied to post-Miranda trials made good sense, where criminal defendants were seeking to exclude direct statements made without prior warning of their rights. Exclusion of possibly unreliable pre-Miranda statements made in the inherently coercive atmosphere of in-custody interrogation, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 457458, 467, 470, 86 S.Ct., at 16181619, 1624, 1625, could be obtained at a relatively low cost. For, although the police might have relied in good faith on our prior rulings in interrogating defendants without first advising them of their rights, Miranda put the police on notice that pre-Miranda confessions obtained without prior warnings would be inadmissible at defendants' trials. Since defendants who had made pre-Miranda confessions had not yet gone to trial, and the police investigations into those cases were still fresh, Johnson envisioned 'no undue burden (being) imposed upon prosecuting authorities by requiring them to find evidentiary substitutes for statements obtained in violation of the constitutional protections afforded by Miranda.' Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 219220, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 1681, 23 L.Ed.2d 253 (1969); see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S., at 732, 86 S.Ct., at 1780.
'(C)oncern for the justifiable reliance of law enforcement officials upon pre-Miranda standards militates against applying Miranda to retrials . . .. As we stated in Stovall (v. Denno, supra), '(I)nquiry would be handicapped by the unavailability of witnesses and dim memories.' 388 U.S., at 300 (87 S.Ct. 1967 at 1971). The burden would be particularly onerous where an investigation was closed years prior to a retrial because law enforcement officials relied in good faith upon a strongly incriminating statement, admissible at the first trial, to provide the cornerstone of the prosecution's case.' 395 U.S., at 220, 89 S.Ct., at 1681 (footnote omitted).
For the reasons stated in my dissent in that case, I continue to think that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was illconceived and without warrant in the Constitution. However that may be, the Miranda opinion did not deal with the admissibility of evidence derived from in-custody admissions obtained without the specified warnings, and the matter has not been settled by subsequent cases.
In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969), it appeared that petitioner, who was convicted of murder, had been arrested and interrogated in his home without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Among other things, petitioner admitted having a gun and told the police where it was hidden in the house. The gun was recovered and ballistic tests, which were admitted into evidence along with various oral admissions, showed that it was the gun involved in the murder. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed, the applicability of Miranda being rejected by the state courts. Petitioner brought the case here, urging in his petition for certiorari, which was granted, that the ballistic evidence was a fruit of an illegal interrogation' the direct product of interrogation' without indispensable constitutional safeguards. His brief on the merits suggested that it was error under Miranda to admit into evidence either his oral admissions or the evidence of ballistic tests performed on the pistol, which was referred to as 'an illegally seized object.' This Court reversed the conviction but after referring to the ballistic evidence, went on to hold only that the admission into evidence of Orozco's statements made without benefit of Miranda warnings was fatal error. Although the issue was presented, the Court did not expressly deal with the admissibility of the ballistic tests and gave no intimation that the evidence was to be excluded at the anticipated retrial.
In this case the respondent, incarcerated as a result of a conviction in a state court, was granted a writ of habeas corpus by the District Court. The basis for the writ was the introduction at respondent's trial of testimony from a witness whose identity was learned solely as a result of in-custody police interrogation of the respondent preceded by warnings which were deficient under the standards enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The District Court concluded that 'the introduction by the prosecution in its case in chief of testimony of a third person which is admittedly the fruit of an illegally obtained statement by the (accused violates the accused's) Fifth Amendment rights.' 352 F.Supp. 266, 268 (E.D.Mich.1972). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 480 F.2d 927 (C.A.6 1973).
'The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege (against self-incrimination) exists for the indigent as well as the affluent. . . . While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his proverty, they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice. . . .
'In order to fully apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.' 384 U.S., at 472473, 86 S.Ct., at 1627.
I cannot agree when the Court says that the interrogation here 'did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.' Ante, at 446. The Court is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a constitutional basis. We held the 'requirement of warnings and waiver of rights (to be) fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege,' 384 U.S., at 476, 86 S.Ct., at 1629, and without so holding we would have been powerless to reverse Miranda's conviction. While Miranda recognized that police need not mouth the precise words contained in the Court's opinion, such warnings were held necessary 'unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person' of his rights. Id., at 479, 86 S.Ct., at 1630. There is no contention here that other means were adopted. The respondent's statements were thus obtained 'under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege (against self-incrimination).' Id., at 491, 86 S.Ct., at 1636 (emphasis added).
With the premise that respondent was subjected to an unconstitutional interrogation, there remains the question whether not only the testimony elicited in the interrogation but also the fruits thereof must be suppressed. Mr. Justice Holmes first articulated the 'fruits' doctrine in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). In that case the Government had illegally seized the petitioner's corporate books and documents. The Government photographed the items before returning them and used the photographs as a basis to subpoena the petitioner to produce the originals before the grand jury. The petitioner refused to comply and was cited for contempt. In reversing, the Court noted that '(t)he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.' Id., at 392, 40 S.Ct., at 183.
The principle received more recent recognition in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). There one Toy had made statements to federal agents and the statements were held inadmissible against him. The statements led the agents to one Yee and at Yee's home the agents found narcotics which were introduced at trial against Toy. In reversing Toy's conviction the Court held that the narcotics discovered at Yee's home must be excluded just as Toy's statements which led to that discovery.
The testimony of the witness in this case was no less a fruit of unconstitutional police action than the photographs in Silverthorne or the narcotics in Wong Sun. The petitioner has stipulated that the identity and the whereabouts of the witness and his connection with the case were learned about only through the unconstitutional interrogation of the respondent. His testimony must be excluded to comply with Miranda's mandate that 'no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation (not preceded by adequate warnings) can be used against' an accused. 384 U.S., at 479, 86 S.Ct., at 1630 (emphasis added).
In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), the Court held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda standards must be excluded from all trials occurring after the date of the Miranda decision. Mr. Justice BRENNAN suggests that Johnson be limited and that the fruits derived from unlawful pre-Miranda interrogations be admissible in trials subsequent to the Miranda decision. Though respondent's trial occurred subsequent to the Miranda decision, his interrogation preceded it. I disagree, as I disagreed in Johnson, that any defendant can be deprived of the full protection of the Fifth Amendment, as the Court has construed it in Miranda, based upon an arbitrary reference to the date of his interrogation or his trial.
'Linkletter, convicted in the state court by use of 'unconstitutional evidence,' is today denied relief by the judgment of this Court because his conviction became 'final' before Mapp was decided. Linkletter must stay in jail; Miss Mapp, whose offense was committed before Linkletter's, is free. This different treatment of Miss Mapp and Linkletter points up at once the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the judicial contrivance utilized here to break the promise of Mapp by keeping all people in jail who are unfortunate enough to have had their unconstitutional convictions affirmed before June 19, 1961.' 381 U.S., at 641, 85 S.Ct., at 1744 (dissenting opinion).
As Mr. Justice Black said in Linkletter: 'It certainly offends my sense of justice to say that a State holding in jail people who were convicted by unconstitutional methods has a vested interest in keeping them there that outweighs the right of persons adjudged guilty of crime to challenge their unconstitutional convictions at any time.' 381 U.S., at 653, 85 S.Ct., at 1750.
480 F.2d 927 (6 Cir. 1973).
19 Mich.App. 320, 172 N.W.2d 712 (1969).
The Court has also held that comment on a defendant's silence or refusal to take the witness stand may be an impermissible penalty on exercise of the privilege. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965).
'In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
As noted in the text, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was not held applicable against the States until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
See nn. 3 and 4, supra.
In Wong Sun the police discovered evidence through statements made by the accused after he had been placed under arrest. This Court, finding that the arrest had occurred without probable cause, held that the derivative evidence could not be introduced against the accused at trial. For the reasons stated in the text we do not believe that Wong Sun controls the case before us.
The opinion also relied upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416, 86 S.Ct. 459, 465, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See 414 U.S., at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, 31 et seq.; Brief for Respondent 9 et seq.
The Court has made clear that the truth or falsity of a statement is not the determining factor in the decision whether or not to exclude it. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Thus a State which has obtained a coerced or involuntary statement cannot argue for its admissibility on the ground that other evidence demonstrates its truthfulness. Ibid. But it also seems clear that coerced statements have been regarded with some mistrust. The Court in Escobedo, for example, stated that 'a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses' than a system relying on independent investigation, 378 U.S., at 488489, 84 S.Ct., at 1764, 12 L.Ed.2d 977. The Court then cited several authorities concerned with false confessions. Id., at 489 n. 11, 84 S.Ct., at 1764. Although completely voluntary confessions may, in many cases, advance the cause of justice and rehabilitation, coerced confessions, by their nature, cannot serve the same ends.
It has been suggested that courts should exclude evidence derived from 'lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens,' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 13, 88 S.Ct., at 1875, in recognition of 'the imperative of judicial integrity.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). This rationale, however, is really an assimilation of the more specific rationales discussed in the text of this opinion, and does not in their absence provide an independent basis for excluding challenged evidence.
Our Brother BRENNAN in his opinion concurring in the judgment treats the principal question here simply as a lineal descendant of the one decided in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), to be analyzed only in terms of the retroactivity framework established in that and subsequent decisions. While his approach has a beguiling simplicity, we believe it marks a significant and unsettling departure from the past practice of the Court in this area. Our retroactivity cases, from Linkletter v. Walker, supra, to Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 93 S.Ct. 2926, 37 L.Ed.2d 873 (1973), all have in common a particular factual predicate: a previous constitutional decision of this Court governs the facts of an earlier decided case unless the constitutional decision is not to have retroactive effect. The doctrine of retroactivity does not modify the substantive scope of the constitutional decision but rather determines the point in time when it is held to apply.
That common factual predicate is absent here. No defendant in Miranda sought to block evidence of the type challenged in this case, and the holding of Miranda, even if made fully retroactive, would not therefore resolve the question of whether Henderson's testimony must also be excluded at trial. Contrary, therefore, to the suggestion in our Brother's opinion that the question here is whether to 'limit the effect of Johnson v. New Jersey,' post, at 454 n. 1, Johnson has never been thought controlling on the question of fruits, for the simple reason that the parent Miranda case did not reach that issue.
retroactively. Under the framework of the analysis established in Linkletter, supra, and in subsequent cases, it would seem indispensable to understand the basis for a constitutional holding of the Court in order to later determine whether that holding should be retroactive. Yet ex hypothesi our Brother has no such analysis available, since the case has yet to be decided. Cases which subsequently determine the retroactivity of a constitutional holding have given the Court enough occasion for concern without substantially increasing the difficulty of that type of decision by making it before, rather than after, the constitutional holding.
Although the petition for certiorari did not urge us to limit the effect of Johnson v. New Jersey, this issue was raised in petitioner's brief as well as in the amicus curiae brief of the State of California, filed in support of petitioner. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 n. 3, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1686, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 294 n. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1968, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).
In Johnson we commentedas we have on a number of occasions in deciding to apply new constitutional rules of criminal procedure retroactivelythat 'we do not disparage a constitutional guarantee in any manner by declining to apply it retroactively.' 384 U.S., at 728, 86 S.Ct., at 1778; Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 55 n. 10, 93 S.Ct. 1966, 1971, 36 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973). This is so, because a prospective application of new rules will aften serve important purposes other than the correction of serious flaws in the truth-determining process.
Compare the decisions of the Michigan courts in the instant case, 19 Mich.App. 320, 172 N.W.2d 712 (1969), and 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971), with United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (CA7 1971), and People v. Peacock, 29 A.D.2d 762, 287 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1968).
(1961), applicable to all cases in which direct review had not come to an end at the time Mapp was announced. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966). That approach, as we have observed, was abandoned in Johnson v. New Jersey, where we stated that the Miranda rules were applicable to all trials commenced after the date of that decision. In more recent decisions, we have regarded the cutoff point as that at which law enforcement officials could first begin to guide their conduct in accordance with our new rules. Thus, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), the confrontation rulings of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), were made applicable to cases in which the confrontations took place after the date of those decisions, and in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969), the exclusionary ruling of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), was made applicable only to cases in which the search and seizure took place after the announcement of Katz. See also Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 57 n. 15, 93 S.Ct. 1966, 1972, 36 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 656657, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971). But cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 81, 89 S.Ct. 61, 62, 21 L.Ed.2d 212 (1968) (holding that Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 88 S.Ct. 2096, 20 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1968), which ruled evidence seized in violation of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 605, inadmissible in state trials, applicable to all cases in which the evidence was introduced after the date of decision in Lee).
The trend of our decisions since Johnson has thus been toward placing increased emphasis upon the point at which law enforcement personnel initially relied upon the discarded constitutional standards. See Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 and n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 1680, 23 L.Ed.2d 253 (1969). As has been noted by an eminent judicial authority such an emphasis is wholly consistent with the underlying rationale for prospective application of new rules, i.e., justified reliance upon prior judicial standards. Schaefer, The Control of 'Sunbursts': Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 631, 645646 (1967).
namely, that Miranda requires the exclusion of fruits, necessarily treats Miranda as a 'parent' decision. For the assumption is that exclusion is necessary to give full effect to the purposes and policies underlying the Miranda rules and to its holding that 'unless and until (the Miranda) warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against (the defendant).' 384 U.S., at 479, 86 S.Ct., at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (emphasis added). It necessarily follows that Miranda itself is the 'parent' decision.
John Edmund PATTERSON v. UNITED STATES.
ARIZONA, Petitioner v. Ronald William ROBERSON.
Robert S. MINNICK, Petitioner v. MISSISSIPPI.
State of MICHIGAN, Petitioner, v. Richard Bert MOSLEY.
Kenneth F. FARE, etc., Petitioner, v. MICHAEL C.
Robert EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. State of ARIZONA.

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