Source: https://www.jeremywrichter.com/author/richterjwgmail-com/page/24/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:33:32+00:00

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I’m Jeremy W. Richter. In addition to authoring this blog, I am an attorney with Webster, Henry, Lyons, Bradwell, Cohan & Speagle, P.C., in Birmingham, Alabama, practicing civil defense litigation and focusing on commercial auto/trucking litigation, premises liability, general business liability, and various other aspects of insurance defense litigation.
I recently wrote about the FMCSA regulations governing the hiring of non-English speaking drivers – in short, a motor carrier shouldn’t hire a non-English speaking truck driver. The Department of Transportation and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration require that truck drivers be able to read and speak English well enough to communicate with the general public, to understand road signs and signals that are in English, to respond to law enforcement and DOT officials, and to fill out paperwork. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.11(b)(2).
But there are truck drivers out on the roads who don’t speak or understand English well enough to be compliant with the regulation, so what are the practical, legal effects on a non-English speaking truck driver who is on the roadways and gets into an accident? You may not like the answer – it depends.
Early in my career as a trucking lawyer, I had a case involving a Russian immigrant to French Canada, who was involved in a wreck in South Alabama. Arkady and his wife were an owner-operator team who hauled loads all over the United States and Canada. One day while is South Alabama, they were involved in an accident that was not their fault. It resulted in their truck being out of commission for a couple of months while being repaired, which in turn resulted in them being unable to earn a living during that time.
Arkady and his wife hired my firm to sue the other driver for their property damage, lost wages, and bodily injuries. I had numerous conversations with Arkady over the phone, but spent more than half of each conversation apologetically asking him to repeat what he had said. His grasp of the English language was minimal, and his heavy Russian accent made it nearly unintelligible.
During the course of the lawsuit, both sides issued written discovery requests. I sent off the Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Arkady so he and his wife could inform the Defendant about their version of events and the injuries and damages they were claiming. It turned out that as poorly as Arkady spoke English, he was able to read and write it even less effectively.
After receiving the paper discovery back from Arkady and wading through it as best I could, I knew I would have to speak with Arkady again to decipher his meanings. I called. We had spoken for 10-15 minutes, when Arkady said to me, “This is Arkady’s wife.” Arkady and his wife had the same baritone voice and speech pattern, and I couldn’t tell them apart! I turned fourteen shades of red, tried to play if off as merely misspeaking, and got off the line as quickly as possible.
Then I settled the case … also as quickly as possible. I could not put these folks in front of a South Alabama jury.
Francisco was driving his tractor-trailer from Texas to Florida. While on the interstate in Alabama, a tire released itself from the grasp of an 18-wheeler traveling in the opposite direction. The tire was rolling along about 50mph when it crossed the median and smashed into Francisco’s front drive tire, rendering Francisco unable to control his vehicle. Francisco’s truck then crossed the median into oncoming traffic, collided with a vehicle, and rolled into the woods.
Francisco hadn’t done anything wrong. He could not have avoided the runaway tire. All of his paperwork was in order. He cooperated with the investigating officers. And after the accident scene investigation wrapped up, the State Troopers said he was free to go.
About a year later, Francisco and the motor carrier he was driving for were served with a lawsuit. Things proceeded well in the lawsuit, until it came time for party depositions. Much to my surprise, Francisco arrived at the deposition with an interpreter. When opposing counsel asked him about the interpreter at the beginning of the deposition, Francisco replied that he didn’t speak English. This was also a surprise since I had spoken with Francisco on several occasions.
It didn’t take long after that for the Plaintiff to hire an expert to say that Francisco and the motor carrier were violating the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations because Francisco was a non-English speaking truck driver. Francisco still hadn’t done anything wrong out on the roadway that day. But now the Plaintiff had red herrings in the form of DOT violations that it could throw at the jury. Specifically, Francisco did not speak English well enough to communicate with the general public. And this despite the investigating officer testifying that he had no trouble communicating with Francisco at the scene.
What Are the Legal Effects of Hiring a Non-English Speaking Truck Driver?
It depends. Maybe nothing. Maybe everything. I have not told the story of the wrongful death suit that was filed against a Spanish-speaking truck driver I represented. Although it was evident that the other driver had pulled out in front of him, leaving him no time to react, the truck driver barely spoke English (I had to communicate with him through his daughter). He and the motor carrier that hired him had violated the FMCSR. Never mind that his native language had no bearing on what occurred out on the roadway. He became a target because of the language barrier.
The hiring of a non-English speaking truck driver may create grounds for a lawsuit where none existed before. I’ve defended truck wrecks before where the truck driver was not at fault for the accident, but had all sorts of DOT problems. It can be done. But it sure is easier when the driver isn’t at fault and he’s in compliance with industry regulations. Juries are looking for reasons to award money to plaintiffs, and having a non-English speaking truck driver may give them that opportunity where none would have existed otherwise.
Valerie A. Taylor n/k/a Valerie Backus v. Lindsey V. Wheeler n/k/a Lindsey Woodard: An Alabama jury’s defense verdict will not be interrupted even when the evidence that a sudden emergency caused an accident is scant and conflicted.
On the evening of December 6, 2007, a vehicle being driven by Valerie Taylor/Backus rear-ended a vehicle being driven by Lindsey Wheeler/Woodard. Almost two years later, Lindsey sued Valerie, alleging claims of negligent and wanton conduct. Valerie raised the affirmative defense of sudden emergency.
Under Alabama law, if a person, without fault of her own, is faced with a sudden emergency, she is not to be held to the same correctness of judgment and action as if she had time and opportunity to fully consider the situation. The standard of care required in an emergency situation is that care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. In order for the sudden emergency doctrine to be applicable, there must be (1) a sudden emergency, and (2) the sudden emergency must not be the fault of the one seeking to invoke the doctrine.
Lindsey offered testimony that her vehicle was at a complete stop when Valerie struck her from behind. Valerie testified on direct examination that Lindsey had not stopped in an “emergency fashion,” but on cross-examination, Valerie’s lawyer elicited testimony from her that Lindsey had stopped suddenly and as a result, Valerie struck Lindsey’s vehicle. Valerie further testified, “I tried to stop, but it wasn’t successful and I hit her.” There was no further evidence of a sudden emergency.
The judge gave the jury instructions on both negligence and sudden emergency. The jury entered a defense verdict in Valerie’s favor. Upon considering a post-trial motion by Lindsey, the trial court found that the jury had entered its verdict against the great weight of the evidence, and the court awarded Lindsey a new trial. Valerie appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. Valerie A. Taylor n/k/a Valerie Backus v. Lindsey V. Wheeler n/k/a Lindsey Woodard [Ms. 2150776], — So.3d — (Ala.Civ.App. Dec. 14, 2016).
Ultimately, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals determined that the trial court erred in granting a new trial. It found there was “some evidence of a sudden emergency” but also that the jury may not have reached its verdict solely on the issue of sudden emergency. Rather, the jury may have found that Valerie was not negligent. Moreover, there was conflicting testimony regarding the circumstances of the accident, and the resolution of conflicting facts lies solely within the province of the trier of fact (in this case, the jury). The appellate court found that the jury had properly exercised its duty to resolve fact conflicts, and its verdict in Valerie’s favor was not against the great weight or preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the trial court’s order granting a new trial was reversed, and the case was remanded accordingly.
 At trial, counsel for Lindsey informed the court Lindsey would not pursue the claims for wantonness, leaving negligence as the only remaining claim against Valerie.
 Jawad v. Granade, 497 So.2d 471 (Ala. 1986).
 See Scott v. Farnell, 775 So.2d 789, 791 (Ala. 2000).
 See Sharrief v. Gerlach, 798 So.2d 646, 651 (Ala. 2001).
Ex parte April Steele Benton: When suit may be properly filed in more than one venue, the interest of justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute gives great weight to the county where material events occurred.
On December 4, 2014, April Steele Benton (Bibb County resident) and Amir Alan Ebrahimi (Shelby County resident) were involved in a collision in Shelby County. Ebrahimi was injured in the accident, and filed suit in Bibb County against Benton and her husband John Benton (owner of the vehicle April was driving), and State Farm (for underinsured motorist benefits).
The Bentons moved to transfer the action from Bibb County to Shelby County on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, pursuant to Alabama Code (1975) § 6-3-21.1. The Bentons argued that Shelby County had a stronger nexus to the case for the following reasons: (1) the accident occurred in Shelby County; (2) the accident was investigated in Shelby County; (3) the plaintiff Ebrahimi received medical treatment in Shelby and Jefferson Counties; and (4) Bibb County’s only connection to the case was that the Bentons resided there. State Farm joined the motion to transfer venue, and Ebrahimi did not file a motion in opposition. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion to transfer venue, and the defendants then filed a petition for writ of mandamus. Ex parte April Steele Benton, et al. [Ms. 1151181], — So.3d — (Ala. Dec. 2, 2016).
As such, a party moving for venue transfer under the forum non conveniens statute has the initial burden of showing that the transfer is justified based on the convenience of the parties and witnesses, or based on the interest of justice.
There is no question that venue is proper in both Bibb County and Shelby County. When venue is proper in more than one county, the plaintiff’s choice of venue is generally given great deference. The issue before the court then is whether the interest of justice overrides the deference given to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
The prior rulings of the Supreme Court of Alabama have shown that it construes the interest-of-justice prong to give great weight to the fact that the accident occurred in Shelby County and no material events occurred in Bibb County. In fact Bibb County’s only nexus to the case is the fact that the Bentons reside there. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama found no need to burden Bibb County with the matter, with its weak connection to the case, simply because it was the county of residence of the Bentons.
 See Ex parte Masonite Corp., 789 So.2d 830, 831 (Ala. 2001).
 See Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So.2d 307, 312 (Ala. 2003).
 See Ex parte J & W Enters., LLC, 150 So.3d 190, 194 (Ala. 2014).
 See e.g., Ex parte Wayne Farms, LLC [Ms. 1150404, May 27, 2016], — So.3d — (Ala. 2016); see also Ex parte Manning, 170 So.3d 638 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Autaga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So.3d 745 (Ala. 2010); Ex parte Mitchell, 690 So.3d 356 (Ala. 1997).
Consider this look at systematic problems and scams associated with DOT medical examinations to be the case study supporting yesterday’s post identifying the compliance problems associated with DOT medical examiner’s certificates and reports.
I recently had a case in which my truck driver client had been issued a Medical Examiner’s Certificate after having submitted to DOT medical examinations. The medical examiner was a nurse practitioner. She appeared to have performed a thorough and comprehensive physical of my truck driver. But there were a few problems.
The nurse practitioner had re-certified the driver when his heart condition and blood pressure results should have only permitted him to receive a re-certification for one year, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 391.41.
My truck driver failed to disclose that he had previously been diagnosed and treated for obstructive sleep apnea. When asked about it later, he thought that since he regularly used his sleep apnea wasn’t a problem any more. Fair enough, maybe. At the time of his examination, the portion of the Medical Examination Report that the driver filled out didn’t ask about sleep apnea specifically, but rather instructed the driver to check yes or no for “Sleep disorders, pauses in breathing while asleep, daytime sleepiness, loud snoring.” While using his CPAP, my driver wasn’t experiencing any of those symptoms. Or maybe it’s an example of a purposely withholding information from his medical examiner so that he can get back out on the roadway to earn a living.
But he was also taking a number of medications that should have given the medical examiner pause about re-certifying the driver. In addition to taking blood pressure medication, my truck driver had active prescriptions for anti-seizure/nerve pain medication; Alzheimer’s/memory loss medication; and medication for his COPD diagnosis. While none of these medications standing alone would have prevented my client from being re-certified, taken in the aggregate and alongside his other medical concerns, it should have given the medical examiner greater pause.
In same ways this was a problem with a medical examiner who either wasn’t properly trained on the criteria affecting re-certification periods. And in other ways it reflects problems in which the system relies on drivers (who are trying to get back out on the roads and earn a living) to relay health information that could negatively affect their ability to work.
But those examples pale in comparison to what has recently been uncovered in Georgia, where Dr. Anthony Lefteris issued bogus medical certificates to more than 6,600 truck drivers while operating out of an Atlanta-area Petro truck stop. He issued the re-certifications without submitting the drivers to the necessary DOT medical examinations. Lefteris was on the FMCSA’s list of certified medical examiners, but has since been removed. Each of the 6,600 drivers, who are sprawled over 48 states, are being compelled to undergo re-certification.
The FMCSA continues to implement new regulations to make the roadways safer and to ensure that driver’s are medically qualified to be operating commercial motor vehicles, but there is still a ways to go. As identified in yesterday’s post, there are no measures in place to require, or even permit, motor carriers to obtain a driver’s Medical Examination Report or other corroborate that he/she is legitimately medically qualified to operate a vehicle. Which is particularly troublesome when there are medical professionals handing out medical certificates like they’re counterfeit hall passes in a middle school.
Photo by British Columbia Emergency Photography.

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