Source: http://www.wisconsinappeals.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsin-state-public-defender/state-v-joel-joseph-lobermeier-2011ap68-cr-district-1-61212/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 05:41:31+00:00

Document:
Failure to object to a jury instruction amounts to a failure to preserve for review an asserted objection, which must therefore be reviewed in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, failure to object to a “material variance” between proposed and actually-given instructions doesn’t constitute waiver of objection to the variance, ¶11, citing § 805.13(4) (and stressing that variance must be “material,” else review falls within IAC context).
¶16 … Thus, not all of a witness’s convictions are admissible to attack his or her credibility. Rather, the trial court has significant discretion to balance the various interests set out in the Rule. Oddly, although Lobermeier argues that his rights were violated by the State’s non-compliance with Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(f), and his trial lawyer’s failure to discover Thornton’s four other convictions, Lobermeier does not tell us, and did not tell the trial court, what those other four convictions were. This alone, either under a harmless-error analysis, see State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶41, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 577–578, 745 N.W.2d 397, 408 (violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.23 subject to a harmless-error analysis), or under a Strickland prejudice analysis, dooms his contention. Simply put, the trial court did not have a chance to assess whether it would have permitted any of the four other convictions to be a basis for the jury’s evaluation of Thornton’s credibility. Moreover, as the trial court opined in its written decision denying Lobermeier’s request for postconviction relief, Thornton’s testimony that Lobermeier helped him do some work for Heinitz a week before the crimes cuts both ways ….
Defendant’s waiver of the right to testify at trial must be accompanied by a colloquy to ensure knowing and voluntary waiver, State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶40, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485, which the trial court failed to do here. However, this omission may be cured by a retrospective hearing at which the State proves waiver by clear and convincing evidence, ¶19, citing State v. Garcia, 2010 WI App 26, 323 Wis. 2d 531, 779 N.W.2d 718. The trial court here, on postconviction motion, held such a hearing and concluded “that Mr. Lobermeier understood two things. First of all, that he understood that he had a choice. In other words, he had the right to testify if he wanted. and [sic] secondly, the choice was up to him,” ¶21. The court of appeals “agree(s) with the trial court that the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Lobermeier personally decided to not testify and that he also understood that he could testify if he wished,” ¶22.
This isn’t to say that Lobermeier should have argued that the record was insufficient to reach the merits, only that the litigant should be alert to the waiver principle articulated immediately above.

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