Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/421/794
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:12:56+00:00

Document:
1. Juror exposure to information about a state defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged do not alone presumptively deprive the defendant of due process. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, distinguished. Pp. 797-799.
2. The voir dire in this case indicates no such juror hostility to petitioner as to suggest a partiality that could not be laid aside. Though some jurors vaguely recalled the robbery and each had some knowledge of petitioner's past crimes, none betrayed any belief in the relevance to the robbery case of petitioner's past, and there was no indication from the circumstances surrounding petitioner's trial or from the number of the panel excused for prejudgment of petitioner, of inflamed community sentiment to counter the indicia of impartiality disclosed by the voir dire transcript. Thus, in the totality of the circumstances, petitioner failed to show inherent prejudice in the trial setting or actual prejudice from the jury selection process. Pp. 799-803.
Before the date set for petitioner's trial on the instant charges, he was indicted on two counts of murder in [p796] Broward County, Fla. Thereafter, the Dade County court declared petitioner mentally incompetent to stand trial; he was committed to a hospital, and the prosecutor nolle prossed the robbery indictment. In August, 1968, he was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiring to transport stolen securities in interstate commerce. After petitioner was adjudged competent for trial, he was convicted on one count of murder in Broward County (March, 1969) and pleaded guilty to one count of the federal indictment involving stolen securities (December, 1969). The indictment for robbery was refiled in August, 1969, and came to trial one year later.
The events of 1968 and 1969 drew extensive press coverage. Each new case against petitioner was considered newsworthy not only in Dade County, but elsewhere as well. [n1] The record in this case contains scores of articles reporting on petitioner's trials and tribulations during this period; many purportedly relate statements that petitioner or his attorney made to reporters.
The District Court denied petitioner relief, 363 F.Supp. 1224 (1973), and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 495 F.2d 553 (1974). We granted certiorari, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974), in order to resolve the apparent conflict between the decision below and that of the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229 (1973), over the applicability of Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959), to state criminal proceedings.
In the face of so clear a statement, it cannot be maintained that Marshall was a constitutional ruling now applicable, through the Fourteenth Amendment, to the States. Petitioner argues, nonetheless, that more recent decisions of this Court have applied to state cases the principle underlying the Marshall decision: [n2] that persons who have learned from news sources of a defendant's prior criminal record are presumed to be prejudiced. We cannot agree that Marshall has any application beyond the federal courts.
Petitioner relies principally upon Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In each of these cases, this Court overturned a state court conviction obtained in a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press coverage.
In Irvin v. Dowd, the rural community in which the trial was held had been subjected to a barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial, including information on the defendant's prior convictions, his confession to 24 burglaries and six murders including the one for which he was tried, and his unaccepted offer to plead guilty in order to avoid the death sentence. As a result, eight of the 12 jurors had formed an opinion that the defendant was guilty before the trial began; some went "so far as to say that it would take evidence to overcome their belief" in his guilt. 366 U.S. at 728. In these circumstances, the Court readily found actual prejudice against the petitioner to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible.
Prejudice was presumed in the circumstances under which the trials in Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard were [p799] held. In those cases, the influence of the news media, either in the community at large or in the courtroom itself, pervaded the proceedings. In Rideau, the defendant had "confessed" to the murder of which he stood convicted. A 20-minute film of his confession was broadcast three times by a television station in the community where the crime and the trial took place. In reversing, the Court did not examine the voir dire for evidence of actual prejudice because it considered the trial under review "but a hollow formality" -- the real trial had occurred when tens of thousands of people, in a community of 150,000, had seen and heard the defendant admit his guilt before the cameras.
The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have "a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent' jurors." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 722. Qualified [p800] jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.
Id. at 723. At the same time, the juror's assurances that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the accused's rights, and it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate "the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality." Ibid.
The voir dire in this case indicates no such hostility to petitioner by the jurors who served in his trial as to suggest a partiality that could not be laid aside. Some of the jurors had a vague recollection of the robbery with which petitioner was charged, and each had some knowledge of petitioner's past crimes, [n3] but none betrayed any belief in the relevance of petitioner's past to the present case. [n4] Indeed, four of the six jurors volunteered their [p801] views of its irrelevance, and one suggested that people who have been in trouble before are too often singled out for suspicion of each new crime -- a predisposition that could only operate in petitioner's favor.
In the entire voir dire transcript furnished to us, there is only one colloquy on which petitioner can base even a colorable claim of partiality by a juror. In response to a leading and hypothetical question, presupposing a two- or three-week presentation of evidence against petitioner and his failure to put on any defense, one juror conceded that his prior impression of petitioner would dispose him to convict. [n5] We cannot attach great significance [p802] to this statement, however, in light of the leading nature of counsel's questions and the juror's other testimony indicating that he had no deep impression of petitioner at all.
Even these indicia of impartiality might be disregarded in a case where the general atmosphere in the community or courtroom is sufficiently inflammatory, but the circumstances surrounding petitioner's trial are not at all of that variety. Petitioner attempts to portray them as inflammatory by reference to the publicity to which the community was exposed. The District Court found. however, that the news articles concerning petitioner had appeared almost entirely during the period between December, 1967, and January, 1969, the latter date being seven months before the jury in this case was selected. 363 F.Supp. at 1228. They were, moreover, largely factual in nature. Compare Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), with Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra.
The length to which the trial court must go in order [p803] to select jurors who appear to be impartial is another factor relevant in evaluating those jurors' assurances of impartiality. In a community where most veniremen will admit to a disqualifying prejudice, the reliability of the others' protestations may be drawn into question, for it is then more probable that they are part of a community deeply hostile to the accused, and more likely that they may unwittingly have been influenced by it. In Irvin v. Dowd, for example, the Court noted that 90% of those examined on the point were inclined to believe in the accused's guilt, and the court had excused for this cause 268 of the 430 veniremen. In the present case, by contrast, 20 of the 78 persons questioned were excused because they indicated an opinion as to petitioner's guilt. [n6] This may indeed be 20 more than would occur in the trial of a totally obscure person, but it by no means suggests a community with sentiment so poisoned against petitioner as to impeach the indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of their own.
We must distinguish between mere familiarity with petitioner or his past and an actual predisposition against him, just as we have in the past distinguished largely factual publicity from that which is invidious or inflammatory. E.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556 (1962). To ignore these real differences in the potential for prejudice would not advance the cause of fundamental fairness, but only make impossible the timely prosecution of persons who are well known in the community, whether they be notorious or merely prominent.
Q. Now, when you go into that jury room and you decide upon Murphy's guilt or innocence, you are going to take into account that fact that he is a convicted murderer; aren't you?
A. Not if we are listening to the case, I wouldn't.
Q. But you know about it?
A. How can you not know about it?
When you go into the jury room, the fact that he is a convicted murderer, that is going to influence your verdict; is it not?
A. We are not trying him for murder.
Q. The fact that he is a convicted murderer and jewel thief, that would influence your verdict?
A. I didn't know he was a convicted jewel thief.
I am sorry I put words in your mouth.
Now, sir, after two or three weeks of being locked up in a downtown hotel, as the Court determines, and after hearing the State's case, and after hearing no case on behalf of Murphy, and hearing no testimony from Murphy saying, "I am innocent, Mr. [juror's name]," -- when you go into the jury room, sir, all these facts are going to influence your verdict?
A. I imagine it would be.
Q. And in fact, you are saying if Murphy didn't testify, and if he doesn't offer evidence, "My experience of him is such that right now I would find him guilty."
I agree with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN that the trial judge was woefully remiss in failing to insulate prospective jurors from the bizarre media coverage of this case [p804] and in not taking steps to prevent pretrial discussion of the case among them. Although I would not hesitate to reverse petitioner's conviction in the exercise of our supervisory powers were this a federal case, I agree with the Court that the circumstances of petitioner's trial did not rise to the level of a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Now, sir, after two or three weeks of being locked up in a downtown hotel, as the Court determines, and after hearing the State's case, and after hearing no case on behalf of Murphy, and hearing no testimony from Murphy saying, "I am innocent, Mr. [Juror]" -- when you go into the jury room, sir, all these facts are going to influence your verdict?
Q. And in fact, you are saying if Murphy didn't testify, and if he doesn't offer evidence, "My experience of him is such that, right now, I would find him guilty."
I cannot agree with the Court that the obvious bias of this juror may be overlooked simply because the juror's response was occasioned by a "leading and hypothetical question," ante at 801. Indeed, the hypothetical became reality when petitioner chose not to take the stand and offered no evidence. Thus, petitioner was tried by a juror predisposed, because of his knowledge of petitioner's previous crimes, to find him guilty of this one.
Q. Now, if you go into that jury room and deliberate with your fellow jurors, in your deliberations, will you consider the fact that Murphy is a convicted murderer and jewel thief?
Q. You would consider that, in your verdict, right?
Q. And that would influence your verdict; would it not?
A. If that is what you say, I guess it would.
Q. I am not concerned about what I say, because if I said it, they wouldn't print it. It would influence your verdict?
Q. And it would influence your verdict; right?
No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father. Where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight. As one of the jurors put it, "You can't forget what you hear and see."
the extent and nature of the publicity has caused such a build up of prejudice that excluding the preconception of guilt from the deliberations would be too difficult for the jury to be honestly found impartial.
Jury selection will continue today in the trial of beach boy hoodlum serving a life sentence for murder in connection with the Whisky Creek slaying of two secretaries in 1968.
Q. The question is, would you compromise your verdict; could you go there -- and say the State proved his guilt and the defense proved that he was insane, but, "I'm not going to let that guy walk the streets, so I'm going to find him guilty, period?"
A. I don't know at this point.
So in fact, ma'am, at this point, you cannot tell us whether you can give a fair and impartial deliberation about Murphy, number one, because of the lack of evidence, and number two, because of what you know about Murphy; isn't that a fact?
UNITED STATES v. Estelle JACOBS, aka "Mrs. Kramer"
Ernest John DOBBERT, Jr., Petitioner, v. State of FLORIDA.

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