Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/privilege/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:26:43+00:00

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In Ardon v. City of Los Angeles, published March 17, 2016, the California Supreme Court reversed a decision by the lower appellate court, and resolved a dispute between the lower appellate courts (discussed in earlier posts in this blog) over whether a public entity's inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document in response to a California Public Records Act Request waives the privilege, allowing the recipient to keep and use the documents and disseminate them to others. The issue turned on interpretation of Government Code section 6254.5, part of the CPRA, which generally provides that "disclosure" of a public record waives any privilege. After examining the statute, its history, and the law on inadvertent disclosures in litigation, the Supreme Court interpreted "disclosure" to refer only to an intentional, voluntary and knowing disclosure. The statute's intent is to forbid public entities from intentionally disclosing a record to one person who requests it, and then refusing to disclose it to another. But it does not apply to inadvertent disclosures.
Here, the records the city disclosed to the attorney for a plaintiff suing the city had been withheld from discovery in the litigation, and listed in a privilege log. These facts indicated that the disclosure was inadvertent.
The court ordered published another case on the subject on which it had granted review, Newark Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (July 31, 2015, A142963) __ Cal.App.4th __, __, [pp. 11-12]), review granted Oct. 14, 2015, S229112, ordered pub. Mar. 17, 2016.
In League of California Cities v. Superior Court (San Diegans for Open Government), published October 28, 2015, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order directing production of e-mails between the San Diego City Attorney and the Legal Advocacy Committee of the League of California Cities in response to the real party's California Public Records Act request; and directing the court to examine the e-mails in camera to determine whether they are protected by attorney-client or work product privileges.
The court interpreted the statute permitting review of trial court decisions under the CPRA via writ petition as allowing the League to petition for writ review, even though it was not a party to the trial court proceedings. Although the statute permits "parties" to petition for writ review, the court interpreted the statute's definition of "party" to include those with a beneficial interest in writ review. The court further concluded that the records were public records under the CPRA, subject to production unless an exception applied. The court found substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the e-mails were not protected by attorney-client privilege or work product. But the City had requested in-camera review of the e-mails, and the trial court had refused it. The court ruled that the City had a right to in-camera review on request, and that the court should review the e-mails to determine whether they were privileged.
In Newark Unified School District v. Superior Court (Brazil), published July 31, 2015, ordered published again March 17, 2016 the First District Court of Appeal, Division 1, issued a writ of mandate directing a trial court to vacate its order denying a temporary restraining order against distributing documents the district inadvertently distributed in response to a California Public Records Act request. The considered whether Government Code section 6254.5, which prescribes that "disclosure" of a privileged document waives the privilege, applied to inadvertently-produced documents. The court decided that it did not. The legislature intended section 6254.5 to prevent public entities that released documents to one requester from denying the same documents to other requesters. Further, interpreting "disclosure" as not applying to an inadvertent release of documents prevented the statute from conflicting with Evidence Code section 912, which holds that an inadvertent release of privileged information does not waive the privilege.
This holding conflicts with the one in Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2014), formerly published at 232 Cal.App.4th 175, now depublished by grant of review by the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court will likely take up review of this case as well, to determine which interpretation of the Act is correct.
Update: On October 14, 2015, the California Supreme Court granted review of this case, depublishing it. Further action in the case is deferred until the Ardon case is decided. On March 17, 2016, the California Supreme Court ordered the case published.
In Wilcox v. Maricopa County, published June 2, 2014, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court order granting a motion to enforce against an Arizona county a settlement agreement reached during mediation, in an action alleging both federal and state law causes of action. The plaintiffs asserted that a mediator hired by the County settled the plaintiffs' claims (and those of several other plaintiffs arising out of the same circumstances) and confirmed the settlement in an e-mail. The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which the directing county manager (authorized by resolution to resolve the claims) testified that he had authority to settle the claims, had authorized the mediator to communicate the settlement offer, was aware the mediator had communicated the offer, and believed a binding settlement was entered into. The district court granted the motion.
The 9th Circuit affirmed. It rejected the county's argument that the manager's testimony and the e-mails were privileged under Arizona's mediation privilege. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal common law governs claims of privilege, but state law goerns privilege regarding a claim or defense governed by state law. Since the same evidence related to the federal and the state claims asserted in the action, state law did not bind the federal court on privilege. Because the county stated it was not contending that federal common law created a mediation privilege, the court declined to rule on whether such a privilege exists.

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