Source: https://www.jeremywrichter.com/category/wills-estates/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:23:32+00:00

Document:
Category Archive for "Wills & Estates"
Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC, et al. v. Paula B. Noble: The personal representative of an estate who had been discharged and released as the estate representative prior to filing a wrongful death action, was without capacity to file the wrongful death action, and filing was a nullity.
On July 8, 2016, the Supreme Court of Alabama decided the matter of Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC, et al. v. Paula B. Noble, as personal representative of the Estate of Thomas A. Noble, [Ms. 1141158, 66, 68, July 8, 2016] — So. 3d — (Ala. 2016). Following the death of Thomas Noble, Paula Noble was appointed as the estate representative. In August 2012, upon Paula’s request, the estate was settled and she was discharged as the estate representative. In November 2013, Paula filed a wrongful death suit against the appellants under Alabama Code (1975) § 6-5-410, within the statute of limitations.
The appellants argued the wrongful death action is a nullity because at the time of filing suit, Paula was not the estate representative. Paula argued that her discharge as estate representative released her only from administrative duties and that the August 2012 discharge order should not be construed as discharging her for the purposes of bringing a wrongful death action. The Court found that the discharge order was a final judgment, clearly and unambiguously, that discharged and released Paula as the estate representative for all purposes. Because a wrongful death action me be brought only by a legally appointed estate representative, “one who may act only upon authority of a court appointment, may not continue to act after such authority had terminated, whether by death, resignation or by order of discharge or removal. Humphrey v. Boschung, 353 So.2d 760, 765 (Ala. 1970). Because Paula had been discharged and released as the estate representative prior to filing the wrongful death action, she was without capacity to file the wrongful death action, and its filing was a nullity.
In December 2013, the probate court re-appointed Paula as the estate representative, but the court found that this was not a remedy and was irrelevant because there was nothing for the re-appointment to relate back to. Although the general rule is that “relation back generally cannot be used to prevent a wrongful death claim from being time-barred where the personal representative is appointed after the two-year limitations period has expired,” an exception to the general rule is that relation back is only applicable where the delay in appointment is due to inadvertence by the probate court. Alvarado v. Estate of Kidd, [Ms. 1140706, January 29, 2016] — So.3d — (Ala. 2016); see also Ogle v. Gordon, 706 So.2d 707 (Ala. 1977). There was no such inadvertence in the instant case and the relation back doctrine did not apply.
For more on recent wrongful death decisions in Alabama, see my post: A Wrongful Death Action Brought by Other than the Estate’s Personal Representative is a Nullity.
Where a will had been in the testator’s possession and cannot be found after his death, there is a rebuttable presumption that the will was destroyed with the intent to revoke. The burden is on the will proponent(s) to overcome the presumption. Where no duplicate originals of the will can be found, a copy can be introduced into evidence to show the intentions of the testator and the contents of the will. Where there is conflicting evidence as to whether the will was revoked, it will be decided by the trier of fact, based on the weight of the evidence.
In a proceeding to probate an alleged lost will, the burden is on the proponent to establish, to the reasonable satisfaction of the judge or jury trying the facts: “(1) The existence of a will an instrument in writing, signed by the testator or some person in his presence, and by his direction, and attested by at least two witnesses, who must subscribe their names thereto in the presence of the testator; (2) the loss or destruction of the instrument no issue of revocation arising; and (3) the contents of the will in substance and effect.
Where there is a copy of the will (even if unsigned and unwitnessed), it may be introduced into evidence under certain conditions. Where sufficient search for the original will appears to have been made, secondary evidence of the contents of the will (ie: an unsigned copy) may be introduced into evidence, not going to the admissibility of a verified copy, but a fact to be determined by the trier of fact, on consideration of all the circumstances proved. Although there is a rebuttable presumption of revocation where the will is shown to have been in the possession of the testator and is not found at his death, the ascertainment of this fact will cast no light on the authentication of the copy, and is not preliminary to its introduction. In short, in a contested proceeding on petition to probate an alleged lost will, the presumption of destruction of the will does not have to be rebutted before the copy of the lost will can be admitted into evidence.
Where a proponent’s evidence is contradicted by evidence presented by the contestants, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the proponent has overcome the presumption of revocation raised by the failure to find the testator’s copy of the will. Conflicting testimony concerning the testator’s intent either to change his will or to distribute his estate in a manner inconsistent with the disposition set out under his will creates a question of fact, to be decided by the trier of fact. Id. Evidence presented by the will proponent that the will contestants had access to the house or premises in which the lost will was kept and proponent’s testimony that the testator had several times reaffirmed the existence of the will, is sufficient for a jury to find that the proponent has overcome the presumption of revocation of the will, arising from the fact that the duplicate original known to be in possession of the testator was not found at his death.
 See Barksdale v. Pendergrass, 319 So.2d 267 (Ala. 1975); Lovell v. Lovell, 132 So.2d 382 (Ala. 1961).
 See Harrison v. Bird, 621 So.2d 972 (Ala. 1993).
 See Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 795 (Ala. 1980)(quoting Managle v. Parker, 71 A. 637 (N.H. 1908)).
 See Stiles, 380 So.2d at 795.
 Lovell, 132 So.2d 382 (Ala. 1961)(quoting Jordan v. Ringstaff, 102 So. 895).
 Jacques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238 (1884).
 The usual method of authenticating a copy is by the testimony of someone who has compared the copy with the original and found the copy to be correct. If this method is unavailable, other evidence may suffice to authenticate the copy. Where evidence is sufficiently established to show that the document is a copy of the lost will, it is permissible for the copy to be admitted into evidence. See Barksdale, 319 So.2d at 271.
 See Barksdale, 319 So.2d 267.
 See Kelly v. Donaldson, 456 So.2d 30 (Ala. 1984).
 The mere fact that a will contestant had access to the will after the testator’s death is not enough to overcome the presumption of revocation. See Lovell, 132 So.2d 382. But the fact that a contestant had access to the will can raise the inference that perhaps someone other than the testator destroyed the will. See Stiles, 380 So.2d at 796.

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