Source: https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/112310.rhs.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:09:58+00:00

Document:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Macklin's oral motion for continuance.
II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Macklin's conviction for Possession of Cocaine.
Macklin contends that the trial court erred in denying his oral motion for continuance on the day of trial.
hire private counsel; and (2) the absence of a subpoenaed, material witness. When a defendant requests a continuance due to the absence of a material witness, and the statutory criteria are met, the defendant is entitled to a continuance as a matter of right. Elmore v. State, 657 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. 1995). However, as is the case here, when a motion for a continuance is made on non-statutory grounds or the motion fails to meet the statutory criteria, the decision to grant or deny the motion is within the discretion of the trial court. Id. We will not disturb the trial court's decision absent a clear demonstration that the trial court abused that discretion. Id. Too, in order for the denial of a continuance to be reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. Vaughn v. State, 590 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ind. 1992).
made no explanation as to why he wanted private counsel and the trial court specifically noted the competence of his appointed counsel.
identifies the absent witness. However, he admits that it is unknown whether the absent witness's testimony would have exculpated Macklin or corroborated his testimony.
Under these circumstances, where Macklin supported his oral motion for continuance on the day of trial with no more than a broad allegation that an absent witness was a material witness, without any identification of that witness or explanation of what the witness would likely testify to, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Macklin's motion for continuance.
Macklin contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction for Possession of Cocaine, a Class D felony. Specifically, Macklin argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence that Macklin had constructive possession of the cocaine.
When reviewing claims of sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh. denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if evidence of probative value exists from which the fact-finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
discovered marijuana in Macklin's pocket and four (4) bindles of a white, rock-like substance located on the driver's seat of the car. This substance was crack cocaine.
A conviction for possession of contraband may rest upon proof of either actual or constructive possession. Goodner v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ind. 1997). Constructive possession is the actual knowledge of the presence and illegal character of the contraband and the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over it. Id.; Godar v. State, 643 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), reh. denied, trans. denied. In cases where the defendant has exclusive possession over the premises on which the contraband is found, an inference is permitted that the defendant knew of its presence and was capable of controlling it. Person v. State, 661 N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. When possession is non-exclusive, however, additional circumstances must be present to support the inference that the defendant intended to maintain dominion and control over the contraband and that the defendant had actual knowledge of its presence and illegal character. Id.; Godar, 643 N.E.2d at 14-15.
the inference of Macklin's intent to maintain control over the cocaine and the inference that Macklin knew of the illegal character of the cocaine.
Macklin espouses the theory that the passenger in the car may have tossed the cocaine onto the driver's seat when neither Macklin nor the officer was looking. We decline this invitation to reweigh the evidence.
Footnote: 1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6 (1993).
Footnote: 2 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (1993).
(3) the location of the evidence.
(5) state that the defendant is unable to prove the facts specified in accordance with subdivision (4) through the use of any other witness whose testimony can be readily procured.
(d) A defendant must file an affidavit for a continuance not later than five (5) days before the date set for trial. If a defendant fails to file an affidavit by this time, then he must establish, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is not at fault for failing to file the affidavit at an earlier date.
Footnote: 4 The trial judge did not make specific reference to Macklin's noncompliance with the statutory requirements set forth in I.C. 35-36-7-1 but did note that Macklin failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 10 of the Marion County Rules of Organization and Procedure for the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division. Review of these rules reveals that the trial court was, in fact, referencing Rule 9, which sets forth as a requirement for a continuance that a verified motion be filed, in writing, at least five (5) days prior to the scheduled trial.

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