Source: http://www.weaponslaw.org/cases/hrc-coi-on-syria-2011
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 11:07:53+00:00

Document:
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic was established on 22 August 2011 by the Human Rights Council under Resolution S-17/1 with a mandate to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic. The reports of the Commission document incidents involving various types of weapons, including chemical weapons, incendiary weapons, barrel bombs and IEDs.
All of the Commission’s reports document serious violations of human rights law and of international humanitarian law (IHL) involving different types of weapons. One of the questions concerning respect for the right to life that the Commission asked the Syrian government to answer at the outset of its inquiry was: ‘[w]hich kind of weapons were the military/security and/or police forces issued and authorized to use in order to ensure public order?’1st report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, Annex V. The Commission has documented numerous indiscriminate attacks involving the bombing, bombardment and shelling of densely populated civilian areas, and on some occasions, has singled out particular weapon types for special consideration and made weapon-specific findings (see below).
The Commission’s first report raised concern about the many casualties caused by sniper fire, directly targeting civilians.1st report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, §46. A later report presented evidence of a pattern of sniper injuries: ‘Most victims had a single wound from a high-velocity gunshot, causing “enormous amounts of damage” and heavy bleeding. Maimed, the victims were often left to bleed in the street, as anyone who approached to help would be shot’.7th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, §98.
The second report reflected the Commission’s concern about the steep rise in casualties as the violence intensified. The Commission documented bombings (use of IEDs) and shelling (use of ground-launched explosive weapons) in residential areas and other densely populated areas with ‘heavy weapons, leading to massive casualties and the destruction of homes and infrastructure’.2nd report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, §§20, 23, 40, 46, 95. The Commission noted, for instance, that ‘[f]ragmentation mortar bombs were … fired into densely populated neighbourhoods’.2nd report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, §39.
In its third report, the Commission documented numerous indiscriminate attacks resulting from the shelling and bombardment of populated areas and also noted ‘an increased use of IEDs by anti-Government armed groups’.3rd report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, §§51, 90-95.
In its fourth report, the Commission noted that the conflict was becoming ‘more militarized because of the proliferation of weapons and types of weapons used’ and regretted that ‘it is the civilian population that suffers most’.4th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, §168. Appended to the fourth report is a ‘Glossary of weapons used’ (Annex XV).
The Commission’s fifth report for the first time contained a section on ‘Illegal weapons’, which addressed allegations of chemical weapon use. This report also contains the first mention of thermobaric weapons.5th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, §§21, 104.
In its sixth report, the Commission noted that '[ i ]mprecise weaponry, such as surface-to-surface missiles and cluster munitions, was regularly used’ and that greater precautions to protect civilians would involve ‘the use of more targeted weaponry and the cessation of use of barrel bombs, poorly-guided missiles and cluster munitions’.6th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, §§114, 125. The Commission called on the Syrian government to ‘[c]ease using imprecise weaponry, such as thermobaric bombs, cluster munitions, barrel bombs and others that are unguided or poorly guided, on civilian areas’.6th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, §201(a).
In its eighth report, the Commission found that ‘[ i ]ndiscriminate and disproportionate aerial bombardment and shelling’ and the ‘use of car bombings in civilian areas’ spread terror among the civilian population. The report’s section on the ‘Use of illegal weapons’ deals with chemical weapons taking the form of barrel bombs. The Commission found that ‘[g]overnment forces used chlorine gas, an illegal weapon’.8th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, Summary and §§115-8.
Annex IV to the report includes a list of ‘massacres’, which the Commission defined as ‘mass killings’ of civilians or other protected persons in a single incident, ‘where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the shelling, bombardments or bombings intentionally targeted’ protected persons. Most of these incidents involved the use of barrel bombs and car bombs (IEDs) in populated areas.8th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, Annex VI.
‘there is a rising number of persons with disabilities due to the use of explosives, particularly in densely populated urban areas. The increased use of landmines and improvised explosive devices by all parties to the conflict has led to the injury and maiming of a large number of victims. The weapons used by government forces, in particular barrel bombs, cause severe injuries, including the loss of limbs and deep cuts from shrapnel. Many of the victims who survive barrel bombings are maimed.’9th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/28/69, 5 February 2015, §78.
Chemical weapons are first mentioned and identified as ‘illegal weapons’ in the Commission’s fifth report (8 July 2013).5th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/23/58. The Commission confirmed in its seventh report (12 February 2014) ‘that chemical weapons, specifically sarin, had been used in multiple incidents during the conflict’. It found that in Al-Ghouta, 'significant quantities of sarin were used in a well-planned indiscriminate attack targeting civilian-inhabited areas, causing mass casualties’.7th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014,§§127-8.
In its eighth report (13 August 2014), the Commission found that reasonable grounds existed to believe that chemical agents, likely chlorine, were used on Kafr Zeita, Al-Tamana’a and Tal Minnis in eight incident and that reasonable grounds existed to believe that those agents were dropped in barrel bombs from government helicopters. The Commission recalled that chlorine gas is a chemical weapon as defined in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, whose use is prohibited in all circumstances under customary IHL and is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.8th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, §§177-8.
The ninth report of the Commission (5 February 2015) for the first time attributes a finding of use of chemical weapons to one of the warring parties. The Commission found that the Syrian government had dropped barrel bombs containing chemical agents, likely chlorine, on locations in Idlib and Hama governorates.9th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/28/69, 5 February 2015, §15.
The Commission’s seventh report (12 February 2014) deals with incendiary weapons, which the Commission considers to be ‘illegal weapons’. In its recommendations, the Commission called on the Government of Syria to ‘[c]ease using illegal weaponry, such as incendiary weapons and other weapons such as barrel bombs, that are unguided or poorly guided, on civilian areas’.7th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, §158.
The seventh report described an incident where ‘an army fighter jet dropped two incendiary bombs on the town of Urem Al-Koubra (Aleppo), one of which landed on a school’, killing 10 civilians and severely injuring dozens of others, mostly children and teenagers. While the Commission could not establish what flammable material was used, it reported that ‘the bomb caused napalm-like effects. Victims, some of whom did not survive, were disfigured, with second- and third-degree burns on up to 80 per cent of their bodies, and suffered extreme pain’. The Commission concluded that ‘[ b ]y using incendiary bombs in the Urem Al-Koubra school incident, the Government violated rules of international humanitarian law prohibiting the use of weapons that cause superfluous injury, unnecessary suffering or that are indiscriminate by nature.’7th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, §§130–1.
The Commission also found that ‘[s]ome barrel bombs are constructed as rudimentary incendiary weapons, causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering’ and that such barrel bombs violate ‘rules of international humanitarian law prohibiting the use of weapons that cause superfluous injury, unnecessary suffering or that are indiscriminate by nature’.7th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, Annex VI, §§4, 42.
Incendiary weapons, in contrast to chemical weapons, for example, are not banned under international law. Whether they can be deemed ‘illegal weapons’ per se is, thus, debatable.
According to the customary IHL study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), incendiary weapons have been cited in practice as causing unnecessary suffering if used in certain or all contexts.ICRC Customary IHL Study, 2005, Rule 70. The customary rule against weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, however, is generally understood to refer to the effect of weapons against combatants rather than civilians.With the possible exception of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. In the determination of the ICRC it follows from this rule, as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts, that 'the anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons' is prohibited, unless it is not feasible to use a less harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat.ICRC Customary IHL Study, 2005, Rule 85. However, the anti-materiel use of an incendary weapon may not be subject to the same restriction under customary IHL.
Incendiary weapons have also been cited in practice as being indiscriminate in certain or all contexts.ICRC Customary IHL Study, 2005, Rule 71. To make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons would likely have indiscriminate effects. For this reason, 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons prohibits such use. Syria, however is not a party to CCW Protocol III (as of May 2015), and in the ICRC's assessment, the specific prohibition on the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons for attacks on targets within a concentration of civilians had not attained customary status in 2005.ICRC Customary IHL Study, 2005, Rule 84.
It is further open to debate whether (all) barrel bombs used in Syria fall within the scope of the definition of an incendiary weapon contained in 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, respectively, of the definition of an incendiary weapon under customary IHL.
In its third report (16 August 2012), the Commission first took note of allegations of cluster munition use and determined that ‘such weapons are inherently indiscriminate when employed in residential areas or areas frequented by civilians’.3rd report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, §93 and Annex VI ‘Indiscriminate attacks’, §23.
In its fourth report (5 February 2013), the Commission documented increasing cluster munition use by government forces, both ground- and air-launched. In one instance, ‘artillery cluster shells’ were reportedly ‘fired by units equipped with BM-21 Grad Multi Rocket Launchers near the cities of Idlib and Latamnah’.4th report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, §21 and Annex II, §7. According to the ‘Glossary on weapons used’ (Annex XV to the report), cluster munitions of the type RBK250-275 were also used in Syria. The Glossary defines a cluster munition as ‘a form of air-dropped or ground-launched explosive weapon that releases or ejects smaller anti-tank and/or anti-personnel sub-munitions’ and notes that the danger posed by these sub-munitions may extend well beyond the immediate threat, as hundreds of sub-munitions may fail to explode upon impact.4th report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, Annex XV.
The Commission documented extensive use of cluster munitions resulting in unlawful attacks in its sixth report (16 August 2013). It described cluster munitions as ‘[ i ]mprecise weaponry’ and called on the Syrian government to ‘Cease using imprecise weaponry, such as … cluster munitions… and others that are unguided or poorly guided, on civilian areas’.6th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, §§114, 201(a).
Cluster munitions of the type used in Syria are prohibited under the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Such use has been condemned by more than 130 governments. As of May 2015, Syria was neither a signatory nor a party to the CCM.
Barrel bomb use was first reported in August 2012 in Homs city. By mid-2013 government forces began ‘an intense campaign of barrel bombing of Aleppo city and governorate’. Barrel bomb use by the Syrian government continued throughout 2013, 2014 and into 2015 with barrel bombs frequently dropping ‘on crowded areas, such as bakery lines, transportation hubs, apartment buildings and markets’.9th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/28/69, 5 February 2015, §14.
‘Barrel-bombs, particularly when dropped from high altitudes, cannot be properly targeted. Nor is it likely that anyone at the impact site would survive the initial blast. The Government does not provide early warning of attacks and there is little chance of being able to move from the area once a barrel bomb is released from a helicopter overhead. Victims of barrel bombs emphasized the extreme fear and mental suffering they felt as they came under attack. Survivors and witnesses consistently described that as a result of the barrel bombing campaign, much of the civilian population lived in a state of terror.
The impact of barrel bombs causes the collapse of buildings around its explosion, leaving neighbourhoods in ruins. Where such buildings are residences, this further contributes to the mass displacement of civilians inside Syria and over its borders.’7th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, §86 and Annex VI, Annex VI, §8.
‘According to medical personnel, most victims of barrel bombs had multiple wounds and experienced burns, loss of eyesight and peripheral vascular injuries from blunt trauma to extremities, often leading to amputations.’8th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, §101.
In its ninth report (5 February 2015), the Commission further noted that barrel bombs, in particular, ‘cause severe injuries, including the loss of limbs and deep cuts from shrapnel’ and that ‘[m]any of the victims who survive barrel bombings are maimed’.9th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/28/69, 5 February 2015, §78.
As to the legal assessment, the Commission noted in its fourth report that barrel bombs were dropped from such a height as to make accurate targeting impossible. In the Commission’s view, this demonstrated ‘a failure to take all feasible precautions in attack’, ‘contribute[d] to the indiscriminate nature of hostilities and amount[ed] to serious violations of international humanitarian law’.4th report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, Annex XI, §§36, 38, 91.
The Commission noted that barrel bombs were of different shapes, sizes and composition, lacking exact technical specifications available with conventional projectiles, in terms of accuracy and lethality. It observed that they were dropped from helicopters at high altitudes, further reducing their accuracy, and concluded in its seventh report that ‘[t]he use of barrel bombs, in this manner, is indiscriminate’.7th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, §86 and Annex VI, §§3-4.
Furthermore, in the Commission’s view, barrel bombs ‘built as de facto incendiary weapons’ violate ‘rules of international humanitarian law prohibiting the use of weapons that cause superfluous injury, unnecessary suffering or that are indiscriminate by nature’. (See above.)7th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, Annex VI §4. The Commission also found that chemical agents were dropped in barrel bombs in violation of the ban on chemical weapons under international law. (See above.)8th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, §118.
The Commission has repeatedly called on the Syrian government to ‘halt immediately the use of illegal and indiscriminate weapons, including barrel bombs’.9th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/28/69, 5 February 2015, §§78, 144.
Whether barrel bombs, like any other improvised weapon that is not made to exact technical specifications, can be deemed a weapon that is by nature indiscriminate (an ‘indiscriminate weapon’) is debatable. It is noteworthy, however, that the majority of cases documented by the Commission under its ‘Special mandate on massacres’ (Annex IV to the eighth report), i.e. the mass killing of civilians in a single incident, involve the use of barrel bombs in populateda areas.8th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, Annex IV. This attests to the wide-area effects of these weapons and supports the view that their use is indiscriminate in the context of a populated area.
In part basing itself on the report of the observer mission of the League of Arab States of 22 January 2012, the Commission documented several ‘bombings’ in its second report (22 February 2012), including of a civilian bus, a police bus, a train loaded with diesel fuel, an oil pipeline and small bridges.2nd report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, §22.
In its third report (16 August 2012), the Commission noted ‘the increased and more efficient use of IEDs by anti-Government armed groups against army and security convoys, patrols and facilities’. According to that report, both body- and vehicle-borne IEDs have been used, some consisting of pipes containing explosive powder and nails, fitted with a fuse, others being ‘homemade bombs’ using gas and fertilizer.3rd report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, Annex III, § 15 and Annex V, §51.
The Commission found in its fourth report (5 February 2013) that ‘[s]taging attacks with improvised explosive devices in predominantly civilian areas spreads terror among the civilian population and is in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, amounting to the war crime of attacking civilians’.4th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, §133.
In its fifth report (18 July 2013), the Commission found that ‘[t]here were multiple bombings, mainly in Damascus, for which no party claimed responsibility’ and that in all but one case, ‘the bombings demonstrated no clear military objective. The attacks spread terror among the civilian population. The large number of civilian deaths and injuries evidenced a disregard for human life’.5th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, §§103, 113. See also, 6th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, §134.
The Commission’s seventh report (12 February 2014) for the first time contains a section entitled ‘Car and suicide bombings’, which mentions use of IEDs in Al-Hasakah, Ar Raqqah, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus governorates. In some cases, the Commission found that attacks with IEDs ‘while directed at military objectives, resulted in a loss of civilian life and injury to civilians, which was disproportionate in relation to the military advantage anticipated’. Other attacks, the Commission considered, ‘appeared designed to target civilians, a war crime’.7th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, §§104-6.
In the eighth report (13 August 2014) the Commission repeated its earlier finding that bombings that appear to have civilians as their primary target, ‘demonstrate a clear intent to spread terror among the civilian population’. The Commission further noted that ‘the use of suicide bombers remained limited to ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, groups listed as terrorist entities on the list established and maintained by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’.8th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, §§107-8.
In its ninth report, the Commission remarked that ‘[ u ]nlike the earlier bombings of 2011 and 2012, most of which were directed against military targets, the bombings in 2013 and 2014 targeted civilians’. It also noted that in conducting hostilities, 'non-State armed groups relied on the inherently indiscriminate use of vehicle-borne (VBIED) and roadside improvised explosive devices (IED)’. In the Commission’s view such use ‘resulted in high civilian casualties as they target civilians in densely populated areas and transit routes’, and that this ‘conduct is in violation of international humanitarian law, and where attacks target civilians, amount to war crimes’.9th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/28/69, 5 February 2015, §§24, 26 and Annex II, §§62, 229, 238.
The Commission’s reference to the ‘inherently indiscriminate’ use of IEDs seems to be at odds with its acknowledgment that most IED attacks were initially directed against legitimate military objectives. As with all explosive weapons, use of an IED in a densely populated area bears a risk of having indiscriminate effects. In this connection it is interesting to note that incidents involving car bombs make up a significant portion of the cases documented by the Commission under its ‘Special mandate on massacres’, i.e. of a mass killing of civilians in a single instance, attesting to the wide area effects of these IEDs.8th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, Annex IV.
Thermobaric bombs are first mentioned in the Commission’s fifth report (18 July 2013) in connection with a trend of government forces and affiliated militias to increasingly use ‘even less precise weaponry’ with civilians bearing the brunt of often indiscriminate attacks.5th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, §§21, 104.
The sixth report (16 August 2013) mentions an incident involving ‘a highly explosive shoulder fired missile, likely to have been thermobaric in nature’ by Hezbollah fighters. In this report, the Commission called on the government of Syria to ‘Cease using imprecise weaponry, such as thermobaric bombs, … and others that are unguided or poorly guided, on civilian areas’.6th Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, §201(a) and Annex III, §16.
In its eighth report (13 August 2014), the Commission noted that government forces ‘relied on highly destructive firepower … including vacuum and barrel bombs, and ballistic missiles’.8th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, UN doc. A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, §99.

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