Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2010StMULawBestBriefOverallMcCartney
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:16:23+00:00

Document:
TIM RIGGINS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. To determine whether a defendant has standing to challenge a rental vehicle search, does the Court consider the totality of the circumstances? Did the defendant have standing to challenge the reasonableness of the government’s actions?
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The court of appeals entered judgment on November 12, 2008. (R. at 25). Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari on December 14, 2008. (R. at 26). This Court granted the petition on March 7, 2009. (R. at 27). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000). A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
refused. (R. at 7). Officer Womack, believing he did not need consent from an unauthorized driver, proceeded with a warrantless search of the rental car and rummaged through Riggins’ personal effects, finding such items as an mp3 player, a gym bag containing men’s athletic clothing, men’s tennis shoes and a business suit hanging in the back seat. (R. at 8). Upon opening the unlocked glove box, Officer Womack discovered a wrapped brown paper sack containing a white substance, which was later confirmed as cocaine, and other drug-related paraphernalia. (R. at 8). After discovering the drugs, Officer Womack immediately placed Riggins under arrest. (R. at 8). Riggins filed a motion to suppress the cocaine seized from the glove box. (R. at 7). The District Court of Dillon denied the motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that an unauthorized driver of a rental car lacks standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge. (R. at 22). The Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. (R. at 24). On March 7, 2009, Riggins’ petition for writ of certiorari to this Court was granted. (R. at 27). Riggins respectfully requests this Court reverse the decision of the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals because an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle may have standing to challenge an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT I. Riggins’ privacy was invaded when an officer unreasonably searched the rental car he was driving. Subsequently, the Fifteenth Circuit unreasonably denied Riggins standing to challenge the legality of the government’s search. After the landmark decision in Katz v. United States, the reach of the Fourth Amendment goes as far as a person's reasonable privacy expectation, which can be shown through concepts that are recognized and accepted by society.
In adopting this new approach, the Court abandoned its previous analysis, which focused almost exclusively on arcane property distinctions. The circuit courts have applied three different tests to determine whether it is objectively reasonable for an unauthorized driver to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a rental vehicle: a bright line approach, which restricts the driver from asserting a Fourth Amendment claim by focusing on property rights and rigid adherence to contract distinctions; a permission test, which allows a claim based on permission to use the rental car; and a totality of the circumstances approach, which considers the surrounding facts in addition to widely shared societal values to determine whether an unauthorized driver has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Based on this Court’s faithfulness to fact-specific analysis of the reasonableness inquiry in Fourth Amendment cases, the totality of the circumstances test should be adopted. II. The Fifteenth Circuit erred in denying standing to Riggins, based solely on his lack of a contractual or property interest in the vehicle. According to this Court’s previous holdings, Riggins can establish a legitimate expectation of privacy since he demonstrated consensual possession and joint authority over the area searched, and he had the ability to exclude others from the premises. Additionally, by applying the Sixth Circuit’s totality of circumstances test, Riggins had a legitimate expectation of privacy while driving the rental car. He had a business relationship with the rental agency based on the joint credit card that Riggins’ wife used to procure the rental car. Moreover, he had permission from his wife, who was the authorized driver, and with whom he had an intimate relationship. Therefore, Riggins has standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim against the unreasonable search of the rental vehicle and this Court should reverse the decision of the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
ARGUMENT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE FIFTEENTH CIRCUIT’S BRIGHT-LINE APPROACH AND INSTEAD APPLY A TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES STANDARD OF REVIEW TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER OF A RENTAL CAR HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF A SEARCH. The Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals improperly applied a bright-line rule in determining that Riggins lacked standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge of the search of the rental vehicle he was driving at the time of the traffic stop. The standing principle in Fourth Amendment cases requires one who contests the legality of a search to prove that he was personally the victim of an invasion of privacy. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978). While this Court has never addressed whether an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle has standing to challenge a warrantless search, it has construed that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable government intrusions, holding that the Fourth Amendment safeguards people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). Because Fourth Amendment privacy rights are personal, establishing standing to challenge a search requires an individual to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched and such expectation must be one society recognizes as objectively reasonable. Rakas at 143. A legitimate expectation of privacy must stem from grounds independent of the Fourth Amendment, either through common law property concepts or from widely held social conventions that are acknowledged and permitted by society. Id. at 143 n. 12. Therefore, because protection under the Fourth Amendment is not exclusively dependent on a property interest in the place searched, courts will constitutionally honor standing to challenge a search in circumstances where an individual demonstrates an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the invaded space. Id. at 143.
Court should reject the single-factor test in favor of a fact-bound review of the totality of the circumstances. II. RIGGINS HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE GOVERNMENT’S ACTIONS BECAUSE THIS COURT’S LINE OF REASONING IN SIMILAR CASES RECOGNIZES RIGGINS’ PRIVACY INTEREST IN THE RENTAL CAR. ADDITIONALLY, UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH, RIGGINS HAD A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, GIVING RISE TO HIS STANDING TO CONTEST THE SEARCH. The Fifteenth Circuit erred in denying Riggins’ standing based solely on his lack of a contractual or property interest in the vehicle. This flawed approach suggests legitimate privacy interests should hinge on a narrow concept of property law, whereas a proper analysis recognizes that Riggins has the right to claim Fourth Amendment protection from the unlawful search of the rental car. Following the line of reasoning this Court initiated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), redefined in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and clarified in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), an individual can claim protection under the Fourth Amendment by establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy through consensual possession and joint authority over the area searched, and by demonstrating the ability to exclude others from the premises. Additionally, because Riggins’ wife, who was in lawful possession of the vehicle, granted him permission to drive the rental vehicle, and since Riggins had an established business relationship with the rental car company based on the use of his joint credit card, this Court should grant him standing to challenge the search because he demonstrated an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car after considering the totality of the circumstances. R. at 5. A. According to a framework of precedent from this Court, Riggins can claim protection under the Fourth Amendment against the government’s unreasonable search of the rental car since he received permission from his wife to drive it, and demonstrated joint authority and control over the vehicle at the time the government action occurred.
the Fourth Amendment seeks to avoid. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Fifteenth Circuit’s ruling and grant Riggins standing to contest the search. CONCLUSION In remaining faithful to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness premise, this Court should consider the totality of circumstances to determine whether an unauthorized driver has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a rental car. In light of the surrounding circumstances, Riggins has established a legitimate expectation of privacy because he exercised dominion and control over the rental car, displayed the ability to exclude others, maintained a business relationship with the rental agency based on the joint credit card payment, and had an intimate relationship with the authorized driver, his wife, from whom he received permission to use the car. Additionally, a bright-line rule giving law enforcement unrestricted power to detain an unauthorized driver and conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle does not comport with this Court’s historical approach to interpreting the reasonableness inquiry in search and seizure cases. The result of instituting a bright-line rule pertaining to unauthorized drivers of rental cars provides too much discretion to law enforcement, leading to unreasonable intrusions upon the privacy of less powerful members of society. For these reasons, Tim Riggins urges the Court to reverse the decision of the Fifteenth Circuit. Respectfully submitted, this 24th day of November, 2009.
APPENDIX FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Catherine G. McCartney, “Best Brief Contest Winner: Tim Riggins v. United States of America 09-9100 Brief for Petitioner Winner of the 2010 Best Brief Contest at St. Mary's University School of Law,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2010StMULawBestBriefOverallMcCartney.

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