Source: https://familylaw.typepad.com/virginiafamilylawappeals/criminal-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:50:06+00:00

Document:
The Court of Appeals upholds a conviction for felony child neglect. The mother was driving with the children with a BAC of 0.25%, two flat tires that she seemed unaware of, had hit a median, and appeared "heavily and highly intoxicated.” Camp v. Commonwealth, 5/8/18.
Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1) requires a "willful act or omission in the care of such child ... so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life."
‘Willful act’ imports knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The act done must be intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably result in an injury.” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 183, 597 S.E.2d 104, 111 (2004). Thus, to fall within the scope of the statute, a parent’s act or omission must be such that “an objectively reasonable person would understand that injury to the child is likely to result” from the act or omission. Hannon, 68 Va. App. at 94, 803 S.E.2d at 359.
Accordingly, to sustain appellant’s convictions, the evidence must be sufficient to allow the factfinder to conclude that appellant’s actions exposed the children to more than a mere possibility of injury; the factfinder must be able to conclude from the evidence that injuries were likely.
In Stevens v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 481, 487-88, 634 S.E.2d 305, 309 (2006), ... the Supreme Court expressly stated that the defendant’s “high level of intoxication, approximately three times the legal limit . . .. alone justifies a finding that Stevens’ conduct was gross, wanton, and culpable[,]” and thus, met the standard found in Code § 18.2-36.1(B).5.
In addition, though not necessary for conviction, "Significant other evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion: appellant’s inability to control her SUV when she nearly struck Lasco’s marked police cruiser; appellant’s inability to control her SUV to the point that she struck a median with sufficient force to flatten two tires; her continued operation of the vehicle with two flat tires; and her inability to complete one of the field sobriety tests without falling down."
The Court of Appeals upholds a decision that leaving an unruly, wandering-prone 5-year-old boy home alone for "the better part of an hour" was felony child neglect. Gibbs v. Commonwealth, unpub. 4/3/18. The Court stresses that it does not retry the case, but only looks at whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” The boy was found walking from his apartment complex across the street towards some businesses, on a very cold day, with no jacket or socks. He said he thought his father was at work and he was going to find him. Actually, the father was at a meeting at the child's school about some safety-threatening misbehavior for which the child had been suspended, which is why he was at home.
The Court also found it significant that the father did not leave the son with any way to reach him, and that he knew that a month earlier, the boy had left the apartment and gone to the complex's pool when left home with his older brother.
If a court reporter or anyone else sends a transcript to a Circuit Court, that counts as the "filing" of the transcript even when that means it starts the time limits for the appeal, the Va. Court of Appeals says in Commonwealth v. Spinola (9-8-15).
The Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the initial petition for appeal and the transcript notice were untimely filed. The appeal was an interlocutory one allowed in criminal cases under a statute which requires the appellant to file a Notice of the transcript's filing within three days after the transcript is filed; and the Petition for Appeal to be filed within 25 days after the Notice.
The transcript was provided to the clerk of the circuit court for the express purpose of being filed, and all parties were given notice [by copy of the reporter's cover letter] that the transcript had been delivered to the clerk “to be filed this day . . . in the above styled case . . . .” ... The clerk accepted it and marked it filed. Furthermore, we previously have held that “‘[a] document is considered filed when delivered to the clerk for filing.’” Waller v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 71, 75, 497 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1998) (quoting Rhem v. State, 820 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
Washington v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 276, 281, 616 S.E.2d 774, 777 (2005) (“[W]e assume legislative familiarity with Virginia case law when the legislature enacts a statute which might impact upon that law.”).
The case law referred to above is Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 0741-13-3, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 251 (Va. Ct. App., unpublished, Sept. 10, 2013). In it, a third party filed the transcript, and the appellant's Notice of its filing was filed within the deadlines caused thereby. But the appellant did not file a duplicate of the transcript, and the statute at the time said the transcript had to be filed “by the Commonwealth”. The Court decided there was no need to have re-filed a duplicate of a transcript that had already been filed. The appellant did not file the appeal petition within the required time after the transcript was filed, but the majority said the appeal was still timely because a literal reading would require the appeal in that case to be filed before the trial court's decision.
Although they have no precedential value, unpublished opinions of this Court are nevertheless persuasive authority. Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 351 n.3, 735 S.E.2d 255, 258 n.3 (2012).
This Court is precluded from construing “a statute . . . so that it leads to absurd results.” Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 637, 651, 621 S.E.2d 140, 147 (2005). Thus, “where a particular construction of a statute will result in an - 16 - absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942).
However, this was an interlocutory appeal allowed under a special statute for criminal cases, and the special requirements based on the filing of a transcript are in that statute, which begins, "The provisions of this subsection apply only to pretrial appeals.", so this case should not lead to deadlines for appeal falling before the order being appealed is entered.

References: v. 
 § 18
 v. 
 v. 
 § 18
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.