Source: https://www.defenselitigationinsider.com/2017/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:32:03+00:00

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A federal district court in the Eastern District of Louisiana recently held that it continued to have federal jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, even after the plaintiffs amended their petition to delete claims that gave rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the original removal satisfied the proper requirements to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction and exercised its discretion to retain the case.
This case, Pitre v. Huntington Ingalls, et al,[i] arose out of lung cancer allegedly caused by asbestos exposure while the decedent was employed at Avondale Shipyard in Avondale, Louisiana. The initial petition named numerous defendants and included, among other causes of action, failure to warn and other negligence claims against Avondale, as well as strict products liability and failure to warn claims against Foster Wheeler. The plaintiffs filed a first amended petition adding an additional defendant, Occidental Chemical, and asserting strict liability claims against the new defendant and against Avondale.
In discovery, a former coworker of the decedent testified that the decedent worked on U.S. navy ships built by Avondale, Destroyer Escorts. Within 30 days of this testimony, defendants Avondale and Lamorak removed the case to federal court and asserted that they were entitled to removal under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), as the plaintiffs’ claims were related to acts performed under color of federal office. After a federal magistrate judge granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint deleting their strict liability claims against Avondale, the defendants appealed the ruling to the district court. In their response to the appeal, plaintiffs moved to remand the action to state court.
The defendants argued that the effort to amend the original petition by deleting strict liability claims was a bad faith attempt to defeat federal jurisdiction. The district court denied defendants’ appeal and concluded that there was no error in granting the plaintiffs leave to amend, as courts are freely permitted to give leave to amend when justice so requires. However, that still left open the issue of the plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
In 2015, the Florida Supreme Court issued a decision in Aubin v. Union Carbide, which mandated that juries be instructed on the “consumer expectations test.” On November 28, 2017, seven years after initially filing her lawsuit, a plaintiff in Miami-Dade County won a $6.9 million asbestos verdict in a retrial based on the Aubin decision, in Font v. Union Carbide, Case No. 2010-041578-CA-01, This was the plaintiff’s second “bite at the apple,” as the first trial had resulted in a defense verdict for Union Carbide.
In the case underlying the Font appeal, Aubin, the Florida Supreme Court rejected sole reliance on the Third Restatement of Torts’ “risk utility test,” under which a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.” Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So.3d 489, 505 (Fla. 2015). Instead, the Florida Supreme Court required courts to use the Second Restatement of Torts’ consumer expectations test, which asks whether a product is unreasonably dangerous in design because it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner. Id. at 503. As described by the Florida Supreme Court in Aubin, “[t]he critical difference regarding design defects between the Second Restatement and the Third Restatement is that the Third Restatement not only replaces the consumer expectations test with the risk utility test but also requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a ‘reasonable alternative design.’ Id. at 505.
In rejecting sole reliance on the Third Restatement’s risk utility test, the Florida Supreme Court in Aubin explained that the original reason for imposing strict liability for defective and unreasonably dangerous products was to relieve injured consumers from the difficulties of proving negligence by the product manufacturer. Id. at 506-507. However, the Third Restatement eliminates consideration of consumer expectations, and, in fact, “imposes a higher burden on consumers to prove design defect than exists in negligence cases” by adding the additional requirement that an injured consumer “prove that there was a ‘reasonable alternative design’ available to the product’s manufacturer.” Id. at 506.
In a unanimous decision, a three-judge panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed summary judgment against the estate of former Detroit Tigers’ pitcher, Mark Fidrych, in Pantazis v. Mack Trucks, Inc., Mass. App. Ct., No. 16-P-1497 (Nov. 27, 2017). On appeal, the Court rejected the Estate’s argument that a component part manufacturer had a duty to warn end-users of foreseeable hazards and risks associated with a non-defective component part installed into a completed end product.
In April of 2009, approximately 30 years after throwing his last pitch in Major League Baseball, Fidrych’s lifeless body was found under a dump truck at his farm in Massachusetts. A witness had observed Fidrych working under the truck, and a medical examiner later determined the cause of death to be accidental asphyxiation.
Mack Trucks, Inc. (“Mack”) had manufactured an incomplete vehicle, consisting only of a chassis, cab, and engine. Fidrych purchased that incomplete vehicle and later converted it into a dump truck by installing a piece of equipment manufactured by a co-defendant. That second piece drew power from the vehicle’s power system to raise and lower the truck bed.
Ann Pantazis, executrix of Firdych’s estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the two entities, among others, alleging that both entities failed to adequately warn end-users about foreseeable risks posed by certain components. She argued that both defendants knew of the dangers posed by unguarded drive shifts, but failed to provide adequate warnings to end users.
For the first time since 1989, Connecticut’s Supreme Court addressed the plaintiff’s burden of proof in the asbestos context, in Wayne Bagley v. Adel Wiggins Group et al, SC 19835 (11/7/17). In a win for defendants facing such claims, the court found that plaintiffs bringing claims pursuant to the Connecticut Product Liability Act (under both strict liability and negligence theories) require expert testimony to prove exposure at levels sufficient to cause their asbestos-related disease, and not merely general testimony that an asbestos-containing product generated an indefinite amount of dust in the plaintiff’s vicinity.
The decedent, Wayne Bagley (“Bagley”) worked at Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (“Sikorsky”), and alleged exposure to an adhesive product used to bind interior components of helicopter blades. The material, an epoxy, came in the form of a sheet with strippable release paper, it contained 8.6 percent asbestos, and was manufactured by Wyeth Holdings’ predecessor. Employees removed any excess epoxy with chisels or by sanding. The Bagley estate called a former co-worker to testify that Bagley’s work area overlooked the blade shop, that Bagley’s daily responsibilities required him to enter the sanding room frequently, and that the sanding process created visible dust to which Bagley and he would have been exposed to.
At trial, the plaintiff presented causation expert testimony from Dr. Arnold Brody and Dr. Jerrold Abraham. Dr. Brody testified in detail regarding the process by which asbestos causes mesothelioma. However, he acknowledged on cross-examination that his testimony was based upon the assumption that a person has already been exposed to respirable asbestos fibers.
Dr. Abraham, a pulmonary pathologist testified that a proximate cause of the decedent’s mesothelioma was the exposure to asbestos fibers from the epoxy while the decedent passed through the sanding room of the blade shop. While discussing causation, Abraham was given a hypothetical scenario that reflected Bagley’s alleged exposure during his ten-month tenure as the manufacturing engineer. In response, Abraham testified that the scenario was a clear description of an exposure to asbestos fibers emitted from working with epoxy, and that the mere presence of dust indicated inadequate control of the product. On cross-examination, Abraham acknowledged that he never inspected the epoxy, that he did not speak with anyone at Sikorsky about the ventilation in the sanding room, and that he did not know of any studies concerning fiber release of the product when manipulated.
Brian D. Gross is a partner at MG+M who has extensive experience in a broad spectrum of litigation. He is also a member of several corporate defendants’ national trial teams.
Jennifer A. Whelan is a partner in MG+M’s Boston office, her practice focuses on defense of asbestos, mass tort, products liability, and general liability matters. Jennifer serves as national coordinating counsel in asbestos litigation matters.
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