Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/federal-rules-of-civil-procedure/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:24:21+00:00

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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has posted changes to its local rules and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which will take effect January 1, 2016. The changes to the Tenth Circuit Local Rules are outlined in a memo, which is available here. A redline of the changes to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, including the corresponding Tenth Circuit Local Rules, is available here.
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.— including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
A redline of the proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is available here.
On Monday, June 1, 2015, the Colorado State Judicial Branch released Rule Change 2015(04) and Rule Change 2015(05). Rule Change 2015(04) amends Rule 32, “Sentence and Judgment,” of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure. The changes are significant and amend many procedural aspects of sentencing. The changes were adopted and effective May 22, 2015.
Rule Change 2015(05) amends the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. The changes are extensive and mirror the changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the new Comment to Rule 1, “The 2015 amendments are the next step in a wave of reform literally sweeping the nation. This reform movement aims to create a significant change in the existing culture of pretrial discovery with the goal of emphasizing and enforcing Rule 1’s mandate that discovery be administered to make litigation just, speedy, and inexpensive. One of the primary movers of this reform effort is a realization that the cost and delays of the existing litigation process is denying meaningful access to the judicial system for many people.” The rule change also added a new form, JDF 622, “Proposed Case Management Order.” The changes were adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court on May 28, 2015, and are effective July 1, 2015, for cases filed on or after July 1, 2015.
On Thursday, June 25, 2015, CLE will host a program to discuss the new rule changes and what they will mean for Colorado attorneys. Richard Holme, Hon. Thomas Kane, and Hon. Michael Berger will discuss the new rules and their significance. Don’t miss this important opportunity to learn about the requirements of the new Rules.
To register for the live program, click here. To register for the webcast, click here. To register for the video replay on July 17, click here.
Criminal Rules 4, 41, and 45.
A PDF of the proposed changes may be found here.
The public comment period closes on Tuesday, February 17, 2015, at 11:59 p.m. Members of the public who wish to present testimony may appear at public hearings on the proposed amendments.
Comments and supporting files must be submitted electronically using the Regulations.gov portal. After choosing the appropriate link below, click the “Submit a Comment” link. This will display the comment web form. You can then enter your submitter information and attach your comment as a file (up to 10MB), or type your comment directly on the web form. When you have finished attaching or typing your comment, click the “Preview Comment” link to review. Once you are satisfied with your comment, click the “Submit” button to send your comment to the advisory committees. Upon completion, you will receive a tracking number for your submission.
Detailed instructions on how to submit a comment are given in the Regulations.gov FAQs.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in FDIC v. Arciero on Friday, December 20, 2013.
In an effort to save Quartz Mountain Aerospace, some of its investors and directors took out large loans from First State Bank of Altus (the Bank) for the benefit of the company. When the Bank failed in 2009, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took over as receiver and filed suit to collect on the loans. This appeal concerns the challenge to those collection efforts by four of those liable on the notes (Borrowers). Borrowers raised affirmative defenses to the FDIC’s claims and brought counterclaims, alleging that the Bank’s CEO had assured them that they would not be personally liable on any of the loans. The district court granted summary judgment for the FDIC because the CEO’s alleged promises were not properly memorialized in the Bank’s records as required by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), a provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.
Borrowers argued on appeal that the district court erred when it denied their motion for more discovery before the court ruled on the FDIC’s motion for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit disagreed as the Borrowers did not identify any documents that would establish a defense under § 1823(e). They already had the Bank minutes and no Borrower alleged they signed an agreement limiting their liability.
The court also rejected Borrowers’ argument that the district court should have granted their motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence. The Oklahoma Department of Securities opened an investigation into the Bank, its affiliate Altus, and Doughty for selling unregistered securities, including the life-settlement contracts used to secure the loan to Borrowers. According to Borrowers, this evidence supported claims and defenses against the FDIC that would not be barred by § 1823(e) because they are based on securities violations rather than agreements with the Bank. The court held that this did not qualify as newly discovered evidence because the existence of an investigation is not admissible evidence of alleged misconduct. Learning of a new legal theory is not the discovery of new evidence.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in In re Application of Republic of Ecuador on Wednesday, November 13, 2013.
Intervenor-Appellant Chevron Corporation appealed from a district court order granting a motion to compel production of documents pursuant to subpoenas issued under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Section 1782 allows for discovery of documents to be used in a foreign proceeding. Petitioners-Appellees, the Republic of Ecuador and its Attorney General (collectively, “the Republic”) sought the discovery to defend an $18.2 billion judgment against Chevron by an Ecuadorian court in Lago Agrio. Chevron sought relief from that judgment pursuant to investment treaty arbitration under United Nations’ rules.
Prior to the Lago Agrio judgment, in September 2009, Chevron commenced arbitration proceedings against the Republic under the U.S.–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty. In February 2011, immediately following the Lago Agrio judgment, the arbitral tribunal ordered that the Republic stay all efforts to enforce the Lago Agrio judgment, pending further order of the tribunal.
In June 2011, the Republic filed a § 1782 application in the District of Colorado seeking “discovery from Bjorn Bjorkman to aid the Republic in defending the validity of the Lago Agrio judgment.” The Republic alleged that Mr. Bjorkman served as one of Chevron’s chief experts and that the Ecuadorian court explicitly relied on his opinions. In the instant action, Chevron argued before the magistrate judge that the 2010 revisions to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 brought materials prepared by or provided to Mr. Bjorkman under the protection of the work-product doctrine. The magistrate judge rejected this argument and ordered the production of all of the facts and data the expert considered in forming his opinion. The Republic filed two motions to compel after Chevron continued to improperly withhold documents. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations that only documents protected by Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) were privileged.
On appeal, Chevron made several arguments that the 2010 revisions to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 radically changed the discoverability of documents held by experts. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the underlying purpose of the 2010 revision was to return the work-product doctrine to its traditional understanding, that it protects only the inner workings of an attorney’s mind. The court affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Myklatun v. Flotek Industries on Tuesday, November 5, 2013.
Defendant Chemical Equipment and Specialties, Inc. (CESI) manufactures chemicals used in oil and gas production, including microemulsion products used in the water-pressure fracturing (“fracking”) process. In December 2004, CESI and Plaintiff Bjorn Myklatun entered into a distributorship agreement. Among other things, CESI agreed it would not during the period of the Agreement enter into any agreement of a similar nature with any other party to market, sell, distribute, provide or otherwise deal in the sale or provision of products competing with Plaintiff in the Territory, except with the prior written consent of Plaintiff. “The “Territory” was oil companies active in Norway and Denmark.
CESI and Mr. Myklatun decided that Plaintiffs’ efforts would be focused on a product called MAD-4. Plaintiffs began seeking environmental approval of MAD-4 in Norway and Denmark. Although Defendants dispute whether Plaintiffs obtained valid environmental approval, the facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs indicate they were successful, at least in Norway. However, Plaintiffs had made no sales of MAD-4 by October 2006, when Defendants informed them they were terminating the agreement.
While the distributorship agreement with Mr. Myklatun was in force, CESI began developing a proprietary microemulsion product for Halliburton Energy Services. CESI never sold any microemulsion products in Norway or Denmark.
In December 2006, CESI filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Mr. Myklatun in Oklahoma state court, requesting a finding as to whether Mr. Myklatun had received public approval of MAD-4 in the North Sea region. Mr. Myklatun and his company, Plaintiff Oil Innovation, brought claims of tortious interference, fraud, and civil conspiracy against the four Defendants involved in this appeal: CESI; its parent company, Flotek Industries; Flotek president Todd Sanner; and former Flotek CEO Jerry Dumas.
Following a trial, the district court granted Defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and entered a superceding judgment in favor of all Defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs appealed this decision.
Plaintiffs first argued that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law because CESI was not included in Defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion made during the trial and was not specifically mentioned in Defendants’ post-trial Rule 50(b) motion. The court’s review of the record persuaded the court that both Rule 50 motions were made on behalf of all Defendants, including CESI. To the extent Plaintiffs challenged the specificity of Defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the argument was waived by Plaintiffs’ failure to raise it in their response.
The court turned next to the merits of Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of any affirmative misrepresentations or facts giving rise to a duty to disclose Halliburton’s development of a microemulsion product. The parties agreed that Oklahoma law governed. Plaintiffs argued their fraud claim was based on Defendants’ “omissions or failures to speak, i.e., constructive fraud.” After carefully reviewing the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that none of the facts gave rise to a duty for Defendants to disclose the development of Halliburton’s microemulsion. Neither the contract between the parties nor Oklahoma law imposes a duty on a manufacturer to disclose all planning and development activities that could potentially affect a current distributor. The court concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that Defendants had the duty to make such a disclosure under Oklahoma law.
For the foregoing reasons, the Tenth Circuit AFFIRMED the district court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its denial of Petition for Rehearing En Banc and dissent in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens on Tuesday, September 17, 2013.
This opinion is a four judge dissent from denial of the petitioners’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc. The denial was a result of an evenly divided vote. The Petitioners removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and alleged the amount in controversy to be $8 million. After the Respondent, Owens, moved to remand the case to state court, Petitioners submitted undisputed proof that the amount in controversy exceeded $14 million but the district court granted Owens’s motion. It did so only because the notice of removal itself had failed to provide evidentiary support, “such as an economic analysis . . . or settlement estimates” for the $8 million figure. An divided Tenth Circuit panel denied the Petitioner’s request to appeal. The author of the dissent discusses the procedural requirements for removal in diversity cases under CAFA.
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure has opened the public comment period for several proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure. Comments must be submitted in writing by February 15, 2014. The changes affect the Federal Bankruptcy and Civil Procedure rules and the public comment period opened August 15, 2013.
Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 3002, 3007, 3012, 3015, 4003, 5005, 5009, 7001, 9006, and 9009, and Official Forms 17A, 17B, 17C, 22A-1, 22A-1Supp, 22A-2, 22B, 22C-1, 22C-2, 101, 101A, 101B, 104, 105, 106Sum, 106A/B, 106C, 106D, 106E/F, 106G, 106H, 106Dec, 107, 112, 113, 119, 121, 318, 423, and 427.
Civil Rules 1, 4, 6, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 55, 84, and Appendix of Forms.
The changes to the Civil Rules limit the number of presumptive depositions to five and limit other modes of discovery as well. The committee is particularly interested in receiving comments on the changes to Rule 37 regarding electronic discovery. Part of the proposed changes to Rule 37 would make it more difficult to get sanctions for ESI spoliation.
A PDF of the changes can be found here. Comments may be submitted to the Advisory Committees by mail or electronically, and will be reviewed then made part of the public record. To submit or view comments on the proposed Bankruptcy Rule changes electronically, see this Regulations.gov webpage. To submit or view comments electronically on the proposed Civil Procedure Rule changes see this Regulations.gov webpage.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Elm Ridge Exploration Co., LLC v. Engle on Tuesday, July 9, 2013.
Elm Ridge Exploration Company, LLC (“Elm Ridge”) is the operator of certain oil and gas leases in New Mexico, and Fred Engle is the majority owner of the leases. An operating agreement (the “Operating Agreement” or “Agreement”) governs their relationship. Elm Ridge sought to recover costs it incurred in drilling a well on the leasehold property (the West Bisti 22-1T well or “1T” well) by foreclosing on Engle’s lease interests. Engle contended, among other things, that he should not have to pay for unauthorized expenses that Elm Ridge incurred and filed several counterclaims. The court dismissed all but one counterclaim.
After a jury trial on Engle’s remaining claim that he should receive damages for Elm Ridge’s breach of its contractual and fiduciary duties, a jury found that Elm Ridge had breached the Operating Agreement and could not recover the costs attributable to the breach from Engle. The jury found that Engle still owed Elm Ridge for other drilling costs. Relying on the jury’s findings, the district court calculated Mr. Engle’s share of the costs not attributable to the breach and held that Elm Ridge was entitled to a foreclosure order. Both parties appealed.

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