Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180725_0027499.NY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:09:11+00:00

Document:
The defendant appeals, and the plaintiff cross-appeals, from the judgment. The defendant's appeal from the order was dismissed (see Kupperstock v. Kupperstock, __A.D.3d__[Appellate Division Docket No. 2014-10799; decided herewith]); however, the issues raised therein are brought up for review on the appeal and cross appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501[a]; Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). We affirm.
On the motion for summary judgment, the defendant established, prima facie, that the mortgage recorded against the property was valid, through copies of the mortgage purportedly bearing the plaintiff s signature and an affidavit of a handwriting expert attesting to the genuineness of the signature. In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact. A certificate of acknowledgment attached to an instrument, such as a mortgage, raises a presumption of due execution, and that presumption may be overcome only on "proof so clear and convincing as to amount to a moral certainty" (Albany County Sav. Bank v. McCarty, 149 NY 71, 80). Here, the plaintiff s affidavit, wherein she affirmed that she never borrowed money from Zvi Kupperstock and never knowingly signed the mortgage note or mortgage, together with considerable documentary evidence created contemporaneously with the purchase of the subject property and throughout the length of the marriage that flatly contradicted the existence of a mortgage, was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact warranting denial of summary judgment (see Stein v. Doukas, 98 A.D.3d 1026).
"In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and this Court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing the testimony'' (Neuman v. Neumann, 109 A.D.3d 886, 887-888 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Here, at trial, the Supreme Court explicitly found the plaintiffs testimony to be consistent and credible and properly concluded that the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption of due execution by establishing that the mortgage was not valid. The court noted that the documents prepared contemporaneously with the house purchase and documents prepared in connection with the divorce did not reference or discuss any mortgage. The court further noted that the details of the mortgage itself lent credibility to the plaintiffs claim that this mortgage was manufactured by the defendant to assert continued control over the plaintiff. Specifically, the mortgage was recorded just weeks after the parties entered into the stipulation of settlement in the divorce action, was for a purported loan in the sum of $840, 000, which was $260, 000 more than the price paid for the subject property, and was a 30-year-term mortgage that required no payment until the expiration of the term, at 10% interest compounded annually, a date when Zvi would have been 114 years old. Taken together with other evidence that tended to establish that the plaintiff was unable to communicate with Zvi, and that Zvi was not in a position to lend large sums of money, the court properly concluded that the mortgage and note must be cancelled and discharged given the lack of any documentary evidence to support the validity of the mortgage and note (see Cunningham v. Baldari, 100 A.D.3d 584; see also Hopper v. Lockey, 17 A.D.3d 912). Therefore, we agree with the court's determination to award the plaintiff judgment in her favor on the first cause of action pursuant to RPAPL article 15 and direct the cancellation and discharge of record of the mortgage allegedly executed by the plaintiff in favor of Zvi.

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