Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96428/nardone-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:53:46+00:00

Document:
1. In view of the provisions of § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605, evidence obtained by federal agents by tapping telephone wires and intercepting messages is not admissible in a criminal trial in the federal district court. P. 302 U. S. 382 .
the phrase "no person" embraces federal agents engaged in the detection of crime, and to "divulge" an intercepted communication to "any person" embraces testimony in a court as to the contents of such a communication. P. 302 U. S. 383 .
3. Evidence in congressional committee reports indicating that the major purpose of the Federal Communications Act was the transfer of jurisdiction over wire and radio communication to the newly constituted Federal Communications Commission, and other circumstances in the legislative history of the Act, held insufficient to negative the plain mandate of the provisions of § 605 forbidding wiretapping. P. 302 U. S. 382 .
4. Whether wiretapping as an aid in the detection and punishment of crime should be permitted to federal agents is a question of policy for the determination of the Congress. P. 302 U. S. 383 .
5. The canon that the general words of a statute do not include the Government or affect its rights unless that construction be clear and indisputable from the language of the Act is inapplicable to this case, but applicable is the principle that the sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute intended to prevent injury and wrong. Pp. 302 U. S. 383 -384.
The importance of the question involved -- whether, in view of the provisions of § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, [ Footnote 1 ] evidence procured by a federal officer's tapping telephone wires and intercepting messages is admissible in a criminal trial in a United States District Court -- moved us to grant the writ of certiorari.
Section 501 [ Footnote 3 ] penalizes willful and knowing violation by fine and imprisonment.
the provisions of the Radio Act of 1927 [ Footnote 4 ] so as to make it applicable to wire messages and to transfer jurisdiction over radio and wire communications to the newly constituted Federal Communications Commission, and therefore the phraseology of the statute ought not to be construed as changing the practically identical provision on the subject which was a part of the Radio Act when the Olmstead case was decided.
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 86 U. S. 239 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 87 U. S. 263 ; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 159 U. S. 548 , 159 U. S. 554 ; United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190 , 215 U. S. 197 ; Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 174 F. 385, 388; Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes (7th Ed.) 117, 121; Black on Interpretation of Laws (2d Ed.) 94.
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 86 U. S. 239 .
United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174 , 295 U. S. 184 . Compare Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508 , 147 U. S. 515 ; Donnelley v. United States, 276 U. S. 505 , 276 U. S. 511 .
United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 39 U. S. 315 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 87 U. S. 263 ; Black on Interpretation of Laws (2d Ed.) 97.
I think the word "person" used in this statute does not include an officer of the federal government, actually engaged in the detection of crime and the enforcement of the criminal statutes of the United States, who has good reason to believe that a telephone is being, or is about to be, used as an aid to the commission or concealment of a crime. The decision just made will necessarily have the effect of enabling the most depraved criminals to further their criminal plans over the telephone in the secure knowledge that, even if these plans involve kidnapping and murder, their telephone conversations can never be intercepted by officers of the law and revealed in court. If Congress thus intended to tie the hands of the government in its effort to protect the people against lawlessness of the most serious character, it would have said so in a more definite way than by the use of the ambiguous word "person." Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 404, 404, 406, 177 N.E. 656. For that word has sometimes been construed to include the government and its officials, and sometimes not. I am not aware of any case where it has been given that inclusive effect in a situation such as we have here. Obviously the situation dealt with in United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174 , was quite different. There, a federal statute forbade the construction of any bridge, etc., in any port, etc., "until consent of Congress . . . shall have been obtained." The mere building of the designated structure, in the absence of congressional consent, violated the statute. There was no ambiguous term, such as we have here, or anything else in the language, requiring construction.

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