Source: https://www.advocatemagazine.com/article/2016-june/appellate-reports-and-briefs
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:25:23+00:00

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Who needs to know about this case: Lawyers bringing personal-injury claims against health-care providers subject to MICRA.
Why it’s important: Holds that negligence in the use and maintenance of equipment used to implement a doctor’s order concerning medical treatment constitutes “professional negligence” under MICRA and is therefore subject to the MICRA statute of limitations (and all other MICRA provisions).
Synopsis: Flores was a patient at Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (PIH Health). While attempting to get up from her hospital bed, the latch on the bedrail failed and the rail collapsed, causing her to fall to the floor. Just under two years later, she filed suit against PIH Health, alleging claims for general negligence and premises liability. She alleged that defendant had “failed to use reasonable care in maintaining [its] premises,” “failed to take reasonable precautions to discover and make safe a dangerous condition on the premises,” and “failed to give Plaintiff a reasonable and adequate warning of a dangerous condition so Plaintiff could have avoided foreseeable harm.” Flores claimed she suffered injury as a result. The trial court sustained PIH Healths’ demurrer without leave to amend, as barred by the one-year MICRA statute of limitations, Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that PIH Health’s alleged failure to use reasonable care in maintaining its premises and its alleged failure to take reasonable precautions to make a dangerous condition safe “sounds in ordinary negligence because the negligence did not occur in the rendering of professional services.” The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.
The Court acknowledged that, “our courts have long recognized, the dividing line between ordinary negligence and professional malpractice may at times be difficult to place,” and that the Courts of Appeal had drawn it differently in cases involving in cases involving alleged negligence in the use or maintenance of hospital equipment or premises.
The Court noted that section 340.5 is not limited to cases involving “those specific tasks that require advanced medical skills and training.” It observed that a medical professional or other hospital staff member may commit a negligent act in rendering medical care, thereby causing a patient’s injury, even where no particular medical skills were required to complete the task at hand. For example, a hospital’s negligent failure to prevent a patient from becoming separated from an oxygen ventilator, for example, occurs in the “rendering of professional services,” regardless of whether it becomes disconnected because of an ill-considered decision by a doctor or being bumped by a janitor’s broom.
The Court rejected, however, the hospital’s proposed rule that “professional negligence” occurs whenever the negligent act violates a state licensing requirement (such as the requirement to keep a hospital premises in good repair.) This approach would transform section 340.5’s special rule for professional negligence – i.e., negligence in the rendering of medical care to patients – into an all-purpose rule covering essentially every form of ordinary negligence that happens to occur on hospital property.
Whether negligence in maintaining hospital equipment or premises qualifies as professional negligence depends on the nature of the relationship between the equipment or premises in question and the provision of medical care to the plaintiff. A hospital’s negligent failure to maintain equipment that is necessary or otherwise integrally related to the medical treatment and diagnosis of the patient implicates a duty that the hospital owes to a patient by virtue of being a health-care provider. Thus, if the act or omission that led to the plaintiff’s injuries was negligence in the maintenance of equipment that, under the prevailing standard of care, was reasonably required to treat or accommodate a physical or mental condition of the patient, the plaintiff’s claim is one of professional negligence under section 340.5.
Labor regulation; wage orders; working conditions; employee seating: Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (2016) __ Cal.4th __ (Cal. Supreme).
“(1) Does the phrase “nature of the work” refer to individual tasks performed throughout the workday, or to the entire range of an employee’s duties performed during a given day or shift?
Arbitration; unconscionability; lack of mutuality of remedy: Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) __ Cal.4th __ (Cal. Supreme).
As a condition of her employment with defendants, plaintiff Maribel Baltazar signed an agreement to resolve any employment-related disputes by arbitration. The agreement provides that, in the event a claim proceeds to arbitration, the parties are authorized to seek preliminary injunctive relief in the superior court. The primary question before the Court was whether that clause rendered the arbitration agreement unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because it unreasonably favored the employer. The Court held that that the clause, which does no more than restate existing law (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.8, subd. (b)) did not render the agreement unconscionable, and that there were no other reasons to support Baltazar’s claim of unconscionability. Accordingly, it affirmed the Court of Appeal opinion that affirmed enforcement of the arbitration agreement.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the failure by Forever 21 to provide Baltazar with a copy of the AAA rules for arbitration of employment agreements (which were adopted in the arbitration agreement), did not raise an issue of procedural unconscionability because Baltazar’s arguments for failing to enforce the agreement did not depend in any way on the terms of the arbitration rules.
Public Records Act requests; inadvertent production of privileged documents; waiver: Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2016) __ Cal.4th __ (Cal. Supreme).
In civil discovery proceedings during the course of litigation between plaintiff Estuardo Ardon and defendant City of Los Angeles, the trial court determined that certain documents the City possessed were privileged under the attorney-client privilege or the privilege for attorney work product, and the City withheld them from plaintiff. Years later, plaintiff filed a request under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) seeking to obtain documents relating to the subject matter of the litigation. In response, the City’s administrative office inadvertently provided the plaintiff with some of the privileged documents. The Court granted review to decide whether the release of privileged documents under these circumstances waives the privilege, thus allowing plaintiff to retain and use the documents and to disseminate them to others. Section 6254.5 of the Government Code, which is part of the Public Records Act, generally provides that “disclosure” of a public record waives any privilege.
But interpreting section 6254.5 in light of the Public Records Act as a whole, the Court concluded that its waiver provision applies to an intentional, but not an inadvertent, disclosure. Accordingly, a governmental entity’s inadvertent release of privileged documents under the Public Records Act does not waive the privilege.
The court explained that contracts formed on the internet tend to come in two flavors: “clickwrap” or click-through agreements, which require the user to click on an “I agree” box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use; and “browsewrap” agreements, in which the site’s terms and conditions of use are generally posted on the site via a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen. Because the user can continue to use a site that uses a browsewrap agreement without visiting the page hosting the terms and conditions, the validity of the browsewrap agreement generally turns on whether the user has actual or constructive knowledge of the site’s terms and conditions. More specifically, the validity of a browsewrap agreement typically turns on whether the site put a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.
Karpinski sued Smitty’s Bar for negligently allowing two intoxicated patrons to stay in the bar and assault him. During a mediation, Karpinski and Smitty’s agreed to settle his claim for $40,000. Karpinski later signed a formal written settlement agreement, which provided that Karpinksi would satisfy any outstanding liens. Smitty’s refused to pay until Karpinski actually satisfied the liens. He filed a motion to enforce the agreement under section 664.4, which the trial court granted. Affirmed.
Nothing in the settlement agreement demonstrated the existence of a condition precedent to payment of the $40,000 to Karpinski. Rather, the agreement states that Karpinski will satisfy all liens and indemnify Smitty’s, its attorneys, and its insurer with respect to any claim arising under a lien or other obligation. There is no provision that either expressly states or implies that Karpinski must satisfy the liens before receipt of the settlement proceeds. The Court held that “public policy does not preclude a court from enforcing a settlement that does not include Medicare as a co-payee on a settlement check where the plaintiff signed a release acknowledging his responsibility to pay any Medicare claim and/or agreeing to indemnify the released parties.” If Smitty’s and its insurer were so concerned about their potential liability to Medicare, they could have negotiated for inclusion of terms in the settlement agreement requiring either Karpinski’s payment of these obligations as a precondition to receipt of the settlement proceeds or inclusion of Medicare as a payee on the settlement check. Smitty’s and its insurer did neither of these things, and must therefore comply with the terms of the agreement as written.
Attorney’s fee applications; in camera inspection of timesheets; due process: Yamada v. Nobel Biocare (9th Cir. 2016) __ F.3d __.
Yamada, a dentist, filed a class action against Nobel alleging that its dental implants were defective. The case settled, and Yamada’s counsel filed a motion for attorney’s fees, which was granted, awarding $4.1 million in fees. At the hearing, the district judge noted that the time records provided by counsel were not sufficient to allow the court to make an award. The court allowed counsel to submit unredacted timesheets for in camera review, finding that this would be more efficient than hearing disputes over what material was privileged and should be redacted. Reversed.
A party opposing an attorney’s fee request has a due process right to see the timesheets on which the court relies in making a fee award. The district court’s failure to make the timesheets available to Nobel was an abuse of discretion.
Sanford was injured in a motorcycle collision with a car driven by Rasnick. Before trial, Rasnick made a § 998 offer for $130,000. The offer included a requirement that Sanford execute and transmit “a written settlement agreement and general release.” Sanford declined the offer, went to trial and recovered less than $130,000. The trial court held that the § 998 offer was valid, and awarded expert fees as part of Rasnick’s costs. Sanford appealed. Reversed.
None of the terms of the required “settlement agreement” were set forth in the offer, or ever communicated to Sanford while the offer was open. While the law allows a defendant to require a settling plaintiff to execute a “release,” a release is not the same as a “settlement agreement.” The terms of a settlement agreement can require considerable negotiation. Because the offer required Sanford to agree to a “settlement agreement” without knowing what terms it would include, it was not a valid offer for the purposes of shifting costs under § 998.

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