Source: https://www.calbizlit.com/cal_biz_lit/appellate_law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:44:40+00:00

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This may be pretty big for California appellate lawyers and any lawyer or client involved in motion practice at the trial court level.The California Supreme Court has just eliminated its long-standing rule that "de-published" any lower court decision taken under review.
the grant of review and any subsequent action by the Supreme Court.
of the Supreme Court or is disapproved by that court.
binding or precedential effect different from that specified in (1) or (2).
A pattern has developed with high-profile legal issues in California: The Supremes grant review of an appellate decision; the review process takes years; meanwhile, appellate courts keep issuing opinions addressing the same critical issue; the Supremes do a "grant and hold" of the petitions for review of those other cases, meaning there won't be any briefing, argument, or any decision, but they will send it back to the Courts of Appeal for further consideration after deciding the first case they accepted. Meanwhile, up until now, all the decisions have been "depublished" and unciteable. Under the new rules, that is going to change, and we will see what difference, if any, it makes.
1,260 of the California Supreme Court’s decisions have been followed at least once by another state’s supreme court. The Washington Supreme Court was next, with 942 followed decisions. The median for all fifty state high courts was 453.
60 of the Court’s decisions were followed three or more times by other states’ high courts. Washington was again second, but with just 72 decisions cited three or more times.
One of Cal Biz Lit's themes has always been that the law in California isn't necessarily worse, isn't necessarily better, but sure as shootin' is different, and out-of-staters ignore those differences at their peril. The study Horvitz & Levy cites makes another point: if you non-Californians think we're a little goofy here, just wait: your time is coming.
Horvitz and Levy's other blog, the appropriately named "California Punitive Damages, An Exemplary Blog" has long been the best comprehensive on-line source on its subject. CBL is now pleased to add the firm's most recent effort to our (somewhat smugly named) "Cal Biz Lit's Approved Blogs."
My only quibble with the two sites: Folks, how about some pictures? I'll get you started with a lectern.
Cal Biz Lit has been following the trail of cases addressing what happens when a successful personal injury plaintiff had his or her medical bills paid by insurance, and the insurer has a deal with the providers to reduce fees to a pre-negotiated rate. As CBL has posted here and here, the question is whether the plaintiff recovers the amounts the providers accept as full payment, or the amounts they initially billed before the write-offs.
This morning's San Francisco Chronicle has coverage of the issue, and the new decision in Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (November 23, 2009) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Fourth Dist., D053620), here.
As the Chron points out, Howell was the result of an aggressive campaign by the California plaintiff bar to find suitable cases and attack this issue in the Courts of Appeal. There are three other cases on this issue pending in appellate courts. And the Chron also quotes predictions, accurate in CBL's view, that this issue is headed to the Cal Supremes.
Most plaintiff personal injury attorneys' have provisions in their fee agreements giving them a lien against client recovery. In a wide variety of circumstances, the medical providers may have a lien against the recovery as well.
So what happens when the case tanks and there isn't enough money to pay off both the liens? In a California case of first impression, California's Court of Appeal for the Third District holds that as a matter of public policy, the attorneys' lien for fees and costs comes first. The case is Gilman v. Dalby (August 10, 2009) ___Cal.App.4th___ (C050294).
But don't worry, there wasn't some poor doctor left out in the cold. The medical lien was owned by Lien Medical, a personal injury medical lien factor ("Turn your liens into greens" -- the colors appear at this company's web site). And Lien Medical, which has already satisfied the provider, is the one to get stuck. But the decision is much broader than that, and pretty clearly applies to all medical liens.
BTB, this is the sort of garden variety call that appellate courts have to make every day. There's no applicable statute of any kind, and it's really a matter of advancing the common law. And it demonstrates that when people -- usually politicians with agendas -- talk about judges "interpreting the law" vs. "making the law," they either don't know what they are talking about or they are deliberately avoiding an honest discussion of how the law works.
It seems hard to believe, but until not all that long ago (1975, to be exact), contributory negligence was a complete defense in California tort cases. There were some wildly successful defense lawyers who would try and win just a ton of product liability and other personal injury cases by arguing that, sure there client was at fault, but because the plaintiff was just a little, tiny bit at fault too, game over.
Then the California Supremes adopted pure comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, and the world changed forever. Well, at least the tort world did. California juries now apportion fault between plaintiff and defendants in all kinds of tort cases, and contributory negligence isn't a bar to anything.
a participant in an active sport breaches a legal duty of care to other participants-i.e., engages in conduct that properly may subject him or her to financial liability-only if the participant intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.
Now comes the First District Court of Appeals in Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC (June 30, 2009) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (No. A12153). The plaintiff was injured at the Burning Man festival in Nevada when -- I'm not making this up -- he got too close to the burning man. He sued the Burning Man operators. Pretty stupid case. But not a sports injury.
That's ok. The Court held that the case was completely barred by the primary assumption of the risk doctrine, and that the doctrine applied not just to sports, but to any activity "involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants like Beninati, where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity."
How broad did they just make the defense? I'm guessing pretty broad. And I'm guessing we'll find out in the years to come, at least if the Supremes don't touch this case.
In this era of electronic mail, what does it mean that the court clerk "mails" a document? Particularly when the court has established procedures for service through the court's electronic filing system?
We now have conflicting answers to that question, as explained after the jump.
California's private attorney general fees statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, allows fees to lawyers bringing suit in the public interest, and sets forth the criteria for when fees will be allowed. CalBizLit did a lengthy post on this subject here. Other posts on different California attorneys' fees provisions appear here and here. And you can always learn more than you ever wanted to know on the subject at the recommended blog, California Attorneys Fees.
As discussed in the earlier 1021.5 post, the Cal Supremes adopted the catalyst theory in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, holding that a plaintiff may obtain fees even without obtaining a judgment if the "defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation.” However, catalyst fees are only allowed when the plaintiff seeking fees reasonably attempted to settle the matter short of litigation.
Today, the Cal Supremes decided in Vasqez v. State of California (November 20, 2008) ___ Cal. 4th ____, S143710 that the bright line Graham limitation -- no fees without a prelitigation effort to settle -- applies only to catalyst cases, not cases where the plaintiff obtains a judgment. The presence or absence of a pre-litigation effort to settle is relevant to "the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement," two of the elements to be considered by the trial court in determining whether to award fees. But unlike catalyst cases, pre-litigation settlement effort is not an absolute prerequisite to obtaining fees.
Also, the Court clarified that cases that settle with stipulated or consent judgments are not catalyst cases.
We have this happen at least a couple of times a year: an out-of-state company calls us, tells us they were sued, they turned the summons and complaint over to (a) an insurer; or (b) their local counsel; or (c) to a clerk or a secretary or somebody in office, and now they have received a notice of entry of default.
The common perception seems to be that we can get a default set aside just for the asking. But that ain't so. The standard for setting aside a default appears in Code of Civil Procedure section 473, which essentially allows a court to set aside the default for mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. There are hundreds of appellate cases on this subject, and they are all over the map.
So, what do we have? We have a legal department at ITW which initially assisted Fasuyi’s counsel in effecting service. Once that service was accomplished, the legal department immediately did what any good department would, forwarding the summons and complaint to its insurance broker for appropriate handling. The broker also did what any good broker should, and immediately forwarded the complaint on to the appropriate insurers, received back the requested confirmation, and believed that the matter would be tended to. Sadly, it was not.
That is the record here. No lack of cooperation from the defense side. Indeed, the converse. No deception. No duplicitousness. No stonewalling. No evasion. And no disregard of any warning. In fact, no warning.
It will be recalled that Fasuyi’s counsel had been in contact with ITW’s legal department, which, not incidentally, had helped counsel effect service by identifying the location of CT Corporation. Notwithstanding that, Fasuyi’s counsel took the default without so much as a reminder, let alone a warning, about any responsive pleading.
You may not be surprised to learn that the Court of Appeal was not too nice to plaintiff's counsel, made some observations about the ethics of taking the default, and reversed the trial court for refusing to set aside the default.
Still, probably better not to allow the default in the first place . . . .

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