Source: http://casaly.com/articles/06_adverse_possession.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:38:04+00:00

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Title to land can be acquired by adverse possession, and rights in easements and servitudes on the land of others can arise based on prescription. I will discuss these two concepts — adverse possession and prescription — in this multi-part article.
Though a good title can be acquired by adverse possession or prescription, a good record title will always depend upon some form of judicial recognition of the rights so acquired. This does not make adverse possession or prescription a subject for theoretical debate, but points out that title based on one or both of these theories must first be proven before a conveyancer can be expected to pass upon the title.
Adverse possession and prescription need to be discussed in the context in which each arises, with particular attention paid to the relationship of the parties that are in the ongoing dispute. As we will see, co-owners under the same deed are treated differently than are strangers, and they have different elements to prove in their case; neighbors may find that their level of proof is different because of the proximity of their respective properties and their unique relationship as abutters; and persons with certain disabilities may in certain cases be exempt from the application of the doctrines altogether.
Where a party claims by a disseisin, ripened into a good title by lapse of time as against the legal owner, he must show an actual, open, exclusive and adverse possession of the land. All these elements are essential to be proved, and the failure to establish any one of them is fatal to the validity of the claim.
So, the basic elements that determine whether title is obtained by adverse possession are (i) actual possession, (ii) open possession, (iii) exclusive possession and (iv) adverse possession. As we shall see, there are points where the four elements of adverse possession overlap, but I will endeavor to point out the fine distinctions between them so that you can see that they are in fact different. A fifth element, continuous possession (or, as the court states, "lapse of time"), is also required, but this goes not to the quality of the possession, but rather its duration. That is, the continuous possession element is the one that is plugged into the running and ultimate expiration of the statute of limitations for the recovery of land, which is the basis of adverse possession in the first place.
Actual possession means that the party claiming the right has to some degree actually occupied the property, or (in the case of constructive possession, to be discussed in the next installment of this article) at least some part of it. The possessor must have made some use of the property, and the activity or activities that the possessor engages in, and the area in which the activity takes place, may determine whether that possession is "actual" as to that area. Actual possession, therefore, is an exercise of dominion over the property. It is for this reason, for example, that the payment of taxes on the property, although admissible in evidence together with other facts, is not sufficient by itself to comply with the actual possession requirement, simply because it does not show such dominion.
Open possession is many times discussed in connection with notorious possession as well. The two terms are closely connected, but they are nonetheless different. Open possession means that the possessor's occupation of the property is in clear view and is not concealed. In other words, the possession must be conspicuous, and not hidden.
Notorious possession means that the possession has been communicated to the public and, presumably, the true owner. It would seem that "open" possession would itself fulfill this requirement, but that is not necessarily the case. Though the possession may be open, if the "message" that it is occurring is not "received" by the public, then the overall purpose of the possession is not realized. For, adverse possession requires that the true owner be given the opportunity to effectively deal with and terminate the same on the part of the claimant. If the possession, even though not concealed, is not known, either actually or constructively, by the true owner, that opportunity has been lost. It should be noted here that the requirement is that the true owner know (or should have known) of the possession, not that the true owner knew that he or she had an interest to protect.
In this regard, Lawrence v. Concord, 439 Mass. 416 (2003) is instructive. In Lawrence Mary Burke left a will that provided that title to her property on Main Street in Concord, Massachusetts, would under its terms pass to her daughter, Helen, for the duration of her life, and upon Helen's death the title would thereupon pass to Harriet. The will further provided that when Harriet died, if she then had no children, the title would go to the Town of Concord for the public purpose of educating deserving children. The town had no knowledge of this provision of the will because under the law then in effect there was no requirement to notify testamentary beneficiaries thereunder of the provisions of the instrument except beneficiaries who were heirs at law.
During her life, Helen conveyed her life estate to Harriet, who thereafter died childless. Therefore, under the terms of the will title would have then vested in the town.
Upon Harriet's death her husband Joseph continued to occupy the property and did so in an open and adverse way, claiming it as his own. He did this for over thirty years, until his death. In his will Joseph left the property to Albert Lawrence. When Joseph's will was probated it was then for the first time that the Town of Concord received information that, under the terms of Mary Burke's will, it was the true owner of the land. It took the property by eminent domain and paid Lawrence no damages, claiming that it was unnecessary because the municipality was the true owner.
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the town's lack of knowledge that it had an interest to protect was irrelevant.
As noted in footnote 2, to describe adverse possession as having the element of adverse possession is to "argue in a circle." That is why many authors ascribe the term "hostile possession" to this element. This element of adverse possession is one of the most interesting because it involves so many sub-elements.
Adverse or hostile possession requires that the possession be wrongful and that it therefore gives the true owner a cause of action against the possessor. But the point is that if the possession is not wrongful, thus raising no right of action in the true owner as against the possessor, adverse possession will not exist. Since adverse possession is anchored in the running of the statute of limitations for an action for the recovery of land, it follows that if the true owner has no cause action against the possessor no adverse possession could be found.
The Connecticut rule evolved from the French v. Pearce decision in 1831 [8 Conn 439] and is clearly the majority position [and that of Massachusetts]. This view considers the subjective intent of the adverse possessor to be irrelevant, whether or not it stems from mistake, ignorance or inadvertence. * * * The strongest justification for the Connecticut rule is that if an adverse possessor's mistake destroys hostility, then bad faith [actual hostility] is rewarded while good faith is penalized.
The minority rule, or Maine rule, began in the 1893 case of Preble v. Maine Central Railroad [85 Me 260]. This position considers the subjective state of mind of the adverse possessor to be relevant, requiring an intent to possess the land of the true owner for such possession to be hostile and to ripen into title.
Another element necessary to prove adverse possession is the requirement of exclusive possession. Here, the exclusivity is as to the true owner. If the true owner is in possession, the adverse possessor cannot acquire rights in the property. But the fact that the adverse possessor shares possession with one other than the true owner does not defeat this requirement of exclusivity. As we will see in the next installment of this article, exclusivity may be as to a part, as opposed to the whole, of the property claimed by the possessor, and the rule of exclusive possession takes on a different meaning when it comes to adverse possession's cousin, prescription.
As noted above, since adverse possession is anchored to and inextricably coupled with statutes of limitations concerning the recovery of land, the duration of uninterrupted possession is important. In Massachusetts this period is twenty years. What will interrupt that possession, causing it to begin anew, and whose possession can be counted toward the statutory period will be examined in the next installment of this article.
Some of the elements of and defenses to adverse possession are rooted in legal fictions. Some of these fictions govern the basis of adverse possession itself and its elements of proof, while others determine what land is the subject of the adverse claim.
The theory of a lost grant is a legal fiction. Bucella v. Agrippino, 257 Mass. 483, 154 N.E. 79 (1926); it rests upon the common law rule that something that has existed from time immemorial must be so. Since the statute of limitations for the recovery of land now is twenty years, this period now is the period of time "beyond which the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." At English common law, that period ran back to the first year of the reign of King Richard I. Coolidge v. Learned, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 504 (1829).
And conclusively to presume a lost license to sell such an interest would be to carry the doctrine of presuming whatever is necessary to give validity to an imaginary grant farther than it has ever yet been carried.
The "memory of man" concept also seems to find its way into the notion of adverse possession from another angle too. As stated, one basic fact that is woven through the concept of adverse possession is that the possessor's occupation of the property cannot be resolved except by applying fictions that suggest a logical reason for the unexplained possession. But in the case of cotenants, for example, the possession of one to the exclusion of the other does not permit the application of the fiction because such possession is consistent with the co-extensive rights of either tenant to possess the entire property. In the case of cotenants, one of the cotenants must show that he has ousted the other in order to prevail in an adverse possession claim - an additional element to adverse possession that "strangers" do not have demonstrate. But in Allen v. Batchelder, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 453 (1984) the court pulled another fiction out of the adverse possession bag and used the "memory of man" concept to explain lack of evidence of such an ouster.
Batchelder supports his claim with the argument that the interest of a cotenant cannot be wiped out by prescription without an ouster and, more to the point, communication of that ouster to the absent cotenant. It is correct that sole possession by one tenant in common is not in itself adverse to the interest of a nonpossessory cotenant; it could be consistent with the right of the cotenant. Richard v. Richard, 13 Pick. 251, 253 254 (1832).
It was regarded by Chief Justice Shaw as equally well settled, that a long exclusive and uninterrupted possession by one, without any possession, or claim for profits by the other, is evidence from which a jury may and ought to infer an actual ouster. * * *. There need be no "turning out by the shoulders" to manifest a decisive intent to occupy to the exclusion of the absent cotenant.
Precisely how long a possession should be to raise a presumption of ouster depends on many circumstances . . . but it is apparent from the cases that ninety years is far more than enough.
So, ouster, the additional element to be proved in adverse possession cases between cotenants, was established not by evidence but rather upon the fiction that "a strong presumption arises that actual proof of the original ouster has become lost by lapse of time." A similar "lost" concept that had been applied to a grant (thus explaining the possession of the errant disseisor) was also applied to an ouster. The interesting point here is that with respect to the fiction concerning a lost grant, it is presumed that the possessor must have had and is claiming peaceably under an instrument from the respondent that cannot be found, while in the case of an ouster the fiction is turned on its head and the presumption is that the respondent must have been turned away even though there is no proof of it.
Color of title, in the context of an adverse possession claim, is an assertion of a claim of ownership based on an instrument of title, such as a deed or lease, even though that instrument does not pass a valid title. See Attorney Gen. v. Ellis, 198 Mass. 91, 97-98 (1908). The advantage which a person may gain from that doctrine is that the activities relied upon to establish adverse possession reach not only the part of the premises actually occupied, but the entire premises described in a deed to the claimant. Dow v. Dow, 243 Mass. 587, 590 (1923). For example, if the act of adverse possession were cultivating a half acre parcel of land, but the claimant held an invalid deed describing three acres, the claimant would have constructive possession of the three acres for the reason that it is the presumed intention of the grantee of the deed to assert such possession.
Although the doctrine of color of title was discussed in Norton it was found to be inapplicable in the case because the party claiming under it, even though taking up possession of a portion of the property, "did not record [the] deed affecting the locus" until after the true owner had re-entered the premises.
One element that will stop an adverse claim in its tracks is consent. Consent will effectively neutralize nearly the "adverse" aspect of any possession. But the question is, consent to what? An interesting case in this regard is Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619 (1992). In this case Selvaggio and Kendall were abutting owners. Prior to Kendall purchasing the property, Selvaggio approached his neighbor's predecessor in title (Rose Crane) and inquired whether she had any objection to his constructing a fence between the bushes that ran from the sidewalk area to the rear lot lines of their adjoining parcels. Rose had no objection and Selvaggio built the fence. In fact Selvaggio built the fence eight or nine feet within the limits of Rose's property. This fact was not discovered until twenty-three years later, when Kendall bought the property from Rose and had a survey prepared. When the discovery was made, Kendall approached Selvaggio and demanded that he remove the fence, but he insisted that he had acquired the invaded-upon land by adverse possession.
Kendall took the position that Selvaggio could not have acquired adverse possession because the fence was constructed with the consent given by Rose, his predecessor in title. The court acknowledged that consent was a valid defense, but pointed out that the proper inquiry was not as to the consent to erect the fence, but the consent to use the respondent's land.
[T]o the extent that the judgment was based on the mistaken belief that consent to build a fence, by itself, vitiates the adverse nature of the use of that land, it was in error. The central inquiry should be whether consent was given to use the plaintiffs' land. Ivons Nispel, Inc. v. Lowe, 347 Mass. 760, 763 (1964). The evidence thus far does not show that Rose Crane granted the defendants permission to build on her own property rather than on the boundary line or even on the defendants' property. Therefore, since Crane's consent did not expressly permit the defendants to use her land, it did not vitiate the defendants' adverse possession claim.
Furthermore, Selvaggio's intent in seeking Crane's consent is irrelevant to a claim of adverse possession. * * * In a number of earlier cases, this court has held that a possessor's intent not to deprive others of their property does not prevent the possessor from acquiring title to that property through adverse possession.
If a person apprehends that a right of way or other easement in or over his land may be acquired by custom, use or otherwise by any person or class of persons, he may give public notice of his intention to prevent the acquisition of such easement, by causing a copy of such notice to be posted in a conspicuous place upon the premises for six successive days, and such posting shall prevent the acquiring of such easement by use for any length of time thereafter; or he may prevent a particular person or persons from acquiring such easement by causing a copy of such notice to be served upon him or them as provided by law for the service of an original summons in a civil action. Such notice from the agent, guardian or conservator of the owner of land shall have the same effect as a notice from the owner himself. A certificate, by an officer qualified to serve civil process, that such copy has been served or posted by him as above provided, if made upon the original notice and recorded with it, within three months after the service or posting, in the registry of deeds for the county or district in which the land lies, shall be conclusive evidence of such service or posting.
It should be noted, however, that posting such a notice will not prevent the acquisition of full fee title if the other requirements of adverse possession are met. See Rothery v. MacDonald, 329 Mass. 238, 107 N.E.2d 432.
As a general rule, unincorporated associations lack the capacity to sue and be sued, see Save the Bay, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 366 Mass. 667, 675 (1975), but G.L.c. 183A §10(b)(4), creates an exception for condominium associations. Belson v. Thayer & Assocs., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 256 n.1 (1992). Section 10(b)(4), as inserted by St. 1963, c. 493, ? 1, specifically empowers the organization of unit owners (whether corporation, trust, or unincorporated association) "[t]o conduct litigation and to be subject to suit as to any course of action involving the common areas and facilities or arising out of the enforcement of the by laws, administrative rules or restrictions in the master deed." The authority to litigate matters concerning the condominium common areas in fact resides exclusively in the condominium unit owners organization. See Cigal v. Leader Dev. Corp., 408 Mass. 212, 217 218 (1990); Strauss v. Oyster River Condominium Trust, 417 Mass. 442, 445 (1994). (Footnotes omitted).
Although it is clear under the statute that the condominium unit owners organization has the exclusive authority to litigate matters concerning the condominium common areas, the court noted that there was some question as to whether the case concerned the condominium common areas at all because, as all parties agreed, the land claimed under the plaintiffs' complaint had not been submitted to the provisions of G.L.c. 183A by a master deed or any amendment thereto.
We are aware of no other appellate case in Massachusetts (or, for that matter, in any other State) involving a claim of adverse possession by a condominium association or trust to land beyond the boundaries of the land submitted to the condominium form of ownership under its master deed. [The defendant] presses two related arguments regarding the lack of statutory authority for the association to maintain this action. First, [the defendant] observes that the association's authority under G. L. c. 183A, §10(b)(4), to conduct litigation is limited to "any course of action involving the common areas" [and] since the claimed land is not now part of the common areas, [the defendant] reasons, the authority to conduct litigation claiming the land is beyond the power conferred by the statute. Second, [the defendant] points to the requirement, under G. L. c. 183A, ? 5(b)(2)(iii), as amended by St. 1998, c. 242, §5, for the consent of at least 75 per cent of condominium unit owners and 51 per cent of their first mortgagees to any addition of land to the condominium. (Footnote omitted).
But the court said neither statutory provision barred the action.
If the record title of land or of easements or rights in land held and possessed in fee simple is encumbered by an undischarged mortgage or a mortgage not properly or legally discharged of record, and the mortgagor and those having his estate therein have been in uninterrupted possession of the land or exercising the rights in easements or other rights in land, either for any period of twenty years after the expiration of the time limited in the mortgage for the full performance of the condition thereof, or for any period of twenty years after the date of a mortgage not given to secure the payment of money or a debt but to secure the mortgagee against a contingent liability which has so ceased to exist that no person will be prejudiced by the discharge thereof, the mortgagor, or those having his estate in the land, or exercising the rights in easements, or any person named in section eleven, may file a petition in the land court; and if, after such notice by publication or otherwise as the court orders, no evidence is offered of a payment on account of the debt secured by said mortgage within such period of twenty years after the expiration of the time limited for the performance of the condition thereof, or of any other act within said time in recognition of its existence as a valid mortgage, or if the court finds that such contingent liability has ceased to exist and that the mortgage ought to be discharged, it may enter a decree, reciting the facts and findings, which shall, within thirty days after its entry, be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district where the land lies, and no action to enforce a title under said mortgage shall thereafter be maintained. Two or more persons owning in severalty different portions or different interests, such as are described in section eleven, in the land subject to the mortgage may join in one petition, and two or more defects arising under different mortgages affecting one parcel of land may be set forth in the same petition. If the petition is contested, the court shall make an appropriate order for separate issues.
Note that the statute speaks in terms of twenty years, the period of adverse possession, and requires the expiration of that period since the stated maturity date in the mortgage (in the case of a mortgage securing the payment of money) with no payment during that time being made on the mortgage, or (in the case of a mortgage securing a non-money obligation) since the recording of the mortgage.

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