Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-williams-1835
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:38:36+00:00

Document:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DION L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner.
Dion L. Williams, a federal inmate, filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence ("§ 2255 Motion") wherein he claimed that counsel had failed to file an appeal as directed. The Court referred that claim to the Magistrate Judge for an evidentiary hearing. The matter is before the Court for review of the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, set forth below in Parts I through V, and Williams's objections to those findings. The Court has reviewed the record, including the transcript of the evidentiary hearing conducted by the Magistrate Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the Report and Recommendation will be accepted and adopted.
Plea Hr'g Tr. 23:21-25:2, ECF No. 354; Plea Agreement, ECF No. 259.) Williams and counsel also reviewed and signed the written statement of facts. (Guilty Plea Hr'g Tr. 22:3-23, ECF No. 354; Statement of Facts, ECF No. 260.) The district court scheduled Williams's sentencing for April 19, 2013. (Guilty Plea Hr'g Tr. 25:3-22, ECF No. 354.) On April 19, 2013, Judge Hudson sentenced Williams to 252 months of imprisonment on Count One, to be followed by five years of supervised release. (Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 39:13-15, ECF No. 355; Judgment in a Criminal Case, ECF No. 315.) Williams did not appeal.
A petitioner collaterally attacking his or her conviction bears the burden of proving that the conviction imposed violated the United States Constitution or laws, that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, that the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or that the sentence otherwise is subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The petitioner has the burden of proving the grounds for the collateral attack by a preponderance of the evidence. Vanater v. Boles, 377 F.2d 898, 900 (4th Cir. 1967); White v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 684, 686 (E.D. Va. 2004). In a § 2255 proceeding, a court may hold an evidentiary hearing to "determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). When making findings of fact, the court should determine the credibility of witnesses and reliability of other evidence. See United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 393-94, 409 n.15 (4th Cir. 2004).
Supplementing the procedural events above, the Court makes the following findings of fact based on the record, as well as the testimony and exhibits submitted at the evidentiary hearing.
1. On January 17, 2013, Judge Hudson conducted Williams's plea colloquy, during which Williams pled guilty to Count One of the superseding indictment, with a written plea agreement and a written statement of facts. (ECF Nos. 259, 260, 354.) The transcript of the plea hearing (ECF No. 354) and the plea agreement (ECF No. 259) were admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing as Government's Exhibits 1 and 2 respectively, having also been filed as ECF Nos. 455-1 and 455-2 respectively.
The Court: Prior to coming to court this afternoon, have you had a thorough opportunity to discuss this case with your attorney, Mr. Ravenell?
The Court: Are you entirely satisfied with his services?
The Court: Has he done everything reasonable you have asked him to do in connection with this case?
Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and that the sentencing judge could depart upward or downward from the advisory range under the Sentencing Guidelines if appropriate, "subject only to review by higher courts for reasonableness." (Plea Agreement ¶ 5, ECF No. 259.) The plea agreement also explained that any estimate of the ultimate sentence "is a prediction, not a promise, and is not binding on the United States, the Probation Office, or the Court." (Id.) Judge Hudson orally informed Williams that any estimate regarding the ultimate sentence imposed could only be an "educated estimate" but did not constitute a basis on which Williams could attempt to withdraw his guilty plea. (Guilty Plea Hr'g Tr. 20:6-24, ECF No. 354.) Judge Hudson also addressed the bolded portion of paragraph 5 of the plea agreement that states that the United States and Williams recommend a number of provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B) (Guilty Plea Hr'g Tr. 12:20-25, ECF No. 354), and he specifically addressed the statement in paragraph 5 of the plea agreement that the United States agrees to recommend a sentence no higher than the mid-range of the advisory range based on the Sentencing Guidelines. (Guilty Plea Hr'g Tr. 16:19-17:10, ECF No. 354).
The Court: All of those factors will be taken into consideration, but I'd like to hear from you before I decide where within those guidelines an appropriate sentence can be found. Go right ahead, sir.
Mr. Williams: To the people and the Court, the Honorable Judge Henry Hudson. I stand before you today to be sentenced of a crime of which I pled guilty to, and I must take full responsibility for in which I'm accused.
Now, Mr. Williams, as a part of your plea agreement, you have waived your right of appeal as to almost all sentencing issues in this case. But if you feel I have done anything unlawful or improper that you wish to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, that appeal must be noted within 14 days of today.
wish to do so he has got to put that process in motion almost immediately.
Mr. Williams: At this time all motions were being denied.
Mr. Williams: Nothing was going in my favor. So at this time it was to me just time to get it over with and get going. First of all, I didn't know that I could even be charged in a state where nothing took place in my case. So the whole thing was just—it was just an out of body experience for me. I'll put it like that.
Mr. Duffey: Okay. Well, the next question from the Court was, "Do you have any questions you would like to ask me about your plea of guilty or the constitutional rights you have waived this afternoon?" That's a pretty straightforward question, isn't it?
Mr. Duffey: ["]Do you have any questions about what happened this afternoon?["] You'll agree with me that's pretty wide open, right?
Mr. Duffey: And your response was, "No, sir"?
Mr. Duffey: Did you not understand that question?
Mr. Williams: I understood it.
Mr. Duffey: But you chose not to ask any questions?
Mr. Duffey: Even though your testimony was you were cloudy and not understanding anything the judge was saying to you?
2012 and "on and about January 18th through January 25th " that he would file an appeal on behalf of her husband, Dion L. Williams. (ECF No. 459-2.) Tabitha D. Williams was not present at the evidentiary hearing.
41. Having considered the above and having weighed the credibility of the witnesses, the Court finds that Williams never expressly requested Ravenell to file an appeal of his case and never expressed an interest in appealing his case immediately following the sentencing hearing, which would have been the appropriate time to file an appeal.
42. Williams's testimony lacks credibility and is not supported by the contemporaneous record. The plea documents and plea hearing made clear that Williams had waived his right to any appeal. Williams asserts that he was "cloudy" and failed to understand the plea agreement, but he never expressed this to Judge Hudson or to Ravenell. The affidavit of Tabitha D. Williams also lacks credibility regarding any conversation she had with Ravenell after the plea hearing on January 17, 2013 due to a lack of contemporaneous records corroborating any conversation. Finally, Williams's claim that he assumed the appeal would be taken care of lacks credibility because he failed to correspond with Ravenell about the status of the appeal after being sentenced and going to prison.
43. Williams repeatedly confirmed under oath during his January 17, 2013 plea hearing that he pled guilty because he was guilty and that he signed and understood his plea agreement. His responses under oath during the plea hearing and his acknowledgement of the terms of his plea agreement thoroughly demonstrate that he intended to plead guilty and that he knew he was waiving his right to appeal.
44. Also during the plea hearing, Williams affirmed under oath that no one had made any other promises other than those contained in the plea agreement, and the plea agreement contained almost identical language stating that "no . . . promises . . . have been made, nor agreements reached, other than those set forth in writing in this plea agreement." (Guilty Plea Hr'g Tr. 12:2-ECF No. 354; Plea Agreement ¶ 15, ECF No. 259.) Thus, there was no separate agreement or promise that would permit Williams to appeal the denial of the pretrial motions.
45. Williams waited until approximately April 2016, almost three years after his sentencing and well beyond the fourteen-day appeal period, to have his brother contact Ravenell. Williams's silence during the critical fourteen-day period and thereafter demonstrates that he understood that he waived his right to appeal when he pled guilty.
46. The documentary evidence does not support Williams's testimony or Mrs. Williams's affidavit. Williams never inquired regarding the status of any appeal and never expressed frustration, disappointment, or concern when Ravenell failed to visit Williams or communicate with him regarding an appeal after sentencing.
47. The Court finds Ravenell's version of events to be more credible and supported by the contemporaneous record.
The standard set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington governs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a criminal defendant's right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 687. To prove a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must first show that his or her counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. Second, the petitioner must demonstrate actual prejudice from the deficiency. Id. at 694.
[C]ounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.
Id. at 480. This determination must take into account "all the information counsel knew or should have known." Id.
If a consultation about appeal has occurred, counsel performs deficiently only by failing to follow the defendant's express instructions with respect to an appeal. Id. at 478. "[A] criminal defense attorney's failure to file a notice of appeal when requested by his client deprives the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, notwithstanding that the lost appeal may not have had a reasonable probability of success." United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1993). Moreover, "an attorney is required to file a notice of appeal when unequivocally instructed to do so by his client, even if doing so would be contrary to the plea agreement [because the defendant has waived his right to appeal] and harmful to the client's interests." United States v.
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2007). "When applying Flores-Ortega, [the Fourth Circuit] has found a breach of the Strickland duty usually because the defendant said something to his counsel indicating that he had an interest in appealing." United States v. Cooper, 617 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding that defense attorney was justified in believing that a rational defendant in Cooper's situation would not want to appeal even though he had not waived his appeal rights in a plea agreement because (1) Cooper's actions and words expressed clearly a desire not to prolong the case but to put it behind him, and (2) Cooper received the sentence he bargained for with the government, so his expectations were met).
If the attorney received no express instruction to file a notice of appeal, and no consultation has occurred, a court must determine "whether counsel's failure to consult with the defendant itself constitutes deficient performance." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478. The prejudice prong of Strickland requires "that counsel's deficient performance must actually cause the forfeiture of the defendant's appeal. If the defendant cannot demonstrate that, but for counsel's deficient performance, he would have appealed, counsel's deficient performance has not deprived him of anything, and he is not entitled to relief." Id. at 484. "Thus, to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim for failing to note an appeal, a defendant need not 'demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might have had merit,' but rather only that 'but for counsel's deficient conduct, he would have appealed.'" Jiminez v. Vaughan, No. 3:07cv639, 2008 WL 2329767, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2008) (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486).
The record demonstrates that Williams did not instruct Ravenell to file an appeal within the fourteen-day period following his sentencing. Williams's testimony that he assumed counsel would file an appeal based on a conversation that took place prior to entering into the plea agreement lacks credibility because Williams waived his right to appeal after that conversation and then did not attempt to communicate with Ravenell after sentencing. Conversely, Ravenell testified credibly that Williams never instructed him to file an appeal after sentencing, and this is supported by the lack of documentary evidence to show Williams's instructions. The contemporaneous record supports Ravenell's testimony.
Williams's responses under oath to Judge Hudson's questions during the plea hearing demonstrate that Williams intended to plead guilty and knew, as a part of that plea, that he was waiving his right to appeal. Williams testified under oath during the plea hearing that he knew he was giving up his right to appeal as a part of his plea. At sentencing, Williams apologized to the Court and took full responsibility for his actions. His request for a downward variance further confirms that Williams knew he waived his right to appeal and intended to do so. Moreover, generally, if the United States has agreed to a conditional guilty plea, a provision reflecting that will be set forth in the written plea agreement and will be addressed by judge taking the defendant's guilty plea. There was no such provision in this plea agreement nor did Judge Hudson discuss a conditional plea during the colloquy. Ravenell confirmed that he sought a conditional plea but that the United States would not agree to a conditional plea in Williams's case, and Ravenell confirmed that Williams understood that fact and was not happy with the government's refusal to do so.
Williams never expressed frustration when Ravenell failed to visit or contact him in prison. The lack of documentary evidence clearly establishes that Williams did not attempt to contact Ravenell after his sentencing hearing. During Williams's sentencing hearing, Judge Hudson clearly and specifically told Williams that if he wanted to file an appeal he needed to speak with Ravenell to get that process in motion almost immediately, yet Williams did nothing.
Absent an express instruction to file a notice of appeal, the Court must consider whether Ravenell had a duty to consult with Williams about an appeal. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480. The Constitution requires counsel to consult with the defendant about an appeal only "when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing." Id. "Consult," as defined by the Supreme Court, means to advise "the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and [make] a reasonable effort to discover the defendant's wishes." Id. at 478. Whether the defendant proceeded to trial or pled guilty becomes a highly relevant factor to this inquiry. Id. at 480. If the defendant pled guilty, the Court should consider whether the defendant received the sentence bargained for in a plea agreement and whether the defendant waived some or all rights to appeal in the plea agreement. Id.
The Court finds that Ravenell had no duty to consult with Williams about an appeal. First, the record demonstrates that a rational defendant in Williams's position would not have pursued an appeal. Williams pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement and waived his right to appeal his conviction, any sentence within the statutory maximum, and the manner in which that sentence was determined. During the evidentiary hearing, Williams admitted that, during the plea hearing, "it was to me just time to get it over with and get going" (Evid. Hr'g Tr. 20:22-21:1, ECF No. 463), similar to the statements made by the defendant in Cooper, who also indicated his desire to put his case behind him. Cooper, 617 F.3d at 314. Also like the defendant in Cooper, Williams ultimately received the sentence for which he had bargained during the plea negotiations with the United States. Id.
to plead guilty despite having to waive his right to appeal in order to receive other concessions from the United States. Based on these considerations, Williams cannot demonstrate that a rational defendant would have wanted to appeal his conviction or sentence.
Williams likewise has failed to demonstrate that he showed any interest in filing an appeal during the fourteen-day appeal period. Williams's testimony that he told Ravenell to appeal the denials of the pretrial motions, although he could not remember specifically when he did this, does not support Williams's purported assumption that Ravenell would file an appeal after the April 19, 2013 sentencing hearing. Further, Williams's claim that he was cloudy and did not understand the plea agreement lacks credibility because Ravenell testified credibly that he and Williams went over the plea agreement line by line and that Williams never requested that he file an appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ravenell had no duty to consult with Williams regarding an appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Williams's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and DENY the §2255 motion.
"The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court." Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.S.C. 1993) (citing Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976)). This Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "The filing of objections to a magistrate's report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985).
Williams objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Ravenell's version of events is more credible than Williams's version of events and objects to the conclusion that Williams did not instruct Ravenall to file an appeal after sentencing. A review of the record supports the Magistrate Judge's conclusion. Through the course of his plea proceedings, Williams was repeatedly informed that, by pleading guilty, he gave up the right to appeal. Williams's testimony that he did not understand that he waived the ability to appeal by pleading guilty contradicts his prior sworn testimony and is not supported by any credible explanation or documentary evidence. Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Williams failed to instruct Ravenall to appeal is supported both by Ravenall's testimony and Williams's inability to produce any documentary evidence indicating that he followed up with Ravenall about the pursuit of an appeal. Accordingly, Williams's first two objections will be overruled.
Finally, Williams objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Ravenall did not have a duty to consult with Williams about an appeal "on the ground that he timely instructed Ravenall to note an appeal." (Pet'r's Objs. 4, ECF No. 480-1.) This objection lacks merit for the reasons stated above—namely, Williams did not instruct Ravenall to appeal. Williams's third objection will be overruled.
The 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion (ECF No. 358) will be denied and the action will be dismissed. A certificate of appealability will be denied.
An appropriate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

References: v. 
 § 2255
 § 2255
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2255
 § 2255
 v. 
 § 3553
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 §2255
 v. 
 v. 
 § 636
 v. 
 § 2255