Source: https://louisvilledivorce.typepad.com/info/dvo_epo/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:55:45+00:00

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On remand from Kentucky Supreme Court, Father challenges sufficiency of evidence supporting FC’s entry of Domestic Violence Order.
Mother and Father have a son born in 1997. An incident occurred in 2009 when Mother attempted to pick up Son from football practice. Mother subsequently filed an EPO, alleging that at that practice she and Father got into a dispute as to when Mother was to retrieve Son; that as Mother was standing at passenger side door of Father’s van telling Son to come with her, Father grabbed her by wrist and yanked her, then shoved her out of the way; that she then called for help; that Father had been sentenced to jail time for violating multiple court orders in custody case; and that all three of her children witnessed the incident. EPO was granted. At the DVO hearing, Mother testified to all these facts and that although she had not been injured, she was afraid. Father testified that he never grabbed or shoved Mother, but that she grabbed his hand from the door of the van; he also stated that he only wanted to take his Son to his home to retrieve a change of clothes and his summer reading assignment for the first day of school the following day; and that he never had any intent to harm or scare Mother. The GAL testified that Son stated nothing had happened that day.
At the conclusion of the hearing, FC determined only that “something happened” and recognized Father’s failure to follow FC orders and to read FC orders in his favor. Upon Father’s request for specific findings, FC found that Father had touched and pushed Mother and that such behavior would continue in the future. FC entered DVO, effective for three years, requiring Father to stay 500 feet away from Mother and her family other than for child exchanges or for Child’s events related to sports and school.
On remand from Supreme Court, Father argues that there were insufficient facts to support entry of DVO. CA agreed, in light of previous precedents establishing that “unwanted touching,” standing alone, is insufficient evidence for entry of a DVO. CA also found FC erred by basing its decision on Father’s actions in domestic case, holding that this bad behavior was not connected to the incident of domestic violence and therefore cannot form the basis for entry of the DVO.
After the Kenton Family Court granted Appellant, Samantha Daugherty’s petition and issued a Domestic Violence Order against Appellee, John Telek, Appellee appealed the Order to the Court of Appeals. The CA held that the family court lost jurisdiction to issue the DVO because it failed to conduct the DVO hearing within 14 days after issuance of an emergency protective order as required by statute.
Appellant’s petition for a DVO was filed August 18, 2009, and the family court issued an EPO to remain in effect until a hearing on August 26. On that date, Appellee’s counsel requested the Court to reschedule the hearing so the guardian ad litem of the parties’ child could be present. The judge agreed to the postponement and said he would re-issue the EPO at fourteen-day intervals until the new hearing date of November 13, 2009. No objections were voiced by any parties.
On September 9, 2009, Appellee appeared in Court for the domestic violence docket and was informed by the Court that the hearing was set for November and the EPO was re-issued for another 14 days, expiring on September 23, 2009. There was no objection to re-issuance of the EPO.
On September 22, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the EPO alleging family court lost jurisdiction when it failed to hold a hearing within fourteen days after issuance of the original EPO. The motion was taken under submission and the EPO was re-issued until a hearing scheduled for October 7. On October 7, the court issued another fourteen-day EPO.
On October 21, 2009, the family court overruled Appellee’s motion to dismiss and conducted a hearing on the issuance of a DVO. The Court found that domestic violence had occurred and entered the DVO. Telek appealed the DVO to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals agreed with Telek that the statute required that a hearing be held within 14 days after initial issuance of an EPO, and beyond that date a DVO based on the original petition could not be issued and family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the DVO.
The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether the statutory time limit for issuing a DVO affects the subject matter jurisdiction of the family court and also to examine the Court of Appeals’ construction of KRS 403.740 (4) applicable in 2009, when the DVO against Telek was sought.
The Supreme Court held that in deciding that a family court’s deviation from a statutory procedure divested it of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals confused a court’s erroneous action within its jurisdiction with a court acting outside its subject matter jurisdiction. SMJ is established by constitutional provisions and statutes assigning courts specific types of claims and causes of action. A court is deprived of SMJ only if it has not been given, by constructional provision or statute, the power to do anything at all. The court has SMJ when the kind of case identified in the pleadings is one which the Court has been empowered to adjudicate. A court does not lose SMJ by misconstruing or overlooking a statute or rule governing the litigation. Once a court acquires SMJ, challenges to its rulings are questions incident to the exercise of jurisdiction, rather than the existence of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court agreed with Telek that the statute required “fixing” a date and time for the DVO hearing within 14 days of the issuance of EPO. The Court noted, however, that a full hearing on a DVO may be rescheduled as circumstances require. The statute in effect at the time did not expressly authorize serial reissuance of an EPO, nor did it specifically bar that process.
Because the Court of Appeals ruled in Telek’s favor on the grounds of SMJ, it was not necessary to rule on his claim that the evidence presented at the DVO hearing was insufficient. If, however, upon discretionary review the Supreme Court reversed the grounds upon which the Court of Appeals based its decision, it is appropriate to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for its consideration of undecided issues. Having reversed the Court of Appeals upon the grounds that formed the basis of its decision, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of Telek’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this matter is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Ex-Husband appealed FC’s reissuance of DVO, arguing evidence was insufficient to support its continuation.
KRS 403.750(2) authorizes the reissuance of a DVO and grants courts the authority to reissue DVOs even in the absence of additional acts of domestic violence and abuse during the prior period. While some showing of a continued need for the DVO must be presented to the court, additional acts of domestic violence need not be proven.
In FC’s re-issuance of the DVO, FC noted that it had had numerous opportunities since initial issuance of DVO, 8 years prior, to hear the parties testify, to observe them, and to assess their credibility; that the parties had a long history of domestic conflict including domestic violence and that emotions had run high during their numerous court appearances; that two DVOs had been issued against Ex-Husband and he had previously been held in contempt of court for violating a DVO, which he had violated as recently as April 2010 by sending Ex-Wife an angry email; and that Ex-Husband was upset over CPS investigations and may have felt additional stress as a result of a pending custody proceeding. Additionally, FC observed that the fact that the parties have a minor child creates situations in which the parties will inevitably cross paths before the child turns 18. On this basis, FC found that domestic violence had occurred and may occur in the future; that Ex-Wife had a reasonable fear of imminent physical harm from Ex-Husband; that the DVO had been effective in preventing domestic violence in the past; and that a continued need for the DVO existed. Accordingly, FC reissued the DVO for three more years.
CA found that sufficient evidence warranted a finding that the circumstances called for the continuance of the DVO because acts of domestic violence and abuse had occurred and may again occur. CA noted that while due consideration was given to the potential consequences resulting from the issuance of a DVO, FC did not err by reissuing the DVO against Ex-Husband.
Dad appealed FC’s amendment of DVO adding minor child as protected party, contending he was improperly denied full evidentiary hearing, that FC improperly made medical findings, and that FC erred by entering DVO for minor child.
Mom and Dad, never married, had been before FC several times on Mom’s DVO petitions. In November 2009, FC entered DVO protecting Mom from Dad. In May 2010, Mom filed Motion to amend DVO to include the parties’ child. At the hearing on the Petition, Mom testified that Child had been returned to her from Dad’s care with a rash, two burns on her leg, and a bump on her head and that he did not seek medical treatment for the burns; Dad testified that he thought that Child was burned at Mom’s house. FC concluded that Child had third-degree burns and that Dad should have sought medical treatment for same, and this alone was cause to extend DVO to Child. FC ordered that Dad would have supervised visitation for 3 hours each Saturday.
Dad filed motion to alter, amend, or vacate which FC denied, and Dad appealed, arguing first, that he was denied full evidentiary hearing because court refused to hear testimony (1) from Batterers’ Intervention Instructor that he was a model student and (2) from his girlfriend that she did not notice the burns prior to taking Child to Mom’s house but they were there on her return; second, that FC should have allowed testimony that Mom attempted suicide while pregnant less than 19 months prior to hearing because custody was at issue at the hearing; and finally, that the facts did not support extension of DVO to Child.
CA first pointed out in a footnote that, although this argument was not raised by the parties, amending the terms of a DVO is fundamentally different from amending the parties to be affected by a DVO and that when a party is to be added to a DVO, the same requirements for the initial issuance of a DVO must be followed.
Regarding the testimony of the Batterers’ Intervention instructor, CA found that FC did not err by refusing this testimony as Dad’s conduct in class had little relevance to his conduct outside of class. However, CA agreed with Dad that he should have been permitted to call Girlfriend to testify regarding the timing of the burns and this error was not harmless.
CA found no error in FC refusing to hear testimony regarding Mom’s mental health history given the length of time that had passed since the alleged suicide attempt and that there were no allegations regarding Mom’s mental health status since Child’s birth.
CA found that any error by FC in making medical findings was harmless as the crux of FC’s finding was Dad’s indifference towards Child’s burns, not the degree to which Child had been burned.
Lastly, CA found Dad’s argument regarding error in issuing DVO moot because case would be remanded to FC on other grounds.
CA found that FC abused its discretion by entering DVO where Petitioner made no allegations of physical abuse, physical injury, or threats of physical abuse but only provided her unsupported statement that she was unsure what Respondent would do and was afraid of him. Petitioner’s testimony that Respondent had stared at the parties’ children at their school and her belief, contradicted by Respondent’s testimony, that Respondent had broken into her home did not provide by a preponderance of the evidence that an act of domestic violence and abuse had occurred and may again occur, and FC therefore abused its discretion. Reversed and remanded for vacation of DVO.
Issue: Domestic Violence Order entered by Family Court reversed.
Bart A. Caudill appealed from a Domestic Violence Order entered by Family Court in Pike Circuit Court at the request of Kathryn L. Caudill.
The parties were involved in a divorce action in the Floyd Circuit Court. Kathryn filed a petition for a DVO in the Pike Circuit Court (the county where she resides) alleging that Bart had ignored her directions to stay away from her workplace and that she felt threatened by his verbal abuse. She further alleged that Bart had a concealed carry permit but she didn’t know if it remained in effect. After hearing testimony from both parties, the Court issued a DVO requiring Bart to stay 1000 feet away for 90 days except for visitation exchange and children’s school and sports activities.
Bart moved to alter, amend or vacate the DVO seeking specific findings on what constituted domestic violence and abuse. After hearing, Bart’s motion was denied and the Court explained that domestic violence occurred when Bart pushed his way through a door. Bart appealed.
The Court of Appeals first ordered briefs on the limited issue of whether the appeal was moot because the DVO expired before the appellate record was transmitted to the Court. Bart argued that an appeal testing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the entry of a DVO is never moot because a DVO remains on the record of the alleged perpetrator forever and shows up on background checks for employment and volunteer activities. The Court agreed that the continuing consequences of a DVO required resolution and the appeal was not moot.
Bart argued that neither domestic violence and abuse or the future likelihood of violence and abuse was established. To enter a DVO the Court must find from a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse occurred and may occur again. The standard requires sufficient evidence to establish that the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence, as defined in KRS 403.720(1). The standard of review for factual determinations is whether the family court’s finding was clearly erroneous, which is not the case if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. The test is whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly erroneous or that he abused his discretion. Abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision is unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.
The Court of Appeals found no testimony to support a finding of abuse as defined by KRS 403.720(1) and even the trial court characterized the case as “marginal” and granted the 90-day DVO to provide a cooling off period. The court granted the DVO based on one occasion when Bart pushed Kathryn out of the way to enter the home.
Lacking substantial evidence of domestic violence and abuse under the statutory definition, the Court of Appeals reversed the DVO entered by the Pike Circuit Court and remanded with direction to eradicate all traces of the erroneously entered DVO from the court record.
Ruby V. Ruby, DVO entered but parties then entered into an agreed order dismissing the DVO. Trial court declined to enter agreed order, amending DVO to no unlawful contact instead. Court of Appeals affirmed entry of DVO but remanded to trial court to conduct a hearing on circumstances surrounding agreement to dismiss DVO.
Howell filed a domestic violence petition against Rivers.  The trial court found that Howell had standing to seek a Domestic Violence Order as a member of an “unmarried couple” as defined in KRS 403.720(3).  The parties were involved in a five year relationship.  Although the parties were engaged to be married at one time and stayed at each other’s residences for periods as long as a week, they never did marry and always maintained separate residences.  They each had access to keys to each other’s residence at various times during the relationship.  Howell’s children occasionally stayed with Rivers, but there was no permanent bed for their use.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous. Applying the factors set out in Barnett v. Wiley, COA found the parties fell short of the definition of an “unmarried couple.”  The domestic violence statutes do not provide protection to victims in a dating relationship, who are not cohabitating.
Criswell filed a petition, on behalf of her two minor children, for a domestic violence order against her former husband, Rankin.  Criswell alleged that Rankin sexually abused the parties’ daughter 7 or 8 years ago.  The trial court held a very brief domestic violence hearing, which mainly consisted of the court reading the allegations in the petition aloud and the court silently reading two separate dependency case files pending in the family court.  Neither the petition nor the dependency files were admitted into evidence and the court asked minimal questions of either party.  Neither party was represented by counsel.  The trial court entered a domestic violence order against Rankin, precluding him from having any contact with Criswell or their two minor children.  The court orally stated that the order would remain in effect until the criminal matter was resolved or until the order expired, however, the order stated that it was effective for three years.
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court failed to conduct a full evidentiary hearing.  There was no testimony or other evidence that supported the petition.  A DVO cannot be granted solely on the basis of the contents of the petition.  At a minimum, Criswell should have been asked by the court whether the allegations in the petition were accurate.  In addition, the rules of evidence apply.  Hearsay contained in the petition cannot be considered as evidence unless an exception applies.  The court also erred in considering the dependency files, which were not in evidence and to which Rankin had no opportunity to examine or refute.
COA remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing with instructions for the trial court to question Criswell under oath as to the allegations and to let Rankin have an opportunity to respond.  As to the duration of the order, if one is entered, it is not dependent on the result of a criminal matter.
Rankin v. Criswell, et al, DVO reversed where court read dependency files without informing parties of contents nor admitting them into evidence and only evidence was petition which contained hearsay. Rivers v. Howell, DVO reversed because Howell lacked standing, as she had never lived with Rivers.
Based on events between the parties in 2002, Valentine was convicted of assault in the fourth degree and two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. Valentine is currently appealing his conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42. As part of his investigation into the evidence associated with his trial, Valentine filed an open records request with the Educational Professional Standards Board concerning Horan. When Horan learned of the request she filed a petition for an EPO. She was afraid Valentine was trying to find personal information about her due to his impending parole and/or expiration of his sentence. She was afraid he would harm her again. The court issued the EPO, as well as a DVO, which prohibited Valentine from gathering information about Horan regarding her address, employment, or personal data and from coming within 1000 feet of her. Valentine appealed.
Based on the criminal convictions for assault and sexual abuse arising from the acts of domestic violence and the higher standard of proof required in criminal matters, the COA found that the evidentiary standards had been met under KRS 403.740 and KRS 403.750. The Court also found that domestic violence may occur again, since Valentine is inquiring about Horan after all these years. Valentine’s arguments regarding failure to receive notice and service of the EPO were moot, since the EPO had expired. DVOs do not have the same notice and service requirement. COA found that the court had complied with the full hearing requirement by holding a hearing with Horan and a separate telephonic hearing with Valentine. AFFIRMED.
Domestic violence crosses all socio-economic lines. Yet, victims often find it difficult to access help. Beyond the usual "I'm afraid to make him mad" reason for not seeking orders of protection, those who are economically fortunate are burdened with a heightened sense of shame. Thus, we were please to read in the Arkansas Benton County Daily Record that University of Arkansas law school dean Cynthia Nance is sharing her story of domestic violence. The article is online. Maybe sharing her story will save lives.
Ex-Husband appealed from TC’s order reissuing domestic violence order against him, arguing that there was no evidence to support the DVO. Parties’ 34-year marriage culminated in an incident in which Ex-Husband threw Ex-Wife against a shower wall and held a gun to her head. Ex-Wife moved out of marital residence and the parties divorced in 1997. In 1998, a DVO was entered against Ex-Husband after he threatened to kill Ex-Wife and all her co-workers. DVO expired in 2001, at which time Ex-Husband again began following and threatening Ex-Wife. Another DVO was entered in early 2003, to expire in 2006. A few weeks before this DVO expired, Ex-Wife filed a motion to extend it for another three years. TC did so after a brief hearing. Ex-Husband appealed to CA, and CA rendered unpublished opinion in 2006 vacating the DVO and remanding to TC, noting that what appeared to be the sole ground for re-issuance of the DVO was Ex-Wife’s testimony that life had been “much more peaceful” with DVO in place, and that, on remand, TC should give proper consideration to the restrictiveness of a DVO as well as all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case before rendering a decision. TC held second hearing, and again re-issued DVO. Ex-Husband appealed again.
CA held that TCs have authority to reissue DVOs even in the absence of additional acts of domestic violence and abuse during the prior period. However, there must be some showing of a continuing need for the DVO. CA recognized that TC considered history of domestic violence in the parties’ marriage; that Ex-Husband’s conduct after the marriage left in Ex-Wife in fear; that during the time post-marriage when no DVO was in place, Ex-Husband again began to harass Ex-Wife; and that when CA’s last opinion on this matter was rendered, Ex-Husband attempted to retrieve his guns from the Sheriff’s office even before TC received notice that DVO had been vacated. Thus, CA found that there existed sufficient evidence to reissue the DVO.
I think in any call for reform it is important to distinguish mandatory arrests for violation of an existing order of protection from arrests at the initial call to the police, before an emergency protective order is entered. I firmly believe that arrests for violation of a domestic violence order lessen the lethality risk of intimate partner violence and doubt that the possibility of future arrests discourages victims from initially seeking protection. Time and studies will tell.
Thanks to Janet Langjahr of Florida Divorce Law Blog for pointing out this editorial.
Whether the district court erred in entering, sua sponte, an order for a mutual domestic violence order. The Court held yes, as the domestic violence statutes do not provide for mutual domestic violence orders under the factual scenario in the instant case.
The parties have a child in common. Two months after the child was born, Charles was arrested for assault fourth degree and two counts of terroristic threatening for choking, beating, and threatening Kimberly. Kimberly also obtained an EPO. Charles pled guilty to the charges. Kimberly failed to appear for the domestic violence hearing and the EPO was dismissed.
Months later, Charles assaulted Kimberly again and was charged with assault fourth degree, terroristic threatening, and criminal mischief third-degree. Kimberly obtained an EPO. At the EPO hearing the judge ordered Charles to have no contact with Kimberly or her family. Charles was also sentenced on the criminal charges.
A couple months later Charles was arrested at Kimberly’ residence and charged with violation of the DVO and terroristic threatening. The police also arrested Kimberly for violating the DVO which she had obtained. Charles pled guilty to violating the DVO, and was sentenced on the new charges. The court dismissed the criminal charges against Kimberly, but then sua sponte entered a DVO for Charles against Kimberly, expressing its frustration with Kimberly inviting Charles over to her residence despite the DVO in place.
Kimberly appealed to the Circuit Court. The court affirmed the decision below relying on KRS 403.750(1) (h). The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review.
KRS 403.735(2) specifically states that a court may issue mutual protective orders only if a separate petition is filed by the respondent. This did not occur in the instant case. Charles never filed a petition and never alleged Kimberly committed acts of violence or abuse. Therefore, the district court erred in entering a DVO against Kimberly and the circuit court erred in affirming the order. The lower courts’ reliance on KRS 403.750(1) (h) and KRS 403.715(2) was misplaced.
The Court noted, with agreement, the complex physical and psychological process many domestic violence victims struggle with, quoting at length from Kimberly’s brief.
Question: Does the family court have jurisdiction to consider a CR 60.02 motion involving a DVO?
Answer: Yes. By its plain language, CR 60.02 provides an avenue by which a party may seek to be relieved from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Where the issuance of a DVO adjudicates all of the rights of both parties in the proceedings with nothing left for its consideration, the order is final. In fact, in cases where issuance of a DVO adjudicates all rights of the parties, the parties also have the right to appeal. Therefore, the relief afforded by CR 60.02 as to “final judgments, orders, or proceedings” is available as to DVOs if a movant sets forth any of the criteria covered by the rule.
As digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates, www.LouisvilleDivorce.com.
Randall v. Stewart, a to be published decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals found here held that a girlfriend who did not live with her boyfriend could not obtain the protection of a domestic violence order against him.
Girlfriend sought a DVO from the trial court after Boyfriend attacked her when she tried to break up with him. Boyfriend and Girlfriend did not have a child nor did they have any other familial relationship. Trial court entered DVO, despite lack of evidence that Boyfriend and Girlfriend shared a residence. Boyfriend appealed to CA, arguing that because he and Girlfriend did not live together, she did not have standing to seek a DVO.
Note: House Bill 396 (HB 396/CI) was introduced and posted in committee on February 14, 2006. This bill would expand KRS 403.720 to allow dating partners to obtain domestic violence protective orders.
Domestic Violence Among Refugee and Immigrant Women is among the posts this week at the Family Law Prof Blog. It links to an audio of a National Public Radio broadcast by Meqdes Mesfin.
1.	Whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over a party who had no contact with the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The Court held no, the court had no personal jurisdiction over such party.
2.	Whether under KRS 403.725(1), a provision of Kentucky’s domestic violence statute, a Kentucky court may issue a protective order against an individual over whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction. The Court held yes, the court can issue the protective order, however the order cannot impose affirmative duties on the individual over whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction.
Ava and Ken Spencer resided in Oklahoma. Ken allegedly abused Ava and their son. On May 21, 2005, Ken flew to Las Vegas. He testified that the family was planning on moving there and he went to find employment. Ava testified that she saw the trip as her opportunity to escape the abuse, and she and their son traveled to Kentucky on May 22, 2005 to stay with a close friend. On May 23, 2005, Ava filed a domestic violence petition in Warren Circuit Court. That same day, the court issued an Emergency Protective Order, which restrained Ken from having any contact with Ava and granted Ava temporary custody of their son. Ken was served in Nevada by the Sheriff’s Department.
On June 6, 2005, Ken filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After a hearing, the court announced that it would enter an Order of Protection. When Ken’s counsel asked the court about its personal jurisdiction over Ken, the court explained that its ruling was based on KRS 403.725(1).
First, the Court analyzed whether the court had personal jurisdiction over Ken. The Court reviewed the three prong test set out in Wilson v. Case, 85 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2002): 1) whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of acting within the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state; 2) whether the cause of action arose from the alleged in-state activities; and 3) whether the defendant has such connections to the state as to make jurisdiction reasonable. All three requirements must be met for the court to have jurisdiction. The Court held that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over Ken, since none of the requirements were met.
Second, the Court examined whether the trial court may issue a protective order against an individual over whom it lacks personal jurisdiction. KRS 403.725(1) allows Kentucky residents to file for domestic violence protection, as well as similar filings by people who have fled to Kentucky to escape domestic violence. The statute does not have a residency requirement; therefore it is a safe harbor statute. The Court recognized that a conflict arises where an order is issued against a party who has no minimum contacts with Kentucky. In such cases, the due process rights of the defendant must be balanced against the state’s interests in protecting victims of domestic violence.
Since this was an issue of first impression in Kentucky, the Court reviewed case law of other jurisdictions. The Court most aligned with how the Supreme Court of New Jersey approached the issue. In Shah v. Shah, 184 N.J. 125, 875 A.2d 931 (2005), the court distinguished between a prohibitory order that protects the victim of domestic violence and an affirmative order that requires the defendant to take action. A prohibitory order enforces the protection the law allows and does not implicate the defendant’s substantive rights. An affirmative order, however, involves the court exercising its coercive power to compel the defendant to act. The court has the authority to impose the former, but not the latter, on an individual over whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction.
In accordance with the analysis in Shah, the Court held that the trial court’s order prohibiting Ken from breaking the law in Kentucky by approaching Ava or the child complied with the requirements of due process. The Court held that the remaining portions of the order, i.e. ordering Ken to attend domestic violence counseling, violated the limits of Kentucky courts’ jurisdiction. The Court vacated the order and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion.

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