Source: http://patents.hdp.com/?cat=26
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:16:50+00:00

Document:
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2017-1694] (February 7, 2019), the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal of the PTAB Final Written Decision sustaining patentability of claims 1 through 15 (all the claims) of United States Patent No. 8,476,239, for lack of standing/jurisdiction and for mootness.
The ‘239 patent covered compounds under the generic name “abatacept” and the BMS brand name Orencia®, used in treatment of immune system disorders such as rheumatoid arthritis. Momenta’s proposed product failed its Phase 1 clinical trials and had been withdrawn, so BMS moved to dismiss the appeal because Momenta no longer had standing. Momenta responded that it had not abandoned its intent to produce a counterpart and that the ’239 Patent is an obstacle to these activities, and that it is injured by the estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). Momenta cited to the “relaxed” standard for Article III compliance when the right of appeal is established by statute.
The Federal Circuit said that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statute. Noting that Momenta had initially stressed that it had spent millions of dollars in its development of a biosimilar, upon Momenta’s termination of all potentially infringing activity, Momenta has not shown “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The Federal Circuit concluded that upon abandoning development of this product, Momenta has no legally protected interest in the validity of the ’239 Patent, and there is no real need to exercise the power of judicial review.
The Federal Circuit further found that Momenta’s abandonment of the development of a biosimilar made the appeal moot: the cessation of potential infringement means that Momenta no longer has the potential for injury, thereby mooting the inquiry.
In Virtnex Inc. v. Apple, Inc., [2017-2490, 2017-2494] (December 10, 2018) the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB that claims 1–11, 14–25, and 28–30 of U.S. Patent No. 8,504,696 were unpatentable as obvious., noting that VirnetX was collaterally estopped from relitigating the threshold issue of whether prior art reference was a printed publication and because VirnetX did not preserve the only remaining issue of whether inter partes review procedures apply retroactively to patents that were filed before Congress enacted the America Invents Act.
During the pendency of VirnetX’s appeal, the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed seven final written decisions between VirnetX Inc. and Apple in which the Board found that RFC 2401 was a printed publication. The Federal Circuit said that Rule 36 summary dispositions could be the basis collateral estoppel, and that the only issue was whether the printed publication issue was necessary or essential to the judgment in the prior cases. The Federal Circuit held that it was.
VirnetX also argued that it preserved in its opening brief the issue of whether inter partes review procedures apply retroactively to patents that were filed before Congress enacted the AIA, pointing to a single paragraph in its Opening Brief, filed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States. The Federal Circuit said that this paragraph raised the specific question later decided in Oil States, and under a very generous reading, the paragraph also arguably raises a general challenge under the Seventh Amendment, but it in no way provides any arguments specifically preserving the retroactivity issue.
publication issue resolved all other issues in the appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed.
The lesson, of course, is to correctly predict the future and simply preserve the issues you will need. Virtnex can hardly be faulted for not preserving the issue, when they had a more substantive issue before it, buy it always pays to have a legitimate Plan B.
In Parkervision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Incorporated, [2017-2012, 2017-2013, 2017-2014, 2017-2074] (September 13, 2018), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s determination in related inter partes review proceedings, The certain apparatus claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,091,940, generally related to telecommunications devices, were unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and that certain method claims were not unpatentable.
patentability decisions on theories and evidence regarding the phrase “plurality of harmonics” that Qualcomm did not present in its petitions. The case came down to whether the claim language required the production of the “plurality of harmonics,” or simply the capability of producing the “plurality of harmonics” — The Federal Circuit found the claim language merely required the capability of producing the plurality of harmonics, which was met by the prior art that was similarly capable.
limitation, which Qualcomm failed to do.
In Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, [2017-1521] (August 27, 2018), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the PTAB did not consider portions of Ericsson’s Reply, and vacated and remanded the Final Written decision that claims 1–3, 6–9, and 12–14 of U.S. Patent No. 5,602,831 were not unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Under PTO regulations, the Board is entitled to strike arguments improperly raised for the first time in a reply. Such decisions related to compliance with the Board’s procedures are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is found if the decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact finding; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision.
responding to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response, but the Federal Circuit disagreed, noting the portions of the Reply the Board declined to consider expressly follow from the contentions raised in the Petition.
construction of the terms after the Petition instituting inter partes review was granted, and the issue was the essential basis of the Board’s decision in concluding that the claim had not been shown unpatentable, Ericsson should have been given an opportunity to respond. Undoubtedly, this was a special case in which Petitioner, Patent Owner, and the Board all initially applied the broadest reasonable interpretation claim construction standard (despite the fact that the patent had expired when it filed the petition), and only after institution applied Phillips instead. In light of these changed circumstances, the Board revisited its approach to the claims in light of this error, and Ericsson likewise deserved an opportunity to do the same.
The Federal Circuit said that its decision should not be viewed as changing or challenging the Board’s practice of limiting the scope of replies pursuant to its regulations; precedent supports the Board’s discretion to reject arguments raised for the first time in a reply.
In Click-to-Call Technologies, LP v. Ingenio, Inc., [2015-1242] (August 16, 2018), the Federal Circuit concluded that the Board committed legal error in rendering its § 315(b) determination, and vacated the Board’s Final Written Decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss IPR2013-00312.
civil action in which the complaint was served “does not trigger” the bar.
without prejudice,” but it did not do so. The Federal Circuit rejected the Board’s effort to graft this additional language into § 315(b).
The Federal Circuit further said that the legislative history of § 315(b) further supports the understanding that its time bar concerns only the date on which the complaint was formally served.
on which the petitioner, its privy, or a real party in interest was properly served with a complaint — there is no need to proceed to Chevron’s second step.
transpired after the defendant was served.
of this patent more than one year before the IPR petition was filed. The Federal Circuit pointing out that unlike reissue, reexamination does not result in the surrender of the original patent and the issuance of a new patent.
In re: Power Integrations, Inc., [2018-144, 2018-145, 2018-146, 2018-147] (August 16, 2018), the Federal Circuit denied Power Integrations, Inc. petitions for writs of mandamus, challenging . The petitions challenge the decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board denying the institution of inter partes review of claims from three patents owned by Semiconductor Components Industries, LLC.
The Federal Circuit held that mandamus does not lie in this case, both because Power Integration has not shown a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ and because relief by way of mandamus would not be appropriate here. The statutory prohibition on appeals from decisions not to institute inter partes review cannot be sidestepped simply by styling the request for review as a petition for mandamus.
court’s intervention to overturn the Board’s decisions not to institute inter partes review. The Federal Circuit found what Power Integration ultimately wants is not just to be given a more complete explanation of the Board’s action, but for the Federal Circuit to review that decision on the merits. The Federal Circuit said that the essence of Power Integration’s claim— that the Board’s analysis “is premised on an incorrect legal standard or a misapplication of that standard”—is nothing more than a challenge to the Board’s conclusion that the information presented in the petitions did not warrant review.
A disappointed petitioner cannot by-pass the statutory bar on appellate review simply by directing its challenge to asserted procedural irregularities rather than to the substance of the non-institution ruling. This is not to say that mandamus will never lie in response to action by the agency relating to the noninstitution of inter partes review. The circumstances described by the Supreme Court in Cuozzo as illustrations of issues for which an appeal might be justified (e.g., constitutional issues, issues involving questions outside the scope of section 314(d), and actions by the agency beyond its statutory limits) would be potential candidates for mandamus review as well. However this case involved no issues extraneous to the application of patent law principles of unpatentability based on printed publications, nor does it involve any “shenanigans” on the part of the Board that might justify appellate review or review by mandamus.
Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Iancu, [2017-1629, 2017-1631, 2017-1633] (August 16, 2018), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s invalidation of claims of two of Luminara’s patent, and as to the third, it vacated the Final Written Decision, and remanding for dismissal of that IPR, because of the section §315(b) time-bar.
been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, the Federal Circuit said the Board erred in instituting the IPR challenging the ’319 patent, vacating the Board’s final written decision as to the ’319 IPR and remand for dismissal of that IPR.
As to the obviousness in the other two IPRs, the Federal Circuit found that these were supported by substantial evidence.
In GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC, [2017-1894, 2017-1936] (July 27, 2018), the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the PTAB’s decisions in IPR2015-01078 and IPR2015-01080 that U.S. Patent Nos. 8,890,954 and 8,896,694 relating to action sport video cameras or camcorders that are configured for remote image acquisition control and viewing.
The focus of the appeal was whether a Go Pro catalog, which disclosed a digital camera linked to a wireless viewfinder/controller that allows for a user preview before recording, was prior art. While the PTAB considered the catalog to be prior art in its decision instituting the IPRs, Contour argued that the catalog was not a printed publication, and the PTAB agreed, finding that that the GoPro had not shown that its Catalog was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art and exercising reasonable diligence could have located it.
rather a dealer show for action sports vehicles like motorcycles, motorbikes, ATVs, snowmobiles, and watercraft.
public accessibility in the context of materials distributed at conferences or meetings, but cited no case where the Federal Circuit held that the the expertise of the target audience was dispositive.
The Federal Circuit said that the fact that the dealer show was focused on action sports vehicles was not preclusive of persons ordinarily skilled in the art from attending to see what POV digital cameras were being advertised and displayed. The Federal Circuit noted that a primary purpose of POV cameras is for use on vehicles in extreme action environments, such as the ones advertised at the show. The Federal Circuit further noted that the The vendor list provided by Go Pro listed a number of vendors who likely sell, produce and/or have a professional interest in digital video cameras, and that the show was directed to action sports vehicles and accessories (emphasis in original).
’694 patent and claims 1, 2, and 11–30 of the ’954 patent were not unpatentable and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
In Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., [2018-1638, 2018-1639, 2018-1640, 2018-1641, 2018-1642, 2018-1643] (July 20, 2018), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s denial of the Tribe’s motion to terminate on the basis of sovereign immunity.
In an attempt to shelter its patents from IPR attack, Allegan assigned them to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, who Allergan hoped could assert sovereign immunity to post grant challenges.
could otherwise assert sovereign immunity, its use here is an impermissible attempt to “market an exception” from the law and non-Indian companies have no legitimate interest in renting tribal immunity to circumvent the law. Finally, Mylan argued that the assignment to the Tribe was a sham, and the Tribe waived sovereign immunity by suing on the patents.
PTO’s original grant of a public franchise.
that proceeding. In this way, IPR is more like cases in which an agency chooses whether to institute a proceeding on information supplied by a private party. According to FMC, immunity would not apply in such a proceeding.
The Federal Circuit added that the role of the parties in IPR suggests immunity does not apply in these proceedings. Once an IPR has been initiated, the Board may choose to continue review even if the petitioner chooses not to participate, which reinforces the view that IPR is an act by the agency in reconsidering its own grant of a public franchise.
similarities with the FRCP, the differences are substantial. Further a patent owner can seek to amend its patent claims during the proceedings, an option not available in civil litigation.
Because it concluded that tribal sovereign immunity cannot be asserted in IPR, the Federal Circuit did not reach the parties’ other arguments.

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