Source: https://marygsykes.com/2017/10/24/from-gg-illinois-forecloure-law-firms-write-a-proposal-to-the-ill-supreme-court-to-delete-almost-all-protections-for-mortgagors/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:46:15+00:00

Document:
The recommendations in this Memorandum are nearly laughable. Such as, providing an accounting in every case the judge can review is “unnecessary and burdensoe”. This is insane given the fact these docts are computer generated and should be posted, before, during and after the foreclosure to keep the banks honest. A link can be provided to the case number.
These proposals are particularly gut wrenching and these lawyers and firms should be completely ashamed of themselves, asking that nearly all protections for homeowners be removed.
GOLDBERG KOHN L . .
lenders, servicers, attorneys, the judicial system, and the future population of borrowers seeking to obtain or refinance home loans.
model foreclosure prove up affidavit.
use in default cases. The Foreclosure Firms request that the firms most actively engaged in prosecuting residential foreclosures participate in drafting any such model affidavit, and that once adopted, substantial compliance with the model affidavit by a plaintiff constitute a safe harbor that would immunize the affidavit from an attack on its form. This model affidavit, combined with a safe harbor, would provide due process protection for borrowers and reduce meritless litigation over the form of affidavits, thereby conserving the resources of the parties and the judicial system.
histories to prove up affidavits. The Foreclosure Firms submit that the extra burden of attaching detailed payment histories to affidavits in cases where payment application is not reasonably disputed does not provide a corresponding benefit to the borrower or the court.
and include allegations as to the amount of the current principal balance and the payment due date under the note. In addition, a copy of the note is always attached, which includes the payment terms and interest rate from which a mathematical calculation of interest can be made.
which are generally proved up by the attorneys themselves, and advances made by the client) are really simple math.
currently provided in support of foreclosure judgments. Notably, payment histories remain available not only in discovery, but at the borrower’s request. Without any systematic problem regarding a borrower’s access to payment histories, a rule that makes this production “automatic” is not sufficiently tailored to address a particular problem. It is those sorts of reflexive rules that should be avoided.
all endorsements and allonges, be attached to the foreclosure complaint.
service the loan, including the right to conduct a foreclosure, are typically held by different entities. This bifurcation represents a fundamental shift away from the model of mortgage finance common in earlier decades, and it has subjected the country’s mortgage recording systems to intense and unsettling pressures resulting from systems incapable of handling such a high volume of transactions. This pressure has been exacerbated by the frequent transfer of mortgage servicing rights, including the right (and obligation) to foreclose a mortgage. These changes ultimately led to the introduction of MERS, a private tracking system for transferring mortgage servicing rights among banks without recording any assignments in the public record.
enforce a mortgage. In some cases, where a servicer or loan originator is out of business, it may be impossible. This difficulty in documenting a chain of mortgage assignments, however, does not affect the borrower because it does not affect the right of the noteholder’s ability to designate anyone it wishes to foreclose the mortgage which secures that debt.
claim twice.” [Citation omitted.] Livonia Property Holdings, L.L.C. v. 12840-12976 Farmington Road Holdings, L.L.C., 717 F. Supp. 2d 724, 735-736 (E.D. Mich. 2010), cert. den. 131 S.Ct. 1696, 179 L.Ed.2d 645 (2011) (emphasis in original). In recent years, courts in jurisdictions all over the country have repeatedly rejected the purported invalidity of an assignment of mortgage as a basis for enjoining a foreclosure or awarding borrowers relief for a wrongful foreclosure. See, e.g., Lisa Bridge, supra; Livonia, supra; Wenzel v. Sand Canyon Comoration, 2012 WL 219371 (D. Mass.); Silving v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2012 WL 135989 (D. Ariz.); Martin v. GMAC Mortgage Com., 2011 WL 6002617 (D. Hawaii); Schieroni v. Deutsch Bank National Trust Company, 2011 WL 3652194 (S.D. Tex.); Edwards v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (In re Edwards), 2011 WL 6754073 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Wis.); Kriegel v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 2011 WL 4947398 (R.I. Super.); Correia v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 452 B.R. 319 (1st Cir. BAP 2011).
MERS. See Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. Inc. v. Barnes, 940 N.E.2d 118, 124 (1st Dist. 2007) (upholding MERS right to foreclose mortgage as designee of the noteholder); Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 481 (2011) (“If MERS indeed lacked authority to make the assignment, the true victim was not plaintiff but the original lender, which would have suffered the unauthorized loss of a $1 million promissory note.”); Mortgage Electronic Registration v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2007) (holding that MERS, acting for the real party in interest, may foreclose a mortgage in its own name).
presentation of documents establishing a sufficient chain of assignments leading to the plaintiff if, during a case, it becomes evident that there is a dispute among lenders and/or servicers as to whom the noteholder has authorized to foreclose the mortgage.
redemption period unless extended by direction of the plaintiff or by court order.
conducting foreclosure sales result in an increase in the number of vacant and sometimes unsecured properties throughout Illinois and the duration of the time in which they remain vacant and/or unsecured. This situation can result in community risk and property devaluation, and should be avoided if at all possible. Since these delays, where they exist, are a result of limited resources available to county sheriffs conducting these sales, the use of private selling officers in at least a portion of cases in counties currently requiring the use of the sheriff would assist in the reduction of these delays.
best practice by the Foreclosure Firms to send notice to all parties, whether in default or not, of judgment motions, sales, and sale confirmation hearings.
borrower was served with process and to place proof of this service in the court file.
expressly states that failure of the clerk to send the recommended notice will not be deemed to impact the validity of the foreclosure proceeding in any way, particularly because plaintiffs have already provided the type of notice described in paragraph. Many court clerks are currently understaffed and overburdened. The requirement that an additional notice be sent by the clerk, where not required by statute, may present difficult compliance issues for many clerks, particularly in higher volume circuits. The clerk’s failure to comply with the requirements should not adversely affect the plaintiff’s rights in any way.
rule or change in code provision makes clear that such appointments are not necessary where there is a surviving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety that now owns the fee simple (or remainderman in the rare case of a life estate) – even in cases where the surviving tenant did not sign the note. To appoint representatives in such cases would be counterproductive, as they would be representing persons who have no interest in the property, thereby creating needless increase in expense and waste of court resources.
record as being the same person as the one authorized to claim the surplus.
requirement gives preferential treatment to borrowers claiming a right to surplus over other parties such as junior lienholders or trustees of bankruptcy estates which may also have a claim to the surplus, but who would not receive the special notice.
The Foreclosure Firms oppose adoption of such a rule.
in the attorney-client privilege and the specific ethical rules which prohibit attorneys who are evidentiary witnesses in a matter from representing a party in that same matter. Such a rule would seek to govern the communication between an attorney and require an attorney to divulge in affidavit form material protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 20 I (b )(2) and Illinois Rule of Evidence 50 I.
(iii) application of the privilege would deny the opposing party access to information vital to its defense, the court should find that the asserting party has impliedly waived the privilege through its own affirmative conduct.
Federal Deposit Ins. Com. v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168 (D. Colo. 1991), citing Hearn, 68 F.R.D.
at 581. Some courts in Illinois have used or acknowledged the Hearn test to determine whether there has been an at issue waiver. See, e.g., Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations. Inc., 176 F.R.D. 269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“Hearn v. Rhay is the seminal case on “at issue” waiver”); Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co .. 579 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1991). However, some courts prefer the anticipatory waiver test according to which: a party waives the attorney-client privilege when she places the advice of counsel at issue by (i) asserting a claim or defense and (ii) then seeking to prove that claim or defense by disclosing or describing an attorney-client communication. 30 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. at 556-557. See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 268, 275-276 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (an Illinois diversity case applying the anticipatory waiver test); Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP, 251 F.R.D. 316, 324 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“[I]t is not sufficient that a party merely deny an allegation, or that the documents are relevant to the claim.”). Under either test, the proposed rule would waive attorney-client privilege. Applying the Hearn test to the proposed rule, it is clear that (i) plaintiffs initiation of a foreclosure proceeding would be an affirmative action; (ii) the affidavit would make protected information not only relevant to the case but necessary; and (iii) application of attorney-client privilege would prevent the defendant from information necessary to defend, thereby satisfying prongs (i), (ii), and (iii) of the test, respectively. Applying the anticipatory waiver test to the new rule, it is clear that (i) plaintiff is clearly asserting a claim that it is entitled to foreclose; and (ii) plaintiff is disclosing an attorney-client communication to prove that claim, thereby satisfying both prongs of the test.
remains unworkable. If the plaintiff retains its attorney-client privilege after filing the attorney affidavit, there is no way to verify the veracity of the affidavit or for the defendant to attack against the affidavit. Essentially, the affidavit allows the plaintiff to enter evidence, favorable to itself, of which the defendant has no ability to discover any facts to disprove. The defendant is put in the unenviable position of arguing the plaintiff did not act diligently, while having no defense to certain admitted evidence that the plaintiff did act diligently. Unless an “at issue” waiver results, the plaintiff is being given a new weapon; a result certainly at odds with the goal of the proposed rule.
The comments to this rule note that “Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.” The proposed rule would require attorneys to balance advocating for the plaintiff while potentially having to attest to facts adverse to the plaintiff. Furthermore, if the veracity of the affidavit is called into question, the only way to determine the truth would be to depose the attorney, thereby forcing him or her to act as a witness against his or her client. Such a situation is clearly in violation of Rule 3.7. Even worse, litigious foreclosure defense attorneys interested in delaying proceedings could seek to depose or obtain courtroom testimony from the attorneys executing such affidavits, potentially forcing their withdrawal from the case and depriving the plaintiffs of their attorney of choice, even though such depositions would have no probative value whatsoever.
Strawboard Co., 190 Ill. 268, 60 N.E. 518 (1901). The attorney cannot testify as to the client’s practice of the business record retention or to its accuracy. The attorney could only aver that he or she asked the client to verify that the figures provided were correct. Such an affidavit has little value added, as an attorney is already required to have a good faith basis for relying on the facts provided by the client under Rule 13 7.

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