Source: http://nevadalaw.info/2018/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:38:19+00:00

Document:
Statutes of limitation are designed to assure fairness to parties and prevent surprise lawsuits by determining the maximum time allowed after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. As a practical matter, statutes of limitation avoid fraud on the court by disallowing claims to linger “until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” In re Jim L. Shetakis Distrib. Co., 415 B.R. 791, 799 (D. Nev. 2009) aff’d, 401 F. App’x 249 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965) (as quoted in Oltman v. Holland America Line, Inc., 538 F.3d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 2008))). The appropriate accrual date after which a claim may not be filed is a question of law if the facts are uncontroverted. Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 277 P.3d 458, 463 (2012).
“The court looks with disfavor on motions to exceed page limits, so permission to do so will not be routinely granted.” LR 7-3(c).
[INSERT PARTY NAME] filed its [NAME OF MOTION] on [DATE] (Docket No. [NUMBER]). [INSERT PARTY NAME]’s [NAME OF MOTION] totals approximately [PAGES] pages.
[INSERT PARTY NAME] has made every effort to be both brief and complete in its reply memorandum, as required by Local Rule 7-4. Because of [REASONS JUSTIFYING THE NEED FOR A LENGTHY PLEADING], [INSERT PARTY NAME] respectfully submits that a presentation of all the relevant facts and legal arguments requires greater length than permitted in a standard-length reply memorandum. [INSERT FACTS AND REASONS FOR THE MOTION IN COMPLIANCE WITH LR 7-3(c)].
That this Court accept the [NAME OF MOTION] filed by [INSERT PARTY NAME] (Docket No. [NUMBER]), which is in excess of twenty (20) pages.
In Nevada, a claim for civil conspiracy requires: (1) two or more parties; (2) acting in concert; (3) with an intent to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another; and (4) damages. Consolidated Generator-Nevada Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 114 Nev. 1304, 1311, 917 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). When alleging civil conspiracy between corporations, one must plead and prove that agent(s) of each corporation involved acted outside their employment and personally became a conspirator.
Under the Intracorporate Conspiracy doctrine, members of a corporation, such as officers or employees, cannot be held to have conspired among themselves, because the corporation and its agents constitute a single actor for purposes of law. Therefore, the plurality of actors requirement needed to constitute a conspiracy is not satisfied. “Agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacity on behalf of the corporation not as individuals for their individual advantage.” Collins v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Association, 99 Nev. 284, 304, 662 P.2d 610, 622 (1983). “[I]n order to sustain a claim for civil conspiracy for agents of a corporation are involved, it is necessary to show that one or more of the agents acted outside of the scope of their employment to render them a separate “person” for purposes of the conspiracy.” Faulkner v. Arkansas Children’s Hospital, 69 S.W. 3d, 393, 407 (Ark. 2002). Thus, it is incumbent upon the Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts that corporations which are alleged to be agents of one another received “a benefit wholly separable from the more general and indirect corporate benefit always present under the circumstances surrounding virtually any alleged corporate conspiracy.” Seleman v. Am. Sports Underwriters Inc., 697, F. Supp. 225, 239 (W. D. VA 1988). See also Trau-Med of Am. Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 SW 3d 691, 704 (Tenn. 2002) (affirming dismissal of a conspiracy claim and noting “in this case, the plaintiff does not even intimate much less expressly allege in the complaint that the corporate agents involved in conspiratorial conduct were acting outside the scope of their employment or that they were pursuing their own personal objectives”).
The law in Nevada has consistently held that a superseding intervening cause is an interfering act that overcomes the original culpable act, and where the intervening act is an unforeseeable, independent, non-concurrent cause of the injury. Thomas v. Bokelman, 86 Nev. 10, 13, 462 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1970) (a negligence action will not stand when there is an intervening cause that in and of itself is “the natural and logical cause of the harm.”). In effect, the intervening cause must break the chain of causation.
Konig v. C.C.O. Ry., 36 Nev 181, 212, 135 P. 141, (1913).
Nevada law requires that counsel, before filing a motion regarding a discovery dispute, meet and confer in an attempt to resolve the matter without court intervention. This article discusses the requirements of that obligation, together with the mechanics of how the parties must be prove compliance with the requirement to the court.
(d) Discovery motions may not be filed unless an affidavit of moving counsel is attached thereto setting forth that after a discovery dispute conference or a good faith effort to confer, counsel have been unable to resolve the matter satisfactorily. A conference requires either a personal or telephone conference between or among counsel. Moving counsel must set forth in the affidavit what attempts to resolve the discovery dispute were made, what was resolved and what was not resolved, and the reasons therefor. If a personal or telephone conference was not possible, the affidavit shall set forth the reasons.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.