Source: https://openjurist.org/349/us/294
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:14:33+00:00

Document:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, Shawnee County, KANSAS, et al. Harry BRIGGS, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. R. W. ELLIOTT, et al. Dorothy E. DAVIS, et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA, et al. Spottswood Thomas BOLLING, et al., Petitioners, v. C. Melvin SHARPE, et al. Francis B. GEBHART, et al., Petitioners, v. Ethel Louise BELTON, et al.
Argued April 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1955.
Mr. Robert L. Carter, New York City, for appellants in No. 1.
Mr. Harold R. Fatzer, Topeka, Kan., for appellees in No. 1.
Messrs. Thurgood Marshall, New York City, and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Richmond, Va., for appellants in Nos. 2 and 3.
Messrs. S. E. Rogers, Summerton, S.C., and Robert McC. Figg, Jr., Charleston, S.C., for appellees in No. 2.
Messrs. Archibald G. Robertson, Richmond, Va., and J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Atty. Gen., for appellees in No. 3.
Messrs. George E. C. Hayes and James M. Nabrit, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioners in No. 4.
Mr. Milton D. Korman, Washington, D.C., for respondents in No. 4.
Mr. Joseph Donald Craven, Wilmington, Del., for petitioners in No. 5.
Mr. Louis L. Redding, Wilmington, Del., for respondents in No. 5.
Messrs. Richard W. Ervin and Ralph E. Odum, Tallahassee, Fla., for State of Florida, I. Beverly Lake, Raleigh, N.C., for State of North Carolina, Thomas J. Gentry, Little Rock, Ark., for State of Arkansas, Mac Q. Williamson, Oklahoma, City, Okl., for State of Oklahoma, C. Ferdinand Sybert, Ellicott City, Md., for State of Maryland, John Ben Shepperd and Burnell Waldrep, Austin, Tex., for State of Texas, Sol. Gen. Simon E. Sobeloff, Washington, D.C., for the United States, amici curiae.
These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions of that date,1 declaring the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, are incorporated herein by reference. All provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle. There remains for consideration the manner in which relief is to be accorded.
Because these cases arose under different local conditions and their disposition will involve a variety of local problems, we requested further argument on the question of relief.2 In view of the nationwide importance of the decision, we invited the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorneys General of all states requiring or permitting racial discrimination in public education to present their views on that question. The parties, the United States, and the States of Florida, North Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Texas filed briefs and participated in the oral argument.
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies4 and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.5 These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.
The judgments below, except that in the Delaware case, are accordingly reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases. The judgment in the Delaware case—ordering the immediate admission of the plaintiffs to schools previously attended only by white children—is affirmed on the basis of the principles stated in our May 17, 1954, opinion, but the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Delaware for such further proceedings as that Court may deem necessary in light of this opinion.
Judgments, except that in case No. 5, reversed and cases remanded with directions; judgment in case No. 5 affirmed and case remanded with directions.
347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884.
The cases coming to us from Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia were originally heard by three-judge District Courts convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2281, 2284. These cases will accordingly be remanded to those three-judge courts. See Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350, 72 S.Ct. 327, 96 L.Ed. 392.
See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239, 56 S.Ct. 204, 209, 80 L.Ed. 192.
See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329—330, 64 S.Ct. 587, 591, 592, 88 L.Ed. 754.

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