Source: http://www.touchngo.com/sp/html/sp-7219.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:46:10+00:00

Document:
Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Bethany Harbison, Judge.
Fairbanks,  for  Appellants/Cross-Appellees.                                  Michael  C.
court held that a valid easement was created but had been extinguished by prescription.
MS-851 - that contained an old gold dredge, which he turned into a tourist attraction.
Alaska Gold owned MS-1709, the property at the terminus of the reserved easement.
permission to use Alaska Gold's easement to access Gold Dredge 8.
2     The plant began operating in 1988.
Alice purchased the property from Alaska Gold.
Ellingsons' property with the Ellingsons' knowledge.
to Alice Ellingson after marrying Harold. Alice and Harold built the gold mine together.
parcel at the end of the easement crossing MS-1724.
visitors to view Gold Dredge 8 and learn about mining in the area.
the time that the Ellingsons owned MS-1724 and Alaska Gold owned MS-1709.
berm off the entrance to mines at the end of the season to comply with safety regulations.
through there," and it was never "absolutely blocked." Alice testified that a "substantial"
unreasonably interfered with a prospective dedication of the easement to the public."
Ellingsons had constructed various barriers that restricted public access to the easement.
These piles were created by material that was produced by the gold plant.
are findings of fact that we review for clear error.
08   (Alaska   2015)   (alteration   in   original)   (quoting   ConocoPhillips   Alaska,   Inc.   v.
Williams  Alaska  Petroleum.,  Inc.,  322  P.3d   114,   122  (Alaska  2014)).
7              Norken Corp. v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622, 626 (Alaska 1991).
clearly erroneous.  We review the application of law to facts de novo."
A.           The 1986 Deed Created An Easement Appurtenant.
Ellingson in 1986 created an easement appurtenant.
specify which property is benefited by the easement.
prescription presented mixed issues of law and fact).
(quoting 25 AM. J   UR. 2                  D  Easements and Licenses                        § 8 (2004)).
P.2d 769, 773 (Alaska 1977)).
was executed, in connection with the conduct of the parties after its execution.' "
an attempt to create an easement that was capable of being dedicated.
the deed ambiguous; rather, the use of the variant word is akin to a spelling mistake.
"would give no effect to the clause containing the doubtful word."
Smith, 216 P.3d at 529).
14           Estate of Smith, 216 P.3d at 529 (quoting Norken Corp., 823 P.2d at 629).
16           Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer , 136 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex.
1940) (quoting Baustic v. Phillips, 121 S.W. 629, 630 (Ky. 1909)).
17           Baustic, 121 S.W. at 630.
The deed is not ambiguous in this regard.
parcel, the servient estate, for the benefit of another parcel, the dominant estate."
18          Estate of Smith             , 216 P.3d at 530 (quoting                       Norken Corp.              , 823 P.2d at 626).
SERVITUDES  § 4.11 (A                      M. L    AW  INST . 2000)).
Licenses  §§ 8, 120 (2004)).
P.3d at 528 (quoting Norken Corp., 823 P.2d at 626).
conveyance'   to   discern   the   parties'  intent."
easement was intended to benefit another parcel of land or a person.
terminus of the easement corridor," MS-1709.  This finding is not clearly erroneous.
holding that the 1986 deed created a valid easement appurtenant on MS-1724.
25         See, e.g., SOP, Inc., 310 P.3d at 968-69.
the gold plant, and that it would not have been safe for him to do so.
26           Hansen v. Davis                  , 220 P.3d 911, 916 (Alaska 2009).
ERVITUDES § 4.9 (A                     M. L     AW  INST . 2000)).
examine because they occurred after the prescriptive period.
29              Hansen, 220 P.3d at 916 (citations omitted).
30              RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROPERTY: S                                                           ERVITUDES  § 7.7 (A                           M. L       AW  INST .
2000) (emphasis added), cited with approval in Hansen, 220 P.3d at 916.
31              Id.  § 7.7 cmt. b.
LICENSES IN LAND § 7:18 (2017).
33           Id.  § 10:25, cited with approval in Hansen, 220 P.3d at 916-17.
Allen Wolf eds. 2017) (emphasis added).
(referenced in § 7.7 cmt. a as explaining rationale behind prescription of easements).
late.  But this argument understates the "hardi[ness]"
that underlie prescription; it embraced them.
38              7 T    HOMPSON ON                    REAL  PROPERTY   § 60.08 (David A. Thompson ed., 2d ed.
servitudes" because they are harder to terminate).
partial extinguishment is the standard we set out in                                                                                                        Hansen .
2.	                 The gold plant partially extinguished the easement.
The gold plant did extinguish that part of the easement upon which it stood.
the gold plant was a permanent improvement.
and "building an addition to [a] deck" may not be in all circumstances, see Titcomb v.
extinguished because passage on foot was still possible).
easement area for a ten-year period by clear and convincing evidence.").
easily removed, it is generally not unreasonable."
easement was sufficient to terminate an easement and concluded it was not.
vehicles (often broken down) are the "vegetation" one would expect to find "growing"
43            Hansen, 220 P.3d at 917-18.
a   manner   that   obstructs   the   easement   does   not   meet   the   continuity requirement."
45          BRUCE  &  ELY,  supra  note  32,  §   10:25  (citations  omitted).
46          Hansen,  220  P.3d  at  917.
47          See  id.;  BRUCE  &  ELY,  supra  note  32,  §   10:25.
drove   in   the   easement   next   to   the   gold   plant.     This   testimony   is   uncontradicted.
Regardless,  an  easement  holder  does  not  have  to  use  an  easement  to  maintain  title  to  it.
question is whether Eagan could have used the easement if he had insisted on using it.
Eagan's use of the easement was unreasonably interfered with for the ten-year period.
49           BRUCE  &  ELY,  supra  note  32,  §   10:25.
by the regular rules of extinguishment; it is not a new doctrine.
an easement by prescription?                                                                                                                 Why or why not?
circumstances have courts applied this doctrine?
the standard set forth in Hansen should apply.
particular parts of the easement to demonstrate whether those parts were extinguished.
they argue that the superior court's factual findings were insufficient.
or sewer rock remained in place and obstructed the easement for a ten-year period.
plantwas                                         terminated and REMANDfor further proceedings consistent withthis opinion.
FABE, Chief Justice, with whom CARNEY, Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
NEW GROUNDS WITHOUT AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
in   the   trial   court,   nor   did   the   superior   court   address  the   question   in   its   ruling.
1                             220  P.3d  911,  915-16  (Alaska  2009).
of land could establish a self-executing grant of land from the federal government.
Neither party had raised this issue before the superior court.
3               Price v. Eastham                           , 75 P.3d 1051, 1056 (Alaska 2003) (quoting                                                                      Potter v.
Potter, 55 P.3d 726, 728 (Alaska 2002)).
Price, Godspeed "reasonably believed" that partial extinguishment "was not at issue"
nor did the superior court address the issue in its decision.
extinguishment doctrine is even recognized in this state.
the principles of procedural fairness in these circumstances.
11                      See id. at 1056.
discretion if doing so were to make different outcome-determinative facts relevant."
13            Frost v. Spencer                     , 218 P.3d 678, 682 (Alaska 2009);                                              see also Bruce L. v.
superior court decision that had relied on an issue not raised by the parties).
14            McCarrey v. Kaylor, 301 P.3d 559, 568 (Alaska 2013).
extinguishment theory here means the court is "applying an unanticipated body of law"
theory before the superior court, therefore, creates a procedural fairness problem.
evidence that [they] did present").
with the current or prospective use of the easement" (emphasis added)).
18                 Frost, 218 P.3d at 682.
SUPERIOR COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR.
land" and therefore we "remand[ed] for a determination of the scope of this easement"
rather than answering that question ourselves.                                                                                                                                                         Id.
fact-intensive, and the trial court is in the best position to address questions of fact."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Id.
a hearing on the quiet title action."                                                                                                                  Id.
20                          Hansen, 220 P.3d at 917.
under a partial extinguishment theory.
23        See  Op.  at  8  (citing  HP  Ltd.  P'ship,  270  P.3d  at  726).
24        See  Op.  at  8  (citing  HP  Ltd.  P'ship,  270  P.3d  at  726).
25        Hansen,  220  P.3d  at  917.
and expensive improvement" under Hansen .
28           Hansen, 220 P.3d at 917-18.
extinguishing that portion of the easement.
easement not covered by the gold plant was still extinguished under our                                                                                                                                                                 Hansen  test.
32                   See  Hansen,  220  P.3d  at  915.
he [or she], the owner, may take steps to vindicate his [or her] rights by legal action.' "
extensive activity will be required to demonstrate adversity."
other party's adverse use and did nothing to stop it.
34                 Id.   (first   alteration   in   original)   (footnote   omitted)   (quoting   Peters   v.
Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council                                                                            , 519 P.2d 826, 832 (Alaska 1974)).
35                 Id. (quoting 7 THOMPSON ON  REAL  PROPERTY   § 60.08(b)(7)(i) (David A.
not protective of their property rights."
equipment and rock piles that sometimes blocked large portions of the                                                                                                                         easement.
could not be moved "by hand."
place more emphasis on some of the evidence that [they] did present."
39                Frost  v.  Spencer,  218  P.3d  678,  682  (Alaska  2000).

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