Source: https://chestofbooks.com/business/law/Handbook-Law-Of-Contracts/Acknowledgment-And-New-Promise.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:09:09+00:00

Document:
Ordinarily the statute of limitations is held merely to bar the remedy, but not to extinguish the right, and therefore the right son v. Martz, 8 Watts (Pa.) 374, 34 Am. Dec. 474. See "Equity," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 67; Cent. Dig. §§ 191-196.
86 Williams v. Mitchell, 112 Mo. 300, 20 S. W. 647; Knight v. McKinney, 84 Me. 107, 24 Atl. 744; Wanmaker v. Van Buskirk, 1 N. J. Eq. 685, 23 Am. Dec. 748; Atkinson v. Dance, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 424, 30 Am. Dec. 422; Stover v. Duren, 3 Strob. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634; Walker v. Emerson, 20 Tex. 706, 73 Am. Dec. 207. See "Payment," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 66; Cent. Dig. §§ 176-188.
87 Anson, Cont (4th Ed.) 316; Llanelly Ry. & Dock Co. v. Railway Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 550, 567. See "Payment," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 66; Cent. Dig. §§ 176-188.
A debt barred by the statute may also be revived by a part payment. A payment on account of the principal, or a payment of interest on the debt, will take the contract out of the statute. It is provided by most, if not all, of the statutes requiring a new promise or acknowledgment to be in writing, and signed by the promisor or his agent, that nothing therein contained shall take away or lessen the effect of such part payments. The payment, to have the effect of reviving the debt, must be made with reference to the original debt, and in such a manner as to amount to an acknowledgment of it.90 Where a payment is made by a debtor kower v. Steel, 23 Or. 106, 31 Pac. 253. See "Limitation of Actions" Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 157; Cent. Dig. §§ 631-636.
88 Campell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209, 29 L. Ed. 483. Contra, Pierce v. Seymour, 52 Wis. 272, 9 N. W. 71, 38 Am. Rep. 737. See "Limitation of Actions:' Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 139; Cent. Dig. §§ 57//, 593, 621.
89 In re River Steamer Co., 6 Ch. App. 822, 828. Some courts have held that a mere acknowledgment of the debt as existing is sufficient to remove the bar, even though there be an express declaration of intention not to pay it; but most courts hold that this is not enough (regarding the statute as one of repose rather than one of presumption), but that the acknowledgment must be of such a nature as to show that the debtor intended to promise to pay. WARREN v. CLEVELAND, I11 Tenn. 174. 70 S. W. 910, 102 Am. St. Rep. 749, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 422. Riddel v. Brizzolara, 64 CaL 354, 30 Pac. 609; Phelan v. Fitzpatrick, 84 Wis. 240, 54 N. W. 014; Heany v. Schwartz, 155 Pa. 154, 25 Atl. 1078; Perry v. Chesley, 77 Me. 393; Hussey v. Kirkman, 95 N. C. 03. As to conditional promises, see Boynton v. Moul-ton, 159 Mass. 248, 34 N. E. 361. See "Limitation of Actions," Dec. Dig. (Key-Wo.) § V,5; Cent. Dig. §§ 584-592.
91 Blake v. Sawyer, 83 Me. 129, 21 Atl. 834, 12 L. R. A. 712, 23 Am. St. Rep. 762. See "Limitation of Actions," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 155; Cent. Dig. §§ 628-630.

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