Source: http://www.readbag.com/3dca-flcourts-opinions-3d08-1094
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:01:06+00:00

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An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Israel Reyes, Judge. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Nikole Hiciano, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Martin L. Roth, for appellee.
Before COPE, CORTIÑAS, and LAGOA, JJ. CORTIÑAS, J.
We review a trial court order suppressing evidence on the ground that the officer did not sign the affidavit in support of the search warrant. Although the affidavit was not signed, it is undisputed that probable cause was shown by the officer swearing to the allegations in the affidavit under oath before the judge, initialing each of the pages of the affidavit, and also initialing each of the three pages of the search warrant. Article I of the Florida Constitution sets forth a declaration of certain rights. Among these is the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. In order to protect this right, Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution provides that: No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.
The sentence, requiring this right to &quot;be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,&quot; was added in a 1982 amendment to Article I, Section 12. The Commentary to this section details the history of the 1982 amendment as follows: The exclusionary rule, which holds that evidence obtained in violation of a person's right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible as evidence, was recognized by Florida courts in 1927, Gildrie v. State, 113 So. 704 (Fla. 1927), and was first placed in the state constitution in its 1968 revision. From the mid-1970's to the early 1980's, federal courts began developing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule such that evidence could be admitted when an officer reasonably and in good faith believed the search or seizure was lawful. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). In a series of state cases, Florida courts rejected the opportunity to adopt a good faith exception, finding that the citizens of Florida provided themselves with greater protection from governmental intrusion than that afforded by the federal constitution. State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981); Hoberman v. State, 400 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1981). In response, the governor, attorney general, state prosecutors, and the law enforcement community supported a joint resolution in the 1982 Regular Session, which would have engrossed a good faith exception onto the constitutional exclusionary rule. Significant opposition precluded its passage in the regular session. In Special Session H, the &quot;conformity&quot; language that was ultimately adopted was presented as a compromise and was approved for ballot placement. Opponents filed suit to enjoin the amendment from appearing on the ballot, asserting that the ballot summary was misleading and did not fully advise the electors of its effect. Grose v. Firestone, 422 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1982). The Florida Supreme Court allowed the measure to remain on the ballot and it was adopted.
following the election. Art. XI, § 5(e), Fla. Const. Thus, Tolmie was decided prior to January 4, 1983, the effective date of the 1982 amendment, at a time that the Florida Constitution permitted Florida courts to more strictly interpret the Fourth Amendment and thus require that the failure to sign a search warrant affidavit was fatal. However, through a constitutional amendment approved by Florida voters, since January 4, 1983 to the present, that is no longer the law. Instead, as the Florida Supreme Court has held, &quot;the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution brings this state's search and seizure laws into conformity with all decisions of the United States Supreme Court rendered before and subsequent to the adoption of that amendment . . . .&quot; Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d at 992. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In construing the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has stated that &quot;courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.&quot; United States v.
give judicial officers the authority to ignore the &quot;teachings of the Court's cases&quot; and the clear dictate that &quot;[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.&quot; With respect to the issue of technical flaws in an affidavit, there is no doubt that the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly addressed and spoken on this issue. So clear are the Supreme Court's teachings on this issue that there is not a single Federal case that would support the dissent's view. Under our state constitution, we must adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court's teachings and dictates. The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to require that probable cause must be supported by oath or affirmation, and not necessarily by an affidavit. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 158 (1927); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. 448, 451 (1806); see also Christofferson v. Washington, 393 U.S. 1090, (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Language in these Supreme Court decisions has been relied upon to support the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not require sole reliance upon an affidavit, see United States ex rel. Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 516, 522 (3d Cir. 1973), and Federal Circuit Courts have held that &quot;[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require that the basis for probable cause be established in a written affidavit . . . .&quot; United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1994).
Mendoza, held that courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense manner, quoting from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Ventresca. Mendoza, 491 F.2d at 539. Similarly, in our case, the officer testified he swore to the allegations in the affidavit under oath before the judge and initialed each of the pages of the affidavit as well as initialed each of the three pages of the search warrant. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, it would be entirely unrealistic and lacking in common sense to find that the technical deficiency of failing to sign a document, the contents of which were sworn to under oath and initialed on each page, is fatal to the question of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
persuasive as to the matter before us.
Following Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution, we find that, in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, it was error for the trial court to suppress the evidence. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in finding the lack of signature on the affidavit to be a fatal error and suppressing the evidence as a result. Reversed and remanded. LAGOA, J., concurs.
construction of the statutory and constitutional provisions governing the issuance of search warrants, so the failure to sign is fatal to the warrant. The majority opinion errs in saying that the warrant can be upheld under the Comformity Clause of Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution. Absent a United States Supreme Court case squarely on point--and there is none--Florida law governs. I. This is a State appeal of an order suppressing evidence because the officer failed to sign the affidavit in support of the search warrant. A Miami-Dade County police detective drafted an affidavit in support of a search warrant to search a single family home and two additional structures which were on the same property. The affidavit set forth the reasons why the detective believed that marijuana was being grown at that location.
administered an oath and that she swore to the affidavit. acknowledged that she did not sign on the signature line.
jurisdictions, the applicable statutes or court rules may be more strict.&quot; Id. § 4.3(e), at 522 n.64. Florida is such a jurisdiction. Florida law requires that the application for the search warrant be signed. § 933.06, Fla. Stat. (2007) (&quot;sworn to and subscribed&quot;). Florida follows a rule of strict construction. Jackson, 99 So. at 549 (oath or affirmation &quot;must conform strictly to the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing their issue.&quot;). See also Smith, 207 S.W.3d at 791 n.20 (&quot;A few states have held that a signature is required; in these cases, though, either a statutory provision or the state constitution required the signature.&quot;). Given (a) the text of the Florida Constitution and statutory provisions, and (b) the rule of strict construction, suppression is required. III. The majority opinion reasons that reversal is required by the Conformity Clause contained in Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution. Respectfully, that is not correct. The majority opinion is inconsistent with Florida Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Conformity Clause.
The State argues that we should reverse under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), but that argument was not raised in the trial court and may not be considered here.

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