Source: https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/abstract/9781526105479/9781526105479.00021.xml
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:57:11+00:00

Document:
US regulation of network neutrality has a history dating back to 1999, and was introduced via merger conditions placed on major Internet Access Providers (IAPs). One of the several principles of network neutrality promulgated by both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and European Commission in 2009/10 is that only 'reasonable network management' is permitted, and that the end user be informed of this reasonableness via clear information. This chapter explores European legislative and regulatory responses to net neutrality in more detail. The European law proposed in 2013 was being rapidly overtaken by events in the Netherlands, France, Slovenia and Finland. The chapter explains that at European Member State level, only Netherlands, Finland and Slovenia had passed laws by the end of 2014. It summarises the outcome of 2014/15 legal manoeuvres in both the United States and European Union. In 2016 zero rating was becoming a common practice in the US.
There have been suggestions that we don’t need legislation because we haven’t had it. These are nonsense, because in fact we have had net neutrality in the past – it is only recently that real explicit threats have occurred.
We must begin with a quick note on terminology: we are concerned with access to the last mile, not generic services on the Internet. The network access providers are Internet Access Providers (IAPs), not Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Open Internet protection affects IAPs, not generic ISPs (though IAPs offer services too, and are thus both IAPs and ISPs). In this book I will refer specifically to IAPs (and much less often generic ISPs), though when I quote regulators such as CRTC (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), BEREC (Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications) and Ofcom (Office of Communications Regulation), I will not correct their use of the more generic term ‘ISP’ even though they are specifically referring to IAPs. So why do they use this term ‘ISP’?
The definition explicitly excludes ISSPs ‘which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks’. In the US, the access provider is an Internet Access Provider (IAP), and the service provider an Online Service Provider (OSP) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA),5 though a further distinction lies between access providers classified under Title I and Title II of the Telecommunications Act 1934.6 In Section 512 an OSP is defined as ‘an entity offering transmission, routing, or providing connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received’ or ‘a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities thereof’.7 This broad definition includes network services companies such as access providers, search engines, bulletin board system operators and even auction websites. It should be noted that most (if not all) access providers are also service providers, and in fact the largest IAPs are also amongst the largest service providers.
Net neutrality was regulated narrowly in the United States, Canada and Europe in 2009 (the latter via a Declaration and amendments to the 2002 Electronic Communications Package). My 2010 book analysed developments to that 2009 settlement, and detailed US regulation by the FCC (though not its eventual but predictable demise in the 2014 District of Columbia Appeals Court decision in Verizon v. FCC). I also critically assessed the 2009 European amendments, and gave (accurate) predictions for their failure in practice. I summarise that long development in the first part of this chapter. Development of European legal implementation of the network neutrality principles has been slow.8 I explain in the second part of this chapter that, at European Member State level, only Netherlands, Finland and Slovenia had passed laws by the end of 2014. I summarise the outcome of 2014/15 legal manoeuvres in both the United States and European Union. Chapter 3 considers Specialised Services in both areas, and then Chapter 4 examines European law in minute detail. Note that as this book is written with Europe as the focus, US regulation is described more briefly.
In Madison River,22 the FCC enforced these policy principles. Madison River is a small consumer IAP and telephone company, not a large national carrier, which was ordered by the FCC to stop blocking rival VoIP services. Madison River’s abuse of its access monopoly was incontrovertible; the vertical integration of the IAP with its voice telephone service meant it had obvious incentives to block its competitor VoIP services, and the practice was intended to degrade its customers’ Internet access. It was an example of negative network neutrality: customers signed up for broadband service with the IAP, but it chose to degrade that service in the interest of preserving its monopoly in telephone service.
The 2007 merger of AT&T and BellSouth involved both parties assuaging net neutrality concerns by various commitments not to block other companies’ applications directed to their users.23 The FCC then made a major intervention with its 2008 Order against Comcast, a major cable broadband IAP.24 Comcast’s deposition to the FCC stated that it began throttling P2P file-sharing application BitTorrent from May 2005 until 2007, using Sandvine DPI technology. The FCC ruling against Comcast’s attempts to stop P2P by sending phantom reset packets to customers reflects another ‘easy’ case of abuse of customers, like the VoIP blocking in Madison River in 2005.25 Table 2 shows the most important regulatory developments since 2005 in three overlapping phases: 2005–10; 2009–14 and 2014–16.
aAn excellent narrative account of the policy and judicial history can be found in Feld (2015).
bFCC, Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 2008.
cFCC, Report and Order, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, 2009.
dFCC, Notice of proposed rulemaking, 2014.
In 2014 the FCC revisited network neutrality in view of the loss of the court case over the 2010 Open Internet Order,30 resulting in an inevitable further legal challenge in 2016. It appears unlikely that general net neutrality (as opposed to specific merger) conditions can be made that can survive court challenge before the end of the Obama presidency in 2017.
This means IAPs can deploy to prevent behavioural advertising by third parties, but not to enhance that advertising in a discriminatory fashion themselves, which we examine in Chapter 5 in the European case, and which is the subject of regulatory proceedings to apply s.222 Telecommunications Act 1934 in the United States. Denial of Service (DoS) is a technique for damaging websites via a flood of traffic that causes congestion. The FCC made clear that it is intended to prohibit all non-critical traffic management, though noting that technologies will differ in criticality as between co-axial cable, copper telecoms, fibre broadband and wireless systems: ‘We believe that a bright-line rule against discrimination, subject to reasonable network management and enumerated exceptions, may better fit the unique characteristics of the Internet [than a less clear rule].’33 It was, however, less tightly drawn than the 2005 Order’s language of ‘narrowly drawn’ and ‘critically important’, which in 2009 it described as ‘unnecessarily restrictive’.
The 26 February 2015 Open Internet Order applied from 12 June 2015 and promised to enforce net neutrality.36 The FCC claimed that the Order offered three ‘Bright Line Rules’, as already discussed in the Introduction.
The FCC announced that it would be asking companies to respond by 15 January 2016 to such complaints, including not just those about T-Mobile and AT&T’s free mobile data, but others, such as Comcast, who claimed their Stream TV video offer was a Specialised Service, with an expectation that an investigation would be opened in February.40 Such services are considered in Chapter 3.
US regulation of net neutrality remained in a legal no man’s land in 2016.
The Commission attaches high importance to preserving the open and neutral character of the Internet, taking full account of the will of the co-legislators now to enshrine net neutrality as a policy objective and regulatory principle to be promoted by national regulatory authorities(1) alongside the strengthening of related transparency requirements(2) and the creation of safeguard powers for national regulatory authorities to prevent the degradation of services and the hindering or slowing down of traffic over public networks.(3) The Commission will monitor closely the implementation of these provisions in the Member States, introducing a particular focus on how the ‘net freedoms’ of European citizens are being safeguarded in its annual Progress Report to the European Parliament and the Council. In the meantime, the Commission will monitor the impact of market and technological developments on ‘net freedoms’ reporting to the European Parliament and Council before the end of 2010 on whether additional guidance is required, and will invoke its existing competition law powers to deal with any anti-competitive practices that may emerge.
(1) Article 8(4)(g) Framework Directive.
(2) Articles 20(1)(b) and 21(3)(c) and (d) of the Universal Service Directive.
(34) A competitive market should ensure that end-users enjoy the QoS they require, but in particular cases it may be necessary to ensure that public communications networks attain minimum quality levels so as to prevent degradation of service, the blocking of access and the slowing of traffic over networks.
In order to meet QoS requirements, operators may use procedures to measure and shape traffic on a network link so as to avoid filling the link to capacity or overfilling the link, which would result in network congestion and poor performance.
Those procedures should be subject to scrutiny by NRAs [National Regulatory Authorities] … in particular by addressing discriminatory behaviour, in order to ensure that they do not restrict competition.
If appropriate, NRAs may also impose minimum QoS requirements on undertakings to ensure that services and applications dependent on the network are delivered at a minimum quality standard, subject to examination by the Commission.
NRAs should be empowered to take action to address degradation of service, including the hindering or slowing down of traffic, to the detriment of consumers.
Member States shall ensure that NRAs are, after taking account of the views of interested parties, able to require networks and/or services to publish comparable, adequate and up-to-date information for end-users on the quality of their services … That information shall, on request, be supplied to the NRA in advance of its publication.
NRAs may specify, inter alia, the quality of service parameters to be measured and the content, form and manner of the information to be published, including possible quality certification mechanisms, in order to ensure that end-users … have access to comprehensive, comparable, reliable and user-friendly information.
In order to prevent the degradation of service and the hindering or slowing down of traffic over networks, Member States shall ensure that NRAs are able to set minimum quality of service requirements on an undertaking or undertakings providing public communications networks.
NRAs shall provide the Commission … with a summary of the grounds for action, the envisaged requirements and the proposed course of action. This information shall also be made available to [BEREC]. The Commission may … make comments or recommendations … NRAs shall take the utmost account of the Commission’s comments or recommendations when deciding on the requirements.
In December 2011 BEREC published to member NRAs its detailed guidelines on transparency and QoS,69 including for instance Network Performance (what IAP monitoring is required for effective detection of discrimination).70 NRAs have to implement net neutrality in 2014 with such detailed guidance. However, on transparency, ‘BEREC states that probably no single method will be sufficient’71 and points out the limited role of NRAs. Governments’ consumer and information commission bodies are also likely to play a key role.
Furthermore, the new wider scope for solving interoperability disputes could be used in France, which is explored in the following section.
One of the several principles of network neutrality promulgated by both the FCC and European Commission in 2009/10 is that only ‘reasonable network management’ is permitted, and that the end user be informed of this reasonableness via clear information. Both the FCC in the US and the European Commission have relied on non-binding declarations to make clear their intention to regulate the ‘reasonableness’ of traffic management practices. Little was done to define reasonableness and transparency by the European Commission prior to the implementation deadline. This has led to extensive and prolonged criticism by the European consumers’ organisation, and a substantial package of measurement, consumer empowerment and regulation for greater transparency and consumer rights in the proposed reforms (discussed below).
The 28 Member States, the European Economic Area members and the 47 members of the Council of Europe (CoE) must also conform to the human rights law of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR).74 This is supplemented in the European Union by legal instruments on data protection which are implemented using both the decisions of national and European courts,75 and taking account of the advice of the group of European Union privacy commissioners. In 2011 the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) expressed his concern that traffic management would result in exposure of users’ personal data including IP addresses, repeating these concerns in November 2013.76 The CoE also issues various soft law instruments to guide member states in observance of citizens’ rights to privacy and free expression.77 In 2016, conveniently just after the publication of the European Union Regulation on the Open Internet, the Committee of Ministers of the 47 CoE Member States issued their own Declaration,78 a soft law instrument which Member States are expected to follow but which has no binding force. It appeared equally as full of exceptions as Regulation 2015/2120, at the time of writing. Telecommunications regulators are aware that net neutrality is a more important issue than they are equipped to explore, as the technologies at stake are technologies of censorship. Private Internet censorship, consistent with Article 10(2) ECHR, may only be acceptable in limited circumstances. Note that the introduction of network neutrality rules into European law was under the rubric of consumer information safeguards and privacy regulation, not competition policy.
Neutrality was defined as excluding zero rating in 2014, in order to ensure that IAPs did not attempt to introduce such a practice: ‘zero-rating lead to selected traffic from the Internet service provider itself or affiliated providers being favoured above other traffic. And this is exactly the kind of situation net neutrality aims to avoid.’86 Norway is unique in that its co-regulatory net neutrality approach was agreed prior to other European nations, yet remains in place unchallenged by affected companies (although Telenor actively zero rates in Asian nations such as Myanmar and Bangladesh). It may therefore prove an exception to the general rule of litigious companies and captured regulators. Note that Norway practises an advanced form of Scandinavian social democracy, supported by strong and independent bureaucracy and government, a social compact between companies and society, and economic growth fuelled by North Sea oil wealth. It is an atypical example.
In mid-June 2011 the Netherlands moved to implement the powers to require Quality of Service guarantees without discrimination.87 Netherlands network neutrality regulation was voted on by its Senate on 6 March 2012,88 which made it the first European nation to formally introduce mandated network neutrality. Implementation of the law was delayed until spring 2013 by the need for secondary legislation from the ministry mandating the regulator to implement the law, and the regulator was merged into the competition authority in April 2013, delaying implementation by over two years.89 By late 2014 it was issuing regulatory decisions to enforce net neutrality and prevent discrimination.
Slovenia’s law makes clear that these must be temporary fixes: ‘proportionate, non-discriminatory and time limited and applied only to the extent necessary’. They both prohibit ‘limited Internet offers’ which block certain traffic, for instance zero rating by mobile providers, as the Netherlands law commands IAPs: ‘do not make the price of the rates for Internet access services dependent on the services and applications which are offered or used via these services.’ The 2015 European Regulation adopts less clear language on what is ‘reasonable’, as we will see in Chapter 4.
The practice of zero rating was outlawed by the Netherlands in its 2015 Guidelines clarifying application of its 2012 net neutrality law.94 The four issues dealt with by the Netherlands regulator once its net neutrality law came into effect in 2013 have caused van Eijk to caution that ‘hard cases make bad laws’, including for zero rating: ‘the new net neutrality rules … led to a new subscription structure, with a substantially increased emphasis on data traffic. Data bundles are priced more specifically, and existing packages with unlimited data access have been replaced by packages with a specific size (data caps) and specific speeds.’95 He cautions that ‘it is too early to tell whether net neutrality has had an effect on the overall costs for mobile broadband’. The new Netherlands rules in practice only affect mobile IAPs: ‘The new neutrality rules had no effect on the fixed market.’ He explains: ‘In two cases, the Authority investigated the bundling of data packages with free services (i.e. a mobile subscription with ‘free’ access to Spotify). To deal with these cases, a new guideline has been drafted by the ministry involved.’96 This clarifies that zero rating is illegal in the Netherlands, though it may not be a ruling that is compatible with the new European law.
While the ZEKOM law dates to the start of 2013, its regulation by AKOS was slow to arrive, with the main four rulings – those of 24 January and 20 February 2015 – against zero rating. AKOS confounded its critics with a strong zero-rating decision when forced to investigate by the Electronic Communications Council (SEK), which filed a complaint in July 2014 alleging Telekom Slovenije violated net neutrality with zero-rated products. From 2013 Telekom Slovenije provided free data for video channel HBO and UEFA Champions League football, then later the music streaming service Deezer. AKOS also found against Si.mobil (the largest mobile IAP) for zero rating cloud storage service Hanger Mapa. Telekom Slovenije and Si.mobil were instructed to stop zero rating. In the second pair of cases, bans were imposed against a zero-rated mobile TV service and web portal provided by AMIS (Mobia TV) and Tušmobil (Tuškamra), respectively. These were the only rulings against all major IAPs in Slovenia, all of whom had zero-rated affiliated content, and were given 60 days to comply. The issue was fought for by AKOS against substantial industry lobbying and the huge asymmetry in personnel between the IAPs and the very small regulator.
A remaining issue is that football and cloud storage on Telecom Slovenije remains zero rated, though this practice was stopped with HBO, whereas AMIS and Si.mobil were banned from video and cloud zero rating. The importance of Champions League football to many users means it may be politically impossible to deprive viewers of that stream by capping downloads in Slovenia. As a result of these bans, ‘Telekom Slovenije and Si.mobile have both come up with special offers and packages with larger data caps or inexpensive data cap options’99 to expand the cap, presumably to try to include their formerly zero-rated services.
In 2010 French regulator ARCEP released a ‘10 point’ set of principles for net neutrality,101 having consulted extensively over an entire year on how to implement the 2009 framework on net neutrality.102 ARCEP updated their ‘10 points’ in a report to the French parliament in September 2012, which concluded that competition and transparency was insufficient to deal with potential long-term detriments to consumers from anti-neutrality behaviours.103 It concluded that further legislation of the type passed in the Netherlands and Slovenia would be required in order to stop blocking and throttling, especially of VoIP over mobile networks, but that this was of course within parliament’s competence.
The decision to uphold the information-gathering demands of ARCEP means that the French regulator was able to gather more information on the traffic management practices of Tier 1 IAPs and CDNs such as Google than any other national regulator, including those outside the European Union.110 Arguably, it also means that ARCEP will be placed in the best position in Europe to assess the state of competition in the backbone IP interconnect market.
While both European and United States legislation and regulation affecting network neutrality were in peril of failing in 2014, the adoption of regulation and legislation in both regions in 2015 suggested that net neutrality was a permanent feature of the Internet law landscape. The European law proposed in 2013 was being rapidly overtaken by events in the Netherlands, France, Slovenia and Finland (see Introduction).
Net neutrality discourse has seen a sea-change in terminology since 2010, with governments keen to term the debate as being about ‘the Open Internet’, while telecoms companies and the European Commissioner,111 who were firmly opposed to net neutrality in 2010, claimed in a Janus-faced manner to favour that term, as redefined and watered down to allow Specialised Service loopholes. These will be explored in Chapter 3, but first we turn to the reasons why competition is not the solution to net neutrality in Chapter 2.
2 Directive 2000/31/EC, Art. 2(a), reiterating Art. 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC, as amended by Art. 1(2)(a) and Annex V of Directive 98/48/EC.
3 See Directive 2010/13/EU, Art. 1(a)(i) and Art. 2.
4 Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), Art. 2(c).
5 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA) 1998, which amended the 1976 Copyright Act, passed as a part of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and referred to as the ‘Safe Harbor’ provision because it added Section 512 to Title 17 of the United States Code.
6 47 USC §201(a) and (b). See Chapter 5.
9 Lemley and Lessig (2000). In Europe, see Marsden (1999) at Section 5.1.
12 FCC, Report and Order Preserving the Open Internet, 2010.
13 See Kang and Tsukayama (2011).
14 Verizon v. Federal Communications Commission 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 11–1355.
15 FCC, Internet Policy Statement 05–151, 2005; FCC, Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, DA 05–543, 2005.
16 Open Internet Advisory Committee (2013a), p. 13.
18 Communications Act of 1934 as amended by Communications (Deregulatory) Act of 1996, 47 USC.
19 Candeub and McCartney (2012).
21 FCC, Internet Policy Statement 05–151, 2005.
22 FCC, Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, DA 05–543, 2005.
23 FCC, In AT&T Inc and BellSouth Corp, 2007.
24 FCC, In AT&T Inc and BellSouth Corp, 2007. FCC, In AT&T Inc and BellSouth Corp, 2008.
26 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009.
27 FCC, Report and Order, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, 2009, especially footnotes 62–63.
28 FCC, Report and Order Preserving the Open Internet, 2010.
30 Verizon v. Federal Communications Commission 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 11–1355, 14 January.
31 Karpinski (2009), p. 47.
32 Broadband Initiatives Program (2009).
33 FCC, Report and Order, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, 2009.
34 Copps, M., quoted in FCC, Report and Order, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, 2009 at 94–5.
35 Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group (2011).
36 FCC, Open Internet Order, 2015.
41 National Cable & Telecommunications Association et al. v. Brand X Internet Services et al. (2005) 545 U.S. at 1013–1014; see also Frieden (2006).
44 Cooper and Powell (2011).
46 Leading to a significant emphasis in EC SEC(2007) 1472, pp. 90–102.
47 Directive 2009/136/EC (Citizens’ Rights Directive) and Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive).
48 Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Diective).
49 Directive 2009/136/EC (Citizens’ Rights Directive), Recital 34.
50 COM(2010) 253, p. 56.
51 BEREC, BoR (10) 42.
52 Swedish Post and Telecom Agency (2009).
53 Ofcom, Traffic Management and net neutrality, 2010.
57 Privacy Commissioner of Canada (2009).
58 See Norwegian Communications Authority, Net neutrality guidelines, 2013.
59 FCC, Report and Order, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, 2009.
61 See Directive 95/46/EC, Directive 2002/58/EC (E-Privacy Directive), Directive 2006/24/EC (Data Retention Directive).
62 Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive).
64 See generally BEREC Net Neutrality Expert Working Group, available at http://berec.europa.eu/eng/about_berec/working_groups/net_neutrality_expert_working_group_/282-net-neutrality-expert-working-group.
65 BEREC, BoR (10) 42.
69 BEREC, BoR (11) 53 and BoR (11) 67.
70 See BEREC, BoR 53 (11), p. 3.
71 See BEREC, BoR 67 (11), p. 5.
72 BEREC, BoR (11) 53.
73 BEREC, BoR (12) 132, p. 56, para. 265.
74 See Koops and Sluijs (2012); Sluijs (2012).
75 See Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio AB and others v. Perfect Communication Sweden AB.
76 EDPS, Opinion on net neutrality, 2011; EDPS, Opinion on the Proposal for a Regulation to achive a Connected Continent, 2013.
77 See Council of Europe (2010) Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on network neutrality adopted 29/9/2010: 1094th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
78 Council of Europe (2016).
79 The Norwegian guidelines are available publicly, unchanged since 2009 (Norwegian Communications Authority, Net neutrality guidelines, 2013).
80 In addition to semi-regular (annual) meetings with the regulator in Oslo, Dublin, Edinburgh, Brussels and Barcelona, I am grateful to representatives of the Norwegian consumer council, Opera software and Telenor for their comments. In Oslo, I thank in particular Professor Lee Bygrave of the University of Oslo for hosting the various meetings of the iGov and iGov2 projects, to which he invited me to meet regulators and ministry officials.
83 Email to author from Frode Sørensen, 23 April 2015, on file with the author.
87 Bits of Freedom (2015).
88 Article 7.4a (3) of the Netherlands Telecommunications Act 2012.
89 From 1 April 2013, OPTA (Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit/Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority) merged with the Competition and Consumer Authorities into the ACM (Autoriteit Consument en Markten/Authority for Consumers and Markets). In 2012–14 I conducted interviews in the Netherlands with Robert Stil and Mark de Hek of ACM, Professor Nico van Eijk and Mariejte Schaake MEP, and had many conversations with researchers at IVIR, Amsterdam, Bits of Freedom and Oxford researcher Ben Zevenbergen. My former co-blogger Dr Jasper Sluijs was also a source of informed comment.
90 Slovenia, Law on Electronic Communications, No. 003-02-10/2012-32, 20 December 2012, Article 203(4). A helpful translation of key aspects is available at https://wlan-si.net/en/blog/2013/06/16/net-neutrality-in-slovenia/ (Accessed 24 September 2016).
91 The author has conducted personal interviews with the relevant national experts in April 2013 (Netherlands) and June 2013 (Slovenia), as well as the Minister responsible in Slovenia (August 2013) and consumer representatives (June 2013). More such research with operators and consumer groups is needed.
92 Netherlands Telecommunications Act 2012, official translation by the Dutch government. Netherlands regulators were not required to implement net neutrality until summer 2013, a deadline delayed by the need for the Ministry to issue secondary legislation and guidance to the regulator on the form that such implementation should take. It is therefore too soon to draw firm conclusions about the efficacy of the Netherlands law.
93 Slovenian Law on Electronic Communications, No. 003-02-10/2012-32, 20 December 2012, Article 203(4).
97 Turk (2015). I declare an interest as co-author.
102 See further Curien and Maxwell (2010) and Sieradzki and Maxwell (2008).
105 Autorité de la concurrence (2012).
107 France, Conseil d’Etat, Decision No. 360397/360398 of 10 July 2013.
111 See my comments at 31:00 on Commissioner Kroes in Marsden, Chris (2013b).

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