Source: http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/53/106
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:07:55+00:00

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Abstract: The German Romantic Friedrich Hölderlin developed a unique perspective on the relationship between humankind and the rest of nature. He believed that humanity has a positive role to play in cosmic evolution, and that modernity is the crucial stage in fulfilling this role. In this paper I will be arguing for a reinterpretation of his ideas regarding the position of humankind in cosmic evolution, and for an application of these ideas to the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity. This reinterpretation is significant because it entails an inversion of the conventional notion of causality in the ‘environmental crisis’; instead of humans ‘harming’ nature, in the reinterpretation it is nature that causes human suffering.
Keywords: Human Nature, Organismic Evolution, Fate, Culture, Technology, Modernity, Environmental Crisis, Human Suffering, Anthropocentricism.
Friedrich Hölderlin, one of the German Romantics, developed a distinctive viewpoint on the relationship between humankind and the rest of nature. His ideas are of particular interest because he yearned for an end to human suffering, but was also firmly convinced that humankind was inevitably destined to be separated from nature, and thereby destined to endure suffering. Hölderlin envisioned a positive role for humanity in cosmic evolution, a role which has significant implications for both human nature and cultural evolution. In this paper I will be outlining Hölderlin’s ideas, and arguing for an application of them to the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity. Hölderlin’s conception of the human-nature relationship as part of an unfolding process of cosmological change seems to be of great relevance today, an age that is characterized by belief in the meaninglessness of human existence, and by concern about the way that we have altered the pre-human conditions of the Earth. Hölderlin’s views provide a unique perspective on modernity that is worthy of serious consideration.
I start by outlining Hölderlin’s views on the role of humankind in universal evolution. I then review the secondary literature on Hölderlin that relates to these ideas. I proceed to argue that Hölderlin’s philosophy is applicable to, and gives a unique perspective on, the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity. I argue that the existing secondary literature on Hölderlin has not recognized this, and that a reinterpretation of the role of humanity in Hölderlin’s philosophy of cosmic evolution is therefore required. My central claim is that for Hölderlin, modernity and the related notion of the contemporary ‘environmental crisis’ is a necessary stage of cosmic evolution, and thus that it is far from a ‘crisis’. It is rather a necessary stage of disharmony that will inevitably be followed by a re-conquered harmony. I will argue that for Hölderlin this disharmony is characterized by the environmental changes that are resultant from the development of technology.
The division means that human beings are not capable of actions that are independent of nature; Hölderlin states that, “all the streams of human activity have their source in nature.” It is revealing to compare this claim with the words of Hölderlin’s character Hyperion, “What is man? – so I might begin; how does it happen that the world contains such a thing, which ferments like a chaos or moulders like a rotten tree, and never grows to ripeness? How can Nature tolerate this sour grape among her sweet clusters?” For Hölderlin, man is the ‘violent’ being, whose coming into existence in opposition to the rest of nature was initiated by nature.
Hölderlin sees this opposition between man and the rest of nature as culminating in modernity – an era he that he claims is characterised by the absence of the gods. In Brot und Wein Hölderlin writes, “Though the gods are living, Over our heads they live, up in a different world…Little they seem to care whether we live or do not.” A key question for Hölderlin is how we deal with this separation. He envisions two possibilities – the ‘Greek’ response which is to dissolve the self and die, and the ‘Hesperian’ response of a living death.
In this section I set out my view of Hölderlin’s conception of fate – that all human actions are part of the evolution of nature towards perfection. I do this by reviewing the existing scholarly literature on Hölderlin and showing that whilst these interpretations all recognise parts of Hölderlin’s conception of fate that they do not capture the whole of it. I start with interpretations of human nature, move on to cosmic processes, and finally consider the role of modernity within these processes.
So Hölderlin sees human nature, economic production and even war as parts of a broader cosmic evolutionary process; the universe as a whole is seen as evolving to perfection. There will inevitably be aspects of this evolution that from a narrow perspective could be viewed as ‘less than perfect’. These negative aspects of the evolutionary process – from war, to the presence of evil in its entirety – have to be seen as inescapable parts of the whole process.
The key point is that for Hölderlin the cosmic evolutionary process ends in perfection. Thus, Ronald Peacock argues that, “the division produced by conflict is followed by a re-conquered harmony.” Similarly, Anselm Haverkamp argues that an interpretation of the poems Andenken and Mnemosyne is the expression, ‘where danger threatens, salvation also grows.’ Whilst, Martin Heidegger translates the opening lines of Patmos as, “But where danger is, grows the saving power also.” Hölderlin’s view is clearly that from a narrow and short-term perspective danger and conflict are often the norm, but that these things actually play a part in bringing about a greater harmony in the future. In the long-term they are all part of the evolution of the whole universe to perfection.
Cosmic evolution is thus one long process of disharmonies and inevitably following harmonies. Peacock argues that Hölderlin’s vision is of a, “harmonised process of life which comprises within itself the rhythmic movement from chaos to form and back again, and an emotional experience of this which in the sphere of nature knows only the one rapture, but in the human sphere suffering and joy.” It is revealing that this interpretation sees ‘violent’ humans as suffering, whilst nature is purely rapturous. This clearly sheds light on the question posed by Hölderlin’s character Hyperion: “How can Nature tolerate this sour grape among her sweet clusters?” The answer seems to be that human ‘violence’ enables nature to be rapturous. As part of this rapture humans experience suffering.
The absence of the gods in modernity is deeply related to the contemporary danger that exists in modernity. It should be remembered that this danger cannot be a cause for concern for Hölderlin – as all dangers are inevitably followed by regained harmonies. Nevertheless, Heidegger attempts to identify the exact danger that Hölderlin believed is present in modernity. Heidegger claims that, “the essence of technology, enframing, is the extreme danger.” It must follow that for Heidegger, “precisely the essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of the saving power.” He sees this as occurring when the essential unfolding of technology gives rise to the possibility of opening up a “free relation” with technology which is inclusive of non-instrumental possibilities.
Following the inevitable successful accomplishment of the “work” of Western civilization, the great Spirit will disclose a Time-Image which will, “be a comprehensive depiction of the historical process and its triumphant result.” Unger argues that, “the Image shows that there is an alliance between the Spirit of history and the elemental divine presences of nature – for the natural elements with which man has always worked have played integral and essential parts in man’s history.” The triumphant result of the actions of humankind in modernity is clearly an example of a re-conquered harmony that follows division.
In Unger’s interpretation of Friedensfeier we have a picture of modernity in which humans are carrying out “work” under a “law of destiny”. The crucial factor is that humanity is ignorant that it is working under a “law of destiny” in modernity, until modernity has ended. It is then that through the Time-Image the great Spirit reveals the successful outcome of modernity, and the nature and value of the accomplished “work”. This is a prime example of a short-term and narrow perspective entailing the perception of a lack of destiny and of needless suffering, whilst in the longer-term the same events are seen to be an inevitable part of a broader positive outcome – the evolution of the universe to perfection.
This difference of perspectives can explain an apparent contradiction in the literature between Unger’s interpretation of Friedensfeier, and Schmidt’s analysis of Hölderlin’s 1801 letter to Bohlendorff. This letter was written only one year before Friedensfeier and Schmidt claims that in it Hölderlin’s position is, “that the peculiar flow of modernity is the lack of destiny.” The apparently contradictory views of Unger and Schmidt can be reconciled through recalling Peacock’s interpretation that, “a godless age is part of a divine mystery, it is as necessary as day, ordained by a higher power,” and comparing it to Unger’s claim that men are blind to the point of the “work” that they have been carrying out until the “storm” of Western civilization has passed.
The comparison reveals that the “law of destiny” applies to the activities of humanity as a collective in Western history, activities that are ordained by a higher power for a specific purpose. In contrast, the “lack of destiny” applies to individual human beings. This difference arises because individual humans are unaware that their actions are part of an inevitably unfolding cosmic plan, it is only the fruition of the plan than enables realization. Instead, humans believe that they have free will and live in a meaningless age. Therefore, modernity can at one and the same time be characterized as both a period governed by a “law of destiny” and a period constituted by a “lack of destiny”. The difference is purely one of perspective.
This view is concordant with the “lack of destiny” perspective. However, when the “law of destiny” is taken into account, then the hidden meaning is revealed. Furthermore, the whole notion of the attitudes of individual humans then becomes irrelevant. It seems that there cannot be such a thing as a truly anthropocentric attitude, because all attitudes originate from nature, and they all lead to actions which fulfil the “law of destiny”. It may seem that our attitudes to nature are of importance, but this is because we believe in a “lack of destiny”, and are inevitably blind to the bigger picture of the “law of destiny”. Whatever our attitudes as individuals, our relationship with the rest of nature as a collective would be ‘for the best’.
The interpretations of Hölderlin that I have reviewed all give an accurate representation of Hölderlin’s views. However, they are all partial views. They all miss the ‘big picture’ of what Hölderlin’s views imply about what it means to be a human in the context of cosmic evolution, and the consequent implications for the perspective from which we should view modernity and the ‘environmental crisis’. In an attempt to fully grasp these implications I am going to defend the thesis that: Hölderlin’s philosophy leads to the conclusion that the ‘environmental crisis’ is a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards perfection. This is an interesting thesis because, if accepted, it would supplant the conception of the meaninglessness of human existence with a conception of positive cosmic purpose.
The argument I will be making centers on three key aspects of Hölderlin’s philosophy. Firstly, that he believes that nature is purposefully evolving towards perfection. Secondly, that he believes that the achievement of this perfection requires human actions. Thirdly, that he believes that human actions are determined by nature. Acceptance of these three claims leads to the conclusion that human actions are determined by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards perfection. As the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity is purely resultant from human actions, a second conclusion inevitably follows. This is that the ‘environmental crisis’ itself is determined by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards perfection.
Hölderlin’s primordeal drive to art in humans has inevitably led to the epoch of modernity. Human actions in this epoch appear to be central to the achievement of perfection. Hölderlin claims that modernity is an epoch that, “is as necessary as day, ordained by a higher power.” Furthermore, humans have been involved in “work” in modernity that is clearly constitutive of the importance of the epoch. This is clear from Unger’s interpretation of Friedensfeier in which the “law of destiny” ensures that a certain amount of human “work” is done. The crucial factor is that humanity is ignorant that it is working under a “law of destiny” in modernity, until modernity has ended. It is then that through the Time-Image the great Spirit reveals the successful outcome of modernity, and the nature and value of the accomplished “work”.
There is no doubt that in Hölderlin’s view human actions and their resultant “work” in modernity are part of purposeful evolution to perfection. What is interesting is the exact nature of the “work”. There is an obvious connection between the “work” of modernity (Friedensfeier) and the “danger” we face in modernity (Patmos). Heidegger’s interpretation of Patmos that, “the essence of technology, enframing, is the extreme danger,” makes it clear that the “work” of modernity is the development of technology. In fact, technological development in modernity seems to be the culmination of Hölderlin’s primordeal drive to art. Furthermore, it is very hard to think of any other distinctive aspects of modernity that are resultant from human actions, present an extreme danger, and have cosmic significance. Therefore, for Hölderlin, the achievement of perfection seems to require the human development of technology.
It is interesting that Heidegger sees the danger we face from the “work” of modernity as the essence of technology rather than actual technology. Andrew Feenberg has criticised Heidegger for this abstract concentration on essences rather than the actual technology itself. A “Feenberg interpretation” of Patmos seems to be more in accordance with Hölderlin’s views than the “Heidegger interpretation”, as Hölderlin’s philosophy is grounded in actualities rather than essences. Hölderlin sees a positive role for actual technology in cosmic evolution; this means that actual technology has a cosmic purpose. Therefore, it seems that both the danger we face, and the saviour, must be the actual technology developed by human actions.
The nature of the relationship between man’s spirit and the Spirit of nature is made clear in the following quote from Hölderlin’s character Diotima: “a unique destiny bore you away to solitude of spirit as waters are borne to mountain peaks.” This concept of individual humans having a unique destiny was the view of Johann Herder, who was one of Hölderlin’s inspirations. Herder saw nature as a great current of sympathy running through all things which manifested itself in unique inner impulses within different individuals. This means that every human has a unique calling – an original path which they ought to tread. As Herder states, “Each human being has his own measure, as it were an accord peculiar to him of all his feelings to each other.” Clearly, for both Herder and Hölderlin, human actions at any one time are determined in accordance with the movements of the One Spirit of nature.
I have presented evidence for the claims that for Hölderlin: nature is purposefully evolving towards perfection, the achievement of this perfection requires human actions, and human actions are determined by nature. Acceptance of these three claims leads to the conclusion that human actions are determined by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards perfection. I now briefly argue that the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity is purely resultant from human actions.
The definition of an environmental problem is: “any change of state in the physical environment which is brought about by human interference with the physical environment, and has effects which society deems unacceptable in the light of its shared norms.” This definition encapsulates a sliding scale of environmental problems from those that are local and temporary on the one hand, to those that are global and long-lasting on the other. The ‘environmental crisis’ as a concept has arisen because of the emergence in the last 100 years of an increasing number of environmental problems that are towards the global and long-lasting end of the scale. The ‘environmental crisis’ is thus purely resultant from the human actions which have created environmental problems that are characterised by their global reach and long-lasting nature.
This means that the above conclusion, that human actions are determined by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards perfection, needs amending. As the ‘environmental crisis’ is purely resultant from human actions, it too must be part of this purposeful evolution. Therefore, the new conclusion that inevitably follows is: the ‘environmental crisis’ is determined by nature as a necessary stage in the purposeful evolution of nature towards perfection.
It could be objected that there are many references to human freedom in Hölderlin’s work that would seem to cast doubt on the third claim. This is particularly noticeable in his novel Hyperion. For example, Hyperion states that, “without freedom all is dead.” However, this objection is easily answered because these references all appear in Hölderlin’s early work, and even then they are more than counterbalanced by the opposing fatalistic views that I have outlined. In his early period Hölderlin was struggling to come to terms with the conflict between his keen moral aspirations for social change on the one hand, and his belief in perfection only arising through natural development on the other. In his later work, as is clear in his endorsement of the ‘Hesperian’ response to our condition, he firmly accepts the powers of natural development and the determination of human actions by nature. He realizes the futility of pursuing his idealistic moral aspirations because he accepts the illusory nature of human free will.
A further objection could be made that this reinterpretation is pointless because Darwin’s theory of evolution, which emerged shortly after Hölderlin’s time, gives a view of evolutionary processes that is incompatible with Hölderlin’s view that there was a ‘blessed unity of being’ prior to the arrival of humans. We now know that the emergence of the human species – and its primordeal drive to art – was preceded by four billion years of evolution of life on Earth. It can thus be argued that there was not a ‘blessed unity of being’ prior to the evolution of humankind.
It is clear that this Darwinian based objection does not invalidate the views of Hölderlin, or the reinterpretation of them presented in this paper. In fact, not only does evolutionary theory perfectly complement Hölderlin’s philosophy, his philosophy needs it. The idea that nature could use its power to instantaneously create a being as complex as a human out of the ‘blessed unity of being’ is hardly defensible. In the light of our knowledge today we can simply reinterpret Hölderlin as claiming that nature used its power four billion years ago to divide the ‘blessed unity of being’ and create a subject/object divide. As he sees nature as an unfolding and evolving organism, the divide would give rise to human subjects after a sufficient period of time. This, ““coming to itself” of original substance”, as Jonas describes it, has in actuality taken approximately four billion years.
I have argued that the existing secondary literature has not grasped the full implications of Hölderlin’s thought for what it means to be a human in modernity. By drawing together Hölderlin’s ideas I have sought to understand his notion of the purpose of human actions, and what this purpose means for the contemporary ‘environmental crisis’.
Hölderlin’s conception of nature is an organism unfolding to perfection. I have argued that he sees modernity as an important stage of this unfolding, which is characterized by the development of technology through human actions. I have further argued that this means that the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity – a side-effect of the development of technology – is also an inevitable stage of this unfolding; it is in the interests of nature. As nature continues to unfold, the disharmony of modernity will be succeeded by a re-conquered harmony. I have argued that Hölderlin’s ‘saving power’ is actual technology, as this seems most consistent with his thought. Heidegger’s view, that the ‘saving power’ is the essencing of technology, seems inconsistent with the positive role of technology in cosmic evolution that is envisioned by Hölderlin.
The reinterpretation I have outlined clearly entails an inversion of the conventional notion of causality in the ‘environmental crisis’ of modernity. Humanity is conventionally pictured as harming nature. My thesis has shown that for Hölderlin it is nature that is ‘harming’ humanity. We have been cast aside out of the rapture of nature into a realm of suffering and self-consciousness, with the purpose of developing technology to serve the purposes of the unfolding nature of which we are a part.
We are left with the question of what our attitudes to nature should be, given this reinterpretation of what it means to be a human in cosmic evolution. The answer is simple. As nature is the source of our individual attitudes, our attitudes to nature must be in the interests of nature. Our attitudes, whether they are techno-centric, environmentalist, quietist, or nature-exploitative are all correct for us as individuals, because in the aggregate they fulfil the purpose of nature as a whole. There is no such thing as an anthropocentric attitude.
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. Nauen, Revolution, Idealism and Human Freedom: Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel and the Crisis of Early German Idealism, p. 139.
. Friedrich Hölderlin , ‘The Perspective from which We Have to Look at Antiquity’, in Thomas Pfau (ed.), Friedrich Hölderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory, New York, SUNY Press, 1988, p. 39.
. Peacock, Hölderlin, p. 37.
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. Hölderlin, ‘Hyperion’, p. 123.
. Hölderlin, ‘Hyperion’, p. 11.
. Friedrich Hölderlin, ‘No.41: To his Mother’, in Thomas Pfau (ed.), Friedrich Hölderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory, New York, SUNY Press, 1988, p. 120.
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