Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2014STMULawBestBriefNadineRodriguez
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:45:19+00:00

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Whether application of the governing legal standard and its progeny render the petitioner’s legislative prayer unconstitutional under the First Amendment Establishment Clause?
OPINION BELOW The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts have not been reported but appear in the record.
STANDARD OF REVIEW A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
JURISDICTION The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2013. R. 34. Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari on February 7, 2013. R.35. This Court granted the petition on May 20, 2013. R. 37. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) (2000).
B. Procedural Background Mrs. Dhaliwal brought a civil action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Martin County Board asserting a violation of her First Amendment right. R.14. She moved for a declaratory judgment stating Martin County’s prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause and an injunction to enjoin it from allowing sectarian prayers at its meetings. R.14. The district court denied Mrs. Dhaliwal’s claim and granted Martin County’s motion to dismiss based on Marsh v. Chambers, finding the prayer practices did not infringe on attendees’ religious freedom, thus did not violate the constition. R.28-29. Mrs. Dhaliwal appealed the judgment of the district court. The Court of Appeals, which applied the “totality of the circumstances” approach endorsed in Galloway v. Town of Greece, reversed the decision and concluded Martin County’s prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause. R.33. This Court granted certiorari. R.37.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT I. The governing legal standard for Establishment Clause case analysis is Lemon and its progeny. Using Lemon, the United States Supreme Court has held the practice of opening governmental meetings with an invocation is constitutional, so long as it does not endorse a particular preference for a religion or coerce an individual to take part in religious activities against their beliefs. To ensure that prayer practices fall within the safeguards of the First Amendment and align with Lemon, the United States Supreme Court held prayers must be nonsectarian in nature to pass constitutional scrutiny. II. Martin County’s Board practice of opening its meetings with an invocation violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Its narrow process has and will continue to cause overwhelming Christian-led invocations, which illustrates a government endorsement of religion by preferring Christianity over other creeds. Furthermore, the practice forces attendees, such as Mrs. Dhaliwal, to adhere to a faith that she does not believe in and causes minorities to feel excluded and unwelcomed in their community.
The assurances set forth in the United States Constitution are the cornerstone of which the United States of America was founded. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1963). The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause were incorporated into the Constitution in order to fasten religious freedom; however, the distinction between the two is evident and cannot be ignored. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 604. The purpose of the Establishment Clause is to forbid “government speech endorsing religion,” while the Free Exercise Clause allows “private speech endorsing religion.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 590 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); accord Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800 (1983). Our history illustrates the struggle between permitting the free exercise of religion and crossing the line to a violation of the Establishment Clause. Compare McCreary Cnty v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky, 545 U.S. 844, 880 (2005) (holding display of Ten Commandments at county courthouse is unconstitutional), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005) (finding Texas’ display of Ten Commandments holds secular purpose and is thus constitutional).
or attempted to convey the message that a particular religious belief was preferred. Id. at 592-97. In doing so, the Court sought to ensure that no one felt alienated and unwelcomed into his or her “political community.” Id. at 594. The Court held that the crèche, standing alone conveyed a religious message, which violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 597. By contrast, the menorah withstood judicial scrutiny because it recognized “cultural diversity.” Id. at 597-618. Thus, the Court ruled that the test to determine whether a legislative practice violated the Establishment Clause is to ask whether it has the effect of “endorsing religious beliefs.” Id. at 594. The Court in Lee further expanded the definition of “effect” under the Lemon analysis to prohibit those acts which cause citizens to feel coerced to participate in religious activities against their beliefs. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 596. In Lee, a student and her father sought to prohibit her middle school from including invocations at public school graduations. Id. at 582. The Court ruled that the test to determine whether government practices had the effect of endorsing religion is to inquire whether it pressures anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise. Id. at 585. They held that by forcing students to stand and maintain respectful silence, the school publicly pressured and coerced them to endorse a religion. This, the Court ruled, violated the Establishment Clause. See id. Martin County’s practice of opening their Board meetings with sectarian prayers similarly violates the Establishment Clause when considered in light of Allegheny and Lee. By opening each meeting with prayers that contain specific Christian references, the Board conveys the message that Christianity is the majority religious preference over any other belief. See Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty, 653 F.3d 341, 354 (4th Cir. 2011). When Mrs. Dhaliwal participates in County affairs, the county’s prayers serve as a reminder that her Sikh religion is secondary to Christianity. This is the specific harm condemned by the Court. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621.
prayers and have implemented other measures of examining the constitutionality of sectarian prayers, the Supreme Court has applied Marsh to only allow those prayers that are non-sectarian. See Lee 505 U.S. 577, Allegheny 492 U.S. 573. Thus, these are the legal standards the Court must incorporate in the case at hand. The application of Marsh as precluding sectarian prayers has not failed in protecting the fundamental rights allocated by the United States Constitution and the Court should not deviate from those standards now. Therefore, the Court should apply the Lemon and its progeny to conclude that Martin County’s prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause. II. MARTIN COUNTY’S PRACTICE OF OPENING GOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS WITH AN INVOCATION VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE. The constitutional harm of allowing sectarian prayer is that it has the effect of endorsing a preference for one religion and coercing individuals to participate in religious exercises against their beliefs. Under the expanded effect prong of the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has ruled governmental practices cannot endorse religion by conveying or attempting to convey the message that a particular religious belief is preferred and it cannot pressure anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise. See Cnty of Allegheny v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585 (1992). Furthermore, the Court in Marsh prohibited the selection of speakers based on the “impermissible motive” of preferring certain beliefs to others. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). Thus, Martin County’s prayer practice must be viewed as a government endorsement of religion and a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
meetings permissible, so long as they are non-sectarian. Therefore, the Court should apply the Lemon and its progeny to conclude that Martin County’s prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause. Based on these parameters, Martin County’s prayer practice is unconstitutional because its narrow selection process had, and will continue to have, the effect of endorsing one religion and coerces individuals, such as Mrs. Dhaliwal, into participating in religious practices. Its practice of requiring attendees to stand during Christian-led prayers forces attendees to adhere to Christianity. Furthermore, the practice makes minorities feel uncomfortable and unwelcomed in their community. This is the very harm the Constitution forbids. In conclusion, the Court should find Martin County’s practice of opening governmental meetings with overwhelming Christian-led prayers unconstitutional under the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The prayers show Martin County’s endorsement for Christianity as the preferred religious belief and forces attendees to adhere to the same beliefs.
PRAYER For these reasons, Respondent prays the Court apply Lemon and its progeny and find that Martin County’s prayer practice violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause.
word) of the statement of the case section ending with the end (last word) of the conclusion. I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct.
Nadine Rodriguez, “Best Brief Contest Winner: Martin County v. Anne Dhaliwal, 12-696a Brief for Respondent Winner of the 2014 Best Brief Contest at St. Mary's University School of Law,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2014STMULawBestBriefNadineRodriguez.

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