Source: https://openjurist.org/16/f1d/175
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:51:37+00:00

Document:
the views of J udge WALL are far more consistent with sound law, right, reason, and strict justice. They commend themselves fully to the judgment of this court. The result is, that judgment will have to be entered in fa-vor of plaintiff for the sum of $1,200. The cases especially referred to are State Savings AS8'n v. Kellogg, 63 Mo. 540: Manvillev. Roever, 11 Mo .. App. 317; Buchananv. MeisBer, Ill. Sup. Ct. MS.; Gauch v. Harri8on, Fourth App. Ct. Ill. MS.; Jones v. Wiltberger,42 Ga. !i75: Cole v. Butler, 43 Me. 141: Thomp. Liab. Stockh. §§ 424, 425. It is not to be consid'ered that this court admits that the decisions: of the supreme court of Illinois go to the extent claimed by the fendant, but merely that if they do, this court follows, as more persuasive, the views of Judge WAI.L heretofore referred to. Were any other views to obtain than those here indicated, the double-liability clause would be comparatively futile, for a stockholder could,atpleas-, ure, defeat the rights of a creditor pursuing him, by secilringthe intervention of a friend, or by transferring his claims which he could not use as a set-off, and have them made the basis of a suit against himself, whereby the obligation imposed onhini bv law would be defeated.
2005,2006, REV. ST.-How CONSTRuED. Sections 2005 and 2006 of the Revised Statutes, although originally contained in the enforcement act of May 31, 1870, which has been repealed, were re-' enacted as they now stand on the twentieth of June, 1874, as part of the law, relating to the electivefranchise, passed by congress in virtue of its general power over federal elections,' and are to be construed as independUi.t enactments.
Although these sections may not.refer in terms to federal yet it -is a . necessary implication of law that they do refer to them, having general powers of legislation in 'respect to such elections, and the courtsbeillg bound' to give effect to such 'sections in respect to all elections con-' gress possesses general powers.
SAME-No APPLICATION TO STA'l'E ELECTIONS.
These sections do not, apply to state elections, because in respect to them, in order to be valid under the fiftee,nth amendment to' the constitution, whkh confers only limited powers 'of legiSiation.upon congress over 'state ejections, they must contain apt words bringing them theprovin<;e: 91, .the amendment, which they do not, 4. BAME- VAI,IDrrY UNDER ARTICLE 1 OF CONSTITUTION. The fact' that these sections are not by the fifteenth amendment' does.not rendeI: them null if authorized by article 1 of the constitution.
5506, which latter sectipn also was originally part of the enrorcement act of May 31,1870. We then held that that act was now repealed; that section 5506 now stands in the Revised Statutes as a distinct section, stripped of the context and uninfluenced by the preambles and "aforesaids" of the act of 1870, by which we might originally have been bound to construe it; that it stood upon its own terms and language as a law enacted in 1874: as part of the chapter of the Revised Statutes relating to crimes against the elective franchise; that although it may not refer in terms to federal elections.. yet it is a necessary implication of law that it does refer to them, congress having general powers of legislation in respect to such elections, and the courts being bound to give effect to the sec.tion in respect to all elections over which congress possesses general powers. The very saIqe question is presented by the demurrer in this case in respect to section 2005. We have only to adhere to'our ruling made the other day in the election case. We hold that section 2005 to the act of May, 1870, as part was passed by of the laws of the Revised Statutes relating to the elective franchise; that it was passed iIi virtue of the general powers of congress over federal elections; that it is not, necessarily, to be construed in connection with the preamble and context of the act of May, 1870; that it was enacted independently of such context, as it now stands in the Revised Statutes, on the twentieth of June, 1874; that congress must be held to have applied it to federal elections whether express language was used to that effect or not; that it does not in its present form and status apply to state elections, because, in respect to them, the section, in order to be valid under the fifteenth amendment, which gives only limited powers of legislation over state elections, must contain apt words bringing it within the province of the amendment, which words are wanting; that the fact that the section is not warranted by the fifteenth amendment does not render it null if it is authorized by article 1 of the constitution; and that if the discrimination com· plained of in this suit resulted, as alleged, in depriving the plaintiff of the privilege of voting equally'with all others entitled to vote in a federal election, the declaration is good. The demurrer is therefore overruled.
See U. S. v. Wri,qht, ante, 112, and U. S. v. Bader, ante, 116.
DUFF, Assignee, etc., v. BINDLEY.
'l'ROVER TO RECOVER VALUE OE' TIMBER BOLD BY OWNER OF UNDIVIDED TEREST IN LAND.
It being by statute unlawful for an owner of an undivided interest in timber land to cut down or remove from the land any timber trees having first obtained the consent of his co-tenaJ;lts, and, as against his non-consenting co-tenants, his sale of lumber manufactured out of timber so cut or removed passing no title to his vendee, held, in an action of trover against such vendee by a non-consenting part owner, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of his interest in the iumber as of the date of the defendant's conversion, with no allowance for the expense and labor of the trespassing vendor.
TIMBER FELLED TREA'l'ED AS REAL ESTATE.
TimberunlawfuUy cut down by an owner of an undivided interest in the land without the. consent of his co-tenant, and still lying upon the land at the time of the marshal's sale of the undivided interest in the land of the non-consenting owner, who had not eleCted to treat the felled timber as personalty, remains part of the freehold, and the interest of the defendant in the execution therein passes to the marshal's vendee as realty.
L. B. Duff, for plaintiff.

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