Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40715/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:37:09+00:00

Document:
Capitation Fee) Act, 1984-preamble-Object of.
to the category of "Indian students from outside  Karnataka"
has  no money whereas the rich can purchase  the  admission.
v. Union of India and Ors.,  2 SCR 67; E.P. Royappa v.
to the medical colleges and also against "Government  seats"
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ petition (Civil) No.	456 of 1991.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution on India). Vijay Pandia and R. Satish for the Petitioner. Santosh Hegde, R. Jagannatha Gouley, M.K. Dua,	K.H. Nobin Singh, Manoj Sarup, C.S. Vaidyanathan, K.V. Mohan, Ms. Anita Lalit and M. Veerappa for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH. J. The Karnataka State Legislature,	with the object of	eliminating the practice of	collecting capitation fee	for admitting	students into	educational institutions, enacted the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 (the Act). The Act which replaces the Karnatatak Ordinance No. 14 of 1983	came into force with effect from July 11, 1983. Purporting to regulate the tuition	fee to be charged by	the Private Medical	Colleges in the State, the Karnataka Government issued a notification dated June 5, 1989 under Section	5(1) of the Act thereby fixing the tuition fee, other fees	and deposits to be charged from the students by	the Private Medical	Colleges in the State. Under the notification	the candidates admitted against "Government seats" are to	pay Rs.2,000 per year as tuition fee. The	Karnataka students (other	than those admitted against "Government seats")	are to be charged tuition fee not 664 exceeding Rs.25,000 per annum. The third category is of "Indian students from outside Karnataka", from whom tuition fee not exceeding Rs.60,000 per annum is permitted to be charged.
Miss Mohini Jain a resident of Meerut was informed by the management of Sri Sriddharatha	Medical College, Agalokote, Tumkur in the State of Karnataka that she could be admitted to the MBBS course in the	session commencing February/March	1991. According to the management she	was asked to deposit Rs.60,000 as the tuition fee for the first year and furnish a bank guarantee in respect of the fee	for the remaining	years of the MBBS course. The	petitioner's father informed the management that it was beyond his means to pay	the exorbitant annual fee of Rs.60,000 and as a consequence she was denied admission to the medical college. Mohini	Jain has alleged that the management	demanded a further	capitation fee of repees four and a half lakhs	but the management	has vehemently denied the same.
In	this petition under Article 32 of the	Constitution of India Miss Mohini Jain has challenged the notification of the Karnataka	Government permitting the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka to charge exorbitant tuition fees from the students other than those admitted to the "Government seats".
Mr. Santosh Hedge learned counsel appearing for	the medical	college respondent No. 3 has	contended that	the students from whom higher tuition fee is charged belong to a different class. According to him those who are admitted to the "Government seats" are meritorious and the remaining non-meritorious. He states that classification of condidates into those who possess merit and those who do	not possess merit is a valid classification and as such the college- management is within its right to charge more fee from those who do not possess merit. He further states that the object sought	to be	achieved by the said classification is to collect	money to meet the expenses incurred by the college in providing medical education to the students. Mr.	C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel appearing for the intervener Karnataka Private Medical Colleges Association	has argued that the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka do not receive any financial aid from either the Central or the State Government. According to him the Private Medical Colleges incur about Rs.5 lakhs per student as	expenditure for a 5 year MBBS course. 40% of the seats in these 665 colleges are set part as "Government seats" to be filled by the Government. The students selected and admitted against Government seats pay only Rs.2,000 perannum as such the rest of the	burden	falls on those	who are admitted against management quota. He, therefore, contended that the tuition fee is	not excessive and as such there is no	question of making	any profit by the Private Medical Colleges in	the State of Karnataka. Mr. Hegde and Mr. Vaidyanathan	have vehemently contended that in order to run	the medical colleges the managements are justified in charging	the capitation fee. According to them, apart from the act, there is no provision under the Constitution or under any other law which forbids the charging of capitation fee. Finaliy they have relied upon the judgment of this Court in	D.P. Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat, and another 	SCR 1215.
(1) Is there a `right to education' guaranteed to	the people	of India under the Constitution? If so, does	the concept of `capitation fee' infracts the same?
(2) Whether the	charging of capitation fee	in consideration of admissions to educational institutions is arbitrary, unfair, unjust and as such violates the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution?
(3) Whether the impugned	notification permits	the Private	Medical Colleges to charge capitation fee in	the guise of regulating fees under the Act?
(4) Whether the	notification is violative of	the provisions of the Act which in specific terms prohibit	the charging of capitation fee by any educational institution in the State of Karnataka?
"21. Protection of life and personal	liberty.-No person	shall be deprived of his life	or personal liberty except according to procedure	established by law."
"38. State to secure a social order for	the promotion of walfare of the people.-(1) The State shall	strive to promote the Welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
(f) that children are given opportunities	and facilities to develop in a hearlthy manner and in conditions of freedom and	dignity	and	that childhood and youth are	protected against exploitation	and against moral and material abandonment."
"41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in	certain cases.- The State shall, within	the limits of its economic capacity	and development, make effective provision for securing the right to	work, to education and to public assistance in	cases	of unemployment, old	age, sickness and	disablement, and in other cases of underserved want."
"45. Provision for free and compulsory education for children.- The	State shall endeavour	to provide, within a period to ten years from	the commencement of this Constitution, for free	and compulsory education for all children	until	they complete the age of fourteen years."
It is no doubt correct that "right to education"as such has not been guaranteed as fundamental right under Part	III of the Constitution but reading the above quoted provisions comulatively it becomes clear that the framers of	the Constitution made it obligatory for the State	to provide education for its citizens.
The preamble promises to secure justice "social, economic and political" for the citizen. A peculiar feature of the Indian Constitution is that it combines	social	and economic rights along with political and justiciable legal rights.	The preamble embodies the goal which the State	has to achieve in order to establish social justice and to	make the masses free in the positive sense. The	securing of social	justice has been specifically enjoined an object of the State under Article 38 of the Constitution. Can	the objectice which has been so prominently pronounced in	the preamble and Article 38 of the Constitution	be achieved without	providing education to the	large majority	of citizens who are illiterate. The objectives flowing from the preamble cannot be achieved and shall remain on paper unless the people in this country are educated. The three pronged justice promised by the preamble is only an illusion to	the teaming-million	who are illiterate. It is only is	the education which equips a citizen to participate in achieving the objectives	enshrined in the preamble. The preamble further	assures the	dignity	of the individual.	The Constitution seeks to achieve this object by	guaranteeing fundamental rights to each individual which he can enforce through court of law if necessary. The directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution are also with the	same objective. The dignity of man is inviolable. It is the	duty of the	State	to respect and	protect the same. It is primarilty the education which brings-forth the dignity of a man. The framers of the Constitution were aware that	more than seventy per cent of the people, to whom	they	were giving the Constitution of India, were illiterate. They were also hopeful that within a period of ten years illiteracy would be wiped out from the country. It was with that	hope that Articles 41 and 45 were brought in Chapter IV of	the Constitution. An individual cannot be assured of human dignity unless his personality is developed and the only way to do	that is to educate him. This is	why the Universal Declaration of	Human Rights,	1948 emphasises "Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality..." Article 41 in Chapter IV of the Constitution recognises an	individual's right "to education". It	says that "the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision	for securing the right.....to 668 education". Although a citizen cannot enforce the directive principles contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution	but these were not intended to be mere pious declarations. We may quote the words of Dr. Ambedkar in that respect: "In enacting	this Part of the Constitution,	the Assembly is giving certain directions to the future legislature and the future executive to show in what manner they are to exercise the	legislature and the executive power they will have. Surely it is not the intention to introduce in this	Part these principles as mere pious declarations. It is the intention of the Assembly that in future	both the legislature and the executive should not merely pay lipservice to these principles but that	they should	be made the basis of all legislative	and executive action that they may be taking hereafter in the matter of the governance of the country" (C.A.D. Vol.VII p.476.) The directive principles which are fundamental in	the governance of	the country cannot be	isolated from	the fundamental rights guaranteed under	Part	III. These principles have to be read into the fundamental rights. Both are supplementary to	each other. The	State	is under a constitutional	mandate	to create conditions in which	the fundamental rights guaranteed to the individuals under	Part III could be	enjoyed by all.	Without making "right to education" under Article 41 of the Constitution a reality the fundamental rights under Chapter III shall remain beyond the reach of large majority which is illiterate.
"But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes	the right to live with human dignity and all that	goes along with it, namely the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing	and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expression oneself in diverse forms, freely 669 moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend	upon the extent of the economic	development of	the country, but it must, in any view of	the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of	life and also the right to carry on such funtions	and activities as constitute	the bare minimum expression of the human-self."
"This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from	the Directive principles	of State Policy	and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39	and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse,	opportunities	and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner	and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person	to live with human dignity and no State - neither the Central	Government nor	any State Government - has the right to take any action which will deprive	a person of the enjoyment of these basic essential."
"Right to life" is the compendious expression for	all those rights which the Courts must enforce because they	are basic to the dignified enjoyment of life. It extends to	the full range of	conduct which the individual	is free to pursue.	The right to education fiows directly	from right to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual cannot be assured unless it is	accompanied by the right to education. The State Government	is under an obligation to	make endeavour to provide	educational facilities at all levels to its citizens.
The fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India including the right to	freedom of speech	and expression and other rights under	Article 19 cannot be appreciated and fully enjoyed unless a citizen is educated and is conscious of his individualistic dignity.
The "right to education", therefore, is concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part	III of	the Constitution. The State is under a constitutional-mandate to provide	educational institutions at all levels for	the benefit	of the citizens. The educational institutions	must function to the best advantage of the citizens. Opportunity to acquire education	cannot be confined to	the richer section	of the society. increasing	demand	for medical education has led to the opening of large number of medical colleges by private persons, groups and trusts with	the permission and recognition of State Governments.	The Karnataka State has permitted the opening of	several	new medical	colleges under various private	bodies	and organisations.	These institutions are	charging capitation fee as	a consideration for admission.	Capitation fee is nothing	but a price for selling education. The	concept of "teaching shops" is contrary to the constitutional scheme and is wholly abhorrent to the Indian culture and heritage. As back as December 1980 the Indian Medical Association in its 56th All India Medical Conference held at	Cuttack on December 28-30, 1980 passed the following resolutions: "The 56th All India Medical Conference views	with great	concern	the attitude of State Goverments particularly the State Government of Karnataka in permitting the opening of new Medical Colleges under	various	bodies and organisations in utter disregard to	the recommendations	of Medical Council of India and urges upon the authorities and the Government of Karnataka not to	permit	the opening of any new medical college,	by private bodies.
It further condemns the policy of admission on	the basis of capitation fees. This commercialisation of medical education endangers	the lowering	of standards of medical education and encourages	bad practice."
500. Such over production of	tehnical man-power from our medical colleges is bound	to lead to unemployment and frustration. Indeed the unabated exodus	of our professional	collegues to other countries is	a direct consequence of	these	lop- sided policies.
According to	some estimates. India has exported human capital worth over 51 billion dollars to	USA alone during 1966-88. Currently about 8000 skilled young	men and women are leaving the country every year.	It is high time a blanket ban is imposed on any further expansion of medical colleges in	our country and a well thought out plan to reduce	the intake into existing institutions is prepared. This will help to	improve the standard	of medical education and health care in our country. It is	common	knowlege that	many of the newly started medical colleges charge huge capitation fees.	Besides, most of these are poorly equipped and provide scanty facilities for	training of students. At best such institutions can be termed as "Teaching	Shops". Experience has	shown	that these colleges admit students who have been unable to gain admission in recognised medical colleges. The result is a back door	entry into medical training obtained solely by the ability to	pay one's	way through. Even the advice of the Medical Council of India is sidelined in many such cases. The Government must resist all pressures to allow this practice	to continue. Admission	to medical colleges bought by paying capitation fees must be stepped forthwith	and all such existing institutions required	to strictly adhere to	the Medical Council of India rules.
In the words of my predecessor Dr. V. Parameshvara, "The need of the hour is better doctors than	more doctors, better health education	than	more education, better health care than more health care delivery."
The indian Medical Association,	the Association of Physicians of	India	and various	other	bodies	and organisations representing the medical profession in	this country have unanimously condemned the practice of charging capitation fee	as a consideration for admission to	the medical college.
We	hold that every citizen has a `right to education' under the Constitution. The State is under an obligation to established educational institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the	said right. The State	may discharge	its obligation through	state-owned or state-recognised educational institutions. When the State Government grants recognition to	the private educational institutions it creates	an agency to	fulfil	its obligation under	the Constitution. The students are givin admission to	the educational institutions-whether state-owned	or state- recongnised-in	recognition of their `right to education' under	the Constitution. Charging capitation fee	in consideration of admission to educational institutions, is a patent	denial of a citizen's right to education under	the Constitution.
Indian civilsation recognises education as one of	the pious obligations of the human society. To establish	and administer educational institutions	is considered a religious and	charitable object. Education in India	has never been a commodity for sale. Looking at the economic- front,	even forty five years after achieving independence, thirty per cent of the population is living below proverty- line and the bulk of the remaining population is struggling for existence	under	poverty-conditions. The preamble promises and the directive principles are a mandate to	the state to eradicate poverty so that the poor of this country can enjoy the right to life guaranteed	under	the Constitution. The state action or inaction which defeats the constitutional-mandate	is per se arbitary and cannot be sustained. Capitation	fee makes the availability	of education beyond the reach of the poor. The state action in permitting capitation fee to be charged by state-recognised educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as	such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. During the last two decades the horizon of equality clause has been widened as a result of this Court's judgments.
Earlier the violation of Article 14 was judged on the twin t ests of classification and nexus. This Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.,  2 SCR 348 gave	new dimension to Article 14 in the following words: "Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within traditional and	doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional	law and is therefore violative of Article 14."
"Unfortunately, in the early stages of	the evolution of	our constitutional law,	Article 14 came	to be	identified with the doctrine	of classification... In Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu this Court laid bare a new dimension of Article 14 and pointed out that that	Article	has highly activist magnitude and it embodies	a guarantee against arbitrariness....."
The capitation fee brings to the fore a	clear class bias. It enable the rich to take admission whereas the	poor has to withdraw dur to financial inability. A poor student with better merit canoot get admission because he has no money whereas the rich can purchase the admission. Such a treatment is patently unreasonable, unfair and unjust. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that charging of capitation	fee in consideration	of admissions	to educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as	such infracts Article 14 of the Constitution.
sideration. This practice strikes at the very root of	the constitutional	scheme	and	our educational system. Restricting admission	to non-meritorious	candidates belonging to the richer section of society and denying	the same to poor meritorious is wholly arbitrary	against	the constitutional	scheme	and as such	cannot	be legally permitted. Capitation fee in any form cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The only method of admission to the medical colleges in consonance with the fair play and equity is by ways of merit and merit alone.
We, therefore, hold and	declare that	charging of capitation fee by the private educational institutions as a consideration for admission is wholly illegal and cannot be permitted.
"The impugned	rule divides,	as already stated, self-nominees	into two groups, those who are	bona fide resident of Madhya Bharat and those who	are not, and while it imposes a capitation fee on	the latter, it exempts the former from	the payment thereof. If thus proceeds on a classification based on residence within the State, and the only point for	decision is	whether	the	ground	of classification has a fair and substantial relation to the purpose of the law, or whether it is purely arbitrary and 675 fanmciful.
The object of the classification underlying	the impugned rule was clearly to help to	some extent students who are residents of Madhya Bharat in	the prosecution of their studies, and it cannot be disputed that it is quite a legitimate and laudable objective for a State to encourage education within its borders. Education is a State subject, and one of the directive principles declared in Part IV of the Constitution is that the	State	should	make effective provisions	for education	within	the limits	of its economy. (vide article 41).	The State	has to contribute for the upkeep and	the running of its educational institutions. We are in this petition concerned with a Medical College, and it is	well-known that it requires	considerable finance to maintain such an institution. If	the State has to spend money on it, is it	unreasonable that it should so order the educational system that the advantage of it would to some extent at least enure	for the benefit of the State? A concession given	to the residents of the State in the matter of fees is obviously calculated to serve that	end, as presumably some of	them might, after passing out of the College, settle down as	doctors	and serve	the	needs	of the locality.	The classification is thus based on a ground which	has a reasonable relation to the subject-matter of	the legislation, and is in consequence not open to attack. It has been held in the State of Punjab v. Ajaib	Singh and Anr., that a classification might validly be made on a geographical basis. Such a classification	would	be eminently	just	and reasonable, where it relates to education which is the	concern	primarily of	the State.	The contention, therefore, that	the rule imposing capitation fee is in contravention of	article 14 must be rejected."
D.P. Joshi's case is an authority for the	proposition that classification on the ground of residence is a justifiable classification under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution of India. The question that capitation fee as a consideration for admission is not permissible under the scheme of	the constitution, was	neither	raised	nor adverted to by this Court. The imposition of capitation fee was also not questioned on the ground of arbitrariness.	The only question raised before the Court was that the Madhya 676 Bharat	students could not be exempted from the	payment of capitation fee. It	is settled by	this	Court	that classification	on the	ground	of residence	is a valid classification.	Subsequently this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain etc. v. Union	of India and Ors. etc., 	3 SCR	942 reiterated the	legal	position on this point. we	are, therefore, of the view that D.P. Joshi's case does not	give us ary guidance on the points before us.
To appreciate the third point it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the Act and the notification. Section 2(b), (e), 3, 4, and 5 of the Act are as under: "2(b).	"Capitation fee" means any	amount,	by whatever name called, paid or collected directly or indirectly in excess of the fee prescribed under section 5, but does	not include the deposit specified under the proviso to section 3.
(e) "Government Seats" means such number of seats in such educational institution or class or classes of such institutions in the state as the Government may, from time to time, specify for being filled up by it in such manner as may be specified by it by general or special order on the basis of merit	and reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and such other categories, as	may be specified, by the Government from time to time, without the requirement of payment of capitation fee or cash deposit.
4. Regulation of	Admission to	educational institutions etc. -	Subject to such rules, or general or special orders, as may be made by	the Government in this behalf and any other law for the time being in force.
Provided that the Government may, in the interest of excellence of education, fix any higher minimum qualification for any course of study.
(2)in order to regulate the capitation fee charged or collected during the period specified under	the proviso to section 3, the Government may, from time to time, by general or special order,	specify in respect of each private educational institution or class or classes of such institutions.
(b) the number of seats that may be filled up by the management of such institution.
Provided that	such number of seats	as may be specified by the Government but not less tha fifty per cent of the total number of seats referred to in clauses (a) and (b) shall be filled from among Karnataka students.
(3) an educational institution required to	fill seats in accordance with item (i) of sub-clause (b) of clause (2) shall form a committee to select candidates for such seats. A nominee each of	the Government and the	University to	which	such educational institution is affiliated shall be included as members in such committee.
5. Regulation	of fees, etc. - (1) It shall be competent for the Government, by notification, to regulate the	tuition	fee or	any other fee or deposit or other amount that may be	received or collected by any educational institution or class of such institutions in respect of any or all class or classes of students.
(2) No educational institution shall	collect	any fees or amount or accept deposits in excess of	the amounts notified under sub-section (1) or permitted under the proviso to section 3.
(3) Every educational institution shall issue an official receipt for the fee or capitation fee or deposits or other amount collected by it. (4) All monies received by any	educational institution by way of fee or	capitation fee or deposits or other amount shall be deposited in	the account of the institution, in any Scheduled	Bank and shall be applied and	expended for	the improvement of the institution and the	development of the educational facilities and for	such other related purpose and to such extent and in	such manner	as may be specified	by order by	the Government.
(b)	Candidates admitted against Government seats in	Private Medical Colleges shall be charged a tuition fee of Rs.2,000	each per annum (Rupees two thousand	only).
And whereas it is considered necessary to effectively curb this evil	practice in public interest by providing for prohibition of collection of capitation fee and matters relating thereto; Be it enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature in the Thirty-fourth Year of the Republic of India as follows:"
Section 3	of the Act prohibits	the collection of capitation fee	by any educational institution	or by	any person	who is in charge of or is responsible for	the management of	such institutions. Contravention of	the provisions of the Act has been made punishable under Section 7 of the Act with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but shall not exceed seven years	and with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. Section 5 of the Act authorises the Government to regulate	the tuition	fees by way	of a notification. The Karnataka Government have issued a notification under Section 5(1) of the Act wherein the fee charged from Indian students	from outside	Karnataka has been fixed not exceeding	Rs. 60,000 per annum. Whether Rs. 60,000 per annum can be considered a tuition	fee or it is a capitation fee is the question	for our determination.
The notification fixes Rs.2000 per annum as the tuition fee for candidates admitted to the seats in Government medical	colleges and for the candidates admitted against "Government seats" in private medical colleges. All these seats are filled purely on the merit of the candidates.	It is thus obvious that the State Government in fulfilling	its obligation under the	Constitution to provide medical education to the citizens has fixed Rs. 2000 per annum as tuition fee for the students selected on merit for admission to the medical colleges and also against "Government seats" in private medical colleges. Therefore, the tuition fee by student admitted to the private medical college is only	Rs. 2000 per annum.	The seats other than the "Government seats" which are to be filled from outside Karnataka the management has been given free hand where the criteria of merit is	not applicable and those who can afford to pay Rs.	60,000	per annum are 681 considered at the discretion of the management. Whatever name one may give to this type of extraction of money in the name of medical education it is nothing but the capitation fee. If the State Government fixes Rs.2000 per annum as the tuition	fee in government colleges and for	"Government seats"	in private medical colleges than it is	the state- responsibility	to see that any private college which	has been set up with Government permission and is being run with Government recognition is prohibited from charging more than Rs. 2000 from any student who may be resident of any part of India.	When the State Government permits a private medical college	to be	set-up and recognises	its curriculum	and degrees than the said college is performing a function which under the constitution has been assigned to the State Government. We are therefore of the view that Rs.60,000 per annum permitted to be charged from Indian students	from outside	Karnataka in Para. 1(d) of the notification is	not tuition fee but in fact a capitation fee and as such cannot be sustained and is liable to be struck down.	Whatever we have said about para 1(d) is also applicable to Para 1(c) of the notification.
Since we have held that what is provided in para	1(d) and 1(c) of the impugned notification dated June 5, 1989 is capitation fee and not a tuition fee it has to be held	that the notification is beyond the scope of the Act rather	goes contrary to section 3 of the Act and as such has to be	set aside.	We therefore	hold and declare that	it is	not permissible in law for any educational institution to charge capitation fee as a consideration for admission to the	said institution.
For the reasons given above we allow this writ petition and quashed para 1(d) and 1(c) of the Karnataka State Government notification dated June	5, 1989. As a consequence paragraph	5 of the	said	notification automatically becomes	redundant. We make it	clear	that nothing	contained in this judgment shall be applicable to the case of foreign students and students who are	non- resident Indians. We further hold that this judgment shall be operative prospectively. All those students who	have already been admitted to the private medical colleges in the State	of Karnataka in terms of the Karnataka State Notification dated June 5, 1989 shall not be entitled to the advantage of this judgment and they shall continue their studies on the same terms and conditions on which they	were admitted to the consolidated MBBS course.
Although we have struck down the capitation fee	and allowed	the writ petition to that extent,	we are	not inclined to grant any relief regarding admission to	the petitioner. She was not admitted to the college on merit and secondly the course commenced in March-April, 1991	and we see no justification to direct respondent 3 the medical college	to admit the petitioner. The writ	petition is allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs.

References: v. 
 v.

 v. 
 V. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.