Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/379/466/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:05:31+00:00

Document:
During petitioner's three-day murder trial, which resulted in his being found guilty and being sentenced to death, two deputy sheriffs who were the principal prosecution witnesses had custody of the jurors and, as a result, were in close and continuous association with them, freely mingling and conversing with them throughout the trial period. Though disapproving of the practice of officers who are witnesses having charge of the jury, the State Supreme Court found no prejudice to petitioner, and affirmed his conviction.
Held: the close and continuous association between key witnesses and the jury deprived the petitioner of the right to trial by an impartial jury which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires. Pp. 379 U. S. 471-474.
244 La. 447, 152 So.2d 555, reversed and remanded.
the trial were such as to deprive Turner of a right secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment.
however, upon the ground that there was no showing that either deputy had talked with any member of the jury about the case itself.
"were in actual charge of the jury; that they were physically present with the jurors in and out of the jury room, in automobiles and in eating places with the jury members, mingling with the jurors. . . ."
This motion was denied without any further evidentiary hearing, and Turner was sentenced to death by electrocution.
244 La. at 454, 152 So.2d at 557-558.
While thus casting its judgment in terms of state law, the court's affirmance of Turner's conviction necessarily rejected his claim that the conduct of the trial had violated the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 8] We hold otherwise with respect to the federal constitutional issue, and accordingly reverse the judgment before us.
standards of due process. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257; Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U. S. 510. 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 349 U. S. 136. In the ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or his life. In the language of Lord Coke a juror must be as 'indifferent as he stands unsworne.' Co.Litt. 155b. His verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial. Cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199. This is true regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender, or the station in life which he occupies. It was so written into our law as early as 1807 by Chief Justice Marshall in 1 Burr's Trial 416. . . ."
"The jury is an essential instrumentality -- an appendage -- of the court, the body ordained to pass upon guilt or innocence. Exercise of calm and informed judgment by its members is essential to proper enforcement of law."
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 749, 279 U. S. 765. Mr. Justice Holmes stated no more than a truism when he observed that "[a]ny judge who has sat with juries knows that, in spite of forms, they are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere." Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, at 237 U. S. 349 (dissenting opinion).
developed" against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel. What happened in this case operated to subvert these basic guarantees of trial by jury. It is to be emphasized that the testimony of Vincent Rispone and Hulon Simmons was not confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution. On the contrary, the credibility which the jury attached to the testimony of these two key witnesses must inevitably have determined whether Wayne Turner was to be sent to his death. To be sure, their credibility was assailed by Turner's counsel through cross-examination in open court. But the potentialities of what went on outside the courtroom during the three days of the trial may well have made these courtroom proceedings little more than a hollow formality. Cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723.
It would have undermined the basic guarantees of trial by jury to permit this kind of an association between the jurors and two key prosecution witnesses who were not deputy sheriffs. But the role that Simmons and Rispone played as deputies made the association even more prejudicial. For the relationship was one which could not but foster the jurors' confidence in those who were their official guardians during the entire period of the trial. [Footnote 12] And Turner's fate depended upon how much confidence the jury placed in these two witnesses.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
244 La. 447, 152 So.2d 555.
Out of the presence of the jury, Turner did testify upon the issue of the voluntariness of his confession, stating, among other things, that he had had no sleep and nothing to eat for a period of 48 hours before he confessed, but he was not in custody during much of that period. He also stated that he was not advised of his "legal rights" before he confessed.
"From the moment of the acceptance of any juror until the rendition of verdict or the entry of a mistrial, as the case may be, the jurors shall be kept together under the charge of an officer in such a way as to be secluded from all outside communication; provided that in cases not capital the judge may, in his discretion, permit the jurors to separate at any time before the actual delivery of his charge."
"Anything that you need you will have to obtain through the Deputy, and any calls that you want to make the Deputies will have to make for you."
"Q. Have you been assisting the other Deputies during the course of this trial, in retiring the Jury and in caring for their needs?"
"Q. As much as any other Deputy on the Sheriff's staff?"
"A. I would say as much."
"Q. Isn't it a fact that you have been sitting in this vicinity through the course of the trial?"
"A. That is a fact."
"Q. Have you spoken at any time during the course of the trial to any of the Jurors? About anything?"
"Q. In connection with providing for their needs . . . seeing that they were comfortable . . . showing them when to go into the Jury Room et cetera?"
"Q. Dy. Simmons have you been with the Jury the course of this trial? A. I have been with them, yes sir."
"Q. On how many occasions, do you know?"
"A. I can't answer that."
"Q. A number of occasions?"
"A. I have been with them or around them throughout the trial."
"Q. Speaking to them about various and sundry matters?"
"Q. Have you ever discussed this case with any one of them?"
"Q. But you have spoken to them?"
"A. I have talked to them, yes sir."
"Q. Made the acquaintance of some of them?"
"A. I knew most of them."
"Q. But, you have made new acquaintances?"
"A. I would say yes. One or two that I didn't know."
"Q. Do you get along well with the Jury Members?"
"A. I try to get along with everbody [sic]."
"Q. There has been no friction in your relationship during these last two days?"
"A. Not as far as I know Sir."
"Q. Have you stayed here any night and watched over the Jury?"
"Q. Have you had several meals with the Jury?"
"A. I have had at least two meals with them."
"Q. Sitting at the same table with them?"
"Q. You have ridden in automobiles with them to and from the restaurant?"
"Q. Dy. Simmons you are the Chief Deputy?"
"A. Chief Criminal Deputy, yes sir."
"Q. As such, you have a position superior to the other Deputies on the Staff? In other words, are you considered the boss or the supervisor, or the superior of the other Deputies?"
"A. I make an effort to supervise them, yes sir."
"Q. That is your job?"
"A. That is my job."
"Q. In the conduct of the Jury, is it not true that you have been in charge of this?"
"A. Yes sir, I would say so."
"Q. You are the Chief Deputy Sheriff handling the Jury?"
"A. Yes sir. I designate certain Deputies to do certain things with the Jury."
"Q. And some of the things you do yourself?"
"that the presence of state's witnesses, whether they be deputies or not, is of itself prejudicial to the constitutional rights of Defendant and violative of due process of law."
The court's opinion did discuss and seemingly rely on a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300. In that case, an appeal from a federal district court's denial of habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted in a Kansas court, it was held on facts apparently similar to those in the present case that there had been no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It appears that every state constitution provides for trial by jury. See, e.g., Alaska Const., Art. 1, § 11; Idaho Const., Art. 1, § 7; Nevada Const., Art. I, § 3; North Dakota Const., Art. I, § 7; see Columbia University Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Index Digest of State Constitutions, 579 (1959).
See notes 5 and | 5 and S. 466fn6|>6, supra.
It is with regret that I dissent in this case. If I were sitting on the Supreme Court of Louisiana, I would vote to reverse it, and do everything possible to put a stop to the practice of permitting an officer who testifies in a case also to be in charge of the jury.
a similar case from the Tenth Circuit, [Footnote 2/3] in which this Court denied certiorari in 1951, the court upheld the conviction on the ground that there was no evidence that a testifying sheriff had acted irregularly in performing as custodian of the jury.
In view of this widespread acceptance of the practice, I cannot say that it is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Cf. my dissent in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 (1963).
E.g., Hendrix v. State, 200 Ark. 973, 141 S.W.2d 852 (1940); State v. Hart, 226 N.C. 200, 37 S.E.2d 487 (1946); Newby v. State, 17 Okl.Cr. 291, 188 P. 124 (1920); Underwood v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 348, 39 S.W.2d 45 (1931).
5 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 2109 at 290, n. 2 (Anderson ed. 1957); 53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 858 at 625; 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1352 at 946. See also Ann.Cas.1912C at 882; Ann.Cas.1917B at 254.
Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 873 (1951).

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