Source: http://thecomplexlitigator.com/post-data/tag/Discovery
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:35:53+00:00

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On our way to reaching these conclusions, we address several issues pertaining to sealing orders that have remained unsettled, including the reach of California Rules of Court, rules 2.550 and 2.551, and media participation in sealing hearings. We also discuss tools available to the trial courts to deal with abusive litigation tactics impacting the handling of sealing issues. Indeed, we are appalled at the burden the parties foisted on the trial court here and view this case as a companion to the decision of our brethren in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 289–290, decrying unnecessary and oppressive summary judgment tactics.
"Nearly all jurisdictions, including California, have long recognized a common law right of access to public documents, including court records." Slip op., at 8. "More recently, many jurisdictions, including California, have recognized a constitutional right of access to certain court documents grounded in the First Amendment." Slip op., at 9. "Not all documents submitted or filed by the parties, however, fall within the ambit of the constitutional right of access. NBC Subsidiary hastened to add the courts have held 'the First Amendment does not compel public access to discovery materials that are neither used at trial nor submitted as a basis for adjudication.'" Slip op., at 10. "In response to NBC Subsidiary, the Judicial Council promulgated 'the sealed records rules,' rules 2.550, 2.551." Slip op., at 11.
Defendants maintain Mercury sets forth a bright-line standard: confidential discovery material merely filed (or, more accurately, lodged) with the court, but not actually “considered or relied on” by the court in connection with the basis on which it rules, is not “submitted as a basis for adjudication” and, thus, is not subject to the sealed records rules. We do not agree Mercury can or should be boiled down to such a limited view.
Slip op., at 21. Instead, the Court held that by "submitting" material for adjudication of (non-discovery) pre-trial motions, the submitting party triggered application of the sealing rules: "defendants’ narrow construction would necessarily mean sealing decisions would be made after-the-fact—that is, after the trial court issues its substantive ruling—because only then would the ground or grounds on which the court rules be known." Slip op., at 23.
The problem is two-fold—parties who fail to exercise any discipline as to the confidential documents with which they inundate the courts, and parties who indiscriminately insist every document satisfies the rigorous requirements of the sealed records rules. This case exemplifies both.
Slip op., at 26-27 (footnotes omitted). The Court encouraged trial courts to sanction parties for abuses or strike improper material to curb such abuses.
A party seeking to have records sealed under the sealed records rules must make an evidentiary showing sufficient to support the findings required by those rules. (Rule 2.551(b)(1).) While “conclusory or otherwise unpersuasive” declarations that parrot statutory or rule-based requirements are generally inadequate (Providian, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 301), the privacy interest in some documents, like medical records, is so apparent a declaration is not required (Oiye, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070).
Slip op., at 29. The balance of the opinion, nearly 30 pages, sets forth the Court's analysis of the propriety of the sealing order for specific documents. In many instances, the Court held that either a small portion of a long document should have been sealed or the entire document should have been stricken.
What procedures must a Court follow when a plaintiff settles, leaving a "headless" putative class action?
I've faced a species of this issue myself. But it turns out that the answer to this question involves more potential twists and turns than one might first believe. Seems there's more than one way to skin this headless cat. And, in a most interesting twist, the appellate division tackling this question is very same division that decided Parris v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 285 (2003) [pre-certification communications with class members], Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 4th 554 (2007) [discovery of putative class member identity and contact information], and Lee v. Dynamex, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 1325 (2008) [discovery of putative class member identity and contact information], so one might say that this division has a certain expertise regarding this prickly area.
In Pirjada v. Superior Court (December 12, 2011), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Seven) issued an order to show cause but ultimately denied the petition for a writ of mandate brought by the plaintiff following the denial of a discovery motion. The plaintiff settled his individual claim through direct negotiations with defendant's CEO. The trial court granted leave to amend the complaint to name a new class representative but denied the motion to compel precertification discovery to identify a suitable class representative.
What will ultimately happen in this case remains unclear. But this opinion does identify key decisions that might have changed the result, though that is hard to say with certainty.
The Court began its discussion by restating existing standards. First, class member rights are protected, even pre-certification. Second, court approval is not needed to communicate with putative class members, but when a court's assistance is solicited, a court can consider the potential for abuse. Third, class member contact information is "generally discoverable." Fourth, lead plaintiffs, who are unqualified to serve as a class representative may, "in a proper case," move for discovery to find a new representative. However, the Court also noted that precertification discovery is not a matter of absolute right.
Next, citing La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 5 Cal. 3d 864 (1971) and Kagan v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn., 35 Cal. 3d 582 (1984) (disapproved in part on another ground in Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 45 Cal.4th 634 (2009)), the Court emphasized the trial court's obligation, as also stated in Rule 3.770, to consider carefully any request to dismiss a class action and evaluate whether notice is necessary.
Then, after noting that the standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard, the Court explained why the writ must be denied. Petitioner first argued, as a matter of discovery law, that because defendant failed to respond to document requests, it waived any objection. Absent a finding that the failure was the result of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, Petitioner argued that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to compel. Second, as a matter of the procedural law governing class actions, Petitioner argued that the court abused its discretion in declining to authorize notice to potential class members about the need for a substitute representative. The Court found the first contention to be incorrect and the second premature.
Outside the context of representative and class actions it may well be, as Pacific National observes, “a matter of common knowledge and common sense” that once a plaintiff settles his or her case any discovery responses not yet due no longer need to be served. Because the lawsuit against Pacific National was filed as a class action, however, and the individual settlement with Pirjada was made without the participation or consent of his lawyer, the experienced employment law attorneys representing Pacific National should have either objected to the still-outstanding discovery as moot, moved for a protective order or taken steps to ensure that the settlement agreement between their client and Pirjada included a provision withdrawing any remaining discovery requests.
Although the court's decision to deny Westrup Klick's motion for notice to the class was based largely on a distinction between consumer and employee class actions, a distinction we implicitly rejected in Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th 554, the propriety of that ruling is not before us. Westrup Klick did not seek writ review of the court's May 26, 2011 order. Instead, it elected to proceed by way of a motion to compel.
Slip op., at 13. The Court then concluded that the trial court's decision to deny the motion to compel after giving time to find a new representative was not arbitrary or capricious.
Whether or not the superior court's initial decision not to notify potential class members that Pirjada now lacks standing to represent the class was correct, the court will necessarily revisit that question when it hears its order to show cause regarding dismissal. Counsel's declaration in support of the petition for writ of mandate indicates a new class representative cannot be identified by the informal means authorized in Parris, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 285, and discussed by the superior court during the May 26, 2011 hearing. Assuming that remains the case, Westrup Klick will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the court that some form of notice is required to avoid prejudice to absent class members. It would be inappropriate for us to prejudge the outcome of that hearing or to restrict the superior court's discretion by attempting to outline the factors it should weigh in deciding how to comply with the requirements of La Sala, Kagan and Rule 3.770.
Slip op., at 14-15. Riiiiiight. Good thing they didn't give the trial court a look at their cards.
So now you know, at a minimum, that when the representative suddenly hits the eject button, class counsel needs to walk carefully through the dismissal process so as to seek the best possible methods for locating replacement representatives and/or obtaining notice to the putative class.
United States Chief Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James is on a roll with the class member contact information discovery orders. In Currie-White v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2010 WL 1526314 (N.D.Cal. Apr 15, 2010), Magistrate Judge James Ordered defendant to produce class member contact information, subject to certain modifications to a pre-existing protective order in the case. The interesting additional tidbit in this case is that it is described as a "class action against Defendant under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq." Moving to certify PAGA-based penalty claims certainly eliminates all the uncertainty about PAGA-based representative actions.
United States Chief Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James, as if predicting the very contents of my April 21, 2010 Daily Journal article, ordered Defendants AT & T Mobility LLC, New Cingular Wireless PCS LCC, and New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. to produce the contact information for thousands of customers that had complained after incurring international roaming charges without first issuing a privacy notice. McArdle v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 2010 WL 1532334 (N.D.Cal. Apr 16, 2010).
As to providing a written notice to the customers, the Court finds such notice unnecessary. First, Pioneer does not impose a notice requirement. Second, notice would make no sense here, as witnesses cannot choose to “opt out” of civil discovery. Tierno v. Rite Aid Corp., 2008 WL 3287035, at *3 (N.D.Cal.2008). “Generally, witnesses are not permitted to decline to participate in civil discovery, even when the information sought from them is personal or private.” Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.4th at 1242, 1256-57 (2008). The Court notes that the minimal information Plaintiff requests is indeed contemplated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as basic to the discovery process. Specifically, Rule 26(a)(1)(A) requires each party to disclose before formal discovery begins “the names, addresses and telephone numbers of each individual likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.” Here, many of Defendants' complaining customers may be considered percipient witnesses to the relevant issue - international-roaming charges, and could therefore be considered persons having discoverable knowledge and proper subjects of discovery.
Slip op., at 4; see also, Boo-ya, at page bite me. Defendants were given 14 days to provide the contact information.
“Generally, witnesses are not permitted to decline to participate in civil discovery, even when the information sought from them is personal or private.” Yes. Witnesses don't get to opt-out of being witnesses.
The 2010 Labor and Employment Law Symposium provides practical advice and cutting-edge panel discussions on labor and employment law issues of critical importance to attorneys, judges, neutrals, government practitioners, union representatives, in-house counsel, and human resource professionals. The Symposium provides a unique intellectual experience allowing the panelists, all of whom are recognized experts in their fields, to share new perspectives, ideas and information. Each panel discussion covers opposing viewpoints, interpretations and strategies, and will encourage audience questions and participation.
I will be speaking on the panel entitled "20 Tips for Successful Navigation of e-Discovery Requirements," with Moderator Angela Robledo, Hon. Carl J. West, and Heather Morgan.

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