Source: http://az.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180108_0000030.DAZ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:13:10+00:00

Document:
Francisco J. Meza Jimenez, Nydia P. Meza, and Taqueria Cajeme, LLC, d/b/a Taqueria Cajeme, Defendants.
Plaintiff J & J Sports Productions has filed a motion for default judgment against Defendant Francisco J. Meza-Jimenez, individually and doing business as Taqueria Cajeme, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). Doc. 20. No. response has been filed. For reasons stated below, default judgment is appropriate.
Plaintiff obtains licenses to distribute pay-per-view programming to various commercial establishments, including bars and restaurants. Plaintiff contracted for the right to broadcast a boxing match between Saul “Canelo” Alvarez and Amir Khan and related undercard bouts. The program aired May 7, 2016.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants intercepted the program and displayed it to the public at Taqueria Cajeme, a Mexican restaurant and bar operated by Defendants and located at 356 East University Drive in Mesa, Arizona. Plaintiff filed suit seeking statutory damages for Defendants' alleged violations of the Communications Act of 1934 and the Cable and Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605 et seq. Doc. 1.
Plaintiff served process on Defendant Meza-Jimenez on August 23, 2017. Doc. 15. The Clerk entered his default three weeks later, after Defendant failed to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. Doc. 18. Plaintiff then filed the present motion for default judgment Defendant Meza-Jimenez. Doc. 20.
After default is entered by the clerk, the district court may enter default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b). The court's “decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the court should consider and weigh relevant factors as part of the decision-making process, it “is not required to make detailed findings of fact.” Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).
The following factors may be considered in deciding whether default judgment is appropriate: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at stake, (5) the possibility of factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable neglect, and (7) the policy favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). In considering the merits and sufficiency of the complaint, the court accepts as true the complaint's well-pled factual allegations, but the plaintiff must establish all damages sought in the complaint. See Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Having reviewed the complaint and default judgment motion, the Court finds that the Eitel factors favor default judgment and statutory damages in the amount of $30, 000.00 are warranted.
A. Possible Prejudice to Plaintiff.
The first Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. Defendant failed to respond to the complaint or otherwise appear in this action despite being served with the complaint, the application for default, and the motion for default judgment. If Plaintiff's motion is not granted, Plaintiff “will likely be without other recourse for recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The prejudice to Plaintiff in this regard supports the entry of default judgment.
B. Merits of the Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint.
The second and third Eitel factors favor default judgment where, as in this case, the complaint sufficiently states a plausible claim for relief under the Rule 8 pleading standards. See Id. at 1175; Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff seeks relief under 47 U.S.C. § 605. To be held liable for a violation this statute, “a defendant must be shown to have (1) intercepted or aided the interception of, and (2) divulged or published, or aided the divulging or publishing of, a communication transmitted by the plaintiff.” Nat'l Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1981). Section 605 applies to satellite television signals. DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2008).

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