Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/55/234.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:53:40+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. App. 2d › Volume 55 › Yucaipa Farmers Cooperative Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Com.
Yucaipa Farmers Cooperative Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Com.
YUCAIPA FARMERS COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION, ROSETTA FENNELL et al., Respondents.
F. Britton McConnell, J. L. Kearney and Herbert S. McCartney, Jr., for Petitioners.
Everett A. Corten and J. Gould for Respondents.
A writ of review was heretofore issued under the apprehension that at the time she received her injuries respondent Rosetta Fennell was an employee of respondent Thompson and not of Yucaipa Farmers Cooperative Association, hereinafter referred to as Yucaipa. Upon a more thorough study of the case we have derived a different conclusion.
After Mrs. Fennell had worked for a short time, she suffered some physical injuries while picking cherries. She endured pain and discomfort during her ten days on the Kuffel farm, but did not abandon her work. About fourteen days after the accident at Thompson's suggestion, Mrs. Fennell called on Yucaipa and inquired whether or not they would pay her doctor's bill incurred as a result of her injuries. She was there told that payment would not be made for the reason that she had waited too long. The employment of Mrs. Fennell and her associates continued for about ten days, during which time Mr. Thompson supervised all of their activities and paid them in the orchard with cash at the termination of their employment.
Mr. Homer T. Hill, assistant manager of Yucaipa, was called to the stand after the testimony of Mrs. Fennell and her associates had been received. He testified that the executor of the Kuffell estate had taken out a membership in Yucaipa; that he had requested Yucaipa to supervise the harvesting of the crop on the Kuffel estate so that the association "could pick it up and deliver it at the plant and then sell it or haul it to the commisison men here in Los Angeles"; that Yucaipa had contracted with Thompson to gather the Kuffel cherries and agreed to pay him 2 1/2 cents per pound for harvesting the crop; that Yucaipa officials did not know anything about who was employed by Thompson or how much they were paid; that Yucaipa had no interest or control over his disposition of the moneys to be paid him for harvesting the cherries.
"Q. If about the third day he was on the job nothing happened out there, Thompson would be put off that place pretty quick, wouldn't he?
"Q. He was just hired to pick this fruit and you paid him according to the amount of fruit that was delivered at your warehouse?
"Q. And you had no recourse?
"The Referee: In other words, you don't know who is supposed to take care of these people then?
From this testimony it is emphasized that Yucaipa had already crystallized its own interpretation of its engagement of Thompson as an independent contractor. Such construction of the agreement is further justified by the answer given Mrs. Fennell on the occasion of her request for payment of her doctor's bill and by the fact that Yucaipa supplied the equipment used by the workers in picking the cherries.
The workers having applied for employment at the Yucaipa office were sent to Thompson who was in charge of the Kuffel land which was under contract to Yucaipa to supervise the harvesting of the cherries grown there. Not only did Thompson hold himself out to the workers as foreman of the pickers for Yucaipa, but likewise did Yucaipa put Thompson in the position of one possessed of authority to act on behalf of Yucaipa. Nothing was said by him or by the officers of Yucaipa to indicate that he had contracted on his own account to gather the cherry crop. His statement to the pickers was that he was Yucaipa's foreman. When they asked Yucaipa for employment, its office sent them to Thompson.
 Upon such evidence, for the commission to have determined that Milt Thompson individually was employer of Mrs. Fennell would not only have operated an injustice but also, it would have gone contrary to the decisions of the appellate courts.  The power of a person at will to terminate the service of one engaged to perform a task is a persuasive circumstance that the relationship was that of master and servant. (Chapman v. Edwards, 133 Cal. App. 72, 77 [24 P.2d 211].) When a person performing work for another is subject to the orders, control, and direction of such other, and is liable to be discharged for disobedience, then he is not an independent contractor, but an employee. (Chapman v. Edwards, supra.)  And where the contract of the parties contains no terms expressly affirming or denying the power of control such power must be determined from the reasonable inferences to be drawn from all of the circumstances, the relationship and character of the parties; the nature of the work to be done; [55 Cal. App. 2d 238] the time within which it is to be completed, and the conduct of the parties toward each other with reference to the subject of the contract. (Press Publishing Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 190 Cal. 114, 120 [210 P. 820].)  If from all of the facts only a single inference and one conclusion may be drawn, whether one be an employee or independent contractor is a question of law (Chapman v. Edwards, supra); but if from all the circumstances either may reasonably be determined, it is a question for the trier of the facts to answer.
Wood, (W. J.) J., and McComb, J., concurred.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.