Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/73/247/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:33:35+00:00

Document:
1. Where a court has no jurisdiction of a case, it cannot award costs, or order execution for them to issue.
cannot dismiss and remand the case, upon motion, on the ground that it has no jurisdiction, because the statute is unconstitutional and void.
3. The validity of the defense which such statute may authorize to be made is a distinct subject, and to be passed on by the court when in due form before it.
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,' and that this power 'shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution and the laws of the United States."
With this provision in force as fundamental, Congress, having in 1789 established circuit courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, passed, during the late rebellion, to-wit, March 3, 1863, "An act in relation to habeas corpus and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases," and on the 11th May, 1866, another amendatory of it.
The statutes provided, in respect to all acts done or omitted to be done, "under any law of Congress," or "by virtue of any order, written or verbal, general or special, issued by the President or Secretary of War, or any military officer of the United States holding command" of the place where such act or omission occurred, that such authority should be a defense in all courts for all concerned, to any civil action or criminal prosecution therefor.
The petition of Smith set forth that the trespasses complained of, if committed, were committed during the rebellion by authority of the President of the United States, under an order issued by General G. H. Thomas, an officer of the United States, holding command of the district within which the trespasses are alleged to have occurred, which order was approved by Andrew Johnson then an officer of the United States, and the military governor of the State of Tennessee.
States having command of the district, to do all the things which were done, or are alleged to have been done by the defendants.
"failed to show that they are entitled to have this cause removed from the Circuit Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, to this Court for hearing under the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1863, and the act amendatory thereof, passed May 11, 1866, and that the said acts of Congress, so far as they authorize and provide for the removal of causes from the state to the federal courts in cases where the petitioner shall show that the acts complained of were done under the order of the President or Secretary of War, or of a military commander, or otherwise than under an act of Congress, are unconstitutional and void."
"that said cause be dismissed and remanded to the Circuit Court of Davidson County, and that the defendants . . . pay all the costs incurred in this court, for which execution may issue."
It does not appear that any question was raised in the court below as to the regularity of the proceedings by which the case was removed from the circuit court of the state to the circuit court of the United States. Nor does it appear to have been denied that the acts of Congress referred to embraced the case, and if valid, gave the right to have the transfer made. We are therefore relieved from the necessity of considering those subjects. We have found nothing in the record, and nothing in the statutes which, as we think, authorizes a doubt or objection as to either point.
The judgment of the court proceeded entirely upon the ground of the constitutional invalidity of the provisions in the acts referred to, which relate to the subject.
We have not had an opportunity to see the opinion of the court, and no argument has been submitted to us in behalf of the defendant in error. We are therefore at a loss to imagine what train of reasoning conducted the learned judge to the conclusion announced in the order, and hence are constrained to examine the subject without reference to the particular views which controlled the decision.
costs and execution was consequently void. Such was the necessary result of the conclusions of the court.
This Court has the power to declare an act of Congress to be repugnant to the Constitution, and therefore invalid. But the duty is one of great delicacy, and only to be performed where the repugnancy is clear, and the conflict irreconcilable. Every doubt is to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the law.
The question before us relates to the 4th and 5th sections of the statute of 1863, and the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 5th sections of the statute of 1866.
"by virtue of any order, written or verbal, general or special, issued by the President or Secretary of War, or any military officer of the United States holding command"
of the place where such act or omission occurred, that such authority shall be a defense in all courts for all concerned, to any civil action or criminal prosecution for the acts or omissions complained of.
They provide further for the removal, in the manner prescribed, of all such cases, before or after final judgment, from the state courts to the circuit courts of the United States.
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,"
and that this power "shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution and the laws of the United States." The other particulars of the grant of power it is not necessary in this case to consider.
in its exercise after it has been acquired, are not prescribed. The Constitution is silent upon those subjects. They are remitted without check or limitation to the wisdom of the legislature.
The sixth article declares that "the Constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land." The grant of the judicial power contains no such qualification. It is declared to extend "to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States," without distinction or discrimination as to the latter; nor is there any restriction as to the tribunals -- state or federal -- in which they may arise. Wherever found, they are within the reach of this authority, and subject, for its exercise, to the lawmaking power of the nation.
As regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to vest it. It is the duty of Congress to act for that purpose up to the limits of the granted power. They may fall short of it, but cannot exceed it. To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant. It can be brought into activity in no other way. Jurisdiction, original or appellate, alike comprehensive in either case, may be given. The constitutional boundary line of both is the same. Every variety and form of appellate jurisdiction within the sphere of the power, extending as well to the courts of the states as to those of the nation, is permitted. There is no distinction in this respect between civil and criminal causes. Both are within its scope. Nor is it any objection that questions are involved which are not all of a federal character. If one of the latter exist, if there be a single such ingredient in the mass, it is sufficient. That element is decisive upon the subject of jurisdiction.
United States whenever its correct decision depends upon the right construction of either."
The jurisdiction here in question involves the same principle, and rests upon the same foundation with that conferred by the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The constitutionality of that provision has been uniformly sustained by the unanimous judgment of this Court whenever the subject has been presented for adjudication. The twelfth section of the act of 1789, and the third section of the act of the 2d March, 1833, relating to revenue officers, present the same question. We are not aware that a doubt as to the validity of either has ever been expressed by any federal court. The acquiescence is now universal.
We entertain no doubt of the constitutionality of the jurisdiction given by the acts under which this case has arisen.
The validity of the defense authorized to be made is a distinct subject. It involves wholly different inquiries. We have not had occasion to consider it. It has no connection whatever with the question of jurisdiction.
The order of the court below is reversed. An order will be remitted that the cause be reinstated, and that the court proceed in it according to law.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 821.
United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450.
3 Stat. at Large 198.

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