Source: https://www.lynchowens.com/blog/2018/june/appeals-court-out-of-court-agreements-to-reduce-/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 17:53:22+00:00

Document:
Attorney Nicole K. Levy reviews a recent Massachusetts Appeals Court decision that may include an incorrect legal standard.
This blog started out as an analysis of recent unpublished Appeals Court decision, Ceurvels v. Murphy (2018), which provided a useful jumping off point for discussing informal agreements to reduce child support, which are problematic under Massachusetts law. As the blog proceeded, however, another issue came to the forefront: a possible error of law in the Appeals Court decision itself.
In an effort to cover both subjects, I have broken the blog into two parts. In Part 1, I discuss the issue of informal agreements to reduce child support, and the (very) limited circumstances in which Massachusetts courts might enforce such agreements. In Part 2 of the blog, I review a potential error that I detected in the recent unpublished Appeals Court opinion, Ceurvels v. Murphy (2018).
Once judgement enters for child support in Massachusetts, any agreement between the parents to reduce child support must generally be approved by a judge in order to be enforceable. Informal, “out of court” agreements between parties to reduce child support are not usually enforceable. This is because a statute, G. L. c. 119A, § 13(a), prohibits Massachusetts Probate Court Judges from retroactively modifying any child support obligations or child support arrearage that accrued prior to the filing a of Complaint for Modification. In other words, unless parties take steps to have their child support agreement formally entered by a court as part of a modification case, the original child support order will remain in effect, regardless of any informal agreement between the parties to reduce child support.
We blogged about the narrow exception to the unenforceability of informal child support agreements around the time the Appeals Court decision in Rosen v. Rosen (2016) case was announced. Today, we will look at another case that seems to provide an exception – or at least a way around – the ordinary rule that informal child support agreements are not enforceable.
As we will discuss further below, the Rosen case created a very narrow exception to the ordinary rule against the enforceability of informal child support agreements. In Ceurvels, the parties entered a divorce settlement that required the father to pay $500 per week. At a hearing on the mother’s post-divorce Complaint for Contempt, the father admitted to paying as little as $250 per week at times. The Appeals Court record suggests that the father’s underpayment was the result of an informal agreement with the mother to reduce child support which was never entered as an order in the probate and family court.
In addition to establishing that the father was in "disobedience of a clear and unequivocal command," the mother also bore the burden of establishing that the father had a present ability to pay. Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 852-853 (2009), quoting from Judge Rotenberg Educ. Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Retardation (No. 1), 424 Mass. 430, 443 (1997).
[T]he father testified that he was unemployed and unable to meet the financial obligations to which he agreed in the divorce settlement. This testimony is uncontroverted. Additionally, as conceded by the mother, she did not establish the extent of the father's unpaid child support, nor the time periods he had failed to pay the full amount. On this record, therefore, we cannot conclude the judge abused his discretion in finding that the mother had failed to establish that the father was in contempt.
[T]he judge gave the mother ample opportunity to supplement the record, which resulted in the mother raising additional issues once the judge began winding down the hearing but did not result in the proffer of any other evidence regarding the father's finances or his nonpayment.
When we consider the risks involved with informal child support agreements, most of the risk falls on the party who is paying child support at a reduced rate. When child support payers enter informal agreements to pay reduced child support, they often assume that the recipient will be required to honor the agreement if the parties later return to Court. In the vast majority of cases, however, the child support payer is in for a rude awakening: The Court is unlikely to enforce an informal agreement to reduce child support, and the payer will be on the hook for all of the unpaid arrears that have built up while he or she has paid child support at a reduced rate.
[T]he support payor must demonstrate that (1) the support recipient agreed (a) to transfer custody of the child to the payor for an extended period of time not contemplated in the original custody order, and (b) to accept the payor’s direct support of the child as an alternative method of satisfying the payor’s child support obligation; (2) the custody transfer was not the result of duress, coercion, or undue influence exerted by the payor against either the recipient or the child; (3) the payor provided the child with adequate support and maintenance while the child was principally domiciled in the payor’s home; (4) the recipient was relieved of supporting the child during the period in question; (5) the alternative support arrangement was not contrary to the child’s best interests; and (6) granting a credit to the payor for his or her direct support of the child would not result in injustice or undue hardship to the recipient.
In most cases involving informal agreements to reduce child support, the Rosen exception/defense simply isn’t available. However, the Ceurvels decision demonstrates that the risk is not totally one-sided when parties enter informal agreements to reduce child support. Ceurvels shows that a child support recipient who agrees to accept less child support than provided in a judgement also faces some risk.
Inability to Pay Defense and Informal Child Support Agreement: What’s the Connection?
Under Massachusetts law, a party cannot be found in contempt for failing to pay child support if he or she lacks the ability to pay the child support owed. If a parent receiving child support has agreed to allow the other parent to pay child support at a reduced rate for a lengthy period of time, the natural consequence is large child support arrears. The larger the child support arrears, the easier it may be for a defendant to claim he or she lacks the ability to pay the child support is due in a contempt case.
Part 2: Did the Ceurvels Decision Contain A Rare Legal Error from the Appeals Court?
So which legal standard is correct for proving an inability to pay child support? Is it the Birchall standard, which places the burden for proving an inability to pay on the plaintiff? Or is it G.L. c. 215, § 34, which explicitly places the burden of proof on the defendant?
The father had the burden of proving that he was incapable of complying with the order. See G. L. c. 215, § 34; Diver v. Diver, 402 Mass. 599, 603 (1988). `[T]he judge was warranted in finding that the [father] had disobeyed [the] order. . . . Nothing in the record demonstrates that, as a matter of law, the [father] satisfied his burden of proving his inability to comply with the judge's orders.' Diver, supra.
At the hearing on a complaint for civil contempt, the defendant has the burden of proving his or her inability to comply with the preexisting order or judgment of which the complaint alleges violation. See G. L. c. 215, § 34.
To be clear, this blog is merely an informational review of the case law. The author has not briefed of issue of the Birchall standard vs. the applicability of G.L. c. 215, § 34 to inability to pay arguments in child support cases. These are complex issues, and a complete analysis of the legal standard would exceed the scope of an informational blog. Assuming, however, that G. L. c. 215, § 34 should have assigned the burden of proof in the Ceurvels case to the father, this may have impacted the Court's analysis - if not the final outcome of the case - in significant ways.
Could Ceurvels Have Been Decided Differently on Appeal?
Although the judge did not include any comment about the mother's lack of proof on this element in the rationale for his judgment, the father testified that he was unemployed and unable to meet the financial obligations to which he agreed in the divorce settlement. This testimony is uncontroverted. Additionally, as conceded by the mother, she did not establish the extent of the father's unpaid child support, nor the time periods he had failed to pay the full amount. On this record, therefore, we cannot conclude the judge abused his discretion in finding that the mother had failed to establish that the father was in contempt.
Again, it is very possible that the Appeals Court could have found that the father in Ceurvels met his burden of proof to establish that he lacked the ability to pay the child support order. After all, the Court notes that the mother in Ceurvels offered no evidence or testimony to counter the father’s claim that he lacked the ability to pay. However, if the burden properly belonged to the father, it is also possible that this could change the Court's analysis to alter the outcome.

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