Source: http://www.abondroit.com/2014/07/employees-get-noticed.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:03:45+00:00

Document:
The Supreme Court of Canada has rendered an important decision in Quebec employment law. In its decision released Friday, Quebec (Commission des normes du travail) v. Asphalte Desjardins Inc. (2014 SCC 51), the Supreme Court held that an employer has to pay an employee during the notice period the employee gives when they resign, so long as that period is reasonable in the circumstances.
The facts are relatively simple. The employee worked for the Respondent since 1994 and had a contract of indeterminate term. In February, 2008, the employee gave three weeks notice of his resignation. After the Respondent tried unsuccessfully to convince him to stay, it decided to terminate his employment immediately and refused to pay the notice period. The Commission des norms du travail claimed an indemnity equivalent to three weeks under s. 82 of the Labour Standards Act (the “Act”) (although under that section he would have been entitled to four weeks of statutory notice).
 A decision by a court of appeal that overrules a dominant line of authority at the trial level is not, of course, open to challenge for that reason alone. On the contrary, such a decision is within the jurisdiction of an appellate court. After all, someone always has to take the first step if the law is to change. Nevertheless, it is impossible to disregard the impact of such a radical reversal in a field of law whose general principles, while based on civil law rules, are also subject to specific legislative provisions relating exclusively to labour relations, which is what makes this appeal so important.
 More broadly, art. 1439 C.C.Q. establishes the principle that a contract is irrevocable: a party cannot resiliate it unilaterally except on grounds recognized by law or by agreement of the parties. The parties to the contract must therefore, inter alia, respect its term. This principle also applies to a contract for an indeterminate term, such as the one at issue in the case at bar. Thus, D. Lluelles and B. Moore state that [translation] “the contract for an indeterminate term is, in principle, just as irrevocable as the contract for a fixed term. . . . A contracting party cannot be allowed to revoke the contract suddenly, brusquely and immediately”.
 It is well established that a contract is not automatically resiliated upon receipt of a notice of termination and that, on the contrary, the contractual relationship continues to exist until the date specified in the notice given by the employee or the employer. This means that even after one of the parties to a contract of employment for an indeterminate term gives the other party notice of termination, both parties must continue to perform their obligations under the contract until the notice period expires. This includes the obligation to give notice of termination set out in art. 2091 C.C.Q., which the other party must meet if he or she wishes in turn to terminate the contract before the notice given by the first expires. The argument that the parties’ legal situation “crystallizes” when notice of termination is given in that the notice merely delays the termination of the employment by postponing the employee’s date of departure must therefore fail. The notice of termination does not immediately terminate the contract of employment, preserving only the conditions of employment during the notice period. Rather, the contract itself continues to exist in its entirety until that period expires.
 In sum, an employer who receives from an employee the notice of termination provided for in art. 2091 C.C.Q. cannot terminate the contract of employment for an indeterminate term unilaterally without in turn giving notice of termination or paying an indemnity in lieu of such notice. The notice given by the employee does not have the effect of immediately releasing the parties from their respective obligations under the contract. If the employer prevents the employee from working and refuses to pay him or her during the notice period, it is “terminating the contract” within the meaning of s. 82 of the Act respecting labour standards.
 Of course, the notice period chosen unilaterally by the employee cannot be “imposed” on the employer. An employer can deny an employee access to the workplace during the notice period, but must nonetheless pay his or her wages for that period, provided that the employee’s notice of termination was given in reasonable time. The employer can also choose to terminate the contract by giving notice of termination in reasonable time or by paying the corresponding indemnity in accordance with art. 2091 C.C.Q. and under ss. 82 and 83 of the Act respecting labour standards (…).
 Article 2092 C.C.Q. makes it impossible for an employee to renounce redress for an injury flowing from, inter alia, insufficient notice of termination. Put differently, art. 2092 C.C.Q. precludes the employer from limiting its liability. It nullifies any clause in a contract of employment by which the employee has renounced the indemnity to which he or she would be entitled should the employer terminate the contract unilaterally without sufficient notice.
 This is a protective provision of public order, and the employee — the party for whose benefit the provision was enacted — cannot renounce the right in question until it has been acquired.
 Given that art. 2092 C.C.Q. deals with renunciation of the indemnity to which the employee is entitled in cases in which the notice of termination is insufficient (or in which the manner of resiliation is abusive), it is wrong to conclude that the absence of an equivalent provision in the employer’s favour means that the employer may “renounce” a notice of termination received from the employee. The prohibition established in art. 2092 C.C.Q. does not imply — as the majority of the Court of Appeal suggest — that otherwise the possibility of renouncing the notice of termination of art. 2091 C.C.Q. is the “default” rule.
 An employee who tells the employer that he or she intends to resign effective immediately but who nonetheless offers to remain for a certain time must be aware and accept that the employer could renounce its right to notice of termination: if the employer does indeed want the employee to leave immediately, there is a meeting of minds and notice of termination is unnecessary, since a contract for an indeterminate term can be terminated by agreement of the parties (art. 1439 C.C.Q.). In such a case, art. 2092 C.C.Q., which precludes the employee from renouncing his or her right to obtain an indemnity, does not apply, since the termination of the employment does not then flow from a unilateral act by the employer. Nor would the indemnity provided for in ss. 82 and 83 of the Act respecting labour standards apply, since the termination of the contract would flow from an agreement between the parties: the employer could not be found to have terminated the contract.
Since, in the present case, the employee gave a clear notice of termination in his resignation letter, the employer was not free to simply refuse it, and notice was due to the employee when it chose to have him not work a notice period.

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 art. 1439
 art. 2091
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 art. 2092
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