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Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:49:25+00:00

Document:
française de common law inc.
Neutral citation: 2005 SCC 74.
2005: October 20; 2005: December 15.
Official languages — Municipalities — Civil proceedings against municipality — Language obligations — New Brunswick legislation on official languages requiring “institution” party to civil proceedings to use official language chosen by other party — Whether word “institution” in legislation includes municipalities — Whether institution obligated to translate evidence and quotations from legal decisions — Official Languages Act, S.N.B. 2002, c. O‑0.5, ss. 1 “institution”, 22.
Statutes — Interpretation — Language rights.
C brought an application, in French, against the City of Saint John. The City and the Attorney General of New Brunswick moved to have the application struck. The City’s pleadings were presented in English only. The Attorney General’s pleadings were in French, but some citations were in English. C objected to receiving pleadings in English on the basis that s. 22 of the Official Languages Act (“OLA”) of New Brunswick enacted in 2002 applied to the City and required it to adopt the language of proceedings chosen by him. Both the Court of Queen’s Bench and the Court of Appeal found that s. 22 of the OLA does not apply to municipalities and cities because that interpretation would create internal incoherence within the OLA.
Held (Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed.
Considered: Charlebois v. Moncton (City) (2001), 242 N.B.R. (2d) 259, 2001 NBCA 117; referred to: R. v. Beaulac,  1 S.C.R. 768; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex,  2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42.
Charlebois v. Moncton (City) (2001), 242 N.B.R. (2d) 259, 2001 NBCA 117; Godbout v. Longueuil (City),  3 S.C.R. 844; R. v. Beaulac,  1 S.C.R. 768; Arsenault‑Cameron v. Prince Edward Island,  1 S.C.R. 3, 2000 SCC 1; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),  1 S.C.R. 27; R. v. McIntosh,  1 S.C.R. 686; 2747‑3174 Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool),  3 S.C.R. 919; Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 1031; Sommers v. The Queen,  S.C.R. 678; Société des Acadiens du Nouveau‑Brunswick Inc. v. Association of Parents for Fairness in Education,  1 S.C.R. 549; Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé) (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 505; R. v. Gautreau (1989), 101 N.B.R. (2d) 1, rev’d (1990), 109 N.B.R. (2d) 54; R. v. Haché (1993), 139 N.B.R. (2d) 81; MacDonald v. Montreal (City),  1 S.C.R. 460; R. v. Potvin (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 641; R. v. Simard (1995), 27 O.R. (3d) 116.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 16 ‑20, 32(1)(b).
Municipalities Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M‑22, ss. 1 “municipality”, 16.
Official Languages Act, S.N.B. 2002, c. O‑0.5, preamble, ss. 1 “city”, “institution”, “municipality”, 3(1), 4, 22, 15-33, 35‑41.
Rules of Court of New Brunswick, N.B. Reg. 82‑73, rule 27.06(1).
Services and Communications Regulation — Official Languages Act, N.B. Reg. 2002‑63, s. 3, Schedule A.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 2004, “pleading”, “process”.
Côté, Pierre‑André. The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 3rd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2000.
Reid, Hubert. Dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien avec table des abréviations et lexique anglais‑français, 3e éd. Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2004, “plaidoirie”.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick (Daigle, Larlee and Deschênes JJ.A.) (2004), 275 N.B.R. (2d) 203, 722 A.P.R. 203, 48 M.P.L.R. (3d) 153,  N.B.J. No. 237 (QL), 2004 NBCA 49, affirming a decision of McLellan J. (2002), 255 N.B.R. (2d) 396, 668 A.P.R. 396, 35 M.P.L.R. (3d) 163,  N.B.J. No. 412 (QL), 2002 NBQB 382. Appeal dismissed, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. dissenting.
Mario Charlebois, appearing on his own behalf.
Michel Doucet and Mark C. Power, for the appellant Association des juristes d’expression française du Nouveau‑Brunswick.
Mélanie C. Tompkins and Marie‑France Major, for the respondent.
Alain Préfontaine, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Chantal A. Thibodeau, for the intervener the Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick.
Johane Tremblay and Christine Ruest, for the intervener the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada.
Antoine F. Hacault and Karine Pelletier, for the intervener Fédération des associations de juristes d’expression française de common law inc.
1 The issue on this appeal is whether the City of Saint John is obliged to use, in any oral or written pleadings or any process issuing from a court, the official language chosen by the appellant Mario Charlebois in the civil proceedings brought by him against the City. Section 22 of the Official Languages Act, S.N.B. 2002, c. O-0.5 (“OLA”), imposes such a duty on “Her Majesty in right of the Province or an institution” who is a party to the civil proceedings. The issue turns on whether or not the word “institution” in s. 22 and defined under s. 1 of the OLA includes municipalities. Both courts below have concluded that it does not and that, consequently, s. 22 does not apply to the City of Saint John. I agree with that conclusion and would dismiss the appeal.
2 Mr. Charlebois brought an application against the City of Saint John (“City”), seeking an order directing it to offer its services equally in both official languages and challenging the constitutional validity of a number of provisions of the OLA. His application was in French. The City and the Attorney General of New Brunswick, as intervener, moved to strike out the application. The issue that concerns us on this appeal arose at the hearing of these interlocutory motions.
22 Where Her Majesty in right of the Province or an institution is a party to civil proceedings before a court, Her Majesty or the institution concerned shall use, in any oral or written pleadings or any process issuing from a court, the official language chosen by the other party.
1. Is the City of Saint John an “institution” within the meaning of s. 22 and, as such, obliged to adopt the official language chosen by Mr. Charlebois in its pleadings or in any process issued by the court?
2. What is the scope of the obligation under s. 22? Must the party provide a translation of quotes from legal decisions included in its pleadings? Must the party provide a translation of the evidence?
16 The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may incorporate a town having a population of ten thousand or more as a city.
6 In an interlocutory decision, the application judge held that the word “institution” as defined under s. 1 of the OLA does not include municipalities and, consequently, does not apply to the City ((2002), 255 N.B.R. (2d) 396, 2002 NBQB 382). Hence, he ruled that the City was entitled to use either or both official languages in the civil proceedings instituted by Mr. Charlebois. He also rejected Mr. Charlebois’s objection as it related to the use of English in the Attorney General’s motion material, finding that s. 22 did not extend to legal quotes or to the evidence. In writing for a unanimous court, Daigle J.A. of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal upheld the application judge’s decision ((2004), 275 N.B.R. (2d) 203, 2004 NBCA 49). Mr. Charlebois appeals from this decision and raises the same two issues before this Court.
7 The second issue can be readily disposed of. I agree with Bastarache J. that the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that “oral or written pleadings” do not include evidence tendered in the course of the proceeding. Nor does s. 22 create an obligation to translate case law cited or incorporated in a book of authorities.
8 Before proceeding to the analysis on the first issue, it is important to stress what this appeal is not about. As we shall see, because of the nature of the right claimed by Mr. Charlebois and the quasi-constitutional status of the OLA, there is a relevant and important constitutional context to this question of statutory interpretation. Nonetheless, the question before the Court on this interlocutory proceeding is restricted to determining the meaning of s. 22, not its constitutional validity. I will return to this important distinction later in these reasons.
9 As indicated at the outset, I agree with the courts below and conclude that municipalities are not included in the s. 1 definition of “institution” in the OLA. I am in substantial agreement with the thorough and lucid reasons of Daigle J.A. in support of this conclusion. I will therefore simply highlight the more salient points in his analysis and add comments of my own as I go along.
11 Daigle J.A. noted the long list of bodies specifically included in the definition and the conspicuous absence of the terms “municipality” and “city” from that list. However, in his view, the fact that the Legislature could easily have included those terms if it had so wanted could not be determinative of the question before the court. At issue, rather, was whether municipalities and cities are included in the descriptive clause as other bodies “established to perform a governmental function by or pursuant to an Act of the Legislature or by or under the authority of the Lieutenant‑Governor in Council”.
12 Relying on the reasoning in Charlebois v. Moncton (City) (2001), 242 N.B.R. (2d) 259, 2001 NBCA 117, where the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, in reasons penned by himself, had concluded that New Brunswick municipalities are institutions of the government for Charter purposes, Daigle J.A. found it “plausible” that the definition of “institution”, on its face, includes municipalities and cities. As I will explain later, the weight that should be given to the decision in Charlebois v. Moncton lies at the heart of my disagreement with the analysis of Bastarache J. Daigle J.A., for his part, found the interpretation, based on the finding in Charlebois v. Moncton, “inconclusive and the analysis incomplete” (para. 27). He therefore proceeded to determine “whether this plausible interpretation [was] consistent both with the purpose and overall scheme of the Act and the intention of the Legislature” (para. 27). For reasons I will outline, he concluded that it was not.
In the context of this case, I believe that a declaration of invalidity subject to a temporary suspension of the effect of the declaration provides the City of Moncton and the provincial government with the flexibility necessary to develop an appropriate solution that will ensure that the appellant’s rights under subsection 18(2) are realized. In this regard, this Court would be loathe to interfere with and impose standards on the legislature. It is obvious that the government has a choice in the institutional means by which its obligations can be met. For example, the exhaustive inquiry of the task force on official languages in New Brunswick (Towards Equality of Official Languages in New Brunswick, at pages 337-84) dealt with the linguistic composition of the population of New Brunswick municipalities. The report acknowledged that a possible approach that would meet the constitutional obligation of the principle of equality of official languages might be to implement a language policy whereby municipal services would be available in both official languages only where numbers warrant. This is a quantitative approach in which certain municipalities might be declared bilingual on the basis of a percentage of the population representing an official language minority. The percentage would have to be determined by the legislature.
In this connection, it should be remembered that section 1 of the Charter allows restrictions of Charter rights only by such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Under this general limitation, the legislature can strike a balance or achieve a compromise between the exercise of a guaranteed right and the safeguarding of society’s best interests. However, while certain limits imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed under subsection 18(2) may be justifiable, this provision creates a requirement of legislative bilingualism that cannot be reduced to unilingualism or a bilingualism that is left to the discretion of municipal councils. This would amount to a denial of the constitutional language right guaranteed by subsection 18(2) . Moreover, by implication, the bilingualism requirement in regard to municipal by-laws extends to the process of enactment.
15 Bastarache J. finds that it would have been more appropriate for the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in this case “to take a positive stance and see whether it was necessary to limit the scope of the newly defined term in light of the difficulties posed by the drafting of the OLA” (para. 32 (emphasis added)). I disagree. First, it is noteworthy that Charlebois v. Moncton dealt with s. 18(2) of the Charter ; hence, the court’s finding that municipalities are “institutions” for the purpose of s. 16(2) is obiter dictum. The question as to whether municipalities are institutions within the meaning of s. 16(2) has never been determined by this Court, it is not before us on this appeal, and I express no opinion on whether or not this interpretation is correct. Second, it is also noteworthy that the province’s constitutional obligations, even as defined in Charlebois v. Moncton, do not mandate a single specific solution. As aptly noted by the court in the above-noted excerpt, there is room for flexibility. The current OLA is the province’s legislative response to its constitutional obligations. It would be inappropriate to pre-empt the analysis with a blanket presumption of Charter consistency. Daigle J.A. therefore was quite correct in pursuing the analysis. This brings us back to the question of statutory interpretation that occupies us: what approach did the province of New Brunswick adopt in respect of its municipalities to meet its constitutional obligations?
16 A reading of the OLA reveals two main structural features. First, the word “institution”, as defined in s. 1, acts as a central provision that identifies those public bodies on which the Legislature imposes particular language obligations in other provisions of the OLA. I will review those obligations shortly. Second, the OLA groups under various headings different areas of activity or services which fall under the purview of the public administration of the province and imposes specific language obligations under each heading. “Municipalities” (which by definition includes cities, towns and villages) is one such heading.
15 Notices, announcements and other documents required to be published under this Act or any other Act by the Province or its institutions shall be printed and published in both official languages.
27 Members of the public have the right to communicate with any institution and to receive its services in the official language of their choice.
28 An institution shall ensure that members of the public are able to communicate with and to receive its services in the official language of their choice.
28.1 An institution shall ensure that appropriate measures are taken to make it known to members of the public that its services are available in the official language of their choice.
29 Institutions shall publish all postings, publications and documents intended for the general public in both official languages.
30 The Province and its institutions are responsible for ensuring that all services offered to the public by third parties on their behalf are delivered in both official languages.
As noted by Daigle J.A., it is plausible that, following the opinion in Charlebois v. Moncton, the Legislature intended to include municipalities in the definition of “institution” even though they are not listed as such under s. 1. On a plain reading of the above-listed provisions, the Legislature would then be taken to have intended to impose those obligations on all municipalities regardless of the official language minority population of those communities.
35(1) A municipality whose official language minority population represents at least 20% of its total population is required to adopt and publish its by‑laws in both official languages.
35(2) A city is required to adopt and publish its by‑laws in both official languages irrespective of the percentage required under subsection (1).
35(3) A municipality or city to which subsection (1) or (2) applies that adopts a new by‑law or amends an existing by‑law after December 31, 2002, shall do so in both official languages.
35(4) Except in the case of a by‑law referred to in subsection (3), a municipality or city to which subsection (1) or (2) applies, other than Moncton, shall adopt and publish its by‑laws in both official languages on or before December 31, 2005.
35(5) Subsection (3) applies, with the necessary modifications, to the minutes of council proceedings.
36 A municipality or city to which subsection 35(1), (2) or section 37 applies shall offer the services and communications prescribed by regulation in both official languages.
37 A municipality may, by by‑law of its municipal council, declare itself bound by the provisions of this Act and nothing in this Act shall be interpreted so as to limit the authority of municipalities to promote the equality of status and use of English and French.
38 The provisions of subsections 35(3), (4) and (5) apply, with the necessary modifications, to a municipality under section 37.
19 If all municipalities, as institutions, are obliged to print and publish their by-laws in both official languages under s. 29, why would it matter what percentage was represented by the official language minority population in any given municipality? Likewise, what would be the sense of prescribing by regulation those services and communications required to be offered in both official languages if all municipalities, as institutions, were required under ss. 27 to 30 to provide them all? What is left for a municipality to declare itself bound under s. 37 if it is already bound by the general obligations imposed on institutions? Those are the “incoherent and illogical consequences” that Daigle J.A. found determinative in the search for the Legislature’s intent. I agree, particularly because, if the opposite interpretation is adopted and “institution” is read as not including municipalities, the internal coherence is restored. Bastarache J. would read the specific obligations set out under the heading “Municipalities” as exceptions to the general provisions applying to institutions. With respect, this approach would require much reading in and reading out, none of which is consistent with the limited role that Charter values can play as an interpretative tool.
20(1) A person who is alleged to have committed an offence under an Act or a regulation of the Province or under a municipal by-law has the right to have the proceedings conducted in the language of his or her choice and shall be informed of that right by the presiding judge before entering a plea.
21 It is clear on the language of s. 20(1) that the choice of official language of the defendant in quasi-criminal proceedings will always trump, regardless of the identity of the prosecuting body. Hence, all municipalities are bound by this provision in the prosecution of their by-laws. The rule is different with respect to civil proceedings. The choice of official language of the same defendant who is a party to a civil proceeding will not necessarily trump. In accordance with the constitutionally mandated general rule, each litigant can choose his or her official language of preference. It is only where the other litigant is Her Majesty, or an “institution”, that the statute gives precedence to the individual litigant’s choice. Two competing interpretations are put before the Court. On the one hand, as the appellants contend, did the Legislature intend to advance judicial bilingualism by extending the application of s. 22 to all municipalities regardless of the minority language population? Of course, that legislative choice was open. On the other hand, as the City contends, did the Legislature choose to extend its application only to those listed bodies under the s. 1 definition of “institution”, leaving it up to municipalities to opt in pursuant to s. 37 if they so choose? That legislative choice was also open. Whether or not the latter choice is constitutional is a separate issue, and precisely the question that is not before us on this appeal. There is no doubt, however, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the more restrictive approach was open to the Legislature and, in this case, it is the only interpretation that creates no illogical or incoherent consequences when read in the context of the statute as a whole.
22 Bastarache J. is of the view that if the definition of “institution” excluded municipalities this would give rise to an incongruity in the fact that a bilingual city like Moncton, or one subject to specific obligations regarding the provision of its services in both official languages like Saint John, would be obliged under s. 20(1) to adopt the language of any person prosecuted under a by-law but would be free to use either official language in any civil proceeding to which it was a party. With respect, if there is any incongruity in the fact that a municipality may have different language obligations depending on whether it is prosecuting under a by-law or is a party to a civil proceeding, this situation has been in existence since 1982 when the choice of official language of a defendant in quasi-criminal proceedings was first accorded special recognition by the Legislature in New Brunswick and no similar provision was adopted in respect of civil proceedings. However, it is my view that the different nature of the proceedings removes any incongruity. The requirements of natural justice are not necessarily the same in quasi-criminal and civil proceedings. I find nothing incongruous in the choice of a blanket provision such as s. 20(1) to meet the exigencies of justice in a quasi-criminal setting, while leaving justice to be achieved on a case‑by‑case application of s. 18 in civil proceedings involving municipalities that have not opted in pursuant to s. 37. Section 18 provides that “[n]o person shall be placed at a disadvantage” by reason of his or her choice of official language.
24 In the context of this case, resorting to this tool exemplifies how its misuse can effectively pre-empt the judicial review of the constitutional validity of the statutory provision. It risks distorting the Legislature’s intent and depriving it of the opportunity to justify any breach, if so found, as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter . In this respect, Daigle J.A. properly instructed himself and rightly found, at para. 58, that the contextual and purposive analysis of the OLA “removed all ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word ‘institution’”. Absent any remaining ambiguity, Charter values have no role to play.
25 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
26 The appellant Mario Charlebois decided to question the validity of a number of sections of the Official Languages Act, S.N.B. 2002, c. O-0.5 (“OLA”), in an application brought, in French, against the City of Saint John (“City”). The City and the Attorney General of New Brunswick, an intervener, moved to have the application struck. The City’s pleadings were presented in English only. The Attorney General’s pleadings were in French, but some citations in his brief and one document, were in English only. Mr. Charlebois objected to receiving pleadings in English on the basis that s. 22 of the OLA applied to the City of Saint John and required it to adopt the language of proceedings chosen by him. Mr. Charlebois’s objection gave rise to decisions of the Court of Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal, and a hearing in this Court.
27 This appeal is not about the constitutionality of the OLA. It is only concerned with the interpretation of s. 22 of the OLA and with determining whether the word “institution” therein applies to municipalities and cities in the context of the OLA. This Court cannot accept the invitation of some interveners to revisit the question of the scope of the rights in s. 19(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
28 The courts below found that s. 22 does not apply to municipalities and cities because that interpretation would create internal incoherence within the OLA; ss. 27 and 36 of the OLA, dealing with communications with the public and services offered to the public, in particular, would come into conflict with each other. Another inconsistency would result from ss. 15 and 35, dealing with the language of by-laws.
29 The context in which this appeal comes to this Court is particularly important. It must be noted that the OLA of 2002 was adopted after the decision of the Government of New Brunswick to implement the decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Charlebois v. Moncton (City) (2001), 242 N.B.R. (2d) 259, 2001 NBCA 117, where it was decided that s. 32(1) (b) of the Charter applies to municipalities and cities in New Brunswick. Applying Godbout v. Longueuil (City),  3 S.C.R. 844, the Court of Appeal in that case decided that municipalities and cities were created by the province, exercise government functions attributed to them by the Legislature or government, and draw their powers from provincial laws. They are therefore “institutions of the legislature and government”. Applying the same criteria to s. 16(2) of the Charter , the Court of Appeal found that this section also applied to municipalities and cities in New Brunswick.
30 In this appeal, the Court is asked to determine whether the words “institution of the Legislative Assembly or the Government of New Brunswick”, within the meaning of s. 32(1) (b) of the Charter , and as used in the definition section of the OLA, s. 1, should bear the same interpretation. The context in which this exercise is to take place is extremely important: the OLA of 2002 constitutes a quasi-constitutional Act that must be interpreted according to the clear principles outlined by this Court in R. v. Beaulac,  1 S.C.R. 768, and Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island,  1 S.C.R. 3, 2000 SCC 1.
31 The difficulty posed in this appeal is due to the imprecision of the definition section and the structure of the OLA. With regard to imprecision, what is remarkable is that although the word “institution” refers to the actual words defined by the Court of Appeal in its 2001 decision, the OLA has a separate definition for municipalities that does not refer to the term “institution”. With regard to the structure of the OLA, what is troublesome is that the general sections which provide for obligations regarding the publication of laws and regulations, as well as communications with the public and services to the public, apply to all “institutions”, while some institutions are dealt with in other parts of the OLA without the obligations defined therein being, in some cases, made subject to the general provisions or said to apply notwithstanding those provisions. It is therefore difficult to draw clear inferences with regard to legislative intent because, while some sections seem to overlap, i.e. communications with the public and municipalities, others contain a limitation on the scope of the word “institution”, i.e. s. 4 dealing with educational and cultural institutions. In the case of planning and solid waste commissions, it is worth noting that particular obligations are set out in ss. 39 to 41 while commissions are expressly mentioned under the definition of “institution” in s. 1. Other sections provide for an extension of the term “institution”, i.e. s. 33(1) dealing with health facilities and establishments. Some sections, in particular the one dealing with the administration of justice, which occupies us here, do not give rise to any conflicts and could be considered as self-standing, as argued by the Association des juristes d’expression française du Nouveau-Brunswick (“AJEFNB”).
32 In the present case, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal applied the rules of statutory interpretation as defined by this Court. It first considered the ordinary meaning of the words used in the OLA and concluded that to include municipalities within the scope of “institutions” was plausible. In the particular context of this case, it should rather be presumed that the Legislature would not have chosen to indicate indirectly its decision to ignore the definition given in Charlebois, the very case which had created the obligation for it to modify its OLA. In my view, it would have been more appropriate for the Court of Appeal to take a positive stance and see whether it was necessary to limit the scope of the newly defined term in light of the difficulties posed by the drafting of the OLA. I will return to the consequences in this erroneous approach.
33 The careful analysis of the Court of Appeal provides a complete review of the legislative history of s. 22 of the OLA. I need not repeat it here. The crux of the Court of Appeal’s decision lies in the identification of two main internal inconsistencies in the OLA. The relevant provisions of the Charter and the OLA are reproduced in the Appendix to these reasons.
34 The main inconsistency noted by the Court of Appeal is that between ss. 27 and 36. Section 27 provides for the right of any member of the public to communicate with any institution and to receive its services in the official language of their choice. The corresponding obligations of the public institutions are defined in ss. 28 and 28.1, i.e. to ensure that members of the public are able to communicate and to receive its services in the language requested, and to make it known that its services are available in the official language of choice. By contrast, s. 36 provides that all municipalities whose official language minority population represents at least 20 percent of its total population, and all cities, shall offer the services and communications prescribed by law in both official languages.
Like Wilson J., the Court of Appeal of Ontario has noted that s. 16(3) of the Charter is an important factor in determining the proper rules of interpretation for quasi-constitutional rights (see Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé) (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 505, at paras. 129-30).
36 This approach is not new. It is now a template for the interpretation of language rights, specially, as just demonstrated, where there is apparent conflict and ambiguity. Under it, the first step is not to read down the protections to eliminate inconsistencies, but to make sense of the overall regime in light of the constitutional imperative of approaching language rights purposefully, with a view to advancing the principles of equality and protection of minorities. Institutional bilingualism is achieved when rights are granted to the public and corresponding obligations are imposed on institutions (see Beaulac, at paras. 20-22). No rights are given as such to institutions. Any interpretation of the OLA must take this into account. The real issue here is whether the apparent inconsistency between ss. 27 and 36 is such that the institutional obligations recognized a priori in s. 22 must of necessity be read down.
18 No person shall be placed at a disadvantage by reason of the choice made under section 17.
In fact, the Court of Appeal itself explained that s. 22 was meant to extend the Charter rights in s. 19(1) and improve the quality of judicial services, and that it was tied to the objective of respect for linguistic guarantees (para. 30).
38 As mentioned earlier, the principles of interpretation applicable here are clearly developed in Beaulac, a case dealing specifically with the interpretation of a statute creating language rights that exceed those that are mandated by the Constitution. In my view, where the Legislature is extending the protection of minority rights, the Court must not adopt a restrictive interpretation in order to eliminate apparent inconsistencies in the law. It must, rather, search for a meaning consistent with the protection of minorities and the achievement of equal rights for the two official languages and language communities that can be reconciled with the wording of the legislation whenever possible. The pronouncements of this Court at paras. 20 and 24 of Beaulac are rather apt in a province where the equality of language communities has been enshrined in the Constitution (see s. 16.1 of the Charter ).
The objective of protecting official language minorities, as set out in s. 2 of the Official Languages Act, is realized by the possibility for all members of the minority to exercise independent, individual rights which are justified by the existence of the community. Language rights are not negative rights, or passive rights; they can only be enjoyed if the means are provided. This is consistent with the notion favoured in the area of international law that the freedom to choose is meaningless in the absence of a duty of the State to take positive steps to implement language guarantees; see J. E. Oestreich, “Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights” (1999), 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 108, at p. 112; P. Jones, “Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights” (1999), 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 80, at p. 83: “[A] right . . . is conceptually tied to a duty”; and R. Cholewinski, “State Duty Towards Ethnic Minorities: Positive or Negative?” (1988), 10 Hum. Rts. Q. 344.
The idea that s. 16(3) of the Charter , which has formalized the notion of advancement of the objective of equality of the official languages of Canada in the Jones case, supra, limits the scope of s. 16(1) must also be rejected. This subsection affirms the substantive equality of those constitutional language rights that are in existence at a given time. Section 2 of the Official Languages Act has the same effect with regard to rights recognized under that Act. This principle of substantive equality has meaning. It provides in particular that language rights that are institutionally based require government action for their implementation and therefore create obligations for the State; see McKinney v. University of Guelph,  3 S.C.R. 229, at p. 412; Haig v. Canada,  2 S.C.R. 995, at p. 1038; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.),  1 S.C.R. 313; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General),  3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 73; Mahe, supra, at p. 365. It also means that the exercise of language rights must not be considered exceptional, or as something in the nature of a request for an accommodation. . . .
40 This is not to say that the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation have no place. The approach defined in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),  1 S.C.R. 27, at paras. 21-22, continues to guide the Court, but the legislative context and the presumption of Charter compliance are particularly important. The Legislature is here implementing a decision subjecting municipalities to language obligations in a quasi-constitutional act which is designed to promote the equality of official languages and official language communities in New Brunswick. This intention is not easily negated because of imperfect drafting. In fact, this Court is very often confronted with inconsistencies and has developed a number of rules to deal with them, but it is clear that it will not be possible in all cases to make sense of the legislation while eliminating all internal inconsistencies (see R. v. McIntosh,  1 S.C.R. 686, at para. 59 (McLachlin J. in dissent); 2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool),  3 S.C.R. 919, at paras. 158-59; Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 1031, at para. 48).
41 In Beaulac, this Court clearly stated that in the context of institutional bilingualism, language provisions should not be read as creating accommodation or privileges, but as creating positive rights giving rise to a duty to provide the means for their implementation (para. 24). The Court said, at para. 22: “Where institutional bilingualism in the courts is provided for, it refers to equal access to services of equal quality for members of both official language communities in Canada.” Obviously, this will apply only once the rights are recognized, but the interpretative rule is by its very nature inconsistent with the approach suggested by the Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick and the City of Saint John. The Court must be guided by the need to give meaning to institutional bilingualism.
This presumption is used primarily to indicate a term’s probable meaning. As with all interpretation, the true meaning can only be established by considering the context . . . .
This said, I will later demonstrate that a better approach was available.
43 During the hearing, counsel were asked whether ss. 27 and 36 were necessarily in conflict, i.e. whether they were referable to identical obligations and rights. I asked counsel of both sides whether s. 27 could be read as creating a right to require a service in the language of choice and obtain a response and service in that language, while s. 36 dealt with the duty of municipalities to actively offer a number of services specified in regulations, in both official languages, independently of any demand or request. The AJEFNB was not convinced that this was a possibility because it was of the view that s. 28 required that services be actively offered in the language of choice; it also noted that the overlap in s. 29, dealing with the publication of postings, publications and documents intended for the general public, would remain. The better solution would be to read specific sections dealing with municipalities, policing services, health services and planning and solid waste commissions as exceptions to the general provisions regarding communication with the public, in spite of the fact that not all of these specific sections refer directly to the meaning of the word “institution”.
44 Policing services have already been defined as institutions of the government in R. v. Gautreau (1989), 101 N.B.R. (2d) 1 (Q.B.), overturned on other grounds in (1990), 109 N.B.R. (2d) 54 (C.A.), and R. v. Haché (1993), 139 N.B.R. (2d) 81 (C.A.). There also appears to be no need to read down the obligations resulting from that interpretation in order to implement s. 31 of the OLA; in fact, s. 32 affirms this. Health services are dealt with in s. 33. Section 33(1) extends the definition of “institution” in that case. As noted earlier, s. 4 restricts the meaning of “institution” with regard to educational and cultural institutions, in conformity with s. 16.1 of the Charter . In my view, the above provisions are a clear indication that the definition of “institution” in s. 1 must be wide and comprehensive. There is no clear reason to believe it should be more restrictive than the definition given by the Court of Appeal in Charlebois, in 2001. The respondent alluded to the fact that the legislation of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut specifically exempts municipalities; Ontario also exempts municipalities expressly. In my view, this only goes to show that the word “institution” would normally apply to municipalities.
45 The difficulty, of course, is in the fact that the section dealing with municipalities (the same is true of the section dealing with planning commissions and solid waste commissions) does not specifically say that the word “institution” must be varied in order to avoid a conflict between ss. 27 to 29, which are of general application, and s. 36, which is specific to municipalities and cities. The same is true of ss. 15 and 35, these sections dealing with the publication of legislative instruments.
Very general expressions are particularly sensitive to their legal environment. As sweeping as the terms may be, harmony of the text may dictate an interpretation that limits their scope.
In order to give an effect to special provisions, it is often necessary to interpret general provisions so as to exclude the situations dealt with in the specific texts. . . .
A special provision in conflict with a general one will be interpreted as an exception to the general one: specialia generalibus derogant. In the event of conflict, the specific provision takes precedence.
The general rules which are applicable to particular and general enactments in statutes are very clear, the only difficulty is in their application. The rule is that wherever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.
47 Under this approach, the court should favour restricting all obligations of municipalities and cities with regard to communications and services to the public, as well as the publication of by-laws, to those set out in ss. 35 and 36 of the OLA. The reading down of the general provision itself, by reducing the scope of its defining term, is not seen as an option at all. But that is not the approach advocated by the respondent. Its approach is based on the fact that municipalities are defined separately from “institutions” in s. 1; this would tend to show that the Legislature did not intend to adopt the definition of “institution” imposed by the Court of Appeal in 2001. The second reason for adopting this approach is that ss. 35 and 36 are a complete code of parallel rules for municipalities and cities. One problem with the last argument is that municipalities and cities are clearly under the obligation to adopt the language of an accused person in proceedings conducted under the terms of s. 20(1).
48 It is also important to note that any argument based on the fact that a section of the OLA constitutes a complete code would have to meet the argument that ss. 17 to 23 dealing with the administration of justice would also be said to constitute such a code and that there is no indication in the language of those sections that the word “institution” must be read down to ensure their application. The application of s. 22 to municipalities and cities would create no conflict with other sections of the OLA.
49 This reality could not have escaped the careful analysis of the Court of Appeal, obviously. It simply refused to adopt the approach described above because it felt compelled to give full effect to the internal consistency rule which required, in its view, that the word “institution” bear the same meaning throughout the OLA, i.e. in ss. 27 and 36 in particular. With all due respect, I believe this approach is too formalistic, as just demonstrated, and surely in conflict with the rules of interpretation applicable to language rights. I also think the Court of Appeal overlooked the fact that commissions are specifically defined as “institutions” in s. 1 of the OLA, but are nevertheless addressed separately in ss. 39 to 41. This would tend to show that there is no reason to conclude that municipalities cannot be included in the definition of “institutions” because their obligations are addressed in a separate part of the OLA.
50 The normal rules of statutory interpretation provide for a contextual approach. One major factor to be considered in the present appeal is the proposition that the Legislature’s intention is to implement the rights defined in the Charter as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in 2001, and that it wants to extend the minimum constitutional protections in the spirit of s. 16(3) of the Charter . The Court must therefore favour the extension of rights and obligations and acknowledge that general obligations must be limited, for specific institutions, only where such limitations are clearly spelled out, as in s. 4 , or implicitly spelled out, as in the case where there is a conflict between general and specific provision, as for ss. 27 to 29 and 36. But there is no valid reason to limit obligations under s. 22 by reading down the definition of the term “institution” when there is no direct conflict between ss. 22 and 36. In reality, a restrictive approach to interpretation, founded solely on the rule of uniformity of expression, applied mechanically, cannot be responsive to the legislative intent revealed by the preamble of the OLA and the simple fact that the government has decided to implement the 2001 decision in Charlebois defining the term “institution” rather than to lodge an appeal before this Court. Reading down the definition of “institution” is not only unnecessary, it is also contrary to principle. The AJEFNB suggests that ss. 27, 28 and 36 can be read together so that all municipalities be required to respond to a communication, this obligation not being one specified in s. 36, but that only those municipalities required to provide services under s. 36 be subject to the obligation regarding services in ss. 27 and 28. This, says the AJEFNB, is a better method for applying the rule of internal consistency. I agree. Internal consistency is not only about uniformity of expression; it is mostly interested in coherence of the OLA with regard to its objects and its effects.
51 One last point I wish to address is the one relating to s. 37 and the power of a municipality to declare itself bound by the provisions of the OLA. The respondent argued that by referring to other sections of the OLA and not to s. 36, the Legislature impliedly decided that s. 22 did not apply to municipalities. This argument is untenable in light of the fact that s. 37 mentions municipalities but not cities, as in the case of ss. 35 and 36. The only realistic inference is that cities are excluded from s. 37 because they are already bound by ss. 35 and 36. The last words of s. 37 also refer to the need to interpret the section in light of the objective of promoting the equality of official languages.
52 To conclude on this issue, I would simply say that institutional bilingualism was clearly meant to apply to all “institutions” and that a limitation on the general rights specified in the OLA must be recognized only when it is necessary in order to ensure the proper implementation of the OLA. In the present case, there is no necessity of limiting the scope of s. 22 dealing with the administration of justice. Difficulties arising in the application of other parts of the OLA can be resolved because there are, in all cases of conflict, either direct or indirect indications of legislative intention to limit the application of some general provisions either in furtherance of s. 1 of the Charter or because of a political decision to limit the extension of rights beyond the constitutionally prescribed minimum.
53 As mentioned earlier in these reasons, the Court is also asked to define the scope of s. 22 rights. The specific question asked is whether the words “oral or written pleadings” and “processes” extend to evidence and authorities cited. I agree with the Court of Appeal that the above terms do not include evidence tendered in the course of a proceeding, whether it be in the form of an affidavit or not. Similarly, there is no obligation to translate case law cited or incorporated in a book of authorities.
54 Although the quasi-constitutional status of the OLA requires a purposeful and generous interpretation, there is here no basis for imputing to the Legislature the intention to extend the definition of the terms used in furtherance of s. 16(3) of the Charter . On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the Legislature was conscious of the distinction between language rights and the right to a fair trial, and the distinction noted earlier in these reasons between the use of one’s official language in pleadings on one part, and communications with government offices under s. 20(1) of the Charter on the other. Another important factor is that the terms “pleadings” and “process” are clearly defined in dictionaries (see H. Reid, Dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien (3e éd. 2004), at p. 433 (“plaidoirie”); Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at pp. 1191 and 1241-42) and case law (MacDonald v. Montreal (City),  1 S.C.R. 460, at p. 514 (Wilson J., in dissent, but on a different point)). Any intention to depart from these definitions would have to be clearly expressed.
55 Section 20 has been given a wider scope than s. 19. I agree with the intervener the Attorney General of Canada where he says, at para. 26 of his factum: “As subsection 19(2) of the Charter provides counsel representing the government party the constitutional right to use the official language of his or her choice, the institutional duty imposed by section 22 of the [OLA] cannot be the expression of subsection 19(2) of the Charter .” This is consistent with the terms used in the Rules of Court of New Brunswick (see N.B. Reg. 82-73, rule 27.06(1)) and decisions pertaining to the regime applicable in criminal matters (see R. v. Potvin (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), at paras. 38-39; R. v. Simard (1995), 27 O.R. (3d) 116 (C.A.), at p. 132).
56 For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed in part. Section 22 of the OLA is declared to be applicable to municipalities and cities. The decision of the Court of Appeal regarding the scope of s. 22 is affirmed. Costs in all courts are awarded to the appellant Mario Charlebois. Costs in this Court are also awarded to the AJEFNB.
3(1) No act, or regulation under it, other than this Act, shall be interpreted so as to repeal, limit or contravene a provision of this Act and, in case of conflict, this Act prevails.
3(1) The services and communications set out in Column I of Schedule A are prescribed for the purposes of section 36 of the Act.
3(2) If a municipality to which section 36 of the Act applies offers a service or communication set out in Column I of Schedule A, it shall do so in both official languages on or before the date set out opposite the service or communication in Column II of Schedule A.
Appeal dismissed with costs, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. dissenting.
Solicitor for the appellant Association des juristes d’expression française du Nouveau‑Brunswick: Université de Moncton, Moncton.
Solicitor for the respondent: Mélanie C. Tompkins, Saint John.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada: Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the intervener the Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick: Barry Spalding, Saint John.
Solicitor for the intervener the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada: Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the intervener Fédération des associations de juristes d’expression française de common law inc.: Thompson Dorfman Sweatman, Winnipeg.

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