Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/369/404/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:54:09+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 369 › Labor Board v. Walton Mfg. Co.
National Labor Relations Board v. Walton Manufacturing Co.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of orders of the National Labor Relations Board requiring reinstatement with back pay of employees found to have been discriminatorily discharged in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. In doing so, the Court of Appeals applied a special rule which it had adopted for use in reinstatement cases, to the effect that the employer's statement under oath as to the reason for the discharge must be believed unless he is impeached or contradicted.
Held: the judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. Pp. 369 U. S. 405-409.
(a) A reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a decision of the National Labor Relations Board when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial when viewed in the light of "the record considered as a whole"; but it may not displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the Court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. P. 369 U. S. 405.
(b) There is no place in the statutory scheme for one test of the substantiality of evidence in reinstatement cases, and another test in other cases. Pp. 369 U. S. 407-408.
(c) Since this Court is in doubt as to how the Court of Appeals would have decided these two cases in the absence of its own special rule applicable to such cases, the cases are remanded to that Court for reconsideration. Pp. 369 U. S. 408-409.
286 F.2d 16; 288 F.2d 630, reversed and cases remanded.
"reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view,"
"displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo."
Id. at 340 U. S. 488.
something else which in fact existed as a ground, his oath cannot be disregarded because of suspicion that he may be lying. There must be impeachment of him, or substantial contradiction, or, if circumstances raise doubts, they must be inconsistent with the positive sworn evidence on the exact point."
This special rule concerning the weight of the evidence necessary to sustain the Board's orders for reinstatement with back pay has been repeatedly followed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in decisions refusing enforcement of that particular type of order. See Labor Board v. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 130 F.2d 260; Labor Board v. Alco Feed Mills, 133 F.2d 419; Labor Board v. Ingram, 273 F.2d 670; Labor Board v. Allure Shoe Corp., 277 F.2d 231; Frosty Morn Meats, Inc. v. Labor Board, 296 F.2d 617.
The Court of Appeals in No. 77, Labor Board v. Walton Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 16, 25, in resolving the issue of credibility between witnesses for the employer and witnesses for the union as to the reasons for the discharge of the employees in question, relied on the test stated in Labor Board v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., supra. In No. 94, Labor Board v. Florida Citrus Canners Cooperative, 288 F.2d 630, decided less than three months later, the Tex-O-Kan opinion was not mentioned. But its test of credibility of witnesses seemingly was applied. 288 F.2d at 636-638.
". . . The findings of the examiner are to be considered, along with the consistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance of his report, of course, depends largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case."
". . . may satisfy the tribunal not only that the witness' testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story, for the denial of one who has a motive to deny may be uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance as to give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies."
Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269.
special rule for reinstatement cases announced in the Tex-O-Kan opinion apparently colored the review given by the Court of Appeals of these two orders, we remand the cases to it for reconsideration.
* Together with No. 94, National Labor Relations Board v. Florida Citrus Canners Cooperative, also on certiorari to the same Court, argued March 19-20, 1962.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, dissenting.
These cases were brought here on the claim that the Court of Appeals had exceeded its reviewing power over orders of the Labor Board under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), requiring that "the record considered as a whole" be canvassed. The Court does not find that the court did not assess the evidence, including inferences fairly to be drawn, in accordance with the scope of judicial review outlined in Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, and its companion case, Labor Board v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U. S. 498. But it remands the cases to the Court of Appeals because of doubt whether that court was improperly influenced in its determinations by what is deemed an erroneous legal rule as applied in Labor Board v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., 122 F.2d 433.
I am constrained to disagree with the Court's disposition of these cases on three grounds. First, the Court assumes legal identity between two cases that raise entirely different issues. Second, in neither case did the Court of Appeals apply a special and more stringent rule of review in cases of reinstatement for wrongful discharge. Finally, I think the Tex-O-Kan rule, insofar as it was applied below in Walton and is disapproved here, is in accord with prior decisions of this Court, and does not conflict with the substantial evidence rule.
that respondents had violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), by surveillance of union activities, interrogations of employees regarding the union, and threats of reprisals for union adherence. But the court refused to enforce an order to reinstate a number of employees with back pay, holding, on its reading of the same dead record that the Board had before it, that there was not substantial evidence to support the Board's findings that the employees had been discharged or laid off because of their union membership and activities. 286 F.2d 16.
In Florida Citrus, the Examiner and the Board found that the respondent had refused to bargain as required by § 8(a)(5), and therefore that employees who had participated in a resulting strike had been discharged and replaced in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3). 124 N.L.R.B. 1182. The Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the order to cease and desist, to bargain on request, and to reinstate the discharged employees with pay; it did so because it concluded, on consideration of the record as a whole, that the critical finding of refusal to bargain was not supported by substantial evidence. 288 F.2d 630.
"The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive."
impeached or contradicted. These decisions are reversed because, in Walton, the Court of Appeals "relied on the test stated in Labor Board v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co.," 122 F.2d 433, and in Florida Citrus, although Tex-O-Kan was not cited, "its test of credibility of witnesses seemingly was applied."
"a cease and desist order on this point costs no money, and only warns to observe a right which already existed; evidence short of demonstration may easily justify such an order."
"Orders for reinstatement of employees with back pay are somewhat different. They may impoverish or break an employer, and, while they are not in law penal orders, they are in the nature of penalties for the infraction of law. The evidence to justify them ought therefore to be substantial, and surmise or suspicion, even though reasonable, is not enough."
"[I]t remains true that the discharger knows the real cause of discharge; it is a fact to which he may swear. If he says it was not union membership or activity, but something else which, in fact existed as a ground, his oath cannot be disregarded because of suspicion that he may be lying. There must be impeachment of him, or substantial contradiction, or, if circumstances raise doubts, they must be inconsistent with the positive sworn evidence on the exact point. This was squarely ruled as to a jury in Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333, . . . and the ruling is applicable to the Board as factfinder."
credibility view has also been applied by the court in determining whether to enforce an order requiring payment of a bonus found to have been withheld in order to discourage union activity. Labor Board v. Crosby Chemicals, Inc., 274 F.2d 72, 78. It has not been cited on the issue of credibility in cases involving only cease and desist orders.
3. A Special Rule for Reinstatement?
"There is no place in the statutory scheme for one test of the substantiality of evidence in reinstatement cases and another test in other cases."
"The requirements of substantiality of evidence and reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are not less in a case of reinstatement and reimbursement than where a cease and desist order is directed against interference"
properly dealt with this as a single issue, and did not purport to apply different standards of review for purposes of various parts of the order. Tex-O-Kan was nowhere cited.
(1) In Florida Citrus, collective bargaining had broken off shortly after a disastrous freeze that threatened future business. The Trial Examiner found that the company was responsible for the failure of bargaining. He recited a delay in meeting which he attributed to the company. He referred to the company's refusal to discuss the union's proposal at a meeting held just after the freeze, and to the company's failure in the face of union demands to request a postponement of negotiations to permit assessment of the effect of the freeze, as it had announced it intended to do. Finally, by resolving conflicting testimony in favor of the General Counsel's witnesses, he found that, after the failure of negotiations, the company had made anti-union statements and offered inducements to the employees should they forsake the union. This finding buttressed his interpretation of the company's earlier conduct when bargaining was called off. In rejecting the testimony of production manager Stephenson and accepting that of Holly, an employee to whom the alleged anti-union statements and promises had been made, the Examiner relied in part on a comparison of the demeanor of these two witnesses, saying also that Stephenson admitted such subjects as a company union had come up in the conversation; that many of the statements he was said to have made later came true; and that Holly was a logical choice to speak such sentiments to because he might reasonably have been induced to lead a movement of defection from the union.
"the belief that reliance may not be placed upon the testimony of a witness who is a part of the management of an employer in a controversy with a labor union."
Beyond this, the court declared it was unable to accept the Examiner's crediting of Holly and discrediting of Stephenson, because there was no prior indication of company opposition to the union, and because it was unlikely that a manager would divulge the details of company labor policy to a watchman. As to a conflict in testimony between Stephenson and Wingate, the union's chief representative, the court ruled that Wingate's testimony should have been "more carefully scrutinized," because the Examiner himself had found Wingate sometimes inaccurate or careless.
saying simply that the Tex-O-Kan "test of credibility of witnesses seemingly was applied." But Tex-O-Kan was no more relied on by the Court of Appeals than it was attacked in this case by the Board. Tex-O-Kan forbids the Examiner and the Board to dismiss summarily management's reasons for a discharge if not contradicted, impeached, or inherently improbable. Florida Citrus was not a case of uncontradicted testimony. It was not a case in which motivation for a discharge was in doubt. The issue was what Stephenson said to the Board's witnesses; the problem was a conflict of testimony. To be sure, the Board argues that both Florida Citrus and Tex-O-Kan are manifestations of the same attitude of hostility to findings of the Labor Board. But if the Court of Appeals strayed outside the Universal Camera bounds, it did not do so by discrediting uncontradicted testimony pursuant to Tex-O-Kan. If this Court is of the opinion that the Court of Appeals unjustifiably substituted its own judgment for that of the Board, it ought to say so. The Court of Appeals ought not to be reversed for following a decision it did not follow.
testimony, unimpeached, assigned plausible grounds for selecting each employee for layoff, and that the factual bases for these statements were largely uncontradicted.
"the demeanor of a witness '. . . may satisfy the tribunal not only that the witness' testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story. . . .'"
This statement, torn from context in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269, is elevated into a rule of law that ignores earlier decisions of this Court and effectively insulates many administrative findings from judicial review, contrary to the command of the Labor Management Relations Act and the Administrative Procedure Act that such findings should be set aside if not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record.
"It is generally held that whether made by jury, judge, or agency a determination of credibility is nonreviewable unless there is uncontrovertible documentary evidence or physical fact which contradicts it."
"that a trial tribunal may disbelieve the only evidence presented and dispose of the case by holding against the party having the burden of proof,"
Administrative Law Treatise, § 29.06, p. 148. Even in reviewing the findings of a trial judge sitting without a jury, where the standard of review permits closer scrutiny by the Court of Appeals, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." And in Labor Board v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U. S. 656, 337 U. S. 660, this Court held that the Board's crediting of all General Counsel's witnesses and discrediting of all respondent's does not indicate bias, so long as none of the credited testimony "carries its own death wound," and none of that which was rejected "carries its own irrefutable truth."
"clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence or both."
"courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions than some courts have shown in the past. . . . Congress has imposed on them responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds."
"Administrative determinations of credibility are often set aside because the reviewing court firmly believes that the evidence supporting the determination is clearly less credible than the opposing evidence,"
"even on a credibility issue, we should probably not tolerate the intuitive 'hunch' where the record evidence overwhelmingly points to the contrary."
"The court below, in affirming the conviction, apparently thought the local board was free to disbelieve Dickinson's testimonial and documentary evidence even in the absence of any impeaching or contradictory evidence. . . . But when the uncontroverted evidence supporting a registrant's claim places him prima facie within the statutory exemption, dismissal of the claim solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation is both contrary to the spirit of the Act and foreign to our concepts of justice."
"We recognize the general rule, of course, as stated by both courts below, that the question of the credibility of witnesses is one for the jury alone; but this does not mean that the jury is at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable point of view is it open to doubt."
283 U.S. at 283 U. S. 216.
on credibility. I do not think the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review or grossly misapplied the correct standard, and, therefore, since it is not for this Court to "pass on the Board's conclusions in the first instance or to make an independent review of the review by the Court of Appeals," Labor Board v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U. S. 498, 340 U. S. 502, I would either affirm the cases or, preferably, dismiss the writs as improvidently granted.

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