Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/351/225/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:43:54+00:00

Document:
Claiming that a "union shop" agreement between an interstate railroad and unions of its employees made pursuant to § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, which expressly authorizes such agreements notwithstanding any state law, violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and the "right to work" provision of the Nebraska Constitution, nonunion employees of the railroad sued in a Nebraska state court to enjoin enforcement of such an agreement.
Held: on the record in this case, the agreement is valid and enforceable as to these employees. Pp. 351 U. S. 227-238.
1. The enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental action on which the Constitution operates, though it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction. Pp. 351 U. S. 231-232.
2. Since § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act expressly permits "union shop" agreements notwithstanding any state law, an agreement made pursuant thereto has the imprimatur of the federal law upon it and, by force of the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Constitution, could not be invalidated or vitiated by any state law. P. 351 U. S. 232.
3. On the record in this case, the requirement for financial support of a collective bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause, and does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 351 U. S. 233-238.
(a) Enactment of the provision of § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act authorizing union shop agreements between interstate railroads and unions of their employees was a valid exercise by Congress of its powers under the Commerce Clause, and it does not violate the Due Process Clause. Pp. 351 U. S. 233-235.
financial support of the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining, and this involves no violation of the First or the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 351 U. S. 235-238.
(c) Judgment is reserved a to the validity or enforceability of a union or closed shop agreement if other conditions of union membership are imposed or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First or the Fifth Amendment. P. 351 U. S. 238.
160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526, reversed.
"for any reason other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. [Footnote 2] "
The Nebraska trial court issued an injunction. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed. It held that the union shop agreement violates the First Amendment in that it deprives the employees of their freedom of association and violates the Fifth Amendment in that it requires the members to pay for many things besides the cost of collective bargaining. The Nebraska Supreme Court, therefore, held that there is no valid federal law to supersede the "right to work" provision of the Nebraska Constitution. 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526. The case is here by appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) and (2). We noted probable jurisdiction. 350 U.S. 910.
"The question in this instance is whether those who enjoy the fruits and the benefits of the unions should make a fair contribution to the support of the unions."
96 Cong.Rec., Pt. 12, p. 16279.
"Such action on the part of Congress is a necessary part of every union shop contract entered into on the railroads as far as these 17 states are concerned, for, without it, such contracts could not be enforced therein."
160 Neb. at 698, 71 N.W.2d at 547. We agree with that view. If private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 321 U. S. 663. In other words, the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed. [Footnote 4] Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 323 U. S. 198-199, 323 U. S. 204; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768; Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 343 U. S. 462. The enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental action on which the Constitution operates, though it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction.
As already noted, the 1951 amendment, permitting the negotiation of union shop agreements, expressly allows those agreements notwithstanding any law "of any State." § 2, Eleventh. [Footnote 5] A union agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has, therefore, the imprimatur of the federal law upon it and, by force of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be made illegal nor vitiated by any provision of the laws of a State.
"by inducing collective bargaining with the true representative of the employees and by preventing such bargaining with any who do not represent them,"
Virginian R. Co. v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 300 U. S. 548, and that will protect the employees against discrimination or coercion which would interfere with the free exercise of their right to self-organization and representation. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 301 U. S. 33. Industrial peace along the arteries of commerce is a legitimate objective, and Congress has great latitude in choosing the methods by which it is to be obtained.
the Court, wrote forcefully against the closed shop. He feared that the closed shop would swing the pendulum in the opposite extreme and substitute "tyranny of the employee" for "tyranny of the employer." [Footnote 6] But the question is one of policy with which the judiciary has no concern, as Mr. Justice Brandeis would have been the first to concede. Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, has the final say on policy issues. If it acts unwisely, the electorate can make a change. The task of the judiciary ends once it appears that the legislative measure adopted is relevant or appropriate to the constitutional power which Congress exercises. The ingredients of industrial peace and stabilized labor-management relations are numerous and complex. They may well vary from age to age and from industry to industry. What would be needful one decade might be anathema the next. The decision rests with the policymakers, not with the judiciary.
union agreement or another. That question is germane to the exercise of power under the Commerce Clause -- a power that often has the quality of police regulations. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 329 U. S. 19. One would have to be blind to history to assert that trade unionism did not enhance and strengthen the right to work. See Webb, History of Trade Unionism; Gregory, Labor and the Law. To require, rather than to induce, the beneficiaries of trade unionism to contribute to its costs may not be the wisest course. But Congress might well believe that it would help insure the right to work in and along the arteries of interstate commerce. No more has been attempted here. The only conditions to union membership authorized by § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act are the payment of "periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments." The assessments that may be lawfully imposed do not include "fines and penalties." The financial support required relates, therefore, to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining. No more precise allocation of union overhead to individual members seems to us to be necessary. The prohibition of "fines and penalties" precludes the imposition of financial burdens for disciplinary purposes. If "assessments" are in fact imposed for purposes not germane to collective bargaining, [Footnote 7] a different problem would be presented.
member of these unions, he is subject to vast disciplinary control, [Footnote 9] and that, by force of the federal Act, unions now can make him conform to their ideology.
On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who, by state law, is required to be a member of an integrated bar. It is argued that compulsory membership will be used to impair freedom of expression. But that problem is not presented by this record. Congress endeavored to safeguard against that possibility by making explicit that no conditions to membership may be imposed except as respects "periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments." If other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case. For we pass narrowly on § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act. We only hold that the requirement for financial support of the collective bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause, and does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments. We express no opinion on the use of other conditions to secure or maintain membership in a labor organization operating under a union or closed shop agreement.
"Labor organizations; no denial of employment; closed shop not permitted. To make operative the provisions of Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Article 15 of the Constitution of Nebraska, no person shall be denied employment because of membership in or affiliation with, or resignation or expulsion from a labor organization or because of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization; nor shall any individual or corporation or association of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude persons from employment because of membership in or nonmembership in a labor organization."
"Eleventh. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, or of any other statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or carriers as defined in this Act and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the requirements of this Act shall be permitted --"
"(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or carriers from the wages of its or their employees in a craft or class and payment to the labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, of any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership: Provided, That no such agreement shall be effective with respect to any individual employee until he shall have furnished the employer with a written assignment to the labor organization of such membership dues, initiation fees, and assessments, which shall be revocable in writing after the expiration of one year or upon the termination date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner."
"(c) The requirement of membership in a labor organization in an agreement made pursuant to subparagraph (a) shall be satisfied, as to both a present or future employee in engine, train, yard, or hostling service, that is, an employee engaged in any of the services or capacities covered in section 3, First (h) of this Act defining the jurisdictional scope of the First Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, if said employee shall hold or acquire membership in any one of the labor organizations, national in scope, organized in accordance with this Act and admitting to membership employees of a craft or class in any of said services; and no agreement made pursuant to subparagraph (b) shall provide for deductions from his wages for periodic dues, initiation fees, or assessments payable to any labor organization other than that in which he holds membership: Provided, however, That as to an employee in any of said services on a particular carrier at the effective date of any such agreement on a carrier, who is not a member of any one of the labor organizations, national in scope, organized in accordance with this Act and admitting to membership employees of a craft or class in any of said services, such employee, as a condition of continuing his employment, may be required to become a member of the organization representing the craft in which he is employed on the effective date of the first agreement applicable to him: Provided, further, That nothing herein or in any such agreement or agreements shall prevent an employee from changing membership from one organization to another organization admitting to membership employees of a craft or class in any of said services."
"(d) Any provisions in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of section 2 of this Act, in conflict herewith are to the extent of such conflict amended."
In 1954, the Bureau of Labor Statistics made an analysis of 1,716 collective bargaining agreements in effect in industries not regulated by the Railway Labor Act. Of the 7,405,000 workers covered by the agreements studied, 64% were employed under union shop provisions. 78 Monthly Labor Review, No. 6, 649.
Once courts enforce the agreement, the sanction of government is, of course, put behind them. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249.
The parallel provision in § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), makes the union shop agreement give way before a state law prohibiting it.
". . . But the American people should not, and will not, accept unionism if it involves the closed shop. They will not consent to the exchange of the tyranny of the employer for the tyranny of the employee. Unionism therefore cannot make a great advance until it abandons the closed shop; and it cannot accept the open shop as an alternative. The open shop means the destruction of the union."
"The advance of unionism demands therefore some relation between the employer and the employee other than either the closed or open shop, and I feel confident that we have found a solution in the preferential union shop."
"to levy such assessments upon the members employed upon the transportation company over which it has jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry on its work."
Subordinate Division Statutes, § 42(H). And see Constitution of the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen of America, Art. I, § 6; Constitution of the American Railway Supervisors Association, Art. XVI, § 7.
"No member of the communist party or any person who advocates the objective thereof, and no person who belongs to or supports the policies of any other organization or group which advocates the overthrow of the United States government or the government of the Dominion of Canada by force shall be eligible"
"if such person associates himself with Communist, Fascist or similar organizations, or the Ku Klux Klan, or Columbians. Such eligibility shall likewise be denied where a person associates himself with, lends support or subscribes to the subversive doctrines of the organizations enumerated herein, similar organizations, or any organization or group that expounds or promotes any doctrine or philosophy inimical or subversive to the fundamental purposes of the constitution of the Government of the United States."
"A member who advocates or encourages communism, fascism, nazism, or any other totalitarian philosophy, or who, by other actions, gives support to these 'philosophies' or 'isms' is not eligible to hold office in the I.A.M."
"interfering with legislative matters affecting national, state, territorial, dominion or provincial legislation, adversely affecting the interests of our members."
"(15) Attending or participating in any gathering or meeting whatsoever, held outside meetings of a L.U. at which the affairs of the L.U. are discussed, or at which conclusions are arrived at regarding the business and the affairs of a L.U., or regarding L.U. officers or a candidate or candidates for L.U. office."
"(16) Mailing, handing out, or posting cards, handbills, letters, marked ballots or political literature of any kind, or displaying streamers, banners, signs or anything else of a political nature, or being a party in any way to such being done in an effort to induce members to vote for or against any candidate or candidates for L.U. office, or candidates to conventions."
And see Art. 17, § 1(b), Constitution of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association; Art. XXIV, § 2, Constitution of the International Association of Machinists.
functioning of interstate railroads and thereby to further the national wellbeing. A mere recital of the course of history in this important field goes a long way to indicate that the main point of attack against the Act of January 10, 1951, 64 Stat. 1238, raises questions not of constitutional validity, but of policy in a domain of legislation peculiarly open to conflicting views of policy. These efforts constitute a body of empiric responses by Congress to new problems or new insight for dealing with old problems.
The course of legislation affecting industrial controversies on railroads flows through these statutes: the Act of October 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 501; the Erdman Act of June 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 424, growing out of the Pullman strike of 1894, see In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564; the Newlands Act of July 15, 1913, 38 Stat. 103; the Adamson Law of September 3, 1916, 39 Stat. 721; Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 469; the Railway Labor Act of May 20, 1926, 44 Stat. 577; the Act of June 21, 1934, 48 Stat. 1185, amending the Railway Labor Act.
regulation, to be confined within such doctrinaire and frozen bounds as were confined the assumptions which underlay the decision in the Adair case. Thus, the Court sustained the Adamson Law, which was enacted to avert the threatened nationwide railroad strike of 1916, Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917); Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States Railroad Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72 (1923), and the Railway Labor Act of 1926, Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930); but see Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
such proposals, which seem sufficient also to protect the interests of the public, they should be enacted into law."
H.R.Doc. No. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 18. The President was Calvin Coolidge.
differ; I think that laboring men sometimes attribute to them advantages, as many attribute to combinations of capital disadvantages, that really are due to economic conditions of a far wider and deeper kind; but I could not pronounce it unwarranted if Congress should decide that to foster a strong union was for the best interest not only of the men, but of the railroads and the country at large."
208 U.S. at 208 U. S. 191-192.

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