Source: http://www.torttalk.com/2016/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:42:21+00:00

Document:
In a recent decision in the case of Petrillo v. Ace American Ins. Co., 2013-CV-306 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 26, 2016 Mazzoni, S.J.), Senior Judge Robert A. Mazzoni of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the insurance company’s cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in a case surrounding the validity of UIM rejection forms.
According to the Opinion, two (2) forms were at issue. The first was a rejection form that was signed and dated October 18, 2011 which the Plaintiff attacked as not having the requisite language for such forms as required by 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1731(c), (c.1).
Also at issue was a second rejection form with a date of January 1, 2012, the policy’s inception date. That rejection form was found to “mirror,” in all aspects, the statutory language of §1731(c). The Plaintiff presented evidence that this second form had been backdated to the policy inception date.
After reviewing the facts against the applicable law, Judge Mazzoni agreed with the Plaintiff’s contention that the failure of the first form to strictly comply with the form language required by §1731(c) rendered that rejection form void.
As to the second form, the Plaintiff asserted that backdating the form rendered that form void. The Defendants countered with a position that the backdating of the form was irrelevant because that form was allegedly signed months before the subject accident occurred.
Judge Mazzoni noted that §1731(c.1) requires that the form be signed by the first named insured and be dated in order to be valid.
The court noted that, absent evidence to the contrary, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that there existed any fraud in the backdating of the document. However, the court went on to review differing prior court decisions on the import of the backdating of insurance forms.
The Petrillo court found the second, backdated waiver of UIM benefits form to be void and of no legal effect. In so ruling, the court noted that there was an uncertainty as to when the backdating had occurred.
Anyone wishing to review Judge Mazzoni's Opinion in the Petrillo case may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney Vince Cimini of the Scranton, PA law firm of Cognetti & Cimini for bringing this case to my attention.
On July 7, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur in the case of Reginelli v. Boggs, to address the issue of whether a hospital can invoke privilege with regards to peer review documents prepared by an outside contractor and, if so, whether that privilege is waived when the third party shares those documents with hospital administration.
A Superior court panel had previously ruled in a non-precedential Opinion in this case that the peer review documents created by a third party were not protected under the Peer Review Protection Act, thus affirming a Washington County trial court judge’s ruling.
I send thanks to Attorney Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr. of the Philadelphia office of Cozen O’Connor for bringing this notable news to my attention.
A Facebook decision from a while back has been brought to my attention--this one is not on the discoverability of Facebook info; rather, this decision pertains to the admissibility of such information at trial over the objection of the Plaintiff, in part, that the information is embarrassing.
In the Federal Western District Court of Pennsylvania decision of Newill v. Campbell Transp. Co., No. 2: 2012-CV-1344, 2015 U.S. Dist Lexis 4350 (W.D. Pa. 2015 McVerry, J.) from over a year ago, the court reviewed a Plaintiff's motion in limine to preclude the Defendant from introducing several of the Plaintiff's Facebook posts into evidence in a personal injury matter on the basis they were irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and potentially embarrassing.
According to the opinion the Plaintiff's Facebook posts referenced going to the gym, landscaping, flooring, and undercoating a truck. The Plaintiff also apparently advertised his services as a handyman, indicating that no job was too big or too small. The Court found that the posts from Plaintiff's Facebook account that reflected physical capabilities inconsistent with Plaintiff's claims of injury and limitations were relevant and embarrassment alone was found not to be a sufficient basis for excluding the posts pursuant to F.R.E. 403.
The Court did leave the door open for the issue to be revisited during the actual trial by noting that if, at the time of trial, the Defendant attempted to introduce posts the Plaintiff felt were particularly embarrassing, the issue of admissibility could be re-raised pursuant to F.R.E. 611.
Anyone wishing to review this case, may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Brian Murren, a law clerk in the Camp Hill office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin for bringing this decision to my attention.
In a recent decision out of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Goldy v. Woodlands Bank, No. 15-01334 (C.P. Lycoming Co. May 31, 2016 Gray, J.), Judge Richard A. Gray denied a landowner Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a trip and fall case.
The landowner initially asserted that the Plaintiff assumed the risk by walking over an allegedly dangerous condition that the Plaintiff had previously encountered. The landowner Defendant also argued that it was entitled to summary judgment given that the Plaintiff was unable to state exactly what caused her to fall.
The court denied the motion after finding issues of fact precluded the entry of summary judgment.
Summary judgment was recently entered in favor of a carrier in a declaratory judgment action of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Moore, et al., No. CR 2014 - 4931 (C.P. Wash. Co. May 31, 2016 Emery, J.). The court entered summary judgment in favor of the carrier on a coverage question that implicated an intentional acts exclusion under a homeowner’s policy in a case arising out of a tragic shooting.
The party injured in the shooting sued the shooter’s estate seeking damages for his personal injuries. The Estate representatives sought coverage under the shooter’s ERIE homeowner's policy. ERIE provided the Estate with a defense to the lawsuit, but also commenced a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that no coverage was owed because shooter’s actions were intentional and, thus, barred from coverage for several reasons, including the policy's "intentional act" exclusion. The injured party argued in the coverage action that the shooter did not intend to shoot him, but rather accidentally shot him during the struggle.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. By Order of May 31, 2016, the Honorable Katherine Emery, president judge of the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, entered an Order granting ERIE's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Carly's Motion.
In her Opinion, Judge Emery essentially found that the policy covers only "accidents" and not intentional acts. The Court quoted a previous Superior Court decision that held "[a]n insured intends an injury if he desired to cause the consequences of his act or if he acted knowing that such consequences were substantially certain to result."
Judge Emery found that, under all of these circumstances, the shooter's acts that resulted in the injury of Carly were intentional, per this definition. Specifically, Judge Emery held that "[t]he shooting of Carly plainly resulted from human agency. Moreover, the prospect of injury from a gun firing during a physical struggle over that gun was no less plainly and reasonably anticipated. As such, while tragic, the shooting of [the injured party] by [the shooter], cannot fall within the definition of an accident."
I send thanks to the prevailing defense attorney Craig Murphey of the Erie, Pennsylvania law firm of MacDonald, Illig, Jones & Britton, LP for bringing this case to my attention.
In another decision from Judge James A. Gibbons in the case of Astleford v. Delta Medix, P.C., No. 2015-CV-5134, the court addressed various motions including the Defendant’s Motions for Reconsideration of the court’s prior decision overruling the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s claims of corporate negligence against a physician’s practice.
Judge Gibbons reviewed the applicable law the court emphasized that, in reviewing the case before that this Preliminary Objections stage, the Plaintiff had not averred that the Defendants’ function as a mere physician’s office or even as a group of physicians.
Judge Gibbons reaffirmed his previous holding that the Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to state a claim for the imposition of corporate negligence against the corporate Defendants. Judge Gibbons noted that, whether that claim survives throughout the case is a question for another day. Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Anyone wishing to review Judge Gibbon's decision on the Motions for Reconsideration, may click this LINK.
Judge Gibbons' original decision in this case on these issues can be viewed HERE.
For a recent Opinion by Judge Terrence R. Nealon, also of Lackawanna County, on the same issue in the case of Brink v. Marian Community Hospital click HERE to view that Tort Talk post which contains a Link to that decision.
Here is a LINK to an Luzerne County Order of Court amending its Local Rules of Civil Procedure 1301 - 1313 pertaining to Arbitrations in that County.
Of note are the adoption of a jursidictional limit of $50,000 or less for Arbitrations in that County along with procedural rules that seem to mirror the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure in the same regard.
These Rules will go into effect on July 25, 2016.
In the case of Echeverria v. Holley, 2016 Pa. Super. 119, No. 1342 WDA 2014 (Pa. Super. June 14, 2016 Olson, Gantman, Fitzgerald, J.J.) (Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a landlord may be held liable for failing to install smoke detectors under the general rule that landlords owe a duty to protect tenants from injury or loss arising out of a negligent failure to maintain a rental property in a safe condition.
The court noted that, since smoke detectors were required by law, failure to install them could be a negligent failure to maintain the property in a safe condition.
The court also emphasized that claims of negligence and negligence per se are significantly different claims. The court ruled that an amendment seeking to add a negligence per se claim to the Complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitation was barred as a matter of law where that particular claim did not relate back to another negligence claim pled.
The court also otherwise indicated that, to the extent that a claim for implied warranty of habitability was pled in a landlord-tenant personal injury context, only contract remedies would be available under that theory and not tort damages for personal injuries.
Several notable issues were addressed by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in his recent decision in the case of Brink v. Marian Community Hospital, No. 13-CV-1314 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 30, 2016 Nealon, J.).
Judge Nealon also addressed issues surrounding both the "gross negligence" standard under the Mental Health Procedures Act, and separate punitive damages claims in this context. Notably, the punitive damages claims were dismissed.
Overall, the court granted the Defendants' motions for summary judgment in part, and denied them in part.
In its recent decision in the case of Costa v. Progressive Preferred Insurance Company, No. 2:16-cv-74 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2016 McVerry, S.J.), the court granted Progressive’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the extent of coverage UIM coverage due to the Plaintiff in this inter-policy stacking case.
According to the Opinion, following a fatal motor vehicle accident, the Plaintiff asserted that the decedent was an insured under three (3) separate policies, i.e., one policy issued to the decedent’s father by Safeco Insurance Company, which was stacked, a policy issued to the decedent’s mother and his mother’s sister by Erie Insurance, which was non-stacked, and the Progressive policy issued to the decedent’s mother that provided for $50,000.00 in UIM coverage. The decedent’s mother had signed a “waiver-of-stacking form” under the Progressive policy.
After the accident, Safeco and Erie Insurance tendered the full limits while Progressive offered $20,000.00, which the Plaintiff accepted, after Progressive took the position that its policy’s “Other Insurance” clause limited its exposure to its pro rata share of the largest applicable single vehicle UIM policy.
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims for breach of contract and bad faith based upon Progressive’s failure to tender its $50,000.00 in UIM benefits.
The federal court reviewed the stacking issue under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Craley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 895 A.2d 530, 539 (Pa. 2006).
In applying Craley, the court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the insured did not understand the waiver of stacking forms she was signing. The court also ruled that, because the insured had waived stacking, the “Other Insurance” clause applied.
The court in this Costa case also went on to distinguish the case before it from the case of Generette v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 957 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 2008).
As noted, the federal court in Costa ultimately granted summary judgement in favor of Progressive finding that Progressive had properly paid out UIM limits under its policy under the policy provisions applicable to the case presented.
Anyone desiring to review this case may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney Patrick Sweeney of the Philadelphia law firm of Sweeney and Sheehan for bringing this case to my attention.
In a recent Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas decision in the case of Penn-Patriot Ins. Co. v. Williams, PICS Case No. 16-0659 (C.P. Phila. Co. May 9, 2016 Djerassi, J.), the court ruled in a declaratory judgment action on an issue of coverage brought by a liability insurance company seeking a judicial declaration that the insurance company need not provide coverage to its insured Defendants in a matter arising out of a fight that occurred at the insured's café.
The trial court also noted that the policy provided coverage for bodily injury or property damages caused by an “occurrence” which was defined as an accident.
Also, an endorsement in the policies expressly stated that the policy “does not apply to liability for damages because of ‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage,’…medical expense arising out of an ‘assault,’ ‘battery,’ or ‘physical altercation’” in, near, or away from the premises, whether or not caused by or involving the insured, the insured’s employees, patrons, or other persons.
The policy also excluded coverage for any act or omission related to the prevention of such incidents, failure to warn, and/or negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision.
The court ruled that the factual allegations pertaining to the fight that occurred on the premises did not trigger coverage under the policy at issue. The court found that the injuries to the injured party arose from the blows by hands, fists, and a bottle, not from any acts of negligence.
The court also emphasized that the allegations of the Defendant’s failure to warn, employed competent staff, train employees, or supervise employees were expressly excluded from coverage by the language of the policy.
Accordingly, the court entered a declaratory judgment finding that no coverage or defense need be provided to the Defendants in this matter.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I send thanks to Attorney Jay Fulmer of Philadelphia for securing a copy of this decision for dissemination.

References: v. 
 §1731
 §1731
 §1731
 §1731
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.