Source: https://openjurist.org/407/us/514
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:07:21+00:00

Document:
continuances until three and one-half years after he was arrested.
vice, by special leave of Court.
for respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.
L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). See also United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D.
(1955). The Court's opinion in Kloper v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
speedy trial right is to be judged. 398 U.s., at 40—41, 90 S.Ct.
at 1570. This case compels us to make such an attempt.
could not be convicted unless Manning testified against him.
Manning was naturally unwilling to incriminate himself.
to assure his testimony against Barker.
its prosecution of Manning. The first trial ended in a hung jury.
an illegal search. Manning v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 421 (1959).
his counsel, to the first 11 continuances.
September 1962, to which Barker did not object.
case. To this continuance, Barker objected unsuccessfully.
Barker was convicted and given a life sentence.
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
not per se prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself.
trial,16 but it is the only possible remedy.
infringed and of simplifying courts' application of it.
constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise.
the approach the Sixth Circuit took below.
every reasonable presumption against waiver,' Aetna Ins. Co. v.
escence in the loss of fundamental rights,' Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
L.Ed. 1093 (1937). In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct.
less is not waiver.' Id., at 516, 82 S.Ct., at 890.
rights designed to protect the accused. See, e.g., Miranda v.
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct.
1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
demand-waiver rule places defense counsel in an awkward position.
attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection.
what circumstances it must be asserted or may be deemed waived.
considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.
defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect.
consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious.
suspicion, and often hostility. See cases cited in n. 33, supra.
trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution.
Manning under circumstances that comported with due process.
witnesses died or otherwise became unavailable owing to the delay.
way significant to the outcome.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 39.
deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial.
anxiety in him, his family and his friends.' United States v.
States v. Marion, supra, at 320, 92 S.Ct., at 963.
386 U.S., at 223, 87 S.Ct., at 993.
sought until October 23, two days after trial should have begun.
the Commonwealth in March 1963 and June 1963.
Bail Reform Act in the District of Columbia 20—21 (1969).
uncertainty of punishment, by affording new chances of escape.' J.
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 46 (1964).13 E.g., the 'Tombs' riots in New York City in 1970. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1970, p. 1, col. 8.
120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).
1968); Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Col.L.Rev.
Trial, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1587, 1619, (1965).
Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951); Flanary v.
v. United States, 351 F.2d 318 (CA5 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
398 F.2d 658 (CA7 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1080, 89 S.Ct.
the Sixth Circuit Takes a similar approach.
his right to a speedy trial.
not regarded the demand rule as being rigid. See United States v.
90 S.Ct. 133, 24 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969).24 See n. 2, supra.
process which has not always been carried out with uniformity . .
public interest in prompt disposition of criminal cases. . . .
supra, n. 17, at 17.
supra, for another slightly different approach.
S.Ct. 481, 485—486, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957).
Prevention of Violence 152 (1969).
v. Mann, 291 F.Supp. 268 (SDNY 1968).
Tr. of Oral Arg. 39.38 Id., at 4.
the time it was made.
prior to that.' Tr. of Oral Arg. 19—20.

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