Source: https://law.justia.com/codes/missouri/2017/title-xix/chapter-304/section-304.010/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:52:05+00:00

Document:
Section 304.010 Definitions — maximum speed limits — cities, towns, villages, certain counties, may set speed limit, how set — slower speeds set, when — violations, penalty.
(4) "Urbanized area", an area of fifty thousand population at a density at or greater than one thousand persons per square mile.
5. The county commission of any county of the second, third or fourth classification may set the speed limit or the weight limit or both the speed limit and the weight limit on roads or bridges on any county, township or road district road in the county and, with the approval of the state highways and transportation commission, on any state road or highway not within the limits of any incorporated city, town or village, lower than the uniform maximum speed limit as provided in subsection 2 of this section where the condition of the road or the nature of the area requires a lower speed. The maximum speed limit set by the county commission of any county of the second, third, or fourth classification for any road under the commission's jurisdiction shall not exceed fifty-five miles per hour if such road is properly marked by signs indicating such speed limit. If the county commission does not mark the roads with signs indicating the speed limit, the speed limit shall be fifty miles per hour. The commission shall send copies of any order establishing a speed limit or weight limit on roads and bridges on a county, township or road district road in the county to the chief engineer of the state department of transportation, the superintendent of the state highway patrol and to any township or road district maintaining roads in the county. After the roads have been properly marked by signs indicating the speed limits and weight limits set by the county commission, the speed limits and weight limits shall be of the same effect as the speed limits provided for in subsection 1 of this section and shall be enforced by the state highway patrol and the county sheriff as if such speed limits and weight limits were established by state law.
(1960) A railroad track itself is a warning of danger and a highway traveler must exercise the highest degree of care in crossing the track. A motorist approaching a railroad crossing with which he is familiar who fails to look or to see that which is plainly visible if he performs his duty to look, is contributorily negligent. Pipes v. Mo. Pacific Railroad Co. (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 30.
(1960) Where information used some of the language of the statute in charging careless and reckless driving and went on to particularized saying that the vehicle was operated at a high rate of speed, weaving back and forth across the road and running through city stop signs, while not recommended for future use, held sufficient as an information. State v. Tevis (A.), 340 S.W.2d 415.
(1961) Operator of motor vehicle about to drive across railroad tracks on which a train is approaching is required to exercise the highest degree of care for his own safety. Reedy v. Missouri -Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 111.
(1961) Every operator of a motor vehicle has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care and such care includes the warning of other motorists on the highway while the vehicle is stopped on the paved portion of the road after the vehicle had stalled and ceased to run. Phillips v. Stockman (A.), 351 S.W.2d 464.
(1961) On trial for violating speed regulations under this section evidence as to prior conviction of offense committed subsequent to the offense for which the accused was on trial held admissible in evidence. State v. Hunt (A.), 352 S.W.2d 57.
(1962) Wife, seated in right front seat of car her husband left parked with the motor running, who in moving over to make room for another occupant accidentally stepped on accelerator causing car to lunge forward and crash through store, injuring plaintiff, became operator of the car within meaning of statute. Hay v. Ham (A.), 364 S.W.2d 118.
(1965) This section is designed to prevent danger and it is unnecessary for the state to show that any specific person was actually put in danger in order to sustain a conviction. State v. McNail (A.), 389 S.W.2d 214.
(1965) Information failing to state that offense occurred on a highway did not charge a crime. State v. Bartlett (A.), 394 S.W.2d 434.
(1966) Duty of a motorist to use the highest degree of care is not limited to the paved portion of a highway, but extends to the shoulder of the highway. Ely v. Parsons (A.), 399 S.W.2d 613.
(1966) To fulfill his statutory duty to exercise the highest degree of care at all times and to keep a careful and vigilant lookout for other persons and vehicles on the highway, a motorist is required to look in such an observant manner as to enable him to see that which a person in the exercise of the highest degree of care would be expected to see under similar circumstances, and he must be held to have seen what looking would have revealed. Weathers v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. (A.), 403 S.W.2d 663.
(1968) Failure to yield the right-of-way is specifically denounced as an offense, but an information charging careless and imprudent driving by failure to yield the right-of-way at a place where required by statute to do so, includes the offense as descriptive of what happened and in what manner defendant drove imprudently. State v. Richards (A.), 429 S.W.2d 351.
(1971) Information failing to state that offense occurred on a highway did not charge a crime. State v. Rollins (A.), 469 S.W.2d 46.
(1972) To constitute careless and imprudent driving there must be conduct which shows under all the existing circumstances and conditions that the property of another or the life or limb of any person is endangered; therefore, evidence that defendant spun his car around two or three times in intersection, making tires squeal and throwing rocks, was insufficient to support conviction of the offense. State v. Todd (A.), 477 S.W.2d 725.
(1977) This section does not impose a duty to exercise the highest degree of care to save all persons from harm proximately resulting from operation of motor vehicles. Ford v. Monroe (A.), 559 S.W.2d 759.
(1984) Offense of careless and imprudent driving is not the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes as a manslaughter charge. State v. Noerper (Mo. App.E.D.), 674 S.W.2d 100.
(1984) Director of revenue may not assess points for speeding violations on state limited access highways within city limits, if the city ordinance violates, duplicates or concurs with the state set limits. Knierim v. James (Mo. banc), 677 S.W.2d 322.
(1990) Motorist stopped on roadway to repair an automobile is considered to be “operating” an automobile within the provision requiring the highest degree of care. Phillips v. United States, 743 F.Supp. 681 (E.D.Mo.).
(1993) Where high speed chase by law enforcement officers resulted in one civilian death and substantial property damage and personal injury to others, statute that provides some regulations for operation of emergency vehicles does not create duty to particular individuals as distinguished from general public; therefore duty created is to public and not to individuals. Boyle v. City of Liberty, Mo., 833 F.Supp. 1436 (W.D. Mo.).

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