Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40341:g-r-nos-134757-58-august-4,-2000-people-of-the-phil-v-reynaldo-langit&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:28:26+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REYNALDO LANGIT, Accused-Appellant.
That on or about July 23, 1995 at [B]arangay Lekep, [M]unicipality of San Fabian, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) cal. .38 handgun w/out first securing the necessary permit/license to possess the same, which firearm was used in shooting to death Abelardo Velasquez.
Point of entry of bullet: 0.5 x 0.5 cm occipital area, R. with contusion collar 1 x 1 cm.
Foreign body recovered within the brain tissue which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, Accused Diong Docusin is hereby acquitted of the crime charged in the information.
In the civil aspect of this case, judgment is hereby rendered ordering said accused to pay the heirs of the deceased an amount of P30,000.00 as compensation for the loss of life of the victim and temperate and moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused Patricio Clauna, he is hereby acquitted.
In the civil aspect of this case, judgment is hereby rendered holding accused liable for his contributory act resulting in the death of the above-named deceased so that he is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of said victim in the amount of P30,000.00 as compensation for loss of life; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Subsequently, Accused-appellant surrendered to Mayor Romulo Magliba of the Municipality of San Fabian, Pangasinan. When arraigned, Accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to both informations and trial proceeded in due course. The cases against him were consolidated having arisen from the same incident and, as such, joint hearings were conducted.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Prudencio Serote, Gemma Velasquez (the wife of the victim), SPO3 Romeo de Guzman and PO2 Francisco Castillo.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 95-01109-D, the Court finds the accused Reynaldo Langit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm punished under Section 1 of P.D. 1866, as amended and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. 95-01115-D, the Court finds the accused Reynaldo Langit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for his death, another amount of P50,000.00, as moral damages, and P16,130.00, for funeral expenses.
A.	. . . CONSIDERING THE SLUG ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED FROM THE BRAIN TISSUE OF THE VICTIM AS EVIDENCE (EXH. "B"), WHEN ITS PROBATIVE VALUE IS SUSPECT AS COMING FROM A POLLUTED SOURCE, WORTHLESS OF CONSIDERATION BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
B.	. . . GIVING MORE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PERJURED TESTIMONY AND SWORN STATEMENT OF PROSECUTION WITNESS PRUDENCIO SEROTE IN CONTRAST WITH THE MORE POSITIVE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER OF TESTIFYING BY WITNESS TRINIDAD SEROTE.
Witness Prudencio Serote claims to have witnessed the crime because at that particular moment, he was unloading a passenger from his tricycle facing them at a short distance. However, his mother appeared in court and cast a doubt on his testimony by testifying that when the crime took place, her son was with him a kilometer away in the ricefields (sic) transplanting rice seedlings. She testified in a positive and straightforward manner with a demeanor and a manner of speaking which was free from nervousness and uncertainty.
On direct and cross-examination this witness testified that he saw accused Diong Docusin and Patricio Clauna come (sic) from the westerly direction as they met the deceased, who was on his way home. Suddenly, each of them grabbed the wrist and arm of the latter. While twisting the arm of the victim and pinning it behind him, Clauna struck him on the nape with a piece of stone. In his sworn statement to the police, he declared that the victim fell on the ground. While there crawling, Accused Langit came near and shot him at close range.
The appreciation of one judge of the testimony of a certain witness is not binding on another judge who heard the testimony of the same witness on the same matter. Each magistrate who hears the testimony of a witness is called upon to make his own appreciation of the evidence. It is, therefore, illogical to argue that because one judge made a conclusion in a certain way with respect to one or more of the accused necessarily dictates that the succeeding judge who heard the same case against the other accused should automatically make the same conclusion.
It is quite apparent in the aforestated narration of the two prosecution witnesses that all of the accused participated in the killing of the accused by simultaneous and concerted acts, consistent with a common criminal intent clearly demonstrating that all of them acted in conspiracy (People v. Pajenado, Et Al., 69 SCRA 172, 179). For as said Prudencio Serote said, Diong Docusin and Clauna held the wrist and arm of the deceased, while accused Langit shot him with a revolver.
What the court cannot understand, however, is if the group acted in concert, consistent with a common criminal design to kill him and they had a gun, why was it still necessary for both Docusin and Clauna to hold and pin him so that he can be shot? Why did they not simply waylay and shoot him to avoid being recognized and apprehended?
Is it not possible that the killing merely sprang from a brawl where both Docusin and Clauna were present and, not knowing that Langit had a gun or the intent to use it, they participated in the fight?
It is quite apparent in the aforestated narration of the two prosecution witnesses that all of the accused by simultaneous and concerted acts, consistent with a common criminal intent clearly demonstrating that all of them acted in conspiracy (People v. Pajenado, Et Al., 69 SCRA 172, 179). For as said Prudencio Serote said, Diong Docusin and Clauna held the wrist and arm of the deceased, while accused Langit shot him with a revolver.
Whether Judge Llamas committed an error in acquitting Diong Docusin and Patricio Clauna for the same offenses of which accused-appellant was convicted by Judge Aliposa is a matter which is already beyond the review of this Court. The principle of double jeopardy prohibits it. However, errors of judgment made by a judge should, undeniably, not be made binding on another judge.
The Court rejects the defense of alibi interposed by the accused because he was positively identified by a credible witness Prudencio Serote. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime. Eyewitness Prudencio Serote categorically and clearly declared that at a distance of about 15 meters, he saw the accused come out from the bamboo grooves, point his gun at Velasquez and shoot the victim on the head, while his hands were being held by Diong Docusin and Patricio Clauna. After shooting the victim, the accused ran away bringing with him the firearm, which the witness identified as a .38 caliber revolver. This firearm was never recovered.
It is also evident that the accused, with the victim’s two hands rendered immobile, had taken advantage of his superior strength and had employed treacherous means to weaken the victim’s defense, thereby qualifying the killing to murder.
There is no reason for Prudencio Serote to testify falsely against the accused. They are barriomates and no ill motive was shown for Serote to implicate the accused in the death of Velasquez.
The defense of the accused, corroborated by the testimony of Antonio Ulanday, his "compadre," that he was at his house at Barangay Poblacion when the crime was committed is petty, unconvincing and deserves scant consideration. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. As testified by the accused, the house of Ulanday is only two kilometers away from where the shooting incident happened. It was, therefore, not physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Moreover, this Court doubts the credibility of Ulanday, for having kept silent for two years, if indeed his "compadre" Reynaldo Langit is innocent, and was in his house when the killing of Velasquez took place.
The testimony of the accused that on the day following the shooting incident, he left San Fabian and brought his family to Alcala, Pangasinan only served to bolster his guilt. Flight is an indication of guilt. For two years, the accused remained in hiding and evaded the warrant of arrest issued against him.
Likewise, the declaration of Trinidad Serote that her son, Prudencio Serote, the eyewitness in this case, was with her in the field at the time of the incident is not worthy of credence. This court is not convinced that she was telling the truth. On cross-examination, she admitted that on July 23, 1995, her son Prudencio was not living with her anymore because of a previous misunderstanding between them and that in fact she filed a case of grave threats against Prudencio before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian.
In conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. Tacan, 182 SCRA 601; People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368; and People v. Caling, 208 SCRA 821, and reiterated in People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, this Court finds the accused guilty of two separate offenses of murder and aggravated illegal possession of firearm as charged.
The finding of Judge Aliposa that accused-appellant is liable for the death of Abelardo Velasquez is clearly supported by the evidence on record.
Will you please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?
A	I am Prudencio Serote, 29 years old, single farmer and a resident of Lequep (sic), San Fabian, Pangasinan.
Q	On July 23, 1995 in the morning, do you remember where you were?
A	Yes, sir, I was along the road.
Q	Where is that road located?
A	Lequep (sic), San Fabian, Pangasinan, sir.
Q	While you were there, was there any unusual incident that you have observed?
Q	Please narrate to this Honorable Court this incident that you have seen?
A	I saw Abelardo Velasquez being held by Diong Docusin and Gary Clauna, sir.
Q	What part of the body of Abelardo Velasquez which was being held by the two?
A	The two hands of Abelardo Velasquez, sir.
Q	What happened next, after the two hands of Abelardo Velasquez were being held by Gary Clauna and Diong Docusin?
A	Gary Clauna told Reynaldo Langit: "Apuram pare" (hurry up, pare).
Q	What happened, after that?
A	Reynaldo Langit shot Abelardo Velasquez, sir.
Q	Now, you made mention of Reynaldo Langit. Can you still recognize this fellow who shot Abelardo Velasquez?
Q	Now, will you please look around the premises of this court and point to him if you know?
Q	Is this the very person now who shot Velasquez?
Q	How long have you known him?
A	I have know (sic) him already for a long time, sir.
Q	From where is he?
A	From Lequep (sic), San Fabian, Pangasinan, sir.
Q	By the way, what is your means of livelyhood (sic)?
A	Farmer and tridycle (sic) driver, sir.
Q	What happened to Velasquez when he was shot by the accused, if you know?
However, we do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that treachery attended the commission of the offense. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take. 56 To appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 57 In the present case, treachery was not adequately established by the prosecution since, as testified upon by Prudencio Serote, Abelardo Velasquez was engaged in a tussle with Diong Docusin and Patricio Clauna prior to the shooting. The existence of a struggle before the delivery of the fatal shot negates the attendance of treachery in the commission of the offense since this shows that the victim was forewarned of the impending attack and afforded the opportunity to put up a defense. 58 Moreover, the prosecution did not present any evidence to prove that accused-appellant deliberately adopted the manner by which Abelardo Velasquez was killed.
The Court agrees with accused-appellant that criminal investigators should be very cautious in handling pieces of evidence recovered from the crime scene or from the body of the victim in order that their sanctity as admissible evidence can be preserved.
Be that as it may, the way the police handled the slug was not really material in convicting accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearm since it does not form part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The fact that the firearm existed and that accused-appellant used the same in shooting Abelardo Velasquez was clearly established through the testimony of Prudencio Serote. Concerning accused-appellant’s lack of authority to possess such firearm, this was proven through the testimony of SPO3 Romeo de Guzman as corroborated by the certification issued by the Firearms and Explosives Department of the Philippine National Police.
Under P.D. No. 1866, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder was punishable with death and was treated as a separate offense from the aforesaid crimes against persons.
SECTION 1.	Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall wilfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
Section 19(1). — Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
SECTION 1.	Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or ammunition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, 44, 45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer or any public or private firm, company, or corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
P.D. 1866, which codified the laws on illegal possession of firearms, was amended on June 6, 1997 by Republic Act 8294. Aside from lowering the penalty for said crime, R.A. 8294 also provided that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as a special aggravating circumstance. This amendment has two (2) implications: first, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder shall not be treated as a separate offense, but merely as a special aggravating circumstance; second, as only a single crime (homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm) is committed under the law, only one penalty shall be imposed on the accused.
Since it is a basic principle in criminal jurisprudence that penal laws shall be given retroactive effect when favorable to the accused, we are now mandated to apply the new law in determining the proper penalty to be imposed on Accused-Appellant. Thus, in the present case, Accused-appellant’s conviction for the crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm must be modified and the use of the unlicensed firearm in the killing of the victim shall be considered as a special aggravating circumstance.
The qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength having been ruled out in the commission of the felony, the crime for which accused-appellant should be made accountable must be modified from murder to homicide. Accordingly, the penalty of accused-appellant must correspondingly be lowered to reclusion temporal. There being one aggravating circumstance of using an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide, the proper imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is anywhere within the range of prision mayor, or from 6 years and 1 day to twelve years, and the maximum within the range of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, or from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years.
(3)	The spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Finally, Gemma Velasquez testified that she incurred P16,130.00 for the burial expense of her husband. This testimony was supported by documentary evidence and was not rebutted by the defense. Thus, the said amount should be awarded to the heirs of Abelardo Velasquez.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decisions in CR-95-01109-D and CR-95-01115-D are hereby MODIFIED and accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of twelve years of prision mayor maximum as minimum and 18 years of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P613,284.75 for unearned income, P37,325.00 for burial expenses, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
2.	Records of CR-95-01109-D, p. 8.
3.	Records of CR-95-01115-D, p. 1.
6.	TSN, dated 22 May 1997, p. 6.
9.	TSN, dated 24 September 1997, pp. 3-4.
10.	TSN, dated 22 May 1997, p. 4.
14.	TSN, dated 2 September 1997, p. 3.
19.	TSN, dated 16 September 1997, pp. 5-6.
22.	TSN dated 23 October 1997, p. 3.
25.	TSN, dated 23 October 1997, p. 9.
26.	Records of CR-95-01115-D, p. 251.
28.	TSN, dated 9 December 1997, pp. 4-5.
39.	TSN, dated 25 November 1997, p. 4.
42.	TSN, dated 25 November 1997, p. 5.
43.	TSN, dated 31 July 1997, p. 4.
48.	TSN, dated 31 July 1997, p. 6.
49.	Records of CR-95-01115-D, p. 325.
51.	Records of CR-95-01115-D, p. 151.
55.	TSN, May 22, 1997, pp. 3-4.
56.	People v. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369, 378-379 (1996); People v. Patrolla, Jr., 254 SCRA 467 (1996); People v. Parangan, 231 SCRA 682, 691 (1994).
57.	People v. Porras, 255 SCRA 514, 529 (1996); People v. Ledesma, 250 SCRA 166, 172 (1995); People v. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314, 332 (1995).
58.	People v. Rillorta, 180 SCRA 102, 107 (1989); People v. Fernandez, 111 SCRA 100, 113, 114 (1982).
59.	People v. Acuña, 248 SCRA 668, 677 (1995).
60.	People v. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87, 97-98 (1995).
63.	Entitled "Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and for Relevant Purposes.
64.	People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742, 781-782 (1998); People v. Feloteo, 290 SCRA 629, 633-636 (1998); People v. Bregante, 286 SCRA 629, 644 (1998).
67.	G.R. Nos. 131592-93, Feb. 15, 2000.
68.	People v. Lopez, GR No. 119380, 19 August 1999.
69.	People v. Villanueva, 302 SCRA 380, 410-402 (1999); People v. Suitos, 20 SCRA 419, 431 (1967); People v. Daniel, 136 SCRA 92, 104 (1985).
70.	People v. Reyes, 309 SCRA 622 (1999).
71.	People v. De Vera, Sr., 308 SCRA 75, 102 (1999).
72.	Article 2208 (1), Civil Code.

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