Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140328_0000480.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:51:18+00:00

Document:
BOROUGH OF LAFLIN, PAUL BENDERAVICH, Individually, CARL YASTREMSKI, Individually, PATRICK GILHOOLEY, Individually, ANTHONY D'ELISEO, Individually, THOMAS PARRY, Individually, Defendants.
A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Michael Flanagan's ("Flanagan") Amended Complaint (Doc. 14) filed by Defendants Borough of Laflin (the "Borough"), Paul Benderavich ("Benderavich"), Carl Yastremski ("Yastremski"), Patrick Gilhooley ("Gilhooley"), Anthony D'Eliseo ("D'Eliseo"), and Thomas Parry ("Parry") (collectively, "Defendants"). Flanagan contends that Defendants retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment, deprived him of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and defamed him and cast him in a false light. Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part. Because Flanagan adequately states claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Defendants' motion to dismiss the federal law claims will be denied. However, because the Borough is entitled to immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and Individual Defendants are entitled to high public official immunity, Defendants' motion to dismiss the state law claims will be granted.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety on January 24, 2014. (Doc. 14.) Defendants' brief in support of its motion was timely filed on February 7, 2014. (Doc. 15.) On February 14, 2014, Flanagan filed his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 16.) Defendants filed a reply brief in further support of their motion on February 27, 2014. (Doc. 17.) Defendants' motion to dismiss is now fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Detailed factual allegations are not required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. However, mere conclusory statements will not do; "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Instead, a complaint must "show" this entitlement by alleging sufficient facts. Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). As such, "[t]he touchstone of the pleading standard is plausability." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
The inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage is "normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged." Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, " Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, meaning enough factual allegations "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of'" each necessary element. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

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