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Timestamp: 2019-04-24 17:45:59+00:00

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Critical to the evaluation of the Wednesbury principle [2 ] is an appraisal of where it can be located within the scheme of administrative law, and its articulation in a different category of challenge to administrative action.
Where is the principle located within the scheme of administrative law?
The way in which such challenge is made is relevant; and in this respect, the Wednesbury principle is understood with respect to grounds of judicial review of administrative action. In relation to this, as the ultra vires principle already exists, a question that is often asked is the reason for the necessity of a discrete principle relating to unreasonableness.
The doctrine of ultra vires and the need for a separate ground of “unreasonableness"
the ultra vires doctrine is deserving of mention. The ultra vires doctrine refers to an action which is in excess of the powers of decision making bodies, and the reasoning or implications of this principle are important insofar as they uphold the sovereignty of parliament, and the rule of law (such importance is to be illustrated in comparison with the Wednesbury principle).
In this case, the Commissioner of Sewers had levied charges for repairing a river bank. Ideally, these charges ought to have been divided equally among all the owners benefited, but this charge had been thrown on one adjacent owner. According to law, they had the power to levy this charge in their discretion, but this charge was disallowed as inequitable.
Coke opined: “… notwithstanding the words of the commission give authority to the commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to be limited, and bound with the rule of reason and law. For discretion is a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private affections…"
While the discretion conferred by the authority to the commissioners allowed them to exercise such discretion as they thought fit, the additional limitation of such discretion being in conformity with the “rule of reason" was imposed by Coke in this case.
While the Rookes ratio did not deal with judicial review of such discretion in explicit terms, this case laid down that not only does such discretion have to be sound discretion (which followed the Rookes ratio as such discretion necessarily needs to follow the “rule of reason"), but also that the Court reserves the power to assess such exercise of discretion.
1666 - R v Commissioner of Fens [11 ] – The court in this case granted certiorari against the commissioner of Fens merely on the allegation that they had proceeded unreasonably, as the court could judge whether they (the commissioner) have pursued their powers. This is a reiteration of the principle that the court can take it upon itself to ensure that the discretion exercised by an authority wielding power is exercised reasonably.
1773 – Leader v Moxon [12 ] - The paving commissioners in this case were given the power to make alterations in streets “in such a manner as the commissioner shall think fit", and the in the exercise of this discretion, the commissioners raised part of a street by six feet, thus blocking the plaintiff’s doors and windows. It was held that the commissioners had grossly exceeded their powers, and such discretion was arbitrary. The emphasis once again was on the conformity of such discretion with the “rule of reason", and this echoed the ratio in the Rookes case.
1925 – Roberts v Hopwood [15 ] - Acting in the exercise of his discretion, the district auditor had disallowed what in his opinion were “over generous" wages paid by the Borough Council of Poplar to their employees under an Act which empowered them to pay such wages as they “may think fit." The House of Lords was of the opinion that the Borough need not have paid more than what was reasonable. Once again, the test was of reasonableness in the exercise of discretion.
"on such terms and conditions and under such restrictions as, subject to regulations of the Secretary of State, the council may by the respective licences determine."
children under 10 years could not enter the premises, irrespective of whether they were accompanied by a guardian or a parent.
- The majority (as per Lush and Rowlatt, JJ) opined that the condition was ultra vires inasmuch as there was no connection between the ground upon which the condition was imposed, and the use of the premise. In other words, there was no connection between the health and and welfare of young children, and the use of the premise for holding exhibitions.
If these requirements are satisfied, then the condition is not ultra vires, and the authority can take into account the public interest so far as children are affected.
The relevant provision was Section 1, sub section 2 of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, and acting under this provision, an authority, having power to grant licences under the Cinematograph Act, 1909, allowed a cinematograph theatre in their area (which was licensed under the aforementioned Act) to be open, and used on Sundays for the purpose of cinematograph entertainments.
that no child under the age of sixteen years should be admitted to the cinematograph theatre.
It was held that the imposition of this condition was not ultra vires, and the condition was not unreasonable. Discretion when vested in an authority must be exercised in a reasonable way, and there is nothing in the exercise of the discretion vested in the authority which suggests that it was not exercised in a reasonable manner, in accordance with the “rule of reason" (the original phrase used by Coke in the Estwick case).
In modern days authorities both statutory and governmental - enjoy a wide range of discretionary powers. This power is however, fettered by restraints. It is to be exercised in public interest and for the public good. The wide range of authorities and officers conferred with discretion adds to the intensity of the problem in as much as quite frequently discretionary powers are wrongly exercised or otherwise abused. In early times, the courts have been overseeing the exercise of discretionary powers by way of judicial review. New developments in administration made the Courts to adopt new techniques to discipline the exercise of administrative discretion but the judiciary was very cautious in exercising its power of judicial review.
It was in Wednesbury Corporation case that the Court of Appeal in England ruled that the courts could only interfere in an act of executive authority if it be shown that the authority had contravened the law and that the power of the courts to interfere in such matters is limited, except where the discretion has not been exercised within the four corners of well-known legal principles. This observation signified the approach the judiciary adopted.
In Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. Lord Greene, M.R. in a classic and oft-quoted passage held that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other following conditions were satisfied viz. the order was contrary to law, or irrelevant factors were considered, or relevant factors were not considered or the decision was one that no reasonable person could have taken.
The facts of Wednesbury are critical to a discourse on the subject. The plaintiff company, the owners and licensees of the Gaumont Cinema, Wednesbury, Staffordshire, were granted by the defendants who were the licensing authority for that borough under the Cinematograph Act, 1909, a licence to give performances on Sunday under S.1 (1) of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932; but the licence was granted subject to a condition that "no children under the age of fifteen years shall be admitted to any entertainment whether accompanied by an adult or not." In these circumstances the plaintiffs brought an action for a declaration that the condition as ultra vires and unreasonable.
The plaintiffs were the owners and licensees of the Gaumont Cinema, Wednesbury, Staffordshire. The defendants were the licensing authority for that area, the Wednesbury Corporation.
The Cinematograph Act – The Wednesbury Corporation had the power under this Act to grant licences in any area for cinematograph performances.
The Sunday Entertainments Act – Section1, sub section 1 of this Act provided that if an authority had, under the Cinematograph Act, the power to grant licences in any area for cinematography performances, then such authority had the power to allow a licensed place to be open and used on Sundays, “subject to such conditions as the authority thinks fit to impose".
The power to allow a licensed place to be open and used on Sundays, “subject to such conditions as the authority think fit to impose."
As there was no debate about the Wednesbury Corporation being an authority contemplated under the Cinematograph Act, there was no debate about it being an authority under the Sunday Entertainments Act.
The claim of the plaintiffs was that the condition was ultra vires and unreasonable.
What then are those principles? They are well understood. They are principles which the court looks to in considering any question of discretion of this kind. The exercise of such discretion must be a real exercise of the discretion. If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there is to be found expressly or by implication matters which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have regard to, then in exercising the discretion it must have regard to those matters. Conversely, if the nature of the subject matter and the general interpretation of the Act make it clear that certain matters would not be germane to the matter in question; the authority must disregard those irrelevant collateral matters."
The decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would ever consider imposing it.
The court held that the condition did not fall into any of these categories. Therefore, the claim failed and the decision of the Wednesbury Corporation was upheld. The test laid down in this case, in all three limbs, is known as "the Wednesbury test". The term "Wednesbury unreasonableness" is used to describe the third limb, of being so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have decided that way.
“By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’…It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it…."
The principle of proportionality envisages that a public authority ought to maintain a sense of proportion between his particular goals and the means he employees to achieve those goals, so that his action impinges on the individual rights to the minimum extent to preserve public interest.
Thus implying that administrative action ought to bear a reasonable relationship to the general purpose for which the power has been conferred. The principle of proportionality therefore implies that the Court has to necessarily go into the pros and cons of any administrative action called into question. Unless the impugned administrative action is advantageous and in public interest such an action cannot be upheld. At the core of this principle is the scrutiny of the administrative action to examine whether the power conferred is exercised in proportion to the purpose for which it has been conferred. Thus, any administrative authority while exercising a discretionary power will have to necessarily establish that its decision is balanced and in proportion to the object of the power conferred. This is so as administrative decisions can often have profound implications on the day-to-day lives of our citizens, their rights, liberties, and legitimate pursuits.
The test adopted by Lord Diplock also underwent criticism and it was said in another decision as “conduct which no sensible authority acting within due appreciation of its responsibilities would have decided to adopt" and these unexaggerated criteria give the administrator ample and rightful rein, consistently with the constitutional separation of powers.
“26. The explanation of the Master of the Rolls in the first sentence of the cited passage requires clarification. It is couched in language reminiscent of the traditional Wednesbury ground of review (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. Vs. Wednesbury Corporation  I KB 223), and in particular the adaptation of that test in terms of heightened scrutiny in cases involving fundamental rights …..There is a material difference between the Wednesbury and Smith grounds of review and the approach of proportionality applicable in respect of review where Convention rights are at stake."
However, in the case of ex-parte Daly, it is the speech of Lord Cooke of Thorndon that has attracted much attention to the principle of judicial review as enunciated in the Wednesbury Case.
This widely cited quote has generated much debate and anxiety over the applicability and future of the Wednesbury Principle. Some commentators feel that in the light of the above statement in the Daly Case, the administrative power of discretion that has remained protected from judicial review unless challenged on the grounds of absurdity, irrationality or perversity was now open to the test of proportionality as enunciated by Prof. Jeffrey Jowell in his article titled “Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review".
(2) Were the means employed suitable to achieve that aim?
(3) Could the aim have been achieved by a less restrictive alternative?
(4) Is the derogation justified overall in the interests of a democratic society?
According to Professor Jowell, such a four-fold test can ensure that a prima facie violation of a fundamental democratic right is not lightly sanctioned while providing for a heightened scrutiny of a decision called into question.
According to De Smith, Woolf and Jowell on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, [22 ] there are three principal formulations by which proportionality is tested.
(1) Whether the relative merits of differing objectives or interests were appropriately weighed or "fairly balanced"?
It may be stated at the onset that the Supreme Court has been applying the test of reasonableness unreasonably and the proportionality principle disproportionately. While the general trend has been stated below, the researchers have focused more on the development of jurisprudence in the 21st Century.
Prior to making a statement on the evolution of case law in India, one must scrutinize the case of Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, decided in 2005, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The minority judgment by Hon’ble Justice Arijit Pasayat has relied heavily on Wednesbury principles regarding the standards for judging reasonableness of an executive action. Unfortunately it has overlooked that the Wednesbury principles have been diluted, if not rejected, by the House of Lords in Ex parte Daly in 2001 and previously by the Privy Council in 1999. This was pointed out in the submissions but somehow has escaped attention.
May 2001), the Supreme Court had firmly acknowledged this tool of judicial interpretation in Om Kumar v. Union of India decided on 17 November 2000.
In this case, inter alia, the Supreme Court noted that while dealing with the validity of legislation infringing fundamental freedoms enumerated in Article 19 (1) of the Constitution of India, the issue of whether restrictions imposed by the legislation were disproportionate to the situation and not the least restrictive of choices has been repeatedly examined by the superior courts in numerous judgments.
Thus in the Om Kumar case proportionality was held to mean whether while regulating the exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures have been adopted by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or administrative order. And that it was for the superior Courts to decide whether the choice made by the legislature or the administrative authorities infringed the rights excessively. This to my mind is the essence of the doctrine of proportionality. In State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and Ors [24 ]. the Supreme Court has supplied further credence to ex-parte Daly. One must also refer to the case of Commissioner of Police v. Syed Hussain [25 ] where a similar endorsement was made.
Based on the facts of the case [26 ]. the Supreme Court while holding that the High Court erred in interfering with the quantum of punishment dwelt upon the question of applicability of doctrine of proportionality. And while holding the view that the doctrine of proportionality could be invoked only under certain situations, the Court however acknowledged that the doctrine of unreasonableness was giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.
Furthermore, the Apex Court decision in Reliance Airport Developers v. Airports Authority of India [27 ] has also firmed up the future applicability of ex-parte Daly if the context so requires. The Court while adjudicating upon a challenge to the exercise of discretion by Government in altering the terms of the original tender documents inter alia held that though the test of proportionality was very much relevant in the light of ex-parte Daly, the facts of the case in Reliance Airport Developers did not necessitate its application.
Finally, in the case of Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kannan [28 ]. it was held that where no appeal is provided for against an administrative order, judicial review of such an order would be maintainable. Further, that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution while undertaking such review need not confine itself to the traditional tests of review viz illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.
The Judges who adjudicated upon this matter also held the view that in such cases of judicial review the Court has to necessarily delve deeper into the matter and subject such orders to deeper scrutiny going beyond the above three tests. Based on the facts [29 ] and the issues in this case, the Supreme Court inter alia had to go into the validity of certain regulations and the power of Judicial Review of administrative acts. While going into this question, the Supreme Court acknowledged that keeping in view the situational changes particularly, the outsourcing of sovereign activities by the State; the Supreme Court had been expanding the scope of judicial review. In its judgment it has held that “the doctrine of unreasonableness has now given way to the doctrine of proportionality"
Therefore, there is a new wave of thinking that the Doctrine of Unreasonableness in cases where applicable could give way to the Doctrine of Proportionality. And we are certain that in appropriate cases the law will develop accordingly.
The superior Courts in India enjoy the powers of judicial review and this is accepted as one of the basic features of our Constitution. We have been following the common law principles in the matter of justice delivery system, and for interpretation of the Constitution and the Statutes we rely heavily on some of the basic principles laid down by the superior Courts of common law countries. It is, therefore, of immense importance that some of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, The House of Lords and The Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia attract our attention and we closely follow them in appropriate cases. But, we must also remember that these decisions are rendered in peculiar socio-economic conditions of those countries and many of these principles cannot be applied implicitly in Indian conditions.
However, the general guidelines issued in these decisions have always been applied by our Courts. In the matter of administrative law, there have been tremendous changes in recent times. There is even a fundamental shift in a great deal of public law litigation in England, by virtue of the implementation of the Human Rights Act, 1998, the shift has been significantly accelerated and the principles of judicial review must be actually justified by Constitutional provisions. Though the right of superior Courts to invoke the judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution, its content, reach and power, and the balance between various principles are not enunciated in any provision of the Constitution, but have probably been founded on various principles enunciated on the basis of notions of fairness which generally permeate the common law.

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