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Timestamp: 2020-06-03 05:11:06+00:00

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Gvildenu | Mintys / Tiesa
Mintys: Tiesa
Žr. Nulybė, Požiūriai, Meilė, Apimtys, Anthony Judge, Flemming Funch See also: Institutions, Freedom
Kaip iš asmeninių požiūrių išvesti besąlygišką Dievo požiūrį?
Koks santykis tarp tiesos ir šviesos ir optikos?
Ar tiesa dinamiška?
Koks ryšys tarp tiesos ir gerumo sandaros, laisvumo?
one of the four RepresentationsOfTheNullsome
a negation of the perspective of the Foursome which is for knowledge of things in themselves
true is negation of hidden, true is what is obvious, in your face
the extent of BeingOneWith
Knowledge from the perspective of BeingOneWith
the Application that we can be meeting the Theory and thus BeingOneWith.
the Coinciding of the global BeingOneWith (God) and the local BeingOneWith (us)
the Application that we are BeingOneWith the Theory
the IndependentPerspective can take up the DefaultPerspective and thus coincide with it, be not hidden
the answer of Willingness
the Nonwilling meets the Willing.
What is true is: what is obvious, not hidden, what is [ThisWiki:View viewed].
Truth is the implicitness of Coinciding. Truth is coinciding from within Contexts.
Truth is taking up of a perspective.
Truth is the Identity across all through Other who is alongside all and so truth ultimately brings meaning all the way back to God as the ultimate ground.
True is one of the four RepresentationsOfTheNullsome. Also, each of the representations of the nullsome may be understood as truth of a different {{Scope}}.
True is the negation of the whether perspective of the {{Foursome}}. It is the negation of knowledge of things in themselves. In that sense, true is negation of what is hidden. True is what is obvious, in your face.
Tiesa yra širdingumo sąlygos. Širdingasis sutampa su savo raiška.
Tiesa yra melas nes nėra santvarkoje. Visi teiginiai melagingi, nes teiginiai yra modelyje, o modelis nėra tikrovė.
Kas yra sutampa (ar ne) su tuo kas reiškiasi.
Tiesa, tai kas akivaizdu, kas nenuslėpta. Sutapimas to, kas yra ir to, kas reiškiasi. Išėjimas už savęs kažkurio asmens atitinkamoje apimtyje. What is True is what is viewed. The Observational Plane is what is viewed by the Observer. What is obvious, not hidden, Viewed, the separation between the viewer and the viewed when it is nothing. Tiesa, sandara, ir būtent išsiaiškinimas, plėtojasi. Tiesa yra sistema be jokių kliūčių, tad visų sistemų grynumas, grynoji sistema, santvarka. Užtat tiesa labai susijusi su laisve, su kliūčių nebuvimu.
Tiesa yra dvasios ir sandaros neišskiriamumas. Tiesa yra nenuslepiama, pasireiškianti dvasia, tad jinai tiek dvasia, tiek sandara. Laisvumas yra gerumo sandara. Ar tai kartu tiesos sandara? Tiesos sandara, yra tarpas tarp klausimo ir atsakymo, tai jo atvaizdai. Tai laisvumas tarp tiesos turinio ir išraiškos, tad laisvumas turi apimtį, taip pat mažėja ar didėja. Laisvumo esmė yra išsiaiškinimas, kuris gali plėtotis.
Tiesa yra tai, kas kyla iš nebuvimo, kas atsiskleidžia, kaip kad Dievas, iškylantis ten, kur jo nėra.
tiesa nebūtinai suvokiama - tiesa nesuvokta, atsirinkta - tvėrinių pagrindas
Tiesa akivaizdi
Tiesa apie keturias apimtis.
Apibrėžti: viską, betką, kažką, nieką.
Didėjantis tiesos griežtumas.
Didėjantis, ryškėjantis neigimo apibrėžimas.
Palyginti: asmenys (žinojimas - visko, betko, kažko, nieko) Kitas žino nieką.
Palyginti: jauduliai (vienas su viskuo, betkuo, kažkuo, niekuo) - lūkestis, jog esame viena
Tiesos atskaitos taškas
Niekas arba viskas?
Apibrėžti viską
Apibrėžti betką, kažką, nieką
Apibrėžti ketverybe kaip skirtumą tarp Dievo ir gerumo (manęs)
Nepaslėpta: Ketverybės požiūrio paneigimas
Heidegerio, graikų tiesa - aletheia - ir mano
Nulybės atvaizdai yra ketverybės požiūrių paneigimai.
Dievas yra tiesos dvasia.
palyginti: troškimų paneigimas, nulybės atvaizdų paneigimas, vienybės atvaizdų paneigimas.
Ar neigimui reikalinga ketverybė? Taip, užtat yra nuliniai atvaizdų nariai.
Tiesa atsiranda su neigimu.
Neigimas slypi apimtyse: viskas, betkas, kažkas, niekas.
Ten kur yra neigimas yra du atvaizdai ir papildinys.
Atvaizdai išsako tiesos santykį tarp tiesos turinio (kas yra tiesa) ir tiesos raiškos (kas tą tiesą parodo). Kada neigimas įmanomas (ir papildinys įmanomas) tada yra du atvaizdai - didėjantis ir mažėjantis laisvumas. O kada neigimas neįmanomas ir nėra papildinio, tai yra keturi atvaizdai išsakantys atstumą tarp turinio ir raiškos. Kai nėra atstumo tarp turinio ir raiškos, tada atsiranda neigimas ir papildinys, antisandara.
Atvaizdai skiria tiesos turinį ir raišką; jeigu jie sutampa, tai dvejopai išsako sutapimo didėjimą ar mažėjima; jei skiriasi, ai ketveriopai išsako skirtumą tarp jų.
Nepaslėpta, neatkirsta santvarkos, esanti viena, neužsidarusi savyje, išeinanti už savęs
Tiesa: Trejybės atvaizdo (ir aplinkybių) užtaisas.
Trys tiesos įrodymo būdai.
Tiesa ir ryšys tarp turinio ir atskleidimo.
Apibrėžta "ne" - netiesa.
Neigimas reikalauja: Ne, taip, ne ne, ne taip.
A priori ir aposteriori, sintetinis ir analitinis
Proto žaidimai - tapatybės (su savimi) atskleidimai - savęs atitikimai (nulybės atvaizdai) - skirtingose apimtyse - skirtingais asmenimis - skirtingais žinojimais - tad tiesa yra siauriausias, smulkiausias - dangaus karalystei - tiesa reiškia, kad ištisai reiškiamasi
Lygiavertės ir nelygiavertės priešingybės
Tiesa ir kas paslėpta - lygiavertės priešingybės - Paslėptas: neišėjęs už savęs Tiesa: nėra neišėjęs už savęs
Prasminga ir kas aprėpta - nelygiavertės priešingybės - Aprėptas: išėjęs už savęs į save Prasmė: nėra pilnai savyje
Keturi atvaizdai (apimtys) nurodo išėjimo už savęs pakopas - taip pat santykį su papildiniu
Dvejybės atvaizdai
Dievo papildinys - septynerybė - antisandara
Gyvenimo lygtis yra antisandara, ketverybės/penkerybės/šešerybės/septynerybės papildinys
Dievas papildo septynerybę (tiesą) ir išsakytas aštuonerybės - nulybės. Tad Dievas - tiesos dvasia.
gerumas papildo šešerybę (tiesumą-betarpiškumą) ir išsakytas septynerybės
gyvenimas papildo penkerybę (pastovumą) ir išsakytas šešerybės
amžinas gyvenimas papildo ketverybę ir išsakytas penkerybės
Pažymėta priešingybė
Dvejybėje - pusė požiūrio
Požiūrio priėmimas, išgyvenimas - neįmanoma išgyventi netiesą
Turinys (nežymėta priešingybė) ir raiška (žymėta priešingybė). Tarp jų yra ryšys.
Trejybėje - permąstymas
Tiesos dvasia kalba iš to, ką girdi - atitikimas
Dievas šlovinamas dvasia ir tiesa - dvasia, tai ryšys su Dievu; tiesa - tai atitikimas su skurdžiadvasių mąsteliais
Tiesa nuo asmeninės iki besąlygiškos
Išsiaiškinimai - pagrindai
Raiška yra svarbi dalis tiesos, nes tai, kas akivaizdu, turi būti išreikšta, nenuslėpta.
To Manifest is to show. In that sense, it is the opposite of View, it is the making way for others to [GoingBeyondOneself go beyond themselves]. It is also closely related to Truth, in that truth is what is obvious, not hidden. Andrius: It also reminds of the statement Those things are which show themselves to be which I once heard God say in a dream as to the nature of everything.
Heidegeris - tiesa ir netiesa - nepaslėpta ir paslėpta - pasislėpimas pasirodymu - aletheia
Heidegeris - tiesa įkūnyta mene, pavyzdžiui, Van Gogo paveiksle "Batai". Meno kūrinys - žemės ir pasaulio kova, ginčas. Ir šioje dinaminėje kovoje skleidžiasi tiesa.
Heidegeris - meno kūrinio tiesa yra tiesesnė negu pasaulio tiesa
Heidegerio - Meno kūrinio ištaka (2 vertimai)
Bulgakovo "Meistras ir Margarita", Ha-Noon ir Poncijaus Piloto dialogas, Kas yra tiesa?
Wittgenstein - turime apibrėžti atskaitos tašką
Aristotelis - mokslas apie būtį apskritai (metafizika); apie esmes ir priežastis; apie nejudantį judintoją (teogonika)
Prieštaravimas - nesąmonės: Dievas trokšta visko
Nesakau, kad galima nepaisyti prieštaravimų ir mąstyti bet kokias nesąmones. Priešingai, siūlau pripažinti prieštaravimą ir labai atsakingai jį stebėti, sulėtinant mąstymą.
Prieštaravimas slypi dviejų tvarkų nesutarime, tad tarp jų, jų nesusivedime, kuris tampa vis griežtesniu.
Antra tvarka iškelia prieštaravimą glūdintį pirmoje tvarkoje. Klajonėje antros tvarkos nariai sutampa su pirmos tvarkos nariais. Užtat prieštaravimas yra griežtas. Raidoje antra tvarka labai miglotai skiria pirmos tvarkos reiškinius, taip kad net neaišku, kur tos ribos.
Žinojimas, tai reiškia žinių prasmės atstatymas iš jų papildinio. Tad glūdi prieštaravimas tarp nežinojimo ir žinojimo. Taip pat papildinys reiškia meilę, reiškia esmę.
Vietoj, kad vengti prieštaravimo - Pradėti nuo prieštaravimo ir ieškoti neprieštaravimo - pradėti nuo klausimo ir ieškoti atsakymo, tai yra, išrišimo. Prieštaravimas - tai neatsakytas klausimas. Nežinojimas, o kartu ir žinojimas. Laukimas. Prieštaravimas yra tarpas tarp tiesos buvimo ir jos pasireiškimo. teiginys A2 = "Šis teiginys A1 yra neteisingas"
Klausimas yra prieštaravimas iššaukiantis neprieštaravimą (atsakymą). Panašiai, meilė yra klausimas - meilė yra esmė, papildinys. Klausimas yra Dievo esmė - ir tas klausimas yra "kodėl" - ir tai yra meilė - nes laukiama atsakymo. Tad gyventi klausimais yra gyventi Dievu. O tiesa yra tarpas, tarp klausimo ir atsakymo, tarp tikrumo ir jo raiškos, jo akivaizdumo. Nes klausime jau glūdi tai, kas tikra, tačiau tai dar išreikština.
Mąstymas Dievo požiūriu - mąstymas besąlygiškai - mąstymas prieštaravimu - mąstymas prasmingai - iš karto dviem takais. Pats santvarkos išgyvenimas yra prieštaringas - juk įsiterpimas keičia aplinką. Bet užtat suvietintas (septynerybės laisvumas). Ir gyvenimas už santvarkos yra prieštaringas. Ir pati tiesa - buvimo ir raiškos skirtumas - yra kažkuo prieštaringa.
Prasmingas - atskiriantis prieštaravimą ir neprieštaravimą - palyginti su buvimu.
Pertvarkymai - skaitlinga tvarka prieštarauja sau - neskaitlinga tvarka neprieštarauja sau. Tada antra tvarka gali iškelti prieštaravimą pirmoje tvarkoje, ją išsakyti.
Apriboti prieštaravimą.
Dievo požiūris - prieštaravimo. Asmenų požiūris - nuoseklumo.
Nesusivedimais ryškėja prieštaravimas, tad žinojimas (taip ar ne). Šis ryškėjimas išsako pertvarkymų (ir padalinimų) eilės tvarką. Prieštaravimai sau: "strange loop".
Priešprieša. Blogiu vadiname priešpriešą gėriui. Tačiau gėrio priešprieša yra Dievas. Juk gerumas yra santvarkoje, o Dievas yra už santvarkos. Jeigu įsikimbame į santvarką, tada bet koks jo klibinimas mums atrodo blogas. Bet toks klibinimas kyla už santvarkos, tad yra Dievas. O jeigu mąstome Dievu, tada priešpriešos nėra.
Tiesos apimtys
Tiesos takai (turiniai) suderina dvi kryptis. Tiesa atsiskleidžia iš žinojimo į nežinojimą, tai yra, iš atsakymo į jį reiškiantį ženklą, galiausiai simbolį (šnipštą), užtat ženklų lygmenimis išreiškia ženklų savybes. O gvildenimai veda iš nežinojimo į žinojimą, tai yra, iš klausimo veda gvildenimu į apibrėžimą. Tiesos atskleidėjas - platesnis požiūris, o tiesos atskleistasis - siauresnis požiūris.
Kodėl tiesa? Dievo požiūris. Tiesa apie viską. (Atskleidžiama jog visaip yra.)
Kaip tiesa? Mano požiūris. Tiesa apie betką.
Kokia tiesa? Tavo požiūris. Tiesa apie kažką.
Ar tiesa? Kito požiūris. Tiesa apie nieką. (Nes atskleidžiama jog kažkaip nėra.)
Imagine God as knowing everything, I as knowing anything, You as knowing something, and Other as knowing nothing.
Truth works differently in these different scopes. "Everything is hot", "Everything is cold" and other such statements about everything are trivially true, much as in a state of contradiction, or in the mind of God, where all statements are true. A statement such as "Anything is hot" depends on a particular point of view, such as that of an engineer, an "I" who can think through in what sense it is true or false based on what "hot" means for her. "Something is hot" is a statement which must be negotiated by several points of view and thus is accepted or rejected tentatively, pragmatically by a "You". "Nothing is hot" is the kind of statement which is formalized in an abstract model of hypotheticals with regard to an "Other" and as such is strictly true or false.
We can define everything as that which has the following four properties: A) Everything has no external context (if it is put in a box, then it includes the box) B) Everything is the simplest algorithm, which accepts all things, that is, has no filter (and so your everything and my everything are the same) C) Everything has no internal structure (it may be orderly or chaotic, and thus all statements are true about it, as there is no structure to latch onto) D) Everything is a required concept (in practice, we all have it, and we all use it, for example, in taking a stand; we could not have learned it from the real world because all we know there is bounded, whereas everything is unbounded; and so we must have always had it)
Let us take Everything as our anchor for our metaphysics. We deal with questions of knowledge by dividing Everything into Whether, What, How, Why. For example, we may put a cup in a cupboard, and imagine Whether the cup is still there. Then we can define Truth as the rejection of this perspective Whether, which is to say, what is true is that which *cannot* be hidden, that which is obvious. (Whereas Heidegger defines truth as that which *is not* hidden, the Greek concept "aletheia"). Similarly, we can define Directness, Constancy and Significance by rejecting What, How and Why, accordingly.
Inherent in Truth is a self-identity, a mind game where we try to distinguish T (a truth) and R (that which reveals the truth) so that R=>T. If T is itself true for us, then we have necessary truth, as in proof by contradiction, and the distinctions collapse. If R is true for us, then it is the ground for T, and we have actual truth, where R and => collapse. If what is true for us is => , then we have possible truth, consistency. Similarly, Directness, Constancy and Significance trigger mind games which together yield a variant of Kant's twelve categories.
Thus we get the distinction between one perspective (necessary truth), two perspectives (actual truth) and three perspectives (possible truth) which is relevant for the onesome, twosome and threesome; but also for the Omniscope (I), Primary Structures (You) and Secondary Structures (Other). We are getting what Truth means to the outsider, not to the truth itself. There may also be no truth, in which case we have four perspectives, namely, there is the outsider, distinct from these three. So then we have the four levels of knowledge where the outsider is the Why and the other three are in a system and they are related. So thus we have the way to climb out of the system and look "objectively" into it as the undefined looks into the defined. And this possible thus to have negation and to have a complement for the system wherein the outsider is. And then the system can grow to include the outsider and to shift them from Other (foursome) to You (fivesome) to I (sixsome) to God (sevensome) and then collapse. This is the proof that God is necessary! and it is given by simplifying the equation of life.
Kaip tiki, taip yra. - this is the fact that there is one truth and so the truth we believe and the truth that happens must be the same truth.
Meluojame ženklais. Note that lying is possible only by way of symbols (not by way of indexes or icons). So this is a way to analyze the Qualities Of Signs, which aspects allow for lying. Similarly, I imagine, with other violations of the ten commandments. On the other hand, if one switches the underlying things, then the meaning changes. But that is perhaps not lying, it is perhaps fooling.
The only mystery is Being One With, as we can participate in that, but we can't know it, as it is prior to knowledge.
Požiūrių sudūrimas leidžia meluoti bet išryškina tiesą
Within a view, everything is true. All of its own perspectives are true. (The false ones would not be in that view. And so in order to think about false perspectives it would need to take up other views. Here then "view" might be the same as "outlook" or "model" as I wrote about institutions.)
Something is not true when a view sees it one way, but presents it another way to another view. Therefore falsehood depends on CompositionOfViews. However, the truth goes intense as it stays true in the face of the opportunity for falsehood.
This is a matter that relates the {{Indefinite}} view which sees along all tracks, and a {{Definite}} view, which sees along one track at a time. The indefinite view is not fooled, as it sees all that is going on. The definite view may be fooled.
Truth is a central notion in an AlgebraOfViews. The change in what we mean by truth mirrors the development of a view as it accesses other views and makes for indirect knowledge.
A {{View}} is the discrimination of what is true. Directly, everything within a view is true, obvious. However, the view may go beyond itself, go beyond its scope. Then the nature of truth becomes more complex, mature. When spaces are accessed indirectly, then there can be false statements, hidden suppositions. And there can also be the collapsing of our space, so that what is obvious, true to us, is cast in doubt.
===Viewer and Viewed===
Implicit in truth - as a representation of the nullsome and a trigger for a representation of the threesome - is a relationship between viewer and viewed. They are considered to be inseparable - hence the nullsome - and yet they are separated. And the way that their separation may be conceived is given by the representation of the threesome as necessary, actual and possible.
I want to consider how the implications, the notion of truth expands when it reaches out to those who do not want to look at it directly, and so it approaches them in forms that they will accept. In particular, truth may take the form of fiction, which is itself challenged, however, to stay true to the truth it conveys. And then to consider what it is like to wake up in a world where truth is of such a nature, which is to say, to take truth very sharply, and be frustrated wherever it is not straightforwardly true. And then to be confused again when, as the context becomes evident, it is apparently true. So that the crucial attitude to take is that there may be a vantage point which may know more than we do. And the troubles of losing touch with such a possibility, the sins of pride.
The smaller the scope on which concepts are kept separate, the more they are separate! This is what relates love and understanding. Ultimately, the scope is zero and the separation is total as it is even under scope zero. (And so the views coincide.) Here it is regarding God and good, I think. Compare also with the diagrams at SpiritVStructure. And consider this all with regard to institutions and the task of translating truth. So that we start with the Concept of truth - holding truth with itself - and this is an overflowing that triggers its going beyond itself, and then maintaining the truth as it does so, relativizing it accordingly, until it can hold even in silence.
The {{Truth}}, and God as the concept of truth, may express that his view is not restrictive, and is thus transparent. (Note that a transparent soul is important for understanding.)
===Hard truths and soft truths===
The CompositionOfViews makes it possible for knowledge to be accessed both directly and indirectly. We may think of truth as that access. What is true is what is not hidden, what is obvious.
If it is to be the same truth in every context, then it needs to be interpreted in a way appropriate to the context.
Here is what I'm finding: As views take up views, they become less direct, and the truth becomes less fluid and more rigid. There are four levels, so that truths about everything are completely fluid, truths about anything are less so, truths about something are rather rigid, and truths about nothing are completely rigid.
Let us consider these four levels:
Truths about everything. When we speak about everything, then all statements are true. "Everything is hot" and "everything is cold" are both true in a trivial sense. They don't say very much because everything has no internal structure for them to latch onto. Instead, everything ends up defining what "hot" and "cold" must mean. So here the truth is completely fluid. We may imagine this as the way that God views everything. God has direct access and things are just as he thinks. This is the nature of absolute truths. Another example of a truth about everything is "Every medicine has its purpose." There is no way for such a statement to be false, even if it's opposite is true, for each statement stands on its own.
Truths about anything. When we speak about anything, then we are applying our assertion to one thing at a time. And we are referencing that assertion from some particular point of view. For example, a doctor might say "Any medicine has its purpose." Here the truth is not entirely direct. It needs to pass through the doctor's point of view. It now depends on the doctor to make it true. It can depend on the doctor's ability to find the purpose of a medicine. Its truth depends on its reference point. So it is a relative truth. As such, it may be a frustrated truth, which is to say, it needs to be manifested and may be endlessly waiting for that to happen. Yet, it can't be false, for we never know for sure that it doesn't hold.
Truths about something. When we speak about something, then we are admitting another point of view with which we are sharing an object of conversation. We are using the same word, the same referent, to express the different ideas which we possess of it. For example, a doctor may speak to a patient about a particular medicine, such as aspirin: "Aspirin has its purpose." The word "aspirin" and the entire sentence is refering to what the doctor has in mind, but also to what the patient has in mind. But the meanings may not match up. One may think of a natural form of aspirin, and another of a synthetic form. One may intend one inference, but the other may take away a different one. It is possible to miscommunicate, to misspeak and to mislead. It is also possible to communicate just enough to be understood. Most of our speaking is quite tentative in this way. We speak to each other about a "tree" as if we meant the same thing. And yet, if we were to take the tree and shorten it, then there would come a point where we would probably disagree if it was still a tree. But, frankly, we're typically not interested in the tree itself, we're just leveraging it as a reference point in our conversation. We're able to catch disagreements and correct them. This is the nature of shared truths.
Truths about nothing. It is possible for us to speak about things for which we have no definite knowledge. For example, we might say "no medicine has its purpose" and explain: "a medicine is a molecule, and molecules don't have purposes". Yet, in a very clear sense, we have overspoken, we have asserted more than we ourselves have the right to. Who are we to speak about what molecules "don't have"? How can we know when molecules "will have" or "won't have" purposes? The problem here is that we are speaking in the negative, rather than in the positive. When we say that "every molecule has its purpose", then that statement can anchor itself in us. When we say "every medicine has its purpose" then we can define what we mean by medicine and by purpose, and adapt as needed, so that truth is fluid. But when we say that "no medicine has its purpose" then we have cut ourselves off from the very meaning that we choose to speak regarding. Whatever we mean is being defined somewhere else without us. If we speak about what we know, then we can choose to mean whatever will make sense. But if we speak about what we don't know, then the choice is not ours to make. So here truth becomes most rigid. Of course, this is a situation that we may try to avoid. And yet there are moments in life where we are called to bear witness. We're not asked what we know - we're asked, what do we choose to say? So I may say - "don't drive drunk" - by which I may mean that, although I don't and can't have any basis to know for sure, yet this is my own stand based on how I make sense of the situation that I've been put into in this life. And I will tell you with authority and responsibility that I have to the extent that I'm able to participate in this life. This statement is a "hard truth" and it is either "true" or "false". And that knowledge rests with some higher, greater vantage point to which I am subordinate. So this is a subordinate truth. And here I may be right or wrong, and also I may speak the truth or I may lie. And the distinction between right and wrong, between truth and lie, is most sharp. So when I say "no medicine has its purpose", then, to the extent that my statement is about "nothing", I may be very right or very wrong or both.
I imagine these as four levels by which God reaches out beyond himself by way of us all, his little godlets. He views directly absolute truths about "everything". He then views indirectly, through us, relative truths about "anything", shared truths about "something" and subordinate truths about "nothing". Our responsibility grows as the truth gets rigid. If we're able to fulfill our responsibility, then the truths carry across all four levels. The relative truth, as such, is also an absolute truth. Likewise, the shared truth, properly meant, is both relative and absolute. The subordinate truth, properly meant, is shared, relative and absolute. Yet this can break down if we act falsely.
These four levels also relate to love which grows more intense as God reaches out further and further:
Truths about everything are supported by "love", and yet they are platitudes.
Truths about anything are supported by "loving one's self", which keeps them from being frustrated.
Truths about something are supported by "loving others", "loving our neighbors", whereby we are supportive of those with whom we speak, so that we may indeed care about their perspective, and may seek a shared perspective.
Truths about nothing are supported by "loving God", so that we speak so as to make things simple for the God who truly knows that which we bear witness about but can't truly know.
===Sources of Truth===
One idea that came up is the power of the hypothesis that all self-standing systems, fully realized as to their potential, are the same - as this hypothesis makes metaphysical thinking very powerful. For example, it makes it easy for us to go to new "source of truth", including "aesthetic sense" or "Scripture" because it gives us a useful criteria - these sources are valid only if we can approach them as self-standing systems. We might then ask, what are the "sources of truth" that we might appeal to? Where do they offer insight? And in what sense are they self-standing? In particular, each of us as individuals can function as a source of truth regarding our own "key concept" by which we are self-standing. This is all relevant as we organize our online system for "openly learning", so I share with our Cyfranogi working group. Andrius,
{{Andrius}}: I share my exchange with Tom Wayburn as we search for how to define truth. His work grounds important economic ideas, so I share also with our Cyfranogi working group.
Thank you for alerting me to your work. I find it very helpful and thought-provoking at this time. I'm very impressed by the scope of your work and by the directness of your conclusions. I think I agree with much of your reasoning, but at times I feel your conclusions are incomplete as "hard truths" unless we complete them with "soft truths". And, in that sense, they are false as "hard truths".
This distinction between "soft truth" and "hard truth" is what I'd like to explore. I'm interested to think about "truth" and it's role in an "algebra of views". I'll respond also to your paper, further below. First, I'll give an example.
You conclude that, in general, it is immoral to exchange money for work. You note that the Money Game is an improper game in that the rules are not written down, they are continuously changing, and that participants do not start off fairly. Participants are tempted or forced to play, and they are tempted or forced to cheat. In general, the game is an unfair competition.
Practically, I feel this fits with my position that "money brings people together, but you can't pay people to care". Caring is self-directed, and so can't be the result of external direction, such as by money. People care in spite of the fact that they are paid money, and we know if they care only when we stop paying them money, and can see that they truly are self-directed and continue in their ways. If people ask for money to care, then that doesn't make sense, they can't and don't care in a self-directed way. So, if we apply the Money Game to what we are serious about - what we care about - then the game is false and sustaining it is immoral.
However, I find it's possible not to take the game so seriously. I may engage somebody with money not to "win" but to make a point. So, for example, at our lab we offer stipends in Lithuania that are not-so-serious money for not-so-serious work. My interest is to encourage, support, integrate people who do care so that we might meet each other halfway. In other words, first they care, then we may play. And it's crucial to keep the amount of money small enough so that it's not overly influential. The goal is not to make them care about something, but rather to encourage them to relate to a strategic direction their own self-directed work on whatever they already do care about. Then the money game becomes not so serious in itself - it becomes just a minor part of a bigger game - and it may be quite helpful. In fact, if we are living in an unfair world, then such money games may be vital in helping transform it into a fair world. Furthermore, the very reason we may be in an unfair world is that this is how a fair world functions - it allows for all manner of unfairness so that it might be transformed into fairness.
My point is that the nature of truth depends on whether we are "game makers" (the ones who make the rules) or "game players" (the ones who are bound by the rules). Game makers live by "soft truths", each of which is not constrained by any other truth. Game players live by "hard truths" which are completely constrained by other truths.
God is a helpful concept as the Ultimate Game Maker. Structurally, I might think of "everything". It seems that all statements are true of everything. "Everything is hot" and "everything is cold". The point is that qualities like "hot" or "cold" or "good" or "bad" or "exists" or "does not exist" don't mean much at all when applied to everything because there is no structure to cling to so as to provide meaning. Similarly, when we have a state of contradiction, then all things are true: 2=3 and so 12=13 and green is white and so on. Again, if I say, "this tomato is everything" then, in a sense, that is true because every thing can be related to that tomato, and so every thing is a fact about that tomato. So "everything" is effective as a reference point for making truth irrelevant - all things are true. Indeed, I feel that, given any statement, no matter how bizaare or ill formed, there is some context in which it is true.
Here's a related statement from Abdullah Yusuf Ali's translation of the Quran, Surah 21: "Not for idle sport did We create the heavens and the earth and all that is between! If it had been Our wish to take just a pastime, We should surely have taken it from the things nearest to Us, if We should do such a thing! Nay, We hurl the Truth against falsehood, and it knocks out its brain, and behold, falsehood perishes! Ah! woe be to you for the false things you ascribe to Us."
Our society encourages us to live as game players, not as game makers; to acknowledge hard truths and not soft truths; to say there is "true" and "false", knowledge of "good" and "evil"; to believe that things matter. And the same society invites us to cheat, and to gain control as game makers for the game players.
But as we play with "hard truths" we find that there may be purpose in "soft truths", but especially if indeed there is injustice, as life suggests. And also we find that our own personal truths are soft, in that they suppose rather than deny.
So I feel that we can understanding by starting with "soft truths" (the view of the game maker) and then deriving from them the "hard truths" (the view of the game player). Why do we have hard truths? I think the reason is that the game maker wants the game to matter. And so the game maker needs to "care" ever deeper, needs to immerse themselves into the game.
Therefore, to understand the game maker, it helps to work with "suppositions". In this sense, all truths are "fictional truths". As you write: "if Dickens tells us that Pip was sorry to see his benefactor die, we are obliged to believe him". Likewise, I feel that we shouldn't elevate "reality" beyond "supposition", even if it is Nature's supposition. And suppositions are "soft truths" in that they are simply possibilities, clearly the prerogrative of a game maker.
So where may hard truths come from? I think they come from the relationships between suppositions. I mean that suppositions can grow hard, they can grow in their implications, as they relate with each other, and imply regarding each other. So, for example, if Dickens has given us reason to doubt the narrator, then we might be obliged to question or even disbelieve him. "All things are true" - but if we speak enough, then we may very well speak a contradiction - assuming that we have a point of accountability.
Here is how I think the game evolves, from "soft truths" to "hard truths":
Rules are absolute: We suppose there is a game maker for whom all rules are equally fine.
Rules are relative: The game maker supposes a game player who has "a self in a situation" and is thereby striving (self-correcting) to play by the rules.
Rules are shared: That game player supposes a game maker who has made it possible to "play perfectly" and so they (and all) are linked by an ideal Other who follows the rules.
Rules are subordinate: That game maker supposes a game player who is in the game and needs to uncover its purpose by supposing that there is a game maker.
I will stop for today, but briefly about your paper, I find most relevant your Third Approach. Some structures that I will write about:
the division of everything into four perspectives, the {{Foursome}}: why, how, what, whether - matches I think your four levels: phenomena (whether), percepts (what), concepts (how), visualizations (why).
pairs of such levels yield the QualitiesOfSigns:
truth as that which is "unhidden"="obvious", thus yielding the necessarily, actually, possibly true, see {{Topologies}}
I hope to write more, and I hope we might help each other advance.
===Letter to Tom Wayburn===
TomWayburn: Andrius, I am curious to know what you think of the [http://dematerialism.net/Chapter%203.html#_Toc104446215 exposition] (under Additional Discussion for the Mathematically Inclined in case the bookmark doesn't work). I wouldn't ask if I were confident that it was correct. I wrote this so long ago that I am afraid to change it as I may no longer understand what I wrote then.
The bookmarked section is embedded in a [http://web.wt.net/twayburn/Chapter%203.html sub-chapter on Truth]. It is an attempt to make definite the stricture of Hemingway, "Tell the truth to those who have a right to know it", from *The Green Hills of Africa* [quoted from memory].
Tom, Thank you for alerting me again to your essay on Truth. http://dematerialism.net/Chapter%203.html#_Toc104446215 I read only parts but I like your writing. I hope to explore it more and perhaps engage you and others with regard to my own explorations.
I have been making steady progress in my efforts to consider how does all knowledge unfold? My quest is to know everything and apply that knowledge usefully. Imagine that there is a vantage point from which God surveys everything and how it all unfolds along with all of the relationships. I wish to find and take up such a vantage point, with the understanding that I won't be able to see as far as God, yet like a nearsighted child I might crawl out and back along any path of inquiry I might find relevant.
I have worked almost every day on my Overview and it is so hard to pull everything together that I am trying to write a condensed Summary I also find it very helpful to listen to God. I am simply encouraged by the enormous intelligence that comes to me, as if to my conscious mind from my unconscious mind. Which is to say, I lean heavily on God as I work to make progress. Certainly that's understandable because in large part I am struggling to imagine and take up God's point of view.
The root of the unfolding - or the nature of God - keeps wriggling as I try to snatch it. But lately I'm thinking about God's fascination with the issue of his own necessity. There aren't many questions that might seem to interest God when he is all by himself, prior to all things and concerns. For him, being and not being are quite the same, as they are just words at this point, and structurally they are the same. But would he exist even if he did not exist? Would he be God even if he wasn't? Is God as such necessary? That is a very stimulating question from his point of view. It opens up two tracks: If God exists, then God exists. And if God does not exist, then yet being God he should still find away to exist, if he truly is God. This is the spirit of any mathematical proof by contradiction. So it suggests what is apparent in the physical world, that God makes his best effort not to exist, and it's very intriguing if and when he creeps into life's practicalities. Whereas in the spiritual world, God is given.
I have a lot of knowledge of the conceptual structures that frame our thinking, and have figured out some of the mechanics of how they can all fit together in theory. I'm noticing that God's effort to not exist is part of that. The structures unfold upon negation of the properties of God (significant, constant, direct, true) by which God goes beyond himself into a particular scope (Everything, Anything, Something, Nothing). There is also a negation of the properties of Everything (no external context, no filter, no internal structure, not an optional concept). Everything is the structure of God, but also, Everything is a substitute for God. In God we are being one through God's being, whereas in Everything we are being one through God's not being.
I'm noticing that each scope is a domain for a particular aspect of nonbeing:
"does not exist" would hold across Everything
"a quality of their being does not exist" would hold for Anything
"a quality of their not being does exist" would hold for Something
"their not being does exist" would hold for Nothing
What I think this means is that God's not being has to realize itself formally, which is to say, it's not enough to have "not God" but rather we have to think formally in terms of "being" so that we can remove ourselves and indicate, objectively, what that's referring to. This formality opens up all four levels.
Tom, I suppose this is related to the distinction that you note when you refer to White Knight’s story in Lewis Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass" between a thing, and what it's called, and its name, and what that's called. Also, you note of four levels of information: Phenomena, Concepts, Percepts, Visualizations and I imagine that this is what I call the Foursome, the division of Everything into four perspectives, which are familiar as Whether, What, How, Why and so I call them that way, but are employed by many thinkers (often materialists neglect the Why and idealists neglect the Whether).
Tom, I imagine that I'm working on the question that you raise regarding Tarski's conjecture: "The definition of a true statement cannot be constructed in the (formalized) language in which the sentence occurs. In particular, it will never be possible to define a true sentence in ordinary colloquial language." What I am trying to show, more or less, is that any system that is inhabited by a Person must admit of an extrasystemic reference point (which is to say, God) or the system will collapse (into that extrasystem). Truth is the last straw, it is the ability of God to reach into the scope of Nothing, which is to say, even into utter nonsense. My guess is that the final collapse occurs when the last property of Everything (that it is not an optional concept) is negated, because then the crux of the matter becomes "optional" and thus the issue resolves itself, but I need to nail that down, what is that!?
Here is what I wrote today listening to God and for me is very helpful to be able to think in terms of the big picture: "God's being and nonbeing are the same as long as they don't interfere with each other. And they could interfere only if they were imposed upon a Person. Thus the Freedom of a Person is the foundation for God's necessity. And Freedom grows through Understanding. Love is what supports that growth. Thus Love is within all things and in being itself and through it we are one. BeingOneWith is the foundation for all relations between Persons."
So now I'm thinking back on how truth hardens so that opposites like "being" and "not being" can become hard and irreconciliable. (Which is how I found your link again, thank you!) See: Truth. Truths about Everything are soft and pliable and all compatible. ("Everything is hot" and "Everything is cold" and "Every medicine has its purpose"...) Truths about Nothing are hard and brittle because they have us overspeak, they have us speak about that for which we have no definite knowledge. If we say, "No medicine has its purpose (for medicines are molecules, and molecules don't have purposes)", then we are overreaching, and our statement is either true or false but not both, in this rigid sense.
Perhaps the "imposed" truths are those that demand us to understand them within the system, and don't let us make sense of them outside the system.
The "free" truths let us know that they carry a meaning that can go
beyond the system. That is why we might hold stubbornly to a truth even though the system runs over us, for we have faith that there is a perspective greater than the system.
Jesus's disciples asked him, Why do you speak plainly to us, but you speak to others in parables? and he replied, so they could listen but not hear, and hear and not understand and so they could be damned. Which I take him to mean, with his ambiguous "could", that in general listeners would have the freedom to understand his meaning or to consider it all nonsense, whereas his disciples already believe and so he can speak plainly without concern for their freedom.
I suppose that I have a faith in the truth and an appreciation of my own ignorance that I don't think that I will limit anybody's freedom with my thoughts. Yet the whole subject is apocalyptic - a world of truth that we can access is the end of the "real world", the human world as we know it.
I will try to think more how God's not being and God's being grow distinct through the Person who distinguishes them (God, I, You, Other) and how the imposition of such a distinction shifts the question along to yet another Person until finally with Other the issue collapses.
Tom and all, Thank you for your thoughts! And I invite us to write about the questions that we are exploring, investigating.
Greetings from San Francisco where I hope to stay for about four weeks,
Felt truth
I think there's both an analytical, logical way of approximating truth, and there's a truth one feels inside. And they're probably not really the same thing. The most deep and real truth is probably what one sincerely feels inside. And the other kind of truth is more about the analysis of data, an external activity, and will always be imperfect. Anyway, any kind of attempt to establish truth will always end up with a subjective feeling inside. No matter how scientific one's methodology is, it will always end up with somebody taking a subjective decision, based on how they feel, as to whether the requirements for truth-finding have been met. Scientific methodology includes the principle that several people would arrive in the same place, but that makes it no less dependent on subjective decision.
The source of data is probably a vital piece of data in itself. Like, a piece of information doesn't exist by itself, separate from everything else. There's no such thing as a "fact" all by itself. It is important who said so, when and why, based on what data or what situation.
Ah yes, I'm actually reading Power vs. Force right now. Indeed, it makes a good case for measuring the truth value of things with Applied Kineseology. I will explore it more. I haven't yet tried to experiment with blind AK tests, to see how it actually comes out.
Jeigu tiesa visada sąlygiška, tai ši tiesa irgi yra sąlygiška, užtat iš sąlygiškos tiesos kyla besąlygiška tiesa. Tai išvertimas išėjimo už savęs, iš santvarkos, iš septynerybės.
Velnias išlenda visokiomis "tiesomis" ir įžvalgomis dėl to, kad tai tėra "žinojimai", ogi Dievas yra grynas nežinojimas.
Brute facts nėra nes gamtoje nėra dalinių sąvokų, modelių, ar yra?
S-o-C goes beyond itself into itself, namely, Everything. Everything is the self of S-o-C.
Truth as the Unique Referent Beyond a System
Define divisions of everything
Define representations
Define going beyond oneself
Define equation of life
Define truth as a representation of the nullsome - that which cannot be hidden, that which has nothing between expression and content. And likewise define the representations of the nullsome and ground them in the foursome.
Define necessary, possible, actual with regard to truth, and similarly define the twelve topologies.
Sevensome and eightsome - ways of choosing - sources of mistakes
Truth is the gap within a restructuring and is the source of paradox.
Statements are typically tentative - we don't care to agree absolutely on what they mean - they are
Scopes of truth: everything, anything, something, nothing.
Truth as a distinguished (unmarked?) opposite.
Results related to truth theories:
Truth is the unique referent which is beyond a system. And thus by definition truth cannot be solely systemic. But a system of this kind is completely explicit, thus truth is the only thing that is outside it. Truth refers to the original everything. And thus true is the opposite of the good.
Truth is that which can be "unmarked", that which can be without context, without conditions, taken at face value.
Truth is that which cannot be hidden.
Substantial and deflationary theories are the 6 representations based on views vs. concepts.
Axiomatic theories are possible (model), actual (proof), necessary (logical).
Statements are given by fusing views and concepts, or content and expression.
How do truth claims arise?
pragmatiškai, tiesa yra konteksto nereikalingumas. Tiesa yra tuomet kuomet galima suprasti tiesiogiai, nereikia vertinti konteksto. Užtat tiesa yra tuo pačiu galimybė atsisakyti konteksto. O kaip tai susiję su aplinka (+3), juk tiesa yra (+0).
antisandara (sąlygiškumo atsisakymas) -1
logika 7-bė
nesusivedimų tarpas
nulybės atvaizdas ir aplinkybės
Equations are truths because they allow "forgetting", they allow equivalence. Equivalence is a sense of not being distinguishable in any context. Any context in which it is distinguishable would be a meta-context. This is the source of paradox: conflating context with metacontext. And that is why context and metacontext need to be different. Truth is that there is no genuine basis for disagreement.
Bridging formal and informal theories.
Tiesų gali būti įvairių, bet dėl melo galime sutarti, kada meluojama.
Shift from self to concept. Truth. God->I->You->Other.
Aplinkybės dalyvauja skaidant požiūrį į dvi priešingybes, būtent nulybės atvaizdo skaidymu, pavyzdžiui, tiesos skaidymą į turinį ir raišką, arba prasmingumo skaidymą. Aplinkybės gi išskiria vieną požiūrį ir jo būklę (aplinkybes). Taip pat iškyla galimas dvilypis požiūris į požiūrį. Taip pat šį skaidymą reikėtų lyginti su gyvenimo lygtimi.
Įrodymas, tai tiesos pagrindimas. Įrodymas (kad teiginys yra teisingas) - yra suskaldymas pagrindimo. Panašus suskaldymas vyksta skaidant veiklą.
Consider the normativity of truth itself. It arises from truth's definition as a negation, a negation of whether, that X cannot be hidden. Also, there is a normativity to respect a toy model, to keep track of what is true and what is false, in the case where we have truths about nothing.
Tiesa ir jos aplinkybės
turinys = raiška (3 supratimai: būtina, tikra, galima)
nėra turinio, yra tiktai raiška (Kitas) arba: nėra lygybės, turinys ir raiška tėra tas pats dalykas
Gali būti raiška be turinio. Arba: gali būti turinys be raiškos (?)
Parsiųstas iš http://www.ms.lt/sodas/Mintys/Tiesa
Puslapis paskutinį kartą pakeistas 2020 vasario 21 d., 20:00

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