Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/354/354mass312.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:52:46+00:00

Document:
Present: WILKINS, C.J., CUTTER, KIRK, & SPIEGEL, JJ.
PETITION for assessment of damages from the abolition of a grade crossing, filed in the Superior Court on January 22, 1962.
Charles Ingram, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth (William D. K. Crooks, Jr., for the Boston and Maine Railroad, & Cornelius T. Finnegan, Jr., City Solicitor, for the city of Lowell, with him).
Charles F. Barrett (Gordon L. Doerfer with him) for the petitioners.
CUTTER, J. This is a petition to determine the damages caused by a railroad grade crossing elimination. Betty Corporation (Betty) recovered a verdict against each respondent. After a trial which ran from May 12 to June 11, 1965, the jury assessed damages at $60,000. Motions for a new trial were denied on condition that Betty remit $25,000 of the verdict. Betty remitted the required amount. The case is here on an outline bill of exceptions. The long record appendix contains excerpts from a 700 page transcript. The affected area is shown on the annexed sketch plan.
On May 5, 1959, the commissioners of the State Department of Public Works (DPW) by order directed that a railroad grade crossing on Western Avenue, Lowell, be closed to all traffic by placing barriers (see annexed plan at  and ) on the west and east side of the tracks for the full width of Western Avenue. A spur track to Betty's plant was to be relocated.
Western Avenue (see  on plan), prior to the 1959 order, ran approximately east and west across the railroad's two main line tracks (see  on plan). The main line tracks crossed Western Avenue at about a thirty degree angle, on a line north of Western Avenue west of the crossing, and south of Western Avenue east of the crossing. A spur track (marked  on the plan) ran from a coal or salt storage building (marked  on the plan) west to the main line, crossing Western Avenue north of, but very close to, Betty's Building C (marked  on the plan) and loading platform (see  on plan). This spur track is shown on the plan as relocated a little south of its former route.
was a large four story brick building, Building C (at  on the plan). Other buildings comprising the Betty plant lie to the south and west of Building C. All the principal buildings are interconnected and have the same floor levels.
The loading platform (at  on the plan) was used, prior to the construction under the 1959 DPW order, for receiving yarns, machinery, and merchandise used in all the principal buildings. Goods thus received could be taken about forty to fifty feet to "one of the largest freight elevators . . . in the entire plant that had access to the center of all these buildings."
The routing of goods and materials from this loading platform around the plant, for further processing and for storage, was described in great detail by Betty's principal operating official. The jury on this and other evidence would have been warranted in concluding that it was a very significant advantage to Betty, in the orderly and efficient conduct of operations, to have large trailer trucks back up to the door of the loading platform (at  on the plan) to deliver goods of various types.
the use of trucks at various loading gates on the locus because the slightly raised tracks cut truck tires.
(2) For a substantial period of time during construction of the barriers, removal of railroad gates, and relocation of the spur track, usual operations at the old loading platform were interrupted.
(3) On the west side of the new westerly barrier (see  on the plan), Western Avenue originally was about thirty-five feet wide in front of Buildings A and B. By the barriers the usable area of Western Avenue was effectively reduced, for a distance of about 130 feet of Betty's frontage on the avenue, in an amount varying from thirty-five feet in width (north to south) to zero width. Betty was thus deprived, detrimentally and directly, of much of its principal access to a public way formerly available immediately adjacent to its property. The narrowing of the avenue made of slight, if any, value the remaining access to the northeastern part of the locus. In addition, Betty could be found to have owned the fee north of the locus as far as the center of Western Avenue, [Note 2] as it formerly ran, subject to the city's easement of travel over Western Avenue and subject also to the railroad's easement to cross the area with its tracks. This fee interest of Betty included a triangular area (the general location of which is marked  on the plan) north of the westerly barrier. The triangle was supposed to contain about 315 square feet.
loading platform became impossible, an injury "confined only to . . . [Betty's] property . . . [which] cannot be said to be . . . of a general and public nature." See Webster Thomas Co. v. Commonwealth, 336 Mass. 130, 138. See also Holbrook v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authy. 338 Mass. 218, 223. The present case involves special, direct, peculiar injury to an important part of Betty's parcels, substantially more intense in its impact on the eastern part of the locus than any inconvenience suffered generally by other members of the public. See Wine v. Commonwealth, 301 Mass. 451, 458. This circumstance distinguishes this case from Tassinari v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authy. 347 Mass. 222, 225, and LaCroix v. Commonwealth, 348 Mass. 652, 657. [Note 4] It could have been found that Betty suffered damage compensable under G. L. c. 159, Sections 70, 75 (see fn. 3), read with the relevant provisions of c. 79. See Sheehan v. Fall River, 187 Mass. 356, 361 (access to building temporarily "rendered more difficult"); Cutter v. Boston, 200 Mass. 400, 402. [Note 5] See also Buck v. Great Barrington, 203 Mass. 372, 375-376.
and a Lowell traffic ordinance. [Note 7] There was, indeed, testimony from which the jury could have found that trailers were left standing during unloading operations for as much as two hours, and that, when so standing, they extended as much as eighteen to twenty feet into Western Avenue. Examination of the annexed plan and the exhibits shows that the north end of a thirty-five foot trailer parked perpendicular to the north line of the old loading platform might come to a point about five feet from the south rail of the main line track. The present western barrier is about eleven feet from the nearest rail. The distance between freight cars passing in opposite directions on the main line tracks is two feet, which "is considered a safe and adequate distance." There had been no prosecutions of Betty for alleged traffic violations because of its unloading methods. The police officer on the beat regarded Betty's former practice of backing trucks up to the old loading platform as "a natural thing."
abutting owner which could have been found to own the fee under the south side of the traveled portion of Western Avenue. It was open to the jury to conclude that Betty did not exceed proper bounds in its unloading practices prior to the erection of the barriers even if (under the principles of the Loosian case, just cited) Betty was in a position successfully to prevent similar action, without its consent, by persons not abutters. The Lowell ordinance, if construed to permit the unloading practice, made a reasonable exception to the general prohibitions of the ordinance. See Commonwealth v. Sargent, 330 Mass. 690, 692.
The judge's charge with respect to Betty's former unloading practices was sufficiently favorable to the respondents. She instructed the jury that Betty could not recover damages based on the loss of an illegal use. See Joly v. Salem, 276 Mass. 297, 303. She correctly refused to instruct that there was a violation of G. L. c. 90, Section 15 (fn. 6), a statute designed only to require motorists to reduce speed when approaching railroad grade crossings. See Verrocchi v. Boston & Maine R.R. 322 Mass. 376, 378. The evidence did not show that Betty's unloading practices had created any such hazard as to require the judge to give instructions concerning that hazard and its nature. In any event the failure of the respondents' counsel to renew objections to the charge, after the trial judge had given further instructions in response to objections by them and after their apparent acquiescence in the amended charge (see fn. 5), leaves them now in no position to contend that the further instructions were inadequate. See Cozzo v. Atlantic Ref. Co. 299 Mass. 260, 268-269; Duff v. Webster, 315 Mass. 102, 105; Bloomberg v. Greylock Bdcst. Co. 342 Mass. 542, 551. See also Herrick v. Waitt, 224 Mass. 415, 417.
before final arguments were to begin. This action of counsel seems to have been viewed by the judge as in contravention of some understanding, by the judge and all counsel, that requests would be submitted sufficiently early to enable the judge to study them in advance of the arguments. The incident appears to have been magnified in the respondents' brief to an extent greatly disproportionate to any significance it may have had. In the context of a long trial the judge's remarks seem of slight consequence. See Charles L. Hazelton & Son, Inc. v. Teel, 349 Mass. 617, 621; Commonwealth v. Leonard, 352 Mass. 636, 641-642. The impact of the remark was not such that explanation of it to the jury was essential.
The respondents also argue that they were prejudiced by the trial judge's delaying closing arguments (until the next day) to afford her time to study the additional requests. This delay, they say, was in addition to the effect of other delays during trial to which the respondents make reference. After a trial of nearly a month, the jury, indeed, might have been "irked and frustrated" by further delay, as the respondents suggest. The respondents do not persuade us, however, that they were hurt more than Betty was by the particular postponement or by the long proceedings. This trial should have proceeded more rapidly. There should have been greater judicial effort to expedite it. Nevertheless, we cannot say that either the delay in arguments or the unnecessarily slow pace of the trial constituted prejudicial error.
4. There is no merit to an exception to the judge's action in preventing a line of argument by counsel for the Commonwealth on the ground that there was no evidence to warrant the contentions made. The judge, in a somewhat extended bench conference, gave counsel opportunity to point out such evidence, but no such evidence was intelligibly drawn to the attention of the judge.
close of the trial. Much of it had been admitted without objection or exception. See Cummings v. National Shawmut Bank, 284 Mass. 563, 568; Leonardi v. Peabody, 351 Mass. 706. See also analogy of Costonis v. Medford Housing Authy. 343 Mass. 108, 116. Cf. Gazianis v. Clinton, 350 Mass. 758. Although the evidence originally had been admitted de bene, this appears to have been done solely because the witness was taken out of order. There was no clear showing that the witness had given such weight to elements of damage not properly to be considered as would require striking all his testimony. The judge, in any event, charged that the jury could not take these elements into account.
6. Other exceptions have not been argued sufficiently, have not been adequately set out or referred to in the outline bill of exceptions (see S. J. C. Rule 1:22 , , , 351 Mass. 742-745), relate to discretionary matters or to requested instructions adequately given in substance, or are not significant enough to merit discussion.
[Note 1] The petitioners are the corporate owner and a corporate tenant of premises on Western Avenue, Lowell. Both corporations have the same officers. Each is controlled by members of the same family. It is stipulated that damages are to be assessed as if Betty Corporation were the sole owner and occupant. The respondents are the Commonwealth, the city of Lowell, and the Boston and Maine Railroad (the railroad).
[Note 2] The deed to Betty dated December 28, 1957, described the locus as bounded "NORTHERLY by Western Avenue by several lines measuring 305.21 feet, 101.92 feet, 91.79 feet, 100 feet and 119.19 feet." See Brassard v. Flynn, 352 Mass. 185, 188-189, and cases cited. The evidence (including plans) indicated that Betty's property extended along Western Avenue for a total distance of 718.11 feet and for 119.19 feet east of a stone bound two feet east of Building A (see  on plan). This would bring the easterly end of Betty's property, as bounded by Western Avenue, to a point somewhat east of the east end of the new barrier, or of the portion of it north of the door (at point  on the plan) formerly used to reach the old loading platform. From the deeds and plans in evidence, the jury were warranted in concluding that Betty owned the locus, and that, along its whole frontage on Western Avenue, including the area near the new western barrier, Betty owned the fee to the avenue's center line. The trial judge left it to the jury to determine Betty's property lines.
[Note 3] Section 75 reads in part, "All damages sustained by any person in his property by the taking of land for . . . a public way, or by an abutter thereon by the discontinuance of such public way, to the same extent as damages are recoverable by abutters on ways discontinued by towns, or by the taking of an easement in land adjoining a public way, shall primarily be paid by the city . . . and all damages caused by the taking of land for the railroad . . . shall primarily be paid by the railroad corporation. Any amount paid by way of damages by the commonwealth or the city . . . or the railroad corporation primarily liable therefor shall be subject to investigation by the department of public works, unless such settlements are assented to in writing by all parties . . .. If the parties interested cannot agree upon said damages, any party may have the damages determined under" c. 79 (emphasis supplied). See also G. L. c. 159, Section 65 (as amended through St. 1937, c. 270) and Section 70 (as amended through St. 1934, c. 357, Section 1); New York, N. H. & H. R.R. v. Blacker, 178 Mass. 386, 390-391. The most relevant provision of c. 79 is Section 12 (as amended through St. 1959, c. 626, Section 4), which reads, in part, "The damages for property taken . . . shall be fixed at the value thereof before the recording of the order of taking, and in case only part of a parcel of land is taken there shall be included damages for all injury to the part not taken caused by the taking or by the public improvement for which the taking is made . . .. In determining the damages to a parcel . . . injured when no part of it has been taken, regard shall be had only to such injury as is special and peculiar to such parcel . . ." (emphasis supplied). Provisions of Section 12 for deducting from damages the amount of benefit received by the parcel from the improvement are not here relevant.
[Note 4] In the Tassinari case (see p. 225), there was no taking of Mrs. Tassinari's property and no diminution of the convenience of her access from her property to Ferry Street, which had been closed at one end at a point some distance from any part of her property. In the LaCroix case, although a small piece of LaCroix's property was taken (see pp. 655, 657), that piece was at such a location as not to interfere in any way (see pp. 653, 656) with LaCroix's access from his land to Howard Road, the street which LaCroix, before and after the taking, used for access to the general highway system.
[Note 5] Portions of the charge directed to whether there had been any "taking" of Betty's property were discussed, after the charge, with the trial judge by counsel. She gave somewhat diffuse further instructions and asked counsel if "that covers it." She received an affirmative reply. See Duff v. Webster, 315 Mass. 102, 105. There was no exception to the additional instructions, as there was in Horowitz v. Bokron, 337 Mass. 739, 746.
[Note 6] Section 15 reads in part: "Except as . . . otherwise provided, every person operating a motor vehicle, upon approaching a railroad crossing at grade, shall reduce . . . speed . . . to a reasonable and proper rate before proceeding over the crossing, and shall proceed over the crossing at such rate of speed . . . as is reasonable . . .." The balance of the section deals with school bus operation and vehicles carrying explosive and inflammable cargo.
[Note 7] The Lowell ordinance defines (art. 1) "intersection" as including "any intersection of ways with a railroad," and "parking" as including the "standing of a vehicle . . . otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading." It also provides (art. 5) that "[n]o person shall . . . park" a vehicle in violation of the traffic rules and "in particular at any time" (except with a permit of a type not shown in this case to have been issued to Betty) "[w]ithin an intersection."

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