Source: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s410.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 11:39:01+00:00

Document:
(5) Forms. The Office provides forms for the public to use in certain situations to assist in the filing of correspondence for a certain purpose and to meet certain requirements for patent applications and proceedings. Use of the forms for purposes for which they were not designed is prohibited. No changes to certification statements on the Office forms (e.g., oath or declaration forms, terminal disclaimer forms, petition forms, and nonpublication request forms) may be made. The existing text of a form, other than a certification statement, may be modified, deleted, or added to, if all text identifying the form as an Office form is removed. The presentation to the Office (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) of any Office form with text identifying the form as an Office form by a party, whether a practitioner or non-practitioner, constitutes a certification under § 37 CFR 11.18(b) of this chapter that the existing text and any certification statements on the form have not been altered other than permitted by EFS-Web customization.
37 CFR 1.4(d)(4) and (5) provide that the presentation to the Office (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) of any paper or Office form by a party, whether a practitioner or nonpractitioner, constitutes a certification under 37 CFR 11.18(b), and that violations of 37 CFR 11.18(b)(2) may subject the party to sanctions under 37 CFR 11.18(c). Thus, by presenting to the Office a paper or Office form, the party is making the certifications set forth in 37 CFR 11.18(b), and is subject to sanctions under 37 CFR 11.18(c) for violations of 37 CFR 11.18(b)(2), regardless of whether the party is a practitioner or nonpractitioner. A practitioner violating 37 CFR 11.18(b) may also be subject to disciplinary action in lieu of or in addition to sanctions under 37 CFR 11.18(c) for violations of 37 CFR 11.18(b). See 37 CFR 11.18(d).
Additional certifications provided in 37 CFR 1.4(d)(4) and (5) include that a person inserting a signature into a document under 37 CFR 1.4(d)(2) certifies that the inserted signature appearing in the document is his or her own signature. Also, a person filing a document signed by another under 37 CFR 1.4(d)(2) is obligated to have a reasonable basis to believe that the signature present on the document was actually inserted by that person. The person filing the document should retain evidence of the authenticity of the signature. See 37 CFR 1.4(h).
37 CFR 11.18(b) provides that, by presenting any paper to the USPTO, the party presenting such paper is making two certifications: (1) the first certification is that the statements made therein are subject to the declaration clause of 37 CFR 1.68; (2) the second certification is the certification required for papers filed in a federal court under Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 37 CFR 1.4(d)(5) makes clear that presenting a completed Office form to the USPTO constitutes a specific certification under 37 CFR 11.18(b).
The first certification has permitted the USPTO to eliminate the separate verification requirement previously contained in several rules for statements of facts by persons who are not registered to practice before the USPTO. As statements submitted to the USPTO by any person are now, by operation of 37 CFR 11.18(b)(1), verified statements, a separate verification requirement is no longer necessary. The USPTO, however, has retained the verification requirement for a statement to be submitted under oath or declaration (37 CFR 1.68) in a number of sections (e.g., 37 CFR 1.63, 1.64, 1.130, 1.131, 1.132, 1.495(f), and 5.25).
37 CFR 1.4(d)(4) and (5) and 11.18 do not require a practitioner to advise the client (or third party) providing information of this certification effect (or the sanctions applicable to noncompliance), or question the client (or third party) when such information or instructions are provided. When a practitioner is submitting information (e.g., a statement of fact) from the applicant or a third party, or relying upon information from the applicant or a third party in his/her arguments, the Office will consider a practitioner's “inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” duty under 37 CFR 11.18 met so long as the practitioner has no knowledge of information that is contrary to the information provided by the applicant or third party or would otherwise indicate that the information provided by the applicant or third party was so provided for the purpose of a violation of 37 CFR 11.18 (e.g., was submitted to cause unnecessary delay).
Nevertheless, it is highly advisable for a practitioner to advise a client or third party that any information so provided must be reliable and not misleading. The submission by an applicant of misleading or inaccurate statements of facts during the prosecution of applications for patent has resulted in the patents issuing on such applications being held unenforceable. See, e.g. , Refac Int'l Ltd. v. Lotus Development Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 38 USPQ2d 1665 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 25 USPQ2d 1561 (Fed. Cir 1993); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 200 USPQ 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); Ott v. Goodpasture, 40 USPQ2d 1831 (D.N. Tex. 1996); Herman v. William Brooks Shoe Co., 39 USPQ2d 1773 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Golden Valley Microwave Food Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F. Supp. 1444, 24 USPQ2d 1801 (N.D. Ind. 1992), aff'd, 11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993)(table), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1128 (1994). Likewise, false statements by a practitioner in a paper submitted to the Office during the prosecution of an application for patent have resulted in the patent issuing on such application also being held unenforceable. See General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 30 USPQ2d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(false statement in a petition to make an application special constitutes inequitable conduct, and renders the patent issuing on such application unenforceable).
An applicant has no duty to conduct a prior art search as a prerequisite to filing an application for patent. See Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397, 38 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (Fed. Cir. 1996); FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6, 5 USPQ2d 1272, 1275-76 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 USPQ2d 1112, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362, 220 USPQ 763, 772 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 224 USPQ 520 (1984). Thus, the “inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” requirement of 37 CFR 11.18 does not create any new duty on the part of an applicant for patent to conduct a prior art search. See MPEP § 609; cf. Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 42 USPQ2d 1300 (Fed. Cir 1997)(the failure to obtain and examine the accused infringing device prior to bringing a civil action for infringement violates the 1983 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). The “inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” requirement of 37 CFR 11.18, however, will require an inquiry into the underlying facts and circumstances when a practitioner provides conclusive statements to the Office (e.g., a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) was unintentional).

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