Source: http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/Smirensky/Novik_Strecha.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:36:01+00:00

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These sessions provided an opportunity for a meeting between a part of the Russian intelligentsia, the bearers of the “new religious consciousness,” and representatives of the traditional Church. By the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries the more sensitive segment of the intelligentsia felt that there was a need to make contact with the “historical Church” as they called it. The idea for the meeting came to Z. N. Gippius and D. M. Merezhkovsky in the fall of 1901. Having received the consent of Metropolitan Anthony Vadkovsky and the Chief Procurator of the Synod K. P. Pobedonostsev, the Religious and Philosophical sessions began on 29 November 1901. The Council of the sessions included Bishop Sergii Stragorodsky of Yamburg as chairman, V. A. Ternavtsev, a Synod official, V. V. Rozanov, D. M. Merezhkovsky, V. S. Mirolubov editor of the “Journal for Everyone”. In all there were 22 sessions.
Ternavtsev’s report, “The Russian Church in the face of a great task” set the tone and delineated the problematics of the sessions. The speaker noted the main obstacles for the renaissance of Russia in the absence of a religious social ideal among the Church’s activists. D. M. Merezhkovsky spoke on “Leo Tolstoy and the Russian Church.” During the discussion of the “Dogmatic development of Christianity” the representatives of the “new religious consciousness” called the official theologians to recognize dogmas as hindrances. V. V. Rozanov described contemporary Christianity as stone-hard and not vital, and contrasted it with the living Gospel. By common consensus the aim of the session was not achieved: the coming together of those seeking God by the new paths of the intelligentsia, and the representatives of the Church, did not take place. The intelligentsia representatives felt that the Church was not sensitive to their anguish and did not express “the truth about the world.” The Church’s representatives felt that the intelligentsia simply refused to bring themselves into the Church properly. But the religious sessions were interesting not so much in their answers but in their questions. They laid the beginnings of the religious and philosophical themes in the “Silver age.” Just as these sessions began to develop a great interest in society they were ended by the authorities in April 1903.
Three of the sessions (7-9) were devoted to the theme Freedom of Conscience.
The lay theologian S. Nilus called Stakhovich “Robespierre” in the Moskovsky Vedomosty. In the same issue Bishop Nikanor said that the very meaning of the term “freedom of conscience” is absurd since conscience acts as a judge and a judge is subject to law.
Prince Volkonsky felt that one should not confuse freedom of conscience with an elementary lack of discipline and unrestricted license.
D. S. Merezhkovsky responded to this by saying that things are exactly opposite: the principle of compulsion lies in the demonic source. If we take up the sword of compulsion we step away from Christ and fall into falsehood.
The conclusions of the opposing sides did not exclude but rather complemented each other. Some expressed an uncompromising faith (in the dogmatic sphere), others, for the need to respect an individual’s freedom and his right to other views (in the ethical sphere). Faith can only be free and cannot tolerate any compulsion. Archimandrite Antonin would have been completely correct had he spoken only of the truth of Christianity and did not touch upon questions of the rights of a person to select the path towards the Ultimate truth.
The presentations made by the presiding Bishop Sergii were significant. Not rejecting the very principle of the freedom of conscience, the foundations of which from a purely theoretical point presented no special difficulty, he cautioned what a straight-forward and immediate application of that principle could lead to in practice. Millions of immature souls could become tempted by such freedom which they would view as absolute permissiveness which, in turn, could lead to unpredictable results. He also called the listeners’ attention to the historical and spiritual role of Orthodoxy in Russia.
V. V. Uspensky, a docent at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy said that freedom of conscience is an unavoidable condition of the existence of Christianity itself. Some fear the destruction of the Church in its separation from the State. But the Church is a divine institution. Should it not remain firm, what would weak human forces do? Some say that to allow freedom would demolish the Church. But if a significant part of the population belongs to the Church only under the fear of punishment, does that kind of belonging have any value? If the Church was able to withstand the first centuries of Christianity, it would stand even more firmly today. Freedom should not be feared.
V. A. Ternavtsev (an official of the Synod) subjected Prince Volkonsky to severe criticism, accusing him of historical irresponsibility. But V. A. Ternavtsev in his very restrained presentation spoke not so much about the principle of the freedom of conscience but more about the historical role of Orthodoxy. The debate about freedom of conscience is a debate about the State and its religious calling and should not be directed to the sacerdotal Church but to the civil authorities as Christians, and to their conscience. The Church should not even consider such a subject. V. A. Ternavtsev rejected any religious content in this subject. This is a matter for secular authorities. It is not coincidental that freedom of conscience is one of the main principles of the revolution. But could a movement which would root out Faith be able to present a question about the religious calling of the secular powers and the State?
To imagine that the New Testament would tolerate pagan freedom as well as the right to preach in favor of new gods is simply mindless.
This is Christ’s teaching! Ternavtsev even proposed that if the State government was in the hands of the early Christians, they would have employed force to guard society against tempters. But he did agree that no other serious questions of faith faces such difficulties as that of freedom of conscience and that it is not sufficient here simply to propose its theoretical solution.
He also spoke about false teachers “who will secretly bring in destructive heresies, even denying the Master who bought them, bringing upon themselves swift destruction” (2 Peter 2:1). The Apostle Paul blinded Elymas the magician (Acts 13).
Here it is not that the freedom of conscience is rejected, but it is the activity of Christians which is endorsed. The whole point is, by which method should the true faith be preserved. Where is the boundary between conviction, coercion and compulsion?
Here examples from the Old Testament would have been more to the point. For example, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the ten Egyptian plagues, the destruction of 450 prophets of Baal by the Prophet Elijah, the destruction of 3000 Israelites who worshiped the golden calf, by the sons of Levi , or the general destruction of the pagan idolaters who occupied Palestine, by God’s chosen people.
But in those days there was an unusual level of relationship between God and his people. The destruction of the enemies of Israel took place with God’s direct help, as the conflict with the Amorites, when stones fell upon them from the heavens “. . .there were more who died because of the hailstones than the Israelites killed with the sword (Joshua 10:11). Further on Joshua stopped the sun “. . .for the Lord fought for Israel” (Joshua 10:12, 14).
The Belozersky elders demonstrated what is to this day the most important argument in support for what we call”freedom of conscience.” No one has the right in the name of God, to “gather the weeds in the wheatfield” (Mt 13:24-30), nor to be indiscriminate in the employment of methods.. There is a definite line over which no one should step.
The discussions on the freedom of conscience at the Religious and Philosophical sessions was of a sufficiently high level. All basic positions “for” and “against” the principle of the freedom of conscience were presented.
In summarizing the discussions the question may be raised thus: How can truth be compared to freedom, assuming a possibility for the rejection of truth?
In approaching this problem, the human intellect, not possessing the fulness of truth, must accept limits to its sovereignty, especially with respect to deciding the fate of other people. The recognition of a right to one’s views (meaning, contrary views), one’s world-view, one’s confession of faith (meaning, a different faith), must be accepted as true. In matters of faith, as in matters of world-view, there can be no compulsion. Any legal discrimination is compulsion. The truth of faith is that it can only be accepted freely. The solution of this problem on the social level can only be based only on some kind of a compromise (religious tolerance). It is important to understand that such a social compromise has nothing in common with a departure from belief within the confines of a particular confession. Here it is important to distinguish the confessional level and the social level. Those who oppose the ‘liberal” principle of freedom of conscience are pounding on open doors., attempting to prove that truth and order are better than lies and disorder, that freedom from sin is is better than freedom for sin. It is also important to understand that any other principle of the freedom of conscience (other than liberal) does not exist. The word “liberalis” means “free”. God Himself granted this freedom to mankind. People should not take it away from each other.

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