Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/10/25/lay-evidence-38-cfr-3-303-ro-denies-existance-of-lay-evidence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:28:54+00:00

Document:
When some one declare that there is “no” evidence, “no” basis or “no” whatever, your shields should go up because more often than not there will evidence of some sort to counter that “no”.
This is of particular importance to VA decision issued before VBA 1989.
We find this decision of interest, in part, because it is a CUE claim.
the appellant challenges the Board finding that the RO in 1969 correctly applied 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) and (b).
decision properly applied the applicable regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.303, to the lay evidence.
before the RO, despite the RO’s failure to discuss all of it explicitly.
See Natali v. Principi, 375 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that, prior to enactment of Veterans’ Benefits Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-237, 103 Stat. 2062 (1989), ROs were not required to set forth in detail the factual bases for their decisions); Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1381 ( Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[A]bsent specific evidence indicating otherwise, all evidence contained in the record at the time of the RO’s determination of the [sic] service connection must be presumed to have been reviewed . . . and no further proof of such review is needed.”). Had the RO not further characterized the state of the evidence, the central issue of this appeal would have been quite different. In this case, however, the appellant has demonstrated that the RO did not correctly apply the law to the evidence. Although the RO in 1969 had the lay evidence before it, it declared that “[t]he veteran has furnished no evidence concerning service incurrence, chronicity and continuity.” R. at 137. From the RO’s explicit statement, it is clear that the RO gave no weight to the lay evidence. The RO did not say or indicate that the evidence was insufficient to find service incurrence or continuity of symptomatology. Its declaration that there was “no evidence” leaves no doubt that it incorrectly applied § 3.303, giving the lay evidence no consideration at all.
Board’s consideration of that matter in the first instance.
satisfactory relief through medical channels.” R. at 60, 62.
sunlight. R. at 99, 106, 114.
nauseated and as understood, on occasion, he vomits.” R. at 114.
doctors at Hamilton Air Force Base suggested that he stay out of the sun.
glasses, hat, and long sleeved clothing when outside during daylight hours.
effective from November 20, 1997.
Suppl. Statement of the Case). Thereafter, in a July 2003 RO decision, Mr.
was increased to 60%, effective from November 1997. R. at 698-702.
an acute, condition” and that service connection should have been granted.
continuous from 1952 to the present. R. at 726.
On appeal, the appellant argues that the 1969 RO decision misapplied 38 C.
492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1969 RO decision. Id. at 12.
in-service disease or injury and the present disability. See Hickson v.
discharge is required to support the claim.
service connection); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b).
Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet.App.
nature of his condition shown after discharge. See Reply at 2.
above, the appellant challenges the Board finding that the RO in 1969 correctly applied 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) and (b).
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-237, 103 Stat. 2062 (1989), ROs were not required to set forth in detail the factual bases for their decisions); Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[A]bsent specific evidence indicating otherwise, all evidence contained in the record at the time of the RO’s determination of the [sic] service connection must be presumed to have been reviewed . . . and no further proof of such review is needed.”). Had the RO not further characterized the state of the evidence, the central issue of this appeal would have been quite different.
doubt that it incorrectly applied § 3.303, giving the lay evidence no consideration at all.
appellant had the onset of urticaria in service and that there was no evidence of continuity of symptomatology.
express language used by the 1969 RO in its statement that there was “no evidence” of service incurrence or continuity. The Board’s view of the matter, therefore, reflects a legally untenable interpretation of the RO’s consideration of the evidence before it. From the RO’s explicit statement, the only interpretation is that the lay evidence did not (could not) constitute evidence. The RO’s interpretation of the law as shown by its statement is inconsistent with § 3.303(a), which expressly allows the establishing of service connection based on lay evidence.
symptomatology after discharge from service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (b). The appellant’s challenge to the validity of the 1969 RO decision is thus far more than a “disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated,” which cannot support an assertion of CUE. Russell, 3 Vet.App. at 313-14. It is a challenge to the RO’s failure to consider lay evidence at all. The Court therefore holds that the Board’s decision finding no error in the 1969 decision did not comply with the law and was arbitrary and capricious.
regarding symptoms and onset. R. at 60, 76, 99, 105, 112-14, 121-25, 130.
Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
order). These matters are to be provided expeditious treatment on remand.
See 38 U.S.C. § 7112.

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