Source: https://chaseplace.wordpress.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:18:53+00:00

Document:
ChasePlace | Pittsburgh's generic lawyer sounds off on assorted topics.
On June 19, 2018, East Pittsburgh police officer Michael Rosfeld stopped a car because it matched the description of one that had been involved in a drive-by shooting in North Braddock some 15 minutes earlier. He detained the driver, but two passengers ran. He opened fire and fatally shot one of the passengers: Antwon Rose, Jr.
Rose was 17 years old. His hands were visible and were empty when he ran, and no weapon was found on his person. Rosfeld is now charged with his murder. As of this writing, trial is scheduled for February 26, 2019. The question is whether the shooting was murder, justifiable homicide, or something in between.
In light of the gag order in this case, I should note that, while I am acquainted with both of the attorneys that will be trying it, I have not discussed the case with either of them or with any of the attorneys representing Antwon Rose’s family. I am not privy to any facts that have not become public. I do not know the exact content of the police radio broadcast about the North Braddock incident. And I speak only for myself.
The question I address here is “When is it a crime for an officer to shoot an unarmed fleeing suspect?” “Always” is not the correct answer.
No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is a crime under this title or another statute of this Commonwealth.
When a defendant asserts that a homicide was justifiable, the Commonwealth must disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt.
Another provision in the Crimes Code — § 501 — states that “believes” means “reasonably believes”. This is a probable cause standard.
Subsection (ii) of § 508(a)(1) is vexing. It has too many conjunctions. It should have been divided into additional subparagraphs. There are two ways this could have been done, with differing meanings.
OR otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict serious bodily injury unless arrested without delay.
The question is whether an officer needs both forcible-felony probable cause and an indication of immediate danger (suspect is armed or engaging in behavior showing intent to endanger life or inflict injury), or whether one or the other will suffice. I believe that “one or the other” is the correct answer.
No precedential appellate decision has addressed this question. There was a 1990 Superior Court opinion (Commonwealth v. Curtis Johnson) that said both probable cause and immediate danger were needed, but it was unpublished and therefore not precedential. I couldn’t find it online, so I went to the Superior Court office and purchased an archived copy. The opinion has no effect on the Rosfeld prosecution.
I do not believe that the Johnson decision correctly interpreted § 508(a)(1)(ii); the legislative intent can be readily discerned from two provisions within § 508 that follow the vexing one.
(b) Private person’s use of force in making arrest.
(c) Use of force regarding escape.
What this all means is that to convict Rosfeld, the DA must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not have probable cause to arrest Rose or that he could have stopped the attempted escape without using deadly force. The fact that no weapon was seen in Rose’s hands or found on his person does not make his shooting a criminal homicide.
Moreover, if the officer honestly but unreasonably believed that he had probable cause, this would reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter.
Whether there was probable cause will be determined by considering the information known to Rosfeld at the time that he fired his weapon. Anything that came to light afterwards is irrelevant.
Some commentators believe that the United States Supreme Court decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) changed Pennsylvania law. I can’t agree.
Thus, Pennsylvania is left with the statute as it was enacted in 1972. It remains in effect until and unless the legislature decides to change it. Even if it had been changed the week after the shooting, the case must be decided according to the law in effect at the time of that tragic event.
Thus, an acquittal or a manslaughter verdict may simply reflect the jury’s application of the law to the facts of this case. Neither outcome, however painful, should be assumed to be a nullification of the law.
The overall impact on Kathy as a young girl was to leave her feeling completely deprived of justice for the heinous crime committed against her, and leaving her feeling like it was somehow her fault.
The affidavit, however, could have had no impact on Shelton “as a young girl” because she did not become aware of it until Glenn Thrush interviewed her for his 2008 Newsday article. According to Thrush, Shelton was “visibly stunned” when he handed her the affidavit.
. . . Hillary and a few other people were present and Hillary and others asked her questions. I think that is a formal witness interview, probably part of the discovery process the defense was entitled to.
There could certainly have been a prosecution team meeting during which more than one person asked Shelton questions, and during which a woman was present. However, defense attorneys are not invited to such meetings.
Defense attorneys are not “entitled” to summon witnesses for pretrial interviews. In fact, the right of a defendant to review prior statements of a prosecution witness is constitutionally guaranteed (with exceptions not material here) only after the witness has testified on direct examination.
In Arkansas, the court has the discretion to compel a prosecutor to make a witness available for a defense interview, but a motion and order would be necessary. None of the discovery motions Clinton filed ask for this opportunity, nor was any such order entered.
Moreover, Shelton told Josh Rogin in 2014 that she did not recall ever meeting Clinton in 1975. Rogin’s interview took place at least six years after she had learned that Clinton had been Taylor’s attorney and had been shown the affidavit.
In short, the claim that Hillary tortured Shelton still fails.
Jackson also claims that Hillary was responsible for the disappearance of the stained portion of the undershorts. The stain had already been tested and the toxicolgist who tested it was, according to the court documents, prepared to testify about the findings. The garment did not have to be present in court for that testimony to be admissible. Evidence tampering would have accomplished nothing for Clinton except the destruction of her own career.
I am keeping a watchful eye on developments.

References: § 501
 § 508
 v. 
 § 508
 § 508
 v.