Source: https://www.pointoforder.com/category/foreign-emoluments-clause/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:55:11+00:00

Document:
When we last left the emoluments clauses, Judge Messitte, U.S. district judge for the District of Maryland, had just issued a ruling in District of Columbia v. Trump, holding that the plaintiffs (DC and Maryland) had standing to sue the president for his alleged violations of the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses. As we observed at the time, the standing theory adopted by the court, based on the premise that these violations were advantaging the Trump Hotel in DC at the expense of competitors such as the Four Seasons and Ritz Carlton, seemed strained, to put it mildly. We also noted that although the court thus far had only addressed standing, “[a]t points it appears to have already decided the merits” against President Trump.
Sure enough, in July 2018 Judge Messitte issued an opinion adopting a broad view of the term “emolument” as extending “to any profit, gain, or advantage, of more than de minimis value, received . . . directly or indirectly, from foreign, the federal, or domestic governments [including] profits from private transactions, even those involving services given at a fair market value.” Memorandum Opinion of 7-25-18 at 47. Although ostensibly Judge Messitte merely denied the president’s motion to dismiss, he effectively decided the case in favor of the plaintiffs since there is no dispute that foreign and domestic governments have patronized the Trump Hotel during the Trump administration, which is all that is required to establish an emoluments violation under the court’s theory. Not surprisingly then, the president’s lawyers sought to stay discovery and take an interlocutory appeal and, when Judge Messitte denied these motions, sought a writ of mandamus in the Fourth Circuit (about which more in a moment).
Two other emoluments suits against Trump also remain pending (hat tip: @SethBTillman). In Blumenthal v. Trump, a suit brought by members of Congress in the U.S. district court for the District of Columbia, Judge Sullivan denied the president’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing but deferred decision on other issues, including the president’s contention that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The district court as of yet has apparently not ruled on the remainder of the motion to dismiss (which was argued nearly a year ago), nor upon Trump’s motion to certify the court’s ruling on standing for interlocutory appeal. No discovery is occurring while these legal motions are pending.
As expected, Judge Messitte has issued an opinion finding that plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims against President Trump for alleged violations of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses in D.C. v. Trump, a case brought by the D.C. and Maryland governments in the U.S. district court in Maryland. Although I think this decision is mostly wrong, it may not matter much. The court is likely to fulfill the plaintiffs’ legal/political objectives before an appellate court has a chance to opine on the matter.
Well, actually it can be gainsaid, and I hereby gainsay it. First, while the court cites anecdotal evidence that foreign governments (and, in one case, a state government) have frequented the Trump Hotel to curry favor with the president, this is not proof that the Trump Hotel is gaining a net advantage over its competitors because of its association with Trump. Are the Four Seasons and the Ritz Carlton (literally, the alleged “victims” being represented here) suffering an increase in room vacancies, a decline in revenue, or any other indicia of unfair competition? Undoubtedly some people are staying at the Trump because they like the president, and others are staying elsewhere because they feel differently. If the polls are to be believed, the Four Seasons should be a net winner.
Second, if the alleged injury is caused merely by the “association” between the president and the hotel, this would not be redressable by an order from the court requiring the president to divest his financial interest in the hotel. The court cursorily addresses this by saying that such an order would reduce the incentive to stay at the Trump Hotel “by some extent.” Op. at 37. This strikes me as sheer speculation (or, more accurately, speculation upon speculation).
Finally, and most importantly, I still do not see how the alleged competitive injuries are within the zone of interest protected by the emoluments clauses. The court’s conclusory assertion that competitors are within the zone of interests because the “the Emoluments Clauses clearly were and are meant to protect all Americans” is utterly unpersuasive. See op. at 41.
The opinion is closer to the mark when it discusses the Domestic Emoluments Clause. It points to the fact that Maine Governor LePage stayed at the Trump Hotel “on an official visit to Washington during the spring of 2017, met with the President, and not long after appeared with the President at a news conference” in which the latter signed an executive order that could help LePage reverse an Obama administration decision regarding a national monument in Maine. Op. at 18. Judge Messitte asserts that this “rather clearly suggests that Maryland and the District of Columbia may very well feel themselves obliged, i.e., coerced, to patronize the Hotel in order to help them obtain federal favors.” Op. at 19.
As a technical question of standing, it seems to me that if Governor LePage’s staying at the Trump Hotel constituted a violation of the Domestic Emoluments Clause (which presumably the court should assume for purposes of the analysis), there is a reasonable argument that Maryland (not DC, which is still not a state) has standing to sue as an injured party. The theory would be that the clause prohibits states from providing emoluments to the president so as to avoid any favoritism on his part with respect to one or more states. Arguably, therefore, a state should be able to sue to prevent the president from accepting a prohibited emolument from another state. See op. at 15 (plaintiffs claim standing “to protect their ‘position among . . . sister States’”) (citations omitted).
On the other hand, the court’s opinion seems to go well beyond this. It posits a causal connection between LePage’s stay at the Trump Hotel and the president’s signing of a favorable executive order. It seems rather unlikely that whatever tangential financial benefit Trump received from the governor’s stay at his hotel was actually the motivating factor for the executive order. But if this connection is part of the basis for the plaintiffs’ standing, is the court going to require them to prove it? Or is this something the court is just going to assume?
The court also cites reports that the Trump Organization has “been accorded substantial tax concessions by at least the District of Columbia and the State of Mississippi.” Op. at 17. The court goes on to say “while ordinarily there may be a presumption of regularity as far as the decisions of the tax authorities are concerned, the fact remains that Trump Organization hotels, from which the President allegedly derives substantial illegal profits, have been the beneficiaries of these actions.” Id. If I read this right, the court is holding that D.C. has standing in part based on the assumption that an agency of D.C. acted illegally.
In short, if I were Trump’s lawyers, I would not be looking forward to the decision on the merits in this case.
None of this is to suggest that the court’s concerns are groundless from a public policy and, potentially, a constitutional perspective. The (alleged) fact that foreign governments are booking rooms at the Trump Hotel in order to win the president’s favor is unseemly at best. See op. at 4-5. While this alone would not constitute a violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, suppose it turned out that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for example, had booked a couple floors of the hotel and had placed a standing order for the most expensive room service meals to be delivered three times a day to each room? Just a hypothetical, of course, but without any independent oversight of the president’s business arrangements, it is hardly beyond the realm of possibility.
Which brings us to Congress. It is not unreasonable to think that had Congress shown even a modicum of interest in overseeing Trump’s business dealings and the arrangements (allegedly) made to prevent conflicts of interest, this case would not be moving forward. For example, the court notes that although the president claims “he has now paid to the U.S. Treasury the profits the Hotel has received from foreign governments,” there is no detail to substantiate this claim. Op. at 4 n.5. This is the type of information that congressional oversight committees should have demanded and obtained.
Judge Messitte leaves little doubt that he intends to fill the vacuum that Congress has left. See op. at 42 (noting that under president’s standing theory “no one—except Congress which . . . may never undertake to act—would ever be able to enforce these constitutional provisions.”). In a pointed footnote, he notes that “[s]uppose” Congress is controlled by the same party as the president and it “never undertakes to approve or disapprove” the president’s receipt of emoluments; the president could receive “unlimited” emoluments “without the least oversight and with absolute impunity.” Op. at 46 n.18. It hardly needs saying that this is exactly what the judge believes has happened.
The district court’s ultimate decision will undoubtedly render a harsh verdict on Trump’s conduct and probably entail serious (though perhaps temporary) legal consequences for the president. But the real institutional loser will be Congress, which once again will see its constitutional functions usurped by another branch.
In this case, at least, it has no one to blame but itself.
Last week I attended a part of the argument in DC v. Trump, one of three Emoluments Clause cases pending against President Trump. This case was brought by the governments of Maryland and the District of Columbia. It is being heard by Judge Messitte of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, who sits in Greenbelt, Maryland. The argument, which began around 10 am and was wrapping up when I left at 3pm, was focused solely on whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case. This is a lot of time to spend on standing, and a good deal of the argument got down into the weeds of the various components of standing (injury in fact, traceability, redressability, etc.).
Judge Messitte seemed to be starting from the presumption that if the Foreign and/or Domestic Emoluments Clauses were being violated (a question on which he did not, from what I heard, express an opinion), somebody ought to be able to go to court to complain about it. Since no one else had any better standing to sue than these plaintiffs, he might as well let them go forward. The court evidently viewed the question of standing to be a legal technicality or fiction, one that he was happy to help the plaintiffs figure a way around.
Certainly anyone listening to the argument would come away with the impression that standing doctrine is rather ridiculous. A good deal of the discussion focused on the claims of Maryland and DC that the Trump Hotel in DC had caused economic injury to various competitor hotels and restaurants in the surrounding area due to the Trump Hotel’s alleged advantages in securing business from state and foreign governments. This led to Judge Messitte asking whether the MGM Hotel in National Harbor (one of the properties where Maryland claimed to have an economic interest) would actually lose gambling revenue from the Trump Hotel given that the latter has no casino. And defendant’s counsel kept harping on the fact that the plaintiffs had provided anecdotal evidence of competitive injury only to the Ritz and the Four Seasons, which were not (at least according to him) among the competitors for which the plaintiffs could assert a derivative economic interest.
While I admit to not being an expert on standing or having read all of the cases discussed in the argument, this whole line of inquiry strikes me as rather silly. I assume that if one looked hard enough one could find some people who stayed or ate at the Trump Hotel, rather than a competitor, for reasons having to do with the fact that the former is associated with the president. It seems rather unlikely, however, that one could show that any competitor suffered a net economic injury in light of the fact that some people also undoubtedly chose not to frequent Trump’s hotel (or restaurants) for precisely the same reason. And even if an injury could be shown, it is hard to see it results from the fact that Trump has an ownership interest in the hotel, as opposed to the fact that his name is on it.
Far more importantly, any competitive injury suffered by other hotels and restaurants has nothing to do with the purposes of the Emoluments Clauses and is therefore not within the zone of interests protected by these provisions. To give an analogy, my wife loves the original BLT restaurant and would undoubtedly be interested in dining at the new BLT Prime in the Trump Hotel. By the logic of plaintiffs’ theory, I should be able to sue President Trump on the grounds that if his establishment were not as busy with foreign and state government visitors trying to curry his favor, it would be easier for me to get a dinner reservation. I assume that this argument would be laughed out of court, but I fail to see how it is any different than plaintiffs’ “competitive injury” theory.
Of the standing cases I heard discussed, the most relevant seems to me to be Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), a case in which the plaintiffs alleged that the Incompatibility Clause was violated by the fact that more than 100 members of Congress were in the reserves during the Vietnam War. Their alleged injury stemmed from the fact that this violation made Congress less independent of the executive branch and therefore more likely to support the war, thereby injuring plaintiffs as citizens and taxpayers opposed to the war. The district court accepted this theory of standing, finding the Incompatibility Clause to be a “precise and self-operative” provision designed to prevent the very type of harm asserted.
Furthermore, to have reached the conclusion that respondents’ interests as citizens were meant to be protected by the Incompatibility Clause because the primary purpose of the Clause was to insure independence of each of the branches of the Federal Government, similarly involved an appraisal of the merits before the issue of standing was resolved. All citizens, of course, share equally an interest in the independence of each branch of Government. In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution was meant to serve the interests of all. Such a generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a “case or controversy” appropriate for judicial resolution. The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.
Closely linked to the idea that generalized citizen interest is a sufficient basis for standing was the District Court’s observation that it was not irrelevant that if respondents could not obtain judicial review of petitioners’ action, “then as a practical matter no one can.” Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes. The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.
The Emoluments Clauses, like the Incompatibility Clause, are “precise and self-operative” structural provisions designed to protect the independence of one branch of the federal government. This is an interest in which all citizens share equally, and therefore is too generalized a grievance to support standing. If this means that no one would have standing to sue (which, as I will discuss in a moment, it may not), that is not sufficient reason to find standing.
Of course, Schlesinger is not on all fours with DC v. Trump because the plaintiffs in Schlesinger asserted their actual grievance, rather than an interest trumped up (sorry) solely for purposes of the litigation. It is obvious that neither Maryland or DC has any actual interest in the “competitive injury” that the Trump Hotel allegedly inflicts. It is as if the Schlesinger plaintiffs, instead of asserting their actual grievance, had claimed injury by virtue of the fact they might lose out to a member of Congress for a coveted slot or promotion in the reserves. Such a move would not have worked, and should not work now, because the alleged grievance is not anywhere in the vicinity of the zone of interests protected by the constitutional provisions at issue.
I will say, however, that there was a part of the plaintiffs’ standing in DC v. Trump position that was at least somewhat persuasive. They made a strong argument, based on in large measure on Federalist No. 73, that the Domestic Emoluments Clause (which prohibits the president from receiving additional emoluments from the United States or any individual state) is designed in part to ensure that all states are treated equally. Thus, if one or more states were providing emoluments to the president, there is an argument that the other states suffer a cognizable injury distinct from the injury suffered by the public at large. Accordingly, there is a plausible basis for Maryland (not DC, which seems to keep forgetting that it is not a state) to assert standing with respect to the Domestic Emoluments Clause only.
Unfortunately, it seems likely that Judge Messitte will allow Maryland and DC to proceed on both the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clause claims. As there is no plausible standing theory on the former claim, and because Congress at any rate should be the arbiter of Foreign Emoluments Clause violations, it remains essential that Congress bestir itself to take action on this front.
Judge Daniels of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has issued this opinion (hat tip: Eric Columbus) dismissing the Emoluments Clause lawsuit spearheaded by Citizens for Ethics and Responsibility in Washington (CREW). The court found that neither CREW nor its co-plaintiffs (individuals and businesses in competition with hotels and restaurants owned by the Trump Organization) had standing to sue President Trump for allegedly violating the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses.
Much of the court’s analysis is focused on explaining why the plaintiffs have not suffered legally redressable injuries from the alleged constitutional violations. Professor Jonathan Adler has a good summary of the court’s reasoning here, and I have nothing in particular to add with respect to that aspect of the opinion. I do, however, have a few additional observations.
First, while the court makes clear (see op. at 2, n.1) it is not addressing the merits of the case, I think one can sense some skepticism from the court about the plaintiffs’ theory of liability. The gravamen of their claims is that Trump’s “’vast, complicated and secret’ business interests are creating conflicts of interest and have resulted in unprecedented government influence in violation of the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses of the United States Constitution.” Op. at 1.
As the court notes, however, nothing in the Constitution prevents Trump from operating an extensive business empire that competes with CREW’s co-plaintiffs as to non-government business. Op. at 17. To the extent the Constitution might be construed to apply to business transactions with governmental entities, the effect on the Trump Organization would be largely incidental. As the court points out, even in that circumstance the Constitution would not prohibit the Trump Organization from doing business with foreign (or state) governments; it would simply prevent Trump from personally accepting income or profits from these transactions. Op. at 14 & n.3. Trump thus can fix any constitutional problem if he has not already, and Congress can waive any constitutional problem under the Foreign Emoluments Clause (FEC) anyway. Op. at 15. In short, Judge Daniels effectively rejects the notions that the Constitution prohibits the Trump Organization from operating during the Trump presidency or that Trump needs to divest himself of all interest in his businesses.
Here, the issue presented under the Foreign Emoluments Clause is whether Defendant can continue to receive income from his business with foreign governments without the consent of Congress. As the explicit language of the [FEC] makes clear, this is an issue committed exclusively to Congress. As the only political branch with the power to consent to violations of the [FEC], Congress is the appropriate body to determine whether, and to what extent, Defendant’s conduct unlawfully infringes on that power. If Congress determines that an infringement has occurred, it is up to Congress to decide whether to challenge or acquiesce to Defendant’s conduct. As such, this case presents a non-justiciable political question.
Op. at 26 (emphasis added).
In addition, the court found that plaintiffs’ claims were premature because Congress itself had taken no action with regard to Trump’s alleged violations of the FEC. (One might add that Congress had little opportunity to do so, given that CREW filed its lawsuit on the first day of the administration.) The result might be different, the court implied, if in the future Congress were to find Trump’s activities required congressional consent. Op. at 27-28. But it is not the court’s role to tell Congress what to do or “how it should or should not assert its power in responding to Defendant’s alleged violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.” Id.
In a footnote, Judge Daniels underscored this point: “Congress is not a potted plant. It is a co-equal branch of the federal government with the power to act as a body in response to Defendant’s alleged Foreign Emoluments Clause violations, if it chooses to do so.” Op. at 28 n.8.
Needless to say (or, rather, as I have already said here and here), I am in strong agreement with the court’s approach to justiciability of the FEC claim. The House and/or Senate should give serious consideration to filing an amicus brief defending the court’s decision if and when CREW appeals to the Second Circuit.
Congress can also justify Judge Daniels’ confidence by demonstrating that it is not in fact a potted plant. It should initiate a review of Trump’s business interests to ensure there are adequate safeguards to prevent violations of the FEC or any other unacceptable conflicts of interest. Upon reflection, I think the best way to conduct a serious, nonpublic and nonpartisan review of this matter would be to entrust it to the GAO, possibly under the auspices of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Finally, I must note that Judge Daniels makes no mention of the theory, advanced by Professor Tillman as amicus curiae, that the FEC is inapplicable to the president, other than to note that “[f]or purposes of this motion, Defendant has conceded that he is subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.” Op. at 6 n.2. Make of this what you will, but perhaps it suggests the court was not bowled over by Tillman’s theory? As an exercise in reading tea leaves this seems as least as plausible as Tillman’s apparently inferring from these orders in District of Columbia v. Trump (another emoluments case) that Judge Messitte is interested in hearing more about his theory. But we will see.
In my last post, I (briefly) laid out reasons why Congress should intervene in the ongoing litigation regarding the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Professor Tillman has offered a comment to that post, which he has shared by email and on the blog. His comment is set forth in full below, along with my response.
Before getting to that, though, there was one other point which I should have mentioned. As we have discussed, pending before the House Ethics Committee is a case which presents two of the major issues that could be decided by the courts if they reach the merits in the FEC litigation: (1) who is covered by the Clause; and (2) do fair market value transactions with foreign governments constitute “emoluments” within the meaning of the Clause. This provides an additional reason why Congress should insist on its own primacy in deciding questions related to the FEC. Not only would judicial pronouncements on the merits of these questions interfere with Congress’s authority vis a vis the other branches, but also with the authority of the House and Senate to discipline their own members.
Litigation in general has rules. And the three Foreign Emoluments Clause cases have scheduling orders imposed by the court (in the SDNY, District of DC, and District of Maryland), and/or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Any amicus brief along the lines you suggest would, in effect, support the President. But the time for filing ab amicus brief in support of the President — in all 3 actions — elapsed some time before your post went live (on October 26, 2017).
It is too late for the House and Senate (or Congress as a whole) to follow your advice. Yes, they could file late, but such a late filing would require justification. What is that justification? Why did you not present your advice in a more timely fashion?
In lieu of a brief, you could take the time to write a full-length paper and post it on SSRN as a prelude to publication in a journal. Or you could snipe from the wings against those who actually attempt to do something consistent with the practical requirements of actual litigation.
Why do I snipe (or why didn’t I snipe earlier)? Tillman asks why I “snipe from the wings” rather than writing a full-length article or brief detailing my own views on the pertinent legal issues. But this misapprehends the nature of my concern. I am not urging Congress to act to ensure that the courts have the benefit of my brilliant legal scholarship. I want Congress to recognize that its own institutional interests are at stake and to take action to protect those interests. Sure, I have suggested some legal arguments that Congress may wish to make, but Congress has its own counsel that are more than capable of deciding on and developing those arguments.
To the extent that I have contributed any original thinking on the FEC, it relates solely to the question of whether the president is covered by the Clause. But this is distinct from the question of who should decide whether the president is covered. To be sure, I think it is important that Congress understand not only the (overwhelming, IMHO) legal arguments in favor of the president being covered, but also the radical implications of a contrary decision. For example, it would mean that the president and vice-president could hold seats in Congress, and that an impeached and convicted president (or vice-president) could not be disqualified from holding that office again. But while the substantive outcome of this issue is very important, it is equally if not more important that Congress, not the courts, should be making it.
As for why I did not post my thoughts on this earlier, I am sure the readers are not interested in my personal time management. As it happens, I don’t think it would have made any difference if I had posted earlier (granting, purely for the sake of discussion, that Congress is eagerly awaiting my advice on these things), for reasons I discuss below. But I will certainly endeavor to be quicker on the trigger in the future. Nobody likes a slow sniper.
What is the point of my giving this advice to Congress? This is a question that Tillman did not ask (at least explicitly), but should have. What makes me think that Congress has the slightest interest in what I have to say or would even be aware that I said it? And, as several people have commented to me, what makes me think that Congress even has any interest in vindicating its own institutional interests?
I am under no illusion that “Congress” as a whole reads my blog or that the House and Senate chambers are echoing with the sounds of members excitedly discussing my proposal. I do know that my blog is read by some of the relatively small cadre of folks on the Hill who care about institutional prerogatives and have the capacity and band-width to consider these types of “over the horizon” issues. The most that can be realistically hoped is that my post will trigger some thinking and discussion about this matter.
As a general matter, there reasons to question Congress’s commitment to protecting its own institutional interests. Individual members may care (or at least say they care) about vindicating those interests, but Congress as a whole is certainly far less consistent in protecting its institutional prerogatives than is the executive. These is partly a result of structural incentives inherent in a multi-member, bi-cameral body, but is also partly historically contingent. In my (tentative) opinion, the prediction that Congress would become more assertive in its dealings with the other branches (particularly the executive) in the unique circumstances of the current administration is in fact being borne out, but it is very much a work in progress. So my post may represent a triumph of hope over experience, but I don’t think it is entirely futile.
Is it too late for Congress to act on my advice? So I am generally familiar with the fact that litigation has rules and, while I did not look at the scheduling orders in the three district court cases, I recognized when I wrote my post that it was likely that the deadlines for filing amicus briefs in those cases had well passed. As a purely theoretical matter, Congress might still be able to file amicus briefs in those cases if it wished to do so. There is a statute, for example, giving Senate Legal Counsel greater leniency in filing amicus briefs than the ordinary litigant. See 2 U.S.C. § 288l(a). (I understand there is currently a legislative effort to give the House Counsel some of the same authorities, although I do not know whether this specific provision is one of those being considered).
As a practical matter, however, there was never any realistic chance that Congress was going to file an amicus brief at the district court level. There is simply too much that would need to happen before either house is going to authorize the filing of an amicus brief in these cases (particularly given their politically fraught nature). My hope (and it is no more than that) is that Congress starts the process of developing a legal position so that the House and/or the Senate could appear as amicus before the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court.
Finally, I would note that my proposal was not limited to formal appearance in court. There are a number of things that Congress could do (such as holding hearings) that would advance its institutional interests and make it less likely that the courts will think that Congress has simply abandoned its constitutional responsibilities for implementing the FEC.
So it is definitely not too late for Congress to act. The clock, however, is ticking.
Professor Josh Blackman has a very informative summary of the oral argument before U.S. District Judge George Daniels in CREW v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA (S.D.N.Y.), one of the three federal cases in which President Trump is being sued for (allegedly) violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause. If you are following these cases, you should read the whole thing.
To paraphrase former VP Biden, this is a BFD. I don’t know whether the government will actually argue in court that the FEC is inapplicable to the president. Presumably it hopes not to have to address the issue because the cases will be dismissed as non-justiciable (as they should be). But even if the government never makes the argument, it has now reserved the right to assert that the FEC does not apply to the president or vice president. This seems a little inconsistent with the promise previously made by Trump’s personal counsel, but Congress has now been given fair warning. The president (or his successors) may take the position in the future that the FEC is inapplicable. That means that the president could accept a present, emolument, office or title from a foreign government without seeking congressional consent or even notifying Congress of this acceptance.
The court is clearly right about this. But there is no one before the court representing Congress’s interests in this matter. Trump’s personal and political interests, the executive branch’s institutional interests, the views and interests of Trump’s political opponents and even the thoughts of officious intermeddlers like Professor Tillman are represented, but not Congress.
It is time for Congress to stop sitting on its hands. It should authorize House and/or Senate legal counsel to file briefs in the three FEC cases, politely explaining to the courts that this is none of their business. It should demand through its committees that the Department of Justice provide a straight answer as to whether the FEC applies to the president. And, while they are at it, the committees should take a hard look at Trump’s business interests and the arrangements that he has made to “scrupulously abide” by the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
You know, the constitutional provision that may or may not apply to him.
Readers of this blog are aware that Professor Seth Barrett Tillman has long maintained that the presidency and vice presidency are not “offices under the United States” within the meaning of various clauses of the Constitution which use that expression or a variant thereof. Tillman’s theory has a number of implications. We first discussed the theory in a December 20, 2008 post entitled “Can Joe Biden Be Vice President and Senator at the Same Time?,” in which it was noted that one implication is that the Incompatible Offices Clause (U.S. const., art. I, §7, cl. 2) would not prohibit someone from serving as president or vice president and at the same time as a member of the House or Senate.
More recently, Tillman’s theory has received a good deal of attention for its application to the Foreign Emoluments Clause (U.S. const., art. I, § 9, cl. 8). If, as Tillman maintains, the president does not hold an “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States]” within the meaning of the FEC, then President Trump is not subject to the prohibitions of that clause, much to the dismay of many, including the plaintiffs in three separate lawsuits who have sued Trump for violating it.
Tillman has not (at least yet) convinced many people that his theory is correct. Among the unconvinced are President Trump’s personal lawyers and the Department of Justice, which represents the president in his official capacity in the aforementioned lawsuits. Because no party to these suits disputes the FEC’s applicability to the president, Tillman filed this amicus brief in one of the cases, CREW v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA (S.D.N.Y.), to ensure that the court has the benefit of his point of view.
Before getting into the nuts and bolts of the Hamilton Report, I want to stress that Tillman’s reliance on the report depends on four assumptions about or inferences from the report: (1) the omission of the president and vice president from the report was a deliberate decision, rather than an oversight or error; (2) this decision was made or approved by Hamilton personally; (3) the decision was made for one specific reason, namely that the phrase “office or employment under the United States” excluded the president and vice president; and (4) the interpretation of this phrase was based on the unambiguous meaning of the words, rather than the context of their use or an extra-textual source of information. None of these can be definitively proved (or disproved), but Tillman evidently believes they can be adequately established for his purposes.
A foundational element of Tillman’s argument, though, came under attack in the CREW litigation when various experts and others aligned with the plaintiffs questioned whether the presidency and vice presidency had actually been omitted from the Treasury Department’s 1793 list. They contended (see here, here and here) that a subsequently published version of the Hamilton Report did include the president and vice president and therefore it was “grossly misleading” to suggest that Hamilton had omitted these offices at all. Moreover, in an amicus brief filed with the court, a group of legal historians contended that Hamilton had in fact signed the second version of this report, contrary to Tillman’s position.
Tillman responded to these charges by filing a proposed amicus response brief with a number of supporting exhibits, including declarations from five expert witnesses, two with expertise on authenticating founding-era documents and three with expertise on Alexander Hamilton. The evidence from these witnesses showed, to the satisfaction even of Tillman’s critics, that Hamilton signed only the Hamilton Report and not the version which listed the president and vice president. (That second version, which we will discuss later, was likely created in the 1830s, well after Hamilton’s death). In fact, the legal historians who had filed the brief criticizing Tillman issued a formal apology to him as well as a letter to the court withdrawing the footnote in which the criticism was made.
At this point you may be thinking this is all very interesting (if you’ve read this far I will assume you are the sort of person who would find this interesting), but is this really the way we go about determining the meaning of a constitutional provision? An inference from omission that is said to cast light on the view of a single framer about the meaning of a phrase that is used in an entirely different context but is similar (though not identical) to a phrase used in the Constitution? And which then leads to a battle of forensic experts about whether the omission happened in the first place? Is this original public meaning originalism or National Treasure originalism?
Is Senator Blumenthal Violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause?
In addition to being really rich, Blumenthal is the lead plaintiff in Blumenthal v. Trump, a lawsuit brought by members of Congress against President Trump in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The lawsuit alleges that Trump is in violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause (U.S. const., art. I, § 9, cl.8) because he “has a financial interest in vast business holdings around the world that engage in dealings with foreign governments and receive benefits from those governments.” Complaint ¶ 2. Because of this financial interest, plaintiffs allege, Trump “has accepted, or necessarily will accept, ‘Emolument[s]’ from ‘foreign State[s]’” within the meaning of the FEC. Id.
We may now turn to the question of whether the Framers might have had reason to exclude the president from the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s presumptive ban on accepting any “present” or “emolument” from a foreign power. Here we should start with an important distinction. I am not claiming that the exclusion of the president from the FEC would be an absurd result in the sense that it would justify departing from the plain meaning of the Constitution. Compare United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868) (classic example of the absurd results doctrine is the law “’that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity’ did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit”). If the plain meaning of the FEC excludes the president, I am satisfied that Professor Grewal’s explanation (discussed in my original post on this topic) would be sufficient to forestall operation of the absurd results doctrine.
If, however, the question is whether the meaning of the FEC is plain or, if plain, what that meaning is, then I think Professor Grewal falls short of offering a persuasive reason why the Framers might have decided not to restrict the president’s acceptance of foreign presents or emoluments. Grewal suggests first that the Framers’ concerns about foreign gifts and payments may have centered on appointed officers because only officers “like ambassadors . . . would make the type of extended visits abroad that could subject them to improper foreign influence.” Andy S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 Minn. L. Rev. __, *7 (forthcoming 2017).
At the outset, there is something less than a tight fit between this hypothesis and the language used in the FEC. After all, the Clause applies to all persons who hold any office of profit or trust under the United States. This language is not limited to officials likely to make extended trips abroad, but includes many officers with a largely or exclusively domestic focus (such as the Secretary of the Treasury and subordinate officials responsible for the public fisc, the Chief Coiner and other officers of the Mint, the Attorney General and district attorneys, postmasters and other officials involved in the postal system, and the entire federal judiciary, among others). If the Framers had wanted to limit the FEC to diplomatic officials likely to spend significant time abroad, they could have employed the language used elsewhere in the Constitution (“ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls”) to refer to such officials.
Common sense also suggests that foreign powers would have ample opportunity, and even greater motive, to offer the president gifts and payments (both of the somewhat above-board ceremonial kind or of the less savory surreptitious kind). For example, the president is charged by Article II with receiving ambassadors and other pubic ministers from foreign nations. See U.S. const., art. II, § 2. As the official ultimately responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, the president would certainly be expected to meet and correspond directly with foreign dignitaries, including heads of state, on a regular basis. Thus, the Framers would hardly have been surprised that U.S. presidents, beginning with George Washington, have been offered or received gifts from foreign governments or dignitaries. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 107 Nw. L. Rev. 180, 188-90 (2013) (citing examples).
It is true that U.S. ambassadors and other diplomatic officials were a particular concern of the FEC, due in large part to the European custom of giving gifts, sometimes of significant value, to visiting foreign diplomats. Because it was often diplomatically awkward to refuse such gifts, this is also likely why it was thought impractical to have an absolute ban on accepting them. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of “Emoluments” in the Constitution *40 (Feb. 5, 2017).
I am aware, however, of no evidence to suggest that the Framers were concerned exclusively with potential foreign corruption of diplomats or other officials who would be abroad for long periods. To the contrary, there is a great deal of evidence (some of which was discussed in my last post) that the Framers were equally if not more concerned about foreign corruption of the president.
For example, during the Philadelphia Convention’s consideration of whether the president should be impeachable, James Madison thought it “indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the Community agst the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate.” II Farrand’s Documentary History of the Constitution 65. Madison warned specifically that the president “might betray his trust to foreign powers.” Id. at 66.
Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst. it by displacing him. One would think the King of England well secured agst bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV.
Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added). Morris’s point seems to be that there is a greater chance that the president would choose his private interest over that of the country than would the King of England, who basically owns his country as private property, yet even the latter could be successfully bribed by a foreign power. Be that as it may, these remarks confirm that the Framers were attuned to the danger of a president coming to be “in foreign pay.” It would therefore be highly surprising had the Framers decided the president, of all executive branch officials, should not be subject to the FEC. See Saikrishna Banglore Prakash, Why the Incompatibility Clause Applies to the Office of the President, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y Sidebar 35, 41-42 (2009) (particularly in light of Framers’ knowledge of incidents such as payments from Louis XIV of France to Charles II of England, reading FEC “as if it permitted the President to receive foreign bribes, without any congressional oversight or check, makes little sense”).
There is another provision against the danger, mentioned by the honorable member, of the President receiving emoluments from foreign powers. If discovered, he may be impeached. If he not be impeached, he may be displaced at the end of four years. By the 9th section of the 1st article, “no person, holding an office of profit or trust, shall accept of any present or emolument whatever, from any foreign power, without the consent of the representatives of the people;” and by the 1st section of the 2d article, his compensation is neither to be increased nor diminished during the time for which he shall have been elected; and he shall not, during that period, receive any emolument from the United States or any of them. I consider, therefore, that he is restrained from receiving any present or emolument whatever. It is impossible to guard better against corruption.
This colloquy shows that Mason and Randolph, though disagreeing on the adequacy of the FEC and other constitutional provisions for this purpose, agree on two key points: (1) the president receiving emoluments or presents from foreign powers is a danger against which safeguards are needed; and (2) the FEC’s strictures do apply to the president.
Randolph’s remarks also suggest that the FEC and the Presidential Compensation Clause (art. II, § 1, cl. 7) are complementary restrictions that limit the president to a fixed salary and ensure that he does not receive any other emoluments from the United States, any state or any foreign power. One might quibble with Randolph on the grounds that the FEC is not an absolute prohibition, thus theoretically permitting the president to receive foreign emoluments or presents with congressional permission. In general, however, his remarks confirm, pace Professor Grewal, that the Framers did not see the presidency for some reason as raising concerns only as to domestic emoluments. Indeed, it is not obvious to me why anyone, with or without insight into the Framers’ deliberations, would think that the president would be singled out for restriction on domestic emoluments, while simultaneously excluded from a general prohibition on foreign emoluments.
Finally, we may address Grewal’s suggestion that the Framers might have been particularly concerned about potential foreign corruption of officers who, unlike the president, did not receive a fixed salary and were dependent on transaction-based payments for their livelihood. Andy S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 Minn. L. Rev. __, *9 (forthcoming 2017). This idea strikes me as getting things a little backwards. The president’s compensation, unlike that of any other executive branch official, is constitutionally fixed because of the singular importance of his office and the need to ensure that Congress cannot financially reward or punish him during his term of office. Likewise, he is prohibited from receiving any other emoluments from the United States or any state to prevent any financial dependence or partiality on his part. It would be utterly implausible to think that the Framers would be less concerned about the need to insulate the president from foreign financial influence, or that they would have been more worried about foreign corruption of customs collectors or immigration officials.
Federal judges also have constitutional protection for their salaries, which cannot be diminished during their time in office. In comparison to the president, there is little reason to think that they would either be in regular contact with foreign powers, or that foreign powers would have reason to influence them. Yet federal judges are not exempted from the prohibitions of the FEC. It is hard to see how it would make sense to exempt the president.
A more plausible explanation for excluding the president would relate to the requirement in the FEC to obtain congressional consent. It is at least possible to imagine that some could think it improper to require the president, as the head of a separate branch of government, to seek such consent whenever a foreign government offered him something “on the order of a snuffbox, a portrait, or a gold chain,” as Professor Currie puts it. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 281 (1997). Rather than requiring the president to seek congressional permission, it would be left to his judgment whether to accept a foreign gift or an emolument personally or on behalf of the United States. If he should accept a bribe or an improper gift or payment that Congress considered to amount to a high crime or misdemeanor, he would be subject to impeachment.
Tillman suggests something along these lines in his comments to my blog post of 3-13-17. While stating “I frankly admit that I do not know” why the Framers might have exempted “federal elected officials” (including the president) from the FEC, Tillman proposes that the Framers might have “relied on elected officials to act like fiduciaries” and/or been concerned about giving another body the power to make judgments concerning “those at the apex of authority.” In the context of the president and the FEC, this would mean that the Framers may have preferred to rely on the president’s judgment regarding the acceptance of foreign presents and emoluments, instead of requiring him to submit to Congress’s judgment on such matters.
There is some surface plausibility to the “no congressional permission slip” explanation, but it is wrong for at least three reasons. First, as Professor Grewal noted regarding his own explanation, “no contemporaneous materials advance this understanding.” In other words, it’s a nice theory, but it is made up out of whole cloth. (I can say this since I made it up, and I think Tillman would agree as well). There is no evidence that any Framers (or anyone else) actually subscribed to it.
Second, this explanation overlooks an important aspect of the congressional consent requirement. This requirement doesn’t just restrict the foreign presents and emoluments that can be accepted; it also ensures that offers of such presents and emoluments are disclosed. If the recipient of a foreign gift or payment discloses it publicly, this is in itself some assurance that it is not improper and will not influence the recipient. If the gift or payment is kept secret, on the other hand, its discovery will excite suspicion even if it was not actually a bribe.
Had the Framers intended to permit the president to be the judge of his own emoluments, they would have provided for a mechanism for disclosure of his decisions. For example, they could have required that he inform Congress, rather than seek its permission. Simply omitting the president from the FEC would be a recipe for misunderstanding and suspicion, which would likely have led to wholly unnecessary and predictable charges of corruption.
Finally, and most importantly, while it is possible that some people might have subscribed to my theory, it is inconceivable that everyone would have done so. As we have seen, any suggestion of a loophole in the FEC that would have allowed the president to receive presents or emoluments (much less titles of nobility) from foreign powers without congressional permission or oversight would have excited tremendous opposition. The fact that there was no controversy on this point can only be explained in two ways: (1) the existence of a presidential loophole in the FEC was publicly known or discussed, and yet no one objected; or (2) everyone understood or assumed, and no one (at least publicly) disputed, that the president was in fact covered by the FEC. The overwhelming evidence is in favor of the latter over the former.

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