Source: http://www.jonathanpollard.org/2004/091404a.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:14:02+00:00

Document:
The American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area (also amici below); the American Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists; and various law professors and other distinguished individuals (also amici below).
United States v. Pollard, 747 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).
United States v. Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.D.C. 2003).
* Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with an asterisk.
Sealed Docket Materials See "Materials"
(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.
(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from the final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
A person seeking executive clemency by pardon, reprieve, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine shall execute a formal petition. The petition shall be addressed to the President of the United States and shall be submitted to the Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530, except for petitions relating to military offenses. Petitions and other required forms may be obtained from the Pardon Attorney. Petition forms for commutation of sentence also may be obtained from the wardens of federal penal institutions. A petitioner applying for executive clemency with respect to military offenses should submit his or her petition directly to the Secretary of the military department that had original jurisdiction over the court-martial trial and conviction of the petitioner. In such a case, a form furnished by the Pardon Attorney may be used but should be modified to meet the needs of the particular case. Each petition for executive clemency should include the information required in the form prescribed by the Attorney General.
(c) The Attorney General shall review each petition and all pertinent information developed by the investigation and shall determine whether the request for clemency is of sufficient merit to warrant favorable action by the President. The Attorney General shall report in writing his or her recommendation to the President, stating whether in his or her judgment the President should grant or deny the petition.
(3) Has signed an approved nondisclosure agreement.
(b) Eligibility for access to classified information is limited to United States citizens for whom an appropriate investigation of their personal and professional history affirmatively indicated loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment, as well as freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion, and willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of classified information. A determination of eligibility for access to classified information is a discretionary security decision based on judgments by appropriately trained adjudicative personnel. Eligibility shall be granted only where facts and circumstances indicate access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States and any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the national security. Sections 2.6 and 3.3 of Executive Order 12968 provide only limited exceptions to these requirements.
The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1998), to decide the Motion for Resentencing.
The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to the Court's inherent supervisory authority over its docket, and the Protective Order, to decide the Access Motion, the Motion for Reconsideration, and the Motion for Modification.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the January 12, 2001 Order denying the Access Motion, the August 7, 2001 Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and the November 12, 2003 Order denying the Motion for Modification. Notices of Appeal were timely filed August 17, 2001 (A-665) and November 20, 2003 (A-869).
(1) Where the Government actively misled a prisoner by falsely representing, in writing, that the prisoner's sentencing counsel had performed in a "skillful" manner and without "any errors," and where the prisoner's habeas lawyer joined in the false praise of sentencing counsel's performance, did the District Court err, under the principles set forth in Banks v. Dretke, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1256 (2004), by denying an evidentiary hearing and allowing the Government to benefit from its deception by summarily ruling that the prisoner had not been diligent in investigating whether the Government had lied, and that AEDPA's statute of limitations therefore barred a claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel filed less than one year after the prisoner was informed by new habeas counsel of the facts supporting the claim?
(2) Where a habeas lawyer misrepresented to his client and the Court that sentencing counsel had performed "skillfully" and "effectively," and where the circumstantial evidence established prima facie that the lawyer was constrained by an undisclosed conflict of interest that caused him to refrain from asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel in his § 2255 motion, did the District Court err by denying an evidentiary hearing and summarily ruling that the defendant had not shown "cause" under McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) for the failure to raise ineffective assistance in that § 2255 motion?
(3) Did the District Court commit plain error in finding that the Appellant actually knew "the facts" supporting each of his claims of ineffective assistance years before 2000?
(4) Did the District Court err in ruling that under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(4) "the facts" supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel do not include the relevant norms of the legal profession that counsel breached?
(5) Did the District Court err in ruling that new security-cleared counsel had no "need-to-know," thereby refusing to allow new counsel to read, in a secure Government facility, approximately 40 pages of classified pre-sentencing memoranda filed with the Court and previously shown to predecessor counsel, where new counsel demonstrated a genuine need to see these documents in order to submit an effective petition for executive clemency, and where on at least two dozen occasions since 1993 the DOJ has unilaterally recognized a "need-to-know" and thereby allowed Government personnel access to these documents, by all indications for the purpose of opposing executive clemency?
(6) Where security-cleared counsel demonstrated that, in order to submit an effective petition for executive clemency, they had a "need-to-know" the contents of pre-sentencing memoranda filed with the Court in 1987, did the District Court err (i) by finding no "need-to-know" on the basis of the District Court's own prediction that President Bush will not grant clemency, and (ii) by finding that the "security threats faced by our nation since September 11, 2001" somehow reduced counsel's "need-to-know," even though the Government had conceded counsel's trustworthiness and integrity?
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate sets of rulings.
On June 4, 1986, pursuant to a written Plea Agreement, Jonathan Pollard pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794(c). Pollard had delivered classified information to Israel.
Hibey's failure to file a Notice of Appeal was the culmination of his woefully deficient representation of Pollard before and during sentencing. (A-28-45, 685-689).
Under prevailing professional norms, Hibey should have objected to the breach of the Plea Agreement and should have pursued a remedy. See ABA Standards §§ 14-2.1(b)(ii), 18-6.3(f)(iii). Hibey did not even object.
Instead, Hibey argued that Pollard had not caused as much damage as had the other spies. (A-140) But there Hibey also acted deficiently, because he failed to obtain and introduce public documents from the Walker and Whitworth dockets that cast serious doubt on the truth of the assertion that Pollard had caused as much harm as had these Soviet spies. According to the NSA, the information Whitworth provided the Soviet Union "had war-winning implications" and constituted "the most damaging impact ever suffered by the U.S. communications security establishment." (A-234) (emphasis added). According to the Director of Naval Intelligence, the information Walker had provided the Soviet Union "would have been 'devastating' to the United States in time of war" and had caused "unprecedented damage[.]" (A-243, 246) (emphasis added).
It is not necessary to determine the interpersonal or other factors that caused Hibey to perform so miserably. The undisputed facts-such as the incomprehensible failure to file a Notice of Appeal from a life sentence-speak for themselves.
Pollard suffered enormous prejudice as a result of Hibey's deficient performance. He was deprived of the benefits of his Plea Agreement, sentenced to life in prison without evidentiary hearing on the basis of rebuttable allegations of harm, and then deprived of a direct appeal from the sentence. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (if counsel deprives defendant of an appeal he would have taken, prejudice is presumed).
In 1990, with different counsel, Hamilton Fox III, Pollard filed a § 2255 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (A-157) Fox based the 1990 Motion primarily on the argument that the Government had violated the Plea Agreement in three ways: (1) by indirectly asking the Court to impose a life sentence after it had agreed not to do so; (2) by allocuting well beyond the "facts and circumstances of the offenses" after it had agreed in the Plea Agreement to so limit its sentencing allocution; and (3) by denigrating Pollard's extensive cooperation, acknowledging the extent and value of the cooperation but improperly asking the judge to disregard it in imposing sentence.
by counsel . . .
After the District Court (Robinson, J.) denied the 1990 Motion, United States v. Pollard, 747 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1990), this Court-in a 2-1 decision-affirmed. United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Crediting the Government's praise of Hibey (which Fox had ratified), the majority could not reconcile Fox's position that the Government had acted in violation of Pollard's rights, with Hibey's failure to object. See Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1025, 1028, 1030.
In a powerful dissent, Judge Williams found that the Government had breached the Plea Agreement, and that the breach was "a fundamental miscarriage of justice requiring relief." Id. at 1032 (Williams, J., dissenting). Judge Williams would have vacated the life sentence. Id. at 1039.
On September 20, 2000, undersigned counsel filed a Motion for Resentencing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which raised claims of ineffective assistance based upon Hibey's deficient performance. (A-25) The Motion for Resentencing was supported by a sworn Pollard Declaration (A-28), and by documents (A-55-277).
Defendant's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss pointed out that under AEDPA, the statute of limitations only begins to run when the prisoner knows, or through the exercise of due diligence should have known, "the facts" supporting the claim of ineffective assistance. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(4). As set forth in the Pollard Declaration, Pollard did not know the facts supporting his claims of ineffective assistance until 2000, when he first met the undersigned counsel. (A-28-29, 33-34, 39-44) That is when AEDPA's statute of limitations began to run. The Motion for Resentencing was timely filed in 2000.
Moreover, as a result of the Government's false praise of Hibey in opposition to the 1990 Motion (A-171), in which Fox had disingenuously joined (A-186), Pollard was left with no reason to suspect that Hibey's performance had been deficient, as he was being misled from both directions.
Finally, the unique circumstances of this case (the Government's falsehood coupled with Fox's whitewash) warranted equitable tolling.
Defendant's Opposition requested an evidentiary hearing at which the Court would ascertain that Pollard had actually learned the facts supporting his claims only in 2000, and at which the Court could determine the reason why he had not learned them earlier, including the effect on Pollard's state of mind of the Government's and Fox's false praise of Hibey.
On August 7, 2001, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, Judge Johnson issued a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment dismissing the Motion for Resentencing. (A-614) United States v. Pollard, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001).
Judge Johnson ruled sua sponte that Defendant had not established "cause" under McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), for not raising ineffective assistance in the 1990 Motion. Judge Johnson ruled that Defendant had not proven that the reason for Fox's failure to raise ineffective assistance was his unwillingness to criticize Hibey. Pollard, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 6-7. Without an affidavit from Fox or any other evidence to support her conclusion, Judge Johnson somehow decided that Fox had engaged in a "strategy" not to raise ineffective assistance in the 1990 Motion. Id. at 5.
Judge Johnson ruled that in any event the passage of time in and of itself establishes that Pollard "would have" learned the facts supporting his claims much earlier had he exercised due diligence. Id. at 12. Judge Johnson gave no weight to the Government's and Fox's false praise of Hibey, and its effect on Pollard. Id. at 11.
Judge Johnson also held that "the facts" supporting a claim of ineffective assistance do not include the prevailing norms of the legal profession from which counsel deviated, so that Pollard's lack of awareness that Hibey had failed to perform tasks mandated by professional norms was irrelevant to his ability to assert a timely claim of ineffective assistance. Id. at 10.
Finally, Judge Johnson held that AEDPA's statute of limitations is never subject to equitable tolling, but that if it is, Pollard is not entitled to equitable tolling. Id. at 12-13.
Judge Johnson never reached the merits of Pollard's constitutional claims.
On November 12, 2003, Judge Hogan denied the Motion for a COA. (A-844) United States v. Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.D.C. 2003).
On December 16, 2003, this Court issued an Order setting forth a briefing schedule for a Motion for Issuance of a Certificate of Appealability.
On January 14, 2004, Appellant filed such a Motion.
By Order dated June 7, 2004, this Court referred the Motion to a merits panel. (A-883) The Motion is now before this Court.
The Government engaged in false, misleading praise of Hibey's deficient performance, and Fox joined in the praise. The Government cannot deprive Pollard of his habeas claim on the ground that he should have distrusted the Government and should have investigated whether the Government and Fox had lied to the Court about Hibey's performance.
Four documents were redacted: a Declaration of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (A-450); a memorandum personally prepared by Pollard (A-471); a memorandum prepared by Hibey (A-535); and the Government's reply (A-584). In addition, the minutes of a sidebar conference held during sentencing were placed under seal. (A-612) The redactions total approximately 40 pages.
On May 17, 2000, Pollard retained the undersigned (Eliot Lauer and Jacques Semmelman) as pro bono counsel.
For example, in November 2000, around the time Pollard was making a well-publicized clemency application (A-403), Joseph diGenova, Pollard's former prosecutor and an outspoken foe of clemency (A-399, 403), told Tim Russert of Meet the Press that Pollard had disclosed the identities of "agents in the field." (A-306) When the undersigned counsel challenged diGenova to provide the basis of that allegation (which appears nowhere in the public court docket), diGenova responded that this was his "opinion." (A-306) But serious damage was done, as anyone watching Meet the Press would have understood this grave accusation by Pollard's prosecutor to be a statement of fact, not opinion.
In order to represent Pollard effectively, it is essential for counsel to see what is in the sealed docket materials, so that (consistent with maintaining the confidentiality of the materials) counsel may address and respond to arguments by those who oppose executive relief on the basis of what is set forth in the sealed materials.
The Access Motion was not a discovery motion. Counsel was not asking to see anything that had not already been shown to Pollard and Hibey. Nor was counsel seeking declassification or public dissemination of the Materials. Counsel was only asking to see the Materials in a secure Government facility.
On December 8, 2000, the Government filed its Opposition to the Access Motion, raising what it presented as two distinct grounds. (A-327) One was that counsel had only been granted "Top Secret" security clearance, while the Materials carried a higher designation: "SCI." (A-333) The Government claimed that counsel's "present clearance is insufficient to review the classified declaration of Secretary Weinberger, which contains Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) . . . which must be handled within formal limited-access control systems established by the Director of Central Intelligence." (A-333) (emphasis added).
The Government submitted no affidavit in support of its contentions.
The error they made was the material is classified higher than Top Secret. It is Special Compartmentalized Information. It is code word protected. And they don't have the code word clearance. . . . But the point I'm making is they don't today have the right clearances. The material in question, Secretary Weinberger's declaration, is code word protected.
The government opposes the motion of defense counsel to view the classified materials. It argues that the disclosure of the classified materials would pose a risk to national security. Moreover, the government claims that defense counsel has not established a "need to know" the classified materials, and thus, the motion should be denied.
The government argues that the disclosure of the classified materials to Mr. Lauer poses a risk to national security. . . . The Court has viewed the classified materials and finds that the exceptionally grave concern over national security is warranted.
On January 19, 2001, counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (A-444) The Government did not respond.
In the event you determine that these documents, or portions thereof, are indeed classified at a level that is higher than Top Secret, we request that you take appropriate steps to grant us whatever clearance is required to allow us access to these documents. Of course, we will cooperate fully and provide any additional information that may be required.
, there are other criteria which must be met, including an SCI indoctrination briefing and a "need to know" determination from the Court or the government. . . . Absent a "need to know" ruling from the Court or the government, the Department of Justice will not be able to upgrade your clearance level or provide you access to this material.
The Macisso Letter demonstrated that the issue of counsel's clearance had not properly been before Judge Johnson, because the Government had already determined that issue in counsel's favor. In truth, there had been only one issue for Judge Johnson to decide-whether counsel had a "need-to-know."
On August 16, 2001, counsel filed a Motion for Modification of the Court's January 12, 2001 Memorandum Order Based Upon the Government's August 3, 2001 Letter. (A-636) Because the Macisso Letter established that the Government had misinformed Judge Johnson regarding clearance, counsel for Pollard asked that the January 12, 2001 Order be modified.
On October 17, 2001, this Court ordered the appeal held in abeyance pending disposition of all motions pending in the District Court.
With regard to the number of persons having access to the documents since Mr. Pollard's sentencing, we can only provide the number of visits recorded in the log of the Security and Emergency Planning Staff.
There were 25 instances of access recorded between November 19, 1993 and January 12, 2001.
In some instances, a single individual accessed the documents on more than one occasion.
This admission repudiated the other premise of the Government's Opposition to the Access Motion: that there was no "need-to-know" because the Materials had become irrelevant. (A-331-334, 427-428) Since the Government insists it has only allowed access to the Materials to those with a "need-to-know" (A-655), the Bryant Letter effectively conceded that on 25 occasions since 1993 the DOJ had unilaterally determined that someone had a "need-to-know."
The Bryant Letter did not disclose the circumstances under which the DOJ had allowed the 25 instances of access.3 However, since the Materials comprise pre-sentencing memoranda and sentencing minutes, and do not comprise defense or intelligence files, it stands to reason that these instances of Government access were all in connection with initiatives related to Pollard (as opposed to unrelated inspections for defense or intelligence purposes).
The Bryant Letter admits that the very next day-November 19, 1993-the DOJ allowed Government personnel access to the Materials. Given the hostility of the DOJ to commutation (A-769), it is apparent that the DOJ allowed access to the Materials for the purpose of opposing clemency. That was a "need-to-know," in the view of the DOJ.
By Order dated November 12, 2003, accompanied by a Memorandum Opinion, Judge Hogan denied the Motion for Modification. (A-865) United States v. Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2003).
Appellant now appeals from the January 12, 2001 Order, the August 7, 2001 Order, and the November 12, 2003 Order.
Counsel has a "need-to-know" the contents of their client's court docket so that they can make an effective clemency application.
The Court below erred in denying security-cleared counsel access to the Materials. The Government misled Judge Johnson into believing (a) that counsel was not eligible to see SCI documents, and (b) that no one in the Government was accessing the Materials in connection with the clemency process. The Macisso Letter establishes that security clearance is not at issue. The Bryant Letter establishes that Government personnel have accessed the Materials on two dozen occasions since 1993, by all indications for the purpose of opposing clemency.
With respect to the Motion for Resentencing, a COA must issue if "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
With respect to the denials of the Access Motion, the Motion for Reconsideration, and the Motion for Modification (each appealable as of right), and with respect to the Motion for Resentencing (for any issue certified by this Court as appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)), findings of facts are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1023.
In denying the Motion for Modification, Judge Hogan applied an incorrect legal standard, disregarding the definition of "need-to-know" in the controlling Executive Order, and improperly predicting that President Bush will not grant clemency, so that allowing access would be futile.
This Court should reverse the Orders denying access.
Under the Protective Order (A-72), accessing classified materials involves three steps: (i) undergoing a background investigation and receiving an appropriate security clearance from the Government; (ii) executing a non-disclosure agreement; and (iii) obtaining Court approval, which, under governing regulations, requires showing a "need-to-know." 28 C.F.R. 17.41(a)(2).
Thus, the only impediment to counsel's seeing the Materials is "need-to-know."
(4) This definition of "need-to-know" is broader than the definitions used in other regulatory areas. For example, as part of its "need-to-know" definition, the Department of Energy requires that access be "necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or access permit duties of employment[.]" 10 C.F.R. 1016.3(p). The Department of the Treasury requires that access be "essential to the accomplishment of official United States Government duties or contractual obligations." 31 C.F.R. 2.22(a).
Nothing in this broad definition limits access solely to Government personnel. See Stillman v. Dep't of Defense, 209 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (D.D.C. 2002) (Government admittedly gave private counsel access to classified materials because counsel was "performing a lawful and authorized function by negotiating" with Government on behalf of client), rev'd on other grounds, 319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Clemency is a lawful and authorized governmental function. See U.S. Const., Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1; Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (clemency "is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.").
By regulation, the clemency process is initiated by the petitioner. See 28 C.F.R. 1.1. To submit an effective clemency petition for Pollard, counsel needs to know what is-and what is not-in their client's Court docket. This requires access to the Materials, to rebut insinuations by opponents of clemency as to what the Materials contain, and to defuse the campaign of disinformation.5 In particular, it is essential that counsel have access to the same Materials which the DOJ has accessed as part of its successful opposition to clemency.
(5) Public relations (positive or negative) can have a significant impact on the clemency process. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 2d 270, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing successful clemency strategy which utilized "lobbyists," "media experts," "public relations consultants," foreign "government officials," and "individuals who had access to the President" to appeal for clemency).
Furthermore, the record indicates that in the Materials the Government emphasized projected consequences of Pollard's conduct. (A-539, 602) If those consequences never occurred, that would provide a basis for clemency. If counsel is not permitted to see the projections, counsel cannot determine whether they materialized, impairing counsel's ability to file an effective clemency petition.
The Government should not be permitted to authorize selective access to gain an advantage in the clemency process. According to the Government, persons who oppose clemency have a "need-to-know," but persons who support clemency do not. That cannot be correct.
While the President might not require counsel's participation, the petitioner requires informed counsel who can submit an effective clemency petition under 28 C.F.R. 1.1, and who can speak to the President's advisers and elected officials with full knowledge of their client's Court record.
Judge Johnson ruled that counsel had no "need-to-know" because the President has the authority to read the Materials. (A-442) But the petitioner bears responsibility for submitting an effective clemency petition. See 28 C.F.R. 1.1. There is no reason to expect the President, or the President's chief clemency advisor-the Attorney General, see 28 C.F.R. 1.6-to evaluate the Materials for additional evidence and arguments that could justify clemency.
Furthermore, the clemency process is considered "adversarial" where (as here) the DOJ is aware that a clemency application is being made and thus has the opportunity to oppose it. Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 288-89 (clemency application made ex parte to the President without DOJ's knowledge was not adversarial, but would have been if DOJ had notice).
Pollard's clemency petitions have been "adversarial" in a very real sense, as they have been vigorously contested by the DOJ. (A-398-399, 403, 769) Counsel has a "need-to-know" the contents of the Materials to address the DOJ's fierce opposition to clemency.
The Government's stated concern about risk to national security if counsel were to see the Materials appears to be pretextual. By bestowing Top Secret clearance and by finding counsel SCI-eligible, the Government has manifested its trust in counsel not to divulge anything in the Materials, even inadvertently. See 28 C.F.R. 17.41 (clearance granted only if Government's investigation indicates "strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment"). The Government is therefore not genuinely concerned that counsel will inadvertently divulge what is in the Materials.
The generous access to the Materials permitted by the DOJ (A-754) raises doubts as to the bona fides of the Government's unsworn assertion that even one instance of access in a secure Government facility by security-cleared counsel of unquestioned integrity somehow poses an unacceptable danger to national security due to the risk of inadvertent disclosure. (A-329, 425) There is no evidence that the persons who conducted the two dozen viewings were more reliable than undersigned counsel. There is no basis to believe that one more viewing, by security-cleared counsel-who are, moreover, subject to the Protective Order-will actually elevate the risk to national security. See Stillman, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 229 ("If disclosure to one more person truly carries an unacceptable risk of inadvertent disclosure, government's counsel's access here has no more justification than would plaintiff's counsel's. . . . The government's concerns for the risk of inadvertent disclosure are further undermined by the strict protective order").
Furthermore, unlike defense and intelligence files generated in the ordinary course, the Materials were specifically prepared for submission to the Court. They were drafted with full awareness that they would have to be shown to opposing counsel. The Materials therefore contain information that the Government believed appropriate, even in 1987, to be seen by security-cleared counsel for Pollard. There is no reason to believe the Materials have become more sensitive with the passage of 17 years. See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("that which is of utmost sensitivity one day may fade into nothing more than interesting history within weeks") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
The Government's claim of danger to national security through inadvertent disclosure is a pretext. It is not a basis for denying access.
The Motion for Modification (amplified by the Motion to Enlarge) asked the Court to modify the January 12, 2001 Order, based upon the admissions in the Macisso Letter and the Bryant Letter. (A-636, 749) In denying the Motion for Modification, Judge Hogan ruled that Pollard "has presented no credible evidence that the current President is any more willing to grant him clemency than the previous three Presidents who declined to do so." Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 166. That is not the standard for determining "need-to-know." See Executive Order 12958 at § 4.1(c) ("need-to-know" means requiring access to "assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function").
It was inappropriate for the Court to assess the likelihood that the current President will grant clemency. The issue was whether counsel has a "need-to-know" in order to submit a viable clemency petition (especially in the face of DOJ access to the Materials to oppose clemency), not whether the Court predicts clemency will be granted by the current President. That is not even a justiciable issue.
The Court further applied an incorrect standard when it ruled that "in light of the current security threats faced by our nation since September 11, 2001, the Court finds it even less likely than before that Mr. Pollard's attorneys will require access to classified documents in support of a speculative possibility of executive clemency." 290 F. Supp. 2d at 166. By invoking "September 11," the Court erroneously revived the security issue (after the Macisso Letter had eliminated that issue from the case), and melded it inappropriately with the "need-to-know" issue. See Stillman, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (Executive Order 12958 "does not allow for considerations of risk to security to impact the need-to-know determination."). The reference to "September 11" obscures the issue, which is "need-to-know," not security. It is impossible to see how "September 11" is even relevant, let alone how it reduces counsel's "need-to-know" the content of Materials filed in 1987.
Finally, the Court cited United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) for the proposition that "Classified information is not discoverable on a mere showing of theoretical relevance in the face of the government's classified information privilege[.]" 290 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (emphasis added).
Counsel made an ample showing of "need-to-know." There was no justification for refusing security-cleared counsel (A-329) access to their own client's Court docket. Denying Pollard's counsel the ability to see the Materials, in a secure Government facility, imposes an unjustifiable barrier to presenting an effective clemency petition on behalf of a client serving a life sentence.
This Court should reverse the January 12, 2001 Order, the August 7, 2001 Order, and the November 12, 2003 Order.
A fundamental issue in this case is whether the Government, having praised Hibey's performance (A-171), may take the position that Pollard should have known better than to believe the Government, and should have investigated the truth of the Government's representation, on pain of losing habeas rights.
The Government is not entitled to deprive a prisoner of habeas rights by making misleading statements, and then arguing that the statute of limitations has expired. It is unconscionable that the Government's position is that Pollard's claims are barred forever and that Pollard must spend the rest of his life in prison without judicial recourse (even if he can prove his constitutional claims) because he should have disbelieved the Government.
Most recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the Government must comport to the highest standards of integrity, and held that a prisoner may not be deprived of habeas rights on the ground that he should have been more skeptical of the Government and should have proceeded with greater diligence to question the Government's assertions. See Banks v. Dretke, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 1256 (2004).
Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, Judge Johnson summarily rejected the argument that the statute of limitations does not bar Pollard's claims because the Government actively misled Pollard regarding Hibey's performance and because Fox whitewashed that performance. Pollard, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 11. In addition, Judge Johnson somehow found that Pollard actually knew "the facts" supporting each of his claims of ineffective assistance long before 2000; that in any event, because of the passage of time he would have known "the facts" had he been more diligent; and that as a matter of law he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Id. at 9-13.
Those rulings cannot be sustained. This Court should reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing to ascertain why Pollard only learned the facts supporting his claims in 2000, including the effect of the Government's false praise of Hibey, and Fox's whitewash.
(7) While Appellant submits that this was a legal ruling to be reviewed de novo, in the event this Court deems this a factual finding, it was clearly erroneous.
The date on which AEDPA's statute of limitations begins to run is a "fact-specific issue." Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court must determine, in hypothetical terms, "when a duly-diligent person in [Pollard's] circumstances would have discovered" the facts supporting his claims. Id. In making that determination, the Court must consider all pertinent facts, including conditions of confinement.8 Id.
AEDPA's "due diligence" requirement "does not require the maximum feasible diligence, only 'due,' or reasonable, diligence." Id. at 190 n.4. That it could have been "possible" for a defendant to discover the facts at an earlier date does not mean AEDPA's statute of limitations began to run on that date. Id.
The unusual circumstances of this case-in which the Government's misrepresentation about Hibey's performance, and Fox's whitewash, affirmatively misled Pollard away from a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance-warrant an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Pollard's diligence.
The Government purposely misled everyone about Hibey's performance in order to persuade the Court that it had not breached the Plea Agreement, arguing that Hibey's silence was proof that the Government had done nothing wrong. (A-173-174) The Government's deception, abetted by Fox, succeeded in persuading not only Judge Robinson (who offered that Hibey "was quite competent," Pollard, 747 F. Supp. at 807), but also this Court's majority, which found it "telling that Pollard's counsel, who reviewed and responded to Secretary Weinberger's submissions in detail and heard the government's argument, never claimed an implicit breach of the agreement not to seek a life sentence." Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1025. Pollard-or a hypothetical prisoner in Pollard's circumstances, Wims, 225 F.3d at 190-was entitled to read these remarks, and the opinions of the District Court and of this Court as a whole, as further endorsement of the Government's (and Fox's) approving characterizations of Hibey's performance.
Had the Government acknowledged the truth about Hibey's performance, it is inconceivable that this Court's majority would have reasoned that Hibey's silence was even relevant-much less "telling" and entitled to "a good deal of weight"-in assessing whether the Government had breached the Plea Agreement. Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1025, 1028. It is difficult to believe that, had the Government been truthful, it still would have garnered a 2-1 majority in this Court. More likely, Judge Williams would have prevailed, and the life sentence would have been vacated. See id. at 1032-39 (Williams, J., dissenting).
The Government now seeks to bar Pollard's claims forever because he did not become aware of the Government's deception earlier. The Government may not argue that Pollard should have been more skeptical and should have exercised greater diligence to unmask the Government's deception. See Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1276 (defendant "was entitled to treat the prosecutor's submission [in opposition to habeas] as truthful" and could not be deprived of habeas rights or considered not diligent for having done so); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.23, 284, 286-87 (1999) (defense entitled to take prosecution at its word, and may not be deprived of habeas rights for failing to be skeptical of even a prosecutor's implicit representation).
Pollard was entitled to take the Government at its word. Absent a triggering event that would have placed him on inquiry notice that the Government had lied (and there was no such event until 2000) the passage of time alone provided no reason for Pollard to spontaneously start disbelieving what the Government and Fox had said in praise of Hibey. Nor should the enactment of AEDPA have caused Pollard-or a hypothetical prisoner-to suddenly start doubting the unanimous praise of Hibey made six years earlier. See Mandarino v. Ashcroft, 290 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D. Conn. 2002) (seven years after attorney's deficient performance in open court, and four years after AEDPA's enactment, petitioner was alerted to deficiency by specific triggering event).
Banks v. Dretke, 124 S.Ct. 1256 (2004) underscores the prisoner's right to rely on assurances provided by the Government, and illustrates how diligence is assessed in a situation in which the Government misled the prisoner.
In Banks, the prisoner had filed a state habeas petition, alleging that the state had failed to turn over exculpatory information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The state's answer conclusorily denied the allegation, and the court rejected the claim. Years later, the prisoner filed a federal habeas petition, this time supported by evidence (fortuitously obtained) which showed that the state had withheld exculpatory information. The Fifth Circuit held the prisoner had not been diligent in pursuing the evidence during his state habeas proceeding, and that his lack of diligence rendered the federal claim procedurally barred.
The Supreme Court reversed. Inasmuch as the state, in its pleading in the first habeas proceeding, had denied it had withheld exculpatory information, the Court held that because the state "misleadingly represented that it had complied in full with its Brady disclosure obligations, Banks had cause for failing to investigate[.]" Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1273 (emphasis added). The Court rejected the state's argument that the prisoner should have been more diligent in seeking discovery in the state habeas proceeding: "in state post conviction court, the State asserted that Banks's prosecutorial misconduct claims were meritless and procedurally barred in that tribunal. Having taken that position in 1992, the State can hardly fault Banks now for failing earlier to request assistance the State would certainly have opposed." Id. at 1276 n.16. The Court concluded that the prisoner "was entitled to treat the prosecutor's submissions as truthful" and could not be deprived of the right to assert a habeas claim, or considered not diligent, for having done so. Id. at 1276.
Judge Johnson never held an evidentiary hearing to determine (a) whether (and when) these attorneys had represented Pollard; (b) if so, what role they had served; and (c) whether they had ever spoken to Fox regarding his failure to raise ineffective assistance. Without these facts, it was incorrect to assume Pollard had not been diligent.
There was no evidence that any lawyer knew that it had been entirely Fox's decision, with no input from Pollard, to refrain from raising ineffective assistance. (A-41-42) And there was no basis to conclude that Pollard was not diligent just because it never crossed his mind to ask another lawyer whether Fox and the Government had both lied to the Court when they had praised Hibey's performance. It would be unrealistic to expect a prisoner to think of asking such a question, and unjust to deprive a prisoner of habeas rights for not having done so. See Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1276 (for purposes of evaluating diligence, prisoner was "entitled to treat the prosecutor's submissions as truthful").
In addition, while Pollard has always been extremely diligent in efforts to achieve freedom through every lawful means,9 he was not obligated to act diligently prior to AEDPA's enactment. See Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 712-713 (11th Cir. 2002) (AEDPA's statutory diligence requirement may not be applied retroactively); cf. Drew v. Dep't of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1291 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1237 (2003).
(9) Pollard's diligence is exemplified by his conduct upon learning from another inmate in 2000 that there may have been a deficiency in Hibey's performance. Pollard acted swiftly, and within three months had located and retained counsel. (A-42-44) See Mandarino, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 260 n.5 (prisoner was diligent since he acted swiftly after being alerted to counsel's deficiency that had occurred seven years earlier in open court).
Nevertheless, Judge Johnson inappropriately held Pollard responsible for not having acted before AEDPA's enactment with the diligence mandated by AEDPA. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12. All but one of the attorneys listed by Judge Johnson had ceased involvement with Pollard before AEDPA was enacted. (A-43) Pollard's sole attorney from 1995 forward was Larry Dub, a corporate lawyer practicing mainly in Israel, who represented Pollard in connection with efforts to obtain fair treatment by the Government of Israel. (A-43) As there was no evidentiary hearing, Judge Johnson had no basis to conclude that Pollard was not diligent because he had not asked Dub if Fox and the Government had both lied to the Court.
Judge Johnson's summary ruling that Pollard was not diligent was erroneous. This Court should reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
(10) Despite abundant case law that holds that AEDPA's statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, see, e.g., Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2001); Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 619 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1998), Judge Johnson erroneously held that AEDPA's statute of limitations is never subject to equitable tolling. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 12. This Court should follow the holding of the other Circuits.
The unique circumstances here, in which the Government's misrepresentations (compounded by habeas counsel) led the defendant to believe, plausibly but incorrectly, that he had no grounds for relief based upon counsel's performance, mandate an evidentiary hearing to determine if equitable tolling applies. See Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (under AEDPA, "a court may deny a request for equitable tolling unless the proponent shows that he was actively misled") (emphasis added); Curtis v. Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility, 338 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (under AEDPA, equitable tolling may be warranted "where the state's conduct has somehow lulled the petitioner into inaction.") (emphasis added).
In United States v. Baldayaque, 338 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit held that a habeas attorney's ethical violations-including the failure to file a § 2255 motion as the client had requested, and the failure to explain matters so as to enable the client to make "informed decisions"-were "far enough outside the range of behavior that reasonably could be expected by a client that they may be considered 'extraordinary'" for purposes of equitably tolling AEDPA's statute of limitations. Id. at 152. The Second Circuit remanded to the district court to determine (a) whether the prisoner had acted as diligently as reasonably could have been expected under the circumstances, taking into consideration factors such as his habeas attorney's "assurances that everything had been done that could be done," and (b) whether the habeas attorney's conduct had caused the defendant not to file a timely § 2255 motion. Id. at 153.
As in Baldayaque, Fox committed serious ethical breaches: he shielded Hibey to Pollard's detriment (i) by not telling Pollard that Hibey had acted deficiently; (ii) by unilaterally refraining from asserting an ineffective assistance claim in the 1990 Motion; and (iii) by gratuitously praising Hibey at the cost of decimating the 1990 Motion. (A-41-42, 44, 186) Those ethical breaches gave Pollard the reasonable but incorrect belief that "everything had been done that could be done," id., at 153, and caused Pollard not to assert a claim of ineffective assistance in the 1990 Motion (or afterward). (A-41-42, 44) As in Baldayaque, Fox's breaches of his ethical obligations constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling.
Judge Johnson's summary ruling that Pollard is not entitled to equitable tolling was erroneous. This Court should reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
There is no evidence that Pollard actually knew the facts supporting each of his claims before 2000. There is no affidavit from Fox (or from anyone) claiming to have discussed these facts with Pollard.
Judge Johnson ruled that because Pollard was present at his sentencing he necessarily "knew" what Hibey had failed to do. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 9 n.5. But being present in the courtroom does not always mean the defendant knows what the attorney failed to do. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986) ("[a] layman will ordinarily be unable to recognize counsel's errors and to evaluate counsel's professional performance; consequently a criminal defendant will rarely know that he has not been represented competently until after trial or appeal, usually when he consults another lawyer about his case.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 330 (1969) (defendants "may not even be aware of errors which occurred at trial").
If the defendant is unaware that the attorney should have performed a particular task, the defendant will not know of the attorney's omission, and will lack the factual knowledge needed to assert an ineffective assistance claim. Thus, in cases based upon courtroom omissions, courts have held that AEDPA's statute of limitations does not begin to run until a triggering event-often years later-alerts the defendant that the attorney had previously failed to perform a necessary task. See Mandarino, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 260 (counsel failed to advise defendant at time of plea concerning immigration consequences; since "defense counsel's omission would not have been evident" to defendant at that time, AEDPA's statute of limitations only began to run seven years later when defendant received INS notice); United States v. Smith, 101 F. Supp. 2d 332, 337, 347 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (although present in court, defendant was unaware of counsel's duty to request adjournment of sentencing so that sentence could be imposed concurrently with state sentence; AEDPA's statute of limitations began to run only when he was told four years later that sentences were not concurrent); Lewis v. United States, 985 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. W.Va. 1997) (where attorney had acted deficiently by having defendant plead guilty to charge that Government could not prove, AEDPA's statute of limitations only began to run more than a year later when defendant was alerted to attorney's deficiency by court's dismissal of case against coconspirator).
Judge Johnson's determination, without evidentiary hearing, that Pollard actually knew "the facts" supporting each of his claims years before 2000 is not supported by evidence and is clearly erroneous. This Court should reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine, on a claim-by-claim basis, when Pollard actually knew the facts supporting each claim.
In addition to the underlying facts-acts and omissions-which support a claim for ineffective assistance, there is another type of fact, equally essential to the assertion of an ineffective assistance claim: a prisoner must allege that the attorney's conduct was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
Absent the existence of specific relevant norms and an unreasonable deviation therefrom, there is no factual basis for a claim of ineffective assistance. See United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (in the ineffective assistance context, "[t]he proper measure of an attorney's performance is 'reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.' 'Prevailing norms of practice,' such as those reflected in the ABA Standards, may inform our determination of what is reasonable.") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)) (citations omitted).
The prevailing norms of the legal profession-like those of other professions-are facts. See, e.g., Williams v. Callahan, 938 F. Supp. 46, 50 (D.D.C. 1996). Nevertheless, Judge Johnson ruled that the norms of the legal profession are not facts. Pollard, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 10. That was error.
The significance of that error is best demonstrated by way of example. Prior to 2000, Pollard was wholly unaware that Hibey had never demanded an evidentiary hearing on the allegations in the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration. (A-33-34, 43) In addition to ignorance of that fact, Pollard did not know that under prevailing professional norms, Hibey should have requested an evidentiary hearing. See ABA Standards § 18-6.4. Pollard was not aware of that fact until undersigned counsel informed him of it in 2000. (A-43) Only then did Pollard have a factual basis for asserting a claim of ineffective assistance based upon Hibey's failure to demand an evidentiary hearing.
A lack of awareness of prevailing professional norms is not the same as a lack of awareness of the legal consequences of known facts, as Judge Johnson erroneously held. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 10-11. Using the same example, to assert a claim of ineffective assistance based upon the failure to demand an evidentiary hearing, the defendant must know the fact that counsel had a duty under prevailing professional norms to request an evidentiary hearing. A legal consequence of failing to demand an evidentiary hearing (which the defendant need not know to assert a claim) is that the sentencing judge will impose sentence without the Government's allegation having been tested through cross-examination. The "duty" and the "legal consequences" of breaching that duty are entirely distinct.
Judge Johnson's ruling that the norms of the legal profession are not among the facts supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was erroneous. This Court should reverse.
Under AEDPA, a second habeas motion ordinarily requires leave of this Court to be filed in the District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, while the Motion for Resentencing was the second § 2255 motion filed on Pollard's behalf (the first being Fox's 1990 Motion), it was properly filed in the District Court without leave.
Judge Johnson summarily ruled sua sponte that Pollard had not shown "cause" under McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) for Fox's failure to raise ineffective assistance in the 1990 Motion. Pollard, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 5-6. That ruling was erroneous, and should be reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine why Fox did not raise ineffective assistance in the 1990 Motion.
Unlike attorney error, which is imputed to the client and which does not generally constitute "cause," see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991), a conflict of interest is a factor "external to the defense" constituting "cause" for failure to assert a claim. See Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1242 (8th Cir.) (in habeas context, "conflicts of interest are examples of factors external to the defense" which constitute "cause" for failure to assert claim), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1029 (1996); Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1478-79 (11th Cir. 1991) (counsel's concern for "social ostracism" held to be "external to the defense" and constituted "cause" for failure to raise issue), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992); Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We have never considered whether a conflict of interest . . . should constitute cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioner's right to pursue his habeas claim. We think that it must.").
The rationale is that acts of a conflicted (or otherwise unethical) habeas attorney are not imputed to the client, since the attorney is not acting in the interests of the client. See United States v. Baldayaque, 338 F.3d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., concurring).
Without evidentiary hearing, Judge Johnson rejected the contention that Fox had been conflicted, and without any evidence to support her finding, Judge Johnson somehow determined that Fox had engaged in a "strategy" not to raise ineffective assistance. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 5. Judge Johnson stated she "will not second guess a strategy of defense counsel without proof that the choices were not reasonable." Id. (emphasis added).
Fox's 1990 Motion, based upon the Government's implicit breaches of the Plea Agreement, could not stand if Hibey, who had failed to object, was acting effectively. See Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1025, 1028, 1030. (A-699) As a result, Fox's failure to assert a claim of ineffective assistance cannot be considered a strategic choice, but must have been motivated by some other concern. The circumstantial evidence strongly suggests an undisclosed conflict that prevented Fox from criticizing Hibey. (A-690-698) See McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 706-07 (6th Cir. 2004) ("the reasonableness of counsel's choice can be relevant as a factor in proving the choice was caused by [counsel's] conflict").
The Government has never even suggested, let alone established, an alternative explanation for Fox's conduct.
Despite these unrebutted (and otherwise unexplained) facts, Judge Johnson erroneously ruled that the "only" evidentiary support for the claim that Fox was steadfastly unwilling to criticize Hibey consisted of articles that describe the D.C. white collar defense bar as a "close-knit" group "reluctant to openly criticize one another." 161 F. Supp. 2d at 6. Judge Johnson ruled that these articles alone did not prove that Fox was acting under a conflict of interest. But Pollard's claim did not rest upon these articles. The articles corroborated the circumstantial evidence, which Judge Johnson disregarded.
In addition, Judge Johnson's statement that there is no proof that "the choices were not reasonable," id., at 5, is incorrect. It is an uncontroverted fact that Fox never even mentioned Hibey's deficiencies to Pollard. (A-41-42) An attorney's decision to withhold crucial information from a client can never be deemed "reasonable" or "strategic," let alone "reasonable" or "strategic" as a matter of law. See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1996) (counsel's failure to discuss option with client is not "strategic"), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997).
Fox's conflict-evidenced circumstantially by his otherwise inexplicable behavior-was an "objective factor external to the defense" which constituted "cause" for the failure to raise ineffective assistance in the 1990 Motion. See Joubert, 75 F.3d at 1242; Hollis, 941 F.2d at 1478-79; Manning, 224 F.3d at 1134.
Judge Johnson's summary determination that Pollard had failed to establish "cause" for not raising ineffective assistance was erroneous. Judge Johnson should have ordered an evidentiary hearing at which Fox would have to explain why he did not assert a claim of ineffective assistance, why he never told Pollard that Hibey's performance had been deficient, and why he offered gratuitous praise of Hibey which he knew would devastate the 1990 Motion. (A 41-42, 186, 694-695).
(11) Judge Johnson expressly did not reach the issue of whether Pollard had shown "prejudice" under McCleskey. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 4. "Prejudice" is demonstrated in two ways. First, Fox's failure to raise ineffective assistance in the 1990 Motion deprived Pollard of the opportunity to have the claim decided at that time. Second, Fox's failure to raise ineffective assistance rendered the 1990 Motion inherently untenable. (A-699) Had Fox raised ineffective assistance, this Court's majority would likely have recognized Hibey's silence as the result of ineffective representation, not as proof that the Government had done nothing wrong. See Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1025, 1028, 1030.
This Court should issue a Certificate of Appealability from the August 7, 2001 Judgment, and should reverse the August 7, 2001 Judgment and remand to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing.
This Brief complies with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B), because it contains 13,996 words (as counted by Microsoft Word), excluding the parts of the Brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) and Circuit Rule 32(a)(2).

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