Source: https://www.kapruka.com/Sri_Lanka/law/view_legal_document.jsp?type=text&key1=Judgements&key2=SLR&key3=SLR-1978-79-80%20Vol.1-P231&key4=Constitution%20Judgements
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:23:11+00:00

Document:
WALKER SONS & CO. (U.K.) LTD.
SHARVANANDA, J. AND WANASUNDERA, J.
170 of the 1978 Constitution - Administration of Justice Law No. 44 of 1973, Sections 12, 414(3) and 14(5).
Jurisprudence - Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law.
settlement, the power to revoke the reference and re-refer the same to another Arbitrator?
power in Nadarajah v. Krishnadasa - 78 N.L.R. 255(1) and in S.C. Application No. 460/75 S .C. Minutes of 7.7.76.
continued in force or only the bare Industrial Disputes Act continued in force.
decision in the form of 2 questions.
the application of the principle of Stare Decisis?
Courts of subordinate jurisdiction among which is the Court of Appeal.
(2) Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner  2 All ER 536 at 557.
(3) Bandahamy v. Senanayake 62 NLR 313, 322, 337-8.
(15) Attorney-General for Ontario v. the Attorney-General for the Dominion  AC 348.
REFERENCE to the Supreme Court under Article 125 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.
H. W. Jayewardene Q.C. with H. L de Silva, L Perera and R. Perera for the Petitioner.
Dr. Colvin R. de Silva with T. B. Dillimunu and M. B. de Silva for the 3rd Respondent.
made ,under the Industrial Disputes Act (Chapter 131), by W. P. Gunatilake the 1st Respondent, quashed.
Justice Law No. 44 of 1973. This application was allowed.
Disputes Act referring an industrial dispute for settlement by arbitration, has power to revoke the said order of reference.
invalid in the law as being in excess ofthe powers of the Minister.
Walgampaya J. and Sirimane J. agreeing, expressed this view. The second was an unreported judgment delivered on 7.7.76(S.C.
Application No. 460/75) in which I with Wanasundera J. and Collin Thome J. agreeing took the same view.
quash the order of the 1st Respondent.
ceased to exist. When we say this was the law it means it had a "binding force" or a "coercive force" for the future.
cognizance of, hear and determine or to continue and complete same ......."
up for hearing before the Court of Appeal.
while Article 141 gives it the power to.issue writs of Habeas Corpus.
Appeal even in writ matters.
exercised by at least three judges.
three judges in such manner as may be prescribed by rules of Court.
Section 14(5) states that the judgment of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive.
direct thatany case pending before the Supreme Court be heard by a bench of five or more judges.
Two features of the Supreme Court under the Administration of Justice Law must now be noted.
Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka which came into operation in 1978.
(a) The Supreme Court of the Republic of Sri Lanka.
(b) The Court of Appeal of the Republic of Sri Lanka.
Parliament may from time to time ordain and establish.
(g) Jurisdiction in respect of such other matters which Parliament may by law vest or ordain.
and that the Court of Appeal is subordinate to it.
authority under the judicial structure established by that Law.
purpose of the application of the principle of stare decisis. "
position of being the Court of last resort.
null and void and of no effect in Law.
laws" within the meaning of Article 168(1) ?"
Before we consider the meaning and effect of Article 168(1) of the present Constitution we must consider the argument ofMr.
law in force. A change of Constitution did not affect its binding force. Itsbindingforceorcoerciveforcecontinued.
present Court of last resort possessed with final authority to take a different view. The legislature too could do thesame.
Court of Appeal as a Court of subordinate jurisdiction to do what only the present Supreme Court or Parliament can do.
of last resort has binding force as a rule for the future.
subordinate jurisdiction within the particular system.
(1) Any relevant judgment of any Court is a strong argument entitled to careful consideration.
immemorial custom.. Rules such as these establish the sources of law". Salmond page 136 (9th Ed.).
acceptance of Kelsen's views. I think the reliance on Kelsen was appropriate especially as we have a written Constitution.
thus a coherent system of progressive delegation and by this process the law is rendered perpetually self-creative.
that is when the decision of the case is giving direction to the decision of similar cases.
judicial decision represents is generalised".
Kelsen refers to the ratio decidendi of a case in this way at page 250.
under which the precedential decision can give direction to the decision of 'similar' cases."
such a decision is only a consistent enlargement of the Court's law creating function."
entirely completed, the Court's functionis not only juris "dictio" the pronouncement oflawinthedeclaratorysense".
that they are pronouncements of the highest Courts.
declaration of the highest Court.
could hardly be set against it."
in them (Judges) and openly and lawfully exercised."
He then continues, "The rule of precedent or stare decisis has beenfullydiscussedbyBasnayakeC.J.inBandahamyv.
refer to some of the statements of Basnayake C.J. to establish this point.
principles of law which the Court lays down in deciding that dispute. The actual decision of the dispute bindstheparties.
Appeal and of ultimate jurisdiction regard themselves as bound by the principles enunciatedbythemintheirdecisions".
Roman Dutch system did not have an opportunity of asserting itself. Pages 337-83.
b) A judge sitting alone regards himself as bound by the decision of two or more judges.
d) Two judges sitting together regard themselves as bound by a decision of three or more judges.
bench numerically inferior regards itself as bounded by the unanimous decision of a bench numerically superior.
2) This cursus curiae is based on the acceptance of the principle of the binding force of precedents.
of a special bench constituted by the C.J. under a statutory provision viz. Section 51 of the Courts Ordinance.
force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.
new Constitution replaced the 1972 Constitution.
Theory of Law and State.
its structure'". He also referred us to Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke (4).
representing the reasons for the validity of all norms that belong to this order".
invalidated in the way which the legal order itself determines. This is the principle of legitimacy".
which the former had not itself anticipated."
believe it is on this that he based his three propositions referred to earlier.
2) To repeal the Constitution as a whole without enacting a new Constitution to replace it".
always be a Constitution or basic norm. There was no other restriction on a new Constitution replacing the old.
existence-that is the validity of the entire legal order directly based on the Constitution is in question."
1) The repeal of the Constitution terminated the legal order it embodied.
2) The new Constitution which takes the previous Constitution's place begins or starts a new legal order.
Constitution is intact or changed according to its own provision."
time of replacement continues in force without a break but derives its validity from the new Constitution.
was established by the Charter of 1833.
Administration of Justice Law and a new System of Courts was established by this law.
matters of law. The Supreme Court is at the very peak of the judicial structure and is the Court of last resort.
two cases, one decided by the Privy Council and the other by the Supreme CourtundertheAdministrationofJusticeLaw.
body of Sri Lanka decided to end it.
have been left stranded by time on the shores of the statute book" page 438.
corpus of law in Ceylon."
legitimacy applied. The existing corpus of law continued without a break.
"it seems clear that the authority of a decision rests on the status of the Court andnot on a counting of heads".
system. It is always open to the legislature to alter the rule as declared.
without a break, from the viewpoint of judicial power.
judicial power of the state was exercised by the Judicature. Liyanage v. Queen (9).
cases under reference are binding on all Courts of subordinate jurisdiction among which is the Court of Appeal.
force of law immediately prior to the new Constitution coming into force.
to interpret a provision of a Constitution.
Before I refer to Dr. de Silva's argument a few preliminary points must be made.
commencement of the Constitution which under the Constitution continue in force".
in substance between the two terminology.
whole argument was built on this single slender foundation.
Order-in-Council". Surely such an argument is fallacious.
Constitutions in the Commonwealth and meant to meet similar situations.
of Justice Law No. 44 of 1973 belong to the category of "unwritten laws" within the meaning of Article 168 (1)".
the words "unwritten laws" become meaningless. It would mean unwritten laws which are written.
difficult to reconcile the "perpetual process of change" in the common law with a rigid stare decisis".
Rupert Cross under the subtitle mentioned discusses the very problem to which Basnayake C.J. makes reference in BandahamyV.
"binding effect on the decisions of the Supreme Court".
unsettled is that it has not been followed with a high degree of uniformity".
decisis has been formally repudiated by an Appellate Court once that Court has fully accepted the doctrine".
Rupert Cross then comments on the view that legislation is the only means by which the effect of LondonStreetTramwaysv.
basic rule or ultimate principle of the English system but a practice controlled by that rule".
of the rules of precedent that means "wait and see what Parliament and the judges do".
on the House of Lords was based on practice.
decisions. No doubt they will only change an earlier decision in rare cases when they find compelling reasons fordoingso.
whether decisions of the highest Courts are binding on Court which are not the highest remains unaffected.
before the new Constitution came into operation.
wrong question. It is not the question referred to us for our determination under Article 125 of the present Constitution.
decisions of the Privy Council and Article 141 of the Indian Constitution which gives binding force to the decisions ofthe"
established by statute while in Sri Lanka we do not have corresponding statutory provisions.
whether its acceptance is. based on statute or on practice.
a theoretical doubt about the binding force of precedent".
such a problem in Sri Lanka. Our acceptance of the theory of precedent is based on the consistent practice of our Courts.
jurisdiction in Sri Lanka to accept the binding effect of the ratio decidendi of cases decided by the Court oflastresort.
in the structure of the Courts did not affect this practice.
stare decisis was part of our law and reference was made to Bandahamy v. Senanayake.
the Supreme Court - The highest Court - seek to make rules under Section 15 of the Administration of Justice Law.
Precedent which had prevailed in this country now for well over a century.
subordinate jurisdiction immediately before the present Constitution came into operation.
the decisions of that Court."
has been so recognised for more than a century.
1973 belongs to the category of "Unwritten laws" within the meaning of Article 168(1).
of Appeal is a Court of subordinate jurisdiction under the present system of Courts. There can be nodoubtonthispoint.
The ratio decidendi of the two cases is binding on the Court of Appeal.
We direct that this determination be communicated to the Court of Appeal.
Messrs Walker Sons & Co. (U.K.) Ltd., the petitioner, to quash the award made by the 1st Respondent to theapplication,Mr.
award quashed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Court of Appeal has accordingly referred those matters to us for decision.
belong to the category of 'unwritten law' within the meaning of Article 168(1) ?
purpose of the application of the principle of stare decisis ?"
Appeal was the binding effect of the two decisions referred to on the Court of Appeal as stare decisis.
questions before we deal with the less important matters.
effective Constitution is the legitimate government of the state."
reason from the new basic norm.
severing it from its historical moorings - Article 121(2).
Court of Appeal) was cut down to a single appeal to the Supreme Court.
only to future modification which may be permissible under that principle.
support Mr. Jayewardene's arguments, it cannot help him to tide over the initial obstacle referred to above.
new Constitution and a provision which sought to do this is nullified by another provision.
of an alternative construction which would ensure the validity of every part and provision of the Constitution.
written law" and the "existing law" in the form of "existing unwritten law'", together making up the entirecorpusoflaw.
of them at the same time. Its wording gives no indication that it refers to "unwritten law". It deals only with writtenlaw.
that a conflict or repugnancy between different parts of the Constitution was intended by the framersoftheConstitution.
its intentions beyond any doubt.
which it was wedded. If this contention is correct, Article 168 would be of no avail to the Petitioner,astheterm"law"
embodied in this expression stare decisis is now necessary.
decisis has been received and adopted in this country, with modifications, duringthecolonial.period-Bandahamyv.
over the years developed a cursus curiae of our own'", and proceeds to summarise those principles.

References: v. 
 Application No. 460
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 v. 
 v. 

Application No. 460
 v. 
 v. 
 v.