Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/310/344/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 05:07:27+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 310 › United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co.
Common carriers by motor, in interstate commerce, filed tariffs providing rates on goods reshipped in the original packages as less than truckload consignments immediately after their transportation as parts of a truckload or carload consignment, and on less than truckload goods which, on arrival at their immediate destination, are to be immediately reshipped, in the original packages, as parts of a truckload or carload consignment. The Interstate Commerce Commission found the rates lower than other rates on like goods between the same points; that practically they could be used only by forwarders and a few large shippers; that they would operate for the special benefit of forwarders, and would not benefit owners of the goods shipped, and that forwarders would thereby be afforded transportation at rates lower than those charged certain other shippers under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, in violation of § 216(d) of the Federal Motor Carrier Act.
1. That the Commission was justified in cancelling the proposed tariffs. P. 310 U. S. 347.
2. Section 216(d) of the Motor Carrier Act, like provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, insures equality of rates for substantially similar services. P. 310 U. S. 351.
3. Although the evidence was undisputed, it was for the Commission to determine the question of undue preference and discrimination. P. 310 U. S. 352.
4. The Commission was authorized to act in the matter on its own motion, without complaint by shippers. P. 310 U. S. 353.
5. The Commission performs its duties in the interests of shippers generally, of the national transportation system, and of the public. P. 310 U. S. 354.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges, which set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission cancelling tariffs of motor carriers.
Respondents are forty-one interstate common carriers operating motor vehicles subject to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935. [Footnote 1] Our decision turns upon the validity of an order of the Commission cancelling certain proposed tariffs of these carriers upon the ground that they were unlawfully discriminatory in affording lower rates to "forwarders" of freight than to other shippers.
route the shipments. Upon arrival of a truckload or carload of the assembled small shipments at a distribution center, the bulk shipment is broken up, the forwarder separates and takes possession of the original small shipments and arranges, where necessary, their further carriage to their various final destinations in the area served by the particular distribution point. In this final carriage of the small shipment to its ultimate destination, the forwarder again utilizes carriers for hire to move these less than truckload or carload lots. Thus, forwarders may use the service of carriers to assemble shipments of less than truckload or carload lots at their concentration center, to transport the assembled truckload or carloads to a distribution center, and to carry the broken up small shipments beyond their break-bulk distribution center.
tariffs providing lower rates for certain less than truckload shipments solely because they had previously been, or were intended subsequently to be, consolidated in truckloads with other individual shipments.
"the forwarders . . . and possibly a few large shippers . . . will be afforded transportation at rates lower than the rates . . . charged certain other shippers under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, in violation of § 216(d). [Footnote 6]"
So far as pertinent here, the tariffs before us propose rates for transportation of commodities in less than truckload lots. All commodities (with exceptions not here material) are, as a group, given the same special rate. In general, respondents' other tariffs provide rates which vary for different types of commodities. Accordingly, if the suspended rates were in effect, transportation of the same commodity over the same haul might cost a forwarder less than other shippers.
in appraising the same evidence has led to these opposing conclusions.
"'All freight' [except as otherwise provided] . . . which has been transported to . . . [an] origin station . . as a part of a truckload consignment or carload consignment moving under tariffs or schedules lawfully on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and immediately reshipped in the original packages as an L.T.L. [less than truckload] shipment: or"
"'All freight,' . . . which is to be transported to . . . [a named] destination station . . . as an L.T.L. shipment, and immediately reshipped in the original package as part of a truckload consignment or carload consignment moving under tariffs or schedules lawfully on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission."
It is evident that these special tariffs are available only to shippers who intend and are able (a) to arrange immediate further transportation in carloads or truckloads for commodities that have been carried in less than truckload lots, or (b) to move commodities in less than truckload lots, immediately after they have been carried as part of a carload or truckload. While, as has been noted, some few large shippers may possibly avail of the tariffs, there is no question about the finding of the court below that the "principal traffic which will be carried under the suspended rates is what is called by the Commission freight forwarder traffic.'"
"Stripped of protective coloring, these rates are published as proportional rates primarily as a matter of expediency to serve the purpose of certain freight forwarders and to perpetuate in another form so-called divisions of purported joint rates of the freight forwarded."
than the rates which . . . [would] be charged certain other shippers under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, in violation of § 216(d)."
Moved by these considerations, the Commission concluded that the mere fact that forwarders might ordinarily furnish a volume of traffic greater than but identical in kind with that furnished by individual shippers did not justify lower rates for forwarders.
"It is not disputable that, from the beginning, the very purpose for which the Commission was created was to bring into existence a body which, from its peculiar character, would be most fitted to primarily decide whether, from facts, disputed or undisputed, in a given case, preference or discrimination existed. [Footnote 14]"
"its judgment as to the existence of preference for that of the Commission, on the ground that, where there was no dispute as to the facts it had a right to do so, [the court] obviously exerted an authority not conferred upon it by the statute. [Footnote 15]"
A special allowance to a forwarder as an inducement to ship goods by a particular carrier would be an illegal rebate. [Footnote 17] Similarly, and as previously pointed out, forwarders are shippers protected by the Interstate Commerce Act from discrimination by carriers. [Footnote 18] As shippers, forwarders do business subject to the paramount principle that Congress intended our national transportation system to operate without favoritism. Pursuant to its duty to apply that principle upon a national scale, the Commission can prevent unjust rate discrimination by carriers against other shippers and in favor of forwarders. The particular problem here involved is but a segment of the larger complicated national problem of rates with which the Commission must deal. As exemplified by this record, the Commission is "informed by experience" [Footnote 19] of years in its consideration of the relationship of forwarders to our national transportation system.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the bill is ordered dismissed.
See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235, 220 U. S. 243.
Division 5 first reported, 10 M.C.C. 556. On reconsideration, the report was by the Commission, 17 M.C.C. 573.
28 U.S.Code, §§ 45, 45a, 47a, 345.
Two Commissioners, in dissent, thought this was "true only in part. They are lower than some, but by no means all, of the corresponding local rates."
"It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, gateway, locality, or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, port, gateway, locality, or description of traffic to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever: Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not be construed to apply to discriminations, prejudice or disadvantage to the traffic of any other carrier of whatever description."
The District Court found that some of the local "rates are higher and some lower than the suspended rate," but the average revenue derived by the respondents from local rates "per hundred pounds . . . upon the whole, is less than" that produced by the suspended rates.
See, e.g., Export Shipping Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 14 I.C.C. 437; Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I.C.C. 201; Acme Fast Freight, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 8 M.C.C. 211.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235.
8 M.C.C. 211; Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.Supp. 968.
Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 309 U.S. 638.
These arguments for sustaining the tariffs were all forcefully presented in the dissenting opinion of Chairman Eastman, concurred in by Commissioner Mahaffie.
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 235 U. S. 314, 235 U. S. 320.
Swayne & Hoyt Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 300 U. S. 304; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., supra, at 220 U. S. 255; Manufacturers' Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 246 U. S. 481; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 162 U. S. 197, represents an apparent exception at an early date before the function of the Commission had become fully outlined against the background of time and the empiric pattern of litigation. (Commission's bill to enforce its holding that the difference between domestic and imported merchandise could not justify different rates between the port of reception and point of delivery, ordered dismissed).
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 444.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Del., L. & W. R. Co, supra, at 220 U. S. 255.
Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235, 283 U. S. 239; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 206 U. S. 441, 206 U. S. 454.
Cf. Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153, 306 U. S. 157.
United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 263 U. S. 515, 263 U. S. 525-526.

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