Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/335/520/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:46:07+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 335 › Coray v. Southern Pacific Co.
Despite the proof that the train had stopped because of the railroad's violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, the state trial judge directed the jury to return a verdict in the railroad's favor. This resulted from the court's holding that the Act didn't apply to Mr. Lucus, that the Act's protection against defective brakes did not extend to employees following and crashing into a train which stopped suddenly because of defective brake appliances.
On appeal, the State Supreme Court affirmed. ___ Utah ___, 185 P.2d 963, 969. That court agreed with the trial court's interpretation of the Safety Appliance Act, and also held that the evidence failed to show that the defective appliance was the "legal" cause of the crash and of the death of decedent. The obvious importance of the restrictive interpretation given to the two federal Acts prompted us to grant certiorari.
First. We cannot agree with the State Supreme Court's holding that, although the railroad ran its train with defective brakes, it thereby "violated no duty owing" to the decedent. That court said that the object of the Safety Appliance Act "insofar as brakes might be concerned, is not to protect employees from standing, but from moving, trains."
need protection from dangerous results due to maintenance or operation of congressionally prohibited defective appliances. Fairport, P. & E. R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589, 292 U. S. 597. Liability of a railroad under the Safety Appliance Act for injuries inflicted as a result of the Act's violation follows from the unlawful use of prohibited defective equipment, "not from the position the employee may be in, or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he is injured." Brady v. Terminal R. Assn., 303 U. S. 10, 303 U. S. 16; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 243 U. S. 621. In this case, where undisputed evidence established that the train suddenly stopped because of defective air-brake appliances, petitioner was entitled to recover if this defective equipment was the sole or a contributory proximate cause of the decedent employee's death. Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239, 263 U. S. 243; Spokane & I.E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U. S. 497, 241 U. S. 509-510.
upon the reasoning that "[t]he leak in the triple valve caused the train to stop, because, as a safety device, it was designed to do just that."
The language selected by Congress to fix liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct. Consideration of its meaning by the introduction of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful interpretative purpose. The statute declares that railroads shall be responsible for their employees' deaths "resulting in whole or in part" from defective appliances such as were here maintained. 45 U.S.C. § 51. And, to make its purpose crystal clear, Congress has also provided that "no such employee . . . shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case" where a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, such as the one here, "contributed to the . . . death of such employee." 45 U.S.C. § 53. Congress has thus, for its own reasons, imposed extraordinary safety obligations upon railroads, and has commanded that, if a breach of these obligations contributes in part to an employee's death, the railroad must pay damages. These air-brakes were defective; for this reason alone, the train suddenly and unexpectedly stopped; a motor track car following at about the same rate of speed and operated by an employee looking in another direction crashed into the train; all of these circumstances were inseparably related to one another in time and space. The jury could have found that decedent's death resulted from any or all of the foregoing circumstances.
It was error to direct a verdict for the railroad. The judgment of the State Supreme Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.
27 Stat. 531, 32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1, 8, 9; 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 36 Stat. 291, and 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 53, 56, 59.
Petitioner was employed by the railroad as a signal maintainer. The other occupant of the motorcar had just been employed to work in the same capacity. This was the new employee's first trip, and he took the trip to familiarize himself with the signals. Both occupants of the car were seated and looking back in the direction of a block signal. Contributory negligence is not a defense to this action.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 51
 § 53