Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2017/5838crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:02:57+00:00

Document:
Meloni v. Raymark Industries, Inc. et al.
The claimant was represented by Catherine M. Ferrante, Esq., and Christopher Meisenkothen, Esq., Early, Lucarelli, Sweeney & Meisenkothen, L.L.C., 265 Church Street, 11th Floor, P.O. Box 1866, New Haven, CT 06508-1866.
Respondent-Appellant Second Injury Fund was represented by Lawrence G. Widem, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120.
This Petition for Review2 from the April 26, 2013 Finding and Award of Amado J. Vargas, the Commissioner acting for the Eighth District, was heard January 27, 2017 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners Christine E. Engel and Daniel E. Dilzer.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The Second Injury Fund (“fund”) has appealed from an April 26, 2013 Finding and Award issued by Commissioner Amado J. Vargas (“2013 Finding”), who found that the claimant was entitled to benefits due to compensable injuries he received as a result of his work at Connecticut Light & Power Company (now known as Eversource) and a prior employer, Raymark Industries.3 The trial commissioner found that Eversource was responsible for administering the claim as the § 31299b carrier but also found that the fund could have potential exposure since Raymark had been self-insured for some period of the claimant’s employment and had subsequently declared bankruptcy.4 The fund and Eversource both filed timely appeals; however, on July 18, 2016, Eversource and the claimant’s estate entered into a stipulation approved by the trial commissioner for the Fifth District settling all claims against Eversource. The fund has filed a “Motion to Dismiss All Claims and Vacate the Judgment Against the Second Injury Fund” for all claims dated September 15, 2016 and argued this motion before this tribunal on January 27, 2017. Upon review, we conclude that any legal exposure the fund may face is speculative and contingent on further actions pursuant to § 31-355 C.G.S. which may never occur.5 As the present controversy is not ripe, we dismiss this appeal.
The argument presented by the fund is essentially that in light of the 2005 revision of § 31-299b C.G.S. in Public Act 05-199, various elements of the 2013 Finding are legally invalid.6 It specifically argues that Findings, ¶ 26, in the Finding and Award is legally invalid, contending that the trial commissioner misapplied the Supreme Court’s precedent in Franklin v. Superior Casting, 302 Conn., 219 (2011) in finding the fund could be responsible for an apportionment share of an uninsured employer’s share of benefits due to a claimant. It cites our precedent in Tufts v. Cary/New England Building, 5297 CRB7-07-11 (November 5, 2008) for its position.
We decline to address the merits of the fund’s appeal. The claimant argues that the impact of the stipulation renders the fund’s concerns moot. Given that the claimant has settled all his claims against Eversource, the lead carrier under § 31-299b C.G.S. is obligated to pay the claim. We note that there does not appear to be any statutory mechanism by which the claimant could now seek an additional award against the fund. As a result, there is no pending dispute which implicates the fund’s interests. We find our precedent in Quinones v. RW Thompson Company, Inc., 5792 CRB-1-12-10 (January 16, 2014) establishes a clear policy that this tribunal discourages unripe appeals.
In Quinones, the claimant appealed a trial commissioner’s decision to obtain additional evidence prior to deciding whether to grant a Motion to Preclude. We declined to rule on the merits of this dispute, deeming it “a decision on an interlocutory motion upon an interlocutory motion.” Id. We pointed out that our precedent stood for the principle that “this board discourages parties from filing appeals before the commissioner has had a chance to rule on the merits of a case.” Id., quoting Kuba v. Michael’s Landscaping & Lawn Service, 4266 CRB-4-00-7 (August 29, 2001). In the present matter, there is no order directing the fund to pay any money to the claimant and we cannot identify a statutory mechanism subsequent to the stipulation by which such an order could be obtained. The Quinones precedent argues against addressing the fund’s claims at this juncture. The merits of an apportionment claim against the fund have yet to be addressed, and may never be addressed. This appeal would appear to be the very definition of an unripe controversy. Since the threat of “irreparable harm” is generally a prerequisite to consideration of an appeal in the absence of a final judgment, we find the appeal unripe for appellate review.
The fund argues that notwithstanding the fact that the claimant may now be unable to seek an award against it subsequent to the stipulation, paragraph 13 of the stipulation contains an explicit carve-out preserving the rights of the claimant’s dependent widow to potentially seek an award for survivorship benefits under § 31-306 C.G.S. As the fund views the situation, the potential § 31-306 C.G.S. award could apply what they view as the erroneous legal reasoning of the 2013 Finding and the fund could then be subject to liability. The merits of a survivor’s claim have not been addressed by this commission. The proper forum for the fund to present these arguments would be before a trial commissioner considering the merits of a § 31-306 C.G.S. claim at a formal hearing. If, subsequent to a hearing, the fund is subject to fiscal liability pursuant to § 31-355 C.G.S., it may then bring an appeal to this tribunal to address an actual, as opposed to a speculative, controversy.
Having found the present controversy unripe, we hereby dismiss this appeal.
5 Section 31-355 (Rev. to 2007) states: “(a) The commissioner shall give notice to the Treasurer of all hearing of matters that may involve payment from the Second Injury Fund, and may make an award directing the Treasurer to make payment from the fund.

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