Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20101112_0060623.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:37:24+00:00

Document:
HARRISON U. JACK, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
This matter is before the court on the motions of defendants Harrison Ulrich Jack, Lo Cha Thao, Lo Thao, Hue Vang, Chong Yang Thao, Seng Vue, Chue Lo, Nhia Kao Vang, David Vang, Jerry Yang, and Thomas Yang (collectively, "defendants") to dismiss counts from the Second Superseding Indictment. The United States of America (the "government") opposes the motions. The court heard oral argument on the motions on October 15, 2010. Based upon the submissions of the parties and the arguments made by counsel, and for the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On June 14, 2007, eleven defendants, Harrison Ulrich Jack, General Vang Pao, Lo Cha Thao, Lo Thao, Youa True Vang, Hue Vang, Chong Yang Thao, Seng Vue, Chue Lo, Nhia Kao Vang, and David Vang, were charged with counts arising from an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government of Laos. (Second Superseding Indictment [Docket #37], filed June 14, 2007.) All defendants were charged with (1) Conspiracy to Violate the Neutrality Act in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 960; (2) Conspiracy to Kill, Kidnap, Maim and Injure People in a Foreign Country in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956; (3) Conspiracy to Receive and Possess Firearms and Destructive Devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C § 922(o), and 26 U.S.C. § 5861; and (4) Conspiracy to Export Listed Defense Items Without a State Department License in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 22 U.S.C § 2778. Nine of the eleven defendants, Harrison Ulrich Jack, General Vang Pao, Lo Cha Thao, Lo Thao, Youa True Vang, Hue Vang, Chong Yang Thao, Nhia Kao Vang, and David Vang, were charged with a Conspiracy to Receive and Possess Missile Systems Designed to Destroy Aircraft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332g.
On September 17, 2009, the grand jury returned the First Superseding Indictment. (First Superseding Indictment [Docket #460], filed Sept. 17, 2009.) The First Superseding Indictment combined Counts One, Four and Five from the original Indictment into Count One. It also added a new charge as Count Four: Conspiracy to Receive and Transport Explosives in Interstate and Foreign Commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 844 (d), (n), and as Count Five: Violation of the Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960. The First Superseding Indictment also charged two new defendants, Jerry Yang and Thomas Yang.
The First Superseding Indictment did not charge General Vang Pao. Rather, on September 18, 2009, the government moved to dismiss the counts in the original Indictment against defendant General Vang Pao, asserting that "based on the totality of the evidence in the case and the circumstances regarding defendant Vang Pao, . . . the continued prosecution of defendant Vang Pao is no longer warranted." (Gov't Mot. to Dismiss [Docket #462], filed Sept. 18, 2009.) The court granted the motion on the same day.
On June 24, 2010 the Second Superseding Indictment charged the same twelve defendants from the First Superseding Indictment with the same five counts. However, just prior to the October 15, 2010 hearing on defendants' pretrial motions, defendant Colonel Youa True Vang agreed to a brief diversion program offered by the government, which will likely result in the dismissal of all charges against him.
The Second Superseding Indictment charges defendants Harrison Ulrich Jack, Lo Cha Thao, Lo Thao, Youa True Vang,*fn2 Hue Vang, Chong Yang Thao, Seng Vue, Chue Lo, Nhia Kao Vang David Vang, Jerry Yang, and Thomas Yang with (1) Count One: Conspiracy to Violate 18 U.S.C. § 960, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), 26 U.S.C. § 5861, and 22 U.S.C. § 2778; (2) Count Two: Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956; (3) Count Four: Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d),(n); and (4) Count Five: Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 960. The Second Superseding Indictment also charges defendants Harrison Ulrich Jack, Lo Cha Thao, Lo Thao, Youa True Vang, Hue Vang, Chong Yang Thao, Chue Lo, Nhia Kao Vang, and Jerry Vang with Count Three: Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332g.
Under the "Overt Acts" section, the Second Superseding Indictment recounts approximately 38 instances of communication by or among the various defendants regarding the alleged conspiracies. (Id. ¶ 24.) Approximately 18 of these communications included or were directed to the undercover agent.
Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Second Superseding Indictment incorporate the preliminary allegations, as well as the Manner and Means and Overt Act allegations set forth in Count One. Count Five, incorporates the preliminary allegations and the Overt Act allegations set forth in Count One.
At the outset, the court notes the extraordinary nature of this case, with respect to both the complexity of the charges against defendants and the proceedings before the court. At every hearing in this matter, there have been serious allegations made, not only by the government against defendants, but also by defense counsel against the government.
Mr. Keker represented General Vang Pao, who was portrayed by the government as the leader of the Hmong people and the leader of the alleged military enterprise. Mr. Keker is no longer co-lead counsel because the government dismissed the counts in the original Indictment against General Vang Pao.
After General Vang Pao was dismissed, Mr. Brosnahan assumed the role of lead counsel. Mr. Brosnahan represented Colonel Youa True Vang, who was also portrayed by the government as a leader of the alleged military enterprise and who was the only senior Hmong military officer among the remaining defendants. However, Colonel Youa True Vang agreed to a diversion program, which will lead to the dismissal of the charges against him. As a result, Mr. Brosnahan no longer serves as lead counsel.
The prosecutors involved in this case have continually changed. The prosecutors who directed the investigation and acted as the initial lead counsel are, for reasons unrelated to this case, no longer representing the government. Subsequently, Assistant United States Attorneys ("AUSA") Robert Tice-Raskin and Jill Thomas appeared as the lead prosecutors. More recently, in addition to the AUSAs, Robert Wallace and Heather M. Schmidt, trial attorneys from the National Security Division of the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., appeared on behalf of the government.
The original Indictment was filed more than three years ago, on June 14, 2007. The First Superseding Indictment, which added two new defendants, was filed more than two years later on September 17, 2009. And finally, after eleven pre-trial motions were filed by defendants, a Second Superseding Indictment was filed less than four months ago on June 24, 2010. Given these series of events and developments, this criminal prosecution can best be described as both uneven and evolving.*fn4 It is against this background that the court undertakes its analysis of the first pretrial motions to be resolved in this matter.
All defendants move to dismiss Counts One, Four, and Five of the Second Superseding Indictment on the grounds that the government has not pled sufficient facts to set forth the elements of the crimes charged or to put each defendant on notice of the specific offense with which he is charged.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requires that a defendant "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." "An indictment must provide the defendant with a description of the charges against him in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense and plead double jeopardy at a later prosecution." United States v. Lane, 765 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962) (holding that the sufficiency of an indictment is measured by "first, whether the indictment contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, secondly, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense whether the record shows with accuracy to what extend he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.") (internal quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has also noted that "[t]wo corollary purposes of an indictment are to ensure that the defendant is being prosecuted on the basis of facts presented to the grand jury and to allow the court to determine the sufficiency of the indictment." Id.
In order to serve these purposes, an indictment must "allege the elements of the offense charged and the facts which inform the defendant of the specific offense with which he is charged." Id. (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1980)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, an indictment must allege each element of the charged offense with sufficient detail (1) to enable the defendant to prepare his defense; (2) to ensure him that he is being prosecuted on the basis of the facts presented to the grand jury; (3) to enable him to plead double jeopardy; and (4) to inform the court of the alleged facts so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.
United States v. Bernhardt, 840 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Jenkins, 785 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1986)).
"In ruling on a pre-trial motion to dismiss an indictment for failure to state an offense, the district court is bound by the four corners of the indictment." United States v. Boren, 278 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2002). The court must accept the allegations in the indictment as true in determining whether a cognizable offense has been charged. Id. "A motion to dismiss the indictment cannot be used as a device for a summary trial of the evidence. . . . The [c]court should not consider evidence not appearing on the face of the indictment." United States v. Jensen, 93 F.3d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Marra, 481 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (6th Cir. 1973)).
Defendants move to dismiss Count Five on the basis that the allegations fail to set forth a violation of the Neutrality Act (the "Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 960. The government asserts that the Second Superseding Indictment sufficiently alleges that a military expedition or enterprise was to be carried on from the United States.
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
"There are four acts declared to be unlawful, and which are prohibited by the statute: To begin an expedition, to set on foot an expedition, to provide the means of an enterprise, and, lastly, to procure those means." United States v. Lumsden, 26 F. Cas. 1013, 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1856) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, in order to set forth a violation of the Act, the Second Superseding Indictment must allege the existence of a military expedition or enterprise that is to be carried on from the United States.
The Supreme Court has held that the ordinary meaning to be accorded the term "military expedition" is "a journey or voyage by a company or body of persons, having the position or character of soldiers, for a specific warlike purpose; also the body and its outfit." Wiborg, 163 U.S. at 650. The term "soldier" is defined as "a person engaged in military service. . . as a member of an organized body of combatants." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2168 (1993). "The word expedition is used to signify a march or voyage with martial or hostile intentions." Lumsden, 26 F. Cas. at 1015.
The term "enterprise" gives a "slightly wider scope to the statute." Id. "[A] military enterprise is a martial undertaking involving the idea of a bold arduous, and hazardous attempt."
Id. Such an enterprise exists "where a number of men, whether few or many, combine and band themselves together, and thereby organize themselves into a body, within the limits of the United States, with a common intent or purpose on their part at the time to proceed in a body to foreign territory . . . ." United States v. Murphy, 84 F. 609, 614 (D. Del. 1898). At bottom, such individuals must demonstrate "concert of action" in order to constitute a military enterprise. Wiborg, 163 U.S. at 652; Murphy, 84 F. at 613.

References: § 956
 § 371
 § 922
 § 5861
 § 371
 § 2778
 § 2332
 § 960
 § 960
 § 922
 § 5861
 § 2778
 § 956
 § 960
 § 2332
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 960
 v. 
 v.