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Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:40:40+00:00

Document:
Argued October 3, 1990. Decided January 8, 1991.
Decision: Instructions as to willfulness under 26 USCS sections 7201 and 7203, that jury should disregard criminal defendant's asserted beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not taxpayer within meaning of Internal Revenue Code, held erroneous.
In a federal prosecution in which the defendant was eventually convicted, under 26 USCS sections 7201 and 7203, on several counts of "willfully" attempting to evade income taxes and "willfully" failing to file federal income tax returns, (1) although the defendant admitted that he had not filed returns during the relevant time period, the defendant (a) testified that he had attended seminars by a group which believed that the federal tax system was unconstitutinal (b) produced a letter from an attorney to the effect, that the Federal Constitution's Sixteenth Amendment did not authorize a tax on wages or salaries, but only on gain or profit, (c) offered the detense that he had sincerely believed, during the relevant time period, that the tax laws were being unconstitutionally enforced, and (d) argued that he had acted without the requisite willfulness; but (2) the Federal District Court gave the jury (a) initial instructions to the effect that an objectively reasonable, good-faith misunderstanding of the law would negate willfulness, but mere disagreement with the law would not, and (b) supplemental instructions to the effect that (i) a person's opinion that the tax laws violated his constitutional rights did not constitute a good-faith misunderstanding of the law, and (ii) an honest but unreasonable belief was not a defense and did not negate willfulness. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in affirming the defendant's convictions, expressed the view that (1) the District Court had not erred in instructing the jury that only an objectively reasonable, good-faith misunderstanding of the law negated the statutory willfulness requirement; and (2) among the beliefs which were not objectively reasonable were the beliefs that (a) wages are not income, or (b) the tax laws are unconstitutional (882 F.2d 1263). On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. In an opinion by WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST, Ch. J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., it was held that (1) in a prosecution, under sections 7201 and 7203, for "willfully" attempting to evade federal income taxes and "willfully" failing to file federal income tax returns, (a) there is no requirement that a defendant's claimed good-faith belief must be objectively reasonable if the claimed belief is to be considered as possibly negating the Federal Government's evidence purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal duty at issue, but (b) the defendant's views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and need not be heard by the jury; and (2) thus, for purposes of determining the willfulness, under 7201 and 7203, of the defendant in the case at hand, (a) it was error, however incredible such claimed misunderstandings of and beliefs about the tax law might be, to instruct the jury not to consider the defendant's asserted beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, but (b) it was not error, regardless of whether the claims of invalidity were frivolous or had substance, to instruct the jury not to consider the defendant's claims that the tax laws are unconstitutional. Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, expressed the view that (1) the Supreme Court's cases had consistently held that a failure to pay a tax in the good-faith belief that the tax is not legally owing is not "willful"; but (2) the court's opinion in the case at hand, in saying that a good-faith, erroneous belief in the unconstitutionality of a tax law is no defense, squarely reversed the long-established statutory construction. BLACKMUN, J., joined by MARSHALL, J., dissenting, expressed the view that the Court of Appeals' judgment ought to be affirmed, for (1) it was incomprehensible how, more than 70 years after the institution of the present federal income tax system, any taxpayer of competent mentality could assert, as a defense to charges of statutory willfulness, that the wage that the taxpayer receives for labor is not income; and (2) the District Court's instruction that an objectively reasonable and good-faith misunderstanding of the law negated willfulness lent further, rather than less, protection to the defendant, because the instruction added an additional hurdle for the prosecution to overcome. SOUTER, J., did not participate.
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Tax protester's failure to submit, or submission of erroneous or incomplete, federal income tax returns as violative of section 7203 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 USCS section 7203), prohibiting willful failure to file return or to supply information. 60 ALR Fed 158. Reliance on advice of attorney, accountant, or tax expert as defense in criminal prosecution for attempt to evade federal income tax under section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 USC  7201). 3 ALR Fed 665. Test of "willfulness" in prosecution for wilful failure to pay tax, file tax return, etc., under section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 USC 7203). 22 ALR3d 1173. Excuse for failure to file return within limitation provisions of Internal Revenue Code. 30 ALR2d 452. Reliance on attorney, accountant, or other expert in preparing income tax returns as defense against fraud penalties. 22 ALR2d 972. What amounts to "reasonable cause" for failure to file, or delay in filing, tax return. 3 ALR2d 617.
Criminal Law section 20; Evidence section 147; Notice section 5 -- ignorance or mistake of law -- presumption 4. As a general rule of the American legal system, ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution; the common-law rule, based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, is that every person is presumed to know the law.
Internal Revenue section 95; Statutes 102, 103 -- criminal case --willfulness 5a, 5b. In federal criminal tax cases, the standard for the statutory willfulness requirement is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty, where (1) in the nation's complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law; and (2) it is not the purpose of the law to penalize (a) frank difference of opinion, or (b) innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care.
Evidence sections 147, 178, 180, 914, 918, 989.5 -- federal criminal tax case -- willfulness -- knowledge of legal duty -- good faith -- burden of proof -sufficiency 6. ln federal criminal tax cases, the statutory requirement of willfulness requires the Federal Government to prove that (1) the law imposed a duty on the defendant, (2) the defendant knew of that duty, and (3) the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty; in a federal criminal tax case in which the issue is whether the defendant knew of the duty purportedly imposed by the provision of the statute or regulation that the defendant is accused of violating, and in which case there is no claim that the provision at issue is invalid, (1) if the Federal Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge component of the willfulness requirement, but (2) carrying this burden requires negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law-or a claim that the defendant, because of a misunderstanding of the law, had a good-faith belief that the defendant was not violating any provisions of the tax laws--for one cannot be aware that the law imposes a duty and yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe that the duty does not exist; in the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the Federal Government 'has proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission, regardless of whether the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. (Blackmun and Marshall, J J, dissented in part from this holding).
Statutes section 107 -- avoidance of constitutional questions 7. The United States Supreme Court, where possible, interprets congressional enactments so as to avoid raising serious constitutional questions.
Appeal section 1339.5; Income Taxes 9, 10 -- federal power -Sixteenth Amendment -- certiorari -- review of Court of Appeals' decision 8a, 8b. Even though a federal criminal defendant's constitutional arguments are not objectively reasonable or are frivolous, the United States Supreme Court-on certiorari to review a Federal Court of Appeals' affirmance of the defendant's convictions, under 26 USCS sections 7201 and 7203, on several counts of "willfully" attempting to evade federal income taxes and "willfully" failing to file federal income tax returns-will address the significance of the defendant's constitutional claims to the issue of willfulness, where (1) at trial, (a) the defendant testified that it was his belief that the law was being enforced nconstitutionally, (b) the defendant produced a letter from counsel to the effect that (i) Congress' power to tax supposedly came from Art I, section 8, cl 1 of the United States Constitution, and not from the Constitution's Sixteenth Amendment, and (ii) the Sixteenth Amendment, construed with Art I, section 2, cl 3 of the Constitution, supposedly did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries, but only on gain and profit, (c) the jury, during deliberations, asked for a portion of the transcript wherein the defendant had said that he was attempting to test the constitutionality of the income tax laws, and (d) the trial judge later instructed the jury that an opinion that the tax laws violated a person's constitutional rights did not constitute a good-faith misunderstanding of the law; and (2) at oral argument before the Supreme Court, the defendant's counsel made observations to the effect that (a) a personal belief that a known statute was unconstitutional smacked of knowledge-of existing law, but disagreement with it, yet (b) a "little different situation" was presented if the person was told by a lawyer or an accountant erroneously that the statute was unconstitutional.
Appeal section 1662 -- effect of decision on other grounds. 9a, 9b. On certiorari to review a Federal Court of Appeals' affirmance of a defendant's convictions, under 26 USCS sections 7201 and 7203, on several counts of "willfully" attempting to evade federal income taxes and "willfully" failing to file federal income tax returns, the United States Supreme Court need not address the defendant's arguments that the Federal Constitution's First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments are violated by the application to the defendant of the Court of Appeals' "objectively reasonable" standard for willfulness, where the Supreme Court invalidates the "objectively reasonable" standard on statutory grounds.
Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a federal income tax return in violation of section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income taxes in violation of section 7201. Although admitting that he had not filed his returns, he testified that he had not acted willfully because he sincerely believed, based on his indoctrination by a group believing that the federal tax system is unconstitutional and his own study, that the tax laws were being unconstitutionally enforced and that his actions were lawful. In instructing the jury, the court stated that an honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness, and that Cheek's beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the Code were not objectively reasonable. It also instructed the jury that a person's opinion that the tax laws violate his constitutional rights does not constitute a goodfaith misunderstanding of the law. Cheek was convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: 1. A good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. Statutory willfulness, which protects the average citizen from prosecution for innocent mistakes made due to the complexity of the tax laws. United States v. Murdock, 290 US 389, 78 L.Ed 381, 54 S Ct 223, is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. United States v. Pomponio, 429 US 10, 50 L.Ed 2d 12, 97 S Ct 22. Thus, if the jury credited Cheek's assertion that he truly believed that the Code did not treat wages as income, the Government would not have carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem such a belief. Characterizing a belief as objectively unreasonable transforms what is normally a factual inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a jury from considering it. And forbidding a jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision, which this interpretation of the statute avoids. Of course, in deciding whether to credit Cheek's claim,.the jury is free to consider any admissible evidence showing that he had knowledge of his legal duties. 2. It was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury not to consider Cheek's claim that the tax laws are unconstitutional, since a defendant's views about the tax statutes' validity are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and should not be heard by a jury. Unlike the claims in the Murdock- Pomponio line of cases, claims that Code provisions are unconstitutional do not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the Code's complexity. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied conclusion that those provisions are invalid and unenforceable. Congress could not have contemplated that a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore his duties under the Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms Congress provided to present his invalidity claims to the courts and to abide by their decisions. Cheek was free to pay the tax, file for a refund, and, if denied, present his claims to the courts. Also, without paying the tax, he could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax Court.
882 F.2d 1263, vacated and remanded. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined. Sourer, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
William R. Coulson argued the cause for petitioner.
Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for respondent.
[1a, 2a, 3a] Title 26, section 7201 of the United States Code [26 USCS  7201] provides that any person "who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof" shall be guilty of a felony. Under 26 USC sections 7203 [26 USCS  7203], "[a]ny person required under this title . . . or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return . . . who willfully fails to... make such return" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
This case turns on the meaning of the word "willfully" as used in sections 7201 and 7203.
I Petitioner John L. Cheek has been a pilot for American Airlines since 1973. He filed federal income tax returns through 1979 but thereafter ceased to file returns. He also claimed an increasing number of withholding allowances-eventually claiming 60 allowances by mid-1980 -- and for the years 1981 to 1984 indicated on his W-4 forms that he was exempt from federal income taxes. In 1983, petitioner unsuccessfully sought a refund of all tax withheld by his employer in 1982. Petitioner's income during this period at all times far exceeded the minimum necessary to trigger the statutory filing requirement. As a result of his activities, petitioner was indicted for 10 violations of federal law. He was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a federal income tax return for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 through 1986, in violation of 26 USC section 7203 [26 USCS section 7203]. He was further charged with three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income taxes for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 in violation of section 7201. In those years, American Airlines withheld substantially less than the amount of tax petitioner owed because of the numerous allowances and exerhpt status he claimed on his W-4 forms) The tax offenses with which petitioner was charged are specific intent crimes that require the defendant to have acted willfully.
1. Cheek did file what the Court of Appeals described as a frivolous return in 1982.
2. Because petitioner filed a refund claim for the entire amount withheld by his employer in 1982, petitioner was also charged under 18 USC section 287 [18 USCS section 287] with one count of presenting a claim to an agency of the United States knowing the claim to be false and fraudulent.
3. In March 1982, Cheek and another employee of the company sued American Airlines to challenge the withholding of federal income taxes. In April 1982, Cheek sued the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States Tax Court, asserting that he was not a taxpayer or a person for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code and that his wages were not income, and making several other related claims. Cheek and four others also filed an action against the United States and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in Federal District Court, claiming that withholding taxes from their wages violated the Sixteenth Amendment. Finally, in 1985 Cheek filed claims with the IRS seeking to have refunded the taxes withheld from his wages in 1983 and 1984. When these claims were not allowed, he brought suit in the District Court claiming that the withholding was an unconstitutional taking of his property and that his wages were not income. In dismissing this action as frivolous, the District Court imposed costs and attorneys fees of $1,500 and a sanction under Rule 11 in the amount of $10,000. The Court of Appeals agreed that Cheek's claims were frivolous, reduced the District Court sanction to $5,000, and imposed an additional sanction of $1,500 for bringing a frivolous appeal.
"'We have a basic disagreement between some of us as to if Mr. Cheek honestly & reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income taxes.
4. The attorney also advised that despite the Fifth Amendment, the filing of a tax return was required and that a person could challenge the constitutionality of the system by suing for a refund after the taxes had been withheld, or by putting himself "at risk of criminal prosecution."
5. "The defendant has testified as to what he states are his interpretations of the United States Constitution, court opinions, common law and other materials he has reviewed .... He has also introduced materials which contain references to quotations from the United States Constitution, cuurt opinions, statutes, and other sources.
"He testified he relied on his interpretations and on these materials in concluding that he was not a person required to file income tax returns for the year or years charged, was not required to pay income taxes and that he could claim exempt status on his W4 forms, and that he could claim refunds of all moneys withheld." App 75-76.
"Among other things, Mr. Cheek contends that his wages from a private employer, American Airlines, does not [sic] constitute income under the Internal Revenue Service laws." ld., at 81.
interpretation 6. A note signed by all 12 jurors also informed the judge that although the jury found petitioner guilty, several jurors wanted to express their personal opinions of the case and that notes from these individual jurors to the court were "a complaint against the narrow & hard expression under the constraints of the law." Id., at 90. At least two notes from individual jurors expressed the opinion that petitioner sincerely believed in his cause even though his beliefs might have been unreasonable.
"(4) the belief that the tax laws are unconstitutional; of "willfully" as used in these statutes conflicts with the decisions of several other Courts of Appeals, see, e.g., United States v. Whiteside, 810 F2d 1306, 1310-1311 (CA5 1987); United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 263-264 (CAiO 1985); United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188, 191-193 (CA1 1985), we granted certiorari, 493 US 1068, 107 L.Ed 2d 1016, 110 S Ct 1108 (1990).
the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory term "willfully" as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception to the traditional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws. In United States v. Murdock, 290 US 389, 78 L Ed 381, 54 S Ct 223 (1933), the Court recognized that: "Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct." Id, at 396, 78 L.Ed 381, 54 S Ct 223.
"(7) the belief that Federal Reserve Notes do not constitute cash or income.
"Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 239-41 (7th Cir 1989); Buckner, 830 F.2d at 102; United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir 1987); Coleman v. Comm'r, 791 F.2d 68, 7071 (7th Cir 1986); Moore, 627 F.2d at 833. We have no doubt that this list will increase with time."
was improper because the statute required a finding of bad purpose or evil motive. Ibid.
We reversed the Court of Appeals, stating that "the Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the reference to an 'evil motive' in United States v. Bishop, supra, and prior cases," ibid., "requires proof of any motive other than an intentional violation of a known legal duty." Id, at 12, 50 L.Ed 2d 12, 97 S Ct 22. As "the other Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have recognized, willfulness in' this context simply means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." Ibid. We concluded that after instructing the jury on willfulness, "lain additional instruction on good faith was unnecessary." Id, at 13, 50 L.Ed 2d 12, 97 S Ct 22. Taken together, Bishop and Pomponio conclusively establish that the standard for the statutory willfulness requirement is the "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."
[1b, 2b, 3b] Cheek accepts the Pomponio definition of willfulness, Brief for Petitioner 5, and n 4, 13, 36; Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, 6-7, 11, 13, but asserts that the District Court's instructions and the Court of Appeals' opinion departed from that definition. In particular, he challenges the ruling that a good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law, if it is to negate willfulness, must be objectively reasonable. We agree that the Court of Appeals and the District Court erred in this respect.
[lc] In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly believed that the Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income, and the jury believed him, the Government would not have carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem such a belief. Of course, in deciding whether to credit Cheek's good-faith belief claim, the jury would be free to consider any admissible evidence from any source showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a return and to treat wages as income, including evidence showing his awareness of the relevant provisions of the Code or regulations, of court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the personal income tax return forms and accompanying instructions that made it plain that wages should be returned as income.
8. Cheek recognizes that a "defendant who knows what the law is and who disagrees with it ... does not have a bona fide misunderstanding defense," but asserts that "a defendant who has a bona fide misunderstanding of [the law] does not 'know' his legal duty and lucks willfulness." Breif for Petitioner 29, and n 13. The Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 13, states: "We are in no way suggesting that Cheek or anyone else is immune from criminal procecution if he knows what the law is, but believes it should be otherwise. and therefore violates it." See also Tr of Oral Arg 9, 11, 12, 15, 17.
beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.
"If the person believes as a personal belief that known--law known to them [sic] is unconstitutional, I submit that that would not be a defense, because what the person is really saying is I know what the law is, for constitutional reasons I have made my own determination that it is invalid. I am not suggesting that that is a defense.
"However, if the person was told by a lawyer or by an accountant erroneously that the statute is unconstitutional, and it's my professional advice to you that you don't have to follow it, then you have got a little different situation. This is not that case." Id., at 6.
Given this posture of the case, we perceive no reason not to address the significance of Cheek's constitutional claims to the issue of willfulness.
Murdock-Pomponio line of cases does not support such a position. Those cases construed the willfulness requirement in the criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to require proof of knowledge of the law. This was because in "our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law," and " '[i]t is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care.'" United States v. Bishop, 412 US 346, 360 361, 36 L.Ed 2d 941, 93 S Ct 2008 (1973) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 US 492, 496, 87 L.Ed 418, 63 S Ct 364 (1943)).
[2d] Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional are submissions of a' different order. They do not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and unenforceable.
Thus in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years, but after attending various seminars and based on his own study, he concluded that the income tax laws could not constitutionally require him to pay a tax. We do not believe that Congress contemplated that such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore the duties imposed upon him by the Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms provided by Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts and to abide by their decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek, from year to year, was free to pay the tax that the law purported to require, file for a refund and, if denied, present his claims of invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to the courts. See 26 USC section 7422 [26 USCS section 7422]. Also, without paying the tax, he could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax Court, section 6213, with the right to appeal to a higher court if unsuccessful. section 7482(a)(1).
10. In United States v. Murdock, 290 US 389, 78 L.Ed 381, 54 S Ct 223 (1933}, discussed supra, at 200, 112 L.Ed 2d, at 628-629, the defendant Murdock was summoned to appear before a revenue agent for examination. Questions were put to him, which he refused to answer for fear of self incrimination under state law. He was indicted for refusing to give testimony and supply information contrary to the pertinent provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. This Court affirmed the reversal of Murdock's conviction, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction directing the jury to consider Murdock's asserted claim of a good-faith, actual belief that because of the Fifth Amendment he was privileged not to answer the questions put to him. It is thus the case that Murdock's asserted belief was grounded in the Constitution, but it was a claim of privilege not to answer, not a claim that any provision of the tax laws were unconstitutional. and not a claim for which the tax laws provided procedures to entertain and resolve. Cheek's position at trial, in contrast, was that the tax laws were unconstitutional as applied to him.
with the duties placed upon them by the law, he must take the risk of being wrong.
the jury that petitioner's asserted beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code should not be considered by the jury in determining whether Cheek had acted willfully.
For the reasons set forth in the opinion above, the judgrnent of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Sourer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment.
11. [9b] Cheek argues that applying to him the Court of Appeals' standard of objective reasonableness violates his rights under the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. Since we have invalidated the challenged standard on statutory grounds, we need not address these submissions.
in many contexts, that "willfully" refers to consciousness of the act but not to consciousness that the act is unlawful. See, e.g., American Surety Co. of New York v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (CA2 1925) (L. Hand, J.); cf. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 US 558, 563565, 29 L.Ed 2d 178, 91 S Ct 1697 (1971). Or alternatively, one may say, as we have said until today with respect to the tax statutes, that "willfully" refers to consciousness of both the act and its illegality. But it seems to me impossible to say that the word refers to consciousness that some legal text exists, without consciousness that that legal text is binding, i.e., with the good-faith belief that it is not a valid law. Perhaps such a test for criminal liability would make sense (though in a field as complicated as federal tax law, I doubt it), but some text other than the mere word "willfully" would have to be employed to describe it--and that text is not ours to write.
Because today's opinion abandons clear and longstanding precedent to impose criminal liability where taxpayers have had no reason to expect it, because the new contours of criminal liability have no basis in the statutory text, and because strongly suspect that those new contours make no sense even as a policy matter, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
It seems to me that we are concerned in this case not with "the complexity of the tax laws," ante, at 200, 112 L.Ed 2d, at 628, but with the income tax law in its most elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages income?
present federal income tax system with the passage of the Income Tax Act of 1913, 38 Stat 166, any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the gullible to resist income tax collections. One might note in passing that this particular taxpayer, after all, was a licensed pilot for one of our major commercial airlines; he presumably was a person of at least minimum intellectual competence.
The District Court's instruction that an objectively reasonable and goodfaith misunderstanding of the law negates willfulness lends further, rather than less, protection to this defendant, for it adds an additional hurdle for the prosecution to overcome. Petitioner should be grateful for this further protection, rather than be opposed to it.
This Court's opinion today, I fear, will encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of the law in the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity. If that ensues, I suspect we have gone beyond the limits of common sense. While I may not agree with every word the Court of Appeals has enunciated in its opinion, I would affirm its judgment in this case. I therefore dissent.
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