Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/9666768/Order-on-Summary-Judgment-Gonzalez-v-Federal-Way
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:00:17+00:00

Document:
This is an order we obtained in our client's favor granting our motion for summary judgment and dismissing a case against this police department. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed this decision.
motion for continuance and DENIES as moot Defendants’ motion to stay.
discussed going out to dinner, and getting a room for the evening. Gonzalez Dep. at 32.
Id. at 33. After turning, Mr. Gonzalez noticed red and white flashing lights. Id. Mr.
17 Gonzalez then pulled to the right side of the road, and awaited the officer’s approach. Id.
20 off when the vehicle came to a stop. Gonzalez Dep. at 34. Mr. Gonzalez warned Ms.
1 had pulled him over because his vehicle had a broken taillight lens.1 Gonzalez Decl. at 1.
8 registration, and proof of insurance. Id. at 35. Mr. Gonzalez complied with the request.
10 did not have identification, but provided her name to Officer Swanson. Id.
check for “wants and warrants” and to confirm that the car was registered to Mr.
returned to the vehicle and issued Ms. Fleming a citation for not wearing her seatbelt.
19 could write [him] a ticket for a taillight or give [him] a warning.” Id. It appears from Mr.
2 the back of his patrol car. Id. Officer Swanson then told Mr. Gonzalez not to move. Id.
After placing Ms. Fleming in his patrol car, Officer Swanson returned to Mr.
10 also told Mr. Gonzalez that Ms. Fleming had been carrying a “big knife,” and that Mr.
17 Officer Swanson placed Mr. Gonzalez under arrest.
20 doors open allowing the rain to get into his vehicle and damage the interior of it. Id.
Officer Swanson thereafter impounded Mr. Gonzalez’s vehicle.
28 declines to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Gonzalez’s state-law claims.
the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Addisu v.
8 burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
10 opposing party must show that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Matsushita Elect.
present significant and probative evidence to support its claim or defense. Intel Corp. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).
constitutional rights – a prerequisite to municipal liability. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
likewise be dismissed from this lawsuit.
under section 1983, despite his failure to plead it.
2 United States Constitution or other laws by individuals acting “under color of law.” S.
accused official reasonably believed his conduct to be lawful. See generally, Harlow v.
9 federal right. Sweany v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987).
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6 Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard in evaluating its duration and scope.
15 v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005) (same as to order to remain in the car).
broken taillight, in violation of Washington State law. See RCW § 46.37.050(1). Mr.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
purpose from a lawful traffic stop into Officer Swanson’s investigation into solicitation.
reasonable articulable suspicion, so long as it does not unreasonably prolong the stop.
See United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Illinois v.
20 Swanson is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
search his vehicle, was retaliatory and violated Mr. Gonzalez’s First Amendment rights.
2 Amendment protects the right to verbally challenge the police. See Mackinney v.
9 rights, the court cannot address such a claim if it is not plead in the Complaint.
17 Swanson’s conduct in relation to Ms. Fleming somewhat troubling, however, Ms.
omitted); see also United States v. Pulliam, 405 F.3d 782, (9th Cir. 2005).
of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).
that his detention of Mr. Gonzalez did not violate his right to move freely about.
substantive due process right to move freely about.
19 immunity be postponed until he has been given the opportunity to conduct discovery.
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-19 (1982)).
boundaries of the substantive due process right to travel).
2 immunity until the resolution of the “threshold [qualified] immunity question.” 457 U.S.
17 all of Mr. Gonzalez’s federal claims, leaving only his state law claims for adjudication.
continuance (Dkt. # 22) and DENIES as moot Defendants’ motion to stay (Dkt. # 25).
1 The court directs the clerk to enter judgment consistent with this order.
2 Dated this 8th day of June, 2007.

References: v.

 v.

 v.

 v.

 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 § 46
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v.