Source: https://www.cruiseshiplawyersblog.com/tag/shipboard-medical-care/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:30:50+00:00

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For the longest times, cruise ship passengers were not allowed to bring cruise lines as defendants in medical malpractice claims to recover for the negligent acts of a doctor or a nurse when they were committed aboard a cruise ship. In almost every single scenario, passengers were left without anyone to sue. Injustice remained served for years, until today.
In its latest ruling, judges of the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the previous law, Barbetta, was outdated, and allowed the family of a deceased cruise passenger to continue on with a lawsuit for medical malpractice against the cruise line, in this case, Royal Caribbean.
Tagged: "barbetta rule", "cruise ship", "medical malpractice", "Ship Doctor", "ship nurse" and "Shipboard Medical Care"
Robert D. Peltz and Carol L. Finklehoffe Leesfield Scolaro, P.A.
A defamation claim by one sports fisherman against another for taking embarrassing photographs and then showing them to others ashore after the conclusion of a fishing trip did not meet either element necessary to establish admiralty jurisdiction. Initially, the court concluded that the tort of defamation was not completed until the defendant showed the photographs to others. Since this occurred ashore, the location requirement for asserting admiralty jurisdiction was not met. The court further held that the claim also failed to meet the requirement that the actions have an impact on maritime commerce.
In upholding a collective bargaining agreement provision that limited maintenance payments to 90 consecutive days, even if the injured seaman had not reached maximum medical cure, the court relied upon a long line of cases upholding limitations on maintenance in legitimately negotiated CBA’s. See e.g. Frederick v. Kirby Tanks Ships, Inc., 305 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2000); Baldassaro v. United States, 64 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1995); Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630 (3rd Cir. 1990); AI-Zawkari v. Am. S.S. Co., 871 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1989); Macedo v. F/V Paul and Michelle, 868 F.2d 519 (11th Cir. 1989); Gardiner v. Sea-land SVRV. Inc., 989 F2d 943 (9th Cir. 1986); Ammar v. United States, 342 F.3d 133 (2nd Cir. 2003).
Under Florida Statutes ‘768.72, which precludes the assertion of a claim for punitive damages in the absence of Aa reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which provides a reasonable basis for such damages,@ it was error for the court to permit an amendment in a seaman=s claim filed in state court without undertaking the requisite evidentiary analysis.
Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 2009 WLD 7264038 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (J. Graham).
In Lindo, the Plaintiff’s CBA required that he submit his claims to arbitration proceedings in his home country (Nicaragua), which would apply the law of the vessel’s flag (Bahamas). Although the Plaintiff argued that the provision would therefore deprive him of his claims under the Jones Act, the court refused to extend the holding in Thomas to bar enforcement of claims arising outside of the Seaman’s Wage Act. Instead, it held that it must rely upon the Eleventh Circuit’s explicit holding that a Jones Act claim is subject to arbitration in Bautista v. Norweigian Cruise Line, Ltd., 396 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). But see contra Williams v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 2011 WL 1206820 (S.D. Fla.)(Lenard).
Bulgakova v. Carnival Corp., 2010 WL 5296962 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (J. Seitz).
In Bulgakova, another federal district judge utilized a different analysis, but reached the same result in refusing to void an arbitration provision for a seaman’s claims under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness and for maintenance and cure. The court concluded that while Panamanian substantive law might bar the seaman’s Jones Act claim, it would likely recognize his non-statutory claims as a basis for recovery. Therefore, while the choice of law provision might “threaten to extinguish the plaintiffs claims,” there was no indication in the case that the court would subsequently be deprived of an “opportunity for review” at the award enforcement stage. Thus, it held that if the plaintiff was in fact denied his U.S. maritime remedies during the course of the arbitration, his remedy would be to come back after the arbitration and raise the claim in the post proceeding enforcement stage. Accordingly, the court ruled that the plaintiff s request for relief was “premature” until after the arbitration was actually conducted.
the fact that the arbitration agreement may not be enforceable because it is purportedly null and void, does not mean that the arbitration agreement does not exist or that the dispute is not one that “relates to an arbitration agreement … covered by the convention.” … in other words, jurisdiction is not contingent upon the validity or enforceability of the arbitration agreement, but simply whether the four jurisdictional prerequisites have been met and the claims relate to the arbitration agreement.
See also Orozco v. Princess Cruise Line, Ltd., 2010 WL 3942854 (S.D. Fla.)(King) (compelling arbitration based upon cruise line’s agreement to waive choice of law provision); Gawin v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 706 F.Supp.2d 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2010)(Ungargo)(same); Matthews v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 728 F.Supp.2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2010)(Gold)(same); Krstic v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 706 F.Supp.1271 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (Gold)(same).
Yet another district court judge reached the opposite result in Harrison, concluding that since it takes two parties “to stipulate” that the cruise lines agreement to waive a choice of law provision was ineffective, thereby causing the contract to run afoul of Thomas. The court further determined that since the contract did not have a severability clause, that it would have been inappropriate in any event to severe the offensive choice of law provision.
In yet another variation on the theme, the cruise line stipulated to arbitrate the plaintiff’s Seaman’s Wage Act claim under U.S. law, but refused to similarly stipulate as to the accompanying Jones Act claim. The Court concluded that Panamanian law does not provide a seaman with a reasonable equivalent to the rights provided by the Jones Act. Accordingly, it held that it would be against public policy to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s Jones Act claim “because to do so would deprive her of important statutory rights provided by Congress to effectuate public policy.” The court went on to further hold that it would be inefficient to bifurcate the plaintiff’s separate claims and accordingly, granted the seaman’s request to remand the case back to state court.
Still another judge concluded that a seaman’s complaint seeking recovery for violation of the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, failure to provide maintenance and cure, failure to treat and for penalty wages was not subject to arbitration where the employment contract contained a choice of law provision requiring the application of Panamanian law in reliance upon Thomas. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that while the validity of the seafarers agreement is typically a question for the arbitrator to determine, the issue of the validity of the arbitration clause contained within the contract is appropriate for resolution by the court.
In an opinion arising from a case against a resort in the Bahamas, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a dismissal based upon forum non conveniens, which will likely have an impact on cruise line cases involving similar issues. In its opinion, the court concluded that while the financial inability of a Plaintiff to bring a lawsuit in a foreign forum will not affect the analysis of whether the forum provides a reasonable alternative, nevertheless, a patty’s claim of financial hardship “is a factor to be considered in the balancing of interests that bears upon convenience, a balancing process that is to be performed after identifying an alternative forum.” See also Gross v. British Broad. Corp., 386 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2004); Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1996).
A security video is not privileged from disclosure on the grounds of work product and a carrier is not entitled postpone the production of the video until after it deposes a passenger, whose fall was captured on the video. The fact that the carrier “preserved the video from destruction” in anticipation of litigation did not transform the video into work product protected material.
Bridgewater v. Carnival Corp., 2011 WL 817936 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
In order to state a claim against a cruise line for the purported negligence of a shore excursion operator under the theory of apparent agency, the Plaintiff must allege a sufficient basis to establish the required elements that: (1) the carrier made representations which caused the passenger to believe that the excursion operator had authority to act for it; (2) such belief was reasonable and (3) the passenger reasonably relied upon this belief to its detriment. The court similarly held that in order to state a claim under the theory of joint venture, the Plaintiff would have to sufficiently plead facts to support the following five elements: (1) the intention of the parties to create a joint venture, (2) joint control or right of control, (3) joint proprietary interest in the subject matter of the venture, (4) the right of both venturers to share on the profits and (5) the duty of both to share in the losses.
A passenger who was rendered a quadriplegic during a beach excursion as a result of being flipped by a wave so that he landed on his neck was barred from recovery against the carrier on the grounds that the sea conditions were considered to be open and obvious.
U.S. Customs did not need “reasonable suspicion” to search a passenger’s cabin and accordingly, the discovery of cocaine while the vessel was docked in Port Everglades following a return from Costa Rica did not constitute a violation of the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights. See also U.S. v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720 (11th Cir. 2010)(reasonable suspicion not necessary for Customs officers search of a crew member’s cabin while vessel was docked in U.S. territorial waters).
In an effort to circumvent the Barbetta line of cases, which hold that a cruise line may not be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a ship’s doctor, Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1988), the Plaintiff alleged that the carrier was negligent in equipping the vessel’s medical center, training the shipboard medical staff, failing to provide communication equipment to reach shoreside medical providers and for failing to timely evacuate the Plaintiff. The court rejected the first three arguments on the grounds that they were barred by that portion of the Barbetta rule which provides that “a cruise ship is not a floating hospital.” The court rejected the Plaintiff’s evacuation claim on the basis that there were no allegations that the Captain had overruled any order by the ship’s doctor to evacuate the passenger.
The court rejected additional attempts to circumvent the Barbetta rule by arguing that the carrier was negligent for failing to hire a ship’s doctor licensed by either the state of the vessel’s home port (California) or its flag (Bahamas) on the grounds that no such duty exist. The court rejected the Plaintiff’s further argument that vicarious liability could be imposed on the grounds that the carrier violated the international safety management code on the grounds that the ISM does not create any legally enforceable duties to cruise ship passengers. See also Calderon v. Reederei Claus-Peter Offen, 2009 WL 3429771 (S.D. Fla. 2009).

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