Source: http://tx.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180402_0000680.STX.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:50:34+00:00

Document:
MICHAEL A. ROESLER, et al, Defendants.
VANESSA D. GILMORE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Richard N. Tawe, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division, sued on November 6, 2017, alleging civil rights violations resulting from a violation of privacy; a denial of due process; retaliation; and exposure to unsanitary living conditions. Tawe, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sues 120 prison officials at the Ellis Unit. Court records show that this lawsuit is one of nine federal lawsuits Tawe filed against Ellis Unit officers in 2017, each lawsuit naming between 10 and 120 officers.
The threshold issue is whether Tawe's claims should be dismissed as frivolous.
Tawe complains that female officers are present in the shower area when male prisoners are showering. He explains that inmates who work in the field place their boots that have been in contact with animal excrement, on shelves. Tawe complains that inmates must place their clean clothing on these same dirty shelves in the shower area. He asserts that prison officials fail to use a sufficient amount of detergent to wash clothes properly.
Tawe complains that the grievance system does not work. He alleges that laundry officers denied him a blanket in retaliation for his filing of a grievance. Tawe seeks an injunction preventing the defendants from implementing policies that violate his civil rights. He further seeks unspecified compensatory damages.
A federal court has the authority to dismiss an action in which the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis before service if the court determines that the action is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § l9l5(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997)). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)).
The PLRA prohibits recovery of damages by prisoners in cases that do not involve physical injury. The PLRA expressly provides that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § l997e(e). To the extent that Tawe's claims are based on mental or emotional harm, his request for compensatory damages must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a prisoner's failure to allege physical injury precludes his recovery of compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). The Fifth Circuit has held that allegations of "mental anguish, emotional distress, psychological harm, and insomnia" are barred by § 1997e(e). See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005).
Absent an allegation that Tawe suffered a physical injury in connection with the complained-of condition of confinement, his claim for compensatory damages lacks an arguable basis in law.
Tawe alleges that prison officials retaliated against him for filing grievances. The Fifth Circuit has held that prison officials are prohibited from retaliating against inmates who exercise the right of access to the courts, or who complain of prison conditions or about official misconduct. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). When a prisoner claims that officials retaliated against him by issuing a false disciplinary report, favorable termination of the underlying disciplinary charge is not a prerequisite for bringing the claim. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164. The concern is whether there was retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right, separate and apart from the apparent validity of the underlying disciplinary report. Id. at 1164-1165. "An action motivated by retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable, even if the act, when taken for a different reason, might have been legitimate." Id. at 1165 (citations omitted). In addition, proceedings that are not otherwise constitutionally deficient may be invalidated by retaliatory animus. Id. (citations omitted).

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