Source: http://www.joeldufresnecase.com/supreme-court-opinions-federal/criminal-opinions/puerto-rico-v-branstad
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 20:51:28+00:00

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This case requires that we reconsider the holding of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), that federal courts [p221] have no power to order the Governor of a State to fulfill the State's obligation under the Extradition Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, to deliver up fugitives from justice.
On the basis of these statements, Calder was arrested, charged with homicide, arraigned before a municipal judge, and released on $5,000 bail. On February 4, 1981, Calder was arraigned before a District Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder. Calder failed to appear at a preliminary hearing on March 4, 1981, and bail was increased to $50,000. Despite representations by counsel that Calder would appear at a preliminary hearing on April 13, 1981, he did not do so. At that time, Calder was declared a fugitive from justice, and bail was increased to $300,000. The Puerto Rican police, having reason to believe that Calder had left Puerto Rico and returned to his family's home in Iowa, notified local authorities in Iowa that Calder was a fugitive wanted in Puerto Rico on murder charges. On April 24, 1981, Calder surrendered [p222] to local authorities in Polk County, Iowa, posted the $20,000 bond set by an Iowa Magistrate, and was released. Id. at A18-A19.
On February 15, 1984, petitioner Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against respondents Governor [p223] Branstad and the State of Iowa, [n1] seeking a declaration that failure to deliver Calder upon presentation of proper extradition papers violated the Extradition Clause and the Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (Act). [n2] The complaint further requested the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent Branstad to perform the "ministerial duty" of extradition. App. 7a-8a. Respondents stipulated before the District Court that the extradition papers fully complied with the requirements of the Act. App. to Pet. for Cert. A20. The District Court dismissed the complaint, agreeing with respondents that this Court's holding in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), absolutely barred any attempt to invoke federal judicial authority to compel compliance with the Clause or the Act. Civil No. 84-126-E (SD Iowa, May 22, 1985), App. to Pet. for Cert. A10. The Court of Appeals "[r]eluctantly" affirmed. 787 F.2d 423, 424 (CA8 1986). [p224] We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 811 (1986), to consider whether the propositions concerning the limitation of federal judicial power stated in Kentucky v. Dennison in 1861 retain their validity today. We reverse.
Kentucky v. Dennison was an action brought under this Court's original jurisdiction to compel by writ of mandamus the extradition of a fugitive felon. The grand jury of Woodford County, Kentucky, returned an indictment in October, 1859 charging Willis Lago, a "free man of color," with the crime of assisting the escape of a slave. 24 How. at 67. The defendant was a resident of Ohio, and papers requesting his extradition were served upon William Dennison, the Governor of that State. Dennison secured an opinion from Ohio's Attorney General, who took the view that the Extradition Clause [n3] covered only those acts which were crimes under the law of the asylum State, or which were "regarded as malum in se by the general judgment and conscience of civilized nations." Id. at 69. [n4] On this basis Dennison refused extradition, and Kentucky brought its mandamus action in this Court.
The case was heard in February 1861, and decided on March 14. On that date, secession was a fact, and civil war a threatening possibility. The Representatives of the States [p225] of the Deep South had withdrawn from the Congress. Justice Campbell was reputedly engaged in mediation efforts between the seceding States and the Lincoln administration, but his resignation from the Court and departure from Washington were imminent; he resigned on April 30, 1861. See 5 C. Swisher, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Taney Period 688-689 (1974). It was in these circumstances, with the practical power of the Federal Government at its lowest ebb since the adoption of the Constitution, that Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Court.
Looking, therefore, to the words of the Constitution -- to the obvious policy and necessity of this provision to preserve harmony between States, and order and law within their respective borders . . . -- the conclusion is irresistible, that this compact engrafted in the Constitution included, and was intended to include, every offence made punishable by the law of the State in which it was committed, and that it gives the right to the Executive authority of the State to demand the fugitive from the Executive authority of the State in which he is found; that the right given to "demand" implies that it is an absolute right; and it follows that there must be a correlative obligation to deliver, without any reference to the character of the crime charged, or to the policy or laws of the State to which the fugitive has fled.
[t]he duty which he is to perform is . . . merely ministerial -- that is, to cause the party to be arrested, and delivered to the agent or authority of the State where the crime was committed.
24 How. at 106. But the Court concluded that "the words ‘it shall be the duty' were not used as mandatory and compulsory, but as declaratory of the moral duty" created by the Constitution. Id. at 107. Such a construction was necessary, in the Court's view, to avoid constitutional infirmity.
The act does not provide any means to compel the execution of this duty, nor inflict any punishment for neglect or refusal on the part of the Executive of the State; nor is there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the Government of the United States with this power. Indeed, such a power would place every State under the control and dominion of the General Government, even in the administration of its internal concerns and reserved rights. And we think it clear that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it.
Thus, for over 125 years, Kentucky v. Dennison has stood for two propositions: first, that the Extradition Clause creates a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives upon proper demand; and second, that the federal courts have no authority under the Constitution to compel performance of this ministerial duty of delivery. As to the first of these conclusions, the passage of time has revealed no occasion for doubt. The language of the Clause is "clear and explicit." Michigan v. [p227] Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 286 (1978). Its mandatory language furthers its intended purposes: "to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed," and "to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state." Id. at 287; see Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 132-133 (1917); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227 (1906). The Framers of the Constitution perceived that the frustration of these objectives would create a serious impediment to national unity, and the Extradition Clause responds to that perception.
It would have been far better to omit it altogether, and to have left it to the comity of the States, and their own sense of their respective interests, than to have inserted it as conferring a right, and yet defining that right so loosely as to make it a never-failing subject of dispute and ill-will.
Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. at 102. We reaffirm the conclusion that the commands of the Extradition Clause are mandatory, and afford no discretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum State. See California v. Superior Court of California, 482 U.S. 400, 405-406 (1987).
that the States and the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns -- is not representative of the law today.
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982).
Respondents contend, however, that an "executive common law" of extradition has developed through the efforts of Governors to employ the discretion accorded them under Dennison, and that this "common law" provides a superior alternative to the "ministerial duty" to extradite provided for by the Constitution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. Even assuming [p229] the existence of this tradition of "executive common law," no weight can be accorded to it. Long continuation of decisional law or administrative practice incompatible with the requirements of the Constitution cannot overcome our responsibility to enforce those requirements. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483"]347 U.S. 483 (1954); 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Though not articulated in these terms, respondents' argument is, in essence, a request that we reconsider our construction of the Extradition Clause to establish, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, a discretion which has hitherto been exercised solely because the Constitution's explicit command has gone unenforced. This, for the reasons previously stated, we decline to do.
1. Petitioner had previously sought to file a bill of complaint in this Court, under our original jurisdiction. Motion for leave to file the bill was denied. Puerto Rico v. Iowa, 464 U.S. 1034 (1984).
Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.
4. This interpretation of the Extradition Clause was frequently invoked in the antebellum period by Governors of free States requested to extradite those who had assisted the escape of slaves. It was initially stated by Governor Seward of New York in 1841. See 2 Works of William H. Seward 502-509 (G. Baker ed. 1853); see generally 5 C. Swisher, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Taney Period 677-685 (1974).
Puerto Rico seeks to force the states to honor its rendition requests even though Congressional representatives of the states have not had an opportunity to consider the admission of Puerto Rico as a state into the Union. . . . Puerto Rico's argument . . . serves to eviscerate the significance of the statehood admissions process.

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