Source: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45178.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:45:15+00:00

Document:
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a rapidly growing field of technology with potentially significant implications for national security. As such, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and other nations are developing AI applications for a range of military functions. AI research is underway in the fields of intelligence collection and analysis, logistics, cyber operations, information operations, command and control, and in a variety of semiautonomous and autonomous vehicles. Already, AI has been incorporated into military operations in Iraq and Syria. Congressional action has the potential to shape the technology’s development further, with budgetary and legislative decisions influencing the growth of military applications as well as the pace of their adoption.
AI technologies present unique challenges for military integration, particularly because the bulk of AI development is happening in the commercial sector. Although AI is not unique in this regard, the defense acquisition process may need to be adapted for acquiring emerging technologies like AI. In addition, many commercial AI applications must undergo significant modification prior to being functional for the military. A number of cultural issues also challenge AI acquisition, as some commercial AI companies are averse to partnering with DOD due to ethical concerns, and even within the department, there can be resistance to incorporating AI technology into existing weapons systems and processes.
Potential international rivals in the AI market are creating pressure for the United States to compete for innovative military AI applications. China is a leading competitor in this regard, releasing a plan in 2017 to capture the global lead in AI development by 2030. Currently, China is primarily focused on using AI to make faster and more well-informed decisions, as well as on developing a variety of autonomous military vehicles. Russia is also active in military AI development, with a primary focus on robotics.
Although AI has the potential to impart a number of advantages in the military context, it may also introduce distinct challenges. AI technology could, for example, facilitate autonomous operations, lead to more informed military decisionmaking, and increase the speed and scale of military action. However, it may also be unpredictable or vulnerable to unique forms of manipulation. As a result of these factors, analysts hold a broad range of opinions on how influential AI will be in future combat operations. While a small number of analysts believe that the technology will have minimal impact, most believe that AI will have at least an evolutionary—if not revolutionary—effect.
How might Congress influence defense acquisition reform initiatives that facilitate military AI development?
How should the United States balance research and development related to artificial intelligence and autonomous systems with ethical considerations?
What legislative or regulatory changes are necessary for the integration of military AI applications?
What measures can Congress take to help manage the AI competition globally?
Information Operations and "Deep Fakes"
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a rapidly growing field of technology with potentially significant implications for national security. As such, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and other nations are developing AI applications for a range of military functions. AI research is underway in the fields of intelligence collection and analysis, logistics, cyber operations, information operations, command and control, and in a variety of semiautonomous and autonomous vehicles. Already, AI has been incorporated into military operations in Iraq and Syria. Congressional action has the potential to shape the technology's development further, with budgetary and legislative decisions influencing the growth of military applications as well as the pace of their adoption.
The U.S. military is already integrating AI systems into combat via a spearhead initiative called Project Maven, which uses AI algorithms to identify insurgent targets in Iraq and Syria.4 These dynamics raise several questions that Congress addressed in hearings during 2017 and 2018: What types of military AI applications are possible, and what limits, if any, should be imposed? What unique advantages and vulnerabilities come with employing AI for defense? How will AI change warfare, and what influence will it have on the military balance with U.S. competitors? Congress has a number of oversight, budgetary, and legislative tools available that it may use to influence the answers to these questions and shape the future development of AI technology.
Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.
An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action.
An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and neural networks.
A set of techniques, including machine learning that is designed to approximate a cognitive task.
This definition encompasses many of the descriptions in Table 1 below, which summarizes various AI definitions in academic literature.
The field of AI research began in 1956, but an explosion of interest in AI began around 2010 due to the convergence of three enabling developments: (1) the availability of "big data" sources, (2) improvements to machine learning approaches, and (3) increases in computer processing power.8 This growth has advanced the state of Narrow AI, which refers to algorithms that address specific problem sets like game playing, image recognition, and navigation. All current AI systems fall into the Narrow AI category. The most prevalent approach to Narrow AI is machine learning, which involves statistical algorithms that replicate human cognitive tasks by deriving their own procedures through analysis of large training data sets. During the training process, the computer system creates its own statistical model to accomplish the specified task in situations it has not previously encountered.
"The automation of activities that we associate with human thinking, activities such as decision making, problem solving, and learning."
"The study of computations that make possible to perceive, reason, and act."
"The art of creating machines that perform functions that require intelligence when performed by people."
"The branch of computer science that is concerned with the automation of intelligent behavior."
Selected Definitions—Where possible, an official U.S. government document is cited.
Understanding the relationships between these terms can be challenging, as they may be used interchangeably in the literature and definitions often conflict with one another. For example, some studies delineate between automated systems and autonomous systems based on the system's complexity, arguing that automated systems are strictly rule-based, while autonomous systems exhibit artificial intelligence. Some, including the Department of Defense, categorize autonomous weapon systems based not on the system's complexity, but rather on the type of function being executed without human intervention (e.g., target selection and engagement).22 Still others describe AI as a means of automating cognitive tasks, with robotics automating physical tasks. This framework, however, may not be sufficient to describe how AI systems function, as such systems do not merely replicate human cognitive functions and often produce unanticipated outputs. In addition, a robot may be automated or autonomous and may or may not contain an AI algorithm. Figure 1 illustrates these relationships, based on the above selected definitions of each term.
These initiatives will present a number of oversight opportunities for Congress.
One impediment to accurately evaluating funding levels for AI is the lack of a stand-alone AI Program Element (PE) in DOD funding tables. As a result, AI R&D appropriations are spread throughout generally titled PEs and incorporated into funding for larger systems with AI components. For example, in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, AI funding is spread throughout the PEs for the High Performance Computing Modernization Program and Dominant Information Sciences and Methods, among others.36 On the other hand, a dedicated PE for AI may lead to a false precision, as it may be challenging to identify exact investments in enabling technologies like AI. The lack of an official U.S. government definition of AI could further complicate such an assessment.
Congress may consider the growth of international competition in the AI market and the danger of foreign exploitation of U.S. AI technology for military purposes. In particular, the Chinese government is reported to be aggressively pursuing AI investments in the United States. Amid growing scrutiny of transactions involving Chinese firms in the semiconductor industry, in September 2017 President Trump, following the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), blocked a Chinese firm from acquiring Lattice Semiconductor, a U.S. company that manufactures chips that are a critical design element for AI technology.43 In this way, some experts believe that CFIUS may provide a means of protecting strategically significant technologies like AI. 44 Indeed, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) expands CFIUS's ability to review certain foreign investments, including those involving "emerging and foundational technologies." It also authorized CFIUS to consider "whether a covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect United States leadership in areas related to national security."45 Congress may monitor the implementation of FIRRMA and assess whether additional reforms might be necessary to maintain effective congressional oversight of sensitive transactions.
DOD is considering a number of diverse applications for AI. Currently, AI R&D is being left to the discretion of research organizations in the individual services, as well as to DARPA and the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA). However, DOD components are currently required to coordinate with the JAIC regarding any planned AI initiatives costing more than $15 million annually.51 In addition, the JAIC has been tasked with overseeing the National Mission Initiatives, projects that will leverage AI to address pressing operational challenges.52 The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, which oversaw the development of DOD's AI Strategy, will continue to support AI development and delivery.
The Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, also known as Project Maven, has previously been a focal point for DOD AI integration and will transition from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the JAIC, where it will become the first of the JAIC's National Mission Initiatives.53 Project Maven was launched in April 2017 and charged with rapidly incorporating AI into existing DOD systems to demonstrate the technology's potential.54 Project Maven's inaugural director stated, "Maven is designed to be that pilot project, that pathfinder, that spark that kindles the flame for artificial intelligence across the department."55 AI is also being incorporated into a number of other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance applications, as well as in logistics, cyberspace operations, information operations, command and control, semiautonomous and autonomous vehicles, and lethal autonomous weapon systems.
DARPA's 2016 Cyber Grand Challenge demonstrated the potential power of AI-enabled cyber tools. The competition challenged participants to develop AI algorithms that could autonomously "detect, evaluate, and patch software vulnerabilities before [competing teams] have a chance to exploit them"—all within a matter of seconds, rather than the usual months.65 The challenge demonstrated not only the potential speed of AI-enabled cyber tools but also the potential ability of a singular algorithm to play offense and defense simultaneously. These capabilities could provide a distinct advantage in future cyber operations.
Artificial intelligence could also be used to create full "digital patterns-of-life," in which an individual's digital "footprint" is "merged and matched with purchase histories, credit reports, professional resumes, and subscriptions" to create a comprehensive behavioral profile of servicemembers, suspected intelligence officers, government officials, or private citizens.72 As in the case of deep fakes, this information could, in turn, be used for targeted influence operations or blackmail.
Future AI systems may be used to identify communications links cut by an adversary and find alternative means of distributing information. As the complexity of AI systems matures, AI algorithms may also be capable of providing commanders with a menu of viable courses of action based on real-time analysis of the battle-space, in turn enabling faster adaptation to complex events.76 In the long run, many analysts believe this area of AI development could be particularly consequential, with the potential to improve the quality of and accelerate wartime decisionmaking.
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are a special class of weapon systems capable of independently identifying a target and employing an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy it with no human interaction. LAWS require a computer vision system and advanced machine learning algorithms to classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision, and guide a weapon to the target. This capability enables the system to operate in communications-degraded or -denied environments where traditional systems may not be able to operate. The U.S. military does not currently have LAWS in its inventory, although there are no legal prohibitions on the development of LAWS.
From the Cold War era until recently, most major defense-related technologies, including nuclear technology, the Global Positioning System (GPS), and the internet, were first developed by government-directed programs before later spreading to the commercial sector.94 Indeed, DARPA's Strategic Computing Initiative invested over $1 billion between 1983 and 1993 to develop the field of artificial intelligence for military applications, but the initiative was ultimately cancelled due to slower-than-anticipated progress.95 Today, commercial companies—sometimes building on past government-funded research—are leading AI development, with DOD later adapting their tools for military applications.96 Noting this dynamic, one AI expert commented, "It is unusual to have a technology that is so strategically important being developed commercially by a relatively small number of companies."97 In addition to the shift in funding sources, a number of challenges related to technology, process, personnel, and culture continue to impede the adoption of AI for military purposes.
Standing DOD processes—including those related to standards of safety and performance, acquisitions, and intellectual property and data rights—present another challenge to the integration of military AI. Often, civilian and military standards of safety and performance are either not aligned or are not easily transferable. A failure rate deemed acceptable for a civilian AI application may be well outside of tolerances in a combat environment—or vice versa. In addition, a recent research study concluded that unpredictable AI failure modes will be exacerbated in complex environments, such as those found in combat.100 Collectively, these factors may create another barrier for the smooth transfer of commercially developed AI technology to DOD.
Finally, some analysts are concerned that DOD will not capitalize on AI's potential to produce game-changing warfighting benefits and will instead simply use AI to incrementally improve existing processes or reinforce current operational concepts. Furthermore, the services may reject certain AI applications altogether if the technology threatens service-favored hardware or missions.122 Members of Congress may explore the complex interaction of these factors as DOD moves beyond the initial stages of AI adoption.
China is by far the United States' most ambitious competitor in the international AI market. China's 2017 "Next Generation AI Development Plan" describes AI as a "strategic technology" that has become a "focus of international competition."127 According to the document, China will seek to develop a core AI industry worth over 150 billion RMB128—or approximately $21.7 billion—by 2020 and will "firmly seize the strategic initiative" and reach "world leading levels" of AI investment by 2030.
Source: Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, China's Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, January 2018, https://www.diux.mil/download/datasets/1758/DIUx%20Study%20on%20China's%20Technology%20Transfer%20Strategy%20-%20Jan%202018.pdf, p. 29.
AI poses a number of unique opportunities and challenges within a national security context. However, its ultimate impact will likely be determined by the extent to which developers, with the assistance of policymakers, are able to maximize its strengths while identifying options to limit its vulnerabilities.
Source: Defense Science Board, "Summer Study on Autonomy," June 9, 2016, p. 12, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSBSS15.pdf.
AI may offer a means to cope with an exponential increase in the amount of data available for analysis. According to one DOD source, the military operates over 11,000 drones, with each one recording "more than three NFL seasons worth" of high-definition footage each day.183 However, the department does not have sufficient people or an adequate system to comb through the data in order to derive actionable intelligence analysis.
AI algorithms often produce unpredictable and unconventional results. In March 2016, the AI company DeepMind created a game-playing algorithm called AlphaGo, which defeated a world-champion Go player, Lee Sedol, four games to one. After the match, Sedol commented that AlphaGo made surprising and innovative moves, and other expert Go players subsequently stated that AlphaGo overturned accumulated wisdom on game play.187 AI's capacity to produce similarly unconventional results in a military context may provide an advantage in combat, particularly if those results surprise an adversary.
AI-based image recognition algorithms surpassed human performance in 2010, most recently achieving an error rate of 2.5% in contrast to the average human error rate of 5%; however, some commonly cited experiments with these systems demonstrate their capacity for failure.190 As illustrated in Figure 4, researchers combined a picture that an AI system correctly identified as a panda with random distortion that the computer labeled "nematode." The difference in the combined image is imperceptible to human eyes, but the AI system labeled the image as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence.
Source: Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms, Issues Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval Analyses, January 2017, p. 61.
"A Young Boy is Holding a Baseball Bat"
Source: John Launchbury, "A DARPA Perspective on Artificial Intelligence," https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/AIFull.pdf, p. 23.
Similarly, AI systems may be subject to algorithmic bias as a result of their training data. For example, researchers have repeatedly discovered instances of racial bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of diversity in the images on which the systems were trained, while some natural language processing programs have developed gender bias.192 This could hold significant implications for AI applications in a military context, particularly if such biases remain undetected and are incorporated into systems with lethal effects.
Other research organizations are also attempting to do a backwards analysis of these types of algorithms to gain a better understanding of their internal processes. In one such study, researchers analyzed a program designed to identify curtains and discovered that the AI algorithm first looked for a bed rather than a window, at which point it stopped searching the image. Researchers later learned that this was because most of the images in the training data set that featured curtains were bedrooms.201 The project demonstrated the possibility that training sets could inadvertently introduce errors into a system that might not be immediately recognized or understood by users.
Source: Evan Ackerman, "Slight Street Sign Modifications Can Completely Fool Machine Learning Algorithms," IEEE Spectrum, August 4, 2017, https://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transportation/sensors/slight-street-sign-modifications-can-fool-machine-learning-algorithms.
Finally, adversaries may be capable of deliberately introducing the kinds of image classification and other errors discussed in the "Predictability" section above. In one such case, researchers who had access to the training data set and algorithm for an image classifier on a semiautonomous vehicle used several pieces of strategically placed tape (as illustrated in Figure 6) to cause the system to identify a stop sign as a speed limit sign. In a later research effort, a team at MIT successfully tricked an image classifier into thinking that a picture of machine guns was a helicopter—without access to the system's training data or algorithm.212 These vulnerabilities highlight the need for robust data security, cybersecurity, and testing and evaluation processes as military AI applications are developed.
Many experts assert that there is a "sense of inevitability" with AI, arguing that it is bound to be substantially influential.214 Nevertheless, in January 2016, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul Selva, intimated that it may be too early to tell, pointing out that DOD is still evaluating AI's potential. He stated, "The question we're trying to pose now is, 'Do the technologies that are being developed in the commercial sector principally provide the kind of force multipliers that we got when we combined tactical nuclear weapons or precision and stealth?' If the answer is yes, then we can change the way that we fight.... If not, the military will seek to improve its current capabilities slightly to gain an edge over its adversaries."215 There are a range of opinions on AI's trajectory, and Congress may consider these future scenarios as it seeks to influence and conduct oversight of military AI applications.
While many analysts admit that military AI technology is in a stage of infancy, it is difficult to find an expert who believes that AI will be inconsequential in the long run.216 However, AI critics point to a number of trends that may minimize the technology's impact. From a technical standpoint, there is a potential that the current safety problems with AI will be insurmountable and will make AI unsuitable for military applications.217 In addition, there is a chance the perceived current inflection point in AI development will instead lead to a plateau. Some experts believe that the present family of algorithms will reach its full potential in another 10 years, and AI development will not be able to proceed without significant leaps in enabling technologies, such as chips with higher power efficiency or advances in quantum computing.218 The technology has encountered similar roadblocks in the past, resulting in periods called "AI Winters," during which the progress of AI research slowed significantly.
Another analysis asserts that AI adoption may be halted by poor expectation management. The report asserts that overhyped AI capabilities may cause frustration that will "diminish people's trust and reduce their willingness to use the system in the future."221 This effect could have a significant chilling effect on AI adoption.
The democratization of AI technology will further complicate the U.S. military's pursuit of an AI advantage. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy warns, "The fact that many technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and nonstate actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed."230 In these circumstances, AI could still influence warfighting methods, but the technology's overall impact may be limited if adversaries possess comparable capabilities.
Statements like this imply that AI's transformative potential is so great that it will challenge long-standing, foundational warfighting principles. In addition, members of the Chinese military establishment assert that AI "will lead to a profound military revolution."233 Proponents of this position point to several common factors when making their case. They argue that the world has passed from the Industrial Era of warfare into the Information Era, in which gathering, exploiting, and disseminating information will be the most consequential aspect of combat operations.
Nevertheless, given AI's disruptive potential, for better or for worse, it may be incumbent on military leaders and Congress to evaluate the implications of military AI developments and exercise oversight of emerging AI trends. Congressional actions that affect AI funding, acquisitions, norms and standards, and international competition have the potential to significantly shape the trajectory of AI development and may be critical to ensuring that advanced technologies are in place to support U.S. national security objectives and the continued efficacy of the U.S. military.
This report was originally written by Daniel S. Hoadley while he was a U.S. Air Force Fellow at the Congressional Research Service. It has been updated by Kelley M. Sayler.
This report was originally written by Daniel S. Hoadley, U.S. Air Force Fellow. It has been updated by Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Security.
China State Council, "A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan," July 20, 2017, translated by New America, https://www.newamerica.org/documents/1959/translation-fulltext-8.1.17.pdf, and Tom Simonite, "For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race," Wired, August 8, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race.
Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, p.3, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
Marcus Weisgerber, "The Pentagon's New Algorithmic Warfare Cell Gets Its First Mission: Hunt ISIS," Defense One, May 14, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/05/pentagons-new-algorithmic-warfare-cell-gets-its-first-mission-hunt-isis/137833/.
For a general overview of AI, see CRS In Focus IF10608, Overview of Artificial Intelligence, by Laurie A. Harris.
P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §238.
Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology Council, Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, October 12, 2016, p. 6, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf.
McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence, The Next Digital Frontier?, June 2017, pp. 4-6.
Govini, Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and Cloud Taxonomy, December 3, 2017, p. 9.
See Steve Ranger, "What is the IoT? Everything you need to know about the Internet of Things right now," ZDNet.com, August 21, 2018, https://www.zdnet.com/article/what-is-the-internet-of-things-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-iot-right-now/.
Kevin Kelly, "The Three Breakthroughs That Have Finally Unleashed AI on the World," Wired, October 27, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/10/future-of-artificial-intelligence.
Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2017, p. 47.
Steve Mills, Presentation at the Global Security Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 7, 2017.
Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms, Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies, Center for Naval Analysis, January 2017, p. 6.
Department of Defense, Joint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems, October 19, 2016, p. A-3.
Department of Defense, Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/DODd/300009p.pdf.
Department of Defense, Joint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems, p. A-3.
See Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems, Center for a New American Security, February 2015, pp. 6-7.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Hearing on China's Pursuit of Emerging Technologies, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., January 9, 2018, transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5244793?1; remarks by Rep. Joe Wilson.
Colin Clark, "Our Artificial Intelligence 'Sputnik Moment' is Now: Eric Schmidt and Bob Work," Breaking Defense, November 1, 2017, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/our-artificial-intelligence-sputnik-moment-is-now-eric-schmidt-bob-work/.
Jack Corrigan, "U.S. Needs a National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, Lawmakers and Experts Say," Defense One, July 14, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/07/us-needs-national-strategy-artificial-intelligence-lawmakers-and-experts-say/149644/.
Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "Pentagon Rolls Out Major Cyber, AI Strategies This Summer," Breaking Defense, July 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/pentagon-rolls-out-major-cyber-ai-strategies-this-summer/; and P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1051.
Ibid., and P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1051.
Justin Doubleday, "Project Maven Aims to Introduce AI tools into Services' Intel Systems," Inside Defense, January 5, 2018, https://insidedefense.com/inside-army/project-maven-aims-introduce-ai-tools-services-intel-systems, and Jason Sherman, "ASB: S&T Funding Inadequate to Support 'Big Bets' on Disruptive Technologies," Inside Defense, December 15, 2017, https://insidedefense.com/inside-army/asb-st-funding-inadequate-support-big-bets-disruptive-technologies.
"DARPA Announces $2 Billion Campaign to Develop Next Wave of AI Technologies," DARPA, September 7, 2018, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-09-07, and Elsa B. Kania, "Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China's Future Military Power," Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017, pp. 40-41, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Battlefield-Singularity-November-2017.pdf?mtime=20171129235804.
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 21, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf.
Executive Office of the President, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, "FY 2020 Administration Research and Development Budget Priorities," July 31, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/M-18-22.pdf.
Dr. Matthijs Broer, Chief Technology Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, Comments at Defense One Summit, November 9, 2017.
Testimony of Paul Scharre, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Hearing on China's Pursuit of Emerging Technologies.
For a discussion of recent defense acquisitions reform initiatives, see CRS Report R45068, Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), by Moshe Schwartz and Heidi M. Peters.
P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division D, Title XLIII, §4301.
Morgan Chalfant, "Congress Told to Brace for Robotic Soldiers," The Hill, March 1, 2017, http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/321825-congress-told-to-brace-for-robotic-soldiers.
See Parmy Olson, "Racist, Sexist AI Could Be a Bigger Problem than Lost Jobs," Forbes, February 26, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2018/02/26/artificial-intelligence-ai-bias-google/#3326a1951a01.
CRS discussion with Mike Garris, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Co-Chairman, Subcommittee on Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence, Committee on Technology, National Science and Technology Council, October 2, 2017.
David Ignatius, "China's application of AI should be a Sputnik moment for the U.S. But will it be?," New York Times, November 6, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-application-of-ai-should-be-a-sputnik-moment-for-the-us-but-will-it-be/2018/11/06/69132de4-e204-11e8-b759-3d88a5ce9e19_story.html?utm_term=.88a808915d9c.
See "Country Views on Killer Robots," Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, April 13, 2018, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/KRC_CountryViews_13Apr2018.pdf; and U.N. CCW Working Papers and Statements at https://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/7c335e71dfcb29d1c1258243003e8724?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=3#_Section3.
Paul Scharre, Remarks to the United Nations, Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, November 15, 2017, Geneva, Switzerland, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Scharre-Remarks-to-UN-on-Autonomous-Weapons-15-Nov-2017.pdf?mtime=20171120095806. For more information on LAWS, see CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas.
Ana Swanson, "Trump Blocks China-Backed Bid to Buy U.S. Chip Maker," The New York Times, September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.html.
Paul Scharre and Dean Cheng, Testimony to Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Hearing on China's Pursuit of Emerging Technologies. For more information on CFIUS, see CRS Report RL33388, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), by James K. Jackson.
The specific technologies that qualify as "emerging and foundational technologies" are to be identified by an interagency process led by the Department of Commerce. See P.L. 115-232, Title XVII, §1702(c). For more information on FIRRMA, see CRS In Focus IF10952, CFIUS Reform: Foreign Investment National Security Reviews, by James K. Jackson and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
Alexander Velez-Green and Paul Scharre, "The United States Can Be a World Leader in AI. Here's How.," The National Interest, November 2, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-united-states-can-be-world-leader-ai-heres-how-22921.
Marcus Weisgerber, "Pentagon Warns CEOs: Protect Your Data or Lose Our Contracts," Defense One, February 6, 2018, http://www.defenseone.com/business/2018/02/pentagon-warns-ceos-protect-your-data-or-lose-our-contracts/145779/?oref=d-river. For more on cybersecurity legislation, see CRS Report R42114, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview of Major Issues, Current Laws, and Proposed Legislation, by Eric A. Fischer.
Brad Smith, "Facial recognition: It's time for action," Microsoft, December 6, 2018, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/12/06/facial-recognition-its-time-for-action/?mod=article_inline.
P.L. 114-92, Section 2, Division A, Title VIII, §813.
2018 Report, Government-Industry Advisory Panel on Technical Data Rights, November 21, 2018, p. 5, https://sbtc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Final-Report_ExSum_TensionPapers_11132018.pdf.
This coordination threshold will be reviewed each year and adjusted upwards, as conditions warrant. Patrick Shanahan, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, "Establishment of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center," June 27, 2018, https://admin.govexec.com/media/establishment_of_the_joint_artificial_intelligence_center_osd008412-18_r.... pdf.
Shanahan, "Establishment of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center"; and Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "Joint Artificial Intelligence Center Created under DoD CIO," Breaking Defense, June 29, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/06/joint-artificial-intelligence-center-created-under-dod-cio/.
Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, "Establishment of an Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team (Project Maven)," April 26, 2017, https://www.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/establishment_of_the_awcft_project_maven.pdf.
Jack Corrigan, "Three-Star General Wants AI in Every New Weapon System," Defense One, November 3, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/three-star-general-wants-artificial-intelligence-every-new-weapon-system/142239/?oref=d-river.
CRS discussions with Dr. Richard Linderman, October 24, 2017.
Corrigan, "Three-Star General Wants AI in Every New Weapon System."
Patrick Tucker, "What the CIA's Tech Director Wants from AI," Defense One, September 6, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/09/cia-technology-director-artificial-intelligence/140801/.
CRS discussions with Dr. Jason Matheny, IARPA Director, October 10, 2017, and https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs.
Marcus Weisgerber, "Defense Firms to Air Force: Want Your Planes' Data? Pay Up," Defense One, September 19, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/09/military-planes-predictive-maintenance-technology/141133/.
Adam Stone, "Army Logistics Integrating New AI, Cloud Capabilities," September 7, 2017, https://www.c4isrnet.com/home/2017/09/07/army-logistics-integrating-new-ai-cloud-capabilities/.
Testimony of Michael Rogers, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing to Receive Testimony on Encryption and Cyber Matters, September 13, 2016, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/16-68_09-13-16.pdf.
Amaani Lyle, "National Security Experts Examine Intelligence Challenges at Summit," September 9, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/938941/national-security-experts-examine-intelligence-challenges-at-summit/.
Scott Rosenberg, "Firewalls Don't Stop Hackers, AI Might," Wired, August 27, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/firewalls-dont-stop-hackers-ai-might/.
"'Mayhem' Declared Preliminary Winner of Historic Cyber Grand Challenge," August 4, 2016, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-08-04.
For a more detailed discussion of information operations, see CRS Report R45142, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary.
Kyle Rempfer, "Ever heard of 'deep fake' technology? The phony audio and video tech could be used to blackmail US troops," Military Times, July 19, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/07/19/ever-heard-of-deep-fake-technology-the-phony-audio-and-video-tech-could-be-used-to-blackmail-us-troops/.
Allen and Chan, p. 29.
"Media Forensics (MediFor)," DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/media-forensics.
Will Knight, "The Defense Department has produced the first tools for catching deepfakes," MIT Technology Review, August 7, 2018, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611726/the-defense-department-has-produced-the-first-tools-for-catching-deepfakes/.
Clint Watts, "Artificial intelligence is transforming social media. Can American democracy survive?," Washington Post, September 5, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/09/05/artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-social-media-can-american-democracy-survive/?utm_term=.7e7a5ef245db.
Colin Clark, "'Rolling the Marble': BG Saltzman on Air Force's Multi-Domain C2 System," Breaking Defense, August 8, 2017, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/08/rolling-the-marble-bg-saltzman-on-air-forces-multi-domain-c2-system/.
Mark Pomerlau, "How Industry's Helping the US Air Force with Multi-Domain Command and Control," Defense News, September 25, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/c2-comms/2017/09/25/industry-pitches-in-to-help-air-force-with-multi-domain-command-and-control/.
"Strategic Technology Office Outlines Vision for 'Mosaic Warfare,'" DARPA, August 4, 2017, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2017-08-04.
See, for example, "Generating Actionable Understanding of Real-World Phenomena with AI," DARPA, January 4, 2019, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-01-04.
CRS Report R44940, Issues in Autonomous Vehicle Deployment, by Bill Canis, pp. 2-3.
David Axe, "US Air Force Sends Robotic F-16s into Mock Combat," The National Interest, May 16, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/us-air-force-sends-robotic-f-16s-mock-combat-20684.
Mark Pomerlau, "Loyal Wingman Program Seeks to Realize Benefits of Advancements in Autonomy," October 19, 2016, https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/uas/2016/10/19/loyal-wingman-program-seeks-to-realize-benefits-of-advancements-in-autonomy/.
For an overview of semiautonomous and autonomous ground vehicles, see CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew Feickert.
Kristin Houser, "The Marines' Latest Weapon is a Remote-Controlled Robot with a Machine Gun," May 4, 2017, https://futurism.com/the-marines-latest-weapon-is-a-remote-controlled-robot-with-a-machine-gun/.
Feickert, p. 24; and Jen Judson, "First Next-Gen Combat Vehicle and robotic wingman prototypes to emerge in 2020," Defense News, March 16, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/03/16/first-next-gen-combat-vehicle-and-robotic-wingman-prototypes-to-emerge-in-2020/.
"ACTUV 'Sea Hunter' Prototype Transitions to Office of Naval Research for Further Development," DARPA, January 30, 2018, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-01-30a.
Julian Turner, "Sea Hunter: inside the US Navy's autonomous submarine tracking vessel," Naval Technology.
Mary-Ann Russon, "Google Robot Army and Military Drone Swarms: UAVs May Replace People in the Theatre of War," International Business Times, April 16, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/google-robot-army-military-drone-swarms-uavs-may-replace-people-theatre-war-1496615.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Swarm 2: The Navy's Robotic Hive Mind," Breaking Defense, December 14, 2016, https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/swarm-2-the-navys-robotic-hive-mind/.
Gidget Fuentes, "Navy Will Test Swarming Underwater Drones in Summer Exercise," USNI News, June 26, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/06/26/navy-will-test-swarming-underwater-drones-summer-exercise; and "Department of Defense Announces Successful Micro-Drone Demonstration," Department of Defense, January 9, 2017, https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration/.
Department of Defense, Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems.
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Paul J. Selva, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and Reappointment to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 115th Cong., 1st sess., July 18, 2017 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2017).
Ibid. For a full discussion of LAWS, see CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas.
William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 368-369. In this history of technology, warfare, and international competition, McNeill discusses government mobilization of the science and engineering community. The effort started in WWII with the creation of large research and development organizations dedicated to creating war-winning technology. The government continued to pump large amounts of money into research and development during the Cold War, as technological superiority was perceived as a key measure of national strength. McNeill states, "The ultimate test of American society in its competition with the Soviets boiled down to finding out which contestant could develop superior skills in every field of human endeavor.... This would guarantee prosperity at home and security abroad." This effort had lingering effects that have persisted to some extent in the wake of the Cold War.
Alex Roland with Philip Shiman, Strategic Computing: DARPA and the Quest for Machine Intelligence, 1983-1993 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002), p. 1 and p. 285.
For example, the foundational research that eventually led to the creation of Google was funded by a National Science Foundation grant. David Hart, "On the Origins of Google," National Science Foundation, August 17, 2004, https://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=100660.
Dr. Ed Felten, Comments at the Global Security Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 7, 2017.
CRS In Focus IF10658, Autonomous Vehicles: Emerging Policy Issues, by Bill Canis.
Based on CRS discussions with Dr. Dai H. Kim, Associate Director for Advanced Computing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, October 4, 2017.
Allen and Chan, pp. 4-6.
Defense Science Board, "Design and Acquisition of Software for Defense Systems," February 2018, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSB_SWA_Report_FINALdelivered2-21-2018.pdf.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Step to Address Challenges Faced by Certain Companies, GAO-17-644, July 20, 2017, p. 9. Other rationales cited include unstable budget environment, lengthy contracting timeline, government-specific contract terms and conditions, and inexperienced DOD contracting workforce.
Marcus Weisgerber, "The Pentagon's New Artificial Intelligence is Already Hunting Terrorists," Defense One, December 21, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/12/pentagons-new-artificial-intelligence-already-hunting-terrorists/144742/.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Acquisitions, DOD is Taking Steps to Address Challenges Faced by Certain Companies.
M.L. Cummings, "Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare," Chatham House, January 2017, p. 11, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-cummings-final.pdf.
Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, "The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National-Security Threat," The Atlantic, December 13, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/growing-gulf-between-silicon-valley-and-washington/577963/.
Jim Garamone, "Defense Digital Service Emphasizes Results for Service Members," DOD News, June 26, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1560057/defense-digital-service-emphasizes-results-for-service-members/.
Ignatius, "China's Application of AI."
Kania, "Battlefield Singularity," p. 36; and Zegart and Childs, "The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington."
Allen and Chan, p. 52.
Daisuke Wakabayashi and Scott Shane, "Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That Upset Employees," New York Times, June 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-pentagon-project-maven.html.
Nitasha Tiku, "Amazon's Jeff Bezos Says Tech Companies Should Work with the Pentagon," Wired, October 15, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/amazons-jeff-bezos-says-tech-companies-should-work-with-the-pentagon/.
CRS discussion with Major Colin Carroll.
CRS discussion with Paul Scharre, Center for a New American Security, September 28, 2017.
U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on the Dawn of Artificial Intelligence, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., November 30, 2016 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016) p. 2.
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., February 9, 2016 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016), p. 4, and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, 115th Cong., 1st sess., May 11, 2017, p. 3, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-coats-051117.pdf.
China State Council, "A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan," p. 2.
Ibid., pp. 2-6. It should be noted that this sum refers to the aspirational total value of China's AI industry in 2020. Credible information about Chinese funding levels for military-specific AI applications is not available in the open source.
Jessi Hempel, "Inside Baidu's Bid to Lead the AI Revolution," Wired, December 6, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/inside-baidu-artificial-intelligence/?mbid=nl_120917_daily_list1_p4.
Aaron Tilley, "China's Rise in the Global AI Race Emerges as it Takes Over the Final ImageNet Competition," Forbes, July 31, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2017/07/31/china-ai-imagenet/#1c1419b9170a.
"Beijing to Judge Every Resident Based on Behavior by End of 2020," Bloomberg, November 21, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-21/beijing-to-judge-every-resident-based-on-behavior-by-end-of-2020. It should be noted that Chinese technology companies such as ZTE Corp are working with other authoritarian regimes to develop similar social-control systems. See, for example, Angus Berwick, "How ZTE helps Venezuela create China-style social control," Reuters, November 14, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-zte/.
Kania, "Battlefield Singularity," p. 23.
CRS discussion with Dr. Richard Linderman.
Kania, "Battlefield Singularity," p. 17.
Yujia He, "How China is Preparing for an AI-Powered Future," The Wilson Center, June 20, 2017, https://www.scribd.com/document/352605730/How-China-is-Preparing-for-an-AI-Powered-Future#from_embed, and Kania, "Battlefield Singularity," p. 19.
Will Knight, "China's AI Awakening," MIT Technology Review, October 10, 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609038/chinas-ai-awakening; and Li Yuan, "How Cheap Labor Drives China's A.I. Ambitions," The New York Times, November 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/25/business/china-artificial-intelligence-labeling.html.
Kania, "Battlefield Singularity," p. 12.
Paul Mozur and John Markoff, "Is China Outsmarting America in AI?," The New York Times, May 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/27/technology/china-us-ai-artificial-intelligence.html.
"Reform and Rebuild: The Next Steps, National Defense Authorization Act FY-2019," House Armed Services Committee, July 25, 2018, p. 18, https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/FY19%20NDAA%20Conference%20Summary%20.pdf.
Kania, "Battlefield Singularity," p. 40.
"Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping's State Visit to the United States," The White House, September 25, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states.
Dominic Barton and Jonathan Woetzel, "Artificial Intelligence: Implications for China," McKinsey Global Institute, April 2017, p. 8, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/China/Artificial%20intelligence%20Implications%20for%20China/MGI-Artificial-intelligence-implications-for-China.ashx.
Simon Baker, "Which Countries and Universities are Leading on AI Research?" Times Higher Education, World University Rankings, May 22, 2017, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/data-bites/which-countries-and-universities-are-leading-ai-research.
Stephen Chen, "China's brightest children are being recruited to develop AI 'killer bots,'" South China Morning Post, November 8, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/2172141/chinas-brightest-children-are-being-recruited-develop-ai-killer.
Dr. Caitlin Surakitbanharn, Comments at AI and Global Security Summit, Washington, DC, November 1, 2017; and CRS discussion with Dr. Jason Matheny.
This sum refers to the estimated total value of Russia's AI industry in 2017. Credible information about Russian funding levels for military-specific AI applications is not available in the open source. For comparison, DOD alone spent an estimated $2.4 billion on AI in 2017. See Govini, Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and Cloud Taxonomy, p. 7.
Jill Dougherty and Molly Jay, "Russia Tries to Get Smart about Artificial Intelligence," The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2018, https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/living-with-artificial-intelligence/russia-tries-to-get-smart-about-artificial-intelligence/; and Asgard and Roland Berger, "The Global Artificial Intelligence Landscape," Asgard, May 14, 2018, https://asgard.vc/global-ai/.
Simonite, "For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race."
Samuel Bendett, "Here's How the Russian Military Is Organizing to Develop AI," Defense One, July 20, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/russian-militarys-ai-development-roadmap/149900/.
Samuel Bendett, "Red Robots Rising: Behind the Rapid Development of Russian Unmanned Military Systems," The Strategy Bridge, December 12, 2017, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/12/12/red-robots-rising-behind-the-rapid-development-of-russian-unmanned-military-systems.
Samuel Bendett, "Should the US Army Fear Russia's Killer Robots?," The National Interest, November 8, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/should-the-us-army-fear-russias-killer-robots-23098.
Patrick Tucker, "Russia Says It Will Field a Robot Tank that Outperforms Humans," Defense One, November 8, 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/russia-robot-tank-outperforms-humans/142376/; and Bendett, "Red Robots Rising."
Tristan Greene, "Russia is Developing AI Missiles to Dominate the New Arms Race," The Next Web, July 27, 2017, https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/07/27/russia-is-developing-ai-missiles-to-dominate-the-new-arms-race/; and Kyle Mizokami, "Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot," Popular Mechanics, July 19, 2017, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-machine-guns/.
Dougherty and Jay, "Russia Tries to Get Smart."
Alina Polyakova, "Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare," Brookings Institution, November 15, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/; and Chris Meserole and Alina Polyakova, "Disinformation Wars," Foreign Policy, May 25, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/25/disinformation-wars/.
"Military expenditure by country, in constant (2016) US$ m., 1988-1997," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/1_Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932017%20in%20constant%20%282016%29%20USD.pdf.
Leon Bershidsky, "Take Elon Musk Seriously on the Russian AI Threat," Bloomberg, September 5, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-05/take-elon-musk-seriously-on-the-russian-ai-threat; and Polyakova, "Weapons of the Weak."
Allen, "Putin and Musk Are Right."
"The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons," https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument.
"Background on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the CCW," https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument.
See "Autonomous Weapons Systems: Technical, Military, Legal, and Humanitarian Aspects," Expert Meeting, International Committee of the Red Cross, March 28, 2014, https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/1707/4221-002-autonomous-weapons-systems-full-report.pdf, and "Autonomous Weapons Systems: Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons," Expert Meeting, International Committee of the Red Cross, March 16, 2016, https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/21606/ccw-autonomous-weapons-icrc-april-2016.pdf.
"Background on Lethal Autonomous Weapons in the CCW."
Paul Scharre, "We're Losing Our Chance to Regulate Killer Robots," Defense One, November 14, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/11/were-losing-our-chance-regulate-killer-robots/142517/.
For more information on the Third Offset Strategy, see CRS In Focus IF10790, What Next for the Third Offset Strategy?, by Lisa A. Aronsson.
Mick Ryan, "Integrating Humans and Machines," The Strategy Bridge, January 2, 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/1/2/integrating-humans-and-machines.
Defense Science Board, "Summer Study on Autonomy," June 9, 2016, p. 12, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSBSS15.pdf.
Office of Technical Intelligence, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, "Technical Assessment: Autonomy," February 2015, p. 4, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a616999.pdf.
Mick Ryan, "Building a Future: Integrating Human-Machine Military Organization," The Strategy Bridge, December 11, 2017, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/12/11/building-a-future-integrated-human-machine-military-organization, and CRS discussion with Paul Scharre.
Allen and Chan, p. 24.
Paul Scharre, Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk, Center for a New American Security, February 2016, p. 35.
"Highlighting Artificial Intelligence: An Interview with Paul Scharre," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11, Issue 4, November 28, 2017, pp. 18-19.
Office of Technical Intelligence, "Technical Assessment: Autonomy," p. 6.
Ryan, "Building a Future: Integrated Human-Machine Military Organization."
Ronald C. Arklin, "A Roboticist's Perspective on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems," Perspectives on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Occasional Papers, No. 30, November 2017, p. 36.
Allen and Chan, p. 23.
Jon Harper, "Artificial Intelligence to Sort through ISR Data Glut," National Defense, January 16, 2018, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/1/16/artificial-intelligence-to--sort-through-isr-data-glut.
Bernard Marr, "Big Data: 20 Mind-Boggling Facts Everyone Must Read," Forbes, September 30, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/09/30/big-data-20-mind-boggling-facts-everyone-must-read/#539121d317b1. For reference 1 zettabyte = 1 trillion gigabytes.
Allen and Chan, p. 27, and Ilachinski, p. 140.
Allen and Chan, p. 32.
Cade Metz, "In Two Moves, AlphaGo and Lee Sedol Redefined the Future," Wired, March 16, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/two-moves-alphago-lee-sedol-redefined-future/.
Paul Scharre, "A Security Perspective: Security Concerns and Possible Arms Control Approaches," Perspectives on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Occasional Papers, No. 30, November 2017, p. 24.
Quoted in Mark Pomerlau, "DARPA Director Clear-Eyed and Cautious on AI," Government Computer News, May 10, 2016, https://gcn.com/articles/2016/05/10/darpa-ai.aspx.
AI Index, "2017 Annual AI Index Report," November 2017, p. 26, http://cdn.aiindex.org/2017-report.pdf.
Defense Science Board, "Summer Study on Autonomy," p. 14.
Brian Barrett, "Lawmakers Can't Ignore Facial Recognition's Bias Anymore," Wired, July 26, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-facial-recognition-congress-bias-law-enforcement/; and Will Knight, "How to Fix Silicon Valley's Sexist Algorithms," MIT Technology Review, November 23, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602950/how-to-fix-silicon-valleys-sexist-algorithms/.
Aaron M. Bornstein, "Is Artificial Intelligence Permanently Inscrutable?," Nautilus, September 1, 2016, http://nautil.us/issue/40/learning/is-artificial-intelligence-permanently-inscrutable.
Paul Scharre, "The Lethal Autonomous Weapons Governmental Meeting, Part 1: Coping with Rapid Technological Change," Just Security, November 9, 2017, https://www.justsecurity.org/46889/lethal-autonomous-weapons-governmental-meeting-part-i-coping-rapid-technological-change/.
Paul Scharre, Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk, Center for a New American Security, February 2016, p. 23.
The MITRE Corporation, "Perspectives on Research in Artificial Intelligence and Artificial General Intelligence Relevant to DOD," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, January 2017, p. 32.
Dr. Dario Amodei, Comments at AI and Global Security Summit, Washington, DC, November 1, 2017.
John Markoff, "How Many Computers to Identify a Cat? 16,000." The New York Times, June 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/technology/in-a-big-network-of-computers-evidence-of-machine-learning.html.
David Gunning, "Explainable AI Program Description," November 4, 2017, https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/XAIIndustryDay_Final.pptx.
Bornstein, "Is Artificial Intelligence Permanently Inscrutable?"
Dawn Meyerriecks, Comments at the Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence Workshop, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, November 13, 2017.
Eric Van Den Bosch, "Human Machine Decision Making and Trust," in Closer than You Think: The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the US Army (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2017), p.111.
U.S. Air Force, Office of the Chief Scientist, "Autonomous Horizons, System Autonomy in the Air Force," p. 17.
DSB Study on Autonomy, pp. 14-15.
Amy Nordrum, "Darpa Invites Techies to Turn Off-the-Shelf Products into Weapons in New 'Improv' Challenge," IEEE Spectrum, March 11, 2016, https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/aerospace/military/darpa-invites-techies-to-turn-offtheshelf-products-into-weapons-in-new-improv-challenge.
Louise Matsakis, "Researchers Fooled a Google AI into Thinking a Rifle was a Helicopter," Wired, December 20, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/researcher-fooled-a-google-ai-into-thinking-a-rifle-was-a-helicopter/?mbid=nl_122117_daily_list1_p2.
"War at Hyperspeed, Getting to Grips with Military Robotics," The Economist, January 25, 2018, https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21735478-autonomous-robots-and-swarms-will-change-nature-warfare-getting-grips.
Allen and Chan, p. 50.
Andrew Clevenger, "The Terminator Conundrum: Pentagon Weighs Ethics of Paring Deadly Force, AI," Defense News, January 23, 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/2016/01/23/the-terminator-conundrum-pentagon-weighs-ethics-of-pairing-deadly-force-ai/.
Brian Bergstein, "The Great AI Paradox," MIT Technology Review, December 15, 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609318/the-great-ai-paradox/.
"Highlighting Artificial Intelligence: An Interview with Paul Scharre," p. 17.
CRS Discussions with Dr. Dai Kim.
Gautam Mukunda, "We Cannot Go On: Disruptive Innovation and the First World War Royal Navy," Security Studies, Vol. 19, Issue 1, February, 23, 2010, p. 136. For more on this topic, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1986), and Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1994).
Patrick Tucker, "Here's How to Stop Squelching New Ideas, Eric Schmidt's Advisory Board Tells DOD," Defense One, January 17, 2018, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/01/heres-how-stop-squelching-new-ideas-eric-schmidts-advisory-board-tells-DOD/145240/.
"Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030," One Hundred Year Study on AI, Report of the 2015 Study Panel, Stanford University, September 2016, p. 42.
Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY Preparing for War in the Robotic Age, Center for a New American Security, January 2014, p. 7.
"War at Hyperspeed, Getting to Grips with Military Robotics."
Kareem Ayoub and Kenneth Payne, "Strategy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39. No. 5, November 2015, p. 816.
Peter W. Singer, Wired for War, The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), pp. 305-311.
Mark Grimsley, "Surviving the Military Revolution: The US Civil War," in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.74.
Christian Davenport, "Robots, Swarming Drones, and Iron Man: Welcome to the New Arms Race," The Washington Post, June 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/06/17/robots-swarming-drones-and-iron-man-welcome-to-the-new-arms-race/?hpid=hp_rhp-more-top-stories_no-name%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.00284eba0a01.
Department of Defense, Joint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems, p. 18, and Elsa Kania, "Strategic Innovation and Great Power Competition," The Strategy Bridge, January 31, 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/1/31/strategic-innovation-and-great-power-competition.
Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, p. 3.
John R. Allen and Amir Husain, "On Hyperwar," Proceedings, July 2017, p. 30.
Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, p. 3, and "War at Hyperspeed, Getting to Grips with Military Robotics."
Kania, "Battlefield Singularity," p. 8.
Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, "The Future Behind Us," in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 178.
James W. Mancillas, "Integrating AI into Military Operations: A Boyd Cycle Framework," in Closer than You Think: The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the US Army (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2017), p. 74.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Environment 2035, The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World, July 14, 2016, p. 18, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917.
Allen and Husain, pp. 31-33.
Scharre, "A Security Perspective: Security Concerns and Possible Arms Control Approaches," p. 26.
Jurgen Altmann and Frank Sauer, "Autonomous Weapons and Strategic Stability," Survival, Vol. 59, No. 5, October – November 2017, pp. 121-127.
Williamson Murray, p. 154 and p. 185.

References: §238
 §1051
 §1051
 §4301
 §1702
 §813