Source: https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/clash-of-the-titans
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 23:06:34+00:00

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abstract. “To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution?” Nearly 230 years have passed since we were first confronted with that opening line from Federalist No. 51, yet this question has not become any easier to answer. Although the struggle to delineate an appropriate separation of powers spans numerous arenas, one area of escalating concern is the debate over immigration policy. The Third Circuit recently engaged a sliver of that debate in Castro v. Department of Homeland Security, when it held that immigrants in expedited removal proceedings have no constitutional rights regarding their application to enter the United States—and thus may be denied habeas corpus at the legislature’s discretion without violating the Suspension Clause. This Essay challenges that conclusion, contending that judicial review over immigration procedures remains an invaluable safeguard in our constitutional system.
In so holding, the Third Circuit opinion pits the power of the political branches against the power of the judiciary4 in a sphere where each is traditionally at its peak.5 Since neither the power to regulate immigration nor Article III habeas jurisdiction is explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has tremendous influence in shaping their contours.6 As to the former, the Court has asserted that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”7 Yet as to the latter, the Court has repeatedly demonstrated that inadmissible, first-time immigrants can file habeas petitions to challenge their removal orders, even in circumstances where Congress clearly intended to abrogate judicial review.8 In Castro, the Third Circuit assumed the unprecedented task of attempting to resolve these competing doctrines—ultimately holding that Congress’s plenary power over immigration prevails.
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case,9 Castro raises significant legal issues. As the Trump Administration continues to craft new immigration policies, it is likely that habeas corpus will be used to challenge those policies.10 Consequently, Castro may provide guidance to lawyers on both sides as they litigate the claims of asylum seekers. Highlighting the unique tension between Congress’s plenary immigration power and the Suspension Clause, this Essay proceeds in four Parts. Part I reviews the Castro opinion to set the stage for a deeper discussion of the interplay between habeas corpus and immigration law. Part II traces the origin of habeas corpus, which sheds light on the proper scope of habeas corpus in Part III. Part IV considers the normative and practical ramifications of expanding habeas corpus review beyond the context of expedited removal. Ultimately, this Essay concludes that while the law in this area is muddled, there are grounds for departing from the Third Circuit’s analysis in future cases.
Against this backdrop, Castro posed a simple question: does the level of judicial review afforded by expedited removal—essentially limited to adjudicating “mistaken-identity claims”15—violate the Suspension Clause? While reaching the same answer, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Third Circuit differed remarkably in their rationale. Relying primarily on Boumediene v. Bush,16 the district court found that immigrants in expedited removal proceedings had a right to habeas corpus, but that the scope of their right was “limited” and that expedited removal did not violate it.17 The Third Circuit, however, denied their right to petition altogether.18 Ultimately, this split is traceable to two persistent ambiguities: first, confusion over the source of habeas jurisdiction, and second, debate over the scope of the writ. The next Part addresses each ambiguity in turn.
This history has enormous ramifications for Castro. As the petitioners noted, a significant body of precedent exists in which immigrants at the border obtained judicial review of their removal orders through habeas.26 However, until the REAL ID Act, most immigrants filed their claims under the general habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.27 Thus, in hearing these petitions, courts were merely exercising the jurisdiction granted to them by Congress. Any clash between judicial review and immigration policy was a conflict of congressional making.28 Because the REAL ID Act nullified 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in expedited removal cases,29 immigration precedent cannot now independently provide a basis for habeas jurisdiction. To hear these claims, courts must draw on the prerogative that once animated the writ—a jurisdiction premised on the need to maintain a proper balance and exercise of power.
The Clause protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account . . . .
If Justice Kennedy is correct, then courts retain inherent habeas jurisdiction even in areas—like expedited removal—that lie deep in the heart of congressional plenary power, because the Suspension Clause exists to prevent overreaching by the other branches. Consequently, any statute that purports to revoke jurisdiction in a manner that wrongfully deprives individuals of their opportunity to be heard violates the Suspension Clause.
By focusing on the petitioners’ legal status rather than on prerogative, the Third Circuit avoided answering the difficult question of whether habeas jurisdiction exists in the absence of statutory authorization. Fundamentally, the Third Circuit held that expedited removal did not violate the Suspension Clause because inadmissible immigrants like Rosa Castro lacked standing to raise a constitutional claim.37 In so doing, the court mimicked the first step of the Boumediene analysis—namely, that individuals may be barred from “invoking the protections of the Suspension Clause . . . because of their status . . . .”38 Yet, while relying on this concept from Boumediene, the Third Circuit seemed to reach a contradictory result. If enemy alien combatants can invoke the Suspension Clause, it seems anomalous that single mothers and young children cannot. Intuitive as this may seem, however, the law remains murky. Boumediene may not apply outside an extraterritoriality analysis.39 Furthermore, even if it does, it remains unclear which types of claims petitioners can raise. The following Section highlights a few brief observations about petitioners’ cognizable rights.
Regardless of Boumediene’s applicability to expedited removal, there are strong historical reasons to believe that an individual’s placement into expedited removal proceedings cannot restrict a courts’ habeas jurisdiction over his or her claims. As habeas scholars repeatedly note, in its earliest form, habeas jurisdiction was related to prerogative: the question was whether a jailer could be held accountable, and it did not concern the rights or status of the petitioner.40 Indeed, historically, access to habeas was not predicated on citizenship status until the Suspension Act of 1777, when Parliament imposed citizenship-based limitations to enable the prolonged detention of American sailors.41 Many have suggested that it was this very suspension that inspired the Suspension Clause.42 Because the Suspension Clause sought to “restor[e] the traditional order of writs . . . that had existed before the Parliamentary suspension acts that began in 1777,”43 the writ should theoretically extend to non-citizens.
In light of this ambiguity, the literature is riddled with speculation about the scope of habeas protections.51 Thoughtful analysis offered by numerous scholars suggests that the petitioners’ lack of due process rights does not automatically bar courts from exercising jurisdiction over their habeas claims. Some measure of procedural protection is required.
In part, this confusion over mixed claims is a natural consequence of seemingly incompatible Supreme Court precedents. The Court has extended habeas protections to noncitizens in Boumediene and St. Cyr—in direct contravention of statutory intent—and yet consistently upheld the plenary power doctrine.61 The result is that, in some cases, the Court has used the Suspension Clause to grant noncitizens the opportunity to bring mixed questions before an Article III court while, in others, it has held that judicial review of very similar claims may be curtailed or even eliminated.62 So which is it? Do the principles of Boumediene and St. Cyr carry into expedited removal? Or does plenary power control? Perhaps more importantly, how is a lower court to decide?
Because both leading Suspension Clause cases (like Boumediene and St. Cyr) and iconic plenary power cases (like Knauff and Eiku) rest on strong doctrinal foundations, divergent analyses are likely to persist. Unless and until the Supreme Court intervenes, the issue of what rights are cognizable in habeas will be far from settled. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, there is a strong historical argument that the petitioners’ habeas claims were wrongfully denied by the Third Circuit in Castro. Unfortunately, for reasons articulated in the following Part, efforts to reclaim these habeas rights will likely face an uphill battle.
Beyond examining the source and scope of habeas corpus, it is worth considering the practical implications of extending full habeas review to expedited removal cases. While “[t]he American rule of law . . . depends on neutral, impartial judges who say what the law is, not what the law should be,” even those most committed to this ideal acknowledge that “it is probably not possible in all cases.”66 Rather, “on occasion the relevant constitutional or statutory provision may actually require the judge to consider policy and perform a common law-like function.”67 Whether Castro presents one of those occasions is open to debate. Nevertheless, it seems prudent to spend some time discussing policy considerations.
In 2016, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, reported: “As governments around the world face increasingly complex migration challenges, the difference between success and failure can often hinge on the ability of policymakers to win and maintain public trust.”68 MPI points to two factors that are “particularly important” to maintaining public trust—namely, “the ability to select a significant majority of a country’s newcomers, and to properly assess asylum claims.”69 The salience of these factors should not be surprising: they implicate both national security and national sympathy, border control and controlled compassion. An immigration policy that achieves these goals could ease anxieties on both sides of the aisle, and thereby boost public confidence in our entire immigration scheme. Expedited removal is important because it cuts to the heart of both selection and asylum. Castro in turn cuts deeper still, forcing us to define and defend a system for navigating these issues and for identifying who gets to decide if that system is within constitutional bounds.
It seems rather uncontroversial that Congress should take the lead in the policymaking function of MPI’s first prong, but which branch we entrust with ensuring the proper assessment of asylum claims depends largely on the meaning of “properly.” If proper is thought of in terms of morality or prudence, Congress seems the proper decider: as the branch entrusted with legislation, Congress possesses the expertise and constitutional authorization to craft a “uniform Rule of Naturalization,” which encompasses asylum-seeking immigrants.70 On the other hand, if proper refers to the impartial “application or interpretation of relevant law,”71 this function falls squarely within the prerogative of the judiciary. Thus, courts should defer to Congress on policy issues, but for questions regarding procedural fairness, courts would be remiss to abdicate their role.
Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to legislative judgment. Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend before political branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy which comprise substantive law.
For Justice Jackson, then, as for Justice Kennedy, courts play a crucial role in maintaining the separation of powers. Without intruding on policymaking, judges are uniquely situated to secure liberty and protect against governmental overreaching by ensuring procedural fairness through habeas corpus. Habeas jurisdiction should extend to mixed questions of law and fact like those raised by the petitioners in Castro.
Despite these practical concerns, the fact remains that the petitioners have a potentially viable claim to habeas protections. And while Castro’s holding may be politically or practically convenient, securing a comfortable outcome using a flawed legal theory does not ultimately advance the cause of justice.83 Honest legal analysis is the courts’ most powerful check on the other branches. So long as the relationship between habeas and plenary power remains ambiguous, it is the prerogative of the judiciary to grapple with these difficult issues.
If courts possess independent habeas jurisdiction as a function of judicial prerogative and the separation of powers—and if the petitioners’ status does not preclude them from invoking habeas protections—the Third Circuit erred in its legal analysis. If mixed questions of law and fact are included in the scope of permissible habeas claims under Boumediene and St. Cyr, the Eastern District likely erred as well. Finally, if both courts erred and the petitioners necessarily possess habeas rights because habeas itself affords rights, the entire expedited removal scheme may be in jeopardy. This conclusion contains a lot of provisional ifs. However, as asylum applications continue to proliferate, other circuits may very soon have a fresh opportunity to address these points of confusion and bring increased clarity to the habeas corpus and plenary power doctrines.
The questions raised by expedited removal are not likely to disappear any time soon. In the meantime, individuals like Rosa Castro remain in detention awaiting a chance to appeal their denials of asylum. Castro is a case where legal theory comes alive—where ideals confront harsh realities, with families and children caught in the crossfire. By denying certiorari in Castro, the Supreme Court lost a remarkable opportunity to clarify existing doctrine and resolve questions about the source of habeas jurisdiction, the applicability of Boumediene and St. Cyr to immigration law, the scope of an appropriate habeas claim, and the proper balance of power between Congress and courts. It lost an opportunity to ensure that the petitioners received the procedural protections guaranteed them by statute—to fulfill an oversight role that was theirs under the Suspension Clause. But similar opportunities will surface in the future. The conflicting legal principles are far too entrenched to be resolved solely by lower courts. Only the Supreme Court possesses the constitutional authority necessary to engage Congress on this issue, and, until it does, ambiguity will persist. As other cases materialize, the time will come to dispense with the legal murkiness. The time is coming for the Court to say what the law is.
Annika Mizel is a member of the Yale Law School J.D. Class of 2018. Special thanks to Professor Eugene Fidell for his encouragement and feedback on an earlier draft of this Essay, to Professor Lucas Guttentag for providing the inspiration for this topic, and to Elizabeth King and Corrine Waite for being invaluable sounding boards during the writing process. Thanks also to Rich Medina, Meenu Krishnan, and Arjun Ramamurti of the Yale Law Journal for their invaluable editorial suggestions. All errors are my own.
Preferred Citation: Annika Mizel, Clash of the Titans: Plenary Power and Habeas Corpus in Castro, 127 Yale L.J. F. 270 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum /clash-of-the-titans.
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016).
Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 47, 64 (2012).
Paul D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire 7 (2010).
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 137 S.Ct. 1581 (2017).
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 163 F. Supp. 3d 157, 158 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 8, at 9.
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 8, at 2.
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 163 F. Supp. 3d 157, 168-69 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445-46 (3d Cir. 2016).
Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 6, at 50-51.
Halliday, supra note 3, at 65-69.
See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304-11 (2001).
See Halliday, supra note 3, at 67.
Garrett, supra note 2, at 83.
553 U.S. 723, 776, 792 (2008).
Id. at 745, 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 442-45 (3d Cir. 2016).
Vladeck, supra note 22, at 957.
See generally Garrett, supra note 2, at 51-52.
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
See Castro, 835 F.3d at 445.
Garrett, supra note 2, at 52 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785).
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 8, at 33 (emphasis added).
Respondents’ Brief, supra note 44, at 60-61.
See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 12, at 20-21, 30, 33-34.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2007) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 44, at 54-64.
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
Respondents’ Brief, supra note 44, at 40-42.
Castro, 835 F.3d at 445-46.
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2120 (2016).
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 223-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Papademetriou, supra note 68, at 9.
Castro, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 162.
The Third Circuit’s discussion of the Suspension Clause challenge is literally divided into three sections—one for habeas corpus, another for plenary power, and a third for their jurisdictional collision in expedited removal.
Compare Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”), with INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”).
The power to regulate immigration is “inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation,” Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892), and congressional authority over immigration is often attributed to a combination of the Naturalization Clause—which grants Congress the power “To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization”—and the Necessary and Proper Clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 4, 18; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983). However, there is no constitutional provision that explicitly addresses the power to secure and regulate national borders. Similarly, while the Suspension Clause clearly places limits on the suspension of habeas corpus, there is significant scholarly debate over whether that negative prohibition also creates Article III habeas corpus jurisdiction and a positive right to the writ. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Federal Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and Post-Conviction Litigation 43-53 (2013).
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (quoting Knauff).
See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 436-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[D]espite the statutes’ finality provisions appearing to strip courts of all jurisdiction to review the Executive’s immigration-related determinations, the Supreme Court consistently recognized the ability of immigrants to challenge the legality of their exclusion or deportation through habeas corpus.”); Brief for Appellants Rosa Elida Castro, et al. at 13, Castro, 835 F.3d 422 (No. 16-1339) (“[E]ven excludable noncitizens have always been entitled to habeas.”) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief].
Indeed, the first legal challenge to President Trump’s highly contested executive order on immigration was framed in part as a petition for habeas corpus. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (“Judicial review of any determination made under section 1225(b)(1) of [the provision governing inspection of applicants for admission into the United States] is available in habeas corpus proceedings, but shall be limited to determinations of (a) whether the petitioner is an alien, (b) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under such section, and (c) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, has been admitted as a refugee under section 1157 of this title, or has been granted asylum under section 1158 of this title, such status not having been terminated, and is entitled to such further inquiry as prescribed by the Attorney General pursuant to section 1225(b)(1)(C) of this title.”) (emphasis added).
Stephen I. Vladeck, Book Review: The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 950 (2011) (reviewing Halliday, supra note 3).
Id. at 959 (“[T]he short version is that the more Parliament intervened, the weaker the writ became.”).
See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 93-94 (1807) (“[T]he power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law.”).
See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 8, at 12 (“If the government’s jurisdictional position were now to prevail, it would be the first time in U.S. history that noncitizens were denied access to the Great Writ to challenge the legal validity of their removal orders.”).
Even in INS v. St. Cyr, which labeled a jurisdiction-stripping statute constitutionally suspect, the Supreme Court did not invoke common law jurisdiction. Instead, in a strategic act of statutory interpretation, it held that the provisions at issue did not actually rescind 28 U.S.C. § 2241, allowing the Court to resolve the merits of St. Cyr’s claim under the auspices of statutory authorization. Id. at 310, 314.
See generally Jed. S. Rakoff, The Magna Carta Betrayed?, N.Y. Rev. Books (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/02/11/the-magna-carta-betrayed [http://perma.cc/PC43-MWDF] (describing the historical origins of the writ of habeas corpus and its gradual diminishment in U.S. law).
Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The Reach of the Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 719, 767 (2012).
Not all scholars embrace this view. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 Const. Comment. 385, 387-90 (2010) (examining statements by the Framers, among other things, as evidence that “the [alleged] strong connection between habeas and the separation of powers” is “neither obvious nor necessary”).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008). Note that while original habeas corpus did not disqualify petitioners based on status, American law often does.
The Third Circuit declined to follow Boumediene’s multi-factor test precisely because they deemed it “of limited utility” outside the Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Castro, 835 F.3d at 445 n.25.
See Brief for Scholars of Habeas Corpus Law, Federal Courts, and Constitutional Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and Reversal at 20-21, Castro, 835 F.3d 422 (No. 16-1339); Garrett, supra note 2, at 61 (“[T]he common law writ was not based on a modern concept of individual rights, but rather a royal prerogative . . . .”).
Response Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 48-49, Castro, 835 F.3d 422 (No. 16-1339) [Hereinafter Respondents’ Brief].
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 802 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Mary Van Houten, The Post-Boumediene Paradox: Habeas Corpus or Due Process?, 67 Stan. L. Rev. Online 9, 11 (2014), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/the-post-boumediene-paradox-habeas-corpus-or-due-process [http://perma.cc/FJF2-V7RA] (quoting Garrett, supra note 2).
See generally Garrett, supra note 2 (divorcing habeas jurisdiction from due process rights); Geltzer, supra note 33 (identifying competing views on the relationship between habeas corpus and due process); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 459 (2006) (exploring four models of habeas corpus in immigration). But see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1392-96 (1953) (arguing that due process and habeas corpus are necessarily intertwined); Van Houten, supra note 50 (similar).
See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”) (internal citations omitted).
Some may try to distinguish Boumediene and St. Cyr based on the inadequacy of the habeas substitute afforded by the statutory scheme in those cases. However, because the Third Circuit in Castro never reached the issue, this Essay focuses primarily on entitlement to the right, rather than on the means by which that right should be fulfilled. See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445-46 (3d Cir. 2016) (declining to reach the issue of whether expedited removal provides an adequate habeas substitute after concluding that petitioners “cannot invoke . . . the Suspension Clause”).
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 163 F. Supp. 3d 157, 169 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 414, 420 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Maintaining Public Trust in the Governance of Migration, Migration Pol’y Inst. 1 (May 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_Trust-PublicAnxiety-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y58D-5TFB]. The MPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank based in Washington, D.C. This report was authored by the MPI’s Transatlantic Council on Migration, a widely respected international body devoted to cutting-edge policy analysis and evaluation. Id.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 287 (8th ed. 2016).
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 163 F. Supp. 3d 157, 162 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (reporting that the number of immigrants who expressed a fear of return rose from 5,250 in Fiscal Year 2009 to 51,001 in Fiscal Year 2014).
Id. at 174 (“The procedures Petitioners urge—necessitating pleadings, formal court proceedings, evidentiary review, and the like—would make expedited removal . . . impossible.”).
Indeed, Justice Jackson—the advocate of fair procedures in Mezei—compared the discovery of a “meritorious [habeas] application” to finding a needle in a haystack. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government . . . .”).

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