Source: https://arkansasappeals.com/2016/10/09/the-arkansas-supreme-court-clarifies-the-standard-for-terminating-consensual-guardianships-of-minors/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 07:06:19+00:00

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The Arkansas statute governing guardianships provides that “[a] guardianship may be terminated by court order . . . [if] . . . the guardianship is no longer necessary or for the best interest of the ward.”2 While this statute might appear to be straightforward, there have been four major Arkansas Supreme Court cases in the last six years or so dealing with this issue, each of them with a concurrence, a dissent, or both.
Some of the complexity arises because of a 2000 case from the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with grandparent visitation. This article will begin with a short synopsis of that case, and then move to the evolution of this area of law in light of that opinion.
Although the Troxel decision would eventually become important in termination of consensual guardianship cases in Arkansas, the first major Arkansas case on point that began to move the needle in favor of parental rights did so without relying on Troxel.
The standard in termination of guardianship cases, as set forth in the statute, is (1) whether the guardianship is no longer necessary, or (2) whether termination is in the best interests of the ward.
When evaluating a petition to terminate a consensual guardianship, the first question is whether the guardianship is still necessary.
When considering whether a guardianship is still necessary, the “paramount consideration” is the best interests of the child.
If the guardianship has been in place for a long period of time, the stability of the child’s environment is a “critical factor” in determining the best interests of the child.
The material-change-of-circumstances standard does not apply in termination of guardianship cases.
This last clarification was important because, until Graham was decided, there was a question as to whether a parent seeking to terminate a consensual guardianship had to meet the heightened standard of a material change of circumstances.
In a footnote in his concurring opinion in Graham, Chief Justice Hannah noted that neither party had raised the issue of whether Arkansas’ guardianship termination statute ran afoul of the holding in Troxel that fit parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their children.6 Three years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court would have the opportunity to address that issue directly.
The first Arkansas case to address termination of consensual guardianships in light of Troxel was S.H. I. In that case, the child’s mother had consented to allow the child’s paternal grandparents to be guardians of the child. Approximately 18 months later, the child’s mother sought to terminate the guardianship, but the circuit court denied the mother’s petition.
Once the parent meets this burden, a presumption arises that termination is in the child’s best interest, and the guardians bear the burden of overcoming that presumption.
on both prongs of the test. Second, she argued that the majority opinion had left the burden of proof on the first prong of the test unclear.
In the second appeal of this case, the Arkansas Supreme Court would clarify the burden on both prongs of the test.
After S.H. I was remanded, the circuit court applied the two-prong test, but still denied the petition to terminate the guardianship. Therefore, the case was appealed again. The court’s decision, which announced the burdens to be applied to both prongs of the test, was a 3-2-2 decision, with Justice Wood writing the opinion of the court, Justice Baker writing a concurring opinion, and Justice Danielson writing a dissenting opinion.
For the second prong, the court held that once the burden shifts to the guardian to prove that it is in the best interest of the child for the guardianship to continue, the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applies. The court held that this standard applied because otherwise, the guardian and the parent would be on an equal playing field.
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Baker, referred back to the court’s opinion in Graham v. Matheny that the termination statute is a disjunctive statute. Therefore, the concurring justices argued, a parent seeking to terminate a consensual guardianship need only prove that the guardianship is no longer necessary or that termination would be in the best interest of the child.
Indeed, that change would come less than three months later.
denied the father’s petition to terminate the guardianship.
Because the court was not bound by the law of the case doctrine in W.L., the court returned to the plain language of the statute and held that the test to terminate a consensual guardianship is a disjunctive test. Because of this, the court held that a parent seeking to terminate a guardianship may proceed under either prong of the test.
As he had in S.H. II, Justice Danielson wrote a dissent in W.L. He argued that the court’s opinion had strayed from the text of the guardianship statute because that statute provides that a guardianship “may” be terminated if the guardianship is no longer necessary or if termination is in the best interest of the ward.
Practical Considerations in the Aftermath of W.L.
court terminate the guardianship. Given the ease with which a fit parent can terminate a consensual guardianship under this prong of the test, a parent seeking to terminate a consensual guardianship should almost always proceed under this prong. Typically, the analysis will end there, and the parent’s revocation of consent will terminate the guardianship.
There are, however, a few problems that could still prevent a parent who revokes consent from regaining custody of the child. First, recall that the Troxel presumption applies only to fit parents. Therefore, a guardian seeking to keep the guardianship in place could seek to have the parent declared unfit. There is a lengthy discussion of parental unfitness in W.L., but to summarize, the guardians would have a high burden to meet on this point in order to continue the guardianship.
Second, the court in W.L. acknowledged that the statute provides that a guardianship “may” be terminated if the reasons for the guardianship no longer exist, but held that there were no facts in W.L. that would overcome the fundamental right of the father in that case to raise his own child. The author of this article is aware of at least one case where a circuit court relied on this footnote to deny a petition by a fit parent to terminate a consensual guardianship.
Third, given that parents often consent to guardianships in a time of upheaval in their own life, such as during a divorce, it is important to bear in mind that once the guardianship is terminated, there is often still a custody determination to be made between the two parents. This is important because one parent could succeed in having a guardianship terminated, only to have the other parent attempt to gain custody.
the guardianship terminated. In this and most other consensual guardianship cases, simply informing the court of the revocation of consent (by filing a petition to terminate the guardianship) will be sufficient to terminate the guardianship.
Whether you agree with the decision in W.L. or not, one thing is clear: an area of the law that once created significant confusion is now subject to a very straightforward analysis.
1. See Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 2012 Ark. App. 695.
2. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-401(b).
3. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000).
4. Graham v. Matheny, 2009 Ark. 481, at 14, 346 S.W.3d 273, 280–81.
5. Smith v. Thomas, 373 Ark. 427, 433, 284 S.W.3d 476, 480 (2008).
6. Graham v. Matheny, 2009 Ark. 481, 16, 346 S.W.3d 273, 281 (Hannah, C.J., concurring).
7. In the Matter of the Guardianship of S.H., 2012 Ark. 245, 22, 409 S.W.3d 307, 320 (“S.H. I”).
8. By the time S.H. I was decided, the Arkansas Supreme Court had adopted Troxel’s holding that fit parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interest and had held that the Arkansas Grandparental Visitation Act was unconstitutional. Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 72 S.W.3d 841 (2002).
9. The Arkansas Supreme Court in S.H. I cited to 15 cases that had so held.
10. S.H. I, 2012 Ark. 245, at 14, 409 S.W.3d at 316.
11. In the Matter of the Guardianship of S.H., 2015 Ark. 75, at 10, 455 S.W.3d 313, 320 (“S.H. II”).
12. S.H. II, 2015 Ark. 75, at 15, 455 S.W.3d at 322.
13. In the Matter of the Guardianship of W.L., 2015 Ark. 289, at 8, 467 S.W.3d 129, 134.
14. Id., at 6, 467 S.W.3d at 132-33.
15. Id., at 8, 467 S.W.3d at 134.
16. Id., at 15 n.6, 467 S.W.3d at 137 n.6.
This article was originally published in The Arkansas Lawyer, Vol. 51, No. 1, Winter 2016.

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