Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/184-windsor-avenue-llc-v-state-274-conn-302-2005/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 05:57:58+00:00

Document:
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
1. The trial court properly granted the state’s motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs contract claim, the statutes pertaining to claims against the state not having expressly or impliedly waived sovereign immunity with respect to contracts such as the lease agreement between the plaintiff and the state; in the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff could not bring suit against the state for claims arising out of the lease without authorization from the claims commissioner, and the plaintiff failed to challenge the claims commissioner’s denial of authorization before the legislature as provided by § 4-159.
(e), and, therefore, the plaintiff did not have an enforceable property interest in the income that would be generated by the tax escalation clause.
Officially released July 5, 2005.
Action to recover damages for the alleged breach of a lease agreement, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, where the court, A. Santos, J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Richard P. Weinstein, with whom, on the brief, was Nathan A. Schatz, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas J. Davis, Jr., assistant attorney general, with whom were Maite Barainca, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiff, 184 Windsor Avenue, LLC, brought this action for damages and declaratory relief against the defendant, the state of Connecticut, alleging that the state’s failure to pay rent due under the tax escalation clause of a lease agreement between the parties constituted a breach of contract and an uncompensated taking in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs action was barred by sovereign immunity. On appeal,  the plaintiff contends that the state: (1) impliedly waived its sovereign immunity when it voluntarily entered into the lease agreement; and (2) is not protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from the takings claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
predecessor entered into two leases with the state on or about May 20, 1998, for the administrative and industrial use of two suites by the state board of education and services for the blind (education board). Negotiations for the leases had begun in 1997, and lease proposal outlines were drafted by an assistant attorney general and signed by the plaintiff by the end of that year. These lease proposals also were signed by the commissioner of the department of public works and approved by the chairman of the state properties review board (review board) on April 6, 1998. At that time, both leases contained a provision indicating that the state would pay, as additional rent, increases in real estate property taxes for the duration of the lease agreements (tax escalation clause), using October 1, 1998, as the base date from which increases would be calculated.
On May 8, 1998, the plaintiff requested that the base date be amended to October 1, 1997, in order to account for improvements that it had made to the property for the benefit of the education board during this period. The state offered to move the base date back even farther to October 1, 1996, which is the date that currently appears in the lease. On or about May 20, 1998, the state’s representative signed the amended lease agreements. The state has, however, refused to pay the additional sums it allegedly owes under the tax escalation clauses, and has expressed an unwillingness to make such payments in the future. The education board nevertheless continues to occupy the plaintiffs premises.
claim, as well as its request for permission to sue the state, and advised the plaintiff that its claim would be submitted to the General Assembly for a final determination.
The plaintiff, however, did not pursue the matter further with the General Assembly. Instead, the plaintiff brought this action against the state alleging that the state’s failure to pay the moneys owed under the tax escalation clauses constituted: (1) a breach of the agreements; and (2) a taking of the plaintiff’s property without just compensation. The plaintiff sought damages and a declaratory judgment stating that the tax escalation clauses are enforceable.
The trial court granted the state’s subsequent motion to dismiss, primarily on the basis of sovereign immunity. The trial court concluded that: (1) the state had not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to its contract with the plaintiff; (2) the takings claims were barred because the tax escalation clauses were invalid as a matter of law; and (3) the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief was barred because the claims commissioner had not acted unconstitutionally or in excess of his statutory authority when he found the tax escalation clauses to be invalid. The trial court further noted that the plaintiff had failed to pursue the one avenue of appeal that had been available to it, namely, review by the General Assembly. This appeal followed.
that the trial court improperly dismissed its request for declaratory relief regarding the enforceability of the tax escalation clauses because requests for declaratory relief of a prospective nature fall into an exception to sovereign immunity. In response, the state claims that the trial court properly granted its motion to dismiss because: (1) there was no legislative intent impliedly to waive the state’s sovereign immunity; (2) the facts pleaded do not support a claim of taking, but merely breach of contract; (3) this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the present case pursuant to General Statutes § 4-148 (c); and (4) the plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief failed to involve the determination of a constitutional infringement. We agree with the state; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Preliminarily, we set forth the standard of review. “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. . . . A determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).
contract when it voluntarily entered into the lease agreement with the plaintiff. As a matter of public policy, “[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. . . . We have held that a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show that: (1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 313-14.
Accordingly, “we begin with a searching examination of the language of the [relevant] statute [or statutes]. . . . We [also] recognize . . . that the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context . . . are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 328. Moreover, “[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” General Statutes § 1-2z.
The plaintiffs first claim sounds in breach of contract. Accordingly, we look to the language of the statutes pertaining to contracts and claims against the state.
Connecticut statute that expressly waives sovereign immunity for specifically enumerated contract actions.
state. Section 4-142 requires that the claims commissioner determine claims against the state, and enumerates specific categories of claims that are exempt from the claims process. The only applicable exemption under that statute would be § 4-142 (2), which applies to “claims upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law including suits to recover similar relief arising from the same set of facts. . . .” Our review of the statutory scheme reveals that the only statute providing for a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to contracts is § 4-61, which expressly waives immunity from suit with respect to specifically enumerated public works contracts. See General Statutes § 4-61 (a) (waiving immunity with respect to contracts “for the design, construction, construction management, repair or alteration of any highway, bridge, building or other public works of the state or any political subdivision of the state,” and stating that “[a]ll legal defenses except governmental immunity shall be reserved to the state”); see also footnote 9 of this opinion.
lease without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so. See General Statutes § 4-160 (a) (“[w]hen the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable”).
statutory scheme, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the state’s motion to dismiss with regard to the plaintiffs contract claim.
has consented to being sued and waived its governmental immunity to the extent of its contractual obligations and such contractual obligations may be enforced against the [s]tate in an ordinary action at law”).
The merits of the various sister state approaches notwithstanding, we are bound by the current scheme. Accordingly, we will not disturb a policy decision committed solely to the discretion of the legislature.
We next turn to the plaintiffs contention that the trial court improperly granted the state’s motion to dismiss because sovereign immunity does not bar its claim that the state’s failure to pay the full amount of rent allegedly due under the lease is an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs property for public use without just compensation. The plaintiffs takings claim is similarly unavailing because the state’s failure to pay the full amount of rent allegedly due is not, as a matter of law, a taking.
The plaintiff correctly notes that “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available to the state as a defense to claims for just compensation arising under article first, § 11, of the Connecticut constitution. . . . When possession has been taken from the owner, he is constitutionally entitled to any damages which he may have suffered.
. . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tamm v Burns, 222 Conn. 280, 283, 610 A.2d 590 (1992). “To survive a motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity, [however] a complaint `must allege sufficient facts to support a finding of a taking of land in a constitutional sense.'” Id., 284. We conclude that the plaintiff has failed to meet this burden.
finding that the tax escalation clause was valid as a matter of law.
The complaint mentions nothing about review board approval, which is a necessary component of a valid contract at law pursuant to § 4b-23 (e). See footnote 5 of this opinion. The plaintiff, therefore, does not have an enforceable property interest in the income that would be generated by the tax escalation clause. Accordingly, the claim was properly dismissed by the trial court.
(c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
 “In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 611, 793 A.2d 215 (2002).
(a).” Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 319-20, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).
 Additionally, we note that the plaintiff failed to seek rejection of the claims commissioner’s recommendation from the General Assembly, despite its ability to do so.
(Mo. 1972) (“when the [s]tate enters into a validly authorized contract, it lays aside whatever privilege of sovereign immunity it otherwise possesses and binds itself to performance, just as any private citizen would do by so contracting”); Todd v. Board of Educational Lands Funds, 154 Neb. 606, 610, 48 N.W.2d 706 (1951) (“[state], by entering into a contract, abandons its attributes of sovereignty”); P, T L Construction Co. v. Commissioner, Dept. of Transportation, 55 N.J. 341, 346, 262 A.2d 195 (1970) (“a [s]tate may be sued in its own courts on contracts it authorized”); Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 320, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976) (“whenever the [s]tate of North Carolina, through its authorized officers and agencies, enters into a valid contract, the [s]tate implicitly consents to be sued for damages on the contract in the event it breaches”); Wrecking v. Allied Medical Supply Corp., 239 Va. 548, 553, 391 S.E.2d 258 (1990) (“doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application in actions based upon valid contracts entered into by duly authorized agents of the government”).
(2005) (“[a]n action respecting the title to property, or arising upon contract, may be brought in the district court against the state the same as against a private person”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491:8 (2004) (“[t]he superior court shall have jurisdiction to enter judgment against the state of New Hampshire founded upon any express or implied contract with the state”); Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (1) (a) (2005) (“[i]mmunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any contractual obligation”); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.92.010 (2004) (“[a]ny person or corporation having any claim against the state of Washington shall have a right of action against the state in the superior court”).
 See also Ga. Const., art. I, § II, para. IX (c) (“[t]he state’s defense of sovereign immunity is hereby waived as to any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract now existing or hereafter entered into by the state or its departments and agencies”); Illinois Const., art. XIII, § 4 (“[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished”).
 We note that, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10-201 (Michie 2005), the state of Arkansas does have a claims commission whose sole function is the payment of all just and legal debts of the state.
 See also Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3 (2004) (“[t]he Legislature of the State of Mississippi finds . . . that the `state’ and its `political subdivisions’ . . . shall continue to be immune from suit at law or in equity on account of any . . . omission or breach of implied term or condition of any warranty or contract”); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307 and 20-13-102 (2004); Unisys Corp. v. Budget Control Board Division of General Services, 346 S.C. 158, 172-73, 551 S.E.2d 263 (2001) (“The right to a jury trial does not apply to actions against the sovereign that were not recognized in 1868. . . . At the time our constitution was adopted in 1868, the [s]tate was immune from suit on a contract.” [Citations omitted.]); Catalina Development v. El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003) (“[w]hen the governmental unit contracts with a private party it waives immunity from liability, but not immunity from suit”).
(Anderson 2005) (“[t]he state hereby waives its immunity from liability, except as provided for the office of the state fire marshal . . . and consents to be sued . . . in the court of claims . . . with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.320 (2003) (“[a] suit or action may be maintained . . . against the State of Oregon . . . upon a contract made by the county in its corporate character . . . and within the scope of its authority; provided, however, that no suit or action may be maintained . . . upon a contract relating to the care and maintenance of an inmate or patient of any county or state institution”); R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-13.1-1 (2004) (“[a]ny person, firm, or corporation which is awarded a contract . . . with the state of Rhode Island . . . for the design, construction, repair, or alteration of any state highway, bridge, or public works other than those contracts which are covered by the public works arbitration act may . . . bring an action against the state of Rhode Island in the superior court”); W. Va. Code § 14-2-13 (2005) (“[t]he jurisdiction of the court [of claims] . . . shall extend to the following matters: (1) Claims and demands . . . ex contractu and ex delicto, against the State or any of its agencies, which the State as a sovereign commonwealth should in equity and good conscience discharge and pay”); Wis. Stat. §18.13 (2) (2004) (“[i]f the state fails to pay any public debt in accordance with its terms, an action to compel such payment may be commenced against the state in accordance with § 801.02”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104 (Michie 2004) (” [a]ny immunity in actions based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract if the contract was within the powers granted to the entity and was properly executed and except as provided in [Wyo. Stat. Ann. §] 1-39-121“).
against the [c]ommonwealth irrespective of the type of relief sought or the fact that the [b]oard of [c]laims may not have the power to grant the relief requested”; [emphasis in original]; “cases can be appealed to Commonwealth Court for review and correction of any legal errors alleged by the parties”).
 Accordingly, the state’s reliance on Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 301, for the proposition that, “[a]bsent permission to sue from the claims commissioner, the [c]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction for any damages claim, even one alleging a constitutional taking” is misplaced. Miller does not overrule Tamm v. Burns, 222 Conn. 280, 610 A.2d 590 (1992). Its central holding with respect to the issue of the exception to sovereign immunity is only that, “when a process of statutory interpretation establishes that the state officials acted beyond their authority, sovereign immunity does not bar an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.” Miller v. Egan, supra, 327. The state’s interpretation of Miller is, therefore, overly expansive.
 Accordingly, the trial court also properly dismissed the plaintiffs request for declaratory relief “determining that the additional rent (tax) clause in the leases is enforceable. . . .” Having already determined that the plaintiff lacks a property interest in the tax escalation clauses, this court need not consider the plaintiffs request for declaratory relief any further. It is axiomatic that without a property interest in the tax escalation clauses, the plaintiff cannot enforce them. Any failure to consider the plaintiffs request on the part of the trial court is, therefore, harmless.
v. Welwood, 258 Conn. 425, 433, 780 A.2d 924 (2001). This issue was, therefore, properly decided by the trial court in the context of a motion to dismiss.
(c) was to rectify the situation of “unsatisfied claimants reappear[ing] every session with the same claims, forcing the legislature into useless repetition.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Appropriations, Pt. 3, 1959 Sess., p. 920, remarks of George Oberst, director of the legislative council. The concern was not to prevent judicial review of legislative determinations. Accordingly, § 4-148 (c) would not serve as a bar to the consideration of the plaintiffs claims in the present appeal.

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