Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/291/411/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:27:50+00:00

Document:
1. To warrant the direction of a verdict for the defendant on the opening statement of plaintiff's counsel, it is not enough that the statement be indefinite; it must clearly appear, after resolving all doubts and uncertainties in favor of the plaintiff, that no cause of action exists. P. 291 U. S. 415.
2. Where a wharf for unloading sand lies adjacent to a public street from which, for want of a proper fence or barrier, its surface may be both seen and entered, and when children of tender years, attracted by the sand piles, are accustomed to enter and use it as a playground, going in and out at their pleasure, the owner is under a duty to take reasonable precautions either to prevent such use or to keep the flooring in repair so that children will not be exposed to the danger of falling through holes. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657; Union Pacific Ry. v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 262, applied. United Zinc Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, distinguished. P. 291 U. S. 416.
62 App.D.C. 271, 66 F.2d 797, reversed.
was directed at the close of the opening statement by counsel for the administrator.
Petitioner's intestate, a child 5 years of age, while playing on a wharf belonging to the District of Columbia, fell through a hole in the wharf and was drowned. This action was for damages for the alleged negligence of the District. After a jury had been impaneled, an opening statement was made by plaintiff's counsel, and thereupon the court, on motion of the defendant and without taking testimony, directed a verdict in defendant's favor upon the ground that no cause of action had been stated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, 62 App.D.C. 271, 66 F.2d 797, and this Court granted certiorari.
"This is a case against the District of Columbia filed by Mr. Best as administrator for the estate of his son. The facts that we will show you, briefly, are these, that Mr. Best's son was a child of five years of age and that, on the day in question, he and other children were playing down at a wharf close to where the Norfolk boats leave for Norfolk, and this wharf was operated and controlled by the District of Columbia; that they had there on this wharf some boards which extended over the water, and they had in the wharf, as several witnesses will testify, from ten to thirteen holes of various and varying sizes; that one of the holes was quite large, approximately 3 feet in diameter; that this place was not fenced off; that it did have some sort of a barrier close to the street. There was no sidewalk, but the side portion was down, and that the children went in and out at their pleasure, and that this son of Mr. Best went in there on this morning and while in there fell through one of the holes in this wharf."
"That there was no one that at the time to keep the children away, and that the watchman who was stationed arrived some time after this occurrence; that the children used this place to play on and play in, and that the District having maintained it in a condition such that it was dangerous to the life and limb of these children it is responsible for the child having been attracted there, going in and falling through this hole. Of course, the child died, having been drowned, and the damages that the plaintiff has suffered as representing the estate of the child will be determined by you in your verdict if you are convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that we have established our case."
is not a place to which the public is admitted, but is a place where the boats dock and unload sand which is taken out and used by the District."
"as to the statement of counsel, the court will withhold its directions, as where the evidence is conflicting, and leave the matter to the determination of the jury."
no cause of action exists. See Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Hurley, 49 F.2d 681, 684; Stuthman v. United States, 67 F.2d 521, 523.
The controversy in this case largely turns upon a difference of view as to the inferences to be drawn from the opening statement. Thus, respondent argues that there was a failure to show that "the wharf could be seen from the public space;" that "the child was attracted by the presence of the wharf itself, or any article or thing which may have been upon the wharf;" that "there was any latent or hidden danger at the place" where the child met his death; that "there was ever a prior accident to children at or near this wharf;" that "respondent invited or permitted petitioner's intestate or other children to enter or play on its wharf." But, with respect to each of these circumstances (with a single unimportant exception), the opening statement of counsel permitted an inference in petitioner's favor. Thus, his counsel stated that "this place was not fenced off; that it did have some sort of a barrier close to the street. There was no sidewalk, but the side portion was down." From this it was not inadmissible to infer that the wharf, without a fence and close to the street, with the side portion of the barrier down, "could be seen from the public space" and readily entered. According to the statement, the wharf was a place where boats unloaded sand which was taken out and used by the District. The inference might be drawn that the wharf had sand piles which would be highly attractive to children. Counsel stated that there were "ten to thirteen holes" in the wharf, of varying sizes, one of them being about three feet in diameter. The existence of these holes manifestly constituted a danger, and the statement does not require the conclusion that the danger would be obvious to young children playing in the sand on the wharf. The fact that the opening statement did not refer to any prior accident to children is inconsequential.
On the question whether the District permitted children to enter and play on the wharf, counsel's statement gave basis for an inference that children had this permission. While counsel conceded that the wharf was "not part of the public highway," but "was on private property of the District," and was "not a place to which the public was admitted," he also stated that "the children went in and out at their pleasure," and that "the children used this place to play on and play in." He said that, at the time of the accident, there was no one "to keep the children away," as "the watchman who was stationed arrived some time after this occurrence." The statement permitted the inference that, while a watchman was customarily there, still the place was used as a playground by children, going in and out as they pleased.
"it hardly appears that he was a trespasser and the path suggests an invitation; at all events boys habitually resorted to the place where he was. Also, the defendant was under a statutory duty to fence the place sufficiently to keep out cattle."
The decision permitting recovery in those circumstances was said to be very far from establishing liability "for poisoned water not bordering a road" where it was "not shown to have been the inducement that led the children to trespass" and "not shown to have been the indirect inducement because known to the children to be frequented by others."
In New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Fruchter, 260 U. S. 141, where a boy, climbing to the topmost girder of a municipal bridge and thence up a latticed tower, touched a live electric wire and was injured, the Court was unable to find any sufficient evidence from which a jury could properly conclude that the railroad company, either directly or by implication, "invited or licensed" him to climb to a point from which he could touch the bare wire thirty feet above the street. The cases of Erie R. Co. v. Hilt, 247 U. S. 97, and Erie R. Co. v. Duplak, 286 U. S. 440, turned upon the application of a statute of New Jersey as construed by the state court.
"temptation is not invitation, it may be held that knowingly to establish and expose, unfenced, to children of an age when they follow a bait as mechanically as a fish, something that is certain to attract them, has the legal effect of an invitation to them although not to an adult."
prevent it or to keep the wharf in such a proper state of repair that children would not be exposed to the danger of falling through holes.

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