Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19831005-981582
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Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche LINGENS c. AUTRICHE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partielllement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9815/82Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-10-05;9815.82 Parties : Demandeurs : LINGENSDéfendeurs : AUTRICHETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9815/82 Peter Michael LINGENS v/AUSTRI A Peter Michael LINGENS c/AUTRICH E DECISION of 5 October 1983 on the admissibility of the application DBCISION du 5 octobre 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Article 10 of the Convention : Conviction of a journalist jbr defamation . /a expressing his opinion about the behaviour of a politician, he was deented to have used unacceptable tanguage . In the circumstances. this measure was in accordance with the law and aimed at the protection of the reputation of others. Was it "necessa ry in a democratic society" ?(Application declared admissibte) .
Article 10 de la Convention : Condamnation d'un journaliste pour diffantation pour avoir usÃ© de termes jugÃ©s inadmissib(es en exprimant son opinion sur le compornement d'un homme politique . Cette ntesure Ã©tait, en l'occurrence, prÃ©vue par lu loi et mâ¢ait pour but de protÃ©ger la rÃ©putation d'autrui . Eiait-e(le â¢ nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique Â°?(Requ@te dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable) .
(jranÃ§ais : voir p. 1 85)
The applicant, who is represented by Messrs W . Masser, E . Grossmann and E . Klingsbigl, lawyers practising in Vienna, is an Austrian citizen born in 1931 and resident in Vienna . He has already previously filed an application (No . 8803/79, Linges and Leitgeb Y . Austria) which the Commission, however, rejected as inadmissible on 11 December 1981 . â¢ In the present case, the applicant complains of a conviction for defamation in the press (iible Nachrede, section 111 (2) of the Penal Code) following a private prosecution brought against him by Dr Bruno Kreisky (th e
â¢ D . R . 26, p . 171 .
tbrnter Austrian Federal Chancellor) . Mr Kreisky had felt attacked by two articles published by the applicant in the magazine "Proftl" (of which he is the editor- in -chief) in October 1975 . On 9 October 1975 . in a television interview . Mr Simon Wiesenthal, Chairman of the Jewish Documentation Center, accused Mr Friedrich Peter, Chairman of the Austrian Liberal Party (Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs, FPO) o( having belonged to the first SS infantry-brigade in World War II, i .e . a uuit which had repeatedly dealt with the liquidation of people behind the Russian front . The next day, Mr Kreisky was questioned on television about these accusations . He vehentently stood up for the chairman of the FPO and called Wieseuthal's activities "political matia" or "matiosi-methods" not only directed against Mr Peter but also against himself . Following these declarations, the applicant published the two articles under discussion . The first of these articles accompanied a report on the above events including a detailed survey of the activities of the first SS infantry brigade, and of what was known about Mr Peter's involvement with that unit . Mr Peter had adntitted to have belonged to the unit, but denied that he had known anything about the killings . It was stated that there was no ground to assume that Mr Peter had taken part in any killings himself, but it was submitted that his involventent with the unit nevertheless made him unbearable as an Austrian politician . In the applicant's article Mr Kreisky was accused of protecting Mr Peter for political reasons . The applicant then wrote : "Had someone else behaved in this wâ¢av, one would probably have spoken of the ugliest opportunism" (Bei einen anderen wÃ¼rde man dies wahrscheinlich Ã¼belsten Opportunismus nennen") .
This gist of the second article was that it would be in the interest of the Austrian society not to protect those who committed serious crimes during the Nazi period . Austria had produced ntuch more war criminals that could follow from its share in the population of the Third Reich, but it had done very little about thent . Austria had not mastered its past, but had neglected it . It was submitted that this tolerance could promote the development of standards which could help a future fascist party in taking over power . The applicant then continued :"But how far away and how speculative are such thoughts . And how near and concrete is a long sequence of Bruno Kreisky cabinets . In truth, one cannot refute in a rational way what Kreisky is doing . Only in an irrational way : It is invuoral, undignified" ("In Wahrheit kann man das, was Kreisky tut . auf rationale Weise nicht widerlegen . Nur irrational : es ist unmoralish . WÃ¼rdelos ." ) It follows from the further contents of the article that the applicant was especiallv angry about Mr Kreisky's refusal to consider Mr Peter unbearable as a politiciau and partner of the Austrian Government . This, it was sumitted, was a ntinimum requirement of political ethics . The "monstrosity" was not - 181 -
Simon Wiesenthal having made this a point of discussion, but Bruno Kreisky's wish to remove it from discussion . Mr Kreisky was very strongly criticised for his attacks on Mr Wiesenthal in this context . Mr Kreisky subsequently brought a private prosecution against the applicant because he considered certain passages of the articles (including the words underlined above) as defamatory and contrary to section lll of the Penal Code . Subsection (1) of this section makes it a criminal offence to state before others that a person has contemptible features or attitudes, or to accuse him of dishonest behaviour or of behaviour contrary to good morals which is liable to scorn, or to degrade him in the public opinion . By virtue of subsection (2) the otfence is aggravated if it is committed in print or broadcast or otherwise iu such a manner that the defamation becomes accessible to a broad public . A persou will not be punished if it is shown that the allegation made is true (subsection (3)) . According to section 112 the burden of proof is on the defendaut party . Ou 26 March 1979, the Regional Court of Vienna convicted the applicaut of the offence of defamation under section 111 (2) of the Penal Code in respect of'the use of the expressions "ugliest opportunism", "immoral" and "uudiguitied" . The court found that he had not offered proof of the truth of the designation "ugliest opportunism" and it considered that he had failed to prove the truth ot the terms "immorat" and "undignified" . The applicant was however acquitted in respect of the use of some other words ("minimum requirement of political ethics", "monstrosity") which in the court's opinion were not defamatory of Mr Kreisky in the context in which they had been used . The applicant was sentenced to a fine of AS 20,000,- the fact that he had intended political criticism and that the tolerance for defamation concerning top potiticians should be greater than that of other people being considered as grounds t'or mitigation . The court refrained from awarding a compeusation to Mr Kreisky in view of the applicant's good faith . Both the private prosecutor and the applicant appealed from this judgment . However, the Vienna Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to deal with the substance of those appeals . By a decision of 30 November 1979 it quashed the above judgment on the ground that the court had failed to investigate Mr Kreisky's legitimation to bring a private prosecution in the present case . If he had been attacked in his capacity of Federal Chancellor, he would have lacked this legitimation unless a public prosecution under section 117 of the Penal Code had been refused by the competent authority . The Regional Court therefore held a new trial on I April 1981 in which it investigated in particular the circumstances under which Mr Kreisky had made the statements criticised by the applicant in his articles . It found that Mr Kreisky had been attacked in his private capacity and as a party leader,
and not in his of7icial function of Federal Chancellor . His legitimation to bring a private prosecution was therefore confirmed . As to the qualification of the applicant's acts under section 111 (2) of the Penal Code, the court fully contirmed its earlier judgntent of 26 March 1979 . Both parties appealed again to the Vienna Court of Appeal . By its final decision o( 29 October 1981, that court reduced the applicant's fine to AS 15,000 .-, but in principle confirmed the Regional Court's decision . It stated that the term "ugliest opportunism" was detrimental to the name of Mr Kreisky and had not been proven to be true . With regard to the terms "immoral" and "undignified" the Court of Appeal rejected the submission of the applicant that he could derive from Article 10 of the Convention a right to otter a personal value judgment of given facts . In the opinion of the Court this interpretation tailed because Article 10 of the Convention provided for an extensive list of restrictions by law . Value judgments had therefore to remain within the limits marked by the penal provisions about the protection of houour . Thev hence had to be based on true facts justifying them . The private prosecutor being personally convinced of the fact that Wiesenthal was using Matia-methods, he could not be blamed to have acted without "morality" or "dignity "
Complaints The applicant alleges a violation of Article 10 of the Convention guaranteeing his right to treedom of expression including the right to impart inforntation and ideas without interference by public authority .
According to the applicant, the freedom of expression is not restricted to the reporting of facts, but includes the right to intpart personal views on facts, which means statements about any questions of scientif-ic, cultural, political or other nature, including value judgments . Restrictions of this freedom are only allowed within the limits of Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention . The applicant's rentarks in the magazine had been a personal opinion on uncontested facts, given in a calm and serious tone and it did not seem fair to punish him for this, while on the other hand the Federal Chancellor's observations about Wiesenthal could not be judged due to his immunity .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant complains that his conviction for defamation of the Federal Chancellor, Mr Kreisky, was an inadmissible restriction of his freedom of expression and contrary to Article 10 of the Convention .
2 . Insofar as it is relevant this provision reads as follow s "1 . Everyone has the right to freedom of expression . This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of trontiers . 2 . The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities niay be subject to such tbrmalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society . . . . for the protection of the reputation or rights of others . . . The Commission notes that the respondent Government do not contes t .3
that the applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies with regard to his above complaint, and that he has observed the six months time limit provided tor in Article 26 of the Convention . The Commission is therefore called upon to deal with the substance of this complaint . 4 . In this respect, the Commission notes first of all that the case concerns the exercise of the freedom of expression in the highly sensible area of political discussion . The applicant purported to criticise certain uncontested and publicly known behaviour of the private prosecutor in his function as a top politician and party leader . Insofar as an account was given of the relevant tacts, the applicant was not in any way restricted . However, insofar as he described the private prosecutor's above behaviour as being "ugliest opportunism", "immoral" and "undignified", it was found that these statements amounted to an offence of defamation under section 111 (2) of the Austrian Penal Code . 5 . There has therefore been an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10, paragraph 1 of the Convention, in particular his right to "hold opinions" and "impart ideas" which is expressly included in this provision . This interference, which took the particular form of the imposition of a criminal penalty, needs to be justified under the second paragraph of Article 10 . 6 . In order to be compatible with the requirements of this provision, any restriction on the freedom of expression mus t a . be prescribed by la w b . pursue one of the legitimate purposes enumerated in this provision, an d c . be necessary in a democratic society having regard to the duties and responsibilities which this freedom carries with it . - 184 -
7 . As regards (he first two conditions, the Commission is satistied that they were met iu the present case . The applicant's conviction was based on section 111 (2) of the Austrian Penal Code, and there is no appearance that the application of this provision was not in line with the relevant criteria of the Austrian law . The restriction of' the applicant's freedom of expression by the intposition of a penalty was therefore "prescribed by law", and it also pursued a legitimate purpose covered by Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention, uantely "the profectiou of the reputation of others" . There can be no doubt that this was (he aim of the applicable legal provision as such, and of its application iu the concrete case . 8 . The turning point of the case is the question whether or not in the given circumstauces the restriction of the applicant's freedom of expression can be regarded as uecessary in a democratic society to achieve the above aim . In this respect, the Contmission has taken cognisance of both parties' submissious, in particular le Government's invocation of the margin of appreciation left to the domestic authorities, and the applicant's detailed description of the circumstances in which he made the incriminated statements, and his invocation of the role and function of the press in relation to the discussion of political ntatters such as those which formed the subject of these statements . In the light o( these subntissions, the Contmission has come to the couclusion that the applicant's complaint raises serious issues as to the interpretaliou and application of A rticle 10 of the Convention and that these issues cau ouly be deterntined after an examination of their me ri ts . The applicant's complaint canuot therefore be rejected as being manifes tly ill-t'ounded within the meaning ol' Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n
EN FAIT Le requÃ©rant, reprÃ©sentÃ© par Mes W . Masser, E . Grossmann et E . Klingsbigl, avocats Ã Vienne, a la nationalitÃ© autrichienne ; il est nÃ© en 1931 et rÃ©side Ã Vienne . II a dÃ©jÃ introduit une requÃªte (NÂ° 8803/79, Lingens et Leitgeb c/Autriche), qui a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable par la Commission le 11 dÃ©cembre 1981 * . â¢ D .R . 26 p . 171
Dans la prÃ©sente affaire, le requÃ©rant se plaint d'une condamnation pour diffamation par voie de presse ( Ã¼ble Nachrede, a rticle 111 (2) du code pÃ©nal), intervenue Ã la suite d'une procÃ©dure de citation directe intentÃ©e contre lui par M . Bruno K re isky ( l'ex-Chancelier fÃ©dÃ©ral d'Aut ri che) . M . K re isky s'Ã©tait estimÃ© attaquÃ© par deux a rticles publiÃ©s par le requÃ©rant dansle mag azine .Profil . ( dont il est le rÃ©dacteur en chef) en octobre 1975 . Le 9 octobre 1975, dans une interview tÃ©lÃ©visÃ©e, M . Wiesenthal, PrÃ©sident du Centre de documentation juive, a accusÃ© M . F ri edrich Peter, PrÃ©sident du pa rti libÃ©ral autrichien ( Freiheitliche Pa rtei Osterreichs - FPfS) d'avoir appart enu pendant la seconde guerre mondiale Ã la premiÃ¨re b rigade d'infante ri e SS, unitÃ© qui avait Ã plusieu rs rep ri ses liquidÃ© des civils derriÃ¨re le front russe . Le lendemain, M . K reisky a Ã© tÃ© interrogÃ© Ã la tÃ©lÃ©vision sur ces accusations . II a soutenu vigoureusement le prÃ©sident du FPO et qualifiÃ© les ac tivitÃ©s de Wiesenthal de â¢ma fi a poli ti que . ou de â¢mÃ©thodes de mafiosi ., visant non seulement M . Peter, mais aussi lui-mÃªme . AprÃ¨s ces dÃ©clarations, le requÃ©rant a publiÃ© les deux articles examinÃ©s . Le premier accompagnait un compte rendu des Ã©vÃ©nements susmentionnÃ©s, notamment une enquÃªte dÃ©taillÃ©e sur les activitÃ©s de la premiÃ¨re brigade d'infanterie SS, ainsi que sur les aspects connus du r81e jouÃ© par M . Peter dans cette unitÃ© . Celui-ci avait admis avoir appartenu Ã l'unitÃ© en question, mais avait niÃ© avoir su quoi que ce soit des tueries . Il a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© que rien ne permettait de supposer que M . Peter avait participÃ© lui-mÃªme Ã des tueries, mais il a Ã©tÃ© soutenu que sa prÃ©sence Ã l'Ã©poque dans l'unitÃ© le rendait insupportable comme homme politique autrichien . Dans l'article du requÃ©rant, M . Kreisky Ã©tait accusÃ© de protÃ©ger M . Peter pour des motifs politiques . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clarait aussi que . de la pan de quelqu'un d'autre, pareil componement aurait Ã©tÃ© sans doute taxÃ© d'opportunisme le plus vif, (Bei einem anderen wÃ¼rde man es wahrscheinlich Ã¼belsten Opportunismus nennen .) . La substance du second article Ã©tait qu'il serait dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de la sociÃ©tÃ© autrichienne de ne pas protÃ©ger ceux qui avaient commis des crimes graves pendant la pÃ©riode nazie . L'Autriche avait produit un nombre de criminels de guerre beaucoup plus Ã©levÃ© que ne reprÃ©sentait sa part dans la population du troisiÃ¨me Reich, -mais elle avait trÃ¨s peu fait Ã leur sujet . L'Autriche n'avait pas maÃ®trisÃ© son passÃ© ; elle l'avait ignorÃ© . L'auteur soutenait que cette tolÃ©rance pouvait favoriser l'Ã©panouissement de valeurs politiques susceptibles d'aider un futur parti fasciste Ã prendre le pouvoir. Et le requÃ©rant de poursuivre :â¢Mais ces rÃ©flexions sont trÃ¨s lointaines et relÃ¨vent de la spÃ©culation . Au contraire, la longue succession des cabinets Bruno Kreisky est toute proche, trÃ©s concrÃ¨te . A dire vrai, on ne peut pas rÃ©futer le comportement de M . Kreisky de maniÃ¨re rationnelle, mais seulement de maniÃ¨re irrationnelle : c'est immoral et dÃ©pourvu de dignitÃ© (In Wahrheit kann man das, was Kreisky tut, auf rationale Weise nicht widerlegen . Nur irrational : es ist unmoralisch . Wgrdelos. .) .
Il dÃ©coule du reste de l'a rt icle que le requÃ©rant en voulait Ã M . Kreisky pa rt iculiÃ¨rement de son refus de voir en M . Peter une personne inacceptable comme homme politique et comme pa rtenai re du Gouvemement autrichien . C'est lÃ , soutenait le requÃ©rant, une exigence minimale de l'Ã©thique en politique . .L'Ã©normitÃ©Â» n'Ã©tait pas que Simon Wiesenthal eut mis la question sur le tapis, mais que Bruno K reisky veuille l'en retirer. L'a rticle c riti quait vigoureusement M . Kreisky pour avoir attaqu' M . Wiesenthal Ã cet Ã©gard . M . K re isky a alors engagÃ© des pou rsuites cont re le re quÃ©rant, estimant que certains passages des a rticles ( notamment les mots soulignÃ©s plus haut) Ã©taient diffamatoi res et contraires Ã l'a rticle 111 du code pÃ©nal . Le paragraphe let de cet article Ã©ri ge en infraction pÃ©nale le fait de dire devant autrui qu'une personne a un trait de caractÃ¨re ou un compo rt ement mÃ©p ri sable, ou de l'accuser d'une malhonnÃªtetÃ© ou d'un comportement contraire aux bonnes mÅ urs, susceptibles de le rabaisser devant l'opinion publique . Aux termes du paragraphe 2, il y a circonstance aggravante si l'acte est commis par voie de presse ou de radiodiffusion ou de toute autre maniÃ¨ re rendant la diffamation accessible Ã un large public . L'auteur n'est pas puni si l'asse rt ion est dÃ©montrÃ©e vraie ( par . 3) . Selon l'article 112, la charge de la preuve incombe au dÃ©fendeur . Le 26 mars 1979, le tribunal rÃ©gional de Vienne a condamnÃ© le requÃ©rant du chef de diffamation conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 111 du code pÃ©nal, pour avoir utilisÃ© les expressions . opportunisme le plus vil ., . immoral . et . dÃ©pourvu de dignitÃ© . . Le tribunal a constatÃ© en effet que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas offert de prouver la vÃ©racitÃ© de la qualification .opportunisme le plus vil ., et il a estimÃ© qu'il avait Ã©chouÃ© dans sa tenta tive de prouver ce ll e des termes .immoral . et .dÃ©pou rv u de dignitÃ© . . Le requÃ©rant a cependant Ã©tÃ© acquittÃ© en ce qui concerne l'emploi de ce rt aines autres expressions ( .exigence minimale de l'Ã©thique en politique ., .Ã©norrnitÃ©â¢) que le t ribunal n'a pas jugÃ© diffamatoires pour M . Kreisky dans le contexte dans lequel elles avaient Ã©tÃ© employÃ©es . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© Ã une amende de 20 000 schillings autri chiens, le juge ayant admis comme circonstance a ttÃ©nuante le fait que le joumaliste avait voulu formuler une c ritique politique et que la tolÃ©rance en matiÃ¨re de diffamation des personnalitÃ©s politiques doit Ãªt re plus grande que lo rs qu'il s'agit de gens ordinai res . Le t ri bunal s'est abstenu d'accorder des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts Ã M . Kreisky, eu Ã©gard Ã la bonne foi du requÃ©rant . Le plaignant et le requÃ©rant ont tous deux fait appel de ce tt e dÃ©cision . La Cour d'appel de Vienne n'a cependant pas jugÃ© nÃ©cessaire d'examiner ces appels au fond . Par une dÃ©cision datÃ©e du 30 novembre 1979, elle a cassÃ© la dÃ©cision susmentionnÃ©e au motif que le t ribunal n'avait pas contrÃ´lÃ© si M . Kreisky Ã©tait habiGtÃ© Ã intenter une procÃ©dure de citation directe en l'espÃ¨ce . S'il avait Ã©tÃ© a tt aquÃ© comme Chancelier fÃ©dÃ©ral, il n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© habilitÃ© Ã ce faire, Ã moins que l'exercice de l'action publique, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 117 du Code pÃ©nal, n'eÃ»t Ã© tÃ© refbsÃ©e par l'auto ri tÃ© compÃ©tente .
Le tribunal rÃ©gional a tenu en consÃ©quence une nouvelle audience le 1e 1 avril 1981, dans le cadre de laquelle il a examinÃ© en particulier les circonstances dans lesquelles M . Kreisky avait fait les dÃ©clarations incriminÃ©es par le requÃ©rant dans ses articles . Il a estimÃ© que M . Kreisky avait Ã©tÃ© attaquÃ© en sa qualitÃ© de particulier et de dirigeant de parti, et non en sa qualitÃ© officielle de Chancelier fÃ©dÃ©ral . Son droit d'ag'v par citation directe a donc Ã©tÃ© confirmÃ© . Quant Ã la qualification des actes du requÃ©rant au regard de l'article 111 (2) du Code pÃ©nal, le tribunal a entiÃ¨rement confirmÃ© son jugement antÃ©rieur du 26 mars 1979 . Les deux parties ont fait de nouveau appel devant ta Cour d'appel de Vienne . Par sa dÃ©cision finale du 29 octobre 1981, la cour d'appel a rÃ©duit Ã 15 000 Schillings autrichiens l'amende du requÃ©rant, mais a confirmÃ© dans son principe la dÃ©cision du tribunal rÃ©gional . Elle a dÃ©clarÃ© que l'expression â¢ opportunisme le plus vi1 . portait atteinte Ã la rÃ©putation de M . Kreisky et que la vÃ©racitÃ© de cette assertion n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© prouvÃ©e . En ce qui concerne les termes â¢ immoral . et â¢ dÃ©pourvu de dignitÃ© ., la Cour d'appel a rejetÃ© la thÃ¨se du requÃ©rant selon laquelle il pouvait puiser dans l'article 10 de la Convention uh droit de porter un jugement de valeur personnel sur des faits donnÃ©s . Selon la Cour, cette interprÃ©tation n'Ã©tait pas correcte car l'article 10 de la Convention prÃ©voit dans une longue liste de restrictions lÃ©gales . Les jugements de valeur doivent en consÃ©quence rester Ã l'intÃ©rieur des limites fixÃ©es par les dispositions pÃ©nales sur la protection de l'honneur . Ils doivent donc Ãªtre fondÃ©s sur des faits exacts les justifiant . L'auteur de la citation directe Ã©tant personnellement convaincu que M . Wiesenthal recourait Ã des mÃ©thodes de mafiosi, on ne pouvait pas lui reprocher d'avoir agi sans â¢ moralitÃ© . ou â¢ dignitÃ© â¢ .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue une violation de l'article 10 de la Convention reconnaissant son droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression, y compris le droit de communiquer des informations ou des idÃ©es sans qu'il puisse y avoir ingÃ©rence d'autoritÃ©s publiques . Selon le requÃ©rant, la libertÃ© d'expression ne se limite pas au droit de rendre compte de faits, mais englobe celui de communiquer des opinions personnelles sur des faits, ce qui implique des dÃ©clarations sur toute question de nature scientifique, culturelle, politique ou autre, y compris des jugements de valeur . Des restrictions Ã cette libertÃ© ne sont autorisÃ©es que dans les limites de l'article 10, paragraphe 2 de la Convention .
Les remarques formulÃ©es par le requÃ©rant dans le magazine avaient reprÃ©sentÃ© une opinion personnelle sur des faits incontestÃ©s, formulÃ©e sur un ton calme et sÃ©rieux, et il ne paraissait pas Ã©quitable de le sanctionner pour cela ; d'un autre cÃ´tÃ©, les observations du Chancelier fÃ©dÃ©ral au sujet de M . Wiesenthal ne pouvaient pas Ãªtre jugÃ©es en raison de son immunitÃ© .
EN DROIT 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint que sa condamnation pour diffamation de M . Kreisky, Chancelier fÃ©dÃ©ral, a reprÃ©sentÃ© une restriction inadmissible Ã sa libertÃ© d'expression, contraire Ã l'article 10 de la Convention . 2 . Cette disposition, pour autant qu'elle est pertinente, est ainsi libellÃ© e â¢ 1 . Toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression . Ce droit comprend la libertÃ© d'opinion et la libertÃ© de recevoir ou de communiquer des informations ou des idÃ©es sans qu'il puisse y avoir ingÃ©rence d'autoritÃ©s publiques et sans considÃ©ration de frontiÃ¨res . . . . . 2 . L'exercice de ces libertÃ©s comportant des devoirs et des responsabilitÃ©s peut Ãªtre soumis Ã certaines formalitÃ©s, conditions, restrictions ou sanctions, prÃ©vues par la loi, qui constituent des mesures nÃ©cessaires, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique . . . Ã la protection de la rÃ©putation ou des droits d'autrui . . . . . 3 . La Commission note que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur ne conteste pas que le requÃ©rant ait Ã©puisÃ© les recours internes en ce qui concerne le grief susmentionnÃ© et qu'il ait respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de 6 mois prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26 de la Convention . La Commission est donc appelÃ©e Ã examiner ce grief au fond . 4 . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission note en premier lieu que l'affaire porte sur l'exercice de la libertÃ© d'expression dans le domaine trÃ¨s sensible du dÃ©bat politique . Le requÃ©rant souhaitait critiquer un certain comportement publiquement connu et incontestÃ© de l'auteur de la citation directe dans ses fonctions d'homme politique de premier plan et de dirigeant de parti . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ il a Ã©tÃ© rendu compte des faits pertinents, la libertÃ© du requÃ©rant n'a Ã©tÃ© aucunement restreinte . Mais pour autant qu'il dÃ©crivait le comportement susmentionnÃ© de l'auteur de la citation directe comme traduisant .l'opportunisme le plus vil . ou comme â¢immoral . et â¢dÃ©pourvu de dignitiÃ© ., il a Ã©tÃ© constatÃ© que ces dÃ©clarations constituaient un dÃ©lit de diffamation conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 111 (2) du code pÃ©nal autrichien . 5 . II y a donc eu ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice du droit du requÃ©rant Ã la libertÃ© d'expression, au sens de l'article 10, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, en particulier se don droit Ã la â¢libertÃ© d'opinion . et Ã celle de .communiquer des idÃ©es ., qui est expressÃ©ment prÃ©vue par cette disposition . Cette ingÃ©rence, qui a pris la forme particuliÃ¨re de l'imposition d'une sanction pÃ©nale, doit Ãªtre justifiÃ©e sous l'angle du second paragraphe de l'article 10 .
6 . Pour Ãªtre compatible avec les exigences de cette disposition, toute restriction Ã la libertÃ© d'expression doi t a . Ãªtre prÃ©vue par la lo i b . poursuivre un des objectifs lÃ©gitimes Ã©numÃ©rÃ©s dans cette dispÃ´sition, et c . Ãªtre nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique eu Ã©gard aux devoirs et responsabifitÃ©s qÃ» entraine l'exercice de cette libertÃ© . 7 . En ce qui concerne les deux premiÃ¨re conditions, la Commission est convaincue qu'elles sont rÃ©unies en l'espÃ¨ce . La condamnation du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© fondÃ©e sur l'article 111 (2) du code pÃ©nal autrichien et rien n'indique que l'application de cette disposition n'ait pas Ã©tÃ© conforme aux critÃ¨res pertinents du droit autrichien . La restriction apportÃ©e Ã la libertÃ© d'expression du requÃ©rant par l'imposition d'une sanction Ã©tait donc .prÃ©vue par la loi . et poursuivait un objectif lÃ©gitime visÃ© par l'article 10, paragraphe 2, de la Convention, Ã savoir la . protection de la rÃ©putation d'autrui . . Il ne fait pas de doute que ceci Ã©tait l'objectif de la disposition lÃ©gale applicable, ainsi que de son application en l'espÃ¨ce . Le point essentiel est celui de savoir si dans les circonstances donnÃ©es, l a .8 restriction Ã la libertÃ© d'expression du requÃ©rant peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique pour parvenir Ã l'objectif susmentionnÃ© . La Commission a pris connaissance Ã cet Ã©gard des exposÃ©s des parties, en particulier de ce que le Gouvernement a invoquÃ© la marge d'apprÃ©ciation laissÃ©e aux autoritÃ©s nationales, de la description dÃ©taillÃ©e donnÃ©e par le requÃ©rant des circonstances dans lesquelles il a fait les dÃ©clarations incriminÃ©es, et du fait que le requÃ©rant a fait mention du rÃ´le et de la fonction de la presse concemant le dÃ©bat sur les questions politiques, comme celles qui constituaient le thÃ¨me de ces dÃ©clarations . A la lumiÃ¨re de cette argumentation, la Commission est pa rvenue Ã la conclusion que le grief du requÃ©rant soulÃ¨ve de graves questions quant Ã l'interprÃ©tation et Ã l'applica tion de l'article 10 de la Conven ti on, questions dont la solution nÃ©cessite un examen au fond . Le grief du requÃ©rant ne peut donc Ãªtre rejetÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'Ã rt icle 27 (2) de la Convention .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE .
-190-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 05/10/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 112
 l'article 111
 l'article 117
 l'article 111
 l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 26
 l'article 111
 l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 111
 l'article 10
 l'article 10