Source: https://canons.sog.unc.edu/king-v-town-of-chapel-hill-the-supreme-court-issues-a-major-decision-on-the-police-power-of-local-governments-part-2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:50:03+00:00

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This entry was posted on July 22nd, 2014 and is filed under Constitutional Issues, Enforcement, General Local Government (Miscellaneous), Ordinances & Police Powers, Police Power Regulations, Statutory Authority & Construction.
In my last blog post I listed and discussed seven points that local governments should take away from King v. Town of Chapel Hill, perhaps the North Carolina Supreme Court’s most significant decision yet on the general police power of local governments. Part 1 of my analysis focused primarily on the portions of King that uphold the broad exercise of regulatory powers by cities and counties. As I noted, however, King also has much to say, both directly and indirectly, about constitutional and statutory limitations on the police power. This blog post picks up where my last one left off and offers five additional takeaways from King.
8. To be constitutionally valid, local regulation of trades and businesses must be reasonably related to a substantial government purpose.
The court’s use of the terms “fundamental right” and “substantial government purpose” could prompt lower court judges, attorneys, and others familiar with how courts evaluate constitutional claims to wonder whether King mandates something more demanding than the rational basis test for local business regulations.
The rational basis test is the standard of review that courts use to evaluate claims that a government action violates the constitutional rights of individuals to equal protection or substantive due process, except when the alleged violation involves the impingement of a “fundamental right” or the disparate treatment of individuals based on a “suspect classification.” (Fundamental rights recognized by the courts include the right to marry, the right to vote, the right to interstate travel, the right to free speech, and the right to religious liberty. Race, alienage, national origin, and gender have all been deemed suspect classifications.) A government action passes the rational basis test so long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective. The rational basis test is extremely deferential to governments, and consequently, they tend to prevail when it is applied.
In cases involving the abridgment of fundamental rights or use of suspect classifications, the courts usually subject government actions to more rigorous standards of review. Depending on the precise nature of the alleged violation, the government will usually have to show either that a contested action was substantially related to an important government interest (“intermediate scrutiny”) or that the action was necessary to further a compelling government interest (“strict scrutiny”). Government actions are less likely to be upheld when intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny is applied.
In cases applying the rational basis test to government actions, the courts have held that the health, safety, or welfare of the public constitutes a legitimate government interest. E.g., Huntington Props., LLC, v. Currituck County, 153 N.C. App. 218, 230 (2002). Similarly, King and precedents cited therein seem to acknowledge that the public’s health, safety, or welfare qualifies as a substantial government purpose when business regulations are challenged under Article I, Section 1. E.g., State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769 (1949).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has noted the similarities between the “substantial government purpose” test for Article I, Section 1 claims and the rational basis test. Sanders v. State Pers. Comm’n, 197 N.C. App. 314, 326 (2009).
My comments so far about the “substantial government purpose” standard have focused on its application to laws that regulate how businesses operate. The supreme court has clearly indicated, though, that it sees a big difference between government measures that impose reasonable requirements on business operations and those that exclude individuals from particular occupations. Measures of the latter sort have prompted the court to apply the “substantial government purpose” standard more stringently. As the court explained long before King, “the power to regulate a business or occupation does not necessarily include the power to exclude persons from engaging in it. When this field has been reached, the police power is severely curtailed.” State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 759 (1940). According to the court, “the ordinary lawful and innocuous occupations of life,” that is, those not requiring advanced education or scientific skill, “must be open to all alike upon the same terms.” Ballance, 229 N.C. at 770. This reasoning has led the court to strike down statutes that created state boards or commissions responsible for approving the qualifications of drycleaners, photographers, and tile contractors. Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 525-26; Ballance, 229 N.C. at 770-73; Harris, 216 N.C. at 759-65.
9. The court’s holding in King that the general police power statues (G.S. 160A-174 and 153A-121) must be broadly interpreted does not necessarily apply to other statutes delegating specific types of regulatory authority to local governments.
The King decision holds that G.S. 160A-174 and, by implication, G.S. 153A-121 must be broadly interpreted. It does not hold that all of the police power statutes have to be construed expansively. Under Lanvale Properties, LLC, v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142 (2012), and related precedents, the statutes in Chapter 160A or 153A warrant expansive interpretations only if the court deems them to be ambiguous. If it finds that such a statute is not ambiguous, the court will construe the law strictly according to the “plain meaning” of its terms, making it less probable that an ordinance adopted in reliance on the statute will survive legal challenge. Thus, when advising a city or county on the lawfulness of a proposed ordinance, a local government attorney should consider whether a judge is likely to apply the “plain language” or the “broad construction” rule to the statute being cited as authority for the measure.
10. Local ordinances regulating matters covered by federal or state law may be preempted.
Ordinances are usually deemed preempted in one of two circumstances. The first is when they concern an activity or condition that federal or state law expressly denies local governments the latitude to regulate. The second is when federal or state statutes regarding the subject matter of an ordinance are comprehensive enough to support a finding that Congress or the General Assembly intended to remove the matter from local control. Detailed statutes passed by the General Assembly to govern large-scale hog farming operations provide an example of this second kind of preemption. Although the laws do not explicitly prohibit local regulation, the supreme court held in one case that they implicitly preempted a county’s attempt to regulate large hog farms. Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 45 (2002).
Chapter 20 of the General Statutes comprises over 1,100 pages of statutes that address practically every aspect of travel on the highways. While some of the statutes grant municipalities limited power over roadways, none of them invest local governments with authority to regulate mobile phone use by drivers.
The General Assembly has enacted at least three statewide laws that restrict drivers’ mobile phone usage. See G.S. 20-137.3(b); 20-137.4(b); 20-137.4A(a). Collectively, the three statutes ban individuals of all ages from texting while driving and prohibit school bus drivers and individuals under age 18 from using mobile phones while driving on public streets or highways.
11. State law preempts efforts by cities or counties to regulate the use of mobile phones by automobile drivers.
See discussion of point 10 above.
12. G.S. 20-219.2 does not authorize local governments to regulate involuntary towing.
In King Chapel Hill identified G.S. 20-219.2 as an alternative statutory basis for its towing ordinance. The statute is not a statewide law; its subsection (c) lists the particular cities and counties to which it applies. (Orange County, home of Chapel Hill, is one of the counties named.) Among other things, G.S. 20-219.2 prohibits the parking of automobiles in a private lot without permission and allows the non-consensual towing of illegally parked vehicles, provided signs designating the lot as private and listing the towing and storage company’s current name and telephone number are prominently posted at each of the lot’s entrances. An individual who parks an automobile in violation of G.S. 20-219.2 is guilty of an infraction and subject to a fine of not less than $150. The statute places certain restrictions on towing companies but also grants them limited liability protection for damages arising from the nonconsensual removal of automobiles.
The supreme court in King concluded that G.S. 20-219.2 was not relevant to its analysis of the towing ordinance. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that G.S. 20-219.2 omits language common to enabling statutes, such as a statement expressly authorizing cities and counties to adopt ordinances consistent with its provisions. According to the court, G.S. 20-219.2 was enacted to allow the prosecution of individuals who trespass in private parking lots and to regulate the removal of unauthorized vehicles from such lots, not to confer authority over involuntary towing on local governments.
The North Carolina Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the general police power in King makes the decision a net plus for local governments, though cities and counties should still pay careful attention to the constitutional and statutory limitations on that power. Of course, as with many decisions by our state’s highest court, the full impact of King will not be apparent until its influence is felt in future cases. No doubt there is much more to come.
Do you have any sense of where we’re left with these “police powers” questions after the passage of HB2? Are these grants of powers with regard to public safety untouched by the new law? Thanks for two great posts.

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