Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83837:58608&catid=1588&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:07:10+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 188487, October 22, 2014 - VAN D. LUSPO, Petitioner, v, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.; G.R. No. 188541 - SUPT. ARTURO H. MONTANO AND MARGARITA B. TUGAOEN, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.; G.R. No. 188556 - C/INSP. SALVADOR C. DURAN, SR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
VAN D. LUSPO, Petitioner, v, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
SUPT. ARTURO H. MONTANO AND MARGARITA B. TUGAOEN, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
C/INSP. SALVADOR C. DURAN, SR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the conviction of Salvador Duran, Sr., Arturo Montano, and Margarita Tugaoen in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 20192 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The conviction of Van Luspo in Criminal Case No. 20192 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is hereby ACQUITTED. The bailbond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
Salvador Duran, Sr., Arturo Montano, and Margarita Tugaoen are further ORDERED to jointly and severally indemnify the Philippine National Police of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Let us briefly recall the facts.
Upon receipt of the ASAs, P/Supt. Arturo Montano (Montano), Chief Comptroller, North CAPCOM, directed Police Chief Inspector Salvador Duran, Sr. (Duran), Chief, Regional Finance Service Unit, North CAPCOM, to prepare and draw 100 checks of P100,000.00 each, for a total of P10,000,000.00. The checks were all dated August 12, 1992 and payable to four different entities2 that are all owned and operated by Margarita Tugaoen (Tugaoen) who later collected the proceeds of the checks from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Cubao Branch.
In her March 5, 1993 sworn statement, Tugaoen admitted that she received the P10 million worth of checks as payment for the previously accumulated PNP debts and not for any CCIE items that she delivered.3 P/CInsp. Isaias Braga, Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and Rolando Flores, Supply Accountable Officer, North CAPCOM confirmed the non-delivery of the CCIE.
After the PNP, General Headquarters, Office of the Inspector General (GHQ-OIG), and subsequently the Ombudsman, conducted an investigation on the CCIE North Capcom transaction, the Ombudsman for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (now Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices) recommended the filing of an Information for 100 counts of Malversation of Public Funds against several PNP officials, including the accused.
On January 26, 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed an Information, but this was for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,4 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information alleged that the accused, among others, conspired with each other and with bad faith and manifest partiality caused undue injury to the government by causing the payment of P10,000,000.00 to Tugaoen for the CCIE items that were not actually delivered.
Second, by issuing the checks, the accused made it appear that there were legal transactions between PNP and the four business establishments owned by accused Tugaoen on the purchase and delivery of CCIE items despite the lack of documents to support these alleged transactions.
Third, undue injury is present in the amount of P10,000,000.00 for the supposed purchases of CCIE items that were never delivered to the end-users.
Contrary to Duran’s claim, affixing his signature on the checks is not a ministerial duty on his part. As he himself stated in his petition and in his present motion, his position as Chief of the Regional Finance Service Unit of the North CAPCOM imposed on him the duty “to be responsible for the management and disbursement and accounting of PNP funds.” This duty evidently gives him the discretion, within the bounds of law, to review, scrutinize, or countercheck the supporting documents before facilitating the payment of public funds.
His responsibility for the disbursement and accounting of public funds makes him an accountable officer. Section 106 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 requires an accountable officer, who acts under the direction of a superior officer, to notify the latter of the illegality of the payment in order to avoid liability. This duty to notify presupposes, however, that the accountable officer had duly exercised his duty in ensuring that funds are properly disbursed and accounted for by requiring the submission of the supporting documents for his review.
By relying on the supposed assurances of his co-accused Montano that the supporting documents are all in order,20 contrary to what his duties mandate, Montano simply assumed that these documents exist and are regular on its face even if nothing in the records indicate that they do and they are. The nature of his duties is simply inconsistent with his “ministerial” argument. With Duran’s failure to discharge the duties of his office and given the circumstances attending the making and issuance of the checks, his conviction must stand.
We clarify that the Court’s finding of bad faith is not premised on Duran’s failure “to prepare and submit” the supporting documents but for his failure to require their submission for his review. While the preparation and submission of these documents are not part of his responsibilities, his failure to require their submission for his review, given the circumstances, amply establishes his bad faith in preparing and issuing checks that eventually caused undue injury to the government.
On the issue raised by Tugaoen and Montano on the admissibility of the checks and of the statements made by Tugaoen before the investigating committee, we note that these arguments are mere rehashes of the arguments that they raised before the Sandiganbayan in their Motion to Dismiss and in this Court in their Petition for Review. We maintain our ruling that the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in this regard.
We do not and cannot share their positions.
It is inappropriate for the accused to rely on a lower court’s decision (although involving some factual similarities with the present criminal case) that was rendered after this Court had already made its own ruling, affirming the accused’s conviction. To begin with, in our judicial hierarchy, only the pronouncements of this Court are doctrinal and binding on all other courts. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. Our judicial system does not work the other way around.
For our present purposes, we are only called upon to determine whether the Sandiganbayan committed an error of law in convicting the petitioners of the crime for which they were charged. The legal correctness of its decision in another case does not only lack the force of jurisprudence but is not even an issue before us. It would do well for the petitioners not to confuse themselves. With the admissibility of the checks in evidence and the prosecution’s evidence on the manner and circumstances by which they were prepared, we find no reason to disturb our finding that conspiracy exists and that the accused acted in bad faith.
The prosecution was also able to prove injury to the government through the testimony of Tuscano (the Supply Accountable Officer of the PNP) that the delivery of P10 million worth of CCIE items for North CAPCOM in 1992 is not supported by the available record. This testimony in turn finds support from accused Tugaoen’s own statement that she did not deliver any CCIE in exchange for the checks that she encashed (and from the written declarations of P/CInsp. Isaias Braga, Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and Rolando Flores, Supply Accountable Officer, North CAPCOM).
Tugaoen though questions the admissibility of her statement before the investigating committee that she did not deliver any CCIE items in exchange for the checks on the ground that it violates her right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Accordingly, contrary to the accused Tugaoen’s claim, the fact that she was “invited” by the investigating committee does not by itself determine the nature of the investigation as custodial. The nature of the proceeding must be adjudged on a case to case basis.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the investigation where Tugaoen made her statement was not a custodial investigation that would bring to the fore the rights of the accused and the exclusionary rule under paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The investigator’s reminder to Tugaoen of her Miranda rights during the investigation cannot be determinative of the nature of the investigation. Otherwise, following the logic of this claim, the law enforcer’s own failure or even disregard of his duty to inform an individual he investigates of his custodial investigation rights would suffice to negate the character of an investigation as legally a custodial investigation. Ultimately, the nature of the investigation must be determined by appreciating the circumstances surrounding it as a whole.
The most crucial question to answer that could have absolved the accused from liability is whether the subject purchases of CCIE items were truly “ghost purchases”, as contended by the prosecution. It is very ironic that no single end user among thousands of police officers and men came forward to attest and declare to the world that indeed he received the CCIE items subject matter of the case, thereby leaving the prosecution’s theory reinforced and unrebutted.
The admitted non-delivery of the CCIE items by the supposed contractor, Tugaoen, well explains why Duran had to argue in vain that the making and issuance of the checks were ministerial on his part (despite his clear responsibility for the “management and disbursement and accounting of PNP funds”). Accordingly, the fact that none of the persons who executed the documents cited by the Court in its Decision testified in open court is not fatal to the accused’s conviction. As we already observed in our February 14, 2011 Decision, the prosecution sufficiently discharged its burden of proof based on the confluence of evidence it presented showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motions for reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
1 Exhibit “F” of the Prosecution and Exhibit 7 for the Defense; Pre-Trial Order, Records, Vol. I, p. 387.
2 These entities are: DI-BEN Trading, MT Enterprises, J-MOS Enterprises, and Triple 888 Enterprises.
3 Volume 1, pp. 94-95.
4 Volume 1, pp. 1-3.
Thus, if the witnesses presented attested to the fact that the checks are microfilmed in the ordinary course of business and that the Photostats have attained acceptable degree of accuracy, the same are no doubt admissible in evidence in lieu of the original, not on the basis of the “best evidence” rule but because they may be considered as entries in the usual or regular course of business. This Court may also want to take judicial notice of the fact that one of reliable means to preserve checks and other commercial papers and documents is by way of microfilm.
x x x As what he categorically stated, the microfilming of checks is just one of the regular or routinary functions being performed by PCH. Hence, the reproductions or copies of the preserved checks it issues, obtained from its existing records facility such as microfilms, may, therefore, be considered admissible in evidence.
6 Duran was declared to have waived his right to formally offer his evidence (Records, Vol. IV, p. 473).
7 Decision promulgated on January 19, 2009 and Resolution promulgated June 30, 2009.
8 Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 46.
10Rollo, pp. 17-18, 237 (GR No. 188556).
13 Id. at 27, 244.
15 Abelardo F. Madridejo, Chief Accountant of North CAPCOM, in a Certification dated March 23, 1993; The written statement of the PNP Chief Directorate for Material Services, P/Supt. Jesus Arceo; written statement of State Auditor Erlinda Cargo of COA-PNP North CAPCOM.
16 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2, rollo, p. 286 (GR No. 188541).
18 Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 287-291.
19 Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 9-12; rollo, pp. 293-296.
22 G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994, 236 SCRA 565.
23People v. Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005, citing Morales, Jr. v. Minister Enrile, et al., 206 Phil. 466, 488 (1983).

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