Source: http://libertymagazine.org/article/the-ultimate-clash-of-loyalties-part-2
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:46:09+00:00

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Background: Both secular and religious governments have put millions to death for their most sacred beliefs. In the first century: Jews, Samaritans, and Christians had to endure the ultimate clash of loyalty—“either treason to the Roman state or treason to their God.” Christians for three centuries believed that “religion was a matter of free will, not of compulsion.” Then they began to persecute each other. In 1528 Balthasar Hubmai, who was tortured by both Protestants and Catholics, was put to death with his wife, Elizabeth, for establishing governments that did not enforce religious beliefs. The principles they expounded took root over two centuries later.
Persecution followed for Jehovah’s Witnesses. “In Wyoming some Jehovah’s Witnesses were tarred and feathered, in Arkansas some were shot, and in Nebraska one Jehovah’s Witness was castrated.”2 The nation’s intellectual community reacted to Gobitis with articles condemning the decision.
In 1943 the Supreme Court agreed to revisit Gobitis. In reversing, the Court said that while “causes and nations, political parties, lodges, and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design,”3 “a person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn.” Second, the Court refused to require unity of belief and action, even in saluting the flag: “Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence [of beliefs] is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, [and] the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity.”4 The Supreme Court showed both courage and wisdom to avoid this “clash of loyalties.” Yet, arguably, the Supreme Court did not seem to apply these same principles 18 years later in the Sunday law cases.
“Anti-Judaism contributed to substituting a new day of worship for the Sabbath.” Justin Martyr, writing from Rome, was one of the first to advocate the change from Sabbath to Sunday. “He empties the Sabbath of all its theological significance, reducing it to a temporary ordinance derived from Moses, which God imposed solely on the Jews as ‘a mark to single them out for punishment they so well deserve for their infidelities.’ He refers, on the other hand, to Sunday as ‘the day on which we all hold our common assembly, because it is the first day on which God, having wrought a change in the darkness and matter, made the world; and Jesus Christ our Savior on the same day rose from the dead.’”7 He failed to point out it was also the Roman day to honor the sun.
Later the Council of Laodicea (A.D. 364), Canon 29, stated: “Christians must not Judaize by resting on the Sabbath, but must work on that day, rather honoring the Lord’s Day; and, if they can, resting then as Christians. But if any shall be found to be Judaizers, let them be anathema from Christ.” Since then millions of Sabbathkeepers who did not recognize Sunday have suffered religious persecution.
Since McGowan businesses have faced hardships. The uniformity concept has not helped Sabbatarians, who have been fired or not hired because of their religious beliefs. The 1964 Civil Rights Act under Title VII has helped by requiring reasonable accommodation for religious practices unless it would require undue hardship for the employer. Yet some Supreme Court cases have made it very easy to show “undue hardship.” See TWA v. Hardison (432 U.S. 63 ).
The McGowan case has blurred the line between what is secular and religious. It has also given precedent to enforce uniformity even when conscience and religious liberty issues are involved. Twenty-four years later the Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly.19 This was the “crèche,” or “Nativity scene,” case. The Lynch case shows how McGowan has blurred the line between what is religious or secular: the majority in Lynch cited McGowan three times; the minority six times; and the concurring opinion once. The Nativity scene pictures one of the most sacred events of the Bible—the Incarnation. The majority admitted Sunday laws were on a par with the virgin birth by stating that not allowing the display “would also require that we view it as more of an endorsement of religion than the Sunday closing laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland.”20 The minority, on the other hand, played up the secular nature of Sunday laws: “In McGowan,” “we concluded that while such laws were rooted in religious motivations, the current purpose was to serve the wholly secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all citizens.”21 The key words to notice are: “rooted in religious motivations”; “uniform day of rest”; and “for all citizens.” Aren’t Sabbatarians right to object to being compelled to observe a governmental provided uniform day of rest, even if it did achieve some secular goals?
Wisconsin v. Yoder (406 U.S. 205 ) was a significant victory for religious freedom. It allowed the Amish to go their distinctive way even against a compulsory school system. It ruled: “Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” But what are such interests of the highest order? Treason, being the highest of all crimes, would certainly qualify. Will legitimate religious beliefs again be made into treason for the sake of uniformity? Is the blurring of lines between what is secular and what is religious heading us down a wrong path? The twenty-first century faces great issues: nuclear destruction, energy and food crises, not to mention world peace. Where will religious freedom for religious minorities fit in? While it seems remote, could we be laying the foundation for a repeat of the ultimate clash of loyalties—when legitimate religious beliefs could become the nation’s highest crime?
Minersville School District et al. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586.
In P. Finkelman, Religion and American Law: An Encyclopedia (2013), p.186.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 419 U.S.624 at 632.
Acts 9:20; 13:5, 14, 15, 42; 14:1; 17:1, 10, 17; 18:1-4, 7, 8, 19, 26; 19:8.
K. A. Strand, The Sabbath in Scripture and History (Washington, D.C: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1982), p. 135.
John A. O’Brien, The Faith of Millions: The Credentials of the Catholic Religion (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1974), pp. 400, 401.
The Liberator, Mar. 31, 1848, p. 50.
D. McAllister, The National Reform Movement, Its History and Principles: A Manual of Christian Civil Government (Allegheny, Pa.: Christian Statesman Co., 1898), pp. 15, 16.
R. B. Flowers, M. Rogers, and S. K. Green, Religious Freedom and the Supreme Court (Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press., 2008), p.146.
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 613.
R.M.A. Brown, G. Weigel, and W. Herberg, An American Dialogue (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday & Co., 1961), pp.162,163.
For Douglas’ complete dissent, see: McGowan v Maryland, 366 U.S. 561-581 (1961).
The Register, America’s National Catholic Newspaper, June 25, 1961, p. 6.
Padon v. White, 485 F.Supp. 602, 604 (1979).
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 736 F.2d 1022 (1984).
K. Hall, The Supreme Court in American Society: Equal Justice Under Law (New York: Garland Pub., 2000), p.485.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984).

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