Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/92436/rast-vs-van-deman-lewis-co
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:16:49+00:00

Document:
Respondent Van Deman and Lewis Co.
right to carry on business by using such coupons and stamps is not so protected by the federal Constitution as to render such a tax a violation of the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute is not open to objection as depriving of liberty and property without due process of law on account of severity of its penalties intimidating against testing its legality. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 , distinguished.
It was determined that the bill set forth grounds of equitable relief; that the condition of complainants' businesses and of the property engaged in them was such that the statute, if exerted against complainants and their property, would produce irreparable injury, citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 ; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223 ; Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207 . We concur in this view.
The ground of discrimination, simply and separated from the other attacks upon the statute, does not present much difficulty. The difference between a business where coupons are used, even regarding their use as a means of advertising, and a business where they are not used is pronounced. Complainants are at pains to display it. The legislation which regards the difference is not arbitrary within the rulings of the cases. It is established that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, and the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 , 220 U. S. 78 . It makes no difference that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of serious strength. It is not within the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such contrariety. Chi., Burl. & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 ; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 , 233 U. S. 413 -414; Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446 , 238 U. S. 452 .
Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 , 223 U. S. 62 , and the cases cited above.
purchases or for or on account of a certain amount having been purchased of the merchant by the customer. "
Let it be granted that this provision permitted the enclosure in the package of tobacco of tokens of the character with which this case is concerned. It goes not farther, nor does it purport to go farther. It does not attempt to protect and enforce the permission to the retail sales of packages in the state. It might not legally have such effect if attempted, and such attempt will not lightly be inferred. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 ; Standard Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540 . The statute of Florida does not seek to control the interstate transportation of the packages; it controls only their sale in the state through the retail merchant, or, it may be, directly to the individual consumer for the purpose described, and in both cases for the ultimate redemption of the tokens delivered with the sale.
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 , is not applicable. There, Congress, for the effective execution of the food and drugs act, defined what the "package" of commerce should be, and necessarily any law which conflicted with it was void. In the case at bar, there is no such definition. There is only permission to insert in the package whatever the manufacturer of tobacco may choose, with a single exception. There is no compulsion of use, and omission to avail of the permission has no effect upon the purpose of Congress in the enactment of the revenue laws which provide for the packing of tobacco products.
understanding and expectation" arising from one or more sales that complainants would continue to sell to such purchasers other articles so that they might be able to accumulate tokens and use them. It cannot be said that there is an obligation to continue sales or an obligation to continue purchases. Besides, as the business is subject to regulation, the contracts made in its conduct are subject to such regulation. Louis. & Nash. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 , and N.Y. Central R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U. S. 583 .
repeated from time to time until the statute in controversy was passed in 1913. [ Footnote 2 ] In such differences between judicial and legislative opinion, where should the choice be? That necessarily depends upon what reasoning judicial opinion was based. We appreciate the seriousness of the situation. Regarding the number of the cases only, they constitute a body of authority from which there might well be hesitation to dissent except upon clear compulsion.
circumstances, become the source of evil or may have evil tendency. Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623 .
or be convinced of the wisdom of the legislation. Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114 , 217 U. S. 126 -127. See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 , 94 U. S. 132 .
"While the courts must exercise a judgment of their own, it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree. Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view as well as for possible peculiar conditions which this Court can know but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by no means are held semper ubique et ab omnibus. "
Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606 , 187 U. S. 608 -609.
In Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224 , the company issued scrip payable in merchandise only from its store as an advance of monthly wages in payment of labor performed. A statute of the state (West Virginia) prohibited the issue of any order for the payment of labor unless it was redeemable in money. The statute was assailed on the ground that it interfered with the freedom of contract. It will be observed that there was a consideration for the order payable in merchandise; it was a payment in advance, and hence it was asserted that the statute was an injury to the employees and employers. There were elements in the transactions of apparent advantage to both, and it would seem to have been within the liberty of both to contract upon an estimate of the value of that advantage. It was deemed an evil by the legislature, and this Court sustained its judgment.
It is not certain from the allegations of the bill that the tax is of the asserted character, but, granting it to be so, we have shown that the business schemes described in the bill are not protected from regulation or prohibition by the Constitution of the United States. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 ; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425 ; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606 ; see also Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 238 ; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623 ; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 699 ; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 ; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60 ; Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U. S. 331 .
The contention that the statute intimidates against a contest of its legality by the severity of its penalties, and is therefore unconstitutional on that ground, within the ruling in Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 , is not justified.

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