Source: https://www.saffroninvestigations.com/sudden-unintentional-acceleration-case-screening/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:52:10+00:00

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Do You Need a Sudden Unintentional Acceleration Case Screening?
Sudden unintended acceleration definition (UA) is the unintended, unexpected uncontrolled acceleration of a vehicle, often accompanied by an apparent loss of braking effectiveness. Such problems may be caused by driver error (e.g. pedal misapplication), mechanical or electrical problems, or some combination of these factors.
If you have experienced a (UA) event which resulted in either a contact accident with another vehicle involving injuries, or a near miss non contact incident, Saffron Investigations may be able to help you. Both NASA and NHTSA engineers after a lengthy investigation have identified two known causes of (UA) unintentional vehicle acceleration that do not involve drivers error. Saffron investigations is currently exploring other potential causes of (UA) that could explain how your incident occurred.
Saffron Investigations has the certified accident investigators with the experience, knowledge and skills you will need to properly prepare your case.
Sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) is the unintended, unexpected, uncontrolled acceleration of a vehicle, often accompanied by an apparent loss of braking effectiveness.  Such problems may be caused by driver error (e.g., pedal misapplication), mechanical or electrical problems, or some combination of these factors.
“Sudden acceleration incidents” (SAI) are defined for the purpose of this report as unintended, unexpected, high-power accelerations from a stationary position or a very low initial speed accompanied by an apparent loss of braking effectiveness. In a typical scenario, the incident begins at the moment of shifting to “Drive” or “Reverse” from “Park”.
The report is taken from a study, begun in 1986, in which the NHTSA examined ten vehicles suffering from an “above average” number of incident reports and concluded that those incidents must have resulted from driver error. In the lab tests, throttles were positioned to wide open prior to brake application in an attempt to replicate the circumstances of the incidents under study. However, it is important to note that the newest vehicle involved in the study was a 1986 model and that no test vehicles were equipped with the electronic control (drive by wire) systems common in 2010. All vehicles were equipped with automatic transmissions, that is, no vehicles had manual transmissions with left foot clutch pedal disengagement of engine power.
In the 1950s, General Motors automobiles with automatic transmissions placed the R for reverse at the furthest clockwise position in the rotation of the column-mounted shift lever. L for low position was just adjacent as one would move the lever one notch counterclockwise. Because it was very easy to select L, a forward position when desiring R, to reverse, there were many intended lurches forward while the driver was watching toward the rear, expecting to reverse the automobile. By the 1960s, gear selection arrangements became standardized in the familiar PRNDL, with reverse well away from the forward positions and between the Park and Neutral selections. The elimination of ‘push-button’ drive control on all Chrysler products began after 1965 to eliminate the ease of selecting an unintended direction.
Unintended acceleration resulting from pedal misapplication is a driver error wherein the driver presses the accelerator when braking is intended. Some shorter drivers’ feet may not be long enough to touch the floor and pedals, making them more likely to press the wrong pedal due to a lack of proper spatial or tactile reference. Pedal misapplication may be related to pedal design and placement, as in cases where the brake and accelerator are too close to one another, or the accelerator pedal too large.
An unresponsive accelerator pedal may result from incursion: i.e., blockage by a foreign object, or any other mechanical interference with the pedal’s operation — and may involve the accelerator or brake pedal. Throttle butterfly valves may become sluggish in operation or may stick in the closed position. When the driver pushes harder on the right foot, the valve may “pop” open to a point greater than that wanted by the driver, thus creating too much power and a lurch forward. Special solvent sprays are offered by all manufacturers and aftermarket jobbers to solve this very common problem.
Other problems may be implicated in the case of older vehicles equipped with carburetors. Weak, disconnected, or mis-connected throttle return springs, worn shotpump barrels, chafed cable housings, and cables which jump their tracks in the throttlebody crank can all cause similar acceleration problems.
For drive-by-wire automobiles, a brake-accelerator interlock switch, or “smart throttle” would eliminate or at least curtail any instance of unintended acceleration not a result of pedal misapplication by causing the brake to override the throttle. An unintended acceleration event would require the failure of such a mechanism if it were present. Such a solution would not be applicable to older vehicles lacking a drive-by-wire throttle.
Physical analysis conducted on Toyota’s electronic engine control system including accelerator pedal position sensors (APPSs) in 2011 showed the presence of a significant number of tin whiskers. Tin whiskers are elongated or needle-like structures of pure tin that grow from pure tin and tin alloy surfaces. Toyota’s APPS were found to use tin finishes. These tin finishes can produce conductive tin whiskers capable of creating unintended electrical failures such as short circuits. The use of tin finish in Toyota’s APPS is therefore a cause for concern. Similarly in 2013, materials used in an automotive engine control unit (ECU) from a 2008 Toyota Tundra truck were analyzed. It was found that pure tin with a nickel underlayer was used as the connector finish in the unit, and analysis revealed tin whiskers on the connector surface. Further testing under a standard temperature-humidity cycling showed tin whisker growth, raising additional reliability and safety concerns. These studies show that poor design choices, such as the use of tin finishes, result in unintended failures.
2004: The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) sent Toyota a chart showing that Toyota Camrys with electronic throttle controls had over 400% more “vehicle speed” complaints than Camrys with manual controls. Toyota culled out[clarification needed] 37,900 customer contact reports from the company’s database that Toyota identified (via the company’s complaint coding system) as potentially related to sudden unintended acceleration.
During model years 1982-1987, Audi issued a series of recalls of Audi 5000 models associated with reported incidents of sudden unintended acceleration linked to six deaths and 700 accidents. At the time, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) was investigating 50 car models from 20 manufacturers for sudden surges of power.
60 Minutes aired a report titled “Out of Control” on November 23, 1986, featuring interviews with six people who had sued Audi after reporting unintended acceleration, including footage of an Audi 5000 ostensibly displaying a surge of acceleration while the brake pedal was depressed. Subsequent investigation revealed that 60 Minutes had not disclosed they had engineered the vehicle’s behavior — fitting a canister of compressed air on the passenger-side floor, linked via a hose to a hole drilled into the transmission — the arrangement executed by one of the experts who had testified on behalf of a plaintiff in a then pending lawsuit against Audi’s parent company.
From 2002 to 2009 there were many defect petitions made to the NHTSA regarding unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles, but many of them were determined to be caused by pedal misapplication, and the NHTSA noted that there was no statistical significance showing that Toyota vehicles had more SUA incidents than other manufacturers. Other investigations were closed because the NHTSA found no evidence that a defect existed. The first major cause of unintended acceleration was found in March 2007, when an engineering analysis showed that unsecured all-weather mats had led to pedal entrapment and drivers accelerating up to 90 mph with decreased braking power. Early on, Toyota suggested that driver error was to blame, saying that some people may have hit the gas when they meant to hit the brake. Even after issuing recalls to address problematic floor mats that in some cases pinned down accelerators, the company hid a flawed gas pedal design that it knew did the same thing This led to Toyota sending a letter to the owners of the affected car, a 2007 Lexus ES350, asking that they bring their cars in to switch out the all-weather mats. After this recall, Toyota decided to revise the internal design of their cars to ensure that there was “a minimum clearance of 10 millimeters between a fully depressed gas pedal and the floor,” but decided to only implement the new designs upon the next “full model redesign,” which wouldn’t take place until 2010. In an attempt to hide these defects from investigators, Toyota switched to verbal communication on the defect rather than traceable forms of communication  As a result, many new cars were knowingly produced with the same floor mat issues that had been identified as being having the potential to cause SUA problems in association with the defective pedal design.
million vehicles and mostly switched out all-weather mats and carpet covers that had the potential to cause pedal entrapment. At this point there was little evidence that there was ever any defect in the Electronic Throttle Control System (ETCS) that was installed in Toyota cars after 2002, despite requests to the NHTSA to investigate it, and Toyota announced that the root cause of sudden acceleration had been addressed.
decided to name herself as a whistleblower after she had been providing evidence to Iowa Senator Charles Grassley.
issued a deferred prosecution agreement with a $1.2 billion criminal penalty for issuing misleading and deceptive statements to its consumers and federal regulators, as well as hiding another cause of unintended acceleration, the sticky pedal, from the NHTSA. This fine was separate from the $1.2 billion settlement of a class action suit paid to the drivers of Toyota cars who claimed that their cars had lost value as a result of the SUA problems gaining publicity in 2012 and is the largest criminal fine against an automaker in US history. Toyota was also forced to pay a total of $66.2 million in fines to the Department of Transportation for failing to handle recalls properly and $25.5 million to Toyota shareholders whose stock lost value due to recalls. Nearly 400 wrongful-death and personal injury cases were also privately settled by Toyota as a result of unintended acceleration.
Sudden acceleration can occur in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the vehicle is parked. The driver shifts the vehicle gear from park to reverse or drive and the vehicle suddenly accelerates. This acceleration after gear engagement involves an open throttle.
The second scenario involves acceleration from speed. In this scenario, the vehicle is on the road already and the vehicle surges, gaining speed. The throttle in this instance appears to become stuck open.
First, the scenario necessarily involves sudden unintended acceleration.
Second, the driver is unable to brake effectively.
Third, in many instances, the driver experiences a loss of steering control.
When a vehicle is being driven at slow speed, power steering allows a wide range of steering wheel rotation.
When a vehicle is being driven at a high speed, the vehicle has little range of rotation to avoid over-correction.
When a vehicle suddenly accelerates, the speed sensors in the vehicle interfere with hydraulic steering.
The vehicle may perceive that it is traveling at a high speed and allow less play in the steering mechanism.
The wide array of instances involving sudden and inadvertent acceleration constitutes powerful evidence that the phenomenon exists. In the case of Stuart v. General Motors, a jury returned a substantial verdict against General Motors in a case involving sudden acceleration. The case was reported as an unpublished opinion by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, the transcript of the trial is available. This trial offers some important information into the jury’s consideration of evidence related to Sudden Acceleration.
“During radiated Susceptibility samples #4, #5, and #7 could be induced to pull full servo while in cruise mode (brake remained functional and provided escape condition).” See A Controller Module, Request for Test, page 2, dated 10/28/86.
Equally significant is the fact that General Motors found that it could induce a wide open throttle condition with the introduction of bulk current into the system. See “Vehicle Status for U.A. Investigations at EMC,” dated May 8, 1987. On May 13, 1987, through the injection of bulk current, General Motors own test revealed that a wide open throttle condition resulted. This Wide Open throttle condition occurred in park, drive, reverse and idle. It was completely unrelated to any driver input because there was no driver involved in the testing. See Page A-5 of the Vehicle Status Report. This event was found to be repeatable. The bulk current was a 1.9-8.5 MHZ. Two days later, a General Motors employee conducting the tests reported: “Found W.O.T. [wide open throttle]. It has been determined that the internal tach is RF susceptible. It will no longer be used.” This drew the comment from a supervisor: “WOW.” See Page 6, document bates numbered 202241. Similar testing by General Motors revealed similar results. On June 15, 1987, the General Motors testing again revealed that Wide Open Throttle (W.O.T.) was being induced by 1.9 MHZ to 44 MHZ BCI. SeePage B-12, document bates numbered 202249. These results were not mentioned in one General Motors summary of these tests, entitled “AC Involvement in Alleged Unintended Acceleration Investigations.” According to that author, “AC performs excessive testing of controller to re-evaluate radiated EMC and conducted transient susceptibility No unintended acceleration conditions observed during these tests.” See document dated September 22, 1987 and Larry Hocken is named contact person for further unintended acceleration investigation.
Discovery in the Stuart case revealed that General Motors had experienced its own unintended acceleration events with General Motor owned vehicles. On August 22, 1987, at the Willow Run, Michigan General Motors facility, Mr. Jeff Talton crashed into a gate post. See incident report attached to this paper and introduced as evidence in Stuart v. General Motors. Mr. Talton started his 1988 Pontiac Bonneville and put it in reverse. Suddenly the vehicle accelerated into wide open throttle — despite the fact his foot was on the brake. See incident report introduced as evidence in Stuart v. General Motors.
General Motors had an engineer, Mr. Michael Holcomb, examine the vehicle. Mr. Holcomb has testified in a number of cases and it would be interesting to read if he has identified this particular investigation. In another similar set of events, a General Motors Dealership, Arrow Oldsmobile in Milwaukee, Wisconsin reported three separate vehicles in which unintended and sudden acceleration occurred. See Warranty Analysis and Savings Program, dated April 2, 1986. According to the dealership, a salesman was preparing to have a car examined by a potential customer. He put the car in park for approximately four minutes. When he placed the car into drive from the park position, the car accelerated beyond control. In fact, the salesman could not stop the car with both feet stomping on the brake pedal. See Warranty Analysis and Savings Program, dated April 2, 1986. This dealership had a second vehicle experience the same type event. In this instance a service technician started to back out of a parking lot when the vehicle took off. The service technician asserted that he was unable to stop the vehicle even with his foot on the brakes.
This odd scenario repeated itself in an almost identical fashion when a 1986 H-car suddenly accelerated while a salesman was demonstrating the car to a customer. The salesman reported that he felt the pedal pull away from his foot while he put the car into drive. Warranty and Safety Analysis, dated June 26, 1986. A particularly telling statement comes in a handwritten note attached to this report, which states, “Van Landingham regards the “CRUISE” light as indicative of where the failure may be occurring, but I’m not so sure. There may be a path for RF to turn it on.” See document bates numbered 202171. In reality, General Motors like all vehicle manufacturers realized long ago that there vehicles were experienced unintended wide open throttle conditions. However, due the transient nature of this dangerous condition, real world duplication of the exact failure is difficult at best. Therefore, the key element for General Motors was to maintain deniability.
results of their tests on the effects of vibrations. See Cruise Control Vibrations dated June 29, 1987 attached hereto. This report offered the conclusion that “The cruise control vacuum valve can be opened by vehicle vibration levels experienced under fast idle conditions.” See Cruise Control Vibrations dated June 29, 1987 attached hereto. The report further concluded that the “cruise control valve can’t be closed by vehicle vibration.” See Cruise Control Vibrations dated June 29, 1987 attached hereto. Importantly, these engineers reported that the “cruise control servo vibration is amplified by resonances of its mounting bracket at 28 to 56 MHZ.” SeeCruise Control Vibrations dated June 29, 1987 attached hereto. On July 27, 1987, in a huge understatement, the author remarks, There was a general agreement that the servo vibration sensitivity was undesirable and steps to reduce or eliminate that sensitivity was discussed. See Joint Meeting on Cruise System, dated July 27, 1987 attached hereto. Engineering Investigations also authored a paper revealing the fault conditions necessary for a vent valve to stick. (1) ignition cycles or cruise switch cycles pulse vacuum valve or (2) vibration at cruise servo can unseat vacuum valve and cause a rapid increase in engine speed.
Graham, the defense attorney for the driver, did a marvelous job at trial of showing how absurd it was for General Motors to assert that every unintended acceleration was the result of driver error. In the end, one of the key factors included the factor that General Motors was testing for various types of radiated electronic interference, but nonetheless contended that electronic interference could never affect the cruise control.
Mr. Rex Kenney is a engineer in California and was the purchaser of a Chrysler Jeep Cherokee. This vehicle began to suddenly accelerate. Mr. Kenney attempted to have these problems repaired. In a typical stance taken by Chrysler, Mr. Kenney was told that he was simply mistaken and that his Jeep Cherokee would not suddenly accelerate. Unlike many consumers, Mr. Kenney continued to pursue this issue. He made a Freedom of Information Request to the NHTSA and this request yielded some critical documents –documents which were later contested by Chrysler and apparently removed from the public files. Furthermore, Mr. Kenney carried a videotape camera and recorded some instances of his vehicle’s malfunctioning. As Mr. Kenney learned, Chrysler instituted a Task Force to examine unintended acceleration. See Exhibits from Rex Kenney Deposition in Colonna v. Chrysler. The materials obtained by Mr. Kenney are now in the possession of the ATLA Sudden Acceleration Litigation Group. Importantly, Chrysler had previously denied the existence of any such Task Force. See Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Defendant’s Expert Testimony in Colonna v. Chrysler. These documents reveal a series of problems with inadvertent acceleration. Finally, much of the documentation in Colonna v. Chrysler was subject to a Protective Order. Additionally, in Sellers v. Chrysler, yet another death resulted from the sudden acceleration of a Jeep Cherokee. See Complaint in Sellers v. Chrysler.
WASHINGTON, DC — The U.S. Department of Transportation released results from an unprecedented ten-month study of potential electronic causes of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) launched the study last spring at the request of Congress, and enlisted NASA engineers with expertise in areas such as computer controlled electronic systems, electromagnetic interference and software integrity to conduct new research into whether electronic systems or electromagnetic interference played a role in incidents of unintended acceleration.
incidents. The two mechanical safety defects identified by NHTSA more than a year ago – “sticking” accelerator pedals and a design flaw that enabled accelerator pedals to become trapped by floor mats – remain the only known causes for these kinds of unsafe unintended acceleration incidents. Toyota has recalled nearly 8 million vehicles in the United States for these two defects.
electronic-based cause for unintended high-speed acceleration in Toyotas.” In conducting their report, NASA engineers evaluated the electronic circuitry in Toyota vehicles and analyzed more than 280,000 lines of software code for any potential flaws that could initiate an unintended acceleration incident. At the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland, NASA hardware and systems engineers rigorously examined and tested mechanical components of Toyota vehicles that could result in an unwanted throttle opening. At a special facility in Michigan, NHTSA and NASA engineers bombarded vehicles with electromagnetic radiation to study whether such radiation could cause malfunctions resulting in unintended acceleration. NHTSA engineers and researchers also tested Toyota vehicles at NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Test Center in East Liberty, Ohio to determine whether there were any additional mechanical causes for unintended acceleration and whether any of the test scenarios developed during the NHTSA-NASA investigation could actually occur in real-world conditions.
During Congressional hearings on the Toyota recalls in February 2010, Members of Congress asked NHTSA to study whether electronic or software problems in Toyota vehicles could be to blame for unintended acceleration. At Congress’ request, NHTSA simultaneously launched two studies: one designed to evaluate possible electronic causes for unintended acceleration in Toyotas, and a broader effort to look at unintended acceleration across the automotive industry. In March 2010, NHTSA enlisted top NASA engineers and experts in areas such as electromagnetic compatibility to study whether electronic flaws can cause unintended acceleration. In its final report, NASA engineers found no evidence of an electronic defect in Toyota vehicles capable of producing dangerous, high-speed unintended acceleration incidents. The two mechanical safety defects originally identified by NHTSA remain the only known causes of dangerous unintended acceleration incidents.
February 16, 2010: NHTSA launches an official probe into the timeliness and scope of the pedal entrapment and sticky pedal Toyota recalls.
acceleration in Toyotas; the other examines unintended acceleration and the safety of vehicle electronics across the automotive industry.
December 20, 2010: Toyota agrees to pay the maximum $16.375 million civil penalty as the result of another NHTSA investigation into whether their recall of 5.5 million vehicles for pedal entrapment was conducted in a timely manner.
Washington — The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration said Friday it will not open a formal investigation into unintended acceleration claims in Lexus and Toyota vehicles.
The denial is the second time this year the safety agency has refused to open a probe into unintended acceleration.
The petition filed by a California man was based on his interpretation of Event Data Recorder data from a crash his wife experienced in a 2009 Lexus ES350 vehicle and from two other crashes involving a 2010 Toyota Corolla and a 2009 Toyota Camry. NHTSA found that the three crashes were likely the result of using the accelerator — rather than the brake pedal — rather than sudden unintended acceleration.
Sudden unintended acceleration definition- (UA) is the unintended, unexpected uncontrolled acceleration of a vehicle, often accompanied by an apparent loss of braking effectiveness. Such problems may be caused by driver error( e.g. pedal misapplication ),mechanical or electrical problems, or some combination of these factors.
If you have experienced a (UA) event which resulted in either a contact accident with another vehicle involving injuries, or a near miss non contact incident, Saffron Investigations may be able to help you. Both NASA and NHTSA engineers after a lengthy investigation have identified two known causes of (UA) unintentional vehicle acceleration that do not involve drivers error. Saffron investigations is currently exploring other potential causes of (UA) that could explain how your incident occurred. Saffron Investigations has the certified accident investigators with the experience, knowledge and skills you will need to properly prepare your case.

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