Source: http://wakeforestlawreview.com/tag/administrative-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:15:14+00:00

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In this civil case, the Sierra Club asked the Court to set aside the Army Corps of Engineers’ (“Corps”) verification which allowed for construction of the Mountain Valley Pipeline through West Virginia using the “dry cut” method for the construction of river crossings which would take four to six weeks to complete. West Virginia regulates the construction of river crossings, requiring them to be completed within 72 hours. The Fourth Circuit vacated the Corps’ verification, finding that the Corps did not have the authority to require the use of the “dry cut” method in lieu of West Virginia’s restriction. A more thorough analysis as to why the Corps lacked the authority is expected in a future opinion.
In this criminal case, Erik Gibbs sought an en banc rehearing of his case after a divided panel of the Court affirmed his twenty-four-month sentence violating the terms of his supervised release. The Court denied the petition. In voting to deny the petition and vacate the panel’s order, Judge Wynn noted that since Gibbs was now released from prison, his case is moot. The court elected to deny the petition prior to the filing of concurring, separate, and dissenting opinions, even though this practice is atypical, in order to avoid unnecessary delay or prejudice to the defendant.
« Judges of the Fourth Circuit – Hon. J. Dickson Phillips, Jr.
In this case, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) sought back pay for employees based on Baltimore County’s discriminatory practice involving improper contribution rates to the county’s age-based employee benefit plan. The district court found the county liable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and granted the EEOC partial summary judgment, but it denied a motion for back pay because the EEOC’s undue delay in investigating substantially increased the county’s back pay liability. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court decision, ruling that an award of back pay is mandatory under the ADEA after a finding of liability. Thus, the case was remanded for a determination of back pay amounts to which affected employees are entitled.
In this criminal case, the defendants argued the government did not sufficiently prove the materiality requirement of health care fraud to convict for submitting to the insurance company medically unnecessary and more expensive tests to increase profits. Materiality requires showing the misrepresentation effected the insurance company’s decision to pay the claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and found there was sufficient evidence of materiality because insurers would not have paid for the more expensive tests submitted by the defendants if they had known the tests were not medically necessarily.
In this civil case, Melina Ali appealed the district court’s order holding her in contempt after she failed to produce certain documents in response to an administrative summons issued by the IRS, arguing that the Government failed to establish her possession or control of additional responsive documents. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding sufficient evidence in the record to establish that Ali’s production was presumptively incomplete, and that the burden shifted to Ali to demonstrate her good faith efforts to produce responsive documents.
On Thursday, January 19, 2017, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the civil case Patterson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of the plaintiff’s disability benefits due to his failure to evaluate the plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment according to the “special technique” required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. The Fourth Circuit held that although failing to follow the special technique does not always necessitate remand, in this case, it was not a harmless error.
On July 21, 2010, the plaintiff filed her initial application for Social Security benefits. After the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her application, the plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing on May 12, 2011. The ALJ at the hearing upheld the denial of the plaintiff’s benefits, holding that she was not disabled during the period for which she sought benefits. The ALJ based this determination primarily on the conclusions of one doctor. The SSA conceded that the ALJ failed to follow the appropriate “special technique” protocol outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a and that the ALJ failed to consider contradictory medical evidence. The plaintiff then filed suit in district court, but district court sided with the ALJ, stating that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings and that the failure to use the special technique constituted harmless error. The plaintiff appealed from these findings.
When evaluating a claimant’s alleged mental impairment, an ALJ must follow the special technique. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). Under the special technique, an ALJ must evaluate the alleged mental impairment according to four areas of functional limitation including activities of daily living, social functioning, concentration, persistence, or pace, and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(4). The ALJ must rate his findings in the final area, episodes of decompensation, according to a four-point scale. Id. Next, the ALJ determines if the mental impairment is severe and whether it qualifies as a listed impairment. Id. § 404.1520a(d). The regulation requires the ALJ to specifically document all of the steps of the special technique. Id.
Here, the ALJ relied on the findings of only two doctors and did not document the steps of the special technique. Moreover, the record contained evidence that conflicted with the doctors’ findings, but the ALJ did not address the discrepancies. The SSA conceded that the ALJ did not properly apply the special technique and that the doctors’ opinions were not a sufficient surrogate for the special technique.
The SSA argues, as a matter of first impression, that the Fourth Circuit can apply the special technique on appeal. If the Fourth Circuit found that the ALJ’s denial of benefits was proper, it could affirm the district court’s opinion. However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with this argument, stating that the plain language of the special technique statute requires the SSA to apply the special technique. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e). Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, the special technique could not have been intended as nonbinding guidance to aid reviewing courts. The Fourth Circuit further reasoned that the SSA frequently issues such nonbinding guidance, and if it had intended for the special technique to be nonbinding guidance, it would not have engaged in the burdensome regulation promulgation process. Finally, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that failure to apply and properly document the special technique in administrative hearings actually hampers judicial review by obscuring the manner in which the ALJ handled different types of evidence. Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it could not independently apply the special technique.
Although the failure to apply the special technique does not automatically require remand in every case, the failure in this case was not harmless. The Fourth Circuit stated that the ALJ’s failure to make and support his findings severely hindered judicial review. The Fourth Circuit had no way of knowing how the ALJ evaluated crucial factors such as the plaintiff’s IQ. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit could not ascertain how the ALJ weighed and treated the conflicting evidence. Thus, the Fourth Circuit was unable to say whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings because the ALJ failed to document and explain his findings according to mandatory procedure.
The Fourth Circuit did not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s application for disability benefits. Instead, it reversed the district court’s findings and remanded the case to the ALJ, directing him to follow the requirements of all applicable regulations.
On March 15, 2016, the Fourth Circuit issued its amended published opinion in the case of Pac Tell Group, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board. The Fourth Circuit held that the decision of the National Labor Relations Board [“the NLRB”] over a dispute between an employer and the union representing its employees was supported by substantial evidence and therefore denied the employer’s petition for review.
The origin of this dispute centers around the decision of factory workers employed by U.S. Fibers to unionize. U.S. Fibers is a South Carolina-based company which recycles polyester fibers. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied-Industrial and Service Workers International Union, Local 7898 [“the union”] hoped to recruit U.S. Fibers employees to join and filed an election petition with the NLRB. The NLRB granted the union’s request and directed an election at the U.S. Fibers plant. The union won the election, meaning that the union gained the right to be the exclusive collective bargaining representative for U.S. Fibers employees.
Following the unionization of its employees, however, U.S. Fibers refused to recognize the union or engage in collective bargaining with it. The employer asserted that the NLRB’s certification of the union was improper and that the results of the election should be set aside. The employer raised two issues in support of its position: (1) that the NLRB improperly designated four employees who participated in the union election as non-supervisors and (2) that these same employees engaged in objectionable conduct in regards to the election. The NLRB disagreed, and ordered that the employer recognize the union and bargain with the union upon request. In response, the employer sought review of the NLRB order at the Fourth Circuit.
U.S. Fibers first argued that the NLRB erred in concluding that four employees were not supervisors as the term is defined under 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). To be considered a supervisor under the statute, an employee must perform one or more listed supervisory functions as well as exercise his or her authority using “independent judgment.” U.S. Fibers sought to establish that these four employees were supervisors because supervisors are generally prohibited from interfering with their employees’ freedom of choice in union elections.
U.S. Fibers made four separate arguments to show that the four employees were supervisors as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). The NLRB rejected each one of these arguments in turn and the Fourth Circuit upheld the NLRB’s decision to do so. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s findings on the matter under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard. The Fourth Circuit held that the record provided ample support for each of the NLRB’s findings. Therefore the Fourth Circuit was without justification to review the NLRB’s determination that the four employees at issue were not supervisors and thus were not prohibited from interaction with subordinate employees in regards to the union election.
U.S. Fibers then made a subsequent argument to the effect that even if the four employees at issue were not supervisors as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), they nevertheless engaged in objectionable conduct in the lead-up to the election. U.S. Fibers argued that the conduct of these employees was objectionable enough to constitute grounds for setting aside the results of the union election. The NLRB again disagreed with U.S. Fibers, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s decision. As the Fourth Circuit explained, misconduct by non-supervisory employees is only grounds to set aside the results of a union election “if such conduct ‘was so aggravated as to create a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal rendering a free election impossible.’” The Fourth Circuit held that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in holding that the conduct complained of did not rise to the level required to set aside election results. As the Fourth Circuit reasoned, the conduct complained of was merely general comments about potential future job loss as a result of refusing to vote for unionization. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the NLRB was more than justified in rejecting U.S. Fibers’ arguments on the subject.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied U.S. Fibers’ petition for review of the NLRB’s order and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its order.
In the civil case of Oxygene v. Lynch, the Fourth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part a petition for review of orders denying Wilerms Oxygene’s (“Oxygene”) application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT’) and a subsequent motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In a published opinion released on February 22, 2016, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the motion to reopen based on Oxygene’s status as aggravated felon under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and agreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision to deny Oxygene’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT because Oxygene had not proven that Haitian officials had a specific intent to torture him upon his return. The Court thus dismissed Oxygene’s petition for review of the order denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings, and denied his petition for review of the order denying his deferral of the removal under the CAT.
Oxygene obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States in 1996, two years after fleeing political violence in his native Haiti. Five years later, in 2001, Oxygene was convicted of several state crimes in Virginia, including burglary, grand larceny, robbery, and using a firearm to commit a felony. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced removal proceedings against Oxygene under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), which provides that, among other things, aliens convicted of aggravated felonies or firearm offense are deportable. Oxygene conceded that his Virginia convictions made him removable under the statute, but applied for deferral of removal under the CAT.
Oxygene had a removal hearing in front of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to consider his application for deferral. During this hearing, Oxygene submitted evidence, including State Department reports, nongovernmental organization reports, and news articles, about the deplorable prison conditions in Haiti. Oxygene expressed a fear that he would face indefinite detention if deported, and that that detention would result in the activation of his latent tuberculosis without access to sufficient medical care. Despite finding the conditions of the Haitian prisons horrid and noting that some instances of mistreatment in Haitian prisons could constitute torture, the IJ denied Oxygene’s application for deferral because he had failed to prove that it was more likely than not that he would suffer torture upon his return to Haiti. He also failed to prove that Haitian authorities intentionally and deliberately detain deportees to inflict torture, which is required under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) that implemented the directives of the CAT.
Oxygene appealed to the BIA, asking it both to reverse the IJ’s denial and, alternatively, to remand the case to the IJ to consider whether of Oxygene’s recent diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression affected the IJ’s ruling. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied the motion for remand. Oxygene’s motion for reconsideration, which the BIA treated as a petition to reopen, was subsequently denied. Oxygene filed two appeals to the Fourth Circuit challenging both the BIA’s denial of the application for deferral and its denial of his motion to reopen. The Court consolidated the questions.
The Fourth Circuit explained that because Oxygene was an aggravated felon for the purposes of removal, its jurisdiction was limited by Congress through 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(C) to legal and constitutional questions. Therefore, the Court had to determine whether Oxygene’s arguments raised legal or constitutional questions, rather than factual questions, before it proceeded with any analysis of those arguments. Oxygene presented two arguments with respect to the BIA’s denial of his application for deferral, only one of which, namely that the precedent on which the BIA relied stated the incorrect legal test for the intent necessary to establish torture, raised legal issues. The Court retained jurisdiction over this question. The Court found that Oxygene’s challenge to the motion to reopen his removal proceedings raised factual issues over which it did not have jurisdiction. As a result, the Court addressed only Oxygene’s argument that In re J-E, the precedent upon which the BIA relied, incorrectly stated the legal test for the intent necessary to establish torture under the CAT.
Congress implemented the CAT through the FARRA legislation in 1998. FARRA did not define torture, but rather instructed the Justice Department to promulgate regulations that reflected the Presidential and Senate understanding of the CAT. This understanding, which was reflected in the Justice Department regulations, included a specific intent requirement for torture. More specifically, the acts in question must be perpetrated with an intent to cause severe mental or physical injury. Acts do not constitute torture if mental or physical injury is an unintended consequence. In re J-E, the BIA adopted the specific intent requirement that each entity responsible for interpreting the CAT understood to be inherent in the definition of torture for the purposes of FARRA.
In re J-E also addressed the issue of the poor conditions in Haitian prisons. The BIA found that although Haitian officials were detaining deportees with knowledge of the poor conditions, the officials did not intentionally keep the prisons in poor condition to inflict torture on the deportees. The BIA concluded that the poor conditions were the result of a lack of resources and severe economic difficulties in the country rather than a delicate effort to torture prisoners.
The Court agreed with the BIA’s reasoning in In re J-E, finding that the specific intent requirement as the BIA had interpreted was consistent with the President’s and Congress’s understanding of torture under the CAT. It therefore afforded it deference in applying the same principles in Oxygene’s case.
For the reasons stated above, the Fourth Circuit denied Oxygen’s petition for review of an order to deny his application for deferral under the CAT, and dismissed his petition for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.
On February 16, 2016, the Fourth Circuit issued its published opinion in the agency review case Adebowale Oloyde Ojo v. Loretta Lynch. In its order, the Fourth Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying a motion to reopen the removal proceedings of Adebowale Oloyde Ojo, a native of Nigeria and adopted son of a United States citizen.
Ojo was born in Nigeria in 1983 and lawfully entered the United States in 1989. Soon after entering the United States, Ojo’s uncle, a United States citizen, became his legal guardian. Ojo lived with his uncle from the age of six to the age of sixteen, at which point Ojo’s uncle filed a petition to adopt Ojo. In 2001, after Ojo had turned seventeen, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland entered a judgment of adoption.
Between 2009 and 2012, Ojo was convicted of two-drug related offenses. In light of Ojo’s convictions, and based in the belief that Ojo had not derived U.S. citizenship as an adoptive child under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated proceedings to remove him from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), the DHS is authorized to order that certain individuals be removed from the United States if the individuals are aliens and commit an “aggravated felony.” Ojo’s drug-related offenses qualify as “aggravated felonies” and therefore, the DHS is authorized to order his removal so long as he qualifies as an alien. A foreign-born child, however, is not deemed an alien, and thus is deemed a naturalized U.S. citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) and § 1101(b)(1)(E) as long as the child was adopted by a citizen-parent while under the age of sixteen years.
In a removal proceeding in 2014, the immigration judge determined that Ojo was removable since he had committed an aggravated felony and was not a U.S. citizen. Critically, the court held that since Ojo was not adopted by his uncle until he was seventeen years old, he did not qualify as an adopted child under § 1101(b)(1)(E), and therefore had not become a U.S. citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1431. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s ruling, agreeing that Ojo did not qualify as an adopted child under the statute because of Ojo’s adoption taking place after he had turned sixteen.
Based upon a nunc pro tunc order, Ojo filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings against him. The nunc pro tunc order, a court order that gives retroactive legal effect, was entered by a Maryland state court and made Ojo’s adoption effective on the day before he turned sixteen. Therefore, under the nunc pro tunc order, Ojo qualified as a U.S. citizen by being adopted by his U.S. citizen uncle while under the age of sixteen. The Board of Immigration Appeals, however, denied Ojo’s motion to reopen, holding that it does not recognize nunc pro tunc orders after a child reaches the age limit for the filing of the adoption petition. On appeal, Ojo alleges that the BIA improperly denied Ojo’s motion to reopen the removal proceedings.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Ojo that the BIA should have allowed the reopening of the removal proceedings. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit argued that the BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(b)(1)(E) impermissibly conflicted with the Maryland state court’s nunc pro tunc order since the law of domestic relations is the domain of states and federal agencies may not interfere with the exercise of state power on the subject absent clear congressional authorization.
As the Fourth Circuit emphasized, “the Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law policy decision with respect to domestic relations.” Therefore, federal agency decisions that override the orders of state courts in regards to domestic relations are inherently suspect. As the Fourth Circuit explained, federal agencies need clear Congressional authorization before encroaching upon traditional state powers. In this case, the Fourth Circuit held that the BIA was lacking such authorization.
The BIA, in refusing to reopen Ojo’s removal proceedings, essentially disregarded the nunc pro tunc order of the Maryland state court which declared that Ojo was adopted by his uncle before he turned sixteen and therefore became a U.S. citizen by virtue of that adoption under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA’s disregard of the nunc pro tunc order was impermissible because the BIA is not empowered to review state court adoption orders. Instead, the BIA was obligated to adhere to the order of the Maryland state court which declared that Ojo was adopted before he turned sixteen. Therefore, the BIA should have reopened Ojo’s removal proceedings since the nunc pro tunc order qualified Ojo as a U.S. citizen.
The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA erred as a matter of law in denying Ojo’s motion to reopen removal proceedings, and consequently vacated the BIA order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On December 18, 2015, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the civil case Montgomery County v. FCC. The court denied Montgomery County, Maryland’s (“County”) petition for review of the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) October 17, 2014 Order (“Order”).
Together with § 6409(a)(2), these provisions forbid State and local authorities from using their zoning authority to deny wireless providers’ requests to modify equipment as long as the modification does not constitute a substantial change.
Congress gave the FCC the authority to implement the Spectrum Act and in implementing § 6409, the FCC issued their October 17, 2014 Order.
The FCC defined the term “base station” as “structures other than towers that support or house an antenna, transceiver, or other associated equipment.” This means that “base station” could conceivably constitute any structure. It further gave objective and numerical standards to establish when a modification request would “substantially change” the dimensions of the facility.
The County alleges that the Order violates the Tenth Amendment by making States and localities participate in federal efforts to grant permit applications. The Tenth Amendment forbids the federal government to require states to enforce federal laws. The Fourth Circuit held that the “deemed granted remedy” comports with the Tenth Amendment because it practically does not require states to take any action. States do not have to affirmatively approve applications, as an application will be deemed granted within the 60-day time period.
The County argued that localities should be able to review each application to determine what constitutes “substantial” modification. The Fourth Circuit found that the FCC came up with objective and concrete standards in order to eliminate the need for review by municipalities. The FCC limited the analysis to whether the proposed modification falls within the statute in order to promote the quick growth of wireless infrastructure. The Fourth Circuit held that under Chevron, the FCC’s interpretation of “substantially change” is reasonable.
The County alleged that the term “base station” should refer only to transmission equipment and not to the structure itself. However, the Fourth Circuit held that, again under Chevron, the FCC’s definition of “base station” is reasonable because it is consistent with Congress’ intent to promote the expansion of networks.
The Fourth Circuit held that the FCC’s Order was fully compliant with the Tenth Amendment and reasonably interpreted the terms of § 6409(a) of the Spectrum Act. The court therefore denied the County’s petition for review.
In the civil case of Etienne v. Lynch, the Fourth Circuit denied a petition to review an Immigration Board of Appeals decision ordering Eddy Etienne (“Etienne”) to be removed from the United States on the ground that he is an alien who has been convicted of an “aggravated felony.” After determining that jurisdiction existed, the Court turned to Etienne’s argument that his conviction was not an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). In a published opinion released on December 30, 2015, the Fourth Circuit found that there was no reason to rebut the common-law presumption when interpreting the term “conspiracy,” and thus found Etienne’s conviction for conspiracy under Maryland law to fit within the definition of “aggravated felony” despite Maryland’s lack of an overt act requirement.
Etienne entered the United States from Haiti as an undocumented immigrant in 1984. In 1996, Etienne was convicted of conspiracy to violate Maryland’s dangerous controlled substances law. After his release from prison, he continued to live in the United States as an undocumented immigrant until 2010, when he received Temporary Protected Status after an earthquake in Haiti. After denying Etienne renewal of his Temporary Protective Status in 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings by serving Etienne with a Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order (“Notice of Intent”). The Notice of Intent stated that Etienne would be removed pursuant to expedited procedures as an alien convicted of an “aggravated felony.” Etienne checked a box on the form indicating he wished to challenge his removal, but did not attach any supporting documents or contest his removal on the ground that his conviction was not an “aggravated felony” under the statute. DHS later issued a Final Administrative Removal Order for Etienne’s removal. Etienne appealed to the Fourth Circuit after an asylum officer and Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that Etienne did not qualify for withholding of removal.
The Court first considered whether it had jurisdiction over Etienne’s petition for review. The jurisdictional question turned on whether Etienne exhausted his administrative remedies with DHS, which in turned rested on whether Etienne was required to have raised his claim that his conviction did not constitute an “aggravated felony” in DHS proceedings. Etienne argued, and the Court agreed, that DHS’s expedited removal proceedings did not provide an opportunity to challenge the legal basis for that removal.
The Notice of Intent gives aliens four options when contesting removal on the basis of deportability: 1) I am a citizen or national of the United States, 2) I am a lawful permanent resident of the United States, 3) I was not convicted of the criminal offense described above, 4) I am attaching documents in support of my rebuttal and request for further review. The Court held both that this language indicates that only factual challenges are available and that the Notice of Intent offers no obvious opportunity to raise legal challenges in expedited removal proceedings. Because exhaustion of administrative remedies only requires that an alien use all the steps the agency holds out, and the agency did not make it clear that legal challenges must be raised during removal proceedings, the Fourth Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction to consider Etienne’s petition for review.
The Court recognized a general presumption that Congress intends to adopt the common law meaning of statutory terms. At common law, “conspiracy” required only the act of conspiring rather than any overt act to further the conspiracy. One-third of the states retain the common law definition, while the other states require an overt act by the defendant to prove conspiracy. Congress evinced an intent that the INA apply broad when it defined “aggravated” offenses as applying to violations of state and federal law, and thus the Fourth Circuit determined that overriding the common law presumption would lead to the anomalous result that the term “conspiracy” would be null and void as to a third of the states.
The Court concluded that because the common law definition of “conspiracy” controlled, Etienne’s conviction under Maryland law, which required no overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, qualified as an “aggravated felony” under the INA. Accordingly, it denied Etienne’s petition for review.

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