Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1672506.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 23:15:03+00:00

Document:
The district court granted Defendants–Appellees' motions for summary judgment as to the Title VII discrimination and § 1983 claims as to all individual officers. Abrams v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 856 F.Supp.2d 402, 411–12 (D.Conn.2012). The district court also granted summary judgment as to the Title VII retaliation claim regarding Abrams's assignment to the Casino Unit, but denied summary judgment for retaliation regarding his continued non-assignment to the Van. Id. at 412–13. Following a trial, a jury found for DPS on the remaining retaliation claim.
On appeal, Abrams now challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants and the judgment in favor of DPS after trial. We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the Title VII retaliation claim pertaining to Abrams's Casino Unit transfer and the jury's verdict in favor of DPS as to the Title VII retaliation claim. We VACATE the district court's grant of summary judgment of the Title VII race discrimination claim, as well as the corresponding race discrimination claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Abrams, a black male, joined Connecticut's Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) in 1986. In 1990, he was made a detective in the Eastern District Major Crimes Unit (“EDMCU”), a division that houses more than thirty detectives working on major crimes but not homicides. Homicides, at least in part, are handled by the EDMCU's crime van (the “Van”).
Abrams has unsuccessfully sought to join the Van since 1998. He has received various reasons for his continued non-selection, including that he had a history of poor performance evaluations with regard to written reports. While at the State Police Training Academy in 1986, Abrams underperformed in areas including report writing, knowledge of the penal code, and criminal investigations. When placed in his first assignment out of the academy, however, performance reports indicated that Abrams had made a “concerted effort and overcame these problems.” (Ex. 10, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Oct. 1986 through Oct. 1987). In 1990, Abrams was transferred to the EDMCU, where his report writing met with differing reviews; he received occasional criticism from some supervisors, while others either noted improvement or offered positive evaluations. (Ex. 12, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Oct. 1990 to Oct. 1991; Ex. 13, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Oct. 1992 to Oct. 1993; Ex. 14, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Oct. 1996 to Oct. 1997; Ex. 15 Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Oct. 1998 to Oct. 1999; Ex. 16. Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Oct. 1991 to Oct. 1992; Ex. H, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Oct. 2005 to Oct. 2006).
Perhaps the most salient of these performance evaluations were those given by Sergeant Thomas Wakely, who supervised Abrams from 2001 to 2008—prior to and during much of the period relevant to this case. Although Wakely rated Abrams's communication skills (which include report writing) as “unsatisfactory” in his Spring 2001 evaluation, he noted in a late 2002 evaluation that Abrams's skills were improving. (Compare Ex. 17, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for April 2001 to June 2001, with Ex. 19, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Nov. 2002 to Dec. 2002). The improving evaluations continued in early Spring 2003, when Wakely again noted improvement and rated Abrams's report writing as “satisfactory.” (Ex. 20, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Feb. 2003 to Mar. 2003). Notwithstanding a late Spring 2003 evaluation in which Wakely noted that Abrams needed improvement in his report writing, Abrams's upward trend continued through 2008 when Wakely was replaced by Sergeant Sean Cox as Abrams's supervisor. (Ex. 21, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for April 2003 to May 2003; Ex. 22, Trooper Perf. Eval. and Observ. Rep. for Oct. 2005 to Oct. 2006).
• Detective Leitkowski, assigned in 2004, possessed special forensic drawing and crime scene diagramming skills.
• Detective McFadden, assigned in 2006, possessed “strong investigatory skills” and excellent report writing (according to Turner, who recommended him).
• Detective Payette, assigned in 2007, had strong technical investigatory and electronic equipment skills, and a college degree. When Wakely spoke to O'Hara about Payette's selection over Abrams, whom Wakely had recommended, O'Hara noted that Payette would “fit in better” and noted his college degree.
• Detective Vining, assigned in 2008, was the only woman in the Van, had skills related to crimes on children and forensic interviewing of children, and had a college degree in Psychology.
• Detective Lamoureux, also assigned in 2008, had strong investigatory and interviewing skills and a college degree in Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Administration.
• Detective Hoyt, the last detective assigned to the Van in 2008, had expertise working with other agencies and handling cases involving children and sexual assault. Hoyt also had a college degree in Justice and Law Administration.
• Detective Cargill, assigned in 2009, was an emergency medical technician and had strong investigatory and report writing skills.
• Detective Kasperowski, assigned in late 2009, held bachelor's and master's degrees. According to Defendant Cox, he also had excellent interviewing skills and success solving sexual assaults.
When a spot opened in the Van in 2007, Wakely personally recommended Abrams to the selection committee; Wakely rated Abrams superior in every category and noted in a March 2007 meeting about his recommendation of Abrams that Abrams's reports were greatly improved and “fantastic.” (Wakely Dep. 55–57). Wakely reported that notwithstanding his recommendation of Abrams, O'Hara found Detective Payette—a different applicant—to be a “better fit” for the Van than Abrams. In communicating this to Wakely, O'Hara apparently also noted that Payette had a college degree. (Wakely Dep. 49–51). During his deposition, Wakely stated that it “crossed his mind” that O'Hara's “better fit” statement could relate to race. (Wakely Dep. 83–84).
At some point between 2004 and 2009, Abrams spoke with DPS's Affirmative Action Officer Barbara Lynch that he was concerned the selection committee was passing him over because of race. There is some dispute as to what Lynch told Abrams, but at the very least he felt that she would not take action. As a result, he never filed a complaint with her. Instead, in April 2007, Abrams filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”), alleging that DPS discriminated and retaliated against him by assigning Detective McFadden and another white detective to the Van instead of him. At some point shortly thereafter, Fields ordered O'Hara and Turner to allow Abrams to ride with the Van.2 Abrams was called several times, but he was either in class or on vacation and did not ride until the morning of June 21, 2007. That morning, the Van members went to breakfast together after leaving the crime scene. In his deposition, Abrams stated that the other detectives on the Van made him feel like he did not belong. (Abrams Dep. 85–86). He was not called to ride again.
A plaintiff presents a prima facie case when he establishes: (1) that he belonged to a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the position he sought; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir.2008). It is undisputed that Abrams has successfully shown elements 1, 2, and 4; as an African–American he is a member of a protected class; he was qualified to be in the Van; and because all the detectives assigned to the Van were white, the circumstances permit an inference of discrimination.
Thus, to make out a prima facie case, the only remaining issue is the third element; that is, whether Abrams suffered a materially adverse change in employment. The district court called this element a “close case” and avoided resolving the matter conclusively because it determined that even had Abrams made out a prima facie case, he could not establish pretext at the final step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Abrams, 856 F.Supp.2d at 409. On appeal, however, Defendants concede that denial to the Van was an adverse employment action, and thus that Abrams has met his prima facie case. (Appellees' Br. 13–25; Tr. of Argument April 29, 2014 at 9–10).
Defendants put forth legitimate non-discriminatory reasons that Abrams was not selected for the Van: (1) that he—unlike five of the eight others selected—did not have a college education; (2) that all members were selected for their specific skills or talent in investigation, report writing or strong evaluations and Abrams was not similarly situated to those selected; and (3) that Abrams had ongoing problems with report writing.
The second question is whether these statements support a reasonable inference of discrimination. This question is crucial to Abrams's case as none of the other evidence proffered by Abrams6 passes muster. It strikes us as somewhat ironic, that while the court correctly excluded Wakely's sense of what the statement he heard implied, the court did not consider that Wakely's impression itself bespeaks of an inference that a jury could reasonably make. In fact, the court seemed to struggle with the conflicting inferences Wakely and Matthews drew from these comments and discussed in their depositions: “While Matthews did not believe Contre was referring to race, it did cross Wakely's mind that O'Hara could be referring to race.” Abrams, 856 F.Supp.2d at 410.7 Indeed, the court's acknowledgement of the differing opinions of Matthews and Wakely belies the court's ultimate finding that no question of fact could exist in the mind of a reasonable juror on the issue of pretext.
Balancing all of these factors, we see this as a very close case, and one, when considered in the light most favorable for the non-moving party—as it must be—that is simply too close to call and should be a question for a jury. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants on Abrams's Title VII discrimination claim against DPS; and because the analysis is parallel under Abrams's § 1983 Equal Protection Clause claim, we vacate this decision as well and re-instate the relevant individual Defendants.
The timing is this: within five months of Abrams filing his fourth and final CHRO Complaint in November 2009, he was reassigned to the Casino Unit by Fields, in or about May of 2010. Upon being transferred, Abrams was no longer able to do any major crime investigations, but instead was relegated to performing ministerial tasks such as background checks. Not only was Abrams's travel-time doubled from his prior work assignment, but he was no longer eligible for overtime. While “temporal proximity must be very close,” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) there is no “bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship between the exercise of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action,” Gorman–Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001). Though five months might be enough to establish a prima facie case, temporal proximity alone is not enough to establish pretext in this Circuit. See El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir.2010) (“The temporal proximity of events may give rise to an inference of retaliation for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, but without more, such temporal proximity is insufficient to satisfy appellant's burden to bring forward some evidence of pretext․ Indeed, a plaintiff must come forward with some evidence of pretext in order to raise a triable issue of fact.”). Abrams has alleged nothing beyond temporal proximity to establish pretext. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to find for Defendants on the Title VII Retaliation related to Abrams's transfer to the Casino Unit.
A decision dismissing a claim based on qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage may only be granted when a court finds that an official has met his or her burden to demonstrate that no rational jury could conclude “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ––– U.S. ––––,131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under prong two, a “[g]overnment official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 2083 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). “The question is not what a lawyer would learn or intuit from researching case law, but what a reasonable person in [the] defendant's position should know about the constitutionality of the conduct.” Young v.. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir.1998). Finally, “we do not consider the subjective intent, motives, or beliefs of the officials.” Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 106 (2d Cir.2003) (citation omitted). “Instead, we use an objective standard for judging the actions of state and federal officials.” Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir.2012).
We note further that the district court erred in holding that Turner and the other individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the Title VII retaliation claim based on Abrams's continued non-placement in the Van. Abrams, 856 F.Supp.2d at 415–16. Since “Title VII imposes no liability on individuals, the doctrine of qualified immunity is irrelevant to plaintiff's Title VII claims.” Genas v. State of N.Y. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 75 F.3d 825, 829 n. 3 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir.1995)). On remand, the district court should only consider the individual Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity with regard to the Equal Protection Clause claim brought under § 1983.
Turning to the second matter, Abrams argues that the district court erred in “exclud[ing] all evidence of racial discrimination” from Abrams trial on retaliation, thus “anaesthetizing the jury from the very basis upon which Abrams claimed the retaliation arose.” (Appellant's Br. 30). But an examination of the transcript of these evidentiary rulings makes clear that the district court did quite the opposite. (Oral Argument Tr. Dec. 3, 2012 at 11–25). In hearing arguments on the admissibility of Abrams's other discrimination claims under Fed. R. of Evid. 403, Judge Kornmann explicitly said, “[Abrams will] certainly be entitled to show that he made complaints of racial discrimination.” (Oral Argument Tr. Dec. 3, 2012 at 20); later cabining this to allow “testimony about racial matters” only to “state generally that he filed complaints ․ of discrimination.” (Oral Argument Tr. Dec. 3, 2012 at 22–23).
3. The district court dismissed all claims against Cox as Abrams had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in his claims against him. On appeal, Abrams offers nothing to dispute this. We therefore consider this claim abandoned.
4. “We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the non-movant.” Singer v. Ferro, 711 F .3d 334, 339 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. We note that while the statements were improperly excluded as hearsay evidence, we take no position as to whether, on remand, they might be properly excluded on other bases not considered here.
6. Before the district court, Abrams attempted to demonstrate pretext through a history of discrimination at DPS from the 1980s and a racist cartoon in someone's workspace, among other things. The district court correctly decided that these did not establish pretext and Abrams gives us no cause to revisit this determination on appeal.
7. In addition, the district court seemed to think that because Wakely was not “involved in the decision-making process” and did not make reference to “an objective basis” for his impression, that impression was suspect. 856 F.Supp.2d at 411. But Wakely knew the quality of Abrams's work, wrote glowing recommendations of that work, and knew that Abrams had been passed over before. Thus the court's justification for dismissing Wakely's impression is unfounded.

References: § 1983
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v.