Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/222/114/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:19:28+00:00

Document:
There is no appeal to this Court from an order disallowing a claim made by the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico sitting as the bankruptcy court.
The express provisions in § 25 of the Bankruptcy Act for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by implication exclude the right to exercise jurisdiction over a subject not delegated by that or some other statute.
An order of the bankruptcy court disallowing a claim is a step in the proceeding, and not a controversy arising in the proceeding within the meaning of § 24a. Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 234; Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296.
The fact that no method of review is prescribed by the statute in certain cases does not justify this Court in disregarding the statute and assuming jurisdiction where none exists.
That this Court has assumed jurisdiction in a case in which its jurisdiction passed unchallenged is not controlling in a subsequent case when the jurisdiction is challenged. Armstrong v. Fernandez, 208 U. S. 324, qualified and limited.
The provisions for review of judgment of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico in § 35 of the Act of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. 85, c. 191, do not affect the exclusive modes of review specifically provided for in the Bankruptcy Act.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this Court of appeals under the Bankruptcy Act, are stated in the opinion.
We are of opinion that a motion made to dismiss this case must prevail, and we therefore state only the facts which are essential to the consideration of that subject.
petition for review, reversed the action of the referee. It was held that the settlements relied upon by Munsuri were binding. An order was made directing that the previous allowance of the claims be vacated and that the claims be disallowed. Thereupon the court filed its "findings of fact and conclusions of law," which were recited to have been made "in pursuance of general order in bankruptcy No. 36, p. 3." The attorney for the creditors then petitioned for the allowance of an appeal to this Court from the judgment and order "whereby the referee's report denying the motion to disallow the claims of said creditors is reversed and set aside and the said claims are disallowed."
"APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR"
"a. That appeals and equity cases may be taken in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy to the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, and to the supreme court of the territories, in the following cases, to-wit . . . (3) From a judgment allowing or rejecting a debt or claim of five hundred dollars or over.
Such appeal shall be taken within ten days after the judgment appealed from has been rendered, and may be heard and determined by the appellate court in term or vacation, as the case may be."
This express provision for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the courts therein named over the case here presented by necessary implication must be held to exclude the right of this Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a subject not delegated unless some other provision of the statute compels to a contrary view. But, instead of tending to so do, the context of the statute adds cogency to and makes irresistible the implication arising from the provision of 25a, above quoted. This result flows from the careful provision otherwise made by the statute for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by this Court over proceedings in courts of bankruptcy, or the orders, judgments, and decrees rendered by such courts, none of which embraces the character of case here presented. Indeed, when the context of the statute is considered and the distribution of appellate jurisdiction for which it provides is taken into view, it becomes certain that to extend by remote implication, based upon conceptions of inconvenience, the reviewing power of this Court to a subject like the one now in question would destroy the symmetry of the law and would render necessary limitations on the power of this Court to review as to important subjects concerning which the power would otherwise obtain.
See 25(b), paragraphs 1 and 2, defining the appellate power of this Court in certain cases, and see also the right to certify questions to this Court and the authority conferred on this Court to allow writs of certiorari conferred in § 25(d), as well as authority conferred by 24(a,) to which we shall hereafter advert. We might well leave the sufficiency of the motion to dismiss to rest upon these conclusive considerations, but we nevertheless briefly refer to the contentions pressed in argument to the contrary.
"Jurisdiction of appellate courts. -- (a). The Supreme Court of the United States, the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, and the supreme courts of the territories, in vacation in chambers and during their respective terms, as now or as they may be hereafter held, are hereby invested with appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they have appellate jurisdiction in other cases. The Supreme Court of the United States shall exercise a like jurisdiction from courts of bankruptcy not within any organized circuit of the United States and from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia."
the proposition really rests upon the misconstruction of the section already pointed out. That is to say, as the sentence relied upon only confers upon this Court "a like jurisdiction" to review the Acts of the particular courts of bankruptcy which the sentence designates to that conferred by the immediately preceding provisions of § 24(a) -- that is, to review controversies in bankruptcy -- it follows that the sentence confers no power to review a mere step in bankruptcy taken by a bankrupt court, even although such court be one of those referred to in the last sentence relied upon.
The fact that the result of the previous settled construction of the statute causes it to come to pass that orders in mere proceedings in bankruptcy, rendered by the court below when acting as a court in bankruptcy, may not be susceptible of being reviewed in any court unless in some case where such review is specially provided for in the Bankrupt Act, affords no ground for disregarding the plain text of the statute by assuming jurisdiction where none exists.
therefore, insofar as it conflicts with the construction which we here give the statute, must be deemed to be qualified and limited.
"Writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and the district court of the United States shall be allowed and may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States in the same manner, and under the same regulations, and in the same cases, as from the supreme courts of the territories of the United States, and such writs of error and appeal shall be allowed in all cases where the Constitution of the United States, or a treaty thereof or an act of Congress, is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied."
supreme courts of the territories of the United States,"
we think it evident that, as to questions of the character of those presented by this appeal, arising in steps in bankruptcy proceedings proper, the modes of review specifically provided for in the Bankruptcy Act are exclusive.

References: § 25
 § 24
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 § 35
 § 25
 § 24