Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/403/403mass184.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:20:23+00:00

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EDWARD B. HANIFY vs. MARTHA M. HANIFY.
In a divorce proceeding, the judge properly considered a party's interest in a pending lawsuit as part of the marital estate subject to division under G. L. c. 208, Section 34, and, where the valuation of that interest was uncertain, the judge properly entered an order directing that future recovery, if and when received, be divided according to a fixed formula. [186-190] LIACOS, J., dissenting, with whom LYNCH, J., joined.
support order. [Note 1] We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.
1. Interest in pending lawsuits. As part of the division of property under G. L. c. 208, Section 34, [Note 2] the judge assigned to the wife "from the net settlement or judgment of the `Martha's Vineyard Lawsuit(s)' which were brought by the Husband and are now pending, . . . one-half thereof, or the sum of $70,000, whichever amount is lesser, within ten days after receipt of the same by the Husband." [Note 3] The husband claims error in this award on the ground, inter alia, that the pending lawsuits do not constitute part of the marital estate under G. L. c. 208, Section 34. We disagree.
Massachusetts law vests in a judge broad powers of discretion regarding the division of marital estates. Under Section 34, a judge "may assign to one party in a divorce proceeding all or part of the separate nonmarital property of the other in addition to or in lieu of alimony." Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398 , 401 (1977). By definition, a party's estate "includes all property to which he holds title, however acquired." Id. at 400.
An unliquidated claim for money damages constitutes a chose in action. "[C]hoses in action are property . . . and fall within the divorce court's broad power to divide marital property . . . . `[A]ll personal property, tangible and intangible, in which a spouse acquires an interest is includable [as property to be divided by the court]. Choses in action, rights and other interests, the benefits of which may be receivable now and in the future are classifiable as intangible personal property.'" (Citations omitted.) Moulton, v. Moulton, 485 A.2d 976, 978 (Me. 1984), quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 468 (1977). Thus, many jurisdictions hold that pending lawsuits constitute marital property subject to division on divorce. Bunt v. Bunt, 294 Ark. 507 (1988). In re Marriage of Dettore, 86 Ill. App. 3d 540 (1980). Moulton v. Moulton, supra. Heilman v. Heilman, 95 Mich. App. 728, 731 (1980) ("a spouse's chose in action for personal injuries and the other spouse's per quod claim constitute property subject to such distribution"), quoting DiTolvo v. DiTolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 79 (1974). Richardson v. Richardson, 139 Wis. 2d 778 (1987). [Note 4] We agree with this view.
The husband's reliance on precedents regarding expectancies is misplaced. Expectancies, unlike choses in action, embody no enforceable rights accruing during marriage. See Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240 , 244 (1987) (future earning potential created by a professional degree); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 , 714 (1985) (future earning potential created by a patent); Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364 , 374 (1985) (anticipated inheritance under a will where testator still living and could change terms of will).
Where valuation is uncertain an "if and when received" order division of a pending chose in action achieves a final and equitable property division under Section 34. The judge enters a final order dividing all the present assets and directs that the future recovery, if and when received, be divided according to a fixed formula. Such an order does not require the judge to retain jurisdiction over the settlement or leave it "open" pending resolution of the lawsuits. Nor does it prolong an unwanted relationship between the divorced spouses. The nonlitigating spouse need only keep the forum court and the litigating spouse's attorney advised of a current address. [Note 6] Judicial supervision of alimony and support payments creates far more onerous burdens on the Probate Court and the parties than does an order to divide future pension or damage payments.
at least to the extent of recovery for income lost and expenses added during marriage, constitute marital property. [Note 7] The fact that a lawsuit is still pending at the time of divorce does not alter this result. A contrary decision would merely "place the claimant in the position of manipulating the claim so as to `liquidate' it after divorce and thus have the power to determine whether it is included in marital property." Bunt v. Bunt, supra at 511. In our view, "if the claim for a compensation award accrues during the marriage, the award is marital property regardless of when received." In re Marriage of Dettore, supra at 542. We therefore affirm the judgment awarding the wife an interest in the pending lawsuit.
judgment made pursuant to Section 34, a two-step analysis applies. "First, we examine the judge's findings to determine whether all relevant factors in Section 34 were considered. . . . The judge may consider only factors which are enumerated in Section 34 . . . . [Second, we] determine whether the reasons for the judge's conclusions are apparent in his findings and rulings. . . . The rationale for the decision must appear in the judgment either explicitly or by clear implication, and the mere listing of findings, even if detailed, is not enough." Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265 , 267-268 (1987). See Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102 , 107-108 (1986).
the court's decision pertaining to the husband's claims of error as to the assignment of an automobile and as to the order pertaining to child support, I write to express my disagreement with the court's decision on the major issue in this appeal. That issue pertains to whether an interest in a pending lawsuit should be considered subject to division as part of the marital estate under G. L. c. 208, Section 34 (1986 ed.). In my view, the court has not distinguished persuasively our prior cases dealing with the division of expectancies.
reasons govern the general rule excluding such expectancies from the statutory definition of property subject to division: "An attempt at some determination of the usual speculative quantum of an expectancy might well involve the lengthy trial of issues collateral to the Section 34 action: the validity of a will, current and future testamentary capacity, valuation of the estates of others, familial relationships, and so forth. See Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn. 361, 365 (1978)." Id.

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