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As Amended on Denial of Rehearing March 14, 1938. [303 U.S. 123, 124] Messrs. John P. Bullington and F. G. Coates, both of Houston, Tex., for appellant.
Prior to the hearing before the commission, the South Texas Gas Company, which owned and operated the transmission properties and transported the gas sold to the Texas Border Gas Company at the Laredo city gate, was made a party to the proceeding. The Texas Border Gas Company applied to the city for an increase of rates and, because of the city's failure to act, took an appeal to the commission as the statute provided. The two appeals were consolidated. The United Gas Public Service Company, a Delaware corporation, entered its appearance on both appeals alleging that it had acquired the properties of both companies. The commission, by order of June 13, 1933, fixed a rate of 55 cents per m.c.f. with a penalty of 10 per cent. for nonpayment within ten [303 U.S. 123, 127] days, and the order was made retroactive to January 1, 1932. Texas Border Gas Co. v. City of Laredo, 2 P.U.R.,N.S., 503.
The United Gas Public Service Company then brought suit in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas to restrain the enforcement of the commission's order. On July 26, 1933, the State of Texas, the members of the commission, and the city instituted the present suit in the District Court of Travis county in the nature of an appeal under article 60592 for the purpose of protecting the jurisdiction of the state court and of enforcing the commission's order if determined to be valid. The state court thereupon stayed all proceedings by the commission, or by the officials of the state and city, to enforce the commission's order until the determination of the suit. On August 1, 1933, the District Court of the United States composed of three judges, 28 U.S.C . 380, 28 U.S.C.A. 380, stayed all proceedings in that court pending the final determination of the suit in the state court. Subject to the order of the state court, the company has continued to charge its 75-cent rate.
A motion to dismiss the appeal taken to this Court from the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was denied. 301 U.S. 667 , 57 S.Ct. 921. Upon hearing, the Court ordered reargu- [303 U.S. 123, 128] ment, noting that it especially desired to hear the parties on the state of the evidence as to the effect of the application of the commission's rate to the years 1932 and 1933, that is, as to the revenues and expenses for those years on that basis, and as to the effect upon the rights of the appellant, with respect to those years, of the bond given on its appeal to the commission. November 8, 1937. 302 U.S. 647 , 58 S.Ct. 527, 82 L.Ed. --. Reargument has been had accordingly.
The proceedings before the commission and its rulings. The commission gave a full hearing. It received voluminous evidence offered by appellant and the city as to every phase of the controversy and their counsel were fully heard in argument. The opinion of the commission reviews the history of the utility from the time that the Texas Border Gas Company received its franchise from the city in 1909. The commission found the interrelation of the companies concerned and that the present appellant, which had become the owner of the properties of the former operating companies, was itself a unit of the United Gas System. It was in view of the 'interrelated company operation and ownership,' that the gathering, transmission, and distribution properties used and useful in serving the city of Laredo were valued as a combined property. As consumers in a number of other communities within the Laredo area were also served, it became necessary to allocate to Laredo its appropriate proportion. Methods of allocation were submitted by the respective parties and the commission adopted a weighted average per cent., which had been taken by the city's engineer as an approximate mean between two percentages used by the company's engineer, as coming the [303 U.S. 123, 129] closest to a fair and correct allocation. Evidence of historical cost and of reproduction cost new less depreciation was submitted. The company's appraisal on the basis of reproduction cost new, less depreciation, was $1, 231,601. The appraisal of the city's engineer on the same basis was $810, 698. The city adduced evidence showing the depreciated historical cost as of July 31, 1932, to be $709,991.23.
With respect to 'available revenue,' the commission said that the company had presented a 'setup' of operating revenues and expenses for the twelve-month period ending July 31, 1932, only. On the other hand, the city had presented a similar 'setup' covering the years ending June 30, 1929, 1930, and 1931, and for the year ending July 31, 1932-a period of four years. The commission was of the opinion that the one year ending July 31, 1932, should not be taken as a test period. It was believed to be a matter of common knowledge that 'from a general business standpoint the year 1932 was the worst year since 1929.' The city's exhibit was deemed to show that the fiscal year 1931 was also subnormal, and the commission concluded that neither that year, nor an average of those two years, should be taken as an adequate test. The commission also thought that it would be unfair to the company to take the year 1930 [303 U.S. 123, 131] or an average of the three years, 1930, 1931, and 1932, as it appeared that the year 1930 was the best year in point of gross revenues that the company had experienced since 1928. On the whole, the commission thought that justice would be done if an average of revenues and expenses for the four fiscal years, 1929, 1930, 1931, and 1932, should be taken as the test period for the computation upon which a fair return should be predicated.
The commission found the rate, for all domestic uses, of 55 cents per m.c.f., the minimum bill per user per month to be $1 and the penalty for nonpayment within 10 days to be 10 per cent., to be 'just and reasonable.' The commission found that its application would produce 'a net return in excess of seven per cent (7%) per annum on the present fair value of the properties, after provision for operations and reserve for depreciation.' The commission ordered that the rate should be effective from and after January 1, 1932, and that there [303 U.S. 123, 132] should be refunded to the city of Laredo for the benefit of domestic gas consumers the difference between the amount collected under the existing rate and the amount that would have been due by consumers under the commission's order.
At the close of the evidence, appellant moved for a peremptory instruction in its favor and also for the suspension of the commission's order for the years 1932 and 1933. These motions were overruled. Appellant then moved to have the case submitted to the jury on 'special issues' and not upon a 'special charge.' The court stated that in its view its charge was on 'special issue' and hence complied with the request. The appellant then moved to submit to the jury certain special issues which were separately stated; that is, that the jury should make separate findings as to the values of component parts of appellant's property during the years 1932 and 1933, respectively, also as to the amount of the necessary materials and supplies and cash working capital, and the amount which should be allowed for 'going value,' and [303 U.S. 123, 133] as to the average cost of gas at the well month and the proper annual allowance for the depreciation reserve. These requests were refused.
That by 'operation expenses' was meant such expenses as were incurred in the operation of appellant's property in furnishing gas to the people of Laredo. [303 U.S. 123, 134] That by 'annual depreciation' was meant the amount per annum that was reasonably necessary to compensate for the wearing out and any necessary replacements and retirements of appellant's property.
'You are further instructed that in determining your answer to said issue in the light of all the evidence introduced in this case the defendant, United Gas Public Service Company, is entitled to receive a fair return at this time on the present fair value of its property that is used and useful in the public service after first deducting all necessary operating expenses and a fair and reasonable amount for the annual depreciation of said property, and [303 U.S. 123, 135] that in considering what is a fair value of said property you will take into consideration all elements of value that have been introduced in evidence before you, including reproduction cost new of said property and the amount of going value (if any) that inheres in said property.
First.-The question of procedural due process.-There is no ground for holding that appellant did not have a fair hearing before the commission. Appellant's evidence was received and weighed; its arguments were heard and considered. The commission made findings as to the value of appellant's property, the permissible allowance for depreciation, and the rate of return. The amounts of revenues and expenses for the four years [303 U.S. 123, 139] which the commission took as a basis sufficiently appear, as already stated, from the city's exhibit to which the commission referred in its opinion. The estimated amount of revenue at the commission's rate appears from a simple calculation, applying the rate of return to the rate base after the annual allowance for depreciation. In the commission's procedure there was no lack of the due process required by the Federal Constitution. Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 302 U.S. 388 , 58 S.Ct. 334, decided January 3, 1938; Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corporation v. Railroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287, 304 , 305 S., 53 S.Ct. 637, 643; West Ohio Gas Company v. Public Utilities Commission, No. 1, 294 U.S. 63, 70 , 55 S.Ct. 316, 320.
With respect to the proceedings in the state courts, appellant urges that the case was not tried and determined as required by state law, and we are referred to the state statutes and the decisions of the Texas courts as to the proper procedure in the trial court and on appeal. It is not our function, in reviewing a judgment of the state court, to decide local questions. We are concerned solely with asserted federal rights. The final judgment of the state court in the instant case must be taken as determining that the procedure actually adopted satisfied all state requirements. John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583, 585 , 34 S.Ct. 178; Lee v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 252 U.S. 109, 110 , 40 S.Ct. 254; Central Union Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 194 , 195 S., 46 S. Ct. 90, 91.
As to the requirement of due process under the Federal Constitution, appellant contends that it was denied the independent judicial judgment upon the facts and law to which it was entitled. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 , 40 S.Ct. 527; Bluefield Water Works Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679 , 43 S.Ct. 675; State Corporation Commission v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 569 , 54 S.Ct. 321, 324; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 49 , 56 S.Ct. 720, 724. The proceeding in the state court undoubtedly purported to afford an independent judicial review. As the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas said in the instant case, the [303 U.S. 123, 140] trial of the issues whether the rate was unreasonable or confiscatory was 'de novo.' Appellant itself recognizes that the trial 'was essentially de novo, new and full testimony being introduced as to property value, depreciation reserve accrual, revenues, expenses, rates of return,' etc. Appellant's evidence was received by the trial court and appellant's contentions were heard. The question whether due process in the court's procedure was accorded thus comes to the mode of trial; that is, (1) the propriety of a trial by jury, and (2) the manner in which the issues were submitted to the jury.
We do not fail to appreciate the difficulty in presenting to a jury the complicated issues in a rate case, especially where, as here, the evidence is voluminous, embracing the conflicting valuations of experts and a host of details in appraisals and in accounts of operations, with elaborate tabulations. Even in trials of such cases without a jury, the service of a special master for the analysis of the details in evidence with respect to values and return has been found advisable. We have had abundant occasion to become familiar with the difficulty of such determinations. But we are not dealing with questions of policy as to procedure. The state is entitled to determine the procedure of its courts, so long as it provides the requisite due process. And on that question we have never held that it is beyond the power of the state to provide for the trial by a jury of questions of fact because they are complicated. Cases at law triable by a jury in the federal courts often involve most difficult and complex questions, as, for example, in patent cases at law presenting issues of validity and infringement. See Tucker v. Spalding, 13 Wall. 453, 455; Keyes v. Grant, 118 U.S. 25, 36 , 37 S., 6 S.Ct. 950; Royer v. Schultz Belting Co., 135 U.S. 319, 325 , 10 S.Ct. 833; Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 578 , 579 S., 15 S.Ct. 199. Most difficult questions of fact in protracted trials, with much conflicting expert testimony, are not infrequently presented in criminal cases triable by jury. The issue of life or death may be [303 U.S. 123, 141] decided in such a case. We have held that a state may modify trial by jury or abolish it altogether (Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 ; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 , 20 S.Ct. 448, 494; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 , 35 S.Ct. 582), but never that the time- honored method of resolving questions of fact by a jury must be abandoned by a state under compulsion of the Federal Constitution. And we find no warrant for such a ruling now.
The special issues which appellant requested were for findings as to the value of component parts of appellant's property during the years 1932 and 1933 and as to the amounts necessary to cover material and supplies, working capital, going value, and certain other items. It will be observed that these special issues did not embrace all the questions which the jury should consider, as for example, the questions of operating revenues, operating expenses and return for the period to which the evidence before the court appropriately related and not simply for the years 1932 and 1933. If trial by jury was permissible, as we hold it was, we cannot say-putting aside questions of correct practice under the state law not reviewable here-that appellant was entitled under the Federal Constitution to have special issues framed and submitted to the jury, much less that appellant could demand that the particu- [303 U.S. 123, 142] lar items it mentioned should be singled out and specially passed upon. We consider that question in the light of the total power which the state possesses to provide for jury trials, and for the manner of conducting them, and not with respect to any alleged limitations imposed by state statutes. See Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U.S. 674, 683 , 18 S.Ct. 229.
Second.-The question of confiscation.-We have said that our inquiry in rate cases coming here from a state [303 U.S. 123, 143] court 'is whether the action of the state officials in the totality of its consequences is consistent with the enjoyment by the regulated utility of a revenue something higher than the line of confiscation.' West Ohio Gas Company v. Public Utilities Commission, No. 1, supra. This Court will review the findings of fact by a state court (1) where a federal right has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the record to be without evidence to support it, and (2) where a conclusion of law as to a federal right and findings of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the federal question, to analyze the facts. Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Albers Commission Co., 223 U.S. 573, 591 , 32 S.Ct. 316; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 593 , 35 S.Ct. 429, L.R.A.1917F, 1148, Ann.Cas.1916A, 1; Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Conley, Atty. Gen. of West Virginia, 236 U.S. 605, 609 , 610 S., 35 S.Ct. 437; AEtna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 394 , 45 S.Ct. 129, 130. We make that analysis, not to determine issues of fact arising on conflicting testimony or inferences, and thus to usurp the function of the state court as a trier of the facts, but to perform our own proper function in deciding the question of law arising upon the findings which the evidence permits. Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Albers Commission Co., supra.
Here, the issues of fact were determined in the trial court. Counsel agree that under the state practice the Court of Civil Appeals had no authority to make findings of fact. 'Where the evidence is without conflict, it may render judgment. But where there is any conflict in the evidence upon a material issue, it has no authority to substitute its findings of fact for those of the trial court.' Post v. State, 106 Tex. 500, 501, 171 S.W. 707, 708. The Court of Civil Appeals held not only that appellant had failed to make good its claim that it was entitled to judgment in its favor, but that, having regard to the presumption in favor of the commission's rate order and the clear and satisfactory proof required to overcome such pre- [303 U.S. 123, 144] sumption, appellant's evidence was insufficient as matter of law to show that the commission's rate was confiscatory. The reasoning of the Court of Civil Appeals was directed to the decision of those legal questions. Upon the issue of confiscation, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed and thus its finding of fact was not disturbed.
Separate questions are presented [303 U.S. 123, 1] as to the value of appellant's property and (2) as to its return from operations. As to the first, the commission found the value to be $885,000. But the commission stated that this valuation included property which was neither used nor useful. If it be assumed that the commission in the exercise of its legislative discretion might include that property in fixing a 'reasonable rate,' still appellant would not be entitled to its inclusion on the issue of confiscation. While the evidence as to value was conflicting, we are unable to conclude that there was not adequate evidence to sustain a finding that the total property used and useful, after making deductions for the portions not of that sort, was worth not more than $750,000.
Appellant complains that the Court of Civil Appeals based its conclusion upon a valuation of '$700,000' which appellant contends is inadmissible, and that the appellate court misapplied the rule as to the burden of proof in holding that the value must be 'pared down unsparingly' to that amount. But we must distinguish 'between what was said and what was done,' between 'dictum and decision,' between reasoning and conclusion. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 292 U.S. 290, 298 , 302 S., 54 S.Ct. 647, 651, 653. What the appellate court did was to affirm the judgment of the trial court and if, as we think, a valuation of appellant's property at $750,000 would have adequate support in the evidence, we need go no further in relation to that part of the case. [303 U.S. 123, 145] With respect to return from operations, the crucial question is whether appellant was entitled to have the rate for the future fixed with sole regard to the result of operations in the years 1932 and 1933, as appellant contends, or it was permissible to fix the rate upon a consideration of the returns for a number of years, that is, for the four years prior to July 31, 1932, as taken by the commission, or for that period and the years 1932 and 1933, as shown by the evidence before the trial court. The commission held its hearing in the latter part of 1932 and made its order in June, 1933. Apart from the question raised by the retrospective feature of its order, we think it manifest that in fixing its rate for the future the commission was not limited to the results of operations for the year ending July 1932. Not only was that but a single year, but the commission regarded it as an abnormal year and the propriety of its ruling in that respect is supported by common knowledge of economic conditions at that time. Similarly, the trial court, sitting in the spring of 1934, was not bound to limit its vision to the results of 1932 and 1933. What would happen in the future was necessarily a matter of prophecy. The commission's rate had not been put into effect and in estimating what would be the consequence of the requirement the court was entitled to a reasonable basis for prediction, especially in view of a contemplated emergence from a period of extreme depression. As the Court of Civil Appeals observed, the way was open to the appellant to seek a change in the rate on proof of actual experience. Of course, appellant was entitled to take its chances on appellate review of the trial court's judgment, but it cannot complain of the delay incident to that review and its case must be judged as it stood before the trial court. We hold that there was no error in taking into consideration the results of appellant's operations for the years 1929 to 1933, inclusive, according to the evidence produced in the [303 U.S. 123, 146] trial court, and in determining the issue of confiscation in the light of the average return thus shown.
Appellees introduced evidence tending to show that appellant's operating revenues, calculated on the basis of the 55-cent rate and after deducting the operating expenses deemed to be allowable and the annual allowance for depreciation, for the years ending June 30, 1929, 1930, and 1931, and July 31, 1932, yielded net amounts of $106,815.36, $123,293.02, $ 91,554.04, and $48,556.88, respectively, and for the year 1933, $46,371.85. Appellant contends that on the basis of the 55-cent rate its net operating revenue for 1932 would have been but $10,086.25, and for 1933, $18,408.39. We do not think it necessary, so far as concerns the validity of the commission's rate in its prospective application, to extend this opinion by stating in detail the contentions pro and con as to these estimates, questions which largely relate to the permissible allowances for operating expenses. We are satisfied that if we consider the results of appellant's operations for the entire period, 1929 to 1933, the evidence was adequate to support the judgment of the trial court.
Third.-With respect to the question of the validity of that part of the commission's order which made its rate retroactive to January 1, 1932, considered in the light of the evidence relating to the intervening period and of the bond given on the appeal to the commission from the city's ordinance, this Court is equally divided and the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals in that relation is accordingly affirmed.
Although I concur in sustaining the judgment of the court below, I do not agree that the rights of this Delaware corporation doing business in Texas are derived from the [303 U.S. 123, 147] Fourteenth Amendment1 or that the Fourteenth Amendment deprives Texas of its constitutional power to determine the reasonableness of intra-state utility rates in that state.
'The argument is made that the proofs demanded by the commission will involve an extensive and unnecessary valuation of the pipe line company's property and an analysis of its business, and that this burden should not be thrown upon appellant. Whether this is so we need not now decide. It is enough to say that, in view of the relations of the parties and the power implicit therein arbitrarily to fix and maintain costs as respects the distributing company which do not represent the true value of the service rendered, the state authority is entitled to a fair showing of the reasonableness of such costs, although this may involve a presentation of evidence which would not be required in the case of parties dealing at arms' length and in the general and open market subject to the usual safeguards of bargaining and competition.' 5 [303 U.S. 123, 150] Not only did appellant fail to prove the reasonableness of its intercompany dealings, but it did not-as requested in open court-produce a full list of salaries paid by its associates, affiliates, etc. It is true that evidence did show that some of the officers of associates, affiliates, etc., received from $65,000 to $100,000 a year but there was no proof of the reasonableness of such salaries or of their effect upon appellant's local gas distribution expenses.
'Of what do these operating expenses consist? Are they made up partially of extravagant salaries,-fifty to one hundred thousand dollars to the president, and in like proportion to subordinate officers? Surely, before the courts are called upon to adjudge an act of the legislature fixing ... maximum ... rates for railroad companies to be unconstitutional, ... they should be fully advised as to what is done with the receipts and earnings of the company. ... While the protection of vested rights of property is a supreme duty of the courts, it has not come to this: that the legislative power rests subservient to the discretion of any railroad corporation which may, by exorbitant and unreasonable salaries, or in some other improper way, transfer its earnings into what it is pleased to call 'operating expenses."
When a public utility chooses to pay out a large part of its 'operating expenses' to corporate associates, affiliates, etc., these payments might conceivably be used to [303 U.S. 123, 151] drain the operating company's income and to inflate the 'operating expenses.' Inflated operating expenses inevitably lead to inflated rates. Since affiliates, associates, etc., do not ordinarily deal at 'arm's length,' appellant had the burden of proving the fairness and reasonableness of all expenditures made or charged as inter-company transactions.
Mr. Justice BUTLER and I are of opinion that the judgment under review should be reversed. We adhere to the [303 U.S. 123, 154] doctrine announced in Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 , 40 S.Ct. 527, 528, and often reaffirmed. When rates fixed for a public service corporation by an administrative body are alleged to be confiscatory, the Federal Constitution requires that fair opportunity be afforded for submitting the controversy to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment both as to law and facts. Here such opportunity has been denied.
A tribunal required to accept weighty presumptions against a defendant, resolve all doubts against it, pare down valuations to the utmost, and refuse a judgment in its favor when the evidence is conflicting as to valuations or other important elements, could not reach an independent judgment in respect of the law and facts-could not arrive at a fair, judicial determination. To us the proceedings in the state courts seem an empty show.
[ Footnote 1 ] See dissent filed in Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 , 58 S.Ct. 436, decided January 31, 1938.
[ Footnote 2 ] See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 , 47 S.Ct. 144; McCart v. Indianapolis Water Works, 302 U.S. 419 , 58 S.Ct. 324; Indianapolis Water Co. v. McCart, D.C., 13 F.Supp. 110; Id., 7 Cir., 89 F.2d 522, 525, 526.
[ Footnote 3 ] Cf. Chicago & G.T. Railway Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 , 12 S.Ct. 400; see dissent in McCart Case, supra.
[ Footnote 4 ] Cf. San Diego Land Company v. National City, 174 U.S. 739, 754 , 19 S.Ct. 804; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 270.
[ Footnote 5 ] Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of Kansas et al., 285 U.S. 119, 126 , 127 S., 52 S.Ct. 283, 285.
'Purchases are frequently made by a member or members of a system from affiliates or subsidiaries, and with comparative infrequency from strangers. At times obscurity or confusion has been born of such relations. There is widespread belief that transfers between affiliates or subsidiaries complicate the task of rate-making for regulatory commissions and impede the search for truth. Buyer and seller in such circumstances may not be dealing at arm's length, and the price agreed upon between them may be a poor criterion of value. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 292 U.S. 290, 295 , 54 S.Ct. 647; Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of Kansas, 285 U.S. 119 , 52 S.Ct. 283; Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. 133 , 51 S.Ct. 65.' American Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al. v. United States et al., 299 U.S. 232, 239 , 57 S.Ct. 170, 173.
[ Footnote 6 ] Barron v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, at page 247; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, at page 557.
[ Footnote 7 ] Den ex dem. Murray's Lessee et al. v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co ., 18 How. 272, 276.
[ Footnote 8 ] Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 , 350 S., 18 S.Ct. 620, 622.
[ Footnote 9 ] Chicago, Burlington Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 243 , 17 S.Ct. 581, 587.
[ Footnote 10 ] Id., 166 U.S. 226, 244 , 245 S., 17 S.Ct. 581, 588.

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