Source: http://patents.hdp.com/?cat=24
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:16:47+00:00

Document:
In In re Bigcommerce, Inc., [2018-122] (May 15, 2018), the Federal Circuit granted petitions for mandamus, requiring that transfer of cases from the Eastern District of Texas.
The Federal Circuit held that a domestic corporation incorporated in a state having multiple judicial districts “resides” for purposes of the patent-specific venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), only in the single judicial district within that state where it maintains a principal place of business, or failing that, the judicial district in which its registered office is located. Because the petitioner did not “reside” in the Eastern District of Texas under this interpretation, the Federal Circuit granted the petitions for mandamus.
Rule 12(g)(2) and hence Rule 12(h)(1)(A) inapplicable.
futile in the sense that the law bars the district court from adopting it to dismiss, to require the assertion of the defense or objection in an initial motion to dismiss, on pain of waiver, would generally be to require the waste of resources, contrary to Rule 1.
that it does not come within the meaning of “resides” for purposes of venue under §1400(b).
The Federal Circuit thus granted the petition for mandamus vacating the Order denying Micron’s Rule 12(b)(3) motion, and remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its Order.
In re: Cray Inc., 2017-129 (September 21, 2017), the Federal Circuit granted Cray’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus and directed the Eastern District of Texas to transfer a patent infringement action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1406(a). The Federal Circuit found that the district court misinterpreted the scope and effect of its precedent in determining that Cray maintained “a regular and established place of business” in the Eastern District of Texas within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1400(b).
Although Cray did not rent or own an office or any property in the Eastern District of Texas, it allowed Harless and Testa to work remotely from their respective homes in the district. The district court found that activities of Harless working from his home as a “sales executive” made his personal residence Cray’s regular and established place of business in the district.
The Federal Circuit found that although the law was unclear and the error understandable, the district court misunderstood the scope and effect of our decision in Cordis, and its misplaced reliance on that precedent led the court to deny the motion to transfer, which we find to have been an abuse of discretion.
The statutory language we need to interpret is “where the defendant . . . has a regular and established place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). The noun in this phrase is “place,” and “regular” and “established” are adjectives modifying the noun “place.” The following words, “of business,” indicate the nature and purpose of the “place,” and the preceding words, “the defendant,” indicate that it must be that of the defendant. Thus, § 1400(b) requires that “a defendant has” a “place of business” that is “regular” and “established.” All of these requirements must be present. The district court’s four-factor test is not sufficiently tethered to this statutory language and thus it fails to inform each of the necessary requirements of the statute.
In deciding whether a defendant has a regular and established place of business in a district, no precise rule has been laid down and each case depends on its own facts. However, the analysis must be closely tied to the language of the statute. The first requirement is that there “must be a physical place in the district.” The second requirement for determining venue is that the place “must be a regular and established place of business.” sporadic activity cannot create venue. Finally, the third requirement when determining venue is that “the regular and established place of business” must be “the place of the defendant.” Thus, the defendant must establish or ratify the place of business. It is not enough that the employee does so on his or her own. Relevant considerations include whether the defend-ant owns or leases the place, or exercises other attributes of possession or control over the place. In the final analysis, the court must identify a physical place, of business, of the defendant.
The Federal Circuit stressed that no one fact is controlling, but that taken together, the facts cannot support a finding that Cray established a place of business in the Eastern District of Texas. Thus venue cannot exist there under § 1400(b).
In In re TLC Heartland LLC, [2016-0105] (April 29, 2016), the Federal Circuit denied Heartland petition for mandamus directing the District of Delaware to either dismiss or transfer the patent infringement suit brought by Kraft against Heartland in the District of Delaware.
contracts in Delaware or called on any accounts there to solicit sales, although it did admit to shipping 44,707 cases of the accused product to the District of Delaware that generated at least $331,000 in revenue.
The Federal Circuit found that Heartland failed to show its right to mandamus was clear and indisputable, rejecting the argument that Heartland did not reside in Delaware for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), and rejecting the argument that the District Court lacked specific personal jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit rejected Heartland’s contention that amendments to the venue statute statutorily overruled VE Holdings‘ determination 1988 amendments to the venue statute made the definition of corporate residence in the general venue statute, § 1391(c), apply to the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Heartland;s argument that specific jurisdiction only gives the court jurisdiction over those acts occurring in the district. The Federal Circuit rejected the result that to get jurisdiction over all of the acts of infringement, Kraft would have to sue in each state, or sue defendant where it is incorporated.
Venue continues as it has since VE Holdings — a corporate infringer can be sued wherever it can be found.

References: § 1400
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 § 1391
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