Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/414-u-s-218-606794214
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:07:25+00:00

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Having, as a result of a previous check of respondent's operator's permit, probable cause to arrest respondent for driving while his license was revoked, a police officer made a full custody arrest of respondent for such offense. In accordance with prescribed procedures, the officer made a search of respondent's [94 S.Ct. 469] person, in the course of which he found in a coat pocket a cigarette package containing heroin. The heroin was admitted into evidence at the District Court trial, which resulted in respondent's conviction for a drug offense. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the heroin had been obtained as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Held: In the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under that Amendment. Pp. 224-237.
(a) A search incident to a valid arrest is not limited to a frisk of the suspect's outer clothing and removal of such weapons as the arresting officer may, as a result of such frisk, reasonably believe and ascertain that the suspect has in his possession, and the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for which the arrest is made does not narrow the standards applicable to such a search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, distinguished. Pp. 227-229; 23235.
(b) A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment and, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification, such as the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would, in fact, be found upon the suspect's person; and whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest need not be litigated in each case. P. 235.
to search, it is immaterial that the arresting officer did not fear the respondent or suspect that he was armed. Pp. 236-237.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. POWELL J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 237. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and BRENNAN, JJ., joined, post, p. 238.
that court first remanded the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing concerning the scope of the search of respondent's person which and occurred at the time of his arrest. 145 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 447 F.2d 1215 (1971). The District Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law adverse to respondent, and he again appealed. This time the Court of Appeals en banc reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that the heroin introduced in evidence against respondent had been obtained as a result of a search which violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 153 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 471 F.2d 1082 (1972). We granted certiorari, 410 U.S. 982 (1973), and set the case for argument together with Gustafson v. Florida, No. 71-1669, post, p. 260, also decided today.
On April 23, 1968, at approximately 11 p.m., Officer Richard Jenks, a 15-year veteran of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, observed the respondent driving a 1965 Cadillac near the intersection of 8th and C Streets, N.E., in the District of Columbia. Jenks, as a result of previous investigation following a check of respondent's operator's permit four days earlier, determined there was reason to [94 S.Ct. 470] believe that respondent was operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his operator's permit. This is an offense defined by statute in the District of Columbia which carries a mandatory minimum jail term, a mandatory minimum fine, or both. D.C.Code Ann. § 40-302(d) (1967).
left breast like this (demonstrating) and proceeded to pat him down thus [with the right hand].
As I felt the package, I could feel objects in the package, but I couldn't tell what they were. . . . I knew they weren't cigarettes.
Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained in many cases. 1 Bishop on Criminal Procedure, § 211; Wharton, Crim.Plead. and Practice, 8th ed., § 60; Dillon v. O'Brien and Davis, 16 Cox C.C. 245.
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.

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