Source: http://aboutdrugspdf.com/n/nasabaconvention.org1.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:51:57+00:00

Document:
771 F. Supp. 2d 556, *; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30107, ** UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. LAUREN STEVENS, Defendant.
and Johnson LLP, New York, NY; Reid H Weingarten, On October 9, 2002, the FDA sent a letter to GSK Robert Ayers, William Hassler, Steptoe and Johnson LLP, stating that the FDA had recently received information indicating that GSK had possibly promoted Wellbutrin for weight loss, a use not approved by the FDA. Indictment at For USA, Plaintiff: Adrienne Elise Fowler, Patrick Glenn ¶ 3. The FDA asked GSK to provide it with materials Jasperse, United States Department of Justice, Office of related to Wellbutrin promotional programs sponsored by Consumer Litigation, Washington, DC; Cynthia A GSK, including copies of all slides, videos, handouts, and Young, Office of the United States Attorney, District of other materials presented or distributed at any GSK pro- Massachusetts, Boston, MA; Sara Miron Bloom, Office of gram or activity related to Wellbutrin. Id. Stevens was "in charge of" GSK's "response to the FDA's inquiry and investigation" and "led a team of lawyers and paralegals JUDGES: Roger W. Titus, United States District Judge.
who gathered documents and information." Id. at ¶ 4.
cause or induce any person to . . . [*561] gates the Specific Intent Required to Violate 18 U.S.C.
withhold testimony, or withhold a record, § 1519.
document, or other object, from an official proceeding [or] alter, destroy, mutilate, or Good faith reliance on the advice of counsel is only conceal an object with intent to impair the relevant to specific intent crimes because such reliance object's integrity or availability for use in demonstrates a defendant's lack of the requisite intent to an official proceeding . . . shall be fined violate the law. United States v. Miller, 658 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1981) ("The reliance defense . . . is designed to refute the government's proof that the defendant intended to commit the offense."), United States v. Polytarides, 584 F.2d 1350, 1353 (4th Cir. 1978) ("The basis for the de-fense of action taken on the advice of counsel is that, in The Court held that the most natural reading of the relying on counsel's advice, defendant lacked the requisite statute was one in which the word "knowingly" modifies intent to violate the law."). The United States argues that "corruptly persuades." Id. The Court explained 771 F. Supp. 2d 556, *; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30107, ** with consciousness of their wrongdoing. At least three of "[The statute] provides the mens our sister courts have also held that Section 1519 is a specific intent crime to which the advice of counsel de- acts--'uses intimidation or physical force, fense is applicable. See United States [**10] v. Moyer, threatens, or corruptly persuades.' We have 726 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506, 509-10 (M.D. Pa. 2010), United recognized with regard to similar statutory States v. Kun Yun Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d 618, 637 n.9 (E.D. language that the mens rea at least applies Tex. 2006), rev'd on other grounds by 534 F.3d 398 (5th to the acts that immediately follow, if not Cir. 2008), United States v. Velasco, No. 8:05-CR-496, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39218, 2006 WL 1679586 at *4 [*562] Because the Court concludes that 18 U.S.C. § 1519 is a specific intent crime, proof of Stevens' good The Supreme Court held that one could not "know- faith reliance on the advice of counsel would negate her ingly [**8] . . . corruptly persuad[e]" another person wrongful intent on that count. The Government conceded with intent to cause that person to withhold documents at oral argument that Stevens was entitled to assert the from, or alter documents for use in, an official proceeding advice of counsel defense with respect to Counts 1 and without being "conscious of [his] wrongdoing." Andersen, 3-6, charging her with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 544 U.S. at 705-706. The Court stated that "limiting 1512, both specific intent crimes. Accordingly, the United criminality to persuaders conscious of their wrongdoing States' Motion to Preclude the Advice of Counsel Defense sensibly allows § 1512(b) to reach only those with the level of culpability usually required to impose criminal II. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 is Not Unconstitutionally Vague.
As in Arthur Andersen, the most natural, grammatical Stevens moves for dismissal of Count 2 on the reading of § 1512 is one in which the word "knowingly" ground that 18 U.S.C. § 1519 is unconstitutionally vague. modifies "with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence." Stevens argues that under the Government's interpretation The mens rea of 1519 is not just "knowingly"--meaning of the statute--which would allow for conviction under 18 "with awareness, understanding, or consciousness"--as U.S.C. § 1519 without proof that defendant acted with the Government suggests. Id. at 705. Rather, the mens rea specific, wrongful intent--Section 1519 criminalizes in- is "knowingly . . . with intent to impede, obstruct, or in- nocent conduct and is [**11] subject to arbitrary and fluence," a mens rea clearly requiring consciousness of discriminatory enforcement. ECF No. 39-1. City of Chi- wrongdoing. One cannot be said to "knowingly . . . alter, cago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 144 L. . . . conceal, cover up, falsif[y], or make false entry in Ed. 2d 67 (1999) ("Vagueness may invalidate a criminal any record [or] document . . . with intent to impede, ob- law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may struct, or influence" an investigation or administration of a fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency unless it people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second it is [**9] that individual's intent to do that which is may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and dis- wrongful. As one of our sister courts has held, though the word "corruptly" is not found in § 1519, the same evil When § 1519 is construed as requiring proof that intent embodied in § 1512 is embodied in § 1519. United defendant acted with specific, wrongful intent, it is not States v. Moyer, 726 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (M.D. Pa. impermissibly vague. See United States v. Moyer, 726 F. 2010). The language "with intent to impede, obstruct, or Supp. 2d 498, 506, 509-10 ("§ 1519 contains a scienter influence" "imposes upon the § 1519 defendant the same requirement which mitigates any vagueness that remains sinister mentality which 'corruptly' requires of a § in the statute."), United States v. Fumo, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1512(b)(2) defendant." Id. As with 18 U.S.C. § 1512, the 573, 598 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (§ 1519 includes a scienter most reasonable reading of Section 1519 is one which requirement, which "may mitigate a law's vagueness, imposes criminal liability only on those who were con- especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the scious of the wrongfulness of their actions. To hold oth- complainant that his conduct is proscribed.") United erwise would allow § 1519 to reach inherently innocent States v. Velasco, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39218, 2006 WL conduct, such as a lawyer's instruction to his client to 1679586 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (rejecting vagueness challenge withhold documents the lawyer in good faith believes are to § 1519 because statute "has a specific scienter re- quirement that requires the Government to prove that Any other interpretation of § 1519 would ignore the Defendants acted knowingly and willfully in violation of admonition of the Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen that [**12] the Act.") Stevens concedes as much in her motion criminal liability ordinarily may only be imposed on those to dismiss Count 2. ECF No. 39-1 at 6. ("The statute itself 771 F. Supp. 2d 556, *; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30107, ** . . . states that to be convicted a defendant must act with requires proof that there was a pending or foreseeable the 'intent to impede, obstruct or influence' the handling of official federal proceeding, while conviction under § 1519 a matter. If such intent is interpreted to mean a specific, requires no proof that offense conduct was done with wrongful intent, then no constitutional problem arises.") intent to impair an object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. Rather, a conviction under § When construed as requiring proof of a specific intent 1519 can be premised on alteration or destruction of a to impede, obstruct, or influence a federal matter, § 1519 document or object "with the intent to impede, obstruct, or provides sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited, influence the investigation or proper administration of and is not subject to arbitrary or discriminatory enforce- any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or ment. Accordingly, Section 1519 is not unconstitutionally agency of the United States or any case filed under title vague, and Stevens' motion shall be denied. 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case . . . " 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (emphasis added). III. Counts 1 and 2 are Not Multiplicitous.
Because 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 [**15] and 1519 each Stevens argues that Count 2 must be dismissed be- require proof of an element that the other does not, Counts cause it is multiplicitous of Count 1, and therefore violates 1 and 2 of the indictment are not multiplicitous, and Ste- the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because Count 2 and Count 1 each require proof of an element that the other does not, IV. Count 2 Does Not Fail to State an Offense.
if the elements of the crime are met, that cial Legal Advice Given to the Grand Jury.
advice given him by a lawyer to whom he has made full Commit the Crimes Charged.
101 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 1996), accord Oakley, 2010 Instruction.
States to seek another indictment from a different grand jury [**32] that is properly advised in accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Opinion.

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