Source: http://www.legalcomplianceresource.com/articles/view.php?article_id=11052
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 20:46:40+00:00

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In two key decisions issued in December 2007, the United States Supreme Court has picked up where it left off following last term’s ruling in Rita v. United States, and has provided further – and much-needed – guidance to lower courts and practitioners as to the mechanics of federal sentencing in the post-Booker era in which the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory. In its two latest decisions, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), and Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), the Court has made clear that district court judges have substantial discretion to impose non-Guidelines sentences and need not find extraordinary circumstances in order to justify such sentences, as had been previously required by many courts of appeals. And perhaps more importantly for defendants and their attorneys, the courts of appeals may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness to non-Guidelines sentences, and instead must give due deference to the sentencing judge’s decision that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justify the sentence imposed.
Although these decisions should be heralded by defense attorneys as confirming that a Guidelines sentence may not simply be presumed reasonable, and that sentencing judges have been restored substantial discretion to impose below-Guidelines sentences, it cannot be overlooked that such discretion includes the ability to impose not only below-Guidelines sentences, but also sentences above the Guidelines range. Although the impact of Gall/Kimbrough in the lower courts has been immediate, as shown by numerous lower court opinions issued in the weeks following the Supreme Court’s latest sentencing pronouncements, the long-term impact of these decisions on the number of non-Guidelines sentences imposed, and the extent of such deviations, remains to be seen.
In Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), the Court held that a court of appeals may, but is not required to, presume that a sentence that falls within the applicable Guidelines range is reasonable for purposes of appellate review. A companion case argued with Rita, Claiborne v. United States, raised the corollary question of whether the courts of appeals may apply a proportionality test to review sentences, and in doing so require that a sentence that constitutes a substantial variance from the applicable Guidelines range be justified by extraordinary circumstances. The Court did not reach the question raised in Claiborne due to the petitioner’s untimely death, which mooted the case. The Court granted certiorari in Gall v. United States to address that very question, and on December 10, 2007, in an opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, rejected the notion that extraordinary circumstances were required to justify a sentence outside the range, or that rigid use of mathematical formulas (that use a percentage of a departure) as a standard for determining the justification for a variance to a specific sentence were required. Instead, Justice Stevens wrote that a court of appeals must apply a deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of whether the sentence is inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range, and that a district judge’s justification to vary from the Guidelines simply must be sufficiently compelling to support such a deviation.
In Gall, the petitioner, while a second-year college student, joined an ongoing enterprise distributing the controlled substance known as Ecstasy. Shortly after joining the enterprise, Gall decided to stop using Ecstasy, and a few months later, voluntarily withdrew from the criminal conspiracy and ceased using and selling illegal drugs altogether. He later graduated from college, and was successfully employed in the construction industry. More than three years after withdrawing from the conspiracy, Gall was charged, along with seven other defendants, with participating in a six-year conspiracy to distribute Ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana. Gall subsequently pleaded guilty, and the presentence report called for sentencing in the range of 30 to 37 months. The District Court, however, imposed a 36-month sentence of probation, which it believed was warranted in light of Gall’s withdrawal from the conspiracy; extraordinary post-offense conduct, including his graduating from college and starting a successful business; support from family and friends; lack of criminal history; and age at the time of the offense. In addition to making a lengthy statement on the record, the District Court filed a detailed sentencing memorandum explaining its decision, and provided a complete statement of reasons in the final judgment. The District Court further noted that probation, “rather than ‘an act of leniency,’ is a ‘substantial restriction on freedom,’” because Gall would be required to comply with strict reporting conditions, submit to alcohol and drug testing, seek approval of his probation officer should he wish to relocate or change jobs, and face harsh consequence should he violate any of the terms of his probation.
On appeal, the 8th Circuit reversed, applying a proportionality test which requires that a sentence outside the Guidelines range must be supported by a justification that “is proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed.” The sentenced imposed by the District Court failed this test, the 8th Circuit held, because a sentence of probation constituted a “100 percent downward variance,” and was not supported by extraordinary circumstances.
At the outset of its opinion reversing the 8th Circuit, the Supreme Court reaffirmed once again that, although they are now advisory, the Sentencing Guidelines nonetheless merit significant consideration in the sentencing process, because they are “the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions.” As such, a district judge must set forth a sufficient explanation for why an unusually harsh or lenient sentence is justified under the circumstances of a given case, and may not simply presume that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable. On appeal, a court of appeals is entitled to “take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines.” The Court explicitly rejected the 8th Circuit’s approach and held that a court of appeals is not permitted to require a showing of extraordinary circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range, nor may an appellate court make use of a “rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence.” The flaw in these approaches, the Court wrote, is that they “come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.” The Court specifically rejected the notion that a heightened standard of review should be applied to sentences outside the Guidelines range, instead making clear that the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies, regardless of whether the sentence is inside or outside the range.
The Court’s opinion in Gall further proceeded to provide guidance for district judges in imposing sentences and for appellate judges in reviewing the reasonableness of such sentences. Justice Stevens reiterated that the Guidelines themselves should be “the starting point and the initial benchmark” for a district judge. However, the Guidelines are not the only consideration; a district judge must give proper consideration to all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and may not simply presume that the applicable Guidelines range is reasonable. If the judge decides that a non-Guidelines sentence is appropriate, he or she must “ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance” and must adequately explain why the sentence was chosen in order to allow for meaningful appellate review.
In reviewing sentences, the Court held that a court of appeals first must ensure that the district judge did not commit procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, or failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Next, the court of appeals should consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the Court of Appeals may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness. But if the sentence is outside the range, the Court of Appeals may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. The Appellate Court may consider the extent of the variance, but must give “due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Notably, the Court observed that “[t]he fact that the Appellate Court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the District Court.” Such deference is mandated, according to the Court, because the sentencing judge is in a “superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case,” which is attributable to an institutional advantage that district courts have over appellate courts in making these types of determinations.
On the other hand, some recent lower court rulings have confirmed that defendants will not always benefit in the post-Gall era. For example, on December 20, 2007, the 6th Circuit affirmed above-Guidelines sentences in two cases as appropriate exercises of the sentencing judges’ discretion under the facts of each case. In United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals upheld a sentence of 24 months in a violation of supervised release case where the advisory Guidelines range was 4 to 10 months. In United States v. Lane, 509 F.3d 771 (6th Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals upheld a 68 month sentence in a wire fraud case where the Guidelines called for a sentence of 41 to 51 months. In United States v. Ramirez, 2008 WL 185509 (11th Cir. Jan. 23, 2008), the 11th Circuit affirmed, with little explanation, a 60-month statutory maximum sentence in a larceny case involving $1,000 of personal property, where the Guidelines called only for an eight to 12 month sentence. And most recently, in United States v. Evans (No. 06-4789, May 27, 2008), the 4th Circuit affirmed, in an identity fraud case, a sentence of 125 months, which represented an over 300 percent upward deviation from the Guidelines range of 24 to 30 months.
Although it remains to be seen whether the Court’s latest decisions in Gall and Kimbrough will increase the number of non-Guidelines sentences imposed, the clear message from these decisions is that the sentencing judge is in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed and that the appellate courts must give due deference to that assessment when reviewing sentences for reasonableness. Perhaps more importantly, the sentencing judge must not presume that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable, but instead must make an individualized assessment based upon the facts presented. Like the defendant in Gall, this should open the door for sentencing judges to give meaningful consideration of such subjective characteristics such as the defendant’s age, character, family circumstances, charitable and civic contributions, and post-offense rehabilitation – factors that were given little or no weight under the advisory Guidelines regime. As the en banc 6th Circuit observed in United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008), “Booker breathes life into the authority of district court judges to engage in individualized sentencing within reason in applying the § 3553(a) factors to the criminal defendants that come before them.” Although a return to individualized sentencing in the post-Booker era should bode well for criminal defendants (particularly white-collar offenders), it is too early to tell whether the Court’s pronouncements in Gall and Kimbrough truly herald a new era in federal criminal sentencing, or whether sentencing judges will continue to be drawn to, and guided by, the Sentencing Guidelines in making sentencing determinations.
Mr. Lee is a former trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice. He is a partner in the Philadelphia office of Blank Rome LLP and member of the firm’s White Collar, Government, and Internal Investigations practice group. Mr. Lee may be reached at 215-569-5352 and [email protected].

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