Source: https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/florida-medical-malpractice-and-the-statute-of-limitations/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:08:43+00:00

Document:
A full understanding of statute of limitations issues is essential to both case selection and analysis and the formal prosecution of each meritorious medical negligence claim. As a practical matter, the practitioner is well advised to select the earliest possible date for computation of the two-year statute of limitations which will control in most cases, i.e., the date the error or omission occurred. Unfortunately, meritorious cases, for many reasons, at least on occasion, will not be presented to counsel until after two years from the date of the actions giving rise to the case, or under circumstances where, viewing the case in the most cautious light, the statute runs the risk of running shortly.
This article will consider the benefits and risks of immediate action to preserve claims while counsel, suspicious that the case has merit, requires additional time for consideration and investigation. A clear understanding of these issues can enable counsel to take on difficult cases (occasionally meritorious ones with a large upside that numerous other attorneys have rejected), without substantial risk (other than that generally in contingent cases). Counsel should promptly reject those where the risk is clearly outweighed by the reward, or where the chance of obtaining the required corroborating medical affidavit1 i s unlikely to be accomplished within the limitations period.
Occasionally, some of the most difficult scenarios are posed to counsel where retention is accepted (sometimes after the case has been rejected elsewhere) in what later proves a marginal case, or one where no reasonable view of the facts after further analysis can lead to a conclusion that the standard of care has been breached, or if it has, that the prospective plaintiff’s injuries or damages are a proximate result of that breach. In these circumstances, the case should be formally rejected, in writing, at the earliest opportunity. Often, the analysis that has lead to the conclusion should be explained to the client personally. These meetings, while time consuming, can save counsel from considerable annoyance later.
Where the limitations period is approaching rapidly, a face-to-face discussion with the client is highly advisable both to preserve the relationship and to discuss options. If the upside potential is enormous and the risk worth your time, you must be fully prepared to proceed immediately, and have a prospective expert lined up to review the case. Do not consider these difficult liability or damages cases unless your calender is free and you are prepared to devote the time necessary on an immediate basis. Even then, unless there are clear overriding reasons to proceed, cases like this must be viewed with extreme caution. Consideration should be given as well to a formal agreement outlining what counsel is willing to do and the client’s risks. On occasion, counsel may find that a very promising matter has crossed his or her desk—but usually you will just be the last of many counsel who have rejected the case. Avoid this precarious position. If there is not a clear understanding, certainly the file should not even remain in counsel’s office following the initial consultation and a formal rejection should be out that same day. As discussed below, a full understanding of the limitations period, combined with the other considerations in a medical malpractice case, will enable counsel to go forth unafraid of the risks inherent in these cases, and to act accordingly to protect the client’s interests in a timely manner.
Indeed, understanding the statute of limitations issues discussed in this article, combined with the practitioner’s independent research and consideration, will provide most counsel with the tools to make a fully educated determination and not to simply reject a case out of apprehension (as prior counsel may have done). While beyond the scope of this article, finding an esteemed medical provider to prepare the necessary corroborating medical affidavit or the opinion necessary to properly reject the case for lack of merit as to liability or damages, or both, may, as well, be close at hand.
Consistent with the Florida Supreme Court decision in Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993), in Mason the Fifth District also reaffirmed that the correct method for computing the 90-day period tolled upon filing the notice of intent to initiate litigation, starts by counting when the notice is actually received. Both cases involved an alleged conflict between F.S. §766.106(3) and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.650 (the medical malpractice presuit screening rule). While the court in Boyd found the conflict to be whether the 90-day period starts from the date notice was mailed or received, the rule was immediately amended to comport with the statutory language that the period begins upon receipt.28 E xpounding further on this point, in Mason the Fifth District refused to find any conflict with F.S. §766.106(3) and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.650 as amended, finding instead that the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute and the rule was clear and must be read together.
Under the above reasoning, the Florida Supreme Court held in Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2000), that the claimant’s lawsuit was timely filed. The court in Hankey covered many aspects of the medical malpractice act and statute of limitations issues. It agreed with the Fifth District in noting that if the limitations period was suspended under the tolling provisions of §766.106(4), then the Hankeys’ complaint was timely filed. In that case, the limitations period began to run on December 6, 1994, and was scheduled to end on December 6, 1996. The notice of intent was filed on March 19, 1996, and suspended the limitations period for 90 days as of the date it was received by the defendants. Prior to a response by the defendants, the parties agreed to a 30-day extension, which continued to suspend the limitations period for another 30 days or until the defendants responded to the notice of intent.
July 18, 1996, all the potential defendants had responded to the notice of intent, running the limitations period again. As of March 19, 1996, the date the notice of intent was served more than 60 days remained until the expiration date of the original limitations period (December 6, 1996). The Hankeys therefore were not entitled to any of the 60 days provided under §766.106(4) and when the limitations period began running again on July 18, it was set to expire on April 6, 1997.37 H owever, the Hankeys had until July 5, 1997, in which to file suit because they had filed a petition with the clerk of the court for an automatic 90-day extension on November 20, 1996.38 T he suit in this case was timely filed on June 19, 1997.
Exactly when an action accrues has been a highly contested issue among the Florida Supreme Court and courts of appeal. The seminal case is Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976), in which the Florida Supreme Court held among other things that the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases commences when either the plaintiff has notice of the negligent act giving rise to a cause of action or when the plaintiff has notice of the physical injury caused by the negligent act. Subsequent cases reaffirmed the Nardone principle with harsh results as a consequence in some cases.43 T he requirements of a prospective claimant’s “knowledge of injury” announced by the Nardone rule certainly gave defendants a superior advantage where plaintiffs brought an action after the statute of limitations period but within the repose period. Defendants could pick the earlier of the two alternatives to begin the running of the limitation period and bar causes of action that may have been meritorious while placing a super-knowledge burden on prospective plaintiffs. The effect of this rule can be seen as counterproductive and resulting in an actual increase in litigation, for it encourages people who may have any suspicion that their injury was caused by medical malpractice to run out and hire a lawyer or be barred from bringing any action at all. It also put patients in the precarious position of having to decipher what is and what is not medical negligence.
The court discussed the Nardone line of cases relied on by the defendants and the lower appellate court’s attempts to grapple with and ameliorate the often harsh results a literal application of that rule had in latter cases, suggesting that all the elements of a negligence cause of action should be present before running of the limitations period. Of particular concern were cases where natural causes may be a likely cause making the Nardone rule counterintuitive to notions of fairness. Even the Second District, which rendered Nardone, later took issue with the results that case had on other medical malpractice cases. The Tanner court admitted that the new rule may make determining when the limitations period begins to run more difficult, but reasoned that the new rule was justified given the four-year statute of repose absent fraudulent concealment announced in Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992), placing a definitive cap on medical malpractice actions and the less burdensome knowledge of injury requirement for potential claimants.
Subsequent case law has covered the issue of “immediately apparent” injuries and courts have ruled both ways.55 O f particular interest are cases in which a claimant facing a barred medical malpractice action attempts to apply the “delayed discovery doctrine” so as to preserve a cause of action.56 T he Florida Supreme Court addressed this issue in Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000), and answered the certified question57 i n the affirmative. Although that case did not involve medical malpractice, in discussing this doctrine the court noted that it was not a novel principle of law and had been discussed in previous cases involving medical negligence.58 T he delayed discovery doctrine, however, may only be applied to the accrual of a cause of action and not to tolling the statute of limitations. Determining whether a cause of action is time-barred upon expiration of the statute of limitations may include an inquiry into both issues: 1) Did the cause of action accrue? and 2) Does a statutory tolling provision apply? Finally, the delayed discovery doctrine provides that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff either knows or reasonably should know of the tortious act giving rise to the cause of action. This last principle sounds strikingly akin to Nardone and a transgression from Tanner in which knowledge of the injury must also be accompanied by knowledge of a reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical malpractice. Either way, Tanner is still good law but it can be seen that its holding is not as broad as some may believe.
The medical malpractice act in Florida is both complex and evolving. Counsel handling a potential medical malpractice case must be familiar with the presuit requirements affecting the viability and strength of each case whether representing the claimant or health care provider. It is hoped that the above analysis demonstrates the need for careful attention to detail and how procedure can affect the substance of a cause or right of action in medical malpractice litigation. Given the rising battle among the states and nationally between plaintiff’s advocates and the insurance industry, Florida stands as a good example of an evolving system in search of balance and justice. At first impression the statute of limitations may seem like a simple calculation. However, it can be seen how in many cases it can become determinative of a given medical malpractice case. A full understanding of the statute of limitations and its relationship to other aspects of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act will enable counsel to handle these cases with confidence.
2 Fla. Stat. ch. 766.
3 Dean v. Vazquez , 786 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001) (the intention of the legislature in enacting the statutory scheme for medical malpractice claims).
4 Fla. Stat. §95.11(4)(b) (2002).
5 Fla. Stat. §95.11(3) (2002).
6 Fla. Stat. §95.11(4)(b) (2002). 7 Fla. Stat. §95.11(4)(b) (2002).
8 Cf. Bell v. Indian River Memorial Hosp. , 778 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001) (holding that parents’ action against hospital for loss or destruction of their deceased infant’s remains was not an action for “medical malpractice,” and thus action was not subject to medical malpractice statute of limitations; hospital personnel did not engage in any medical skill or judgment in disposition of infant’s remains and were only expected to perform ministerial act of transporting infant’s remains back to the parents following conclusion of autopsy).
9 O’Shea v. Phillips ,746 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1999) (citing J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola , 635 So. 2d 945, 949 (Fla. 1994) and Fla. Stat. §§766.106(1)(a), 766.201-212 (1997)).
10 Fla. Stat. §766.104(1) (2002).
12 Weinstock v. Groth , 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla.1993) (holding that a psychologist was not a health care provider and thus the plaintiff patient was not required to give presuit notice under the act); cf. Preston v. Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America ,785 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001) (noting statutory amendments and holding that the malpractice act’s presuit requirements do not apply where the plaintiff alleges only that a nursing home violated a resident’s rights under ch. 400). Also, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have begun to assert the failure to utilize the presuit requirements in an attempt to thwart claimant’s benefit cases. See Solomon v. Well Care HMO, Inc. , 822 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2002) (reversing dismissal of the complaint where there were no allegations that the HMO was rendering medical care or services as required to invoke the application of the presuit notice requirements); Lane v. Health Options, Inc. , 796 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001) (same); cf. Frappier v. Wishnov , 678 So. 2d 884, 887 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996) (no federal preemption under ERISA of case against HMO where the complaint asserts “failing to provide, arrange for, or supervise qualified doctors to provide the actual medical treatment for plan participants”).
13 Fla. Stat. §766.203 (2002).
14 Fla. Stat. §§766.104(1) (2002), 766.203 (2002).
16 Kagan v. Pollock , 638 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1994). In Kagan v. Pollock ,638 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1994), the plaintiffs sent a notice of intent to initiate litigation on May 1, 1991, as required by Fla. Stat. §766.106(2). They named several defendants but had not included one physician. Two days later, the plaintiffs filed and were granted the 90-day extension of the statute of limitations regarding all the previously named defendants. The unnamed defendant finally received notice of intent on April 20, 1992, and the complaint was amended on May 11, 1992, to reflect this defendant’s inclusion in the lawsuit. As an affirmative defense, it was alleged that the amended complaint was filed after the statute of limitations period had expired and the lower court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
On reversal, the Fourth DCA found the plaintiff to have been aware of her injury since February of 1990 thus a strict reading of the statute of limitations would bar an action after February 20, 1992. However, considering that the plaintiffs were granted the 90-day extension, the court found the limitations period was tolled until May 20, 1992, thus negating the defendant’s statute of limitations defense. The court construed the statutory language narrowly and refused to read into the language a requirement that a defendant must be specifically named in the petition for the 90-day extension where it is not specifically provided for otherwise.
As Kagan illustrates, the 90-day presuit investigation period reflects a balancing for both sides and in favor of allowing a prospective plaintiff access to the court. A contrary result would leave the plaintiff in the precarious position of conducting an investigation only to find out a defendant that should have been named and wasn’t because of inadequate information, is now immune from suit. This holding is also consistent with promoting a curtailment of frivolous claims.
17 Fla. Stat. §766.201 (2002).
18 Fla. Stat. §766.106(2) (2002). See Novitsky v. Hards , 589 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1991)(letter of intent to sue sent by certified mail to dentist’s malpractice insurer was not letter of intent to sue under statute’s tolling provision; however, letter of intent was not ineffective on grounds it referred to dentist as a professional association absent a showing that such a defect prevented the defendant from receiving actual notice of the complaint and intent to sue).
19 Fla. Stat. §766.106(3)(a) (2002).
20 Fla. Stat. §766.106(3)(a) (2002).
21 Fla. Stat. §766.106(3)(a)(4) (2002).
22 Fla. Stat. §766.106 (2002); cf. Grau v. Wells , 795 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001) (finding that court, as authorized by statute, could strike doctor’s responsive pleadings for failure to reasonably investigate patient’s claim and enter default judgment against doctor who attached affidavit of expert who was also his business partner which was completed before any discovery and before rejection of patient’s claim).
23 Fla. Stat. §766.203(3) (2002).
25 Fla. Stat. §766.204(1) (2002). However, an independent special hospital district with taxing authority owning two or more hospitals has 20 days. Fla. Stat. §766.204(1) (2002).
26 Mason v. Bisogno , 633 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1994).
27 Note that there are three extension and tolling provisions at play here. The 90-day presuit investigation phase filed seven days before the limitations ran out, the 60-day agreed stipulations of extension, and the 60-day period in which to respond to the defense’s notice of rejection. Regarding the 60-day period, the statute provides that the plaintiff has 60 days or the remainder of the statute of limitations, whichever is longer, in which to respond to the notice of rejection. In this case, the original limitations period had only seven days left and thus the 60 days applied, in which case the 90 days and 30 days tacked on pushed the period to April 25, 1991, and adding 60 days pushed the limit in which to respond to June 24, 1991. Note the court rejected 60 days from April 30, 1991, in which to file suit, ruling that the earlier receipt of the rejection of the claim on April 25, 1991, by the claimant began the 60 days in which to file suit. Thus, suit had to be filed on or before June 24, 1991 and the filing on June 27, 1991, was therefore untimely. Suit would have been timely had an automatic extension of the statute of limitations been obtained since there would have been 97 rather than seven days left until the statue of limitations ran at the time the notice of intent was received.
“(A) The expiration of 90 days after the date of receipt of the notice of intent to initiate litigation.
“ (B) The expiration of 180 days after mailing of the notice of intent to initiate litigation if the claim is controlled by section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes.
“(C) Receipt by claimant of a written rejection of the claim.
“(D) The expiration of any extension of the 90-day presuit screening period stipulated to by the parties in accordance with section 768.57(4), Florida Statutes.” (Emphasis added). Note that although the statute is tolled as of the date the notice of intent is mailed, the tolling period is measured from the date the notice is received by the prospective defendant. Boyd v. Becker , 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993).
29 Mason v. Bisogno , 633 So. 2d at 468.
30 Musculoskeletal Inst. Chartered v. Parham , 745 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1999).
31 University of Miami v. Bogorff , 583 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1991).
32 Moore v. Winter Haven Hospital , 579 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1991).
33 Pergrem v. Horan , 669 So. 2d 1150 (5th D.C.A. 1996).
34 Hankey v. Yarian , 755 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2000) (abrogating Pergrem in that regard).
37 This date is reached by adding the 90 days from the notice of intent and the 30-day extension stipulated to among the parties thus, 120 days from the original December 6, 1996 date is pushed forward to April 6, 1997.
38 The automatic 90 days granted upon petition to the clerk of court is in addition to any other tolling provision, i.e. , the 90-day period upon filing the notice of intent to initiate litigation, and thus the April 6, 1997, date is again pushed to July 5, 1997, in which to bring suit, since the petition was made within the limitations period.
39 For a case dealing with the thorny issue of the limit of when a case may be filed, see Thorney v. Clough , 438 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983), finding that where the very last day of the statute of limitations fell on a weekend, a case filed on the next business day was timely.
40 Coffaro v. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority , 752 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2000), affirmed , 829 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2002).
41 Fla. Stat. §§766.104(2), 766.106(4) (2002). Accordingly, the court held, in affirming the overriding policy of providing access to the courts, that the “purchased” 90-day extension of the statute of limitations would be added onto the 60 days in which to file suit extending the time to file suit to 150 days instead of 120 (there were 30 days remaining on the statute of limitations and the purchased 90-day extension at the time the notice of intent was filed). This author recommends carefully reading Justice Wells’ dissent (in which Senior Justice Harding concurred), since it unlikely this decision is the final word on all of these related issues. Justice Wells’ analysis seems to provide the more accurate statutory construction of the applicable statutes since, as he argues, the majority’s decision may result in inconsistent applications depending upon when the plaintiff purchased the extension under Fla. Stat. §766.104(2). It would seem wise, where practicable, in the exercise of due caution, to comply with Justice Wells’ construction, notwithstanding the court’s ruling in favor of greater access to the courts through an interpretation with a longer limitations period under the applicable statutes.
42 Justice Quince wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Anstead, Shaw, and Lewis concurred. Justice Pariente, in a concurring opinion in which Justice Anstead also concurred, noted the court’s holding was consistent with the court’s earlier explanation in Hankey v. Yarian , 755 So. 2d 93, 98 (Fla. 2000), that a plaintiff can “also automatically secure an additional 90-day extension under §766.104(2) that will be added to the end of both periods described” in §766.106(3) and (4).
43 Barron v. Shapiro , 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1990) (reinstating summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff knew or should have known either of the injury or the negligent act); University of Miami v. Bogorff ,583 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1991) (finding that limitations period began to run when parents noticed an injury to their child after treatment even if they did not know if the injury was caused by medical malpractice).
44 In Tanner , assuming the statute of limitations began to run on April 1, 1988, it would expire on April 12, 1990. The Tanners claimed that the statute of limitations was tolled for 90 days and that they thereafter had 60 days to file suit. Accordingly, the Tanners argued the statute of limitations did not run until August 29, 1990 (150 days from April 1, 1990) so that suit was properly filed on August 1, 1990. However, the court found that the time remaining on the statute of limitations must be calculated from the date the notice of intent was filed, rather than simply adding on the extra time at the end of the original limitations period. Accordingly, from the date the notice of intent is filed, the plaintiff has 90 days (the tolling period during presuit) plus either 60 days or the remainder of the statute of limitations (calculated as the amount remaining at the time the notice of intent was sent), whichever is greater. Based on this calculation, the court concluded suit was not timely filed on August 1, 1990, since suit would have had to be filed within 150 days of February 12, 1990, or by July 12, 1990. Tanner , 618 So. 2d at 178, 183-184.
45 Cardenas v. Godbold , 625 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1993); cf. Gumbs v. Guerra , 2002 WL 341750 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2002).
46 Higgs v. Florida Dept. of Corrections , 654 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1995).
47 Fla. Stat. §95.11(4)(b) (2002).
48 Cunningham v. Lowery , 724 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999).
49 Perry v. Schlumbrecht ,724 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1999). Actions for wrongful death resulting from medical malpractice are subject to the medical malpractice statute of limitations rather than the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions. See Fla.Stat. §766.104(1); Crosby v. Jones , 705 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1998); Stone v. Rosenthal , 665 So. 2d 276 (Fla 4th D.C.A. 1995); Ash v. Stella , 457 So. 2d 1377( Fla. 1984).
50 Torrey v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center , 796 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 2001) (finding that personal representative of patient’s estate failed to comply with statutory requirements designed to encourage pretrial settlements in a medical malpractice action, where verified medical expert opinion affidavit failed to specify if expert had ever been disqualified and discovery materials were not made available even though they had been requested twice, and remanding to dismiss the claim). Cf. St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Bell ,785 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2001) (certiorari may lie from orders denying motions to dismiss for failure to comply with the presuit requirements in medical malpractice actions; however, certiorari does not lie for appellate courts to reweigh the evidence presented concerning compliance with the presuit statutory requirements).
51 Integrated Health Care Services, Inc. v. Lang-Redway , 783 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2001) (personal representative for estate of deceased nursing home patient was not required to comply with the presuit requirements in her action against nursing homes for violations of patient’s statutory rights as nursing home resident, where complaint did not allege separate claim for professional malpractice under common law).
52 Hazen v. Kaplan, 734 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999).
53 Tanner , 618 So. 2d at 181–82.
54 Doe v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Authority, 816 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2002) (holding that patient did not have constructive notice of positive results of AIDS test in hospital records).
55 Cascio v. St. Joseph Hosp. of Port Charlotte, Inc., 734 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1999) (holding that nature of patient’s injury following cervical myelogram was not of the kind that was immediately apparent as being caused by medical malpractice); King v. Rojas , 767 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000) (finding that nature of child’s injury did not necessarily communicate to parents the possibility of medical negligence).
56 Hearndon v. Graham , 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000).
57 The certified question was: Where a plaintiff in a tort action based on childhood sexual abuse alleges that she suffered from traumatic amnesia caused by the abuse, does the delayed discovery doctrine postpone the accrual of the cause of action?
58 Citing to Kush v. Lloyd , 616 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 1992); cf. Holt v. Rowell , 798 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2001) (citing to Kush to discuss the impact doctrine and noting that the impact rule does not apply to the tort of wrongful birth; the impact rule does not generally apply in recognized torts where the damages are predominately emotional, such as defamation or invasion of privacy); cf. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Corcoran, 679 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1996); cf. R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc. , 652 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1995) (noting the limitations of the impact rule).
Mark R. Osherow is the shareholder of Mark R. Osherow, P.A., a boutique litigation firm with a principal office in Boca Raton and satellite locations in West Palm Beach, Ft. Lauderdale, and New York City. He is a graduate of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Mr. Osherow has been practicing law since 1988 and is a member of the Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut bars. He concentrates in business litigation, products liability, medical negligence and other professional liability claims, insurance coverage disputes, and personal injury claims.
The author thanks Gabriel Riveros for his assistance with this article.

References: v. 
 §766
 §766
 v. 
 §766
 §766
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §95
 §95
 §95
 §95
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §766
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §766
 v. 
 v. 
 §766
 §766
 §766
 v. 
 §766
 §766
 §766
 §766
 v. 
 §766
 §766
 §766
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §766
 v. 
 §766
 §766
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §95
 v. 
 v. 
 §766
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.