Source: https://toolkit.thegctf.org/en/Prevention/Detail/id/68
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:13:41+00:00

Document:
Good practices for addressing terrorism must be built on a functional criminal justice system that is capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the human rights of the accused.
Protect Victims, Witnesses, Informants, Undercover Agents, Juries, Investigators, Prosecutors, Defense Counsel, and Judges in Counterterrorism Cases.
The rights of victims should be protected. This includes the right to protection and appropriate assistance and support during criminal proceedings.5 In enacting and implementing such measures, States will be ensuring that prosecutors and courts treat victims fairly in the criminal justice process. In addition, States should consider measures necessary to ensure protection of counsel, especially where they are representing informants, while respecting their ability to provide vigorous representation of their clients.
3. Protecting witnesses from intimidation and retaliation is an important component of multiple United Nations conventions. “Each State Party shall take appropriate measures within its means to provide effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses in criminal proceedings.” United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime [hereinafter UNTOC], art. 24.1; accord UNCAC, art. 32.1. Those measures include physical protection of witnesses, relocation, not disclosing their identity and whereabouts, and evidentiary rules that allow them to testify without being in person. UNTOC, art. 24.2; accord UNCAC, art. 32.2. These conventions have also called for criminalizing the “use of physical force, threats or intimidation… to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence…. [or] to interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law enforcement official.” UNTOC, art. 23; accord UNCAC, art. 25.
4. Technical Guide for the Implementation of Resolution 1373 at 28 (2001).
5. These rights have been recognized in UN conventions that call for State Parties to “take appropriate measures within [their] means to provide assistance and protection to victims… in particular in cases of threat of retaliation or intimidation.” UNTOC, art. 25.1. These measures include “access to compensation and restitution,” and having their “views and concerns… presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings.” UNTOC,art’s. 25.2 & 25.3; accord United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, art’s. 6.2 & 6.6, Dec. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319, Annex II [hereinafter Trafficking in Persons Protocol]. The Trafficking in Persons Protocol also calls for “protect[ing] the privacy and identity of victims” through confidential legal proceedings, counseling on their legal rights, “[m]edical, psychological, and material assistance,” “employment, educational and training opportunities,” and “[a]ppropriate housing.” Art’s. 6.1 & 6.3. In addition, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy calls on all States “[t]o consider putting in place, on a voluntary basis, national systems of assistance that would promote the needs of victims of terrorism and their families and facilitate the normalization of their lives.” UN General Assembly Resolution 60/288 (Sept 2006), Plan of Action, Sec. 1, Para. 8 [hereinafter UN Strategy].
Encourage Cooperation and Coordination among Domestic Government Agencies that Have Responsibilities or Information Relevant to Counterterrorism.
Effective investigation of terrorist threats often involves the gathering and analysis of information collected by multiple agencies within a single government, such as intelligence, law enforcement, military, finance, and banking agencies, as well as provincial, state or local governments. It is often critical to connect disparate pieces of information drawn from different sources in order to identify and disrupt a terrorist plot and to prosecute terrorism cases. Thus the sharing of information aimed at preventing terrorist offenses among all agencies involved is an important means of preventing terrorist acts. States may wish to consider, where appropriate, promulgating measures and mechanisms establishing a legal framework aimed at enhancing inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, while maintaining necessary protections for personal data.6 In this context, law enforcement agents, prosecutors and other relevant officials should work together while respecting their competencies, as determined by the applicable legal framework, to enable an effective and integrated criminal justice system.
6. Domestic cooperation has already been stressed by the UNCAC, “Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage… cooperation between, on the one hand, its public authorities, as well as its public officials, and, on the other hand, its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences.” Those measures may include providing information “on their own initiative,” or “upon request.” UNCAC art. 38.
Provide a Legal Framework and Practical Measures for Undercover Investigations of Terrorist Suspects or Organizations.
Where necessary and feasible, States should put in place adequate mechanisms and legislation for conducting investigations of terrorist activity without the knowledge of the suspected terrorists under investigation. Accordingly, States should enable, where appropriate, the use of special investigative techniques, such as undercover investigations, following established procedures, as provided for in relevant national laws or policies, that assure the accountability of law enforcement officials as well as the production of admissible evidence of terrorist activity and related criminal plans, preparations, actions, and involvement.7 It is important that procedures be in place to protect those involved in undercover operations from harm to the maximum extent possible, while ensuring their accountability. All such procedures should be consistent with relevant national laws and applicable international law. It is also important that their activities be closely supervised to ensure that they are targeting their operations based on evidence of terrorist activity, that they conduct the operations within appropriate human rights boundaries, and do not engage in entrapment.
7. United Nations conventions have called on State Parties “to allow for the appropriate use by its competent authorities of… special investigative techniques, such as… undercover operations,… and to allow for the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom.” UNCAC, art. 50.1; accord Organized Crime Convention, art. 20.1.
Provide a Legal Framework and Practical Measures for Electronic Surveillance in Counterterrorism Investigations.
The clandestine and complex nature of terrorism requires specialized investigative methods and techniques. Lawfully approved forms of electronic surveillance such as wiretapping, tracking devices, and the monitoring of Internet and other electronic communications have proven to be effective tools to combat terrorist activities. Evidence derived from electronic surveillance should, as provided for in relevant national laws, generally be obtained in a form that will be legally admissible in court, and the methods should be compliant with relevant human rights obligations.8 Regulating such surveillance can directly promote the right of persons not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful invasions of privacy.9 There should be an appropriate legal authorization by the competent authorities to initiate electronic surveillance against a terrorist suspect. Laws authorizing electronic surveillance also need to be flexible enough to account for rapid changes in communications technology, which terrorists may exploit, and should apply the legal principle of proportionality.
8. Various international conventions have provisions encouraging the use of electronic surveillance. “[E]ach State Party shall… take such measures as may be necessary, within its means, to allow for the appropriate use by its competent authorities of… special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance,… and to allow for the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom.” UNCAC, art. 50.1; accord Organized Crime Convention, art. 20.1.
Adopt Incentives for Terrorist Suspects and Others to Cooperate in Counterterrorism Investigations and Prosecutions.
Without adequate incentives, those with knowledge of or involvement in terrorist activity may have little reason to cooperate with law enforcement authorities, especially given the fear of retribution by members of a terrorist organization. Accordingly, adequate incentive programs to encourage terrorist suspects and others to provide accurate and useful information to competent authorities about terrorist activities and plots should be adopted.10 Any such program should respect the principle that no one should be compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt. With respect to those involved in planning or undertaking terrorist activities, legal systems should have the flexibility to take into account cooperation with authorities, including testimony in other criminal proceedings, and early admissions of guilt to mitigate punishment.11 Formal cooperation agreements or “plea agreements” are one way but not the exclusive way to accomplish this objective, as are sentencing rules that address the impact of cooperation. Finally, care should be taken to ensure that incentives for cooperation do not lead individuals to provide false information or evidence to law enforcement authorities.
10. Various United Nations conventions call for State Parties to take “appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate or who have participated in the commission of an offense to supply information useful to competent authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes.” UNTOC, art. 37.1, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter UNCAC]; accord UNTOC, art. 26.1, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter Organized Crime Convention].
11. United Nations conventions support mitigating punishment or granting immunity to those who cooperate with law enforcement. “Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in appropriate cases, of mitigating punishment of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence,” and “shall consider providing for the possibility… of granting immunity.” UNCAC, 1, art’s. 37.2 & 37.3; accord UNTOC, art’s. 26.2 & 26.3; accord United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, art. 7.18, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter 1988 UN Drug Convention].
Because persons often provide this type of information to the government in confidence and in situations of risk to their personal safety, these measures help further the protection of the of the privacy interests of victims and informants from interference or attacks.13 Moreover, this approach protects national security.
12. Measures already exist at the international level to protect sensitive information that one State Party receives from another. “State Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to protect the confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue of the provisions of this convention from another State Party…. If States Parties provide information to international organizations in confidence, steps shall be taken to ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected.” International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, art. 7, April 13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention].
13. Cf, ICCPR, art. 17.
15. ICCPR arts. 9 and 14.
16. The need for States to detain persons prior to trial is clearly recognized and authorized by the ICCPR, arts. 9, 10, and 14. The regulation of such pre-trial detention, absent a state of emergency, should be subject to judicial review, ICCPR, art. 9.3 (requiring persons arrested on criminal charges to be brought promptly before a judge or other judicial power) and art. 9.4 (providing for judicial review of the lawfulness of any form of arrest or detention). [Under article four of the ICCPR formal derogation of the judicial review provisions of article nine may be proclaimed during a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation, only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies, and provided they are not inconsistent with other international legal obligations and are not imposed in a discriminatory manner. .]ICCPR, art. 4.1.
Provide for the Professional Development of Investigators, Prosecutors, and Judges Who Handle Terrorism Cases.
A long-term commitment to developing and building a specialized cadre of permanent career investigators, prosecutors, and judges (where relevant) is needed to ensure effective prosecution. Career prosecution and investigative services should be equipped with the infrastructure, remuneration, and specialized training they need to perform critical counterterrorism functions within the criminal justice system. In particular, they should be able to handle the complex legal, forensic, technological, and financial aspects of counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions. A competent and impartial judiciary attuned to the complexity and importance of terrorism cases, including human rights aspects, is also critical to an effective criminal justice approach to counterterrorism within a rule of law framework. Training and resources necessary to handle these cases appropriately should be available to investigators, prosecutors, and judges.
Develop Practices and Procedures to Encourage International Cooperation in Counterterrorism Matters.
Extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties and associated domestic laws should be updated and modernized where needed. In addition, States could, where possible and appropriate, develop new tools to facilitate cooperation among judicial authorities in different countries.19 In this regard, States should comply with their international legal obligations with respect to the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Training should be available to central authorities, judges, and prosecutors on the international requirements of all aspects of mutual legal assistance and judicial cooperation.
17. Many of the international conventions that are in force contain measures to increase the cooperation between countries. For instance, many contain provisions that limit acceptable reasons to deny an extradition request. UNCAC, art. 44; UNTOC, art. 16; 1988; UN Drug Convention, art. 6; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art’s. 9 & 11, Oct. 24, 1995, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 [hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention]; International Convention against the taking of Hostages, art. 10, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostages Convention];.Nuclear Terrorism Convention, art. 13. Other provisions state that “State Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings,” with specific provisions for a central authority to handle all requests. UNCAC, art. 46; accord Organized Crime Convention, art. 18; 1988 UN Drug Convention, art. 7.
18. See, e.g., U.N. Sec. Res. 1373 (September 2001), para. 3(g), Terrorist Bombings Convention, arts. 11 and 12.
19. For example, States may consider 1) concluding agreements or arrangements that provide for the use of special investigative techniques across national boundaries that allow for the admissibility of such evidence in their courts; b) the exchange of liaison magistrates and justice attaches, without prejudice to their national laws; and 3) whether joint investigative teams could, in a specific case and in accordance with their national laws, further the interests of international cooperation in counterterrorism. See, e.g., UNTOC, Art. 19.
20. Various conventions have been adopted that contain provisions which promote informal international cooperation. For example, the UNCAC provides that State Parties shall “take effective measures [t]o enhance and, where necessary, to establish channels of communication between their competent authorities, agencies and services in order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of [criminal] offences.” UNCAC, art. 48; accord Organized Crime Convention, art. 27; 1988 UN Drug Convention, art. 9. Other provisions provide for sharing information to help prevent offenses, or sharing evidence after an offense has been committed. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, art. 18, Sep. 10, 2010 [hereinafter Beijing Convention] (“Any State Party having reason to believe that [an offense]… shall be committed shall, in accordance with its national law, furnish any relevant information in its possession to those States Parties.”); Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 15 (“State Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of [criminal] offences…. [b]y exchanging accurate and verified information in accordance with their national law.”).
Develop and Use Forensic Evidence to Determine the Identities of those involved in Terrorist Acts.
The use of scientifically accepted, human rights-compliant, modern forensic sciences is an invaluable tool in terrorism investigations. These measures may include modern DNA analysis, automatic fingerprint analysis, ballistics, bomb residue analysis, and a host of other tools. It must be recognized, however, that forensic evidence may not always be present at crime scenes, and absent such evidence, the identity of a perpetrator may be discovered through other lawful means. In order to increase the possibility that useful evidence will be recovered, law enforcement and other authorities who first respond to a crime scene should do their utmost to maintain the integrity of the crime scene, so that a proper forensic examination may be conducted, and should consider issuing guidelines to further that objective. In specific cases international assistance may be helpful in securing the crime scene or in the collection, protection, and examination of forensic evidence. Finally, the availability of forensic tools also directly furthers the protection of human rights in that it increases the number of tools to discover the identities of terrorist suspects through non-coercive means.
Ensure that Convicted Terrorists Are Appropriately Punished and Develop Policies for Their Incarceration and Reintegration.
An effective system for incarcerating convicted terrorists is a critical part of an effective criminal justice response to terrorism. Such a system should ensure appropriate punishment so as to deter terrorist activity, prevent further radicalization of prisoners, prevent terrorist activities from being directed or supported from within the prison system, and provide for the deradicalization and reintegration of prisoners into society where possible and thereby reduce recidivism.
Convicted terrorists should be held securely for the duration of their incarceration, which should reflect the gravity and potential harm to society from their conduct, while treating them humanely and respecting their human rights.21 Experience has shown that some convicted terrorists continue to conduct terrorist activities during their incarceration. Governments should enact measures -- such as proportionate restrictions on communications by convicted terrorists -- to prevent such activities from occurring.
States are encouraged to share with each other relevant experiences and information about the incarceration and reintegration of terrorists. States may make use of the experiences and information from governments that have succeeded in rehabilitating persons convicted of committing terrorism offences and in getting them to renounce violence. For those prisoners who will be released into the community, measures should be undertaken to reintegrate them into society. Such measures could, where appropriate and consistent with the relevant national laws, include strict conditions of court-supervised release.
21. The principles and philosophy espoused in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Economic and Social Council Resolutions 666 C (XXIV) and 2076 (LXII), (July 31, 1957 and May 13, 1977), provide a useful and flexible guide that countries should use when deciding what conditions of confinement are appropriate for prisoners. However, as noted in the Rules themselves. “it is evident that not all of the rules are capable of application in all places and at all times.” Id. at p. 1, Preliminary Observation 2. Thus some of the suggested rules may need to be modified in order to protect against those who seek to continue their terrorist acts from inside prison.
Criminalize Terrorism offenses as Outlined in the Applicable International Conventions and Protocols.
Although States may approach codification of terrorism offenses differently depending on their legal traditions, States should criminalize the offenses outlined in the relevant international counterterrorism legal instruments to which they are a party, or which are required by relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as part of a comprehensive legal framework to combat and prevent terrorism.22 Furthermore, States that are not a party to some or all of these international instruments should consider becoming a party.23 Adequate incorporation into national legislation of the international counterterrorism provisions and obligations constitutes a key element in a comprehensive and coherent counterterrorism legal framework that is sufficiently precise to give fair notice of conduct that is prohibited and guards against potential misuse of criminal laws.
22. Certain terrorism-related offenses are already covered by specific international conventions requiring State Parties to criminalize those actions. See e.g. Hostages Convention, Supra note 10, art. 1 (criminalizes “hostage-taking”); Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 2 (makes it illegal to “deliver, place[ ], discharge[ ], or detonate[ ] an explosive or other illegal device”); Nuclear Terrorism Convention, art. 2 (makes it an offense to make, possess, or use radioactive material or a device, or to damage a nuclear facility).
23. See, UN Sec. Res. 1373 para. 3(d).
Criminalize Conspiracies, Solicitation and other Preparatory Acts of Terrorism.
Criminalizing preparatory acts, such as conspiracy, terrorist fundraising, terrorist recruitment, planning and training, particularly when a terrorist attack has not yet been carried out, is vital in an effective criminal justice preventive approach to counterterrorism. If terrorist violence is to be reduced and attacks are to be thwarted before they occur, authorities must be able to focus their attention on proactive intervention when terrorist suspects are at the planning and preparation stages. While countries differ on how exactly these offenses are defined (e.g., membership in a terrorist organization, directing the activity of terrorist organizations, solicitation, incitement or recruitment) criminalization of preparatory acts will greatly facilitate early intervention. The creation of conspiracy or criminal association offenses, which prohibit agreements to commit crimes associated with terrorism, is vital to facilitating this early intervention. For these offenses to be complete, terrorist attacks need not be attempted or accomplished but only agreed to or prepared for in some manner. In the criminalization and prosecution of these acts, countries should pay full respect to the rights of individuals to freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief, and freedom of association.
Criminalize Attempts to Commit and Aiding and Abetting Terrorist Acts.
Likewise, countries should enact laws that criminalize attempts to commit, or aiding or abetting the commission of, terrorism offenses.24 Criminalizing attempts, even when the perpetrator does not ultimately succeed in committing the crime, is essential in a preventative criminal justice system.
24. International conventions commonly criminalize any attempt to commit the substantive offense covered by the convention. See UNCAC, art. 27.2; Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 2.2; Hostages Convention, art. 1.2; Genocide Convention, art. 3(d); ICTY Statute, art. 4.3; ICTR Statute, art. 2.3. These same international conventions often criminalize participating in an offense as an accomplice. See UNCAC, art. 27.1; ; Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 2.3; Hostages Convention, art. 1.2; Genocide Convention, art. 3(e) (makes punishable “complicity in genocide”); ICTY Statute, art. 4.3 (makes punishable “complicity in genocide”); ICTR Statute, art. 2.3 (makes punishable “complicity in genocide”).
Preventing terrorists and terrorist organizations from funding their activities is an essential component of any successful counterterrorism strategy and a binding requirement under several UN Security Council resolutions.25 Countries should enact laws that criminalize the financing of terrorism in accordance with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and are encouraged to implement the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations on Criminalizing Terrorist Financing.26 Procedures and proper mechanisms allowing for the freezing, seizing, and confiscation of terrorist assets and funds used or allocated for the purpose of terrorist financing, should also be enacted in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and subject to appropriate review.
25. See, e.g., U.N. Sec. Res. 1267 (1999); U.N. Sec. Res 1373 (2001).
26. In addition to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, other international conventions also prohibit the activities of those who “knowingly finance” offenses set out in that particular convention. See Terrorist Bombings Convention, art. 15; accord Nuclear Terrorism Convention, art. 7.1.
It is vital for States to assist each other in developing the necessary capacity to confront terrorism through the criminal justice system. Accordingly states should in the first instance have a modern, fair and efficient criminal justice system that forms the basis for a robust criminal justice response to terrorism. Thus, capacity building is a core element in an effective counterterrorism program. This Working Group encourages all States and relevant multilateral bodies to participate in such efforts.
Capacity-building programs should be designed to ensure that law enforcement and criminal justice officials understand and implement the good practices discussed above that are consistent with their legal requirements and circumstances. Furthermore, counterterrorism enforcement should be conducted within a framework that respects human rights and promotes the rule of law and good governance.
States are encouraged to submit offers of assistance and requests for assistance to the GCTF Administrative Unit using the form in the attached addendum to improve cooperation in counterterrorism capacity building efforts in a way that is most consistent with the priorities and legal systems as well as the special circumstances of each state. The Working Group Co-Chairs will, in cooperation with the GCTF Administrative Unit, share requests for and offers of assistance with all Working Group members on a timely and regular basis.
This Working Group recognizes that there is no obligation on any state to provide or receive assistance. Such offers or requests should be based on the sovereign decision of each state based on its legal system, priorities, needs, and circumstances.
The Working Group encourages all states to consider using the Good Practices as a non-binding guide for implementing counterterrorism capacity-building assistance activities. States should keep in mind that the above Good Practices may be updated over time to take into account the experiences of states in using their criminal justices systems to counter and prevent terrorism.
As noted above, one of the fundamental obstacles to effective investigation and prosecution is often the lack of coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among public safety, law enforcement, intelligence, and prosecutorial agencies. Encouragement of institutional mechanisms, such as interagency task forces, to coordinate among various agencies of government is key to overcoming obstacles.
As noted above, to effectively use the criminal justice system to counter terrorism, countries should consider developing a professional cadre of practitioners in every component of the criminal justice system.28 Given the increasingly complex and highly specialized nature of terrorism investigations and prosecutions, States can benefit from ensuring that law enforcement officials, judges, and prosecutors are provided with specialized counterterrorism training and skills to develop and implement the above-mentioned tools effectively. Given the international nature of the terrorist threat, specialized expertise in international cooperation, including the development of effective central authorities, is also critical.
27. Some international conventions provide for specialized authorities to deal with a specific issue. The UNCAC, for example, says that each State Party shall “ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. Such body or bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence… to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without any undue influence. Such persons or staff of such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources to carry out their tasks.” UNCAC, art. 36.
28. In the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the General Assembly recognizes “that States may require assistance in developing and maintaining [an] effective and rule of law-based criminal justice system” and encourages “them to resort to the technical assistance delivered, inter alia, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” UN Strategy, Plan of Action, Sec. 4, Para. 4. In addition, United Nations conventions have recognized the importance of specialized training across the entire spectrum of the criminal justice system. “Each State Party shall… initiate, develop, or improve specific training programs for its law enforcement personnel including prosecutors, investigating magistrates and customs personnel, and other personnel charged with the prevention, detection and control of the offences covered by this convention.” UNTOC, art. 29.

References: art. 24
 art. 32
 art. 24
 art. 32
 art. 23
 art. 25
 art. 25
 art. 38
 art. 50
 art. 20
 art. 50
 art. 20
 art. 37
 art. 26
 art. 7
 art. 7
 art. 17
 art. 9
 art. 9
 art. 4
 art. 44
 art. 16
 art. 6
 art. 10
 art. 13
 art. 46
 art. 18
 art. 7
 Art. 19
 art. 48
 art. 27
 art. 9
 art. 18
 art. 15
 art. 1
 art. 2
 art. 2
 art. 27
 art. 2
 art. 1
 art. 3
 art. 4
 art. 2
 art. 27
 art. 2
 art. 1
 art. 3
 art. 4
 art. 2
 art. 15
 art. 7
 art. 36
 art. 29