Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/76/76massappct366.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:33:26+00:00

Document:
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Reasonable suspicion, Probable cause. Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion, Protective frisk, Probable cause. Threshold Police Inquiry. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Failure to make objection.
A Boston Municipal Court judge properly denied a criminal defendant's pretrial motion to suppress drugs discovered during a patfrisk that was conducted by police officers when, after the defendant had responded to an initial request for identification by the officers, who observed him in front of a building with a "no trespassing" sign, the defendant acted evasively, stated in response to an officer's question that he had marijuana on his person, and attempted to put his hand in his pocket, where the defendant was seized only at the point when he was pat frisked, and the defendant's evasive behavior justified the patfrisk, and where the defendant's statement that he was in possession of illegal drugs provided, in any event, probable cause for his arrest and a search incident to that arrest. [368-374] WOLOHOJIAN, J., dissenting.
COMPLAINT received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on February 6, 2006.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Roberto Ronquillo, Jr., J., and the case was tried before Rosalind Henson Miller, J.
Jill S. Klowden for the defendant.
Anna E. Kalluri, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A; and committing the offense within a school zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. The defendant asserts error in the denial of his motion to suppress evidence central to his convictions. Specifically, the defendant contends that the arresting officers (i) conducted an unlawful seizure in violation of his rights under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and (ii) subjected him to custodial interrogation in violation of his Miranda rights.
At this point, the officers emerged from their cruiser. [Note 6] The defendant, who now was avoiding eye contact, "looking down at the ground," made several attempts to put his hands into his pockets. After instructing the defendant to remove his hands, Officer Edwards conducted a patfrisk of the defendant's waist area. During the course of the frisk, several plastic vials containing "crack" cocaine fell from the defendant's pockets.
that the officers did not seize the defendant when they first approached him and asked his identity in a "reasonable tone." An officer's conversational approach to an individual, absent a show of authority, does not rise to the level of a seizure under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403 , 406 (1999); Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367 , 370 (2007). The officers did not restrict the defendant's freedom of movement, nor did they question the defendant in a hostile manner. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the officers' location -- whether inside the cruiser or on the sidewalk -- does not alter our conclusion. See DePeiza, supra at 369-370 (no seizure where officers left their vehicle and positioned themselves on either side of the defendant during questioning); Commonwealth v. Pagan, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 780 , 782 (2005) (no seizure "by simply alighting from the police cruiser and approaching" the defendant). Contrast Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135 , 138-139 (2001) (encounter became stop when officer not only emerged from cruiser but also commanded defendant to stop).
earlier time period while his documentation was retained by the police.
As stated, supra, and assuming the defendant provided the officers with identification in written form, it was returned to him after the warrant check was completed. Our cases dealing with investigatory stops recognize that there is some ambiguity inherent in many encounters between citizens and police officers. See Commonwealth v. Sykes, 449 Mass. 308 , 311 (2007) ("The nature of an encounter between a citizen and a law enforcement official is necessarily fact specific and requires careful examination of the attending circumstances"); Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 166 , 172 (2001) ( "[s]treet encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity . . . [which] yields the abundance of 'highly fact-based questions' " [citations omitted]).
Moreover, even if we assume that the defendant had not been free to depart after the warrant check produced negative results, the police were justified in continuing their investigation under these circumstances, at least to the minimal extent they did so here. The defendant's odd and evasive behavior provided ample support for the single additional question that led to the admission that the defendant had illegal drugs on his person. Thus, even if the return of the identification is not characterized as a termination of the seizure that began when it was taken, there was reasonable suspicion to prompt the question asked by the police. See note 13, infra.
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Commonwealth v. Rock, 429 Mass. 609 , 611 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782 , 786 (1996). The fact that an officer leaves his cruiser during an encounter is but one factor in considering whether the requisite show of authority has occurred. See DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 370; Pagan, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 782. The record contains no indicia of additional police conduct that could be interpreted as improper by any standard, much less coercion. [Note 12] The officers asked a single question -- "You got anything on you I need to know about?" -- which was not excessive [Note 13] or improper, especially in light of the defendant's abnormal behavior preceding the question. Although the dissent characterizes the police as "impermissibly" using the opportunity of the warrant check to question the defendant at greater length, the general questioning of the defendant in fact did not occur during the warrant check, but, rather, followed his admission that he was in possession of an illegal substance. See note 5, supra. We agree with the motion judge that if the officers left their cruiser before the defendant's admission, this act did not constitute new grounds to conclude that the defendant was seized at the time he uttered the incriminating statement. [Note 14] See Commonwealth v. Thinh Van Cao, 419 Mass. 383 , 385, 387-388, cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1146 (1995) (no seizure where, absent an order to comply or indication that defendant could not terminate the encounter, officer approached him on foot and asked questions concerning his identity).
this demeanor provided reasonable suspicion for the limited patfrisk of the defendant. DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 371- 372.
Perhaps more to the point, however, and equally dispositive in this appeal, is the fact that the officers had probable cause to arrest this defendant after he told them he was in possession of illegal drugs. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 413 Mass. 598 , 602 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 742 (1991) (search incident to arrest may precede formal arrest "as long as probable cause [to arrest] existed independent of the results of the search").
focused entirely on illegal search and no objection raised to statements at trial).
WOLOHOJIAN, J. (dissenting) . The defendant was questioned by police only because he was standing in front of a house posted with a "no trespassing" sign. Although the officers had no reason to think that the defendant was in fact trespassing, [Note Dissent-1] they were entitled to inquire as to why he was there. Neither his mannerism nor his response gave them any reason to think he was trespassing; indeed, the defendant willingly and openly offered a reasonable explanation for his presence (that his mother lived in the building), and one the officers had no reason to doubt. The officers were, as the motion judge found, satisfied that the defendant was not trespassing.
see id. at 815-816, and the police impermissibly used that opportunity not only to run a warrant check but also to question the defendant, both aimlessly and intrusively. The last question in this conversation ("You got anything on you I need to know about?") happened to occur after the police returned the defendant's identification. It is overly formalistic to conclude as a matter of law, as the majority does, that a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have believed he was "free to turn his back on his interrogator and walk away," Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 541 , 544 (1991), simply because his identification had been returned to him in the middle of an ongoing over-reaching police interrogation.
was free to go; instead his full testimony was that he thought he should have been free to leave once the police determined he had no outstanding warrants, but that the police further detained him. Thus, to the extent that the majority's analysis or conclusion rests on any of these factual findings, it strays beyond the proper bounds of appellate review.
[Note 1] Although the parties spell Officer Sleamon's name as detailed in the text, it appears as "Slamin" in the criminal complaint.
[Note 2] The defendant testified that he provided identification. The officers did not remember whether they asked for documentation or merely asked the defendant for his name and address. It is uncontested that the information, however provided, was used to determine whether the defendant had any outstanding warrants.
[Note 3] The officer so testified at one point. The judge found that the officer "asked the question whether [the defendant] had any guns or drugs on him." The judge's use of "guns and drugs" rather than "anything" is not supported by the evidence; the difference in wording does not affect our analysis.
[Note 4] At the time of the offense, it was still a crime in Massachusetts to possess even a small amount of marijuana. See G. L. c. 94C, § 34, as in effect prior to St. 2008, c. 387, § 5, which amended the statute to criminalize possession of more than one ounce of marijuana.
WITNESS: "I believe at that time I proceeded to exit the cruiser. And I asked him. I was like, you know, 'You have anything on you I need to know about?' And, um, he stated to me, you know, 'Yeah, I got a bag [of] my weed in my pocket.' And he proceeded to go inside his pocket to try to pull the weed out. And I told him, you know, keep your hands where I could see them."
PROSECUTOR: "At -- at this point, Officer, where is your partner?"
WITNESS: "Um, I believe he's still, uh, sitting inside the cruiser, I believe, or he's getting out at the time I get out."
PrOSECUTOR: "Uh, and you stated that you instructed him to take his hands out of his pocket?"
WITNESS: "At that time I proceeded to, um, I continued to engage him, you know. Um, you know, 'You ever been arrested before?' that sort of thing. Just general conversations. And, um, at that time, you know, I still made additional observations. Like I said, he was looking away from us, failing to make eye contact, looking down at the ground. And at the time, I believe I -- he attempted to put his hands back in his pocket again."
[Note 6] The defendant testified that the officers left their vehicle only after questioning him. The motion judge's findings on this point, though imprecise, adopted the defendant's version.
[Note 7] In this context we must disagree with the suggestion in the dissent that the police were not justified in making serious inquiry of the defendant because the initial encounter involved "only" a "no trespassing" sign, representing as that does in many instances a final line of defense for elderly or vulnerable residents of deteriorating neighborhoods to criminal activity on their doorsteps.
[Note 8] We note that the judge did not have the benefit of Lyles, which was decided after the trial in this case.
[Note 9] DEFENDANT: "[T]hey just hopped out of the car and asked me . . . do I have any weapons or drugs. That's when they exited the car."
DEFENSE COUNSEL: "Ok. And did you think you were free to leave at (inaudible) that point?"
DEFENDANT: "Yeah. If I don't have no warrants."
The defendant also denied having been nervous, but conceded that he had been out of breath, testifying he had "[run] down the stairs."
[Note 10] As noted, supra, the facts are undisputed in all material respects; accordingly we do not comprehend the dissent's perception of appellate fact finding. In any event, a determination whether a reasonable person is free to leave is a legal conclusion applied to (here, undisputed) facts, and not a factual finding. Compare Commonwealth v. Rock, 429 Mass. 609 , 611-612 (1999).
[Note 11] We have noted as well that the finding that the officers were still in their vehicle is based on the defendant's own testimony, which the motion judge was entitled to credit. See note 5, supra.
[Note 12] To the contrary, as discussed, supra, the defendant's own version of events was that his identification, which he knew by then that the police considered to be exculpatory, had been returned to him before they exited the cruiser, and that he considered himself free to leave.
[Note 13] General questioning unrelated to the reason for a police encounter does not "convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009). One question, undeniably the fewest number one can ask, cannot rationally be argued to qualify as violative of this principle.
[Note 14] The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233 (1983), is unavailing. In King, the investigating officer's "repositioning of his cruiser" constituted a show of authority that transformed the encounter into a seizure. Id. at 241. Thereafter, further interaction with the defendants required an articulable justification on the part of the officer. Id. at 243- 244.
[Note 15] Officer Edwards testified as well that the defendant's mannerisms -- those he observed during his initial questioning about the defendant's presence in front of a "no trespassing" sign -- "are consistent with someone who may be in possession of a weapon."
[Note 16] This case does not involve a routine traffic stop and the questioning of an individual who was not the driver, and hence not suspected of any traffic violation, as was considered in Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153 , 158-159 (1997). Furthermore, even assuming the defendant was still seized by the police despite the return of his identification and despite his own perception to the contrary, his behavior described, supra, satisfies the need for "reasonable suspicion grounded in specific articulable facts . . . to question him further." Id. at 158.
[Note 17] Even were we to reach the issue, there is no colorable claim on this record that the defendant was being subjected to custodial interrogation at the time he made his inculpatory statement. See DePeiza, supra at 376 (officer's querying whether defendant was carrying a gun after announcing he wanted to conduct a patfrisk not deemed custodial interrogation where officers' tone was conversational and conduct not aggressive).
[Note Dissent-1] The police had not received any reports of trespassing, or any other suspicious activity in the area that evening. The police did not know the defendant, and there is no suggestion that they had any reason to think he did not live at the address or was not otherwise legitimately present. The officer admitted that he stopped the defendant only because he was standing near a "no trespassing" sign.
[Note Dissent-2] The Torres and King cases involve police questioning in the context of vehicular stops. There is no reason, however, not to apply their analyses to this case. Indeed, in the related context of searches, it long has been held that vehicles carry with them a diminished expectation of privacy. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999). It would make no sense, therefore, to hold here (as the majority does) that the defendant is entitled to more protection from police questioning when in his car than on the street.
[Note Dissent-3] Such behavior alone in any event would not justify the search. Commonwealth v. Brown, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 528 , 533 (2009), quoting from Commonwealth v. Williams, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 181 , 184 (1999) ("The trooper's testimony that the defendant and his fellow passenger had 'nervous looks' or appeared to be 'tense' are 'general descriptions [that] fall short of the 'specific and articulable facts' which are required to demonstrate reasonableness").

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