Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/50/50massappct319.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:48:16+00:00

Document:
THOMAS LEWIS vs. COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES(and a companion case [Note 1]).
Committee for Public Counsel Services. Practice, Civil, Relief in the nature of certiorari, Discovery. Attorney at Law, Compensation.
In actions in the nature of certiorari seeking review of determinations by the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS), made pursuant to the authority vested in CPCS by G. L. c. 211D, s. 12, a Superior Court judge correctly concluded that substantial evidence in the record supported the CPCS determination that two attorneys had submitted excessive billings for CPCS work and that repayment was due the Commonwealth for the overbilled amounts [322-323, 326-328]; further, there was no merit to the attorneys' claims that they were denied due process in the CPCS hearings [323-324, 328].
CIVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 8, 1996, and December 20, 1996, respectively.
After consolidation, the cases were heard by Diane M. Kottmyer, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Terry M. Craven for the plaintiffs.
Court. After the plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings, judgments entered for CPCS. On appeal, each plaintiff argues that there was insufficient evidence to support CPCS's decision and that CPCS's policies and procedures violated his right to due process. We affirm the judgments of the Superior Court affirming the decisions of the executive committee of CPCS.
Pursuant to G. L. c. 211D, s. 12, set forth in relevant part in the margin, [Note 2] and CPCS's "Manual for Counsel Assigned Through the Committee for Public Counsel Services Policies and Procedures" (manual), the audit and oversight department of CPCS (audit department) notified Lewis and Fox that it was concerned that they were improperly preparing their bills. Although each attorney submitted additional information, a staff auditor found that each of them had overbilled CPCS and recommended repayment. After holding hearings at the request of the attorneys, the executive committee of CPCS approved the recommendations, with some modification in the case of Fox.
Our function in reviewing an appeal in the nature of certiorari is only to "inquire whether the [CPCS] decision was 'legally tenable and supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.'" Bielawski v. Personnel Administrator of the Div. of Personnel Admn., 422 Mass. 459 , 464 (1996), quoting from Gloucester v. Civil Serv. Commn., 408 Mass. 292 , 297 (1990) (other citation omitted).
"During FY 1994, attorney Lewis submitted bills (Requests for Payment) to CPCS for 2,785.50 hours of services to children and parents in non-criminal proceedings and was paid $91,233.75. The bills were for services on 340 days during the period of July 1, 1993 through June 30, 1994, including most holidays and weekends, and for services on 40 days in excess of 10 hours a day.
"The time spent by Lewis in the review and update of the files of his children and adult clients far exceeds the standard of reasonableness applicable in civil fee disputes. See In the Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481 , 489-490 (1996), [cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997)]. His continual resort to reviews and updates of files is clearly excessive within the meaning of S.J.C. Rule 3:07, DR 2-106(B). Id. at 485-487. A prudent, experienced lawyer would not consider it productive to devote well in excess of fifty percent of his time in representing these clients assigned to Lewis through CPCS, in reviewing and updating files. He would use his time for more significant efforts on behalf of the clients.
"There is no adequate explanation why Lewis routinely went through his active, and in some instances, his inactive files. . .
CPCS submitted numerous time sheets of Lewis which supported the hearing officer's description of the entries. Lewis does not contest that those entries were made. He argues, instead, as stated in a letter he sent to the audit department, that his responsibility for clients who are children requires constant review and updating of files, including reviewing reports.
In Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. at 492-493, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that the language quoted "creates explicitly an objective standard by which attorneys' fees are to be judged." The executive committee, obviously experienced in the area of law involved, did not need to credit Lewis's assertion that all his claimed time for review and updating was required.
not possible. In view of the percentage reduction of Lewis's hours, a showing of specific charges disallowed was not relevant or feasible, and hence, the denial of discovery was not improper. See Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92 , 102-103 (1994).
Lewis's additional claims that at the hearing he was unduly limited to one-half hour and precluded from questioning the staff auditor who had made the initial recommendation were correctly answered by the Superior Court judge. The judge concluded, it "is evident from the transcript of the hearing [Lewis was] not denied the right to rebut the Disposition Recommendation findings" of the audit department. Lewis had no right to cross examine the author of the disposition recommendation "because 'inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decision makers at administrative hearings is inappropriate.' New England Medical Center, Inc. v. Rate Setting Commn., 384 Mass. 46 , 56 (198 1)."
"Review of the ten days of time sheets [of the sixteen requested] [provided by] Attorney Fox revealed that 96% of the telephone calls he billed for were for .25 hours and 75% of his conferences were .25 hours. There was no further documentation to substantiate that all the calls were fifteen . . . minutes, nor did the time sheets provided show the actual time spent on each call. This presented the same issue as in the 1991 audit."
"unrealistic for an attorney to have 96% of his telephone calls to be exactly fifteen . . . minutes in length. Although conferences can last fifteen . . . minutes, they can also be more or less. Because Attorney Fox did not submit necessary documentation to prove otherwise, I find that in fiscal 1994 Attorney Fox billed in standard increments, rather than actual time spent which is not in keeping with established policies and procedures of CPCS billing practices."
hours. [Note 9] She concluded, however, that for the fifty-one weekends, he should be credited for two hours per weekend day, for a total of 204 hours, thus reducing the recommended overpayment to $13,370.
"Through his own admissions, and by his failure to provide requested documents, Attorney Fox has demonstrated that either he cannot maintain the necessary records required by CPCS, or that he refuses to maintain those records."
he billed on the basis of standard increments of time without considering that the amount billed should reflect the total actual time spent. Cf. Handy v. Penal Insts. Commr. of Boston, 412 Mass. 759 , 768-769 (1992). In sum, the findings support the requirement of repayment and the removal of Fox from CPCS panels.
The due process claims of Fox fail for substantially the reasons that those of Lewis lack merit, as well as for additional reasons. The claim that Fox was unduly limited in time at the hearing is belied by counsel's reference at the hearing to "the last thing I want to say" and her reply of "Nothing" when asked at the end of the hearing whether she had anything to add. Fox's assertion of a lack of due process because of the denial of his request for discovery founders not only because he had access to all the documentation relied on by the audit department but also because he did not place in the record the print-out which CPCS had given him and which, CPCS asserts, informed him of all the problems. That Fox was denied the right to submit letters of commendation on his behalf did not deny him the right to rebut the disposition recommendation findings. As the Superior Court judge rightly pointed out, "a letter of commendation does not constitute 'documentation in support of his rebuttal to the Disposition Recommendation report findings.'"
In conclusion, we agree with the Superior Court that there is no basis for granting relief in the nature of certiorari. There are no errors appearing upon the face of the return, let alone "errors . . . so substantial and material that, if allowed to stand, they will result in manifest injustice to a petitioner who is without any other available remedy." Johnson Prod., Inc. v. City Council of Medford, 353 Mass. 540 , 541 n.2, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 296 (1968), quoting from Tracht v. County Commrs. of Worcester, 318 Mass. 681 , 686 (1945).
[Note 1] John J. Fox vs. Committee for Public Counsel Services.
"The committee shall establish policies and procedures to provide fair compensation to private counsel, which shall include a remedy for any attorney aggrieved by the amount of payment. The committee shall also establish an audit and oversight department to monitor billing and private attorney compensation. . . . The committee may . . . prescribe such policies and procedures for payment as it deems appropriate." G. L. c. 211 D, s. 12, as amended through St. 1993, c. 110, s. 221.
the audit department indicated that Lewis was permitted to limit his explanations to records for sixteen specific dates, but was advised that the audit was not restricted to those dates.
[Note 4] The decision continued: "The time sheet for Saturday, March 26, 1994, for example, states a quarter hour charge for 'update rev file' as to twenty-two of the twenty-nine listed clients; and a quarter hour charge is made with respect to four other clients for 'It. to client; update file.' Similarly, on March 29, 1993, one quarter hour charges are made for twenty-seven of thirty-three clients (21 for 'update rev file' and 6 for a phone call and 'update file'); and one half hour is charged with regard to four clients for a phone call and 'update file.' On each of these dates, the total hours billed was 9.75. On both dates, most of the time was billed solely for 'update rev file' (56% on 3/26/94, 69% on 3/29/93)."
[Note 5] Although the staff auditor's disposition criticized Lewis for billing the minimum .25 hour charge for each task (a criticism made by the hearing officer in the Fox case), this was not the basis of the executive committee's criticism of Lewis. Accordingly, our discussion of the provisions in the manual with reference to Fox, see note 10, infra, and accompanying text, does not apply to Lewis.
[Note 6] The report of the audit department noted: "Attorney Lewis does have a method of time keeping and did not intentionally overbill the Commonwealth. He was very diligent in providing information to us and cooperated completely." In reducing the number of hours billed, the department credited attorney Lewis with working fifty-one weeks of fiscal 1994 at forty-two hours per week for a total of 2,142 hours.
"(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
[Note 8] As in the case of Lewis, Fox was advised that the audit was not restricted to those dates. See note 3, supra.
[Note 9] The audit department in its recommendation found that Fox had billed 2,498 hours for 341 days, and was paid $86,876.25 for services in fiscal year 1994. Its recommendation was to reduce the number of hours per weekday to a maximum of eight hours for 239 days, i.e., credit for 1,912 hours, and two hours per weekend for the 51 weekends, i.e., 102 hours, for a total of 2,014 hours. The number of hours overbilled found by the audit department was 484 hours which, multiplied by the CPCS hourly rate of $35, amounted to $16,940.
Attorneys are required to bill in quarter-hour increments. This means rounding off the amount of time actually spent to the nearest quarter hour. You may not automatically round up to the next quarter hour.
"1. If you spend 10 minutes on a case, you may bill .25 hours. If you spend 20 minutes on a case, you may still bill only .25 hours.
"2. If you spend 5 minutes investigating a case, and 5 minutes interviewing a client, you may bill .25 hours for either client interview or for investigation, but not both.
"Your bills should reflect the total actual time you spent on your cases each day. You may find you cannot bill for every single item of work you performed, since the quarter-hour increments would improperly inflate your billable hours.
"Attorneys are expected to maintain case files containing, among other things, contemporaneous time records for each of their cases, separate from their bills. These records should include a daily log or diary which records how much time the attorney spent working that day, where the attorney was, what clients s/he represented, and what services s/he performed.
"Attorneys should cross-reference their cases, so that on any given day, their bills for several clients will total the actual amount of time they spent working on cases that day."
[Note 11] Indeed, at oral argument, the panel indicated that the provisions were confusing.
"Does Mr. Fox understand that he must . . . bill for only that time that the] actually spend(s] in any one day working on cases?"
Counsel: "Correct. And that's what he has done."
Hearing examiner: "And is he saying, therefore, that when he billed .25 hours for . . . the 10 days that he provided the billing information to the committee on. Does he say that since 96% of the phone calls were billed at .25, is he saying that those were actually 15 minute phone calls?"
example, on April 27, 1989, Mi. Fox billed 24.75 hours spread over 48 different clients, for an average time charge of approximately one-half hour per client. This example is representative of the types of time charges that appear throughout this report."
At the 1996 hearing, counsel explained that the figure of 24.75 hours was in error because "Mr. Fox had billed a case on a day at 1.25 hours and it had been clerically logged into a database as 12.5 hours."
Thus, although counsel corrected the figure, Fox did not contest, and does not contest on appeal, that the prior audit involved the issue of computing time in standard increments.

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