Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/99-3012/99-3012a-2011-03-24.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:12:20+00:00

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 2000 › USA v. Mathis, Eddie J.
claiming that the government's evidence at trial proved multi- ple conspiracies and that the variance between the single conspiracy charge on which they were indicted and the evi- dence against them substantially prejudiced them. Addition- ally, Walter Mathis claims that the district court erroneously admitted other crimes evidence at trial and committed two sentencing errors. Appellants Eddie Mathis and Lee also challenge the district court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) in sentencing them. Fi- nally, Lee claims that the district court erroneously admitted his handgun and certain legal documents into evidence. We conclude that while the government's conspiracy evidence varied from the conspiracy charged, the variance did not substantially prejudice the appellants. We affirm the district court in all other respects except for its application of section 4A1.1(d) of the Guidelines in sentencing Walter Mathis. Ac- cordingly, we affirm all three appellants' convictions and Eddie Mathis's and Lee's sentences but vacate Walter Math- is's sentence and remand to the district court to resentence him in accordance with this opinion.
duced Eddie Mathis to Castro's initial courier, Elias Rodri- guez, to whom Eddie Mathis expressed an interest "in dealing with heroin." Trial Tr. 5/6/98 (a.m.) at 56. Andrews and Eddie Mathis pooled their money to buy enough cocaine and heroin from Castro (through Rodriguez) to make it "worth it for [Rodriguez] to come" to the District. Trial Tr. 5/6/98 (p.m.) at 12. Castro's new courier, Vladimir Perez, at first delivered the drugs to Andrews's house and also delivered cocaine and heroin to Harold Corbett, another drug dealer operating in the District. Soon Eddie Mathis himself ordered heroin from Castro.
On March 8, 1997 DEA agents, acting undercover, ordered 250 grams of heroin from Andrews. After Perez delivered the heroin, the police arrested both Andrews and Perez. They pleaded guilty and Perez identified Castro, Rodriguez and Eddie Mathis as coconspirators. On July 9, 1997 DEA agents arrested Castro as he was preparing to sell Eddie Mathis 300 grams of heroin. Castro pleaded guilty to drug trafficking charges and cooperated with the DEA by making several monitored telephone calls to Eddie Mathis to arrange a drug deal. Castro arranged a heroin sale to Eddie Mathis. Eddie Mathis dispatched Lee to purchase the heroin and a DEA agent arrested Lee on August 20, 1997. DEA agents were unable to arrest Eddie Mathis before he went into hiding but they subsequently filed a complaint against him and obtained a warrant for his arrest.
and Dee Smith at the Landover Mall. Walter Mathis then dispatched Smith, who drove a gold and tan Geo vehicle, to pick up Eddie Mathis. Eddie Mathis arrived at the Mall fifteen minutes later. Smith then left the Mall in his Geo. Bates showed Eddie Mathis the cocaine, who replied "Okay," and DEA agents then arrested both Eddie and Walter Math- is. Trial Tr. 5/12/98 at 148. Less than an hour later DEA agents spotted Smith's gold and tan Geo parked in front of the Glenarden Apartments adjacent to the Landover Mall. Inside an apartment the officers found and searched Smith, recovering a semiautomatic handgun magazine. In the glove compartment of the Geo the officers recovered Smith's loaded semiautomatic handgun. A search of Smith's apartment un- covered copies of court documents related to Lee which Lee had mailed to a Maryland post office box and letters from Kelton to Smith regarding Lee's court proceedings.
The government secured a six-count indictment against Eddie Mathis, Walter Mathis, Lee and Rodriguez, charging each of them with one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846. Additionally, Eddie Mathis was charged individually with two counts of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(i); he and Lee were jointly charged with one count of possession of heroin with intent to distrib- ute in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(i). Eddie Mathis was also charged with one count of conspiracy to launder money in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(ii). On May 22, 1998 a jury found Eddie and Walter Mathis and Lee guilty of conspiracy.1 After the district court sentenced the appellants, they filed their timely appeals.
__________ 1 Eddie Mathis was convicted on two counts and Lee on one count of possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(i). Eddie Mathis was also convicted of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The jury acquitted him on the two remaining counts against him and also acquitted Rodriguez of conspiracy.
The indictment charged Eddie and Walter Mathis and Lee with participating in a single conspiracy to possess and dis- tribute cocaine and heroin from "at least in or about May 1996 to on or about November 5, 1997." Indictment at 1. The appellants concede that the evidence establishes a con- spiracy among themselves, Castro, Rodriguez, Perez and Matthews (the Mathis-Castro conspiracy) but contend it end- ed with Lee's arrest on August 20, 1997,2 after which date all participants except Eddie and Walter Mathis were under arrest. They contend that evidence of the transaction culmi- nating in the November 5 reverse sting involving Coley and the Mathises constituted a separate conspiracy (the Mathis- Coley conspiracy) which materially varied from the conspira- cy on which they were indicted. In addition, Eddie Mathis contends that evidence of Castro's drug deliveries to Andrews involved a separate conspiracy (the Andrews-Castro conspira- cy) from the Mathis-Castro conspiracy.
__________ 2 All dates occurred in 1997 unless otherwise noted.
participants in the allegedly separate conspiracies." Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1533 (citation omitted). The participants shared a common goal to distribute drugs for profit in the District. Furthermore, Eddie and Walter Mathis's involvement with participants Castro, Andrews and Coley established cocon- spirator overlap. See id. at 1533 (overlap satisfied when main conspirator works with all participants); United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (overlap satisfied when "main figures" are involved in all alleged schemes).
__________ 3 The "hub" is "the focal, key or central member[s] of a wheel conspiracy." United States v. Flood, 965 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1992).
4 The "spokes" are the hub's "associates" who are involved in individual transactions and "know that they are working for the hub." United States v. Payne, 99 F.3d 1273, 1279 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996).
5 The government does not dispute that interdependence must exist between the spoke suppliers and the hub conspiracy. See Appellee's Br. 24.
a rim and constitute a single conspiracy. In United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the government established the operation of the "Newton Street Crew," a cocaine trafficking organization consisting of three different "cliques" or groups of people selling drugs together. The three defendants charged with conspiracy were members of the same clique but the government used evidence of the entire drug operation, including all three cliques, to establish the conspiracy. The court analyzed the connections among the three drug cliques in concluding that the evidence "was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that ... the cliques were dependent on each other." Graham, 83 F.3d at 1472; see also United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd in part en banc, 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (core hub conspiracy with various unrelated suppli- ers "likely ... varied from the indictment's conspiracy count") (citing United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1395-1402 (7th Cir. 1991) (conspiracy requires interdependen- cy among competing suppliers)). Although "fairly minimal" evidence may establish interdependency, Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1522, some connection among competing spoke suppliers in a hub conspiracy must exist in order to constitute one conspira- cy. With the foregoing in mind, we must determine whether spoke suppliers Andrews, Castro and Coley were interdepen- dent.
The evidence supports Andrews's involvement not solely with Eddie Mathis but also with Castro. Andrews introduced Eddie Mathis to Castro and DEA surveillance of Andrews uncovered Eddie Mathis's subsequent connection with Castro. Furthermore, according to Castro, Eddie Mathis relied on Andrews as an initial critical link to order heroin from Castro. Finally, Castro delivered drugs to both Andrews and Eddie Mathis at Andrews's house. This evidence is more than sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Andrews had the requisite connection to competing supplier Castro and thus participated in the Mathis-Castro conspiracy. See Gra- ham, 83 F.3d at 1471 (finding interdependency among cliques that purchased and distributed drugs together).
The evidence does not, however, manifest a connection between Coley and either Castro or Andrews. The govern- ment does not point us to evidence of such a connection, apparently assuming that interdependency among suppliers is not required. With no connection between Coley and either Castro or Andrews, however, we conclude that the Mathis brothers' transaction with Coley constituted a separate con- spiracy, the Mathis-Coley conspiracy. Accordingly, the gov- ernment's evidence regarding Coley and the November 5 reverse sting varied from the Mathis-Castro conspiracy charged in the indictment.
__________ 6 Eddie Mathis also argues that evidence of Castro's drug sales to another dealer, Corbett, established a separate conspiracy. Corbett obtained drugs initially from Andrews and later from Castro, see Trial Tr. 5/5/98 (a.m.) at 37, thus showing interdependency among the Mathis-Castro conspiracy participants. See Graham, 83 F.3d at 1472. There is no evidence, however, linking Corbett (as a spoke or otherwise) in the Mathis-Castro hub conspiracy including Eddie and Walter Mathis and Lee. Assuming without deciding that Corbett's involvement with Andrews and Castro indicates a sepa- rate conspiracy, we conclude that the evidence of that conspiracy was not substantially prejudicial to Eddie Mathis. See Anderson, 39 F.3d at 348.
7 Walter Mathis contends for the first time on appeal that, because of the variance, the government's indictment joined two conspiracies and was therefore duplicative. This argument is waived, however, because defenses based on " 'defects in the indict- ment' ... are waived under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 12(f) if not raised prior to trial." United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)).
__________ of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 11 We note that "the principles governing what is commonly referred to as other crimes evidence are the same whether the conduct occurs before or after the offense charged." United States v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Coley conspiracy did not substantially prejudice Walter Math- is. In light of the government's recognized latitude in using other crimes evidence in a conspiracy prosecution and the probative value of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy to show in- tent, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the Mathis-Coley conspir- acy.
Walter Mathis also raises two challenges under the Guide- lines. First, he claims that the district court erroneously failed to apply section 3B1.2(b) which provides a two-level reduction for a "minor participant," defined as "any partici- pant who is less culpable than most other participants." U.S.S.G. s 3B1.2, Application Note 3. A minor participant's relevant conduct must involve more than one participant and " 'culpability for such conduct [must be] relatively minor compared to that of the other participant(s).' " United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Walter Mathis contends that his role in the Mathis- Castro conspiracy was similar to Lee's (who did receive the minor participant reduction) and therefore the district court erroneously found that his was not a "relatively minor" role compared to the other participants' roles. Because "[t]he application of section 3B1.2 is inherently fact-bound" it is "largely committed to the discretion of the trial judge." Caballero, 936 F.2d at 1299. Ultimately, we uphold the district court's findings of fact unless "clearly erroneous." United States v. Bridges, 175 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
the offense of conviction, the district court may nonetheless consider it at sentencing as relevant conduct. See United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994)). The district court correctly considered Walter Mathis's relevant conduct in the November 5 reverse sting and, accordingly, it did not clearly err in failing to apply section 3B1.2(b)'s minor participant reduction to him notwithstanding its treatment of Lee to the contrary.
Finally, Walter Mathis contends that the district court erroneously applied section 4A1.1(d)'s two-point increase to his offense level because the government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was on parole at the time of his offense.12 In view of the government's conces- sion,13 we conclude that the district court clearly erred in this factual determination and we remand for resentencing be- cause of the incorrect addition of a two-level adjustment under section 4A1.1(d). See Drew, 200 F.3d at 874.
__________ 12 Section 4A1.1(d) provides a two point increase "if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including ... parole."
13 "[W]e concede that the record does not show by a preponder- ance that appellant committed the offense while on parole." Appel- lee's Br. 48.
ed handgun in the glove compartment of the Geo he had driven from the crime scene. Furthermore, it was foresee- able to Eddie Mathis that his coconspirator Smith would be carrying a firearm in view of the fact that Eddie and Walter Mathis were purchasing five kilograms of cocaine for $75,000 from a stranger. See Childress, 58 F.3d at 725 (coconspira- tor's possession of handgun reasonably foreseeable when conspirators "handled a substantial quantity of drugs and money"). Because the district court's finding that Smith possessed the firearm at the shopping mall where the reverse sting took place, see Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 37-38, is sup- ported by a preponderance of the evidence and because Smith's possession was reasonably foreseeable, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying section 2D1.1(b)(2)'s two-level increase to Eddie Mathis's sentence calculation.
__________ 14 In passing, Lee asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued during closing that the goal of the conspiracy was "selling drugs for profit in the District of Columbia." Trial Tr. 5/19/98 at 3. We need not address this " 'asserted but unanalyzed' argument." SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
rulings apply different standards. The court admitted Lee's handgun at trial under the "relevant evidence" standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See supra n.8. "Relevant evidence" need only tend to make the existence of a fact "of consequence" more or less probable. The standard applica- ble to the court's ruling at sentencing, however, is preponder- ance of the evidence, that is, "evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.... '[P]reponderance' means something more than 'weight'; it denotes a superiority of weight, or outweighing." United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1255 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted). Lee's possession of the handgun, although not directly fur- thering the Mathis-Castro conspiracy, may have nonetheless constituted relevant evidence. See In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (guns are common "tools of the trade" for drug dealers) (quotation omitted). In United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court held that the defendant's gun seized at the time and place of a drug transaction was admissible as drug paraphernalia. See Payne, 805 F.2d at 1066 n.5. Although Lee's gun was not found at the time drugs were bought or sold, it was found during the existence of the Mathis-Castro conspiracy. In addition, the government did not mention Lee's handgun in closing, thus mitigating any negative effect. Furthermore, the government introduced a videotape of Lee selling drugs as part of the Mathis-Castro conspiracy. In view of this uncontroverted evidence of Lee's involvement in the conspira- cy, we conclude that the district court's admission of Lee's handgun, if error, was nevertheless harmless. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993) (non-prejudicial harmless error not grounds for reversal).
after his (Lee's) arrest. Trial Tr. 5/13/98 (p.m.) at 14. Al- though at sentencing the court found that Lee's participation "ended with his arrest on August 20, 1997," Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 72, it did not abuse its discretion in admitting these documents at trial because they were relevant to show Lee's continued connection with Eddie Mathis. Even if the court did err in admitting the redacted documents, the documents contained no substantially prejudicial information and there- fore any error was harmless.
__________ 15 Section 5C1.2 provides that if five criteria set out in 18 U.S.C. s 3553(f)(1)-(5) are met, "[i]n the case of an offense under 21 U.S.C. s 841, ... [or] s 846 ..., the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence."
claims that a proffer would have been futile because the government stated at sentencing that "at this point, post trial, it certainly wouldn't be a productive debriefing." Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 68. Nevertheless, Lee cannot avoid his affirma- tive disclosure obligation merely because the government suggests a debriefing would be unproductive. See United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[D]e- fendants seeking to avail themselves of downward departures under s 3553(f) bear the burden of affirmatively acting."). Because Lee failed to proffer information of any kind to the government, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by not applying section 5C1.2.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of Eddie Mathis, Walter Mathis and Maurice Lee. In addition we affirm the sentences imposed on Eddie Mathis and Mau- rice Lee but remand to the district court to resentence Walter Mathis in accordance with this opinion.

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