Source: http://www.voiceforthedefenseonline.com/story/march-2016-sdr-voice-defense-vol-45-no-2
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:26:31+00:00

Document:
The judge in D’s murder trial did not violate U.S. Const. amend. VI by dismissing a juror who provided equivocal answers when asked if he could impose the death penalty if D was convicted. White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456 (2015).
District court did not err in treating illegal-reentry D’s prior Texas conviction for possession of 4 to 200 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute as a crime of violence under USSG § 2L1.2 and an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B). United States v. Teran-Salas, 767 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 2014).
On the face of the Texas delivery statute, the offense of delivery could theoretically be committed in a way that did not qualify under USSG § 2L1.2 or § 1101(a)(43)(B), namely, by “administering” a controlled substance. However, the Fifth Circuit held that D had not shown a reasonable probability that Texas would prosecute under such a non-qualifying theory; under Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), this failure precluded a finding that D’s prior Texas conviction was non-qualifying.
Where death-sentenced Texas D filed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) relief from a judgment denying federal habeas relief, the motion was properly treated as a successive habeas petition because the claims it made—relating to evidence previously undiscovered because of ineffective assistance of counsel—were fundamentally substantive, not procedural as required under Rule 60(b). In re Coleman, 768 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2014).
D was not entitled to relief on the successive petition because the claim was previously raised and rejected and, in any event, did not meet the standard for a successive petition. For these reasons, D was also not entitled to a stay of execution.
The offense of theft by deception under Texas law is within the generic definition of “theft”; therefore, D’s Texas theft conviction was a “theft offense” and thus an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). United States v. Rodriguez-Salazar, 768 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2014).
In sentencing D for a hostage-taking conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a), district court did not err in applying a six-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2A4.1(b)(1) for a ransom demand. United States v. Fernandez, 770 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2014).
The ransom enhancement applies anytime a defendant demands money from a third party for release of a victim, re­gard­less of whether that money is already owed to the de­fen­dant. Thus, D’s belief that he and his co-conspirators were going to demand repayment of a debt was a sufficient ground to apply the ransom enhancement; it did not have to be foreseeable to D that the original scheme was going to morph into a classic kidnapping of another person with a demand for ransom.
Board of Immigration Appeals properly determined that D was ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) due to his 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) conviction because under the modified categorical approach, § 554(a) was divisible and constituted the aggravated felony of illicit trafficking in firearms under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C). Franco-Casasola v. Holder, 773 F.3d 33 (5th Cir. 2014) (on reh’g).
Under Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), the statute of immigrant’s prior conviction (18 U.S.C. § 554(a), prohibiting the export of “merchandise, article[s], or object[s] contrary to any law or regulation of the United States”) was a “divisible” statute; the statute sets out a finite, though lengthy, list of every U.S. statute or regulation that prohibits such export. Because the statute was “divisible,” it was permissible under Descamps to use the “modified categorical approach” to narrow the basis for immigrant’s prior conviction and, under that approach, determine that the conviction was for the unlawful purchase of firearms for export and thus an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C) (including “illicit trafficking in firearms” as an aggravated felony).
Where drug D’s first sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) lowered his offense level under USSG § 2D1.1 sufficiently to cause his sentence instead to be calculated under the “career offender” Guidelines (USSG §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2), D was not entitled to a sec­ond sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), notwithstanding a further reduction in the offense level under § 2D1.1. United States v. Banks, 770 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2014).
D’s new sentence was not imposed under § 2D1.1, but rather §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2, so the latest Guideline amendment to § 2D1.1 would not result in a lower Guideline range applicable to D.
Where D raised a meritorious sentencing issue for the first time in her untimely reply brief, the Fifth Circuit exercised its discretion to consider the brief and consider the issue, notwithstanding the usual rule that the Fifth Circuit will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. United States v. Myers, 772 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2014).
(2) In this false-claims/fraud/identity-theft/tax-fraud case, it was a plain violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause (applicable to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, as made clear in Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013)) to sentence D under the 2012 Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing because the 2007 Guidelines in effect on the date of the commission of the offense were significantly more lenient. Particularly, due to a more stringent definition of who constituted a “victim” of the offense, D would not have received a six-level enhancement for 250 or more “victims”; because this raised D’s Guideline range from 46 to 57 months, up to 87 to 108 months, D’s substantial rights were affected, and the Fifth Circuit exercised its discretion to remand for resentencing.
(3) The district court did not clearly err in applying to D a two-level “vulnerable victim” enhancement under USSG §3A1.1(b)(1). D knew she had gotten names and identities from a list of persons at a nursing home; D should have known that at least some people in nursing homes suffer from physical and mental disabilities that render them vulnerable.
D, stopped at the El Paso border crossing in a bus bound for Mexico, was properly prosecuted for being “found in” the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. United States v. Quezada Rojas, 770 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2014).
Although a line of cases holds that an alien is not “found in” the United States if he voluntarily presents himself to immigration authorities when seeking entry into the United States, that rule has not been extended to the case of an alien, like D, seeking to exit the country. Likewise, although some cases hold that an alien has not truly “entered” the United States if he was never free of “official restraint” from the time he crossed the border, the “official restraint” doctrine has been applied only to persons entering the country, not to persons leaving.
It was error to determine D was entitled to have an original plea agreement presented to a second judge af­ter a first judge was recused. Rodriguez v. State, 470 S.W.3d 823 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
D was charged with ten counts of sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. Based on the advice of his counsel, he declined the State’s plea bargain recommending a 10-year sentence and proceeded to trial. The jury found D guilty and assessed a punishment of 8 life sentences and one 20-year sen­tence. He filed a motion for new trial claiming ineffective as­sis­tance of counsel. The trial judge granted the motion for new trial and motion to require the State to reinstate the plea-bargain offer of 10 years. The State reinstated the plea offer, and D accepted. After admonishing D and accepting his stipulations of guilt, the trial judge rejected the plea agreement and advised D that he could withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial or accept a 25-year sentence. D rejected the 25-year sentence and moved to recuse the judge based on demonstrated prejudice. The judge voluntarily recused herself, and a new judge was assigned. D filed another motion to require the State to re-offer the 10-year deal. The new judge declared the slate was wiped clean by the original judge’s recusal but that she would accept a new agreement if one were reached. The State offered a deal of 25 years and D accepted, pleading guilty to 5 of the counts in exchange for waiver of the other 5 counts. The judge accepted and signed the judgments of conviction.
D appealed, claiming that he was entitled to a 10-year plea-bargain offer from the State, and that the trial court was required to accept the 10-year plea agreement. To determine whether D was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance, COA considered whether D would have accepted the original plea had he been given competent advice by counsel, whether the State was likely to withdraw the plea bargain, and whether the trial court was likely to accept the plea bargain. Concluding that D was prejudiced, COA determined that the proper remedy was to require the State to reoffer the 10-year plea bargain and to have the agreement presented to a judge who had not recused herself. COA disagreed with D that he was entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement and stated that the new judge had the discretion to accept or reject the agreement.
CCA reversed COA and reinstated the 25-year sentence. COA erred by finding the second judge was required to order the State to re-offer the 10-year plea a second time. The motion to recuse did not state any basis for prejudice on the part of the first judge, other than she had granted D’s motion for the State to re-offer a 10-year plea deal and then rejected that deal; the first judge’s comment that she was rejecting the deal because she had sat through the evidence was not a basis for finding prej­udice. Upon the voluntary recusal of the judge, however, the case started over from the beginning as if no plea negotiations had occurred.
Ds did not commit the crime of securing the execution of documents by deception by filing a false mechanic’s lien with a county clerk; Ds did not cause “another” to “execute” a document affecting property or pecuniary interests under Tex. Penal Code § 32.46(a)(1). Liverman v. State, 470 S.W.3d 831 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
Ds filed mechanic’s lien affidavits in the county clerk’s office, alleging they performed “labor and/or materials” worth a certain amount on a house. As a result of these filings, the State charged Ds with securing the execution of documents by deception. The indictments alleged that Ds caused the county clerk to sign or execute the affidavits. Ds were convicted, fined, and placed on community supervision. COA reversed, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient because “the conduct of the court clerk filing and recording” the mechanic’s lien af­fi­davit in each case “was not the signing or executing of a doc­u­ment as contemplated by subsection 32.46(a)(1).” In this conclusion, COA held it need look no further than the two sub­sections of § 32.46. COA observed that subsection (a)(1) used the verbs “sign and execute” while subsection (a)(2) used “file and record.” CCA affirmed COA.
CCA found, without a majority reason, that D was not entitled to habeas relief. Ex parte Marascio, 471 S.W.3d 832 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
CCA dismissed D’s habeas application because the final conviction D challenged was not the source of a later en­hancement; therefore, the later enhancement was not a collateral consequence of that conviction. Ex parte Cooke, 471 S.W.3d 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
D was placed on deferred adjudication for family-violence assault in this Tarrant County case, and he was later adjudicated, Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2) (2000, 2006), (b)(2)(A) (2014). He filed here for habeas relief, claiming that a prior New Mexico conviction was improperly used for enhancement. His sentence in this case had discharged; he claimed, though, that CCA could still reach his complaint because he was suffering a collateral consequence of his conviction—namely, the use of the Tarrant County offense to enhance a third offense, a family-violence assault in Hood County. CCA disagreed.
The evidence was sufficient to show D had the requisite intent when he impersonated an assistant district attorney; he told an actual assistant district attorney that he undertook certain acts as an assistant district attorney upon which he intended the actual assistant district at­torney to rely in deciding whether to grant his “personal favor” in a friend’s case. Cornwell v. State, 471 S.W.3d 458 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
D was convicted of impersonating a Dallas County assistant district attorney and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. COA affirmed, holding the evidence was sufficient to show D impersonated a public servant with the intent to in­duce another to rely on his pretended official acts. Tex. Pen. Code § 37.11(a)(1). D conceded that he impersonated a public ser­vant but argued that the evidence failed to establish he did so with the requisite specific intent. CCA affirmed.
“Section 37.11(a)(1) breaks down into two components, a culpable act component (actus reus) and a culpable mental state component (mens rea). It is essentially a nature-of-conduct offense with an accompanying specific intent. The State must prove both the conduct (impersonation) and the specific intent (to induce another to submit or rely). . . . We therefore focus on the second component of Section 37.11(a)(1), the culpable mental state and, specifically, the reliance theory: does the evidence show that Appellant had the specific ‘intent to induce another . . . to rely on his pretended official acts’? Does the phrase ‘pretended official act’ implicitly require a second actus reus beyond impersonation? Must an accused not only hold himself out falsely to be a public servant, but also ‘act as such,’ before it may be said that he intended to induce another to rely on that false impersonation?
CCA upheld dismissing the charge against D for violating Texas’ flag desecration statute; the statute was overbroad and covered expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. State v. Johnson, 475 S.W.3d 860 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
Based on constitutionality, the trial court dismissed the information charging D with violating Texas’ flag desecration statute, Tex. Penal Code § 42.11, arising out of D’s jumping from a sidewalk for a hanging flag, causing the flag to come off in his hand, and throwing it in the street. COA affirmed, find­ing § 42.11 was unconstitutional on its face because it was overbroad in violation of U.S. Const. amend. I.
Trial court erred by denying D’s request for an in­struc­tion on sudden passion where D testified he was scream­ing in panic before his accomplice stabbed the victim; D was awakened by the victim sexually assaulting him; the sexual assault, the stabbing, and D’s grabbing of the victim all occurred in a very brief timespan; and the jury could have deduced that the victim’s assault of D and D’s sudden reaction triggered a chain reaction that resulted in the victim’s death. Beltran v. State, 472 S.W.3d 283 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
D was convicted of murder and sentenced to 70 years’ imprisonment. In a single issue on direct appeal, D asserted the trial court erred in denying his request for an instruction on sudden passion during the penalty phase under Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(d). COA affirmed and held that the court did not err in refusing the instruction because there was no evidence that D caused the victim’s death under the immediate influence of sudden passion. CCA reversed COA and remanded for an Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) harm analysis.
“In order to have raised sudden passion, the defense would have had to put on some evidence: (1) that [D] acted under the immediate influence of terror, anger, rage, or resentment; (2) that [D]’s sudden passion was induced by some provocation by McKnight, and that such provocation would commonly produce such passion in a person of ordinary temper; (3) that [D] committed the murder (in this case, as a party) before regaining his capacity for cool reflection; and (4) that there was a causal connection between McKnight’s provocation, [D]’s passion, and the homicide. We conclude that the appellate court failed to consider the evidence raising the issue of sudden passion and erroneously focused on the evidence tending to show that [D] did not act under the immediate influence of sudden passion.” Furthermore, the law of the parties did not apply at the punishment phase of trial, and therefore the conduct of the primary actor was not relevant to whether D was entitled to a sudden passion instruction.
D’s statements asserting a blood draw was conducted without a warrant were not enough to apprise the trial court that it must consider whether there were exigent circumstances to permit the warrantless search; D failed to preserve error with respect to his Fourth Amendment complaint for purposes of Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Douds v. State, 472 S.W.3d 670 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
“Are isolated statements globally asserting that a blood draw was conducted without a warrant enough to apprise the trial court that it must consider whether there were exigent circumstances to permit a warrantless search in a driving while intoxicated case, when the context of the entire record in a motion to suppress refers to a different complaint? We conclude that the answer to this question is ‘no.’ Because this record shows [D] failed to preserve his complaint that the search was conducted in the absence of exigent circumstances or some other valid exception to the warrant requirement, we sustain the State’s first ground in its petition for discretionary review that contends that the court of appeals erred by reversing his conviction for misdemeanor DWI. . . . We accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment af­firm­ing appellant’s conviction.” D’s arguments presented a challenge to the admissibility of the blood evidence only on the basis of the officer’s application of the mandatory-blood-draw statute, Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b). Nothing about D’s arguments indicated that he was further challenging the constitutionality of the search based on the fact that it had been conducted without a warrant.

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