Source: https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/23/mayo-v-prometheus-lawless-decision-wreaking-havoc-patents/id=77438/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:01:59+00:00

Document:
Recently, someone who took the patent bar review course I teach asked whether my views on the Supreme Court decision in Mayo v. Prometheus had changed, or moderated. Yes, my views on Mayo have changed, perhaps significantly in some ways, but they certainly have not moderated. As we approach the fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision this is what I know — Mayo v. Prometheus is a lawless decision by a Court that has become too powerful, and it continues to wreak havoc on the patent system and innovators. The net effect of the decision has resulted in patent protection being easier to obtain for cutting edge software, biotech, genetic and medical innovations in Europe, Canada, Australia and even China.
Mayo v. Prometheus is at the root of all of the problems facing the industry relative to patent eligibility, and if I could repeal only one Supreme Court decision in the patent space it would be Mayo. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo is probably the worst, most wrongly decided case by the Supreme Court in the patent field ever. I say “probably” only because there are so many contenders to choose from that picking only one is truly difficult. Only the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange comes at all close to Mayo in terms of damage to the patent system. Only the Supreme Court’s decision in Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics comes close to Mayo in terms of intellectual dishonesty.
In eBay the Supreme Court ruled that there is no presumptive right to a permanent injunction when a victorious patent owner prevails in litigation after having proved the defendant infringed valid patent claims. The Supreme Court ignored the factual reality that a patent itself is an exclusive right, and further ignored the truth that a victorious patent owner is worse off having won because prior to complete victory the patent owner had the right to exclude. Furthermore, the Supreme Court seemed totally unfamiliar with what a permanent injunction is and does; all a permanent injunction does is allow the district court to retain jurisdiction to make sure that infringement stops moving forward. Infringement stopping moving forward is already supposed to stop based on the exclusive nature of the original patent grant, so functionally all a permanent injunction does is obviate the need to file a brand new patent infringement lawsuit against a recalcitrant, repeat infringer.
In Myriad the Supreme Court properly ruled that the claims in question covered subject matter that did not exist in nature. Notwithstanding that scientific truth, which the Supreme Court did get correct, the Supreme Court still ruled that the claims were patent ineligible under the law of nature doctrine. Thus, the holding in Myriad is that a claim can be considered patent ineligible under the judicially created law of nature doctrine despite the claim not covering a law of nature. If you read the decision that is what the ruled, although it does admittedly sound as if it is a fake news report.
Despite these very serious errors in both eBay and Myriad, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo is far worse. It is a lawless decision that intentionally ignored the statute, which means in the patent space the Supreme Court is not at all a co-equal branch of government. The Supreme Court is the omnipotent branch of government, doing whatever they want regardless of the explicit terms of the statute and despite their own precedent.
The statute the Supreme Court was interpreting in Mayo v. Prometheus is very simple, and is all of one sentence long. 35 U.S.C. 101 says you have a patent eligible invention if what is claimed is a machine, a method, an article of manufacture or a composition of matter. The claims at issue in Mayo clearly and unambiguously satisfy this very low threshold. The were still, nevertheless, declared patent ineligible under the statute, which is possible because of the judicially created exceptions to the statute the Supreme Court has made up over the years.
There is no support anywhere in the law for judicial exceptions to patent eligible subject matter. The Supreme Court created them out of whole cloth without any authority. They exist though, and we have to live with them since Congress has long since acquiesced to this unsupported power grab by the Supreme Court.
The real mischief of Mayo v. Prometheus is found in the fact that the Supreme Court intentionally choose not to apply 35 U.S.C. 102 (novelty), 35 U.S.C. 103 (obviousness) and 35 U.S.C. 112 (description) to evaluate the claims. The Solicitor General of the United States specifically argued that the Supreme Court should look to those other sections of the statute as the Court itself commanded be done in Diamond v. Diehr, for example.
In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim, because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made. The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.
It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101. Presumably, this argument results from the language in § 101 referring to any “new and useful” process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Specific conditions for patentability follow, and § 102 covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty.
Therefore, one of the clear holdings coming from Diehr is that it is inappropriate to dissect claims into old and new elements. That, however, is exactly what Mayo v. Prometheus commands. Indeed, in Mayo v. Prometheus the Supreme Court found that the claims at issue were not directed to laws of nature because there were well-understood, routine, conventional activity added to the natural laws being claimed and, therefore, the claims were patent ineligible. In other words, the Supreme Court did in Mayo what their own precedent forbade, which was to dissect the claims into old and new elements when making a patent eligibility decision under 101.
That Mayo overruled previous Supreme Court decisions cannot be seriously debated; it did. Novelty and obviousness are considered under a 101 patent eligibility analysis as directed by Mayo, but oddly without the application of any prior art or the benefit of a claim interpretation. This means that thanks to Mayo, the Supreme Court ignored the statute and their precedent warning against turning patentability into a one-question inquiry. Unfortunately, for many inventions, indeed the most commercially valuable inventions in today’s economy, we now have a one-part test for patentability.
Today, thanks to Mayo, decision makers consider whether claims are new, nonobvious and even properly described all under a 101 patent eligibility analysis, which allows decisions to be made without information or thoughtful consideration. It allows claims to be deemed conventional and, therefore, patent ineligible without apply a single piece of prior art or considering priority dates or availability of references or when teachings were made public. The novelty and nonobvious considerations under 101 are done without even a claim interpretation, which means the specification is not considered critically to see if the claim terms are defined and technical concepts explained. It also means the prosecution history, which black letter law tells us is equally as important as the claims and specification, is not considered.
How can you know what the claims are directed to without a proper claim interpretation? If “directed to” means anything other than “what does the preamble explicitly say,” you cannot possibly know under the Alice-Mayo framework because there is no consideration of the specification or prosecution history, both of which are essential for any claim interpretation. If “direct to” is determined by the preamble, which for 101 purposes it really ought to be, then almost all claims would pass the threshold, which is exactly what 101 was intended to do. 35 U.S.C. 101 was only ever intended to weed out the most glaringly offensive and unpatentable claims. This is true because if a claim is declared patent ineligible under 101 the decision maker is saying that they do not care how revolutionary the innovation is, how novel, how nonobvious, and how expertly described, no patent will issue ever. Aggressive use of 101 was never contemplated as being appropriate because it cuts off hope for nascent innovation from the very start because most 101 patent eligibility concerns only ever present for truly new, truly groundbreaking classes of innovation.
As the Supreme Court repeatedly ruled prior to Mayo v. Prometheus, the statute should be allowed to do the work for which each section was designed.
On the flip side: So should we now argue that a patent found to be eligible is – based on that finding alone – also novel and nonobvious?
Logically that would make since given that in order to pass the 101 threshold claims must contain something that is unconventional and not found in the prior art. Sadly, I think patent owners and innovators get stuck with the short end of the stick. An untethered novelty and obviousness inquiry is made as part of 101, which does not rely on or even apply prior art. If and only if the decision maker thinks the single representative patent claim that is chosen as a proxy for all claims is subjectively novel and nonobvious in their opinion do you get the honor of being rejected under 102, 103 and 112, this time with no deference given to the fact that the claim was already determined to define a unique invention.
Does it make sense to focus on this one case, Prometheus and by that ploy lose sight of the bigger mind-bend picture?
Let’s step back. The phrase, “patent eligible” did not exist in the vernacular just a few years ago. Either you had statutory subject matter pursuant to 101 or you didn’t.
Somewhere in the tumultuous river of misdirections thrown at the SCOTeti by them who claim to be friends of the court and who don’t like American inventors too much, the phrase, “patent eligible” sprung forth out of the abyss.
The SCOTeti who don’t know much about patent speak or the difference between obviousness, anticipation and subject matter took it to mean what any lay person would assume: Is this invention significant enough to deserve (to be “eligible” for) a patent? And hence we arrived at the currently enlightened era of witch drowning tests. Does she float as do wood and witches or does she weigh “significantly more” such that she drowns and springs forth to heaven all the quicker? Spin the “directed” to shard on a sting and let it decide. Who among you dares to question the wise and mighty Oz?
Even worse than the act of what they did are the plainly inconceivable lies about what they did.
Mayo professes to have not changed the case most on point (Diehr) in the least.
The degree of intellectual DIShonesty required to attempt to pretend that the jurisprudence of the High Court does not implode of its own weight is staggering.
A lot of bad decisions indeed. Worse, however, is the incompetency of the Federal Circuit, which apparently cannot competently follow the construing claims as a whole rule.
Electric Power Group v. Alstom, for example, the CAFC ignores limitations in Part 1 of the Alice/Mayo test to come to an erroneous outcome inconsistent with what the claims actually disclose using an analysis inconsistent with McRO v. Bandai. The kicker is that Judge Taranto participated in both decisions.
Yes, and this is inconsistent with Bandai, which expressly states that ALL limitations must be construed under both Part 1 and Part 2. To give this rule meaning (substance over form), dependent claims must be separately construed.
Pre-emptively include at the time of an original filing, three Declarations by persons of ordinary skill in the art who are also seasoned patent attorneys, detailing why the claimed invention is patent eligible. Failing that, sue the Supreme Court at the International Level, include an appropriately-worded amicus brief signed by every patent practitioner. Who wouldn’t sign ?
So what does relevant source documentation of the Founding Fathers say, as to what to do about a runaway judiciary? Some of the Founders deplored Marbury v. Madison; but to look to today’s legislature for the ‘check’ of its ‘balancing’ force, is to see such “stalwarts” as Sens. Goodlatte, Leahy and Schumer still strongly ensconced in the same positions of power from which the Anti-Inventor Act was promulgated. Are we witnessing the operations of a fatal flaw in the otherwise, oft-praised Founders’ design?
Gene, a few points on eBay.
According to Roberts concurrence, continuing infringement automatically satisfies the first two prongs of the four prong test.
The problem comes in when trying to prove the third prong. Infringers typically argued that if the patent owners in NPE, the balance of hardships almost always favor them.
I have argued and recent scholarship supports the notion that the patent owner is substantially damaged in the first place by having to bring suit to collect a reasonable royalty that everybody else pays. Thus, the balance of hardships has to be viewed from the point of before the patent owner file and should be directed to making the patent owner completely whole so that the threat of an injunction itself should be a deterrent against forcing the patent owner to sue to collect what he is otherwise owed.
We agree. In fact, so many recent SCOTUS and other legal decisions since eBay affecting patent law are so unsound that we believe the only practical course, in part, is for Congress to change patent law to comply with the original plan of America’s founders. All these changes have done is to legalize theft of our inventions. As the founders taught us in the Constitution: if an invention is useful or advances the sciences, it is patentable. We believe that is the most efficient way to undo all the mayhem caused by so many ghastly unsound decisions of the courts. If they can’t follow that simple directive, then the problems with our courts extend beyond patent law and suggest far deeper resurfacing is needed, such as changing our manner in selecting judges or even including impeachment or recall. Thereafter, if occasionally judges still cant get it right our juries should have the good sense to steer the course to clear sailing. Hopefully, jurors will maintain their historical independence from judges and assert their prerogative when needed to best serve justice. Independent juries are one of our best safeguards to protect our property and other rights.
What makes matters worse, these fundamentally flawed legal doctrines and resulting bad law have affected all patent law throughout the patent system including the Patent Office (PTO) which is now ran by a regime infected by large multinational infringers who are all too ready to apply new law in the most disadvantageous way possible to deny us our patents. This new judicially created law has thereby affected our ability to both obtain and keep our patents. When inventors and small entities have to fight to get and keep our patents we go out of business.Meanwhile, our large multinational competitors are free to rob and crush us as they ship more and more American jobs to China and elsewhere. When they cant export jobs, they import workers. This in great measure explains why America can’t find a good paying full time job.
Further, we believe the best course forward includes replacing the present PTO director who we believe opposes property rights and is a pawn for large multinational infringers, allowing Chinese and foreign nationals to steal America’s inventions. How can America effectively compete against China and other low wage countries while protecting our jobs if we don’t protect our property which is the foundation of those American jobs? We have seen no indication that this PTO regime is ready to change its stripes so we expect more of the same. Until we see a complete reversal in PTO policy, we will continue to call for a complete house cleaning of all top PTO management. That swamp must be drained! We have prepared a list of candidates for PTO director we believe inventors will support and are advancing these candidates in Congress and with the Trump administration.
Gene, “new” is also a requirement of 101 and it is independent of whether the subject matter was previously known or used generally. What the Supreme Court held in Mayo was that invention required an act of creating something new. Just as one cannot “discover” the invention of another an get a valid patent on it regardless that that invention was not previously known to the public, the discoverer of a product of nature cannot patent it. In contrast, if the inventor creates a new composition, albeit a composition that exists in nature but unknown, he is entitled to a patent on the composition.
Ultimately, in Mayo, the Supreme Court held that the discovery of human genes does not entitle the discoverer to claim the composition, and the claims to isolated DNA in that case effectively claimed the human gene itself, albeit that the structure of an isolated string of DNA is chemically different from that naturally occurring.
Gene, finally, Mayo is nothing new. Even back in O’Reilly v. Morse, the court discussed the English case of Nielsen where the discovery that injecting hot air into a smelting furnace increased its efficiency. The court ruled in Nielsen that while one could not claim the discovery in the abstract, one could claim an inventive application, in that case heating air in a box prior to injecting the air into the furnace.
The problem in Mayo is that every process step claimed was known and in prior use. Thus there could not possibly be a patentable invention unless the law of nature was used to modify this pre-existing process, as was the case in Diehr. Because the claim ended without doing anything new with the information from the pre-existing process, the process being claimed effectively was the same process that was in widespread use already.
Respectfully, I assert that there was something new in the ordered combination of all claim limitations. In Mayo, the SCOTUS rejected the idea of using “post-solution activity that is purely conventional or obvious.” This violates the “claim as a whole” rule expressed in Alice and Diehr, as well as the rule about not separating old and new claim limitations in a 101 analysis. What was “obvious” about the particular steps in Mayo as a whole? Nothing! Those “conventional” steps were “conventional” and “obvious” ONLY after a discovery.
The bottom line: the problem in Alice/Mayo comes with how much you want to generalize what a claim is directed to in Part 1 of the test.
B, “post solution” activity that was completely conventional? What post solution activity was that? There was none at all claimed.
Every step in the claim, every one, from the administering of the drug to the conducting of a blood test to measure metabolites, was old and admittedly old.
Also, Flook and Diehr also condemned insubstantial post-solution activity. But there was no such activity in Mayo. After conducting the blood test and measuring the metabolites, what activity did the claim require?
It has been pointed out to you in the Act of 1952 what the meaning of new left in the newly created section of 101 meant.
You attempt to not recognize that actual Act of 1952 with your revisionist ‘version,’ and quite frankly, your actions are repugnant.
Your statement of “In contrast, if the inventor creates a new composition, albeit a composition that exists in nature but unknown, he is entitled to a patent on the composition.” is in error.
One may obtain a patent on the new process – but the doctrine of inherency prevents a patent on the composition.
Anon at 15 and 16, regardless of your contentions regarding the ’52 Act, I am just pointing out the basis for the holding of the Supreme Court in Myriad. The Supreme Court placed heavy emphasis on the requirement for newness in its holding that invention requires creating something new.
Regarding your contention that even if an inventor creates a new composition, he is not entitled to a patent if it is later discovered that the composition is a natural product, let us agree to disagree. The Supreme Court has only addressed cases where the inventor admits that they did not create anything new, but discovered the composition in question.
What’s this nonsense about “creating” something new.
If I find a new and nonobvious use for an old tool, the method is patentable.
And I haven’t “created” (whatever that means) a something new.
I thought only God “creates”. We humans tear things apart and recombine them.
Step, just read the case.
Also, “improved” is part of the statute.
Are you serious or delirious?
It is disingenuous to say “just reading the case” and ignoring the Statute as actually written by Congress.
As for “parts of the statute,” well, you are rather infamous for omitting or leaving discussions or both when it comes to actually discussing certain parts of the statute that you find inconvenient.
Step, from the case: “We have “long held that this provision  contains an important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Mayo, 566 U.S., at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 1293 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Rather, “`they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work'” that lie beyond the domain of patent protection. Id., at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 1293. As the Court has explained, without this exception, there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents would “tie up” the use of such tools and thereby “inhibit future innovation premised upon them.” Id., at ___, 132 S.Ct., at 1301. This would be at odds with the very point of patents, which exist to promote creation. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980) (Products of nature are not created, and “`manifestations… of nature [are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to none'”).
… We must apply this well-established standard to determine whether Myriad’s patents claim any “new and useful … composition of matter,” § 101, or instead claim naturally occurring phenomena.
“The Chakrabarty bacterium was new “with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature,” 447 U.S., at 310, 100 S.Ct. 2204, due to the additional plasmids and resultant “capacity for degrading oil.” Id., at 305, n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2204. In this case, by contrast, Myriad did not create anything. To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.
What the SCOTeti said there is a clear out lie.
They never had a “directed to” exception.
They never had a “something significantly more” exception.
They are liars and you are their water carry boy.
Also the SCOTeti have no substantial evidence to back up their BS about “fundamental” building blocks and the possible (“might tend to”) thwarting of “innovation”.
Everything they say is just pure nonsense pulled out from their behinds, which is where they stuffed the amicus briefs of their chosen “friends” of the court.
You treat them as if they were infallible gods.
However, they are naked emperors leading a parade of fools.
No substantial evidence is necessary, at least under APA 706. I know this first hand. Also, the “as a whole” requirement is purely optional according to the CAFC.
Step, I thought Myriad could go either way, especially after Lourie’s opinion. But the underlying law regarding law and products of nature has been with us for centuries. Myriad doubled-down on Chakrabarty and its predecessors to clarify that patents are awarded for the creation of something new, not for the discovery of something already existing. Thus, with laws of nature or products of nature, they must be applied in an inventive application.
Now, I do agree that the reasoning about “available for all mankind” is flaky. But we all have to recognize that simple discovery of something that exists (a product of nature, a law of nature, someone’s else invention (in the piracy sense), even if valuable, is not within 101 because it is not “new” or “improved” regardless that it generally unknown and therefor novel under 102.
There was nothing really new in Myriad in this regard.
Now, whether we should change this legislatively is a separate question. But it should benefit us all to understand the Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.
Your adulation of hte Supreme Court continues unabated Mr. Heller, nomatter how it is put to you.
So let me put it to you this way: what does your actual attorney oath state? Does that oath put the Supreme Court above the Constitution?
I ask this question asked of you several times previously (with never an answer from you ) in the hopes that you recognize WHY the question is important in the context of the current discussion.
Do you recognize your actions in NOT questioning the Supreme Court places them above the Constitution (and above the checks and balances that our founding fathers strove so diligently to put into place?
Do not let the Supreme Court take the throne of George III.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 101
 § 101
 § 101
 § 101
 § 102
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 101