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Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:42:16+00:00

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PDP- LABAN, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."1 History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously. The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government that contravenes its mandates. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
2005 entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005". (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1. the President issued E. Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Senga who. 2005." Senate President Drilon. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry. – In accordance with Article VI. Danga. Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. in Aid of Legislation. Pimentel Jr. Ermita a letter4 dated September 27. Lt. 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. Estrada delivered on July 26. 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger". pursuant to Section 6 thereof.. Mayuga. Hermogenes C. Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution. Jr. 464. Balutan. Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government. Francisco V. however. Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff." On September 28. delivered on June 6. Gudani. took effect immediately. for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28. Gen. 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. and (5) Senate Resolution No. 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Esperon. Quevedo. (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Col."7 which. 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World". Alexander F. Corps of Cadets of the PMA. Marlu Q. Cortes. 2005. Senate President Franklin M. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: SECTION 1. On September 28. in Aid of Legislation. "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers. wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week. by letter3 dated September 27. and For Other Purposes. on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. General Generoso S. and in the National Interest. 2005. . all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. requested for its postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters. Gen.The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations 2 dated September 22.O." Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28. on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal". 295 filed by Senator Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry. (4) Senate Resolution No. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured. Gen. and Assistant Commandant. 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L.
23 May 1995.R. G. and Such other officers as may be determined by the President. Presidential Commission on Good Government. .R.R. 9 July 2002). Presidential Commission on Good Government. No. 130716. 95367. G. G. 23 May 1995). Vasquez. Public Estates Authority. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. No. 23 May 1995. SECTION 3. 2. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege.R. No. (b) Who are covered.R. including: Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. 95367.The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs.When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing. 9 December 1998). the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. G. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. SECTION. No. Chavez v. No. 130716. diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order. No. Further.R. Chavez v. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either . 9 July 2002). 133250.R. Nature. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Republic Act No. Presidential Commission on Good Government. G. Vasquez G. Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. 9 December 1998). – (a) Nature and Scope. No. G. – The following are covered by this executive order: Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege. No.R. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. 95367. Public Estates Authority. 9 December 1998). Vasquez. 133250. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Military. 130716. G.
R.O. 464. be prohibited from imposing. citing E. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional. and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL). pray. Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E. Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong. pursuant to [E. 169659. Bases Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen.O. an organization of government employees. Perez.11 On October 3. Gen. allege that E. As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29. Neri. in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo. and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President. sent letter of regrets. Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. Brig. Gen. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Also on September 28. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations. adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through. 464." Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Gudani and Col. Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso. House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo. Crispin Beltran. no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005. then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez. et al. docketed as G. 464. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. Rafael Mariano. 464 infringes on its right as a political party entitled to participate in governance. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval.O. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon.R. with only Col.O. and 169667. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. in their petition that E. three petitions. No. 464. for certiorari and prohibition. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in .O. democracy and peace. Liza Maza. Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo V.O. informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo]. Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security. 2005.O. Executive Secretary Ermita. petitioners claim that E. 2005." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping. a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice. Nos. 169659.House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers. Senga. Satur Ocampo.O. Courage. all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed.O. In G. DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza. were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E. 2005. Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II.10 NorthRail President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E. that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita. 169660. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino. Balutan and Brig. Additionally. thru the Secretary of National Defense. petitioners party-list Bayan Muna. Bayan Muna alleges that E. Gen. in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles. Thus.
16 In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA). Senga replied. 2006 was cancelled.19 DOJ Secretary Raul M.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress. 464. 2005. Senga for him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10." As none of those invited appeared. Inc. Gen. it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. docketed as G. and their rights to information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.R. Chavez. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Courage alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on. petitioner Alternative Law Groups. are affected by the enforcement of E. Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen. In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13. by letter15 dated February 8. DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales. 464. the hearing on February 10. a right which was denied to the public by E. November 24 and December 12.12 (ALG).O. and threatened by. prays in his petition that E.O. 2005 but most of them failed to attend.R.O. Petitioner Senate of the Philippines. several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26. No. No. th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing" and that "they will attend once [their] request is approved by the President. During the . taxpayer and law practitioner. filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition. that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it. 464. filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition. 169660. petitioner Francisco I. Gonzalez20 and Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. No. 464.O.O. as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern. a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives. In G. On October 14.R. In G. and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury. On October 11. alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of E. Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen.the implementation of laws. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress. 169834. Gicana.17 and those from the Department of Budget and Management18 having invoked E. alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country. that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No.O. No. by letter14 dated February 6.O. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director Norlito R. docketed as G. 169777 and prays that E.13 prays.O. and CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law. PDP-Laban. 464. however.R. 2006. particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the government. Meanwhile. 169667. 464. alleging that it is affected by the challenged E. 464 be declared unconstitutional. 2006. 2006. 2005. DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes. Corpus21 communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E. Bunye. their submission to the requirements of E. 2005.O.
VI.O. 28.R. Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita. On February 13. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7. all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public interest. 734 Art. 16 36 . Sec. IV. III. Petitioners in G. docketed as G.O. Sec. 171246. Sec. 464 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. 2130 Art.O. 16966725 and G. 21. No. in G. Art.R. paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E. Sec. Sec. 1. 464 be declared null and void.R. and Art. Jose Anselmo I. No. After the conclusion of the oral arguments. XI. VI. Art.29 Petitioners submit that E. Art. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. III. VI. Sec. as taxpayers. 171246 did not file any memorandum.R. No. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Sec. Sec. namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam. instead. Sec. III. Sec. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on March 8. 2006. filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition. 2231 Art.O. 2005 budget hearing.O. All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from implementing. prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them. while those in G. 2006. 16966023 and G. 2006. XIII.R. and observing E.O. 1. XI. Sec. 464 is. Sec. 133 Art. II. and pray that E. and (2) assuming that it is not. No. and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers. 169659. Sec. the parties were instructed to discuss it in their respective memoranda. 4. No. unconstitutional. Sec.February 13. 132 Art. 435 Art. VI. Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. III. 16. VI. after their motion for extension to file memorandum27 was granted. (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP. it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances. No.R. The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up. 464. subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14. and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract. Art. No. 22. Sec. the following substantive issues were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E. the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda. 2006. XIII. Art.R. enforcing. In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21. however. 2006 that it would no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest. Art. and (2) whether E.22 Petitioners in G. 7. on its face. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions: Art.
power."40 . 464.O. pray in their consolidated memorandum38 on March 13. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution.O. 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit. 169659. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.Art. and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 2837 Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al. and that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution. As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented.R. (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. and privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E. were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted. 169660 and 169667 make it clear that they. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al.39 Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the disagreement between the parties lies. or will sustain. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E. direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows: 1. Nos. 2. adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in the investigations called by the different committees of the Senate.O. ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is in order. Whether E. 464. assert that the allegations in G. through the Solicitor General. on the other hand. 464. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.O. otherwise stated. Essential requisites for judicial review Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E. Sec. he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained. and 3. Whether E. II. respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties "injured-in-fact.O. (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance. have not shown any specific prerogative. there being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted due to the implementation of E. Standing Respondents.. the power of judicial review is subject to limitations. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.O.
O.Respecting petitioner Chavez. and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E. Chavez.49 In filing their respective petitions. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power. Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna). curtailed and violated by E.46 Verily. 464.47 In the same vein. however. the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens. the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E. is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.41 With regard to the petition filed by the Senate. likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is. Ongpin 42 and Valmonte v.44 That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system. allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E. one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case. orders. 464. must be direct and personal. 464. has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E. Bayan Muna.O. powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. the Senate. but more especially for sound legislation 45 is not disputed.O. asserting that the right to information.O. 464. the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws. 464 notwithstanding. passing on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary. including its individual members. organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation. the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E. House of Representatives.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna).52 It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen. and other regulations. E. The national political party. therefore.O. 464. Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis). respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E. entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors. 464. Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members.O. 464.O. Joel Virador (Bayan Muna). Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. In Franciso v.48 As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. presidential decrees.50 invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.53 this Court held that when the proceeding . it being sufficient that a claim is made that E. Indeed.43 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party.O. respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the implementation of E. have the standing to file their petitions.O. legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative. Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis).
it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing. Its allegation that E. there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain. Actual Case or Controversy Petitioners assert that an actual case exists.O. not that the President prohibited their attendance. and that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E. Indeed. it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E. The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E. For E. (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government.O.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September 28.56 These officials. petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy.O. Concrete injury. As for petitioner PDP-Laban.R. 464 . Constitutionality of E.O. Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy. As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines. Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress.55 In fine. 464. 2005. they claim. is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.involves the assertion of a public right. it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication.O. not on E. respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the President’s consent was based on its role as Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces. Nos. 464 is concerned. it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case. 464. however.O. 464. the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.54 The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.O. merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President. they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E. and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties.O. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance. 464. whether actual or threatened. particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy. and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
"also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. In other words.59 . The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution. It follows that the operation of government. deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. detained for contempt. is in order. and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete. to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress. the Court therein ruled. the transaction. 58 a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution. . is a proper subject for investigation. consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information. the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. . by resolution of the Senate. otherwise known as the power of inquiry. (Underscoring supplied) This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that. and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. who was considered a leading witness in the controversy. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point. The power of inquiry. in Arnault v. Nazareno. the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. The power of inquiry The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads: SECTION 21. the Court held. is co-extensive with the power to legislate. so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied." .E. Nonetheless. was called to testify thereon by the Senate. in the latter. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. being a legitimate subject for legislation. it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees. The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. he was. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.O. this Court held: Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing. Thus. 464. Arnault.
which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege.O. . by parity of reasoning. the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. as noted in Bengzon v. Nonetheless. its preambular clauses. depending on the particulars of each case. necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. of course. in theory. the power of inquiry. it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States. or to any person for that matter. no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. there may be exceptional circumstances. resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances. none appearing to obtain at present." however. an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Article VIII of the Constitution. it being mentioned in its provisions. wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established.63 Being of American origin. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure. it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E. even if they belong to the executive branch. Given such statement in its invitations. Parenthetically. attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order. along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof.Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch. there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation. upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected. and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. remediable before the courts. one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned. Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is.62 and in its very title. Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. These abuses are. there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry. 464. Executive privilege The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. For one.61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation. "with process to enforce it. As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era. Section 21. As discussed in Arnault." is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process.
the courts. executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying kinds. 72 decided in 1974. Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress. nonetheless."64 Similarly. and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions. thus: Since the beginnings of our nation. Nixon.Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public. but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.67 Tribe. and the Congress. not a clear or unitary concept. In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine."65 Executive privilege is. beginning with Washington. based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Finally." it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations. and ultimately the public. Presidents. v. This privilege. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege.71 The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U. in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations. recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intragovernmental advisory and deliberative communications. Tribe explains. in fact. on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations. however. the courts. Another variety is the informer’s privilege. and may be asserted." One variety of the privilege.S. that is. The claim of privilege was based on the President’s general interest . necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances.S. the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges. is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not. or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions. 68 Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case. with differing degrees of success.
it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. Supreme Court in Nixon.73 Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress."82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations.S. that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information. thus acknowledging. beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. added to those values. the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Vasquez. PCGG. in Chavez v. and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information. the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. the Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public. recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena. like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations. the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.S. Public Estates Authority. . The U. 76 In this jurisdiction. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid. the right of the people to information.81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers. nonetheless. diplomatic and other national security matters. and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Notably. the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and. and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.78 Nonetheless. It did not involve. the U.S. Ruling that the balance favored the President. in a case decided earlier in the same year as Nixon.in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. In Chavez v.79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military.S. correspondences. as expressly stated in the decision.74 However.S. the U. The Court. for example."80 The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue. Cases in the U.S. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. Constitution. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege: "The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences. rejected the President’s claim of privilege. objective.77Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare. Similarly. in substance if not in name.
or the public. because in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa – as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa – one of the most competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations. The President herself has. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Validity of Section 1 Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. unlike also Section 3. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour. SECTION 22. however. in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2. both in the United States and in this jurisdiction. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday. MAAMBONG. a clear principle emerges. Indeed." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing. or upon the request of either House. we usually issue subpoenas.O. There are significant differences between the two provisions. I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when . the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI. made the determination that they are. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept. the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or before the Senate. Rather. the courts. require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E. We usually invite them. which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately. but may cover matters related thereto. It does not. the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative. 464. Executive privilege. Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. but if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation. whether asserted against Congress. as the rules of each House shall provide. Further. there is no reference to executive privilege at all. with the consent of the President. is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. In fact. MR. through the challenged order.From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege. Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress. Madam President. unlike Section 3. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions. either in aid of legislation or in congressional investigations. I have a particular problem in this regard. a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
in effect. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour. Would it be. very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also. MR. Presiding Officer. MR. DAVIDE. Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation. |avv phi|. Thank you. In other words. because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the Question Hour. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go. We confirm that. which is Legislative Inquiry. and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. precisely in recognition of this distinction. I propose that instead of putting it as Section 31. in aid of legislation. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply. it is in aid of legislation. GUINGONA. that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21.net MR. we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner Davide. whereas. a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry. Yes. Mr.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say? MR. Actually. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) . may be summoned and if he refuses. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. Does the gentleman confirm this.requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. Presiding Officer. Madam President. it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style. it should follow Legislative Inquiries. DAVIDE. DAVIDE. Commissioner Davide is recognized. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. whereas. GUINGONA. MR. Presiding Officer. Mr. under which anybody for that matter. we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21. he can be held in contempt of the House. he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour. According to Commissioner Suarez. we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations: MR. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting. it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking. to give his reaction. MAAMBONG. MAAMBONG. Madam President? MR. Mr. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this. to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative Department. Jamir). later moved the provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31. After conferring with the committee. Commissioner Davide. Commissioner Davide? MR. DAVIDE.
They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Commissioner Davide’s only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely together. the "question hour" has a definite meaning. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information. the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. a clear separation between the legislative and executive branches. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. on the other hand. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential. In fact. unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain. Commissioner Davide. As Schwartz observes: Indeed. the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly.87 The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. however.85 corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee. From the above-quoted exchange. In the context of a parliamentary system of government. . if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system. they being complementary to each other. mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential.88 To that extent. as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction.Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. The absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution. Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired. Commissioner Maambong’s committee – the Committee on Style – shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress. where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it. Neither Commissioner considered them as identical functions of Congress. in light of the absence of a mandatory question period. In the United States there is. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not. if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion. if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners’ alone. its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content. was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department. the question hour. it is that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive branch.
in keeping with the separation of powers. while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour. 464. Nonetheless. the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Article VI of the Constitution. Section 22. the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. Section 1. states that Congress may only request their appearance. Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22. it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. as much as possible. and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom. . judicial power is vested in a collegial body. the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. In such instances. should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation. the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. in a way that will render it constitutional. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted. when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21. hence. Joker Arroyo.90 In fine. the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested. beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch. Ultimately. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. therefore. hence. admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice. Sen. as even counsel for the Senate. the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Unlike the Presidency.since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Sections 21 and 22. By the same token.O. while closely related and complementary to each other. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature. members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry. such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. the Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E. its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom. as Chief Executive.
or a head of office authorized by the President. and that the President has not reversed such determination. the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege. be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. or by the President herself. Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered by the executive privilege. are "covered by the executive privilege. Article VI of the Constitution. Chief of the PNP.O. underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office. In light. 464 which deals with the nature. the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E. and the National Security Adviser).O. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. Thus. Chief of Staff of the AFP. authorized by the President under E. department heads.O. that such official is in possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. and all senior national security officials who. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. The enumeration is broad. The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order." The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President.The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1. as discussed above. Given the title of Section 2 — "Nature. Section 1 cannot. Verily. however. by authority of the President. This determination then becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation.O.e. either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" —. the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is. Such declaration. Validity of Sections 2 and 3 Section 3 of E. limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour. however. the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis.O. unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made. however." such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. For under Section 22. even without mentioning the term "executive privilege." amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch. privileged as defined in Section 2(a). such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President. there is an implied claim of privilege. in the judgment of the head of office concerned. scope and coverage of executive privilege. It covers all senior officials of executive departments. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. whenever an official invokes E. . on the basis of executive privilege. in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i. 464. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E. Executive privilege. of Sec 2(a) of E. is valid on its face. 464. 464 to justify his failure to be present. has determined that the requested information is privileged. is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.O. all officers of the AFP and the PNP. En passant. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry. In view thereof.
and that. Significant premises in this letter. 464. are left unstated. Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch. it only means that the President has not reversed the standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress. please be informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President.O.. cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution. correspondences.m. 2005). at the time of writing. In fine.91 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Section 3 of E. either through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E. Inevitably. they cannot attend the hearing. As explained earlier. there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. Legislative and Judicial power. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a coequal branch of government.The letter dated September 28. And For Other Purposes". therefore. the same must be deemed implied. like internaldeliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts. Thus. by the designated head of office or the President. (Underscoring supplied) The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.O. to be covered by the order means that a determination has been made. Thus. While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress. . however. The information does not cover Presidential conversations. the case holds: There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. has made a determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged. 464.O. although it is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made. Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. The letter assumes that the invited officials are covered by E. however. 464. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments. 464 (s. This is not the situation in the instant case. 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E. are recognized as confidential. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers.O. pursuant to Executive Order No. or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which. 464.O. that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive privilege. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not secured the consent of the President. 464. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E. is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential. or executive sessions of either house of Congress. deliberately or not. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties. It reads: In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a. it is gathered from Chavez v.
being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information. and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. or in this particular instance. By its very nature. Nixon. lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. that the disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is designed to protect. Reynolds teaches: The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it. whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets. and that the President has not overturned that determination.93 These.). the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E. That the message is couched in terms that..S. on first impression. in substance. As U.95 A. While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order. Smith v. do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges. Article of Drug:97 On the present state of the record. thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs’ needs to determine whether to override any claims of privilege. generally. has determined that it is so. against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it. after actual personal consideration by that officer. The government has not shown – nor even alleged – that those who evaluated claimant’s product were involved in internal policymaking. Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive." Certainly. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be established.O. were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. be clearly asserted. there is.92 (Underscoring supplied) Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege. and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged.S. or whether. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. given the circumstances in which it is made.While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis. this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. A claim of privilege. or an authorized head of office.O. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege. government asserts. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President. closed-door Cabinet meetings. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening: [T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible. To find these interrogatories objectionable. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. Vasquez94 and. and nothing more. therefore. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. must. it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. v.96 (Underscoring supplied) And so is U. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive. v. in an implied claim of privilege. more in point. etc. In stating its objection to claimant’s interrogatories. but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e. a defect that renders it invalid per se. this Court would have to assume . There must be a formal claim of privilege.g. it should be respected. It is not to be lightly invoked.
To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide ‘precise and certain’ reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information. U. To sustain the privilege." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.that the evaluation and classification of claimant’s products was a matter of internal policy formulation.104 declares: The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself – his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. is highly relevant to these questions. in the setting in which it is asked. an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.S. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. a decent respect for the House of Representatives. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified. 724. the Court has little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. upon interposing his claim. he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. 323. moreover. that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. For it is as true here as it was there. Ct. of America100 amplifies.101 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Due respect for a co-equal branch of government. Without this specificity. 70 S. Therefore. would make a farce of the whole procedure. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. and] cannot be condoned. that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association. were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court. it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Thus.103 A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) . Sheraton Corp.S. U. 339 U. and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken. Bryan. Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. it need only be evident from the implications of the question. despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires.’ However. demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. thus: A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. if the witness. Hoffman v.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Mobil Oil Corp. the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability. As the affidavit now stands. v. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. by whose authority the subpoenas issued." Black v.S:102 We think the Court’s decision in United States v. His failure to make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee[. citations omitted) Upon the other hand.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E. The privilege being. If. Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E. is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. as already discussed. the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.O. Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance." which means that he personally consulted with her. in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President. however. however. neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege. Executive privilege. by definition. such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress. No infirmity. The privilege being an extraordinary power. binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b). 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. therefore. as a matter of necessity. in relation to Section 2(b). . In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege. might be covered by executive privilege. In fine. It follows. is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch. only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress. Petitioners. It is merely implied. cites the case of the United States where. coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. Petitioner Senate of the Philippines. Such presumptive authorization. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. on what is covered by executive privilege.106 The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations must. in particular. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.O. so it claims.O. it merely invokes E. once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged. an exemption from the obligation to disclose information. that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. is further invalid on this score. however. in this case to Congress. 464. subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. 464 must be invalidated. In other words. the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines. after the lapse of that reasonable time. It is not asserted.105 or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. Section 3. in his own judgment.
Implementation of E. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public.O. it does not follow. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Thus holds Valmonte v. Yet. while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people. the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which. Belmonte: It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. for which reason it must be invalidated. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming. in the sense explained above. just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry. except in a highly qualified sense. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. There are. is presumed to be a matter of public concern. it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege. Tuvera states: . That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch.O. however. the people are exercising their right to information. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it. and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. it bears noting. Thus. Right to Information E. clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. therefore. that in every exercise of its power of inquiry. being presumed to be in aid of legislation. Tañada v.The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O.O. this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. 464 is. 464 prior to its publication While E. For one.107(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E. it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry. however. but the right of the people to information." In light of the above discussion of Section 3.
however. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions. like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. VALID.O. the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. As explained above. however.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes. and For Other Purposes. SO ORDERED. but we shall have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The infirm provisions of E. It is. (Underscoring supplied)109 Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers.O. Sections 1 and 2(a) are. Conclusion Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. For [w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy. a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. based on the divine right of kings and nobles. logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution. the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. if he is a proper party. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual. 464. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government. E. for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. Otherwise. even in courts of justice. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or. therefore. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged. That is impermissible. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application." are declared VOID. WHEREFORE. 464 (series of 2005). allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity. .

References: V. 
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