Source: https://www.jbwpc.com/Articles/Zoning-and-Land-Use-General/What-s-Going-on-in-the-Zoning-Legal-World.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:25:33+00:00

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1. Café Risqué/We Bare All Exit 10, Inc. v. Camden County, 273 Ga. 451, 542 S.E.2d 108 (2001).
Where a local government issues a permit which is in violation of an existing ordinance, even if issued under a mistake of fact, the permit is void and the holder does not acquire any vested rights. This is true even if substantial expenditures were made in reliance on the void permit. A local government is not prohibited from revoking an improperly issued permit.
2. North Georgia Mountain Crisis Network, Inc. v. City of Blue Ridge, 248 Ga.App. 450, 546 S.E.2d 850 (2001).
3. Meeks v. City of Buford, 275 Ga. 585, 571 S.E.2d 369 (2002).
The issue in this case is whether a property owner obtained a vested right to use undeveloped investment property in accordance with a variance granted in 1985, 14 years earlier. In finding the earlier variance no longer valid, the court relied on the rule that a property owner must make a substantial change in position, make substantial expenditures, or incur substantial obligations in order to acquire a vested right. In this case, the mere reliance on a variance without showing substantial change in position by expenditures or other obligations does not vest a right in the landowner to develop in accordance with the earlier variance which would no longer be valid by virtue of a subsequently adopted zoning ordinance.
4. Marietta Properties. LLC. v. City of Marietta, 732 S.E.2d 102 (Court of Appeals, decided August 31, 2012).
5. Union County v. CGP, Inc., 277 Ga. 349, 589 S.E.2d 240 (2003).
6. Cohn Communities, Inc. v. Clayton County, 257 Ga. 357, 359 S.E.2d 887 (1987).
7. Corey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. The Board of Zoning Adjustments of the City of Atlanta, 254 Ga. 221, 327 S.E.2d 178 (1985).
Property owner did not obtain a vested right to build a sign even though the city issued a permit if the permit was invalided because the location of the sign violated the sign ordinance.
8. Haralson County v. Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc., 291 Ga. 321, 729 S.E.2d 357 (2012).
Appeal to superior court from zoning board by mandamus authorized unless zoning ordinance provides appeal by other means.
On appeal, superior court will uphold board's decision if there is any evidence in support of it.
9. Cobb County v. Peavy, 248 Ga. 870, 286 S.E.2d 732 (1982).
Issuance of business license does not create vested right.
10. BBC Land and Development, Inc. v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 472, 640 S.E.2d 33 (2007).
The plaintiffs bought land in Butts County for development. At the time of purchase, the zoning allowed construction of homes with a minimum size of 1,500 square feet. The plaintiff submitted plats showing houses of that size. The county approved the plat, and the plaintiffs expended money developing the properties consistent with the existing zoning. Thereafter, and prior to requests for building permits, the county amended its zoning ordinance to require a minimum house size of 2,000 square feet in that zoning district. The plaintiffs later sold lots in the subdivision to builders. The county denied building permits to builders because the proposed houses did not comply with the 2,000-square foot minimum under the amended zoning ordinance.
The question presented was whether the builders who purchased the property had a vested right to develop the property consistent with the minimum size house of 1,500 square feet rather than the 2,000 square feet under the amended ordinance. The court held that the builders were subject to the amended minimum square foot restriction.
The court reasoned that there was a crucial difference between vested rights and nonconforming uses. Nonconforming uses are uses or structures existing prior to the enactment of an ordinance which renders them nonconforming. A use which is merely contemplated for the future, but not yet realized as of the effective date of an amended ordinance, is not a nonconforming use. A vested right is one which cannot be divested without the consent of the person to whom it belongs. The court thus concluded that a vested right is earned by the owner's substantial change of position in relation to the land, including substantial expenditures or in incurring substantial obligations. That gives the owner the right to develop property in accordance with prior zoning restrictions. But vested rights are personal to the owner and are not transferable with the land. The choice by the owner to sell the property is voluntary, but if it chooses to sell, then it sells with the knowledge that the vested right is not transferable to a purchaser.
Cherokee County rezoned Martin's property to a PUD classification based on a site plan which showed that a portion of the property would be used as an "assisted living" facility. But Cherokee County in the adopting ordinance approving the rezoning did not stipulate that the rezoning must comply with the site plan. Later, Martin decided to build an apartment complex instead of an "assisted living" facility, but the county refused to issue a permit although both uses were permitted in the zoning district. Thereafter, Martin sued Cherokee County contending he had the right to build the apartment complex.
In the 2007 session, the General Assembly adopted new statutes governing the resolution of zoning and land use disputes between cities and counties resulting from annexation of property by cities. The new provisions were effective on September 1, 2007. The statutes governing the new resolution procedure are found at O.C.G.A. § 36-36-11 and O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-110 through 119.
After a final resolution is reached to an objection by the county to the zoning and land use of the annexed property, the city is prohibited from changing the zoning of the annexed property for one year with the exception that a change may be made if the service delivery agreement or comprehensive plan adopted by the city and county is amended to be consistent with the changed zoning or land use. If the city and the applicant for annexation accept the recommendations of the arbitration panel, or the decision of the court on appeal, the annexation may proceed under the established annexation procedures. If the arbitration panel recommendation or court decision is not accepted, then the city is not authorized to proceed with annexation.
VI. ZONING PROCEDURES LAW, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq.
1. Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County, 261 Ga. 153, 401 S.E.2d 527 (1991).
A property owner wished to use property for surface mining and needed to get a certificate of land use compliance from the county before such a permit was issued. The county denied the permit on the grounds that the property was zoned for agricultural uses only. The Supreme Court held that the zoning ordinance was invalid because it did not comply with the Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq. The court held that the ZPL requires that, before a zoning ordinance is adopted, an ordinance detailing policies and procedures must be adopted, and that ordinance is also subject to the ZPL's notice and public hearing requirements. Further, where the zoning ordinance is procedurally invalid, there are no legal restrictions on the use of land, and the property owner was entitled to mandamus relief ordering the county to issue the certificate of land use approval.
2. Kingsley v. Florida Rock Industries, Inc., 259 Ga.App. 207, 576 S.E.2d 569 (2003).
Florida Rock challenged the validity of Lamar County's Comprehensive Land Use Plan on the ground that it was not adopted in accordance with the notice requirements of the Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et. seq. Lamar County had given only 14 days notice of the public hearing on the plan rather than the minimum 15 days required by the ZPL. The court however reasoned that planning was not the same as zoning. "Comprehensive planning . . . refers to 'any plan by a county,' without any limitation to the type of planning involved." (at p. 210). Planning, according to the court, does not impose immediate restrictions on land use, but "contemplates the evolvement of an over-all program or design of the present and future physical development of a total area and services. . . ." 101A CJS, Zoning and Land Planning, § 2(b) (1979). Zoning is a means by which the comprehensive plan is carried out; it is subject to the constitutional protections of equal protection and due process and the prohibition against taking private property without just compensation. The notice for adopting a comprehensive plan is that usually followed by a local government for public hearings, not zoning hearings. See DCA Regulations at Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 110-3-2-.06(4)(a). Since Lamar County followed its usual public hearing procedure, it satisfied the notice requirements for a hearing on the comprehensive plan.
– the zoning map was in existence at the time the zoning applicant bought the property and the map was in the administrator's office.

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