Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83145:57173&catid=1585&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:25:28+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 194638, July 02, 2014 - PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. CATALINA L. SANTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LUZ B. PROTACIO, AND DAVID R. RAYMUNDO, Respondents.
PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. CATALINA L. SANTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LUZ B. PROTACIO, AND DAVID R. RAYMUNDO, Respondents.
Respondent Catalina L. Santos (Santos) entered into a Contract of Lease8 with Frederick O. Chua (Chua) over eight (8) parcels of land9 located in Parañaque City (leased premises), specifically giving the latter the “first option or priority to buy” the same in case of sale.10 Chua then caused the construction of a 6-door commercial complex11 on the leased premises but, by reason of business reverses, he was constrained to assign12 his rights thereon to Lee Ching Bing (Lee), who likewise assumed all obligations under the lease contract with Santos. Lee, in turn, executed a Deed of Assignment13 over the leased premises, including all improvements thereon, in favor of petitioner. On March 19, 1991, petitioner filed a Complaint14 before the RTC (docketed as Civil Case No. 91-786) against Santos and respondent David A. Raymundo (Raymundo) to whom Santos allegedly sold the leased premises on September 21, 1988 for a consideration of P5,000,000.00,15 without giving petitioner the opportunity to exercise its priority to buy the same. Petitioner claimed that, when it objected to the sale, Santos repurchased the subject properties for the same price,16 and offered them to petitioner for P15,000,000.00. The latter made a counter-offer of P5,000,000.00 but, before replying thereto, Santos sold the subject properties again to Raymundo on May 15, 1989 for P9,000,000.00.17 Petitioner argued that the sale was simulated and that there was collusion between Santos and Raymundo (respondents).
Petitioner wanted to strike out, in particular, the allegations in the Answer that the subject properties were offered to it first at P5,000,000.00, and subsequently at P9,000,000.00.36 However, petitioner’s Motion to Strike Out was denied by the RTC in an Order37 dated May 18, 1998, emphasizing the inapplicability of the principle of res judicata with respect to the afore-quoted February 26, 1997 Decision. As indicated in the dispositive portion of the said Decision, the trial court was to conduct “further proceedings” which meant that respondents could not be deprived of the right to submit their own case and to proffer evidence to rebut the allegations in the Complaint.38 Petitioner moved39 for the reconsideration of the said Order, as well as the voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge for alleged acts of “undue deference for and haste in granting all the motions and wishes of [respondents] and his consistent denial of the motions of [petitioner].”40 The motion was, however, denied by the RTC, in an Order41 dated June 11, 1998, and the case was set for pre-trial on July 7, 1998. On July 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial,42 claiming that it was preparing a petition for certiorari and prohibition which (a) was to be filed with the CA before the scheduled pre-trial on July 7, 1998, and (b) was intended to challenge the validity of the RTC’s Orders dated May 18, 1998 and June 11, 1998 by raising alleged prejudicial questions that must be resolved first before the pre-trial and trial on the merits of the case could proceed. Incidentally, the petition for certiorari and prohibition43 (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48214) that was actually filed at 2:1744 in the afternoon of July 7, 1998, (contrary to petitioner’s assertion in its Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial that it was to be filed before the July 7, 1998 pre-trial) was resolved by the CA in favor of petitioner in a Decision45 dated December 6, 1999 (December 6, 1999 CA Decision), where it was determined that the Motion to Strike Out was denied prematurely.
Upon motion for execution58 of petitioner, the trial court issued an Order59 dated November 11, 2008 elevating the entire records of the case to the CA. The appeal, which was the fourth time petitioner was before the CA, was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 92522. On September 22, 2010, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision60affirming the First and Second Orders both dated July 7, 1998, as well as the Order dated September 21, 1998. The same court further denied61 petitioner’s motion for reconsideration62 of said Decision, hence, the instant petition.
The threshold issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld (a) the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial, and (b) the dismissal of the Complaint for failure of petitioner to proceed to pre-trial as directed by the trial court.
The pattern to delay the pre-trial of the instant case is quite evident from the foregoing. Petitioner clearly trifled with the mandatory character of a pre-trial, which is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case.65 It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.66 Far from showing bias or prejudice, the RTC judge was merely complying with his sworn duty to administer justice without delay. It should be recalled that the Complaint was filed by petitioner on March 19, 1991.
SEC. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the petition [for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
Verily, as the Court sees it, petitioner had the opportunity to present its case, yet chose to unduly forego the same. The appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 92522 pointed out the crucial fact that petitioner had already submitted its pre-trial brief and its counsel was armed with a special power of attorney for the pre-trial.74There was nothing that could have stopped petitioner from proceeding to pre-trial when its motion for postponement was denied.
The trial court correctly opined that it would have been entirely different if petitioner simply objected to the proceeding and made of record its objection. But petitioner’s refusal to even start with the statement of its cause is a “clear, firm and open defiance” of the directive of the court,75 which justified the dismissal of its Complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court as above-cited. The Court finally considers that this case was elevated to the CA for four (4) times, and this is the third time that the Court has to resolve issues between the parties, at the instance of petitioner. If this case has dragged on for more than two (2) decades, surely petitioner cannot wash its hands of any responsibility therefor. The expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of petitioner, being the plaintiff, as the court’s. Indeed, respondents, as the defendants, cannot be wearingly denied of their right to the speedy disposition of the case filed against them. After more than two (2) decades, respondents certainly do not deserve the agony of going through the same issues all over again with petitioner, which could have been settled had the latter simply proceeded to pre-trial and had given the trial court the opportunity to evaluate the evidence, apply the law, and decree the proper judgment. At the end of the day, the unfortunate fault can fall on no one’s hands but on petitioner’s. Indeed, there is a price to pay when one trifles with the rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 22, 2010 and the Resolution dated November 23, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92522 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
2 Id. at 82-95. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Danton Q. Bueser, concurring.
4 Id. at 98-99. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
8 Id. at 150-153. Dated November 28, 1977.
9 Covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. S-19637, S-19638, S-19643, S-19644, S-19645, S-19646, S-19647, and S-19648 (subject properties). See id. at 123-149.
10 Id. at 152, paragraph 9.
12 Id. at 154-156. Agreement dated February 12, 1979.
13 Id. at 157-159. Dated April 6, 1979.
15 See Deed of Absolute Sale; id. at 160-163.
16 See Deed of Reconveyance; id. at 166-169.
17Rollo, p. 19. See second Deed of Absolute Sale; id. at 175-178.
18 See Motion to Dismiss dated July 15, 1991 filed by Raymundo; id. at 192-198 and Motion to Dismiss filed by Santos on July 11, 1991; id. at 199-204.
22 Id. at 207-211. See Order penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez.
24 Id. at 212-213. Dated October 3, 1991.
26 Id. at 216-221. Penned by Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui, with Associate Justices Jainal D. Rasul and Eduardo G. Montenegro, concurring.
27 See Decision in Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, 335 Phil. 1184 (1997).
30Rollo, pp. 243-256. Dated February 17, 1998.
34 Id. at 283-301. Dated April 14, 1998.
35 Id. at 285. See also Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, supra note 27, at 1196.
37 Id. at 313-315. Penned by Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
39 Id. at 317-329. Motion for the Voluntary Inhibition of His Honor the Presiding Judge and to Vacate and/ or Reconsider the Order of May 18, 1999 dated June 4, 1998.
45 Id. at 491-502. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali, with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., concurring.
47 See Santos v. Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc., 535 Phil. 776 (2006).
51 Id. at 336-343. Dated August 12, 1998.
53 Id. at 346-347. Dated September 30, 1998.
56 Id. at 364-425. Dated January 25, 1999.
57 Id. at 427-438. See CA Decision penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Marlene G. Sison, concurring.
59 Id. at 456. Penned by Pairing Judge Reynaldo M. Laigo.
62 Id. at 107-122. Dated October 11, 2010.
63Alcaraz v. CA, 529 Phil. 77, 82-83 (2006).
64Rollo, pp. 103-104. Order dated September 21, 1998.
65 See Anson Trade Center, Inc. v. Pacific Banking Corporation, 600 Phil. 806, 814 (2009).
66Dr. Vera v. Rigor, 556 Phil. 561, 562 (2007).
67Rollo, pp. 98-99. First Order dated July 7, 1998.
69 Id. at 103. Order dated September 21, 1998.
71 525 Phil. 804 (2006).
74 Id. at 93. CA Decision dated September 22, 2010.

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