Source: https://kernbar.org/ebriefs-april-4-2019/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:34:36+00:00

Document:
The rule of Baze v. Rees and Glossip v. Gross govern all Eighth Amendment challenges, whether facial or as-applied, alleging that a method of execution inflicts unconstitutionally cruel pain.
A death knell order does not constitute a “trial” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure §583.310, and an appellate decision reversing such an order does not trigger the three-year extension under §583.320(a)(3).
A request to the court that it retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure §664.6 must be made by the litigants, not their attorneys of record.
Asking questions, including incriminating questions, does not turn an encounter with law enforcement into a detention; a person is not detained as long as a reasonable and innocent person in the same position would have felt free to go.
A California choice-of-law clause in an arbitration agreement covering “all disputes” arising from the employment relationship does not remove the parties’ agreement to arbitrate wage claims.
A 2019 amendment to Penal Code §832.7 that expands public access to certain peace officer records can be used to compel the disclosure of records created prior to 2019; although the records may have been created prior to 2019, the event necessary to “trigger application” of the new law—a request for records maintained by an agency— necessarily occurs after the law’s effective date.
Assuming that the status of all alleged heirs must be determined simultaneously at a single hearing, an alleged heir did not suffer prejudice if the alleged heir could not show how a different result might have changed absent the error. In order for the mark on a document to be an official seal, it must include a signature by a public official. A court may find evidence to be inadmissible without an objection having been raised by a party.
A set of homeowners were entitled to tax relief under Revenue and Tax Code §69.5 where they sold their original property and constructed a replacement property which, at the time of their claim, they owned and occupied as their primary residence; the fact that, to satisfy a bank requirement, they made temporary use of a limited liability company before taking title to their replacement property provides no justification under the terms of the statute or in logic or fairness for denying them the relief provided by §69.5.

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