Source: http://texas-opinions.com/08-GE-General-Electric-v-Moritz-Tex-2008-Dissent-by-Green-injury-of-independent-contractor-liability-of-owner-of-premises.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:57:18+00:00

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our own settled law, but also with comparative liability principles that govern virtually all other jurisdictions.
premises defect claim for trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
in which Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Johnson joined.
and improvidently reintroduce the discredited no-duty concept back into Texas premises liability jurisprudence.
correctly remanded Arthur Moritz's premises defect claim for trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
that have been settled in our state for more than thirty years.
Serv. of Tex., Inc. v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d 223, 225B26 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); Hoechst‑Celanese Corp. v.
523, 528 (Tex. 1997); Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. 1993); Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.
conditions owe a commensurate duty to their shopper customers. See Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.
(Tex. 1983). Considering all of this, it is difficult to see why the Court would treat Moritz differently.
the owner=s duty disappears entirely.
use of negligent activity arguments in a premises defect claim fails to survive close scrutiny.
premises condition or to make it safe.
of which the invitees know, or of which they are charged with knowledge, then the occupier owes them "no duty"
of law he will be charged with knowledge and appreciation thereof.
negligent is still entitled to have his negligence compared with that of the other participants in the event.
a matter which bears upon his own contributory negligence. . . .
openly and obviously, is a matter that bears upon his own negligence; it should not affect the defendant's duty.
appreciation) as a total bar is incompatible with the legislative purpose of the comparative negligence statute.
and obvious,@ that condition could be weighed against Moritz only on the question of comparative negligence.
that fault question is no longer a part of the duty analysis.
Dixon v. Van Waters & Rogers, 682 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam). See ___ S.W.3d at ___ & nn.21B28.
separate burden to prove knowledge of danger on the part of the owner.
underlying obligation to establish a duty on the part of a defendant and a violation of that duty.@); Delgado v.
lacked knowledge and appreciation, he must still prove, however, that the defendant had a duty and breached it.
the part of a defendant and a violation of that duty.@); Thomas v. Internorth, Inc., 790 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.
because of no control over the allegedly negligent activity); Shell Oil Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 295B98 (Tex.
2004) (no duty because of no control over the allegedly defective premises); Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc.
comprehensive and explicit review of first principles.
notCGE=s defense would fail under Delhi-Taylor because GE warned neither Moritz nor his employer.
and obvious limitation in Delhi-Taylor was abolished by the Legislature=s adoption of comparative negligence.
recovery when compared to the defendant=s negligence, it will not defeat the claim at the duty stage of a lawsuit.
recovery in proportion to the share of responsibility the factfinder assigns to the plaintiff . . . .
Id. ' 7 (emphasis added). Never does the Restatement distinguish duties by identifying independent contractors.
determining the duty of the possessor, or whether he has acted reasonably under the circumstances.
injured. If it is found that this could reasonably be anticipated by A, A is subject to liability to B.
Id. ' 343A cmt. f, illus. 3. This case easily fits that illustration.
awareness of the danger posed by the ramp.
premises defect claim for trial.
not true of shoppers, sightseers, or other business invitees.@).
throughout the remainder of this opinion, I refer to GE, TCLP, and Ellis collectively as GE.
premises liability claim is similarly unsupported. See ___ S.W.3d at ___.
surroundings, and of any danger involved in them.@); see also id. ' 464.
percentage reduction. They continue to constitute an absolute bar to recovery.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability ' 7 cmt. k (2000).
 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854B55 (1992).
No. 98-40228, 1998 WL 723859, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 1998) (recognizing abrogation). Robert E. McKee, General Contractor, Inc. v.
Patterson, 271 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1954), was also expressly abrogated by Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 513, 516B19. See Edco Prod., Inc.
v. Hernandez, 794 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 1990, writ denied) (recognizing abrogation). Western Auto Supply Co. v.
Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1963), merely followed Halepeska and McKee, and Hall v. Medical Building of Houston, 251 S.W.
Carbide Corp. v. Burton, 618 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Baca v. Sand, Inc., 600 S.
whether the premises occupier was negligent.@).
and it is our view that the Delhi‑Taylor rule was necessarily set aside by Parker.
595 S.W.2d at 581B82 (citations omitted).
230 (1971 & Supp. 2008); 1 Texas Torts & Remedies 20.05[a] (J. Hadley Edgar Jr. & James B. Sales, eds. 2008); 4 Fowler V.
Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts ' 61 (5th ed., Lawyer=s ed. 1984).

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