Source: https://clanreviews.com/legal-provisions-of-section-115-of-code-of-civil-procedure-1908-c-p-c-india-revision/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:45:13+00:00

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(c) To have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegality or with material irregularity.
(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.
In this section, the expression “any case which has been decided” includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.
The word ‘jurisdiction’ is a verbal coat of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Reid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [(1969) 2 A.C. 147], namely, the entitlement “to enter upon the enquiry in question”. It has, as a result of a catena of Indian decisions, assumed a restricted meaning. Section 115 confers power of revision on the High Court in a case not subject to appeal thereto.
According to the Law Commission, errors of jurisdiction and errors apparent on the face of the record could be corrected under Art. 227 of the Constitution. But the third clause under S. 115 could not be covered by Art. 227, viz., when the court acts or exercises jurisdiction on the subordinate court’s acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
The remedy under Art. 227 is also costly for the poor litigants, and the remedy provided in S. 115, is, on the other hand, cheap and easy. The Committee, however, felt that, in addition to the restrictions contained in S. 115, an overall restriction on the scope of the applications for revision against interlocutory orders should be imposed.
(ii) That the order, if allowed to stand, is likely to occasion a failure of justice or cause an irreparable injury.
“The High Court in cases arising out of an original suit or other proceedings of the value of rupees twenty thousand and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before August 1, 1978, and the District Court in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceedings instituted before such date, may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court, or District Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears.
Provided further that the High Court or the District Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where (i) the order, if so varied or reversed, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceeding; or (ii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.
In this section, the expression ‘any case which has been decided’ includes any order deciding an issue in the course of suit or other proceedings.
(c) Acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
In the exercise of revisional powers it is not the duty of the High Court to enter into the merits of the evidence; it has only to see whether the requirements of the law have been duly and properly obeyed by the court whose order is the subject of the revision and whether the irregularity as to failure or exercise of jurisdiction is such as to justify interference with the order. The remedy by way of revision cannot be denied in a case where the order is not appealable and in which one or the other condition stated in S. 115 is satisfied.
Section 115 applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it. But the mere fact that the decision of the lower court is erroneous, whether it be upon a question of fact or law, does not amount to an illegality or material irregularity.
Therefore, the High Court will not interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction merely because the lower court wrongly decides that a particular suit is barred by res judicata, or that it is barred by limitation or because it proceeds upon an erroneous construction of the various provisions of an Act.
The suit was brought by the plaintiff appellant for possession on redemption of a three-fourths share in Kaka Khanpur. The first two courts decreed the suit in favour of the appellant, and the second decree became final under section 622 of Act X of 1877.
A petition was presented to the Judicial Commissioner, alleging that the first court had no jurisdiction to try the case, and asking that the record might be sent for and the decrees reversed. On the 7th February, 1880, the Judicial Commissioner dismissed the suit with costs in all three courts.
He did not find thereon that the first court had no jurisdiction, but that the courts below had exercised their jurisdiction illegally and to the material prejudice of the applicant, and thereon founded the decree appealed from.
The question in this case depends upon the proper construction to be put upon Act X of 1877, section 622, and upon Act XII of 1879, section 92, by which the former section was amended. According to Act XIII of 1879, section 21, there was no appeal in this case from the Lower Court of Appeal to the Judicial Commissioner.
By section 92 of Act XII of 1879 that section was amended by the insertion after the words “so vested” of the following words “or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity”. The question then is, did the judges of the Lower Court in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with material irregularity.
It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them, and they did decide it. Whether they decided it rightly or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case; and even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
Their Lordships therefore thought that under section 622 of Act X of 1877, as amended by section 92 of Act XII of 1879, the Judicial Commissioner had no jurisdiction in the case. Under these circumstances their Lordships would humbly advise Her Majesty to allow his appeal, and to reverse the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, and to order the respondent to pay the costs of this appeal.
To come to an erroneous conclusion does not amount to acting with material irregularity or illegality and a court has much jurisdiction to pass a correct order as a wrong one. The court’s coming to an erroneous view will not justify interference in revision under S. 115, C.P.C.
By its clauses (a) and (b), S. 115 empowers the High Court to satisfy itself: (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction, and (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction. Therefore, where the court by a wrong or erroneous finding assumes jurisdiction which it has not, or refuses to exercise a jurisdiction which it ought to exercise then the matter becomes revisable by the High Court.
The decision of the subordinate court on all questions of law and fact not touching its jurisdiction is final and however erroneous such a decision may be, it is not revisable under sub-ss. (a) and (b) of S. 115, C.P.C. On the other hand, if by an erroneous decision on a question of fact or law touching its jurisdiction, e.g., on a preliminary fact upon the existence of which its jurisdiction depends, the subordinate court assumes a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or fails to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, its decision is not final, and is subject to review by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under the sub-section.
If the jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C. is invoked, the application must show not only that a jurisdictional error has been committed by the court below but also that the interests of justice call for interference by the High Court. The powers of the court under S. 115 of the Code are to be exercised in its discretion, and discretionary powers should be exercised in the interests of justice.
The power to interfere under S. 115 is much circumscribed. Unless the lower appellate court had exercised jurisdiction where it had none or exercised it illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court cannot interfere with the order of the lower appellate court even when the order sought to be revised be erroneous or not in accordance with the law.
The words ‘acting illegally’ would mean acting in breach of some provisions of law and the words ‘acting with material irregularity1 would mean committing some error of procedure and in the course of proceedings, which is material in the sense that it may have affected the ultimate decision.
Therefore, it is only when a court decides a case perversely that it can be said to act illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction and the other errors of questions of law or procedure are outside the scope of cl. (c) of S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Where a lower court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction, the High Court will not interfere with it in revision.
The grant of ad interim injunction is within the discretion of the trial court. Where it has been shown that ad interim injunction had been granted by the said court against the principles governing the same, it cannot be said that the court below, while granting the ad interim injunction, had acted illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.
Where the trial court has the jurisdiction to reject a document or impound it was also the jurisdiction to receive it on recording reasons showing as to why its receipt as evidence was justified and it takes the view that the document concerned can be easily procured for purposes of litigation and that its genuineness is not beyond suspicion, the order passed by it refusing to take the document on record does not call for any interference under S. 115.
The section is not directed against conclusion of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. Error of law is by itself no ground for revision unless it either results in a failure or wrong exercise of jurisdiction or amounts to a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Where a decree is erroneous in the sense that some technical rule of law has been overlooked which could have been remedied, the High Court does not ordinarily interfere in revision, but where there is a prohibition in a statute and a claim could not have been decreed according to law, the High Court would not be justified in importing any abstract considerations of justice and overlooking the principle that justice should be administered according to law.
The powers of the High Court in revision are not available for correction of errors of law, however gross those errors may be, and whatever may be the result of those errors on the merits of the case. Errors of ‘subordinate courts, however gross and palpable they may be, would escape correction in the court of revision. The cause of justice has no place in the framework of the revisional power and cannot prevail.
This power, of the High Court is only available where the High Court could legitimately hold that the court below had exceeded its jurisdiction or had refrained from exercising a jurisdiction vested in it or it acted illegally or with material; irregularity in the exercise of that jurisdiction, namely, committed such an error of procedure, a mandatory procedure, and the error had resulted in failure of justice or some such thing.
Section 115 empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters : (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision.
And if the High Court is satisfied on these three matters it has no power to interfere because it differs from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law. A distinction must be drawn between the errors committed by subordinate courts in deciding questions of law which have relation to, or are concerned with, questions of jurisdiction of the said court, and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. An erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate court which has no relation to questions of jurisdiction of that court, cannot be corrected by the High Court under S. 115, C.RC.
The trial court had jurisdiction to pass the order for discovery. Even if lack of jurisdiction is assumed to result from every material error of law even an error of law within the jurisdiction in the primitive sense of the term we do not think the order was vitiated by any error of law.
The rejection of the application for time and the consequent dismissal of the petition for permission to sue in forma pauperis can hardly be said to sound in jurisdictional error even in its extended sense. We are also not satisfied that the refusal to adjourn occasioned any failure of natural justice so as to render the order a nullity. Nor is there anything to show that in rejecting the application for time, the court acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The power of the High Court under S. 115 is exercisable in respect of ‘any case which has been decided’. A case can be said to have been decided when any rights or obligations for the parties sire adjudicated upon. By permitting a party to file evidence in the appeal, no court decides any question relating to right or obligation of the parties in controversy. An admission of evidence even in appeal does not decide any right of the parties.
By evidence the truth of a fact which is submitted to investigation is established or disproved. That is the precise reason that a rule of evidence is defined as a principle which expresses the mode or manner of proving the fact and circumstances upon which a party relies to establish a fact in dispute.
Hence by deciding to take evidence in the appeal, the court below cannot be said to have adjudicated upon any of the rights of the parties. The admission of additional evidence in the appeal cannot amount to case decided. Non-interference will not cause a denial of justice or irremediable harm to the applicant.
The Supreme Court has observed in Major S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dhillon, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497, that the exercise of jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C., is discretionary and that the court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of S. 115 are satisfied. The fact that another remedy is available to an aggrieved party by way of any appeal from the ultimate judgment or decree, is one of the relevant considerations for refusing to exercise discretion under S. 115, C.P.C.
If once a revision petition has been admitted by the High Court, it cannot be dismissed later on the ground that it was not filed by a duly authorised person/Under S. 115, the High Court can call for-the record of the case suo motu and revise the same if ,it finds that the subordinate court exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Therefore, if the case is not presented by a duly authorised person and the court finds that the impugned order falls within the purview of S. 115, it can suo motu revise it.
The High Court is fully justified in rejecting the findings of both the authorities below, even though it is a finding of fact if these authorities have based their findings on “conjectures and surmises and they have lost sight of relevant pieces of evidence which have not been controverted.
After the Amendment of 1976 in S. 115, C.P.C., the nature of the section has changed and the court under proviso (b) got ample power to interfere with the orders of the lower court for the ends of justice and to avert failure of justice which might cause irreparable injury to any party against whom the order is made.
It may be pointed out that the jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code is a discretionary one. It is limited in scope and covers only jurisdictional errors. Further restrictions have also been placed in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction and even where the conditions for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction are fulfilled the court in exercise of its discretion in a judicial matter may still refuse to interfere.
Where the Civil Judge exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by statute and not followed the procedure laid down by the statute and thus committed illegality in exercise of his jurisdiction, the High Court must rectify the error in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
(ii) Failure or illegal refusal to exercise the jurisdiction vested or the court below is alleged and proved to have acted illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in passing the order impugned.
If these conditions are shown to exist even then the Court is not bound to interfere with an order impugned under S. 115 of the Code, instead as per proviso I to S. 115 a rider has been put that the Court will not interfere with the order impugned under S. 115 of the Code unless the case is one which comes within one of the two exceptions provided under proviso II to S. 115 of the Code.
The orders which are passed in a routine manner and do not decide any substantial right or question affecting rights of the parties cannot be said to amount to a case decided.
The above observations lay down that an order which has the effect of determining and on either granting or refusing to grant a claim or a right may be relating to the proceedings or the suit itself can be said to be a case decided but orders of routine nature which do not determine and decide any right or claim of the party but are only procedural such as order adjourning the case, cannot be said to amount to be a case decided.
An order rejecting application to summon documents does not amount to a case decided. It is not an order deciding any right of the parties one way or the order. Revision does not lie against such an order.
It has also been laid down in S. 115, C.P.C., vide proviso thereto that the power under S. 115, C.P.C. shall not be exercised ordinarily even upon the establishment and fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in S. 115 including the condition of error of jurisdiction unless and until the case comes within one of the two exceptions provided in that proviso, namely, that the order impugned if it had been made in favour of the reverisionist applicant the same would have resulted in final disposal of the case or the order is of such a nature that if it is allowed to stand it is likely to cause irreparable loss and injury to the party concerned who had filed the revision.
It has been laid down in S. 115, C.P.C. as amended by U.P. Act 31 of 1971 vide proviso thereto that the power under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not be exercised ordinarily even upon the establishment and fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in S. 115 including the condition of error of jurisdiction unless and until the case comes within one of the two exceptions provided in that proviso, namely, that if the order impugned would have been in favour of the revisionist applicant, the same would have resulted in final disposal of the case or the order is of such a nature that if it is allowed to stand it is likely to cause irreparable loss and injury to the party concerned who had filed the revision.
Again the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this section is purely discretionary and even if the lower court has acted without jurisdiction or acted illegally in the exercise of jurisdiction, the High Court will not interfere if the result of an irregularity has been to promote justice. The powers will only be exercised for the prevention of injustice. Section 115 confers powers to be exercised with a view to subserve and not to defeat the ends of justice.
Then, the revisional powers will not ordinarily be exercised so long as there is any other remedy available either by suit or appeal. The High Court will not interfere if another convenient remedy is open to the applicant. But it may interfere if such course is necessary in the interests of justice.
There is always room for an honest difference of opinion as to whether a certain set of facts amounts to sufficient cause or not. The courts below must have the discretion to decide the question for themselves, and unless the court below travels beyond the limits within which discretion may be reasonably exercised or, in other words, unless it can be said that it has taken a perverse or absurd view, the exercise of the discretion by it will not be interfered within appeal and much less in revision.
Although an appellate or revisional court has unquestioned right to review or interfere with the orders of subordinate courts, it will not do so unless the subordinate court acted perversely or took a wrong view.
When it is said that a certain matter is in the discretion of the court, what is really meant is that the court has to apply the rule of reason and justice and not to act according to private or personal opinion; it is the law and not humour which guides the court and the possessor of discretion must put his mind to the case and really use judgment in coming to a decision; he must not approach the matter with his mind as if already made up.
Exercise of discretion must be legal and regular, not arbitrary, fanciful or vague. To command respect, discretion should be informed by traditions, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system. It is exercised largely on the facts and circumstances of a given case, with the result that ordinarily it is neither possible nor feasible to formulate a rigid formula capable of fitting all circumstances.
It is only when some illegality or material irregularity is committed by the subordinate court in the manner of the exercise of its jurisdiction, that is, if some procedural errors in exercise of its jurisdiction are committed resulting into any illegality or material irregularity, such error can be rectified by the High Court, while exercising the powers under S. 115 (1) (c), C.P.C. After the amendment of S. 115 by the C.P.C. Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976, a proviso has been added in sub-section (1). Even if the order falls under any of the clauses of S. 115 (1), the High Court will have no jurisdiction to vary or reverse any order unless the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. There are two clauses of the proviso. In view of clause (b) of this proviso, the petitioner is further required to show that the impugned order would occasion a failure of justice or would cause an irreparable injury to him.
There is no hard and fast or an inflexible rule that if a point has not been urged in the courts below, that point may not be allowed to be raised for the first time in revision petition. As the remedy by way of revision is discretionary and not a matter of right, the court may, looking into the facts and circumstances of each case, allow any point to be raised for the first time in the revision petition.
High Court does not interfere under S. 115, C.P.C. if the lower court in exercise of its judicial discretion allowed the amendment.
The court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer for amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. A revisional court ought not to lightly interfere with a discretion exercised in allowing amendment in the absence of cogent reasons or compelling circumstances.
While discussing the case the learned Judge further observed: “Relyini upon certain decision of the Privy Council in appeals against discretionary orders, and also upon a Sind case, Lord William, J. with whom Bucklind, A.C.J, was in agreement, observed in Durga Das v. Nalin Chandra Nandan: “Moreover, it must be remembered that both these orders were discretionary, and an appellate court ought not to interfere with the discretion of a Judge unless satisfied that it was not judicially exercised, that is to say, that the Judge acted on wrong principles.
The mere fact that the Judges of the appellate court might have taken a different view is not a sufficient ground for interference… If the Judge rightly appreciated the facts, and applies to those facts the true principles, that is a sound exercise of judicial discretion.
It is well established that the High Court is not bound to interfere under S. 115, C.P.C. except in aid of justice. Thus where the order of a subordinate court has brought about a just result and where the setting aside of the order would bring about an unjust result, the High Court would not exercise its discretion under S. 115, C.P.C., and interfere with such order, even though the order suffers from an illegality or irregularity.
The term “case decided” used in S. 115, C.P.C. is not equivalent of a suit or appeal decided. The word “case” is something wider but not wide enough to include every order passed by a court during the pendency of a suit. It would include a decision on any substantial question in controversy between the parties affecting their rights, even though such order be passed in the course of the trial of the suit.
The decision of part of a case or purely an ad interim order that does not effectually dispose of the matter before the court would not be “case decided”. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that an order granting an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis is a “case decided” within the meaning of S. 115, C.P.C. and hence can be revised.
Numerous cases of the various High Courts have taken different views in regard to the interpretation of the expression “case decided”. The decisions of the Allahabad and Lahore High Courts had taken a narrower view. So did the Rajasthan High Court.
The other High Courts have taken a liberal view. The narrower view was canvassed for acceptance of the Supreme Court in Major S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dhillon, but it was not ‘ accepted.
“The expression ‘case’ is a word of comprehensive import; it includes civil proceedings other than suits, and is not restricted by anything contained in the section to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil court. To interpret the expression ‘case’, as an entire proceeding only and not a part of proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice.
” A few years later, a question arose before the Supreme Court in Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., that if the expression “case” did not mean only the entire proceeding but also meant a part of the proceeding as held by that Court in the case of Major S.S. Khanna, then could it lead to the conclusion that every interlocutory order of the court, if it suffers from an infirmity of error of jurisdiction, should be taken to be a case decided so as to clothe the High Court with the power of interference”.
“A case may be said to be decided, if the court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” The expression ‘case’ is not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in an action.
Observed in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dhillon, that the expression ‘case’ is a word of comprehensive import; it includes a civil proceeding and is not restricted by anything contained in S. 115 of the Code to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil court.
To interpret the expression ‘case’ as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceeding imposes an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of powers of superintendence and may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice.
But it was not decided in Major S.S. Khanna’s case that every order of the court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided. As stated above, a case may be said to be decided, if the court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Before the High Court can entertain a revision, the order must amount to a decision of a case and an order which a court can itself change at any time cannot be termed an order which decides a case.
An order of remand passed under Order XLI, Rule 23 constitutes a case decided within S. 115 C.P.C.
Where only one issue in the suit has been decided but the result of the order of the court below is that a part of the claim has gone out of the suit then with respect to this part it cannot be said that no case has been decided within the meaning of S. 115, C.P.C. and a revision lies from such a decision.
An order holding that the arbitration clause did not apply to the dispute in suit and directing that the suit should proceed is not appealable nor is it a case decided and reversible under S. 115, C.P.C. Once the question whether the suit is maintainable has been raised and becomes an issue, the decision does not result in the termination of the suit and cannot be revised under S. 115, C.P.C.
As already said, the expression “case” is a word of comprehensive import; it includes civil proceeding other than suits, and is not restricted by anything contained in the section to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil court.
To interpret the expression “case” as an entire proceeding only and not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain case in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice.
An order dismissing an application under Order XIV, Rule 5, thereby refusing to frame additional issues, would be an adjudication in the course of a suit of some right or obligation of the parties in controversy and so according to the law enunciated in S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dhillon,” such an order would fall within the words “case decided”, as it has been passed in the course of a suit. Expressing dissent with Modi Spg. Wvg. Mills v. Ladha Ram & Co., a single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court held in Harish v. Som Nath, that a revision was maintainable.
A case may be said to be decided, if the court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of S. 115, C.P.C.
In British India Corporation, Ltd., Kanpur, and another v. G.S. Nigam, a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that the words “case decided” mean the adjudication of a controversy as to the rights and obligations of the parties in suit, and it must necessarily touch on the right and obligation in controversy in order to constitute the decision of deciding a case.
Orders passed merely for the progress of a proceeding are not orders deciding a case, and would accordingly not fall within the meaning of the expression ‘case decided’. They are only steps towards the final adjudication.
Orders passed merely for the progress of a proceeding are not orders deciding a case, and would accordingly not fall within the meaning of the expression “case decided”. They are only steps towards the final adjudication of the case, and only regulate the procedure, and do not affect any right or obligation of the parties.
Discovery or production of documents accordingly is not a matter relating to the rights and obligations of the parties in controversy in a suit, and hence an order in that regard does not amount to “case decided”.
Where the civil court passed an order granting permission to the plaintiff to file certain documents and admitted them on payment of certain amount by way of cost, then such an order passed by the court even after framing of issues was in its discretion and would not call for interference under S. 115, C.P.C. as the order did not amount to a “case decided”.
An order regarding admission of evidence was also held not an order relating to the rights or obligations of the parties in controversy in a suit in Smt. Shanti Kaur v. Smt. Hasan Jahan Begum. Further, an interlocutory order, in order to amount to a ‘case decided’ has to be on a substantial question arising in regard to the rights and obligations of the parties in controversy.
By amendment made in S. 115, C.P.C. the scope of the word ‘case’ has not been widened, and it has only been explained. The word ‘case’ always includes the whole or a part of the case and an interlocutory order passed in a suit can also amount to a “case decided” provided it satisfies the test as regards the decision of a case.
Where the courts are constituted to do justice between the parties within the confines of the statutory limits an undue emphasis on technicalities or enlarging the scope would cramp their power, diminish their effectiveness and defeat the very purpose for which they are constituted.
The “case decided” is to be construed in its wider amplitude giving realistic meaning to these words. “Case decided” does not necessarily mean case finally adjudicated, rather each decision which terminates a part of the controversy though the suit or the case may not be finally decided, shall come within the ambit of the term “case decided”.
In other words, where any controversy is raised in an application in the pending suit and that controversy is resolved by any order. That order will also be construed as “case decided”. It cannot be interpreted and construed only to mean final adjudication of the suit.
Thus, if the petitioner’s application raising for submission for framing additional issue has been rejected by the trial court, indeed that order also falls within the purview of “case decided” and the same is undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C.
In British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur v. G.S. Nig am, after a consideration of the cases cited, it was held that the words “case decided” mean the adjudication of a controversy as to the rights and obligations of the parties in the suit, and it must necessarily touch on the right and obligation in controversy in order to constitute the decision of deciding a case.
An order passed under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. allowing or refusing to allow amendment is ‘case decided’ within the meaning of that expression in S. 115. The High Court will however not interfere except when the case falls under the proviso appended to S. 115, C.P.C.
Where in a suit for recovery of dues filed against a partnership firm and its partner the plaintiff sought leave to add a new defendant on the ground that the assets and liabilities of the defendants on record were taken over by the new defendant firm, the rejection of the leave to amendment could occasion an irreparable injury to the revisionist plaintiff within the meaning of the proviso to S. 115, C.P.C.
Power of the court to add or refuse to add a party to a proceeding is a discretionary power vested in the court, but the discretion must be a judicial discretion and if judicial discretion has been exercised either in favour of adding a party or refusing to add a party under Order I, Rule 10 considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court, in revision, will not interfere with the exercise of such a judicial discretion.
The High Court is not obliged to exercise its jurisdiction when a case is decided by a subordinate court and the conditions in cl. (a), (b) or (c) are satisfied. Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; the High Court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions are satisfied.
The interlocutory character of the order, the existence of another remedy to an aggrieved party by way of an appeal, from the ultimate order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the High Court, even in cases where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction.
If an appeal lies against the adjudication directly to the High Court or to another court from the decision of which an appeal lies to the High Court, it has no power to exercise its revisional jurisdiction, but where the decision itself is not appealable to the High Court, directly or indirectly, exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court would not be deemed excluded.
Where a court has acted by inventing a rule of procedure for itself which is not warranted by law, the High Court is not only competent to interfere but should interfere in its revisional jurisdiction.
So the High Court can interfere where a civil court has wrongly entertained a suit cognizable by a revenue court, or where the lower court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law under a misconception of the law of limitation.
An order declining to exercise jurisdiction will be interfered with by the High Court in revision.
The High Court will not interfere with an incorrect decision of the lower court where there is no question of lack of jurisdiction or material irregularity in procedure. If the lower court had jurisdiction to decide the question before it and there is no irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction its decision is not open to revision even if it is a wrong decision.
The words ‘illegally’ and ‘material irregularity’ in S. 115 do not cover either errors of fact or of law. These words do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors as contemplated relate to material defects of procedure.
Where the lower appellate court did not express an opinion upon a matter which it was not invited to consider it cannot be said to have acted illegally within the meaning of S. 115 of the Code.
If the court below has exercised its jurisdiction in the prescribed way but its decision is based upon erroneous conclusions of facts or law, it cannot be said to have acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. If the court below had jurisdiction to decide the question before it and there is no irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction, its decision is not open to revision even if it is a wrong decision.
Section 115 (c) of the Code applies when the court ‘acts’ illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. It cannot apply to cases where the court merely comes to a wrong decision on a question of fact or of law.
The sub-section is limited to that class of cases where the court having jurisdiction violates any rule of law or procedure prescribing the mode in which such jurisdiction is to be exercised. Section 115 (c) does not provide for revision of wrong decisions of law if those decisions are not vitiated by any ‘act’ of the court which is illegal or materially irregular.
There is no justification for the view that clause (c) of S. 115 is intended to authorise the High Court to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate courts so as to prevent gross injustice in non-appealable cases. It only applies to cases in which no appeal lies, and where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal the manifest intention is that the order of the trial court, right or wrong, shall be final.
The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters, viz., (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction, (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction, and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally that is in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity.
If the High Court is satisfied upon those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate court upon questions of fact or law. Where there is a wilful disregard or conscious violation of a rule of law or procedure the case is one of material irregularity calling for interference in revision.
Where the court below did not at all apply its mind to the relevant provisions of an enactment, it has been held that there was material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the court and a revision lay to the High Court under S. 115 of the Code.
In case the revisional court comes to the conclusion that the finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guide-lines. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact.
A finding on the question of benami is one of fact and such finding cannot be interfered with in revision. There is no jurisdictional error or material irregularity.
While exercising the jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C., it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless they said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. The words “illegally” and “with material irregularity” as used in cl. (c) do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached.
The errors contemplated by this clause may relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law.
Clause (c) is not confined in its application to defects in procedure alone and it would still be open to the High Court to interfere in revision with decisions involving illegality as distinguished from mere errors of law or fact. Illegality means something in breach of some provision of law.
The word ‘jurisdiction’ is a verbal coat of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Reid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd v. Foreing Compensation Commission, namely, the entitlement “to enter upon the enquiry in question.” If there was an entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into the question, then any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction.
The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords in the above case would show the intent to which ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of ‘jurisdiction’.
The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdiction.
Why is it that a wrong decision on a question of limitation or res judicata was treated as a jurisdictional error and liable to be interfered with in revision? The reason can only be that the error of law was considered as vital by the court. And there is no yardstick to determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the court.
Where the Court declined to issue ad interim injunction ex parte and directed notice to be issued to the opposite party for deciding the application for temporary injunction, it could not be said that the trial court had either “exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law” or had “failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested”, within the meaning of clauses (a) and (b) of S. 115 and, hence, no revision was maintainable against the order refusing to issue ex parte injunction.
The trial Court obviously had jurisdiction to issue or not to issue ad interim injunction ex parte and also to issue notice to the opposite party before deciding the application for temporary injunction without issuing any ad interim injunction ex parte.
The trial court, therefore, in passing the impugned order has without doubt exercised a jurisdiction which had been vested in it by law and accordingly the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked vis-a-vis the impugned order only if the trial court, in passing the impugned order, has acted “illegally” “or with material irregularity” within the meaning of cl. (c) of S. 115, C.P.C. But there is consensus of authority commencing from Amir Hassan Khan’s case [(1884) I.L.R. 11 Cal. 6] that the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case, and even if it decided wrongly it did not exercise its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity and accordingly the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked vis-a-vis the order.
Where the amendment in the plaint was rightly refused and the order refusing the amendment did not occasion any failure of justice or cause any irreparable injury to the plaintiff, no revision against the order under S. 115 is maintainable. If there was any defect in the plaint the plaintiffs have only themselves to blame for it, and if they felt that the suit was bound to fail on account of some technical defects which they wanted to overcome by the amendment the better course for them to adopt would have been to apply for withdrawal of the suit with permission to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action or partly on a new cause of action, provided the law of limitation did not bar it and the plaintiffs could show that they were acting bona fide and not mala fide.
Where an order rejecting the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. was passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the District Judge under S. 115 (High Court amendment), it is not “a decree passed in appeal” as contemplated by S. 100 and therefore an appeal against the said order is not legally maintainable.
The jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 115 is a limited one and it can interfere with an order of a subordinate court if question of jurisdiction is involved therein. It cannot interfere with an order because an erroneous view on a question of law has been taken by the subordinate court.
While exercising its jurisdiction under S. 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross they may be, or even errors of law, unless they said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself.
An erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate court which has no relation to questions of jurisdiction of that court cannot be corrected by the High Court under S. 115, C.P.C. The construction of a decree like the construction of a document of title is no doubt a point of law. Even so, it cannot be held to justify the exercise of the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code because it has no relation to the jurisdiction of the Court.
When the question is one relating to pure appreciation of evidence, it is not a case for interference in civil revision and it cannot be said that the lower court has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In other words, it is not open to the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to question the finding of fact recorded by a subordinate court.
Revisional jurisdiction shall be exercised in cases involving questions of jurisdiction, i.e., questions regarding the irregular exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction or the illegal assumption of jurisdiction by a court and is not directed against conclusion of law or fact in which questions of jurisdiction are not involved.
A point not raised before the trial court and the first appellate court should not be allowed to be raised while hearing a revision petition under S. 115, C.P.C.
A mistake committed by a party does not confer jurisdiction on court. Where a court having jurisdiction exercises it in an irregular manner due to a mistake of the parties, there is no ground for interference in revision.
It could not be laid down as a general proposition that the High Court has no power of interference at all or should not interfere in revision where there is another remedy by way of a suit open to the applicant. The provision that a regular suit may be filed under Order XXI, Rule 63, C.P.C. (Rule 63 deleted in 1976) after an objection filed under Order XXI, Rule 58, has been disposed of, does not therefore bar the consideration of the propriety of the decision by the court below under S. 115, C.P.C.
The High Court is fully justified in rejecting the findings of both the authorities below, even though it is a finding of fact if authorities have based their findings on conjectures and surmises and they have lost sight of relevant pieces of evidence which have not, been controverted.
It may be pointed out that the jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code is a discretionary one. It is limited in scope and covers only jurisdictional errors. Further restrictions have also been placed in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction and even where the conditions for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction are fulfilled the court in exercise of its discretion in a judicial matter may still refuse to interfere.
In the instant case it was held that rejection by lower Court on merits did not amount to failure or refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. The expression “failure to exercise jurisdiction” means that the Court had refused to consider application on merits due to some technical ground.
An appeal can be converted into an application for revision under Section 115, C.P.C.
No revision lies against interlocutory orders which are appealable. As regards non-appealable interlocutory orders, there is a conflict of decisions as to whether they can be revised under section 115, C.P.C. The words used in the section are “case decided”, and the conflict turns on the meaning of this expression as to whether it includes an issue or part of a case.
The earlier view of the Allahabad High Court and the Lahore High Court was that the word “case” does not include an issue or part of a case and accordingly an interlocutory order was not available.
But in later pronouncements the trend of decision is that although the general rule is against such interference, the High Court can interfere in revision with an interlocutory order where the court below has acted perversely or in a manner to cause irreparable loss to the party which cannot be remedied otherwise than by the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court at that stage.
The other High Courts have consistently taken the view that the word “case” is wide enough to include an interlocutory order, and the High Court has power to revise an interlocutory order of the courts below in which the conditions of clause (a), (b) or (c) of section 115, C.P.C. are satisfied.
The Calcutta High Court has gone to the length of holding that the High Court has ample jurisdiction to revise interlocutory orders and to set them aside, although such orders may be attacked in an appeal from the final decree or order in the proceeding.
Where the parties to suit had not disputed existence of arbitration agreement. Held, that rejection of reference to arbitration amounted to failure of justice which had caused irreparable injury to the party seeking reference. Therefore, revision against such order was maintainable.
Term “other proceedings” used in proviso would not be proceeding in suit but proceeding other than suit. Order made in application for temporary injunction could not be treated as order by which proceedings for granting temporary injunction was finally disposed of. Held, that revision against such order was not maintainable. But High Court in those circumstances could invoke Article 227 of Constitution of India.
Where there was closure of entire evidence of plaintiffs side by the Rent Controller while rejecting her son’s affidavit for recording evidence on her behalf. Held, that serious error had been committed by the Rent Controller by closing entire evidence. As such, recall of said order on ground of mistake or error by the Rent Controller by exercising inherent powers could not be viewed as an act of review.
The Code of Civil Procedure does not specifically speak of consolidation of suits but the same can be under the inherent powers of the Court flowing from Section 151 of the C.P.C. Unless specifically prohibited, the Civil Court has inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
Where in a suit for recovery of money, but due to mistake, office has drafted decree as preliminary decree in mortgaged suit. Held, that it could be corrected by High Court in application made even after 11 years of said decree as there has been no prescribed period of limitation to file the said application.
Where in a suit for possession decree directing non-applicant to refund security deposit was issued. But due to inadvertent typographical error, it was typed defendant in place of plaintiff which stood corrected by subsequent order.
Non-applicant, plaintiff claimed to correct in judgment of negate direction of refund of security deposit was not a case of correction of inadvertent error or omission. Therefore, it could be corrected and plaintiff could prefer appeal against the same.

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