Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321207936/Ali-Karimi-v-Eric-Holder-Jr-4th-Cir-2013
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:36:06+00:00

Document:
instructions by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn joined. Judge King filed a dissenting opinion.
of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") final order of removal.
Karimi contends the BIA erred when it ruled that his Maryland second-degree assault conviction was for a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16, and thus an "aggravated felony"
BIA with instructions to reinstate Karimis asylee status.
United States in 1990. He was granted asylum in 1999.
[her] with his free hand." J.A. 321.
know that the other is a law enforcement officer, parole agent, or probation agent engaged in the performance of his or her official duties. Md.
bearing on whether it constitutes an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
term, wholly suspended, for the DUI charge.
under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C.
which the term of imprisonment was at least one year.
aggravated felony, found him removable as charged, and terminated his asylum. The case was then transferred to Baltimore, Maryland, where Karimi filed a motion to reconsider.
issued a final order of removal in March 2011.
and they are now ripe for our review.
heard oral argument in this case.
by failing to raise it in his opening brief. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that pursuant to Fed.
denying Karimis motion to reconsider and reopen.
scope of 16, which is not a question of immigration law.
for reconsideration of these questions would serve no purpose.
prior conviction constitutes an aggravated felony. Mbea v.
deference. Garcia v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 465, 467 (4th Cir.
his BIA notice of appeal, J.A. 64.
evidence. Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 116 (4th Cir. 2011).
the term of imprisonment" is "at least one year." 8 U.S.C.
used in the course of committing the offense.
4 (2004) (holding that an immigrants conviction under Floridas comparable DUI statute was not a conviction for a crime of violence that rendered him deportable).
at 167 (internal quotations omitted).
include "any felony offense which has as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another[.]" Id. at 1270-71.
holding. Id. Accordingly, we rely on Johnson here.
may apply a modified categorical approach. Johnson, 130 S.
of the charging document, . . . a plea agreement, . . . [a] transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant, . . . or . . .
conviction nor admitted by the defendant." United States v.
can tell whether the defendants plea "necessarily admitted"
facts identifying the offense as a crime of violence. Id. at 22425 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20-21, 24, 26).
convictions under that statute. See id. at 223; United States v.
an alien is removable as a result of a prior aggravated felony conviction.
of both violent and nonviolent conduct. See United States v.
(and therefore are not categorically "crime[s] of violence"
be unlawful (and therefore are not categorically "burglar[ies]"
conviction using the modified categorical approach.
approachesthe strict categorical or the modified categoricalcan sustain the BIAs determination that Karimi committed an aggravated felony.
including Karimis, cannot categorically be crimes of violence. See Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1270.
BIAs conclusion that he committed a crime of violence.
done to the officer" as a result of the grabbing. J.A. 292.
grabbing was so forceful as to be capable of causing harm.
forceeven when coupled with the act of grabbing.
recitation of evidence to be presented at trial.
The Attorney General argues that Karimis reliance on Alston is misplaced because Alstons plea was entered pursuant to North Carolina v.
his conviction necessarily rest on such facts.
and the judicial process would operate at its intended efficiency.

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