Source: https://dbfamilylaw.wordpress.com/2018/02/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:13:39+00:00

Document:
Trump’s response was surely not that of a mature person? No one should have a gun, save for very good reason, in the first place. Guns should be banned; or at least their use should be heavily regulated (as they are in most countries which regard themselves as civilised).
So why not change the ‘constitution’ and teach US people that killing is wrong? ‘The means of killing should be taken away from people’ I suggested. Ah, ‘easier said than done, said my friend’. And yet, in 1865 the constitution was changed to deal with slavery….
This is all so basic. People in civilised countries stopped carrying swords and daggers more than two centuries ago; and yet in US most people – I believe – are entitled to carry guns. (I even find it odd that in eg France police and customs officers carry guns: that would never be allowed in England.) Guns provide a means far more lethal than swords to kill each other. You can kill at much further away with a fire-arm than with a dagger.
US claims to lead the free world; yet US people carry guns around to kill each other with in a way which to most of us is truly primitive. It gets worse. Success for some US persons – such as their President – is judged by how much money you can amass. Materialism is everything. Greed defines you. Yet it is said that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to get to heaven. In other societies art, music and intellectual achievement are measures of success, for many. US people, relative to their number, have a modest number of artists, composers, intellectuals, scientists and law reformers. The state of its religion is about where European societies were in the mid-1800s.
Compared to many other modern societies, US is a primitive country to be sure: governed by materialism and regulated by private gun-laws. And to ban or regulate guns is ‘Easier said than done’ said my friend. That was probably what many people said in (say) 1800 of slavery. In England slavery was said not to exist at common law (Somersett’s case) in 1775. Trade in slaves was abolished in 1807 and it was formally banned throughout the colonies in 1833. In US it was banned in 1865, though segregationist tendencies subsisted – still subsist, under Trump? – for a long time.
If the US can ban slavery in 1865, why can it not ban guns now; or at least severely regulate their use (as is the case with the rest of us)?
(b)provision prohibiting [B] from molesting a relevant child [(C)].
(b)if in any family proceedings to which the respondent is a party the court considers that the order should be made for the benefit of any other party to the proceedings or [C] even though no such application has been made.
(1) A person [ie B] who without reasonable excuse does anything that he is prohibited from doing by a non-molestation order is guilty of an offence….
(b)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both….
Alleged breaches of a NMO can result in an arrest, and – if the breach is proved – can result in punishment including imprisonment. That all looks relatively straightforward. It gets away from the unresolved problem, under the earlier scheme, of who was responsible for bringing B to court: the police or A herself. In clear terms it makes application under s 42A a matter for the police and CPS. The section also states that if a person has already been punished for contempt of court in civil proceedings, they cannot be convicted also (s 42A(3) and (4)).
Straightforward it may appear; but it may leave a real injustice for B. In civil proceedings, though A may have legal aid (Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 Sch 11-13, subject to A’s means) it is most unlikely that B will have legal aid. B will therefore not have legal aid when the NMO is made. The NMO will be made on the basis of evidence proved to the civil standard – ‘balance of probabilities’.
If B is to be sent to prison – whether under a civil proceedings contempt application by A or as part of a police prosecution under s 42A – the standard of proof will be the criminal standard. But the conviction under s 42A will be based on a sub-stratum of findings of fact which have been established to a less exacting standard of proof. This lower standard of proof test at an earlier stage in financial relief proceedings, but which lead to judgment summons – ie committal proceedings – for alleged wilful failure to pay by Mr Prest – was considered by the Court of Appeal in Prest v Prest  EWCA Civ 714 sub nom Prest v Prest (Judgment Summons: Appeal)  1 FLR 773.
 The collective professional experience of Thorpe LJ and Mostyn J in these matters makes me most hesitant to express a contrary view, but my reason for advising caution concerning this set of observations is that they each suggest that, in the course of the criminal process that is the hearing of a judgment summons, it is simply sufficient to rely upon findings as to wealth made on the civil standard of proof in the original proceedings and that those findings, coupled with proof of non-payment, is sufficient to establish a ‘burden’ on the respondent which can only be discharged if he or she enters the witness box and proffers a credible explanation.
(d)the respondent cannot be compelled to give evidence.
 … that the judge did not sufficiently appreciate that in terms of Convention law, an application under the Debtors Act 1869 constituted a criminal proceeding. The judge went no further than to label it as a ‘hybrid’ proceeding. Mr Howard particularly relies on the decision in the case of Engel and Others v The Netherlands (No 1) (1979) 1 EHRR 647, which at 677, paras 80 and 81 very clearly classifies proceedings such as applications under the Debtors Act 1869 as criminal proceedings for Convention purposes.
 The maximum penalty that the Supreme Military Court could pronounce consisted [of] three or four months’ committal to a disciplinary unit for Mr. de Wit, Mr. Dona and Mr. Schul…. The “charges” against Mr. de Wit, Mr. Dona and Mr. Schul did indeed come within the “criminal” sphere since their aim was the imposition of serious punishments involving deprivation of liberty…. The Supreme Military Court no doubt sentenced Mr. de Wit to twelve days’ aggravated arrest only, that is to say, to a penalty not occasioning deprivation of liberty (paragraph 62 above), but the final outcome of the appeal cannot diminish the importance of what was initially at stake. The Convention certainly did not compel the competent authorities to prosecute Mr. de Wit, Mr. Dona and Mr. Schul under the Military Penal Code before a court martial (paragraph 14 above), a solution which could have proved less advantageous for the applicants. The Convention did however oblige the authorities to afford them the guarantees of Article 6 (art. 6).
 Article 6 (art. 6) proves less exacting for the determination of such rights than for the determination of “criminal charges”; for, while paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) applies to both matters, paragraphs 2 and 3 (art. 6-2, art. 6-3) protect only persons “charged with a criminal offence”. Since Mr. Dona and Mr. Schul were the subject of “criminal charges” (paragraph 85 in fine above), Article 6 (art. 6) applied to them in its entirety. The Court considers it superfluous to see whether paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) was relevant on a second ground, since the question is devoid of any practical interest (emphasis added).
As can be seen from the italicised passage, the punishment available to the court martial meant that in effect the offences were a ‘criminal charge’ and thus – as with Mubarak – then entitled the defendant to rights under Art 6.3.
The question then arises: does the protection of Art 6.3 arise at the civil order – ie the FLA 1996 s 42 stage; or only at the criminal prosecution (s 42A) stage?
 … It is, indeed, necessary for a judge who is required, at a subsequent stage in proceedings, to make findings on the higher criminal standard of proof, to ensure that earlier findings made on the lower civil standard are not, even inadvertently, relied upon as substantive findings in the subsequent quasi criminal process.
And this is without, in this post, going into questions of issue estoppel. On the basis of the assertion of McFarlane LJ – which is entirely understandable – then it may be argued that such estoppel could only apply to facts found to a criminal standard of proof. Does it not mean in practice that the findings on which the NMO were made, if not accepted by B, must be re-opened once more at the committal stage?
If this is the case, then better surely to ensure that findings at the s 42 stage are – if not to the criminal standard at that stage – made with the requirements of Art 6(3) fully met so far as B is concerned. So far as possible findings can then be relied upon by the police and A if a s 42A prosecution becomes necessary? Allegations proved to a lower standard must not – on Prest principles – simply be recycled to punish B. The substratum of proof at the later stage may not do justice to B.
The question prior to this is: what is B’s entitlement to legal aid at the s 42 hearing stage? The position of the law in relation to exceptional case determinations under LASPOA 2012 s 10(3) was considered in my ‘Convention compliance of legal aid exceptional case determination’ . This was after R (Gudanaviciene & Ors) v The Director of Legal Aid Casework & Ors  EWCA Civ 1622 and concerned entitlement under Art 6(1): can a person like the immigration appellant Ms Gudanaviciene have a fair trial without legal aid. If not, exceptional case determination might apply. This principle might apply also to B if he is opposed by a represented former partner A.
But if the Engel and Art 6.3(c) points are correct then B should be entitled to legal aid at the prior – non-molestation order – Art 6.3(c) stage. It is likely to be an exceptional case determination decision, but it should be relatively straightforward.
I acknowledge, with thanks, the brief comments of Vicky Ling and Simon Pugh, authors of LAG Legal Aid Handbook 2017/18, in my preparation of this post. All errors are mine.
 … despite the fact that the use of the term ‘disclosure’ to describe a statement or allegation of abuse made by a child has been deprecated since the Cleveland Report due to it precluding the notion that the abuse might not have occurred (see para 12.34(1)), every professional who gave evidence in this case (except the Children’s Guardian) used the term ‘disclosure’ to describe what the children had said to them).
We would like invite you to complete our survey on professionals’ experiences of listening to children and receiving disclosures of abuse and neglect. Our ambition is to develop a practical resource that will support professionals working with children to confidently deal with disclosures of abuse and to improve children’s experiences of the disclosure process.
Neither organisation has responded to my concern at the mismatch between what they are sending out, and what was said – over 30 years ago – in the Cleveland Report. Both should be well aware of the report.
Yesterday (5 February 2018) Sarah Phillimore posted: http://childprotectionresource.online/mind-your-language-whats-the-problem-with-disclosure/ on what’s in a word, like ‘disclosure’.
 Where a child makes an allegation of abuse to a professional, the relevant guidance for professionals to whom allegations of abuse are reported makes clear the following principles with respect to the initial contact with the child.
 The ABE Guidance goes on to state at [2.6] under the heading ‘Initial Contact with Victims and Witnesses’ that a person engaged in early discussion with an alleged victim or witness should, as far as possible, (a) listen, (b) not stop a free recall of events and (c) where it is necessary to ask questions, ask open-ended or specific closed questions rather than forced-choice, leading or multiple questions and ask no more questions than are necessary to take immediate action.
The subject of interviewing children takes the practitioner back to Chapter 12 of the Cleveland report, which is entitled ‘Listening to the Child’ and summarises the evidence of a number of the child psychiatrists who gave evidence to the inquiry. The purpose of the interview must be ‘to hear what the child has to say’ (§12.12) where the child is of sufficient ‘age and understanding’ (§12.10). The interviewer must use open questions (§§12.24; 12.34.4) and understand that there may be a variety of reasons why the child is speaking or is not willing to: the abuse has occurred; the child does not want to speak or is in denial; or the abuse has not occurred (§12.25). Interviewers must have an open mind (§12.34.3: which makes the term ‘disclosure’ such bad practice). Those conducting interviews must be trained (§12.34.2&11).
These recommendations are developed on the back of interviewing for court in criminal proceedings following Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 Pt 2 in ABE Guidance. The Guidance is clear: no assumptions as to anything that has happened – which had bedevilled the initial investigations by doctors in Cleveland – must be made by anyone interviewing a child. An open mind and open questions are essential.
1 What are the alternatives to the options in this Bill? There are not many. The first is to retain full reciprocity. That would almost certainly mean being bound by the CJEU and its decisions, which Ministers currently reject. It is worth noting that unlike other areas of law, here the CJEU is dealing only with procedural questions, not with substantive law. Every EU state keeps its own family law. The court can rule on questions of interpretation of laws, such as which country decides a case or the wording of enforcement orders. It does not change the law by which a country decides who gets divorced, what maintenance will be granted or how much contact there will be.
The procedural point cannot be stressed too strongly. Each EU country keeps its own cultural roots in family law. No one tells the UK it must change its primitive adoption laws; nor dictates to any EU catholic country which may have different bases for dissolution of marriage. UK money distribution remains its own.
That said the primacy of children’s welfare in any decisions is one adopted by EU law and re-enforced by the European Court Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland Application No 41615/07  1 FLR 122, ECtHR).
2 Secondly, we could seek a bespoke arrangement. We could try to make a deal with the EU for a new framework for family law co-operation. That would be slow and difficult and certainly not possible by 2019. Even if we end up with no deal and even if we can get rid of the asymmetry, there is still no guarantee that the Hague conventions would apply, leaving us with an unacceptable void.
‘Slow and difficult’ is not an answer. We are here today with ‘exit day’ a matter of months away; so for the sake of the families and children concerned it must be dealt with by 2019. The opposing Brexit army abetted by MPs on both sides of the Commons, is advancing. Family lawyers cannot just say: ‘wait, we aren’t ready to fight’. We just have to work harder to prepare battle positions: ie a fresh Brussels IIA.
The ‘bespoke’ solution sounds a little like the second option put forward by family lawyers in reply to Brexit (October 2017). If nothing is ‘bespoken’, separating families and their children will fall off the famous Brexit cliff edge; and this is not for lack of warning. The problems families will suffer as outlined in the earlier part of the speech were predicted by the Supreme Court over a year ago in R (Miller & anor) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union  UKSC 5,  2 WLR 583 at para .
The painful fact of the matter is that unless EU and the Tories agree to keep such instruments as Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility (‘Brussels IIA’) on hold families like the one in the earlier part of Lady Sherlock’s will fall into a Brexit void where few hold will be barred between competing jurisdictions.
The Ministry of Justice and practising lawyers must get their heads together with individual jurisdictions to work out what reciprocity can be agreed following EU withdrawal and to agree how this is to be enforced. For the sake of the families and their children concerned, surely those who support EU withdrawal can agree that the European Court of Justice continue to have jurisdiction in those few cases where a neutral arbiter is needed?
3 I am very worried that Ministers appear to have given no attention to what they will do about this area. I have heard not a single thing telling us what they will do. By the time we get to Committee—where I intend to return to this—I very much hope that the Government are in a better position.
4 I have a final word on children. Children’s charities are deeply concerned about whether our law will be sufficiently robust and comprehensive to protect vulnerable children post Brexit. For example, not all the provisions of the EU anti-trafficking directive 2011 were brought into domestic law, which will leave real gaps in safeguards, for example for unaccompanied minors.
The issues over children go must wider than anti-trafficking (crucial though this is). EU law is much more firm and clear – though still not always followed by UK law (as I explain ). UK is bound by eg Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), which the Government proposes to ditch. This gives children rights to express their views which still need clearer procedural expression in English and Welsh law. Outside EU there is a real risk that children’s rights will again suffer. The massive advances of Children Act 1989 twenty-five years later and without the impetus of EU law reform look tawdry in the area of children rights.
Without Brussels IIA children in care will find themselves caught in a jurisdictional cross-fire where parents leave UK, and children are in care in England and Wales (Brussels IIA Art 15: there are a number of recent reported decisions on this see eg Redbridge LBC v D, E, F and G (Children : Art 15 – transfer of the proceedings)  EWHC 3078 (Fam) (19 September 2017), HHJ Carol Atkinson as High Court judge).
Children law and children’s rights to be heard must be made more clear preferably by statute.
Without this families and children will suffer.

References: EWCA 
 art. 6
in fine
 Art 6
 Art 6
 Art 6
 EWCA 
 Art 6
 Art 6
 Art 6
 CJEU 
 CJEU 
 UKSC 
 Art 15
 Art 15