Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2018/a-17-17.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:39:01+00:00

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › New Jersey Case Law › Supreme Court of New Jersey Decisions › 2018 › New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. R.L.M.
Plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) brought a guardianship action against R.L.M. and J.J., seeking to terminate their parental rights to their daughter R.A.J. At a case management conference early in the proceeding, J.J. told the court that he did not want an attorney appointed for him. As the conference continued, J.J.’s previously assigned counsel continued to speak on his behalf. At the second case management conference, J.J. left the courtroom before the conference began. At the third conference, J.J. stated that he wanted to retain substitute counsel. The judge noted that J.J.’s assigned counsel would continue to represent him pending any substitution of attorney. J.J. did not retain private counsel. At the final case management conference and the pretrial conference, J.J.’s assigned counsel represented him; J.J. declined to appear. The Court granted J.J.’s petition for certification, in which he claimed only that he was entitled to a new trial by virtue of the trial court’s denial of his request to represent himself. "Although a parent’s decision to appear pro se in this complex and consequential litigation represents poor strategy in all but the rarest case," the New Jersey Supreme Court found N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 plainly authorized that parent to proceed unrepresented. "The parent’s right of self-representation, however, is by no means absolute. That right must be exercised in a manner that permits a full and fair adjudication of the dispute and a prompt and equitable permanency determination for the child." In this case, the the Supreme Court found the trial court properly denied J.J.’s "untimely and ambivalent claim."
New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. R.L.M. and J.J.
PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court.
assigned counsel would continue to represent him pending any substitution of attorney. J.J.
conference, J.J.’s assigned counsel represented him; J.J. declined to appear.
attorney improperly refused to follow his instructions. The trial court denied J.J.’s request.
fact and expert witnesses, the trial judge concluded that the best interests of R.A.J.
necessitated the termination of the parental rights of R.L.M. and J.J.
relaxed pursuant to Rule 1:1-2(a). Id. at 148.
himself.  231 N.J. 414 (2017).
J.J.’s untimely and ambivalent claim.
VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
In the Matter of the Guardianship of R.A.J., a minor.
450 N.J. Super. 131 (App. Div. 2017).
Defender Parental Representation, attorney; John A.
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and James D.
argued the cause for respondent R.A.J. (Joseph E.
Noel C. Devlin, of counsel and on the briefs).
parental rights pursuant to  N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15 to -20.
15.1(a)’s best-interests standard, and terminated the parental rights of R.L.M.
self-representation. We granted J.J.’s petition for certification.
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 plainly authorizes that parent to proceed unrepresented.
In this case, the court acted well within its discretion. Although J.J.
who is the subject of this appeal.
five older children were adopted, two by one family and three by another.
R.J., the Family Part made no finding that J.J. abused or neglected his son.
conducted an emergency removal of R.A.J. pursuant to  N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29.
seeking custody of R.A.J. The court granted that application.
nine times between May and December 2014.
in sufficient services to remedy the issues that had led to the Division’s action.
The Division filed a petition for guardianship pursuant to  N.J.S.A.
J.J. with respect to R.A.J.
courtroom before the conference began.
court instructed J.J.’s counsel to file a motion. Later in the conference, J.J.
arrange for any substitute counsel to confirm the representation in writing.
pending any substitution of attorney.
unrelated to any issues in the earlier proceeding involving his son R.J., J.J.
trial court asked J.J.’s attorney whether he sought to withdraw from the case.
serve J.J.’s interests in difficult circumstances.
and confirmed that J.J.’s assigned counsel would continue to represent him.
regarding J.J.’s son, R.J. The trial court observed that the dispute between J.J.
and awarded guardianship of R.A.J. to the Division.
defendants challenged the trial court’s best-interests findings under  N.J.S.A.
because the trial court had denied his application to represent himself.
An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s determination.
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Id. at 134.
court’s effort to achieve a fair result. Id. at 144-45.
147. The panel found no explicit right of self-representation in  N.J.S.A.
untimely invocation of the right of self-representation.
met its burden under  N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1.
process right of self-representation in termination of parental rights cases.
counsel for an indigent parent only at the parent’s request.
represent himself in the Division’s action to terminate his parental rights.
Predator Act (SVPA),  N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. D.Y.,  218 N.J. at 384.
court’s commitment order. In re Civil Commitment of D.Y.,  426 N.J. Super.
436, 441-47 (App. Div. 2012).
to New Jersey’s colonial past, is deeply established in our State. Id. at 374-76.
exceptions identified in statutes, court rules, and case law.” Id. at 365.
and appellate litigants in civil, probate, and family disputes. Id. at 376.
guardian of the party.” R. 1:21-1(a).
effective solution to these challenges.”  218 N.J. at 377.
counsel, or, if indigent, to the appointment of counsel at the State’s expense.
counsel.” Id. at 383 (alteration in original) (quoting  N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c)).
claims of self-representation in the SVPA setting.
set forth in Crisafi,  128 N.J. at 511-12).
license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.” Ibid. (quoting Faretta,  422 U.S.
litigant disrupts the hearing. Id. at 385-86.
court for a new hearing. Id. at 386.
of a child warrant the termination of parental rights.
family integrity.” In re Guardianship of K.H.O.,  161 N.J. 337, 347 (1999).
when a child is placed in foster care.” K.H.O.,  161 N.J. at 347.
responsibility to protect the welfare of children.” J.C.,  129 N.J. at 10.
DYFS v. L.J.D.,  428 N.J. Super. 451, 478 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting  N.J.S.A.
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
evidence that [addresses] the specific circumstances in the given case.” Ibid.
(quoting In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S.,  134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)).
may involve complicated, expert medical and psychological evidence.”).
prompt determination of the difficult issues before them.
children and indigent parents in termination of parental rights proceedings.” S.
preclude the parent from retaining private counsel.
termination of parental rights pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
not indigent is free to retain private counsel, but is not required to do so. Ibid.
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4, with  N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c).
termination of parental rights action must be represented by the Law Guardian.
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” DYFS v.
could elect to appear pro se.
assist our Family Part judges, we offer the following guidelines.
n.1 (2006) (citing Reddish,  181 N.J. at 587; Crisafi,  128 N.J. at 509).
meaningful colloquy” envisioned in the contested-adoption context in J.E.V.
representation. J.E.V.,  226 N.J. at 114.
principles of substantive or procedural due process, to represent themselves.
termination of parental rights action. See R.L.M.,  450 N.J. Super. at 142-47.
DCPP v. A.B.,  231 N.J. 354, 369 (2017) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare,  154 N.J.
de novo. See D.Y.,  218 N.J. at 373; Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.
of Manalapan,  140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
the court’s denial of J.J.’s request did not constitute error.
J.J. regarding the proceedings, the role of counsel, and the challenges that J.J.
his representation at that late date.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified.
representation claims that J.J. asserts in this Court. See DYFS v. B.R.,  192 N.J. 301, 305-09 (2007) (adopting standard set forth in Strickland v.
assistance of appellate counsel fails.

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