Source: http://doczz.net/doc/3603188/pardon-me--the-constitutional-case-against-presidential-self
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 21:02:25+00:00

Document:
Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996-1997).
nothing that circumscribes the power.. .
was prepared by Special Counsel James St. Clair. See Schorr. supra.
grand jury); Pete Yost, The 'Cleansing' Effect May Not W~ork. Associated Press Pol. Sev. Dcc 25. 1992.
said Bush was 'the subject now of our investigation."').
4. See, e.g., James Gill, Walsh's Quarry. NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE. Jan I. 1993. at B7. Schorr.
5. Gill, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
staffer says Bush "can't pardon himself"); Saul Friedman. Prosecutor Bashes Bush. NEWSDAY. Dcc 26.
undo the punishment the Senate doles out upon conviction."
Dec. 25, 1992), transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, NPR File (reporting that Walsh "doubts"
(editorial by lawyer/professor); see also Betty Parham & Gerrie Ferris, Q & A on the News, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Dec. 3, 1992, at A2 ("[A] self-pardon would be a tricky proposition and open to challenge.").
8. See Saul Friedman, Pardon Pirouette: Walsh to Drop Iran-ContraProsecutions,NEWSDAY, Dec.
9. U.S. CONST. art. It, § 2, cl. 1.
PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 54 (1941).
11. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 190 (Randall W.
"removal" and "disqualification" from ever holding federal office. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
12. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866); see also Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp.
the law. See HUMBERT, supra note 10, at 63 & n.45.
13. See HUMBERT, supra note 10, at 22.
such an amnesty to Vietnam War draft evaders. See CORWIN, supra note 11, at 198.
or taken part in." Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601, 32,602 (1974).
these methods, each of the arguments is presented here as analytically distinct.
16. See Osbom v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 477 (1875).
17. See HUMBERT, supra note 10, at 22.
18. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
(arguing that Presidents can pardon themselves); Frank J. Murray. Clinton's Words Fuel Pardon Talk.
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at Al (discussing legality of Clinton self-pardon); Paul Craig Roberts.
himself for his alleged Whitewater offenses).
only in passing. See Duker, supra note 10, at 504 (implying President can pardon self); Eric M. Freedman.
Peter M. Shane, Presidents,Pardons, and Prosecutors:Legal Accountability and the Separationof Power.
pardon self); Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges?. 142 U. PA. L REV 209.
"awkward," "troubling," and possibly a crime and grounds for impeachment. See Murray. supra note 20.
circumstances surrounding the decision" by the (prudentialist) court. Id.
are some traces of prudential arguments there.
at times a Bobbin-like ethical interpretation.
Framers did not affirmatively intend self-pardons to be valid.
in England. This history reveals three facts that are important for our purposes.
to determine their validity in America solely by looking to English precedent.
23. See, e.g., HUMBERT, supra note 10, at 134 (discussing influence of English "ideas of clemency"
Subsection III.B.2.a and Section IV.A, infra.
25. See HUMBERT, supra note 10, at 9; Duker, supra note 10, at 476.
Joseph Butterworth and Son 1820).
war against France. See id.
power provided a little less insulation.
of the pardon power in general, but also on self-pardons in particular.
extent, President Clinton, see Murray, supra note 20.
36. Duker, supra note 10, at 489.
38. See id. at 489-95.
despite his pardon. See id. at 495 & n.97.
between the two. See Duker, supra note 10, at 496-97 & n. 110.
41. See Duker, supra note 10, at 496 & nn.108-09.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
the possibility, it seems quite clear that they did not affirmatively intend selfpardons to be valid.
given that the Americans had just fought a war against a monarchy.
43. See Duker, supra note 10, at 497-500.
44. See id. at 500-01.
47. See id at 500.
federal criminal law's small purview at that time.
shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment." 2 THE RECORDS OF TiE FEDERAL Co.svE:N-'o% OF 1787.
language of the Act of Settlement, see supra note 40.
exclusive "in cases of" phrase).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. cf. 7.
postimpeachment mercy was not nearly as important.
the King than the reduced or shared powers of the states' governors.
guilt he can be impeached and prosecuted.
can be found in 2 RECORDS, supra note 49, at 626-27.
54. See id. at 419.
55. See id. at 426.
Danby case in unclear; it was never mentioned specifically in discussions of the pardon power.
Nevertheless, the parallel seems too striking to ignore.
57. 2 RECORDS, supra note 49, at 626.
letting slip the golden opportunity.
proved to be in the Danby case.
the pardon power should include treason and should vest in the President alone. See id. at 626-27.
60. See id. at 627. Connecticut was split and so its vote did not count on this motion. See id.
the pardon power could not protect him as it had King Charles II.
other words, perhaps the self-pardon was just lost in the translation.
Wilson that the President could have a new power.
61. See generally RECORDS, supra note 49.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
answer to the self-pardon question can be found in the Convention debates.
of self-pardons literally went without saying.
of a "guilty" President by pointing out that the President could be prosecuted.
the pardon power did not place the President above the law.
secure in the knowledge that a President could be prosecuted by his successor.
J.L. & POL. 555, 583-84 (1995), which mention Wilson's statements at Pennsylvania ratifying convention.
be issued instantly, well before the slow process of impeachment would have even begun.
64. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. § 4.
him pardoning himself (and for any crime, not just treason) not be even worse?
or that their silence indicates a conscious acceptance of self-pardons as valid.
the President above the law.
created provide more evidence that self-pardons are constitutionally disfavored.
of public opinion in determining pardon policies).
67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl.1.
States. 71 Second, "Cases of Impeachment" are excluded.72 The "simple"
however, that such a reading is simplistic and inaccurate.
only limitation on the underlying power being granted.
68. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
69. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
plain breadth of the text reflects a trust by the Framers that the power would not be abused.
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
hemmed in by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
reading the Constitution in a similarly holistic way.
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.12. This stands in contrast to thenext grant of pocr to Congress.
concerning the navy, which is not similarly restricted. See id. cl.13.
76. Id. art. III, § 3,cl.
78. See i. amend. VIII.
79. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Posverfrom the King.
could review and presumably invalidate such use of the clemency power on equal protection grounds "
Kobil argues that under current doctrine, presidential actions are subject to the cqual protection rcquirementSee id.
courts could extend it to the excluded class without voiding it. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U S. 356.
voiding law under which they were prosecuted).
80. U.S. CoNs'r. art. II, § I, cl.
be accurate. Congress presumably could not, for instance, restrict the "place"
this limit is not to be found in the Elections Clause itself.
id. art. VI, cl. 2. Other appointments have the procedural safeguard of Senate confirmation built in. See id.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
82. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
not imply ability to appoint its own campaign regulators independent of President's appointment power).
to forbid any but explicit exceptions).
Such uses of the maxim by the Court, however, have been controversial. See, e.g., Thornton, 115 S.
v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv.
be read expressio unius or without consulting the rest of the Constitution.
examined to provide a complete reading of the pardon power.
individual parts of its design.
for limits in the Constitution as a whole, not just the clause in question.
85. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
provisions (explicit and implicit) interrelate. Instead of treating the Constitution as a series of disjointed.
though, this Note maintains that the most convincing readings are those that preclude self-pardons.
number or increased the salaries of public offices for the benefit of its own members.").
Article V. The ConstitutionalLessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1993).
the majority party might be voted out of power in response to the pay raise.
93. See id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
the will of the majority.
their own Vice Presidents and run as a single ticket. See U.S. Co,.ST. amcnd. X11.
96. See generally Amar, supra note 95.
97. See infra Subsection IV.B.I.
causes odd results that anyone accepting self-pardons must confront.
99. See U.S. CONsT. art. I § 3, cl. 4.
100. See id. cl. 6.
101. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikran David Amar. Is the PresidentialSuccession Law Constitutional'.
when the Vice President is absent or when he is acting as the (Article II) President. See U.S. CONT. art.
I, § 3, cl. 5.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6.
preempt, not undo the work of courts.
104. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
contrasted exclusion to expulsion and noted that in the latter, the defendant could speak on his own behalf.
separation of powers as intended to prevent self-dealing).
thus seems a curious power to bestow.
108. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § I,cl.I (defining terms as four years in length); see also id. amend.
XXII (limiting Presidents to two elected terms).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
111. Other federal officials can enjoy immunity from federal prosecuuon after their term of service.
but they are enjoying a gift from the President, not a benefit of their office per se. What makes a selfpardon objectionable is that it is a self-dealt fruit of power.
ability to self-deal to pardons?
convict lightly; a petit jury, which can acquit; or a President, who can pardon.
President in the equation is his successor), why should he be able to go free?
the end of the line (e.g., Bush) or with little political capital left (e.g., Nixon).
before a new President took office. A swift impeachment would, however, eliminate this problem.
paragraph, the self-pardon clashes structurally with the Constitution even if there is a special prosecutor.
vest sole power to pardon in President).
counterevidence, to be sure, but it is readily distinguishable.
as King Charles II did, this would amount to a constructive self-pardon.
116. See supra text accompanying note 1.
119. See Bensky, supra note 6; Garry Wills. Bush's Shameless Finale. WASi. POST. Dec. 27. 1992.
120. See Friedman, supra note 8.
121. See id.; see also Yost, supra note 3.
against their leader. See supra text accompanying note 55.
His actions thus did not represent an indirect self-pardon.
mootness is very weak at best.
4. Counterargument: The PresidentHas "Suffered Enough"
to issue a self-pardon would do so, even if such a thing were constitutional.
Friedman, supra note 8 (quoting unnamed "source, who has worked closely with Walsh").
124. This point has been convincingly argued by historian Stephen Ambrose. See, e.g., Stephen E.
Ambrose, Why Didn't Nixon Burn the Tapes and Other Questions About Watergate, 18 NOVA L. REV.
125. A Life of Greatness, Tragedy, CINCINNATI PosT, Apr. 23, 1994, at IA.
79, at 617 (arguing that Nixon pardon "undoubtedly played a role" in Ford's defeat).
power, and return the favor.
to rule that self-pardons are valid. It is well established that the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors"
otherwise straightforward text to achieve minimal gains?
counts of impeachment against Andrew Johnson was "'corruptly usling] the pardoning power " Duker.
criminalized. Obviously, most crimes have little connection to the Constituion per sc. Thus. een if.
the example of the bribe-for-a-veto, the crime is not the pardon but rather the corruption underlying it.
others, the President would have a firm constitutional basis for defending his action as per se reasonable.
pardons as he wanted, but the last one he issued before leaving office would expose him to prosecution.
treason),13 thus sparing himself at least some potential dishonor on the sly.
would face all of these other penalties whether or not he pardoned himself.
successor President is better placed structurally to make that decision.
constitutionally anomalous and unprecedented in the constitutional structure.
of "sole" authority in these matters. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6.
132. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
133. This possibility is explored in Parham & Ferris, supra note 7.
134. See, e.g., supra note 15 (quoting Ford's general language pardoning Nixon).
law and finds that it dictates that the pardon power is not completely plenary.
135. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
offend the Constitution" standard); Virgin Islands v. Gereau. 592 F2d 192, 195 t3d Ctr 1979) (same.
is "almost absolute") (emphasis added).
147-48; Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380.
139. See supra note 70.
"offensiveness" of self-judging and flouting the rule of law.
is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it.
Marshall thus hearkened back to the English monarchical version of the power.
Calling the pardon "an act of grace" makes the power sound royal and plenary.
to replace the fiat of the King.
appears, however, this does not answer the self-pardon question.
would-be recipient of a pardon could refuse to accept it. See id. at 161.
142. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
143. Duker, supra note 10, at 509.
public grace, not private fiat.
directly in self-pardons, are germane to the Schick standard.
a death sentence could not refuse to accept it. See td. at 486-87. While not formally o.crruling Mlson.
not want to topple a venerable John Marshall opinion loudly if it could do so sub stlentto.
146. Biddle, 274 U.S. at 486.
148. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
system of government than a self-pardon.
149. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
150. Id. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.).
adhering to Chase's placement of natural law over constitutional text).
152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
"a republican remedy for the diseases [i.e., faction] most incident to republican government").
liability. See id. at 2233.
156. See id. ("No one should be judge in his own cause.") (citation omitted).
integral part of the structure of our constitutional government.
that the Constitution establishes a system in which the rule of law is supreme.
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
his own cause]) (citation omitted).
regarding a separate forum in which he had personal involvement. See 349 U S at 136 He was not.
however, judging himself. Nevertheless, this case shows that the Court is quite comfortable using self.
judging language as a basis for restraining the actions of government officials.
161. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
162. Id. at 163. The expression originally appeared in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. pt- 1.
163. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
inquiry; the Court disagreed. See id. at 219-20.
It is a message that has been received and amplified by subsequent Courts.
a significant structural theme. When combined with the theme of non-selfjudging, it provides plenty of fodder for the Schick test.
pardon power, forbidding those variations of it that "offend" the Constitution.
165. See supra text accompanying note 114.
166. See Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 368 (1906) (citing Lee, 106 U.S. at 220).
167. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246 (1979) (citing Lee, 106 U.S. at 220).
168. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (citing Lee, 106 U.S. at 220; Marbury, 5 U.S.
PresidentialPrivilegeAgainst Prosecution, 2 NEXUS (forthcoming 1997).
the political facts of the moment would distort our considered legal judgment.
171. GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL 173 (1979).

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