Source: https://www.legalindia.com/judgments/ramesh-dwarkadas-mehra-vs-indravati-dwarkadas-mehra-on-2-may-2001
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:25:23+00:00

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Posted On May 2, 2001 by &filed under Bombay High Court, High Court.
1. Notice of Motion No. 2172 of 1998 in Suit No. 2747 of 1998 was directed to be placed before this Bench by an order of the Hon’ble Chief Justice in exercise of the powers under Rule 28 of the High Court of Judicature Original Side Rules. 1980 for the said Notice of Motion could be more advantageously heard by this Bench along with Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 112 of 1998 and 121 of 1998 for deciding a common question of law which has arisen in all of them.
“Whether a Suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is tenable before the Presidency Small Cause Court under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 or should such a Suit be filed before the Civil Court?
a joint owner of the flat along with his brother (present Appellant) and their father. It was alleged that all of them had contributed to the purchase of the said flat. The Appellant herein had deposed supporting the case of Shashi, The said case was not accepted. A contention was also raised by Shashi that he was a “gratuitous licensee” and that the Small Cause Court had no Jurisdiction. But, the said contention was also rejected by the Appellate Court. In 1994, Suit No. 119 of 1990 filed against the Respondent was taken up for hearing. The Appellant had also raised similar defence of joint ownership. The Trial Court held that the Appellant was not the joint owner of the flat and that he was residing as a gratuitous licensee and that the licence was terminated. It was held that the Suit under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 was maintainable. In the Appeal filed by the Appellant, namely, Appeal No. 75 of 1995, the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, by an order dated 6th October, 1997, confirmed the finding that the Appellant was not the joint owner of the flat. It was held that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to decide the Suit. Hence, the order came to be passed returning the Plaint for presentation to the proper Court. Against the said judgment, the Respondent herein preferred Writ Petition No. 5986 of 1997 before this Court. The said Writ Petition was allowed by the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 13th/15th April 1998. Aggrieved by the said order, the Appellant herein has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal.
dismissed by the judgment dated 3rd March 1997 of the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court at Bombay confirming the finding that the Small Causes Court. Bombay had jurisdiction to decide the Appeal. Against the said order, the Appellants herein preferred Writ Petition No. 2336 of 1997 in this Court. The learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dated 13th/15th April 1998 dismissed the said Writ Petition. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the Appellants have preferred the Letters Patent Appeal.
5. The Suit has been brought by the Plaintiff for a declaration that the Plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the suit flat; for a declaration that the Defendants are the gratuitous, licensees of the Plaintiff and her husband being members of the family and consequently they have no right, title or interest of whatsoever nature in the Suit and for recovery of possession of the suit premises. It is the case of the Plaintiff herself in the Plaint that the suit flat has been given to the Defendants for residence gratuitously. Notice of Motion No. 2172 of 1998 was taken out in the Suit for interim reliefs. When the Notice of Motion was heard, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Defendants that the dispute is one which has to be exclusively tried by the Small Causes Court by virtue of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. In view of different views taken by different Single Judges, the learned Single Judge hearing the Notice of Motion (Mrs. K. K. Baam, J.) was of the opinion that the issue had to be referred to a larger Bench for decision. Consequently, by an order made by the learned Chief Justice, this Notice of Motion has been assigned to us.
6. Though these are the only matters assigned to us by orders of learned Chief Justice, we have permitted Advocates in several other matters to intervene and address submissions to us as the decision taken by us on the issue would have an effect on the final determination of their matters.
7. One set of Counsel who appeared before us canvassed that a Suit between the licensor and licensee relating to recovery of possession of immovable property, where the licence is a gratuitous licensee, would lie exclusively before the Small Causes Court in Mumbai. Another set of Counsel controverted this view and contended that such a Suit does not fall within the ambit of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and would be entertainable by the regular Civil Court – the City Civil Court, or the High Court on its Original Side, depending upon the valuation of the Suit.
Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Brig. Sukhjit Singh; (vide paragraph 30) where it observes that “payment of licence fees is not an essential attribute for the subsistence of the licence”.
9. The concept of licence is contradistinguish able from the concepts of easement and interest in property. Licence is purely a personal right created and terminable at will, which may or may not be supported by material consideration. That is the reason why Section 56 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 provides that a licence is not transferable and Section 56 provides that where the grantor of the licence transfers the property affected thereby, the transferee is not bound by the licence already granted. Section 60 provides that a licence may be revoked by the grantor at will. There are, however, two known exceptions to this. First, where the licence is coupled with transfer of property and such transfer is in force. Second, where the licensee acting upon the licence has executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution thereof. Section 61 of the Indian Easements Act. 1882 provides that revocation of a licence may be express or Implied. Section 62 indicates specific cases where, upon occurring of certain facts, a licence already granted is deemed to be revoked. Section 63 provides for the only right of the licensee where a licence is revoked for a reasonable time to leave the properly affected therein and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property. Section 64 provides that where a licence has been granted for a consideration and the licensee without any fault of his own is evicted by the grantor before has fully enjoyed the licence right, the licensee is entitled to recover compensation from the grantor.
“41. Summons against person occupying property without leave.
or been withdrawn and the tenant or occupier refused to deliver of such property after being requested in this behalf. The Section provided for a summary remedy of a summons being issued to the occupant calling upon him to show cause. If he failed to appear before the Court, or failed to show a good cause, Section 43 enabled an order directing the Bailiff of the Court to give possession of the property to the applicant if the Small Cause Court was satisfied that the applicant was entitled to apply under Section 69. Section 46 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 provided that an application for an order under Section 41 by an applicant, who was not entitled to possession of such property, would amount to an act of trespass committed by the applicant against the occupant, irrespective of whether possession was obtained as a result of the application. Section 47 empowered the Small Causes Court to stay the proceedings on the application until the person aggrieved by such trespass could file a Suit in the High Court for compensation. If a decree was obtained by the occupant in any such Suit against the applicant, such decree would supersede the order, if any, made under Section 43. Section 48 applied the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, as far as possible, to such proceedings. Section 49 provided that recovery of possession of any immovable property under the said procedure was not a bar to the Institution of the Suit in the High Court for deciding the title thereto.
11. The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, under Section 41 gave a summary remedy for recovery of possession of immovable property of the prescribed value. Section 41 also dealt with cases of a tenant or a person or an occupant by permission holding to the Immovable property after such tenancy or permission was determined or withdrawn. It is interesting to notice that though the Indian Easements Act. 1882 had already come into force on 17th February 1882, and contained Chapter VI (Sections 52 to 64) together with the definition of the expression “licence”, Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 did not use the expression “licence”, but used the expression “permission”. It is also to be noticed that the expression “permission” was not qualified as being supported by any material consideration.
12. In 1963, vide Maharashtra Amendment Act. 1963 (Maharashtra Act XLI of 1963), Section 42A was added in Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. This laid down a procedure where the occupant contested an application made under Section 41 by claiming to be a lawful tenant. There was a self-contained procedure for determining the list. Taking notice of the coming into force of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, Section 42A provided that even if the occupant raised the defence that he was a “tenant” within the meaning of the Rent Act, then notwithstanding anything contained in the aforesaid Act, the Small Causes Court would decide the issue as a preliminary issue. There was a provision for appeal made under Section 42A and a provision that no further appeal would lie against such a decision.
of the tenants. They did not have any special or separate definition of “licence”, nor did they deal with “licensees”.
14. On 13th February, 1947, the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “Rent Act, 1947”) was brought into force which consolidated the law relating to control of rent. Even this Act as enacted originally did not deal with licence, licensees or their rights.
15. The Act as originally enacted deals only with the rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants as defined in the Act. There was large scale attempt to evade the rigour of the Act by creating what were known as “leave and licence” agreements. These agreements usually had a short period, not exceeding eleven months, and were renewed from time to time. Such agreements specifically declared that they were mere “licences” for consideration and did not create any right of tenancy or any other right in the immovable property.
The Bill also prohibited taking of or charging of licence fees in excess of standard rent and permitted increases and for reasonable amount of amenities and services.
have occasion to make reference later.
18. By Maharashtra Amendment Act XIX of 1976, entire Chapter VII containing Sections 41 to 49 was replaced by Sections 41 to 45. Section 41 as enacted by Act XIX of 1976 was amended by deleting the words “or any other law for the time being in force” in sub-section (1) by Maharashtra Act XXIV of 1984. Chapter VII as presently applicable provides for an appeal vide Section 42, the procedure to be followed in the proceedings vide Section 43 and finally Section 45 declares that nothing contained in the Chapter shall be deemed to be a bar to a party to a Suit, appeal or proceedings, from suing in a competent Court to establish question of title to immovable property.
Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 1882, in its pre-1976 form, enabled the proceeding being brought against an “occupant” who failed to deliver up the Immovable property after the permission given to him to occupy the properly had been terminated or withdrawn. The word “permission” used in the Section means the same thing as the formal word “licence” used in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. A “licence” may or may not be for material consideration. After Section 41 was amended in 1976, the Section has made it explicit and permitted a proceeding by a “licensor” against a “licensee” relating to the recovery of possession of any immovable property situated in Greater Bombay or relating to the recovery of the licence fees or charges or rent therefor, irrespective of the value of the subject matter of such suits or proceedings. Sub-section (2) of Section 41, of course, excludes the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court where such suits are covered by some special enactments. It is contended that the expressions “licensor” and “licensee” used in Section 41 are unqualified and have to be given their wide meaning without injecting into them an element of material consideration. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Brig. Sukhjit Singh (supra) is pressed into service to contend that consideration is not a sine qua nan of a “licence”.
Act makes it clear that it is an Act which is cognate and pan” materia with Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. Further, by the application of principle of Noscitur a sociis, the expression “licensor” and “licence” being in the company of the expressions landlord and tenant and recovery of license fees or charges or rent suggests that the “licence” referred to in Section 41 must be one for consideration and not a mere gratuitous licence.
21. Both sets of Counsel have argued ably and supported their arguments by reference to a number of authorities some of which we shall have occasion to deal with.
22. In Vishwanath Sawant v. Gandabhai Kikabhai, a learned Single Judge of this Court, analysing the nature of a licence, took the view that licence could be of two kinds, namely, a bare licence which is a matter of personal privilege and a licence coupled with a grant or interest. While a bare licence without anything more is always revocable at the will and pleasure of the licensor and is not assignable, a licence coupled with grant or interest cannot in general be revoked so as to defeat the grant to which it is incidental. The learned Single Judge referred to the definition of the expression “licence” in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act and then observed : “In my judgment, it is only when a licence is created as of right that it can be covered under the provisions of Section 52. When a permission is afforded not as of right but as of grace or where a permission is afforded, it is incidental or ancillary to say a family arrangement, an arrangement of employment or the like, the same would not amount to a licence under Section 52. The transaction has to partake the nature of a commercial transaction for valuable consideration before it can partake the nature of a right envisaged by Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act.” We notice that this observation is directly contrary to the view of the Supreme Court in Briq. Sukhjit Singh’s case (supra). In Briq. Sukhjit Singh (supra), the Supreme Court in categorical terms has held that payment of licence fees is not an essential attribute for the subsistence of a licence.
Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 or Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act were held not applicable. It was held that the Defendant was not entitled to the protection of Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act inasmuch as occupation was not coupled with and under a subsisting licence as on 1st February 1973. Though this judgment is correct on the facts of the case, it does not afford any assistance to us in deciding the issue that is posed before us. The view taken by the learned Single Judge that a person who was inducted on to the premises initially as a licensee and whose licence came to be terminated later on, could be treated as a mere trespasser, with respect, appears to be contrary to the view taken by the Division Bench of our High Court in Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli v. Haribhai Manibhai Patel.
24. In Nagin’s case (supra), a similar contention was raised, namely, that when the relationship of licensor and licensee had been terminated by efflux of time or by termination of licence, the erstwhile licensee turns into a trespasser and, therefore, the Civil Court would have Jurisdiction to entertain a Suit for recovery of possession. The contention was that Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 dealt with the case of licensor and licensee and landlord and tenant. It was urged that a person whose licence had been cancelled would cease to be a licensee and would be a rank trespasser and, therefore, not be covered by Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. This contention was categorically rejected by the Division Bench which pointed out that the use of the words “a licensor and licensee” and “a landlord and tenant” in the said Section 41 had no such particular significance or effect as canvassed and that these words have been used in accordance with a very well-settled and normal legislative drafting practice. In various statutes dealing with rights and obligations arising out of jural or contractual relationship and enforcement of such rights and obligations the parties are described by the legal character they bear. The Division Bench gave a number of illustrations of the principle by which parties are described by the character which they held, or once held, as a means of identification or a label to point out the particular rights and obligations which arise out of such relationship either during its subsistence or after its termination i.e. existing relationship or erstwhile relationship. The contention that the moment a licence is terminated, the licensee turns into a trespasser was categorically rejected by the Division Bench. We are, therefore, of the view that though the conclusion in Vishwanath (supra) may be right, the reasoning on which it is based appears to be erroneous and contrary to the principle laid down in Nagin’s case (supra).
may not supported by any material consideration, but arising out of familial relationship, love or affection. This is a far cry from saying that such a licence would not be one within the meaning of Section 52 of the Easements Act. We have already pointed out that Section 52 in turns does not rule out a licence being granted for consideration other than material.
26. In Conrad Dias (supra), the Defendant was a member of the family who was a son who had fallen into the bad books of the father and was sought to be injuncted from entering or continuing to remain in the suit premises. The learned Single Judge took the view that the pleadings in the case showed that question of title and adverse possession was raised. The learned Single Judge was of the view that even if Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 was attracted, it did not specifically bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by reason of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. He further relied upon Section 45 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 which keeps open the option to a party to bring a suit, appeal or proceeding in which a question of title to any immovable property arises. Then the learned Single Judge considered the arguments on the assumption that the Defendant could be called a gratuitous licensee residing in the house of his father. While deciding the case on this assumption, the learned Single Judge distinguished the cases of Nagin M. Dagli v. Haribhai M. Patel, Eknath Vithal v. Mansukhlal, and Hoshang Rustomji Dotiwala v. Rustomji E. Dotiwala,3 and preferred to rely on the judgment in Vlshwanath (supra) and concluded by observing that Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 does not apply to a suit filed by a father against a son either for possession or for injunction.
27. The same learned Judge (Vaidyanatha, J.) also decided the case of P. Vijaykumar and others v. V. C. Gopalkrishnan, This judgment was decided on the concession that it was not disputed that a gratuitous licensee is not one covered under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. (See observations in paragraph 10) and also by following Vishwanath’s case (supra).
jurisdiction to try such Suit, was pressed into service. Here again, the learned Single Judge followed the judgment in Vishwanath (supra) and over-ruled the preliminary objection raised to the tenability of the suit on the ground that the Defendant was a rank trespasser.
29. In S. B. Parab and others v. Dr. Mrs. Roshan S. Boyce, the Defendant was permitted to occupy the premises free of rent since her husband was working under the Plaintiff. Since there was no evidence adduced by the Defendant to show that any rent was paid to the licensor, it was held that the licence was not for any consideration and that the Defendant being a gratuitous licensee, it was not a licence within the meaning of the Rent Act, that it was a special privilege given to the licensee which came to an end on his death. Here again, the learned Single Judge preferred to follow the ruling in Vishwanath’s case (supra) that the Civil Court had jurisdiction.
130. In Vijay K. Divekar v. Deepak J. Gandhi and others, the Defendant was temporarily given permission to occupy the suit premises without any charge. The Court held that the Defendant was a gratuitous licensee and, therefore, not entitled to protection of Sections 4A and 15A of the Bombay Rent Act. On an analysis of Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, read with Sections 4A and 15A, the learned Single Judge was of the view that, having regard to the ingredients of the latter two Sections, their application excludes a gratuitous licensee from the protection of Section 15A. Consequently, Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act would not apply to such a case and, therefore, the ordinary Civil Court (the City Civil Court in that case) would continue to have jurisdiction for recovery of the possession of the premises from the gratuitous licensee. On the facts it was found that though the Respondent-Defendant was put in exclusive possession of the premises and continued to remain in possession of the suit under a licence which was subsisting on 1st February 1973, since the Appellant was a gratuitous licensee, he was not covered by Section 15A of the Rent Act, nor protected under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. Consequently, it was held that City Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Suit.
31. These are the judgments which were relied upon to support the proposition that a Suit for recovery of possession given under a gratuitous licensee did not fall within the provisions of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.
32. After having carefully considered all these judgments, we are of the view that none of these judgments lays down the wide proposition as contended. In the factual matrix of each case, a particular view has been taken, the correctness of which is not the subject matter before us. We have, therefore, decided to approach the matter on basic principles.
the request made in that behalf. In such circumstances, the Section permitted an application to be made to the Small Cause Court against the occupant calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be compelled to deliver up the property.
34. Section 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 enabled the Small Causes Court, if no good cause was shown, to issue an order to the Bailiff to recover possession of the property. It Js interesting to note that at this juncture there was no exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Small Causes Court. Section 46 enabled the occupant, if aggrieved by the order of the Court, to file a suit in the Civil Court. Similarly, there was nothing in Section 41 or in the Letters Patent which conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Small Causes Court.
35. After its amendment in 1963, by Maharashtra Act XLI of 1963, Section 42A was added to the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. This Section provides that if the occupier of the immovable property called upon to hand over possession raises a contention that he was a tenant of the immovable property within the meaning of the Bombay Rent Act and consequently entitled to protection thereunder, then notwithstanding anything contained in the Rent Act, such a question had to be decided by the Small Cause Court as a preliminary issue. There was also a provision for an appeal. It is of significance that Section 41 remained unamended at this stage and still continued to use the expression “permission”. Nowhere did the Act uses the expression “licensor” or “licensee”.
36. We find that the expression “licensor and licensee” came to be used for the first time when Section 41 was amended by Maharashtra Amendment Act XIX of 1976. The marginal note of Section 41 was changed to “Suits or proceedings between licensors and licensees or landlords and tenants for recovery of possession of immovable property and licence fees or rent, except to those to which other Acts apply to lie to Small Cause Court.” This Section, for the first time, was re-worded to deal with proceedings between licensor and licensee relating to the recovery of possession of an immovable property or relating to the recovery of licence fee or charges or rent. This Section was given an overriding effect as indicated by the non-obstante clause “Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act” and the suit lay in the Small Causes Court irrespective of the value of the subject matter of such suit or other proceeding. Sub-section (2) excluded the operation of sub-section (1) to the cases covered by the Bombay Rent Act, the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. 1888, the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 and such other Acts. Provision for appeal and revision were added. Section 43 provided that in all suits, appeals and proceedings in Chapter VII, the Small Causes Court, as far as possible, follow, the procedure and, unless excepted, follow the procedure under the Civil Procedure Code. Section 45 kept open a right of the party to a proceeding in which a question of title to immovable property arises and is determined, to sue in a competent Court to establish his title to such property.
large scale evasion of the provisions of the Act by entering into “Leave and Licence” agreements for limited short periods. To remedy the situation, and to bring such cases under the purview of the Act, by the amendment carried out by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973, Section 15A was added to the Bombay Rent Act for giving protection to such “licensees” who were in occupation of any premises or any part thereof being not less than one room as licensees, whose licence was in subsistence on 1st February 1973. Similarly, the expression “tenant” was amended by the same Act so as to apply to such licensee as shall be deemed to be tenant for the purposes of the Act by Section 15A. It was this amendment of 1973 which applied the provisions of the Rent Act and gave protection under the Act to the class of “licensees” who were occupying specific premises as on the cut off date i.e. 1st February 1973. In our view, the inspiration for using the expression “licensee” in Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, must have been derived from this amendment of 1973 carried out in the Bombay Rent Act. We cannot be unmindful of the fact that Section 51 of the Bombay Rent Act provides that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, references to suits or proceedings in the Bombay Rent Act, shall include reference to proceedings under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and references to decrees in the Rent Act shall include references to final orders in such proceedings. That the two Acts are cognate, and have to be read in conjunction as complementing each other, is clearly postulated in Section 51 of the Bombay Rent Act.
38. An accepted canon of interpretation is that the meaning of expressions not defined in statute can be derived from a cognate part materia statute, whether earlier or later. (See in this connection Attorney General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, and J. K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India. This fortifies the view that the expression “licensor” and “licensee” used in Section 41 of the 1882 P.S.S.C. Act, have the same meaning as in Section 5(4A) of the Bombay Rent Act. That the Bombay Rent Act and Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 are pari materia, is incontrovertible in view of the specific provision made in Section 51 of the Bombay Rent Act. The expression “licence” not having been defined in the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 must, therefore, derive its meaning from the expression “licensee” as used in Section 5(4a) of the Bombay Rent Act.
charge or rent, is not merely accidental. There is close association and this is a case where the principle Noscitur a sociis would clearly be applicable-We are, therefore, of the view that the expressions “licensor and licensee” used in Section 41 derive their colour from the expression “landlord and tenant”. The latter is a relationship based on material consideration; the same concept must, therefore, colour and permeate the expression “licensor and licensee”. Further, the use of the expression “licence fee, charge or rent” in close juxtaposition is also not without reason, and must colour the expression “licensor and licensee” used in the Section. The observations of Supreme Court in The State of Bombay and others v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, (vide paragraph 9) and in M. K. Ranganathan and another v. Govt. of Madras and others, (vide paragraphs 21 and 22) and in M/s. Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, (vide paragraphs 12) support this canon of interpretation of the statute.
40. In the judgment in M. K. Ranganathan (supra). Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph 19 that though the Statement of Objects and Reasons is certainly not admissible as an aid to the construction of a statute, it may be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil which was sought to remedied. If a plea of tenancy was raised and succeeded, the matter would again have to be tried by the Small Causes Court. Conversely, in a proceeding initiated in the Small Causes Court on the footing of tenancy. If a defence of licence was taken and succeeded, the plaint would have to be returned and re-presented to the City Civil Court or the High Court depending on the valuation. It was considered that this caused unnecessary delay, expense and hardship to the suit or to move from Court to Court and have the issue of jurisdiction decided. Further, Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 did not preclude separate sutts on title where relationship admittedly was not between that of a landlord and tenant. In order to overcome these difficulties, and to eliminate delay, expenses and hardship to the suitor, and to have uniformity of procedure, the amendments were carried out in the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 1882 “so that all suits and proceedings between a landlord and tenant or a licensor and a licensee for recovery of possession of premises or for recovery of rent or licence fee irrespective of the value of the subject matter should go and be disposed of by Small Causes Court either under that Act or the Rent Control Act”. The context in which the amendment was made thus becomes very important and Haydon’s rule of identifying the mischief and eliminating it, becomes relevant.
(a) Suits between a landlord and a tenant relating to recovery of possession of premises or rent, irrespective of the value of the subject matter, would have to be filed in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act.
(b) Suits and proceedings for the recovery of licence fees between a licensor and a licensee falling within the provisions of Section 5(4A) of the Bombay Rent Act also had to be instituted in the Small Causes Court irrespective of the value of the subject matter. Section 5(4A) of the Bombay Rent Act mostly applied to licences for material consideration but also contains an inclusive and exclusive provision. Section 5(4A) read with Sections 7, 20 and 28 of the Bombay Rent Act covered only suits between licensor and licensee for recovery of licence fees and did not cover suits between licensor and licensee for recovery of possession of licensed property.
(c) Suits between licensors and licensees for recovery of possession of premises were required to be filed either in the Presidency Small Causes Court or in the City Civil Court or in the High Court depending on the rack rent of the property concerned.
(d) Suits between licensors and licensees for recovery of licence fees, in cases not covered by the Bombay Rent Act, were required to be brought in the Presidency Small Causes Court, City Civil Court or the High Court according to the value of the subject matter i.e. the amount of licence fees involved.
42. It was pointed out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Bill L. C. Bill No. XXI of 1975 that, depending on whether plea of licensee/tenancy succeeded in one or the other Court, the plaint would be returned and the suitorwould have to recommence his long and arduous challenge in another Court. The Bill was intended to cut through this Gordian knot to save public time and money and avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardships to suitors. By the amendment carried out in Section 41, all suits of the type indicated therein were brought within the Jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court irrespective of the value of the subject matter.
This obviously contemplates a situation of licence for consideration for otherwise the plea of tenancy could not be raised. The other situation contemplated under the Statement of Objects and Reasons is where proceedings on the basis of tenancy has started in the Small Causes Court “and subsequently the defence of licence is taken and succeeds” .
Here again, the suit could not have been filed on the basis of a tenancy, if the licence was gratuitous. Thus, it appears to us that the factual situation which was in the contemplation of the Legislature when bringing forward the amendment to Section 41 by Act XXI of 1975, did not include a gratuitous licensee. Thus, we are fortified in our thinking that the amendment to Section 41, despite its somewhat wide language, was not intended to apply to gratuitous licensee.
46. Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani and others. I s an authority for the well settled proposition that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be strictly construed. [See also the observations of the Supreme Court in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi and others, and Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and others,.
47. With these principles in mind, let us now scan the provisions of Section 41 and see the extent to which the jurisdiction of Civil Court is intended to be excluded thereunder.
48. Ex-facie reading of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 does not indicate that the jurisdiction of Civil Court is excluded thereunder. In fact, the wording of Section 41 would suggest that the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court is in addition to and not to the exclusion of the competent Civil Court. In Nagin (supra) this issue was considered by the Division Bench of our High Court. A contention was specifically raised that Section 41 gave concurrent jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court without taking away the jurisdiction the High Court on its Original Side or the Bombay City Civil Court possessed prior to the coming into force of the 1976 Amending Act. This Court rejected the contention by placing reliance on the amendment carried out to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court and Section 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948. The Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 and the Bombay High Court Letters Patent Act, 1948 were both brought into force simultaneously on 16th August 1948 by Notification dated 14th August 1948. The cumulative effect of these two amendments was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to receive, try and determine any suit cognizable either by the Presidency Small Causes Court at Bombay or the Bombay City Civil Court. It was for this reason that the Division Bench overruled the contention and held that where a suit is cognizable either by the Bombay City Civil Court or the Bombay Presidency Small Causes Court, the High Court would not have concurrent jurisdiction to try such, a suit. Thus, a suit which falls within Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and is cognizable by the Small Causes Court, would not be cognizable by the City Civil Court by reason of Section 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 and would not be cognizable by the High Court on the Original Side by reason of the amendment to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Thus, the result is that Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Court i.e. the Bombay City Civil Court upto its pecuniary jurisdiction, and thereafter the Original Side of the High Court.
49. Having reached the conclusion that Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of matters made cognizable by the Small Causes Court, the principle of stricto construction must, therefore, apply. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot he said to have been taken away beyond what was intended.
Courts Act, 1882 were those in the case of a non-gratuitous licence i.e. a licence for material consideration. It is only such cases of licenses supported by material consideration which fall under Section 41 which are excluded from the purview of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction and vested exclusively in the Small Causes Court.
(iv) relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charges or rent thereof.
Thereafter the Supreme Court referred to the Plaint and pointed out that the Plaintiffs had claimed relief on the basis that they were licensees on monetary consideration and the Defendants were the licensors. Hence, condition No. (i) was held satisfied. While dealing with Condition No. (iii), the Supreme Court interpreted the words “relating to the recovery of possession of any property” as being of wide import so as to take in their sweep any Suits in which the grievance is made that the Defendant is threatening to illegally recover possession from the Plaintiff-licensee. It was held that Suits for protecting such possession of immovable property against the alleged illegal attempts on the part of the Defendants to forcibly recover possession would be covered by the wide sweep of the words “relating to recovery of possession” employed by Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. Thus, a Suit for injunction was held to fall within Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 1882.
a licensor and licensee where the licence is gratuitous, though the Court referred to the pleading of the Plaintiff that he was a licensee for consideration. On the other hand, it appears to us that some of the observations in paragraph 14 of the judgment in Mansukhlal (supra) are significant and implicitly support the view we are inclined to take.
Thus, if the nature of the suits contemplated by Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act and Section 41 are same; then a fortiorari the character of the suitors must be the same; since the Bombay Rent contemplates all licensees to be non-gratuitous, Section 41 also must be held to contemplate the cases of proceedings between licensors and non-gratuitous licensees.
Court seems to have held is that the Court below did not appear to have committed any error in law in holding that the mother of the Appellant-Cawas Saher, being the sister of the Respondent, had been permitted to reside as a gratuitous licensee and further that the Courts below were right in holding that the Appellant could not be said to be a statutory tenant having inherited right from his mother or grand-mother. It was seriously contended that since the finding that the Appellant was a gratuitous licensee, whose licence had been revoked, had been expressly confirmed by the Supreme Court, this judgment of the Supreme Court must be held to decide, sub silentio, that the Small Causes Court has jurisdiction to entertain a Suit against a gratuitous licensee for recovery of possession of immovable property. We are afraid that it is not possible to read such a ratio in this judgment. As observed by the Privy Council in Quinn v. Leathem,.
We are not inclined to accept that there is any such ratio decidendi in this judgment as contended by the learned Counsel. The question of the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to entertain a Suit against a gratuitous licensee was neither raised, nor considered, nor answered by the Supreme Court in this judgment.
55. Thus, considered from all points of view, we are of the view that Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 invests jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court to entertain proceedings between licensor and licensee only where the licence is not gratuitous, i.e. It is for a consideration other than material.
56. A number of other authorities were also cited at the bar but we have not referred to all of them as we do not think them to be of assistance in deciding the controversy before us.
(a) in the result, we allow the Letters Patent Appeals and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge (P. S. Patankar, J.) dated 13th/15th April 1998 passed in Writ Petition No. 2336 of 1997 and Writ Petition No. 5986 of 1997.
(b) We uphold the judgment of the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court in Appeal No. 75 of 1995 holding that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to decide the Suit since the relationship between the parties was one of a gratuitous licensee. Consequently, Writ Petition No. 5986 of 1997 stands dismissed and Rule is discharged therein without any order as to costs.
(c) We allow Writ Petition No. 2336 of 1997 and make the Rule absolute quashing and setting aside the judgment dated 3rd March 1997 made by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court at Bombay in Appeal No. 72 of 1990 upholding the trial Court’s judgment dated 21st December 1989 made in Ejectment Application No. 378/E of 1968. Ejectment Application No. 378/E of 1968 is, therefore, dismissed as without jurisdiction. No order as to costs.
(d) We overrule the preliminary objection raised in Notice of Motion No. 2172 of 1998 and in Suit No. 2747 of 1998 and hold that the Suit is within the jurisdiction of this Court on the Original Side and we direct that the Suit be disposed of in accordance with law.
59. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this Judgment duly authenticated by the Sheristedar/Associate of this Court.
60. Issuance of certified copy expedited.

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 Application No. 378
 Application No. 378