Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-dadi
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:47:58+00:00

Document:
James Lee Turner, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Houston, TX, for United States.
Roland E. Dahlin, II, Fed. Pub. Def., Renata Ann Gowie, Asst. Fed. Pub. Def. (argued), Houston, TX, for Dadi.
Before KING, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
The 17-count superseding indictment charged Ali Reza Dadi with one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of aiding and abetting bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and 15 counts of aiding and abetting the conduct of monetary transactions with criminally derived property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. A jury trial was held in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, and on March 26, 1999, the jury found Dadi guilty on all counts. On April 16, the district court denied Dadi's post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal and then ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSR). In carrying out that task, the probation officer grouped the offenses and based Dadi's offense level on the Sentencing Guideline applicable to a violation of the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Under that Guideline, Dadi's base offense level was 17. Four levels were then added under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.2(b)(2) for the amount of money derived from the bank fraud (more than $600,000). Four additional levels were added since Dadi was an organizer or leader in the offense which involved more than five participants. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).
Before sentencing, the government filed a notice of intent to enhance the sentence for committing the offense while on release on another offense ( 18 U.S.C. § 3147 and U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7) but the district court rejected this enhancement. On July 12, the district court sentenced Dadi to serve 84 months in prison, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. The court also ordered Dadi to pay $161,239 in restitution and $1,700 in special assessments. The clerk entered a notice of appeal on Dadi's behalf, and a federal defender was appointed to represent him on appeal. The government cross-appealed the district court's rejection of the § 2J1.7 enhancement.
Dadi also deposited counterfeit checks into the bank accounts of Southwest Oil Company and NM Petrochemical Company, which were maintained at Texas Commerce Bank and Highlands Bank, respectively. Those accounts had been opened by Naser Khayambashi. On May 30, 1997, a counterfeit check for $130,000, drawn on Gillman Auto Group's account at Nationsbank in North Carolina, was deposited into the Southwest Oil account at Texas Commerce Bank. On June 5, a $77,650 counterfeit Gillman check was deposited into the same account.
A check for $50,000 was later drawn on the Southwest Oil account, payable to Siamak Mackvandian, who used the proceeds to purchase a Texas Commerce Bank check for $41,000 payable to Logistic Express. This check was signed by Khayambashi. Mackvandian deposited that check into his Logistic Express account at Wells Fargo Bank, and — two days later — issued a check drawn on that account for $30,000, payable to Dadi. Dadi used the proceeds of this check to purchase a Wells Fargo cashier's check in the amount of $20,500, which he deposited into his Frost National Bank account. Later, Mackvandian and Dadi issued a check for $4,000, drawn on the Wells Fargo Logistic Express account, payable to Mackvandian. The proceeds were provided to Dadi.
According to Mackvandian's testimony, Dadi had given him this counterfeit check, and the handwriting on the payable — to line looked like Dadi's. He also testified that the $9,000 remainder was received in cash, and split between Dadi and him.
Loretta Wolsey, a lead analyst for the fraud prevention unit of the Chase Bank of Texas, testified that Khayambashi had opened the Southwest Oil Company account. Khayambashi also owned NM Petrochemical. The $53,000 counterfeit check deposited into that account was drawn on one Ebrahim Yazdanpanah's account. Khayambashi was indicted by a Texas grand jury in connection with that counterfeit check.
A check was drawn on the NM Petrochemical account (into which counterfeit checks had been deposited) for $52,000, payable to Homa Dadi, who deposited the check into her Coastal Banc account. The drawee was designated in Dadi's handwriting. The following day, Dadi and Homa Dadi issued a check drawn on NM Petrochemical for $40,000, payable to Dadi. Dadi then deposited that amount into his Frost National Bank account. Later, Dadi and Homa Dadi drew a check on Homa Dadi's Coastal Banc account for $1,500, payable to Dadi.
Dadi issued a check for $9,500, payable to Yvette Reyes. Seven days later, Dadi issued three checks payable to Yvette Reyes: one for $9,000 and two for $16,000. Yvonne and Yvette Reyes used these funds to purchase a house for the use and benefit of Dadi's family. Dadi and his wife Carmen later sold the house without the knowledge of the Reyes sisters. The following month, a counterfeit check drawn on "Southern Polymer" for $95,728 was deposited into the account of Stella Reyes at the Texas Commerce Bank; Dadi allegedly made this deposit. Later that month, Dadi and Mackvandian issued a check for $42,500, drawn on the Stella Reyes account and payable to Mackvandian, who deposited this check into his account at the Frost National Bank. Mackvandian then issued a check drawn on that account payable to "cash" and used the proceeds to purchase a cashier's check payable to All American Delivery. This check was deposited into Mackvandian's All American Delivery account at Bank United. Mackvandian later used the proceeds to purchase a cashier's check for $25,000 payable to Logistic Express and deposited that into the Wells Fargo Bank Logistic Express account. He then drew a $24,500 check on this account and gave the proceeds to Dadi.
The $95,728 deposit into the Stella Reyes account was the basis for the charge of bank fraud. The checks drawn against the counterfeit funds in amounts exceeding $10,000 were the bases for the money laundering violations.
In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141, 144 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. McDow, 27 F.3d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1994) (also noting that the reviewing court must "accept all reasonable inferences which tend to support the jury's verdict"). "The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence." United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1551 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1156, 115 S.Ct. 1113, 130 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1995).
Dadi first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conspiracy charge. Under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government must prove that (1) two or more persons conspired to pursue an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant knew of the unlawful objective and voluntarily agreed to join the conspiracy with the intent to further the objective; and (3) one or more of the members of the conspiracy committed an overt act in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. See United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1519 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Campbell, 64 F.3d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). The government must prove the same degree of criminal intent as is necessary for proof of the underlying substantive offense. See United States v. Bordelon, 871 F.2d 491, 493-94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 838, 110 S.Ct. 121, 107 L.Ed.2d 82 (1989). In Pettigrew, all the evidence pointing toward the agreement and intent elements of the crime was circumstantial. The court affirmed the conviction because the evidence was such that a rational juror could infer both these elements of the offense. See Pettigrew, 77 F.3d at 1519.
The government, of course, contends that the evidence indicating a conspiracy outweighs Mackvandian's and Yvette Reyes' disclaimers. Several pieces of evidence support this argument: for example, Dadi and Khayambashi had a close relationship; Dadi recommended Khayambashi to the Wallis State Bank; Dadi's fingerprints were found on counterfeit checks drawn on Khayambashi's account; and checks drawn on that account were passed through Homa Dadi's account. Dadi assisted Mackvandian and Khayambashi in acquiring bank accounts through which counterfeit checks were later funneled. Mackvandian also admitted at trial that he thought he and Dadi were using other people's money without their knowledge or consent. And Dadi received a large share of the profits from the transactions involving the counterfeit checks.
Dadi next argues that there was insufficient evidence to show specific intent to defraud a bank or that he voluntarily participated in an agreement to defraud a bank. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "knowing[ly] execute[d] or attempt[ed] to execute a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises." Campbell, 64 F.3d at 975.
Dadi also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to support the aiding and abetting charges. To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, the government must prove that "the defendant `knowingly engage[d] or attempt[ed] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity.'" United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)). To prove that a defendant aided and abetted the commission of a criminal offense, the government must show that the defendant intentionally associated with, and participated in, the criminal venture and acted to make the venture succeed. See United States v. Beuttenmuller, 29 F.3d 973, 981 (5th Cir. 1994).
Most of the counts at issue involve banking transactions by Mackvandian. Because Mackvandian is implicated as a counterfeiter and as a participant in this scheme, Dadi argues that — to the extent that Mackvandian's testimony implicated Dadi — Mackvandian's testimony is not credible. This assertion is unavailing on appeal. The credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury and its determinations demand deference. See United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 567 n. 6 (5th Cir. 2000).
The district court concluded that Dadi was an organizer or leader, and therefore added four levels to his base offense level. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court may increase a defendant's conspiracy offense level by four levels "[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).
Dadi argues that this enhancement is inapplicable because there was no proof that he controlled or influenced anyone involved in the offense. The PSR recommended the enhancement based, Dadi contends, simply on the fact that Dadi suggested to the others that they commit the offense — a fact that is not sufficient to establish that he exercised control or influence over the others. Even if he was a major participant in the offense, he argues, this is still not enough to justify the enhancement absent some showing of control or influence. See United States v. Castellone, 985 F.2d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Sostre, 967 F.2d 728, 733 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1992). We find, however, that the conclusion that Dadi is an organizer or leader is plausible in light of the record.
Dadi also contends that the offense did not involve five or more participants — another factor required to justify the enhancement. Dadi cites United States v. Maloof, 205 F.3d 819, 830 (5th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that failure to find that each of the people identified was criminally responsible requires reversal of the application of the enhancement. However, Maloof also makes clear that the additional participants need not have been convicted of the offense. See id. Dadi offers nothing to refute the PSR finding that he was an organizer, and that Mackvandian, Yvette Reyes, Yvonne Reyes, Homa Dadi, Naser Khayambashi and Mike Maharaj were involved in the scheme. While the evidence on the involvement of the latter three is weaker than the evidence of the involvement of Mackvandian and the Reyes sisters, that — without more — is insufficient to support a finding of clear error.
Given Dadi's weak attacks on the district court finding that he was an organizer or leader, and the wealth of evidence from which such a finding could be inferred, we see no reason to disturb this sentence. It is entirely plausible that — based on the evidence viewed as a whole — a court could conclude that Dadi was an organizer or leader.
The district court found that the amount of the loss attributable to Dadi was $807,100. Had the Khayambashi checks been excluded, the total loss attributable to Dadi would have been $95,728. Thus, without the Khayambashi checks, Dadi's base offense level would have been increased — at most — by only one level (instead of four) under the relevant Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.2(b)(2); 2S1.1(b)(2)(B).
The losses to be considered were attributed to the $53,000 Yazdanpanah check, the $95,728 Southern Polymer check (deposited into Stella Reyes' account) and the forged Gillman checks for $130,000, $77,650, $125,000, $75,750, and $249,972. All these checks were presented for deposit into one of Khayambashi's accounts (Southwest Oil, NM Petrochemical or his personal account at the Wallis State Bank). Dadi argues that, even if the evidence was sufficient to convict him, the trial court erred in attributing to him the six checks deposited into Khayambashi's accounts.
Dadi contends that only the $95,728 check should be attributed to him because the other checks were presented for deposit into Khayambashi's accounts — something not reasonably foreseeable to Dadi. Dadi's contention is based on the thesis that there was no connection between him and Khayambashi aside from the fact that Dadi "allegedly" referred Khayambashi to the Wallis State Bank. The government did not establish, Dadi argues, that there was an agreement between Dadi and Khayambashi, that — even if there were such an agreement — the Khayambashi checks were within the scope of that agreement, or that the checks were reasonably foreseeable to him. But see United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1995) (sufficient evidence of money laundering where the scheme was defendant's idea and defendant profited).
The government argues that the record supports the foreseeability of these losses, citing the facts that (1) Patricia Mackvandian (Mackvandian's wife) issued a $30,000 check payable to Dadi from an account into which Mackvandian deposited a Khayambashi check; (2) the handwriting on a Gillman Properties counterfeit check — deposited into Khayambashi's Wallis State Bank account — resembled that on other checks prepared by Dadi; and (3) the other checks involved Mike Maharaj, the "mysterious" man with whom Dadi dealt in counterfeit checks, according to Mackvandian's testimony. The government notes that a "common denominator" in the transactions involving these checks was Mike Maharaj. Also, the government argues that the trial testimony traces the proceeds of all these checks back to Dadi.
Dadi argues that the district court erred in its application of the Sentencing Guidelines by failing to apply the more lenient fraud guidelines instead of the money laundering guideline. Dadi finds his strongest support from United States v. Smith, a Third Circuit opinion in which that court determined that the initial choice of sentencing guideline should be governed by a "heartland" analysis: whether the offense is outside the heartland of the conduct normally punished using a particular guideline. 186 F.3d 290, 297-300 (3d Cir. 1999). Dadi argues that the money laundering guidelines, U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1 and 2S1.2, are intended to apply to large scale drug and organized crime enterprises that launder large amounts of money — not "simple fraud cases." A district court's choice of a Sentencing Guideline is a matter of law, and therefore the decision is subject to de novo review. See Smith, 186 F.3d at 297; see also United States v. Franklin, 148 F.3d 451, 459 (5th Cir. 1998).
Dadi correctly notes that a court is authorized to depart downward if the offense falls outside the "heartland" of the conduct for which a Sentencing Guideline was intended. Dadi argues that departure from money laundering and use of the more lenient fraud guideline as a guide is appropriate here. He cites our decision in United States v. Hemmingson, in which we held that the district court did not err in applying the fraud guideline where the money laundering offenses did not fall within the heartland of the money laundering guideline. 157 F.3d 347, 361-63 (5th Cir. 1998). And in United States v. Bart, a Texas district court used the fraud guideline as a guide for its downward departure from the money laundering guideline. 973 F.Supp. 691, 695-96 (W.D.Tex. 1997). The court determined — based on the legislative history of the money laundering statutes — that the guideline was targeted at "large scale drug and organized crime enterprises laundering large amounts of money." 973 F.Supp. at 696. Dadi claims further support from cases in which the money laundering statutes were deemed inapplicable because the money laundering was incidental to the underlying offense; the underlying offense in this case, Dadi asserts, is bank fraud. See United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871, 120 S.Ct. 172, 145 L.Ed.2d 146 (1999); Smith, 186 F.3d at 299.
A decision not to depart downward is not subject to review in this circuit. See Leonard, 61 F.3d at 1185. In United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 1999), this court declined to invalidate a refusal to depart downward absent a district court misunderstanding of the law. Thus, unless the refusal to depart "is premised upon the [sentencing] court's mistaken assumption that the Guidelines do not permit such a departure," we have no jurisdiction to review the sentence. Id. at 753 (citing United States v. Palmer, 122 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 1997)). Here, there was no such erroneous belief, and therefore the choice not to depart downward is not subject to our review.
We also note that — unlike in Smith — Dadi's case involves violations that fall within the heartland of a violation of § 1957. In Smith, the defendants were involved in an embezzlement/kickback scheme, for which money laundering was incidental, and for which the money laundering guideline was inappropriate. 186 F.3d at 300. The defendant in Powers argued against this reasoning — claiming, like Dadi, that the court should have departed downward because his conduct fell outside the heartland of offenses intended to be the object of the guideline. 168 F.3d at 753. That argument did not work for Powers, and it does not work here.
The government relies on an Eleventh Circuit case to assert that notice was adequate. In United States v. Bozza, 132 F.3d 659, 661 (11th Cir. 1998), the court concluded that notice of the § 2J1.7 enhancement did not have to be given prior to the guilty plea. But in that case, as Dadi correctly points out, the court noted a conflict with this circuit, because we had held that it was error not to inform the defendant of the enhancement prior to his guilty plea. See id.; United States v. Pierce, 5 F.3d 791, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1993). More important, the defendant in Bozza had received notice upon release for the prior conviction. See id. The government can point to nothing in the record to show that Dadi received such notice upon his release. Therefore, the district court's decision not to apply the enhancement under § 3147 will stand.
Because application of the enhancement fails for lack of notice, we need not address the issue on which the district court based its decision: that applying both the criminal history points and the enhancement would be impermissible double counting (two upward adjustments for the same conduct). In United States v. Franklin, however, this court held that "double counting is legitimate where a single act is relevant to two dimensions of the Guideline analysis." 148 F.3d 451, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Kings, 981 F.2d 790, 796 (5th Cir. 1993)). As this circuit noted in Kings, "The offense level represents a judgment as to the wrongfulness of a particular act. The criminal history category principally estimates the likelihood of recidivism." 981 F.2d at 796 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992)). Thus, the two adjustments were relevant to two different dimensions, and therefore arguably not impermissible double counting. However, we need not reach this issue today.

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