Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/175/552/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 17:53:03+00:00

Document:
In Mexico, in 1831, a departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power or authority to make a grant of lands, and the fact that the governor presided at a meeting of the territorial deputation at the time such a grant was made, makes no difference, as the power to make the grant was exclusively in the governor, and the territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter.
some 5,000 acres of land in New Mexico, about one league from the Manzano grant. The title is evidenced by a grant by the territorial deputation of New Mexico, made in 1831, and the first question in the case relates to the authority of that body to make the grant.
It is further stated that, by reason of the action of the governor in writing the letter dated December 22, 1831, and hereinafter set forth, that officer ratified and confirmed the grant, and in effect made it his own.
"go before the most excellent territorial deputation, which, as the authority competent, may accede to the donation of the land prayed for by the said petitioner without injuring the pastures and watering places for the passers-by."
"(Extract from record of proceedings of the territorial deputation,"
"session of November 12, 1831)"
report of the respectable corporation council of Tome, in which it is set forth that there is no objection to the concession of the said land, having been heard it was ordered that it be granted."
"Santa Fe, November 12, 1831"
"The honorable the deputation of this territory, having received the report of the constitutional council of Tome, appended to this petition, has resolved in this day's session to grant the land prayed for by the petitioner, charging the alcalde of said jurisdiction to execute the document that will secure the grantee in the grant hereby made to him."
"In obedience to the decree of the most excellent deputation of this territory made under date of November 12 of the current year on the margin of the petition which, under date of February 28, the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya, resident of this said jurisdiction, presented to this honorable council, and on which petition is recorded the report made by this council, in accordance with which report its excellency has deemed it proper to accede to the petition of Montoya, granting him full and formal possession of the tract he prayed for,"
granted him, with all the customary formality,"
etc. This was dated December 7, 1831, and signed by the alcalde.
"in compliance with the provision made by this most excellent deputation of this territory and the notification given me by the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya,"
proceeded with Montoya to the tract of land granted him and placed him in possession thereof, the act being signed by the alcalde.
"Office of the Political Chief of New Mexico"
"By your official communication of the 20th instant, I am advised of your having executed the decree of the most excellent deputation granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of land."
"But in regard to the inquiry you make of me, as to how much your fee should be, I inform you that I am ignorant in the premises, and that you may, if you choose to do, put the question to the assessor (asesor), who is the officer to whom it belongs, to advise the justices of first instance in such cases."
"God and Liberty. Santa Fe, December 22, 1831."
grant was exclusively in the governor, and the territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter. The claim was therefore rejected.
We think that in thus deciding, the court below was right.
In United States v. Vallejo, 1 Black 541, it was held that the Mexican law of 1824 and the regulations of 1828 altered and repealed the Spanish system of disposing of public lands, and that the law and the regulations from the time of their passage were the only laws of Mexico on the subject of granting public lands in the territories. It was also held that the governor did not possess any power to make grants public lands independently of that conferred by the act of 1824 and the regulations of 1828. Mr. Justice Nelson, who delivered the opinion of the Court in that case, refers to the various sections of the law of 1824, and also to the regulations of November, 1828, for the purpose of showing that the governors of the territories were authorized to grant vacant lands within their respective territories with the object of cultivation or settlement, and that the grants made by them to individuals or families were not to be definitively valid without the previous consent of the departmental assembly, and when the grant petitioned for had been definitively made a patent, signed by the governor, was to be issued, which was to serve as a title to the party. This case did not decide that the territorial deputation could not make a valid grant, because the grant was made by the governor, but the various extracts from the law and regulations indicate very plainly that the authority to initiate a grant of public lands existed in the governor alone, and not in the assembly.
In United States v. Vigil, 13 Wall. 449, it was held that departmental assemblies (territorial deputations) had no power to make a grant.
authority to make the grant to Montoya, and in order to maintain that proposition, stated that it was necessary to discuss the effect of the decision of this Court in United States v. Vigil. He claimed that what was said as to the lack of power in the territorial deputation to make a grant was not necessary to the decision of the Court in that case, and that such expressions as were therein used regarding the question would not therefore constitute a precedent now binding on this Court.
In Vigil's case, there was a petition to the departmental assembly, through the Governor of New Mexico, asking for a grant of land which in fact amounted to over two million, the grantees binding themselves, if the grant were made, to construct two wells for the relief and aid of travelers, and to establish two factories for the use of the state, and to protect them from hostile invasion. The governor transmitted the petition to the assembly, but declined to recommend that favorable action should be taken upon it. The assembly, notwithstanding this refusal, granted the tract on January 10, 1846, for the purpose of constructing wells and cultivating the land, etc., and the question was as to the validity of this grant.
information was satisfactory on these points, he was authorized to make the grant, and at the proper time to lay it before the assembly, who were required to give or withhold their consent. They were in this respect an advisory body to the governor, and sustained the same relation to him that the Senate of the United States does to the President in the matter of appointments and treaties."
"it cannot be in reason held that a title to land derived from a territory which the territorial authorities did not own, over which they had no power of disposition, was regularly derived from either Spain or Mexico or a State of the Mexican nation."
some circumstances to make grants, and it was therefore held that a grant made by him was prima facie evidence that he had not exceeded his power in making it, and that he who denied it took upon himself the burden of showing that the officer by making the grant had transcended the power reposed in him. There is in the case before us no evidence that the territorial deputation had the power, in any event, to make grants other than the fact that in some instances it assumed to make them.
was himself making the grant, or that he thereby intended so to do. It does not even show that he was in favor of the grant as made by the deputation. His signing the record constituted nothing more than an authentication of the act of the deputation. It purported to be nothing else. He might have properly signed the record if in fact he had voted against the grant, and had been opposed to the action of the assembly. He might have signed the record as an authentication, and yet have been absent at the time of the action of the assembly. In any event, it was his signature as an ex officio member or presiding officer of the deputation, attesting or perhaps assenting to its action, and it was not his action as governor making a grant in that capacity. The signature by the secretary alone, to the instrument (above set forth, dated November 12, 1831) which recites the previous action of the deputation, and charges the alcalde of the jurisdiction to execute the document which will secure the grantee in the grant, is simply a direction to the alcalde, and has no materiality upon this branch of the case other than as confirming the view that the grant was solely that of the deputation.
We cannot hold that, when the power was given under the laws of Mexico to the governor to make grants of lands, he in any manner exercised that power, or performed an act equivalent to its exercise, by presiding ex officio at a meeting of the territorial deputation which made a grant of lands in conformity to a petition solely addressed to it and by authenticating as president the action of the deputation in deciding that the grant should be made.
addressed solely to that body. And it is obvious from the wording of the record that the president of the deputation was not assuming to act as governor upon a petition addressed to himself, but only as the president of the deputation. It might have been that he acquiesced in the assumption by the deputation of the right to make the grant, but his act of signing the record cannot be tortured into a grant or as the equivalent of a grant by himself.
The only evidence that the person who signed the letter was the governor at that time is the heading of the letter, "Office of the Political Chief of New Mexico." It will be also noted that the person signing it is not the same one who signed the record of November 12, 1831, as president of the deputation. But, assuming that Chavez was governor in December, 1831, when he signed the letter, he therein simply acknowledged the receipt of the official communication of the alcalde, in which that officer reports that he had executed the decree "of the most excellent deputation, granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of land." In reply to the question as to how much the alcalde's fee should be, he answered that he was ignorant of the premises, and advised the alcalde to put the question to the assessor, the officer to whom it belonged to advise the justices in the first instances in such cases.
approval was the same as if the governor had himself made the grant, and in substance and effect it was his grant.
"the finding of the court below that the complainants' title was derived from the Republic of Mexico, and was complete and perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty in the Territory of New Mexico, within which the land was situated."
We do not question the correctness of the remarks made by MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS in regard to evidence of possession and the presumptions which may under certain circumstances be drawn as to the existence of a grant.
We do not deny the right or the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper case, in order to quiet a title and to give to long continued possession the quality of a rightful possession under a legal title. We recognize and enforce such rule in the case of United States v. Chavez, decided at this term, in which the question is involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not of a duration long enough to justify any such inference.
There is no proof of any valid grant, but, on the contrary, the evidence offered by the plaintiff himself and upon which he bases the title that he asks the court to confirm, shows the existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to make it, and which therefore conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that possession of the lands was taken. We cannot presume (within the time involved in this case) that any other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not been long enough to presume a grant. Crespin v. United States, 168 U. S. 208; Hayes v. United States, 170 U. S. 637, 170 U. S. 649; Hays v. United States, ante, 175 U. S. 248. The possession subsequently existing, we cannot notice. Same authorities.

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