Source: https://constitution.findlaw.com/article2/annotation12.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:06:00+00:00

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The capacity of the United States to enter into agreements with other nations is not exhausted in the treaty-making power. The Constitution recognizes a distinction between ''treaties'' and ''agreements'' or ''compacts'' but does not indicate what the difference is. 388 The differences, which once may have been clearer, have been seriously blurred in practice within recent decades. Once a stepchild in the family in which treaties were the preferred offspring, the executive agreement has surpassed in number and perhaps in international influence the treaty formally signed, submitted for ratification to the Senate, and proclaimed upon ratification.
The Lend-Lease Act .--The most extensive delegation of authority ever made by Congress to the President to enter into executive agreements occurred within the field of the cognate powers of the two departments, the field of foreign relations, and took place at a time when war appeared to be in the offing and was in fact only a few months away. The legislation referred to is the Lend- Lease Act of March 11, 1941, 407 by which the President was empowered for something over two years--and subsequently for additional periods whenever he deemed it in the interest of the national defense to do so-- to authorize ''the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government,'' to manufacture in the government arsenals, factories, and shipyards, or ''otherwise procure,'' to the extent that available funds made possible, ''defense articles''--later amended to include foodstuffs and industrial products--and ''sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of,'' the same to the ''government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States,'' and on any terms that he ''deems satisfactory.'' Under this authorization the United States entered into Mutual Aid Agreements whereby the Government furnished its allies in World War II forty billions of dollars worth of munitions of war and other supplies.
Many types of executive agreements comprise the ordinary daily grist of the diplomatic mill. Among these are such as apply to minor territorial adjustments, boundary rectifications, the policing of boundaries, the regulation of fishing rights, private pecuniary claims against another government or its nationals, in Story's words, ''the mere private rights of sovereignty.'' 417 Crandall lists scores of such agreements entered into with other governments by the authorization of the President. 418 Such agreements were ordinarily directed to particular and comparatively trivial disputes and by the settlement they effect of these cease ipso facto to be operative. Also, there are such time-honored diplomatic devices as the ''protocol'' which marks a stage in the negotiation of a treaty, and the modus vivendi, which is designed to serve as a temporary substitute for one. Executive agreements become of constitutional significance when they constitute a determinative factor of future foreign policy and hence of the country's destiny. In consequence particularly of our participation in World War II and our immersion in the conditions of international tension which prevailed both be fore and after the war, Presidents have entered into agreements with other governments some of which have approximated temporary alliances. It cannot be justly said, however, that in so doing they have acted without considerable support from precedent.
When the President enters into an executive agreement, what sort of obligation is thereby imposed upon the United States? That international obligations of potentially serious consequences may be imposed is obvious and that such obligations may linger for long periods of time is equally obvious. 438 But the question is more directly pointed to the domestic obligations imposed by such agreements; are treaties and executive agreements interchangeable insofar as domestic effect is concerned? 439 Executive agreements entered into pursuant to congressional authorization and probably through treaty obligations present little doctrinal problem; those arrangements which the President purports to bind the Nation with solely on the basis of his constitutional powers, however, do raise serious questions.
In United States v. Pink, 445 decided five years later, the same course of reasoning was reiterated with added emphasis. The question here involved was whether the United States was entitled under the Executive Agreement of 1933 to recover the assets of the New York branch of a Russian insurance company. The company argued that the decrees of confiscation of the Soviet Government did not apply to its property in New York and could not consistently with the Constitution of the United States and that of New York. The Court, speaking by Justice Douglas, brushed these arguments aside. An official declaration of the Russian government itself settled the question of the extraterritorial operation of the Russian decree of nationalization and was binding on American courts. The power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals was ''a modest implied power of the President who is the 'sole organ of the Federal Government in the field of international relations'. . . . It was the judgment of the political department that full recognition of the Soviet Government required the settlement of outstanding problems including the claims of our nationals. . . . We would usurp the executive function if we held that the decision was not final and conclusive on the courts.
''It is, of course, true that even treaties with foreign nations will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy. . . . But state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an international compact or agreement. . . . Then, the power of a State to refuse enforcement of rights based on foreign law which runs counter to the public policy of the forum . . . must give way before the superior Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or international compact or agreement. . . .
''The action of New York in this case amounts in substance to a rejection of a part of the policy underlying recognition by this nation of Soviet Russia. Such power is not accorded a State in our constitutional system. To permit it would be to sanction a dangerous invasion of Federal authority. For it would 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.' . . . It would tend to disturb that equilibrium in our foreign relations which the political departments of our national government has diligently endeavored to establish. . . .
[Footnote 388] Compare Article II, Sec. 2, cl. 2, and Article VI, cl. 2, with Article I, 10, cls. 1 and 3. Cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570 -572 (1840). And note the discussion in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 28 -32 (1982).
[Footnote 389] CRS Study, op. cit., n.262, xxxiv-xxxv, 13-16. Not all such agreements, of course, are published, either because of national- security/secrecy considerations or because the subject matter is trivial. In a 1953 hearing exchange, Secretary of State Dulles estimated that about 10,000 executive agreements had been entered into in connection with the NATO treaty. ''Every time we open a new privy, we have to have an executive agreement.'' Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43, Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 83d Congress, 1st sess. (1953), 877.
[Footnote 390] One authority concluded that of the executive agreements entered into between 1938 and 1957, only 5.9 percent were based exclusively on the President's constitutional authority. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States--II, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 651, 721 (1959). Another, somewhat overlapping study found that in the period 1946-1972, 88.3% of executive agreements were based at least in part on statutory authority; 6.2% were based on treaties, and 5.5% were based solely on executive authority. International Agreements: An Analysis of Executive Regulations and Practices, A Study Prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Comm. Print) (1977), 22.
[Footnote 391] ''[T]he distinction between so-called 'executive agreements' and 'treaties' is purely a constitutional one and has no international significance.'' Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 Amer. J. Int. L. 697 (Supp.) (1935). See E. Byrd, op. cit., n.292, 148-151. Many scholars have aggressively promoted the use of executive agreements, in contrast to treaties, as a means of enhancing the role of the United States, especially the role of the President, in the international system. See McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (Pts. I & II), 54 Yale L. J. 181, 534 (1945).
[Footnote 392] 1 Stat. 138 (1790). See E. Byrd, op. cit., n.292, 53 n.146.
[Footnote 393] W. McClure, International Executive Agreements (New York: 1941), 41.
[Footnote 394] Id., 38-40. The statute was 1 Stat. 232, 239, 26 (1792).
[Footnote 396] Id., 78-81; S. Crandall, op. cit., n.264, 127-131; see CRS Study, op. cit., n.262, 52-55.
[Footnote 397] Id., 121-127; W. McClure, op. cit., n.393, 83-92, 173-189.
[Footnote 398] Id., 8, 59-60.
[Footnote 399] Sec. 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612.
[Footnote 400] Tariff Act of 1897, Sec. 3, 30 Stat. 15, 203; Tariff Act of 1909, 36 Stat. 11, 82.
[Footnote 401] 48 Stat. 943, Sec. 350(a), 19 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1351-1354.
[Footnote 402] See the continued expansion of the authority. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 872, Sec. 201, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1821; Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1982, as amended, 19 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2111, 2115, 2131(b), 2435. Congress has, with respect to the authorization to the President to negotiate multilateral trade agreements under the auspices of GATT, constrained itself in considering implementing legislation, creating a ''fast-track'' procedure under which legislation is brought up under a tight timetable and without the possibility of amendment. 19 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2191-2194.
[Footnote 403] 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
[Footnote 404] Id., 694. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), in which the Court sustained a series of implementing actions by the President pursuant to executive agreements with Iran in order to settle the hostage crisis. The Court found that Congress had delegated to the President certain economic powers underlying the agreements and that his suspension of claims powers had been implicitly ratified over time by Congress' failure to set aside the asserted power. Also see Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 -30 n. 6 (1982).
[Footnote 405] 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
[Footnote 407] 55 Stat. 31.
[Footnote 408] E.g., 48 Stat. 1182 (1934), authorizing the President to accept membership for the United States in the International Labor Organization.
[Footnote 409] See E. Corwin, op. cit., n.44, 216.
[Footnote 410] W. McClure, op. cit., n.393, 13-14.
[Footnote 412] 1 W. Willoughby, op. cit., n.294, 543.
[Footnote 413] A Decade of American Foreign Policy, S. Doc. No. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 126 (1950).
[Footnote 415] Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
[Footnote 416] Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 -17 (1957) (plurality opinion); id., 66 (Justice Harlan concurring).
[Footnote 417] 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: 1833), 1397.
[Footnote 418] S. Crandall, op. cit., n.264, ch. 8; see also W. McClure, op. cit., n.393, chs. 1, 2.
[Footnote 421] Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 435 (1902).
[Footnote 422] Id., 467. The first of these conventions, signed July 29, 1882, had asserted its constitutionality in very positive terms. Q. Wright, op. cit., n.302, 239 (quoting Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870)).
[Footnote 424] S. Crandall, op. cit., n.264, 103-104.
[Footnote 426] 1 W. Willoughby, op. cit., n.294, 539.
[Footnote 427] W. McClure, op. cit., n.393, 98.
[Footnote 433] Id., 391-393. Attorney General Jackson's defense of the presidential power to enter into the arrangement placed great reliance on the President's ''inherent'' powers under the Commander-in-Chief clause and as sole organ of foreign relations but ultimately found adequate statutory authority to take the steps deemed desirable. 39 Ops. Atty. Gen. 484 (1940).
[Footnote 434] 4 Dept. State Bull. 443 (1941).
[Footnote 435] See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents 1941-1949, S. Doc. No. 123, 81st Congress, 1st sess. (1950), pt. 1.
[Footnote 436] For a congressional attempt to evaluate the extent of such commitments, see United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 91st Congress, 1st sess. (1969), 10 pts.; see also U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. Res. 151, 90th Congress, 1st sess. (1967).
[Footnote 437] The ''National Commitments Resolution,'' S. Res. 85, 91st Congress, 1st sess., passed by the Senate June 25, 1969. See also S. Rept. No. 797, 90th Congress, 1st sess. (1967). See the discussion of these years in CRS Study, op. cit., n.262, 169-202.
[Footnote 438] In 1918, Secretary of State Lansing assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Lansing-Ishii Agreement had no binding force on the United States, that it was simply a declaration of American policy so long as the President and State Department might choose to continue it. 1 W. Willoughby, op. cit., n.294, 547. In fact, it took the Washington Conference of 1921, two formal treaties, and an exchange of notes to eradicate it, while the ''Gentlemen's Agreement'' was finally ended after 17 years only by an act of Congress. W. McClure, op. cit., n.393, 97, 100.
[Footnote 439] See E. Byrd, op. cit., n.292, 151-157.
[Footnote 440] E.g., United States v. One Bag of Paradise Feathers, 256 F. 301, 306 (2d Cir., 1919); 1 W. Willoughby, op. cit., n.294, 589. The State Department held the same view. 5 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington: 1944), 426.
[Footnote 441] 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
[Footnote 442] 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
[Footnote 443] United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
[Footnote 445] 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
[Footnote 446] Id., 229-234. Chief Justice Stone and Justice Roberts dissented.
[Footnote 447] The decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), is rich in learning on many topics involving executive agreements, but the Court's conclusion that Congress had either authorized various presidential actions or had long acquiesced in others leaves the case standing for little on our particular issue of this section.
[Footnote 448] But see United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F. 2d 655 (4th Cir., 1953), wherein Chief Judge Parker held that an executive agreement entered into by the President without congressional authorization or ratification could not displace domestic law inconsistent with such agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds and declined to consider this matter. 348 U.S. 296 (1955).

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