Source: https://louisvilledivorce.typepad.com/info/child_support/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:46:45+00:00

Document:
Appellant appeals the decision of the family court to terminate child support on May 30, 2014 for a home-schooled child remaining in high school after his 18th birthday. Appellant argued child support should either terminate on June 30, 2014, or extend until the child completed his senior year in November 2014. The Appellate Court affirmed in part, upholding the family court’s decision not to extend child support through November 2014, given the trial court’s discretion and the circumstances of the case. The Appellate Court reversed in part, holding the plain language of KRS 158.050 sets June 30 as the end of the school year and the court erred as a matter of law in setting May 30 as the end of the school year.
Trial court denied father's motion to reduce child support. Father had burden of proof to show substantial and continuing change of circumstances. Even though at time of agreement youngest child was age two and no income was imputed to mother and at time of hearing child was age four and mother was still not working, trial court was unable to find father's income from self-emloyment due to lack of documentation. The court's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to find a change in circumstances that would justify modification was affirmed.
The appellate court affirmed the family court’s decision to exclude income from W’s limited partnership in child support calculations. The court held that income generated from an ownership interest in a limited partnership may be considered income in calculating child support. In this case, W had no control over the distribution and there was no evidence in the record showing a cash distribution (K1 line 19), so the court found the family court properly determined the income from the partnership, while taxable income, was not disposable income.
The appellate court’s dissenting opinion found the case should be reversed and remanded to make finding as to the income W received as a distribution. The dissent indicates the family court’s decision could have been an abuse of discretion if it did not include the partnership income because it found that partnership distributions should not be considered income.
Parties entered into a mediation agreement and advised the trial court that all issues had been settled with the exception of child support. The parties agreed they would supply income information for the child support worksheet. The mediation agreement was silent as to the child support arrearage. The parties dissolution of marriage was entered incorporating the mediation terms. The decree was also silent as to the child support arrearage. After the final degree was entered, the arrearage was brought to the court’s attention in a Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court denied the Motion holding the mediation settled all matters. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded because the mediation did not settle on the child support issue, and any support is for the benefit of the child, and it is fixed once it accrues.
Hempel v. Hempel. When child support is reversed on appeal, overpaid child support cannot be recouped unless there is an accumulation of benefits not consumed for support. If the overpayments have already been expended to benefit the child, no recoupment is allowed, even when a fund equivalent to child support is available. A college fund would not be equivalent to child support even if equivalency were allowed.
Smyrichinsky v. Smyrichinsky http://opinions.kycourts.net/coa/2013-CA-000181.pdf Where both parties and the child have moved from the state issuing original child support order, trial court properly applied Kentucky law. The Court noted that the mother did not object to the application of Ky law until the third time the Ky court modified support. Trial court allocation of income tax dependency exemptions to father for three specific years affirmed.
McFelia v. McFelia. Child support where parents share time with the children almost equally.
Bell v. Bell. Exclusion of unreimbursed business expenses from income of employed obligor for child support purposes.
Mother appeals from a judgment awarding $10,828.61 to Father for overpayment of child care expenses.
In 1999, a child support order established father’s obligation at $453.00 per month, which included $270.56 in child care expenses. In 2003, father sought a reduction in child support but was advised by the County Attorney he did not meet the requirements for modification.
In June, 2011 father filed a motion for reimbursement of child care expenses and modification of child support. He sought reimbursement of $18,366.59 for child care expenses which were never incurred. Mother appealed father’s motion, arguing that he had unreasonably delayed requesting a reduction of child care expenses.
Following a hearing, the court concluded father was entitled to reimbursement of $10,828.61 for the overpayment of child care expenses. Mother filed a motion to set aside the order, asserting that the doctrine of laches barred father’s claim. Mother’s motion was denied and the parties executed an agreed order providing father a credit of $200.00 against his monthly child support obligation to satisfy the judgment. This appeal followed.
Mother contends the trial court erred by concluding that the doctrine of laches did not bar father’s claim. After a hearing, Mother’s counsel conceded laches had not been established because neither party was aware that a decrease in child care expenses warranted modification of support.
Father testified that he was advised by the County Attorney in 2003 that he was not eligible for reduction, and both parties testified they did not understand how child care expenses factored into the calculation of child support. The Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting mother’s laches defense.
Mother argued that according to Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. App. 1986), an overpayment of child support cannot be recouped unless there exists an accumulation of benefits not consumed for support. The Court of Appeals held, however, that Olson v. Olson, 108 S.W.3d 650 (Ky. App. 2003) controls the outcome of this case. Olson held that the modification of child care expenses is appropriate when warranted by the facts, regardless of whether there is a 15% material change in circumstances.
The trial court considered all the facts including mother’s evidence to mitigate the amount father sought to recoup and the parties’ agreement which minimized the detrimental effect on the child by providing credit against father’s child support obligation. The trial court’s judgment was supported by sound legal principles and there was no abuse of discretion, thus the judgment was affirmed.
Issue: Extent of child support and arrearage to be paid by non-custodial parent whose only income is SSI.
The Cabinet for Health and Family Services moved the trial court to hold Ivy in contempt after she fell behind in child support payments. At the hearing, Ivy presented evidence that her sole source of income is SSI, which is inadequate to meet her own needs. The trial court reduced her child support, held her in contempt for failure to pay the past due amount, and ordered that future failure to pay would result in her incarceration. Ivy appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding neither the contempt finding nor the order to pay could stand because Ivy does not have the ability to pay.
The Supreme Court granted the Cabinet’s motion for discretionary review to consider in what manner and to what extent SS recipients may be held accountable for child support.
In 2008, Ivy had been ordered to pay $106.00 for the support of her child, D.G. By virtue of assistance provided to D.G., the Cabinet became assignee for support due him and in February, 2009 brought its motion for contempt. At the show cause hearing, Kenneth Anderson, an attorney who serves as guardian and/or payee for SSI beneficiaries testified that Ivy is one of his clients and that after payment of Ivy’s rent and utilities, she receives less than $50.00 monthly.
The trial court reduced her child support to $60.00 per month and held her in contempt because she was an able-bodied person capable of providing financial support for her child.
The Court of Appeals held that the record did not support a finding of contempt or the imposition of a support obligation. Accordingly, the trial court had abused its discretion in finding her failure to pay contemptuous and ordering her to pay support and arrears she did not have the ability to pay.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to the extent that it suggests that a SSI recipient-parent’s present inability to pay precludes even the assessment of child support, but vacated the existing order and remanded for the family court to determine if the guidelines-based amount would be unjust or inappropriate pursuant to KRS 403.211(2).
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals holding that a contempt finding was inappropriate where there was insufficient evidence that Ivy’s failure to provide child support stemmed from any reason but her inability to do so.
Father appealed from three orders, all related to child support. Father had previously appealed the first order, entered in May, 2006, but the CA affirmed FC and no discretionary review was sought. Subsequently, father filed motions requesting FC to vacate the 2006 Order. Father appealed FC’s denial of these motions in addition to the 2006 Order.
The CA declined to revisit the 2006 Order because it had already been appealed and affirmed. The CA no longer had jurisdiction to alter the opinion. After eliminating the issues in the 2006 Order, little remained for review. Father failed to advance any argument to support reversal nor were there any manifest errors. Thus, the Fayette Family Court Orders were affirmed.
The CA included a lengthy discussion of the importance of adhering to the format and briefing requirements mandated by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. When an appellate advocate fails to follow the rules, the CA may ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review, strike the brief or offending portions, or review the issues raised in the brief for manifest injustice only. This discussion is informative not only for pro se appellate advocates, but good review for their professional counterparts.
After review of the orders appealed from, the CA found no manifest errors and affirmed the Fayette Family Court.
Mother appealed from trial court’s order terminating father’s child support obligation.
The parties were divorced in 2006 and family court entered an order in which father agreed to pay $872.90 per month in support for their two children. In March, 2008, father filed a motion to terminate his child support obligation citing the children’s independent financial resources, the parenting schedule and the mother’s financial resources, and also requesting the court to impute income to mother. Mother then filed a motion for an increase in child support.
At the hearing in September, 2008, father testified that his annual salary was $73,892. Mother was a stay-at-home mom, suffering from various medical problems associated with the birth of the second child. She was in the process of appealing the initial denial of her social security disability claim. Although unable to work, mother had income from family gifts and trusts of approximately $43,057 in 2007.
The children also received distributions from trusts and gifts, which mother testified was either used for private school tuition and books or reinvested and added to the principal of the trust.
Father testified that he had the children 43% of the time, but mother’s testimony indicated he had them only 36% of the time.
The Family Court terminated father’s child support obligation and overruled mother’s motion for an increase in child support. The court found that mother had not met the burden of proof of her disability, the children had significant financial resources, that father had physical custody 43% of the time, that mother had significant financial resources and that she was voluntarily unemployed.
Mother appealed, stating that termination of child support violated Kentucky common law and public policy and that the findings were inconsistent with the facts of record from the hearing.
CA noted that child support decisions are left to the discretion of the trial court, but must be fair, reasonable and supported by sound legal principles. The TC has broad discretion in assessing reliability of evidence and factual findings are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence.
KRS 403.213(1) provides that child support may be modified only upon a showing of a material change in circumstance that is substantial and continuing and which results in equal to or greater than 15% change in monthly support. FC did not address the change in circumstance which allowed for modification, although since the original child support order, father had not changed employment, mother was still unemployed, and the parenting schedule remained the same.
CA found that even if income was imputed to mother, the result would not be a 15% change in child support and thus not rebuttably presumed to be a substantial change in circumstance. Therefore, FC must make written findings of statutory factors allowing for a deviation from the guidelines.
CA acknowledged mother’s medical difficulties, but did not believe she provided sufficient evidence that she is completely unable to work in her profession as a clinical psychologist.
FC ruled that there were grounds to deviate from the guidelines because their application would have been unjust or inappropriate due to the disparity in the parties’ resources, the children’s independent financial resources, and the timesharing arrangement.
The CA did not find that the FC abused its discretion in determining that the children’s independent financial resources permit a deviation from the guidelines. It noted, however, that the child support obligation of each parent must be adjusted. Further, normal gifts from grandparents were not intended to be part of the child support calculus and such gifts do not abrogate a parent’s duty to provide for children.
The CA found that the FC failed to make sufficient findings to justify deviation from the guidelines on the basis of actual sharing of expenses and relatively equal parenting time. The CA was unable to find any factor of an extraordinary nature which would allow for deviation from the guidelines under KRS 403.211(3)(g).
CA noted that parents have a universal duty to support and maintain their minor children as well as a statutory duty to do so and therefore decision to terminate all of father’s child support obligation is difficult to reconcile with public policy. CA concluded TC erred by eliminating father’ entire child support obligation.
Affirmed with respect to FC’s imputing income to mother and finding children’s independent financial resources permitted deviation from guidelines. Reversed with respect to FC’s elimination of father’s entire child support obligation. Remanded to FC for calculation of child support with imputation of income to mother. Then, FC shall use independent financial resources of children to deviate from the guidelines per each parent’s proportionate child support responsibility.
CHFS and Mom appealed FC’s order denying motion to modify child support.
Mom and Dad divorced while Child was toddler. MSA provided that Dad would be primary residential parent and neither parent would pay child support. Ten years later, FC suspended Dad’s visitation and ordered him to pay $623 monthly child support, including contribution to health insurance premiums. Parties subsequently entered an Agreed Order that Dad would pay for Child’s health insurance premiums but would pay no child support. Thirteen months later, CHFS filed motion to intervene to modify the child support obligation. FC sustained the motion. CHFS filed a motion seeking child support from Dad. Dad testified that Mom entered current agreement that he not pay child support due to fact that she had not paid child support during the ten years when Child primarily resided with him. Mom testified that she believed she was only waiving child support arrears in that agreement and that she was currently seeking child support from him because he was not maintaining health insurance on Child, a fact that FC found to be in error. FC denied the motion, finding no change in circumstances because there had been no change in income and that Mom and Dad had both been represented by counsel when they agreed that Dad would pay no child support to Mom, and that the Agreed Order was fair to all parties based on the Mom having paid no child support to Dad when he provided Child’s primary residence.
CHFS and Mom argued that because child support at the time the motion to modify was filed was zero, there was clearly at least a fifteen percent (15%) change in the amount of child support due. However, CA found that as Mom was still not working and Dad was earning the same income and providing insurance at the time the motion to modify was filed, there had been no material change in circumstances since the time the parties had entered into the agreed order that warranted modifying child support. Thus, any presumption that there was at least a fifteen percent (15%) change from the current child support ($0) and the current amount of child support per the guidelines was overcome as a matter of law by the court’s determination that no material change in circumstances had occurred. CA held that the burden was on CHFS and Mom to prove a material change in circumstances, which they failed to do. CA further found it significant that neither CHFS nor Mom set forth any arguments or evidence demonstrating that Child’s physical needs were not being met. CA noted that CHFS and Mom were really challenging the initial order setting a $0 child support amount, arguing that FC did not consider Child’s financial needs and that it is against public policy for parents to agree by contract to not support their children. CA found that they should have appealed from the Agreed Order and not sought a motion to modify. Nonetheless, CA found no abuse of discretion in Agreed Order even if it had been properly challenged. Deviation from the guidelines is permitted under KRS 403.211(3)(g), which provides that a court may deviate for any factor of an extraordinary nature identified by the court which would make application of the guidelines inappropriate. Here, FC found that Mom had never paid any child support in the ten years Dad had primary custody of Child, an appropriate factor for deviation.
Dad appealed FC’s orders denying to separate motions to modify child support based on Mom’s increased income.
When Mom and Dad divorced, they agreed to approximately equal parenting time with their children. At the time, Mom earned about $50,000 and Dad earned about $100,000 annually. Dad agreed to pay Mom $950 per month for child support. Subsequently, Mom’s income increased to about $100,000 and Dad’s $115,000 and Dad sought a corresponding modification of child support. FC denied Dad’s motion, finding that the change of circumstances was not material, substantial, and continuing because Dad did not meet the rebuttable presumption of same by establishing a 15% change in the child support owed per the Child Support Guidelines. Dad appealed this Order. Several months later, Dad filed another motion to modify child support as Mom’s income had again increased, to about $125,000. FC denied this motion as well, and Dad filed the second appeal.
CA concluded that the child support guidelines are inapplicable to Mom and Dad’s case for two independent reasons. One, their combined monthly gross income exceeded the uppermost level of the child support guidelines rendering application of the guidelines inappropriate, and two, the equal timesharing arrangement was of an extraordinary nature rendering application of the child support guidelines unjust. CA found that as the child support guidelines are inapplicable, the rebuttable presumption found in KRS 403.213(2) concerning modification of child support is, likewise, inapplicable. The proper standard for modification of child support in such a case is found in KRS 403.213(1) and is simply whether there exists a material change in circumstances that is substantial and continuing.
Jones v. Hammond, order terminating child support reversed and remanded. Digest to follow.
Mom, non-custodian, appealed from CA decision vacating FC’s order reducing her child support obligation based on the children’s receipt of Social Security Disability payments received due to disability of Dad, custodial parent, claiming CA erred in its interpretation of child support statute and its failure acknowledge and reconcile provisions of that statute.
Mom paid Dad, primary residential parent, $564 monthly child support for parties’ 2 minor children. Mom later filed a motion to reduce child support due to the children's receipt of approximately $800 .00 per month in Social Security benefits resulting from Dad’s disability. After hearing, FC granted Mom’s motion, holding that, pursuant to KRS 403.211(3)(d), the children's SS income was an independent financial resource, and that child support guidelines should be adjusted. Dad appealed. CA held that only Dad, the disabled parent, was entitled to claim credit for the children's SS disability benefits and remanded to FC for recalculation.
SC held that KRS 403.211 (15) states that a payment of money received by a child as a result of a parental disability shall be credited against the child support obligation of the parent but shall not be counted as income to either parent when calculating a child support obligation. CA stated that a child support credit based upon SS disability benefits "may only be taken by the disabled parent from whom the payments stern," because "these social security benefits in essence step into the shoes of the income lost by the father as a result of his disability." Mom argued to SC that CA failed to consider the statute’s clear language referring to "the parent" and "either parent" as opposed to "the disabled parent."
SC disagreed. “It defies both common sense and the plain wording of the statute to hold that the non-disabled parent is entitled to a credit for his or her child support obligation due to the Social Security disability payments of the disabled parent. Such an interpretation would clearly reach an absurd result. KRS 403.211(15) indicates that disability payments received by the child are to be credited to "the child support obligation" of "the parent." Clearly, the legislature intended that "the parent" receiving the credit is to be the non-custodial disabled parent with the child support obligation.” Furthermore, SC recognized that the SS disability benefits received on behalf of the parties' minor children are merely a substitute for the wages Dad would have received, but for his disability, and from which his support payments would otherwise have been made.
SC also disagreed with Mom’s argument that CA should have made a finding that FC’s decision was an abuse of discretion and should have given direction to FC as to how Dad's SS benefits were to be considered in the calculation of Mom's child support obligation. “While Social Security benefits of the type at issue here are arguably a financial resource of a recipient, we do not believe that such benefits are the type of ‘independent financial resource’ that would allow a trial court to deviate from the basic child support guidelines. Indeed, allowing the trial court to consider the Social Security benefits of the disabled parent when calculating the child support obligation of the non-disabled parent would, in effect, nullify the mandate of KRS 403.211(15). As stated earlier, KRS 403.211(15) does not allow the non-disabled parent to receive a child support credit for the Social Security disability payments of the disabled parent. If the trial court instead were to consider these payments as ‘independent financial resources’ of the child, a back door would be created whereby the court essentially gives the non-disabled parent credit for such payments... It would be illogical to think that the legislature would exempt the parent's disability benefits from being calculated for income purposes under KRS 403.211(15), and yet allow those same benefits to be considered for deviation from the child support guidelines.
The Kentucky Supreme Court accepted discretionary review of one unpublished family law case, Noe v. Artrip. The issues are whether a thrift saving plan withdrawal is income for child support calculation and whether a non-custodial, non-disabled parent is entitled to a credit toward his/her child support based on the child's receipt of social security benefit paid on account of the other parent's disability.
At the time the parties divorced in 2007, the father was living in Hardin County, Kentucky and the mother was living in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The trial court entered an order outlining various contingencies regarding parenting time and child support. If the father moved to Louisville within ninety days of entry of the court’s order, the parties would share equal parenting time and determine an appropriate child support obligation. If the parties could not agree on child support within 30 days of his relocation, the father could file a motion for modification of child support. When the father actually relocated to Louisville, the parties could not agree on child support. A hearing was scheduled on the matter on December 4, 2007, but the father never filed a written motion for modification. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order requiring that the new parenting schedule begin on December 8, 2007. Then the court entered an order in May 2008 reducing his child support obligation. The father asked the trial court to make the reduction retroactive to December 8, 2007, the date the new parenting schedule began. The trial court denied his request since no written motion for modification of child support had been filed.
The COA affirmed. No oral or written motion for modification of child support had been filed. The mother cannot be divested of child support payments that have already been accrued. Since a court speaks through its written orders, no child support modification occurred until May 2008. Pursuant to KRS 403.213(1), a written motion for modification is required before a trial court may change a child support award.

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