Source: https://openjurist.org/395/us/621
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:07:28+00:00

Document:
UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 15 et al.
The challenged statute is applicable only in the districts which hold annual meetings. To be eligible to vote at an annual district meeting, an otherwise qualified2 district resident must either (1) be the owner or lessee of taxable real property located in the district, (2) be the spouse of one who owns or leases qualifying property, or (3) be the parent or guardian of a child enrolled for a specified time during the preceding year in a local district school.
Although the New York State Department of Education has substantial responsibility for education in the State, the local school districts maintain significant control over the administration of local school district affairs.3 Generally, the board of education has the basic responsibility for local school operation, including prescribing the courses of study, determining the textbooks to be used, and even altering and equipping a former schoolhouse for use as a public library. N.Y.Educ.Law § 1709 (1953). Additionally, in districts selecting members of the board of education at annual meetings, the local voters also pass directly on other district matters. For example, they must approve the school budget submitted by the school board. N.Y.Educ.Law §§ 2021, 2022 (1953).4 Moreover, once the budget is approved, the governing body of the villages within the school district must raise the money which has been declared 'necessary for teachers' salaries and the ordinary contingent expenses (of the schools).' N.Y.Educ.Law § 1717 (1953).5 The voters also may 'authorize such acts and vote such taxes as they shall deem expedient * * * for * * * equipping for library use any former schoolhouse * * * (and) for the purchase of land and buildings for agricultural, athletic, playground or social center purposes * * *.' N.Y.Educ.Law § 416 (1953).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied appellant's request (made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281) that a three-judge district court be convened, and granted appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's complaint. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 259 F.Supp. 164 (D.C.E.D.N.Y.1966). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, ruling appelln t's complaint warranted convening a three-judge court. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 379 F.2d 491 (C.A.2d Cir. 1967). On remand, the three-judge court ruled that § 2012 is constitutional and dismissed appellant's complaint. 282 F.Supp. 70. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253, appellant filed a direct appeal with this Court; we noted probable jurisdiction. 393 U.S. 818, 89 S.Ct. 117, 21 L.Ed.2d 90 (1968).
At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue in this case. The requirements of § 2012 that school district voters must (1) be citizens of the United States, (2) be bona fide residents of the school district, and (3) be at least 21 years of age are not challenged. Appellant agrees that the States have the power to impose reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the availability of the ballot. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 775, 777, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817 (1904). The sole issue in this case is whether the additional requirements of § 2012—requirements which prohibit some district residents who are otherwise qualified by age and citizenship from participating in district meetings and school board elections—violate the Fourteenth Amendment's command that no State shall deny persons equal protection of the laws.
Thus, state apportionment statutes, which may dilute the effectiveness of some citizens' votes, receive close scrutiny from this Court. Reynolds v. Sims, supra. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968). No less rigid an examination is applicable to statutes denying the franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and age.6 Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives.7 Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest. See Carrington v. Rash, supra, 380 U.S., at 96, 85 S.Ct., at 780.
We turn therefore to question whether the exclusion is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. First appellees13 argue that the State has a legitimate interest in limiting the franchise in school district elections to 'members of the community of interest'—those 'primarily interested in such elections.' Second, appellees urge that the State may reasonably and permissibly conclude that 'property taxpayers' (including lessees of taxable property h o share the tax burden through rent payments) and parents of the children enrolled in the district's schools are those 'primarily interested' in school affairs.
Nor do appellees offer any justification for the exclusion of seemingly interested and infore d residents—other than to argue that the § 2012 classifications include those 'whom the State could understandably deem to be the most intimately interested in actions taken by the school board,' and urge that 'the task of * * * balancing the interest of the community in the maintenance of orderly school district elections against the interest of any individual in voting in such elections should clearly remain with the Legislature.'16 But the issue is not whether the legislative judgments are rational. A more exacting standard obtains. The issue is whether the § 2012 requirements do in fact sufficiently further a compelling state interest to justify denying the franchise to appellant and members of his class. The requirements of § 2012 are not sufficiently tailored to limiting the franchise to those 'primarily interested' in school affairs to justify the denial of the franchise to appellant and members of his class.
'The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 663, 24 S.Ct. 573, 576, 48 L.Ed. 817; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335, 21 S.Ct. 125, 128, 45 L.Ed. 214, absent of course the discrimination which the Constitution condemns.' 360 U.S., at 50—51, 79 S.Ct., at 989.
Three classes of persons are qualified under New York law to vote in these school elections: (1) parents or guardians of children attending public schools within the District; (2) persons who own taxable real property within the District, and their spouses; and (3) persons who lease taxable real property within the District, and their spouses.2 The appellant, a bachelor who lives with his parents and who neither owns nor leases any real property within the District, falls within none of those classes, and consequently is disqualified from voting despite the fact that he meets the general age and residence requirements imposed by state law. The question presented is whether, by virtue of that disqualification the appellant is denied the equal protection of the laws.
Although at times variously phrased, the traditional test of a statute's validity under the Equal Protection Clause is a familiar one: a legislative classification is invalid only 'if it rest(s) on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation's objectives.' Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556, 67 S.Ct. 910, 912, 91 L.Ed. 1093.3 It was under just such a test that the literacy requirement involved in Lassiter was upheld. The premise of our decision in that case was that a State may constitutionally impose upon its citizens voting requirements reasonably 'designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot.' 360 U.S., at 51, 79 S.Ct., at 990. A similar premise underlies the proposition, consistently endorsed by this Court,4 that a State may exclude nonresidents from participation in its elections. Such residence requirements, designed to help ensure that voters have a substantial stake in the outcome of elections and an opportunity to become familiar with the candidates and issues voted upon, are entirely permissible exercises of state authority. Indeed, the appellant explicitly concedes, as he must, the validity of voting requirements relating to residence, literacy, and age. Yet he argues—and the Court accepts the argument—that the voting qualifications involved here somehow have a different constitutional status. I am unable to see the distinction.
Clearly a State may reasonably assume that its residents have a greater stake in the outcome of elections held within it boundaries than do other persons. Likewise, it is entirely rational for a state legislature to suppose that residents, being generally better informed regarding state affairs than are nonresidents, will be more likely than nonresidents to vote responsibly. And the same may be said of legislative assumptions regarding the electoral competence of adults and literate persons on the one hand, and of minors and illiterates on the other. It is clear, of course, that lines thus drawn can not infallibly perform their intended legislative function. Just as '(i) lliterate people may be intelligent voters,'5 nonresidents or minors might also in some instances be interested, informed, and intelligent participants in the electoral process. Persons who commute across a state line to work may well have a great stake in the affairs of the State in which they are employed; some college students under 21 may be both better informed and more passionately interested in political affairs than many adults. But such discrepancies are the inevitable concomitant of the line drawing that is essential to law making. So long as the classification is rationally related to a permissible legislative end, therefore—as are residence, literacy, and age requirements imposed with respect to voting there is no denial of equal protection.
Thus judged, the statutory classification involved here seems to me clearly to be valid. New York has made the judgment that local educational policy is best left to those persons who have certain direct and definable interests in that policy: those who are either immediately involved as parents of school children or who, as owners or lessees of taxable property are burdened with the local cost of funding school district operations.6 True, persons outside those classes may be genuinely interested in the conduct of a school district's business—just as commuters from New Jersey may be genuinely interested in the outcome of a New York City election. But unless this Court is to claim a monopoly of wisdom regarding the sound operation of school systems in the 50 States, I see no way to justify the conclusion that the legislative classification involved here is not rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. 'There is no group more interested in the operation and management of the public schools than the taxpayers who support them and the parents whose children attend them.' Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435, 72 S.Ct. 394, 398, 96 L.Ed. 475 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
With good reason, the Court does not really argue the contrary. Instead, it strikes down New York's statute by asserting that the traditional equal protection standard is inapt in this case, and that a considerably stricter standard—under which classifications relating to 'the franchise' are to be subjected to 'exacting judicial scrutiny'—should be applied. But the asserted justification for applying such a standard cannot withstand analysis.
Nor is there any other jurisdiction for imposing the Court's 'exacting' equal protection test. This case does not involve racial classifications, which in light of the genesis of the Fourteenth Amendment have traditionally been viewed as inherently 'suspect.'7 And this statute is not one that impinges upon a constitutionally protected right, and that consequently can be justified only by a 'compelling' state interest.8 For 'the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one * * *.' Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178, 22 L.Ed. 627.
'But while the administration of schools and the formulation of general policies have been centralized in the State Education Department * * * the immediate control and operation of the schools in New York have to a large extent been vested in the localities. The thousands of districts * * * possess a high degree of authority in education. They decide matters of local taxation for school purposes, elect trustees and other school officials, purchase buildings and sites, employ teachers and * * * maintain discipline * * *.' Graves, Development of the Education Law in New York, 16 Consolidated Laws of New York (Education Law) xxiii (McKinney 1953). See R. Pyle, Some Aspects of Education in New York 9—13 (1967).
This case presents an issue different from the one we faced in McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969). The present appeal involves an absolute denial of the franchise. In McDonald, on the other hand, we were reviewing a statute which made casting a ballot easier for some who were unable to come to the polls. As we noted, there was no evidence that the statute absolutely prohibited anyone from exercising the franchise; at issue ws not a claimed right to vote but a claimed right to an absentee ballot. Id., at 807—808, 89 S.Ct., at 1408.
See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425—428, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104—1106, (1961); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527, 79 S.Ct. 437, 441, 3 L.Ed.2d 480, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1959); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
The District Court's statement to this effect has been explicitly reiterated and emphasized by the appellees, and the proposition is apparently conceded by the appellant. See N.Y.Educ.Law §§ 416, 1717, 2021; N.Y.Real.Prop.Tax Law McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 50—A, §§ 1302, 1306, 1308.
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817; Lassiter v. Northampton County Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51, 79 S.Ct. 985, 990, 3 L.Ed.2d 1072; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93—94, 96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 778—779, 13 L.Ed.2d 675; see Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 16 L.Ed.2d 169.

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