Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/46127
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:01:33+00:00

Document:
BERNABE L. CARRIAGA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ISMAEL O. BALDADO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 45, BAIS CITY, NEGROS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENT.
Under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988, inhibitions are judicial actions that are not subject to prior administrative approval. Consequently, executive judges have no power to reverse or overrule orders of inhibition of judges under their administrative supervision.
Another witness, Roque Amorganda, is the baptism sponsor of the late Bonifacio Benitez who, together with Edna Iso’s father were defeated in a case filed by Carriaga. The private complainant in Criminal Case No. B-62-2000 is the husband of Edna Baldado Iso.
Complainant has the penchant of filing administrative cases against judges with the end view of seeking their inhibition from the cases.
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, this Court resolved to re-docket the Complaint as a regular administrative matter and to designate Judge Jayme E. Ananson of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose, Negros Oriental, to hear and decide the subject six (6) criminal cases at the MCTC, Bindoy-Ayungon-Manjuyod.
In his letter dated December 17, 2003, Judge Ananson recused himself from hearing the criminal cases on the ground of delicadeza, because he had represented the complainant and his family in a related litigation prior to his appointment as judge. In its Resolution dated April 5, 2004, this Court noted his letter and designated Judge Leoncio R. Bancoro, MCTC of Bais City, Negros Oriental, to hear the cases.
The OCA opined that Judge Baldado had exceeded his authority when he revoked the Order of Inhibition of Judge Romeo L. Anasario. The power of respondent as an executive judge was merely to designate another judge to try the case that was the subject of inhibition. He had no authority to reverse the Order, as the authority to affirm or reverse a judge’s inhibition is vested in the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Baldado be fined in the amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000) for abuse of authority.
Agreeing with the reason for Judge Anasario’s inhibition, the OCA affirmed it, explaining that “the accused had lost confidence [i]n him and he believes that he could no longer hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge because of the administrative case previously filed by the accused against him.” After finding that the Administrative Complaint against Judge Anasario had been instituted long before the filing of the six criminal cases, the OCA disbelieved respondent’s contention that this had been filed to force the former to inhibit himself from hearing the cases.
Since there is no sufficient proof that the action taken by respondent had been prompted by his desire to favor private complainant, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the charge of bias and partiality against the executive judge. Furthermore, the court administrator said that there was no proof of the alleged use by respondent of his position to promote his own interests.
We agree with the findings of the OCA.
A judge’s decision to recuse on account of some disqualification is not conclusive. However, orders of inhibition are not administrative in character; they are judicial in nature. Questions on the inhibition or the competency of the inhibiting judge should be determined with finality in an appropriate judicial proceeding.
In conformity with this rule, parties may avail themselves of the ordinary remedies of reconsideration and appeal or of the extraordinary remedies of certiorari or mandamus. Disciplinary proceedings against the inhibiting judge are not complementary or suppletory to, or a substitute for, the aforementioned judicial remedies.
The administrative matter before us differs from petitions assailing a judge’s disqualification from hearing a particular case. In the present case, the judge voluntarily inhibited himself; the parties had not filed any motion on the matter. It was the executive judge who insisted that Judge Anasario should continue hearing the case. Respondent’s action was improper.
The duty of executive judges, therefore, is merely to elevate an order of inhibition to the Supreme Court through the Office of the Court Administrator or, otherwise, to appoint another trial court judge under their supervision to handle the case. It is not within their authority to resist or overrule the order of recusation. By disapproving Judge Anasario’s inhibition, respondent acted contrary to the aforesaid Circular.
Respondent judge’s lack of awareness of the Circular and the decisions concerning inhibitions of judges indicates a failure to live up to the Code of Judicial Conduct that enjoins judges “to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence.” Being the visible representation of the law, judges must be familiar with the circulars and issuances of this Court and must diligently keep themselves abreast with developments in our legal system. Only in doing so can they live up to their sacred judicial duties. Hence, they are called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules, lest public confidence in the judiciary be eroded.
The charge of partiality has no factual support. Mere suspicion is not enough. Bias and partiality must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be inferred from respondent’s contested Order, there is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of partiality or bias.
WHEREFORE, Judge Ismael O. Baldado of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 45) of Bais City, Negros Oriental is found guilty of administrative abuse and is hereby FINED in the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000). A repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. However, he is found innocent of the charge of bias and partiality.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio, Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 OCA Report, pp. 1-2 & 116-117.
 Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated November 10, 1980.
 Ang Kek Chen v. Andrade, 318 SCRA 11, November 16, 1999; Flores v. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302, July 10, 1997.
 Request to designate another judge to try and decide Criminal Case No. 3713 (SF-99) pending before the MCTC, San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, 366 SCRA 555, October 5, 2001 (citing Flores v. Abesamis, supra).
 Regarding the implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
 Hilario v. Concepcion, 327 SCRA 96, March 2, 2000.
 Madula v. Santos, 410 SCRA 504, 510, September 11, 2003; Chin v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 206, August 15, 2003.
 Chin v. Court of Appeals, supra.
 Gochan v. Gochan, 398 SCRA 323, February 27, 2003.

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