Source: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/collages/41451
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:09:45+00:00

Document:
Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc.
McLachlin C.J.C., L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Binnie, LeBel JJ.
Transferring image of poster on to canvas does not constitute reproduction within meaning of s. 3(1) of Copyright Act as there is no multiplication of copies and one poster exists — Art galleries which transferred posters of artist’s paintings on to canvas did not infringe copyright of artist under Copyright Act — Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 3(1).
Art galleries which transferred posters of artist’s paintings on to canvas did not infringe copyright of artist under Copyright Act — Artist was asserting moral right under guise of economic right — Artist or author who alleges infringement of moral right does not have access to seizure before judgment provided for in art. 734 of Code of Civil Procedure, as artist does not meet requirements of s. 38 of Act — Artist’s seizure before judgment of art galleries’ transfers on to canvas was quashed — Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 38 — Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, art. 734.
Entoilage de l’image d’une affiche ne constitue pas de la reproduction au sens de l’art. 3(1) de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur vu qu’il n’y a aucune multiplication des copies; il n’y a toujours qu’une seule affiche — Galeries d’art qui ont entoilé des affiches représentant des peintures de l’artiste n’ont pas violé le droit d’auteur de celui-ci au sens de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur — Loi sur le droit d’auteur, L.R.C. 1985, c. C-42, art. 3(1).
Galeries d’art qui ont entoilé des affiches représentant des peintures de l’artiste n’ont pas violé le droit d’auteur de celui-ci au sens de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur — Artiste essayait de faire valoir un droit moral sous le couvert d’un droit économique — Artiste ou auteur qui allègue la violation d’un droit moral ne peut recourir à la saisie avant jugement prévue à l’art 734 du Code de procédure civile, car il ne répond pas aux critères d’application de l’art. 38 de la Loi — Saisie avant jugement par l’artiste des entoilages chez les galeries d’art devait être annulée — Loi sur le droit d’auteur, L.R.C. 1985, c. C-42, art. 38 — Code de procédure civile, L.R.Q., c. C-25, art. 734.
An artist, a painter, authorized by contract the reproduction of some of his paintings. The contract between the artist and the publishing house allowed the publisher to publish a certain quantity of reproductions, cards and other paper products. The contract also provided that the product could be sold without restrictions as to use. The product could be framed, laminated or assembled with other products.
Some art galleries bought cards, photolithographs and posters of the artist’s works. They then transferred the image on canvas through a chemical process which allowed the ink layer to be lifted off the paper and displayed on a canvas.
Given that situation, the artist applied for an injunction, accounting, and damages and obtained a writ of seizure before judgment under art. 735 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The artist seized, among other things, all the art galleries’ canvases of his works on the ground that he had a deemed right of ownership in them under s. 38 of the Copyright Act. The art galleries brought a motion for release of the seizures. The trial judge concluded that the transfer on to canvas of an authorized paper reproduction did not amount to infringement within the meaning of the Act and that the artist could not benefit from the presumption of ownership created by s. 38(1) of the Act. The judge ordered the release of the seized items. The artist appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded that transfer on to canvas was infringement, allowed the appeal and confirmed the seizure before judgment with regards to the canvases. As this was an interlocutory matter, the art galleries applied for leave to appeal and it was granted.
Per Binnie J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Iacobucci, Major JJ. concurring): The Copyright Act grants authors economic and moral rights on their works. The economic rights are based on a view of artistic and literary works which essentially considers them to be commercial objects. These rights can be bought or sold in part or in whole, generally or with territorial restrictions, for the complete or partial duration of the protection. It is not necessary that the owner of the copyright be the author. In this case, the artist had assigned his economic rights to the publisher. He could assert only under the Copyright Act the economic rights he had kept.
Moral rights adopt a more noble and less commercial view of the relationship between an artist and his work. They treat the work as the extension of the artist’s personality and give it a dignity that deserves to be protected. They emphasize the artist’s right to protect, throughout the duration of his economic rights, the integrity and the authorship of his work. The integrity of the work is infringed under the Copyright Act only when the work is modified to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author. Moral rights act as a continuing restraint on what purchasers can do with a work once it passes from the author, but respect must be given to the limitations that are an essential part of the moral rights created by Parliament. Economic rights should not be read so broadly that they cover the same ground as moral rights, thus rendering inoperative the limits Parliament has imposed on moral rights.
Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is usually the purchaser, not the seller, who has the right to decide what will happen to the copy. The purchaser can divide the poster as he wishes. A division cannot logically be considered a reproduction. By transferring the image fixed in ink on a canvas, which image is the subject matter of the intellectual property, it was transferred from one support to another. There was still only one poster. The image was not reproduced within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Act.
Reproduction has generally been defined as the action of producing additional or new copies of a work in any material form. The Act recognizes not only literal physical, mechanical reproduction, but technological evolution allows the reproduction of expression with the help of previously unthought of means. However, evolution played no part in this case because of the facts. This was a literal physical, mechanical transfer in which no multiplication took place. The original poster lived on in the new “re-fixated” poster. There was no multiplication, and fixation alone could not constitute an infringement of the original work.
Section 3(1) of the Copyright Act prevents the person infringing a work from avoiding liability because he or she reproduced only an important part of the work. In this case, the ink layer, where the artistic content was, had remained intact and there was no multiplication of “an important part” of the poster.
In the Copyright Act, Parliament gave the buyer the right to make changes to the work that are not done to the “prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author”. Under s. 28.2(3), a change to the work’s physical structure does not necessarily amount to a distortion, mutilation or modification of the work. To the extent that it can be said that a change of support modifies the “physical structure” containing the artist’s work, that change does not “necessarily” appear to amount to an infringement of a moral right. The existence of separate structures in the Act, one for economic rights, one for moral rights, shows Parliament’s clear intent to distinguish and separate them. The legislature wanted modification without reproduction to be governed by moral rights provisions rather than by the economic rights provisions. Maintaining otherwise would allow an artist who objects to a “modification” of the authorized reproduction to sidestep the important requirement of showing prejudice to honour or reputation to establish an infringement of moral rights. The art galleries made no reproduction when they contributed blank canvas to the “combination” of ink layer and canvas.
The economic rights of the owner of the copyright do not allow him to keep control over the specific uses that third party purchasers make of authorized copies of his work. Parliament formulated restrictive provisions which gave the owner of the copyright a certain control power of the uses. There is no general right to control subsequent uses.
A large interpretation of s. 3 economic rights would thus heavily favour the owner of the copyright and would not sufficiently recognize the art galleries’ right of ownership over the posters they bought.
Per Binnie J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Iacobucci, Major JJ. concurring): No reproductions of the artist’s works were made, nor production (or reproduction) of a new work under s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act. The art galleries owned the posters and they had the right to transfer on to canvas the paper reproductions authorized by the artist. The artist was asserting a moral right under the guise of an economic right. That attempt should be rejected.
The seizure before judgment provided for in art. 734 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not available to the artist or author who alleges infringement of a moral right. Moral rights are hedged about with the concept of reasonableness. The evaluation of a potential breach calls for a good deal of judgment. A distortion, mutilation or modification is only actionable if it is to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author. The artist or author should not become judge in his own cause in such matters. Since the remedy of art. 734 is so drastic, it was understandable that Parliament would require prior judicial review before any seizure takes place based on an assertion of violation of moral rights.
At the interlocutory proceedings stage, the artist did not meet the conditions of s. 38 of the Act. The seizure before judgment of art. 734 was not available to him to seize the art galleries’ copies. It was the trial judge who could determine whether the more complete evidence produced at trial showed an infringement of economic or moral rights. The appeal was dismissed, the Court of Appeal’s order quashed and the motions judge’s order restored.
Per Gonthier J. (dissenting) (L’Heureux-Dubé, LeBel JJ. concurring): The Copyright Act protects both the copyright defined in s. 3(1) and the author’s moral rights. The copyright protects against the unlawful appropriation and distribution of creative expression. It protects against any reproduction or use that was not authorized by its owner. This is an assignable patrimonial right. The copyright is thus a right on the work and not a personal right. The key element is the work, which includes the medium of the work, not the idea of the work. Moral rights mainly aim to protect the integrity and authorship of the work, which is then considered to be an extension of the author’s personality. These rights are extra-patrimonial and are not assignable. In this case, the dispute was exclusively decided by the aspects of the English notion of copyright. The moral rights concept could not be applied to the facts of the case.
A seizure under s. 38(1) of the Act requires that there be infringing copies of works or of any other subject matter of copyright. Infringement arises from two distinct sources: a copy made in contravention of the Copyright Act or a copy dealt with in contravention of the Act. In the first case, the act of copying is itself illegal. In the second case, it is not necessarily the copying itself which infringes the Act, but rather that it was dealt with in contravention of the Act. An appropriate interpretation of the Act leads to the conclusion that a mere violation of moral rights cannot amount to infringement. A violation of the copyright as described by s. 3 of the Act is required. The Act adopts the definition that says that to have infringement an illegal copy or appropriation is required, regardless of any other concomitant tort. Section 38(1) gives the owner of the copyright, not the author, the right to take possession of any infringing copies. Only the presence of a violation of the copyright will justify granting the remedies of s. 38(1).
To reproduce a work, it is not absolutely necessary to show an increase of the total number of copies of that work. The reproduction concept must receive a liberal interpretation since the statute is written in general terms in order to include new reproduction technologies. The primary purpose of s. 3(1) is to allow the author to profit from his work.
The Act must be interpreted while bearing in mind that Parliament has protected the right to reproduce the whole of the work, but also an important part of the work. Both the quantitative and qualitative aspect of reproduction must be considered. The analysis of the qualitative aspect is an essential element of the s. 3(1) analysis. The key element of reproduction is the quality rather than the quantity. The qualitative aspect of a work is protected by s. 3(1) and a restrictive analysis based solely on the multiplication of the work would not give it the required protection and would ignore the concept of an “important part of the work” protected by s. 3(1).
A work is the physical outcome of the creative process. Fixation in a medium is a condition sine qua non of the production of a work. Reproducing a work amounts to rematerializing what already existed under a first material form. The work is produced for a second time. The fixation to a new medium therefore represents the fundamental aspect of the act of reproducing. That is plagiarism and thus a violation of the copyright owner’s rights. Multiplication of the copies of a work is therefore not an essential aspect of the reproduction of a work. What matters is the new act of fixation. The determination of whether a reproduction is illegal is a question of fact and must be examined with the facts of each case. That means the analysis based on s. 3(1) is the same whether the reproduction is made from the original work or from a copy.
It is important to draw a distinction between the medium protected by s. 3(1), which is inextricably linked to the work, and the concept of “structure” found in s. 28(3) of the Act. A change in structure can constitute an alteration of a work and can cause prejudice to the author’s integrity and thus violate his moral rights. Section 3 prohibits the change in medium and s. 28(1) prohibits the modification of the structure containing the work, if the author shows that the new structure is to the prejudice of his work.
The Copyright Act allows the owner of the copyright to assign his right completely or partly, but the owner nevertheless keeps the remainder of the exclusive reproduction rights he did not assign. The artist had signed a contract which set out the terms of the reproduction of his works. That contract was unequivocal and was not contested. The analysis of the contract’s provisions regarding the authorized medium allowed the conclusion that the artist never intended to assign the whole of his right to reproduce his work under any material form. The artist assigned only his right to reproduce his works on paper and he excluded reproduction under any material form. The rights granted did not include the right to transfer on to canvas an image of one of his works. That conclusion was also sustained by many elements of the contract. Allowing the paper product to be sold without restriction did not entail a possibility to alter its original nature. The rights assigned by contract did not at all include the possibility to change completely the nature of the authorized product by changing its support. Contrary to transfer on to canvas, neither framing nor laminating causes such a complete change in the nature of the paper product. The rights assigned by the artist did not include the right to make copies regardless of the medium. What was assigned was the right to distribute a certain amount of paper reproductions of the works.
By transferring the artist’s works on to canvas, the art galleries reproduced his works contrary to s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act . Given his lack of consent, they infringed his copyright. They infringed his work and he was entitled to seize the canvases under art. 734(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and s. 38(1) of the Act.
Un artiste peintre a autorisé par contrat la reproduction de certaines de ses toiles. Le contrat entre l’artiste et la maison d’édition permettait à cette dernière de publier un certain nombre de reproductions, de cartes ainsi que d’autres produits de papeterie. Le contrat stipulait aussi que le produit pouvait être mis en vente sans restriction d’utilisation; le produit pouvait donc être encadré, laminé ou regroupé avec d’autres produits.
Des galeries d’art ont acheté des cartes, photolithographies et affiches représentant des oeuvres de l’artiste, pour ensuite en entoiler l’image selon un processus chimique permettant de détacher la couche d’encre du papier et de l’apposer sur une toile.
Devant cette situation, l’artiste a intenté un recours en injonction, reddition de compte et dommages-intérêts et a obtenu la délivrance d’un bref de saisie avant jugement en vertu de l’art. 735 du Code de procédure civile. Alléguant détenir un droit de propriété présumé sur ces biens en vertu de l’art. 38 de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur, l’artiste a notamment fait saisir dans les galeries d’art concernées tous les entoilages de ses oeuvres. Les galeries d’art ont présenté une requête pour obtenir la mainlevée de ces saisies. Le juge de première instance a conclu que l’entoilage d’une reproduction papier autorisée n’équivalait pas à une contrefaçon au sens de la Loi et, donc, que l’artiste ne pouvait bénéficier de la présomption de propriété créée par l’art. 38(1) de la Loi. Il a ordonné la mainlevée des saisies. L’artiste a interjeté appel. La Cour d’appel a conclu à la contrefaçon, a accueilli le pourvoi et maintenu la saisie avant jugement quant aux entoilages. S’agissant d’une affaire interlocutoire, les galeries d’art ont demandé et obtenu la permission d’interjeter appel.
Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.
Binnie J. (McLachlin J.C.C., Iacobucci, Major JJ. souscrivant): La Loi sur le droit d’auteur confère aux auteurs des droits économiques et des droits moraux sur leurs oeuvres. Les droits économiques sont fondés sur une conception des oeuvres artistiques et littéraires qui les considère essentiellement comme des objets de commerce. Ces droits peuvent être achetés et vendus en totalité ou en partie, d’une façon générale ou avec des restrictions territoriales, pour la durée complète ou partielle de la protection. Il n’est pas nécessaire que le titulaire du droit d’auteur soit l’auteur de l’oeuvre. En l’espèce, l’artiste avait cédé ses droits économiques à la maison d’édition. Il pouvait seulement faire valoir en vertu de la Loi les droits économiques qu’il avait conservés.
Les droits moraux consacrent une conception plus noble et moins mercantile du lien entre un artiste et son oeuvre. Ils traitent l’oeuvre comme un prolongement de la personnalité de l’artiste et lui attribuent une dignité qui mérite d’être protégée. Ils mettent l’accent sur le droit de l’artiste de protéger, pendant la durée des droits économiques, l’intégrité de l’oeuvre et sa paternité. Pour qu’il y ait violation de l’intégrité de l’oeuvre selon la Loi sur le droit d’auteur, l’oeuvre doit être modifiée d’une manière préjudiciable à l’honneur ou à la réputation de l’auteur. Les droits moraux restreignent de façon permanente l’utilisation que les acheteurs peuvent faire d’une oeuvre une fois que son auteur s’en est départi. Il faut par contre tenir compte des limites qui constituent une partie essentielle des droits moraux créés par le législateur. Les droits économiques ne doivent pas être interprétés de façon tellement large qu’ils engloberaient les mêmes éléments que les droits moraux, ce qui rendrait alors inapplicables les limites aux droits moraux imposées par le législateur.
Dès qu’une copie autorisée d’une oeuvre est vendue à un membre du public, c’est à l’acheteur qu’il appartient généralement, et non à l’auteur, de décider de son sort. L’acheteur a le droit de diviser l’affiche comme bon lui semble. On ne peut pas logiquement qualifier une division de reproduction. Par le procédé de l’entoilage, l’image fixée dans l’encre, qui est l’objet de la propriété intellectuelle, a été transférée d’un support à un autre. Une seule affiche demeurait toujours. L’image n’a pas été reproduite au sens l’art. 3(1) de la Loi.
La reproduction est généralement définie comme l’action de produire des copies supplémentaires ou nouvelles de l’oeuvre sous une forme matérielle quelconque. La multiplication des copies serait donc une conséquence nécessaire de cette notion matérielle de « reproduction ». La Loi ne reconnaît pas seulement la reproduction littérale matérielle et mécanique; elle reconnaît aussi que l’évolution technologique permet de reproduire l’expression à l’aide de moyens préalablement inimaginables. En l’espèce, cette évolution n’entrait pas en jeu vu les faits. Il s’agissait ici d’un transfert littéral matériel et mécanique sans multiplication. L’affiche originale continuait d’exister dans l’affiche « fixée à nouveau ». Il n’y avait aucune multiplication et la seule fixation ne constituait pas une violation de l’oeuvre originale.
L’article 3(1) de la Loi empêche la personne qui contrefait une oeuvre d’échapper à sa responsabilité parce qu’elle en a seulement reproduit une partie importante. En l’espèce, la couche d’encre, dans laquelle se trouvait le contenu artistique, était demeurée intacte et il n’y avait pas eu multiplication d’une « partie importante de l’oeuvre » de l’affiche.
Dans la Loi sur le droit d’auteur, le législateur a conféré à l’acheteur de l’oeuvre le droit de lui apporter un changement qui n’est pas « préjudiciable à l’honneur ou à la réputation de l’auteur ». Selon l’art. 28.2(3), un changement à la structure de l’oeuvre ne correspond pas nécessairement à une déformation, mutilation ou modification de l’oeuvre. Dans la mesure où l’on peut dire qu’un changement de support modifie la « structure » qui contient l’oeuvre de l’artiste, ce changement ne semble pas « nécessairement » équivaloir non plus à une violation d’un droit moral. L’existence de régimes distincts dans la Loi, un pour les droits économiques et un pour les droits moraux, dénote l’intention claire du législateur de les distinguer et de les séparer. Le législateur a voulu que la modification sans reproduction soit régie par les dispositions sur les droits moraux plutôt que par celles portant sur les droits économiques. Soutenir le contraire permettrait à l’artiste qui s’oppose à une « modification » de la reproduction autorisée de se soustraire à l’exigence importante de prouver le préjudice causé à son honneur ou à sa réputation pour établir que ses droits moraux ont été violés. En intégrant la toile vierge à la « combinaison » formée de la couche d’encre et de la toile, les galeries d’art n’ont donc pas fait de reproduction.
Les droits économiques du titulaire du droit d’auteur ne lui permettent pas de conserver le contrôle sur les usages précis que font les tiers acquéreurs des copies autorisées de son oeuvre. Le législateur a formulé des dispositions restrictives dans lesquelles il a attribué un certain pouvoir des contrôles sur les usages au titulaire du droit d’auteur. Il n’existe donc aucun droit général de contrôler l’usage ultérieur.
Donc, une interprétation large des droits économiques de l’art. 3 Loi ferait trop pencher la balance en faveur du titulaire du droit d’auteur et ne reconnaîtrait pas suffisamment les droits de propriété des galeries d’art sur les affiches qu’elles ont achetées.
Il n’y avait donc eu aucune reproduction des oeuvres de l’artiste ni production (ou reproduction) d’une nouvelle oeuvre au sens de l’art. 3(1) de la Loi. Les galeries d’art étaient propriétaires des affiches et elles avaient le droit de transférer sur toile les reproductions papier autorisées par l’artiste. L’artiste essayait de faire valoir un droit moral sous le couvert d’un droit économique. Cette tentative devait être repoussée.
L’artiste ou l’auteur qui allègue la violation d’un droit moral ne peut recourir à la saisie avant jugement prévue par l’art. 734 du Code de procédure civile. Les droits moraux sont circonscrits par la notion de caractère raisonnable. L’évaluation d’une violation potentielle fait appel à l’exercice du jugement. La déformation, la mutilation ou la modification d’une oeuvre ne peut donner lieu à une poursuite que si elle est faite d’une manière préjudiciable à l’honneur ou à la réputation de l’auteur. L’artiste ou l’auteur ne doit pas devenir juge de sa propre cause dans ces cas-là. La procédure de l’art. 734 étant draconienne, il était compréhensible que le législateur requiert la tenue d’un examen judiciaire préalable à une saisie fondée sur une allégation de violation de droits moraux.
À l’étape de l’instance interlocutoire, l’artiste ne répondait pas aux critères d’application de l’art. 38 de la Loi. Il ne pouvait donc recourir à la saisie avant jugement prévue par l’art. 734 du Code pour saisir les exemplaires des galeries d’art. C’est le juge de première instance qui devait déterminer si la preuve plus complète produite au procès démontrait l’existence d’une violation des droits économiques ou des droits moraux. Le pourvoi devait être rejeté, l’ordonnance de la Cour d’appel annulée et l’ordonnance du juge saisi de la requête rétablie.
Gonthier J. (dissident) (les juges L’Heureux-Dubé, LeBel JJ. souscrivant): La Loi sur le droit d’auteur protège tant le droit d’auteur défini à l’art. 3(1) que les droits moraux de l’auteur. Le droit d’auteur protège contre l’appropriation et la dissémination illicites de l’expression créative. Il protège contre toute reproduction ou usage non autorisé par le son titulaire. C’est un droit patrimonial qui peut être cédé. Le droit d’auteur est donc un droit sur l’oeuvre et non un droit personnel. L’élément clé est l’oeuvre incluant son support matériel et non l’idée de l’oeuvre. Les droits moraux, quant à eux, visent principalement à protéger l’intégrité et la paternité de l’oeuvre, qui est alors considérée comme une extension de la personnalité de l’auteur. Ces droits sont extra-patrimoniaux et ils sont incessibles. En l’espèce, le litige était exclusivement réglé par les aspects de la notion anglaise de « copyright ». Les notions de droit moraux étaient inapplicables aux faits de l’affaire.
Pour pouvoir faire une saisie en vertu de l’art. 38(1), il faut qu’il existe des exemplaires contrefaits d’oeuvres ou de tout autre objet du droit d’auteur. La contrefaçon découle de deux sources distinctes: une reproduction faite contrairement à la Loi sur le droit d’auteur ou une reproduction qui a fait l’objet d’un acte contraire à celle-ci. Dans le premier cas, c’est l’acte de reproduction lui-même qui est illicite. Dans le deuxième cas, ce n’est pas nécessairement la reproduction elle-même qui constitue une violation de la Loi, mais plutôt le fait que la reproduction a fait l’objet d’un acte contraire à la Loi. Une interprétation appropriée de la Loi amène à conclure qu’une simple violation des droits moraux ne peut être équivalent à de la contrefaçon. Il faut nécessairement une violation du droit d’auteur décrit à l’art. 3 de la Loi. Selon la Loi, pour qu’il y ait contrefaçon, il faut une copie ou une appropriation illicite, indépendamment de tout autre délit concomitant. L’article 38(1) confère au titulaire du droit d’auteur le droit de prendre possession d’exemplaires contrefaits et non à l’auteur lui-même. Seule la présence d’une violation du droit d’auteur justifie l’octroi des mesures prévues par l’art. 38(1).
Pour reproduire une oeuvre, il n’est absolument pas nécessaire de démontrer une augmentation de nombre total de copies de celle-ci. Il faut interpréter la notion de reproduction libéralement vu que la législation est rédigée en termes généraux pour inclure les nouvelles technologies de reproduction. Le but premier de l’art. 3(1) est de permettre à l’auteur de bénéficier des fruits de son oeuvre.
La Loi doit être interprétée en se rappelant que le législateur a non seulement protégé le droit de reproduire la totalité de l’oeuvre, mais aussi une partie importante de celle-ci. Il faut tenir compte tant de l’aspect quantitatif de la reproduction que de l’aspect qualitatif. L’aspect qualitatif d’une oeuvre est protégé par l’art. 3(1) et une analyse restrictive uniquement basée sur la multiplication de l’oeuvre ne saurait lui octroyer la protection nécessaire et ignorerait le concept de « partie importante de l’oeuvre » protégé par l’art. 3(1).
L’oeuvre est l’aboutissement matériel du processus de création. La fixation à un support matériel est une condition sine qua non de la production d’une oeuvre. Reproduire une oeuvre équivaut donc à rematérialiser ce qui existait déjà sous une première forme matérielle. On fait naître l’oeuvre une seconde fois. La fixation à un nouveau support matériel constitue donc l’élément fondamental de l’acte de reproduction. Cela constitue du plagiat et, donc, une violation des droits du titulaire du droit d’auteur. La multiplication des copies d’une oeuvre n’est donc pas un élément essentiel de la reproduction d’une oeuvre. C’est le nouvel acte de fixation qui importe. La détermination de l’existence d’une reproduction illégale est une question de fait et doit être appréciée selon les faits dans chaque cas. Par conséquent, l’analyse basée sur l’art. 3(1) est la même que la reproduction soit tirée de l’oeuvre originale ou d’une copie. Il faut se demander dans les deux cas s’il s’agit d’une reproduction de l’oeuvre ou d’une partie importante de cette dernière.
Il est important de faire une distinction entre le support matériel protégé par l’art. 3(1), inextricablement lié à l’oeuvre, et la notion de « structure » se retrouvant à l’art. 28(3). Un changement de structure peut constituer une modification de l’oeuvre et porter préjudice à l’intégrité de l’auteur et ainsi violer ses droits moraux. La modification du support matériel est prohibée par l’art. 3(1), tandis que la modification d’une structure qui contient l’oeuvre sera prohibée par l’art. 28(3) si l’auteur démontre que la nouvelle structure porte préjudice à son oeuvre.
La Loi sur le droit d’auteur permet au titulaire du droit d’auteur de céder son droit en totalité ou en partie, mais il conserve néanmoins le reliquat des droits exclusifs de reproduction qu’il n’a pas cédés. L’artiste avait signé un contrat dans lequel il énonçait les conditions de la reproduction de ses oeuvres. Ce contrat était sans équivoque et n’était pas remis en question. L’examen des dispositions contractuelles visant le support matériel autorisé permettait de conclure que l’artiste n’avait jamais eu l’intention de céder la totalité de son droit de reproduires ses oeuvres sous une forme matérielle quelconque. Il a seulement cédé le droit de reproduire ces oeuvres sur support papier; il a exclu la reproduction sous toute forme matérielle. Les droits accordés n’incluaient pas celui d’apposer sur une toile une image représentant une de ses oeuvres. Plusieurs éléments du contrat appuyaient d’ailleurs cette conclusion. Le fait de permettre la mise en vente sans restriction du produit papier n’entraîne pas la possibilité de modifier sa nature première. Les droits cédés par le contrat n’incluait pas du tout la possibilité de dénaturer le produit autorisé en en changeant le support. Contrairement à l’entoilage, ni le l’encadrement ni le laminage ne donnent lieu à une telle dénaturation du produit papier. Les droits cédés par l’artiste ne comportaient pas celui de faire des copies sans égard au support matériel. C’est le droit de diffuser un certain nombre de reproductions des oeuvres sur support papier qui avait été cédé.
Par conséquent, en faisant l’entoilage des oeuvres de l’artiste, les galeries ont reproduit les oeuvres de ce dernier contrairement à l’art. 3(1) de la Loi. Elles ont violé le droit d’auteur de l’artiste vu son absence de consentement. Elles ont donc contrefait son oeuvre et l’artiste avait le droit de saisir les entoilages conformément aux art. 734(1) C.p.c. et 38(1) de la Loi.
Copyrights Act, 1997, 17 U.S.C.
APPEAL by art galleries from judgment reported at 2000 CarswellQue 133, (sub nom. Théberge v. Galeries d’Art Yves Laroche Inc.) 9 C.P.R. (4th) 259,  J.Q. No. 412 (Que. C.A.), concluding on infringement, confirming seizure before judgment and allowing appeal by artist from judgment reported at 1999 CarswellQue 3176 (Que. S.C.), quashing seizures before judgment made by artist in art galleries.
POURVOI des galeries d’art à l’encontre de l’arrêt publié à 2000 CarswellQue 133, (sub nom. Théberge v. Galeries d’Art Yves Laroche Inc.) 9 C.P.R. (4th) 259,  J.Q. No. 412 (C.A. Qué.), qui a conclu à la contrefaçon, maintenu la saisi avant jugement et accueilli le pourvoi interjeté par l’artiste à l’encontre du jugement publié à 1999 CarswellQue 3176 (C.S. Qué.), qui avait ordonné la mainlevée des saisies avant jugement pratiquées par l’artiste dans les galeries d’art.
1 We are required in this appeal to determine the extent to which an artist, utilizing the statutory rights and remedies provided by the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, can control the eventual use or display of an authorized reproduction of his or her work in the hands of a third party purchaser.
2 Claude Théberge, a well-established Canadian painter with an international reputation, seeks to stop the appellants, who amongst other things produce poster art, from transferring authorized reproductions of his artistic works from a paper substrate (or support) to a canvas substrate for purposes of resale. In my opinion, for the reasons which follow, the appellants did not thereby “copy” the respondent’s artistic works. They purchased lawfully reproduced posters of his paintings and used a chemical process that allowed them to lift the ink layer from the paper (leaving it blank) and to display it on canvas. They were within their rights to do so as owners of the physical posters (which lawfully incorporated the copyrighted expression). At the end of the day, no new reproductions of the respondent’s works were brought into existence. Nor, in my view, was there production (or reproduction) of a new artistic work “in any material form” within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act. What began as a poster, authorized by the respondent, remained a poster.
3 Nevertheless, on August 19, 1999, the respondent arranged to have the bailiff seize canvas-backed reproductions from the appellants without ever satisfying a judge that the appellants had violated the Copyright Act. Although seizure before judgment is designed purely as a conservation measure divorced from the merits of the case, the appellants claim that the seizure of their inventory caused them a significant loss, both in sales and reputation. The respondent has not proceeded with his action on the merits since the date of the seizure two and a half years ago.
4 I find myself in respectful disagreement with the conclusion of my colleague Gonthier J. In my view, the seizure was not authorized by the Copyright Act. The pre-judgment seizure provisions of Article 734 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25 were thus not an available remedy. The seizure was therefore wrongful. I would allow the appeal.
5 Copyright in this country is a creature of statute and the rights and remedies it provides are exhaustive: Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc. (1979),  1 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.), at p. 373; R. v. Stewart,  1 S.C.R. 963 (S.C.C.); Bishop v. Stevens,  2 S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.), at p. 477.
6 This is not to say that Canadian copyright law lives in splendid isolation from the rest of the world. Canada has adhered to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) and subsequent revisions and additions, and other international treaties on the subject including the Universal Copyright Convention (1952). In light of the globalization of the so-called “cultural industries”, it is desirable, within the limits permitted by our own legislation, to harmonize our interpretation of copyright protection with other like-minded jurisdictions. That being said, there are some continuing conceptual differences between the droit d’auteur of the continental civiliste tradition and the English copyright tradition, and these differences seem to lie at the root of the misunderstanding which gave rise to the present appeal.
7 I acknowledge, at the outset, that there is a significant difference in appearance between a paper-backed poster and a canvas-backed poster. The question is whether for present purposes creating this difference by mechanical transfer from one substrate or backing to another violates the Act. The respondent must find authority for the seizure in the Code of Civil Procedure read in light of the Copyright Act. If he cannot find authority in the legislation, then it does not exist and the seizure was wrongful.
8 The respondent easily meets the first hurdle, which is to satisfy the statutory requirements for a copyright. There is no doubt that his talent is embodied in artistic works of great originality. These works were protected by copyright from the moment of their expression, without any requirement of registration or other formality on his part. The protection extends not only to the original painting (”artistic work”) but also to subsequent copies which embody the work. The respondent is thus entitled to the full measure of protection the Act allows. The question, however, is whether he went too far in obtaining a seizure before judgment of works which he, necessarily viewing the matter in his own interest, found to be infringing.
9 In my view, with respect, my colleague Gonthier J. gives too little scope to the property rights of the purchaser who owns the poster, i.e., the physical object incorporating the copyrighted expression, and excessive rights to the artist who authorized the printing and sale of the poster purchased.
10 More specifically, I think that if modification of these posters were to give rise to any legitimate objection on the part of the artist, it must be as a result of violation of his “moral” right to the integrity of his work. In that regard, however, my colleague Gonthier J. and I are in agreement that seizure before trial is not a remedy available in an action based on the alleged breach of the artist’s “moral” right in a work.
11 The Act provides the respondent with both economic and “moral” rights to his work. The distinction between the two types of rights and their respective statutory remedies is crucial.
12 Generally speaking, Canadian copyright law has traditionally been more concerned with economic than moral rights. Our original Act, which came into force in 1924, substantially tracked the English Copyright Act, 1911 (U.K.), 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46. The principal economic benefit to the artist or author was (and is) the “sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever” (s. 3(1)) for his or her life plus fifty years (s. 6). The economic rights are based on a conception of artistic and literary works essentially as articles of commerce. (Indeed, the initial Copyright Act, 1709 (U.K.), 8 Anne, c. 19, was passed to assuage the concerns of printers, not authors.) Consistently with this view, such rights can be bought and sold either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to territorial limitations, and either for the whole term of the copyright or for any part thereof (s. 13(4)). The owner of the copyright, thus, can be, but need not be, the author of the work. It was the respondent’s economic rights in enumerated works that were the subject matter of an assignment to two poster manufacturers, Éditions Galerie L’Imagerie É.G.I. Ltée (herein “É.G.I.”) by contract dated October 29, 1996, and New York Graphic Society, Ltd. by contract dated February 3, 1997.
The product is offered for sale without restriction as to use, i.e. it may be framed, laminated or combined with other products and such uses shall not be considered to have generated products or sub-products other than those provided for in this contract.
14 The appellants were not party to this contract, but I agree with my colleague Gonthier J. that its terms may nevertheless be relevant in determining to what extent the respondent assigned away his economic rights under the Copyright Act, and to what extent he still holds them. É.G.I., it is noted, is not a party to this proceeding. The only economic rights the respondent can assert under the Act are those rights that he has retained. Accepting, as I do, my colleague’s interpretation of the É.G.I. contract to the effect that the respondent (rather than É.G.I.) retained the right to bring this action, the respondent must still establish a breach by the appellants of s. 3(1) of the Act.
15 Moral rights, by contrast, descend from the civil law tradition. They adopt a more elevated and less dollars and cents view of the relationship between an artist and his or her work. They treat the artist’s oeuvre as an extension of his or her personality, possessing a dignity which is deserving of protection. They focus on the artist’s right (which by s. 14.1(2) is not assignable, though it may be waived) to protect throughout the duration of the economic rights (even where these have been assigned elsewhere) both the integrity of the work and his or her authorship of it (or anonymity, as the author wishes).
I cannot agree that the sale of the manuscript of a book is subject to the same rules as the sale of any other article of commerce, e.g., paper, grain or lumber. The vendor of such things loses all dominion over them when once the contract is executed and the purchaser may deal with the thing which he has purchased as he chooses. It is his to keep, to alienate or to destroy. But ... [a]fter the author has parted with his pecuniary interest in the manuscript, he retains a species of personal or moral right in the product of his brain.
28.2 (1) Il n’y a violation du droit à l’intégrité que si l’oeuvre est, d’une manière préjudiciable à l’honneur ou à la réputation de l’auteur, déformée, mutilée ou autrement modifiée, ou utilisée en liaison avec un produit, une cause, un service ou une institution.
... [was] adamant in his belief that his naturalistic composition has been made to look ridiculous by the addition of ribbons and suggests [that] it is not unlike dangling earrings from the Venus de Milo.
18 Thus, even though the flying geese had been sold and paid for, the artist was able to reach across the ownership divide to take action against a successor owner not for infringing his economic rights but for violating his moral rights, i.e., for perpetrating what both he and the judge regarded as an attack on the artistic integrity of the descending flock.
19 The evidence here suggests that, at least in some instances, the respondent’s name was deleted and was no longer on the posters when they were offered for resale. The respondent could have asserted a moral right to be publicly identified with his artistic work in this respect.
20 The respondent made it clear in his evidence that his real complaint is more properly characterized as the alleged infringement of his “moral” rights and its potential impact on the market for his works.
[TRANSLATION] Q. Is it not true, Mr. Théberge, that your position is that the canvas-backed reproductions that are now being made of your works are unlawful because you do not authorize them and especially because you are not paid a royalty for each reproduction that is made?
A. I would never want a penny for those works. Do you know why? Shall I tell you why?
A. Because, first and foremost, it is once again a dilution of my work; it is an abusive commercialization of my work, without authorization; it is a manipulation of the work because, in many cases, my signature does not appear on the reproduction; it is an anonymization, if I can use that word without being scholarly. There is no Théberge on my work, it is not signed. Turn it around and there is nothing on the back. Where does it come from, who sells it? Not a word. These things are all over the place. And, furthermore, the final argument, Mr. Charia, is that clients and friends of mine call me, they won’t accept it anymore and they are asking me whether I am a party to the distribution of these things.
A. Being a party to the distribution of these things means that they assume that I hatched a plot in which I am a participant. I’m getting money, royalties or ... that I make money off of it — “otherwise, it’s just not possible. How can you allow such a thing, Mr. Théberge?” So there are clients who have originals, who have paid eight thousand dollars ($8,000), nine thousand dollars ($9,000) that they find reproduced on canvas all over, in slightly smaller or medium sizes, or depending on the size, and for forty dollars ($40), sixty dollars ($60), eighty dollars ($80) or one hundred and twenty dollars ($120).... Me, Claude Théberge, the artist, I have nothing whatsoever to do with it, and want to put a stop to it. It’s just unreal. And especially, if I accepted money for that manoeuvre, I wouldn’t dare look myself in the mirror, Sir.
21 Apart from the complaint of non-attribution (which is a moral rights issue), it seems the respondent as an artist simply wishes to stop the appellants from catering to the market for canvas-backed reproductions that apparently exists. To do so, however, he must as a litigant demonstrate a statutory right that overrides what the owners of the authorized poster could otherwise do with their tangible property.
22 Moral rights act as a continuing restraint on what purchasers such as the appellants can do with a work once it passes from the author, but respect must be given to the limitations that are an essential part of the moral rights created by Parliament. Economic rights should not be read so broadly that they cover the same ground as the moral rights, making inoperative the limits Parliament has imposed on moral rights.
23 To the extent the respondent is suggesting that observers cannot tell the difference between the original painting and a poster reproduction on a canvas substrate, I think he perhaps does them all a disservice. In any event, he has enabled the appellants to do what they are doing by authorizing the creation of up to 10,000 paper-backed posters, some of which they have duly purchased on the open market.
Fixation of the work in a new medium is therefore the fundamental element of the act of “reproduc[ing] ... in any material form whatever”. ... Reproducing a work therefore consists mainly of the subsequent non-original material fixation of a first original material fixation.
Thus a copyright springs into existence as soon as the work is written down or otherwise recorded in some reasonably permanent form (”fixated”).
26 My colleague proposes that the idea of “fixation” be carried forward into the physical composition of the work embodying the copyrighted expression, so that substitution of one backing for another constitutes a new “reproduction” that infringes the copyright holder’s rights even if the result is not prejudicial to his reputation.
27 On this view, it does not matter that the appellants were multiple offenders at “ink transfers” or that they were commercial entities participating in the resale market. The copyright infringement occurred at the moment of “reproduction” in each instance, and would have been similarly objectionable, according to my colleague’s approach, if done to a single copy by the individual appellant to hang in his own living-room.
28 In my view, with respect, this expansive reading of the s. 3(1) economic rights tilts the balance too far in favour of the copyright holder and insufficiently recognizes the proprietary rights of the appellants in the physical posters which they purchased. Adoption of this expanded interpretation would introduce the civiliste conception of “droit de destination” into our law without any basis in the Copyright Act itself, and blur the distinction between economic and moral rights imposed by Parliament.
(vii) the proposed test would conflict with precedent from other comparable jurisdictions.
(viii) The U.S. concept of a “recast transformed or adapted” derivative work would be introduced into our law without any legislative basis.
He who engages in a laborious work, (such, for instance, as Johnson’s Dictionary,) which may employ his whole life, will do it with more spirit, if, besides his own glory, he thinks it may be a provision for his family.
31 The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them. Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it.
32 Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions to copyright infringement enumerated in ss. 29 to 32.2, which seek to protect the public domain in traditional ways such as fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review and to add new protections to reflect new technology, such as limited computer program reproduction and “ephemeral recordings” in connection with live performances.
33 This case demonstrates the basic economic conflict between the holder of the intellectual property in a work and the owner of the tangible property that embodies the copyrighted expressions.
34 To illustrate the level of intrusiveness that would result from my colleague’s interpretation, it is useful to describe in greater detail the process applied by the appellants.
35 The appellants purchased on the open market a quantity of posters of the respondent’s artistic works. They subjected these posters to a technique which involved spreading a special resin or laminating liquid across the face of a poster. The resin is designed to bond with the surface inks. After the applied coating is dried (or cured), the coated poster is submerged in a bath of solvent which loosens the paper substrate but leaves intact the fixed ink/resin layer, thus allowing the latter to be peeled off the former. The rear of the ink/resin layer is then coated with a suitable adhesive resin and transferred to a canvas substrate, which is then smoothed and finished.
36 It is not suggested that “reproduction” occurred when the resin was spread on the poster. This is part of the laminating process envisaged by the É.G.I. contract, and the respondent does not regard it as objectionable.
37 Did “reproduction” occur when the paper backing was peeled away? If the resulting film of inks had then been framed and suspended in front of a window like a piece of Tiffany glass, I would think the respondent could not complain. A purchaser has the right to cut up a poster into strips or divide it as he or she wishes. Division cannot logically be characterized as reproduction.
38 My colleague, Gonthier J., takes the position that if the image were transferred from one piece of paper to a different piece of paper with no other “change”, there is a new “fixation” and that would be “reproduction”. But in what way has the legitimate economic interest of the copyright holder been infringed? The process began with a single poster and ended with a single poster. The image “fixed” in ink is the subject matter of the intellectual property and it was not reproduced. It was transferred from one display to another. It is difficult to envisage any intellectual content let alone intellectual property embodied in the piece of blank paper peeled away, or in the piece of blank paper substituted for it. When Raphaël’s Madonna di Foligno was lifted for preservation purposes from its original canvas in 1799 under the direction of the chemist Berthollet and fixed to a new canvas, the resulting work was considered to be no less an original Raphaël. Similarly, when the frescoes of Pompeii were restored by replacement of the underlying plaster, the result was not classified as a “reproduction”, even though the old plaster was a constituent physical element of the original frescoes. If a comparable copyright situation arose, I do not think the artist would (or should) have a veto over a purchaser’s attempt to preserve the asset. These examples may be more spectacular than the humble swap of substrates of a paper poster, but the principle is the same and applies equally to authorized copies as well as to the original artistic work. In neither case is there reproduction within the meaning of the Act.
39 The Quebec Court of Appeal adopted a more restricted view than does my colleague, suggesting that the violation of economic rights lay not simply in “fixation” but in moving the ink film from a paper substrate to a substrate of a more costly material, namely canvas ( J.Q. No. 412 (QL), paras. 18-23). (This was thought to place the respondent’s work for resale in a different market niche, as discussed below.) This too, in my view, goes too far. If the “new” substrate material were made of a smooth sheet of vellum (calf) or papyrus, the result would have the identical appearance to the original paper. How has the copyright holder’s interest in the “intellectual” property been harmed by such a change in the material composition of the backing? Does the mischief only emerge in appearances, i.e., if the new piece of paper has a textured finish, or is pebbled to look like canvas? No one would deny the world of difference between the original artistic work and a mechanically produced copy, but we are talking here about moving the same physical layer of inks around different blank substrates.
40 To allow artists to regulate what can or cannot be done with posters in this way would have the public searching for elusive distinctions. There would be no even reasonably “bright line” between infringing and non-infringing conduct, a deficiency that would be particularly mischievous when dealing with pre-judgment seizure at the instance of a plaintiff without judicial supervision.
41 I do not foreclose the possibility that a change of substrate could, as part of a more extensive set of changes, amount to reproduction in a new form (perhaps, for example, if the respondent’s work were incorporated by the ink transfer method into some other artist’s original work) but the present case does not rise to that level.
The second question is whether the transfer process constitutes copying. My conclusion, after listening to the argument of counsel, but without hearing any evidence, is that such process does not constitute copying, because it involves the transfer physically of the picture on the copy of The Canadian from which the defendant’s product is made. After such transfer there was no picture on the page of The Canadian. I am satisfied that the defendant would have been entitled to purchase a copy of The Canadian; cut out one of the strip photographs; paste it on a piece of paper; put a border around it; frame it; and sell it, without infringing copyright, just as she would have been entitled to sell the issue of The Canadian itself and just as any person, who purchases the work of an artist, is entitled to resell that work, or a piece of it. In my view that is essentially what was done by the defendant in this case.
See also to the same effect: No Fear Inc. v. Almo-Dante Mfg. (Canada) Ltd. (1997), 76 C.P.R. (3d) 414 (Fed. T.D.).
45 My colleague takes the view (at para. 139) that reproduction does not necessarily imply multiplication of the thing reproduced. In this connection, he refers to Apple Computer Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd. (1986),  1 F.C. 173 (Fed. T.D.), affirmed (1987),  1 F.C. 673 (Fed. C.A.), affirmed  2 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.). In that case, however, multiplication was admitted ((1987),  1 F.C. 673 (Fed. C.A.), at p. 697). The issue was not the meaning of reproduction but whether a computer silicon chip could be the subject matter of copyright protection. The computer program at issue was multiplied when reproduced in the form of a ROM chip. When the process was complete, the original written text of the program still existed, as did the subsequent renditions of it in code within the plaintiff’s systems as well as the new reproduction etched in the memory cells of the defendant’s chip (p. 12 of the trial judgment as reported in (1986), 10 C.P.R. (3d) 1). In Apple Computer Inc. the copyright issue was whether literal multiplication might nevertheless not constitute a “reproduction” for purposes of the Copyright Act. The facts here pose the opposite question, namely whether there is “reproduction” without multiplication.
46 My colleague also cites Cie générale des établissements Michelin - Michelin & Cie v. CAW - Canada (1996),  2 F.C. 306 (Fed. T.D.). In that case, the defendant union, in an organized campaign against Michelin, reproduced in its leaflets Michelin’s “fanciful happy marshmallow-like” man shown stomping on the head of a worker. The union denied substantial reproduction of Michelin’s copyrighted figure because of minor differences in the rendition (”qualitative” differences). The defence was rejected. There was, accordingly, reproduction, but there was also multiplication of the copyrighted image in each of the union’s leaflets.
47 This is not to say that the Act recognizes only literal physical, mechanical reproduction. The legal concept has broadened over time to recognize what might be called metaphorical copying (transformation to another medium, e.g. books to films). It is recognized that technologies have evolved by which expression could be reproduced in ways undreamt of in earlier periods, such as evanescent and “virtual” copies in electronic formats. Transformation of an artistic work from two dimensions to three dimensions, or vice versa, will infringe copyright even though the physical reproduction of the original expression of that work has not been mechanically copied. Equally, translations or transformations into another medium may be infringements of economic rights. Nevertheless, the important evolution of legal concepts in the field of copyright is not engaged by the facts here. This is a case of literal physical, mechanical transfer in which no multiplication (metaphorical or otherwise) takes place.
48 It is of interest that our courts have not given an independent meaning to “produce” as distinguished from “reproduce” in s. 3(1) of the Act. Nor have the courts done so under the English Act. In fact, in that country, the word “produce” was thought to be of such little consequence that it was eliminated from the Act by amendment in 1956 (H. G. Richard et al., ed., Canadian Copyright Act Annotated (loose-leaf ed.), vol. 3, at p. 3-7). See also C. Brunet, “Copyright: The Economic Rights”, in Copyright and Confidential Information Law of Canada, (G. F. Henderson, ed.), (1994), 129, at pp. 136-37, and McKeown, supra, at p. 421.
49 The U.S. legislation expressly incorporates a definition of “derivative work”, as happens for example when a cartoon character is turned into a puppet, or a tragic novel is turned into a musical comedy. In such circumstances there is, in a sense, “ Aproduction” rather than a reproduction. However, the examples of what might be called derivative works listed in ss. 3(1)(a) to (e) of our Act are consistent with the notion of reproduction because they all imply the creation of new copies or manifestations of the work. In the application of the ink transfer method, however, there is no derivation, reproduction or production of a new and original work which incorporates the respondent’s artistic work.
50 Even if one were to consider substitution of a new substrate to be a “fixation”, the fact remains that the original poster lives on in the “re-fixated” poster. There is no multiplication and fixation alone is not an infringement of the original work.
51 My colleague relies on the respondent’s exclusive right under s. 3(1) to produce or reproduce his work “or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever” (para. 142). Under this provision, an infringer does not escape liability by reproducing a substantial part of the artistic work as opposed to the whole of it. An individual who copies a novel does not avoid the penalties set out for infringement simply by changing a few words and, likewise, an individual cannot copy with impunity simply by changing the medium. A playwright would be liable if he or she put on the stage a substantial part (but not the whole) of a copyrighted novel. There would clearly be reproduction of that part, i.e., the part of the novel in which intellectual property subsists. After the production, the novel would still exist intact, as would the new play. Here the layer of inks, in which resides the artistic content, rests intact and there is no such multiplication of a “substantial part” of the poster.
52 If the respondent’s attempt to extend the concept of reproduction “in substantial part” to situations where there is no multiplication were correct, one would expect to find decided cases in support of his thesis but none have been brought to our attention.
[TRANSLATION] When we take a reproduction on paper and transfer it onto canvas, it is perhaps not an infringement of the right of the person who is authorized to reproduce the painting on paper (since there is no multiplication of the paper reproduction), but it is an infringement of one of the rights of the artist who painted it.
The value of a paper reproduction is no different whether the reproduction is framed or “laminated”. The purchaser of a paper reproduction that is framed or “laminated” pays for the value of the paper reproduction and the cost of framing or “lamination”.
On the other hand, the record shows that a canvas made from a paper reproduction allows the vendor to charge an amount that consists of more than the value of the paper reproduction and the cost of the canvas transfer process.
54 The respondent, as stated, says that money is not the issue. If it were, he could presumably amend his contract with É.G.I. to permit them to sell reproductions on canvas. Equally, he could theoretically have insisted that É.G.I. obtain agreement from its customers not to engage in the ink transfer process, and so on down the line of vendors and purchasers, thereby dealing with the issue of control through a chain of contracts. Indeed, É.G.I. did print such a prohibition on some of the posters, but if any contract resulted, it was not between the appellants and the respondent, and É.G.I. has not come before the Court to complain.
55 The position taken by the Quebec Court of Appeal, nevertheless, echoes the debate in some U.S. courts about the proper allocation of compensation where a new way has been found to exploit the work in a market or market niche perhaps not anticipated by the creator of the underlying work, who thus may not have captured the highest price to be charged for the sale or use of that underlying work: see Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (U.S. 9th Cir., 1988); Amy B. Cohen, ”When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of a Copyright Owner?” (1999), 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 623, at p. 654.
56 I shall refer below to the U.S. concept of a “derivative work”, but for the moment it is sufficient to say that by 1996 and 1997 when É.G.I. and New York Graphic contracts were entered into, the “ink transfer process” was well established in the poster art industry. The respondent’s position is that he does not want to enter that market, not that it was unknown or unforeseen. The question he poses in this case is whether his economic rights under the Copyright Act permit him to prevent others from entering that market using existing (and paid for) copies of his work.
57 As previously noted, s. 28.2(1) of the Act provides that even a purchaser of the tangible object may not “distor[t], mutilat[e] or otherwise modif[y]” (emphasis added) the work “to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author”. It seems clear, at least by negative implication, that a modification of a work by the purchaser which does not “prejudice ... the honour or reputation of the author” was intended by Parliament to be within the purchaser’s rights.
58 In addition, as a secondary point, s. 28.2(3) of the Act provides that a change in “the physical ... structure containing a work ... shall not, by that act alone, constitute a distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work”. To the extent a change in substrate can be said to change the “physical structure” containing the respondent’s work, it does not “by that act alone” amount to a violation of a moral right either.
Unfortunately, the present text of the Copyright Act does little to help the promotion of the fusion of moral rights with the economic prerogatives of the law, since there is no comprehensive definition of copyright that embodies both. Section 3 of the Act, which is drafted as a definition of copyright, only refers to the economic dimension of copyright. Moral rights are defined and circumscribed in entirely distinct sections. This absence of cohesion leads to the separate mention of “copyright” and “moral rights” whenever Parliament wants to refer to both aspects of copyright law and to the near duplication of the provision on remedies for moral rights infringements.
(See also R. G. Howell, L. Vincent, and M. D. Manson, Intellectual Property Law: Cases and Materials (1999), at p. 383.) This is not to say that moral rights do not have an economic dimension (e.g., there may be an economic aspect to being able to control the personality-invested “moral” rights of integrity and attribution) or to deny that there is a moral rights aspect to copyright (e.g., a critic may reproduce parts of the text of a book when reviewing it, but it will be considered a breach of the author’s economic rights unless his or her authorship is attributed). However, in terms of remedies, the distinction in the Act between the two sets of rights is clear.
60 My view is that Parliament intended modification without reproduction to be dealt with under the provisions dealing with moral rights rather than economic rights. To adopt a contrary view, i.e., to treat the modification of the substrate here as the violation of an economic right, would allow copyright holders other than the artist to complain about modification (despite the non-assignability of moral rights). It would allow an artist who objected to a “modification” of an authorized reproduction both to sidestep the independent evaluation of a judge in unleashing a pre-judgment seizure in Quebec, and to sidestep at a trial anywhere in Canada the important requirement of showing prejudice to honour or reputation in order to establish an infringement of moral rights.
61 Could the economic rights of the sculptor of the descending geese at the Eaton Centre be said to be infringed (quite apart from his moral rights) because the seasonal “combination” of geese plus Christmas ribbons could be considered a “reproduction”? The be-ribboned flock incorporated the original artistic work in more than “substantial part”, no doubt, but there was no “reproduction” in any legal sense, any more than there was “reproduction” when the appellants in this case contributed blank canvas to the “combination” of ink layer and canvas. The sculptor rightly invoked his moral rights against the Eaton Centre, not economic rights.
[TRANSLATION] The expressions “droit d’auteur” and “copyright” speak volumes in themselves. It has been pointed out that the distinction between the copyright tradition and the “droit d’auteur” tradition is based on a question of terminology: where the followers of the first tradition, the British and their spiritual heirs, talk about “copyright” to refer to a right that derives from the existence of a “copy,” an object in itself, the followers of the second tradition talk about “author’s right” (droit d’auteur) to refer to a right that stems from intellectual effort or activity brought to bear by an author, a creator. This is the fundamental difference: on the one hand, a right that is conceived of by reference to the author, the creative person, and, on the other, by reference to the copy of the work, the product of the creative activity that is protected against copying.
63 Under the civiliste tradition, and particularly in France, the right of reproduction was interpreted to include not only the right to make new copies of the work (reproduction stricto sensu) but also what is called by French jurists the “right of destination” (droit de destination). The right of destination gives the author or artist the right to control to a considerable extent the use that is made of authorized copies of his or her work: see generally A. Lucas and H.-J. Lucas, Traité de la propriété littéraire & artistique (1994), at p. 235; F. Pollaud-Dulian, Le droit de destination : Le sort des exemplaires en droit d’auteur (1989). See also Crim., January 28, 1888, Bull. crim., No. 46, p. 68; Crim., December 2, 1964, Bull. crim., No. 320, p. 672; Crim., October 7, 1977, bull. crim., No. 315, p. 801; Civ. 1er, May 5, 1976, Bull. civ., No. 161, p. 128; Paris, March 18, 1987, D. 1988. Somm. 209, note Colombet; Civ. 1er, April 19, 1988, Bull. civ., No. 112, p. 76; Paris, April 27, 1945, Gaz. Pal., 1945, p. 192.
64 The “droit de destination” applies in other civiliste jurisdictions. Thus in Hovener/Poortvliet, HR January 19, 1979, NJ 412, brought to our attention by counsel for the respondent, the Netherlands Supreme Court found a violation of the droit d’auteur where a purchaser of an authorized art calendar cut out the pictures, stuck them to coasters, and resold them. This was regarded by the court as an altogether new and different “publication”. In Frost v. Olive Series Publishing Co. (1908), 24 T.L.R. 649 (Eng. Ch. Div.), by contrast, the English court did not regard as an infringement the cutting out of pictures from books, pasting them on cards, and reselling. “[The recirculation of] objects already in existence is not reproduction in a material form”: Laddie, et al., supra, at p. 614.
65 It seems to me that the respondent is pursuing a form of “droit de destination” in this case. But, under our Copyright Act, the “right of destination” as such does not exist. Generally, the copyright holder does not by virtue of his or her economic rights retain any control over the subsequent uses made of authorized copies of his work by third party purchasers. Where in specified situations the Act gives the copyright holder some power to control or benefit from subsequent uses of authorized copies of his work, the relevant provisions are narrowly framed to apply only to very specific forms of reproduction, as in the case of sound recordings (s. 15(1)) or computer programs (s. 3(1)(h)). If a general right to control subsequent usage existed, it would not have been necessary to make specific provision in these cases.
[T]he process ... involves the use of acrylic resin, emulsions, or similar compounds which act as a transfer medium to strip the printed indicia from the original surface on which it is printed, whereupon the image carrying film is applied to another article, such as the plaster base of a wall plaque. In effect, a decal picture is created.
The process utilized by defendant that is now in question results in the use of the original image on a ceramic plaque; such process is not “ Areproduction or duplication”.
The Court believes that plaintiff’s characterization of the print thus used as a decal is appropriate. Each ceramic plaque sold by defendant with a Paula print affixed thereto requires the purchase and use of an individual piece of artwork marketed by the plaintiff. For example, should defendant desire to make one hundred ceramic plaques using the identical Paula print, defendant would be required to purchase one hundred separate Paula prints. The Court finds that the process here in question does not constitute copying.
69 The “ink transfer” method appears not to have stirred much comment in other common law jurisdictions, including Australia and New Zealand.
71 The concept of a derivative work is found in the Berne Convention, and in the copyright legislation of the United States, England, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. All these provisions reflect a common progression in copyright legislation from a narrow protection against mere literal physical copying to a broader view which allows the copyright owner control over some changes of medium and adaptations of the original work. While the idea of “derivative works” therefore has parallels in other jurisdictions, including Canada, the American statutory language is particularly expansive, including in particular the words “any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”, that have no precise counterpart in Canadian legislation.
... United States court decisions, even where the factual situations are similar, must be scrutinized very carefully because of some fundamental differences in copyright concepts which have been adopted in the legislation of that country.
73 I should note that while there is no explicit and independent concept of “derivative work” in our Act, the words “produce or reproduce the work ... in any material form whatever” in s. 3(1) confers on artists and authors the exclusive right to control the preparation of derivative works such as the union leaflet incorporating and multiplying the Michelin man in the Michelin case, supra. See generally, McKeown, supra, at p. 64. In King Features Syndicate Inc. v. O. & M. Kleemann Ltd.,  A.C. 417 (U.K. H.L.), under a provision in the English Act similar to s. 3(1) of our Act, the plaintiff’s copyright in the cartoon character “Popeye the Sailor” was held to be infringed by an unauthorized doll, i.e., the two dimensional character was reproduced without authorization in a new three-dimensional form. See also W. J. Braithwaite, “Derivative Works in Canadian Copyright Law” (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 191, at p. 203. To the extent, however, that the respondent seeks to enlarge the protection of s. 3(1) by reading in the general words “recast, transformed or adapted” as a free-standing source of entitlement, his remedy lies in Parliament, not the courts.
74 My conclusion is that in this case the respondent is asserting a moral right in the guise of an economic right, and the attempt should be rejected.
75 If the respondent’s argument were correct in principle, of course, the absence of authority would not prevent his success. It is in the nature of the subject that intellectual property concepts have to evolve to deal with new and unexpected developments in human creativity. The problem here is that the respondent’s submission ignores the balance of rights and interests that lie at the basis of copyright law.
76 I agree with Gonthier J. that an Article 734 seizure before judgment is not available to an artist or author who relies on the alleged infringement of a moral right.
[TRANSLATION] It is moreover settled law that seizure before judgment is a draconian procedure and is an exception to the ordinary rules of law, and that a person who uses that procedure must comply strictly with the rules set out in the Code of Civil Procedure.
78 I think Parliament had good reason not to authorize seizure before judgment without judicial order where the only sustainable allegation of infringement relates to moral rights. As discussed earlier, moral rights are hedged about with the concept of reasonableness. The evaluation of a potential breach calls for the exercise of a good deal of judgment, e.g., an artist or author has the moral right to be associated with his or her work “where reasonable” (s. 14.1(1)). A distortion, mutilation or modification of a work is only actionable if it is to “the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author” (s. 28.2(1)). The artist or writer should not become the judge in his own cause on such matters and it is therefore entirely understandable that Parliament should insist on prior judicial review before any seizure takes place based on an assertion of violation of moral rights.
79 I conclude therefore that at this stage of the interlocutory proceedings, the respondent has not brought himself within s. 38 of the Copyright Act and therefore had no authority to obtain a seizure of the appellants’ copies under Article 734 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure. Whether a fuller record adduced at trial will demonstrate a breach of economic rights or moral rights will be for the trial judge to determine. At this stage, we need to decide only that the interlocutory record did not justify the seizure before judgment.
80 The appeal should be allowed. I would vacate the order of the Quebec Court of Appeal and restore the order of the motions judge setting aside the seizure and ordering that the seized goods be returned to the appellants. As this is an interlocutory proceeding, the costs both here and in the courts below should be to the appellants in the cause, i.e., the appellants will be entitled to their costs of these interlocutory proceedings only if they ultimately succeed in the action on the merits.
81 The issue in this case involves the validity of a seizure before judgment under s. 38(1) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (C.A.), and art. 734(1) of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25 (C.C.P.). The only matter before this Court is the seizure of the canvas-backed reproductions of the paper posters that embody the respondent artist’s works. In order to dispose of that question, however, we must first determine whether the process of transferring a poster onto canvas can give rise to an infringement of the exclusive rights conferred by the C.A. and thereby constitute a form of copyright infringement.
82 The new process in issue here involves lifting only the ink that was used in printing a paper poster and transferring it onto a canvas. This process eliminates any trace of what was previously printed on the poster, leaving it blank. There is therefore no increase in the total number of reproductions.
83 The appellants Galerie d’Art Yves Laroche Inc., Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., Galerie d’Art Laroche, Denis Inc. and Serge Rosa each operate an art gallery, while the appellant Éditions Multi-Graph Ltée runs a publishing firm. The respondent, Claude Théberge, is a painter who enjoys a well-established reputation in Canada, the United States and Europe. Under s. 13(1) C.A., he was the first owner of the copyright in his works.
84 The respondent had nonetheless contractually authorized the reproduction of some of his works, being careful to define the exact scope and type of reproductions authorized. As a representative contract, the parties introduced in evidence a written agreement dated October 29, 1996, in which the respondent assigned the right to publish 10,000 reproductions, 100,000 cards and other stationery products representing the work Célébration to Éditions Galerie L’Imagerie É.G.I. Ltée (É.G.I.). Under the heading [TRANSLATION] “Products”, the contract provides as follows: [TRANSLATION] “Reproduction 50 × 60cm — 19.7 × 23.6 — No. 6304 and/or cards and/or stationery”. Then, under the heading [TRANSLATION] “Printings” it specifies “Maximum ten thousand (10,000) reproductions, and/or one hundred thousand (100,000) cards and/or stationery as advised”. And under the heading [TRANSLATION] “Compensation”, it stipulates that [TRANSLATION] “the publisher will give the artist, free of charge, twenty-five (25) reproductions and/or one hundred (100) cards as artist’s proofs”.
[TRANSLATION] The publisher is authorized to produce other stationery products (e.g., calendars, agendas, address books, writing paper, wrapping paper, gift boxes, etc.) if it informs the artist of the quantities published and sales generated, and if it pays him royalties equivalent to the royalties agreed to herein.
[TRANSLATION] The product is offered for sale without restriction as to use, i.e. it may be framed, laminated or combined with other products, and such uses shall not be considered to have generated products or sub-products other than those provided for in this contract.
87 The appellant art galleries had all purchased cards, photolithographs and posters embodying various of the artist’s works, and then transferred the image to canvas using the process described earlier. Although the possibility that there were other suppliers was mentioned, it seems that the stationery products that were transferred onto canvas by that process were purchased mainly from É.G.I.
88 Given this situation, the respondent applied for an injunction, accounting, and damages in the Quebec Superior Court. He also obtained a writ of seizure before judgment under art. 735 C.C.P. As well, he applied for seizure of, inter alia, all of the canvas-backed reproductions embodying his works, claiming to have a deemed right of ownership in those items under s. 38 C.A. The appellants applied to have the seizure quashed under art. 738 C.C.P. The validity of the seizure before judgment of the canvas-backed reproductions is the only matter before this Court.
(5) the movable property which a provision of law permits him to seize in order to assure the exercise of his rights upon it.
13. (1) Subject to this Act, the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein.
14.1 (1) The author of a work has, subject to section 28.2, the right to the integrity of the work and, in connection with an act mentioned in section 3, the right, where reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with the work as its author by name or under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous.
(2) Moral rights may not be assigned but may be waived in whole or in part.
(3) An assignment of copyright in a work does not by that act alone constitute a waiver of any moral rights.
(4) Where a waiver of any moral right is made in favour of an owner or a licensee of copyright, it may be invoked by any person authorized by the owner or licensee to use the work, unless there is an indication to the contrary in the waiver.
14.2 (1) Moral rights in respect of a work subsist for the same term as the copyright in the work.
(c) where there is no person described in paragraph (a) or (b), the person entitled to any other property in respect of which the author dies intestate.
28.1 Any act or omission that is contrary to any of the moral rights of the author of a work is, in the absence of consent by the author, an infringement of the moral rights.
34. (1) Where copyright has been infringed, the owner of the copyright is, subject to this Act, entitled to all remedies by way of injunction, damages, accounts, delivery up and otherwise that are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of a right.
(2) In any proceedings for an infringement of a moral right of an author, the court may grant to the author or to the person who holds the moral rights by virtue of subsection 14.2(2) or (3), as the case may be, all remedies by way of injunction, damages, accounts, delivery up and otherwise that are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of a right.
90 Bélanger J. concluded that transferring an authorized paper reproduction onto canvas did not amount to infringement within the meaning of the C.A.:  Q.J. No. 4472 (QL).
91 He relied first on art. 19 of the representative contract, which stipulates: [TRANSLATION] “[The] product is offered for sale without any restriction as to use, i.e. it may be framed, laminated or combined with other products, and such uses shall not be considered to have generated products or sub-products other than those provided for in this contract” (emphasis added). Thus, he apparently interpreted that clause as conferring broad authority to alter the substrate or medium of the work.
92 Bélanger J. relied heavily on the reasoning of Southey J. in Fetherling v. Boughner (1978), 40 C.P.R. (2d) 253 (Ont. H.C.). He also observed that the process of transferring onto canvas [TRANSLATION] “does not in any way constitute new, unauthorized copies of the work”, since the image is physically transferred from the paper onto the canvas. Bélanger J. added that the cards in the possession of the appellant Serge Rosa had all been purchased from the authorized publisher, É.G.I.
93 Bélanger J. therefore concluded that the respondent could not benefit from the presumption of ownership created by s. 38(1) C.A. He ordered that the seizure be quashed.
94 Since this was an interlocutory proceeding, the appellants had to bring a motion for leave to appeal under arts. 26 and 511 C.C.P. Nuss J.A., sitting as a single judge, allowed the motion but [TRANSLATION] “only as it relates to the quashing of the seizure and the release ordered with respect to goods that are reproductions on canvas” (emphasis added). The issue in the Court of Appeal was therefore substantially narrower. This Court may not dispose of any issue that was not before the Court of Appeal.
95 The three judges agreed that the respondent’s appeal should be allowed:  Q.J. No. 412. Michaud C.J. and Delisle J.A. wrote separate reasons, however, each emphasizing different aspects. Beauregard J.A. concurred in their analysis.
96 Michaud C.J. first stated that the publishing contracts showed that the respondent had consented only to paper-backed reproductions and not canvas-backed reproductions. He also distinguished laminating, framing or mounting a paper-backed reproduction onto another substrate from transferring a paper-backed reproduction onto canvas. While the basic nature of a paper-backed reproduction remains the same when it is glued, framed or laminated, transferring a reproduction onto canvas changes its nature. Furthermore, the value of a paper-backed reproduction that is framed or laminated is equal to the sum of the value of the poster and the cost of the process, while transferring a reproduction onto canvas allows a vendor to charge more than the sum of the costs.
97 Michaud C.J. therefore concluded that the original painting had indeed been reproduced, even though the technique used for doing it consisted in transferring a paper-backed reproduction onto canvas. In addition, the rights of the artist had in fact been infringed even though the rights of the authorized publishers might not have been.
98 Delisle J.A, reviewed a number of relevant sections of the C.A. He first considered the definition of “infringing” in s. 2, that is any copy of a work made or dealt with in contravention of that Act. Then he referred to the sole right to “produce or reproduce ... in any material form whatsoever” in s. 3(1). He then cited the description in s. 27 of what constitutes an infringement of copyright: “for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do”. He then interpreted those provisions and concluded that the canvas-backed reproductions in question, which had been made without the consent of the respondent, constituted a reproduction of his works in a different form, and was therefore infringement.
99 The Court of Appeal accordingly allowed the appeal and upheld the seizure before judgment with respect to the canvas-backed reproductions.
100 In my opinion, there is only one real issue in this case: whether the canvas-backed reproductions of the artist’s paintings constitute infringement within the meaning of the C.A. As I will explain in greater detail in the analysis, the validity of the seizure before judgment of the canvas-backed reproductions depends entirely on the answer to that question. If we conclude that the canvas-backed reproductions are infringing copies, the respondent is deemed to be the owner of the items under s. 38 C.A. The seizure would then be valid. If, however, we reach the contrary conclusion, the seizure must be set aside.
(1) Interaction between art. 734(1) C.C.P. and s. 38(1) C.A.
101 Article 734(1) C.C.P. allows a plaintiff to seize before judgment the movable property which he has a right to revendicate. Section 38(1) C.A. provides that “the owner of the copyright in a work ... may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work ... and take proceedings for seizure of those copies ... before judgment if, under the law of Canada or of the province in which those proceedings are taken, a person is entitled to take such proceedings, as if those copies ... were the property of the copyright owner”.
102 The fate of the revendication and seizure is therefore inextricably tied to the determination of the issue of infringement. If the canvas-backed reproductions constitute infringing copies of the respondent’s works, the respondent is entitled to revendicate them under s. 38(1) C.A. That right of revendication will then serve as the basis for the right of seizure before judgment under art. 734(1) C.C.P. (see, for example, Tri-Tex Co. c. Gideon,  R.J.Q. 2324 (C.A. Que.); 2946-1993 Québec inc. c. Sysbyte Telecom Inc., 2001 CarswellQue 1411 (C.S. Que.)).
103 The determination of the infringement issue in this case is relevant in determining whether the affidavit in support of the application for a writ of seizure (art. 738 C.C.P.) was sufficient. This is a moot point having regard to the veracity of the relevant facts alleged in the affidavit. The appellants’ admissions relating to the transfer onto canvas of some paper-backed reproductions of the respondent’s works have alone eliminated any uncertainty on that point.
104 A decision with respect to the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of a seizure before judgment is not, strictly speaking, a decision on the merits of the case. The judge who analyses the issue of sufficiency must nonetheless examine the logical connection between the facts alleged and the right to seize before judgment (Stopponi c. Bélanger,  R.D.J. 33 (C.A. Que.), at p. 37).
105 In this case, however, the question of the connection between the facts and the right to seize is completely indistinguishable from the question of the infringement of the respondent’s copyright. This is so by reason of s. 38(1) C.A., which states that “the owner of the copyright in a work ... may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work ... and take proceedings for seizure of those copies ... before judgment if, under the law of Canada or of the province in which those proceedings are taken, a person is entitled to take such proceedings, as if those copies ... were the property of the copyright owner” (emphasis added). “Infringing”, as defined by s. 2 C.A., requires an infringement of the copyright. In other words, in order to conclude that the process of transferring onto canvas gives rise to an act of infringement, it must first be established that it constitutes a copyright infringement.
106 In short, in order for the facts in the affidavit to meet the sufficiency requirement in the C.C.P., they must establish that an infringement has occurred. The issues of sufficiency and copyright infringement therefore involve the same elements of fact and law. Since the relevant facts were admitted, the legal issue is all that remains to be decided. That issue is a narrow one, and calls for a determination of whether the process of transferring onto canvas amounts to infringement.
107 Counsel for the appellants argued that we should apply the rigorous tests relating to recognition of the validity of seizures before judgment under art. 734 C.C.P. Those tests refer to, inter alia, the possibility of abuse and the devastating effects that such proceedings may have on the parties involved.
108 While a seizure before judgment under art. 734 C.C.P. may be carried out without prior approval by a judge, it must also be noted that this is a conservatory measure the purpose of which is simply to [TRANSLATION] “obtain possession of property that is in dispute ... and place it under the authority of the court until it has determined the respective rights of the parties” (see C. Belleau, “Des mesures provisionnelles” in D. Ferland and B. Emery, eds., Précis de procédure civile du Québec (3rd ed. 1997), vol. 2, at p. 307; Molloy c. Bouchard,  R.J.Q. 1941 (C.S. Que.)). As was previously mentioned, seizure before judgment does not, strictly speaking, call for a determination of the merits of the case. That is in fact why the affidavit in support of the application for a writ need only set out sufficient supporting facts, and those facts must be accepted by the judge who hears the motion to quash under art. 738 C.C.P.
[TRANSLATION] [T]he seizure before judgment may be quashed (arts. 737, 738), if requested by another party to the main action, or release may be granted (art. 739), but, as a rule, these circumstances will not affect the conduct of the action, which may continue until the final judgment is rendered or a settlement between the parties is signed.
It is therefore important to carry out a contextual analysis of the requirements that must be met in order for art. 734 C.C.P. to apply, from the standpoint of s. 38 C.A., while at the same time strictly complying with the rules laid down in the C.C.P. in respect of seizure before judgment.
111 In the case of a seizure that was abusive or made in bad faith, the party from whom the seizure was made will retain the option of bringing an action in damages in accordance with the ordinary rules of civil liability.
[TRANSLATION] It is said in the theatre lobby that it is not noble for authors to write for the worthless pursuit of money, they who pride themselves on their claim to fame. Indeed, they are right, fame is appealing. But they forget that nature condemns us to dine 365 times in order to bask in glory merely for a year. For the authors, they are not defending a privilege, but the sacred right of all rights to retain ownership of their works... .
[TRANSLATION] In fact, although Canada’s Copyright Act was enacted in 1921, the manner in which it is interpreted is modern, and allows the development of new techniques and modern theories surrounding the creative act to be taken into consideration.
In the event of disagreement regarding the meaning of specific provisions, it will be up to the courts to interpret them, referring to the ordinary meaning of the words and the purpose and spirit of the Act (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),  1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.), at para. 21).
114 In Canada, the first real Copyright Act was enacted in 1921 and came into force in 1924, although canvases were already protected by The Copyright Act of 1875, S.C. 1875, c. 88, an Act validated by the British Parliament by The Canada Copyright Act, 1875 (U.K.), 38 & 39 Vict., c. 53. (For an analysis of the sources of copyright in Canada, see P.-E. Moyse, “La nature du droit d’auteur: droit de propriété ou monopole?” (1998), 43 McGill L.J. 507.) The Act of 1921 was designed to enable Canadian authors to benefit from the protection provided by the provisions of the Berne Convention, which was adopted in 1886 and ratified by Great Britain on behalf of Canada. The purpose of the Convention was to establish an international code and to create a Union of States “for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works” (Revised Berne Convention, art. 1). Generally, copyright enables the owner to prevent the unauthorized plagiarism and distribution of an original work. It is therefore these acts themselves that are prohibited, without regard to their purpose, be it mercenary or otherwise. In some respects, copyright is also similar to a real right; inter alia, it is an exclusive right that can be set up against anyone. The intangible subject-matter that it protects distinguishes it, however, from a right in a material thing. In short, given the sui generis nature of copyright, we must be circumspect in proposing any analogy to other rights.
115 Moreover, the purpose of copyright is not to protect the ideas or opinions expressed by the creator, but rather the various means and forms by which those ideas are communicated (J.S. McKeown, Fox, Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 60; Cartwright v. Wharton (1912), 25 O.L.R. 357 (Ont. H.C.); Stevenson v. Crook,  Ex. C.R. 299 (Can. Ex. Ct.), at p. 307; L.B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Products Ltd.,  R.P.C. 551 (U.K. H.L.)). In other words, it is the formal expression of those ideas or opinions that is protected by copyright.
Canadian statutes must therefore be interpreted in light of their historical context, domestic case law and legislative developments, and international conventions.
117 The C.A. provides protection for both copyright, defined by s. 3(1), and the author’s moral rights, in particular in ss. 14.1 and 14.2. While the intended purposes of those rights overlap in some respects, they are nonetheless completely different legal instruments in terms of both their definition and their scope.
118 Copyright protects against the unlawful appropriation and distribution of creative expression. With respect to a work, that right includes (s. 3(1) C.A.) the right: (i) “to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever”, (ii) “to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public”, and (iii) “to publish the work or any substantial part thereof”, as well as a series of other rights derived from those fundamental rights (s. 3(1) C.A.). Copyright is a patrimonial right that may be assigned, as provided in s. 13(4) C.A.
The relationship between the artist and society may be characterized in straightforward economic terms: society places demands on its members to share with it the fruits of their intellectual labour. Artists supply those demands; however, if society recognizes an artist’s right of ownership of his intellectual work, he may set conditions and exact a price for the society’s consumption of it. Copyright confers in the creator a monopoly to exploit his work in public for his own economic self-interest.
121 Furthermore, my colleague, Binnie J., suggests that this case arises out of the conceptual differences between “the droit d’auteur of the continental civiliste tradition and the English copyright tradition” (para. 6). I cannot subscribe to that view. The disposition of this case is determined solely by the aspects that derive from the English concept of copyright. The concepts of moral rights, as I will explain later, are inapplicable to the facts of this case.
[T]he purpose of the Copyright Act is and always has been to grant a monopoly. No distinction is made therein as to the purpose of the work created — for entertainment, instruction or other purposes. The legislation historically, in my view had two purposes: to encourage disclosure of works for the “advancement of learning”, and to protect and reward the intellectual effort of the author (for a limited period of time) in the work.
In light of those observations, if we are to determine whether infringement has occurred, we must examine the concept of reproduction.
125 A seizure under s. 38(1) C.A. therefore requires that there be infringing copies of works or of any other subject-matter of copyright. As I explained earlier, the outcome of this case depends entirely on the determination of the question of infringement.
127 The expression “or other subject-matter” in s. 38(1) C.A. refers to the concepts of performance, sound recording and communication signal referred to in paras. (b), (c) and (d) of the definition of “infringing” (McKeown, supra, at p. 667). It also appears from the wording of the various paragraphs that make up that definition that in order for a copy to be infringing, it must have an unlawful aspect.
128 ”Infringing”, in relation to a work in which copyright subsists, is defined in s. 2 C.A. as “any copy, including any colourable copy, made or dealt with in contravention of this Act”. Infringement can therefore arise from two distinct sources: (i) a copy made in contravention of the C.A. or (ii) a copy dealt with in contravention of that Act.
129 In the case of a copy made in contravention of the Act, it is the act of copying itself that is unlawful. What that element of the definition is referring to is copies of works made in contravention of s. 3(1) C.A., which prohibits the production or reproduction of a work in any material form whatever.
130 In the case of a copy dealt with in contravention of the Act, the copy itself was not necessarily an infringement of the C.A. Rather, it was dealt with in contravention of that Act. We might then ask whether the expression “copy dealt with in contravention of this Act” requires the commission of acts that are contrary to s. 3(1) C.A. (s. 27 C.A.), or whether it can refer to a copy that resulted solely in an infringement of the author’s moral rights (s. 28.1 C.A.).
131 The respondent maintains that a copy that infringes moral rights results in infringement, while the appellants maintain that only an infringement of the copyright under s. 3 C.A. (the right to produce, reproduce, perform or publish) can do that. With all due respect, I am of the view that an appropriate interpretation of the Act leads to the conclusion that a mere infringement of moral rights cannot constitute infringement. An infringement of the copyright defined in s. 3 C.A. is required.
132 First, infringement of a work, in its most common sense, is synonymous with plagiarism or unlawful appropriation. Generally speaking, we consider that infringing therefore requires copying or unlawful appropriation regardless of any other concurrent wrongful act (for example, an infringement of moral rights). In my view, it is that definition that has been adopted in the Act.
133 Section 38(1) C.A. provides that the owner of the copyright may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work or other subject-matter. This means that the right to recover possession of infringing copies is given to the owner of the copyright and not to the author himself or herself. The owner of the copyright and the author may be one and the same person or two different persons. In the latter case, it would be illogical for a copyright owner other than the author himself or herself to be entitled to recover possession of copies of a work the reproduction of which was an infringement only of the author’s moral rights. Although, as I observed earlier, those rights attach solely to the person of the author and may not be assigned, the expanded interpretation of the expression “copy dealt with in contravention of [the] Act” proposed by the respondent would lead to just that outcome.
134 Furthermore, the definition of infringement cited refers to “a work in which copyright subsists”. It also seems that only where there is an infringement of copyright will the measures described in s. 38(1) C.A. be justified. Therefore, in the case of a work, a “copy dealt with in contravention of [the] Act” refers only to a copy dealt with in contravention of s. 3(1) C.A. The statutory history of the provisions in question confirms that conclusion: the provisions relating to moral rights were added in 1985 (R.S.C. 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.)), while the meaning of s. 38(1) C.A. and of the definition of “infringing” have always been the same, for all practical purposes, since the Act was enacted in 1921.
135 Nevertheless, as I will explain later in the analysis, I am of the view that in this case the appellants unlawfully reproduced the respondent’s works in a material form in breach of s. 3(1) C.A. A more in-depth analysis is therefore required in order to determine the scope of s. 3(1) C.A.
(c) Application of s. 3(1) C.A.
137 I find that there are three distinct concepts in this subsection, which are crucial in resolving this case. First, s. 3(1) confers the “sole right to produce or reproduce”; second, it protects the work in its entirety or “any substantial part thereof”; third, it specifies that the protection applies to the work “in any material form whatever.” Let us examine what these concepts mean.
139 It appears that the primary and essential meaning of the word “reproduce” as it appears in s. 3(1) C.A. is “produce a copy of” or “cause to be seen again” or “give a specified quality or result when copied”. Accordingly, in order for a work to be reproduced, there is no requirement whatsoever to establish that there has been an increase in the total number of copies of the work. The nature of the protection that copyright confers confirms that interpretation.
[T]he opening words of subsection 1(2), now section 3 of the Act, were purposely drafted broadly enough to encompass new technologies which had not been thought of when the Act was drafted.
141 The primary purpose of s. 3(1) C.A. is to enable the author to profit from his or her work. Despite the fact that the legislation was written early in the last century, Parliament’s use of general terms allows the C.A. to evolve and adapt to new social and technological circumstances.
144 The narrow analysis, limited as it is to the quantitative aspect, is therefore not consistent with a teleological interpretation of the protection given to a substantial part of the work. The qualitative aspect of a work is protected by s. 3(1) C.A., and a restrictive analysis based solely on multiplication of the work could not provide the work with the necessary protection and would ignore the concept of “substantial part thereof”, which is protected by s. 3(1) C.A.
145 In the view of Binnie J. “[t]he process began with a single poster and ended with a single poster” (para. 38). I do not agree with that view. The concept of “work” refers to any materialized and original form of expression (Tamaro, supra, at p. 84). The work is, so to speak, the physical outcome of the creative process. Fixation of the work in a medium is a condition sine qua non of the production of a work. Therefore, “producing” a work refers to the initial materialization and “reproducing” it refers to any subsequent material fixation that is modelled (in the causal sense) on its first fixation.
146 ”Reproduc[ing] [a] work ... in any material form whatever” therefore simply means “rematerializing” what already existed in a first, original material form. A person who models a subsequent materialization on the original materialization therefore reproduces the work in a material form and has therefore produced the work a second time.
147 Since material fixation is essential for the production of a work, it is also essential for reproduction of the work. Fixation of the work in a new medium is therefore the fundamental element of the act of “reproduc[ing] ... in any material form whatever”. However, while the work is an original creation, the reproduction of the work is necessarily not. Reproducing a work therefore consists mainly of the subsequent non-original material fixation of a first original material fixation. That type of conduct amounts to plagiarism and constitutes an infringement of the rights of the copyright owner under s. 3(1) C.A.
148 It may be pointed out that the expressions “reproduce a work” and “reproduce a work in any material form” are pleonastic since in all cases, reproducing a work involves a new materialization derived from the original one. However, s. 3(1) does not say only “reproduce ... in a material form”; rather, it says “reproduce [a] work ... in any material form whatever” (emphasis added). That is an appropriate and carefully worded recognition that a work may be reproduced even if the new medium is different.
149 Having regard to the foregoing, it is clear that multiplication of the number of copies of a work is not an essential element of the act of “reproduc[ing] ... in any material form whatever”. It does not matter that the process which produces a new materialization eliminates another; all that matters is that a new act of fixation occurs. Therefore, what we must count in order to determine whether a work has been reproduced is not the total number of copies of the work in existence after the rematerialization, but the number of materializations that occurred over time.
[TRANSLATION] If it were otherwise, anyone would be entitled to make a new material fixation of a work, in a modified form, or a fixation of the work on a different medium. That is no longer the case and the owner of the right to reproduce a work has the sole right to authorize an adaptation of the work; in that case, we refer, for example, to a derivative work, an adaptation or a reproduction that has been transformed.
When the subject of a picture is copied, it is of no consequence whether that is done directly from the picture or through intervening copies.
154 Therefore, contrary to what my colleague, Binnie J., says, at para. 65, I am of the view that based on s. 3(1) C.A., the analysis is the same whether the reproduction was made from an original work or a copy. In both cases, we must determine whether there has been a reproduction of the work or a substantial part of the work.
156 Two comments must be made. First, my colleague places the emphasis on the expression “shall not”. A comparative analysis shows that Parliament emphasizes, rather, “shall not by that act alone”, which corresponds to “ne constitue pas nécesssairement” in the French version. By using the negative, it allows authors to show that a change in structure can amount to a modification of the work and cause prejudice to the author’s honour or reputation, therefore infringing his or her moral rights.
157 Second, my colleague seems to want to give the concept of “physical structure containing a work”, which Parliament rendered as “la structure qui contient [l’oeuvre]”, a meaning that cannot stand up to an analysis of the concept of “work” (”oeuvre” in French). In my opinion, by referring to the concept of physical structure rather than medium (s. 3(1) C.A.), Parliament is making a vital distinction and is instead referring, in s. 28.2(3) C.A., to a physical structure that is superimposed onto the work. As Binnie J. pointed out in his analysis of copyright, copyright protects only works, not ideas. As I explained earlier, a work necessarily includes the medium. A change to the medium is prohibited by s. 3(1) C.A., while a change to a physical structure containing the work will be prohibited by s. 28.2(3) if the author establishes that the new physical structure causes prejudice to the integrity of his or her work.
158 In determining the meaning of “reproducing in any material form whatever”, it is completely irrelevant that the consequence of one materialization destroys another. Obviously, when a person reproduces a work and at the same time destroys a copy of it, we assume that the person derives some benefit from doing so. In this case, for example, the appellants sold the canvas-backed reproductions of the respondent’s works at a much higher price than the paper-backed reproductions. However, there would be unlawful reproduction even if the re-materialization process resulted in an economic loss as a result of the destruction of another copy.
159 We must now address the issue on which the entire case is predicated: whether transferring a poster representing a work onto canvas constitutes infringement. In order for infringement to have occurred, there must have been an infringement of the copyright conferred under s. 3(1) C.A. Section 27 C.A. defines such an infringement as “[doing], without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do”. In short, in order for infringement to have occurred, a work must have been plagiarized or unlawfully appropriated. In the case of a painting, infringement will occur, inter alia, when the painting as a whole or any substantial part thereof is reproduced in any material form whatever, in the words of s. 3(1) C.A.
160 The respondent had given his publishers, in particular É.G.I., very detailed authorization for the reproduction of his works. The evidence established that the posters that were transferred onto canvas by the appellants were all purchased from É.G.I.
161 The appellants argued that transferring the paper-backed reproductions of the respondent’s works onto canvas was not an infringement of the respondent’s copyright. They submitted, first, that the contract between the respondent and É.G.I. allowed the works to be reproduced in any material form whatsoever. Second, they argued that transferring posters onto canvas did not ultimately result in an increase in the total number of copies of the work, and accordingly, they had not reproduced the works, in any material form whatever, in breach of s. 3(1) C.A.: they had merely transferred the image represented from one medium to another, and this was not contrary to the Act.
162 We must therefore first determine the scope of the reproduction rights that were granted, which will at the same time establish the scope of the rights that the respondent retained. That determination calls for a simultaneous examination of certain provisions of the Act and the terms of the contract between the respondent and ÉGI. We will then need to determine whether transferring an image from one medium to another amounts to “produc[ing] or reproduc[ing] the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever” within the meaning of s. 3(1) C.A.
A copyright owner may therefore dispose of his or her right, either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to certain limitations, inter alia, with respect to the medium. However, he or she retains the residue of the sole reproduction rights that were not assigned.
164 My colleague, Binnie J., relies on the testimony of the respondent Théberge to show that the nature of the copyright infringements was not economic, but moral, and that consequently s. 3(1) does not apply. The respondent’s testimony is, however, not relevant to the disposition of this case. The respondent is an artist; he is not a lawyer. He is not an expert in intellectual property. However, he signed a contract setting out the terms in which he authorized the reproduction of his works. The contract is unequivocal and has not been challenged. It is the contract, and not the respondent’s testimony, that must be analysed.
In considering whether a substantial part has been taken, particular emphasis must be given to the fact that the defendant’s work competes with the plaintiff’s work, or may serve as a substitute for it, or will interfere with a work that the plaintiff may publish in the future.
166 Prima facie, the question of the legal nature of the contract between the respondent and ÉGI might generate some disagreement. We might well ask whether it comprised an assignment or a mere concession (or licence). In the first case, it would amount to the assignment of the sole right, which may be set up against everyone to produce and reproduce in any material form whatever, while in the second case, it would amount only to the grant of a personal “interest”, and the respondent would retain his right in full. The limitation on the number of paintings, in particular, suggests that this was a mere concession, or licence. In any event, I do not believe that this kind of characterization is necessary for the purposes of this case. We may conclude, simply by reviewing the contractual provisions with respect to the authorized medium, that the respondent never intended to assign in full his right to reproduce the works in question in any material form whatever. The only right that he assigned was the right to reproduce his works on paper, thereby excluding reproduction in any other material form.
1425. The common intention of the parties rather than adherence to the literal meaning of the words shall be sought in interpreting a contract.
1426. In interpreting a contract, the nature of the contract, the circumstances in which it was formed, the interpretation which has already been given to it by the parties or which it may have received, and usage, are all taken into account.
1427. Each clause of a contract is interpreted in light of the others so that each is given the meaning derived from the contract as a whole.
1429. Words susceptible of two meanings shall be given the meaning that best conforms to the subject matter of the contract.
1431. The clauses of a contract cover only what it appears that the parties intended to include, however general the terms used.
This is therefore, prima facie, the grant of a right to publish certain products produced from the original work, not an unqualified right to distribute copies of that work in any material form whatever (art. 1431 C.C.Q.).
169 The contractual provisions, when construed as a whole, show that the right conferred is limited solely to reproduction on paper products (posters, cards or other stationery products). No mention was made of the possibility of marketing products on any medium other than paper. The rights granted therefore do not include the right to affix an image representing the respondent’s work onto a canvas. Several elements of the contract support that conclusion.
170 First, under the heading [TRANSLATION] “Products”, it states: “Reproduction 50 × 60cm - 19.7 × 23.6. — No. 6304 and/or cards and/or stationery” (emphasis added). Second, under the heading [TRANSLATION] “Printing”, it specifies [TRANSLATION] “Maximum ten thousand (10,000) reproductions, and/or one hundred thousand (100,000) cards and/or stationery as advised”. And third, under the heading [TRANSLATION] “Compensation”, it stipulates that [TRANSLATION] “the publisher will give the artist, free of charge, twenty-five (25) reproductions and/or one hundred (100) cards as artist’s proofs ... .” (emphasis added).
171 The use in the contract of the term “reproduction” might, prima facie, create some ambiguity since that word carries more than one meaning. In its most general sense, it may simply refer to any item that has been copied from an original. However, when we look at the context specific to the contract between the respondent and ÉGI (art. 1429 C.C.Q.), it is clear that this is not the meaning that was intended.
172 First, the nature of the contract must be considered (art. 1426 C.C.Q.): it is a contract between the respondent and a publisher whose business consists of publishing reproductions on paper. It would therefore be illogical for the contract to allow any “reproduction” of the work in the most general meaning of the word. Second, the notation “No. 6304” that follows the dimensions of the authorized reproductions and is part of the description of those reproductions seems to suggest that a specific standard of paper or sheet of paper has been selected. And third, when we see that the publisher agreed to give the artist 25 of those “reproductions,” free of charge, the only conclusion we can reach is that what is referred to as “reproductions” is in fact paper posters: it would defy all logic to suggest that the respondent could had agreed to be given 25 “reproductions” of his works, in the broadest sense, as compensation. In short, there is no doubt, in my opinion, that the respondent had authorized only the reproductions on paper medium, in the sense of “poster”.
[TRANSLATION] The publisher is authorized to produce other stationery products (e.g. calendars, agendas, address books, writing paper, wrapping paper, gift boxes, etc.) if it informs the artist of the total quantities published and sales generated, and if it pays him royalties equivalent to the royalties agreed to herein.
The use of the expression “other stationery products” implies that the products that are expressly authorized are also stationery products. In order for there to be “other” stationery products, there would have to be products of that nature in the first place.
[TRANSLATION] The product is offered for sale without restriction as to use, i.e. it may be framed, laminated or combined with other products and those uses shall not be considered to have generated products or sub-products other than those provided for in this contract.
The fact that the product may be framed, laminated or combined with other products also suggests that the product is in fact a stationery product. I also note that the authorized medium is not physically altered and is still paper, in the case both of framing and of laminating the product or combining it with other products. The following distinctions must therefore be made: 1. framing, lamination and any other type of arrangement, which leaves the paper medium intact and identifiable, and 2. transferring onto canvas, which results in a complete substitution of medium.
175 The appellants’ final argument was that the provision in art. 19 that “the product is offered for sale without restriction as to use” allows for paper reproductions to be transferred onto canvas. I see two fatal objections to that argument, however.
177 Second, art. 19 stipulates that “[the] product is offered for sale without restriction as to use, i.e. it may be framed, laminated or combined with other products”. While the abbreviation “e.g.” (”for example”) could leave room for some extrapolation, the abbreviation “i.e.” (”that is”) has a clear restrictive meaning. Accordingly, the sale of the paper product without restriction as to use is strictly limited to framing, laminating and combining with other products. The ability to do something else, specifically, to transfer the product onto canvas, cannot be inferred from that enumeration.
178 In short, the rights given by the respondent to his publisher, É.G.I., do not include the right to make copies of his works regardless of medium. What was granted was the right to distribute a certain number of reproductions of works on paper. The “products” referred to in the contract are exclusively stationery products. Therefore, the rights granted by the assignment involve certain restrictions as to the medium. In my opinion, that interpretation is the one that reveals the true intention of the parties to the contract.
179 As a result, I conclude that by expressly confining the rights that were assigned to producing reproductions of his works on paper, the respondent retained all his rights to produce reproductions on any other medium whatsoever. By transferring authorized reproductions of the respondent’s works onto canvas, the appellants “produce[d] or reproduce[d] [those] work[s] or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever”, contrary to s. 3(1) C.A.
180 In short, by transferring posters of the respondent’s works onto canvas, the appellants did in fact reproduce the respondent’s works or a substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, contrary to s. 3(1) C.A. The fact that the respondent did not consent means that his copyright was infringed. The appellants had therefore engaged in infringement and the respondent was entitled to seize the canvas-backed reproductions under art. 734(1) C.C.P. and s. 38(1) C.A.
181 I would therefore dismiss the appeal and uphold the seizure before judgment with respect to the canvas-backed reproductions, with costs.
Original Item: Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc.
Lineage of: Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc.

References: v. 
 art. 734
 art. 734
 art. 3
 art. 38
 art. 734
 art. 735
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 art. 734
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 art. 734
 art. 734
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 v. 
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 art. 734
 art. 735
 art. 738
 art. 19
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 art. 734
 art. 734
 art. 734
 art. 734
 art. 738
 art. 734
 art. 1
sui generis
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 art. 19
 art. 19
 art. 734
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