Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/32615
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:24:26+00:00

Document:
AUGUSTUS GONZALES AND SPOUSES NESTOR VICTOR AND MA. LOURDES RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. QUIRICO PE, RESPONDENT.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Twentieth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, entitled Quirico Pe v. Honorable Judge Rene Hortillo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, Augustus Gonzales and Spouses Engr. Nestor Victor and Dr. Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez, which granted the petition of respondent Quirico Pe. The CA Decision reversed and set aside the Order dated September 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 31, which dismissed respondent's appeal for non-payment of docket and other lawful fees, and directing the issuance of the writ of execution for the implementation of its Decision dated June 28, 2002 in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent. The CA Decision also directed the RTC to assess the appellate docket fees to be paid by the respondent, if it has not done so, and allow him to pay such fees and give due course to his appeal.
Respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of construction materials, and had been transacting business with petitioner Spouses Nestor Victor Rodriguez and Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) awarded two contracts in favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez for the following projects, namely, construction of "Lanot-Banga Road (Kalibo Highway) km. 39 + 200 to km. 40 + 275 Section IV (Aklan side)" and concreting of "Laua-an Pandan Road (Tibial-Culasi Section), Province of Antique." In 1998, respondent agreed to supply cement for the construction projects of petitioner Spouses Rodriguez. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez availed of the DPWH's pre-payment program for cement requirement regarding the Lanot-Banga Road, Kalibo Highway project (Kalibo project), wherein the DPWH would give an advance payment even before project completion upon his presentment, among others, of an official receipt for the amount advanced. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez gave Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 6563066 to respondent, which was signed by co-petitioners (his wife Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez and his business partner Augustus Gonzales), but leaving the amount and date in blank. The blank LBP check was delivered to respondent to guarantee the payment of 15,698 bags of Portland cement valued at P1,507,008.00, covered by Official Receipt No. 1175, issued by respondent (as owner of Antique Commercial), in favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez (as owner of Greenland Builders). However, a year later, respondent filled up blank LBP Check No. 6563066, by placing P2,062,000.00 and June 30, 1999, corresponding to the amount and date.
On December 9, 1999, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint for Declaration of Payment, Cancellation of Documents and Damages against respondent with the RTC, Branch 31, Iloilo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 25945. The amended complaint alleged that they entrusted blank LBP Check No. 6563066 to respondent so as to facilitate the approval of the pre-payment application of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez with the DPWH. They stated that the blank LBP check would "serve as collateral" to guarantee the payment for 15,698 bags to be used for the Kalibo project, amounting to P1,507,008.00, and that after payment of the said amount, respondent would return the LBP check. According to them, after having paid respondent the amount of P2,306,500.00, which is P139,160.00 more than the amount of P2,167,340.00 (representing the value for 23,360 bags of cement taken for the Kalibo project), they were cleared of any liability.
On January 6, 2000, respondent filed an Answer to Amended Complaint, averring that he had so far delivered 40,360 bags of cement to petitioners who remitted P2,306,500.00, thereby leaving an outstanding amount of P2,062,000.00. He countered that when petitioners stopped the bank-to-bank online payments to him, he filled up the amount of P2,062,000.00 and made the LBP check payable on June 30, 1999. The LBP check was dishonored for being "drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF)." By way of compulsory counterclaim, he sought recovery of the balance of P2,062,000.00, with interest at 24% from January 29, 1999 until fully paid as actual damages.
(5) whether this case be dismissed and with the dismissal of the complaint to proceed with the counterclaim.
Defendant's counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
After receipt of a copy of the said RTC Decision on July 26, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2002.
In an Order dated August 5, 2002, the trial court gave due course to respondent's appeal, and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the CA.
On August 26, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of Execution, stating that respondent's appeal should be dismissed as the same was not perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees as required under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Claiming that since the respondent's appeal was not perfected and, as a consequence, the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 became final and executory, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of execution for the implementation of the said RTC Decision. To buttress their motion, petitioners also appended a Certification dated August 19, 2002, issued by the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC, Iloilo City, certifying that no appeal fees in the case had been paid and received by the OCC.
In the Order dated September 23, 2002, the trial court dismissed respondent's appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.
On October 2, 2002, the Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo issued the Writ of Execution directing the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.
On October 7, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to set aside the RTC Order dated September 23, 2002 (which dismissed his appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), and to enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2002.
In a Resolution dated October 9, 2002, the CA granted the respondents' prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and, in the Resolution dated August 20, 2003, approved the respondent's injunction bond and directed the Division Clerk of Court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction.
On August 20, 2003, the Division Clerk of Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, thereby enjoining the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2002.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed order and writ of execution of the Regional Trial Court must be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE. The trial court is hereby ordered to assess the appellate docket fees, if it has not done so, and allow the petitioner to pay such fees and give due course to the petitioner's appeal. No costs.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 24, 2004, which, however, was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated February 23, 2005.
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT AND ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO BELATEDLY PAY THE REQUIRED APPELLATE DOCKET AND OTHER LEGAL FEES.
Petitioners allege that since respondent failed to pay the docket and other legal fees at the time he filed the Notice of Appeal, his appeal was deemed not perfected in contemplation of the law. Thus, petitioners pray that the CA decision be set aside and a new one be rendered dismissing the respondent's appeal and ordering the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.
On the other hand, respondent, citing Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, maintains that his appeal has been perfected by the mere filing of the notice of appeal. Respondent theorizes that with the perfection of his appeal, the trial court is now divested of jurisdiction to dismiss his appeal and, therefore, only the CA has jurisdiction to determine and rule on the propriety of his appeal. He raises the defense that his failure to pay the required docket and other legal fees was because the RTC Branch Clerk of Court did not make an assessment of the appeal fees to be paid when he filed the notice of appeal.
In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the CA cited Yambao v. Court of Appeals as justification for giving due course to respondent's petition and ordering the belated payment of docket and other legal fees. In Yambao, the CA dismissed therein petitioners' appeal from the RTC decision for failure to pay the full amount of the required docket fee. Upon elevation of the case, the Court, however, ordered the CA to give due course to their appeal, and ruled that their subsequent payment of the P20.00 deficiency, even before the CA had passed upon their motion for reconsideration, was indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.
The ruling in Yambao is not applicable to the present case as herein respondent never made any payment of the docket and other lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so, simultaneous with his filing of the Notice of Appeal. Although respondent was able to file a timely Notice of Appeal, however, he failed to pay the docket and other legal fees, claiming that the Branch Clerk of Court did not issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the part of the respondent rendered his appeal with the CA to be dismissible and, therefore, the RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002, to be final and executory.
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the Court explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
Respondent's claim that his non-payment of docket and other lawful fees should be treated as mistake and excusable negligence, attributable to the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, is too superficial to warrant consideration. This is clearly negligence of respondent's counsel, which is not excusable. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. Respondent's counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period for filing the same without, however, paying the appellate docket fees. He simply ignored the basic procedure of taking an appeal by filing a notice of appeal, coupled with the payment of the full amount of docket and other lawful fees. Respondent's counsel should keep abreast of procedural laws and his ignorance of the procedural requirements shall bind the respondent. In National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, we ruled that therein counsel's failure to file the appeal in due time does not amount to excusable negligence. The non-perfection of the appeal on time is not a mere technicality. Besides, to grant therein petitioner's plea for the relaxation of the rules on technicality would disturb a well-entrenched ruling that could make uncertain when a judgment attains finality, leaving the same to depend upon the resourcefulness of a party in concocting implausible excuses to justify an unwarranted departure from the time-honored policy of the law that the period for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
The CA took cognizance over the case, based on the wrong premise that when the RTC issued the Order dated August 5, 2002 giving due course to respondent's Notice of Appeal and directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the CA, it ipso facto lost jurisdiction over the case. Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules explains that the court of origin loses jurisdiction over the case only upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time by the appellant and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Withal, prior to the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, the RTC may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the prevailing party, as in this case, the issuance of the writ of execution because the respondent's appeal was not perfected.
Since respondent's appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, it was as if no appeal was actually taken. Therefore, the RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents lodged before it, such as the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of Execution, filed on August 26, 2002, which sought to set aside its Order dated August 5, 2002 that gave due course to respondent's Notice of Appeal, and directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the prudent thing that the CA should have done was to dismiss the respondent's appeal for failure to pay the appeal fees, and declare that the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 has now become final and executory.
As an incidental matter on the propriety of petitioners' petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules, respondent raises the argument that since the subject of the present petition is the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the CA (in favor of the respondent enjoining the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, which is interlocutory in nature, petitioners' petition should be denied for being the wrong remedy. In other words, respondent advances the theory that since the assailed CA Decision dated June 23, 2004 partakes of an interlocutory order, i.e., enjoining the finality of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002, petitioners should have availed of the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Respondent's argument is unfounded. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 45 provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to Us by filing a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Therefore, petitioners' filing of the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper and adequate remedy to challenge the Decision dated June 24, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the CA.
To recapitulate, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The rules require that from the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order denying one's motion for reconsideration, an appellant may take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC and paying the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, within the 15-day reglementary period for the perfection of an appeal. Otherwise, the appellant's appeal is not perfected, and the CA may dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-payment of docket and other lawful fees. As a consequence, the assailed RTC decision shall become final and executory and, therefore, the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Since the CA erroneously took cognizance over the case, its Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 should be overturned, and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on August 20, 2003 should likewise be lifted. Thus, the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 is reinstated and, as the said decision having become final and executory, the case is remanded for its prompt execution.
While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction, issued by the Court of Appeals on August 20, 2003, is LIFTED.
The Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Iloilo City is REINSTATED and, in view of its finality, the case is REMANDED for its prompt execution.
 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap, with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 30-38.
 Per Presiding Judge Rene S. Hortillo, records, vol. 1, p. 347.
 Sec. 14. Blanks; when may be filled. ? Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount. In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against any person who became a party thereon prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time.
 Records, Vol. I, p. 340.
 G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 141.
 Rural Bank of the Seven Lakes (S.P.C.), Inc. v. Dan, G.R. No. 174109, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 476, 488-489; KLT Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc., G.R. No. 174219, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 713, 727-728; Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 252, 259-260; Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139596, January 24, 2006, 470 SCRA 594, 603-604; Bacarra v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162445, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 581, 586.
 G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 591.
 SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal, effect thereof. - A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
 Emcor Incorporated v. Sienes, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009, 598 SCRA 617, 626-627, citing Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150241, November 4, 2004, 441 SCRA 463, 469; Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165910, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 78, 99.
 M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 525, 528.
 National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, supra note 27.

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