Source: http://bjp-tiaj.net/0_TIAJ/0_3_Art_II.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:28:54+00:00

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Article II § 1 cl 1-8 define the legal machinery by which some offices of the general government’s executive branch are filled and maintained. There is nothing inherently in conflict with the global covenant about these clauses, so long as they are strictly construed.
Article II § 2 cl 1 delineates some of the most important powers of the president. There is nothing inherently in conflict with the global covenant about this clause, assuming that it is strictly construed. From the perspective of the global covenant, there is nothing inherently wrong with the original intent of the framers in their construction of this clause. — But the way that the executive powers have been implemented over the years is an altogether different issue. So much of American history revolves around the executive’s abuse of power that it would turn this brief, cursory examination of the Constitution into screeds of historical data to even attempt to account for all this misfeasance. So we’ll only attempt to account for a few of the most prominent presidential escapades.
For the sake of honoring the compact theory of government – because it is nothing more than the attempt to describe how to build governments based on consent – he would have allowed the States to secede. By allowing them to secede, he would have avoided the damage to the Constitution that inevitably accompanies every onslaught of national consolidation. 14 The South was violating the consent rule by perpetuating slavery. If Lincoln failed to honor the compact theory, then like the South, he would also be violating the consent rule.
For the sake of honoring the property rights of every human being, he would have pushed hard to get the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments passed. Once slavery was illegal, the remaining united States would have had the moral high ground for pursuing a war of liberation against the "Confederacy".
If he had the resources and the wisdom to abide by the global covenant, Lincoln would have persuaded Congress to declare war against the seceded slave States. He would have made it clear in the declaration of war that his military forces would treat every slave owner as a criminal. He would have made sure that the property of every slave owner was confiscated and redistributed to the ex-slaves. He would have turned these foreign States into territories of the united States, and made clear declarations to these States that they would not be allowed to reenter the Union until all the former slaves and their progeny were educated as well as the former slave owners and their progeny. The South may have become a foreign, conquered people, but that was preferable to trashing the Constitution.
Even though these three points mark the legally and morally correct way to eliminate slavery at the time of secession, the North, in fact, was generally more interested in economic expansion than in doing what was legally and morally correct.
The national consolidation has continued ever since, and the only thing that keeps the united States from turning into a full-blown police state is the supreme Court’s glossy application of the Bill of Rights.
The presidential power to appoint diplomats, supreme Court judges, and "inferior Officers" by way of a "two thirds" concurrence of the Senate is not inherently unreasonable. BUT: (i)These days, the entire State Department, including "Ambassadors", "Ministers and Consuls", appears to be following a globalization agenda that is inherently at odds with the global covenant. (ii)The supreme Court appears to promote the national consolidation process at every possible opportunity. (iii)The population of "inferior Officers" appears to increase like maggots on a carcass. — If either the president or the Senate had the inclination, they could stop or at least curtail these phenomena. But they don’t. Instead they argue vehemently over the nature of supreme Court appointments. They in essence put on a show of caring about whether the new justice will crack the national consolidation egg at the narrow end or at the broad end. These Lilliputians thereby prove that they have no intention of suppressing the globalization and national consolidation processes. But all this is mere political fireworks displayed by the two political branches. In contrast to such political frenetics about supreme Court appointments, and such complacency about appointing diplomats and "inferior Officers", treaties are often passed almost totally unnoticed, even while they have huge legal implications by way of Article VI cl 2 and Article I § 8 cl 10. 34 Treaties therefore go far beyond politics in their impact on the everyday lives of the citizens of the fifty States.
This should give the reader a taste of the powers in international law that the President has by default. They are huge, and if citizens within the fifty States are not protected against them, the rights of such citizens will almost inevitably be trampled. Since the Constitution was ratified, such protections have been systematically eroded by judicial decisions like this one: "Congress is constitutionally empowered to enact whatever legislation is necessary and proper for carrying into execution the treaty making power of the United States" (Stutz v. Bureau of Narcotics, 56 F.Supp. 810, 813 – N.D.Cal. 1944). By way of Article II § 2 cl 2, the President has extraordinary powers to make practically any kind of treaty he wants, especially if Congress doesn’t care enough to stop him. After the treaty is ratified, the Congress can create statutes to promulgate the treaty into the geographical jurisdictions of the States. Because the Constitution limits crimes that Congress can make penal, these incursions into State sovereignty must fall within one or more of these limited penalty areas. The Constitution’s penal offenses are "treason, via Art. 1, §6, cl. 1; counterfeiting, via Art. 1, §8, cl. 6; and piracy, felonies on the high seas and offenses against the laws of nations, via Art. 1, §8, cl. 10". 39 Obviously, all violations of treaties fall into the purview of "Offenses against the Law of Nations". It’s reasonable that the general government might be able to exercise municipal police powers at points of entry into the country by way of treaties. But to exercise such police powers within the interior of any given State violates the territorial restrictions that the Constitution placed on the general government. 40 This is an exercise of international law within the States, and such international law "utilizes admiralty procedures in federal court". 41 Such international law gives the general government not only unlawful power over the States, but also provides rationales to invade other countries in the names of such treaties. — In the process of national consolidation, Congress has often passed laws that were found unconstitutional by the federal courts. Then a treaty is ratified, and an almost identical law is passed to enforce the treaty, and the judicial branch treats the new law as having passed its inspection. 42 Often, the Congress appears to act as a rubberstamp for bureaucrats at the State Department who are always trying to enhance their status by creating new treaties. The President generally appears equally as oblivious to what the bureaucrats are doing, and equally as willing to rubber stamp anything they want.
For more about big trouble with treaties, see the Supremacy Clause. 43 Also see Becraft’s Brief on Treaties. 44 — Whenever unalienable Rights of people living within the States are violated by such international law, these people have a valid argument that the treaty is null and void as it applies to them, because the president and Senate ratified the treaty under false pretenses, namely, that such officials had authority that they did not have. So such treaties were ratified under color of law. There are certainly exceptions (i)if the given human being has explicitly consented to be contractually bound by the terms of the treaty, or (ii)if the treaty explicitly and undeniably operates within the scope of the global mandate against bloodshed.
Article II § 2 cl 3 gives the president power to make appointments to fill offices of the general government’s executive branch on a temporary basis. There is nothing inherently in conflict with the global covenant about this clause, so long as it is strictly construed.
We don’t see anything about this section that’s obviously in conflict with the global covenant. But given the many problems indicated above, the phrase, "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed", begs an explanation for why no President has done anything to correct these many problems. For those of us who love law that is ordained by God, there are obvious and serious doubts about whether the President is doing his job, and taking "Care that the Laws be faithfully executed". We inevitably wonder if the general government and all the State governments have abandoned law, in favor of arbitrary, fiat, and inherently despotic government.
Given that nonfeasance is not listed here, there appears to be no way to rid ourselves of executive branch officers who refuse to do their job, except through the electoral process. Given that this is the case, and given that the electoral process is the captured entity that it is, we have little choice but to conduct our lives in accordance with the global covenant regardless of whether the general government does likewise or not.
1The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 580, "Native Americans", by Rennard J. Strickland.
2Principles of Confederacy, pp. 50-51. — Graham’s endnote #37 indicates that he gets his information from the following sources: 5 Elliot’s Debates 198-205 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​lled&​fileName=​005/​lled005.db&​recNum=​219&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28ed0051%29%29%230050001&​linkText=1); Tansill’s Documents 215-225; 1 Ferrand’s Records 282-293 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​llfr&​fileName=​001/​llfr001.db&​recNum=​311&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28fr0012%29%29%230010003&​linkText=1) (Madison’s Notes, June 18, 1787); 1 Elliot’s Debates 417-423 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​lled&​fileName=​001/​lled001.db&​recNum=​432&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28ed0011%29%29%230010001&​linkText=1); Tansill’s Documents 776-783; 1 Ferrand’s Records 294-301 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​llfr&​fileName=​001/​llfr001.db&​recNum=​323&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28fr0012%29%29%230010003&​linkText=1+) (Yates’ Minutes, June 18, 1787). — Hamilton’s "Plan for National Government" can also be found at The Anti-Federalist Papers and The Constitutional Convention Debates, pp. 70-79.
3After the Constitution was signed on September 17, 1787, Hamilton may have become more sympathetic to the concept of a confederate republic – evidenced by his contributions to the Federalist Papers (e.g., Federalist #9). But his inclinations towards national consolidation still remained stronger than that of most of his fellow framers. This is a kindly viewing of Hamilton. A view that is less sympathetic, and possibly more realistic, holds that he flip-flopped on two important issues for the sake of self-advancement: (i)At the constitutional convention, he spoke in favor of a national consolidation similar to the English monarchy. But in the Federalist Papers, he spoke instead of a confederate republic. His motives for doing so had to be in part because the national consolidation was held in such low esteem by such a majority of the delegates at the convention. This doesn’t mean that he dropped his vision of national consolidation. It merely means that he resolved to find a way to circumvent the majority opinion. (ii)At the constitutional convention, Hamilton, "a former aide to Robert Morris, founder of the Bank of North America", had been a staunch supporter of a sound currency (The Creature from Jekyll Island, p. 328). This is evidenced by the fact that at the convention, he said, "‘To emit an unfunded paper as the sign of value ought not to continue a formal part of the Constitution, nor ever hereafter to be employed; being, in its nature, repugnant with abuses and liable to be made the engine of imposition and fraud.’" (The Creature from Jekyll Island, p. 316. — Griffin is quoting "Alexander Hamilton, Works, Part II, p. 271, as cited by" George Bancroft, "A Plea for the Constitution. New York: Harpers, 1886; rpt. Sewanee, Tennessee: Spencer Judd Publishers, 1982", p. 26). But as the first Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton formed the nation’s second central bank, which was modeled after the Bank of England, which practiced fractional-reserve banking. "It is possible that Hamilton, Morris, and other Federalist leaders had hoped to keep the government out of the money-making business . . . because that would leave the field clear for a central-bank mechanism which . . . could become their own private engine of profit." (The Creature from Jekyll Island, p. 328). — Hamilton’s motives may have been self-serving throughout.
4Principles of Confederacy, p. 50.
53 Elliot’s Debates 30 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​lled&​fileName=​003/​lled003.db&​recNum=​41&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28ed0031%29%29%230030001&​linkText=1) (Virginia Convention, June 4, 1788). — Mason’s statement appears at Principles of Confederacy, p. 50.
6Marx and Engels may have created this expression, but it has been largely realized in the UNITED STATES.
7"[Clinton] Rossiter regarded only Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt as ‘constitutional dictators,’ presidents who acted on their own discretion during crises for which the laws did not provide adequate authority." — Rossiter’s Constitutional Dictatorship is cited by – and this quote is taken from – The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 665, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson.
8The idea that taxes can only be collected for a very limited set of purposes is an absolutely essential part of any concept of government that’s based on consent.
9Carson’s Basic History of the United States, Vol. 3, pp. 39-41.
10Carson’s Basic History of the United States, Vol. 3, pp. 39-41. — It’s important to understand that slave States were not the only States that believed they had rights of nullification and secession. In fact, before the War Between the States, there were several cases of nullification, and several threats of secession, by non-slave States: (1)"New England Federalists often ignored the authority of the national government" (The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 601, "Nullification", by Richard E. Ellis.). (2)"In 1854 the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the 1850 [Fugitive Slave Act] unconstitutional and released the abolitionist Sherman Booth from federal custody." (The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 436, "Interposition", by Paul Finkelman.) (3)"New Englanders threatened secession after the Louisiana Purchase (1803) and again during the War of 1812 and blocked federal action during the Mexican War (1846-1848). Illinois, Ohio, and Wisconsin thwarted federal laws on several occasions." (The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 862, "Tenth Amendment", by Forrest McDonald..).
11It’s essential for us to acknowledge in passing that even though Andrew Jackson refused to recognize the rights of nullification and secession, he nevertheless was fervently against the kind of central bank that Hamilton built, a bank built with fractional money, i.e., money created through fractional-reserve banking. So he was probably not as much in favor of national consolidation as Hamilton was. — For a more thorough treatment of Jackson’s confrontation with central banking, see The Creature from Jekyll Island, pp. 341-360, Chapter 17, "A Den of Vipers".
13Early in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, there was a proposal to give power to Congress to send federal troops against any State that Congress deemed out of compliance with Congressional wishes. "The proposal was quickly denounced as dangerous, and left to lie on the table, never to be brought up again." — This information can be found in the following: 1 Elliot’s Debates 144, 153 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​lled&​fileName=​001/​lled001.db&​recNum=​159&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28ed0011%29%29%230010001&​linkText=1); 1 Ferrand’s Records 16, 47 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​llfr&​fileName=​001/​llfr001.db&​recNum=​43&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28fr0012%29%29%230010003&​linkText=1) (Journal, May 29 and 31, 1787); 5 Elliot’s Debates 127-128, 139-140 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​lled&​fileName=​005/​lled005.db&​recNum=​148&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28ed0051%29%29%230050001&​linkText=1); Tansill’s Documents 117, 130; 1 Ferrand’s Records 21, 54 (URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​llfr&​fileName=​001/​llfr001.db&​recNum=​48&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28fr0012%29%29%230010003&​linkText=1) (Madison’s Notes, May 29 and 31, 1787). It is cited at Principles of Confederacy, p. 41.
14When George Washington finished his second term as President, he made the following statement in his farewell address: "if in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly over-balance in permanent evil any transient or partial benefit which the use can at any time yield." — Quoted at Carson’s Basic History of the United States, Vol. 5, p. 232.
15Excerpt from Lincoln's second inaugural address. See Yale’s Avalon Project, URL: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/​19th_century/​lincoln2.asp.
16Carson’s Basic History of the United States, Vol. 3, pp. 192-193.
17See Article I § 9 cl 2, URL: ./0_2_2_Art_I_Sec_9.htm​#TexasVWhite.
18Carson’s Basic History of the United States, Vol. 3, pp. 192-193.
19Carson’s Basic History of the United States, Vol. 3, pp. 193-194.
20See Article 1 § 8 cl 18, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl18.
21"The view that the Constitution is equal to any emergency is set forth in The Federalist, nos. 23 and 28, among others." — The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 665, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson.
22See The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 665, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson; and Rossiter’s Constitutional Dictatorship.
23In addition to these things, he also introduced fiat money and another national banking system. For more about this, see The Creature from Jekyll Island, pp. 369-395.
24This information can be verified at The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 665, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson.
25This information can be verified at The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 665, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson.
26But then on the other hand, to keep things in perspective, we have to say that it’s too bad the framers legalized slavery in the first place. But then we have to say it’s too bad the British practiced the slave trade in the first place. There’s no end to this regress. At some point we claim it’s too bad that Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit. What we’re talking about every time we say "it’s too bad", is utopia, i.e., no place.
27See The Creature from Jekyll Island, pp. 451-504, Chapter 22, "The Creature Swallows Congress", and Chapter 23, "The Great Duck Dinner", for how presidents Wilson and Roosevelt fouled up the banking and monetary systems.
28The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 665-666, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson.
29The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 665-666, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson.
30Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934) (p. 425). — It’s interesting that in the same opinion in which Hughes was inveighing against "national emergency", he was succumbing to the pressure of the presumed "national emergency" by clobbering the Contracts Clause, URL: ./0_2_3_Art_I_Sec_10.htm​#Blaisdell. — For more about this, see (i)The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 665-666, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson; and (ii)The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 410-411, "Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell", by John W. Johnson.
31Thereby in effect giving the president carte blanche to do practically anything he wanted.
32The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 665-666, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson.
33The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 665-666, "Presidential Emergency Powers", by Donald L. Robinson.
34Article VI cl 2, URL: ./0_5_Art_IV-VII.htm​#Article6Cl2, and Article I § 8 cl 10, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl10.
35Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book 1 Chapter 7, "Of the King’s Prerogatives". — See Blackstone at LONANG, URL: http://www.lonang.com/​exlibris/​blackstone/.
36Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book 1 Chapter 7, "Of the King’s Prerogatives". — See Blackstone at LONANG, URL: http://www.lonang.com/​exlibris/​blackstone/.
37Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book 1 Chapter 7, "Of the King’s Prerogatives". — See Blackstone at LONANG, URL: http://www.lonang.com/​exlibris/​blackstone/.
38Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book 1 Chapter 7, "Of the King’s Prerogatives". — See Blackstone at LONANG, URL: http://www.lonang.com/​exlibris/​blackstone/.
39Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", endnote #2, URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.
40See Article I § 8 cl 17, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl17, and Article IV § 3 cl 2, URL: ./0_5_Art_IV-VII.htm​#Art4Sec3cl2.
41Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", endnote #2, URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.
42For an example of how this works, see Article VI cl 2, URL: ./0_5_Art_IV-VII.htm​#Article6Cl2.

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