Source: https://www.lawweb.in/2019/01/leading-judgment-on-prosecution-for.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:52:59+00:00

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In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words "Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice.
It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint.
The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remedyless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be discarded.
19. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub- section (1) of Section 340 Cr.P.C. contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the Court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered.
Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Ors.
R.C. Lahoti, C.J., B.N. Agrawal, H.K. Sema, G.P. Mathur and P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.
1. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Crl) No.4111 of 2000.
2. In view of conflict of opinion between two decisions of this Court each rendered by a bench of three learned Judges in Surjit Singh v. Balbir SinghMANU/SC/0416/1996 : 1996CriLJ2304 and Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0077/1998 : 1998 (2) SCC 493, regarding interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.'), this appeal has been placed before the present Bench.
3. The facts of the case may be noticed in brief. The appellant nos.1 and 2 are real brothers of Mukhtar Singh Marwah, while respondent nos.1 and 2 are his widow and son respectively. Mukhtar Singh Marwah died on 3.6.1993. The appellant no.1 filed Probate Case No.363 of 1993 in the Court of District Judge, Delhi, for being granted probate of the will allegedly executed by Mukhtar Singh Marwah on 20.1.1993. The petition was contested by the respondents on the ground that the will was forged. On their application the appellant no.1 filed the original will in the Court of District Judge on 10.2.1994. Thereafter, the respondents moved an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. requesting the Court to file a criminal complaint against appellant no.1 as the will set up by him was forged. A reply to the said application was filed on 27.7.1994 but the application has not been disposed of so far. Thereafter, the respondents filed a criminal complaint in May 1996 in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, for prosecution of the appellants and their mother Smt. Trilochan Kaur Marwah under Sections 192, 193, 463, 464, 465, 467, 469, 471, 499 and 500 IPC on the ground that the will of Mukhtar Singh Marwah set up by the appellants is a forged and fictitious document. It is stated in the complaint that though Mukhtar Singh Marwah was an educated person, but the will bears his thumb impression. He had accounts in Bank of Tokyo and Standard Chartered Bank which he used to operate by putting his signature. Under the will he had completely divested the respondents, who were his widow and son respectively and also a daughter who was spastic and had bequeathed his entire property to his mother and after her death to his brothers and sisters. The appellant no.1 Iqbal Singh Marwah was appointed as the sole executor and trustee of the will. Before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, the complainant examined six witnesses including two persons from the banks who brought the relevant records and deposed that Mukhtar Singh Marwah used to operate the accounts by putting his signature. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate held that as the question whether the will was a genuine document or a forged one, was an issue before the District Judge in the probate proceedings where the will had been filed, Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and (ii) Cr.P.C. operated as a bar for taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 192, 193, 463, 464, 471, 475 and 476 IPC. The complaint was accordingly dismissed by the order dated 2.5.1998. The respondents thereafter filed a criminal revision against the order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, before the Sessions Judge, who, relying upon Sachida Nand Singh v. State of BiharMANU/SC/0077/1998 : 1998CriLJ1565, held that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would not apply where forgery of a document was committed before the said document was produced in Court. The revision petition was accordingly allowed and the matter was remanded to the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate for proceeding in accordance with law. The appellants challenged the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before Delhi High Court, but the same was dismissed on 15.9.2000 following the law laid down in Sachida Nand Singh. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred the present appeal in this Court.
except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.
9. The scheme of the statutory provision may now be examined. Broadly, Section 195 Cr.P.C. deals with three distinct categories of offences which have been described in clauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to (1) contempt of lawful authority of public servants, (2) offences against public justice, and (3) offences relating to documents given in evidence. Clause (a) deals with offences punishable under Sections 172 - 188 IPC which occur in Chapter X of the IPC and the heading of the Chapter is - 'Of Contempts Of The Lawful Authority Of Public Servants'. These are offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI of IPC which is headed as - 'Of False Evidence And Offences Against Public Justice'. The offences mentioned in this clause clearly relate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making a false declaration in any judicial proceeding or before a Court of justice or before a public servant who is bound or authorized by law to receive such declaration, and also to some other offences which have a direct co-relation with the proceedings in a Court of justice (Sections 205 and 211 IPC). This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195, viz., that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the Court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in Court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C. This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court.
10. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing of the Court for taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in clauses (b) (i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341 Cr.P.C. which occur in Chapter XXVI give the procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith. The heading of this Chapter is --'Provisions As To Offences Affecting The Administration Of Justice'. Though, as a general rule, the language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words of the Section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning, but they are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the Sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked to explain its enactments, but as affording a better key to the constructions of the Sections which follow them than might be afforded by a mere preamble.(See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. Pages 207, 209). The fact that the procedure for filing a complaint by Court has been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer of the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such type which directly affects the administration of justice, viz., which is committed after the document is produced or given in evidence in Court. Any offence committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or giving in evidence in Court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an offence affecting the administration of justice.
(c) Prosecution for certain offences relating to documents given in evidence. -- of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate"
"(i) The underlying purpose of enacting Section 195(1)(b) and (c) Section 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous vexations or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administration of public justice which is the direct and immediate object or the victim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the Civil Court to file complaint.
(ii) the offences about which the court alone is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceeding in that court so that it can without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore, appears to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confirming the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceeding in character as such party. The Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) to the offences mentioned therein, when committed by a party to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such party.".
13. The aforesaid decision was considered in Raghunath v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0147/1973 : AIR1973SC1100 . Here, the accused had obtained sale deed of the property of a widow by setting up of an imposter and thereafter filed a mutation application before the Tehsildar The widow contested the mutation application on the ground that she had never executed the sale deed and thereafter filed a criminal complaint under Sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC in which the accused were convicted. In appeal, it was contended that the private complaint was barred by virtue of Section 195(1)(c) Cr.P.C. and the revenue court alone could have filed the complaint. The court repelled the aforesaid contention after relying upon the ratio of Patel Lalji Bhai v. State of Gujarat and the private complaint was held to be maintainable. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/0136/1973 : 1974CriLJ350, the above noted two decisions were relied upon for holding that provisions of Section 195(1)(c) (old Code) would not be applicable where mutation proceedings were commenced after a will had been forged. In Legal Remembrancer, Govt. of West Bengal v. Haridas Mundra MANU/SC/0148/1975 : 1976CriLJ1732 Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was), speaking for a three Judge Bench observed that earlier there was divergence of opinion in various High Courts, but the same was set at rest by this Court in Patel Lalji Bhai Somabhai (supra) and approved the view taken therein that the words of Section 195(1)(c) clearly meant the offence alleged to have been committed by a party to the proceeding in his character as such party, i.e. after having become a party to the proceeding, and Sections 195(1)(c), 476 and 476-A (of the old Code) read together indicated beyond doubt that the legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) to the offences mentioned in the said Section when committed by a party to a proceeding prior to his becoming such party. Similar view has been taken in Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0364/1994 : 1994CriLJ1389 where the contention that the absence of a complaint by the revenue court was a bar to taking cognizance by the criminal court in respect of offences under Sections 446, 468, 471 read with Section 120B IPC which were committed even before the start of the proceedings before the revenue court, was not accepted.
14. Dr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the appellants, in support of his contention has placed strong reliance on Gopalkrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy MANU/SC/0100/1983 : 3SCR836 which is a decision rendered by a Bench of two learned Judges. In this case, the appellants filed a civil suit for refund of Rs.20,000/- which they claimed to have deposited with the first respondent and for recovery of certain amount. Along with the plaint the appellants produced a receipt for Rs.20,000/- in support of their claim. Thereafter the first respondent filed a criminal complaint against the appellants alleging forgery of his signature on the money receipt and thereby commission of offences punishable under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. The appellants moved the High Court for quashing of the proceedings on the ground that in absence of a complaint by the court, the prosecution was barred under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. The High Court dismissed the petition holding that Section 463 cannot be construed to include Section 467 IPC as well and, therefore, the Magistrate was competent to take cognizance on the complaint. This Court reversed the view taken by the High Court observing that as Section 463 defines the offence of forgery and Section 467 punishes forgery of a particular category, Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted and in the absence of a complaint by the Court the prosecution would not be maintainable. After briefly referring to Patel Lalji Bhai (supra), the Court observed that "not the conclusion but the ratio" of the said case supported the view taken by it. The judgment does not show that applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) was examined with regard to the question as to whether the alleged forged receipt was prepared before or after commencement of the civil suit, nor any such principle has been laid down that the bar would operate even if the forgery was committed prior to commencement of the proceeding in the civil court.
15. The other case which is the sheet-anchor of the argument of learned counsel for the appellants is Surjit Singh v. Balbir SinghMANU/SC/0416/1996 : , 1996CriLJ2304 . The facts as stated in paras 1 & 11 of the report show that a criminal complaint was filed by the respondent under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with 120B IPC alleging that the appellants had conspired and fabricated an agreement dated 26.7.1978 and had forged the signature of Smt. Dalip Kaur and on the basis thereof, they had made a claim to remain in possession of a house. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 27.9.1983. The appellants thereafter filed a civil suit on 9.2.1984 wherein they produced the agreement. It may be noticed that the cognizance by the criminal Court had been taken much before filing of the Civil Suit wherein the agreement had been filed. During the course of discussion, the court not only noticed Gopalkrishna Menon (supra), but also quoted extensively from Patel Lalji Bhai (supra). Reference was then made to Sanmukh Singh v. The King AIR 1950 P C 31 and Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0315/1987 : 1988CriLJ427 wherein it has been held that the bar of Section 195 would not apply if the original document had not been produced or given in evidence in Court. Then comes the passage in the judgment (para 10 of the reports) which we have reproduced in the earlier part of our judgment. The observations therein should not be understood as laying down anything contrary to what has been held in Patel Lalji Bhai, but was made in the context that bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would not be attracted unless the original document was filed. It is for this reason that in the very next paragraph, after observing that the cognizance had been taken prior to filing of the civil suit and the original agreement in Court, the view taken by the High Court that the Magistrate could proceed with the trial of the criminal case was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 195.
18. In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words "Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice.
19. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub- section (1) of Section 340 Cr.P.C. contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the Court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a Court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In view of these provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits where decisions are challenged in successive appellate for a which are time consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of appeal against an order passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These provisions show that, in reality, the procedure prescribed for filing a complaint by the Court is such that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the offender for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses become reluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets lost. This important consideration dissuades us from accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed upon clause (b)(ii).
"Parliament is taken not to intend the carrying out of its enactments to be unworkable or impracticable, so the court will be slow to find in favour of a construction that leads to these consequences. This follows the path taken by judges in developing the common law. '... the common law of England has not always developed on strictly logical lines, and where the logic leads down a path that is beset with practical difficulties the courts have not been frightened to turn aside and seek the pragmatic solution that will best serve the needs of society."
In S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (1979) 2 All ER 91, while interpreting a provision in the Finance Act, 1972, Lord Denning observed that if the literal construction leads to impracticable results, it would be necessary to do little adjustment so as to make the section workable. Therefore, in order that a victim of a crime of forgery, namely, the person aggrieved is able to exercise his right conferred by law to initiate prosecution of the offender, it is necessary to place a restrictive interpretation on clause (b)(ii).
"But penal statutes must never be construed so as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words in their ordinary acceptations would comprehend. ........... But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument."
In Lalita Jalan v. Bombay Gas Co. MANU/SC/0315/2003 : 2003CriLJ2514 this question was examined in considerable detail and it was held that the principle that a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty is to be strictly construed is not of universal application which must necessarily be observed in every case. The Court after referring to Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharasthra MANU/SC/0146/1976 : 1976CriLJ1527, Kisan Trimbak Kothula v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0133/1976 : 2SCR102, Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of West Bengal v. Abani Maity MANU/SC/0524/1979 : 1979CriLJ897 and State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni MANU/SC/0518/1979 : 1980CriLJ429 held that the penal provisions should be construed in a manner which will suppress the mischief and advance the object which the legislature had in view.
24. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal Courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given.
There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.
This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under S. 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."

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