Source: https://openjurist.org/146/f3d/149
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:32:42+00:00

Document:
Victor Jacalone, Appellant in No. 96-5835.
Nos. 96-5538, 96-5539 and 96-5835.
Allan Roth (argued), Scarinci & Hollenbeck, Seacaucus, NJ, for Appellants City of Passaic and Passaic Police Department.
Peter W. Till (argued), Wilf & Silverman, Short Hills, NJ, for Appellant Victor Jacalone.
Michael Shen, Shneyer & Shen, P.C., Teaneck, NJ, for Appellee William Failla.
Jeffrey E. Fogel (argued), Ball Livingston, Nutley, NJ, for Appellee William Failla.
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH, and RENDELL Circuit Judges.
Appellants City of Passaic, Passaic Police Department, and Victor Jacalone appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury's determination that appellants violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination when they transferred appellee William Failla to a night shift which aggravated his back condition, and from the district court's orders denying their consolidated post-trial motions and their motion for reconsideration of the award of attorneys' fees to Failla. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment entered against the City and the Police Department, vacate the judgment entered against Jacalone, and reverse the district court's order denying appellants' post-trial motions insofar as it imposes individual liability on Jacalone, but will affirm the order in all other respects. We will also affirm the order denying appellants' motion for reconsideration of the attorneys' fee award.
Failla served as a captain with the Passaic Police Department. In 1989, he suffered a work-related back injury for which he subsequently received a partial disability award pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Act. In 1991, Failla was transferred from day shift to night shift work. At trial, Failla testified that approximately one year prior to that transfer, Jacalone, then the Chief of the Passaic Police Department and Failla's immediate supervisor, advised Failla that he wanted to transfer Failla to the night shift. Failla stated that he informed Jacalone of his back pain, and that Jacalone responded that the night air would "do [him] good."
Failla testified that following his transfer to the night shift, his back pain worsened. Several of Failla's co-workers also testified to his apparent discomfort on the night shift. Failla claimed that both the night air and the more strenuous duties required of the night captain aggravated his back condition. Failla also offered expert medical testimony in support of his claims. The expert testified that the cold and dampness of the night air, as well as the increased stress associated with the busier night shift, aggravated Failla's back condition. Failla requested a transfer back to a day shift on at least six occasions between 1992 and 1993. However, Failla was not reinstated to a day shift until November 1993, after he filed this suit and after Jacalone retired.
While still working the night shift, Failla initiated this action against the City, the Police Department, and Jacalone in his official and individual capacities. Failla alleged several causes of action, many of which were dismissed prior to trial. Failla proceeded to trial on his claims against all three appellants based upon their alleged violation of the LAD, and against the City and the Police Department based on their alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 Failla contended that day shift work constituted a reasonable accommodation of his back condition.
Appellants have appealed from multiple rulings of the district court, and different standards of review apply to different arguments that appellants have raised on appeal. Appellants' contention that Failla failed to establish a prima facie case under the LAD relates to their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and this court exercises plenary review over an order granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993). A court should grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law "only if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor." Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir.1993). Appellants' arguments relating to Jacalone's individual liability turn on the district court's interpretation of the effect of the jury's answers to interrogatories. We exercise plenary review over the district court's determination that the jury's findings resulted in a verdict of individual liability against Jacalone. See Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 542, 107 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989). Appellants' challenges to the district court's evidentiary rulings relate to their right to a new trial, and an abuse of discretion standard applies to the district court's decision to grant or deny a new trial. See Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir.1992). Where, however, the district court's decision rests on the application of legal precepts, we exercise plenary review. See id. (citing Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir.1986)). Finally, in considering appellants' arguments that the district court improperly awarded attorneys' fees, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (3d Cir.1990). The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Appellants raise four arguments on appeal. They contend that Failla failed to establish a prima facie case under the LAD, that the district court wrongly imposed a verdict of individual liability against Jacalone, that the district court erroneously admitted evidence of a worker's compensation judgment, and that the district court improperly awarded attorneys' fees to Failla. We will address these in turn.
We first consider appellants' contention that Failla failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the LAD. The LAD prohibits discrimination against any person who is or has been "handicapped," unless the handicap precludes the performance of employment. See N.J.S.A. § 10:5-4.1. The regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute require employers to make reasonable accommodations to the limitations of a handicapped employee unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. See N.J.A.C. § 13:13-2.5(b); see also Ensslin v. Township of North Bergen, 275 N.J.Super. 352, 646 A.2d 452, 458-59 (1994).
Appellants challenge two aspects of Failla's prima facie case under the LAD. First, appellants dispute the finding that Failla was "handicapped," arguing that the jury's determination that Failla was not disabled under the ADA precluded its determination that Failla was handicapped under the LAD. Second, appellants contend that Failla failed to demonstrate any need for an accommodation. We find these arguments unpersuasive.
The meaning and propriety of the jury's verdict with respect to the ADA claims on the one hand and the LAD claims on the other turns on a review of the statutory definitions of "disability" and "handicapped." Although the words are often treated interchangeably as a matter of common usage, we have expressed some skepticism as to whether the terms, as used in the ADA and LAD, are actually equivalent. See Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 956 (3d Cir.1996).
The ADA defines the term "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities...." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The LAD, in contrast, applies to "handicapped" persons, defined by statute as those who suffer:from physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or from any mental, psychological, or developmental disability resulting from anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. Handicapped shall also mean suffering from AIDS or HIV infection.
N.J.S.A. § 10:5-5(q). In contrast to the ADA, the LAD definition of "handicapped" does not incorporate the requirement that the condition result in a substantial limitation on a major life activity. See Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 966 F.Supp. 312, 314-15 (D.N.J.1997); Illingworth v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 926 F.Supp. 482, 488 (D.N.J.1996); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., 250 N.J.Super. 338, 594 A.2d 264, 275 (1991) (noting that the LAD definition of "handicapped" does not include a major life activity requirement). This lower standard under the statutory definition of "handicapped," as compared to the definition of "disability," negates any inconsistency in the jury's verdict with respect to the ADA and LAD claims, and the district court's instructions advised the jury of the different statutory definitions.
We also disagree with the second aspect of appellants' challenge to Failla's prima facie case, and find that Failla adduced sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that his back condition warranted a reasonable accommodation. Appellants contend that Failla failed to present medical evidence necessary to establish that he "needed"--as opposed to merely "wanted"--to work a day shift. We find, however, that the evidence demonstrated that Failla suffered from a painful back condition that was aggravated by night shift work. Failla adduced expert medical testimony indicating that the dampness and coldness of the night air, as well as the increased stress associated with the busier night shift, exacerbated his condition. Furthermore, the expert testified that working the night shift would disrupt Failla's sleeping patterns, which also negatively affected his condition. The expert stated that this combination of factors combined to reduce Failla's ability to function on the night shift.
Appellants, however, contend that two aspects of that expert's testimony undermine the claimed need of an accommodation. First, the expert acknowledged that cold and damp conditions during the day would also affect Failla's back condition. He also testified, however, that it is generally more cold and humid at night. Furthermore, he offered testimony that the night shift is busier and causes a disruption in sleeping patterns.
Second, the expert stated that Failla's condition had worsened between the two occasions on which the expert examined him, even though Failla had been reinstated to a day shift in the interim. The actual effect of a transfer to a day shift on Failla's back condition, viewed in hindsight, is largely irrelevant to the question of appellants' obligation to make a reasonable accommodation at the time Failla requested the transfer. Furthermore, the expert did not address the extent to which the worsened condition reflected deterioration that occurred between the first examination and the reinstatement to a day shift, rather than between the reinstatement and the second examination. In fact, the expert specifically testified that a reduction in stress and change in schedule would make it easier for Failla to perform required activities, and Failla and other witnesses testified that his condition did improve after his reinstatement to a day shift.
Accordingly, we find that these two aspects of the expert's testimony do not negate Failla's claimed need of an accommodation. Appellants have not argued that a transfer to a day shift constitutes an unreasonable accommodation, and the evidence demonstrated that Failla suffered from a back condition that was exacerbated by night shift work.3 We conclude that Failla adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case under the LAD.
It is apparent from the district court's instructions that the issue of liability under N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(a) was not presented to the jury, and the only issue on which the jury was instructed was Jacalone's aiding and abetting liability under N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(e). That the jury was not asked to impose liability on the basis of § 12(a) is clear due to a variety of factors. First, the district judge stated that only if the City and the Police Department were found liable could the jury consider Jacalone's individual liability, which is a classic aiding and abetting requirement. Moreover, in explaining the elements necessary to Jacalone's liability, the district judge's discussion closely paralleled portions of the discussion of aiding and abetting liability developed by his colleague Judge Irenas in Tyson v. CIGNA Corp., 918 F.Supp. 836, 839 (D.N.J.1996). Finally, in denying appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district judge indicates that in his view § 12(e) provides the only basis for employee liability, so that he did not recognize the theory that individuals can be liable as "employers" under § 12(a). As the issue of the imposition of § 12(a) liability was not submitted to the jury, we need not reach this issue.
(1) Did the plaintiff prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant Jacalone engaged in discriminatory conduct?
(2) Did plaintiff prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant Jacalone was acting in the scope of his employment when he denied plaintiff a transfer to a day shift?
The court's instructions regarding these two questions were somewhat broader, indicating that Jacalone could be held liable for engaging in discriminatory conduct if the jury found that Jacalone knew that Failla was handicapped, knew that he needed an accommodation--namely, a transfer to a day shift--and failed to transfer him, and that he could be found to have acted in the scope of his employment if he had authority to transfer Failla and did not do so. The jury answered "yes" to both questions, and the district court concluded, based on those findings, that Jacalone had been found individually liable to Failla as an aider and abettor. Jacalone's counsel questioned that conclusion at trial and again on appeal, and argues that a finding that Jacalone acted in the scope of his employment does not lead to the imposition of individual liability.
Accordingly, we must predict whether the New Jersey Supreme Court would determine that the answers to interrogatories in this case warranted a finding of individual liability against Jacalone. To resolve that question, we must consider whether the interrogatories and the corresponding instructions properly stated the law. No party has objected to the language of the interrogatories or instructions as such, although Jacalone's counsel's objection to the district court's ruling clearly calls them into question. We have discretion to review instructions, even sua sponte, if they are such that the jury was without adequate guidance on a fundamental question and our failure to consider the error would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983, 987 (3d Cir.1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 506, 99 S.Ct. 1854, 60 L.Ed.2d 435 (1979). For the reasons set forth below, we find that the jury was without adequate guidance on the question of Jacalone's individual liability, and we will exercise our discretion to review the interrogatories and instructions as part of our determination that a new trial is warranted. We will focus first on the legal relevance and appropriateness of the second interrogatory, and then the first.
In its opinion denying appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court indicated that it viewed Tyson as setting forth the standard for aiding and abetting liability under the LAD. According to the district court's interpretation, "Tyson stands for the proposition that, under the NJLAD, a supervisory employee may be held individually liable for discriminatory acts committed in the scope of his employment." The court in Tyson cites a New Jersey Superior Court decision analogizing aiding and abetting liability under the LAD to accomplice liability in the criminal context. See 918 F.Supp. at 840 (citing Baliko v. Stecker, 275 N.J.Super. 182, 645 A.2d 1218 (1994)). The Tyson court notes that criminal accomplice liability requires a finding of shared intent: " '[t]he aider and abettor must share the same intent as the one who actually committed the offense. There must be a community of purpose between the actual perpetrator and the aider and abettor.' " Id. (quoting State v. Newell, 152 N.J.Super. 460, 378 A.2d 47, 52 (1977)). The court then reasons that because a supervisor's acts within the scope of his employment are the acts of the employer, "a supervisor who engages in discriminatory conduct while acting within the scope of his employment shares the intent and purpose of the employer (the principal) and may be held individually liable (as an accomplice) for aiding and abetting the employer's unlawful conduct." Id. at 841. In contrast, a supervisor acting outside the scope of his employment "ipso facto" does not aid and abet his employer, and is therefore not subject to accomplice liability under the LAD.6 Id. Courts in other jurisdictions have endorsed a similar analysis of aiding and abetting liability under state antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g., Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1997 WL 660636, at * 12-13 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 22, 1997).
It is apparent that this concept of shared intent was the key to the district court's view that a supervisor who commits a discriminatory act within the scope of his employment aids and abets a violation of the LAD and is subject to individual liability under § 12(e). The second interrogatory to the jury was based on this view. However, although civil aiding and abetting may to some extent be analogized to its criminal counterpart,7 the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the element of shared intent necessary in the criminal context is not an element of aiding and abetting in the civil context. The court specifically stated that "[t]o borrow ... from definitions of aiding and abetting liability in the criminal field, where criminal intent is stressed because the aider is a criminal principal, is entirely inappropriate in the context of the present statute which is basically a remedial, not a criminal one." Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649, 656 (1973).8 In its only comment on the LAD aiding and abetting provision, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected an analogy to criminal accomplice liability and its shared intent requirement. The court rebuffed a newspaper's challenge to the validity of a regulation, promulgated under the LAD, prohibiting the publication of classified employment advertisements with race, gender, or age-based headings, finding that the newspaper that printed the ads could be held liable for aiding and abetting an employer's violation of the LAD, even in the absence of shared intent or common purpose between the newspaper and employer. See id. at 656-57.
It should be noted that in Passaic Daily News, the court determined that shared intent was not necessary in order to find civil aiding and abetting, while in Tyson, the court found that the defendant's supervisory status satisfied the element of shared intent that it thought necessary for aiding and abetting liability. Taking guidance as we must from the New Jersey Supreme Court, we conclude that the issue of shared intent is irrelevant under the LAD.9 Accordingly, the district court interrogatory to the jury as to whether Jacalone, conceded to be a supervisor, acted in the scope of his employment, was not a relevant question for purposes of determining aiding and abetting liability. The real issue then becomes what are the elements of aiding and abetting, and did the court's instructions and the remaining interrogatory sufficiently explore and probe the proper test.
As this court has recognized, aiding and abetting liability traditionally applies to criminal offenses and "is not a well-settled mechanism for imposing civil liability." American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 1430 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103, 115 S.Ct. 1838, 131 L.Ed.2d 757 (1995). The New Jersey Superior Court in Baliko stated its view that the criminal law definition of the words "aid" and "abet," namely as meaning respectively " 'to assist, support or supplement the efforts of another,' " and " 'to encourage, counsel, incite or instigate the commission of a crime,' " should be applied in the civil context. Baliko 645 A.2d at 1223 (quoting State v. Newell, 152 N.J.Super. 460, 378 A.2d 47, 52 (1977)). In Passaic Daily News, the court only opined as to the lack of need for shared intent in the civil context, but did not otherwise discuss the elements of civil aiding and abetting. Although Passaic Daily News and Baliko provide some guidance, they fail to explore, let alone definitively establish, the full nature and scope of aiding and abetting liability under the LAD. Based on the limited available guidance, however, we conclude that the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow the Restatement of Torts to define aiding and abetting liability under the LAD.
We note that, as the district court instructed the jury, it is fundamental to aiding and abetting liability that the aider and abettor acted in relation to a principal, here, the employer, the city. Once the city has been found liable, the issue becomes whether under § 12(e), any employee is liable for aiding and abetting. Employees are not liable as aider and abettor merely because they had some role, or knowledge or involvement. Rather, the degree of involvement, knowledge and culpability required as a basis for liability is heightened by the standard that the Restatement sets forth and we adopt. Only those employees who meet this heightened standard will be aiders and abettors. It is important that this standard be set above mere knowledge and/or implementation, lest a reverse respondeat superior liability could be created under the guise of aiding and abetting.
Accordingly, we agree with appellants that the jury's answers to interrogatories in this case were insufficient to establish Jacalone's liability as an aider or abettor. Because the interrogatories and corresponding instructions did not properly state the elements of aiding and abetting liability, we conclude that a new trial on the issue of Jacalone's individual liability is required. See NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 275 (3d Cir.1975), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977).
We next consider appellants' argument that the district court committed reversible error by permitting Failla to testify that he received a worker's compensation award for a partial permanent disability and by admitting a copy of the judgment, with the amount of the award redacted, into evidence. Appellants now contend that this evidence was irrelevant and was highly prejudicial, and should have been excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. At trial, appellants only argued lack of relevance (and not the application of Rule 403), and the district court determined that the evidence was relevant because it tended to prove that Failla "had something wrong with him." We cannot find the court's ruling an abuse of discretion. The test of relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence is low. "Because [Rule 401] makes evidence relevant 'if it has any tendency to prove a consequential fact, it follows that evidence is irrelevant only when it has no tendency to prove the fact.' " Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 514 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5166, at 74 n. 47 (1978)). We cannot conclude that the district court erred in determining that the worker's compensation judgment tended to prove that Failla was disabled or handicapped. See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1099 n. 12 (3d Cir.1995) (noting that the admission of evidence of an EEOC determination is committed to the discretion of the trial court); Dickerson v. State of N.J. Dep't of Human Serv., 767 F.Supp. 605, 612 (D.N.J.1991) (recognizing the probative value of an EEOC determination).
Appellants raised their argument under Rule 403 for the first time on appeal.12 Accordingly, they waived any objection based on Rule 403, and we consider only whether the admission of the evidence constituted plain error. See Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed, Feb. 17, 1998 (No. 97-1380). Rule 403 requires a balancing which the district court is in the best position to evaluate. See United States v. Gatto, 995 F.2d 449, 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 114 S.Ct. 391, 126 L.Ed.2d 339 (1993). "[W]hen a trial court is not given an opportunity to exercise its discretion in striking the balance, we will seldom find plain error...." Id. On appeal, appellants have not even argued that the admission of the evidence constitutes plain error, and we do not find plain error here.
We also reject the tenor of appellants' sparse discussion of the fee issue in its brief on appeal, which urges that we reverse the fee award because the district court should have considered the City's status as a public entity, and should not have viewed it as a "deep pocket." Appellants cite no cases in support of this argument, and we find the City's public status entirely irrelevant. The LAD provides that attorneys' fees may be awarded to prevailing parties without any reference to the losing party's ability to pay. See N.J.S.A. § 10:5-27.1. The mere fact that the City is a public entity does not relieve it of its obligation to pay attorneys' fees when it is found liable for unlawful discrimination. See Robb v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 269 N.J.Super. 394, 635 A.2d 586 (1993) (awarding attorneys' fees against a local school board). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's award of attorneys' fees.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part the district court's order denying appellants' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, insofar as the district court found that individual liability should be imposed on Jacalone. We will affirm that order in all other respects, and will affirm the district court's award of attorneys' fees. We will affirm the judgment entered against the City and Police Department. We will vacate the judgment entered against Jacalone, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1291
 § 10
 § 13
 v. 
 v. 
 § 12102
 § 10
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 10
 § 10
 § 12
 v. 
 § 12
 § 12
 § 12
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 12
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 12
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5166
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 10
 v.