Source: https://www.employmentlawblog.info/2018/04/kelber-v-carefusion-corp-no-171206-7th-cir-apr-26-2018.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:55:18+00:00

Document:
Kelber v. CareFusion Corp., No. 17‐1206 (7th Cir. Apr. 26, 2018): Though the Supreme Court has confirmed that the ADEA does permit disparate impact (i.e., non-intentional policies that nevertheless have the effect of screening out protected-class employees), Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), it is unsettled whether such claims may be brought in the context of hiring.
Kelber was a 58-year-old attorney when he "applied for a position as 'Senior Counsel, Procedural Solutions' with defendant CareFusion, a healthcare products company. He qualified for the position in all respects except for the level of experience. The company classified the position as limited to lawyers with "3 to 7 years (no more than 7 years) of relevant legal experience."
When he did not get the position, Kelber filed an EEOC charge and lawsuit alleging that the "no more than 7 years" classification had a disparate impact on employees 40 and over, in violation of the ADEA. The distrait court dismissed the complaint, holding that job applicants were not "employees" for the purpose of § 623(a)(2). That section prohibits employers from enacting policies "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age."
1. To impose "minimum or maximum experience requirements" does limit or classify the job, in a way that "would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities."
2. To give the term "status as an employee" significance, the panel majority notes that "[d]eciding whether a person becomes an employee or not has the most dramatic possible effect on such status.
The balance of the opinion supports this plain statutory construction with legislative history, an examination of the statute's purpose, the bizarre results stemming from a narrower construction of the language, and additional policy arguments that bolster the plain meaning.
"Given Congress's omission of 'applicants for employment" in § 4(a)(2), yet unquestionable inclusion of job applicants in several other places throughout the ADEA, including the section directly preceding § 4(a)(2), I must conclude that Congress intentionally excluded 'applicants for employment' in § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA."
The right answer (I think) lies in focusing on the substance of the act - the conduct that the statute expressly prohibits - instead of the arid question of whether the plaintiff is covered by the ADEA. The conduct prohibited is classifying or limiting employees, and is just what the employer did here: defining the position at issue to a 3-7 year experience level. Subject to the affirmative defense of "reasonable factor other than age" (on which the employer bears the burden of proof, Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008)), this classification combined with proof that it had a disparate age impact, is enough to state a claim.

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