Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/459-n-2d-411-613594826
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:32:05+00:00

Document:
Party Name: INDIANA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. CITY OF MUNCIE, Muncie Police Pension Board, Cordell Campbell, Jack E. Turner, Donald R. Scroggins, Larry McCaffrey, Muncie City Police Department and Harold B. Duke, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below).
Rehearing Denied March 15, 1984.
Transfer Denied May 18, 1984.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Frederick S. Bremer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Thomas L. DeWeese, Asst. City Atty., Muncie, for appellees.
Milton Smith, a black, was employed by the City of Muncie as a special police officer. In seeking to secure a permanent position as a regular police officer, Smith was required to apply for membership in the Muncie Police Pension Fund. On September 4, 1973, the Pension Board denied Smith's application for admission. The Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) made a determination that Smith had been discriminated against based on race, and the Pension Board appealed to the Delaware Superior Court. The trial court reversed and entered findings of no discrimination. ICRC now appeals that decision.
notice that such order, decision or determination is made by any such agency. Notice shall be given in the manner prescribed by section 6 of this act. Unless a proceeding for review is commenced by so filing such petition within fifteen (15) days any and all rights of judicial review and all rights of recourse to the courts shall terminate."
In judicial review of an administrative determination, compliance with the requirements of this section is a condition precedent to jurisdiction. Personnel Board v. Parkman, (1969) 252 Ind. 44, 245 N.E.2d 153; White v. Bd. of Med. Regis. and Exam. (1956) 235 Ind. 572, 134 N.E.2d 556; Ind. Civil Rights Comm. v. Int'l. Union, (1979) 179 Ind.App. 407, 385 N.E.2d 1176; Gleason v. Real Estate Comm., (1973) 157 Ind.App. 344, 300 N.E.2d 116.
Any person who falsifies an affirmation or representation of fact shall be subject to the same penalties as are prescribed by law for the making of a false affidavit."
The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that " '[v]erification ... includes both the actual swearing to the truth of the statements by the subscriber and also the certification thereto by the notary or other officer authorized by law to administer oaths.' " State ex rel. Hodges v. Kosciusko Circuit, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 1231, at 1233; Gossard v. Vawter, (1939) 215 Ind. 581, at 584-586, 21 N.E.2d 416, at 417.
" 'the certificate that the writing is true.' 2 Bouvier's Law Dict. (15th ed.) 781.
"Black's Law Dict. (2d ed.) 205 says: ... Verification is defined as a 'confirmation of the correctness, truth, or authenticity of a pleading, account or other paper, by an affidavit, oath, or deposition.' Black's Law Dict. (2d ed.) 1203.
"In the case of State v. Trook (1909), 172 Ind. 558, 560, [88 N.E. 930, 931], the word 'verify' is defined as follows: 'The primary definition of the verb "verify," when used in matters of law, as given in the Standard Dictionary, is: "To affirm under oath; confirm by formal oath; as, to verify pleadings in an action; to verify accounts, etc." ' "

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