Source: https://apanewslaw.wordpress.com/category/impaired-driving/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:59:43+00:00

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This post is hardly ‘new’ case law. In fact, this issue has been discussed and argued for years. It is worthy refreshing ourselves on the law in this area from time to time though. R. v. Roblin 2017 ONCJ 702 discussed two issues that are worthy noting: mouth alcohol and legal articulation.
Section 254(2) of the Code permits an officer — during the investigative stage of an impaired driving inquiry, and upon developing a reasonable suspicion that a motorist has alcohol in his or her body — to require breath samples be provided into an ASD. Because the driver is being detained and denied his section 10 Charter rights, the officer is required to make the demand, and obtain a reliable sample, forthwith. The test’s purpose is to determine, with accuracy, the presence and amount of alcohol in a driver’s bloodstream, and to assist in determining whether a further criminal investigation is warranted (i.e. arrest for driving with excess blood alcohol) or permit the detainee to be swiftly on his or her way. This, of course, requires that the testing process be reliable, otherwise what is the point of the exercise. This reality imports some flexibility into the forthwith requirement, which is otherwise quite rigid — a brief delay is acceptable if it is reasonably necessary to allow for the testing process to be properly conducted (for example, R. v. Bernshaw  1 S.C.R. 254).
It is widely known that mouth alcohol may artificially raise an ASD test result. This is why police officers need to be alert for “credible evidence” of its presence during sobriety-related traffic stops. An officer is entitled to rely upon the accuracy of an ASD result absent such evidence. As a result, courts have historically permitted a brief delay at the roadside in circumstances where there is credible evidence of recent consumption in order to ensure that the alcohol has dissipated from the detainee’s mouth and is not an impediment to the ASD’s proper functioning.
In this case, the arresting officer, part of a broader deployment of police resources aimed at detecting potential impaired drivers, positioned his cruiser in a parking lot adjacent to a licensed establishment. His intention was to conduct random sobriety checks of motorists leaving the restaurant. He pulled a vehicle over after it was seen exiting the restaurant’s parking lot. The driver was alone in his vehicle. He had no difficulty pulling over at the police direction. Standard requests for documentation were made by the officer and during the interaction, the officer noted an “evident” odour of alcohol relatively quickly; he described it as being more apparent the longer they spoke. He asked how long the driver had been at the bar, and was told about an hour. He then asked if he had consumed alcohol, and received a response that he had drank one beer, five minutes previous. The officer was suspicious of this statement, as it did not accord with his understanding of how people act in bars or restaurants — people generally do not abstain in such locations, only to then consume alcohol in a short period of time before leaving, in the officer’s opinion.
On the basis of the driver’s answers, the officer formed a suspicion that the driver was operating a motor vehicle with alcohol in his body. The officer was in possession of an approved screening device and, after turning it on and conducting various tests, administered the device to the driver. A “fail” result was obtained eight minutes after the initial traffic stop. The officer testified that the device can provide three possible results — pass, alert, or fail — and that a fail indicates an amount in the test subject’s bloodstream in excess of 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. On the basis of the fail result, an arrest occurred and a s. 254(3) breath demand was made.
In cross-examination, however, the officer agreed that it was possible that the driver had consumed alcohol five minutes before the traffic stop. His principal difficulty with the driver’s utterance was not the timing of consumption, but the quantity. He believed the driver would have drank more but, critically for present purposes, he agreed on multiple occasions that the driver could have recently drank alcohol, as stated, five minutes before the traffic stop. While this would mean that he was administering a test thirteen minutes after the subject had potentially consumed alcohol, and was aware that mouth alcohol could generate a false fail, the officer indicated that he was nonetheless confident that the obtained sample was reliable. He indicated that, in his mind, a fifteen minute delay is a recommendation only, a “soft decision”, not a “necessity or a hard and fast rule”.
The court ruled that a reasonable officer would have been aware of the notorious effect of mouth alcohol on ASD test results, and would have known that it was necessary to wait fifteen to twenty minutes after consumption to ensure a reliable sample, one that could either further a criminal investigation or permit a detainee to be swiftly on his way, as envisioned by the section 254(2) Code provision was obtained. While the officer honestly believed he had grounds based on the “fail”, in the circumstances that belief was unreasonable, said the judge. The breath samples obtained at the police station were unreasonably seized and a section 8 Charter violation was established.
A related s. 8 Charter issue arose during the course of the application, with regard to subjective grounds. Upon receiving the “fail” result from the ASD, the officer testified that his “suspicion had been confirmed that the driver was operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol”; i.e. 253(1)(a), not 253(1)(b). The officer further testified, when asked about what information he provided to the breath technician back at the police station, that he explained his “suspicions”. The position of the Crown was that the officer misspoke when he used the term “suspicion”, misspoke again when he identified the impaired driving s. 253(1)(a) offence, and that the surrounding circumstantial evidence should satisfy the court that he subjectively believed that the driver was operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Code.
Luckily, the judge ruled that “a court [can] infer from circumstantial evidence the officer had the requisite belief without having said the “magic words”. In the end, the judge accepted the crown’s submission that the officer’s testimony that his suspicion was “confirmed” meant that he had escalated his suspicion to something more concrete, like a belief. In the circumstances, the judge was satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the officer honestly believed that he had evidence capable of justifying an arrest for driving with excess blood alcohol, his choice of language notwithstanding. Of course, for the reasons already indicated, that belief was unreasonable given the clear and present danger mouth alcohol posed to the ASD test procedure. The breath samples were excluded from evidence.
R. v. Bingley 2017 SCC 12 – after Bingley was observed driving erratically, the police were called. One of the officers, a certified drug recognition expert (DRE) under the Criminal Code, conducted a standard field sobriety test. Bingley failed the test and was arrested for driving while impaired by a drug. At trial, the prosecution called the DRE to explain the results of his drug recognition evaluation as evidence of Bingley’s impairment. The prosecution relied on s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code as establishing the admissibility of the DRE’s testimony and argued that no voir dire was required. The judge at the first trial allowed the DRE to testify as an expert regarding the results of the drug recognition evaluation without a voir dire, but acquitted Bingley. On appeal, the acquittal was overturned and a new trial ordered. The second trial judge held that the DRE could not be qualified as an expert because he was not trained in the science underlying the drug recognition procedure. He also concluded that the evidence was not admissible lay opinion. He acquitted Bingley. The prosecution successfully appealed the second acquittal. The summary conviction appeal judge held that s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code rendered a DRE’s opinion automatically admissible and that in any event, it would be admissible lay opinion. The Court of Appeal held that the DRE’s opinion evidence was admissible without a voir dire. Section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code allowed a DRE “to determine” whether an individual was impaired due to a drug or a combination of drugs and alcohol. It was implicit that this determination was automatically admissible as opinion evidence, the Court opined. Bingley appealed to the SCC.
The SCC said the only issue in this case was whether the DRE had special expertise as required by the fourth Mohan factor. Bingley conceded that the proposed evidence was logically relevant, necessary, and not subject to any other exclusionary rule. Further, Bingley did not argue that the evidence should be excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
Knowledge of the underlying science was not a precondition to the admissibility of a DRE’s opinion, said the SCC. The basic requirement of expertise for an expert witness was that the witness had expertise outside the experience and knowledge of the trier of fact, which the DRE in this case did. DREs received special training in how to administer the 12-step drug recognition evaluation and in what inferences could be drawn from the factual data they noted. It followed that the DRE’s evidence was admissible in this case.
Where it was clear that all the requirements of a common law rule of admissibility were established, the trial judge was not obliged to hold a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the evidence. The trial judge correctly found that the DRE in this case was an expert for purposes of administering the 12-step evaluation and determining whether Bingley was driving while impaired for the purpose of requiring further testing. He erred, however, said the SCC, in concluding that because the officer was not an expert in the scientific foundation of the various elements of the test, none of his opinion evidence was admissible.
The dignity of the human being is equally seriously violated when use is made of bodily substances taken by others for medical purposes in a manner that does not respect that limitation.
Although a decision at the Provincial Court level, R. v. Abbot 2015 BCPC 415 cited some SCC decisions in arriving at a decision. Abbot drove his vehicle off the road, over a ditch and through a 7-8 foot fence, landing on private property – in the course of which his head went out through the roof of his vehicle and then back in through the roof. He received a very significant injury to his head, was confused, and at times incoherent from the time of the accident until some point during his treatment at the hospital.
When the officer arrived, Abbot was being supported by the property owner outside the vehicle. Given the head injury and the fact the accused’s pupils were large and responded unevenly to light, the officer believed he was, at the very least, concussed. His speech was slurred. Abbot said he was fine and just wanted to go home. He did not want any medical treatment. It was apparent to the officer that Abbot was not fine and that he would need to go to the hospital. Abbot said he was not injured, but just drunk.
Based on this statement, the slurred speech and the accident, she detained him for impaired driving. The ambulance attended and when Abbot was moved to the stretcher, he began vomiting at which point the officer could smell the odour of liquor from the vomit and Abbot’s breath. Abbot was taken by ambulance to the local hospital, in the course of which he was yelling and swearing his objections to being strapped down – asserting that he was Scottish and should not be held captive but needed open spaces. He did not respond to and did not appear to understand the Charter warnings or the breath demand read to him by the officer.
Once at the hospital, Abbot remained volatile, upset and crying one minute, and angry and swearing the next. He was trying to free himself from the restraints of the stretcher. He said he was refusing medical treatment and did not want anyone to touch him. The officer asked the doctor if blood samples would be taken in the normal course of treatment and she was told that they would. She told him the RCMP would seek a warrant for any samples taken and the doctor said he’d make sure the lab didn’t destroy them. The doctor did order blood samples in order to determine how much alcohol was in Abbot’s system as he needed to know to what extent Abbot’s confusion was or might be the result of alcohol rather than the head injury. Later in the morning, Abbot was taken into surgery where the doctor stitched his scalp back together. Abbot signed a consent prior to the surgery.
The blood sample taken from Abbot was analyzed at the hospital and then stored in the lab refrigerator where it would normally be kept for a week and then discarded unless further tests were ordered during that period. No further tests were ordered on Abbot’s blood. Five days later, the officer telephoned the lab and spoke to the chief lab technician. The officer confirmed with him that the blood samples taken from Abbot were still at the lab and asked him to put those samples aside as the RCMP would be preparing a warrant for them. The lab technician said the samples would be placed in a bag and labeled for RCMP use and kept labeled and secure until the warrant was produced.
The police had all the information necessary to complete an ITO and apply for a warrant, but due to an injury of the investigator, she was off work for some time and the warrant was not executed and the blood samples seized until approximately 3 months later. Upon seizure, the samples were in the refrigerator of the hospital lab, labeled “Keep for RCMP Warrant”. No Report to Justice was ever completed for the seized blood samples. They were sent to the RCMP lab and an analysis was conducted on them some 10 weeks after the seizure. The officer was aware of the requirement for a Report to Justice to be filed, but simply forgot to attend to it.
At issue at Trial was whether the doctor and lab technician acted as “agents for the police” in directing that Abbot’s blood be held at the hospital lab until the police attended with a warrant to seize it, and if so, whether their actions constituted an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter; another issue was the lack in filing a Report to Justice.
The Crown relied on the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Lunn (1990) 61 CCC (3d) 193 for the proposition that hospital employees are not acting as agents for the State when they hold on to hospital blood samples at the request of police in anticipation of a police warrant. Lunn, however, did not consider the situation where a doctor or hospital employee takes positive action to hold onto a blood sample after the period when it would normally be discarded, at the request of the police, and for no ongoing medical purpose, because in Lunn, the doctor told the officer that the blood samples would normally be discarded after 7 days, and the warrant was executed on the 6th day.
In R. v. Christensen 2005 BCPC 173, the accused was taken to the hospital after an accident. Blood was taken for medical purposes and the police were advised by a nurse that the samples had been taken and would be held for 7 days. When the police advised they would be seeking a warrant to seize the blood, they were told that the lab would hold onto the blood until the warrant was delivered. The police continued investigating the accident and it was not until about day 9 after the samples had been taken that they felt they had the grounds to apply for a warrant. The initial warrant was denied because of errors relating to the time and place of the search and a subsequent ITO and warrant were not prepared for another three weeks as the officer dealing with the file went on holiday. Five and a half weeks after the blood samples were taken at the hospital the warrant was executed and the blood samples seized. However, in that case, the police did not request the blood to be held – rather they advised of their intention to seek a warrant and the hospital employees chose to keep the blood beyond the 7 day limit in anticipation of the warrant.
The dignity of the human being is equally seriously violated when use is made of bodily substances taken by others for medical purposes in a manner that does not respect that limitation. In my view, the trust and confidence of the public in the administration of medical facilities would be seriously taxed if an easy and informal flow of information, and particularly of bodily substances from hospital to police were allowed.
In this case, Abbot’s blood was taken, with his consent, for medical purposes. Those purposes included any testing of the blood by the hospital for treating Abbot and the retention of the blood by the hospital as required for such treatment – i.e. 7 days. In holding the blood samples for a further three months at the request of the officer and for the purpose of an anticipated police seizure, the court found that the lab technician was not acting for any medical purpose. He was assisting the police for a non-medical purpose and in doing so he became an agent of the police and his actions were subject to Charter scrutiny. The doctor, on the other hand, did nothing other than tell the police officer he would make sure the lab did not destroy the blood. He was not asked to do this by the officer and there was no evidence that he ever gave any instructions to the lab in this regard. He was not acting as an agent for the police.
The judge ruled that the decision of the lab technician to hold Abbot’s blood sample for the police, after the point in time when it would otherwise have been discarded, was a seizure within the meaning of s. 8. Abbot clearly had a privacy interest in his own blood. It was kept by a state agent without his knowledge or consent for reasons unrelated to the medical purpose for which it was taken and beyond the time frame for which it would otherwise have been in the custody of the hospital, and the seizure, therefore, was not authorized by law.
For the reasons set out in R. v. Garcia-Machado 2015 ONCA 569, (and in particular paragraphs 39 – 55), the court also found that the failure by the officer to complete a Report to Justice for the seizure of the blood samples and the hospital records as required by s. 489.1(1) of the Criminal Code also resulted in a seizure which was not authorized by law and constituted a breach of s. 8 of the Charter (see also R. v. Paterson 2011 BCSC 1728). While that failure on its own was far less serious and would not, on its own lead to the exclusion of the blood samples, in this case, it was indicative of a somewhat careless or negligent attitude which precluded the judge from finding that the police acted in good faith.
The use of blood samples in cases involving motor vehicle accidents is an important part of maintaining safe roadways. The samples were taken for a legitimate medical purpose and with the accused’s consent. At the same time, in the context of the systemic goal of the integrity of the justice system it is difficult to see how an informed and thoughtful public could condone the gathering of evidence in circumstances, such as here; where a person gives consent for the taking of blood in the course of emergency medical treatment, and that blood is then held by hospital officials at the request of the police for no medical purpose. The admission of the blood samples in this case would send a message that in the context of an impaired driving investigation, where the police had other investigative tools to use but simply did not do so, (i.e. seeking a blood warrant under s. 256, preparing a warrant for the hospital samples in a timely way), a person’s right to control the use of their own bodily substances does not count. In my view such a message would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and I find that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the blood samples were admitted in this case. The blood samples and the report of [lab employee] are therefore excluded.
In reading a recent case out of the ABPC (R. v. Sibanda 2015 ABPC 238), I was reminded of the difficult situation that we sometimes find ourselves in. That is, if the desire is to use information acquired from a motorist in criminal proceedings, the information cannot derive from the duty of the motorist mandated by the statutory provisions. In Sibanda, officers were dispatched to a collision scene to investigate a possible impaired driving. When the two officers arrived, they saw a vehicle stuck in a snowbank resting on top of a bent road sign. The front wheels of the vehicle were “slightly off the ground”, and were spinning. One officer saw Mr. Sibanda standing on the passenger side of the vehicle and walking around. An officer also noticed that a female was in the front passenger seat of the motor vehicle. The officer approached the accused and said, “What happened? The driver said he misturned, crashed, and got stuck. The officer noticed some signs of possible impairment (smell, balance, stumbling) as well. This post won’t focus on the grounds for the breath sample issues, but instead on the issue of compelled statements.
The s. 10(b) Charter rights of suspected impaired drivers who are detained are suspended while the police are performing screening tests. The screening procedures must be carried out in a reasonably prompt manner; otherwise, the detained driver’s s. 10(b) rights may come into play. The screening tests include: an approved screening device test, admissions made by the detainee as a result of police questioning and compelled physical testing. The admissions, the approved screening sample and results of the compelled testing may only be used to support the demanding officer’s reasonable grounds to make a s. 254(3) demand, or the reasonable suspicion to ground an officer’s s. 254(2) demand. These observations cannot be used to prove impaired operation or impaired care or control offences. Some observations that do not result from the compelled participation of the accused may be used to support these offences.
In short, Judge Allen found that Mr. Sibanda’s admission that he was driving when the vehicle crashed can only be used as a basis for the officer’s s. 254(3) demand and cannot be used to prove he was operating the motor vehicle. Therefore, the Crown (officer) must prove who was driving in other ways. This got me pondering on a larger scale because this is a common dispatch faced by many officers.
This research led me down two roads, although they often intersect. It is well recognized that where police stop drivers to check for sobriety, the driver is detained: R. v. Hufsky (1988), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 398 (SCC); R. v. Ladouceur (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22 (SCC); R .v Mellenthin (1992), 76 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (SCC). What cases such as R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias,  2 S.C.R. 3 have decided is that the impugned evidence is admissible for a limited purpose. That is, the evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of establishing reasonable grounds (suspicion) to make an ASD demand or a breath demand, but not as evidence to prove directly elements of the offence at trial. Although the court found that s. 10(b) was infringed, it also found that the infringement was a reasonable limit justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
The other road involves s. 7 of the Charter. Despite the strong connection between ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter, the two are not mutually exclusive. In what circumstances would admission into evidence in a criminal trial of statements made by the accused under legislative or regulatory compulsion violate the s. 7 protection against self-incrimination? The answer depends on the context.
When there is a motor vehicle accident, we have a duty to investigate and complete an accident report where the requirements are met. In most provinces (e.g. Saskatchewan, pursuant to section 253 of the Traffic Safety Act, s. 98 in Nova Scotia, s. 130-131 in New Brunswick, s. 232 in PEI, and so on), police have a duty to complete an accident report. In situations such as these, it requires the driver or the person in charge of the vehicle to report to a police officer, and it further requires the officer receiving the “report” (information) to make a written report. So, it contemplates two mandatory reports — one by the motorist (to give the information), and one by the police officer. Therefore, the question to ponder is, “Can statements or admissions made while participating in the mandatory making of the report (statutory requirement) be used for any purposes in the criminal trial for grounds for a demand or an arrest?” Narrowly focused, due to the provincial legislation, answers to any questions asked by the police where there has been a collision are compelled answers, so can they be used to establish who was driving in criminal precedings?
In the case of a roadside stop, the questioning by police in those cases does not involve compelled answers; the motorist can refuse to answer if he or she chooses; they are not forcefully enlisted in aid of their own prosecution. The same cannot be said when an accident is involved and the driver is compelled to report (or give answers to) certain information. There is absolutely no legal compulsion to speak or provide information in the prior, but there is in the latter. What many courts have decided in the latter context is that the statutorily compelled admission(s) from the driver is not admissible for the purpose of establishing grounds for making either the ASD or the breath demand.
…as a practical matter, it will be very important for the police officer who takes an accident report while simultaneously investigating a crime to delineate clearly for the declarant the start and end points of the accident report. For example, it may be useful for police to tell the driver that they will postpone the taking of an accident report until after they have questioned, or attempted to question, the driver. Alternatively… police may wish to tell the driver that they intend to secure the details of the accident report from sources other than the driver, thus terminating the statutory duty to report.
I am not at this time seeking an accident report from you pursuant to the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act (or Off-Road Vehicle Act); therefore you are under no compulsion to answer my questions. If I do decide to take an accident report from you later, I will clearly inform you. Do you understand?

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