Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/382/406/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:28:59+00:00

Document:
In 1961 respondent was tried and convicted in an Ohio court for violation of the Ohio Securities Act. Respondent had not taken the stand, and the prosecutor commented extensively, as permitted by Ohio law, on his failure to testify. The conviction was affirmed by an Ohio court of appeals, the State Supreme Court declined review, and this Court dismissed an appeal and denied certiorari in 1963. Shortly thereafter respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging various constitutional violations at his trial. The federal District Court dismissed the petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed, noting that, on the day preceding oral argument of the appeal, the Supreme Court, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, held that the Fifth Amendment's freedom from self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth against state abridgment, and reasoning that the protection includes freedom from comment on failure to testify. In Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, this Court held that adverse comment on a defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal trial violates the privilege against self-incrimination, and the parties here were requested to brief and argue the question of the retroactivity of that doctrine.
Held: The doctrine of Griffin v. California will not be applied retrospectively. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, followed. Pp. 382 U. S. 409-419.
In 1964, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination "is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 378 U. S. 6. In Griffin v. California, decided on April 28, 1965, the Court held that adverse comment by a prosecutor or trial judge upon a defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal trial violates the federal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, because such comment "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 380 U. S. 609, 380 U. S. 614. The question before us now is whether the rule of Griffin v. California is to be given retrospective application.
the respondent guilty, the judgment of conviction was affirmed by an Ohio court of appeals, and the Supreme Court of Ohio declined further review. 173 Ohio St. 542, 184 N.E.2d 213. The respondent then brought his case to this Court, claiming several constitutional errors but not attacking the Ohio comment rule as such. On May 13, 1963, we dismissed the appeal and denied certiorari, MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissenting. 373 U. S. 240. All avenues of direct review of the respondent's conviction were thus fully foreclosed more than a year before our decision in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, and almost two years before our decision in Griffin v. California, supra.
by Judge and prosecutor upon the defendant's failure to testify at his trial, as permitted by the California Constitution. The Court again followed Twining in holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to accord the privilege against self-incrimination, and, as in Twining, the Court did not reach the question whether adverse comment upon a defendant's failure to testify would violate the Fifth Amendment privilege. [Footnote 7] Thereafter, the Court continued to adhere to the Twining rule, notably in Knapp v. Schweitzer, decided in 1958, 357 U. S. 371, 357 U. S. 374, and in Cohen v. Hurley, decided in 1961, 366 U. S. 117, 366 U. S. 127-129.
In recapitulation, this brief review clearly demonstrates: (1) For more than half a century, beginning in 1908, the Court adhered to the position that the Federal Constitution does not require the States to accord the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (2) Because of this position, the Court, during that period, never reached the question whether the federal guarantee against self-incrimination prohibits adverse comment upon a defendant's failure to testify at his trial. [Footnote 8] Although there were strong dissenting voices, [Footnote 9] the Court made not the slightest deviation from that position during a period of more than 50 years.
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 308 U. S. 374. It is against this background that we look to the purposes of the Griffin rule, the reliance placed upon the Twining doctrine, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of Griffin. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 636.
"recognition that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay. . . . Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not, by coercion, prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth. [Footnote 12]"
378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 7-8.
"our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,' [Footnote 13]"
any impingement upon those values resulting from a State's application of a variant from the federal standard cannot now be remedied. As we pointed out in Linkletter with respect to the Fourth Amendment rights there in question, "the ruptured privacy . . . cannot be restored." 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 637.
As in Mapp, therefore, we deal here with a doctrine which rests on considerations of quite a different order from those underlying other recent constitutional decisions which have been applied retroactively. The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth, and it is self-evident that to deny a lawyer's help through the technical intricacies of a criminal trial or to deny a full opportunity to appeal a conviction because the accused is poor is to impede that purpose, and to infect a criminal proceeding with the clear danger of convicting the innocent. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U. S. 202; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12; Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U. S. 214. The same can surely be said of the wrongful use of a coerced confession. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368; McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U. S. 575; Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433. By contrast, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth. That privilege, like the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, stands as a protection of quite different constitutional values -- values reflecting the concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone. To recognize this is no more than to accord those values undiluted respect.
The last important factor considered by the Court in Linkletter was "the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of Mapp." 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 636. A retrospective application of Griffin v. California would create stresses upon the administration of justice more concentrated, but fully as great, as would have been created by a retrospective application of Mapp. A retrospective application of Mapp would have had an impact only in those States which had not themselves adopted the exclusionary rule, apparently some 24 in number. [Footnote 19] A retrospective application of Griffin would have an impact only upon those States which have not themselves adopted the no-comment rule, apparently six in number. [Footnote 20] But, upon those six States, the impact would be very grave indeed. It is not in every criminal trial that tangible evidence of a kind that might raise Mapp issues is offered. But it may fairly be assumed that there has been comment in every single trial in the courts of California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio, in which the defendant did not take the witness stand -- in accordance with state law and with the United States Constitution as explicitly interpreted by this Court for 57 years.
We have proceeded upon the premise that "we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 629. We have considered the purposes of the Griffin rule, the reliance placed upon the Twining doctrine, and the effect upon the administration of justice of a retrospective application of Griffin. After full consideration of all the factors, we are not able to say that the Griffin rule requires retrospective application.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissents for substantially the same reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, at 381 U. S. 640.
The Supreme Court of California and the Supreme Court of Ohio have both considered the question, and each court has unanimously held that, under the controlling principles discussed in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, the Griffin rule is not to be applied retroactively in those States. In re Gaines, 63 Cal.2d 234, 404 P.2d 473; Pinch v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St.2d 212, 210 N.E.2d 883.
As in Linkletter, the question in the present case is not one of "pure prospectivity." The rule announced in Griffin was applied to reverse Griffin's conviction. Compare England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411. Nor is there any question of the applicability of the Griffin rule to cases still pending on direct review at the time it was announced. Cf. O'Connor v. Ohio, ante, p. 286.
See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 381 U. S. 622-628.
211 U.S. at 211 U. S. 114.
As the Court pointed out in Adamson, 332 U.S. at 332 U. S. 50, n. 6, this question had never arisen in the federal courts, because a federal statute had been interpreted as prohibiting adverse comment upon a defendant's failure to testify in a federal criminal trial. See 20 Stat. 30, as amended, now 18 U.S.C. § 3481; Bruno v. United States, 308 U. S. 287; Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60.
See, e.g., MR. JUSTICE BLACK's historic dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 332 U. S. 68.
"The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important advance in the development of our liberty -- one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.'" Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 350 U. S. 426. [The quotation is from Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955), 7.] It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial, rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates"
"8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev., 1961), 317; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,' United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-582 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U. S. 391; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements, and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.' Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 349 U. S. 162."
378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 55.
"[T]he privilege against self-incrimination represents many fundamental values and aspirations. It is 'an expression of the moral striving of the community . . . a reflection of our common conscience. . . .' Malloy v. Hogan, ante, p. 378 U. S. 9, n. 7, quoting Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955), 73. That is why it is regarded as so fundamental a part of our constitutional fabric despite the fact that 'the law and the lawyers . . . have never made up their minds just what it is supposed to do, or just whom it is intended to protect.' Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment -- Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 Bull. Atomic Sci. 181, 182."
378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 56, n. 5.
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, it was unequivocally determined by a unanimous Court that the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers.
338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 27-28.
See, for example, Scott v. California, 364 U. S. 471, where, as late as December, 1960, only a single member of the Court expressed dissent from the dismissal of an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the California comment rule.
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, at 364 U. S. 224-225 (Appendix).

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