Source: http://patents.hdp.com/?cat=44
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:23:54+00:00

Document:
In Spineology Inc. v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc., [2018-1276] (December 14, 2018), the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of Wright Medical Technology, Inc.’s motion for attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, finding no abuse of discretion.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that, while Spineology’s proposed construction of “body” was ultimately rejected at summary judgment, the attempt was not so meritless as to render the case exceptional. The Federal Circuit stressed that a party’s position ultimately need not be correct for them not to standout. The Federal Circuit noted that Wright was hardly in a position to complain about Spineology’s continuing to pursue a construction not adopted by the district court in the claim construction order, since the district court declined to adopt Wright’s proposed construction as well.
The Federal Circuit noted that Wright was asking the court to basically decide the damages issues mooted by summary judgment in order to determine whether it ought to obtain attorney fees for the entire litigation. The Federal Circuit refused to do so — it will not force the district court, on a motion for attorney fees, to conduct the trial it never had, and the Federal Circuit declined to conduct the trial in the first instance.
The bottom line is exceptional does not mean “wrong” — otherwise every case would be exceptional.
In Stone Basket Innovations, LLC v. Cook Medical LLC, [2017-2330] (June 11, 2018), the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of attorneys fees to defendant under 35 U.S.C. § 285 after plaintiff dismissed its complaint for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,551,327 on a basket-type stone extraction medical device used to remove stones from biological systems, when defendant instituted in inter partes review.
This appeal involved two main issues: whether the District Court erred in its assessment of: (1) the substantive strength of Stone’s litigating position, and (2) the alleged pattern of vexatious litigation by Stone. On the first issue, the Federal Circuit held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the substantive strength of Stone’s ultimately non-prevailing litigating position did not warrant an award of fees. The Federal Circuit held that the patent owner was not put on clear notice of the invalidity of its patent by defendants invalidity contentions listing 32 prior art references with general statements of invalidity, and “inconsistent and unilluminating” claim charts. The Federal Circuit further noted that the invalidating prior art used in the inter partes review was listed on the face of the patent, creating a presumption of good faith in asserting its patent rights against Cook. The Federal Circuit likewise found the statements of the inventor to be taken out of context, and in any even irrelevant because a post-issuance statement regarding a single element of a claimed invention does not establish invalidity. Lastly, the Federal Circuit noted the district court’s explanation that following the service of the invalidity contentions, Cook took no action to ensure a rapid termination of the instant litigation. Cook complained that the prevailing party’s conduct is not a proper consideration, but the Federal Circuit said it was a proper part of the totality of the circumstances.
The Federal Circuit added that Cook’s failure to provide early, focused, and supported notice of its belief that it was being subjected to exceptional litigation behavior further supports the District Court’s determination that Stone’s litigating position did not “stand out” from others.
In Raniere v. Microsoft Corp., [2017-1400, 2017-1401] (April 18, 2018), the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding that Microsoft and AT&T were the prevailing parties under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012), and did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees and costs.
Raniere sued for infringement of a total of five patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,373,936, 6,819,752, 7,215,752, 7,391,856, and 7,844,041), and Microsoft and AT&T challenged Raniere’s standing. Rainiere and the other inventors assigned the underlying inventions to Global Technologies, Inc. In May 1996, GTI was administratively dissolved. In December 2014, Raniere executed a document on behalf of GTI, claiming to be its president and “sole owner,” that purportedly transferred the asserted patents from GTI to himself.
$176,166.40 in attorney fees and $2,073.68 in costs. The district court found Appellees were not entitled to fees spent on certain matters after the district court issued its stay order. And, the district court reduced the lodestar for both Appellees by twenty percent due to duplication of efforts between Microsoft and AT&T attorneys. In view of these determinations, the district court awarded $300,295.71 to AT&T and $143,719.26 to Microsoft in attorney fees and costs.
The Federal Circuit agreed that the Appellees were the prevailing parties, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion finding the case exceptional and awarding fees. The Federal Circuit, noting that the district court was in a better position to determine whether a case is exceptional, had no reason to disturb the district court’s well-reasoned determination. The Federal Circuit also concluded that the district court’s discretionary determination of fees and costs is well-supported and reflects the court’s careful consideration of the relevant billing rates, invoices, and records.
In Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., [2016-2442] (December 8, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of fees on the grounds that following the Alice decision, patent owner’s claims were objectively without merit.
based solely on the weakness of IH’s post-Alice patent-eligibility arguments and the need to deter future “wasteful litigation” on similarly weak arguments.
in the specification for implementing the asserted method claims are unambiguously described as “conventional.” These components do not supply an inventive concept.
was and is sometimes difficult to analyze patent eligibility under the framework prescribed by the Supreme Court in Mayo, the Federal Circuit said there was no uncertainty or difficulty in applying the principles set out in Alice to reach the conclusion that the ’582 patent’s claims are ineligible. The Federal Circuit said that it was IH’s responsibility to reassess its case in view of new controlling law.
In Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., [2016-1115, 2016-1116, 2016-1842] (August 9, 2017), the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s award of attorneys fees to Romag under 35 U.S.C. § 285 but not under the identically worded 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
No. 5,722,126 and U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 2,095,367. Under the Patent Act and the Lanham Act, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
Before Octane, the Second Circuit allowed recovery of attorney’s fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) only if there was bad faith or willful infringement on the part of the defendants. However the Federal Circuit found that there is intervening relevant Supreme Court authority which, we think, would lead the Second Circuit to follow other circuits which have held that the Octane standard applies to the Lanham Act.
The Federal Circuit noted that since Octane was decided, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all held that Octane applies to Lanham Act Cases as well, and that no circuit has specifically considered Octane and then declined to apply it to the Lanham Act. Thus the Federal Circuit concluded that the Second Circuit would hold that, in light of Octane, the Lanham Act should have the same standard for recovering attorney’s fees as the Patent Act. Thus, the Federal Circuit vacated the denial of attorneys fees, and remanded the case.
On the issue of attorneys fees on the patent infringement claim, the Federal Circuit likewise vacated the award. The Federal Circuit noted that a district court must consider the totality of circumstances, including the conduct of the prevailing party that is seeking attorney’s fees. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in declining to consider, in connection with its totality of circumstances analysis, Romag’s earlier litigation misconduct. Romag’s misconduct cannot be disregarded on the theory that failure to award fees is equivalent to double-sanctioning Romag. In fact the Federal Circuit said that the fact that Romag’s misconduct has already been sanctioned should be weighed more heavily, rather than be excluded, in the 35 U.S.C. § 285 analysis.
This Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court to consider the Lanham Act and the Patent Act attorney’s fees and the claimed expert fees under the correct standard, free of the errors it identified.
requests for attorney’s fees under § 285 of the Patent Act, (2) the district court did not err by making factual findings not foreclosed by the jury’s verdict on standing, and (3) AIA’s due process rights were not violated.
The Federal Circuit recounted an elaborate scheme perpetrated by plaintiff AIA and the purported sole inventor Mullan to appropriate for themselves inventions from Imperial College (Imperial) in London and the University of South Florida (USF). The jury determined that USF did not knowingly and intentionally waive its ownership rights to the invention and that Hardy was a co-inventor. Based on the jury’s verdict, the district court found AIA lacked standing to assert the U.S. Patent Nos. 5,455,169 and 7,538,258, and entered judgment in favor of Avid. Avid then sought attorneys fees for the case (in which in which twelve witnesses testified and over 200 exhibits were introduced) of $6,508,687.00, and was awarded of $3,943,317.70.
Reducing by more than half non-attorney time of more than 900 hours at an average rate of $227/hour for docketing and updating case files.
Eliminating 300 hours of attorney time ($67,000) for collecting documents, which the Special Master found to be a clerical task.
Cutting by 66% the $470,000 in attorney time for assisting with the preparation of documents.
Cutting by half the $1,098,654.50 billed for attendance at trial, finding that it difficult to understand the contribution of eight lawyers to the trial.
Cutting local counsels fees for merely attending the trial.
All in all, the Special Master reduced the fees requested by $2.9 million. This still resulted in the $3.9 million award affirmed by the Federal Circuit, proving once again that patent litigation is the sport of kings, and that if you have to ask “how much,” you probably can’t afford it.

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