Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/200/480.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 17:05:06+00:00

Document:
Messrs. Maurice D. Rosenberg, Alexander Wolf, and Simon Lyon, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. J. J. Darlington for defendants in error.
Action brought by plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of James F. Looney, deceased against the defendants, for damages for the death of her intestate, alleged to have been caused by defendants. Judgment went against plaintiff in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, which was affirmed by the court of appeals.
After the plaintiff had rested her case the court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendants. The correctness of this ruling is the question in the case.
The declaration consists of four counts. The first three allege the employment of the deceased by each of defendant [200 U.S. 480, 481] companies respectively. In the fourth the allegation is that he was rightfully and lawfully in the discharge of his duties.
Looney was employed as a 'pitman' by the Washington & Great Falls Railroad Company (now the Washington Railway & Electric Company), and was, on the day of his death-July 28, 1901-in one of the 'plow pits' located on the lines of the company, near its terminus at Thirty-sixth street and Prospect avenue northwest.
At the trial there was evidence given by the plaintiff of the arrangement between the defendant companies as to the exchange of cars, and to the relation of their respective employees. On this evidence the parties base opposing contentions, the defendants contending that the conductor and Looney were fellow servants, the plaintiff contending that they were not. Both of the lower courts sustained the contention of the defendants. The court of appeals beside intimated a belief that the testimony on behalf of plaintiff rather tended to show accident than negligence. If this be so, or if the evidence fails to establish whether the death was caused by accident or negligence, the judgment should be affirmed, and it will be unnecessary to decide whether Looney and the conductor were fellow servants. We will assume, for the purposes of the case, that they were not fellow servants.
Another witness testified that he lived on Prospect avenue, and was in front of his house, lighting the fire in his automobile. He did not notice the car before it stopped. While it was standing over the pit he heard an exclamation and a groan, and some one said 'Pull that trolley down!' After the exclamation he looked up and saw the trolley against the wire. He was about 75 feet from the car.
If the trolley was on before the plow was disconnected and removed, the plow would be charged with the full voltage on the line.
A witness who had experience with the construction of electric railway systems, and was familiar with the action of electricity generally, and had experience in superintending the work of disconnecting a plow from an electric car and adjusting the wires to move an overhead system, testified that, in his opinion as an expert, it would be the duty of a conductor to keep the trolley off the wire until he received some signal from the man beneath the car.
(1) It will be observed that the deceased did not meet his death while removing the plow. Of this the testimony leaves no doubt. (2) He received the electric shock while adjusting the leads. It follows from the first proposition that the trolley pole was not in contact with the trolley wire when the plow was removed. The argument of plaintiff assumes the contrary, and, indeed, is based entirely on the assumption that the deceased received his death stroke when removing the plow.
Two questions arise on the second proposition. The leads are insulated except at the ends that go into the connection; they are necessarily uninsulated there in order to take the current. But it was not necessary for the deceased to touch the uninsulated parts in making the connection, and, unless touched, no shock would have been received, even though they had been connected with the current by reason of the trolley being in contact with the wire, unless there was a leak in the [200 U.S. 480, 486] insulation arising from defective construction or wear and tear in use. Granting, therefore, that the conductor was negligent, one of two things was necessary to cause the accident,-a leak in the insulation, or the act of the deceased in touching the uninsulated ends of the leads. Either one or the other was a necessary condition. If the first existed, the defendants may be charged with liability. If the second, they are exonerated. The burden of proof becomes a factor. The plaintiff in the first instance is not required to prove that the deceased was free from contributory negligence; in other words, the burden of proof of contributory negligence is on the defendant. But, on the other hand, plaintiff must establish grounds of liability against the defendant. To hold a master responsible, a servant must show that the appliances and instrumentalities furnished were defective. A defect cannot be inferred from the mere fact of an injury. There must be some substantive proof of the negligence. Knowledge of the defect or some omission of duty in regard to it must be shown.
In Texas P. R. Co. v. Barrett, 166 U.S. 617 , 41 L. ed. 1136, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 707, the plaintiff (defendant in error in this court) was a foreman in charge of a switch engine, and was injured by the explosion of a boiler of another engine. There was evidence tending to prove that the boiler was and had been in a weak and unsafe state by reason of the condition of the stay bolts, and that if a well-known test had been applied the condition of the bolts would have been discovered. The circuit court instructed the jury that the mere fact of the injury received from the explosion would not entitle plaintiff to recover: that, besides the fact of explosion, he must show that the explosion resulted from the failures of the railroad company to exercise ordinary care either in selecting the engine or in keeping it in reasonably safe repair. The court also instructed the jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff throughout the case to show that the boilers and engines that exploded were improper appliances to be used on its railroad by the defendant; that by reason of the particular defects pointed out and in- [200 U.S. 480, 487] sisted on by the plaintiff the boiler exploded and injured him, and the plaintiff was ignorant of the defects, and did not, by his negligence, contribute to his injury. Passing on these instructions, this court said that they laid down the applicable rule with sufficient accuracy, and in substantial conformity with the views of this court expressed in prior cases which were cited.
The declaration does not charge a defect in the leads. It charges the negligence to have been in the failure 'to keep, or cause to be kept, cut off' the electric current while the deceased was in the pit, 'whereby and by reason of said negligence the said intestate was so severely shocked and injured by said electric current that he almost immediately died.' In other words, the cause of death was the negligent act of permitting the trolley pole to come in contact with the trolley wire.
But granting plaintiff is not limited by her declaration, nevertheless she has not satisfied the requirements oflaw in her proof. A plaintiff in the first instance must show negli- [200 U.S. 480, 488] gence on the part of the defendant. Having done this, he need not go farther in those jurisdictions where the burden of proof is on the defendant to show contributory negligence. In other words, if there is no evidence which speaks one way or the other with reference to contributory negligence of the person killed, then it is presumed that there was no such negligence. Thomp. Neg. 401; Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Landrigan, 191 U.S. 461 , 48 L. ed. 262, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U.S. 353 , 41 L. ed. 186, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1104. But the negligence of a defendant cannot be inferred from a presumption of care on the part of the person killed. A presumption in the performance of duty attends the defendant as well as the person killed. It must be overcome by direct evidence. One presumption cannot be built upon another. Douglass v. Mitchell, 35 Pa. 440; Philadelphia City Pass. R. Co. v. Henrice, 92 Pa. 431, 37 Am. Rep. 699; Yarnell v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. 113 Mo. 570, 18 L. R. A. 599, 21 S. W. 1.

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