Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/389/235.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 19:12:30+00:00

Document:
Florida's Unemployment Compensation Law, as applied by the State Industrial Commission's holding that petitioner was disqualified for unemployment compensation solely because she filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, held invalid as violating the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution because it frustrates enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act. Pp. 238-240.
Michael H. Gottesman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Bernard Kleiman, Elliot Bredhoff, George H. Cohen, Jerome Cooper and Neal Rutledge.
Glenn L. Greene, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Stanley Works et al.
Solicitor General Marshall, Robert S. Rifkind, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come filed a memorandum for the National Labor Relations Board, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 160, authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to initiate unfair labor practice proceedings whenever some person charges that another person has committed such practices. The Board cannot start a proceeding without such a charge being filed with it. See, e. g., National Labor Relations Board v. National Licorice Co., 104 F.2d 655 (C. A. 2d Cir.), [389 U.S. 235, 236] modified on other grounds, 309 U.S. 350 ; Local 138, Operating Engineers (Skura), 148 N. L. R. B. 679, 681. The crucial question presented here is whether a State can refuse to pay its unemployment insurance to persons solely because they have preferred unfair labor practice charges against their former employer.
"An individual shall be disqualified for [unemployment] benefits . . . . (4) For any week with respect to which the commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute in [389 U.S. 235, 237] active progress which exists at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed . . . ."
In holding that this Florida law as applied in this case conflicts with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution [389 U.S. 235, 240] we but follow the unbroken rule that has come down through the years.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436, decided in 1819, this Court declared the States devoid of power "to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." In Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 , decided in 1896, this Court declared that a state law cannot stand that "either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation or impairs the efficiency of those agencies of the Federal government to discharge the duties, for the performance of which they were created." Id., at 283. And again in Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542 -543, decided in 1945, this Court struck down a labor regulation saying it stood "`as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. . . .'" Id., at 542.
All of the cases just cited and many more support our invalidation under the Supremacy Clause of the Florida Unemployment Compensation Law as here applied.
[ Footnote 1 ] The Florida Supreme Court seems to have decided that it lacks jurisdiction by appeal to consider per curiam denials of certiorari by the Florida District Court of Appeal. Callendar v. State, 181 So.2d 529. While it is true that a district court of appeal may certify a question "of great public interest" to the Florida Supreme Court, this is done upon the district court of appeal's own motion, and although litigants may file a suggestion that a particular question be certified, such suggestion has been declared to have "no legal effect." See Whitaker v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 131 So.2d 22 (1st D.C. App. Fla. 1961). Thus, it is impossible for us to say that under Florida law petitioner here had any right to call upon the State Supreme Court for review. In these circumstances, we therefore are unable to say that the District Court of Appeal was not the highest court in Florida wherein a decision could be had as required by 28 U.S.C. 1257 (3).
[ Footnote 2 ] Because of our disposition of the case on Supremacy Clause grounds, we need not consider petitioner's alternative argument that such ruling violates her privileges and immunities of United States citizenship in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[ Footnote 3 ] Although 10 (a) of the Act empowers the Board to prevent unfair labor practices, and thus to protect the employees' 7 rights, 10 (b) conditions the exercise of that power on the filing of charges; the Board cannot initiate its own processes.

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