Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180731_0000753.WNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:48:43+00:00

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Plaintiff Billyjo McAllister ("Plaintiff) brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("the Act") seeking review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security that denied his application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Act. (Dkt. 1). The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Dkt. 10; Dkt. 13). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs motion (Dkt. 10) is granted in part, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 13) is denied, and this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings.
On September 17, 2013, Plaintiff applied for DIB with the Social Security Administration ("the SSA"). (Dkt. 7 at 60-65).He alleged disability beginning February 8, 2013, due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), heart problems, scoliosis, compressed discs in his back, a recent heart attack, and high cholesterol. (Id. at 162, 166). On September 17, 2015, Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified before Administrative Law Judge Michael W. Devlin ("the ALJ"). (Id. at 26-49). Plaintiff subsequently filed an application for SSI on November 13, 2015. (Id. at 153-61). On February 1, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Id. at 14-21). On May 11, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review. (Id. at 5-7). Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced this action seeking review of the Commissioner's final decision. (Dkt. 1).
"In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Wagner v. Sec 'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

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