Source: https://www.publiclandsforthepeople.org/ca-suction-dredge-legal-update-10172017/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:53:28+00:00

Document:
As you may recall, the Court has repeatedly delayed resolution of several outstanding motions and issues, most of which were filed more than a year ago. These issues include: (1) the miners’ attacks on the SEIR and 2012 regulations as violating CEQA and the APA; (2) the miners’ “one subject” attack on AB 120 and SB 1018; (3) whether the Court should vacate its prior federal preemption decision in light ofRinehart; and (4) whether the takings claims should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Yesterday, shortly before noon, Judge Ochoa issued a tentative ruling (attached), which appeared to reject the state’s attempt to establish that there can never be a takings case for nonpatented claims, but to deny our “one subject motion”. The tentative ruling seemed to ignore all the CEQA/APA briefing entirely, and it was evident that the Court had not read all of the “one subject” briefs as well. In the tentative ruling, the Judge seemed to think that AB 120 and SB 1018 made no changes in substantive law, and therefore did not violate the “one subject” rule. Worst of all, he seemed convinced that somehow, because water quality permits were not yet available under SB 637, the miners could make no claims at all, because winning the case now would now not get them back in the water.
I traveled down to San Bernardino for the hearing, and after some delay, the Department sought an audience with the Judge in chambers. There we heard about complications in his shoulder surgery, and he confirmed that he had been unaware of the earlier CEQA/APA briefing and had not read all the “one subject” briefs. He also reaffirmed his view that somehow, SB 637 excused any need to resolve all these issues, which the Department resisted to the extent they were seeking guidance on the CEQA/APA issues. As to the taking claim, the Department threatened the Court with further hearings and a long trial if he did not dismiss it. After some discussion, the Judge declared that we might as well argue all the issues, including the CEQA/APA issues. By this time, there was so little time left that he declared we could only have half an hour or so to argue, plus, perhaps, some rebuttal time.
Back in the courtroom, I outlined the history of how AB 120 and SB 1018 were substantive interferences in the consent decree/EIR process, and a perfect example of the sort of special interest legislation the “one subject” rule was invented to stop. And I explained that these cases has been filed long before SB 637 took effect, and that the Judge had resisted our attempt to bring the water quality issues into the case. The Department responded by misrepresenting the law of the “one subject” rule, and, ironically, agreeing with me that it was not entirely satisfactory to declare that the miners lacked standing because of SB 637, because we would just be back again later when the Water Quality Board finally finished its process.
I then turned to CEQA and APA, but by then I had only fifteen minutes left, so I gave a highly abbreviated version of the argument, referring Judge Ochoa to the briefs for further guidance. The Department made the standard argument that the Court must believe anything it said (“a high degree of deference”). The Judge seemed somewhat uninterested in the argument, and asked the Department why the Karuk Tribe had been willing to walk away from the litigation, believing its interests were adequately protected by SB 637. The Department had no answer (later on, the Tribal attorney, listening in, tried offer an answer, but I objected that they were no longer parties, and the Judge did not allow the Tribal attorney to speak).
The Department then argued the takings motion, making some rather spectacular misrepresentations that unpatented mining claims were not property at all, and misrepresenting the cases involved. I had the apprehension, which will hopefully not be proved correct, that the Department’s threat to draw out the takings litigation might be pushing Judge Ochoa away from his tentative ruling in our favor.
In particular, my fear is that it will prove overwhelmingly attractive for the Judge to just string together a series of words that throw out the takings and “one subject” claims, and excuse himself from wrestling with the complex CEQA/APA claims. I closed by begging that if we could not stop the relentless legal and regulatory changes wiping us out, the minimal requirement of justice was that we be compensated when the claims were seized for fish reserves. I found it particularly discouraging when he complimented all of us on the quality of our advocacy, as if he were done with us, and the only remaining recourse was with the Court of Appeal.
A ruling is expected in a couple of months.
Movant: Defendants California Dept. of Fish & Game, et al.
Respondent: Plaintiffs The New 49’ers, Inc., et al.
(a) The use of any vacuum or suction dredge equipment by any person in any river, stream, or lake of this state is prohibited, except as authorized under a permit issued to that person by the department in compliance with the regulations adopted pursuant to Section 5653.9. Before any person uses any vacuum or suction dredge equipment in any river, stream, or lake of this state, that person shall submit an application for a permit for a vacuum or suction dredge to the department, specifying the type and size of equipment to be used and other information as the department may require.
(b) Under the regulations adopted pursuant to Section 5653.9, the department shall designate waters or areas wherein vacuum or suction dredges may be used pursuant to a permit, waters or areas closed to those dredges, the maximum size of those dredges that may be used, and the time of year when those dredges may be used. If the department determines, pursuant to the regulations adopted pursuant to Section 5653.9, that the operation will not be deleterious to fish, it shall issue a permit to the applicant. If any person operates any equipment other than that authorized by the permit or conducts the operation in any waters or area or at any time that is not authorized by the permit, or if any person conducts the operation without securing the permit, that person is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) The department shall issue a permit upon the payment, in the case of a resident, of a base fee of twenty-five dollars ($25), as adjusted under Section 713, when an onsite investigation of the project size is not deemed necessary by the department, and a base fee of one hundred thirty dollars ($130), as adjusted under Section 713, when the department deems that an onsite investigation is necessary. In the case of a nonresident, the base fee shall be one hundred dollars ($100), as adjusted under Section 713, when an onsite investigation is not deemed necessary, and a base fee of two hundred twenty dollars ($220), as adjusted under Section 713, when an onsite investigation is deemed necessary.
(d) It is unlawful to possess a vacuum or suction dredge in areas, or in or within 100 yards of waters, that are closed to the use of vacuum or suction dredges.
(a) The issuance of permits to operate vacuum or suction dredge equipment is a project pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code) and permits may only be issued, and vacuum or suction dredge mining may only occur as authorized by any existing permit, if the department has caused to be prepared, and certified the completion of, an environmental impact report for the project pursuant to the court order and consent judgment entered in the case of Karuk Tribe of California et al. v. California Department of Fish and Game et al., Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG 05211597.
(1) The department has completed the environmental review of its existing suction dredge mining regulations, as ordered by the court in the case of Karuk Tribe of California et al. v. California Department of Fish and Game et al., Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG 05211597.
(2) The department has transmitted for filing with the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 11343 of the Government Code, a certified copy of new regulations adopted, as necessary, pursuant to Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
(3) The new regulations described in paragraph (2) are operative.
(4) The new regulations described in paragraph (2) fully mitigate all identified significant environmental impacts.
(5) A fee structure is in place that will fully cover all costs to the department related to the administration of the program.
(c) (1) To facilitate its compliance with subdivision (b), the department shall consult with other agencies as it determines to be necessary, including, but not limited to, the State Water Resources Control Board, the State Department of Public Health, and the Native American Heritage Commission, and, on or before April 1, 2013, shall prepare and submit to the Legislature a report with recommendations on statutory changes or authorizations that, in the determination of the department, are necessary to develop the suction dredge regulations required by paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), including, but not limited to, recommendations relating to the mitigation of all identified significant environmental impacts and a fee structure that will fully cover all program costs.
(2) The requirement for submitting a report imposed under this subdivision is inoperative on January 1, 2017, pursuant to Section 10231.5 of the Government Code.
(3) The report submitted to the Legislature pursuant to this subdivision shall be submitted in accordance with Section 9795 of the Government Code.
(d) The Legislature finds and declares that this section, as added during the 2009-10 Regular Session, applies solely to vacuum and suction dredging activities conducted for instream mining purposes. This section does not expand or provide new authority for the department to close or regulate suction dredging conducted for regular maintenance of energy or water supply management infrastructure, flood control, or navigational purposes governed by other state or federal law.
(e) This section does not prohibit or restrict nonmotorized recreational mining activities, including panning for gold.
In the interim, while CDFW was preparing and circulating the DSEIR and FSEIR, Plaintiffs filed the various actions that are currently before this Court (Kimble, Karuk II, PLP, The New 49’ers, Walker, and Foley).
On November 16, 2015, Karuk filed a Request for Dismissal of its action. A few days later, Karuk filed a Stipulation and Proposed Order Resolving Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, wherein it stated that Karuk dismissed their action without prejudice due to the enactment of Senate Bill 637, which was signed into law on October 9, 2015, and became effective as of January 1, 2016. Karuk believed that through this new legislation, they had achieved the primary relief sought in this litigation, and thus, decided not to expend their resources on the remainder of this action.
(a) The use of vacuum or suction dredge equipment by a person in a river, stream, or lake of this state is prohibited, except as authorized under a permit issued to that person by the department in compliance with the regulations adopted pursuant to Section 5653.9. Before a person uses  vacuum or suction dredge equipment in a river, stream, or lake of this state, that person shall submit an application to the department for a permit to use the vacuum or suction dredge equipment, specifying the type and size of equipment to be used and other information as the department may require pursuant to regulations adopted by the department to implement this section.
(c) Under the regulations adopted pursuant to Section 5653.9, the department shall designate waters or areas wherein vacuum or suction dredge equipment may be used pursuant to a permit, waters or areas closed to the use of that equipment, the maximum size of the vacuum or suction dredge equipment that may be used, and the time of year when the equipment may be used. If the department determines, pursuant to the regulations adopted pursuant to Section 5653.9, that the use of vacuum or suction dredge equipment does not cause any significant effects to fish and wildlife, it shall issue a permit to the applicant. If a person uses vacuum or suction dredge equipment other than as authorized by a permit  issued by the department consistent with regulations implementing this section , that person is guilty of a misdemeanor.
On May 1, 2014, this Court heard several summary adjudication motions on the issue of federal preemption as it relates to pre-amendment Section 5653, Section 5653.1, and the related CEQA Guidelines. On January 12, 2015, this Court found “as a matter of law and in actual fact, that the State’s extraordinary scheme of requiring permits and then refusing to issue them and/or being unable to issue permits for years, stands “as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”.
In May and June 2015, the parties filed their respective Statement of Issues wherein each set forth what they thought remained of the case. The Karuk Coalition, before their voluntary dismissal, asserted that issues pertaining to CEQA, violations of the F & G Code, and Declaratory Relief remained. As for the Miners (PLP, Kimble, and The New 49’ers), they believed the CEQA and APA issues were technically moot due to this Court’s January 2015 ruling. CDFW believed the CEQA and APA issues remained.
On July 6, 2015, The New 49’ers filed a new Complaint and Petition, as Case Number CIVDS1509427, in order to add new individual plaintiffs Derek D. Eimer, Stephen Jones, David Guidero, Marvin Garry Lampshire II, and Dyton W. Gilliland. After consolidation with the current litigation, a First Amended Complaint and Petition was filed in the new action, wherein The New 49’ers and the new individual Plaintiffs alleged causes of action for Federal Preemption and violations of the One Subject Rule.
On November 10, 2015, Plaintiffs/Petitioners Eimer, Jones, Guidero, Lampshire, and Gilliland filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, on the grounds that Assembly Bill 120 and Senate Bill 1018 embrace more than one subject, and thus violate Article IV, § 9 of the California Constitution. The remaining Plaintiffs – Kimble, PLP, and The New 49’ers – concurrently sought adjudication of the remaining CEQA and APA issues in the Writ Petition, pursuant to Public Resources Code sections 21168 and 21168.5, and Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5. Plaintiffs sought an order setting aside the FSEIR as void, or alternatively, setting aside the 2012 regulations as void, and reinstating the 1994 regulations until such time as CDFW has lawfully promulgated further regulations. However, this Court stayed the action pending the ruling by the California Supreme Court on People v. Rinehart.
On August 22, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its Rinehart decision wherein it reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal. Since this Court’s January 2015 MSA/MSJ ruling rested largely on the appellate court’s then-published opinion, the reversal by the Supreme Court means that the MSA/MSJ ruling has to be vacated. Accordingly, on November 14, 2016, this Court lifted the stay, and set a hearing regarding the effect of the Rinehart decision on the issues in the current litigation.
On May 26, 2017, CDFW filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as a supporting brief on the impact of the Rinehart decision. The Miners have responded, and this matter is now before the Court.
CDFW notes that the defendant/appellant in the Rinehart case, Mr. Brandon Rinehart, has filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court challenging the California Supreme Court’s decision. That petition is apparently still pending, and a decision on the petition will likely not be handed down until the upcoming term. However, on May 15, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court invited the Acting Solicitor General to file a brief discussing the views of the United States on the issues. CDFW notes that the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in the California Supreme Court case wherein a ruling against preemption was advised.
The Miners do not mention this pending cert petition in their brief, and neither party suggests that this matter should be stayed pending a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court as to whether it will hear the case in their papers. This issue was discussed at the last hearing briefly and the Court decided to move forward since both sides have fully briefed the issues arising out of the California Supreme Court’s Rinehart ruling.
The Court of Appeal reversed, and agreed with Rinehart that “federal mining law should be interpreted as preempting any state law that unduly hampers mining on federal land.” (Rinehart, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 659.) In addition, the Court of Appeal concluded Rinehart had set forth a colorable argument that: (1) the state regulatory scheme amounted to a de facto ban on suction dredging; and (2) the ban effectively rendered mining “‘commercially impracticable.’” (Id., quoting California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co. (1987) 480 U.S. 572, 587, 107 S.Ct. 1419, 94 L.Ed.2d 577 (Granite Rock).) Since the determination of these points rested on disputed issues of fact, and the trial court had refused to admit evidence pertaining to these issues, the Court of Appeal remanded for further proceedings. The State of California then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.
interfere by asserting its own property rights.
Notably, the Court agreed with Rinehart’s assertion that the 1872 law conferred specific property rights on him and other miners. “Rinehart has an interest in land, a real property right to possess the area of his claim for particular purposes.” (Rinehart, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 667, citing to Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kruchnic (1930) 280 U.S. 306, 316-317, 50 S.Ct. 103, 74 L.Ed. 445, and Cole v. Ralph (1920) 252 U.S. 286, 295, 40 S.Ct. 321, 64 L.Ed. 567.) However, pursuant to the legislative history of the law, the Court reiterated that this grant of a real property interest does not usually carry with it immunity from regulation, or a guarantee that the state’s police power will be inoperative with regard to the property interest simply because the source of the real property is federal. (Id.) The Court supported this interpretation of the 1872 law by pointing to the fact that in 1884, after the application of California law resulted in a de facto ban placed on a major industrial mining method, Congress expressly approved and helped enforce that ban. (Id., citing to People v. Gold Run D. & M. Co. (1884) 66 Cal. 138, and North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1898) 88 F. 664.) As a result, the Court found that Congress did not intend the 1872 Mining Law to preempt state laws regarding the use of particular mining methods.
In the wake of the Rinehart ruling, CDFW brings a motion entitled “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.” According to CDFW, the Rinehart decision has three direct consequences on what remains of these coordinated cases: (1) a reversal by this court on its earlier MSJ/MSA ruling on preemption, (2) the lack of merit for some of the Miners’ arguments regarding their record-based claims, and (3) the Miners’ takings claims lack merit as a matter of law.
Regarding the second issue, CDFW contends the Miners’ three record-based claims must fail for reasons related to the preemption issue: (a) 30 U.S.C. § 612(b) does not apply to states, and therefore, cannot support the Miners’ argument that CDFW’s discussion of alternatives is flawed; (b) since sections 5653 and 5653.1 are not preempted, then it cannot be argued that CDFW did not give due consideration to federal law or that federal mining law preempts these 2012 regulations; and (c) since sections 5653 and 5653.1 are not preempted, it cannot be argued that CDFW did not have to complete an environmental review pursuant to the mandate in those statutes.
According to CDFW, the Miners’ property interest is not in real property, but rather, in their unpatented mining claims – claims which are a unique form of property that represent a possessory interest in the land, but not title to the land. (See, Best v. Humboldt Placer Min. Co. (1963) 371 U.S. 334, 335-336.) CDFW notes that title to the land is still held by the federal government, but that the Miners’ property interests derive from 30 U.S.C. § 22 – a statute which provides for rights to exploration, occupation, and purchase of “valuable mineral deposits.” However, CDFW contends that these rights are subject to “regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.” (30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 26.) In pointing to this language, CDFW argues that the “regulations prescribed by law” includes state laws, and therefore, the Miners’ must comply with state law in asserting their respective mining claims – including the suction dredge mining laws.
CDFW notes that in this litigation, the Miners claim that compliance with sections 5653 and 5653.1 eliminates “all economically beneficial or productive use” of their mining claims. However, CDFW argues that compliance with the state law is part of the marketability test and prudent person test for determining whether there is a “valuable mineral deposit” on the land, and whether the mining claim is valid. According to CDFW, under the Miners’ own theory of the case, they do not have any property interests in the land because their compliance with sections 5653 and 5653.1 renders their mining claims invalid.
In opposition, the Miners contend that CDFW’s argument runs afoul of the maxim that a “State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all.” (Hughes v. Washington (1967) 389 U.S. 290, 296-297 (Stewart, J., concurring).) According to the Miners, until CDFW instituted the ban on suction dredging, owners of unpatented mining claims reasonably expected they could extract the valuable minerals on the land through motorized operations mining – a method which supported high prices for their valuable claims.
The Miners argue that since CDFW does not admit it destroyed all economically beneficial uses of their mining claims – an admission which would make CDFW liable per se under the holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, then CDFW will likely rely on the multi-factor test in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (1978) 438 U.S. 104. However, according to the Miners, the Penn Central analysis is not proper upon judgment on the pleadings it is a factual inquiry designed to allow for examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances. Moreover, the Miners note that the second factor of the Penn Central test – i.e., a consideration of the “extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” – emphasizes the constitutional protection against retroactive destruction of property rights after the imposition of the challenged regulation. The Miners argue they had legitimate investment-backed expectations with regards to their mining claims, and those expectations were destroyed by arbitrary action by the State.
The Miners further contend all California property owners hold their property “under regulations prescribed by law,” and that the purpose of the takings law is to compensate the property holder when the state exercises its regulatory power to destroy the value of certain private property for an asserted public benefit. According to the Miners, CDFW misconstrues takings law in arguing that only persons with valid property interests at the time of taking are entitled to compensation. Instead, the Miners argue that courts have held that after discovery of a valuable mineral deposit upon a properly located unpatented mining claim, the locater has a property right “in the full sense” – a right which is within the protection of the Constitution’s prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
Furthermore, the Miners contend CDFW misconstrues federal mining law as well. According to the Miners, 30 U.S.C. § 22 does not make any reference to state law, but rather, in conjunction with other provisions, refers to particular state rules for obtaining and holding title to a mining claim. In addition, the Miners argue that no state, including California, has attempted to declare that the mining claims “shall be void” based on the degree of compliance with the regulations governing mining claims. The Miners assert that once ownership of a mining claim is perfected, it cannot be destroyed by the state regulation of mining operations. Moreover, the Miners contend only the federal government has standing to initiate validity contests with regards to mining claims. Nevertheless, the Miners argue all that is required in this procedural posture is that they demonstrate they had valuable property until it was taken by CDFW.
Judgment on the Pleadings. As noted above, CDFW purports to present this motion as a judgment on the pleadings. A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made by any party to the action after the time to demurrer has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., §438(b)(1) and (f); Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994)28 Cal.App.4th 540, 548.) Essentially a motion for judgment on the pleading performs the same function as a general demurrer, and thus attacks only the defects disclosed on the face of the pleading or by matters that are judicially noticed. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998)67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) As such, the judgment on the pleading admits the truth of all material facts.
Here, in the current litigation, therefore, this motion only presents the question of whether the Miners have stated sufficient facts to constitute their causes of action.
Reoforce and Application of Penn Central Factors. The recent case of Reoforce, Inc. v. United States (Fed. Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 1249, is instructive. In Reoforce, the owners of unpatented mining claims filed suit alleging that the federal Department of Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) effected a regulatory taking of their mining claims when BLM entered into a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) regarding the potential transfer to California of federal land encompassing the mining claims until the date that BLM entered a settlement agreement which granted the owners mining rights on three mining claims. The case also was based on the 1972 Mining Law.
CDFW Motion. As noted above, after the extensive procedurally history of this matter, CDFW has decided to make its post-Rinehart arguments under the guise of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In this procedural posture, CDFW must demonstrate that the Miners have not alleged sufficient facts to constitute their causes of action. However, in their Amended Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandate, filed March 13, 2013, the Miners set fort the following allegations: (1) the only practicable method of removing present underwater gold deposits is through suction dredge mining [FAC, ¶¶21, 53]; (2) for many years, CDFW issued permits for suction dredging under section 5653 et seq. [FAC, ¶23]; (3) CDFW has recently instituted statutory moratoriums and a new set of suction dredging regulations which have banned suction dredge mining in California [FAC, ¶¶24, 25]; (4) the mining claims are located, in whole or in part, in areas identified as “Closed Areas” where suction dredge mining is prohibited under the new regulations [FAC, ¶¶32, 33]; (5) no suction dredge permits can be issued because CDFW cannot certified the requisite conditions under the law [FAC, ¶35]; (6) the regulations will not permit suction dredge mining on the mining claims and/or will operate to forbid suction dredge mining for those mining claimants who are not able to obtain one of the 1500 annual permits [FAC, ¶36]; (7) the mining claims are private property protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution [FAC, ¶52]; (8) the mining claims are not valuable for any other purpose other than mining, and the Miners’ property rights are limited to prospecting, mining, or processing operations related to gold mining [FAC, ¶ 54]; (9) the Miners are denied all economically beneficial or productive use of their respective mining claims due to the regulations [FAC, ¶ 55]; and (10) the Miners have not received any compensation for the taking of their mining claims by CDFW [FAC, ¶¶ 56, 57].
CDFW has not demonstrated that these allegations are not sufficient to state the Miners’ takings cause of action. Indeed, CDFW seems to primarily rest its argument on the Supreme Court’s Rinehart decision. However, as discussed thoroughly above, while the Rinehart decision clearly stated that sections 5653 and 5653.1 are not federally preempted, the opinion does not address the question of whether the State’s statutory scheme amounted to a regulatory taking of the Miners’ mining claims. Moreover, as noted in the recent Reoforce opinion, whether a temporary moratorium amounts to a taking under the Fifth Amendment is a question that must be viewed through a Penn Central analysis – an analysis which is not amenable to the procedural restrictions of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
As for whether the mining claims are “valuable,” CDFW also seems to rest its analysis on whether the claimant has complied with all state and federal laws. However, as alleged in the operative pleading, suction dredging permits were issued for several years under the previous statutory scheme, and were only prohibited after the statutes were amended in 2009. As a result, to the extent the mining claims at issue were instituted prior to 2009, CDFW cannot claim ex post facto that the 2009 regulations rendered those mining claims invalid because they were no longer “valuable” – i.e., profitable.
CDFW has not met its burden with regards to this motion. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to the takings cause of action.
Authorizes the Water Board or a regional board to protect water quality by adopting waste discharge requirements that address the water quality impacts of mercury loading, methylmercury formation, bioaccumulation of mercury in aquatic organisms, and resuspension of metals due to suction dredging; specifying conditions or areas where the discharge of waste or other adverse impacts on the beneficial uses of the waters of the state from suction dredge mining is prohibited; and prohibiting any particular methods of suction dredge mining that exceeds water quality objectives or unreasonably impacts beneficial uses.
Moreover, as with the takings cause of action, the remaining issues regarding the CEQA and APA claims, the effect of Rinehart on these causes of action, and the effect of the amended statutes cannot be addressed in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. As discussed above, contrary to the position seemingly taken by CDFW, the Rinehart decision, though consequential on the issue of preemption, did not address issues dispositive to the CEQA and APA claims such that they should be dismissed on the pleadings. Accordingly, the motion is denied as to the CEQA and APA causes of action.
The Court denies the Department of Fish and Wildlife’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding the Takings Cause of Action, on the ground that CDFW has not met its burden of demonstrating that the cause of action is not adequately alleged, or that the underlying mining claims are invalid.
The Court denies the Department of Fish and Wildlife’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding the CEQA and APA causes of action, on the ground that CDFW has not met its burden of demonstrating that these causes of action are not adequately alleged.
The Court grants the Department of Fish and Wildlife’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to the extent it seeks an order vacating this court’s earlier MSJ/MSA ruling on the issue of preemption due to the Rinehart decision in effect denying the MSJ/MSA brought by Plaintiffs.
On July 6, 2015, Plaintiffs/Petitioners The New 49’ers, Inc., Derek D. Eimer, Stephen Jones, David Guidero, Marvin Lampshire II, and Dyton Gilliland (collectively, “Eimer Plaintiffs”) filed a putative class action Complaint and Petition, Case No. CIVDS 1509427, against Defendants/Respondents California Department of Fish & Wildlife, and Charlton H. Bonham, in his capacity as Director of the Department (collectively, “CDFW”). In the Complaint and Petition, the Eimer Plaintiffs alleged causes of action for Violation of the One Subject Rule, and Federal Preemption. Shortly thereafter, the Eimer litigation was coordinated with the ongoing Suction Dredge Mining Cases, JCPDS 4720.
On August 24, 2015, the Eimer Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint and Petition, wherein they set forth class action allegations and a single cause of action for Violation of the One Subject Rule. The Eimer Plaintiffs allege that the legislative predicate to Fish & Game Code sections 5653 and 5653.1 – Senate Bill No. 1018 (“SB 1018”) and Assembly Bill No. 120 (“AB 120”) – are unconstitutional because they violate Article IV, § 9 of the California Constitution, in that these bills embrace more than one subject. As a result, the Eimer Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandate prohibiting and enjoining CDFW from enforcing SB 1018 and AB 120, and compelling CDFW to resume issuing permits for suction dredge mining. In addition, the Eimer Plaintiffs seek to restrain and enjoin CDFW from citing, arresting, harassing, seizing the equipment of, or otherwise taking any action against those who are suction dredge mining without a permit, but otherwise in compliance with the 2012 regulations.
On November 10, 2015, the Eimer Plaintiffs filed the current Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Keith Walker has filed a joinder in support. In response, CDFW has filed a singular brief opposing the summary judgment motion, and supporting its cross-motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. To date, the Eimer Plaintiffs have not replied.
On January 6, 2016, CDFW filed a combined brief entitled, “Defendants’ Brief on Single Subject Claims in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.” CDFW also filed the requisite Notice of Motion and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as an opposing separate statement with regards to the summary judgment motion, and a combined Request for Judicial Notice for both its opposition to the MSJ and its cross-motion.
Exhibit 5 – Senate Bill No. 637, Chapter 680, filed with Secretary of State October 9, 2015.
California Evidence Code section 452(c) states that judicial notice may be taken of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.” Section 453 provides that judicial notice shall be taken of any matter specified in Section 452 if requested, if each adverse party is given sufficient notice of the request, and if the court is given sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.
The Eimer Plaintiffs contend these are official documents and/or memorialize official acts taken by various government entities. Pursuant to the discussion above, the request is granted as to Exhibits 1 through 5.
Exhibit B – Senate Bill 637 (Stat. 2015, ch. 680), as enrolled, which was signed by the Governor on October 9, 2015.
Pursuant to the above, CDFW’s request is granted in its entirety.
The Eimer Plaintiffs submitted four material facts in their Separate Statement (“UFs”). In opposition, CDFW disputed the facts proffered by the Eimer Plaintiffs, but did not submit any additional material facts.
CDFW disputes, and states that the Eimer Plaintiffs’ facts are vague and not supported by the cited evidence. CDFW further disputes, and states that since the explicit and single subject of both AB 120 and SB 1018 is “public resources”, suction dredge mining, along with the bills’ other provisions, is within that subject.
The Eimer Plaintiffs contend that AB 120 and SB 1018 are unconstitutional, and therefore, Section 5653.1 cannot continue to operate as a barrier to the issuance of suction dredge mining permits by CDFW. According to the Eimer Plaintiffs, AB 120 and SB 1018 violated Article IV, § 9 of the California Constitution, in that these two bills amended several sections of the California Codes on a variety of subjects unrelated to suction dredge mining. [RJN, Exh. 2 at p. 18; RJN, Exh. 3 at p. 23.] Moreover, the Eimer Plaintiffs assert that AB 120 and SB 1018 cobbled together unrelated subjects so that the unpalatable requirements of the bills – i.e., those provisions which acted as a de facto prohibition on suction dredge mining – could secure passage. The Eimer Plaintiffs argue that such an action by the Legislature is unconstitutional because all provisions of a bill must be related and have a common purpose. In support, they point to Homan v. Gomez (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 597, and Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 42 Cal.3d 1078.
In opposition, CDFW contends both AB 120 and SB 1018 are budget trailer bills – not budget bills – related to public resources. According to CDFW, as long as the bills’ provisions are reasonably germane to a common theme, purpose, or subject, then they do not violate the single-subject rule contained in Article IV, § 9. CDFW argues that the subject of the challenged laws is “public resources”, and that this topic is not so broad as to violate the single-subject rule.
Here, in the current litigation, CDFW contends there is a significant distinction between the budget bill and what are known as “budget trailer bills”. According to CDFW, trailer bills are not part of the related budget act, and over the years, the Legislature has passed an increasing number of budget trailer bills with topics ranging from state finance to public safety to taxation. CDFW contends that in this instance, AB 120 and SB 1018 were budget trailer bills related to “public resources” – a category that is not too broad under the holding of City of Cerritos v. State (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1020. CDFW asserts that as it relates to “public resources”, the terms of a moratorium on suction dredge mining and the related environmental review are “reasonably germane”.
Existing law designates the issuance by the Department of Fish and Game of permits to operate vacuum or suction dredge equipment to be a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and suspends the issuance of permits, and mining pursuant to a permit, until the department has completed an environmental impact report for the project as ordered by the court in a specified court action. Existing law prohibits the use of any vacuum or suction dredge equipment in any river, stream, or lake for instream mining purposes, until the Director of Fish and Game certifies to the Secretary of State that (a) the department has completed the environmental review of its existing vacuum or suction dredge equipment regulations as ordered by the court, (b) the department has transmitted for filing with the Secretary of State a certified copy of new regulations, as necessary, and (c) the new regulations are operative. [¶] This bill would modify that moratorium to prohibit the use of vacuum or suction dredge equipment until June 30, 2016, or until the director’s certification to the secretary as described above, whichever is earlier. The bill would additionally require the director to certify that the new regulations fully mitigate all identified significant environmental impacts and that a fee structure is in place that will fully cover all costs to the department related to the administration of the program.
Contrary to the argument of the Eimer Plaintiffs, this provision did not substantively change the obligations of CDFW regarding the suction dredge mining permit program under section 5653.1. Instead, it primarily addressed the extension of the already-existing moratorium, provided a specific sunset clause for the expiration of the moratorium, and reiterated CDFW’s obligations to certify new regulations that fully mitigated all significant environmental impacts of the program, and institute a fee structure to cover the administrative costs.
The bill would, in order to facilitate the making of that certification, require the department to consult with other agencies as it determines to be necessary, and, on or before April 1, 2013, prepare and submit to the Legislature a report with recommendations on statutory changes or authorizations necessary to develop the required suction dredge regulations, including, but not limited to, recommendations relating to the mitigation of all identified significant environmental impacts and a fee structure that will fully cover all program costs.
Accordingly, the Eimer Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that as a matter of law, AB 120 and SB 1018 violated the single-subject rule embodied in Article IV, § 9, and thus, they have not met their burden on this issue. The MSJ is denied and AB 120 and SB 1018 are found to be constitutional under California Constitution Article IV, § 9.
Accordingly, the MSJ of the Eimer Plaintiffs is denied, and AB 120 and SB 1018 are found to be constitutional under California Constitution Article IV, § 9.
Applicable Law- See discussion on pg. 23 re the law on Judgment on the Pleadings.
As noted above, CDFW termed this an “Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and … Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.” In this instance, it appears that CDFW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings rests on the recent passage of Senate Bill 637, which amended Section 5653 as of January 1, 2016. As discussed above, the newly-enacted amendments to Section 5653 now require suction dredge mining permit applications to include a water quality permit, or letter of waiver, under the Federal Clean Water Act and the state water quality law. According to CDFW, none of the Eimer Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have applied for such a permit, and they cannot do so because the State Water Resources Control Board has previously indicated that it will take a few years to issue these permits. [See, Haven Decl. in Support of Defs. Opp. to Mtn. for Prelim. Inj. in Kimble v. Harris, filed May 1, 2013 (CIVDS 1012922).] As a result, CDFW contends that even if the Eimer Plaintiffs were to prevail on their summary judgment motion, they still would not be able to return to suction dredge mining at this time. The Court finds this argument persuasive.
The Court grants CDFW’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings without leave to amend, as the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the defect can be cured by amendment.
Defendant DFW to prepare Order and Judgment as necessary.
 Per Stipulation and Order filed January 13, 2014, Karuk Tribe of California, et al. v. Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game, et al., Case No. RG5211597, Alameda County, filed May 6, 2005 (“Karuk I”) no longer needs to be listed in the caption of the coordinated cases since the continuing jurisdiction of the Court to enforce the December 20, 2006 Consent Order in Karuk I is terminated and nothing remains to be resolved in the case.
Per Stipulation and Order, Hillman, et al. v. Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game, et al., Case No. RG09434444, Alameda County, filed February 5, 2009 (“Hillman”) was dismissed per Judgment filed January 13, 2014.
 The California Department of Fish & Game (CDFG) changed its name to California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) on January 1, 2013.
 As discussed further below, Section 5653 was amended as of January 1, 2016.
 As noted above, per Stipulation and Order filed January 13, 2014, Karuk I was dismissed because the continuing jurisdiction of the Alameda Superior Court to enforce the December 2006 Consent Order was terminated, and nothing remained to be resolved in the case.
 Hillman, et al. v. Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game, et al., Case No. RG0943444, Alameda Superior Court, filed February 5, 2009. The Hillman case was dismissed pursuant to a Judgment entered on January 13, 2014.
 However, CDFW has not certified completion of all five items required by Section 5653.1(b), and the moratorium remains in effect.
 In the Stipulation and Order, Karuk and CDFW agreed that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 under a catalyst theory, CDFW will pay Karuk’s counsel $350,000.00 in attorneys’ fees. The Court signed this Order on November 19, 2015.
 The changes are indicated by bold type.
 As counsel knows, this Court’s ruling relied heavily on the appellate decision in People v. Rinehart (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 419. However, the case was depublished shortly after this Court’s ruling, and Rinehart was reviewed by the California Supreme Court, Case No. S222620. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision, as will be discussed in detail infra.
 In Lucas, the landowner paid $975,000 for two residential beachfront lots on which he intended to build single-family homes. At the time he acquired the lots, there was no legal restraint on the right to build. However, two years later, South Carolina enacted a statute imposing setback requirements that effectively prevented the owner from erecting any permanent habitable structure on the lots. The owner argued that the effect of the statute was to deprive the property of all value, and that this deprivation entitled him to compensation. The trial court agreed with the owner, and awarded compensation. The state supreme court reversed, and ruled that when a regulation regarding the use of property is designed to prevent serious public harm, no compensation is due.
After providing two illustrations of the nuisance exception, the Supreme Court then conceded that regulatory action could have the effect of eliminating the land’s only economically productive use, and stated that no compensation would be required because the regulation did not prevent a productive use that was previously permissible under property and nuisance principles. Notably, the Lucas Court did not determine that the state law deprived the owner of all beneficially economic use of his lots. Instead, both the Supreme Court and the trial court assumed that the lots were rendered valueless by the regulation.
 The parties purportedly stipulated to shorten the notice time so that CDFW’s cross-motion could be heard concurrently with the summary judgment motion.
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