Source: https://www.ipmvs.com/filewrapper/second-circuit-copyright-registration-is-a-jurisdictional-requirement
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:56:05+00:00

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Last week, the Second Circuit issued a decision addressing whether the registration requirement for bringing a copyright action was jurisdictional or merely a "claim processing" rule. The decision turned on whether the Supreme Court's decision in Eberhart v. United States reduced the class of "jurisdictional" statutes such that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) should be considered a "claim processing" rule. The majority, following the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, held that the requirement was jurisdictional, and that all members of the class had to have registered their works for the district court to have jurisdiction. The dissent—focusing instead on statutory language, legislative history, jurisdictional exceptions, and exceptions for foreign works—argued that the requirement was merely a claim processing rule.
Update (12/4): This holding arguably conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (opinion here, amended opinion released yesterday here). In footnote 1 of that opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that as long as the plaintiff has at least one registered copyright, a district court had jurisdiction to enjoin infringement of the plaintiff's registered and unregistered copyrights, because "section 411 does not limit the remedies a court can grant." While the case was also factually distinguished by the Second Circuit in this case, the nature of the § 411 registration requirement is one that would benefit from clarity, either from Congress or the Supreme Court.
More on In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litig. after the jump.
This case is a bit of a judicial aftershock stemming from the Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times Co. v. Tasini (holding that publishers need specific authorization to electronically publish works and can not rely on permission to use the works in print publications) and Eberhart v. United States (urging courts to more carefully distinguish between true jurisdictional bars and "claim processing" rules that may be waived).
The case is a consolidation of four previous class actions stemming from freelance writers who contracted with publishers regarding print media, but retained the copyrights. The works were eventually published online and were also indexed and stored by electronic database services. The writers brought suit for violation of their copyright as 1) the original publishers did not contract for the electronic publication rights, and 2) the licenses obtained from the publishers by the database services were not valid as the publishers did not have the right to grant them.
The settlement was presented to the court for class certification and settlement approval. While objections to the proposed settlement were filed by various Category C plaintiffs, the court approved the settlement. The objectors appealed. On appeal, The Category C claimants then appealed claiming that the settlement was inadequate and unfair because "they were paid little and singled out for reduction if the total claims exceeded $18 million." The defendants responded that the Category C claimants "were adequately represented and treated fairly because their claims were essentially worthless" due to the fact that they had not registered their copyrights. The appeals court raised the jurisdictional issue sua sponte, and vacated and remanded after finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to certify the class and approve the settlement.
The majority first determined that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the claims for the unregistered works by holding that § 411(a)'s requirement of registration was jurisdictional. The majority first determined that the precedent of the circuit precluded a holding otherwise as the Second Circuit, as well as several other circuits, had previously upheld dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to meet § 411(a). Second, the majority determined that Eberhart did not cast doubt on this precedent as Eberhart dealt with "a time limit for moving in a case that undoubtedly already falls within the district majority's subject matter jurisdiction" while "section 411(a) creates a statutory condition precedent to the suit itself." Given these considerations, the majority held that there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.

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