Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/compensatory-damages/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:19:36+00:00

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I get too many phone calls from students in higher education, particularly graduate schools, where the college or professional school seems to not have a clue about their ADA compliance obligations. So, I always list this blog entry, which discusses an ADA compliance checklist for places of higher education.
A critical principle with the ADA is that the ADA is a duty that cannot be delegated as seen here. But, be sure to read this blog entry as well as it’s complicated.
One of the greatest hits is just what is the statute of limitations for ADA claims. However, an even more important question perhaps, is when does that statute of limitations begin to run, which we discussed just last week in this blog entry.
10. Is causation under the ADA “but for,” or something else? This blog entry discusses that question. (907 views and sixth place last year).
9. Whether public colleges and public university are immune from suit on the grounds of sovereign immunity is discussed here. (1125 views and eighth place last year).
8. How does the ADA deal with temporary disabilities is discussed in this blog entry. (1246 views and third place last year).
7. In order to file suit under title I of the ADA, one has to exhaust administrative remedies. This blog entry discusses what that means. (1351 views and 10th place last year).
6. Just what is the difference between a service dog and a therapy dog? See this blog entry. I should note that the issue of service dogs is something you will find numerous blog entries on. (1430 views and fifth place last year).
5. Suing a state court system for violations of the ADA is extremely difficult, but it can be done as discussed here. (1496 views and seventh place last year).
4. July 2016 blog entry discussing ADA and Related Cases at the Supreme Court and What is Next. (2108 views and new this year).
3. What do you have to show in order to get compensatory damages under title II of the ADA is discussed in this blog entry. (2144 views and second place last year).
2. Just what is the applicable statute of limitations for ADA claims is discussed in this blog entry. (2774 views and fourth place last year).
It is not even close for the second year in a row. This particular blog entry, which discusses whether you can get compensatory and punitive damages in ADA retaliation cases, has more than 1.5 times the views of the second-place finisher coming in at 4,406 views.
Merry Christmas, Happy Hannukah, Happy Holidays, and Happy New Year to all!
Two years ago, I discussed in this blog entry the issue of whether ADA claims survive. In that case, the court looked to local law to decide whether the ADA claim survived. Today’s case, Guenther v. Griffin C Inc., goes one further by holding that it isn’t local law that decides whether claims for compensatory damages under the ADA survive, rather it is a uniform federal rule that applies. Before proceeding further, keep in mind that my prior blog entry on survivability was a title III case, while this blog entry concerns a title I case. As is typical, my blog entry is divided into categories: facts; issue, court’s reasoning, and takeaways. The reader is free to read any or all of the categories.
The facts are pretty straightforward. Plaintiff oversaw construction projects across Arkansas and Texas for four years for Griffin Construction. In the spring of 2012, he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. He requested and received roughly 3 weeks of leave from work to receive treatment and returned to work when it appeared the treatment was successful. In 2013, plaintiff learned that the cancer had spread throughout his body. He notified his employer that he would need to take another three weeks of leave to undergo radiation therapy. Griffin Construction then fired him and told him he could reapply for any openings in the future if he wished. Despite promises they made to the contrary, Griffin Construction also immediately canceled his insurance policies. He filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. From filing to the time the EEOC reached its conclusion that reasonable cause existed, 20 months transpired, and plaintiff had died 12 months previously. Accordingly, the special administrator of his estate filed suit under title I of the ADA and the defendant responded by claiming that the plaintiff’s claim did not survive his death. The District Court bought that argument after applying Arkansas law, and the plaintiff appealed.
Regardless of State Law, Does a Claim for Compensatory Damages under the ADA Survive a Plaintiff’s Death?
Whether a federal claim survives is a question of federal law.
Congress did not supply any answer to how courts should treat survivability of ADA claims and there is no general survival statute for federal question cases.
Survival questions are governed by federal common law when there is no expression of contrary intent from Congress. However, the devil is in the details. That is, sometimes it is best to incorporate state law, while at other times, a uniform rule is best.
State law should not be incorporated where doing so frustrates specific objectives of the federal program. That is, federal courts have to be vigilant in order to ensure that application of state law poses no significant threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest.
1983 actions and the approach they take to survivability doesn’t apply to ADA because in §1983 matters Congress clearly expressed a preference for state law. Further, the Supreme Court case holding as such clearly stated that their holding would have no independent adverse effect on the policies underlying §1983, which is not the case with the ADA if the Eighth Circuit held similarly.
Abatement of compensatory ADA claims pose a special threat to enforcement because the very nature of the ADA makes it more likely than would be typically the case for an aggrieved party to die before the case is completed given the health issues which bring a person with a disability under the statute’s protection. That is, ADA claims specifically involve plaintiff with disabilities alleging they were discriminated against because of their disability. The ADA was specifically passed to eradicate discrimination against persons with disabilities, some of whom may be targeted precisely because of his or her poor health. Following state law to allow claims to abate when the aggrieved party dies gets in the way of this broad remedial purpose. In a footnote, the court notes that this is not a fanciful situation. With respect to filing a title I claim, a plaintiff has to first exhaust the administrative process. In this case, the exhaustion took two years. Further, it is quite conceivable that defendants may prolong litigation with the hope that the claim would abate. This type of thinking is contrary to the overall purpose of the ADA.
State law is not suited to fill gaps in federal law where the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards.
The ADA embodied Congress’s attempt to create a comprehensive national mandate with the federal government having a central role in enforcing consistent standards. For example, in Clackamas, which we discussed in this blog entry, the United States Supreme Court created a uniform definition for an employee under the ADA.
In many states, such as Iowa for example, the plaintiff’s claim would have survived.
Both Congress’s call for a national mandate with consistent standards and the desire to affect evenhanded application of the ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions weigh in favor of a uniform federal rule.
There is a critical difference between a statute of limitations and a survivorship statute. With respect to statute of limitations, they do not entirely bar a diligent plaintiff. On the other hand, a survivorship statute is an absolute barrier to a plaintiff and to his or her estate who does everything he or she can to assert his or her rights. Further, in the statute of limitations situation, there is an element of control by the plaintiff, but that is not the case with respect to survivorship matters.
Federal courts have historically applied a well-established uniform rule to address survivorship.
It may be inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal law.
With respect to the ADA, it is federal law and not state law that is the dominant source of disability antidiscrimination law. To have a uniform rule would not require fashioning an entire body of law out of nothing. Further, allowing claims to survive would not upset the employer-employee balance struck by state laws because federal law and many state laws already prohibit discrimination.
The court takes no view on whether a claim for punitive damages survives, especially since it is traditional federal common law that penal claims abate on death.
The court also took no position whether a claim under any other federal scheme warranty uniform rule of survivorship.
Courts continue to use “because of,” language and not “on the basis of,” language when it comes to referring to causation in title I of the ADA matters. As we have discussed numerous times previously, such as here, the two standards are not the same.
Despite the difference in standard for getting compensatory damages under title II of the ADA, this court’s reasoning could have equal application to survival of compensatory damages claims arising under title II of the ADA.
It is a bit more complicated with respect to title III claims, since the only relief a person can get is injunctive relief and attorneys fees. Even so, if you are a plaintiff and the survival statute of a state would abate a title III claim, it would still be worth using this case to see if that statute could not be circumvented.
If on the defense side on a title II or title III matter in this case comes up, it would be worthwhile to argue that neither of those titles contain an exhaustion requirement. With respect to title II it is even possible, as discussed here, that a plaintiff may not even be able to go DOJ for redress in the first place.
Since I am in the Atlanta area, Go Falcons!
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a),(b) prohibit retaliation and interference, coercion, or intimidation. This particular section is very broad indeed and reaches even those situations where the conduct does not meet the materially adverse standard required for retaliation. EEOC gives specific examples as to what might constitute interference including: coercing an individual to relinquish or foregoing an accommodation to which he or she is otherwise entitled; intimidating an applicant from requesting an accommodation for the application process by indicating that such a request will result in the applicant not being hired; threatening an employee with loss of employment or other adverse treatment if he does not voluntarily submit to a medical examination or inquiry that is otherwise prohibited under the statute; issuing a policy or requirement purporting to limit an employee’s right to invoke ADA protections; interfering with the former employee’s right to file an ADA lawsuit against the former employer by stating that a negative job reference will be given to prospective employers of the suit is filed; and subjecting the employee to unwarranted discipline, demotion, or other adverse treatment because he assisted a co-worker in requesting reasonable accommodation. The interference must be such that it is reasonably likely to interfere with the exercise or enjoyment of ADA rights.
2. With respect to retaliation, as Robin discusses in the above-mentioned blog entry, protected activity can consist of either participation in the EEO process or opposing a practice made unlawful by an anti-discrimination statute.
3. There is a difference between participation and opposing a practice. With respect to an occurrence arising out of participating in the EEO process, that clause applies even if the underlying charge is not meritorious or was not timely filed. Participation encompasses internal complaints. With respect to opposition, an individual must have a reasonable belief that the matter complained of violates the laws in order for his or her statements or action to be protected.
4. A request for a reasonable accommodation is as we have seen throughout our blog protected activity.
5. The EEOC takes the position that compensatory and punitive damages are available for retaliation claims because Title I allows it (as discussed in my most popular blog of 2015, the answer isn’t as simple as that). They note in a footnote that the courts, especially the district courts, are split on this. The Circuit courts to date, as the EEOC notes, are saying the opposite, though some Circuits have affirmed such awards without visiting the question. Undoubtedly, this question is headed to the Supreme Court. Since the Rehabilitation Act allows for compensatory and not punitive damages and 12203 relates back to the Rehabilitation Act, it is fair to say that compensatory but not punitive damages are allowed for retaliation involving Title II. With respect to Title III, since the remedies refer back to Title III remedies, compensatory and punitive damages would not be in play. So, the only real question is whether compensatory and punitive damages are in play for retaliation claims that occur in the employment context.
6. Another question is whether individual liability is in play where retaliation occurs. We know that Title I-III do not allow for individual liability. However, § 12203(a), the ADA retaliation provision, specifically includes within it the term, “person.” §12203(b), the interference provision, does not contain the term, “person.” Therefore, the question becomes with respect to retaliation, whether personal liability is in play. There are two views on that question with respect to title II matters. The view that personal liability is not in play represented by the case of Bertolotti v. Prunty, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101015 (S.D. W. Va. September 21, 2010), which followed a Fourth Circuit decision saying that because retaliation remedies for the ADA are linked to title VII, which does not allow any remedy against individual defendants, individual liability is not possible. On the other hand, the 11th Circuit in Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003) in a very extensive opinion said that individual liability is in play with respect to retaliation occurring under title II of the ADA because the retaliation provision specifically includes the word “person,” the statute with respect to individual liability is inscrutable, solid policy reasons exist for imposing individual liability in the title II context, and the Department of Justice in 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 refers to a private entity as including a person and since that rule went through proper rulemaking it is entitled to deference. So, in short, an argument exists for individual liability for retaliating against someone in the context of title II of the ADA. However, even if that argument would prevail, not at all a given, one wonders whether it would apply to the interference section because the word “person,” does not appear in that particular provision.

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