Source: http://mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/779940/Patent/Realtime+Data+LLC+v+Iancu+No+Requirement+to+Make+Any+Finding+of+a+Motivation+to+Combine+Two+References+When+a+Claim+is+Invalid+as+Being+Obvious+Over+a+Single+Reference
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:25:52+00:00

Document:
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent and Trademark Appeal Board’s (PTAB) determination that all of the challenged claims of Realtime’s U.S. Patent 6,597,812 (“the ‘812 patent”) would have been obvious over the prior art.
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co. and others (collectively “HP”) petitioned for inter partes review of the ‘812 patent, alleging that claims 1-4, 8, 14-17, 21, and 28 would have been obvious over O’Brien (U.S. 4,929,946), in view of Nelson (a data compression textbook) and further Welch (U.S. 4,558,302).
The Board agreed that O’Brien discloses the “maintaining a dictionary” limitation and every other limitation in claim 1. While recognizing that there was a dispute as to the construction of the phrase “maintaining a dictionary,” the Board determined that no construction was necessary, as O’Brien taught every step for “maintaining a dictionary” identified in dependent claim 4.
The Board next addressed why “a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had to turn to Nelson after reading O’Brien when O’Brien allegedly teaches all the limitations of all claims challenged in Ground 1.” The Board noted that HP’s primary obviousness argument established only that “Nelson makes clear that O’Brien’s string encoding . . . is dictionary-based encoding” without using Nelson for the disclosure of a particular claim limitation. According to the Board, HP’s other argument (that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to substitute Nelson’s dictionary compression techniques with O’Brien’s string compression) was an argument in the alternative.
35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of O’Brien alone, or alternatively, in view of Nelson, and claims 14–17 and 21 would have been unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of O’Brien, Nelson, and Welch. Realtime appealed.
(2) that the Board erred by failing to construe the “maintaining a dictionary” limitation and in finding that O’Brien disclosed the “maintaining a dictionary” limitation.
The Federal Circuit (“the Court”) noted that HP’s primary argument to the Board was that all of the elements of claims 1–4, 8, and 28 were disclosed in O’Brien, a single reference. HP relied on Nelson simply to demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the string compression disclosed in O’Brien was, in fact, a type of dictionary encoder, the terminology used in the ’812 patent. The Court concluded that the Board was not required to make any finding regarding a “motivation to combine” given its reliance on O’Brien alone. Had the Board relied on HP’s alternative argument, HP would have been required to demonstrate a sufficient motivation to combine the two references. However, HP relied on Nelson merely to explain that O’Brien’s encoder is a type of dictionary encoder.
While Realtime agreed that the use of O’Brien as a single anticipatory reference would have been more properly raised under § 102, it is well settled that “a disclosure that anticipates under § 102 also renders the claim invalid under § 103, for ‘anticipation is the epitome of bviousness.’” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Court concluded that the Board did not err that claim 1 was invalid under § 103 based on O’Brien alone.
The Court further stated that even if the Board were required to make a finding regarding a motivation to combine O’Brien with Nelson, its finding in this case was supported by substantial evidence. The Board found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Nelson because Nelson is “well known,” the compression techniques taught in Nelson that were described as dictionary encoders “share striking similarities” to O’Brien’s compression techniques, and O’Brien itself “suggests that a wide variety of adaptive compression algorithms could be used and encourages a person having ordinary skill in the art to turn to ‘well known’ algorithms such as Nelson’s.” This is enough evidence to support a finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have turned to Nelson, a well-known data compression textbook, to better understand or interpret O’Brien’s compression algorithms. Thus, the Court held that the Board had no obligation to find a motivation to combine the two cited references because the Board did not rely on Nelson for the disclosure of a particular element or teaching, instead finding that O’Brien alone disclosed all claim elements. HP’s primary argument relied on Nelson merely to explain that O’Brien’s algorithm was a dictionary algorithm, which Realtime conceded was correct. Thus, the Board is not required to make any finding regarding a motivation to combine two references when it finds that a claim is invalid as being obvious in view of a single reference.
claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Those claim construction principles are important even in an inter partes review proceeding and here, the Board properly used the “broadest reasonable interpretation” consistent with the specification.
“maintaining a dictionary” is not defined in claim 1, and dependent claim 4 is the first of the claims to provide meaning to the phrase. Also, the language of claim 4 directly mimics the portion of the specification. The Court agreed that the specific passage from the specification strongly suggested that the steps of claim 4 were one way of “maintaining a dictionary,” as the Board concluded.
satisfy the “maintaining a dictionary” limitation. In response, the Court reminded that the word “‘comprising’ does not mean that the claim can be read to require additional unstated elements, only that adding other elements to the device or method is not incompatible with the claim” (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The Court continued that Realtime did not point to any law undermining the Board’s view in this case that the claim elements introduced in dependent claim 4 with “comprising” language are properly understood as giving details sufficient to constitute a particular embodiment of the more general “maintaining a dictionary” term of independent claim 1. That view was strongly supported by the specification.
step of initializing the dictionary if the number of code words exceeds a predetermined threshold.” The Court stated that the fact that claim 5 “further” adds this step indicated that this step was neither a necessary element of claim 4 nor required in the step of “maintaining a dictionary” in independent claim 1. The Court concluded that “[b]ecause the intrinsic evidence does not support Realtime’s proposed construction, Realtime has not demonstrated that the Board committed legal error by failing to adopt it.” Thus, the Court rejected Realtime’s construction of the term “maintaining the dictionary,” where it attempted to add unstated elements to the term.
The Federal Circuit Court concluded that (1) the Board did not err in concluding that the claims would have been obvious in view of a single reference, and that (2) the Board did not err in finding that O’Brien disclosed the “maintaining a dictionary” limitation in independent claim 1.
Realtime Data, LLC, v. Iancu, No. 2018-1154 (Fed. Cir., January 10, 2019).

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