Source: https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=62876
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:03:30+00:00

Document:
Letter from Steengracht, 20 March 1944, transmitting copy of Hitler's Decree appointing Veesenmayer as German Plenipotentiary and Minister in Hungary and defining Veesenmayer's authority, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 336-337.
Translation of Document NG-2947, Prosecution Exhibit 1806.
I enclose for your confident information a copy of the Fuehrer's power of attorney for the Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich in Hungary, Party Member Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer.
2. Wagner [Initials] v. TH. [von Thadden].
(1) The interests of the Reich in Hungary will henceforward be protected by a Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich in Hungary, who will simultaneously bear the designation Minister.
(2) The Reich Plenipotentiary is responsible for all political developments in Hungary and receives his directives through the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has the special task of paving the way for the formation of a new national government which will be resolved to fulfill loyally and until final victory is achieved the obligations imposed upon it by the Tripartite Pact. The Reich Plenipotentiary will advise this government on all important matters and represent always the interests of the Reich.
(3) The Reich Plenipotentiary is to ensure that the entire administration of the country, as long as German troops are there, is carried out by the new national government under his guidance in all fields, and with the object of utilizing to the fullest all the resources the country has to offer, in particular the economic possibilities, for the joint conduct of the war.
(4) German civilian offices, no matter of what nature, which are to operate in Hungary may be established only with the consent of the Reich Plenipotentiary; they will be subordinate to im and will act in accordance with his directives.
To perform tasks of the SS and Police to be carried out by German agencies in Hungary, and especially police duties in connection with the Jewish problem, a Higher SS and Police Leader will be appointed to the staff of the Reich Plenipotentiary and will act in accordance with his political directives.
(5) As long as German troops remain in Hungary, military sovereignty will be exercised by the commanding officer of these troops. The commanding officer is subordinated to the High Command of the Wehrmacht and receives his directives from him. The commanding officer of troops is responsible for the internal military security of the country and for its defense against threats from abroad. He supports the Reich Plenipotentiary in his political and administrative duties and acquaints him with all Wehrmacht requirements, especially with regard to the utilization of the country for the provisioning of the German troops. The requirements of the Wehrmacht, so far as they concern the realm of civilian affairs, are met by the Reich Plenipotentiary. In cases of imminent danger the commanding officer of German troops has the right to order also in the realm of civilian affairs, measures necessary for the fulfillment of military asks. He will arrive at an agreement with the Reich Plenipotentiary concerning this as soon as possible. The Reich Plenipotentiary and the commanding officer of German troops, must cooperate as closely as possible wherever their spheres of activity overlap and agree on all measures.
(6) I name Party Member Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer, Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich, and Minister in Hungary.
Teletype from Veesenmayer to von Ribbentrop Through Ritter, 20 March 1944, concerning Veesenmayer's conference with the Hungarian Regent, Horthy, on Germany's wishes in the formation of the Hungarian Government, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 338-340.
To be treated as sealed matter only.
Nr. 493 of 20 March 1944.
For the Reich Foreign Minister through Ambassador Ritter.
Just had discussion with the Regent lasting for 1 hour. He stated that in his opinion formation of the government had to be completed by today but that, after discussion with Imredy, he realized that for the time being only a government of civil servants headed by Sztojay or Csatay was tolerable for him. Contrary to Imredy's account, he left it open how long such a government was to remain in office. Any other solution would force him to violate his oath on the constitution and to the law. I emphatically pointed out that I considered such an interim solution politically unwise and impossible in point of time. The time of eternal compromising was past, and I said I was under the impression that the Regent was merely out to gain time which was not in accordance with the will of Hitler and the Reich government. In the ensuing conversation we once again referred to Kallay and the Regent said literally: "He regretted that neither Hitler nor the Reich government had so far been frank with him. Until a few days ago he did not know that the Reich government objected to Kallay, else he would have dismissed him long ago." I voiced my consternation and stated that on Horthy's last visit Hitler, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister since, had suggested in no uncertain terms that Herr Kallay did not enjoy the confidence of the Reich government. I pointed out that Hitler objected on principle to receiving Herr Kallay once more and that or a year the German Minister had virtually ceased relations with Herr Kallay. Reverting to the question of a government composed of civil servants, I told the Regent that I could not understand how the appointment of a government headed by Imredy would drive the Regent into committing perjury and argued my case.
Unable to retort, he said that I was much too intelligent and too well versed in rhetoric for him but that he had to stick to his opinion. I stated in conclusion that I had to report and request new instruction first, but that I much regretted his uncompromising attitude and that I felt compelled even now to voice my anxiety lest it entail grave consequences.
From hereon secret cipher V.
After having had three longer talks with the Regent within 4 hours, I increasingly gained the impression that Horthy on the one hand is lying inordinately and on the other is no longer physically fit to cope with his task. He is repetitious, often contradicting himself within a few sentences, and sometimes does not know how to continue a statement. His statements sound like a formula learned by heart, and I am afraid that he can hardly be convinced, let alone gained for our cause.
Last edited by David Thompson on 30 Oct 2004 07:28, edited 1 time in total.
Telegram from Veesenmayer to Ritter, 22 March 1944, reporting the impending military occupation of the residence of the Hungarian Regent Horthy, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 340-341.
Translation of Document NG-5526, Prosecution Exhibit C-440.
Budapest, 22 March 1944, 2340 hours.
Arrival: 23 March 1944, 0130 hours.
No. 3 (Probably No. 560 of 20 March 1944) of 22 March 1944.
Sudden occupation [alarmartige Besetzung] of the castle with present distribution of troops will take 3 hours according to Army Group report. It is hardly possible to surround the castle effectively in view of its cellars and unknown secret exits. Veesenmayer.
Teletype from the Foreign Office to Veesenmayer, 2 April 1944, giving von Ribbentrop's instructions on relations with Horthy and the new Hungarian Government, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 341-342.
Translation of Document NG-5574, Prosecution Exhibit 3701.
Fuschl, 2 April 1944, 1940 hours.
Received: 2 April 1944, 2000 hours.
Secret note for Secret Reich matter.
Telegram Control, 2 April 1944.
The Reich Foreign Minister requests you to work along political lines toward the goal of keeping the Regent more and more away from government business, pushing into the background and gradually isolating him in the castle. The aim therefore is, to eliminate him gradually and to continue the necessary political work with the new Hungarian Government alone. Altenburg.
This is copy No. 5.
[Handwritten] State Secretary I, Hungary--1178.
Working copy at [Handwritten] Political IV.
Telegram from Veesenmayer to von Ribbentrop through Ritter, 3 April 1944, with copies to Steengracht and Woermann, concerning the possible shooting of Jews as retaliatory measures to air raids upon Budapest, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 347-348.
Translation of Document NG-2234, Prosecution Exhibit 1807.
No. 65 dated 43 April 1944.
The reaction of the population of Budapest to the two air raids led, in large circles, to an intensified anti-Semitic attitude. Yesterday leaflets were distributed, asking the life of 100 Jews for each Hungarian killed. Even if this cannot actually be carried out, since in that case we would have to shoot at least 30000 to 40000 Jews, the idea of revenge creates an effective propaganda possibility and perhaps also a warning example. At the next attack I would have no scruples against having 10 suitable Jews shot for every Hungarian killed. In view of a conference which I had last night with the Ministers Ratz and Kunder, I have the impression that the government would be willing to carry out such a measure on its own. On the other hand such an action once begun should be carried out consistently. In view of the suggestions made to the Fuehrer by the Reich Foreign Minister, offering all Jews as a present to Roosevelt and Churchill, I would like to be informed whether this idea is being followed up, or whether after the next attack I may start with retaliatory measures described above.
Telegram from Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, 23 April 1944, concerning the confinement of Hungarian Jews in ghettos and preparations for the deportation to Auschwitz of 3000 Jews daily, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 348-349.
Partial Translation of Document NG-2233, Prosecution Exhibit 1811.
Budapest, 23 April 1944, 0130 hours.
Received: 23 April 1944, 0800 hours.
No. 1022 of 23 April 1944.
Reference: Telegraphic report No. (X) 117, of 19 April 1943.
[Handwritten] (X) Inl II 220 top secret.
The work of putting Jews into ghettos began in the Carpathian area on 16 April 1944. Thus far 150000 Jews have been affected. The action will probably be completed by the end of next week, approximately 300000 Jews. The same is already in preparation and is planned to follow immediately in Transylvania and in a number of counties bordering on Rumania. An additional 250000 to 300000 Jews are to be dealt with. Subsequently it will be the turn of the counties bordering on Serbia and Croatia with the final ghetto work to be done in the interior of the country, and its conclusion in Budapest.
Negotiations about transportation have been started. They call for a daily shipment of 3000 Jews, mainly from the Carpathian area, beginning on 15 May 1944. If transportation facilities permit, there will be later on also simultaneous shipments from other ghettos. Auschwitz is designated as receiving station. Provisions have been made that far reaching consideration will be taken for war economy requirements in the execution of this action. In order not to jeopardize the execution of this action, it appears advisable to delay somewhat the transport of the 50000 Jewish workers from the Budapest area, whose shipment has been demanded by me and has been agreed on by the government; this will be necessary anyway in view of the existing transportation difficulties. Transport by marching is not practicable, since it entails great difficulties in the questions of feeding, shoes, and guarding. Since the Jewish action is an entity, I deem the above sketched plan correct, and I request wired orders if you have any doubts or special requests.
[Stamp] Work copy! Register with Inland II.
Teletype from Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 27 April 1944, concerning the imminent deportation of two shipments of 2000 Jews to Auschwitz, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. p. 350.
Translation of Document NG-5535, Prosecution Exhibit 3705.
To be treated only as sealed matter.
Budapest, 27 April 1944, 1910 hours.
Arrival: 27 April 1944, 2325 hours.
No. 1089 of 27 April 1944.
In the following up telegraphic report No. 117 of 19 April 1944 ([Marginal Note] Inl. II Secret Reich Matter).
Of the Jews made available for deportation by the Honved Ministry, [The Hungarian Ministry of War was commonly referred to as Honved Ministry. The term "Honved" meaning "home defense" also was the name of the Hungarian Army in the revolutionary war of 1848-1849.] two shipments, each of them made up of about 2100 able-bodied men and women in the age-groups of 16 to 50 years, will leave for Auschwitz on 27-28 April1944 respectively.
The Hungarian Police have been consulted and the processing camps have been visited to make sure that Jews who are nationals of neutral or enemy countries are exempted from deportation. Veesenmayer.
Political Department IV: 1 copy.
Hungary State Secretary 1 1595.
Extract from the newspaper 'Voelkischer Beobachter,' 11 May 1944, reporting discoveries of bomb casings and secret radio transmitters in the homes of Budapest Jews, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. p. 351.
Translation of Document Veesenmayer 223, Veesenmayer Defense Exhibit 155.
Secret Transmitters in Jewish Homes, Budapest, 10 May 1944.
In the Monday meeting of the administrative committee of the Budapest City Council it was announced that a considerable number of bomb cases had recently been found in Jewish premises. Furthermore secret transmitter installations were again and again detected in Jewish homes.
In view of these announcements, which furnish further weighty proof of the criminal machinations of the Jews, the greatest possible severity against the Jews was demanded.
Extract from the newspaper 'Voelkischer Beobachter,' 17 May 1944, reporting the establishment of ghettos in 34 Hungarian cities and the attitude of the Hungarian population toward anti-Jewish measures", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. p. 351.
Translation of Document Veesenmayer 224, Veesenmayer Defense Exhibit 156.
The De-Judaization of Hungary Continues.
By our Budapest reporter. He. Budapest, 16 May 1944.
State Secretary Vitez Endre Laszlo who is in charge of de-Judaization and of cleansing the public life of Jews has returned from a prolonged inspection trip which took him into all parts of the country. He visited no less than 34 cities and numerous communities. He explained to a staff reporter of the large metropolitan paper "Uy Mag Yarsag" that the conclusion of the initiated de-Judaization scheme represented a gigantic task. It meant making up for decades of omissions and moreover doing so at top speed. He was pleased to find that nowhere had the law been ignored. "We defend the life of our nation, by ridding it from the Jewish poison, a self-defense, which will end Jewish predominance."
Ghettos had been established in all the 34 cities which he visited. One of the strongest impressions he retained from his long trip was that the population in all cities and communities hailed the government measures with genuine delight, and took a keen interest in their enactment from Kosice [Kaschau] to Cluj [Klausenburg] and from Szeged [Szegedin] to Subotica [Maria Theresiapol]. Especially in the cities of Mukachevo [Munkacs], Uzhgorod [Ungvar], Bereszasz, and Marmaros Sziget, which had borne the brunt of the flood of eastern Jews, the population rejoiced and frequently supplied means of transportation to speed resettlement and get rid of the Jews.
Memorandum of Dr. Schmidt, Chief of the Information and Press Division of the Foreign office, to Steengracht, 27 May 1944, suggesting 'external causes and reasons' be created for the 'current and planned actions' against the Jews in Hungary, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 352-353.
Partial Translation of Document NG-2424, Prosecution Exhibit 1754.
The Chief of the Information and Press Division.
[Stamp], Foreign Office, Inland II Section 308 secret.
Received: 1 June 1944, Top Secret.
From a very good report on the current and planned Jewish "actions" [Judenaktionen] in Hungary, I see that a major "action" [Grossaktion] is planned for June 1944 against the Budapest Jews.
On account of its proportions the planned action will excite a lot of attention abroad and will certainly cause violent reactions. The enemies will cry out and talk of manhunts [Menschenjagd] and so on, and by the use of atrocity reports [Greuelberichten] will try to stir up opinion at home and in neutral countries. Therefore, I should like to suggest that perhaps these things should be averted by creating external causes and reasons [aeussere Anlaesse und Begruendungen] for the action, for example, the discovery of explosives in Jewish clubs and synagogues, the unearthing of sabotage organizations, revolutionary plots, attacks on the police, illegal currency transactions on a large scale aimed at undermining the Hungarian monetary system. The keystone of such an action would have to be particularly serious case, which would then become the occasion for the great raid [Grossrazzia].
[Signed] Dr. Schmidt [Dr. Paul Karl Schmidt appeared as a prosecution witness. His testimony is recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 2/5/1948, pages 1351-1428.].
[Handwritten note] Through Chief of Press Division to Inland ll.
The State Secretary requests that the above suggestions of Minister Schmidt be communicated to Minister Veesenmayer and that he be asked for his opinion.
Telegram from Veesenmayer to Ritter, 17 June 1944, reporting that 326009 Jews have been deported from Hungary", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952.
Translation of Document NG-5567, Prosecution Exhibit 3713.
[Stamp] Foreign Office, Inland II 1213 g.
Received: 20 June 1944 encl.
[Stamp] To be treated as sealed matter only.
Telegram from Budapest No. 1820 of 17 June 1944 for Ambassador Ritter.
Addition to wire report No. 258 of 15 June 1944.
Note: Telegram was sent by Budapest Embassy directly to Fuschl.
1. Communism: KdS [Commander of Security Police] Budapest arrested the Jew Deutsch and his wife because he is suspected of being a Bolshevist agent. Deutsch was in Moscow from 1932 to 1936 and was visited there a number of times by his wife. After her return from Moscow she frequently stated that she worked there as a tailor for GPU commissars.
[Initials] v. T. [von Thadden] 20.6.
2. Jews: Total number of Jews deported to the Reich, 326009.[Auschwitz concentration camp was located in that part of Poland which was incorporated into the Reich after Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939. Veesenmayer, in an earlier report of 27 April 1944 to the Foreign Office mentioned Auschwitz as the destination for two shipments of Jews. See Document NG-6535, Prosecution Exhibit 3705, reproduced earlier in this section.] From circles of the Rumanian Consul General in Cluj we found out that the Hungarian Jews who have fled to Rumania are treated there like political refugees and that the Rumanian Government intends to make it possible for them to emigrate to Palestine.
Telegram from Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 30 June 1944, reporting on the progress of the deportation of Hungarian Jews, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952.
Translation of Document NG-2263, Prosecution Exhibit 1821.
Letter Telegram (Open), Budapest, 30 June 1944.
Arrival: 3 July 1944, 1105 hours.
No. 1838 dated 30 June 1944 subsequent to report by telegram--No. 1657--(with Inland II V.S. 1159 g lb) dated 13 June 1944.
I. Deportation of Jews from zone III with 50805 concluded according to plan. Total figure from zones I-III 340162.
II. Concentration in zone IV and deportation with 41499 concluded according to plan. Total figure 381661, continuation of activities has been reported separately by teletype--No. 279--dated 27 June 1944;--No. 287--dated 29 June 1944; and No. 289--dated 30 June 1944, to Fuschl.
Concentration in zone V (area so far not included, west of the Danube not including Budapest) has started 29 June 1944. Simultaneously small special actions in suburbs of Budapest as preparatory measures have started. Furthermore, a few small special transports with political Jews, intellectual Jews, Jews with many children and especially skilled Jewish workers are still on the way.
Working Copy at Inland II register.
[Initials] V. TH. [von Thadden] 4 July 1944.
Telegram from Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office, 11 July 1944, concerning difficulties in carrying out the Jewish Policy in Hungary because of the different handling of the Jewish Question in Rumania and Slovakia, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 361-362.
Translation of Document NG-5586, Prosecution Exhibit 3715.
Budapest, 11 July 1944, 2225 hours.
Received: 12 July 1944, 1100 hours.
No. 1939 dated 11 July 1944.
[Handwritten] Hungary, State Secretary 1 4196.
Teletype from Ritter to German Legation in Budapest, 27 April 1944, concerning the deportation of 50000 Hungarian Jews, and making recommendations for action in case of further delay in deportation", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 1071-1072.
Translation of Document NG-2196, Prosecution Exhibit 1812.
[Handwritten] For Legation Counsellor von Thadden, Teletype, Diplogerma, Budapest.
Reference: Telegraphic directive of 18 April 1944 and cable No. 117 of 19 April 1944.
I. The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service informs us, regarding the deportation of 50000 Jews, that their open labor assignment in the plants of the Reich is out of the question, because it would make illusory the completed evacuation of Jews from the Reich territory and the effected exclusion of Jews from the plants in the Reich. [Materials concerning the treatment of Jews are reproduced earlier in section IX B 1.] On the other hand, there is no objection to placing the Hungarian Jews into labor camps in the Reich, which are under the control of the Reich Leader SS.
The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service will issue a separate directive concerning the transportation question.
II. In case of a further delay in the deportation, I suggest that you express clearly in your telegraphic report that, on your part, everything possible and necessary had been done in order to carry out this operation as quickly as possible. [The remainder of this paragraph is crossed out in the original]. That the deportation of the Jews who were ready for shipment was delayed by the fact that the authorities in charge of the deportation and placement of the Jews did not make the necessary arrangements.
Is the USA printing office a war propaganda buro or does it have some factual grounds for these alleged intercepted telegrams ?

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