Source: https://www.ptab.us/2010/06/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:49:17+00:00

Document:
In Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) the court held that despite the absence of explicit antecedent basis, '[i]f the scope of a claim would be reasonably ascertainable by those skilled in the art, then the claim is not indefinite.'" Energizer Holdings Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Antecedent basis can be present by implication. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also In re Moore, 58 C.C.P.A. 1042, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (CCPA 1971) ("[T]he definiteness of the language employed must be analyzed-not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.").
Arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the record. Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
“Common sense has long been recognized to inform the analysis of obviousness if explained with sufficient reasoning.” Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Our reviewing court has explained that “the use of common sense does not require a ‘specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference,’ only a reasoned explanation that avoids conclusory generalizations.” Id. at 1329 (quoting DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
The Examiner's focus during the examination of claims for compliance with the requirement for definiteness of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is whether the claims meet the threshold requirements of clarity and precision, not whether more suitable language or modes of expression is available. See Ex parte Porter, 25 USPQ2d 1144, 1146 (BPAI 1992). Claims are considered to be definite, as required by the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, when they define the metes and bounds of a claimed invention with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity. See In re Venezia, 530 F.2d 956, 958 (CCPA 1976).
An obviousness-type double patenting analysis entails two steps: (1) construction of the claims of the patent and the claim in the application to identify any differences, and (2) determination of whether the differences in subject matter between the claims render the claims patentably distinct. Accord Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In other words, "a double patenting of the obviousness type rejection is analogous to [a failure to meet] the non-obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103, except that the patent principally underlying the double patenting rejection is not considered prior art." In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted).
In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("If a prima facie case is made in the first instance, and if the applicant comes forward with reasonable rebuttal, whether buttressed by experiment, prior art references, or argument, the entire merits of the matter are to be reweighed").

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