Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19780712-785477
Timestamp: 2016-10-27 11:05:07+00:00

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BONZI c. SUISSE
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7854/77Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-07-12;7854.77 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVILParties : Demandeurs : BONZIDéfendeurs : SUISSETexte : APPLICATION/REOUÃ`TE NÂ° 7854/7 7 Sergio BONZI v/SWITZERLAND' Sergio BONZI c/SUISSE ' DECISION of 12 July 1978 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 12 juillet 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Article 3 of the Convention : Solitary confinement of an accused person. In the case in point, no appearance of a violation of Article 3, having regard to the degree of strictness, duration and purpose of the measure . Article 6, paragraph 3 (b) of the Convention : Is this provlsion applicable at the stage of preliminary investigation ? fQuestion not pursued) . Article 6, paragraph 3(b ) and (c) of the Convention : These provisions do not guarantee the right to confer at any time with one's counsel and to exchange confidential indications or information with him without any restriction .
Article 3 de la Convention : Mise au secret d'un inculpÃ© . En l'espÃ¨ce, aucune apparence de violation de l'article 3, eu Ã©gard au degrÃ© de rigueur, Ã la durÃ©e et au but de cette mesure . Article 6, paragraphe 3, litt . (b) de la Convention : Cette disposition est-elle applicab/e A/a phase de l'instruction prÃ©paratoire ? IQuestion non rÃ©sofuel . Article 6, paragraphe 3, litt. ( b) et (c) de la Convention : Ces dlspositions ne garanrlssenr pas le droit de s'entretenir en tout temps avec son conseil et d'Ã©changer avec lui des instructions ou des informations confidentielles sans aucune restriction .
The applicant was reprasented before the Commission by Mr Jean Lob . a lawyer practisinp in Leusanne . Le requÃ©rant Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par Me Jean Lob, avocat Ã© Lausanne .
(English : see p . 188 1
Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© le 16 juin 7976, inculpÃ© de vol et de dÃ©tention illicite d'explosifs et d'armes et Ã©crouÃ© Ã la prison d'Yverdon IVaudl . Le 17 juin, le juge informateur a ardonnÃ© sa mise au secret pour dix jours (article 79 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale vaudois) . Le tribunal d'accusation du canton de Vaud a prolongÃ© par deux Jots la durÃ©e de cette mesure Le secret a Ã©tÃ© levÃ© le 16 jui7/et 1976. Le requÃ©rant a/ormÃ© un tecours de droit public au Tribunal lÃ©dÃ©ral . Ce recours a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ© le 23 fÃ©vrier 1977.
EN DROIT Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'avoir Ã©tÃ© mis au secret dans le cadre d'une 1 procÃ©dure d'instruction . II soutient que cette mesure, en rompant toul contact du prÃ©venu avec le monde extÃ©rieur et, en particulier, son dÃ©fenseur, constitue un mode de pression illÃ©gitime, voire une torture morale, destinÃ©e Ã lui soustraire des aveux . Tant par son objet mÃ©me que par ses modalitÃ©s, cette forme rigoureuse de dÃ©tention serait contraire Ã l'article 3 de la Convention qui prohibe le recours Ã la tonure et aux traitements inhumains ou dÃ©gradants . Il n'est pas contestÃ© que le prÃ©venu mis au secret conformÃ©ment au x articles 79 et 80 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale du canton de Vaud, est isolÃ© des autres dÃ©tenus ; il lui est interdit de recevoir les visites qui, dans le rÃ©gime normal, sont assez gÃ©nÃ©ralement permises ; il est privÃ© du droit qui appartient aux autres dÃ©tenus de communiquer librement avec son dÃ©fenseur Il se trouve dans une situation d'isolement cellulair e La Commission a dÃ©j9 indiquÃ© que l'isolement cellulaire prolongÃ© n'Ã©tait guÃ¨re souhaitable, surtout lorsque la personne est en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive (dÃ©cision sur requÃªte NÂ° 6038/73 c/RFA, Rec . 44, p 115 111911 . Toutefois, pour dÃ©cider si une telle mesure peut, dans un . cas particulier, tomber sous le coup de l'article 3 de la Convenlion, il y a lieu d'avoir Ã©gard Ã sa rigueur, Ã sa durÃ©e ainsi qu'Ã l'objectif poursuivi . En l'espÃ©ce, la mise au secret du requÃ©rant, effectuÃ©e sous contrÃ´le ludiciaire, n'a pas excÃ©dÃ© un mois . Durant cette pÃ©riode, le requÃ©rant aurait pu avoir accÃ©s, Ã sa demande, au mÃ©decin et Ã l'aum6nier . Il auriit pu Ã©galement demander un assouplissement de la mesure en faveur du dÃ©fenseur Officiellement dÃ©cidÃ©e en vue d'Ã©liminer tout risque de collusion, la mise au secret a Ã©tÃ© rapportÃ©e Ã la fin des interrogatoires et confrontations, sansqu'un changement ait pu Ãªtre dÃ©celÃ© dans le comportement du requÃ©rant et son refus persistant de reconna(tre les faits qui lui Ã©taient reprochÃ©s .
Dans ces conditions, la mise ausÃ©cret du requÃ©rant ne saurait Ãªtr esmtconsidÃ©rmluayncsÃ©devi'oufrÃ ncphysqe oral dans le but de brlser sa rÃ©sistance et de luiarracher tles aveux Icf . Cour eur . D .H ., Affaire Irlande c/Royaume-Uni, arrÃªt du 18 janvier 1978, par . 167 ; voir aussi article 1 de la DÃ©claration relative ; Ã la protection contre la torture contenue dans la RÃ©solution 3452 iXXXIde l'AssemblÃ©e GÃ©nÃ©rale des Nalions Uniesl . Elle n'a donc pas Ã¨u le caractÃ¨re d'un traitement inhumain ou dÃ©gradant . ' ' II s'ensuit que la requÃ©te est, Ã cet Ã©gard, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention .' 2 . Le requÃ©rant soutien[ encore que sa mise au secret a mÃ©connu les alinÃ©as Ibl et Icl du paragraphe 3 de l'article 6 qui'cdnsacrent, selon lui, le droit inconditionnel pour le prÃ©venu de'communiquer avec son dÃ©fenseur librement et en tout temps, y compris :lors -dela phase de l'instruction prÃ©paratoire . Contrairement Ã d'autres instruments-internationaux dans le domain e des droits de l'homme ou du droit humanitaire, et notamment l'article 14, paragraphe 3 Ibl, du Pacte des Nations-Unies relatif aux droits civils et politiques, l'article 6, paragraphe 3, de la Convention ne garantit pas expressÃ©ment le droit d'un accusÃ© de communiquer avec le conseil de son choix . Toutefois, ce droit rÃ©sulte largement des, dispositions prÃ©citÃ©es L'article 6 . paragraphe 3 ( b) garantit en effet lÃ© droit pour un accusÃ© de disposer du temps et des facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense, tandis que l'alinÃ©a Icl de la mÃªme disposition consacre celui d'avoir l'assislance d'un dÃ©fenseur de son choix : la possibititÃ© pour l'accusÃ© de s'entretenir avec son dÃ©fenseur est un AlÃ©ment fondarnental de la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense . En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant a pu s'entretenir frÃ©quemment et sans entraves avec son conseil au cours d'une pÃ©riode de neuf mois, soit du 16 juillet 1976 au 16 avril 1977, date du jugement . Il a eu ainsi suffisamment de temps et de contacts avec son dÃ©fenseur pour prÃ©parer son procAs, au terme duquel il fut mis en libertÃ©, suite au prononcÃ© d'une peine Ã©quivalant Ã la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et Ã l'octroi du sursis . La question a nÃ©anmoins Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©e de savoir si la mise au secret du 17 juin au 16 juillet 1976 a pu, en elle-mÃªme, heurter les dispositions invoquÃ©es . L'article 6, paragraphe 3 Ibl, de la Convention, qui protÃ¨ge l'accusÃ© contre un procÃ¨s hÃ¢tif au cours duquel il n'aurait pas accÃ¨s 8 tous les Ã©lÃ©ments du dossier dans les mÃªmes conditions que I :accusation s'applique-t-il Ã l'Instruction prÃ©paratoire ? PlusieÃ»rs gouvernements l'ont contestÃ© devant l a
Commission et la Cour (cf RequÃ©tes NÂ° 2178/64, Matznetter c/AU - Cour Eur . DH, SÃ©rie B p . 228 ; NÂ° 7899/77 c/BE, non publiÃ©el . Cette question n'a pas encore repu de rÃ©ponse . Elle peut Ã©galement demeurer ouvene danslaprÃ©sente affaire . En effet, Ã dÃ©faut de disposition expresse, on ne saurait soutenir que le droit de s'entretenir avec son conseil et d'Ã©changer avec lui des instructions ou informations confidentielles, implicitement garanti par l'article 6, paragraphe 3, n'est susceptible d'aucune restriction . En l'espÃ¨ce, si les visites de l'avocat ont Ã©tÃ© effectivement interdites suite Ã la dÃ©cision de inise au secret, il convient de relever que le requÃ©rant avait la possibiftÃ© d'informer son conseil par Ã©crit, sous le contrÃ´le du juge, du dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure d'instruction Il aurait pu, en outre, demander que la mise au secret fOt allÃ©gÃ©e en faveur de son conseil . Dans ces circonstances, la limitation relative et temporaire des contacts entre le requÃ©rant et son dÃ©fenseur, replacÃ©e dans le contexte de l'ensemble de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, ne saurait avoir constituÃ« un refus par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires d'accorder au requÃ©rant les facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fens e
Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte est, Ã cet Ã©gard, manifestenient mai fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REOUÃTE IRRECEVABLE .
Summary of the facts The applicant was arrested on 16 June 1976, on rhe charge of theft and illegal carrying of explosives and fire arms and was emprrsonerl in the prison of Yverdon IVaudl . On 17 June 1976, the investigating judge ordered hts solitary confinement for ten days ISection 79 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the canton of Vaudl . The indictment court of rhe canton of Vaud prolonged twice the duration of this measure, which ended on 16 July 1976. The applicant lodged a public law appeal with the Federal Court . This appeal was dismissed on 23 February 797 7
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THE LA . The applicant complains that he was ~placed in solitarÃ¿ confinemen t W1 during investigatory proceedings . He.submits that this measure, by cutting the accused off from all contact with the outside world, and in particular with his defence counsel, constitutÃ©s an unlawful formof pressure, and even of mental torture, designed to extract confessions from him . . . .. . He argues that, tioth by its very purpose and in the manner of its execution, this strict form of detention contrevenes Article 3 of the Convention, which prohibits the use oftorlure and inhuman or degrading treatment . It is not contested that a prisoner, placÃ¨d in solitary confinement in accordance with Sections 79 and 80 of the Code of Penal Procedure of the canton of Vaud, is isolated from theother prisoners ; he is denied-.visits fairly generally permiued ;`he"is -whic,undertomalsyÃ©,re deprived of the right enjoyed by otherprisoners to communicate f 'reely with his defence counsel . He is isolated in a cell already st ated that prolonged solitary confinemen t .TheComisna is undesirable, particularly where the prisoner concerned is in detention on remand (Decision on application No . 6038/78 against the Federal Republic of Germany, Collection of Decisions No . 44, page 1191 . However, in deciding whether such a measure may come within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention in a particular case, regard must be had to its strictness, its duration and the end pursued . In the case in point, the applicant's solitary confinement, under judicial supervision, did not excee month During that period, the applicant could have had access to th e done doctor and the almoner on request . He could also have requested relaxation of his isolation where his defence counsel's visits were concerned . The solitary confinement imposed by an official decision in order to obviate any risk of collusion was revoked at the end of the interrogations and inter v iews without any change being detectable in the applicant's behaviour or his persistent refusal to admit the facts with which he was charged . This being so, the applicant's solitary confinement cannot beconsidered to have caused him great physical or mental suffering with the .aim of breaking down his resistance and extracting confessions from him tcf . European Court of Human Rights, case of Ireland v . United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, para . 167 ; see also Article 1 of the _ Declaration on Protection : from Torture contained in Resolution 3452 (XXX) of the United Nations General Assembly( . Thus it did not constitute inhuma . nordegaitmn .
It follows that the application, on this point, is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 121 of the Conventio n 2 . The applicant further maintains that his solitary confinement contravened sub-paragraphs Ibl and Icl of paragraph 3 of Article 6 which, in his opinion, secure to the accused and unconditional right to communicate with his defence counsel freely and at all times, including of preparatory investigation . Unlike other internationalinstruments in the field of human rights or humanitarian law, notably Article 14 1311b1 of the United Nations Covenant and Civil and PoliGcal Rights, Article 6 131 of the Convention does not expressly secure the right of an accused person to communicate with the counsel of his choic e However, that right can be inferred from the above-mentioned provisions since Article 6 1311b1 secures the right of an accused person tc have adequate time and facilities foi the preparation of his defence, while sub-paragraph 3 of thai same provision secures the right to have the legal assistance of his own choosing : the opportunity for the accused to confer with his defence counsel is fundamental to the preparation of his defence . In the case in point, the applicant was able to confer with his counsel frequently and without impediment during a period of nine months, from 16 July 1976 until 16 April 1977, the date of the judgment . He therefore had sufficient time and contact with his defence counsel to prepare for his trial, at the end of which he was released, following the passing of a sentence equivalent to the duration of his detention on remand and its suspension . The question was nonetheless raised whether the solitary confinement from 17 June to 16 July 1976 may in itself have contravened the provisions referred t o Does Article 6 1311b1 of the Convention, which protects the accused against a hasty trial in which he does not have access to all the documents in the case in the same conditions as the prosecution, apply to the preliminary investigation ? Several Governments have contested this before the Commission and the Court (cf application No . 2178/64, Matznetter v Austria - European Court of Human Rights, Series B, page 228 ; No . 7899/77 v Belgium, not published) . This question has not yet been answered . It can also remain unanswered in the present case . In the absence of any explicit provision, it cannot be maintained that the right implicitly guaranteed by Article 6 (3) to confer with one's counsel and exchange confidential instructions or information with him is subject to no restriction whatsoever
In the case in point, while the lawyer's visits were forbidden after the decision to place the accused in solitary confirnement, it must be pointed out ihat the app6cant was free to inform his counsel in writing, under supervision of Ihe court, of the progress of the investigatory proceedings . In addition, he could have requested a relaxation of his isolat-on where his counsel's visits were concerned This being so, the relative and tempora7y limitation of contacts belween the applicant and his defence counsel, seen in the context of the criminal proceedings as a whcle, canriot be said to have constituted a refusal on the part of ihe judicial authorities to grant the applicant the necessary facilities for the preparation ol his defence . It follows that the application, in this respect, is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning ot Article 27 (2) of the Convention . For ihese reasons the Commissio n DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBL E
- 191 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 12/07/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 3
 l'article 3
 l'article 3
 l'article 27
 l'article 6
 l'article 14
 l'article 6
 L'article 6
 L'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27