Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/ForeignRegistration.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:34:20+00:00

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The United States has assumed certain obligations from agreements adopted at the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and subsequent revisions to these agreements. The United States is also a member of the Inter-American Convention for Trademarks and Commercial Protection (also known as the "Pan-American Convention"), the Buenos Aires Convention for the Protection of Trade Marks and Commercial Names, the World Trade Organization, and certain other treaties and agreements. See TMEP §1002.03 and Appendix B of this Manual for additional information about treaties and international agreements.
Section 44 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1126, implements these agreements. Section 44 applications fall into two basic categories: (1) United States applications relying on foreign applications to secure a priority filing date in the United States under §44(d); and (2) United States applications relying on ownership of foreign registrations as a basis for registration in the United States under §44(e). See TMEP §§1003 et seq. regarding §44(d), and TMEP §§1004 et seq. regarding §44(e).
Section 44(d) of the Act provides only a basis for receipt of a priority filing date, not a basis for publication or registration. See TMEP §1003.03.
An applicant may file an application based solely on §44, or may claim §44 in addition to §1(a) or §1(b) as a filing basis. An applicant who claims more than one basis must comply with all application requirements for each basis asserted. 37 C.F.R. §2.34. See TMEP §§806.02 et seq. regarding multiple-basis applications.
In an application based solely on §44, the applicant must submit a verified statement that the applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in commerce is not required prior to registration. TMEP §1009.
In limited circumstances, applicants domiciled in the United States may be entitled to file under §44, if they meet the requirements of the Act. See TMEP §1002.05.
A mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign applicant may be registered on the principal register if eligible, otherwise on the supplemental register herein provided.
In re Societe D'Exploitation de la Marque Le Fouquet's, Serial No. 74/135,691, (TTAB 2003).
Section 44(e) of the Act provides, in part, that "a mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign applicant may be registered on the principal register if eligible, otherwise on the supplemental register herein provided."
This rule became effective on October 30, 1999.
This section of the rule became effective on October 30, 1999, as part of the rule changes made as a result of the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, and was thus obviously not in effect at the time the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered its 1993 decision in De Luxe.
The statute does not state that the foreign registration need only have been in existence when the U.S. application is filed, or at some point during examination.
Further, subsection (f) provides that "the registration of a mark under the provisions of subsections (c), (d), and (e) ... shall be independent of the registration in the country of origin and the duration, validity, or transfer in the United States of such registration shall be governed by the provisions of this Act."
The fact that the statute specifically refers to the U.S. registration being independent of the foreign registration once the U.S. registration issues, indicates that until the U.S. registration issues, the foreign registration must be in effect, as provided by subsection (e).
The De Luxe decision, of course, involved the question of whether a foreign applicant could assign its U.S. application without also assigning its underlying foreign registration. It did not consider the question which is before us here, namely, whether the applicant must show that the underlying foreign registration continues to be valid in order for the U.S. registration to issue. That question was, however, considered by the Board in Marie Claire Album S.A. v. Kruger GmbH & Co. KG, 29 USPQ2d 1792 (TTAB 1993), a decision which issued after the Federal Circuit's decision in De Luxe. The Board found that the De Luxe decision did not overrule precedent stating that a valid foreign registration must exist for a U.S. application under Section 44 to register, and reaffirmed the principle, set forth in Fioravanti v. Fioravanti Corrado S.R.L., 230 USPQ 36 (TTAB 1986), recon. denied, 1 USPQ2d 1308 (TTAB 1986), that the U.S. application is dependent upon the validity of the foreign registration up until the time the U.S. registration based thereon is issued.
Reasoning behind why the applicant must show the continuing validity of its foreign registration.
Although neither applicant nor the Examining Attorney mentioned this in their briefs, perhaps the strongest reason for affirming the requirement of the Examining Attorney that applicant show the continuing validity of its foreign registration is Trademark Rule 2.34(a)(3)(iii). This subsection, which discusses the requirements for the registration of a mark under Section 44(e) of the Act, provides: "If the record indicates that the foreign registration will expire before the United States registration will issue, the applicant must submit a true copy, a photocopy, a certification, or a certified copy from the country of origin to establish that the foreign registration has been renewed and will be in force at the time the United States registration will issue. If the foreign registration is not in the English language, the applicant must submit a translation."
Merely showing a certified copy of a registration prior to the time the applicant is seeking a U.S. registration is insufficient to shown that the foreign registration is currently in force.
Thus, it is clear by the provisions of this rule that applicant must show that its foreign registration is in force currently, and that merely providing a certified copy of a registration in 1991 which showed, on its face, that it would expire in 2000 is insufficient.
A foreign applicant for U.S. registration who satisfies the requirements of Section 44 may assign the application without assigning foreign rights, and without precluding the assignee's ability to thereafter obtain a U.S. registration.
The Board stated: "The Board does not believe that the holding of In re De Luxe is applicable to the current case. ...[In De Luxe, the Court] stated that "a foreign applicant must comply with the requirements [of Section 44] at the time the application is filed...." De Luxe, 26 USPQ2d at 1477. However, the Court's further explanation reveals the limits of this holding. Central to this decision is the fact that a valid foreign registration, upon which the U.S. application was based, always was in existence. The original applicant merely put a new applicant in its place, and the Court saw no difference between this and an assignment made subsequent to the issuance of the U.S. registration. This holding is clearly limited to the proposition that "a foreign applicant for U.S. registration who satisfies the requirements of Section 44 may assign the application without assigning foreign rights, and without precluding the assignee's ability to thereafter obtain a U.S. registration." De Luxe, 26 USPQ2d at 1477. Here, we are contemplating the possibility that no "duly registered" foreign mark exists, as was the case in Fioravanti. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Board to suspend proceedings pending a determination of whether the foreign registration is valid. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the intent of the statute and the need to protect against unfair competition...." Marie Claire Album S.A. v. Kruger GmbH & Co. KG, 29 USPQ2d at 1794.
As the result of treaty provisions and Section 44, foreign applicants are given substantial advantages over U.S. citizens, most particularly, the right to obtain U.S. registrations for goods and services for which they have not yet used the marks in commerce.
We see a clear distinction between a requirement that a foreign applicant continue to own the underlying foreign registration which provides the basis for its Section 44 application, and a requirement that the foreign registration continue to be valid at the time the U.S. registration issues. It must be remembered that as the result of treaty provisions and Section 44, foreign applicants are given substantial advantages over U.S. citizens, most particularly, the right to obtain U.S. registrations for goods and services for which they have not yet used the marks in commerce.
The present application is a good example of this, with applicant attempting to obtain registration for a myriad of disparate goods and services in what was originally 20 classes and which is now 18 classes. As a result, the provisions of Section 44 should be construed narrowly. See United Rum Merchants Ltd. v. Distillers Corp. (S.A.) Ltd., 9 USPQ2d 1481, 1483 (TTAB 1988), discussing the standard by which the mark shown in the U.S. application must conform to the mark in the foreign registration: "...we must recognize, at the outset, that the purpose of Section 44(e) is to give effect to this country's treaty obligations and to allow foreign applicants to obtain U.S. registrations based on registrations obtained in their countries of origin. This procedure is an exception to the normal registration process whereby a party is required to use the mark in commerce prior to the application filing date. Because the registration procedure under Section 44(e) is such an exception, we believe it would not be appropriate to construe it broadly...."
An applicant may not establish a country of origin outside of the United States by relying on the commercial facilities of another company in a parent-subsidiary relationship.
In the case of In re Aktiebolaget Electrolux, supra, the Board held that an applicant may not establish a country of origin outside of the United States by relying on the commercial facilities of another company in a parent-subsidiary relationship.
A country of origin cannot be established by relying on contractual relationships with a licensee in another country.
In the case of Ex parte Blum, 138 USPQ 316 (Comm'r 1963), the Commissioner held that a country of origin cannot be established by relying on contractual relationships with a licensee in another country.
We begin our analysis by considering applicant's contention that, based on the facts noted above, it has qualifying "countries of origin" in addition to the United States, entitling it to rely independently on its predecessors' claims under Section 44.
Case Finding: Neither applicant's status as a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Delaware company, which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a United Kingdom company, nor the facts that applicant's officers and principals operate outside the United States and that it may sell products and produce programs outside the United States through related companies or licensees, creates a bona fide commercial establishment and, thus, a country of origin, outside of the United States for applicant.
In view thereof, we find that neither applicant's status as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lyrick, a Delaware company, which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a United Kingdom company, nor the facts that Joker's officers and principals operate outside the United States and that it may sell products and produce programs outside the United States through related companies or licensees, creates a bona fide commercial establishment and, thus, a country of origin, outside of the United States for Joker.7 There is no genuine issue of material fact that Joker is purely and simply a domestic corporation and, thus, does not qualify as a "person" entitled to claim the benefits of Section 44(e). FOOTNOTE 7 "Unlike the appellant in International Barrier, supra, whose only "bona fide and effective commercial establishment" was in Canada, in this case it is Joker's parent, Lyrick, and Lyrick's parent, HIT, that have a presence in the United Kingdom and elsewhere outside the United States, not Joker."
A domestic assignee may not continue to rely upon the Section 44(e) basis for registration asserted by the original foreign applicant.
We turn to the next question we must decide, whether as a matter of law opposer is entitled to judgment because, as opposer claims, the assignment of the applications to a domestic corporation renders these applications, which are based entirely on Section 44, invalid.
We agree with opposer that Nestle controls the question herein of whether Joker, a domestic corporation, may rely on the Section 44(e) basis properly asserted by its foreign assignor. Thus, there is no question that the domestic assignee, Joker, may not continue to rely upon the Section 44(e) basis for registration asserted by the original foreign applicant.
Case Finding: Discussion of findings in DeLuxe case.
We note, first, that In re De Luxe, supra, relied upon by applicant, is inapposite because it involves an assignment to another foreign entity, which is not the case herein, and because the issue decided in that case is different from the issue involved here. De Luxe involved a Netherlands company that properly filed its application in the United States with a claim of priority, under Section 44(d), and asserted a basis under Section 44(e). Only after submitting a copy of its Benelux registration did the Netherlands company assign the U.S. application, but not its Benelux registration, to another foreign entity, De Luxe. The issue in that case was whether a foreign applicant must be the owner of the asserted foreign registration, on which its U.S. application is based, at the time the U.S. application is approved for publication. The court concluded "that the language of Section 44 is clear: a foreign applicant must comply with the requirements at the time the application is filed; and the language of the statute neither expressly nor impliedly restricts a foreign applicant from freely alienating a U.S. application once the statutory requirements have been met" (Id. at 1477, emphasis in original). Further, the court noted, in quoting the language of Section 44(c), that "Section 44(b) limits the applicability of Section 44 to those whose country of origin is a party to a convention or treaty to which the United States is also a party, or which extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States" (Id., fn. 4). Thus, De Luxe dealt only with the situation of an assignment of a U.S. application from one foreign entity to another, while here we have an assignment of a U.S. application from a foreign entity to a U.S. company.
Case Finding: Discussion of finding in Nestle case.
In Nestle Co., Inc. v. Grenadier Chocolate Co., supra, relied upon by opposer, the Canadian applicant filed an application in the United States based on its Canadian application, asserting a claim of priority under Section 44(d) with no claim of use in commerce. During the pendency of the U.S. application, applicant assigned the mark and U.S. application to a Delaware corporation. Subsequently, but still prior to publication for opposition, the mark and U.S. application were reassigned to the original Canadian applicant. The question in that case that is relevant herein was whether the application was rendered void by the assignment to the domestic corporation which was not entitled to claim the benefits of Section 44 of the Act. The Board confirmed that a domestic applicant may not register a mark in the United States pursuant to Section 44; that a Section 44-based application is valid only if prosecuted by an applicant entitled to claim the benefits of Section 44; and, thus, an assignment of the application to a domestic entity renders the application invalid and void. The Board concluded, further, that the void application cannot be made valid, subsequent to the assignment, by an amendment to assert dates of use in commerce, or by a reassignment from the domestic entity to the foreign entity. The Board acknowledged that a domestic entity may in appropriate circumstances assert a priority claim under Section 44(d), but must also assert use in commerce as a basis for registration.
However, regarding the obvious next question of whether the applications are rendered void by the assignment to Joker, our inquiry does not end with Nestle. Nestle's holding that such an application must be held void is no longer valid in view of subsequent changes in the law and practice.
Effective November 16, 1989, Section 1(b) of the Act permits an applicant to assert, as a basis for filing an application, a bona fide intention to use the applied-for mark in commerce.
First, the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, P.L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (TRLA), effective on November 16, 1989, permits, in Section 1(b) of the Act, an applicant to assert, as a basis for filing an application, a bona fide intention to use the applied-for mark in commerce.
Effective October 30, 1998, the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act of 1998 permits applicants to amend or substitute their application basis both before and after publication of a mark for opposition.
Second, practice changes permitting applicants to add or change the basis for registration post-publication were instituted in In re Monte Dei Maschi Di Sienna, 34 USPQ2d 1415 (Com'r. Pats 1995) (applicants may make pre/post publication amendments to add or substitute the basis for registration), and expanded and codified in the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act of 1998 (TLTIA), P. L. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3069, effective on October 30, 1998, which permits applicants to amend or substitute their application basis both before and after publication of a mark for opposition. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.35 and 2.133 and Section 806.02 of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP), 4th ed. April 2005.
Amendments to add a post-publication Section 1(b) basis are permissible if there is a continuing valid basis for registration.
The Board confirmed, in Leeds Technologies Ltd. v. Topaz Communications Ltd., 65 USPQ2d 1303 (TTAB 2002), that such an amendment or substitution of application basis was acceptable for applications that are the subject of an opposition proceeding, noting that such amendments to add a post-publication Section 1(b) basis are permissible if there is a continuing valid basis for registration.
Case Finding: If Joker submits an appropriate amendment asserting a Section 1 basis for registration of the mark in each application that is valid from the date of the assignments to Joker, the Office would presume a continuing valid basis for registration.
Therefore, the applications herein are not void simply because of the assignment to Joker. Joker may file an amendment to substitute an acceptable basis for registration in each application. Further, as previously noted, there is no question as to the validity of the Section 44(d) and (e) claims made by the original applicants herein and, therefore, if Joker submits an appropriate amendment asserting a Section 1 basis for registration of the mark in each application that is valid from the date of the assignments to Joker, the Office would presume a continuing valid basis for registration.
An assignee stands in the shoes of its assignor.
FOOTNOTE 9 "...However, the law is well established that an assignee stands in the shoes of its assignor. Gillette Co. v. Kempel, 254 F.2d 402, 117 USPQ 356 (CCPA 1958)."

References: §1002
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