Source: https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/recuenco_and_review_of_blakely_error/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:31:10+00:00

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Recuenco was charged with assault with a deadly weapon enhancement, and he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon enhancement, but he was erroneously sentenced with a firearm enhancement. We conclude it can never be harmless to sentence someone for a crime not charged, not sought at trial, and not found by a jury. In this situation, harmless error analysis does not apply. Therefore, we vacate the firearm sentence and remand for correction of the sentence.
What can we make of Justice Scalia's take on structural/harmless errors?
The Apprendi line of cases has seen its share of side-switching or seemingly contradictory votes by Supreme Court justices, usually without explanation. For example, Justice Thomas has publicly stated that Almendarez-Torres v. United States should be overruled, admitting in the process that he voted for the wrong side. Similarly, Justice Scalia is the only justice to vote with the majority in both Apprendi and Harris v. United States. Finally, Justice Ginsburg voted to join both majority opinions in United States v. Booker.
Yesterday, Justice Scalia dissented in United States v. Resendiz-Ponce and stated that he would deem the indictment-omission error he thinks occurred in that case structural, citing to his dissent in Neder v. United States. In Neder, the majority said that withholding an essential element from a petit jury is not structural and is amenable to harmless-error review. Justice Scalia disagreed, and so his pronouncement that an indictment's failure to allege an essential element is also structural error ought not to surprise us. The only problem is that in June 2006, Justice Scalia voted with the majority in Washington v. Receunco, which, relying heavily on Neder's majority opinion, concluded that a jury's failure to determine a sentence-enhancing fact, in violation of Apprendi's holding, is amenable to harmless-error review. This would suggest that Justice Scalia distinguishes between essential crime elements and sentence-enhancing (or "Apprendi") elements for purposes of determining whether a Sixth Amendment error is amenable to harmless-error review.
One possible explanation for these seemingly inconsistent votes is that Justice Scalia's Neder dissent did note that, despite labeling the error "structural," an appellate court could vote to affirm if it were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury had necessarily found the omitted fact in reaching its verdict. In Recuenco, there is almost no doubt that that's what occurred. But the Court, following its usual practice in cases emanating from state courts, vacated the judgment and remanded to the Washington Supreme Court so that the state court could perform the harmless error analysis in the first instance. Could it be that Justice Scalia agreed with the ultimate result in, but not the reasoning of, Recuenco and chose not to write a concurring opinion to make that clear?
Some fans of Blakely might be bummed that the Supreme Court today in Recuenco (discussed here) declared that violations of Blakely rights could be subject to harmless error. But I see a very important silver lining in Recuenco: the opinions and the voting pattern in Recuenco suggest to me that the main consequence (and goal?) of the opinion will be to make it much easier for the Court to feel comfortable expanding Blakely rights in the future.
By voting to limit the potential consequences of future Blakely rulings through Recuenco, three of the Blakely five — Justices Scalia and Souter and Thomas — have ensured that the entire Court can feel more at ease when deciding whether to expand Blakely rights in later cases. Of course, the Court already has two big Blakely cases on its docket: (1) Cunningham, which addresses Blakely's applicability to California's sentencing system, and (2) Burton, which addresses whether Blakely is to be applied retroactively.
The opinion in Recuenco provides no reason to believe that Justice Scalia (the author of Blakely) and Justice Souter (the author of Jones) or Justice Thomas (the author of strong separate opinions calling for Blakely's extension in Harris and Shepard) are not still strong believers in Blakely principles. In fact, that these three Justices are all in the majority in Recuenco — and that Justice Thomas authored the opinion and included some loose pro-Blakely language — leads me to (naively?) view the defendant's loss in Recuenco as setting up some more important Blakely wins next term.
1. The court's decision was on a 7-2 vote, with only Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissenting. Perhaps the most surprising (silent) member of the majority is Justice Scalia, who was the author of Blakely and a vocal dissenter in the key precedent that the majority relies upon to declare that Blakely errors can be harmless (this post details Justice Scalia's prior assertions that jury trial errors should be seen as structural).
2. Justice Thomas' opinion has some broad language about "sentencing factors" that might be read — and certainly could be misconstrued — to extend the reach of Blakely. See Recuenco, slip op. at 6 ("we have treated sentencing factors, like elements, as facts that have to be tried to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"); id. at 7 (discussing the Court's "recognition in Apprendi that elements and sentencing factors must be treated the same for Sixth Amendment purposes"). Both of these assertions — which carry seven votes, including those of the two new Justices — raise the stakes on what exactly counts now as a "sentencing factor."
3. Justice Kennedy writes an opaque little separate concurrence which seems to signal that he still does not accept Apprendi and Blakely. Notably, Justice Breyer does not sign on to this tea leaf concurrence (nor does, for that matter, Justices Alito and CJ Roberts).
4. The author of the main dissent on the merits is Justice Ginsburg, who writes as if she was the strongest believer in the full panoply of Blakely rights. But, as the majority-jumping Justice in Booker who allowed for federal defendant to have their procedural rights at sentencing gutted, I am surprised she is a vocal dissenter here. Might this dissent signal that she is disappointed with how the post-Booker world is unfolding?
Last year, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether violations of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial right, as articulated in Blakely v. Washington, are structural error, requiring automatic reversal. In an earlier article I explain why Recuenco presents a substantial federal question for the Supreme Court's resolution. That article also suggests that Recuenco presents a "perfect vehicle" for resolving the question presented because the Washington Supreme Court would be free to affirm Recuenco's enhanced sentence were the U.S. Supreme Court to conclude that Blakely errors do not require automatic reversal. This article elaborates on that critical assumption and highlights an issue that, although not addressed by the parties, may require the Supreme Court to fine-tune its harmless-error jurisprudence to accommodate Blakely-type claims.
O Recuenco, Recuenco, wherefore art thou granted Recuenco?
and no one reports on it, does it make precedent?
Sorry for the silly metaphysical question, but I am a bit stunned that I cannot find a single press account or any other kind of coverage of the Supreme Court oral argument yesterday in Washington v. Recuenco (No. 05-83). Even the folks at SCOTUSblog did not even bother to provide a preview of the case (as seems to be their custom for all SCOTUS cases) the time to mention Recuenco.
Because the issues in Recuenco concerning the nature of Blakely errors are opaque and perhaps of limited significance, I did not expect the Recuenco oral argument to get a lot of attention. But now I am thinking Recuenco might set some sort of record for least-discussed Supreme Court case.
Thanks to a number of helpful attendees, I have heard a few reports concerning this morning's oral argument in Washington v. Recuenco (No. 05-83). Based on these reports, I no longer think Recuenco is likely to turn out to be a big little Blakely case. Apparently, the Justices spent a lot of time trying to sort through the particulars of Washington state law, and that fact alone might suggest that the Court could possibly decide to DIG the case.
Even if the case is not sent packing through a DIG, the peculiar case facts in Recuenco may entail a relatively narrow (and thus relatively unimportant?) ruling. When not debating Washington law, the Justices were apparently concerned with indictment and notice issues; they did not cleanly focus on the big issue of whether clear Blakely sentencing errors ought to be subject to harmless error treatment.
Of course, these are second-hand reports of the argument, and I may have more tea leaves to read once I have a chance to review the official transcript in the days ahead.
As detailed in this recent post, the Supreme Court today starts a criminal-case-heavy session with arguments this morning in Washington v. Recuenco (No. 05-83). Recuenco will explore whether Blakely errors can be subject to harmless-error analysis or instead are structural errors. I have here described Recuenco as a big little Blakely case, and my numerous prior posts about the case are assembled in this archive.
For more basic background on the facts and issues in Recuenco (as well as links to the parties' briefs), check out this account of the case from the Medill folks at Northwestern. In addition, the folks at Cornell Law School have this effective write-up of the Recuenco case that also includes a discussion and analysis section.
A key point for the intersection of Blakely issues and error review issues in Recuenco is that the defendant preserved his jury trial claim and thus the case does not directly implicate any plain error doctrines relating to unpreserved claims. However, a ruling in Recuenco still could impact some Blakely/Booker plain error litigation; there is a complicated interplay between harmless/structural error doctrines and plain error doctrines.
1. Justice Scalia, as detailed here, has long been a vocal advocate against harmless-error review in the context of Sixth Amendment jury trial violations. It will be interesting to see not only if Justice Scalia sticks to his guns in Recuenco, but also if he might brings new Justices Alito and Roberts along for the ride.
3. Especially with the prior conviction and mandatory minimum exceptions to Blakely on seemingly shaky ground, a ruling in Recuenco could greatly impact the ripple effect of any future expansions of Blakely.
4. As hinted in point 1, Recuenco is the first opportunity for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito to weigh in (or not weigh in) on the Supreme Court's Apprendi-Blakely-Booker Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Especially with many other Blakely-Booker issues on the Court's horizon, Recuenco should provides some valuable tea leaves for reading about the new justices' take on the Sixth Amendment.
SCOTUS taking up Blakely harmless error issue!
I have be wailing for a long time about the many post-Blakely and post-Booker questions that I think merit the Supreme Court's attention (which in part accounts for my kvetching again and again about SCOTUS taking so many death penalty cases). Thus, you'd think I'd be happy that SCOTUS, as detailed in a series of posts from last October (here and here and here), granted cert in Washington v. Recuenco to explore whether Blakely errors can be subject to harmless-error analysis. However, because of the nature of the Recuenco issue and its procedural posture, it seems that SCOTUS has selected a case (from a cert pool filled with many pressing Blakely/Booker issues) that could engender more confusion than clarity.
Recuenco could make the post-Blakely world even messier because the defendant's brief (available here) argues that harmless-error review "is impossible here because of an unusual circumstance under state law." In other words, the defendant (who prevailed below) seems to be contending that the Supreme Court ought to just dismiss Recuenco as improvidently granted. And, because the defendant has uber-SCOTUS-litigant Jeff Fisher on his team, one can expect the Court will give careful consideration to the idea that it ought to just make the case go away.
"But not so fast," says Steven Sanders in a forthcoming article in the New Jersey Lawyer, which carries the terrific title "Is Washington v. Recuenco a Big Fat Dud?". Steve argues in this article that any argument suggesting that SCOTUS "should decline to resolve a question of immense importance to prosecutors and defense attorneys alike ... is fundamentally misguided." Available for download below, Steve's short article provides a useful primer on Recuenco and leads me to the conclusion that, no matter what SCOTUS does, the case could well engender even more post-Blakely confusion.
As shown from this docket sheet, the Gomez case from Tennessee (background in this post) is scheduled for its third SCOTUS conference on February 17. And, intriguingly, a number of the Blakely cases coming from California will also be conferenced that day, as revealed by docket sheets in Black, Cunningham, Diaz, and Harless. Consequently, by the second half of February, we ought to have some new information and insights concerning whether, when and how the Supreme Court may examine state sentencing systems that have elided Blakely.
A bit of Blakely March madness will develop around the Supreme Court's consideration of Washington v. Recuenco (docket 05-83), which concerns whether Blakely errors can be subject to harmless-error analysis. Though not yet officially scheduled, Recuenco will likely be argued in the second half of March. I provided some coverage of Recuenco back in October when cert. was granted, and I plan to discuss the case a lot more as oral argument approaches.
Folks interested in these and other state Blakely stories should be sure to check out this recent issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, which provides thorough and thoughtful coverage of the state of Blakely in the States. More background on that issue is available at this post.
UPDATE: Based on this post about the argument schedule at SCOTUSblog, it now appears that Recuenco won't be argued until April (even though cert. was granted well before some of the cases now scheduled to be argued in March). Hmmmm.
Relying on basic federalism principles, this article explains why state courts are not obligated to obey a federal law of remedies in adjudicating federal constitutional violations and why state courts have every right, as a matter of state law, to remedy a federal constitutional violation that a federal court would find harmless.
As first noted in this post, last week the Supreme Court granted cert in Washington v. Recuenco (docket 05-83) in order to explore whether Blakely errors can be subject to harmless-error analysis under Neder v. US, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (available here) or instead qualify as structural errors under Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (available here). As spotlighted in subsequent posts and comments here and here, there are many intriguing aspects of the High Court's decision to take up this issue and to use Recuenco as its vehicle.
To help fill out this story and enhance my own understanding of this fascinating little case, I have obtained copies of the cert briefing in Recuenco. Three briefs — the state's petition for cert, the defendant's brief in opposition and the state's reply — are available for download below. I hope to have some more comments about the dynamics and the stakes of Recuenco after I get a chance to review and contemplate these briefs.
The Court's fascinating and important decision to grant cert in Recuenco to consider whether Blakely error can be harmless (basics here, commentary here) has led me to go back and re-read Neder v. US, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (available here) and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (available here), which are two critical precedents for the ultimate resolution of Recuenco. Both cases are fascinating reads, in part because of the sparring between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia and because of Justice Scalia's obvious distain for harmless-error review in the context of Sixth Amendment jury trial violations.
Even if we allowed (as we do not) other structural errors in criminal trials to be pronounced "harmless" by judges ... it is obvious that we could not allow judges to validate this one. The constitutionally required step that was omitted here is distinctive, in that the basis for it is precisely that, absent voluntary waiver of the jury right, the Constitution does not trust judges to make determinations of criminal guilt. Perhaps the Court is so enamoured of judges in general, and federal judges in particular, that it forgets that they (we) are officers of the Government, and hence proper objects of that healthy suspicion of the power of government which possessed the Framers and is embodied in the Constitution. Who knows? — 20 years of appointments of federal judges by oppressive administrations might produce judges willing to enforce oppressive criminal laws, and to interpret criminal laws oppressively — at least in the view of the citizens in some vicinages where criminal prosecutions must be brought. And so the people reserved the function of determining criminal guilt to themselves, sitting as jurors. It is not within the power of us Justices to cancel that reservation — neither by permitting trial judges to determine the guilt of a defendant who has not waived the jury right, nor (when a trial judge has done so anyway) by reviewing the facts ourselves and pronouncing the defendant without-a-doubt guilty. The Court's decision today is the only instance I know of (or could conceive of) in which the remedy for a constitutional violation by a trial judge (making the determination of criminal guilt reserved to the jury) is a repetition of the same constitutional violation by the appellate court (making the determination of criminal guilt reserved to the jury).
Of course, five Justices rejected these sentiments in Neder. But, two of those five (Rehnquist and O'Connor) will not be involved in resolving Recuenco. And another Justice in the Neder majority, Justice Thomas, seems to be a much bigger fan of jury trial rights now than he was in 1999.
Though I won't credit all my whining about the need for the Supreme Court to start addressing all the important issues left unresolved by Blakely and Booker (see, e.g., here and here), I will celebrate the big news coming from Lyle Denniston at SCOTUSblog that the Court today granted cert in "a significant sequel to its series of rulings on the roles of judges and juries in criminal sentencing" by accepting for review "the issue of whether a violation of the jury's role in sentencing can ever be excused as 'harmless error.'"
The case taken up by SCOTUS is Washington v. Recuenco (docket 05-83). The decision by the Washington Supreme Court was rendered in April and is available here. I reported on the decision in this post.

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