Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/304/458.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:16:26+00:00

Document:
Mr. Elbert P. Tuttle, of Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Mr. Bates Booth, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Petitioner, while imprisoned in a federal penitentiary, was denied habeas corpus by the District Court. 1 Later, [304 U.S. 458, 459] that court granted petitioner a second hearing, prompted by 'the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case and the desire of the court to afford opportunity to present any additional facts and views which petitioner desired to present.' Upon consideration of the second petition, the court found that it did 'not substantially differ from the' first, 'and for the reasons stated in the decision in that case' the second petition was also denied.
Petitioner and one Bridwell were arrested in Charleston, S.C., November 21, 1934, charged with [304 U.S. 458, 460] feloniously uttering and passing four counterfeit twenty-dollar Federal Reserve notes and possessing twenty-one such notes. Both were then enlisted men in the United States Marine Corps, on leave. They were bound over to await action of the United States Grand July, but were kept in jail due to inability to give bail. January 21, 1935, they were indicted; January 23, 1935, they were taken to court and there first give notice of the indictment; immediately were arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced that day to four and one-half years in the penitentiary; and January 25, were transported to the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta. While counsel had represented them in the preliminary hearings before the commissioner in which they-some two months before their trial-were bound over to the Grand Jury, the accused were unable to employ counsel for their trial. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty, said that they had no lawyer, and-in response to an inquiry of the court-stated that they were ready for trial. They were then tried, convicted, and sentenced, without assistance of counsel.
'Both petitioners lived in distant cities of other states and neither had relatives, friends, or acquaintances in Charleston. Both had little education and were without funds. They testified that they had never been guilty of nor charged with any offense before, and there was no evidence in rebuttal of these statements.' 5 In the habeas corpus hearing, petitioner's evidence developed that no request was directed to the trial judge to appoint counsel, but that such request was made to the District Attorney, who replied that in the state of trial (South Carolina) the court did not appoint counsel unless the defendant was charged with a capital crime. The District Attorney denied that petitioner made request [304 U.S. 458, 461] to him for counsel or that he had indicated petitioner had no right to Counsel. The Assistant District Attorney testified that Bridwell 'cross examined the witnesses;' and, in his opinion, displayed more knowledge of procedure than the normal layman would possess. He did not recall whether Bridwill addressed the jury or not, but the clerk of the trial court testified 'that Mr. Johnson (Bridwell?) conducted his defense about as well as the average layman usually does in cases of a similar nature.' Concerning what he said to the jury and his cross-examination of witnesses, Bridwell testified: 'I tried to speak to the jury after the evidence was in during my trial over in the Eastern District of South Carolina. I told the jury, 'I don't consider myself a hoodlum as the District Attorney has made me out several times.' I told the jury that I was not a native of New York as the District Attorney stated, but was from Mississippi and only stationed for overnme nt service in New York. I only said fifteen or twenty words. I said I didn't think I was a hoodlum and could not have been one of very long standing because they didn't keep them in the Marine Corps.
Reviewing the evidence on the petition for habeas corpus, the District Court said6 that, after trial, petitioner and Johnson '... were remanded to jail, where they asked the jailer to call a lawyer for them, but were not permitted to contact one. They did not, however, undertake to get any message to the judge. [304 U.S. 458, 462] '... January 25th, they were transported by automobile to the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, Ga., arriving ... the same day.
'There, as is the custom, they were placed in isolation and so kept for sixteen days without being permitted to communicate with any one except the officers of the institution, but they did see the officers daily. They were no request of the officers to be permitted to see a lawyer, nor did they ask the officers to present to the trial judge a motion for new trial or application for appeal or notice that they desired to move for a new trial or to take an appeal.
The '... right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself wheter the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.' 10 The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts,11 in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel. [304 U.S. 458, 464] Two. There is insistence here that petitioner waived this constitutional right. The District Court did not so find. It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights12 and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' 13 A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 70 A.L.R. 263, decided that an accused may, under certain circumstances, consent to a jury of eleven and waive the right to trial and verdict by a constitutional jury of twelve men. The question of waiver was there considered on direct appeal from the conviction, and not by collateral attack on habeas corpus. However, that decision may be helpful in indicating how, and in that manner, an accused may-before his trial results in final judgment and conviction-waive the right to assistance of counsel. The Patton Case noted approvingly a state court decision14 pointing out that the humane policy of modern criminal law had altered conditions which had existed in the 'days when the accused could not testify in his own behalf, (and) was not furnished counsel,' and which had made it possible to convict a man when he was 'without money, without counsel, without ability to summon witnesses, and not permitted to tell his own story ....' [304 U.S. 458, 465] The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused- whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.
Petitioner, convicted and sentenced without the assistance of counsel, contends that he was ignorant of his right to counsel, and incapable of preserving his legal and constitutional rights during trial. Urging that- after conviction-he was unable to obtain a lawyer; was ignorant of the proceedings to obtain new trial or appeal and the time limits governing both; and that he did not possess the requisite skill or knowledge properly to conduct an appeal, he says that it was-as a practical matter- impossible for him to obtain relief by appeal. If these contentions be true in fact, it necesarily f ollows that no legal procedural remedy is available to grant relief for a violation of constitutional rights, unless the courts protect petitioner's rights by habeas corpus. Of the contention that the law provides no effective remedy for such a deprivation of rights affecting life and liberty it may well be said-as in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 , 55 S.Ct. 340, 342, 98 A.L.R. 406-that it 'falls with the premise.' To deprive a citizen of his only effective remedy would not only be contrary to the 'rudimentary demands of justice' 21 but destructive of a constitutional guaranty specifically designed to prevent injustice.
It must be remembered, however, that a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by collateral attack, even on habeas corpus. When collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of regularity. 25 Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his constitutional [304 U.S. 458, 469] right to assistance of Counsel. If in a habeas corpus hearing, he does meet this burden and convinces the court by a preponderance of evidence that he neither had counsel nor properly waived his constitutional right to counsel, it is the duty of the court to grant the writ.
In this case, petitioner was convicted without enjoying the assistance of counsel. Believing habeas corpus was not an available remedy, the District Court below made no findings as to waiver by petitioner. In this state of the record we deem it necessary to remand the cause. If-on remand-the District Court finds from all of the evidence that petitioner has sustained the burden of proof resting upon him and that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel, it will follow that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed to judgment and conviction of petitioner, and he will therefore be entitled to have his petition granted. If petitioner fails to sustain this burden he is not entitled to the writ.
[ Footnote 1 ] Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F.Supp. 253.
[ Footnote 3 ] 5 Cir., 92 F.2d 748.
[ Footnote 4 ] 303 U.S. 629 , 58 S.Ct. 610, 82 L.Ed. --.
[ Footnote 5 ] Opinion of the District Judge, Bridwell v. Aderhold, D.C., 13 F. Supp. 253, 254.
[ Footnote 6 ] Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F.Supp. 253, 254.
[ Footnote 7 ] Bridwell v. Aderhold, D.C., 13 F.Supp. at page 256; see Rules of Practice and Procedure (Criminal Appeals Rules), adopted May 7, 1934, II, III, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723a.
[ Footnote 8 ] Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152.
[ Footnote 9 ] Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 261, 70 A.L.R. 263.
[ Footnote 10 ] Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 , 69 S., 53 S.Ct. 55, 63, 64, 84 A.L.R. 527.
[ Footnote 11 ] Cf., Barron v. The Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 557.
[ Footnote 12 ] Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 , 57 S.Ct. 809, 811, 812; Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 , 1 S.Ct. 307.
[ Footnote 13 ] Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 307 , 57 S.Ct. 724, 731.
[ Footnote 14 ] Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346, 351, 124 N.W. 492, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 664.
[ Footnote 15 ] Cf., Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; Knewal v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442 , 45 S.Ct. 522; Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 , 31 S.Ct. 44, 21 Ann.Cas. 849.
[ Footnote 16 ] Woolsey v. Best, 299 U.S. 1, 2 , 57 S.Ct. 2.
[ Footnote 17 ] Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 , 35 S.Ct. 582, 587.
[ Footnote 18 ] In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 116 , 11 S.Ct. 939, 941; In re Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 280 , 9 S.Ct. 703.
[ Footnote 19 ] 28 U.S.C., ch. 14, 451 et seq., 28 U.S.C.A. 451 et seq.
[ Footnote 20 ] Frank v. Mangum, supra, pages 330, 331, 35 S.Ct. page 588, cf., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 , 43 S.Ct. 265; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 , 55 S.Ct. 340, 98 A.L.R. 406; Ex parte Hans Nielson, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 , 9 S.Ct. 672.
[ Footnote 21 ] Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, supra, page 112, 55 S.Ct. page 342.
[ Footnote 22 ] Cf. Frank v. Mangum, supra, page 327, 35 S.Ct. 582.
[ Footnote 23 ] Ex parte Hans Neilsen, Petitioner, supra.
[ Footnote 24 ] Cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 , 43 S.Ct. 265, 267; Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 , 313 S., 50 S.Ct. 253, 70 A.L.R. 263.
[ Footnote 25 ] In re Cuddy, Petitioner, supra.

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