Source: http://masscases.com/cases/land/2016/2016-15-000260-DECISION.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:02:49+00:00

Document:
This is a dispute over the ownership of improved property at 8 Harding Avenue in Malden (the Property). Both the plaintiff, Joseph M. Soscia, and the defendant, DCB Welding and Fabrication, Inc. (DCB Welding), claim title to the Property. The plaintiff asserts his title to the Property through a deed from his father, Joseph Soscia (Soscia Sr.). Although the deed from his father was never recorded, plaintiff contends that his acceptance is implied by his conduct. Conversely, DCB Welding argues that the plaintiff never accepted the deed out of fear of liability for potential contamination on the Property and sought to exercise the benefits of ownership without being willing to accept the liabilities that went along with ownership. DCB Welding claims title to the Property by virtue of a subsequent deed from Soscia Sr. that was recorded with the registry of deeds.
The plaintiff commenced this action on July 9, 2015 and also sought a temporary restraining order, or in the alternative, a preliminary injunction, as well as an ex parte motion for endorsement of a memorandum of lis pendens. The court (Foster, J.) allowed the plaintiffs motion for temporary restraining order and ex parte motion for endorsement of memorandum of lis pendens, restraining DCB Welding from conveying, mortgaging, or otherwise transferring or encumbering title to the Property. A hearing on plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction was held on July 21, 2015, and the court (Speicher, J.) allowed the motion in part, enjoining any transfer or encumbrance of the Property, but permitting DCB Welding to continue to occupy the Property. On August 3, 2015, DCB Welding filed its answer and counterclaim for 1) breach of lease and 2) unjust enrichment. A pre-trial conference was held on November 24, 2015, at which the court dismissed DCB Weldings counterclaim without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A trial was held on March 3, 2016. Upon receipt of the parties post-trial submissions on May 2, 2016 and May 10, 2016, this matter was taken under advisement.
10. I do not credit Attorney Fareses testimony that the plaintiff rejected the deed because of his concern about contamination of the Property, or for any other reason. There was no competent evidence that the Property was contaminated or that the plaintiff believed it to be contaminated. The plaintiff denied knowledge of any information that the Property was contaminated, and Attorney Fareses testimony as to his conversations with the plaintiff on this subject was equivocal. Although Attorney Farese drew his own conclusion that the plaintiff did not accept the deed, and that the reason was fear of liability concerning contamination, he never testified that he actually told the plaintiff about any contamination on the Property or that the plaintiff had any knowledge that the Property was contaminated. [Note 12] I do not draw the same conclusion. I do not credit Attorney Fareses suggestion that the plaintiff knew about or believed the Property to be contaminated. I find that the plaintiff was not informed that the Property was contaminated, he did not believe it to be contaminated, and he did not act on the basis of any such information.
15. After signing the Lease, the plaintiff began work on repairs and improvements to the Property necessary for the commencement of occupancy by DCB Welding. The repairs performed either by the plaintiff or by contractors hired by the plaintiff included electrical work, plumbing, installation of new bathroom fixtures, repair of the roof, installation of a new heater, painting of the interior of the building, levelling of the interior flooring necessary to DCB Weldings welding and fabrication business, demolition of basement walls to create an open floor plan, cleaning of gutters and replacement of downspouts, and work on the fire alarm system. In connection with work performed on the property, the plaintiff hired and paid several professionals, including an electrician, a plumber, painter, mason, and an architect. He also communicated with the building inspector for the City of Malden (the City).
17. He used his mothers address in Revere as his local address in matters related to the Property.
The ultimate dispute in this case turns on whether there was a delivery of the Soscia Deed to the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff accepted the deed either expressly, or implicitly, based on his conduct. In order to effect a conveyance of property, a deed must be delivered by the grantor and accepted by the grantee. Juchno v. Toton, 338 Mass. 309 , 311 (1959). Delivery and acceptance can be made by the parties themselves or their attorneys acting on their behalf. Trial v. Rodrigues, 3 LCR 232 , 233 (1995). Delivery of a deed is essential to its validity and the deed becomes effective only at the time of its delivery. Town of Lexington v. Ryder, 296 Mass. 566 , 568 (1937). The factors essential to delivery are that the grantor intended the deed to effect a present transfer of the property and that the grantee by his conduct assent to the conveyance. Whether there has been a delivery of a deed is ordinarily a question of fact. Frankowich v. Szcuka, 321 Mass. 75 , 77 (1947) (internal citations omitted); Washington Mutual Bank v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (2015). Particularly important here, it is settled that manual delivery of a recorded deed is not required to work a transfer, and that acts of the grantee when coupled with a purpose of the grantor to treat the deed as delivered are sufficient to pass the title. Bianco v. Lay, 313 Mass. 444 , 448 (1943), quoting Sullivan v. Hudgins, 303 Mass. 442 , 446 (1939). The date on a deed is prima facie evidence of the date of delivery. Graves v. Hutchinson, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 634 , 639-640 (1996). Delivery of a deed is only complete upon acceptance by the grantee. Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560 , 562 (1870). Acceptance can be actual or may be implied from the grantees conduct. . . . But there can be acceptance by conduct only if the grantee had knowledge of the conveyance at the time he acted. Juchno v. Toton, supra, 338 Mass. at 311.
Here, it is clear, and I so find, that Soscia Sr. intended to convey the Property to the plaintiff and this intention was communicated to the plaintiff, who understood that he was to receive delivery of the Soscia Deed. Attorney Farese and Ms. Feudo both testified that Soscia Sr. directed Fareses firm to draw up a deed conveying the Property to his son, the plaintiff, as grantee. At trial, the plaintiff testified that his father had expressed a desire to leave the Property to him as repayment for working on the Property as well as to help support his family financially. At the direction of Soscia Sr., Fareses firm prepared the Soscia Deed and trustee certificate, which were then signed by Soscia Sr. and sent back to Farese with instructions to hold the deed for the plaintiff until the plaintiff contacted Farese. There is no dispute that the plaintiff contacted Attorney Farese and that Attorney Farese informed the plaintiff that the deed was available for his benefit. This constituted an attempted delivery of the Soscia Deed. The next question to be answered is whether the delivery of the deed was completed by acceptance by the plaintiff.
There was contradictory evidence presented regarding conversations that took place between the plaintiff and Attorney Farese following the delivery of the Soscia Deed. The parties agree that the plaintiff asked Attorney Farese and Ms. Feudo not to record the deed, but disagree as to whether this was a rejection of the attempted delivery of the deed, or simply an instruction to hold the deed before recording while the plaintiff determined how he wanted to take title. I find and rule that the plaintiffs discussions with Attorney Farese and Ms. Feudo did not constitute a rejection of delivery of the deed, and that his subsequent conduct sufficiently demonstrated his acceptance of the delivery of the deed so as to complete the conveyance of the Property to him.
In characterizing the plaintiffs instructions to Attorney Farese and Ms. Feudo not to record the deed, DCB Welding misconstrues the import of an instruction not to record. It is true that recording alone does not constitute acceptance of a deed. See Barnes v. Barnes, 161 Mass. 381 , 383 (1894) (recording of deed by one who was not agent of grantee, where grantee had no knowledge of the attempted conveyance, did not effect a conveyance of property); see also, Hawkes v. Pike, supra, 150 Mass. at 563 . However, the converse, that there can be no conveyance without recording, is not true. A lengthy delay in the recording of a deed will not negatively affect the effectiveness of a conveyance. Graves v Hutchinson, supra, 39 Mass. App. Ct. at 640-641. Similarly, a conveyance remains effective as between the parties to the conveyance and as to those with knowledge of the conveyance, even without recording the deed in the registry of deeds. Recording of [a] deed [is] not required to complete [a] conveyance. The deed, being duly executed and delivered, [is] sufficient, without any other act or ceremony, to convey [the property]. Solans v. McMenimen, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 178 , 181 (2011), quoting G. L. c. 183, § 1. It is well settled that a deed duly signed, sealed and delivered is sufficient as between the original parties to it to transfer the whole title of the grantor to the grantee, although the instrument is not acknowledged or recorded. Cooper v. Monroe, 237 Mass. 192 , 198 (1921). The recording statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 183, § 4, does not affect the validity upon delivery of an unrecorded deed as between the parties to it or as to persons with notice. Aronian v. Asadoorian, 315 Mass. 274 , 276 (1943) (emphasis added).
The plaintiffs conduct, following his conversations with Attorney Farese and Ms. Feudo, evinced his acceptance of the deed. At the time of this conduct, he had actual knowledge, through conversations with either Soscia Sr., his stepmother, or Attorney Fareses office, that Soscia Sr. had executed the Soscia Deed on September 16, 2014 and that Farese had been instructed to deliver it to him. The plaintiffs conduct was consistent with his acceptance of the delivery of the deed. He advertised the Property for lease on Craigslist and spoke to realtors. He negotiated and entered into a lease with Bartholomew for lease of the Property by DCB Welding. Throughout the course of these negotiations, the plaintiff held himself out to be the owner of the Property and Bartholomew testified that she believed the plaintiff to be the owner. Eventually, the negotiations led to an agreement for use of the Property and the Lease was signed on October 25, 2014. After signing the Lease, the plaintiff invested his own funds and with Bartholomews permission used DCB Weldings deposit to make repairs and improvements to the Property and to generally prepare it for occupancy by DCB Welding as his tenant. He insured the Property with due regard to the particular use to which it was to be put by his intended lessee.
After DCB Welding informed the plaintiff that it would not accept occupancy of the Property, the plaintiff, still acting as one who believed he was the owner of the Property, again posted an advertisement on Craigslist to find a new tenant to lease the Property. He ultimately negotiated a Second Lease with Rodriguez of EastBay Metal, LLC. As with Bartholomew, the plaintiff held himself out as the owner, and Rodriguez testified that he understood the plaintiff to be the owner of the Property. Both the Lease and Second Lease list the plaintiff as the landlord. The plaintiffs continued work to fit out the Property for his new tenant ceased only when he was locked out by DCB Welding. The plaintiffs conduct, including without limitation the execution of the Lease with DCB Welding and the plaintiffs investment in the repair and improvement of the Property, sufficiently evinced and accomplished the acceptance of the delivery of the Soscia Deed. See, Juchno v. Toton, supra.
DCB Welding attempts to use the fact that the plaintiff signed his name without his middle initial on several legal documents (the Lease, Second Lease, building permit application, and application for property insurance) as evidence that he denied and failed to accept ownership of the Property. Because the plaintiffs name and his fathers name were both Joseph Soscia, DCB Welding maintains that the plaintiff dropped the middle initial M in a deliberate attempt to conceal or obscure the true ownership of the Property and maintain his ability to disclaim liability in the event contamination was discovered on the Property. Further, DCB Welding argues that the plaintiffs use of his mothers address in Revere in the Lease, the same address his father had noted in the original deed for the Property, is further evidence of his intention to disclaim ownership.
I decline to reach the conclusion argued by DCB Welding. The suggestion that there was some illicit motive in the failure of the plaintiff to use his middle initial and in his use of his mothers address is undercut by my finding that he had no knowledge of or any reason to know of any actual or alleged contamination on the Property. I further decline to ascribe such a motive to the plaintiffs failure to use his middle initial and his use of his mothers Revere address, because on all the evidence I accept as truthful his testimony that his failure to use his middle initial was not with any such intent, and that his use of his mothers address was for the convenience of being able to use a local address.
Aside from DCB Weldings speculative accusations, which I do not accept or credit, there is nothing in the record to support the argument that the plaintiff acted in any way other than as the true owner of the Property. The record before me demonstrates that there was a valid conveyance from Soscia Sr. to the plaintiff. Further, I find that, although the Soscia Deed was not recorded prior to the subsequent conveyance to DCB Welding, the conveyance from Soscia Sr. to the plaintiff was binding and effective so as to convey title not only as between Soscia Sr. and the plaintiff, but so as to preclude DCB Welding from receiving title to the Property. This is because I find that DCB Welding accepted delivery of its deed with actual knowledge of the earlier, unrecorded conveyance to the plaintiff. Bartholomew, the president of DCB Welding, in negotiating with the plaintiff, understood him to be the owner of the Property. Moreover, the deed to DCB Welding was plainly and clearly an alteration of the deed that had conveyed title to the plaintiff. The name of the grantee as well as the consideration for the deed were typed over a Wite-out obliteration of another grantees name and a different stated monetary consideration. That the obliterated name was the plaintiffs was apparent on the third page of the document, which, by apparent oversight, still identified the plaintiff as the intended grantee. [Note 38] Bartholomew personally recorded the deed, and I find that she was personally aware of the obvious alterations to the deed and that the deed had originally been delivered to the plaintiff.
I find, therefore, the subsequent conveyance from Soscia Sr., as trustee of the Trust, to DCB Welding to be invalid. It is also invalid because the deed to DCB Welding, even had DCB Welding not taken with actual knowledge of the conveyance to the plaintiff, was altered after the plaintiff had accepted it. Although the DCB Welding Deed was recorded and the Soscia Deed was not, the DCB Welding Deed, an altered document delivered with knowledge by the subsequent grantee of the earlier conveyance, did not divest the plaintiff of his estate. The alteration of the name of the grantee, in a deed already delivered, but not recorded, does not divest the title from the original grantee and vest it in the substituted grantee. Carr v. Frye, 225 Mass. 531 , 532-533 (1917) (the erasure of original grantees name and insertion of another did not divest grantee of his estate; it was the original grantees property though the record title was in anothers name); Lima v. Lima, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 479 , 487 (1991); Smigliani v. Smigliani, 358 Mass. 84 , 90-91 (1970) (finding the altered instrument ineffective as a conveyance).
Attorney Farese and Ms. Feudo testified that they created the DCB Welding Deed by changing the existing Soscia Deed using Wite-out or some similar product, writing in the new grantee where the plaintiffs name had previously been, and changing the statement of consideration to $6,000. The DCB Welding Deed bears the same date, September 16, 2014, as the Soscia Deed. Likewise, the trustee certificate, part of the same document as the DCB Welding Deed, contains the September 16, 2014 date and still identifies the plaintiff as the grantee of the Property and the consideration as one dollar, both in conflict with the first page of the DCB Welding Deed. Accordingly, while the alteration of the Soscia Deed to form the DCB Welding Deed may have invalidated the instrument itself, it did not divest the plaintiff of his title to the Property.
For the reasons stated above, I find that the plaintiff is the owner of the Property and neither DCB Welding nor the Trust has any right, title, or interest in the Property.
[Note 1] The court ordered service on the trustees and beneficiaries of the Somango Nominee Trust by publication. No one having appeared on behalf of the Trust, the Trust is defaulted, and judgment will enter against it pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and 55(b).
[Note 2] Stipulation of Facts (SOF), ¶ 1; Trial Transcript (Tr.) 17-18.
[Note 3] SOF, ¶¶ 2-3.
[Note 4] SOF, ¶¶ 4-6; Tr. 20, 67; Exh. 1.
[Note 5] SOF, ¶¶ 9-10; Exh. 2.
[Note 8] SOF, ¶ 11; Tr. 19-20, 22-23, 29, 100-102, 117-118, 120, 131; Exh. 3.
[Note 9] SOF, ¶¶ 12-13; Tr. 22-23, 71-72, 102-103, 119-120.
[Note 11] Tr. 23-24, 72-74, 135.
Q. And at that time did you tell him the reason that the buyers were backing out (the alleged contamination)?
Q. Did he bring up contamination at any point?
[Note 13] SOF, ¶ 14; Tr. 23-25, 72-77, 121-124, 135-136.
[Note 14] Tr. 27-28, 84-85.
[Note 15] SOF, ¶¶ 15-17; Tr. 27-29, 84, 140-142, 146, 149-150.
[Note 16] SOF, ¶¶ 18-19; Tr. 28-30, 56-58, 67-68, 79, 86, 141-142, 150-151; Exh. 4.
[Note 17] Tr. 30-42, 46-52, 81-86, 88, 95, 142-143, 150-152; Exh. 5-7; 12.
[Note 18] Tr. 52-53, 91-92; Exh. 8.
[Note 19] SOF, ¶ 20; Tr. 54-55, 91-93, 144-145; Exh. 9.
[Note 20] Tr. 158-159, 163.
[Note 21] SOF, ¶ 21; Tr. 53-56, 79-82, 94-95, 124-126, 165; Exh. 10.
[Note 22] Tr. 58-59, 61, 89, 167-170, 176-177; Exh. 11.
[Note 23] Tr. 61-63, 171-174; Exh. 12.
[Note 24] Tr. 19, 103-105; Exh. 13.
[Note 25] SOF, ¶ 22; Tr. 103-104.
[Note 26] SOF, ¶ 30; Tr.104-105, 108-109; Exh. 13.
[Note 27] SOF, ¶¶ 7-8; Tr. 66, 73-74.
[Note 28] SOF, ¶¶ 24-29, 31; Tr. 25-26, 108-111, 131-134; Exh. 3.
[Note 30] SOF, ¶ 32; Tr. 105; Exh. 14.
[Note 31] SOF, ¶ 23; Tr. 66, 165-166.
[Note 32] Tr. 63-65, 96-97.
[Note 33] Tr. 63-65, 174-175.
[Note 34] SOF, ¶ 33.
[Note 35] SOF, ¶¶ 34-35.
[Note 36] SOF, ¶¶ 36-37.
[Note 37] SOF, ¶ 38.

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