Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/303/414/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:08:08+00:00

Document:
Under § 610 of the Revenue Act of 1928, barring suits in the name of the United States to recover amounts erroneously refunded unless brought within two years "after the making of such refund," the period of limitation begins to run not from the time of the allowance of the refund (the date when the Commissioner approves the schedule of overassessments), but from the time of its payment. P. 303 U. S. 416.
Certiorari, 302 U.S. 678, to review the affirmance of a judgment for the taxpayer in a suit by the United States to recover an erroneous refund of taxes.
Under the Revenue Act of 1928, [Footnote 1] forbidding suit by the United States to recover an erroneous tax refund unless brought "within two years after the making of such refund," does the two year limitation begin when the refund is allowed, or when it is paid?
The Court of Appeals affirmed [Footnote 2] the District Court's judgment holding the Government barred by this limitation because the present suit was not brought within two years after the Commissioner allowed the refund by signing the schedule of overassessments.
1928 Act, relied upon as barring recovery of this erroneous and unwarranted tax refund, does not grant the Government a new right, but is a limitation of the Government's long established right to sue for money wrongfully or erroneously paid from the public treasury. Ordinarily, recovery of Government funds, paid by mistake to one having no just right to keep the funds, is not barred by the passage of time. [Footnote 4] There is no contention here that respondent has any right to retain this refund erroneously paid by the Government. His defense is that the statutory bar prevents recovery. The Government's right to recover funds, from a person who received them by mistake and without right is not barred unless Congress has "clearly manifested its intention" [Footnote 5] to raise a statutory barrier.
"Where the Commissioner has (before or after June 6, 1932) signed a schedule of overassessments in respect of any internal revenue tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1932, or any prior revenue Act, the date on which he first signs such schedule (if after May 28, 1928) shall be considered as the date of allowance of refund or credit in respect of such tax."
relates to limitations on suits for erroneous refunds. It has no purpose in common with § 610 of the 1928 Act. The 1932 Act throws no light on the meaning of § 610.
Section 610 is clear when its words are given their commonly accepted import. "Congress may well be supposed to have used language in accordance with the common understanding." [Footnote 7] Webster's New International Dictionary,2d Ed., Unabridged, defines "refund" as "that which is refunded" and defines the transitive verb as: "to return (money) in restitution, repayment. . . ." Only by ignoring the common understanding of words could "making . . .(a) refund" be considered synonymous with "allowing a refund."
"The § (610) provides that any erroneous refund, . . . may be recovered by suit brought in the name of the United States if such suit is begun within two years after the making of the refund."
"The principal change made in existing law is that in the case of a refund the interest period now terminates with the allowance of the refund, a date which often precedes the actual making of the refund. . . ."
It would require language so clear as to leave room for no other reasonable construction in order to induce the belief that Congress intended a statute of limitations to begin to run before the right barred by it has accrued. Obviously, the Government had no right to sue this taxpayer to recover money before money had been paid to him. The construction urged by respondent would allowed the statute of limitations to begin to run against recovery on an erroneous payment before any such payment is made. As said by a House Committee in reporting on a statute of limitations contained in a revenue act, [Footnote 9] "[l]ogically, the period of limitation should run from the date of payment, since it is at that time that the right accrues."
Revenue Act of 1928, c. 852, 45 Stat. 791, 875, § 610.
Wisconsin Central Railroad United States, 164 U. S. 190, 164 U. S. 212; see United States v. Burchard, 125 U. S. 176, 125 U. S. 180-181.
Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 112, 252 U. S. 121.
Compare, United States v. Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. Co., 118 U. S. 120, 118 U. S. 125.
Revenue Act of 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169, 287, § 1104.
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343, 91 U. S. 347.
Daube v. United States, 289 U. S. 367, 289 U. S. 372.
House Report No. 179, 68th Congress, 1st Session, page 27.
Cf. Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 119 U. S. 602.

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