Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/AestheticallyFunctional.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:19:28+00:00

Document:
"Aesthetic functionality" refers to situations where the feature may not provide a truly utilitarian advantage in terms of product performance, but provides other competitive advantages. For example, in Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 32 USPQ2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995), the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's determination that the color black for outboard motors was functional because, while it had no utilitarian effect on the mechanical working of the engines, it nevertheless provided other identifiable competitive advantages – i.e., ease of coordination with a variety of boat colors and reduction in the apparent size of the engines.
The concept of "aesthetic functionality" (as opposed to "utilitarian functionality") has for many years been the subject of much confusion. While the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) appeared to reject the doctrine of aesthetic functionality in In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1047-1050, 215 USPQ 394 (C.C.P.A. 1982), the Supreme Court later referred to aesthetic functionality as a valid legal concept in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 58 USPQ2d 1001 (2001). The confusion regarding aesthetic functionality stems in part from widespread misuse of the term "aesthetic functionality" in cases involving ornamentation issues, with some courts having mistakenly expanded the category of "functional" marks to include matter that is solely ornamental, essentially on the theory that such matter serves an "aesthetic function" or "ornamentation function." It is this incorrect use of the term "aesthetic functionality" in connection with ornamentation cases that was rejected by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 215 USPQ 394, 397, 399-401 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (majority opinion and Rich, J., concurring) (holding, in a case involving features of toy dolls, that the Board had improperly "intermingled the concepts of utilitarian functionality and what has been termed ‘aesthetic functionality;'" and rejecting the concept of aesthetic functionality where it is used as a substitute for "the more traditional source identification principles of trademark law," such as the ornamentation and functionality doctrines).
Where the issue presented is whether the proposed mark is ornamental in nature, it is improper to refer to "aesthetic functionality," because the doctrine of "functionality" is inapplicable to such cases. The proper refusal is that the matter is ornamental and thus does not function as a mark under §§1, 2 and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1052 and 1127. See TMEP §§1202.03 et seq. regarding ornamentation.
The Supreme Court's use of the term "aesthetic functionality" in the TrafFix case appears limited to cases where the issue is one of actual functionality, but where the nature of the proposed mark makes it difficult to evaluate the functionality issue from a purely utilitarian standpoint. This is the case with color marks and product features that enhance the attractiveness of the product. The color or feature does not normally give the product a truly utilitarian advantage (in terms of making the product actually perform better), but may still be found to be functional because it provides other real and significant competitive advantages and thus should remain in the public domain. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165, 34 USPQ2d 1161, 1163-1164 (1995) (stating that a product color might be considered functional if its exclusive use "would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage," even where the color was not functional in the utilitarian sense).
This case seems to involve elements of both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality. Here, for example, there is evidence of utility in applicant's patent application, as well as statements touting the superiority of applicant's design in applicant's promotional literature, and statements that applicant's design results in reduced costs of installation. On the other hand, there is no question that applicant's roof designs which match the appearance of surrounding roof tiles are more pleasing in appearance because the venting tiles in each case are unobtrusive.
M-5 Steel, 61 USPQ2d at 1096. Citing extensively from the TrafFix, Qualitex and Brunswick cases, the Board concluded that the product designs were functional for a combination of utilitarian and aesthetic reasons. M-5 Steel, 61 USPQ2d at 1097.
Note that this type of functionality determination – while employed in connection with a normally "aesthetic" feature such as color – is a proper use of the functionality doctrine, necessitating a §2(e)(5) refusal where the evidence establishes that a color or other matter at issue provides identifiable competitive advantages and thus should remain in the public domain. This is the opposite of an ornamentation refusal, where the matter at issue serves no identifiable purpose other than that of pure decoration.
Generally speaking, examining attorneys should exercise caution in the use of the term "aesthetic functionality," in light of the confusion that historically has surrounded this issue. In most situations, reference to aesthetic functionality will be unnecessary, since a determination that the matter sought to be registered is purely ornamental in nature will result in an ornamentation refusal under §§1, 2 and 45, and a determination that the matter sought to be registered is functional will result in a functionality refusal under §2(e)(5). Use of the term "aesthetic functionality" may be appropriate in limited circumstances where the proposed mark presents issues similar to those involved in the M-5 Steel and Brunswick cases, supra – i.e., where the issue is one of true functionality under §2(e)(5), but where the nature of the mark makes the functionality determination turn on evidence of particular competitive advantages that are not necessarily categorized as "utilitarian" in nature. Any such use of the term "aesthetic functionality" should be closely tied to a discussion of specific competitive advantages resulting from use of the proposed mark at issue, so that it is clear that the refusal is properly based on the functionality doctrine and not on an incorrect use of "aesthetic functionality" to mean ornamentation.
The owner of a "popular" trademark has the right to prevent others from marketing items using a confusingly similar mark.
We cannot conclude that applicant has any right to register its mark simply because it attempts to market its goods to a fan who wants "to communicate his allegiance and support of his team." The trademark owner has a right to market its promotional items to those fans and to prevent others from marketing promotional items to the same fans by using a confusingly similar mark.
The mere fact that a trademark owner's mark is associated with a movie, television show, university, or sports team does not mean that it is functional and available for others to use to promote their goods when the trademark owner is actively licensing the mark for related items.
FOOTNOTE 8 "We add that the case of American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 204 USPQ 609, 616 (2d Cir. 1979), is distinguishable because the "trademarks registered to Universal [relating to the Six Million Dollar Man and The Bionic Woman television shows] were in the areas of T.V. entertainment and toys. This market area bears little if any relationship to footwear, and diminishes the strength of Universal's contention that it had established a right to the term ‘bionic' as a fanciful mark in the field of footwear." In the present case, opposers have shown that the goods of the parties are not only related, but in some cases, identical, and that opposers have priority of use for these items, unlike the party in American Footwear. Id."
Public's desire to purchase goods for the sake of a popular trademark does not preclude registration of the mark.
In light of the above, and assuming for the sake of argument that aesthetic functionality is a valid basis for opposing registration, we concur with applicant that the marks at issue are not aesthetically functional as used in connection with clothing. While, especially in the case of apparel imprinted with designs featuring "Bucky Badger," it is undisputed that many purchasers buy such garments because they find "Bucky" to be "cute" or otherwise appealing and do not care about the particular quality of the goods or whether the University sponsors or endorses them, these facts are legally immaterial. That is to say, the fact that consumers buy a T-shirt, sweatshirt or other garment because they like and want the particular "Bucky Badger," "Bucky on W" or "WISCONSIN BADGERS" design imprinted thereon does not render such designs aesthetically functional. Taken to its logical conclusion, opposers' argument would eliminate trademark protection and registrability for any popular and commercially successful design which is imprinted on clothing, irrespective of whether the design additionally is source-indicative to at least some consumers. University Book Store v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 33 USPQ2d 1385, 1406 (TTAB 1994)(footnote omitted).
Case Finding: Case law does not recognize a right to register similar marks to show support or hostility to a cause.
Also, we reject applicant's argument because it apparently would allow others to register marks that are similar to registered marks in order to show support or hostility to a sports team. American case law simply does not recognize such a right.
Case Finding: Abandonment of a mark confusingly similar to the new mark does not entitle another to use the abandoned mark to confuse the public.
For example, despite the finding of the abandonment of the Baltimore Colts mark and the resulting anger of local fans when the team moved to Indianapolis, another team was not permitted to use the mark BALTIMORE CFL COLTS. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, 31 USPQ2d at 1814 ("The Colts' abandonment of a mark confusingly similar to their new mark neither broke the continuity of the team in its different locations -- it was the same team, merely having a different home base and therefore a different geographical component in its name -- nor entitled a third party to pick it up and use it to confuse Colts fans").
Case Finding: Degree of merchandising of a mark can lead to a finding that the mark is a functional aesthetic component and not a mark.
Second, this case is not similar to International Order of Job's Daughters on which applicant relies. In that case: "The TTAB gave preclusive effect to the Ninth Circuit's determination that the Job's Daughters name and emblem were merely "functional aesthetic components of the product, not trademarks," primarily as a result of the widespread merchandising of Job's Daughters jewelry by many American retail jewelers (including Lindeburg) who are independent of Job's Daughters." International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg and Company, 727 F.2d 1087, 220 USPQ 1017, 1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 1984), discussing International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg and Company, 633 F.2d 912, 208 USPQ 718 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). Here, applicant has not shown that there has been widespread merchandising of the BEARS club marks by independent entities.

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