Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/284/284mass563.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:52:57+00:00

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JOHN B. CUMMINGS vs. THE NATIONAL SHAWMUT BANK OF BOSTON.
Where opinion testimony by expert witnesses was admitted without objection or exception, there was no error in the denial of a motion, presented at the close of the evidence, that such testimony be struck out on the ground that the experts had based their opinions upon facts which were not in evidence; and such testimony was entitled to its probative force.
In determining what is a fair and reasonable charge to be made by an attorney for his services, many considerations are pertinent, including the ability and reputation of the attorney, the demand for his services by others, the amount and importance of the matter involved, the time spent, the prices usually charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same neighborhood, the amount of money or the value of the property affected by controversy, and the results secured; neither the time spent nor any other single factor is necessarily decisive of what is to be considered as a fair and reasonable charge for such services. Per CROSBY, J.
At the hearing by a judge without a jury of an action by an attorney for legal services rendered to the defendant, it was proper to refuse rulings requested by the defendant to the effect that on all the evidence a fair compensation for the plaintiff's services did not exceed a certain sum per hour, and that, in view of the nature of the services required of the plaintiff, "the only elements to be considered in determining a fair compensation are the actual time and labor involved": the question, what was fair and reasonable compensation for the plaintiff's services was a question of fact to be decided on all the evidence.
testified he had performed was from $6,500 to $8,500, it could not be said that a finding for the plaintiff in the sum of about $5,300 was excessive or unreasonable as a matter of law.
No abuse of discretion appeared in the denial of a motion by the defendant for a new trial of the action above described on the grounds that the finding was excessive and that the trial judge was in error in refusing certain requests for rulings.
CONTRACT. Writ dated January 20, 1932.
"5. Upon all the evidence a fair compensation for the plaintiff's services does not exceed $20 an hour.
"6. In view of the. nature of the services the plaintiff was called upon to perform, the only elements to be considered in determining a fair compensation are the actual time and labor involved."
The judge found for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,300.09. The defendant alleged exceptions.
W. T. Snow, for the defendant.
J. W. Cummings, 2d, for the plaintiff.
CROSBY, J. This is an action brought by a lawyer to recover for legal services rendered the defendant, and for certain expenses incurred in connection with an action brought by the defendant against the Border City Manufacturing Company. The action was tried before a judge of the Superior Court without a jury who found for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,300.09. During the course of the trial the defendant excepted to the refusal of the judge to strike out certain testimony. The defendant also excepted to the refusal of the judge to grant certain requests for rulings and to allow a new trial.
on deposit with the bank, the indebtedness was $25,019.74 on that note and $135,000 on the other. On the above date the defendant placed with its general counsel for collection the balance of its claim and authorized its general counsel to employ the plaintiff to collect the balance by an action. The plaintiff was so employed and was directed to begin an action at once on the two notes held by the bank. In accordance with this direction he brought an action in the Superior Court in which the bank was named as plaintiff, the Border City Manufacturing Company was defendant, and the B. M. C. Durfee Trust Company was named as trustee. Service was duly made upon the defendant Border City company and trustee. Between November 12, 1929, and December, 1930, many letters passed between the plaintiff and the general counsel and the vice-president of the bank relative to the claim. On February 18, 1930, the plaintiff received from the treasurer of the defendant Border City Manufacturing Company a certified check for $34,442.91, being the amount attached by trustee process in the hands of the Durfee Trust company and on the same day forwarded it to general counsel of The National Shawmut Bank of Boston. The plaintiff in behalf of the bank claimed a jury trial and afterwards waived it. He filed interrogatories to the treasurer of the defendant in that action, which were answered.
to $1,317.36, and forwarded it to the general counsel, and the $65,000 note was returned to the plaintiff and was stamped "paid" by the bank. The plaintiff sent the cancelled note and an interest statement to the maker by mail. On October 24, 1930, the treasurer of the Border City Manufacturing Company called upon the plaintiff and gave him a check for $5,000 and requested him to find out if the bank would reduce the interest rate on the balance of the indebtedness. The plaintiff sent this check to the general counsel of the bank to be applied on the note of Border City Manufacturing Company and wrote for instructions relative to the reduction of interest, stating that the case was on the trial list for the next session without jury in Fall River. The general counsel made reply to this letter and also stated that the plaintiff should obtain judgment as soon as possible unless notified to the contrary. The plaintiff on November 3 and 4, 1930, spent a day and a half to two days at the Superior Court waiting for the case to be reached. At that time he was informed by counsel for the Border City company that the company did not wish to have the action tried because of the publicity and because it would injure the credit of the company. Thereupon an agreement for judgment was prepared and filed in court which recited that judgment for the bank in the sum of $102,324 with costs in the sum of $31.35 was to be entered forthwith. The plaintiff mailed a copy of the agreement to the general counsel of the bank. The plaintiff also had correspondence with the vice-president of the bank respecting its claim against the Border City Manufacturing Company.
Manufacturing Company and then testified that in his opinion a fair and reasonable charge for such services was $6,785.62, which sum with disbursements of $13.30 made a total of $6,798.92. On cross-examination he testified that he might have spent altogether twelve or fifteen hours on the matter. On his direct examination he had already testified that he had on two different occasions spent one and a half to two days waiting for a trial in the Superior Court. He further testified on cross-examination that in arriving at his opinion as to the fair value of his services he gave very little attention to the time element which he considered insignificant, and could apportion no part of his charge to it. "He considered the amount involved and the amount subsequently received by the National Shawmut Bank as the most important elements to be considered in determining the charge. He considered the fact that the bank was unable to do business with the defendant [Border City Manufacturing Company] and turned it over to him to make it do business and the fact that he did make it do business as important. The only other element he considered was the customary charge of the Fall River Bar Association as established by its schedule of fees in collection cases."
tion was denied subject to the defendant's exception. This exception cannot be sustained. If the defendant deemed the evidence incompetent it was its duty to object to it and save an exception to its admission when it was offered. It was too late to raise a question as to its admissibility by a motion to strike it out after it had been admitted without objection or exception. In these circumstances the testimony was entitled to its probative effect. Hammond v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 211 Mass. 549, 551. Orpin v. Morrison, 230 Mass. 529, 531, 532. Westport v. County Commissioners, 246 Mass. 556, 562, 563. Ferris v. Ray Taxi Service Co. 259 Mass. 401, 405. Crowley v. Swanson, 283 Mass. 82. In support of the motion the defendant cites Payne v. Springfield Street Railway, 203 Mass. 425, 433, where at the close of the evidence the judge directed that the testimony of a witness be struck out. It does not appear that the judge acted upon any motion or request. In the case at bar it is to be assumed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary that the judge, in considering the testimony of the witnesses as to the value of the plaintiff's services, correctly instructed himself as to what was proper to be considered in determining the issue involved and what part of it should be disregarded.
the services rendered. The judge ruled in accordance with the defendant's first request that the plaintiff was entitled to receive only a reasonable compensation for what he did in consequence of his employment. "The principles of law applicable to claims of attorneys for services are not different from those applicable to claims of surveyors, or mechanics, or farmers." The above quoted words are taken from the opinion of this court written by Chief Justice Knowlton in Blair v. Columbian Fireproofing Co. 191 Mass. 333, at page 336. The requests of the defendant which were granted fully protected its rights. The other requests could not properly have been given. The exceptions to their denial must be overruled.
In determining what is a fair and reasonable charge to be made by an attorney for his services many considerations are pertinent, including the ability and reputation of the attorney, the demand for his services by others, the amount and importance of the matter involved, the time spent, the prices usually charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same neighborhood, the amount of money or the value of the property affected by controversy, and the results secured. Neither the time spent nor any other single factor is necessarily decisive of what is to be considered as a fair and reasonable charge for such services. The judge who presided at the trial and heard the testimony of the witnesses was in a position to decide the credence and weight to be given to their testimony. In view of the entire evidence we are unable to reach the conclusion as contended by the defendant that the finding of the trial judge was excessive or unreasonable as matter of law.
granted rests in the sound judicial discretion of the presiding judge. There is nothing in the present case to show that such discretion was not properly exercised.

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