Source: http://thecabadvantage.com/articles/category/cases-from-bits/c193-volume-17-edition-10-cases/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:51:28+00:00

Document:
RONALD MUKASA MAITEKI, Plaintiff, v. MARTEN TRANSPORT LTD, and VOYAGER EXPRESS INC., Defendants.
COUNSEL: [*1] For Ronald Mukasa Maiteki, Plaintiff: Andrew Nyombi, LEAD ATTORNEY, Ikechukwu K. Emejuru, Emejuru & Nyombi LLC, Silver Spring, MD.
For HireRight Inc, Defendant: Daniel Mitchell Combs, LEAD ATTORNEY, Campbell Litigation, P.C., Denver, CO; Chad Joseph Kaldor, Littler Mendelson, PC-Columbus, Columbus, OH; Rod Michael Fliegel, Littler Mendelson, PC-San Francisco, San Francisco, CA.
For Voyager Express Inc, Consol Defendant: Antonio L. Converse, LEAD ATTORNEY, Jennifer E. Schlatter, Patrick D. Vellone, Allen & Vellone, P.C., Denver, CO.
JUDGES: William J. Martínez, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Ronald Maiteki (“Maiteki”) sues Defendant Marten Transport Ltd. (“Marten”) and Defendant Voyager Express Inc. (“Voyager”) for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and related claims. (ECF No. 157.) Currently before the Court are three motions: Marten’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 220), Voyager’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 221), and Maiteki’s Motion to Strike or for Leave [*2] to File a Surreply (ECF No. 239). For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant Marten’s motion in full, grant Voyager’s motion as to all claims except an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A), and deny Maiteki’s motion as moot.
Both sides agree that the following facts are undisputed.
1 All ECF page citations are to the page number in the ECF header, which does not always match the document’s internal pagination.
2 Drive-A-Check reports are treated as credit reports for FCRA purposes and motor carriers furnishing information for such reports are subject to FRCA under the enforcement authority of the Surface Transportation Board. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(b)(1)(C).
The Fair Credit Reporting Act . . . requires a reinvestigation of an employment history provided for your company [regarding Maiteki].
Consumer states that “Unsatisfactory Safety Record” on the work record is incorrect due to the consumer has [sic] no accidents/incidents listed on the report.
HireRight requests Marten send in details/documents to support the disputed information.
Please check your records to determine if an error has been made on the information. . . .
I have reviewed Mr. Maiteki’s record and conclude the information is correct.
On 7/21/2011 Mr. Maiteki was placed on a Written Warning due to a speeding citation issued in the State of Illinois on 7/16/2011.
On 10/5/2011 a Serious Warning was issued based on numerous recorded speed incidents where Mr. Maiteki was driving over the posted speed limit.
Therefore, Work Record (938) Unsatisfactory Safety Record is accurate.
Maiteki claims that Marten’s reinvestigation was inadequate and that the details reported in Konsela’s March 22, 2012 letter were false. (ECF No. 229 at 19, ¶ 38.) The Court will discuss this claim as it relates to the Illinois citation in this Part, and will discuss the “numerous recorded speed incidents” below in Part I.C.
Maiteki challenges the Illinois citations on numerous grounds. As explained below, however, none of these challenges establish a genuine factual dispute over the existence or nature of this Illinois speeding incident, nor a genuine factual dispute over whether Konsela considered this incident as part of her reinvestigation.
Maiteki disputes that he was cited for speeding on this occasion “because when he was inspected by Illinois State Police, a usual routine examination, his truck was parked, [and] all he received was a stop card which did not show him as having been speeding between six (6) and ten (10) miles.” (ECF No. 229 at 5-6, ¶ 11.) This is more of an evasion than a dispute. Maiteki’s explanation implicitly admits that the Illinois State [*6] Police indeed stopped him on this occasion. Moreover, the fact that “his truck was parked” is irrelevant–police officers do not issue citations on the fly. Finally, the fact that the patrol officer did not fill in the blanks for the actual miles-per-hour figures does not alter the fact that the officer put an “X” in the box next to “Speeding” and that Maiteki’s official driving record specifies the miles-per-hour figures.
Q. Okay. Did Mr. Maiteki have any citations, speeding citations?
Q. Okay. So you didn’t look at any citations–okay, there were no citations, like you said?
(ECF No. 232-7 at 16.) The fact that Sobotta was not aware of any speeding citations is not an admission by Marten that Maiteki had no speeding citations.
Generally speaking, Marten does not conduct internal investigations relating to incidents in which a driver was determined to be violating an applicable speed limit or one or more other traffic laws. However, any driver who receives a moving violation in the course of his [or her] employment may contest that violation through the judicial system of the state in which he or she received the citation. In the event that a driver successfully contests such a violation through the judicial system, Marten will remove any negative reference relating thereto from the driver’s employment driving history.
(ECF No. 230-4 at 3.) This does not support an assertion that “Marten never investigated this incident at all because Marten[,] as a policy[,] does not investigate such incidents or use it [sic] to discipline drivers.” (ECF No. 229 at 5-6, ¶ 11.) Also, whether Marten investigated this incident, as [*8] a matter of policy or otherwise, is immaterial to whether the incident occurred.
Maiteki, however, does dispute that Konsela actually looked at the documentary evidence during her reinvestigation. (ECF No. 229 at 17, ¶ 32.) In support, Maiteki cites an e-mail between Konsela and Sobotta, as well as Marten’s responses to certain requests for admission. (Id.) These materials relate solely to an October 2011 “serious warning,” discussed below at Part I.C, allegedly issued to Maiteki on account of later speeding incidents. They are not relevant to whether Konsela viewed the Illinois driver report or stop card. Consequently, Maiteki has failed to establish a genuine dispute that Konsela actually looked at those documents as part of the reinvestigation.
3 This presumably refers to 49 C.F.R. § 392.25, a regulation promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. The regulation prohibits “the use of any flame-producing emergency signal for protecting any commercial motor vehicle transporting” certain explosive and flammable cargo. Marten nowhere explains this alleged violation and does not rely upon it as a justification for reporting an unsatisfactory safety record to HireRight.
Maiteki disputes that his driving record contains this warning letter. In support, he argues that “Marten never investigates or disciplines its drivers for such incidents,” citing the same interrogatory response quoted above. (ECF No. 229 at 6, ¶ 12.) That response only states that Marten, “[g]enerally speaking, . . . does not conduct internal investigations” into speeding incidents. (ECF No. 230-4 at 3.) [*10] It does not say that Marten never disciplines its drivers for speeding.
Maiteki also cites the Sobotta deposition testimony about her unawareness of any speeding citations for Maiteki. (ECF No. 229 at 6, ¶ 12.) As already explained, that testimony does not undermine the existence of the speeding citation, and has no relevance to whether Marten issued a warning letter in response to the citation.
Thus, Maiteki has not established a genuine dispute about the existence of the warning letter. He nonetheless disputes whether Konsela ever looked at it during her reinvestigation, citing an e-mail from Konsela to Sobotta and a response to a request for admission regarding that e-mail. (Id. at 17, ¶ 32.) As already noted, this evidence pertains to a different warning, one given in October 2011 allegedly in response to additional speeding incidents. This evidence says nothing about the July 2011 warning letter. Thus, Maiteki has failed to establish a genuine dispute that Konsela viewed the July 2011 warning letter as part of the reinvestigation.
In addition to the Illinois speeding incident, Konsela’s response letter to HireRight justified Marten’s adverse safety report because [*11] a “Serious Warning was issued based on numerous recorded speed incidents where Mr. Maiteki was driving over the posted speed limit.” (ECF No. 220-12.) As with the Illinois citation, Maiteki challenges this assertion on numerous grounds, and his Motion to Strike specifically relates to certain evidence Marten offers in its reply brief to bolster the assertion. As the following analysis demonstrates, however, Maiteki has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to these additional incidents. This is so even without considering the evidence Maiteki seeks to strike (see ECF No. 239), which the Court has not considered and will not discuss below.
Marten says that the “numerous recorded speed incidents where Mr. Maiteki was driving over the posted speed limit” were documented through information provided by a company named SpeedGauge, Inc. (ECF No. 220 at 5, ¶ 6.) Maiteki argues that “SpeedGauge is a recent façade of Marten’s imagination.” (ECF No. 229 at 4, ¶ 8.) Determining whether this presents a genuine factual dispute requires an extended discussion of SpeedGauge, its alleged use at Marten, and Marten’s record-keeping procedures with respect to it.
Maiteki attacks most aspects of Marten’s story, essentially accusing Marten of fabricating it. The Court will address all attacks in turn.
In various forms, Maiteki objects that the original SpeedGauge records no longer exist. (See, e.g., ECF No. 229 at 4-13, ¶¶ 8, 13, 16, 22, 27.) Marten admits as much, asserting that it “does not keep speed-monitoring data pertaining to a driver after he or she separates from the Company.” (ECF No. 220-6 ¶ 14 n.1.) Marten also ended its relationship with SpeedGauge at some point after Maiteki’s departure. (ECF No. 220 at 11, ¶ 36.) Nonetheless, Sobotta testified that she created [*14] the HRIS entry on October 5, 2011, drawing on contemporaneous SpeedGauge reports. (ECF No. 220-5 at 2, 7-8.) Maiteki does not object that the HRIS entry is inadmissible (e.g., as failing to meet the requirements of the business records hearsay exception, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)). Thus, competent evidence exists to show that the SpeedGauge reports were real and contained the information noted by Sobotta on the October 5, 2011 HRIS entry.
reporting inaccurate information on the consumer[‘]s work history report. The consumer states that the company is reporting that the consumer struck another employee with her tractor trailer, and the consumer states that she didn’t. The consumer has documentation from a judge stating a ruling in her favor, but the company will [*15] not remove it.
(Id. at 1, 2.) “However,” the FTC said, “we were not able to locate any investigative records [relating to this complaint].” (Id. at 1.) This information falls well short of raising a triable issue of fact whether Marten regularly falsifies data on its drivers’ employment records.
Q. You understand what a Drive-a-Check report is?
Q. Okay. Do you understand what DOT recordable accidents are?
Q. Do you understand what non-DOT recordable accidents are?
Q. Why weren’t the accidents that were in the [HRIS] file inserted into the [Drive-A-Check] report as a DOT or non-DOT recordable accident?
A. If it was an incident, it was not reported.
Q. –though the HRIS file says preventable accidents?
So the HRIS file is in error, it’s–it’s an erroneous document?
Q. The HRIS file has issues with the language?
Q. –based on your [*17] experience?
A. If new information comes to light, yes, there’s been clarifications.
A. There–there could possibly be descriptions. I see that more in accident descriptions of an accident that have been corrected or adjusted.
(ECF No. 232-6 at 4-5.) This testimony does not support an assertion that “Konsela testified that she has had to make corrections and clarifications on several occasions.” It says nothing about the quantity of corrections, only that when corrections happen, they are usually to accident descriptions. This is, at best, only a scintilla of evidence that the negative information in Maiteki’s record (which was not accident-related) was entered in error. It does not create a genuine factual dispute. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 678 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Genuine issues of fact must be supported by more than a mere scintilla of evidence.”).
I am responding to a [Drive-A-Check] Rebuttal [from Maiteki] and need your help.
Could have this [sic] comment been entered under this driver in error? I would like to remove it if you agree or would you have an e-mail from 10/5/11 to Stacy Gray, Alexa for myself regarding this driver?
Both Konsela and Sobotta testified at their depositions that they spoke on the phone in the gap between the 11:14 and 11:44 e-mails. Konsela testified that she learned from Sobotta about [*19] how SpeedGauge worked, and that Sobotta confirmed the accuracy of her HRIS entry–apparently from memory, because the underlying SpeedGauge records no longer existed. (ECF No. 232-5 at 4-5.) Sobotta recalled explaining the SpeedGauge system to Konsela. (ECF No. 220-5 at 3; see also id. at 7-8; ECF No. 232-7 at 22-23.) Thus, as it relates to SpeedGauge, the Konsela-Sobotta e-mail exchange is simply additional evidence that SpeedGauge records no longer existed to backup Sobotta’s HRIS entry. It is not evidence of fabrication.
Maiteki also makes much of the fact that Konsela could not find a letter documenting the Serious Warning. (ECF No. 229 at 7-8, ¶ 16.) Maiteki appears to assume that the Serious Warning should have generated a letter, but the relevant HRIS entry documents a conversation. It does not mention a written warning–in contrast to the HRIS entry for July 21, 2011, documenting Maiteki’s Illinois speeding citation. (See ECF No. 220-7 at 2.)5 Thus, Konsela’s e-mail exchange with Sobotta does not raise a genuine dispute of fact regarding the existence of SpeedGauge data generally or specifically as to Maiteki.
5 As for the “driver review queue” mentioned in the e-mail exchange, the parties [*20] do not elaborate on it or its significance.
Q. Okay. So Marten enacted a SpeedGauge from in trucks?
Q. It’s a report. The gauge is a report or the gauge is–Marten enacted a SpeedGauge after this–can you clarify what you just said? I don’t understand what you said, I’m sorry.
A. Marten Transport put a program together to be able to manage–to be able to view speed of trucks in given areas, any area, in an effort to be able to, you know, identify, counsel, advise drivers of speed.
Q. Do they–do you still use the gauge today?
A. We still have access to it, yes.
Q. You still have access to SpeedGauge?
Q. Okay. Can I go back to the letter, Exhibit 1? Let me go back for a second.
If–are you able to access that–the SpeedGauge today?
A. Yes. Could I clarify, though? SpeedGauge was a name of a company.
A. SpeedGauge is what employees of Marten Transport refer to when they’re speaking of the speed of the truck, of a driver.
Q. And you can still access it today?
(ECF No. 220-3 at 2-3.) Viewing the entire passage, it is clear that Konsela testified that Marten still tracks driver speed, not that it has access to historical information from the company named SpeedGauge. Thus, contrary to Maiteki’s assertion, Marten has never admitted that it has continuing access to historical SpeedGauge data.
Regardless of who bears the burden, a jury in a civil case may usually draw inferences against a defendant for failing to offer evidence in its own defense. Marten’s failure to subpoena Maiteki’s SpeedGauge records–assuming they still exist (something no party addresses)–could therefore be the basis of a jury’s adverse inference.
Even so, the range of permissible inferences would be limited. Maiteki’s two remaining claims against Marten are for unreasonable reinvestigation under FRCA and for defamation. (See Part II, infra.) There could be no relevant adverse inference concerning the FCRA unreasonable investigation claim because the failure to subpoena SpeedGauge records in this lawsuit has nothing to do with whether Marten failed to reasonably investigate in March 2012.
As for the defamation claim, SpeedGauge records could help to prove that the supposedly defamatory statement was true, and Marten’s failure to obtain those records could support an inference that Marten is at least uncertain what it would find, in turn supporting an inference that the alleged defamatory statement was false (or at least that Marten was reckless about its truth or falsity). In [*23] the context of the evidence as a whole, however, this would at best rise to the level of a “mere scintilla,” which is not enough to defeat summary judgment. See Adler, 144 F.3d at 678 n.5. Consequently, the lack of a subpoena from Marten to SpeedGauge does not create a triable issue of fact.
Q. . . . Would you consider the SpeedGauge a radar detector?
Q. Would you consider it a scanner?
A. It was used [*24] as a safety tool, not as–not as one of these devices.
Q. Okay. But they–they do the same thing, right? They gauge speed?
Q. So the result is the same, but the purpose for which you’re employing them is different, correct?
Q. Okay. But you understand that Marten Transport says they do not condone–condone the use of radar detectors?
Q. So most likely they wouldn’t agree to use a radar detectors [sic]?
Q. But they would agree to the use of SpeedGauge–SpeedGauge in the trucks?
(Id. at 8-9.) Thus, Marten disapproves of radar detectors, laser detectors, scanners, and police receivers. But Maiteki points to nothing in the Official Guidebook or elsewhere stating that Marten disapproves of “Speed tracking-technology”–a category that Maiteki’s counsel appears to have invented during the deposition (i.e., devices that “gauge speed”) in hopes of leading Sobotta into some sort of admission that SpeedGauge would be contrary to company policy.
Counsel obtained no such admission, obviously. Counsel therefore had no good faith basis to represent to this Court “that Marten as a Company policy does not use or even condone the use of Speed tracking-technology.” [*25] (ECF No. 229 at 4-5, ¶ 8.) Indeed, the word choice demonstrates an attempt to be technically true (because Marten does not condone “Speed tracking-technology,” if that refers to technology such as radar detectors) but intentionally misleading (because “Speed tracking-technology,” on its face, appears to be a category that would encompass SpeedGauge, although, for Marten, it does not).
Maiteki additionally claims that “[a] Marten vehicle cannot speed past the posted speed limit anywhere,” citing testimony from his own deposition. (ECF No. 229 at 6-7, ¶ 14.) But that is not what Maiteki stated in his deposition. Rather, he testified that Marten’s “vehicles are governed, so there is no way a driver can speed in an area which has a speed limit which is over the speed–the governed speed limit.” (ECF No. 232-4 at 4.) Thus, Maiteki’s counsel cannot truthfully represent that “[a] Marten vehicle cannot speed past the posted speed limit anywhere” (emphasis added). At best, a Marten vehicle cannot speed in an area where the posted speed limit matches the governor’s speed limit.6 This fails to raise a genuine dispute about the existence of SpeedGauge.
Having reviewed the evidence thoroughly, the Court concludes that Maiteki fails to raise any genuine dispute of material fact regarding the information backing up Konsela’s March 22, 2012 response letter to HireRight.
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1). “Courts have implied a reasonableness requirement to this investigation.” Maiteki v. Marten Transp. Ltd., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1252 (D. Colo. 2013); see also Westra v. Credit Control of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, 357 F.3d 426, 426 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004). Moreover, “the requirement that furnishers investigate consumer disputes is procedural. An investigation is not necessarily unreasonable because it results in a substantive conclusion unfavorable to the consumer, even if that conclusion turns out to be inaccurate.” Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009). “The burden of showing the investigation was unreasonable is on the plaintiff.” Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2010).
o Konsela timely wrote back to HireRight with details regarding Maiteki’s “Unsatisfactory Safety Record” (i.e., dates and descriptions of the various speeding incidents).
(ECF No. 229 at 26-35.) Many of these arguments overlap, so the Court will address them below in related blocks.
Arguments 1-4, 6, and 18 accuse Marten of generally failing to [*30] have a sufficiently formal reinvestigation system. Marten disputes some of these accusations but the Court finds the dispute immaterial under the circumstances. Although lack of formal reinvestigation policies and procedures may have a role in some FCRA disputes, the Court finds that it has no relevance to the present dispute given the scope of the reinvestigation required in this case, as discussed in Part II.A.2.d below.
Arguments 5 and 8-10 all relate to supposed deficiencies in employee FCRA training. The only insufficiently trained employees Maiteki refers to, however, are Sobotta and another employee named Alexa Sax, who was “involved in generating disciplinary warnings to drivers.” (ECF No. 229 at 29.) Maiteki does not attack Konsela’s FCRA training, and Konsela was the investigator in this instance.7 To be sure, Maiteki claims that Konsela was forced to “engage in on-the-job training during the investigation of Maiteki’s dispute,” but this refers to Konsela’s knowledge of how the Driver Review Queue works (as evidenced by the Konsela-Sobotta e-mail exchange), not Konsela’s knowledge of FCRA requirements. The fact that Konsela asked for help with a particular [*31] data source shows that she takes her FCRA responsibilities seriously, not that she was insufficiently trained to perform a FCRA investigation. Thus, these arguments provide no shield against summary judgment.
Arguments 11, 13, and 14 accuse Marten of performing a perfunctory investigation. However, “[t]he wording of the notice of dispute, as the furnisher receives it from the CRA [here, HireRight], constrains the investigation: the furnisher need only respond to the specific dispute, as it is received. Thus, a limited investigation may suffice for a limited dispute.” Collins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 912 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1011 (D. Colo. 2012) (citations omitted); see also Chiang, 595 F.3d at 38 (“a more limited investigation may be appropriate when CRAs provide the furnisher with vague or cursory information about a consumer’s dispute”).
8 Maiteki challenges Marten’s assertion that it considers speeding violations to be a violation of company safety standards. (ECF No. 229 at 11, ¶ 24.) “Indeed,” says Maiteki, “this is another fantastical notion by Marten.” (Id.) To the contrary, it would be fantastical if a trucking company such as Marten did not consider speeding to be a violation of its safety standards.
For reasons that no party explains, the enclosures themselves are not in the record. Regardless, Maiteki’s arguments are baseless. The first statement (“Konsela testified that HireRight only sends a standard letter stating what a driver disputes with no mention of attachments.”) is worded to convey the impression that Konsela testified to a lack of attachments. She did not. When asked, “[W]hat [does HireRight] send to you in particular?”, Konsela responded, “It’s a standard letter that would state the driver’s name[,] his dates he was employed by Marten, [and] what he disputes.” (ECF No. 232-5 at 8 (irrelevant verbal interjection omitted).) This answer responds to a question about HireRight letters generally, not the letter about Maiteki specifically; and [*34] Konsela was never asked about attachments.
As for the second statement (“Konsela quickly went straight to looking at the computer summary Driver Review Queue and HRIS screen for comments entered on Maiteki.”), Maiteki cites three items of evidence. The first is a particular page of Konsela’s deposition testimony that Maiteki does not put in the record. (See ECF No. 229 at 16, ¶ 30 (citing “p.20” of ECF No. 232-5, which does not exist).) The second is to a Konsela deposition excerpt that has no apparent relevance to the issue. (Id. (citing “p.29:19-25” of ECF No. 232-6, which is a discussion of the number of HireRight reinvestigation letters Marten receives every year).) The third is a Sobotta deposition excerpt in which Maiteki’s counsel asks a confusing series of questions conflating Sobotta’s use of the Driver Review Queue when she is evaluating disciplinary measures and her use of that same data source when asked by Konsela to confirm its accuracy. (See ECF No. 232-7 at 12-14.) This says nothing about whether Konsela consulted the enclosures accompanying HireRight’s March 8, 2012 letter.
Furthermore, Maiteki has not explained what might have been in those enclosures that would have [*35] given Konsela more direction, thereby altering the scope of a reasonable investigation under the circumstances. For all these reasons, the Court rejects Maiteki’s attempt to raise a factual dispute on proper scope of Marten’s reinvestigation.
Arguments 12, 16, and 17 all claim that Marten could not perform a competent investigation without the original records underlying the HRIS speeding notations. But Marten did possess original records for the Illinois citation. As for SpeedGauge, Marten certainly could have made this case easier on itself had it retained those records, but their absence does not raise a genuine dispute regarding the reasonableness of the investigation. To the contrary, Konsela was ready to delete the SpeedGauge-prompted HRIS entry if she could not confirm it, and so she reached out to another information source, Sobotta, who was responsible for the HRIS entry in the first place. Other than his already-rejected claims about the alleged general inaccuracy of Marten’s records, Maiteki provides no reason why Konsela could not reasonably rely on Sobotta’s recollection of her own HRIS entry. Consequently, the completeness of [*36] Marten’s reinvestigation raises no question needing resolution by a jury.
Marten disputes that its driver qualification file is legally deficient (ECF No. 236 at 5, ¶ 22), but that dispute is immaterial because Maiteki has not explained how it would change the outcome here. Maiteki asserts that “Marten’s employees never looked at [his] medical examiners certificate, certificate of driver’s road test, [his] application for employment, [or] a note relating to the annual review of [his] driving record.” (ECF No. 229 at 33.) Maiteki fails to explain the relevance of any of these documents to the question of whether he in fact was speeding as the HRIS entry indicated. Consequently, Marten’s [*37] maintenance of or reference to Maiteki’s driver qualification file raises no genuine factual dispute about the reasonableness of its reinvestigation.
After conducting its reasonable investigation and reviewing all relevant information provided by a CRA, a furnisher must report back its findings about a customer’s information to the CRA that originally provided notice of the dispute. . . . [T]his reporting duty requires a furnisher to respond to a CRA regarding the results of the furnisher’s investigation, irrespective of the outcome of its investigation.
This passage does not require a furnisher to explain all the records it could and could not find. Circumstances may exist when this sort of information might be necessary for the credit reporting agency to accurately [*38] convey the results of the reinvestigation back to the consumer. Maiteki, however, has not explained how this case fits into that category. Thus, there is no genuine dispute to send to a jury.
Argument 20 claims that Marten failed in its duty under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E) to modify, delete, or block inaccurate or unverifiable information. (ECF No. 229 at 34-35.) This begs the question. Marten did not find its information inaccurate or unverifiable, and therefore had no such duty.
Maiteki’s numerous arguments fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment will be granted to Marten on Maiteki’s FCRA claim. Given that the Court reaches this disposition without reliance on the alleged untimely disclosed evidence that Maiteki attacks in his Motion to Strike (ECF No. 239), that motion is denied as moot.
9 This provision contains exceptions other than for malice or willful intent, but Maiteki does not argue that those exceptions apply here.
Courts evaluating malice in this context have borrowed the Supreme Court’s definition of “actual malice” in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). See, e.g., Greenwood Trust Co. v. Conley, 938 P.2d 1141, 1149 (Colo. 1997) (adopting New York Times standard). Thus, “malice” requires “knowledge that a statement is false or reckless disregard for whether a statement is false or not.” Id. at 1149.
Assuming arguendo that Marten’s original report to HireRight regarding Maiteki was false, Maiteki has presented no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Marten knew that it was false. Indeed, Maiteki does not argue that Marten actually knew the report was false.
As for “reckless disregard,” that phrase has been defined as requiring “a high degree [*40] of awareness of probable falsity” or at least entertaining “serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.” Beuster v. Equifax Info. Servs., 435 F. Supp. 2d 471, 477 (D. Md. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, Maiteki has raised no triable issue of fact.
Some of his arguments in this regard go back to Marten’s reinvestigation procedures and results (see ECF No. 229 at 36-37), which are not relevant to reckless disregard at the time of the original report to HireRight. In terms of potentially relevant evidence, Maiteki claims that Marten furnished its report “without even reviewing his work record.” (Id.) In support, however, Maiteki cites only his own deposition, where he speculates that Marten could not have reviewed his entire file because he resigned on December 1, 2011 (a Thursday) and the HireRight report indicates that HireRight received information on Maiteki on December 5, 2011 (the following Monday). (ECF No. 232-4 at 14; see also ECF No. 230-9 at 8.) Maiteki believes that this timeframe was somehow too short, considering the intervening weekend.
It is undisputed, however, that Marten’s contract with HireRight requires reporting on a driver within one business day after the driver’s termination or resignation. (ECF No. 220 at [*41] 8, ¶ 19.) In any event, even viewed in the light most favorable to Maiteki, his speculation is not enough to raise a triable issue of fact. No reasonable jury could infer that Maiteki’s nine-month employment with Marten generated a personnel file so large that it would require several days to review.
From this, Maiteki constructs a chain of inferences. First, he assumes that code 938 must refer exclusively to accident-related terminations. Maiteki then correlates this with Marten’s March 22, 2012 response letter to HireRight, which concludes by stating, “Work Record (938) Unsatisfactory Safety Record is accurate.” (ECF No. 220-12.) Maiteki therefore infers that Marten used code 938 when reporting Maiteki’s termination to HireRight, which would have been inaccurate because he had no accidents while at Marten. (ECF No. 229 at 8, ¶ 21.) This, says Maiteki, is evidence of reckless falsehood.
For all these reasons, the Court finds no genuine dispute over any fact from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Marten furnished information recklessly (and therefore maliciously).10 Summary judgment is appropriate on Maiteki’s defamation claim. Moreover, because the parties have stipulated to dismiss all of Maiteki’s causes of action against Marten other than his FCRA reinvestigation claim and his defamation claim (ECF No. 212), final judgment in favor of Marten is appropriate and will be entered at the close of the case.
10 FCRA allows a defamation claim where the plaintiff can prove “malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (emphasis added). Maiteki notes that this phrase is [*44] “disjunctive” (ECF No. 229 at 35) but provides no standards for judging “willful intent,” nor does he present evidence of such intent other than the same evidence on which he bases his claim of recklessness. The Court therefore finds no triable issue of fact regarding willful intent.
Voyager has placed in the record a July 19, 2012 employment application appearing to be from Maiteki. (ECF No. 222-2 at 34-37.) Maiteki, however, denies that the application is actually his because “Voyager Express, in response to a federal subpoena, stated under oath that Plaintiff’s application had been, ‘purged and destroyed after one year from the date of his application.'” [*45] (ECF No. 231 at 2, ¶ 1.) Thus, from the outset, the Court must evaluate a bizarre factual dispute to determine if it raises a genuine issue for trial.
Q. . . . Is Document 17–is that the application you submitted to Voyager?
Q. Okay. And do you see on the first page it has, kind of in the middle of the page, a space for a signature?
Q. And is that your signature?
It looks like an application; but Voyager say[s] that they didn’t have anything about me. They never–they said they did not have any information about me, that I’d never done any–any business with them, and all the information I filled [sic; ‘filed’?] with them was destroyed. So I don’t–I don’t believe that this is true because they already admitted that they didn’t have anything about me.
Q. (BY MR. CONVERSE [Voyager’s counsel]) Well, you’ve had an opportunity to look over the document that’s been marked Deposition Exhibit 53. There’s handwriting throughout that deposition [sic]. Do you see that?
Q. Do you recognize any of that handwriting anywhere on that document to be your own handwriting?
MR. NYOMBI [Maiteki’s counsel]: Objection for the record. Calls for speculation.
A. I cannot admit because you say that I didn’t have–that Voyager did not have any information about me. So I don’t know where this one came from.
MR. NYOMBI: Objection for the record; lacks foundation. Objection for the record; confusing. Objection; asked and answered.
Q. (BY MR. CONVERSE) Can you recognize your own handwriting, Mr. Maiteki?
MR. NYOMBI: Objection. Asked and answered.
A. I don’t know. I don’t know because I’m not an expert in analyzing handwritings.
Q. (BY MR. CONVERSE) No, I’m not asking for an expert opinion. I’m just asking you, are you capable of recognizing your own handwriting when you see it written on a piece of paper?
Q. Are you capable of recognizing your signature when you see it on a piece of paper?
12 The Court notes that Mr. Nyombi’s objections are inappropriate, at times ridiculous, and an abuse of the right to object under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(c)(2). Unfortunately, this is not an isolated lapse. All of the Maiteki deposition excerpts submitted to the Court display the same pervasive abuse.
Returning to the question that prompted [*50] this long evidentiary excursion: is there a genuine dispute of material fact over the authenticity or genuineness of the document Voyager proffers as Maiteki’s July 2012 employment application (including the FCRA disclosure page)? The answer is no. As to the first four pages, Maiteki affirmed to HireRight’s counsel that it was his application–even though he stated the very next day that he did not know if he could recognize his own signature. As to the FCRA disclosure page, no reasonable jury examining the handwriting and signatures throughout the application materials could conclude that the handwriting and signature on the FCRA page is not Maiteki’s.
Accordingly, to the extent based on a continuing insistence that Maiteki’s application to Voyager no longer exists, Maiteki’s objections to Voyager’s statement of material facts are rejected as unsupported. (See ECF No. 231 at 2-8.) Maiteki’s answers on his second deposition day were not good faith denials, but unquestionably motivated by his desire to avoid admitting that he gave consent to have his Drive-A-Check report pulled (which is a crucial question in some of his causes of action, as discussed in Part IV, below). The Court notes [*51] that if Maiteki’s counsel coached Maiteki to respond as he did on the second deposition day, Maiteki’s counsel should be subject to bar discipline. But the Court need not inquire that far. Even if Maiteki developed conveniently obstructive amnesia entirely on his own, Maiteki’s counsel could not in good faith rely on Maiteki’s nonsensical insistence that his own application–which he authenticated the day before–no longer exists because Voyager at one point mistakenly asserted that it had been destroyed.
(Id. at 2.) This appears to be Maiteki’s only evidence of the e-mail.
Relying on such evidence raises serious concerns. Assuming Maiteki intends to introduce this at trial (as a prior consistent statement, for example), Mr. Emejuru would probably need to take the stand to authenticate it, thus becoming a witness in his own client’s case. Moreover, Voyager would almost certainly question Mr. Emejuru regarding [*53] why he would ever cut and paste a portion of the e-mail into his letter rather than producing a print-out of the original, and Mr. Emejuru would almost certainly refuse to answer based on attorney-client privilege or work product protection, thus bogging down the trial in thorny evidentiary questions.
Voyager’s explanation makes sense, but the question in this context is not whether Voyager received the e-mail. It is whether Maiteki sent it, or at least attempted to send it, because doing so is evidence from which a jury could conclude that Lindeen did not speak with Maiteki on July 31, 2012. Mr. Emejuru’s letter is potential evidence, however problematic, that Maiteki attempted to send the e-mail.
The Court accordingly finds a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether Lindeen actually spoke with Maiteki on July 31, 2012, or at least whether Lindeen [*54] told Maiteki on that date that his application had been rejected. W hether this dispute is material to the outcome depends on the issues the Court turns to next.
In support of his claim that Lindeen received the Drive-A-Check report on July 31, Maiteki cites to an “Inquiry History Report” [*55] showing a July 31 “Request Submitted” date for Maiteki’s Drive-A-Check history, among other things. (ECF No. 233-5.) Without more (e.g., testimony about the length of time it takes for HireRight to fill orders), this is not evidence that Lindeen received the report on July 31.
Considering all of the evidence, a reasonable jury could accept Lindeen’s story (somewhat bolstered by her work journal) that she made her decision on July 31 before receiving Maiteki’s Drive-A-Check report, and informed Maiteki of her decision the same day. On the other hand, (i) a jury could conclude that Maiteki at least attempted to send an e-mail over two months later inquiring about his application status, suggesting that he had not heard from Lindeen [*57] earlier; (ii) Voyager received Maiteki’s Drive-A-Check report at least by August 1; and (iii) Lee’s affidavit establishes that consulting the Drive-A-Check report is part of Voyager’s ordinary course of conduct when screening applicants. See Fed. R. Evid. 406 (“Evidence of . . . an organization’s routine practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the . . . organization acted in accordance with the . . . routine practice.”). Taking all of this together, a reasonable jury could conclude that Lindeen made her decision sometime after receiving, and in part based on, the Drive-A-Check report. Consequently, a genuine dispute exists regarding the material fact of when and on what basis Voyager decided to reject Maiteki’s employment application.
Maiteki contends that Voyager’s alleged conduct violated two FCRA provisions. The Court will discuss each in turn.
(ii) the [applicant] has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that [prospective employer].
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). No reasonable jury could conclude that Voyager’s FCRA disclosure statement was anything other than “clear and conspicuous,” or that it failed to inform that a consumer report would be obtained for employment purposes. (See ECF No. 222-2 at 42.) In addition, as determined in Part III.A, above, no reasonable jury could conclude that Voyager failed to give this disclosure to Maiteki or that he failed to sign it. The Court will therefore grant summary judgment on Maiteki’s Claims 10 and 11 to the extent Maiteki alleges a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
(ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as prescribed by . . . section 1681g(c)(3) of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). Maiteki claims, and Voyager does not contest, that FCRA also requires additional notices after the adverse action has been taken. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m.
Voyager admits that it never sent any of these notices. (ECF No. 231 at 12-13, ¶¶ 2-5.) Voyager maintains it never had a duty to send such notices because Lindeen made her decision not to hire Maiteki before she saw his Drive-A-Check report. (ECF No. 221 at 6-7.) The Court has already concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. (See Part III.C, supra.) Voyager offers no argument that it could somehow be excused from the notice requirements even assuming that Lindeen relied on the Drive-A-Check report when making her decision. Accordingly, summary judgment must be denied on Maiteki’s Claims 10 and 11 to the extent Maiteki alleges a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A).
Maiteki’s invasion of privacy claim rests on the allegation that Voyager “illegally accessed his Drive-A-Check report surreptitiously without his knowledge.” (ECF No. 157 [*60] at 44, ¶ 7.) Again, however, no reasonable jury could conclude other than that Maiteki gave his written consent for Voyager to access his Drive-A-Check report. The Court will grant summary judgment to Voyager on Maiteki’s Claim 12.
Maiteki claims that Voyager was negligent in hiring and supervising Lindeen, thereby leading to the alleged FCRA violation. (ECF No. 157 at 45.) “Negligent hiring cases . . . involve the employer’s responsibility for the dangerous propensities of the employee, which were known or should have been known by the employer at the time of hiring, gauged in relation to the duties of the job for which the employer hires the employee.” Raleigh v. Performance Plumbing & Heating, 130 P.3d 1011, 1016 (Colo. 2006) (emphasis added). And, “in a claim for negligent supervision against an employer the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew his employee posed a risk of harm to the plaintiff and that the harm that occurred was a foreseeable manifestation of that risk.” Keller v. Koca, 111 P.3d 445, 446 (Colo. 2005) (emphasis added). Thus, both negligent hiring and negligent supervision are closely tied to the employer’s knowledge of the specific employee’s potentially dangerous propensities.
Assuming Lindeen decided not to hire Maiteki based in [*61] part on his Drive-A-Check report, Maiteki has offered no evidence that Voyager had any knowledge or reason to know, either at the time of hiring or later, that Lindeen might have a propensity to fail to provide the required FCRA notices. Maiteki claims that Voyager had insufficient policies, procedures, and training to ensure FCRA compliance, but Maiteki points to no authority converting such alleged corporate laxity into a claim of negligently hiring or supervising a specific employee. (ECF No. 231 at 28-32.) Thus, summary judgment in Voyager’s favor on Claim 13 is appropriate. Cf. Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 F. App’x 755, 766 (10th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment was appropriate on Oklahoma negligent supervision claim where plaintiffs failed to “point to any evidence of prior knowledge by [the employer] of any propensity by [the employee] to commit any of the torts alleged”).
Finally, Maiteki claims that Voyager engaged in “outrageous conduct” by failing to give the required FCRA notices. (ECF No. 157 at 46; ECF No 231 at 33-36.) This Court has previously noted the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) under Colorado law: “(1) the defendant engaged in extreme [*62] and outrageous conduct; (2) recklessly or with the intent of causing the plaintiff severe emotional distress; (3) causing the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.” Maiteki, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (quoting Han Ye Lee v. Colo. Times, Inc., 222 P.3d 957, 966-67 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)). The Court has further noted that “the level of outrageousness required to create liability is extremely high.” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Kancilia, 70 P.3d 594, 597 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003)). Finally, this Court previously held that “alleg[ations] [of] knowingly and repeatedly report[ing] false information to HireRight . . . fall far short of meeting the exacting standard required to state a claim for [IIED].” Id. Maiteki’s IIED theory against Voyager is even less compelling than that. It therefore fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment will be granted for Voyager on Maiteki’s Claim 14.
5. Further considering the limited portion of this case that remains for trial, Maiteki and Voyager are strongly encouraged to consider moving this Court for approval of a settlement conference to be scheduled before the assigned Magistrate Judge.
THOMAS VOGLER, SR., THOMAS VOGLER, JR., TIFFANY M. VOGLER, and TAMMY VOGLER, Plaintiffs, vs. JAMES R. POSHARD & SON, INC., and JONATHAN SHEALEY, Defendants.
COUNSEL: [*1] For THOMAS VOGLER, SR., THOMAS VOGLER, JR., TIFFANY M. VOGLER, Plaintiffs: Gregory G. Fenlon, LEAD ATTORNEY, St. Louis Lawyers Group, Clayton, MO.
For JAMES R. POSHARD & SON, INC., POSHARD LOGISTICS, LLC, JONATHAN SHEALEY, Defendants: Christopher P. Leritz, LEAD ATTORNEY, Leritz, Plunkert et al., St. Louis, MO.
JUDGES: RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF United States District Judge.
Plaintiffs, Thomas Vogler, Sr., Thomas Vogler, Jr., Tiffany M. Vogler, and Tammy Vogler, brought this action against Defendants, James R. Poshard & Son, Inc. (“Poshard”) and Jonathan Shealey, for damages arising out of a vehicular accident that occurred on U.S. Highway 231 on March 20, 2014. On that day, Shealey was driving a tractor-trailer owned by Poshard. Plaintiffs allege Shealey negligently crossed the center line and collided with Plaintiffs’ automobile. Defendants now move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages. For reasons explained below, the court GRANTS the motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment [*2] as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A genuine dispute of fact exists if, based on the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party on a particular issue. Id. at 248. The court views all admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but it need not draw unreasonable inferences. Tindle v. Polte Home Corp., 607 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2010).
Poshard is a trucking company and the registered owner of the tractor involved in the collision on March 20, 2014. On that day, Shealey, employee of Poshard and driver of the tractor-trailer, was transporting coal from a coal mine in Corning, Indiana, to a power plant in Owensboro, Kentucky. Shealey would typically deliver three loads of coal from the mine to the power plant in a single day. The accident occurred at approximately one o’clock p.m. as Shealey headed northbound on U.S. Highway 231 to pick up a third load of coal. (Filing No. 86-9 (“Shealey Dep.”) at 8-10).
Highway 231 is a two-lane highway with a single lane for northbound traffic and a single lane for southbound traffic. The posted speed limit where [*3] the accident occurred was fifty-five miles per hour. (Filing No. 86-2 at 3-6). In response to interrogatories, Shealey stated that he was traveling fifty miles per hour. (Filing No. 86-10 at 7). Shealey testifies that he entered the southbound lane where he collided with another tractor-trailer heading south on Highway 231. After colliding with the tractor-trailer, Shealey testifies that he remained in the southbound lane where he collided head-on with Plaintiffs’ vehicle traveling in the southbound lane behind the tractor-trailer. Plaintiffs suffered serious injuries as a result of the collision. (Filing No. 86-2 at 6-7). Shealey pleaded guilty to a citation for crossing the center line. (Shealey Dep. 69-70; Filing No. 86-4 at 3).
The court must address the parties’ objections to designated evidence. Defendants designate documents purportedly consisting of Shealey’s work history report, two different reports of his driving record, a drug test report, a photocopy of Shealey’s driver’s license, and a medical examiner’s certificate. Plaintiffs object to the documents on grounds that Defendants failed to authenticate them with affidavits.
1 The court notes that Defendants declined to respond to Plaintiffs’ objections.
Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the Indiana Officer’s Standard Crash Report (Filing No. 86-2 (“Crash Report”)) as inadmissible hearsay. The court agrees. To the extent Plaintiffs rely upon witness statements reported in the Crash Report–as opposed to firsthand observations of the officer–the court finds it inadmissible. See Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing the advisory committee’s note to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), observing that “[p]olice reports have generally been excluded except to the extent to which they incorporate firsthand observations of the officer”).
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs [*5] allege that Defendants’ conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages. (See Filing No. 62 (“Sec. Am. Compl.”) at 6-12). Plaintiffs appear to base their claim for punitive damages against Poshard on a theory of vicarious liability.2 Defendants argue Plaintiffs have failed to establish a dispute of material fact on the issue of punitive damages against either defendant and, accordingly, the court should grant summary judgment.
2 On September 10, 2015, the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim of negligent entrustment. (See Filing No. 110). Additionally, Plaintiffs disavow of any claims of negligence on the basis that Poshard negligently hired Shealey, (see Filing No. 86-1 at 3-4), but they do not articulate a cause of action against Poshard. Punitive damages is not an independent cause of action. Yost v. Wabash College, 3 N.E.2d 509, 514 (Ind. 2014). Thus, the court construes Plaintiffs’ evidence and arguments as supportive of a claim of vicarious liability against Poshard for the alleged negligence of its employee, Shealey.
Indiana law views punitive damages as a means of deterring and punishing wrongful activity. Yost, 3 N.E.2d at 523. Because punitive damages are not commonplace and rarely appropriate, a “plaintiff [*6] has an especially heavy burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 524. In tort actions, a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant either (1) engaged in “willful and wanton misconduct,” knowingly subjecting other persons to probable injury, or (2) acted maliciously, fraudulently, oppressively, or with gross negligence and such conduct “was not the result of a mistake of law or fact, honest error of judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence or other such noniniquitous human failing.” Id. at 523-24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 260 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (Am. Law Inst. 1979)).
Q: So you would be gone from home over 12 hours every day working; right?
(Shealey Dep. at 9). This exchange, however, follows Shealey’s testimony that he typically left home in his tractor at approximately 5:20 a.m. and that his day ended “[a]round 4:30, 5:00 [p.m.].” (Shealey Dep. at 8-9). Shealey also testified that, prior to the accident, he took a lunch break and “[t]alked to another fellow driver about 15 minutes or so.” ( [*8] Id. at 10). Moreover, the collision occurred “somewhere near 1:00 [p.m.],” and Plaintiffs do not assert that driver fatigue contributed to the collision. See Cast N. Am. (Trucking) Ltd. v. NLRB, 207 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that regulations in § 395.3 are designed to prevent drivers from operating commercial vehicles while impaired by fatigue, illness, or any other cause).
As Defendants point out, the relevant inquiry is not how much time a driver spends away from home, but rather how much “driving time” he or she accrues within a fourteen-hour window. See 49 C.F.R. § 395.3(a)(3) (“A driver may drive a total of 11 hours during the 14-hour period specified in paragraph (a)(2) of this section”); 49 C.F.R. § 395.2 (“Driving time means all the time spent at the driving controls of a commercial motor vehicle in operation.”). In light of the entire exchange between Shealey and Plaintiffs’ counsel, (see Shealey Dep. at 8-10), Plaintiffs’ assertion of fact reflects a conflation of “time away from home” and “driving time.” This cursory attempt to show a violation of § 395.3(a) fails to establish a genuine dispute of fact, and the court declines to develop the argument for Plaintiffs. See Krepps v. NIIT (USA), Inc., No. 11C8787, 2013 WL 2636879, at *7 (citing Fabriko Acquisition Corp. v. Prokos, 536 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2008) for the proposition that it is not the court’s role “develop and/or support arguments on behalf of parties”). Even if the court assumes [*9] the truth of Plaintiffs’ assertion and its relevance to causation, they present no evidence that Poshard had knowledge of a violation nor provide any reason why such knowledge should be imputed to the company. Therefore, the court grants summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against Poshard.
Plaintiffs fare no better in their claim for punitive damages against Shealey. Plaintiffs assert (1) that Shealey was speeding just before the collision; (2) that Shealey has a record of speeding; (3) that Shealey crossed the center line where he collided with one truck and Plaintiffs’ vehicle; (4) that Shealey referred to his record of speeding tickets as “being human”; (5) that Shealey was driving while impaired by controlled substances; (6) and that Shealey did not provide aid to the Plaintiffs immediately following the collision. Taken together, Plaintiffs maintain, these assertions create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Shealey operated his tractor with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of Plaintiffs. Defendants challenge each of these assertions of fact on grounds that they either obfuscate the evidence or simply fail to assert a degree of [*10] culpability that exceeds mere negligence.
The court need not address whether Shealey’s driving speed constituted a reckless disgregard for other drivers, as Plaintiffs’ own designated evidence establishes that Shealey’s driving speed did not exceed the posted limit. (See Crash Report at 3-6 (indicating posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour); Filing No. 86-10 at 7 (stating Shealey’s driving speed as 50 miles per hour)). Plaintiffs give the court no reason why the alleged conduct of Shealey immediately following a major vehicular accident should support a finding of misconduct that caused the accident. In any event, Shealey testified that he rendered no aid to Plaintiffs because when he asked one of the Plaintiff passengers whether they “were all right,” the passenger answered in the affirmative. (See Shealey Dep. at 19-20). Nor do Plaintiffs present any evidence that Shealey was driving while impaired. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ evidence indicates both that Shealey submitted to a drug test and that he was not charged with driving while impaired. (See Crash Report at 3; Filing No. 86-10 at 5; Shealey Dep. at 7, 20-21; Filing No. 86-4 at 3-4). Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish a degree [*11] of culpability required to support a claim of punitive damages against Shealey, the court grants summary judgment.
On August 26, 2015, a month after filing their Response in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Amend Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Punitive Damages to Add Newly Discovered Evidence” (Filing No. 106). Plaintiffs seek to make new assertions of fact based on the deposition testimony of Knox Whitt, the driver of the tractor-trailer with which Shealey’s tractor collided just prior to colliding with Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Specifically, Plaintiffs wish to assert (1) that Shealey was looking down at his cellular phone just prior to the accident, and (2) that Whitt overheard an exchange between a responding officer and Shealey confirming that Shealey had ended a phone call with his wife just prior to the accident. (See Filing No. 106 at 3-4).
Plaintiffs provide no legal support for such a motion but nonetheless ask the court to consider the evidence to support their opposition to summary judgment on the claim for punitive damages. The [*12] court declines. Rule 56(d) permits a party to seek a stay of summary judgment proceedings when, by affidavit or declaration, it establishes that it needs more time to gather evidence to justify its opposition to summary judgment. As Defendants note, Whitt was involved in the accident and could have been deposed well before this stage of the proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Claim for Punitive Damages (Filing No. 73).
SO ORDERED this 20th day of October 2015.

References: v. 
 § 1681
 § 1681
 § 392
 v. 
 § 1681
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1681
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1681
 § 1681
 § 1681
 § 1681
 § 1681
 § 1681
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 909
 v. 
 § 395
 § 395
 § 395
 § 395
 v. 
 v.