Source: https://www.ptab.us/2010/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:13:55+00:00

Document:
“[A]bsence from the reference of any claimed element negates anticipation.” Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Here, similar to Benson, concluding that the claimed subject matter is patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 would effectively pre-empt performing the various steps by any means, and in practical effect would be a patent on the idea of detecting fraud in relation to stored value products. As the Supreme Court has made clear, “[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.” Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) quoted in In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See In re Stencil, 828 F.2d 751 (Fed. Cir 1987) (holding that the functional limitation or intended purpose recited in a claim distinguishes the claimed device from the prior art device); In re Watanabe, 315 F.2d 924, 928 (CCPA 1963) (holding that the functional limitation or intended use recited in a claim limits the claimed electrode to a particular type of electrode having properties suitable for such function or intended use); see also In re Garnero, 412 F.2d 276, 279 (CCPA 1969) (The structure or property of a claimed product implied by process limitations must be considered when assessing the patentability of a product-by-process claim over the prior art).
“[W]hen a party challenges written description support for an interference count or the copied claim in an interference, the originating disclosure provides the meaning of the pertinent claim language.” Robertson v. Timmermans, 603 F.3d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “[In] an interference in which claims copied from one party’s patent into the other party’s application [are] the subject of a motion for invalidity based on prior art[,] . . . the claims should be interpreted in light of their host disclosure, just as they would during ex parte prosecution.” Id.
Notwithstanding that this test [machine and/or transformation] for determining patent eligibility of a process is unduly narrow (see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, No. 08-964, 2010 WL 2555192 (U.S. June 28, 2010), it can nevertheless be instructive as a factor in determining whether the claimed processes are patent-ineligible abstract ideas.
The Examiner finds that the claimed processes are not tied to another statutory class of invention, such as a machine. But the Examiner does not explain why this is so. See Answer 3-4. An explanation is made more necessary, given that the claims are reasonably broadly construed to require a particular apparatus. That is, they are nominally tied to a particular apparatus in contradistinction to the Examiner’s finding. The initial burden of establishing that the claimed processes are patent-ineligible abstract ideas has not therefore been established because the construction of the claims does not fully support finding that they are not tied to an apparatus as an underlying factor in concluding that the processes as claimed as a whole are patent-ineligible abstract ideas.
In this regard, the Examiner further asserts that "[a]ny claim containing a negative limitation which does not have basis in the original disclosure should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph as failing to comply with the written description requirement (Ans. 3). In support, the Examiner cites Ex parte Grasselli, 231 USPQ 393 (Bd. App. 1983), aff’d mem., 738 F. 2d 453 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
However, Grasselli does not provide a per se rule providing that the addition of any negative limitation to a claim, which is not expressly set forth in an application disclosure as originally filed, automatically violates the written description requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Compare Ex parte Parks, 30 USPQ2d 1234, 1236-37 (BPAI 1993).
See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1562-63 (the written description requirement is a factual question).
With respect to temperament, Stillman’s determining of a person’s mood through analyzing their voice meets the definition of “temperament” under a broadest reasonable interpretation. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). While Appellant may have intended a more narrow or specific definition of temperament, such a definition is not set forth in the claim. See CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
The Court does not look favorably on per se rules of obviousness. See In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995 (no per se rule of obviousness exists).
An adequate traverse must contain adequate information or argument to create on its face, a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances justifying Examiner's notice of what is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971). If an applicant does not seasonably traverse the taking of official notice during examination, then the object of the official notice is taken to be admitted prior art. In re Chevenard, 139 F.2d 711, 713 (CCPA 1943).
Breadth in scope does not equal indefiniteness. In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 693 (CCPA 1971).
Obviousness requires finding that the prior art provided a reason for carrying out a claimed process, and provided a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed beneficial result. In re Dow Chemical Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The expectation of success must be founded in the prior art, not in the applicant’s disclosure.” Id.
3628 Ex Parte Ryan 11/156,156 TURNER 103(a) PITNEY BOWES INC.
Appellant's arguments appear to be predicated on a belief that a reference must describe a limitation in haec verba. There is no such requirement. See In re Bode, 550 F.2d 656, 660 (CCPA 1977). Further, there is no requirement that a reference must recognize all features of its invention. Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58, 60 (BPAI 1985), aff'd mem., 795 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that the recognition of another advantage flowing naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art cannot be the basis for patentability when the difference would otherwise be obvious); see also In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1023 (CCPA 1979) (mere recognition of an inherent property in the prior art does not render patentable a known structure).
Appellant acknowledges that the Board’s recent decision in Ex parte Tanaka, 93 USPQ2d 1291 (BPAI 2009) (Precedential) is dispositive of this issue, but argues that because Tanaka is on appeal to the Court of Appealsfor the Federal Circuit, it is not binding on the instant case.
The specific wording used in §251 limits the scope of the Director's power to grant reissue patents only in situations in which the original patent is deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent. The Office's interpretation of §251 to disallow reissue applications that simply add narrower claims to the reissue patent when no assertion of inoperativeness or invalidity for the reasons set forth in §251 can be made by the patentee, is in keeping with the plain wording and scope of §251. Ex parte Tanaka, 93 USPQ2d at 1299 (emphasis in original).
[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in a product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process. In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
“Where a product-by-process claim is rejected over a prior art product that appears to be identical, although produced by a different process, the burden is upon the applicants to come forward with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product.” In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

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