Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/250/489/43058/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:49:04+00:00

Document:
Paul Magasin, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant.
Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Lloyd F. Dunn, Bruce A. Bevan, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before CHAMBERS and BARNES, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal by two defendants (Ernest Nelson Murray and Charlotte Agnes Murray) from a jury verdict convicting them on three counts of a five count indictment against them and two co-defendants, Schrier and McCormick. Count I, charged a conspiracy to smuggle into this country from Mexico psittacine birds (18 U.S.C.A. § 371); Count II, charged the smuggling of forty-two of such birds on or about February 1, 1956 (18 U.S.C.A. § 545); Count III, charged the receiving, concealing and transporting of said birds on or about February 1, 1956 (18 U.S.C.A. § 545). Count IV, charging the subsequent act of smuggling seventeen birds on February 16, 1956, and Count V, charging the receipt, concealment and transportation of the same birds on the same date, were dismissed by the trial court on motion of the government. Also dismissed were overt acts four and seven charged in the conspiracy count, both occurring after the court ruled the conspiracy had come to an end at the time of the arrest of codefendants Schrier and McCormick on February 1, 1956. Schrier pleaded guilty to Counts I, II and III, and testified against the appellants. McCormick was subsequently indicted on a lesser offense, and this charge dismissed.
I. The invalidity of the indictment.
II. The ruling of the court below admitting testimony "of matters, accounts or declarations" occurring subsequent to the termination of the conspiracy.
III. The refusal of the court to instruct on entrapment.
We find no merit in this appeal. We shall discuss the three grounds claimed for reversal in turn.
This same point has been ruled upon adversely to appellant Ernest Nelson Murray by this Court, after his plea of guilty to a similar charge. Murray v. United States, 9 Cir., 1955, 217 F.2d 583, 585. Cf. also Steiner v. United States, 9 Cir., 1956, 229 F.2d 745; Duke v. United States, 9 Cir., ___ F.2d ___ (petition for rehearing pending).
We are satisfied to maintain the position we have previously taken on this subject.
II. The testimony "of matters, accounts, or declarations" occurring subsequent to the termination of the conspiracy.
Appellants misconstrue (a) the nature of admissions against interest made by a defendant vis a vis the declarations of a co-conspirator and (b) the nature of extra-judicial statements.
Further, appellants urge that "all of Schrier's testimony (and that of his wife) was given subsequent to the termination of the alleged conspiracy." That, of course, is the only time testimony can be given. Even if recordings of conversations had been made prior to the termination of any conspiracy, and during its course, it would not become testimony until offered in evidence at the trial. All testimony at any trial relating to prior statements or acts is given subsequent to any alleged conspiracy. But this alone cannot make it inadmissible! So long as the testimony relates to events occurring prior to termination of the conspiracy, it is fundamental that the testimony of one conspirator is admissible as to the statements of all the conspirators where it relates to communications made during and in the course of the conspiracy. Krulewitch v. United States, 1949, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S. Ct. 716, 93 L. Ed. 790; Fiswick v. United States, 1946, 329 U.S. 211, 67 S. Ct. 224, 91 L. Ed. 196.
This point likewise has no merit. Entrapment requires that the enforcement agency plant the idea of the commission of the crime in the mind of the defendant. It has no application to a situation where enforcement officers merely permit a violation to occur in order to get sufficient facts to insure conviction. There is not a scintilla of evidence to indicate the government agency here planted any idea in defendants' minds. There is evidence that the government agents merely went along with the criminal plan of the defendants, and managed to thereby obtain a recording of their plans, through the device of a recording device placed upon an informer. No instruction on entrapment was proper, since there was no factual situation presented to the jury on this issue for its decision and ascertainment. Sherman v. United States, 9 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 329; Trice v. United States, 9 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 513; Lufty v. United States, 9 Cir., 1952, 198 F.2d 760.
The trial court carefully instructed the jury on the various evidentiary matters before it. He carefully saw that two counts (IV and V) were dismissed, and that two overt acts charged in Count I were dismissed, because of his ruling as to the date of the termination of the conspiracy. His very first instruction to the jury was to disregard any testimony of events occurring after February 1, 1956.6 We think his instructions were proper and sufficient, and we find no error.
The judgment is affirmed by Circuit Judges CHAMBERS and BARNES, Circuit Judge FEE not participating in the hearing and decision.
"Proof of defendant's possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence sufficient to authorize conviction for violation of this section. * * *."
"Psittacine birds shall not be brought into the United States for the purpose of sale or trade. Psittacine birds may be brought in only for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed in subparagraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of this paragraph, and subject to the provisions of Section 71.153."

References: § 371
 § 545
 § 545
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