Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/329/424/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:53:27+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 329 › United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.
United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.
Pursuant to Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued to a common carrier by water, whose vessels had special facilities for carrying loaded railroad cars and tank space for liquid cargoes in bulk, a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing it to carry "commodities generally" between certain ports subject "to such terms, conditions, and limitations as are now, or may hereafter be, attached to the exercise of such authority by the Commission." Later, the Commission, on its own motion and over the protest of the carrier, reopened the proceedings and issued an order directing the cancellation of the original certificate and the issuance of a new one, which deprived the carrier of its right to carry "commodities generally" and limited it to carrying liquid cargoes in bulk, empty railroad cars, and property loaded in freight cars received from and delivered to rail carriers.
1. The Commission had no authority to cancel the original certificate. Pp. 329 U. S. 428-433.
2. It is apparent from the record in this case that the proceedings were not reopened to correct a clerical mistake in the issuance of the original certificate, but to execute a subsequently adopted policy of holding that a certificate to carry "commodities generally" did not authorize water carriage of freight cars. Pp. 329 U. S. 428-429.
3. The Commission has no express authority to revoke a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued to water carriers under Part III of the Act. Pp. 329 U. S. 429-431.
4. The order was not within the Commission's authority under § 309(d) to fix "terms, conditions and limitations" for water carrier certificate holders. Pp. 329 U. S. 431-432.
5. Nor was it within the Commission's authority under § 315(c) to "suspend, modify, or set aside its orders," since the Act makes a clear distinction between "orders" and "certificates." P. 329 U. S. 432.
and the time fixed for rehearing has passed, it is not subject to revocation in whole or in part, except as specifically authorized by Congress. Pp. 329 U. S. 432-433.
64 F. Supp. 156, affirmed.
Having issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to a water carrier under Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission subsequently ordered its cancellation and the issuance of a new certificate substantially curtailing the rights granted. 260 I.C.C. 430. The District Court set aside the Commission's order. 64 F.Supp. 156. Affirmed, p. 329 U. S. 433.
Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 929, 49 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., subjected water carriers to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Section 309(a) of that Act required them to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity from the Commission. The same section contains a proviso commonly referred to as the grandfather clause. It provides that any water carrier, with an exception not here material, which was in bona fide operation as a common carrier by water on January 1, 1940, shall be entitled to a certificate to continue operations over the route or routes which it had been serving previous to that date without determination by the Commission of the question of public convenience and necessity.
Mexico" was accordingly issued to Seatrain. By its terms, it became effective August 10, 1942, subject "to such terms, conditions, and limitations as are now or may hereafter be attached to the exercise of such authority by the Commission."
"as a common carrier by the 'Seatrain' type of vessel, in interstate or foreign commerce, in the transportation of liquid cargoes and bulks, of empty railroad cars, and of property loaded in freight cars received from and delivered to rail carriers and transported without transfer from freight cars between the ports of New York, N.Y., New Orleans, Louisiana, and Texas City, Texas."
and altering the certificate. The District Court further held that, even if the Commission would have had power under different circumstances to alter a certificate, it should not have done so in this case, where, as the Court found from evidence before it but which had not been before the Commission, Seatrain had expended large sums of money in reliance upon the complete validity of its certificate. 64 F.Supp. 156. We need not consider the Commission's objection to the District Court's admission of evidence not heard by the Commission, since we agree with the District Court that the Commission was without authority to cancel this certificate.
In altering Seatrain's certificate, the Commission held that a certificate authorizing the carriage of "commodities generally" does not embrace the right to carry loaded or unloaded railroad cars; that, consequently, the original certificate granted Seatrain actually deprived it of any future right to carry railroad cars -- its chief business; that issuance of the original certificate to carry commodities generally was consequently an inadvertent error, patent on the face of the record, which the Commission has the right and power to change at any time the matter comes to its attention. But Seatrain argues that, far from restoring the right to which it was entitled under the original proceedings, the new order actually results in a drastic limitation on the nature of the equipment and service Seatrain is privileged to employ in loading and carrying freight, and could bar delivery or receipt of freight to or from any consignees except railroads.
cannot revoke such a certificate under its general statutory power to alter orders previously made. Smith Bros. Revocation of Order, 33 M.C.C. 465.
"That no terms, conditions, or limitations shall restrict the right of the carrier to add to its equipment, facilities, or service within the scope of such certificate, as the development of the business and the demands of the public shall require. . . ."
respect [Footnote 5] are not controlling as to the Commission's power to regulate the details of the service of water carriers. We can find no authority for alteration of Seatrain's certificate from the Commission's power to fix "terms and conditions."
For a description of Seatrain equipment, see Investigation of Seatrain Lines, Inc., 195 I.C.C. 215, 218-222.
See Investigation of Seatrain Lines, Inc., supra; Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Akron C. & Y. Ry., 226 I.C.C. 7; Hoboken Manufacturers R. v. Abilene & So. Ry. Co., 248 I.C.C. 109, but see Commissioner Patterson, dissenting, id. at 120.
24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., (railroads); 49 Stat. 543, 54 Stat. 919, 49 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., (motor carriers); 54 Stat. 929, 49 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (water carriers).
"This bill leaves section 212(a) unchanged, and has no corresponding provision in the new part III. While there is room for argument, we are inclined to believe that provision for the revocation or suspension of water carrier certificates is not essential if adequate penalty provisions are provided for violation of part III. Revocation or suspension, in the case of motor carriers, is believed to be the most effective means of enforcement, since there are so many such carriers, and the operations of the great majority are so small, that enforcement through penal actions in courts presents many practical difficulties, but this is not true of water carriers."
Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. v. United States, 322 U. S. 1; Crescent Express Lines v. United States, 320 U. S. 401: Noble v. United States, 319 U. S. 88. See also Smith Bros. Revocation of Certificate, 33 M.C.C. 465; Quaker City Bus Co., 38 M.C.C. 603.
And §§ 316 and 317 of the Act pointedly treat an order as one thing, and a certificate as another.

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