Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/24/395.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:52:07+00:00

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 3d › Volume 24 › In re Scott K.
Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Dennis A. Fischer, Harold E. Shabo, Kenneth I. Clayman, Michael Allensworth and Albert J. Menaster, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.
D. Heather Werthmuller as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Norman H. Sokolow and Roy C. Preminger, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A 17-year-old defendant appeals from an order declaring him a juvenile court ward and placing him on probation. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The order was based on the court's finding that defendant unlawfully possessed marijuana for purpose of sale in violation of section 11359 of the Health and Safety Code. The question is whether a warrantless, parent-approved, police search of defendant's personal property was permissible.
Defendant's mother found marijuana in his desk drawer. She gave it to an off-duty police officer who lived in the neighborhood and told him [24 Cal. 3d 399] that conversations with other parents led her to believe that her son might be selling marijuana. A week later that officer's report was given to Narcotics Officer Schian for a follow-up. He telephoned the father to advise that he was about to arrest defendant. The conversation was as follows: "In substance, I advised the father that I was in charge of the follow-up investigation of the marijuana that his wife had turned over to the police officer; that an arrest would result from this situation, arrest of the son; that I intended to come out and arrest his son if his son was home, and then I received the information that he was working on his motorcycle in the garage.
Without warrant, Schian and other officers went to the garage. Schian arrested defendant and took him to the house, where the father gave permission to search defendant's bedroom. The search disclosed a locked toolbox. The father told Schian that he had no key and that it was defendant's box. When asked about the key, defendant replied he had lost it. Schian said, "Your father already told me I could break the toolbox open if I couldn't find a key, but it's not in my interest to destroy the lock. Let me see the keys you have in your pocket." Defendant gave Schian his keys, one of which opened the box. Inside were nine baggies of marijuana.
The formulation of issues in both the trial court's ruling and the People's argument seems misleading. Is not an important distinction obscured -- the distinction between the parent-child relation and a constitutionally prescribed relation between people and government? A minor's interest in both those relations is identifiable even when, as here, his or her assertion of privacy rights against the government appears to conflict with parental authority. The primary issue in this case involves the minor's rights regarding his government.
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized."
We are assisted when we interpret those words by United States Supreme Court opinions on the federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, [24 Cal. 3d 401] which of course prescribes minimum standards that may not be violated. fn. 3 That court apparently has not yet considered the Fourth Amendment in a juvenile context. Further, the justices seem to have been reluctant to define the "totality of the relationship" of minors and the state. (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 13 [18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 538, 87 S. Ct. 1428]; Carey v. Population Services International (1977) 431 U.S. 678 [52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 97 S. Ct. 2010].)  Minors are, however, persons under our Constitution possessed of rights that governments must respect. fn. 4 (Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 511 [21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 740, 89 S. Ct. 733].) Fourth Amendment protection may be inferrable from the court's recognition of minors' rights to privacy; e.g., a state may not condition a minor's decision to have an abortion on parental consent (Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth (1976) 428 U.S. 52 [49 L. Ed. 2d 788, 96 S.Ct. 2831]); nor may it because of youth restrict one's access to contraceptives (Carey v. Population Services International, supra, 431 U.S. 678). Contraceptives are property, inherently personal. Since Carey prevents the state from restricting access to that property, it may indeed also protect the minor from arbitrary search and seizure once the property is obtained.
 By no means are the rights of juveniles coextensive with those of adults. (See In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 921, 928 [141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286].) Minors' rights are often legitimately curtailed when the restriction serves a state's interest in promoting the health and growth of children. (See Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) 321 U.S. 158, 168-170 [88 L. Ed. 645, 653-655, 64 S. Ct. 438]; Ginsberg v. New York (1968) 390 U.S. [24 Cal. 3d 402] 629, 638 [20 L. Ed. 2d 195, 203, 88 S. Ct. 1274].)  In juvenile court proceedings rights may not be asserted if they might disrupt unique features of the proceedings; for example, jury trial is not required. (People v. Superior Court (Carl W.) (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 271, 274 [124 Cal. Rptr. 47, 539 P.2d 807].) Search and seizure laws, however, hardly seem disruptive or otherwise inconsistent with the state's interest in child welfare. It is established that minors have a liberty interest that entitles them to due process whenever a state initiates action to deprive them of liberty. (In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. 1; Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 574 [42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 734, 95 S. Ct. 729]; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 367 [25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 377, 90 S. Ct. 1068]; In re Roger S., supra, 19 Cal. 3d 921; In re Arthur N. (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 226 [127 Cal. Rptr. 641, 545 P.2d 1345].) Enforcement of search and seizure protection helps ensure that the factfinding process conforms with standards of due process.
The minor here contends that, because the toolbox was his own property, warrantless police search violated both his right to privacy and his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. He was age 17, [24 Cal. 3d 403] old enough to assert his rights. When the police asked him for the key he did not consent to the search; instead the father gave consent.
 The People argue that, because a parent is responsible for minor children and may himself inspect their property, police search of that property when pursuant to parental consent is reasonable and accordingly constitutional. Implicit is the notion that the father here could effectively waive his son's right to be secure in the son's effects. We reject that view.
This court has insisted that a minor's due process right be protected even when the right imposes a burden on parents or limits parental control. (In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 513 [86 Cal. Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204]; In re Roger S., supra, 19 Cal. 3d 921.) In Ricky H. the trial court's decision accepting a minor's waiver of the right to counsel was reversed because the waiver was influenced by the fact that the nonindigent [24 Cal. 3d 404] parents were obliged by statute to pay counsel fees. Roger S. held that, regarding admission to a mental hospital, a minor of 14 years or more possesses due process rights that may not be waived by the parent or guardian. It would be incongruous to conclude that parents, for good reason or no reason, may summarily waive their child's right to search and seizure protections.
California case law prior to Matlock is consistent with that "common authority" principle. Third-party-consent searches were held invalid in People v. Cruz (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 861, 866-867 [40 Cal. Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d 889] (apartment guests could not consent to search of property of others jointly residing there); People v. Murillo (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 173, 176-180 [50 Cal. Rptr. 290] (roommate's consent to search residence was not a valid consent to search attache case); People v. Egan (1967) 250 Cal. App. 2d 433 [58 Cal. Rptr. 627] (stepfather's consent invalid for search of adult stepson's personal effects though they were located in bedroom of stepfather's home); People v. Daniels (1971) 16 Cal. App. 3d 36 [93 Cal. Rptr. 628] (mother could not consent to search of adult son's suitcase in her home).
 Juveniles are entitled "to acquire and hold property, real and personal" (Estate of Yano (1922) 188 Cal. 645, 649 [206 P. 995]); and "a minor child's property is his own ... not that of his parents." (Emery v. Emery (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 421, 432 [289 P.2d 218]; see also Civ. Code, § 202.) [7b] Parents may have a protectible interest in property belonging to children, but that fact may not be assumed. When a warrantless search is challenged the People must show that it was reasonable. Here the People did not establish that the consenting parent had a sufficient interest under search and seizure law. The father claimed no interest in the box or its contents. He acknowledged that the son was owner, and the son did not consent to the search. Because those facts were known to the police there was no justification either for their relying on the father's consent to conduct the search or for their failure to seek the warrant required by law.
The trial court's order is reversed.
By bringing Scott's possession and possible sale of marijuana to the attention of the authorities, and by cooperating with them in the investigation of these offenses, Scott's parents certainly did not jeopardize his health or safety, nor did their actions "have a potential for significant social burdens." Quite the contrary. However, the majority's decision very likely will have such deleterious effects by diminishing the authority of parents to discipline and control their children.
The issue presented by this case was correctly analyzed in the majority opinion prepared for the Court of Appeal by Justice Kingsley. "There is a strong public policy protecting the interest of a parent in the care, discipline and control of a minor child. A parent who, as in this case, has reasonable grounds to believe that a minor child is engaged in serious criminal activity, must be allowed to investigate that belief, in order to determine the proper discipline and corrective action to be taken. If that investigation involves the search, with or without the minor's consent, of [24 Cal. 3d 407] locked items, the search is justified as conduct in aid of the parental power of care and discipline. It follows that, if the father in this case had himself opened the toolbox, or if the father, exerting his parental authority, had secured the key from the minor and then opened the box, the search would have been lawful. That conclusion is supported by the cases involving searches of locked containers by school authorities. (In re Christopher W. (1973) 29 Cal. App. 3d 777 [105 Cal. Rptr. 775]; In re Fred C. (1972) 26 Cal. App. 3d 320 [102 Cal. Rptr. 682]; In re Donaldson (1969) 269 Cal. App. 2d 509 [75 Cal. Rptr. 220].) If the loco parentis status of a school official permits a search of a locked container in order to protect against and prevent violations of the criminal laws, a fortiori, a parent has an equal right.
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part. On the one hand, parents, in my view, have both the right and the responsibility to preserve the lawful nature of activities in their home. Both generally, as law-abiding citizens, and particularly, as model-setting parents, their obligation, assuredly, is to control and eliminate any criminal activity in the home. Children in a home setting are more than tenants at will of the rooms which they occupy, and a parent is more than a landlord. On the other hand, a minor child no less than an adult retains substantial Fourth Amendment rights, but I do not view these as absolute or unconditional in a home environment.
How may we reconcile the seemingly conflicting interests and obligations? The Fourth Amendment proscription against "unreasonable" searches and seizures provides the key. I would hold that a minor child living in a home situation is not powerless before an unrestricted exploratory police search even though undertaken with parental consent. However, both the child's Fourth Amendment and privacy rights are not unrestricted. Bearing in mind the dual relationships involved herein, namely, the minor-citizen versus the officer-state invoking Fourth Amendment rights, and the private parent-child familial relationship, I would adopt the following principles. A parent may validly consent, over the objection of his dependent minor child living in the family home, to a police search of the premises and possessions used or owned by the child on the premises, if reasonable grounds (not necessarily amounting to probable cause) support a belief that the place or thing searched will [24 Cal. 3d 409] yield criminal evidence. In this situation I would not elevate a child's Fourth Amendment or privacy rights above a parent's right to maintain a lawful, stable home environment free from criminal activity. The minor has no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in these limited circumstances where the police act reasonably in good faith reliance on the parents' consent.
The evidence here clearly supports the instant search. Scott's parents had already discovered marijuana in his room. Their own discussions with other parents established the substantial possibility that Scott was trafficking in the substance. On that basis, they initiated contact with the police. After further independent investigation, the authorities became convinced there was probable cause for Scott's arrest. Detective Schian, one of the arresting officers, testified he told the parents that a search of Scott's bedroom was the best way to prove or disprove Scott's involvement. This was reasonable. The parents had a legitimate purpose in seeking to ferret out the existence of any criminal activity conducted in any part of their home. Their responsibility to themselves, and as parents of Scott and of any other children in the family required that they do so. Parents in certain situations have a right to be suspicious, and to act reasonably in accordance with those suspicions. They do not help their children if they do otherwise. A locked container controlled solely by the suspect minor and found in his room would, of course, be one of the most logical places for concealment of contraband or criminal evidence.
Under the foregoing conditions, I would not recognize a child's right of "sanctuary" vis-a-vis the responsible parent. I therefore conclude that the search was proper, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
"I find that the father ... because of the evidence elicited as relates the relationship vis-a-vis the father, the minor and the home, had the right to conduct a search through whatever means were efficacious of the entirety of his own home and anything therein contained, whether placed there by his son or any other person; that it is not an overextension of the father's rights to use the instrumentality of the Narcotics Division of the Los Angeles Police Department to assist him in doing so.
"[T]he possessory rights to the contents of the entirety of the home ... are at least joint possessory rights residing equally with the father and the minor. ..."
FN 2. The People appear to confuse search by a private party with a warrantless police search validated by third-party consent. The marijuana that defendant's mother found appears to have been the product of search by a private party. But the baggies found in the toolbox were the product of a search initiated and conducted by the police. Defendant's father did not search; nor did he ask the police to search. Rather he consented to a request that the police be permitted to search.
FN 5. See for example judicial extension of those protections to juveniles in State v. Lowry (1967) 95 N.J. Super. 307, 313-317 [230 A.2d 907, 910-912]; In re Williams (1966) 49 Misc.2d 154, 169-170 [267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 109-110]; In re Morris (1971) 29 Ohio Misc. 71 [278 N.E.2d 701, 702]; In re Harvey (1972) 222 Pa. Super. 222, 229 [295 A.2d 93, 96-97]; Ciulla v. State (Tex.Civ.App. 1968) 434 S.W.2d 948, 950.
A number of states have statutes that give juveniles the same fourth amendment protection as adults. See Uniform Juvenile Court Act, section 27, subdivision (b) (1968) and state statutes cited in Levitt, Preadjudicatory Confessions And Consent Searches: Placing The Juvenile On The Same Constitutional Footing As An Adult (1977) 57 B.U.L.Rev. 778, 781, footnote 24.
FN 6. In re Joseph A. (1973) 30 Cal. App. 3d 880, 883-884 [106 Cal. Rptr. 729]; In re Robert H. (1978) 78 Cal. App. 3d 894 [144 Cal. Rptr. 565]; In re Christopher W. (1973) 29 Cal. App. 3d 777 [105 Cal. Rptr. 775]; In re Fred C. (1972) 26 Cal. App. 3d 320 [102 Cal. Rptr. 682]; In re Donaldson (1969) 269 Cal. App. 2d 509 [75 Cal. Rptr. 220].
FN 7. The father told the police that the box belonged to his son. It was locked and the son had the key. The father later testified that the son obtained the box from a father-in-law and, though he (the father) had borrowed tools, he had never opened the box himself but always obtained the tools directly from the son.
FN 10. Courts have not previously embraced the notion that the government can use the relationship between parties to impute "common authority" to the consenting party when none in fact existed. (Cf. People v. Daniels (1971) 16 Cal. App. 3d 36 [93 Cal. Rptr. 628]; People v. Murillo (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 173 [50 Cal. Rptr. 290]; also see dictum in People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 362, 392 [85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961], where this court held the wife could give valid consent to police search of her husband's property because "[t]here is no evidence that the murder weapon was in a sealed box or other container belonging to Terry (the husband), which Mrs. Terry might not have had authority to permit to be searched."

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