Source: https://www.johntfloyd.com/mandatory-minimums-crack/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:08:53+00:00

Document:
This was a “novel question” the Third Circuit Court of Appeals answered on March 12, 2014 in the case of Jose Ortiz-Vega (“Ortiz”) who was convicted and given 108 months’ imprisonment for crack cocaine offenses. This sentence was imposed on June 6, 2004 after a guilty plea to multiple crack cocaine possession and distribution offenses. Ortiz was also given a mandatory consecutive term of 60 months for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense as required under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(1).
At the time of Ortiz’s sentencing, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) required a mandatory minimum penalty of 120 months. The Third Circuit in United States v. Ortiz-Vega noted that these mandatory provisions should have resulted to a sentencing range for Ortiz of 120-121 months. The sentencing judge, however, imposed the lesser 108 months because the Government did not seek the mandatory minimum. The Government did not want the mandatory minimum imposed as evidenced by its decision not to challenge the actual sentence imposed, not to seek resentencing, or to appeal the sentence within the prescribed time period.
This was done in 2010 through what is known as Amendment 750 which was made retroactive and became effective November 1, 23011.
Pursuant to these retroactive modifications in the Sentencing Guidelines in crack cocaine cases, Ortiz sought a sentence modification under procedures authorized in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The Government opposed the request, telling the district court that Ortiz was not eligible for such a reduction because of the 120-month mandatory minimum that should have been imposed. The district court accepted the Government’s rationale—a decision that was, as the Third Circuit noted, “arguably consistent,” with the court’s 2009 controlling precedent in United States v. Doe.
The district court in the Ortiz-Vega case took direction from Doe whose holding effectively rendered Ortiz ineligible for a sentence reduction because of the statutory minimum applicable in his case. Consistent with Doe, the district court concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence “subsumes and becomes the applicable guideline range for the Defendant.” In effect, the district found that because the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement ruled out a sentence reduction for Ortiz, it did not consider “Step One” in the § 3582(c)(2) analysis, i.e., whether Ortiz’s sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The court instead proceeded directly to “Step Two”—any sentence modification would be inconsistent with applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.
This broad, though definitive conclusion forced the Third Circuit to focus on the underpinnings of the Government’s argument that Ortiz was ineligible for a sentence reduction because even though he had not seen sentenced to the mandatory minimum, he was eligible for it.
With these arguments out of the way, the appeals court turned its attention to a “Step One” analysis under § 3582(c)(2)—the requirement that a defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment “based on the sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” And this is where thicket of thorns grew thicker for the court. The Government argued that even though the mandatory minimum had not been imposed on Ortiz, he was “subject to” it, and therefore his sentence was not “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered.” Ortiz argued that while the mandatory minimum should have been applied, it was not, and therefore he was not “subject to” it, and thus his sentence was clearly “based” a sentencing range (crack cocaine guidelines) that were subsequently lowered.
And this is where we part company with the Third Circuit, and all the other Federal circuits that have refused to apply the FSA mandatory minimums retroactively. It is our firm view that the refusal to grant retroactive application to the FSA mandatory minimums undermines the very purpose of the act itself: to restore fairness in the Federal cocaine sentencing process. Those defendants sentenced prior to August 2010 should enjoy all the benefits of the FSA as those sentenced after August 2010.

References: § 924
 § 841
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 § 3582
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 § 3582
 § 3582