Source: https://vdocuments.site/2013-midyear-update-on-deferred-and-non-prosecution-agreements.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:46:30+00:00

Document:
Summer 2013 client memo from law firm Gibson Dunn & Crutcher describing developments in federal law enforcement's use of deferred prosecution agreements in the white-collar/corporate crime arena.
corporate wrongdoing is poised to continue.
was 19. DOJ has twice reached its high-water mark of 39 agreementsin 2007 and 2010followed closely by 37 agreements in 2012.
January 1, 2000 and July 8, 2013.
antitrust allegations, in terms of total monetary recoveries.
allegations have continued to lead the pack this year.
agreement through July 8 in line with the SEC's previous pace.
number of DOJ agreements to date in 2013 is 12.
shareholders' investments, and the wider economy.
Ms. White noted in her confirmation hearing that while "certainly, prosecutors should consider"
collateral consequences, those consequences will not necessarily preclude prosecution.
for the conduct, and cooperating comprehensively with the government.
plea, why would I do it?" Mr. McInerney said.
DPAs as early as February 2014, continuing a trend in the expanded use of these tools.
that is going to mean a reduction in competition," Mr. Huston said.
facts describing the underlying conduct.
and cooperate fully with the SEC."
including more than $5 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.
that issue in the SEC's 2010 Carter's, Inc. NPA.
supervise matters on their dockets.
the waiver question, as a proxy for its request to have the court defer prosecution of the case, U.S.
company to explain, in writing, why the DPA was in the public's interest.
admit its transgressions and assume responsibility for wrongdoing.
underprivileged in the surrounding area would be drastically and inhumanely curtailed."
Judge Boyle's approval was subject to the parties providing the court with periodic status reports.
prompt further consideration of the judiciary's role in the DPA process.
company argued the DPA would not trigger Rule 11(c)(1)(A).
of the same punitive effects of a guilty plea" while avoiding the potential collateral consequences.
power "to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings."
than warrants the use of the supervisory power.
Court." The court's approval was subject to quarterly reports on the DPA's implementation.
consensual arrangements as means to resolve criminal investigations and prosecutions.
prosecutorscurrently only the Director of the Serious Fraud Office ("SFO") and the Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP")first to produce guidance on the principles to be applied in considering whether to offer or enter into a DPA.
interests of justice not to do so.
to do so may use the consultation response form available here.
prosecutions of partnerships and corporations.
bribery by persons associated with them).
by way of a DPA.
committed, including prior to the time DPAs became available.
and not delegatedexcept where the Director is unavailable. A defendant organization has no right to be considered for disposition by way of a DPA.
organization to enter into negotiations for a possible DPA.
must remain private. If a court refuses to grant such a declaration, the prosecutor may apply again.
the concluded DPA, not just proposed terms.
be very interested in the proposed language of these published documents.
notice to the Crown Court.
modification of the DPA terms, and admissibility of the statement of facts in a terminated proceeding.
The draft DPA Code affords valuable insight into prosecutors' likely approach to DPAs.
to be satisfied that the public interest would be properly served by a DPA in lieu of prosecution.
natural or legal persons involved.
remedial measures, and robustness of the organization's compliance program.
be deployed in a manner sensitive to the likely concerns of the defendant business organization.
includes a monitorship among its terms.
disclosure to individual defendants extend to extracts of such reports.
penalty to be provided for in a DPA.
"controlling mind and will" of the company.
have tended to focus on strict liability offenses that do not require proof of mens rea in the first place.
any event, it would take several years before any such reform proposals might come before Parliament.
agreement, or modify the agreement.
limits U.K. DPAs to certain enumerated crimes (and their earlier analogues)mostly economic offenses.
applies only to companies, partnerships, and unincorporated associations.
contexts in the United States and abroad.
one date is associated with an agreement, we use the earliest stated execution date.
arrangements, and other monitorship arrangements found in settlement agreements.
to review its benchmark interest rate submissions.
and the creation of a Compliance Confirmation Report to be provided to the government.
organizational structure to ensure compliance with U.S. trade laws and regulations.
of Health and Human Services, which has a term of five years.
unavailable or not widely available at the time of our 2012 Year-End Update.
Department Components and United States Attorneys, 1 n.2 (Mar. 7, 2008).
payments, forfeiture amounts, and civil settlements related to DOJ and/or SEC resolutions.
Department of Justice Criminal Division).
Rep., (Mar. 11, 2013, 11:02 AM).
Competition Rev. (Feb. 25, 2013).
(Mar. 15, 2013, 12:51 PM).
Competition Review (Feb. 25, 2013).
Ralph Lauren Corp. Involving FCPA Misconduct (Apr. 22, 2013).
Crime Rep., Nov. 16, 2012.
an indictment if it is punishable: (A) by death; or (B) by imprisonment for more than one year.").
be prosecuted by information if the defendantin open court and after being advised of the nature of the charge and of the defendant's rightswaives prosecution by indictment.").
 Transcript of Docket Call at 22, United States v. WakeMed, No. 5:12-CR-398-BO-1 (E.D.N.C.
 Transcript of Docket Call at 3, United States v. WakeMed, No. 5:12-CR-398-BO-1 (E.D.N.C.
 Transcript of Docket Call at 15, United States v. WakeMed, No. 5:12-CR-398-BO-1 (E.D.N.C.
 See Transcript of Disposition Hearing and Arraignment at 15, United States v. WakeMed, No.
5:12-CR-398-BO-1 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2013).
No. 5:12-CR-398-BO-1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 31, 2013).
 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 slip op. at 23 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (hereinafter "HSBC slip op.").
N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012).
 HSBC slip op. at 23.
2, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013).
States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013).
 HSBC slip op. at 89.
 HSBC slip op. at 1011.
alma mater." Slip op. at 1112.
 Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 44, 45, sch. 17 (U.K.).
of Practice (Draft, 27 June 2013).
Agreements, Invitation to Comment on Proposed New Rules (June 2013).
association is itself increasingly rare as a unit of business organization.
 See Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, 45, sch. 17 1530 (U.K.).
 See Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, 45, sch. 17 7 (U.K.).
 See Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, 45, sch. 17 8 (U.K.).
 See Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, 45, sch. 17 11 (U.K.).
the Director of Public Prosecutions (March 2011).
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997 (entered into force Feb.
15, 1999) (amended Dec. 9, 2009).
of Practice 43 (Draft, 27 June 2013).
implant manufacturer to oversee its compliance with a DPA.
only and are not intended as legal advice.
Corporate Governance Implications of Non-and Deferred Prosecution Agreements - Evidence from 1993-2013 Wulf A. Kaal AALS Midyear Meeting Washington DC.

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