Source: http://co.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180312_0000314.DCO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:33:51+00:00

Document:
This matter comes before the court on review of the Commissioner's denial of Plaintiff Lucy Gallegos's application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act. (See generally Doc. No. 11, Social Security Administrative Record [“AR”].) Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff filed her opening brief on August 22, 2016 (Doc. No. 14 [“Opening Br.”]), Defendant filed her response on September 8, 2018 (Doc. No. 15 [“Resp.”]). No reply was filed.
In denying Plaintiff's claim, Commissioner found Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Administration's regulations (“SSA”). (AR 15-31, 35-51.) In determining disability, the ALJ used the five-step sequential evaluation process. After reviewing the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments that included psoriatic arthritis, psoriasis, and cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease. (AR 16.) However, the ALJ found that she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in or medically equal to one contained in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1.
A person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if her physical and/or mental impairments preclude her from performing both her previous work and any other “substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2). “When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social Security [Act] requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effect of the impairments in making a disability determination.” Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). However, the mere existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To be disabling, the claimant's condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive months. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995).
Further, “if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). The court “meticulously examine[s] the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The court, however, may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner. Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1487.

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