Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/376/376mass80.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:05:31+00:00

Document:
EDWARD H. CHARPENTIER vs. COMMONWEALTH.
Present: HENNESSEY, C.J., KAPLAN, WILKINS, & LIACOS, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on September 13, 1977.
Thomas Hoffman for the plaintiff.
LIACOS, J. The question before us involves the right of an indigent defendant to a transcript, at public expense, in order to pursue an appeal under G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33H. The plaintiff here (hereinafter called the defendant), was convicted in the Superior Court of armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon and sentenced to a term of from six to ten years at Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole. Following the defendant's claim of appeal from his convictions pursuant to G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33H, the trial judge appointed the Massachusetts Defenders Committee (committee) as appellate counsel to represent the defendant, who was then indigent. The judge informed the committee that he wanted to know the issues involved in the appeal in order to "narrow the transcript to those issues and avoid the necessity of providing a complete transcript."
An attorney of the committee, in a letter to the judge, replied that he had consulted with the defendant's privately retained trial counsel to ascertain what errors might have occurred at trial and concluded that a transcript of the suppression hearing and the prosecutor's closing argument would be needed. The attorney also wrote that he would need the transcript, excluding jury empanelment, to support the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The attorney stated in another letter that he was unable to comply with the judge's further request for a particularization of the alleged errors at trial. He noted that he had neither tried the case nor seen a transcript and was reluctant to rely on his client's memory for a detailed specification of the trial counsel's alleged errors.
of a full transcript would result in a waste of public funds." The judge then ordered that the defendant receive only those portions of the trial transcript containing the evidence presented at the voir dire on the motion to suppress, so much of the judge's jury charge as was given after the jury reported that they were unable to agree on a verdict, and the prosecutor's closing argument.
on statutory grounds that the defendant is entitled to the trial transcript. See Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 374 Mass. 744 , 748-749 (1978).
1. The defendant's claim of a right to a free copy of the trial transcript must be viewed in the context of the statutory procedures available for review of a criminal case. Various avenues of appeal are open to a criminal defendant seeking to overturn his conviction. See generally K.B. Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure Sections 1181-1259 (1970). Under G. L. c. 278, Section 28, for example, a criminal defendant may appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court based on a matter of law apparent on the record. This method of review does not bring to the appellate court the evidence heard at trial, even if recorded by a stenographer. See Commonwealth v. Berney, 353 Mass. 571 , 572 (1968); Guerin v. Commonwealth, 337 Mass. 264 , 266 (1958). Another limited method of appellate review is by writ of error, G. L. c. 250, Sections 1, 2, 9-13. the writ of error ordinarily does not lie to review errors as to findings of fact made at trial or errors of law committed during trial. Since many trial or errors are not open to review on a writ of error, an indigent is not entitled to a free transcript unless he shows that a reasonable need for the trial transcript exists. See Commonwealth v. Gilday, 357 Mass. 775 (1970); Guerin v. Commonwealth, supra at 267-270. Thirdly, the bill of exceptions under G. L. c. 278, Section 31, is a common appellate procedure for review of criminal cases. The transcript of the proceeding, if there is one, is not part of the record when a case is reviewed on a bill of exceptions. Commonwealth v. Fiore, 364 Mass. 819 , 827-828 (1974). Commonwealth v. McGrath, 361 Mass. 431 , 433 (1972).
In Commonwealth v. Britt, 362 Mass. 325 (1972), a majority held that an indigent defendant, charged with a felony, is not entitled to a free typewritten transcript of his probable cause hearing in a District Court, even though a solvent defendant could arrange for a stenographer to record and transcribe the proceedings under G. L. c. 221, Section 91B. While the transcript of a probable cause hearing could be helpful at trial to demonstrate inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, see Commonwealth v. Mustone, 353 Mass. 490 (1968), it would not be useful for appellate review since traditionally errors at a probable cause hearing would not void a subsequent indictment or conviction. Britt v. McKenney, 529 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Burden v. McKenney, 429 U.S. 854 (1976). This court in Commonwealth v. Britt, supra at 331, distinguished the situation where "a State has appropriated funds to pay stenographers, has committed itself to record the proceedings, and has made transcripts available for a price."
and the higher stakes involved. Cf. Blazo v. Superior Court, supra at 150; Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 355 Mass. 373 , 377 n.5 (1969).
Moreover, a procedure which bases the grant of a free transcript on a defendant's ability to substantiate the allegations of trial error would frustrate the legislative purpose of G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33H. This statute was enacted to eliminate delay in the processing of appeals. See Commonwealth v. Dorius, 343 Mass. 533 , 536 (1962). While there may be some delay in preparing a full transcript, significant delay is inevitable if pre-appeal hearings are held to evaluate a defendant's points of appeal and to determine the sufficiency of the record on appeal. Further, to substantiate many claims of error, a defendant's appellate counsel would have to spend an inordinate amount of time conferring with participants at the trial in order to reconstruct the events supporting the allegations. General Laws c. 278, Sections 33A-33H, however, provides for a stenographic record and transcript so that reliance on other more cumbersome methods of preparing an appeal can be avoided and the appeal expedited.
matters of serious consequence." Blazo v. Superior Court, supra at 153. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 199 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Counsel should refrain from requesting the transcript of the jury empanelment or other aspects of the proceedings not relevant to the defendant's appeal. [Note 9] See ABA Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals Section 3.3(b) (Tent. Draft 1969) ("The best safeguard against abuse is to permit counsel for the appellant to specify what is necessary for his representation, subject to appropriate sanctions against counsel who has acted irresponsibly or extravagantly in requesting record documents at government expense"). See also Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Mass. 803 , 814-815 (1977).
The judgment of the single justice is set aside and the case is remanded to the county court for an appropriate order under the provisions of G. L. c. 211, Section 3.
[Note 1] We have exercised our extraordinary power to grant relief under G. L. c. 211, Section 3, at whatever stage of the proceedings it becomes necessary to protect substantive rights, especially when no other practical remedy is available. See Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753 , 755 (1977); Lataille v. District Court of E. Hampden, 366 Mass. 525 , 526-527 (1974); Corey v. Commonwealth, 364 Mass. 137 , 138 (1973). According to the defendant, without the requested relief he cannot effectively appeal from his conviction. It thus appears appropriate, and the Commonwealth has not objected, for us to take cognizance of this particular case under G. L. c. 211, Section 3. See Blazo v. Superior Court, 366 Mass. 141 , 143 n.1 (1974).
[Note 2] The legislative history clearly indicates that the defendant may buy the complete transcript. See Thirtieth Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144, at 8 (Dec. 1954), reprinted in 40 Mass. L.Q. (No. 1, 1955).
[Note 3] For a legislative history of the provisions of this statute see Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 355 Mass. 373 , 375 (1969). The most recent amendment (see St. 1974, c. 540, Section 2) eliminated the requirement of a court order and extended this method of review to all felonies and misdemeanors tried with such felonies when either party makes a request that the case be governed by G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33G.
[Note 4] For a listing of decisions on the question of free transcripts for indigents see Blazo v. Superior Court, 366 Mass. 141 , 143 n.2 (1974). The only cases where the Supreme Court rejected the indigent defendant's claim to a free transcript involved the availability of an adequate alternative, Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), or a plainly frivolous request on collateral attack. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
[Note 5] See also Blazo v. Superior Court, supra at 152 n.20, quoting from Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971): "[W]here the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an `alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds."
[Note 6] Where the stenographic record is unavailable through no fault of the parties, the principles of Commonwealth v. Harris, ante 74 (1978), apply.
[Note 7] Although the plurality opinion rejected the respondent's claim to a free transcript on collateral review, it nevertheless stressed the fact that in the Federal system a free transcript would have been automatically available to the indigent on direct appeal. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323, 326-328 (1976). See 28 U.S.C. Section 753 (f) (1970). See also Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1971).
[Note 8] One commentator, discussing the problems of counsel newly appointed on appeal, said: "Recollections and notes of trial counsel and of others are apt to be faulty and incomplete. Frequently, issues simply cannot even be seen--let alone assessed--without reading an accurate transcript. Particularly is this true of questions relating to evidence or to the judge's charge; and it may also apply to many other types of questions. Moreover, the actual record (if appellate counsel could have it to inspect) might disclose issues substantial enough to constitute probable or possible `plain error,' even though trial counsel was not aware of their existence; and the indigent should have the same opportunity as the wealthy to urge that plain error should be noticed on appeal. In short, a conscientious counsel freshly entering the case at the appellate stage normally is likely to conclude that a full or partial transcript of the trial proceedings will be indispensable if the requisite `dependable record' is to be obtained as a basis for evaluating the case." Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 792-793 (1961), quoted in Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280-281 n.3 (1964).
[Note 9] For capital cases, however, the entire case must be before us, including a transcript of the entire proceedings. See G. L. c. 278, Section 33E.

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