Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/269/411/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:54:27+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 269 › United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co.
1. An adjudication of a circuit court of appeals final in its nature as to the general subject of the litigation may be reviewed by this Court without awaiting the determination of a separate matter affecting only the parties to such particular controversy. P. 269 U. S. 413.
"shall take into consideration by way of reducing the amount of compensation or damages any special and direct benefit to the remainder arising from the improvement,"
an increase in value of such remainder, caused by its frontage on a river as widened and deepened by the improvement and the right of immediate access to and use of the improved stream, is such a " special and direct benefit," although the remaining portions of other riparian parcels would be similarly benefited. P. 269 U. S. 414.
substantial relation to the control of navigation or appropriateness to that end. P. 269 U. S. 418.
4. In view of the substantial character of this right, an instruction in a condemnation case giving the jury to understand that, in considering benefit to riparian land from a river improvement, the owner's right amounted to no more than a mere uncertain and contingent privilege of such access, etc., as the government might see fit to allow him was error. P. 269 U. S. 417.
5. An error which relates not merely to formal or technical matters, but to the substantial rights of the parties, especially when embodied in the charge to a jury, is ground for reversal unless it appears from the whole record that it was harmless and did not prejudice the right of the complaining party. P. 269 U. S. 421.
6. The Act of February 26, 1910, amending § 269 Jud.Code, did not alter this rule. Id.
Error to judgments of the circuit court of appeals which affirmed judgments against the United States recovered in the district court by owners of riparian land in a consolidated condemnation proceeding brought in aid of a river improvement.
from those as to the riparian lands, and its result can have no bearing whatever upon the awards to the land owners. While the general rule requires that a judgment of a federal court shall be final and complete before it may be reviewed on a writ of error or appeal, it is well settled that an adjudication final in its nature as to a matter distinct from the general subject of the litigation and affecting only the parties to the particular controversy may be reviewed without awaiting the determination of the general litigation. Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 111 U. S. 699; Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 252 U. S. 371; Arnold v. Guimarin, 263 U. S. 427, 263 U. S. 434. And so, conversely, an adjudication final in its nature as to the general subject of the litigation may be reviewed without awaiting the determination of a separate matter affecting only the parties to such particular controversy.
"shall take into consideration by way of reducing the amount of compensation or damages any special and direct benefits to the remainder arising from the improvement."
In each of the sixteen instances here involved, the United States condemned only a portion of the parcel of land belonging to the riparian owner. It insists that there was error in the instructions to the jury in reference to the extent and measure of the benefits to the remainder.
industrial plants were located along its banks. Although it had been somewhat improved by the United States prior to 1917, the channel was narrow, winding, comparatively shallow, and incapable of accommodating large freighters. Under the terms of the Act of 1917, the new improvement was to be made in accordance with a plan recommended by the engineers of the War Department. [Footnote 4] This contemplated straightening the channel of the river and widening and deepening it for about four miles above its mouth, so that it would accommodate the largest type of freighters on the Great Lakes and become, as was said, "practically a long slip serving for numerous docks and industries." The bottom width of the new channel was to be 200 feet, the banks sloping to a top width of 290 feet between the harbor lines. After its completion, riparian owners desiring to construct docks were to be "required to locate the dock line or retaining wall" upon the harbor line, and excavate the bank "in front of the retaining wall or dock front" to the depth necessary to permit vessels to lie alongside.
"The benefit is not less direct and special to the land of the petitioner because other estates upon the same street are benefited in a similar manner. The kind of benefit, which is not allowed to be estimated for the purpose of such deduction, is that which comes from sharing in the common advantage and convenience of increased public facilities, and the general advance in value of real estate in the vicinity by reason thereof. . . . The advantages of more convenient access to the particular lot of land in question, and of having a front upon a more desirable avenue, are direct benefits to that lot, giving it increased value in itself. It may be the same, in greater or less degree, with each and every lot of land upon the same street. But such advantages are direct and special to each lot. They are in no proper sense common because there are several estates, or many even, that are similarly benefited."
But while the trial judge recognized the right of the United States to the deduction of such special benefits, if any, it insists that, in charging the jury in reference to them, he erroneously minimized their nature and extent.
"and because of a greater opportunity directly and specially to enjoy such use of the improved river as the government may permit such owner to have;"
"always in mind the uncertainty of securing from the government the privilege to enjoy these advantages, and the limited character of whatever advantages may be so secured."
"over navigation for the protection of public rights cannot be arbitrarily and capriciously exercised so as to destroy these riparian rights, but must be exercised with reasonable relations to the requirements of navigation,"
and that, by the terms of the plan of improvement, riparian owners whose lands would border the new stream were given the right or privilege of constructing docks or retaining walls for their use upon the harbor line, and to excavate the bank in front thereof to the depth necessary to permit vessels to lie alongside. These requests were denied, and the United States excepted.
streams, the shipping business would become practically worthless. It can never be unlawful for a landowner to make such wharves and landings as will accommodate all vessels ordinarily using the stream unless there are some exceptional circumstances, as narrows, bends, or the like, which may in particular cases render his structures improper."
This right of a riparian owner, it is true, is subordinate to the public right of navigation, and subject to the general rules and regulations imposed for the protection of such public right. And it is of no avail against the exercise of the absolute power of Congress over the improvement of navigable rivers, but must suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation, if Congress determines that its continuance is detrimental to the public interest in the navigation of the river. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., supra, 229 U. S. 62, 229 U. S. 70.
"This riparian right is property, and is valuable, and, though it must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired."
This language was cited with approval in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, supra, 77 U. S. 445.
Considering the charge of the court in the light of these general principles, we find that it was permeated by the fundamental error, emphasized by the refusal of the requests, that the jury were left to determine the amount of the benefits to be deducted on the theory that a riparian owner on the improved river would have merely such uncertain and contingent "privileges" of access to the navigable stream and of constructing docks fronting on the harbor line, as the government, in the exercise of an absolute control over the navigation of the river, might see fit to allow him, instead of being instructed that he would have a right to such access and the construction and maintenance of such docks until taken away by the government in the due exercise of its power of control over navigation. And this error was the more serious since the plan of the improvement contemplated that the improved river should become a slip for a docks and industries and recognized the right of a riparian owner to construct docks upon the harbor line, and there was nothing in the evidence indicating any probability that the government would at any time abrogate or curtail this right in any respect.
contingent privilege which may not be allowed at all. The failure to observe this distinction went to the root of the charge in reference to the deduction of benefits. And its natural, if not inevitable, effect was to lead the jury to a lower estimate of the benefits than would have been made under a proper charge.
The present case is not controlled by the provision of § 269 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 26, 1919, [Footnote 5] that, in an appellate proceeding, judgment shall be given after an examination of the entire record, "without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." We need not enter upon a discussion of the divergent views which have been expressed in various circuit courts of appeals as to the effect of the Act of 1919. It suffices to say that, since the passage of this Act, as well as before, an error which relates not to merely formal or technical matters, but to the substantial rights of the parties -- especially when embodied in the charge to a jury -- is to he held a ground for reversal unless it appears from the whole record that it was harmless and did not prejudice the rights of the complaining party. See Yazoo Railroad v. Mullins, 249 U. S. 531, 249 U. S. 533; Fillippon v. Albion Slate Co., 250 U. S. 76, 250 U. S. 82. In the present case, the error in the charge could not but mislead the jury in reference to a material element necessary for its consideration in determining the amounts of the awards, and it cannot be said from the whole record that the substantial rights of the United States were not prejudiced thereby. The judgments of the district court should therefore have been reversed, and new trials granted.
Appeals, and we are entirely satisfied with the conclusions which it reached in reference to them.
40 Stat. 250, 258, c. 49, § 1.
The appropriation was made on condition that the "local interests" should donate the necessary land and settle all claims for damages. Act of 1917, supra; H.Doc. No. 2063, 64th Cong.2d Sess. pp. 5, 15. The "local interests" which had undertaken to secure the necessary lands were unable to obtain them by purchase, and, at the request of the Secretary of War, condemnation proceedings were instituted in the name of the United States. Act of May 16, 1906, c. 2465, 34 Stat. 196, as amended by the Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3628, 34 Stat. 632. In order that the United States might be given immediate possession and proceed with the work, the Ford Motor Company, the principal "local interest," made a deposit to cover any awards of compensation and damages that might be made. Act of July 18, 1918, c. 155, 40 Stat. 904, 911.
40 Stat. 904, 911, c. 155, § 6.
H.Doc. No. 2063, note 2 supra, pp. 10, 11.
40 Stat. 1181, c. 48.

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