Source: http://academy.lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/state-v-jennings-171-s-e-2d-447-nc-supreme-court-1970/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:31:57+00:00

Document:
Attorney General Morgan and Staff Attorney Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., for the State.
Schoch, Schoch and Schoch, by Arch K. Schoch, Jr., for defendant.
JUDGES: Branch, J. Huskins, J., dissents. Moore, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to grant his motion for nonsuit at the close of all the evidence.
The State elected to prosecute defendant for second degree murder. Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, but without premeditation and deliberation. State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E. 2d 889; State v. Street, 241 N.C. 689, 86 S.E. 2d 277. There was plenary evidence that deceased died from a wound intentionally inflicted by defendant with a rifle, thus creating the presumptions that the killing was unlawful and that it was done with malice. State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E. 2d 638; State v. Redfern, 246 N.C. 293, 98 S.E. 2d 322. Upon the jury finding that deceased died from a wound intentionally inflicted by defendant with a rifle, it became incumbent upon defendant to satisfy the jury that the homicide was committed without malice so as to mitigate it to manslaughter or that the homicide was justified on the ground of self-defense. State v. Redfern, supra; State v. Gordon, 241 N.C. 356, 85 S.E. 2d 322. We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly overruled this assignment of error.
The reasoning and authorities cited by the Court of Appeals in overruling defendant’s assignment of error relative to cross-examination of defendant as to previous criminal convictions, without limiting instructions, appear to be correct, and further discussion by us is not required.
By his Assignment of Error No. 3, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury by allowing the jury to find defendant guilty of manslaughter if it found that he had killed the deceased “in sudden passion” or “heat of blood.” Admittedly, it is error for the trial judge to charge on matters which materially affect the issues when they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Knight, 248 N.C. 384, 103 S.E. 2d 452; State v. McCoy, 236 N.C. 121, 71 S.E. 2d 921. However, if the instruction is based upon a state of facts presented by a reasonable view of the evidence produced at the trial, there is no prejudicial error. State v. Wilson, 104 N.C. 868, 10 S.E. 315. The terms “heat of passion” or “heat of blood,” as used by the trial judge, are synonymous.
This Court has recognized that when there are circumstances strongly calculated to excite the passion of terror, a homicide may be mitigated from murder to manslaughter. State v. Will, 18 N.C. 121.
The instant case presents facts which would allow the inference that deceased approached defendant with a pistol pointed at him on the same day that defendant and deceased had been engaged in another altercation. It is reasonable to infer from this evidence that defendant might have become dominated by a sudden passion or rage, anger, fear or terror that caused him to inflict the fatal wound. In any event, it would seem that the instruction complained of was for defendant’s benefit rather than to his prejudice, since it presented a ground upon which the homicide could have been reduced from murder in the second degree to manslaughter. We find no error prejudicial to defendant in this assignment of error.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in its charge on self-defense in failing to define or further explain the words “without fault” and “free from blame” in bringing on the controversy, when defendant specifically requested such charge. The words “without fault” and “free from blame” are words of common usage and would ordinarily require no explanation to be understood. There are many cases in this jurisdiction which hold that it is not error for the court to fail to define and explain words of common usage in the absence of a request for special instructions. State v. Hall, 267 N.C. 90, 147 S.E. 2d 548; State v. Godwin, 267 N.C. 216, 147 S.E. 2d 890; State v. Jones, 227 N.C. 402, 42 S.E. 2d 465. Further, this Court has approved charges on self-defense which used these words or words so nearly identical as to be indistinguishable without further definition or amplification. State v. De Mai, 227 N.C. 657, 44 S.E. 2d 218; State v. Robinson, 213 N.C. 273, 195 S.E. 824; State v. Parker, 198 N.C. 629, 152 S.E. 890; State v. Pollard, 168 N.C. 116, 83 S.E. 167.
Likewise, it is our opinion that conduct towards another must be evaluated within the framework of the surroundings, circumstances and parties, including their previous relations and the then existing state of their feelings. However, the fact that a person has previously been guilty of immoral conduct or wrongful acts, or has had past difficulties with the decedent, does not, standing alone, deprive a defendant of his right of self-defense. 40 C.J.S., Homicide, ß 119, at 990. The requirement that a defendant must be free from fault in bringing on the difficulty before he can have the benefit of the doctrine of self-defense ordinarily means that he himself must not have precipitated the fight by assaulting the decedent or by inciting in him the reaction which caused the homicide. Usually, whether the defendant is free from blame or fault will be determined by his conduct at the time and place of the killing. Yet the fault in bringing on a difficulty which will deprive him of the right of self-defense is not confined to the precise time of the fatal encounter, but may include fault so closely connected with the difficulty in time and circumstances as to be fairly regarded as operating to bring it on. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, ß 145, at 434.
Here, defendant had been engaged for a period of years in conduct with deceased’s wife which, in the eyes of an average juror, would fix him with blame and fault, and under the particular facts of this case the court should have amplified and explained the meaning of “without fault” and “free from blame.” We wish to make it crystal-clear that we do not intend to overrule the line of cases which have used the words “without fault” or “free from blame” without further definition when there was no request for further instruction. We emphasize that this opinion must be read in connection with the facts of the case. Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E. 2d 10. We conclude that upon the facts of the instant case, upon request of counsel, the court should have further clarified the charge so as to properly relate defendant’s conduct to the time and place of the homicide and to dispel any idea that defendant’s right of self-defense was precluded solely by reason of his prior improper association with the wife of deceased.
Accord: State v. Kirby, 273 N.C. 306, 160 S.E. 2d 24; State v. Hardee, 3 N.C. App. 426, 165 S.E. 2d 43; State v. Fowler, 250 N.C. 595, 108 S.E. 2d 892; State v. Goode, 249 N.C. 632, 107 S.E. 2d 70; State v. Rawley, 237 N.C. 233, 74 S.E. 2d 620; State v. Moore, 214 N.C. 658, 200 S.E. 427. This unbroken line of decisions clearly indicates error in the charge.
“It was incorrect and material error to charge the jury that the prisoner must have killed the deceased from mere necessity, in order to excuse the homicide, Whether there was any actual necessity for killing the deceased in order to save his own life, or to prevent great bodily harm to him, makes no difference, provided, at the time, the prisoner believed, and had reason to believe, that from the facts and circumstances as they then appeared to him he was about to be killed, or to suffer some enormous bodily harm.
See also: State v. Fowler, supra; State v. Isley, 221 N.C. 213, 19 S.E. 2d 875; State v. Floyd, 220 N.C. 530, 17 S.E. 2d 658; State v. Starnes, 220 N.C. 384, 17 S.E. 2d 346; State v. Mosley, 213 N.C. 304, 195 S.E. 830; State v. Johnson, supra.
We do not deem it necessary to rule on the other assignments of error since these questions may not recur in a new trial.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that Court with direction to award a new trial to be held in accordance with the principles herein stated.

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