Source: https://eem.jacksonkelly.com/water_quality_and_permitting/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:50:20+00:00

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Few states initially adopted the EPA proposal. One of them that did was West Virginia, which did so in 1993. It quickly came to regret its decision. WVDEP soon identified many waters as impaired based solely on aluminum concentrations, but also discovered that many were not actually impaired. It has worked since to rescind or alter its criteria. Most recently, in 2013 WVDEP adopted hardness-based criteria, but to-date that proposal is still awaiting EPA approval. EPA has consistently cited its on-going efforts to revise the 1988 criteria as grounds for delaying any decision on WVDEP’s latest proposal.
The 2017 proposed criteria, though, rely on “multilinear regression” to compute aluminum toxicity across a range of pH, dissolved organic carbon (“DOC”) and hardness levels. As a consequence, the criteria varies within certain ranges of these variables.
We have reviewed the public comments on EPA’s proposal. Most commenters support the use of statistical tools to adjust the criteria with changes in pH, DOC, and hardness because aluminum toxicity generally decreases with increasing DOC and hardness. However, the criteria are based on toxicity tests in which the ranges of those variables were bounded. As a consequence, EPA’s proposal does not authorize adjustment of the aluminum criteria for hardness and DOC values outside the ranges evaluated in the toxicity tests even though many waters have much higher levels of DOC and hardness.
The inability to extrapolate aluminum toxicity into higher ranges of DOC and hardness prevents regulators from recognizing the likelihood that aluminum toxicity continues to decrease above the ranges used in the laboratory tests—which would allow regulators to increase the allowable concentrations of aluminum. Many commenters suggested EPA should account for a wider range of DOC and hardness. Many of the commenters believed that without those adjustments the criteria would cause many healthy waters to be needlessly declared as “impaired”—resulting in “false” 303(d) listings and inappropriately stringent NPDES permit limits.
More importantly, though, the proposed criteria are expressed as “total” rather than as “acid soluble” or “dissolved” aluminum. That proposal has been met with widespread opposition. Commenters observed that laboratory waters used in toxicity tests relied on the use of soluble aluminum salts that are designed to dissolve in water and thereby convert to a bioavailable form. By expressing the criteria in total form, EPA has falsely assumed that the aluminum particles found in natural waters are likely to become as toxic as the soluble aluminum salts used in the toxicity tests.
EPA claims that unless “total” aluminum is measured, the criteria will fail to account for aluminum that can be sorbed to clay particles or complexed to DOC and later be converted to a toxic form in the water column. Thus, claims EPA, use of “total” aluminum measures will account for colloidal forms and hydroxide precipitates of aluminum that can dissolve under natural conditions and thereby become bioavailable. In response, several commenters observe that use of the standard “acid-digestion” method to measure total aluminum uses nitric acid to lower the pH of the sample to a range which does not exist in natural waters and in doing so breaks molecular bonds that would not otherwise be broken. Thus, they claim, however valid EPA’s claims about colloidal or complexed aluminum, the use of the “total” form will significantly overestimate the fraction of aluminum that can become bioavailable under natural conditions. The same commenters oppose EPA’s efforts to justify the use of the “total” form as “conservative,” saying that EPA simply should not express the criteria in total form unless it is able to advance a test method that appropriately accounts for aluminum solubility.
We have prepared a summary of most of the substantive comments on the proposed criteria. Please contact Bob McLusky if you would like a copy.
The Petition notes that as originally issued, the CCR rule was self-implementing. There was no nationwide permitting program created, and the rule would have relied primarily on citizen suits to enforce it. As a result, EPA rejected the use of flexible and risk-based standards because there was no regulatory program for administering and policing them. However, the Petition claims that former President Obama signed the Water Infrastructure Improvements (“WIIN Act”) into law on December 16, 2016. It says that the WIIN Act amended RCRA Subtitle D to authorize states to implement the CCR Rule through state permit programs. But, to obtain this authority, states must submit applications to administer the CCR Rule through a state program in lieu of the self-implementing rule. Where states do not seek this authority, EPA is directed to implement the Rule through a federal program. The Petitioner believes that the implementation of these programs should allow for more site-specific risk-based program elements than are permitted by the current CCR rule, but that time is needed both to recognize these elements in an amended rule and to implement them. Also, utilities will need more time to coordinate ash disposal options with new effluent limitation guidelines issued in late 2015.
The CCR rule generally relies on Safe Drinking Water Act “maximum contaminant levels” for groundwater protection; however, for constituents without an MCL, the rule defaults to background levels. The original proposal would have recognized risk-based standards, but EPA did not adopt them after determining they complicated what was then a self-implementing program. The Petition seeks a rule modification recognizing the use of risk-based standards now that the rule will not be self-implementing.
The Petition asks that the Rule be modified to recognize that a facility could demonstrate no need for further corrective action if the groundwater was not a drinking water source and had a low likelihood of migrating off-site. Again, EPA dropped this proposal from the final Rule after determining that its implementation was problematic under a self-implementing program.
4. Modification to Allow for Alternative Points of Compliance and Site-Specific Groundwater Monitoring Constituents.
The current Rule requires that unlined impoundments that trigger corrective action by detecting a statistically significant increase over a groundwater protection standard must cease receipt of CCR within 6 months and commence closure, with no opportunity to continue operating while taking steps to remedy the release with engineering controls. EPA has acknowledged that engineering controls could serve as an alternative to closure at some locations, but declined to authorize the option under the former self-implementing program. Now that facilities will be regulated by state or federal programs, there is no reason not to allow such controls in lieu of closure.
The Petition asserts that inactive impoundments are subject only to the “imminent and substantial endangerment” authorities of RCRA and CERCLA, but not to the regulatory or permitting authority of EPA.
7. Clarify that the use of CCR to close out CCR units can qualify as a “Beneficial Use” of CCR not otherwise regulated under the Rule.
The Rule does not restrict what activities can qualify as unregulated beneficial use with the exception of its use in “sand and gravel pits or quarries.” EPA has extended the prohibition to clay mines even though clay provides a natural barrier to groundwater migration.
9. Amend the Rule to Recognize use of liners found by States to be Effective.
The Petition says that EPA’s math was wrong in the final Rule, and that the threshold should have been 75,000 tons.
I have written previously (“Deciding Who Will Decide” January 18) about the complicated developments in the litigation over the “waters of the United States” rule (WOTUS) rule promulgated by the Corps of Engineers and EPA in 2015. The Sixth Circuit granted a motion by one of the parties in the case, the National Association of Manufacturers, on January 25 to suspend the litigation over the rule until the U.S. Supreme Court can decide whether the appeals court actually has jurisdiction. Regardless of which federal court, district or circuit, the Supreme Court ultimately finds has jurisdiction to hear the challenge, the controversy over what is a jurisdictional water will not soon recede – if ever.
The principal reason can be found in the Justice Department brief filed on behalf of the Corps and EPA in the Sixth Circuit on January 13. In its brief of 246 pages, the DOJ addresses 11 issues raised in the 22 cases consolidated before the court. It attempts to defend every aspect of the agencies’ rule, and it does so thoroughly and professionally. In reading it, however, especially in its defense of those features which are most remote from anything resembling a flowing stream, one understands why the rule so severely overreaches.
The rule, and DOJ’s brief in defense of it, attempts to justify the “nexus” test described by Justice Anthony Kennedy in the 2006 Rapanos case. Justice Kennedy joined with the plurality opinion which denied the Corps’ jurisdiction, but only because the Corps had not shown what he described as the “nexus” between the property and traditionally navigable waters. He then described those criteria which, if demonstrated and significant, would establish the nexus.
Justice Kennedy is a native of California and someone who acutely understands the importance of water and the protection of the property rights in water in that state and much of the arid Western United States. It is for this reason that he acknowledged the inclusion of ephemeral and intermittent streams within the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act if their importance can be demonstrated under the criteria he laid out in his opinion. As the nation has witnessed this winter, water from the snow and rain which has blanketed much of California is now being delivered to its coastal cities. It will continue to be delivered though the spring and early summer as the snow melts. Afterwards, the ephemeral streams will revert to dry creek-beds until the next seasonal rains. Thus, for an arid region the inclusion of ephemeral streams, as described in Kennedy’s opinion and the agency rule, makes sense.
What does not make sense is the application of the same standard for the half of the continental United States drained by the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The land in this part of the country, especially in higher elevations in mountainous region from New England to Northern Alabama and Georgia, is covered with drainages which act as ephemeral streams. These drainages do not act hydrologically to carry the significant volumes of water that are transported in the Western U.S. Nevertheless, virtually every example provided in DOJ’s brief in defense of the rule’s reach to minor streams is done with reference to the arid West. Whether or not intended, the DOJ brief illustrates how over-inclusive in its scope the rule is.
EPA and the Corps were unconstrained in how they might have approached the issue of a definition of “waters of the United States”. A regional or watershed approach would have been arguably permissible. It undoubtedly would be more precise than the present attempt to impose a nationwide standard across climactic and hydraulic regions which bear no resemblance to one another. If environmental protection was truly the purpose of the rule (and other motives have been suggested), the agencies have failed. The controversy will continue long after the Supreme Court considers the pending jurisdictional issue over which courts will hear disputes.
The article was authored by Blair M. Gardner, Jackson Kelly PLLC.
The Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) allows Congress to disapprove so-called “midnight” rules of an outgoing administration. But, disapprovals require congressional approvals and are subject to presidential vetoes—making them of limited utility where a rule was issued by an agency of a current president. Thus, while Congress voted to disapprove several rules under the Obama administration, all of the disapprovals were vetoed. In fact, the CRA has only been successfully used under Bush II to disapprove an OSHA ergonomics rule adopted in the waning days of the Clinton administration. Now, however, with Republicans controlling both houses of Congress and the White House, the CRA is a weapon to be reckoned with in a target rich environment. Among the first rules likely to be targeted will be the Office of Surface Mining’s Stream Protection Rule and the Environmental Protection Agency’s Methane Rule.
The CRA was enacted in 1996 to reestablish a measure of legislative control over agency rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–805.
Requires executive agencies to send their rules to both houses of Congress and the GAO before they can take effect. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
Delays effective date of “major rules” even further—until 60 days after publication in FR or until submitted to Congress, whichever is later. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3).
Allows a Member of Congress to introduce a joint resolution of approval regarding a rule “beginning on the date on which the report referred to in Section 801(a)(1)(A) is received by Congress.” 5 U.S.C. § 802(a).
The period for introducing a joint resolution starts upon “receipt” by Congress of the final rule and ends 60 days after Congress receives the rule, but the time period does not include days when either house is adjourned for more than 3 days. 5 U.S.C. § 802(a). In addition, if the rule is submitted to Congress with less than 60 days left before the session expires, then a new period of review becomes available in the next session of Congress. In that event, the rule is treated as if it had been submitted to Congress on the 15th day of the new session. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(d).
A joint resolution shall be referred to the committees in each House of Congress with jurisdiction. 5 U.S.C. § 802(b)(1).
−If a committee to which a joint resolution has been referred does not report the resolution after 20 days [from submission or publication] the committee may be “discharged” from further consideration of the resolution upon a petition supported in writing by 30 Members of the Senate, and the resolution shall be placed on the calendar.
−When a committee to which the resolution is referred either “reports” or is “discharged” from reporting, then a motion to consider the resolution is in order without being subject to a motion to amend, postpone or consider other business.
−Before the Senate, debate or the resolution is limited to 10 hours.
If the joint resolution is ultimately enacted, the rule may not take effect (or continue in effect), and may not be reissued in substantially the same form. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
Can the CRA be Used to Disapprove of Portions of a Rule or More Than One Rule?
No. The CRA can only be used to invalidate a single rule in its entirety; it cannot be used to modify or restructure a rule, and a single resolution cannot invalidate more than one rule. 5 U.S.C. § 802(c) & (d).
Only one rule has been overturned (OSHA’s ergonomic standards under Clinton administration in 2001). Five were passed by Congress under the Obama administration, but they were all vetoed. CRA FAQ, p. 5.
How Can You Determine if a Rule has Been Submitted Under CRA?
Notice of each Congressional house’s receipt appears in the “Executive Communications” section of the daily Congressional Record. They can also be searched using the Legislative Information System.
Submissions to GAO: GAO has a database at http://gao.gov/legal/congressional-review-act/overview. This contains links to reports by the GAO on major rules.
How is a Joint Resolution of Disapproval Introduced?
A joint disapproval resolution is introduced like other bills, but there is precise language required and defined time limits during which it must be submitted.
The receipt of the rule by Congress starts the 60 “days-of-continuous session” during which any member of either house may submit a resolution.
–A rule is considered received by Congress on the later date of receipt by the Speaker of the House or its referral to Senate committee.
–In calculating “days of continuous session” every calendar day is counted, including weekends and holidays, and the count is paused only for periods where either chamber adjourns for more than three days.
–The resolution must be submitted during this 60-day period—not before and not after.
 Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700-01, 773-74, 777, 779-80, 783-85, 800, 816-17, 825, and 827)..
 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
 “Before a rule can take effect, the Federal agency promulgating such rule shall submit to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing – (i) a copy of the rule; (ii) a concise statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a major rule; and (iii) the proposed effective date of the rule.” 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
 “Major rules” are those “that the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs [OIRA] of [OMB] finds has resulted in or is likely to result in – (A) an annual effect on the economy of $100 [million] or more; (B) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, . . . agencies or geographic regions; or (C) significant adverse effects on competition, employment. . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 804(2).
The Stream Protection Rule was not identified as a “major” rule. It is unclear what effect there is to a misclassification of a rule or a failure to submit it to the GA/Congress since the CRA also provides that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 805.
 Since the ability to introduce a resolution is tied to the submission of a report to Congress and the GAO by the issuing agency, does the failure of an agency to submit the rule prevent the introduction of a resolution? According to one researcher, the Senate Parliamentarian has ruled that if the GAO determines an agency action is a covered rule that should have been submitted, a Member can introduce a resolution of disapproval starting on the day of GAO’s determination. See Congressional Review Act: Many Recent Final Rules Were Not Submitted to GAO and Congress, Independent Report of Curtis W. Copeland (July 15, 2014), p. 7 n. 15 (citing, e.g., http://www.finance.‌senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=363028c1-c4fe-4ca9-b180-746e3e9daf82.
 Congressional Review Act: Frequently Asked Questions, CRS Report (Nov. 17, 2016) (“CRA: FAQ”), p. 4.
The controversy over EPA’s definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) took another meander on January 13. United States Supreme Court surprised many by granting a petition for certiorari to decide which court – the federal district or circuit courts – have the authority to adjudicate disputes over a regulation defining a key term of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Ever since EPA and the Corps of Engineers issues their final WOTUS definition on June 29, 2015, the rule has been mired in legal challenges over not only what the regulation means, but more critically, which court gets to decide that question.
Challenges to the regulation began almost immediately upon its publication almost 19 months ago. Given the national applicability of the rule, and the immense variation in waters and wetlands governed by it, suits were filed across the United States in various district courts. One district court in North Dakota found that it had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition; at least two other district courts decided they did not. The cases were consolidated before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati. In a decision issued last February, a three judge panel of the Sixth Circuit decided that it did have jurisdiction to decide the case. And this is where it begins to get strange.
Congress grants jurisdiction to the circuit courts to review EPA’s actions in seven enumerated instances. The Sixth Circuit decided that the WOTUS rule was either a “limitation” or a permitting decision under §509(b)(1)(F) or (G) of the CWA. It reached this conclusion after reviewing numerous decisions of the Supreme Court and the other circuit courts, including the Sixth Circuit’s own decision in a 2009 case, National Cotton. A second judge on the panel concluded that the agencies’ action in promulgating the definition fit neither of the statutory categories. He also concluded that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in National Cotton was incorrectly decided. Nevertheless, it was a binding rule of law which the panel was bound to follow. And therefore, the judge concurred in the judgment of the court. The third member of the panel dissented and concluded that the Sixth Circuit had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
The upshot of the decision was that the parties in the various consolidated cases were ordered to brief the merits of the challenge. On January 13, the EPA and Corps submitted their response, a 246 page document which asserts why the federal agencies will be able to assert legal authority over virtually any moist patch of the United States. Because the Sixth Circuit had already issued a nationwide stay of WOTUS pending its final decision, the stay will almost certainly remain in effect while the Supreme Court takes up the difficult question of where jurisdiction lies under the CWA to hear the case.
The Supreme Court has rarely found consensus in its CWA decisions. This case is likely to change that trend. The case is National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, No. 16-299.
The article was authored by Blair M. Gardner, Jackson Kelly, PLLC.
The United States Office of Surface Mining (“OSM”) has finalized its “Stream Protection Rule (“SPR”) (12/20/16). This was formerly known as the “buffer zone rule” and dates to the early 1980s. OSM adopted it originally as a means of keeping sediment out of streams. It prohibited land disturbance within 100 feet of intermittent or perennial streams unless the applicant made certain showings about protecting water quality and environmental resources. In the late 1990s, though, the rule became the centerpiece of the assault on surface coal mining operations when a federal court in West Virginia relied on it to prohibit the construction of new excess spoil valley fills. Although that ruling was reversed on jurisdictional grounds, anti-mining advocates continued to advance it in permit challenges. In the waning days of the George Bush administration, in late 2008, OSM substantially revised the rule. That rule expressly recognized that SMCRA could not be used to prohibit valley fills authorized under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, but did require applicants to make extensive showings that they had minimized generation of excess spoil. Anti-mining forces immediately challenged the rule as insufficiently stringent, and claimed OSM had failed to consult with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. The new Obama administration attempted to vacate the rule immediately by “confessing error,” but the Court ruled that OSM would either have to litigate the issue or vacate the rule through rulemaking.
For the past 8 years, the Obama administration has fumbled its way through the rulemaking process to produce the current SPR. The current rule started as a means to limit surface mining, but is now also widely regarded as a vehicle to restrict longwall underground impacts to streams. Along the way, leaks from OSM’s review process suggested that the rule would result in widespread unemployment in the east. OSM has spent several years trying to repair this damage, and now implausibly claims that the rule will result in a net employment increase. OSM concedes that coal mining jobs will diminish, but claims that more people will be hired to comply with the mitigation and restoration portions of the rule—a claim that seems to assume mining will proceed apace and that industry will absorb all of the new costs imposed by the rule with no production decreases. That might have been true if cheap and widespread sources of shale gas had not become available over the last 8 years, but is economic nonsense in the current environment.
The State of North Dakota has already challenged the rule, which is set to become final on January 19, 2017. Other industry challenges are sure to follow, and it is likely that the rule will become the object of a disapproval resolution under the Congressional Review Act, which empowers Congress to void so-called “midnight” rules by the executive branch. OSM has issued briefing documents and a press release regarding the elements of the final rule.
On December 21, 2016, U.S. EPA finalized changes to the Accidental Release Prevention Requirements for Risk Management Programs under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7). According to EPA, the amendments aim to modernize EPA’s RMP regulations as required under Executive Order (EO) 13650. EO 13650 directs the federal government to carry out a number of tasks intended to prevent chemical incidents, such as the explosion in West, Texas on April 17, 2013.
Ensure LEPCs (Local Emergency Planning Committees), local emergency response officials, and the public can access information in a user-friendly format to help them understand the risks at RMP facilities and better prepare for emergencies.
EPA is submitting the rule for publication in the Federal Register (FR). It will become effective 60 days after publication.
EPA Releases Draft Field-Based Methods for Developing Aquatic Life Criteria for Specific Conductivity (12/10/16): Specific conductance, or conductivity, is a surrogate for measuring dissolved salts in water. Most water quality standards to protect aquatic life are developed using the results of laboratory exposure tests on a variety of aquatic life, and EPA has never adopted a recommended aquatic life criterion for conductivity. Nor have many states adopted conductivity criterion to protect aquatic life.
In 2011, however, as part of its efforts to restrict surface mining in the east, EPA developed a “conductivity benchmark” which it used as a sort of informal water quality standard in objecting to NPDES permits that did not include conductivity limits. The Benchmark did not rely on exposure tests performed in laboratories. Instead, using a database from the WVDEP of paired water chemistry and aquatic insect sampling, EPA inferred causative impacts to different insects at varying conductivity levels. It arrived at a “suggested” range of 300-500 μS/cm, a value widely considered unachievable downstream of most surface mining.
EPA purportedly relied on epidemiological principles and statistics to discount potential alternative or confounding factors. Now, it has proposed documents that can be used by states to adopt their own aquatic life criterion for conductivity using their own field data. It also suggests a method by which states with sufficient water chemistry information, but without paired benthic insect sampling, may extrapolate from the work done with the WV and other databases to develop a criterion. And, finally, the released documents include a suggested criterion of about 500 μS/cm to protect fish based on a review of eastern data.
EPA’s documents note that the draft documents are not a rule and do not establish legally binding requirements, but there is little doubt that anti-development activists will rely on the data to force EPA to adopt a recommended criterion and on states to do the same. EPA is providing a 60-day public comment period that will run from the date of publication in the federal register.
This article was authored by Robert G. McLusky and Douglas J. Crouse, Jackson Kelly, PLLC.

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