Source: https://ncforensics.wordpress.com/2011/08/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 16:31:47+00:00

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In S.L. 2011-283 (H 542), the General Assembly revised North Carolina Evidence Rule 702(a). Rule 702(a) guides the trial court in serving a gatekeeper function with regard to expert testimony; the trial court must make a preliminary determination as to whether a witness has the qualifications to testify as an expert, and if so, whether the expert’s testimony is admissible. S.L. 2011-283 was enacted as a part of new limits in civil tort actions; however, the amended rule applies to criminal cases as well as civil. Thus, criminal defenders are asking: to what extent has the framework for determining the admissibility of expert testimony changed?
To what degree is the theory or technique generally accepted by the scientific community? Id. at 593-94.
In Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltc., 358 N.C. 440 (2004), the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the federal standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony. “North Carolina is not, nor has it ever been a Daubert jurisdiction.” Id. at 469. Instead, North Carolina has used the three-part inquiry set forth in Howerton: “(1) Is the expert’s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert’s testimony relevant?” Id. at 458, relying on State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527-29 (1995) (internal citations omitted). The first prong of the Howerton test includes a requirement that the expert’s method of proof be reliable, much like the second restriction in amended Rule 702(a). Unlike amended Rule 702(a), however, the Howerton test does not explicitly require that experts have sufficient facts and data for their opinions, or that they apply their methods reliably to the facts. Arguably, these were implicit requirements under Howerton as they are components of reliability. Some North Carolina decisions have recognized that experts should have sufficient facts and data for their opinions and should apply their methods reliably. See, e.g., State v. Grover, 142 N.C. App. 411, aff ’d per curiam, 354 N.C. 354 (2001). Amended Rule 702(a) makes it clear that trial judges must apply those requirements before allowing expert testimony before the jury.
The approach that North Carolina adopted in Howerton was “less mechanistic and rigorous than the exacting standards of reliability demanded by the federal approach.” Howerton, 358 N.C. at 464 (internal citations omitted); see also Robert P. Mosteller et al., North Carolina Evidentiary Foundations at pp. 10-15 to 10-17 (2d ed. 2006). Amended Rule 702(a) may or may not mandate the precise approach required by Daubert, but by adopting the language of Federal Rule 702, the General Assembly has raised the bar (or better stated, “the gate”), thereby requiring greater scrutiny of expert testimony than the former North Carolina rule and the cases interpreting it. Court actors should not presume that a method of proof that was deemed sufficiently reliable under the former North Carolina rule and Howerton will be admissible under the amended rule. The subparts added by S.L. 2011-283 are not a codification of Howerton, and it may no longer be good law. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586-87 (holding that the “general acceptance test” of Frye v. United States,54 App. D.C. 46 (1923) was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence). In response to the legislative changes, defenders should be prepared to conduct more rigorous scrutiny of experts to determine admissibility, which will require probing discovery, motions, and voir dire practices to determine whether the expert’s testimony complies with the amended requirements.
As mentioned above, the amendments to Rule 702(a) are part of the “An Act to Provide Tort Reform for North Carolina Citizens and Businesses.” Possibly, the General Assembly did not have an eye to the impact the amendments would have on criminal practice in North Carolina. However, recent cases reveal growing concerns about unreliable expert testimony in criminal cases. See State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 133 (2010) (expert’s testimony was not based on sufficiently reliable method of proof where expert identified substances based on a visual examination rather than a chemical analysis); State v. Davis, __ N.C. App. __, 702 S.E.2d 507 (2010) (expert’s testimony was not based on sufficiently reliable method of proof where expert relied on odor analysis to conduct retrograde extrapolation of defendant’s blood alcohol concentration at time of accident); State v. Meadows, __ N.C. App. __, 687 S.E.2d 305 (2010) (expert’s testimony was not based on sufficiently reliable methods of proof where expert relied on the results of the NarTest machine). Thus, amended Rule 702(a) may be viewed as a timely reform in the criminal context.
Note: A later bill (SL 2011-317) makes the revised rule applicable to actions arising on or after October 1, 2011. For criminal cases, the rule likely applies to cases in which the offense occurred on or after that date.
For those of you who just cannot get enough Duke Lacrosse news, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion on August 2, 2011 in a civil case involving a lawsuit filed by the DNA tester, Brian Meehan, against his former company, which had fired him “for cause.” Not surprisingly, the Court held that submitting an incomplete lab report that obscured the test results constituted just cause to fire Meehan both under the express terms of his employment contract and as a matter of public policy.
In the present case, Plaintiff’s misconduct involves intentionally obscuring evidence and submitting an incomplete report in a court of law when clear explanation of the test results would have exculpated individuals wrongly charged. We believe public policy supports the conclusion that such misconduct is grounds for just cause termination of employment.
The NC Attorney General’s Office has released the Report of the Ombudsman, completed by Judge Vince Rozier, Jr. prior to leaving that position. The Ombudsman’s report is preceded by a memo from the Acting North Carolina State Crime Lab Director Joseph R. John, Sr. responding to the report’s recommendations.
Publish past protocols and procedures of the SBI lab, in addition to the current procedures (see p. 13). While the current procedures for most sections of the lab have been posted on the NCDOJ’s website, historical procedures have not been posted, despite the recommendations of the Swecker Report from August 2010.
Make clear where standards have been modified and include former and current status of the standard (see p. 13-14). To demonstrate the importance of denoting changes, Rozier points to a 2008 Administrative Order that changed the standard for what conclusions can be drawn regarding minor profiles in DNA mixtures. (Prior to the 2008 order, if a DNA sample contained more than one person’s profile, analysts could report that the defendant “cannot be excluded as the contributor to the minor allele” if the defendant’s DNA was observed as a minor profile at a minimum number of locations. The new standard requires analysts to state “no conclusion can be rendered as to the donor of the minor profile” if the same results are observed.) Attorneys should be made aware of changes to procedures regarding interpretation of results and acceptable conclusions and should be aware of which standard is being used in their case.
Rozier also recommended that a group of criminal justice stakeholders be formed to review the Evidence Submission Form (SBI-5) to ensure the form promotes neutrality (see p. 19-20).
This is just a handful of the recommendations that I found to be significant. I welcome posts in the comments section about these or other recommendations.
Yesterday, the News and Observer article Long delays in SBI reforms stirs critics covered this report and responses to recent announcements by the Attorney General regarding the Crime Lab.
A Texas appeals court affirmed the exclusion of evidence that a dog identified a defendant’s scent in a “scent-lineup” in State v. Dominguez. The trial court found that human scent identification by a canine is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted in evidence in a criminal trial, based on the defendant’s motion to suppress and the testimony of a state and a defense expert. The appeals court affirmed that finding.

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