Source: https://www.bna.com/diagnosing-patent-ineligibility-n12884909266/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:08:13+00:00

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The authors are partners with Pryor Cashman, New York. Klaiber is a member of the firm's Intellectual Property Group, specializing in patent law. Goodman is co-head of the firm's Mergers and Acquisitions Practice, specializing in the representation of technology-based companies. The authors wish to thank Andrew S. Langsam and Jeffrey C. Johnson, also Pryor Cashman partners, and Ryan S. Osterweil, a Pryor Cashman law clerk, for their contributions to this article.
For previously issued patents, the Mayo case may well embolden potential infringers who believe they can create reasonable challenges to those patents by alleging they are primarily patents of natural laws and seeking to convince a court that the “other elements” of the patent are insufficiently inventive. Thus, the cost of defending issued process patents is likely to increase.
A close examination of the case is essential to understanding the availability of protection for process patents, not only in medical diagnostics but also in software and other fields.
Accordingly, the court analyzed the steps of the Prometheus claim to determine whether this threshold was met.
[T]he claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.
[T]here is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more than an instruction to “apply the natural law,” or otherwise forecloses more future invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify.
The arguments of Prometheus and the U.S. government (as amicus curiae) were also rejected by the court. Prometheus had argued that its claimed processes were patent-eligible because “they involved transforming the human body” by administering the drug and “transforming the blood” itself by analyzing it to determine the level of metabolites.
It is interesting to note that the Mayodecision did not engage in (or require) a construction of claims before embarking on the patent-eligibility analysis, as would be necessary in any analysis under 35 U.S.C. §§102 (novelty), 103 (nonobviousness), and 112 (written description, best mode, enablement, and definiteness). Since a rigorous claim construction does not appear to be necessary to challenge the patent-eligibility of a claim, the case may subject patent-holders to new challenges alleging that the novel or nonobvious aspects of its invention are simply natural laws or mathematical algorithms, and that the claims are so broadly or abstractly worded that it would foreclose innovation.
More particularly, Mayo states that no amount of “conventional” or “obvious” matter can be added to overcome the recitation of an ineligible natural law or algorithm. Thus, challengers may also now allege with greater impunity that those elements of a claim which are notnatural laws are entirely obvious based on prior art references under Sections 102 or 103 of the patent code.
But other companies, such as those with software-implemented inventions (since algorithms are treated by the courts in the same manner as natural laws) or companies that are active in the medical diagnostic field should be especially concerned after Mayo, and should review their method patents to determine whether they include significant novel and nonobvious steps beyond the algorithm or any natural laws that may be recited.
The claim in Ultramercial was for a method whereby a consumer would receive a copyrighted product for free in exchange for viewing an advertisement, while the advertiser would be charged and pay the copyright holder for the copyrighted content delivered to the consumer. Citing one of its own earlier precedents,39 the Federal Circuit found that the “abstract idea” underlying the claimed invention did not “exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter.” Rather, the opinion determines that the steps set forth in the claims constitute a particular, useful application of the abstract idea of using advertising as a form of currency.
If the Federal Circuit is required to reexamine Ultramercial (or if it must revisit the patent eligibility of a software or business method patent for any other reason), the holdings of the Mayo decision will force it to confront a number of questions. Perhaps the primary issue relates to the fact that most challenges to the eligibility of software or business methods for patent protection are based on the argument that the invention represents an “abstract idea” rather than a “law of nature,” as in Mayo.
Will the Federal Circuit apply the same reasoning set forth in Mayo to distinguish between an unpatentable “law of nature” and a patentable application of such a law when confronted with a challenge to a software patent that the claimed invention is an unpatentable “abstract idea” rather than a patentable application of that idea?
The Mayo court seems to have intended its decision to apply to all categories of exceptions to Section 101 patentable subject matter, as attested by its remand of the Myriad case (which involved both the “law of nature” and the “abstract idea” exceptions). The court hinted at a roadmap for arguing the patent-eligibility of software or a business method in the face of challenges based on these exceptions by virtue of its extensive reliance on Diehr.
Accordingly, a patent applicant (or patentee facing a patent-eligibility challenge) should make every effort to call attention to the ways in which its claims are like those in Diehr.
According to the Mayo court, the Diehr claims were held to be patent-eligible “because of the way the additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as a whole.”40 So the smart applicant or patentee should craft software or business method claims so as to identify as clearly as possible steps that are patent-eligible (i.e., neither abstract, part of a mental process, or a mathematical algorithm), and explain how those steps integrate (or apply) the patent-ineligible aspect of the invention in a way that demonstrates a measurable improvement over existing technology.
The court noted that the Diehr patentees “did not seek to pre-empt the use of the equation, but sought only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all the other steps in their claimed process.”44 Thus, one key to overcoming a Section 101 challenge may be inclusion of a significant number of steps, or one substantial step, that acts to limit the claimed use of the patent-ineligible subject matter in a meaningful way.
One strategy for accomplishing this would be to forgo broad claiming and add more independent claims that include steps drafted to cover specific applications of the technology. As the Mayocourt made clear in its review of Bilski, however, mere “field of use” restrictions are insufficient.45 Since Bilski did not recite such limiting steps, it is likely that a court faced today with claims similar to those at issue in Bilksi would reach the identical result through application of the Mayo “inventive concept” test.
Thus, while the briefs and arguments of the parties in the SmartGenecase pre-dated the Supreme Court's Mayodecision,53 the decision seems to reinforce the idea that Mayo may bolster Bilski-based arguments by patent challengers that broad claims based on automating human analysis are in reality efforts to control abstract ideas and hence fall outside patentable subject matter under Section 101. This leads to one possible conclusion that process patents might best be drafted or defended by convincing the PTO or the court that the patent leaves open the possibility for someone to “invent around” the claims.
1 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (54 PTD, 3/21/12).
132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (54 PTD, 3/21/12).132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (54 PTD, 3/21/12).132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (54 PTD, 3/21/12).
2Id., slip op. at 8.
, slip op. at 8., slip op. at 8., slip op. at 8.
3Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010).
, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010)., 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010)., 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 USPQ2d 1001 (2010).
4Mayo, slip op. at 3.
, slip op. at 3., slip op. at 3., slip op. at 3.
5 Discussed below at note 46 et. seq.
Discussed below at note 46 et. seq.Discussed below at note 46 et. seq.Discussed below at note 46 et. seq.
10Id. at 1 (citations omitted).
at 1 (citations omitted).at 1 (citations omitted).at 1 (citations omitted).
11Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).
at 2-3 (citations omitted).at 2-3 (citations omitted).at 2-3 (citations omitted).
16Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ 1 (1981) (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 590, 198 USPQ 193 (1978).
, 450 U. S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ 1 (1981) (1981); , 437 U. S. 584, 590, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)., 450 U. S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ 1 (1981) (1981); , 437 U. S. 584, 590, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)., 450 U. S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ 1 (1981) (1981); , 437 U. S. 584, 590, 198 USPQ 193 (1978).
17See Mayo, slip op. at 11-12.
, slip op. at 11-12., slip op. at 11-12., slip op. at 11-12.
21Id. at 12-13 (citations and quotations omitted).
at 12-13 (citations and quotations omitted).at 12-13 (citations and quotations omitted).at 12-13 (citations and quotations omitted).
23Bilski,supra note 4; Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972); O'Reillyv.Morse, 15 How. 62 (1854); Neilsonv.Harford, Webster's Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841) (English case discussing whether a claim is directed to a principle or a machine embodying that principle).
supra note 4; v. , 409 U. S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972); , 15 How. 62 (1854); , Webster's Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841) (English case discussing whether a claim is directed to a principle or a machine embodying that principle).supra note 4; v. , 409 U. S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972); , 15 How. 62 (1854); , Webster's Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841) (English case discussing whether a claim is directed to a principle or a machine embodying that principle).supra note 4; v. , 409 U. S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972); , 15 How. 62 (1854); , Webster's Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841) (English case discussing whether a claim is directed to a principle or a machine embodying that principle).
24Mayo, slip op. at 14.
, slip op. at 14., slip op. at 14., slip op. at 14.
26Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).
at 16-17 (citations omitted).at 16-17 (citations omitted).at 16-17 (citations omitted).
28Id. at 19 (citations and quotations omitted).
at 19 (citations and quotations omitted).at 19 (citations and quotations omitted).at 19 (citations and quotations omitted).
36Mayo, slip op. at 18.
, slip op. at 18., slip op. at 18., slip op. at 18.
37Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 99 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (147 PTD, 8/1/11); cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., No. 11-725 (U.S. March 26, 2012).
, 653 F.3d 1329, 99 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (147 PTD, 8/1/11); cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, , No. 11-725 (U.S. March 26, 2012)., 653 F.3d 1329, 99 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (147 PTD, 8/1/11); cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, , No. 11-725 (U.S. March 26, 2012)., 653 F.3d 1329, 99 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (147 PTD, 8/1/11); cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, , No. 11-725 (U.S. March 26, 2012).
38Ultramercial LLC v. Hulu LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 100 USPQ2d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (182 PTD, 9/20/11). It appears that the court will likely address the petition in May.
657 F.3d 1323, 100 USPQ2d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (182 PTD, 9/20/11). It appears that the court will likely address the petition in May.657 F.3d 1323, 100 USPQ2d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (182 PTD, 9/20/11). It appears that the court will likely address the petition in May.657 F.3d 1323, 100 USPQ2d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (182 PTD, 9/20/11). It appears that the court will likely address the petition in May.
39Research Corporation Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 97 USPQ2d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
, 627 F.3d 859, 97 USPQ2d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010)., 627 F.3d 859, 97 USPQ2d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010)., 627 F.3d 859, 97 USPQ2d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
40Mayo, slip. op. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
slip. op. at 11-12 (emphasis added).slip. op. at 11-12 (emphasis added).slip. op. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
41Diehr at 450 U.S. 181. The Research Corporation Technologies case echoes the Diehr court's approbation of the patent-eligibility of computerized improvements to existing technical problems (“Indeed, this court notes that inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”); Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1328 (citing Research Corporation Technologies, and noting that “[b]y its terms, the claimed invention purports to improve existing technology in the marketplace.”).
at 450 U.S. 181. The case echoes the court's approbation of the patent-eligibility of computerized improvements to existing technical problems (“Indeed, this court notes that inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”); , 657 F.3d at 1328 (citing , and noting that “[b]y its terms, the claimed invention purports to improve existing technology in the marketplace.”).at 450 U.S. 181. The case echoes the court's approbation of the patent-eligibility of computerized improvements to existing technical problems (“Indeed, this court notes that inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”); , 657 F.3d at 1328 (citing , and noting that “[b]y its terms, the claimed invention purports to improve existing technology in the marketplace.”).at 450 U.S. 181. The case echoes the court's approbation of the patent-eligibility of computerized improvements to existing technical problems (“Indeed, this court notes that inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”); , 657 F.3d at 1328 (citing , and noting that “[b]y its terms, the claimed invention purports to improve existing technology in the marketplace.”).
42Mayo, slip. op. at 12. This view is somewhat curious, as the Diehr opinion, quoting the examiner's rejection, noted that “[t]he remaining steps … were conventional and necessary to the process and cannot be the basis for patentability.” Diehr at 450 U.S. 180-181 (quotation omitted).
, slip. op. at 12. This view is somewhat curious, as the opinion, quoting the examiner's rejection, noted that “[t]he remaining steps … were conventional and necessary to the process and cannot be the basis for patentability.” at 450 U.S. 180-181 (quotation omitted)., slip. op. at 12. This view is somewhat curious, as the opinion, quoting the examiner's rejection, noted that “[t]he remaining steps … were conventional and necessary to the process and cannot be the basis for patentability.” at 450 U.S. 180-181 (quotation omitted)., slip. op. at 12. This view is somewhat curious, as the opinion, quoting the examiner's rejection, noted that “[t]he remaining steps … were conventional and necessary to the process and cannot be the basis for patentability.” at 450 U.S. 180-181 (quotation omitted).
43Diehr at 45 U.S. 188-189.
at 45 U.S. 188-189.at 45 U.S. 188-189.at 45 U.S. 188-189.
44Mayo, slip. op. at 12 (quotation omitted).
slip. op. at 12 (quotation omitted).slip. op. at 12 (quotation omitted).slip. op. at 12 (quotation omitted).
45Mayo, slip. op. at 15 (quotation omitted).
slip. op. at 15 (quotation omitted).slip. op. at 15 (quotation omitted).slip. op. at 15 (quotation omitted).
46SmartGene Inc. v. Advanced Biological Laboratories SA, No. 08-642 (D.D.C. March 30, 2012) (65 PTD, 4/5/12).
, No. 08-642 (D.D.C. March 30, 2012) (65 PTD, 4/5/12)., No. 08-642 (D.D.C. March 30, 2012) (65 PTD, 4/5/12)., No. 08-642 (D.D.C. March 30, 2012) (65 PTD, 4/5/12).
48Id., slip op. at 23.
, slip op. at 23., slip op. at 23., slip op. at 23.
49Id., slip op. at 35.
, slip op. at 35., slip op. at 35., slip op. at 35.
51Id., slip op. at 23-32.
, slip op. at 23-32., slip op. at 23-32., slip op. at 23-32.
52Id., slip op. at 36.
, slip op. at 36., slip op. at 36., slip op. at 36.
53Id., slip op. at 6 (motion filed Dec. 12, 2011; hearing held March 9, 2012).
, slip op. at 6 (motion filed Dec. 12, 2011; hearing held March 9, 2012)., slip op. at 6 (motion filed Dec. 12, 2011; hearing held March 9, 2012)., slip op. at 6 (motion filed Dec. 12, 2011; hearing held March 9, 2012).

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