Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83753:58144&catid=1588&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:26:45+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 197442, October 22, 2014 - MAJESTIC FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO., INC., Petitioner, v. JOSE D. TITO, Respondent.; CORNELIO MENDOZA AND PAULINA CRUZ, Petitioners-Intervenors, v. JOSE NAZAL AND ROSITA NAZAL, Respondents-Intervenors.
MAJESTIC FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO., INC., Petitioner, v. JOSE D. TITO, Respondent.
CORNELIO MENDOZA AND PAULINA CRUZ, Petitioners-Intervenors, v. JOSE NAZAL AND ROSITA NAZAL, Respondents-Intervenors.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 30, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated June 22, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 81814, which reversed and set aside the Order4 dated July 28, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 27958, and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.
Prior to the institution of the annulment case, Tito had, however, already transmitted his interest over the subject property to spouses Jose and Rosita Nazal (Sps. Nazal) on September 13, 1977,12 prompting the latter to join him in the proceedings as intervenors, impleading Cruz and Mendoza on April 25, 1979.13 Earlier, or on January 5, 1979, Mendoza filed against Sps. Nazal a case for forcible entry and another case for recovery of possession, which were dismissed on February 22, 197914 and archived pending the resolution of the annulment case,15 respectively.
Majestic’s motion for reconsideration44 was denied by the CA in a Resolution45 dated June 22, 2011, hence, the instant petition.
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in allowing Sps. Nazal to prosecute their claim against Majestic.
All told, whether one treats Sps. Nazal as mere intervenors or, properly speaking, as the plaintiffs in the annulment case, the Court finds no cogent reason as to why the same should not be dismissed. In fine, Sps. Nazal are precluded from prosecuting their claim against Majestic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2008 and the Resolution dated June 22, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 81814 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 27958.
2 Id. at 255-268. Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
3 Id. at 317-324. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Noel G. Tijam, concurring.
4 Id. at 110-114. Penned by Judge Mariano M. Singzon, Jr.
5 Id. at 256-257. See also Agreement to Sell; id. at 468-470.
12 By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale with Exchange of Real Property; id. at 348-352. See also id. at 257.
14 Upon Sps. Nazal’s motion sans objection from Mendoza; id. at 259.
15 On October 19, 1983; id. at 260.
25cralawred Not attached to the record of this case.
27 Id. at 262 and 417.
28 Id. at 64-70. Penned by Pairing Judge Alicia P. Mariño-Co.
30 See id. at 69, citing Ventura v. Baysa, 114 Phil. 122 (1962).
31 Not attached to the records of this case.
32Rollo, pp. 71-77. Penned by Judge Amelia A. Fabros.
36 Id. at 110-114. Penned by Judge Mariano M. Singzon, Jr.
44 Dated November 25, 2008. Id. at 269-315.
SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. – If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
47 In certain instances, however, the Court has ruled that the dismissal of the original plaintiff’s action does not necessarily entail the consequent dismissal of the intervenors’ petition in intervention after the intervenor has become a party to the suit, such as: (a) when the parties to the principal action has entered into a compromise without the participation of the intervenor (see Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, G.R. No. 89909, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 820, 827); or (b) when the plaintiff in the principal action was declared to be without personality to file the action (see Eagle Realty Corp. v. Rep. of the Phils., 579 Phil. 355, 370-371 ). In such cases, the intervenors’ petition showing it to be entitled to affirmative relief will be preserved and heard regardless of the disposition of the principal action. However, none of the afore-cited circumstances obtain in the present case.
48Cariño v. Ofilada, G.R. No. 102836, January 18, 1993, 217 SCRA 206, 215 (citations omitted), as cited in B. Sta. Rita & Co., Inc. v. Gueco, G.R. No. 193078, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 320, 329.
49 Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Volume I, Tenth Edition (2009), p. 110.
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
53 See Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. v. Banco de Oro Universal Bank, supra note 51, at 547.
54 Ko v. Philippine National Bank, 515 Phil. 276, 282 (2006).
Upon the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980” on August 14, 1981, the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts was reposed in the Court of Appeals. However, it was only in the 1997 Rules of Court that it provided for a specific rule for such kind of actions.

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