Source: https://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/08/PA.tereanced.philly.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 06:46:08+00:00

Document:
Plaintiffs Tereance D. and Wanda D. bring this five-count action against the School District of Philadelphia (the "District") for failing to provide Tereance with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") and for discriminating against Tereance. The court presently considers the District's motion to dismiss Counts III and IV under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and its motion to dismiss Wanda as a plaintiff in her own right.
On December 13, 2006, Wanda filed a due process complaint pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("section 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. A hearing officer reviewed the case over six sessions before issuing an order on June 8, 2007 granting compensatory education for the period between December 13, 2004 and May 9, 2005 and compensatory ESY for the summers of 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2006. The hearing officer denied compensatory education for the school years of 2001-2002, 2002-2003, and 2003-2004, concluding that the statute of limitations had expired on those claims. The hearing officer also denied compensatory education for September through December 2004 and compensatory ESY for the summer of 2005. On July 17, 2007, the Special Education Appeals Panel's (the "panel") affirmed the hearing officer's order.
On October 15, 2007, Tereance and Wanda filed this five-count Complaint against the District.
Count I seeks enforcement of the hearing officer's award of compensatory education and ESY under IDEA. Count II appeals the panel's determination that the statue of limitations applied to preclude recovery for a violation of a FAPE under IDEA. Count III alleges discrimination based on Tereance's disabilities in violation of section 504 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Count IV alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for intentional discrimination against Tereance in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Count V alleges a failure to reimburse plaintiffs for their attorney fees and costs under IDEA, section 504, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
On December 20, 2007, the District moved to dismiss Counts I, III, and IV under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The District also moved to dismiss Wanda D. as a plaintiff in her own right. In response, plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss and moved for summary judgment as to Count I. After considering the parties' briefs, the court presently addresses the District's motion to dismiss Count III, Count IV, and Wanda in her own right, but will not consider either parties' motion with respect to Count I until after the parties complete on-going settlement negotiations for that Count and, if necessary, after a settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Hey.
Generally, when deciding whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court is testing the sufficiency of a complaint. Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). The court must accept as true all well-pled allegations of fact in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, to determine whether "under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. Nami, 82 F.3d at 65. A plaintiff must show a "plausible" or "reasonably founded hope" of success, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969, 1974 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), although "[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim," In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if it adequately puts the defendants on notice of the essential elements of the plaintiff[s] cause of action." Nami, 82 F.3d at 65.
Count III alleges violations of section 504 and of the ADA. The District contends that the Complaint fails to allege that the District discriminated against Tereance because of his disability. Because the Complaint properly alleges claims under section 504 and the ADA, the District's motion will be denied.
"No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ..."
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To establish a violation of section 504 in this case, plaintiffs must allege that (1) Tereance "is disabled as defined by the Act"; (2) Tereance is "otherwise' qualified to participate in school activities"; (3) the District "receives federal financial assistance"; and (4) Tereance "was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination at, the school." See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007). Furthermore, under the fourth element, the District must know of or be reasonably expected to know of Tereance's disability. See Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1380-81 (3d Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs, however, "need not establish that there has been an intent to discriminate in order to prevail under Section 04." Matula, 67 F.3d at 492 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1384.
(1) the District failed to provide Tereance with autistic and ESY services required to address his disability, which denied him an appropriate education, even after it suspected autistic spectrum disorders (see Compl. 2, 57, 74, 79, 81, 91, 111); (2) the District inappropriately treated Tereance's behavior as emotionally related, relegating him to inappropriate educational situations (see id. at 52-55, 73, 92, 96-98, 107, 109); (3) the District did not properly conduct the required evaluations of Tereance (see id. at 56, 62-63, 66, 91-93,115-116, 128); and (4) the District told Wanda to get private psychiatric evaluation that the school should have performed to assess Tereance's educational needs (see id. at 71-72). Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts which, if proven, show that the District excluded Tereance from participation in, denied him the benefits of, and subjected him to discrimination at school. Plaintiffs have thus made a prima facie case of the four elements required for a cause of action under section 504, and the court will deny the District's motion.
The court reaches the same conclusion for plaintiffs ADA claim. Under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." The ADA thus "extends the nondiscrimination rule of [section 504] to services provided by any "public entity" (without regard to whether the entity is a recipient of federal funds)." Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996). Because "the remedies, procedures, and rights" under the ADA are the same as those under Section 504," id., the allegations of the complaint discussed above sufficiently state a cause of action under the ADA. As such, the Complaint adequately describes facts that, if true, entitle plaintiffs to relief under section 504 and the ADA; therefore, the court will deny defendant's motion to dismiss Count III.
Count IV alleges a violation of the rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause through a cause of action under § 1983. The District claims that plaintiffs fail to allege treatment different from similarly situated individuals. Because the Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for discrimination under § 1983, the court will deny the District's motion.
In order to sufficiently plead a claim for a violation of the equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment under § S1983, plaintiffs must allege that Tereance "received different treatment from other similarly situated individuals or groups. See Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 850 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)); Irene B. v. Phila. Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-1716, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11 3020, at *46-47 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003); Kevin M. v. Bristol Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 00-6030, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22509, at *25-27 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2002). In the disability context, the United States Supreme Court has held that discrimination is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, whereas accommodation for disabled individuals "comes from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause." Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
In this case, the Complaint states two plausible grounds on which the District discriminated against Tereance. First, plaintiffs have alleged that the District's actions "were in furtherance of an official policy or ratification of systematic practices which ... violate Tereance's well-established federal constitutional rights as well of [sic] the rights of other children with disabilities, and was in deliberate indifference of those rights." (Compl. at 174 (alleging that the "District ... systematically failed to train its staff or to supervise its staff and contractors to prevent the deprivation of FAPE to Tereance and others like him"); see also Compl. at 62 (alleging practice of assigning psychologist who was not competent to evaluate an autistic child); Compl. at 50 (alleging failure to train an autistic support services teacher).) Those policies, for example, caused Wanda to forego ESY offerings for Tereance despite their availability to other students. (Id. at 150.) Second, plaintiffs have alleged discrimination through the District's specific denial of the availability of autistic support services to Tereance. (Id. at 168-69.) More specifically, the Complaint states that "most of the students in Tereance's Autistic Support classroom at Nebinger were in that class during the time the District was telling Wanda D. that Tereance was too "high functioning" for Autistic Support. His other classmates had been attending Autistic Support classrooms in other parts of the City, none of which the District had identified in response to Wanda D.'s repeated pleas for Autistic Support services for Tereance." (Id. at 146.) Either factual ground is sufficient to allege that the District discriminated against Tereance when compared to other similarly situated individuals, not just that it denied him accommodation without reference to its provisions for other individuals. These allegations are sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. The court will thus deny the District's motion to dismiss as to Count IV.
The case caption includes Wanda D. both as guardian of Tereance D. and in her own right. The District moves to dismiss Wanda as a plaintiff in her own right because she "has not alleged any specific violations of her own rights under IDEA, section 504, the ADA, or the Equal Protection Clause." (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 9.) Under IDEA, a parent may be an aggrieved party with standing to assert both substantive and procedural rights. See Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2004 (2007) ("IDEA, through its text and structure, creates in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by this process but also in the substantive decisions to be made ... As a consequence, a parent may be a 'party aggrieved' for purposes of Sec 1415(i)(2) with regard to "any matter" implicating these rights."). Wanda concedes that she "has made no individual claims other than her right to a FAPE on Tereance's behalf." Under IDEA, however, she has the personal right to enforce a FAPE as the parent of Tereance; therefore, she does not need to allege the type of personal violation suggested by the District. The court will deny the District's motion to dismiss Wanda as a party in her own right.
In sum, the court will deny defendant's motion to dismiss as to Counts III and IV. The court will also deny defendant's motion to dismiss Wanda D. as a party in her own right. An appropriate order follows.
 Because this is a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts that plaintiff alleges in the Complaint as true. See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court "must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom" (citation omitted)).
 ESY for the summer of 2005 is not at issue in this case, although it is not clear from the Complaint or briefs whether this is because Tereance received ESY in 2005 or for some other reason.
 Relying on J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2000), the District contends that section 504 requires only reasonable accommodations. The parties have not presented argument regarding the reasonableness of the District's accommodations, and in any event, such reasonableness is not relevant to the present motion to dismiss.
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts III and IV and to dismiss Wanda D. as a plaintiff in her own right is DENIED.
2. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED as premature.

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