Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/appellate/129wnapp/129WnApp0659.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:12:34+00:00

Document:
EVA M. FRESE ET AL ., Respondents , v. SNOHOMISH COUNTY ET AL ., Petitioners .
 Courts - Stare Decisis - Factual Dissimilarity. The doctrine of stare decisis does not compel a particular result between factually dissimilar cases.
 Judgment - Collateral Estoppel - Elements - Identity of Issues - Necessity. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not compel a particular disposition of an issue sought to be adjudicated in a current proceeding if the issue is not identical to one adjudicated in a prior proceeding.
 Judgment - Collateral Estoppel - Elements - Privity - Necessity. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply between cases having different plaintiffs if the plaintiffs in the current proceeding were not in privity with the plaintiffs in the prior proceeding.
 Judgment - Collateral Estoppel - Elements - Privity - Nonparty - "Virtual Representation Doctrine" - Applicability. The virtual representation doctrine, which permits the use of collateral estoppel against a nonparty when the previous litigation involved a party with a substantial identity of interest with the nonparty, is applied cautiously in order to ensure that nonparties are not unjustly deprived of their day in court. In determining whether application of the doctrine would unjustly deprive a nonparty of the right to be heard in court, a court will consider (1) whether the nonparty in some way participated in the former adjudication, (2) whether the issue was fully and fairly litigated in the previous litigation, and (3) whether separation of the actions was the product of some manipulation or tactical maneuvering.
APPELWICK , J., concurs by separate opinion.
Nature of Action: Action to determine whether 162 past and present county employees were entitled to additional compensation for a daily 30-minute lunch period during which the employees were required to remain available to respond when needed to perform job duties. Under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the employees were regularly paid for an eight hour day, including the 30-minute lunch period. The employees claimed that their actual responsibilities during the lunch period were greater than contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement and that they were entitled to additional compensation under the agreement and a state regulation governing meal periods.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 03-2-24214-4, Nicole MacInnes, J., on March 1, 2004, entered orders denying both parties' motions for summary judgment.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the plaintiffs' claim is not barred by the precedent established in a prior Court of Appeals decision on a similar claim by a co-employee because the record developed by the plaintiffs is sufficient to distinguish it from the prior case; that it is premature to decide whether the plaintiffs' claim is barred by their failure to exhaust remedies provided by the collective bargaining agreement; that the plaintiffs' claim that they are entitled to additional compensation based on the employer's alleged violation of a state regulation governing meal periods is not barred unless the employer can show that the collective bargaining agreement varies from or supersedes the regulation; and that employee declarations submitted by the plaintiffs are insufficient to establish the employer's liability as a matter of law, the court affirms the denial orders and remands the case for further proceedings.
Janice E. Ellis , Prosecuting Attorney, and Bradley E. Neunzig , Deputy, for petitioners .
Peter Mazzone (of Phillips & Mazzone ), for respondents .
¶1 BECKER, J. - The Snohomish County Department of Corrections agreed to pay certain employees for eight hours of work on a shift that includes a 30 minute meal period in exchange for their agreement to remain "on call" and on the premises during the meal period. In this lawsuit against Snohomish County (County), the employees claim the agreement is violated when they are routinely required to work through the meal period without an opportunity to sit down and eat. The trial court's decision to deny summary judgment to both sides comes before us on discretionary review. We affirm.
5.2 Meal Breaks- All employees assigned to an eight (8) hour shift exclusive of the meal period shall be entitled to a thirty (30) minute meal break during their shift. Said employees shall not be on call except for emergencies during their meal period.
¶3 Plaintiffs allege that the County violates the agreement by requiring them to work through their entire meal period, the same as the rest of the workday, without a genuine break. They claim this practice extends their bargained-for workday and entitles them to additional compensation as a remedy.
¶4 The County sought dismissal of the claim on summary judgment, arguing that when plaintiffs work a shift of eight hours and get paid for all eight hours, as a matter of law there is no legal basis for additional compensation. The employees cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that additional compensation is legally required by the collective bargaining agreement and state labor regulations. Factually, they supported their motion with declarations by several corrections officers describing how their meal periods are completely taken up by the task of supervising inmates. The trial court denied both motions.
¶5 This court granted discretionary review. We review a trial court's determination on a motion for summary judgment de novo, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is proper only if the record shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Wilson v. Steinbach , 98 Wn.2d 434 , 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
1. The lawsuit is not precluded by Iverson v. Snohomish County.
«1»Article 5, § 2; 2.1 of Collective Bargaining Agreement, Clerk's Papers at 48-49.
Terry Iverson. Reviewing the same section of the collective bargaining agreement, we held that being "on call" during his lunch period did not mean Iverson was entitled to additional compensation. "In fact, this provision clearly states that Iverson is required to remain on the premises and be 'on call' during his lunch period." Iverson , 117 Wn. App. at 622 .
¶7 On this legal point, Iverson is controlling. That is, the employees are already being paid during their lunch period, and the obligation to remain on the premises and be on call during lunch does not, by itself, entitle them to additional compensation. But the real dispute here is whether the duties the employees were called upon to perform went beyond what the agreement contemplates for "on call" status.
Iverson argues that the requirement that he be "on call" does not reflect the reality of the extensive duties that he is required to perform during his lunch period. He has provided no evidence, however, regarding the amount of time he is asked to spend performing these duties during his lunch period. The only evidence in the record regarding the actual amount of work to be performed during a custody officer's lunch came from a defense witness. The witness stated that the work requirements do not take up more than 10 percent of the lunch period for a custody officer.
Iverson's union agreed that he would perform certain duties during his lunch period in exchange for being paid for that time period. Any dispute that Iverson has with that arrangement should be addressed with his union. He has failed to produce any evidence that the reality of his employment contradicts the collective bargaining agreement.
Iverson , 117 Wn. App. at 622 .
«2»Decl. of John Hatchell, Clerk's Papers at 384.
«3»Decl. of John Rogers, Clerk's Papers at 370-72.
«4»Decls. of John Rogers, Clerk's Papers at 373; John Hatchell, Clerk's Papers at 385; Ronald Robles, Clerk's Papers at 396; Ronald Neff, Clerk's Papers at 401.
«5»Decl. of John Rogers, Clerk's Papers at 373-74.
«6»Decl. of Ronald Neff, Clerk's Papers at 405.
«7»Decl. of Eva Frese, Clerk's Papers at 414.
plaintiffs, on the other hand, have submitted substantial evidence indicating that their lunch period exists in name only.
[3, 4]¶12 Collateral estoppel does not apply for the further reason that the County has not established the element that the plaintiffs were parties to the prior adjudication or in privity with a party. See Reninger v. Dep't of Corr. , 134 Wn.2d 437 , 449, 951 P.2d 782 (1998). The County contends the plaintiffs were in privity with Iverson by virtue of the doctrine of virtual representation. But preclusion through use of the doctrine of virtual representation "must be applied cautiously in order to insure that the nonparty is not unjustly deprived of her day in court." Garcia v. Wilson , 63 Wn. App. 516 , 520, 820 P.2d 964 (1991). Use of the doctrine is inappropriate in this case not only because it was not argued below but also because the factors identified in Garcia as supporting application of the doctrine are not strongly present in this record. While a few of the plaintiffs presented declarations in Iverson's suit, most did not participate. Because the scanty evidence in Iverson justified summary judgment, the meaning of "on call" status under the collective bargaining agreement was not a fully litigated issue. And it is difficult to discern, without the benefit of a finding by the trial court, that the separation of Iverson's lawsuit from this one was the product of some manipulation or tactical maneuvering. See Garcia , 63 Wn. App. at 521 .
«8»Trial court's memorandum ruling on Summary Judgment, Mar. 1, 2004, Clerk's Papers at 313.
employer to demand unremitting work through the lunch period. The record developed by the plaintiffs in this case is sufficient to distinguish it from Iverson .
2. It is premature to decide whether the cause of action for violations of the collective bargaining agreement is barred by plaintiffs' failure to exhaust remedies provided by the agreement .
¶14 In 2000, the union declined to pursue a grievance on behalf of Iverson with respect to meal breaks. The union told Iverson it waived its right to file a grievance because the issue had been raised at past contract negotiations and discussed extensively at meetings of the Labor-Management Committee. But more recently, the union did participate in a grievance concerning meal breaks filed by one of the instant plaintiffs, Juan Rubio, "on behalf of all employees affected."«9»In April 2003 Rubio's grievance proceeded to a hearing with a representative of the Snohomish County Executive.«10»The County's representative found that Rubio "has a break from his duties to eat his meal but is on call to attend to matters that cannot wait until he finishes his meal. . . . Employees are not required to perform their normal duties during their meal break."«11»Scheduling of the next step, arbitration, was stayed by this court with the agreement of the parties but over the objection of the union.
¶15 The County contends the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiffs to pursue their cause of action based on the collective bargaining agreement without first exhausting the contractual remedy of the grievance procedure. The plaintiffs respond that they should not be bound by the union's new position because there is no assurance that the union will not change position again.
«9»Letter from County labor relations advisor Cabot Dow to union representative Kelly Blomquist, May 16, 2003, Clerk's Papers at 227.
«10»Letter from County labor relations advisor to union representative, May 16, 2003, Clerk's Papers at 225-28.
«11»Findings of Fact 2 and 4, Letter from County labor relations advisor to union representative, May 16, 2003, Clerk's Papers at 227.
¶17 Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are recognized where the underlying policies favoring exhaustion are outweighed by considerations of fairness or practicality. Also, exhaustion is not required if resort to the collective bargaining agreement procedure would be futile. Moran v. Stowell , 45 Wn. App. 70 , 77, 724 P.2d 396 (1986). Further factfinding in the trial court may well be helpful in determining whether any of these exceptions apply to the grievance under the collective bargaining agreement. And the lawsuit includes a claim under state regulations that would not be addressed in the resolution of Rubio's grievance. The trial court correctly concluded that dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint on the basis of failure to exhaust remedies is unwarranted at this stage of the proceedings.
¶18 We are lifting the stay of arbitration that this court imposed pending appeal, without prejudice to the issue being raised in the trial court on remand.
3. The claim based on state meal period rules after May 20, 2003, is not barred unless the County can show how the collective bargaining agreement varies from, or supersedes, those rules.
«12»Order on Summ. J., Clerk's Papers at 314.
This chapter shall not be construed to interfere with, impede, or in any way diminish the right of employees to bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own choosing concerning wages or standards or conditions of employment. . . .
RCW 49.12.187 (as amended by LAWS OF 2003, ch 401, § 3).
(1) Employees shall be allowed a meal period of at least 30 minutes which commences no less than two hours nor more than five hours from the beginning of the shift. Meal periods shall be on the employer's time when the employee is required by the employer to remain on duty on the premises or at a prescribed work site in the interest of the employer.
¶21 Both the regulations and the agreement contemplate a meal period. Both require the employer to pay wages during the meal period to an employee who must remain on the premises while eating. The collective bargaining agreement does not specify meal break arrangements that are different from what the regulation provides.
¶22 We conclude the trial court correctly refused to dismiss the employees' cause of action for violations of WAC 296-126-092 occurring after May 20, 2003.
4. The plaintiffs are not yet entitled to judgment as to any issue in the case.
¶23 The plaintiffs assign error to the trial court's refusal to grant their motion for summary judgment. They contend the declarations they submitted established the County's liability as a matter of law. They ask this court to order their motion granted and remand for a determination of damages.
«13»Collective Bargaining Agreement, Clerk's Papers at 49.
injunctive relief? The parties have not really confronted these questions in the record we have seen thus far.
«14»Decl. of Christopher Bly, Clerk's Papers at 436.
«15»Decl. of Christopher Bly, Clerk's Papers at 437.
routinely or occasionally, denied any or all of the plaintiffs a meal period in violation of the collective bargaining agreement or the regulation. The trial court properly denied the employees' motion for summary judgment on the issue of the County's liability.
¶27 Finally, we note that the plaintiffs have abandoned their claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. On remand, reinstatement of this claim should not be permitted.
¶29 APPELWICK, J (concurring) - I concur in the majority opinion, but feel compelled to comment on the Iverson v. Snohomish County , 117 Wn. App. 618 , 72 P.3d 772 (2003), decision and the choices available on remand.
¶30 The collective bargaining agreement recognizes two situations. Under section 5.2 employees with a 30-minute break during their shift are expected only to be on call to respond to emergencies. To the extent they respond to emergencies they are not entitled to additional compensation. Under section 5.2.1 employees assigned to an eight-hour shift inclusive of meal periods must be on the premises and on call to respond to any need - emergent or not - during the meal period. They are paid for that meal period whether they are called upon to respond or not.
¶31 The evidence in Iverson was that Iverson was on call and responded to calls no more than 10 percent of the meal period. However, the 10 percent figure was in itself significant to the decision; it was not a threshold or an upper bound recognized by the court. The evidence showed that Iverson was on-call as bargained for during the meal period, performed emergent and non-emergent work as needed and was able to have his meal .
sive, on a regular basis, as to go beyond being on call and to eliminate an opportunity for the employees to have their meal during that period or the remainder of their shift, then more is expected of them than the collective bargaining agreement contemplates and then Iverson is not controlling.

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