Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/wrongful-termination/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:55:41+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Roybal v. City & County of Denver on Thursday, January 24, 2019.
Municipal Law—Termination—Charter of the City and County of Denver—Designated Authority.
Roybal was a deputy sheriff with the Denver Sheriff Department (DSD). After an investigation, the Department of Safety’s Civilian Review administrator (the administrator) determined that Roybal had violated multiple rules, which warranted disciplinary action, and terminated his employment. Roybal appealed the termination to a career service hearing officer, who affirmed the termination, and then to the City and County of Denver’s Career Service Authority Board (Board), which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. Roybal appealed to the district court, which affirmed the Board’s order.
On appeal, Roybal contended that the district court erred in affirming the Board’s decision and order. He argued that under the Charter of the City and County of Denver (Charter), the authority to discipline and terminate DSD employees rests solely with the manager or the deputy, not the administrator, and therefore his termination was void as an ultra vires act. The safety manager may authorize a designee within the department, other than the deputy manager of safety, for the purposes of hiring, disciplining, and terminating DSD employees. Therefore, the Board did not err when it concluded that (1) the Charter and the Career Service Rules (CSR) do not limit the manager’s ability to designate authority solely to the deputy, and (2) the manager was permitted to delegate disciplinary authority to the administrator.
Roybal also argued that (1) two division chiefs were required to be at his hearing, and only one was present; and (2) the sheriff failed to initiate the discipline by written recommendation to the manager. Roybal claimed that in making these procedural errors, the Board effectively created a new CSR without engaging in rulemaking and applied the rule retroactively to his case to excuse the DSD’s violations of its own policies. Roybal asserted that these errors require reversal of his termination and that the Board erred in concluding otherwise. Here, the Board’s mention of existing CSR 16-72(D) was limited to explaining its reasoning in concluding that trivial deviations from pre-disciplinary regulations do not warrant the reversal of a termination decision. Simply discussing and implementing the policy behind the rule does not implicate quasi-legislative rulemaking by the Board. The Board did not err in finding that Roybal received a fair pre-disciplinary process, and any procedural irregularities are trivial.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., LLC on Tuesday, July 26, 2016.
Eugene Foster worked at Mountain Coal’s West Elk Mine in Colorado when he turned his head suddenly on February 5, 2008, and injured his neck. He sought treatment the following day at a local ER and received a return-to-work form from the ER doctor saying he could return on February 8. However, due to a previously scheduled hernia repair surgery, he did not return to work until March 31. Mountain Coal held a meeting with Foster on February 10 to discuss the injury where his managers rejected the ER doctor’s return to work form and instead told Foster that he needed to have a doctor complete Mountain Coal’s return to work form. Foster said he would try to have it completed during his hernia surgery.
Foster was unable to have a hospital doctor complete the Mountain Coal return to work form, so he dropped it off with his regular doctor. Foster testified in his deposition that sometime in early March, he delivered the form to the Mountain Coal offices, where he left it on the HR person’s desk. When she told Foster she did not receive the form, he obtained another form from his personal doctor and delivered it to Mountain Coal on March 18. Foster continued to receive care for his neck injury at Mountain Coal’s direction.
On March 31, Foster returned to work with a Mountain Coal return to work form completed by his hernia doctor. On April 3, the general manager of Mountain Coal held a meeting with Foster and an HR employee. During the meeting, the manager confronted Foster about not seeing his personal physician for the neck injury. Foster confirmed that he hadn’t seen his personal physician, and averred that he told the managers that but they continued to request that he have the personal physician complete the return to work form. Foster was supposed to have retraining the following day but requested at the April 3 meeting that it be rescheduled to accommodate his appointment with a doctor about scheduling surgery for his neck. Foster was suspended indefinitely during the meeting. According to his account, it was for not seeing the personal physician before receiving the return to work form. According to Mountain Coal, it was because Foster lied about delivering the earlier return to work form.
Foster saw the specialist on April 4, who opined that he would not recommend surgery because Foster’s work was aggravating the neck condition. On April 9, Foster saw his personal physician, who opined that Foster should not return to his regular work activities. Foster received a letter from his personal physician on April 11 memorializing the doctor’s conclusions that Foster was unable to return to work, and immediately called Mountain Coal to inform them of the letter. He spoke to his direct supervisor.
Two Mountain Coal managers testified that they had decided to terminate Foster on April 9 because he had lied about leaving a return to work form on the HR person’s desk, while a third testified that Foster had not provided a return to work form with the correct dates for his release “and stuff.” On April 14, Foster received a letter advising him of his termination. Although the letter was dated April 11, it stated that the termination was effective April 9. The letter advised that Foster was being terminated for false information regarding a return to work slip.
After Mountain Coal terminated his employment, Foster filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and Colorado Civil Rights Division. He received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, and filed a complaint in district court in December 2012, seeking relief under the ADA and Colorado law. The district court entered summary judgment for Mountain Coal, and Foster appealed.
The Tenth Circuit first concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Foster had proved his ADA retaliation claim. Foster claimed that his requests for accommodation on April 3 and April 11 were protected activity, and his termination was a retaliatory adverse employment action. The Tenth Circuit evaluated Foster’s claims of requests for accommodation and found them sufficient to apprise Mountain Coal of his needs. Although the district court held that Foster’s April 3 remarks were not sufficiently direct and specific to constitute a request for accommodation, the Tenth Circuit found that the remarks conveyed a need to meet with the doctor in order to schedule surgery, which was sufficiently specific to trigger accommodations. The Tenth Circuit noted that Foster’s deposition testimony could be clearer, but it was clear enough to survive summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit also found that Foster’s April 11 request was clear, and found Mountain Coal’s attempt to retroactively terminate Foster disingenuous. The Tenth Circuit noted the discrepancies between Mountain Coal’s stated reasons for suspending and terminating Foster, and found that the suspicious timing could lead a reasonable fact-finder to infer that Mountain Coal learned of Foster’s request for accommodation and terminated him because of it.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Mountain Coal.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Williams v. Rock-Tenn Services, Inc. on Thursday, February 11, 2016.
Douglas Williams had been employed by Rock-Tenn Services for 36 years, and in the last four years of his employment, Williams was the Denver plant manager. In 2012, the Denver plant underwent a scheduled audit. Williams rescheduled his previously approved vacation in order to attend the post-audit meeting on June 27, 2012, but due to a scheduling conflict with upper-level management, the meeting was rescheduled for July 3, 2012, during Williams’ previously scheduled vacation. Williams’ supervisor, Vas, approved the vacation and absence from the meeting, but Vas’ supervisor, Morris, became upset that Williams was not at the meeting and ordered his termination. When Williams returned from vacation, he was terminated.
Williams sued Rock-Tenn under Colorado’s Lawful Off-Duties Activities Statute (LODAS), arguing that his approved vacation and absence from the meeting was a lawful activity for which he could not be terminated. Rock-Tenn filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted, holding that Williams’ conduct plainly fell within one of the LODAS exceptions because the termination was reasonably and rationally related to Williams’ duty to attend the post-audit meeting. Williams appealed, holding the dismissal was in error because his approved vacation was a personal, private activity protected by LODAS. He also suggested the dismissal was improper because it was based on an affirmative defense.
The court of appeals analyzed Williams’ factual allegations and found that they plainly showed the vacation and missing the meeting were inextricably linked. Williams was unavailable in person or by phone during his vacation, and the court agreed with the district court’s determination that Williams alleged Rock-Tenn improperly terminated him for missing the meeting while he was on a pre-approved vacation. Although the court found that Williams was correct that generally a party need not address an affirmative defense in its complaint, in these circumstances Williams was on notice of the availability of the affirmative defense because his complaint alleged impropriety under the same subsection of LODAS from which the affirmative defense arises. The court therefore found no error in the district court’s dismissal. Similarly, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that Williams’ complaint failed to state a claim from which relief could be granted due to the presence of the affirmative defense. Addressing Rock-Tenn’s request for attorney fees, the court of appeals declined to award attorney fees, noting that Rock-Tenn stated no legal basis for the fee award.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Levy v. Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services on Tuesday, June 16, 2015.
Paul Levy was a rehabilitation counselor for the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS). In December 2008, he agreed to serve as a counselor for a blind co-worker, Tina Bruce, who was concerned she was not being properly accommodated. He ordered an assessment from a contractor, Brenda Umholtz, who had done extensive work for both Levy and Bruce at SRS. Umholtz’s report stated that Bruce was not receiving adequate accommodations and could not compete on a level playing field with her co-workers. In February 2009, Levy’s supervisor, Michael Donnelly, sent Levy a letter proposing Levy’s termination due to a violation of SRS’s conflict of interest policy based on Umholtz’s report. The letter provided Levy an opportunity to appear in person and respond to the allegations on February 24, 2009. Levy reported in his interrogatories that he met with Donnelly prior to receiving the termination letter, and in that meeting he told Donnelly that other counselors in the division had served as counselors for co-workers without being punished. He also stated that he informed his supervisor about Bruce’s case in January 2009 and transferred the case to his supervisor immediately when asked to do so. Levy tendered his resignation on February 25, 2009, noting that it became clear to him in the February 24 meeting that Donnelly intended to terminate him regardless of the outcome of the meeting.
Umholtz filed suit against SRS on February 11, 2011. Levy joined the suit on March 2, 2011, and Bruce joined shortly after. In the Second Amended Complaint, Levy alleged SRS retaliated against him in violation of the ADA and requested reinstatement, compensatory damages, attorney fees, and other litigation expenses. Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint to include Rehabilitation Act claims for Bruce and Levy, and SRS agreed not to oppose the amendment in exchange for plaintiffs’ agreement that SRS had not waived sovereign immunity. SRS filed for summary judgment on all Levy’s claims on March 23, 2012, arguing Levy’s ADA claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and his Rehabilitation Act claim was barred by Kansas’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Levy countered that SRS waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity claim by accepting federal funds and the Rehabilitation Act claims were more appropriately characterized as statutorily created rights subject to Kansas’ three-year statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment to SRS on the ADA claim based on sovereign immunity and on the Rehabilitation Act claims due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Levy appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found Levy’s arguments that the state waived sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds cogent, but ultimately disagreed. Levy contended the waiver provisions of the Rehabilitation Act similarly apply to the ADA because the two acts are closely linked. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the two acts were closely linked, but instead found it appropriate to apply a stringent test to determine whether the state waived its sovereign immunity. The Tenth Circuit decided that, since “Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes,” the waiver of sovereign immunity under the ADA must be explicitly stated and not “hidden in another statute and only applied to the ADA by implication.” Particularly because the ADA was passed after the Rehabilitation Act’s waiver provisions, the Tenth Circuit found merit in its determination.
Turning next to the statute of limitations issue, the Tenth Circuit agreed that Kansas’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to the analogous Rehabilitation Act claims. Levy argued that the case on which the district court relied was confusing because it made several references to a Kansas statute detailing when a three-year statute of limitations applies, and argued Kansas case law supported the determination that Rehabilitation Act claims should be subject to the three-year statute of limitations because they involved statutorily created rights. The Tenth Circuit found that although the case incorrectly cited the wrong statute twice, the holding of the case was clear that the personal injury analogy should apply to Rehabilitation Act claims. The Tenth Circuit found Levy’s second argument more persuasive, since Kansas courts expressly characterized employment discrimination claims as statutorily based and subject to the three-year statute of limitations. However, the Tenth Circuit was not bound by the Kansas Supreme Court decisions, and chose to uphold its own precedent in finding Rehabilitation Act claims analogous to personal injury claims. The Tenth Circuit determined Levy’s Rehabilitation Act claims were time-barred.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Meyers v. Eastern Oklahoma County Technology Center on Wednesday, January 28, 2015.
Donna Meyers was the adult education coordinator for the EMT program at Eastern Oklahoma County Technology Center. The school lost the records of tuberculosis tests for six students, and a teacher, Ms. Gonzales-Palmer, an Air Evac medic, offered to retest the six instead of asking them to absorb the cost of testing. Ms. Meyers believed the medic had stolen testing materials from Air Evac and instructed her not to test the students. Later, Ms. Meyers discovered the medic had disobeyed her orders. Ms. Meyers contacted Air Evac and agreed to cooperate in their investigation, then met with Ms. Gonzales-Palmer about the incident. Ms. Meyers terminated Ms. Gonzales-Palmer at the meeting.
Ms. Gonzales-Palmer contacted the school superintendent about her termination. The superintendent reinstated Ms. Gonzales-Palmer and warned Ms. Meyers that she lacked authority to terminate employees. The superintendent also admonished Ms. Meyers not to retaliate against Ms. Gonzales-Palmer or discuss the testing with anyone. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Meyers met with the Air Evac supervisor regarding the testing. The superintendent learned of the communication and warned Ms. Meyers that if she continued to discuss the testing or if she retaliated against Ms. Gonzales-Palmer she could be terminated.
Four days later, Ms. Meyers removed Ms. Gonzales-Palmer as a c0-instructor of two classes without consulting her supervisor. When the superintendent learned of this action, he met with Ms. Meyers and informed her she was suspended. The next day, the supervisor learned Ms. Meyers had failed to renew the school’s certification as an EMT training site, and recommended her termination. Ms. Meyers made a written complaint with the Oklahoma Department of Health the same day about the tuberculosis testing. The superintendent wrote a letter advising Ms. Meyers he was recommending her termination and she could appeal his decision, even though she had no right to appeal. Ms. Meyers appeared at the appeal hearing before the school’s board with counsel, but the board voted to terminate her at the end of the hearing.
Ms. Meyers sued under § 1983, alleging denial of the right to free speech regarding her report about the tuberculosis testing and deprivation of due process based on the board’s alleged bias during the hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to the school and superintendent on these claims. Ms. Meyers appealed.
Ms. Meyers claimed that her discussions with the Oklahoma State Board of Health and Air Evac regarding the testing were protected speech and she was wrongfully terminated for engaging in the speech. The district court, and the Tenth Circuit, agreed that the speech was protected but found that Ms. Meyers was not terminated for engaging in the protected speech. The Tenth Circuit applied the five-pronged Garcetti-Pickering test and found that, regarding the Oklahoma State Board of Health, Ms. Meyers’ claim of retaliation failed at the fourth prong because the superintendent did not know about the communication at the time he recommended Ms. Meyers’ termination.
As for the communication with Air Evac, the district court and Tenth Circuit found the retaliation claim failed at the fifth prong, because the superintendent would have recommended Ms. Meyers’ termination regardless of the communication with Air Evac based on her retaliation against Ms. Gonzales-Palmer. The superintendent had specifically advised her to consult her supervisor before taking any action against Ms. Gonzales-Palmer, so removing her as an instructor was a direct disregard of orders.
The Tenth Circuit next addressed Ms. Meyers’ claim of deprivation of due process and found the claim failed as a matter of law. Ms. Meyers had no protected interest in the meeting with the board.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the superintendent and school was affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Dalpiaz v. Carbon County, Utah on Friday, July 25, 2014.
Bridget Dalpiaz worked as the benefits coordinator for Carbon County, Utah, from February 1995 until her termination in September 2009. As benefits coordinator, Dalpiaz scheduled doctor’s appointments for new county employees and was very familiar with the process for taking FMLA leave. She had favorable evaluations and no disciplinary history until she was in a car accident in April 2009.
After her motor vehicle accident, Dalpiaz missed work from April 3 through July 13, 2009, and she returned on a limited basis on July 13. Because of the extended absence, her supervisor requested that she submit a request for FMLA leave and mailed her a form in May 2009. Dalpiaz did not respond and did not submit the form. The supervisor emailed Dalpiaz on June 12, requesting that she return the FMLA form as soon as possible. Dalpiaz did not respond. The county attorney sent Dalpiaz a letter on June 30, advising her that she must return the form by July 10. Dalpiaz returned the form at 4:22 p.m. on July 10. On July 13, Dalpiaz returned to work for two hours a day, two days a week, per the restrictions set by a spine specialist she saw.
While she was gone from work, her supervisor received eight written statements from coworkers that Dalpiaz was engaging in physical activities that seemed inconsistent with her claims for injury. Because of these reports, the county requested that Dalpiaz submit to an IME and gave her three physicians from which to choose for this exam. Dalpiaz never responded. The county attorney then sent Dalpiaz a letter requesting her to schedule the exam by August 3, and advising her that failure to schedule the exam may result in disciplinary action. Dalpiaz attempted to set the exam but was told she needed a referral. Instead of obtaining the referral, she sent a letter to the county attorney regarding the referral and inquiring if it was now county policy to force employees to submit to IMEs. Eventually, Dalpiaz was terminated for five reasons – (1) failure to timely complete the FMLA forms; (2) failure to schedule an IME; (3) significant evidence of untruthfulness regarding her injuries; (4) abuse of sick leave; and (5) personal use of a camera belonging to the county. Dalpiaz filed a federal complaint on six grounds, the sixth alleging the county interfered with, restrained, and/or denied her right to FMLA leave. The district court granted summary judgment to the county on all counts.
Dalpiaz appealed only the grant of summary judgment related to the interference with FMLA leave. The Tenth Circuit first determined that the type of FMLA at issue in this case was retaliation, even though Dalpiaz only pled interference in her complaint. In response to the county’s claims that Dalpiaz waived the issue of retaliation by not pleading it in her complaint, Dalpiaz asserted that she did not need to specifically claim retaliation to preserve the issue. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Dalpiaz, remarking that nothing in her complaint referenced retaliation, and instead she tracked the language pertaining to interference.
Examining her claims under the interference context, the Tenth Circuit found that Dalpiaz was entitled to FMLA leave and the county may have taken an adverse action which interfered with her right to FMLA leave. However, as to the third prong of the interference test, whether her termination was related to the exercise of her FMLA rights, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the county would have terminated Dalpiaz regardless of her FMLA status. The Tenth Circuit noted ample evidence in the record of the county’s sincere belief in Dalpiaz’s untruthfulness regarding the extent of her injuries and abuse of sick leave. The Tenth Circuit also noted that the county was justifiably concerned with Dalpiaz’s failure to return the FMLA forms “as soon as possible” as directed by her supervisor, instead choosing to return the forms at the last minute. Dalpiaz also failed to make an IME appointment as directed and did not put forth a good faith effort to make the appointment. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Dalpiaz, supported the county’s termination. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

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