Source: https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/ppr/codes-standards/standard-essential-patents.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:04:37+00:00

Document:
What happens when a standard-setting organization establishes a technical standard that can be complied with only through the use of a patented technology? This module focuses on that problem, building on a case study of the Microsoft v. Motorola litigation. Key issues involved in the case study include the problem of setting fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms and deciding whether an injunction should apply. The materials in this module were created by Cynthia Laury Dahl, Practice Professor of Law and Director of the Detkin Intellectual Property and Technology Legal Clinic.
What role do standards play in the technology industry?
What does it mean to set a FRAND licensing rate?
Why did the dispute between Microsoft and Motorola go to court?
How can a licensor make a FRAND offer without risking a legal challenge?
Does the standard-setting process give rights holders what they are due?
Why is it important to value standard essential patents accurately?
Why can’t standard-setting organizations decide a FRAND licensing rate?
How did the dispute arise between Microsoft and Motorola?
Do different industries think about FRAND licensing differently?
Will companies continue to dispute licensing rates for standard essential patents?
Is injunctive relief proper if a licensor proposes a licensing fee?
Was it helpful to bifurcate the contract claims from the patent claims?
Why did the judge decide the FRAND rate but leave the contract issue to the jury?
What precedent guided the court?
How does royalty analysis differ when patents are essential to a standard?
How did the court arrive at a FRAND rate?
Has the court’s decision affected subsequent FRAND negotiations?
Why should law students learn about voluntary standards?
What was your reaction to learning you would preside over Microsoft v. Motorola?
How was Microsoft v. Motorola a unique case?
How did you come up with the approach you followed in deciding a FRAND rate in Microsoft v. Motorola?
What makes for an appropriate comparable license when making a FRAND determination?
Should a proper FRAND rate be based on the end product’s wholesale price?
Why did you, as a U.S. judge, block an injunction that a German court imposed on Microsoft at the request of Motorola?
When are injunctions a proper remedy in the context of standard essential patents?
Now that Microsoft v. Motorola analyzed the “fair and reasonable” aspect of FRAND, will the next cases focus on analyzing the definition of “non-discriminatory”?
What is the legacy of Microsoft v. Motorola?

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