Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321206745/J-Douglas-Pinney-M-D-Patricia-S-Colonell-Individually-and-on-Behalf-of-All-Others-Similarly-Situated-Francis-J-Farina-Individually-and-on-Behal
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:58:29+00:00

Document:
Angeles Cellular Telephone Company, Defendants.
Corp., AT & T Wireless PCS, LLC and AT & T Wireless Services, Inc.
Washington, D.C., for Verizon Wireless, Cellco Partnership. Paul F.
Strain, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland; M.
Piper Rudnick, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Motorola, Inc. Steven M.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Washington, D.C.; John B.
Powertel PCS, Inc., Powertel/Atlanta, Inc. Patrick R. Buckler, Walter T.
Graham, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for NEC America, Inc. Francis A.
Telecommunications Industry Association. Mark H. Kolman, Leslie R.
Mitsubishi Wireless Communications, Inc. Daniel S. Reinhardt, Steven J.
& Bernstein, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland; Charles L. Babcock, David T.
state courts of Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania.
are preempted by the Federal Communications Act of 1934(FCA), 47 U.S.C.
the order dismissing that case.
frequency on which the user may communicate.
a relatively small transmission range because they have low power transmitters.
before they are marketed or sold. See 47 C.F.R. 2.801, 2.803 (2004).
Guidelines); see 47 C.F.R. 1.1307, 1.1310, 2.1091, 2.1093.
headset. The plaintiffs also seek punitive damages, costs, and attorneys' fees.
necessarily depend on the resolution of a substantial federal question.
rule on the validity of those standards.
plaintiffs appeal the district court's orders.
Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.1994).
to the state court from which it was removed." Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
420 (1983) (citing 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)).
plaintiffs do not arise under federal law by reason of either doctrine.
their cases to state court.
jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law" in drafting his complaint.
law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded... claims." Christianson v.
removal cannot be justified under this doctrine. Id.
element of one of the well-pleaded state claims." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
truly at issue in the case." Id. at 14, 103 S.Ct. 2841.
We now examine the claims in the complaints filed by the Pinney plaintiffs.
use. See Harsh v. Petroll, 840 A.2d 404, 416-17 (Pa.2003).
deceptive trade practices. See Md.Code Ann., Com. Law II, 13-408; N.Y.
manners." Denny, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 662 N.E.2d at 736.
was a causal connection between the breach and the injury. See Johnson v. Am.
Nat'l Red Cross, 276 Ga. 270, 578 S.E.2d 106, 108 (2003); Hemmings v.
S.E.2d 208, 211 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v.
Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445, 454 n. 9 (1992).
representation, and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result. See Rhone v.
Bolden, 270 Ga.App. 712, 608 S.E.2d 22 (2004); Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v.
(N.Y.App.Div.1994); Gibbs v. Ernst, 538 Pa. 193, 647 A.2d 882, 889 (1994).
243, 245 (1942); De Joseph v. Zambelli, 392 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d 644, 647 (1958).
not on the basis of their agreement to engage in such conduct. See Miller v.
well-pleaded state claims." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13, 103 S.Ct. 2841.
attack the lack of a headset requirement under the federal RF safety rules." Id.
Bd., 463 U.S. at 14, 103 S.Ct. 2841.
can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in the background." Gully v.
unreasonably dangerous inquiry depends on the resolution of a federal question.
determines whether the telephone is unreasonably dangerous. Nokia is wrong.
(1993); Denny, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 662 N.E.2d at 735-36; Sherman v. M.
plaintiffs would not automatically establish the defective design element.
Ormet decision, and it is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Ormet does not establish, or even support, Nokia's sufficient connection theory.
least one of the plaintiffs' state claims.
sustained on the basis of the substantial federal question doctrine.
select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Metro. Life Ins. Co.
defendant must establish that the plaintiff has a "discernible federal [claim]"
dangerous wireless telephones constitutes a "practice in connection with"
is not evidence of congressional intent, and we accord it no weight.
by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies."
that Congress intended to sweep aside all state claims in a particular area.
Naquin plaintiffs, on the ground that the claims are preempted by the FCA.
dismiss the claims of the Naquin plaintiffs.
transferor court prior to transfer.
districts," (2) a transfer would serve "the convenience of parties and witnesses,"
actions." 28 U.S.C. 1407(a); see also In re Vernitron Secs. Litig., 462 F.Supp.
statute or the case law.
they could have requested that the district court suggest a remand to the JPML.
transferee court, has the authority to remand the case to the transferor court).
in the district court will not be addressed on appeal.").
context, where there is a need for consistent treatment of consolidated cases.
"interferes with, or is contrary to" federal law is invalid. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
expressly declares its intent to preempt state law. S. Blasting Svcs., Inc. v.
"actually conflicts with federal law." Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713, 105 S.Ct.
with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law."
occupied,'" such as health and safety.4 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct.
2240 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct.
1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)).
(4th Cir.1997) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342, 117 S.Ct.
perform some particular function or serve or facilitate some particular end."
examine the specific statutory context in which the term "facility" is used.
supports the interpretation that the term does not include wireless telephones.
ensure the availability of a nationwide network of wireless service coverage.
area constitutes a barrier to entry and is prohibited by 332(c)(3)(A)).
preempt the claims of the Naquin plaintiffs.
Frequency Emissions Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.Supp.2d 452, 463 (D.Md.2003).
464 (citing In re Wireless I, 216 F.Supp.2d at 483-87).
that provide wireless service to the public for profit as "common carriers"
(3) prevents states from regulating "the entry of or the rates charged by"
preemptive national RF radiation standards for wireless telephones.
law unless expressly so provided...." Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L.
create an implicit conflict with state tort law.
network of wireless telephone service coverage. We conclude that it would not.
obstacle to Congress's goal of achieving nationwide coverage.
claims, such as those asserted by the Naquin plaintiffs, be swept aside.
case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
federal question exists because "the effect of [the Pinney plaintiffs'] allegations"
explain in the text that follows, this argument cannot be sustained.
doesnot consider itself the `expert agency' for evaluating health effects." J.A.
necessary element of any one of the plaintiffs' state law claims.
warranties for wireless telephones misleading, the amended complaint alleges.
(providing that states may not regulate "the entry of or rates charged by"
remedies, like tort recoveries, when no federal remedy exists." Abbot v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.1988) (citation omitted).
Wireless Communications Facilities, 51 Fed. Comm. L.J. 887, 888 (1999).
triples the capacity of traditional cellular systems." Tuesly, supra at 88.
RF radiation emission standards are too high to protect the consuming public.
any defense that the defendants may assert.
whether or not the wireless telephones comply with the FCC standards.
FCC standards raises a substantial federal question.
indicted the FCC standard by name, that is the effect of their allegations.
health effects, one of which was the FDA. See Cellular Phone Taskforce v.
expertise of the FCC and the sufficiency of its standards.
responsible for developing safety standards for RFR emitting devices." 71.
not confer federal question jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
to support federal question jurisdiction.
federal interest justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts." Id.
federal regulatory standards. This presents a substantial federal question.
simply because the plaintiffs have filed claims cloaked in state law language.

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