Source: http://volokh.com/category/civil-procedure/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:45:33+00:00

Document:
The Green Bag has picked, as an example of “exemplary legal writing,” Professor Stephen Sachs’s amicus brief in Atlantic Marine v. U.S. District Court (previously discussed here).
[FN:] We observe, moreover, that a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), unlike a motion under §1404(a) or the forum non conveniens doctrine, may lead to a jury trial on venue if issues of material fact relating to the validity of the forum-selection clause arise. Even if Professor Sachs is ultimately correct, therefore, defendants would have sensible reasons to invoke §1404(a) or the forum non conveniens doctrine in addition to Rule 12(b)(6).
People who follow class action litigation are doubtless familiar with the “smelly washer” cases (see also here and here). The Sixth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit (per Judge Posner) allowed consumer class actions based on alleged washing machine design defects to go forward, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cases for reconsideration in light of the hugely important Comcast Corp. v. Behrend decision (written by Justice Scalia), and the lower court panels reaffirmed their pre-remand decisions.
On Wednesday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Atlantic Marine v. U.S. District Court, a case about the proper procedure for enforcing a forum selection clause. As I’ve mentioned on this blog before, Professor Stephen Sachs (who is also a friend) filed an amicus brief arguing that both parties were wrong and that a third side of the 3-way circuit split was correct.
The Court was apparently quite interested in the theory — Sachs was mentioned by name 17 times at argument as the Justices asked a lot of questions about his position. (Here’s the transcript.) Unfortunately, Sachs was not given time to argue the case (amici curiae almost never are), and the parties either couldn’t or didn’t want to give good answers to those questions.
There are three ways to decide the case in Atlantic Marine, and at oral argument the Justices didn’t seem very happy with any of them.
The parties, Atlantic Marine and J-Crew, had agreed in a contract that their disputes “shall be litigated” in Virginia. When a dispute arose, J-Crew instead sued in the Western District of Texas, which had jurisdiction and proper venue under the statutes. The question in the case is what difference the contract makes: whether it destroys proper venue in Texas (Atlantic’s view), whether it informs the court’s discretion to transfer venue to Virginia (J-Crew’s view), or whether it provides an affirmative defense in the Texas court (my view).
In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United States to which the United States or any agency, officer or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney General, and shall permit the United States to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The United States shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.
These concepts of convenience and fairness fail to account for another worry. Whether or not one agrees with the McIntyre plurality’s take on sovereignty (or its contractarian theory in particular), the authority of a distant court ought to be supported by some theory of obligation.
The person whose fender you hit has asked us to decide your case. We will hear it according to our own rules of procedure and evidence—not just about the kind of paper you file on, but about how intrusive discovery will be, what kind of experts can testify, and whether you will have to pay the plaintiff’s costs and fees if you lose.
Your arguments will be considered by a French judge, who was appointed by French politicians or selected by French bureaucrats. Your substantive rights and liabilities will be determined through our choice-of-law principles, which (all else being equal) tend to favor the laws of France. You can get a jury trial only if French law permits one (which it doesn’t), so the judge will decide all the facts. And any appeals will run to the regional cour d’appel and from there to our Cour de cassation.
This isn’t optional, by the way.
Eugene had some posts a while back about good amicus briefs, and now that I’m here I wanted to mention an unusually good academic amicus brief recently filed at the Supreme Court — that of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as amicus curiae in Atlantic Marine v. U.S. District Court (although the real respondent is J-Crew Management).
The parties in this case defend two sides of a many-sided circuit split. This brief argues that a third view is correct.
If a contract requires suit in a particular forum, and the plaintiff sues somewhere else, how may the defendant raise the issue? Petitioner Atlantic Marine Construction Company suggests a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406, on the theory that the contract renders venue improper. Pet. Br. 3. Respondent J-Crew Management, Inc. contends that venue remains proper, and that the defendant’s only remedy is a transfer motion under § 1404. Br. in Opp. (BIO) 11.
When a university is deciding whether to expel, suspend, or otherwise discipline a student for an alleged sexual assault, how much proof should the university proceeding require? Should the student’s guilt be shown by “clear and convincing evidence”? By a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is what the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights has demanded, under its interpretation of Title IX? Beyond a reasonable doubt? I’m inclined to say — contrary to quite a few people whose judgment I generally much respect — that preponderance of the evidence would likely be the right standard, at least for claims of sexual assault and not just offensive words. Let me briefly explain why.
First, let’s think of preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt as probability thresholds. Preponderance of the evidence means that the university should expel or discipline the accused student if there’s just a bit more than a 50% chance that the student is guilty. Clear and convincing evidence might be seen as requiring a 75% or 80% probability, or thereabouts. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt might be seen as requiring a 95% probability. These are oversimplifications, to be sure, but they are probably the most helpful way of looking at these standards.
The decision by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas is Arcq v. Fields (Dec. 8), and it distinguishes Largent v. Reed (blogged about recently here) on the ground that the party seeking discovery lacked a sufficient good-faith basis for requesting access to the private portion of the other side’s social networking accounts. In Largent, and in other cases, the party seeking discovery saw the public portion of her adversary’s Facebook account, and therefore had a basis to conclude that there may be relevant information in the private portions of the account. In Arcq, by contrast, the party seeking discovery made a blanket request for access to all of the other side’s social networking accounts, and yet didn’t know if his adversary even had any such accounts. The court in Arcq concludes that because the moving party did not first see the public portion of his adversary’s site, he lacks a good-faith basis to believe that there is relevant evidence in the private portions and therefore the motion to access the social networking sites is denied.

References: v. 
 §1404
 §1404
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1406
 § 1404
 v. 
 v.