Source: https://thesecuritieslitigator.com/tag/supreme-court/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:43:52+00:00

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On April 6, 2011, a jury convicted Kevin Loughrin of bank fraud and a number of other crimes relating to a scheme that he and an accomplice hatched in Utah to defraud some unsuspecting citizens and Target, the retail store. Loughrin and his accomplice dressed up like Mormon missionaries, went around to various homes, stole checks from people’s mailboxes, altered the checks, purchased items at Target, then returned the items to Target for cash. Loughrin made about $1,200 and was ultimately sentenced to 36 months in prison.
At trial, his attorney tried to convince the Court that it should issue a jury instruction explaining to the jury that he could not be found guilty of bank fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1344 unless the jury concluded that Loughrin had intended to defraud a financial institution, as opposed to simply intending to defraud someone. The trial court disagreed, citing precedent from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and issued an instruction requiring the Government to prove that Loughrin acted with “an intent to defraud” someone (e.g., Target, the account holders, etc.). As noted above, the jury convicted Loughrin of bank fraud. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision not to instruct the jury that, in order to convict under § 1344, the Government had to prove that Loughrin intended to defraud a bank.
On December 13, 2013, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Loughrin v. United States, in order to resolve a split among the federal circuit courts as to whether the U.S. Government must prove that a defendant intended to defraud a bank in order to secure a conviction for bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2). Specifically, the majority of federal circuit courts require the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to defraud a financial institution under both subsections of § 1344. The minority position, which is shared by the appeals court that decided the Loughrin case, is that the Government need only prove that the defendant intended to defraud someone for a § 1344(2) (obtaining property owned by, or under the control of, a bank) conviction.
Another rationale is that the expansive interpretation sought by the Government would federalize areas of crime normally prosecuted by state authorities. This is a federalism argument rooted in an interpretation of the statute. However, as seen in decisions across different topical areas and different Supreme Court eras, the appeal of such federalism arguments depends almost entirely on the composition and politics of the Supreme Court bench at a given point in time.
By contrast, a rationale for the Government’s position – that the state of mind required for a § 1344(2) conviction is an intent to defraud someone, bank or otherwise – is that the plain language of the two subsections of § 1344 show an intent to create two separate crimes: “[C]lause (1) focuses on the conduct as it affects the financial institution, while clause (2) emphasizes the conduct of the defendant.” “Indeed, the latter extends to any knowingly false representation by the defendant.” For liability under clause (2), the Government need only show that the defendant obtained or attempted to obtain bank property or property held by a bank with an intent to defraud someone else. Relatedly, because the target of the fraud need not be a bank, the Government need not prove that a bank was “at risk” for a loss.
Whether Loughrin or the Government will carry the day and on which specific issues remains to be seen. For example, the record is a bit unclear as to whether the issue of intent to defraud a bank is the only issue properly before the Court. The Government has devoted a lot of its briefing to arguing that the issue of risk of loss to a bank was not preserved on appeal. At a minimum, the Court will likely wrangle with the issue of resolving the circuit split on the issue of whether the Government need prove an intent to defraud, generally, or an intent to defraud a financial institution for subsection 2 liability.
 See U.S. v. Loughrin, 10-cr-00478-TC, Dkt. Nos. 3, 115 (D. Utah).
 See id. at Dkt. Nos. 3, 150.
 See U.S. v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing trial court decision). Specifically, the Court found that there was no need to prove intent to defraud a bank with respect to subsection 2 of § 1344. Section 1344 provides that it is a felony to knowingly execute, or attempt to execute, a scheme or artifice: (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any … property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
 Loughrin v. United States, Dkt. No. 13-316.
 See e.g., U.S. v. Kendrick, 221 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2000).
 See, e.g., Loughrin, 710 F.3d at 1116.
 See United States v. Rodriguez, 140 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1998).
 See Loughrin, 710 F.3d at 1116 (citations omitted).
 See id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
 In addition, the Government will likely argue before the Court that there is substantial case law across the federal circuits where convictions under § 1344(2) were upheld even though the bank in question is not the primary victim.
This entry was posted in Supreme Court Bank Fraud Case and tagged 18 U.S.C. 1344, bank fraud, bank fraud victims, circuit split, compliance, DOJ, federalism, financial crime, Identity Fraud, Loughrin, Mormon, negotiable instruments, statutory interpretation, Supreme Court, Target check fraud, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, white collar on January 5, 2014 by thesecuritieslitigator.

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