Source: https://casetext.com/case/sikandar-v-clarke
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:41:18+00:00

Document:
RAZA H. SIKANDAR, Petitioner, v. HAROLD CLARKE, Respondent.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence," U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Claim 1 Sikandar received ineffective assistance at sentencing.
Respondent has moved to dismiss on the grounds that, inter alia, Sikandar's claims lack merit. Sikandar has responded. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) will be granted.
Respondent also suggests that, to the extent that in Claims 1(ii), 1(iii), and 2 Sikandar seeks to raise different claims from those he advanced in his state habeas proceedings, such claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6-11, ECF 17.) Sikandar insists, and the Court finds, that the claims in the § 2254 Petition raises essentially the same claims Sikandar raised on state habeas. (Br. Opp'n 3, ECF No. 20.) Accordingly, the Court proceeds to address the merits of Sikandar's claims.
On September 28, 2010, the Court of Appeals of Virginia denied Sikandar's petition for appeal. Sikandar v. Commonwealth, 0457-10-4, at 1 (Va. Ct. App. July 28, 2010). On April 6, 2011, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused Sikandar's petition for appeal. Sikandar v. Commonwealth, No. 102147, at 1 (Va. Apr. 6, 2011).
On April 6, 2012, Sikandar filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Virginia, wherein he raised many of the same claims he raises in his § 2254 petition. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at\, Sikandar v. Dir. of the Dep'tofCorr.,No. 120625 (Va. filed Apr. 6, 2012). On December 17, 2012, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. State Habeas Op., 12.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the question "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,473 (2007) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).
In light of the foregoing statutory structure, the Supreme Court of Virginia's factual findings and disposition of Sikandar's claims figure prominently in this Court's opinion.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must show first, that counsel's representation was deficient and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1994). To satisfy the deficient performance prong of Strickland, the convicted defendant must overcome the "'strong presumption' that counsel's strategy and tactics fall 'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 588 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The second component of Strickland, the prejudice component, requires a convicted defendant to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is not necessary to determine whether counsel performed deficiently if the claim is readily dismissed for lack of prejudice. Id. at 697.
Petitioner contends counsel should have objected because the prosecutor misrepresented a material term of the plea agreement as it allowed payment of restitution on or before the sentencing date not exclusively prior to the sentencing date.
The Court holds that this portion of claim (1) satisfies neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. Petitioner proffers no evidence and nothing in the record indicates that petitioner paid the restitution in full on or before the date set for sentencing pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
State Habeas Op., at 2-3. The Virginia Supreme Court's rejection of this claim was reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Sikandar was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments or by an omission by his counsel, but rather by his own failure to pay restitution before or at sentencing. Accordingly, Claim 1(i) will be DISMISSED.
In another portion of claim (1), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to inform the prosecutor and the trial court at the sentencing hearing that petitioner's parents were present with a check to pay the restitution in full. As a result, petitioner contends he was deprived of the benefit of the plea agreement and was sentenced to serve three years and six months instead of two years and two months.
The Court holds that this portion of claim (1) satisfies neither the 'performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. The record, including the affidavit of counsel, demonstrates that during counsel's contact with petitioner's family regarding the restitution payment between the time of the guilty plea hearing and sentencing, they never informed counsel that they could pay the full restitution on or before the sentencing date. Furthermore, they never told counsel that they had a check for the full restitution payment at the sentencing hearing and counsel had no knowledge that they possessed such a check at the sentencing hearing. Moreover even if the restitution had been paid in full on the date of sentencing, the trial court would not have been bound by the Commonwealth's sentencing recommendation and petitioner fails to establish that the court would have followed the Commonwealth's recommendation. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
11. I spoke with Raza Sikandar's father, Syed Sikandar, a number of times regarding the payment of the restitution amount that had to be paid as a condition of the plea agreement. Initially, Syed Sikandar indicated that he was unwilling to pay any amount of the restitution. At some point Syed Sikandar's position changed regarding his willingness to assist in paying the restitution amount, but he indicated that he was unable to pay all of the funds on or before the sentencing date. At no time did Syed Sikandar, or any other of Raza Sikandar's family members, indicate to me that they were able to pay the full restitution amount on or before the sentencing date. The night before the sentencing hearing I spoke extensively to at least one of Raza Sikandar's family members and [sic] who made no mention of the family being in a position to pay the restitution amount. Prior to the sentencing hearing beginning I greeted the Sikandar family at the Fauquier County Courthouse, none of them said anything to me about having the restitution funds. It was in my client's interest to see the restitution funds paid. Had anyone indicated to me that they had the restitution funds, I would have immediately raised the issue with the Commonwealth's Attorney and, if necessary, the court. I believe that the Commonwealth's Attorney would have accepted the payment as fulfillment of the plea agreement. The day following the sentencing hearing I spoke with Syed Sikandar by telephone, he called to apologize for his son's "rude" behavior in court, there was no mention of the restitution payment in that telephone conversation.
payments toward the restitution amount. I explained that the plea agreement required payment in full by the time of sentencing. I attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a payment plan with the Commonwealth's Attorney. The Commonwealth's Attorney mentioned that he was already overlooking Raza Sikandar's status as a fugitive from Prince William County and he expected the agreement to be fulfilled in order to get the benefit of the more lenient recommendation.
19. I did not correct the record regarding the Commonwealth's statement that the agreement had been breached, largely because it was my opinion that it had been breached. The restitution payment had not been made and no one had indicated to me that they were prepared to pay it. Further, the plea agreement was a part of the record and it reflected the terms of the plea as it related to when the payment needed to be made.
20. I did not advise the court that Raza Sikandar's family was prepared to make the restitution payment because I had no such knowledge. In the weeks before Raza Sikandar's sentencing date I had had several conversations with members of the Sikandar family regarding their desire to pay a portion of the restitution amount with the balance coming in installments. I explained the change in circumstances to the Commonwealth's Attorney and requested that he accept a payment plan as fulfillment of the plea agreement. The Commonwealth's position was that the [sic] Raza Sikandar must fulfill the terms of the plea agreement in order to get the benefit of it.
21. It is true that I received an email (attached as Exhibit 1) from Raza Sikandar's brother Bilal [sic] Sikandar on January 5, 2010. In his email Bilal [sic] Sikandar raised the topic of certain funds that were seized from Raza Sikandar's home at the time of his arrest, not about the payment of restitution. At the time that I received Bilal [sic] Sikandar's email message I had already discussed the seized funds with Raza Sikandar's father and sister in the preceding forty-eight hours and again in the two days before sentencing. Their position was that they could not make the entire restitution payment even with the seized funds. It may be that the Sikandar family's position with regard to the payment of the restitution changed in the hours before Raza Sikandar's sentencing, but this was not brought to my attention.
Motion to Dismiss Ex. 6 ("Lester Aff") ¶ 11, ¶¶ 18-21, Sikandar v. Dir. of the Dep't of Corr. No. 120625 (Va. filed July 25, 2012). Given the record before it, the Supreme Court of Virginia's rejection of Claims 1(ii)-(iv) was reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Accordingly, Claims 1(ii)-(iv) will be DISMISSED.
Nothing in the Circuit Court record indicates that, following his sentencing, Sikandar or his family paid the full amount of restitution.
Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make or draw or utter or deliver any check, draft, or order for the payment of money, upon any bank knowing, at the time of such making, drawing, uttering or delivering, that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank, banking institution, trust company, or other depository, for the payment of such check, draft or order, although no express representation is made in reference thereto,' shall be guilty of larceny; and, if this check, draft, or order has a represented value of $200 or more, such person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. In cases in which such value is less than $200, the person shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-181 (West 2013). In order to sustain a conviction of larceny by false pretenses, "the Commonwealth must prove: '(1) an intent to defraud; (2) an actual fraud; (3) use of false pretenses for the purpose of perpetrating the fraud; and (4) accomplishment of the fraud by means of the false pretenses used for the purpose . . . .'" Austin v. Commonwealth, 723 S.E.2d 633, 636 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (omission in original) (quoting Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 227 S.E.2d 714, 717 (Va. 1976)).
Sikandar faced a sentence of between one and twenty years for each of his convictions for larceny by false pretenses. See Va. Code Ann. 18.2-178(A) (West 2013); Va, Code. Ann. 18.2-95 (West 2013). For his five counts of uttering a bad check, see Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-181 (West 2013), Sikandar faced "a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury, confinement in jail for not more than 12 months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both." Va. Code Ann. 18.2-10 (West 2013). In contrast, by the terms of the Plea Agreement, if Sikandar paid full restitution, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend that Sikandar receive an active term of imprisonment of only two years and two months for all of his crimes.
Petitioner did not intend to defraud the banks in question. Among other factors, petitioner had overdraft protection on the relevant bank accounts; his writing of checks in excess of his balance in this context is not evidence of intent to defraud, merely the intent to assume a standard commercial debt under the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code.
(§ 2254 Pet. 6.) Sikandar, however, fails to direct to the Court to any evidence as to why any overdraft protection he may have had could possibly cover the checks at issue. See Bagheri v. Commonwealth, 408 S.E.2d 259, 263 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting challenge to sufficiency of the evidence for uttering bad checks where defendant failed to demonstrate his bank would extend credit to cover his overdrafts); cf. United States v. Terry, 366 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (observing that where a petitioner faults counsel for not calling a witness, the petitioner must provide "concrete evidence of what [the witness] would have testified to in exculpation," so that the reviewing court can adequately assess the significance of the decision not to call the witness).
Sikandar also alleges that his "wife also tried to replenish the subject accounts with sufficient funds the day after the checks were tendered." (§2254 Pet. 6.) Sikandar, however, once again fails to advance, as he must, any concrete evidence of such efforts by his wife. See Terry, 366 F.3d at 316 (finding a petitioner must provide evidence as to exculpatory testimony from a potential witness). Accordingly, this aspect of Claim 2 lacks merit and will be DISMISSED.
58. I explored every defense that I believed reasonably applied to Raza Sikandar's case and discussed each defense with him thoroughly. On June 5 and 18, 2009, specifically, we spent a great deal of time on this issue.
59. I discussed with Raza Sikandar on numerous occasions the evidence that my investigation and the discovery revealed. It was my opinion that the evidence simply did not support a defense of mistake, a point that Raza Sikandar and I discussed on numerous occasions and which I believe he understood.
60. As I have indicated above, I specifically discussed with Raza Sikandar what I believed to be the overwhelming evidence against him: his recorded admission to investigators that he personally wrote and cashed each of the checks at issue, knowing that he did not have the funds in his bank account; that the account was opened using another person's Social Security Number; the photographic evidence of Raza Sikandar at multiple banks on the same day cashing checks far exceeding his account balance; his recorded statement to police that he cashed all of the checks to pay for oral surgery; the likelihood that he would have to testify in order to introduce a mistake defense, which could very well expose at least part of his criminal record involving fraud; the likelihood that evidence of the checks cashed in Prince William County, at or near the same time was likely to be admitted to show a scheme; and, that his bank records would reflect the single deposit of $2,400.00 and repeatedly cashed checks for $2,200.00 each, which would contradict the defense of mistake and buttress the government's knowledge element.
61. I explored, investigated and researched the defense of mistake and shared my opinion extensively with Raza Sikandar. It was my opinion that no reasonable jury would believe that his actions were the result of a mistake. I further shared my opinion with Raza Sikandar that such a defense might anger a jury and could impact any sentencing recommendation to the court.
62. I repeatedly advised Raza Sikandar that the choice of whether to go to trial was his and that I would do my best to represent him zealously no matter what his decision. I also told Raza Sikandar that I thought it [sic] that going to trial, given the circumstances, was not a good choice for him. I believed then, and I believe now, that I would have provided ineffective assistance if I had advised or encouraged Raza Sikandar to go to trial.
(Lester Aff. ¶¶ 58-62.) Counsel reasonably perceived that the defense Sikandar suggests had little chance of succeeding with a jury given Sikandar's admissions to police, his conduct in setting up the accounts and passing the checks at issue and, his lengthy history of crimes of a similar nature. Sikandar's conduct and record overwhelmingly indicate his intent to defraud the banks. Indeed, when Sikandar suggested his conduct was nothing more than an honest mistake. the Circuit Court remarked, "I'm very unimpressed. I think you're guilty as sin . . . ." (Jan. 25, 2010 Tr. 9.) Given the near certainty of a conviction on the ten charges to which Sikandar pled guilty and the significant reduction in his sentencing exposure under the terms of the Plea Agreement, counsel acted in an eminently reasonable manner in advising Sikandar to plead guilty. Accordingly, Claim 2 will be DISMISSED.
In Claim 3, Sikandar contends that appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to argue that the Circuit Court erred in calculating Sikandar's sentence under Virginia's sentencing guidelines. (§ 2254 Pet. 7.) Appellate counsel reasonably eschewed raising such a claim because "[a] judge's failure to follow the sentencing guidelines 'shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief" Harmon v. Commonwealth, No. 0694-11-4, 2012 WL 1204361, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2012) (quoting Va. Code § 19.2-298.01(F)). Accordingly, Claim 3 will be DISMISSED because Sikandar fails to demonstrate deficiency on the part of counsel.
The Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) will be GRANTED. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be DENIED. The action will be DISMISSED.

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