Source: http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1998.03.10_oil_platforms.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:44:51+00:00

Document:
2. That the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are accordingly dismissed.
2. That the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordingly under an obligation to make full reparation to the United States for violating the 1955 Treaty in a form and amount to be determined by the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings.
The United States reserves the right to introduce and present to the Court in due course a precise evaluation of the reparation owed by Iran."
"In the Counter-Memorial and Counter-Claim of the United States dated 23 June 1997, paragraph 6.10, it was asserted that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has not agreed to enter into negotiations in relation to the counter-claim. That statement was not, however, accompanied by the correspondence which has been exchanged between the Parties.
"Iran does not share the views of the United States as expressed in its letter of 20 October 1997 that Iran's submissions are to be limited to the issues set forth in Article 80, paragraph 3, of the Rules. As provided for in Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules, a counterclaim may only be presented provided that it is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the party and that it comes under the jurisdiction of the Court. Pursuant to the Registrar's letter of 21 October 1997, Iran's submissions will be directed to showing the legal grounds why the counter-claim presented by the United States does not meet these requirements, as indicated in Iran's letter of 2 October 1997.
"even assuming that there may be a sufficient legal link (connexit� juridique) between claims of a breach of freedom of commerce under Article X (1) of the Treaty (which pursuant to the Court's Judgment of 12 December 1996 now forms the sole basis of Iran's Application) and claims of breaches of freedom of navigation under Articles X (3)-(9, only two of the incidents involved US vessels within the meaning of Article X (2) which were even arguably covered by those paragraphs (Bridgeton and Sea Isle City)"
"Moreover, the Court could face great practical difficulties in seeking to resolve Iran's objections to admissibility at this stage in the context of Article 80 (3). Many of Iran's objections to jurisdiction and admissibility involve contested matters of fact which the Court cannot effectively address and decide at this stage, particularly not in the context of the abbreviated procedures of Article 80 (3) FN3.
"the facts and circumstances that caused the United States to engage Iran's oil platforms � Iranian attacks on, and threats to, merchant shipping, including US shipping and US nationals � are at the heart of the US defence to Iran's claims"
"it would be a natural interpretation of the word 'commerce', in Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of 1955 that it includes commercial activities in general � not merely the immediate act of purchase and sale, but also the ancillary activities integrally related to commerce" (Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 819, para. 49).
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this tenth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of the United States of America, respectively.
Judges Oda and Higgins append separate opinions to the Order of the Court.
Judge ad hoc Rigaux appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the Court.
1. I voted in favour � albeit reluctantly � of the Order which was very nearly unanimously adopted.
However, I find it incorrect that the Court has decided, at this stage and in the form of a Court Order, that "the counter-claim presented by the United States in its Counter-Memorial is admissible as such and forms part of the current proceedings" (Order, p. 206, para. 46 (A)).
I feel that the Court's decision in this Order sets a rather unfortunate precedent in its jurisprudence relating to counter-claims.
2. In the current case concerning Oil Platforms, which was presented unilaterally by Iran against the United States on 2 November 1992, Iran submitted its Memorial on 8 June 1993. While the United States, on 16 December 1993, presented its preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Court (within the time-limit fixed by the Court for the submission of the Counter-Memorial), the Court in its Judgment of 12 December 1996 rejected that objection and found that "it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of 1955, to entertain the claims made by [Iran] under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty" (Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 821, para. 55 (2)).
2. That [Iran] is accordingly under an obligation to make full reparation to the United States for violating the 1955 Treaty in a form and amount to be determined by the Court ..."
3. Several months passed and the Court has not taken any action so far. The Court did not order a second round of written pleadings (in other words, the submission of a Reply by Iran and a Rejoinder by the United States) since the counter-claim was presented in the Counter-Memorial of the Respondent party on 23 June 1997.
"I should . . . observe that Iran has serious objections to the admissibility of the United States' counter-claim. It is Iran's position that the counter-claim as formulated by the United States does not meet the requirements of Article 80 (1) of the Rules. Iran requests a hearing on this question, as provided for in Article 80 (3) of the Rules."
On 17 October 1997, after the exchange of the above-mentioned letters of the Agents of both Parties through the Registrar of the Court, the Acting President in the present case held a meeting with the Agents of the Parties in order to ascertain their views as to the further proceedings in the case. According to the United States letter of 20 October 1997 "it was discussed [at that meeting] that the two Parties may be ordered by the Court to file submissions regarding the United States Counter-Claim" (emphasis added). It is also known from the text of the present Order, however, that at that meeting "the two Agents agreed that their respective Governments would submit written observations on the question of the admissibility of the United States counter-claim" (emphasis added) and that "the Agent of Iran envisaged that his Government would then present oral observations on the question".
"the United States understands that any order by the Court will limit the filing of these submissions to the issue set forth in Rule 80 (3) of the Rules of the Court, in other words, to the connection of the counter-claim to Iran's claim".
In his letter of 27 October 1997 to the Registrar, prepared in response to the Registrar's request of 21 October 1997, the Agent of Iran made it [p 210] clear that he did not share the views of the United States that Iran's submissions should have been limited to the issue set forth in Article 80, paragraph 3, of the Rules. Iran was of the view that "a counter-claim may only be presented provided that it is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the [other] party and that it comes under the jurisdiction of the Court".
"[Iran] hereby requests a hearing pursuant to Article 80, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court in order to allow the Court to determine whether or not the United States Counter-Claim should be joined to this Case".
"[t]he thrust of Iran's position is not whether the US counter-claim is connected to the subject matter of Iran's claim, but whether there is a valid US counter-claim at all. The Court cannot make such a determination at this stage of the proceedings. It certainly should not allow Iran to avoid responding to the merits of the US counter-claim"
and that "the Court should now decide to join the questions presented by the US counter-claim to the original proceeding" (ibid.). The United States was of the view that "no oral proceeding is required in connection with such a decision" (ibid.) and "[t]here is ... no need for an oral proceeding under Article 80 (3)" (ibid.).
5. This procedure strikes me as irregular, if 1 may Say so, in the light of the jurisprudence of this Court, as well as of its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice.
"When proceedings have been instituted by means of an application, a counter-claim may be presented in the submissions of the Counter-Mernorial, provided that such counter-claim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the application and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court. In the event of doubt as to the connection between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the subject-matter of the application the Court shall, after due examination, direct whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined to the original proceedings."
3. In the event of doubt as to the connection between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the subject-matter of the claim of the other party the Court shall, after hearing the parties, decide whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined to the original proceedings."
6. Throughout the entire history of the present Court, there have been only two other cases (except for the quite recent case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in which case an Order on a relevant matter has been issued during the past few months) when counter-claims were presented during the proceedings.
"1. That the Republic of Colombia, as the country granting asylum, is competent to qualify the offence for the purpose of the said asylum, within the limits of the obligations resulting in particular from the Bolivarian Agreement on Extradition of 18 July 1911, and the Convention on Asylum of 20 February 1928, and of American international law in general.
"[as a counter-claim under Article 63 of the Rules of Court, and in the same decision,] that the asylum granted by the Colombian Ambassador at Lima to ... Haya de la Torre was contrary to Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 2, paragraph 2, item 1 (inciso primero), of the Convention on Asylum signed at Havana in 1928" (ibid., p. 164 [translation by the Registry]).
"To sum up, the Government of Peru has not succeeded in establishing its counter-claim concerning the alleged violation of Articles 1, paragraph 1, and 2, paragraph 2, item 1 (inciso primero) of the 1928 Havana Convention on Asylum, by the Colombian Ambassador at Lima as resulting from the 'grant' of asylum to ... Haya de la Torre." (Ibid., p. 386.) [Translation by the Registry].
In its Rejoinder of 15 June 1950 (ibid., p. 425), as in its Counter-Memorial, Peru submitted its request to the Court to reject the Colombian submission and to adjudge in relation to its counter-claim in the same manner as in its Counter-Memorial (ibid., p. 442).
The issues relating to the counter-claim of Pen were extensively discussed in parallel with the original submission of Colombia in the two rounds of oral proceedings held from 26 September 1950 to 9 October 1950. At those oral proceedings Peru submitted its final submissions, presented by Georges Scelle, which were essentially the same as the previous [p 213] submissions in its Counter-Memorial and Rejoinder, but with one addition in the last line, which reads that "in any case the maintenance of the asylum constitutes at the present time a violation of that treaty" (I. C. J. Pleadings, Asylum, Vol. II, p. 192 [translation by the Registry]).
In the Judgment of 20 November 1950, the Court, regarding Peru's counter-claim, (i) "[r]ejects it in so far as it is founded on a violation of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the [1928 Havana] Convention on Asylum" and (ii) "[flinds that the grant of asylum by the Colombian Government to ... Haya de la Torre was not made in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 2 ('First'), of that Convention" (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 288).
7. In the case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco presented unilaterally by France against the United States on 27 October 1950, France submitted its Memorial on 1 March 1951 in which it made submissions relating, inter alia, to the privileges that were to be enjoyed by United States nationals in Morocco, which privileges arose from the 1836 Treaty, to the existence of the consular jurisdiction over United States nationals and to the extent of that consular jurisdiction, and to the effect of the 1948 Decree relating to consumption taxes upon United States nationals.
The preliminary objection was eventually withdrawn by the United States.
1. Under Article 95 of the Act of Algeciras, the value of imports from the United States must be determined for the purpose of customs assessments by adding to the purchase value of the imported merchandise in the United States the expenses incidental to its transportation to the custom-house in Morocco . . .
2. The treaties exempt American nationals from taxes . . . [T]o [p 214] collect taxes from American nationals in violation of the terms of the treaties is a breach of international law.
Such taxes can legally be collected from American nationals only with the previous consent of the United States . . . and from the date upon which such consent is given . . .
In its Rejoinder of 18 April 1952, the United States maintained, in their entirety, the submissions presented in its Counter-Memorial (ibid., p. 131). The oral proceedings were held from 15 to 26 July 1952. The United States repeated its original submission in respect of its counterclaim (ibid., p. 291).
8. The institution of counter-claims, in parallel with that of third-party intervention which appears immediately after counter-claims in the section on incidental proceedings in the Rules of Court, had been introduced at the time of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Its purpose was the proper administration of justice with a view to judicial economy to enable it to rule on any or al1 connected claims in a single proceeding, in other words, to avoid any inconvenience which might be caused by the other party or by a third party filing a fresh application on issues that are directly connected. Any new application would, of course, necessitate another confirmation of the Court's jurisdiction and an examination of the complete documentation, and it would be a situation best avoided.
However, an applicant State will be severely prejudiced if the scope of the issues, in the respondent State's counter-claim, is broadened beyond the original contention in the claim of the applicant State. While an applicant State is not itself allowed to bring additional claims, why then may a respondent State be permitted to bring a new claim if this (counter-)claim is not directly connected with the subject-matter of the Applicant's claim? We should not simply put what may have originally been somewhat distinct matters into one melting-pot without making a careful examination of the essential character of that claim.
9. In the present case, 1 wonder if it is quite proper to confirm the admissibility of the United States counter-claim and make it part of the whole proceedings without (i) affording the Parties, and in particular the Applicant, the opportunity to express their views on this matter in the written pleadings and (ii) without having oral hearings on the basis of the complete exhaustion of the exchange of views indicated in the written proceedings. In the light of past jurisprudence, except as already mentioned for the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in which an Order was made just a few months ago, 1 wonder if the quick rendering of an Order by the Court is quite reasonable.
the counter-claims were directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party.
10. Icertainly agree that, at this stage, the Court should fix the time-limit for the submission of a Reply and of a Rejoinder, as has been done in paragraph 46 (B) of the present Order. The matter, including whether or not there is a "connection between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the subject-matter of the claim of the other party", should have been open to analysis by Iran in the Reply which it is to prepare and, further, by the United States in its Rejoinder.
There remains, as a matter of principle, the question of whether it is fair for the Respondent to be given the opportunity to present the subject-matter twice, once in its Counter-Memorial and once in its Rejoinder, while the Applicant is confined to a single written pleading in its Reply, although the Applicant will be afforded a further opportunity to argue this point during the oral pleadings.
11. I find it difficult to understand why the admissibility of the counter-claim should be determined at this stage before the Court has, at least, received Iran's Reply. I also fail to understand why this needs to be done so hastily in this case especially when one considers the careful manner in which the Court has proceeded in earlier years. In addition, I believe that this matter, namely whether the (counter-) claim is admissible or not, should not be determined by the Court in the form of an Order but should rather be decided by the Judgment in the merits phase.
I agree with the Court's finding that the counter-claim presented by the United States in its Counter-Memorial is admissible and now forms part of the current proceedings.
There is, however, one point which the Court has not at all addressed, while nevertheless apparently making a negative finding on it; and there are two further points which it seems to hold over for the merits, when arguably they should have been disposed of at this juncture.
As the present Order recalls, Iran instituted proceedings against the United States claiming breaches by the latter of Article 1, Article IV, paragraph 1, and Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity of 1955. The Court, having heard the preliminary objections to its jurisdiction of the United States, in its Judgment of 12 December 1996 determined that it had jurisdiction "to entertain the claims made by the Islamic Republic of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty". It found it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the claims under Article 1 and Article IV, paragraph 1.
On 23 June 1997 the United States presented both a defence to Iran's Memorial and the counter-claim which is the subject of the present Order. The United States contended that Iran, for its part, had engaged in actions which violated Article X of the Treaty. In Section 1 of its counter-claim it based its application on Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. In Section 2 it based its application on "the remainder of Article X" and went on to refer particularly to acts it alleged constituted violations of Article X, paragraph 3. In its submissions the Court was asked to adjudge and declare that Iran had breached its obligations under Article X, generally.
In its reply to the Court's invitation to present its views on Iran's observations on the counter-claims (see paragraph 9 of this Order), the United States further referred at paragraph 39 to "paragraphs X (2) through X (5)". It both claimed violations of these provisions by reference to particular events and it objected that "Iran's jurisdictional arguments seek to force al1 of the US counter-claim into the confines of Article X (1) of the 1955 Treaty".
"within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty as interpreted by the Court; and whereas the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the United States counter-claim in so far as the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 1".
It may thus be that while Article X, paragraph 1, is the sole basis of jurisdiction identified by the Court, paragraphs 2 to 6 still have relevance to the task of ascertaining the freedoms guaranteed under paragraph 1.
In the first place, findings that reject the contentions of a party should be based on reasons. The disturbing tendency to offer conclusions but not reasons is not to be welcomed. In the second place, the inarticulate assumption that the jurisdictional basis established for a claim necessarily is the only jurisdictional basis for, and sets the limits to, a counter-claim, is open to challenge.
There is nothing in the Rules or practice of the Court to suggest that the very identical jurisdictional nexus must be established by a counter-claimant. The travaux pr�paratoires to the various formulations of what is now Article 80 of the Rules of Court contain no suggestion whatever that this was thought of as a requirement. The rule on counter-claims has gone through successive changes. But neither in the discussions of 1922, nor of 1934, 1935, 1936, nor again of 1946, 1968, 1970, 1972, does this thought anywhere appear.
Nor does the wording of Article 80, paragraph 1, suggest this. It requires that a counter-claim "comes within the jurisdiction of the Court", not that it "was within the jurisdiction established by the Court in respect of the claims of the applicant".
Of course, the very requirement of a direct connection with the subject-matter of the claim is likely to bring a counter-claimant into the same general jurisdictional area, i.e., the same treaty may well form the basis of the claimed jurisdiction for the bringing of a counter-claim. But that is all.
The view of the Committee for the Revision of the Rules, when deciding to retain the phrase "and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court" from the old Rule, was that the phrase meant that a counter-claimant could not introduce a matter which the Court would not have had jurisdiction to deal with had it been the subject of an ordinary application to the Court.
And that remains the position under Article 80 of the present Rules of Court, which continues simply to require that a counter-claim "comes within the jurisdiction of the Court". The correct and necessary procedure in the present case would have been for the Court to enquire whether it would have had jurisdiction to deal with the claims of the United States, as they related to Article X, paragraphs 2 to 5, had they "been the subject of an ordinary application to the Court".
In its Judgment of 12 December 1996 (case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 803) the Court established the methodology for doing this where there is contested jurisdiction under a treaty. The test is whether the facts as claimed by the applicant might give to a violation of a specified provision (whether the facts are in fact correct, whether they do constitute a violation, and if there is a defence, are then all matters for the merits). There is no reason why the Court should not have engaged in this exercise in relation to the counter-claim of the United States based on Article X, paragraphs 2 to 5, of the 1955 Treaty and thus to provide it with a reasoned response, one way or the other.
Implicit in the Court's unexplained reliance on Article X, paragraph 1, as the apparent sole basis of jurisdiction is the thought that a counter-claim can only arise out of an initial claim, and therefore cannot be on a wider jurisdiction basis than the initial claim. But it is not a question of a counter-claimant being able to "expand" the jurisdiction initially established by the Court. The Court first establishes its jurisdiction by reference to the facts as alleged by the claimant. But that does not mean to say that it might not have jurisdiction in relation to allegations brought by the defendant under other clauses of the same treaty.
"Whereas the Respondent cannot use a counter-claim as a means of referring to an international court claims which exceed the limits of its jurisdiction as recognized by the parties ..." (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, 1C.J. Reports 1997, p. 257, para. 31; emphasis added).
The test in the Genocide Convention case of "jurisdiction as recognized by the parties" will only be met when the Court decides whether Article X, paragraphs 2 to 5, on the facts alleged by the Defendant, might sustain claims of violations by the Applicant. The Order, which is the vehicle for dealing with preliminary matters in the counter-claim, should have contained a reasoned decision on this point.
The matter may usefully be looked at in the following way. There either is, or is not, jurisdiction to sustain claims, on the basis of the facts alleged by the United States, in relation to Article X, paragraphs 2 to 5. If an initial claim could have been brought claiming breaches of these provisions, that cannot be taken away by virtue of the fact that the Court has already established its jurisdiction, in respect of another provision (Art. X, para. 1) in respect of claims articulated by Iran.
If, arguendo, the treaty provisions of Article X, paragraphs 2 to 5, would have founded jurisdiction in an initial claim then presumably the United States could still bring a claim de novo even if it is not allowed to do so as a counter-claim under the Court's Order. Such a result is hardly consistent with the stated purpose of counter-claims, namely, convenience of court management. It underlines that what is required under Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules is that a counter-claim "comes within the jurisdiction of the Court" by reference to the normal juris-dictional principles rather than by reference to the particular basis of jurisdiction that the initial claimant happens to have relied on in relation to its own particular facts.
If the United States might reasonably have expected a reasoned response to its claim that the Court has jurisdiction under Article X, paragraphs 2 to 5, as well as under Article X, paragraph 1, Iran might reasonably have expected that, on the basis of equality of treatment, this Order would have resolved two items on which it is in fact silent.
Parties to litigation should be treated in a comparable manner. But, from the silence of the Court in the present Order, it seems that what it saw as a jurisdictional question when determining United States preliminary objections to the main claim it treats as a matter for the merits when considering Iran's response to the counter-claim.
Second, Iran claims that those itemized vessels identified as warships are excluded from the reach of Article X, paragraph 1, by the terms of Article X, paragraph 2. This may or may not be correct in the particular context. But the silence of the Order on this question � which Iran clearly saw as relevant to the "direct connection" requirement in Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules, and thus as preliminary � means that Iran will perforce have to answer on the merits al1 contentions of fact and law relating to the claims concerning warships. The Court has not applied the same procedures, in determining the scope of its jurisdiction under the Treaty, to both of the Parties.
Undoubtedly, some of the difficulties stem from the terms of Article 80 itself. Paragraph 1 of Article 80 contains two requirements for counterclaims to be admissible � that they have a direct connection with the subject-matter of the claim and that they come within the jurisdiction of the Court. Paragraph 3 of Article 80 provides that the Court shall hear the parties "In the event of doubt as to the connection between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the subject-matter of the claim of the other party." No provision is made to hear the parties in the event of doubt as to whether the counter-claim comes within the jurisdiction of the Court. It might be thought that this was perhaps deliberate, and that the intention was that the Court would resolve any doubts as to its jurisdiction only when it got to the merits. This would be a sort of standing exception to Article 79, paragraph 6, of the Rules (or, put differently, a counter-claim where jurisdiction is contested would always and necessarily be treated as not having an exclusively preliminary character under Article 79, paragraph 7). In any event, the idea that "direct connection" within the meaning of Article 80, paragraph 1, should be disposed of as a preliminary matter, while the jurisdiction requirement in Article 80, paragraph 1, should be dealt with on the merits finds no support at al1 in the travaux pr�paratoires of the various versions of the Rules, including the present Rules. The failure of Article 80, paragraph 3, to "match" Article 80, paragraph 1, seems to have been inadvertent and there was no intention to distinguish between objections relating to "connection" and those to "jurisdiction".
What can be said is that the travaux do show that the Court has, since 1922, resolved to keep ample room for discretion in the handling of these [p 223] matters, on a case-by-case basis. In the exercise of this discretion the Court has determined that the reference in Article 80, paragraph 3, in case of doubt as to "connection", to the phrase "after hearing the parties" may be taken in a particular case as the receipt of written submissions FNl. Oral submissions are neither required by the terms of Article 80, paragraph 3, nor excluded. Further, the Court has also found sufficient freedom to decide, notwithstanding the apparently limiting terminology of Article 80, paragraph 3, that the Parties may be heard (whether in writing or orally) on the question of jurisdiction as well as on the question of connection.
FN1 This matter is raised in footnote 2 of Iran's Request and in the declaration of Judge ad hoc Kre�a and the separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, pp. 262-271 and 278-286, respectively.
The exception allowed in Article 79, paragraph 7, whereby preliminary matters are not disposed of at the preliminary phase, is to be used sparingly, lest the purpose underlying the 1978 alteration to that Article be negated. Further, the tests applied to Iran to see if its claims came under the 1955 Treaty should equally have been applied to the United States (i.e., to see, if on the facts alleged, a counter-claim could possibly lie under particular articles and clauses). The process by which certain claims of Iran were found not to be within the jurisdiction of the Court under the Treaty of Amity, and would thus not proceed to the merits, should be equally applied to the counter-claims of the United States to see whether or not they should advance in their entirety to the merits.
There is much to be said for three judicial principles. First, judicial conclusions should be justified by legal reasons. Second, matters going to jurisdiction should, whenever possible, be disposed of before proceeding to the merits. Third, parties to litigation are entitled to an equality of treatment (see, for example, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 25; Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, Order of 22 September 1995, I. C.J. Reports 1995, p. 296).
On 23 June 1997, the United States of America filed its Counter-Memorial in the main action and appended to it a counter-claim. On 18 November 1997, the Islamic Republic of Iran filed a "Request for Hearing in Relation to the United States Counter-Claim Pursuant to Article 80 (3) of the Rules of Court". On 18 December 1997, the United States submitted a statement on that request to the Court.
Although this passage in the statement by the United States is included in the Order (para. 22), the Court does not infer from it the consequences which the passage should have implied, namely that the Court is not asked to consider whether a direct connection exists between the original claim and the counter-claim, nor even whether such a connection is not in doubt. The Court's sole choice is between the two limbs of the following alternative: either, if it considers that the connection is in doubt, to proceed to an adversarial oral hearing on that point, or else to dismiss the request of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
� it must come within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Paragraph 2 of Article 80 contains a condition of form.
� the decision by the Court "after hearing the parties"
1. Is there a direct connection between the two actions?
2. Does the counter-claim come within the jurisdiction of the Court?
3. In regard to the first question, is there doubt about the connection alleged?
4. If there is doubt, the Court must hear the Parties.
1. What is a direct connection?
2. Is there or is there not doubt about the connection?
3. If there is, does the phrase "after hearing the parties" require oral proceedings?
Following the succinct reference in the 1922 Rules of Court, the changes made in 1936, 1976 and 1978 had the effect of stating explicitly the conditions for a counter-claim to be brought, and of doing so restrictively.
The dual requirement of "direct connection" and competence emerged in 1936. The Rules adopted by the present Court in 1946 added a procedural rule: "In the event of doubt as to the connection between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the subject-matter of the application the Court shall, after due examination, direct ..."
In 1978, this wording was moved to paragraph 3 of Article 80, with the words "after hearing the parties" substituted for the words "after due examination".
One of the main changes, that of 1936, was clearly inspired by Judge Anzilotti, who had presided over the Permanent Court when it pronounced judgment on the merits in the Factory at Chorz�w case in 1928. The article published by the eminent judge, in Italian in 1929, and translated into French the following year FNl bears the imprint of that determination and can, in a way, be seen as a statement of the reasons for Article 63 as adopted in 1936.
nationale", Journal du droit international (Clunet), 1930, Vol. 57, pp. 857-877.
After pointing out that the Factory ut Chorz�w case was the first in which the Permanent Court had had to rule on the admissibility of a counter-claim, Judge Anzilotti examined first whether Article 40 of the 1922 Rules of Court was in conformity with the Court's Statute, which had made no provision for a counter-claim being brought; he decided that it was, and today this is no longer disputed. He emphasized the exceptional nature of counter-claims, which could only be "certain claims which have some connection with that of the applicant" FN2.
FN2Clunet, 1930, p. 866. It may be thought that "a connection which is certain" would have been a more accurate translation of the original Italian "certa connessione".
As regards the condition of jurisdiction which Judge Anzilotti held to be necessary, it implies that, unlike the solution adopted in some municipal systems of law, a connection does not, by virtue of Article 40 of the 1922 Rules, justify an extension of the Court's jurisdiction (Clunet, 1930, p. 869).
In so doing, Judge Anzilotti seems certain to have spelt out, with al1 due amplification, the thinking behind the 1928 Judgment.
These observations by the Permanent Court reveal clearly the notion of a connection between the two claims, of such a kind that it would have been neither appropriate nor equitable to rule on the claim by Germany without at the same time ruling on the claim by Poland: the decision seems therefore to fulfil the general criteria set forth earlier (p. 872).
This was also the position maintained by Judge Anzilotti at the meetings of the Court in 1934 concerning what was to become Article 63 of the Rules of the Permanent Court (P.C.I. J., Series D, 1936, Third Addendum to No. 2, pp. 104-117). The views of Judge Negulesco are in agreement here and he gives a very restrictive example of the notion of "direct connections (ibid., p. 111). In the opinion of Judge Fromageot (ibid., p. 112) and Judge Wang (ibid., p. 114) the counter-claim should be based on the same facts as the main action; however, that very restrictive definition of a "direct connection" was not followed by al1 the members of the working group (see inter alia the opinion of Judge Sch�cking, ibid., p. 112).
A number of judgments provide indications of the "direct" or close character of a connection.
Just one judgment predates the introduction of this notion into the Rules of Court, but it was given under the presidency of Judge Anzilotti and appears to be in keeping with the restrictive conception of connection that he developed in the doctrinal study published a year later. Seeking to secure a ruling that the value of rights and interests allegedly passing into the ownership of the respondent State (applicant in the counter-claim) under Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles should be deducted from the indemnity claimed in the main action, the counter-claim was "juridically connected with the principal claim" (case concerning Factory ut Chorz�w, Merits, Judgment No. 13, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 38).
In the case concerning Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Judgment, 1937, P.C.I.J., Seriies A/B, No. 70), the counter-claim of the respondent State in the main action was for a ruling by the Court that the violation of the Belgian-Dutch Treaty of 12 May 1863 alleged against it had been preceded by a similar violation of which it accused the applicant State. The Permanent Court found that the claim was "directly connected with the principal claim" (ibid., p. 28). The dismissal of the counter-claim [p 228] on the merits was the subject of several dissenting opinions. The most notable was that of Judge Anzilotti, who saw in the counter-claim an application of exceptio non adimpleti contractus justifying dismissal of the principal claim on that point (ibid., pp. 49-52). As Judge Hudson saw it, this exception was an equitable principle that the Court ought to have applied (ibid., pp. 75-78).
The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case (Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 76, p. 4) tells us nothing about the position of the Permanent Court regarding counter-claims, since the Court upheld a plea of non-admissibility inferred from the non-exhaustion of local remedies.
The two most significant judgments come from the present Court.
"It emerges clearly from the arguments of the Parties that the second submission of the Government of Colombia, which concerns the demand for a safe-conduct, rests largely on the alleged regularity of the asylum, which is precisely what is disputed by the counter-claim. The connexion is so direct that certain conditions which are required to exist before a safe-conduct can be demanded depend precisely on facts which are raised by the counter-claim. The direct connexion being thus clearly established . . ." (I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 280-281).
In the case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 176), the applicant State in the main action does not seem to have raised any objection to the counter-claim brought against it (at least there is no trace of any in the statement of reasons to the Judgment), but the connection between the two claims appears to be indisputable, since they both concerned the rights of which United States nationals in Morocco could avail themselves.
Paragraph 33 of the Order of 17 December 1997 (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 258) refers to the sovereign power of the Court to appreciate whether the link between the two claims is sufficient, seeing that no definition exists of the concept of "direct connection".
The detailed commentary on the jurisprudence of both Courts in the work of Mrs. Genevi�ve Guyomar (Commentaire du R�glement de la Cour internationale de Justice adopt� le 14 avril 1978, Interpr�tation et pratique, 1983, pp. 518-525) contains an objective account of the jurisprudence of both Courts and of the "travaux pr�paratoires" for the changes made to the Rules of Court.
"Paragraph 3 corresponds to the last sentence of the previous Rules. Here the expression 'after hearing the parties7 replaces the former 'after due examination'. This means that in future there will always be some oral proceedings in the event of doubt � by whom [p 230] is not stated � as to the connection between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the subject matter of the claim of the other party."
Mr. Rosenne's commentary offers a dual interpretation of the Rules: the expression "after hearing the parties" refers to oral proceedings and their precondition is that the direct connection should be in doubt. The same solution is reiterated in the third edition of The Law and Practice of the International Court, Vol. III, 1997, pp. 1272-1273).
None of the precedents provides any answer to the questions the Court will have to decide in the case now pending. None of the cases previously judged reveals any serious questioning of the admissibility of the counter-claim. In all instances both claims concerned the same facts, and to rule on the counter-claim the Court had no need to examine new facts. The issue raised by Article 80, paragraph 3, was also a novel one, as observed by Mr. Rosenne (ibid., pp. 1273-1274), until the Order of 17 December 1997 (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 243).
In that Order the Court exercised the discretion allowed it by Article 80, paragraph 3, of its Rules, and it considered itself sufficiently well informed about the respective positions put forward in writing to be able to rule on the admissibility of the counter-claims. This would nevertheless not prevent the Court, in any subsequent case, from exercising the same discretion differently.
The notions of counter-claim and connection used in Article 80 of the Rules of Court are borrowed from the vocabulary of the municipal law of procedure. This raises the question whether the Court could rely on general principles of law developed from convergent practice in municipal systems. That would appear to have deserved more painstaking examination. Here are a few examples taken from French law, Belgian law and the law of the European Communities.
France's New Code of Civil Procedure ranks the counter-claim among incidental claims. The admissibility of such a claim may depend on the jurisdiction assigned to the Court in which it is pending (Art. 38).
"A counter-claim shall be a claim whereby the original defendant seeks an advantage other than the mere dismissal of his opponent's claim."
"Counter-claims or additional claims shall not be admissible unless there is a sufficient link between them and the original claims.
A claim for compensation shall nevertheless be admissible even in the absence of such a link, subject to the proviso that the court may sever it should it be liable excessively to delay trial of the case as a whole."
The "sufficient link" between the two claims (Art. 70, para. 1) is an indeterminate concept not spelled out by the lawmakers. The Court of Cassation has inferred from this that the court trying the main action had discretion to determine the alleged link between the two claims (see, in particular, Civ. Ire, 6 June 1978, Bull. civ., I, p. 171; Civ. 3e, 21 May 1979, D. 1979, IR 509; Civ. 2e, 14 January 1987, Bull. civ., II, p. 7).
"A counter-claim is an incidental claim brought by the defendant for the purpose of securing judgment against the plaintiff."
"The court of first instance shall hear counter-claims whatever their nature and amount.
In the municipal law of procedure, connection (often joined to litis pendens) justifies the joinder of cases b�ought separately and, as the case may be, is a ground for extending the jurisdiction of the court first seised. The simplest case is the submission of two connected claims to different chambers of the same court. In that event, an order of the presiding judge, a purely interna1 measure, will suffice to join the cases (see Article 107 of the New French Code of Civil Procedure).
"Should two cases brought before two separate courts be connected in such a way that it is in the best interests of justice to hear and determine them together, one of these courts may be asked to relinquish jurisdiction and transfer the case as it stands to the other court."
The tautological wording of this text conceals the absence of any definition of connection: cases linked in such a way that they should be joined are deemed to be connected, according to so vague a criterion as "the best interests of justice". Hence the Court of Cassation decided that, since the law leaves it to the court seised of the merits to assess the circumstances establishing a connection, a court of appeal is exercising its unfettered discretion in ordering a joinder to the merits (Civ. 1re, 9 October 1974, Bull. civ., I, p. 223).
Where the court seised of the merits finds that there is a connection, two legal consequences arise: relinquishment of the case by the second court seised and, in certain instances, extension of the jurisdiction of the first court seised. Such extension is not always possible where there is exclusive jurisdiction. (In doctrinal writing: Lo�c Cadet, Droit judiciaire priv�, 1992, Nos. 632-633; Jean Vincent and Serge Guinchard, Proc�dure civile, 23rd ed., 1994, pp. 334-338; Jacques H�ron, Droit judiciaire priv�, 1991, pp. 636-641).
Article 30 of the Belgian Judicial Code gives a similarly tautological definition of connection to that found in French law. Here too, appraisal of the existence of "such a close link that they can usefully be heard and determined at the same time" is also at the sole discretion of the court seised of the merits (Cass., 6 June 1961, Pas., 1961,I, 1082; 4 September 1987, Pas., 1988, I, 4, and note 3).
The second sentence in Article 4, paragraph 1, contains a restrictive definition of connection: "Only disputes arising from the same cause or relating to the same subject-matter may be regarded as connected."
As regards counter-claims, Article 4, paragraph 2, did not make their admissibility subject to any other condition than the jurisdiction of the court seised "by virtue of the matter concerned".
The Brussels and Lugano Conventions on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, the former of which is in force between the States of the European Union, and the latter between the same States and certain States of the European Free Trade Association, also contain rules on counter-claims and connection.
3. On a counterclaim arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the original claim is pending."
"For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from s�parate proceedings."
However, unlike the situation obtaining in municipal law, connection is not a source of jurisdiction (H�l�ne Gaudemet-Tallon, Les conventions de Bruxelles et de Lugano, 1993, No. 297).
The same authoritative commentator on the two Conventions notes how strict the condition is for the admissibility of a counter-claim, and she proposes an interpretation which would seem better to suit the intentions of the authors of the Convention, namely, "that the notion contemplated was rather the more flexible one of a connection" (op. cit., No. 229).
1. Whereas in municipal procedural law the admissibility of counterclaims and the joinder of related claims are two separate institutions, the [p 234] Rules of Court make the former subject to the establishment of a direct connection.
2. The Rules do not contemplate any extension of jurisdiction in favour of the admissibility of the counter-claim: to be admissible, the counter-claim must fall within the jurisdiction of the court before which the original claim is pending. In municipal law, the assigned jurisdiction of that court is sometimes, but not always, extended to enable it to entertain a counter-claim which, otherwise, would lie outside its jurisdiction.
3. The independent nature of the two institutions in municipal procedural law is brushed aside by provisions which, like Article 70 of the New French Code of Civil Procedure and Article 6, paragraph 3, of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, require the existence of a "sufficient link" (Art. 70), defined more precisely in Article 6, paragraph 3, quoted above. This link may be regarded as analogous to what is required for the joinder of connected claims. The originality of Article 80 of the Rules of Court is that it does not � even tautologically � define connection, but qualifies it with an epithet ("directly connected"), of which there is no equivalent in the models of municipal procedural law discussed earlier.
The Court could learn from three municipal law solutions (which are confined to two similar systems in the foregoing discussion), namely that the connection is particularly close when the two claims are based on the same fact (see Article 563, paragraph 2, of the Belgian Judicial Code and G�rard Couchez, Proc�dure civile, 8th ed., 1994, No. 376) or that the counter-claim is only admissible if "arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based" (Brussels and Lugano Conventions, Art. 6, para. 3); that the assessment of the connection is a specific determination lying outside supervision by the Court of Cassation, an idea which, transposed to the particular function of the International Court of Justice, might also inspire decisions appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case; and that one element for consideration in such an assessment is the delay which the joinder of the two claims would mean for the determination of the principal claim (Belgian Judicial Code, Art. 810; New French Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 70, para. 2).
The reasoning at the basis of the Order, whose main operative provision 1 found myself unable to support, is directly inspired by the Order of 17 December 1997 in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Many of the recitals in the present Order reproduce verbatim the terms of the Order of 17 December 1997. The force of res judicata, which is beyond dispute, or even the relative force of a case already adjudicated between other parties, is not undermined by the observation that the doctrine of pre-[p 235]cedent includes the art of distinguishing between one case and another submitted to the same court in turn. What the present Order asserts in relation to "direct connection", namely "whereas it is for the Court, in its sole discretion, to assess . . . taking account of the particular aspects of each case" the existence of a sufficient link between the two claims, applies equally to the application of Article 80, paragraph 3, of the Rules: is there doubt about such a link? It would therefore have been appropriate for the Court to ascertain how far "the particular aspects" of the present case would have warranted a departure by it from the previous decision without in any way undermining the force of the decision as a precedent. In the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide the facts forming the subject-matter of the respective claims of the two Parties were of the same kind (accusation of the crime of genocide) and had occurred in the same territory during the same period: In the present case too, but to a lesser extent, there is unity of time and place but not unity of action: the deliberate destruction of oil platforms, immobilized in the middle of the Persian Gulf, is quite different from the laying of mines and attacks on ships sailing in other parts of the Gulf. Hence, there are serious reasons for doubting the apparent connection between these two series of facts. The Court could therefore have accommodated Iran's claim that the reply to this question should form the subject-matter of adversarial oral proceedings.
Although, as the Court decided, it was sufficiently well informed by the written observations exchanged between the Parties, it was not immediately seised either of the question whether the direct connection was established, or whether the very varied claims made in the Counter-Memorial of the United States all met this condition and the condition of its jurisdiction. Admittedly, the terms in which the Court affirmed its jurisdiction .in paragraph 36 in reality leave this question open, since only a detailed examination of each of the claims formulated by the United States is able to provide a reply to this question, as well as to the question of the sufficiency of the connection between each of these claims and the principal one. The summary examination undertaken by the Court during a purely procedural phase, when it had dispensed with an adversarial oral hearing of the Parties, does not make it possible to rule with certainty on whether all the counter-claims meet the substantive conditions in Article 80, paragraph 1, even though there is no doubt that they meet the forma1 condition in paragraph 2.
These are the reasons why I could not associate myself with al1 the other Members of the Court in regard to the first subparagraph of the operative part of the Order.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 Art. 6
 Art. 810
 Art. 70