Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1745906.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 17:08:25+00:00

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JAYNE SORRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
BEFORE: KEITH, CLAY, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Jayne Sorrell (“Sorrell”) appeals the district court's affirmance of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). The Commissioner denied Sorrell's applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Sorrell sought judicial review of the decision, asserting that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in concluding that Sorrell is not disabled. A magistrate judge, concluding that the ALJ did not err, recommended that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed. Over Sorrell's objections, the district judge adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation. Sorrell now appeals. Because there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision, we AFFIRM.
Sorrell was born in 1959. She has two years of online college education. Her past relevant work experience includes jobs as an assistant manager, retail cashier, circuit board assembler, data entry clerk, front desk clerk, cashier II, and an unspecified position in dining services. Sorrell has been diagnosed with various illnesses, including degenerative disc disease of the spine, edema (swelling) of the lower extremities secondary to a mass on the kidney, hypertension, and obesity.
Between 2009 and 2011, Sorrell made several trips to the Emergency Room and to outpatient clinics complaining of various ailments, such as hip pain, back pain, leg pain, and swelling in the legs.
On November 29, 2010, Sorrell applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Sorrell alleged that her disability, stemming from both physical and psychological conditions, began on May 1, 2010.
Sorrell testified that she stopped working on September 24, 2010 because she “couldn't stand.” She believed it was due to “disc problems” and “a pinched nerve.” She also testified that she has “been having severe bouts of swelling” in her legs. She stated that her doctors advised her to elevate her legs above heart level to alleviate the swelling. When asked how often she is supposed to elevate her legs, Sorrell testified that she is supposed to do it “anytime they swell.” She testified that she finds herself elevating them “often.” However, she stated that there are “periods of time where maybe a week might go by that [she does not] have swelling, but then it reoccurs.” She testified that edema medication “seems to be helping.” She testified that she does not have any problems with the use of her hands or arms.
Wilmer testified that he has been working in the vocational field for over twenty years. The ALJ gave the vocational expert multiple hypotheticals to consider.
First, he asked Wilmer to assume Sorrell's limitations were as follows: “lifting [up] to 20 pounds occasionally, 10 frequently, stand and sit six hours each in an eight hour work day, walking limited to two blocks at a time. ․ [O]ccasional stairs, stoop, balance, kneel, crouch, or crawl. No ladders. Just vocational exposure to hazards such as heights and moving parts.” Wilmer testified that with these limitations Sorrell could perform past work, specifically as a retail cashier, circuit board assembler, a data entry clerk, and a cashier II.
During the examination of Wilmer, the ALJ also noted that Sorrell had a period of no earnings in the 1990s, but that after that, up until 2010, she had a “good earnings history.” Sorrell explained that in the 1990s she was married and raising a son, and her then-husband made enough money for her to stay at home.
The ALJ gave “partial weight” to the opinion of Dr. Kevin Malloy, who opined that Sorrell was limited to “occasional lifting/carrying up to ten pounds and frequent lifting/carrying up to five pound[s].” Dr. Malloy also opined that Sorrell could only stand for two hours in an eight-hour workday. The ALJ noted that these conclusions from Dr. Malloy were supported. However, the ALJ rejected Dr. Malloy's opinion that Sorrell could only sit for twenty minutes at a time; the ALJ reasoned that this sitting limitation was not supported partly because Sorrell “was able to remain seated throughout the hearing, which lasted over forty minutes with no reported difficulties or visible distress.” The ALJ also did not adopt Dr. Malloy's opinion that Sorrell can only sit for three hours total in an eight-hour workday.
The ALJ concluded that Sorrell's residual functional capacity (“RFC”)3 was within the “sedentary” work range. The ALJ determined that Sorrell's RFC reflected that Sorrell has the following limitations: occasional lifting of ten pounds; frequent lifting of five pounds; standing for two hours in an eight-hour workday; sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday; walking only two blocks at a time; occasional stair climbing, stooping, and balancing; no kneeling, crouching, crawling, or ladder climbing; and only occasional exposure to hazards (i.e., heights and moving parts).
While [Sorrell's] medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, [Sorrell's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment for [three] reasons. First, the medical evidence in [the] record establishes that [Sorrell's] residual function[al] capacity is within the sedentary exertional range. Second, [Sorrell's] activities of daily living are inconsistent with [her] allegations. Finally, the opinion evidence in [the] record establishes that [Sorrell's] residual functional capacity is greater than that alleged.
The ALJ applied the five-step process 4 and reasoned that, in light of the RFC, the medical evidence in the record, and the vocational expert's testimony, Sorrell could perform work as a data entry clerk and a circuit board assembler under these restrictions. Accordingly, Sorrell was not disabled.
The Appeals Council denied Sorrell's request for review of the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2004). Sorrell subsequently filed a complaint in federal district court for review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sorrell only raised errors relating to her claim for physical disability rather than for any mental impairments. In the district court, a magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed. Sorrell timely filed objections. The district judge overruled Sorrell's objections and adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge. Sorrell timely appealed to this court.
This court has jurisdiction on appeal to review the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits. Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1993).
We review the district court's conclusions in social security cases de novo. Blakely v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009); Valley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 427 F.3d 388, 390 (6th Cir. 2005). The Commissioner is tasked with determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Blakely, 581 F.3d at 405 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)). “Our review of the ALJ's decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 405−06 (citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). “The substantial-evidence standard is met if a ‘reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Id. at 406 (quoting Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)). This standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Id. (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’ ” Id. (quoting Callahan, 109 F.3d at 273). However, “[e]ven if supported by substantial evidence,” the “decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fail[ed] to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.” Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007).
In order to be entitled to disability insurance benefits, “an individual must be under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Rabbers v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009).5 Under the Social Security Act, “disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “To be found disabled,” a claimant's impairments “must not only prevent” the claimant from doing her previous work, but they “must also render [the claimant] unable to engage in any other kind of work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
Step 2: If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment—i.e., an impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities—the claimant is not disabled.
See id.; Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997); Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
This process includes a burden-shifting analysis. See Jones, 336 F.3d at 474. In steps one through four, “the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work.” Id. However, in step five, the “burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant's residual functional capacity ․ and vocational profile.” Id.
Step Four, the one examined here, “necessarily entails a comparison of the physical demands of the claimant's past relevant work with [her] present mental and physical capacity.” Walters, 127 F.3d at 529 (quoting Veal v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1987)). The Commissioner's denial of Sorrell's claim at Step Four was “proper if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that” Sorrell “could perform [her] past relevant work.” See id.
On appeal Sorrell asserts that: (1) the ALJ failed to consider the need for Sorrell to periodically elevate her legs; (2) the ALJ failed to follow SSA requirements; and (3) the ALJ erred in assessing Sorrell's credibility. For the following reasons, none of Sorrell's claims requires reversal.
Sorrell argues that the ALJ failed to consider the need for her to elevate her legs. Appellant Br. at 26. But this argument is belied by the record. The ALJ specifically noted in his findings of facts that Sorrell has swelling in her feet at times, but the swelling decreased with the elevation of her feet. And as Sorrell herself admits, the ALJ listed her swelling as a severe impairment. It is clear from the record that the ALJ considered her swelling and the need for her to elevate her legs. See Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 F. App'x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the ALJ considered obesity where he made explicit mention of obesity in his findings of facts).
Sorrell alleges four bases to support her argument that the ALJ failed to follow the SSA regulatory requirements: (a) the ALJ erred in “fail[ing] to indicate which part of [Dr. Malloy's] opinion was given weight;” (b) the ALJ applied the “sit and squirm” test 8 in rejecting Dr. Malloy's sitting limitation; (c) the ALJ erred in not considering the opinion from Marc Wise, MD, and Jodi Lawson, RN; and (d) the ALJ acted as his own medical expert. Appellant Br. at 30−31; 33−35.9 We address each argument in turn.
Sorrell argues that the ALJ violated SSA requirements because he failed to indicate which part of Dr. Malloy's opinion was given weight. Sorrell asserts that “most significantly” the ALJ failed to address or assign weight to Dr. Malloy's overall sitting limitation of three hours in an eight-hour workday. Appellant Br. at 31. Sorrell argues that the “ALJ's decision requires a higher and more specific level of analysis than what was provided” here. See Appellant Reply Br. at 8; Appellant Br. at 31.
Sorrell also argues that the ALJ applied the improper “sit and squirm” test in rejecting Dr. Malloy's twenty-minute sitting limitation. Appellant Br. at 31. This argument was presented to the district court. In support of this argument, Sorrell asserts that it was improper for the ALJ to conclude that Dr. Malloy's twenty-minute sitting limitation should not be afforded weight because Sorrell could sit through a forty-minute hearing without apparent distress. See Appellant Br. at 31.
Sorrell argues that the ALJ erred in not considering the opinion from Marc Wise, MD and Jodi Lawson, RN. Appellant Br. at 33. The “opinion” from Dr. Wise and Nurse Lawson is a discharge summary generated after Dr. Wise and Nurse Lawson examined Sorrell in the ER for swelling in her legs. “The SSA promises claimants that all ALJs ‘will evaluate every medical opinion [they] receive.’ ” Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 875 (6th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)). The Government asserts that the discharge summary is not a medical opinion. See Appellee Br. at 26.
We need not decide whether the discharge summary was a “medical opinion” because Sorrell failed to present this argument to the district court. Indeed, neither Dr. Wise nor RN Lawson was even mentioned in Sorrell's Statement of Errors to the district court. Sorrell cannot seek review of some claims of error with the district court and then—after losing on those claims—seek review of wholly new claims of error on appeal. See Young, 925 F.2d at 149. Accordingly, Sorrell's argument on this point is foreclosed.
Sorrell argues that the ALJ acted as his own medical expert for two reasons: (i) the RFC is not supported by any treating or examining medical source, Appellant Br. at 35; and (ii) the non-examining state agency reviewing opinions were based on a substantially incomplete record. Id. As a preliminary matter, the second issue was raised for the first time in this appeal. Accordingly, it is foreclosed. See Ealy, 594 F.3d at 513. We turn now to addressing the first issue.
To begin, the ALJ considered the opinion of a state agency reviewer whose assessment affirmed the opinion of another state agency reviewer. The most recent agency reviewer, Dr. Gardner, opined that Sorrell's RFC is in a “light” exertional range and that she could occasionally lift or carry twenty pounds, frequently lift or carry ten pounds, and stand, walk, and sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. Instead of giving significant weight to the state agency reviewers, the ALJ concluded that the other evidence in the record supported an RFC that was even more favorable to Sorrell: that she could only perform a range of “sedentary” work. An individual who can perform light work without additional limiting factors can also perform sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
A “sedentary” range is generally associated with sitting for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. See SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *3 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (noting that in a sedentary range “[s]itting would generally total about 6 hours of an 8-hour workday”); see also Mager v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 145 F.3d 1332, at *2 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998) (table). Because two reviewing doctors opined that Sorrell could perform light work jobs and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday, the ALJ's conclusion that Sorrell could perform a range of sedentary work is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Cf. Downs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 634 F. App'x 551, 554 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that the ALJ's RFC assessment that the claimant could do light work was supported by substantial evidence where the ALJ gave “significant weight” to the opinion of a state agency reviewer whose assessment was affirmed by the opinion of another state agency reviewer).
The RFC is not only supported by the state agency reviewers' opinions, however; it is also largely supported by Dr. Malloy's opinion, the opinion Sorrell claims the ALJ failed to properly evaluate. The ALJ adopted Dr. Malloy's lifting, carrying, and standing limitations for the RFC. Finally, the ALJ's RFC finding that Sorrell is “limited to only walking two blocks at a time” is supported by Sorrell's own testimony. For the foregoing reasons, Sorrell's argument lacks merit.
“[W]e are to accord the ALJ's determinations of credibility great weight and deference particularly since the ALJ has the opportunity, which we do not, of observing a witness's demeanor while testifying.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 476. Accordingly, “we are limited to evaluating whether or not the ALJ's explanations for partially discrediting” a claimant “are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. However, we have declined to give substantial deference to an ALJ's “unexplained credibility finding” where the claimant's testimony was “entirely consistent” with the medical evidence in the record, such that there was literally no medical evidence in the record that conflicted with the claimant's testimony regarding her pain. See King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974−75, 975 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984).
Further, “[t]here is no question that subjective complaints of a claimant can support a claim for disability, if there is also objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition in the record.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 475. “Nevertheless, an ALJ is not required to accept the claimant's subjective complaints and may properly consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability.” Id. at 476.
The ALJ noted multiple inconsistencies in Sorrell's testimony. For example, the ALJ noted that Sorrell's testimony about the use of an assistive device such as a walker to get around was inconsistent with the record that contained no prescription for such a device and minimal reports of the use of an assistive device. He also noted that despite Sorrell's claims of extreme pain, the “most recent physical examination” showed that her “musculoskeletal examination was normal with no joint swelling, no warmth or redness, and no restriction of range of motion.” Additionally, there was “no back tenderness,” and Sorrell “had a full range of motion of the extremities.” The ALJ contrasted Sorrell's ability to do daily activities with her reports of pain—noting that Sorrell is “able to prepare simple meals, perform various household duties with breaks, handle personal care, drive, and shop.” Sorrell was even able to volunteer at a coffee shop until it closed in August 2011, during the period she claims she was disabled. The ALJ concluded that this level of functioning is inconsistent with Sorrell's claim that she cannot perform a range of sedentary work. This conclusion was reasonable and supported. See Downs, 634 F. App'x at 556-57 (holding that similar inconsistent statements reasonably supported the ALJ's conclusion that the claimant's allegations of the extent of her physical impairments were not credible); see also Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 543−44 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the ALJ's adverse credibility finding was supported, among other things, by the claimant's ability to “do a variety of daily activities,” such as washing “dishes, light cooking, talk[ing] on the telephone, shop[ping]” and occasionally going to church).
Sorrell also argues that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard when he stated that Sorrell's statements concerning her alleged symptoms and their limiting effects “are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [ ] residual function[al] capacity.” As Sorrell notes, this language was referred to as problematic “template” or “boilerplate” language by the Seventh Circuit. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645−46 (7th Cir. 2012). But Sorrell's reliance on this case is misplaced, because the Seventh Circuit did not suggest that this language can never be used. See Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (clarifying that the ALJ's use of the template language is not reversible error when it is accompanied by an adequate explanation of the ALJ's credibility finding). This court has also addressed the template, explaining that the “chief concern with the popularity of this template, however, is the risk that an ALJ will mistakenly believe it sufficient to explain a credibility finding, as opposed to merely introducing or summarizing one.” Cox v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App'x 254, 260 (6th Cir. 2015). Thus, usage of the template to introduce the ALJ's credibility finding is not by itself erroneous. Here, the ALJ provided an adequate explanation of the adverse credibility finding, pointing to, among other things, Sorrell's inconsistent statements, and her failure to provide medical evidence supporting her claims regarding the intensity and pervasiveness of her pain.
Lastly, Sorrell argues that she is entitled to “substantial credibility” because of her “exemplary work” history. Appellant Br. at 47−48. The ALJ noted that since a period of unemployment in the 1990s, Sorrell has had a “good” earnings history. In support of her proposition that she is therefore entitled to “substantial credibility,” Sorrell relies on Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994). But nothing in Felisky supports that proposition. See id. (noting only that Felisky's “long ․ work history” coupled with the fact that her alleged disability “can be traced to a specific onset date” was an “additional factor” supporting her credibility).
2. While the ALJ considered other medical opinions, none of them is relevant for purposes of this appeal.
3. A residual functional capacity reflects “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [the claimant's] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
4. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) “has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled.” Rabbers v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009).
5. “The individual also must be insured for disability insurance benefits, have not attained retirement age, and have filed an application for benefits.” Id. at n.5 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)). The Commissioner does not contend that Sorrell failed to satisfy any of these requirements.
6. Sorrell's argument that some of the doctors implicitly opined that she has to elevate her legs during the workday is unavailing. She asserts that the doctors necessarily opined that she must lie down or recline during the workday because they limited her ability to sit and stand to a few hours. Appellant Br. at 26. We cannot interpret the medical records to say what they do not say. See McAlister v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, No. 15-5801, 2016 WL 2343030, at *8 (6th Cir. May 4, 2016) (“[W]e are not medical specialists and that judgment is not ours to make.” (quoting Elliott v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 473 F.3d 613, 622− >23 (6th Cir. 2006))).
7. Sorrell's reliance on the vocational expert's statement in support of a leg-elevation limitation is misplaced. See Appellant Br. at 29. The expert testified that if Sorrell needed to be in a reclined position from elevating her feet to waist level, she would not be able to do any of her past jobs “in such a position.” The expert was responding to a hypothetical question posed on cross-examination. However, in order for the hypothetical response to shed any meaningful light on Sorrell's disability claim, a critical link was needed—medical evidence that Sorrell needs to be in a reclined position during the workday. Cf. Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 516 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In order for a vocational expert's testimony in response to a hypothetical question to serve as substantial evidence ․ the question must accurately portray a claimant's physical and mental impairments.”). Sorrell failed to supply that missing link, and it was her burden to do so. See Jones, 336 F.3d at 474.
8. The “sit and squirm” test refers to when an ALJ denies a claimant's claim for disability based solely on the claimant's demeanor at a hearing. Martin v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 735 F.2d 1008, 1010 (6th Cir. 1984).
9. Although Sorrell argued in the district court that the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling weight to the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Tewell, she has abandoned that argument on appeal by not raising it. See Enertech Elec., Inc. v. Mahoning Cty. Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 257, 259 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that issues which were raised in the district court, yet not raised on appeal, are considered abandoned and not reviewable on appeal).
11. Because the ALJ did not apply the “sit and squirm” test, it is of no moment that the ALJ observed Sorrell's demeanor through video conferencing rather than in person.
12. Sorrell's reliance on the Seventh Circuit case of Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) for the proposition that heavy reliance on daily activities in making disability determinations is “deplorable” is unavailing. Bjornson merely criticized the failure of an ALJ to recognize differences between daily activity and activities in a full-time job. Id. While the applicable regulations state that “[g]enerally, we do not consider activities like taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies,” etc. to be “substantial gainful activity,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(c), the regulations do not prohibit the ALJ from assessing such activities in determining the claimant's credibility regarding pain and other limitations.

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