Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/1994/1332crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:56:42+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented at the trial level by Joseph A. Adamo, labor relations consultant, 588 Washington Avenue, West Haven, CT 06516 and on appeal by Christopher Carveth, Esq. and Kristin Dorney Foley, Esq., Stevens, Carroll and Carveth, 31 Cherry Street, P.O. Box 432, Milford, CT 06460.
The respondent-employer was represented by Booth M. Kelly, Jr., Esq., Murphy and Beane, P.O. Box 590, New London, CT 06320.
These Petitions for Review from and relating to the October 29, 1991 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Seventh District were heard October 30, 1992 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse Frankl and Commissioners Angelo L. dos Santos and Donald H. Doyle, Jr.
JESSE FRANKL, CHAIRMAN. The claimant in the instant matter is the dependent spouse of a former uniformed member of the respondent’s municipal police force. On June 29, 1977 the decedent was found to be suffering from heart disease. Under the provisions of Sec. 7-433c, the decedent was entitled to a twenty per cent (20%) permanent partial disability to his heart. He was also awarded 25 weeks of compensation due to permanent and significant scarring resulting from surgery relating to his cardiac disease. The decedent’s weekly compensation rate at the time of his injury/disease was $135.00. Due to the provisions of the decedent’s collective bargaining agreement he did not sustain any wage loss and thus, never received temporary total or temporary partial benefits.
On February 4, 1991 the decedent died due to cardiac arrest. At the time of his death, the decedent was survived by his dependent spouse and son. On April 12, 1991 the Commissioner for the Seventh District approved a Finding and Award stipulated to by the claimant and the respondent in which the claimant was awarded; $4,000 for funeral expenses; dependent spouse benefits until remarriage or death, and “benefits for a dependent child until he reaches age 18 or as otherwise provided under Sec. 31-306.” See October 29, 1991 Finding paragraph 1D.
On September 11, 1991 the respondent employer moved to modify the April 12, 1991 Finding and Award and raised the following issues; (1) whether the claimant was entitled to cost of living adjustments from June 29, 1977, the date of the decedent’s injury/disease, or from February 4, 1991 the date of decedent’s death, (2) if the claimant was entitled to cost of living adjustments who was responsible for payment of the cost of living adjustments, i.e., the respondent employer or the Second Injury Fund, (3) whether the respondent employer was entitled to repayment of the $4000 burial allowance as the statutory allowance for burial expense in effect at the time of the decedent’s injury/diagnosis only permitted $1000 for burial expenses and was only to be paid in the event that the death occurred within 6 years of the date of injury/disease1, (3) whether the provisions of Sec. 31-306(i) which provided for a waiting period for compensation benefits and which was in effect at the date of the decedent’s injury or disease was applicable.
The trial commissioner concluded; (1) the claimant was entitled to cost of living adjustments from October 1, 1991, (2) cost of living adjustments were to be paid by the employer and reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund; (3) the claimant was to reimburse the employer for the payment of the $4000 funeral expense and (4) the waiting period provided in Sec. 31-306(i)2 was applicable and thus, the claimant was not entitled to compensation until the expiration of 220 weeks3.
Subsequent to the commissioner’s ruling in the instant matter a number of motions were filed by the parties. The motions filed, inter alia, sought dismissal on various procedural grounds as well as modification and submission of additional evidence. For the moment we will put aside ruling on these various motions with the exception of the claimant’s Motion for Modification. Our consideration of the claimant’s Motion for Modification at this point is based on its impact as to our conclusions in the substantive issues raised by the appellants. The claimant’s Motion for Modification and Continuance of Formal Hearing was filed September 21, 1992 and denied by the commissioner, September 30, 1992. An appeal was taken by the claimant on the commissioner’s denial of her Motion for Modification for Continuance of Formal Hearing and because we consider the legal argument raised by the Motion for Modification pertinent in our consideration of the earlier filed appeals, we refer to that motion initially in our consideration of the instant matter.
We begin by reviewing whether the commissioner erred in concluding that the claimant was not entitled to cost of living adjustments from June 29, 1977, the date of decedent’s injury/disease and only entitled to cost of living adjustments from February 4, 1991 the date of decedent’s death. We conclude that the claimant was entitled to cost of living adjustments from the date of the decedent’s injury/disease June 29, 1977.
In construing Sec. 7-433c, our task is to discern the apparent intent of the legislature, first by an analysis of the relevant statutory language at issue and thereafter, in the event of any latent ambiguity by an examination of the statute’s legislative history and the purpose it was designed to serve. (citations omitted.) On its face, the language “compensation . . . in the same amount and the same manner” suggests that once Sec. 7-433c coverage is established, the measurement of the plaintiff’s benefits under this statute is identical to the benefits that may be awarded to a plaintiff under chapter 568. We have regularly so held; Collins v. West Haven, 210, Conn. 423, 429-30 (1989); Lambert v. Bridgeport, 204 Conn. 563, 566 (1987); Maciejewski v. West Hartford, 194 Conn. 139, 146 (1984); Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 68-69 (1984); as has the Appellate Court. Lundgren v. Stratford, 12 Conn. App. 138, 144 (1987); Middletown v. Local 1703, 1 Conn. App. 58, 61 (1983), cert. dismissed, 192 Conn. 803 (1984).
Compensation shall be paid on account of death resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment or from an occupational disease as follows . . .
The plain language of Sec. 31-306(b)(2)(B) indicates that a claimant dependent whose claim arises under Chapter 568 and whose entitlement to benefits results from a decedent’s death due to a compensable injury occurring on or before September 30, 1977, is entitled to cost of living adjustments which are to be paid by the Second Injury Fund. However, the Second Injury Fund argues on appeal that Sec. 7-433c is special or bonus legislation and is separate and distinct from Chapter 568. Further, under Sec. 7-433c the need to prove that certain injuries arose out of and in the course of employment is obviated by the claimant’s proof that he/she satisfies the prerequisites to entitlement set out in Sec. 7-433c. The Fund then argues, as Sec. 7-433c does not require proof that the injury for which compensation is claimed “arose out of and in the course of employment” the claim is removed from the realm of Chapter 568 and thus, the prerequisite to entitlement under Sec. 31-306(b)(2) is not satisfied. Therefore, the Fund argues, it is not liable for the payment of cost of living adjustments.
However, if we were to adopt the argument and reasoning of the Second Injury Fund, we would have to ignore Sec. 7-433c’s provision that a claimant under Sec. 7-433c “shall receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and same manner as that provided under Chapter 568 . . . .” and our court holdings as to the purpose and intent of Sec. 7-433c. See Felia, supra.
We therefore, sustain the trial commissioner’s ruling that the claimant was entitled to cost of living adjustments and the Second Injury Fund was liable for the reimbursement to the employer for the cost of living adjustments. However, as noted previously, we reverse the trier as to the period from when the cost of living adjustments should be calculated.
The dependents of any deceased employee who was injured on or after January 1, 1974, and who died not later than December 31, 1981, shall be paid compensation on account of such death retroactively to the date of the employee’s death. The cost of such payment or adjustment shall be paid by the employer or his insurance carrier who shall be reimbursed therefor from the second injury fund as provided in section 31-354, as amended by section 2 of this act, upon presentation of such vouchers and information as the treasurer shall require.
(a)(1) Four thousand dollars shall be paid for burial expenses in any case where the employee died on or after October 1, 1988 . . . . (b) The dependents of any deceased employee who was injured on or after January 1, 1974 and who died not later than November 11, 1991, shall be paid compensation on account of the death retroactively to the date of the employee’s death. The cost of the payment or adjustment shall be paid by the employer or his insurance carrier who shall be reimbursed therefor from the second injury fund as provided in section 31-354 . . . .
In claimant’s Motion for Modification and Continuance of Formal Hearing the remedy provided to the claimant under Public Act 92-31 was brought to the trier’s attention and the claimant contended the reason it was not raised in the hearing before the commissioner was the act was passed by the legislature after the commissioner rendered his decision. We think the remedy provided by Public Act 92-31 is applicable as a matter of law to the claimant. Specifically, we note that Public Act 92-31 became effective while the instant matter was pending appeal. Further, the plain language contained within the public act indicates that the remedy provided is to be applied retrospectively. Although we are keenly aware as to the statutory presumption that legislation affecting substantive rights is to be applied prospectively, see e.g. Sec. 55-3, it is clear on the basis of the commissioner’s findings that the claimant falls within the class of persons to whom the pertinent parts of Public Act 92-31 are intended to apply.
Finally, we consider the various motions and appeals alleging certain procedural defects in the parties’ prosecution of the instant matter. At oral argument we ruled from the bench that we were dismissing the respondent employer’s Motions to Dismiss. For the record, the respondent employer has filed; a Motion to Vacate Claimant’s Extension of Time in Which to File Motion to Correct and Dismiss Claimant’s Appeal, a Petition for Review from trier’s denial, a Petition for Review from the Chairman’s granting the claimant an extension of time to file her reasons of appeal, various Motions to Dismiss, and a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence.
As to the procedural defect alleged by the respondent employer that the trier should not have granted the claimant’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Correct, at most, the trier’s granting of that Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Correct was harmless error. Even though the Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Correct was filed after the two week period from the October 29, 1991 Finding and Award, the failure to timely file a Motion to Correct is controlled by Administrative Regulation Sec. 31-301-45. Thus, as the time requirements set out in Administrative Regulation Sec. 31-301-4 are not statutory, a failure to comply with the time requirement may not be fatal to the consideration of the appeal as a matter of law. See Sager v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 11 Conn. App. 693, 697-98 note 5 (1987). See also, Kinney v. State, 6 Conn. App. 143 (1989), Andrews v. Sal’s Express, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 110, 228 CRD-4-83 (1984). Furthermore, as the commissioner denied the claimant’s Motion to Correct filed December 10, 1991 in its entirety in his ruling of December 11, 1991, we fail to see how the trier’s granting of the claimant's Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Correct even if beyond the time prescribed in Administrative Regulation Sec. 31-301-4 harmed the respondent employer. Thus, assuming arguendo that the commissioner did err in granting the claimant’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Correct, (and we in no way concede that it was error) the commissioner’s November 21, 1991 denial of the respondent employer’s Motion to Vacate Claimant’s Extension of Time in Which to File Motion to Correct and to Dismiss Claimant’s Appeal was, at most, harmless error.
We also find the respondent employer’s contention raised by its petition for review filed from the former chairman of the Compensation Review Division’s November 19, 1991 ruling granting the claimant’s Motion for Extension of Time to file Reasons of Appeal is without merit. The respondent employer contends that Administrative Regulation Sec. 31-301-26 does not permit the extensions of time for the filing of Reasons of Appeal. We find the respondent employer’s argument totally unavailing. In Sager v. GAB Business Services, 11 Conn. App. 679 (1987), the appellate court concluded that the reasons of appeal required by Sec. 31-301-2 were tantamount to the preliminary statement of issues provided in Practice Book Sec. 4013(a) regarding the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Sager court noted that Sec. 31-301 of our Workers’ Compensation Act provides in pertinent part “The procedure in appealing from an award of the commissioner shall be the same as the procedure employed in an appeal from the superior court to the Supreme Court, where applicable, the chairman of the workers’ compensation commission shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to establish rules, methods of procedure and forms as the chairman deems expedient for the purposes of this chapter.” Thus, as Practice Book Sec. 4009 provides in pertinent part: “The time for taking any of the steps necessary to prosecute or defend the appeal . . . may be extended in accordance with Sec. 4040,” it is only logical that this appellate tribunal is similarly vested with such power to extend time for reasons of appeal. Furthermore, in light of our ultimate conclusion as to the substantive issues raised on appeal, our dismissal of the respondent employer’s Petition for Review filed November 29, 1991 in no way prejudices the rights of the respondent employer in this action.
Likewise, we deny the respondent employer’s Motion to Dismiss sent by facsimile on August 5, 1992 which sought to dismiss the Second Injury Fund’s appeal due to the late filing of the Second Injury Fund’s brief as our subsequent granting of the respondent employer’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a Brief cured any prejudice arguably caused by the Fund’s delay. See e.g., Richardson v. H.B. Sanson, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 107, 590 CRD-1-87 (1989).
Finally, having reached the substantive conclusions that we have, we deny the respondent employer’s Motion to Submit Additional Evidence filed August 6, 1992 which sought to proffer proof that the respondent employer had paid its assessments under Sec. 31-354. The criteria for the submission of additional evidence is a matter controlled by Administrative Regulation Sec. 31-301-97. Before additional evidence will be considered it must be material. In Chapo v. Westport, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 17. 170 CRD-4-82 (1985) this tribunal noted, “The first requirement that must be met for additional evidence to be presented before the Compensation Review Division [Board] is that it be material. The test of materiality is whether or not it is necessary to the determination of the issue before us. BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY 1128 Rev. Ed. 1968.) We do not think that the evidence which the respondent employer seeks to add, i.e. proof of payments of Second Injury Fund assessments under Sec. 31-354, is necessary to the determination before us given the conclusion we have reached on the merits.
In summary, we conclude that the claimant in the instant matter is entitled to cost of living adjustment to be calculated from October 1st following the decedent’s injury and such cost of living adjustments are to be paid by the respondent employer and reimbursed by the Second Injury Fund. Additionally, we conclude that based on the amendments to Sec. 31-306 as provided in Public Act 92-31, the waiting period provided in Sec. 31-306(i) as it existed at the time of decedent’s injury is inapplicable and the claimant is entitled to the four thousand dollar burial expense provided in Sec. 31-306(a)(1) as amended by Public Act 92-31.
We therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part.

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