Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2011/07
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:50:56+00:00

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I’ve previously discussed the deductibility of Part 7 Benefits in Tort Claims. These benefits are also deductible in ICBC UMP (Underinsured Motorist Protection) Claims. This was demonstrated in CD v. ICBC which I summarize below in my effort to create a searchable UMP judgement database.
In CD v. ICBC the Claimant was injured in a 2003 Collision in California. The at fault motorist only had $25,000 in Third Party Liability coverage. The Claimant was insured with ICBC applied to ICBC pursuant to UMP. The value of the Claimant’s claim was decided via arbitration. Arbitrator Yule quantified the claim at $27,500 less the $25,000 USD payment that was made by the at fault party’s insurer. When converted to Canadian funds the payment exceeded the value of the claim leaving ICBC with no responsibility to pay under UMP.
[ICBC] takes the position that nothing is recoverable for physiotherapy or massage therapy because these expenses are payable as no-fault benefits under Part 7 and, as such, are a “deductible amount” from UMP compensation. There is no evidence that ICBC refused to pay these expenses under Part 7…I agree that the physiotherapy and massage therapy expenses are not recoverable in these circumstances as part of UMP compensation. The vehicle repair deductible is not compensible because it is a claim relating to property damage, and UMP compensation is restricted to damages for injury or death.
Adding to this site’s ICBC claims pain and suffering database, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a moderate soft tissue injury.
 Mr. Olianka suffered what Dr. Neumann describes as a moderate soft tissue injury to the neck, a moderate soft tissue injury to the mid-back and a mild soft tissue injury to his lower back. I accept Mr. Olianka’s evidence with respect to his collision-related injuries and that these injuries precluded him from working for a four-month period. I also accept that Mr. Olianka continues to experience intermittent pain in his neck and upper back which is expected to last for some unknown period. Dr. Neumann opined that by January 14, 2011, Mr. Olianka had made a significant recovery from his injuries and concluded that his residual pain should gradually subside in intensity and frequency. He did not expect Mr. Olianka to suffer any permanent consequences from his collision-related injuries.
 Based on the authorities and the unique evidence found in this case, I find that the appropriate award for Mr. Olianka’s non-pecuniary damages is $30,000, taking into account all contingencies, given the extent of the soft tissue injuries to his neck and back, the disability period of 27 months post-collision, as well as the lingering and ongoing aspect of his injuries, the limitations that the injuries imposed, not just on his ability to work, but also on his ability to partake in those physical activities which occupied his life prior to the collision and which he has only recently been able to resume albeit to a limited extent.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing the jurisdiction of the BC Supreme Court to hear a claim involving alleged sexual abuse which took place out of Province.
 The real and substantial connection test requires that there be a significant or substantial connection: Beals v. Saldanha,  3 S.C.R. 416; and UniNet Technologies Inc. v. Communication Services Inc., 2005 BCCA 114.
 This case lacks the additional element, beyond the mere residence of the plaintiff in this jurisdiction, to support a finding that there is a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts on which a proceeding is based. The action concerns allegations of sexual assault in Quebec in relation to a defendant who continues to reside in Quebec. There is not a “significant connection” as required by the Supreme Court of Canada in Beals v. Saldanha,  3 S.C.R. 416.
 That the plaintiff suffers damages here is, as was the case in Roed, purely as a result of her residence in British Columbia. As stated by Dickson J. in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd.,  1 S.C.R. 393, and referred to in Dembroski, if the essence of a tort is injury, “a paramount factor in determining situs must be the place of the invasion of one’s right to bodily security.” That location in this case is Quebec. The motor vehicle scenarios in Roed and Dembroski are analogous for the purposes of determining territorial competence, as they concern tortious conduct in another jurisdiction. The presence of the plaintiff in British Columbia alone does not establish a real and substantial connection in relation to events that occurred in another jurisdiction where the defendant continues to reside.
 Accordingly, I dismiss the plaintiff’s application.
This is the second in my series of UMP Case Summaries. In today’s case (LD v. ICBC) the arbitrator had to address whether legal fees can be taken into account when considering the deductibility of past tort payments.
In LD the Claimant was involved in as 2003 collision in California. The Claimant was insured with ICBC and had UMP coverage. The at fault motorist only had $25,000 in Third Party Liability coverage and ICBC agreed that the Claimant’s claim exceeded this amount.
The parties agreed to have the value of the claim determined via UMP Arbitration. Total damages of $86,608.31 were assessed. Prior to this the Claimant already settled with the Defendant’s insurer for the policy limits of $25,000. She had to hire counsel to achieve this result and after legal fees she received $16,054.
ICBC, however, submits that the correct deductible amount is what the M’s liability insurer was obliged to pay, namely $25,000. (This position) is supported by the decision of Arbitrator Paul Fraser, Q.C. in Cederberg v. ICBC (May 18, 1995)….As Mr. Fraser concluded, the obligation to pay attorney’s fees arose out of a separate and independent contract with the attorney which, in no way, reduce the amount paid by the tortfeasor or payable by the tortfeasor’s insurer. I agree with his analysis. The full amount of the settlemetn of the M’s liability insurer is therefore a deductible amount.
…I assess Mrs. D’s non-pecuniary damages at $55,000.
I should note that, adjusting for inflation, this assessment is closer to $58,000 in today’s dollars.
Section 6(4) of the BC Limitation Act states in part that a limitation period “does not begin to run against a plaintiff…..until the identity of the defendant…is known to the plaintiff“. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering this provision in the context of an ICBC Claim.
In this week’s case (Telus Corporation v. Araneda) equipment owned by Telus was struck by a motor vehicle causing $43,000 in damage. They sued the party they alleged was responsible but did so nine days after the limitation period expired.
 …. On the day of the accident, Telus, through its employee Dale Summers, knew it had a claim for property damage and knew the name of the tortfeasor was immediately ascertainable from a reliable source, the RCMP.
 In saying so, I reject Telus’ argument that a large enterprise should be judged on its “ individual circumstances” and that its step-wise approach to the management of its legal claims is akin to the situation in Strata Plan LMS 2940 v. Quick as a Wink Courier, 2010 BCCA 74. There the Court of Appeal upheld a judge of this Court who had found that an action brought by a strata corporation against an individual one day outside the limitation period was not statute-barred because the strata corporation was obliged to pass a resolution before it could initiate the action, and doing so took some time.
 Telus was not impeded by a statutory prerequisite, and there is no reason in principle why a large organization should be judged by a more accommodating standard than would apply to any competent individual. As in Meeker, Telus knew on the first day of the accident that it had suffered actionable harm and that the name of the person involved was ascertainable.
 It is regrettable that the limitation period went by in this case. As some of the case law demonstrates Courts frequently go some distance to ensure that cases are tried on their merits. The policy inherent in limitation periods, however, must also be respected. Applying the relevant legal principles to the present case, Telus has not established that it is entitled to postponement, and the action must be dismissed.
As previously discussed, when catastrophic injuries are sustained through the fault of an under-insured motorist most British Columbians enjoy Underinsured Motorist Protection “UMP”.
Sections 148.1 – 148.4 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation deal with UMP Claims. When disputes arise as to the availability or the amount of UMP coverage the matter needs to be resolved through private arbitration as opposed to a public lawsuit. The law requires all UMP decisions from 2007 onward to be published on ICBC’s website. These cases, unfortunately, are published in PDF Format and they are not search friendly. To remedy this I’ve decided to include UMP case summaries on this blog. With that in mind here is the first in a series of UMP cases summaries.
The first UMP judgement published was RAH v. ICBC. In RAH the Claimant was injured in a 2002 motor vehicle collision. Fault was admitted. It was agreed that the value of the claim would exceed the Defendant’s insurance limits and the parties agreed to have the value of the claim adjudicated by way of UMP Arbitration.
…I assess the non-pecuniary damages at $95,000.
I should point out that this case was decided in 2008 and adjusting for inflation the assessment would be approximately $100,000.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the issue of fault following a two vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Rackstraw v. Robertson) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision with a tractor trailer. The tractor trailer was travelling Northbound on Mount Lehman Road. The Plaintiff was travelling eastbound on Sunset Crescent which forms a T-intersection with Mount Lehman Road.
The Defendant “decided to pass a northbound vehicle ahead of him”. To do so he accelerated above the speed limit and had to travel in the southbound lane. As he did so he saw the Plaintiff approach the intersection and run the stop sign which was facing him on Sunset Crescent. The vehicles collided and the Plaintiff died shortly after.
 …it is my opinion that the accident in the case at bar was caused solely by the failure of Mr. Rackstraw to stop at the stop sign, to keep a proper lookout and to yield to the Robertson vehicle when he entered the roadway on Mount Lehman Road. When Robertson started his pass, there was no reason for him to believe that he could not do so safely or that he would interfere with the travel of another vehicle. As in Ferguson, he was engaged in a lawful manoeuvre. He did not see, and could not reasonably have seen, the Rackstraw vehicle until he was just about at the intersection and he had no reasonable opportunity to avoid the collision.
As previously discussed, ICBC can typically arrange an ‘independent’ medical exam (IME) in one of two ways. The first is when an insured applies for first party no-fault benefits. Section 99 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation gives ICBC the power to compel an IME in these circumstances. The second is under Rule 7-6(1) of the BC Supreme Court rules which allows the court to order an independent exam to “level the playing field” in an injury lawsuit.
Two sets of reasons for judgement were recently brought to my attention from the BC Supreme Court, Campbell River Registry, discussing when a previous Part 7 Exam will prevent ICBC from obtaining a new expert under the Rules of Court.
 Dr. Dommisse went through the examination and gave his opinion. His opinion is not qualified in any way. He does not suggest that there is more information he needs. He makes no recommendaiton for treatment. There is nothing to suggest that, if he had more information or that he wished more information before he could make the determinations he did.
 In those circumstances the defendant’s application is dismissed.
In the second case (Lamontage v. Adams) a similar result was reached with a Court finding that a subsequent exam should be with the Part 7 physician as that examiner covered ground relevant in the tort claim.
The above cases are unreported but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy of the reasons to anyone who contacts me and requests these.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages following a 2005 motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (X v. Y) the Plaintiff was an RCMP officer. (Supplemental reasons were released permitting the Plaintiff to identify himself by initials and to seal the Court file given the Plaintiff’s undercover work). He was responding to an emergency call. He was travelling on his motorcycle when he was struck by a truck driven by the Defendant who was in the course of making a U-turn. Although fault was put at issue the Court found the defendant fully liable for the collision.
 In summary on this issue, I find that the plaintiff’s symptoms are genuine. He regularly experiences varying degrees of pain and significant stiffness, tightness, and spasms in his back. The cold exacerbates his symptoms. He will continue to experience episodic aggravation of his symptoms. He is at an increased risk of developing degenerative arthritis and he has an increased susceptibility for further injury to his back. He also faces the possibility of another surgery to remove the hardware in his back. He has reduced stamina and tires much more easily than prior to the collision. I also conclude that as the plaintiff ages, there is a substantial likelihood that his pain and discomfort will increase because he will not be able to maintain the same level of conditioning in the muscles supporting the fused area of his back.
 While the authorities are instructive, I do not propose to review them in detail, as each case turns on its own unique facts. Having reviewed all of the authorities provided by both counsel, and in considering the plaintiff’s particular circumstances, I conclude a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary damages is $140,000.
Its hard to believe this is my fifth installment of this series but its that time of year again. ICBC has released their Statements and Schedules of Financial Information for 2010. (You can click here, here, here, and here for my previous 4 discussions of this topic).
As discussed last year, this annual report contains a lot of interesting information. None more so than the billings of “Suppliers of Goods and Services“. Some of the Suppliers of Goods and Services are Lawyers and Doctors. If you browse through this annual report you can see just how much any given lawfirm or doctor has been paid by ICBC in the 2010 Calendar Year.
Another provider of ’services’ revealed in these financial statements are law firms who do ICBC defence work. I have previously posted that some lawfirms and lawyers work both sides of the fence, that is on some cases they work for ICBC and in other cases they work for injured plaintiff’s suing someone insured by ICBC. According to the BC Law Society there is nothing wrong with this but these lawyers need to let their clients know if they signed the ICBC defence contract (known as the SAA) which restricts the lawyers ability to make claims against ICBC. This is required so clients can make an informed decision when choosing to hire their lawyer.
If you hired a lawyer to advance your ICBC injury claim and are curious if your lawyer also works for ICBC you can check these annual reports to see just how much money any given lawfirm is paid by ICBC in each calendar year.

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