Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/a-v-giordano-co-v-american-diamond-exchange-31-conn-app-163-1993/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:04:52+00:00

Document:
A. V. GIORDANO COMPANY, INC. v. AMERICAN DIAMOND EXCHANGE, INC.
O’CONNELL, HEIMAN and FREEDMAN, Js.
variance between the complaint and the proof was immaterial and the defendant was not prejudiced in maintaining its defense, surprised by the plaintiff’s proof or misled by the allegations in the complaint.
Action to recover damages for breach of contract, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven where the court, Gray, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability; thereafter, the matter was referred to Hon. Harold Mulvey, state trial referee; judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Tara L. Knight, for the appellant (defendant).
Ronald F. Bozelko, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant appeals from the trial court’s granting of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability for services performed by the plaintiff and the subsequent award after a hearing in damages. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the court improperly awarded damages for the value of engineering services rendered when the complaint, on which summary judgment was granted, set forth a completely different basis for recovery and the evidence presented at the hearing in damages demonstrated that the services were rendered prior to the operative time alleged in the complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
purchaser, here the defendant, would be responsible for all costs of collection. The plaintiff further asserted that the principal, interest and collection costs were unpaid and sought money damages.
In its answer, the defendant admitted the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the complaint.
The plaintiff filed a motion seeking summary judgment as to liability only. In its supporting affidavit, the plaintiff asserted that “[i]n or about December, 1989, plaintiff rendered engineering services to defendant.” (Emphasis added.) The affidavit also asserted that the invoices stated that unpaid accounts were subject to interest at 18 percent per annum, costs of collection and reasonable attorney’s fees and that the accounts had not been paid. The affidavit also set forth the total damages and costs allegedly owed to the plaintiff.
of an hourly workup and the dates between May 27, 1989, and November 15, 1989, that the services were rendered. After the hearing in damages, the court awarded $6500.13 as damages, plus costs taxed at $152.60. This appeal ensued.
The defendant asserts that the state trial referee improperly awarded damages for the value of engineering services when the complaint, on which summary judgment was granted, set forth a different basis for recovery and the evidence presented at the hearing in damages demonstrated that the services were rendered prior to the operative time alleged in the complaint. The defendant’s claim is essentially that the pleadings and proof are at variance. In the defendant’s opinion, the variance between the complaint that alleged in its third paragraph that the plaintiff performed architectural services and the summary judgment affidavit that alleged in its third paragraph that the plaintiff performed engineering services is fatal. We disagree.
Our law provides that a plaintiff’s recovery is limited to the allegations made in its complaint. Tedesco v. Stamford, 215 Conn. 450, 458, 576 A.2d 1273 (1990); Sampiere v. Zaretsky, 26 Conn. App. 490, 492, 602 A.2d 1037, cert. denied, 222 Conn. 902, 606 A.2d 1328 (1992). “A plaintiff may not allege one cause of action and recover upon another.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sampiere v. Zaretsky, supra.
To set aside a judgment on the basis of a variance between the pleadings and the proof, the variance must be material in a way that is essential to the cause of action claimed. Schaller v. Roadside Inn, Inc., 154 Conn. 61, 65, 221 A.2d 263 (1966). A variance is material if the defendant was prejudiced in maintaining a defense, surprised by the plaintiff’s proof or misled by the allegations in the complaint. Strimiska v. Yates, supra, 184.
judgment will thus not be invalidated if a variance does not change the theory of the cause of action and if the party complaining of the variance was, at all times, in a position to know the true state of the facts. Strimiska v. Yates, supra; DiLieto v. Better Homes Insulation Co., supra.
has hired the Plaintiff to do similar work in the past, and the amounts charged for the most recent work are excessive and unfair.” The defendant admitted its prior dealings with the plaintiff and use of its services. It did not demonstrate that it was prejudiced in maintaining its defense, that it was surprised by the plaintiff’s proof, or that it was misled by the allegations in the complaint. See Hillman v. Greenwich, supra, 531. “Justice is not served by accepting a claim of variance from a party who at all times has been in a position of knowing the true state of facts.” Schaller v. Roadside Inn, Inc., supra, 67. Similarly, the variance between the use of the phrase “in or about December, 1989,” and the actual dates of service is immaterial. The variances between the pleadings and proof were thus so slight that the defendant was not prejudiced in maintaining its defense, surprised by the plaintiff’s proof or misled by the allegations in the complaint. Strimiska v. Yates, supra.
 The trial court refused to order attorney’s fees because the invoice made no mention of them.
 We note that had the variance in this case been material, the question should have been raised when the evidence was presented, in this case in the objection to the motion for summary judgment. as to liability only. See DiLieto v. Better Homes Insulation Co., 16 Conn. App. 100, 106, 546 A.2d 957 (1988). Since this was not done, “no opportunity was given to the plaintiff to make [its] pleading, if insufficient, conform to the proof. The entire evidence was received without any objection on the ground of variance between allegation and proof . . . . It is now too late to raise such a point on appeal.” Winsor v. Hawkins, 130 Conn. 669, 670, 37 A.2d 222 (1944); DiLieto v. Better Homes Insulation Co., supra. The defendant here attempted to raise the issue of the variance at the hearing in damages before the state trial referee. The state trial referee, however, correctly noted that the issue of liability for services rendered by the plaintiff had already been adjudicated.

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