Source: https://ielrblog.com/index.php/category/international-organizations/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:07:02+00:00

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In late March, Microsoft reported that it had taken down 99 websites which had been used by a company referred to as Phosphorus to target the computer systems of businesses and government agencies, as well as activists and journalists involved in advocacy and reporting on issues relating to unrest in the Middle East. Microsoft obtained a federal judge’s approval on March 15 to disable the websites that it detected and had been tracking for six years. Although multiple intelligence agencies and groups pointed to Iran as the culprit, the difficulty of attributing cyber-attacks and operations to particular state actors and the lack of international legal frameworks to deal with cyber issues makes it highly likely that Iran will escape international condemnation.
To begin, effective attribution of attacks to state actors is difficult, complex, and highly time consuming. Most hackers have the technical capability to cover their tracks extremely well and an attack, even if it can be connected to a computer or a facility, often cannot be connected indelibly to specific individuals or groups. Further, because the process of global investigation requires the investigator to follow official, and at times bureaucratic, legal channels to request assistance, investigations can end up being subordinated to political agendas or to the whims of particular states. Thus, while the ability to conceal the source of attacks does become imminently more difficult as the attacks increase in both sophistication and in scale, it is still possible for deception, deflection, and misinformation to make it unclear exactly who is responsible for cyber-attacks.
Even in seemingly clear-cut cases, there is often significant skepticism about the source of attacks. For example, after the Obama Administration pinned the 2014 Sony hack on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a variety of academics and hackers expressed public skepticism, pointing to things like a seeming insider’s knowledge of Sony systems and the ability of IP addresses to be used across geographies as evidence that the DPRK was not the Sony hacker. This uncertainty was also present in a hack discovered by McAfee which spanned 72 networks globally, including the United Nations, governments, and corporations. In characterizing the source of this attack, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said that the attack was “very likely” undertaken by China, while the Chinese said nothing and the Defense Department said that “it is unknown who is perpetuating these intrusions,” although it is known that China has been pursuing similar capabilities. Even in cases with clear motives, state actors retain significant capacity for plausible deniability.
Another equally pressing issue regarding cyber warfare is the relative absence of international legal standards governing cyber actions. In February 2018, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres gave two speeches in which he argued that a lack of rules governing cyber warfare and cyber conduct constituted a global threat. While some sources have argued that international legal standards already apply to cyber warfare and conduct, the United Nations (“UN”) Group of Governmental Experts (“GGE”) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security stated in 2013 that “the application of norms derived from existing international law . . . is essential to reduce risks to international peace, security and stability.” Such derivation requires extensive debate, discussion and, eventually, agreement, and thus cannot be merely extrapolated from existing laws. Unfortunately, consensus has yet to emerge, as GGE talks broke down in 2017, leaving the international legal community without agreed upon standards for applying existing international law to the cyber domain.
There is a set of guidelines derived from existing international law and generally accepted (at least implicitly) by Western countries – the Tallinn Manual. It is not followed by many countries, most notably Russia, due to the perception of Western bias in the manual itself. Russia has thus developed a similar, but not exactly parallel, set of standards based on the UN Charter, which specifically emphasizes respect for national sovereignty and non-interference.
Unfortunately, as there is insufficient evidence to support claims of a distinct customary international law rule of territorial sovereignty applicable to cyberspace operations, current norms remain insufficient to parse out the legal space in which cyber-attacks and warfare exist. Further, because the principle of sovereignty is differentially applied to different domains (land, sea, air, space), there would have to be legal consensus on how it applies to the domain of cyberspace before the principle could hold any legal weight.
The lack of easy, universal application of current international legal norms to cyber warfare is compounded by the tendency of powerful states such as Russia and the United States to use the development of cyber norms as a conduit by which to score policy wins. In October 2018, it was reported that “Russia [was] planning to submit two UN resolutions, one on a code of conduct to regulate states behavior in cyberspace and one on a new UN cybercrime convention.” The US, in response, publicly announced Russian complicity in multiple hacks, using this revelation to damage Russian progress on its resolutions. This oppositional approach has been consistent between the two countries, making it unlikely that any comprehensive international legal norms on cyber warfare will be agreed upon anytime soon.
In the absence of agreed upon norms, rogue actors such as Iran and Russia will be able to use cyber warfare with relative impunity. For example, by exploiting the gaps in the existing international structure regarding cyber-attacks – the difficulty of attribution and the lack of international legal norms – Russia has been able to win significant strategic victories with very little pushback from the international community. In Estonia in 2007, in Georgia in 2008, and in Ukraine beginning in 2014, the Russian government used cyber weapons to attack infrastructure and to produce widespread confusion. Specifically, in Ukraine, there has been a significant number of attacks. On December 23, 2015, malicious actors opened breakers at some 30 distribution substations in the capital city Kiev and western Ivano-Frankivsk region, causing more than 200,000 consumers to lose power. Nearly a year later, another substation was rendered powerless. Explaining the Russian strategy regarding these sorts of cyber-attacks, Thomas Rid, a professor in the War Studies department at King’s College London, put it simply: “They’re testing out red lines, what they can get away with…You push and see if you’re pushed back. If not, you try the next step”.
Given the poor track record of the international community and the United States in responding strongly to Russian cyber-attacks, it seems highly likely that they will fail to respond politically to Iranian (and other state actors) actions as well.
On March 12, 2019, the EU Finance Ministers updated the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions. The list now has 15 countries and is part of the EU’s fair taxation initiative.
The Commission explained that it assessed 92 countries based on three criteria: tax transparency, good governance and real economic activity, and the existence of a zero corporate tax rate. As a result of the assessment and pressure to avoid the blacklist, 60 countries acted and eliminated over 100 harmful regimes.
The Ministers blacklisted 15 countries. 5 have taken no commitments since the first blacklist adopted in 2017: American Samoa, Guam, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 3 others were on the 2017 list, but were moved into the grey list following commitments they had taken. However. They have been blacklisted again for not following up: Barbados, the United Arab Emirates and the Marshall Islands.
7 additional countries were moved from the grey list to the blacklist for the same reason: Aruba, Belize, Bermuda, Fiji, Oman, Vanuatu, and Dominica. Another 34 countries will continue to undergo monitoring in 2019 (grey list), while 25 countries from the original screening process have been cleared.
The EU members have agreed on a set of countermeasures against listed countries. They can choose to apply them, including increased monitoring and audits, withholding taxes, special documentation requirements and anti-abuse provisions. The Commission will continue to support EU members’ work to develop a more coordinated approach to sanctions for the EU list in 2019. Additionally, new provisions in EU law forbid EU funds from being channeled or transited through entities in countries on the tax blacklist.
The EU will send a letter to all jurisdictions on the EU list, explaining the decision and what they can do to be de-listed. The Commission and Member States (Code of Conduct Group) will continue to monitor the jurisdictions that have until the end of 2019/2020 to deliver, and assess whether any other countries should be included in the EU listing process. The Commission will continue the dialogue and engagement with the jurisdictions concerned, to provide technical support and clarifications whenever needed and to discuss any tax matters of mutual concern.
Some of the targeted countries sent letters or made press releases, protesting their listing.
Approximately one week ago pressure from the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Panama prompted EU governments last week to block another blacklist of countries that show deficiencies in countering money laundering and terrorism financing.
A criticism of the EU listing initiative is that is does not include the many EU countries with international financial services, such as Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Austria, Hungary, and the U.K. A continuing criticism is that, notwithstanding the EU’s statements of open and vigorous engagement, the targeted countries complain about ever-shifting and obscure standards and insufficient communication over the standards and the expectations from the EU. A continuing complaint is about the overlapping standards of the EU and OECD.
 European Commission, Fair Taxation: EU updates list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, IP/19/1606, March 12, 2019.
 European Commission, Fair Taxation: EU updates list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, supra.
On February 11, 2019, 90 representatives from various international organizations and national law enforcement agencies met at the INTERPOL headquarters in Lyon, France for the 6th Global Meeting of the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP). AIRCOP is a coordinated effort by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), INTERPOL, and the World Customs Organization (WCO). It strives to improve the capacities of international airports to catch and confiscate illicit goods including drugs, as well as high-risk passengers at any and all points of their journey.
The meeting, which ran from February 11 to 13, gathered a wide variety of attendees. It featured members from AIRCOP national focal points, particularly from countries in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East, where AIRCOP focuses their operations. It also included trainers and mentors from national law enforcement agencies that partner with AIRCOP, as well as international agencies that work alongside AIRCOP, including the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). Private donors, like the European Union (EU), also attended. The EU is the largest financial contributor to AIRCOP, largely because it began as an operation specific to the EU. In 2010, the EU launched the Cocaine Route Programme, which aimed to reduce cocaine trafficking to Europe via passenger transportation, cargo, and mail. Since then, the project has expanded in scale and scope, utilizing global cooperation to assist regions most vulnerable to drug trafficking.
The meeting touched on a variety of topics. Participants discussed the evolving threats that criminals pose, often appearing “smarter” or “faster” than national law enforcement personnel. They pointed specifically to organized crime and terrorism as threats AIRCOP must address. Attendees also reflected on AIRCOP’s past successes, achieved through cooperative techniques such as the sharing of best practices. Those successes include seizing eight tons of cocaine, $14.5 million in undeclared funds, and two persons wanted on INTERPOL Red Notices, among many others. Various high-level officials presented remarks outlining AIRCOP’s growth and success. UNODC Division for Operations Director Ms. Miwa Kato, for example, noted that, “Through our joint efforts, we have come a long way, not only by welcoming new countries, but also by targeting and combating all types of threats that occur on airport platforms.” Other premier personnel, including Tim Morris, INTERPOL Executive Director of Public Service, and Ana Hinojosa, WCO Director of Compliance and Facilitation, offered remarks as well.
AIRCOP has confronted – and continues to confront – an array of global issues. In 2017, they partnered with EUROPOL and the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) to crack down on an international airline ticket fraud scheme. While AIRCOP focused their operations on airports in Africa and the Middle East, they assisted in detaining a total of 195 individuals. Several of these individuals aimed to smuggle illicit substances across borders, using the cheaply purchased tickets to fly back and forth with greater frequency. Over 60 countries from around the globe participated in the operation. More recently, the UNODC – one of AIRCOP’s three branches – has noticed an increase in drug trafficking throughout West Africa, where the profits made from selling drugs routinely go to terrorist organizations. Although AIRCOP has noticed drugs like methamphetamine streaming through airports in Nigeria, Ghana, and Benin, the UNODC has stressed that drug trafficking is harming the entire region, with Executive Director Yury Fedotov noting that, “UNODC is registering new alarming trends on drug trafficking in West and Central Africa with disruptive and destabilizing effects on governance, security, economic growth, and public health.” Drugs transported throughout the region include not just methamphetamine, but heroine, cocaine, and a variety of opioids.
To confront these evolving and developing threats, AIRCOP must do exactly what they outlined in their 6th Global Meeting – evolve and develop. The international organization has proven highly effective in shutting down illicit trafficking that flows through airports, and by continuing to improve the means by which member states share information and coordinate operations, AIRCOP may prove even more effective.
Over the past several years, thanks to human rights advocates’ hard work and growing attention from the media, the general public has had the opportunity to learn more about how governments abuse INTERPOL to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions. The discussion about INTERPOL’s internal mechanism, which provides individuals the opportunity to fight the abuse, and its shortcomings, has travelled beyond scholarly publications and entered the general news cycle. INTERPOL, in turn, has carried out reforms to eliminate some of those shortcomings. The organization has rightfully been praised for the improvements it has made and called upon to close remaining serious loopholes. Yet these reforms have also limited the rights of victims of INTERPOL abuse, and it is what the victims have lost as a result of the reforms that hasn’t received wide attention.
Article 18 of INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD) proclaims: “Any person or entity shall be entitled to submit directly to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files a request for access to, or correction and/or deletion of data processed in the INTERPOL Information System concerning that person or entity. These rights of access to, or correction and deletion of data shall be guaranteed by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files and be governed by separate rules.” The two sentences contradict each other. The first guarantees the right to submit a request for access only, whereas the second points to an unconditional right of access. The truth is that what INTERPOL has for a long time been loosely calling the “right of access” has never been an unconditional right.
Under the Operating Rules of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, adopted in 2008, prior to providing an individual access to the information about her or him in INTERPOL’s databases, the Commission had to obtain consent from the government source of that information. The rule, however, permitted the Commission to provide access without the government’s consent if the individual possessed “sufficient evidence showing that he/she [knew] that there [was] information about him/her in INTERPOL’s files.” The latter provision made a difference. It is hard to overstate how critical it is for an individual, who is fighting a request to locate and provisionally arrest her or him pending extradition (red notice or diffusion), to access the information the government submits to INTERPOL. It is often impossible to prepare a comprehensive argument against an abusive red notice or diffusion without possessing all information recorded in INTERPOL’s files, and it is not uncommon for an individual fleeing persecution to be unaware of the full extent of the criminal prosecution, including all accusations on which the red notice or diffusion is based. The provision, however, was repealed in 2017 as part of the reforms following the adoption of the Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files and the Commission’s new Operating Rules.
INTERPOL’s regulations do not directly address a situation in which a red notice or diffusion is based on several offenses only some which have been proven to be politically motivated or defy the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The regulations, however, suggest how INTERPOL could approach such a situation, in which an individual successfully argued against all but one offence behind the red notice or diffusion. Consider Article 83(1)(c) of the RPD: “[I]f the request includes several offences, the red notice may be published for all offences that meet INTERPOL’s Rules provided that at least one offence meets the above criteria.” The “above criteria” refers to the minimum requirements a red notice must comply with: the offence behind a red notice must be a serious ordinary law crime, must not raise “controversial issues relating to behavioral or cultural norms,” “relate to family/private matters,” originate from a “violation of laws of an administrative nature” or “private disputes,” must satisfy the penalty threshold and be “of interest for the purposes of international police cooperation.” Would INTERPOL apply this rule by analogy and publish a red notice or diffusion if the individual proved that all but one accusation, of which he was not aware, were politically motivated or defied the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and thereby violated the INTERPOL Constitution?
There seems to be no clear answer to this question from INTERPOL. Under the Commission’s Statute adopted as part of the recent reforms, a government must justify any restriction on the disclosure of information. However, “[t]he absence of justification alone will not lead to the disclosure of the content of the information but may be taken into consideration by the [Commission’s] Requests Chamber in assessing and deciding on a request.” At the same time, the RPD requires that to determine whether a red notice complies with Article 3 of its Constitution, which strictly prohibits INTERPOL from undertaking “any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character,” the organization must examine “all relevant elements.” Therefore, both the Statute and the RPD can be interpreted as giving the Commission the power to assess all information related to a red notice, including accusations an individual has not had the opportunity to address. However, even if the Commission adopted this approach, its assessment would often lack objectivity because it would not include the individual’s argument and evidence and would be limited to the government’s submissions and information in the public domain, if any.
By allowing individuals who possessed evidence of the existence of information about them in INTERPOL’s files access to that information without government authorization, the repealed rule guaranteed a fairer, closer to due process adjudication of their complaints. The rule also provided INTERPOL with more opportunities to maintain neutrality and thereby comply with its Constitution. By repealing the rule, INTERPOL harmed not only the victims of red notice and diffusion abuse but itself too.
Governments known for their abuse of INTERPOL’s resources have wasted no time in taking advantage of the repeal of the rule. They have used it to limit access to individuals who possess evidence that there is information about them in the organization’s databases by either agreeing to release only part of the information (partial disclosure), or by denying access altogether. The Commission, in turn, has reportedly refused such individuals access without first obtaining consent from the respective governments, and explained this approach by citing the difference between the repealed rule, which explicitly empowered the Commission to disclose the information without consulting governments, and the new rules, which do not.
The repeal of the rule has negated much of the progress INTERPOL has made in protecting individuals from persecution, which the organization considers one of its “primary objectives.” INTERPOL should reinstate the rule without delay. The organization should also change its approach towards individuals who do not possess evidence of the existence of information about them in its files. In this regard, in light of its refugee policy, INTERPOL should provide refugees unconditional access to the information about them. Because INTERPOL must protect all individuals from persecution, not just refugees and individuals who possess evidence of the information recorded in its databases, the organization should provide unconditional – without obtaining prior consent from a government – access to every other individual who can prove that there is a reason to believe that she or he may be a target of a politically motivated or otherwise unlawful prosecution which can be used as a basis for a red notice or diffusion.
Yuriy Nemets is the managing member at NEMETS, a law firm based in Washington, DC. Yuriy is an attorney with over fifteen years of experience in domestic and international litigation and arbitration, international extradition, corporate, banking, transportation, international trade and investments, and intellectual property law. He has authored publications about international extradition, corporate, banking, and intellectual property law.
 INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data art. 18(1), (2), 2016, https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials [hereinafter RPD].
 See also Rules on the Control of Information and Access to INTERPOL’s Files art. 9(a), 11(a) II.E/RCIA/GA/2004(2009) (abrogated 2016).
 Operating Rules of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files art. 14(1), II.E/RCCF/CCF/2008 (abrogated 2017).
 See Fair Trials, Dismantling the Tools of Oppression: Ending the Misuse of INTERPOL, 49 (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.fairtrials.org/publication/dismantling-tools-oppression-1 (“Applicants need to have access to information about the data being held on INTERPOL’s databses, as well as the arguments being made, to justify the data. Without such information, applications will inevitable be based on guess work, and individuals cannot be expected to make focused, succinct complaints to challenge the data.”).
 RPD, supra note 1, art 83(1)(a).
 Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files art. 35(4), 2016, https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Commission-for-the-Control-of-Files-CCF [hereinafter Statute].
 Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL, art. 3, June 13, 1956, http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution.
 RPD, supra note 1, art 34(3).
 See also Fair Trials, supra note 5, at 20, 21.
 See also INTERPOL, Neutrality (Article 3 of the Constitution), https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Neutrality-Article-3-of-the-Constitution.
 In this regard, Fair Trials argues that the rule, which provided individuals who were aware of their INTERPOL status access to the information, has been repealed because the Commission’s Statute and its new Operating Rules contain “new broader presumptions of disclosure” and promote “improved transparency and the equality of arms” and that the repeal is “unlikely to create significant changes in practice given [Fair Trials’] experience that this provision did not, in fact, lead to disclosure in such cases.” Fair Trials, supra note 5, at 45, 50. Regardless of the Commission’s unwillingness to comply with the now-repealed provision, the provision provided individuals aware of their INTERPOL status a clear basis to argue that they had the right of access independent of any government’s will. By repealing the provision, INTERPOL has eliminated that right and, thereby, moved further away from the presumption of disclosure and towards the presumption of secrecy. The latter, as Fair Trials has rightfully noted, “prevents even people who have good reasons to believe that they are subject to an INTERPOL alert from accessing the data.” Id. at 40.
 Fair Trials, INTERPOL Text on Refugee Policy – Excerpts (last visited Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/INTERPOL-TEXT-ON-REFUGEE-POLICY.pdf?platform=hootsuite; See also Fair Trials, supra note 5, at 56.
After a snap election in Dubai, South Korean Kim Jong Yang has officially been named INTERPOL’s new president.
Multiple news sources had previously reported that Alexander Prokopchuk, a Russian who has served as the INTERPOL vice chair for Europe since 2016, was the favorite to become the next President of INTERPOL.In recent weeks, Prokopchuk’s strong bid for the presidency led many international actors, including the United States, to openly decry the misuse of INTERPOL by authoritarian regimes as a political tool. These allegations did not begin with the Russian candidate. In fact, Chinese use of the ‘red notice’system under Meng Hongwei to target political and ideological opponents led groups like Human Rights Watch to declare that the system has long been abused to support particular political agendas. Sources show that in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the number of diffusions (in which a country requests that INTERPOL issue a ‘red notice’against an individual or group) and a less significant, but still apparent, increase in the number of ‘red notices’ issued.
The use of red notices as a political tool has damaged the supposed objectivity of INTERPOL, revealing that it is, at its root, largely dominated by international realpolitik. It is very telling that the US and European leaders who campaigned against Prokopchuk emphasized the need for INTERPOL to remain neutral and independent, arguing that electing a Russian president would lead to further abuses of power. Lithuania and Ukraine both threatened to leave INTERPOL altogether if Prokopchuk were to be elected. It is even more telling that, in response, the Russians accused the U.S. and other actors of overly politicizing the issue and of smearing Prokopchuk, a seasoned professional, in the name of personal gain. What this reveals is that, reflecting common trends across international institutions, states tend to use these institutions not as a mechanism to support rule of law, but rather as another site for the contestation of power and influence in international politics.
While many see Yang’s election as an uncontroversial choice, it does little to assuage concerns about the continued misuse and abuse of INTERPOL and its mechanisms. The number of red notices has increased since last year, even as Yang has been at the helm of INTERPOL for nearly two months of this year already, suggesting that his presidency might be merely more of the same. In fact, the truly troubling part of this saga is that countries used the the snap election as an opportunity to pursue highly partisan agendas, and that, in some sense, Yang’selection represents a highly partisan victory against Russia. Beyond that, the confusion of INTERPOL during the disappearance of its former president Meng raises significant concerns about its ability to uphold global rule of law and to counter partisan efforts to misuse INTERPOL’s institutions. All in all, this election has not resolved many of the tensions within INTERPOL, and many serious questions remain.

References: art. 18
 art. 9
 art. 14
 art 83
 art. 35
 art. 3
 art 34