Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/55/55massappct756.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:53:24+00:00

Document:
CAROLINE D. CABOT vs. ROBERT C. CABOT.
Divorce and Separation, Modification of judgment. Contempt. Contract, Construction of contract, Rescission.
School, he made no order obligating Robert to contribute to the cost of private schooling, leaving these expenses to be paid by Caroline. Neither did the divorce judgment address the issue of the children's college expenses; this was, as we shall discuss, to be expected as they were then in grammar school.
trustee, he would maintain the principal of this trust in "high income producing securities consistent with the manner in which the funds have been maintained in the past and shall exercise his discretion to this end consistent with the duties he owes as trustee." Trust income was to be paid at least annually and used to pay the first $14,000 per year of the children's education costs. To the extent that the children's "education costs" (a term to which we shall return) exceeded the total of $14,000, the parties agreed they would each pay one-half of the excess.
"countervailing equities," a showing not made here, and not merely upon materially changed circumstances. See McCarthy v. McCarthy, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1994) ("more than a material change in circumstances or, to use the analogous term, a 'countervailing equity,' " is required to modify surviving agreement). This is because (he argues) the integrated agreement governs all of the parties' obligations to one another, including the children's future college expenses; the failure to make provision in the agreement for the payment of these college expenses reflects the parties' intention that neither party was obligated to pay them. See ibid.
In making her findings, the judge appropriately relied on extrinsic evidence. "Where contract language employed by the parties leaves their obligations (and, as in this case, the status of the agreement itself) in doubt, the court will place itself in the position occupied by the parties and 'will examine the subject matter of the agreement and the language employed, and will attempt to ascertain the objective sought to be accomplished by the parties.' " Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 86 (1991), quoting from Feakes v. Bozyczko, 373 Mass. 633, 635 (1977).
The reference to "education," in the context of the 1985 agreement as a whole, also supports the judge's view that the term refers solely to private grammar and high school costs. The subject of the 1985 agreement was specific to support, uninsured medical expenses of the children, and private school expenses. The agreement states that "[i]n consideration of the foregoing agreement[,] . . . the parties . . . agree on the finality of the terms of this agreement as to . . . education" (emphasis supplied). The agreement provides that trust income was payable to both children until 1991, when one-half would be paid to the son only until 1993, dates coinciding with anticipated completion of the children's preparatory school education. "[T]he scope of a party's obligations cannot 'be delineated by isolating words and interpreting them as though they stood alone.' " Starr v. Fordham, 420 Mass. 178, 190 (1995), quoting from Boston Elevated Ry. v. Metropolitan Transit Authy., 323 Mass. 562, 569 (1949).
the term "education" to mean "schooling up to but not including post high school education." There was no error.
Turning now to Robert's argument that the agreement is integrated, we note that it was for the trial judge to determine whether the 1985 agreement "was the entire agreement of the parties," Alexander v. Snell, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 323, 324 (1981), or whether certain other of the parties' obligations to each other and to their children were the subject of other agreements (written or oral), or remained unaddressed. "Whether there was an integration as [Robert] contend[s] was a question of the intention of the parties on which proof could be received ranging beyond the writing proper." Antonellis v. Northgate Constr. Corp., 362 Mass. 847, 849 (1973). Fred S. James & Co. of New England, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 160, 163 (1987).
"A fully integrated agreement is a statement which the parties have adopted as a complete and exclusive expression of their agreement." Starr v. Fordham, 420 Mass. at 188 n.8, citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210(1) (1981). Such an agreement will typically contain an "integration clause" stating that it constitutes the parties' sole agreement and that there are no oral or written representations outside of the agreement. See, e.g., Kobayashi v. Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 496 n.6 (1997).
children's college costs. Thus, the decision did not, by concluding that neither party had the legal obligation to pay for college, impose a de facto burden to pay such costs upon the parent most desirous of financially assisting a child's college attendance.
(b) Material change in circumstances. The divorce judgment made no provision for payment of the children's college costs because at that time the children were not yet eighteen, see note 9, supra, and no other factors were present supporting an order for this future obligation, Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. at 54. Modification was proper upon a finding that a material and substantial change in the circumstances of the parties had occurred and the judgment of modification was necessary in the best interests of the children. G. L. c. 208, § 28. L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 432 Mass. at 451. "In determining whether there has been a material change in the parties' circumstances, the probate judge must weigh the relevant circumstances; the resolution of the various factors rests with the judge's sound discretion. Unless there is no basis in the record for the judge's decision, we defer to the judge's evaluation of the evidence presented at trial." Bush v. Bush, 402 Mass. 406, 411 (1988) (citations omitted).
to his interest in the former family home, warrant the judge's order.
There is no merit to Robert's claim that the judge was without authority to order payments for education support because, by the time judgment entered, the children had become emancipated. The case on which Robert exclusively relies to support his argument, Gediman v. Cameron, 306 Mass. 138 (1940), is inapposite. [Note 15] First, it was an appropriate exercise of the judge's discretion to make the obligation retroactive. Boulter-Hedley v. Boulter, 429 Mass. 808, 809 (1999) ("there is no statutory mandate that modification of support orders be given retroactive effect; the decision whether to give retroactive effect to such orders rests in the sound discretion of the judge"). Second, in October, 1990, when Caroline filed her complaint (in which she sought college contributions commencing in September, 1992), the children were seventeen and fifteen years old and just beginning the college selection and application process. By the time judgment entered, each child had reached the age of eighteen, triggering the court's authority to issue orders relative to education. See note 9, supra.
children's remainder interests in two other trusts, as to which Robert is the sole lifetime beneficiary, see notes 12 and 14, supra. Because he offers no citation to authority to support his argument, we do not address it. [Note 16] Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).
The order neither alters the amount of Robert's one-half interest in the former marital home, nor changes the nature of his interest (which would, upon sale of the property, have been cash), and he points to no prejudice befalling him as the result of the order. There was no abuse of discretion in the judge's exercise of her broad equitable powers to fashion appropriate remedies. Cf. Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. 292, 301 (1991) (probate judge has discretion to order that husband's child support arrearages be paid out of his interest in former marital residence); Rosenberg v. Merida, 428 Mass. 182, 189-190 (1998) (father's assets in bank account may be attached to secure child support obligation).
There is ample support in the record for the judge's detailed findings to the effect that Robert persistently disregarded clear and unambiguous orders contained in that judgment, and for the conclusion that Robert was in contempt of the 1985 modification judgment. Bisienere v. Buccino, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753 (1994) (there must be a clear and unequivocal command and an equally clear and undoubted disobedience to support finding of civil contempt).
$14,000 annually, the parties would each pay one-half of the excess.
whether to deny relief on the basis of the plaintiff's conduct [is] a matter committed to the broad discretion of the judge." Fales v. Glass, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 575 (1980), citing Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). MacCormac v. Flynn, 313 Mass. 547, 550 (1943). There was no abuse of discretion.
the parties shall divide such excess equally" (emphasis supplied).
("What is a reasonable time depends on the nature of the contract, the probable intention of the parties as indicated by it, and the attendant circumstances").
The judge's findings as to these amounts are supported by the evidence. Further, the awards were within the judge's broad discretion to make. See Patten v. Mayo, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 662 (1987) (Probate Court jurisdiction includes authority to award damages).
Rescission is available when a contract has been abrogated.
Worcester Heritage Soc., Inc. v. Trussell, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 345 (1991). See Runkle v. Burrage, 202 Mass. 89, 99 (1909) ("nothing less than conduct that amounts to an abrogation of the contract, or that goes to the essence of it, or takes away its foundation, can be made a ground for rescission of it by the other party"). "There is ample authority for refusing rescission where there has been only a breach of contract rather than an utter failure of consideration or a repudiation by the party in breach." Worcester Heritage Soc., Inc. v. Trussell, supra at 345. Cf. Rezendes v. Rezendes, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 438 (1999).
4. Conclusion. We affirm the judgments. Caroline may submit her petition for appellate fees together with the necessary supporting material within fifteen days of the issuance of the rescript in this case. Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 20 (1989). Robert shall have fifteen days thereafter to file a response. Caroline's request for double costs and attorney's fees [Note 23] is denied as not all of Robert's appellate arguments can be said to be without reasonable basis in fact or law.
A modification agreement may, by its terms, survive the judgment as an independent and binding contract. To the extent that such an agreement seeks to serve as a bar to future attempts to modify it, it is subject to the same requirements and exceptions as a separation agreement that is incorporated in the original divorce judgment. See Bracci v. Chiccarelli, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 318, 322-323 (2001). The parties make no claim that the 1985 agreement was not judicially determined to be fair and reasonable.
[Note 8] Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 514 (1982), quoting from Reeves v. Reeves, 318 Mass. 381, 384 (1945), held that separation agreements that survive divorce judgments are valid "when free from fraud and coercion and when fair and reasonable," and will preclude modification of provisions limiting alimony payments on the mere showing of changed circumstances.
The issue has not been raised that to the extent the agreement for unallocated monthly support payments includes child support, it may not have been susceptible to such binding limitations. See Quinn v. Quinn, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 144, 146 (2000); G. L. c. 208, § 28; G. L. c. 209, § 37.
[Note 21] Robert does not challenge the judge's order that "[a]s a further remedy for Robert's breach, the 1985 Modification Judgment shall be modified back to the date Caroline filed the Complaint for Contempt in March, 1990, in that Robert shall pay Caroline's one-half of the excess over $14,000." We have noted that "[i]n limited circumstances, modifications may . . . be made pursuant to a complaint for contempt." Ruml v. Ruml, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 500, 509 n.14 (2000), citing Kennedy v. Kennedy, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 312 (1983).
[Note 22] The parties raise no issue regarding the authority of the Probate Court, under general principles of equity jurisprudence, to rescind an agreement that has been incorporated in a judgment entered pursuant to an action for divorce. We will assume, without deciding the issue, that it has such authority. See, e.g., Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 385, 392 (1975) (stating "that a court acting under general principles of equity jurisprudence has broad power to reform, rescind, or cancel written instruments . . . on grounds such as fraud, mistake, accident, or illegality").
[Note 23] The request, made pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 10, is unavailable under that statute, but is available under G. L. c. 211A, § 15, which mirrors it. Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 454 (1993).

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