Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/369/369mass200.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 20:49:18+00:00

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GEORGE OSSERMAN & others vs. HERMAN JACOBS & another (and four companion cases [Note 1]).
Present: QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, & KAPLAN, JJ.
FIVE CIVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Superior Court on August 8, 1974.
The cases were heard by McNaught, J., on motions to dismiss.
Michael R. Coppock for the plaintiffs.
Eric Lund for the defendants.
KAPLAN, J. In what circumstances does a judgment for the defendant upon the sustaining of a demurrer to a declaration preclude a second action on the same cause of action? As urged by the plaintiffs-appellants, we deal with this problem of res judicata apart from the possible influence upon it of the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure effective on July 1, 1974: here the earlier action was concluded before that date, though the later action -- the one under present appeal -- was commenced thereafter.
motion and the plaintiffs appealed. We transferred the matter to this court.
present separate action was commenced, with the result above stated, leading to the present appeal by the plaintiffs as appellants.
adverse judgment, would work preclusively against him. See Hacker v. Beck, 325 Mass. 594 (1950); Elfman v. Glaser, 313 Mass. 370 (1943); Whitney v. Whitney, supra; Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L.J. 299, 319-320 (1929).
has been given two chances to state his case and is not entitled to burden the courts and the opposing parties with further attempts." [Note 9] See Turner v. Dahlberg, 360 Mass. 854 (1971); cf. McArdle v. Schneider, 228 F. Supp. 506 (D. Mass. 1964).
The conclusion we reach is made the easier because on the motion to vacate the judgment it was open to the plaintiffs to press on the judge any "equities" that might exist: for example, that the omission to move to file a second amended complaint was due to excusable inadvertence or that there was plausible reason for thinking that a solid cause of action could be pleaded and proved notwithstanding earlier failures. The motion to vacate was denied and appeal was not taken. That an appeal from the refusal to vacate the judgment would present difficulties for the plaintiffs because of the discretionary elements in such a decision does not supply a reason, as the plaintiffs seem to suggest, for allowing them to commence a new action.
1B J.W. Moore, Federal Practice par. 0.409 (2d ed. 1974). But cf. 5 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 1357 at 614-616 (1969).
[Note 1] O.C.G. Enterprises, Inc. vs. Herman Jacobs & another; Medical Management Services, Inc. vs. Herman Jacobs & another; Waldo L. Fielding vs. Herman Jacobs & another; and OB/GYN Associates, Inc. vs. Herman Jacobs & another were consolidated with the main case for purposes of appeal as indicated in the text.
[Note 2] A defense of the running of the statute of limitations against the tort aspects of the five complaints was also raised in the motions to dismiss (mentioned below) and on this question there were possible variations among the five complaints. We do not reach the limitations issue because we dispose of the appeals on the basis of res judicata.
[Note 3] The use of the Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to raise the defense of former adjudication was not objectionable here as the materials for decision were official records available and not subject to dispute that could be read together with the complaint. See J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice Section 12.13 (1974); 5 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 1360 at 634-635, Section 1357 at 608-610 (1969).
[Note 4] Rule 23 of the Superior Court (1954) stated: "A motion for leave to amend shall contain or be accompanied by the proposed amendment.
"If a demurrer is sustained, and leave to amend is not denied, a case shall be deemed ripe for final judgment or decree only after ten days from the sustaining of the demurrer, or such other time as the court may allow for amendment, and then only after the disposition of any motion to amend the pleading demurred to, filed within such time. After the expiration of such time no motion to amend such pleading shall be filed without leave of court." The rule was repealed effective June 30, 1974.
[Note 5] General Laws c. 250, Section 15, as appearing in St. 1972, c. 434, read thus: "If a final judgment has been entered either party, or any one or more of several plaintiffs or defendants, within one year thereafter may file in the court in which judgment was rendered a petition to vacate same. In the supreme judicial or the superior court, such petition shall be filed in the county where the judgment was entered." The section has been confined by amendment (St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 296) to the District Courts. The analogous rule is Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974) (relief from judgment).
[Note 6] See F. James, Civil Procedure Section 11.17 (1965); Restatement of Judgments Section 50 (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 48, comment d at 39-40, reporter's note at 42-43 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Developments in the Law -- Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 836-837 (1952); Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal. 2d 826 (1952) (Traynor, J.).
[Note 7] See 38 Mass. L.Q. No. 1 at 36, No. 5 at 31 (1953).
[Note 8] Appeal was taken from this judgment but was dismissed for want of prosecution.
[Note 9] In the Martin case the first action, instituted in the Massachusetts Superior Court, had been removed to the United States District Court and went to judgment there; the second action was commenced in the Superior Court. The court dealt with the res judicata question as a matter of our State law.
[Note 10] Also referring to the possible bearing of Rule 41 (b), last sentence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (regarding effect of involuntary dismissal), analogous to Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (3), 365 Mass. 803 (1974). See 9 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 2373 at 238-239 (1971).

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