Source: http://yoshabunko.com/nationality/Nationality_law_2000_inheritance_ruling.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 21:23:46+00:00

Document:
I am calling this case "Rees v. State" after the family name of William and Roberta Rees, the adult guardians of the child plaintiff Robert Rees Andrew (ロバート・リース・アンデレ), their adopted son. The case originated in 1992 when the Rees sued the Japanese government on behalf of Andrew in what is called a "nationality confirmation" case.
On 4 June 2008, the Supreme Court issued separate but substantially identical judgments in both Boy v. State and Children v. State.
The court held that the legitimacy condition in Article 3 of the Nationality Law was unconstitutional, by no later than 2003 in Boy v. State and by no later than 2005 in Children v. State.
The earlier date in Boy v. State became the criterion for the retroactive transitional measures that came into effect with a revision of Article 3 -- sans the legitimacy condition -- from 1 January 2009.
By the time the Supreme Court issued its rulings against the legitimacy requisite, there were numerous cases before various courts. Here I will present the chronologies of the two principle series of rulings which ended with the Supreme Court's rulings in 2008.
The series of cases involved the nationality of a boy. It followed and was entwined with a case involving a deportation order against the mother and the boy. The nationality confirmation case became the first in which a Japanese court, in 2005, ruled that part of the Nationality Law was unconstitutional.
The judgment in this case is a wonderful example of the capacity of the Supreme Court to favor the spirit of a law over its literal interpretation. The judgment came down to the quality of what I would call the acknowledging father's MO.
The English version was extracted from an html file retrieved by a query in the English section of the same 裁判所 Courts in Japan website. A note at the bottom states that the English version as "Translated by Sir Ernest Satow Chair of Japanese Law, University of London" -- which would seem to be Hiroshi Oda (小田博 Oda Hiroshi), who has has been the Sir Ernest Satow Professor of Japanese Law at the University of London, University College, since 1990. Oda is the author of Japanese Law, first published by Butterworths in 1993. Oxford University Press brought out a revised 2nd edition in 1999 and further revised 3rd edition in 2009.
Because parts of the received translation do not accurately reflect the finer details and texture of the language of the Japanese ruling, I have occasionally shown structural translations of parts that are of special interest to me.
All underscoring in the text of the judgment is as received. Unless otherwise noted, the underscoring of corresponding parts of the received translation is mine. All underscoring in my own commentary is, of course, also mine.
Unless otherwise noted, all (parentheses) in the received text and translation are as received.
All in-line [square brackets] and <angle brackets> -- and everything enclosed in such brackets -- are mine.
My own closer (structural) translations are generally shown in blue in cells below the received judgment and received translation. At times I have shown closer translations of words or short phrases in-line, between right and left → arrows ← following the amended text.
Editorial [clarifications] are shown in-line. Brief comments are sometimes boxed in the cells of the texts they relate to. Extended comments are generally shown in cells below the relevant texts.
The received texts of the judgment and translation, and my own commentary, are shown in black. However, to facilitate commentary on the language of the ruling and/or its translation, I have highlighted specific words and phrases in various colors according to the following scheme, which includes in-line editorial clarifications and corrections.
※ The example of incorrect 朝鮮 (Chōsen) being mistranslated Korea (韓国 Kankoku), thus "accidentally" correcting the usage in the judgement, can be seen in Kanda v. State 1961.
1. While 朝鮮 (Chōsen) in the judgment is factually incorrect, the correct translation is "Chōsen" because that is what the original text says. Because the translators conflate "Chōsen" (朝鮮) with "Korea" (韓国 Kankoku), they habitually translate "Chōsen" as "Korea" -- which constitutes a "mistranslation" that in effect accidentally "corrects" the factual error in the original -- i.e., a double negative becomes a positive. But two wrongs don't make a right. Translators are not supposed to "edit" the content of legal briefs. They might flag a problematic expression for comment in a footnote, but the translation itself should be faithful to the original.
2. Note that where the judgment precisely paraphrases the phrasal logic of the expression "Nik-Kan heigō" (日韓併合) [Japan-Korea union] as "X to Y to no heigō" (ＸとＹとの併合) [the union between X and Y], the received translation incorrectly represents the syntactic logic of the paraphrase as "the annexation of Y by X" -- which constitutes an interpretation of the effects of the union, not its formal description in Japanese law -- which I underscore, because the court is making a legal, not political, argument. Historiographic "opinion" external to received text of the original judgment, and its attempt to deal with the letter and operation of Japanese law is irrelevant. A translator might say that the past is past. Treaties, laws, and ordinances of the past -- though no longer enforced -- may continue to have effect in court reviews of what I call "legacy" cases, which involve status actions in the past.
The rulings in the three Rees v. State court cases understandably got quite a bit of play in newspapers in Japan, and the small but dedicated sector of the foreign press that covers social issues in Japan. The Supreme Court judgment has also gotten a lot of attention in academic journals and a number of books, mostly in Japanese, but also in English, and I would guess also a few other languages.
Higashizawa Yasushi (東沢靖) represented the Rees in the first round of litigation in the Tokyo District Court, which in April 1993 ruled in their favor, namely that Andrew qualified for birth-right jus soli Japanese nationality. The following book, published 3 months later, ends with a detailed overview of Andrew's case.
The 23 pages numbered in roman numerals, at and from the back of the book, are devoted to solid chapter summaries in good English -- like the < provided English title > on the cover. In the English summary of the Epilogue (あとがき), dated Spring 1993 (1993年春), Higashizawa credits "Mr. Suzuki Akihiko for helping me with translation." The fuller Japanese version credits Suzuki Akihiko (鈴木昭彦) of the "OŌta citizen network for living together with foreigners" (外国人と共に生きる太田・市民ネットワーク Gaikokujin to tomo ni ikiru Ō shimin nettowaaku) for his considerable exertions in checking the English summaries. Who originally wrote them, if not Higashizawa himself, is not clear.
On its website, theŌta Citizens Network an NGO, dubs itself "OCNet (Ohta Citizens' Network for Peoples' Togetherness)" in English. This is a not uncommon example of "duplicity" in organizational naming, avoiding -- in this case -- a faithful English rendering of the notion that the "citizens" (市民 shimin) of Ōta ward, in Tokyo, are endeavoring to "live together" with "aliens" or "foreigners" or "outlanders" (外国人 gaikokujin).
The term "shimin" (市民) should imply anyone, regardless of nationality, who is registered as a resident of a 区民町村 (ku-min-chōson) -- a ward, city, town, or village -- of prefecture in Japan. "Japanese" and "foreigners" residing in Ōta are already "living together" as "citizens" of the same municipal polity -- and the only certain difference between "Japanese" and "foreigners" is their nationality -- not, as the Japanese (but not the English) version of OCNet's organization description would seem to imply.
The English expression "Peoples' Togetherness" has heavy overtones of "racioethnic peoples". The Japanese version of OCNet's blurb underscores the "ethnic" implications of the English version by speaking of exchanges among people whose languages, cultures, and customs variously differ. The English version speaks of the twain of "Japanese" and "non-Japanese" -- which hearkens of the "we Japanese" and "foreigners" refrain.
Andrew's case is the centerpiece of the 5th and final story (pages 161-202), which bears the following titles.
This article is an edited reprint from Hokudai Hōgaku Ronshū (北大法学論集) [The Hokkaido Law Review), Volume 54, Number 1, pages 456-429 [from higher to lower page numbers because article, in English, is published in a journal that features mostly Japanese articles on pages that run in the opposite direction].
Comments on Okuda, Statelessness and the Nationality Act of Japan: Baby Andrew Becomes a Teenager and other Changes?
This article is a critique of Okuda's article.
The Osaka High Court was the second instance court. Here it is called the "original instance court" from the viewpoint of the Supreme Court, since the case the Supreme Court was asked to review originated in the Osaka High Court.
MOJ's English version of 父母がともに知れないとき (fubo ga tomo ni shirenai) is "When both parents are unknown". I am structurally translating the phrase as I have here because the main judgment interprets its meaning by paraphrasing it with different words, which I will also structurally render in order to facilitate their comparison (see below).
While "unknown" is a good translation of "shirenai" (知れない), this expression -- as a negative potential -- means "could not be known" despite attempts to know -- i.e., is presently unknown but could be known in the future. The negative passive "not known" would be "shirarete inai" (知られていない), which also stops short of declaring that something is "unknowable" no matter how much one attempts to know.
The underscoring in the received text, and in corresponding parts of the translation, reflects the received text. All bold or otherwise highlighted emphasis is mine.
1. In cases where, in transnational legal relations, the preliminary issue which is indispensable to solve the primary issue constitutes a different legal relationship from the primary issue from the viewpoint of conflict of laws, the applicable law of the preliminary issue shall be determined by the rules of conflict of laws of Japan.
2. In determining the emergence of a parent-child relationship in transnational relations, first, the existence of a parent-legitimate child relationship should be determined by applying its applicable law, and if this relation is denied, the existence of a parent-child relationship other than that with a legitimate child should be determined by applying its applicable law.
3. Under the Law on the Application of Laws before the amendment by Law No.27, 1989, the applicable law to the existence of a parent-legitimate child relationship, in cases where the child obtains the status of a legitimate child by reasons other than birth, is the law of the home country of the mother's husband at the time the fact which constitutes the ground for the acquisition of the status as a legitimate child emerged.
4. Under the Law on the Application of Laws before the amendment by Law No.27, 1989, the emergence of a parent-child relationship other than that with a legitimate child, between those who are not in blood relationship, is acknowledged when the parent-child relationship is confirmed by the law of the home country of the parent, as well as the child, at the time the fact which constitutes the ground for the acquisition of the status as a legitimate child emerged.
Whether a child is legitimate or not shall be determined by the law of the country of the husband of the mother at the time of the birth, and if the husband has died before the birth of the child, the law of the last country which he belonged to.
Requirements for the legitimisation of a child are determined by the law of the country of the father or mother at the time of the legitimisation in relation to the father or mother, and the law of the country of the child at the time of the legitimisation in relation to the child.
Family relationship and the rights and obligations emerging from family relationship other than those as provided by the preceding nine provisions shall be determined by the law of the home country of the parties.
6) The remaining claims by the jokoku appellant are dismissed.
2. The total cost of the litigation shall be divided in half. Half shall be borne by the jokoku appellant and the remaining half shall be shared by the jokoku appellees.
I. The present case is the result of the consolidation of an action by the jokoku appellee B vis-a-vis the jokoku appellant, claiming the transfer of the building as indicated in list (3) of the property attached to the judgment of the first instance court (hereinafter, "the Building") (Case 1) and the payment of rent based upon the right to the share in the Building and a claim by the jokoku appellant vis-a-vis the jokoku appellees for the registration of the transfer of the share, on the ground of acquisition by prescription of the piece of land as indicated in lists (1) and (2) of the property attached to the judgment of the first instance court (hereinafter, "the Land" and together with the Building, "the Land and the Building")(Case 2).
1. G, who is a Korean national (who, as indicated later, subsequently acquired Japanese nationality) has the eldest son, jokoku appellee D (born January 1, 1940), the eldest daughter, jokoku appellee C (born December 28, 1941) and the second daughter, jokoku appellee E (born March 14, 1943) between his wife H who has Korean nationality. G had an extra-marital relationship with I and has illegitimate children, jokoku appellees B (born March 20, 1951) and F (born August 30, 1953) with I. Both B and F have Japanese nationality.
2. In September the same year G divorced H on March 10, 1961 and married J, who is a Korean national and lived in Korea.
3. G acquired Japanese nationality on February 27, 1963 and was registered in the civil register in the name of K, but his marriage with J was not registered.
4. K married the jokoku appellant on May 2, 1963. The jokoku appellant lived together with K and the jokoku appellees B and F after the marriage.
5. K died on May 16, 1970.
The Land and the Building are the inheritance estate of K. The jokoku appellant has occupied and administered the Land and the Building on her own since the death of K.
6. On January 23, 1971, the jokoku appellees B, C, the jokoku appellant, and the relatives met and discussed the inheritance of K's estate, but failed to reach an agreement.
7. J died on September 4, 1977.
8. The jokoku appellee B initiated an action vis-a-vis the jokoku appellant for the revocation of the marriage on the ground that her marriage with K was a dual marriage, and the judgment which revoked the marriage came into effect on March 3, 1992.
9. The jokoku appellant is letting the Building (shop and communal residence) to YAUCHI Sonoko and 14 others and is receiving 414,000 yen per month in total.
10. The jokoku appellant invoked acquisitive prescription for the Land and the Building (or its share) on the ground that she had occupied the property for 20 years, and also that the right of the jokoku appellee B to recover the inherited property had expired by extinctive prescription.
II. The original instance court ruled as follows and acknowledged the claim for the transfer of the Building and the payment of the equivalent of the monthly rent of 40,115 yen but dismissed the remaining claim in Case 1 and dismissed the claim in Case 2.
1. As a result of K's death, the jokoku appellee inherited one-twelfth of the Building as an illegitimate child and J, one-third of the Building as his wife.
2. Concerning the scope of the heirs, their rank, and their share of the inheritance on the death of J, by virtue of Article 25 of the Law on the Application of Laws before the amendment by Law No.27, 1989 (hereinafter, "the Previous Law"), Korean law is the applicable law. According to Articles 773, 774, 1000, 1002, and 1009 of the Korean Civil Code before the amendment of 1977, the inheritance share of the jokoku appellee B is one-thirteenth. Therefore, the jokoku appellee B has a share of 51/468 of the Building if the inheritance from K and J is combined and is entitled to claim 40,115 yen per month which is an equivalent of 51/468 of 414,000 yen from the jokoku appellant.
3. The jokoku appellant became aware that she was not an heir and had no entitlement to the Land and the Building or inheritance share to them within several months of January 23, 1971, and since then she has not occupied the Land and the Building with the intention to own them. Therefore, the jokoku appellant cannot acquire the title to, or a share of the Land and the Building by acquisitive prescription.
4. The jokoku appellant, although being aware that she was not an heir, or without having a reasonable ground to believe that she had the right to inheritance, claimed that she was an heir, infringed the right to inheritance through administering or occupying the estate and therefore, there is no possibility of the application of extinctive prescription of the right to claim recovery of the inherited estate.
Under the above circumstances lawfully established by the original instance court, it is evident that the jokoku appellant lived together with the jokoku appellees B and F and was aware that there were heirs to K other than herself, even if the jokoku appellant commenced occupation of the Land and the Building on her own, it does not follow that she has demonstrated her intention to own the Land and the Building on her own. Therefore, in conclusion, the ruling of the original instance court that the jokoku appellant did not acquire the Land and the Building as a whole by acquisitive prescription can be upheld. The argument of the representatives for the jokoku appeal contests the unlawfulness of the judgment of the original instance court on facts not established by the original instance court and cannot be accepted.
Article 186, para.1 provides for the presumption that the person who occupies a property has an intention to occupy the property with the intention to own it, and the person who claims that the occupier does not have such an intention and contests the acquisitive prescription by the occupier bears the burden of proof for the absence of the intention to own on the part of the occupier (Supreme Court 1979 (O) 19, Judgment of the First Petit Bench, July 31, 1979, Saibanshu, Civil Cases, No.127, p.315). The intention to own should be determined not by the internal intention of the occupier, but formally and objectively by the right which served as the ground for the commencement of the occupation or the circumstances concerning the occupation (Supreme Court, 1970 (O) 315, Judgment of the First Petit Bench, June 18, 1970, Saibanshu No.99, p.375; Supreme Court, 1970 (O) 265, Judgment of the Second Petit Bench, September 8, 1972, Minshu vol.26, No.7, p.1348; Supreme Court, 1982 (O) 548, Judgment of the First Petit Bench, March 24, 1983, Minshu vol.37, No.2, p.131).
In the present case, the original instance court established the fact that the jokoku appellant had been occupying the Land and the Building on her own after the death of K, but has overturned the presumption of the existence of the intention to own the property merely with reference to the change of the internal intention of the jokoku appellant, that she had become aware after the commencement of the occupation that she was not an owner nor had a share in inheritance. This is an error in the interpretation and application of Article 186, para.1 of the Civil Code which provides for the overturning of the presumption of the intention to own, and it is evident that this error affects the conclusion of the original instance court. The argument is with grounds.
According to the facts established above, the jokoku appellant, as an heir of J, commenced occupation of the Land and the Building on May 16, 1970 when K died, and has continued to occupy the property for 20 years. The jokoku appellant should be regarded to have commenced occupation as the sole spouse of K with the statutory inheritance share of one-third, and since the jokoku appellees failed to assert any circumstances which support the absence of the intention to own on the part of the jokoku appellant, the jokoku appellant should be regarded to have acquired one-third of the Land and the Building by acquisitive prescription. Thus, the jokoku appellant occupies the Building as a co-owner, but the jokoku appellee B has not put forward any reason to justify the claim vis-a-vis the jokoku appellant who is a co-owner to transfer the Building to B. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the original instance court in Case 1 which acknowledged the claim to transfer the Building and dismissed the entire claim in Case 2 cannot but be quashed.
(1) [Summary 1] In cases where, in transnational legal relations, there is a preliminary issue which is indispensable to solve the primary issue and which constitutes a different legal relationship from the primary issue from the viewpoint of conflict of laws, the applicable law of the preliminary issue shall not be determined by the applicable law of the primary issue or the applicable law which is designated by the rules of conflict of laws of the country of the applicable law of the primary issue, but should be determined by the rules of conflict of laws of Japan which is the law of the forum.
In the present case, by virtue of Article 25 of the previous Law on the Application of Laws, the applicable law of the inheritance of J is Korean law which is the law of the home country of the deceased J. According to Article 1000, para.1, subpara.1 of the Korean Civil Code, J's direct descendants are heirs, but the applicable law of the problem of whether the jokoku appellees are J's direct descendants or not, which is a different matter from inheritance, i.e. whether there is a parent-children relationship between J and the jokoku appellees is to be determined by the rules of conflict of laws of Japan.
(2) [Summary 2] In accordance with the structure of articles 17 and 18 of the Previous Law on the Application of Laws which provides for the acquisition of legitimacy as a separate legal issue within the legal problem of the existence of a parent-child relationship, if there is a problem as to the existence of a parent-child relation, first, the existence of the parent-legitimate child relationship should be determined by applying the applicable law to this relation, and if the existence of this relation is denied, the applicable law to the existence of a parent-child relationship other than that with a legitimate child should be sought and the existence of the relation should be determined by applying this law.
[Summary 3] According to Article 17 of the previous Law on the Application of Laws, whether the child is a legitimate child or not was to be determined by the law of the home country of the husband of the mother at the time of the birth of the child. This is understood by its wording to be a provision which determines the applicable law to the emergence of the parent-legitimate child relationship in which the legitimacy is obtained by birth. If this is the case, the previous Law on the Application of Law lacks any provision on the acquisition of legitimacy on grounds other than birth. However, it is appropriate to apply this provision by analogy and determine the emergence of the relation by applying the law of the home country of the husband of the mother at the time of the birth of the child.
Therefore, whether the jokoku appellees D, C, and E became the legitimate children of G and J by the marriage of G and J should be determined by Korean law which, at the time of the marriage, was the law of the home country of G who is the husband of J, and whether or not jokoku appellees B and F became the legitimate children of K and J by the legitimization by K shall be determined by Japanese law which is the law of the home country of K at the time of the legitimization by K (this is because it is evident from the records that K legitimised the jokoku appellees on March 14, 1963 after G (K) naturalised to Japanese nationality).
If this is the case, by virtue of Article 773 of the Korean Civil Code before the amendment by Law No.4199 of 1990, a step mother-children relation emerged between jokoku appellees D, C, and E on one hand and J on the other and the jokoku appellees should be treated in the same manner as real children and become heirs (it is understood in Korea that it is not necessary for a mother and a child to belong to the same family register in order for a legal mother-child relation to emerge) (Article 12, para.1 of the Attached Rules to the amended law).
(3) Now let us examine whether or not there is a parent-child relationship other than that with legitimate children between J and the jokoku appellees B and F who are not recognised as the legitimate children of J.
[Summary 4] Article 18, para.1 of the previous Law on the Application of Laws is understood to be a provision which determines the applicable law to the emergence of the parent-child relation between a legitimatising person and a legitimatised child, and therefore, the previous Law lacks a provision on the applicable law when a parent-child relation emerges on other grounds. Of the emergence of a parent-child relation on other grounds, concerning the emergence of a parent-child relation between non-blood related people on a ground other than birth, in the light of the intention of articles 18, para.1 and 22 of the previous Law on the Application of Laws, it is appropriate to acknowledge the emergence of a parent-child relation only when both the law of the home country of the parent and the law of the home country of the child, at the time of the establishment of the fact which serves as the ground for the emergence of the parent-child relationship, acknowledge this.
Therefore, whether or not a parent-children relationship emerges between J and the jokoku appellees by K legitimatizing B and F shall be determined by both Korean law which is the law of the law of the home country of J and Japanese law which is the law of the home country of the jokoku appellees. Since under the Japanese law, a parent-child relationship does not emerge between J and the jokoku appellees, even without considering the content of Korean law, the parent-children relationship between J and the jokoku appellees is denied, and therefore, the jokoku appellees are not the heirs to J.
(4) The ruling of the original instance court, which, different from above, applied Korean law to the emergence of the parent-child relationship between J and the jokoku appellee B and acknowledged the parent-child relationship, has erred in its interpretation and application of the law and it is evident that this error affects the conclusion of the judgment of the original instance court. The argument is with grounds. The part of the judgment of the original instance court which ordered payment of the amount calculated upon the premise that the jokoku appellee is an heir to J in relation to the claim for the payment of the amount equivalent to the rent of the Building in Case 1 cannot but be quashed.
(1) J has inherited one-third of the estate of K in accordance with Article 900 of the Civil Code before the amendment by Law No.51 of 1980.
According to Korean law, concerning the inheritance as a result of the death of J, as above, jokoku appellees D, C, and E who have a statutory mother-children relationship with J are heirs of the same rank, but the share of a female who is not within the same family register is one-quarter that of a male (Article 1009, para.1 of the Korean Civil Code before the amendment by Law No.3051 of 1977, para.2 of the same provision before the amendment in 1990, para.5 of the Attached Rules to the Civil Code before the 1977 amendment, Article 12, para.1 of the Attached Rules to the Civil Code before the 1990 amendment). It is evident that jokoku appellees C and E were females who were not within the same family register by the record.
Therefore, the shares of inheritance of the jokoku appellees of the estate of K are as follows.
The jokoku appellee D inherits four-sixths of the one third of the Land and the Building inherited by J, i.e. 4/18 of the Land and the Building. D has already inherited 2/12 each of the Land and the Building as the legitimate child of K after K's death, and therefore, in total, acquired 7/18 of the estate.
Jokoku appellees C and E inherit one-sixth of the one-third of the share of the Land and the Building inherited by J, i.e. 1/18 of the Land and the Building as females not within the same family register. They have already inherited 2/12 of the Land and the Building as legitimate children of K after K's death, and therefore, in total, acquired 4/18 of the estate.
Jokoku appellees B and F inherited 1/12 each of the Land and the Building by the death of K as K's illegitimate children.
1. The jokoku appellant has acquired one-third of the Land and the Building and the claim of the jokoku appellee B for the transfer of the Building in Case 1 shall be dismissed.
2. The claim of the jokoku appellee B for the payment of the equivalent of the rent in the Case 1 can be regarded as a claim for the return of the part of the rent due to the jokoku appellee corresponding to the share in the Building on the ground of unjust enrichment from the rent which the jokoku appellant is receiving. However, part of the claim by a co-owner for the return of the profit from letting the property from another co-owner exceeding the latter's share on the basis of unjust enrichment for the period after the end of the oral hearing of the fact-finding instance does not qualify for an action for future payment (Supreme Court 1984 (O) 1293, Judgment of the Supreme Court, March 31, 1988, Saibanshu, Civil Cases, No.153, p.627), the claim on the part demanding the payment of the equivalent of the rent after October 20, 1994 shall be dismissed. The part of the claim by the jokoku appellee B for the payment of the equivalent of the rent before the end of the oral hearing of the fact-finding instance shall be acknowledged to the extent of the one-twelfth of the share in the Building deducted by one-third which has been inherited by the jokoku appellant, i.e. one-eighteenth. Thus, the claim by the jokoku appellee B for the payment of the equivalent of the rent shall be acknowledged to the extent of 23,000 yen, which is the one-eighteenth of 414,000 yen per month.
3. According to the records, the Land is still registered in the name of K and the registration of the title to the Building has been transferred, one-third to Kinsetsu (cousin of J), 2/12 each to jokoku appellees D, E, and C, and 1/12 each to jokoku appellees B and F. Therefore, the claim of the jokoku appellant in Case 2 shall be acknowledged to the extent that, concerning the Land, the jokoku appellees should transfer registration of one-third each of their shares of the inheritance (jokoku appellee D, 7/54, jokoku appellees C and E, 4/54 each, jokoku appellees B and F, 1/36 each, i.e. with the common denominator, D, 14/108, C and E, 8/108, B and F, 3/108) and concerning the Building, one-third each of the registered share (jokoku appellee D, C, and E, 2/36 each, jokoku appellees B and F, 1/36 each) on the ground of acquisitive prescription on May 16, 1970. Thus, the justices unanimously rule as the main text of the judgment.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.