Source: https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/p-v-grecu-10957.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:50:39+00:00

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This People's appeal is taken from an order dismissing charges against defendant Michael Grecu. The trial court concluded that defendant's "due process rights to a speedy trial" had been violated based on this court's decision in People v. Martinez (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1589. For reasons that follow, we disagree with the trial court and reverse the trial court's order.
At approximately 9 p.m. on June 25, 2004, Peter Mainwald was battered outside his residence at 228 Carlton Avenue in Los Gatos. According to Mr. Mainwald, defendant struck him in the face with his fist, breaking his nose in two places. Defendant continued to hit him in the face and the back of the head. Then, defendant kicked Mr. Mainwald in the ribs and face. Eventually, defendant placed a chokehold on Mr. Mainwald, but Mr. Mainwald broke free and escaped back to his apartment.
While Mr. Mainwald was on the phone to the police, defendant "took off" on a red motorcycle.
Defendant sent a Penal Code section 1381 demand form dated August 16, 2004, to the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office wherein he claimed that he had been sentenced "to a term of 2yrs" after being "convicted of the crime of P.C. 11378." In this demand form, defendant stated under penalty of perjury that he believed that criminal action was pending against him in Santa Clara County for violations of "HS 11377, HS 11364." Defendant referenced a police report "# 04-207-0496."
Defendant sent another Penal Code section 1381 demand form dated August 29, 2004, to the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office. This time he claimed that he had been sentenced "to a term of 2 yrs" after being "convicted of the crime of HS 11351.5 meth." In this demand form, defendant stated that he believed criminal action was pending against him in Santa Clara County for "P.C 245." The demand form referenced the number "04-1643" and "LGPD."
On August 31, 2004, the District Attorney's Office responded to defendant's first demand form stating that there were no outstanding warrants pending against defendant in Santa Clara County. The letter referenced the San Jose Police Department report #04-207-0496 and noted that no formal charges had been filed.
#04-1643 and noted that no formal charges had been filed.
On December 28, 2004, the District Attorney's Office issued a felony complaint in the current case. Defendant was charged with one count of violating Penal Code sections 242 and 243, subdivision (d). The complaint alleged that in the commission of the offense the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667 and 1192.7. In addition, the complaint alleged that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12 and three prison priors within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). An arrest warrant was requested.
On January 19, 2005, the Los Gatos Police Department received the arrest warrant and mailed three letters to defendant notifying him of the outstanding arrest warrant. The letters were sent to each of the addresses that they had on file for defendant.
Defendant was arrested on the warrant on February 18, 2005. The People claim that he was out of custody at the time of his arrest. Defendant does not dispute this fact.
Following a preliminary hearing held on April 8, 2005, defendant was held to answer. Subsequently, the District Attorney's Office filed an information charging defendant with one count of battery causing serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, 242 and 243, subd. (d)), and one count of assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code 245, subd. (a)(1).) The information contained the same allegations as the complaint.
On July 5, 2005, defendant moved to dismiss the case for "DUE PROCESS AND PENAL CODE SECTION 1381 VIOLATION."
On July 22, 2005, the motion was argued before the Honorable Judge Randolf Rice. The People called Ms. Bonnie Eckert, the custodian of records at the Los Gatos Monte Sereno Police Department, to testify as to how expeditiously the warrant was served once the complaint was filed. She told the court that her department received the warrant on January 19, 2005 and it was entered into the "Wanted Person System" on January 24, 2005. The reverse side of the arrest warrant indicates that letters were sent to defendant on January 19, 2005. At the end of the hearing, Judge Rice stated that he would make a written ruling.
In a written ruling filed on July 26, 2005, Judge Rice granted defendant's motion on the ground that defendant's "due process rights to a speedy trial were violated." Judge Rice found that defendant had shown "pre-accusation prejudice in that the People waited nearly four months from the date of Defendant's first 1381 demand to file the complaint in this case. Defendant lost the ability to serve concurrent time during this period. (People v. Salvador Martinez (Sixth Dist. 1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1589.) The People provide no justification whatsoever for the delay and acknowledge that they had received the police report in this matter some two month before Defendant made his first 1381 demand. Therefore, the People were well aware of both Defendant's in-custody prison status and the pending charges against him in this case at the time Defendant made his 1381 demands. As the People have failed to justify the delay, the balancing test required under Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 504-505 weighs in favor of Defendant."
The People filed a notice of appeal on July 29, 2005.
On appeal, the People raise two issues they ask this court to resolve. First, "[i]n the context of California's non-statutory speedy trial law, does the due process (fair trial) test set forth in People v. Denise Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 75 apply to a defendant against whom no complaint has been filed but who is in custody on another case?" Second, "[d]oes the possibility of loss of concurrent sentencing on a case not yet filed qualify as due process (fair trial) prejudice?" We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
We note that the People and defendant agree that in this case defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not implicated. As defendant points out, this case "involves only a delay between the identification of an individual as the probable perpetrator of an offense and the filing of criminal charges by the responsible prosecutorial agency. As such, it implicates due process guarantees rather than speedy trial rights." Further, defendant concedes that he is not entitled to any presumption of prejudice. Rather, he asserts that he was required to establish prejudice in order to succeed in his motion to dismiss.
In this case, the issue is whether a defendant may establish prejudice by demonstrating that the delay between identifying him as the possible perpetrator of a crime and the filing of charges cost him the opportunity to serve a sentence for the charged crime concurrently with the sentence being served in another case.
As noted, in concluding that the defendant in this case had established prejudice, the trial court relied on this court's decision in People v.Martinez, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 1589.
Nevertheless, this court's decision in People v.Martinez, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 1589 and the California Supreme Court's decision in Lowe, supra, 40 Cal.4th 937 were decided under the speedy trial right provided by the California Constitution. (People v. [Salvador] Martinez, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1593-1596; Lowe, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 939, 946.) The speedy trial right provided by the California Constitution is modeled on the United States Constitution and " 'reflects the letter and spirit of' the Sixth Amendment . . . ." (People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 144, fn. 2.) However, as noted, here we are not concerned with either the federal or state speedy trial right, but with due process guarantees.
Accordingly, we must decide if the loss of the possibility of concurrent sentencing constitutes a denial of due process of law.
In People v. Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 767 the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to due process "protects a criminal defendant's interest in fair adjudication by preventing unjustified delays that weaken the defense through the dimming of memories, the death or disappearance of witnesses, and the loss or destruction of material physical evidence." In other words, due process protects fair trial rights and not sentencing considerations. Since defendant's claim of prejudice rested entirely on the loss of the possibility of serving concurrent time, the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant's motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, we must reverse the Superior Court's ruling granting defendant's motion to dismiss and order the trial court to reinstate the charges against defendant.
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court to reinstate the charges against defendant.
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 The background facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript.
 Pursuant to Penal Code section 1381, " [w]henever a defendant has been convicted, in any court of this state, of the commission of a felony . . . and has been sentenced to and has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison . . . and at the time of the entry upon the term of imprisonment . . . there is pending, in any court of this state, any other indictment, information, complaint, or any criminal proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced, the district attorney of the county in which the matters are pending shall bring the defendant to trial or for sentencing within 90 days after the person shall have delivered to said district attorney written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment or commitment and his or her desire to be brought to trial or for sentencing unless a continuance beyond the 90 days is requested or consented to by the person, in open court, and the request or consent entered upon the minutes of the court in which event the 90-day period shall commence to run anew from the date to which the consent or request continued the trial or sentencing. . . ."
 It appears that the Los Gatos Police Department forwarded the results of their investigation to the Santa Clara County District Attorney on July 16, 2004 requesting issuance of a complaint. Furthermore, since defendant is alleged to have committed the crime in the instant case in June 2004, it appears that at the time he sent his demand letters defendant was not serving a two-year sentence for his other convictions, but was serving time on a parole violation.
 It appears the court filed the warrant on December 30, 2004.
 Judge Rice held that the provisions of Penal Code section 1381 did not apply because no charges were pending against defendant at the time of his Penal Code section 1381 demands.
Description This People's appeal is taken from an order dismissing charges against defendant Michael Grecu. The trial court concluded that defendant's "due process rights to a speedy trial" had been violated based on this court's decision in People v. Martinez (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1589. For reasons that follow, Court disagree with the trial court and reverse the trial court's order.

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