Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/300/300mass620.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:53:05+00:00

Document:
Is it competent for the General Court to enact legislation, substantially as set forth in said bill, providing that under certain circumstances the neglect or refusal of a defendant in a criminal proceeding to testify may be made the subject of comment at his trial, notwithstanding the provisions of Article XII of Part the First of the Constitution of the Commonwealth?
could not have called the defendant as a witness, he might have elected to be a witness in his own behalf and that in weighing the evidence it may take into consideration his failure to testify.
The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court respectfully submit this answer to the question proposed in an order adopted on the twenty-fifth day of May, 1938, a copy whereof is hereto annexed.
It is provided by art. 12 of Part I of the Constitution of the Commonwealth that "No subject shall be . . . compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." Defendants in criminal causes could not be witnesses until the passage of St. 1866, c. 260. Commonwealth v. Fortier, 258 Mass. 98, 101.
"The St. of 1870, c. 393, Section 1, which makes defendants who are charged with crimes and offences competent witnesses, provides that their neglect or refusal to testify shall not create any presumption against himself. Since this class of defendants are allowed to testify if they will, there is some danger that if one exercises his right of silence, the jury will look upon it as a proper matter to weigh against him in considering the question of his guilt. It is important that courts should carefully guard his constitutional right."
In Commonwealth v. Maloney, 113 Mass. 211, at 214, referring to the same statute, it was said: "The statute is explicit; and the exemption should be scrupulously secured to the defendant. . . . It is doubtless intended to carry out the spirit and purpose of the clause in the Declaration of Rights, that no subject shall `be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself.' A bare literal compliance with the terms of this provision is not all that a defendant is entitled to." Commonwealth v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285, 287. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
jury in determining whether a defendant is or is not guilty, and that an equivocal instruction upon this matter entitles the defendant to a new trial; Chief Justice Chapman saying, `It is important that courts should carefully guard his constitutional right.' Commonwealth v. Harlow, 110 Mass. 411." Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 450. Commonwealth v. Finnerty, 148 Mass. 162, 166. Commonwealth v. Richmond, 207 Mass. 240, 248. Commonwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507, 514. Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 316. Commonwealth v. Hanley, 140 Mass. 457.
It was held in Commonwealth v. Clark, 14 Gray 367, 373, that the omission of the defendant to produce a witness other than himself, to meet and explain evidence tending to prove his guilt, was proper for the consideration of the jury. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 430, in dealing with the statute which provides that neglect or refusal to testify shall not create any presumption against the defendant, it was said: "But it may be assumed that the provision of the Constitution [art. 12] needs no statute to reinforce it in this particular, and that the refusal to testify before the grand jury could create no presumption against the defendants, whether the above statute applies or not. This means, no presumption upon which a legal judgment or consequence could rest. . . . The protection afforded by the Constitution is that the individual shall not be prejudiced at law by his silence, if he keeps silent."
against himself had become embodied in the common law and distinguished it from all other systems of jurisprudence. It was generally regarded then, as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions."
The present statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 233, Section 20, cl. Third, is in these words: "Third, The defendant in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be allowed to testify; but his neglect or refusal to testify shall not create any prosumption against him." In view of the number of decisions dealing with that clause, there is no doubt touching its constitutionality.
We are of opinion that the final sentence of clause "Third" in Section 1 of the proposed bill, being lines nineteen to twenty-nine, contains unconstitutional provisions. The protection of art. 12 is that "No subject shall be . . . compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." That shield is positive and unequivocal. It is subject to no condition. It rests wholly upon the volition of the defendant whether he shall fail to interpose it, or not. The last sentence of the proposed bill is not positive and unequivocal. Whether a defendant may, under the proposed bill if enacted, avail himself of that positive protection, or not, depends upon the preliminary determination by the judge of the fact whether it is in the power of the defendant, if not guilty, truthfully to contradict by his testimony material evidence as to his guilt introduced by the prosection, and upon the further exercise of discretion by the trial judge to give instructions touching the subject. This procedure cuts down the positive protection given by the Constitution and renders it conditional and subject to limitations. That which was before certain, clear and indubitable has become contingent, clouded and ambiguous. Positive rights secured to individuals by the Constitution cannot be thus circumscribed and rendered doubtful.
This conclusion is supported by State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D.
178, 184, 188. Minters v. People, 139 Ill. 363. People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522.
It becomes unnecessary to discuss the other provisions of the proposed bill. The question proposed in the order is answered "No."
The constitutional validity of Senate Bill 506 depends upon the meaning which certain words bore in 1780, when they were included in our Declaration of Rights. Mass. Const. Part I, art. 12. The words are: "No subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." Nothing in the Federal Constitution applies. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78. In construing our constitutional provision, its historical setting is of the first importance.
was established in 1780 by the very article under discussion (Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9, 16), and may have been recognized earlier (St. 1697, c. 9, Section 11), in England counsel were first allowed in trials for treason in 1695 (St. 7 Wm. III, c. 3, Section 1), came to play minor parts in other trials, and were admitted to defend in felonies generally in 1836 by St. 6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 114, Section 1. 9 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law (1926), 235. Modern judges who have heard criminal defendants conduct their cases without the aid of counsel know that their efforts often result in a jumble of cross-examination, unsworn assertion, and argument upon the evidence. In the early seventeenth century and before, a criminal trial was in great part a protracted wrangle between counsel for the prosecution and the defendant. This is vividly portrayed by Stephen (1 Hist. Crim. Law, 325, 326), quoted in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 103. See also 9 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law (1926), 225-235.
The almost inevitable furnishing of evidence by a criminal defendant conducting his own defence at a time when the law of evidence was in its infancy, was aggravated by the adoption of the inquisitorial system which became the accepted practice of the Court of Star Chamber in criminal cases. 4 Wigmore, Evid. (2d ed.) Section 2250, I, 2 (b), page 806. Stephen says (1 Hist. Crim. Law, 342), "In the old Ecclesiastical Courts and in the Star Chamber it [the ex officio oath, to make true answers to all questions] was understood to be, and was, used as an oath to speak the truth on the matters objected against the defendant -- an oath, in short to accuse oneself." The controversy over this oath reached its peak in Lilburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315, in 1637. As a result, in 1641 the Court of Star Chamber was abolished, and the use of such an oath in penal cases was forbidden. St. 16 Car. I, cc. 10, 11. 4 Wigmore, Evid. (2d ed.) Section 2250, I, 3, page 808.
, 185-187), and accused persons were compelled to submit to an examination before trial, the results of which were put in evidence. 4 Wigmore, Evid. (2d ed.) Section 2250, II, 1, 2. Authorities are collected in 30 Mich. Law Rev. (June, 1932) 1224, 1231 et seq. During the time of Charles II, the general privilege against self-crimination became established, and "the extension of the privilege to include an ordinary witness, and not merely the party charged, is for the first time made." 4 Wigmore, Evid. (2d ed.) Section 2250, II, 3. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 181.
might be drawn against him from his failure to testify. State v. Bartlett, 55 Maine, 200, 216-221. State v. Lawrence, 57 Maine, 574. State v. Cleaves, 59 Maine, 298. Similar decisions have been made in Connecticut (State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454; State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490; State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 94 Am. L. R. 696), under a constitutional provision that "the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." Conn. Decl. of Rights, Section 9.
There are no decisions in this Commonwealth, for from the moment when a criminal defendant was allowed to testify there has existed a statutory provision that his neglect or refusal to testify shall not create any presumption (i.e. inference) against him. St. 1866, c. 260. St. 1870, c. 393, Section 1. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 233, Section 20 (3). Whatever intimations may be found in our cases can at best rise no higher than dicta. Commonwealth v. Harlow, 110 Mass. 411. Commonwealth v. Maloney, 113 Mass. 211. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285. Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239. Commonwealth v. Finnerty, 148 Mass. 162, 166, 167. Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 430. Commonwealth v. Richmond, 207 Mass. 240, 249. Commonwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507, 514. Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 316. In most of these cases there is nothing strong enough to be called a dictum. But in Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 450, it was said, "If evidence is material and competent except for a personal privilege of one of the parties to have it excluded under the law, his claim of the privilege may be referred to in argument and considered by the jury, as indicating his opinion that the evidence, if received, would be prejudicial to him. This is the rule . . . in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, where the party charged with a crime, who has a legal right to testify in his own behalf, fails to take the witness stand." This, too, was dictum. But it was said, after evident research and consideration, by one of the greatest of our chief justices.
against which the constitutional provision was aimed. Neither is subjecting the accused to an inference if he does not testify, the sort of self-accusation or self-crimination meant. The history of the privilege, and the weight of authority, show that the constitutional provision was directed against torture, force, and the inquisitorial practices of past centuries. It has no concern with tactical refinements.
If our constitutional provision is to be interpreted in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Justices, the question may deserve consideration whether it does not preclude the drawing of an inference against a criminal defendant because of his failure to call witnesses other than himself to explain incriminating circumstances (Commonwealth v. Finnerty, 148 Mass. 162: Commonsealth v. Goldstein, 180 Mass. 374; Commonwealth v. Peoples Express Co. 201 Mass. 564, 581), and the drawing of an inference against a party to a civil case, who has not waived his privilege against self-crimination, because of his claim of the privilege. See Andrews v. Frye, 104 Mass. 234; Commonwealth v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285, 287; Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 316, 317; Bartlett v. Lewis, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 249, 260, 261. Certainly, the opinion of the majority of the Justices deprives the words of the present statute, that "his neglect or refusal to testify shall not create any presumption against him," of all effect, and makes them unnecessary.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the question should be answered "Yes."
[Note Star] For the anomalous right to make an unsworn statement -- a survival from the time when an accused could not testify -- see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9; St. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, Section 1 (h); Rex v. Dunn, 91 L. J. N. S. (K. B.) 863; 1 Wigmore, Evid. (2d ed.) Section 579.

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