Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/269359581/Spider-Man-Opinion
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:24:44+00:00

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continue to receive royalties for sales made after his patent expires.
asks this Court to overrule Brulotte.
Held: Stare decisis requires this Court to adhere to Brulotte. Pp. 318.
use the article passes to the public. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U. S. 249, 255256.
so doing, conflicted with patent laws policy of establishing a postexpiration . . . public domain, ibid.
abandon Brulottes bright-line rule in favor of a case-by-case approach based on antitrust laws rule of reason. Pp. 37.
not an inexorable command, is the preferred course. Payne v.
free to take their objections to Congress. See e.g., Patterson v.
has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte, see Watson v.
likely to rely on such precedents when ordering their affairs.
(c) Neither of the justifications Kimble offers gives cause to overrule Brulotte. Pp. 1218.
matter. But Congress, not this Court, gets to make patent policy.
for innovation are more appropriately addressed to Congress. Halliburton, 573 U. S., at ___. Pp. 1618.
727 F. 3d 856, affirmed.
dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined.
relief not from this Court but from Congress.
pressurized foam stringfrom the palm of [the] hand.
1 Petitioner Robert Grabb later acquired an interest in the patent.
For simplicity, we refer only to Kimble.
glove and a canister of foam.
Kimble patent. 692 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1161 (Ariz. 2010).
Brulotte covers a transaction structured in that alternative way.
counterintuitive and its rationale is arguably unconvincing. 727 F. 3d 856, 857 (2013).
the right to make or use the article, free from all restriction, passes to the public. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964).
that Brulotte should be overruled).
have struck down state statutes with that consequence.
the statutory provision setting the length of a patent term.
See id., at 30 (quoting the then-current version of 154).
patent laws. 379 U. S., at 31 (quoting 326 U. S., at 256).
such use continue the patent monopoly beyond the [patent] period, even though only as to the licensee affected.
make free use of a formerly patented product. Ibid.
allocate the risks and rewards associated with commercializing inventionsmost notably, when years of development work stand between licensing a patent and bringing a product to market. See, e.g., 3 R. Milgrim & E.
to either goal, Brulotte may pose an obstacle.
patent term, but to amortize that amount over 40 years.
either multiple patents or additional non-patent rights.
enable parties to share the risks and rewards of commercializing an invention.
posits, is whether a patent holder has power in the relevant market and so might be able to curtail competition.
See Brief for Petitioners 4748; Illinois Tool Works Inc. v.
and the like. Brief for Petitioners 48 (quoting 1 H.
to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827828 (1991).
we would decide a case differently now than we did then.
court, for acceptance or not as that branch elects.
Nov. 19, 1988, 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (limiting patentmisuse claims). Brulotte survived every such change.
about whether Brulotte has actually generated reliance.
precedents means that reversing it could threaten others.
that the old rule of tying was among Brulottes legal underpinnings.
Brulotte, and so further supports adhering to stare decisis.
apply. A court need only ask whether a licensing agreement provides royalties for post-expiration use of a patent.
make the law less, not more, workable than it is now.
abandoning stare decisis cut the other way here.
view of the competitive effects of post-expiration royalties.
give Congress cause to upset Brulotte, but does not warrant this Courts doing so.
Brulotte per se rule makes little sense. Id., at 11.
Inc., 551 U. S. 877 (2007); Illinois Tool Works, 547 U. S.
we might answer both questions as Kimble would like.
the terms dynamic potential. Business Electronics Corp.
v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 731732 (1988).
amendretains its usual strong force. See supra, at 8.
reason to think his own the Court erred claim is special.
fails to clear stare decisiss high bar.
on the notion that post-patent royalties harm competition.
effect on competition. 1 Hovenkamp 3.2d, at 310.
Congress, not this Court, is his proper audience.
see the light of day. Id., at 33.
not know where or how to start.
Which is one good reason why that is not our job.
Claims that a statutory precedent has serious and harmful consequences for innovation are (to repeat this opinions refrain) more appropriately addressed to Congress.
leaving matters of public policy to Congress.
teaches that we should exercise that authority sparingly.
Kimbles invitation to overrule Brulotte.
restraint, to reaffirm a clear case of judicial overreach.
finding support for this holding in the language of the Act.
the purchase or use of unpatented ones. Id., at 33.
the patentees monopoly or extend the term of the patent.
ing agreements that provide for post-expiration royalties.
not really statutory interpretation at all.
Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 Utah L. Rev.
n. 11 (collecting sources); ante, at 3, n. 3.
Hous. L. Rev. 953, 955 (2005).
and why such arrangements have pro-competitive effects.
products by spreading licensing fees over longer periods.
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S.
parties can often find ways around Brulotte. Ante, at 6.
also allowing patent holders to capitalize on slowdeveloping inventions.
stopped selling toys that fit the terms of the agreement.
shattered, and petitioners rights were extinguished.
in Marvels direction. Ante, at 10.
In the end, Brulottes only virtue is that we decided it.
(1991)). But stare decisis is not an inexorable command.
tion. And it unsettles contractual expectations.
decisions can be undone by Congress. See, e.g., John R.
think this goes a bit too far.
tion to decisions that do not actually interpret a statute.
entire burden of correcting the Courts own error.
Sherman Act has no parallel in Patent Act cases.
to our Sherman Act decisions.
U. S. 633, 650 (1990)).
ence committee and repassed by both Houses.

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