Source: http://berschauerlaw.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61:personal-injury&catid=34&Itemid=54
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:09:00+00:00

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"Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or persons, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself."
Thus, in California negligence claims have a basis in statute as well as under common law.
However, when the condition was not created by the owner's own willful or negligent acts liability will only be imposed if he had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Constructive knowledge will be implied if the condition existed for such a period of time that the landowner, in the exercise of reasonable care, would have discovered the existence of the condition in the maintenance of his property.
Aside from the fact that a landowner is not liable for injuries caused by "open and obvious conditions" and just plain stupidity of those on his property, a landowner is also not liable for injuries caused by "trivial" defects. Such "dangerous" conditions include minor cracks, chips, uneven surfaces, and raised concrete slabs in walkways, paths, and steps. Thus, in Ursino v. Bob's Big Boy Restaurants (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 394, 397, the court held that a the owner of a restaurant was not liable when an invitee tripped and fell on a 3/4 inch rise between two concrete slabs in the walkway to the restaurant. The court followed a public entity case, Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 734, and held that 3/4 of an inch was a "trivial defect" for which there could be no liability on the part of the landowner. This fits well with the notion that a landowner is not an insurer of the safety of those using his property, otherwise landowners would have a duty to make their property super safe and eliminate all possible irregularities.
An interesting situation exists when the "trip and fall" occurs on a public sidewalk adjoining a private landowner's property. Who in this case has the duty to repair or maintain the path in question? Streets and Highways Code Section 5610 imposes a duty on owners of abutting property to maintain and repair sidewalks. However, it has been held that Section 5610 does not create a tort duty owed by a landowner to third parties (or to a public entity) to maintain and repair sidewalks, but merely allocates the cost of such repairs between the entity and the private landowner. (Williams v. Foster (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 510; Schaefer v. Lenaham (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 324 (interpreting Section 31 of the Improvement Act of 1911, the precursor to Section 5610).) Nevertheless if the sidewalk defect was somehow attributable to the abutting property owner he could be liable under Civil Code Section 1714(a). The interplay between the abutting private landowner and the public entity is complicated and is well explained in a law reivew article, California Sidewalks: A Comprehensive Scheme For Determining Municipal And Abutter Liabilities 31 Santa Clara L.Rev. 463 (1991).
An "assault" is the threat or use of force on another that causes that person to have a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact.
A "battery" is the application of force to another resulting in harmful or offensive contact.
Both "assault" and "battery" are torts (i.e. personal wrongs against another) for which one can sue to recover damages, and are civil claims rather than the analogous criminal charges under Penal Code Sections 240 and 242.
Defamation includes both slander and libel.
The owner of a dog is strictly liable at law for any damages suffered by a person who is bitten by the dog in a public place, or while lawfuly in a private place. (Civil Code Section 3342) Contrary to popular belief there is no "one free bite" rule.
At common law a landowner was not liable for the criminal acts of third parties. This rule was modified by case law creating a duty on the landowner to protect against such criminal acts. However, absent a "special relationship" there was no duty to take affirmative action to protect another for the criminal conduct of a third party. Once such a special relationship is established such criminal acts must be foreseeable to impose a duty on the landowner.
Early California appellate case law on the subject was restrictive, holding that in the absence of prior similar incidents the landowner was not bound to anticipate the criminal activities of third persons. (Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 538; Riley v. Marcus (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 103; Jubert v. Shalom Realty (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1.) These cases were disapproved in Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 125.
Subsequent cases include: Lopez v. McDonald's (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 495, Thai v. Stang (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1264, and Onciano v. Golden Palace Restaurant (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 385. The Isaacs decision is the only guiding authority from the California Supreme Court on the subject. It seriously puts into question the continued validity of prior appellate decisions where foreseeability was limited to prior similar incidents. In these days where drive-by shootings and car-jackings are common place events, there is little a landowner can do to guard against such criminal attacks. Additionally, allowing these cases to go to a jury on the issue of foreseeability to determine whether a landowner's security measures were adequate creates the risk that a jury will use hindsight in determining that the crime in question was foreseeable, and award a substantial sum as damages. Certainly the "no duty" and proximate cause approaches can and should be used by the courts in appropriate cases to decide the case as a matter of law. However, what remains is the vast majority of cases like Onciano where the jury will question the landowner's actions in light of his duty to protect against the criminal acts of third parties.
A side note: Obviously, these cases all deal with criminal acts on the premises of the landowner. To date no case has held that the landowner has a duty to prevent or guard against criminal acts on adjacent property. (See Wylie v. Gersch (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 412, 418-19; Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 379, 384 (defendant Supermarket had no duty to customer who was hit by a motorist on adjacent public street over which defendant had no control); Donnell v. California Western School of Law (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 715 (Plaintiff left defendant's building after dark and was attacked by an unknown assailant on a public sidewalk bordering the building. Plaintiff alleged that by failing to provide parking for its students, defendant forced him to walk through a high-crime area, and that defendant provided neither a warning nor protective measures such as security guards or lights or monitors on the building. The court denied liability, holding that premises liability is based upon ownership, possession or control, and that merely having the power to influence adjoining property does not amount to control under premises liability law.).) Thus, the law in this area of premises liability is open and developing rapidly.

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