Source: https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/11179901.rhs.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:15:44+00:00

Document:
Following a jury trial, Donald L. Green appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana, a Class D felony.See footnote 1 Green raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained following an investigatory stop of Green.
release. Frantz asked Green for his consent to search the vehicle. Green consented. Frantz found marijuana in the car's glove compartment.
Before trial, Green moved to suppress the marijuana on the theory that Frantz lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop Green and that the marijuana found in the vehicle was a product of the illegal stop. The trial court denied Green's motion. The trial court also overruled Green's objection to the introduction of this evidence at trial. Green was convicted of possession of marijuana. This appeal ensued.
642, 644 (Ind. 1994). It is also determined by the totality of the circumstances. Hatch, 827 F.Supp. at 541; Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ind. 1992). If the facts known by the police at the time of the 'stop' are such that a man of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate, the command of the fourth amendment is satisfied. Platt, 589 N.E.2d at 226 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880-81).
Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. 1997), modified on rehearing, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997). The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within a proper exception to the warrant requirement. Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 1998).
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we examine the evidence most favorable to the ruling, together with any uncontradicted evidence. State v. Joe, 693 N.E.2d 573, 574-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. However, the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
Here, the evidence reveals that Frantz stopped his car in front of Green's on a narrow lane, showed Green his badge, and began asking him questions. This was an investigatory stop to which Fourth Amendment protections applied. State v. Nesius, 548 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (even a brief stop of an automobile and detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure); Williams v. State, 611 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1552, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)) (consensual encounters are not seizures, but an encounter is consensual only where a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his business').
Frantz, an officer with experience and training in drug law enforcement, knew that the property on which he found Green had been used to store marijuana approximately one year earlier and that it was the harvest season for marijuana. Other than his presence on this suspect property, however, Green had done nothing to indicate that he was engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity himself. Assuming, somewhat charitably, that this particular location could be considered a high crime area, Green's presence alone did not justify an investigatory stop.
The State contends that reasonable suspicion was unnecessary in this case because Green had waived his Fourth Amendment protections as a condition of his work release. The Benton County Sheriff testified that Green had signed an agreement in conjunction with the work release program wherein Green had agreed to waive his 4th Amendment right with regard to a search and seizure by any law enforcement officer. Record at 168. The sheriff could not produce the document Green signed, but he testified that the work release rules had been discussed with Green point by point. Record at 169.
Supreme Court specifically observed in Griffin that the permissible degree of impingement is not unlimited. Id. The Court held that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system justified replacement of the probable cause standard with reasonable grounds. Id. at 875-76.
Like probation, a work release program is simply one point . . . on a continuum of possible punishments, and as such, work release participants do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special . . . restrictions.' Id. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). Generally, work release is a more restrictive form of punishment than probation since work release participants are actually jail inmates who must return to the jail when not working or participating in other sanctioned activities. See Ind. Code § 11-12-5-2 (1998). Nevertheless, an inmate who has been released for work closely resembles a probationer. Like the probationer, the work release participant enjoys conditional liberty subject to the terms of the work release program. Id. We conclude that our holding in Purdy applies equally to the terms and conditions of work release. Therefore, a condition of work release that purports to require a participant to submit to a search or seizure without reasonable suspicion is overly broad.
found in Green's vehicle was obtained as the result of an improper investigatory stop. The trial court erred by denying Green's motion to suppress.
NAJAM, J., and RUCKER, J., concur.
Footnote: 1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (1998).
Footnote: 2 Frantz was not in uniform nor was his vehicle marked.
Footnote: 3 We note that Frantz did not recognize Green when he first stopped Green. Thus, Green's status as a work release participant was not a factor confronting Frantz at the time of the stop and cannot be used to justify the stop.

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