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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:37:25+00:00

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Constitutional Law - Relationship of State and Federal Constitutions - Independent State Interpretation. A court determines whether the state constitution should be interpreted as being more protective of individual rights than the federal constitution by considering the following nonexclusive factors: (1) the language of the state constitution, (2) significant differences in the language of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions, (3) the history of the state constitution and common law, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences between the federal and state constitutions, and (6) whether the subject matter is of particular state interest or local concern.
 Searches and Seizures - Warrant - Informant - Credibility - Admissions Against Penal Interest. The credibility of a person who provides information used to obtain a search warrant is supported by his admissions of criminal activity with no motive to lie.
NATURE OF ACTION: Prosecution for conspiring to deliver, delivering, and possessing cocaine. The affidavit used to obtain a search warrant for the defendant's house included long distance toll records and pen register tapes for the defendant's telephone.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 83-1-00798-9, Daniel T. Kershner, J., entered a judgment of guilty on September 4, 1984.
Supreme Court: Holding that the police violated the defendant's privacy rights under Const. art. 1, 7 by obtaining the toll records and pen register tapes without valid legal process but that, even without such telephone information, the affidavit established probable cause to search the defendant's house, the court AFFIRMS the judgment.
COUNSEL: MARK W. MUENSTER of WASHINGTON APPELLATE DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, for appellant.
In December of 1983, the Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney charged Laura Gunwall and her brother, Ken Bohan, with delivering, conspiring to deliver and possessing cocaine in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50.401(a). Mr. Bohan has not appealed; therefore, we will herein refer to Ms. Gunwall as the sole defendant.
Later that day, two undercover officers bought an additional one-half ounce of cocaine from Mayer. Police officers again watched her drive to 3010 Butler, enter the house, depart and drive back to the undercover officers with the cocaine. Mayer told the officers that her girl friend cut the cocaine from pound bags. When asked about the possibility of meeting her friend to arrange a larger purchase, Mayer stated, "Laurie doesn't like to meet too many people and I'm one of Laurie's closest friends." The officers bought cocaine from Mayer a third time on September 2, again after Mayer drove to and from 3010 Butler.
«2» The State does not challenge the defendant's contention that insofar as the defendant's rights are concerned, the court order was thus a "sham". BUT CF. 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(ii) exonerating the phone company from liability when information is released pursuant to "court order".
The detective learned from the pen register tapes that several calls had been placed to airline reservation offices, and also to a Florida phone number listed to one William Navarro. It was then learned that Navarro had been contacted by United States customs agents regarding possible marijuana violations and in 1973 was convicted of mail fraud.
The defendant returned to Seattle on September 21, 1983, and a detective watched Janice Mayer meet her and drive her home. On September 28, Mayer sold an undercover officer one-eighth ounce of cocaine as a sample for a larger purchase. Police surveillance again indicated that Mayer got the cocaine from the defendant's residence. When Mayer produced the one-eighth ounce, the officer asked her if she had seen more cocaine. Mayer reported seeing 7 ounces in a safe and said that she could sell the officer 2 ounces whenever the officer was ready.
«3» Utter, FREEDOM AND DIVERSITY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: PERSPECTIVES ON STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 491, 499 (1984). SEE STATE v. JACKSON, 102 Wn.2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); STATE v. MYRICK, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984); STATE v. CHRISMAN, 100 Wn.2d 814, 817, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); STATE v. RINGER, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983); STATE v. RINALDO, 36 Wn. App. 86, 89, 673 P.2d 614 (1983), AFF'D, 102 Wn.2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (1984); STATE v. WHITE, 97 Wn.2d 92, 108, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); ALDERWOOD ASSOCS. v. WASHINGTON ENVTL. COUN., 96 Wn.2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d 108 (1981); STATE v. SIMPSON, 95 Wn.2d 170, 177, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); STATE v. FAIN, 94 Wn.2d 387, 392, 617 P.2d 720 (1980); STATE v. HEHMAN, 90 Wn.2d 45, 49, 578 P.2d 527 (1978).
«4» PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CTR. v. ROBINS, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980). SEE OREGON v. HASS, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975); COOPER v. CALIFORNIA, 386 U.S. 58, 64, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S. Ct. 788, REH'G & MODIFICATION DENIED, 386 U.S. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 243, 87 S. Ct. 1283 (1967).
«5» SEE WHITE, at 108 (and cases therein cited).
«6» THE ROLE OF A BILL OF RIGHTS IN A MODERN STATE CONSTITUTION, 45 Wash. L. Rev. 453 (1970).
«7» SEE Deukmejian & Thompson, ALL SAIL AND NO ANCHOR- JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, 6 Hastings Const. L.Q. 975 (1979).
«8» Howard, STATE COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE DAY OF THE BURGER COURT, 62 Va. L. Rev. 873, 934 (1976).
Many of the courts now resorting to state constitutions rather than to analogous provisions of the United States Constitution simply announce that their decision is based on the state constitution but do not further explain it. The difficulty with such decisions is that they establish no principled basis for repudiating federal precedent and thus furnish little or no rational basis for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law.
in certain areas of judicial administration is desirable.
the importance of federal sources of constitutional doctrine.
«9» STATE v. HUNT, 91 N.J. 338, 363, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
«10» SEE THE ROLE OF A BILL OF RIGHTS IN A MODERN STATE CONSTITUTION, 45 Wash. L. Rev. 453 (1970); WHITE, 97 Wn.2d at 108; Bice, ANDERSON AND THE ADEQUATE STATE GROUND, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 750 (1972); Deukmejian & Thompson, 6 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 975; Utter, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. at 494 (1984).
relevant to determining whether, in a given situation, the constitution of the State of Washington should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than does the United States Constitution.
4. PREEXISTING STATE LAW. Previously established bodies of state law, including statutory law, may also bear on the granting of distinctive state constitutional rights. State law may be responsive to concerns of its citizens long before they are addressed by analogous constitutional claims. Preexisting law can thus help to define the scope of a constitutional right later established.
«11» For example, the United States Supreme Court upheld local concerns in COYLE v. SMITH, 221 U.S. 559, 55 L. Ed. 853, 31 S. Ct. 688 (1911) (each state has the power to locate its own seat of government, to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose) and COOLEY v. BOARD OF WARDENS, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851) (pilotage does not require uniform national rule).
The former may be more appropriately addressed by resorting to the state constitution.
«12» IN RE ROSIER, 105 Wn.2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986), quoting with approval from UNITED STATES v. PHILLIPS, 433 F.2d 1364, 1366 (8th Cir. 1970), CERT. DENIED, 401 U.S. 917, 27 L. Ed. 2d 819, 91 S. Ct. 900 (1971).
«13» Nock, SEIZING OPPORTUNITY, SEARCHING FOR THEORY: ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 331, 347-48 (1985).
«14» SEE HUNT, 91 N.J. at 367 (Handler, J., concurring).
«15» Fishman, PEN REGISTERS AND PRIVACY: RISKS, EXPECTATIONS, AND THE NULLIFICATION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 557, 558 n.3 (1980) states: "A pen register is a mechanical device, usually installed at a central telephone company facility, that records on paper the numbers dialed from a particular telephone by monitoring the electronic impulses caused when the dial is rotated. Such a device reveals only the numbers that have been dialed. It does not enable anyone to hear any of the communications transmitted. Thus, a pen register discloses neither the subject of a communication between the caller and the recipient, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed. A touch-tone decoder accomplishes the same results, with the same limitations, on a touch-tone telephone."
«16» HUNT, 91 N.J. at 344.
Legally, they are in the same mold, therefore, we here consider them together.
«17» SEE, E.G., C. Fishman, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING 28, at 103 (Supp. 1985) ("unrestricted use of pen registers by the police would have a substantial and deleterious effect on privacy"); PEOPLE v. SPORLEDER, 666 P.2d 135, 141 (Colo. 1983) ("A telephone subscriber . . . has an actual expectation that the dialing of telephone numbers from a home telephone will be free from governmental intrusion."); 1 W. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 2.7, at 153-55 (Supp. 1986) (contending that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone records); Note, PEN REGISTERS AFTER SMITH v. MARYLAND, Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 753 (1980).
«18» REPORTERS COMM. v. A.T. & T., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), CERT. DENIED, 440 U.S. 949, 59 L. Ed. 2d 639, 99 S. Ct. 1431 (1979); UNITED STATES v. FITHIAN, 452 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1971); DIPIAZZA v. UNITED STATES, 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969), CERT. DENIED, 402 U.S. 949, 29 L. Ed. 2d 119, 91 S. Ct. 1606 (1971).
 As discussed above, however, these federal rulings are not the end of our inquiry. Applying the six nonexclusive neutral criteria set forth above, we conclude that this is an appropriate case in which to resort to independent state constitutional grounds. Our reasoning, keyed to the above six criteria, is as follows.
«19» STATE v. MYRICK, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
«20» SEE STATE v. CHRISMAN, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); STATE v. WHITE, 97 Wn.2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); STATE v. SIMPSON, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). SEE ALSO Nock, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. at 342.
«21» JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at 497 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962). SEE Nock, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. at 332.
This, too, lends support to reading article 1, section 7 independently of federal law in this case.
We recently discussed this in some detail in STATE v. O'NEILL, 103 Wn.2d 853, 700 P.2d 711 (1985); therefore, we need not do so again here. The long history and tradition of strict legislative protection of telephonic and other electronic communications in this state lends strong support to our decision to resort to independent state constitutional grounds in this case.
«23» SEE FAIN v. CHAPMAN, 89 Wn.2d 48, 53, 569 P.2d 1135 (1977); Utter, FREEDOM AND DIVERSITY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: PERSPECTIVES ON STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 491, 494 (1984).
This also supports construing article 1, section 7 of our state constitution so as to guarantee protection of the defendant's privacy rights in the context presented here.
«24» SEE MICHIGAN v. LONG, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
we now proceed to do so.
to effectively communicate in today's complex society.
J. Skelly Wright, dissenting in REPORTERS COMMITTEE v.
number appeared on Anderson's billing record. See ID.
release to other persons for other reasons.
«25» SEE STATE v. MYRICK, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510-13, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
«26» SEE STATE v. FIELDS, 85 Wn.2d 126, 530 P.2d 284 (1975); Nock, SEIZING OPPORTUNITY, SEARCHING FOR THEORY: ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 331, 347 (1985).
«27» SEE STATE v. FIELDS, SUPRA; STATE v. HUNT, 91 N.J. 338, 348, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
«28» SEE STATE v. O'NEILL, 103 Wn.2d 853, 874-75, 700 P.2d 711 (1985).
«30» RCW 9.73.030-.140. SEE STATE v. O'NEILL, SUPRA.
«31» RCW 9.73.040(1). SEE O'NEILL, at 861-67.
legislative action may be required before a pen register can be authorized to intercept telephonic information concerning illegal drug transactions.
«33» BIXLER v. HILLE, 80 Wn.2d 668, 497 P.2d 594 (1972).
«34» SMITH v. MARYLAND, 442 U.S. 735, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979).
«35» SEE STATE v. HUNT, 91 N.J. at 348-49; CASCADE SEC. BANK v. BUTLER, 88 Wn.2d 777, 784-85, 567 P.2d 631 (1977).
«36» STATE v. JACKSON, 102 Wn.2d 432, 433, 688 P.2d 136 (1984).
«37» STATE v. LAIR, 95 Wn.2d 706, 709, 630 P.2d 427 (1981); STATE v. SMITH, 28 Wn. App. 387, 391, 624 P.2d 191 (1981).
«38» LAIR, at 709; SMITH, at 392.
«39» STATE v. MAFFEO, 31 Wn. App. 198, 201, 642 P.2d 404 (1982).
the defendant were admissions against their penal interest.
additional cocaine. (Citations omitted.) MAFFEO, at 201-02.
«40» LAIR, at 711, quoting with approval from 1 W. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3.3, at 530 (1978).
«41» SEE JACKSON, at 437; MAFFEO, at 201.
«42» STATE v. PATTERSON, 83 Wn.2d 49, 52, 515 P.2d 496 (1973).
«43» PATTERSON, at 52; STATE v. HIGBY, 26 Wn. App. 457, 613 P.2d 1192 (1980).
POST-OPINION INFORMATION: Reconsideration denied August 15, 1986.

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