Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2000/4054crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:30:46+00:00

Document:
Adams v. Leisure Limousine, LLC.
The claimant was represented by Robert Cooney, Esq., Williams, Cooney & Sheehy, One Lafayette Circle, Bridgeport, CT 06604-6021.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Richard Hine, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, P. O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120, who did not appear at oral argument.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The claimant has petitioned for review from the May 25, 1999 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District. In that decision the trial commissioner found that the claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof that he suffered an injury to his back while at work on September 27, 1997. In support of his appeal, the claimant argues that the trial commissioner erred by ignoring undisputed medical evidence from the claimant’s treating physician which indicates that the claimant sustained a compensable injury. We find no error.
“The determination of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact for the commissioner.” Spatafore v. Yale University, 239 Conn. 408, 418 (1996). The power and duty of determining the facts rests on the trial commissioner as the trier of fact. This fact-finding authority “entitles the commissioner to determine the weight of the evidence presented and the credibility of the testimony offered by lay and expert witnesses.” Webb v. Pfizer, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 70, 1859 CRB-5-93-9 (May 12, 1995) (citing Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 32 Conn. App. 595, 599 (1993), appeal dismissed, 229 Conn. 587 (1994)). We will not disturb such determinations unless they are found without evidence, based on impermissible or unreasonable factual inferences or contrary to law. Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988).
The Appellate Court has repeatedly explained that the trier “is not required to accept uncontradicted expert testimony. The [trier] might reject it entirely as not worthy of belief or find that the opinion was based on subordinate facts that were not proven.” Cummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 40 Conn. App. 36, 44 (1996) (citation omitted). Because it was the claimant’s burden to prove a compensable injury, and he did not do so in this case, “it is of no moment that the respondents did not present any medical evidence.” Menard v. People’s Bank, 3887 CRB-2-98-9 (Nov. 23, 1999), citing Reeder v. Zohne Industries, 3313 CRB-5-96-3 (Aug. 21, 1997), aff’d., 49 Conn. App. 904 (1998)(per curiam); see also Lalanne v. Greenwich, 3914 CRB-7-98-10 (Sept. 2, 1999).
In the instant case, the trial commissioner’s decision was based upon the credibility which he accorded the evidence, including the testimony of the claimant. Although the trial commissioner determined that an automobile accident did occur on September 27, 1997, he nevertheless concluded that the claimant did not sustain an injury as a result thereof.1 This conclusion is supported by the findings of fact which indicate that the claimant did not seek medical attention at the time of the accident; the claimant continued working on that day and for some time thereafter; the damage to the automobile driven by the claimant was the rear quarter of the passenger side; and the claimant did not seek medical attention until February of 1998.

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