Source: http://toyosu.com/ura2003.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:02:47+00:00

Document:
・"Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office; Proposed Rule" Fed.Reg. (December 12, 2003).
・"ROGAN TO LEAVE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE IN EARLY 2004" USPTO (December 9, 2003).
・Associated Press, "Pooh Heirs Hire Cochran in Disney Suit." FindLaw Intellectual Property Law News (Dec. 1, 2003).
・Robert C. Faber; Ostrolenk Faber Gerb & Soffen, "Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting, 5th Edition." Practising Law Institutes.
・"Microsoft Faces Showdown at the EU Corral." Reuters (November 9, 2003).
・Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 41 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
・Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
・George W. Lewis "Madrid Protcol: A preliminary guide for non-US applicants filing applications in the United States" AIPLA (2003).
・"To Promote Innovation:The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy" Federal Trade Commission (October 2003).
・"FTC RELEASES REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT POLICY" IPO Daily News (Oct. 28, 2003).
1. Create post-grant opposition proceedings in USPTO.
2. Determine challenges to a patent on “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
3. Tighten certain legal standards for obviousness.
4. Provide adequate funding for USPTO.
5. Modify rules on prior art citations and examining procedures.
6. Consider harm to competition before expanding patentable subject matter.
7. Publish all patent applications 18 months after filing.
8. Create intervening or prior user rights to protect against continuing applications.
9. Require actual notice or deliberate copying for liability for willful infringement.
10. Consider economics and competition concerns in patent law decision making.
・Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Systems, Inc., No. 02-1013, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
With respect to argument-based estoppel, Vector contends that arguments made during prosecution estop Deering from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. "To invoke argument-based estoppel, the prosecution history must evince a 'clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter.'" Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Communication Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
As described above, the Examiner objected to original claim 9 and indicated its allowability if rewritten in independent form although original claim 9 was already in independent form. In response, the applicants noted the Examiner's mistake and restated the Zero Position Limitation as not being disclosed in the references of record. This statement is merely a clarification of the Examiner's mistake, not the "clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter" required by this court in Eagle Comtronics. Accordingly, we hold that argument-based estoppel was not a proper basis for applying prosecution history estoppel. Upon remand, should Deering adequately rebut the presumption discussed above, Deering shall not be estopped from arguing that the VX-10 infringes claim 4 of the '428 patent based on arguments made in prosecution.
・"FindLaw Weekly Opinion Summaries for September 22-September 26, 2003"
・Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabusihiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
・"Federal Circuit Clarifies Prosecution History Estoppel and Rules That It Is Issue for the Judge, Not the Jury." MoFo Update (October 2003).
...Most significantly, the court ruled that these issues will be determined as a matter of law by judges, not juries, and it limited the scope of evidence which trial courts should consider when assessing whether patent holders have overcome any presumption of claim-scope surrender.
・Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
・Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
・Justin Beck (The Recorder), "The Willful Infringement Mess." law.com (Sept. 19, 2003).
...It's little wonder that juries find a majority of infringements to be willful. Oddly, the judge, who, unlike the jury, does know something about legal competence, has no role in deciding if the opinion is competent or if the infringement is willful.
...If the infringement was willful, the judge in post-trial motions, using additional factors, exercises judicial discretion in determining whether, and by how much, damages should be enhanced. But in exercising that discretion, the judge is bound by the jury's willfulness finding and may not reweigh the evidence on willfulness. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
...In order to assert reliance on an opinion of counsel, the defendant must waive the attorney-client privilege. This is a subject matter waiver, and thus all communications between the client and any of its attorneys on the subjects addressed by the opinion become discoverable and potentially admissible at trial.
...Opinions are expensive. A well-written opinion by an experienced patent attorney will cost between $10,000 and $100,000, and over the course of a year a large company may be on notice of dozens of possible infringements.
...Oral opinions and opinions by in-house counsel are suspect, regardless of their fundamental soundness. As a practical matter the opinion author must tailor the opinion for the jury, not for the client.
...What the current system does is foster support for the popular view that clients can buy any opinion they want from their lawyers.
....Because, in order to offer an opinion at trial, the client must waive the attorney-client privilege on the subjects of infringement and validity, the defendant's trial counsel must be guarded in discussing the case with the client. By doing so, the client can take the position that trial counsel has expressed no opinions on those subjects, thereby protecting communications with trial counsel from disclosure.
・Brenda Sandburg (The Recorder), "Lawyers Stump for End to Tough Patent Policy" law.com (Nov. 11, 2003).
..."Sophisticated parties aware that there is unusual vulnerability to a particular patent will likely be able to find a competent outside attorney that can write a plausible opinion letter, even if the party believes that, in all likelihood, it infringes," Weil, Gotshal & Manges partner Matthew Powers and his colleagues wrote in a brief.
..."Published estimates range from $20,000 to over $100,000 per patent," Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe partner L.J. Chris Martiniak, wrote on behalf of the Computer Associates group. "Notices of infringement often encompass multiple patents, which means that formal opinion letters could easily reach into the hundreds of thousands or even into the $1 million range." Citing a study that found 46 percent of patents litigated to judgment on validity issues are held invalid, Martiniak said opinion letters are likely to have no value anyway.
...Microsoft Corp. focused on this issue, arguing that a good faith defense to infringement should bar a willfulness finding. Microsoft counsel Frank Scherkenbach, a partner in Fish & Richardson's Boston and Silicon Valley offices, said defendants whose first notice of infringement is a lawsuit face an "untenable Hobson's choice":Don't rely on advice of counsel and face an adverse inference or rely on such advice and "provide your ongoing communications with trial counsel."
・"Amici Curiae to Federal Circuit: Revise the Law on Advice of Counsel and Patent Willfulness" mofo Update (November 2003).
・Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, Nos.03-1032 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
means for determining distances and areas from said at least two images.
The [district] court then found that the structures corresponding to this function were the VME bus based framegrabber video display board, the computer video processor ("CVP"), and "[s]oftware routines for converting digital-to-digital known to those of skill in the art."　The framegrabber and the CVP both perform only the conversion of analog data into the selected digital format, known as analog-to-digital conversion.　The accused devices do not perform analog-to-digital conversion, but rather only perform digital-to-digital conversion using software.
systems useful in brain surgery for presenting images from a variety of imaging sources on a single display device.
...the [district] court concluded that because techniques for performing those conversions were known to those of skill in the art at the time the application was filed, a person of skill in the art would understand software to be a corresponding structure for the converting function...　MIDCO presented some evidence before the district court that a skilled programmer at the time of the application's filing could have written a program for digital-to-digital conversion of image size, and we have no reason to doubt that assertion.　In discussing software programs in the medical imaging field, MIDCO's expert explained that "a software programmer having ordinary skill in the art . . . would be aware of the sources of routines, modules and even small programs . . . that could be incorporated into the larger program being developed.　These programs were widely available from well-known sources or available from other software developers. . . ."　MIDCO then provided examples of programs for digital-to-digital image conversion (none of which are cited in the patents) that would have been available at the time the patent was filed.
However, that is not the correct inquiry.　The correct inquiry is to look at the disclosure of the patent and determine if one of skill in the art would have understood that disclosure to encompass software for digital-to-digital conversion and been able to implement such a program, not simply whether one of skill in the art would have been able to write such a software program.　See Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[I]nterpretation of what is disclosed must be made in light of the knowledge of one skilled in the art."); see also Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., Nos. 01-1546, 02-1478, slip op. at 28-29 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2003) (explaining that statements from experts cannot be used to "rewrite the patent's specification" to create a clear link where the language in the specification provides none); Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding particular structures not to be corresponding structures because "one skilled in the art would not perceive any clear link or association between these structures and the [recited] function of connecting adjacent elements together").　It is important to determine whether one of skill in the art would understand the specification itself to disclose the structure, not simply whether that person would be capable of implementing that structure.　See Atmel, 198 F.3d at 1382 ("Fulfillment of the § 112, ¶ 6 trade-off cannot be satisfied when there is a total omission of structure.　There must be structure in the specification.").　Indeed, the requirement of looking to the disclosure to find the corresponding structure comes from section 112, paragraph 6 itself.　It is not proper to look to the knowledge of one skilled in the art apart from and unconnected to the disclosure of the patent.
...The majority is not correct.　The patent specification need not "teach software" and the writing of routine programs in order to teach how to practice the described method.　It suffices if one of skill in the art "would have been able to write" a standard program of digital-to-digital conversion.　If one of skill in the programming art would have been able to write such a program without undue experimentation, the statutory requirements are met.　See, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (enablement requires that the disclosure teach how to carry out the claimed invention without undue experimentation).
・B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
"structure disclosed in the specification is 'corresponding' structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim."
・"Split Federal Circuit Disagrees With Interpretation of Patent Claims for Medical Imaging Inventions and Overturns Jury Verdict." IPO Daily News (Sept. 2003).
・Bayer v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Nos.02-1598 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent . . . . A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after?
・"Bayer Did Not Infringe Patents on Pharmaceutical Screening Processes by Importing Information or Products Identified by Using Processes." IPO Daily News (Aug. 2003).
・E-Pass Techs. v. 3Com Corp., No. 02-1593 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In order to construe a disputed claim term, we first seek the ordinary meaning of the claim term.　Tex. Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002).　We resort initially to the relevant dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of the term “card.”　Id.　Merriam-Webster’s provides a relevant definition of “card” as “a flat stiff usu. small and rectangular piece of material (as paper, paperboard, or plastic).”　Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 172 (10th ed. 1999).　Similarly, Random House provides a relevant definition as “a usually rectangular piece of stiff paper, thin pasteboard, or plastic for various uses.”　Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 313 (2d ed. 1998) (“Random House”).　The Oxford English Dictionary provides a relevant definition of “card” as “[a] rectangular piece of stiffened plastic issued by banks or other institutions, with information embossed or otherwise represented.”　The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 2, at 888 (2d ed. 1989).　The dictionary definitions provide no specific length, width, or depth measurements, nor do they refer to industry standard dimensions.
・"Federal Circuit Interprets Patent Claim so That “Palm Pilot” Devices May Infringe." IPO daily News (Aug. 2003).
・"The Patent Crib Sheet:CLAIM CONSTRUCTION"
・Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 626 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
・"Jury Awards $520.6 Million Against Microsoft For Infringement of Web Browser Patent" 66 PTCJ (August 15, 2003).
・Paul Festa, "W3C to study patent's threat to HTML." CNET News.com (September 24, 2003).
・"Madrid Protocol: Final Rules" USPTO (September 26, 2003).
・Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.*, 54 USPQ2d 1437, 1440 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
・"2003 PATENT QUALITY IMPROVEMENT HEARING" Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property (JULY 24, 2003).
・Brenda Sandburg (The Recorder), "Patent Lawyers Fight Limits on Federal Circuit." Law.com (July 22, 2003).
While the patent bar is fairly unanimous in its opposition to Holmes, antitrust lawyers generally think the ruling is beneficial for them. They have been critical of the Federal Circuit's reach beyond patent law and what many see as its tendency to have intellectual property law trump antitrust restrictions. One issue that has been contentious among patent and antitrust lawyers is whether a company's refusal to license a patent can be considered an antitrust violation. The Federal Circuit has made broad antitrust rulings "some of which are not related to patent law," said antitrust lawyer James Kobak Jr., a partner at New York's Hughes Hubbard & Reed. "It seems to us these issues should stay with the regional circuits."
Some IP lawyers are less concerned about the impact Holmes will have on patent law.
・Robert A. Matthews Jr. (The National Law Journal), "Patent-Holding Companies Hold Risks." law.com (July 18, 2003).
・Alan Cohen (IP Law & Business), "The Razor's Edge." law.com (July 17, 2003).
・"Online File Inspection (Officially launched on June 18, 2003)" epo online.
The European Patent Office's Online File Inspection service implements Article 128 of the European Patent Convention, according to which the public is entitled to inspect the complete contents of the files relating to all European patent applications after they have been published.
1.3 If you request inspection of a file that is not yet stored in electronic form, the file will as a rule be made available online within ten working days of entry of the application or publication number, unless it has already been destroyed (Rule 95a(4), (5) EPC). This does not apply to files with regard to which oral proceedings are imminent or have recently taken place. Entering a valid application or publication number is equivalent to requesting a file inspection. There is no need for a separate written request.
・REUTERS, "Jury Awards Honeywell $30 Million." New York Times (June 13, 2003).
...A spokesman for JVC in the United States, Terry Shea, said on Friday the jury award does not change the company's position that it has not infringed on any Honeywell patents.
・STEVE LOHR, "A Marketing Craze (and Oh, Yes, a Scooter)." New York Times (June 8, 2003).
...The book's great strength, however, is its deft depiction of the craft of engineering, and the engineering mentality. I would have preferred a deeper look at the animating technology behind the Segway and its lineage, and a few drawings to help visualize the technology.
...A college dropout, Mr. Kamen was a rich and renowned inventor before Segway, having made millions on creations including the first insulin pump, the first portable kidney dialysis machine and surgical stents used to prop open clogged cardiac veins and arteries...As he[Mr. Kamen] once said: science is about why; engineering is about why not.
・Matthew B. Lowrie (The National Law Journal), "Claims of Joint Inventorship Are on the Rise." law.com (June, 6, 2003).
Potential joint inventors are lurking as subcontractors, manufacturers, testing outfits, research partners or even people engaging in chitchat at a cocktail party. When joint inventors do not have to assign their rights to one party, each has a joint interest in the patent. As a result, a defendant in a patent case can endeavor to find someone who arguably contributed to any claim in the patent, secure a license from that person for whatever they may have and use the license as a defense.
・University of Colorado Foundation Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366 52 USPQ2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
・Ethicon Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
・Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Techs. Ltd., 292 F.3d 1363, 63 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
...We have explained that “if unenforceable due to inequitable conduct, a patent may not be enforced even by ‘innocent’ co-inventors.　One bad apple spoils the entire barrel.　Misdeeds of co-inventors, or even a patent attorney, can affect the property rights of an otherwise innocent individual.”　Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1556, 43 USPQ2d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
・Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 59 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed.Cir. 2001).
・"Revised Guidelines for Usage of Previously Cited/Considered Prior Art In Reexamination Proceedings." USPTO (June 11, 2003).
・"Clarification of the United States Patent and Trademark Office's Interpretation of the Provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iv)."　USPTO (June 11, 2003).
・Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., Nos.00-1012 (Fed.Cir. 2003).
Pioneer contends it added the "switching" limitation through sheer inadvertence, unmotivated by any of the statutory requirements for a patent.　To argue that its addition of the "switching" limitation was obviously in error, it relies on (1) the Beecher declaration, (2) the portion of its patent application stating that amended claim 1 incorporated claims 2-6 (which did not include the switching limitation), and (3) its assertion that reading amended claim 1 to include the "switching" limitation would be redundant of amended claim 2.
This argument is unpersuasive.　First, we do not consider the Beecher declaration in determining the reason for the amendment to the claim.　Only the public record of the patent prosecution, the prosecution history, can be a basis for such a reason.　Otherwise the public notice function of the patent record would be undermined.　Second, the prosecution history does not show that the reason for the amendment of the term "switching" was inadvertent.　Although the Remarks section of the amendments indicates that Pioneer amended claim 1 to state claim 6 in independent form, it is equally possible that Pioneer changed the claim intentionally but inadvertently failed to update the Remarks.　Finally, claim 2 is not redundant of claim 1 because it includes the additional limitations of a "timer and ramp signal generator . . . ." '366 patent, col. 6, ll. 41-43.
Pioneer further argues that its amendment adding the "switching" limitation to claim 1 was not related to patentability because it was voluntary and was not offered to overcome any rejection, on prior art or otherwise.　However, the mere fact that an amendment is voluntary does not shield it from prosecution history estoppel.　Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1345, 65 USPQ2d 1385, 1408-09 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
We therefore conclude that Pioneer has failed to meet its burden of establishing a reason unrelated to patentability for its amendment.　Our own examination of the prosecution history convinces us that the amendment was made to avoid prior art, the classic basis for the application of prosecution history estoppel.　See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-31; see also Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 826, 49 USPQ2d 1865, 1871 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1355, 48 USPQ2d 1674, 1677 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (substantive changes to a claim that clearly respond to an examiner's rejection of that claim as unpatentable over prior art give rise to prosecution history estoppel).
The prosecution history shows that the examiner rejected claims 1-5 and 8-9 in light of the Carpenter reference, which disclosed a power supply containing a non-switching multiplier.　Pioneer amended claim 1 to include a switching analog multiplier, which distinguished the '366 invention over Carpenter.　Therefore, the addition of this limitation was made to avoid prior art.
Having concluded that the district court properly determined that there had been a narrowing amendment for a substantial reason related to patentability, we next turn to whether Pioneer can overcome the presumption that it has surrendered the equivalent in question.　The Supreme Court held that the presumption can be overcome if “[t]he equivalent [was] unforeseeable at the time of the application; the rationale underlying the amendment [bears] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there [was] some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.”　Festo, 535 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1842.　As noted, the Carpenter reference discloses a non-switching multiplier circuit.　Therefore, a non-switching circuit was known in the art and would have been foreseeable at the time of the amendment.　The amendment was clearly not tangential to the equivalent in question; the amendment was made to avoid the very prior art that contained the equivalent.　And given the equivalent’s presence in the prior art cited against the patentee during prosecution, there can be no other reason the patentee could not have described the substitute in question.
Therefore, Pioneer is estopped from arguing that a non-switching multiplier circuit is equivalent to the switching multiplier circuit limitation of the claims in the '366 patent.　As the parties have recognized, the determination of these issues is dispositive. It is therefore unnecessary to reach the remainder of the issues briefed by the parties.
・Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
・Associated Press, "Honda Says It Won Patent Lawsuit in China." FindLaw (June 2, 2003).
・"Rules of Practice for Trademark-Related Filings Under the Madrid Protocol Implementation Act." Fed.Reg. (March 28, 2003).
・Robert Burlingame (The Recorder), "Consider Yourself Warned." law.com (June 20, 2003).
・Robert B. Burlingame, "Protocol Simplifies Registration Process in Foreign Countries." Pillsbury Winthrop.
・Greg Aharonian, "GET READY FOR SOFTWARE AGENTS PATENT LAWSUITS." Internet Patent News Service (May 29, 2003).
・Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., Nos. 02-1497 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
...A question exists as to the proper standard of materiality.　See, e.g., 6 Chisum on Patents § 19.03 (2000).　For many years this court held that materiality for purposes of an inequitable conduct determination required a showing that “a reasonable examiner would have considered such prior art important in deciding whether to allow the parent application.”　Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884, 221 USPQ 745, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1982); see also Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Pres. Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801, 803, 17 USPQ2d 1579, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1214, 2 USPQ2d 2015, 2019 (Fed. Cir. 1987).　Information did not need to be prior art in order to be material, but “instead embrace[d] any information that a reasonable examiner would substantially likely consider important in deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent.”　Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1382, 47 USPQ2d 1533, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).　This interpretation of materiality was based, in part, on 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991), which defined materiality using a “reasonable examiner” standard.　See Driscoll, 731 F.2d at 884, 221 USPQ at 750; Gardco, 820 F.2d at 1214, 2 USPQ2d at 2019 (stating that § 1.56 is “the appropriate starting point for determining materiality”).
In 1992, however, the Patent Office amended its rules to provide a different standard for materiality.　The new rule “was not intended to constitute a significant substantive break in the previous standard.”　Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1366 n.2, 66 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003).　The new rule reiterated the preexisting “duty of candor and good faith,” but more narrowly defined materiality, providing for disclosure where the information establishes either “a prima facie case of unpatentability” or “refutes, or is inconsistent with a position the applicant takes.”　37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992) (“Rule 56”).　In promulgating the new regulation, the Patent Office noted that:　“Section 1.56 has been amended to present a clearer and more objective definition of what information the Office considers material to patentability.　The rules do not define fraud or inequitable conduct which have elements both of materiality and of intent.”　Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992).　In response to a comment suggesting that courts might interpret the duty of “candor and good faith” to require more than Patent Office rules require, the Patent Office stated that the rule was “modified to emphasize that there is a duty of candor and good faith which is broader than the duty to disclose material information.”　Id. at 2025.　Thus, the extent, if any, to which the Patent Office rulemaking was intended to provide guidance to the courts concerning the duty of disclosure in the context of inequitable conduct determinations is not clear.
Since the time of the 1992 amendment we have continued to apply the reasonable examiner standard, but only as to cases that were prosecuted under the earlier version of Rule 56.　Brasseler, U.S.A. I., L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380, 60 USPQ2d 1482, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274, 60 USPQ2d 1141, 1143-44 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Li Second Family Ltd. v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1379, 56 USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2000).　The court has not decided whether it should adhere to the preexisting standard for inequitable conduct in prosecutions occurring after the effective date of the new rule.　See Molins PLC v. Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8, 33 USPQ2d 1823, 1827 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1109-10, 66 USPQ2d 1025, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2003); PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322 n.2, 56 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1312, 56 USPQ2d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2000).　Thus, we have not decided whether the standard for materiality in inequitable conduct cases is governed by equitable principles or by the Patent Office’s rules.
The final piece of information relied upon by the district court when granting summary judgment of unenforceability was the existence of an outstanding rejection of claims in the ‘196 application that were substantially similar in content and scope to claims pending in the applications that issued as the patents-in-suit.　The district court relied upon the “multiple rejections of claims with identical subject matter in the ‘196 application and its progeny in view of the Wilson ‘981 patent.”　Id. at 1135.
This court has never addressed whether the prior rejection of a substantially similar claim in a copending United States application is material under the reasonable examiner standard.　The District Court for the Northern District of Indiana addressed this issue, “find[ing] that it was important for [an examiner] to know that another knowledgeable Patent Examiner had carefully examined and rejected all claims of [another] application, including claims that were directly related to claims in the [present] application, on the grounds that the claims were obvious in light of prior art patents.”　Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F. Supp. 1444, 1474 (N.D. Ind. 1992).　Without such a disclosure requirement “applicants [may] surreptitiously file repeated or multiple applications in an attempt to find a ‘friendly’ Examiner.”　ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, Annual Report 1993-1994 (1994).
We hold that a contrary decision of another examiner reviewing a substantially similar claim meets the Akron Polymer “reasonable examiner” threshold materiality test of “any information that a reasonable examiner would substantially likely consider important in deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent.”　148 F.3d at 1382, 47 USPQ2d at 1534 (emphasis in original).　Patent disclosures are often very complicated, and different examiners with different technical backgrounds and levels of understanding may often differ when interpreting such documents.　Although examiners are not bound to follow other examiners’ interpretations, knowledge of a potentially different interpretation is clearly information that an examiner could consider important when examining an application.
We also hold that the information meets the threshold level of materiality under new Rule 56, in that “[i]t refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in . . . [a]sserting an argument of patentability.”　37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2) (2002).　When prosecuting claims before the Patent Office, a patent applicant is, at least implicitly, asserting that those claims are patentable.　A prior rejection of a substantially similar claim refutes, or is inconsistent with the position that those claims are patentable.　An adverse decision by another examiner, therefore, meets the materiality standard under the amended Rule 56.　However, the district court did not address intent to deceive related to the failure to disclose the examiner’s adverse decision.　A trial on this issue is, therefore, necessary.
...Word of the appeals decision alarmed standards-setting bodies, which viewed the ruling as a warning to review, if not clean up, their official patent disclosure policies. But that created a catch-22 for these groups [see "Standard Deviation"]. The more rigid the disclosure policy, some say, the harder it will be for the groups to function. "The whole point is to keep [the standards-setting process] as commercially viable and vibrant as possible," says Marasco of the American National Standards Institute. "You don't want to put too many strictures on this."
・Krysten Crawford (Corporate Counsel), "Standard Deviation." law.com (May 8, 2003).
...But a key issue never got resolved in the case: whether the Dell engineer who participated in the standards-setting body even knew about the patent he was accused of withholding and, if he didn't, whether the company should be punished for that.
・Shannon P. Duffy (The Legal Intelligencer), "Claim Interpretation in Patent Case Not Privileged." law.com (May 6, 2003).
・S.S. White Burs Inc. v. Neo-Flo Inc.
・Allison Fashek (IP Law & Business), "A Vision for Victory" law.com (May 1, 2003).
・Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., Nos.02-1280 (Fed.Cir. 2003).
...[T]he standard to be applied in determining whether a reference is “material” is not whether the particular examiner of the application at issue considered the reference to be important; rather, it is that of a “reasonable examiner.”　Nor is a reference immaterial simply because the claims are eventually deemed by an examiner to be patentable thereover.
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 33 USPQ2d 1823 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
...Third, materiality is determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable patent examiner, Molins, 48 F.3d at 1179, 33 USPQ2d at 1828, and not the subjective beliefs of the patentee.
・"Patent for Making Taxol Cancer Drug Unenforceable Because of Inequitable Conduct in USPTO" IPO Daily News (April 17, 2003).
・William F. Lang IV (The National Law Journal), "Inequitable Conduct May Apply to Post-Filing Data." law.com (July 3, 2003).
The court, however, explained that materiality is not determined by whether a particular examiner considered the reference to be important, but instead whether a reasonable examiner would consider the reference to be material.
・Scott B. Schwartz (The National Law Journal), "Europe Now Provides Design-Right Protection." Law.com (May, 29, 2003).
デザインとは、"the appearance of the whole or a part of a product resulting from the features of, in particular, the lines, contours, colours, shape, texture and/or materials of the product itself and/or its ornamentation."
・Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
・Andreas Renck, "Protection of Spare Parts as Community Designs." World Intellectual Property report (May 2003).
...Visible component parts which do not fall within the exceptions for functional and “must fit” designs may be protected and registered provided they qualify in other respects -- e.g., they are novel and have individual character. However, for the time being these rights cannot be enforced to prevent third parties using the design to repair the complex product or to prevent the manufacture and supply of spare parts for the complex product (Article 110(1)).
So, for example, the owner of the design for the shape of a car door could enforce the design against a person making a key fob or paperweight to the design or against another car manufacturer who incorporated the design into a new type of car. However, the owner could not act against a garage using the design to repair the car or a spare parts manufacturer making spare doors.
To take a more specific example, the mirror of a NISSAN Z car with its special design might be registered, as it is a visible component part of a complex product. Moreover, the outside part of this mirror does not fall within the “must fit” provisions, unlike the special clips in the part to be connected with the car.
However, NISSAN would not be able to stop a third party from reproducing the same mirror design when the mirror is incorporated into the same NISSAN Z. On the other hand, use of the design on any other make of car would probably infringe NISSAN’s CD, and NISSAN should be able to stop the third party from using the design for such purposes.
・Bell Communications Research, Inc.v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620-21, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1820-21 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Rowe v. Drer, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550,1553 (Fed.Cir.1997).
・Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell International Corp., No. 01-1633 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
“In general, a preamble limits the [claimed] invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.”　Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 USPQ2d 1781, 1784 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).　“[A] claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it.　In other words, when the claim drafter chooses to use both the preamble and the body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention, the invention so defined, and not some other, is the one the patent protects.”　Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1995).　When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.　See, e.g., Electro Sci. Indus. v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, 1348, 64 USPQ2d 1781, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Rapoport v. Dement, 254 F.3d 1053, 1059, 59 USPQ2d 1215, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1306, 51 USPQ2d at 1166.　On the other hand, “[i]f the body of the claim sets out the complete invention,” then the language of the preamble may be superfluous.　Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1310, 64 USPQ2d 1832, 1837 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1373-74, 58 USPQ2d 1508, 1512 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
・General Electric Co. v. Nintendo Co., 179 F.3d 1350, 50 USPQ2d 1910 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
・John R. Thomas (Professor of Law, Georgetown University) "An Analysis of Trends in the Construction of U.S. Patent Claims:1997-2002." Prepared for The Institute of Intellectual Property.
"As claims drafters in Japan typically draft more prolix preambles than are typical in the United States, consideration should be given to adapting claims to U.S. style when filing applications here."
・Catalina Marketing Int'l Inc. v. Coolsavings. com Inc., No. 01-1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Whether to treat a preamble as a limitation is a determination “resolved only on review of the entire[ ] . . . patent to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim.”　Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257, 9 USPQ2d 1962, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1572-73, 40 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Whether a preamble stating the purpose and context of the invention constitutes a limitation of the claimed process is determined on the facts of each case in light of the overall form of the claim, and the invention as described in the specification and illuminated in the prosecution history.”).
In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim.　Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1305.　Conversely, a preamble is not limiting “where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.”　Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
No litmus test defines when a preamble limits claim scope.　Corning Glass, 868 F.2d at 1257.　Some guideposts, however, have emerged from various cases discussing the preamble’s effect on claim scope.　For example, this court has held that Jepson claiming generally indicates intent to use the preamble to define the claimed invention, thereby limiting claim scope.　Rowe, 112 F.3d at 479; Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1029, 61 USPQ2d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2002).　Additionally, dependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for antecedent basis may limit claim scope because it indicates a reliance on both the preamble and claim body to define the claimed invention.　Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen the claim drafter chooses to use both the preamble and the body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention, the invention so defined, and not some other, is the one the patent protects.”).　Likewise, when the preamble is essential to understand limitations or terms in the claim body, the preamble limits claim scope.　Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1306.
Further, when reciting additional structure or steps underscored as important by the specification, the preamble may operate as a claim limitation.　Corning Glass, 868 F.2d at 1257 (limiting claim scope to “optical waveguides” rather than all optical fibers in light of specification); General Electric Co. v. Nintendo Co., 179 F.3d 1350, 1361-62, 50 USPQ2d 1910, 1918-19 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (limiting claim scope to a “raster scanned display device” rather than all display systems in view of specification’s focus on the prior art problem of displaying binary data on a raster scan display device); Rowe, 112 F.3d at 479-80; Applied Materials, 98 F.3d at 1573.
Moreover, clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.　See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1375, 58 USPQ2d 1508, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (A preamble may limit when employed to distinguish a new use of a prior art apparatus or process.).　Without such reliance, however, a preamble generally is not limiting when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention.　IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434, 54 USPQ2d 1129, 1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (preamble phrase “control apparatus” does not limit claim scope where it merely gives a name to the structurally complete invention).　Thus, preamble language merely extolling benefits or features of the claimed invention does not limit the claim scope without clear reliance on those benefits or features as patentably significant.　STX, LLC v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (preamble stating that invention provides “improved playing and handling characteristics” is not a limitation); Bristol-Myers, 246 F.3d at 1375 (steps of claimed method are performed the same way regardless of whether, as stated in the preamble, a reduction　of hematologic toxicity occurs).
Moreover, preambles describing the use of an invention generally do not limit the claims because the patentability of apparatus or composition claims depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure.　In re Gardiner, 171 F.2d 313, 315-16, 80 USPQ 99, 101 (CCPA 1948) (“It is trite to state that the patentability of apparatus claims must be shown in the structure claimed and not merely upon a use, function, or result thereof.”).　Indeed, “[t]he inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.”　Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875).　More specifically, this means that a patent grants the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sale, or importing the claimed apparatus or composition for any use of that apparatus or composition, whether or not the patentee envisioned such use.　See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).　Again, statements of intended use or asserted benefits in the preamble may, in rare instances, limit apparatus claims, but only if the applicant clearly and unmistakably relied on those uses or benefits to distinguish prior art.　Likewise, this principle does not mean that apparatus claims necessarily prevent a subsequent inventor from obtaining a patent on a new method of using the apparatus where that new method is useful and nonobvious.
Perhaps a hypothetical best illustrates these principles: Inventor A invents a shoe polish for shining shoes (which, for the sake of example, is novel, useful, and nonobvious).　Inventor A receives a patent having composition claims for shoe polish.　Indeed, the preamble of these hypothetical claims recites “a composition for polishing shoes.”　Clearly, Inventor B could not later secure a patent with composition claims on the same composition because it would not be novel.　See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997).　Likewise, Inventor B could not secure claims on the method of using the composition for shining shoes because the use is not a “new use” of the composition but, rather, the same use ? shining shoes.　See Bristol-Myers, 246 F.3d at 1375; In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327, 231 USPQ 136, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Suppose Inventor B discovers that the polish also repels water when rubbed onto shoes.　Inventor B could not likely claim a method of using the polish to repel water on shoes because repelling water is inherent in the normal use of the polish to shine shoes.　Id. at 1326 (“’[I]f a previously patented device, in its normal and usual operation, will perform the function [claimed] in a subsequent [ ] process patent, then such [ ] process patent [is] . . . anticipated by the former patented device.") (quoting In re Ackenback, 45 F.2d 437, 439, 7 USPQ 268, 270 (CCPA 1930)); see also Bristol-Myers, 246 F.3d at 1375.　In other words, Inventor B has not invented a “new” use by rubbing polish on shoes to repel water.　Upon discovering, however, that the polish composition grows hair when rubbed on bare human skin, Inventor B can likely obtain method claims directed to the new use of the composition to grow hair.　See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor."); 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994) ("The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.").　Hence, while Inventor B may obtain a blocking patent on the use of Inventor A’s composition to grow hair, this method patent does not bestow on Inventor B any right with respect to the patented composition.　Even though Inventor A’s claim recites “a composition for polishing shoes,” Inventor B cannot invoke this use limitation to limit Inventor A’s composition claim because that preamble phrase states a use or purpose of the composition and does not impose a limit on Inventor A’s claim.
In this case, the claims, specification, and prosecution history of the ‘041 patent demonstrate that the preamble phrase “located at predesignated sites such as consumer stores” is not a limitation of Claim 1.　The applicant did not rely on this phrase to define its invention nor is the phrase essential to understand limitations or terms in the claim body.　Although the specification refers to terminals located at points of sale, and even once states that terminals may be placed in retail stores, the specification, in its entirety, does not make the location of the terminals an additional structure for the claimed terminals.　See ‘041 patent, col. 1, l. 67 - col. 2, l. 37 and col. 4, ll. 65-67.
・Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., Nos. 00-1310 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
・"Claiming the Benefit of a Prior-Filed Application under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119(e), 120, 121, and 365(c)." USPTO (Feb 26, 2003).
・"2002 TOP DEFENSE WINS: Winning on plaintiff's turf?in Japanese" National Law Journal (February 24, 2003).
・Deere & Company v. Kubota Corp., No. 99-CV-4026 (C.D. Ill.).
・Matthew Haggman (Miami Daily Business Review) "Suit Filed Over Debit Card Patent." law.com (Feb. 20, 2003).
・Tresa Baldas (The National Law Journal), "Juries Less Tolerant of IP Crime." law.com (Feb. 10, 2003).
・Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, Nos.01-1449, 1583, -1604, -1641, 02-1174, -1192 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
・Rambus Prod. Co. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 164 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Va 2001).
・Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 01-1108,-1109 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
・"Federal Circuit Splits on Whether Shrinkwrap Software License Prohibiting Reverse Engineering Was Preempted by Federal Copyright Law." IPO Daily News (January 30, 2003).
・Toys "R" Us Inc. v. Step Two SA, 3d Cir., No. 01-3390 (3rd Cir. 2003).
...Rather, there must be evidence that the defendant "purposefully availed" itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via its web site, or through sufficient other related contacts.
Based on the facts established in this case thus far, Toys has failed to satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. Step Two’s web sites, while commercial and interactive, do not appear to have been designed or intended to reach customers in New Jersey. Step Two’s web sites are entirely in Spanish; prices for its merchandise are in pesetas or Euros, and merchandise can be shipped only to addresses within Spain. Most important, none of the portions of Step Two’s web sites are designed to accommodate addresses within the United States. While it is possible to join Club Imaginarium and receive newsletters with only an email address, Step Two asks registrants to indicate their residence using fields that are not designed for addresses in the United States.
・Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
・"Without Purposeful Availment, Operation of Interactive Site Not Enough for Jurisdiction." Electronic Commerce & Law Report Vol.8, No.5 (February 5, 2003).
・"Failure to Read Clickwrap Agreement Terms Fails to Overturn Finding of Its Enforceability.", Electronic Commerce & Law Report Vol.8 No.9 (March 5, 2003).
・DeJohn v. .TV Corporation International, No.02 C 4497 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
・Eldred v. Ashcroft, Nos. 01-618 (U.S. 2003).
・Tony Mauro (American Lawyer Media), "Supreme Court Upholds Copyright Extension." law.com (January 16, 2003).
・GINA HOLLAND (Associated Press Writer), "Supreme Court Upholds Extended Copyrights." FindLaw (January 16, 2003).
・"Copyright Term Extension Did Not Violate Congress's Copyright Authority." 65 PTCJ 224 (January 17, 2003).
・"Court Will Review Decision in Constitutional Challenge to Term Extension." 63 PTCJ (February 22, 2002).
・"Companies Receiving Most U.S. Patents in 2002." IFI Press Release (January 13, 2003).
・PctEasy.help, "PCT-EASY version 2.92 build 0004 available." (January 13, 2002).

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