Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/board-of-county-commissioners/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:04:55+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Friends of the Black Forest Preservation Plan, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners on Thursday, April 7, 2016.
C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)—Special Use Permit Appeal—Binding Nature of Master Plans.
Under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), plaintiffs, Friends of Black Forest Preservation Plan, Inc. and several residents of the Black Forest area, appealed the district court’s judgment affirming the decision of defendant Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County (Board) approving the special use permit application of defendant Black Forest Mission, LLC (BFM) to construct a greenhouse operation in the Black Forest Preservation area.
BFM proposed to construct a 1.19-acre greenhouse on a 4.87-acre lot it owned in an area governed by the Black Forest Preservation Plan (BFPP), which is contained within El Paso County’s overall master plan. Greenhouses are allowed if less than one acre in size, but a special use permit is required for larger greenhouses.
The Planning Commission recommended by a 6–2 vote that the Board deny BFM’s application for a special use permit because of its inconsistency with both El Paso County’s Policy Plan and the BFPP. At the first hearing before the Board, BFM was granted a continuance to amend its application to attempt to ameliorate various concerns of the Planning Commission and residents. At the next hearing, BFM presented a revised plan proposing three smaller greenhouses that collectively would be larger and would be built on two parcels instead of one. BFM also modified the location to address concerns about light pollution, view obstruction, and traffic congestion. The Board approved BFM’s amended special use application by a vote of 3–2.
Plaintiffs filed this action, arguing the Board misapplied governing law and abused its discretion because of its belief, as relayed by a county attorney, that the county’s master plan was merely advisory. The district court affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that the county’s master plan was advisory and there was competent evidence in the record supporting the Board’s decision to approve BFM’s special use permit application. Plaintiffs appealed.
The court of appeals noted that C.R.S. § 30-28-106 provides that master plans may be made binding by formal inclusion in county land use regulations. The court undertook an extensive analysis of El Paso County’s land use regulation scheme and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the Board’s approval was based on an erroneous legal standard, concluding there was a reasonable basis for the Board’s interpretation of its own regulatory framework. It held that the master plan was advisory and the Board has discretion in deciding how to apply the master plan in its decisions on special use applications.
Plaintiffs also argued it was error for the district court to find competent evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision. The court disagreed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Prospect 34, LLC v. Gunnison County Board of County Commissioners on Thursday, November 5, 2015.
Reserve Metropolitan District No. 2 (RMD2) is a special district located entirely within the town of Mt. Crested Butte (Town) in Gunnison County. RMD2’s service plan—a document statutorily required to organize a special district—states that RMD2’s mill levy “shall not exceed 50 mills, subject to Gallagher Adjustments,” and that any levy beyond 50 mills requires Town approval. By 2013, the mill levy totaled 52.676 mills, including the Gallagher Adjustment of 2.676 mills. The RMD2 board approved certifying to the Gunnison County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) 55.676 mills, 3mills in excess of the cap in the 2000 service plan, which the Town counsel protested. When RMD2 taxed Prospect Development Company, Inc., and Prospect 34, LLC (collectively, Prospect) at a higher rate, Prospect petitioned the BOCC to abate the excess taxes. After the BOCC denied the petition, Prospect appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA). Instead of reaching the merits of this issue, the BAA resolved it against Prospect on the basis of the court’s order denying a summary judgment motion on this issue in a parallel district court action involving RMD2 and Prospect.
On appeal, Prospect first contended that the BOCC must abate the excess mill levy under CRS § 39-10-114(1)(a)(I)(A). The four grounds for abatement provide relief from taxes “levied erroneously or illegally.” Here, the mill levy caps are enforceable. Because the stated procedure was not followed to increase those caps, the excess mill levy was illegal.
Prospect also contended that the BAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion by relying on an order denying summary judgment as a final determination. Because such an order is not a final determination of the issue raised in the motion, the BAA abused its discretion by not exercising its authority to decide whether the excess mill levy was illegal. The order was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Giuliani v. Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners on Thursday, November 1, 2012.
Medical Marijuana—Local Zoning—Summary Judgment—Colorado Constitution, Amendment 20—Mootness—Medical Marijuana Code.
In this action concerning whether a county may prohibit the operation of a medical marijuana dispensary as a non-permitted use under a local zoning plan, plaintiffs Marc Giuliani and Footprints Health and Wellness, Inc. (collectively, providers) and Christopher Peck and Frank Campbell (collectively, patients) appealed the trial court’s orders partially dismissing their claims and affirming the resolution of the Jefferson County Board of Adjustment (Board). They also appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC), the Board, and the Jefferson County Division of Planning and Zoning (collectively, County). The appeal was dismissed in part, the judgment was affirmed in part, and the order was affirmed.
The providers leased a commercial unit in a shopping center in unincorporated Jefferson County in September 2009 for the purpose of operating a medical marijuana dispensary. Believing this use would be compatible with the official development plan (ODP) of the shopping center, as zoned, the providers hired a contractor to perform tenant improvements and obtained various permits from Jefferson County.
The business opened in late October 2009. Two months later, the zoning administrator issued a zoning violation notice to the providers, stating the operation of a medical marijuana dispensary was not a permitted use in the zone district. The providers appealed to the Board, which affirmed the administrator’s conclusion.
In May 2010, the providers filed this action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages. In March 2011, the patients were permitted to intervene and joined the providers’ claim that the County was preempted by Amendment 20 to the Colorado Constitution from interpreting its zoning regulations so as to impose a de facto ban on medical marijuana dispensaries.
The trial court granted in part the County’s motion to partially dismiss the complaint and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. It also affirmed the Board’s resolution that the dispensary was not a permitted use. It then granted the County’s motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims.
Amendment 20, passed in November 2000, permits patients to possess and use medical marijuana without criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. In the 2010 legislative session, the Colorado Medical Marijuana Code (Code) was enacted. Pursuant to authority granted in the Code, the BOCC approved a resolution in July 2010 prohibiting businesses that cultivate, manufacture, or sell marijuana or marijuana products within unincorporated Jefferson County. None of the parties addressed how the Code affected the issues they raised on appeal, and the Court of Appeals therefore requested supplemental briefing to determine whether the claims were moot in light of the Code’s enactment.
The County asserted that any claims for prospective relief were moot because the Code would prevent the providers from operating the dispensary in unincorporated Jefferson County. The Court agreed.
The Court held that even if it assumed that Amendment 20 created a constitutional right to distribute marijuana for medical use and to receive in from a provider of one’s choice, such rights are not unfettered. Here, the request for declaratory and injunctive relief would have no practical legal effect because of the County’s July 2010 ban on dispensaries and the Code’s requirement that all existing and new dispensaries operate their businesses in accordance with applicable state or local laws. Thus, even without the ban, the providers would have needed to apply and be approved by a local licensing authority. Such approval cannot be obtained under the ban; therefore, the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot.
Alternatively, the patients and providers claimed they were “grandfathered” under CRS § 38-1-101. The Court disagreed. The statute limits the broad land-use-planning authority of counties by prohibiting a local government from enacting or enforcing an ordinance, resolution, or regulation in such a way that terminates or eliminates by amortization a nonconforming property use that was lawful at its inception. Here, assuming the statute applies, the dispensary was not lawful in 2009; therefore, there was no basis for it to be lawfully grandfathered.
The providers argued it was error to dismiss their equitable estoppel claim because the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) does not apply to claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court disagreed. Equitable estoppel applies where a plaintiff detrimentally relies on a defendant’s misstatement of fact. It lies in tort. Here, the providers claimed the County led them to reasonably believe a dispensary was a permitted use on their property. Thus, the claim was a tort claim and it was not error to dismiss it under the CGIA (the nature of the damages sought is immaterial).
The providers also contended it was error to dismiss their money damages claims for the County’s violations of their due process, equal protection, and article XVIII, § 14, rights under the Colorado Constitution. The Court disagreed. The due process clause of the Colorado Constitution does not create an implied cause of action in damages. Equal treatment under the laws in Colorado is a right under the due process clause. The providers thus have no entitlement to money damages for state due process and equal protection claims.
The providers further argued that the Board impermissibly based its decision on a de facto ban on dispensaries. Because the Board reasonably concluded the dispensary was not a use expressly contemplated by the zoning resolution, the Court found no abuse of discretion. The appeal was dismissed with respect to the patients’ and providers’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed.

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