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JUANITA BAY VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. THE CITY OF KIRKLAND et al., Respondents, JOHN A. BIGGS, Appellant.
 Municipal Corporations - Environment - Environmental Policy Act - Applicability. The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (PCW 43.21C), including all of its detailed procedural requirements, is directly imposed upon all elements of state government including municipal corporations.
 Statutes - Construction - Adoption From Other Jurisdiction - Effect. A legislative enactment adopted from another jurisdiction carries the construction placed upon it by the other jurisdiction.
 Environment - Environmental Policy Act - Impact Statement - Initial Project. The impact statement required from the appropriate governmental agency or branch under the provisions of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (RCW 43.21C) must be prepared prior to any authorization of any portion of a project, or series of projects, which in cumulative effect constitutes a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment.
 Environment - Environmental Policy Act - Impact Statement - Necessity - Review. Before a court may sustain the determination of a governmental agency or branch that a proposed public or private project is not a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment and hence outside the requirement of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (RCW 43.2lC.030 (c)) that an environmental impact statement be prepared, the appropriate governing body must be able to demonstrate that environmental factors were considered in a manner sufficient to amount to prima facie compliance with the procedural requirements of the act.
 Environment - Environmental Policy Act - Permits - Ministerial or Discretionary - Effect. While the routine and nondiscretionary issuance of various construction permits and authorizations, such as a grading permit, may otherwise constitute ministerial action not subject to judicial review, the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 introduces an element of legislative discretion which must be exercised in considering the various environmental factors affected by such action and renders it subject to judicial review (RCW 43.21C.030(c)).
within a statute delegating a function to a specified body or agency must be respected.
 Environment - Shoreline Management Act - Application - Limits Designations by the legislature and, upon appropriate delegation of authority, by the Department of Ecology of certain parameters, boundaries, and measurements concerning bodies of water, streams, or wetlands as limits beyond which the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 would not apply, while specific and arbitrary to some degree, represent reasonable delineations arrived at with considerable care and are in keeping with the general purpose of the act and are not subject to modification by the courts as arbitrary or capricious.
 Appeal and Error - Findings of Fact - Review - In General. Findings of fact supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.
 Zoning - Grading Permit - Vested Right - In General. An applicant for a grading permit acquires a vested right to have the issuance of the permit determined by the law in effect at the time application for it is made.
 Appeal and Error - Assignments of Error - Argument in Support - Necessity. Assignments of error unsupported by argument or citations of authority and not appearing on their face to be well taken will not be considered on appeal.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 755842, Horton Smith, J., entered September 15, 1972. Reversed and remanded.
Action for injunctive relief. The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendants.
Schroeter, Jackson, Goldmark, Bender, Anderson, Whelan, Brotman & Leed, P.S., and Roger M. Leed, for appellants.
Powell, Livengood, Dunlap & Silvernale, Robert P. Tjossem, Ostrander, Van Eaton, Thomas & Ferrell, and Ralph I. Thomas, for respondents.
Slade Gorton, Attorney General, Charles B. Roe and Charles W. Lean, Assistants, amici curiae.
Does the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) (RCW 43.21C) require branches of state government, specifically municipalities, to exercise legislative discretion with reference to the issuance of land use permits otherwise available as a matter of right in order to assist in the implementation of the state's environmental policy? We hold that it does.
This is an appeal by a group of property owners, as individuals and as an organization called the Juanita Bay Valley Community Association (Association),«1» from the trial court's denial of their application for a writ of mandamus and ancillary relief to halt grading, excavating and filling activity commenced by Kirkland Sand & Gravel, Inc. (KSG), pursuant to a grading permit issued by the City of Kirkland (City). The Association's claim for relief is based primarily upon its allegations that the City violated SEPA and the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (SMA) (RCW 90.58) in issuing a grading permit to KSG.
The members of the Association own homes and property adjacent to a gravel pit operation which has been operated by KSG since 1936 on a portion of a 55-acre tract of land which includes a stream, generally referred to as Forbes Creek, and its adjoining marshlands, located about threefourths of a mile east of Lake Washington. In early 1972, a plan to convert the gravel pit site into an industrial park was revealed. When KSG obtained a permit to excavate and grade its property, the local neighborhood residents attempted to persuade the Kirkland city council to withdraw the permit, but the council refused. Thereafter the Association was formed, and it commenced suit to preserve what it describes as "a fragile marsh and wildlife habitat."
«1» The Association will be referred to herein as if it were the sole appellant.
the Association alleged that the City failed either to consider or obtain what has become commonly referred to as an Environmental Impact Statement, which is procedurally required by SEPA when a branch of the state government, such as the City, recommends or reports on proposals amounting to "major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment." RCW 43.21C.030 (c). Secondly, the Association asserted that the marshland area adjacent to Forbes Creek is an "associated wetland" within the meaning of SMA and therefore KSG must obtain a permit from the proper governmental agency before undertaking any excavating, grading or filling because such activity amounts to a "substantial development" on "shorelines" of the state. RCW 90.58.030(2) (f); RCW 90.58.140(2). Third, the Association claimed an applicable city ordinance was disregarded by the council when it approved the issuance of the grading permit. Finally, the Association contended that the grading permit was invalid because of an apparent conflict of interest on the part of one of the city council men who voted to approve the permit. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law adverse to the Association's contentions, denied the requested relief, and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
The appellant Association makes 65 separate assignments of error, 35 of which are directed to findings of fact, and 6 of which are assigned to the trial court's refusal to make certain requested findings. In addition, appellant assigns error to all of the court's conclusions of law except that relating to the court's jurisdiction. Error is also assigned to the dismissal of the complaint and to the trial court's order denying the appellant's motion for a new trial. Appellant argues its numerous claims of error in the context of the four principal theories outlined above, each of which is directed to the basic contention that the grading permit was unlawfully issued to KSG and ought to be revoked.
mandate of SEPA inasmuch as no Environmental Impact Statement was prepared. The respondents KSG and the City essentially argue that (l) the strict procedural requirements of SEPA do not apply to the issuance of the grading permit, or (2) if they do, the facts as determined by the trial court make it clear an Environmental Impact Statement was not necessary in this case. The state Attorney General, appearing specially as amicus curiae, takes the position that it was incumbent upon the City, in making its decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, to consider environmental factors under procedures made applicable to all municipalities by the express language of SEPA such that a failure to do so necessitates a remand of the issue to the City.
(b) Assure for all people of Washington safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; (c) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; (d) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage; (e) Maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; (f) Achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and (g) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
The policies and goals set forth in this chapter are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of all branches of government of this state, including state agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties. In short, the detailed procedural requirements of SEPA, specifically RCW 43.2lC.030, are directly imposed upon all branches of state government, including municipalities.
In order to facilitate an understanding of our discussion concerning the requirements of SEPA in the context of the respective allegations and contentions of the parties, it is necessary to set forth the following chronological account of the pertinent facts and events as found by the trial court and confirmed by our review of the record to be supported by substantial evidence: KSG and two of its officers, G. L. Stubenrauch and Van A. Smith, own all of the property affected by the grading permit here in question. Gravel and other materials have been removed from portions of the subject property as long ago as 1904. In 1924, a gravel pit operation was established on a portion of the property, and in 1936 respondent KSG purchased the property and since has continued, at least to the time of trial, to conduct a gravel pit operation upon it. A certain unnamed stream, unofficially referred to as Forbes Creek, flows across a portion of the property from east to west and eventually into Lake Washington. When it crosses the KSG property, the stream is between 35 and 45 feet above the elevation of the surface of Lake Washington, and KSG's property is located three-fourths to one mile east of the high-water mark of Lake Washington.
In the summer of 1971, the City became aware of the fact that grading and excavation was being carried on by KSG upon its property south of Forbes Creek without the permit required by chapter 70 of the Uniform Building Code.«2» The City issued a stop work order, but subsequently granted a limited permit to include the grading and excavation work already done and to allow completion of certain landfill necessary to buttress adjoining property. SEPA became effective on August 9, 1971, and during the spring of 1972 preliminary advisory guidelines were prepared and circulated by the Department of Ecology.
«2» In April of 1968 the City adopted by reference chapter 70 of the Uniform Building Code which regulates grading and excavation - ties by a permit system. Before chapter 70 was adopted, the City had no regulation of any kind relating to grading and excavation. In 1970 the city council enacted ordinance No. 2128 which amended chapter 70 to include an alternative requirement that "[g]rading or excavation . . . be carried out with the approval of City Council." Kirkland Municipal Code 21.08.070(4).
«3» On the same date as the grading application, March 31, 1972, KSG made a separate application to rezone portions of its property from "single family residential" to "light industrial," and elected to have this rezone application processed under the new zoning code, ordinance No. 2183, which subsequently had gone into effect. We note parenthetically that there is evidence in the record that an Environmental Impact Statement regarding the proposed rezone was in the process of preparation at the time of trial. Pursuant [to KSG's request, the grading permit application was processed under chapter 70 of the Uniform Building Code as adopted by the City, but appellant argues that it was also subject to the provisions of ordinance No. 2183. This contention is discussed elsewhere in this opinion.
That the evidence pertaining to the environmental and ecological impact of the filling and grading on subject property which is authorized by the Grading Permit G- 023 is insufficient to establish that said activities will cause any significant impact on the environment or have any significant effect on the environment including the unnamed stream, Lake Washington and the shorelands thereof. Finding of fact No. 32. In addition, the court found that any development of KSG's property under the existing land use ordinance of the City would have virtually the same impact or effect, both ecologically and economically, on the stream and adjoining properties as would the activities authorized by the grading permit.
«4» The city planning department had recommended that no action be taken on the grading permit application until after it had acted on the previously noted rezone application, and that the two applications be regarded as a single package. In its motion approving the grading permit, the city council included a statement to the effect that the City was not thereby committed one way or the other with reference to the rezone application.
to deny the issuance of the grading permit because KSG was entitled to have it issue as a matter of vested right.
(3) The legislature recognizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment. "Identical language was included in the original version of NEPA passed by the Senate. The House version deleted the provision. The Act emerged from Conference with a similar provision, but without any reference to 'fundamental and inalienable' rights. The compromise resulted from 'doubt on the part of the House conferees with respect to the legal scope of the original Senate provision.' M.R. Rep. No. 91-765, 91st (Cong. 1st Sess. 8 (1969). For a discussion of this change, and its possible implications, see Eva H. Hanks and John L. Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 2 ENVIRONMENT L. REV. 147, 169-72 (1971) (Reprinted from 24 RUT. L. REV. 230 (1970)).
"A second noteworthy difference is that while NEPA applies only to the federal government and its various departments and agencies, SEPA applies to the state government plus all municipal and public corporations and counties. SEPA, as originally proposed, would only have included state agencies, but House amendments extended coverage to local governments. See Senate Journal, 1971 Ex. Sess., pp. 1808-09.
"A final difference between NEPA and SEPA is that there is no agency at the state level which exactly corresponds to the Federal Council on Environmental Quality. The Council issued guidelines on April 30, 1970, covering federal agency procedures under NEPA. At the state level, SEPA (RCW 43.21C.030 (2) (b)) directs all branches of government to develop procedures to insure that environmental values will be given appropriate consideration in decision-making, 'in consultation with the department of ecology. . . ., The Department of Ecology attempted to facilitate this process by distributing its 'Preliminary Guidelines for Implementation of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971' . . . to all state and local governmental agencies. These guidelines were not adopted as regulations pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act (Ch. 34.04 RCW)."
federal legislation it also borrows the construction placed upon such legislation by the federal courts. See State v. Carroll, 81 Wn.2d 95, 500 P.2d 115 (1972); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
The power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it. (Footnotes omitted.) In essence, it is the contention of respondents KSG and the City that the SEPA requirement of an Environmental Impact Statement is applicable only in the case of a discretionary or policy making action during the course of which the municipality or governmental agency may consider and choose among various alternatives before taking any action. KSG directs us to Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972), for the proposition that an Environmental Impact Statement is not required to be filed under NEPA with respect to administrative or nondiscretionary governmental actions. The City points out that this court has held that a city acts in an administrative capacity when it issues a special use permit under a city zoning ordinance. Lund v. Tumwater, 2 Wn. App. 750, 472 P.2d 550 (1970); see also State ex ret. Morrison v. Seattle, 6 Wn. App. 181, 492 P.2d 1078 (1971). Respondents declare that the issuance of building permits, even where that issuance may involve the exercise of some administrative or ministerial discretion, has been judicially determined to be a ministerial act. See State ex rel. Klappsa v. Enumclaw, 73 Wn.2d 451, 439 P.2d 246 (1968); State ex rel. Kuphal v. Bremerton, 59 Wn.2d 825,371 P.2d 37 (1962); Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958); State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954).
discretion to deny the application for the grading permit once the requirements established by the building department had been met and therefore would amount to requiring the performance of a useless act, something that the law does not require.
The appellant denies that the City was obligated to issue a grading permit to KSG upon demand, thus making the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement unnecessary. The appellant points out that the building code requires the city building official to make numerous judgments as to the type and extent of data to be prepared by the application and the conditions to be imposed upon grading and excavation activities. In addition, appellant argues that the grading plan itself lists 11 conditions, each of which represents an administrative judgment by the City pertaining to environmental factors. Appellant asserts that regardless of whether the City characterizes its action in issuing the grading permit as ministerial or discretionary, such characterization cannot defeat the express mandate of the legislature requiring the City to carry out the procedural steps of SEPA in addition to those set forth in the building code prior to the issuance of the grading permit.
S. Davison, Environmental Rights & Remedies 5:6 (1972).
affecting the quality of the environment . . ." RCW 43.21C.030(c).
 Moreover, we hold that RCW 43.21C.030(c) necessarily requires the consideration of environmental factors by the appropriate governing body in the course of all state and local government actions before it may be determined whether or not an Environmental Impact Statement must be prepared. Thus, SEPA requires that a decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement must be based upon a determination that the proposed project is not a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment. A decision by a branch of state government on whether or not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement is subject to judicial review, but before a court may uphold such a decision, the appropriate governing body must be able to demonstrate that environmental factors were considered in a manner sufficient to amount to prima facie compliance with the procedural requirements of SEPA. See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
 In the case at bar, although the trial court determined that the issuance of the grading permit did not constitute a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment, there is no showing that the responsible branch of state government, the City, made such a determination. The essential point is that SEPA requires the City, acting through its city council, actually to consider the various environmental factors. The change in the substantive law brought about by SEPA introduces an element of discretion into the making of decisions that were formerly ministerial, such that even if we assume, arguendo, that the issuance of a grading permit was, prior to SEPA, a ministerial, nondiscretionary act, SEPA makes it legislative and discretionary. We hold that the City failed to exercise its legislative discretion under SEPA, and consequently grad ing permit No. G-023 was issued in a manner contrary to law.
Environmental Impact Statement before making a decision on the question of whether or not to issue KSG a grading permit. Only after the City has made such a determination will its decision as to the grading permit properly be subject to judicial review. If, in the event of such review, the City can affirmatively demonstrate prima facie compliance with the procedural requirements of SEPA, then the burden will fall upon the appellant, if the City's decision is adverse to appellant, or upon another proper party to prove the City's decision was invalid.
"No substantial development shall be undertaken on shorelines of the state without first obtaining a permit from the government entity having administrative jurisdiction under this chapter."
" 'Substantial development' shall mean any development of which the total cost or fair market value exceeds one thousand dollars, or any development which materially interferes with the normal public use of the water or shorelines of the state; . . ."
Appellant argues that such a permit is necessary because the marshland adjacent to Forbes Creek constitutes "associated wetlands" and therefore comes within the meaning of language in SMA.
The trial court rejected appellant's interpretation of SMA and concluded "[t]hat subject property is not wetlands or associated wetlands as that term is defined in the Shorelines Management Act, Supra." Conclusion of law No. 5. In this connection we find no specific statutory definition of the term "associated wetlands"; however, SMA defines "wetlands" or "wetland areas" in RCW 90.58.030(2) (f) as: those lands extending landward for two hundred feet in all directions as measured on a horizontal plane from the ordinary high water mark; and all marshes, bogs, swamps, floodways, river deltas, and flood plains associated with the streams, lakes and tidal waters which are subject to the provisions of this chapter; the same to be designated as to location by the department of ecology.
(Italics ours.) The trial court found as a fact "[t]hat subject property . . . is not less than 3/4 to one mile east of the highwater mark of Lake Washington." Finding of fact No. 12. Substantial evidence supports this finding; consequently, it is clear, at least on the face of the statute, that the Forbes Creek marsh does not come within the quoted definition of "wetlands" unless it is designated by the Department of Ecology to be "associated with" a body of water subject to the provisions of SMA.
That the certain unnamed stream which happens to traverse subject property, having only a mean annual flow [of 4 cubic feet per second, is not subject to the regulations and provisions contained in the Shorelines Management Act and that the Department of Ecology has no jurisdiction under the Shorelines Management Act over said stream or the abutting land in the immediate vicinity of subject property by reason of the existence of said stream. Conclusion of law No. 6. Thus a narrow statement of the statutory interpretation problem presented to this court is as follows: The marshland adjacent to Forbes Creek on KSG's property is a "wetland" subject to the provisions of SMA only if we can say that the trial court erred in concluding, based upon the failure of the Department of Ecology to make a contrary designation, that such marshland area is not associated with Lake Washington.
is unscientific and contrary to the spirit and letter of SMA. Appellant asks this court to correct such alleged erroneous interpretation and thus to require KSG to obtain a permit under SMA. Appellant also requests us to direct the City to initiate proceedings to prevent any further activity by KSG on "wetlands" until such a permit has been applied for and obtained. Appellant argues that the undisputed testimony of its expert witnesses establishes that Forbes Creek marsh is an "associated wetland" entitled to the protection of SMA because (1) the marsh is a "wetland" in both the everyday and the scientific sense, which was conceded by the Department of Ecology; (2) the marsh has direct surface water, subsurface water, and marshland habitat connections to the lake; (3) the marsh is a part of the same ecological system as Lake Washington; and (4) this system allows nutrient flow and includes interrelated plant and animal communities.
 We recognize the persuasiveness of appellant's arguments and the effect any interpretation of "associated wetlands" will have on areas other than that of Forbes Creek and its adjacent marshlands, but it is not our role to balance the respective interests of the members of the Juanita Valley Community Association, whose primary concern appears to be preservation of a marshland area which they deem to be of great importance as a wildlife habitat, and the specific interest of the respondent landowners, who apparently plan to industrialize the subject property. At the same time, although we must be mindful of the practical problems facing the Department of Ecology in designating the areas to be covered by SMA and in otherwise administering its responsibilities under the statute, we cannot permit such problems to color our interpretation of the legislation. Moreover, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature as to what would be the best use of the Forbes Creek marshland area. Our role is to interpret SMA in a manner consistent with legislative intention and purpose.
Appellant contends that because the stated policy of SMA is to provide for the management of the shorelines of the state by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. . . . This policy contemplates protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the state and their aquatic life . . . RCW 90.58.020, and because the legislature has directed that the statute "shall be liberally construed to give full effect to the objectives and purposes for which it was enacted," RCW 90.58.900, the words "associated with" in the definition of "wetlands" and "wetland areas" in RCW 90.58.030(2) (f) should be interpreted in a manner to include the subject property and thereby afford the maximum protection to the public and the environment.
In other words, the nutrient flow to the lake, the interrelationship to the plant and animal communities do not depend on a zero grade. If we had a very high gradiant here, this might be a factor. But not with what we have here at all. The appellant insists that in the absence of any scientific justification for adopting such a "zero grade" interpretation of the meaning of "associated with," the regulations adopted by the Department of Ecology are inconsistent with the framework and policy of SMA.
These boundary decisions, as you know, what is a wetland and what is not associated wetland are always somewhat arbitrary. And decisions are often made on terms of administrative convenience as much as anything else. For example, there is nothing magic about 20 cubic feet per second as opposed to 25 or 15, as far as I know. Simply at some point the resources of the State agencies such as the Department of Ecology that have to worry about these matters and simply cannot be diluted down to handling two and three and five cubic feet per second streams.
resources to handle this. You wish to concentrate your attentions naturally on bigger bodies of water. So that you make some sort of arbitrary cut-off. Where there is such a clear basis for a difference of opinion by reasonable men, we cannot conclude that an administrative decision is arbitrary or capricious, or that it constitutes an abuse of discretion. "Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." DuPont-Ft. Lewis School Dist. 7 v. Bruno, 79 Wn.2d 736, 739, 489 P.2d 171 (1971); see also Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn.2d 255,461 P.2d 531 (1969).
"Shorelines" means all of the water areas of the state, including reservoirs, and their associated wetlands, together with the lands underlying them; except . . . (ii) shorelines on segments of streams upstream of a point where the mean annual flow is twenty cubic feet per second or less and the wetlands associated with such upstream segments . . .
(Italics ours.) It is obvious that the legislature, by making such a specific and arbitrary designation, was seeking to delineate with care the geographic coverage of the act. Similarly, it is apparent that the Department of Ecology's approach is consistent with such legislative intent. The department's designation of areas having a surface water connection at grade essentially guarantees protection under SMA to bodies of water having a close physical proximity to their respective "associated wetlands." Under such a "zero grade" test, each body of water and its "associated wetlands" will share the same water, the water quality of one will affect the other, and there will be a visual and esthetic connection between the two.
flows well below that rate, at a rate of no more than 4 cubic feet per second. Thus, if we were to conclude that the area in question should be designated an "associated wetland," as appellant would have us do, we would in effect be expanding that term to include areas which were specifically excluded from coverage under SMA by the legislature. Under such circumstances, we cannot say that the Department of Ecology's regulations fall outside the framework and policy of SMA.
There is an additional problem in appellant's reasoning. Appellant contends that the environment is a continuum. This is true. An ecological connection exists between the Pacific Ocean and the smallest stream in eastern Washington. When lesser distances are involved, such as the threefourths to one mile between Lake Washington and the subject property involved in this case, there is a closer ecological connection. There is an even closer ecological connection between areas having a surface connection at grade, and these are the areas designated under SMA by the Department of Ecology. So even though it may not make perfect ecological sense to draw a line across this continuum, as the legislature did with its 20 cubic feet per second cut-off point, that is apparently what the legislature expected the Department of Ecology to do by delegating to the department the authority to designate "associated wetlands" and, as we noted previously, there is nothing to indicate that the department acted improperly under that authority. In this regard, it is notable that there is no indication in the legislation that the designation of "associated wetlands" should be based solely on ecological factors. On the contrary, factors such as physical proximity, practical recreational use, and increased public access are also involved. See RCW 90.58.020. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined the subject property to be outside the scope of SMA.
that the City's new zoning code, ordinance No. 2183, which became effective after KSG applied for the grading permit but prior to its issuance, was applicable to KSG's landfilling and excavating activities. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to declare grading permit No. G-023 invalid because KSG did not obtain the "unclassified use permit" required by ordinance No. 2183.
 The trial court's findings, although many of them are disputed by appellant, are nevertheless supported by substantial evidence and disclose that the facts pertinent to the possible applicability of ordinance No. 2183 are as follows: On April 18, 1960, ordinance No. 8D3 was passed which specifically provided that KSG's "present gravel pit operation" on the subject property was to cease "when 500,000 cubic yards of sand and gravel have been removed or on or before June 1, 1965, whichever is sooner." As previously noted, on March 31, 1972, when KSG filed its application for a grading permit, the only city ordinance regulating grading or excavating and providing for permits was section 21.08.070 of the municipal code, which amended and adopted by reference chapter 70 of the Uniform Building Code, and on May 24, 1972, KSG met all of the terms and conditions of that ordinance. The trial court also found that "on May 26, 1972, the City of Kirkland adopted a new zoning code requiring a 'non-classified use' permit before grading or excavating to a depth over 3 feet"«9» (finding of fact No. 21) and that "no Non-classified Use Permit was applied for or issued by the City of Kirkland to Kirkland Sand & Gravel prior to the issuance of the Grading Permit." Finding of fact No. 25.
«9» Defendant's exhibit No. 17 which is a copy of the new zoning code indicates that the required permit is known as an "unclassified use permit." Appellant's brief points out and it is not disputed that the trial court erred as to the date of adoption of the new zoning code. In fact, it was adopted May 15 and became effective Nay 29, 1972. However, such error as to date is not material to a determination of the question under discussion.
That the new zoning code of the City of Kirkland having been adopted after Kirkland Sand & Gravel had made application for a Grading Permit and met all conditions necessary to obtain said permit, said ordinance has no effect on the issue of whether or not the Grading Permit G-023 is valid and enforceable. Conclusion of law No. 10. Appellant's argument to support its claim that the trial court was incorrect in so concluding is basically threefold: First, that the critical date to be used in determining which ordinance applies is the date the application is complete, not the date the application was filed, and there is no substantial evidence to support a finding that the application was complete at any time prior to the effective date of ordinance No. 2183; second, that the "vested right" doctrine, as enunciated in State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954), and relied upon by the trial court, simply does not apply to a grading permit; and third, assuming arguendo that it does, the application is inconsistent with the 1960 ordinance No. 803 which was applicable at the time KSG applied for the grading permit.
applicable such that, even if the original application were defective in some manner, a grading permit properly may issue provided the application is subsequently modified or completed to bring it into conformance with the applicable ordinances. See State ex ret. Klappsa v. Enumclaw, 73 Wn.2d 451,439 P.2d 246 (1968); Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 73 Wn.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968).
Second, with regard to the specific applicability of the "vested right" doctrine to a grading permit application, it is not disputed that an applicant for a building permit has a vested right in the permit which accrues at the time the application is made. Pierce v. King County, 62 Wn.2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963); State ex rel. Kuphal v. Bremerton, 59 Wn.2d 825, 371 P.2d 37 (1962); Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958); State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, supra. The doctrine has also been held applicable to an application for a conditional use permit. Beach v. Board of Adjustment, supra. Appellant argues that the "vested right" doctrine has never been held to apply to a grading permit but, in the context of that doctrine, we see no rational distinction between building or conditional use permits and a grading permit.
cases. The only issue involved in Hass was the validity of a fire code provision which was in effect on the day that the building permit was applied for and our state Supreme Court simply upheld the city's refusal of the building permit because Hass had failed to comply with all applicable ordinances, specifically the fire code provision. No such situation is presented in the case at bar inasmuch as KSG complied with all ordinances applicable to its grading permit application.
The final portion of appellant's 3-pronged argument is that KSG's application for a grading permit did not vest any rights because it was not consistent with ordinance No. 803 which was enacted in 1960 when KSG's property was annexed to the City. Appellant argues that KSG's "present gravel pit operation" should have been discontinued after 500,000 cubic yards of sand and gravel had been removed but no later than June 1, 1965. Appellant's argument is defeated by the trial court's finding of fact, based upon substantial evidence, that the "present gravel pit operation" referred to in ordinance No. 803 did cease in a timely manner. This finding was based upon the trial court's evaluation of evidence that the processing activities in effect when ordinance No. 803 was enacted were completely different from subsequent activities, including those taking place at the time of KSG's application for the grading permit. We are bound by such finding.
For the reasons stated, we conclude the trial court correctly determined that ordinance No. 2183 was not applicable to KSG's March 31, 1972 application for the grading permit here in question.
be considered in view of our decision to remand and because such problem is unlikely to arise a second time as to the parties herein.
In addition to such relief, including money damages, the court in its discretion may award attorney's fees and costs of the suit to the prevailing party. RCW 90.58.230. Inasmuch as we have determined appellant is not entitled to relief under SMA, we must deny its request for attorney's fees and expert witness' costs.
We also decline to grant KSG's request for attorney's fees on appeal, pursuant to RCW 90.58.230.
Wn.2d 146, 500 P.2d 79 (1972); Wagner v. Wagner, 1 Wn. App. 328,461 P.2d 577 (1969).
Because neither party obtained the relief sought, nor specifically contended in this court for the relief granted, i.e., a remand to the City, each party shall bear its own costs. See Department of Highways v. King County Chapter, Wash. Environ. Council, 82 Wn.2d 280, 510 P.2d 216 (1973).
The cause is reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FARRIS and JAMES, JJ., concur.
Petition for rehearing denied September 18, 1973.
Review denied by Supreme Court November 20, 1973.

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