Source: https://canucklaw.ca/category/types-of-law/civil/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 06:16:56+00:00

Document:
(5) About The Case: Canada Egg Market Agency v. Richardson, (1998) 3 S.C.R.
(7) Would This Work In Court?
The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (I.C.B.C.), is a government crown corporate that holds a legal monopoly on automobile insurance in the province. Although additional coverage is available privately, those wishing to legally drive must buy the $200,000 3rd party liability insurance through I.C.B.C.
Needless to say, since this is a government monopoly, there is no incentive to operate efficiently, or to provide good service. Even so, they routine post huge losses. No worries, just jack up rates on the drivers. It’s a captive market. They can complain, but there is no avenue of recourse.
But this article is about a specific grievance: that I.C.B.C. has different rules for drivers when it comes to calculating the base rate, SEE HERE. In short, new drivers start at a CRS of zero ”0”, and it is adjusted up or down depending on whether you have accidents, or drive claims free.
(a) A BC-born driver immediately begins accruing years of ”claims free driving” as soon as he/she gets a license. No experience or skill is required. If you got a license at age 16, but don’t get insured until age 30, you would begin at -14, or the maximum 43% discount.
(b) A driver born in another province who moves to BC is subjected to different rules. Here, you don’t get ”claims free driving” for mere possession of a license. You can get up to 8 years from another jurisdiction, but only for time which you actually held insurance. If you came from Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, etc… you may have had a license since age 16, but will still start at 0 when you finally get insurance.
Note: should you move to BC a a year or more prior to getting insurance, that time will be considered ”claims free driving”.
Since simple possession of a BC license means ”experience” and of ”claims free driving” then actual experience is irrelevant. It is this double standard that is illegal.
”…Under the CRS system the maximum discount on compulsory basic insurance is 43 per cent, and that discount percentage applies to policies that reflect nine or more claim-free years. If you, as a new resident with a 40 per cent discount, stay claims-free for one more year, you will have the best discount on Basic, which is three percent more than the out of province entry point.
Each full year of being claim-free represents a five per cent discount on the base premium up to a maximum of 40 per cent.
The maximum discount allowed is level -8 (40 per cent) effective the ICBC history start date.
When a customer has been outside of British Columbia for more than eight years, ICBC follows the Basic Insurance Tariff, which has the force of a Regulation in the province of British Columbia. The Tariff outlines that ICBC will start from the date of the application for insurance and count backwards the number of “full chargeable claim payment free years” to a maximum of 8 years. The Tariff states that a new resident applying for a discount must provide verification letters from each previous insurer documenting a continuous record of the applicant’s coverage history. This history is a maximum of eight years and must immediately precede the date of the application for insurance in British Columbia. The Basic Insurance Tariff can be found on ICBC’s website: http://www.icbc.com/about-icbc/company-info/Documents/bcuc/basic-tariff.pdf#search=Tariff.
Information on moving to British Columbia can be found on the ICBC website, at: http://www.icbc.com/autoplan/moving-insurance/Pages/Default.aspx.
Ms. Dixon confirms in writing that out of province drivers are subjected to different rules.
While she is careful to avoid expressing saying ”double standard”, she goes on at length to explain how I.C.B.C. treats non-BC born drivers differently. She is also careful to avoid answering the question of Sections 6 (Mobility) and 15(1) (Equality) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Those will be addressed later.
Section 2 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231, provides that, if the Insurance Corporation Act authorizes ICBC to operate a plan of universal compulsory vehicle insurance, ICBC must operate the plan of universal compulsory vehicle insurance in accordance with the Insurance (Vehicle) Act and regulations.
The Insurance (Vehicle) Act provides ICBC the authority to establish classes and subclasses of vehicles and drivers of vehicles, and basic premiums that apply to those classes as well as premium discounts and additional premiums based on, among other things, the accident record of the owner or driver: Insurance (Vehicle) Act, ss. 34(1) and 35.
The Utilities Commission Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 473, applies to and in respect of ICBC’s rates for basic insurance as if it were a public utility, except where expressly precluded under the Insurance Corporation Act.
The British Columbia Utilities Commission (the “Commission”) is a statutory body continued under s. 2 of the Utilities Commission Act.
ICBC and the Commission have distinct but interrelated roles. The Commission may determine and set adequate, efficient, just and reasonable standards, practices or procedures to be used by ICBC in providing universal compulsory vehicle insurance and may order ICBC to comply with those standards, practices or procedures: Insurance Corporation Act, s. 45(2).
ICBC must make available universal compulsory vehicle insurance in a manner, and in accordance with practice and procedures, that the Commission considers are in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable: Insurance Corporation Act, s. 45(1).
The Commission may exercise its powers and duties under the Insurance Corporation Act in relation to ICBC’s provision of universal compulsory vehicle insurance, but not in relation to the provision of insurance to any one customer: Insurance Corporation Act, s. 45(5).
The rates to be applied to applications for basic insurance premiums are approved by the Commission pursuant to s. 46.2 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, ss. 44 and 45 of the Insurance Corporation Act, ss. 58 to 60 of the Utilities Commission Act, and the Special Direction IC2 to the British Columbia Utilities Commission, B.C. Reg. 307/2004, which provides direction to the Commission regarding ICBC.
The Insurance (Vehicle) Act specifically confers jurisdiction on the Commission to approve, require replacement of, or to override and replace, classes and subclasses of vehicles and drivers, basic premiums, additional premiums, and discounts for universal compulsory vehicle insurance: Insurance (Vehicle) Act, s. 46.2.
The Special Direction IC2 to the British Columbia Utilities Commission, as amended, provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the Commission may not determine rates based on age, gender, or marital status (s. 3(1)(i)). Under the Insurance Corporation Act and Utilities Commission Act, an insured’s driving history is not a protected ground.
As part of its mandate, the Commission is empowered to inquire into, hear and determine any application by or on behalf of any interested party or on its own motion regarding whether ICBC is administering the universal compulsory vehicle insurance in a manner that is adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. Upon doing so, the Commission may make an order granting the whole or part of the relief applied for or may grant further or other relief, as the Commission considers advisable: Insurance Corporation Act, s. 45(2); see also, Utilities Commission Act, ss. 2.1, 58, 72, 99 to 105.
and applied to the plaintiff were approved by the Commission, after ICBC received a direction from the Province of British Columbia to prepare and implement a basic insurance rate design plan that required ICBC to, among other things, retain the CRS until at least the 2011 rate year.
It is interesting that Ms. Harlengton goes on to ”deny” that there is any double standard of how non-BC born drivers are treated. She very explicitly denies this.
She then spends a lot of time ”justifiying” why this double standard exists, citing the: 1/ Basic Insurance Tariff; 2/ Insurance Corporation Act; and 3/ Utilities Commission Act.
Here’s the thing: when you start explaining why a double standard exists, you are no longer denying the double standard. Rather you are justifying it.
Logically, once you start justifying an action, you are in fact admitting that action.
As an example: Suppose a robber breaks into my home, and I shoot him to protect my family. I then call the police. I am not denying that I did the shooting, but rather, am justifying or explaining why it happened.
Justifying involves admitting the underlying facts.
And again, if all one needs for claims-free driving is a BC driver’s license, then actual experience is not needed. So a license from any province should be suitable.
Note #1: Even though the Civil Resolution Tribunal covers very small amounts, they will not get involved in any case that involves a government body.
Note #2: Although Small Claims Court would be suitable for small amounts, they will not get involved in cases that involve questions of law.
Note, there is a specific case Canada Egg Market Agency v. Richardson, (1998) 3 S.C.R., that addresses this issue, but in an unrelated case. That will be covered in the next part.
I.C.B.C also violates Section 15(1), Equality.
Before anyone gets fussy, the wording means this list is not exclusive, and may include other grounds.
(6) About The Case: Canada Egg Market Agency v. Richardson, (1998) 3 S.C.R.
The scope given to these words has significant implications for the exercise of the federal and provincial powers enumerated in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, respectively. This context makes it necessary to consider carefully the purpose and role of the mobility section, and of the Charter itself in our constitutional order. The necessity of returning to first principles is heightened by the scarcity of both jurisprudence and academic commentary on s. 6.
50 The specific sections of the Charter raised in this case are s. 6(2)(b) and s. 6(3)(a). A preliminary problem is whether the two paragraphs should be read together as establishing a single right which is internally qualified, or whether, alternatively, the first paragraph establishes a self-contained right which is externally qualified by the second paragraph. Section 6(2)(b) guarantees the right to “pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province”. Section 6(3)(a) then dramatically narrows the ambit of that right, making it subject to laws of general application in the province, except those which discriminate against individuals “primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence”. In our view, it is impossible to ascertain the purpose of the extremely broad statement in s. 6(2)(b) without importing the limitation contained in s. 6(3)(a).
(c) The exception to the exception: Except if these laws discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of the province of residence.
On close examination, it will be observed that (b) almost entirely undermines the guarantee set out in (a); meaning, scope and purpose can only be attributed to (a) by reading it in conjunction with (c). The correctness of this general approach was recognized in both of the major Supreme Court decisions on s. 6, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, 1984 CanLII 3 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 357, and Black v. Law Society of Alberta, 1989 CanLII 132 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 591.
Although the circumstances of the case are quite different than I.C.B.C. and auto insurance, the principle outlined here still applies.
Here, the principle would be the right of any Canadian citizen to move to any province, including that of British Columbia.
The exception would be that all those wishing to drive must go through I.C.B.C., regardless of what their previous insurance rules were.
The exception to the exception is that drivers new to BC would not be subjected to the ”moving to BC” guidelines that I.C.B.C. lays out, since they financially punish drivers for the crime of not being born in BC.
Once more, since simply having a BC driver’s license counts as ”claims free driving”, then actual experience becomes irrelevant.
What about illegal overpayments from a long time ago?
Other possible arguments would involve that I.C.B.C. commits fraud (section 380 of criminal code) with their policies, or that it is a corrupt enterprise.
Note: These arguments, even if they fail, does not mean the claim would not be valid, just that a person couldn’t go further back to make a claim for over payment.
THE FACTS are on the side of the non-BC born driver. I.C.B.C. admits they have different sets of rules. They justify them at great length, but then deny there is actually a double standard.
THE LAWS are on the side of the non-BC born driver. Sections 6 (mobility) and 15 (equality) are spelled out quite clearly in the Charter. Sections 32 (applicability) and 52 (supremacy) show that the constitution is supreme to other laws. Other laws that conflict have no effect and are unenforceable. To be fair, the Limitations Act may make older overpayments hard to collect on.
I.C.B.C. is proposing changing this rule anyway. SEE HERE. Among the new proposals would change the rules so that all you need is a driver’s license, regardless of province.Pretty hard to argue their current policies are justified.
Very interesting to see how this will play out in such a case.
CBC published an article announcing that former Conservative Party leadership candidate, Kevin O’Leary, is suing Elections Canada over ruling relating to how he can pay back campaign debt. During the election campaign, O’Leary accumulated about $2,000,000 in debt. Approximately $400,000 is still outstanding.
In his claim, O’Leary said that it is proving too difficult to raise the necessary funds in the three-year timeframe set by Elections Canada laws because people are understandably “uninterested” in contributing to a failed campaign that is long over.
He has a good point. No one would be interested in contributing to a political campaign that has long since ended. So it does posse serious challenges for him to do so.
Again, this is valid. O’Leary’s brief political career is finished. He claims to never wish to run for office again, so what is the issue with him simply paying the debts and moving on with his life? O’Leary states that he has the funds available to do so, but is prohibited from doing so under the Canada Elections Act.
The claim filed is available here, and let’s go through some of the better arguments.
Okay, let’s dissect this word salad. O’Leary claims that portions of the Canada Elections Act, violate several provisions of the Canadian Charter. The “reasonable limitation is the Charter (section 1) would not apply and justify the C.E.A. Further, he implies that the C.E.A. is written in a too confusing standard to be followed.
Here is the Canada Elections Act.
Okay, 367(1)(d) has to do with individuals making contributions being limited to $1,500 per year to any leadership contestant. Sections (6) and (7) have to do with overall individual limits. It is definitely reasonable that there should be contribution limits, in order to avoid having candidates “BOUGHT AND PAID FOR”. However, should that apply to former candidates who have since moved on.
(a) What if a person “hasn’t” moved on, and intends to use this relief for future campaigns?
(b) Would removing this cap be an end-run around spending limits?
(c) Would this restriction be necessary to ensure “smaller candidates” get a fair shot?
There is no 478.756 in the Canada Elections Act. It appears to be a type in the claim. However, this is the provision that I believe O’Leary was referring to. That is 478.75.
478.75 (1) If a claim for a leadership campaign expense is evidenced by an invoice or other document that has been sent under section 478.74, or if a claim for repayment of a loan is made to the leadership contestant under section 373, the claim shall be paid within three years after the day on which the leadership contest ends.
Once more this seems to make a good point. The C.E.A requires repayment within 3 years. However, if former candidates must: (I) pay in 3 years or less; (II) are not actually able to raise more donations because they are not running; and (III) have strict limits as to how much of their personal wealth they can use, then there seem to be few, if any options.
500 (1) Every person who is guilty of an offence under any of subsections 484(1), 486(1), 489(1), 491(1), 492(1), 495(1), 495.1(1), 495.2(1), 496(1), 497(1), 497.1(1), 497.2(1), 497.3(1), 497.4(1), 497.5(1) and 499(1) is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three months, or to both.
I’m not going to quote the entirety of Section 500. The point is that O’Leary is correct, the C.E.A. does in fact threaten jail time as a punishment for failing to comply.
One the surface, Kevin O’Leary’s claim seems to be valid, given the strict rules the C.E.A. sets out. But let’s now check out the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which the lawsuit references as relief.
O’Leary makes the argument that fairly large campaigns are necessary to be elected as part of a legislative assembly. Without debating the merits of “big money”, it is a fact. Campaigns and elections are expensive to run.
Section 7 has to do with punishments, which Section 500 of the C.E.A. establishes can be up to 90 days in prison for violating provisions of the act.
Section 1 is often invoked as a “reasonable justification” for restricting Charter rights. Obviously, in order to restrict, there must be some societal overall good. While Elections Canada will obviously argue differently, O’Leary is attempting to preempt the defence by stating there is none.
Obviously, this is only beginning. The claim has been filed, but no response or defence has yet been made.
On the surface, the claim makes valid points. O’Leary, like all Canadian citizens, is allowed to run for any legislative assembly or body he wishes to. Today’s reality is that campaigns are long, expensive, and a financial drain to run. However, candidates may find themselves hamstrung by campaign finance rules, which seem overly complex and tedious.
Politicians (and aspiring politicians) across the country will likely be tracking this case, as it will have real impact on future elections and party leadership races.
As a side note: CBC published the article a month after the case was filed. Not that it is relevant to the case, but did they not know about it until then?
CNN’s White House Correspondent, Jim Acosta had his press access to the White House revoked on November 8th. Now his network, CNN, is suing President Donald Trump and several aides.
The lawsuit claims that by revoking Acosta’s media access, his 1st and 5th Amendments (freedom of the press, and due process), were violated.
2. But on November 7, 2018, Defendants revoked Acosta’s White House credentials because, in the President’s own words, Acosta failed to “treat the White House with respect” at a White House press briefing.
Except if you watch that November 6 video, he wasn’t being respectful. He was being antagonistic.
4. And the revocation of Acosta’s credentials is only the beginning; as the President explained, there “could be others also” who get their credentials revoked.
The slippery-slope argument except it is unwarranted here. There aren’t other journalists in the press core who act the way Acosta does. Blatant fearmongering.
5. The Framers of our Constitution embraced a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The President lacks the authority to quash “[t]he sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment”— debate that is “bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988). That is why the D.C. Circuit has been clear that “the protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press requires that . . . access [to White House press facilities] not be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons.” Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977). And “notice . . . of the factual bases for denial [of access to White House press facilities] with an opportunity to rebut is a minimum prerequisite for ensuring that the denial is . . . [not] based onarbitrary or less than compelling reasons.” Id. at 131.
This conflates a number of things: First, the press is there to cover the White House, not to DEBATE. Second, the 1st Amendment is to enshrine public talks and even unpleasant sharp attacks, but it doesn’t say that public figures MUST engage with you. Third, given Acosta’s frequent behaviour, it would be easy to rebut ”arbitrary or less than compelling reasons quite easily. Fourth, the 1st Amendment doesn’t guarantee access to the White House.
Jim Acosta seems to want a blank cheque to confront and badger White House staff at will.
While these claims are true, Acosta’s frequent behaviour does make it clear he is there to agitate, rather than report on the news. But since CNN raised the issue of the 1st Amendment, would this not be going against TRUMP’S right to free speech?
34. When Acosta attempted to ask a follow-up question, President Trump refused to take it. A White House staffer then approached Acosta and attempted to grab the microphone. The staffer reached all the way across Acosta’s body, successfully latched onto the microphone, and physically attempted to remove it from Acosta’s right hand. Acosta held onto the microphone, stated “Pardon me, ma’am,” and continued to ask his question.
This is a distortion of the truth. Acosta attempted to ask several questions, and was argumentative the entire time. Footage available refutes these assertions.
39. Hours after the press conference concluded, Press Secretary Sanders issued an official statement announcing that “the White House is suspending the hard pass of [Acosta] until further notice.” The Press Secretary accused Acosta of “placing his hands” on the White House staffer who attempted to take the microphone from Acosta during the press conference. The Press Secretary added that the alleged conduct “is absolutely unacceptable” and stated “[w]e will not tolerate this inappropriate behavior.” The White House’s statement indicated that this alleged “incident” was the basis of its decision to revoke Acosta’s credentials.
Whether this was deliberate or not is up for debate in the video. However, it was clear that Acosta was making a nuisance of himself.
57. Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their right to access the White House grounds by revoking Acosta’s White House credentials. Without those credentials, Acosta cannot access the White House and cannot effectively serve as a White House correspondent, thus depriving Plaintiff CNN of its chief White House correspondent.
CNN is not prohibited from covering White House press briefings, only Acosta is. Do they not have anyone else on staff who could do it?
59. Defendants’ justifications for impeding Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights are hollow and hardly sufficiently compelling to justify the indefinite revocation of Acosta’s White House credentials. Consequently, the only reasonable inference from Defendants’ conduct is that they have revoked Acosta’s credentials as a form of content- and viewpoint-based discrimination and in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercise of protected First Amendment activity.
Except Acosta wasn’t banned for his views. He was banned for regularly disturbing press conferences.
65. Acosta received no direct notice from the White House that his credentials had been revoked, let alone any notice prior to the revocation. Instead, the White House announced the revocation itself via Twitter after Defendants already decided to effectively ban Acosta from the White House grounds.
66. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs a written explanation, nor any explanation at all, before revoking Acosta’s press credentials. The only written explanation was a short statement posted on Twitter that Acosta was suspended because he “plac[ed] his hands” on a White House staffer. Even if this tweet were accurate—and it is not, as the reportedly doctored video Defendant Sanders posted would later show—it would not suffice to demonstrate prior notice of the revocation.
While many media heads are supporting Acosta’s reinstatement, I believe this claim to be completely bogus.
(1) Acosta has been repeatedly rude and antagonistic to the White House staff. He is clearly being an activist, not a journalist. This is seen again and again on tape. No one else behaves this way, and it is surprising that his behaviour has been tolerated for so long.
(3) CNN is not banned from covering the White House. They just need a new correspondent.
(4) Not being given notice is rude, but not a constitutional violation.
The judgement is expected any day, and a followup will be provided.
On Friday, November 16, a DC Judge ordered the press credentials to be temporarily returned to Jim Acosta while the matter is formally resolved. Personally, this was a surprise.
While Acosta seems to be allowed back in, there is nothing to stop the White House from: (a) simply refusing to call on Acosta; (b) cancelling press conferences; or (c) throwing Acosta out for the day.

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