Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/seyyado-ibrahim-saibo-et-al-v-jainambeebee-ammal-et-al/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:32:17+00:00

Document:
S. Ibrahim Saibo v. Jainambeebee Ammal.
SEYYACO IBRAHIM SAIBO et aJ. v. JAINAMBEEBEEAMMAL et al.
Partnership—Land purchased by partnership—Brought into pa; tnership stock—Claim by heirs of partner—Onus on plaintiffs to prove that land isindividual property.
Hold, that the onus was on the plaintiffs to, prove that the land was theprivate property of the individual partners.
Sir PHILIP MACDONELL—S. Ibrahim Saibo v. Jainambeebee Animal.
PPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court.
N. Pritt, K.C. (with him R. K. Handoo), for the appellant.
Stephen Chapman, for the respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Supreme Court ofCeylon setting aside a judgment and decree of the District Court ofNuwara Eliya and sending the case back to that District Court for anorder of partition of certain land to be entered in an action wherein therespondents-plaintiffs in the action, sued the appellants-defendants inthe action for a partition of that land.
No. 5 of the original partners, by name Pavanna Ibrahim Saibo, wasalso a member of each of the two succeeding partnerships and executedeach of the three partnership deeds. The three plaintiffs-respondentsclaim under him as his intestate heirs, being his widow and his two sons.He himself died intestate on February 16, 1915, during the currency ofthe third partnership. His estate was not administered until 1931, thisaction being commenced in 1933. Owing to absence from the jurisdictionand minority, an issue of prescription does not arise.
The third partnership had occasion to mortgage portions of the landin question by three several notarial deeds executed on October 7, 1915—after, that is, the death of partner No. 5—and eventually on February 12,1916, sold it by notarial deed P 9 to some of the defendants and a pre-decessor in title of other defendants-appellants. This deed P 9, givesthe numbers and dates of the three partnership deeds and of that bywhich the land had originally been conveyed to the partnership. Itrecites the mortgages on this land, the fact that No. 3 is the only one ofthe original partners still alive, also that the third partnership had boughtin their respective shares in this land from a retired partner, No. 6, andthe heirs of a deceased partner, No. 2, also that partner No. 5 under whomthe plaintiffs claim, had died. It recites further that “although thepremises” (i.e., this land) “were acquired in the names of the sevenpersons of whom the said partnership was originally composed and ofwhom the only person now alive is ” (the original partner No. 3) “ the saidpremises have always been regarded as property of the said firm andhave been possessed as such up to date without any disturbance orinterference whatsoever on the part of the heirs, executors or administra-tors of such of the original partners” as are dead, the: said No. 3“ himself having always allowed the rents and profits of the said premisesto be included in the accounts of the said partnership and to be distributedamongst the partners for the time being of the said firm according to theirrespective.shares in the said business”, also that “on the same principlethe said premises have always been considered as part of the assets of thesaid partnership, and its value at the time of the taking of a generalaccount has accordingly been included in estimating the amount availablefor distribution among the different partners ”, and that “ on that footingeach deceased or retiring partner has actually been paid the price of hisinterest in the said premises ”. This deed P 9, selling to the defendants,or to their predecessors in title,, gives in the schedule a description byextent and boundaries of the land sold, showing that it is identical withthe land acquired by the first partnership on deed P 3. At different times,not material, the defendants and their predecessors in title bought in theoutstanding interests of all the partners in this land, save that of No. 5under whom the plaintiffs claim.
On July 17, 1917, the third partnership dissolved itself by notarialdeed D 5.
30.0 Sir PHILIP MACDONELL—S. Ibrahim Saibo v. Jainambeebec Animal.
to the partnership, the legal and beneficial right to a one-seventh sharetherein. They also claim two sixty-third shares in it as follows:—Theretired partner No. 6 and the heirs of deceased partner No. 2 on May 14,1912, sold to the third partnership consisting, as will be remembered ofnine persons, of whom No. 5 was one, their two one-seventh shares. Ofthese two-sevenths No. 5 would be entitled to a one-ninth or two sixty-thirds. These must be added to No. 5’s original one-seventh makingeleven sixty-thirds in all.
administered in England in the like case, at the corresponding period,if such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in England,unless in any case other provision is or shall be made by any Ordinancenow in force in this Colony or hereafter to be enacted: Provided thatnothing herein contained shall be taken to introduce into this Colony. any part of the law of England relating to the tenure or conveyance orassurance of, or succession to any land or other immovable property,or any estate, right, or interest therein.
All property and rights and interests originally brought into thepartnership stock or acquired whether by purchase or otherwise onaccount of the firm or for the purposes and in the course of partnershipbusiness are called in this Act Partnership propeity and must be heldand applied by the partners exclusively for the purposes of the partner-ship and in accordance with the partnership agreement.
This land was “ brought into the partnership stock ” and “ acquired…. by purchase …. on account of the firm and ….
that of England, does, not recognize a partnership firm as a legal persona,it was conveyed, as is a usual method under that law, to the seven partnersof the firm nominatim, and by the instrument conveying it each of themacquired a one-seventh share in the legal title to the land and, since hewould be entitled to share in any profits the land produced, in thebeneficial interest also, but so that each of them used his share exclusivelyfor the purposes of the partnership4 At the trial of this action theDistrict Judge was satisfied that the land thus became partnershipproperty, but on appeal the Supreme Court dissented from this. In it?view the Ceylon Statute of Frauds, Ordinance No. 7 of 1840, section 2,created against holding this land to be partnership property, difficultieswhich might not have seemed so great had it been kept in mind that theonus was on the plaintiffs to show that each partner’s one-seventh sharein the land was his for his personal use, and that therefore the land wasnot partnership property.
unless in writing and by notarial deed. The second and third partnershipdeeds do not refer specifically to this land, or state that the. partnershipsucceeding to the first one took or held it as partnership property, hence,il was argued, the members of the second and third partnership, No. 5being one of these, took it for their own benefit and not as partnershipproperty; conversely, to enable the partnership to claim it as suchproperty, the second and third partnership deeds should have containedwords definitely stating it to be so. Various Ceylon cases were cited insupport of this line of argument, and their Lordships were also invited toascertain the intention of the deed P 3, conveying this land, by examiningthe subsequent conduct of the persons who executed it, a method ofinterpretation applied also by the Supreme Court in its judgment: thuswhen the retired partner No. 6 filed in August, 1909, the inventory of theestate of the deceased partner No. 2, he included therein a one-seventhshare of “ Fountain Store and premises ”, valuing that share at Rs. 8,000and inserted an item “ Rents due Rs. 4,420 ”, and it was. argued that these" rents ” would be the deceased partner’s share of rents due to theindividual partners from the partnership for its occupation of the land,but this overlooks the fact that the partnership owned other lands inwhich this inventory also claimed shares, likewise that deed P 9 by whichthe third partnership sold this land, recites that its “rents and profits”were included in the accounts of the partnership, consequently these“ rents ” may have been due from tenants to the partnership, not fromthe partnership to individual partners.
302Sir PHILIP MACDONELL—S. Ibrahim Saibo v. Jainambeebee Ammai.
Sir PHILIP MACDONELL—S. Ibrahim Saibo v. Jainambeebee Ammal.
a man dying in 1915 is only administered in 1931, and’ action only takenfor. what is claimed thereunder in 1933, evidence may have becomeunavailable which was available in 1915 and following years.
But generally this line of argument for the plaintiffs, namely, interpreta-tion of the deed of conveyance P 3, hy the subsequent conduct of theparties to it, overlooks the fact that in this case the onus is on the plaintiffs;it is not for the defendants to show that this land was partnership propertybut for the plaintiffs to show that it was the property of the individualpartners. Parties to a partition action must make clear title to the landthey seek to partition and must identify what land it is that they claim.If plaintiffs here begin with the deed P 9 by which the third partnershipsold the land in derogation, as they claim, of their rights, it/jvill be noticedthat that deed describes the land fully by boundaries and extent but alsoasserts in clear terms—set out above—that the land had always beentreated as partnership property, and recites the power of the partners tosell it. If the plaintiffs rely on the deed P 29 establishing the thirdpartnership, it will be noticed that that deed, while it states that thepartnership owns lands, and while it gives the principal partners powerto sell them and on dissolution of the partnership to call for conveyancesfrom the several partners of their interests therein, yet does not specifywhat those lands are or where. The deed creating the second partnership,P 28 describes the partners as “ of the shop …. Fountain Store ”but again does not specify the lands of the partnership while stating thatit does own “ properties ”, and while giving the principal partner powerto sell them. The plaintiffs must go then to the deed P 3 by which thefirst partnership obtained a conveyance of this land. This deed specifiesthe land by boundaries and extent but also makes it partnership propertywithin section 20 (1) of the Partnership Act, 1890. The plaintiffs’ actionthen fails. The only two deeds executed by the partnership whichidentify this land or mention it specifically, are the notarial deed P 9, thesale of the land under a power given by inter alios partner No. 5, whichdeed states the land always to have been treated as partnership property,and the notarial deed P 3, the purchase of the land by the partnershipwhich, executed under a power given by inter alios partner No. 5, makesit partnership property. On this view of the case, the failure of theplaintiffs to make out the partners’ personal claim to this land, the onusbeing on them to do so, it becomes unnecessary to consider how farOrdinance No. 7 of 1840, section 2, and the cases cited thereon inargument, are applicable in the present matter.
the plaintiffs for partner No. 5’s share in the assets of the firm, and soavoid further litigation, but failing agreement there must be an inquirywhich should be carried out in accordance with such directions as theSupreme Court may give.
conveyance of the shares of the land which they claim in this action.
Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. Theappellants will have the costs of this appeal.

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