Source: https://www.ptab.us/2014/08/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:19:47+00:00

Document:
See In re Thompson, 545 F.2d 1290, 1294 (CCPA 1976) (economic factors alone may provide motivation for the proposed combination).
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (breadth is not indefiniteness); see also In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970).
3626 Ex Parte Jung et al 11986986 - (D) CHUNG 103 102/103 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 101 Constellation Law Group, PLLC COLEMAN, CHARLES P.
Regardless, the Examiner’s stated rationale seems to be predicated upon the use of multiple pins and, regarding claim 7, the Examiner’s sole basis of multiple pins being obvious in light of Zen’s single pin is a reliance on Nerwin, whose use as a per se rule is improper.
The Examiner’s reasoning is not persuasive. Patent drawings are not necessarily intended to show accurate relative dimensions and “arguments based on mere measurement of the drawings [are] of little value.” In re Chitayat, 408 F.2d 475, 478 (CCPA 1969).
Definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, requires that “a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable clarity.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014).
We further note that if the scope of a claim would be reasonably ascertainable by those skilled in the art, then the claim is not indefinite. Energizer Holdings Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that “anode gel” provided by implication the antecedent basis for “zinc anode”); Ex parte Porter, 25 USPQ2d 1144, 1145 (BPAI 1992) (“controlled stream of fluid” provided reasonable antecedent basis for “the controlled fluid”). For these reasons, we reverse the rejection of claims 1−20 under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph.
An adequate traverse must contain adequate information or argument to create on its face, a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances justifying notice of what is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971).
We find that claims 1–8, 11, and 13–25 are directed to a mathematical algorithm for calculating the modular inverse of a value, i.e., an abstract idea. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that fundamental concepts, by themselves, are ineligible abstract ideas. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. ___, No. 13-298, slip op. 1 at 10 (June 19, 2014). We recognize that independent claims 1, 14, and 18 conclude with an intended use clause “used for a cryptographic application” that applies the mathematical calculation steps to a specific application. A claim may be patent eligible if it includes additional inventive features such that the claim scope does not solely capture the abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. ___, slip op. at 6. A claim reciting an abstract idea, however, does not become eligible “merely by adding the words ‘apply it.’” Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference[.]”).
Specifically, the scope of the claimed “prescribed presentation preference” is not defined and thus, appears to depend solely on the unrestrained, subjective opinion of a particular individual purportedly practicing the invention. See Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The scope of claim language cannot depend solely on the unrestrained, subjective opinion of a particular individual purportedly practicing the invention. See Application of Musgrave, 57 C.C.P.A. 1352, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (1970) (noting ‘[a] step requiring the exercise of subjective judgment without restriction might be objectionable as rendering a claim indefinite’). Some objective standard must be provided in order to allow the public to determine the scope of the claimed invention.” (emphasis added)).
“When different words or phrases are used in separate claims, a difference in meaning is presumed.” Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc., 424 F.3d 1136, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, “the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.” Phillips v. AWH Corp, 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This presumption is “especially strong when the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim.” SunRace Roots Enterprise Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Appellant disagrees and references Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) for stating “the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” App. Br. 21 (additional citations omitted); see also Reply Br. 2. “Accordingly, the Examiner's allegation that the meaning could change over time is irrelevant, as the meaning ‘at the time of invention’ determines plain meaning.” App. Br. 21; see also Reply Br. 3.
“[U]nhelpful evidence [does not] diminish the strength of the more persuasive forms of evidence.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Company V. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 13-1306, 18 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 12, 2014). The burden of showing commercial success attributable to the features of the claim does not impose a burden to demonstrate that no other conceivable factors contributed to that success. App. Br. 31-36; contra Ans. 8. “It is not necessary that  the patented invention be solely responsible for the commercial success, in order for this factor to be given weight appropriate to the evidence, along with other pertinent factors.” Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1273 (Fed.Cir. 1991).
We are unaware of any requirement that the invention be the only successful product in its market niche or the most successful. App. Br. 38 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 602,679 (D. Del. 2013) aff’d at Bristol-Myers Squibb Company V. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc ., supra (Fed. Cir. Jun. 12, 2014)(“ We agree with the factual findings on secondary considerations and find no clear error”). Evidence of growth in market share, like evidence of total market share, is relevant to the commercial success inquiry. See e.g., Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F. 2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983). A growing market share demonstrates that Appellant was “displac[ing] other devices which had previously been employed for analogous uses.” See Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 US 486, 495-6 (1877).

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