Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321207756/LaMarcus-Ealy-v-Pinkerton-Government-Services-4th-Cir-2013
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:38:23+00:00

Document:
Before MOTZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
VENABLE, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Thomas H. Strong, Mark D.
Arthur P. Rogers, Keira M. McNett, D.C.
CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
class certification and Pinkerton filed this appeal.
Procedure have been satisfied in this case.
on the federal enclave doctrine.
Service and Andrews Air Force Base.
officers employed by Pinkerton at Andrews Air Force Base.
at an on-site guard shack.
and equipment to be used during their respective shifts.
equipment, that is, to disarm.
meals and scheduled breaks as required by state and local law,"
compensated for time spent arming and disarming.
their claim with respect to arming.
to take meals off/away from posts."
filed by the parties in this appeal.
refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
such claim is not at issue in this appeal.
court certified Appellees' FLSA claims as a collective action.
were barred under the federal enclave doctrine.
interlocutory review of the federal enclave doctrine issue.
bench and granted Appellees' request for class certification.
regard to this class is to start with . . . regard to meals.
joinder would be impractical. J.A. 988.
and adequately protect the interest of the class proposed.
These three proposed members all suggest that they were . . .
security guards since December 2007.
certification decision for an abuse of discretion.
Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 2009).
Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 475 (4th Cir. 2006).
maintained: Rule 23(a); and Rule 23(b).
adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
of the class action requirements found in Rule 23(b).
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
fact common to the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
any common question will do.
appropriate respecting the class as a whole; . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
provision of law is insufficient.
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
that the class members have suffered the same injury[,] id.
the claims in one stroke.
class . . . .
would also prove the claims of the absent class members.
WL 5992207 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012).
distinct from the requirements found in Rule 23(a).
Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
individual issues is qualitative, not quantitative.
(citing In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080 (6th Cir.
predominate even when some individualized inquiry is required.
For example, in Stillmock v. Weis Markets, Inc., 385 F.
385 F. Appx at 273.
and the inquiries should not be blended.
the same tools to construct the two separate inquiries.
predominate for Rule 23(b)(3) purposes.
of both Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are met.
We first turn to commonality.
It is undisputed that they were not.
have been compensated for that time under Maryland law.
allow the district court to conduct rigorous analysis).
The same can be said of the typicality requirement.
determine whether Appellees claims are typical of the class.
See e.g., Deiter, 436 F.3d at 46667.
appeared to blend the commonality and predominance inquiries which Wal-Mart counsels against.
outcome about the propriety of a class action . . . .
See, e.g., Stillmock, 385 F. Appx at 27375.
could probe behind the pleadings and look to the declarations.
their own argument in this regard.
You have the underlying declarations.
to anything but the time, but the present time period.
That is the time period after November of 2009.
signing out at the beginning and end of their shift.
disarming claim, is not even at issue in this case.
discrimination, is also instructive here.
fellow employees who suffered that same injury.
district court to determine in the first instance.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
single question of fact or law is common to the class.
of each one of the claims in one stroke.
at 2551; see also Ross, 667 F.3d at 90810 (7th Cir. 2012).
determining whether they tend to advance the same interests.
See Deiter, 436 F.3d at 46667.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
class action method is in fact superior.
385 F. Appx at 27375.
path the district court should take.
or perhaps class certification should be denied entirely.
superiority requirements of both Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are met.
Lienhart, 255 F.3d at 146.
exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution.
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings.
from the district courts with certain limited exceptions.
that courts of appeals can only hear appeals from final orders.
F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Servs., 689 F.3d 1234, 123638 (10th Cir. 2012).
Swint, 514 U.S. at 5051.).
1983 action); Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir.
set forth in Swint are not always so easily distinguished.
624 F.3d at 553 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v.
Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 576 (2d Cir. 2005)).
the appealable issue necessarily decides the pendent issue.
Rux, 461 F.3d at 476.
been required to hold the municipality liable.
(considering the issues inextricably intertwined); cf.
evaluation of the state constitutional claims).
United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 581 n.4 (4th Cir.
Berrey v. Asarco, Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 647 (10th Cir.
warrant our review at this stage.
non-appealable federal enclave doctrine issue.
in fact, the two issues are distinct legal concepts.
claims are ultimately barred under the federal enclave doctrine.
review of the class certification issue.
focused on efficiency . . . .).
a basis for the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction.).
the context of a class certification appeal.
barred under the federal enclave doctrine.
by considerations of need, rather than of efficiency.
should be considered in the wake of a final order.
of its motion for partial summary judgment.
Law Office of Michael D. Smith, P.C.
Gordon v. Acosta Sales and Marketing, Inc.

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