Source: https://multiracial.com/index.php/1999/09/30/vander-linden-v-hodges-9301999-no-98-2174/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:03:01+00:00

Document:
On page 3, section 1, lines 7-8 — “Herbert E. Buhl, III, Columbia, South Carolina,” is added to the counsel listing.
NEIL A. VANDER LINDEN; FORREST E.
OTT; ANN Y. HART; PEGGY A.
DUFEK; VINCENT JOHNSON; ALICE J.
ROBERT H. WATERS; ANITA L.
Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.
UNION FOUNDATION, INC., Atlanta, Georgia; Herbert E.
Buhl, III, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.
ter, Jr., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee Beasley.
ment applies, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
1994), and the Civil Rights Act of 1957, id. § 1971(a).
in the election of large numbers of African-American officials.
specifically described powers set forth above. See J.A. 184.
ment and renovating park and recreation facilities.
native, the district court reactivated the case.
After a bench trial, the district court rejected both contentions.
pose and effect of the delegation system.
for proportionally equal numbers of officials.
369 U.S. at 209-10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
mandate in the absence of a compelling justification for the deviation.
bers are not great enough to violate the one person, one vote principle.
tions are appointed. The court then analogized this case to Sailors v.
functions. Id. at 108, 110.
rather simply by virtue of their popular election to the legislature.
The district court did not, however, rely exclusively on Sailors.
members automatically upon their election to the General Assembly.
challenged the structure of the Board of Estimate of New York City.
Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
tion before us is: do the delegations perform governmental functions?
ernmental functions: the State has conceded that they do.
left to the state courts.
making of appointments, as a governmental function. See Crow v.
§ 22; Cal. Const. art. III, § 8; Col. Const. art. IV, § 23; Conn. Const. art.
4th, § 27; Del. Const. art. III, § 9; Fla. Const. art. IV, § 6; Ga. Const. art.
IV, § 2, para. I; Haw. Const. art. V, § 6; Idaho Const. art. IV, § 6; Ill.
Const. art. V, § 9; Ind. Const. art 5, § 18; Iowa Const. art. V, § 16; Kan.
Const. art. 1, § 11; Ky. Const. § 152; La. Const. art. IV, § 5; Me. Const.
§ 11; Mich. Const. art. V, § 3; Minn. Const. art. V, § 3; Miss. Const. art.
4, § 103; Mo. Const. art. IV, § 22; Mont. Const. art. VI, § 8; Neb. Const.
art. IV, § 1; Nev. Const. art. 4, § 12; N.H. Const. part 2, art. 46; N.J.
§ 9; Tenn. Const. art. III, § 17; Tex. Const. art. III, § 24a; Utah Const.
art. VII, § 5; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 21; Va. Const. art. V, § 10; Wash. Const.
art. III, § 13; W. Va. Const. art. VII, § 8; Wis. Const. art. VI, § 4; Wyo.
Const. art. 4, § 7.
of the [official] were officially authorized, or lawful”); Snowden v.
the Alabama Constitution requiring reapportionment every ten years.
Protection Clause. See id. at 584.
missions, id. §§ 59-53-440, 59-53-550 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp.
the power to approve the alteration or division of school districts, id.
reduction of certain school tax levies, id. § 59-73-110 (Law. Co-op.
county and regional housing authorities, id. §§ 31-3-720, 31-3-910 (Law.
tions for public use of lakes and ponds, id. § 50-13-2020 (Law. Co-op.
the power to approve certain new or amended fishing regulations, id.
the powers exercised by the legislative delegations.
7-7-450, 7-7-480, 7-7-501, 7-7-520, 7-7-530 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
tions of the parties does not purport to be exhaustive.
tant that the one person, one vote rule should not be applied to them.
enough indication that the choice is an important one.
Hadley, 397 U.S. at 55.
person, one vote rule is inescapable.
constitutes reliance on “hypotheticals” and “assumptions.” Post at 26.
other purpose in this litigation . . . .
expenses . . .;” and “reducing existing special school levies . . . .” Id.
Supreme Court.” Post at 26.
method by which county delegations are elected.” Reply Br. at 7-8.
and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact”).
improper. Judicial authority does not, however, flow in that direction.
exercise of such powers does not constitute a governmental function.
ernmental budgets. See J.A. 264-65; 269-71.
tive, legislative, or judicial — the requirements of Gray v.
the principle of “one man, one vote” has no relevancy.
Sailors, 287 U.S. at 111.
govern popularly elected officials exercising appointive powers.
ment, we hold it to be unconstitutional.
is not a separate political office to which members are elected.
with how they function today in compliance with state law.
troubled by this awkward and unnecessary exercise of federal power.
For the reasons discussed below, I dissent.
evaluate whether a governmental body acted within its power or not.
the entire system, we must examine what legislative delegations are.
what powers they are authorized to wield under South Carolina law.
they violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
state legislative districts to have a substantially equal voting population.
that the majority’s entire analysis is built on a house of cards.
has ruled that the legislative delegation may not exercise that power.
See Aiken County Bd., 262 S.E.2d at 17.
appellants’ own limitations on the arguments they raise in this case.
powers exercised by legislative delegations.
system as established under South Carolina law.
171, 173 (S.C. 1994); Crow v. McAlpine, 285 S.E.2d 355, 357 (S.C.
ments to local governmental offices, see Tucker, 442 S.E.2d at 172.
ticular, allegedly ultra vires act.
majority has refused to address.
would subject them to the federal limitation of one person, one vote.
While the majority cites Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S.
analysis under Supreme Court precedent.
ney General apply for the appointment of an independent counsel).
government — have as a constitutional right. See U.S. Const. amend.
as to positions on boards of education or transportation committees.
substantive does not necessarily mean “governmental” in this context.
this power without complying with one-person, one-vote principles.
restricted by one-person, one-vote principles.
the elective and appointive systems as was done here.
Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110-11.
where that subset does not follow one-person, one-vote principles.
ment, and therefore we have no authority to strike them down.
the hands of the legislature as a check on the executive branch.
delegation system with disfranchisement” of blacks.
discriminatory purpose and that it has a discriminatory effect. See id.
cannot prevail under any of these theories.
elected office by African-Americans is legislative seats.
legislative delegations compared to 2 for White senators.
enhances African-American representation on these bodies.
fied by law to vote . . . shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all . . .
by giving local governments a specific access to the state legislature.
judgment made by South Carolina unless it is unconstitutional.
the Supreme Court in Sailors.
in South Carolina, a sentence with which I vigorously disagree.

References: § 1971
 v.

 v. 
 v.

 § 8
 § 23
 art.
4
 § 27
 § 9
 § 6
 § 2
 § 6
 § 6
 § 9
 art 5
 § 18
 § 16
 art. 1
 § 11
 § 152
 § 5

§ 11
 § 3
 § 3
 art.
4
 § 103
 § 22
 § 8
 § 1
 art. 4
 § 12
 art. 46

§ 9
 § 17
 § 24
 § 5
 § 21
 § 10
 § 13
 § 8
 § 4
 art. 4
 § 7
 v.

 § 59
 § 50
 v.

 v. 
 v.