Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/61/65/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:03:12+00:00

Document:
The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the power to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for its government.
In the exercise of this power, Congress provided for the punishment of desertion and of other crimes not specified in the articles, which should be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea.
Where a seaman was charged with deserting, and the court martial found him guilty of attempting to desert, the Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and an action of trespass for false imprisonment will not lie against the ministerial officer who executes the sentence for attempting to desert.
It is only where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, or, having such jurisdiction, is bound to adopt certain rules in its proceedings, from which it deviates, whereby the proceedings are rendered coram non judice, that an action will lie against the officer who executes its judgment.
The authorities upon this point examined, and also the legal powers of courts martial.
enlisted in the naval service. Whereupon the President of the United States directed Hoover, the marshal of the district, to commit him to the penitentiary.
The proceedings of the circuit court are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff brought an action for assault and battery and false imprisonment, charging that the defendant imprisoned him in the penitentiary of the District of Columbia. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and several special pleas, in which he denied the force and injury and set up that he, as Marshal of the District of Columbia, imprisoned the plaintiff by virtue of the authority of the President of the United States in the execution of a sentence of a naval court martial, convened under an Act of Congress of the 23d of April, 1800; which sentence was approved by the Secretary of the Navy, which was final and absolute, and denying the jurisdiction of the court. The plaintiff filed a retraxit, admitting that there was no battery other than the imprisonment in pursuance of the sentence of the court martial.
"That on or about the twelfth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, Frank Dynes deserted from the United States ship Independence, at New York."
"We do find the accused, Frank Dynes, seaman of the United States navy, as follows:"
"Of the specification of the charge, guilty of attempting to desert; of the charge, not guilty of deserting, but guilty of attempting to desert; and the court do thereupon sentence the said Frank Dynes, a seaman of the United States navy, to be confined in the penitentiary of the District of Columbia, at hard labor, without pay, for the term of six months from the date of the approval of this sentence, and not to be again enlisted in the naval service."
This conviction and sentence was approved by the Secretary of the Navy, on the 26th of September, 1854. The prisoner was then brought from New York to Washington, in custody, and the President, reciting the trial and sentence, made the following order upon the defendant, the marshal, in relation to carrying the judgment of the court into execution.
to the penitentiary in the District of Columbia, in accordance with their respective sentences."
1. Because the said court martial had no jurisdiction or authority whatever to pass such sentence as that pleaded and set forth in said plea.
2. Because the sentence is illegal and void.
3. Because the President of the United States had no jurisdiction or authority whatever to write such a letter to the defendant as that pleaded and set forth in said plea, nor in any manner whatever to direct the defendant to commit the plaintiff to the penitentiary in the District of Columbia, in accordance with said sentence.
4. Because the said letter, and the said directions therein contained, are unconstitutional, illegal, and void.
5. Because the said plea is altogether vicious and insufficient in law, and wants form.
There was a joinder in demurrer and judgment for the defendant.
This presents the question whether the defendant, as marshal, was authorized to execute the direction to receive the plaintiff, then in custody of the captain of the United States steamer Engineer, to deliver him to the keeper of the penitentiary of the District of Columbia.
"The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United States."
These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely independent of each other.
"All crimes committed by persons belonging to the navy, which are not specified in the foregoing articles, shall be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea."
"the finding was coram non judice, it being for an offense of which the plaintiff was never charged and of which the court had no cognizance. That the subject matter of the sentence, the punishment inflicted, was not within their jurisdiction, and is a punishment which they had no sort of permission or authority of law to inflict."
another. Or when the charge is of a higher degree, including one of a lesser, there may be a finding by a partial verdict of the latter. As upon a charge of burglary, there may be a conviction for a larceny, and an acquittal of the nocturnal entry. So, upon an indictment for murder, there may be a verdict of manslaughter, and robbery may be reduced to simple larceny, and a battery into an assault.
peace as a militiaman; he could never be legally enrolled, and it is a principle that a decision of such a tribunal, in a case clearly without its jurisdiction, cannot protect the officer who executes it. The court and the officer are all trespassers."
2 Brown 124; 10 Cranch 69; Mark's 118; 8 Term 424; 4 Mass. 234.
I add two cases from the 2d of Horace Gray's reports of the Supreme Judicial Federal Court of Massachusetts, furnished me by MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL of Pifer v. Person, 120; Clark v. Whipple, in May and Kent 410.
But the case in hand is not one of a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, or that of one which has neglected the forms and rules of procedure enjoined for the exercise of jurisdiction. It was regularly convened; its forms of procedure were strictly observed as they are directed to be by the statute; and if its sentence be a deviation from it, which we do not admit, it is not absolutely void. Whatever the sentence is or may have been, as it was not a trial by court martial taking place out of the United States, it could not have been carried into execution but by the confirmation of the President, had it extended to loss of life, or in cases not extending to loss of life, as this did not, but by the confirmation of the Secretary of the Navy, who ordered the court. And if a sentence be so confirmed, it becomes final, and must be executed unless the President pardons the offender. It is in the nature of an appeal to the officer ordering the court, who is made by the law the arbiter of the legality and propriety of the court's sentence. When confirmed, it is altogether beyond the jurisdiction or inquiry of any civil tribunal whatever, unless it shall be in a case in which the court had not jurisdiction over the subject matter or charge, or one in which, having jurisdiction over the subject matter, it has failed to observe the rules prescribed by the statute for its exercise. In such cases, as has just been said, all of the parties to such illegal trial are trespassers upon a party aggrieved by it, and he may recover damages from them on a proper suit in a civil court, by the verdict of a jury.
a direct reference to what the law was in England that this Court said, in Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 337, that in such a case "the court and the officers are all trespassers." When we speak of proceedings in a cause or for the organization of the court and for trials, we do not mean mere irregularity in practice on the trial or any mistaken rulings in respect to evidence or law, but of a disregard of the essentials required by the statute under which the court has been convened to try and to punish an offender for an imputed violation of the law.
to try, or shall inflict a punishment forbidden by the law, though its sentence shall be approved by the officers having a revisory power of it, civil courts may, on an action by a party aggrieved by it, inquire into the want of the court's jurisdiction, and give him redress. Harman v. Tappenden, 1 East. 555; as to ministerial officers, Marshall's Case, 10 Cranch 76; Morrison v. Sloper, Wells 30; Parton v. Williams, B. & A. 330; and as to justices of the peace, by Ld. Tenterden, in Basten v. Carew, 3 B. & C. 653; Mules v. Calcott, 6 Bins 85.
Such is the law of England. By the mutiny acts, courts martial have been created, with authority to try those who are a part of the army or navy for breaches of military or naval duty. It has been repeatedly determined that the sentences of those courts are conclusive in any action brought in the courts of common law. But the courts of common law will examine whether courts martial have exceeded the jurisdiction given them, though it is said, "not, however, after the sentence has been ratified and carried into execution." Grant v. Gould, 2 H.Black 69; Ship Bounty, 1 East. 313; Shalford's Case, 1 East. 313; Mann v. Owen, 9 B. & C. 595; In the Matter of Poe, 5 B. & A. 681, on a motion for a prohibition. A judge, or any person acting by authority as such, where he has over the subject matter and over the person, a general jurisdiction which he has not exceeded, will not be liable to have his judgment examined in an action brought against himself; but if jurisdiction be wanting over the subject matter and over the person, such judgment would be examinable. Hammond v. Howel, 1 Mod. 184; Garnett v. Ferrand, 6 B. & C. 611; Moslyn v. Fabugas, Cow. 172; Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114; Greenwell v. Burwell, 1 Le Roy 454; by Holt, C.J., 1 Le Roy 470; Lumley v. Lance, 2 Le Roy 767; Basten v. Carew, 3 B. & C. 649. The preceding cited cases relate to judges of record. As to judges not of record, ecclesiastical judges, Acherly v. Parkerson, 3 M. & S. 411. Commissioners of court of bequests, Aldridge v. Haines, 2 B. & Ad. 395. As to returning officer of election, Ashby v. White, 2 Ld.Raym. 941; Cullen v. Morris, 2 Start 577.
constitutional obligation that "He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," violated no law in directing the marshal to receive the prisoner Dynes from the officer commanding the United States steamer Engineer for the purpose of transferring him to the penitentiary of the District of Columbia, and consequently that the marshal is not answerable in this action of trespass and false imprisonment.
We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

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