Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-%C2%A7-2309/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:15:50+00:00

Document:
Contrary to defendants' contention, a certificate of conformity (see CPLR 2309[c]) was not required since the physician is licensed to practice in New York and signed the affirmation in New York.
It appears from this record that the plaintiff was the holder of the mortgage and note. In any event, by failing to appear in the action, the debtor waived the defense of lack of standing (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher, 104 AD3d 815, 817). However, the affidavit attesting to the debtor's default in repaying the mortgage loan did not comply with CPLR 2309(c). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying relief to the movant without prejudice.
In support of their motion for leave to enter a judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant upon its failure to appear or answer, the plaintiffs submitted their process server's affidavit of service, an affidavit of merit, and their attorney's affirmation regarding the defendant's default (see CPLR 3215[f]).
To successfully oppose the plaintiffs' motion and in support of its cross motion to compel the plaintiffs to accept the late answer, the defendant was required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for its default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015[a]; May v Hartsdale Manor Owners Corp., 73 AD3d 713; Gross v Kail, 70 AD3d 997, 998; Leifer v Pilgreen Corp., 62 AD3d 759, 760; Kouzios v Dery, 57 AD3d 949). The affirmation of the defendant's president, which was submitted in an effort to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense, was not in an authorized form (see CPLR 2309; Slavenburg Corp. v Opus Apparel, 53 NY2d 799, 801 n; Martinez v D'Alessandro Custom Bldrs. & Demolition, Inc., 52 AD3d 786, 787; Pampalone v Giant Bldg. Maintenance, Inc., 17 AD3d 556, 557; United Talmudical Academy of Kiryas Joel v Khal Bais Halevi Religious Corp., 232 AD2d 547, 548). Furthermore, the affirmation of the defendant's attorney failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default in answering and for the lengthy delay in cross-moving to compel the plaintiffs to accept the late answer (see Holloman v City of New York, 52 AD3d 568, 569; Miller v Ateres Shlomo, LLC, 49 AD3d 612, 613; Robinson v 1068 [*2]Flatbush Realty, Inc., 10 AD3d 716). Moreover, the defendant's proposed answer was verified only by its attorney, who had no personal knowledge of the facts (see Gross v Kail, 70 AD3d at 998; Baldwin v Mateogarcia, 57 AD3d 594, 595; Bekker v Fleischman, 35 AD3d 334, 335). Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion should have been granted and the defendant's cross motion should have been denied.
We find that the IAS court properly considered the affidavit of defendant Elrac's senior account manager in the damage unit in concluding that defendant's disposal of the vehicle in question was not done in bad faith. Initially, plaintiff's claim that the affidavit was not in admissible form because it was signed outside New York State but notarized by a New York notary, without providing a certificate of conformity as required by CPLR 2309(c) and Real Property Law § 299-a is unpreserved (see Matapos Tech. Ltd. v Compania Andina de Comercio Ltda, 68 AD3d 672, 673 ; P.T. Bank Cent. Asia v Chinese Am. Bank, 229 AD2d 224, 229 ). In any event, as long as the oath is duly given, authentication of the oathgiver's authority can be secured later, and given nunc pro tunc effect if necessary (Matapos Tech. Ltd., 68 AD3d at 673).
The affidavit was based on the affiant's personal knowledge and his review of the documents, including wholesale purchase order/bill of sale and the check received by defendant in payment for the wrecked vehicle, sold as salvage, which established the date of transfer. This is not a summary judgment motion, where the movant's evidence must be in admissible form, and even a summary judgment motion affords some flexibility to the party opposing the motion (see Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067-1068 ).
taking it in accordance with his religious or ethical beliefs.
This is the bare minimum. The bold is mine.
The sad state of CPLR § 2309 and other things.
Op 50043(U) (App. Term, 1st, 2010). A few days ago, the Appellate Division, First Department wasn't as understanding. (h/t JT). In Green v Fairway Operating Corp., 2010 NY Slip Op 03481 (App. Div., 1st, 2010) the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on default. Plaintiff moved to vacate and attached an affidavit from a non-party witness which was sworn in the DR. The plaintiff's motion was denied and the Appellate Division affirmed. I think I said this once before, but it remains true, it's an exceptionally silly reason to lose a motion. JT compares it to russian roulette, which is pretty apt.
The last time I wrote about 2309, I said that it was a dead objection, or something like that. It appears that, in the first department at least, it is alive and well. The objection, however, must be made in the papers, otherwise it's waived. You'll find that most people don't know enough to object.
I'm sure you're thinking, "well, what's the rule in the First Department after Green?" I have no idea. I'd be interested to see what the Appellate Term does with Green. Will it distinguish it or make 2309 a hard rule?
Why is there a split between the Second and First Department as to what is required to show a "reasonable excuse" when attempting to vacate a default?
Why do the courts allow a defendant to move to dismiss under CPLR R. 3211(a)(7) when the defendant is not claiming that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action? When affidavits and other proofs are attached, the courts change their inquiry from whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action to whether plaintiff has a cause of action (which is different from whether a plaintiff will ultimate be successful with that cause of action). This, mind you, is different than a court converting it to a motion for summary judgment. It just doesn't make any damn sense to me.
Author DMGPosted on May 2, 2010 Categories CPLR § 2309, CPLR R. 3211, CPLR R. 5015, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on The sad state of CPLR § 2309 and other things.
CPLR § 2309: What’s the point?
CPLR § 2309 has been watered down so as to be non-existent. And from what I can tell, it serves no useful purpose. Why not just scrap the damn thing. I really don’t care whether we have the section or not; however, it’s dumb to keep it there for the sake of keeping it there.
Order (Raul Cruz, J.), entered October 16, 2008, reversed, without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed on the condition that defendant, within 60 days of service upon it of a copy of this order with notice of entry, files with the Clerk of the Civil Court and serves upon plaintiffs an affidavit of Steven Esteves that is accompanied by a certificate demonstrating that the notary administered the oath as prescribed by the laws of the State of New Jersey. In the event defendant fails to duly file and serve such an affidavit, the order is affirmed, without costs.
The affidavit submitted by defendant of its employee (Esteves) established defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment dismissing this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits. Plaintiffs, however, raised a timely objection to the form of this affidavit, asserting that it did not comply with CPLR 2309(c). Specifically, plaintiffs correctly note that the affidavit failed to include a certificate demonstrating that the notary administered the oath as prescribed by the laws of the State of New Jersey, the state in which the oath was administered (see CPLR 2309[c]; Real Property Law § 299-a; PRA III, LLC v Gonzalez, 54 AD3d 917 ). Inasmuch as the document can be given nunc pro tunc effect once the appropriate certificate is obtained (Nandy v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 155 AD2d 833, 834 ; see Moccia v. Carrier Car Rental, Inc., 40 AD3d 504, 505 ; see also Matapos Tech. Ltd. v Compania Andina de Comercio Ltda, ___AD3d___, 2009 NY Slip Op. 09713 [Dec. 29, 2009]), we reverse the order and grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the conditions stated above (cf. Sandoro v Andzel, 307 AD2d 706, 708-708 ).
JT made a very similar suggestion right before the decision was published. What happens if defendant screws up the 2309(c) affidavit? It happens more often than you think.
Author DMGPosted on January 17, 2010 Categories CPLR § 2309, [App Term 1st Dept]3 Comments on CPLR § 2309: What’s the point?

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