Source: https://www.riederstravis.com/our-legal-blog/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 11:09:08+00:00

Document:
Wright v. Residence Inn by Marriott 2019 Pa. Super LEXIS 330 (April 9, 2019) Kunselman, J.-Superior Court reversed trial court in refusing to admit plaintiff’s sole medical expert. The objection to the testimony was that plaintiff’s expert was precluded because the case was so specialized. Marriott argued the doctor was not sufficiently qualified in orthopedic surgery since he was simply an internist. The doctor who was plaintiff’s expert practiced for 37 years and rotated through all specialties including orthopedic surgery. He had been on the staff of at least two hospitals. He had been qualified previously. It was prejudice to not let him testify. The case was sent back for trial.
Freeman Maurice Vaughan v. Olympus Am. 2019 Pa. Super. LEXIS 334 (April 10, 2019) McLaughlin, J.-Lower court reversed in dismissing the case for change of venue. One of the defendants, Olympus America sought dismissal based on forum non conveniens. The lower court abused its discretion in moving the case to North Carolina. Further, Olympus had sufficient contacts in Pennsylvania. This case involved a device where Olympus allegedly had a duty to ensure and an effective and validated reprocessing protocol is disseminated to medical facilities and professionals. Despite of its redesign of the scope, Olympus took no action to update the reprocessing protocol and thus failed to provide end users of the redesigned scope an effective and validated protocol. If Olympus wanted or needed to disseminate information about changes to the reprocessing protocol, it would do so through a related company, Olympus Corporation of America. The court found sufficient contacts and also found that there was no reason to disturb venue.
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2293 (March 26, 2019) ALITO, J.-This case concerns the requirements applicable to a particular method of serving civil process on a foreign state. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), a foreign state may be served by means of a mailing that is “addressed and dispatched … to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” 28 U.S.C. §1608(a)(3). The question now before us is whether this provision is satisfied when a service packet that names the foreign minister is mailed to the foreign state’s embassy in the United States. We hold that it is not. Most naturally read, §1608(a)(3) requires that a mailing be sent directly to the foreign minister’s office in the minister’s home country.
Warrick v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49716 (March 25, 2019) Kenney, J.-Plaintiff Richard Warrick brings an action for breach of contract and bad faith against Defendant Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company for denying his claim of underinsured motorist coverage following an accident in November 2016 with an allegedly underinsured motorist. Plaintiff claims that Defendant is liable to Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s purchase of Supplemental Liability Protection from Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC, to whom Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company issued an excess policy. Even if Empire had not separately excluded underinsured motorist coverage, it would be excluded from the MVFRL’s requirement that it provide underinsured motorist coverage or that it use the written rejection form because it is an excess policy and not subject to the requirements of the MVFRL.
Marshall v. Brown’s IA 2019, Pa. Super LEXIS 279 (March 27, 2019) Bowes, J.-Harriet Marshall appeals from the July 10, 2017 judgment in favor of Appellee Brown’s IA, LLC, and alleges that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in refusing to give an adverse inference instruction based on Appellee’s spoliation of videotape evidence. We vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial. As we stated in Mt. Olivet, supra, at 1269 (quoting Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distributors, Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982)), “[s]poliation sanctions arise out of ‘the common sense observation that a party who has notice that evidence is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy evidence is more likely to have been threatened by that evidence than is a party in the same position who does not destroy the evidence.’” Ms. Marshall asked the court for the least severe spoliation sanction, an adverse inference instruction. On the facts herein, it was warranted, and the court abused its discretion in refusing the charge. Judgement vacated. Case remanded for a new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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