Source: https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=1051&amp;search=
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 17:17:03+00:00

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Keyes--the Denver school desegregation case--was the first northern school desegregation case to reach the Supreme Court, and one of the only cases where the Supreme Court identified segregation in northern schools. The Supreme Court’s 1973 opinion was influential in defining “intent” in de facto segregation.
The case lasted for decades, so this summary is necessarily partial.
Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the Denver School Board adopted three resolutions between January 30, 1969 and March 20, 1969, Resolutions Nos. 1520, 1524, and 1531, as part of a plan to desegregate the schools in the Park Hill area of the northeast part of Denver, due to remaining de facto de segregation almost fifteen years after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was decided. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. One, Denver, Colorado, 303 F.Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969). These plans involved busing. However, in the next school board election, two board members who had supported the integration policies were defeated and replaced by new members. Id. at 283. On June 9, 1969, the resolutions were rescinded and replaced with a voluntary student transfer program. 413 U.S. 189, 192.
Later that month, June 1969, the plaintiffs filed this suit to enjoin the defendants from rescinding the resolutions that had required integration of the schools, and sought an order directing that the board desegregate and provide equal educational opportunity for the district “as a whole.” Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 192 (1973). The plaintiffs were a group of parents of black and Hispanic schoolchildren in Denver Public Schools suing on behalf of their children and classes of persons similarly situated. They sued the Denver School District, the Board of Education, and its Superintendent in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4), and the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and alleged that the defendants had violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by treating them unequally with respect to their right to an education. 303 F.Supp. 279. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from maintaining, requiring, continuing, encouraging and facilitating separation of children and faculty on the basis of race, and further from unequally allocating resources, services, and facilities on the basis of race. 445 F.2d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 1971).
The case was assigned to District Judge William E. Doyle, Jr. On July 31, 1969, Judge Doyle granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the rescission of the three resolutions constituted arbitrary state legislative action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 303 F.Supp. at 288–89. The school board appealed, and the district court made supplemental findings and conclusions, determining that the injunction should continue until the case was decided on the merits. 303 F.Supp. 289, 297 (D. Colo. 1969).
On March 21, 1970, the district court issued its decision on the merits, holding that if school board chose not to take positive steps to alleviate de facto segregation, then at a minimum it was required to insure that its schools offered equal educational opportunity, and that evidence had established that equal educational opportunity was not being provided at segregated schools within the school district. 313 F.Supp. 61. The district court set forth remedies in a subsequent decision. 313 F.Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970). Under the court’s plan, the segregated schools in the district would be integrated within two years; students would have free transfer with a space guarantee during an interim period, and compensatory education programs, including Head Start, would be provided to minority children. Id.
In the years that followed, there were numerous appeals, and the district court issued several orders and opinions building on its earlier decisions.
The district court found that the Denver schools had never been operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that required or permitted racial segregation in public education. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973). However, the district court had found that the district had used various techniques—including the construction of a new elementary school, gerrymandering of student attendance zones, the use of “optional zones,” and the “excessive use” of mobile classrooms—to carry out unconstitutional and deliberate racial segregation with respect to the Park Hill Area, in the northeast portion of the city of Denver. Id. at 192. The defense argued, and the district court held, that the even though one part of the Denver school system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well. The district court found that the core city schools were maintained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because they were educationally inferior to “white” schools elsewhere in the district, and ordered them to provide substantially equal facilities for those schools. .
The Tenth Circuit reversed the relief regarding the core city schools, and affirmed the Park Hill ruling and “agreed that Park Hill segregation, even though deliberate, proved nothing regarding an overall policy of segregation.” Id.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which issued its decision on June 21, 1973. In a 7-1 decision authored by Justice Brennan, the Court found that although there were no official laws supporting segregation in Denver, “the Board, through its actions over a period of years, intentionally created and maintained the segregated character of the core city schools.” 413 U.S. 189, 206. The Court held that when part of a school system is found to be segregated, a “prima facie case of unlawful segregative design” becomes apparent and the school district assumes the burden of proving that it operated without “segregative intent” on a system-wide basis. Id. at 208, 209–10. Because the Court found that the school district failed to do so, it must be declared a “dual system,” and the school board was ordered to desegregate the entire system “root and branch.” Id. at 213.
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, arguing that the right way to think about school integration was to abandon the distinction between "de facto" and "de jure segregation," and require all school districts to take reasonable integrative measures. However, he argued that busing went beyond the appropriate obligations of school boards, even in a remedial context. Justice Rehnquist, newly on the Court, dissented, breaking the decades-long tradition of unanimity in school desegregation cases.
Litigation continued for more than two decades after the Supreme Court’s decision. In hearings in the immediate aftermath, the defendants resisted proposed remedial measures, and the district court compelled compliance. 380 F.Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974). The Tenth Circuit reversed the part-time classroom pairing and compensatory education provisions of the plan approved by the district court. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975). In 1976, the case was transferred to District Judge Richard Matsch.
The parties then agreed to a modified plan that was approved by court order entered in 1976, and agreed that no changes would be made for three years for stability’s sake. 540 F.Supp. 399, 400 (D. Colo. 1982). The plans set a target for all schools to have pupil populations within 15% of the district’s overall white enrollment. Id. at 400. In response to a declining school population and decreasing white enrollment, the school board passed a resolution to close four elementary schools and change pupil assignments for the 1979–1980 academic year. Id. The school board created a Long-Range Planning Committee and an Ad Hoc Committee, which produced a report with recommendations in March 1980, and designed two new, different student assignment plans, respectively. Id. at 401.
The school board submitted the two student assignment plans on October 30, 1981, and both were rejected by the district court. Id. at 401. By a 4-3 majority, the “sharply divided” school board submitted the “Total Access Plan” of open enrollment with optional educational opportunities in magnet schools. Id. The court found that the Plan was “the kind of neutrality which was criticized by the Supreme Court in Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and that it was “lacking in concern, commitment and capacity.” 540 F.Supp. at 402.
In 1982, the district court, with “qualifications and reservations,” permitted the school district to proceed with a new pupil assignment plan for the 1982-1983 school year. Id. at 400.
In 1984, the school district moved for an order declaring that the school district had achieved unitary status and terminating the court’s jurisdiction in the case. 609 F.Supp. 1491, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985). The district court found that the school district had not achieved unitary status. Id. The school district appealed, but the Tenth Circuit found that the district court’s finding that the school district had not achieved unitary status was not clearly erroneous. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir., 1990). The school district appealed the case to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied. 482 U.S. 1082.
On remand, the district filed another motion to terminate jurisdiction. Chief Judge Matsch granted the motion, holding, among other things, that the school district had complied with desegregation degrees and that vestiges of past discrimination by the district had been eliminated “to the extent practicable.” Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F.Supp. 1274, 1287 (D. Colo. 1995).
The plaintiffs’ appeal was dismissed in August 1997 for lack of jurisdiction, and the case was closed; it remains closed.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 396 U.S. 1215 (1969).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (granting certiorari).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 921 (1973) (denying certiorari).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 414 U.S. 883 (1973) (denying petition for rehearing).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 368 F.Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 380 F.Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976) (denying certiorari).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 540 F.Supp. 399 (D. Colo. 1982).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 576 F.Supp. 1503 (D. Colo. 1983).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 609 F.Supp. 1491 (D. Colo. 1985).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991) (denying certiorari).
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).

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