Source: https://mcphersonrane.com/articles/talent-agencies-act-a-personal-managers-nightmare/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:45:33+00:00

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For years people in and out of the entertainment industry have been asking the same question but not necessarily getting the same answer. The age-old question is: “What does a personal manager do for an artist/actor?” The answer to that question can be anything from career advisor to baby sitter, from spokesman to travel agent.
A more accurate answer to the question might be that the personal manager, particularly in the music industry, does just about everything for the artist. A personal manager chooses songs; sometimes co-writes or arranges songs; retains lawyers, agents and business managers; selects band members, clothing, backup singers, sound equipment, sound engineers, lighting technicians, tour managers, bus companies, video directors, record producers, singles, publicists, record companies, scripts, “the right part,” makeup personnel, personal assistants, acting instructors, vocal coaches and everything else in the artist’s life.
Managers may get a limo for the premiere of a movie or scotch for the party afterward, but what they cannot get for their actor is a part and what they cannot get for their recording artist is a gig because that is illegal. Legalities aside, does it happen? All the time. Does anyone care? Yes: the state Labor Commissioner.
Face it, often an artist or actor will hire a manager solely because the manager has the contacts and/ or the clout to get that artist or actor a show or a part, and will be ecstatic when the manager books the band in club after club (particularly when the band is unsigned and/or does not have enough of a following to get an agent) or when the manager gets the actor reading after reading and part after part that is, until the artist or actor decides that he or she does not want the manager around anymore. Perhaps the artist has become so big (often due to the manager’s efforts) that he needs more of a “heavy hitter” to manage him, or perhaps the actress just plain does not want to pay that 15 percent anymore or, for that matter, does not want to pay the commissions that are long past due.1 That is when the artist or actor decides that it might make more sense to take the matter to the labor Commissioner. More common, however, is when the manager has been let go and decides to sue the artist for past due commissions and the artist then asserts the Labor Code, specifically the Talent Agencies Act2 as a defense to the action. The artist would then seek (and in California almost invariably obtain) a stay of the litigation, pending review by the Labor Commission where the results can be harsh and there is nothing that a court will (or generally can) do about it. The theory is that talent agencies perform a much more specific function than do personal managers and therefore must be severely regulated. If a personal manager (or anyone else, for that matter) can circumvent this regulation by performing the function of a talent agent,3 then the statute would be rendered useless.
A person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists.
Thus, it was held that the mere negotiation of an employment agreement, even absent any actual, direct “solicitation,” was demonstrative evidence that the respondent had unlawfully contracted to act as a talent agent. The contract was accordingly declared void (and no commissions payable thereunder).
Although the Labor Commissioner will routinely declare a management agreement null and void because it violates the Talent Agencies Act, therefore allowing the artist to avoid paying the fees that would otherwise be owed to the manager, it is much more difficult for an artist to obtain a “restitution” order, whereby all monies previously paid to the manager would be disgorged and returned to the artist.
Nevertheless, in some cases,” the commissioner will disgorge from the manager at least those commissions that were specifically attributable to the work that the manager actually procured or negotiated for the artist. In other words, sometimes the commissioner will not award restitution of all amounts paid to the manager for all of his or her services, but will order the return of commissions received for the particular deal or booking that is determined to be unlawful.
In Pryor v. Franklin, for example, the commissioner ordered comedian Richard Pryor’s former personal manager to return all compensation he received from Pryor for his “services in procuring and attempting to procure employment.” Although such an award, on its face, does not appear to be that onerous, such restitution can be a significant amount In fact, in the Pryor case, the amount the manager was ordered to repay was $753, 217.
As the quoted language implies, the Talent Agencies Act carries with it a very strict one-year statute of limitations. There can be no recovery whatsoever based on infringing acts that occurred more than one year prior to the filing of a petition with the Labor Commission. It is not clear whether an artist may recover commissions that were paid or incurred more than one year prior to filing if the violation was within the year. However, the artist would argue that, if the management agreement is void because of a violation within the year, no commissions should be paid pursuant to a void contract, irrespective of when they were otherwise incurred.
A manager’s attempts to classify his procurement activities as casual or a minor or incidental part of his management agreement with his artist (and concomitant duties) are equally unfounded. Both the legislature and the Labor Commissioner have soundly and repeatedly rejected the argument that one ought to be permitted to engage in some minimal amount of procurement activity without a license.
Much of this legislative history was cited by the Labor Commissioner in Damon v. Emler,22 and Bo Derek v. Callan,23 wherein respondents unsuccessfully argued that a talent agency license was not required for minor or incidental procurement activity. In Damon, the petitioner sought to have her contract with her personal manager declared invalid because the personal manager had engaged in procurement activities without a license.
It is not unlawful for a person or a corporation which is not licensed pursuant to this [c]hapter to act in conjunction with, and at the request 012 a licensed talent agency in the negotiation of an employment contract.
It is clear that this exception to the licensing requirements is a narrow one. It is also clear that working with an attorney is not enough to exempt a personal manager from liability under the Talent Agencies Act. Moreover, it is not even enough to “work with” an agent; the manager must be working with a licensed agent, and at that agent’s specific request.
It is apparent, therefore, that current law does not allow unlicensed individuals to perform even the most remote procurement functions whether or not those functions are performed in conjunction with an attorney or any other individual who is not a licensed talent agent and there will be no appreciable changes in that law for the foreseeable future.
procuring employment from liability under the Talent Agencies Act.
1. This is not intended to imply that more legitimate reasons do not exist; in many instances, the manager simply is not interested in the artist any more, but refuses to release her because he likes the 15 percent that she still brings him.
2. CAL. LAB. CODE §§1700, et seq.
4. Although it is certainly not easy to obtain such a license, it is not that difficult with a lengthy background check.
5. Elvis Presley’s personal manager, Colonel Parker, reputedly got 50 percent of Elvis’s gross earnings, which, of course, means that he got more than Elvis since Elvis would have only received a net amount.
7. Buchwald v. Sup. Ct., 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 386, 143 P. 691, 692 (1914).
9. Buchwald, supra, at 351, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
10. Lab. Comm’r Case No. MP-429 AM-211-MC.
12. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
13. Lab. Comm’r Case No. TAC17 MP-114.
14. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
15. Buchwald, supra, at 360, 362 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
16. Rogers v. Portnoy, Lab. Comm’r Case No. SF MP 40 (decided Mar. 8, 1978), at 10.
17. Id.at 10-11); see also Entner v. Maiman, Lab. Comm’r Case No. MP-281 (decided Aug. 18, 1971) (petitioner entitled to the return of all sums received by respondent as a result of petitioner’s services).
18. SB 1464, as amended Oct. 13, 1971, and SB 686, as amended May 15, 1972, respectively.
20. REPORT or THE CALIFORNIA ENTERTAINMENT CoMMIssIoN, Dec. 2, 1985, at 11.
22.*3 Lab. Comm’r Case No. TAC 36-79 SF MP 63.
23. Lab. Comm’r Case No. 08116 TAC 18-80 SF MP 82-80.
27. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1702; Legislative Council’s Digest, Assembly Bill No. 997, Ch. 682.
28. Statement on AB 3649, May 15, 1986, from the bill folder of the Senate Comm. on Industrial Relations.
29. California Entertainment Commission Report at 6.
31. The only change the commission recommended was to delete the word “franchise” as a modifier of “talent agency”; there was no reason given for this recommended change.
33. Id. at 10, 11.

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