Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/174/47/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:36:09+00:00

Document:
On the trial of a person charged with feloniously receiving and having in his possession with intent to convert them to his own use postage stamps which had been feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away from a post office by three persons named, although the person so receiving them well knew that the same had been so feloniously taken, stolen and carried away, the judgment convicting the said three persons of stealing the said stamps was received in evidence against the accused under the provision in the Act of March 3, 1875, c. 144, § 2, that such judgment "shall be conclusive evidence against said receiver, that the property of the United States therein described has been embezzled, stolen or purloined." The accused having been convicted, and the case brought here by writ of error, held that that provision of the statute violates the clause of the Constitution of the United States declaring that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him, and that the judgment must be reversed.
The contention by the defendant that the indictment is defective in that it does not allege ownership by the United States of the stolen articles of property at the time that they were alleged to have been feloniously received by him is without merit.
The objection that the indictment does not show from whom the accused received the stamps, nor state that the name of such person was unknown to the grand jurors, is not well taken.
1875, c. 144, entitled "An act to punish certain larcenies, and the receivers of stolen goods." 18 Stat. 479.
"any person who shall embezzle, steal or purloin any money, property, record, voucher or valuable thing whatever of the moneys, goods, chattels, records or property of the United States shall be deemed guilty of felony, and on conviction thereof before the district or circuit court of the United States in the district wherein said offense may have been committed, or into which he shall carry or have in possession of said property so embezzled, stolen or purloined, shall be punished therefor by imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or both at the discretion of the court before which he shall be convicted."
"if any person shall receive, conceal, or aid in concealing or have, or retain in his possession with intent to convert to his own use or gain, any money, property, record, voucher or valuable thing whatever, of the moneys, goods, chattels, records or property of the United States, which has theretofore been embezzled, stolen or purloined, such person shall, on conviction before the circuit or district court of the United States in the district wherein he may have such property, be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, one or both at the discretion of the court before which he shall be convicted, and such receiver may be tried either before or after the conviction of the principal felon, but if the party has been convicted, then the judgment against him shall be conclusive evidence in the prosecution against such receiver that the property of the United States therein described has been embezzled, stolen or purloined."
therefrom certain moneys and property of the United States, to-wit, 3,750 postage stamps of the denomination of two cents, and of the value of two cents each, 1,266 postage stamps of the denomination of one cent. and of the value of one cent each, 140 postage stamps of the denomination of four cents, and of the value of four cents each, 250 postage stamps of the denomination of five cents, and of the value of five cents each, 80 postage stamps of the denomination of eight cents, and of the value of eight cents each, and also United States treasury notes, national bank notes, silver certificates, gold certificates, silver, nickel, and copper coins of the United States, as well as current money of the United States, a more particular description of which the grand jury were unable to ascertain, of the value of $58.19, and that the persons above named were severally indicted and convicted of that offense, and had been duly sentenced upon such conviction.
"so as aforesaid feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away, feloniously did receive and have in his possession, with intent then and there to convert the same to his own use and gain, the said Joe Kirby then and there well knowing the said postage stamps to have been theretofore feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away, contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statutes of the United States in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States."
At the trial of Kirby, the government offered in evidence a part of the record of the trial of Wallace, Baxter, and King, from which it appeared that Wallace and Baxter, after severally pleading not guilty, withdrew their respective pleas, and each pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary at hard labor for the term of four years. It appeared from the same record that King, having pleaded not guilty, was found guilty, and sentenced to the penitentiary at hard labor for the term of five years.
far as it made that conviction conclusive evidence in the prosecution of the receiver that the property of the United States described in the indictment against him had been embezzled, stolen, or purloined. The objection was overruled, and the record offered was admitted in evidence, with exceptions to the accused.
that he did know. Now if a person received property under such circumstances that would satisfy a man of ordinary intelligence that it was stolen property, and you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually did believe it was stolen property, then you have a right to infer and find that, at the time of the receipt of the property, the person knew that it was stolen. Now the next point in the case is in regard to the intent the defendant had in regard to the use or disposal of the property. The statute requires that this receipt of stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, must also be with the intent to convert it to the use of the party in whose possession it is found. There are statutes which simply punish the knowingly receiving of stolen property. That was the common law. But this statute has added this further ingredient -- that it must be done with the intent to convert it to the party's own use and gain. It was probably put in for the reason that the statute goes further than the common law, making it punishable to conceal or aid in concealing, with intent to convert it to his own use and gain. Now all these propositions that I have charged must be made out by the prosecution, of course, beyond a reasonable doubt, and in case you have a reasonable doubt of any of these ingredients, it will be your duty to acquit the defendant."
been so stolen from the United States by these parties, with the intent to convert the same to his own use and gain, or if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that they were so stolen at the Highmore post office, as I have stated, and that the defendant, on or about the 9th day of June, had them in his possession, or any portion of them, knowing the same to have been so stolen, with the intent to convert the same to his own use and gain, and you will find all these facts beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be authorized to return a verdict of guilty as charged."
The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Kirby. The exceptions taken by him at the trial were sufficient to raise the questions that will presently be considered.
As shown by the above statement, the charge against Kirby was that, on a named day, he feloniously received and had in his possession, with intent to convert to his own use and gain, certain personal property of the United States, theretofore feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away by Wallace, Baxter, and King, who had been indicted and convicted of the offense alleged to have been committed by them.
Notwithstanding the conviction of Wallace, Baxter, and King, it was incumbent upon the government, in order to sustain its charge against Kirby, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the property described in the indictment was in fact stolen from the United States, (2) that the defendant received or retained it in his possession, with intent to convert it to his own use or gain, and (3) that he received or retained it with knowledge that it had been stolen from the United States.
there was no evidence whatever to show that the property alleged to have been received by Kirby was stolen from the United States.
against them alone was sufficient prima facie to show, as against Kirby, indicted for another offense, the existence of the fact that the property was stolen -- a fact which, it is conceded, the United States was bound to establish beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a verdict of guilty against him.
"is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established, until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created."
he was put upon the defensive almost from the outset of the trial, by reason alone of what appeared to have been said in another criminal prosecution with which he was not connected, and at which he was not entitled to be represented. In other words, the United States, having secured the conviction of Wallace, Baxter, and King, as principal felons, the defendant, charged by a separate indictment with a different crime (that of receiving the property in question, with knowledge that it was so stolen, and with intent to convert it to his own use or gain), was held to be presumptively or prima facie guilty, so far as the vital fact of the property having been stolen was concerned, as soon as the government produced the record of such conviction, and without its making any proof whatever by witnesses confronting the accused of the existence of such vital fact. We cannot assent to this view. We could not do so without conceding the power of the legislature, when prescribing the effect as evidence of the records and proceedings of courts, to impair the very substance of a right long deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the constitution of the United States and in the constitutions of most, if not of all, the states composing the Union.
This precise question has never been before this Court, and we are not aware of any adjudged case which is in all respects like the present one. But there are adjudications which proceed upon grounds that point to the conclusion reached by us.
"Having since learned that a case occurred before Mr. Baron Wood at York, where two persons were indicted together, one for stealing and the other for receiving, in which the principal pleaded guilty and the receiver not guilty, and that Mr. Baron Wood refused to allow the plea of guilty to establish the fact of the stealing by the principal, as against the receiver, the learned judge thought it right to submit to the learned judges the question whether he was right in admitting the confession of Sarah Rich in the present case. The learned judge thought it right to add that the prisoner, one Taylor, and Sarah Rich had immediately before been tried upon an indictment for burglary and stealing other property in the house of Mrs. Clarke on the night of the 22d of August, and that Taylor and Rich had been found guilty, but the prisoner had been acquitted; there being no proof of his presence. The learned judge did not pass sentence upon Sarah Rich immediately, but a new jury was called and the prisoner was tried as a receiver, so that either party might have called her as a witness. In Easter term, 1832, all the judges except Lord Lyndhurst, C.B., and Taunton, J., met, and, having considered this case, were unanimously of opinion that Sarah Rich's confession was no evidence against the prisoner, and many of them appeared to think that had Sarah Rich been convicted, and the indictment against the prisoner stated not her conviction, but her guilt, the conviction would not have been any evidence of her guilt, which must have been proved by other means, and the conviction was held wrong."
once admitted evidence of a plea of guilty by the taker, and it was held that I did wrong."
"In R. v. Turner, 1 Moo.C.C. 347, R. v. Ratcliffe, 1 Lew.C.C. 112, Keable v. Payne, 8 Ad. & El. 560, it is stated that many of the judges (all the judges except two being assembled) were of opinion that the record of the conviction of the principal would not be evidence of the fact where the indictment against the accessory alleged not the conviction, but the guilt, of the principal. And on principle it would seem to be evidence only when the indictment alleges the conviction of the principal, and simply to support that allegation."
question presented by these exceptions. Our decision is this, and no more: the record of the conviction of a thief, on his plea of guilty to an indictment against him alone for stealing certain property, is not admissible in evidence to prove the theft on the trial of the receiver of that property upon an indictment against him alone, which does not aver that the thief has been convicted."
"A record of conviction of a principal in felony has been admitted in some cases, not of modern date, as evidence against the accessory. R. v. Smith, Leach Cr.C. 288; R. v. Baldwin, 3 Camp. 265. This has been supported on the ground of convenience, because the witnesses against the principal might be dead or not to be found, and on the presumption that the proceedings must be taken to be regular, and the guilt of the convicted party to be established. Fost.Disc. iii, p. 364, c. 2, s. 2, p. 364. But this is not strictly in accordance with the principle respecting the admissibility of verdicts as evidence against third persons. From the report of the recent case of Rex v. Turner, it seems that a record of conviction of a principal in the crime of stealing who pleads guilty would not now be received as evidence of the guilt of the principal against the receivers of the stolen property, or the accessory after the fact, and it is said to be doubtful whether a record of the conviction of the principal on his plea of not guilty would be admissible against the accessory. As proof of the fact of conviction, the record would be admissible and conclusive, but it seems not to be admissible evidence of the guilt of the convict, as against another person charged with being connected with him in crime, the record being in this respect res inter alios acta. It is evidence that a certain person, named in the record, was convicted by the jury, but not evidence as against a third person, supposed to have been engaged with him in a particular transaction, as to the ground on which the conviction proceeded -- namely, that the convict committed the criminal act described in the record. "
"So strictly is this rule enforced that where a person is indicted for receiving stolen goods, a confession by the principal that he was guilty of the theft is no evidence of that fact, as against the receiver (R. v. Turner), and it would be the same, it seems, if both parties were indicted together, and the principal were to plead guilty (id.)."
1 Taylor's Ev., 6th ed., § 826.
to enable the government to put the accused, although shielded by the presumption of innocence, upon the defensive as to a vital fact involved in the charge against him by simply producing the record of the conviction of other parties of a wholly different offense, with which the accused had no connection.
"the condition of the party who made them being such that every motive to falsehood must be supposed to have been silenced, and the mind to be impelled by the most powerful considerations to tell the truth."
Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 146 U. S. 151; Cooley's Const.Lim. 318; 1 Phillips on Ev. c. 7, § 6.
For the reasons stated, it must be held that so much of the above Act of March 31, 1875, as declares that the judgment of conviction against the principal felons shall be evidence in the prosecution against the receiver that the property of the United States alleged to have been embezzled, stolen, or purloined had been embezzled, stolen, or purloined is in violation of the clause of the Constitution of the United States declaring that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him. Upon this ground, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial had in accordance with law. But, as the case must go back to the circuit court for another trial, it is proper to notice other questions presented by the assignments of error.
"the postage stamps aforesaid, so as aforesaid feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away, feloniously did receive and have in his possession, with intent then and there to convert the same to his own use or gain, the said Joe Kirby then and there well knowing the said postage stamps to have been theretofore feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away."
The stamps alleged to have been feloniously received by the accused on the 9th day of June are thus alleged to have been the same that were stolen from the United States two days previously. The larceny did not change the ownership, and it must be taken that the United States had not regained possession of the stamps before they were received by Kirby, and that the indictment charges that they were out of the possession of the United States, and stolen property when they came to the hands of the accused.
"if any person shall receive any chattel, money, valuable security or other property whatsoever, the stealing or taking whereof shall amount to a felony either at common law or by virtue of this act, such person knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken, every such receiver shall be guilty of felony, and may be indicted and convicted either as an accessory after the fact or for a substantive felony, and in the latter case, whether the principal felon shall or shall not have been previously convicted, or shall or shall not be amenable to justice,"
"It will do. The offense created by the act of parliament is not receiving stolen goods from any particular person, but receiving them knowing them to have been stolen. The question therefore will be whether the goods are stolen, and whether the prisoner received them knowing them to have been stolen. Your objection is founded on the too particular form of the indictment. The statute makes the receiving of goods, knowing them to have been stolen, the offense."
accused, no matter from whom, with the intent to convert them to his own use or gain, and knowing that they had been stolen from the United States, he could be found guilty of the crime charged even if it were not shown by the evidence from whom he received the stamps. This rule cannot work injustice nor deprive the accused of any substantial right. If it appears at the trial to be essential in the preparation of his defense that he should know the name of the person from whom the government expected to prove that he received the stolen property, it would be in the power of the court to require the prosecution to give a bill of particulars. Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 156 U. S. 452; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 161 U. S. 35; Commonwealth v. Giles, 1 Gray 466; Rosc.Crim.Ev. (6th ed.) 178, 179, 420.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded, with directions for a new trial, and for further proceedings consistent with law.

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