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[Appellate Department, Superior Court, County of Los Angeles.
The Vehicle Code section numbers given here are those prior to the revision currently used.
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. O. L. AUSEN, Appellant.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher for Appellant.
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, W. Jos. McFarland, Assistant City Attorney, and John L. Bland, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent.
"(c) Red alone or 'Stop'.
"1. Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at such other point as may be indicated by a clearly visible line, and shall remain standing until green or 'Go' is shown alone. ..."
The evidence shows that defendant, on the occasion in question, was acting as a motorman operating a street car on tracks on a public highway in the city of Los Angeles and that his car was so operated in an easterly direction on Seventh Street that it entered the intersection of Towne Avenue while a traffic signal on the southwest corner thereof showed the word "Stop".
 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the law he was charged with violating was not applicable to motormen operating street cars. Subsection (e) of said section 476 expressly provides that "The motorman of any street car shall obey all official traffic signals as applicable to vehicles ..." (with an exception not material to this [40 Cal.App.2d Supp. 833] case). We hold that such law is applicable to motormen operating street cars and that the motion was properly denied. During the trial, however, an error of law occurred which entitles the defendant to a new trial.
 We do not regard the provisions of paragraph 1, subsection (c), section 476, Vehicle Code (above quoted), as stating a rule absolute under all circumstances. Subsection (f) of said section, itself, provides that "No person shall disobey the directions of this section except when it is necessary for the purpose of avoiding a collision or in case of other emergency ...," thereby disclosing an intent to establish a rule which could be obeyed within reason but which did not call for inexorable compliance regardless of circumstances. An emergency is not necessarily something wholly unexpected; according to Webster's New International Dictionary (1930) it may also comprehend a pressing necessity or exigency. In 20 C.J., at p. 499, we find it defined as "Any event or occasional combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action or remedy; ... a perplexing contingency or complication of circumstances."  It was error, under the circumstances disclosed in the record of this case, to sustain objections to questions asked on cross-examination of the People's principal witness and which questions bore directly on the issue as to whether defendant's conduct in the premises was willfully in violation of the law or was legally justified by an "emergency", within the meaning of the statute.
We are strengthened in our construction of the "emergency" clause of the statute as being applicable here by the following considerations. Where official traffic signals have two signs only--"Stop" and "Go"--with no preliminary warnings of change, strict compliance with the letter of the law in every instance (disregarding the emergency clause) would be almost impossible of achievement and bona fide efforts to attain such compliance would tend to defeat one of the principal purposes of the law. Traffic signals are not installed to retard traffic--on the contrary their principal purpose, along with promoting safety for users of highways generally, is to expedite traffic movement. So important is the flow of traffic that Vehicle Code section 511.7 provides that "Local authorities in timing traffic signals may so regulate the timing thereof as to permit the movement of traffic in an orderly and safe manner at speeds slightly at variance from the [40 Cal.App.2d Supp. 834] speed otherwise applicable within the district or at intersections under this code." A signal-marked intersection with a prima facie lawful crossing speed of 15 or perhaps 25 miles per hour, according to the district in which located, could never be approached safely at any such speed if the operator of the vehicle were under the absolute necessity, with penal sanction, of stopping, in any event whatsoever whenever the signal changed to show "Stop", "before entering the nearest crosswalk ... [to] remain standing until green or 'Go' is shown alone." Such an interpretation of the law would make every signal-marked intersection of every street a "boulevard stop"--every "Go" signal would be first a stop signal; the flow of traffic would be but spasmodic drippings.
Operators in attempting in good faith to comply with such an unreasonable construction of the law would be menaced by the provisions of section 514 of the same code, requiring that "No person shall drive upon a highway at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic ..."
 Certainly a bona fide effort must be made, and reasonable care used, to comply with the law in every instance. But when a person operating a vehicle is approaching an intersection at a speed which is otherwise lawful under all extant circumstances (see Vehicle Code, sec. 511) and when the signal, without preliminary warning, changes from "Go" to "Stop" while the vehicle is so close to the crosswalk line that it is physically impossible to stop it before crossing that line, the operator is entitled, if charged with a violation of the law, as was the defendant here, to show the circumstances under which he proceeded, in order that it may be determined as a fact whether the "emergency" contemplated by the law existed. The objections to the three questions addressed to the witness Fujiki inquiring concerning the weather, the speed of the street car when the witness first saw it (while it was opposite the center of a safety zone) and its speed at the time the signal changed (the position of the car at that time, according to later adduced testimony of the witness Ashworth, being approximately 10 feet west of the signal) were improperly interposed and should have been overruled.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the municipal court for a new trial.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUSTIN PANAH BENHOOR, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Hamid Soleimanian and Hamid Soleimanian for Defendant and Appellant.
After he was cited for driving at an unsafe speed, Justin Panah Benhoor fn. 1 unsuccessfully contested the charged infraction through a trial by written declaration. Dissatisfied with the adverse decision, he exercised his right to a trial de novo. The clerk set the new trial for a date 57 calendar days after receipt of Benhoor's new trial request. Arguing that rule 4.210 of the California Rules of Court, which governs trials by declaration, requires the new trial be held within 45 calendar days of the clerk's receipt of the new trial request, Benhoor moved to dismiss the citation. The trial court denied the motion and convicted Benhoor of the infraction. Although we agree with Benhoor's interpretation of rule 4.210(b)(7), fn. 2 we disagree with his contention the remedy for this violation of the rule is dismissal pursuant to Penal Code section 1382 (section 1382), which provides a statutory right to a speedy trial and requires dismissal of an action that is not timely tried absent a showing of good cause. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Benhoor was found guilty on December 11, 2007 of driving at an unsafe speed (Veh. Code, § 22350), fn. 3 following a trial by written declaration (Veh. Code, § 40902, subd. (a)(1)). He filed a timely written request for a trial de novo (rule 4.210(b)(7)), which was received by the clerk on December 19, 2007. On December 21, 2007 Benhoor's request was granted (Veh. Code, § 40902, subd. (d)); and the new trial was set for February 14, 2008, 57 days after the written request was received.
Rule 4.210(b)(7) provides in part, "If the defendant files a Request for New Trial (Trial de Novo) (form TR-220) within 20 calendar days after the date of delivery or mailing of the Decision and Notice of Decision (form TR-215), the clerk must set a trial date within 45 calendar days of receipt of the defendant's written request for a new trial." Rule 4.210 does not specify dismissal or any other remedy for failure to set a trial date within 45 calendar days of receipt of the defendant's written request for a new trial. Moreover, rule 4.210(c) generally provides, "Due dates and time limits must be as stated in this rule, unless changed or extended by the court. The court may extend any date, but the court need not state the reasons for granting or denying an extension on the record or in the minutes."
Rule 4.210 was originally adopted as rule 828, effective January 1, 1999. Former rule 828(b)(7) in part provided, "If defendant files a Request for New Trial (Trial de Novo) (form TR-220) within 20 calendar days after the date of mailing of the Decision and Notice of Decision, the clerk shall set a trial date that shall be within 45 calendar days of receipt of defendant's written request for a trial de novo." (Third italics added.) The original language of the rule, therefore, clearly imposed a requirement that the defendant be brought to trial within 45 days of the request for a new trial, not merely that trial be scheduled within that period. The deletion of the clarifying phrase "that shall [177 Cal.App.4th 1319] be" from former rule 828(b)(7) was part of the January 1, 2007 rules amendments, adopted June 30, 2006, reorganizing, renumbering, reformatting and amending many of the Rules of Court. In addition to revising former rule 828(b)(7) (primarily substituting "must" for "shall"), it was relocated from former title 2 to title 4 and renumbered as rule 4.210(b)(7).
 Whatever arguable ambiguity may exist in the use of the word "set" in rule 4.210(b)(7) as it now reads, the plain meaning of former rule 828(b)(7), coupled with the express statement that the 2007 amendments to [177 Cal.App.4th 1320] this rule were not intended to be substantive, leave no doubt rule 4.210(b)(7) requires a defendant's new trial commence within 45 days of the court's receipt of his or her request for a new trial. Accordingly, bringing Benhoor to trial 57 days after the court's receipt of his request for a new trial violated rule 4.210(b)(7). fn. 13 The question remains, however, whether the citation should have been dismissed as a result of that violation.
Conceding that rule 4.210 itself provides no remedy for a violation of its time limits--and at least implicitly recognizing he is unable to demonstrate either the "uncommonly long" delay or prejudice necessary to establish a violation of his federal or state constitutional right to a speedy trial--Benhoor argues the delay in setting his new trial in violation of rule 4.210(b)(7) constitutes a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial under section 1382, subdivision (a)(3), and dismissal is required pursuant to that section. Benhoor's argument suffers from two fatal flaws.
 First, by its own terms section 1382, subdivision (a)(3), does not apply to a request for a new trial following a trial by written declaration. That subdivision requires the court to hold a new trial within 30 days in a case involving a defendant charged with a misdemeanor or infraction only when the retrial follows "a mistrial, an order granting a new trial from which no appeal is taken, or an appeal from a judgment." There was, of course, neither a mistrial nor a reversal on appeal in this case. Although there was an order granting a new trial, that order was not appealable; granting the new trial was automatic so long as the request was timely. (See Veh. Code, § 40902, subd. (d).) An "order . . . from which no appeal is taken" necessarily refers only to appealable new trial orders, that is, to those new trial orders made pursuant to Penal Code section 1181 appealable by the People. (See Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(3); see generally People v. Andrade (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 651, 655, fn. 3 ["[t]he Legislature has granted the People the right to appeal from an order granting a new trial"].) No such order was made in this case.
Benhoor acknowledges this rule of statutory construction and essentially admits its applicability. (Cf. Kennedy, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240 ["[w]e construe subdivision (d) of [Vehicle Code] section 40902 and rule 4.210(b)(7) to be specific provisions limiting the general right to appeal from a conviction of an offense that is an infraction"].) Nevertheless, he contends section 1382, subdivision (a)(3), must be applicable--or at least its remedy of dismissal grafted onto rule 4.210(b)(7)--because otherwise violation of rule 4.210(b)(7) is without a remedy.
 However, in Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433, 438 the Court explained, "Sykes involved the applicability of section 1382 in a situation not expressly covered by that or any other statute. . . . In the absence of specific statutory coverage we applied in Sykes the self-executing constitutional provision and held that the accused was entitled to the dismissal of charges which were not brought to trial within the 60-day period." Here, in contrast, there is specific statutory authority. As discussed, Vehicle Code section 40902, subdivision (d), grants a defendant dissatisfied with the results of a trial by written declaration the right to a new trial, but imposes no time limit for conducting that trial. Similarly, rule 4.210, although requiring the new trial be held within 45 days of receipt of the defendant's written request, expressly permits the court to extend that deadline without any statement of reasons on the record, let alone a showing of good cause. Thus, there is simply no basis, as there was in Sykes, to suggest there has been a legislative determination a delay in trial beyond 45 days from the defendant's request constitutes prima facie evidence of a violation of Benhoor's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
A defendant who elects to proceed by trial by written declaration is still able to pursue federal and state constitutional speedy trial claims if there is a [177 Cal.App.4th 1323] viable basis for them, including a demonstration of prejudice or an uncommonly long delay. As discussed, Benhoor makes no such constitutional claim; and on this record no such claim would have merit.
­FN 1. Benhoor's name has frequently been misspelled as "Beohoor" in the record and the briefs filed in this case. Throughout this opinion we use the spelling provided by his counsel at oral argument.
­FN 2. References to a rule or rules are to the California Rules of Court.
­FN 3. The citation stated Benhoor was driving approximately 44 miles per hour on a street with a posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour. Vehicle Code section 22350 provides, "No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property."
­FN 4. The record on appeal does not contain either a settled statement or a reporter's transcript of the oral proceedings at trial. Benhoor does not challenge his conviction on any ground other than the asserted denial of his statutory right to a speedy trial.
­FN 5. Vehicle Code section 40902, subdivision (a), states, "(a)(1) The court, pursuant to this section, shall, by rule, provide that the defendant may elect to have a trial by written declaration upon any alleged infraction, as charged by the citing officer, involving a violation of this code or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this code, other than an infraction cited pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 23152) of Chapter 12 of Division 11. [¶] (2) The Judicial Council may adopt rules and forms governing trials by declaration in accordance with this section. Any rule or form adopted by the Judicial Council pursuant to this paragraph shall supersede any local rule of a court adopted pursuant to paragraph (1)."
­FN 6. With respect to misdemeanor and infraction cases, Penal Code section 1382 provides, "(a) The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the action to be dismissed in the following cases: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) Regardless of when the complaint is filed, when a defendant in a misdemeanor or infraction case is not brought to trial within 30 days after he or she is arraigned or enters his or her plea, whichever occurs later, if the defendant is in custody at the time of arraignment or plea, whichever occurs later, or in all other cases, within 45 days after the defendant's arraignment or entry of the plea, whichever occurs later, or in case the cause is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order granting a new trial from which no appeal is taken, or an appeal from a judgment in a misdemeanor or infraction case, within 30 days after the mistrial has been declared, after entry of the order granting the new trial, or after the remittitur is filed in the trial court, or within 30 days after the date of the reinstatement of criminal proceedings pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1367)." A number of exceptions to dismissal are provided, but are not relevant to our analysis.
­FN 9. There is no question that, if applicable, section 1382, subdivision (a)(3), required Benhoor be brought to trial within 30 days after entry of the order granting a new trial.
­FN 12. We provided the parties with a computer link to this report, as well as a copy of an October 2, 1998 report from the Traffic Advisory Committee to the Judicial Council of California, entitled "Traffic--Trial by Written Declaration (new rule 828 of the California Rules of Court and new Forms TR-200, TR-205, TR-210, TR-215, TR-220, and TR-225) (Action Required)," notified them we intended to take judicial notice of both reports pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 459 and invited their response. (See Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (d).) In reply the People stated they had no objection to the court taking judicial notice of this material but otherwise provided no substantive comment. (In their reply the People suggested neither party had "proposed or briefed any issue based on either of these voluminous documents" and requested, "if the Court intends to raise an issue based on either or both of those documents," that we "inform the parties of the issue and permit supplemental briefing as to that issue." Of course, the proper construction of rule 4.210(b)(7)--the sole purpose for referring to these documents--was the central issue in the appeal.) Benhoor did not respond. We now take judicial notice of these two reports.
­FN 13. Rule 4.210(c) authorizes the trial court to extend any date in rule 4.210 without a showing of good cause and without stating its reasons on the record. No order extending rule 4.210(b)(7)'s 45-day time limit was made when Benhoor's trial date was set for February 14, 2008.

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 § 459