Source: https://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/09/rim_with_the_su.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:49:43+00:00

Document:
NTP v. Research-in-Motion (en banc review).
A new flurry of appeal briefs further complicates this closely watched case involving the fundamental question of how the U.S. patent laws can be asserted against foreign activities. Canada based Research-in-Motion (RIM) was at the losing-end of a 2003 patent infringement trial that resulted in a permanent injunction against its popular BlackBerry system. That judgment is stayed pending a series of appeals that have included two appellate court opinions. Now, RIM is asking the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) to hear the appeal as an en banc panel of all twelve judges.
Sale: The CAFC found it unlikely that a method claim could infringe through the sale provision of 271(a).
Component: Distinguishing Eolas, the CAFC implied that a method claim would rarely if ever trigger 271(f).
Section 271(g): The import provision only applies to physical articles — and thus cannot be used to find infringement of a method for transmitting information (as claimed by NTP).
In the wake of the revised appellate opinion, RIM has renewed its request for an en banc rehearing – hoping that a full panel of appellate judges will eliminate the “control and beneficial use” standard for transnational infringement. NTP opposes the rehearing.
The Panel erred on multiple grounds. First, the Panel fails to follow the plain statutory language extraterritorially limiting § 271(a) liability to "uses . . . within the United States." As a result, the Panel makes an unsupported distinction between method claims and system claims creating a generic rule for all system claims that fails to consider the nature of the actual patented invention. Second, the Panel ignores basic cannons of statutory construction that forbid extending the patent statute extraterritorially absent clear Congressional direction. Third, the Panel erroneously finds § 271(a) liability based on Decca, a case decided under 28 U.S.C. 1498, the statutory language and purpose of which are entirely different from § 271(a). Fourth, the Panel misapplied that analysis and decided fact issues that should be left for the jury.
The Panel properly focused on the only pertinent activities for the 271(a) question presented: the acts of millions of U.S.-located BlackBerry users that put into service their U.S.-located BlackBerry handhelds to send and receive wireless emails millions of times each day using U.S.-located transceivers and US.-located email systems equipped with thousands of U.S.-located email gateway redirectors sold by RIM. The only pertinent RIM activities are those establishing inducement and contributory liability - activities conceded by RIM on appeal. Other acts that RIM raises are irrelevant. Indeed, under RIM'S reasoning, use by BlackBerry customers in other countries negates the tort of infringement arising from use in the United States. Such analysis lacks any basis in law, precedent, or reason.
NTP v. Research in Motion, (271(f) “component” does not apply to method claims).
In a rare move, the Government of Canada filed a brief supporting the petition for rehearing en banc. The brief notes that the panel opinion does not include any discussion of the principles of comity and international law that should be considered when determining the extent that U.S. laws should be interpreted to limit activities taken on foreign soil.
The brief recognized that the eventual conclusion may well be that patent laws should extend transnationally. However, the the thrust of this brief is that an expansion of extraterritorial application of the law should include a thorough analysis of the international implications.
The group of Canadian businesses argue that the standards created by the RIM opinion create confusion by the artificial distinction between system and process claims. Further, the group argue that the court should respect the rule of comity when construing a statute.
As the Supreme Court recently stated, courts "ordinarily construe ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations." F. Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (1994).
Seven Networks argues simply that patents are “national in scope.” And, without congressional action, patents should remain national in scope.
On its face, 35 U.S.C. §271(a) is national in scope, and the statute has no extraterritorial reach. It applies to "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States". When a statute is silent as to its extraterritorial application, the presumption is that the statute does not have extraterritorial effect.
With reference to “control and beneficial use” standard derived from Decca, Seven argued that Decca’s decision required ownership of the foreign-located system elements. Because RIM customers do not own the Routers located in Canada, they cannot be said to have control or be beneficially using that element.
The ITAC brief takes the stance that method and system claims should be treated consistently. ITAC correctly points out that it is often quite easy to draft a “system” claim that contains the same limitations as a parallel “method” claim.
No amici disputes the fact that one of the patents does not even give rise to the issue of territoriality (NTP wants to avoid this altogether and just get paid).
The Canadian Gov’t Brief confirms that U.S. patent laws apply when the RIM system is used Within the U.S.
Microsoft supports the decision finding infringement of the system claims.
The Canadian Chamber of Commerce seeks an improper advisory opinion (on product-by-process claims).
The ITAC brief, prepared by RIM’s patent firm (Kirkland & Ellis) merely rehashes RIM’s old arguments.
Seven Networks hopes to avoid infringement by placing its own routers abroad.
In a brief supporting an en banc rehearing, Intel first noted that this issue is of great importance to today’s economy where many thousands of businesses operate multinationally. Like RIM, Intel could find no “principled or policy basis” for the outcome of a multinational infringement case to depend on the form of the preamble of the claim.
There is no reason to hold that practicing every step is essential to infringement of a claimed process, yet hold that use of every component is not essential to infringement of a claimed system.
Finally, Intel asked the court to place the burden on patent drafters — arguing that it is possible to draft claims to virtually any invention that avoids the need to extend 271(a) to cover extraterritorial activities.
In a brief filed specifically in response to Intel’s brief, RIM argued (i) that it had been filed after the deadline and thus should be considered untimely; (ii) that Intel does have a financial interest in the case; and (iii) that Intel’s brief simply rehashes old arguments.
Link: Discussion of the NTP v. RIM CAFC Replacement Opinion, August 3, 2005.
Link: Discussion of RIM/NTP Settlement Problems, June 26, 2005.
Link: Expanding reach of U.S. patent law, March 6, 2005.
Link: Eolas v. Microsoft, March 2, 2005.
Link: Discussion of Original NTP v. RIM decision, December 14, 2004.
First off, I must admit that I am anything but a lawyer. Actually, I am far closer to the object of the suit: a software engineer. As an individual who, at some point in the future, hopes to somehow contribute materially to society by advancing the field of computer science, I am extremely dismayed by suits of this nature.
I understand that patent holding companies sometimes act as true representatives of inventors. However, I also understand that they are frequently play the equivalent of an "intellectual stock market" buying up patents from inventors. The patent holding company then waits like a spider in the web for some other inidivudal/company to attempt to profit from a similar invention, and then sues the life out of them.
How is this the least bit beneficial to society as a whole? Clearly there must be a way to legally distinguish between a patent holding company representing an inventor and a social vampire looking to make a quick buck at society's cost. That is, by the way, clearly the net effect: innovation requires capital. Lawsuits remove capital.
What's worse is that these patent holding companies CREATE NOTHING! In the case where the holding company merely invests in patents for the explicit purpose of later suing other companies, these patent holders are no better than social vampires!
This cannot be the intent of the patent system.
It's ridiculous that any party can claim for patent rights just based on an "idea" without real innovation of practical beneficial to user.
Only US can has org like NTP, just like the fat cats in the financial business.

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