Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/237/648/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 11:00:08+00:00

Document:
In this case, as there was uncontradicted evidence that decedent survived his injuries, although only for something more than half an hour, and that the injuries were such as to cause extreme pain if he remained conscious, and there was conflicting evidence as to whether he did remain conscious, those questions were properly submitted to the jury, and the question for this Court is not which way the evidence preponderated, but whether there was evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that decedent did endure conscious pain during the period between his injury and death.
While, in this case, there was evidence to go to the jury on those questions, generally such pain and suffering as are substantially contemporaneous with death, or mere incidents to it, afford no estimation or award of damages under such statutes as the Employers' Liability Act.
there was no provision for the survival of the right given to the injured person, and the right as at common law died with him, but under the act as amended in 1910 that right of action survives to the personal representatives of the decedent for the benefit of the widow, husband, children, parents or dependent next of kin, as specified in § 9 of the act as amended.
A provision brought into a federal statute by way of amendment, expressing the deliberate will of Congress, must be given effect, and, construing §§ 1 and 9 of the Employers' Liability Act, as amended, together, the personal representative of a deceased employee is to recover, on the part of the designated beneficiaries, not only such damages as will compensate them for their own pecuniary loss, but also such damages as will be reasonably compensatory for the loss and suffering of decedent while he lived.
Such a recovery is not a double recovery for a single wrong, but a single recovery for a double wrong.
Quaere whether, under the final clause of § 9 of the Employers' Liability Act, as amended in 1910, providing that there shall be only one recovery for one injury, the personal representative of a deceased employee can recover where there has been a recovery by decedent in his lifetime.
The provisions in § 9 of the Employers' Liability Act, as amended in 1910, that there shall be only one recovery for one injury does not restrict the personal representative of a decedent who suffered pain after the injury and before death to one basis of recovery to the exclusion of tho other, or require him to make a choice between them; it does, however, limit him to one recovery of damages for both, and thus avoid needless litigation in separate actions.
While reports of Committees of the different Houses of Congress in regard to bills in their charge cannot be taken as giving to the act as passed a meaning not fairly within its words, they may be persuasive as showing that its words should not be wrongly construed.
The amount of a verdict for damages for suffering, although apparently large, in this case $5,000 for pain endured during a period of thirty minutes, involves only questions of fact, and is not reviewable here under § 237, Judicial Code. The power, and with it the duty and responsibility, of dealing with such questions rests upon the courts below.
Amendment of 1910 and the right of the administrator of an employee killed by negligence of the employer to recover not only for the death of, but also for the pain and suffering endured by, decedent, are stated in the opinion.
of the death and (b) conscious pain and suffering of the decedent before the injuries proved fatal. In the trial court, the plaintiff had a verdict and judgment awarding $1,000 for the pecuniary loss to the father and $11,000 for the pain and suffering of the decedent, and the supreme court of the state, after reducing the latter sum to $5,000, affirmed the judgment. 171 S.W. 1185.
Without questioning that the evidence justified an assessment of damages for the father's pecuniary loss, the defendant insists, as it did in both state courts, that the recovery could not include anything for pain and suffering of the decedent, first because there was no evidence that he endured any conscious pain or suffering, and second because the statute requires that the recovery in such cases be restricted to either the pecuniary loss to the designated beneficiaries or the damage sustained by the injured person while he lived, and does not permit a recovery for both.
of consciousness, and that he seemed to be unconscious from the beginning. The jury found that he was conscious, and both state courts accepted that solution of the dispute. Of course, the question here is not which way the evidence preponderated, but whether there was evidence from which the jury reasonably could find that, while he lived, he endured conscious pain and suffering as a result of his injuries. That question, we are persuaded, must be answered in the affirmative. But, to avoid any misapprehension, it is well to observe that the case is close to the borderline, for such pain and suffering as are substantially contemporaneous with death or mere incidents to it, as also the short periods of insensibility which sometimes intervene between fatal injuries and death, afford no basis for a separate estimation or award of damages under statutes like that which is controlling here. The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335, 145 U. S. 348; Kearney v. Boston & Worcester R. Co., 9 Cush. 108; Kennedy v. Standard Sugar Refinery, 125 Mass. 90; Tully v. Fitchburg R. Co., 134 Mass. 499, 504; Mulchahey v. Washburn Car Wheel Co. 145 Mass. 281; St. Louis &c. Ry. v. Dawson, 68 Ark. 1; Burch v. St. Louis &c. Ry., 108 Ark. 396, 408.
&c. Ry. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 229 U. S. 158; Taylor v. Taylor, 232 U. S. 363. So it is by that act that we must test the objection that the recovery could not include damages for the decedent's conscious pain and suffering along with damages for the father's pecuniary loss.
The original act was adopted by Congress April 22, 1908. In its first section, it provides for two distinct rights of action based upon altogether different principles, although primarily resting upon the same wrongful act or neglect. It invests the injured employee with a right to such damages as will compensate him for his personal loss and suffering -- a right which arises only where his injuries are not immediately fatal. And where his injuries prove fatal, either immediately or subsequently (Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra; Louisville & St.Louis R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U. S. 230, 152 U. S. 238), it invests his personal representative, as a trustee for designated relatives, with a right to such damages as will compensate the latter for any pecuniary loss which they sustain by the death. At first there was no provision for a survival of the right given to the injured person, and so, under the operation of the rule of the common law, it would die with him.
"This cause of action is independent of any cause of action which the decedent had, and includes no damages which he might have recovered for his injury if he had survived. It is one beyond that which the decedent had -- one proceeding upon altogether different principles. It is a liability for the loss and damage sustained by relatives dependent upon the decedent. It is therefore a liability for the pecuniary damage resulting to them, and for that only."
his death, nor pass to his representatives. But the act, in case of the death of such an employee from his injury, creates a new and distinct right of action for the benefit of the dependent relatives named in the statute. The damages recoverable are limited to such loss as results to them because they have been deprived of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits by the wrongful death of the injured employee. The damage is limited strictly to the financial loss thus sustained."
"amended by adding the following section:"
"Sec. 9. That any right of action given by this Act to a person suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee, and if none, then of such employee's parents, and if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury."
Eichorn v. New Orleans &c. Power Co., 112 La. 236; Vicksburg & Meridian R. Co. v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 693.
Much stress is laid upon the concluding clause in the new section, "but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury." Passing and reserving the question of its application where there has been a recovery by the decedent in his lifetime (see Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra, p. 227 U. S. 70), we think this clause, as applied to cases like the present, is not intended to restrict the personal representative to one right to the exclusion of the other, or to require that he make a choice between them, but to limit him to one recovery of damages for both, and so to avoid the needless litigation in separate actions of what would better be settled once for all in a single action. This view gives full effect to every word in the clause and ascribes to it a reasonable purpose without bringing it into conflict with other provisions the terms of which are plain and unequivocal. Had Congress intended that the personal representative should make an election between the two rights of action and sue upon one only, it is not easy to believe that it would have chosen the words in this clause to express that intention.
for the Ninth Circuit, the court saying that "the plain meaning" of the new section is that damages for the deceased's personal loss and suffering and for the pecuniary loss to the designated beneficiaries by the death, "not only may be recovered by the personal representative of the deceased in one action, but must be recovered in one action only, if at all." So far as we are advised by the reported decisions, this is the view which has been taken by all the courts, federal and state, that have had occasion to consider the question.
"as broad, as comprehensive, and as inclusive in its terms as any of the similar remedial statutes existing in any of the states, which are superseded in their operation by force of the federal legislation upon the subject."
Senate Report No. 432, 61st Cong.2d Sess. pp. 12-15; House Report No. 513, 61st Cong.2d Sess. pp. 3-6. While these reports cannot be taken as giving to the new section a meaning not fairly within its words, they persuasively show that it should not be narrowly or restrictively interpreted.
For these reasons, we think the second objection is not tenable.
Finally, it is said that the award of $5,000 as damages for pain and suffering, even though extreme, for so short a period as approximately thirty minutes, is excessive. The award does seem large, but the power, and with it the duty and responsibility, of dealing with this matter rested upon the courts below. It involves only a question of fact, and is not open to reconsideration here. Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 100 U. S. 31; The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; Erie R. Co. v. Winter, 143 U. S. 60, 143 U. S. 75; Herencia v. Guzman, 219 U. S. 44; Southern Railway v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80.

References: § 9
 § 9
 § 9
 § 237
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.