Source: http://speechlawblog.com/2010/06/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:20:48+00:00

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Speech Law Blog contributor Phil Zisook was interviewed by CBS News-Chicago for his impressions on a new lawsuit filed by a business owner against a reviewer who gave his services an “F” on angieslist.com. Read the story here and see the video here.
On June 1, 2010, the Illinois Appellate Court in Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co.reversed a dismissal of a petition seeking the the identity of anonymous comment posters on a newspaper’s website. The comments implied that the plaintiffs bribed officials to change a zoning ordinance. The newspaper argued that the poster’s identity was constitutionally protected, but the court found that the First Amendment was not implicated. Instead, the court ruled that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 permits petitioners to seek the identity of the anonymous poster prior to filing a Complaint for the purpose of identifying a potential defendant. In a defamation action, Rule 224 requires that the potential plaintiff file a verified petition stating why the discovery is necessary and alleging facts with particularity that would establish a cause of action for defamation against the unnamed potential defendant.
Courts in other jurisdictions, such as New Jersey and Delaware, have held that there is a First Amendment right to speak anonymously and therefore require that a petition show: (1) that the poster has been notified of the potential claim so they have the opportunity to appear; (2) the exact statements purportedly made by the anonymous poster; (3) that the allegations meet a prima facie standard and can withstand a hypothetical motion for summary judgment. This strict test protects the First Amendment right to speak anonymously from being chilled by meritless defamation claims.
Maxon points to the divergent paths that courts are taking on the issue of anonymous internet posts. Some courts have favored a First Amendment protection of anonymous speech, while Maxon favored potential plaintiffs seeking relief for defamatory speech. These conflicting results will likely continue in the absence of additional state supreme court decisions. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court may have to address the speech rights of anonymous internet posters.
On May 10, 2010, in Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protection District, the Seventh Circuit held that it was error to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court’s ruling allows the plaintiff’s claims, that he was terminated as a firefighter by the District in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment speech rights and that he had a property right in continued employment, to proceed. The Plaintiff, Kodish, had been a firefighter for over one year. However, during four of his sixteen months of employment, he was on medical leave. The applicable Illinois Fire Protection Act provides that the right to continued employment in the absence of just cause for termination attaches only after a firefighter “holds” his position for one year or longer.
The court found that “holding a position” for one year or longer did not require one to perform his job duties without interruption during that period. Rather, the requirement was satisfied by a “colorable appointment coupled with performance of the duties of the position and remuneration therefor.” Because Kodish met this standard notwithstanding his period of medical leave and interrupted employment, the court found that he had a property interest in continued employment.
With respect to Kodish’s First Amendment claim, the court found that given circumstantial evidence that the District Chief had anti-union animus and the District’s Board did not conduct its own investigation, but instead relied upon the Chief, it was error to hold that there was no genuine question of fact and that the District was entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that the initial reduction was inappropriate since the trial court did not provide specific reasons for reducing the award. On April 15, 2010, the Supreme Court found that the question is whether there is a basis in the record to support the order, not whether specific grounds for reduction are articulated. In this regard, the Court found that contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, there was no evidence supporting the theory of a premeditated scheme to defame. Rather, at most, there was a reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s rights, which the Supreme Court found was “on the low end of the scale for punitive damages, far below those cases involving a defendant’s deliberate attempt to harm another person.” In addition, the Supreme Court found that the statements were not repeated, but stated merely once in a meeting to a limited number of persons. Further, the Supreme Court emphasized that the jury returned no award for reputational injury. Thus, the Supreme Court found that even the trial court’s remittitur to $1 million constituted an abuse of discretion and there was no basis in the record to support such an award and affirmed the appellate court’s reduction of punitive damages to $81,600.
Slovinski is probably limited to its particular facts. In a case with a significant reputational injury and more widespread publication, the defendants would likely have a more difficult time justifying such a drastic reduction of the damages found to be appropriate by a jury.
In Femal v Square D Company, the Illinois Appellate Court applied the fiduciary shield doctrine to determine whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In Femal, the attorney for Rockwell International, a Wisconsin corporation, traveled to Illinois to explore the possibility of a settlement between Rockwell and another corporation in a patent infringement case. In the course of that meeting, the attorney purportedly made statements accusing Femal, an employee of the other corporation, with certain ethical violations which Femal claimed led to his termination. Femal sued the attorney for defamation. The attorney claimed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction since he did not reside or do business in Illinois and only traveled to Illinois for the settlement conference on behalf of his Wisconsin employer. The court, citing the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Rollins v. Ellwood, a kidnapping case, found that the fiduciary shield doctrine prevents courts from asserting jurisdiction over a person on the basis of acts by that person not on his own behalf, but on behalf of his employer. The court found that it would be unfair and unreasonable under Illinois’ due process clause to assert jurisdiction over an individual whose sole contacts with the state were a consequence of his acting on behalf of his employer. Ultimately, the court found that there were questions of fact as to whether the defendant acted out of personal interests or solely in the interests of his employer and ordered an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Femal provides an important defense for individual defamation defendants whose statements were made in the course of their employment. There is contrary Illinois authority which could support arguments that jurisdiction existed since the defendant’s tortious conduct occurred in Illinois and the plaintiff’s injury occurred in Illinois. Also, there is authority from the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Van Horne v. Muller, that whoever participates in the publication of a defamatory statement is liable for defamation. However, Femal provides an important defense to out of state defendants who can show that their statements were made in the course of their employment duties.
In Stepek v. Doe, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the First Amendment’s free exercise of religion clause barred the defamation claim of a Catholic priest against two brothers who charged that he abused them 25 years earlier. The court adopted the rationale of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, where the court found that “The First Amendment’s protection of internal religious disciplinary proceedings would be meaningless if a parishioner’s accusation that was used to initiate those proceedings could be tested in a civil court.” Because the brothers’ accusations arose in the course of a church disciplinary decision, the court found that exercising subject matter jurisdiction would “require the secular court to involve itself in the regulation of ecclesiastical activity.” Accordingly, the court held that the First Amendment barred the trial court from exercising jurisdiction.
Stepek presents a departure from prior Illinois law where the First Amendment inquiry focused upon whether a controversy involving a church could be determined without reference to ecclesiastical doctrine or church law. Prior cases involving alleged improper sexual activity by clergy were held not to implicate the First Amendment because the matters were determined by application of neutral principles of law. Biven v. Wright (allegations of improper sexual conduct in the course of religious counseling). Moreover, unlike the Hiles case relied upon by the court, Stepek involved allegations of criminal conduct, over which secular courts unquestionably have an interest. In addition, in Stepek, the Church’s own written procedures and policies required the reporting of accusations of the abuse of minors by clergy to secular prosecuting and investigative authorities. Thus, in Stepek, it was argued that determination of the defamation claim would not involve interpretation of church doctrine or review of church discipline. The court’s focus upon the forum in which the statements were made rather than whether the truth or falsity of the statements at issue can be determined without interpreting religious criteria will make it harder for defamation plaintiffs to proceed where their claims are based, in part, on statements made in a religious forum.
The court’s opinion is a straightforward application of Garcetti, a necessary case for anyone representing public employees to be aware of.

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