Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/446/635/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 21:53:54+00:00

Document:
allege that the official has acted in bad faith in order to state a claim for relief or, alternatively, whether the defendant must plead good faith as an affirmative defense.
the Police Department concluded that all of petitioner's factual allegations were true.
In April, 1976, while still stationed at the Police Academy, petitioner was subpoenaed to give testimony in a criminal case arising out of the evidence that petitioner had alleged to be false. At the trial, petitioner, appearing as a defense witness, testified that the evidence was in fact false. As a result of this testimony, criminal charges, filed on the basis of information furnished by respondent, were brought against petitioner for the allegedly unlawful wiretapping of the agents' telephones. Respondent suspended petitioner in May, 1976, and discharged him without a hearing in July. In October, the District Court of Puerto Rico found no probable cause to believe that petitioner was guilty of the allegedly unlawful wiretapping and, upon appeal by the prosecution, the Superior Court affirmed. Petitioner, in turn, sought review of his discharge before the Investigation, Prosecution, and Appeals Commission of Puerto Rico, which, after a hearing, revoked the discharge order rendered by respondent and ordered that petitioner be reinstated with backpay.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict anong the Courts of Appeals. [Footnote 5] 444 U.S. 1031 (1980). We now reverse.
(1871) (Rep. Shellabarger), reflects a congressional judgment that a "damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees," 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 651. As remedial legislation, § 1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose. See 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 636.
"excus[ed] from liability for acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid, but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied."
And in other contexts we have held, on the basis of "[c]ommon law tradition . . . and strong public policy reasons," Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 420 U. S. 318 (1975), that certain categories of executive officers should be allowed qualified immunity from liability for acts done on the basis of an objectively reasonable belief that those acts were lawful. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975) (superintendent of state hospital); Wood v. Strickland, supra, (local school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974) (state Governor and other executive officers). Cf. Owen v. City of Independence, supra, (no qualified immunity for municipalities).
Moreover, this Court has never indicated that qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action; instead, we have described it as a defense available to the official in question. See Procuner v. Navarette, supra at 434 U. S. 562; Pierson v. Ray, supra at 386 U. S. 556, 386 U. S. 557; Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 438 U. S. 508 (1978). Since qualified immunity is a defense, the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 8(c) (defendant must plead any "matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense"); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1271 (1969). It is for the official to claim that his conduct was justified by an objectively reasonable belief that it was lawful. We see no basis for imposing on the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate such a defense by stating in his complaint that the defendant acted in bad faith.
"[i]t is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct."
The decision. of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE RHNQUIST joins the opinion of the Court, reading it as he does to leave open the issue of the burden of persuasion, as opposed to the burden of pleading, with respect to a defense of qualified immunity.
"[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
This decision was in accord with earlier decisions in that Circuit. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248 (1973); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1977); Maiorana v. MacDonald, 596 F.2d 1072 (1979).
Other Courts of Appeals have held that the burden of pleading a defense of good faith lies with the defendant. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (CA2 1972); Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d 53, 61-62 (CA3) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1213 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976); Jones v. Perrigan, 459 F.2d 81, 83 (CA6 1972); Tritsis v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021, 1022-1023 (CA7 1974); Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1324-1325, 1329 (CA8), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978); Martin v. Duffie, 463 F.2d 464, 468 (CA10 1972); Dellums v. Powell, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 275, 284-285, 566 F.2d 167, 175-176 (1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). Cf. McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 370 (CA4 1975) (en banc) (burden of proof), cert. dism'd, 426 U. S. 471 (1976); Gilker v. Baker, 576 F.2d 245 (CA9 1978) (same).
Actions under Puerto Rican law come within both § 1983 and its jurisdictional predicate, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572 (1976).
"It seems to be considered only fair that certain types of things which in common law pleading were matters in confession and avoidance -- i.e., matters which seemed more or less to admit the general complaint and yet to suggest some other reason why there was no right -- must be specifically pleaded in the answer, and that has been a general rule."
ABA, Proceedings Institute at Washington and Symposium at New York City on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 49 (1939). See also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1270-1271 (1969). Cf. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 324 U. S. 759 (1945) (good faith defense under Robinson-Patman Act); Barcellona v. Tiffany English Pub., Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 468 (CA5 1979); Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-740 (CA7 1979); United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393 (CA7 1977).

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