Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/164/112/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:41:46+00:00

Document:
the provisions of the federal Constitution. The following are some of the numerous cases in which this principle has been announced and carried into effect: Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812; Van Renesselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599; Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 111 U. S. 704; Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492.
There is no specific prohibition in the federal Constitution which acts upon the states in regard to their taking private property for any but a public use. The Fifth Amendment, which provides, among other things, that such property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, applies only to the federal government, as has many times been decided. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 313; Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U. S. 490. In the Fourteenth Amendment the provision regarding the taking of private property is omitted, and the prohibition against the state is confined to its depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It is claimed, however, that the citizen is deprived of his property without due process of law if it be taken by or under state authority for any other than a public use, either under the guise of taxation or by the assumption of the right of eminent domain. In that way, the question whether private property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes material in this Court even where the taking is under the authority of the state, instead of the federal, government.
"Water and Water Rights. SEC. 1. The use of all water apportioned, or that may hereafter be apportioned, for sale, rental or distribution is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and control of the state in the manner to be prescribed by law."
formed or carried into effect. In general, the water to be used must be carried for some distance, and over or through private property, which cannot be taken in invitum if the use to which it is to be put be not public, and if there be no power to take property by condemnation, it may be impossible to acquire it at all. The use for which private property is to be taken must be a public one, whether the taking be by the exercise of the right of eminent domain or by that of taxation. Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1. A private company or corporation, without the power to acquire the land in invitum, would be of no real benefit, and at any rate the cost of the undertaking would be so greatly enhanced by the knowledge that the land must be acquired by purchase that it would be practically impossible to build the works or obtain the water. Individual enterprise would be equally ineffectual. No one owner would find it possible to construct and maintain waterworks and canals any better than private corporations or companies, and unless they had the power of eminent domain, they could accomplish nothing. If that power could be conferred upon them, it could only be upon the ground that the property they took was to be taken for a public purpose.
The case does not essentially differ from that of Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, where this Court held that the power of the legislature of California to prescribe a system for reclaiming swamp lands was not inconsistent with any provision of the federal Constitution. The power does not rest simply upon the ground that the reclamation must be necessary for the public health. That, indeed, is one ground for interposition by the state, but not the only one. Statutes authorizing drainage of swamp lands have frequently been upheld, independently of any effect upon the public health, as reasonable regulations for the general advantage of those who are treated for this purpose as owners of a common property. Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., 113 U. S. 9, 113 U. S. 22; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, 114 U. S. 611; Cooley on Taxation 617, 2d ed. If it be essential or material for the prosperity of the community, and if the improvement be one in which all the landowners have to a certain extent a common interest, and the improvement cannot be accomplished without the concurrence of all or nearly all of such owners by reason of the peculiar natural condition of the tract sought to be reclaimed, then such reclamation may be made, and the land rendered useful to all and at their joint expense. In such case, the absolute right of each individual owner of land must yield to a certain extent, or be modified by corresponding rights on the part of other owners for what is declared upon the whole to be for the public benefit.
The difference between this case and the case of Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 353, is said by counsel for appellees to consist in the fact that, in the Spencer case, the lands in question might have been benefited, while here, the additional benefit to land already capable of beneficial use without irrigation is in no legal or proper sense a benefit which can be considered for the purpose of an assessment. We think this alleged difference is not material. It is in each case one of degree only, and the fact of the benefit is by the act to be determined after a hearing by the board of supervisors. In this case, the board has necessarily decided that question in favor of the fact of benefits, by retaining the lands in the district. Unless this Court is prepared to review all questions of fact of this nature decided by a state tribunal, where the claim is made that the judgment was without any evidence to support it or was against the evidence, then we must be concluded by the judgment on such a question of fact and treat the legal question as based upon the facts as found by the state board. Due process of law is not violated, and the equal protection of the laws is given, when the ordinary course is pursued in such proceedings for the assessment and collection of taxes that has been customarily followed in the state, and where the party who may subsequently be charged in his property has had a hearing, or an opportunity for one, provided by the statute. Kelley v. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 78.
If the state courts would have had the right to review these findings of fact, jurisdictional in their nature, the United States circuit court had the same right in this case; but it has not done so, its judgment being based upon the sole ground that the act was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. Upon the question of fact as to benefits, decided by the board, it is held that its decision is conclusive. 88 Cal., supra. Whether a review is or is not given upon any of these questions of fact (if the tribunal created by the state had power to decide them, and if an opportunity for a hearing were given by the act) is a mere question of legislative discretion. It is not constitutionally necessary in such cases to give a rehearing or an appeal. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22; Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294.
To the same effect, Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 140 U. S. 333.
The publication of a notice of the proposed presentation of the petition is a sufficient notification to those interested in the question, and gives them an opportunity to be heard before the board. Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30.
right to any other or further hearing upon that question. The right which he thereafter has is to a hearing upon the question of what is termed the "apportionment of the tax" -- i.e. the amount of the tax which he is to pay. Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 149 U. S. 41. But when, as in this case, the determination of the question of what lands shall be included in the district is only to be decided after a decision as to what lands described in the petition will be benefited, and the decision of that question is submitted to some tribunal (the board of supervisors in this case), the parties whose lands are thus included in the petition are entitled to a hearing upon the question of benefits, and to have the lands excluded, if the judgment of the board be against their being benefited. Unless the legislature decide the question of benefits itself, the landowner has the right to be heard upon that question before his property can be taken. This, in substance, was determined by the decisions of this Court in Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 125 U. S. 356, and Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578. Such a hearing upon notice is duly provided for in the act.
In the case of Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 106, the assessment, with which this Court refused to interfere, was for a local improvement (reclaiming swamp lands), and by § 8 of the Act of the Legislature of Louisiana, passed in 1858, Laws of Louisiana, 1858, 114, such a uniform assessment was levied upon "the superficial or square foot of land situate within the draining section or district of such board" as would pay for the cost of construction. The effect of this provision was that each foot of land in the whole district paid the same sum as any other foot, although the assessment was founded upon the theory of an assessment for benefits. It was complained that the amount assessed upon plaintiff's lands was excessive, and that part of them received no benefit at all, and it was to that argument that the reply was made that it was a matter of detail, so far as this Court was concerned -- i.e. it was not a constitutional question, and therefore was not reviewable here.
In Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, an assessment was laid upon lands for benefits received from construction of a local improvement according to the number of square feet owned by the landowner. It was urged that it was not an assessment governed by the amount of benefits received, but was an absolutely arbitrary and illegal method of assessment. This Court held the objection not well founded, and that the matter was for the decision of the legislature, to which body the discretion was committed of providing for payment of the improvement.
"First. -- The name of the person to whom the property is assessed. If the name is not known to the assessor, the property shall be assessed to Unknown owners."
"Second -- Land by township, range, section or fractional section, and when such land is not a congressional division or subdivision, by metes and bounds, or other description sufficient to identify it, giving an estimate of the number of acres, locality, and the improvements thereon."
"Third -- City and town lots, naming the city or town, and the number and block, according to the system of numbering in such city or town, and the improvements thereon."
"Fourth -- The cash value of real estate other than city or town lots."
"Fifth -- The cash value of improvements on such real estate."
"Sixth -- The cash value of city and town lots."
"Seventh -- The cash value of improvements on city and town lots."
"Eighth -- The cash value of improvements on real estate assessed to persons other than the owners of the real estate."
"Ninth -- The total value of all property assessed."
"Tenth -- The total value of all property after equalization by the board of directors."
"Eleventh -- Such other things as the board of directors may require."

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