Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2010/10/26/5-key-elements-of-claim-vasques-flores-goodwin-dingess/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:38:43+00:00

Document:
Kathy A. Lieberman, of Washington, D.C., for the appellant.
D.C., were on the brief for the appellee.
neuropsychiatric disorder because it was not service connected on a direct basis or as secondary to a service-connected renal disability. See Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 22 Vet.App. 37 (2008) (Vazquez-Flores I). Subsequently, in Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Vazquez-Flores II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) vacated and remanded that part of the Court’s January 30, 2008, decision that set aside and remanded Mr.
throughout this opinion, as they are throughout the caselaw addressing VA disability compensation.
unemployability (TDIU) will be set aside and the matters remanded for further adjudication.
nephrolithiasis, and in April 1976 his disability rating was increased to 30%. R. at 242, 246.
incurred in or aggravated by service. R. at 296-305.
In August 1994, Mr. Vazquez-Flores sought to reopen his previously denied claim. R. at 358.
He also claimed that his “service-connected kidney condition ha[d] increased in severity.” Id.
service connected. R. at 390. In February 1998, Dr. Juarbe testified before the RO that Mr.
between these conditions. R. at 585.
that at least three reports in the record before the Board appeared to contradict this statement.
complaints of depression were the result of his nephrolithiasis), 455 (February 1998 testimony of Dr.
Flores provided no history or complaint to the examiner.
at least general notice of that requirement to the claimant. Id.
The Secretary removed this requirement from 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b), effective 4 May 30, 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg.
2001 and December 2003 and a February 2004 SSOC to find adequate preadjudicatory notice.
information renders section 5103(a) notice inadequate).
record for prejudice, the Court further found that throughout the extensive administrative appeal Mr.
(citations omitted)). We now address the contentions of the parties on remand.
38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) as amended by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 3(a), 114 Stat.
III. 20 Vet.App. 537 (2006). The Federal Circuit affirmed in Mayfield IV.
that Mr. Vazquez-Flores was not prejudiced by notice errors.
now must be reconsidered in their entirety, (2) the December 2003 notice letter provided to Mr.
was prejudiced by any purported notice error.
increased benefits for nephrolithiasis. It is to that portion that we now turn.
he is correct that the Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review factual findings, see 38 U.S.C.
otherwise remains persuasive. See Exxon Corp., supra.
there was no indication that she had pertinent evidence in her possession).
submitted evidence in his possession and that he did not possess such evidence. R. at 930 (Mr.
fourth element of notice per § 3.159(b)(1) does not have the natural effect of producing prejudice).
section 5103(a) notice, and not any notice provided in the February 2004 SSOC.
employment. Indeed, Vazquez-Flores II emphasizes the importance of employment evidence.
specific nature of the veteran’s claim).”).
on the claimant’s employment. See Vazquez-Flores II, 580 F.3d at 1279-80; Vazquez-Flores I, 22 Vet.App. at 43.
evidence that his condition has “worsened.” See Mayfield IV, 499 F.3d at 1323 (noting that timing problems are cured by new notification that complies with VCAA and subsequent readjudication).
adequate notice followed by another adjudication of the claim. See Mayfield II, 444 F.3d at 1333-34.
However, even assuming arguendo that in this instance the December 2003 letter provided to Mrs.
Secretary when determining whether adequate notice had been provided).
determination reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard).
Vet.App. at 12 (incomplete and confusing information renders section 5103(a) notice inadequate)).
because our observations in Vazquez-Flores I were based on the totality of the notice provided to Mr.
the adjudication. This is discussed below.
Once error is found, the Court must determine whether the error is prejudicial. 38 U.S.C.
§ 7261(b)(2) (the Court must “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error”); Sanders, 129 S. Ct.
burden of demonstrating prejudice in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.
forward with a plausible showing of how the essential fairness of the adjudication was affected by that error.”).
464 U.S. 548, 554, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), Intercargo Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 F.3d 391, 396 (Fed.
Cir.1996))); Parker v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 476, 481 (1996).
defective as to a key element needed to substantiate a claim for benefits in the first instance.
decision in Sanders v. Nicholson, which was reversed, vacated, and the matters remanded. 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir.
that court, having read the entire record, conscientiously concludes the contrary.” (emphasis added)).
viewed in the context of the case and should not be extended blindly in subsequent cases).
claim; we now turn to that issue.
found to be measured at 20/70).
In a claim for increased benefits, the claimant already is service connected for a disability.
A claim for increased benefits can be substantiated with evidence of a worsening of the disability that, depending upon the nature of the corresponding disease or injury in the DC, is demonstrated by more objective evidence such as a specific measurement or test result, or, more general evidence such as the impact upon employment or daily life.9 Significantly, however, all three types of evidence are not always necessary to be awarded a higher disability rating. Compare 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5215 (2010) (evaluating ankylosis of the wrist at 10% if dorsiflexion is less than 15 degrees), and § 4.100, DC 6847 (2010) (evaluating sleep apnea syndrome at 50% if the veteran requires the use of breathing assistance such as a continuous airway pressure machine), with 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, DC 9201 (2010) (evaluating schizophrenia based upon, inter alia, the degree of occupational impairment, including “difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a worklike setting)”), and with 38 C.F.R. § 4.88b, DC 6354 (evaluating Chronic Fatigue Syndrome based upon the degree to which fatigue “restricts routine daily activities”).
how to substantiate an increased-rating claim simply is not provided at all, a shift of the appellant’s burden to the Secretary to show that the appellant was not prejudiced is unwarranted.
include the impact nephrolithiasis has on employment. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.115b, DC 7508 (2010) (rating nephrolithiasis, inter alia, at 30% if recurrent stone formation requires either diet therapy, drug therapy, or an invasive or non-invasive procedure more than two times per year). Accordingly, the inadequacy of this notice does not have a natural, adverse affect on the ability of Mr. Vazquez-Flores to meaningfully participate in the processing of his claim and the essential fairness of the adjudication. Thus, the burden of demonstrating prejudice falls on Mr. Vazquez-Flores.
confusing. If the notice letters of April 2001 and December 2003 are considered in a vacuum, they certainly can be confusing as there is no indication which notice should be followed to substantiate his claim for increased benefits. However, prejudice is not assessed in a vacuum; rather it is based on the facts and circumstances presented in the entire record. Sanders, Newhouse, Mlechick, and Conway, all supra.
benefits since 1978 (R. at 583-85); and (4) Mr. Vazquez-Flores’s Social Security Association records, obtained by the Board in 2002 note, inter alia, poor ability to comprehend and follow instructions as well as poor ability to perform simple, complex, and repetitive tasks and that no degree of improvement can reasonably be anticipated in Mr. Vazquez-Flores’s condition (R. at 588-89).
Moreover, the Board is not only presumed to have reviewed this information, Newhouse, 497 F.3d at 1302, its statement of reasons or bases supporting the decision reflects its awareness that Mr. Vazquez-Flores’s nephrolithiasis, along with his other physical, psychiatric, and social conditions, has impacted his employment to the degree that he has not been able to work since 1978. R. at 9, 17. Accordingly, without any indication from Mr. Vazquez-Flores that he has been prejudiced by the Secretary’s error, and without finding any prejudice demonstrated by the record on appeal, remand is not warranted with regard to his assigned schedular rating. See Marciniak v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 198, 201 (1997) (noting that remand is unnecessary “[i]n the absence of demonstrated prejudice”).
nephrolithiasis, by itself, caused frequent hospitalization or marked interference with employment. R. at 17. Logically, because Mr. Vazquez-Flores’s claim for benefits for a neuropsychiatric disability has been remanded on appeal and there is evidence showing that both his physical and mental conditions have caused unemployment, the Board will have to again address possible referral of his claim for consideration of entitlement to an extraschedular rating on remand. See Tyrues v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 166, 178-79 (2009) (remand generally appropriate when matter on appeal is “inextricably intertwined” with matters being adjudicated below); Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 111 (2008) (holding that referral for extraschedular consideration is a three-step inquiry and is not warranted if the rating schedule adequately contemplates the effect of a claimant’s level of disability and symptomatology).
is entitled to TDIU. See R. at 583-85 (a November 2002 VA examination report states that Mr.
Vazquez-Flores stopped working in April 1978 and had been receiving Social Security benefits since 1978), 458 (a February 1998 hearing transcript notes the testimony of Mr. Vazquez-Flores’s private psychiatrist that Mr. Vazquez-Flores had no industrial capacity due to his physical, psychiatric and social conditions); see also 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (2010) (criteria for a total rating based on individual unemployability). Accordingly, the Board erred in not addressing TDIU and it must do so on remand. See Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the Secretary must consider TDIU when a veteran makes a claim for the highest rating possible and submits evidence of a medical disability and of unemployment); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008)(noting that the Board required to consider all issues raised either by the claimant or by evidence of record); see also Barringer v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 242, 244 (2008) (Court has jurisdiction to review whether Board erred in failing to address a reasonably raised claim); Patton v. West, 12 Vet.App. 272, 283 (1999) (noting that the Court’s statutory directive under 38 U.S.C. § 7261 to “decide all relevant questions of law” allows it to raise issues sua sponte, particularly where “substantial interests of justice dictate that the Court require the Secretary to adhere to his own regulatory provisions”).
adjudication consistent with this decision.
render a section 5103(a) notice error nonprejudicial. Because the Federal Circuit did not address this issue in Vazquez-Flores II, 580 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Court’s majority opinion as to these issues stands undisturbed. Therefore, for the reasons stated in my concurrence in Vazquez-Flores I, see 22 Vet.App. 37, 51-57 (2008), I continue to respectfully disagree with the majority’s apparent minimization of the duty to notify.
Paul J. Hutter, General Counsel; R. Randall Campbell, Assistant General Counsel; Carolyn F. Washington, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Tracy K. Alsup, Appellate Attorney, all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief for the appellee.
affirmed a February 18, 2005, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) that denied an effective date earlier than April 12, 2000, for the appellant’s service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). On May 18, 2007, the appellant filed a timely motion for single-judge reconsideration.
In order to address issues raised by the reconsideration motion as to the interaction of recent precedent of this Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), the Court requested and received a response from the Secretary. Upon consideration of the arguments presented in the appellant’s reconsideration motion, the Secretary’s response, and the associated briefs, the Court assigned the case for panel consideration. The panel hereby withdraws the May 2, 2007, decision, and issues this decision in its place.
Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 3(a), 114 Stat. 2096 (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a)), as to the effective date element of her PTSD claim, styled as an “earlier effective date claim.” This appeal is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a). For the following reasons, we affirm the February 2005 Board decision.
October 1991, she submitted a service-connection claim for chronic stress. In July 1992, the San Diego, California, VA regional office (RO) denied her service-connection claim for a psychiatric disability, and the decision became final. In October 1998, the Muskogee, Oklahoma, RO considered medical evidence the appellant submitted as an informal claim for PTSD linked to an alleged incident of sexual harassment. In February 1999, the RO denied service connection for PTSD, and that decision also became final.
In April 2000, the appellant submitted new medical records dated March 2000 in support of her service-connection claim for PTSD. In August 2000, the RO reopened but denied her claim on the merits, and she filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) as to that decision in December 2000. The RO issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) in March 2002 maintaining denial of the PTSD claim.
officer maintained the denial of an effective date earlier than April 2000 and the appellant filed another NOD, seeking an earlier effective date and a permanent and total disability rating.
In a September 2003 letter, the RO explained the evidentiary requirements pertaining to the claims for a permanent and total disability rating and for dependents’ educational assistance. The September 2003 letter, however, discussed no evidentiary requirements for establishing an earlier effective date for the service-connected PTSD. The RO issued an SOC in December 2003 and a Supplemental SOC (SSOC) in July 2004, both of which maintained the denial of an effective date earlier than April 2000. In its decision here on appeal, the Board also denied entitlement to an effective date earlier than April 2000 while granting permanency for the PTSD rating.
the claimant provide any evidence in the claimant’s possession that pertains to the claim.” Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 112, 121 (2002). Errors with respect to these notice elements are referred to as first-element, second-element, third-element, and fourth-element notice errors, respectively. See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881, 886 (2007), petition for cert. filed, Peake v. Sanders (U.S. Mar. 21, 2008) (No. 07-1209).
“section 5103(a) assumes a fundamental role in furthering an interest that goes to the very essence of the nonadversarial, pro-claimant nature of the VA adjudication system . . . by affording a claimant a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his or her claim.” Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103, 120-21 (2005) (Mayfield I) (citation omitted).
In Mayfield I, this Court addressed in detail the rule of prejudicial error in the VCAA notice context. Id. Initially, we held that “before prejudice becomes relevant . . . the Court must conclude that there has been an error . . . . [and that] every appellant must carry the general burden of persuasion regarding contentions of error.” Id. at 111. Turning to the issue of prejudicial error, the Court concluded that first-element notice errors have the effect of naturally producing prejudice. The Court therefore assigned to the Secretary the burden of either refuting the allegation of error or demonstrating that the claimant was not prejudiced by the error, even in the absence of an allegation of prejudice. Id. at 122. As to second-, third-, and fourth-element notice errors, as well as timing errors, we held that the burden of establishing prejudice was on the claimant. Id. at 122-23.
substantive notice requirements. Particularly, we clarified the meaning of the term “claim” as consisting of five elements: (1) Claimant’s status as a veteran; (2) existence of a current disability; (3) nexus between the disability and the veteran’s service; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. Id. at 484. We held that VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a claim. Id. at 486. With respect to the effective-date element, we stated that VCAA notice must, at a minimum, include a statement that an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is granted and that this date will be assigned based on when the evidence of the disability was submitted, or the day after the veteran’s discharge if that evidence was submitted within one year of discharge. Id. at 486, 488. Additionally, the content of the application for benefits may raise more specific evidentiary requirements that VA must address with regard to particular elements of the claim. Id. at 487, 488-89.
effective date have been assigned, the typical service-connection claim has been more than substantiated-it has been proven.” Id. at 491. Hence, the Court held that after an appellant has filed an NOD as to the initial effective date or disability rating assigned-thereby initiating the appellate process-different, and in many respects, more detailed notice obligations arise, the requirements of which are set forth in sections 7105(d) and 5103A. Id. The Court ultimately held that VCAA notice was not required because “the purpose that the notice [was] intended to serve has been fulfilled.” Id.
to glean what evidence was lacking at the time of the initial adjudication. 444 F.3d at 1333. Furthermore, in reviewing a Board finding of VCAA compliance, this Court may only consider the content of the communications on which the Board relied in making that finding. Id. at 1334.
The Federal Circuit noted that because the VCAA became effective after the initial decision by the RO, strict compliance with the timing requirements set forth in Mayfield I was impossible.
Instead, the Federal Circuit held that such a timing problem could be “cured” by issuing a fully compliant VCAA notice and then readjudicating the claim. Id. In a subsequent decision after remand, the Federal Circuit upheld this Court’s holding that an SSOC may serve as a readjudication. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield III). The Federal Circuit further clarified that because the initial timing error was cured by a VCAA-compliant notice and subsequent readjudication, harmless error analysis is not needed with respect to that initial timing error. Id. at 1324. The Federal Circuit did not, at that time, address our prejudicial-error analysis.
Thereafter, this Court issued its decision in Overton v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 427 (2006), reaffirming the prejudicial error analysis in Mayfield I. Id. at 439.
new claim requiring another VCAA notification. We held that the NOD initiates appellate review of the rating decision and does not constitute a new claim for a rating increase. Id. at 117 (citing Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156, 1158-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). We further held that when a notice error occurs, and the claim is subsequently substantiated, the Court will no longer presume that the notice error is prejudicial. Id. at 119. Rather, the appellant must demonstrate that the notification error affected the essential fairness of the adjudication. Id.
prejudicial-error analysis this Court announced in Mayfield I. See Sanders, 487 F.3d at 881. In Sanders, the veteran’s claim had been reopened after remand on the basis of new and material evidence. After furnishing two VA medical examinations, the RO issued two SSOCs denying the claim. Relying on the VA medical examinations as the most probative evidence, the Board also denied the reopened claim. On appeal to this Court, the claimant argued that VA failed to furnish VCAA-compliant notice identifying the party responsible for obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim.
At that time, pursuant to Mayfield I, this Court required appellants to demonstrate prejudice from second-, third-, and fourth-element notice errors. Because Sanders had not alleged any specific prejudice from the notice errors, this Court held that Sanders had not carried his burden of demonstrating prejudice and that the Court therefore did not need to decide whether any notice error had occurred. The Court affirmed the Board’s denial of service connection.
Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 37, 42 (2008). “What the statute and regulation require is that the claimant be given the required information prior to the VA’s decision on the claim and in a form that enables the claimant to understand the process, the information that is needed, and who will be responsible for obtaining that information.” Mayfield II, 444 F.3d at 1333.
As noted above, this Court has extensively discussed the role of VCAA notice in the entire VA adjudication scheme. “[O]nce a decision awarding service connection, a disability rating, and an effective date has been made, section 5103(a) notice has served its purpose, and its application is no longer required because the claim has already been substantiated.” Dingess, 19 Vet.App. at 490. Thereafter, the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C. §§ 5104 and 7105 control as to further communications with the claimant during the administrative portion of the appeal. Id.; see also Mayfield II, 444 F.3d at 1333 (notice of decision and SOC under sections 5104 and 7105 serve different purposes under different statutory requirements than pre-adjudicatory VCAA notice).
notice. Clearly, VA did not attempt to give any sort of notice before the initial adjudication of the appellant’s reopened claim, or even before the subsequent RO decision that granted service connection for her PTSD claim. The Board found that the issuance of July 2003 and September 2003 documents, followed by “every opportunity to submit evidence and argument in support of her claims and to respond to VA notices,” rendered harmless any timing error. Record (R.) at 5.
See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (section 5103(a) “applies only when a claim cannot be granted in the absence of additional information described in the notice”).
“[T]he Court reviews the Board’s determination that a notification communication satisfies VA’s section 5103(a) duty-to-notify requirements under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.” Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 370, 378 (2006). ‘”A finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”‘ Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 52 (1990) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
The Board found that “VA has satisfied its obligations to notify and assist the claimant in this case.” R. at 5. The Board stated that the July 2003 SOC and the September 2003 VCAA letter “notified the veteran of the evidence needed to substantiate her claims and offered to assist her in obtaining any relevant evidence.” R. at 4. While conceding that the notice did not satisfy the requirements of Pelegrini, supra, the Board took the position that the appellant had been given every opportunity to submit evidence, including testimony at a hearing, and that, therefore, “all due process concerns have been satisfied.” Id. The Board found that “any defect with respect to the timing of the VCAA notice requirement was harmless error.” R. at 5.
claim. The July 2003 notification of decision was not a document intended to address any notice requirements of the VCAA, and did not address any evidentiary requirements to establish an earlier effective date. See Vazquez-Flores, supra. The September 2003 letter was in no way directed to the PTSD claim, but instead was directed to the claims for a permanent and total disability rating and dependents’ educational assistance. Contrary to the Board’s conclusion, the September 2003 letter concerning these claims cannot provide VCAA-compliant notice with respect to the effective date of the PTSD claim. This letter neither considered nor discussed evidentiary requirements about the disputed effective date.
application. Notice that may be adequate as to one set of claims may not be extrapolated to satisfy VCAA notice requirements for claims contained in another application or not addressed in the notice documents under review. We hold that the evidentiary requirements for each claim under VA consideration must be addressed in a notice document directed, at least in part, to that claim. We therefore conclude that the Board erred in its conclusion that there was VCAA-compliant notice concerning the effective date of the substantiated PTSD claim.
Consequently, we must consider the treatment of the VCAA notice error in view of the fact that the PTSD claim has been substantiated. Under Sanders, supra, any VCAA notice error is presumptively prejudicial, and VA has the burden of rebutting that presumption. Under Dunlap, supra, however, once a claim has been substantiated, the appellant must demonstrate how the notification error affected the essential fairness of the adjudication. Only then would the Secretary have the burden of demonstrating that no prejudice resulted.
Dunlap, supra, survives the Federal Circuit’s decision in Sanders, supra. In other words, when the appellant’s claim has been substantiated, must the appellant demonstrate how a VCAA notice error has adversely affected the essential fairness of the adjudication?
of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) do not apply in cases where an appellant challenges an effective date determination in an NOD after a grant of service connection. Distinguishing Sanders and Simmons, both supra, the Secretary asserts that both of those cases involved denials of reopened claims and consequently neither case addressed prejudice from a VCAA notice error pertaining to a “downstream” issue after a claim had been substantiated. See Evans v. West, 12 Vet.App. 396, 399(1999) (effective date is a “downstream matter” to be addressed after the benefit has been awarded).
The Court agrees with the Secretary that the factual scenario presented in the instant case and in our Dunlap decision are distinguishable from Sanders and Simmons, both supra, and do not involve the same concerns voiced by the Federal Circuit in either of those decisions. In Sanders, the Federal Circuit noted that this Court erred “by not giving sufficient weight to the importance of claimant participation to the VA’s uniquely pro-claimant benefits system.” Sanders, 487 F.3d at 889 (citing Mayfield I, 19 Vet.App. at 120-21). The Federal Circuit focused on Congress’s intent that the VA adjudication system provide a claimant “a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his or her claim.” Id. In Dunlap, we engaged in a thorough analysis regarding the importance of claimant participation in the adjudication process. See 21 Vet.App. at 119-20.
Nonetheless, we concluded that “once a claim has been proven-triggering VA to award service connection, and assign a disability rating and an effective date-the claim has been substantiated and the claimant has been provided a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his or her claim.” Id. at 120. This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s holding in Dingess.
See Dingess, 19 Vet.App. at 484, aff’d sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
various elements of the notice required by [section] 5103(a) and finding certain elements of the required notice more substantial than others.” 487 F.3d at 889. In Dunlap, however, we did not treat the various notice elements differently with regard to assigning the burden of proving prejudice.
regulatory provisions, particularly 38 U.S.C. §§ 5104(a), 7105(d)(1), and 5103A, are in place requiring VA to assist and advise a claimant throughout the remainder of the adjudication process.” Dunlap, 21 Vet.App. at 119. This conclusion is consistent with recent Federal Circuit caselaw. See Wilson, 506 F.3d at 1061 (acknowledging that there are “many statutory and regulatory provisions that do apply to VA’s actions after an initial RO decision, and that provide the claimant with notice as to why his claim was rejected and an opportunity to submit additional relevant evidence”).
burden of demonstrating any prejudice from defective VCAA notice with respect to the downstream elements. See Dunlap, 21 Vet.App. at 119.
be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.” 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a). In the absence of an argument that an exception applies, the effective date will be no earlier than the date of the claim. But see 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2). In this case, for example, appellant Goodwin makes no argument that there is any evidence that could have been submitted to VA that had not already been considered by the RO and the Board. Instead, her argument that § 3.156(c) applies in the instant case is premised on evidence already before VA.
notified. Rather, she merely asserts that the absence of VCAA notice of the possible effect § 3.156(c) might have on her effective date is prejudicial. Contrary to the appellant’s assertions, however, the Court is not persuaded that the presumption of prejudice should be applied in this or in other cases where a claim has been substantiated and the asserted VCAA notice error pertains to a downstream element.
We note that this is not a case in which the claimant’s initial application raised an effective-date issue requiring more specific discussion of evidentiary requirements pertaining to that element in the VCAA notice. When the appellant submitted the medical information that eventuated in the RO reopening her claim for PTSD, she described her symptoms and experiences at length, but advanced no particular issue with respect to an effective date. Therefore, had VA issued a VCAA-compliant notice, it would have addressed only the minimal information concerning effective date.
See Dingess, 19 Vet.App. at 486, 488. Consequently, the only prejudice the appellant can show would have had to result from the lack of this minimal notice. We continue to reserve for another day “the question of what would result if a claimant reasonably raised an issue regarding disability rating and effective date in [the] initial application for benefits rather than for the first time as part of a notice of disagreement with a decision.” Id. at 489.
argued that the effective date should be 1991. Essentially, counsel attacked the evaluation of evidence during the 1992 and 1999 rating decisions, which had become final. She argued that the record contained evidence of possible PTSD that VA should have developed in those cases. The appellant’s counsel reiterated this line of argument at length in a letter dated December 15, 2004.
Before this Court, the appellant’s present counsel argues that there is an unadjudicated claim pending from 1991. Citing Myers v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 228 (2002), and McGrath v. Gober, 14 Vet.App. 28 (2000), he contends that this pending claim could be developed with a “retrospective medical opinion.” Appellant’s Brief (App. Br.) at 14. The appellant should have been notified that such evidence would be required to substantiate her claim, he reasons, and this omission constitutes prejudice arising from the inadequate VCAA notice.
from which a claimant could deduce that the claim was adjudicated or an explicit adjudication of a subsequent ‘claim’ for the same disability”). Second, it is clear that VA has no obligation under the VCAA to discuss every legal theory that might support an earlier effective date. While VCAA-compliant notice must address the downstream elements of disability ratings and effective dates, as noted, “[r]equiring VA to provide notice on all potential disability ratings that can be awarded, effective dates that may be assigned, or other claims that may be filed, where dispute on those issues is not reasonably raised in the veteran’s application, is inconsistent with the plain language and history of the [VCAA] statute.” Dingess, 19 Vet.App. at 487 (emphasis added).
Appellate counsel further argues, both in the original brief and in the brief accompanying the reconsideration motion, that VA reopened the appellant’s case on the basis of previously missing service records. Counsel reasons that VA erred in not advising her that she might obtain an earlier effective date by operation of 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156(c) and 3.400(q)(2).
This argument misperceives both the purpose of the VCAA notice procedures and the type of prejudice contemplated by the case law thereunder. The VCAA notice procedures are primarily intended to notify a claimant of the type of evidence needed to substantiate the claim, and not of every regulatory and statutory provision that might bear on the adjudication of that claim. See Sanders, 487 F.3d at 886 (“The purpose of § 5103(a) notification ‘is to ensure that the claimant’s case is presented to the initial decision maker with whatever support is available, and to ensure that the claimant understands what evidence will be obtained by the VA and what evidence must be provided by the claimant’ prior to the initial adjudication of [the] claim.”). Whatever merit there might be in.
her “missing service records” argument, it has nothing to do with obtaining further evidence through the VCAA notification process. We conclude that the appellant has demonstrated no prejudice from the VCAA notice error, particularly no prejudice from any notice to which she would have been entitled on the basis of her application to reopen.
The appellant argues that “the original grant of service connection for PTSD was based upon newly considered service records,” and that she is therefore entitled to an earlier effective date pursuant to § 3.156(c). App. Br. at 14. The appellant never raised this issue to the Board. Instead, her arguments below centered on VA’s alleged failure to provide a PTSD examination during her original 1991 claim. See R. at 416, 440-42. Moreover, this issue was not “reasonably raised” by the evidence of record. See Floyd v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 88, 96 (1996) (Board is required to address all issues “reasonably raised from a liberal reading of the documents or oral testimony submitted prior to the [Board] decision”). There is no indication that VA’s decision to grant service connection was based, in whole or in part, on previously unobtained service personnel or medical records.
The Court has discretion to evaluate an argument first raised on appeal or to remand an issue to the Board for further consideration. See Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

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 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 4
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 7261
 § 3
 § 5103
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5103
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5110
 § 5110
 § 3
 § 3
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5103
 § 3
 v. 
 v.