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Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:43:21+00:00

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SHIV INDERSEN MIRCHANDANI & ORS. Vs. NATASHA HARISH ADVANI & ORS.
Foreign Judgment shall not be Recognised if not Pronounced by Court of Competent Jurisdiction : General and Well Established Rule of Private International Law is that Wife’s Domicile Follows Domicile of Husband — Competency of Court to be decided with reference to question of jurisdiction — If Court has no jurisdiction it is not competent Court to pass decree.
Whether and where a marriage can be dissolved is a matter in the domain of the earthly law governing the spouses. But the matrimonial laws are not common everywhere in the world and they differ from country to country. The problem arises when the parties have their domicile in one country and one of them obtains matrimonial relief in a foreign country. The moot question posed in this Notice of Motion is whether the decree passed by a Swedish Court can be recognized by this Court, as being conclusive, or not.
(a) (i) Whether the plaintiff No. 2 has any locus to file the above suit or to file a caveat to challenge the Will of the deceased?
(ii) Whether the plaintiff No. 1 has any right to any part of the properties of HUF to which the deceased was entitled?
(iii) Whether plaintiff No. 1 is entitled to any reliefs against defendant No. 9 or 10?
3. The deceased Indrasen Tolaram Mirchandani, was an industrialist and had a large business interest in several companies including defendant Nos. 9 and 10. He was the Karta and Manager of Indrasen Tolaram Mirchandani HUF. He was an Indian national having Indian domicile. On 13.9.1952 he contacted civil marriage with defendant No. 8 Barbro Baeck, a Christian woman of Swedan in New York. After the marriage both of them lived together first in New York for some time and then in India till May, 1958 and were blessed with two children, a son Rajiv (defendant No. 2) and a daughter Kavita (defendant No. 3). It appears that there were some serious differences between the deceased and defendant No. 8 who alongwith both the children went back to Sweden to live there permanently. Four years thereafter, i.e. on 15.6.1962 she obtained a decree of judicial separation from the District Court Vesterbegslags, Sweden and two years thereafter i.e. 23.4.1964, the deceased and defendant No. 8 obtained from the same Court a decree of divorce by mutual consent. The deceased thereafter, returned to India married for the second time to Chandra (plaintiff No. 2) as per Hindu Vedic rites on 30.8.1964. The couple got a son Shiv (plaintiff No. 1) on 13.11.1967.
4. According to the plaintiffs on 30.3.1976 the deceased effected a partial partition in respect of 195 equity shares of a company belonging to the HUF. The deceased died on 30.7.1982. Since before his death he was seriously ill as a result of which his mental condition was not sound. After the death of deceased, defendant Nos. 4 to 7 set up his Will dated 28.5.1982, claiming themselves to be the executors under the said Will. But according to the plaintiffs the said Will appears to have been brought about by machinations by the interested parties. The plaintiffs filed the present suit on 14.6.1983, praying inter alia for declaration that the deceased died intestate, that the HUF consisted of the deceased and the plaintiffs and that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 do not have any share in the properties belonging to the HUF and for partition of the said properties.
5. In their written statements defendant Nos. 1(a), 1(b) and defendant No. 2 have contended inter-alia that the domicile of both the deceased and defendant No. 8 was India at the relevant date, and therefore, the Swedish Court did not have any jurisdiction to pass a decree of divorce in their matter and it is not a valid decree. It is further contended that consequently the purported marriage between the deceased and plaintiff No. 2 is null and void and the suit filed by plaintiff No. 2 is not maintainable.
6. Defendant Nos. 4 to 7 have pointed out in their written statements that the deceased left a Will dated 28.5.1982 under which they are appointed as the executors. They have stated that on the basis of the said Will they have filed Petition No. 304/1983 for probate but the present plaintiff No. 2, having filed a caveat, opposing the grant to probate, the said petition is converted into Testamentary. Suit No. 12/1984.
7. I have heard the learned Counsel Mr. Setalwad for defendant Nos. 1(a), 1 (b) and 3, Mr. D.V. Merchant for defendant Nos. 4 to 7 and Mr. E.S. Kotwal for the plaintiffs, at length. Mr. Setalwad made the following submissions : (i) that the domicile of the deceased was India; (ii) that as per the private international law the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband, and therefore, the domicile of the defendant No. 8 must, at the relevant time be held to be India and not Sweden though she was residing there for quite some time; (iii) that the parties are governed by the law of their matrimonial domicile; (iv) that domicile of parties is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the foreign Court; (v) that under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, the judgment of the Swedish Court is not conclusive as to the divorce of the deceased and defendant No. 8, since it does not fulfil the conditions contemplated by Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (f) of that section; (vi) that the marriage between the deceased and defendant No. 8 thus not having been dissolved by a valid decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction : it continued to subsist on 30.8.1964 when plaintiff No. 2 claims to have married the deceased; (vii) that the marriage between the deceased and plaintiff No. 2 being in contravention of the provisions of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is null and void under Section 11 of that Act, and consequently she has no right to claim anything in the HUF properties or the properties of the deceased; (viii) as regards plaintiff No. 1, he gets legitimacy in view of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, but he cannot get any share in the joint family property. At the most he may get a share in the self-acquired property of the deceased.
8. Mr. Merchant who represents the executors under the Will of the deceased submitted that as executors, it is their duty to see that the property goes to the right persons. He further submitted that right to file caveat arises from a statute which gives a person a right to claim on intestacy. He also argued that in order to fall within Schedule I of the Hindu Succession Act, plaintiff No. 2 must establish that she was legally wedded wife of the deceased. As regards the divorce between the deceased and defendant No. 8, the submission of Mr. Merchant is that their marriage was governed by the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and there is no provision in the said Act to obtain divorce by mutual consent, and therefore, the decree of divorce passed by the Swedish Court is in breach of the law in force in India at the relevant time.
9. Mr. Kotwal for the plaintiffs made the following submissions : (i) plaintiff No. 2 has been treated as the wife of the deceased for about 18 years and it is only after his death that the validity of his marriage with plaintiff No. 2 is disputed; (ii) defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have taken benefits of the divorce decree to obtain maintenance for a number of years and now they are contending that there was no valid divorce between their mother (defendant No. 8) and the deceased; (iii) defendant No. 8 does not appear to contend that the marriage of plaintiff No. 2 with the deceased is null and void nor does she deny the validity of the divorce decree passed by the Swedish Court; (iv) the concept that wife’s domicile depends upon the domicile of her husband is absurd, rigid and discriminatory to the wife. It is no longer a good law after 1960 and that a wife is capable of having distinct domicile from that of her husband. Modern theory recognises the law of habitual residence which has a real and substantial connection with the place of the Forum Court; (v) the question of jurisdiction has to be understood in the sense of Swedish Court and it cannot be ascertained as per the municipal law i.e. Indian Law; (vi) once the question of jurisdiction is decided by a foreign Court, this Court cannot go behind it and allow it to be challenged. International comity requires recognition of foreign judgments; (vii) where the municipal law is silent, the common law will prevail and common law includes International Conventions; (viii) everything which law does not permit to do is not necessarily against the public policy. The public policy should be to prevent limping marriages and avoid hardships.
It will, therefore, be necessary to see as to what was the domicile of the deceased and defendant No. 8 when they approached the Swedish Court.
11. There is no dispute of the fact that the domicile of the deceased Indersen was India and it continued to be so till last. There is also no dispute of the fact that defendant No. 8 separated from him sometime in 1958 and went to Sweden and that at the time of the commencement of the divorce proceeding she alongwith her two children (defendant Nos. 2 and 3) was residing in Sweden. The question is : what was the domicile of defendant No. 8 at the relevant time and whether her residence in Sweden had real and substantial connection with the jurisdictional competency of the Swedish Court.
12. The plain dictionary meaning of the term domicile is one’s legally recognized place of residence. Such residence must be coupled with the intention to make it a permanent home. A mere sojourn or temporary residence does not constitute domicile. As observed by Lord Westbury in Udny v. Udny, 1869 (1) LR Sc & Dn. 441 (HL). “Domicile is the condition in virtue whereof is ascribed to an individual the character of a citizen of some particular country ……………….. on the basis of which the personal rights of the party that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy or intestacy must depend.” The object of ascertaining domicile is to determine which municipal law is applicable for regulating the rights and obligations of the parties. Thus domicile signifies connection with a single system of territorial law. There are some general rules regarding domicile and they are that — (i) nobody is without domicile, (ii) a person cannot have two domiciles, (iii) there is a presumption in favour of continuance of an existing domicile. There are two main classes of domicile : domicile of origin which is communicated by operation of law to each person by birth i.e. domicile of his father or mother and domicile of choice which every person of full age is free to acquire in substitution for that which he at present possesses. The domicile of origin is received by operation of law at birth and for acquisition of a domicile of choice one of the necessary conditions is the intention to remain there permanently. The domicile of origin is retained and cannot be divested until the acquisition of the domicile of choice. By merely leaving his country, even permanently, one will not, in the eye of law, lose one’s (his domicile until he acquires a new one. [see Louis Do Res dt. v. Union of India; 1991 (3) SCC 554]. So far married woman is concerned, the domicile of her husband is communicated to her immediately on marriage and it is necessarily and inevitably retained by her for the duration of her marriage. This means that she is incapable of acquiring a domicile of her choice during the subsistence of her marriage and that her domicile follows that of her husband’s domicile. It is thus a domicile of dependence or a matrimonial domicile. Thus domicile is a test for determining personal law.
General Rule — Wife’s Domicile Follows the Domicile of the Husband.
13. The contention of Mr. Setalwad is that although defendant No. 8 separated from the deceased and went to reside in Sweden, she did not acquire Swedish domicile and her domicile continued to be the same as that of the deceased viz. India at the time when the divorce proceedings were taken in Swedish Court. He, therefore, submitted that the Swedish Court did not have jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. In support of his submissions Mr. Setalwad relied upon some English decisions which in substance, lay down that under the British Law the jurisdiction to decree of divorce depends on domicile and that the domicile of the husband decides the domicile of the wife. This appears to be based on the principle of unity of marriage. If the husband and wife were to have separate domiciles, then the proceedings for dissolving the marriage might be filed in two Courts of different jurisdiction and in that event there might be different results. In Harvey v. Farnie, 1882 (VIII) HL 43, the contention was that a marriage solemnized in England between an English woman and a Scotchman, being an “English marriage” no foreign Court had jurisdiction to dissolve the same. The House of Lords rejected this contention and held that on marriage the wife took the domicile of her husband and became subject to his laws. The decree of divorce passed by the Scottish Court was, therefore, recognised as valid decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction. In Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey, 1920 HL 146 (Sc.), the facts were that one Isabella married one Robert, a scotch and lived with him in Scotland. Thereafter, Robert left for Queensland (Australia) where he married another woman and lived with her there till his death. In the meantime, Isabella filed an action against Robert for divorce on the grounds of desertion and adultery but that action failed in consequence of her death. Thereafter, a question about legacy duty in respect of her property arose and it became necessary to decide as to what was her domicile. While affirming the general rule that the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife, it was held that Robert had abandoned his Scottish domicile and acquired a domicile in Queensland and that in the absence of decree for judicial separation in favour of Isabella, her domicile followed that of Robert. This case affirms that the rule laid down in Le Measurer’s case, (1895) AC 517, that the matrimonial status is governed by the law of domicile of the parties and that the wife’s domicile follows the domicile of her husband.
14. In H. v. H, 1928 Probate Div. 206, the parties were married in England and had their domicile there. The wife thereafter obtained a decree of judicial separation on the ground of desertion. After that the husband went to reside in France. The wife filed a petition for divorce which was resisted by the husband on the ground that he was domiciled in France, and therefore, the English Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. In reply it was contended on behalf of the wife that the husband who had deserted the wife was estopped from asserting that he had acquired domicile elsewhere. It was also argued that wife so deserted was entitled to determine the Forum for her action. It was held that the competent jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage is that o f the husband’s domicile and the defendant must be domiciled in that jurisdiction at the commencement of the proceedings. As regards the effect of the decree of judicial separation it was observed that it does not from its date fix matrimonial domicile or render it incapable of alteration without the consent of the wife. In Attorney General for Alberta v. Reata E. Cook, 1926 JC 444, it was held that the well-established rule that the domicile of a wife is that of her husband is an incident of marriage. It was further held that a decree for judicial separation does not enable the wife to acquire a domicile different from that of her husband and thereby entitle her to sue for divorce in a Court other than that of her husband’s domicile. In Heard v. Heard, 1935 Probate Div. 205, the parties were married and domiciled in England. Later on the husband left the wife in England and went to U.S.A. where he started living with another woman and had no intention to return to England. The wife then filed a petition for divorce in an English Court on the ground of the husband’s adultery. The husband did not enter his appearances. The petition was however, not admitted and it was held that since the decision of the House of Lords in Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey, and of Privy Council in Attorney General for Alberta v. Cook, that there can only be a single matrimonial domicile of the husband and wife in which proceedings can be maintained to dissolve the married status, no exception to the general rule can be admitted in the case of a wife deserted by her husband in the original matrimonial domicile. It was observed that under such circumstances the wife cannot be allowed to assert for the purpose of maintaining proceedings that the original domicile of the husband is still subsisting and that the English Court retains jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage when the husband has acquired a domicile of choice elsewhere.
15. The aforesaid decisions thus in substance lay down that the effect of marriage is to give the spouses a common domicile, which is the domicile of the husband within the jurisdiction of which the matrimonial claims of the spouses ought to be determined. A judicially separated wife residing in a different country does not acquire a new domicile of her own choice and for sustaining a claim of divorce she has to necessarily bring it in the Court of that country where her husband is domiciled. She may discard her husband for all purposes but she cannot discard her derivative domicile acquired on marriage and it remains with her inseparable like a shadow so long as the marriage is not dissolved by a decree of divorce.
In Prakash v. Mst. Shanmi, AIR 1965 J & K 83, the High Court went a step further and observed that even on the death of her husband, a widow retains her husband’s domicile until she changes it by her own act e.g. by marriage.
Indyka v. Indyka — A Departure from the General Rule.
17. Mr. Kotwal on the other hand come out with Indyka v. Indyka, (1967) 2 All.ER 639, which appears to be the corner stone which changes the concept that the wife’s domicile follows that of the husband within which jurisdiction alone an action for matrimonial relief can be brought and that decree passed by the Court of domicile only can be recognized. By this decision the House of Lords accepted as correct the earlier decision in Travers v. Holley, (1953) 1 All.ER 794, which was based on the provisions of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949 and which gave the English Courts jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for divorce by a wife even if the husband was not domiciled in England, provided that the wife had resided in England for a period of three years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings. In the said case, the Court of Appeal accepted as valid a decree of divorce granted to the wife by an Australian Court though the husband was domiciled in England at the time of the filing of the wife’s petition. In Manning v. Manning, (1958) 1 All.ER 291, the English Court applied the rule in Travers v. Holley and gave recognition to a divorce decree granted to a wife by a Court in Norway on the ground, (i) that though she had no domicile in that country she had been continuously residing there for at least three years preceding the commencement of the proceeding; and (ii) even though the ground of divorce was not one recognized by the English Law, it did not offend against natural justice.
18. In Indyka v. Indyka, the departure from the established doctrine laid down in Le Mesuriers case was justified mainly on the ground that rule operated as tyrannical, unjust, unrealistic and inconsistent with the modem trend and international comity. Besides it creates the problem of “ limping marriages” in the modern times where there are more marriage between persons of different nationalities than there used to be previously. In the said case the first marriage was between two Czech national in Czechoslovakia. The husband later on acquired English domicile in 1946 but, the wife continued to reside in Czechoslovakia where she obtained a decree of divorce in 1946. Thereafter the husband married his second wife in England who also filed a petition for divorce. The husband filed a cross-petition for nullity of the second marriage on the ground that the decree passed by the Czech Court in favour of the first wife would not be recognized in England since England being his domicile, the Czech Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree. The House of Lords, however, upheld the validity of the Czech decree. In the words of Lord Wilberforce who was one of the five Judges who rendered separate judgments.
“In my opinion, it would be in accordance with developments and with the trend of legislation to recognize divorces given to wives by Courts of their residence wherever a real and substantial connection is shown between the petitioner and the country or territory exercising jurisdiction. I use these expressions so as to enable the Courts who must decide each case, to consider both the length and quality of the residence and to take into account such other factors as nationality which may reinforce the connection.
19. The dictum in Indyka’s case was applied by the English Courts in their subsequent decisions. Angelo v. Angelo, (1967) 3 All.ER 314; Mayfield v. Mayfield, (1969) 2 All.ER 219; Mather v. Mahoney, (1968) 3 All.ER. 223, and Brown v. Brown, (1968) 2 All.ER 11, are illustrative of the fact that decrees passed by foreign Courts were recognized on the ground of real and substantial connection of either of the parties to the respective foreign country.
20. The rule in Indyka’s case was also followed in Nasina v. Smith, (1971) 2 All.ER 1046 wherein the Nevada Court decree of divorce was recognized by the English Court though the parties in the strict sense, had English domicile. The wife was residing in U.S. for six years. It was held that the wife had a sufficient connection with the Court granting decree and that if Nevada Court decree was accepted as valid by the other States in America, there was no justification for the English Courts to deny recognition to that decree.
Referring to the decision in Indyka’s case, the Supreme Court emphasized that residence must answer a qualitative as well as quantitative test that is the two elements of factum and animus must conour. It was held that residence for a particular purpose fails to answer the qualitative test for the purpose being accomplished the residence would cease. It will thus be seen that the rule in Indyka’s case has been implicitly acknowledged in Teja Singh case.
Theory of Real and Substantial Connection.
The theory of real and substantial connection was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Surinder Kaur v. Harbax Singh, 1984 SCC 698, in connection with a similar case of custody of a minor child by observing that the modern theory of conflicts of laws recognizes and in any event prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has the most intimate contact with the issues arising in the case. It was further observed that in matters relating to matrimony and custody the law of that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well being of the spouses and the welfare of the off-springs of marriage. The Supreme Court further emphasised that it is the Court’s duty and function to protect the wife against the burden of litigating in an inconvenient Forum which she and her husband had left voluntarily in order to make their living in England.
In Cruse v. Chittum, (1974) All.ER 940, the English Court gave recognition to a decree of divorce passed by the Court in Mississipi (USA) where the wife has residing for a period of more than one year immediately preceding the filing of divorce petition by her. The Court at Mississipi had held that she had been actual bona fide resident of that State. While explaining the term “habitually resident”, the English Court observed that it indicates the quality of the residence rather than its duration. It denotes a regular physical which has to endure for some time.
(b) the spouses last habitually resided together in a State whose law, at the date of institution of the proceedings, did not provide for divorce.
Where the State of origin uses the concept of domicile as a test of jurisdiction in matters of divorce or legal separation, the expression “habitual residence” in Article 2 shall be deemed to include domicile as the term is used in that State.
In M.V. Mariner IV v. V.S.N., 1998 (1) Mh.LJ 751, a Division Bench of this Court held in an admiralty case that in case of a conflict between the municipal law and to international law or conventions, the Court will have to apply the municipal law. However, when there is no conflict between the two, then all just principles of international law or conventions could be legitimately applied unless either they are in conflict with any statute or are prohibited by any municipal law.
“There can be no question that nations must march with the international community and the municipal law must respect rules of International Law even as nations respect international opinion. The comity of Nations requires that Rules of International Law may be accommodated in the Municipal Law even without express legislative sanction provided they do not run into conflict with the Acts of Parliament. But when they do run into such conflict, the sovereignty and the integrity of the Republic and the supremacy of the constituted legislatures in making the laws may not be subjected to external rule except to the extent legislatures in making the laws may not be subjected to external rule except to the extent legitimately accepted by the constituted legislatures themselves. The doctrine of incorporation also recognises the position that the rules of international law are, incorporated into national law and considered to be part of the national law, unless they are in conflict with an Act of Parliament. Comity of Nations or no, Municipal Law must prevail in case of conflict. National Courts cannot say yes, if Parliament has said no to a principle of international law. National Courts will endorse international law but not if it conflicts with national law. National Courts being organs of the National State and not organs of the international law, must perforce apply national law if International law conflicts with it. But the Courts are under an obligation within legitimate limits, to so interpret the Municipal Statute as to avoid confrontation with the comity of Nations or the well-established principles of International Law. But if conflict is inevitable the latter must yield”.
26. In Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan, III (1997) CCR 126 (SC)=AIR 1997 SC 3011, the Supreme Court while dealing with a case of sexual harassment of working women felt the necessity and urgency to safeguard them by an alternative mechanism, in the absence of legislative measures. Relying upon the enabling provision or Article 51(c) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court drew assistance from the International Conventions and laid down certain guidelines to protect the working women from sexual harassment and to enable them to work with dignity. The directions are to be binding and enforceable in law until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the field. Verma, C.J.I. observed.
27. To sum up the dictum laid down by the aforementioned four cases viz. M.V. Elizabeth, M.V. Mariner, Gramophone Company of India, and Vishakha (supra), it can be said that the Courts in India can rely on the provisions of International Conventions even though India may not be signatories to them. The only important limitation for doing so is that there should be no inconsistency or conflict between the provisions of the International Convention and the Municipal Law. In case of conflict between the two the Municipal Law will prevail. If the Municipal Law is silent, then the doctrine of incorporation can be pressed into service to rely upon the provisions at the International Convention. But such a course again subject to the condition, as laid down in Teja Singh’s case (supra), that it is on considerations of justice and it does not offend our public policy.
Mr. Kotwal rightly said that everything that law does not permit to do is not necessarily against the public policy. Therefore, whether a thing is against or contrary to public policy has to be tested with reference to the interest or good of the public. As regards to application of the rule of public policy in the field of private International Law, it was held in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., AIR 1994 SC 860, that the Courts refuse to apply a rule of foreign law or recognize a foreign judgment or a foreign arbitral award if it is found that the same is contrary to the public policy of the country in which it sought to be invoked or enforced.
In result, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order holding that the photostat copy of the decree was not per se inadmissible in evidence.
31. In Narsimhrao’s case, the Supreme Court has laid down certain guidelines for the interpretation of Section 13 of the C.P. Code. Before turning to them it would be proper to deal with the submissions made by Mr. Setalwad in connection with the said decision. According to Mr. Setalwad, the judgment in Narsimhrao reiterates what is stated in Teja Singh’s case. This submission is true but not completely. As discussed in the preceding para, the Supreme Court has gone a step forward in Narsimhrao’s case. The second submission of Mr. Setalwad is that on facts, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the decree of divorce passed by the Court at St. Louis, Missouri. The comparison need not stop here for what is laid down is of more concern and importance which I shall point out shortly. The third submission of Mr. Setalwad is that the Supreme Court has sought to legislate and confer jurisdiction upon a Court which does not have jurisdiction. This submission is however, not tenable as the Supreme Court itself made it clean that it “can accomplish the modest job within the framework of the present statutory provisions if they are rationally interpreted and extended to achieve the purpose”. The fourth and last submission of Mr. Setalwad in this respect is that the guidelines given are prospective and they cannot be applied retrospectively to the cases which are concluded prior to 1991. I do not see any logic or reason in this submission. It is true that Swedish Court passed the decree of divorce way back in 1964 but the question of its validity and conclusiveness has been raised for the first time in 1985 when defendant No. 2 filed his written statement. The said question is more specifically raised in this Notice of Motion filed in 2001. There is, therefore, no reason why the ratio of Narsimhrao’s case should not apply to this case.
32. Turning to the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, it may be noted that Clause (a) of Section 13 of the C.P. Code states that a foreign judgment shall not be recognized if it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In the instant case the decree in question was passed by the Swedish Court and the domicile of the deceased husband was India. The general and well established rule of private international law is that the wife’s domicile follows the domicile of the husband. Therefore, it must be held that at the relevant time viz. in 1964 the domicile of the deceased and defendant No. 8 was India. Mr. Kotwal however, stated that the domicile of defendant No. 8 was Sweden and not India as she separated from the deceased in 1958 and went with her two children to reside permanently in Sweden. He also pointed out that in 1962 defendant No. 8 obtained a decree of judicial separation from the Swedish Court. It is not possible to accept the argument of Mr. Kotwal for more than one reason. In the first instance it is not the plea of defendant No. 8 that she had acquired Swedish domicile. Till 1964 she was required to apply for her reentry in Sweden. Secondly, so long as the marriage is subsisting, the domicile of the wife remains the same as that of her husband and nothing sort of a decree of divorce, not even a decree of judicial separation, is sufficient to change her domicile. She can acquire a domicile of choice only after the dissolution of her marriage. Till then the husband’s domicile is inseparable from her like a shadow.
Therefore, when the deceased and defendant No. 8 voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Swedish Court, there is no reason why the Swedish Court should not be regarded as the Court of the competent jurisdiction.
In the instant case, both the parties have filed ordinary xerox copies of the translation of the judgment dated 23.4.1964 given by the Swedish Court. The translation filed by the plaintiffs is unofficial while that filed by defendants 1(a), l(b) and 3 purports to be official. Both are uncertified photostat copies of English translation and strictly speaking both are not admissible under the Evidence Act. However, there is no dispute about certain basic facts and Mr. Kotwal has no objection to go by the translation furnished by the defendants. It is admitted before me that the said petition was filed by the deceased Indrasen as the plaintiff against present defendant No. 8, as the defendant on the ground that after passing of the decree of judicial separation there was no resumption of cohabitation between the parties. It is also not disputed that the prayer for grant of divorce made by the deceased was consented to by defendant No. 8 and that accordingly the Swedish Court passed a decree of dissolution of marriage on consent of the parties. So far as the first condition is concerned, there is nothing on record to show that the aforesaid ground was available to the said parties under the law under which they were married in civil form in New York in 1952. In fact we do not know as to what was the law then prevalent in New York for civil marriages. Under these circumstances, the first condition cannot be said to have been complied with. As regards the second condition, the contention of Mr. Setalwad is that obtaining order by filing consent is no adjudication for the purpose of Clause (b) of Section 13. This submission cannot be accepted since the Supreme Court has clarified that the second requirement is fulfilled when the respondent is duly served and voluntarily and unconditionally submits himself/herself to the jurisdiction of the Court even by agreeing to the passing of the decree with or without appearance.
In this respect the contention of both Mr. Setalwad and Mr. Merchant is common. It was pointed out by them that the Hindu Marriage Act as it was in 1964 did not provide for a divorce by mutual consent. The provisions of Section 13-B regarding divorce by mutual consent came to be inserted in the Act in 1976. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Hindu Marriage Act came in force in 1955 whereas the marriage between the deceased and defendant No. 8 was solemnized in 1952. Secondly it was not performed in India and thirdly, it was not a marriage between two Hindus since defendant No. 8 is a Christian. It is nobody’s case that before or at the time of her marriage, defendant No. 8 got converted to Hinduism. Nevertheless her marriage with the deceased who was a Hindu was valid and for the purpose of dissolution it was governed by the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 as Section 2 thereof authorizes the Court to grant relief only when the petitioner or respondent professes Christian religion and the parties are domiciled in India at the time when the petition is presented. Section 10 provides only one ground to the husband and that is adultery of the wife after the marriage. As against this, the wife can seek divorce on the grounds of conversion of the husband from Christianity, adultery, bigamy with adultery, adultery with cruelty etc. But the said Act does not provide for divorce by mutual consent. It is, therefore, contended before me that the divorce granted by the Swedish Court is contrary to or in refusal to recognise the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act which was applicable. This contention cannot be accepted because the Supreme Court has made it clear that the only law applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the law under which the parties are married and no other law. The Indian Divorce Act does not lay down any condition precedent to the marriage nor does it deal with the performance of marriages. Its object as evident from its preamble is to amend the law relating to divorce of persons professing the Christian religion and to confer upon certain Courts jurisdiction in matrimonial matters. It is not a Marriage Act but a Divorce Act. Hence, there is no question of the deceased and defendant No. 8 being married under the provisions thereof. They were married in civil form in New York in 1952. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid interpretation and guideline given by the Supreme Court, the question of dissolution of their marriage will have to be decided with reference to that law under which they got married in New York. Since it is defendant Nos. 1(a), 1(b), 2 and 3 who are challenging the validity of the divorce decree or its conclusiveness, the burden lies on them to show how the dissolution of marriage between the deceased and defendant No. 8 is not in accordance with the law under which the marriage took place in New York in 1952. These defendants must show that the law under which the marriage was performed did not provide in 1964 separation between the spouses for two years and their failure to resume cohabitation, a ground for divorce. The defendants have failed to discharge this burden.
In the present case, the petition for divorce was filed by the deceased in the Swedish Court, and the wife i.e. defendant No. 8 was residing in Sweden for about six years. She put in her appearance in that case and gave her consent for divorce. Thus there was compliance of the condition contemplated by clause (d).
37. Coming to Clause (e) of Section 13 it states that a foreign judgment will not be conclusive if the same is obtained by fraud. Such fraud may be in relation to the merits of the matter or jurisdictional facts. It was contended before me that the said divorce petition was filed deliberately in Swedish Court circumvent the provisions of Indian Law which at the relevant time did not provide for divorce by mutual consent. The truth of this submission cannot be wholly denied. But it cannot be said that there was fraud in obtaining the divorce decree. Defendant No. 8 was residing in Sweden for about six years after separating from the deceased. She had, therefore, a real and substantial connection with the place of the Court which passed the divorce decree. Thus two Form were available to the deceased: one in India and other in Sweden. The Court in the foreign would not have granted decree of divorce except on the grounds stated in the Indian Divorce Act. But factually none of these grounds was available to him. The ground on which he wanted divorce was permissible in Sweden. Therefore, there is nothing wrong or illegal if he chose to have recourse to Swedish Court. This cannot be termed as fraud but permissible convenience.
38. As regards Clause (f) of Section 13, the discussion is regard to Clause (c) made in para above already covers it. Hence the same need not be repeated.
39. To sum up the foregoing discussion, I may formulate my conclusions as follows : (i) where in a matrimonial dispute judgment is passed by a foreign Court, its jurisdictional competency is ordinarily dependent upon the domicile of the parties; (ii) the domicile of the wife follows the domicile of her husband. Therefore, ordinarily it is the Court of that country where the husband has his domicile, which has the jurisdiction to pass a judgment in the matrimonial dispute; (iii) the above rule of common law operates very harshly against the wife who has for one reason or the other, to reside habitually or permanently in a country other than the country of her husband’s domicile. The stringency of this rule is done away with by the modern theory which acknowledges the right of a wife to file a matrimonial proceeding in that country to which she has real and substantial connection by her habitual or permanent residence. This theory now finds place in the statutory law of England and has also been acknowledged by the Hague Convention on Private International Law, 1970. In the absence of any legislation to the contrary, the rules of International Convention can be followed in India. The said theory is accepted and followed by the Supreme Court in Narshimrao’s case (supra); (iv) the question of grant or rejection or matrimonial relief must however, be decided with reference to the law under which the parties got married; (v) the present case falls under the third exception of the rule laid down in Narsimhrao’s case inasmuch as the deceased husband Indrasen Mirchandani and the wife Barbro Baeck (defendant No. 8) voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Swedish Court and consented to the relief of divorce. Therefore, the judgment of the Swedish Court has to be regarded as a judgment of the Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 13(a) of the C.P. Code; (vi). the said judgment does not violate the other conditions also stated in Section 13 of the C.P. Code. Hence, for all purposes it has to be regarded as a conclusive judgment. As laid down in Vishwanath v. Abdul Wajid, AIR 1963 SC 1, the Courts in India will not inquire whether the conclusions recorded in the foreign judgment are supported by evidence or otherwise correct, because the binding character of such a judgment may be displaced only by establishing that the case falls within one or more of the six clauses of Section 13 and not otherwise.
40. In view of the above conclusions the judgment/decree dated 23.4.1964 passed by the Swedish Court dissolving the marriage of deceased Indrasen and defendant No. 8 Barbro Baeck is held to be a judgment/decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction and it is conclusive and binding. Consequently, the subsequent marriage of deceased Indrasen with plaintiff No. 2 Chandra solemnized on 30.8.1964 as per Hindu Vedic rites is perfectly legal and valid under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Plaintiff No. 1 Shiv who was born on 13.11.1967 out of this lawful wedlock, is therefore, the legitimate son of deceased Indrasen. Plaintiff No. 2 Chandra being legally wedded wife of deceased Indrasen has locus and right to file the present suit for partition and declarations. She has also locus and right to challenge the Will purporting to be of her husband as set up of the defendants and for that purpose she is entitled to file a caveat. Plaintiff No. 1 Shiv, being the legitimate son of deceased Indrasen will have a right to the properties of the HUF to which the deceased was entitled. I, therefore, record my findings on issues a(i) and (ii) as mentioned in the Notice of Motion accordingly. Issue No. a(iii) is not pressed before me. As regards the prayer (b) in the Notice of Motion there is no need to modify the order dated 29.3.1984 passed in Notice of Motion No. 1471/1983 under which the plaintiffs have been receiving income from the HUF properties.
41. In the result, the Notice of Motion is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs..
Certified copy expecited. A copy of this order duly authenticated by the P.A./Court Stenographer is allowed.
Notice of Motion disposed of.
MOHD. HOSHAN, A.P. & ANR. Vs. STATE OF A.P.

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