Source: http://cafc.whda.com/category/america-invents-act/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:59:47+00:00

Document:
Shire Development et al. v. Watson Pharmaceutical et al.
Before: Prost, Chen and Hughes. Opinion by Hughes.
In 2014, the CAFC reversed and remanded a district court finding of infringement, due to incorrect claim construction. Shire appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded in view of Teva v. Sandoz. The CAFC again reached the same conclusion, and found that de novo review is appropriate in this case, since extrinsic factual findings did not “underlie” the district court’s claim construction. Because the district court claim construction was based only on intrinsic evidence, de novo review was appropriate.
Panel: Newman, Prost, Moore. Opinion by Prost.
Lawyer Brooks sued Dunlop under 35 U.S.C. § 292 for falsely marking a guitar string winder with the number of a patent that had both expired and been found invalid. During the pendency of the law suit, Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA) that, inter alia, eliminated false marking actions, except under very limited circumstances.
The trial judge therefore dismissed Brooks’ case, despite Brooks’ argument that the AIA’s elimination of false marking cases violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. On appeal, the CAFC agreed with the trial judge and therefore affirmed his dismissal of the case.
The Fox Group, Inc. v. Cree, Inc.
Panel: Newman, O’Malley, and Wallach. Opinion by Wallach. Dissent by O’Malley.
(1) Summary judgment in favor of defendant was affirmed with respect to asserted claims because (a) defendant was first to reduce to practice the claimed SiC single crystal, and (2) plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence raising genuine issue of material fact to show that defendant suppressed or concealed the invention.
(2) Holding that unasserted claims were invalid was vacated.
1st Media v. Electronic Arts et al.
Panel: Rader, Linn and Wallach. Opinion by Rader.
This case demonstrates how Therasense has changed the inequitable conduct analysis. Although the individual inventor and sole practitioner knew of references which were probably material, and did not submit the references, this is now insufficient to demonstrate inequitable conduct. It must additionally be shown that there was a specific decision to withhold the documents from the USPTO, in order to show an intent to deceive. This can be demonstrated, for example, by selective disclosure. However, no such evidence was presented, and thus an intent to deceive, the first part of the inequitable conduct analysis, was not found.
Belkin International, Inc. et al. v. David Kappos, Director, USPTO, et al.
Panel: Rader, Lourie and Wallach. Opinion by Lourie.
This decision results from a pre-AIA appeal in an inter partes reexamination proceeding. The issue in this appeal is whether a prior determination that an argument based on a given reference does not raise a substantial new question of patentability (“SNQ”) as to a claim when such an SNQ was raised with respect to certain other prior art is appealable. The CAFC held that this determination is not appealable and that the proper course of action is to timely petition the Director to review the determination.
Affirmed 9-0 (CAFC en banc 7-2 decision). Opinion by Justice Thomas. Concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor joined by Justice Breyer.
The Hyatt decision is a victory for patent applicants. Any patent applicant dissatisfied with a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (or Patent Trial and Appeal Board after enactment of the AIA) may file a civil action against the Director of the PTO in federal district court and introduce new evidence beyond what was submitted to the PTO. The new evidence is subject to de novo review.
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., et al. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.
Panel: Gajarsa, Linn and Newman. Opinion by Gajarsa. Dissent by Newman.
1. 102(a)(2) prior art can be qualified as prior art for obviousness (JP: only anticipation).
2. Applicants can rely on a public disclosure date to antedate 102(a)(2) prior art (JP: No!).
3. Applicants may have one-year grace period (before first filing) after the first disclosure (JP: must file JP application within 6 months).
4. Once Applicants publicly disclosed the subject matter, later disclosure by an independent inventor may not bar the patentability (JP: may be qualified prior art).
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