Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/author/fred-skillern/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:18:27+00:00

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Editor’s note: This is Part 22 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.
Municipal Annexation Act of 1965; timely motion for reconsideration with the municipality as condition to judicial review; C.R.S. § 31-12-116.
The Supreme Court, in a direct appeal by Woodland Park under C.A.R. 21, holds that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review Teller County’s petition for judicial review of an annexation by the City of Woodland Park under C.R.S. § 31-12-116. Subsection (2)(a)(II) of the statue requires a party (such as a county in which the property is located) to file a motion for reconsideration with the governing body of the annexing municipality within ten days of the effective date of an annexation ordinance as a precondition for obtaining judicial review of a municipal annexation. The effective date of the ordinance can, and is here, different than the effective date of the annexation. The petition for reconsideration with the City should have been filed by September 16, 2013, but was not filed until September 20, 2013.
Homeowners association; town parking ordinance; “tandem” parking in town right-of-way; police power; due process.
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by a condominium association near the Dillon Marina in Summit County. The small complex was built in the 1960’s, not long after the creation of the Dillon reservoir, and occupies the corner of an intersection of two residential streets (Tenderfoot and Gold). The reservoir lies to the rear. The condominium buildings consist of approximately 64 “available units,” but only 44 parking spaces. The discrepancy is apparently due to the creation of additional “lockoff” units through subdivision of original units over the years. Over the decades, parking became a problem, for neighbors, bicyclists, and the town. The project provides parking for its owners in paved spaces in front of the building, which is parallel to the adjacent streets. In recent years the occupants have adopted the practice of parking “two cars deep,” front to rear, at right angles to the building along both city streets. This created some stress, as cars parked in front of the building might be forced to back out through a “tunnel” of two cars on each side. Moreover, the second row of cars frequently (neighbors might say substantially) encroached on the town “right-of-way,” which is Town property.
The Town sought by ordinance to prohibit the stacked parking procedure, citing the danger and inconvenience to town residents and interference with the town’s new recreational path — a popular bicycle path connecting Dillon with Frisco and Keystone.
Noting that “only one” accident had been reported in the past 40 years, the district court ruled that the parking ordinance was unreasonable, and a violation of procedural due process. Along with this came an award for attorney fees against the Town under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The court of appeals affirmed, in an unpublished decision, reasoning that the ordinances were not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest because they caused the condo owners significant economic harm and there were alternatives available which would have furthered the Town’s interests. The supreme court accepted the case for review, which is interesting for an unpublished, 3-0 decision. The court reverses the lower courts.
The Supreme Court, in a 7-0 decision by Justice Marquez, holds that the Town did not abuse its police power in enacting the two parking ordinances at issue here.
Can a municipality constitutionally exercise its police power to undertake a road improvement project that eliminates parking on the municipality’s street near a condominium? An ordinance comports with due process where it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest. The two ordinances here were within the Town’s police power to regulate matters of public health, safety, and welfare, and were a reasonable exercise of that power because the measures are reasonably related to the Town’s objectives of improving traffic safety, improving water drainage, and remedying a missing portion of a recreational bike path.
Importantly, the Court holds that the inquiry turns on the reasonableness of the relationship between the ordinance and the government objectives to be achieved, and not on the burden on the complaining party or the availability of less burdensome alternatives. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment, and remands the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings – the lower court had affirmed the district court’s ruling solely on the police power issue, without considering the district court’s alternative findings that the ordinances were unconstitutionally retrospective.
Editor’s note: This is Part 21 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.
Special districts; Colorado Open Records Act; fee; deposit; attorney-client privilege log.
The special district did not have to reveal a consultant’s emails (that it no longer retained) to Mountain-Plains’ shareholders, under C.R.S. § 24-72-202(7), because the District did not make or keep the emails and the consultant did not keep them for it.
Charging a retrieval fee without having in place a records retention policy, and requiring a deposit to cover the retrieval fee, did not violate the Colorado Open Records Act, C.R.S. §§ 24-72-201, et seq. No policy was required at the time the records were sought, and C.R.S. § 24-72-203 allows a fee.
A fee can be charged to segregate privileged material because C.R.S. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(IV) bars inspection of privileged matter.
A fee for a privilege log was proper because C.R.S. § 24-72-205(3) allows a fee for creating a record, and the fee did not exceed the log’s cost.
City park; conveyance of park land; Denver Charter § 2.4.5.
Editor’s note: This is Part 15 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.
Valuation of a private golf club property.
The Pitkin County assessor determined the value of the Roaring Fork Club property for tax year 2011, and The Pitkin County Board of Equalization and the Board of Assessment Appeals agrees with the valuation. On appeal, the club asserts that the assessor should not have included the value of sold club memberships in the assessment of the club’s property. The Court of Appeals agrees and reverses.
The club’s property is open only to its members. Membership rights are retained for life unless sold or relinquished or revoked by the club. The club uses membership deposits to improve the property and maintain the improvements. The deposits are treated as a liability for accounting purposes because all or a part of them are refunded if members maintain their membership for at least thirty years or if they resign earlier and replacement members fill their spots.
The club’s amenities were completed in 1999 and the club had sold about 82% of the memberships by 2011. The club argues that the value of the sold memberships should not be considered in determining the actual value of the club’s property for property tax purposes because they are not interests in the real property. The BOE contends that the membership deposits are akin to prepaid rent on leasehold interests and they would escape taxation if not included in the property value.
On appeal, the club and the BOE agree that the income approach is the proper method to value the club’s property. However, the county argues that the memberships are an interest in land, like a leasehold, and should be included in the value under the “unit assessment rule.” The club contends that memberships are licenses, and are not an interest in land. The court agrees, and holds: (1) the membership agreement is not a lease; (2) memberships are not life estates; (3) the membership agreement does not give members any other taxable interest in the club’s property; (4) the membership agreement establishes that memberships are revocable licenses; (5) the unit assessment rule does not apply to these memberships; and (6) the sold memberships are not usufructuary interests. Accordingly, the Board’s order is reversed and the case is remanded to hold a hearing to determine the actual value of the club’s property without taking into account the value of the sold memberships.
Property tax; unit assessment rule.
Village paid more than $1 million to purchase certain development rights from the Treehouse Condominium Association (HOA). This supposedly gave Village the right to construct up to nineteen condominium units in the complex. The development rights were created by an amendment to the Treehouse declaration in 2006. The rights were assigned to Village in 2008 in a document entitled “Warranty and Assignment of Supplemental Development Rights”. The question is whether this property right is a taxable interest in real property. The Board of Assessment Appeals found that the right to build new condominium units constituted a taxable interest in real property for ad valorem tax purposes.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirms the BAA, and holds that the assignment, in effect, severed the development rights from the common elements owned by the HOA, creating a new taxable property interest. Because the Village acquired an interest in land, taxation of the development rights was required under C.R.S. § 39-1-102(16) and (14)(a).
Because the Assignment evinced the intent to sever title to the development rights from the common elements, taxing the development rights separately from the common elements did not contravene §§39-1-103(10) or 38-33.3-105. This taxation does not violate the unit assessment rule.
The Assignment created separate interests in real estate as between the interests of the individual unit owners in the common elements and those of the developer. The order was affirmed.
S.W. v. Towers Boat Club, Inc.
Attractive nuisance; premises liability statute.
The Supreme Court considers whether, in the context of our premises liability statute, the attractive nuisance doctrine applies to both (a) trespassing children and (b) children who are licensees or invitees. The Court held that the doctrine permits all children, regardless of their classification, to bring a claim for attractive nuisance. C.R.S. § 13-21-115. The court therefore reverses the judgment of the court of appeals, which had found that the doctrine only protects trespassing children.

References: § 31
 § 31
 § 1985
 § 24
 § 24
 § 24
 § 24
 § 2
 § 39
 v. 
 § 13