Source: http://www.ipdigit.eu/2014/03/no-need-to-ask-for-authorization-before-hyperlinking-but-what-did-the-eu-court-of-justice-meant-in-svensson/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:23:41+00:00

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IPdigIT No need to ask for authorization before hyperlinking, but…what did the EU Court of Justice mean in Svensson?
No need to ask for authorization before hyperlinking, but…what did the EU Court of Justice mean in Svensson?
In a previous post (see here), I had asked to anticipate the response of the Court of Justice of the EU to several questions raised in the Svensson case (C-466/12). The core question was whether establishing an hyperlink to a copyrighted work could constitute a “communication to the public” (under Article 3 of the 2001/29 Directive on copyright in the information society). One could expect the CJEU to rely on is growing case law on what constitutes a communication to the public (see 4 oct. 2011, C-403/08 & C-429/08, Premier League; 15 mars 2012, C-135/10, Consorzio Fonografici v. Del Corso; 15 mars 2012, C-162/10, Phonographic Performance Ltd; 7 March 2013, C-607/11, ITV Broadcasting v. TV Catchup). To predict the outcome of the Svensson case on the basis of this case law was not obvious, however. Several groups has advocated opposing responses, for instance the European Copyright Society (see opinion of 15 Febr. 2013 here) and the ALAI (see Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale opinion of 16 Sept. 2013 here).
Therefore, the person placing such a link must not ask for a prior authorization as hyperlinking does not fall under the acts covered by copyright.
To limit the possibility to establish hyperlinks could thus be considered as a brake on the engine of free expression that the web definitely supports and expands. Of course, some constraints to the freedom of expression and information, which arguably includes the freedom to place hyperlinks to other online sources as a way to expand the online conversation, are justified. Those limitations must respect the constraints put forward by Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Basically, the limitation by a law (such as copyright law) must be legitimate and proportionate. An across the board obligation to ask for a prior authorization before linking arguably would not pass the proportionality test. Therefore, concluding, as the CJEU did, that inserting clickable links does not require an authorization is right – and positive for the online sharing and discussion. It is also positive for the preservation of copyright online: indeed, would the CJEU have decided differently, the effectiveness and relevance of copyright would have been severely under question. Indeed, the burden required by the application of the basic principle of copyright, that authorization must be sought before committing an act falling under copyright’s scope, would mean that a copyright law encompassing the simple establishment of hyperlinks would not be respected at all in practice. This, in turn, would risk to further undermine the relevance and value of copyright in the online world.
In Svensson, the issue turns around clickable links posted on the site of a media monitoring agency (Retriever) to the articles of journalists (including Mr Svensson) published on their newspaper’s website. Retriever’s customer who has paid a subscription fee can access a search function on Retriever’s site. In response to a query based on search terms, the customer receives a list of clickable links. If the customer clicks a link, the linked-to site article is displayed in a pop-up window. The customer is not clearly informed that, by clicking on the link, he has been transferred to the website of the press publisher. The process thus can give the impression that the content originates from Retriever, but the risk of confusion is in principle not relevant for the copyright issue under consideration. However the possible confusion could be relevant for an action based on a claim of unfair competition. Links which blur the distinction between the linking and the linked-to sites can confuse the public or appear unfair.
What about framing links as in the CJEU pending case Bestwater (C-348/13; see the preliminary question here). This case brought forward by the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) regards the legitimacy of framing video content. YouTube’s option to embed video clips on other websites is at the core of the Bestwater case (see on the kluwercopyrightblog a first presentation by B. Schuetze, here).
Now what about the next paragraph of the Svensson decision?
By adding this paragraph, the Court very probably wants to keep the door open for a copyright claim. Thus, in certain circumstances, posting clickable links might fall under the notion of “communication to the public”. But when exactly? When some access restrictions are placed on the linked-to site and the link allows to by-pass those restrictions, the public that has access through the link can differ from the public that can access the work on the linked-to site. The Court is right to consider that one should be able to oppose this circumvention of the access restrictions. The CJEU probably has in mind a paywall system. Another case pending before the CJEU, C More Entertainment v. Linus Sandberg (C-279/13, here) seems to be about a paywall system (A link to streamed ice-hockey matches is offered by C More Entertainment for visitors who pay for it. The defendant discovered the linked-to page and put the link on its own webpage, thus allowing to bypass the access restriction put in place by C More Entertainment).
While there might be good reasons to prohibit those practices, is it the best option to consider that a communication to the public takes place in those circumstances? Are there not other ways to address such situations?
How do you interpret the Svensson decision and what do you expect the CJEU responses to be in Bestwater and C More Entertainment?
Also, what do you think of the last sentence of the paragraph 31 in the Svensson decision? Could this impact the way search engines function?

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