Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321207502/United-States-v-Terrence-Vaughan-4th-Cir-2012
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:20:41+00:00

Document:
Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Davis wrote the opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Wynn joined.
Sean Siebert, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Neil H.
events that followed it, and there was no objection to that testimony.
and registration, and explained the reason for the stop.
"especially" popular "with people involved with drugs"
TracFone on [them]." J.A. 43.
from the passengers to see if the occupants will give conflicting stories. J.A. 45.
Vaughan about the purpose of his travels, or whether Vaughan volunteered that information.
Homiak went back to the rental vehicle to speak with Scott.
a way that appeared to Homiak to be "a stalling technique."
nine minutes after he initiated the traffic stop.
back not on file." J.A. 46.
sweep allowed Homiak to continue the traffic stop without prolonging it.
"a couple minutes." J.A. 51.
Homiak was in possession of Vaughans identifying information and the vehicle rental agreement.
Vaughan that the troopers were going to search the vehicle.
Vaughan continued to display "very high levels of nervousness, continued with the shaking and the heavy breathing,"
handgun played in the prosecution of this case.
A search of the vehicle revealed a handgun in the center console and 830.6 grams of cocaine.
beyond the necessary time to issue a traffic summons."
of criminal activity to justify a brief extension of the stop.
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Mubdi, 691 F.3d 334, 339 (4th Cir.
2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.
persons within the meaning of this provision." Whren v.
police conduct in routine traffic stops." United States v.
United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir. 1992)).
the officers action was "justified at its inception,"
the officers suspicion in a short period of time." Id.
consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot." Id.
check, and issuing a ticket." United States v.
officer may also, "in the interest of personal safety,"
prolong the seizure. United States v. SorianoJarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 50001 (4th Cir. 2007).
take other actions that do not constitute "searches"
the duration of the stop." Johnson, [555 U.S. at 333].
stopped car to exit his vehicle." Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citation omitted).
his suspicions through the canine sweep of the vehicle.
the stop would have become such an investigative detention.
Scotts explanations of their travels.
First, Scotts behavior was nervous and evasive.
observe on a daily basis what transpires on the street,"
Branch, 537 F.3d at 336-37 (citation omitted).
"[m]ost people when they are pulled over by the police are nervous."
States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011).
the presence of the phones constitutes a valid factor in a reasonable suspicion analysis.
suspicion is weak, but the changing story remains a valid factor contributing to reasonable suspicion.
stayed and the real purpose of their travel." 628 F.3d at 129.
an explanation for his travels that conflicted with Vaughans.
denial of Vaughans motion to suppress.
CB Domz Ando Duyogan Jr.

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