Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/426/394/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:43:23+00:00

Document:
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is appropriate only when the party seeking it has no alternative means of reaching the same result and has shown that the right to the writ is clear and indisputable.
A class was formed of all male adults who were convicted of felonies and held in the custody of the California Department of Corrections in the present or in the future. The plaintiffs and their attorneys were allowed to inspect the files of a sample of prisoners currently in CDC custody, as well as information in the personnel files of Adult Authority members and their employees. The court denied a request for in camera inspection before releasing these files to the plaintiffs. One of the defendants in the ensuing class action was Kerr. He sought writs of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate these discovery orders, but the Ninth Circuit denied them.
The overuse of writs of mandamus would raise serious concerns over fragmenting related litigation, creating a process of appeal by writ, and undermining the Congressional intent to limit this remedy to use after all other avenues have been exhausted. In almost all situations, an appellate court should not review a case until the trial court has made a final decision. The defendant in this case still has a viable alternative to seeking the writ because he could assert governmental privilege. This would lead the trial court to reconsider its rejection of the request for an in camera review, and the court never acted to prevent the defendant from making that argument.
Actions for a writ of mandamus often require the court of appeals to essentially review the merits of the claim, even though this is not technically the appropriate forum to do so.
In a class action by California state prisoners on behalf of themselves and all present or future adult male felons in California state prisons or on parole, plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations in the manner in which the members of the California Adult Authority and other petitioners determine the length of detention and conditions of punishment for convicted offenders, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In the course of discovery pursuant to Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 34 plaintiffs sought (1) Adult Authority files consisting, inter alia, of personnel files of all members and employees of the Adult Authority; and (2) prisoners' files, consisting of the files of every twentieth inmate in each state correctional institution. Petitioners, claiming that the Adult Authority files were irrelevant, confidential, and privileged, suggested that they should not be compelled to turn over the files without prior District Court in camera inspection. That court ordered the production of the documents without such review, but limited the number of people associated with the plaintiffs who might examine the documents. Petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus to vacate the discovery order, which the Court of Appeals denied. Though recognizing a qualified governmental "official or state secrecy privilege," the court indicated that, contrary to the situation here, assertion of such a privilege had to be made with specificity by high-level Adult Authority officials. A somewhat similar course ensued with regard to the prisoners' files, ending with the Court of Appeals' denial of mandamus without opinion.
Held: In the circumstances of this case -- and particularly since less extreme alternatives for modification of the challenged discovery orders were available -- issuance of the writ of mandamus is inappropriate. Pp. 426 U. S. 402-406.
(a) As a means of implementing the rule that mandamus will issue only in extraordinary circumstances, the party seeking this largely discretionary writ must show that there are no other adequate means to secure the desired relief. Pp. 426 U. S. 402-403.
(b) Here, adequate alternatives to mandamus existed. The Court of Appeals' opinion did not foreclose in camera review, but apparently left open the opportunity for petitioners through responsible officials to assert the privilege more specifically, and have their request for in camera review reconsidered. They thus have an avenue far short of mandamus to achieve the relief they seek, and this approach affords an appropriate and useful method for achieving a balance between petitioners' claims of irrelevance and privilege and plaintiffs' asserted need for the documents. Pp. 426 U. S. 404-406.
(c) There is no reason to believe that, by its order relating to the discovery of the prisoners' files, the Court of Appeals meant to foreclose petitioners from availing themselves of the same opportunity of securing in camera review as is available in the case of the Adult Authority files . P. 426 U. S. 406.
511 F.2d 192, and order of Dec. 18, 1974 (unreported), affirmed.
the availability of an alternative, less extreme, path to modification of the challenged discovery orders -- issuance of the writ is inappropriate. We therefore affirm.
"on behalf of all adult male felons who now are, as well as all adult male felons who in the future will be, in the custody of the California Department of Corrections, whether confined in an institution operated by the Department or on parole."
App. 370. [Footnote 1] Among the defendants in the action are petitioners in this case: the individual members of the California Adult Authority, the Administrative Officer of the California Adult Authority, and the Director of Corrections of the State of California. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges substantial constitutional violations in the manner in which the California Adult Authority carries out its function of determining the length and conditions of punishment for convicted criminal offenders.
and will be referred to here as the "prisoners' files." Plaintiffs requested the opportunity to examine the files of every twentieth inmate at each California Department of Corrections institution, App. 234; the class of documents, therefore, is composed of the correctional files of a sample of the prisoners in the custody of the California Department of Corrections.
"[N]o personnel file of any member of the Adult Authority, hearing representative or executive officer, nor any copy of any of its contents, shall be shown to any person except counsel of record for the plaintiffs and no more than a total of two investigators designated by such counsel, and then only to the extent necessary to the conduct of this action."
"the question of relevancy 'is to be more loosely construed at the discovery stage than at the trial,' 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2008 at 41 (1970),"
nor the Director of Corrections nor any official of these agencies asserted, in person or writing, any privilege in the district court."
"The claiming official must "have seen and considered the contents of the documents and himself have formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not to be produced'" [United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 345 U. S. 8 n. 20, quoting from Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,  A.C. 624, 638,] and state with specificity the rationale of the claimed privilege. . . ."
"In [this] suit, petitioners' counsel merely raised a blanket objection covering any and all documents in request numbers 7, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21 and 22. Formally claiming a privilege should involve specifying which documents or class of documents are privileged and for what reasons, especially where the nature of the requested documents does not reveal an obviously privileged matter. . . ."
"In sum, the petition fails to show such an [sic] usurpation by the district court that warrants the extraordinary remedy of writ of mandamus."
protective order a requirement that no prisoner's file be turned over for examination without the inmate's consent. Id. at xxxi, xxxiii. Petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus which the Court of Appeals denied by order and without opinion on December 18, 1974. Id. at xxiii.
Petitioners sought review in this Court of the denial of both petitions. [Footnote 4] We granted certiorari. [Footnote 5] 421 U.S. 987 (1975).
"has traditionally been used in the federal courts only 'to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.'"
Will v. United States, supra at 389 U. S. 95, quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21, 319 U. S. 26 (1943). And, while we have not limited the use of mandamus by an unduly narrow and technical understanding of what constitutes a matter of "jurisdiction," Will v. United States, supra, at 389 U. S. 95, the fact still remains that "only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy." Ibid.
"have the unfortunate consequence of making the [district court] judge a litigant, obliged to obtain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the litigant [appearing] before him"
quoting Ex parte Fahey, supra at 332 U. S. 260. More importantly, particularly in an era of excessively crowded lower court dockets, it is in the interest of the fair and prompt administration of justice to discourage piecemeal litigation. It has been Congress' determination since the Judiciary Act of 1789 that, as a general rule, "appellate review should be postponed . . . until after final judgment has been rendered by the trial court." Will v. United States, supra at 389 U. S. 96; Parr v. United States, 351 U. S. 513, 351 U. S. 520-521 (1956). [Footnote 6] A judicial readiness to issue the writ of mandamus in anything less than an extraordinary situation would run the real risk of defeating the very policies sought to be furthered by that judgment of Congress.
As a means of implementing the rule that the writ will issue only in extraordinary circumstances, we have set forth various conditions for its issuance. Among these are that the party seeking issuance of the writ have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires, Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., supra at 319 U. S. 26, and that he satisfy "the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.'" Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, supra at 346 U. S. 384, quoting United States v. Duell, 172 U. S. 576, 172 U. S. 582 (1899); Will v. United States, supra at 389 U. S. 96. Moreover, it is important to remember that issuance of the writ is, in large part, a matter of discretion with the court to which the petition is addressed. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U. S. 104, 379 U. S. 112 n. 8 (1964); Parr v. United States, supra at 351 U. S. 520. See also Technitrol, Inc. v. McManus, 405 F.2d 84 (CA8 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 997 (1969); Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949 (CA9 1968).
"production of the confidential documents not be compelled without a prior informed determination by the district court that plaintiffs' need for them in the action below outweighs their confidentiality."
"Since there may be information in the requested documents which should be protected, the petitioners may assert a privilege to a particular document or class of documents, and perhaps seek in camera inspection, at the time the documents are discovered in the district court."
language of the opinion as providing petitioners an avenue far short of mandamus to achieve precisely the relief they seek.
long held the view that in camera review is a highly appropriate and useful means of dealing with claims of governmental privilege. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 418 U. S. 706 (1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953).
Insofar as discovery of the prisoners' files is concerned, it is true that the Court of Appeals' order denying the petition for a writ of mandamus with regard to those files was issued without any statement of reasons for the denial. However, there is no reason to think that, by its order, the Court of Appeals meant to foreclose petitioners from following precisely the same avenue with regard to the prisoners' files as it gave them the opportunity to follow with regard to the Adult Authority files.
We are thus confident that the Court of Appeals did, in fact, intend to afford the petitioners the opportunity to apply for and, upon proper application, receive in camera review. Accordingly the orders of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
The seven prisoners and the class they represent will be referred to here as "plaintiffs."
"7. All files, including all personnel files, which are maintained by the Adult Authority or by the Department of Corrections, or by any officer or employee thereof, with respect to each member, each hearing representative, and the Executive Officer of the Adult Authority."
"14. Each report submitted by any member, hearing representative, Executive Officer, or any other employee or official of the Adult Authority. . . ."
"15. All written statements written or delivered by any member or hearing representative or the Executive Officer of the Adult Authority during the past 5 years favoring, opposing, or in any way commenting upon bills or other legislation or legislative proposal pending in the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate of the United States, or the California Legislature."
"18. All written proposals for any change whatsoever in the organization or operation of, qualifications for, or substantive criteria and procedures to be employed by the Adult Authority. . . ."
"20. All memoranda written by the Chairman of the Adult Authority during the past 5 years, no matter to whom sent, including without limitation memoranda sent to other government organizations, agencies or officials, or to other members, hearing representatives, officials or employees of the Adult Authority."
"21. All documents in effect on November 15, 1972, which pertain to any Policy Statement or Resolution issued by the Adult Authority, including without limitation any file maintained on any Resolution or Policy Statement and all such documents executed or issued subsequent to that date."
"22. All documents, however formal or informal, issued during the past calendar year, which concern the Adult Authority's adoption of new policies, procedures, criteria, and the like, to be followed by members, hearing representatives, officials and employees. . . ."
While it has not yet come to trial, there have been additional developments in the underlying case during the pendency of the instant action before this Court. Since none of these developments is relevant to the resolution of the issue before us, we simply summarize them.
Subsequent to the filing of the petition for certiorari in the instant case, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in the underlying action in which they added allegations which led petitioners, in turn, to request the appointment of a three-judge District Court to hear the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281. The single judge then hearing the case certified it to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as one appearing to require the convening of a three-judge court. The Chief Judge appointed the three members of the court on October 28, 1975, several days before oral argument was held in the instant case. But, soon thereafter, plaintiffs amended their complaint once again. This subsequent amendment made the convening of a three-judge court appear unnecessary, and the three-judge court dissolved itself, remanding the entire case to the single judge originally assigned to the case. Thus, as the matter now stands, the underlying action is being heard by a single-judge District Court.
"no longer seek any of the documents which are the subject of this appeal, because the trial of [the underlying] case in District Court will be completed before this Court is able to decide [the] issues before it."
Memorandum of Respondents Concerning Mootness of Pending Matter 1-2. They therefore suggested that we hold this case moot. Plaintiffs never advised the District Court that they did not want the documents.
We deferred decision on the suggestion of mootness until after oral argument. However, at oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs stated that, because the trial date for the underlying action had been substantially delayed, they had changed their minds, and did indeed want the documents. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38, 441. While no papers were filed here formally withdrawing the suggestion of mootness, plaintiffs' representations at oral argument, combined with the fact that the trial of the underlying action has not yet taken place, leave us with no indication that this case is moot.
The use of extraordinary writs aside, it is only in narrowly defined circumstances, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292, that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals extends to interlocutory orders.
See Metros v. United States District Court for Dist. of Colo., 441 F.2d 313 (CA10 1971).
See United States Board of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25 (CA4 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
Petitioners also assert, citing Ford Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459 (1945), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), that discovery of material which is actually the property of the State or its agencies is limited by the Eleventh Amendment. In view of our resolution of this case and the fact that petitioners did not raise this issue either in the discovery proceedings in the District Court or in their petition for mandamus to the Court of Appeals, we need not reach this issue.
United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal.

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