Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/498/439/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 07:01:53+00:00

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Petitioner motor carrier filed suit in a Nebraska trial court, claiming, inter alia, that certain "retaliatory" taxes and fees the State imposed on motor carriers and vehicles such as his, which are registered in other States but operate in Nebraska, constituted an unlawful burden on interstate commerce and that respondents were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among other things, the court concluded that the taxes and fees violated the Commerce Clause and permanently enjoined respondents from assessing, levying, or collecting them; but it dismissed petitioner's § 1983 claim. The State Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that there is no cause of action under § 1983 for Commerce Clause violations because the Clause allocates power between the State and Federal Governments, and does not establish individual rights against the government.
Held: Suits for violations of the Commerce Clause may be brought under § 1983. Pp. 495 U. S. 443-451.
(a) A broad construction of § 1983 is compelled by the statutory language, which speaks of deprivations of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." It is also supported by § 1983's legislative history and by this Court's decisions, which have rejected attempts to limit the types of constitutional rights that are encompassed within the phrase "rights, privileges, or immunities," see, e.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538. Pp. 495 U. S. 443-446.
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 429 U. S. 321, n. 3, and this Court's repeated references to "rights" under the Clause constitute a recognition that it was intended to benefit those who are engaged in interstate commerce, see, e.g., Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 141 U. S. 57. Respondents' attempt to analogize the Commerce Clause to the Supremacy Clause, which does not confer "rights, privileges, or immunities" under § 1983, is also rejected. Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause is not a source of federal rights, but merely secures federal rights by according them priority when they come into conflict with state law. The fact that the protection from interference with trade conferred by the Commerce Clause may be qualified or eliminated by Congress does not mean that it cannot be a "right," for, until Congress does so, such protection operates as a guarantee of freedom for private conduct that the State may not abridge. Pp. 495 U. S. 446-451.
234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined, post, p. 495 U. S. 451.
This case presents the question whether suits for violations of the Commerce Clause may be brought under 93 Stat. 1284, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We hold that they may.
Petitioner does business as an unincorporated motor carrier with his principal place of business in Ohio. He owns tractors and trailers that are registered in Ohio and operated in several States, including Nebraska. On December 17, 1984, he filed a class action suit in a Nebraska trial court challenging the constitutionality of certain "retaliatory" taxes and fees imposed by the State of Nebraska on motor carriers with vehicles registered in other States and operated in Nebraska. [Footnote 1] In his complaint, petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the taxes and fees constituted an unlawful burden on interstate commerce and that respondents were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner sought declaratory and injunctive relief, refunds of all retaliatory taxes and fees paid, and attorney's fees and costs.
"because they are imposed only on motor carriers whose vehicles are registered outside the State of Nebraska, while no comparable tax or fee is imposed on carriers whose vehicles are registered in the State of Nebraska."
of his § 1983 claim, and respondents cross-appealed the trial court's allowance of attorney's fees and expenses under the common fund doctrine. Respondents did not however, appeal the trial court's determination that the retaliatory taxes and fees violated the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's § 1983 claim, but reversed the trial court's allowance of fees and expenses under the common fund doctrine. See Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676 (1990). With respect to the § 1983 claim, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that "[d]espite the broad language of § 1983 . . . there is no cause of action under § 1983 for violations of the commerce clause." Id. at 430, 451 N.W.2d at 678. The court relied largely on the reasoning in Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (CA8), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984), which held that claims under the Commerce Clause are not cognizable under § 1983 because, among other things, "the Commerce Clause does not establish individual rights against government, but instead allocates power between the state and federal governments." 730 F.2d at 1144.
As the Supreme Court of Nebraska recognized, see 234 Neb. at 430, 451 N.W.2d at 678, there is a division of authority on the question whether claims for violations of the Commerce Clause may be brought under § 1983. [Footnote 2] We granted certiorari to resolve this issue, 495 U.S. 956 (1990), and we now reverse.
laws enacted pursuant thereto," Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 441 U. S. 611 (1979), but the Court has never restricted the section's scope to the effectuation of that goal. Rather, we have given full effect to its broad language, recognizing that § 1983 "provide[s] a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights." Monell, supra, at 436 U. S. 700-701. Thus, for example, we have refused to limit the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 to civil rights or equal protection laws. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 448 U. S. 4, 448 U. S. 6-8 (1980).
"the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. . . . The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is, in truth, a 'personal' right, whether the 'property' in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account."
Id. at 405 U. S. 552. See also United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 383 U. S. 800-806 (1966).
"To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the State; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States."
"asserting their right under the Commerce Clause to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory taxes on their business and they allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right."
Id. at 429 U. S. 320, n. 3.
creates obligations binding on the governmental unit, or rather 'does no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment.' Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 451 U. S. 19 (1981).  The interest the plaintiff asserts must not be 'too vague and amorphous' to be 'beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.' Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 479 U. S. 431-432 (1987).  We have also asked whether the provision in question was 'intend[ed] to benefit' the putative plaintiff. Id. at 479 U. S. 430; see also id. at 479 U. S. 433 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 422 U. S. 78 (1975))."
Id. at 493 U. S. 106. See also Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 496 U. S. 509 (1990). Respondents do not dispute that the first two considerations weigh in favor of recognition of a right here, but seize upon the third consideration -- intent to benefit the plaintiff -- arguing that the Commerce Clause does not confer rights within the meaning of § 1983 because it was not designed to benefit individuals, but rather was designed to promote national economic and political union. Brief for Respondents 19-24.
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will, by customs duties or regulations, exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality."
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 336 U. S. 539 (1949).
Respondents also argue that the protection from interference with trade conferred by the Commerce Clause cannot be a "right," because it is subject to qualification or elimination by Congress. Brief for Respondents 21. That argument proves too much, however, because federal statutory rights may also be altered or eliminated by Congress. Until Congress does so, such rights operate as "a guarantee of freedom for private conduct that the State may not abridge."
We conclude that the Supreme Court of Nebraska erred in holding that petitioner's Commerce Clause claim could not be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Compare Kraft v. Jacka, 872 F.2d 862, 869 (CA9 1989); J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1476-1477 (CA10 1985); and Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (CA8), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984), with Continental Illinois Corp. v. Lewis, 838 F.2d 457, 458 (CA11 1988), vacated on other grounds, 494 U. S. 472 (1990); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 562 (CA6 1982); and Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 186, n. 5 (CA3 1980). See also Private Truck Council of America, Inc. v. Quinn, 476 U. S. 1129 (1986) (WHITE, J., joined by Brennan and O'CONNOR, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting conflict of authority).
"My next proposition is historical, and one simply in aid and support of the truth of the first [i.e., that 'Congress is bound to execute, by legislation, every provision of the Constitution, even those provisions not specially named as to be so enforced']. It is that the United States always has assumed to enforce, as against the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Constitution which restrain and directly relate to the States, such as those in tenth section of first article, that 'no State shall make a treaty,' 'grant letters of marque,' 'coin money,' 'emit bills of credit,' &c., relate to the divisions of the political powers of the State and General Governments. They do not relate directly to the rights of persons within the States and as between the States and such persons therein. These prohibitions upon the political powers of the States are all of such nature that they can be, and even have been, when the occasion arose, enforced by the courts of the United States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently, has the United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitution. But there are some that are not of this class. These are where the court secures the rights or the liabilities of persons within the States, as between such persons and the States."
"These three are: first, that as to fugitives from justice; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or slaves;) third, that declaring that the 'citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.'"
"And, sir, every one of these -- the only provisions where it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the constitutional provisions -- the only three where the rights or liabilities of persons in the States, as between these persons and the States, are directly provided for, Congress has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect or to subject such persons."
Cong.Globe at App. 69-70 (emphasis added to reflect omissions in dissent).
"to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person . . . committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."
Id. at 68. A principal objection to that section was that Congress lacked the authority to enact it, because it infringed upon the powers reserved to the States by overriding their authority to define and punish crimes. See id. at 69. In answering that argument, Shellabarger contended that Congress had the power to enforce by legislation "every one of the provisions of the Constitution." He observed that most of the provisions of the Constitution "which restrain and directly relate to the States" had been enforced by the courts without federal legislation, but noted that three provisions limiting state authority -- the Extradition Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause -- had been enforced pursuant to federal legislation.
It becomes clear that, fully quoted and properly read, Shellabarger's remarks do not in any way aid the dissent. The dissent's attempt to characterize Shellabarger's argument for expansive federal power to enact criminal legislation as support for a narrow construction of § 1983 is strained, to say the least. Shellabarger simply did not address the issues of which constitutional provisions establish "rights, privileges, or immunities," whether the Commerce Clause falls into that category, or whether provisions that allocate power cannot also confer rights. Nor would it be likely that he would have made any of the statements on these points argued by the dissent, given this Court's then-recent holding that the affirmative grant of power to Congress in the Credit Clause established a "right, privilege, or immunity." See The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16, 74 U. S. 22 (1869). The other snippets of legislative history relied upon by the dissent, see post at 498 U. S. 456-457, are similarly inapposite and inconclusive.
In any event, even if the dissent's cut-and-paste history could be read to provide some support for its formalistic distinction between power-allocating and rights-conferring provisions of the Constitution, it plainly does not constitute a "a clearly expressed legislative intent contrary to the plain language of [§ 1983]." American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 456 U. S. 75 (1982). Rather, if Congress had intended to limit the "broad and unqualified" language of § 1983, "it is not unreasonable to assume that it would have made this explicit." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U. S. 531, 438 U. S. 550 (1978).
The statute at issue in Lynch was the jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which contains the same "rights, privileges, or immunities" phrase. Even the dissent in Lynch agreed "without reservation" that the phrase was not limited to violations of "personal" rights, but disagreed with the majority on a different issue. See 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 556.
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U. S. 69, 481 U. S. 87 (1987); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 441 U. S. 326 (1979); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 424 U. S. 370-371 (1976); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 53 U. S. 318 (1852). These cases are distinguishable from cases involving assertions that state regulations of commerce directly conflict with federal regulations enacted under the authority of the Commerce Clause. An example of the latter is Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), in which the Court struck down a New York statute to the extent that it excluded federally licensed boats from operating in New York waters.
See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1324 (6th ed.1990) (defining "right" as "[a] legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other shall do a given act, or shall not do a given act") (citing Restatement of Property § 1 (1936)). That the right at issue here is an implied right under the Commerce Clause does not diminish its status as a "right, privilege, or immunity" under § 1983. Indeed, we have already rejected a distinction between express and implied rights under § 1983 in the statutory context.
"The violation of a federal right that has been found to be implicit in a statute's language and structure is as much a 'direct violation' of a right as is the violation of a right that is clearly set forth in the text of the statute."
Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103, 493 U. S. 112 (1989).
An additional reason why claims under the Supremacy Clause, unlike those under the Commerce Clause, should be excluded from the coverage of § 1983 is that, if they were included, the "and laws" provision in § 1983 would be superfluous. See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 493 U. S. 107, n. 4.
"held as a matter of pleading that the particular cause of action set up in the plaintiff's pleading was in contract, and was not to redress deprivation of the 'right secured to him by that clause of the Constitution' [the contract clause] to which he had 'chosen not to resort.'"
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 441 U. S. 613, n. 29 (1979); see also Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 307 U. S. 527 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.).
its economic regulation and taxation. With respect, I dissent.
The majority must acknowledge, under even Golden State, that not all violations of federal law give rise to a § 1983 action. The plaintiff must assert "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The majority appears to base its decision upon three grounds. First, the "ordinary meaning" of the term "right" as confirmed by Black's Law Dictionary indicates that the Commerce Clause provides petitioner a right. Ante at 498 U. S. 447, and n. 7. Second, our cases contain scattered references to a "right" to engage in interstate commerce. Ante at 498 U. S. 448. And third, the Commerce Clause purportedly meets Golden State's test to determine whether a statutory violation gives rise to a § 1983 cause of action, because the Commerce Clause was intended to benefit those who engage in interstate commerce. Ante at 498 U. S. 448-450. The majority errs, I must submit, when it ignores what the sponsors of § 1983 told us about the scope of the phrase "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution," and errs further when it applies the Golden State test in this context. Even were I to apply the majority's various tests, moreover, I would reach the opposite conclusion.
the Federal and State Governments. The former secure rights within the meaning of § 1983, but the latter do not.
The Commerce Clause, found at Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution, is a grant of power to Congress. It states simply that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate commerce . . . among the several States." By its own terms as well as its design, as interpreted by this Court, the Commerce Clause is a structural provision allocating authority between federal and state sovereignties. It does not purport to secure rights. The history leading to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution confirms these premises.
The lack of a national power over commerce during the Articles of Confederation led to ongoing disputes among the States, and the prospect of a descent toward even more intense commercial animosity was one of the principal arguments in favor of the Constitution. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 7, pp. 62-63 (C. Rossiter ed.1961) (A. Hamilton); id. No. 11, pp. 89-90 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 22, pp. 143-145 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 42, pp. 267-269 (J. Madison); id. No. 53, p. 333 (J. Madison).
"The sole purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution was 'to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations and trade of the said States; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony.'"
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 336 U. S. 533 (1949) (citation omitted). The Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a way to preserve economic union and to suppress interstate rivalry. The Clause assigned prerogatives to the general government, not personal rights to those who engaged in commerce. See, e.g., id. at 336 U. S. 533-535; Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 294 U. S. 523 (1935); Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y. U.L.Rev. 43, 51-56 (1988).
"The necessity of centralized regulation of commerce among the states was so obvious and so fully recognized that the few words of the Commerce Clause were little illuminated by debate."
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., supra, at 336 U. S. 534. An exhaustive examination of the debates reports only nine references to interstate commerce in the records of the Convention, all directed at the dangers of interstate rivalry and retaliation. See Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 Minn.L.Rev. 432, 470-471, and nn. 169-175 (1941). It is not for serious dispute that the Framers of the Commerce Clause had economic union as their goal, nor that their deliberations are devoid of any evidence of intent to secure personal rights under this Clause.
Section 1983 has its origins in § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, and § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 405 U. S. 543, n. 7 (1972). Until recent cases, we have placed great reliance upon the sponsors of the 1871 Act in interpreting the scope of § 1983. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 436 U. S. 690 (1978) ("[A]nalysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities . . . to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies" (emphasis in original)); Lynch, supra, at 405 U. S. 545-546 (sponsors intended § 1983 to protect property rights as well as personal rights); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 365 U. S. 172-185 (1961) (legislative history of § 1983 supports the conclusion that § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies).
"Most of the provisions of the Constitution which restrain and directly relate to the States, such as those in tenth section of first article, that 'no State shall make a treaty,' 'grant letters of marque,' 'coin money,' 'emit bills of credit,' &c., relate to the divisions of the political powers of the State and General Governments. They do not relate directly to the rights of persons within the States and as between the States and such persons therein. These prohibitions upon the political powers of the States are all of such nature that they can be, and even have been, when the occasion arose, enforced by the courts of the United States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently, has the United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitution. But there are some that are not of this class. These are where the court secures the rights or the liabilities of persons within the States, as between such persons and the States."
secure rights of persons with respect to States, and within the meaning of § 1983, the sponsors of § 1983 added the constitutional guarantees contained in the Civil War Amendments, including the provisions of the Bill of Rights incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Every specific mention of rights secured by the 1871 Act refers to these constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Cong.Globe 475-476 (Rep. Dawes; privileges and immunities, Bill of Rights); id. at App. 84-85 (Rep. Bingham; equal protection, first eight Amendments); id. at App. 153 (Rep. Garfield; right to vote, privileges and immunities, equal protection).
"promote the general welfare by prohibiting the States from doing what is inconsistent with civil liberty, and compelling them to do what is essential to its maintenance."
Trumbull made the same distinction between these categories of constitutional provisions. Id. at 575. The sponsors of § 1983 thus gave us a straightforward answer to the question of which constitutional violations give rise to a § 1983 action, and told us that violations of power-allocating provisions such as the Commerce Clause do not.
Not only did the 42d Congress understand the difference between rights-securing and power-allocating provisions of the Constitution, but this Court's decisions of more than 100 years support the distinction. All previous cases in which this Court has determined (or assumed) that a constitutional violation gives rise to a § 1983 cause of action alleged violations of rights-securing provisions of the Constitution, not power-allocating provisions. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 171 ("Allegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies to that extent the requirement of R.S. § 1979 [§ 1983]"); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939) (Fifteenth Amendment violation supports § 1983 cause of action).
In our only previous case discussing a § 1983 claim brought for the violation of a supposed right secured by Article I of the Constitution, we held that violation of the Contracts Clause does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 317 (1885). As is true of the Commerce Clause, the Court held that the Contracts Clause can be said to secure individual rights "only indirectly and incidentally." Id. at 114 U. S. 322. The Court further explained that the only right secured by the Contracts Clause is the "right to have a judicial determination, declaring the nullity of the attempt to impair [a State's] obligation." Ibid.
The Contracts Clause of Art. I, § 10, provides that "[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." At least such language would provide some support for an argument that the Contracts Clause prohibits States from "doing what is inconsistent with civil liberty."
(Cong.Globe 333 Rep. Hoar). If the Contracts Clause, an express limitation upon States' ability to impair the contractual rights of citizens, does not secure rights within the meaning of § 1983, it assuredly demands a great leap for the majority to conclude that the Commerce Clause secures the rights of persons. The Commerce Clause is, if anything, a less obvious source of rights for purposes of § 1983, as its text only implies a limitation upon state power.
At best, all that can be said is that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce; from this grant of power, the Court has implied a limitation upon the power of a State to regulate interstate commerce; and in turn, courts provide a person injured by taxation that exceeds the limits of the Commerce Clause the "right to have a judicial determination, declaring the nullity of the attempt to" levy a discriminatory tax. Carter, supra, at 114 U. S. 322. I find it ironic that Carter draws a distinction of nearly the same character as Golden State, between provisions which directly secure rights and those which do so "only as an incident" of their purpose. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 493 U. S. 109. Yet the majority finds that the Commerce Clause was "intended to benefit the putative plaintiff," Golden State, supra, at 493 U. S. 108, while Carter held that the Contracts Clause only provides incidental benefits.
In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538 (1972), we rejected an attempt to limit § 1983 to personal rights, as opposed to property rights, in that case a deprivation of property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The legislative history of § 1983 did not support such a distinction, and we recognized both its false nature and the impossibility of its application. Today, on the other hand, the Court rejects a distinction which finds strong support in the legislative history of § 1983 and would bring no difficulties of application. I see no good reason for this rejection, and suggest that the Court's decision only can do mischief.
"may be one arising under the Constitution, within the meaning of that term, as used in other statutes, but it is not one brought on account of the deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution."
Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 115 U. S. 611, 115 U. S. 615-616 (1885). [Footnote 2/2] The statements upon which the majority relies are weak support for its conclusion.
"to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the [discriminatory] rate reductions during the contested tax period."
Id. at 496 U. S. 40. If the State refused to provide any remedy, then the taxpayer would arguably have a § 1983 claim, but that claim would be for a deprivation of property without due process of law, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, not of the Commerce Clause. McKesson Corp. in no way supports the existence of a § 1983 cause of action for Commerce Clause violations.
"implicitly rejected in Boston Stock Exchange[ v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.] at 429 U. S. 321, n. 3, where we found that the plaintiffs were arguably within the 'zone of interests' protected by the Commerce Clause."
fundamental sense, separation of powers is designed to secure individual liberty. Yet we would not say that the Presentment Clauses secure personal rights. Rather, Chadha was able to assert the interests of the other branches of Government because he met our traditional test of standing.
I cannot doubt the truth of the statement, ante at 498 U. S. 449-450 (quoting H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 336 U. S. 539), that the Commerce Clause benefits individuals and entities engaged in interstate commerce. Nor do I question the importance of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in guaranteeing a single, national market. Benefits to those engaged in commerce, however, are incidental to the purpose of the Commerce Clause; they are but evidence of its sound application. That the Commerce Clause benefits individual traders or consumers does not satisfy the majority's test that a provision must have been intended for the benefit of a particular plaintiff; nor do such benefits prove that the provision secures a plaintiff's constitutional right to engage in any one activity, to receive any direct benefit, or to avoid any specific detriment. Rather, the Commerce Clause "benefits particular parties only as an incident of" its allocation of power between Federal and State sovereignties. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 493 U. S. 109.
Golden State test. The majority does not purport to rest its decision upon such an all-inclusive view of § 1983, but that is the necessary consequence of its reasoning.
The Court's analysis demonstrates the poverty of the "intended to benefit" test in the constitutional context, for it shows that even structural provisions that benefit individuals incidentally come within its purview. The Court's logic extends far beyond the Commerce Clause, and creates a whole new class of § 1983 suits derived from Article I. For example, the Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 489 U. S. 813 (1989) (violation of statute "coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes embodied in the modern constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity"), interferes with the federal power over foreign relations, see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U. S. 429 (1968), applies a duty upon imports in violation of Art. I, § 10, cl. 2, see Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652 (1945), invades the federal power over regulation of the entrance and residence of aliens in violation of Art. I., § 8, cl. 4, see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 312 U. S. 66-67 (1941), or attempts to tax income upon a federal obligation in derogation of Congress' Art. I, § 8, cl. 2, power to "borrow Money on the credit of the United States," see Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313 (1930). There is no textual or other support for holding that § 1983 imposes such far-reaching liabilities upon the States.
State. Rather, the significance of the Court's decision, in this and future Commerce Clause litigation, is that a § 1983 claim may permit dormant Commerce Clause plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
In the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Congress authorized the award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in, inter alia, § 1983 litigation. The award of attorney's fees encourages vindication of federal rights which, Congress recognized, might otherwise go unenforced because of the plaintiffs' lack of resources and the small size of any expected monetary recovery. See S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976). Congress was reassured that § 1988 would be "limited to cases arising under our civil rights laws, a category of cases in which attorneys fees have been traditionally regarded as appropriate." Id. at 4.
§ 1983 to redress allegedly unconstitutional state taxation. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981). Relying upon the "overriding interests of the state in an efficient, expeditious and nondisruptive resolution of . . . tax disputes," Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 505, 224 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1976), state courts have refused to permit plaintiffs to proceed under § 1983 where there exists a complete remedy under state law. Ibid.; Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492, 497, 316 S.E.2d 386, 388-389 (1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 471 U. S. 82 (1985) (per curiam). These questions now become of paramount importance, as we risk destruction of state fiscal integrity in a manner which may require congressional correction.
Shellabarger was discussing the power of Congress to enact § 2 of the 1871 Act, and not the scope of § 1, which we know as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Reliance upon Shellabarger's statement is nevertheless appropriate. The proposed § 2 used the phrase "rights, privileges or immunities of another person," Cong.Globe App. 69, and Shellabarger was discussing his understanding of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, not of any language which would differ in meaning as between § 1 and § 2 of the 1871 Act. It matters not whether one repeats Shellabarger's speech of many pages, or only the relevant portion thereof, for I do not rely upon Shellabarger's views of congressional power to legislate, but rather the distinction he articulated between power-allocating provisions and rights-conferring provisions, between those provisions which "do not relate directly to the rights of persons within the States and as between the States and such persons therein," and those which do "secure" "rights" of persons. Ibid. (emphasis added). Shellabarger's distinction is borne out by the remainder of the legislative history.
"in any case brought on account of the deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."
Rev.Stat. § 699 (1874). See Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 Geo. L.J. 1493, 1519-1520, 1549-1551 (1989).
"We think, as the Court of Appeals apparently did, that the appellant is a proper person to challenge the validity of this statute as a burden on commerce. If it is an invalid burden, the conviction under it would fail. The statute affects appellant as well as the transportation company. Constitutional protection against burdens on commerce is for her benefit on a criminal trial for violation of the challenged statute. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 204 U. S. 160 [(1970)]; Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 325 U. S. 463 [(1945)]."
Morgan, supra, at 328 U. S. 376-377 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Morgan merely held that a criminal defendant had standing to assert the Commerce Clause as a defense to a prosecution under a Virginia law that required segregation by race of passengers on interstate buses, rejecting the State of Virginia's argument that only the transportation company had standing to challenge the segregation law. 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 376-377.

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