Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82577:56453&catid=1577&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:28:30+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 182356, December 04, 2013 - DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA, Petitioners, v. REBECCA BIONG, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF PONGKAY TRADING, Respondent.
DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA, Petitioners, v. REBECCA BIONG, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF PONGKAY TRADING, Respondent.
Every case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law. Questions of fact are for the parties and their counsels to respond to, based on what supporting facts the legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can only draw one conclusion: that the case must fail for lack of evidentiary support.
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A. dela Llana’s (petitioner) petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the February 11, 2008 decision2 and the March 31, 2008 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.21 It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because road visibility diminishes at night. He should have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck and could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It also concluded that Joel was probably sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that fateful day.
The RTC further declared that Joel’s negligence gave rise to the presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel’s selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muñoz Market, Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three elements necessary to establish Rebecca’s liability were present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the employer, personally or through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals,23 it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted that the interval between the date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether Joel’s reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llana’s injury.
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present case. She stresses that Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code, provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix that showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that case.
As opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because she was a surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several cases, she posits that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted.25 She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of common knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact that whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains that the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that Dra. dela Llana’s arguments are not substantial to merit this Court’s consideration.
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review the presented evidence, by way of exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA.27 We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of the collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that these pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit “H” during trial, should not be considered in resolving this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated September 23, 2004.38 Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.
Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that pain in your left arm?
Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was due to a compression of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.
By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?
Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist.
You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate. What relation does this medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate, you said was made by Dra. Milla?
This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.
Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.
What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that feeling, that pain that you felt in your left arm?
Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition after three months indicated that I needed surgery.
Did you undergo this surgery?
So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.
And, what was the result of that surgical operation?
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate. However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings.
We also point out in this respect that the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled her medical history and physical examinations.
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her testimony that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury.
Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence.
emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury was not established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
1 Dated May 20, 2008 and filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 8-30.
2 Id. at 39-55; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
7 RTC rollo, p. 117.
10 RTC rollo, pp. 121-122.
12 RTC rollo, p. 139.
21 Dated April 19, 2007; id. at 36.
23 484 Phil. 330-349 (2004).
25 Citing GSIS v. Ibarra, 562 Phil. 924-938 (2009); Ijares v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 9-21 (1999); and Loot v. GSIS, G.R. No. 86994, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 54-61.
27Carvajal v. Luzon Development Bank and/or Ramirez, G.R. No. 186169, August 1, 2012, 678 SCRA 132, 140-141.
28Vergara v. CA, 238 Phil. 566, 568 (1987).
29Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 775 (1918).
30Syki v. Begasa, 460 Phil. 386 (2003).
32Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, G.R. No. 174156, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 118, 128.
34Eulogio v. Spouses Apeles, G.R. No. 167884, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 562, 571-572, citing Go v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001).
35Real v. Belo, 542 Phil. 111, 122 (2007), citing Domingo v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 812, 818; and Ongpauco v. CA, G.R. No. 134039, December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA 395, 400.
36Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 186 (1957).
37Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, 543 Phil. 468 (2007).
38 RTC rollo, p. 145.
39 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 36.
40Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. CA, 404 Phil. 287 (2001), citing PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. CA, 358 Phil. 41, 60 (1998).
41Tating v. Marcela, 548 Phil. 19, 28 (2007).
42 RTC rollo, pp. 277 -281.
43 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 50.
44 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 49.
45People of the Philippines v. Florendo, 68 Phil. 619, 624 (1939), citing United States v. Kosel, 24 Phil 594 (1913).
46 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Section 2.

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