Source: https://patentlyo.com/tag/anticipation/page/2
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 05:58:38+00:00

Document:
Introduction: Although not a poultry expert, Prof Crunch recently designed and built his own back-yard chicken coop (Coop) (started and completed in August 2016). Among its special features, the coop includes a translucent roof to allow additional winter light, a hinged trap-door in the floor for removing waste, and a vertically sliding door opening to the chicken-run. The vertically sliding door is operated by a pulley system and can be controlled while standing next-to the nesting box door. Thus, a user can provide access to the chicken-run at the same time as collecting eggs. The coop is also designed to be long-and-narrow in order to fit through a 40-inch wide gate while also providing at least 21 square feet of floor area. While Crunch expects that many of these features are not unique, he believes that the combination is unique. Crunch is an idea-man. Rather than production is looking to sell plans and instructions for making his Coop.
a second side wall that includes a vertically sliding door operated via a pulley system; wherein said pulley system is operable by a user standing near said nesting box and wherein said coop is configured with a width of less than 40-inches.
2. A set of instructions comprising: instructions for making the poultry coop of claim 1.
Question 1. (120 words). Crunch had considered adding an additional limitation that precisely defines the configuration of the pulley system and its components. What are major pros and cons of adding these additional limitations to claim 1 (considering primarily the doctrines of patentability and infringement)?
Question 2. (200 words) Are these claims patent eligible subject matter?
Question 3. (60 words) Provide a concise argument that claim 1 fails for lack of definiteness.
Question 4. (80 words) Should Crunch be concerned that his back-yard prototype constitutes prior art that could be used against his own patent application?
Question 5. (240 words) Assume the following for this question: (a) the back-yard prototype is not prior art; and (b) Crunch’s expectations are correct that while many of the patented elements are known in the prior art, the combination as a whole is unique. What can we say about the novelty/nonobviousness of the claims.
Question 6. (25 words) Assuming claim 1 is patented but not claim 2. Does Crunch have an infringement claim against a third party who begins teaching others how to make the coop?
Background: The complexity of this appeal is illustrated by the opinion’s 8 bullet-point summary of its holdings. The jury found that Power Integrations’ Patent Nos. 6,107,851 and 6,249,876 were not anticipated and were directly and indirectly infringed by Fairchild and that Fairchild’s Patent No. 7,259,972 was not obvious and was infringed by Power Integrations under the doctrine of equivalents (but was not literally infringed or indirectly infringed by Power Integrations). The jury also found Power Integrations’ Patent No. 7,834,605 neither anticipated nor obvious. Following trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law that Fairchild directly infringed this patent. The district court granted a permanent injunction against Fairchild and declined to grant an inunction against Power Integrations.
Fairchild appealed and Power Integrations cross-appealed.
Inducement: The indirect infringement issue involved 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), a one sentence provision at the heart of several significant opinions over the last few years. Section 271(b) reads “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Basic elements of an inducement claim include some type of action by the alleged inducer to encourage acts by a third party, an awareness that the third party’s acts would infringe a patent, and actual direct infringement by a third party.
Slip Op. at 22 (emphasis in opinion). The problem, in the court’s words, was that “[t]his instruction left the jury with the incorrect understanding that a party may be liable for induced infringement even where it does not successfully communicate with and induce a third-party direct infringer.” Id. at 23. Rather, inducement “requires successful communication between the alleged inducer and the third-party direct infringer.” Id. Quoting from Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363, F.3d 1263, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the court observed “[w]e have further held that “[t]o prevail under a theory of indirect infringement, [plaintiff] must first prove that the defendants’ actions led to direct infringement of the [patent-in-suit].” Id. at 24. Thus, “a finding of induced infringement requires actual inducement.” Id. In terms of doctrine, the court situates this inquiry in the requirement of inducement itself.
Although the court does not come right out and say it, this is fundamentally a theory of causality in inducement. In other words, it is not enough that the alleged inducer engage in acts intended to result in direct infringement by a third party and that the third party directly infringes. At a minimum, there must be a successful communication between the two. Attempted inducement is not enough; there must be “actual inducement.” This interpretation is further bolstered by the court’s rejection of the language in the jury instruction stating that “infringement need not have been actually caused by the party’s actions.” That said, despite the invitation to address causality presented by the jury instruction, the court conspicuously avoids describing its holding in those terms. Nowhere outside of the jury instruction and a few unrelated places does a permutation of “caus” appear.
that Power Integrations introduced evidence of only three acts of direct infringement—sales of an HP printer, Acer notebook computer, and Samsung notebook computer containing infringing Fairchild controller chips—and that Power Integrations was required to present evidence that Fairchild specifically induced HP, Acer, Samsung, or the retailers from which Power Integrations purchased the infringing products to incorporate the infringing controller chips into products bound for the United States.
requiring hard proof that any individual third-party direct infringer was actually persuaded to infringe by that material.” Id.
Thus, although some evidence of a link between inducer’s acts and the directly infringing acts is required, it need not be with the level of specificity that might need to be shown in other contexts. Absolute precision of proof as to the machine in the courtroom is not necessary. And yet, some proof of a link must be present. Here, the court concluded, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that necessary link.
At this point you might be asking why all of this mattered, given that Fairchild did not appeal the jury verdict that it directly infringed the patents. The reason is because the finding of inducement greatly expanded the scope of Fairchild’s liability beyond its direct infringement in the United States. Based on its decision on inducement, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of Power Integrations’ motion for a permanent injunction against Fairchild. Of course, given that these issues are being remanded to the district court, it is conceivable that the outcomes of both could ultimately be the same.
In other words, Power Integrations was required to prove that: (1) a third party directly infringed the asserted claims of the ’851 and ’876 patents; (2) Fairchild induced those infringing acts; and (3) Fairchild knew the acts it induced constituted infringement.
In my view, this version is much easier to understand than the usual way inducement is articulated.
Anticipation: The court’s review on anticipation of the ‘605 patent is also interesting as an example of a jury verdict of no anticipation being overturned on appeal. Here, Fairchild bore a double-burden on Power Integrations ‘605 patent: not only did it bear the burden of proving that the presumptively-valid claims were anticipated, but it also had to convince the Federal Circuit on appeal that the jury’s finding to the contrary was unsupported by substantial evidence. Fairchild was helped on appeal by the relative narrowness of the disputed evidentiary issue. On that particular issue, the court concluded that Power Integrations’ own expert had testified that the critical element required by the claims was disclosed by the prior art reference.
Doctrine of equivalents: The main point here is Power Integrations’ successful claim vitiation argument.
Edit: Added the opinion itself.
In Unwired Planet v. Google, the Federal Circuit has vacated a PTAB covered business method decision – holding that the PTO’s definition of a “covered business method” was unduly broad.
The America Invents Act created a powerful set of post-issuance administrative review procedures known generally as AIA trials, including the covered business method (CBM) review. CBM is designed as a transitional proceeding that will sunset in the year 2020 barring congressional action. The most popular form of AIA trial is inter partes review (IPR) that allows for review of any issued patent but is limited to only novelty and obviousness challenges based upon prior art. CBM review applies to a much narrower set of patents – only “covered business methods” – but those patents can be challenged on almost any patentability ground, including eligibility. Here, the Board found the challenged claims unpatentable subject matter under section 101.
The term covered business method is particularly defined to include any patent “that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1). In its implementing rules, the PTO did not further define or explain the CBM definition within its official rules – although the PTO did propose the “incidental” or “complementary” language in its official responses to comments on its proposed rules. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has rejected the more expansive definition as contrary to the statute.
The Board’s application of the “incidental to” and “complementary to” language from the PTO policy statement instead of the statutory definition renders superfluous the limits Congress placed on the definition of a CBM patent.
The patent for a novel lightbulb that is found to work particularly well in bank vaults does not become a CBM patent because of its incidental or complementary use in banks. Likewise, it cannot be the case that a patent covering a method and corresponding apparatuses becomes a CBM patent because its practice could involve a potential sale of a good or service. All patents, at some level, relate to potential sale of a good or service. Take, for example, a patent for an apparatus for digging ditches. Does the sale of the dirt that results from use of the ditch digger render the patent a CBM patent? No, because the claims of the ditch-digging method or apparatus are not directed to “performing data processing or other operations” or “used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,” as required by the statute. It is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the specification speculates such a potential sale might occur.
The decision here thus appears to eliminate any chance that the patent will be considered a CBM and thus the Section 101 decision by the PTAB goes away.
No Appeal? Like IPR proceedings, CBM proceedings begin with an initiation decision followed by a trial decision. And, like IPR proceedings, the decision to initiate a CBM is not appealable. In Versata, however, the Federal Circuit held that the initiation question of whether a patent is a CBM patent may be reviewed on appeal. Despite the statutory language and the intervening Supreme Court decision in Cuozzo, the court here held that it still has jurisdiction to review the CBM initiation question on appeal.
Deference: In reviewing the PTAB determination, the court gave no deference to the Board’s interpretation of the law. “We review the Board’s statutory interpretation de novo.” The Court also gave no deference to the PTO’s “policy statement” made in its notice of final rules. The court does implicitly suggest – as it did in Versata – that implementation of a more thorough definition in the CFR rules would be given deference. However, the PTO has not taken that approach.
I do not know yet whether Google will push this case to the Supreme Court. The strongest argument is that Cuozzo implicitly overruled Versata. That is the holding suggested by Alito’s dissenting interpretation of the Cuozzo majority.
This case is going to cause some problems.
Normally, if Client A and Lawyer A have a confidential communication, disclosure of it to a third party waives any privilege. However, if Client A and the third party have a “common interest,” there is no waiver. So, for example, if a licensor communicates with patent prosecution counsel for the licensee about prosecution of a foreign counterpart of the licensed patent, there might be a privilege.
But not under New York law. The Court of Appeals, inaptly named highest court of New York, held that only if there is pending or anticipated litigation is the common interest exception to waiver available. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., (June 9, 2016).
In the end, I don’t know how important Amdocs will be, but it offers an interesting split decision on the eligibility of software patent claims. Senior Judge Plager and Judge Newman were in the majority — finding the claims eligible — with Judge Reyna in dissent. One takeaway is that the Federal Circuit continues to be divided on the issues. By luck-of-the-panel in this case, the minority on the court as a whole were the majority on the panel (pushing against Alice & Mayo). Going forward, the split can be reconciled by another Supreme Court opinion, a forceful Federal Circuit en banc decision, or perhaps by future judicial appointments by President Trump. I expect 2-3 vacancies on the court during Trump’s first term.
You’ll note that the claim is an almost pure software claim — requiring “computer code” “embodied on a computer readable storage medium.” The code has three functions: (1) receiving a network accounting record; (2) correlating the record with additional accounting information; and (3) using the accounting information to “enhance” the original network accounting record. The claim term “enhance” is construed narrowly than you might imagine as the addition of one or more fields to the record. An example of an added field would be a user’s name that might be added to the accounting record that previously used a numeric identifier. The court also found that the term “enhance” should be interpreted as requiring that – and doing so in a “a distributed fashion … close to their sources” rather than at a centralized location. This narrow interpretation of the term “enhance” do not flow naturally from the claim language, but do turn out to be crucial to the outcome.
In reviewing the claim, the court noted that “somewhat facially-similar claims” have been alternatively invalidated as abstract ideas and found eligible. Compare, for example, Digitech with Enfish and DDR. Here, the court wrote that the claims are “much closer” to the ones found eligible. I might rewrite their opinion to say that the judges in the majority prefer the decisions finding eligibility over those invalidating software patent claims.
The two recent Supreme Court cases of Alice and Mayo spell out the court’s two-step framework for determining whether a patent is improperly directed to one of the excluded categories of abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature. Briefly, the court first determines whether “the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” If so, the decision-maker must then determine whether any particular elements in the claim “transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” This second step requires consideration of additional elements both individually and in combination in search for an “inventive concept . . . sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” [Quoting Mayo and Alice throughout].
In making its eligibility conclusion in Amdocs, the appellate majority focused on the claim requirement (as construed) that processing be done in a distributed fashion. According to the court, “enhancing data in a distributed fashion” is “an unconventional technological solution . . . to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Remember here though that we are not talking about patenting a distributed system, but rather patenting a “computer program product embodied on a computer readable storage medium” used to implement the features.
Despite being the stated “unconventional” idea of using a distributed architecture, the court noted that the patent may still fail on anticipation or obviousnesss grounds.
Writing in dissent, Judge Reyna offered several different arguments. First, Reyna argue that the court’s skipping of Alice/Mayo Step 1 helped lead to an incorrect result. If you do not define the abstract idea at issue, how do you know whether the claim includes something more? Reyna also argued that the “distribution architecture … is insufficient to satisfy Alice step two” because the limitation is not actually found in the claims and, even as interpreted provide only a functional result. Reyna does note that the specification provides sufficient description of a distributed architecture, but that the claims themselves lack the requisite detail.
The specifications disclose a distributed system architecture comprising special-purpose components configured to cooperate with one another according to defined protocols in a user-configurable manner for the purpose of deriving useful accounting records in a more scalable and efficient manner than previously possible. The disclosed system improves upon prior art systems by creating a specific “distributed filtering and aggregation system . . . [that] eliminates capacity bottlenecks” through distributed processing. ’ The disclosed system is patent eligible. But the inquiry is not whether the specifications disclose a patent-eligible system, but whether the claims are directed to a patent ineligible concept.
The following is reprinted from USPTO Director Michelle K. Lee’s “Director’s Blog.” On December 13, 2016, the USPTO is hosting its next patent quality conference.
I’m pleased to report that we have completed the Clarity of the Record Pilot launched earlier this year as part of our Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative. We’ve achieved our goal of identifying some best practices for enhancing the clarity of various aspects of the prosecution record. These include best practices for documenting the USPTO’s positions with respect to claim interpretation, reasons for allowance, and interview summaries as well as encouraging examiners to initiate pre-search interviews when needed to gain a better understanding of the claimed invention. I would like to fill you in on some of our findings, and also encourage you to attend our day-long patent quality conference on December 13, where we will report in detail on the progress of the dozen or so programs in the Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative.
As a result of this pilot, we found there is progress to be made in the treatment of 35 USC 112(f) limitations, interview summaries, and reasons for allowance, while our highest clarity was in the area of 35 USC 102 and 103 rejections. Going forward, we plan to continue increasing clarity in all aspects of our practice.
140% more best practices as compared to control cases for assessments of 35 USC 112(f) limitations.
Also, we found that pilot participants carried on using the best practices they learned in the pilot, even to applications not in the pilot program. This is a strong indication that the examiners embraced the training. We also had anecdotal evidence that pilot participants encouraged fellow, non-pilot examiners to use the best practices during the prosecution of their own cases. Clearly the pilot participants saw a value to using these best practices when examining applications.
The Clarity of the Record Pilot ran from March 6 to August 20 of this year. To ensure a diverse pool of examiners, we invited randomly selected utility patent examiners with at least two years of patent examining experience to participate. All told, 125 examiners representing all utility technology centers participated, and roughly two-thirds of these participants were primary examiners.
The pilot kicked off with initial training in the form of four different modules – an initial module to provide participants with an overview of the pilot and three modules to provide identified best practices to enhance clarity with respect to the pilot’s three focus areas – claim interpretation, reasons for allowance and interview summaries. All of the modules started with a discussion about the goals of the pilot and the importance of clarity of the record.
Pilot participants were expected to use identified best practices when drafting office actions for a select number of cases. In addition, throughout the pilot, participants attended meetings (called “quality enhancement meetings”) to discuss interesting takeaways with fellow pilot participants. The quality enhancement meetings were typically held with examiners working within similar technologies; however, there were also pilot-wide meetings involving invited speakers, including a judge from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and the Commissioner for Patents, who shared their perspective on the importance of clarifying the prosecution record. Participants also met biweekly with a pilot manager to receive one-on-one training and to consult on lessons learned.
To evaluate the pilot, the Office of Patent Quality Assurance reviewed the clarity of approximately 2,600 cases for a statistical assessment of whether the best practices of the pilot improved the clarity of office actions. In addition, we analyzed feedback from the quality enhancement meetings and training sessions, including a list of best practices developed by the pilot participants. Using this information, we identified the best practices that were key drivers of overall clarity. Based on the results from the pilot program, we are analyzing the data to provide recommendations on implementation of the pilot’s best practices across the patent examining corps.
Cooper v. Lee and Cooper v. Square are both ask the same question: whether 35 U.S.C. §318(b) violates Article III of the United States Constitution, to the extent that it empowers an executive agency tribunal to assert judicial power canceling private property rights amongst private parties embroiled in a private federal dispute of a type known in the common law courts of 1789, rather than merely issue an advisory opinion as an adjunct to a trial court.” The issues here are also parallel to those raised in MCM Portfolio v. HP (“Does IPR violate Article III of the Constitution?”). The cases received a boost this month with the Court’s call for response (CFR) in Cooper v. Square. Square had previously waived its right to respond, but its response is now expected by October 11, 2016. Under Supreme Court R. 37, the Call for Response reopens the period for filing of an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner. (~ due October 8, 2016). Eight Amici Curiae briefs were filed in MCM and two in Cooper v. Lee. In general, each brief additional brief incrementally increases the odds of certiorari. Statistical analysis also suggests that a call for response significantly increases the odds of certiorari being granted.
I wrote earlier this week about the new IPR process challenge in Ethicon where the patentee has challenged Director Lee’s delegation of institution decision authority to the PTAB. The case is one of statutory interpretation but uses the separation-of-function doctrine as an interpretive guide. The same question is also presented in LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Pharmatech Solutions, Inc. Both petitioners (Ethicon and LifeScan) are owned by J&J.
The final new petition is a personal jurisdiction case: Mylan v. Acorda. The Hatch-Waxman setup involved Mylan preparing and filing its abbreviated new drug application that created a cause of action for infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2). Although the ANDA preparation occurred in West Virginia and the filing in Maryland, the infringement lawsuit was filed by Acorda in Delaware. Mylan asks: “Whether the mere filing of an abbreviated new drug application by a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer is sufficient to subject the manufacturer to specific personal jurisdiction in any state where it might someday market the drug.” The argument builds on the non-patent decision Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). In the pro-business case of Daimler, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of general personal jurisdiction to states where the defendant company is incorporated or has its personal place of business.
On the merits side – we have three patent cases pending oral arguments. First-up is the design patent damages case of Apple v. Samsung. Although not a party, the Solicitor General has requested to been granted leave to participate in oral arguments. Its brief, the SJ argued (1) Section 289 does not permit apportionment but rather requires award of the infringers profits on the relevant article of manufacture; but (2) the article of manufacture can be a “component” rather than a finished product sold to end-users. In the end, the SJ argues that the jury should have been tasked with determining the appropriate article-of-manufacture and that the case should be remanded to determine whether a new trial is warranted. Briefing continues in both SCA Hygiene (laches) and Life Tech (Component Export liability).
Referring to the headline. The PTAB (acting on behalf of the PTO Director) held that traditional equitable defenses do not apply to IPR proceedings. Because this holding was made as part of an IPR institution decision, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The case here is interesting because Husky’s former owner (Schad) is the founder of competitor Athena. Schad is also co-inventor of Husky’s U.S. Patent No. 7,670,536 – that Schad’s company challenged in an IPR proceedings. The PTAB ultimately found some of the challenged claims valid and cancelled others.
[Prior cases] establish a two-part inquiry for determining whether we may review a particular challenge to the decision whether to institute. First, we must determine whether the challenge at issue is “closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes review,” or if it instead “implicate[s] constitutional questions,” “depend[s] on other less closely related statutes,” or “present[s] other questions of interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact,” “well beyond ‘this section.’” Cuozzo. If the latter, our authority to review the decision to institute appears unfettered. But if the former, § 314(d) forbids our review. One further exception remains, however. At the second step of the inquiry, we must ask if, despite the challenge being grounded in a “statute closely related to that decision to institute,” it is nevertheless directed to the Board’s ultimate invalidation authority with respect to a specific patent. Id.; see also Versata; and Achates. If so, we may review the challenge.
After rejecting Husky’s challenge of the institution decision, the Federal Circuit moved to Athena’s appeal.
Incorporation by Reference: Athena challenged the portion of the Board’s opinion finding some of the claims not anticipated. The basic issue is that the prior art (Glaesener – U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2004-0208950) did not itself disclose all of the claimed elements. However Glaesener referred particularly to a prior patent (Choi): noting that Choi described “pineapple and toothed-ring mechanism” and in a separate paragraph stating that “All cross-referenced patents and application[s] referred to in this specification are hereby incorporated by reference.” The combination of Choi and Glaesener do (arguably) teach all of the claim element but the Board refused to treat them as a single document despite the incorporation by reference. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has vacated that holding.
Here, the court found sufficient particularity to incorporate Choi by reference – noting that PHOSITA would “appreciate Glaesener’s reference of ‘pineapple and toothed-ring’ to describe, with sufficient particularity” the securing assemblies in Choi. “To find otherwise would be to undervalue the knowledge of a skilled artisan.” On remand, the Board will need to re-evaluate anticipation based upon Glaesener now expanded by Choi.
Abbott’s patent broadly covers Tumor Necrosis Factor α binding protein (TBP-II). U.S. Patent No. 5,344,915. The U.S. application was filed in 1990, but claims priority to two German applications filed in 1989. A would-be anticipatory prior art reference (Engelmann) was published after the priority applications but before the U.S. application – and the parties have agreed that dispute turns on whether the claims get to rely upon the early priority date.
A priority filing is only effective if the claimed invention was sufficiently described in the original filing. This implementation of the written description requirement requires the invention “be disclosed in a way that clearly allows a person of ordinary skill to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed and possessed the claimed subject matter at the date of filing.” Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). In the priority context, failure of written description does not directly invalidate the claims but instead effectively negates the priority claim. Here, that date is critical because of the intervening prior art.
Abbott’s Claim 1 is directed to the binding protein with “a molecular weight of about 42,000 daltons” and that has at “the N-terminus the amino acid sequence Xaa Thr Pro Tyr Ala Pro Glu Pro Gly Set Thr Cys Arg Leu Arg Glu . . . .” The problem though is that neither of Abbott’s priority filings expressly disclose the claimed N-terminus sequence.
Under the doctrine of inherent disclosure, when a specification describes an invention that has certain undisclosed yet inherent properties, that specification serves as adequate written description to support a subsequent patent application that explicitly recites the invention’s inherent properties.
Slip Opinion at 6 (citing Kennecott).
The Supreme Court will begin granting and denying petitions in early October. Meanwhile, several new petitions are now on file. Last week I wrote about the TC Heartland case as a mechanism for limiting venue. Without any good reason, the Federal Circuit overruled a 1957 Supreme Court case that had strictly limited patent venue as spelled out in the patent venue statute 1400(b). See VE Holdings (explaining its overruling of Fourco Glass). A result of VE Holdings is the expansive venue availability that facilitated the rise of E.D. Texas as the most popular patent venue. TC Heartland simply asks the Supreme Court reassert its Fourco holding – something that could almost be done with a one-line opinion: “REVERSED. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).” The best arguments for the Federal Circuit’s approach are (1) the reasoning of Fourco itself is a bit dodgy; and (2) VE Holdings is well settled doctrine (decided 26 years ago) and Congress has revised the statutory provisions several times without amending. As a side note, several members of Congress have suggested they will act legislatively if SCOTUS fails to act.
Two new petitions (Grunenthal v. Teva and Purdue v. Epic) stem from the same Federal Circuit OxyContin case and focus on anticipation and obviousness respectively. Grunenthal v. Teva questions how ‘inherently’ operates for anticipation purposes. Purdue suggests that – despite the final sentence of Section 103, that the actual circumstances of the invention should be available to help prove non-obviousness (but still not be available to prove obviousness). Another new petition includes the BPCIA case Apotex v. Amgen that serves as a complement to the pending Sandoz case questioning the requirements and benefits of providing notice of commercial marketing.
Finally – Encyclopedia Britannica v. Dickstein Shapiro is a patent prosecution malpractice action. The lower court held the lawyers harmless since Alice would have invalidated the patents even if drafted to perfection. The petition asks whether Alice Corp can excuse patent prosecutors from alleged prosecution errors made well prior to that decision.
Wi-Fi One is the new owner of Ericcson’s U.S. Patent No. 6,772,215 that covers a method for encoding and sending packet-receipt error messages over the internet. In 2013, Broadcom brought this IPR challenge and the Board eventually found many of the claims anticipated.
On appeal here Wi-Fi challenges Broadcom’s standing to bring the IPR challenge under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Section 315(b) indicates that an IPR proceeding may not be instituted if the petitioner (or its privy) had been served with an infringement complaint more than one year prior.
315(b) Patent Owner’s Action.— An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.
Although Broadcom had not been previously sued on the patent, Wi-Fi argues that its privies had been previously sued. The PTAB rejected that argument – finding that Broadcom was not a “privy” of the prior litigants because Wi-Fi did not prove that Broadcom had power to control the prior district court litigation or that Broadcom would be bound by the outcome of that prior litigation. The Board also refused Wi-Fi’s request for further discovery on the matter.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed — holding that the question of proper institution is unreviewable based upon the statutory statement that “The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). Although I have not quite found the line in the decision, is appears that the court also held that even the denial of discovery is unreviewable.
The Supreme Court extended the preclusion of judicial review to statutes related to the decision to institute; it did not limit the rule of preclusion to substantive patentability determinations made at the institution stage, as the facts of Cuozzo itself make clear.
Slip Opinion at 8. The decision here essentially follows the Federal Circuit’s prior ruling in Achates.
The court also sided with the Board on Wi-Fi’s substantive argument – affirming the Board decision that the prior art anticipates.
The 1989 priority date of Genetic Tech’s patent reaches back to the heyday of gene discovery and the claims are directed to a technique of detecting gene alleles. U.S. Patent No. 5,612,179. The claimed method is based upon the insight that genes are typically associated non-coding regions of DNA — i.e., based upon a the phenomenon known as “linkage disequilibrirum”, someone who inherits a particular gene from a parent is also likely to inherit the nearby non-coding DNA regions from the same parent. Using that insight, the method amplifies DNA segments containing non-coding region associated with the gene and then checks the sequence of the associated coding section (the gene) that is incidentally amplified – looking for alleles of a known gene.
Dr. Malcolm Simons discovered that, in the DNA of unrelated individuals, a polymorphism in a non-coding DNA region and a coding region allele could be inherited together. This natural phenomenon is known as “linkage disequilibrium.” The discovery prompted Dr. Simons to invent a new and useful process for detecting a coding region allele of a multi-allelic genetic locus by interrogating a non-coding DNA sequence that is in linkage disequilibrium with that multi-allelic genetic locus. Dr. Simons’ invention, as reflected in claim 1 of the ‘179 patent, was advantageous for a number of reasons, including that it was more reliable and quicker than prior art identification processes that used direct identification of allelic variants.
A number of companies have licensed the patent, but Merial and Bristol-Myers refused. In the resulting litigation, the district court dismissed the case on the pleadings — finding that the claimed invention lacks eligibility as an unpatentable law of nature under Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed — holding that the relationship between coding and non-coding sequences was a naturally occurring phenomenon and that the additionally claimed laboratory techniques were used in a routine and conventional manner known at the time. Petitioner argues that patentability can be established by the fact that no one was “using the non-coding sequence as a surrogate marker for the coding region allele …” This novel feature survived both the original examination as well as reexamination.
Whether the Federal Circuit properly concluded – in conflict with other decisions of the Federal Circuit and this Court – that the definition of a patent-ineligible concept under the Mayo/Alice framework may include both a natural phenomenon and an inventor’s ingenuity in applying that natural phenomenon to a new and useful purpose?
Whether a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be properly granted based on patent-ineligibility – as the Federal Circuit determined below in conflict with other Federal Circuit decisions – when the record plausibly demonstrates that the claimed process inventively applies a natural phenomenon for a new and useful purpose, the claimed process does not improperly preempt the natural phenomenon, and the claimed process is not routine and conventional?
The defendants in this case (Merial and Bristol-Myers) waived their right to respond to the petition. That non-response has accelerated the case with a conference set for September 26. If the case is to move forward, we could expect the court to call for a response (CFR).
I’ll pause here to write a moment about the call-for-response system. The respondent to a Supreme Court petition for certiorari is not required to file a response but can instead waive her right to respond. At that point, the Supreme Court may request that a response be filed. Although the CFR comes from the Court, it is generally known that a single Justice can request the CFR – and that request is often triggered by questions raised by a single clerk. CFRs almost always issue prior to the conference. Bringing this back to the eligibility issue: We perhaps didn’t get the message from the Mayo/Alice Opinions and the Sequenom Denial. If it turns out that not even a single Justice (or Clerk) seeks a response in this case, we should understand that the Supreme Court believes it has sufficiently spoken on the issue of eligibility.
The two additional eligibility cases pending are Jericho Systems Corporation v. Axiomatics, Inc., et al., No. 15-1502 (Eligibility of Patent No. 8,560,836 under Section 101) and Essociate, Inc. v. Clickbooth.com, LLC, et al., No. 16-195 (please clarify the meaning of ‘abstract idea’ and ‘inventive process’).
One narrative of the decision here could focus on the difference between the expert appellate court willing to dig into the language of the patent documents themselves and the generalist trial court ready to rely upon expert testimony explaining the underlying documents. It is also a reminder that, for the Federal Circuit, the underlying patent and prior art documents represent the most important evidence available in a patent validity dispute.
Summary judgment is a mechanism for short-cutting a lawsuit prior to trial. The basic jurisprudential approach asks whether there are any genuine disputes of any material fact and whether the moving-party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. When considering the evidence produced, all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant’s favor.
Here, the district court ruled on summary judgments that Semcon’s asserted wafer finishing method patent claims are invalid as anticipated by a prior U.S. patent. (Holding that the claim of Semcon’s U.S. Patent No. 7,156,717 is as anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,010,538 (“Sun”)). On appeal, the Federal Circuit has vacated that judgment – finding that the prior art is not as clear as the district court concluded.
The actual dispute focuses on whether the prior art Sun describes the claimed step of relying upon both “in-situ process information” and “tracked information” to modify control parameters during the finish cycle. For its part, the district court adopted Micron’s expert’s conclusions that Sun disclosed that claimed process. Semcon did not present competing expert testimony that seemed to seal-the-deal for the district court.
On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit dug-into the patent documents and found (as suggested by Semcon) that the portions of Sun cited by Micron’s expert did not actually support the conclusions drawn. “In fact, however, the cited portions of Sun do not appear to support Dr. Dornfeld’s characterization.” The court then pointed to several portions of Sun that suggested that the “tracked information” was not used as a finish cycle control parameter.
Addressing the lack of competing-expert, the Federal Circuit wrote that “textual arguments” regarding the prior art reference as well as identifying inconsistencies in the opposing expert’s testimony were sufficient to create a dispute of material fact as to what was disclosed by Sun.

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