Source: https://www.lawweb.in/2018/03/whether-convicted-accused-is-liable-to_10.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 19:09:04+00:00

Document:
Law Web: Whether convicted accused is liable to pay compensation even after he has undergone default sentence in cheque dishonour of case?
Whether convicted accused is liable to pay compensation even after he has undergone default sentence in cheque dishonour of case?
These two judgments make it clear that the deeming fiction of Section 431 Code of Criminal Procedure extends not only to Section 421, but also to Section 64 of the Indian Penal Code. This being the case, Section 70 Indian Penal Code, which is the last in the group of Sections dealing with sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine must also be included as applying directly to compensation Under Section 357(3) as well. The position in law now becomes clear. The deeming provision in Section 431 will apply to Section 421(1) as well, despite the fact that the last part of the proviso to Section 421(1) makes a reference only to an order for payment of expenses or compensation out of a fine, which would necessarily refer only to Section 357(1) and not 357(3). Despite this being so, so long as compensation has been directed to be paid, albeit Under Section 357(3), Section 431, Section 70 Indian Penal Code and Section 421(1) proviso would make it clear that by a legal fiction, even though a default sentence has been suffered, yet, compensation would be recoverable in the manner provided Under Section 421(1). This would, however, be without the necessity for recording any special reasons. This is because Section 421(1) proviso contains the disjunctive "or" following the recommendation of the Law Commission, that the proviso to old Section 386(1) should not be a bar to the issue of a warrant for levy of fine, even when a sentence of imprisonment for default has been fully undergone. The last part inserted into the proviso to Section 421(1) as a result of this recommendation of the Law Commission is a category by itself which applies to compensation payable out of a fine Under Section 357(1) and, by applying the fiction contained in Section 431, to compensation payable Under Section 357(3).
Kumaran Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.
Considering the fact that this is an offence Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act I do not consider this to be a fit case to be proceeded under the Probation of Offenders Act. I am of the view that simple imprisonment for 4 months for the offence Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would meet the ends of justice. The Accused is further directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 2,75,000/- to the complainant Under Section 357(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure. In default of payment of compensation, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for 1 month.
4. The Accused challenged the aforesaid judgment before the Court of Sessions, and the Appellate Court, by an order dated 27th April, 2006, confirmed the conviction, but reduced the sentence to imprisonment till rising of the Court. The order to pay compensation with the default Clause was, however, sustained. The Accused underwent imprisonment till the rising of the Court and also underwent the default sentence for non-payment of compensation. The second Respondent filed CMP No. 2018 of 2008 before the learned Judicial Magistrate Under Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for realising compensation by issuing a distress warrant against the accused. This CMP was allowed on 19th July, 2008, and a distress warrant for the realisation of compensation was issued. A recalling petition filed by the Accused was dismissed on 29th March, 2011. The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 8th August, 2012, held that despite the fact that the default sentence was undergone, yet, under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, compensation was recoverable, and upheld the orders of the learned Judicial Magistrate.
6. Shri C.K. Sasi, learned Counsel for the Respondent, has repelled the above submissions. According to the learned Counsel, by operation of the deeming fiction contained in Section 431 Code of Criminal Procedure compensation can be realized even if the Accused had undergone the default sentence. The exception provided in the proviso to Section 421 is to achieve the object of payment of compensation to the victim of the offence. According to learned Counsel, the purpose of Section 421 being victim compensation, the provision must be liberally construed to meet the ends of justice. This being so, the Division Bench judgment cannot be faulted on any score.
(5) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation under this section.
It is important to note that Sub-section (3) is a new provision which did not exist in the old Code of Criminal Procedure.
Provided that no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender.
Provided that Section 421 shall, in its application to an order Under Section 359, by virtue of this section, be construed as if in the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 421, after the words and figures "Under Section 357", the words and figures "or an order for payment of costs Under Section 359" had been inserted.
From this provision, it is clear that a deeming fiction is enacted, viz., that any money other than a fine, (which would include compensation payable Under Section 357(3) Code of Criminal Procedure) the method of recovery of which is not expressly provided for, shall be recoverable as if it was a fine. One of the bones of contention in these appeals is the effect of the deeming fiction Under Section 431.
68. Imprisonment to terminate on payment of fine.- The imprisonment which is imposed in default of payment of a fine shall terminate whenever that fine is either paid or levied by process of law.
70. Fine leviable within six years, or during imprisonment - Death not to discharge property from liability.--The fine, or any part thereof which remains unpaid, may be levied at any time within six years after the passing of the sentence, and if, under the sentence, the offender be liable to imprisonment for a longer period than six years, then at any time previous to the expiration of that period; and the death of the offender does not discharge from the liability any property which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts.
On June 30, 1934, the applicant was Released from jail, having served not only his substantive sentence, but also the sentence imposed upon him in default of payment of the fine, and he now asks that the warrant for the recovery of the fine issued against him should be withdrawn, and in support of his contention he relies on the proviso to Section 386(1). That proviso provides that if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue a warrant under the Section unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing it considers it necessary to do so. The proviso applies in terms only to the issue of a fresh warrant and does not require the withdrawal of a warrant already issued before expiration of the sentence in default of payment. But, I think that, in dealing with such existing warrants, the Court should follow the policy which seems to have inspired the proviso to Section 386. That policy appears to be that in general an offender ought not to be required both to pay the fine and to serve the sentence in default. But the proviso enables a warrant to be issued for recovery of the fine, even if the whole sentence in default has been served, if the Court considers that there are special reasons for issuing the warrant. I apprehend that the special reasons should be reasons accounting for the fact that the fine has not been recovered before the sentence in default has been served, and any reasons which are directed to that point would be relevant. It may be that the authorities, through no negligence on their part, did not know of the existence of the property or the Accused may have inherited property after he served his sentence in default; or there may not have been time to execute the warrant. Matters of that sort would all be special reasons for issuing a warrant after the sentence in default had been served; and I think, in the same way, they are reasons justifying the Court in refusing to withdraw a warrant already issued. In the present case, in my opinion, there are special reasons, though not quite those which were recorded by the Judge. I think that a special reason for not withdrawing the warrant is that before the sentence in default had been served the authorities had taken steps to enforce this warrant by levying execution, upon the immoveable property of the applicant, and the delay which has taken place is not, in my opinion, shown to be due to any default on the part of the authorities. The learned Judge himself gave as his reasons for not withdrawing the warrant that the offence was a serious one, and the complainant had been allotted part of the fine. In my view, reasons of that sort are not relevant because they do not account for the fine not having been recovered before the service of the sentence in default. For these reasons, I think the application must be refused.
In Digamber Kashinath Bhavarthi v. Emperor (MANU/MH/0118/1934 : AIR 1935 Bom 160): (1935-36 Cri LJ 1034) the Bombay High Court pointed out that special reasons mentioned in Section 386 of the old Code should be reasons accounting for the fact that the fine had not been recovered from the convict before the sentence in default had been served out and any reasons which are directed to that point would be relevant applying that test, I am unable to say that the reasons-given by the learned Sessions Judge is not relevant. It must be pointed that, that the discretion is of the learned Sessions Judge and sitting in revision it may not be interfered with lightly.
Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue such warrant unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing it considers it necessary to do so."
18. A Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Saji Kumar v. Soman Pillai, MANU/KE/0258/2006 : 2006 (3) KLT 679, set out Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and held that the fiction contained in Section 431 Code of Criminal Procedure must be extended logically until its object is accomplished. A non-fine must be deemed to be a fine for the purpose of recovery, and until recovery is complete, the fiction must continue. Having so held, the learned Judge stated that the proviso to Section 421(1) would apply not merely to Section 357(1), but also to Section 357(3) and this being so, held that despite the fact that the default sentence had been undergone, compensation Under Section 357(3) is recoverable. The impugned judgment before us of the same High Court approved of the conclusion of the aforesaid judgment, but with completely different reasoning. According to the Division Bench, "compensation" is not a "sentence" and this being the case, would not be covered by the proviso to Section 421(1). This would make it clear that since compensation is otherwise recoverable, despite the default sentence having been undergone, ultimately, a warrant can be issued under the first part of Section 421(1).
20. In Collector of Broach and Panchmahals v. Ochhavlal Bhikalal MANU/MH/0116/1940 : AIR 1941 Bom 158, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (i.e. the predecessor Section to Section 421 of the present Code) relates only to procedure, whereas the substantive law as to payment of fine is contained in Section 70 of the Penal Code. This being the case, it was held that the limitation period of six years from the date of the sentence barred the darkhast that was presented in that case.
The jurisdiction of the trial court to impose a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is merely permissive. It is not imperative to award a term of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine. Section 64, Penal Code (Section 53, Travancore Code) only states that it shall be competent to the court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine. Further, imprisonment in default of payment of fine does not liberate an Accused person from his liability to pay the fine imposed on him. Such imprisonment does not serve as a discharge or satisfaction of the fine, but is imposed as a punishment for nonpayment. The fine would remain alive for collection for six years after the passing of the sentence. Assuming the Accused counter-petitioner has no means now to pay the same, it can be recovered from any property acquired by him within the period specified. Even his death will not discharge from the liability any property which would, after his death be legally liable for his debts. (Section 70, Penal Code, corresponding to Section 59, Travancore Penal Code).
22. In K. Vemmana Shenoy v. Collector of South Kanara MANU/KA/0088/1964 : AIR 1964 Mys. 64, a Single Judge of that High Court adverted to the amending Act of 1923, by which a substantial change was made to Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which made it clear that the offender should not be made to pay fine as well as undergo imprisonment in default of payment of the fine in the absence of special reasons to be recorded in writing. The learned Single Judge held that Section 70 Indian Penal Code read with Section 386(1) proviso would necessarily lead to the conclusion that in the absence of special reasons to be recorded in writing, the fine cannot be recovered after the offender has undergone imprisonment in default of payment.
28.10. Fine should be recoverable when compensation has been ordered. - We notice that in the above judgment the fact that the complainant has been allotted part of the fine was not considered a relevant special reason for purposes of the proviso as it stands. A contumacious offender should not, in our opinion, be permitted to deprive the aggrieved party of the small compensation awarded to it by the device of undergoing the sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine. When an order Under Section 545 has been passed for payment of expenses or compensation out of fine, recovery of the fine should be pursued, and in such cases, the fact that the sentence of imprisonment in default has been fully undergone should not be a bar to the issue of a warrant for levy of the fine. We recommend that the proviso to Section 386(1) should make this clear.
Provided that Section 421 shall, in its application to an order Under Section 359, by virtue of this section, be construed as if in the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 421, after the words and figures 'Under Section 357', the words and figures 'or an order for payment of costs Under Section 359' had been inserted."
Section 431 makes it clear that any money other than a fine payable on account of an order passed under the Code shall be recoverable as if it were a fine which takes us to Section 64 Indian Penal Code.
64. Sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine.--In every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, whether with or without imprisonment, and in every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine, or with fine only, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, it shall be competent to the court which sentences such offender to direct by the sentence that, in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall suffer imprisonment for a certain term, which imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he may have been sentenced or to which he may be liable under a commutation of a sentence."
31. The provisions of Sections 357(3) and 431 Code of Criminal Procedure, when read with Section 64 Indian Penal Code, empower the court, while making an order for payment of compensation, to also include a default sentence in case of non-payment of the same.
26. This statement of the law was reiterated in R. Mohan v. A.K. Vijaya Kumar MANU/SC/0520/2012 : (2012) 8 SCC 721 (see paras 26 to 29).
27. These two judgments make it clear that the deeming fiction of Section 431 Code of Criminal Procedure extends not only to Section 421, but also to Section 64 of the Indian Penal Code. This being the case, Section 70 Indian Penal Code, which is the last in the group of Sections dealing with sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine must also be included as applying directly to compensation Under Section 357(3) as well. The position in law now becomes clear. The deeming provision in Section 431 will apply to Section 421(1) as well, despite the fact that the last part of the proviso to Section 421(1) makes a reference only to an order for payment of expenses or compensation out of a fine, which would necessarily refer only to Section 357(1) and not 357(3). Despite this being so, so long as compensation has been directed to be paid, albeit Under Section 357(3), Section 431, Section 70 Indian Penal Code and Section 421(1) proviso would make it clear that by a legal fiction, even though a default sentence has been suffered, yet, compensation would be recoverable in the manner provided Under Section 421(1). This would, however, be without the necessity for recording any special reasons. This is because Section 421(1) proviso contains the disjunctive "or" following the recommendation of the Law Commission, that the proviso to old Section 386(1) should not be a bar to the issue of a warrant for levy of fine, even when a sentence of imprisonment for default has been fully undergone. The last part inserted into the proviso to Section 421(1) as a result of this recommendation of the Law Commission is a category by itself which applies to compensation payable out of a fine Under Section 357(1) and, by applying the fiction contained in Section 431, to compensation payable Under Section 357(3).
if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of those in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.
29. The legal fiction enacted Under Section 431 is not limited to "the purpose of this Act" unlike Section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act, as was the case in Ashok Leyland Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu MANU/SC/0020/2004 : (2004) 3 SCC 1 at para 32, 76. Thus it is clear that the object of the legal fiction created by Section 431 is to extend for the purpose of recovery of compensation until such recovery is completed-and this would necessarily take us not only to Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but also to Section 70 of the Penal Code, a companion criminal statute, as has been held above.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.