Source: https://www.ptab.us/2009/11/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:25:39+00:00

Document:
To anticipate under § 102, the prior art reference “must not only disclose all elements within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Net MoneyIn, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Thus, it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses part of the claimed invention, which an ordinary artisan might supplement to make the whole, or that it includes multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Id. at 1371. See also In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972) (“[T]he [prior art] reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.”).
Ex Parte Fukumura HORNER 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
Ex Parte Laux et al HAIRSTON 112(1)/103(a) BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
Appellants concede that drawings can anticipate claims when they clearly show the structure that is claimed (citing MPEP § 2125 and In re Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069 (CCPA 1972)), but also correctly point out that drawings “cannot be relied upon for precise proportions or particular sizes of objects when the specification is silent on the matter,” citing Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Ex Parte Marks et al WHITEHEAD, JR. 103(a) CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
Mere lawyer's arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re GEISLER, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The specification underlying a “single means” claim per se fails to enable the full scope of the claim. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
By its own terms, the sixth paragraph of § 112 limits the scope only of an element in a claim for a combination. A single means claim recites a structure having only a single element, not a combination of elements. The sixth paragraph of § 112 does not limit the scope of a claim reciting a structure comprising only one element, even if the element is recited as a “means” for performing a specified function. Without the limitation provided by the sixth paragraph of § 112, the “means” recited in a single means claim encompasses any structure which might be capable of performing the specified function. Since the disclosure of any specification will be limited to those means known by the inventor, no specification can be drawn sufficiently broadly to teach how to make and use the full scope of a single means claim. Id. at 715.

References: § 102
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 § 2125
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 § 112
 § 112
 § 112