Source: http://www.xenu-directory.net/mirrors/www.whyaretheydead.net/lisa_mcpherson/legal/Motion_to_Change_Venue_0305.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:20:38+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff, Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. (Flag), by its undersigned counsel, pursuant to Florida Statutes, § 47.101 (2002), moves the court for a change of venue to Palm Beach or Broward County, but in no event to any county within the circulation of the St. Petersburg Times or within the broadcasting reach of television stations WFLA-8 (NBC), WTVT-.13 (Fox), WTSP-10 (CBS) or WFTS-28 (ABC). The grounds for this motion are set forth in the following memorandum.
Flag has learned that the breadth and intensity of “community prejudice” against both the Scientology religion and Flag within Pinellas County is such that Flag cannot receive a fair trial in this venue. The community prejudice has been fueled by an ongoing barrage of negative media comments, principally by the St. Petersburg Times and the local television stations, including publication of inflammatory and unethical public statements by Kennan Dandar. Flag thus moves for a change of venue to Palm Beach or Broward County but, in no event, to any county within the circulation of the St. Petersburg Times or the broadcasting reach of television stations WFLA-8 (NBC), WTVT-13 (Fox), WTSP-1O (CBS) or WFTS-28 (ABC).
A party may move to change venue based upon “community prejudice” under either § 47.101 or § 47.121. Under the former, there is a filing time limit of ten days from when the action is at issue unless good cause is shown for a later filing. The latter contains no time limit and, indeed, appears from the statute and the case law to contemplate the filing of the motion during the actual jury selection process. See, e.g., Thornton v. DeBerry By and Through DeBerry, 548 So.2d 1177 (4th DCA 1989).
3) The enormous waste to the public and the judicial system in time and money were Flag limited to seeking a § 47.121 change of venue during jury selection that itself will require an enormous venire, is itself good cause to decide the substantive issue now.
. . . the prejudicial conduct in its collective import is so extensive that its influence pervades the trIal, gravely impairing a calm and dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the jury . . .
Tyus v. Apalachicola Northern Railroad Company, 130 So.2d 580, 587 (Fla. 1961).
Similarly, while Judicial Administration Rule 2.160 provides for a 10-day time limit on the filing of a motion to disqualify a judge, the law is well-settled that where the judge's alleged bias is inimical to public policy or the prejudice manifest, the time limit must be ignored. See, Pistorino v. Ferguson, 386 So.2d 65, 66-67 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980); Klapper-Barrett v. Nurell, 742 So.2d 851, 852-53 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Here, the degree of community ill-will and villification shown below is of such a level as similarly to go beyond mere venue questions and to so implicate fundamental due process rights that procedural time limits must yield.
Good cause for this Court to consider the issue now clearly exists as well in the practical sense in that were Flag relegated to making a § 47.121 motion during jury selection, the Court would first have to endure the enormous burden in time and expense of a selection process which will almost certainly end with the same result — a change of venue — given the overwhelming evidence of community prejudice shown here. In fact, recognizing the difficulty, in seating a fair and impartial jury in the wrongful death case, Judge Schaeffer advised the parties on January 7, 2003, that she had directed the clerk to summon 1,700 persons for the venire. (Ex. 3, January 7, 2003 Tr., p. 38.)  To incur that burden in time and expense in this case in the face of the now evident certainty that a proper jury cannot be seated here, is itself good cause to avoid that wasteful endeavor and to determine the issue now.
By 1997, when Kennan Dandar filed the wrongful death action alleging that Flag was culpable for the December, 1995, death of Ms. McPherson, decades-old community prejudice had subsided markedly from its earlier levels. By 1997, both the Scientology religion and Flag had greatly expanded their presence in this county and, through their involvement in a host of community outreach and good corporate citizen activities, one would have thought that the days of media hate-mongering and public animus had perhaps gone the way of racial hatred. Indeed, before the McPherson era, the media regularly reported stories laudatory of Flag's community contributions, including awards received for its spirited public service. (Ex. 5.) To the extent the tide had been turning by 1997, however, the McPherson wrongful death case set the clock back.
As of May 5, 2003, the post-1995 pre-trial media coverage of the wrongful death accusations and press statements on other subjects about the Scientology religion and Flag reached overwhelmingly negative epidemic proportions, amounting to a total of 1334 published articles, including 77 editorials and columns and 119 letters to the editor, appearing in the St. Petersburg Times and the Tampa Tribune. (Ex. 6, Affidavit of Ben Shaw.) That massive press assault, which continues today, went well beyond the McPherson case to such disparate subjects as some Scientology parishioners' private purchase of a building in Clearwater and the opening of other Scientology churches in the county.
To fully appreciate the breadth of this media assault, Flag notes that another local high profile case that garnered a significant volume of pre-trial media was the Oba Chandler case. Oba Chandler went on trial in September, 1994. Before trial some 170 published articles appeared on Chandler and the homicide. (Ex. 7, Chandler motion.) The defense filed a change of venue motion based entirely on the prejudicial pre-trial publicity. In that case Judge Susan Schaeffer determined that it would not be possible to impanel a fair and impartial jury in Pinellas County and granted a change of venue. Yet in the Chandler case the pre-trial publicity extended to only 20% of the volume of published material attacking either Scientology or Flag since Lisa McPherson's death. Flag hastens to point out that the present case is not the wrongful death case, but given: the mountain of adverse press almost invariably identifying Flag and McPherson; the presence of the same parties here; and the fact that trial of this case will necessarily require some disclosures to the jury about McPherson's death and the wrongful death case, the poison is just as toxic to the jury pool. And while the particulars of the adverse, inflammatory media statements that relate to the McPherson case may be more pertinent to that case, the spillover pollution of the jury pool here cannot be so ignored.
To appreciate the anti-Scientology message relentlessly trumpeted by the St. Petersburg Times, one need go no further than a sample of headlines from its editorials and columns over the past five years: “Scientology's Bullying” (1/25/97, Ex. 8); “A Quiet Paranoia Settles in Clearwater” (2/23/97, Ex. 9); “Intimidating the IRS” (3/11/97, Ex. 10); “The Hypocrisy of Scientology” (12/2/97, Ex. 11); “The Prosecutor's Duty” (12/9/97, Ex. 12); “Scientology's New Tack” (11/20/98, Ex. 13); “A Cry for Justice” (3/3/00, Ex. 14); “Who'll Save the Serfs in the Land of the Lost?” (6/27/00, Ex. 15); and many more in the same vein.
They are the ones that killed Lisa McPherson. They are the ones that captured her and threw her into the Fort Harrison Hotel against her will.
They killed Lisa McPherson — she is dead. Her entire death was preventable, they chose to let her die in following the dictates of Scientology.
Through an isolation, they were following the exact programs authored by the founder of the Church of Scientology, Mr. Hubbard, and as a result of those programs they killed Lisa McPherson.
There was no accident involved here. This was a very standardly prescribed procedure which the Church followed to the letter; and according to Hubbard sometimes people don?t make it, they die, and that's what happened to Lisa.
I'm here to talk about the murder of Lisa McPherson by a cult known as the Church of Scientology.
Counting only those media that reach audiences in Pinellas County, Dandar has appeared 46 times on television making such unethical, incendiary statements, and his statements have been quoted in 65 newspaper articles.
Flag accepts that a price we pay for a free society is freedom of the press even when in the form of the kind of hurtful journalism shown here. But Flag need not accept trial in this polluted environment, nor need it accept the unethical sound bites that Dandar provided to the press.
Thus, a total of 25, or 100% percent of the group, offered a strongly negative, vitriolic response.
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670 (SDNY 1963).
The weight of case authority, the consensus of legal writers, and reasoned policy considerations all indicate that the hearsay rule should not bar the admission of properly conducted public surveys. Although courts were at first reluctant to accept survey evidence or to give it weight, the more recent trend is clearly contrary.
5) Remarkably, of the 223 survey respondents who offered unfavorable comments in response to survey questions l0b)c)e), 1 lb)c)e) or 12b)c)e), 65 (29.1%) spontaneously expressed religious bigotry, and referred to the Scientology religion as a “cult” or in similar, religious-based derogatory terms (Sorensen Survey Report, Part V, Exhibit E to Sorensen affidavit).
“Cult,” was the answer offered by 44 respondents (14.6% of those responding), while another 30 respondents (10% of those responding) offered some other religion-related, negative word. (Sorensen Survey Report, p. 22, Ex. E to Sorensen affidavit.) However, that does not tell the full story. A good number of respondents answered the question with the word “science” and when asked in the follow-up probe why they said that, it was obvious that they were either guessing (which they were told by the survey interviewers not to do) or they were reacting to the fact that “science” and “Scientology” share a common root.
4) Adding the responses described in paragraph 2 and 3, above, a total of 80 respondents (65% of those offering a negative word) offered an answer that demonstrated religious bias.
1) In response to the one word association question, one survey participant replied, “Run.” And in response to the probe of why he said that, he explained, “That's what they do when we try to swerve to hit them.” (Respondent # 123, Exhibit 6 to Sorensen Survey Report attached as Exhibit E to Sorensen affidavit).
2) One respondent suggested, “It's dangerous to even have any contact with them as they might control your mind. I think Congress should investigate the IRS for allowing them to be counted as a religion.” (Respondent # 189, Exhibit 6 to Sorensen Survey Report).
3) Another said, “I do not like them.... I see them. They are very visible.” Scientology is a “farce,” a “scam,” “they are not for real. A brainwashing cult.” (Respondent # 110, Exhibit 6 to Sorensen Survey Rep it).
because “they rip people off.” (Respondent # 253, Exhibit 6 to Sorensen Survey Report).
5) “They have a negative and evil influence on people. It's not religious and is a cult of mind control.” (Respondent # 188, Exhibit 6 to Sorensen Survey Report).
6) “When you join you turn over all your assets and then they try and kill you off.” (Respondent # 258, Exhibit 6 to Sorensen Survey Report).
Thus, we speak here not of merely a dislike, a lack of affinity, but of vicious, almost obsessive hatred.
astounding and a damning commentary on the citizens of this county and their willingness to buy into the publishings of the St. Petersburg Times and other media.
Twenty-three years ago, the Sixth Judicial Circuit (Bryson, J.), and, on appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal, granted a change of venue for trial on the grounds that the Church of Scientology of California and the Scientology religion were so odious to the inhabitants of Pinellas County that the Church, and even an individual associated with it, could not get a fair trial here. Church of Scientology of California, Inc. v. Cazares, 401 So.2d 810 (2nd DCA 1981). Notably, Scientology and Flag in particular, were, at that time, in their infancy in this county, and the Clearwater Church having been established in only 1976 was, by any standard, a mere wisp of its prominent public presence here today.
The venue motion was supported by affidavits of experts analyzing the publicity in the area, and the data and analyses of a survey conducted among many potential jurors demonstrating the breadth and depth of prejudice against the Scientology religion, Flag and its parishioners. (Ex. 27, Affidavit of Dr. Kenneth Ellis.) The survey revealed pervasive opinions that Scientologists were viewed as money-seeking outsiders that use subtle means of influencing people, are different from others in anti-social ways, and that Scientology is a “cult,” not a religion. (Id., 23-37.) The survey indicated that members of the community responded to survey questions by paraphrasing the very antiScientology themes expressed at that time in the Clearwater Sun, St. Petersburg Times and Tampa Tribune. (Id., 30-46.) The motion's conclusion that it was impossible for Flag or even individual Scientologists to receive a fair trial in the Clearwater area, (id., 57), was also supported by other evidence and affidavits demonstrating community bias.
3) Out of the 74 total Pinellas County respondents who offered negative comments about Scientology, the first word on their lips, the most frequently reoccurring negative comment by far, was “cult” or the like, e.g., “not a real religion” (id.).
After eliciting the respondents' overwhelmingly negative opinions of Scientology, the survey posed the question whether Scientology or a Scientologist could get a fair trial in Pinellas County, 49% (102 out of 2l0 respondents) answered “yes,” a response which is belied by their earlier survey answers, evidencing deep-seated animus, but, as discussed infra, indicative of the phenomena of less than full candor by potential jurors.
Clearly, the quantitative and qualitative levels of anti-Scientology prejudice precludes the possibility of Scientologists receiving a fair trial in the Clearwater area.
One possible solution is to change the venue to a place where anti-Scientology newspaper publicity has not been so prevalent, and where the anti-Scientology sentiments are not predominant among the population.
Based upon this evidence, the trial court granted the motion to transfer venue for trial, and the Second DCA agreed that a transfer of venue for trial was necessary. Church of Scientology of California, Inc. v. Cazares, 401 So.2d 810 (2nd DCA 1981).
Much has changed in this county in the past 23 years but, as the Sorensen survey shows, McPherson case publicity has created an environment as hostile to a fair trial as the 1980 Ellis survey demonstrated. (Ex. 28, Affidavit of Ward A. Wilson; Ex. 29, Affidavit of Robert A. Bush.) In 1980, on a showing less compelling than here at bar, Flag was granted a change of venue for trial. A fortiori, that same result must obtain here on the present evidence.
Finally, one may anticipate that Dandar will oppose, arguing that it will be far more costly for defendants to try this case in another county. Flag trusts this Court will reject that argument, particularly when offered by a man who has played a significant role in “murdering” Flag's chances of getting a fair trial in any jury case in this county, whether it be the wrongful death case or this case.
In some instances, the percentage of prospective jurors professing an extrinsic knowledge of the case or a fixed opinion has been used to determine whether pervasive community prejudice exists.
The test for determining a change of venue is whether the general state of mind of the inhabitants of a community is so infected by knowledge of the incident and accompanying prejudice, bias, and pre-conceived opinions that jurors could not possibly put these matters out of their minds and try the case solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom. Rolling at 284 (quoting McCaskill v. State, 344 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 1977)). If the venire's media-generated knowledge of either the parties or the issues to be tried in a case is sufficient to warrant a change of venue for trial under Rolling, a fortiori, here the far-more-pervasive, press-inflamed general bigotry obliges the same result.
The problem, however, is not merely pre-trial press reports per se. That is bad enough, but it has been geometrically exacerbated by Dandar's frequent public statements, invariably republished by the media as “news,” that Flag is a “murderer,” and that it kills people. Thus, the notion that a jury hearing this breach of contract-tort case can put all of this out of its mind and in a fair and impartial way, award substantial damages to a “murderer,” is illusory.
Further, while there are several cases in which a change of venue is ordered based solely upon adverse pre-trial publicity respecting the case itself, here one need not rely only on the Rolling principle that from it, community prejudice may be inferred. Instead, Flag has here presented overwhelming empirical evidence — the Sorensen survey — proving beyond debate the breadth, depth and intensity of actual — not inferred or suspected — community prejudice.
Finally, while 11.8% of Dr. Sorensen's survey respondents who acknowledge having heard or read about Scientology, Flag or the lawsuit did not admit to unfavorable opinions, Flag ought not to have its due process rights depend upon its ability to ferret out those people from a venire. Indeed, given the number of survey respondents who disingenuously claimed never to have heard or read anything about Scientology, Flag or the McPherson case, the very notion that these same people should be believed were they to claim to be able to be a fair and impartial juror here is more illusory than real.
Courts of Florida and other jurisdictions have long recognized that jurors are typically unwilling publicly to admit harboring bias, and will even lie to conceal their bias. State v. Carter, 250 Wis.2d 851, 857-858, 641 N.W.2d 517, 520-521 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (”While there may be the occasion when a prospective juror explicitly admits to a prejudice, or explicitly admits to an inability to set aside a prejudice, most frequently the prospective juror's subjective bias will only be revealed through his or her demeanor.”); United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977) (”Bias can be revealed by a juror's express admission of that fact, but, more frequently, jurors are reluctant to admit actual bias...”); US. v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109-1112 (9th Cir. 2000); Simmons v. Blodgett, 910 F.Supp. 1519, 1528 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (”jurors are usually reluctant to admit to bias or fail to recognize it.”); State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1077-1078 (Conn. 1993).
As noted in a lengthy discussion of the problem of “ferreting out bias,” a District of Columbia court found that a burden of constitutional dimension rests upon the judiciary, particularly because, “People do not readily admit to bias, states of mind that prevent the rendering of a just verdict or opinions which would improperly influence their verdicts.” Lewis v. Voss, 770 A.2d 996, 1004-1005 (D.C. Ct. App. 2001), quoting Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973).
Florida courts have recognized that simple voir dire and inquiry of jurors concerning bias is unlikely to reveal juror prejudices, because “[f]ew jurors would resolutely continue to admit that they have a bias after having a prosecutor and a trial judge so cloak them in a duty to try to be fair.” Montozzi v. State, 633 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
Mere reluctance to admit bias is only part of the problem, because some courts have found that jurors conceal their bias in a desire to be appointed to a jury to determine the outcome of a case. United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 554 (5th Cir. 2001); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998). Given the enormous percentage of the venire who are biased, as shown in the Sorensen survey, it is improper to saddle Flag with the task of bobbing in a tainted barrel in a quixotic effort to ferret out the few good apples.
Thus, where, as here, survey information reveals an overarching community bias for or against a party, the normal methods of assuring the empaneling of an unbiased jury cannot guarantee a constitutionally acceptable level of due process and a fair result.
While most change of venue motions based upon pre-trial publicity or community bias and prejudice appear to arise during jury selection, there appears to be no rule or reason why such a motion must abide the arrival of a 1,700-person venire at the courthouse and the attendant inconvenience and expense. In fact, in Rolling, the Florida Supreme Court at least implied as much. There, the defendant waited until jury selection to move for a change of venue. On appeal, the prosecutor criticized the defendant for waiting too long, and argued that defendant should have moved earlier and since he did not, he was somehow estopped. The Rolling court rejected the argument, holding that the timing of a change of venue motion is a matter of trial strategy and the court will not second-guess it, at least if not beyond the bounds of reasonableness. Moreover, although not specifically addressed in the published opinion, we note that in Flag's 1980 case, the motion to change venue was also made well before jury selection began.
Here, Flag acted promptly upon learning of the research results that support this motion in this case. Indeed, it would have been irresponsible for Flag to wait until 1,700 persons were summoned for the venire and jury selection had begun.
Upon a showing, as overwhelmingly made here, that a change of venue for trial is required, the only question left is to what county. No Florida statute addresses any procedure for the determination of the appropriate county to which a civil action should be transferred. However, Fla. Stat. § 910.03 (2002), that applies to criminal actions, requires that upon determining the need to change venue to protect a defendant's due process rights, a court shall give priority to any county that closely resembles the demographic composition of the county from which the action was transferred. To this, we would add that given the extent of the unprecedented media coverage, including Dandar's unfortunate — and unethical — public statements, all counties within the reach of circulation of the St. Petersburg Times and all those within the broadcast range of local television stations [WFLA-8 (NBC), WTVT-13 (Fox), WTSP-10 (CBS) or WFTS-28 (ABC)], be excluded from consideration. That leaves Palm Beach and Broward Counties as the two that best satisfy the comparable demographics test. As between those two, Flag would prefer the one with the least congested docket, the county in which this case can proceed to trial the quickest. From the data presently available, it appears that would be Broward County, but Flag would accept transfer to either county.
Based upon all of the foregoing and the overwhelming evidentiary showing made, Flag respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion to change the trial venue and to determine that this action is to be tried in either Palm Beach or Broward County.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of hereof and the Affidavit of Dr. Robert C. Sorensen in support thereof has been furnished BY HAND DELIVERY to Thomas John Dandar, Esq., Dandar & Dandar, P.A., 1715 N. Westshore Blvd., Suite 750, Tampa, FL 33607; and Luke Lirot, Esq., 112 East Street, Suite B, Tampa, FL 33602, this ____ day of May, 2003.
 The fundamental issue underlying this motion is the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial.
 See infra, beginning p. 18 for discussion of the earlier prejudicial atmosphere.
 When, in 2002, Dandar was forced by Judge Schaeffer to amend his complaint so as to delete all claims of “murder,” the media coverage was, predictably, non-existent. The quiet death of Dandar's incendiary charges did nothing to abate the renewed community hatred that his original charges, as widely reported by the media, ignited.
 As set forth in the separately bound and filed Affidavit of Dr. Robert C. Sorensen in support of this motion and memorandum (“Sorensen affidavit”) at 3, it was not until he had completed his survey and assembled all of the responses that Rosen disclosed to him that Flag was his client.
 Those of the senior generation remember Ted Sorensen as a highly visible member of President Kennedy's inner circle of advisors, serving as Special Counsel to the President, and author of President Kennedy's inaugural address.
 Because this research was for the wrongful death case, survey respondents were limited to those living in the southern half of the county from which St. Petersburg juries are drawn. However, as Dr. Sorensen's expert affidavit recites (at 6), there is no basis to believe that the anti-Scientology sentiment disclosed among those respondents would be any different in the northern half of the county.
 As Dr. Sorensen states in his affidavit (at 8), rarely in his experience has he seen anything like this in such magnitude.
 “Until 1981, the Flag Service Organization (“Flag”) was a division of the Church of Scientology of California, Inc. In December 1981, Flag was separately incorporated as the Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. (Ex. 6, Shaw Affi., 3). For convenience, “Flag” is used herein to denote the plaintiff and its predecessor.
 When it comes to issues like racial or religious bigotry, it is politically correct to deny having such animus and to claim an ability to be a fair and impartial juror when in fact, that may be anything but truthful.

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