Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/the-king-v-l-seeder-de-silva/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:10:48+00:00

Document:
The King v. L. Seeder de Silva.
Present: Howard C.J. and Keuneman and Nihill JJ.
No. 1 of 1940fS. C. No. 5/M. C. Kalutara, 44,026.
Misdirection of law—Misdirection of fact no ground of appeal—Circumstantialevidence—Duty of Judge to direct the Jury on law applicable—Wherethere is no case to go to the jury—Duty of Judge to direct a verdict ofnot guilty—Grounds of appeal—Failure to state grounds in notice—Court of Criminal Appeal Ordinance, No. 23 of 1938, s. 4 (b).
A wrong direction as to the law, which obtains gener-Jly in the class ofcases to which the particular case belongs, or as to the law applicable to-the special facts of the case is a misdirection of law.
A mistake of fact or an omission to refer to some point in favour of theaccused is not a misdirection of law but falls under “any other ground ’*within the meaning of section 4 (b) of the Court of Criminal AppealOrdinance.
In a case resting upon circumstantial evidence the Judge shouldexplain to the jury the main principles that should be followed inappreciating such evidence. But where the charge contains passageson which it is open to the jury to find an innocent as well as a guiltyexplanation in the circumstances proved, the charge cannot be said to beunfair or prejudicial to the accused.
Section 234 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code imposes a duty on theJudge, if he considers there is no evidence to go to the jury that theaccused committed the offence, to direct a verdict of “ not guiltyThe Court of Criminal Appeal will as a general rule refuse to entertaingrounds not stated in the notice of appeal.
But where the appellant is without legal aid and has drawn his ownnotice the Court will not confine him to the grounds stated in the notice.
(1) As a matter of law there was no case to go to the jury.
(2) In dealing with a possible theory involving the guilt of the accusedthe learned Judge addressed these words to the jury, “ I cannot refer toanything that he may have said to the Police because the law preventsany reference being made to that ”, It is submitted that this is a mis-direction in that the words used by the Judge, having regard to thecontext in which they were used, suggest or tend to suggest to the jurythat the accused had made a confession to the Police.
The King v. L. Seeder de-Silva.
the accused who unlocked the door for the Police to enter, it is submittedthat this misdirection was calculated to cause grave prejudice to theaccused.
In dealing with the admittely abnormal behaviour of the accusedin general, the Judge directed the jury to consider whether such behaviourwould be sufficient to bring the accused within the exception created bysection 77 of the Ceylon Penal Code, but failed to direct the attention ofthe jury to the bearing of such abnormality on the question of theinferences to be drawn, with reference to the alleged guilt of the accused,from the conduct of the accused in relation to the incidents of the day inquestion. Referring to the possibility of the accused having dressed andlaid out the body of the deceased, the learned Judge directed the jury toconsider whether the master of a house finding his servant stabbed,would act in that way, without immediately informing the Police,implying thereby that the jury had to consider whether a man wouldnormally act in that way, if the deceased had been killed by someoneelse. It is submitted that the failure to draw the attention of the juryto the fact that the accused was abnormal in his general behaviour is anon-direction amounting in the circumstances to a misdirection.
In the absence of proof that the blood found on exhibits P 2 andP 3 was human blood, or a tittle of evidence indicating it to be such, theJudge was wrong in directing the jury to regard it as an item of realevidence, which may be taken into account-by them.
H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him M. T. de S. Amerasekere, K.C., S. Allesand N. M. de Silva), for the accused, appellant.—The furthest the evidencegoes, is to indicate opportunity. This is insufficient. It does notexclude the possibility of a person other than the accused committing theact. If this is the case, the fact is not inconsistent with the hypothesis ofinnocence.
The evidence is to the effect that it was the accused who unlocked thedoor for the Police to enter. The effect of the learned Judge’s charge tothe jury is to identify the person who unlocked the door with themurderer. (Counsel cites the relevant passages.) This is a misdirection,and moreover prejudicial to the accused.
Statements in the nature of confessions made by accused persons tothe Police officers are inadmissible in evidence (vide section 25, EvidenceOrdinance). This is a well-known rule of evidence and it is inconceivablethat the jury are unacquainted with this proposition, so that the learnedJudge’s statement, “ I cannot refer to anything that he may have said tothe Policfe because the law prevents any reference being made to that ”,in effect, suggests to the jury that the accused made a confession to thePolice. Statements of accused to the Police other than confessions areadmissible. This is all the more reason why the jury might have inferred,that the statement of the accused to the Police was to the effect that hecommitted the offence.
The evidence indicates that the behaviour of the accused is abnormal.Assuming that the body was arranged by the accused, this circumstancedoes not identify him as the murderer. Considering the feelings of theaccused for the deceased it is not unnatural that he should have acted inthis way, seeing the woman murdered.
The tCr.g v. L. Seeder de Silva.
There is no case to go to the jury. Section 234, Criminal ProcedureCode, provides that the Judge should direct the jury to return a verdict ofnot guilty when after the prosecution is closed the Judge considers thatthere is no evidence, that the accused committed the offence. Takingthe case for the prosecution as a whole, one cannot say that a prima faciecase is made out against the accused. This is a matter for the Judge toconsider even though there is no submission from Counsel for the defence.
J. W. R. llangakoon, K.C., Attorney-General (with him E. H. T.Gunasekera, C.C.), for the Crown.—Points 2 to 5 are not questions of ldw.They are questions of fact. According to section 4, sub-section (b), of theCourt of Criminal Appeal Ordinance, No. 23 of 1938, there is no right ofappeal on facts without leave of Court. Leave has not been obtainedhere.
Taking the evidence adduced in the chse as a whole there is stringentproof of circumstances to support the charge against the appellant. Insuch cases the absence of an explanation from the accused militatesagainst him. (The Attorney-General here referred to various items ofevents and circumstances and cited Wills’ Circumstantial Evidence, -pages314-316, 7th ed.) The principles laid down in Wills have been adoptedhere. See Inspector Arendsly v. Wilfred Pieris1 and cases referred to inDias’ Criminal Procedure Code, Vol. I., p. 640.
Whether there is evidence to go to the jury is a question of law (seeBenjamen Pearson s). Although this point was not raised by Counsel atthe trial there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jurymay legitimately draw an inference adverse to the accused. (TheAttorney-General here referred to the evidence.) Under such circum-stances it is submitted $iat the learned Judge could not havewithdrawn the case from the jury.
The mere presence of some expressions used by the Judge in his chargewhich are open to criticism will not avail the appellant. The summingup must be considered as a whole. The burden is on the appellant toshow that notwithstanding the presence of some expression open toobjection there has been some substantial miscarriage of justice. Unlessthe appellant establishes this, the Court will not interfere. See thejudgment of the Lord Chief Justice in the case of Dodds’.
Even when the point of law is a good one, which the Court will giveeffect to, the Court may dismiss the appeal if no substantial miscarriagehas resulted. See the case of Allen *. On the question of miscarriage ofjustice it is open to the Court to consider the whole of the evidence andeven to admit fresh evidence. See Rex v. Abraham George=. TheAttorney-General referred to the contents of a diary the entries in whichhad been ruled out by the Judge. No doubt it was open to the prose-cution to prove the handwriting of the accused. There is ample proof thatthe document was in his possession. Having regard to the circumstancesand the contents of the dairy it is submitted that the material is ampleto create the presumption that the appellant was acquainted with itscontents. See Phipson on Evidence, 5th ed., p. 241.
l10 Ceylon Law Weekly 121.3 1 Crim. App. Rep. 77.
5 1 Crim. App. Rep. 168.
H. V. Perera, K.C., in reply.—The cases cited by the Attorney-Generalare distinguishable. In those cases, without an exception, certain incri-minating circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused were definitelyproved. In this case all that one can say is that there was evidence ofopportunity. The distinction between suspicion and proof has beenforcibly brought out in Justice Darling’s charge to the jury in SteinMorrison’s Trial at p. 275 of the report in the Notable British TrialSeries.
The burden of proof does not shift on to the accused unless and untilsome incriminating circumstances have been proved by the prosecution.In this case there is no case to go to the jury. See William Wallace*.The grounds on which the Court will hold that there has been amiscarriage of justice are considered in Cohen v. Bateman &apos;.
11 Crim. App. Rep. at p. 238.* 23 Crim.. App. Rep. 32.
9 Crim. App. Rep. 189.5 2 Crim. App. Rep. 197.
» (1939) 1 All. Ey. Rep. 396.8 2 Crim. App. Rep. 207.
HOWARD C.J.—The King v. L. Seeder de Silva.
formulated, we are of opinion that grounds 3, 4 and 5 cannot be regardedas involving questions of law. The suggestion in ground 5 that thelearned Judge was wrong in directing the jury to regard the finding of theblood as real evidence is a complaint with regard to a misdirection as toa fact. Ground 4 is an alleged omission to refer to some point in favourof the appellant. Ground 3 is an alleged misstatement of the evidence."We are of opinion that ground 2 must he regarded as involving a questionof law inasmuch as the phraseology employed by the Judge if construedas contended for in the grounds of appeal had the effect of bringing to thenotice of the jury the fact that the appellant had made a confession.Applying therefore the strict letter of the law, grounds 3, 4 and 5 were notproperly before the Court. In view, however, of the uncertainty withregard to what is a question involving a point of law we have decided inmaking our decision on the appeal to take these grounds into consideration.
We do not consider that ground 3 bears the construction placed upon•it by Counsel for the appellant. Read with the rest of the context itcannot be said that the learned Judge told the jury that one person musthave done all of these acts. He is putting before the jury various hypo-theses. The words that follow the passage of which complaint is madeindicate that the person who locked the door, that is to say the appellant,may not have been the murderer.
Ground 4 raises a matter of small importance. It is true that withregard to the laying out of the body the learned Judge did not particularlyrefer to the "abnormality of the appellant. On the other hand a largepart of the summing-up is devoted to a consideration as to whether hewas of sound mind. It cannot be contended, therefore, that suchabnormality would not be present in the minds of the jury when theywere considering this and every aspect of the case.
With regard to ground 5 it might have been better if the learned Judgehad informed the jury that there was no evidence that the blood washuman blood. On the other hand they were warned that it might be anyother kind of blood and the matter was left for them to decide. We donot consider the appellant was prejudiced by this passage.
The point made with regard to ground 2 is that the reference to thestatement made by the appellant to the Police would inevitably lead thejury to think that the appellant had made a confession. The policemanto whom the statement had been made by his omission to relate in hisevidence what the appellant said to him might with equal force be said tohave brought to the notice of the jury that the appellant had made aconfession. Moreover, jurymen are not so well versed in legal procedureas to infer from the words used by the learned Judge that a confessionhad been made. Jurymen know that the law formulates various ruleswith regard to the admission of evidence. They are not, however, fullyacquainted with such rules and in these circumstances it does not followthat the phraseology of the Judge suggested to their minds a confession.
To sum up we are of opinion for the reasons I have stated that there isno real substance in grounds 2, 3, 4 and 5.
ground not mentioned in the notice of appeal, namely, that the learnedJudge omitted to explain to the jury the main principles to be followedin appreciating circumstantial evidence and, in particular, to point out tothem that before they could convict, they must be satisfied that theincriminating facts must be incompatible with the innocence of theaccused and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypo-thesis than that of his guilt. This alternative ground of appeal isintimately connected with ground 1 and, in these circumstances, we havegiven it consideration although it is not raised in the notice of appeal.Generally speaking this Court will refuse to give effect to grounds notstated in the notice, but when the appellants is without means to procurelegal aid and has drawn his own notice, the Court will not as a rule confinehim to the grounds stated in his notice.
thje death of the deceased. At the Police Station the appellant made astatement in consequence of which Sub-Inspector Ratnarajah went withthe appellant to his house. The appellant opened the door with a keywhich he had in his pocket. All the doors and windows were closed. Ina room the Inspector saw the body of the deceased covered with a clothlaid on a mat with the head resting on a pillow. She was dressed in awhite jacket and a white cloth which were soaked with blood. Her handswere placed on her chest clasped together with a bunch of orchids placedin her hand- A candle fixed in a bottle was burning at the time. A knifecovered with blood stains and identified as having previously been in thepossession of the appellant was on the pillow. The deceased’s hair wascropped short. The appellant told the Inspector that the hair cut fromthe woman’s head would be in the shed. The Inspector went to the shedand found the hair there. The appellant also took from the bed someclothes—exhibits P 2 and P 3—which were identified by the dhoby asbelonging to the appellant. These clothes had blood stains on them. Itwas not, however, established that it was human blood. The Inspectorthen took the appellant to the Police Station, searched him and found adiary in one of his pockets. Inside the diary was a Galle Gymkhana Clubsweep ticket the nom de plume being “ Lily ”, one of the names of thedeceased. The dairy also contained certain entries. The handwritingthat made these entries was net proved to be that of the appellant. Inthese circumstances we are of opinion that such entries cannot be takeninto consideration.
344HOWARD C.J.—The King v. L. Seeder de Silva.
This dictum applies in the present case. A strong prima facie case wasmade against the appellant on evidence which was sufficient to exclude thereasonable possibility of someone else having committed the crime.Without an explanation from the appellant the jury were justified incoming to the conclusion that he was guilty.
HOWARD C.J.—The King v. Bellana Vitanage Eddin.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.

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