Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/470/470mass708.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:53:20+00:00

Document:
M. DAVID COHEN vs. SHELLEY COHEN.
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Contempt. Divorce and Separation, Foreign judgment, Child support, Attorney's fees. Probate Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Child support, Probate Court. Parent and Child, Child support.
REGISTRATION for enforcement of a foreign order of support filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on March 31, 2004.
A complaint for contempt was heard by Randy J. Kaplan, J.
Anna S. Richardson for the father.
connection with proceedings dissolving the marriage of M. David Cohen (father) and Shelley Cohen (mother). After the parties separated in 1999, a Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a judgment establishing monthly child and spousal support payments payable by the father to the mother. The father moved to Massachusetts in 2002. In 2004, the California support order was registered in the Probate and Family Court, upon request of the Los Angeles County Department of Child Services (California CSSD). Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), which has been adopted by both California and Massachusetts, Massachusetts courts thus acquired jurisdiction to enforce the support order. See Cal. Fam. Code, §§ 4900, 4950, 4951 (West 2013); G. L. c. 209D, §§ 6-601, 6-602. The child support division of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR), acting on behalf of the mother, initiated contempt proceedings against the father in the Probate and Family Court, and a Probate and Family Court judge subsequently issued multiple orders that sought to enforce the California support order. The orders incorporated the parties' stipulated agreements, which, inter alia, obligated the father to pay the child's uninsured medical expenses and to contribute to her college education costs; neither of these items had been included in the order of the California court. In 2010, a Probate and Family Court judge found the father in contempt for having failed to make payments in the amounts agreed toward support arrears, to pay the agreed share of the child's college costs and her uninsured medical expenses, and to pay previously-awarded attorney's fees and costs incurred by the mother in seeking enforcement. The father challenges the jurisdiction of the court to enter this judgment.
resumed enforcement. The Probate and Family Court judge therefore had authority to hold the father in contempt for failing to comply with orders that he pay the mother's attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with enforcement of the California order.
Background and prior proceedings. 1. California proceedings. The father and the mother lived in Los Angeles with their daughter. After a lengthy marriage, the parties separated in 1999, and a Los Angeles County Superior Court ordered the father to pay the mother monthly payments for child and spousal support. [Note 1] The father relocated to the Boston area in January, 2002, while the mother and child remained in California. Arrearages accumulated, and, in February, 2003, the California CSSD transmitted to the child support enforcement division of the DOR the first of two requests for registration of the California support order. This transmittal sought enforcement in Massachusetts through income withholding, pursuant to G. L. c. 209D, § 6-602 (a). [Note 2] In June, 2003, a "judgment of dissolution of marriage" entered in the Los Angeles County Superior Court that increased the father's monthly child support obligation to $1,035, and his spousal support to $600; the judgment also reserved jurisdiction over arrearages.
In March, 2004, on request of the California CSSD, the 2003 California support order was registered in the Probate and Family Court, giving the Massachusetts court authority to enforce the California support order. See G. L. c. 209D, §§ 6-601 to 6-603. The child support enforcement transmittal document stated that registration was "for enforcement only" and for "collection of arrears."
third of the child's college costs; and to pay the mother's attorney's fees. [Note 3] The stipulation included the father's "acknowledge[ment] that he is earning less than he is capable [of] and will forthwith commence a job search to obtain employment commensurate with his education and experience."
In October, 2006, the mother filed another complaint for contempt. [Note 4] In December, 2006, the father was found in contempt for, among other things, his failure to pay his agreed contribution to the child's college expenses and uninsured medical expenses. [Note 5] Another order issued in May, 2007, incorporating a four-page written stipulation of the parties. In that stipulation, the father agreed that he was guilty of contempt for having failed to pay "child support." The order required, among other things, that the father "continue to pay $150 per week toward the child support arrears," and that he reimburse the mother for attorney's fees and costs, "including travel incurred as a result of the hearing" that day. [Note 6] The written stipulation provided that the father would "focus his efforts on his new employment," and resign from involvement in all but one specific nonprofit organization.
was denied later that month. In December, 2010, the father returned to California.
Discussion. We note as a preliminary matter that the father did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court concerning the support orders, nor its authority to hold him in contempt for violation of those orders, prior to this appeal. Nonetheless, "a party has the right to raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time." ROPT, Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601 , 607 (2000). A claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Harker v. Holyoke, 390 Mass. 555 , 559 (1983), quoting Litton Business Sys. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass. 619 , 622 (1981) ("Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, conduct or waiver"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (4).
1. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. "UIFSA aims to cure the problem of conflicting support orders entered by multiple courts, and provides for the exercise of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by one tribunal over support orders." Child Support Enforcement Div. of Alaska v. Brenckle, 424 Mass. 214 , 218 (1997) (Brenckle). UIFSA establishes continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the State issuing a support order, so as to ensure that the issuing State is the only State with jurisdiction to modify its order absent specified, narrow circumstances. G. L. c. 209D, § 6-611 (a) (1)-(2). Every State appears to have adopted some version of UIFSA. See Annot., Construction and Application of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 90 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2012) (requiring States to adopt UIFSA in order to access Federal funding for child support enforcement).
child for whose benefit the order is entered continues to reside within the jurisdiction of that court unless each party consents in writing to another jurisdiction." Brenckle, supra at 218. See G. L. c. 209D, §§ 2-205 (a), [Note 11] 6-611 (a) (1)-(2). [Note 12] See also Draper v. Burke, 450 Mass. 676 , 679 (2008); Peddar v. Peddar, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 192 , 194-195 (1997); C.P. Kindregan, M. McBrien, & P.A. Kindregan, Family Law and Practice, § 30.6, at 255 (4th ed. 2013). The written consent must be filed in the issuing tribunal. G. L. c. 209D, § 6-611 (a) (1)-(2).
a. Enforcement of California's order. To enforce judgments against a party who has moved from an issuing State that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to a second State, an issuing State may register an order for enforcement in the second State. See G. L. c. 209D, § 6-601. Once such an order is registered in the Probate and Family Court, that court becomes the "responding tribunal," and is "limited to recognizing and enforcing the order of the other [S]tate [because] under UIFSA[,] conceptually, the responding [S]tate is enforcing the law of another [S]tate" (quotations and citation omitted). C.P. Kindregan & P.A. Kindregan, Massachusetts Domestic Relations Rules and Statutes Annotated, § 7.6(3), Comment to G. L. c. 209D, § 6-603 (2014).
the California CSSD transmitted a request to the DOR that was then entered on the Probate and Family Court docket. The transmittal specified that the Probate and Family Court could exercise jurisdiction over the California court's order "for enforcement only." See G. L. c. 209D, § 6-602.
b. Modification of California's order. The judgment entered on September 22, 2010, dated May 26, 2010, held the father in contempt for his failure to comply with earlier orders and judgments that had entered in the Probate and Family Court beginning in 2009. The father contends that portions of the orders constituted modifications of the California order, and that the Probate and Family Court did not have jurisdiction to modify the California support order. UIFSA does not define "modification," but, "where UIFSA is silent, the [Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2012),] may help fill any gaps." Spencer v. Spencer, 10 N.Y.3d 60, 66 (2008). Section 1738B(b) of that statute defines modification as "a change in a child support order that affects the amount, scope, or duration of the order and modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to the child support order."
child support beyond the child's attaining the age of nineteen, thereby affecting the duration of child support. The judgment also required the father to pay $24,000 toward the child's college education costs and $26,230 toward the child's uninsured medical expenses; these obligations constitute modifications of the California court's support order because they affected the amount, scope, and duration of support and were made subsequent to the order. These impermissible modifications of the California order exceeded the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court.
c. Effect of impermissible modification. As stated, prior to this appeal, the father had not challenged the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court to issue such orders, nor its authority to hold him in contempt for violation of those orders. Nonetheless, "[w]here a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment is void and time limitations for raising the issue are inapplicable." ROPT, Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. at 605. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (4).
Rule 60 (b) "strikes a balance between serving the ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments," and "may not be used as a substitute for a timely appeal" (citation omitted). Harris v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392 , 395 (1987). See Harker v. Holyoke, 390 Mass. at 558 ("If we were to permit such an attack as a general rule, the finality of judgments would be substantially impaired"). Therefore, "when a court has rendered final judgment in a contested action, a party may not litigate that court's subject matter jurisdiction except in certain circumstances." Matter of Dugan, 418 Mass. 185 , 186 (1994). One such circumstance is when "[a]llowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982).
States. See Scanlon v. Witrak, 110 Wash. App. 682, 686 (2002) (allowing rule 60 [b] motion where Georgia had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under UIFSA and Washington State court had modified Georgia child support order). Cf. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174-176 (1998) (erroneous order that expressed child support payments as percentage of income was in violation of statute, but was voidable, not void, in part because it was purely State matter and did not "implicate the authority of another tribunal" [citation omitted]).
Because the Probate and Family Court had no jurisdiction to modify the California support order, the portions of the orders that required the father to pay child support for a period beyond that established by the California court, part of the child's college education costs, and the child's uninsured medical expenses were void. The father, therefore, could not be found in contempt for violating the void portions of those orders. Cf. Kendall v. Kendall, 340 S.W.3d 483, 501, 503-504 (Tex. App. 2011) (when reviewing collateral attack, court will limit "review to determining whether the record affirmatively and conclusively negates existence of jurisdiction" to modify support order of State that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, and will not consider "whether court otherwise erred in rendering its judgment"). The judgment of contempt is enforceable insofar as it concerns portions of the orders that enforced the terms of the California support order.
2. Attorney's fees and costs. The father also was adjudged in contempt for his failure to pay attorney's fees of $6,930 that had been awarded to the mother, and costs of $2,370 that had been incurred in connection with the mother's travel to Massachusetts to attend court proceedings. The father apparently has not paid these fees and costs. The judgment also ordered the father to pay additional attorney's fees and costs incurred by the mother in pursuing the 2009 complaint for contempt.
obligee under UIFSA where court registered and enforced foreign judgment). The imposition of attorney's fees and costs is an appropriate mechanism for enforcement of the California order, and part of the enforcement power of the Probate and Family Court as the responding tribunal.
Conclusion. The judgment of contempt is vacated. The matter is remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion, holding the father in contempt and obligating payment only for his failure to comply with such portions of the Probate and Family Court's orders that enforced the California child and spousal support order, and the fees and costs associated with such enforcement.
[Note 1] The order obligated David Cohen (father) to pay monthly to Shelley Cohen (mother) $178 in child support, $280 for the child's special education therapy, and $477 in spousal support.
[Note 2] The record does not indicate whether the father's wages were attached. The record on appeal includes a copy of an "audit" created by the Los Angeles County Department of Child Services (California CSSD), setting forth the monthly support obligation and the amounts paid toward that obligation. This document reflects that no payments for child support or spousal support were made for the period from February, 2001, through July, 2004, and that payments were made only sporadically prior to and after that period.
[Note 3] The record does not indicate the method used to determine the amount in arrears, but the amount appears to include arrears accumulated after the father relocated to Massachusetts.
[Note 4] According to the Probate and Family Court docket sheet, the mother also had filed a complaint for contempt in September, 2005; the parties entered into stipulations on that complaint in November and December, 2005; and a judgment of contempt entered in April, 2006. Copies of these documents are not included in the record submitted by the father, and the mother neither submitted a brief nor appeared at argument before us. The Probate and Family Court judge's decisions, however, provide detail concerning the facts at issue, including the judge's findings on the amounts of arrears and the father's ability to make the stipulated payments to reduce those arrears.
[Note 5] The December, 2006, order finds the father in contempt for having failed to pay $26,230 for the child's medical expenses incurred in 2006. While the record does not include an order requiring the father to pay health care costs, in a memorandum in support of the father's motion for relief from judgment, the father's attorney states that "healthcare costs were added to the agreement by stipulation of the parties."
[Note 6] The costs were $1,750. The amount of attorney's fees was to be established at a later hearing.
dated [his] support obligation" and "purged [his] arrears balance." The letter noted, "For as long as you live in the Commonwealth, there is always the possibility that we may become involved in your CCS case in the future." In a September, 2009, letter responding to an inquiry from the father, the DOR explained that, although it had closed the father's child support case, "[a]ny and all existing court orders remained in place . . . . Closing our case just meant that DOR was no longer taking action to enforce or collect the debt."
"[The father] has twice been found guilty of contempt for failure to pay spousal and child support [in Massachusetts] . . . , substantial arrears still exist and, therefore, . . . the convicted defendant cannot seek modification of the spousal support award until the contempt is purged. . . . California's assumption of jurisdiction regarding spousal support is not intended to and does not deprive Massachusetts of ongoing jurisdiction to enforce its own orders."
[Note 9] The father also was found in contempt for his continued involvement in nonprofit organizations and was ordered to resign from his membership in several of those organizations. The father makes no claim that this portion of the judgment was not within the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court, and we do not address his other claim, raised for the first time on appeal, regarding this portion of the order.
[Note 10] Also in June, 2010, the Los Angeles County Superior Court notified the parties that it would hold a hearing for a "determination of arrears." The parties informed the Probate and Family Court judge who had issued the judgment of that pending hearing, and on August 23, 2010, the judge issued an order stating that "Massachusetts will assume sole jurisdiction over this matter." In June, 2011, a Los Angeles County Superior Court judge ruled, "As both the initiating [S]tate and now both parties' [S]tate of residence, California has jurisdiction to issue spousal support orders. The Massachusetts court cannot preclude otherwise appropriate jurisdiction by court order."
"(2) until [each party has] filed written consents . . . with the tribunal of [the issuing State] for a tribunal of another [S]tate to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction."
See Cal. Fam. Code § 4909 (West 2013), which contains virtually identical language.
"After a child support order issued in another [S]tate has been registered in the [C]ommonwealth, the responding tribunal of the [C]ommonwealth may modify that order only if . . . it finds that . . .
". . . each of the parties who are individuals has filed a written consent in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of the [C]ommonwealth to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over such order."
See Cal. Fam. Code § 4960 (West 2013), which contains virtually identical language.
"(B) each individual contestant has filed written consent with the State of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for a court of another State to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order."
[Note 14] Although the Probate and Family Court judge could, in the absence of any motion to dismiss brought during the proceedings, exercise jurisdiction as the judge did here, we note that where orders of the Probate and Family Court and a California court conflict, the California court's orders control. G. L. c. 209D, § 2-207 (b) ("If a proceeding is brought under this chapter and two or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of the [C]ommonwealth or another [S]tate . . .  if only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of such tribunal shall control and be so recognized").
[Note 15] The order stated that child support payments were to continue "until the minor child reaches majority, dies, marries, becomes self-supported, emancipates or until further order of Court, whichever first occurs."
[Note 16] The California legislature "expressly contemplated that Civil Code [§] 196 would only apply to minors and that to the extent that an obligation devolves upon a parent to provide education to an adult child, it is limited to the completion of a high school education." Jones v. Jones, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1017 (1986). The California support order provides that, "Pursuant to Civil Code [§] 196.5, child support shall continue as set forth above and extend as to any unmarried child who has attained the age of [eighteen], is a full-time high-school student, and resides with a parent until such time as he or she completes the [twelfth] grade or attains the age of [nineteen,] whichever first occurs." Although California Civil Code § 196.5 has been repealed, essentially the same language appears in Cal. Fam. Code § 3901 (West 2013).
[Note 17] An order registered in the Commonwealth that issued in another State "is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of the [C]ommonwealth." G. L. c. 209D, § 6-603 (b). Because the father did not contest the validity or enforcement of California's order, as he was entitled to do under G. L. c. 209D, § 6-607 (a), the registered order could "be enforced by all remedies available under the laws of the [C]ommonwealth." G. L. c. 209D, § 6-607 (b). See also G. L. c. 209D, § 3-305 (a)-(e) (setting forth duties and powers of responding tribunal including power to award reasonable attorney's fees as well as other fees and costs).
[Note 18] We note that the extensive litigation in this case arose as a result of the father's chronic nonpayment of his support obligations, and that, in her efforts to obtain child and spousal support payments owed, the mother apparently was required to expend significant amounts on private investigators and travel to Massachusetts.

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