Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/445/552/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 11:11:47+00:00

Document:
Held: The District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing consecutive sentences on petitioner who had pleaded guilty to two counts of using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, petitioner's refusal to cooperate with Government officials investigating a related criminal conspiracy to distribute heroin in which he was a confessed participant. Pp. 445 U. S. 556-562.
(a) No misinformation of constitutional magnitude was present in this case; petitioner rebuffed repeated requests for his cooperation over a period of three years, and concedes that cooperation with the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change his behavior." By declining to cooperate, petitioner rejected an obligation of community life that should be recognized before rehabilitation can begin, and protected his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to resume criminal activities upon release. Pp. 445 U. S. 556-558.
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of self-incrimination. Pp. 445 U. S. 559-562.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 445 U. S. 562. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 445 U. S. 563.
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would stay, the investigators asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, then the principal target of the heroin investigation. Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed drug transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted telephone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code words used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § § 841, 846, and four counts of using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). [Footnote 1] He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Government's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In March, 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of 4 to 15 years' imprisonment, 3 years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately disclosed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 570 F.2d 999 (1977).
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also emphasized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin to support his extravagant lifestyle while unemployed and on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal and that codefendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of "many, many years, knowing what he faces." Id. at 36. Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that the defendant has cooperated. . . ." Ibid. Stressing the seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended a substantial prison term.
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. 195 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 600 F.2d 815 (1979). We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 822 (1979), and we now affirm.
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
"'a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider or the source from which it may come.'"
Id. at 438 U. S. 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 404 U. S. 446 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 302 U. S. 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker, supra at 404 U. S. 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 334 U. S. 740-741 (1948).
No such misinformation was present in this case. The sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change his behavior. . . ." Brief for Petitioner 17. [Footnote 4] Unless a different explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that these laudable attitudes are lacking.
"having knowledge of the actual commission of [certain felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and make known the same to [the appropriate] authority. . . ."
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 6, 1 Stat. 113. [Footnote 5] Although the term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.
"'the likelihood that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or does not deem himself at war with his society.'"
United States v. Grayson, supra at 438 U. S. 51, quoting United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974).
"did not assert his privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination. His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought."
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim that he was coerced. [Footnote 9] Thereafter, petitioner was represented by counsel who was fully apprised -- as was petitioner -- that the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law enforcement was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of self-incrimination.
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case, you were clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity, and failed to cooperate with the Government."
See, e.g., ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty § 1.8(a)(v) (App. Draft 1968); id. at 48-49; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 413-414 (1966); cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 (2d ed.1975).
The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 U.S.C. § 4. It has been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative act of concealment or participation." See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 408 U. S. 696, n. 36 (1972).
The Court recognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 656-657, that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case. See infra at 445 U. S. 561.
See Garner v. United States, supra at 424 U. S. 658, n. 11; Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 341 U. S. 486 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 244 U. S. 364-366 (1917); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 340 U. S. 374-375 (1951). A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he simply would prefer not to give.
"[a]ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which the Court thought was caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody."
The dissenting opinion asserts that the record reflects an "improper involvement of the judicial office in the prosecutorial function." Post at 445 U. S. 567. We find no basis for this contention. The District Court did not participate in the plea-bargaining process; it merely undertook a retrospective review of petitioner's character, record, and criminal conduct in accordance with applicable law. 18 U.S.C. § 3577; Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 32(c). And a defendant who failed even to raise the possibility of self-incrimination or retaliation over a course of three years is hardly in a position to complain that he was "put to an unfair choice." Post at 445 U. S. 568.
Nevertheless, the problem of drawing inferences from an ambiguous silence is troubling. As a matter of due process, an offender may not be sentenced on the basis of mistaken facts or unfounded assumptions. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 334 U. S. 740-741 (1948); see United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 438 U. S. 55 (1978) (STEWART, J., dissenting) (collateral inquiry may be required before sentence is enhanced because of trial judge's unreviewable impression that defendant perjured himself at trial). It is of comparable importance to assure that a defendant is not penalized on the basis of groundless inferences. At the least, sentencing judges should conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of silence where a defendant indicates before sentencing that his refusal to cooperate is prompted by constitutionally protected, or morally defensible, motives. Furthermore, especially where conviction is based upon a guilty plea, it may be advisable for trial judges to raise the question of motive themselves when presented with a prosecutorial recommendation for severity due to an offender's noncooperation. During the Rule 32 allocution before sentencing, Fed.Rule Crim. Proc. 32(a)(1), the defendant could be asked on the record whether he has a reasonable explanation for his silence; if a justification were proffered, the judge would then proceed to determine its veracity and reasonableness. Such an allocution procedure would reduce the danger of erroneous inference and provide a record to support sentencing against subsequent challenge. Cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 394 U. S. 466-467 (1969) (Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 11 allocution procedure).
* When the Government actually seeks to incriminate the subject of questioning, failure to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege is reviewed under the stringent "knowing and completely voluntary waiver" standard. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 593 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). But when it is only the subject who is reasonably aware of the incriminating tendency of the questions, it is his responsibility to put the Government on notice by formally availing himself of the privilege. Id. at 425 U. S. 589-594; Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 655. At that point, the Government may either cease questioning or continue under a grant of immunity.
involved in criminal activities -- a refusal that was not unlawful and that may have been motivated by a desire to avoid self-incrimination or by a reasonable fear of reprisal. I do not believe that a defendant's failure to inform on others may properly be used to aggravate a sentence of imprisonment, and accordingly, I dissent.
"to identify the person or persons from whom he was getting the drugs, and the location, and to lay out the conspiracy and identify other coconspirators who were involved with them."
App. 36. Disclosure of this information might well have exposed petitioner to prosecution on additional charges. [Footnote 2/1] He was never offered immunity from such prosecution. Petitioner's right to refuse to incriminate himself on additional charges was not, of course, extinguished by his guilty plea.
There can be no doubt that a judge would be barred from increasing the length of a jail sentence because of a defendant's refusal to cooperate based on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In such a case, the threat of a longer sentence of imprisonment would plainly be compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183 (1971). Such an aggravation of sentence would amount to an impermissible penalty imposed solely because of the defendant's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
I also believe that it would be an abuse of discretion for a judge to use a defendant's refusal to become an informer to increase the length of a sentence when the refusal was motivated by a fear of retaliation. [Footnote 2/2] In such a case, the failure to identify other participants in the crime is irrelevant to the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, see ante at 445 U. S. 558, and bears no relation to any of the legitimate purposes of sentencing. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41 (1978); United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972).
The usual method for obtaining testimony which may be self-incriminatory is through a grant of immunity from prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II). Prosecutors would have little incentive to offer defendants immunity for their testimony if they could achieve the same result without giving up the option to prosecute. There is no suggestion here that an offer of immunity was ever extended to petitioner. If a defendant knows his silence may be used against him to enhance his sentence, he may be put to an unfair choice. He must either give incriminating information, with no assurance that he will not be prosecuted on the basis of that information, or face the possibility of an increased sentence because of his noncooperation. Since a prosecutor may overcome a Fifth Amendment claim through an offer of immunity, I see no reason to put defendants to such a choice.
"The trial judge, whose impartiality is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system, may be tempted, under the guise of exercising discretion in sentencing[,] to join forces with the prosecutor in securing the defendant's cooperation."
195 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 3, 60 F.2d 815, 817 (1979). I do not believe that we should allow that possibility.
I find disturbing the majority's willingness to brush aside these serious objections to the propriety of petitioner's sentence on the strength of "the duty to report known criminal behavior," ante at 445 U. S. 558. According to the Court, petitioner's refusal to become an informer was a rejection of a "deeply rooted social obligation," ibid. All citizens apparently are "obliged to assist the authorities" in this way, and petitioner's failure to do so was not only "a badge of irresponsible citizenship," but constituted "antisocial conduct" as well. Ante at 445 U. S. 558, 445 U. S. 559.
has never been as unambiguous as the majority suggests. The countervailing social values of loyalty and personal privacy have prevented us from imposing on the citizenry at large a duty to join in the business of crime detection. If the Court's view of social mores were accurate, it would be hard to understand how terms such as "stool pigeon," "snitch," "squealer," and "tattletale" have come to be the common description of those who engage in such behavior.
be a sign of repentance and the beginning of rehabilitation. [Footnote 2/10] But our Government has allowed its citizens to decide for themselves whether to enlist in the enterprise of enforcing the criminal laws; it has never imposed a duty to do so, as the Court's opinion suggests. I find no justification for creating such a duty in this case and applying it only to persons about to be sentenced for a crime.
of our criminal laws, we place their enforcement in the hands of public officers, and we do not give those officers the authority to impress the citizenry into the prosecutorial enterprise. By today's decision, the Court ignores this precept, and it does so in a setting that both threatens Fifth Amendment rights and encourages arbitrary and irrational sentencing.
The prosecutor stated at the sentencing hearing that the Government's initial offer of leniency in exchange for petitioner's cooperation was made on the assumption that he was a relatively minor figure in the conspiracy. The Government argued for lengthy consecutive sentences, however, because "we were shown to be wrong" about that assumption. It seems plain that, if petitioner had provided the information requested, he would have incriminated himself on additional charges.
"It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty is too harsh for man."
Marbury v Brooks, 7 Wheat. 556, 20 U. S. 575-576 (1822) .
Indeed, the record hardly supports the Court's characterization of petitioner's behavior as "intransigency." Ante at 445 U. S. 559. Except for his refusal to identify additional participants, petitioner was quite helpful. He voluntarily accompanied Ms. Payne to the office of the United States Attorney. At that time, as the Government conceded at the sentencing hearing, "we had no idea of the identity of who it was who was using that green Jaguar automobile to ferry narcotics about the city." App. 35. Ms. Payne said she lent the car to petitioner, and he agreed to be interviewed. At that initial interview, he confessed, implicated a coconspirator, and voluntarily explained the meaning of code words used in the conspiracy.
The Court also relies on Judge MacKinnon's assertion that the sentence was "very light" for a "substantial drug distributor." Ante at 445 U. S. 557, n. 4. Of course, petitioner did not plead guilty to conspiracy or to distribution of heroin, but to two counts of unlawful use of a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin. Each count was punishable by a maximum of four years' imprisonment and a $30,000 fine, and petitioner was sentenced to consecutive 1- to 4-year terms. At the sentencing hearing, petitioner's counsel stated that he had been unable to find a single case "in which any federal judge has ever given consecutive sentences for two or more phone counts." App. 28. The Government has never challenged this assertion.
The sentencing hearing took place on April 21, 1978. At that time, there was no settled law on the question whether failure to cooperate could be considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing. Compare United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 684-686 (CA3 1976) (improper factor), and United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079 (CA5 1974) (same), with United Slates v. Chaidez-Castro, 430 F.2d 766 (CA7 1970) (proper factor). Nor was there any rule that a defendant was required to identify reasons for his failure to cooperate. For the Court to hold in these circumstances that the defendant's silence amounted to "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464 (1938), seems to me extraordinarily stern in light of the Court's traditional indulgence of "every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." Ibid. (citation omitted).
In this respect, petitioner's conduct was quite different from the deliberate perjury involved in United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41 (1978). Perjury is itself a serious crime, a "manipulative defiance of the law,'" id. at 438 U. S. 51, quoting United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974), that corrupts the trial process.
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information . . . which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
This statute, however, was merely a codification of the sentencing standards set forth in Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949). Nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests a congressional intention to overturn or limit this Court's historic powers of supervision over the conduct of criminal cases in the federal courts. See Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U. S. 1, 352 U. S. 14 (1956). There is no warrant for the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 3577, which was designed to codify existing judicial practices, operates as a bar to the use of those supervisory powers to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege or to protect against irrational sentencing.
Cf. F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 582-583 (2d ed.1909).
"doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between 'enhancing' the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 'leniency' he claims would be appropriate if he cooperated."
"It is one thing to extend leniency to a defendant who is willing to cooperate with the government; it is quite another thing to administer additional punishment to a defendant who, by his silence, has committed no additional offense."
"between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy."
"[W]hile it is true that a defendant's lack of desire for rehabilitation may properly be considered in imposing sentence, to permit the sentencing judge to infer such lack of desire from a defendant's refusal to provide testimony would leave little force to the rule that a defendant may not be punished for exercising his right to remain silent. Moreover, we question how much a refusal to testify indicates an absence of rehabilitative desire, given that defendants often provide such testimony simply to get back at their former associates or to obtain a better deal from the Government. In any event, refusal to testify, particularly in narcotics cases, is more likely to be the result of well founded fears of reprisal to the witness or his family."
DiGiovanni v. United States, 596 F.2d 74, 75 (1979).

References: § 841
 § 843
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 6
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1
 § 4
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3577
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 6001
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3577
 v.