Source: http://lawsdocbox.com/Legal_Issues/76047223-In-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:42:33+00:00

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5 1 REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER Indiana s Brief in Opposition only underscores how far the state s prejudice standard diverges from the standard established by this Court and used in virtually every other jurisdiction. Outside of Indiana, the law is clear. In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement where a guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The Brief in Opposition concedes (BIO at 7-8) that Indiana requires an additional showing that the defendant would have been acquitted at trial. The Brief in Opposition proffers three defenses of this heightened standard, none of which can withstand the slightest scrutiny. First, Indiana declares (BIO at 8-10) that the state applies its heightened standard only to a category of cases it calls available-defense cases, and that the state reserves the Hill standard for a category it calls plea-consequences cases. But Indiana is the only jurisdiction in the country that uses these categories. There is no other state, and no federal circuit, that divides ineffective assistance claims into two types and uses a different prejudice standard for each. Every other jurisdiction applies a single prejudice standard to all claims that a guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance. In every other jurisdiction (except Rhode Island, Pet. at 13 n.1) it is the Hill standard, not Indiana s heightened standard.
6 2 Second, Indiana asserts (BIO at 10-17) that several other jurisdictions also employ its heightened standard. This assertion is incorrect. It rests in part on unpublished and pre-hill cases, and in part on passages taken out of context from published post- Hill cases. No other jurisdiction (again except Rhode Island) requires defendants to show that had they proceeded to trial they would have been acquitted. Third, Indiana insists (BIO at 6-7, 10, 27-28) that it is actually following Hill, on the theory that there is no difference between showing that a defendant would have proceeded to trial and showing that the defendant would have been acquitted at trial. But this claim is wrong as well. There is an enormous practical difference between Indiana s standard and the Hill standard. Judge Easterbrook s opinion for the Seventh Circuit is exactly right. Indiana s unique prejudice standard is a mistake that was committed in cases in which the Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that the Supreme Court of the United States couldn t have meant what it said in Hill. Payne v. Brown, 662 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 2011). This case is a perfect vehicle for correcting Indiana s mistake. The Court should grant certiorari and summarily reverse.
8 4 Indiana to change its prejudice standard only for the latter category. We hold today, the Indiana Supreme Court explained, that the United States Supreme Court s recent decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), does not affect the Van Cleave standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims as to errors or omissions of counsel that overlook or impair a defense. Segura, 749 N.E.2d at 499. For such claims, the defendant would still have to show that the defense would likely have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Id. But for claims that counsel s incorrect advice as to the penal consequences led the petitioner to plead guilty, the Indiana Supreme Court held, the proper prejudice standard was the one from Hill: a reasonable probability that the erroneous or omitted advice materially affected the decision to plead guilty. Id. As the Brief in Opposition correctly points out (BIO at 8-10), Indiana has adhered to this bifurcated prejudice standard ever since. But that only makes Indiana even more of an outlier. No other jurisdiction has adopted two different prejudice standards. This Court has certainly never suggested that different prejudice standards should govern different sorts of ineffective assistance claims. Indiana s bifurcated standard was invented by the Indiana Supreme Court precisely to avoid conforming its idiosyncratic prejudice standard to the one used everywhere else.
No. ================================================================ In The Supreme Court of the United States --------------------------------- --------------------------------- HENRY MONTGOMERY, vs.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs September 16, 2008 JAMES H. CARTER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Grundy County No. 4020 J.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA93 Court of Appeals No. 15CA0080 El Paso County District Court No. 10CR4367 Honorable David S. Prince, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
1 Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950) U.S. 662 (1895). 2 Ibid U.S. 459, 462 (1947).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA NO STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BRIAN PATRICK CLEMENS. Defendant-Appellant.
FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit April 7, 2009 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT NORMAN E. WIEGAND, Petitioner-Appellant, No. 08-1353 v.
RACINE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION and RACINE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondent.
********** conjunction with the AILA audio seminar, Post-conviction Relief in a Post-Chaidez World, held on March 4, 2014.
Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ. and Carrico, 1 S.J.
No. 12-86 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States WILLIS OF COLORADO, INC.; WILLIS GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED; WILLIS LIMITED; BOWEN, MICLETTE & BRITT, INC.; AND SEI INVESTMENTS COMPANY, Petitioners, v.

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