Source: http://chestervetclinic.com/j/jonesdayappellate.com1.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:00:42+00:00

Document:
No. 97 Civ. 4978,2000 WL 1639417 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2000) .
Almaguer v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. Co., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972) Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2000) Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc., 588 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1978) .7 Bradley v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Mo. 2000) Davis v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 212 F.R.D. 432 (D. Me. 2003) Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., Case No. 06-cv-4112 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2008) .
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) . 28 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) .
In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006) K.W. Muth Co. v. Bing-Lear Mfg. Group, L.L.C., 219 F.R.D. 554 (E.D. Mich. 2003) Logan v. Comm'l Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 1996) . 14, 24 Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002) . 18 Martin v. Monfort, Inc., 150 F.R.D. 172 (D. Colo. 1993) NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) . 19 Nevada v. J-M Mfg. Co., 555 F. App'x 782 (10th Cir. 2014) . 14, 24, 26 Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967).
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998) United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997). 18 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) .
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) .
21 U.S.C. § 355 .
Charles P. Cercone, The War Against Work Product Abuse : Exposing the Legal Alchemy of Document Compilations As Work Product, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 639 (2003) Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege & the Work Product Doctrine (5th ed. 2012) .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 .passim Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 . 27 David M. Greenwald, et al., Testimonial Privileges (3d ed.) .
fact work product cannot be discovered unless the party seeking it shows that it has some special significance to the case. That makes perfect sense. There is no true "need" for work product that is only tangentially relevant to a dispute (or at least not a "need" that is "substantial"). The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that its new "substantial need" standard is in direct conflict with Logan, 96 F.3d at 977. In that case, a plaintiff alleging bad faith denial of a worker's compensation claim sought discovery of the insurance company's entire claims file, but the company withheld as work product portions of the file created during litigation with plaintiff. Id. at 975. Plaintiff moved to compel production of the documents, arguing among other things that he had shown substantial need for them because the file was potentially the only evidence of bad faith, which was critical to his claim. Id. at 977. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that documents revealing the "strategy, mental impressions and opinion of the insurer's agents considering the handling of the claim are directly at issue." Logan, 96 F.3d at 977 (quoting Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 576-78 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and punctuation marks omitted)). But the court ruled that the plaintiff was required to "demonstrate some likelihood or probability that the documents sought may contain evidence of bad faith" to show substantial need. Id. Because the district court had conducted an in camera review of the (admittedly relevant) documents and found that they did not support an argument of bad faith, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiff had not shown "substantial need" for the documents. Id. The D.C. Circuit also attempted to distinguish the Tenth Circuit's unpublished opinion in J-M Manufacturing Co., 555 F. App'x at 785. Pet. App. 26a n.4. In J-M Manufacturing, the government ordered certain tests of the defendant's allegedly defective product while determining whether it should intervene in a qui tam action. 555 F. App'x at 784. After the government declined to intervene, the defendant subpoenaed the laboratory that had conducted the tests for the results. Id. The United States opposed, asserting work-product privilege, and the district court upheld the objection on the ground that the defendant had not shown substantial need. Id. The appellate court affirmed. Id. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the tests were directly relevant to the plaintiff's fraud theory. Id. at 784. However, the court noted that substantial need can only be shown where "the information sought is essential to the party's defense, is crucial to the determination of whether the defendant could be held liable for the acts alleged, or carries great probative value on contested issues." Id. at 785 (quoting Nat'l Congress For Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 194 F.R.D. 105, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). The court found that because the defendant had not carried its burden of showing that the test results had "great probative value on contested issues," it had not shown substantial need. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly held that fact work product must not be merely relevant, but necessary, before a party can show "substantial need" for it. In United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d at 1322, the United Kingdom sought to compel certain documents from United States authorities for use in prosecuting suspects whose co-conspirators were being investigated by the United States. Although the court agreed that the requested documents were relevant to the British prosecution, id. at 1319, it nevertheless held that materials over which the United States had claimed work-product protection need not be disclosed because the United Kingdom had not shown substantial need for them. The court stated that a mere finding of relevance "does not overcome a valid claim of work product privilege," and cited Hickman to hold that a "party must show that production of the material is not merely relevant, but also necessary" to overcome work-product protection. Id. at 1322. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have also indicated that under Rule 26(b)(3), a document must have a heightened relevance to the case before an adversary can show "substantial need" for it. In Belcher, 588 F.2d at 908, the court considered an interlocutory appeal of a district court's grant of permission under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 for a plaintiff's expert to inspect the defendant's plant as part of an employment discrimination lawsuit. In considering under what circumstances such an inspection would be permissible, the court analogized such requests to requests for trial preparation materials under Rule 26(b)(3). The court noted that although as a "general policy" discovery may be had by "simply showing the relevancy of the desired discovery to the cause of action," "when the desired discovery concerns materials prepared in anticipation of trial, the moving party must show that he has substantial need of the materials." Belcher, 588 F.2d 908. In other words, "substantial need" required more than mere relevance. See also Stampley, 23 F. App'x at 471 (party seeking discovery must always "show that documents are relevant," but if the materials were created in anticipation of litigation, the party must also show "substantial need."). Several district courts in other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., K.W. Muth Co. v. Bing-Lear Mfg. Group, L.L.C., 219 F.R.D. 554, 575 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (noting that "need" under Rule 26(b)(3) requires "some ‘plus' factor" beyond relevance); Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 194 F.R.D. 666, 672 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (to show substantial need, requesting party must show that the work product is "essential to proving [the requestor's] prima facie case"); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (substantial need shown where "the information sought is ‘essential' to the party's defense, is ‘crucial' to the determination of whether the defendant could be held liable for the acts alleged, or carries great probative value on contested issues" (quoting Nat'l Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, 194 F.R.D. at 110); Davis v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 212 F.R.D. 432, 436 (D. Me. 2003) ("the fact that the documents sought might be relevant to [plaintiff's] claims is not enough under Rule 26(b)(3)."); Bradley v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 557, 558 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (there can be no substantial need for materials that are not essential to the requesting party's prima facie case); Martin v. Monfort, Inc., 150 F.R.D. 172 (D. Colo. 1993) (finding no substantial need despite assuming relevance of requested documents); Almaguer v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. Co., 55 F.R.D. 147, 148-49 (D. Neb. 1972) ("When lawyers have prepared or obtained the materials for trial, all courts require more than relevance; so much is clearly commanded by Hickman[.]"); see also David M. Greenwald, et al., Testimonial Privileges § 2:24 (3d ed.) ("In order to demonstrate substantial need sufficient to overcome the work product protection, a party must show more than the mere relevancy of the work product in question." (citing district court cases in support)). 2. These cases are in direct conflict with the D.C.
II. The decision below conflicts with several other circuits and erroneously holds that no heightened relevance is required to show "substantial need"

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