Source: https://www.shipmangoodwin.com/the-end-of-a-long-road-the-connecticut-supreme-court-dismisses-the-appeal-of-the-ccjef-plaintiffs
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:24:40+00:00

Document:
Because we conclude that the trial court was correct in its initial determination that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the state’s educational offerings are not minimally adequate under article eighth, § 1, and in its determination that the state has not violated their equal protection rights under the state constitution, the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claims that the state has not provided them with a suitable and substantially equal educational opportunity.
With those words, Chief Justice Rogers of the Connecticut Supreme Court announced the end of a long road for the case of Connecticut Coalition on Justice in Educational Funding v. Rell, (SC 19768, January 17, 2018) (CCJEF II). Chief Justice Rogers was joined in the majority by Justices Eveleigh, Vertefeuille and Alvord. Dissenting in part were Justices Palmer, Robinson and Sheldon. Interestingly, Justices McDonald and D’Auria did not participate on the panel because of their involvement with the case prior to appointment to the Court. Justice D’Auria argued the case on behalf of the state when it was last before the Court in 2008, and Justice McDonald had been Corporation Counsel for the City of Stamford, which is a member of the plaintiff coalition. This landmark decision essentially leaves the burden of ensuring that all children in Connecticut receive substantially equal educational opportunities squarely in the hands of the legislature going forward. To understand how we arrived at this point, it is helpful to look briefly at the history of the case.
The CCJEF case was first brought in 2005, and it was resuscitated by the Connecticut Supreme Court in 2010, as described below. Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Educational Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240 (2010) (CCJEF I). The case was then tried in the Superior Court, and in 2016 Judge Moukawsher ruled that the state’s system of funding education violates article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut Constitution. On January 17, 2018, a divided Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the 2016 decision, and ordered judgment to be entered for the state.
The Superior Court had previously dismissed as non-justiciable the claims brought by parents, who alleged that the current system of education funding denies them their constitutional right to a “suitable” education for their children. Carroll-Hall v. M. Jodi Rell, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2478 (Conn. Super. 2007). However, after deliberating for almost two years, a deeply divided Connecticut Supreme Court decided in 2010 (without a majority opinion) that the plaintiffs could proceed with their claim that their children’s right to a suitable education under article eighth, § 1, was violated by the current system of funding for education.
In describing this constitutional standard, the majority repeatedly emphasized that the analysis must focus on whether the “educational inputs are minimally adequate to enable a student who takes advantage of them to perform the basic functions of an adult,” rather than on the educational outputs (i.e., achievement) because there are a myriad of factors that could affect student achievement beyond the control of the state or school districts, such as poverty, nutrition and parenting. The CCJEF II majority then affirmed the trial court in its finding that educational funding in Connecticut meets the “minimally adequate” standard under the criteria above. The CCJEF majority also affirmed the trial court’s finding that the equal protection rights of the plaintiffs were not violated.
We agree with the defendants, however, that the trial court went on to improperly apply a constitutional standard of its own devising after concluding that the state’s schools satisfied the controlling Campaign I criteria. (Emphasis added).
Rather, if the state is providing a minimally adequate educational opportunity to all of its elementary and secondary school students under the Campaign I criteria, the fact that some educational policies and programs are not, in the trial court’s personal view, “rationally, substantially and verifiably connected to teaching children” is constitutionally irrelevant. (Emphasis added).
The judgment is reversed with respect to the trial court’s determination that the defendants are violating article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution and the case is remanded to that court with direction to render judgment for the defendants on that claim . . . .
The ruling here was anything but unanimous. Notwithstanding the reliance of the CCJEF II majority on Justice Palmer’s concurring opinion in CCJEF I, Justice Palmer, joined by Justices Robinson and Sheldon, wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in which he (1) argued that the trial court applied the wrong constitutional standard, (2) announced what he believed to be the correct constitutional standard, and (3) stated that the court should order a new trial so that the plaintiffs might make their arguments in light of that new constitutional standard.
So what should the trial court have done? It should have performed a single legal analysis, applying the Campaign I test, as articulated in my concurrence in Rell, to the specific educational failings that the plaintiffs allege exist in specific schools and school districts. It should have determined whether, in light of its factual findings regarding both financial and nonfinancial considerations, the state’s educational programs are reasonably calculated to satisfy each of the Campaign I criteria so as to ensure that students in those districts have the opportunity to secure the fruits of a minimally adequate education. And it should have made these determinations in light of the ‘‘special needs of . . . particular local school system[s],’’ as defined in Justice Borden’s dissent in Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 143.
Because the plaintiffs were not afforded the opportunity to prove their case according to the correct legal standard, and because there is reason to believe that the trial court may have found one or more violations of Campaign I if that test had been applied properly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that directs judgment for the defendants. Instead, I would remand the case for a new trial.
The majority, however, ruled otherwise, and the CCJEF II case is now over.
If you have any questions about the dismissal of this Appeal, please contact: Thomas B. Mooney at (860) 251-5710 or tmooney@goodwin.com; Peter J. Maher at (860) 251-5507 or pmaher@goodwin.com; or Natalie S. Wagner at (860) 251-5613 or nwagner@goodwin.com.

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