Source: https://www.texasinjurylawyersblog.com/category/automobile-accidents/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:29:32+00:00

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Automobile Accidents Category Archives — Page 2 of 5 — Texas Injury Lawyers Blog Published by Texas Injury Attorneys — Carabin & Shaw, P.C.
Liability in Texas car crashes is generally governed by negligence principles. Negligence refers to a party’s failure to act in a way that an ordinarily prudent person would act under the circumstances to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm. Under Texas law, the elements of a negligence claim are: 1) a legal duty owed by one person to another; 2) a breach of that duty; 3) damages; and 4) proximate causation of the damages by the breach of duty.The standard of care one person owes another depends on the circumstances surrounding the accident as well as the relationship between the parties. Generally, the standard of care refers to the care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would use to prevent injuries under the circumstances. Therefore, a plaintiff must show that a defendant did something (or failed to do something) that a person exercising ordinary care would not have done under the circumstances.
In car accident cases, in order to hold another driver liable, a plaintiff must show that the driver was negligent and also that the other driver’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Proximate cause refers to both the direct cause of the damages and the foreseeability of the damages. In cases involving more than one negligent driver, each driver is jointly and severally liable for the resulting damages.
In a recent Texas car accident case, an on-duty police officer rear-ended the plaintiff’s van. Afterward, the police supervisor came to the scene and spoke to both the police officer and the plaintiff. He prepared the investigative reports.
Later, the plaintiff sued the city for damages under the Texas Tort Claims Act on the ground that the officer’s negligence caused the collision and his serious injuries. He claimed that the city had been given actual and formal notice. The city denied the allegations and argued in a plea to the jurisdiction it hadn’t been given timely actual and formal notice of the claims.
The plaintiff argued the notice requirement was satisfied because he’d actually told the officer and his supervisor about his injuries at the time of the accident. The trial court denied the city’s plea to the jurisdiction.
In Blevins v. Pepper-Lawson Construction, the plaintiff appealed after a jury awarded him $170,850 for injuries suffered when he hit a construction vehicle driven by an employee of a masonry company.
The case arose one evening when the plaintiff was driving near a high school under renovation. A subcontractor of Pepper-Lawson Construction was doing some masonry. The plaintiff tried to pass a car but instead hit the mason’s construction vehicle. He was hurt and sued Pepper-Lawson, the mason, and the driver of the construction vehicle.
At trial, he argued that the construction vehicle should not be driven on a public road without a road kit (headlights and tail lights), and there was a failure to warn. A witness testified at trial that she was driving in the same area, which was well lit. A motorcycle sped around her in the right lane, followed by the plaintiff’s truck, which was also speeding. She believed they were racing and stopped her car because she saw that the plaintiff was driving as if he didn’t see the construction vehicle and was going to hit it.
In Texas Department of Transportation v. Kirk, the plaintiff sued several entities, including the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), to recover compensation for injuries suffered when he lost consciousness and control of his vehicle on Hwy. 277. Before crashing the car, he started to suffer dizziness and blurred vision. When he lost consciousness, his car left the road and hit a guardrail, some of which came through the passenger side, causing injuries.
Later, the plaintiff claimed that the end terminal of the guardrail had an ET-Plus design, which was developed and sold by various defendants, although not TxDOT. It had been designed so that it would absorb collision impact. The plaintiff also claimed other parties had altered the design so that it didn’t function in the same way.
TxDOT filed a motion for summary judgment and to dismiss, arguing it had sovereign immunity. The motion was denied, but the trial judge gave no reason why. TxDOT appealed.
In Adams v. City of Dallas, the appellate court considered a car accident allegedly caused by a malfunctioning traffic light. The two people involved in the accident were Clinton Adams and Adeba Ghebrekidan. The latter sued the former and the City of Dallas. Adams counterclaimed against Ghebrekidan and cross-claimed against the City 20 days later.
The City claimed it wasn’t provided with timely written notice of Adams’ lawsuit, and it didn’t have the actual notice required by the Texas Tort Claims Act. The lower court dismissed Adams’ claims against the City.
Adams appealed. The appellate court explained that if the City had sovereign immunity from suit, the lower court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. All plaintiffs bringing lawsuits against governmental entities are required to provide notice to the relevant entity in order to bring a valid lawsuit. Under Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.101, a governmental entity is entitled to notice of a claim within six months of the day of the accident described in the claim. However, under § 101.101(c), the notice requirement doesn’t apply if the governmental entity has actual notice of the claimant’s injuries.
In Painter v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., a Texas appellate court considered the death of two oil field employees and injuries to a third oil field employee. The workers were doing drilling on behalf of their employer, Amerimex. Amerimex was hired by Sandridge, which had a lease to drill wells at a ranch. The contract described Amerimex as an independent contractor but specified that the crew worked under Sandridge’s control, supervision, and direction. Sandridge was obligated to pay bonuses to the Amerimex employees so that they wouldn’t be hired away by other drillers. Sandridge had an on-site supervisor who stayed in a trailer.
The accident happened after the workers’ shift while they were driving to a bunkhouse 30-40 miles away owned by Amerimex. There was no requirement that the workers live in the bunkhouse or ride with their crew leader to and from the drilling site, but since the crew leader was the only one with a car, they did drive to and from the bunkhouse with him every day. The crew worked in shifts of seven days on and seven days off. While driving, the crew leader ran into the back of another car. Two of the employees were killed, and another was injured. Later, the crew leader testified that nobody at Sandridge gave him any driving instructions.
The decedents’ relatives and the surviving employee sued the other driver in the crash, Amerimex, and Sandridge, the owner of the oil and gas lease. Their petition alleged that Sandridge was responsible for the crew leader’s actions because it gave a financial incentive to the crew leader to transport them in his car. They alternatively alleged the crew leader was the agent of Sandridge due to a transportation bonus, or that he was a “borrowed servant” of Sandridge.

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