Source: https://recreation-law.com/tag/independent-contractor/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:54:22+00:00

Document:
Seung Yon Choi and Gerald J. Keane on behalf of E.K., a Minor as Guardian Ad Litem, and Seung Yon Choi, and Gerald J. Keane, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Hunterdon County YMCA, Inc., Michael Trianio, Chris Nallen, Alex Baker, Erica Croat, The New Jersey Professional Golfers Association, Inc., James Mullen, Defendants, and The Professional Golfers Association, Inc., Defendant-Respondent.
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION.
PLEASE CONSULT NEW JERSEY RULE 1:36-3 FOR CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. L-0159-14.
COUNSEL: Carter, Van Rensselaer and Caldwell, attorneys for appellant (William J. Caldwell, on the brief).
Cascio & Capotorto, attorneys for respondent (Jeffrey A. Savage, on the brief).
JUDGES: Before Judges Yannotti and Leone.
This action arises out of injuries sustained by a five-year-old girl, E.K., while attending a golf camp. Plaintiffs, E.K.’s parents Seung Yon Choi and Gerald J. Keane, brought suit on their own behalf and on behalf of E.K. They appeal from a June 28, 2016 order granting summary judgment to defendant Professional Golfers Association of America, Inc. (PGA). We affirm.
In the summer of 2013, plaintiffs enrolled E.K. in a summer “Golf Camp” offered by defendant Hunterdon County YMCA, Inc. (YMCA). The YMCA summer camp brochure’s description of the Golf Camp stated that “PGA (Professional Golf Association) Professionals will provide a friendly and relaxing environment where your child can learn the fundamentals of” golf, and that “campers will spend half of the day with PGA professionals playing golf[.]” The PGA’s logo was displayed above the description of the Golf Camp in the [*2] brochure.
On July 27, 2013, E.K. was accidentally struck in the mouth by a golf club swung by another minor child. E.K. sustained injuries to her face and mouth including the loss of multiple baby teeth.
Plaintiffs filed suit against multiple defendants including the YMCA and several of its employees; Chris Nallen, the professional golfer hired as an instructor at the camp; the parents of the minor child that hit E.K. with the golf club; the New Jersey Professional Golfers Association, Inc. (NJPGA); the New Jersey Golf Foundation, Inc. (NJ Golf Foundation); the PGA Foundation; and the PGA. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that E.K. would not have been injured but for the negligent supervision of the Golf Camp and the campers. Plaintiff also alleged that Nallen was a member, official, agent, servant, or independent contractor of the PGA, that the PGA had a duty to ensure Nallen would properly supervise the Golf Camp, and that the PGA was an independent contractor of the YMCA.
The PGA filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was denied on January 28, 2016, because discovery had not yet been completed and the court wanted to give plaintiffs the opportunity to develop [*3] their claim against the PGA. Plaintiffs then settled with the NJPGA, NJ Golf Foundation, Nallen, and the YMCA and its employees. After the close of discovery, the PGA filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty of care to plaintiffs. On June 28, 2016, Judge Michael F. O’Neill granted the PGA’s renewed motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal.
Summary judgment must be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.” R. 4:46-2(c). The court must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995). “[T]he court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord [that party] the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom.” Id. at 535 (citation and internal [*4] quotation marks omitted).
An appellate court “review[s] the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court.” Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199, 129 A.3d 1069 (2016). We must hew to that standard of review.
Based on our standard of review, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge O’Neill’s thoughtful and well-reasoned decision issued on June 28, 2016. We add the following.
“[A] negligence cause of action requires the establishment of four elements: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages.” Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 594, 59 A.3d 561 (2013). “The determination of the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court.” Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 479, 655 A.2d 1354 (1995). “Under respondeat superior, an employer can be found liable for the negligence of an employee causing injuries to third parties, if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment.” Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 408-09, 815 A.2d 460 (2003). To establish liability, a plaintiff must show “that a master-servant relationship existed.” Id. at 409. “If no master-servant relationship exists, no further inquiry need take place because the master-servant relationship is sine qua non to the invocation of respondeat superior.” ]Ibid.
The record indicates Nallen was hired by [*5] the NJ Golf Foundation as an independent contractor to run the YMCA’s Golf Camp. The NJ Golf Foundation paid Nallen $2700 for his services, which was reflected in an IRS form 1099-MISC used for reporting income paid to independent contractors. The PGA is not mentioned in the agreement signed by the YMCA and the NJPGA. Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence that would show, or even create a genuine dispute of fact, that Nallen was in a master-servant relationship with the PGA. We agree with the trial court that a master-servant relationship was not established merely because Nallen was a professional golfer who had competed in PGA events as a member of the PGA. See Basil v. Wolf, 193 N.J. 38, 62, 935 A.2d 1154 (2007) (a principal is generally immune from liability for the negligence of an independent contractor).
Plaintiffs argue that even if Nallen was an independent contractor, liability can still be imposed under the doctrine of apparent authority or agency. See Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 337-38, 634 A.2d 74 (1993). “If a principal cloaks an independent contractor with apparent authority or agency, the principal can be held liable as if the contractor were its own employee if it held out the contractor to the plaintiff as its own servant or agent.” Basil, supra, 193 N.J. at 63. Liability may be imposed on the [*6] principal based upon “apparent authority” when “the principal’s actions have misled a third-party into believing that a relationship of authority in fact exists.” Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 324 N.J. Super. 290, 317, 735 A.2d 576 (App. Div. 1999). Liability arises if “the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business uses, and the nature of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has the authority to perform the particular act in question.” Id. at 318 (citation omitted).
To satisfy its burden of establishing the apparent authority or apparent agency relationship, plaintiffs had to establish: “(1) that the appearance of authority has been created by the conduct of the alleged principal and it cannot be established ‘alone and solely by proof of [conduct by] the supposed agent,’ (2) that a third party has relied on the agent’s apparent authority to act for a principal, and (3) that the reliance was reasonable under the circumstances.” Ibid. (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs seek to impose liability on the PGA based on the use of the PGA logo and references to the PGA in the YMCA’s summer camp brochure. In Mercer, we reversed summary judgment granted to Weyerhaeuser, a [*7] large building and lumber supply company, because “[t]here was no dispute that Weyerhaeuser authorized [the home builder] to use its logo on [the home builder’s] business cards, brochures, press lists, correspondence and newspaper advertisements at the time that plaintiffs purchased their homes.” Mercer, supra, 324 N.J. Super. at 321. As such, there was a factual dispute over “whether plaintiffs relied on Weyerhauser’s conduct (lending [the home builder] its name and logo for marketing purposes) in deciding to purchase these homes[.]” Id. at 319.
1 The PGA asserts the use of its logo was apparently authorized by the NJ Golf Foundation or the NJPGA, which contracted with the YMCA. Plaintiffs have not shown those entities were alter egos of the PGA.
Moreover, the PGA did not hold Nallen out as its agent or employee. Indeed, [*8] there was no evidence the PGA was involved in any aspect of the planning or administration of the YMCA’s camp. Thus, plaintiffs, unlike the plaintiffs in Mercer, have failed to meet their burden to show apparent authority. Therefore, we need not address whether plaintiffs relief on the alleged apparent authority, or whether that reliance was reasonable.
State Law prohibits releases for employees if they are covered by Worker’s Compensation.
Prior to the creation of Worker’s Compensation, if an employee was injured at work he had to sue his employer and prove the employer was negligent to recover for his injuries. This created problems for both parties. Injured employees went bankrupt attempting to win a suit and employers injured employees rather than keeping workplaces safe. It was cheaper to fight a lawsuit then make a workplace safe.
With the creation of worker’s compensation the employers and employees both gave up and received benefits. Basically, in return for not suing the employer the employee receives medical care and some of their lost wages.
An employee gives up the right to sue the employer if they accept worker’s compensation benefits. The employer is required to carry worker’s compensation on employees or they can suffer fines or damages levied by the state or if sued by the employee additional damages over what are owed.
Colorado Statutes state that if you accept worker’s compensation you give up other rights to sue.
An election under the provisions of section 8-40-302 (5) and in compliance with the provisions of articles 40 to 47 of this title, including the provisions for insurance, shall be construed to be a surrender by the employer, such employer’s insurance carrier, and the employee of their rights to any method, form, or amount of compensation or determination thereof or to any cause of action, action at law, suit in equity, or statutory or common-law right, remedy, or proceeding for or on account of such personal injuries or death of such employee other than as provided in said articles, and shall be an acceptance of all the provisions of said articles, and shall bind the employee personally, and, for compensation for such employee’s death, the employee’s personal representatives, surviving spouse, and next of kin, as well as the employer, such employer’s insurance carrier, and those conducting their business during bankruptcy or insolvency.
(a) The rights and the remedies granted to an employee by this chapter shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death; provided, however, that no employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any third-party tortfeasor, other than an employee of the same employer or any person who, pursuant to a contract or agreement with an employer, provides workers’ compensation benefits to an injured employee, notwithstanding the fact that no common-law master-servant relationship or contract of employment exists between the injured employee and the person providing the benefits, and other than a construction design professional who is retained to perform professional services on or in conjunction with a construction project on which the employee was working when injured, or any employee of a construction design professional who is assisting in the performance of professional services on the construction site on which the employee was working when injured, unless the construction design professional specifically assumes by written contract the safety practices for the project. The immunity provided by this subsection to a construction design professional shall not apply to the negligent preparation of design plans and specifications, nor shall it apply to the tortious activities of the construction design professional or the employees of the construction design professional while on the construction site where the employee was injured and where those activities are the proximate cause of the injury to the employee or to any professional surveys specifically set forth in the contract or any intentional misconduct committed by the construction design professional or his employees.
(b) As used in subsection (a) of this Code section, the term “construction design professional” means any person who is an architect, professional engineer, landscape architect, geologist, or land surveyor who has been issued a license pursuant to Chapter 4, 15, 19, or 23 of Title 43 or any corporation organized to render professional services in Georgia through the practice of one or more such technical professions as architecture, professional engineering, landscape architecture, geology, or land surveying.
(c) The immunity provided by this subsection shall apply and extend to the businesses using the services of a temporary help contracting firm, as such term is defined in Code Section 34-8-46, or an employee leasing company, as such term is defined in Code Section 34-8-32, when the benefits required by this chapter are provided by either the temporary help contracting firm or the employee leasing company or the business using the services of either such firm or company. A temporary help contracting firm or an employee leasing company shall be deemed to be a statutory employer for the purposes of this chapter.
Sec. 5. (a) There is no common law or statutory right to recover compensation or damages from the employer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of any of them for or on account of any injury to health, disease, or death therefrom, other than for the compensation herein provided or for damages as provided in Section 3 of this Act [820 ILCS 310/3]. This Section shall not affect any right to compensation under the “Workers’ Compensation Act” [820 ILCS 305/1 et seq.].
No compensation is payable under this Act for any condition of physical or mental ill-being, disability, disablement, or death for which compensation is recoverable on account of accidental injury under the “Workers’ Compensation Act“.
Consequently the battle in worker’s compensation cases is whether or not someone was an employee. Several people are automatically excluded; first independent contractors are not employees. Interns are probably a revolving area of the law, and are probably moving close to being called employees. Several recent federal regulatory changes have required more education for interns and several lawsuits have resulted in interns receiving pay. If interns are paid, then they are employees covered under worker’s compensation.
Interns that have been injured and not covered by worker’s compensation are prevented from recovering because of state law, not because of unequal bargaining power.
The prohibition against lawsuits does not extend to malfunctioning equipment or any third party that might have caused the injury. An example would be an employee working on a road that is hit and injured by a car. The employee’s worker’s compensation would cover his lost wages and medical bills. The injured employee would still sue the driver of the car. However the worker’s compensation insurance company would have the right to recover any damages first before the injured employee based on its subrogation rights.
Simply put, an injury on the job provides guarantees not lawsuits. Those guarantees vary by state, but generally it means 100% of the injured employee’s medical bills are paid and a percentage of their income is replaced. If necessary additional retraining and/or long term disability if the injury is severe enough or permanent.
An employer who has complied with the provisions of articles 40 to 47 of this title, including the provisions relating to insurance, shall not be subject to the provisions of section 8-41-101; nor shall such employer or the insurance carrier, if any, insuring the employer’s liability under said articles be subject to any other liability for the death of or personal injury to any employee, except as provided in said articles; and all causes of action, actions at law, suits in equity, proceedings, and statutory and common law rights and remedies for and on account of such death of or personal injury to any such employee and accruing to any person are abolished except as provided in said articles.
There is no litigation between employers and employees any more. Now that type of litigation resolves around whether or not someone was an employee. If you are an employer, make sure every person understands that situation and you can prove it, either in writing or some other way. You also must be able to prove that someone is not an employee according to the law. Just saying someone is not an employee is not enough.
134.93. Payment of commissions to independent sales representatives.
(a) “Commission” means compensation accruing to an independent sales representative for payment by a principal, the rate of which is expressed as a percentage of the dollar amount of orders or sales made by the independent sales representative or as a percentage of the dollar amount of profits generated by the independent sales representative.
1. A person who places orders or purchases products for the persons own account for resale.
1. Manufactures, produces, imports or distributes a product for wholesale.
2. Contracts with an independent sales representative to solicit orders for the product.
3. Compensates the independent sales representative, in whole or in part, by commission.
(a) Subject to pars. (b) and (c), a commission becomes due as provided in the contract between the principal and the independent sales representative.
(b) If there is no written contract between the principal and the independent sales representative, or if the written contract does not provide for when a commission becomes due, or if the written contract is ambiguous or unclear as to when a commission becomes due, a commission becomes due according to the past practice used by the principal and the independent sales representative.
(c) If it cannot be determined under par. (a) or (b) when a commission becomes due, a commission becomes due according to the custom and usage prevalent in this state for the particular industry of the principal and independent sales representative.
(3) NOTICE OF TERMINATION OR CHANGE IN CONTRACT.
Unless otherwise provided in a written contract between a principal and an independent sales representative, a principal shall provide an independent sales representative with at least 90 days prior written notice of any termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or substantial change in the competitive circumstances of the contract between the principal and the independent sales representative.
(4) COMMISSIONS DUE; PAYMENT ON TERMINATION OF CONTRACT.
Any principal that violates sub. (2) by failing to pay a commission due to an independent sales representative as required under sub. (2) is liable to the independent sales representative for the amount of the commission due and for exemplary damages of not more than 200% of the amount of the commissions due. In addition, the principal shall pay to the independent sales representative, notwithstanding the limitations specified in s. 799.25 or 814.04, all actual costs, including reasonable actual attorney fees, incurred by the independent sales representative in bringing an action, obtaining a judgment and collecting on a judgment under this subsection.
(1) Commission. Compensation accruing to a sales representative for payment by a principal, the rate of which is expressed as a percentage of the dollar amount of certain orders or sales.
a. Engages in the business of manufacturing, producing, importing, or distributing a product or products for sale to customers who purchase the product or products for resale.
b. Utilizes sales representatives to solicit orders for the product or products.
c. Compensates the sales representatives, in whole or in part, by commission.
(3) Sales representative. Any person who engages in the business of soliciting, on behalf of a principal, orders for the purchase at wholesale of the product or products of the principal, but does not include a person who places orders or purchases for his or her own account for resale, or a person engaged in home solicitation sales.
(4) Termination. The end of services performed by the sales representative for the principal, whether by discharge, resignation, or expiration of a contract.
§ 8-24-2. Sales representative’s commission contracts; commission due.
(a) The terms of the contract between the principal and sales representative shall determine when a commission is due.
(b) If the time when the commission is due cannot be determined by a contract between the principal and sales representative, the past practices between the parties shall control, or if there are no past practices, the custom and usage prevalent in this state for the business that is the subject of the relationship between the parties shall control.
(c) All commissions that are due at the time of termination of a contract between a sales representative and principal shall be paid within thirty days after the date of termination. Commissions that become due after the termination date shall be paid within thirty days after the date on which the commissions become due.
§ 8-24-3. Failure to pay commission; damages; attorney’s fees.
A principal who fails to pay a commission as required by Section 8-24-2 is liable to the sales representative in a civil action for three times the damages sustained by the sales representative plus reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.
§ 8-24-4. Nonresident principal; personal jurisdiction.
A principal who is not a resident of this state and who enters into a contract subject to this chapter is considered to be doing business in this state for purposes of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the principal.
§ 8-24-5. Waiver void; unrestricted rights or remedies.
(a) This chapter may not be waived, whether by express waiver or by any provision in a contract attempting to make the contract or agreement subject to the laws of another state. A waiver of any provision of this chapter is void.
(b) This chapter does not invalidate or restrict any other right or remedy available to a sales representative or preclude a sales representative from seeking to recover in one action on all claims against a principal.
A. The sales representative and the principal shall enter into a written contract. The contract shall set forth the method by which the sales representative’s commission is to be computed and paid.
B. The principal shall provide each sales representative with a signed copy of the contract. The principal shall obtain a signed receipt for the contract from each sales representative.
1. All the commissions due through the time of termination shall be paid to the sales representative within a period of not to exceed thirty days after termination.
2. All the commissions that become due after the effective date of termination shall be paid to the sales representative within fourteen days after they become due.
B. The principal shall pay the sales representative all commissions due while the business relationship is in effect in accordance with the agreement between the parties.
C. A principal who fails to comply with subsections A and B of this section is liable to the sales representative for damages in the amount of three times the sum of the unpaid commissions owed to the sales representative.
D. The prevailing party in an action brought under this section is entitled to the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney fees.
E. Commissions shall be paid at the usual place of payment unless the sales representative requests that the com-missions be sent by registered mail. If, in accordance with a request by the sales representative, the sales representative’s commissions are sent by mail, the commissions are deemed to have been paid as of the date of the registered postmark on the envelope.
F. Unless payment is made pursuant to a binding and final written settlement agreement and release, the acceptance by a sales representative of a commission payment from the principal does not constitute a release as to the balance of any commissions claimed due. A full release of all commission claims that is required by a principal as a condition to a partial commission payment is null and void.
(3) “Sales representative” means a person who solicits on behalf of a principal orders for the purchase at wholesale of the principal’s product. The term “sales representative” does not include a person who places orders for or purchases the product for his or her own account for resale, or is engaged in door-to-door sales regulated by § 4-89-101 et seq.
4-70-302. Sales representatives’ contracts — Limitation.
(a) A contract between a principal and a sales representative under which the sales representative is to solicit wholesale orders within this state must be in writing and set forth the method by which the sales representative’s commission is to be computed and paid.
(b) The principal shall provide the sales representative with a copy of the contract.
(c) A provision in the contract establishing venue for an action arising under the contract in a state other than this state is void.
4-70-303. Payment in absence of contract.
If a compensation agreement between a sales representative and a principal that is not in writing is terminated, the principal shall pay all commissions due the sales representative within thirty (30) working days after the date of the termination.
A principal who is not a resident of this state and who enters into a contract subject to this subchapter is considered to be doing business in this state for purposes of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the principal.
A provision of this subchapter may not be waived, whether by express waiver or by attempt to make a contract or agreement subject to the laws of another state. A waiver of a provision of this subchapter is void.
4-70-306. Damages and attorney’s fees.
A principal who fails to comply with a provision of a contract under § 4-70-302 relating to payment of a commission or fails to pay a commission as required by § 4-70-303 is liable to the sales representative in a civil action for three (3) times the damages sustained by the sales representative, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 

§ 8

§ 8

§ 8

§ 8
 § 4
 § 4
 § 4