Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/424/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:17:06+00:00

Document:
1. The New Mexico statute, as applied here to prevent the publication in New Mexico of the proscribed advertising, does not impose a constitutionally prohibited burden on interstate commerce. Pp. 374 U. S. 427-429.
2. New Mexico's jurisdiction to regulate professional advertising practices in the manner here involved has not been preempted with respect to radio advertising by the Federal Communications Act. Pp. 374 U. S. 429-432.
3. The statute here involved does not deprive appellants of property without due process of law or violate their privileges and immunities of national citizenship contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 374 U. S. 432, n. 12.
This case comes to us on appeal from the Supreme Court of New Mexico. One of the appellants, Agnes K. Head, owns a newspaper in Hobbs, New Mexico. The other appellant, Permian Basin Radio Corporation, owns and operates a radio station there. Hobbs is in the southeastern corner of the State, close to the Texas border, and much of the area served by both the radio station and the newspaper lies in Texas. The appellants were enjoined from accepting or publishing within the State of New Mexico a Texas optometrist's advertising found to be in violation of New Mexico law. The appellants claim that the state law, as applied, imposes an unlawful burden on interstate commerce. Permian also argues that regulation of advertising by radio has been preempted by the Communications Act of 1934. [Footnote 1] We noted probable jurisdiction, 371 U.S. 900, and invited the Solicitor General to express the Government's views concerning the question of federal preemption. We have concluded that the judgment should be affirmed.
"Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 93 U. S. 103; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503; The Minnesota Rate Cases. 230 U. S. 352; Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U. S. 234; Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U. S. 528."
362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 443-444.
Like the smoke abatement ordinance in the Huron case, the statute here involved is a measure directly addressed to protection of the public health, and the statute thus falls within the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power. [Footnote 4] The legitimacy of state legislation in this precise area has been expressly established. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, supra, at 362 U. S. 448.
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 373 U. S. 141.
itself has, on occasion, so interpreted its authority. [Footnote 9] Further, the United States argues that the Commission has the authority to promulgate general regulations concerning the subject of advertising for the guidance of broadcasters. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284, 347 U. S. 289-290. This grant of federal power, it is argued, is sufficient to oust state regulation of radio advertising.
The case is not one, therefore, in which the State seeks to justify a statute as a health measure on the attenuated theory that the economic wellbeing of a profession or industry will assure better performance in the public interest. See Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 294 U. S. 522-523. Compare Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608.
The appellants have argued that the decree below will have the effect of preventing communication between the Texas optometrist and Texas residents. A similar argument was rejected in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, which held valid a local ordinance prohibiting the display of advertising on trucks which also operated in other States.
E.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 319 U. S. 213 ("wide licensing and regulatory powers"), id. at 319 U. S. 217 ("comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast potentialities of radio"); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 309 U. S. 137 ("unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the industry").
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52.
See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Los Angeles, 280 U. S. 52, 280 U. S. 68-70. Compare Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, which held state censorship of motion pictures shown on television preempted by those provisions of the federal act expressly dealing with "communications containing profane or obscene words, language, or meaning." 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(D).
The appellants urge three additional grounds for reversal. Each may be disposed of briefly. First, both appellants urge that the state statute deprives them of property, in violation of the Due Process Clause. That claim is foreclosed by Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726. The appellant Head claims that denial of her right to do business with Abner Roberts is a violation of her privileges and immunities of national citizenship. But the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a naked right to conduct a business free of otherwise valid state regulation. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 309 U. S. 92-93. Finally, it is contended that the injunction constitutes an invalid restraint upon freedom of speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument was not made to the state courts, nor was it reserved in the notice of appeal to this Court. Under Rule 10, par. 2, of the Rules of this Court, "Only the questions set forth in the notice of appeal or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the court." See also Rule 15, par. 1(c)(1).
I agree that the attack on the New Mexico statute as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce has no merit, and therefore join Part I of the Court's opinion. The attack based on the Supremacy Clause -- the contention that the Federal Communications Act preempts the subject matter of this state regulation -- is not, however, so easily answered. Although I conclude that it too cannot prevail, I think it is appropriate that I state separately my reasons for reaching that result. For, only recently, we held, in Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U. S. 525, that the Communications Act displaced the state law of defamation insofar as that law directly conflicted with the "equal time" aims of § 315. Cf. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120; Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153. What reasons arise from the relevant state and federal legislation governing advertising which require a different conclusion in this case?
short-term licenses. [Footnote 2/4] Forfeitures have been imposed for "violations that do not warrant revocation proceedings," [Footnote 2/5] and cease and desist orders have been issued for the first time in broadcast cases. [Footnote 2/6] Thus, infractions which would heretofore have gone formally unregulated are apparently now being dealt with because the Commission may impose sanctions more commensurate with the gravity of the offense.
"powerful informal sanctions working in its favor, for the constant theoretical threat of license revocation at renewal time is always present. . . . [I]f a complaint arises in the programming field that accuses a station of violating FCC standards, the mere notification of the respondent of the fact of the complaint would result in immediate settlement in many cases. [Footnote 2/9]"
the cancellation of a license. [Footnote 2/16] However, no license appears to have been withdrawn solely for that reason. Rather, the possibility of cancellation seems to have been employed as a threat, and an effective one, for the Commission continued to report its satisfaction that many complaints of this nature were settled through the use of warnings and other informal sanctions outside the formal administrative machinery. Recourse to these informal solutions seems to have been extensive at least until 1940.
"The Commission has no desire to concern itself with the particular length, content, or irritating qualities of particular commercial plugs. [Footnote 2/18]"
a view of the regulatory field. Cf. Farmers Educational & Co-operative Union v. WDAY, Inc., supra. Although, in Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, supra, at 326 U. S. 131-132, we decreed the displacement of state law in some respects, we recognized that state regulation in other respects might be constitutional.
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 289 U. S. 279. But that language should not be read as construing the Communications Act to mandate the ouster of all local regulation the application of which might in any way prevent perfect national uniformity. [Footnote 2/21] Indeed, even the Solicitor General, in his brief as amicus curiae, concedes as much by his recognition that Congress intended the survival of certain "traditional" state powers and remedies -- particularly common law tort and traditional criminal sanctions.
Of course, such a general provision does not resolve specific problems, Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 372 U. S. 671, n. 22, but its inclusion in the statute plainly is inconsistent with congressional displacement of the state statute unless a finding of that meaning is unavoidable. [Footnote 2/22] Second, the statutory regulation of radio and television broadcasting is far less comprehensive than the regulation in the very same title of telephone and telegraph facilities, Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 309 U. S. 474 -- yet, even as to those means of communications, some subjects and remedies are saved to state regulation. Finally, Congress has enacted detailed regulations of some broadcasting practices (not including that regulated by the New Mexico statute) -- e.g., the manner in which sponsorship must be identified and announced, 47 U.S.C. § 317; the uttering of any "obscene, indecent, or profane language" over the air, 18 U.S.C. § 1464; and the transmission of communications known to contain fraudulent matter, 18 U.S.C. § 1343; cf. 47 U.S.C. § 509. While the failure expressly to regulate nondeceptive advertising surely does not deprive the FCC of all such jurisdiction, that failure argues against a congressional design that state regulation was to be ousted. Cf. Federal Communications Comm'n v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, supra, at 373 U. S. 142. It is the application of this criterion which reveals the basic difference between this case and WDAY. We held there that the strong federal interest represented by the "equal time" obligation which § 315 imposes upon broadcasters with respect to political candidates would be frustrated, if not altogether defeated, by the survival of state remedies against the broadcaster for allegedly defamatory political broadcasts. Thus, the conflict in operation between the federal and state laws which converged in that case made it inevitable that the state law should yield in the interests of a particular federal regulatory scheme.
The instant case, by contrast, presents no such conflict or dissonance. The New Mexico law is one designed principally to protect the State's consumers against a local evil by local application to forbid certain forms of advertising in all mass media. Such legislation, whether concerned with the health and safety of consumers, or with their protection against fraud and deception, embodies a traditional state interest of the sort which our decisions have consistently respected. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 331 U. S. 230. Nor is such legislation required to yield simply because it may in some degree restrict the activities of one who holds a federal license. Cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 362 U. S. 447-448.
"refuse the facilities of his station to an advertiser where he has good reason to doubt the integrity of the advertiser, the truth of the advertising representations, or the compliance of the advertiser with the spirit and purpose of all applicable legal requirements; [Footnote 2/24]"
station to transmit network broadcasts because of their sponsorship. [Footnote 2/28] While the State's interests might be no different from that protected by this New Mexico statute, the more drastic effect of the regulation upon the exercise of the broadcaster's federal license and his access to network material might well require a different result. All that the Court decides today is that this New Mexico statute may constitutionally be enforced against radio broadcasters equally with other news media doing business in New Mexico.
This is not to suggest that a statute which formally exempted certain media from penalties upon certain types of advertising would necessarily represent any violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 285 U. S. 108-110. Cf. Calif.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17502, which was amended in 1951 to exempt from the prohibitions against false and deceptive advertising a newspaper or radio station which "broadcasts or publishes an advertisement in good faith, without knowledge of its false, deceptive, or misleading character."

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