Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/47631
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:25:41+00:00

Document:
NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, (UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT); MED-ARBITER TOMAS FALCONITIN; AND NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES UNION, RESPONDENTS.
Unless it has filed a petition for a certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code, an employer has no standing to question such election or to interfere therein. Being the sole concern of the workers, the election must be free from the influence or reach of the company.
“In sum, the Court finds that public respondents did not commit any abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed decision and order. There is no capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction and hence there is no room for the issuance of the equitable writ of certiorari.
The challenged Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
“On October 14, 1991, private respondent Notre Dame of Greater Manila Teachers & Employees Union (NGMTEU for brevity) a legitimate labor organization duly accredited and registered with the Department of Labor & Employment (DOLE) under Registration Certificate No. 9989 filed with the Med-Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, (DOLE) a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent or certification election among the rank and file employees of petitioner NDGM.
‘Considering the manifestation of petitioner its legal counsel praying that this case be submitted for resolution; and considering further that the respondent failed to appear on November 13, 1991 scheduled hearing despite knowledge of said hearing; and considering furthermore [that] respondent is [an] unorganized establishment within the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code, as amended, we rule to grant certification election instead of direct certification as prayed for by petitioner, in order to give each employee a fair chance to choose their bargaining agent.
“On January 13, 1992, petitioner NDGM registered a motion to include probationary and substitute employees in the list of qualified voters. On the same day, respondent Med-Arbiter Falconitin denied said motion by handwritten notation on the motion itself – ‘1/13/92 – The Rep. officer allow[s] only regular employees to vote’.
“On January 17, 1992, petitioner NDGM filed an appeal from the said handwritten ‘order’ dated January 13, 1992 of Med. Arbiter Falconitin in the form of a notation, in effect excluding probationary and substitute employees from the list of voters.
“On January 18, 1992, petitioner filed a written notice of protest against the conduct and results of the certification of election, which was opposed by private respondent NDGMTEU.
“On January 27, 1992, a motion to certify private respondent NDGMTEU as the exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner was filed.
“On March 16, 1992[,] Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin issued an order which certified private respondent NDGMTEU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of petitioner and accordingly dismissed petitioner’s protest.
“On March 30, 1992, petitioner lodged an appeal from the aforementioned March 16, 1992 Order of Med-Arbiter Falconitin.
“On July 23, 1992, respondent then Undersecretary Laguesma rendered the questioned decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
“Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision which was rejected by public respondent in his order dated October 12, 1992.
‘The issuance of the orders dated July 23, 1992 and October 12, 1992 is flagrantly contrary to and violative of the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
‘1. On [o]rdering the [h]olding of the [c]ertification [e]lection on January 18, 1992 despite [p]etitioner’s [p]erfected [a]ppeal on January 17, 1992 with the Office of the Secretary of the Department.
Ruling in favor of respondents, the appellate court held that Med-Arbiter Falconitin’s notation on petitioner’s “Motion to Include Probationary and Substitute Employees in the List of Qualified Voters” was not an order that could be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. Also, petitioner was deemed to have abandoned its appeal of the notation when it filed another one on March 30, 1992, also with the labor secretary. Thus, the CA held that staying the holding of the certification election was unnecessary.
The appellate court added that complaints regarding the conduct of the certification election should have been raised with the registration officer before the close of the proceedings. Moreover, it held that only complaints relevant to the election could be filed. Be that as it may, the pre-election conference was deemed to have already dispensed with the issue regarding the qualification of the voters.
Lastly, the CA ruled that petitioner had no standing to question the qualification of the workers who should be included in the list of voters because, in the process of choosing their collective bargaining representative, the employer was definitely an intruder.
Simply put, the main issue is whether the holding of the certification election was stayed by petitioner’s appeal of the med-arbiter’s notation on the Motion to Include the Probationary and Substitute Employees in the List of Qualified Voters.
Petitioner argues that the med-arbiter’s January 13, 1992 handwritten notation denying its Motion was the order referred to by Article 259. Hence, petitioner insists that its appeal of the denial should have stayed the holding of the certification election.
“SEC. 6. Procedure.– Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter, upon receipt of the assigned petition, shall have twenty (20) working days from submission of the case for resolution within which to dismiss or grant the petition. In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election.
“In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed x x x.
“SEC. 7 . Appeal.– Any aggrieved party may appeal the order of the Med-Arbiter to the Secretary on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary for the conduct of election have been violated.
The intention of the law is to limit the grounds for appeal that may stay the holding of a certification election. This intent is manifested by the issuance of Department Order No. 40. Under the new rules, an appeal of a med-arbiter’s order to hold a certification election will not stay the holding thereof where the employer company is an unorganized establishment, and where no union has yet been duly recognized or certified as a bargaining representative.
Consequently, the appeal of the med-arbiter’s January 13, 1992 handwritten notation -- pertaining to the incidental matter of the list of voters -- should not stay the holding of the certification election.
More important, unless it filed a petition for a certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code, the employer has no standing to question the election, which is the sole concern of the workers. The Labor Code states that any party to an election may appeal the decision of the med-arbiter. Petitioner was not such a party to the proceedings, but a stranger which had no right to interfere therein.
Clearly, petitioner did not and will not sustain direct injury as a result of the non-inclusion of some of its employees in the certification election. Hence, it does not have any material interest in this case. Only the employees themselves, being the real parties-in-interest, may question their removal from the voters’ list.
To buttress its locus standi to question the certification election, petitioner argues that it has the support of all the excluded employees. This support was made known to the representation officer in a letter stating the employees’ desire to participate in the certification election. To lend plausibility to its argument, petitioner cites Monark International v. Noriel, Eastland Manufacturing Company v. Noriel and Confederation of Citizens Labor Union v. Noriel. It argues that in the instances therein, management was allowed to interfere in certification elections.
This Court would be the last agency to support an attempt to interfere with a purely internal affair of labor. The provisions of the Labor Code relating to the conduct of certification elections were enacted precisely for the protection of the right of the employees to determine their own bargaining representative. Employers are strangers to these proceedings. They are forbidden from influencing or hampering the employees’ rights under the law. They should not in any way affect, much less stay, the holding of a certification election by the mere convenience of filing an appeal with the labor secretary. To allow them to do so would do violence to the letter and spirit of welfare legislations intended to protect labor and to promote social justice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
 Id., pp. 27-40. First Division. Penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., with the concurrence of Justices Salome A. Montoya (presiding justice and Division chair) and Bernardo Ll. Salas (member).
 Id., pp. 41-42. Special Former First Division. Penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., with the concurrence of Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero (Division chair) and Conrado M. Vasquez Jr.
 Assailed CA Decision, p. 13; rollo p. 39.
 Id., pp. 2-6 & 28-32.
 The case was deemed submitted for decision on December 20, 2002, upon this Court’s receipt of the Office of the Solicitor General’s Memorandum, signed by Assistant Solicitor General Nestor J. Ballacillo and Associate Solicitor Raymond Joseph G. Javier. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Attys. A. B. F. Gaviola Jr. and Marie Josephine C. Suarez, was also received by the Court on December 20, 2002. Private respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Marcos L. Estrada Jr., was received by the Court on the same date.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 211. Original in upper case.
 Section 12, Rule XI, Book Five of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
 The amendatory rules pertaining to Book Five of the Labor Code. Issued on February 17, 2003.
 Article 211 A (a) and (g) of the Labor Code.
 Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corp. v. Laguesma, 223 SCRA 452, June 17, 1993; Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency v. Torres, 224 SCRA 682, July 21, 1993; R. Transport Corporation v. Laguesma, 227 SCRA 826, November 16, 1993.
 Article 259 of the Labor Code.
 225 SCRA 568, August 24, 1993.
 Id., p. 576, per Bellosillo, J. See also Hechanova v. Hon. Adil, 228 Phil. 425, September 25, 1986; Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876, November 25, 1992; St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres, 223 SCRA 779, June 29, 1993; Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 234 SCRA 455, July 25, 1994 and Velarde v. Social Justice Society, GR No. 159357, April 28, 2004.
 Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 21; rollo, p. 224.
 83 SCRA 114, May 11, 1978.
 197 Phil. 624, February 10, 1982.
 202 Phil. 249, September 21, 1982.
 Article 243 of Title V of Book Five of the Labor Code.
 Id., p. 118-119, per Fernando, J.
 Eastland Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Noriel, supra.

References: Art. 257
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