Source: http://thecomplexlitigator.com/?category=Class+Actions%3A+Discovery+Rights
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:28:35+00:00

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The issue of witness identity surfaces in a number of interesting ways in class actions. A few years ago, a number of cases examined whether plaintiffs could discovery the identity and contact information of putative class members. With little qualification, that question was answered in the affirmative (the nature of privacy interests involved define the outer limits on such discovery, but usually yield to the right to obtain discovery of witness identity). Today, in Coito v. Superior Court (June 25, 2012), the California Supreme Court examined the work product protections applicable to (1) recordings of witness interviews conducted by investigators employed by defendant's counsel, and (2) information concerning the identity of witnesses from whom defendant's counsel has obtained statements. The trial court sustained objections to production of such material, concluding as a matter of law that the recorded witness interviews were entitled to absolute work product protection and that the other information sought was work product entitled to qualified protection. A divided Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that work product protection does not apply to any of the disputed items.
As to the identity of witnesses from whom defendant's counsel has obtained statements, we hold that such information is not automatically entitled as a matter of law to absolute or qualified work product protection. In order to invoke the privilege, defendant must persuade the trial court that disclosure would reveal the attorney's tactics, impressions, or evaluation of the case (absolute privilege) or would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney‟s industry or efforts (qualified privilege).
In sum, we disapprove Fellows v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 55, People v. Williams, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d 40, Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 626, and Kadelbach v. Amaral, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d 814 to the extent they suggest that a witness statement taken by an attorney does not, as a matter of law, constitute work product. In addition, Greyhound, supra, 56 Cal.2d 355, which was decided before the Legislature codified the work product privilege, should not be read as supporting such a conclusion. At the same time, we reject the dicta in Nacht & Lewis, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at page 217 that said “recorded statements taken by defendants‟ counsel would be protected by the absolute work product privilege because they would reveal counsel's 'impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories' . . . . [Citation.]” Instead, we hold that a witness statement obtained through an attorney-directed interview is entitled as a matter of law to at least qualified work product protection. A party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing that denial of disclosure will unfairly prejudice the party in preparing its claim or defense or will result in an injustice. (§ 2018.030, subd. (b).) If the party resisting discovery alleges that a witness statement, or portion thereof, is absolutely protected because it “reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories” (§ 2018.030, subd. (a)), that party must make a preliminary or foundational showing in support of its claim. The trial court should then make an in camera inspection to determine whether absolute work product protection applies to some or all of the material.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that, because the recorded witness statements themselves were not entitled to work product protection, defendant could not refuse to answer form interrogatory No. 12.3. In so concluding, the majority disagreed with Nacht & Lewis, which held that the information sought by form interrogatory No. 12.3 is entitled as a matter of law to qualified work product protection to the extent it consists of recorded statements taken by an attorney. (Nacht & Lewis, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 217.) Justice Kane, in his separate opinion below, identified a third approach. He would have adopted a default rule requiring parties to respond to form interrogatory No. 12.3, while permitting parties to make a showing that the responsive material is entitled to qualified or absolute protection. As explained below, the approach suggested by Justice Kane is most consistent with the policies underlying the work product privilege.
Because it is not evident that form interrogatory No. 12.3 implicates the policies underlying the work product privilege in all or even most cases, we hold that information responsive to form interrogatory No. 12.3 is not automatically entitled as a matter of law to absolute or qualified work product privilege. Instead, the interrogatory usually must be answered. However, an objecting party may be entitled to protection if it can make a preliminary or foundational showing that answering the interrogatory would reveal the attorney's tactics, impressions, or evaluation of the case, or would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney's industry or efforts. Upon such a showing, the trial court should then determine, by making an in camera inspection if necessary, whether absolute or qualified work product protection applies to the material in dispute.
Slip op., at 24. The decision was unanimous.
Trial courts should groan in pain at this outcome. It guarantees that counsel will view their client as having nothing to lose in refusing to provide this information. Which guarantees that trial courts will have to resolve these fights by reviewing lists of names in camera. Of course, bad faith refusal to respond will, in the long run, cost parties their credibility with the trial court, but they won't internalize the cost effectively unless strict discovery sanctions are imposed.
I'm playing catch-up again, which explains the date on this post vis-a-vis the date on the opinion I want to mention. In Folgelstrom v. Lamps Plus, Inc. (pub. ord. May 20, 2011, mod. June 7, 2011), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Five) reviewed a judgment entered following a successful demurrer to a complaint principally challenging the collection of customer zip codes during credit card transactions. The super easy part of the decision was the portion where the Court said, "Based on the holding of Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524 (Pineda), we reverse the judgment and order the trial court to overrule the demurrer to plaintiff's cause of action alleging a violation of the SongBeverly Credit Card Act of 1971 (Credit Card Act) (Civ. Code, § 1747 et seq.)." Easy.
Plaintiff offers no explanation of why we should find a privacy interest in plaintiff's address based on the Supreme Court's conclusion that performing a bodily function under the watchful eye of strangers implicates a privacy interest.
Slip op., at 4-5, referencing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1 (1994). Just another arrow in the quiver when arguing about whether a plaintiff is entitled to discovery of contact information for putative class members.

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