Source: https://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/aedpa/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:35:17+00:00

Document:
US v. O'Brien, No. 07-2312. The First splits with other circuits and find that “[U]nder a statute forbidding the carrying and use of guns in connection with a federal crime, the nature of the weapon is to be found ... by the jury as an element of the crime.” Specifically, under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), there was a question of whether the knowledge that a gun was modified to be a machine gun was found beyond a reasonable doubt.
The First says some really amazing things about the post-Booker landscape (which everyone that practices criminal law must read), and notes that Congress rarely explains what is an element and what is a sentencing factor. Saying that it is reluctantly applying Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000) it concludes, “firearm type is traditionally an element of the offense--a judgment unaffected by the rephrasing of the statute.” Legislative history doesn’t show any intent to override Castillo. So, it gets to use the old version of the statute (rather than any constitutional formulation) to say that the jury should determine this.
Stroyny v. Hall, No. 07-1825 (unpublished) rejects a an IAC habeas claim. The First seems to say that his theory as to why defense counsel’s opening argument was ineffective conflicts with the argument as to culpability adduced on appeal.
I guess I have to pretend that the First is taking this issue seriously. The underlying issue is whether the prosecutor incorrectly stated state law regarding manslaughter in his closing argument. Everyone seems to agree that he did. But the First says that the Mass. SJC Applied Donnelly v. Dechristoforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974) well enough.
Leftwich v. Maloney, No. 06-2583. In this habeas case, Selya makes one thing clear: he knows how to use big words to keep the damned damned. He says there is one issue, “Was the evidence sufficient, in terms of the Due Process Clause, to ground a conviction for first-degree murder either as a principal or as a joint venturer?” Selya figures out which theories of guilt (joint venturer or principal) the state courts passed on and concludes that the state court didn’t address whether his conviction as a principal would stand up to due process standards. Finally, Selya says that the defendant confessed that he helped dispose of the body, and therefore, enough inferences could be drawn.
Martinez-Medina v. US, No. 06-1594 (unpublished). This affirms a denial of a motion to vacate a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The grounds asserted are whether, in an “Apprendi Pipeline” case, the defendant was given ineffective assistance of counsel when she “misconstrued” Apprendi and conceded (to the First Circuit) that he would be subject to a higher sentence. But the First says that in the underlying case, the higher sentence would have been warranted because the indictment did state enough (i.e. that there were “multi-kilograms” of cocaine in drug conpsiracy.) Likewise, the First says that it had found in appeals of his codefendant’s cases that a failure of the jury to find drug quantity was harmless error. Therefore, the statutory maximum was life, and there were no real Apprendi claims. Therefore, appellate counsel’s concession didn’t make a difference.
The First ends by saying that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions can’t be used to make Booker retroactive.
Although Congress has the power, pursuant to the Constitution, to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, its authority is not plenary. Even as Congress may confer or restrict the federal courts' jurisdiction -- its "quantitative powers" -- it may not instruct the court how to decide certain cases or how to carry out the qualitative aspects of its work.
To limit the traditional analytic tools available to a court strikes at the heart of its independent adjudicatory process.
By limiting the sources of law a federal court may rely upon in granting habeas relief to "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," § 2254(1) [this might be a mistake] impinges upon a federal court's "judicial power" by "strik[ing] at the center of the judge's process of reasoning."
Given the limited nature of Supreme Court review, there are constitutional principles that have been elaborated by the lower federal courts but they have not yet been adopted by clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
See coverage of Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) here and here.

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