Source: http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=69196
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:09:15+00:00

Document:
Below is a list of areas of law that The Committee on Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction has identified as showing conflicts in decisions rendered among the Appellate Divisions and within the individual Appellate Divisions.
In some areas there is a stark difference in the approach taken by different panels. The consequence of the conflicting decisions is vastly different outcomes depending on where or when an appeal is heard.
By identifying these conflicts and differences among the Appellate Divisions we hope to educate and assist the Bar in recognizing these splits, and we hope that understanding the differences will be the first step in reaching a unified approach on these issues across the State.
We invite members of this Committee to submit information relating to any splits in authority here.
Such a ruling is not appealable. Court also rejected plaintiff’s alternative arguments, stating that the rulings did not go to the merits of plaintiff’s case or affect a substantial right.
Such a ruling is not appealable as of right or by permission. Compare, Hurrell-Harring v. State, 119 AD3d 1052 (2014), which involved the alleged systemic failures in New York’s public defense system, Court entertained appeal from order precluding testimony from a key plaintiff expert; State did not raise any appealability issue.
Such a ruling is appealable where it affects a substantial right of the appealing party.
Applying State Technology Law §304, Court held in an opinion (Abdus-Salaam, J.) that an electronic signature does comply with CPLR §2106.
Court held that an electronic signature, as well as affixed or stamped facsimile, does not comply with CPLR §2016, at least in absence of proof as to who placed them on document or that the signature was authorized.
Court held such improper filing sequence may be excused.
Court held such improper filing sequence is not a jurisdictional defect, and hence is waivable where no timely objection.
Court held such improper filing sequence may not be excused, citing to Goldenberg v. Westchester County Health, 16 NY3d 323 (2011).
Court vacated judgment and directed a new inquest on proper notice.
Court held in an opinion (Cohen, J.) that defendant was entitled to have judgment vacated because the failure deprived Supreme Court of jurisdiction to entertain motion for leave to enter a default judgment.
Failure to provide notice does not standing alone warrant vacating of default judgment.
Motion for leave to enter a default judgment made without providing notice is defective, requiring vacating of default judgment.
CPLR 3101(d) does not apply.
CPLR 3101(d) does not apply even though treating physician’s exchanged report contained no opinion regarding causation.
CPLR 3101(d) does not apply even though the physician gave opinion on causation at trial which contradicted his opinion as made in hospital record while treating plaintiff.
Court indicates that the author or source of the statement must testify.
Court strongly suggests that author or source of statement must testify.
In O’Brien, Court concluded reliability of the report was established as treating physician relied upon the report in treating plaintiff; and in Howard, Court concluded reliability of what was told to testifying expert by investigator was established by that expert who gave testimony regarding the investigator’s qualifications and his reliance upon that person in other investigations.
Court held any such testimony would be barred by the hearsay and best evidence rules.
Court held treating physician could testify to content of the report as limited to how that content informed his opinion. No best evidence objection was raised as to such testimony. NOTE: In Borden v. Brady, 92 AD2d 983 (1983), Court found error where the expert “[n]ot only was permitted to identify the report upon which he relied and to explain its significance in forming his opinion; the report itself was admitted into evidence and read to the jury.” As to the hearsay and best evidence rules, the Court of Appeals in Matter of Floyd Y, 22 NY3d 95 (2013), a MHL Article 10 proceeding, held such evidence was admissible for explanation purposes, ie, non-truth purposes, unless it was unduly prejudicial; and most courts in other jurisdictions hold best evidence rule is not violated when the testimony about a writing’s contents is admitted when the testimony seeks only to show what the expert relied upon and not prove its contents. See, Miller, “Contents May Have Shifted: Disentangling the Best Evidence Rule from the Rule Against Hearsay,” 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 186 (2014) (collecting cases).
Commentary – Marcy Friedman, “Need for a Testifying Physician to Rely on Reports by a Non-Testifying Physician Poses Evidentiary Problems, NYSBA Journal (Nov/Dec 2001), p. 28; Marcy Friedman, “Clarifying Evidentiary Rules on Contents of Reports by Physicians Could Give Jurors More Information”, NYSBA Journal (Jan. 2002), p. 33; John Curran, “The ‘Professional Reliability’ Basis for Expert Testimony,” NYSBA Journal (July/Aug. 2013); Martin, “Professionally Reliable Material as a Basis for Expert’s Opinion,” NYLJ, Sep. 16, 2009, p.1, col.1.
Decision suggests answer is yes. Hole here had an opening of 3-4 feet and and a drop of 10-15 feet.
Decision suggests answer is yes, but dimensions of hole not stated. Compare, Carey v. Five Bros., Inc., 106 AD3d 938 (2013) where statute was held inapplicable to fall of 10 feet through an open manhole cover.
Decision suggests answer is no. Worker fell into a hole that was 5-7 feet deep while walking on a flat level floor.
Decision suggests answer is no. Worker stepped backward and fell into a hole at ground level, dimensions of which were not stated.
Court holds it is not admissible. NOTE: In Preldakis v. Alps Realty, 69 AD3d 455 (2010) a panel held it was admissible.
Robles v. Polytemp, Inc., 127 AD3d 1052 (2015). NOTE: In Nelson v. Bogopa, 123 AD3d 780 (2014), a panel held such an entry is not admissible.
Court holds it is admissible.
Commentary – Alexander, Practice Commentaries to CPLR 4518, C4518:3; John Curran, “Issues Involving Medical records as Evidence at Trial,” NYSBA Journal (Dec. 2014), p. 36; Hutter, “Admissibility of Patient’s Statement in Medical Record,” NYLJ, Dec. 2, 2010, p. 3, col. 3.
Court held plaintiff must establish plaintiff has no comparative fault. NOTE: Panel rejected earlier panel ruling to the contrary, Tselebis v. Ryder Truck, 91 AD3d 468 (2012), on the ground that Thomai v. Ronai, 82 NY2d 736 (1993) required that conclusion. Including this opinion and subsequent opinions, Justices Acosta, Catterson, Degrasse, Moskowitz, and Saxe have expressed their disagreement with Calcano.
Court held plaintiff must establish plaintiff has no comparative fault, citing in support Thomai. NOTE: The First Department panel in Calcano cited to A1 in support of its rejection of prior panel ruling. More recently, the Second Department in an Opinion written by Justice Dillon in Philip v. D&D Carting, 136 AD3d 18 (2015) adhered to Roman, but also invoked CPLR 3212(g) and directed that plaintiff a passenger in a vehicle rear-ended by defendant’s vehicle was free from comparative fault.
Court granted partial summary judgment on liability to plaintiff, holding that defendant failed to raise any comparative fault on plaintiff’s part.
Court granted partial summary judgment on liability to plaintiff, concluding that plaintiff met her burden of showing defendant’s failure to yield was sole proximate cause of accident; and also reinstated the affirmative defense of culpable fault, noting that defendant raised an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s injuries were caused in whole or in part by her conduct.
Commentary - Siegel and Connors, New York Practice (5th ed) §280, Jan. 2016 Update; Connors, “Can Comparative Fault Stop the Train Known as Summary Judgment?”, NYLJ, Jan 16., 2013, p. 3, col. 3; Alexander, Practice Commentaries to CPLR 1412.

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