Source: http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180326_0000237.WKY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:26:20+00:00

Document:
Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., Chief Judge United States District Court.
Plaintiff Daniel Wade Grant filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial review of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims and give him an opportunity to amend his complaint.
Plaintiff, a convicted inmate at the Daviess County Detention Center (DCDC), sues David Craig, whom he identifies as a DCDC correctional officer, in his official capacity only. Plaintiff states that Defendant used excessive force “when he threw me to the ground after trying to put me in a housing area of the jail where I had previous conflicts. Mr. Craig knocked my teeth loose, cut my lip, put abrasion's on my cheeks, and contusions on my jaw.” He states that the incident occurred on January 11, 2018, and “was documented on video.” As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff sues Defendant in his official capacity only. “Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent  another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Suing an employee in his official capacity is the equivalent of suing his employer. Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2008); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); Smallwood v. Jefferson Cty. Gov't, 743 F.Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff's official-capacity claim against Defendant as brought against his employer, Daviess County.
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation' in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant subjected him to excessive force. However, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant's actions occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by Daviess County. The complaint alleges an isolated event affecting only Plaintiff. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1999) (“No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event for which the county is not responsible.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's official-capacity claim against Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

References: § 1983
 § 1915
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