Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/43/619/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:23:01+00:00

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This case is brought before the court from the Eastern District of Louisiana, by a division of the judges on certain points, which are certified under the act of Congress.
The complainants in their bill state that Daniel Clark, late of the City of New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, in the year 1813 died, seized in fee-simple, or otherwise well entitled to and lawfully possessed of, in the district aforesaid, a large estate, real and personal, consisting of plantations, slaves, debts due, and other property, all of which is described in the bill.
That the said Myra was the only legitimate child of the said Clark. That about the month of July, 1813, he made his last will and testament, according to law, and in which he devised to his daughter Myra all his estate, real and personal, except certain bequests named. Col. Joseph Deville, Degontine Bellachasse, James Pitot, and Chevalier Dusuau de la Croix were appointed executors of the will, and the said Chevalier de la Croix was also appointed tutor to the said Myra, who was then about seven years of age. In a few days after making the will the said Clark died.
From her birth, the said Myra was placed, by her father, in the family of Samuel B. Davis, who at the time resided in New Orleans, but in 1812 removed to Philadelphia, where the said Myra resided until her first marriage, being ignorant of her rights and her parentage.
In the year 1811, being about to make a journey to Philadelphia, and fearing some embarrassments from a partnership transaction, the said Clark conveyed property to the said Samuel B. Davis and others, to the amount of several hundred thousand dollars to be held in trust for the use of the said Myra. And about the same time he made a will devising to his mother, then residing out of Louisiana, his property, and appointed Richard Relf and Beverley Chew, two of the defendants, his executors. That afterwards, on his return from Philadelphia, he received back a portion of the property conveyed in trust as aforesaid; and by the will of 1813 revoked that of 1811.
The bill charges that immediately upon the death of the said Clark, the will of 1813 came into the possession of the said Relf, who fraudulently concealed, suppressed, or destroyed the same, and did substitute in its place the revoked will of 1811; that the will of 1813 was never afterwards seen except by the said Relf and Chew, and their confederates.
It is further charged that the said Relf fraudulently set up the revoked will of 1811, and obtained probate of the same; that he, with the said Chew, being sworn as executors, fraudulently took possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, and also his title papers and books. That they appropriated to their own use large sums of money and a large amount of property of the estate, and in combination with the defendants named, who "had some knowledge, notice, information, belief or suspicion, or reason for belief or suspicion and did believe," so that the said Relf and Chew had acted fraudulently in setting up and proving the will of 1811. And the complainants pray that effect may be given to the will of 1813, and that the will of 1811 may be revoked, and that the defendants may be decreed to deliver up possession of the lands purchased as aforesaid, and account for the rents &c., and that the executors may be decreed to account. The complainants also represent that the said Myra is the only heir-at-law of the said Clark, and that his property descended to her &c. In addition to the special relief asked, the complainants pray for "such other and further relief in the premises, as the nature of the case may require."
1. Is the bill multifarious? and have the complainants a right to sue the defendants jointly in this case.
2. Can the court entertain jurisdiction of this case, without probate of the will set up by the complainants, and which they charge to have been destroyed or suppressed.
3. Has the court jurisdiction of this case, or does it belong exclusively to a court of law. The demurrer is not before the court, but the points certified. In considering these points, all the facts stated in the bill are admitted.
Whether the bill be multifarious or not is the first inquiry.
real and personal, by purchase or otherwise, which belonged to Daniel Clark at the time of his death. That a bill which is multifarious may be demurred to for that cause is a general principle; but what shall constitute multifariousness is a matter about which there is a great diversity of opinion. In general terms, a bill is said to be multifarious, which seeks to enforce against different individuals, demands which are wholly disconnected. In illustration of this, it is said, if an estate be sold in lots to different persons, the purchasers could not join in exhibiting one bill against the vendor for a specific performance. Nor could the vendor file a bill for a specific performance against all the purchasers. The contracts of purchase being distinct, in no way connected with each other, a bill for a specific execution, whether filed by the vendor or vendees, must be limited to one contract. It has been decided that an author cannot file a joint bill against several booksellers for selling the same spurious edition of his work, as there is no privity between them. But it has been ruled that a bill may be sustained by the owner of a sole fishery against several persons who claimed under distinct rights. The only difference between these cases would seem to be, that the right of fishery was necessarily more limited than that of authorship. And how this should cause any difference of principle between the cases is not easily perceived.
"to lay down any rule, applicable universally, or to say, what constitutes multifariousness, as an abstract proposition, is, upon the authorities, utterly impossible."
Every case must be governed by its own circumstances, and as these are as diversified as the names of the parties, the court must exercise a sound discretion on the subject. Whilst parties should not be subjected to expense and inconvenience, in litigating matters in which they have no interest, multiplicity of suits should be avoided, by uniting in one bill all who have an interest in the principal matter in controversy, though the interests may have arisen under distinct contracts.
(he says) to which I do not assent. It would indeed be extremely mischievous if such a rule were established in point of law. No possible advantage could be gained by it, and it would lead to a multiplication of suits, in cases where it could answer no purpose to have the subject matter of contest split up into a variety of separate bills."
The same doctrine is found in Story's Equity Pleading sec. 534; Attorney General v. Cradock, 3 Myl. & C., 85; 7 Sim. 241, 254.
"The object of the rule against multifariousness is to protect a defendant from unnecessary expense; but it would be a great perversion of that rule, if it were to impose upon the plaintiffs, and all the other defendants, two suits instead of one."
The bill prays that the defendants, Relf and Chew, may be decreed to account for moneys &c., which came into their hands, as executors, under the will of 1811, and that the other defendants, who purchased from them real and personal property, may be compelled to surrender the same, and account, &c., on the ground that they had notice of the fraud of the executors.
The right of the complainant, Myra, must be sustained under the will of 1813, or as heir-at-law of Daniel Clark. The defendants claim mediately or immediately under the will of 1811, although their purchases were made at different times and for distinct parcels of the property. They have a common source of title, but no common interest in their purchases. And the question arises on this state of facts, whether there is misjoinder or multifariousness in the bill, which makes the defendants parties.
On the part of the complainants there is no misjoinder, whether the claim be as devisee or heir-at-law. And the main ground of the defense, the validity of the will of 1811, and the proceedings under it, is common to all the defendants. Their interests may be of greater or less extent, but that constitutes a difference in degree only, and not in principle. There can be no doubt that a bill might have been filed against each of the defendants, but the question is whether they may not all be included in the same bill.
without subjecting the defendants to inconvenience or unreasonable expense. There are, however, two exceptions to this remark, one of which relates to Caroline Barnes and her husband. She is represented to be a devisee in the will of 1813, and consequently can have no common interest under the will of 1811. The other exception is the prayer of the bill that the executors may account. In the rendition of this account the other defendants have no interest, and such a matter therefore ought not to be connected with the general objects of the bill. The bill in these respects may be so amended in the circuit court as to avoid both the exceptions.
"whether the court can entertain jurisdiction of this case, without probate of the will set up by the complainants, and which they charge to have been destroyed or suppressed."
The bill charges that the will of 1813 was fraudulently suppressed or destroyed by Relf, and that he fraudulently procured the will of 1811, in which he and Chew were named as executors, to be provided.
It is contended that the court of probate in Louisiana has exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills, and that a court of chancery can exercise no jurisdiction in such a case.
"the courts of probate shall have no jurisdiction except in the cases enumerated in the preceding article, or in those which shall be mentioned in the remaining part of this title."
"Art. 934. If the will be contained in a sealed packet, the judge shall order the opening of it at the time appointed by him, and shall then proceed to the proof of the will."
may be opened and proved, or that the execution of it may be ordered."
"Art. 937. If the notary or other individual to whom the said order is directed, refuses to obey it, the judge shall issue an order to arrest him, and if he does not adduce good reasons for not producing the will, shall commit him to prison until he produces it; and he shall be answerable in damages to such persons as may suffer from his refusal."
From the above provisions it is clear that, in Louisiana, the court of probates has exclusive jurisdiction in the proof of wills, and that its jurisdiction is not limited, like the Ecclesiastical Court in England, to wills which dispose of personal property. Has a court of equity power to set up a spoliated will and carry it into effect?
Formerly it was a point on which doubts were entertained, whether courts of equity could not relieve against a will fraudulently obtained. And there are cases where chancery has exercised such a jurisdiction. Maundy v. Maundy, 1 Ch. 66; Welly v. Thornagh, Pr.Ch. 123; Goss v. Tracy, 1 P.Wms. 287; 2 Vern. 700. In other cases such a jurisdiction has been disclaimed though the fraud was fully established, as in Roberts v. Wynne, 1 Ch. 125; Archer v. Moss, 2 Vern. 8. In another class of cases, the fraudulent actor has been held a trustee for the party injured. Herbert v. Lawnes, 1 Ch. 13; Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vern. 296; Devenish v. Banes, Pr.Ch. 3; Barnesly v. Powell, 1 Ves. 287. These cases present no very satisfactory result as to the question under consideration. But since the decision of Kenrick v. Bransby, 3 Bro.P.C. 358, and Webb v. Cleverden, 2 Atk. 424, it seems to be considered as settled in England that equity will not set aside a will for fraud and imposition. The reason assigned is, where personal estate is disposed of by a fraudulent will, relief may be had in the ecclesiastical court, and at law, on a devise of real property. Bennett v. Vade, 2 Atk. 324; 3 id. 17; Gingoll v. Horne, 9 Sim. 539; Jones v. Jones, 3 Meriv. 171.
"It is impossible that at this time of day it can be made a serious question, whether it be in this court that the validity of a will, either of real or personal estate, is to be determined."
satisfactory reason for this exception. The exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills is vested in another tribunal is the only one that can be given.
By art. 1637 of the Civil Code, it is declared that "no testament can have effect unless it has been presented to the judge," &c. And in Clappier v. Banks, 11 La. 593, it is held that a will alleged to be lost or destroyed and which has never been proved cannot be set up as evidence of title in an action of revendication.
In Armstrong v. Administrators of Kosciusko, 12 Wheat. 169, this Court held that an action for a legacy could not be sustained under a will which had not been proved in this country before a court of probate, though it may have been effective, as a will in the foreign country where it was made.
"the bill cannot be sustained for the purpose of avoiding the probate. That should have been done, if at all, by an appeal from the court of probate, according to the provisions of the law of Alabama."
The American decisions on this subject have followed the English authorities. And a deliberate consideration of the question leads us to say that both the general and local law require the will of 1813 to be proved before any title can be set up under it. But this result does not authorize a negative answer to the second point. We think, under the circumstances, that the complainants are entitled to full and explicit answers from the defendants, in regard to the above wills. These answers being obtained may be used as evidence before the court of probate to establish the will of 1813 and revoke that of 1811.
"in civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages where positive law is silent."
This view seemed to be necessary to show on what ground and for what purpose jurisdiction may be exercised in reference to the will of 1813, though it has not been admitted to probate.
The third point is, "has the court jurisdiction in this case, or does it belong exclusively to a court of law?"
Much that has been said in relation to jurisdiction on the second point, equally applies to this one. Indeed, they might have been considered under the same general head.
1. Under the will of 1813.
2. As heir-at-law of the deceased.
The first has been examined, and we will now consider the second.
"an heir-at-law claiming a share of the succession of her deceased sister, who was the wife of the defendant, who holds possession of it under a will, as instituted heir and universal legatee."
The defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction of the district court, on the ground that the court of probates for the parish St. Landry had exclusive jurisdiction of the matters and things set up in the petition.
"that as the will sought to be annulled had been admitted to probate, and ordered to be executed, the court had no jurisdiction, but that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case."
"The plaintiff sets up a claim under the law of inheritance of lands, slaves, and a variety of movable property; that these are proper subjects for the exercise of the jurisdiction of district courts cannot be doubted. But the petitioner proceeds further, and alleges the nullity of the will, which constitutes the very title under which the defendant holds the property in controversy. Before what court then must the validity of this will be tested?"
"It appears that the jurisdiction of the court of probates is limited to claims against successions for money, and that all claims for real property appertain to the ordinary tribunals, and are denied to courts of probate. The plaintiff in this case was, therefore, compelled, in suing for the property of the succession, to seek redress in the district court, and whether she attacked the will or the defendant set it up as his title to the property, the court having cognizance of the subject must of necessity examine into its legal effect."
"that a court of ordinary jurisdiction, having cognizance of the principal matter, shall suspend its proceedings until another court of limited powers shall pronounce upon the subject. . . . If the ordinary courts should examine into the validity of testaments, drawn in controversy before them, they will do no more than we have often said a court of limited jurisdiction may do, even in relation to a question it could not directly entertain."
Lewis' heirs v. His Executors, 5 La. 387, and say there is no conflict, as indeed there is none, between that case and the one before it. It says that in the case before it, the functions of the executor had expired, the probate of the will had taken effect, and the devisee had entered into possession under it. The decision of the district court was reversed on the ground that it had jurisdiction of the case.
"the distinction repeatedly made by this court to be that whenever the validity or legality of a will is attacked and put at issue (as in the present case) at the time that an order for its execution is applied for or after it has been regularly probated and ordered to be executed, but previous to the heirs' or legatees' coming into possession of the estate under it, courts of probate alone have jurisdiction to declare it void. . . . But when an action of revendication is instituted by an heir-at-law, against the testamentary heir or universal legatee who has been put in possession of the estate, and who sets up the will as his title to the property, district courts are the proper tribunals in which suits must be brought."
6 Mart. N.S. 263; 2 La. 23.
The functions of the executors under the will of 1811 have long since terminated, and the property of the deceased, both real and personal, has passed into the hands of purchasers. If the heir-at-law and the devisee were the only litigant parties, a suit at common law might afford an adequate remedy. But the controversy is rendered complicated by the numerous parties and the various circumstances under which their purchases were made. Besides, many facts essential to the complainant's rights are within the knowledge of the defendants, and may be proved only by their answers. Of this character is the fraud charged against the executors in proving the will and acting under it, and the notice of such fraud before their purchase, alleged against the other defendants.
in this view, are required to do complete justice between the parties.
This remedy under the Louisiana law and before the Louisiana courts of ordinary jurisdiction would be undoubted. For although those courts cannot annul the probate of a will, when presented collaterally, as a muniment of title, they inquire into its validity. Under the peculiar system of that state, the forms of procedure, being conformable to the civil law, are the same in all cases. But the circuit court of the United States, exercising jurisdiction in Louisiana, as in every other state, preserves distinct the common law and chancery powers. In either the state or federal court, the relief is the same; the difference consists only in the mode of giving it.
It is insisted that trusts are abolished by the Louisiana code, and that consequently that great branch of equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in that state.
"That substitutions and fidei commissa are and remain prohibited. . . . Every disposition by which the donee, the heir or legatee, is charged to preserve for, or to return a thing to a third person, is null, even with regard to the donee, the instituted heir or the legatee,"
This abolishes express trusts, but it does not reach nor affect that trust which the law implies from the fraud of an individual who has, against conscience and right, possessed himself of another's property. In such a case, the Louisiana law affords redress as speedily and amply as the law of any other state. There is therefore no foundation for the allegation that an implied trust, which is the creature of equity, has been abrogated in Louisiana. Under another name, it is preserved there in its full vigor and effect. Without this principle, justice could not be administered. One man possesses himself wrongfully and fraudulently of the property of another; in equity, he holds such property in trust, for the rightful owner.
In answer to the objection that the validity of the will of 1811, collaterally, can only be tested by an action at law and on an issue devisavit vel non, it may be said that such an issue may be directed by the circuit court.
the mode of proceeding there in the state courts was adequate to all the purposes of justice, and knowing with what pertinacity even forms are adhered to, I was averse to any change of the practice in the federal courts. But I was overruled, and I see in the change only a change of mode which produces uniformity in the federal courts throughout the Union. No right is jeoparded by this, and to say the least, wrongs are as well redressed and rights as well protected by the forms of chancery as by the forms of the civil law.
From the foregoing considerations, the Court answers the first point certified in the affirmative, subject to the amendments of the bill, as suggested. And it answers the second and third points, with the qualifications stated, also in the affirmative.
I agree the points certified must be answered favorably to the complainants, but I do not altogether agree with the reasoning that has led a majority of my brethren to this conclusion.
"Can the circuit court entertain jurisdiction of this case without probate of the will set up by the complainants, and which they charge to have been destroyed or suppressed?"
The will of 1813, cannot be set up, without a destruction of the will of 1811; this will has been duly proved, and stands as a title to the succession of the estate of Daniel Clark; nor can the circuit court of the United States set the probate aside; this can only be done by the probate court.
jurisdiction to set aside the probate of a will alleged to have been forged or to be fraudulent, after the testator's death; as will be seen by the cases cited; although he who committed the fraud, or forgery, procured the probate to be had of the paper, in the probate court.
"That donations either inter vivos or mortis causa cannot exceed the fifth part of the property of the disposer if he leaves at his decease one or more legitimate children or descendants, born or to be born."
By the case made in the bill, Mr. Clark could only dispose of one-fifth part of his property at the time of his death, provided he had no wife living, and if she was living, then only of the one-fifth part of one-half. It follows, if the will of 1811 is permitted to stand as Daniel Clark's last and only will, that Mrs. Gaines can come in as heir for the four-fifths. On this aspect of the bill she can proceed to establish, and enforce her rights as heir, without making probate of the will of 1812 -- and the second question must be answered in the affirmative.
By the will of 1811, Mary Clark is the principal devisee. She made her will and died; by this will, Caroline Barnes is entitled to part of Daniel Clark's estate, and ought to be before the court to maintain her rights. I therefore do not concur that as to her the bill is multifarious. As to the purchasers from the executors, I have more difficulty. I agree, where there is one common title in the complainant, and this could only be the true source of all the titles in all the defendants, and they have not obtained the first link in the chain of title; that then the true owner may sue them together in chancery although they claim by separate purchases from a spurious source. Such is the general rule; nor do I think the purchasers from Chew and Relf are exempt from its operation, on the ground that they have no concern with the settlement of the accounts growing out of the administration. I therefore concur in answering the first question -- that the bill is not multifarious.
Mrs. Clark co-distributees with Mrs. Gaines under the will of 1811, as to the one-fifth part of Daniel Clark's estate.
The purchasers are charged with having purchased with knowledge of Mrs. Gaines' superior title; and with having fraudulently purchased from the executors with such knowledge, there being jurisdiction to grant relief against the executors, in chancery, the same court can grant relief against the purchasers, involved in the fraud of the executors. If they could be compelled to account in regard to the real estate when it remained in their hands; purchasers with notice of Mrs. Gaines' rights, and who purchased with the intention to defeat her rights and deprive her of them, can stand in no better situation than the executors, and must account likewise; both being held in a court of equity equally as trustees for the true owner. Therefore, on the face of the bill, a court of equity has jurisdiction, and a court of law has not exclusive jurisdiction, and thus the third point ought to be certified.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and on the points and questions which were certified to this Court for its opinion agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is the opinion of this Court that the first question should be answered in the affirmative, but that the bill should be so amended in the circuit court as to avoid both of the exceptions stated in the opinion of this Court, and that the second and third questions should also be answered in the affirmative, with the qualifications stated in the opinion of this Court. Whereupon it is now here ordered and adjudged that it be so certified to the judges of the said circuit court.

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