Source: https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/091803.lmb.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 03:04:30+00:00

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I. Whether the trial court erred by refusing Utley's tendered instruction regarding the charge of Reckless Homicide.
II. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the mens rea element of the offense of Leaving the Scene of an Accident.
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Utley's motion in limine requesting the prohibition of evidence relating to his sexual preference.
IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Utley to the presumptive term of four years, and in addition, ordering him to make restitution by paying the victim's funeral expenses.
V. Whether Utley was denied his right to a fair trial by the State's closing argument to the effect that Utley had a duty to return to the scene of the accident after he learned that the victim had been injured.
police). On October 13, 1996, Utley and the victim had an argument at a bar. (R. 301-E). Eventually Utley left the bar and the victim followed Utley to his car. (R. 301-E). As Utley drove out of the parking lot, he saw the victim running towards the side of the car. (R. 301- E, 447). Utley heard a thump. (R. 448). Another witness testified that he heard a loud crash, saw the victim flying through the air, and saw the Utley's car speed away. (R. 254). The victim died as a result of the injuries sustained in the collision. (R. 362).
Utley was charged with Reckless Homicide and Leaving the Scene of an Accident. (R. 6-7). After a trial, the jury acquitted Utley of Reckless Homicide, but convicted him of Leaving the Scene of an Accident. (R. 31-32). The trial court found that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances balanced each other out and sentenced Utley to the presumptive term of four years. (R. 704). Additionally, the trial court ordered Utley to make restitution by paying the victim's funeral expenses. (R. 704). Also, the trial court ordered Utley to complete 200 hours of community service as a condition of probation.See footnote 3 3 (R. 704). This appeal followed.
You are instructed that a pedestrian has no right to proceed heedlessly into the path of a vehicle. A pedestrian must exercise ordinary care for his own safety. A pedestrian must at all times exercise ordinary care for his own safety and is required to use all of his own faculties to avoid any danger or injury to himself. If you find that the decedent did not use ordinary care and he was the contributory cause of his injury, then you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Reckless Homicide.
As noted above, Utley was acquitted of the charge of Reckless Homicide. Accordingly, Utley cannot demonstrate any prejudice to his substantial rights flowing from the trial court's refusal to give this instruction. Therefore, we find no reversible error. See Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (before a defendant is entitled to reversal, he must affirmatively show that there was error prejudicial to his substantial rights), trans. denied, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176. In so holding, we reject Utley's contention that the instruction somehow could have influenced the jury's verdict regarding the offense of Leaving the Scene of an Accident.
Knowledge of the fact that an accident occurred is a necessary element of the proof required upon the prosecution, but this is not to say that the State must prove actual knowledge of an accident by the defendant to obtain a conviction. A jury may infer that a defendant knew that an accident occurred or that a person was injured from an examination of the circumstances of the event.
Where conditions were such that the driver should have known that an accident occurred or should have reasonably anticipated that the accident resulted in injury or death to a person the requisite proof of knowledge is present.
It is unnecessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew that the death resulted from his accident. This legal requirement of stopping after an accident is mandatory, whether or not a person is familiar with the law or not. In other words, ignorance of the law is no excuse in failing to stop after an accident as long as the defendant knew or should have known that an accident occurred. Likewise, the State need not prove that the defendant's failure to stop caused or contributed to the death. The State need only to prove that the accident resulted in the death of another person.
(R. 628-29; Final Instructions No. 13-14). Utley argues the instructions were not supported by the evidence because he did not claim ignorance of the law. Utley also argues that the instructions failed to inform the jury that the State was required to prove that Utley knew that the accident resulted in injury or death, citing Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 152-53 (Ind. 1986).
reviewing court determines whether the instruction correctly states the law, whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction, and whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions which are given. Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1315, 1322 (Ind. 1997).
The jury may infer that a defendant knew that an accident occurred or that people were injured from an examination of the circumstances of the event. Where conditions were such that the driver should have known that an accident occurred or should have reasonably anticipated that the accident resulted in injury to a person, the requisite proof of knowledge is present.
Thus, the trial court's instruction correctly stated the law. We cannot conclude that the jury was misled regarding the law in the case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury.
Utley argues the trial court should have granted his motion in limine and prohibited evidence reflecting upon his sexual preference at trial. Utley argues that the evidence was inadmissible character evidence, was irrelevant, and the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value.
793 (Ind. 1997); Thompson v. State, 671 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (Ind. 1996). A trial court's decision to admit evidence will not be reversed absent a showing of a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion resulting in the denial of a fair trial. Minnick v. State, 544 N.E.2d 471, 477 (Ind. 1989).
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Evid.R. 403; Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 127. The trial court has wide latitude in weighing the probative value of the evidence against the possible prejudice of its admission and its ruling will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Poindexter v. State, 664 N.E.2d 398, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) applies to any act not part of the charged offense regardless of whether the other act was criminal. Cadiz v. State, 683 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (gang membership admissible under Evid.R. 404(b) to prove motive despite fact it might bear adversely upon defendant's character); Kimble v. State, 659 N.E.2d 182, 184 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (membership in white supremacist group admissible to prove motive under Evid.R. 404(b) fact it might bear adversely upon defendant's character), trans. denied.
died); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 290-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (parent's extra-marital sexual conduct relevant in child custody determination); Hall v. State, 176 Ind.App. 604, 339 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1976) (defendant would not be permitted to question State's witness regarding sexual preference for sole purpose of discrediting witness); State v. Tillman, 119 OhioApp.3d 449, 695 N.E.2d 792, 798-99 (Ohio App. 1997) (evidence of sexual preference not admissible to prove conduct in conformity therewith); State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 733 P.2d 1090, 1100-01 (Ariz. 1987) (evidence of sexual preference, whether heterosexual or homosexual, is character evidence under Evid.R. 404 and, State was appropriately permitted to introduce evidence that victim was heterosexual to rebut defendant's claim that victim had made a homosexual attack); State v. Lambert, 528 A.2d 890, 893 (Me. 1987) (evidence of victim's character as a heterosexual not admissible under Evid.R. 404(a)); People v. Kosters, 437 Mich. 937, 467 N.W.2d 311, 316-17 n. 3 (1991) (evidence of sexual preference covered by Evid.Rule 404); Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1981); People v. Mitchell, 402 Mich. 506, 265 N.W.2d 163, 169 (Mich. 1978); People v. Limas, 45 Ill.App.3d 643, 359 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (1977).
but inextricably bound up with the crime charged. See State v. Lambert, 528 A.2d at 892 (evidence of defendant's sexual preference inextricably bound up with the crime alleged). Moreover, i t is well-established that evidence which explains the relationship of the defendant with the victim and the context of the alleged crime is not inadmissible simply because it incidentally discloses sexual conduct which, by definition, reflects upon the defendant's character. See Smith v. State, 655 N.E.2d 532, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.
Thus, the evidence of Utley's sexual preference was not inadmissible under Evid.R. 404 because it was not admitted for the improper purpose of proving that Utley acted in conformity therewith in the commission of the charged homicide. See Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 128 (evidence is only excluded if offered for the sole purpose of producing the forbidden inference that the defendant possesses certain character traits and that the defendant acted in conformity with those character traits in committing the charged offense). As the evidence was not introduced for the forbidden inference of demonstrating Utley's propensity to commit the charged crime, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by refusing to prohibit evidence which collaterally referenced Utley's sexual preference which was inextricably bound up with the circumstances of the charged crime.
trial court's imposition of conditions of probation and its order of restitution.See footnote 4 4 Utley argues that the trial court's authority to order the defendant to pay the victim's funeral expenses is limited to those defendants convicted of homicides, citing Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(a)(4).
Utley contends that an argument made by the prosecutor during closing statements prejudiced his right to a fair trial. During his closing statement, the prosecutor outlined Utley's statements made to the police in which he admitted that he had returned to an area near the scene of the accident, saw the ambulance, but still did not report to the authorities. The prosecutor argued: the statute required that he go back there right then and report it . . . . (R. 516). Utley contends the prosecutor's argument was a misstatement of law because the statute requires the motorist to stop immediately. See Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1. Utley argues the statute does not require a motorist who fails to stop immediately to go back a few minutes later. (Appellant's brief at 30).
attempt to avoid police is circumstantial evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt which the jury may consider, in connection with other evidence presented, to find guilt).
In any event, the correct procedure to be employed when the prosecutor makes an improper argument is to request that the trial court admonish the jury and, if further relief is desired, to request a mistrial. Isaacs v. State, 673 N.E.2d 757, 763 (Ind. 1996). The failure to request an admonishment or move for a mistrial results in waiver. Id. To overcome waiver under these circumstances, the defendant must demonstrate fundamental error. Id.
Fundamental error is error so prejudicial that it amounts to a denial of fundamental due process. State v. Winters, 678 N.E.2d 405, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Fundamental error must be of such magnitude to persuade the reviewing court that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial or that the verdict is clearly wrong or of such dubious validity that justice cannot permit it to stand. Id. Similarly, to obtain reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate that counsel's alleged error rendered the result of the proceeding fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind. 1997) (no longer sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have been different), modified on reh'g, 690 N.E.2d 211.
irrelevant. Id. The trial court's instructions to the jury are presumed to cure any improper statements made during trial. Fox v. State, 520 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ind. 1988).
As noted above, the challenged statements made by the prosecutor were not objectionable. Moreover, the jury was correctly instructed regarding the statutory requirements to convict Utley of the instant offense. Based on the above, we cannot conclude that the statements made by the prosecutor served to deny Utley of his right to a fair trial or rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Therefore, we find no error.
We reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court vacate the order of restitution. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Footnote: 1 1 Ind. Code § 9-26-1-8(a)(2) (accident involving the death of a person).
Footnote: 2 2 Also, as discussed in n. 3 infra, the trial court's imposition of probation is mere surplusage.
Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (before a defendant is entitled to reversal, he must affirmatively show that there was error prejudicial to his substantial rights), trans. denied, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176; Williams v. Rogier, 611 N.E.2d 189, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (trial court findings which amount to mere surplusage cannot constitute the basis for reversal even if erroneous), trans. denied; Donavan v. Ivy Knolls Apartments Partnership, 537 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
Footnote: 4 4 We reiterate that the imposition of conditions of probation were mere surplusage because the trial court did not impose probation. See n. 3 infra.
Footnote: 5 5 Our conclusion is limited to the facts of this case. We can conceive of different factual situations where leaving the scene of an accident could be causally connected to a victim's death and therefore warrant the imposition of restitution.

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