Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/191/499/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 03:10:15+00:00

Document:
A right claimed under the federal Constitution, finally adjudicated in the federal courts, can never be taken away or impaired by state decisions, refusing to give due weight to such federal judgment properly invoked for the protection of the party in whose favor it was rendered.
When a state court refuses to give effect to a judgment of a federal court which adjudicates that one of the parties has a contract within the protection of the impairment clause of the federal Constitution, it denies a right secured by the judgment of the federal court upon matters wherein its decision is final until reversed in an appellate court or modified or set aside in the court of its rendition.
The adjudication of a federal court establishing a contract exempting from taxation, although based upon the judgment of a state court given as a reason therefor, is equally effectual as res judicata between the parties as though the federal court had reached its conclusion as upon an original question, and under the doctrine of res judicata, such adjudication will estop either party in subsequent litigation between themselves from again litigating the question of contract determined in the former action, even though the judgment of the state court upon which the federal court based its decision has meanwhile been reversed by the highest court of that state.
Where it has been litigated and determined in a federal Court that the state law under which the taxes were levied is unconstitutional within the impairment clause of the Constitution because of a contract which exempted from all taxation, including particular years then in controversy, the question is res judicata as to the right to levy the tax under such law in any other year, although it may have been established by the highest court of that state that an adjudication concerning taxes for one year cannot be pleaded as an estoppel in suits involving taxes of other years.
"SECTION 1. That shares of stock in state or national banks, and other institutions of loan or discount, and in all corporations required by law to be taxed on their capital stock, shall be taxed 75 cents on each share thereof equal to $100, or on each $100 of stock therein owned by individuals, corporations, or societies, and said banks, institutions, and corporations shall, in addition, pay upon each $100 of so much of their surplus, undivided surplus, and undivided accumulations as exceeds an amount equal to ten percent of their capital stock, which shall be in full of all tax, state, county, and municipal."
"SEC. 4. That each of said banks, institutions, or corporations, by its corporate authority, with the consent of a majority in interest of a quorum of its stockholders at a regular or called meeting thereof, may give its consent to the levy of said tax, and agree to pay the same as herein provided, and to waive and release all rights under the act of Congress, or under the charters of the state banks, to a different mode or smaller rate of taxation, which consent or agreement to and with the State of Kentucky shall be evidenced by writing, under the seal of such bank, and delivered to the governor of this commonwealth, and upon such agreement and consent being delivered, and in consideration thereof, such bank and its shares of stock shall be exempt from all other taxation whatsoever so long as said tax shall be paid during the corporate existence of such bank."
"SEC. 5. The said bank may take the proceeding authorized by section 4 of this act at any time until the meeting of the next general assembly: provided, they pay the tax provided in section 1 from the passage of this act."
"SEC. 6. This act shall be subject to the provisions of section 8, chapter 68, of the General Statutes. "
"SEC. 7. If any bank, state or national, shall fail or refuse to pay the tax imposed by this act, or shall fail or refuse to make the consent and agreement as prescribed in section 4, the shares of stock of such bank, institution, or corporation, and its surplus, undivided accumulations, and undivided profits, shall be assessed as directed by section 2 of this act, and the taxes -- state, county, and municipal -- shall be imposed, levied, and collected upon the assessed shares, surplus, undivided profits, undivided accumulations, as is imposed upon the assessed taxable property in the hands of individuals: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as exempting from taxation for county or municipal purposes any real estate or building owned and used by said banks or corporations for conducting their business, but the same may be taxed for county and municipal purposes as other real estate is taxed."
The Deposit Bank of Frankfort accepted the terms of the Hewitt Law, and made payment of the taxes as therein provided.
The Circuit Court of Franklin County, by judgment upon the pleadings in this case, sustained the bank's claim of exemption, holding the Hewitt Law to be an irrevocable contract between the bank and the state. Upon appeal, this judgment was reversed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, that court holding that the Hewitt Act did not constitute an irrevocable contract, and had been repealed by the later act of 1892, under which act the bank was not exempt from payment of the taxes in controversy.
decree in the United States court, the judgment of the state circuit court relied on was in full force, although subsequently reversed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
"The court being sufficiently advised, files its opinion herein."
"It is therefore adjudged, ordered, and decreed as follows:"
"First. That the demurrer of the defendants Board of Councilmen of the City of Frankfort and Franklin County and of the defendants Samuel H. Stone, G. W. Long, and Charles Finley be, and the said demurrers are, hereby overruled; to which the said defendants each except."
"Second. The plea of defendants Board of Councilmen of the City of Frankfort and Franklin County to the bill of complaint is overruled, to which the said defendants except."
"Third. Thereupon came the complainant, by Frank Chinn, its counsel, and files its replication to the answer of the defendants Board of Councilmen of the City of Frankfort and Franklin County. The defendants County of Franklin and City of Frankfort offered to file an amended answer, to which complainant objected, and the motion to file is overruled, to which said defendants except, and said amended answer is made a part of the record by the order of the court."
"And by consent, this cause came on to be heard for final decree. The complainant read upon hearing its bill of complaint and its amended bill of complaint herein, together with all the exhibits filed with said bills, to-wit:"
"Exhibit 'A,' being the record of the proceedings in the case of Deposit Bank of Frankfort against Franklin County and John W. Gaines, sheriff."
"Exhibit 'B,' being the records in the proceedings in the case of Deposit Bank of Frankfort against Franklin County and R. D. Armstrong, sheriff."
"Exhibit 'C,' being judgment of Franklin Circuit Court, entered February 1, 1896, in the suit of Deposit Bank of Frankfort against Franklin County."
Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort against Deposit Bank of Franklin."
"The defendant, The County of Franklin, read on the hearing its answer, and the defendant Board of Councilmen of the City of Frankfort read on the hearing the record of the proceedings in the case of Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort against L. C. Norman, auditor, etc., and also read its answer."
"And it is now adjudged, ordered, and decreed that the defendants Samuel H. Stone, Charles Finley, and George W. Long be, and they are hereby, perpetually enjoined and restrained from proceeding to value the franchise of the complainant under the Act of November 11, 1892, for the years 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898, or for any other subsequent years until the expiration of the charter of the complainant, and are enjoined and restrained from certifying such value to the County Clerk of Franklin County or to any officer of the Board of Councilmen of the City of Frankfort or the County of Franklin, and the defendants County of Franklin and Board of Councilmen of the City of Frankfort are enjoined and restrained from endeavoring to collect any tax upon any such valuations, and the complainant, by making payments in accordance with the Hewitt Law, is discharged in full from all taxes to be exacted from it under any form or by any authority."
mode or at a greater rate of taxation than as prescribed in said act, and can be assessed for taxation and taxed for county and municipal purposes only upon its real estate used by it in conducting its business; that the provisions of the present Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the Act of November 11, 1892, insofar as they are intended to provide or do provide for any assessment or taxation of the complainant's property, rights of property, or franchise, or shares of stock, except to the extent and in the manner provided by sections 1, 2, and 3 of article 2 of the said act approved May 17, 1886, and except to assess and tax for county and municipal purposes upon its real estate used in conducting its business, are in violation of and repugnant to the federal Constitution, and void."
"And it is further adjudged that the complainant recover of the defendant its costs in this action expended."
"And came defendants and prayed an appeal in open court, and tendered their assignment of errors; whereupon the court allowed the appeal, and orders the assignment of errors to be filed, and fixes the appeal bond at $1,000."
This decree of 1898 was afterwards affirmed in this Court. 174 U.S. 800. The Franklin Circuit Court, in the case now before us, dismissed the petition upon the ground that there had been no proper return of no property found, and did not pass upon the question as to whether the decree of the United States court was effectual as an estoppel between the parties. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, it was held by a majority of the court, three judges dissenting, that the decree relied upon was not an estoppel. By writ of error, that judgment is brought here for review.
The so-called Hewitt Law, set forth in the foregoing statement, has given rise to much litigation in the courts of Kentucky, as well as in those of the United States. At one time, it was held by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky that its provisions, when complied with by the bank seeking to avail itself of its privileges, constituted a valid and binding contract. Commonwealth to use of Franklin County v. Farmers' Bank, 97 Ky. 590. In a later case, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held the law not to constitute an inviolable contract. Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Daviess County, 102 Ky. 174. When the law was before this Court, the same conclusion was reached. Citizens' Savings Bank of Owensboro v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636.
It may be now regarded as the settled law that this enactment did not constitute a contract between the state and the banks as to taxation, but is subject to modification and repeal by subsequent laws of the state undertaking to tax bank property.
"It is further adjudged, ordered, and decreed that, by reason of the several pleas of res judicata, relied on by the complainant in its bill, and as shown by the exhibits therewith, the complainant has established a contract with the Commonwealth of Kentucky under the provisions of article 2 of the act of the General Assembly of the State of Kentucky entitled 'An Act to Amend the Revenue Laws of the Kentucky,' approved May 17, 1886, and the acceptance of the same by the complainant, the terms of which contract the commonwealth cannot alter or change without the consent of the complainant; that, by the terms of this contract, the complainant and its shares of stock cannot, during its corporate existence, be assessed for taxation for state purposes in a different mode or at a greater rate of taxation than as prescribed in said act, and can be assessed for taxation and taxed for county and municipal purposes only upon its real estate used by it in conducting its business; that the provisions of the present Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Act of November 11, 1892, insofar as they are intended to provide or do provide for any assessment or taxation of the complainant's property, rights of property, or franchise, or shares of stock, except to the extent and in the manner provided by sections 1, 2, and 3 of article 2 of the said act approved May 17, 1886, and except to assess and tax for county and municipal purposes upon its real estate used in conducting its business, are in violation of and repugnant to the federal Constitution, and void."
force and effect, as having adjudicated the Hewitt Law to be a binding contract covering the right to tax the bank, there can be no question that this subsequent legislation is violative of the constitutional inhibition against the states from enacting laws impairing the obligation of contracts. This legislation is in absolute conflict with the Hewitt Law. Citizens' Savings Bank of Owensboro v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636. The decree declares in terms, as direct and specific as it is possible to make them, that the act now sought to be enforced in the assessment and collection of taxes is in violation of the federal Constitution, and therefore void.
The judgment of the state court upon which the decree of the federal court is predicated was equally broad in its terms, and covered not only the particular years of assessment then in question but the broader right of the parties to be protected under the federal Constitution against state enactments in violation of the contract provision of that instrument.
"Its integrity, its validity, and its effect are complete in all respects between all parties in every suit and in every forum where it is legitimately produced as the foundation of an action, or of a defense, either by plea or in proof, as it would be in any other circumstances. While it remains in force, it determines the rights of the parties between themselves, and may be carried into execution in due course of law to its full extent, furnishing a complete protection to all who act in compliance with its mandate, and even after reversal, it still remains, as in the case of every other judgment or decree in like circumstances, sufficient evidence in favor of the plaintiff who instituted the suit or action in which it is rendered, when sued for a malicious prosecution, that he had probable cause for his proceeding."
"If the judgment roll was competent evidence when received, its reception was not rendered erroneous by the subsequent reversal of the judgment. Notwithstanding its reversal, it continued in this action to have the same effect to which it was entitled when received in evidence. The only relief a party against whom a judgment which has been subsequently reversed has thus been received in evidence can have is to move on that fact in the court of original jurisdiction for a new trial, and then the court can, in the exercise of its discretion, grant or refuse a new trial, as justice may require."
It is to be remembered that we are not dealing with the right of the parties to get relief from the original judgment by bill of review or other process in the federal court in which it was rendered. There, the court may reconsider and set aside or modify its judgment upon seasonable application. In every other forum, the reasons for passing the decree are wholly immaterial, and the subsequent reversal of the judgment upon which it is predicated can have no other effect than to authorize the party aggrieved to move in some proper proceeding, in the court of its rendition, to modify it or set it aside. It cannot be attacked collaterally, and in every other court must be given full force and effect, irrespective of the reasons upon which it is based. Cooley on Const.Limitations, 7th ed. 83 et seq., and cases cited.
Again, it is urged that the taxes herein involved are those for different years than were under consideration and covered by the decree of the federal court relied upon. The vice of this argument consists in assuming that the taxes for specific years were alone involved and covered by the decree of the court.
"The proposition that, because a suit for a tax of one year is a different demand from the suit for a tax for another, therefore res judicata cannot apply, whilst admitting in form the principle of the things adjudged, in reality substantially denies and destroys it. The estoppel resulting from the thing adjudged does not depend upon whether there is the same demand in both cases, but exists, even although there be different demands, when the question upon which the recovery of the second demand depends has, under identical circumstances and conditions, been previously concluded by a judgment between the parties or their privies. This is the elemental rule, stated in the text books, and enforced by many decisions of this Court. . . . "
"It follows, then, that the mere fact that the demand in this case is for a tax for one year, and the demands in the adjudged cases were for taxes for other years, does not prevent the operation of the thing adjudged, if, in the prior cases, the question of exemption was necessarily presented and determined upon identically the same facts upon which the right of exemption is now claimed."
"A right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies, and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or fact, once so determined, must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified."
The thing established by the federal decree relied upon here was the binding and conclusive character of the contract embodied in the Hewitt Law and its acceptance. That it was such a contract was then adjudicated, and, irrespective of the reasons given for the decision, must remain concluded until the judgment constituting such adjudication is modified or reversed.
"According to these decisions, and in view of the statute giving this Court authority to reexamine the final judgment of the highest court of a state, denying a right specially set up or claimed under an authority exercised under the United States, it is clear that we have jurisdiction to inquire whether due effect was accorded to the foreclosure proceedings in the circuit courts of the United States under which the plaintiff in error claims title to the lands and property in question."
in such a case, under such circumstances, than is due to the judgments of the state courts in a like case and under similar circumstances."
The cases which, by clear inference, cannot come within this class are to be noticed.
"Whatever deference may be due to the decisions of the state court of final resort in every case in which it has spoken, and whatever may be the respect to which its decisions upon questions of purely local law established as rules of property may be entitled, they are not authority binding upon the courts of the United States, sitting even in the same state, where the questions involved and decided relate to rights arising under the Constitutions and laws of the United States."
such cause as would be sufficient to set it aside in the courts of the District.
Mr. Justice Matthews, who delivered the opinion, again stated the doctrine that the judgments of the courts of the United States are upon the same footing, so far as concerns the obligation created by them, with judgments of the states. Other cases are found in the reports stating the general proposition.
In Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71, the question was as to the effect to be given to a state judgment as res judicata. It was held that the federal courts were not required to give such domestic judgments any greater force and effect than was awarded them by the courts of the state where rendered.
But it is equally well settled that a right claimed under the federal Constitution, finally adjudicated in the federal courts, can never be taken away or impaired by state decisions. The same reasoning which permits to the states the right of final adjudication upon purely state questions requires no less respect for the final decisions of the federal courts of questions of national authority and jurisdiction.
"Indeed, the duty imposed upon this Court to enforce contracts honestly and legally made would be vain and nugatory if we were bound to follow those changes in judicial decisions which the lapse of time and the change in judicial officers will often produce. The writ of error to a state court would be no protection to a contract, if we were bound to follow the judgment which a state court had given, and which the writ of error brings up for revision here."
Black 436; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 168 U. S. 501, and cases cited.
"The defendant insists that his rights having been acquired when these decisions of the highest court of Kentucky were in full force, should be protected according to the law of the state as it was adjudged to be when those rights attached. But is this Court required to accept the principles announced by the state court as to the extent to which the contract clause of the federal Constitution restricts the powers of the state legislatures? Clearly not. The defendant invokes the jurisdiction of this Court upon the ground that the rights denied to him by the final judgment of the highest court of Kentucky, and which the state seeks to prevent him from exercising, were acquired under an agreement that constituted a contract within the meaning of the federal Constitution. This contention is disputed by the state. So that the issue presented makes it necessary to inquire whether that which the defendant asserts to be a contract was a contract of the class to which the Constitution of the United States refers. This Court must determine -- indeed, it cannot, consistently with its duty, refuse to determine -- upon its own responsibility, in each case as it arises, whether that which a party seeks to have protected under the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States is a contract the obligation of which is protected by that instrument against hostile state legislation."
Mobile & Ohio Railroad v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486; Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 147 U. S. 91; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662.
These cases thoroughly established the proposition that in no other way can the obligation of the federal courts under the Constitution be discharged than by rigidly adhering to the right and duty to maintain the ultimate right of the federal courts to protect the citizens of the United States, and of every state, in the enjoyment of rights and privileges guaranteed by the federal Constitution.
"That the decree or judgment referred to is null and void for the reason that the courts of the United States had no jurisdiction of said suit, and no legal power or authority to render said decree or judgment."
general question, be deemed a nullity. It was at the time of the trial in the present case in the court below a valid and subsisting prior adjudication of the matters in controversy, binding on these parties, and a bar to this action. In refusing to so decide, the court failed to give full faith and credit to the decree of this Court under which the navigation and railroad company claimed an immunity from all liability to the homestead company on account of the taxes sued for, and this was error."
This reasoning is applicable here. The decree of the federal court of 1898 gave judgment that the bank had a contract absolving if from all taxes, including those sued for. When the state court refused to give that judgment effect, it denied a right secured by the federal court judgment upon matters wherein its decision was final until reversed in an appellate court, or modified or set aside in the court of its rendition.
In our judgment, the adjudication of the federal court relied upon here, although based upon the judgment of a state court, given as a reason therefor, is equally effectual as it would have been had the federal court reached the conclusion, as upon the original question, that the Hewitt Law constituted a binding contract between the parties. Any other conclusion strikes down the very foundation of the doctrine of res judicata, and permits the state court to deprive a party of the benefit of its most important principle, and is a virtual abandonment of the final power of the federal courts to protect all who come before them relying upon rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, and established by the judgments of the federal courts.
cases. And we repeat that we are not dealing with any right of relief which the state may have in the federal court wherein the original decree was rendered.
This was a petition in equity filed by defendant in error in the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Kentucky, seeking the recovery of certain taxes for the years 1893 and 1894, penalties and interest. To revise the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky rendered November 19, 1901, this writ of error was sued out, and the question is whether that court erred in declining to direct to Franklin Circuit Court to sustain a plea of former adjudication by the decree of the circuit court of the United States rendered June 25, 1898, in enforcement of a decree of the Franklin Circuit Court rendered in the same case February 1, 1896, and which was reversed by the state Court of Appeals, June 19, 1900.
their charters, and that to decide otherwise would be to hold that the prior decree in this case, though reversed, was nevertheless made binding by the decree of another jurisdiction rested upon it, as having determined the invalidity of taxes of other years, notwithstanding the law of the state to the contrary.
And the Court of Appeals was fortified in its conclusion by the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court of Appeals, and the circuit court of the United States, in opinions delivered at the time of the rendition of the decree in question, had all held that the Hewitt Law did not constitute an irrevocable contract.
The case before us stands in the same situation as if the Franklin Circuit Court had overruled the plea of former adjudication, and rendered decree for complainant, and the Court of Appeals had thereupon affirmed that decree, and it seems to me that the Franklin Circuit Court could not have done otherwise in view of the law of the state in respect of litigation as to taxes of different years.
Moreover, there is a distinction between estoppel by decree and estoppel by the findings on which the decree rests, in that the one operates as a bar to subsequent suits on the same cause of action, and the other to further litigation of the particular issuable facts found.
to accept the existence of the contract as "established" by the decree of the Franklin Circuit Court.
I think it follows that, when a decree rests on the establishment by a prior decree of a certain conclusion of law, such ground of the prior decree cannot be treated as merely reasons for the later decree, which, as mere reasons, may be ignored, and that this must necessarily be so when the court rendering the later decree is shut up to the single question of estoppel. This being so, I differ entirely from the view that the controversy in the federal court was at large as to the force and effect of the Hewitt Law as a contract exempting the banks from taxation not only for the specified years, but for all other years. The decree cannot be treated as giving to the Franklin Circuit decree a wider scope than the law of the state allowed, and the law of the state was that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to taxes for years other than those under consideration in the particular case. See Union &c. Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71, 189 U. S. 75, and cases cited.
It is true that the decree of the United States circuit court enjoined the taxes involved in that suit, and also the taxes for subsequent years, but this was upon the express ground that the decree of the state circuit court had established a contract of exemption during the corporate existence of the bank, and whatever the terms of the latter decree, the state law permitted a renewal of the controversy in respect of taxes not directly involved. To apply the federal decree to any other than the taxes enumerated is to hold that matters of public law can be placed by estoppel beyond the power of reconsideration -- a doctrine not heretofore favored by this Court. Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645; Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U. S. 493; O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U. S. 450.
of the obligations of a contract, when in fact there is no contract to impair. Here, this Court and the highest court of the State of Kentucky agree that there is no contract, and yet a valid law of Kentucky is overthrown on the pretence of a contract which confessedly has no existence. The reason given is that the federal court once held that there was a contract when, in truth, that court held that there was no contract, but that defendant in error was estopped to assert that fact by reason of a judgment of the state court which has since been duly vacated. The decision is therefore not based upon any provision of the federal Constitution, but upon a rule of general law as to the conclusiveness of a judgment. But that rule of general law is, like any other, subject to modification or change by the state, and it is as true of Kentucky as of Tennessee that the rule of res judicata as applied to taxes does not embrace other taxes than those immediately in litigation. Repeated decisions of this Court are that a federal judgment is entitled to the same consideration as a state judgment, "no more and no less," and we held in Union Bank v. Memphis that what effect a judgment of a state court shall have as res judicata is a question of state law.
In my judgment, the state courts, in rendering decree for the taxes of 1893 and 1894, did not refuse to give the federal decree such effect as it was entitled to.
Of course, I express no opinion as to the taxes for 1895, 1896, 1897 and 1898, the immediate subject of the bill in the United States court. The situation of that case is peculiar. The decree of that court was affirmed in this Court on appeal by an equal division, May 15, 1899. 174 U.S. 800. Leave was subsequently granted by this Court to appellants to apply to the circuit court for leave to file such bill as counsel might be advised. The present defendant in error (appellant there) accordingly applied to that court for leave to file a bill of review, which was denied. 120 F. 165. The case was then carried to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and that court affirmed the order of the circuit court.
124 F. 18. The court stated that the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court rested on a former decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, holding the revenue act of 1892 void as an impairment of the state's contract with the banks, and that, after the decree of the United States circuit court, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky overruled its former decision, and the United States Court of Appeals then held that the consequent reversal of the Franklin Circuit judgment furnished no adequate ground for the revision of the decree of the United States circuit court.
The prior decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky was rendered June 1, 1895, and is reported 97 Ky. 590. That decision was overruled by a decision rendered March 24, 1897, and reported 19 Ky.L.Rep. 248. The decree of the circuit court of the United States was rendered June 25, 1898. There were many cases under consideration in the state Court of Appeals, and it happened that the decree of the Franklin Circuit Court was not in fact reversed until June 19, 1900. But as the ground on which that decree rested had been swept away in 1897, the circuit court of the United States might well have applied the rule laid down by Lord Redesdale, that where a party comes into a court of equity to have the benefit of a former decree, the court is at liberty to inquire whether the circumstances justified the relief. Mitf.Pl. 96; 138 U. S. , 138 U. S. 561. This was not done, and the federal decree has not as yet been set aside.
But Lord Redesdale's rule is applicable in this case, and that is, in itself, sufficient to require the affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
My Brothers BREWER, BROWN, and PECKHAM concur in this dissent.

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