Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50111:gr-153290-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:58:12+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 153290 - BMG RECORDS (PHILS.), INC., ET AL. v. AIDA C. APARECIO, ET AL.
BMG RECORDS (PHILS.), INC. and JOSE YAP, JR., Petitioners, v. AIDA C. APARECIO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the November 20, 2001 Decision1 and April 26, 2002 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No. 65403 affirming the August 23, 2000 Decision3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed and set aside the October 27, 1998 Decision4 of the Labor Arbiter finding that private respondent voluntarily resigned and was not illegally dismissed.
Petitioner BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. (BMG) is engaged in the business of selling various audio records nationwide. On September 2, 1990, it hired private respondent Aida C. Aparecio (Aparecio) as one of the promo girls in its Cebu branch. For working from Monday to Sunday, she received a salary of P181.00 per day.
Petitioners, however, proffer a different version of the facts. They narrate that Aparecio was initially performing well as an employee but as years passed by she seemed to be complacent in the performance of her job and had been comparing the salaries of promo girls in other companies. It appeared that she was no longer interested in her job. In April 1998, Aparecio and two other promo girls, Jovelina V. Soco and Veronica P. Mutya, intimated to their supervisor that they were intending to resign and were requesting for some financial assistance. BMG made it clear that, as a company policy, an employee who resigns from service is not entitled to financial assistance, but considering the length of their service and due to humanitarian consideration it would accede to the request after they secure their respective clearances. Forthwith, the three employees tendered their resignations, which were accepted. When they processed the required individual clearance, it was found out that they had incurred some shortages after inventory. Per agreement, said shortages were deducted from the amounts due them. Thus, Soco and Mutya received their last salary, a proportion of the 13th month pay, tax refund and financial assistance less the deductions, and they executed their releases and quitclaims. Except for the financial assistance, Aparecio also obtained the same yet refused to sign the release and quitclaim, protesting the amount of P9,170.12 deducted from the financial assistance. She was adamant but BMG stood by the previous agreement.
Attached to petitioners' Position Paper7 were the sworn statements of Jose Yap, Jr. and Evangeline A. Magno, supervisor of BMG.
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing consideration, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one ENTERED finding the dismissal of complainant illegal thus ordering the respondent to pay her backwages from April 30, 1998 up to date hereof and in lieu of reinstatement, the respondent is further ordered to pay complainant separation pay computes at the rate of one (1) month pay for every year of service from date of hiring on September 2, 1990 up to the finality of this decision.
Based on the evidence submitted, the [petitioners] failed to support [their] claim that [Aparecio's] resignation was made out of her own volition. Granting arguendo that [Aparecio] executed a resignation letter, it appears that she did it in consideration of the separation pay and other benefits promised by the petitioner.
Resignation, moreover, is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. It would have been illogical for the employee to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal x x x Thus, had the private respondent been determined to resign and relinquish her position in the petitioner company, she would not have commenced an action for illegal dismissal.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied on April 26, 2002;15 hence, this petition.
Considering, however, the Motion for Reconsideration17 filed and the Comment18 as well as the Reply19 thereon, this Court resolved20 on April 23, 2003 to reinstate the petition and require the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts; it is not duty-bound to re-examine and calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover, findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.21 In exceptional cases, however, we may be constrained to delve into and resolve factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties.22 The present case is an exception to the rule. Hence, this Court finds the need to review the records to determine the facts with certainty not only because the NLRC and the labor arbiter have come up with conflicting positions but also because the findings of the NLRC, as supported by the CA on substantial matters, appear to be contrary to the evidence at hand.
Reading through the records would ineluctably reveal that the evidence upon which both the NLRC and the CA based their conclusion rests on rather shaky foundation. After careful analysis, this Court finds and so holds that the submissions of Aparecio in all her pleadings failed to substantiate the allegation that her consent was vitiated at the time she tendered her resignation and that petitioners are guilty of illegal dismissal.
One. It is admitted by both petitioners and the respondents that the supposed resignation of private respondent was conditional in nature. It was premised on petitioners' (employers) performance of certain prestations or petitioners' compliance with certain conditions.
Two. The supposed decision of private respondent to tender a resignation is vitiated by vices of consent. The resignation letter was wrongfully obtained from private respondent on petitioners' inducement and promise to pay employment benefits and financial assistance without any deductions. However, it is now very clear that right from the start, petitioners did not intend to comply with their promise. After private respondent handed in a resignation letter, petitioners raised all obstacles to prevent private respondent from actually receiving the promised employment benefits and financial assistance. Accordingly, it can be easily said that fraud vitiated private respondent's consent.
In a nutshell, Aparecio submits that fraud, undue influence, intimidation, and/or mistake were attendant upon her resignation from BMG. As her consent was allegedly vitiated, the act of resigning became involuntary; hence, petitioners are guilty of illegal dismissal.
The argument is not tenable.
In this case, Aparecio alleged that her resignation was wrongfully obtained when petitioners did not keep the promise of giving her employment benefits and financial assistance without any deductions. Without a showing of the nature and extent of such "inducement," however, such submission fails to establish that there was in fact a deception on the part of petitioners. Even if it is considered that there was an assurance given by petitioners and that they later reneged on their promise, this Court still finds no injustice made since Aparecio, who only questioned the manner by which the inventory was conducted - that it was held without her presence - but did not categorically deny her accountabilities with BMG, would unjustly be enriched without the deduction.
On the contrary, petitioners correctly point out that the NLRC finding, which the CA erroneously affirmed, of a "strong and irresistible economic pressure originating from [petitioners] if only to push [Aparecio] into accepting the offer" is not supported by any evidence in the records but is merely based on conjectures and guesswork. Truly, the factual circumstances upon which the legal conclusion was based were lacking as no less than the NLRC itself admitted the absence of proof of any kind of pressure, economic or otherwise, that petitioners applied to force Aparecio's resignation. What is clear is that there is no concrete evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing that undue influence was used by petitioners in such a way that it took improper advantage of its power over the will of Aparecio and deprived the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.29 Granting for the sake of argument that BMG was in a "more advantageous position," as the CA had opined, it would nonetheless be unfair to presume that it utilized the same against Aparecio. Indeed, the allegation of exploitation is a very serious matter and should not be taken lightly. Proof is absolutely essential.
Fourth, Aparecio already initiated the processing of her clearance; thus, she was able to receive her last salary, 13th month pay, and tax refund but refused to receive the financial assistance less the deductions made.
The foregoing facts were affirmatively narrated and attested to in the notarized affidavit of Soco and Cinco and have remained incontrovertible as they were never denied by Aparecio. The NLRC, thus, erred when it did not give probative weight to their testimonies even if belatedly presented in petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment". If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment.
Certainly, what transpired here was caused by an employee's error of judgment and not by the employer's application of means vitiating the consent to resign. It would be utterly unfair to attribute to petitioners the commission of illegal dismissal and to impose upon them the burden of accepting back Aparecio who unequivocally manifested her intent and willingness to sever her employment ties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the November 20, 2001 Decision and April 26, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 65403 affirming the August 23, 2000 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The October 27, 1998 Decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that private respondent was not illegally dismissed is hereby REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos, with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Rodrigo V. Cosico concurring.
3 Penned by Commissioner Bernabe S. Batuhan, with Commissioners Irenea E. Ceniza and Edgardo E. Enerlan concurring.
4 Penned by Ernesto F. Carreon.
5 CA rollo, p. 49.
15 Id. at 208-215, 224.
21 Acevedo v. Advanstar Company, Inc., G.R. No. 157656, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 656, 664.
22 Pascua v. NLRC (3rd Div.), 351 Phil. 48, 61 (1998).
24 CA rollo, pp. 153-155.
25 See Art. 1338, New Civil Code.
26 Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No. 153535, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 409, 426; Republic of the Philippines v. Institute for Social Concern, G.R. No. 156306, January 28, 2005, 449 SCRA 512, 521-522; Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123586, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 213, 223; and Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 435 (2000).
27 Republic of the Philippines v. Institute for Social Concern, id. and Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, id.
28 St. Michael Academy v. NLRC, 354 Phil. 491, 509-510 (1998) and Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 105083, August 20, 1993, 225 SCRA 526, 535.
29 See Art. 1337, New Civil Code.
30 Fortuny Garments v. Castro, G.R. No. 150668, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 125, 130.
31 See Shie Jie Corporation/Seastar Ex-Im Corp. v. National Federation of Labor, G.R. No. 153148, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 569, 575.
32 See Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 166039, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA, 704, 743 and Philippine Today, Inc. v. NLRC, 334 Phil. 854, 877 (1997), citing Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81087, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 318.

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