Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=28778:g-r-no-l-48724-august-29,-1988-celestino-pahilanga-v-artemon-d-luna&amp;catid=1240&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 01:53:08+00:00

Document:
CELESTINO PAHILANGA, Petitioner, v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, Judge CFI of Negros Occidental, Br. I, FUNDADOR PAHILANGA, ANTERO PAHILANGA, CARLOS PAHILANGA, ENRIQUETA P. VECERA, and CARLOS SOPIO, Respondents.
Constancio G. Legaspi for Petitioner.
Ernesto B. Templado for Respondents.
1.	REMEDIAL LAW; SERVICE OF PLEADINGS; SUMMONS; PURPOSE. — The purpose of summons is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against him. The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of plaintiffs or petitioners." (Far Corporation v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-57218, December 12, 1986, 146 SCRA 197, 204.) Ordinary prudence dictates that petitioner, upon receipt of the summons, should consult a lawyer about the case.
2.	ID.; ID.; ORDER OF DEFAULT; ISSUANCE THEREOF PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — An order of default is not proper where defendant’s failure to file her answer on time was due to illness which prevented her from consulting a lawyer about her case within the period fixed by law [Ladislao v. Pestano, 96 Phil. 890 (1955)]. This ruling finds no application here, since, the petitioner’s illness in this case disabled him only after the period to answer had expired. Such illness therefore constitutes no valid excuse for setting aside the default order.
3.	ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL OF MOTION TO LIFT SAID ORDER, SUSTAINED; NOT ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED. — The motion to lift the order of default was properly denied in view of the absence of any meritorious defense of petitioner. He failed to establish prima facie defense in his favor. Equally important is a proper showing why a party may be justifiably excused for disregarding the reglementary period provided for by the Rules of Court within which such party should submit his answer. It is not therefor an error or an abuse of discretion on the part of the Court to refuse to set aside its order of default.
The antecedent facts are simple.
Private respondents, the brothers and sisters of the petitioner, Celestino Pahilanga, filed on June 18, 1977 before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City a complaint for reconveyance of their shares as co-heirs and co-owners of Lot No. 372, Talisay, Negros Occidental Cadastre and for damages against the petitioner. Summons was served on the petitioner thru his wife on February 28, 1978.
On March 27, 1978, counsel for the petitioner filed in the court below a motion for an extension of ten days counted from March 28, 1978, within which to file his answer to the complaint. The court in an order dated April 3, 1978 required petitioner to explain within five days from receipt of the order why his motion should not be denied considering that the reglementary period has lapsed and hence, there was no more period to be extended. Petitioner’s counsel submitted an explanation stating that according to his client’s recollection, summons was served on March 13, 1978.
On April 5, 1978, while the petitioner’s motion for extension was still pending resolution, the respondent judge, upon motion of the private respondents, issued an order declaring the petitioner in default and authorizing the private respondents to present their evidence ex-parte on June 19, 1978.
This case calls for a determination of whether respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he denied the motion to lift the default order.
The record shows that the validity of the default order is beyond question. The undisputed fact is that summons and a copy of the complaint were served on the petitioner, through his wife, on February 28, 1978. Petitioner himself admitted in paragraph III of his petition that he was "undergoing treatment of (sic) neuro-arthritis (knee bilateral) which un-able (sic) him to walk, when he received the summons and complaint on February 28, 1978 through his wife, Encarnacion Pahilanga." [Rollo, p. 9] Consequently, the 15-day period within which to file an answer should be reckoned from this date. As petitioner failed to file an answer or a motion for extension within the reglementary period which expired on March 15, 1978, he was properly declared in default. His motion for extension of time to file answer was correctly denied by the trial judge inasmuch as when it was filed on March 24, 1978, the reglementary period had already lapsed and consequently, there was no longer any period to extend. A motion for extension filed beyond the period sought to be extended without any proper showing of a valid excuse for the delay in filing said motion does not merit the court’s approval [Quirante v. Verano, G.R. No. L-30207, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 801.] The petitioner in his motion to set aside the order of default alleges honest mistake or excusable negligence, claiming that since he was already very old and feeble-minded and has just recovered from a bout of "neuro-arthritis, *" he can hardly remember the exact date when he was served with summons and a copy of the complaint. So, when his counsel prodded him to remember the exact date when he was served with summons, he answered that probably, it was a week before March 22 (the date he engaged the services of his counsel) or on March 13, 1978. Accordingly, his counsel jotted down the said date on the petitioner’s copy of the summons as the date of receipt.
Second. Even granting that he was indeed ill with neuro-arthritis, the medical certificate signed by his doctor shows that such illness disabled him from walking only "since March 20, 1978 up to the present (July 3, 1978)." [Rollo, p. 44.] There was no proof at all that he was ailing during the pendency of the reglementary period and that such illness prevented him from consulting a lawyer regarding the summons served upon him. His receipt of the summons should have prompted him to immediately engage the services of counsel for." . . (t)he purpose of summons is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against him. The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of plaintiffs or petitioners." [Far Corporation v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-57218, December 12, 1986, 146 SCRA 197, 204.] Ordinary prudence dictates that petitioner, upon receipt of the summons, should consult a lawyer about the case, involving as it does his property rights and a demand for reconveyance of real property as well as payment of damages.
While this Court has recognized that an order of default is not proper where defendant’s failure to file her answer on time was due to illness which prevented her from consulting a lawyer about her case within the period fixed by law [Ladislao v. Pestano, 96 Phil. 890 (1955)], this ruling finds no application here. In the aforesaid case, the defendant fell ill on the third day after summons was served on her and such illness lasted for 45 days, thus effectively preventing the defendant from preparing an answer. On the other hand, the petitioner’s illness in this case disabled him only after the period to answer has expired. Such illness therefore constitutes no valid excuse for setting aside the default order.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.