Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2001/4200crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:13:49+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Barry Guliano, Esq., Town Attorney for the Town of South Windsor, South Windsor Town Hall, 1540 Sullivan Avenue, South Windsor, CT 06074.
The respondent was represented by Matthew Levine, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, P. O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120.
This Petition for Review from the February 24, 2000 Denial of the Claimant’s Motion to Reopen by the Commissioner acting for the Eighth District was heard March 30, 2001 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners George A. Waldron and Stephen B. Delaney.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The claimant (dependent widow) has petitioned for review from the February 24, 2000 Denial of the Claimant’s Motion to Reopen of the Commissioner acting for the Eighth District. In that ruling, the trial commissioner denied the claimant’s request under § 31-315 to reopen the December 3, 1999 Finding and Dismissal which dismissed the claimant’s claim for § 31-306 widow’s benefits. In support of her appeal, the claimant argues that the trier failed to make any findings in his December 3, 1999 decision regarding the claimant’s claim for benefits under Chapter 568, and thus the trier should have granted her Motion to Reopen in order to rule upon this claim. We find no error.
We will first consider the respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, in which the respondent argues that the claimant failed to file an appeal within ten days following the issuance of the December 3, 1999 Finding and Dismissal. In the instant case, the claimant did not file an appeal from the December 3, 1999 decision, but instead filed a Motion to Reopen on February 7, 2000, which was denied on February 24, 2000 and appealed by the claimant on March 3, 2000. The respondent argues that the claimant has improperly attempted to circumvent the ten day appeal period by filing an appeal from the denial of the Motion to Reopen. The respondent relies on Prioli v. State/Connecticut State Library/Arts Commission, 3955 CRB-6-98-12 (Jan. 13, 2000), aff’d, 64 Conn. App. 301 (2001). In Prioli, supra, the claimant’s petition for review was filed within ten days of the denial of the claimant’s Motion to Open, but not within ten days of the memorandum of decision itself. Because the Motion to Open was filed within ten days of the memorandum of decision, however, the board held (in accord with Practice Book § 63-1(b)) that a new appeal period had commenced upon the issuance of the denial of the Motion to Open, and thus the appeal was timely.
Where, as here, an appeal from a final judgment has not been seasonably taken, ‘[c]laimed errors which might have been assigned on such an appeal are no longer open to review’ upon an appeal from a denial of a motion to open that judgment.” Id., quoting Crozier v. Zaboori, 14 Conn. App. 457, 462 (1988), citing Zingus v. Redevelopment Agency, 161 Conn. 276, 282 (1971).
Thus, we must limit our focus on this appeal to the question of whether or not the commissioner abused his discretion in denying the Fund’s motions to reopen under § 31-315 C.G.S.
In the instant case, as in Matey, supra, we may only consider whether the trial commissioner abused his discretion in denying the claimant’s Motion to Reopen.
“Section 31-315 allows a trial commissioner to modify an award or an approved voluntary agreement where an injured employee’s incapacity has increased, decreased or ceased, or where the measure of dependence on account of which he is paid compensation has changed, or where changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of the award.” Gary v. State/Dept. of Correction, 4208 CRB-8-00-3 (Jan. 4, 2001). The trial commissioner may also open and modify an award in the same manner as a judge of the superior court, i.e., in cases of accident, fraud, or mistake of fact. Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1, 16-17 (1998). “Generally, the decision to open and modify an agreement or award under § 31-315 falls within the discretion of the trial commissioner, and this board will not disturb the decision unless the commissioner has arbitrarily reached an unreasonable result.” Chase v. Honeywell, Inc., 3717 CRB-1-97-11 (Jan. 28, 1999), citing Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 212 Conn. 441, 453 (1989); Tutsky v. YMCA of Greenwich, 28 Conn. App. 536, 541-42 (1992); Hines v. Linc Scientific Imaging, 3037 CRB-8-95-3 (April 14, 1997).
4. The issues before the undersigned are whether the claimant is entitled to C.G.S. Section 31-306 dependency benefits under Section 5-142a 1 or under Chapter 568. (Emphasis added).
5. The claimant contends she is entitled to C.G.S. Section 31-306 benefits under the presumptions set forth in C.G.S. Section 5-142a or alternatively under Chapter 568 as the death arose out of and in the course of the decedent’s employment. The claimant seeks an award regarding same. (Emphasis added).
The trial commissioner further found that the decedent voluntarily retired on June 30, 1997, and began his second career working for another employer. On September 16, 1997, the decedent, who maintained an active lifestyle and regularly exercised, was jogging when he had a heart attack and died shortly thereafter at a local hospital. The claimant contended that because the decedent had accrued 77 days of vacation time when he retired on June 30, 1997, that therefore he continued to be employed for 77 days which includes September 16, 1997. The trier did not accept this argument, but rather found that the decedent was “not eligible for workers’ compensation benefits given his June 30, 1997 retirement, notwithstanding the 77 days of accrued vacation time.” Finding ¶ 16, citing Gorman v. Waterbury, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 17, 39 CRD-5-80 (May 20, 1983), no error, 4 Conn. App. 226 (1985). The trier thus dismissed the claimant’s widow’s claim as it is derivative in nature, and held that “the other issues litigated before the undersigned are therefore moot.” Finding ¶ 18.
Capra v. State/Dept. of Correction, 3791 CRB-4-98-4 (April 27, 1999), quoting Dibenedetto v. State of Connecticut/University of Connecticut Health Center, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 3, 862 CRD-6-89-5 (Jan. 3, 1991); see also Horn v. State/Dept. of Correction, 4177 CRB-3-00-1 (Feb. 22, 2001).
“‘The determination of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact for the trial commissioner.’” Kolomiets v. Syncor International Corp., 51 Conn. App. 523, 526 (1999), quoting Spatafore v. Yale University, 239 Conn. 408, 418 (1996).2 The “conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” Kolomiets, supra, 526-27, quoting Kish v. Nursing & Home Care, Inc., 47 Conn. App. 620, 623 (1998).
.” Id. at 233. Regarding the Chapter 568 claim, it is undisputed that the decedent had voluntarily retired on June 30, 1997 and was not fulfilling any duties of his employment when he was jogging on September 16, 1997. The fact that the decedent had been paid for accrued vacation time does not serve to extend his period of employment in this regard.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial commissioner’s denial of the claimant’s Motion to Reopen.

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