Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/2018/12/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:47:17+00:00

Document:
Issue Was Cost Shifting For Redaction Of Computerized Materials Under The California Public Records Act.
#18-173 National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward, S252445. (A149328; 27 Cal.App.5th 937, mod, 28 Cal.App.5th 372e; Alameda County Superior Court; RG15785743.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in an action for writ of administrative mandate. This case presents the following issue: Does the California Public Records Act permit a public agency to shift the cost of redacting exempt information from electronic records to the party making the request for the records although the cost of redaction cannot be required for paper records?
Fee Award Was 25% Of The Common Fund, But A Lower 14% If Value Of Customer Support Was Factored Into The Analysis.
In In re Takada Airbag Products Liab. Litig., Case No. 1:15-md-02599 (S.D. Fla. 2018), a $299 million settlement was approved by District Judge Federico Moreno in a class action against Ford Motor Co. for defective Takada air bags by which each class member will be reimbursed for documented out-of-pocket expenses, up to $500 in undocumented expenses, and provided with a rental car to bridge the gap when the car is being repaired. Also, free customer service is provided by Ford to class members. The district judge approved class counsel’s full fee request of $74.775 million, which was 25% of the common fund but was actually closer to 14% of the percentage of recovery if the value of customer service was factored into the analysis.
Although Such Fees Should Usually Be Paid Forthwith, Probate Code Has Discretion To Defer Them For Payment Until Final Distributions Are Made.
In Estate of Trikha, Case No. G054909 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Dec. 27, 2018) (unpublished), a son of decedent by a prior relationship successfully defended against a will contest so as to create a common fund for others to share. He, in turn, moved to recoup his attorney’s fees. The trial judge agreed that fees were warranted, awarding about $154,000 from the estate to son’s counsel of record. However, the judge deferred payment and determination of priority until the time of final distribution. Son appealed, claiming prompt payment of fees should have been ordered and the fees deemed to have priority.
The 4/3 DCA, in an opinion authored by Acting Presiding Justice Aronson, affirmed the deferment order under the abuse of discretion standard. Although agreeing that payment of such fees normally should be prompt in nature, the panel could locate no case saying that the trial court must order prompt or immediate payment. Review was hampered by the lack of a reporter’s transcript of the hearing, such that deferment was within the discretion of the probate judge in this particular situation.
Trial Judge Awarded A Minimal Award Based On Erroneously Applying CCP § 998 Penalties Of An Unjustified Nature.
In our December 6, 2018 post, we discussed the then unpublished decision of Etcheson v. FLA US, LLC, Case No. D072793, where the 4/1 DCA reversed about a $2,637 fee/costs award by the trial judge after the tentative was to award over $86,000 in fees and costs. The abuse of discretion was in applying CCP § 998 penalties under a section 998 defense offer which had unfavorable terms and was invalid in this “lemon law” case. We can now report that Etheson was certified for publication on December 27, 2018.
“Court Intervention” Language Not Limited To Just One Court, 2/1 DCA Concludes.
In Pont v. Pont, Case No. B284064 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Dec. 20, 2018) (unpublished), ex-husband was awarded $90,000 in attorney’s fees and costs for defeating ex-wife’s claim that he siphoned off community assets in an Orange County action, after the parties had entered into a stipulated judgment with a fees clause in Los Angeles County family law court. The fees clause covered a prevailing party involved in a “court intervention . . . in connection [with the stipulated judgment].” Both the trial and appellate court had no difficulty concluding that husband’s Orange County victory qualified him as the prevailing party, not just limited to the Los Angeles County family law court producing the entry of the stipulated judgment. Husband obtained a dismissal at the demurrer stage, so that this certainly was a prevailing “win.” Finally, hourly rates ranging from $120-800 per hour for his attorneys was sustained as reasonable given this was a family law matter (although the lower court did note that the $800 mark was at the high range of fees for this type of matter).
Compensatory Award Was $307,762, Even Though Jury Was Asked To Award $7 Million.
Inflated fee requests, as we know from the oft-quoted decision in Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325-1326 (2008), are a special situation which allows a trial judge to substantially reduce or deny altogether the request. Alnor was front and center in the conclusion reached by the same DCA in McElwain v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Case No. G055049 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Dec. 20, 2018) (unpublished).
There, a FEHA plaintiff won $307,762 in compensatory damages from a jury in a disability discrimination suit, although asking for $7 million in damages and not awarded any future economic/noneconomic damages. She then moved to recover over $2.7 million in fees under FEHA’s pro-plaintiff fee shifting statute. The trial judge awarded over $710,000 in fees, refusing to award a positive 1.2 multiplier and applying a negative .4 multiplier after observing that the hourly rates were excessive for the Orange County venue, plaintiff had limited success, and the fee submissions were rife with duplications/inefficiencies/billing errors.
The appellate court affirmed. Alnor controlled, with the factors relied on by the lower court fully supporting the reduced award, the application of a negative multiplier, and the refusal to grant a positive multiplier. Justice Ikola authored the 3-0 decision.
Lower Court Improperly Denied Request In Finding Statute Only Applied To Filing Of An Action.
In Holloway v. Alliance Environmental Group, Case No. E066365 (4th Dist., Div. Dec. 20, 2018) (unpublished), plaintiff was defensed after a 7-week jury trial which she brought against a testing company and abatement company in a residential asbestos abatement gone awry. She apparently was impeached on several occasions during the trial. Testing company moved for attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1780, a deceptive act fee-shifting provision which is mandatory for a prevailing plaintiff and allows recovery for a prevailing defendant where the prosecution of the action was not done in good faith. The lower court denied testing company’s request, determining that “prosecution” only applied to the filing of the action.
The 4/2 DCA reversed. It found that the lower court’s construction of “prosecution” was too narrow, determining that it covered both filing and pursuit of the action. It relied on a definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary and reasoning from the First District in Corbett v. Hayward Dodge, Inc., 119 Cal.App.4th 915, 926, 929 (2004) in reversing. It refused to enter testing company’s request for fees of $243,468, remanding for a consideration of bad faith and then reasonable amount of any award.
4/1 DCA Decision, Although Unpublished, Suggests That Attorneys And Experts Should Correlate Their Time To Specific RFA Work So It Can Be Properly Allocated.
Orange County Water Dist. v. The Arnold Engineering Co., Case No. D070763 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Dec. 19, 2018) (unpublished) is an RFA costs-of-proof sanctions battle arising out of the North Basin Groundwater Protection Project contamination suit which has been brewing for a long time in Orange County Superior Court, Complex Division. After trial, defendant asked for costs-of-proof sanctions for certain District denials of RFAs to the tune of $2.5 million in fees and $400,000 in expert costs. After the lower court voiced some concerns, defendant lowered the request, respectively, to $650,000 and $300,000. Over District’s opposition, the lower court eventually awarded $313,000 in fees and $300,000 in expert costs for the RFA denials.
However, it did find that discretion was abused on awarding costs-of-proof sanctions on certain District RFA denials because it had a reasonable basis to deny based on percipient witness testing, undisputed scientific evidence, and opinions from qualified expert witnesses. So, the matter was reversed and remanded.
Beyond that, the appellate court also reversed the $300,000 expert cost award, providing some instructive observations for attorneys and experts as far as the type of billing which should be employed to obtain costs-of-proof sanctions. Here, some of the work was allowable and some of it was not—meaning apportionment was necessary. It quoted from the Weil & Brown pre-trial practice treatise in recommending that attorneys and experts correlate their billing work to the RFA denial/proof which is at issue. The appellate court also found that the expert costs were incompetently introduced into evidence, because the attorney tried to authenticate the expert work. The attorney could testify that the invoices were paid, but could not attest to the work performed—evidentiary infirmities which were similar to those discussed in our posts on the Copenbarger decision [No. 9 of our 2018 Top Decisions] and on the Eith decision [see our December 19, 2018 post].
Post-Judgment Fee Proceeding Considered Both Entitlement And Amount, So Failure To Mention Fee Award In Notice Of Appeal Was Fatal.
Lower Court Does Not Have To Agree To Maximum Amount Ceiling In “Clear Sailing” Provision Under Settlement Agreement And Does Not Have To Award Percentage of Recovery Fees.
Orozco v. Pebble Beach Co., Case No. H044232 (6th Dist. Dec. 14, 2018) (unpublished) demonstrates that lower courts do not have to award percentage of recovery class counsel fees in class action cases under Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat., Inc., 1 Cal.5th 480 (2016) [our Leading Case No. 17]. What happened here is that parties agreed to a “clear sailings” clause in a wage/hour class action settlement that the defense should not challenge fees “up to” $250,000, one-third of the gross settlement common fund. However, the trial court awarded only $180,000 based on hourly rates it deemed excessive and based on its perception that the hours claimed were not commensurate with work seen on like cases. The Sixth District affirmed, because Laffitte does not mandate that a percentage-of-recovery fee recovery has to be made as a matter of law. The “clear sailings” provision did not require otherwise, given that only an award “up to” the $250,000 had to be considered—it did not hamper the trial judge from making a lower award. Lower fee award affirmed.
District Judge Reduced Fee Request By 25%.
We can now report that the district judge in Stephanie Clifford v. Donald J. Trump, Case No. CV18-06893-SJO (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2018 order) has finally decided what attorney’s fees are recoverable by President Trump’s attorneys in the defamation lawsuit brought by Stormy Daniels. President Trump had earlier prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion under Texas law against the suit, because the district judge found that his tweets were rhetorical hyperbole and protected First Amendment opinions. Texas, like California, has a mandatory SLAPP fee-shifting provision in favor of the SLAPP-ing defendant.
President Trump had sought $389,403.11 in attorney’s fees. The district court did find that the Texas anti-SLAPP statute could encompass acts during the course of the entire litigation, given that they are related to work on the defamation claim. It did find that the claimed hourly rates of $307.60 for associates to $841.64 for partners were reasonable in nature.
However, the district judge did reduce the fee request by 25%, bringing the fee award to $292,052.33. He did so for two major reasons: (1) the defense could have used more highly qualified associates rather than partners to do some work; and (2) excessive work on some tasks had to be discounted.
Allowing Plaintiff To Obtain Broader Civil Rights-Type Fees Would Circumvent “Actually Incurred” Restriction in Civil Code Section 1036.
Plaintiff must have been ecstatic in Johnson v. South San Joaquin Irrigation Dist., Case No. C079200 (3d Dist. Dec. 12, 2018) (unpublished), after winning an inverse condemnation/tort case against irrigation district after it closed a storm water drainage gate to make repairs, which led to storm water flooding and damages on plaintiff’s nearby property. After winning, plaintiff moved for and received attorney’s fees of $953,861.25 against irrigation district under Civil Code section 1036, an inverse condemnation fee-shifting statute allowing fees to a plaintiff for fees “actually incurred.” The fee award was based on a lodestar request increased by a positive 1.5 multiplier, akin to requests under civil rights statutes.
The Third District reversed and remanded for a reevaluation.
Part 2 of 2—Employment Issues, Lender Trust Deed Fee Clauses, Fees As Damages, Section 998, And Sanctions Dominated The Second Batch Of Our Top 25.
In line with our prior post on some of the Top 25 decisions, we now round out with the 12 additional decisions. If other decisions come out after this post that are significant, we will include them in the 2019 top cases. Happy Holidays to our readers!
10. DEEDS OF TRUST – Chacker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 27 Cal.App.5th 751 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Sept. 19, 2018) – authored by Justice Baker; discussed in our Sept. 20, 2018 post and Hart v. Clear Recon Corp., 27 Cal.App.5th 322 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Sept. 18, 2018) – authored by Justice Rubin; discussed in our Sept. 19, 2018 post: Narrow deed of trust provisions only allowed recovery of fees incurred by lender which could be added to loan amounts due by borrowers, but these provisions did not allow for independent fee award over the deed of trust limitations.
9. DAMAGES/SUBSTANTIATION OF REASONABLENESS OF FEES – Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc., 29 Cal.App.5th 1 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 13, 2018) – authored by Justice Fybel and discussed in our Oct. 20, 2018 post and Nov. 13, 2018 post: Attorney’s fees sought as damages for a contractual breach had to be proven at trial through admissible evidence, with presentation of client’s testimony alone not able to competently show verification or reasonableness of counsel’s work, reversing trial court’s admission of client’s testimony and overturning the judgment as a matter of law.
8. SECTION 998 – Martinez v. Eatlite One, Inc., 27 Cal.App.5th 1181 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Oct. 3, 2018) – authored by Justice Ikola and discussed in our Oct. 3, 2018 post: Although calling for legislative clarification of the statute, section 998 requires a trial court to compare the jury’s verdict plus plaintiff’s pre-offer fees/costs against the amount of the 998 offer plus plaintiff’s pre-offer fees/costs in determining whether plaintiff received a more favorable judgment for fees/costs shifting purposes.
7. SANCTIONS -- Huerta v. Kava Holdings, Inc., 29 Cal.App.5th 74 (2d Dist., Div. 8) – authored by Orange County Superior Court Judge Kim Dunning (sitting by assignment) and discussed in our Nov. 17, 2018 post: Panel followed Agave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 18 Cal.App.5th 1098 (2018) [#22 of our Top 25 Cases for 2018] in deciding that FEHA plaintiffs in pre-2019 cases do not face costs/fees exposure where a CCP § 998 offer was involved unless the case filing/prosecution is found to be frivolous in nature, finding a legislative amendment effective January 1, 2019 to be persuasive with respect to its conclusion.
6. COSTS/EMPLOYMENT – Quiles v. Parent, 28 Cal.App.5th 100 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 2, 2018) – authored by Justice Fybel and discussed in our Nov. 6, 2018 post: In a Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action, plaintiff was entitled to recovery of certain routine costs under the federal statute even though not recoverable under state law costs provisions when plaintiff prevailed on FLSA claims.
5. TAXATION – Land Partners, LLC v. County of Orange, 19 Cal.App.5th 741 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Jan. 22, 2018) – authored by Justice Ikola and discussed in our Jan. 16, 2018 post and Jan. 24, 2018 post: Losing County tax assessor is not subject to Revenue and Taxation Code § 5152 fee exposure in taxpayer refund action where assessor only wrongly applied the law.
4. ARBITRATION/COSTS – EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc., 21 Cal.App.5th 1058 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Mar. 28, 2018) – authored by Justice Chavez and discussed in our Mar. 30, 2018 post: Incremental costs award process used during the course of an arbitration, after a JAMS appellate panel confirmed the merits award, did not violate the one judgment rule, waiver, or estoppel principles.
3. SECTION 998 – Meleski v. Estate of Hotlen, 2018 WL 6241504 (3d Dist. Nov. 29, 2018) – authored by Acting Presiding Justice Blease and discussed in our Dec. 6, 2018 post: Non-named insurance carrier is liable for CCP § 998 costs after rejecting 998 offer on behalf of its insured when the insured did not do better than the 998 offer after a jury trial.
2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY/PREVAILING PARTY – Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. 16-56234 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018) – per curiam order and discussed in our Dec. 4, 2018 post: Defendants prevailing on attorney’s fees compensable-California Resale Royalties Act claims based on preemption grounds, despite existence of non-compensable, remaining “sliver” claims, were prevailing parties under the fee-shifting provision despite the existence of some residual claims for purposes of applying for appellate fees.
1. SANCTIONS -- CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC v. Gray, 2018 WL 6380742 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Dec. 6, 2018) – authored by Justice Dato and discussed in our Dec. 6, 2018 post: Panel decided that 4/1 DCA’s prior decision in San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego, 247 Cal.App.4th 1306 (2016) was incorrect and followed the reasoning by the 2/8 DCA in Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. Southern SARMS, Inc., 20 Cal.App.5th 117 (2018) [#19 of our Top 25 Decisions for 2018], concluding that parties moving for CCP § 128.5 sanctions must satisfy the 21-day “safe harbor” requirements of CCP § 128.7.
Part 1 of 2—CCP §998, Civil Code § 1717, Civil Rights, Sanctions, And Ethics Dominated First Batch.
25. HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS – Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Assn., 19 Cal.App.5th 923 (1st Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 24, 2018) –authored by Justice Banke; discussed in our Jan. 28, 2018 post: Interim successes by homeowner against homeowner association did not allow homeowner an entitlement to an award of fees under the Davis-Stirling Act.
24. CIVIL RIGHTS – Bustos v. Global P.E.T., Inc., 19 Cal.App.5th 558 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 16, 2018) – authored by Justice Codrington; discussed in our Jan. 16, 2018 and Dec. 22, 2017 posts: Plaintiff obtaining a favorable vote on one jury question, but losing on causation issue, was not entitled to FEHA fee recovery.
23. ALLOCATION/FEE CLAUSE INTERPRETATION/ SECTION 1717 – Burkhalter Kessler Clement & George LLP v. Hamilton, 19 Cal.App.5th 38 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Jan. 8, 2018) – authored by Justice Moore, discussed in our Jan. 9, 2018 post: There can be more than one prevailing party where plaintiff prevailed against a limited liability partnership defendant but lost against alter ego defendant, although apportionment of work required where defendants were jointly represented.
22. CIVIL RIGHTS/SECTION 998 – Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 18 Cal.App.5th 1098 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Jan. 2, 2018) – authored by Justice Slough; discussed in our Jan. 2, 2018 post: Appellate court denied defense expert witness costs as against unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff rejecting a CCP § 998 offer in a nonfrivolous FEHA case, departing company from contrary reasoning in 1/5 DCA and 4/1 DCA decisions. [NOTE: Arave was found persuasive in one of our upcoming top 25 decisions on this split of opinion, see Huerta v. Kava Holdings, Inc., 2018 W 5999639, a 2/8 DCA published opinion issued in November 2018].
21. PREVAILING PARTY/SECTION 1717 – Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assn. v. Southern California Financial Corp., 20 Cal.App.5th 191 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Feb. 5, 2018) – authored by Justice Grimes; discussed in our Feb. 6, 2018 post: No attorney’s fees awarded to either side where no clear winning prevailing party under Civil Code § 1717 because homeowner did not completely rid a transfer fee but HOA only got 10% of FMV valuation; settlement communications could not be used in determining whether one side prevailed or not for “prevailing party” analysis.
19. SANCTIONS – Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. Southern SARMS, Inc., 20 Cal.App.5th 117 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Jan. 31, 2018) – authored by Presiding Justice Perluss; discussed in our Feb. 3, 2018 post: CCP § 128.5 sanctions are not appropriate unless moving party satisfies CCP § 128.7’s “safe harbor” protections, disagreeing with contrary conclusion by 4/1 DCA in San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego, 247 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1317 (2016). [NOTE: A different panel of the 4/1 DCA, in the recent December 2018 decision of CPF Vaseo Associates LLC v. Gray agreed with Nutrition Distribution and disagreed with San Diegans, which we will review later in the remainder of our top 25 decisions].
18. ETHICS/EQUITY/RETAINER AGREEMENTS – Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 4 Cal.5th 467 (Cal. Supreme Ct. Mar. 5, 2018) – authored by Justice Cuellar; discussed in our March 8, 2018 post: Dissolved law firm has no property interest in legal matters handled on an hourly basis and has no interest in profits generated by former partners’ work on hourly matters pending at the time of the firm’s dissolution; court refused to decide if Jewel v. Boxer is still applicable to contingency matters.
17. SECTION 1717 – Shapira v. Lifetech Resources, 22 Cal.App.5th 429 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Apr. 17, 2018) – authored by Justice Collins; discussed in our Apr. 20, 2018 post: Litigant does not face Civil Code § 1717 fee exposure where litigant voluntarily dismisses with prejudice pending matter after trial, under submission, but before any merits decision comes down.
16. CONSTRUCTION – United Rigger & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co., 4 Cal.5th 1082 (Cal. Supreme Ct. May 14, 2018) –authored by Justice Cuellar; discussed in our May 15, 2018 post: Construction prompt payment statutes only relate, for penalties and fee exposure, to the relevant payment dispute rather than a more generalized non-retention construction dispute.
15. ETHICS – Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc., 6 Cal.5th 59 (Cal. Supreme Ct. Aug. 30, 2018) – authored by Justice Kruger; discussed in our Aug. 31, 2018 post: Contractual fee recovery is not allowable to law firm with undisclosed conflict of interest, which was not cured by boilerplate conflict waiver from challenging party; however, the matter was remanded to see if the ethical violation was egregious enough to prevent quantum meruit recovery.
14. PROBATE – Powell v. Tagami, 26 Cal.App.5th 219 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Aug. 15, 2018) – authored by Presiding Justice McConnell; discussed in our Aug. 9, 2018 and Aug. 16, 2018 posts: Probate compensation allowed for mediation work, personal litigant work, and accounting objector work where unwarranted ad hominem attacks were levied against opposing siblings and their attorneys.

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