Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50129:gr-159974-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:38:53+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 159974 - JESUS CAYABYAB, ET AL. v. ROSEMARIE GOMEZ DE AQUINO, ETC.
JESUS CAYABYAB and ZALDY LAZO, Petitioners, v. ROSEMARIE GOMEZ DE AQUINO, represented by ARMANDO AQUINO, Respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 12, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72105 and its Resolution of September 15, 2003, which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan and reinstated the earlier Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bayambang, Pangasinan ordering the ejectment of the petitioners from the subject premises.
On July 11, 2001, Rosemarie Gomez de Aquino (respondent), represented by her attorney-in-fact Armando Aquino, filed a Complaint2 for Unlawful Detainer against Jesus Cayabyab and Zaldy Lazo (petitioners), docketed as Civil Case No. 644 before the Municipal Trial Court of Bayambang, Pangasinan.
In the Complaint, respondent (as plaintiff) alleged that she is the owner and was in prior possession of the land currently being occupied by the petitioners, through Transfer Certificate of Title No. 97848 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan. Respondent added that since 1998, petitioners were allowed to occupy the property with her tolerance, on the condition that the petitioners will vacate the same upon her demand. Respondent claimed that when she made such demand through the demand letters dated October 30, 2000 she sent to the petitioners, the latter refused to vacate and has continued to occupy the premises to this day. Respondent complained that despite her ownership of the property and despite the petitioners' receipt of her demand letters, the latter insist on staying in the premises; hence, the complaint.
In their Answer,3 the petitioners (as defendants) averred that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in long, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property for more than 40 years. They likewise contended that the property was in fact neither owned nor possessed by the respondent, as the same had always been part of the former Camp Gregg Military Reservation. As such a military reservation, the land was allegedly put under the exclusive use of the Government for military purposes by the then colonial American Government, which then subsequently transferred its control to the Philippine Government in 1947. They claimed that they did not occupy the property at respondent's tolerance; that the land is public in nature which means that it is owned and administered by the Government, through the Bureau of Lands. Petitioners also contended that respondent's title, TCT No. 97848, is spurious, having been derived from older titles issued on the said military reservation. In addition, petitioners cried lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTC to decide the case for Unlawful Detainer since prior to the filing of the case by the respondent, petitioners already raised the issue of ownership of the land under the Camp Gregg Military Reservation in a case they had filed with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) where both the petitioners and the respondent were parties.
Following the parties' submission of their respective Position Papers, the MTC rendered its Decision4 dated February 20, 2007 in favor of respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate the land in question.
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioners filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Regional Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayambang, Pangasinan adverted to above is set aside and a new one entered dismissing the complaint.
The RTC based its Decision on the doctrine of "primacy of administrative jurisdiction" since the petitioners had already filed an earlier case involving the same property and the same parties before the COSLAP.
Finding the Decision of the RTC unfavorable, the respondent appealed to the CA. In her Petition for Review, the respondent contended that the RTC erred in giving credence to petitioners' contention that the property is within a military reservation when the fact is, respondent has a title to the property which cannot be collaterally attacked.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 14, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the Decision dated February 20, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayambang, Pangasinan is REINSTATED.
In a Resolution7 dated September 15, 2003, the CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE MTC HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION.
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision and reinstating the MTC Decision for the following reasons: first, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case for Unlawful Detainer under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; second, since it was alleged that the subject land is within a military reservation, the courts should have given way to the COSLAP case because the latter is determinative of who is entitled to possession of the subject land.
We summarize the arguments of petitioners in the Petition for Review into a single issue: whether or not the COSLAP case barred the MTC from taking jurisdiction over the case of Unlawful Detainer now subject of herein petition.
Such a position becomes even more compelling in the instant case since the petitioners herein do not even plead their own title or ownership of the subject property, but merely the Government's alleged ownership and control.
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The Commission shall promulgate such rules and procedures as will insure expeditious resolution and action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court.
8. Perform such other functions as may hereafter be assigned to it by the President of the Philippines.
Section 3 (2) indicates that none of the petitioners or respondents falls under the classifications enumerated in items (a) to (e) thereof as to compel the trial court to defer its jurisdiction over the case to COSLAP. Neither are the parties involved in "land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature."
In addition, considering the enactment of the later law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, expressly conferring on the Municipal Trial Court jurisdiction over cases for Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (under Section 33 thereof), there is no more question as to its power to decide these cases independently of other tribunals.
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. Under the law, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, namely: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action.In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.
The instances when COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant. The Cuison property is private property, having been registered under the Torrens system in the name of petitioner. Thus, the government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. The parties claiming the Cuison property are herein petitioner and private respondents. None of them is a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural minority. The dispute between the parties was not critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action.
Second. COSLAP is not empowered to review decisions of the DARAB or the Provincial Adjudicator or any other quasi-judicial agency for that matter. In their Position Paper, private respondents questioned the validity of the DARAB and the Provincial Adjudicator's order of cancellation of private respondents' CLOAs and of the government's certificate of title over the Cuison property on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines was not impleaded in those cases. Private respondents' recourse from the decision of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 2362, affirming the Provincial Adjudicator's order of cancellation of the compulsory acquisition proceedings, is to appeal the decision of the DARAB to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. Respondent COSLAP cannot arrogate the duty of directing the DAR to reinstate the CLOAs of private respondents because the same falls within the competence of the DAR subject to the appellate review of the Court of Appeals. Insofar as the assailed Resolution delved on the propriety of the rulings of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 2362 and of the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93, the Court finds COSLAP to have exceeded its quasi-judicial functions.
It is clear that the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not extend to disputes involving the ownership of private lands, or those already covered by a certificate of title, as these fall exactly within the jurisdiction of the courts and other administrative agencies. In addition, COSLAP's powers do not include the review of decisions of quasi-judicial or judicial agencies. Since the issuance of a certificate of title proceeds from a decision of a quasi-judicial or judicial agency, it is not reviewable by COSLAP, though it may be questioned in a separate judicial proceeding directly instituted for that purpose.
Prior possession, however, may gain importance, if the Government and the petitioners choose to file a separate action directly attacking respondent's title. Unfortunately, since the herein subject action is only one for the summary proceeding of Unlawful Detainer, the Court, in the present petition, may not touch on the relevance of said prior possession without running afoul of the nature of such suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 12, 2003 and Resolution dated September 15, 2003 are AFFIRMED in toto.
1 Penned by Justice Eliezer R. De Leon Santos with the concurrence of Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Regalado E. Maambong; rollo, p. 28.
9 Garcia v. Anas, 121 Phil. 1040, 1042 (1965).
10 University Physicians Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100424, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 86, 89.
11 Orellano v. Alvestir, No. L-22412, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 536, 541.
12 Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, G.R. No. 75206, September 5, 1989, 177 SCRA 288, 292.
13 De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 218 Phil. 498-499 (1984); Drilon v. Gaurana, No. L-35482, April 30, 1987, 149 SCRA 342, 348 and Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 40, No. L - 75860, September 17, 1987, 154 SCRA 77, 84 quoted in Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, ibid.
14 350 Phil. 499, 506 (1998).
15 De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13, at 500.
16 Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13, at 499.
17 Arranza v. BF Homes, 389 Phil. 318, 329 (2000).
18 Heirs of Raphael Magpily v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 167748, November 8, 2005, 474 SCRA 366, 372.
19 Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), G.R. No. 141523, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 491, 509-513.
20 Pangilinan v. Aguilar, 150 Phil. 166, 176 (1972); Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372, 383; Orellano v. Alvestir, supra note 11, at 541.
21 Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257 (1956); Corporacion de PP. Agustinos v. Crisostomo, 32 Phil. 427, 439 (1915).
22 Atun v. NuÃ±ez, 97 Phil. 762, 764 (1955).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.