Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/otherwise-qualified/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:51:13+00:00

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Baseball season is about to get up and running. Good luck on your team for this year. In my case: the Chicago Cubs are expected to be good; the Chicago White Sox not so good; and the Atlanta Braves, anybody’s guess. Also, hope everyone is having fun if not success with the NCAA tournament. Currently, in a bragging rights pool run by my brother, I find myself in last place just behind my daughter, who watches absolutely zero basketball, though she did just finish a season of organized basketball in our local recreation league.
Today’s blog entry are appellate updates on two cases I have blogged upon previously. In the first, Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, the 11th Circuit came down with a published decision on March 21, 2019. In the second, Gati v. Western Kentucky University, decided January 29, 2019, the Sixth Circuit came down with an unpublished decision.
As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia; Gati v. Western Kentucky University; and Gati takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Previously, I blogged on this case here. My blog entry focused on the ADA piece of the case. That part of the case still remains at the lower court level. What was appealed was the civil rights (title VII), part of the case. The question on appeal was just when has the plaintiff put forth appropriate comparators. The 11th Circuit concluded that a plaintiff put forth an appropriate comparator when the comparators are similarly situated in all material respects. In determining whether a comparator is similarly situated in all material respects, the 11th Circuit suggested some factors to consider with respect to any comparator: 1) he or she will have engaged in the same basic conduct or misconduct as the plaintiff; 2) he or she will been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff; 3) he or she will ordinarily, although not invariably, have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff; and 4) he or she will share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history. The list does not appear to be exclusive because the court uses the phrase, “ordinarily, for instance, a similarly situated comparator-.” Finally, a valid comparison will not turn upon formal labels, but rather on how substantively alike the situations are. That is, the plaintiff and his or her comparators must be sufficiently similar, in an objective sense. That is, plaintiff and his or her comparators cannot reasonably be distinguished.
With respect to the ADA, I don’t see this case having much of an impact. Due to the nature of how the ADA works, you don’t often see comparators an issue in ADA cases. As mentioned previously, the ADA portion of the case is still in the District Court. Also, there is now a Circuit court split on the comparator issue. So, expect to see that question go to the United States Supreme Court at some point.
I previously blogged on this case here. Here are the key aspects of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning affirming the District Court.
A prima facie case for title II discrimination involves showing: 1) plaintiff has a disability; 2) plaintiff was otherwise qualified; and 3) plaintiff was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under the program because of her disability.
A person with a disability is otherwise qualified if he or she can meet a program’s necessary requirements with reasonable accommodations.
The ADA does not require an educational institution to lower or substantially modify its standards when making modifications. Rather, only reasonable not fundamental adjustments are required.
The federal judiciary is ill-equipped to evaluate the proper emphasis and content of a school’s curriculum and should afford a university’s judgment and discretion great respect. That is, in assessing the importance of academic requirements and healthcare programs especially, where the conferral of a degree places the college or university’s signature upon the student as qualified to practice, the judiciary ought only to reluctantly intervene.
Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and proving that it is reasonable.
Western Kentucky’s faculty did not find the plaintiff’s proposed accommodations reasonable.
Looking to title I cases, an employee cannot force his or her employer to provide a specific accommodation if the employer offers another reasonable accommodation.
Again, looking to title I cases, if an employee rejects a reasonable accommodation, then he or she is no longer a qualified individual as a matter of law.
With respect to the interactive process, even if an interactive process is required in an academic setting, that process is a means to find a person with the disability reasonable accommodations and is not an end in and of itself. Here, negotiations broke down when the plaintiff refused to consider the University’s proposed accommodations and transferred to another school.
A failure to engage in the interactive process only becomes an independent violation of the ADA when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing that he or she proposed a reasonable accommodation, which was not the case here.
With respect to academic deference and disability discrimination, courts are not always going to be so nice to the University, such as discussed here. From the University perspective, it really helps if the faculty has done its homework with respect to what are the essential eligibility requirements of the program. We discussed that process here.
The court says that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proposing the accommodation and proving that it is reasonable. I always have trouble with this formulation because undue burden and fundamental alteration are affirmative defenses. Also, what is reasonable under the ADA is whatever does not constitute an undue burden or a fundamental alteration. So, does this formulation of the court’s mean that undue burden and fundamental alteration are not affirmative defenses and is something the plaintiff has to prove?
The University did have its faculty consider whether they could make the proposed accommodation work without fundamentally altering the program, and the faculty decided that it could not.
As we have mentioned previously, such as here, failure to engage in the interactive process is not always a separate cause of action depending upon the jurisdiction. In the Sixth Circuit, it appears that failure to engage in the interactive process can be an independent violation of the ADA where the plaintiff proposes a reasonable accommodation.
The person who blows up the interactive process bears the responsibility, which is the same rule in title I cases.
U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights has said for years that failure to engage in the interactive process is an independent violation of the ADA. There is also this case holding that colleges and universities have an obligation to engage in the interactive process with respect to their students. That said, interactive process is a title I construct. Even so, I do not understand how reasonable modifications under title II and under title III are even possible to determine without engaging in an interactive process first. If you subscribe to the publication Disability Compliance for Higher Education put out by Wiley, Professor Masinter of Nova Southeastern Shepard Broad School of Law in its April 2019 issue has an excellent article on OCR’s insistence, which may or may not be problematic, on the interactive process and why it is a good idea to use it even if it is a title I construct.
“Because,” is not the standard for causation in title II matters. Rather, the standard for causation is “by reason of,” which is different from the Rehabilitation Act, “solely by reason of” standard. We just discussed that here.
Otherwise qualified is not the term found in title II of the ADA as amended. Rather, that term is found in the Rehabilitation Act. The term in title II of the ADA is, “qualified.” Even so, the meaning of “otherwise qualified,” and, “qualified,” are identical.
Universities and colleges have a lot of programs where they signify a student is qualified to practice upon completion. You see this all the time with associate degrees and certificate programs (paralegals-an area I taught full-time in for 12 years, including running an ABA approved program for four years). So, any university or college doing our two-step process first should be in good shape if after they have completed our two-step process, it denies certain accommodation request on the grounds the program will be fundamentally altered.
Today’s blog entry returns us back to the world of employment law. One of the things that drives me crazy is that people, including judges, sometimes forget whether a person is qualified to do a particular job means assessing whether the individual can perform the essential functions of the job WITH or without reasonable accommodations. Today’s case, Todd v. Covenant Security Services, Inc., from the Western District of Kentucky, does an excellent job of walking through the whole essential function analysis and making clear that it is really important to focus on whether the essential functions of the job can be done WITH or without reasonable accommodations. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories, and they are: facts; framework for handling essential function claims; court’s reasoning essential functions of the job; court’s reasoning interactive process; court’s reasoning retaliation; and takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Plaintiff provided security services to defendant’s customer, Kimberly-Clark, in its Owensboro, Kentucky facility for 6 ½ years. He was assigned to the second shift with work hours being from 3 PM until 11 PM. His actual job was more like a clerk job with his main responsibilities operating or manning the over the road truck desk and the shuttle desk and paperwork related to both. He received favorable employment evaluations from the defendant.
The written job description for the security officer position at the Kimberly-Clark facility in place at the time Todd was hired had a physical requirement of an ability to walk several miles per day. Plaintiff testified that security officers patrolled rounds early in his employment, but the patrol rounds were not performed during the majority of his employment. He also testified that he voluntarily performed patrol rounds during those years and was permitted to use his own vehicle for a Kimberly-Clark vehicle during the exterior facility and parking lot rounds. In 2013, plaintiff suffered a disabling impairment and notified the defendant that he had a physical issue relating to his back and was unable to work more than 32 hours per week. In response, the defendant adjusted his schedule.
In January 2015, an issue arose with plaintiff’s delay in turning in bills of lading during his shift. That led to his immediate supervisor and the site supervisor sending an email mandating the use of patrol sheets on all rounds. After receiving the email, plaintiff sent an email to the site supervisor requesting a reasonable accommodation for the additional job responsibilities of the mandatory patrol rounds on each shift. Plaintiff specifically requested some type of mobility device to enable him to make rounds inside the plant and an exception to allow his personal vehicle beyond the gate to deliver the bill of ladings. The defendant did make a temporary accommodation in response to plaintiff’s request by temporarily excusing him from performing the duty of a patrol during the shift. Evidence showed that another individual voluntarily handled the walking patrols from March 5, 2015 until at least September 2015. At some point, that person notified the defendant that he no longer wished to perform all the walking patrols.
In May 2015, plaintiff’s physician completed the medical inquiry for reasonable accommodations under the ADA form at the defendant’s request. That form was submitted to the defendant by the plaintiff. The foreman noted that the plaintiff suffered from chronic low and thoracic back pain and that the condition was a permanent, long-term physical impairment that substantially limited plaintiff’s ability to walk, but that he was able to work. In July 2015, defendant modified the written job description for security officers to include routine vehicle patrols of the facility parking lot and exterior patrols of the facility as well as routine internal foot patrols of the facility.
On October 6, 2015, plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, site supervisor, and defendant’s human resources officer requested to meet with plaintiff. At that meeting, plaintiff again requested a reasonable accommodation to enable him to complete patrol rounds. The accommodations he requested included: 1) plaintiff would handle the heavier traffic volume desk and his co-worker would handle lower traffic volume desk in the patrol rounds; 2) defendant would provide him with a mobility device; 3) plaintiff’s supervisor would perform the patrol rounds on the second shift as he volunteered to do; and 4) plaintiff be permitted to use his own vehicle or drive a vehicle of the defendant’s in order to do to patrol rounds outside of the facility. Plaintiff represented that his site supervisor and the human resources officer denied the accommodations, informed him that he could not perform the job under the new requirements, and terminated his employment. He also represented that he offered to stay until the employer hired someone to replace him but was informed that the defendant had already hired his replacement, a 22-year-old male.
Plaintiff brought suit in state court under both the ADA and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act as well is under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Of course, defendant remove the action to federal court. The court winds up dismissing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim because the prerequisite procedural steps were not done.
Since the language of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act mirrors the ADA, they both get analyzed under the ADA framework.
For a plaintiff to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff has to show that: 1) he has a disability under the ADA; 2) he is a qualified individual for that particular position; 3) the employer knew or had reason to know of his disability; 4) he requested a reasonable accommodation; and 5) the employer failed to accommodate him.
If the prima facie case is met, an employer can rebut that by showing that the proposed accommodation either eliminates the essential function of the job or the proposed accommodation imposes an undue hardship on his business.
Under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12111(8), a person is a qualified individual where they can with or without reasonable accommodation perform the essential functions of the employment position they hold or desire.
A job function is essential if its removal fundamentally alters the position.
In considering whether a job duty is essential, the EEOC, at 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii), looks to a variety of factors: 1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; 2) written job description prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; 3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; 4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; 5) the terms of the collective bargaining agreement; 6) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or 7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
Whether a function is essential is so highly fact specific that it is typically not suitable for resolution on a motion for summary judgment.
The ADA does not limit an employer’s ability to establish or change the content, nature, or functions of a job (this is the big issue with respect to what Walmart is doing with the Greeters positions).
Evidence exists that the necessity and schedule of patrol rounds was determined by both the defendant and Kimberly-Clark and that the patrol rounds were implemented to ensure safety at the facility.
Just because the defendant forgave the mandatory patrol rounds for a period of just about eight months, does not mean that the daily patrol rounds were not essential. That is, an employer does not concede for all time that a function is nonessential simply because it allows an employee to stop performing that function temporarily.
Plaintiff presented no evidence to rebut the conclusion that patrol rounds were essential to the security officer position.
Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that the accommodation is objectively reasonable.
An accommodation is reasonable if it is necessary in light of the plaintiff’s known physical limitations.
The reasonableness of the requested accommodation is generally a question of fact.
An employer is under no obligation to accommodate individuals by shifting essential job functions onto others.
Genuine disputes of material fact exists whether plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of the job of the security officer with reasonable accommodations. In particular, plaintiff requested defendant provide him with a mobility device and/or permit him to use his own vehicle or a vehicle of the defendant in order to do to patrol rounds outside of the facility.
While defendant claimed that the use of mobility device was rejected by Kimberly-Clark for safety reasons, defendant did not provide any evidence from Kimberly-Clark that the mobility device was rejected on the basis of safety or that the concerns rose to the level of undue hardship.
The rejection of the mobility device for the external facility patrol on safety grounds is suspect given that the defendant and Kimberly-Clark permitted security officers and other individuals to walk or patrol the exterior of their facility on foot despite the heavy volume of large vehicles in the parking lot.
A reasonable jury could believe that since mobility devices come in so many different varieties, the defendant and the plaintiff could have found a mobility device that was small, compact, and either permitted the plaintiff to stand the entire patrol round or transfer from a sitting to standing position during the patrol rounds.
A reasonable jury could also believe that the defendant and the plaintiff could have found a mobility device that would limit the speed of the device to the equivalent of an individual briskly walking in order to minimize the device interfering with manufacturing operations.
While an employer is not required to eliminate essential functions of a job in order to accommodate an employee with a disability, permitting one employee to patrol inside and another employee to proposal outside is not eliminating an essential function of the job. Rather, that it just restructuring the job.
The ADA imposes a duty on the employer to engage in an interactive process.
The purpose of the interactive process is to determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation for a given employee. That process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and the potential accommodations that overcome those limitations.
Both parties to the interactive process are required to participate in the process in good faith.
Where an employer readily meets with the employee, discusses any reasonable accommodation, and suggest other possible positions for the plaintiff, the employer has then generally fulfilled its obligations.
Prevailing on an interactive process claim, means that plaintiff has to show that: 1) he is qualified for the position; 2) the employer failed to participate in the interactive process in good faith; and 3) a reasonable accommodation would have been possible had the employer participated in the process.
When plaintiff made his request for reasonable accommodation, no one from the defendant met with him regarding his request for reasonable accommodation for approximately seven months.
Not until the defendant had already hired someone to replace the plaintiff, did a meeting occur to discuss reasonable accommodations.
No evidence exists that the defendant suggested any alternative reasonable accommodations. Instead, the record shows that the defendant refused all of the suggested accommodations proposed by the plaintiff.
A reasonable jury could find that the defendant did not attempt to entertain plaintiff’s requested accommodations. The jury could also reasonably conclude that the defendant failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith thereby preventing the parties from discovering and implementing accommodation that might have worked for the plaintiff to remain as a security officer.
Prevailing on a retaliation claim means showing: 1) plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; 2) the exercise of protected rights was known to the defendant; 3) the defendant took adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and 4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action existed.
Requesting a reasonable accommodation is a protected act.
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, then the employer has to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
The only evidence presented by the plaintiff suggest that defendant terminated the plaintiff because of his disability and not because he requested an accommodation for that disability. Accordingly, a reasonable jury under the facts could not find that the defendant discharged the plaintiff because he asked for an accommodation.
Oftentimes, you see cases where the disability discrimination claim fails but the retaliation claim continues because retaliation claims are broader in their scope. This is not one of those cases.
At the very beginning of the opinion, the court says that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position on summary judgment is insufficient. That is, there has to be evidence and with the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. We have seen this scintilla language before here, where that court said the exact opposite. The bottom line here is check your jurisdiction. Depending upon the judge and your jurisdiction, very different views of how to deal with summary judgment motions exist.
If a job function is essential, you are under no obligation as an employer to waive it. However, keep in mind that the analysis focuses on whether the essential functions of the job can be performed WITH reasonable accommodations. Also, don’t forget about restructuring the job. That is, switching essential functions of various jobs around.
I wonder what would have happened if the employer had called the Job Accommodation Network first?
Not all jurisdictions have a separate cause of action for interactive process claims. That is, some jurisdictions don’t have a separate claim for interactive process but fold it into the broader ADA claims. Many jurisdiction do have a separate cause of action for violation of the interactive process. Again, be sure to check how your jurisdiction deals with that.
If you as an employer are going to not think about restructuring of the position, be prepared to show an undue hardship (i.e. fundamental alteration), on the business. Also, remember any denial of an accommodation gets measured against the undue hardship standard.
Just because an employer waives an essential function for a period of time, that does not create a situation where the employer is prevented from arguing later that they don’t have to waive that essential function. Of course, this does raise the question of why you would want to waive an essential function of the job in the first place.
Essential function of the job is something that can be decided on summary judgment, but convincing a court of that is not an easy task.
It is much harder to convince the court that the reasonableness of a reasonable accommodation request should be decided on summary judgment as that is generally a question of fact. In making this statement, the court cited to the deaf lifeguard decision we discussed here.
Restructuring and shifting job functions onto others are different concepts. Shifting essential job functions onto others implies a one-way street. Restructuring implies that essential functions of the job are being flipped from both positions. Shifting an essential function of the job onto someone else is not required, but restructuring may be. From all the cases I have read over the years, restructuring of the position is not something you read a lot about, and therefore, is probably an underutilized strategy when it comes to figuring out reasonable accommodations.
If a request for reasonable accommodation is made, don’t wait seven months to deal with it. Get on top of it right away. Also, be sure that a true interactive process occurs.
While it isn’t unusual for a disability discrimination claim to fail, but a retaliation claim continues, occasionally, such as here, you see the situation where the disability discrimination claim continues but the retaliation claim fails.
The EEOC factors for essential functions drive me nuts because of the complexity. In the vast majority of situation, you can keep it simple by focusing on whether the function is fundamental to the job. Another way to look at it is just like the court described in the case we are discussing here, which is ask if the functions removal fundamentally alter the position.
Keep job descriptions current. What matters is what is happening on the ground. Anything happening on the ground will prevail over what the job description says.
Make sure your employees understand what is the interactive process. That is an ideal situation for training and role-playing.
In all the years I have been blogging, the number of times I have blogged more than once a week is about three I believe. So, why am I making an exception now? Well, my next few weeks are going to be really weird. My daughter comes home from camp on Monday after four weeks. She then has two weeks at home before we all go on a family vacation to California for a week. Once we get back from that, she starts school August 1. Also, I have a bit of give in my schedule at the moment, and so I figured why not. Finally, there is a Supreme Court nominee decision coming up next Monday, and I am figuring that my next blog will be analyzing the nominee’s record when it comes to understanding the rights of persons with disabilities. It may take some time to go through all the relevant opinions. So, with that in mind, our case of the day is Pfendler v. Liberty Dialysis-Hawaii, LLC out of the Ninth Circuit decided July 2, 2018. It is a really short case, but it contains a lot of useful information about dealing with essential functions. As usual, blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning reversing summary judgment for the employer; and takeaways. Since the blog entry is so short, I can’t imagine the reader will not read the whole thing. In any event, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Plaintiff suffered a non-work-related shoulder injury and was granted a medical leave in January 2012. Between March and December 2012, he asked to return to work with a lifting restriction that started at 30 pounds and then went up to 50 pounds. The employer rejected those proposals relying on a written job description that lifting 75 to 100 pounds was an essential job function. At the District Court level, the court held that he was not qualified because he could not perform the essential function of the job as listed by the employer, and he appealed.
The employer bears the burden of production for establishing what are the essential functions of the job.
A job’s essential functions are fundamental duties not the marginal functions of the position.
Plaintiff testified that he only had to tilt the dialysis recliners and never had to lift one up. Further, evidence in the record existed from another person in the same position that the most weight lifted on a regular basis would be about 40 pounds, a figure within the doctor’s restrictions. So, a question of fact existed as to whether the 75 to 100 pounds was an essential function of the job. Therefore, summary judgment for the employer was not appropriate.
If the lifting requirement was an essential function, plaintiff may have been entitled to an accommodation that the employer waive the formal lifting condition.
I have said for years that the best way to think of essential functions of a particular job is in terms of fundamental duties of the position. It is always best if you keep it simple.
This decision notes that the burden of production is on the employer with respect to what are the essential functions of the job.
Just because the employer says something is essential in a job description does not mean that the employer automatically wins. What is happening on the ground is critical. So, make sure your job descriptions reflect the reality of what is actually happening. It is a good idea to periodically review job descriptions just to make sure they are accurate. Job descriptions always go out of date over time.
The court statement that “If the lifting requirement was an essential function, plaintiff may have been entitled to an accommodation that the employer waive the formal lifting condition,” is simply not correct. That is, an employer is under no obligation under the ADA waive an essential function of the job. However, the employer does have to determine whether the essential functions of the job can be performed with or without reasonable accommodations.
With respect to essential functions of the job, focusing on fundamental duties is the most simple way to go about it. However, for complicated situations, take a look at the EEOC seven factors test and three situation test, which can be found here, to flesh things out. In the vast majority of situations, the fundamental duties approach will solve your problems, but not always.
Case law exists saying that a function can be essential even if it is not done very often. A fellow blogger, Eric Meyer, whose blog The Employer Handbook appears in my blogroll, discussed such a case here.
Whether a person has a disability under the ADA does not depend upon how that person incurs that disability.

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