Source: https://www.contest-will.com/testamentary-capacity/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:36:53+00:00

Document:
“[W]here a Will, rational on its face, is shown to have been executed in legal form, the law presumes that the testator had testamentary capacity and that the Will speaks his wishes. If the will has been probated and is thereafter contested, the burden of proving its illegality is, by statute (now, RCW 11.24.010), imposed upon the person contesting such probation, and … that burden can be met only by producing clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of the invalidity of the Will.” Estate of Bottger, 14 Wn.2d 676, 685-86 (1942); Estate of Nelson, 85 Wn.2d 602 (1975).
Has the capacity to make a rational plan, and understands that he/she is signing a document, that disposes of his/her property at death.
Is able to recall what he/she owns.
Is aware of his/her immediate circle of family, friends, and associates.
With respect to medical testimony, it has been held that special consideration should be given to the opinion of the attending physician. Estate of Reilly, 78 Wn.2d 623 (1970); [Citation omitted]. Although medical testimony and the testimony of attesting witnesses are more commonly given, any testimony that is credible, internally consistent, and supported by other similar evidence is admissible to determine testamentary capacity [Citation omitted].
Estate of Moulton, 1 Wn. App. 993 (1970).
Estate of Forsman, 177 Wash. 38 (1934).
Estate of Thomas, 165 Wash. 42 (1931).
Estate of Moulton, as above.
1. The Retarded Testator. Mental retardation is normally the product of brain damage, which can occur prenatally (as a result of an illness to one’s mother, such as measles) or postnatally (from illness or trauma). Brain damage takes many forms, and the resulting impairment to mental functioning varies widely. Very few American appellate decisions have seriously discussed the will making ability of retarded persons.
2. The Handicapped Testator. The situation of the handicapped testator (one with a physical disorder that impairs motor-sensory skills without serious change in psychological behavior) really has nothing to do with the general rule of testamentary capacity.
Estate of Johnson, 20 Wn.2d 628 (1944) — Testator was paralyzed, unable to write or speak, and attempted to communicate with his attorney through movement of his head in response to questions.
Estate of Chapin, 17 Wn.2d 196 (1943) — Testator had had a stroke, had very limited speech, was partially paralyzed, was bedridden, and described by her physician as hemiphlegic.
Estate of Faucett, 160 Wash. 295 (1931) — Testator had cancer and was unable to speak clearly and too weak to write or make signs.
Wilson v. Craig, 86 Wash. 465 (1915) — Testator had had a stroke the day before making his Will, could speak only with difficulty, was partially paralyzed, and could sign his Will only by mark.
Schafer, 8 Wn.2d 517 (1941) — Testator was in hospital with incurable cancer, in pain, and given opiates for its relief.
D. Functionally Impaired Testators — The Schizophrenic, Paranoid, Manic, or Depressed Testator.
Courts have a difficult time with nonorganic mental illness, and the results of these cases are bizarre. These mental conditions generally get lumped under what is known as the “Insane Delusion” rule.
E. The Insane Delusion Rule.
The Paranoid Testator. The testator who believes that one or more persons are out to harm him/her by taking his/her property or doing him/her physical injury, with the testator showing symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia or paranoia. The testator believes rationally, except for the delusion, and generally disinherits the persons he/she believes to be his/her enemies.
These people are probably not psychotic and may not even be mentally ill, just far off the continuum of maintaining socially acceptable beliefs.
It is not a question whether the testator has general testamentary capacity, for many persons laboring under insane delusions may be competent to make a Will [Citation omitted], but whether the insane delusions under which the testator suffered materially affected the will he made. In other words, is it reasonably certain that but for the insane delusions, [the contesting beneficiary] would have received a materially larger [distribution from the estate]? At page 692.
[A] delusion which induces a testator to make his will, but which does not affect the provisions of such will, does not render it invalid. However, if the insane delusion is of such a character and operates in such a manner that by reason thereof, the testator disinherits a natural object of his bounty, such as one of his children, which he would not have done had he not been laboring under such insane delusion, then the testator is regarded as one not having capacity to make a will, and a will so made is not valid. At page 586. An insane delusion is a false belief that a person of sound mind in similar circumstances would not hold and from which one cannot be dissuaded by any evidence or argument, and that materially affects the disposition of the estate.
Estate of Watlack, 88 Wn.App. 603 (1997) — Testator believed his children had stolen ~$100,000 from him.
Estate of Meagher, 60 Wn.2d 691 (1962) — Testator believed her “adoptive” son had forged her earlier Will, entered her safety deposit box and removed her Bonds, and had illegally had a Guardian appointed for her.
Estate of Gwinn, 36 Wn.2d 583 (1950) — Testator believed that his son had accused him of having sexual relations with his wife’s nurse.
Estate of Torstensen, 28 Wn.2d 837 (1947) — Testator believed that his son had been incarcerated in jail.
Estate of Klein, 28 Wn.2d 456 (1947) — Testator believed that his daughter tried to poison her.
Estate of Hanson, 87 Wash. 113 (1915) — Testator believed in and practiced spiritualism, consulted a picture of her deceased husband’s brother on business and family matter, and claimed to see and converse with the picture about the spirits of her husband and son.
Ingersoll v. Gourley, 78 Wash. 406 (1914) — Testator believed that her sole Beneficiary, the head of a religious sect, was endowed with supernatural power and character.
F. Effect of Commitment to a Mental Institution or Appointment of a Guardian.
Estate of Bottger, as above.
Estate of Miller, 10 Wn.2d 258 (1941) — Testator had been charged with insanity, held in hospital for treatment and observation for eight weeks, had a Guardian appointed for her estate, and was then discharged.
White v. White, 111 Wash. 354 (1920).
Estate of Rutherford, 110 Wash. 148 (1920).
Estate of Ney, 183 Wash. 503 (1935).
Estate of Lundgren, 189 Wash. 33 (1936).
The Courts have universally held that the time to determine whether a testator had testamentary capacity is the date of execution of the testator’s will. Courts will admit evidence on the testator’s state of mind within a reasonable period before or after the execution of the will, but they are adamant in the respect they give to the actual moment of execution. In some jurisdictions, attesting witnesses are entitled to greater creditability than other witnesses on the issue of testamentary capacity because the former were present at the moment when the testator signed the will.
Treat the presumption as an evidentiary substitute that attaches to the proponent of a will when the proponent shows that the will was executed with due formalities.
The judicial treatment of evidence of lack of mental capacity is treated similarly to that of presumption of capacity. For example, when Courts are faced with the Testator’s having been placed under a guardianship at or near the time of will execution, they state that the testator’s having been judicially determined to be incompetent and a guardian having been appointed does not mean that the testator necessarily lacked testamentary capacity.
Courts often state that unrebutted evidence of great age, physical illness, memory loss, regressive behavior, personal untidiness, or peculiar behavior is insufficient evidence to demonstrate lack of testamentary capacity. In effect, the Courts are stating that the presumption of mental capacity established by due execution is not overturned by proof of advancing senility unless the evidence of senility is overwhelming.
The presumption of capacity that arises upon proof of due execution also assists the proponent of the will in carrying forward the burden of proof on the issue of testamentary capacity after the burden of persuasion has been shifted to the contestant to disprove capacity. For the majority of Courts, the presumption survives contrary evidence and may be used by the trier of fact to evaluate contrary evidence.
Remaining with the proponent of the will throughout trial.
Remaining with the proponent of the will until showing that the will was executed with proper formalities, at which time the burden shifts to the contestant to show that the will was the product of an unsound mind with the preponderance of the evidence.
As immediately above, but that the contestant must disprove capacity not merely by the preponderance of the evidence but more strictly, by clear and convincing evidence. In these states, the actual burden of persuasion shifts to the contestant, not just the obligation to come forward with some rebuttal evidence. Washington is typical of this third category.
>Most will contests challenging the testator’s capacity fail. The will contest that succeeds, when undue influence is not a factor, does so because the contestant can demonstrate the testator’s manifestly irrationally behavior at or about the time of execution of the will. If this behavior is directed at an heir of the testator, Courts will act. The kind of will contest most likely to succeed is one closely modeled on the insane delusion rule involving a delusional structure on the testator’s part regarding a spouse or child.
Part of the reason for the low success rate of will contests is the formidable handicaps established by the Courts. The states most unfavorable to will contests, such as Washington, not only place the burden of proving lack of mental capacity on the contestant but also require the contestant to prove lack of mental capacity by clear and convincing evidence. However, when undue influence becomes an issue in a will contest, the proponents lose some of their judicial favoritism, and the contestants have some practical help from the system of presumptions and burden of proof.
Torstensen, 28 Wn.2d 837 (1947).
Johnson, 20 Wash 2d 628 (1944).
Landgren, 189 Wash. 33 (1936).
Ney, 183 Wash. 503 (1935).
Forsman, 177 Wash. 38 (1934).
Thompson, 165 Wash. 42 (1931), affirmed 165 Wash. 42 (1931).
Adams, 164 Wash. 64 (1931).
Faucett, 160 Wash. 295 (1931).
Rennie V. Washington Trust Co., 149 Wash 357 (1928).
Geissler, 104 Wash. 452 (1918).
Est. of Pond v. Faust, 95 Wash. 346 (1917).
Hartley v. Lord, 38 Wash. 221 (1905).

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