Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/394/217/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:44:59+00:00

Document:
"are not proper matters to be presented by a motion to vacate sentence under § 2255 but can only be properly presented by appeal from the conviction."
Held: A claim of unconstitutional search and seizure is cognizable in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Pp. 394 U. S. 221-231.
(a) Unconstitutional restraints "may be challenged on federal habeas corpus even though imposed pursuant to the conviction of a federal court of competent jurisdiction," Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 372 U. S. 409 (1963), and the same principle applies in a proceeding under § 2255, which revised the post-conviction procedure for federal prisoners but did not reduce the scope of habeas corpus relief. Pp. 394 U. S. 221-222.
(b) Post-conviction relief for prisoners' constitutional claims is not limited by the rule that collateral review is not available to correct errors of law. P. 394 U. S. 223.
(c) Federal post-conviction relief is available to both state and federal prisoners to protect constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial process (including the right of a defendant not to have unconstitutionally obtained evidence admitted against him at trial), and the circumstances under which a federal court must review constitutional claims of federal prisoners in a § 2255 proceeding are the same as those requiring habeas corpus review of constitutional claims of state prisoners, see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 372 U. S. 313 (1963), except that a § 2255 court need not be concerned with the adequacy of the underlying federal rules of procedure. Pp. 394 U. S. 225-227.
(d) Considerations of finality of litigation have no greater weight with respect to federal prisoners seeking § 2255 relief than with respect to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. P. 394 U. S. 228.
(e) Petitioner's insanity defense, like any other defense, cannot be prejudiced by the admission of illegally seized evidence. P. 394 U. S. 230.
Petitioner was tried and convicted in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on charges of armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association. At trial, petitioner's only defense was insanity. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, on petitioner's direct appeal, affirmed the conviction. Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408 (1965).
"The record does not substantiate this claim. In any event, this matter was not assigned as error on Kaufman's appeal from conviction, and is not available as a ground for collateral attack on the instant § 2255 motion."
268 F.Supp. 484, 487 (1967). Petitioner's applications to the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for leave to appeal in forma pauperis were denied.
"are not proper matters to be presented by a motion to vacate sentence under § 2255, but can only be properly presented by appeal from the conviction. [Footnote 3]"
view. [Footnote 4] In light of the importance of the issue in the administration of § 2255, we granted certiorari. 390 U.S. 1002 (1968). We reverse.
"writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States. . . ."
"all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States. . . ."
Act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
"at the instance of the Judicial Conference [of the United States] to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum,"
"the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined."
Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 368 U. S. 427 (1962). Thus, we may refer to our decisions respecting the availability of the federal habeas remedy in deciding the question presented in this case.
"[t]he course of decisions of this Court . . . makes plain that restraints contrary to our fundamental law, the Constitution, may be challenged on federal habeas even though imposed pursuant to the conviction of a federal court of competent jurisdiction. [Footnote 6]"
"the writ is not designed for collateral review of errors of law committed by the trial court -- the existence of any evidence to support the conviction, irregularities in the grand jury procedure, departure from a statutory grant of time in which to prepare for trial, and other errors in trial procedure which do not cross the jurisdictional line."
habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of appellate review. The function on habeas is different. It is to test by way of an original civil proceeding, independent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments, the very gravest allegations. . . . The language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this Court, all make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary. Therefore, where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the federal court to which the application is made has the power to receive evidence and try the facts anew."
issue at trial or on direct appeal. In sum, the Government sponsors adoption by this Court of the rule announced in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 116, 368 F.2d 822, 824 (1966), that, in the absence of a showing of "special circumstances," a claim by a federal prisoner that evidence admitted at his trial was the fruit of an unconstitutional search or seizure is not properly the ground of a collateral attack on his conviction.
certiorari jurisdiction to review state convictions -- do not obtain with respect to federal prisoners. Thus, we are told that the federal prisoner, having already had his day in federal court, stands in a different position with regard to federal collateral remedies than does the state prisoner. Conceding this distinction, we are unable to understand why it should lead us to restrict, completely or severely, access by federal prisoners with illegal search and seizure claims to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar restriction on access by state prisoners.
The opportunity to assert federal rights in a federal forum is clearly not the sole justification for federal post-conviction relief; otherwise there would be no need to make such relief available to federal prisoners at all. The provision of federal collateral remedies rests more fundamentally upon a recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief. This is no less true for federal prisoners than it is for state prisoners.
"If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the factfinding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing."
"In all other cases where the material facts are in dispute, the holding of such a hearing is in the discretion of the district judge."
"conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."
"[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged."
This philosophy inheres in our recognition of state prisoners' post-conviction claims of illegal search and seizure. Plainly, the interest in finality is the same with regard to both federal and state prisoners. With regard to both, Congress has determined that the full protection of their constitutional rights requires the availability of a mechanism for collateral attack. The right then is not merely to a federal forum, but to full and fair consideration of constitutional claims. Federal prisoners are no less entitled to such consideration than are state prisoners. There is no reason to treat federal trial errors as less destructive of constitutional guarantees than state trial errors, nor to give greater preclusive effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by state defendants. To hold otherwise would reflect an anomalous and erroneous view of federal state relations.
of finality is as controlling in the context of post-conviction relief as in the context of retroactive relief. The availability of post-conviction relief serves significantly to secure the integrity of proceedings at or before trial and on appeal. No such service is performed by extending rights retroactively. Thus, collateral relief, unlike retroactive relief, contributes to the present vitality of all constitutional rights whether or not they bear on the integrity of the factfinding process.
"We are duly mindful of the reliance that society must place for achieving law and order upon the enforcing agencies of the criminal law. But insistence on observance by law officers of traditional fair procedural requirements is, from the long point of view, best calculated to contribute to that end. However much in a particular case insistence upon such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of short-cut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness. . . . Every householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest against unlawful invasion of the house."
Finally, MR. JUSTICE BLACK's reliance on petitioner's concession of participation in the robbery is misplaced.
That concession is irrelevant in light of petitioner's defense at trial based on insanity. Surely that defense, any more than any other defense, cannot be prejudiced by the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence.
"There is undoubtedly a difference in the way federal courts should treat post-conviction applications by state and federal prisoners. Brown v. Allen, [344 U.S. 443, 344 U. S. 508], 73 S.Ct. 397 (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), interprets 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as requiring federal courts to have the 'last say' with respect to questions of federal law. Federal prisoners applying for collateral relief often have had their constitutional claims passed on by federal courts at trial or on appeal, so the Brown v. Allen rationale for federal court relitigation is inapposite. But this difference provides no basis for limiting the grounds upon which federal prisoners may obtain collateral relief, or for formulating a separate set of rules to determine when a federal prisoner's claim has adequately been adjudicated. Where a federal trial or appellate court has had a 'say' on a federal prisoner's claim, there may be no need for collateral relitigation. But what if the federal trial or appellate court said nothing because the issue was not raised? What if it is unclear whether the 'say' was on the merits? What if new law has been made or facts uncovered relating to the constitutional claim since the trial and appeal? What if the trial or appellate court based its rulings on findings of fact made after a hearing not 'full and fair' within the meaning of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963)?
All these problems are common to state and federal prisoners, and the interest in finality operates equally in both situations. These problems raise; not the issue whether relitigation is necessary, but whether one adequate litigation has been afforded. It would be anomalous indeed, especially in light of the interest in maintaining good federal state relations, if defaults not precluding one adequate federal review for the constitutional claims of state prisoners precluded such a review for federal prisoners, or if defects rendering state court adjudications inadequate did not similarly affect federal court adjudications."
We therefore hold that a claim of unconstitutional search and seizure is cognizable in a 2255 proceeding. The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
"A motion for such relief may be made at any time."
"Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the . . . sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate."
"A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing."
"The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner."
Petitioner initiated the § 2255 proceeding by a motion. The only claim presented was denial of effective assistance of counsel. The District Judge ordered a hearing, and appointed counsel to assist petitioner. Counsel filed a supplemental motion presenting two additional claims, one of which was that the search of petitioner's automobile was illegal.
Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673, 675 (1963); see also Springer v. United States, 340 F.2d 950 (1965); Peters v. United States, 312 F.2d 481 (1963); Gendron v. United States, 340 F.2d 601 (1965). Accord: United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (C.A.2d Cir.1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193 (C.A.3d Cir.1960); Armstead v. United States, 318 F.2d 725 (C.A. 5th Cir.1963); Eisner v. United States, 351 F.2d 55 (C.A. 6th Cir.1965); De Welles v. United States, 372 F.2d 67 (C.A. 7th Cir.1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F.2d 366 (C.A. 9th Cir.1962).
We have not overlooked that the District Court's statement that "this matter was not assigned as error on Kaufman's appeal from conviction . . ." suggests that, in any event, failure to appeal the conviction renders the § 2255 remedy unavailable. This suggestion is contrary to our decisions that failure to take a direct appeal from conviction does not deprive a federal post-conviction court of power to adjudicate the merits of constitutional claims; the question, rather, is whether the case is one in which refusal to exercise that power would be appropriate. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 372 U. S. 438-440 (1963); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 379 U. S. 451-452 (1965).
This certainly is not a case where there was a "deliberate bypass" of a direct appeal. Appointed counsel had objected at trial to the admission of certain evidence on grounds of unlawful search and seizure, but newly appointed appellate counsel did not assign the admission as error either in his brief or on oral argument of the appeal. After oral argument of the appeal, however, petitioner wrote a letter to appellate counsel asking him to submit to the Court of Appeals a claim of illegal search and seizure of items from his automobile. Counsel forwarded petitioner's letter to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, who notified counsel that petitioner's letter had been given to the panel which had heard and was considering the appeal. The opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction does not appear to pass on the search and seizure claim.
United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 (C.A.4th Cir.1963); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d 494 (C.A. 10th Cir.1963).
Among the serious administrative problems under habeas corpus practice in the case of federal prisoners was that created by the requirement that the action be brought in the district of confinement, where the records of the case were often not readily available. Section 2255 changed this to require an application by motion filed in the sentencing court. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 342 U. S. 212-219 (1952).
See, e.g., 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 163 (1874); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1888); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 (1939); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708 (1948); see also cases collected in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 372 U. S. 409, n. 17.
"Section 2255 provides for a collateral attack on a judgment of conviction, and is not a substitute for appeal for alleged errors committed at the trial,"
"Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence obtained directly or indirectly as a result of an unlawful search can be reviewed on an appeal from a judgment of conviction, but cannot be dealt with in a section 2255 proceeding,"
"It has long been the law that habeas corpus and § 2255 will not be allowed to do service as an appeal, and that, so far as federal prisoners are concerned, failure to appeal will normally bar resort to post-conviction relief,"
Nash v. United States, 342 F.2d 366, 367 (C.A. 5th Cir.1965). These paraphrase the statement in Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 332 U. S. 178 (1947), that "the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal," but that statement was made in the context of an alleged nonconstitutional trial error. See United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 322-323 (C.A.2d Cir.1963).
Where a trial or appellate court has determined the federal prisoner's claim, discretion may in a proper case be exercised against the grant of a § 2255 hearing. Section 2255 provides for hearing "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. . . ." In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), we announced standards governing the determination whether a hearing should be ordered in the case of a successive motion under § 2255. Similarly, where the trial or appellate court has had a "say" on a federal prisoner's claim, it may be open to the § 2255 court to determine that, on the basis of the motion, files, and records, "the prisoner is entitled to no relief." See Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 125, 368 F.2d 822, 833 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Wright, J.).
Furthermore, the § 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided at or before trial and by way of appeal -- e.g., motion to suppress under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 41(e) or appeal under Fed.Rule App.Proc. 4(b). Fay v. Noia, supra, n. 3, at 372 U. S. 438; Henry v. Mississippi, supra, n. 3, at 379 U. S. 451-452.
decision had become what is generally considered "final" -- he filed in the Federal District Court the present motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asking that his sentence be vacated on the ground, among others, that the trial court had committed error in not suppressing the evidence against him because the articles had been obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. Despite the fact that he has never, either in his trial or in this proceeding, asserted that he had not actually physically committed the robbery with a pistol, and despite the fact that this plainly reliable evidence clearly shows, along with the other evidence at trial, that he was not insane, the Court is reversing his case, holding that he can collaterally attack the judgment after it had become final. I dissent.
"Discretion is implicit in the statutory command that the judge . . . 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require,' 28 U.S.C. § 2243. . . ."
attack is the possibility of the applicant's innocence. For illustration, few would think that justice requires release of a person whose allegations clearly show that he was guilty of the crime of which he had been convicted.
"[G]enerally a claim by a federal prisoner that evidence admitted at his trial was the fruit of an unconstitutional search or seizure is not properly the ground of a collateral attack on his conviction. As further noted below, this rule is subject to an exception for special circumstances. . . ."
"Many opinions declare that collateral attack, as by habeas corpus, is available to correct the denial of a constitutional right. This is the general rule, but it is not an absolute. . . ."
is no imperative to provide an additional, collateral review, leaving no stone unturned, when exploration of all avenues of justice at the behest of individual petitioners may impair Judicial administration of the federal courts, as by making criminal litigation interminable, and diverting resources of the federal judiciary."
701 (1955). The conviction of Noia's other codefendant was also reversed, People v. Bonino, 1 N.Y.2d 752, 135 N.E.2d 51, and since there was no evidence other than the coerced confessions that they were guilty, the State apparently declined to reprosecute them and they were set free. See United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 183 F.Supp. 222, 227, n. 6 (1960). Noia, however, languished in prison, even though his alleged confederates had been released. Both the New York courts and the Federal District Court declined to review his case on the ground that his 1942 failure to appeal made his conviction "final." He remained in jail despite the fact that he "continuously asserted his innocence of the crime for which he [had] been convicted" in his petition for habeas corpus and elsewhere. See Transcript of Record in No. 84, October Term, 1962, p. 8.
It was under these circumstances, strongly appealing to the Court's sense of what justice required, that this Court held that Noia was entitled to challenge his conviction even though it had previously become "final." My Brother HARLAN, dissenting, concluded that no matter how appealing the circumstances, one wrongly convicted must be consigned to the slow, tedious, and uncertain road to whatever relief he might possibly get from the Chief Executive. On the contrary, I agreed with Fay v. Noia as one of the bright landmarks in the administration of criminal justice. But I did not think then and do not think now that it laid down an inflexible rule compelling the courts to release every prisoner who alleges in collateral proceedings some constitutional flaw, regardless of its nature, regardless of his guilt or innocence, and regardless of the circumstances of the case. The Court's opinion in Noia shows, from beginning to end, that the defendant's guilt or innocence is at least one of the vital considerations in determining whether collateral relief should be available to a convicted defendant.
"Although we hold that the jurisdiction of the federal courts on habeas corpus is not affected by procedural defaults incurred by the applicant during the state court proceedings, we recognize a limited discretion in the federal judge to deny relief to an applicant under certain circumstances. Discretion is implicit in the statutory command that the judge, after granting the writ and holding a hearing of appropriate scope, 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require,' 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and discretion was the flexible concept employed by the federal courts in developing the exhaustion rule. Furthermore, habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles. [Footnote 2/4]"
"Today as always few indeed is the number of state prisoners who eventually win their freedom by means of federal habeas corpus. Those few who are ultimately successful are persons whom society has grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation. [Footnote 2/5]"
Surely, it cannot be said of Kaufman, an admitted armed robber, that he is a person whom "society has grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation."
Although, as the Court of Appeals indicated in the Thornton case, habeas corpus has been thought of broadly as a means of securing redress for the violation of any "constitutional right," it was true until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), that almost every "constitutional right" referred to in this sense played a central role in assuring that the trial would be a reliable means of testing guilt. It is true that the prohibition against coerced confessions has been vigorously enforced even in the absence of proof that the confession itself was unreliable, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 (1961), but even this prohibition rests to a substantial extent on recognition that all such confessions "may be and have been, to an unascertained extent, found to be untrustworthy," id. at 365 U. S. 541.
"Our rejection of the availability of collateral review for claims of unreasonable search and seizure (in the absence of exceptional circumstances) is not attributable to a low regard for the significance of the Fourth Amendment in our times and civilization. On the contrary, the magnitude of the Fourth Amendment in our constitutional constellation has prompted unusual remedies by Congress, as well as the courts. . . ."
". . . The corollary, however, is a contraction of the need for enlarging collateral review in order to assure effective vindication of the constitutional interests involved."
"Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights. This, it was found, was the only effective deterrent to lawless police action. Indeed, all of the cases since Wolf [v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949)] requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action."
"exalts the value of finality in criminal judgments at the expense of the interest of each prisoner in the vindication of his constitutional rights."
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by removing the incentive to disregard it."
"We cannot say that this [deterrent] purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective. The misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred, and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved. . . . Finally, the ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late."
381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 637.
The Court's consistent adherence to this approach has continued through all of the various "retroactivity" cases, including today's decision in Desist v. United States, post, p. 394 U. S. 244, in which the Court emphasizes, quoting from Linkletter, that "[t]he misconduct of the police . . . has already occurred, and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved,'" and that "the exclusionary rule is but a `procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt.'" It would be hard to find a more apt summary of this Court's holdings in these "retroactivity" cases than the statement that they "exal[t] the value of finality in criminal judgments at the expense of the interest of each prisoner in the vindication of his constitutional rights." But since this is the course the Court has chosen to steer, I think it would not be amiss to suggest that the Court at least decide this case on the same principles, and seek to achieve a modest semblance of consistency. Instead the Court adopts a rule that offers no discernible benefits in enforcing the Fourth Amendment and insures that prisoners who are undoubtedly guilty will be set free.
to such a disposition of this case. [Footnote 2/11] But the Court does not rest its judgment on this narrow ground, and I therefore do not attempt to pass on it. I do contend, however, that the court below was right in refusing to follow the broad rule that this Court is announcing today. In collateral attacks, whether by habeas corpus or by § 2255 proceedings, I would always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt. This defendant is permitted to attack his conviction collaterally although he conceded at the trial and does not now deny that he had robbed the savings and loan association and although the evidence makes absolutely clear that he knew what he was doing. Thus, his guilt being certain, surely he does not have a constitutional right to get a new trial. I cannot possibly agree with the Court.
"If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate."
125 U.S.App.D.C. at 116-118, 368 F.2d at 824-826.
See Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term -- Foreword: The High Court, The Great writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 56, 796 (1965).
372 U. S. 391, 372 U. S. 438.
Id. at 372 U. S. 440-441.
125 U.S.App.D.C. at 118, 368 F.2d at 826.
Only one of these decisions, Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968), actually ordered the granting of habeas relief on the basis of a search and seizure claim, and in Mancusi (as in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967)) the issue was not even theoretically before us since only in the most exceptional case would we have considered a question not mentioned in the State Warden's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U.Pa.L.Rev. 378, 389 (1964).
79 Harv.L.Rev. (parody ed.) 10, 12 (March 1966).
Thornton v. United States, supra; Amsterdam, supra, n. 8, at 391-392, n. 60.
Petitioner's allegations suggest that he may have been unjustifiably frustrated in his efforts to raise the search and seizure issue on direct appeal from his conviction. See the Court's opinion, ante at 394 U. S. 220, n. 3.
I concur in much of my Brother BLACK's opinion, and agree with his conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 should be available to contest the admission of evidence allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment only under limited and special circumstances of the sort suggested in Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 368 F.2d 822 (1966). I must, however, disassociate myself from any implications, see, e.g., ante at 394 U. S. 232-233, 394 U. S. 234-236, that the availability of this collateral remedy turns on a petitioner's assertion that he was in fact, innocent, or on the substantiality of such an allegation.
inveighs are to be found in the Court's decisions in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), which have opened wide the gates to collateral reexamination of both state and federal criminal convictions. Be that as it may, the present case offers an opportunity to narrow the entrance in a fair and practicable manner. In rejecting the opportunity, the Court once again * this Term imposes a burden on the judiciary and on society at large, which results in no legitimate benefit to the petitioner and does nothing to serve the interests of justice.
I therefore dissent from the opinion of the Court.
* See my dissent in Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367, 393 U. S. 371 (1969).

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