Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/389/416/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:59:06+00:00

Document:
Appellants' suit under the Civil Rights Act, challenging the California welfare law and regulations as unconstitutional, was dismissed by a three-judge District Court for failure "to exhaust adequate administrative remedies."
Held: One of the Act's underlying purpose was "to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have," and "relief under the Act may not be defeated because relief was not sought under state law which provided [an administrative] remedy." McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668.
"relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided [an administrative] remedy,"
id. at 373 U. S. 671. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 365 U. S. 180-183. We intimate no view upon the merits of appellants' allegations, nor upon the other grounds not passed upon by the District Court.
the right to assert, in a federal court, that state officials had acted in a manner depriving the plaintiff of clear constitutional rights could not be delayed by he interposition of intentionally or unintentionally inadequate state remedies for the alleged discrimination.
"provide for granting . . . a fair hearing before the State agency [whose creation is required by a separate provision, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)] to any individual whose claim for aid to families with dependent children is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness."
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4). The California plan approved by the Secretary apparently includes both California's three-month requirement and California's hearing procedure.
The Court simply ignores the highly successful federal-state working relationship created by Congress in this area. The right of these appellants to receive AFDC funds involves not only questions of state law, but also the propriety of that law under federal statutory law. For the determination of these questions Congress has specified a state forum in the first instance. Today's holding, made without benefit of briefs and oral argument and on a skimpy record, that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be used to bypass 42 U.S.C. § 602 is a disservice to both of thee important statutes.
"to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate, [and] 'to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice,'"
373 U.S. at 373 U. S. 672, the Court concluded that, "[w]hen federal rights are subject to such tenuous protection, prior resort to a state proceeding is not necessary." Id. at 373 U. S. 676.
The majority opinion in McNeese also, however, attributed to Monroe the establishment of the principle that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a "supplementary" remedy to any a State might have. This language is now interpreted by the Court to mean that there can be no requirement that a person dealing with an administrative agency continue to deal with it in an orderly fashion, no matter how adequate his remedy there. If this is what the majority opinion in McNeese meant to say, its dictum was gratuitous both in the sense that it was not compelled by the facts as the Court viewed them and in the sense that it was an incorrect interpretation of Monroe.

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 602
 § 602
 § 1983
 § 602
 § 1983