Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-doss-16
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:22:23+00:00

Document:
This matter is before the Court on Defendant James Edward Doss III's Motion to Suppress. [DN 13.] The United States responded. [DN 14.] The Court held an evidentiary hearing on November 22, 2016, at which it heard testimony from Kentucky State Police Troopers Sean Wint and Jim McArthur. [DN 16.] The United States filed a post-hearing brief, [DN 19], and Doss filed a response, [DN 20.] The United States did not reply. Fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Doss's Motion to Suppress, [DN 13], is DENIED.
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. If the government violates a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, that defendant may move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C), to exclude the evidence gathered against him. United States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d 1049, 1053 (6th Cir. 2008). It is well-settled that, in seeking suppression, "the burden of proof is upon the defendant" to show that the search or seizure violated "some constitutional or statutory right." United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673, 679 n.11 (6th Cir. 1979)). In resolving a motion to suppress, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 366 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2011)).
A "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Andrews v. Hickman Cty., Tenn., 700 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). Accordingly, "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable," id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)), and therefore "a warrantless search or seizure inside a home by a law enforcement officer violates the Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies." Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). For instance, the prohibition on entering a person's home "does not apply . . . to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained . . . from the individual whose property is searched." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
As Doss points out in his brief, "[i]t is the government's burden to prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given." United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). The government must prove this "through 'clear and positive testimony.'" Beauchamp, 659 F.3d at 571 (quoting United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 953 (6th Cir. 1998)). "Consent is voluntary when it is "unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion." Ivy, 165 F.3d 397 at 402 (quoting United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 721 (6th Cir. 1977)). Moreover, "[t]he government is required to show something more than 'mere acquiescence' on the part of the defendant." United States v. Holland, 522 F. App'x 265, 274 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Canipe, 569 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 2009)). Voluntariness of consent is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397 at 402 (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227; McCaleb, 552 F.2d at 720).
Courts examine a multitude of factors when determining whether consent was voluntary. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d at 572. First, courts consider "the characteristics of the accused, including the age, intelligence, and education of the individual; whether the individual understands the right to refuse to consent; and whether the individual understands his or her constitutional rights." Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1988)). Although it is not a prerequisite to valid consent that law enforcement inform an individual of his or her right to refuse consent, "the absence of such a warning is considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis." Id. (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227). Second, courts examine "the details of the detention, including the length and nature of detention, the use of coercive or punishing conduct by the police, and indications of 'more subtle forms of coercion that might flaw [an individual's] judgment.'" Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226; quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976)).
Courts have found consent to be lacking, invalid, or involuntarily obtained in various circumstances. See, e.g., Beauchamp, 659 F.3d at 572-73 (Police coercion invalidated an individual's consent where the individual was not told of his right to refuse and consented only after the officer placed his hands on the individual's body to conduct a frisk); Turk v. Comerford, 488 F. App'x 933, 942 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[A] reasonable factfinder could conclude that the officers' threatening jail time and pounding on the door so hard that the glass shook was coercive and therefore vitiated any consent that Turk gave."); United States v. Tatman, 397 F. App'x 152, 156 (6th Cir. 2010) (Signed consent form was invalidly obtained when domestic violence victim signed the form in the middle of the night, after a domestic violence incident with the defendant, and after the defendant was placed in handcuffs and put in the back of a police car); United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir. 1999) (Finding lack of unequivocal consent where defendant's statement to officers that "You've got the badge, I guess you can [search]" was likely influenced by defendant's belief that refusing consent was futile, that he had no choice but to acquiesce, where defendant was not informed of his right to refuse consent, and was accosted in a busy airport crowded with people); United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 143 (6th Cir. 1992) (Lack of voluntary consent where defendant was told he was not free to leave and that if he did not consent he would have to wait two to three hours in a small, crowded room for police to obtain a search warrant).
Here, Doss contends that the government has not carried its burden of proving that, under a totality of the circumstances, "that Doss's purported consent was given voluntarily, and was unequivocal, specific, and uncontaminated by duress or coercion." [DN 20 at 5 (Doss's Post-Hearing Brief).] It appears that Doss makes two arguments as to his alleged lack of valid consent. First, Doss argues that the consent as to the troopers' initial entry was invalid. [Id. at 2; 5.] Second, Doss argues that the troopers' actions once inside his house invalidated any subsequent consent to search he gave. [Id. at 2; 6-7.] The Court will address each of these issues in turn.
But even assuming, for argument's sake, that Doss did only step aside rather than giving verbal consent, as the troopers testified he did, the Sixth Circuit has held multiple times that verbal consent is not a requirement. See United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2004) (The police "properly asked permission to enter, and [the defendant] stepped back, letting them in. Any ordinary caller, under like circumstances, would understand assent to have been given, and the police are not held to a higher standard in this regard than an ordinary person.") (citing Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 1966)); United States v. Hinojosa, 606 F.3d 875, 882 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he . . . testimony never indicates that Spears affirmatively responded to the officers' request, but there is no requirement that consent must be verbally given."); United States v. Jackson, 468 F. App'x 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Jackson led the officers to his apartment . . . and without saying anything, unlocked the door, entered the apartment, looked back at the officers, and 'seemed' to hold the door open to allow them to enter. Such conduct could reasonably be interpreted as consent to their entry.") Rather, if a defendant clearly steps aside in response to an officer's request to enter, officers are permitted to interpret this act as one of assent to their entry. See Carter, 378 F.3d at 588.
Though Trooper Wint did testify that Doss initially hesitated before allowing the troopers inside, this initial hesitation likely "indicates . . . that [Doss] knew he had a right to refuse the [entry] and that he contemplated exercising that right." United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 175 (6th Cir. 2011). The fact that Doss ultimately verbally consented or, at the very least, stepped back to allow the troopers inside, indicates that he ultimately decided against exercising this right. See id.; Carter, 378 F.3d at 588. Moreover, a careful review of the record persuades the Court that Trooper Wint's statement to Doss that the encounter was "not going to take but a minute. I do need to talk to you. It's important," [DN 16 at 11], is not indicative of police coercion such that Doss's consent was "merely a response conveying an expression of futility in resistance to authority or acquiescing in the officers' request." Worley, 193 F.3d at 386. Here, nothing about the troopers' interactions with Doss indicated that his refusal to allow them inside would be futile. The troopers did not threaten Doss or raise their voices, [DN 16 at 12; 24], pound on or kick his door, unholster their weapons, [DN 16 at 25], or claim to have a warrant or threaten to obtain one if Doss refused them entry. See United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (Police officers entered with guns drawn after banging and kicking the door and asserting lawful authority by stating they had a warrant); Comerford, 488 F. App'x at 942 ("[A] reasonable factfinder could conclude that the officers' threatening jail time and pounding on the door so hard that the glass shook was coercive and therefore vitiated any consent that Turk gave."); Tillman, 963 F.2d at 143 (Police told defendant he was not free to leave and that if he did not consent he would have to wait for police to obtain a search warrant).
Unlike in Worley, Doss was not confronted in a bustling airport surrounded by people but rather on the porch of his home. See Lucas, 640 F.3d at 175 (quoting Worley, 193 F.3d at 387) ("[T]he request for consent to search occurred in Lucas's home, as opposed to the busy airport where Worley felt pressured to cooperate with police to avoid 'an untoward scene before the crowds of people[.]'") Nor does the Court find that Doss was tricked or confused by the fact that Trooper Wint lived next door to him. To the contrary, Trooper Wint and Trooper McArthur were both dressed in their full police uniforms, [DN 16 at 11], eliminating any uncertainty as to whether Trooper Wint approached Doss's house for a friendly neighborly encounter as opposed to a knock and talk by law enforcement officers. See Carter, 378 F.3d at 588 ("The investigating officers were instantly recognizable as policemen when Carter opened the door.") Furthermore, the record does not indicate that Doss "was unaware of his well-known right to refuse entry, which he might have done simply by standing pat, saying 'no,' or closing the door." Id. at 588. Doss's decision to allow the troopers inside his house "may have been rash and ill-considered, but that does not make it invalid. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to counsel a suspect to consider his options with care." Id. at 588-89.
Finally, the mere facts that Doss appeared sleepy or that he told the troopers had just awoken from sleep do not render Doss's consent involuntary or not freely given. Both troopers testified that Doss appeared to understand everything that went on during the encounter and that nothing about Doss's demeanor or actions caused them to question his ability to comprehend the situation. [DN 16 at 23-24; 57-58.] In sum, under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Doss's consent to the troopers' initial entry into his home was valid.
Moreover, Doss did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, and therefore the record does not contain any testimony from him claiming that he did not read or comprehend the form or that he was not aware of or did not understand his right to refuse consent to search. See United States v. Starnes, 501 F. App'x 379, 389 (6th Cir. 2012) ("At the suppression hearing, Kim testified that she did not read or fully understand the FBI's consent form."); United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir. 1996) ("At the suppression hearing, Palomino initially admitted that he read the consent form before signing it, although he later testified that he signed the document without reading it. There is no indication that Palomino did not understand what he was signing.").
Furthermore, after signing the consent to search form, Doss provided Trooper Wint with the key to his dresser drawer, which contained a firearm, and the combination to his safe, which contained a firearm, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. [DN 16 at 17-18.] In other words, Doss "did not object to any aspect of the search after he signed the consent forms." See Lucas, 640 F.3d at 175. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that, because of the troopers' interactions with the other occupants of his home, Doss did not understand that the encounter was a consensual one and that he had the ability to withdraw or withhold consent to the searches of his home.
Nor does the Court agree, as Doss argues, that the troopers' decision to obtain his written consent "demonstrates that they were aware that the search was constitutionally inadequate, and were attempting to fix the defect." [DN 20 at 7.] Rather, Trooper Wint testified that "even though [Doss] was extremely cooperative and gave [him] verbal consent, [he] went ahead and got written consent" from Doss. [DN 16 at 17 (emphasis added).] Based on this testimony, it appears that Trooper Wint was merely trying to take additional steps before performing a more detailed search of the rest of the house, rather than trying to cure what he believed was an improper prior search.
Finally, Trooper Wint testified that, when he asked Doss "What were you thinking doing all this next door to a state trooper," Doss "said something to the effect of, 'Sean, I've been waiting for you to come to that door anytime for months.' He said, 'I just got caught up.'" [DN 16 at 22.] Likewise, Trooper McArthur stated that it appeared as if Doss "was glad he got caught. He was relieved." [Id. at 55.] Taking all of these circumstances together, it appears that Doss simply felt that "the jig was up" and decided to cooperate with police, which he did. See Lucas, 640 F.3d at 175. In sum, the Court finds that the United States has established, "through 'clear and positive testimony,'" Beauchamp, 659 F.3d at 571, that Doss provided free and voluntary consent to each of the troopers' searches of himself and his home.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant James Edward Doss III's Motion to Suppress, [DN 13], is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Telephonic Further Proceedings is SET for May 11 , 2017 at 11:30 a.m. CDT . The Court shall place the call to counsel.

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