Source: https://www.newyorkbusinesslawyerblog.com/old-cases-same-rule-experts-affidavits-in-opposition-to-motions-for-summary-judgement-in-new-york/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:52:00+00:00

Document:
The plaintiff was going to use the expert to establish key facts, not just opinion: that the defendants either manufactured or reconditioned the drum that exploded and the windshield washer fluid that was in the drum at the time. That is, the plaintiff needed the expert to link the defendants to the drum that caused plaintiff’s injuries. This was based on the markings on the drum; the expert would testify what those markings were and why they meant the drum was manufactured or reconditioned by defendants. It was not just that the expert was to testify that what the defendants did was wrong; without the expert plaintiff could not even show that the defendants were even involved.
The plaintiff apparently hid this fact for at least the ten years during which litigation proceeded, disclosing the expert only when faced with the motions for summary judgement.
During the time plaintiff failed to disclose the witness it was going to rely on to conclusively establish the identities of the parties responsible for the drum and its contents, i.e., the expert, it also got rid of the drum. The defendants, therefore, were severely prejudiced: Even if they were given additional time to retain their own experts to refute the findings of plaintiff’s expert, there was nothing for their experts to inspect because the drum was long gone.
In any event, even if the affidavit of the plaintiff’s expert could have properly been considered, the result would not have been different, inasmuch as the Supreme Court correctly concluded that it was speculative, conclusory, and partially based on evidence which is not in the record (see Micciola v. Sacchi, 36 A.D.3d 869, 871, 828 N.Y.S.2d 572; Guarino v. La Shellda Maintenance Corp., 252 A.D.2d 514, 515, 675 N.Y.S.2d 374; see also Wartski v. C.W. Post Campus of Long Is. Univ., 63 A.D.3d 916, 917, 882 N.Y.S.2d 192).
Further, the expert failed to demonstrate that he was qualified to render an opinion (Hofmann v. Toys “R” Us, N.Y. Ltd. Partnership, 272 A.D.2d 296, 707 N.Y.S.2d 641). Moreover, the expert’s opinion which was speculative and conclusory, and was not based on accepted industry standards, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Rabon-Willimack v. Robert Mondavi Corp., 73 A.D.3d 1007, 1009, 905 N.Y.S.2d 190; Pappas v. Cherry Cr., Inc., 66 A.D.3d 658, 888 N.Y.S.2d 511; Rivas-Chirino v. Wildlife Conservation Socy., 64 A.D.3d 556, 883 N.Y.S.2d 552).
In Gerardi v. Verizon New York, Inc., 66 A.D.3d 960, 961, 888 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137-38 (2nd Dept. 2009), and in Wartski v. C.W. Post Campus of Long Island Univ., 63 A.D.3d 916, 917-18, 882 N.Y.S.2d 192 (2nd Dept. 2009), the Second Department held that the plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit should not have been considered because the expert was not disclosed until after the note of issue was filed. More importantly, though, was the fact that the Second Department went out of its way, in each case, to point out that the expert’s affidavit would not have raised a triable issue of fact even if it had been considered.
This small, but illustrative, sampling of the relevant case law in the Second Department shows again that the more things change, the more they stay the same. A close reading, with a critical eye, often is worth the effort. Even if you are not always right, at least you will never fail to learn something along the way.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.