Source: https://openjurist.org/299/f2d/327
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:26:27+00:00

Document:
Benjamin Lazarow, Tucson, Ariz., for appellant.
C. A. Muecke, U.S. Atty., James J. Brosnahan, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Phoenix, Ariz., and Sheldon Green, Sp. Asst. to U.S. Atty. of Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee.
Before HAMLIN and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, District judge.
Appellant was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1407, which provides that no citizen of the United States 'who has been convicted of a violation of any of the narcotic or marihuana laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, the penalty for which is imprisonment for more than one year, shall depart from or enter into or attempt to depart from or enter into the United States, unless such person registers, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury with a customs offical, agent, or employee at a point of entry or a border customs station'.
Appellant sought to prove that on May 2, 1958, the Youth Authority honorably discharged him from its control. The evidence was excluded. No proof was offered that the California court had set aside the verdict of guilty and dismissed the accusation against appellant (see Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code 1772), and it was conceded at oral argument that no such action had been taken.
Two points are urged: 1, that appellant was not 'convicted' by the state court within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1407, and 2, that the court erred in excluding the proffered evidence. The same points are urged in support of appellant's claim of error in the denial of his motion for a new trial. We find that neither point has merit, and we therefore affirm.
1. Appellant was 'convicted' by the California Court.
Appellant claims, in substance, that Congress, in referring to one who has been 'convicted of a violation of * * * laws * * * of any State' meant convicted in the sense in which the state (here, California) uses the term, and that, under California law, commitment to the Youth Authority is not conviction. To this there are two answers.
First, we do not think that 18 U.S.C. 1407 incorporates all of the niceties and nuances of state laws on the subject of conviction. (cf. Arrellano-Flores v. Hoy, 9 Cir. 1958, 262 F.2d 667) The section must have been intended to have a reasonably uniform operation. The California judgment recites a conviction and a punishment-- the usual indices of conviction. The particular form of punishment arises from the fact that, at the time, appellant was 20 years old. We have held that suspension of the imposition of sentence and granting of probation, following a plea or finding of guilt, is nevertheless a conviction (Tanzer v. United States, 9 Cir., 1960, 278 F.2d 137, involving a prior federal conviction; Wood v. Hoy, 9 Cir., 1959, 266 F.2d 825, involving a prior California conviction; Arrellano-Flores v. Hoy,supra, 9 Cir., 1958, 262 F.2d 667, also involving a prior California conviction). A fortiori this case involves a prior conviction, for here the California court did not suspend the imposition of sentence, but imposed it, and did not grant probation, but punished appellant by commitment to the Youth Authority for the term prescribed by law (not more than 10 years). This, in our opinion, would be a conviction within the meaning of18 U.S.C. 1407, even if our decisions in the three cases just cited were in error.
Second, we have no doubt that, under California law, appellant was convicted by the California court. California Welfare and Institutions Code, 1737.5, provides that a commitment to the Authority is a judgment. Either before or at the time of his coming of age, appellant could have been transferred to a state prison (Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code 1737.1, 1780-1782). While our attention has not been directed to any California case directly in point, we think that the following fully support our views: People v. Rick, 1952,112 Cal.App.2d 410, 246 P.2d 691; People v. Acosta, 1931, 115 Cal.App. 103, 1 P.2d 43; People v. Banks, 1959, 53 Cal.2d 370, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102; People v. Walters (1961), 190 Cal.App.2d 98, 11 Cal.Rptr. 597.
2. The proffered evidence was properly excluded.
'Every person honorably discharged from control by the Authority who has not, during the period of control by the Authority, been placed by the Authority in a state prison shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime for which he was committed, and every person discharged may petition the court which committed him, and the court may upon such petition set aside the verdict of guilty and dismiss the accusation or information against the petitioner who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime for which he was committed.
'Every person discharged from control by the Authority shall be informed of this privilege in writing at the time of discharge.
There is some question whether the proffered evidence would bring appellant within any part of the section. It is admitted that he did not petition to have the verdict set aside and the accusation dismissed. Further, it does not affirmatively appear that he was not placed in a state prison by the Youth Authority. However, it seems to be conceded that he was not (see People v. Lockwood, 146 Cal.App.2d 189, 303 P.2d 621, holding that the Vocational Institution maintained by the Youth Authority at Lancaster is not a state prison). We therefore will assume that appellant's proof would bring him within the first clause of the section.
Appellant claims that the effect of the first clause which says that he 'shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime for which he was committed' has the effect of wiping out the conviction, so that he no longer falls within 18 U.S.C. 1407. We do not agree, and for several reasons.
b. Our view is strengthened by the fact that the California Supreme Court, in construing a similar statute,1 has said that 'The 'penalties and disabilities' to which the probation statute refers are those which it is within the power of the legislative branch of the government to release.' (In re Phillips, 1941, 17 Cal.,2d 55, 109 P.2d 344, at p. 347, 132 A.L.R. 644.) Assuming that the registration requirement of 1407 is a 'penalty' or 'disability', we do not think that, being imposed by the Congress, it is one that the California legislature can release.
d. We do not think that, under California law, appellant's honorable discharge 'wiped out' his conviction. The second clause of 1772 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides, in permissive but no mandatory language, a method of doing so. The California Supreme Court, again construing a comparable statute,1 has held that its provisions are not effective even where a defendant has a right to the court's order but has not obtained it. People v. Banks, 1959, 53 Cal.2d 370, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102. Thus, even assuming that under 1772 appellant's honorable discharge would entitle him, as of right, to an order of the California court setting aside his conviction and dismissing the proceeding against him, this does not mean that his conviction has been 'wiped out' when he has not obtained the order.
There was no statutory exception to California Penal Code 1203.4 relating to disciplining attorneys when In re Phillips was decided. In each of the following cases, a similar result, not based upon any statutory exception, was reached: Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 1949, 34 Cal.2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (discipline of a physician), Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Cal.2d 586, 191 P.2d 432 (prior guilty plea as admission in civil action). Thus, it makes no difference that there are no statutory exceptions to California Welfare & Institutions Code 1772, while there are now many such exceptions to Penal Code 1203.4 (See Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code 2383, 2384, 6102, 10177, 10302, 10562; Ed. Code 12911; Pen.Code 290, Veh.Code 13555). The facts in In re Ringnalda, D.C.Cal., 1943, 48 F.Supp. 975, on which appellant principally relies, are quite different from the facts of the present case. We express no opinion as to whether Ringnalda was correctly decided.
In short, we are of the opinion that the honorable discharge of appellant by the California Youth Authority did not wipe out his conviction for the purposes of this case. The evidence was properly excluded, as it could have no effect upon the determination of his guilt.

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