Source: http://news.lawreader.com/?m=201408
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:42:42+00:00

Document:
AUSTIN, Texas—A federal judge on Friday blocked a portion of a new state law set to take effect Monday that would have required abortion clinics to qualify as “ambulatory surgical centers,” a rule that could have shuttered many clinics in the state.
The suit was filed by the New York-based Center for Reproductive Rights on behalf of abortion providers in the state.
The judge also ruled that an abortion clinic in El Paso and another one in McAllen could be excused from the admitting-privileges requirement, concluding that the requirement, when combined with the surgery-center rule, imposes an undue burden on women in those parts of the state.
The Texas Attorney General’s Office, which defended the law, said it would appeal the ruling. “The State disagrees with the court’s ruling and will seek immediate relief,” said a spokeswoman for the office.
The suit is the latest challenge to the abortion law, which was enacted last year and includes other provisions that have already taken effect, including a restriction on abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy and a requirement that abortion doctors have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals.
Last year, ruling in a separate suit, Judge Yeakel struck down the Texas law’s admitting-privileges requirement. That ruling was later overturned by the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the law in March. The Fifth Circuit ruling is on appeal.
The admitting-privileges rule has already forced half of the state’s abortion clinics to shut their doors, leaving swaths of the sprawling state without any abortion providers.
Abortions-rights groups say that many poorer women, particularly in South Texas along the Mexican border, don’t have the resources to travel to abortion clinics and have been forced to resort to unsafe alternatives. They say the real intent of the Texas law was to effectively deny many their rights to an abortion under the Supreme Court’s landmark Roe v. Wade decision.
More clinic closures are expected if abortion providers must also qualify as ambulatory surgical centers. Currently, only seven clinics, located in the state’s five biggest cities, qualify as surgery centers.
But supporters of the law say it will improve women’s health by imposing more rigorous quality-control standards on clinics.
FRANKFORT, Ky. — Betty A. Springate, an attorney from Lawrenceburg, has been sworn in to fill the vacant District Court judgeship for Anderson, Shelby and Spencer counties. The seat represents the 53rd Judicial District, Division 1. The vacancy was created when Judge Linda S. Armstrong resigned March 16, 2014.
District Judge Donna G. Dutton swore in Judge Springate on June 30. Judge Dutton serves in the 53rd Judicial District, Division 2.
Judge Springate’s legal career includes positions as general counsel for the Kentucky Labor Cabinet and administrative law judge for the Kentucky Workforce Development Cabinet. She also served as assistant county attorney and county attorney for Anderson County. She retired nearly two years ago and currently serves on the Anderson County board of the United Way.
She earned a juris doctor from the University of Baltimore School of Law after completing a bachelor’s degree from the University of Kentucky and a master’s degree in education from the University of Louisville.
Judge Springate and her husband, Jerry L. Springate, who is also an attorney, have a son and a daughter, Jay and Scarlett.
Judge Springate will not be on the ballot in the November general election and will serve only until the new judge elected in November takes the bench in January 2015.
District Court judges handle juvenile matters, city and county ordinances, misdemeanors, violations, traffic offenses, probate of wills, arraignments, felony probable cause hearings, small claims involving $2,500 or less, civil cases involving $5,000 or less, voluntary and involuntary mental commitments and cases relating to domestic violence and abuse.
DALLAS (CN) – A Texas bank cannot force a district attorney’s office to compensate it for producing over 38,000 pages of subpoenaed account records, a Texas appeals court ruled.
Preston State Bank was served with a subpoena in October 2009 asking for documents from two of its account holders. After the Dallas-based bank complied with the request, it asked about reimbursement, only to be told it is not entitled to recover costs for a criminal grand jury subpoena.
Preston sued Collin County District Attorney Greg Willis in 2010, claiming his office’s refusal to reimburse it for the documents amounts to an unconstitutional taking of property for public use under both the state and federal constitutions.
Texas later intervened in the suit to defend the section of the Texas Finance Code that purportedly exempts the government from reimbursing the production of private records for a government subpoena.
In January 2012, the trial court denied the bank’s motion for summary judgment and granted Willis and the state’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
A three-judge panel with the 5th District Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling on Tuesday, agreeing that there was no unconstitutional taking.
In that case, the court rejected potential witnesses having a right to reimbursement for expenses incurred in testifying.
“But when there is any taking, the bank argues, whether reasonable or unreasonable, the government must pay compensation,” he wrote. “UnderHurtado, however, there is no taking. No compensation is required by either the state or the federal Constitution.
Although the trial court erred by concluding that a ‘taking’ occurred, that error did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment, because the judgment did not require any compensation for the alleged ‘taking,’” Bridges wrote.
He also agreed that it was within the trial court’s discretion to deny both sides’ motions for attorney’s fees.
Preston State Bank did not immediately respond to a request for comment Wednesday evening.
FRANKFORT, Ky. (Aug. 5, 2014) — A report released today from the Kentucky Center for Education and Workforce Statistics (KCEWS) on the Commonwealth’s eight public four-year universities shows that students from Kentucky were more likely to stay in the state to work than students from out-of-state. It also indicates that people who complete postgraduate degrees are less likely to remain in Kentucky to work than people with undergraduate degrees.
More than 80 percent of the Kentucky students who graduated with a bachelor’s degree from one of the Commonwealth’s public universities were working in Kentucky a year later, compared to less than 30 percent of the out-of-state students, according to the 2014 Kentucky Postsecondary Feedback Report.
The report provides in-depth data by institution about which degrees are pursued and the employment of graduates, as well as information about students who go on to pursue advanced degrees, average wages for various degree categories, and some insights into what happens to students who leave without a credential and do not continue their education elsewhere.
The report includes Eastern Kentucky University, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Western Kentucky University, the University of Louisville and the University of Kentucky. It does not include associate’s degrees from the Kentucky Community and Technical College System or degrees from independent colleges in Kentucky.
“This is the first report of its type in the nation that takes a deep look into what happens to our graduates after they leave college. The reports provide critical information for students and parents to help them make decisions about what they want to study,” said KCEWS Executive Director Charles McGrew, Ph.D.
“Employment and earnings shouldn’t be the only factor when people decide what or where to study, but given the current economic climate, it is much better to know before you choose than to be surprised after graduation,” he said.
More than 80 percent of the students who completed an associate’s degree and nearly 75 percent of those who completed a bachelor’s degree from one of the public universities were identified as working in Kentucky five years after graduation. However, about 61 percent of graduate degree earners, such as those with a master’s degree or doctorate degree, were employed in Kentucky after five years. For professional degrees such as those in medicine or law, 65 percent were working in the state after five years.
“National data suggests that wages in other states are typically higher and we know people with higher levels of education on average tend to be mobile. In many ways this report tells us as much about Kentucky’s economic opportunities for our college graduates as it does about the universities themselves,” McGrew said.
King said that the report will also be beneficial to employers and policymakers as they gain a greater understanding of the characteristics of graduates, transfer students and those who leave college.
The report shows that students who completed an associate’s or bachelor’s degree in a health or science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) related field earned more in general five and 10 years after graduation than most other majors. People who receive an associate’s degree in health earned more on average than people who earned bachelor’s degrees in other types of fields. However, health and many STEM areas are selective admission programs and many have caps that control the number of students who can be selected.
Data from the report comes from the Kentucky Longitudinal Data System. Employment information is limited to people who work in Kentucky because it comes from the state Unemployment Insurance System.
“We estimate that the employment data covers 90 percent of the people who are employed in the state; however, we currently have no data on students who work in other states. I am confident most of the students who are not identified as working in Kentucky are still working – they are just working somewhere else,” McGrew said.
In 2011-12, the total enrollment at Kentucky’s eight public universities was 84,998. The combined number of students who received undergraduate and postgraduate degrees for that year was 14,289.
STEM graduates from the public research universities – which include the University of Kentucky and the University of Louisville – were the most likely to continue their education from any of the public programs, with more than 28 percent moving directly into graduate school, according to the report.
“When comparing associate’s degree earnings to earnings from graduates with a bachelor’s degree in the same field, more education in general translates into more income, which is what most people would expect to see,” said McGrew.
The report also includes a snapshot of what happens to students who leave without completing a degree or transferring to another college. The majority are found working a year later. Three fourths of the in-state students who left in 2012 were found working in Kentucky a year later.
“On average, though, their wages were close to what someone would make working full-time at minimum wage which is about $15,000 per year. While this may seem low, this is still considerably more than high school graduates who do not attend college at all earn, so the impact of having at least some college is apparent. Still, the wages are far behind those earned by the average person who completed a degree from the same institution,” McGrew said.
To view this report, visit http://KCEWS.ky.gov.
KCEWS collects and provides information about education and workforce at all levels to better inform policymaking statewide. It maintains the Kentucky Longitudinal Data System which securely links information from the Kentucky Department of Education (KDE), the Council on Postsecondary Education (CPE), the Education Professional Standards Board (EPSB), the Kentucky Higher Education Assistance Authority, and the Kentucky Education and Workforce Development Cabinet. For more information, go to http://kcews.ky.gov.
It’s not just the thin blue line insulating bad cops from accountability, it’s the entire judicial system. From lower-level judges treating statements from police with amazing amounts of credulity even in the face of past misconduct or contradictory recordings to the nation’s top court, the judiciary branch, giving police officers built-in defenses that far exceed those available to the public.
An op-ed by Edwin Chemerinsky (lawyer and Dean of Law at the University of California, Irvine)notes that recent decisions by the Supreme Court have put even more distance between bad cops and accountability. Earlier this year, the nation’s top court essentially gave police officers permission to open fire on anyone deemed a threat and not stop firing until they determined the threat to be neutralized.
While the police have access to a wide variety of tactics and less-lethal weapons when dealing with “public safety risks,” there’s really no need for them to use anything but their guns. (Which they do… with gusto.) The Supreme Court’s decision turns any perceived threats to “public safety” (practically speaking, “officer safety“) into blank checks for excessive force.
Federal courts aren’t much better than the Supreme Court when it comes to prosecuting excessive force. Amanda Taub at Vox, writing about the ongoing investigation into Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson’s killing of unarmed resident Mike Brown, notes that while officers can find themselves facing both local and federal charges, Officer Wilson’s chances of walking away from this situation intact are still very high.
Simple murder is not a federal offense, but it is a federal crime for a police officer to deprive someone of his rights under the Constitution. If a victim dies, the perpetrator can be sentenced to life in prison or even the death penalty. That means the DOJ could prosecute Wilson under federal law for violating Brown’s civil rights, if the evidence supports that charge.
Federal civil rights prosecutions are rare, though, and convictions are even rarer. Astudy from Syracuse University’s TRAC program found that between 1986 and 2003, fewer than 2 percent of civil rights matters referred to the DOJ were ever prosecuted. Out of 43,331 referrals, 690 were actually prosecuted — and of those, 423 resulted in a conviction.
We already know the Ferguson Police Dept. believes Wilson’s actions to be defensible. Statements released by the department claim that Mike Brown got into an altercation with Officer Wilson and tried to grab his gun. It has also claimed that Officer Wilson suffered injuries from Wilson’s attack (although it has released no photos or medical information to back up these claims). The courts have repeatedly shown that officers claiming to fear for their safety are fully justified in deploying deadly force. In the absence of any start-to-finish recordings of the incident, it becomes the police department’s word against the words of Mike Brown’s legal representatives. And the department will have some form of immunity as well as “officer safety” to deploy in its defense.
With all of this in play, it seems unlikely that there will be a satisfactory resolution to the Ferguson situation. And, despite all appearances otherwise, Officer Wilson may truly be justified in his shooting of Mike Brown. But the legal roadblocks erected by every level of the judicial system makes it extremely difficult to combat the use of excessive force. Even when the system comes together to punish officer wrongdoing, it’s rarely the officer that bears the burden. Whether it’s a settlement or a prison sentence, it’s still the public footing the bill.
Will the Supreme Court decide whether judge-found facts can be used to increase a federal sentence?
I thought I’d post with a short update about the petition. Two amicus briefs were filed in support of the petition — one from the Cato Institute and Rutherford Institute, and one from Professor Douglas Berman, known to all of the blogosphere for his tireless work at Sentencing Law and Policy. The Court asked the government for a response, which is posted here. And the defendants filed a reply. It is distributed for conference at the end of September.
Looking at the petition and the amicus briefs, I was struck by something: Different people are concerned about different types of judge-found facts. Some are most concerned about facts that are made legally dispositive (emphasized by the cert. petition). Some are most concerned about facts about the offense, as opposed to facts about the offender (noted at the end of the Cato brief). Some are most concerned about facts on which the jury acquitted, as opposed to those that were simply never charged (emphasized by the Berman brief).
So far as I can tell, these defendants’ case lies at the center of all three concerns. So if the Court is indeed interested in deciding whether appellate common-law rules are subject to the same constraints as statutory law — as Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued — the case seems like the right vehicle.
Even if as-applied challenges were theoretically available, no such claim could succeed on the facts of this case. Cf. Rita, 551 U.S. at 373-374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disavowing any claim of an as-applied Sixth Amendment violation where the petitioner could not demonstrate that his sentence would have been unreasonable absent a judge-found fact). Petitioner Jones could not establish that, without the district court’s finding, his 180-month sentence would be unreasonable, given his status as a career offender and his resulting advisory Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months of imprisonment. See pp. 4-5, supra. Petitioner Ball also could not establish that his sentence was unreasonable, in light of the seriousness of his crime of conviction, the quantity of drugs that he personally distributed, and his long history of drug dealing. See p. 5, supra. Similarly, petitioner Thurston could not meet the unreasonableness standard, in light of his long criminal history and numerous arrests for drug offenses and violent crimes. See p. 5, supra. This case presents a particularly weak case for a claim that petitioners’ sentences were substantively unreasonable because the district court varied downwards from the applicable Guidelines range and imposed below-range sentences.
Petitioners do not claim to have led blameless lives: they were, after all, convicted of isolated street-level sales of crack cocaine. But in painting this case as a purportedly poor vehicle for review, the Government’s statement of facts principally mirrors its conspiracy theory, which the jury unanimously rejected.
It claims that Petitioners were members of a “loosely-knit gang” and “engaged in acts of violence against rival gangs.” Ball, it contends, was “one of its leaders.” Next it devotes virtually a full page to spelling out the underlying charges. Only then does it concede that a jury (after an eight month trial) acquitted them of everything except Ball’s single count of distributing crack cocaine and Thurston’s and Jones’ two counts of distributing crack. Even then, it fails to disclose the amounts: for Ball, 11 grams, for Thurston and Jones, 2 grams or less.
The Government’s lengthy characterization of Petitioners and the charges brought is a smokescreen to limit reasoned discussion of the Question Presented. One might look to Thurston, whose sentence fell in the middle of Petitioners’ sentences. He received 194 months’ imprisonment for a conviction that normally yields a-33 month term, and for which no one similarly situated during the post-Booker era received more than 51 months incarceration. Moreover, the Government’s extravagant claims made here about him were never found by a jury, apart from having sold a miniscule amount of crack.
…As for Ball, he was never charged with possessing a weapon when he made his crack sale and no evidence to the contrary was presented below. Nothing else the Government says here about him (or Jones) was proved to a jury, either, aside from the street-level sale.
Here’s more coverage by Tony Mauro. And finally, in the spirit of full disclosure: I have discussed some of these issues with several of the lawyers involved in the case, but of course these views are entirely my own.
Independent, political organization and political group candidates running for most offices in Kentucky must file their petitions of nomination and pay the filing fee by August 12, 2014. The paperwork must be received by the filing official by 4 p.m. prevailing local time.
“I encourage all interested individuals to complete their filings as soon as possible to allow time to address any problems with their paperwork,” said Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes.
Independent, political organization and political group candidates for many offices were required to file a statement-of-candidacy form no later than April 1, 2014, to be qualified. That prerequisite does not apply to candidates for federal offices, nonpartisan offices, and mayor or legislative body of cities of the second to sixth classes that conduct partisan elections.
Following the August 12 filing deadline, public drawings for ballot position will be held in the filing officials’ offices at 2 p.m. on August 14.
Judge Julie Reinhardt-Ward, Campbell County Circuit Court, is accepting resumes for an attorney position. The deadline to send a resume is August 30, 2014.
Resumes can be sent directly to me at julieward@kycourts.net. The salary has increased to $33,100.00 per year, plus benefits.
I am seeking a qualified applicant who is interesting in filling the position for two years or longer. Starting date is September 15, 2014.
Kentucky Supreme Court discusses Plea Bargain system, and acknowledges that attorneys cannot ethically waive their (11.42) liability to their client in a Plea Bargain.
The pervasiveness of plea bargain agreements in the Courts of the Commonwealth cannot be overstated. Today, we deal with the ethical ramifications of one aspect of this “horse trading between prosecutor and defense counsel.
“The United States Attorneys for the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky (United States) have moved this Court to review the merits of Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) Ethics Opinion E-435, an ethics advisory opinion, which finds the use of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) waivers in plea agreements violates our Rules of Professional Conduct.
We agree with the KBA that the use of IAC waivers in plea bargain agreements (1) creates a non-waivable conflict of interest between the defendant and his attorney, (2) operates effectively to limit the attorney’s liability for malpractice, and (3) induces, by the prosecutor’s insertion of the waiver into plea agreements, an ethical breach by defense counsel.
Consequently, we hold that E-435 accurately states our ethical rules.
After an 18-year fight, Virginia Gaither has finally won justice for her grandson, a special education student who was tortured and murdered after Kentucky State Police used him to make a drug buy despite his identity being compromised.
In a unanimous opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court Thursday reinstated most of a $168,729 award to her that had been thrown out by lower courts.
Justice Daniel Venters, writing for the court, said that in “what might be fairly described as the height of imprudence,” Detective Danny Burton and other detectives decided to use 18-year-old LeBron Gaither to make another buy on July 17, 1996, after he appeared as a witness before two grand juries and his cover was blown.
Although the state is immune from liability for discretionary acts by police and other employees, the court said in a 6-0 opinion that it is well-known in law enforcement circles that a compromised informant must not be exposed to the danger of a buy-bust operation.
Here’s an unreasonable solution to unreasonably bad legislation: If an N.C. lawmaker votes for a bill that is subsequently rejected by the courts, that lawmaker must help pay for resources that went into defending the flawed law.
Absurd? Well, yes. But no more so than the latest legislative gem from N.C. Republicans – a provision in the state budget that fast-tracks all constitutional challenges of state laws directly to a three-judge panel appointed by the chief justice of the state Supreme Court.
The law, which takes effect in September, will bypass pesky Superior Court judges, who keep rudely reminding Republicans that the Constitution matters when it comes to lawmaking. Republicans say the problem isn’t the laws, it’s the judges. A panel, they say, will keep activists from “judge shopping” – or finding a Superior Court judge who might issue a favorable ruling.
Of course, this new law is judge shopping to the extreme: Challenges to state law will now leap straight to a panel selected by the Republican judges who control the state Supreme Court.
The North Carolina State Bar and the N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts oppose the provision, which is the first of its kind in the country. There’s a reason for that: The law deprives plaintiffs the full appeals process they’re entitled to. That includes Superior Court judges issuing stays on legislation being implemented until matters are legally settled.
All of which means that this law, too, can be added to the list of constitutionally flawed measures passed by N.C. Republicans in recent sessions. This year alone, federal judges struck down an N.C. law that would allow a “Choose Life” license plate, but not a pro-choice plate, as well as a provision in an N.C. law that required doctors to narrate ultrasound images for women seeking abortions.
Also this year, Superior Court Judge Howard Manning rebuked legislators for an “unlawful taking” of Asheville’s water system, and Superior Court Judge Robert Hobgood had enough concerns with the legislature’s school voucher plan that he temporarily blocked it. The Supreme Court lifted that stay, but Hobgood will make a final decision on vouchers this week.
We’re not sure why Republicans continue to hold their hands over the legal flame like this. It could be that controlling the legislature and governor’s mansion has left them with the illusion that no one, not even judges, should be able to tell them no. It could be they think there’s no harm in tossing a bad bill up against the wall and seeing what sticks.
But there is harm. Passing flawed legislation wastes time and resources, and this most recent law shows an additional disregard for the role the courts play in lawmaking. Here’s a better – and even reasonable – idea: If some of the laws you pass are getting held up in court, don’t try to silence judges. Write better laws.
Spoliation of evidence has, for some time, remained an important topic relating to the discovery of electronically stored information. Many companies continue to struggle with the burden and expense of various retention requirements in the era of “big data.” However, a recent Texas Supreme Court decision may bring clarity to companies concerned about their preservation obligations. On July 3, the Texas Supreme Court articulated a complete analytical framework to guide Texas courts in evaluating arguments regarding the spoliation of evidence. Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 10-0846, 2014 Tex. LEXIS 562, 2014 WL 2994435 (Tex. July 3, 2014). The decision brings clarity to Texas law, though not without a few points of uncertainty.
The Texas Supreme Court’s 6–3 holding in Brookshire Brothers arises in the context of a routine slip-and-fall premises liability case. Plaintiff Jerry Aldridge slipped and fell on a liquid substance at a Brookshire Brothers grocery store. Aldridge notified Brookshire Brothers immediately after his fall, but he did not know the full extent of his injuries until days later. Upon Aldridge’s return to the store, he complained of increased pain, so Brookshire Brothers documented the incident and preserved an eight-minute segment of video tape recorded on store security cameras at the time of the fall. The video clip began just before Aldridge entered the store and concluded shortly after he fell and left. Because the store’s cameras recorded video in a continuous loop, footage from the remainder of the day was automatically recorded over, approximately 30 days after the incident. Aldridge argued that the unpreserved portion of the video could have shown the source of the substance on the floor, whether additional employees may have seen the substance, or the effort necessary to clean up the substance following the incident.
Along with allowing the jury to hear evidence bearing on whether Brookshire Brothers spoliated the video, the trial court submitted a spoliation instruction to the jury and also permitted the jury to decide whether spoliation occurred during its deliberations on the merits of the lawsuit.
Ultimately, the jury found for Aldridge and awarded more than $1 million in damages. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the verdict, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of spoliation or allowing the spoliation instruction. However, the Texas Supreme Court ultimately reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to hear evidence regarding spoliation and in submitting a spoliation instruction.
The trial court—rather than the jury—must determine, as a question of law, whether the party spoliated evidence.
If spoliation occurred, the court must then assess an appropriate remedy.
Under step one, the Texas Supreme Court found that in order to avoid unfair prejudice, and in a substantial departure from prior practice, the trial judge, outside the presence of the jury, must determine whether spoliation has occurred. And, if spoliation is found, the trial judge must decide the appropriate sanction. The court reasoned that spoliation is an evidentiary issue and not a separate cause of action, and because evidentiary issues are resolved by the trial court and not the jury, it is inappropriate to present spoliation issues to the jury for resolution.Brookshire Bros. 2014 Tex. LEXIS 562, *20-21 (citing Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1998)). The court also noted that while a trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing to assist the court in resolving spoliation issues, such a hearing may not take place in the presence of the jury. The court emphasized that the jury should focus on the merits of a case rather than on evidentiary issues. Id. at *22.
In determining whether spoliation occurred, the court found that the trial court must find that the spoliating party had a duty to reasonably preserve evidence and the party intentionally or negligently breached that duty by failing to do so. Id. at *22. In assessing whether a party had a duty to reasonably preserve evidence, the court pointed to the standard articulated in Wal-Mart Stores v. Johnson. In that case, the Texas Supreme Court noted that “[s]uch a duty arises only when a party knows or reasonably should know that there is a substantial chance that a claim will be filed and that evidence in its possession or control will be material and relevant to that claim.” Brookshire Bros. 2014 Tex. LEXIS 562 at *22 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2003)). The “substantial chance of litigation” arises when “litigation is more than merely an abstract possibility or unwarranted fear.” Id. (quoting National Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 204 (Tex. 1993)). Once a duty is established, the party alleging spoliation must show that the other party breached that duty by failing to exercise reasonable care in preserving the evidence. Id. at *23.
Id. at *26 (citing Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 958 (Baker, J., concurring)). In adopting the criteria, the court noted that these factors had proved workable and were aligned with tests used in federal courts. Id. at *27.
The court did note that the imposition of a spoliation instruction as a remedy, “among the harshest sanctions a trial court may utilize to remedy an act of spoliation,” should be taken cautiously. Brookshire Bros., 2014 Tex. LEXIS 562 at *30. In general, “a party must intentionally spoliate evidence in order for a spoliation instruction to constitute an appropriate remedy.” Id. at *31. But, even when a party intentionally spoliates evidence, the spoliation instruction may be imposed only when a less severe remedy would be insufficient to reduce the prejudice caused by the spoliation. The court also carved out an exception for certain cases where only negligence is found. This negligence exception, which the court called a “narrow caveat,” allows a trial court to impose a spoliation instruction “in the rare circumstance” when the spoliating party’s negligence “irreparably prevents the nonspoliating party from having any meaningful opportunity to present a claim or defense.” Id. at *38 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, 106 S.W.3d at 721).
Under the Brookshire Brothers framework, courts can provide a spoliation instruction: (i) when a spoliating party acted with the specific intent of concealing discoverable evidence, and (ii) when a party has negligently failed to preserve information and that negligent failure has irreparably deprived the nonspoliating party of any meaningful ability to present a claim or defense. An open question remains as to how trial courts and the courts of appeals will interpret and apply the language governing the latter circumstance, deemed the “negligence exception.” While the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion states that the exception applies only in certain “rare” situations, parties claiming that spoliation has occurred will most certainly point to the negligence exception as opening the door to a broader application of spoliation instructions. In any event, the negligence exception is generally a departure from prevailing federal law.
Under Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, “the severe sanctions of granting default judgment, striking pleadings, or giving adverse inference instructions may not be imposed unless there is evidence of ‘bad faith.’”Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Camarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2010). Mere negligence is not enough to warrant an instruction on spoliation. Id. Other circuits employ similar approaches and have held that negligence is insufficient for an adverse inference instruction. The Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have held that bad faith is required for an adverse inference instruction. Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 614. The Third Circuit balances the degree of fault and prejudice. Id. at 615. In contrast, the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted an approach similar to the Brookshire Brothers framework and have held that bad faith is not essential to imposing severe sanctions if there is severe prejudice, although the cases often emphasize the presence of bad faith. Id. at 614; see also Brookshire Bros., 2014 Tex. LEXIS 562 at *38 (citing Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 594 (4th Cir. 2001) in support of the newly articulated negligence exception); Beaven v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 622 F.3d 540, 553-54 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that negligent destruction of evidence can satisfy the requirements for the imposition of a spoliation instruction); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (same).
Id. This new rule, which must still be approved by the Judicial Conference, the U.S. Supreme Court, and Congress, supplants the existing Rule 37(e). In promulgating proposed Rule 37(e), the Committee noted that the federal circuits “have established significantly different standards for imposing sanctions or curative measures on parties who fail to preserve electronically stored information. These developments have caused litigants to expend excessive effort and money on preservation in order to avoid the risk of severe sanctions if a court finds they did not do enough.” Id.
Proposed Rule 37(e) limits the trial court’s ability to impose severe sanctions on a party to only those circumstances in which the court finds that the party “acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.” This standard is akin to the bad faith approach employed in the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Notably, the proposed rule recognizes that “reasonable steps” to preserve electronically stored information suffice to satisfy a party’s preservation obligations. Indeed, the rule does not require perfection. Rather, the Committee Note that accompanies the rule states that “the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system would be a relevant factor for the court to consider in evaluating whether a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve lost information, although the prospect of litigation may call for reasonable steps to preserve information by intervening in that routine operation.” Id. at 320.
Under the proposed Rule 37(e), a court may instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to a spoliating party only if the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation. This standard could differ from theBrookshire Brothers approach, which allows a spoliation instruction to be given both if the spoliating party acted intentionally or if the spoliating party’s negligence irreparably prevents the nonspoliating party from having any meaningful opportunity to present a claim or defense.
There are several important practice points that litigants and their attorneys should consider in light of the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling. While the Brookshire Brothers decision has brought substantial clarity to Texas law, a business operating both in Texas and other states should be cognizant that the law of those other states as well as federal law may govern a subsequent dispute. It is, therefore, not sufficient to look solely to the Brookshire Brothers opinion for guidance on the consequences of evidence spoliation.
Moreover, taking steps to preserve data and articulating those steps in the form of a retention policy and litigation hold program will help a company argue that a spoliation instruction is unwarranted. Companies should take care to issue litigation hold notices when appropriate, and companies should formulate reasonable policies to facilitate the preservation of evidence. While the negligent failure to preserve data can still subject a party to court-ordered penalties, reasonable data preservation procedures can help protect a company from more severe sanctions. However, under the Brookshire Brothers decision, a Texas trial court may impose a spoliation instruction when a nonspoliating party has been “irreparably deprived of any meaningful ability to present a claim or defense” under the negligence exception. It is difficult to predict whether a court will find the lost or destroyed evidence so crucial to the other parties’ case that a severe sanction, such as a spoliation instruction, is justified. Only time will tell how Texas trial courts will interpret the breadth of the negligence exception under the court’s new framework.
It’s puzzling how the State Bar could be overlooking the appearance at its convention of the chief justice of the United States and seven of the associate justices.
On a narrower scale, but sparking widespread attention, the far-right John Birch Society, and groups of like mind, were clamoring for Warren’s impeachment.
Warren, who was governor of California when appointed to his judicial post by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953, noted in his speech that he had not previously spoken before any bar association during his tenure as chief justice. But the invitation extended by State Bar President William P. Gray (later a U.S. District Court judge) was “so intriguing,” he related, that he could not resist accepting.
The opportunity was probably more enticing than intriguing. A beleaguered chief justice could hardly call a press conference to respond to charges of a largely political nature. Warren needed an appropriate forum in which to counter the increasingly fierce assaults on the court—and him personally—and to portray the high court’s recent decisions as being reflective of the normal progression of law rather than a series of radical departures from settled law.
What Gray offered Warren was an occasion for presenting his defense to the people of the nation—through the inevitable press accounts of his address—while speaking before an audience in his home state comprised nearly entirely of lawyers and judges (whose registration badges gained them the right of admission). The forum was one that was dignified; it was non-political; it was one where the audience was bound to be supportive…and Warren was, in fact, warmly received.
“This has been an interesting decade on the Court. The years have been challenging, and I need hardly tell you, they have been controversial. However, it is not the Court that has made them controversial—it is the times in which we are living. The landmark cases that came to us were charged with great emotion. But the same can be said in varying degrees of almost all the decades of our national life.
The chief justice good-naturedly accepts a pamphlet from a woman holding an “Impeach Earl Warren” sign. She was one of about a dozen picketers outside San Francisco’s Masonic Auditorium to which Warren had come to deliver his address.
“When told that there was no dissenting opinion, many of them demanded to know by whose orders the dissenting opinion had been abolished. Others, believing that there must be a dissenting opinion, threatened to have him investigated for suppressing it.
“This disparity is the cause of conjecture on the part of many people. They wonder why only a little over 1 per cent of our decisions were in this area 25 years ago while almost 50 per cent are in this area now. Many of them say, ‘Don’t you think we are moving too fast in this area?’ as though the Court could regulate the speed with which such cases come to it.
“Warren, whitehaired but spry at 75, has been a familiar figure during the State Bar convention. He has dropped in on actions, hailed old friends and talked over old times with people he knew in his long career here.
“Warren drew a standing ovation when, unannounced, he strode into the State Bar [Conference of Delegates] meeting—in between debate on state’s rights and civil rights issues that touched on Supreme Court decisions.
Other members of the Supreme Court mingled with the lawyers. An AP photo shows Justice Tom C. Clark pouring coffee for San Francisco Deputy City Attorney Agnes O’Brien Smith (who later served as presiding judge of the San Francisco Municipal Court). Standing beside him at a breakfast meeting of the women’s division of the State Bar are Justices Hugo L. Black and Potter Stewart, with Justice Arthur Goldberg seated.
Warren and Black were among those who attended a speech by then-California Supreme Court Justice Matthew Tobriner, according to a MetNews report.
The California Judges Association, then known as the Conference of California Judges, used to hold its meetings in tandem with the State Bar convention (now referred to as the “annual meeting.”) Justices Clark and William Brennan addressed the conference that year—as Justice William Douglas had in 1949.
That was not the only time a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, other than Kennedy and Scalia, addressed a State Bar convention in California. Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered the Morrison lecture on Aug. 23, 1951.
Entitled “Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court,” it is published in the Fall, 1951, issue of the Cornell Law Quarterly.
So, prior to Kennedy’s address in 2010, at least two members of the U.S. Supreme Court spoke at a State Bar of California convention, and at least seven others made appearances there.
Perhaps there were others. It could not responsibly be said that there weren’t others without looking through State Bar records from 1927 on.
MEA CULPAS—While on the subject of gaffes in statements about history, a “Snippets” item in this newspaper awhile back referred to Court of Appeal Presiding Justice Joan Dempsey Klein of this district’s Div. Three as “the first female presiding justice in the state.” Klein has many distinctions, but that isn’t one of them.
The appointment rendered her not only the first woman presiding justice in the state, but the first female member of the appellate bench in California.
Though little remembered today, she attained national prominence in her time, even being mentioned as a possible vice presidential nominee.
She was also the first woman in the United States to serve as a federal prosecutor, nominated by President Woodrow Wilson on Sept. 28, 1914, as assistant U.S. district attorney for the Northern District of California. She had worked to stir support among women for Wilson’s candidacy in 1912 (the first year women could vote in a presidential election), serving as president of the Women’s State Democratic Club.
Adams gained international attention in connection with her wartime prosecution of Franz Bopp, the German consul general in San Francisco, along with four of his underlings, for violations of the Neutrality Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. Bopp had plans for an expedition against Canada and to dynamite U.S. ships carrying ammunition to allies.
It was presented to the grand jury, which approved it.
Convictions came on Jan. 10, 1917.
“While the ‘silent picketing’ of the white house by suffragists tends to lessen the faith of many in the ability of women to exercise good judgment and ability in case trust is placed in them it is more than off-set by the accomplishment of a woman—Mrs. Annette A. Adams in the Franz Bopp case, which is now of international importance.
“….According to the press dispatches a large part of the strength of the government’s case was due largely to her excellent work. It was she who opened the case, and who represented the government when the verdict was announced.
Wilson sent her nomination to the Senate on Feb. 27, 1919, and she was confirmed a few days later.
In 1920, U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer—architect of the “Palmer Raids,” aimed at mass arrests and deportation of alien radicals, and a candidate that year for the Democratic nomination for president (which he did not receive)—asked Wilson to appoint Adams as an assistant U.S. attorney general. The president obliged on May 29 of that year; on June 4, 1920, she was confirmed by the Senate, becoming the first woman to attain the post. In fact, that was the highest federal post held by a woman in the history of the nation.
Adams attended the 1920 Democratic National Convention, which took place in San Francisco from June 28-July 6. She was there to rally support for Palmer’s long-shot presidential bid…and her own far-longer-shot bid, backed by women’s organizations, for the vice presidential nomination.
“Will the Democratic vice president nomination go to a woman? This query was agitating not alone the feminine advance guard to the national convention here but was also being seriously discussed by the male contingent.
“One well defined vice presidential boom for a woman is well under way and two other names of women prominent in the party are mentioned in connection with the proposal to place a lady close to, if not, actually in the While House.
“The boom is for Mrs. Annette A, Adams of San Francisco….
“Are we going to have a woman for Vice-President if the Democratic ticket wins?
“Just what will happen if Assistant United States Attorney-General Annette Abbott Adams is nominated and elected ‘right hand woman’ to our next President?
The May 30, 1920, edition of the San Francisco Chronicle tells of Adams having recently been admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court (actually, the previous March). Moving for her admission was U.S. Rep. John E. Raker, D-Northern California (in whose law office she had practiced), and administering the oath was Chief Justice Edward L. White. The admission fee was $10. When asked by the clerk to pay, the article recounts, she found she had only $7 in her handbag. She stepped into the office of White’s secretary and returned with the balance of the fee. Adams carried cash in her stockings.
Adams was also the first woman to sit on the California Supreme Court—though by assignment, in 1950, participating in one case.
She served as presiding justice until her resignation, effective Nov. 30, 1952. Her age was 75.
Death came on Oct. 26, 1956.
All persons mentioned above are deceased…with the possible exception of the unidentified woman holding the picket sign.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.