Source: http://www.4lawschool.com/outlines/bank/laborlawdavis.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:24:35+00:00

Document:
Text: Cases & Materials on Labor Law, Cox, Bok, Gorman, Finkin. 13th Edition.
II. History of Judicial and Legislative Response to the Organization of Labor in the U.S.
VIII. Is There a Future For American Labor Unions?
(a) Black Plague = scarcity of labor. Bound to master for one year.
g. Title VII (1964): Prohibits employment discrimination on basis of race, national origin, religion, gender.
h. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA): No compulsory retirement; applies to anyone over 40.
j. Warn statute (1980s): Mandated notice (60 days) for Ees to know about layoffs.
l. Family and Medical Leave Act (1993): Unpaid leave up to 12 weeks a year for ppl to care of newborns or family w/ serious medical condition.
(3) In reality, few of these cases brought b/c of lack of $$.
4. Gantt v. Century Ins.: π brought action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Held: Public policy must be expressed in a written statute or state constitution. Administrative regulation ≠ source of public policy.
5. Green v. Ralee Engineering (1998): π inspects airplane parts. Δ company producing defective parts and shipping them to Boeing (according to FAA). π made reports to Er that parts were defective. π fired. Held: Violation of the administrative regulation is sufficient b/c it comes out of the statutes—which are passed by the legislature.
a. No protection for π under whistleblower statutes b/c π must inform violations of the law to a govt entity.
(1) State c/a: “Unlawful purpose" or “unlawful means"
(a) e.g. Pullman strike (RR) Fed. marshals enforcing the labor injunction and killed 30 ppl on the first day.
(2) Duplex Printing (1921): Machinist union trying to organize Ees who mfr printing presses. Actual factory was in Michigan, but union began picketing in NYC @ Duplex’s customers who ordered parts from Duplex Printing. Held: Clayton Act only directed to primary Ers. Use of secondary Ers is NOT covered by the Clayton Act.
(1) § 1: “No court…shall have jx to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute…"
(b) Need to demonstrate “substantial and irreparable injury"
(5) § 13: Defines “labor dispute" such that the ct’s decisions under the Sherman antitrust laws and Clayton Act are overruled.
(a) Broad definition meant to cover primary and secondary Ers.
c. → Cts could enjoin violence as long as they meet § 7 procedural requirements and does not violate § 4.
e. Burlington Northern RR Co. v. Brotherhood: National union striking against Guilford RR (Maine), and other RRs that did business w/ Guilford. District ct interpreted Norris-LaGuardia as only covering primary Ers or those substantially aligned. S.Ct. held: Norris-LaGuardia clearly covered the RRs—policy of the Act has no basis for a substantial alignment test/theory. This reflects Cong’s intent that Act extends to ALL labor disputes; i.e. including prohibition of injunctions extended to secondary Ers.
f. Intl Longshoremen v. USSR (1980): Δ refused to handle any USSR goods in US ports b/c of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Held: Δ’s could NOT be enjoined. This is a labor dispute under Norris-LaGuardia, and there is no exception for political reasons for labor dispute.
a. Thornhill v. Alabama (1940): π and other Ees picketing outside Er’s business asking non-union workers not to go to work. Thornhill charged w/ criminal offense of picketing under the state statute (any picketing = misdemeanor). Held: Under federal Constitution (b/c state action), statute invalid. Picketing = free exchange of ideas.
(2) Does NOT apply to mass picketing, a tort (i.e. effectively blocking ingress and egress). No mass picketing here.
(i) West: this is the reason why labor movement is dead now.
(1) § 14(b): “Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or applications is prohibited by State…law."
(a) These states are called “RIGHT TO WORK STATES"
(b) Southern states could prohibit union-shop and CBAs. Thus, entire industries and businesses headed to the south.
a. Ers must engage in direct or indirectly w/ interstate commerce to amount exceeding prescribed $$ amount.
(a) § 2(11): “…any individual having authority, in the interest of the Er to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other Ees, or responsibly direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action…exercise of authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."
(i) This is problematic in the health care industry where nurses were supervising nurses aides. S.Ct: No statutory basis to not call these people supervisors. Thus, all nurses bcm supervisors.
(b) Supervisors not prohibited from unionizing—only that Ers are free from the duty to deal w/ supervisors re: collective bargaining.
(c) Multi-Vision Cable TV (Cal. Ct. App. 1993): Supervisor fired for refusing to spy on Ees to see if they were organizing. Filed claim under wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; public policy = allowing Ees to organize. Held: Er wins b/c of doctrine of preemption: federal law source (i.e. NLRA) trumps state law.
(a) Longtime declared as students, not Ees—has since changed once UC TAs were declared Ees, not students.
(c) Yeshiva Univ. (1980): Private university faculty are managers, NOT Ees w/in the meaning of the NLRA. Faculty aligned w/ mgmt b/c votes on tenure, helping decide the “product" by research, class lectures, curriculum—essentially helping the administrators run the university.
(b) BUT, can request the election be set aside based on interference w/ Ee choice (but not a ULP).
(1) Decides whether to file ULP complaints in “novel or complex cases"
(1) Cts must accept the Bd’s findings of fact “if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole"
(3) NLRB’s “non-acquiescence doctrine": Since circuits vary (and often reverses the Bd), a circuit decision will be ignored if so far from NLRB decision. Thus, that will become the law of the Circuit so long as the S.Ct. doesn’t take the case.
(a) Bd will not change its policy to acquiesce to the Circuit’s reversal unless the S.Ct takes the case.
A. Protection of the right of self-organization under § 7: “Ees shall have the right to self-organization, for form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities…"
(1) In general, the longer the time drawn out, the more the Er will gain votes. Likely the ‘undecideds’ will go w/ the Ers the longer the waiting period b/t signing cards and the election.
a. § 8(a)(1)—“(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an Er—(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce Ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7"
(1) Republic Aviation: Military aircraft manufacturing factory during WWII. [before Taft-Hartley; original Wagner Act]. Ees passing out authorization cards during lunch period (Ees fired) + Ees wearing union buttons.
(a) NLRB’s rule on solicitation: Ees may not solicit other Ees during “working time." Er may not prohibit solicitation if Ee is on his own time (i.e. rest periods, lunch breaks).
i) Need to balance Er’s property rights/rt to proper discipline v. Ee’s rt to organize.
(b) Er must enforce their anti-solicitation rules consistently; otherwise, they may be liable for discriminatory enforcement (violation of § 8(a)(3)).
(c) Another issue here: Can the NLRB take its rules from adversary proceedings (here, rule established in payton packing), and apply it forward [since it differs from other administrative agency rule-making]?
i) S.Ct: Ok for Bd to set rules in this way—unless Ers can show that they have special circumstances that would remove the Er from the presumption.
(2) Healthcare Industry’s no-solicitation rules: Hospitals are “special" and can prohibit ALL solicitation in patient-care areas/floors—whether Ees are on their own time or not.
(a) Thus, Ees must take breaks in the cafeterias or lobby.
(3) Dept Stores: Can’t talk shop on the department floor b/c would distract customers + interfere w/ business.
(4) BUTTONS [worn by Ees]: Rule, fn 7: “The rights of Ees to wear union insignia at work has long been recognized as a reasonable and legitimate form of union activity and the respondent’s curtailment of that right is clearly violative of that Act."
(c) Harrah’s Reno (1960s): Rule: strict uniform, no jewelry allowed. Thus, Er allowed to have “no union button" rule.
(c) Point: The closer the Ees can confine their activities to traditional union speech, the more protection. Cts/Bd has more trouble when branching out to newer forms of speech.
(a) Babcock/Wilcox: Country plant 30 mi outside of town w/ long driveway into the plant + parking lot. Issue: can the union organizers come into the parking lot? S.Ct: No, must protect the private property rts of the Ers from trespassing union organizers.
(c) Lechmere: Strip mall adjacent to public land. Union organizers tried fliering the parking lot, but were kicked off by mgmt under Babcock. Then went to the grassy strip of land to picket and copied license plates to get addresses via DMV. Got 20% of Ees addresses & sent mailings. Over 6 months over 1 Ee signed authorization card.
1) West: S.Ct ignoring labor history in interpreting the NLRA & brings in outside assumptions on private ppty, etc.
2) Chevron deference issue: S.Ct should defer to the Bd when interpreting the statute.
(d) Post-Lechmere: Union organizers getting hired by the Er to get the status of Ee. Called “salting." S.Ct: These organizers are Ees, despite the fract they may also work for a union, too. Thus, cannot fire a “salter" for being a union Ee.
(e) Off-Duty Ee who comes back onto the parking lot after his shift is over to talk to Ees. Bd: Ee is an Ee, not a trespasser, even though he may not have access to the plant at the time.
(2) 1941: S.Ct rules that Bd can’t tell the Ers they can’t talk. Ers have freedom of speech to their opinion.
(3) § 8(c): “The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
(a) In short, Ers’ speech is ok so long as no threats and no promises. Also written so that statute complied w/ 1st A.
(b) In voicing their anti-union opinion, Er’s speech cannot be used as evid of a ULP.
(c) But, threats or promise of a benefit IS a ULP b/c they are coercing Ees.
(4) General Shoe (1948): Speech may not violate § 8(a)(1), but still violates the election.
(a) Ct develops “laboratory conditions" doctrine: Union elections are like an experiment in a lab. If Ers’ speech is too out of line, will contaminate the lab conditions—i.e. Ees free choice.
iv) Controversial b/c studies show that this doesn’t make a difference in the election since Ees expect Ers to engage in this type of speech. Studies also show that the “cleaner" the Er was, the more effective the Ers’ campaign against the union was.
(5) Dal-Tex Optical Co (1962): Er said, “Do you want to gamble all these things? If I am required to bargain, I will bargain with cold-blooded business basis. You may come out w/ a lot less than you have now." Bd: Er’s statements were coercive (i.e. illegal threats) and not protected by § 8(c). ULP here.
(6) Gissel Packing Co (1969): Plant of a parents company in W. Mass. Mid-1960s, plants closing. Er told Ees that they were forgetting the lessons of the past strikes and that a strike would lead to a closing. Also told Ees that they might lose their jobs b/c parent co. had no reason to stay in Mass. “Teamsters are a strike-happy outfit w/ hoodlums." Bargaining unit: 14 Ees. Before the campaign, 11 signed cards. After the campaign, union loses, 6-7.
(a) S.Ct.: Need to balance Er’s free speech rts v. Ees free choice. BUT…balancing the rights must take into account the fact that the Ees are economically dependent on their Ers.
(b) Gissel Rule: Er may make a prediction—but prediction must be carefully phrased on basis of (1)objective facts to convey demonstratively (2)probable consequences (3)outside of the Er’s control.
i) Here, mgmt had control over the closing of the plant. Thus, conditions of bad consequences are probably w/in the Er’s control.
(c) EXCEPTION: If a company has made a decision that if the Ees vote in the election to close the entire business → NO ULP. Er can cease being an Er entirely.
iv) “Law allows Ers to replace strikers."
i) “This is a very serious matter for you and your family. On the day of the election, vote as if your job depends on it." Threat; violation of § 8(a)(1).
ii) “I will close down the shop if you do not do what I tell you to do…"
i) Rationale: Attempt by Er causes fear of reprisal in the Ee’s mind if he replies in favor of unionism; Impinges on his § 7 rights.
(b) Formal Polling (Struksnes): Union organizing on the job, 20 of 26 Ees sign cards. Ee make a demand for bargaining. Er circulated a petition asking Ees to sign their own name. Afterwards, only 9 Ees agreed to have union representation.
iii) Once this rule set, Ers almost never polled. Reason: if the Er finds a majority, then the Er is obligated to bargain w/ the union. Most Ers want to delay bargaining for as long as possible.
iv) If union already filed a petition for election w/ the Bd, Ers may NOT poll.
(a) Held: § 8(a)(1) violation.
(b) Granting benefits = violation of § 8(a)(1). “The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove."
ii) Once the union shows up, Er cannot change the working conditions. Er cannot grant benefits until an election held.
(2) Concept: Maintaining the status quo. Once the union shows up, the Er cannot do anything different through organizing → election → bargaining phases. Thus, Er may NOT make any unilateral changes while they are bargaining.
i) HYPO: Co. gives wage increases every 3 years. Co. planning a wage increase 2002 (consistent w/ past practice). Union shows up in march 2002 & Er knows they cannot grant or withhold economic benefit near an election. What should they do?
1) Key: Establish the status quo.
2) If the status quo is dynamic (i.e. changes), need to show that proposed wage increase is in line w/ past practices & dynamic status quo.
ii) re: Solicitation and grievances. Er called a mtg prior to election; mtgs had never been given before.
2) Implied promise…This is not a speech, but a change. Here, Ees are given access to mgmt when not previously given.
a. § 8(a)(3): “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
c. Diff b/t § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) violations….
(d) In a dual motive case ONLY, Er can put on an affirmative defense. Er has the burden to prove they would’ve made the same decision anyway despite their anti-union animous.
ii) GC must show that despite dr’s note, there was still anti-union animous. Bd: Infers anti-union motive. Ct: Reversed.
(b) Er’s Legitimate reason: R used lewd and suggestive misconduct toward female Ees that Er had a plant rule against.
(e) Held: Rogers’ conduct so offensive, ct refuses to sanction the behavior—even though its been happening for years. Don’t look @ past labor activity.
e. Darlington (1965): Textile mill in the south. Ees voted the union in. Millikin shut down the textile mill b/c he hated the union. Ees bring a § 8(a)(3) charge to contest the Er’s decision.
(1) Held: Case remanded to decide whether this was a total or partial closing.
(a) Total closing of a plant/business will NEVER violate § 8(a)(3) b/c Er ceases to be an Er under the Act.
i) Bd cannot prohibit to close the entire business—cannot force Er to continue being an Er if they don’t want to be an Er any longer.
(b) A partial closing may violate § 8(a)(3) if the GC can prove the motive/purpose of the closing was to chill union activity in other remaining parts of the business and if it was “reasonably foreseeable" that the closing would have that effect.
(2) Called “runaway shops": when the Er’s shop becomes unionized and goes out of business after the unionization and moves shop to non-union area.
(3) This case hampered by severe delay.
(a) e.g. Plant closes, 1956 → S.Ct remands case, 1965 → NLRB award, 1967 → Enforces Bd’s order, 1968 → S.Ct demands cert (ends liability phase), 1969.
(e) 1980, Co settles for $5m. Ees accept the offer—1/3 of them dead.
i) Discharge of a supervisor will violate the Act only if it “directly interferes" w/ an Ees exercise of § 7 rights.
a. § 10(c):“If on preponderance of the testimony taken the Bd shall be of the opinion that any person…engaged in a ULP, then the Bd shall state its findings of fact and shall issue…an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such [ULP], and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement w/ or w/o back pay…"
(a) Phelps Dodge (1941): Applicants who were known union activists denied job b/c of their union activity. Could they get the reinstatement remedy?
i) Held: Yes, applicants also protected.
ii) Ee still entitled to remedial remedies, even if the Ee obtains substantially similar employment.
e. Hoffman Plastic Compounds (2002): People fired during the organizing campaign. One worker, Castro, takes the stand and testifies that he is an undocumented worker—he used a false birth certificate to obtain a job. Issue: Can an undocumented worker get back pay or reinstatement for ULP?
(1) US S.Ct: Bd may have expertise under NLRA, but this also involves IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Act). Remedy of back pay violates the policy of IRCA. Thus, no right to give any remedies to undocumented workers.
(a) Dissent: No evid to show that Cong intended IRCA to impact the NLRB. Now, no remedy to hire undocumented workers—will it encourage Ers to hire undocumented workers and violated the NLRB b/c no sanctions against Ers who hire undocumented workers?
(1) This case consolidated w/ 4 fact patterns united by the fact that at some point in time, union had gotten a majority of cards by Ees to vote in the election.
i) In short, an Er can lose the right to have an election b/c of all of the § 8(a)(1) & (3) violations. And, since at one point, the union did have a majority, Er has lost the right to demand election & must bargain with the union or be accused of § 8(a)(5).
ii) Irrelevant: good/bad faith of Er’s refusal to bargain. Only matters that § 8(a)(1)-(3) violated.
iii) Rationale: Er has contaminated conditions so badly, there is no possibility of holding a fair election.
(2) General rule: After getting a majority of cards, Ees can notify Er and file petition w/ the Bd OR Ees can make a bargain demand.
(a) After a bargain demand, Er can refuse and tell the Ees to have an election.
(c) BUT…if the Er violates § 8(a)(1)-(3) enough, Bd may withhold the election or set it aside, and instead, issue a [Gissel] bargaining order. In order to issue a bargain order, need to find a violation of § 8(a)(5).
(a) Gissel I: Non-majority bargain order: For outrageous and pervasive ULPs, Bd can issue a bargain order in absence of a majority.
(c) Gissel III: Minor/less extensive ULPs will not sustain a bargaining order.
b. Gourmet Foods (1984): Held: Non-majority orders fail to recognize Ees rights. Thus, Bd can no longer issue Gissel Is, non-majority bargain orders.
a. Linden Lumber Co: Held: If the Er has not committed any ULPs, Er has the rt to insist the union file for an election. No obligation on Er to recognize the union or to file for an election.
(3) Thus, an election is virtually the only way to get the Bd to recognize them.
(1) § 9(a): “Union may designate an appropriate bargaining unit…"
(b) Important to determine this correctly b/c the bargain unit is the 1) election unit; 2) economic power unit (i.e. strike unit); 3) bargaining unit (i.e. need to represent interests of a cohesive group at the table.
(3) In healthcare, the Bd set bargain units (i.e. all nurses, alll physicians, all profs, all technicians) w/in one Er.
(1) Excelsior Underwear Inc (1966): election campaign. union asked for names/addresses of voters and Er refused.
(b) If a union loses an election, only way to review the election is to file objects w/ the regional office under the laboratory conditions. Thus, can get administrative review (NOT judicial) to re-run the election.
(c) If an Er refuses to bargain, then § 8 violation (i.e. ULP). Thus, Bd decision on ULP = final order + subject to judicial review.
(2) 1976: Gattman/Goldberg study—Speech during a campaign is unimportant b/c 90% of Ees make up mind by the time the election is set.
(3) Shopping Kart (1977): Held: Bd not to probe into the truth/falsity of campaign statements—instead rely on individual maturity and sophistication to recognize propaganda. But, Bd to intervene and set aside the elections if deceptive campaign practices involve the Bd or its processes OR involves forged documents.
(4) General Knit (1978): Overruled shopping kart and went back to hollywood ceramics.
(5) Midland Natl (1982): Photos of abandoned plants implying that the union put all of those out of work. Also used the union’s report to the Labor Dept to manipulate facts, implying that the union would only collect high salaries for its officers and not pay out to Ees.
(a) Held: Back to Shopping Kart. This is propaganda, not a threat. No violation of laboratory conditions, no ULP. Ers generally have the freedom to say what they want.
(a) Sewell Mfg (1962): Propaganda relates union to blacks, racial integration, communism, anti-Christianity.
(b) DC Circuit case (1999): Labor union appealed to prejudice by appealing to the tension b/t black and hispanic daycare workers. Issue: whether hispanic workers should be allowed to speak spanish.
i) Held: union’s message implicated race, but was ok.
(c) e.g. Union circulated letter of unrelated Japanese businessman who was critical of American workers. Union won the election. Er contests. Ct.App: Letter appealed to racial prejudice.
(c) Cannot have election day raffles (on either side). Bd: Interferes w/ the voting.
(1) § 10(f): Party may have judicial review if “aggrieved by a final order."
1. § 9(a): “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the Ees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all Ees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."
a. Issue: What is a CBA?
(2) 3d party beneficiary k—Ees like 3d parties since CBA is signed b/t Er and Union. Thus, Ees work under the CBA.
b. Issue: What is CBA’s relationship to individual ks of employment?
(1) Individual ks are subsumed into the CBA. CBA is not a k of employment—it only sets the overriding provisions of employment. Individual Ees can bargain w/in this.
(2) In order for Ees to negotiate individual deals, CBA must give express permission to negotiate deals separate and apart from the individual agreement.
(3) If individuals are in the bargaining unit (and union wins election), Ees w/in the unit are represented by the union.
a. HYPO: In the middle of the strike w/ deadlocked negotiations. Co wants to send leaflets to individual Ees to let them know of their position. Can Co distribute ballots to Ees?
4. Emporium Capwell Co v. Western Addition Comm. Org (1975): Er has a CBA w/ provision prohibiting “employment discrimination." African-American Ees protested discrimination by handing out fliers. Ees discharged. Issue: Was the action of the discharged Ees protected by § 7?
a. Held: The Ees’ activity is not protected—even though it is “concerted."
(1) Ees’ concerted activity in response to their bargaining demand (i.e. not protected by the statute) à Ees lose their labor law claim.
1. What is “good faith?"
(1) “Good faith" = present intention to have a basis for agreement; Er must have a sincere desire to reach common ground.
c. § 8(d): “…to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the Er and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment…but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
(a) e.g. when the company simply says, “thank you, we understand your position and will get back to you."
(3) Absolute demands—not alone ULPs, but can indicate bad faith bargaining.
(a) e.g. We will “never agree to a union-security clause of a dues check off."
(b) Take it or leave it proposals—e.g. of bad faith bargaining for refusing to take counter-proposals.
e. NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches (1984): π and Co met 18 times in 11 months. Company did not make any concessions. Co’s proposals kept expanding Er control over mandatory subjects of bargaining. Held: Violation of § 8(a)(5).
(b) Under these facts, union would have been in a worse position with the agreement than without it.
(2) If there is a strong Co and weak union, sometimes this will NOT be considered bad faith bargaining.
f. Bulwarism (1969): Mr. Bulwar engaged in scientific research to survey their Ees over what they wanted to develop a firm and fair proposal, which they marketed as their product. Presented proposal to the union.
(2) Publicity campaign to Ees ≠ protected by § 8(c).
(a) Truitt: Co claimed that they were not able to pay higher wages, so union asked for proof. Held: Any Er who claims they can’t pay must disclose financial status.
(2) Union can get the names and addresses of all Ees from the company b/c it is crucial to the union’s ability to carry out functions. Irrelevant to whether the Co thinks the union only wants to collect dues.
(b) NJ Bell Telephone (1983): 3 Ees marked tardy. Union asked to see absentee and privacy records. Co refused b/c they had their own privacy protection plan that prohibited info to outside people. Held: This is private information and the union cannot get access—even though the info really wasn’t confidential b/c any Ee could answer the phone.
(b) Although this is a non-traditional method of using economic power does not mean that they are not engaging in good faith bargaining.
i) However, slow-down is not a protected activity. Ers could have fired the insurance agents.
b. Unilateral change by the Er in mandatory subjects of bargaining, during bargaining = ULP under § 8(a)(5).
(1) NLRB v. Katz (1962): During bargaining, Co unilaterally changed merit increases, sick-leave, and wage increases. Held: Violation of § 8(a)(5).
(a) Er’s use of its economic power by granting wage increase and changing the sick-leave plan = flat refusal to bargain about those issues (i.e. terms and conditions of employment).
(b) Er essentially took these issues off of the table.
(c) BUT…impasse is a temporary condition that ends once a party decides that they will change.
(2) After impasse, Er may implement the “last offer"
(4) Duffy Tool & Stamping: Er implemented “no fault" attendance policy since parties reached impasse.
a. § 8(d): “…wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment…"
b. Ford Motor Co: Ford wanted to raise the prices of in-plant food. Union protested. No surrounding restaurants, so impracticable for workers to eat off-site. Held: This is a ‘term and condition’ of employment, thus, a mandatory subject of bargaining.
d. re: Christmas bonuses. Look @ status quo. If xmas bonuses are a regular practice (and related to terms of employment), it is considered a wage—not a gift.
e. re: On-site child care. Co wanted to close the child care center. Arguable whether this constitutes a change in social conditions.
f. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp v. NLRB (1964): Maintenance Ees in a bargaining unit. Co decided to contract out the maintenance work to an independent contractor. Co announces the decision 4 days before the k expired. Co insisted that this was b/c of economics, but union brings the grievance to the Bd.
(1) Held: This is a mandatory bargaining subject. Whether you have a job = “terms and conditions of employment."
(a) Decision reinforced by industrial practices around the country—contracting out = mandatory bargaining subject.
i) “…that type of claim is grist in the mills of the arbitrators…"
(c) Issue revolves around the cost of labor (i.e. wage rate). Cost of labor is an amenable subject of bargaining. Union deserves a chance to bargain about the wage rates.
b. First National Maintenance (1981): Maintenance workers for Er, the maintenance company, doing housekeeping for nursing homes in NY. 3/77, union wins elections. Er asks for fee increase from Greenpark nursing home. Union makes demand for bargain. Co gives notice that they are terminating their business w/Greenpark nursing home, and all Ees terminated.
c. Dubuque Packing: Dubuque was relocating its meat packing plant. Bd: If moving the plant w/ no change in the operations (i.e. keeping the same equipment, same assignment of the work, just moving the work) → will be treated like subcontracting in Fibreboard.
i) Must assume what the union would be willing to bargain on or make concessions with. e.g. if the decision to relocate is only based on labor costs, likely that it will be mandatory since the union has power to control or negotiate the cost of work.
(b) If there is a substantial change in the way business is done @ the new location, then the decision to relocate the plant is NOT mandatory.
5. Illegal subjects: ULP to insist upon the inclusion of an illegal provision in the k or to use economic force in support of a demand.
b. (2003): MI auto brake parts mfr relocated several operations to KT after the union was certified. Er refused to bargain about relocation decision (§ 8(a)(5) + § 8(a)(3) b/c motivated by anti-union animus). Little change in mfr operations = mandatory subject.
i) Exception: Co and union reach agreement on a package of proposals. Er then w/draws their proposals. Bd can find bad faith bargaining & order the Co to sign to what they had already agreed.
(2) Union’s recourse: Strike or sign the k w/o the clause in it.
b. Ex-Cell-O Corporation (1970): “Make whole" remedy—e.g. if there is a violation of § 8(a)(5), can the Bd order the Co to pay monetary fine to Ees based on a hypothetical k (i.e. IF the Co had bargained in good faith, this was the agreement we would’ve reached…)?
(1) Ct: No, cannot force the Co to agree to a k they didn’t agree to.
(2) The “make whole" remedy was a topic of the labor law reform in 1978, but failed.
(1) City Sanitation Workers (1985): CA S.Ct: Reversed the c/l prohibition that public (i.e. local govt Ees) Ees couldn’t strike.
a. § 8(d): If CBA is already in effect, need 60 days notice to the other side before the strike. Must notify a federal mediator w/in 30 days of providing notice to the Er.
c. National Emergencies: Strike can be enjoined if the president believes the strike will imperil national health/safety. Required 60-day cooling off period where the union can’t strike then.
a. Thornhill v. Alabama (1940): Ees on strike. Picketer told a non-union Ee to go home. Held: Protected speech since no threats, coercion. Only disseminating info.
b. 1942: Picketing = “speech plus"
(2) Labor pickets ≠ communicate ideas. Instead, pickets coerce people and are designed to provoke an automatic response to a signal.
c. Teamsters v. Vogt (1957): Picketing = “aspect of communication." But can limit or control picketing. Presence of picket line may induce action & thus, is not just disseminating info.
(a) If picketing for an unlawful purpose, then the 1st A allows prohibition here.
(1) Longshoremen v. USSR: Under Taft-Hartley, illegal secondary boycott.
(a) Distinguished from labor picketing since this is a public/political issue, in the heart of the democratic system.
1. § 7: “Ees shall have the right…to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection…"
(a) WA Aluminum (1962): Ees walked out b/c plant was too cold. Held: Concerted activity, even though not directed by the union. Still protected.
iii) Ways individual can be in “concerted activity"
2. Hudgens v. NLRB (1979): Butler Shoe Ees picket the entire shopping mall to protest collective bargaining negotiations. 2nd issue: Is this protected concerted activity?
(1) Here, since primary picketing à stronger § 7 rights. Also, property rights are minimal b/c the mall is open to the public.
3. Problem: Ees want to engage in primary strike activity to Er on 15th floor of a highrise. Must they stay @ entrance on the ground floor or go up to the 15th floor?

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