Source: https://openjurist.org/404/us/1201
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 12:01:21+00:00

Document:
404 U.S. 1201 - Mahan v.
404 US 1201 Mahan v.
Joan S. MAHAN et al.
court the redistricting order decreases representational disparity between the several House districts from 16.4% to 7.2%. In its consideration of the General Assembly's Senate districting formula, the court found it necessary to effect only one change to make allowances for the residences of naval personnel stationed in the Norfolk-Virginia Beach area. The motion here is for a stay of the district court's order pending appeal. In considering questions of this kind an individual Member of the Court to whom the matter is presented should give due consideration to the fact that the four district judges' order was substantially unanimous1 and that the two judges who were subsequently requested to stay their order refused to do so. A single Justice, of course, must also weigh the substantiality of the questions presented in light of this Court's prior decisions. E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 89 S.Ct. 1234, 22 L.Ed.2d 535 (1969). Moreover, it is settled that unless a judge considering the application believes it reasonably probable that four Members of the Court will vote to hear such an appeal the requested stay should not be granted.2 Here, therefore, the basic thing for me to consider is whether four Members of the Court are likely to vote in favor of granting this appeal when the matter is given consideration. On due consideration, I am unable to say that four ----------1.Judge Lewis filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. He fully agreed with all aspects of the ruling with the exception of the court's refusal to create a 10-member multi-member district in Fairfax County.2 Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County v. Davis, 84 S.Ct. 10, 11 L.Ed.2d 26 (1963); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 80 S.Ct. 33, 4 L.Ed.2d 34 (1959); Edwards v. New York, 76 S.Ct. 1058, 1 L.Ed.2d 17 (1956).
trict Court's opinion and order are comprehensive and well reasoned. In my judgment the facts found by the District Court, which do not appear to be materially disputed by the applicants, fully justify the order. Under these circumstances I deny the stay and let the matter await final decision before the full Court when the petition for certiorari is properly presented for consideration. The stay is denied. It is so ordered. Stay denied. Russo v. U. S. [92SCt4,404US1209,30LEd2d13] 92 S.Ct. 4 404 U.S. 1209 30 L.Ed.2d 13 Anthony RUSSO, Jr. v. UNITED STATES.
The question is an important one on which there seems to be conflict among the Circuits. Compare In re Evans, (D.C. Cir. 1971), 452 F.2d 1239, and In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (CA3) (both holding that a grand jury witness has standing to object to illegal wiretaps), with Bacon v. United States, 446 F.2d 667 (CA9) and United States v. Parnas, 443 F.2d 837 (CA9) (to the contrary). But in this case, the United States represented to the District Court that 'no wiretaps of any kind were used in this case.' Applicant, so far as I can ascertain, did not present any evidence of or indicate probable cause for believing (or even suspecting) that his wires had been tapped or that wires of others had been tapped with the result that his privacy had been implicated. There must be some credible evidence that the prosecution violated the law before ponderous judicial machinery is invoked to delay grand jury proceedings.

References: v.

 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.