Source: https://www.ptab.us/2010/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:43:34+00:00

Document:
Ex Parte Sosalla et al 10/738,269 GARRIS 103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.
The scope of claimed limitations is determined by giving the terms in claims their ordinary and accustomed meaning while interpreting the claims as broadly as is reasonable and consistent with the specification. See In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
The Examiner’s position is without merit. We are aware of no authority which supports a per se rule that unless a produced value recited in a claim is further accompanied by an indication in the claim of how it is thereafter used, then the claim is regarded as indefinite. We have considered the two cases cited in the Examiner’s Answer, In re Venezia, 530 F.2d 956 (CCPA 1976) and In re Collier, 397 F.2d 1003 (CCPA 1968). They do not set forth such a rule and the facts in those cases also are not apposite here.
Appellants argue that “the Examiner has been engaged in piecemeal examination of the Application” (Appeal Br. 27). This argument relates to a petitionable matter and not to an appealable matter, because it relates to the manner in which examination has been conducted. See In re Schneider, 481 F.2d 1350, 1356-57 (CCPA 1973) and In re Mindick, 371 F.2d 892, 894 (CCPA 1967). See also the MPEP § 1003 (“All unusual questions of practice may be referred to the Technology Center Directors”) and MPEP §§ 1002.02(c)(3) and 1201.
Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly crossed through citations of a properly submitted Information Disclosure Statement (Br. 28-29). Appellant argues that the Examiner’s decision to cross out specific citations was not related to the Rules, but instead is concerned with the subsequent publication (id.).
We do not find this line of argument, however, to raise any issue that can be decided on appeal. The actions of the Examiner in such a matter are not within our purview. In re Watkinson, 900 F.2d 230, 232-33 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (The Board has no jurisdiction for matters within the discretion of the examiner and not tantamount to a rejection of claims).
As our reviewing court recently stated, “it is not enough to simply show that the references disclose the claim limitations; in addition, ‘it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements as the new invention does.’” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 3257312 at *4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007)).
(1) first, we determine whether, and in what respect, the reissue claims are broader in scope than the original patent claims; (2) next, we determine whether the broader aspects of the reissue claims relate to subject matter surrendered in the original prosecution; and (3) finally, we determine whether the reissue claims were materially narrowed in other respects, so that the claims may not have been enlarged, and hence avoid the recapture rule.
No. Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc., 258 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
It is clear that in determining whether “surrender” of subject matter has occurred, the proper inquiry is whether an objective observer viewing the prosecution history would conclude that the purpose of the patentee’s amendment or argument was to overcome prior art and secure the patent. This is because the recapture rule is aimed at ensuring that the public can rely on a patentee’s admission during prosecution of an original patent. … Thus, if the objective public observer can discern a surrender of subject matter during the prosecution of an original patent in order to overcome prior art and obtain the patent, then the recapture rule should prevent the reissuing of that patent to claim the surrendered subject matter.
Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
A surrender can occur by argument as well as by amendment. Hester [Indus., Inc. v. Stein, Inc.], 142 F.3d [1472,] 1480-84 [(Fed. Cir. 1998)] (noting the statement in Clement that “‘[t]o determine whether an applicant surrendered particular subject matter, we look to the prosecution history for arguments and changes to the claims made in an effort to overcome a prior art rejection’ ” (quoting [In re] Clement, 131 F.3d [1464,] 1469 [(Fed. Cir. 1997)]) (emphasis added in Hester, 142 F.3d at 1480)). We stated in Hester that, like prosecution history estoppel, “unmistakable assertions made to the Patent Office in support of patentability” “can give rise to a surrender for purposes of the recapture rule.” Id. at 1482.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 465 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

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