Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=49790:gr-155299-2007&amp;catid=1494&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 13:00:50+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 155299 - China Banking Corp. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF AVELINA VDA. DE PIÃ‘ERO and EMMANUEL PIÃ‘ERO, Respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision1 dated December 13, 2000, promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57249, which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Pasig City, in Civil Case SCA No. 171; and the CA Resolution2 dated September 16, 2002 which denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
This case originated from an action for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Notice of Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction filed by respondents against herein petitioner China Banking Corporation, Inc., Notary Public Ernesto Bonifacio, Alfonso Kipte, Marivic Kipte and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, with the RTC.
The deceased Avelina Vda. de PiÃ±ero (Avelina), herein respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was the registered owner of two adjoining parcels of land with improvements, consisting of 510 sq m situated in Mandaluyong City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 64018 and 59833. On August 27, 1991, Alfonso Kipte obtained a P1,200,000.00 loan from petitioner, secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage signed by Avelina over her properties. The mortgage was annotated on the titles. The loan was also secured by a surety agreement signed by Kipte as principal and by Avelina as surety. Due to Kipte's failure to pay his indebtedness, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and auction sale was scheduled on August 17, 1992.
On September 6, 1996, Avelina died and was substituted by her heirs.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and ERNESTO BONIFACIO and orders the DISMISSAL of this action.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby permanently LIFTED.
The compulsory Counter-claim of defendant is likewise DISMISSED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of appellants. Appellee bank is further ordered to reconvey the property to appellant heirs of appellant Avelina Vda. de PiÃ±ero.
The CA held that the deceased Avelina was an old widow, 80 years of age and blind even before she purportedly signed the Real Estate Mortgage and Surety Agreement on August 26, 1991 and August 29, 1991, respectively; that Rebecca PiÃ±ero-Galang, daughter of Avelina, testified that in 1985, her mother became totally blind, was not physically fit, and suffered an eye disease or glaucoma; that Avelina herself testified that she was only persuaded to sign the questioned documents as witness; that Ludivina guided her when she signed the foregoing documents; that Avelina did not receive from Kipte, the principal borrower, any amount as consideration of the mortgage attests to her credible theory that she was only a witness to the execution of the documents; that her deportment in court and the fact that she had to be guided to take the witness stand constituted the "strongest proof of blindness"; that the notary public, Atty. Restituto Fano, who claimed to have notarized the Surety Agreement, said that he remembered Avelina to be an old lady, with white complexion and white hair, and who had to be assisted and accompanied to his table to be able to sign the questioned agreements; that Atty. Fano noticed that "she could hardly see"; and that it was unusual for Avelina, a woman of old age, to be so willing to act as surety to a promissory note of petitioner Kipte, a complete stranger, which involved the large amount of P1,200,000.00.
The main issue in this case is one of fact, i.e., whether or not the deceased Avelina signed the real estate mortgage and surety agreement knowingly and voluntarily, with full knowledge of its contents.
As a general rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. But jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court,8 at least two of which are present in the instant case, namely: (1) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (2) when the findings of facts of the lower courts are conflicting.
Petitioner argues, in the main, that respondents admitted that Avelina indeed signed the mortgage and surety agreements in question; that, as notarial documents, they are clothed with the prima facie presumption of regularity and due execution; that Avelina, being of sound and disposing mind despite old age, was duly informed of the nature and purpose of these agreements by petitioner's branch manager and the notary public before she affixed her signature; and that the respondents could have easily submitted a medical certificate attesting to the supposed blindness of Avelina or made an ophthalmologist take the witness stand, but they did neither.
a - I don [sic] not know who guided me because I could not see.
a - I can not remember, sir.
Yes, but precisely the witness is blind.
I will reform my question.
a - That is true, but I could not read, sir.
a - I did not say it to Ludivina Pinero but she said to me that I would merely act as a witness only, sir.
a - No, I did not ask her, sir.
Also established are the facts that Avelina was already blind when she was manipulated into signing the questioned documents by her daughter-in-law, Ludivina, who did not explain to her the contents and true nature of the documents beforehand; that her hand had to be guided by Ludivina during the act of signing; that Avelina did not know that the Surety Agreement and Real Estate Mortgage she signed were to secure the loan Kipte contracted from the petitioner; that she was made to understand that she was to sign only as witness; and that Kipte was a total stranger to her, and, by this reason, it is implausible that she agreed to be his surety.14 In fact, it was only after Avelina received the notices of foreclosure that she learned that there was a mortgage document among the papers she signed.
Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear that Avelina was in fact blind, that she did not know the contents of the documents she signed, and more importantly, that she did not know the capacity in which she was signing these documents.
The evidence presented by respondents are clear and convincing, sufficient to overturn the presumption of regularity of the subject documents.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali (retired), with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 43-50.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired) and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; id. at 52.
5 CA rollo, p. 88.
8 Heirs of Dicman v. CariÃ±o, G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 240, 261.
9 TSN, July 4, 1994, p. 3.
10 Mayor v. Belen, G.R. No. 151035, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 561, 567.
12 See Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 396 Phil. 87, 96 (2000); Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1198, 1221 (1999).
13 TSN, July 12, 1993, pp. 18-20.
14 TSN, September 25, 1992, pp. 8-10.
15 TSN, July 19, 1993, p. 8.
16 TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 12-13.
17 TSN, July 4, 1994, pp. 10-12.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.