Source: https://nuddleman.com/2015/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 09:04:02+00:00

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What are the “Hours Worked” for Purposes of Calculating Employee Pay?
Employers must pay employees for all “hours worked.” But does an employer have to pay an employee when the employee is not actually rendering services on behalf of the employer? The answer may surprise you.
The Industrial Welfare Commission, the agency charged with promulgating California regulations regarding the terms and conditions of employment, typically define “hours worked” as ” the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” This includes any time the employee is required to be in a specific location, and any time the employee actually performs work, even if the work is not previously approved.
These differing definitions lead to confusion and potentially costly mistakes. Employees and employers need to understand which hours are counted as hours worked so that employees can be properly compensated.
Recent California Supreme court decisions make it clear that, unless the employee is covered by Wage Order 5, employees that are required to remain on the premises are entitled to compensation, even if the employee spends some of that time sleeping. There are a few exceptions, such as ambulance drivers, but for the most part employers are required to compensate employees for all hours worked.
Some employers need employees to be available to answer cell phone calls and/or email messages. Depending on several factors, the time spent waiting for the phone to ring or for the email to come may be compensable or not. Is the employee “waiting to be engaged?” or “engaged to wait?” State and federal law define compensable on-call or stand-by time differently. Although technology has made it easier for employees to work away from the job site, that same technology also creates new liabilities for employers.
All employees are entitled to take regular meal and rest breaks. Failure to provide required rest breaks to non-exempt employees can carry significant penalties. Employers are required to maintain accurate records of the hours worked, including meal breaks taken. Employers that do not maintain accurate records of meal breaks have a difficult time defending meal and rest break violation claims. Courts and the Labor Commissioner continue to struggle with how much control an employer can exercise over an employee during the required breaks, and how far an employer has to go to ensure the employee is afforded the opportunity take all required breaks.
Despite the media attention given to this topic, many employers still fail to adequately relieve employees, and large and small companies routinely face litigation involving meal and rest break claims. Employers are much more likely to violate wage and hour laws than anti-discrimination laws, and employees are much more likely to pursue wage claims.
Understanding the employer and employee rights and obligations is the first step in resolving any potential issues. Robert Nuddleman has advised and litigated unpaid wage claims on behalf of hundreds of clients. Because he represents employees and employers, he understands the motivating factors behind the dispute, and how to avoid issues before they become problems, and how to resolve problems when they occur.
The following is a compilation of recent employment cases effective California workplaces.
California and federal courts and administrative decisions alter the landscape and refine the relationship between companies and their employees. The Nuddleman Law Firm stays abreast of recent developments so we can better serve our clients.
Prue v. Brady Company/San Diego, Inc.
Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.
Palacio v. Jan and Gail’s Care Homes, Inc.
Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Services, Inc.
National Labor Relations Board ex. rel. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union v. Fresh and Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc.
Roos v. Honeywell International, Inc.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. McLane Company, Inc.
Miranda v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc.
Vita Planning and Landscape Architecture, Inc. v. HKS Architects, Inc.
San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc.
Idaho Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Inland Pacific Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.
Resilient Floor Covering Pension Trust Fund Board of Trustees v. Michaels Floor Covering, Inc.
Oregon Teamster Employers Trust v. Hillsboro Garbage Disposal, Inc.
IATSE Local 720 v. InSync Show Productions, Inc.
Anti-SLAPP motion filed 632 days after complaint and on eve of second phase of trial was properly dismissed as untimely.
Employee was entitled to legal fees incurred in defending against employer’s aborted appeal of Labor Commission award.
James L. Harris Painting and Decorating, Inc. v. West Bay Builders, Inc.
No error in trial court’s determination that no party prevailed at trial for purposes of attorney fee award.
Supervisor’s log of firefighter’s daily activities was not part of firefighter’s personnel file for purposes of Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act.
Arbitration agreement’s reference to American Arbitration Association’s National Rules bound parties to those rules.
Employer’s contractual arbitration agreement was unenforceable as procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
Corporate officer’s wrongful-termination claim was arbitrable where parties’ agreement incorporated AAA rules.
Arbitration provisions in car purchase agreement did not render it unconscionable.
Employee’s showing that supervisor considered age pertinent to promotion decision raised triable issue of fact under Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Truck drivers entitled to reimbursement under Labor Code section 2802 for paycheck deductions, when misclassified as independent contractors instead of employees.
Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc.
Dismissal of claims under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the Netherlands provided a more convenient forum than Oregon, and the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission was an adequate alternative forum.
Williams v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, P.A.
Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.
Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
District court lacked jurisdiction where Class Action Fairness Act’s “local controversy exception” required remand to state court.
Administrative law judge erred in denying application for disability benefits with no mention of doctor’s report concluding that applicant was disabled.
The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, S220812 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)) [Does the trial court or the arbitrator decide whether an arbitration agreement provides for class arbitration if the agreement itself is silent on the issue?], or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Review granted/briefing deferred.
Defendants Prime Time Shuttle, Inc. (Prime Time), Rideshare Airport Management, LLC, formerly known as Rideshare Port Management, LLC, and Rattan Joea appeal a trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration of claims based on the alleged misclassification of plaintiff Valo Khalatian as an independent contractor rather than an employee. We find the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) applies to the parties’ arbitration agreement, and all of plaintiff’s claims are arbitrable. We also conclude defendants did not waive their right to arbitration even though they waited 14 months after the complaint was filed to move to compel arbitration. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate prejudice from the delay, which is determinative. (Saint Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1203.) We reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition to compel arbitration and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order compelling arbitration of all of plaintiff’s claims.
Petitioner Andre Williams filed a single-count representative action pursuant to the Private Attorney General Act, Labor Code section 2699 et seq. (PAGA), alleging that real party in interest Pinkerton Governmental Services, Inc. (Pinkerton) violated various provisions of the Labor Code. In response, Pinkerton moved to enforce petitioner’s waiver of his right to assert a representative PAGA claim, or alternatively, for an order staying the PAGA claim, but sending the “individual claim” that petitioner had been subjected to Labor Code violations to arbitration pursuant to a written agreement. The trial court denied the motion to enforce the waiver, but granted the alternative relief. Williams petitioned this court for a writ reversing the trial court’s order, arguing that it violated Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 384 (Iskanian). We agree with the trial court that under Iskanian, the waiver of a right to assert a representative PAGA claim in any forum is unenforceable. However, we conclude that petitioner’s single cause of action under PAGA cannot be split into an arbitrable “individual claim” and a nonarbitrable representative claim. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Federal courts have jurisdiction to determine whether entity that previously negotiated on behalf of employees qualified as employees’ Railway Labor Act representative.
Seventeen months and more than 1,300 attorney hours after plaintiff Julio Oregel (Oregel) filed a class action against his former employer, defendant PacPizza, LLC (PacPizza), PacPizza petitioned to compel arbitration of Oregel’s claims. The trial court denied the petition, finding PacPizza waived its right to enforce a purported arbitration agreement between the two parties. PacPizza appeals, primarily contending the court erred in denying the petition, and also asserting two other claimed errors. We conclude the petition was properly denied, a conclusion that moots PacPizza’s remaining arguments. We thus affirm.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in a civil action. This case presents the following issues: (1) Is the health care industry meal period waiver provision in section 11(D) of Industrial Wage Commission Order No. 5-2001 invalid under Labor Code section 512, subdivision (a)? (2) Should the decision of the Court of Appeal partially invalidating the Wage Order be applied retroactively?
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc.
U.S. Supreme Court: Disparate-treatment claimant need show only that his or her need for accommodation was motivating factor in employer’s decision, not that employer had knowledge of that need.
Forum selection clause in employment agreement not enforceable absent showing that enforcement would not impair employee’s statutory rights under Labor Code.
9th Circuit: Employee’s internal appeal of ERISA claim mailed on Monday following Saturday on which appeal period expired was timely.
In this action for disability discrimination and wrongful termination, we affirm a summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer. We do so largely because the plaintiff employee’s alleged disability—an inability to work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress related to the supervisor’s standard oversight of job performance—is not a disability recognized in California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.).
The panel filed (1) an order amending and replacing its prior opinion and denying, on behalf of the court, a petition for rehearing en banc, and (2) an amended opinion.
In the amended opinion, on remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014), the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a class action brought by current and former employees of Amgen, Inc., and an Amgen subsidiary under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, alleging breach of fiduciary duties regarding two employer-sponsored pension plans.
The plans were employee stock ownership plans that qualified as “eligible individual account plans,” or “EIAPs.” All of the plaintiffs’ EIAPs including holdings in the Amgen Common Stock Fund, which held only Amgen common stock.
The Supreme Court held in Fifth Third that there is no presumption of prudence for employee stock ownership plan fiduciaries beyond the statutory exemption from the otherwise applicable duty to diversify. The panel held, therefore, that the plaintiffs were not required to satisfy the criteria of Quan v. Computer Sci. Corp., 623 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2010), in order to show that no presumption of prudence applied.
The panel held that the plaintiffs stated a claim that the defendants acted imprudently, and thereby violated their duty of care, by continuing to provide Amgen common stock as an investment alternative when they knew or should have known that the stock was being sold at an artificially inflated price. The panel concluded that there was no contradiction between defendants’ duty under the federal securities laws and ERISA.
The panel held that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the defendants violated their duty of loyalty and care by failing to provide material information to plan participants about investment in the Amgen Common Stock Fund. Agreeing with the Sixth Circuit, the panel held that the defendants’ preparation and distribution of summary plan descriptions, including their incorporation of Amgen’s SEC filings by reference, were acts performed in their fiduciary duty.
The panel also reversed the dismissal of derivative claims, as well as a claim that the defendants caused the plans directly or indirectly to sell or exchange property with a party-in interest. Because the Amgen Plan contained no clear delegation of executive authority, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of Amgen from the case as a nonfiduciary. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge W. Fletcher wrote that, contrary to the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, the panel’s opinion did not hold that as a general matter, when previously concealed material information about a company is eventually revealed, the stock price will inevitably decline by more than the amount it would have declined as a result of merely withdrawing the fund as an investment option. The opinion also did not impose on fiduciaries an obligation to act when they only suspect that there has been a violation of the federal securities laws. Finally, the opinion did not impose on ERISA fiduciaries greater disclosure obligations than those imposed under the federal securities laws.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski, joined by Judges O’Scannlain, Callahan, and Bea, wrote that the opinion failed to give effect to the creation in Fifth Third of stringent new requirements for plaintiffs who sue fiduciaries under ERISA for imprudent investment in an employer’s stock. Judge Kozinski wrote that the opinion created almost unbounded liability for ERISA fiduciaries and subjected corporations to novel, judicially-fashioned disclosure requirements that conflict with those of the securities laws.
U.S. Supreme Court: Statute permitting extension of time to file qui tam actions against government contractor during time of war applies only to criminal charges, not to civil claims.
U.S. Supreme Court: Time limits on breach of fiduciary claim against 401(k) plan administrators not violated so long as claim alleging continuing breach of prudence occurs within six years of suit.
9th Circuit: Video actress not entitled to mandatory preliminary takedown injunction absent protectable copyright interest in brief film performance.
Petitioners Eduardo Garcia, Garcia Transportation GP, and Luis Torres-Garzon seek relief from the April 25, 2014 order of respondent court (Michael P. Vicencia, Judge) granting the motion of real party in interest Southern Counties Express, Inc. to compel arbitration of Petitioners’ wage and hour complaints to the Labor Commissioner. We grant the requested relief in part and remand to the trial court with directions.
Beginning in January 2012, plaintiff Michael Williams was an employee at a retail store operated by Marshalls of CA (Marshalls) in Costa Mesa, California. On March 22, 2013, after a little more than one year of employment, he brought a representative action against Marshalls under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, §§ 2698-2699.5), alleging Marshalls failed to provide its employees with meal and rest breaks or premium pay in lieu thereof (Lab. Code, §§ 226.7 & 512), to provide accurate wage statements (§ 226, subd. (a)), to reimburse employees for necessary business-related expenses (§§ 2800 & 2802), and to pay all earned wages during employment (§ 204).
Plaintiff served special interrogatories seeking production of the names and contact information of all nonexempt Marshalls employees in California who had worked for the company beginning on March 22, 2012. Marshalls objected to the discovery on the ground it was irrelevant, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and implicated the privacy rights of its employees. Plaintiff met and conferred with Marshalls, offering to address its privacy concerns with a “Belaire-West notice,” but Marshalls rejected the offer.
Plaintiff moved to compel the discovery, arguing the contact information was routinely discoverable in representative employee actions and vital to the prosecution of his PAGA claims. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion in part, compelling Marshalls to produce contact information for the employees only at its Costa Mesa store and denying production of the contact information of employees at Marshalls other 128 stores statewide. The court ordered that plaintiff could renew his motion to compel the remaining information after he had been deposed “for at least six productive hours.” The court also ruled that in opposition to any such motion, Marshalls could attempt to show plaintiff’s substantive claims had no factual merit.
In these writ proceedings, plaintiff seeks a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its discovery order and enter a new order granting plaintiff’s motion to compel production a list of all nonexempt employees who worked for Marshalls beginning on March 22, 2012.
Employer may raise union ‘ s abandonment of employees as defense to union ‘ s request for mandatory mediation and conciliation.
Employer may not assert union’s abandonment as defense to bargaining request.
Procedural amendment to Labor Code extended cancer presumption to firefighter who died before law took effect.
The panel held that employee Michael Ashbey knowingly waived his right to a judicial forum for his Title VII claim and equivalent state-law claims, reversed the district court’s order denying Archstone Property Management, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration, and remanded for entry of an order granting Archstone’s motion.
The scope of the Federal Arbitration Act is narrowed by federal statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which limits “the enforcement of arbitration agreements with regard to claims arising under” the statute. Kummetz v. Tech Mold, Inc., 152 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1998).
concluded that the arbitration provision was enforceable.
9th Circuit: Neither Fair Debt Collection Practices Act nor California ‘ s Rosenthal Act precluded debt collector ‘ s letter seeking ten percent interest on debt.
Decision to exclude temporary staffing agencies from workers ‘ compensation self-insurance program had rational basis.
Purchase of additional service credits did not entitle police officers or firefighters to supplemental benefits after they took disability retirement.
Kimberli Hirst, an employee of American Forensic Nurses, Inc. (AFN), brought a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claim against the City of Oceanside (City), alleging she was sexually harassed by an Oceanside police officer, Gilbert Garcia, while she was providing phlebotomist services on behalf of the Oceanside Police Department. The jury found Hirst proved her claim and awarded her $1.5 million in damages against the City. After reducing the amount for which Garcia was found responsible, the court entered judgment in Hirst’s favor for $1.125 million.
The City moved for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). In the new trial motion, the City contended the damages award was unsupported by the evidence. In the JNOV motion, the City argued Hirst was not entitled to recover under the FEHA because she was not a City employee, special employee, or a “person providing services pursuant to a contract” under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)(1).
Hirst did not appeal from the new trial order, but the City appealed from the denial of its JNOV motion, contending Hirst had no standing to recover damages on her FEHA claim against the City. We determine the evidence supports that Hirst was a “person providing services pursuant to a contract” and therefore she was entitled to recover against the City for its employee’s sexual harassment. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).) Based on this conclusion, we do not reach the additional asserted ground for standing (whether Hirst was a “special employee” of the City). We affirm the court order denying the JNOV motion and remand for further proceedings under the court’s new trial order.
Plaintiff who alleged disparate treatment as Latino failed to state claim under California Constitution ‘ s anti-affirmative action provision.
Nam Min Cho appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside the default judgment in this [wage and hour, PAGA, wrongful termination, and retaliation] action. Cho raises two main contentions, one relating to purportedly improper or fraudulent service of the summons and complaint, and the second relating to the amount of damages awarded in the default judgment. We find the first contention lacks merit but the second does not. We hold the default judgment is void because it exceeded the amount of damages stated in the complaint. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions.
This month the United States Department of Labor reported that from 2011 to 2014 it recovered more than $6.8 million in overtime and unpaid minimum wages for more than 1300 employees in Bay Area nursing homes and residential care facilities.
This controversy—which involves the wrongful denial of unemployment compensation benefits—began in January 2010 because of a pair of shoes. More than five years later, appellant Employment Development Department (EDD or the Department) continues to refuse to award Jose Robles (Robles) the benefits to which he would have been entitled absent the Department’s error, this despite being ordered to do so twice by the trial court and once by this court. (See Robles v. Employment Development Dept. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1029 (Robles I).) Most recently, in response to Robles’s motion to enforce writ of administrative mandate, the trial court in August 2013 ordered EDD “to pay withheld federal extension benefits, costs and interest in the amount of $45,560.39, within 30 days.” Instead, the Department appeals, arguing that Robles is not entitled to benefits for weeks in which he did not certify that he was able, available, and actively looking for work in accordance with EDD’s current regulatory scheme. Thus, EDD asserts, the trial court’s order is at odds with both federal and state law. The Department, unfortunately, has shown itself repeatedly unable to see the forest in this matter, instead focusing doggedly on the bureaucratic trees. Having reviewed in some detail EDD’s response to the directives of both courts involved in this matter, we see no error in the trial court’s order and therefore affirm.
Plaintiff Loring Winn Williams sued defendant Chino Valley Independent Fire District (the District) for employment discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) The trial court granted summary judgment for the District and, in a separate order, awarded the District its court costs. Williams appealed from the latter order, contending that in the absence of a finding his action was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, defendant should not have been awarded its costs.
The issues presented are these: Is a defendant prevailing in a FEHA action entitled to its ordinary court costs as a matter of right pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, or only in the discretion of the trial court pursuant to Government Code section 12965, a provision of FEHA itself? And, if the trial court does have discretion, must that discretion be exercised according to the rule applicable to attorney fee awards in certain federal civil rights actions under Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412 (Christiansburg), according to which a prevailing defendant receives its attorney fees only if the plaintiff’s action was objectively groundless?
We conclude Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), governs cost awards in FEHA actions, allowing trial courts discretion in awards of both attorney fees and costs to prevailing FEHA parties. We further conclude that in awarding attorney fees and costs, the trial court’s discretion is bounded by the rule of Christiansburg; an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant’s fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in a civil action. This case presents the following issues: (1) Do Labor Code, § 226.7, and Industrial Welfare Commission wage order No. 4-2001 require that employees be relieved of all duties during rest breaks? (2) Are security guards who remain on call during rest breaks performing work during that time under the analysis of Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833? Review granted/brief due.
Courts have authority to review whether the EEOC has fulfilled its Title VII duty to attempt conciliation. This Court has recognized a “strong presumption” that Congress means to allow judicial review of administrative action. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670. That presumption is rebuttable when a statute’s language or structure demonstrates that Congress intended an agency to police itself. Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349, 351. But nothing rebuts that presumption here.
In order to comply with that provision, the EEOC must inform the employer about the specific discrimination allegation. Such notice must describe what the employer has done and which employees (or class of employees) have suffered. And the EEOC must try to engage the employer in a discussion in order to give the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice. A sworn affidavit from the EEOC stating that it has performed these obligations should suffice to show that it has met the conciliation requirement. Should the employer present concrete evidence that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage in a discussion about conciliating the claim, a court must conduct the fact finding necessary to resolve that limited dispute. Should it find for the employer, the appropriate remedy is to order the EEOC to undertake the mandated conciliation efforts.
Civil service commission did not err in dismissing writ proceeding following petitioner ‘s death.
Peace officer ‘ s execution of warrant was not protected activity under anti-SLAPP statute.
Defendants in contract dispute were properly charged with proving that plaintiff would have incurred claimed reliance damages even in absence of their breach.
California law governed enforceability of pre-dispute jury trial waiver where federal law offered less protection of right to jury.
Billing statements sent from counsel to client were privileged communications exempt from disclosure under California Public Records Act.
The panel withdrew the opinion filed on February 25, 2015, and replaced it with an amended opinion, and reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Sears, Roebuck and Co. in a former employee’s diversity action alleging disability discrimination claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.
The panel held that the employee presented triable claims under FEHA: (1) that Sears discriminated against the employee because of his disability; (2) that Sears declined to accommodate the employee’s disability; and (3) that Sears did not engage in an interactive process to determine possible accommodation for the employee’s disability. The panel noted that it was beside the point that some of the employee’s evidence was self-serving because such testimony was admissible, though absent corroboration, it may have limited weight by the trier of fact at trial. The panel further noted that a district court could disregard a self-serving declaration that stated only conclusions and not facts that would be admissible evidence. The panel remanded for further proceedings.
The panel reversed the district court’s order that a settlement agreement be enforced in an employment discrimination action filed by a physician. The agreement included a provision that the physician waive his rights to employment with the defendant or at any facility that the defendant may own or with which it may contract in the future.
The panel held that the parties’ private party contract dispute regarding whether the no-employment provision voided the settlement agreement was ripe for review under the traditional ripeness standard.
The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in holding that Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600, which provides that a contract is void if it restrains anyone from engaging in a lawful profession, did not apply solely because the no-employment provision in the settlement agreement did not constitute a covenant not to compete. The panel remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Dissenting, Judge Kozinski wrote that the settlement agreement was not void because the no-employment provision did not limit the physician’s current ability to practice his profession.
Reyes v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
The panel reversed the district court’s order remanding the case to state court, and remanded with instructions for the district court to exercise federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.
Defendant Dollar Tree Stores removed the case from state to federal court in 2012 invoking jurisdiction under CAFA, and the district court granted plaintiff Richard Reyes’ request to remand back to state court because the CAFA $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement was not satisfied. In May 2014, a California superior court certified a broader class and the amount-in-controversy for the class actually certified exceeded $5 million. Dollar Tree again removed to federal court, and the district court found removal untimely because the order was based on the same complaint that was the subject of the first removal.
The panel held that the state court’s class certification order created a new occasion for removal, and the second removal was permissible. The panel also held that the second removal was timely because Dollar Tree removed within thirty days of the class certification order. The panel concluded that because the jurisdictional requirements of CAFA were met, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendant timely removed state-court class action under Class Action Fairness Act.
Amendment of city retirees ‘ right to cost of living increase illegally impaired vested pension rights.
Broad release of claims encompassed negligent supervision claim against adult supervisor of juvenile tortfeasor.
Defendant Superior Court of Nevada County (SCNC) appeals a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and former employee Emily Gallup. Gallup brought this action alleging, in part, that SCNC retaliated against her in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) for engaging in protected activity when she complained to her supervisor, other court management, and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) that the Family Court Services Department (FCS) was not providing services in compliance with the law, rules, regulations, and policies. SCNC demurred to this cause of action on the ground Gallup had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under section 98.7.
The trial court overruled the demurrer, relying on Lloyd v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 320. The case was tried before the jury on the section 1102.5, subdivision (b) cause of action alone, as all Gallup’s other causes of action were disposed of by demurrer or summary judgment. The jury found in Gallup’s favor, awarding her past economic loss in the amount of $168,206, future economic loss in the amount of $105,000, and past noneconomic loss in the amount of $40,000, for a total of $313,206.
SCNC appeals from the judgment, raising as the only issue the trial court order overruling the demurrer. We shall conclude that Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311 (Campbell), is the controlling authority, and shall reverse the judgment.
Texas-based enterprise with no more than eight percent of operations in California was not subject to general personal jurisdiction in California.
Party forfeited reliance on presumption of invalidity of service by failing to properly raise it in trial court.
An individual pregnant worker who seeks to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence may do so through application of the McDonnell Douglas framework by showing that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying accommodation. That reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those whom the employer accommodates. If the employer offers a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason, the plaintiff may show that it is in fact pretextual. The plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. This approach is consistent with the longstanding rule that a plaintiff can use circumstantial proof to rebut an employer’s apparently legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, see Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 10, and with Congress’ intent to overrule Gilbert.
Under this interpretation of the Act, the Fourth Circuit’s judgment must be vacated. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). The record here shows that Young created a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from hers. It is left to the Fourth Circuit to determine on remand whether Young also created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS’ reasons for having treated Young less favorably than these other nonpregnant employees were pretextual.
U.S. Supreme Court: A company ‘s statement of opinion prior to issuance of stock is not actionable as an “untrue statement of … fact ” simply because the stated opinion later proves to be incorrect, so long as no material facts were omitted regarding the issuer ‘s inquiry into, or knowledge concerning, that statement.
9th Circuit: Federal disability law did not require retail store to provide wheelchair user enough room to pull restroom door open.
9th Circuit: Car dealership “service advisors ” were not exempt from overtime pay requirements of Fair Labor Standards Act.
Minute order awarding attorney fees not “final judgment ” subject to postjudgment interest.
Kohler v. Presidio International, Inc.
9th Circuit: Americans with Disabilities Act plaintiff not required to offer expert evidence to establish store counter ‘s height.
9th Circuit: Civil rights claims of two Yemeni-born Muslim seamen against private company that operated U.S.-owned ship should have been brought against U.S. government in admiralty.
Mediation confidentiality statutes barred client from suing attorneys for malpractice based on their advice to him during mediation.
I-CA Enterprises, Inc. v. Palram Americas, Inc.
No basis for joint and several liability as to two defendants that committed independent tortious acts resulting in plaintiff ‘s loss of profit.
Purported “judgment ” filed by trial court was not final and could not be appealed.
Madeline Serafin (Serafin) sued her former employer Balco Properties Ltd., LLC and related individuals and entities (collectively Balco) alleging claims arising from her employment, including wrongful termination, harassment, and defamation. The trial court granted Balco’s motion to stay the litigation until the completion of binding arbitration based upon an arbitration agreement Serafin signed when she was hired by Balco. The arbitrator ultimately found in Balco’s favor on all issues, and the trial court granted Balco’s petition to confirm the arbitration award, entering judgment in Balco’s favor.
On appeal, Serafin argues the trial court erred in concluding her claims against Balco were subject to arbitration, contending she never entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate her employment-related claims. Alternatively, assuming the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate, Serafin contends the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. We disagree, and affirm the judgment in Balco’s favor.
Ventura County employees Timothy S. Lanquist and Thomas W. Temple appeal a judgment denying their petition for a writ of mandamus to compel VCERA to grant their requests to purchase retirement service credit for military service as midshipmen at the Academy. We reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring VCERA to grant their requests.
Junior lienholder’s attempts to collect on unenforceable debt may be actionable if they misrepresent debt’s enforceability.
Marvalyn DeCambre, M.D., appeals a judgment entered after the trial court granted special motions to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 brought by defendants Rady Children’s Hospital-San Diego (RCHSD), Children’s Specialist San Diego (CSSD) and the Regents of the University of California (Regents) (collectively, defendants), and also sustained defendants’ demurrers to certain causes of action in DeCambre’s complaint. DeCambre, a physician specializing in pediatric urology, filed an action against RCHSD, CSSD and the Regents alleging retaliation, harassment, racial discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and wrongful termination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). DeCambre also brought claims against all defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), defamation, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.). The theme of DeCambre’s complaint is that throughout her tenure at RCHSD, defendants discriminated against her because of her race and gender.
Each defendant filed a special motion to strike DeCambre’s complaint. The trial court granted the motions in full on the ground that all of DeCambre’s causes of action arose from RCHSD’s decision not to renew its contract for DeCambre’s services, which was the culmination of a peer review process that is protected as an official proceeding authorized by law under section 425.16, subdivision (e). The court also sustained defendants’ demurrers to DeCambre’s claims for IIED, defamation, unfair competition and violation of the Cartwright Act and denied DeCambre’s request for leave to amend.
On appeal, DeCambre contends that the trial court erred in granting the special motions to strike because the defendants’ peer review process was not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP statute and even it was, her claims did not arise from that process. DeCambre also challenges the resulting attorney fee awards and the trial court’s order sustaining defendants’ demurrers. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions as to DeCambre’s claims for harassment and IIED. These claims do not arise from protected activity under section 425.16 and we reject the defendants’ attempt to cloak them in the protections afforded to peer review proceedings under the anti-SLAPP statute. Because we reverse this portion of the anti-SLAPP ruling, we also reverse and remand the attorney fee awards. In addition, we remand with directions that the court determine whether DeCambre should be afforded leave to amend her claim for defamation.
9th Circuit: Plaintiffs failed to state due process claim in action challenging California State Controller ‘s application of Unclaimed Property Law.
Conversations recorded at direction of law enforcement were admissible in hearing on employee ‘s termination.
Code Civ. Proc. Section 685.040 authorizes post-judgment attorney fees incurred in enforcing judgment for fees awarded for successful defense of SLAPP suit.
9th Circuit: Employer had to satisfy Norris-Laguardia Act ‘s “clean hands ” provision before seeking anti-strike injunction under Railway Labor Act.
Intellectual property policy exclusion was applicable to unfair competition claims based on unauthorized use of name or likeness.
Summary judgment may be entered on enforcement actions for violations of state and local laws without immediate determination of penalty issues.
Prejudgment interest may not be awarded on costs.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes the procedures federal administrative agencies use for “rule making,” defined as the process of “formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” 5 U. S. C. §551(5). The APA distinguishes between two types of rules: So-called “legislative rules” are issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking, see §§553(b), (c), and have the “force and effect of law,” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 302–303. “Interpretive rules,” by contrast, are “issued . . . to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers,” Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87, 99, do not require notice-and?-comment rulemaking, and “do not have the force and effect of law,” ibid.
In 1999 and 2001, the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division issued letters opining that mortgage-loan officers do not qualify for the administrative exemption to overtime pay requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In 2004, the Department issued new regulations regarding the exemption. Respondent Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) requested a new interpretation of the revised regulations as they applied to mortgage-loan officers, and in 2006, the Wage and Hour Division issued an opinion letter finding that mortgage-loan officers fell within the administrative exemption under the 2004 regulations. In 2010, the Department again alter edits interpretation of the administrative exemption. Without notice or an opportunity for comment, the Department withdrew the 2006 opinion letter and issued an Administrator’s Interpretation concluding that mortgage-loan officers do not qualify for the administrative exemption.
Held: The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is contrary to the clear text of the APA’s rulemaking provisions and improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the APA’s maximum procedural requirements.
(a) The APA’s categorical exemption of interpretive rules from the notice-and-comment process is fatal to the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine. The D. C. Circuit’s reading of the APA conflates the differing purposes of §§1 and 4 of the Act. Section 1 requires agencies to use the same procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they used to issue the rule, see 5 U. S. C. §551(5), but it does not say what procedures an agency must use when it engages in rulemaking. That is the purpose of §4. And §4 specifically exempts interpretive rules from notice-and-comment requirements. Because an agency is not required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those procedures to amend or repeal that rule.
(b) This straightforward reading of the APA harmonizes with longstanding principles of this Court’s administrative law jurisprudence, which has consistently held that the APA “sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural correctness,” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 513. The APA’s rulemaking provisions are no exception: §4 establishes “the maximum procedural requirements” that courts may impose upon agencies engaged in rulemaking. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 524. By mandating notice-and-comment procedures when an agency changes its interpretation of one of the regulations it enforces, Paralyzed Veterans creates a judge-made procedural right that is inconsistent with Congress’ standards.
(c) MBA’s reasons for upholding the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine are unpersuasive.
(1) MBA asserts that an agency interpretation of a regulation that significantly alters the agency’s prior interpretation effectively amends the underlying regulation. That assertion conflicts with the ordinary meaning of the words “amend” and “interpret,” and it is impossible to reconcile with the longstanding recognition that interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law. MBA’s theory is particularly odd in light of the limitations of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which applies only when an agency has previously adopted an interpretation of its regulation. MBA fails to explain why its argument regarding revised interpretations should not also extend to the agency’s first interpretation. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, and Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87, distinguished.
(2) MBA also contends that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine reinforces the APA’s goal of procedural fairness. But the APA already provides recourse to regulated entities from agency decisions that skirt notice-and-comment provisions by placing a variety of constraints on agency decision-making, e.g., the arbitrary and capricious standard. In addition, Congress may include safe-harbor provisions in legislation to shelter regulated entities from liability when they rely on previous agency interpretations. See, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §§259(a), (b)(1).
(3) MBA has waived its argument that the 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation should be classified as a legislative rule. From the beginning, this suit has been litigated on the understanding that the Administrator’s Interpretation is an interpretive rule. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed this argument below, and MBA did not raise it here in opposing certiorari.
9th Circuit: Retailer ‘ s failure to maintain wheelchair-navigable aisles violated customer ‘ s accessibility rights under Americans with Disabilities Act.
Rush v. Sport Chalet, Inc.
9th Circuit: Landlord properly joined in Americans with Disabilities Act complaint against retailer.
9th Circuit: Nursing home was entitled to review or dismissal of all cited quality of care violations.
Trabert v. Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc.
Unconscionable arbitration provisions in auto purchase agreement were severable.
9th Circuit: Pilot who turned 60 only six days before agency rule that required retirement at sixty was abrogated by legislation did not qualify for exception to non-retroactivity.
Law firm that represented attorney in fee dispute against former client was disqualified from representing third party in similar fee dispute against same client.
Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (Securitas) petitions for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition challenging the superior court’s order granting its amended motion to compel arbitration in which the court ordered the parties to arbitrate all of real party in interest Denise Edwards’s claims, including her class action and representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, §§ 2698 et seq.). Securitas contends the court impermissibly rewrote the parties’ written dispute resolution agreement, which contained an express waiver of class, collective or representative claims; it argues the parties did not mutually agree to arbitrate class and/or representative claims and the agreement should have been deemed silent on arbitration of any class or representative action. It further contends the court erred by refusing to enforce the lawful class action waiver, as well as the PAGA waiver, because as to the latter, Edwards’s waiver was voluntary, rendering the circumstances unlike those in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian), certiorari denied sub nom. CLS Transportation Los Angeles v. Iskanian (Jan. 20, 2015, No. 14-341) 2015 WL 231976. Securitas argues that because Iskanian does not apply, the parties’ arbitration agreement should be enforced in its entirety as to Edwards’s individual claims.
We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that Iskanian rendered the PAGA waiver within the parties’ dispute resolution agreement unenforceable. However, the court then erred by invalidating and severing the waiver provision, including an enforceable class action waiver, from the agreement and sending Edwards’s entire complaint, including her class action and PAGA claims, to arbitration. Under the plain language of the parties’ agreement, in the event Edwards sought to arbitrate a PAGA claim, her PAGA waiver (or any other waiver of the right to bring a dispute as a class or collectively) was not severable from the remainder of the agreement, thus rendering the entire dispute resolution agreement unenforceable and precluding the court from requiring the parties to arbitrate their disputes. Though we grant Securitas’s petition to the extent it seeks to set aside the order compelling Edwards’s class and PAGA claims to arbitration, we deny the remainder of its requested relief, and based on our de novo interpretation of the parties’ agreement, direct the trial court to enter a new order denying Securitas’s amended motion to compel arbitration.
Petitioner Universal Protection Service, L.P. (Universal) petitions for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition challenging the superior court’s order granting real party in interest Floridalma Franco’s demand to arbitrate her employment-related disputes with Universal and ruling the arbitrator would decide the arbitrability of Franco’s class action claims. Universal contends the court legally erred in its ruling because the parties’ arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably submit arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, and thus it was for the superior court to decide whether the agreement authorized class and/or representative arbitration.
We conclude the court erred by granting Franco’s petition in reliance on Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle (2003) 539 U.S. 444 (Bazzle). Nevertheless, we agree with Franco that the parties’ reference to American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules, which unambiguously state that the arbitrator is to decide whether the parties’ arbitration agreement permits class arbitration, constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of their intent that the arbitrator decide this issue, which is a threshold question of arbitrability. Because the trial court reached the correct conclusion, we deny the petition.
Following the rule announced in Iskanian, we reverse and remand with directions the trial court’s order denying the petition of defendant Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (Arakelian) to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims for individual and class action relief, and for representative relief under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, §§ 2698-2699.5) (PAGA).
Eva Mies seeks to bring a class action against her former employer, Sephora U.S.A., Inc. (Sephora), on behalf of employees who, like her, worked as Specialists in Sephora’s California retail stores. Mies claims Sephora misclassified Specialists as exempt from certain provisions of California labor law and, as a result, failed to pay overtime wages and failed to compensate them for missed meal periods. However, after crediting evidence that all Specialists do not engage in the same tasks to the same extent, the trial court denied class certification, concluding individualized issues, not common ones, would predominate the determination of liability. We conclude the trial court used proper legal criteria in assessing class certification and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. We therefore also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification.
California Supreme Court: Freeway Service Patrol Act contract did not make California Highway Patrol special employer of contracted tow truck driver.
Mies v. Sephora U.S.A., Inc.
Trial court did not err in denying class certification where evidence supported conclusion that allegedly underpaid workers did not engage in same tasks to same extent.
Subcontractor’s cross-complaint did not preclude trial court’s grant of general contractor’s application for writ of attachment.
The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Sears, Roebuck and Co. in a former employee’s diversity action alleging disability discrimination claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.
The panel held that the employee presented triable claims under FEHA: (1) that Sears discriminated against the employee because of his disability; (2) that Sears declined to accommodate the employee’s disability; and (3) that Sears did not engage in an interactive process to determine possible accommodation for the employee’s disability. The panel noted that it was beside the point that some of the employee’s evidence was self-serving because such testimony was admissible, though absent corroboration, it may have limited weight by the trier of fact at trial. The panel remanded for further proceedings.
May the second-place bidder on a public works contract state a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against the winning bidder if the winner was only able to obtain lowest bidder status by illegally paying its workers less than the prevailing wage? We hold that the answer is yes if the plaintiff alleges it was the second lowest bidder and therefore would have otherwise been awarded the contract, because that fact gives rise to a relationship with the public agency that made plaintiff’s award of the contract reasonably probable.
Nothing in the [Public Contract Code] or legislative history suggests the law applies to interference claims based on prevailing wage violations.
Engagement letter supported award of attorney fees incurred in collecting unpaid legal fees.
Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc.
Health club’s release of liability was applicable to injury resulting from exercise machine failure.
9th Circuit: Plaintiff failed to show restroom door was not in compliance with Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines.
The genesis of this dispute is an employment discrimination action filed by appellant Raymond E. Horne (Horne) in which the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of respondent District Council 16 International Union of Painters and Allied Trades (District Council 16). In particular, the trial court held that—because Horne was unable to establish that he was qualified for the union organizer position he unsuccessfully sought—he had failed to state a prima facie case of racial discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) On appeal, Horne contends that the trial court improperly considered after-acquired evidence of a prior narcotics conviction in determining that he was ineligible for the organizer job. Horne also claims that, even if the after-acquired evidence was admissible, the trial court erred in concluding that the conviction disqualified Horne from employment as a union organizer. District Council 16, for its part, disagrees with Horne’s assertions, argues that his discrimination claim is preempted by the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), and seeks sanctions from Horne for filing a frivolous appeal. Upon due consideration, and in light of the holding and rationale in Salas, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. We also deny District Council 16’s request for sanctions.
Bias against women and non-Muslims rendered Iran unsuitable alternative forum for resolving property dispute.
Cross-defendant and appellant the County of Los Angeles, by and through its Sheriff’s Department and Lee Baca (County), sought to compel individual arbitrations of grievances by certain union employees employed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) and the now defunct Office of Public Safety (OPS) and represented by cross-complainants and respondents the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (LAPPOA) and the Associations for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) (collectively Unions). The trial court refused to compel such arbitrations, ruling that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 (section 1281.2) gave it discretion, in the interest of judicial economy, to stay the arbitration of arbitral issues between the parties while it resolved issues between the parties that were not subject to arbitration, which resolution might make arbitrations unnecessary. Because we hold that all of the issues between the parties were subject to individual arbitrations and therefore the part of section 1281.2 upon which the trial court relied was inapplicable, we reverse.
Homebuyer released and waived all future claims when he settled construction defect dispute with builder.
Injured city worker was properly found to be unable to perform the essential functions of his job.
Three health care workers sued their hospital employer in this putative class and private attorney general enforcement action for alleged Labor Code violations and related claims. In this appeal, their primary complaint is a hospital policy illegally let health care employees waive their second meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours.
A statute requires two meal periods for shifts longer than 12 hours. But an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) authorizes employees in the health care industry to waive one of those two required meal periods on shifts longer than 8 hours. The principal issue before us concerns the validity of the IWC order.
We conclude the IWC order is partially invalid to the extent it authorizes second meal break waivers on shifts longer than 12 hours. However, with one exception, the retroactive application of our conclusion must be litigated on remand. We also determine the court incorrectly granted summary judgment and denied class certification.
Defendant could not assert anti-SLAPP motion as means to excise allegations from plaintiff’s mixed causes of action.
In this putative class action, plaintiff Francisco Marenco contends that defendant DirecTV LLC violated state wage and unfair competition laws. (Lab. Code, § 212; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 (UCL).) DirecTV moved to compel arbitration as the successor to an arbitration agreement between Marenco and his previous employer, 180 Connect, Inc., which was acquired by DirecTV. The trial court granted the motion over Marenco’s objections that DirecTV is not a signatory to the agreement, and that the agreement’s class action waiver is unconscionable under state law.
In this appeal from the judgment (order) staying the class claims and compelling arbitration of the individual claims, we conclude that DirecTV has standing to enforce the agreement, that the agreement’s class action waiver is enforceable under AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (Concepcion), and that the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian), which was issued while this appeal was pending, is controlling.
Plaintiff Monnie Wright was a correctional officer at San Quentin State Prison (San Quentin), who lived on the San Quentin premises, in a unit he rented from his employer, defendant State of California (State). Wright was injured when he fell in the course of his lengthy walk from his home to his actual place of work. Following his injury, Wright sought workers’ compensation, and received it. He thereafter filed suit against the State, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’ compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy, an argument based on the “premises line” rule, which provides that the employment relationship commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.
We reverse, concluding that it was error to hold Wright’s tort claim barred solely because he was on his employer’s premises at the time of his fall, particularly where Wright lived on those very premises.
Plaintiff and appellant Wilfredo Velasquez appeals from a judgment after jury trial of his product-related personal injury action. Velasquez alleged his lung disease was caused by workplace exposure to a chemical compound, diacetyl, that was distributed by defendant and respondent Centrome, Inc. dba Advanced Biotech (Advanced). The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s special verdict which included findings, as to multiple causes of action, that Advanced’s acts were not a substantial factor in causing harm to Velasquez.
After finding the issue relevant to Velasquez’s ability to receive a lung transplant, the trial judge advised the prospective jurors during jury selection that Velasquez is an undocumented immigrant. Velasquez claims the jurors who decided his case were incapable of being fair given their knowledge of his immigration status. We find the trial court erred when it disclosed Velasquez’s undocumented immigrant status to the venire of prospective jurors, and in denying a motion for mistrial. We find the denial of Velasquez’s motion for mistrial requires that the judgment be reversed.
Plaintiff Jennifer Augustus and others, formerly security guards employed by defendant ABM Security Services, Inc. (hereafter ABM), allege on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals that ABM failed to provide rest periods required by California law in that it failed to relieve security guards of all duties during rest breaks, instead requiring its guards to remain on call during breaks. The trial court certified a class and granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication, concluding an employer must relieve its employees of all duties during rest breaks, including the obligation to remain on call. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment on the issue of damages, seeking unpaid wages, interest, penalties, attorney fees and an injunction. Finding no triable issue as to whether ABM was subject to approximately $90 million in statutory damages, interest, penalties, and attorney fees, the court granted the motion.
The summary adjudication and summary judgment orders rest on the premise that California law requires employers to relieve their workers of all duty during rest breaks. We conclude the premise is false, and therefore reverse the orders. We affirm the certification order.
Denial of employer’s right to cross-examine injured employee at workers’ compensation hearing violated due process.
Employee’s violation of employer’s written policy justified arbitration award in employer’s favor.
Amendment of club bylaws providing for arbitration after club members filed action against club was ineffective.
Service of notice of entry of judgment by party who later moved for new trial did not trigger jurisdictional deadlines for that motion.
Acceptance of payment in full barred creditor from seeking attorney fees incurred in collection efforts.
9th Circuit: Clear error for district court to intervene in pending arbitration based on court’s prediction that any award would likely be vacated due to arbitrator’s “evident partiality” under Federal Arbitration Act.
The panel affirmed the dismissal, pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging failure to pay minimum wages and overtime wages.
The panel held that under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), it is not enough for a complaint under the FLSA merely to allege that the employer failed to pay the employee minimum wages or overtime wages. Rather, the allegations in the complaint must plausibly state a claim that the employer failed to pay minimum wages or overtime wages. Agreeing with the First, Second, and Third Circuits, the panel held that detailed factual allegations regarding the number of overtime hours worked are not required, but conclusory allegations that merely recite the statutory language are not adequate. A plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime payments must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week.
The panel held that the complaint in this case did not state a plausible claim because it did not allege facts showing that there was a specific week in which the plaintiff was entitled to but denied minimum wages or overtime wages.
U.S. Supreme Court: Sixth Circuit’s reliance on supposition as to intentions of parties to collective bargaining agreement violated ordinary principles of contract law.
Fairness of contract properly determined by looking at contract as whole and not at unfavorable provisions only.
U.S. Supreme Court: Federal air marshall’s disclosure to media that Transportation Security Administration was reducing overnight missions in order to cut costs was not “specifically prohibited by law” under Homeland Security Act.
Employment application’s arbitration clause was itself sufficient to establish that employee and employer agreed to arbitrate employment-related disputes.
Breach of contract action could not be based on alleged breach of preliminary title report.
Mailing address was not “unknown” to plaintiff merely because personal service could not be effected at that address.
Party could not be compelled to testify regarding responses to pretrial requests for admission.
Here we hold that, under the California wage order covering security guards, these plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for all on-call hours spent at their assigned worksites under their employer’s control.
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ on-call time constituted hours worked within the meaning of Wage Order 4 and was subject to the wage order’s minimum wage and overtime provisions. We reverse the court’s conclusion that state and federal regulations permitted CPS to exclude sleep time from plaintiffs’ 24-hour shifts.
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment remanding the putative class action to state court, and held that the defendants Knight Transportation, Inc., and Knight Truck and Trailer Sales had shown that they were entitled under the Class Action Fairness Act to proceed in federal court because they had established the requisite $5 million amount in controversy.
The plaintiff putative class of truck drivers alleged that Knight misclassified them as independent contractors and asserted other labor law violations, and filed their action in California state court. Knight removed the case to federal court and estimated the amount in controversy for reimbursing the drivers’ lease-related and fuel costs to be at least $44 million In Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., __ F.3d __. No. 14-56779 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 2015), filed simultaneously with this opinion, the panel held that when a defendant relies on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, the chain of reasoning and its underlying assumptions must be reasonable.
The panel applied the framework of analysis in Ibarra to defendants’ proof, and concluded that defendants had met their burden of proof because defendants relied on a reasonable chain of logic and presented sufficient evidence to establish that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million.
The panel vacated the district court’s order remanding the putative class action to state court, and remanded to the district court to allow both parties the opportunity to submit evidence and arguments whether the $5 million amount in controversy requirement under the Class Action Fairness Act had been satisfied where the complaint did not include a facially apparent amount in controversy or may have understated the true amount in controversy.
The plaintiff putative class of employees sued in state court alleging violations of California’s Labor Code, and explicitly alleging that damages did not exceed $5 million. Defendant Manheim Investments, Inc. removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, asserting more than $5 million was at stake based on a “pattern and practice” of labor law violations.
The panel held that because the complaint did not allege that Manheim universally, on each and every shift, violated labor laws by not giving rest and meal breaks, Manheim bore the burden to show that its estimated amount in controversy relied on reasonable assumptions. The panel also held that a remand to the district court was necessary to allow both sides to submit evidence – direct or circumstantial – related to the contested amount in controversy. The panel further held that if the damages assessment included assumptions, the chain of reasoning and the assumptions needed some reasonable ground underlying them. The panel concluded that Manheim relied on an assumption about the rate of its alleged labor law violations that was not grounded in real evidence, and remanded on an open record for both sides to submit proof related to the disputed amount in controversy.
Defendant Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. (Inter-Con) appeals from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of a putative wage and hour class action filed by plaintiff Brian Bower. Inter-Con contends the trial court erred in finding that it waived its right to compel arbitration by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with the right to demand arbitration. Inter-Con further argues that Bower’s claims should be arbitrated and that the arbitration should be limited in scope to Bower’s individual claims in light of a waiver of class claims contained in the parties’ arbitration agreement. Because we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of waiver, we affirm the order denying the petition to compel.
Name appended to email not shown to be electronic signature for purposes of Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.
Plaintiffs Frank Koval, Mike Williams, Vanmark Strickland, and Donald Washington filed this consolidated class action lawsuit against their employer, defendant Pacific Bell Telephone Company (d.b.a. AT&T California) (Pacific Bell). They alleged Pacific Bell violated California law by failing to relinquish control over their activities during meal and rest break periods, and moved for class certification. Relying, in part, on Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 (Brinker), the trial court concluded plaintiffs failed to show Pacific Bell’s allegedly restrictive policies had been consistently applied to the putative class members. The court denied class certification on the ground that common questions do not predominate over individual questions, making the class action procedure an inappropriate method for resolving this dispute. We affirm.
County sheriff’s department not “person” for purposes of civil rights claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
After respondent Doctor’s Medical Center (DMC) terminated Carolyn Satyadi’s employment, Satyadi sued DMC, its owner the West Contra Costa Healthcare District (the District), and various DMC officials. Satyadi claimed she had been fired in retaliation for reporting and refusing to participate in her employer’s allegedly illegal activities. Her complaint alleged causes of action under Labor Code section 1102.5.
Respondents filed a demurrer, arguing Satyadi had not filed a complaint with the Labor Commissioner under section 98.7 before bringing her action, and thus her suit was barred by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court agreed with respondents, ruling that Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311 (Campbell) required Satyadi first to seek relief from the Labor Commissioner before filing suit in court. It therefore entered a judgment dismissing Satyadi’s action, and Satyadi appealed to this court.
While her appeal was pending, the Legislature amended the Labor Code to specify that employees such as Satyadi need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit for violations of the Labor Code, unless the provision under which suit is brought expressly requires exhaustion. We asked the parties to brief whether these amendments apply to this appeal. We conclude they do, and we therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings on Satyadi’s complaint.

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