Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/life-sentence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:37:30+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Wilder on Thursday, February 25, 2016.
In accordance with the law in 1999, defendant was sentenced to mandatory life without parole based on his conviction of first-degree murder after deliberation. Defendant was a juvenile when the crime was committed.
In February 2015, the Court of Appeals reconsidered defendant’s sentence based on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). The Court concluded that defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for an individualized determination of whether life without parole was an appropriate sentence. The Court’s decision was based on the conclusion that Miller applied retroactively.
In June 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court decided People v. Tate, 2015 CO 42, holding, among other things, that Miller did not apply retroactively. Acting on a petition for certiorari, in October 2015 the Colorado Supreme Court vacated the decision in this case and remanded for reconsideration in light of Tate. At that time, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___ (2016), was pending in the U.S. Supreme Court. The division decided to wait for the result in Montgomery before deciding defendant’s case under Tate.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Montgomery in January 2016. The effect of Montgomery was to overrule that portion of Tate concluding that Miller should not be applied retroactively. As directed by the Colorado Supreme Court, and in light of Montgomery, the Court of Appeals reached the same result and remanded this case to the trial court, directing it to consider whether life without the possibility of parole is an appropriate sentence given defendant’s “youth and attendant characteristics.” If the trial court concludes that life without possibility of parole is unwarranted, life with the possibility of parole after 40 years is the appropriate sentence.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Ellis on Thursday, August 13, 2015.
Juvenile—Murder—Life Sentence—Eighth Amendment—Possibility of Parole—Life Expectancy—Direct Transfer Hearing—Jury Selection—Batson Challenge.
Ellis was 17 years old when he shot and killed C.H. and wounded N.A. from the backseat of his friend’s car. Defendant was found guilty of the charges against him for these crimes. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after forty years on the first-degree murder conviction and a thirty-two-year consecutive sentence for the attempted first-degree murder–extreme indifference conviction.
On appeal, Ellis contended that his sentence to life with the possibility of parole after a minimum of forty years’ imprisonment, together with his mandatory consecutive term of thirty-two years imprisonment, is the equivalent of life without the possibility of parole and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of homicide. Ellis’s sentence would constitute a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole, and therefore would be unconstitutional, if it left Ellis without a meaningful opportunity for release. However, because Ellis’s contention depended on a factual determination of his life expectancy, which the trial court did not previously conduct, the case was remanded to the trial court to make this determination.
Ellis contended that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a direct transfer hearing. CRS § 19-2-517(1)(a)(I) permits prosecutors to charge juveniles 16 years old or older as adults, without a transfer hearing, if their charges include a class 1 or 2 felony. The reenacted statute included a provision allowing juveniles charged by direct filing to file a motion with the district court seeking transfer to juvenile court. However, the reenacted statute became effective three days after a jury convicted Ellis. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied Ellis’s reverse transfer motion as untimely.
Ellis also contended that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his Batson challenge to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse two potential jurors on account of their race. The prosecution provided a race-neutral explanation, the court found the prosecutor’s reasons believable, and the trial court’s ruling is supported by the record. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it denied Ellis’s Batson challenges.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Lehmkuhl on Thursday, June 20, 2013.
Juvenile Prosecuted as Adult—Sentence—Cruel and Unusual Punishment—Constitutional—Eight Amendment—Parole—Mitigating Factors.
Defendant Jordan Lehmkuhl appealed the district court’s order denying his Crim.P. 35(c) motion challenging, on cruel and unusual punishment grounds, the constitutionality of sentences he received in connection with acts committed while he was a juvenile. The order was affirmed.
In October 2001, Lehmkuhl, who was then 17 years old, broke into a house where three high school girls were staying. While brandishing a gun, he bound the girls’ hands with duct tape, put a blanket over their heads, and rummaged around the house. He then took one of the girls out of the house, placed her in the trunk of a car, and, after driving the car for some distance, sexually assaulted her in the backseat of the car. Lehmkuhl was prosecuted as an adult, convicted, and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling seventy-six years to life imprisonment.
On appeal, Lehmkuhl contended that his sentence constituted unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment because it does not provide him with a meaningful opportunity of being paroled within his lifetime. The Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide crime to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Here, the record indicates that Lehmkuhl will become eligible for parole in 2050, when he is 67 years old. Pursuant to CRS § 13-25-103’s mortality table, Lehmkuhl’s life expectancy is 78.2 years. Therefore, Lehmkuhl would have a meaningful opportunity for release during his natural lifetime because his life expectancy exceeds his date of parole eligibility. Accordingly, Lehmkuhl’s sentence was not a de facto life without parole sentence.
Lehmkuhl next contended that in sentencing him, the district court did not properly consider his age and other mitigating factors. The record here, however, reflects that the district court considered Lehmkuhl’s youth, as well as several other mitigating factors, including his lack of a criminal record and reputation in the community. Thus, the record shows that the court afforded Lehmkuhl the individualized sentencing determination to which he claims he was entitled.

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