Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/99-7073/99-7073a-2011-03-24.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:44:37+00:00

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The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on April 4, 2000.
Bruce M. Bender argued the cause for the appellee. Su- zanne L. Lawrence entered an appearance.
Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) challenges the district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law on the claims Jimmy Duncan brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. ss 12101 et seq. (1994), and for which a jury returned a verdict awarding Duncan $250,000 in compensatory damages: $125,000 for the "decision not to reasonably accommodate [him]" and $125,000 "as a result of [WMATA's] decision to terminate [him]." Judgment on the Verdict, p p 7, 8. WMATA also challenges two post-trial orders granting attorney's fees and costs and one post-trial order granting backpay and prejudgment interest.
We conclude that Duncan failed to establish he was dis- abled and thus protected under the ADA and, therefore, reverse the district court's order denying judgment as a matter of law. We also vacate the jury verdict and the post- trial orders noted above.
Duncan, forty-seven years old at the time of trial, attended high school and trade school in electronics but completed neither. He has an employment history of unskilled labor positions, many requiring heavy lifting. He began working for WMATA in May 1986 as a custodian, a position that required him to lift between 75 and 100 pounds. Duncan then became an Automated Fare Collector (AFC) parts run- ner in November 1991. He testified that 30 pounds was the heaviest lifting required and his testimony was corroborated by that of a co-worker. In early December 1992, as a result of another employee's grievance, Duncan was transferred involuntarily to the Elevator/Escalator branch (ELES) into a position requiring heavy lifting.
From 1989 to 1992 Duncan sustained several back injuries including an off-duty automobile accident in February 1992. Some of the injuries required a number of weeks away from work or on light duty but in each instance Duncan was able to return to work without restriction. On December 16, 1992, working his third night in ELES, Duncan re-injured his back. Duncan reported the injury to his supervisor, John Weston, who referred him to WMATA's Associate Medical Director, Dr. Mary O'Donnell. Duncan also saw his orthopaedist, Dr. Harvey N. Mininberg. At that time, Dr. Mininberg limited Duncan's lifting to no more than 20 pounds. See Joint Appendix (JA) 60. After another visit in late January 1993, Dr. Mininberg confirmed the restriction. See id. 61.
The medical restriction precluded Duncan from returning to his job in ELES. Weston told Duncan that no light duty position was available in ELES and Duncan was placed on leave without pay. Between December 1992 and August 1993 Duncan periodically contacted Weston and Weston's supervi- sor to inquire about light-duty work. Duncan also applied for two vacancies in his former AFC position, one in March and the other in July. Apparently Duncan's first application was not forwarded to the decisionmaker, Charles Beuttner, but the second was. Beuttner declined to interview Duncan for the second position after learning that Duncan was in the process of being terminated, see infra, and was "physically disqualified." JA 307-08.
letter stated that Duncan could not perform heavy lifting but could work in the AFC position. Believing WMATA already had decided to fire him, however, Duncan never submitted the letter to WMATA. Weston had drafted a letter of termination on August 31, citing failure to respond to re- quests from WMATA's medical office but the letter was not sent until October 7, 1993.
We review de novo the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. See Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 658- 59 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We will not disturb a jury verdict "unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree on the verdict." Id. at 659 (quot- ing Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Evidence supporting the verdict, however, must be "more than merely colorable; it must be significantly probative." Id. (quoting Smith, 135 F.3d at 782).
plaintiff had a 'disability.' " E.g., Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1999); accord Smith v. Midline Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999).
When the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase "substantially limits" __________ 1 The ADA also protects individuals who have "a record of such an impairment" and those whose employers "regard[ ] as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. s 12102(2). Duncan makes no claim under either alternative approach.
requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs.... To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs. Id. at 2151 (emphasis added). The Sutton Court stressed that "whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry," id. at 2147 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624), and noted several factors courts "should consider" when making this determination, including the accessible geograph- ical area and the number of similar jobs within that area from which the individual also is disqualified. Id. at 2151. Ulti- mately in Sutton, the Court held that the plaintiffs' disqualifi- cations from their current jobs due to impairment did not establish that they were substantially limited in their ability to work, particularly where other jobs utilizing their skills were available to them. See id.
[A]n individual does not have to be totally unable to work in order to be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of working. An individual is substan- tially limited in working if the individual is significantly restricted in the ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, when compared with the ability of the average person with comparable qualifications to perform those same jobs. For example, an individual who has a back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the individual's impairment elimi- nates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs. This would be so even if the individual were able to perform jobs in another class, e.g., the class of semi-skilled jobs. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(j), App. (emphasis added).
WMATA insists that Duncan failed to prove his degenera- tive disc disease substantially impaired his ability to work. While conceding that Duncan, through medical testimony, established a lifting restriction of approximately 20 pounds,2 WMATA argues he did not establish, as he must, that he was thereby disqualified from a "broad class of jobs" as Sutton instructs. WMATA cites Duncan's failure to proffer expert testimony from a vocational rehabilitation specialist and testi- mony or statistical evidence regarding the numbers of jobs from which he was disqualified. Other than relying on his limited educational background and work experience, Duncan offers only his testimony that he inquired about some truck driving positions.
__________ 2 Dr. Karim's September 1993 evaluation, which Duncan did not submit to WMATA, and the testimony of both doctors at trial indicated that the previous 20-pound restriction was a good guide- line but that Duncan could also lift somewhat heavier objects.
__________ the court stated that surviving a motion for summary judgment "require[s] at least some evidence from which one might infer that [plaintiff] faced 'significant restrictions' in her ability to meet the requirements of other jobs." Id. at 1259 (quoting Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.1998)). Accord- ingly, the court declared that the existence of a genuine issue of fact turned on its evaluation of the declaration of a vocational rehabilita- tion specialist, which was "the only evidence which might show that [plaintiff] is barred from significant percentages of available em- ployment in the [geographical] area" because of her impairment. 192 F.2d at 1257. In the end, the court found that the declaration lacked a medical foundation and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
officer "compelled" holding of insufficient evidence of substan- tial limitation on major life activity of working).
Several cases involve a plaintiff with a limitation similar to Duncan's. In Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed a lifting restriction of no more than 25 pounds on a regular basis and more only rarely. The court found the plaintiff failed to prove a substantial limitation despite having established the lifting restriction: "[Plaintiff] points to no evidence that the restrictions ... preclude her from engaging in an entire class of jobs. Nor does she offer the information relevant to this particularized determination." 121 F.3d at 540. The Thomp- son court also cited decisions from other circuits finding similar lifting restrictions not substantially limiting. See id. (citing Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (25-pound lifting limitation, as matter of law, "does not constitute a significant restriction on one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity"); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (25-pound lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff not substantially impaired by limitation on heavy lifting where he otherwise could lift and reach)); see also Snow, 128 F.3d at 1207 ("[A] general lifting restriction imposed by a physician, without more, is insufficient to constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA.").
could name no other kind of job he investigated as part of his effort to find employment. See id. 138; see also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151 ("If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs.").
informs us what positions were generally available in his geographic area for unskilled workers, much less for workers with a lifting restriction like his. Not only have our sister circuits required this type of evidence but the Supreme Court has told lower courts to consider these factors when making individualized determinations of disability. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. The evidence Duncan offered to establish that his impairment substantially limited his ability to work is no more than "merely colorable" and it is not significantly proba- tive. Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Therefore, we find the evidence insufficient to support the jury's necessary finding that Duncan was a person with a disability under the ADA. Accordingly, Dun- can's claim fails as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of March 26, 1998 denying WMATA's motion for judgment as a matter of law is reversed. The judgment on the jury verdict entered May 29, 1997 is vacated, as are the district court's post-trial orders awarding attorney's fees and costs and granting Duncan backpay and prejudgment interest.
__________ upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with ... later pronouncements") (emphasis added). We therefore decline to follow the EEOC's guidelines here.
Edwards, Chief Judge, dissenting: On the record at hand, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Mr. Duncan was disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The majority opinion proposes a standard of proof in ADA cases that is unprecedented and unsupported. The case law from our sister circuits does not support the majority's position. And recent Supreme Court decisions construing the ADA cannot be stretched to accommodate the majority's rigid formulation of a plaintiff's burden of proof under the statute. The jury's verdict in this case should stand.
The defendant claims no legal error--i.e., no alleged im- proper exclusions or admissions of evidence and no alleged faulty jury instructions. If this case involved legal error that was found not to be harmless, we would merely remand for a new trial pursuant to the correct legal standard. See, e.g., Griffin v. Washington Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding for a new trial because of errone- ous exclusion of evidence). The defendant here seeks much more, however, claiming that the jury verdict should be set aside and judgment entered against the plaintiff for lack of sufficient evidence. In other words, in asking this court to issue a judgment of law in its favor, the defendant seeks to have us " 'intrude[ ] upon the jury's domain.' " McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Carter v. Duncan-Higgins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). This is something that a court will rarely do, because neither the trial judge nor an appellate court may " 'usurp[ ] the prime function of the jury as the trier of the facts.' " Id. at 646 (quoting Lind v. Schenley Indus., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960) (en banc)); see also Stenograph, L.L.C. v. Bossard Assoc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's denial of a judgment as a matter of law for defendants); Burns v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 114 F.3d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (reversing magistrate's grant of a judgment as a matter of law for defendant); Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's denial of defendant's motion for a judgment as a matter of law); Mackey v. United States, 8 F.3d 826, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's grant of a judgment as a matter of law for defendant); Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d 708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (giving jury awards "the utmost of deference and respect") (internal quotation marks omitted). Under well-established case law that is designed " 'to protect the litigants' right to jury trial,' " McNeal, 836 F.2d at 647 (quoting Lind, 228 F.2d at 90), the courts are strictly limited from either granting a new trial or granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. To this end, the law is clear that a verdict "will withstand challenge unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree on the verdict." Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1999). In light of this very narrow standard of review, there is no basis upon which to set aside the jury verdict in favor of Mr. Duncan.
The ADA defines a disability as, inter alia, "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C. s 12102(2)(A) (1994). Mr. Duncan's back condition consti- tutes a physical "impairment" under the statute. The only question at issue here is whether he provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that his impair- ment "substantially limits" any of his major life activities.
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Id. s 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
the following factors may be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the ma- jor life activity of "working": (A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; (B) The job from which the individual has been dis- qualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or (C) The job from which the individual has been dis- qualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes). Id. s 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).
The question that we face is whether the "evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not dis- agree," Swanks, 179 F.3d at 933 (internal quotation marks omitted), that Mr. Duncan was not significantly restricted in his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. The majority essentially holds that, because Mr.
Duncan provided no quantitative evidence detailing the rele- vant job market, no reasonable juror could conclude that he was significantly restricted in his ability to perform either a class or a broad range of jobs. In my view, the majority asks too much of an ADA plaintiff, for neither the statute, regula- tions, nor case law require quantitative evidence of the sort that the majority here demands.
It is beyond peradventure that a plaintiff cannot establish that he is substantially limited in his ability to work simply by showing that he is disqualified from one particular job. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999). At the same time, however, courts do not require ADA plaintiffs to prove that almost all jobs are outside their reach in order to avoid summary judgment or a judgment as a matter of law. See DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[A]n employer cannot avoid liability by showing that the employee is still generally capable of doing some economically valuable work in the national economy."). Rather, courts require "at least some evidence from which one might infer that [the plaintiff] faced 'significant restric- tions' in her ability to meet the requirements of other jobs." Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing what plaintiff must do to defeat a motion for summary judgment); see also Swain v. Hillsborough County Sch. Bd., 146 F.3d 855, 858 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Although a plaintiff seeking recovery under the ADA is not required to provide a comprehensive list of jobs which she cannot per- form, the person must provide some evidence beyond the mere existence and impact of a physical impairment to sur- vive summary judgment.").
In determining what "class of jobs" is relevant for deciding whether the plaintiff is substantially limited in his ability to work, the analysis must focus on the personal characteristics of the particular plaintiff. Thus, a court must reasonably look to a plaintiff's "expertise, background, and job expectations." Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1996). Indeed, as one court has commented, "it is not easy to envision how any other approach could be taken." Mondze- lewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1998) (adopting approach "under which an individual's train- ing, skills, and abilities are taken into account in determining whether the individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working").
serious dispute, that he was precluded from performing jobs requiring medium, heavy, and very heavy lifting; this is a sufficiently broad class of jobs to satisfy the requirements of the statute. Cf. Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding maintenance supervisory work to be a class of jobs); DePaoli, 140 F.3d at 673 (considering "any assembly line job that required repetitive movement" to be a class of jobs).
was unable to perform jobs similar to that from which he was fired. After moving out of his apartment because of his inability to pay rent, Mr. Duncan eventually took a part-time light-duty job with a rental car company in which he earns approximately one-third of his previous salary.
The majority focuses attention, however, on a few decisions that mention a lack of quantitative evidence with respect to the relevant job market in holding that a plaintiff failed to offer sufficient proof for a jury to conclude that he or she was disabled. None of these cases can be stretched to support the majority's apparent per se requirement that an ADA plaintiff provide quantitative evidence detailing the job mar- ket. Rather, they establish the relevance, not the necessity, of such evidence.
For example, the instant case is easily distinguishable from Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The Thompson court did not treat detailed statistical evidence as a sine qua non of an ADA claim, but focused on the plaintiff's failure to provide job market evidence in the face of the defendant's proffer of an affidavit from a vocational counselor stating that the plaintiff, a nurse, remained qualified for a number of registered nurse positions. See id. at 540 (noting, in addition, that plaintiff remained employed in the health care industry). The defen- dant made no such showing here.
insisted that "correction officer" was a class of jobs. Because the plaintiff presented no evidence that he was precluded from jobs other than correction officer, the court had no real choice but to issue a judgment as a matter of law for the defendant. See 187 F.3d at 313.
Finally, the language taken by the majority from Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Department, 158 F.3d 635, 645 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1253 (1999), is not inconsistent with a jury verdict in favor of Mr. Duncan. Unlike the plaintiff in Colwell, whose "only evidence concerned the gen- eral restrictions imposed by his doctor," id., Mr. Duncan also provided evidence as to his education and vocational history. That the plaintiff in Colwell was faulted for not providing evidence of the "kinds of jobs," id. (internal quotation marks omitted), from which he was disqualified does not mean that the Colwell court expected detailed quantitative evidence of the relevant job market. There is no indication that the Second Circuit would have been dissatisfied if the plaintiff had simply provided more and better qualitative evidence from which a jury could have inferred a substantial limitation in his ability to work.
motion for a judgment as a matter of law, that the jury could have reasonably concluded that plaintiff's depression, testified to by plaintiff and physician, "substantially impaired the major life activity of working," while referring to no evidence regarding classes of jobs for which she was disqualified); Cline, 144 F.3d at 303-04 (finding a jury verdict of intentional discrimination under the ADA supportable where plaintiff showed that he was disqualified from maintenance superviso- ry work, and where the court made no mention of vocational evidence); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether plaintiff's diabetes is a disability under the ADA because plaintiff's condition made him irritable and unable to cooperate with co-workers, an ability "necessary for all but the most solitary of occupations," without reference to quantitative vocational evidence); Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that summary judgment for defendant was improper even though the record did not show how many jobs plaintiff was disqualified from because of the impairment); Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether bladder infection resulted in a substantial limitation of working with no reference to testimony about job market); Pritchard v. Southern Co. Svcs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury where an engineer suffered symptoms of "marked fatigue, lack of energy, lack of interest, poor concentration, memory problems, suicidal thoughts, depressed affect, and irritability" that limited her ability to work in nuclear engineering, even though she was able to work as a non-nuclear engineer).
the plaintiff. See Pritchard v. Southern Co. Svcs., 1995 WL 338662, at *8-9 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 1995) (finding that plain- tiff did not allege sufficient evidence to support her disability claim). Nonetheless, following review, the decision of the court of appeals never even mentions the quantitative evi- dence in reversing the district court's holding that the plain- tiff had not alleged sufficient evidence to reach a jury. See Pritchard, 92 F.3d at 1134.
limited in working where plaintiff provided evidence that he could perform "no overhead work, heavy lifting, or pulling and pushing out from his body," because these restrictions "might apply to a broad range of jobs, and are more than job specific").
In short, the weight of the case law from our sister circuits indicates that the existence of Mr. Duncan's disability should be evaluated based upon his individual characteristics, that he must show that he is disqualified from more than one particu- lar job, and that relevant proof to determine whether he is disabled may include his education, work history, and evi- dence of the job market. Other courts have been more likely to focus on the inadequacy of quantitative vocational evidence where the defendant has made a showing regarding the plaintiff's eligibility for employment. The defendant made no such showing in this case. Mr. Duncan offered more than enough to have his case heard and decided by a jury. And this court acts beyond its authority in taking the case from the jury.
he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification." Id. at 2139. It was undisputed, according to the Court, that in fact petitioner was "generally employable as a mechanic." Id. This lack of evidence put forward by petitioner combined with the uncon- troverted evidence put forth by respondent that he could "perform jobs such as diesel mechanic, automotive mechanic, gas-engine repairer, and gas-welding equipment mechanic" convinced the Court that petitioner was not regarded as substantially impaired in the major life activity of working. Id. The Court's decision nowhere suggests that an ADA plaintiff must present quantitative evidence within the rigid formula devised by the majority here in order to demonstrate a substantial limitation in the major life activity.
pilot instructor to name a few, that are available to them." Id. In Sutton, then, as opposed to the instant case, the plaintiffs could only allege exclusion from one particular job, which has long been insufficient to support a claim of disabili- ty under the ADA.
[t]he EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of work- ing, including the geographical area to which the individ- ual has reasonable access, and "the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abili- ties, within the geographical area, from which the indi- vidual is also disqualified." ss 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B). Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. Nothing in the EEOC regula- tions, however, says that a plaintiff must in every case proffer quantitative evidence detailing the relevant job market. In- deed, the relevant regulations both pre-Sutton and post- Sutton suggest that courts may look to the available job market as one among several relevant factors in evaluating whether or not an individual is disabled. Sutton does nothing to change this.
nia, at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 1999). The court in Broussard, however, found the expert's vocational report to be unreliable for two reasons ignored by the majority: the expert assumed, based on no documented evidence, that the plaintiff had a lifting restriction; and the expert incorrectly assumed that the plaintiff could only type for 15 minute intervals when testing had established she could type for 50 minute intervals. See Broussard, 192 F.3d at 1258. Obvious- ly, in such circumstances, an expert's testimony should be rejected as unreliable. More importantly, Broussard cites Bolton v. Scrivner approvingly, indicating the relevance of three separate types of evidence for the purposes of establish- ing a disability: a plaintiff's vocational training, the geograph- ical area to which he has access, or the number and types of jobs from which a plaintiff is disqualified. See Broussard, 192 F.3d at 1258 (citing Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944).
To defeat the University's motion for summary judg- ment, Broussard needed to "identify what requirements posed by the class of [animal care] jobs ... were proble- matic in light of the limitations that [CTS] imposed on her. This is not an onerous requirement, but it does require at least some evidence from which one might infer that [plaintiff] faced 'significant restrictions' in her ability to meet the requirements of other jobs." David- son v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.1998). Broussard has failed to meet this require- ment. Broussard, 192 F.3d at 1259. The court's references to "not an onerous requirement," "at least some evidence," and "one might infer" are a far cry from what the majority seeks here.
As one of our sister circuits has observed, in the context of proving a substantial limitation of the major life activity of working, Sutton and Murphy principally stand for the propo- sition that an ADA plaintiff must "do more than allege that he is regarded as having an impairment which prevents him from working at a particular job." Shipley v. City of Univer- sity City, 195 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1999). This is not an earth-shaking notion, nor is it one that shatters the founda- tion of the ADA. However, that a plaintiff is not "disabled" merely because he or she cannot perform a preferred job is a far cry from saying that, in order to prevail under the ADA, a plaintiff must in every case proffer expert testimony from a vocational specialist and statistical evidence regarding the numbers of jobs from which he was disqualified. In adopting this rule, the majority essentially holds that, in order to prevail under the statute, ADA plaintiffs must prove, with quantitative certainty, that almost all jobs are outside their reach. The statute does not require this, nor do the opinions from the Supreme Court. This rigid formulation simply rewrites the statute--something we have no authority to do-- and virtually ensures that very few plaintiffs will ever prevail under the ADA in this circuit.

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