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KENTRIDGE AJ: The Pretoria News is a daily newspaper published in Pretoria. The first appellant is the editor of the Pretoria News, the second appellant is the owner and publisher of the newspaper, the third appellant is a journalist employed on the newspaper and the fourth appellant is its distributor. During February and March, 1993, the newspaper published a series of six articles dealing with the supply by air of arms and other material to the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA. The tenor of the articles was that South African citizens were engaged in these operations, that the operations were covert, and that they entailed the evasion of South African air control regulations. The flights were described in the articles as “illegal” and as “pirate flights.” The articles suggested that those responsible for the flights were “fuelling the war in Angola”, and were doing so for motives of personal gain, notwithstanding the disastrous effect of the Angolan civil war on the inhabitants of that country. The articles were published under the by-line of Dale Lautenbach, the third appellant.
 On 25th May, 1993, the Defendants filed a joint plea. The Defendants admitted publishing the articles, but denied that they meant that the Plaintiffs were involved in illegal activities, or that the articles were defamatory of the Plaintiffs. In the alternative the Defendants alleged that the general subject matter of the articles was a matter of public interest. On this basis they pleaded a “rolled-up” defence of fair comment1 - namely that in so far as the references to the Plaintiffs were expressions of opinion, those opinions constituted fair comment made in good faith on matters of public interest, and were based on facts truly stated in the articles themselves; and that in so far as the articles contained allegations of fact those allegations were true and were matters of public interest. There was a further allegation by way of defence that the Defendants had published the articles in good faith in pursuance of a duty to its readers and to the public in general to keep them informed of “facts, opinions and allegations” concerning the civil war in Angola, that its readers had a corresponding right to be so informed and that in the premises the publication of the articles “was not unlawful.”2 All allegations of damage were denied.
 I have given only a brief and simplified summary of the Defendants’ plea because it is not in issue in the proceedings in this Court. What has brought the Defendants, as appellants, to this Court is the fate of an application to amend their plea by adding a further defence. Notice of intention to amend the plea was given by the Defendants on 7 October, 1994. The significance of this date is that it was subsequent to the coming into force of the interim Constitution on 27thth April, 1994, in terms of section 251(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. The Plaintiffs objected to the proposed amendment, and it is necessary to set out in full both the proposed amendment and the grounds on which the Plaintiffs objected to it.
12.15.1 The articles in question were published against the background and in the circumstances described in paragraphs 12.1 - 12.9 hereof in good faith and without the intention of defaming the plaintiffs.
12.15.2 The articles concern matters of public interest and were published pursuant to a duty to keep members of the public informed of facts, opinions and allegations concerning the on-going civil war in Angola and a corresponding right or legitimate interest on the part of readers of the Pretoria News to be informed of such facts, opinions and allegations.
 The question whether Chapter 3 of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights) has only a “vertical” application or has in addition a “horizontal” application has been the subject of considerable debate by commentators on the Constitution. There have been similar debates, both academic and judicial, in other countries with constitutional Bills of Rights. The term “vertical application” is used to indicate that the rights conferred on persons by a Bill of Rights are intended only as a protection against the legislative and executive power of the state in its various manifestations. The term “horizontal application” on the other hand indicates that those rights also govern the relationships between individuals, and may be invoked by them in their private law disputes. Although the terms “vertical” and “horizontal” are convenient they do not do full justice to the nuances of the jurisprudential debate on the scope of Chapter 3. Does Chapter 3 entitle a party to private litigation to contend that a statute relied on by his opponent is invalid as being inconsistent with the Constitution? To what extent does Chapter 3 have an impact on the common law in either the criminal or the civil field? Does the vertical application of the Constitution cover private law disputes between a citizen and the state? These and no doubt other related questions are open questions in this Court at least. At this point in the present judgment it is sufficient to record that Van Dijkhorst J, upon an analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions, held that Chapter 3 had only vertical and not horizontal application, and that in consequence a defendant could not invoke section 15 as a defence to a civil action for damages for defamation.
(1) These two Constitutional issues are of substance and a ruling thereon by the Constitutional Court is desirable.
(2) They can be disposed of on the pleadings and no evidence is necessary.
(3) In view of conflicting decisions in the Supreme Court on both issues there is a reasonable prospect that another court may reach a different conclusion should permission be granted to bring the appeal.
At the hearing before us on 7thth November counsel addressed us on all the above issues.
 In their written argument the Defendants contended that the amendment which they had sought ought to have been granted. At an early stage of the oral argument, however, Mr Gilbert Marcus, who appeared for the appellant Defendants, was faced with a difficulty which proved to be insuperable. The Constitution, in terms of section 251(1), came into operation on 27th April 1994, and on that day a new legal order came into existence in the country. In S v Mhlungu and Others, supra n6, a case much relied on in the Defendants’ written argument, this Court held that from that day onward any person in South Africa was entitled to, and could invoke, the rights conferred by Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Cases such as Kalla v The Master and Others, supra n4, which had held, in reliance on section 241(8), that those rights were not available in proceedings which were pending immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, were overruled. The purpose of section 241(8), was held to be essentially to preserve the authority of pre-Constitution courts to continue to adjudicate in pending cases.7 On and after 27April the Constitutional guarantees were available to accused persons in pending cases as they were to all other persons.th Accordingly, Mhlungu and other persons accused in cases pending on 27 April, 1994, were entitled to invoke their constitutional rights so as to preclude the use against them of the presumption contained in section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, a presumption which this Court had held in S v Zuma and Othersth to be unconstitutional and hence invalid.
That sub-section enables this Court, where the interests of justice and good government require it, to ante-date the operation of a declaration of invalidity. Although there is no express limit on the power to ante-date a declaration of invalidity, it could hardly be suggested that any such declaration could refer to a date earlier than the date of the commencement of the Constitution.11 See the orders made by this Court in S v Zuma and Others, supra n9, and S v Mhlungu and Others, supra n6.
 The Defendants argued that even if the Constitution does not make lawful what was previously unlawful, the protections of Chapter 3, including section 15, are available to relieve them from the consequences of a previously unlawful act. They rely by way of analogy on the right of persons convicted and sentenced before the commencement of the Constitution to invoke their constitutional right not to undergo cruel and inhuman punishment.13 The previous lawfulness of the sentence did not preclude their relying on their Chapter 3 rights to avoid its consequences. Similarly, they say, they are now entitled to rely on section 15 to relieve them from the obligation of paying damages for their earlier unlawful act.
 With all respect to the arguments of counsel, the analogy is false. This Court has held that the death penalty and the whipping of juveniles were in themselves unconstitutional and therefore unlawful by reason inter alia of section 11(2), which provides that no person shall be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.14 Although the sentences were lawful when imposed, their execution became unconstitutional once the Constitution came into operation. The obligation to pay damages is obviously not in such a category. Another fundamental difference is that the commission of the delict and the liability to pay damages cannot be separated. The right to damages accrues at the moment the defamation is published. No-one could sensibly assert that the state has an accrued right to inflict a punishment. It cannot be disputed that since 27 April, 1994, the Defendants have been entitled to exercise their right of freedom of expression and freedom of the press under section 15. If their case on the interpretation of section 15 and on its horizontal application is correct, it may allow them to repeat their allegedly defamatory publications with impunity. But it is not in that sense that the Defendants wish to invoke their right of free speech.
The arbitrariness to which Mahomed J was referring related to the suggested exclusion of litigants in cases pending on 27 April, 1994, from the right to invoke constitutional guarantees after that date. As appears from section 7(2) of the Constitution, referred to above, there can be nothing arbitrary, absurd or unjust in the distinction between acts done (including delicts committed) before the Constitution commenced and those done thereafter.
 The Defendants also submit that the articles which are the subject-matter of the civil action could have led to a prosecution for the common law offence of criminal defamation. On the hypothesis that the existence of that common law offence is inconsistent with the right of freedom of speech under section 15, that section could be properly invoked, they say, as a defence to a prosecution notwithstanding the fact that the offence was committed before the Constitution came into force. The same principle might apply, it is suggested, to a prosecution for the common law crime of blasphemy. I shall assume for the purpose only of the present argument that that submission is correct. The attempt to extend it to civil law delictual claims is, however, unsound. At common law the statutory abolition of a criminal offence did not ordinarily affect a prosecution for an offence committed before the abolition.th Under the Constitution different policy considerations may apply. The state may possibly be precluded from prosecuting for an offence which has by reason of the Constitution ceased to exist.15 The state cannot be said to have vested rights which will be affected, nor is any other person adversely affected and it may be said that to punish a person for an offence which has ceased to exist is an infringement of one or other of his protected fundamental rights.16 It is unnecessary and would be undesirable to express any view on these arguments. What is obvious is that very different considerations must apply to a civil claim for damages for defamation. There is another party whose rights would indeed be affected by depriving him of a claim for damages which had vested in him before the commencement of the Constitution. A right of action is a form of incorporeal property.17 Whether it is property entitled to protection under section 28 of the Constitution need not be decided.18 What is clear is that there is no warrant in the Constitution for depriving a person of property which he lawfully held before the Constitution came into force by invoking against him a right which did not exist at the time when the right of property vested in him. The Defendants’ citation of the well-known authorities on the need for a generous rather than a legalistic interpretation of a Constitution hardly supports an argument directed to depriving an individual of an existing right.
 I have dealt with the question of the retrospective or retroactive operation of Chapter 3 of the Constitution in general terms. As stated in paragraphs 13 and 14 above, the Constitution does not turn conduct which was unlawful before it came into force into lawful conduct. It does not enact that as at a date prior to its coming into force “the law shall be taken to have been that which it was not”. The consequences of that general principle are, however, not necessarily invariable. In the present case we are dealing with the right to damages for a defamation committed before the Constitution came into operation, and we hold that nothing in the Constitution impairs that right. But we leave open the possibility that there may be cases where the enforcement of previously acquired rights would in the light of our present constitutional values be so grossly unjust and abhorrent that it could not be countenanced, whether as being contrary to public policy or on some other basis. It is not necessary to spell out examples. It is sufficient to say that cases such as the one before us obviously do not fall into that category.
 I would therefore hold that the Defendants are not entitled to invoke section 15 as a defence to an action for damages for a defamation published before the Constitution came into operation.19 I have reached this conclusion without reference to foreign authority, but at this stage it may be appropriate to refer to some decisions on another constitutional instrument which has given rise to problems of retrospectivity in one sense or another, namely the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
“Section 58 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that the Act is to come into force on a day to be fixed by proclamation. That proclamation was issued by the Queen, who came to Canada for the purpose, at a ceremony in Ottawa on April 17, 1982; and the proclamation fixed April 17, 1982 as the day upon which the Constitution Act, 1982 was to come into force. The Charter of Rights accordingly came into force on that day, and operates only prospectively from that day.
 The generous approach of the Canadian courts to the interpretation of the Charter is well known. Perhaps, therefore, the Canadian cases put into perspective the Defendants’ contention that failure to uphold their submissions would result in absurdity and injustice.
In previous cases this Court has left open the precise connotation of the expression “disposes of a matter.”29 Whatever the precise scope of the expression, I have no doubt that in this case the learned judge had disposed of the matter before him. That matter was the application to amend the plea so as to introduce a new defence. His judgment refusing the amendment on the ground that the new plea would be bad in law, effectively eliminated that defence from the case.
“Where an order, though made during the progress of a litigation is not reparable at the final stage; or to put it another way, where the final word has been spoken on the point dealt with, then that order is final and not interlocutory”.
The order of Van Dijkhorst J did dispose finally of all the relief claimed in the application for amendment. He spoke the final word on that application. The conclusion that the judge had disposed of the case before him is reinforced by the consideration that the trial of the action need not be heard by the same judge.
 This conclusion is not affected by the possibility that an appeal may lie against the decision of Van Dijkhorst J. Section 102(8) refers to “any division of the Supreme Court”, which indicates that the power conferred is not limited to a court of final appeal.
 As to policy and convenience, I cannot see why the framers of the Constitution should have wished to exclude from the operation of sub-section (8) a case such as this one, where there has been a claim for specific relief and that claim has been finally disposed of. I see no reason of policy why, before a referral, the whole of any relevant proceedings must be completed, proceedings which may be protracted and which have no bearing on the constitutional issue. The whole basis for a referral under sub-section (8) is that a constitutional issue of great public importance has been raised. As far as the proceedings before the Supreme Court are concerned the issue may be moot. The losing party may not wish to appeal, or the parties may have reached a settlement. Nonetheless, provided there is a compelling public interest, the constitutional issue may properly be referred.33 I would add that a referral such as this does not disturb the “logic” of the appeal routes provided in the Constitution. Theoretically, no doubt, the learned judge might have granted leave to appeal to a full bench of the Transvaal Provincial Division but, given that the constitutional issue is of such public importance as to call for a referral to this Court, that possibility can be disregarded. In practical terms this is the only Court competent to review the judgment of the learned judge on the constitutional issues. Before sending the case to this Court he had dealt fully with those issues. I can discern no ground on which his referral can be faulted.
 The “horizontality” issue has arisen in other countries with entrenched Bills of Rights and the parties have supplied us with a wealth of comparative material both judicial and extra-judicial, for which we are grateful.
“When interpreting the Constitution and more particularly the Bill of Rights it has to be done against the backdrop of our chequered and repressive history in the human rights field. The State by legislative and administrative means curtailed the common law human rights of most of its citizens in many fields while the Courts looked on powerless. Parliament and the executive reigned supreme.
Horizontal application of Chapter 3 would in his view create an undesirable uncertainty in private legal relationships which could not have been intended by the framers of our Constitution. After an analysis of certain provisions of the Constitution he held that the fundamental rights set out in Chapter 3 were of vertical application only, and that the contrary conclusion of Van Schalkwyk J in Mandela v Falati38 was clearly wrong. It should be noted that in Motala and Another v University of Natal39 Hurt J refused to follow the opinion of Van Dijkhorst J and held that at least sections 8 (equality) and 32 (education) had horizontal application. In Potgieter en n Ander v Kilian40 the Natal Provincial Division disagreed with these two judgments and endorsed the opinion of Van Dijkhorst J.
 There can be no doubt that the resolution of the issue must ultimately depend on an analysis of the specific provisions of the Constitution. It is nonetheless illuminating to examine the solutions arrived at by the courts of other countries. The Court was referred to judgments of the courts of the United States, Canada, Germany and Ireland. I would not presume to attempt a detailed description, or even a summary, of the relevant law of those countries, but in each case some broad features are apparent to the outside observer. A comparative examination shows at once that there is no universal answer to the problem of vertical or horizontal application of a Bill of Rights. Further, it shows that the simple vertical/horizontal dichotomy can be misleading. Thus under the Constitution of the United States the First to Tenth Amendments (the “Bill of Rights”) and the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as they confer rights on individuals, would at first sight appear to be vertical, in the sense of being directed only against state power.41 Yet the courts of that country have in some cases at least reached what is effectively a horizontal application of constitutional rights by holding that the judicial power is a state power against which constitutional protections may invoked.
It was on this principle that the United States Supreme Court was able to hold in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan44, an action between private litigants, that the law of defamation of the State of Alabama was an unconstitutional impairment of the right of freedom of speech. A complex case law suggests that the rule in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra n47, is not invariably available in private law disputes.45 The reasoning behind the decision has also been cogently criticised.46 It may nonetheless be accepted that by identifying some state involvement in private transactions (sometimes with great ingenuity47) United States’ courts have found a way of enforcing fundamental constitutional rights in disputes between private litigants.
 Irish cases indicate that in some instances at least, constitutional rights have been directly applied in private disputes so as to override a rule of common law. An example is C.M. v T.M.48 in which Barr J held that the common law doctrine that a wife’s domicile was dependent on that of her husband was inconsistent with the principles of equality before the law and equality between husband and wife embodied in Articles 40 and 41 of the Irish Constitution.
 Very different models of constitutional adjudication are to be found elsewhere. There is a valuable comparative overview of the application of constitutional rights in the private law of a number of countries in Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law, a work by Justice A. Barak, of the Supreme Court of Israel,49 from which it appears that there are several jurisdictions which reject the horizontal application, or at least the direct horizontal application of constitutional rights. I propose to confine my further consideration of the comparative material to the Canadian and German position, particularly as argument on these two systems was specifically addressed to us.
What follows from this is - (a) if a party to private litigation founds a claim or defence on some piece of legislation (whether an act of Parliament, a by-law or regulation) or on some executive act, (such as the issue of a licence) its constitutionality under the Charter is an issue which may properly be raised; (b) in litigation between private parties no inconsistency between the common law and the Charter may be relied on; but (c) the Charter applies to the common law in a dispute between government and a private litigant - for example where the government relies on a common law prerogative. (In a subsequent case53 the Canadian Supreme Court has held that the Charter applies to the state even in respect of activities which are contractual or commercial in nature). The Defendants in the present case point to differences in wording between the Charter and our own Constitution, and deny that Dolphin Delivery provides any assistance in interpreting the latter. They have also referred us to the academic criticisms of Dolphin Delivery noted by Friedman JP in Baloro and Others v University of Bophuthatswana and Others.54 I shall return to Dolphin Delivery later in this judgment.
 The German jurisprudence on this subject is not by any means easy to summarise, especially for one who does not read German. There are, however useful, accounts of the German approach in some of the South African literature, as also in the work of Justice Barak,55 which I have mentioned above. I have also had the benefit of reading an extensive article entitled “Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory” by Professor Peter E. Quint,56 to which I am much indebted.
 The doctrine of the application of the norms of the Basic Law in the field of private law (“Drittwirkung”) is subtle and is the subject of considerable debate in Germany itself. The analyses of Justice Barak and Professor Quint might not command universal acceptance, still less my own brief interpretation of the doctrine. It is not, however, my purpose to provide a definitive statement of German law, even if I were competent to do so. The purpose of this perhaps overlong account of constitutional adjudication elsewhere is to see what guidance it might provide in the interpretation of the South African Constitution. In my opinion there is at least one positive lesson to be learnt from the Canadian and German approaches to the problem before us. Both Canada and Germany have developed a strong culture of individual human rights, which finds expression in the decisions of their courts. Yet, after long debate, both judicial and academic, in those countries, the highest courts have rejected the doctrine of direct horizontal application of their Bills of Rights. On this issue, as on the retrospectivity issue, the example of these countries seriously undermines the Defendants’ contention that anything other that a direct horizontal application of Chapter 3 must result in absurdity and injustice.
 As I have already indicated the issue of horizontal or vertical application of Chapter 3 has been hotly debated in the South African legal literature. Arguments of substance have been deployed on both sides of the debate. I have read much of this literature,63 I hope with advantage. It is not out of any disrespect to the authors that I refrain from listing all those to be found on each side of the controversy, or from analysing their respective arguments. I propose instead to turn without further delay to consider what I take to be the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
The words “all law in force” may have some ambiguity, in that they are capable of being read as being limited to statute law. However, any ambiguity is removed by the Afrikaans version, where the equivalent words are “alle reg wat van krag is.” The word “reg” (as distinct from “wet”) unambiguously embraces common law as well as statute law.65 Although the Afrikaans version of Act 200 of 1993 was the original signed version, by virtue of section 15 of Act 2 of 1994 the English version is deemed to be the signed version.66 The latter version would therefore prevail in case of a conflict between the two versions. But where there is no conflict between them there is another well-established rule of interpretation: if one text is ambiguous, and if the ambiguity can be resolved by the reference to unambiguous words in the other text, the latter unambiguous meaning should be adopted.67 There is no reason why this common-sense rule should not be applied to the interpretation of the Constitution. Both texts must be taken to represent the intention of Parliament. Moreover, Afrikaans remains an official language with undiminished status in terms of section 3 of the Constitution. The term “reg” is used in other parts of Chapter 3 as the equivalent of “law,” for example in section 8 (“equality before the law”) and section 33(1) (“law of general application”). Express references to the common law in such sections as 33(2) and 35(3) reinforce the conclusion that the law referred to in section 7(2) includes the common law, and that Chapter 3 accordingly affects or may affect the common law. Nor can I find any warrant in the language alone for distinguishing between the common law of delict, contract, or any other branch of private law, on the one hand, and public common law, such as the general principles of administrative law,68 the law relating to acts of state or to state privilege, on the other. By contrast, many provisions of the Constitution use the word “wet” as the equivalent to “law”, in contexts which may assist in finding the answers to the second question.
Again, one asks why such a provision would be needed if the Chapter could be directly applied to common law disputes between private litigants.
“(1) This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or act inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication in this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency.
In this section the Afrikaans equivalent of “law” (in the phrase any law or act’) is not “reg” but “wet”, which unambiguously connotes a statute. This means that any statute inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force and effect.73 Any litigant must therefore be able to rely on this section in any litigation. To adopt the language of the reformulation of the referral issue (b) set out in paragraph 10 above, any litigant contesting the constitutionality of a statute is applying Chapter 3 to the relationship between himself and the legislature, not to his relationship to the opposing (private) litigant.
“unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication in this Constitution”.
If on a proper construction of Chapter 3 its operation is intended to be vertical only, the argument based on section 4 loses any force which it may have had.
a) Constitutional rights under Chapter 3 may be invoked against an organ of government but not by one private litigant against another.
In sub-paragraph (c) I refer to “governmental acts or omissions”. For the purposes of this judgment it is unnecessary to attempt to define that concept. In particular, I leave open the question whether (as in Canada)76 it would include state activities in the commercial or contractual sphere.
 In argument before us it was urged that this result was anomalous. It is fortuitous in modern times whether a rule of private law remains a common law rule or is embodied in a statute. Examples were given of some rules of common law which may be inconsistent with the rights of the individual set out in Chapter 3. It is also pointed out that some statutes embody the common law, and that various statutes have altered the common law in some parts of South Africa but not others. Thus the statute abolishing the marital power77 does not apply in the territories of the former Transkei, Bophuthatswana or Venda.78 Other examples mentioned were common law crimes such as blasphemy or criminal defamation which, it was said, may be inconsistent with Chapter 3 rights; if so, they must be susceptible to attack although no statute is involved.
Here too the Afrikaans text has “wet”, and the reference to passing or making a law is obviously inappropriate to a rule of common law. There is no similar reference to the constitutionality of any rule of common law. Sub-sections 98(5) and 98(6) also relate to statute law only. They provide that if the Constitutional Court finds a law (“wet”) inconsistent with the Constitution it shall declare such law invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. The Court may require Parliament or any other competent authority to correct the defect in the law (again “wet”) during which time that law remains in force.
 The operation of a declaration of invalidity of a law (“wet”) is dealt with in sub-section (6), but section 98 nowhere provides for a declaration that a rule of common law is invalid. Such a declaration would be highly unusual, and would give rise to much difficulty. If a statute, including one embodying a private law rule, is struck down, the previous common law (or earlier statute law) is presumably restored. But what would result from holding a rule of common law to be unconstitutional? What would follow is that the relevant common law would require to be reformulated. But reformulation of the common law is the task of the Supreme Court. In Shabalala, supra n80, we held that the state’s claim of docket privilege was inconsistent with the Constitution. The extent of the inconsistency was defined in the order in that case, but as was stated in paragraph 58 of the judgment of Mahomed DP, “the details as to how the Court should exercise its discretion in all these matters must be developed by the Supreme Court from case to case, but always subject to the right of an accused person to contend that the decision made by the court is not consistent with the Constitution”. This Court’s jurisdiction derives only from section 98. Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Australian High Court or the Supreme Court of Namibia, it has no inherent or general jurisdiction. It cannot re-write the common law governing private relations. If this is borne in mind most if not all the suggested irrationality of the vertical doctrine disappears.
 In many cases81 a holding of unconstitutionality would leave a gap in the law. Take the rule of the common law referred to in the Defendants’ Heads of Argument that the widow of a customary union has no action for loss of support. If that rule were held to be unconstitutional what specific rights are to be accorded the widow, having regard to other rules of customary law regarding widowhood? To take another of the examples put before us, assume that, in the absence of a statute, the marital power at common law were to be “struck down” as unconstitutional, how would existing marriages in community of property be dealt with? Section 11(3) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, as amended by section 30 of Act 132 of 1993, which statutorily abolished the marital power, provided a detailed regime for the governance of marriages in community of property. This Court would have had no power to fill the gap. Defendants point out that if this is so, striking down a statute may leave an even worse common law regime in place. The lesson is to be circumspect in attacking statutes. The radical amelioration of the common law has hitherto been a function of Parliament; there is no reason to believe that Parliament will not continue to exercise that function.
It was by reason of these provisions that we were able in Shabalala83 to declare that certain practices hitherto adopted by prosecuting authorities were unconstitutional and to state what was required of them so as to ensure that an accused’s right to a fair trial was not infringed. It will not have been overlooked that there is no provision similar to section 98(7) in relation to private persons - a strange hiatus if horizontality were intended.
 Another pointer in the same direction is section 33(1) which provides that rights entrenched in Chapter 3 may be limited by law of general application. That “law” may be common law, but the problem of applying section 33(1) to private relationships governed by the common law seems almost insurmountable. The common law addresses problems of conflicting rights and interests through a system of balancing. Many of these rights and interests are now recorded in the Constitution and on any view that means that as a result of the terms of the Constitution the balancing process previously undertaken may have to be reconsidered. A claim for defamation, for instance, raises a tension between the right to freedom of expression and the right to dignity. The common law compromise has been to limit both rights to a certain extent, allowing damages to be recovered for what is regarded as “unlawful expression” but allowing “dignity” to be infringed in circumstances considered to be privileged. Section 33(1) could hardly be applied to such a situation.
Those remarks seem to me to be fully applicable to Chapter 3 of our own Constitution.
“The Appellate Division shall have no jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court”.
Numerous provisions of Chapter 3 could and would be invoked in private litigation if direct horizontal application of the Chapter were permitted. For example, cases of injuria including defamation, invasion of privacy and breach of confidentiality would call for the application of sections 10, 13 and 15 of the Constitution. Section 15 would also be relevant to civil contempts of court. In employment cases sections 8 and 27 would apply. Section 26 would be applied to contracts in restraint of trade and section 29 in actions for nuisance. Section 30 would be applied in custody and maintenance cases. The consequence would be that appeals in all such cases would lie to the Constitutional Court, and the Appellate Division would be deprived of a substantial part of what has hitherto been its regular civil jurisdiction. At the very least, appeals to the Appellate Division would routinely result in referrals of common law cases to the Constitutional Court. I do not believe that such a state of affairs could ever have been intended by the framers of the Constitution.
person”, however grossly defamed in relation to his or her public conduct, can only succeed in an action for defamation by proving that the defamatory statement was false and, what is more, by proving with “convincing clarity” that it was made by the defendant with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard whether it was false or not. I would suggest that before adopting this rule as part of our law, a court would have to consider among other things the sharp criticisms of that rule both academic and judicial,84 within the United States, and its rejection by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto.85 Presumably a court would also wish to consider the rule adopted by the High Court of Australia86 in the interests of freedom of speech, namely that in an action for defamation by a person engaged in politics or government it is a defence for the defendant to prove that he honestly and reasonably believed in the truth of what he published. The Australian rule introduces the concept of a duty to exercise care into the law of defamation. A South African court would have to consider the appropriateness of introducing such an element into a delict of intent (injuria) in which hitherto culpa has not been an element.87 It would also doubtless consider whether the Australian rule was not right in placing the burden of proof on the defendant rather than the plaintiff - in that respect among others refusing to follow New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra n49. At least equally important would be the consideration of the development of the South African law of defamation. Unlike some of the other rights embodied in Chapter 3, freedom of speech and of the press is not a newly created right. When not suppressed or restricted by statute it was emphatically endorsed and vindicated in many judgments of South African courts.88 Any law of defamation is a restriction on freedom of speech in the interest of other rights thought worthy of protection. More particularly, in cases of defamation, courts have tried to strike a balance between the protection of reputation and the right of free expression.89 Presumably, too, a court would wish to take account of the fact that our Constitution, like that of Germany but unlike that of the United States, expressly recognises the right to dignity and to personal privacy, and might find guidance in the German cases to which I have referred as well as in the American cases. On the other hand a court might also wish to consider the desirability of cutting down the concept of a defamatory statement in the interests of freer political criticism.90 It may similarly consider whether the rule that the press and the broadcasting media, unlike other litigants, cannot avail themselves of the defence of absence of animus injuriandi91 ought to be varied in the light of the values embodied in section 15 of the Constitution. Those values might also require the development of a broader concept of the public interest, entailing a reconsideration of the Neethling case, supra n2. For present purposes the point is that these are not choices which this Court can or ought to make. They are choices which require consideration perhaps on a case by case basis by the common law courts. The common law, it is often said, is developed on incremental lines. Certainly it has not been developed by the process of “striking down”.
 The consequences which I have outlined in paragraph 57 above are well illustrated by the judgment of Cameron J in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd to which I referred in paragraph 21 above. The learned judge had regard to section 15 of the Constitution and to much South African and foreign case law, and considered various possible forms which a law of defamation might take. In the context of the case before him he fashioned a principle of the law of defamation which is completely novel in this country. Whether his reformulation of the law is a desirable one is a question quite outside the purview of this judgment.92 He reached his conclusion by attempting to apply the precepts of section 35(3) - a provision to which I shall advert in a subsequent paragraph - and not by a direct application of section 15. If, however, section 15 had a direct horizontal application the task of formulating an appropriate law of defamation would fall to this Court on appeal. But that could not be reconciled with our limited jurisdiction under section 98(2). What is in my view certain is that section 15 of the Constitution does not mandate any particular rule of common law. Our jurisdiction, which is to interpret, protect and enforce the provisions of the Constitution, cannot empower us to choose one among a number of possible rules of common law all of which may be consistent with the Constitution. It would be equally impossible, for reasons which I have already explained, for this Court simply to declare that a particular rule of the law of defamation is invalid, leaving a lacuna in the law.
It has no equivalent to section 35(3). Yet, as I pointed out earlier in this judgment, the German courts nonetheless apply a model of indirect and not direct application of the basic rights provisions in private litigation.
In Bank of British Columbia v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.97, the court engaged in the process of weighing up the claims of the Charter and the common law rules of defamation, in circumstances where a bank had sued a public broadcaster for libel following reports that it was in imminent danger of failing. The court extracted what it perceived to be the core value underlying the freedom of expression, press and media provision in section 2(b) of the Charter, namely the right to gather and disseminate truthful information free from government interference. “The ultimate purpose of the Charter protection is so that truth may be uncovered and made known ... . The Charter speaks to our highest values. Truth is one of them.” 98 What section 2(b) did not do, it was held, was to provide a special privilege to the press in the context of private litigation. In Hill’s case, supra n90, plaintiff instituted action for libel following the bringing of contempt proceedings against him by the Defendants. The court ruled out direct application of the Charter but emphasised that “the common law must be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with Charter principles. This obligation is simply a manifestation of the inherent jurisdiction of the courts to modify or extend the common law in order to comply with prevailing social conditions and values.” 99 Having weighed up the Charter requirements and the common law rules, the court concluded that the common law of defamation complied with the underlying values of the Charter and there was no need to amend or alter it. Our courts may well reach a different conclusion: for one thing section 35(3) has no counterpart in the Canadian Charter. But the process of reasoning of the Canadian judges remains instructive.
 What I conclude is that Chapter 3 does not have a general direct horizontal application but that it may and should have an influence on the development of the common law100 as it governs relations between individuals. I insert the qualification “general” because it may be open to a litigant in another case to argue that some particular provision of Chapter 3 must by necessary implication have direct horizontal application. Section 15(1) is not such a provision. No such implication is necessary. One of the purposes of the section is to give protection against far-reaching censorship laws and other statutes restricting free speech which were common under the regime of Parliamentary supremacy. Accordingly, my response to the second issue referred to this Court by the learned judge would be that Chapter 3 of the Constitution does not in general have direct horizontal application, and more particularly that section 15(1) does not have direct horizontal application. On the other hand, the values which it embodies can and must be taken into account in the development of the common law of defamation.
 I should add that in my opinion the phrase “a court” in section 35(3) means “all courts”, and includes the Appellate Division, notwithstanding the provisions of section 101(5). There is no contradiction as the “application and development of the common law” is not a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court under section 98. This is not to say that the Constitutional Court has no control over how the common private law develops. In terms of section 98(2) it has jurisdiction in the final instance over all matters relating to “the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the provisions of this Constitution”. It must ensure that the provisions of section 35(3) in relation, inter alia, to the development of the common law are properly interpreted and applied, otherwise it is not discharging its duty properly in relation to the enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to determine what the “spirit, purport and objects” of Chapter 3 are and to ensure that, in developing the common law, the other courts have had “due regard” thereto. It is unnecessary, for the purposes of this judgment, to define the boundaries of its jurisdiction in this regard. Whether the Constitutional Court will exercise review powers along the same lines as the German Constitutional Court101 is a question for the future.
 What I have said above has implicitly answered the questions put to counsel by the President of the Court, set out in paragraph 11 above.
i. The issue whether the common law of defamation should be developed to make it consistent with the Constitution, was not an issue in the appeal but fell to be considered in relation to the second issue referred to this Court by the judge.
ii. The development of the common law is within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division, but not of the Constitutional Court, subject to the reservation made in the previous paragraph of this judgment.
iii. Any appeal on such an issue (the development of the common law), once it has been properly raised and dealt with in a provincial division, must be directed to the Appellate Division.
“We cannot say that the law was one thing yesterday but is to be something different tomorrow. If we decide that the rule [i.e. the previously accepted rule] ... is wrong we must decide that it always has been wrong”.
This is no doubt correct. It may nonetheless be said that there is no rule of positive law which would forbid our Supreme Court from departing from that practice. Indeed, in England at least two Law Lords have said that the judiciary should seriously consider exercising a jurisdiction to overrule a previous decision prospectively only,105 as American courts have done.
 It is unnecessary to discuss the American practice in detail. It is described in Tribe, American Constitutional Law106 and in an article, “Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking”, by Professor M.I. Friedland,107 which also describes English and Canadian practice. It is sufficient to refer to two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which state the principle that courts may (not must) apply their decisions prospectively if they overrule past precedents. See Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co,108 and Chevron Oil Co v. Huson.109 It may be that a purely prospective operation of a change in the common law will be found to be appropriate when it results from the application of a constitutional enactment which does not itself have retrospective operation. But it follows from what I have said above that those are matters which it is for the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court to decide as part of their function of applying section 35(3) and developing the common law. I do no more than respectfully draw their attention to the considerations which I have outlined. Whether appeals against judgments on such matters go to the Appellate Division or this Court, need not be decided now and should be left open.

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