Source: http://wakeforestlawreview.com/tag/religion/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:09:13+00:00

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Religion: Friend or Foe to the IEP?
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M.L. was born in 2003 with Down Syndrome and lives with his family in an Orthodox Jewish community in Maryland. M.L’s faith governs almost every aspect of his life, including how he dresses, eats, and works. In 2009, M.L. enrolled in a private special education program that was tailored to his religious needs. In 2012, M.L.’s parents met with the Montgomery County Board of Education (“MCPS”) to create an individualized education program (“IEP”) as part of his public school education, but his parents rejected the IEP, complaining that it did not offer instruction on preparing for life in an Orthodox Jewish community. MCPS replied that an IEP meeting the standards of M.L.’s parents would be too specific, too religious, and not part of the public school curriculum.
M.L. filed a due process claim against the School Board with the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, arguing a violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled that the IDEA does not require a public school to offer specialized religious instruction in an IEP because the IDEA only requires “access [to] the general curriculum.” M.L. then filed a claim in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland where summary judgment was granted to the School Board. M.L. appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (“COLPA”) argued in its amicus brief that directing certain IDEA benefits toward “the non-practice of religion is coercive.” In support of their argument, COLPA cited the Supreme Court’s firmly established precedent that the “Free Exercise Clause bars government action aimed at suppressing religious belief or practice.” While the Court previously noted “a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability,” the Court recently held that a policy that makes practicing one’s religion more expensive “imposes a burden on the exercise of religion.” Thus, COLPA raised a valid question as to whether the IEP, as written, violated the Free Exercise Clause.
In brief, the School Board suggested that pursuing the goals and objectives that M.L. requested would itself violate the Establishment Clause due to their religious nature. However, despite both parties’ Establishment Clause arguments, both the ALJ and the district court quickly dismissed any Establishment Clause considerations by resolving the relevant issues using only the IDEA and Maryland state law. The School Board argued that neither the IDEA nor Maryland state law requires it to provide M.L. with IEP goals and objectives that incorporate his religious practices.
M.L. also asserted that requests that his religious practices be developed through his IEP were simply requests for accommodation of his religious practices. In response, the School Board countered by asserting that M.L. was clearly seeking “affirmative IEP goals and objectives” that were designed to incorporate M.L.’s religion into his IEP. The School Board’s counterargument effectively diverted the court’s analysis of M.L.’s claims from a focus on accommodation toward a focus on affirmative IEP goals. In brief, the School Board reminded the court that, religious concerns aside, M.L. previously and consistently agreed that the IEP was otherwise adequate to meet M.L.’s educational needs.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the appellants had been mistaken in reading “other education needs” as “all other educational needs.” The court observed that the IDEA is not so comprehensive—not every limitation a disabled student may possess needs to be addressed. The court further elaborated that the IDEA does not ensure a specific scholastic result and therefore does not address a disabled student’s ability to practice his chosen religion. Relying on the reasoning in Rowley, the court emphasized the function of the IDEA, not as a guarantee for providing certain levels of education to disabled students, but as a way to “open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms.” Similarly, the court emphasized that Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) requires only that a child receives an educational benefit that is slightly more than trivial from the special instruction and services provided. The court declined to address COLPA’s Free Exercise Clause arguments because the appellants did not raise a Free Exercise argument in their opening brief.
By finding for the School Board in this case, the court made clear that the IDEA does not require a school board to provide a religious or cultural curriculum to a disabled student. Under the IDEA, disable students do not need a religious curriculum in order to have equal access to education.
 M.L. by Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 2017).
 Brief for National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 11, M.L. by Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2017).
 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559 (1993).
 See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770 (2014).
 Brief for Appellants at 19, M.L. by Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2017).
 Brief for Appellees at 14, M.L. by Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2017).
 Brief of Appellants, supra note 13, at 14–15.
 M.L. v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 498–99 (4th Cir. 2017).
On February 9, 2016, the Fourth Circuit issued its published opinion in the civil case Andon LLC v. City of Newport News. In this case, Andon, LLC, and Reconciling People Together in Faith Ministries, LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the City of Newport News, Virginia (the City). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the City violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by denying Plaintiffs’ variance request that would permit them to use a specific property as a religious facility. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, and its denial of Plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint.
Knowing that the property did not meet the ordinance’s setback requirement, Plaintiff’s filed a request for a variance from the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA). BZA ultimately denied the variance request. Plaintiffs then brought action under RLUIPA claiming that the denial imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ exercise of religion.
Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on its previous decision in Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery County Council. In that case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs successfully brought a substantial burden claim under RLUIPA, because the regulations at issue substantially pressured the plaintiffs to modify and then abandon their pre-existing plan to construct a church building. The Fourth Circuit distinguished Plaintiffs’ claim from Bethel by noting that Plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation that they could use the property for religious purposes. Rather, Plaintiffs knew that the City had an ordinance in place prohibiting such use. Thus, Plaintiffs assumed the risk when they entered into the lease agreement and applied for a variance instead of continuing to search for a usable property. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Plaintiffs could not show any facts indicating that the burdens were not self-imposed.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice, along with the denial of Plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint.
Today, in the civil rights case Infinite Allah v. Virginia, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion the decision of the District Court for the Western District of Virginia granting judgment in favor of Virginia on the plaintiff’s Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claim.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended two issues: (1) the District Court erred in concluding that Virginia’s prison policies were the least restrict means of furthering a compelling government interest; and (2) the District Court incorrectly found that the plaintiff’s religious group, the Nation of Gods and Earths (“NGE”), was a prison gang. The plaintiff also asked the court to definitively rule on three issues that the District Court assumed to be in the plaintiff’s favor.
Infinite Allah, a prisoner, brought a claim against the Virginia Department of Corrections for substantially burdening his religious exercise in violation the RLUIPA. Infinite Allah claimed that Virginia burdened his religion, NGE, by classifying NGE as a gang, by restricting NGE members from meeting communally, by prohibiting the plaintiff from wearing NGE clothing and accessories, by not providing meals that complied with a NGE diet, and by preventing NGE members from access to NGE publications. The District Court held a three-day bench trial to decide the case. The District Court found that NGE asserted racist teachings, NGE acted as a prison gang that posed a threat to the safety and security of the prison, NGE members posed a heightened risk of violence when they met, NGE accessories served as a gang identifier and served recruitment, the prison allowed Infinite Allah to have meals in general accordance with his religious accommodations, and NGE materials contained prison codes for passing messages and racist and violent sentiments.
For the sake of the argument, the District Court assumed that the NGE was a religion, the plaintiff’s beliefs were sincerely held, and that Virginia’s policies substantially burdened the plaintiff. With these three prongs of the RLUIPA assumed, the burden switched to Virginia to show that its policies were the least restrictive means in furtherance of a compelling government interest. The District Court decided that prison safety is a compelling government interest. The District Court also ruled that each of the measures Virginia took was the least restrictive means to further the compelling government interest of prison safety and that the plaintiff’s diet in prison was not substantially burdened. The plaintiff appealed.
Is There Reversible Error in District Court Decision?
The Fourth Circuit examines all findings by the District Court on factual issues on the clearly erroneous standard. It is also an affirmative defense to a RLUIPA claim for a governmental entity to claim that a challenged policy used the least restrictive means in furtherance of a substantial governmental interest.
The Fourth Circuit commended the District Court on its “well-crafted” opinion, and decided to adopt the same reasoning as the District Court did. The Fourth Circuit gave appropriate deference to the District Court’s finding of fact that NGE was a prison gang in ruling that the District Court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. The Fourth Circuit also agreed with the District Court’s reasoning on whether Virginia’s policies were the least restrictive means to a compelling governmental interest. The Fourth Circuit also refused to rule on the three elements of the RLUIPA that the District Court assumed were satisfied.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Virginia’s prison policies were the least restrict means of furthering a compelling government interest and that the District Court did not err as to any findings of fact.

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