Source: https://www.schwabe.com/newsroom-publications-13278
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:33:15+00:00

Document:
Arlington – The Circuit dismisses for lack of jurisdiction an appeal of a contempt order because the order is not a final judgment or otherwise appealable until the sanctions are decided by the district court. The fact that sanctions were ordered by the district court after the notice of appeal was filed does not help the appellant since the Circuit cannot normally consider documents outside of the record on appeal.
Golden Bridge – The Circuit determines that the patentee disclaimed a broader scope of the claim term "preamble" in an IDS submission that included a previously-agreed-upon construction. An additional infringement theory argued by the patentee in a motion for reconsideration was waived because the argument was made for the first time in a motion for reconsideration‎.
ePlus – The Circuit vacates an injunction, a contempt order and an $18 million penalty because all of the claims of the two patents in suit have either been determined by the Circuit to be not infringed or invalid.
Also, just because the district court construed claim ‎terms for the first time in the 2013 Injunction, it does not ‎necessarily follow that the 2013 Injunction is transformed ‎into a modification of the parties' relationship. Because ‎the 2004 Injunction was the result of a settlement agreement, the district court did not need to analyze infringement and therefore did not need to issue any claim ‎constructions at that time. In expressly providing the claim constructions, the ‎district court simply interpreted or clarified the meaning ‎of those claim terms.
The panel recognizes that § 1292(c)(2) confers jurisdiction to entertain appeals from patent infringement liability determinations when a trial on ‎damages has not yet occurred. See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) But here, the Circuit is not considering a determination of patent infringement; it has before it a civil contempt order. Thus, although Congress created an exception to the final judgment rule in patentcases via § 1292(c)(2), this patent carve-out does not expressly include contempt orders. Accordingly,‎ the panel holds that ‎§ 1292(c)(2) does not extend to contempt orders.
The panel notes that "a contempt order ‎interpreting or enforcing an injunction . . . is generally not ‎appealable until final judgment. This is particularly so ‎where no sanction has yet been imposed for that contempt and proceedings with respect to that question ‎remained ongoing at the time the appeal before us is ‎filed." Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., 727 F.3d 1375, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Here, the district court imposed sanctions, but only well after the record was fixed for appeal. ‎Bridgeport filed notices of appeal after the sanction award, but the Circuit normally cannot consider documents outside of the record on appeal. And ‎even if the Circuit was to take judicial notice of the sanction order,‎ Bridgeport's later notice of appeal suggests that Bridgeport recognized, as the Circuit is now holding, that its earlier ‎appeal was premature.
While the Circuit dismisses this appeal due to lack of jurisdiction, because the amount of sanctions has already been decided by the district court in the amount of $2.3 million, and a notice of appeal has already been filed, this case will be right back before the Circuit in the proper appeal. This dismissal might seem overly strict, but it is consistent with the Circuit's precedent. See Entegris and Aevoe, discussed at length in the opinion.
GBT's patents describe and claim an improvement to a Code ‎Division Multiple Access (CDMA) system. A CDMA wireless cellular network consists of a ‎base station and multiple mobile stations, such as cellular ‎telephones. To establish communication between a mobile ‎station and a base station, the mobile station transmits a ‎known signal called a "preamble" over a random access ‎channel (RACH). The CDMA system allows multiple ‎signals to be sent over the same RACH by using different ‎numerical spreading codes in transmitting each signal. ‎Spreading codes enable the mobile stations and the base ‎station to distinguish a particular wireless communication from other concurrent communications. However, if too many mobile stations are transmitting simultaneously at high ‎power levels, the signals from mobile stations can interfere with each other.‎ The patents-in-suit disclose an improvement for a ‎CDMA system that reduces the risk of interference between the signals sent from various mobile stations.
The district court issued a claim construction order ‎construing the disputed claim terms, including the term "‎preamble," which is included in the claims of both patents. The court granted Apple's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement based on its construction of ‎"preamble," and denied Apple's motion for summary judgment of invalidity. Following the district court's ruling on summary judgment, GBT filed a motion for reconsideration. The court reviewed the motion but declined to modify its summary judgment of noninfringement. ‎GBT ‎appeals.
It is correct that "mere disclosure of potentially material prior art to the PTO does not automatically limit the ‎claimed invention." ‎However, this is not a typical IDS, and GBT did more ‎than simply disclose potentially material prior art. It ‎submitted its own stipulated construction of a claim term ‎in the context of the particular patents being reexamined ‎‎('267 patent) and prosecuted ('427 patent). This is a clear ‎and unmistakable assertion by the patentee to the PTO of ‎the meaning and scope of the term preamble. The fact ‎that the stipulation was contained in documents accompanying an IDS does not change this result. The Circuit has ‎held that "an applicant's remarks submitted with an IDS can be the basis for limiting claim scope." On the facts of ‎this case, the panel sees no meaningful difference between limiting ‎claim scope based on an applicant's stipulations contained ‎in IDS documents and an applicant's remarks contained ‎in the IDS itself. GBT's stipulation tells the PTO how ‎preamble should be construed, and the panel concludes that GBT ‎is bound by this representation. Therefore, the term "preamble" is to be construed in ‎accordance with the stipulation as "a signal used for ‎communication with the base station that is spread before transmission and that is without message ‎data."
The Circuit reminds us once again, as it did earlier this month in Hill-Rom v. Stryker (June 27, 2104), that there must be a clear and unambiguous disavowal in the prosecution history in order for there to be a disavowal. The recent cases of X2Y Attenuators, Inc. v. ITC and Intel (July 7, 2014) and Vederi v. Google (March 14, 2014) applied that same strict test to disavowal in the patent specification. However, despite this high bar, these cases show that the Circuit is not reluctant to find clear and unambiguous disavowals.
The patents in suit are ‎directed to using electronic databases to search for product ‎information and ordering selected products from third-‎party vendors. The only claim now at issue in this ‎appeal, claim 26 of the '683 patent, recites a "method ‎comprising the steps of": "maintaining at least two product ‎catalogs on a database," "selecting product catalogs to ‎search," "searching for matching items," "building a ‎requisition," "processing the requisition to generate one or ‎more purchase orders," and "determining whether a ‎selected matching item is available in inventory."
While Lawson's appeals were pending, in another ‎case, the Circuit affirmed the PTO's reexamination decision ‎invalidating claim 26 of the '683 patent.
The first question is whether the district court's modified injunction against Lawson must be set aside now that ‎the PTO has cancelled the patent claim on which it is ‎based. It is well established that an injunction must be ‎set aside when the legal basis for it has ceased to exist. ‎ Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. ‎‎(13 How.) 518, 577–79 (1851). The principles of the Wheeling Bridge case have repeatedly been followed by the Supreme Court as well as ‎‎"by lower federal and state courts. Those principles reflect the fact that "a continuing ‎decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject ‎always to adaptation as events may shape the ‎need. . . . A court does not abdicate its power to revoke or ‎modify its mandate, if satisfied that what it has been ‎doing has been turned through changing circumstances ‎into an instrument of wrong."
Under these authorities, there is no longer any legal ‎basis to enjoin Lawson's conduct based on rights that ‎claim 26 of the '683 patent previously conferred as those ‎rights have ceased to exist. The PTO found claim 26 ‎invalid and the Circuit affirmed that decision, so claim 26 no longer ‎confers any rights that support an injunction.
The second question is whether the civil contempt ‎sanctions should be set aside. It is well established that ‎‎"violations of an order are punishable as criminal ‎contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal ‎‎. . . or though the basic action has become moot." ‎ United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330‎ U.S. 258 (1947) If Lawson had been found guilty of criminal contempt, that ‎order and any resulting penalties would not be set aside simply because claim 26 had been cancelled.‎ However, the district court found Lawson in civil, not ‎criminal, contempt.
In dissent, Judge O'Malley argued that the facts of Fresenius were so different that Fresenius did not require that the contempt award be vacated.

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