Source: https://cis.org/Report/Plenary-Power-Should-Judges-Control-US-Immigration-Policy
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:07:26+00:00

Document:
The U.S. Constitution provides no direction to any branch of government on “immigration,” although it does invest the power of “naturalization” in Congress.1 Immigration law has developed over time through numerous statutes and regulations created and adopted by the legislative and executive branches — the political branches of the United States government. Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a hands-off approach when asked to review the political branches’ immigration decisions and policymaking. The ability of Congress and the executive branch to regulate immigration largely without judicial intervention is what has come to be known as the political branches’ “plenary power” over immigration.2 Ever since immigration became an issue of political significance more than 100 years ago, the political branches have been able to exclude and deport aliens or deny certain benefits according to political, social, economic, or other considerations, largely without being second-guessed by the judicial branch. The Supreme Court, in fact, did not seek to assert judicial authority and instead recognized that immigration decisions “are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.”3 Ultimately, for much of America’s history, immigration-related decisions were made within the political branches by politically accountable actors according to legislation written by elected representatives of the American citizenry.
Political Question Doctrine: Federal courts generally refuse to hear cases that involve policy questions best resolved by elected officials. The logic is that elected officials are more accountable to the public and can best represent the public’s interests. Elected officials are also more likely to understand the political implications of their decisions. The connection between immigration and foreign affairs, national security, and similar policy-related fields has often resulted in courts invoking this doctrine.
Uniformity: The specifics of immigration (how many, who gets admitted, who gets deported, etc.) are regulated by federal-level political-branch policies. If lower courts become too involved in this process and craft unique statutory interpretations, there is a strong likelihood of an inconsistent immigration system that varies from one jurisdiction to another. This would arguably be in direct violation of the Constitution, which requires a “uniform rule of naturalization.” Such a result would make it difficult for citizens to change the system if so desired. Aliens would also find it difficult to navigate the system.
Efficiency: From a resource perspective, a court-run immigration system would be problematic. Judges are already grappling with the ever-escalating onslaught of immigration cases; reducing the authority of the political branches to easily remove or exclude aliens would obviously increase the caseload.
Immigration Enforcement Is Not Punishment: The Supreme Court has held that due process protections apply when an individual faces punishment in the form of deprivation of life, liberty, or property, but that an alien being returned to his homeland or denied entry to the United States is not being punished and therefore cannot expect the courts to grant him these protections. Deportation and exclusion is simply an administrative procedure.
History: The great weight of legal authority is in support of judicial deference to the political branches on the issue of immigration. The concept of stare decisis, which stands for the principle that past holdings should be respected by the courts, ensures that the plenary power doctrine cannot easily be abandoned.
While the plenary power rests on a solid history, attempts to weaken the plenary power doctrine and undermine the role of Congress and the executive branch in the realm of immigration regulation have been afoot for years. This is, in part, a result of an increased judicial focus on individual rights, a willingness of courts to dissect and/or rewrite statutes (what some might call “legislating from the bench”), and the general tendency of those granted power by the state to aggrandize that power. At the same time, open-border immigration attorneys have been desperately searching for an argument that would erase decades of Supreme Court precedent and the authority of the political branches to regulate immigration at all, their aim being more opportunities for appeal and a more lenient immigration policy over all. Outside academia, they have been largely unsuccessful, save for a few anomalous and narrow Supreme Court holdings, critiqued below, and an increasing willingness on the part of a number of lower courts to openly evade the plenary power doctrine by applying their own inconsistent statutory interpretation methodology to even the most basic immigration cases.
This attempt at erasing the plenary power must not go unaddressed. Without the plenary power doctrine, the judicial branch — rather than elected members of the political branches — would be in control of much of the nation’s immigration system as courts apply constitutional or “constitutional-like” standards to all exclusion and deportation cases. Theoretically, the ability of the political branches to determine who should be welcomed to our shores, who should stay, and who should go could be almost completely abolished in favor of a judge-regulated immigration system. Immigration policy decisions would be less likely to be shaped through the political process and would therefore lessen the power of the electorate to control the nation’s future and to decide who we are as a nation and who we will be. Furthermore, detailed political considerations appropriate to expert agency officials may not be adequately considered by judges who are generally without the requisite immigration expertise. This is good for neither citizens nor aliens. Fortunately, the plenary power doctrine rests on a solid foundation and will remain strong, provided that the political branches steadfastly rebuff any attempts to weaken it.
This Backgrounder provides a brief history of the plenary power doctrine and attempts to discredit the case law highlighted by those seeking to weaken the doctrine. It concludes with recommendations on how to protect the political branches’ power over immigration. On a basic level, Congress must make sure that immigration laws are clear and decisive as to the issue of authority and the executive branch must vigorously defend its regulation and enforcement of those laws. Without attention to this matter, the courts will continue to encroach upon immigration regulation and policy.
“Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it applicable only to persons departing from the country after the passage of the act, are not questions for judicial determination. If there be nay just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the political department of our government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject.”9 (emphasis added).
By holding as it did, the Court affirmed the political branches’ authority to exclude aliens as the branches see fit. The Court signaled an unwillingness to second-guess what it considered policy-based decisions and gave strong deference to both Congress and the executive branch in the area of immigration, thus forming the basis of the plenary power doctrine.
“An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful. Congress may, if it sees fit…authorize the courts to investigate and ascertain the facts on which the right to land depends. But…the final determination of those facts may be entrusted by Congress to executive officers; and in such a case, as in all others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.”11 (emphasis added).
“It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive branches of the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.”12 (emphasis added).
Knauff illustrates the importance of the plenary power doctrine. The Supreme Court recognized the limited role of the judicial branch in immigration proceedings and the decision appropriately forced the political issues surrounding Ellen Knauff to be debated within political branches rather than in the court system. This ensures that agency experts rather than Article III judges make the final determination. It also allows citizens to control their nation’s immigration policy through the ballot box.
In 1953, the Court went further in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, holding that a non-citizen facing exclusion is not entitled to any due process whatsoever, even if the result was indefinite detention.31 In this case, Ignatz Mezei, an eastern European immigrant who had lived in the United States for more than 25 years, left the country, apparently to visit his dying mother in Romania. He was denied entry there, and instead remained in Hungary for 19 months. Thereafter, he returned to the United States, ultimately arriving at Ellis Island where he was then permanently denied entry by the U.S. government on the basis of national security. In an effort to relocate, Mezei shipped out to both Britain and France; each country denied him admission, and Mezei returned to Ellis Island. The U.S. Department of State unsuccessfully negotiated with Hungary to send Mezei there, and Mezei himself unsuccessfully applied for entry to approximately a dozen other countries.32 Eventually, both the U.S. government and Mezei ended their search. After 21 months of living on Ellis Island, Mezei applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his exclusion from the United States amounted to an unlawful detention.
Mezei remained on Ellis Island for nearly four years until he was released on humanitarian grounds and paroled into the United States by the U.S. Attorney General after hearings.36 Like the decision to admit Ellen Knauff into the United States, discussed above, Mezei’s parole was the result of political decisions made within the political branches and involved, for example, private bills in Congress and hearings in executive branch immigration courts. Once again, the plenary power doctrine appropriately placed political decisions in the hands of policymakers.
1976: Mathews v. Diaz et al. — The Supreme Court upholds a statute requiring a five-year period of admission as a prerequisite for aliens wishing to receive Medicare. In reaffirming the plenary power doctrine, the Court held: “For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. This very case illustrates the need for flexibility in policy choices rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional adjudication. Appellees Diaz and Clara are but two of over 440,000 Cuban refugees who arrived in the United States between 1961 and 1972.”41 The Court noted the significant political, social, and economic impact a decision in favor of the aliens — and against the plenary power — would have: “An unlikely, but nevertheless possible, consequence of holding that appellees are constitutionally entitled to welfare benefits would be a further extension of similar benefits to over 440,000 Cuban parolees.” In being asked to substitute its judgment for that of Congress, the Court simply responded: “We decline the invitation.”42 The Court understood that it lacked the capacity to rein in the political implications a decision in favor of the alien would have in this case.
Despite decades of judicial support for the political branches’ plenary power over immigration, the doctrine is not without some cracks. Soon after the early Chae Chan Ping, Ekiu, and Fong Yue Ting cases and prior to the Knauff decision in 1950, the Supreme Court softened the plenary power doctrine in a number of cases and carved out some exceptions, especially for individuals facing deportation who claimed to be U.S. citizens.43 But most of these small exceptions were short-lived as the plenary power was reinvigorated by Knauff, Mezei, and the other cases discussed above. Nevertheless, with the inevitable appointment of new justices to the Supreme Court and an increasing focus on individual rights during the 1960s and 70s came a judicial willingness to wield “a scalpel [and] dissect the administrative organization of the Federal Government,” at least according to a dissenting Justice Rehnquist in his defense of the plenary power doctrine.44 As the judicial branch expanded the number and types of immigration claims it would hear, the result was a chipping away of the plenary power doctrine. But trying to make sense of the high court’s inconsistent immigration decisions has justifiably been a challenge for the brightest of legal scholars. Quite simply, the agenda of judges opposed to the plenary power doctrine has been to slowly begin applying semi-constitutional norms — what some academics call “phantom norms” — to basic immigration cases that would not otherwise escape the reach of the plenary power doctrine.45 The thinking is that if the Supreme Court could squeak out a few cases that superficially apply constitutional norms in the immigration context (e.g., the use of a First Amendment analysis as a bar against deportation, race-based civil rights claims as an argument against exclusion, protections against cruel and unusual punishment), then slowly, over time, the entire notion of dragging nearly every deportation or exclusion hearing into the judicial branch and granting constitutional protections to all aliens — both those within and outside the country — would become the status quo. The resulting decisions, logically, are much more sympathetic to the alien as the increasingly powerful judiciary finds more and more justifications for denying exclusions and deportations. The overall outcome is that political decision-making in immigration law becomes usurped by unelected, and largely unaccountable, Article III judges with little or no understanding of the political implications of their decisions.
A few notable cases seem to have abandoned decades of precedent while simultaneously enlarging the role of judges to that of immigration policymakers. Although some of the cases are heralded as “groundbreaking” by anti-plenary power attorneys, it is likely that these cases represent an anomalous, narrow, and temporary deviation that will not hold up, particularly after the deaths of nearly 3,000 people at the hands of 19 immigrants on September 11, 2001. Post-9/11 developments and possible strategies for reinvigorating the plenary power are discussed later in this report.
This holding clearly conflicts with Fong Yue Ting, discussed earlier, where the Court held that deportation is “not a banishment” and “not a punishment.”51 Clearly, respect for stare decisis must be abandoned by those wishing to eliminate the plenary power doctrine. Interestingly, Congress amended the language of this statute not long after this holding so as to render an alien deportable if he is twice convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, regardless of whether the two convictions are in one trial or separate trials, and regardless of whether the alien is actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment as a result of such convictions. The exact motive for rewriting the statute is unclear, but it might be evidence of Congress’s attempt to override judicial intervention in immigration regulation of the kind noted in Fong Haw Tan.52 While the new statute renders the case holding somewhat irrelevant from a legal standpoint, this case nevertheless represents one of the early movements away from absolute judicial deference to the political branches on immigration enforcement and remains highlighted by anti-plenary advocates.
The Mezei Court explained the seemingly contradictory holdings by noting that while Kwong Hai Chew had previously undergone a security clearance as a requirement for his seaman position, Mezei left the country “apparently without authorization or reentry papers.”62 Still, anti-plenary advocates cite Kwong Hai Chew as another example of the Court’s willingness to move away from absolute deference to the political branches on immigration enforcement — a move they believe represents the beginning of the end of the plenary power doctrine. The decision did clear the way for the Court to — in a future case discussed below — grant an alien like Kwong Hai Chew constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause without first “assimilating” the arriving resident alien’s status to that of an alien residing within the country.
Although the anti-plenary crowd heralded this decision as the death of the plenary power doctrine, the holding is not as far-reaching as some claim it to be. The Constitutional protections were only granted to a small, specific type of defendant: returning legal permanent resident aliens, generally continuously present in the United States, with social ties that create a “stake” in living here, and who had been absent from the country for “only a few days.”71 Furthermore, although the Court held that Plasencia was protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court never articulated precisely what process is due and instead remanded the case to the lower court for that determination. In other words, the Court did not want to completely abolish the plenary power doctrine and did not speak on the appropriate level of due process afforded an alien.
About two months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Supreme Court took a more active role in immigration regulation than it ever had before in Zadvydas v. Davis, a case that some argue also signals the abandonment of the plenary power.72 To be sure, the Court’s dissection of specific immigration statutes in this case — as well as the dissection of the executive branch’s enforcement of those statutes — was an assault on the plenary power doctrine. But the holding was limited in scope and legislation that came about in the following months as a result of the 9/11 attacks assures a partial reinvigoration of the plenary power doctrine. Nevertheless, Zadvydas remains a vivid example of how invasive a court not recognizing the plenary power can be in the realm of immigration regulation. The case is also noteworthy for the fact that its encouragement of judicial intervention created confusion and conflicting rulings in the lower courts, the result of which is a seemingly inconsistent U.S. immigration policy.
“An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible [or] removable [as a result of violations of status requirements or entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons of security or foreign policy] or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision….”73 (emphasis added).
The dissenters also noted that the dangerousness of the alien and the risks he or she poses to society “do not diminish just because the alien cannot be deported within some foreseeable time.”88 Clearly, the dangerousness of an alien and the decision about whether to release him or her is a political question — a question that should be left up to politically-accountable actors who can be taken to task for making a faulty decision. By creating an arbitrary deadline for release, the ruling in Zadvydas arguably eliminates the type of accountability that can be corrected through elections: If a dangerous alien is released as a result of Zadvydas, executive branch officers can shrug their shoulders and point to the judiciary’s demands, while lower court judges can shrug their shoulders noting that they have to abide by the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Had the majority shown greater respect for the plenary power doctrine, and by consequence, greater deference to the political branches, none of these glaring concerns would have been raised. But in attempting to resolve the constitutional rights of the alien, it seems the majority raised numerous and arguably more significant constitutional conflicts.
By not adhering to the plenary power doctrine, the Zadvydas majority effectively relocates foreign policy considerations from experienced and accountable political actors to arguably less-politically astute judges while simultaneously politicizing the judiciary. The decision also puts foreign governments in the driver’s seat.
The Political Branches Respond. Two months after the Zadvydas decision, the 9/11 terrorist attacks were perpetrated by 19 aliens. The Department of Justice was in the midst of updating its procedures to accommodate the Supreme Court ruling. While the provisions met the Court’s requirements, they also narrowly defined the holding and carved out numerous exceptions. Specifically, the new provisions added immigration procedures for determining whether aliens with final orders of removal are likely to be removed within a reasonable amount of time and whether they should remain in government custody or be released into the United States pending their removal.93 But the rule also set out a procedure for the continued detention of deportable aliens who are not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. These involve aliens described by four special circumstances: (1) aliens who have highly contagious diseases that pose a danger to the public; (2) aliens who pose foreign policy concerns; (3) aliens who pose national security and terrorism concerns; and (4) aliens who are specially dangerous due to a mental condition or personality disorder (and have previously committed a crime of violence, and are likely to engage in acts of violence in the future).94 These categories were not mentioned by the Court in Zadvydas, although the Court did state that its holding would be different if the case involved “terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.”95 The political branches have used this language to defend the new regulations and its plenary power over immigration regulation generally; the terms “special circumstances,” “foreign policy concerns,” “specially dangerous,” and “matters of national security” offer some leeway in continuing the detention of many aliens.
Any alien released under supervised conditions due to a finding that there is no likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future must obey all laws, must continue to seek travel documents, must provide the immigration agency with all correspondence to and from foreign consulates, or face being placed back into detention. This might include a requirement of medical or psychiatric exams and attendance at any necessary rehabilitative programs.
The government may revoke the alien’s release if the government believes there are changed circumstances that create a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The government is not required to grant employment authorization to a released inadmissible alien.
Any alien denied a request for release must wait six months before submitting a new request for review of his detention.
In addition, the government has set high bonds as a means of keeping aliens detained longer. If the executive branch keeps a firm grasp on the process, all of these procedures give the political branches of the government greater control over immigration regulation than the ruling in Zadvydas might seem to allow.
The committee report also noted that Congress’ goal has long been to “abbreviate the process of judicial review of deportation orders and to eliminate the previous initial step in obtaining judicial review.” In all, REAL ID was designed to put review of deportation, exclusion, and final orders of removal squarely within the Court of Appeals. It is important to remember that Congress is empowered to limit the district courts’ jurisdiction.103 So far, REAL ID has returned some power to the political branches, but it will take a few years to determine the act’s full impact.
Ultimately, these examples show that the political branches can limit judicial intervention and assert authority over immigration regulation should Congress and executive branch officials decide to do so.
It is possible that the Supreme Court will take a more supportive position of the plenary power as a result of new appointments to the Court, and as a response to lower courts going too far in dismissing the power.104 But if the political branches want to reassert their authority in the regulation of immigration, they will have to take the initiative by drafting focused legislation and vigorously enforcing existing immigration laws. Additionally, political branch attorneys should argue not only the substantive matters in immigration-related cases, but should also routinely challenge the courts on the ease with which they dismiss the plenary power. Two strategies might be useful in limiting judicial regulation of immigration policy: advocacy of the Chevron deference, and an expanded expedited removal process.
The Court also noted that the agency’s interpretation need not be the only possible interpretation and that a court should not “substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” Only if an agency’s interpretation of a statute is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” should courts intervene.107 The logic is that the agency is staffed with individuals who are experts in the subject matter and more knowledgeable than a judge when it comes to interpreting and applying the statute. This is what has come to be known as the Chevron deference analysis. And for reasons outlined by the Supreme Court over the past century, immigration regulation is unquestionably deserving of such analysis. In fact, Chevron has been used by the Supreme Court as well as lower courts in the immigration context.108 Ultimately, courts invoking Chevron are less likely to substitute an agency’s interpretation and enforcement of immigration statutes for the court’s own. This undoubtedly protects some authority of the political branches over immigration regulation. Of course, serious constitutional issues will not be overlooked by the courts, and the burden will remain on the immigration authorities to argue any such issues. And therein lies the weakness of the Chevron analysis: The anti-plenary crowd has been working overtime to grant all aliens the constitutional protections of U.S. citizens by interpreting many standard immigration issues as “constitutional” in nature, as explored earlier. The Chevron doctrine, then, works best on smaller, statutory issues that do not directly raise constitutional analysis. Finally, the doctrine’s success will require Congress to draft immigration statutes in a way that clearly grants authority to the executive’s immigration agencies.
Expedited Removal. A more promising strategy is the expansion of expedited removal. In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was signed into law. One component of the act was what has come to be known as “expedited removal.”109 The process generally allows federal agents to quickly remove any inadmissible alien who is without a valid claim of asylum. It results in a final order of removal and prohibits the alien from reentering the United States for a period of five years. Most significantly, it circumvents any judicial involvement from either the executive branch immigration courts or the judicial branch courts. In this sense, expedited removal keeps immigration regulation squarely within the political branches; immigration officers, rather than the courts, provide the alien his due process. In other words, expedited removal invokes the plenary power tenets as articulated by the Supreme Court at the doctrine’s inception. As written into law, the policy applies to any illegal alien apprehended anywhere in the United States, provided the alien has not been continuously physically present in the country for longer than the two years preceding the determination of inadmissibility. For whatever reason, however, the executive branch has not taken full advantage of this authority. Both the Clinton and G.W. Bush Administrations have actually chosen to limit their authority; the Clinton White House implemented expedited removal only at a few ports of entry while the Bush White House has decided not to use the removal process for Mexican or Canadian aliens.110 While there was some expansion of the program in the Bush administration since 9/11, it was minimal; the process is now being used at more ports of entry, but only on any alien apprehended within 100 miles of the borders, and only if the alien is apprehended within 14 days of entry.111 The large majority of inadmissible aliens apprehended outside of these parameters will have access to the court system. Any future administration wishing to defend plenary power over immigration should expand expedited removal nationwide; Congress has obviously signaled its interest in reclaiming its influence over immigration enforcement by allowing expedited removal to apply nationwide. For the record, in Fiscal Year 2005, the Border Patrol detained over 18,000 aliens under the expedited removal program; over 14,500 of these aliens were removed.112 The number would be much larger if implemented nationwide.
The plenary power doctrine has a lengthy history and serves the important purpose of keeping the regulation of immigration squarely within the control of politically accountable actors. The doctrine allows for informed deliberation of sensitive issues like foreign relations, national security, and other immigration-related policies. It also assures uniformity and efficiency within our immigration system. Ultimately, it allows citizens to decide the future of the United States through the political process. Should the doctrine be abandoned, the political branches will have their hands tied on the issue of who should be admitted and who should be required to leave. Unelected and largely unaccountable judges would become the nation’s immigration gatekeepers. Of course, in order for this to happen, judges will have had to abandon stare decisis; unfortunately it is clear that many judges have already done so. If this trend continues, it is not unrealistic to suggest that some judges might make deportation a thing of the past; plenty of judges might have difficulty authorizing the deportation of aliens who, in their opinion, are not immediate threats to national security. And there are probably judges who could find reason to prevent the deportation even of an alien convicted of terrorism (i.e. “he claims he is reformed,” “he has family here,” etc.). Other justifications for excluding or deporting aliens may be abandoned: Excluding aliens because they might become public charges? Economic discrimination. Excluding aliens because they come from terrorist-sponsoring states? Nationality discrimination. Excluding aliens because they advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government? Viewpoint discrimination. In other words, the result could be effectively open borders, where no one is excluded. Such scenarios are less likely when immigration regulation is left to political actors who can be taken to task by constituents for faulty decisions.
Without the plenary power doctrine, the system of constitutional rights that has evolved to protect Americans from an overbearing government would instead operate to shield deportable aliens from basic enforcement of U.S. immigration law while subtly suggesting, incorrectly, that aliens have some “right” to immigrate here in the first place. Such an immigration system would no longer operate for the benefit of the American people as our immigration system always has; it would instead exist for the benefit of people around the globe. The entire notion of an immigration policy — a system that exists primarily for the benefit of the host country and secondarily for the alien — would be turned on its head.
The increasing complexity and unnecessary hair-splitting advanced by anti-plenary advocates has contributed to the perception that the nation’s immigration system is broken. Yet despite their best efforts, the plenary power doctrine will not easily fade away. It is backed by decades of Supreme Court precedent that continues to be favorably cited by many courts. While it is undeniably true that the U.S. immigration system can be improved, the courtroom is not where this process can or should take place. This is not to suggest that the indefinite detention of aliens, for example, is necessarily good policy, but rather that the onus to improve the system should be placed on the political branches. Congress must make sure that immigration laws are clear and decisive as to the issue of authority, and the executive branch must vigorously defend its regulation and enforcement of those laws. Such sentiment must be regularly expressed by the political leadership within the first two branches of government in order to put a halt to judicial branch encroachment over immigration policy.
2 This paper uses the term “plenary power” solely in the context of immigration powers; other plenary powers exist, such as Congress’s plenary power over the regulation of interstate commerce, for example.
3 Mathews v. Diaz et al., 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
5 Not all aliens facing removal are entitled to a day in immigration court; aliens subject to expedited removal, for example, are generally summarily removed by immigration law enforcement officers. Expedited removal, a way of avoiding anti-plenary courts, is discussed later in this report.
6 Interestingly, prior to 1983 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) served the dual purpose of detaining aliens and conducting removal proceedings; after that date, enforcement and adjudication was separated.
7 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
10 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
11 Id.. at 660. (Note: As to habeas corpus, a detained alien generally can apply for the writ in order to get the judicial branch involved only after he has exhausted all administrative remedies. If he does get to the judicial branch courts, the issue then turns to deference; courts supportive of the plenary power will generally uphold the administrative order by deferring to the agency decision-making. For more information on the relationship between habeas corpus and immigration law, see generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 459 (2006)).
12 Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660.
13 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
15 Id.. at 730 (Note: This reasoning is applicable only to an alien not claiming to be a citizen. A person claiming U.S. citizenship is entitled to due process – a judicial hearing – as deportation of a citizen does amount to deprivation of life, liberty, and property. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)); see also, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (affirming, along with many other cases, that “deportation is not a criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment. No jury sits. No judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution.”).
16 See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); see also, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Also of significance is Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) – known as the “Japanese Immigrant Case” – in which the Supreme Court upheld the deportation of an illegal alien determined to be a likely public charge. Here, the Court did suggest that aliens facing deportation are entitled to some amount of due process. The administrative process provided by immigration officers seemed sufficient to meet constitutional requirements: “[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends – not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such officers are required to act.” at 100.
17 See generally, Steven H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy (4th ed. 2005).
18 Knauff, 338 U.S. 537.
19 Id. at 542 (citing both Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting).
22 See generally, Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933 (1995)(discussing a detailed account of Knauff’s immigration history).
23 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)(upholding the retroactive application of a 1940 statute that made deportable any alien who had joined the Communist party after entering the United States).
31 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
32 United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 964 (1952).
33 United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210.
36 For a detailed account of Mezei’s immigration history, see generally Weisselberg, supra note 22.
37 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
38 Kleindienst v. Mandel et al., 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
39 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766; see also Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
40 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.
41 Diaz et al., 426 U.S. at 81.
43 See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); see also, e.g., Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1912) (holding that decisions by immigration officials are “final, and conclusive upon the courts, unless it be shown that the proceedings were manifestly unfair, were such as to prevent a fair investigation, or show manifest abuse of the discretion committed to the executive officers by the statute, or that their authority was not fairly exercised, that is, consistently with the fundamental principles of justice embraced within the conception of due process of law.”).
44 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong et al., 426 U.S. 88 (1976)(holding unconstitutional a federal regulation that barred non-citizens from employment with the Civil Service Commission without due process of law.).
45 For an analysis of the judicial application of semi-constitutional norms to immigration cases, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545 (1990).
46 For additional examples, see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945)(reversing deportation order of suspected Communist alien and calling deportation a “hardship” and an immigration statute “unconstitutional”); see also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)(requiring more due process than would be normal in most civil proceedings – here, deportation – and substantially raising the burden of proof against the executive branch’s wishes); see also the Woodby dissent (noting, “This is but another case in a long line in which the Court has tightened the noose around the Government’s neck in immigration cases.”).
47 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 8 (1948) (Note: the crime of murder involves “moral turpitude”).
48 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 162 F.2d 663, 665 (1947).
49 Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 9. Interestingly, the appeals court predicted such a holding and explained why it would be problematic to do anything other than defer to the executive’s interpretation of the statute: “By what formula shall the permissible lapse of time between crimes be measured? How closely must the crimes be related to each other? Must they derive from the same impulse? Do separate crimes of different natures committed to clear the way for a main objective come within the conclusion?” Fong Haw Tan, 162 F.2d at 665.
50 Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10.
51 See cases cited supra note 15.
52 See Chanan Din Khan v. Barber, 147 F. Supp. 771, 773 (1957); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
53 United States ex rel. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 97 F. Supp. 592, 594 (1951).
54 Id. at 595 (Note: The court rendered its decision “with some reluctance, not because the court has not the power of judicial review under the statute, but rather…[because Kwong Hai Chew was] to be deported without knowing what charge as been levelled against him.”).
55 United States ex rel. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 192 F.2d 1009 (1951).
59 Justice O’Connor describing the holding in Kwong Hai Chew: “[T]o avoid constitutional problems, we construed the regulation as inapplicable. Although the holding was one of regulatory interpretation, the rationale was one of constitutional law.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982).
60 Interestingly, the Court reviewed a 1953 presidential commission report on immigration entitled, “Whom We Shall Welcome” in rendering its decision and noted that the commission “treats the provisions [above] as applicable to entrant and reentrant aliens but does not even suggest that they are applicable to aliens lawfully admitted to permanent residence and physically present in the United States…[and it] does not…even suggest that the reentry doctrine attempts to limit the constitutional right to a hearing which resident aliens, in the status of [Kwong Hai Chew], may have under the Fifth Amendment.” See Kwong Hai Chew, n.11. In other words, the commission did not speak to the situation at issue. Of course, one must ask: If the Court felt it reasonable to look to an executive branch report for help in resolving the case, why would the Court not defer to the executive branch officials who actually enforced the statute in the first place? Had the court done the latter, it would have been making use of the plenary power doctrine – a doctrine that is designed, in part, to resolve the very type of uncertainty found in Kwong Hai Chew. Instead, the Court created a legal fiction, applied a constitutional due process analysis, and abandoned decades of precedent.
61 United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.
64 Motomura, supra note 45, at 580.
65 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 23 (1982).
67 For example, an alien who loses in a deportation hearing can designate the country of deportation, depart voluntarily in order to avoid certain legal stigmas, and can seek suspension of deportation.
68 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 25.
69 Id.at 34 (citing a case not immigration-related but nonetheless constitutionally-significant: Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)).
70 Motomura, supra note 64.
71 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34.
72 See, e.g Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 339 (2002).
73 Zadvydas v. Davis, 522 U.S. 678, 682 (2001); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
74 Zadvydas, 522 U.S. at 689.
82 Zadvydas, 522 U.S. at 700.
84 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
85 Zadvydas, 522 U.S. at 702-3.
93 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, “Justice Department Implements Zadvydas v. Davis Supreme Court Decision.” (Nov. 14, 2001). Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/November/01_ins_595.htm.
94 Id. See also 18 U.S.C § 16 (listing crimes of violence in a finding of “specially dangerous”). For the last three types of aliens, there must also be no conditions of release that can reasonably be expected to prevent public danger.
95 Zadvydas, 522 U.S. at 696.
96 See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13,14; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (outlining post-release supervision requirements).
97 8 U.S.C. § 1226a.
98 Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386, n.8 (2005).
100 See, e.g Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 276 F. Supp. 2d 42, 82 (2005).
101 In the 1963 Supreme Court case Rosenberg v. Fleuti, the Court held that a Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) who took an “innocent, casual, and brief” trip outside the borders of United States could not be deemed to have “intended” to depart, and thus was not “entering” upon his return; the immigration service could not treat the LPR as if he was seeking admission. 374 U.S. 449. This judicially-created rule was replaced with Congress’ own definition of admission when Congress wrote the IIRIRA; it allowed the immigration service to treat some LPRs as if they were seeking admission for the first time, even if they were outside the country for only a few hours. For a full explanation of these changes, see In re Jesus Collado-Munoz, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1061 (1998).
102 Enwonwu, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 82.
104 Indeed, the Court already has brought order to inconsistent, anti-plenary power rulings in the lower courts in Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). The Court overruled the idea that due process prohibited detention pending removal proceedings, absent some evidence of the aliens flight risk or danger to the community.
105 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
109 See, e.g. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1228.
Jon Feere is a legal policy analyst at the Center for Immigration Studies.

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