Source: https://shisaku.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-supreme-court-says-fiat.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:55:02+00:00

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Shisaku: The Supreme Court Says, "FIAT"
The Supreme Court Says, "FIAT"
Yesterday, the Supreme Court of Japan did largely the same thing. The automobile in this instance was the nation's electoral map. Anthony's Garage is the Diet and Anthony (Tony) is the Liberal Democratic Party.
In a split decision the Supreme Court ruled that the 2014 electoral district map, where the greatest vote disparity was 2.13 (meaning that 2.13 times as many voters lived in the largest district as lived in the smallest, reducing the value of each individual's vote in the largest district to only 47% of a vote in the smallest one) violated the principle of the legal equality of citizens under Article 14 of the Constitution. Three of the justices ruled the electoral map unconstitutional, one declaring the election invalid. Two dissenting justices ruled the electoral map constitutional. An outright majority (9 of the 14 offering opinions) ruled the electoral maps and the election results "in a state of unconstitutionality" (iken jotai - 違憲状態 - Link).
Labeling the electoral map "in a state of unconstitutionality" does sidestep a clash of the branches of the government over who is supreme based upon the two conflicting Constitution articles. However, rather than a flight from responsibility this twisted non-ruling ruling (similar to the option in Scottish jurisprudence of a verdict of "Not Proven" where guilt cannot be established but everybody still thinks the defendant guilty as hell) should perhaps be more properly seen as a necessary and paradoxical step toward preserving the constitutional order.
Suppose the justices were to ever to lose their collective minds and rule a House of Representatives election unconstitutional and invalid. From such a ruling the sitting Diet would instantaneously become illegitimate and without constitutional standing. The Diet, however, is under Article 41 "the sole, law-making organ of the State" and under Article 47 the sole organ vested with power to determine electoral districts. The justices would thus be ordering a repair of the electoral map whilst simultaneously wiping out the only body able to fix it.
By ruling the electoral map in a "state of unconstitutionality" for the third time, the Supremes are scolding the LDP for its shenanigans without tearing the entire edifice down in the process. With the closest the Supremes can come to fury they are pushing the electoral map back into the Diet building and telling the LDP that the ruling coalition's sneaky +0/-5 solution of 2013 did not fix the disproportionality problem in the House of Representatives.
"So FIAT!" is what the Supremes are saying.
Yesterdays decision and the ruling coalition's promise to be serious is all that anyone could have and can hope for in terms of the Supreme Court's making Japanese elections more fair and thus better, in theory, at delivering good governance.
Meanwhile, in another challenge to a widely disliked Abe Era law, the Tokyo District Court passed on ruling on the constitutionality of the new and extremely controversial Designated Secrets Act (Link - J). The refusal to accept the case was to be expected, the Tokyo Court following the precedent set down by the Supreme Court's Suzuki Decision of 8 October 1952, which found that unless a plaintiff can demonstrate an actual injury from a statute, the judicial branch will abstain from all involvement in a case. Groups representing the news media argued that the Act injures journalists by preventing them from doing their jobs. The judges of the Tokyo District Court asked, "Who is the specific plaintiff and what specific hurt was caused by the Act?" -- questions to which there were, of course, no answers.
“Suppose the justices were to ever to lose their collective minds and rule a House of Representatives election unconstitutional and invalid…. The justices would thus be ordering a repair of the electoral map whilst simultaneously wiping out the only body able to fix it. … Yesterday’s decision and the ruling coalition's promise to be serious is all that anyone could have and can hope for in terms of the Supreme Court's making Japanese elections more fair and thus better, in theory, at delivering good governance.” Actually, no, there is an alternative.
Some might raise the objection that the Supreme Court would be acting as a law-making body and would be determining election districts (actually, one nation-wide district) in violation of Arts. 41 and 47. But it is up to the Supreme Court to make that determination of whether it is violating the Constitution, and it is unlikely to invalidate its own action.
In other words, once the justices rule that an election is unconstitutional, the election is *automatically* invalid. The Constitution does not give the justices discretion to act as they have done so often during the past five decades, including in the present case (what some scholars call “soft” judicial review).
So, it boils down to choosing HOW the Supreme Court should ignore the Constitution. The style to date, which you praise, has been to allow bad-faith actors to cling to power illegitimately and indefinitely. Reasonable people could prefer that the court instead act to allow something closer to democratic legitimacy.
I fail to see how Article 98 provides a way around the road block of Article 41.
Two possible arguments. One argument, in my comment above, is that they are both roadblocks. In the current ruling, and for many elections in Japan's postwar history, the Court has ridden roughshod over Art. 98 -- it has approached the question of invalidity of unconstitutional acts as if the Court had discretion to rule them invalid. But a reading of the express wording of the Constitution shows it does not: the election *is* invalid, while the Court has chosen to ignore this. It has acted unconstitutionally, and without fear of anyone having authority to call it to account for that.
My comment above assumes that the remedial election scheme I outlined would in effect be enacting a law, and says that if the Court were going to choose to ignore Constitutional provisions, they could just as easily have chosen to ignore Art. 41 and respect Art. 98. I.e., it's a choice of which roadblock to ride over -- since the Court is already driving that way.
A second and better argument is that the Court could declare that the proportional-based election is not a law but a one-off remedy. This would eliminate the Art. 41 problem. It's not contemplated that the Court would replace the POEL. It would only be taking action to make sure that whoever does fix that statute has been elected in a manner that respects the Constitution's one person, one vote rule.
The point about any "violation" of the Constitution by the Court being that the Court is the only organ of the State who can say whether it has violated the Constitution or not. That fact is already the only thread of argument that supports the current order we have today, i.e. the Court's ignoring of Art. 98 in order to keep an illegally elected House in office.
PS: Taking a leaf from the Obamacare reasoning (when is a tax not a tax, etc.) the Court could also say that (1) it's not drawing a district when it makes the whole country one undivided district, and (2) the choice of proportionality is not a choice of "method," since the choice is dictated by the number of seats specified in the POEL (which already calls for proportional election of some seats). That reasoning could neutralize the Art. 47 problem, too, though it might mean that the election would need to be conducted using the D'Hondt algorithm, as under the current POEL.
Thank you both, first one for a very entertaining article and the second for thought-provoking ideas. Although, I do not see this happening, your arguments about Art. 98, the comparative example of Obamacare, and the convention concerning the dissolution of the House of Representatives are really interesting Prof. Sutter. I subscribe to this blog!
Oh King Of Awful Majesty!

References: Art. 98
 Art. 41
 Art. 98
 Art. 41
 Art. 98
 Art. 47
 Art. 98