Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/315/60/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:53:38+00:00

Document:
The Sixth Amendment is violated when a lawyer representing two criminal co-defendants has a conflict of interest between them.
elapsed since the state law came in force, and the absence of any showing that women's names had appeared on the state jury lists in the counties comprising the federal district. P. 315 U. S. 64.
2. The record in this case shows adequately, though informally, that the indictment was returned by the grand jury in open court. P. 315 U. S. 65.
3. An indictment which is sufficiently definite to inform the defendants of the charges against them and shows certainty to a common intent, is good against demurrer. P. 315 U. S. 66.
4. Depriving the United States of lawful governmental functions by dishonest means is a "defrauding" within the meaning of § 37 of the Criminal Code. P. 315 U. S. 66.
5. A charge of conspiracy to defraud the United States of lawful governmental functions by bribery of a Government officer is distinct from a charge of bribery or of conspiracy to commit bribery. P. 315 U. S. 66.
6. Error which might be overlooked as harmless where the case is strong against the accused may be ground for reversal where the question of guilt or innocence is close. P. 315 U. S. 67.
7. A defendant in a conspiracy case is deprived of the assistance of counsel, contrary to the Sixth Amendment, where, over his objection, the court appoints his counsel to represent also a codefendant, where this is done with notice to the judge that their interests may be inconsistent, and where the counsel's defense of the first defendant is less effective than it might have been if he had represented that defendant alone. P. 315 U. S. 76.
8. Every reasonable presumption is indulged against a waiver of fundamental rights such as the right of the accused to have the full and untrammeled assistance of counsel in the trial of a criminal case. P. 315 U. S. 70.
9. The fact that a defendant in a criminal case is an experienced lawyer may be a factor in determining whether he waived his right to assistance of counsel, but it is not conclusive. P. 315 U. S. 70.
10. The trial judge should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel. P. 315 U. S. 71.
11. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental to be made to depend upon nice calculations by courts of the degree of prejudice arising from its denial. P. 315 U. S. 76.
12. The declarations of a conspirator are not admissible against an alleged coconspirator, who was not present when they were made, unless there is proof aliunde connecting the latter with the conspiracy. P. 315 U. S. 74.
13. Person connected as conspirators cannot have a new trial because of error prejudicial to a codefendant but not to themselves. P. 315 U. S. 76.
14. A verdict of conviction must be sustained if, taking the new most favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence to support it. P. 315 U. S. 80.
15. Participation in a criminal conspiracy may be inferred from circumstance. P. 315 U. S. 80.
16. Defendants in a criminal case cannot complain of error in the introduction of reports a to which, when they were admitted in evidence, the trial judge informed the jury that they were admitted against another defendant only. P. 315 U. S. 81.
17. A district judge conducting jury trial in a criminal case has a sound discretion to interrogate witnesses and to limit their cross-examination. P. 315 U. S. 82.
18. Acts of the trial judge, complained of as lacking impartiality, were not such as to prejudice substantial rights of defendants. P. 315 U. S. 83.
19. Acts of alleged misconduct of the prosecuting attorney -- held not such as to call for reversal of convictions. P. 315 U. S. 83.
20. A motion for a new trial in a criminal case upon the ground that the jury was illegally constituted must be supported by the introduction or offer of distinct evidence; a formal affidavit, in the absence of a stipulation that it may be accepted as proof, is not enough, although it be uncontroverted. P. 315 U. S. 87.
Petitioners, together with Anthony Horton and Louis Kaplan, were found guilty upon an indictment charging them with a conspiracy to defraud the United States, under § 37 of the Criminal Code (R.S. § 5440; 18 U.S.C. 88). [Footnote 1] Judgment was entered on the verdict and Glasser, Kretaske and Kaplan were sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 14 months. Roth was ordered to pay a fine of $500, and Horton was placed on probation. On appeal, the convictions of Glasser, Kretaske and Roth were affirmed. [Footnote 2] We brought the case here because of the important constitutional issues involved. 313 U.S. 551.
contend that the grand jury, composed entirely of men, and summoned on August 25, 1939, was illegally constituted because, at the time it was drawn, Illinois law required state jury lists to contain the names of women. However, in 17 of the 18 counties comprising the Northern District of Illinois, the county boards could wait until September, 1939, to include women on their jury lists. [Footnote 4] Of course, for women to serve as federal jurors in Illinois, it is not necessary that their names appear on a county list, but we are of opinion that, in view of the short time elapsing between the effective date of the Illinois Acts and the summoning of the grand jury, it was not error to omit the names of women from federal jury lists where it was not shown that women's names had yet appeared on the state jury lists.
A.D.1939, Hoyt King, Clerk." Immediately following the indictment in the record is the motion-slip discharging the September grand jury, dated September 29, 1939, initialled by Judge Wilkerson and containing: "The Grand Jury return 4 Indictments in open Court. Added 10/30/39." The presence of this notation in the record is meaningless unless the indictment in this case is one of the four mentioned. The addition was obviously made to clarify the indorsement of the clerk so as to show clearly the return by the grand jury, and thus avert the technical argument here advanced. While a formal nunc pro tunc order would have been the more correct procedure, especially since a new term of court had begun, we do not think that this informal clarification of the record amounts to such error as requires reversal. Cf. Breese v. United States, 226 U. S. 1.
The demurrers to the indictment were properly overruled. The indictment is sufficiently definite to inform petitioners of the charges against them. It shows "certainty, to a common intent." Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 207 U. S. 447. The particularity of time, place, circumstances, causes, etc., in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of a conspiracy, for which petitioners contend, is not essential to an indictment. Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539. Such specificity of detail falls rather within the scope of a bill of particulars, which petitioners requested and received.
The indictment charges that the United States was defrauded by depriving it of its lawful governmental functions by dishonest means; it is settled that this is a "defrauding" within the meaning of § 37 of the Criminal Code. Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182.
federal court cannot constitutionally deprive an accused, whose life or liberty is at stake, of the assistance of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 462, 304 U. S. 463. Even as we have held that the right to the assistance of counsel is so fundamental that the denial by a state court of a reasonable time to allow the selection of counsel of one's own choosing, and the failure of that court to make an effective appointment of counsel, may so offend our concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing as to amount to a denial of due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, so are we clear that the "assistance of counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests. If the right to the assistance of counsel means less than this, a valued constitutional safeguard is substantially impaired.
To preserve the protection of the Bill of Rights for hard-pressed defendants, we indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U. S. 389; Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292. Glasser never affirmatively waived the objection which he initially advanced when the trial court suggested the appointment of Stewart. We are told that, since Glasser was an experienced attorney, he tacitly acquiesced in Stewart's appointment because he failed to renew vigorously his objection at the instant the appointment was made. The fact that Glasser is an attorney is, of course, immaterial to a consideration of his right to the protection of the Sixth Amendment. His professional experience may be a factor in determining whether he actually waived his right to the assistance of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464. But it is by no means conclusive.
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 281 U. S. 312-313. The trial court should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458,4 304 U. S. 65.
this obvious objection lest an objection on behalf of Glasser alone leave with the jury the impression that the testimony was true as to Kretaske. The Government attacks this argument as unsound, and, relying on the doctrine that the declarations of one conspirator in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy made to a third party are admissible against his co-conspirators, Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, contends that the declarations of Kretaske were admissible against Glasser, and hence no prejudice could arise from Stewart's failure to object. However, such declarations are admissible over the objection of an alleged co-conspirator, who was not present when they were made, only if there is proof aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy. Minner v. United States, 57 F.2d 506, and see Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426.
Stewart as counsel for Kretaske is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 291 U. S. 116; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 273 U. S. 535; Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 281 U. S. 292. And see McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S. 342, 298 U. S. 347. Of equal importance with the duty of the court to see that an accused has the assistance of counsel is its duty to refrain from embarrassing counsel in the defense of an accused by insisting, or indeed even suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which might diverge from those of his first client when the possibility of that divergence is brought home to the court. In conspiracy cases, where the liberal rules of evidence and the wide latitude accorded the prosecution may, and sometimes do, operate unfairly against an individual defendant, it is especially important that he be given the benefit of the undivided assistance of his counsel without the court's becoming a party to encumbering that assistance. Here, the court was advised of the possibility that conflicting interests might arise which would diminish Stewart's usefulness to Glasser. Nevertheless, Stewart was appointed as Kretaske's counsel. Our examination of the record leads to the conclusion that Stewart's representation of Glasser was not as effective as it might have been if the appointment had not been made. We hold that the court thereby denied Glasser his right to have the effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This error requires that the verdict be set aside and a new trial ordered as to Glasser.
as to one defendant in a conspiracy case requires that a new trial be granted him, the rights of his codefendants to a new trial depend upon whether that error prejudiced them. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150; Rossi v. United States, 278 F. 349; Belfi v. United States, 259 F. 822; Browne v. United States, 145 F. 1; Dufour v. United States, 37 App.D.C. 497. Kretaske does not contend that he was prejudiced by the appointment, and we are clear from the record that no prejudice is disclosed as to him. Roth argues the point, but he was represented throughout the case by his own attorney. We fail to see that the denial of Glasser's right to have the assistance of counsel affected Roth.
The judge conducting a jury trial in a federal court is "not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct." Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 289 U. S. 469. Upon him rests the responsibility of striving for that atmosphere of perfect impartiality which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding. Petitioners contend that the trial judge made remarks prejudicial to them, committed acts of advocacy, questioned them in a hostile manner, unduly limited cross-examination, and in general failed to maintain an impartial attitude. Various incidents in support of those contentions are brought to our attention.
The alleged undue limitation of cross-examination merits scant attention. The extent of such examination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687. We find no abuse of that discretion.
Perhaps the court did not attain at all times that thoroughgoing impartiality which is the ideal, but our examination of the record as a whole leads to the conclusion that the substantial rights of the petitioners were not affected. The trial was long and the incidents relied on by petitioners few. We must guard against the magnification on appeal of instances which were of little importance in their setting. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 310 U. S. 240; Goldstein v. United States, 63 F.2d 609; United States v. Warren, 120 F.2d 211.
Lest the right of trial by jury be nullified by the improper constitution of juries, the notion of what a proper jury is has become inextricably intertwined with the idea of jury trial. When the original Constitution provided only that "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury," [Footnote 6] the people and their representatives, leaving nothing to chance, were quick to implement that guarantee by the adoption of the Sixth Amendment which provides that the jury must be impartial.
Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 311 U. S. 130.
So, if the picture in this case actually is as alleged in Glasser's affidavit, we would be compelled to set aside the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial as a clear abuse of discretion, and order a new trial for all the petitioners. But, from the record before us, we must conclude that petitioners' showing is insufficient. The Government did not controvert the affidavits by counteraffidavits or formal denial, and it does not appear from the record that any argument was heard on them. From this, petitioners argue that the allegations of the affidavits are to be taken as true for the purpose of the motion. However, this is not a case where the prosecution has impliedly, Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, or actually, Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613, stipulated that affidavits in support of a motion alleging the improper constitution of a jury may be accepted as proof. In the absence of such a stipulation, it is incumbent on the moving party to introduce, or to offer, distinct evidence in support of the motion; the formal affidavit alone, even though uncontroverted, is not enough. Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592; Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519; cf. Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U. S. 426. Glasser, in his affidavit, offered to prove the allegations contained therein, but the record is barren of any actual tender of proof on his part. Furthermore, there is no indication that the court refused to entertain such an offer, if it were, in fact, made. Roth did not even make an offer of proof in his affidavit, and Kretaske did not file one. While it is error to refuse to hear evidence offered in support of allegations that a jury was improperly constituted, Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, there is, and, on the state of this record, can be, no assertion that such error was here committed. The failure of petitioners to prove their contention is fatal.
(1) The Brantman episode evaporates upon examination. His only testimony relating to Glasser was that he did not know him. This was brought out fully and distinctly on direct examination. [Footnote 2/3] That it had been amply established, Glasser himself recognized in his address to the court before sentence. It is difficult to understand how cross-examination would have been of any further benefit to Glasser. In any event, the record shows that Stewart abstained from cross-examining Brantman not because he felt himself inhibited by any conflict of interest, but because, as he told the judge after verdict, he thought that, on cross-examination, Brantman "would be telling worse lies."

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