Source: https://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/2008/05/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 17:48:34+00:00

Document:
Sanchez-Figueroa v. Banco Popular, No. 07-1013. This appeal of an ADA case seems to really be affirming summary judgment for failure to comply with Puerto Rico’s Local Rule 10(b) (translation of exhibits from Spanish to English); and having a counter-statement of facts that wasn’t concise.
The First seems says it isn’t opinion on the underlying issue, but the plaintiff seems to have suffered some kind of mental breakdown due to some interaction at the office.
However, based on whatever record does make it to summary judgment, the First says that the condition appeared temporary.
Some people have what it looks like when I blog.* Just for fun, here is a screenshot. As you can see, I use only the hippest open-source systems and software. However, since I am a lawyer I will deny all knowledge of computers if you met me in person and will feign helplessness. That stuff is for nerds and paralegals.
*Oh, fine. This whole post was an excuse to link to a Nancy Grace video.
Guideline which makes the amendment retroactive, section 1B1.10, is itself unconstitutional, because according to Joseph, the provision provides limitations on the court's discretion once the court calculates the amended Guidelines range.
US v. Rodriguez-Guerrero, No. 07-1256 (unpublished). The First makes it clear that “Role-in-the-offense determinations typically are factbound and, therefore, we will reverse the denial of minimal participant status only for clear error.... “ therefore “Our standard of review is not appellant-friendly.” Yet, somehow, “ The line between minor and minimal participation is fuzzy.” Because there is a “plausible” basis for concluding that the defendant wasn’t a “minor” participant, the defendant loses.
US v. Ellis, No. 07-1997. A guy serving a 25-year sentence who claims to have provided assistance to a “warden of the federal prison where he was once incarcerated” moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 to shorten his sentence. What kind of assistance. “...it suffices to say that the assistance was of value to the warden in running the prison.” But, according to the convict, the warden made some promises. “[T]o transfer Ellis to a lower-security prison and to write a letter to the sentencing court to "create an opportunity to have the sentencing judge consider reducing [the defendant's] sentence as a reward for [his] service." Only an idiot would believe such a promise. Despite the fact that the convict was an idiot, the warden did write a letter, and the sentencing judge got it, the US Attorney did not move under R. 35 for a reduction. The court didn’t move on its own motion to reduce the sentence. The US Attorney, seeing that the convict was dumb enough to believe that a warden could help, did nothing either. A law-abiding person would have retained a lawyer.
Thirteen years later, after the sentencing judge died, the convict moves himself under R. 35. The District Court denied the motion and ordered the case “closed.” The First, of course, says that such a “promise” can’t be enforced by the warden, because 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) only gives the director of the Bureau of Prisons the power to file such a motion, and the BOP didn’t do this unless the prisoner had medical problems. Moreover, the current R. 35 has a 120-day limit.
The First adds that the warden doesn’t have necessary or apparent authority to bind the BOP or the US Attorney. A long discussion of “agency” principles and how they impact the government (mostly under government contract law) ensues.
Anyway, the moral of the story is clear: prisoners should retain counsel before “providing” assistance.
We find that the equitable considerations favor vacatur of the action.
As in Wal-Mart and Kerkhof, vacating the judgment preserves the ability of both sides to litigate complex issues, here under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
As well, federalism concerns support dismissal.
For some reason, the Boston Business Journal thinks that it is notable that Judge Sandra Lynch is going to become the first lady chief judge of the First Circuit. Now, come on, of all the milestones of feminism, is this one really that notable. There are plenty of female judges out there.
I did have some really deep thoughts on the recent "Don't Ask Don't Tell" decision from the Ninth, but for now the above snark will have to act as a replacement. I trust that will be satisfactory.
Sok v. Mukasey, No. 07-2113 remands back to the IJ on a withholding of removal claims because “the BIA and IJ gave a legally insufficient explanation of why Sok failed to prove that she suffered past persecution in Cambodia, we grant the petition with respect to the withholding claim.” The First says that there are six events that establish persecution, and it can’t seem to figure out how the IJ ruled on them. Specifically, the First says that it is simply wrong to call “threats” “mere threats” because threats can be persecution. And, in this case, the threats seems credible.
Secondly, the IJ seems to have found a “massacre” to be incredible because the petitioner didn’t present a police report. In fact, the IJ seemed to have assumed that a police report would be generated, even though there is some indication in State Department reports that the opposite is happening. So, the First remands so that the agency can do a better job.
US v. Sharapka, No. 06-2715. This is an appeal sentence for 121 month sentence for identity theft. The First says that the enhancement for “more than 10 but fewer than 50 ‘victims’” was okay, despite the fact that the defendant had argued that the issuing banks were the “victims.” The government argued that the numerous vendors were the really losers. The First concludes that “We believe that the district court properly relied on both the testimony regarding the conversation with American Express and the Sentencing Guidelines explanatory notes, which defines “victims” for purposes of § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) as including ‘individuals, corporations, companies . . .’ See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A), cmt. n.1.” Strangely, this information was based on a proffer from the government. The First rejects the idea the since government took an inconsistent position at a restitution hearing (because the vendors didn’t submit statements), it should not be entitled to rely upon that theory.

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