Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/graham-v-r-j-679899973
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:30:30+00:00

Document:
Opinion Judge: WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge.
Party Name: THERESA GRAHAM, as PR of Faye Dale Graham, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, individually and as successor by merger to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the American Tobacco Company, PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, individually and as successor by merger to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the American Tobacco Company, PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
This appeal presents the questions whether due process forbids giving a jury's findings of negligence and strict liability in a class action against cigarette manufacturers preclusive effect in a later individual suit by a class member and, if not, whether federal law preempts the jury's findings. Florida smokers and their survivors filed a class action against several tobacco companies, and after a yearlong trial designed to answer common questions concerning the companies' tortious conduct against all members of the class, a jury found that each company had breached its duty of care and sold defective cigarettes. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the jury verdicts of negligence and strict liability in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Engle III), and decertified the class to allow individual actions about the remaining issues of specific causation, damages, and comparative fault. The Engle decision made clear that the jury findings of negligence and strict liability had preclusive effect in the later individual actions, and the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed that ruling in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So.3d 419 (Fla. 2013). R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Philip Morris USA Inc. challenge a jury verdict against them in one of those individual actions in the district court. They argue that giving the Engle findings preclusive effect violates the Due Process Clauses, U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV, and they urge us to overrule our decision to the contrary in Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013). They argue, in the alternative, that federal law preempts giving preclusive effect to the Engle findings of negligence and strict liability. Because we reaffirm our holding in Walker and conclude that federal law does not preempt the Engle jury findings, we affirm the judgments against R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris.
In 1994, six individuals filed a putative class action in Florida court against the major domestic cigarette manufacturers, including R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris, and two tobacco industry organizations. Id. at 1281. They alleged claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. The strict liability count alleged that the companies manufactured "cigarettes containing nicotine, " "manufactured their defective tobacco products by manipulating the levels of nicotine so as to addict the consuming public, " "failed to design, manufacture, distribute and sell a safer alternative cigarette that would not addict smokers, " and "failed to warn" members of the class of the dangers. The negligence count alleged that the companies "breached their duty of reasonable care" through several "acts and omissions, " including the "failure to design and manufacture products that were not addictive, " the "failure to . . . adequately or sufficiently reduce or remove the level of nicotine in cigarettes, " and the "failure to warn the smoking consumers of the addictive nature of nicotine." A Florida district court of appeal approved the certification of the following class: all Florida citizens and residents, "and their survivors, who have suffered, presently suffer or have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by the addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So.2d 39, 40-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Engle I).
The trial court in Engle divided the proceedings in three phases. Walker, 734 F.3d at 1281. In Phase I, a jury "decide[d] issues common to the entire class, including general causation, the Engle defendants' common liability to the class members . . ., and the class's entitlement to punitive damages." Douglas, 110 So.3d at 422. Phase I was a year-long trial on "common issues relating exclusively to defendants' conduct and the general health effects of smoking." Liggett Grp. Inc. v. Engle, 853 So.2d 434, 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Engle II). Phase I required "hundreds of witnesses, thousands of documents and exhibits, and tens of thousands of pages of testimony." Douglas, 110 So.3d at 431. In Phase II, the jury determined the liability of the tobacco companies to three class representatives, awarded them compensatory damages, and fixed the amount of class-wide punitive damages. Walker, 734 F.3d at 1281. The trial court planned to have new juries decide specific causation and damages for the remaining class members in Phase III. Id.
In his opening statement in Phase I, the plaintiffs' attorney stated, "The evidence will show, ladies and gentlemen, that there is no dispute or controversy in the medical and scientific communities but that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, emphysema and many other diseases." He stated that "the evidence will establish overwhelmingly" that "[n]icotine is addictive." And he explained that the tobacco companies "have the technology to make a safer cigarette" but not one that is profitable. He also stated that "the evidence will show that the tobacco companies have so successfully misled the American people that many highly intelligent people, in 1998, are confused."

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