Source: http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/20080116-IR-312080013NRA.xml.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:52:58+00:00

Document:
(1) IC 14-26-2 and rules adopted for the Lakes Preservation Act at 312 IAC 11.
(2) IC 14-29-1 and rules adopted for the Navigable Waters Act at 312 IAC 6.
The scope of this information bulletin is to provide guidance for determining the boundaries of riparian zones within public freshwater lakes and within navigable waters. The guidance helps define the relationships between neighboring riparian owners, between easement holders and the fee ownership, and between riparian owners and public use of the waters.
(1) Reported decisions by the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals.
(3) Expertise of the Department, the Commission, and the Advisory Council.
"Advisory Council" refers to the advisory council established by IC 14-9-6-1 to serve the bureau of water and resource regulation and the bureau of lands and cultural resources.
"Commission" refers to the natural resources commission established by IC 14-10-1-1.
"Department" refers to the department of natural resources created by IC 14-9-1-1.
"Lakes Preservation Act" means IC 14-26-2 including rules adopted at 312 IAC 11.
(2) The Indiana general assembly.
(3) The United States Army Corps of Engineers.
(4) The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
(5) A board of county commissioners under IC 14-29-1-2.
(6) The commission following a completed proceeding under IC 4-21.5.
(c) The roster described in subsection (b) is not dispositive of whether a waterway is or is not navigable. In administrative review, the Commission would determine whether the waterway: "was available and susceptible for navigation according to the general rules of river transportation at the time  Indiana was admitted to the Union. It does not depend on whether it is now navigable.... The true test seems to be the capacity of the stream, rather than the manner or extent of use. And the mere fact that the presence of sandbars or driftwood or stone, or other objects, which at times render the stream unfit for transportation, does not destroy its actual capacity and susceptibility for that use.4 A modified standard for determining navigability would be applied to a waterway that did not exist in 1816.
"Navigable Waters Act" means IC 14-29-1 including rules adopted at 312 IAC 6.
"Ordinary high watermark" means the line as defined by 312 IAC 1-1-265 to establish the boundary of a navigable waterway.
"Public waters" refers to a waterway which is either navigable or a public freshwater lake.
"Riparian owner" means the owner of land, or the owner of an interest in land sufficient to establish the same legal standing as the owner of land, bound by a waterway. The term includes a littoral owner.
"Riparian zone" means the portion of public waters where a riparian owner has particular rights that are correlative to those of citizens, under the public trust, and exclusive of those of neighboring riparian owners.
"Shore" means the shoreline or water line of a public freshwater lake or the ordinary high watermark of a navigable waterway.
"Shoreline" means "shoreline or water line" as defined by IC 14-26-2-47 to establish the boundary of a public freshwater lake.
Third principle: Where the shore is irregular, and it is impossible to draw lines at right angles to the shore for a just apportionment, then the lines forming the boundaries between riparian zones should be run to divide the total navigable waterfront in proportion to the length of the shores of each owner taken according to the general trend of the shore.32 If the navigable waterfront borders a lake which is substantially round, or is a bay that is substantially round except for its connection to the main body of the public waters, the riparian zones may be made by running lines from each owner's shore boundaries to the center of the lake or bay. If the navigable waterfront borders a long lake or other public waters which are not substantially round, the riparian zones may be made by identifying a line through the center of the public waters, with deflected lines run from each owner's shore boundaries to intersect the centerline at perpendiculars.
1 IC 4-22-7-7(a) and (b).
2 IC 4-21.5-3-32 and IC 4-21.5-3-27(c).
3 In addition to publication on the website of the Legislative Services Agency, the Commission includes this nonrule policy document on its website. The Commission's website includes links at www.ai.org/nrc/policy/navigati.html, by county and waterway, to waters declared navigable or nonnavigable.
4 State v. Kivett, 228 Ind. 629, 95 N.E.2d 148 (1950), subsequently referenced in this nonrule policy document as Kivett.
(1) The line on the shore of a waterway established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by physical characteristics.
(A) A clear and natural line impressed on the bank.
(C) Changes in character of the soil.
(D) The destruction of terrestrial vegetation.
(E) The presence of litter or debris.
(2) Notwithstanding subdivision (1), the shore of Lake Michigan at five hundred eighty-one and five-tenths (581.5) feet I.G.L.D., 1985 (five hundred eighty-two and two hundred fifty-two thousandths (582.252) feet N.G.V.D., 1929).
(2) A lake lying wholly or in part within the city of East Chicago, Gary, or Hammond.
(3) A privately owned body of water used for the purpose of, or created as a result of, surface coal mining.
(B) if water level records are not available, the action of the water that has marked upon the soil of the bed of the lake a character distinct from that of the bank with respect to vegetation as well as the nature of the soil.
9 Brown v. Heidersbach, 172 Ind. App. 434, 440, 360 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ind. 1977) cited in Bath v. Courts, 459 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. App. 1984). These decisions are subsequently referenced in this nonrule policy document as "Brown" and "Bath", respectively.
10 Watson v. Thibodeau, 559 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (Ind. App. 1990).
11 Several Indiana court decisions have considered whether a particular easement granted riparian rights to an easement holder. These include Brown; Klotz v. Horn, 558 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 1990); and, most recently, Parkison v. McCue, 831 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. App. 2005). The latter is subsequently referenced as Parkison. A discussion of what factors are considered in determining whether an easement holder may properly exercise riparian rights is beyond the scope of this document.
12 Rufenbarger, et al. V. Blue, et al. 11 Caddnar 185 (2007), subsequently referred to as Rufenbarger, at page 193.
13 Kivett. An exception to this general principle is established by IC 14-18-6 providing Indiana land patents for qualified filled lands within Lake Michigan.
14 United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 482 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1973).
15 IC 14-19-1-1(9), IC 14-29-1, and IC 14-26-2.
16 Lake Sand Co. V. State, 68 Ind. App. 439, 120 N.E. 715 (Ind. App. 1918). This decision and the Ordinance of 1787 are discussed in "The Public Trust Doctrine on Navigable Waters and Public Freshwater Lakes and The Lake Management Workgroups", Information Bulletin #41 (First Amendments), Natural Resources Commission, 20070214-IR-312070073NRA (March 1, 2007).
17 Lake of the Woods v. Ralston, 748 N.E.2d 396, 401 (Ind. App. 2001).
18 Parkison at page 128.
19 Havel & Stickelmeyer v. Fisher, et al., 11 Caddnar 110, 118 (2007) (subsequently Havel) citing Barbee Villa Condominium Owners Assoc. V. Shrock, 10 Caddnar 23, 26 (2005).
20 Bath at page 76.
21 Havel at page 119 and Rufenbarger at page 194.
22 Zapffe v. Srbeny, 587 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. App. 1992), subsequently referenced as Zapffe, at page 180.
23 Zapffe at page 180 and IC 14-15-3-17(b).
24 Zapffe at page 181. On the facts, the Court of Appeals found that 50 feet from shore was a reasonable pier length. The Commission has adopted a rule that authorizes a general license for many temporary piers extending as far as 150 feet from shore, although the general license is contingent upon navigation safety, compatibility with the activities of other riparian owners, and the sufficiency of water depth. 312 IAC 11-3-1. A detailed discussion of the rule section and related rule sections is beyond the scope of this document.
25 P.L. 64-2000 and P.L. 152-2006.
27 Zapffe at page 181.
28 Roberts v. Beachview Properties, LLC, et al., 10 Caddnar 125 (2005), subsequently referenced as Roberts.
30 The principle is articulated in Nosek v. Stryker, 309 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Wis. App) (subsequently Nosek), a decision cited favorably by the Court of Appeals of Indiana in Bath.
31 Pipp v. Spitler, et al., 11 Caddnar 39 (2007).
32 Nosek at page 872. This principle was applied in Roberts and in Ray v. Blackburn and Lukis, et al. 10 Caddnar 400 (2006).
33 This principle was applied in Belcher and Belcher v. Yager-Rosales, 11 Caddnar 79 (2007).

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