Source: https://wlflegalpulse.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:14:47+00:00

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Nearly a year ago in Neither Reason nor Science Supports Class Actions against Diet Soda Makers, we applauded the dismissal of several copycat class-action lawsuits alleging that because the word “diet” in “diet soda” implies the beverage aids in weight loss, companies like Pepsi and Dr. Pepper were misleading consumers. Consumers were misled, the suits asserted, because the artificial sweetener being used causes weight gain. The plaintiffs cited scientific studies they said supported that conclusion.
One decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Manuel v. Pepsi-Cola Co., thoroughly dismantled the studies plaintiffs relied upon, holding that at most the studies supported a correlation between the sweeteners and weight gain, not causation.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that decision last month. On April 17, the same court, in a curt summary order, affirmed the dismissal of another diet-soda suit by the Southern District of New York, Excevarria v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. The order explained that even if the reasonable consumer believed that a product containing the word “diet” was making promises about weight management, the studies Excevarria cited did not establish a causal connection between the artificial aspertame and weight gain.
Several other dismissed diet-soda class actions are awaiting decisions from the Ninth Circuit. Because all these suits rely on the same flawed studies, Manuel and Excevarria should seal the fate of those pending appeals.
As we anticipated in our post last year, the Supreme Court has granted a petition for a writ of certiorari from the Ninth Circuit in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund. The justice will decide whether the Clean Water Act (CWA) regulates discharges through groundwater that reach a water of the United States (WOTUS). The certiorari grant embraced the Solicitor General’s view, who filed an amicus brief urging the Court to take the case and decide the groundwater discharge issue.
This issue has become a prominent one in CWA jurisprudence recently, with three circuit courts of appeals weighing in on the issue in five decisions in 2018 alone. The circuits are split; the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have determined that the CWA does regulate discharges to groundwater, while the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that it does not.
If the Court ultimately sustains the Ninth Circuit’s approach, Maui will have far reaching implications for CWA regulation and enforcement, particularly for spills and other releases that reach groundwater. Moreover, the Court is addressing the case at the same time that EPA and the Corps are receiving comments on their proposed revised definition of what is a water of the United States. Although Maui is not expected to address the definition of WOTUS, the decision will bear close reading for any Supreme Court insights into that all-important Clean Water Act term.
The Court added Maui to the docket for its October Term 2019, which begins this fall on October 7.
*Sam Boxerman is a Partner in the Washington, DC office of Sidley Austin LLP.
By Megan Brown, a Partner with Wiley Rein LLP, with Boyd Garriott, Jeremy Broggi, and Wesley Weeks, Associates with the firm.* Wiley Rein LLP attorneys authored the two amicus briefs discussed in this post. The firm has long participated in cases involving core First Amendment issues, particularly as they relate to the government’s exercise of regulatory power.
Among the various areas of constitutional law on which the U.S. Supreme Court must routinely rule, the First Amendment has figured prominently during John Roberts’ tenure as Chief Justice. Speech rights are once again on the docket in the current term, and, depending on how the Justices rule on a pending petition for certiorari, may also be on the October Term 2019 docket this fall.
On April 15, the Court will hear oral arguments in Iancu v. Brunetti, a facial challenge to the Lanham Act’s prohibition on trademarks with “immoral” or “scandalous” matter. Iancu tests the limits of last term’s invalidation (in Matal v. Tam) of the “offense” bar in the Lanham Act. The Court also has been asked to review Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, which challenges a California law that favors pro-union speech as a violation of both the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and the First Amendment.
Iancu: Can the government discriminate against “immoral” speech?
In Iancu v. Brunetti, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) refused to grant Erik Brunetti’s application to register the mark “FUCT,” which he has been using for decades. Finding that Brunetti’s clothing line depicted explicit sexual imagery, the USPTO concluded that the mark would be perceived as an obscenity and accordingly denied his registration under the Lanham Act’s prohibition on registering marks with “immoral” or “scandalous” matter. Brunetti challenged the USTPO’s determination in court, and the Federal Circuit applied strict scrutiny, holding that the Lanham Act provision was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as an impermissible content-based regulation of speech. The government then petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court opted to take up the question.
In response, Brunetti relies on the Supreme Court’s 2017 Tam decision, which struck down a similar prohibition on registering “disparag[ing]” trademarks. In particular, Brunetti contends that (1) the scandalous-marks provision constitutes viewpoint discrimination triggering strict scrutiny; or in the alternative (2) the provision regulates content, which triggers strict scrutiny; and (3) even under lower levels of scrutiny, the provision is unconstitutional.
An amicus brief filed by the Rutherford Institute in support of Brunetti offers a simple proposition: discriminating against offensive views is still viewpoint discrimination. The brief also picks apart the government’s arguments by distinguishing trademark registration from the narrow holdings of the government-subsidy and obscenity cases the government attempts to rely upon. The brief concludes by pointing out that even if the Court were to find that the scandalous-marks provision does not constitute viewpoint discrimination, the provision would nevertheless be unconstitutional either under strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation or intermediate scrutiny, pursuant to Central Hudson’s admonition that a restriction of commercial speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest.
Interpipe: Can the government play favorites with funding to advantage union speech?
In addition to Iancu, the Court has before it a petition in another speech case: Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra. In that case, Interpipe Contracting, Inc. (“Interpipe”), performed work for California. California’s labor code requires public-works contractors to pay their employees the “prevailing wage” set by California either (1) in cash, or (2) in a combination of cash wages and employer payments, the latter of which can include payments to third-party industry-advancement funds. Using option number two, Interpipe paid contributions to an industry-advancement fund that supported open-shop arrangements. Then, effective 2017, California amended its labor code so that an employer could only count payments to an industry advancement fund against the prevailing wage requirement if that fund is approved by a labor union through a collective bargaining agreement. Interpipe and the fund to which it had previously made payments—the Associated Builders & Contractors of California Cooperation Committee, Inc.—challenged the amendment as (1) preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and (2) violative of the First Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit held that the law survived both challenges. According to the Ninth Circuit, the law was merely “a legitimate minimum labor standard that regulates no one’s labor speech.” Interpipe petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.
An amicus brief on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce supports Interpipe’s petition for certiorari. The brief argues that the California amendment effectively favors pro-unionization speech by requiring contractors to pay a prevailing wage and then alleviating that burden only where the contractor supports pro-unionization advocacy directed by a labor union. Accordingly, California’s scheme attempts to end-run the Supreme Court’s decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, which held that California was preempted by the NLRA when it prohibited contractors from using state funds to “assist, promote or deter union organization.” The brief also highlights the fact that the law is not viewpoint neutral under the First Amendment and concludes by emphasizing the sea-change on national labor relations that this law would effect if allowed to stand. The day after the Chamber filed its brief, the Court signaled its interest in taking the case by calling for an opposition to be filed by the state of California.
The Court made clear last term in Janus v. AFSCME that it is willing to enforce individuals’ First Amendment rights in high-profile labor cases. And in NIFLA v. Becerra, it reinforced its hostility to content-based regulations of speech that favor particular viewpoints. It remains to be seen whether the cases this term or next will achieve similar outcomes, but it appears that, at the very least, the First Amendment will continue to grab the attention of the Court.

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