Source: http://fl.bna.com/fl/19990511/s8123.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:23:55+00:00

Document:
Appearances: Jody Davis and Andrew Harrington, Alaska Legal Services Corporation, Fairbanks, for Appellant. Scott Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Six years after Ray Ferguson admitted paternity of Paul Gold and a paternity judgment was entered against Ferguson, blood tests excluded Ferguson as Paul's father. Ferguson then sought relief from the superior court, which vacated the paternity judgment and ordered the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) to cease collecting future child support, but refused to extinguish the arrearages that had accrued under the judgment. Because Ferguson sought and received relief only under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5), and argued only that the judgment should no longer have prospective application, we affirm, and reject Ferguson's argument that he should not have to pay the arrearages that accumulated before the superior court disestablished paternity.
Paul Gold was born in February 1986. In February 1991 Paul's mother, Rebecca Gold, signed a paternity affidavit alleging that Ray Ferguson was Paul's father.(1) Based on this affidavit, CSED filed a Complaint for Establishment of Paternity against Ferguson. The complaint alleged that Ferguson was Paul's biological father and that Ferguson owed Paul a duty of support from the date of Paul's birth.
Ferguson admitted these allegations. He also signed and filed an Acknowledgment of Paternity, admitting that he was Paul's father and acknowledging that he could be held financially responsible for Paul. Accordingly, on July 5, 1991, the court entered a judgment in favor of CSED and an order adjudicating Ferguson to be Paul's father.
In October 1991 CSED issued a Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility to Ferguson, imposing monthly child support of $792 and finding support arrearages of $37,928 for the period of February 1, 1986 to November 30, 1991. In November 1995 CSED administratively reduced the monthly support to $144, effective May 1, 1995. Although the parties' briefs do not expressly say so, it appears from the record that CSED sought reimbursement from Ferguson for public assistance paid on Paul's behalf.
In late 1995 or early 1996 Ferguson's daughter, Hadley Hess, learned that Rebecca Gold had stated that Ferguson was not Paul's father. Hess then arranged genetic testing of her father, Rebecca, and Paul. The test results excluded Ferguson as Paul's father.
In March 1997 Ferguson moved to vacate the judgment of paternity; relying on Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5), he argued that the paternity judgment should no longer have prospective application. He requested that the court order CSED to "cease collection . . . of all past and future child support based on the paternity order."
CSED filed a limited opposition. It did not oppose the motion "as it pertains to prospective enforcement of his child support obligation from the date of filing of the motion." But it opposed any order which would restrict CSED's ability to collect child support arrearages accruing under the paternity judgment.
The superior court granted relief to Ferguson under Rule 60(b)(5) and vacated the paternity judgment. It ordered CSED to cease collecting future child support, but it denied Ferguson's request that CSED cease collecting arrearages. CSED later recalculated Ferguson's entire support obligation based on his actual income and determined that he owed $6,734.64 in arrearages.
Ferguson argues that he should not have to pay child support arrearages accruing between July 1991, when the paternity judgment was entered, and March 1997, when Ferguson moved to vacate the judgment. CSED responds that the superior court properly refused to extinguish Ferguson's arrearages because relief was granted to Ferguson under Rule 60(b)(5), which provides only prospective relief from judgments or final orders.
(5)	the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.
Our previous Rule 60(b)(5) cases involved litigants who sought relief under that subsection, claiming that their judgment had prospective effect.(4) Ferguson sought both prospective and retroactive relief. It is a question of first impression in Alaska whether a litigant who obtains Rule 60(b)(5) relief on grounds that a judgment should not have prospective application is entitled to both prospective and retroactive relief.
If Rule 60(b)(5) relief is available only if a movant shows that the prospective application of a judgment is inequitable, it would be anomalous to give both prospective and retroactive effect to a modification after relief is properly granted under Rule 60(b)(5). We therefore hold that the "prospective application" requirement limits not only the circumstances in which Rule 60(b)(5) may be applied, but also the type of relief available under Rule 60(b)(5).
Our interpretation of Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5) is consistent with the federal courts' interpretation of the identical federal rule.
Relief under Rule 60(b)(5) is therefore available against only the prospective, or executory, aspects of judgments. A paternity judgment has prospective aspects that can be alleviated under Rule 60(b)(5), because a paternity judgment gives rise to prospective duties, including a duty to pay child support in the future. But each child support payment, as it becomes due, is a final judgment in its own right.(23) As a result, vacating Ferguson's paternity judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) eliminated only its prospective effect and did not preclude the collection of amounts past due. Given Rule 60(b)(5)'s limited scope, the superior court appropriately alleviated only the prospective effects of the paternity judgment and support order after Ferguson sought and received relief on grounds that the paternity judgment should no longer have prospective effect under Rule 60(b)(5). Accordingly, we affirm.
Ohio's Rule 60(b)(4) is identical to Alaska's Rule 60(b)(5).
Ferguson contends that preventing CSED from collecting the arrearages is necessary to eliminate the prospective application of the vacated paternity judgment. He asks: "Does the 'prospective application' of the judgment, which is to be barred when relief is granted under Rule 60(b)(5), differentiate between prospective assessment of support (which the CSED agrees is barred), and prospective collection of support (which the CSED asserts is not barred) or does it encompass both?"
Moreover, the distinction Ferguson asks us to draw would unreasonably disfavor obligors who comply with court orders and pay child support and favor obligors who fail to pay child support and generate arrearages. Assuming that obligors who comply with child support orders will not be reimbursed even if their paternity is later disestablished,(33) the distinction Ferguson proposes would give child support obligors incentive not to pay child support, in hopes that paternity might someday be disestablished. Such a distinction would also give potential obligors incentive not to resolve paternity disputes promptly. CSED argues that it is a matter of social policy to resolve paternity disputes promptly. We agree.
Ferguson argues that a judicial disestablishment order, like an administrative disestablishment determination, should extinguish child support arrearages. Alaska Statute 25.27.166 now requires the agency to grant relief from arrearages when paternity is administratively disestablished.(35) But Ferguson's paternity was not administratively disestablished, and the legislature's silence about the effect of judicial disestablishment orders provides no relevant expression of legislative intention regarding any statute applicable to Ferguson. The relief required following judicial disestablishment is therefore governed by Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) and the applicable legal principles discussed in Part III.B.
Ferguson argues that the State will be unjustly enriched if CSED is permitted to collect child support arrearages following vacation of the paternity judgment. We disagree.
Ferguson distinguishes Wetherelt on grounds that Wetherelt sought a refund of money already paid to CSED, whereas Ferguson seeks to prevent CSED from collecting the money from him in the first place. This is not a principled distinction. In Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Murphy,(42) a disestablished father sought reimbursement from the state for money collected by the state under a child support order.(43) The court held that the state did not have to refund any money collected for payments that accrued before Murphy's paternity was disestablished in February 1989, even if the money was collected after February 1989: "It is not the date that the money was collected that is the determinative factor; rather, it is the date that the support payments accrued."(44) Wetherelt and the instant case present the identical question: whether an individual who disestablishes paternity may be relieved from a previously existing duty to reimburse the state for public assistance paid for the period during which the child was the financial responsibility of the putative father.
Ferguson reasons that he would be entitled under Mitchell to be reimbursed if he had already paid the child support, and by extension, that CSED should not be able to collect arrearages. But Mitchell is inapposite to Ferguson's situation. The extent to which the State was unjustly enriched by retaining the previously paid child support was not fully litigated in Mitchell. The State there did not initially oppose Mitchell's motion for reimbursement.(48) The central dispute there was whether the State might have to repay amounts it collected from Mitchell and paid to the child's mother in excess of the public support.(49) Because the issue raised in Mitchell was limited, and because the State did not there dispute whether it could be required to pay back the monies it had retained (as distinguished from those paid to the child's mother), Mitchell does not control.
We conclude that the State is not unjustly enriched by collecting arrearages accruing for monthly support Ferguson failed to pay before paternity was disestablished. As CSED maintains, "[Paul] was [Ferguson's] legal child regardless of the biology of the situation." Ferguson must pay for Paul's support owed during the period before he disestablished paternity.
Because Ferguson sought and was granted relief under Rule 60(b)(5) on the ground that the paternity judgment should no longer have prospective application, we conclude that Ferguson must pay the arrearages owed for the period between July 1, 1991, and March 1997, when he filed his motion to vacate the judgment of paternity. We therefore AFFIRM.
1. "Paul Gold" and "Rebecca Gold" are pseudonyms.
2. See Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979).
3. See Airoulofski v. State, 922 P.2d 889, 892 (Alaska 1996).
4. See Bauman v. Day, 892 P.2d 817, 829 (Alaska 1995); Dewey v. Dewey, 886 P.2d 623, 626-27 (Alaska 1994); Propst v. Propst, 776 P.2d 780, 783 (Alaska 1989).
5. 718 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1986).
6. See id. at 146.
7. Id. (quoting 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice � 60.26 , at 261-62 (2d ed. 1985)) (emphasis added).
8. 892 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).
10. 886 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1994).
12. 718 P.2d at 145.
13. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
14. 286 U.S. 106 (1932), declined to follow by Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1992); see generally Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
15. See 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure � 2863, at 336-47 (1995).
16. See Wheeling, 59 U.S. at 429; see also Wright, supra, note 15, at 339.
17. See Wheeling, 59 U.S. at 431-32.
18. Swift, 286 U.S. at 114.
19. 575 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1978).
20. Id. at 425 (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 114).
21. Id. (citations omitted) (holding that district court's refusal to vacate its award for damages for past overtime wages wrongfully withheld conformed with mandate of Rule 60(b)(5), notwithstanding Supreme Court's subsequent decision in unrelated decision that overruled precedent upon which damages award was predicated).
22. Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1138-39 (citations omitted). See generally John F. Wagner Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule 60(b)(5) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Authorizing Relief from Final Judgment Where Its Prospective Application Is Inequitable, 117 A.L.R. Fed. 419, �� 5-6, at 445-50 (1994).
23. See AS 25.27.225; State ex rel. Inman v. Dean, 902 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Alaska 1995) ("Alaska considers periodic child support obligations 'judgments' that vest when an installment becomes due but remains unpaid."); Greene v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk County, 312 N.W.2d 915, 917-18 (Iowa 1981) ("The effect of an award of child support is to provide the custodial parent with a money judgment. Each installment becomes a judgment when due. Accrued installments thus become the vested right of the spouse entitled to the support and may not be taken away.") (citations omitted).
24. 637 N.E.2d 914 (Ohio 1994).
25. See id. at 916.
26. Id. at 917 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
27. 676 N.E.2d 604 (Ohio App. 1996).
29. 592 N.E.2d 1297 (Mass. 1992).
30. See id. at 1298-99.
31. Id. at 1300 (footnote omitted).
32. Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1138; see also Ryan v. U.S. Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430, 434 (2d Cir. 1962) ("Rule 60(b)(5) . . . properly applies only to judgments with prospective effect, and so does not cover the case of a judgment for money damages.").
33. See State, CSED v. Wetherelt, 931 P.2d 383, 390-91 (Alaska 1997).
(a)	The agency shall, by regulation, establish procedures and standards for the disestablishment of paternity of a child whose paternity was established in this state other than by court order if the paternity was not established by genetic test results that met the standards set out in AS 25.20.050(d) at the time the test was performed.
(c)	The agency shall disestablish paternity under this section if genetic test results are negative under the standard set out in AS 25.20.050(d) and if the other standards established in its regulations are met.
(d)	If a decision under this section disestablishes paternity, the petitioner's child support obligation or liability for public assistance under AS 25.27.120 is modified retroactively to extinguish arrearages for child support and accrued liability for public assistance based on the alleged paternity that is disestablished under this section. This subsection may be implemented only to the extent not prohibited by federal law.
(Emphasis added.) This provision became effective January 1, 1996, when CSED was given the authority to establish and disestablish paternity administratively. See AS 25.27.020(a)(11); AS 25.27.165; AS 25.27.166; Wetherelt, 931 P.2d at 388 n.8. These provisions were not in effect when Ferguson's child support obligation began to accrue. He applied for judicial, not administrative, relief from a judgment that judicially established paternity. The statute gave the agency no authority to disestablish paternity established by court order. See AS 25.27.166(a).
36. 931 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1997).
37. See id. at 385.
39. See id. at 384-90.
40. See id. at 390-91.
41. See also Smith v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 658 N.E.2d 1100, 1100-02 (Ohio App. 1995) (holding that Smith was not entitled to restitution from Department of Human Services for child support collected by agency after he voluntarily acknowledged paternity although genetic tests later disproved paternity; stating that "the unjust impoverishment which [Smith] has suffered does not necessarily correspond to any unjust enrichment on the part of the state").
42. 608 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. App. 1993).
43. See id. at 1002.
44. Id. at 1003; see also State ex rel. Blackwell v. Blackwell, 534 N.W.2d 89, 91 (Iowa 1995) ("[R]efusing to enforce a judgment as opposed to vacating a judgment 'constitutes a distinction without a difference.'") (citation omitted).
45. 930 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1997).
46. See id. at 1289.
47. Id. (citing Restatement of Restitution � 1 (1937)).
48. See id. at 1287-88.
49. See id. at 1289-90.

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