Source: http://academy.lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/state-v-brown-96-s-e-61-sc-supreme-court-1918/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 11:52:34+00:00

Document:
STATE v. BROWN ET AL.
Messrs. Cothran, Dean & Cothran, Haynsworth & Haynsworth, for Gordon Brown, Doill Huggins and John Humphries, cite: As to dying declarations: 58 S.C. 352; 15 Rich. 349, 9231; 14 S.C. 410. As to dying declarations in favor of accused: 4th Enc. of Ev. 938; 146 U.S. 140; 46 A. D. 276; 17 S.W. 337; 23 So. 270; 5 Ky. L. R. 203; note to 56 L.R.A. 367-9, and note at 441-2; 56 S.C. 360. As to mutual combat: 21 N.E. 121; 14 Rich. 215; 49 S.C. 555; 67 S.C. 323; 49 S.C. 555. As to defendant using jibe reasonably calculated to cause one to resent them: 85 S.C. 101; and ask that the case be reconsidered.
Mr. J. R. Martin, for Tom Harvey and I. A. Williams, cites no authorities.
Solicitor P. A. Bonham, for the State, cites no authorities.
Judges: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GARY. MESSRS. JUSTICES HYDRICK, WATTS and GAGE concur. MR. JUSTICE FRASER, dissenting.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GARY.
The defendants were indicted for the murder of Davis Freize, and were convicted of manslaughter. Freize was killed in a general fight that took place on the early morning of the 27th of November, 1915, in front of the office of the Judson Mills. A few days before the homicide took place, a labor union was organized among the employees of the mill, and soon thereafter a strike of the weavers was called. A number of the employees joined in the strike, and the mill was closed, and so remained for about 20 days. On November 15th, a large majority of the employees who had become strikers returned for work, and the mill again started its operations. Those who continued on the strike, stationed pickets along the public roadways, about 200 yards from the mill, for the purpose of persuading the employees to join the strikers. There was no trouble until the morning of the 27th of November, when a party of the strikers, after failing in their efforts to influence the employees to join them, left their post and came past the mill office, where several of the workers had gathered. This was in the early morning while it was still dark, and a few minutes after the mill had commenced its work. The strikers and the employees exchanged a few jokes, when the defendant, Harvey (one of the strikers), took exception to some remarks that were made in regard to him, and this led to a fight then and there, in which about four or five strikers and an equal number of employees took part. The defendants, Harvey and Williams, were strikers, and the defendants, Brown, Huggins and Humphries, were non-strikers. As the fight took place while it was still dark, the testimony is confused and conflicting, in regard to what occurred. Several of the combatants were severely cut, and David Freize (striker) was so badly cut that he did not linger long. There was testimony to the effect that when the fight commenced, Harvey had a knife, and that a bystander (Tidwell) exclaimed, “Look out, men; Harvey has his knife open;” that he saw the knife, and that Harvey struck at Humphries with it. In other words, there was testimony tending to show that those who joined in the combat knew that a knife was being used by one of the combatants. The defendants, Brown, Huggins and Humphries, alone appealed.
These appellants made a motion for a severance, on the ground that their defenses were antagonistic to the defenses of the other two defendants; but the motion was refused, and this is made the basis for the first assignment of error. It is only necessary to cite the case of State v. Wade, 95 S.C. 387, 79 S.E. 106, to show that the exception raising this question cannot be sustained.
“She said she thought at the time the violence was inflicted that ‘she would then die,’ but she did not say that at the time she made the statement she considered herself in the very presence of death, soon to occur;” whereas, the words in the present case indicate a consciousness of approaching death, and the abandonment of all hope.
We will consider, first, subdivision (a). It is incumbent on the party offering to introduce in evidence a dying declaration to show that it fulfills the requirements of the law; and the mere fact that declarations may have been made on a previous occasion, under such circumstances as rendered them admissible, is not sufficient to show that the subsequent declarations are admissible. State v. Belcher, 13 S.C. 459. The record discloses the fact that the declarations made to Rector were at the home of the deceased, shortly after daylight, on the morning of the homicide, but that those subsequently made to Miss Alice Agnew were at the city hospital. It does not, however, appear how much time elapsed between the two declarations. Under such circumstances, the ruling of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is free from error.
The decision is reaffirmed in State v. Stuckey, 56 S.C. 576, 35 S.E. 263. Those cases are conclusive of the questions under consideration.
All the other exceptions (which will be reported) relate to the law of mutual combat, and the questions presented by them must be determined, in connection with the following requests which were charged: “That, to constitute mutual combat, it is not necessary that there should be a positive agreement between the participating parties to enter the combat; it is sufficient if they wilfully enter into the conflict, upon the impulse of the moment. If one comes to the assistance of his friend or relative, and takes part in a difficulty in which such friend or relative is engaged, he enters the combat upon the same footing of the person to whose assistance he comes, and under the same legal status.” State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1013, 125 Am. St. Rep. 788, 13 Ann. Cas. 1051.
The case of State v. Lee, 85 S.C. 101, 67 S.E. 141, 137 Am. St. Rep. 869, shows that the fifth exception cannot be sustained.
When the fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth exceptions are considered in connection with the entire charge, it will be seen that they must be overruled. Instead of being prejudicial to the appellants, the charge was too favorable to them. Affirmed.
MESSRS. JUSTICES HYDRICK, WATTS and GAGE concur.
Some people use the strongest language they know on all occasions, and it seems to me that something further should be shown than “I am killed,” especially when the two physicians say, in effect, that the hope of life was so strong that the deceased did not believe their statement that he would die, but, on the contrary, expected an early recovery.
If the statement of the sheriff was allowed, then I think the statement of the nurse should also have been admitted. Death was nearer. Now eliminate the testimony of the doctors, as I think we must do, to allow the dying declaration at all; then there is a presumption that a condition once shown to exist continues until a change is shown. The first statement was made while the heat of battle had little time to cool. The latter statement was made after there was time for reflection. The second statement was by the nurse: “‘I said, who cut you?’ He said, ‘I don’t know, it was dark.'” A free fight and a dark night makes the second statement highly probable.
We are considering rules for other cases, as well as this case. I do not think this is in conflict with the cases cited in the majority opinion. The danger of the “fabrication of false testimony” is greater with the prosecution than the defense. Unless the deceased is permitted to live only a few minutes, he is likely to die surrounded by his friends. It may be a fearful weapon in the hands of the prosecution, and leave the defendant powerless to protect himself against its use.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.