Source: http://missouri-k.com/?tag=mmpa
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:48:18+00:00

Document:
Proving Damages for MMPA Claim–Oitker v. K.C. Waterproofing, Inc.
Missouri authority allows a property owner to testify as to the value of property, in contexts where one might think that the property owner’s testimony would be excluded as being an expert testimony without proof of the ordinary prerequisites to expert testimony. Oitker v. K.C. Waterproofing addresses such an issue. It seems there were problems with the foundation work done by the contractor.
It seems to be the contractor’s position that the client was not entitled to claim that the promised services were worth at least what the contractor charged. Presumably the contractor would not have expressly disagreed at the time the contract was formed.
Let’s see if the contractor’s discussion of the foundation for the damages computation is “all wet”.
This entry was posted in Copyright © 2014 Royce Barondes, Pending, Uncategorized and tagged MMPA, owner, proof of damages on August 12, 2014 by Royce Barondes.
Are Fiduciary Relationships Necessarily Excluded from the MMPA? Someone Claims So. McFarland v. Trame.
Appellant’s Count VI in her First Amended Petition, alleging violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, was dismissed on or about November 23, 2010. See L.F. 4. This ruling was proper and should not be disturbed because Missouri courts have not applied the MMPA to fiduciary causes of action such as the present case (i.e., cases against attorneys), and instead have only applied the MMPA to its intended types of cases, such as consumer transactions such as claims brought by automobile purchasers against automobile dealerships, and customers against roof repair and air conditioning companies. See, e.g., Schuchmann v. Air. Serv. Heating & Air. Cond., Inc., 199 S.W.3d 228 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006); Morehouse v. Behlmann Pontiac-GMC Truck Serv., Inc., 31 S.W.3d 55 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000); Viene v. Concours Auto Sales, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. App. 1990); State ex rel. Webster v. Milbourn, 759 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988).
That’s interesting. What about real estate brokers? Categorization of that relationship has changed in various jurisdictions over time. What was the characterization in, let’s say, 1984, in a case discussing the relationship of H.S.C., as the real estate broker, to American, its principal and the seller?
This entry was posted in Copyright (c) 2013 Royce Barondes., Pending and tagged attorney, fiduciary, lawyer, MMPA on December 2, 2013 by Royce Barondes.
If a Car Dealer Says, “it is what it is; you have to pay it”, Should You Believe it? Does the Question Answer Itself?
Fired for a girlfriend’s vehicle purchase. No cause of action, or can we think of something?
The odious circumstances are provided by Hedrick v. Jay Wolfe Imports I, LLC, 404 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013).
Hedrick contends that Missouri has a clear public policy of allowing citizens to freely conduct business and that by patronizing his employer’s competitor for a better price in purchasing a Honda, he and his live-in girlfriend acted in accordance with a public policy that Missouri encourages. He asserts that his termination falls under the public policy exception because he was terminated for acting in accordance with public policy. We disagree.
Let’s see if we can find an alternative way to frame the claim, shall we?
This entry was posted in Copyright (c) 2013 Royce Barondes. and tagged consumer, good faith, MMPA, reservation price on September 24, 2013 by Royce Barondes.
An obligor cannot assign rights without the consent of the obligee if the assignment operates to materially affect the rights of the obligee.
An assignment of the right to payment under a contract, where the payee’s performance is subject to the MMPA, would materially affect the rights of the obligee if the assignment operated to eliminate protections in the debt collection process that would be otherwise available absent the assignment.
It would appear that a party cannot consent to elimination of protection of the MMPA. There would not seem to be a useful reason not to apply that to consenting to an assignment in circumstances that operated to eliminate MMPA protections.
Were a court to determine an assignee of a debt representing deferred payments from a payor benefitting from the MMPA was not subject to the MMPA, effectiveness of the assignment would therefore require the assignor remained liable for any practice engaged-in by the assignee that would be actionable had there not been an assignment and it had been performed by the assignor.
This entry was posted in Copyright (c) 2013 Royce Barondes. and tagged assignments, assumption, consumer, delegation, MMPA on September 19, 2013 by Royce Barondes.
Though justice is supposed to be blind, perhaps it requires particular efforts to take up the charge against those the legislature has termed “heroes”. We shall see if those in that camp are up to it.
Here we have a discussion of an interesting issue of whether the MMPA extends to–whether the defined term “person” includes–a particular “public corporation” (see State v. Long, 213 S.W. 436 (Mo. 1919) (“We judicially notice, however, that the corporation by which the University of Missouri is controlled is styled “the curators of the University of Missouri.” We notice this because such corporation is a public one, created by a public statute (section 11097, R. S. 1909), of which, and of all such statutes, we are required to take judicial notice.”).
Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) by misrepresenting the meaning and purpose of the Missouri Heroes’ Act by misapplying Plaintiffs’ money and “gift aid” funds.
Something of an awkward circumstance, to be sure.
Moreover, we conclude that these averments sound in contract rather than tort. Clearly, the averments relate to the sale of educational services. Under these averments, the protection of bargained-for expectations is implicated.
Further, Plaintiffs brought an action under Section 9.2 of the CPL. As discussed elsewhere, such an action may be brought by a person “who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss….” 73 P.S. § 201–9.2. Thus, an action under Section 9.2 of the CPL must be transaction based. For this additional reason, we conclude Plaintiffs’ action under the CPL sounds in contract.
30 A.3d at at 599. Of course, the MMPA allows enhanced remedies, including punitive damages. A facile way to distinguish contract and tort is to focus on the availability of something beyond expectation damages. But not so fast.
This entry was posted in Copyright (c) 2013 Royce Barondes., Pending and tagged MMPA, punitive damages, sovereign immunity, university on September 9, 2013 by Royce Barondes.

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