Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/wa-court-of-appeals/1550195.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 11:18:48+00:00

Document:
Randy ANFINSON; James Geiger; and Steven Hardie, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Appellants, v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC.; John Schnebeck; Cheryl Pilakowski; and John Does 1 through 10, Respondents.
Martin S. Garfinkel, William Joel Rutzick Schroeter, Rebecca Jane Roe, Attorney at Law, Lawrence Rea Schwerin, Dmitri L. Iglitzin, Schwerin Campbell Barnard Iglitzin & Lavitt, Seattle, WA, for Appellant. Kelly Patrick Corr, Guy Paul Michelson, Kevin Carl Baumgardner, Emily J. Brubaker, Corr Cronin Michelson Baumgardner & Preece LLP, Seattle, WA, Chris A Hollinger, O'Melveny & Meyers LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Jury instructions are sufficient if they permit each party to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and when read as a whole, properly inform the jury of the applicable law.1 Here, pickup and delivery drivers working for FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., (FedEx) sued for relief under the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA) on behalf of themselves and other drivers similarly situated. They claim a right to overtime pay and attorney fees. They also seek reimbursement for the expenses of their uniforms under the Industrial Welfare Act (IWA).
¶ 2 The primary issue in this case of first impression is whether the court properly instructed the jury on the legal standard for determining whether the drivers are employees or independent contractors for purposes of the MWA. Other jury instructions are also at issue. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 4 Anfinson seeks overtime wages under the MWA for a period commencing three years prior to December 2004, when this action was filed. The essence of this claim is that the FedEx drivers are “employees” under the MWA, not “independent contractors,” as the company classifies them. Anfinson also seeks attorney fees under the MWA and other statutes.
¶ 6 The court bifurcated the trial into two phases. The first phase was the liability phase and the second phase was to have addressed damages.
¶ 7 A central issue for the liability phase was how the trial court should instruct the jury on the legal standard for whether the drivers are employees of FedEx or independent contractors. The court, drawing on submissions from the parties and its own research, fashioned a preliminary and a final instruction for the jury on this question. They were worded substantially the same. These instructions are the primary issue on appeal.
¶ 10 Anfinson challenges both the trial court's decisions to give certain instructions and its refusal to give others. We agree with some of these challenges and disagree with others.
¶ 16 Anfinson's primary argument is that the court's preliminary instruction, as well as Instruction 9 (collectively, “Instruction 9”), misstates the law. Specifically, the class members argue that this instruction erroneously states the legal standard for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors for purposes of the MWA. Anfinson argues Instruction 9, which focuses on whether an employer has the “right to control the details of the class members' performance of the work” is incorrect. We hold that Instruction 9 incorrectly states the law and was prejudicial to Anfinson.
¶ 17 In considering Anfinson's arguments, we have several preliminary observations. First, the question whether the FedEx drivers are employees or independent contractors for purposes of the MWA is a question of first impression in Washington. Second, there are a wide variety of approaches in other states that have considered the same or similar questions.16 Third, in contrast to the multiplicity of approaches by various states, the Supreme Court and all federal circuits agree that “the economic realities” test is the applicable test for the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), on which the MWA is based.17 Finally, Anfinson submitted supplemental authority during this appeal stating the approach taken by the Washington Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) on this question.18 For the reasons that we explain later in this opinion, that authority from DLI is helpful in deciding this question.
You must decide whether the class members were employees or independent contractors when performing work for FedEx Ground. This decision requires you to determine whether FedEx Ground controlled, or had the right to control, the details of the class members' performance of the work.
8. Whether or not the class members and FedEx Ground believed they were creating an employment relationship or an independent contractor relationship.
Neither the presence nor the absence of any individual factor is determinative.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his [or her] employees for a work week longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his [or her] employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he [or she] is employed.
¶ 23 The above definitions provide little guidance for determining whether an employment relationship exists in any particular case for purposes of the MWA. We thus turn to the established rules of statutory construction to address that question.
¶ 27 In view of the supreme court's reliance on the FLSA in analyzing the MWA in Stahl and other cases,36 review of the history of both statutes is helpful to our task here.
¶ 32 The purpose of the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor is thus substantially different in these two areas of law. While the common law “right to control” test was developed to define an employer's liability for injuries caused by his employee, the purpose of the MWA is to provide remedial protections to workers.52 As discussed above, federal courts have recognized that this distinction between tort policy and social legislation policy justifies a departure from common law principles when an employer claims that a worker is excluded as an independent contractor from a statute protecting “employees.” There is no reason to conclude that state law should not also recognize the differences in the policies underlying tort law and this remedial legislation.
(6) whether the service rendered by the worker is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.
¶ 34 Instruction 9 includes introductory language from the common law “right to control” test for distinguishing between agents and independent contractors, which is stated in Washington Pattern Jury Instruction (WPI) 50.11.01.55 The first six numbered factors that follow the introductory language are adopted from the FLSA “economic realities” test used by the majority of the federal circuits.56 Factor seven is from a Washington tort case.57 Factor eight is from a California case.58 In short, this instruction is a mix of federal and state common law factors.
¶ 36 With these considerations in mind, we hold that the economic realities test used by the majority of the federal circuits should be the proper legal test for determining whether a worker is an employee under the MWA. Instruction 9, while including some factors drawn from this test, defines the ultimate test for determining whether a worker is an “employee” under the MWA as the “right of control” over the worker's performance. This is legally incorrect.
¶ 37 Stahl and other supreme court cases make clear that Washington's MWA is patterned on the FLSA. Given this and the legislative history of the MWA, we conclude that the federal test of “economic realities” used by a majority of the federal circuit courts is most persuasive, given the parallel remedial purposes of the state and federal acts.
¶ 38 In Stahl, the supreme court also looked to DLI's then current interpretation of RCW 49.46.130 for guidance.61 So do we for purposes of our analysis here.
1. The degree of control that the business has over the worker.
2. The worker's opportunity for profit or loss depending on the worker's managerial skill.
3. The worker's investment in equipment or material.
4. The degree of skill required for the job.
5. The degree of permanence of the working relationship.
6. The degree to which the services rendered by the worker are an integral part of the business.
¶ 41 Because this instructional error was given on behalf of the party in whose favor the verdict was returned, we presume that it was prejudicial. Therefore, we reverse.
¶ 42 FedEx argues that Anfinson was still able to argue effectively its theory of the case under Instruction 9 because of the presence of the six factors used by the majority of federal circuits. But Instruction 9 clearly states that the “right of control” is determinative. Thus, Anfinson could not effectively argue that the six factors of the “economic realities” test were determinative. This is particularly true in light of the presence of two additional factors in this instruction, neither of which is considered in the economic realities test. Our review of the final arguments by the parties supports our conclusion that this instruction was prejudicial to Anfinson.
¶ 44 First, the court's analysis gives no indication that either party argued that any test for distinguishing employees from independent contractors other than the common law test should apply. Second, it is significant that the statutory framework in the wage and hour laws at issue in Ebling is not based on the FLSA. Thus, there was no reason for that court to consider the persuasive authority of the FLSA on that state law.
¶ 45 Third, Hollingbery, on which Ebling relied, sets forth the common law standard for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor in Washington in the context of tort law.73 There, our supreme court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) as setting forth the relevant factors to be considered in determining whether a worker is an employee in the context of determining respondeat superior liability.74 As we explained earlier in this opinion, the definition of an “employee” under the MWA is distinct and broader than the definition of an “employee” under the doctrine of respondeat superior in tort law.
¶ 46 For these reasons, neither the reasoning in Ebling nor Hollingbery is persuasive with respect to the question of what legal standard should be used to distinguish an “employee” from an “independent contractor” under the MWA.
¶ 47 We note that the record indicates that the trial court also gave particular weight to the application of California's common law test in Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.75 and S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Industrial Relations.76 Neither case is helpful here.
¶ 48 In Estrada, a case seeking reimbursement for work-related expenses under the California Labor Code, the court accepted Borello as stating the applicable standard for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor because no party disputed the applicability of that test.77 But Borello is not on point for the question that must be addressed by this court: what test should be applied under Washington's MWA?
¶ 52 Because the California Labor Code and minimum wage laws are not patterned on the FLSA, the trial court incorrectly relied on the California courts' articulation of that state's common law test for distinguishing between an employee and an independent contractor under the MWA.
¶ 53 Anfinson also argues that factors three and eight of Instruction 9 incorrectly state the applicable law. We agree in part.
¶ 54 Anfinson first argues that factor three of Instruction 9 should have referred to the “relative” investments of the parties. While all federal circuits agree that the economic realities test is the proper test,87 only the Fifth Circuit states relative investment of the parties as one of six factors to be used in determining the economic realities of the relationship between the parties.88 We conclude that the test in Washington should be based on the test articulated by the majority of the federal circuit courts and that the “relative” investment of the parties is not articulated in that test.89 Accordingly, we reject Anfinson's challenge to that part of Instruction 9.
¶ 55 Anfinson next argues that factor eight of Instruction 9, the belief of the parties, is not a relevant factor under the FLSA test used by the majority of the federal circuits. We agree.
¶ 56 While Washington is not bound to strictly follow the test used by the majority of federal circuits, that test is persuasive. We have heard no persuasive argument why that test should not be used here. However, we acknowledge that the trial court, on remand, may hear such arguments, and we do not prejudge any ruling the trial court may make on that question.
¶ 57 Anfinson next argues that the court abused its discretion by refusing to give his Proposed Instruction 13C. We disagree.
(6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.
You may also consider other evidence bearing on this matter (including whether the alleged employer and alleged employees' believed or stated that they were creating an employment relationship or an independent contractor relationship) only to the extent that such statements or beliefs mirror economic reality. No one factor is controlling but you should weigh them all to determine whether or not the class members are so dependent upon defendant's business such that class members are not, as a matter of economic reality, in business for themselves. If you find that class members were, as a matter of economic reality, dependent upon defendant during the class period, you should find that class members were employees of defendant. On the other hand, if you find that class members, as a matter of economic reality, were not dependent upon defendant during the class period, you should find that class members were independent contractors.
¶ 59 As we just explained, relative investment of the parties is not among the six factors that a majority of the federal circuits use to determine the economic realities of the relationship between the parties. Moreover, even the Fifth Circuit, which includes this factor, states its six factor test differently from this proposed instruction. Thus, for both reasons, this proposed instruction does not correctly state the economic realities test followed by any of the federal circuits. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing this proposed instruction, although we affirm the trial court on different grounds than the court utilized.
¶ 60 FedEx argues that judicial estoppel should preclude Anfinson from arguing that Instruction 9 is erroneous. The trial court implicitly rejected this argument below, and so do we.
¶ 65 The trial court appears to have rejected FedEx's argument by dealing with the issue on the merits.
¶ 66 In a footnote, FedEx now argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should preclude Anfinson's arguments on appeal with respect to Instruction 9. FedEx claims these arguments are inconsistent with his legal position during the class certification proceedings that the common law “right to control” test was the applicable legal standard for determining whether the class members were independent contractors or employees.
¶ 67 But, the “heart of the doctrine [of judicial estoppel] is the prevention of inconsistent positions as to facts. It does not require counsel to be consistent on points of law.”97 Here, Anfinson's position on appeal is not factually inconsistent with his arguments in the class certification proceeding. Thus, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply.
¶ 68 Anfinson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to give Anfinson's proposed instructions 4 and 4A.
Plaintiffs have signed operating agreements, or contracts, with defendant. These contracts state, among other things, that plaintiffs are “independent contractors.” The contractual label of “independent contractor” does not determine whether plaintiffs are independent contractors or employees. You must determine whether plaintiffs are employees or independent contractors based on the actual relationship between plaintiffs and defendant. Stated otherwise, the subjective intent of the plaintiffs and defendant cannot override the facts of this actual relationship.
Proposed instruction 4A is identical to proposed instruction 4, but omits the last sentence.
¶ 70 The trial court declined to give these instructions, in part, because it believed they overemphasized one of the factors the court believed controlled the case. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in making this decision on that basis under those circumstances. In any event, because of our decision on Instruction 9, further discussion of these proposed instructions is likely moot. We do not envision that these instructions will likely be proposed on remand. If they are, we have given the trial court and the parties sufficient guidance.
¶ 71 Anfinson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to give Anfinson's proposed instruction 15A.
The fact that one or more of the plaintiffs, who provided services to defendant, did so through his or her personal business entity should not impact your decision in this case. If, applying the six factors set forth in Instruction No. _, you find that the plaintiffs were so dependent upon defendant's business such that plaintiffs were not, as a matter of economic reality, in business for themselves during the class period, you must find that plaintiffs were employees of defendant.
¶ 73 In view of our holding as to the proper test for distinguishing between employee and independent contractor, we need not address this claim. This instruction is unlikely to be proposed on remand.
¶ 74 Anfinson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the jury Instruction 8. We hold that instruction was misleading and likely prejudicial. It also appears to be legally incorrect.
¶ 79 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the wording of the instruction was misleading and likely prejudicial to Anfinson. It was misleading because it permitted the jury to accept an argument that the court expressly ruled could not be made. “Common” does not mean “all,” as FedEx argued during closing. Absent an objection and a request for a curative instruction, this instruction permitted the jury to decide that Anfinson failed to prove his case if any one member of the class failed to fulfill any of the relevant class criteria. There is no legal support for that proposition.
¶ 80 Based on the briefing on appeal and our independent research we also conclude that the instruction appears to be legally incorrect. In so concluding, we note the complexity of this issue and the dearth of persuasive case law addressing the issue. On remand, the parties should brief the question for the trial court to decide, with the following considerations in mind.
When it is said that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or that any proposition must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, or the expression “if you find” is used, it means that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case bearing on the question, that the proposition on which that party has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true.
It appears that Instruction 8 was intended to supplement this initial statement of the burden of proof. Whether this was proper under the circumstances of this case is unclear.
¶ 83 A court should order class certification only after conducting a “rigorous analysis” to ensure that the plaintiff has satisfied CR 23's prerequisites.109 But contrary to FedEx's representation, CR 23 does not require “that the shared questions of law or fact be identical” as to each individual class member.110 Evidence from individual class members may be used to demonstrate a common course of conduct by the defendant employer.111 If a defendant believes that the trial court certified the plaintiff class in error or that the requirements of CR 23 are no longer satisfied, he may move for decertification at any point during the proceedings.112 Here, FedEx moved for decertification and the court denied that motion. To the extent that FedEx relies on case law from the class certification stage of a CR 23 action, that case law is not persuasive as to the plaintiffs burden of proof at the liability phase of trial. In short, commonality for certification purposes is separate from the burden of proof at the liability phase.
¶ 85 Here, Instruction 8 did not inform the jury that it could consider representative evidence only to the extent it demonstrated FedEx's policies or practices. Rather, it instructed the jury that it “should not consider individualized actions, conduct, or work experiences unless you find that they reflect policies, procedures, or practices common to the class members during the class period.”116 This is incorrect.
¶ 87 Here, however, the test for determining whether FedEx delivery drivers are independent contractors or employees is not whether FedEx had the “right to control” the workers. Rather, the test in Washington for determining employment status is the “economic reality” of the working relationship. Under this test, it is likely that evidence of the actual working relationship between FedEx and FedEx drivers would be relevant and probative. For this reason, FedEx's reliance on FedEx Ground Package System is not persuasive.
¶ 88 Finally, FedEx argues that the cases Anfinson cites to support the propriety of representative evidence in the wage and hour law context are distinguishable. We agree that the cases Anfinson cites deal primarily with the issue of damages under the FLSA and are in that sense distinguishable from the issue in this case.121 However, we conclude that they do not support the court's Instruction 8.
¶ 90 Anderson is distinguishable from this case in that the discussion of the burden of proof was related only to the measure of damages, not the fact of liability.125 Here, on the other hand, the issue is liability itself, not the resulting damages. However, as discussed at length above, the test for determining liability is whether the class of plaintiffs was, as a matter of economic reality, dependant on FedEx. This determination requires analysis of the written practices and procedures of FedEx. But it also requires analysis of the actual working relationship of the parties, which may only be presented in the form of representative evidence from individual class members.
¶ 91 For these reasons Instruction 8 appears to be legally incorrect. Because it was also misleading and prejudicial, it should not have been given.
¶ 92 Anfinson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give Anfinson's proposed instructions11A and 12A. We disagree.
¶ 93 Anfinson's proposed Instruction 11A and Instruction 12A deal with the burden of proof and the issue of representative evidence. As discussed at length above with respect to Instruction 8, the case law on these issues is inconclusive. For that reason, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give these instructions.
¶ 94 Anfinson argues that the trial court erred by giving its Special Verdict Form and refusing to give the Proposed Verdict Form [Second Alternative]. We disagree.
The question here is whether the court or the jury should make the determination whether a claimant is an employee under the MWA or an independent contractor. We hold that this is a jury question.
¶ 100 While Anfinson's citation to Tift is accurate, we conclude that the trial court did not err in submitting the question of employment status to the jury.
¶ 101 Anfinson seeks fees on appeal based on RCW 49.46.090 and RCW 49.48.030. Because it is premature to determine whether such an award is proper at this stage of this case, we deny the request without prejudice to a future application for such fees.
[a]ny employer who pays any employee less than wages to which such employee is entitled under or by virtue of this chapter, shall be liable to such employee affected for the full amount of such wage rate, less any amount actually paid to such employee by the employer, and for costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed by the court.
In any action in which any person is successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary owed to him [or her], reasonable attorney's fees, in an amount to be determined by the court, shall be assessed against said employer or former employer: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That this section shall not apply if the amount of recovery is less than or equal to the amount admitted by the employer to be owing for said wages or salary.
¶ 104 Because we remand this case for further proceedings, there has been no judgment for wages under the MWA. Likewise, there has been no determination that FedEx has paid less than the wages that are due. Accordingly, a fee award on the basis of either statute is premature.
¶ 105 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
1. Cox v. Spanqler, 141 Wn.2d 431, 442, 5 P.3d 1265 (2000).
2. Clerk's Papers at 217.
3. Report of Proceedings (March 27, 2009) at 7.
4. Clerk's Papers at 2220.
5. Clerk's Papers at 2383-85.
6. Cox, 141 Wn.2d at 442.
7. Leeper v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 123 Wn.2d 803, 809, 872 P.2d 507 (1994).
8. Cox, 141 Wn.2d at 442.
9. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 237, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
11. Stiley v. Block, 130 Wn.2d 486, 498, 925 P.2d 194 (1996).
12. Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., 127 Wn.2d 67, 92, 896 P.2d 682 (1995).
13. Boeing v. Harker-Lott, 93 Wn.App. 181, 186, 968 P.2d 14 (1998).
14. Van Cleve v. Betts, 16 Wn.App. 748, 756, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977).
15. Swope v. Sundgren, 73 Wn.2d 747, 750, 440 P.2d 494 (1968); Hammond v. Braden, 16 Wn.App. 773, 776, 559 P.2d 1357 (1977).
16. See In re FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., Employment Practices Litigation, --- F.R.D. ----, 2008 WL 7764456 (N.D.Ind.2008) (discussing the test applied to determine employment status in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
17. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130, 67 S.Ct. 1547, 91 L.Ed.1947 (1947); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir.1983); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2nd Cir.1988); Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1383 (3rd Cir.1985); Steelman v. Hirsch, 473 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir.2007); Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir.1998); Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1117 (6th Cir.1984); Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir.1987); Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir.2005); Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir.1981); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 805 (10th Cir.1989); Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 818-19 (11th Cir.1998).
18. Statement of Additional Authorities by Appellants/Plaintiffs dated July 12, 2010; RAP 10.8.
19. See Graves v. P.J. Tagqares Co., 94 Wn.2d 298, 302-03, 616 P.2d 1223 (1980) (“ ‘Whether a relationship is one of agency or independent contractorship can only be decided as a matter of law where there are no facts in dispute and the facts are susceptible of only one interpretation.’ ”) (quoting Larner v. Torqerson, 93 Wn.2d 801, 804, 613 P.2d 780 (1980)); Brock, 840 F.2d at 1059 (“The existence and degree of each factor is a question of fact while the legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts-whether workers are employees or independent contractors-is a question of law.”).
20. Clerk's Papers at 2195 (emphasis added).
23. Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc., 159 Wn.2d 700, 708, 153 P.3d 846 (2007) (citing State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)).
24. Id. (citing Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d at 600).
26. Id. (quoting Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007)).
27. 148 Wn.2d 876, 64 P.3d 10 (2003).
34. Id. at 885. See also Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wn.2d 291, 298, 996 P.2d 582 (2000); Inniss v. Tandy Corp., 141 Wn.2d 517, 524, 7 P.3d 807 (2000).
35. Stahl, 148 Wn.2d at 886.
36. Id. at 886; Inniss, 141 Wn.2d at 523-34; Drinkwitz, 140 Wn.2d at 298.
38. RCW 49.46.130; Drinkwitz, 140 Wn.2d at 299.
39. Stahl, 148 Wn.2d at 885; Inniss, 141 Wn.2d at 523-24; Drinkwitz, 140 Wn.2d at 298. See also Cornelius J. Peck, Labor Law, 34 Wash. L.Rev.. 316, 317 n.5, n.6 (1959) (citing provisions adopted directly from the FLSA and provisions based in large part on the FLSA).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). This definition is followed by enumerated exceptions, none of which is relevant here.
42. Professor Cornelius Peck authored a comment on the MWA in the Washington Law Review the year that the MWA was enacted. He observed that many of the provisions of that statute, including the definitions of “employ,” “employer,” and “employee,” were adopted from the FLSA. Professor Peck further noted that the MWA provided that compliance with the FLSA “shall be deemed to constitute compliance with crucial sections of the [MWA].” Cornelius J. Peck, Labor Law. 34 Wash. L.Rev.. 316 (1959).
43. See Inniss, 141 Wn.2d at 523-24; Laws 1975, ch. 289 (conforming state minimum wage laws to federal laws).
44. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713, 67 S.Ct. 1463, 91 L.Ed. 1757 (1947).
45. Id.; Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130; United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362-63, 65 S.Ct. 295, 89 L.Ed. 301 (1945).
46. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates, Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir.1979).
47. See Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370; Real, 603 F.2d at 754.
48. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L Ed. 1772 (1947). See also BarteIs, 332 U.S. at 130; Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370.
49. Massey v. Tube Art Display, Inc., 15 Wn.App. 782, 785-88, 551 P.2d 1387(1976).
51. 1C Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 43.42, at 8-20 (1986).
52. Compare Massey, 15 Wn.App. at 787-88 (“[R]ight to control the negligent actor's physical conduct of the performance of the service” constitutes the test.) and Bostain, 159 Wn.2d at 712 (remedial statutes in Title 49 should be liberally construed to carry out the legislature's goal of protecting employees) (internal citations omitted), and Stahl, 148 Wn.2d at 881 (“Employer exemptions from remedial legislation such as the MWA will be ‘narrowly construed and applied only to situations which are plainly and unmistakably consistent with the terms and spirit of the legislation.’ ”).
53. See, e.g., Brock, 840 F.2d at 1058-59; DialAmerica Mktg., 757 F.2d at 1383; Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1117; Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535; Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370; Dole, 875 F.2d at 805.
55. 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil 50.11.01, at 458-59 (2005) (WPI).
56. These factors appear to be adopted from Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370, a FLSA case.
57. This factor appears to be adopted from Hollingbery v. Dunn, 68 Wn.2d 75, 81, 411 P.2d 431 (1966) and WPI 50.11.01.
58. This factor appears to be adopted from Hollingbery, 68 Wn.2d 75, WPI 50.11.01. and Estrada v. FedEx, 154 Cal.App. 4th 1, 10, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 (2007).
59. WPI 50.11.01; Ebling v. Gove's Cove, Inc., 34 Wn.App. 495, 663 P.2d 132 (1983); Hollingbery, 68 Wn.2d at 80.
60. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370.
61. Stahl, 148 Wn.2d at 886.
62. Statement of Additional Authorities by Appellant/Plaintiffs at 1 (Technical Bulletin # 11 dated November 10, 2009).
63. RCW 49.46.010, .040, .090(2).
64. Wash. Water Power Co. v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wn.2d 62, 68-69, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978).
65. Statement of Additional Authorities by Appellant/Plaintiffs at 1 (Technical Bulletin # 11 dated November 10, 2009).
66. This is also consistent with the approach adopted by a number of other states, including Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Maine, Illinois, Michigan, Alaska, and Oregon, which all look to the FLSA for the relevant test. Com., Dep't of Labor and Indus., Bureau of Labor Law Compliance v. Stuber, 822 A.2d 870 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.2003), aff'd by, 859 A.2d 1253 (Pa.2004); Garcia v. Am. Furniture Co., 101 N.M. 785, 789, 689 P.2d 934 (1984); People ex rel. Dep't of Labor v. MCC Home Health Care. Inc. 339 III.App.3d 10, 19-21, 790 N.E.2d 38 (2003); Buckley v. Professional Plaza Clinic Corp. 281 Mich.App. 224, 234, 761 N.W.2d 284 (2008); Jeffcoat v. Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Alaska 1987); Presley v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 200 Or.App. 113, 117, 112 P.3d 485, 487 (2005). See also Director of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Cormier, 527 A.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (Me.1987); Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp. 351 III.App.3d 668, 677-78, 814 N.E.2d 198 (2004).
67. 34 Wn.App. 495, 663 P.2d 132 (1983).
71. 68 Wn.2d 75, 411 P.2d 431 (1966).
72. Ebling, 34 Wn.App. at 498.
73. Hollingbery, 68 Wn.2d at 76, 79-80.
75. 154 Cal.App. 4th 1, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 (2007).
76. 48 Cal.3d 341, 769 P.2d 399 (1989).
77. Estrada, 154 Cal.App. 4th at 11.
78. Borello, 48 Cal.3d at 349.
82. 49 Cal.4th 35, 231 P.3d 259 (2010).
84. Id. at 52-66 (“In no sense is the IWC's definition of the term ‘employ’ based on federal law.”).
86. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
87. See Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130; Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1510; Brock, 840 F.2d at 1058-59; DialAmerica Mktg., 757 F.2d at 1383; Steelman, 473 F.3d at 128; Herman, 161 F.3d at 303; Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1117; Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535; Blair, 420 F.3d at 829; Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370; Dole, 875 F.2d at 805; Brouwer, 139 F.3d at 818-19.
88. See, e.g., Herman, 161 F.3d at 303.
89. See Brock, 840 F.2d at 1058-59; DialAmerica Mktg., 757 F.2d at 1383; Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1117; Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535; Surewav Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1370; Dole, 875 F.2d at 805.
90. Clerk's Papers at 1819-20 (emphasis added).
91. Miller v. Campbell, 164 Wn.2d 529, 539, 192 P.3d 352 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).
93. Bartley-Williams v. Kendall, 134 Wn.App. 95, 98, 138 P.3d 1103 (2006).
94. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).
96. Robinson v. Khan, 89 Wn.App. 418, 420, 948 P.2d 1347 (1998) (“A notice of cross-review is essential if the respondent ‘seeks affirmative relief as distinguished from the urging of additional grounds for affirmance.’ ”) (quoting Phillips Building Co. v. An, 81 Wn.App. 696, 700 n.3, 915 P.2d 1146 (1996); RAP 2.4(a)).
97. King v. Clodfelter, 10 Wn.App. 514, 521, 518 P.2d 206 (1974).
98. Clerk's Papers at 2169.
99. Clerk's Papers at 2174.
100. Cox, 141 Wn.2d at 442.
101. Clerk's Papers at 2194 (emphasis added).
102. Report of Proceedings (Mar. 27, 2009) at 16.
103. Report of Proceedings (Mar. 30, 2009) at 78.
104. Report of Proceedings (Mar. 30, 2009) at 56.
105. Clerk's Papers at 2193.
106. See Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (7th Cir.1992) (“The fact that there is some factual variation among the class grievances will not defeat a class action.”).
107. See Civil Rule 23.
108. Clerk's Papers at 209-19.
109. Oda v. State, 111 Wn.App. 79, 93, 44 P.3d 8 (2002).
110. Miller v. Farmer Bros. Co., 115 Wn.App. 815, 820, 64 P.3d 49 (2003).
112. Oda, 111 Wn.App. at 91.
113. See, e.g., Real, 603 F.2d at 754.
114. Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1298 (3rd Cir.1991) (“It is not necessary for every single affected employee to testify in order to prove violations or to recoup back wages. The testimony and evidence of representative employees may be sufficient to establish prima facie proof of a pattern and practice of FLSA violations.”).
115. See Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 701-02 (3rd Cir.1994); Martin, 949 F.2d at 1298 (“Not all employees need to testify in order to prove the violations or to recoup back wages. Rather, the Secretary can rely on testimony and evidence from representative employees to meet the initial burden of proof requirement. Once the pattern is established, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the existence of violations or to prove that individual employees are excepted from the pattern or practice.”); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-88, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L Ed. 1515 (1946) (holding that the plaintiff's burden in a collective action for uncompensated work under FLSA is to produce sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of the uncompensated work as a matter of “just and reasonable inference”).
116. Clerk's Papers at 2194 (emphasis added).
117. --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 3239363 (2010).
121. See, e.g., Anderson, 328 U.S. at 688 (“[H]ere we are assuming that the employee has proved that he has performed work and has not been paid in accordance with the statute․ The uncertainty lies only in the amount of damages arising from the statutory violation by the employer.”).
122. 328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L Ed. 1515 (1946).
126. Farmboy, 127 Wn.2d at 92.
128. Clerk's Papers at 2220.
129. See Graves, 94 Wn.2d at 302-03; Brock, 840 F.2d at 1059.
130. See Zurfluh v. Lewis County, 199 Wash. 378, 381, 91 P.2d 1002 (1939), overruled in part on other grounds by Portland-Seattle Auto Freight v. Jones, 15 Wn.2d 603, 131 P.2d 736 (1942) (holding question of proximate cause is a mixed question of law and fact which must be submitted to the jury unless the facts are undisputed); Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc., 617 F.3d 182, 185-86 (2nd Cir.2010) (holding that in the context of a jury trial, whether a defendant is a plaintiffs' joint employer is a mixed question of law and fact and is properly a question for the jury); Davila v. Yellow Cab Co., 333 III.App.3d 592, 595, 776 N.E.2d 720 (2002) (holding question of whether employer/employee relationship exists is a mixed question of law and fact to be submitted to a jury unless the facts are undisputed); Johnson v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County. 180 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1202-03 (D.Kan.2001) (concluding that special verdict form requiring jury to decide employee/independent contractor status was not error because questions of fact and questions of law were inextricably intertwined, and because verdict form was not prejudicial).
132. 76 Wn.App. 577, 886 P.2d 1158 (1995).
WE CONCUR: DWYER, C.J., and BECKER, J.

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