Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/150/93.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 17:40:51+00:00

Document:
A. H. Garland, for plaintiff in error.
John Brown, the plaintiff in error, was indicted and convicted for the murder of Josiah Poorboy and Thomas Whitehead on December 8, 1891, at the Cherokee Nation, in the Indian Territory, and on April 30, 1892, was sentenced to be hanged.
It appears from the record that Poorboy and Whitehead were deputy marshals who had been trying to arrest James Craig, an escaped prisoner, for whose apprehension a small reward had been offered, and who was the co- respondent in a suit brought by Brown Hitchcock against his wife for divorce on the ground of adultery.
On the night of the murder, the plaintiff in error, with John Roach and Wacoo Hampton, an escaped convict, were at the house of Mrs. Hitchcock, and at her request started out to find Craig. They did not succeed, and, on their way back, Hampton, who had gone on a short distance ahead, stopped in front of the house of Shirley, where it was known White- [150 U.S. 93, 94] head was staying, and called out for Whitehead. The latter came out, accompanied by Poorboy, both being armed. As they appeared, Wacoo Hampton rode off; and, about the time the marshals reached the roadway, Roach and the plainitff in error, mounted on one horse, rode up. Whitehead asked if either of them was Matthew Craig, a brother of James Craig, and, when he was told 'No,' he said he 'would arrest them anyhow,' and told them to get off the horse, and lay down their guns. They dismounted, and Roach laid his gun down on the ground. As he straightened up, some one fired, and the shot struck him in the arm. He then ran away, but Wacoo Hampton returned, and a shooting affray ensued. The proof tended strongly to establish the fact that the plaintiff in error killed Whitehead; but, as to whether he or Wacoo Hampton killed Poorboy, the testimony was inconclusive. A few days after the murder, Hampton, who resisted arrest, was killed.
'(1) Manslaughter is an unlawful and willful killing, but without malice, and is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, and fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
This was refused because the court had already fully instructed upon the subject of manslaughter, and by reference to the record it appears that the charge, as given, which defined 'manslaughter' to be 'the willful and unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought,' was more accurate than the instruction asked for, which omitted the element of the killing being without any malice either express or implied. After what the court had said, and in the form presented, we think this instruction was properly refused.
The remaining point to be considered is covered by several assignments, which charge error in the court below in admitting testimony of subsequent declarations or statements of one party tending to show that there was a conspiracy to commit murder, and in charging the jury on that subject.
It appears in the evidence that, while on their mission to find Craig, Wacoo Hampton said to Roach and the plaintiff in error that he intended to kill Brown Hitchcock, the husband of Mrs. Annie Hitchcock, with whom she had quarreled on account of the suit for divorce which her husband was prosecuting. It was claimed on the part of the government that this statement of Wacoo Hampton showed a conspiracy to commit an unlawful act, and while engaged in this unlawful enterprise the murder by Poorboy and Whitehead was perpetrated. Roach, who was wounded on the night of the [150 U.S. 93, 96] murder, and was taken to the house of Mrs. Hitchcock, remained there all night. On the following morning, Sullivan, a witness for the government, and his stepson, were riding by the house of Mrs. Hitchcock, and saw her on the porch. He thought she called to him, and he stopped his horse, but she told him not to come in. She said she wanted his stepson. The young man went into the house, and remained there four or five minutes.
'If the defendant was on an unlawful mission, if he had entered into an understanding to kill Hitchcock, or if he had entered into an understanding to assist others in resisting [150 U.S. 93, 97] arrest, or resisted an arrest that could properly be made, he has entering upon the commission of an act where there was a purpose to do an unlawful act, and he would be in the wrong. He would be entering upon a state of case that he had no right to enter upon.
Considered in connection with these instructions, the court improperly admitted the testimony as to what Mrs. Hitchcock said after the killing, as evidence tending to establish a conspiracy between the plaintiff in error and herself and others to [150 U.S. 93, 98] kill her husband. It was furthermore objectionable because there was no evidence in the case tending to show that the defendant or his alleged co- conspirators killed either of the deceased under the mistaken supposition that either one of them was Hitchcock. In the admission of the statements and declarations of Mrs. Hitchcock, the court assumed that the acts and declarations of one co-conspirator after the completion or abandonment of a criminal enterprise constituted proof against the defendant of the existence of the conspiracy. This is not a sound proposition of law.
In Logan v. U. S., 144 U.S. 263, 309 , 12 S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 617, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court, said : 'The court went too far in admitting testimony on the general question of conspiracy. Doubtless, in all cases of conspiracy, the act of one conspirator in the prosecution of the enterprise is considered the act of all, and is evidence against all. U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 469. But only those acts and declarations are admissible under this rule which are done and made while the conspiracy is pending, and in furtherance of its object. After the conspiracy has come to an end, whether by success or by failure, the admissions of one conspirator by way of narrative of past facts are not admissible in evidence against the others. 1 Greenl. Ev. 111; 3 Greenl. Ev. 94; State v. Dean, 13 Ired. 63; Patton v. State, 6 Ohio St. 467; State v. Thibeau, 30 Vt. 100; State v. Larkin, 49 N. H. 39; Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. St. 145; Davis v. State, 9 Tex. App. 363.' The same proposition is stated in the following authorities: People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 103; Indemnity Co. v. Gleason, 78 N. Y. 504; People v. McQuade, 110 N. Y. 307, 18 N. E. Rep. 156; also, Whart. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) 699.
Tested by the rule laid down in these cases, the acts and declarations of Mrs. Hitchcock on the morning after the killing were not competent evidence, against the plaintiff in error, of the existence of any conspiracy on his part to kill her husband, or to resist the arrest of Hampton, or to commit any other unlawful act, such as the court instructed the jury would render him responsible for the acts done by his associates while engaged in a criminal enterprise. If a conspiracy was sought [150 U.S. 93, 99] to be established, affecting the plaintiff in error, it would have to be by testimony introduced in the regular way, so as to give the accused the opportunity to cross-examine the witness or witnesses. It could not be established by acts or statements of others directly admitting such a conspiracy, or by any statement of theirs from which it might be inferred.
The case having to be reversed for this error, it is not deemed necessary to consider the other assignments, relating to matters which may not occur upon another trial.
For the erroneous action of the court below in improperly admitting the testimony of Sullivan as to what Mrs. Hitchcock said after the killing, as evidence tending to show a conspiracy, and in charging the jury that the declarations of a party or parties as to their participation in the criminal act was competent evidence of the conspiracy, as against the plaintiff in error, the judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Arkansas, with direction to set aside the judgment, and award plaintiff in error a new trial, and it is accordingly so ordered.

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