Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/348/348mass458.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:33:50+00:00

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MARY ANN STELLA & another [Note 1] vs. MORRIS E. CURTIS.
TORT. Writ in the District Court of Lawrence dated June 17, 1957.
The first trial of the action was before Darcy, J.
Richard R. Flood & John L. McDonough, Jr., for the defendant, submitted a brief.
Salvatore J. Basile (Michael T. Stella with him) for the plaintiffs.
this action of tort following a second trial which was limited to the issue of damages for personal injury to Mary Ann Stella (the plaintiff). The second trial was held by order of the Appellate Division following the establishment of a report, upon the petition of the plaintiff, because of alleged errors at the first trial.
Neither party contends that there was error at the second trial, where the award of damages to the plaintiff was substantially larger than the award at the first trial. The defendant contends that there was error in the order of the Appellate Division vacating the finding at the first trial and granting a new trial. He asks that judgment be entered on the finding made at the first trial.
The Appellate Division's order dismissing the second report is a final decision, and the appeal brings before us for review that final decision, and also the rulings of law made by the judge at the first trial, the report on the first trial, and the action of the Appellate Division thereon. Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp. 303 Mass. 123, 127. Via v. Asbestos Textile Co. Inc. 335 Mass. 210, 212. Peerless Cas. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co. Inc. 336 Mass. 691, 694.
which the requests were addressed, compensable damages in a personal injury case, we think that the number of requests, including their subdivisions, was clearly excessive and that the judge would have been justified in requiring the plaintiff to refashion the requests and reduce the number as a condition precedent to passing upon any of them. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Stan Cross Buick, Inc. 343 Mass. 622, 626. In making this observation we intend no discouragement of the helpful practice of submitting detailed memoranda to the judge, even though sometimes in the form of requests, when offered as an aid to him in the consideration of the case and not as a device to ensnare him into error.
of such a request, or the failure to act upon it which is treated as a denial, raises a question of law. Bresnick v. Heath, 292 Mass. 293. Hurley v. Ornsteen, 311 Mass. 477, 480.
the judge to grant it. The extent to which a judge shall deal with the evidence or the subsidiary facts is generally within his discretion. Barnes v. Berkshire St. Ry. 281 Mass. 47, 51.
We have discussed this aspect of the case before us because of the Appellate Division's intimation, in its opinion, that the judge had a duty to deal with all requests whose premise was "the evidence warranted a finding." Under the principle heretofore discussed, this conception, if intended, is not correct.
In personal injury cases, under the general issue of damages, there usually are of course special issues, retrospective and prospective, as to pain and suffering, impairment of earning capacity, and disbursements for hospitalization and medical attendance. The sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a finding as to each of these special issues may properly be the subject of a request for a ruling of law. The requests after no. 27, however, represent, in the main, a catechistic effort to get a ruling on subsidiary facts or fragments of the evidence which are not decisive of any general or special issue in the case. They would not be tolerated as requests for instructions to a jury, and they have no better standing as requests for rulings in a trial without jury.
On the other hand, we agree with the Appellate Division, that, without particularization, there were requests not cited in footnote 2, which stated correct principles of law or related to factual situations, which if found to exist would be decisive of an issue in the case. These requests, therefore, required the judge to grant them or to state facts found by him which made the requests inapplicable, and otherwise to comply with Rule 27 of the Rules of the District Courts (1952). His failure to do so was error.
It follows that the first order of the Appellate Division, directing a retrial, was right, and that the order dismissing the report after the second trial was right.
[Note 1] Michael T. Stella.
[Note 2] "27. A finding is warranted that the plaintiff was permanently disabled from doing any and all types of work from August 13, 1956, to the latter part of January, 1957.
28. A finding is warranted that the plaintiff was unable and has been unable to do all of her usual household duties from the middle part of January, 1957 to the present date.
29. A finding is warranted that the plaintiff was unable and has been unable, to do all of her stenographic work from the middle of January, 1957 to the present date.
(a) An oblique comminuted fracture of the distal and of the left clavicle at the acromio clavicular joint.
(b) A chronic strain of the neck with nerve root irritation.
(c) Secondary to (a) and (b) moderate freezing periarthritis of the left shoulder joint.
(d) 1 inch laceration of the right eye lid requiring two sutures.
(e) Inflammation of right eye caused by glass particles which required a physician about two hours to remove.
(f) Contusion of left and right scalp.
(g) Broken 1st molar front upper left with laceration of mouth.
(h) Contusion of left upper shoulder resulting in hematoma and edema with discoloration tapering down forearm and hand markedly at the shoulder.
(i) Contusion of right shoulder with hematoma.
(j) Edema and discoloration of right knee and both legs and right outer hip.
(k) Shock -- palpation -- dizziness.
(n) Flattening of the cervical spine as regards the normal lodoric curve.
31. A finding is warranted that as a result of this accident the plaintiff has sustained the following permanent injuries.
(a) Permanent partial loss of use of left shoulder and arm to the extent of 40%.
(b) Loss of grip power in left hand.
(c) Permanent deformity of left shoulder.
(d) Partially separated left acromio clavicular joint.
(e) Permanent scar -- right eye.
32. A finding is warranted that immediately prior to the injuries which she sustained the plaintiff took care of all the household duties in her home in North Andover, covering seven rooms and two and one-half baths. That in addition to that she worked for the Marconi Credit Union and received compensation of $30.00 per week. That in addition to that she did all of the legal stenographic and typing work for her husband as a legal stenographer on a full time basis.
(a) Earning capacity of $60.00 per week as a legal stenographer.
(b) Earning capacity of $30.00 per week as a part time bookkeeper for the Marconi Credit Union."

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