Source: https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/brazil
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:37:28+00:00

Document:
The Brazilian enforcement regime has been going through active and remarkable years in the present decade, with unprecedented results in many aspects. While it is true that new laws came into force in the anti-corruption space, most of the legal rules and tools that have been used in the massive investigations ongoing in the country already existed, but had never been as effectively applied as they recently have. Prosecutors and judges have become much tougher than ever before, and society seems more intolerant to corruption-related culture and practices.
The Brazilian Penal Code sets forth the crimes of active and passive corruption within its chapter dedicated to the crimes against the government, which states that, as a rule, those crimes must affect public interest and involve someone vested with public authority. Active corruption (Art. 333) incriminates whomever offers or promises an undue advantage to a public servant for him to omit or delay an official act. The penalty for active corruption ranges from two to twelve years of imprisonment and a fine – which will be increased by a third if the illegal favour is actually carried out by the public servant (Art. 333, sole paragraph). Passive corruption (Art. 317) incriminates whomever solicits, receives or accepts any offer of an undue advantage made by virtue of the public function that he/she exercises. The penalty for passive corruption ranges from two to twelve years of imprisonment and a fine – which will be increased by a third if the person actually carries out an act or omission related to the public function in exchange for the advantage solicited, received or accepted (Art. 317, first paragraph).
The violation of a functional duty by a public servant, which is not aimed at a personal benefit but is being influenced by or seeking to meet a request from a third party, is also corruption in Brazil. Such crime has a penalty that ranges from three months to one year of detention or a fine (Art. 317, second paragraph). The Penal Code also incriminates the practice of influence-peddling (Art. 332), imposing penalties that range from two to five years of imprisonment to whomever solicits, charges or obtains an advantage, or promises an advantage for influencing an act to be carried out by a government official in the exercise of his/her duties.
In the wake of and under the direct influence of Brazilian adhesion to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Brazil’s Penal Code was amended in June 2002 to set forth the crimes of active corruption of a foreign public official (Art. 337-B) and influence-peddling in the context of an international business transaction (Art. 337-C). The penalty for active corruption of a foreign public official is imprisonment from one to eight years and a fine, whereas for the crime of influence-peddling in the context of an international business transaction, the penalty is imprisonment from two up to five years and a fine. In line with the main provisions relating to general corruption, the law also sets forth that the penalties for the crime of active corruption of a foreign public official shall be increased by a third if the latter actually carries out an act or omission violating his or her duties in exchange for the advantage solicited, accepted or promised (Art. 337-B, sole paragraph).
In addition to the provisions set forth in the Penal Code, the Brazilian legal system establishes other important legal provisions relating to bribery and corruption. The so-called Law of Crimes Against the Tax System, the Economic Order and the Consumer Relations sets forth specific cases of passive corruption by officers of the Brazilian Revenue Services, which penalties are three to eight years of imprisonment and a fine (Law No. 8,137/90, Art. 3). In turn, the Public Bid Law contains a chapter listing a number of criminal provisions which aim at ensuring fairness of public bids and to punish undue favours to private interests (Law No. 8,666/93, Arts. 8–98). The Anti-Money Laundering Act (Law No. 9,613/98) has often been used by prosecutors as a means to bring more serious legal consequences – both in terms of punishment and of facilitating precautionary measures, such as freezing of assets – in relation to possible acts of bribery and corruption, more notably in high-profile cases.
Unlike many other jurisdictions, Brazil does not incriminate commercial bribery in general. The two exceptions to this rule are found within the scope of the so-called Law of Unfair Competition, which sets forth a specific crime in this regard, for which it establishes a penalty ranging from three months to one year of detention or a fine (Law No. 9,279/96, art. 195, items IX and X), and in the Law No. 10.671/03, which sets forth penalties ranging from two to six years of imprisonment and a fine to whoever requests or accepts (Art. 41-C) or gives or promises to give (Art. 41-D) an undue advantage aimed at changing the outcome of a sports competition.
(i) The Anti-Corruption Law, also known as the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/13), establishes an entire system of civil and administrative liabilities for companies, and establishes a controversial mechanism of strict liability for companies involved in bribery. Under clear inspiration from the successful leniency policies in the antitrust space (originally introduced in Brazil in 2000 in the wake of the American and European legal reforms of the previous years and currently regulated by Law No. 12,529/11), the Anti-Corruption Law introduced in its Art. 16 the leniency agreement mechanism to Brazilian anti-bribery enforcement, although its lax regulation, alongside the self-referential and sometimes dysfunctional practices of Brazilian regulators and prosecutors, still give much room for legal uncertainty in the field.
(ii) In turn, the Improbity Law (Law No. 8,429/92) was originally drafted to hold public servants liable for violating their duties and to prevent them from causing civil damages and/or illicit enrichment, but it has also been used to impute civil damages to private entities and government officials which are found guilty of misconduct.
From the investigative and procedural perspectives, there are two other laws that are utterly important to understand the current anti-bribery and anti-corruption landscape in Brazil. One is the already cited Anti-Money Laundering Act (Law No. 9,613/98), which not only facilitates the prosecution of corruption-related crimes and their subsequent acts but – as abovementioned – also facilitates the use of precautionary measures aimed at following the flow of money, and at freezing and recovering assets. The other is the Law on Organised Crime (Law No. 12,850/13), which incriminates the act of taking part in a criminal organisation and, more importantly, introduces the mechanism of plea bargaining within Brazilian procedural law, which quickly became the most powerful tool used by prosecutors to expand the reach and effects of the biggest anti-corruption investigations the country has ever seen in its history.
With regard to the agencies in charge of the Brazilian enforcement, it is broadly known that the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) has led anti-corruption enforcement efforts throughout the country, with more distinct successes in some specific regions and cases which the Chief Prosecutor’s Office (PGR) designates special task forces to handle. Back in 1988, the Brazilian Constitution established a Public Prosecutor’s Office that was autonomous and independent from the three branches of government (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary), even if formally being part of the first. In the last 15 years, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has consolidated its autonomy and independence, which presently includes federal prosecutors to investigate and prosecute some of the most senior and powerful businessmen and politicians in the country. Seeking the same political independence, but some way behind their federal peers, are the state prosecutors, who do not always have the same resources to investigate and prosecute similar high-profile cases and people within their jurisdictions.
Criminal investigations in Brazil are mostly led by police departments. The Federal Police Department was reformed in the past decade and has been consistently increasing its level of action in anti-bribery and anti-corruption investigations. This is not true, however, in relation to State Police Departments, which are generally poorly equipped and present an undesirable level of financial dependence and political interference from state governments, with a corresponding notable lack of efficiency.
(v) the Department of Assets Recovery and International Legal Cooperation (DRCI) of the Ministry of Justice, which centralises and coordinates Brazilian efforts for international cooperation on criminal matters and has been increasingly active and effective in the present decade – it is typically the central authority of the Brazilian government for the execution of mutual legal assistance agreements.
With respect to jurisdiction, acts related to bribery and corruption may be subject to federal or state jurisdictions, depending on whether federal or state funds or assets may be involved. Federal courts are usually better equipped, but not always, and there can be high-profile and lower cases under either federal or state judicial oversight. Our sense suggests that the more remarkable high-profile cases in the country have been prosecuted in federal courts for a range of reasons, varying from the fact that federal investigators and prosecutors are generally better equipped and more independent to the fact that typically – and naturally – federal contracts tend to involve bigger amounts than state contracts, in accordance with the varying proportion of federal and state budgets.
It is no big news that in the last five years, Brazil has faced what is by far the biggest corruption-related scandal and the biggest and most complex criminal investigation in its entire history, namely the ‘Lava Jato’ (Car Wash) Operation. The country has also faced a major political crisis, precipitated in many ways by economic instability and the high pressure that investigators from both the Federal Police and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office have managed to put on senior government officials, prominent businesspeople and mainstream politicians nationwide – not to mention a certain amount of judicial activism.
Beginning in early 2014 as an investigation targeting a group of money dealers in the State of Paraná, the Lava Jato investigation soon moved on to target a significant graft scheme involving senior officials of the Brazilian state-owned oil company, Petrobras. It became a huge and impressive investigation when, approximately two years later, its reach expanded so broadly that it seemed to involve roughly every major corruption scheme relating to every major public bid and contract in different areas of the government. As a result, what previously involved mainly the political party that ran the federal government at that time (the PT, or Workers Party) and the parties that were part of its congressional coalition, eventually involved every major political party of the country, as well as many of their most prominent leaderships (including those of the party that succeeded the PT in federal government, the MDB – Brazilian Democratic Movement), as the investigations spread across federal and state contracts related to areas such as construction, energy, transportation, sanitation and others. Moreover, Lava Jato evolved in a way that made its investigations sprout links with and reciprocally reinforce other high-profile investigations that were being conducted by other federal police officers and prosecutors throughout the country.
The years of 2017 and 2018 in relation to Brazilian anti-bribery enforcement activities should be understood as a sole reality and distinct from any other, since they were deeply marked by the expansion of those investigations, and particularly by the developments brought by the two biggest and more striking sets of plea agreements arising from Lava Jato: the Odebrecht/Braskem and the J&F/JBS matters.
The multi-jurisdictional record-breaking Odebrecht deals were signed by the companies’ representatives, executives and by prosecutors from Brazil, Switzerland and the U.S. in early December 2016 and ratified by the chief justice of the Brazilian Supreme Court in late January 2017.1 Since then, former executives of Odebrecht have helped federal and state prosecutors in the entire country to evolve investigations and build cases against other businesspeople and public servants from different bodies and levels of government. From May 2017 on, having reached their plea deals,2 J&F executives started following the same path and also helped prosecutors unearth many schemes of spurious relationships between Brazilian politics and business interests – with a memorable level of public scandal, as the evidence gathered therefrom included recordings of senior politicians engaged in very suspicious conversations.
In addition, following notable initial excitement and fevered expectations about the factual and evidentiary contents of the plea deals signed by Odebrecht, J&F and their executives – to which frenzy the Brazilian press contributed remarkably at that time – many analysts argued that they did not shake the political environment as much as had been expected.
It is unquestionable, however, that those massive plea deals and settlements turned investigations much more complex. Their scope became much broader and touched the authority of many other prosecutorial agencies and different jurisdictions, yet they have also lasted longer than expected due to the amount of information to be processed, in contrast to the available resources, personnel qualified to investigate and the lack of coordination among different prosecutorial offices and other agencies of control. These circumstances make it difficult to assess speculation about whether or not the investigators may present the same appetite as they have demonstrated in previous years.
In any case, it is important to note that in June 2018, one of the members of the Lava Jato Task Force was explicitly asked in this regard by participants of the IBA Annual Anti-Corruption Conference at the OECD premises in Paris, and declared to the audience, that in his view, about 50% of the information and evidence gathered – and consequent criminal charges to be brought – could be part of enforcement measures yet to come.
Political efforts to hinder prosecutions were actually felt more in 2017 and 2018 than in previous years, but did not affect them much. In turn, many legal challenges have arisen regarding the use of plea deals and settlements and their consequences for co-operators – both individual and corporate – and for third parties involved in their relevant statement of facts.
As referred to in the topic above, the Anti-Corruption Law establishes that the CGU/MTFC is the central authority with powers to negotiate and settle with corporations within the federal government, but since 2015 the MPF has taken the lead in negotiating leniency agreements in the anti-corruption enforcement space. This attitude by the MPF was welcomed by companies, which feared the way the prosecutors have been active, and due to the CGU’s lack of effectiveness in light of the political crisis.
In August 2017, however, the Federal Court of Appeals overseeing Lava Jato matters ruled that the Odebrecht settlement signed with the MPF should be deemed fully valid and effective only after the CGU’s adhesion to its terms – which eventually occurred only in mid-2018. In fact, and despite all previous efforts, it was only in 2018 that Brazilian administrative agencies overseeing anti-corruption matters – MPF, CGU and AGU – finally presented some level of coordination and could start providing a reasonable level of legal certainty to companies and individuals. The TCU also posed some obstacles to settlements previously signed, but since mid-2018 it seems to have merged into a common understanding for corporate settlements.
Indeed, the multi-agency system to fight corruption which was established by the Brazilian Constitution had proved its importance to prevent powerful political or economic actors from capturing the agencies of control. However, in the wake of some very large-scale plea deals and settlements, which extent and complexity had probably never been foreseen and whose statements of facts touched the powers and jurisdictions of multiple authorities, it proved to be a hard test for them to coordinate and cooperate with each other, and there is still a lot to be done in this regard.
There have also been internal efforts within the MPF towards clearer and more standardised practices relating to corporate settlements and individual plea deals. In this regard, two important documents were released: the Agency’s guidelines for leniency agreements, published in September 2017;3 and the joint guidelines on plea agreements, issued by its 2nd and 5th Chambers of Coordination and Review, and published in May, 2018.4 Though they are not binding documents according to law, their clarifications and recommendations play an important role in a legal system in which the lack of stable precedents and clear regulations and practices relating to a new enforcement culture has been so remarkable – and potentially harmful to both public and private interests.
Irrespective of the challenges and perplexities still at stake, it is fair to assert that enforcement policies relying on plea deals and settlements are here to stay. Legal practitioners have seen these mechanisms being increasingly applied in a number of other investigations in both federal and state jurisdictions, and this is expected to increase even more in the wake of a controversial Supreme Court decision of June 2018 entitling not only prosecutors but also federal and state chiefs of police to sign plea deals in the context of criminal investigations.5 As a result of what has been considered a success of those policies, in November 2017 a new bill of law was approved, expanding the use of such mechanisms to banking and securities regulations. Law No. 13,506/17 reforms the whole sanctioning system in the banking and financial markets and was clearly influenced by leniency policies in the antitrust and anti-corruption laws, and sets forth the use of those agreements both to matters overseen by the Central Bank (Bacen – see Arts. 30–32) and the Securities Commission (CVM – see Art. 34).
According to Brazilian law, facilitation payments – defined as payments made to a government official to secure or expedite a routine or a necessary act – are deemed illegal and subject to the penalties of the aforesaid Art. 317 and Art. 333 of the Penal Code, which respectively incriminate acts of passive and active corruption. The possible differentiation between the purpose of the payment to a government official to carry out a regular act or to violate his/her duty will occur in the application of the relevant penalties, which shall be aggravated in case of violation of one’s legal duties.
In relation to business expenditure, the relevant regulations are found in the administrative law, both at federal and state levels, and vary to a limited extent. At the federal level of government, the main provisions in this regard are established by Decree No. 4,081/02, Decree No. 6,029/07 and Resolution No. 3/00 of the Public Ethics Commission of the Presidency of the Republic.
Despite it being true that in many contexts there can still be seen a customary practice of providing corporate hospitality and gifts to public officials, the applicable legal regulations tend to be very strict, though not always effectively enforced. The acceptance of gifts, personal loans or any other advantage is usually forbidden and may be considered a bribe if connected to any intention of facilitating the counterpart’s access to the government structure.
There are specific situations in which public servants and government officials may accept payments by a private entity for transportation, lodging and expenses for events such as congresses and seminars, especially if provided by academic, scientific or cultural institutions. Such expenses may be accepted if the government official is not in a situation in which he may benefit the entity by a decision that he/she might take part. On some occasions, he/she will be obliged to publicise the relevant terms and conditions and values, fees charged, etc. Gifts can be distributed only under specific circumstances (courtesy, propaganda or by occasion of special events or commemorative dates) and as long as their unit value does not surpass the amount of R$ 100.00.
Effectiveness is still the biggest challenge posed for Brazilian enforcement as a whole, especially if taking into account that the vast majority of acts relating to bribery and corruption are not subject to federal but to state jurisdictions, and, therefore, they often tend to be poorly investigated by state police departments. Despite the undeniable efforts made by investigators and their remarkable achievements, it is important to note that such success has been particularly limited to the scope of special task forces and normally at the federal enforcement level. In turn, there have been a number of cases whose apparent success and effectiveness may hide lack of compliance with defence rights connected to fair trial, which might have been facilitated or somehow influenced by excessive public exposure and pressures for convictions, as well as by the political interests of certain groups.
The two better prepared and better equipped enforcement agencies in charge of corruption-related investigations are the Federal Police Department and the MPF, which activities are focused on offences that may have caused harm to the federal government or whatever entity is part, either directly or indirectly, of the federal government. Federal courts tend to be better equipped than state courts on average, but their presence does not cover the nation’s entire territory.
Having said that, it is important to understand that the possible outcome of a specific case still depends greatly on who are the investigators in charge and how the situation is prosecuted and assessed by the relevant courts. The time to carry out criminal investigations and prosecutions in Brazil may also vary significantly and sometimes pre-trial investigations take several years to be concluded, which may be followed by several more years of court proceedings until their final appeals are decided.
As stated above, the most important legal mechanisms in Brazil’s new high-enforcement landscape of the last five years are the plea bargain and leniency agreements. Plea deals apply to individuals subject to criminal investigations since criminal liability in Brazil is still almost exclusively for individuals (the sole exception in which corporate criminal liability is accepted refers to environmental crimes), whereas leniency agreements are available to legal entities and in relation to reducing and settling civil and administrative liabilities.
In a legal culture utterly reliant on the legality principle, the lack of more detailed legal rules, towards both plea deals and leniency agreements, has given room for an undesirable level of personal activism by some enforcers. This has been felt particularly with regard to federal and state prosecutors, which is facilitated by the high level of autonomy and independence each Brazilian prosecutor may have from their peers and even from their relevant prosecutorial offices’ policies. That said, the abovementioned guidelines on leniency agreements and joint guidelines on plea bargain agreements published by the 2nd and 5th Chambers of Coordination and Review of the MPF indicate important efforts in the search for clear prosecutorial standards and more legal certainty to what has proved to be a powerful tool for anti-bribery and anti-corruption enforcement in Brazil.
The Supreme Court decision authorising chiefs of police to negotiate and sign plea deals – even if with more limited powers in some aspects – is still very recent. Therefore, how compatible and coordinated the police practices will be with the more established prosecutors’ practices in this field remains to be seen.
There are no legal tools such as deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements in Brazil, though a plea bargain may grant immunity for the relevant individual, subject to exceptional conditions (Law No. 12.850, Art. 4, § 4º). Nor are there regulations concerning self-reporting, in spite of how much the Brazilian enforcement practices have been influenced by U.S. practices in the anti-bribery space. This means that there is a high level of uncertainty for a company that, upon implementation of efficient internal controls, identifies misconduct and is considering how to deliver the relevant information to the enforcement authorities.
(iii) the admissibility of execution of penalty right after having the case ruled by the Court of Appeals but still pending special appeals to the Superior Court of Justice or to the Supreme Court, based on an unstable precedent of the latter court issued in 2016, in contrast to a clear Constitutional clause (Art. 5, item LVII) and several other precedents affirming that the execution of a sentence may only commence after a final and unappealable decision has been issued.
Furthermore, and in the wake of the Odebrecht matter, authorities in Latin American countries have lately embarked on new cross-border cooperation initiatives. The most recent initiative, known as the Brasilia Declaration, was signed in February 2017 between the Public Prosecutors of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Portugal, adding a European element to the effort.
The Brasilia Declaration has established the creation of joint teams for bilateral or multilateral investigations, seeking to allow authorities to cooperate in the coordination of ongoing investigations related to recent cases involving acts of bribery, corruption and money laundering related to government officials of several countries.
The declaration was based on article 49 of the Merida Convention, which provides for full technical autonomy and functional independence of the joint teams of investigation and cooperation within law enforcement authorities. The main objective is to permit the request and execution of international cooperation requests and the recovery of assets for the full compensation of damages caused by the parties under investigation, including payment of fines, all in accordance with local legislation.
Furthermore, in July 2018 the MPF and the Argentinian Ministerio Público Fiscal established a common basis for cooperation deriving from the Odebrecht-related plea agreements that touch the jurisdiction of both countries,10 and similar efforts have been developed with other foreign enforcement agencies.
In light of the above and in the face of a multi-jurisdictional government investigation in Latin America, companies considering an internal investigation should bear in mind, at each step of the way, the specific requirement of local legislation with respect to key issues such as data preservation and collection, employee interviews, fact analysis and reporting, disclosure and settlements.
As a rule, criminal liability in Brazil is personal and subjective as well as essentially directed to individuals. The sole exception in which corporate criminal liability is accepted is for environmental crimes (Law No. 9,605/98).
Companies may, however, be held liable for bribery and corruption offences under the regime of civil and administrative sanctions of the Anti-Corruption Law (Law No. 12,846/13), some of which can be very serious and similar in nature and seriousness to the criminal sanctions set forth for entities in the Law of Environmental Crimes.
The list of conducts considered a violation under the Anti-Corruption Law is very broad. It not only includes to offer or give, directly or indirectly, an undue advantage to a government official or to a related third party, but it also covers financing, funding, sponsoring or in any way subsidising the practice of harmful acts pursuant to the law, and the use of third parties to hide or disguise the real interests or the identity of the beneficiaries of the conduct.
The practice of any conduct considered harmful under the law could lead to administrative or civil liability for the company involved. In the administrative and judicial spheres, the company may be subject to individual or cumulative penalties, such as fines (of up to 20% of the company’s revenues), confiscation of assets, rights, or values gained from the illegal act, partial suspension or prohibition from carrying out business activities, and the prohibition from receiving benefits, subsidies or credit from government entities.
The Anti-Corruption Law sanctions bribery offences committed against either Brazilian or foreign governments and establishes a strict liability regime for companies involved in bribery offences, but its applicability and effectiveness have not been sufficiently tested to date.
The Brazilian Congress has been intermittently discussing different bill proposals that could change the enforcement landscape towards bribery and corruption, including new procedural rules relating to plea deals, criminalisation of commercial bribery and the expansion of corporate criminal liability to economic and corruption-related crimes. However, one should not expect many changes for the year ahead, since the priorities of government and Congress after the general elections of October 2018 are clearly much more focused on coping with the political and economic crises the country is still facing.
Therefore, with regard to anti-corruption enforcement in Brazil, the years ahead promise to be a period of consolidation of the policies already in force, and certainly Lava Jato and other present and future investigations will continue to evolve, and may bring some additional tension to the political environment – but probably not on the same scale as the last two or three years. In any event, it is possible to foresee developments relating to the level of cooperation and coordination among the different agencies of administrative corruption control and prosecutorial offices, which suggests some good news on the horizon for corporations and individuals.
Lastly, in a longer perspective, it seems likely in our opinion that Brazil will also adhere to the corporate criminal liability in the anti-corruption space and will possibly incriminate commercial bribery in a few years’ time.
Other than the settlements of the Odebrecht itself and Braskem (its petrochemical subsidiary), as many as 77 present and former executives of the business group signed individual plea bargain agreements with the Brazilian federal prosecutors in December 2016 (all of them ratified by the Supreme Court in late January 2017), and tens of which have still been facing interactions with the U.S. Department of Justice – apart from the Brazilian authorities – ever since.
In early May, 2017, the two controlling shareholders and five other executives of the J&F Group signed their plea bargain agreements with federal prosecutors, which was soon followed by the settlement of the legal entity – the J&F anti-leniency agreement, comprising different companies of the group like JBS, Alpargatas, Eldorado and Vigor (the latter three would later be acquired by national and international investors in the context of the J&F/JBS divestment program deriving from the effects of the investigations to the group).
See http://www.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-tematica/ccr5/coordenacao/grupos-de-trabalho/comissao-leniencia-colaboracao-premiada/docs/Estudo%20Tecnico%2001-2017.pdf, accessed on Aug 31, 2018.
See http://www.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-tematica/ccr5/orientacoes/orientacao-conjunta-no-1 -2018.pdf, accessed on Aug 31, 2018.
Federal Supreme Court, ADI 5508, reporting Justice Marco Aurélio. See http://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/detalhe.asp?incidente=4972866, accessed on Aug 31, 2018.
See http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/resultado, accessed on Aug 31, 2018.
See https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rolls-royce-plc-agrees-pay-170-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act, accessed on Aug 31, 2018.
See https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/keppel-offshore-marine-ltd-and-us-based-subsidiary-agree-pay-422-million-global-penalties, accessed on Aug 31, 2018.
See http://www.mpf.mp.br/rj/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-rj/mpf-firma-novo-acordo-de-leniencia-com-a-sbm-offshore, accessed on Sep 05, 2018.
See http://www.mpf.mp.br/pgr/noticias-pgr/argentina-faz-acordo-com-o-mpf-e-podera-utilizar-delacoes-feitas-no-brasil-no-ambito-da-operacao-lava-jato, accessed on Aug 31, 2018.

References: Art. 3
 art. 195
 Art. 16
 Art. 34
 Art. 317
 Art. 333
 Art. 4
 § 4