Source: https://delaware.lexroll.com/395-associates-llc-v-new-castle-county-05a-01-013-del-super-2006/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:17:50+00:00

Document:
Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, of the Abbott Law Firm, 724 Yorklyn Road, Hockessin, Delaware, 19707, Attorney for the Plaintiff.
Brian J. Merritt, Esquire, Assistant County Attorney, 87 Reads Way, New Castle, Delaware, 19720, Attorneys for the Defendants.
395 Associates, LLC, the Plaintiff filed its Complaint for Writ of Certiorari on January 26, 2005, seeking review of two administrative decisions issued by the New Castle County Department of Land Use (the “Department”) and the New Castle County Board of License, Inspection and Review (“the Board”). As explained below, the decision of the New Castle County Board of License, Inspection and Review is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED INPART, and REMANDED IN PART.
395 Associates, LLC, the Plaintiff (“the Plaintiff”), is a home builder. On August 26, 1998, it received a building permit to construct a new, single family home at 109 Rutledge Court (“the Home”), in the Estates of Farmington, a residential subdivision located in Newark, Delaware. The Department issued a Certificate of Occupancy (“CO”) for the home on April 30, 1999.
Calvin and Linda Wise purchased and moved into the Home.
On June 12, 2002, the Department held a Rule to Show Cause Hearing on these Violation Notices. Based on the evidence and testimony presented, the Department held that the Plaintiff improperly installed approximately six windows, and had five days to respond to the Grading Violation Notice and the Department’s request that it communicate how it intended to address the grading issue. In its July 8, 2002 Rule to Show Cause Decision, the Department directed the Plaintiff to repair the windows and comply with manufacturer’s installation instructions, and revise the lines and grades plan and correct the grading. The Plaintiff did not appeal this decision.
On July 25, 2002, the Department issued a third Violation Notice (“the Handrail Violation”). This violation described a staircase handrail installed below the minimum height prescribed by the Code and required installation of a “handrail as required by Code.” The Plaintiff did not appeal this Violation Notice. It corrected the height problem by replacing the finished railing with an unfinished railing. On May 19, 2003, however, the Department notified the Plaintiff that it would issue a “No Compliance Letter” for the Handrail Violation until an inspection showed the railing and spindles resembled the original finished railing, in compliance with the home warranty standards.
The Board heard this matter on December 14, 2004 and affirmed the Department’s Decision. The Board issued a written decision on December 30, 2004. The Board held that the Department’s actions were not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. Specifically, the Board found that: (1) the Department committed no error of law by refusing to close the Handrail Violation because repairs to the obvious Code violation were not completed in the “workmanlike and acceptable manner” required by BOCA, the new handrail remained unfinished, and the home warranty does not prevent the Department from enforcing the Code as to this violation; (2) the Department had sufficient evidence to reconcile the conflicting testimony on the Grading and Window Violations and after judging the witnesses’ credibility and weighing all the evidence, the Department properly determined the violations still existed; (3) the Department issued the Handrail and Window Violation Notices prior to April 30, 2002, before the limitations period closed; and (4), as to the Grading Violation, the Plaintiff waived its Statute of Limitations argument by failing to raise the defense within a sufficient amount of time after receiving the violation notices.
On January 26, 2005, the Plaintiff filed the Complaint in Certiorari in this Court seeking review of the Board’s decision. The Writ of Certiorari issued on February 7, 2005. On March 8, 2005, the Department returned the record of the proceedings before the Board on Application No. 04-0003. Briefing is concluded and the matter is ripe for decision.
It is the function of “the agency, not the court, to weigh evidence and resolve conflicting testimony and issues of credibility.” Thus, the Court does not consider the case below “on its merits” or “substitute its own judgment for [that] of the inferior tribunal.” Instead, the Court’s review is limited to “considering the record to determine whether the lower tribunal[:]” (a) exceeded its jurisdiction, (b) committed errors of law, or (c) proceeded irregularly.
The Court must address a preliminary issue before it can consider the Plaintiff’s substantive arguments on review. First, the Court must address Defendants’ claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision. The Defendant did not raise this argument until now. According to the Defendants, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the writ because the Plaintiff failed to timely appeal the July 8, 2002 Notice of Rule to Show Cause Decision, the July 25, 2002 Handrail Violation, and the May 19, 2003 Letter directing completion of the Handrail repairs in accordance with New Castle County Code § 6.10.003. As a result, argue Defendants, the Plaintiff lost the opportunity to challenge the Department’s enforcement actions before the Board. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff’s failure to timely file an administrative appeal created a jurisdictional defect that the Board did not discover at the time of the December 14, 2004 hearing. Relying on Draper King Cole v. Malave, the Defendants argue this Court lacks jurisdiction because the Board lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The record indicates that within the scope of this authority, and after considering the evidence and argument, the Board affirmed the Department’s July 13, 2004 decision. Thus, the record returned shows that these matters were within the Board’s subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
In response, the Defendants argue that the record demonstrates the Board applied the complete and correct legal standard during the Hearing, no irregularities exist in the preparation, content or signing of the Board’s subsequent written decision, and the record includes a fair statement of the Board’s conclusions and facts supporting its decision.
The Plaintiff contends that the Board committed errors of law by: (1) failing to conclude from the record before it that all three violations appealed should be reversed due to the three-year statute limitations; and (2) concluding that the Plaintiff waived the right to assert statute of limitations as to the Grading Violation by failing to raise it during prior proceedings, when there was no evidence that the Plaintiff intended to or made an express, knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. The Plaintiff further argues that the Department waived its right to assert waiver by not issuing new Notice Violations based on changed circumstances.
In response, the Defendants argue that: (1) the statute of limitations period commenced on the date the CO issued; (2) pursuant to § 6.09.002©) of the New Castle County Code, tolling rules and other applicable common law principles concerning 10 Del. C. § 8106 apply to County administrative enforcement actions; (3) the three violations issued on April 19, 2002, May 28, 2002, and July 25, 2002; (4) the Board heard testimony that the ponding of water started after the CO was issued as a result of subsequent sidewalk repairs by the Plaintiff; (5) the statute of limitations is not a constitutionally protected right but rather an affirmative defense that is waived if not pled.
Having said that, however, the Court can and will review the record returned to determine if the Board “`proceeded illegally or manifestly contrary to law.'” The record shows that on January 30, 2004 the Plaintiff presented its legal and factual positions as to the expiration of statute of limitations and its repairs. Both parties argued their positions on the statute of limitations issues to the Board during the December 14, 2004 Hearing. These positions are restated again in the Board’s December 30, 2004 Decision.
No. No. . . . Particular I note that there were violation issues . . . violation notices issued January 18, 2002, April 19, 2002 [Window Violations] which certainly were within the statute of limitations even if the argument was, well that’s . . . whether we consider that or not I mean that’s certainly within the three year statute of limitation.
I look at the violation notices here. And clearly the windows are within the three years because the first one was issued in January of 2002 [Window Violation]. I’m going back to [the First Member polled] too. But I notice the other two violations the handrailing [July 25, 2002 or May 19, 2003] and the grading [May 28, 2002] were beyond the three year if this is the first violation. If this is the first violation notice they were beyond the three year limitation. Because it’s May 2002 and July 2002. We can see clearly that the grading was not up to standards so to speak but yet it is outside the three year statute of limitation so that it then becomes another matter. But the violation on the part of the windows concerned 100 percent that the developer is in violation of that particular item.
With respect to the statute of limitations, the Department argues that it specifically cites the Delaware statute in its code so that the case law referring to the statute would apply. One concept found in the case law is that latent defects can allow the period of limitations to be tolled. In the cases of the windows, the leaking windows would not become apparent until storms revealed the problem. More importantly, the Department relies on the concept that, as an affirmative defense, the statute of limitations is waived if not asserted. Although there is no pleading like a complaint to mark as beginning of a 5 day period to assert the defense, by analogy, the violation notice acts as a complaint. According to the Department, by analogy to the Delaware Code, when the statute of limitations is raised as a defense to enforcement of the building code, the defense must be raised within a reasonable time from the date of the violations notice. Moreover, the Department notes that the windows do not receive a separate inspection and the period would begin with the Certificate of Occupancy.
With respect to the statute of limitation, two of the three violation notices were issued before the period came to a close. Both Violation #1 and #2 [the Handrail Violation and the Window Violation] were sent to the Plaintiff before April 30, 2002. Violation #3 [the Grading Violation] was sent after three years had passed, but the Plaintiff did not raise this argument within a sufficient amount of time after receiving this or any other violation notices, effectively waving the argument.
The Court “may not review the substantive decisions” nor may it “correct a mistake of facts or an erroneous conclusion from the facts, even though the [tribunal’s] interpretation of the facts or law may have been erroneous.” It cannot consider the case below “on its merits” or “substitute its own judgment” for that of the Board. With this standard in mind, the Court finds that the record for review adequately sets forth the Board’s factual finding that the Window Violation Notice was not barred by the three year statute of limitations. The record shows the Board heard and considered argument and facts pertaining to the timeliness of the Window Violation. Likewise, it is plain from the discussion of the Department’s position in the December 30, 2004 written decision that the Board found the Department’s position as to that Violation persuasive. Therefore, the Board’s determination on this issue will not be disturbed o certiorari review.
However, the Court finds the Board’s decision that Plaintiff waived its statute of limitation argument on the Grading Violation is manifestly contrary to law. The record indicates that the Board relied on the Department’s legal analogy between a complaint and violation of notice, suggesting that the Plaintiff had five days in which to raise its affirmative defense or risk waiver. The Board explained in its decision that `[a]ccording to the Department, by analogy to the Delaware Code, when the statute of limitations is raised as a defense to enforcement of the building code, the defense must be raised within a reasonable time from the date of the violations notice.” It ultimately determined that the Plaintiff waived its defense as to the Grading Violation.
Recognizing the limited scope of its review and that the issue of whether “a defendant has waived an affirmative defense by failing to assert it timely is a matter left to the discretion” of the Court, the Court finds the Board’s determination on waiver constitutes an error of law. The Court is not persuaded that a notice violation is sufficiently analogous to a “complaint” or a “pleading” so as to require a recipient to file a “responsive pleading” stating its affirmative defense within five days (the time allotted to remedy a deficiency or risk civil, criminal or administrative remedies). Nor is the Court persuaded that five days from the date of the violation notice is a “reasonable time” in which to require the recipient to raise such defenses. This is especially so here because the record establishes the Plaintiff did in fact raise the defense at the January 30, 2004 Rule to Show Cause Hearing. Consequently, the Court reverses the Board’s Decision as to the Plaintiff’s waiver of its statute of limitations defense to the Grading Violation.
Finally, with regard to the Handrail Violation, the Court is unable to determine from the record how the Board reached its conclusion that the Handrail Violation was timely and not barred by the statute of limitations. “`It is settled law that a quasi-judicial tribunal must state the basis for its decision, in order to allow judicial review.'” This finding does not mean the Board committed an “error of law,” it simply means the record is insufficient for certiorari review.
Therefore, the Court remands this issue to the Board for clarification.
I think the point here is that the County essentially waived or estopped from asserting this because in fact the County did all the inspections. The property passed all the inspections or else it never would have been issued a certificate of occupancy. . . . So, before the C of O was issued on April 30, 1999 the County has to, is obligated and required to go out to the property and to ensure that the protective slope is properly graded. . . . So we have to assume that the County properly performed their inspection . . . when the home builder handed over this property to the homeowner everything was copasetic. So here we are five and half years later talking about grading. . . .
The present writ only permits the Court to review of the conduct of the Board by looking for errors that appear on the face of the record returned in obedience to it. The “transcript of the evidence below is not part of the reviewable record . . . the Court cannot examine the transcript in order to evaluate the adequacy of the evidence which supports the conclusion rendered below.” Because the Board never ruled on this issue, the Department did not address it and the Plaintiff did not raise it again until now. Thus, “there is nothing for this Court to review” “under the rubric of a writ of certiorari” and this claim will not be considered on review.
The Plaintiff argues that the Board committed an error of law by affirming the Department’s July 13, 2004 Decision, based in part on its finding that the BOCA National Building Code (“BOCA”) required a stain or finish coat on the re-installed handrail. It contends that the July 25, 2002 Violation Notice cites the CABO Code, and that BOCA was inapplicable at the time the Violation issued. Therefore, the Plaintiff claims the Board should have reversed the Department’s July 13, 2004 decision, which was originally based on the home warranty standard.
The Defendants argue that Plaintiff never raised this issue during the December 14, 2004 Hearing. They assert that the record shows the Board discussed and considered the facts and law relevant to the Handrail issues the Plaintiff raised on administrative appeal. Finally, the Defendants contend that BOCA was the applicable building standard because it was in effect when the CO issued in 1999.
The Court’s review of the record returned confirms Defendant’s contention that this particular issue was not raised or considered below. The July 25, 2002 Violation cites to the “1995 CABO, Section 315.1” and instructs the Plaintiff to “[i]nstall handrail as required by Code.” After the Plaintiff corrected the height of Handrail but failed to apply a finish coat, the Department sent the May 19, 2003 letter refusing to issue a compliance letter because a review of the home warranty standards made “clear that repaired items must be finished to match surrounding areas.” The Plaintiff argued at the July 13, 2004 Rule to Show Cause Hearing that: (1) the Violation was barred by statute of limitations; (2) the Plaintiff had installed handrail as required by Code; and (3) “`any further proceeding must be prosecuted under the new home warranty,'” and (4) the Handrail Violation should have been dismissed because it was time barred by the Building Code statute of limitations, was fixed, and the finish was exclusively a home warranty issue.
“. . . it’s an interesting issue in that the County is saying they have a problem with grading and drainage under the building code which is a little bit of a puzzler . . . in that grading and drainage are expressly regulated under the . . . drainage code.
The Department responded: the drainage code says go to BOCA and BOCA says for one and two to CABO. So that’s how we get to CABO and that’s how we get into the building code.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 2, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8).
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 2, Exhibits A-C, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8); Def. Answering. Br. at 3, 395 Assocs. LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8, 14). The record shows that on January 18, 2002, the Department issued a Violation Notice for the Plaintiff’s failure to issue a new home warranty to the Wises within 30 days of the issuance of the CO See Def. Answering Br. at Exhibit B, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14). The record further reveals that Home Warranty of Delaware, LLC provided a home warranty to the Wises on or about June 5, 2003 See Def. Answering Br. The parties agree that this issue was “resolved,” the warranty violation was “corrected,” and therefore, this matter is not at issue. Pl. Op. Br. at Exhibit I, p. 2, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14); Pl. Amended Reply Br. at 1 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Nov. 29, 2005) (D.I. 17).
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibits A-C, I 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8); Def. Answering. Br. at 3, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit A, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8).
 Def. Answering Br. at 4; Exhibit B, p. 2, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14). The Court notes that “Show Cause Hearings were previously held on March 4, 2002, April 15, 2002 and April 30, 2002” with regard to the home warranty issue. See Exhibit B, p. 2.
 An inspection found approximately six windows showed signs of leaking. Two of these windows were “unzipped,” revealing that they were not installed in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions, the presence of compromised Tyvek house wrap and the absence of nails and caulk under the flange. See Def. Answering Br. At 4; (D.I. 14), Exhibit B.
 Def. Answering Br. at 4; Exhibit B, pp. 2-3, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14).
 Def. Answering Br. at 4; Exhibit B, p. 2-3, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14). The Court notes that “Show Cause Hearings were previously held on March 4, 2002, April 15, 2002 and April 30, 2002” with regard to the home warranty issue. See Exhibit B, p. 2.
 Record of the Proceedings before the Board, Application No. 04-0003, Plaintiff 395 Assocs.’ Memo. of Law in Supp. of Appeal at ¶ I; Exhibit A, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 4).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit C, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8) see Pl. Open. Br. at 2, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8).
 Def. Answering Br. at 5, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14).
 Def. Answering Br. at 5; Pl. Open. Br. at 3, Exhibit G 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8).
 Def. Answering Br. at 5; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit G, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8).
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 3, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8). See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I, p. 2, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14).
 Def. Answering Br. at 5-6; Pl. Open. Br. at 3-4, Exhibit I, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14).
 Def. Answering Br. at 5-6; Pl. Op. Br. at 3-4, Exhibit I 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 14).
 See Pl. Op. Br. at p. 2, Exhibit I; 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8).
 See Pl. Op. Br. at 4, Exhibit I, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8).
 Def. Answering Br. at 5; Pl. Op. Br. at Exhibit I.
 Def. Answering Br. at 7; Pl. Op. Br. at Exhibit I, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8, 14).
 Def. Answering Br. at 5; Pl. Op. Br. at Exhibit J, p. 1; Record of the Proceedings before the Board, Application No. 04-0003, Plaintiff 395 Assocs.’ Memo. of Law in Supp. of Appeal at ¶ I; Exhibit A, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A0-1-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 4).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 62-67, Exhibit J, p. 5.
 The Court notes that both the copy of the decision found in Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J and the decision returned in obedience to the writ (D.I.4, at Exhibit 3) are missing page 3.
 Def. Answering Br. at 7 (D.I. 14).
 See Pl. Opening Br. at 1, 395 Assocs., LLC. v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 1).
 Goldberg v. City of Wilmington, 1992 WL 114074, at *1 (Del.Super.). See also Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.) (citin Shoemaker v. State, 375 A.2d 431, 436-37 (Del. 1977) );Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 894. See e.g. Hundleyv. O’Donnell, 1998 WL 842293, at *3 n. 7. (Del.Ch.).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.).
 Jardel Co., Inc. v. Carroll, 1990 WL 18296, at *2 (Del.Super.); State v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 7, 1989 WL 31600, at *1 (Del.Super.); Breasure v. Swartzentruber, 1988 WL 116422, at *1 (Del.Super.) (citations omitted).
 Luby v. Town of Smyrna, 2001 WL 1729121, at *2 (Del.Super.), (citing Castner v. State, 311 A.2d 858, 860 (Del. 1973)).
 Breasure v. Swartzentruber, 1988 WL 116422, at *1 (Del.Super. 1988) (citations omitted).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), (citing Reise v. Board of Bldg. Appeals of City of Newark, 746 A.2d 271, 274 (Del. 2000)).
 Green v. Sussex County, 668 A.2d 770, 773 (Del.Super. 1995), aff’d 1995 WL 466586 (Del.Supr.) (citing Brandywine Securities, Inc. v. Department of Licenses and Inspection of the City of Wilmington, 1993 WL 18784 (Del.Super.)). See e.g. Matter of Butler, 609 A.2d 1080, 1081-82 (Del. 1992) (declining to consider transcript of the underlying Superior Court proceedings or to overrule Castner v. State, 311 A.2d 858 (Del. 1973) and holding that the Superior Court’s order “is the entire record before us for purposes of certiorari review.”). Cf. Barbour v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Bethany Beach, 1992 WL 302292, at *3 (Del.Super.) (noting that “statutory writ of certiorari is broader and allows for the filing of a transcript of the evidence” but that “a transcript could not be filed in a common law certiorari proceeding since the reviewing court was prohibited from considering the evidence before the lower tribunal.”).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 1551457, at *2 (Del.Super.), aff’d 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.) (citing Reise v. Board of Bldg. Appeals of City of Newark, 746 A.2d 271, 274 (Del. 2000)) Breasure v. Swartzentruber, 1988 WL 116422, at *1 (Del.Super. 1988) (citations omitted).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), citing Reise v. Board of Bldg. Appeals of City of Newark, 746 A.2d 271, 274 (Del. 2000) (citing Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 896).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), (citing Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 921).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), (citing Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 939).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), (citing Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 923).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J. The record returned indicates that a lengthy history of administrative actions relating to the Window, Grading and Handrail issues, dating back at least to an April 19, 2002 Notice of Violation. See Def. Answering Br. at Exhibit B. The December 30, 2004 Board Decision shows that the Board considered the unresolved Window Violation and Grading Violation issues that were the subject of both the July 8, 2002 and July 13, 2004 Show Cause Decisions. See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J; Def. Answering Br. at Exhibit B. This Decision also indicates that the Board considered the Handrail issues, which were the subject of the April 19, 2003 Letter and the July 25, 2002 Violation Notice. See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibits C, G, J.
 Def. Answering Br. at 11.
 See Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), (citing Reise v. Board of Bldg. Appeals of City of Newark, 746 A.2d 271, 274 (Del. 2000)) (citing Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 896); Luby v. Town of Smyrna, 2001 WL 1729121, at *2 (Del.Super.).
 See El Di, Inc. v. Justice of the Peace Court of State, In and For Sussex, 1998 WL 109823, at *5 (Del.Super.).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), citing Reise v. Board of Bldg. Appeals of City of Newark, 746 A.2d 271, 274 (Del. 2000).
 See Upshur v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 17, 2005 WL 2615391, at *3; (Del.Super.) (citing Becker v. State, 185 A. 92 (Del.Super.Ct. 1936)) overruled in part by Committee of Merchants and Citizens Against Proposed Annexation, Inc. v. Longo, 1996 WL 769764, at *6 (Del.Super.). The Court notes that this rule occasionally gives way to certiorari review of constitutional questions involving jurisdiction presented by petitioners for the first time on review or appeal. See Liebman Company v. Del-Chapel Associates, 1980 WL 324511, at * 2 (Del.Super.); Becker v. State, 185 A. 92 (Del.Super.Ct. 1936) Shoemaker v. State, 375 A.2d 431 (Del. 1977). However, as the Defendants assert no constitutional claims or issues that “falls into the `question of grave public policy and interest’ exception,” the Court declines to broaden the limited scope of its review on certiorari. See Upshur v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 17, 2005 WL 2615391, at *3; (Del.Super.). Compare Becker v. State, 185 A. 92 (Del.Super.Ct. 1936); Shoemaker v. State, 375 A.2d 431 (Del. 1977); El Di, Inc. v. Justice of the Peace Court of State, In and For Sussex, 1998 WL 109823, at *5 (Del.Super.); Committee of Merchants and Citizens Against Proposed Annexation, Inc. v. Longo, 1996 WL 769764, at *6-7 (Del.Super.).
 Pl. Open. Br. at pp. 9-10.
 Pl. Open. Br. at p. 9; Pl. Amended Reply. Br. at p. 6.
 Pl. Open. Br. at p. 10.
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), (citing Reise v. Board of Bldg. Appeals of City of Newark, 746 A.2d 271 (Del. 2000)). Cf. Petrucelli v. New Castle County Bd. of Adjustment, 1997 WL 817891, at 8 (Del.Super.) (“The Board must;4932;4932 articulate its;4934;4934findings of fact and;4938;4938 conclusions of law in order to enable the Superior Court, in the exercise of its function on appellate;4956;4956 review . . .”).
 Barbour v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Bethany Beach, 1992 WL 302292, at *3 (Del.Super.) (noting that “statutory writ of certiorari is broader and allows for the filing of a transcript of the evidence” but that “a transcript could not be filed in a common law certiorari proceeding since the reviewing court was prohibited from considering the evidence before the lower tribunal.”).
 Conway Conway v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 WL 283393, at *2 (Del.Super.), (citing Searles v. Darling 83 A.2d 96, 98 (Del. 1951)).
 See Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.); Conway Conway v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 WL 283393, at *2 (Del. Super); Pl. Amended Reply Br. at p. 6.
 Tr. Application 04-0003 (Dec. 14, 2004) at 3. See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D.
 Tr. Application 04-0003 (Dec. 14, 2004) at 62. See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D.
 Tr. Application 04-0003 (Dec. 14, 2004) at 66. See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, pp. 5-6.
 Conway Conway v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 WL 283393, at *2 (Del.Super.), (citing Searles v. Darling, ___ 83 A.2d 96, 98 (Del. 1951)).
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit L, pp. 3-4, Exhibit J; Pl. Amended Reply Br. at pp. 7-11.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at pp. 9-10; Exhibit L, pp. 3-4.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at pp. 11-13; Pl. Amended Reply Br. at pp. 9-11.
 See Pl. Amended Reply Br. at p. 8.
 El Di, Inc. v. Justice of the Peace Court of State, 1998 WL 109823, at *4 (Del.Super.).
 El Di, Inc. v. Justice of the Peace Court of State, 1998 WL 109823, at *4 (Del.Super.); Bailey v. Wilmington Dept. of Police, 1996 WL 658997, at *2 (Del.Super.); Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.).
 Middleton v. Wilmington Dept. of Police, 1996 WL 453363, at *2 (Del.Super.).
 Cf. Hatchett v. City of Wilmington, 1996 WL 111206, at * 3 (Del.Super.).
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del. Supr).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 9-11, 15-17, 25-28, 45-46, 52-55.
 Def. Answering Br. at B.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 58-59.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 62.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 63.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, p. 6.
 Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *3 (Del.Supr.).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 25-28.
 Feralloy Industries v. Wilson, 1998 WL 442937, at *2 (Del.Super.) (referring to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8 in the context of an IAB appeal case involving the statute of limitations for a worker’s compensation claim.).
 Fletcher v. Ratcliffe, 1996 WL 527207, at * 2 (Del.Super.), (citing Cannelongo v. Fidelity Amer. Small Bus. Invest. Co., Del. Supr., 540 A.2d 435, 440 (1988)).
 See Pl. Open . Br. at Exhibit J at 6.
 See Pl. Open . Br. at Exhibits A-C, D, at pp. 25-28.
 Cf. Barbour v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Bethany Beach, 1993 WL 180353, at *4 (Del.Super.).
 See Brandywine Securities, Inc. v. Department of Licenses and Inspection, 1993 WL 18784, at *4 (Del.Super.) Breasure v. Swartzentruber, 1988 WL 116422, at *4 (Del.Super. 1988).
 See Pl. Open Br. at pp. 13-16.
 See Def. Answering Br. at pp. 17-19.
 See Pl. Open Br. at Exhibit K, p. 5.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 13, 16.
 Pl. Open. Br. at p. 16.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 16-18; Pl. Amended Reply Br. at 14-17.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit C p. 1.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit K pp. 1-2.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I p. 3.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit G.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit K.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 5.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 8, 25-40.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 8, 24-25; 44-46.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 53-54.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 63.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 64.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 65.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, p. 4.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, p. 5.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit K, pp. 6-7.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 15-16.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 41.
 Pl. Opening. Br. at 18-20.
 Def. Answering Br. at 22-23.

References: Application No. 04
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