Source: https://dnllegalandstyle.com/2019/onnoghen-asset-declaration-dispute-a-dispassionate-look-at-nba-its-traducers-and-the-verdict-of-history-udemezue/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:03:34+00:00

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There are insinuations in some quarters that the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) is in support of the embattled CJN, Hon Justice WSN Onnoghen in his trial at the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) on charges related to non-declaration or late declaration of his assets as required by the Code of Conduct for Public Officers contained in the 5th Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 1999 (as amended). Those who hold this view are quick to suggest that NBA’s support is a deliberate attempt at derailing the “war against corruption” in Nigeria. It is my humble view that neither the NBA leadership nor the NBA as a body is in support of CJN Onnoghen as a person. All I think the NBA and its leadership have been doing is merely to demand and insist on decorum and observance of due process of law, as opposed to arbitrary desecration of the Constitution. NBA’s stand is made more rational when one recalls the famous declaration in a 1998 book titled, Lex, Rex, or the Law and the Prince: A Dispute for the Just Prerogative of King and People written by Samuel Rutherford whose view I would paraphrase or re-phrase to read, “arbitrary application of laws has no alliance with God.” Besides, one must not forget that, by the very peculiar nature of their office, judicial officers are not ordinarily able to speak out for themselves in matters such as this. The Bar serves as the mouth piece of the Bench, in deserving situations, because the Bar and the Bench are like Siamese twins — conjoined and inseparable in the attainment of justice. Let me pause to quickly reiterate that the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and its leadership would lose my sympathy the day it chooses to overtly or covertly support, encourage or condone acts of corruption – whether against public funds or against rule of law. I shall now proceed to lay out the legal foundations for this humble opinion of mine in the hope that this would enflame further dialogues on whether the role being played by NBA is reasonably justifiable or justified in the circumstances.
Whenever a breach of judicial oath occurs, it is a misconduct itself, then the NJC is the appropriate body to investigate such breaches by the judicial officer and if found to be so, such judicial officer shall face disciplinary action and the NJC may recommend the removal of such a judicial officer to the appropriate authority which is either the President in the case of a Federal Judicial Officer or the Governor of the State in the case of a State Judicial Officer and/or take other actions appropriately. When this is done and accepted by the appropriate authority in compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, then the relevant law enforcement Agent or Agency is at liberty to make the said judicial officer face the wrath of the law. Any act done by the law enforcement Agent or Agency in violation of the above is tantamount to denying the NJC its powers to discipline Judges in accordance with the provisions of Section 153(1) and Paragraph 21 Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). See Paragraph 21 (a) & (b) of the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) respectively. Whenever there is an allegation of official misconduct against a judicial officer and the above stated process is not adhered to, it amounts to jumping the gun and ipso facto a direct violation of the Constitution. Recourse to the National Judicial Council is a condition precedent as clearly set out by the Constitution, and any attempt by any Agency of Government to by-pass the Council will amount to failure to observe condition precedent thereby leading to flagrant violation of the Constitution.
In view of this decision, can anyone say straight from the shoulder that CJN Onnoghen could validly be arraigned and tried by the CCT at a time when the National Judicial Council (NJC) is yet to sit and give a determination over the same case? As noted by Nonso Attoh in the work cited above, the Ngajiwa judgment remains the law for what it decided until it is either set aside or overruled.
The stance of the CCT in CJN Onnoghen’s case becomes more curious when one recalls the judgment of the same CCT in FRN V. SYLVESTER NGWUTA, another Justice of the Supreme Court. The CCT had in that judgment, delivered on 15 May 2018, discharged Hon Justice Ngwuta over false assets declaration charges brought against him by the Federal Government. Hon Justice William A. Atedzeb (a member of the CCT who delivered the judgment of the CCT) had held that as a serving judicial officer, Hon Justice Ngwuta was under the management, control and discipline of the National Judicial Council (NJC) and also that the NJC is a body whose independence of external control or interference is constitutionally provided for in section 158 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The judge then accepted and upheld the decision in HYELADZIRA NGAJIWA V. FRN (supra) as constituting the guiding precedent, and quashed all charges preferred against Hon Justice Ngwuta, noting that “any allegation of official misconduct against a judicial officer would first have to be referred to the NJC to the exclusion of any other body, court or tribunal.” (See https://guardian.ng/news/cct-discharges-ngwuta-over-false-assets-declaration/ accessed on 17 February 2019). Why then the summersault in Onnoghen’s case? Is sauce for the goose not sauce for the gander? Or, are there things we are not being told?
A judicial officer shall not be removed from his office or appointment before his age of retirement except … by the President of the FRN acting on an address supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate, praying that he be so removed for his inability to discharge the functions of his office or appointment (whether arising from infirmity of mind or of body) or for misconduct or contravention of the Code of Conduct; and in any other case, by the President … acting on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council that the judicial officer be so removed for his inability to discharge the functions of his office or appointment (whether arising from infirmity of mind or of body) or for misconduct or contravention of the Code of Conduct.
Under no circumstance may a judicial officer be removed without the recommendation of the NJC (National Judicial Council) or a prior resolution of the Senate of the FRN. Accordingly, the suspension of the CJN without first complying with this provision is a violation of the constitution.
In a statement published on February 01, 2019 on www.legalnaija.com, celebrated constitutional lawyer and Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Professor Ben Nwabueze, had submitted that “It is clear from paragraph 18 that: (a) only the CCT itself can order vacation of or suspension from office; the President is not empowered to do so, and cannot be ordered or directed by the CCT to do so; (b) more importantly, the CCT cannot make an order vacating an office or suspending a person from office until the trial before it is completed and the accused person is found “guilty of contravention of any of the provisions of this Code”; the trial in this case is only just commencing.” The learned professor of constitutional law had then gone ahead to conclude that this applies to a judicial officer in Nigeria, thus ascribing to the CCT a unilateral power to remove a serving judicial officer, albeit upon conviction of such judicial officer. With the greatest respect to the revered learned Professor-Silk, I strongly disagree with any suggestion that the CCT can unilaterally remove or suspend a serving judicial officer without the mandatory participation of both (A) the President/Governor and (B) the NJC/Senate/House of Assembly, as the case may, in line with section 292, CFRN. I will explain.
Paragraph 18 (2) (a) of Part I of the 5th Schedule of the CFRN, 1999 is a GENERAL provision relating to all public officers and as such does not and cannot override the provisions of section 292 (1) of the same CFRN, 1999 which is a SPECIFIC provision relating exclusively to (only) judicial officers. Section 292(1) clearly states that “a judicial officer SHALL NOT be removed from office or appointment before his age of retirement except in the following circumstances.” There are only two such circumstances in section 292 — the first is on the request made vide a resolution supported by two-third majority vote of the Senate of the Federal Republic or the House of Assembly of the affected State, as the case may be; the second is on the recommendation of the NJC. And in each instance, removal may only be made by the President or the Governor (as the case may be).
I accordingly respectfully submit that although the CCT may, upon convicting a public officer, unilaterally give an order that the “public officer” should immediately vacate his or her office, the CCT does not have similar powers with respect to a “judicial officer.” The guiding principle is the Latin legal maxim and canon of statutory interpretation, “generalia specialibus non derogant.” The maxim states that “general provisions in a statute must yield to special or specific provisions in the same statute.” See DORE V. VERDOM  2 SCR 862. Thus, when a matter falls under any specific provision, then it must be governed by that provision and not by any later general provision in the same statute. General provisions in a law must admit or submit to specific provisions in the same law, on the same subject. This is why, in my opinion, section 292 (1) of the CFRN (a special provision made for judicial officers) must necessarily prevail over para 18 (2) (a) of Part I of the 5th Schedule of the CFRN (which is a general provision made for all public officers).
On the maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant,’ the position of an earlier Special Act will not be affected by that of a later general Act although inconsistent with the earlier particular Act and although they deal with the same subject matter.
I therefore suggest that the proper approach where a judicial officer is found guilty by the CCT of breach of the Code of Conduct is to make an order recommending vacation of office of the affected judicial officer, which order could or would then be a ground for the action of the NJC or the Senate/House of Assembly of a State, as provided for in section 292 (1), as the case may be. On the clear provisions of section 292 (1) CFRN, 1999, the ground upon which the NJC or the Senate/House of Assembly of a State may recommend the removal [or suspension] of a judicial officer include “his inability to discharge the functions of his office or appointment…, or for misconduct or contravention of the Code of Conduct.” Accordingly, issues relating to Code of Conduct are well within matter that the NJC has powers to look into in respect of a judicial officer. Any removal or suspension of the CJN pursuant only to a purported court order is improper in law as such amounts to a disregard of the condition precedent put in place in section 292(1) CFRN which makes participation of the Senate/NJC a sine-qua-non.
As the Charge was being read to the Defendant, the CCT Chairman suddenly stopped the Clerk from continuing with reading of the charge. This was after the Clerk had read only count one. The Chairman then asked the Defence team whether it (the Defence) would prefer that pending interlocutory applications be taken first. The Defence team answered that since the Defendant was already present in the tribunal, the Defendant’s plea should be taken first.
… determination of jurisdictional issues come before trial and since the presence of the accused is only required when the High Court is ready to commence trial then when jurisdictional issues are yet to be determined, accused’s presence in court is not mandatory.
Section 266 (b) Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA), 2015 provides that the presence of the accused person is mandatory throughout his trial “unless at the hearing of an interlocutory application.” See also EZEZE v. STATE (2004) LPELR-CA/L/370/2003; (2004)14 NWLR (Pt.894)491; and B.B APUGO v. F R N (2017) LPELR-41643(CA). Issues relating to a court’s jurisdiction are fundamental and lack of jurisdiction is fatal as emphasized in OTUKPO v. JOHN (2000) 8 NWLR (669) 507; BRONIK MOTORS v. WEMA BANK (1983)6 S.C. 158; and OMOKHAFE v. MILITARYT ADMINISTRATOR (2005) 2 MJSC 173. These and more are what the NBA and its Leadership are worried about, and which inform its principled stance in favour of due process, no matter what the outcome would be. Honestly, to me, it really does not matter if CJN Onoghen is in jail or is removed from office, provided due process of law is strictly complied with in either case.
The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. and if he does sit, his decision cannot stand”. It is irrelevant whether he was in fact biased, because “justice is rooted in [public] confidence.
The principle that a judge must be impartial is accepted in the jurisprudence of any civilized country and there are no grounds for holding that in this respect the law of Nigeria differs from the law of England or for hesitating to follow the English decisions.
It is therefore distressing that the CCT Chairman had insisted that CJN Onnoghen must appear before the CCT in spite of the pending application praying that he (CCT Chairman) should recuse (himself) from the case on grounds of breach of nemo judex in causa sua. So, one should not be frightened nor discombobulated that NBA and its Leadership are seriously worried, vigorously complaining and persistently protesting. The protest or complaint is not about the person of Onnoghen himself. NBA knows that CJN Onnoghen is not above the law. NBA’s position, I believe, is that if you must punish CJN Onnoghen or indeed anyone for violation of any extant law, the procedure and processes for meting out such punishment must be in strict compliance with due process of law. NBA’s apprehensions are therefore over the aforesaid, which NBA feels constitute a grave threat to due preservation of the rule of law, separation of powers, constitutionalism, and the independence of the judiciary. Further, as can be gleaned from NBA’s published stand, rule of law and an independent judiciary (free from external influence or unnecessary harassments) are necessary to checkmate abuse of political powers and stop Nigeria from degenerating into a tyrannical State headed by totalitarian leaders evocative of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (the Monster-like leaders), whose personal whims and caprices hold sway as opposed to separation of governmental powers, rule of law and preservation of individual liberty of citizens.
The fifth issue for consideration is that the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) itself is in gross breach of due process of law when it proceeded to file the current charges against CJN Onnoghen notwithstanding the latter’s written admission in response to the allegations made against him as they relate to late-declaration and non-declaration of some aspects of his assets. A close look at section 3 of the Code of Conduct Bureau & Tribunal Act (CCB&T Act), Cap C15 relating to functions of the CCB would help us appreciate this position.
Provided that where the person concerned makes a written admission of such breach or non-compliance, no reference to the [Code of Conduct] Tribunal shall be necessary.
The singular question arising from the proviso to section 3 of the CCB&T Act is as to why the CCB, after having received CJN Onnoghen’s written admission in respect of his asset declaration, still proceeded to file charges against the CJN at the CCT. Are there no other processes and procedures put in place for dealing with a situation in which the affected public officer tenders a written admission, as his Lordship, Hon Justice Onnoghen, had done in this instance, since the CCB&T Act leaves no one in doubt in its command that no reference to the [Code of Conduct] Tribunal shall be necessary where the person concerned makes a written admission of such breach or non-compliance (proviso to section 3)? With the greatest respect, it leaves much to be desired and gives some justification to the feeling in some quarters that there might be more to all this drama than meets the ordinary eye. One could then understand why the NBA feels bothered.
The time to act is now, before it’s too late. Indeed, there is power in numbers, but if those numbers will not unite and rise up against their oppressors, there can be no resistance. You can’t have it both ways. You can’t live in a constitutional republic if you allow the government to act like a police state. You can’t claim to value freedom if you allow the government to operate like a dictatorship. You can’t expect to have your rights respected if you allow the government to treat whomever it pleases with disrespect and an utter disregard for the rule of law.
Civilized existence is one which respects the law, both wise and good laws as well as bad laws, whose constitutional basis is the will of the people. When one does not like a particular law, the remedy resides in modifying it or revoking it by the procedures established for that very purpose. That methodology is the sole means of guaranteeing that popular will cannot be seized and held captive by… with… extreme interpretations.
I rest my case here. May God help Nigeria, my country! Amen!

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