Source: https://harvardcrcl.org/supreme-court-declines-to-consider-challenge-to-mandatory-life-sentences-for-juveniles/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:36:22+00:00

Document:
Ahmad Bright was sixteen years old when he was involved in the shooting death of 19-year-old Corey Davis in 2006. In one sense, Ahmad was the last person you would expect to be caught up in a murder: he was a hardworking and ambitious full-scholarship student at Cambridge’s prestigious Buckingham, Browne & Nichols School. He was a talented tennis player and was touring top-tier colleges. But in another sense, the turn of events wasn’t surprising at all. Ahmad’s troubled home life consisted of housing insecurity, an absentee father, and a drug dealing brother. In fact, the deadly altercation occurred when Ahmad’s brother hired a friend to kill Davis—another drug dealer—because Davis owed him money.
Ahmad was convicted of second-degree murder on a joint venture theory. The prosecution did not contend that Ahmad killed Davis, but rather that he drove the car to and from the murder. In Massachusetts, a second-degree murder conviction triggers a mandatory sentence of life in prison, with the possibility of parole after 15 years. Ahmad has spent the last eight years in prison. All of his appeals have been unsuccessful, including his recent petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied last Monday.
Ahmad’s petition to the Supreme Court relied on its 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, which declared life sentences without the possibility of parole unconstitutional for children under the age of eighteen. In Miller, the court reaffirmed its stance that “children are constitutionally different from adults,” and that a sentencer must “have the ability to consider the mitigating qualities of youth.” To do otherwise would violate the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” It was this line of reasoning that had previously led the Court in 2005 to declare unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.
Ahmad’s lawyers disagreed. They argued that the mere possibility of discretionary parole does not satisfy the constitutional prerogative of individualization for juveniles. This is especially true in Massachusetts, where parole rates have dropped precipitously in the past several years under a reconstituted “tough on crime” board. Ahmad’s lawyers also made the broader argument that parole board decisions in general—which can be highly susceptible to political influences, notes the American Law Institute—are no substitute for the individualized determination of a judge.
Unfortunately the Supreme Court denied Ahmad’s petition, which will certainly be devastating for Ahmad and his family. The denial comes a little under two years after Ahmad’s failed petition to former Massachusetts governor Deval Patrick for a commuted sentence. But the Court’s decision not to weigh in on the constitutionality of mandatory life sentences with the possibility of parole for juveniles has consequences beyond Ahmad. Judges will continue to impose life sentences on children, without the ability to consider individual circumstances—like “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences” —that the Supreme Court has deemed highly relevant in fashioning juvenile sentences.
A mandatory sentence to life imprisonment with or without the possibility of parole may be a distinction without a difference. This is especially true in the context of increasingly harsh parole boards, like the one in Massachusetts Ahmad will face in a few years. (Troublingly, the fact that Ahmad has appealed his conviction means he is even less likely to be paroled.) If we truly believe that children deserve individualized sentences, then the Supreme Court made a mistake last week. If and when a similar challenge comes before the Court again, it should address the issue head on.
 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Bright v. Massachusetts, No. 16-579 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016).
 See 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468.
 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 10.
 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
 See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 7, Bright v. Massachusetts, No. 16-578 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016).
 In 2009, the overall parole rate was 78%; just two years later, it had plummeted to 26%. The rate is even lower for those prisoners with life sentences—just 12% in 2011. See Patricia Garin, et al., White Paper: The Current State of Parole in Massachusetts, 2–3 (Feb. 2013), http://www.cjpc.org/2013/White-Paper-Addendum-2.25.13.pdf; see also Gordon Haas et. al., The Massachusetts Parole Board, i (2012), http://www.cjpc.org/2012/MA-Parole-Board-2012.pdf.
 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 18.
 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.

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