Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/sovereign-immunity/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:42:13+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of L.K. on Thursday, July 14, 2016.
Dependency and Neglect—Sexual Abuse—Polygraph Examination—Treatment Plan—Testimony—Evidence—Attorney Fees—Discovery Violations—Sovereign Immunity.
L.K. alleged sexual abuse by her father, C.K. Although C.K. denied the allegations, he stipulated that L.K. was dependent and neglected because she lacked proper parental care. The court accepted his admission and adjudicated L.K. dependent and neglected. The Moffat County Department of Social Services (MCDSS) devised a treatment plan for C.K., which required, among other things, that C.K. take a polygraph examination as part of denier’s treatment. Moffat later moved to terminate C.K.’s parental rights. Among other things, the court found that C.K. had been referred for a polygraph examination but did not appear for it, and it granted the termination motion, citing C.K.’s failure to successfully complete treatment designed to address the allegations of sexual misbehavior with L.K. as sufficient evidence that he was unable or unwilling to provide nurturing and safe parenting to adequately address her needs.
On appeal, C.K. contended that the trial court committed reversible error by considering the denier’s treatment polygraph examination as evidence supporting its determination that he failed to successfully complete his treatment plan. He did not dispute either that his treatment plan required him to participate in denier’s treatment or that a polygraph examination was required in denier’s treatment. For these reasons, the court properly admitted evidence of efforts to schedule an appointment for a polygraph examination and evidence that C.K. did not keep the appointment, and the court did not err in considering this evidence in terminating C.K.’s parental rights.
Next, C.K. contended that MCDSS had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his parental rights should be terminated, but the trial court erred by unfairly shifting the burden of proof to him when he decided not to testify in the termination hearing. When C.K. failed to present evidence, the court did not improperly shift the burden of proof, infringe on his privilege against self-incrimination, or draw impermissible adverse inferences.
Finally, C.K. contended that MCDSS did not prove its case by clear and convincing evidence, asserting the absence of such evidence that he had sexually abused L.K., which was the basis for the petition in dependency and neglect. However, the factual basis for adjudicating L.K. dependent and neglected had already been established, and MCDSS’s burden was to prove the criteria for termination, including C.K.’s failure to comply with his treatment plan. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment.
On cross-appeal, MCDSS contended that the trial court erred in assessing attorney fees against it for discovery violations. Sovereign immunity precludes orders assessing attorney fees against a governmental entity for discovery violations.
The judgment was affirmed and the sanctions order was reversed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in U.S. Taekwondo Committee v. Kukkiwon on Wednesday, July 3, 2013.
Interlocutory Appeal—Jurisdiction—Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act—Final Judgment—State Doctrine Ruling—Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction—Commercial Activity.
This was an interlocutory appeal of a trial court order denying motions to dismiss a breach of contract action brought against a foreign entity. The appeal was dismissed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded.
Kukkiwon is a South Korean organization that promotes the martial art of Taekwondo. It initially existed as a nongovernmental entity, and so constituted, it contracted with plaintiffs U.S. Taekwondo Committee and U.S. Kukkiwon, making plaintiffs its overseas branch in the United States. Shortly after the contract with plaintiffs was formed, the South Korean government passed a law making Kukkiwon a “special corporation,” and giving the South Korean Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism authority over several of Kukkiwon’s activities. Subsequently, Kukkiwon notified plaintiffs that it was unilaterally cancelling the contract, and plaintiffs filed this action for breach.
Plaintiffs contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to determine this appeal because it was interlocutory. An interlocutory appeal from a ruling denying Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) immunity is immediately reviewable as a “final judgment,” pursuant to CRS § 13-4-102(1). Therefore, the Court had appellate jurisdiction to review this issue. On the other hand, it did not have the authority to review a related act of state doctrine ruling, because it did not have pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding that it did not have FSIA immunity. FSIA is a federal statute that provides immunity to any “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state unless, as pertinent here, the claim is based on “commercial activity.” The contract at issue here constituted commercial activity because it made plaintiffs an overseas branch of Kukkiwon and contemplated activity in the United States that could create revenue and profits. Therefore, defendants were not entitled to FSIA immunity. The case was remanded to the trial court for completion of the trial.
The Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in Buchheit v. Green on Tuesday, November 27, 2012.
Mr. Buchheit sued Carol Green, the clerk of the Kansas state appellate courts, and Shawnee County Court Judge Daniel Mitchell, alleging that the Kansas state appellate courts had denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and had refused to docket his state appeals. A magistrate judge granted Mr. Buchheit’s motion to proceed IFP in federal court. Ms. Green objected on the grounds that the magistrate judge failed to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The district court overruled the objection but dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Mr. Buchheit sought retrospective relief against the state that is barred by sovereign immunity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Ms. Green argued in her cross-appeal that the language of the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), requires a magistrate judge to screen cases for merit before granting IFP because the statute states in part that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious.” While the purpose of the IFP statute is to discourage the filing of baseless lawsuits that a paying litigant generally would not file, the court held that the statute does not require IFP cases be screened for merit before the grant of IFP.
The Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in Muscogee (Creek) Nation Division of Housing v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development on Tuesday, October 30, 2012.
The Muscogee (Creek) Nation (the Nation) received block grant funds for affordable housing under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4243. Under regulation 24 C.F.R. § 1000.58, funds invested by the Nation could not be invested for longer than two years. In 2007 and 2009, HUD issued notices regarding requirements for investing the funds and stating that for funds invested longer than two years, any interest accrued after two years must be returned to HUD. Additionally, any invested funds that were not expended on affordable housing activities by the two-year period would have to be returned to the tribe’s Line of Credit Control System account.
After a HUD review of the Nation’s use of program funds, HUD required the Nation to return $1.3 million in interest on funds invested longer than two years. The Nation returned the interest under protest, then filed suit seeking return of the funds and injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the validity of 24 C.F.R. § 1000.58(g) and the interest repayment requirement of the 2007 and 2009 notices. The district court dismissed the case based on HUD’s sovereign immunity and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim.
The Tenth Circuit found that the Administrative Procedures Act did not waive HUD’s sovereign immunity regarding the two-year time limit on investments because “HUD’s authority to approve investment activities is committed to agency discretion as a matter of law.” Thus, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply and dismissal was proper for lack of jurisdiction.
In analyzing the Nation’s claims regarding the 2007 and 2009 notices requiring the return of interest, the court found a 1992 Comptroller General’s decision persuasive. The court held that the notices were interpretive, not substantive, and were consistent with federal law. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims on failure to state a claim grounds.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger on Thursday, October 18, 2012.
Plaintiff-Appellant, the Northern Arapaho Tribe (“Appellant” or “Northern Arapaho”), sued various state and county officials in Wyoming, seeking an injunction against the state’s imposition of certain vehicle and excise taxes in an area that Appellant contends is Indian country. Appellant claimed that the state may not tax its members in Indian country, and that the Indian country status of the land was conclusively established by an earlier decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) after determining that two absent entities—the Eastern Shoshone Tribe (“Eastern Shoshone”) and the United States—were necessary parties who could not feasibly be joined, and in whose absence the action could not proceed. The district court also concluded that the Indian country status of the land had not been conclusively determined by the earlier state litigation. Appellant appeals both determinations.
The Tenth Circuit agreed that the dismissal of the action was proper because the Eastern Shoshone was a necessary party that could not feasibly be joined. The Court explained that the Eastern Shoshone had an interest in the litigation that could be harmed by the proceeding in its absence, and proceeding in the absence of the Easter Shoshone would also place the State of Wyoming at a substantial risk of incurring multiple inconsistent obligations. The Eastern Shoshone was therefore required to be joined under Rule 19(a). The Tenth Circuit also found that the district court correctly held that the Eastern Shoshone is a sovereign and is therefore immune from suit, so therefore could not be feasibly joined.
However, the Court VACATED the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, since the district court’s disposition was not an adjudication on the merits. Finally, the Court also DENIED as moot Appellant’s Rule 27.2(A) motion for summary disposition or remand.

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