Source: http://houston-opinions.com/files/14thCoA-2009-Mattox-v-County-Commissioners-Court-Grimes-County-by-Hedges-cancellation-of-road-dedication-mandamus.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 06:54:53+00:00

Document:
motion for sanctions. We reverse and remand.
of the Local Government Code.
any owner in Hill Forest Manor.
accommodate access to any pending or prospective developments on the Jackson property.
contended that the Jacksons had not sold any part of their property since 1995.
The county argued that Hill Forest Lane was a public road and provided access to other residents.
commissioners voting to deny the application are appellees Betty Shiflett, John Bertling, and Pam Finke.
mandamus with the district court.
infrastructure to the Jackson property and no pending or existing developments on the Jackson property.
cancellation of the 134-foot portion of Hill Forest Lane that encroached upon their property.
sanctions and granting appellees' motion for summary judgment.
their fifth issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for sanctions.
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v.
must be taken as true. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004).
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex.
judgment is proper. See id. (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).
any of the summary judgment grounds are meritorious. Id.
refusal to perform. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. 1991); Sheppard v.
proper case to correct a clear abuse of discretion by a public official." Anderson, 806 S.W.2d at 793.
which would have authorized the public official to take action sought to be enforced upon him. Wortham v.
Walker, 133 Tex. 255, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1151 (1939); Rash v. City Council of City of Houston, 557 S.W.
basis for finding an abuse of discretion. Wortham, 133 Tex. at 279, 128 S.W.2d at 1151.
matter of law that section 232.008(e) applied.
by “the owners of 75 percent of the property included in the subdivision, phase or identifiable part." Tex.
discretionary act under subsection (h).
novo standard. See Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. 2002).
In construing statutory provisions, our objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.
interconnection or (2) interconnection offered for consideration as the interconnecting infrastructure.
or an interconnection offered for consideration as the interconnecting infrastructure.
interconnecting infrastructure between Hill Forest Manor and the Jackson property.
whether cancellation of the last 134 feet of Hill Forest Lane would prevent that proposed interconnection.
of material fact as to whether there is a pending or existing development on the Jackson property.
The evidence submitted for summary judgment does not conclusively prove that subsection (e) applies.
entitled to mandamus relief against appellees. Accordingly, we sustain appellants' fourth issue.
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and section 10.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 10.001.
A trial court's ruling on a motion for sanctions is reviewed under an abuse-of- discretion standard. Cire v.
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Id.
for legal arguments advanced, or (3) a factual allegation or denial lacked evidentiary support. Tex. Civ.
overcoming the presumption of good faith in the filing of pleadings. Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614.
false and misleading statements. However, those beliefs were not supported by sufficient evidence.
appellees knowingly filed pleadings with false or misleading statements or knowingly filed false affidavits.
appellees, which does not warrant sanctions.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Yates and Frost. (Frost, J. dissenting).
 See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 232.008(e).
over county officials and “general supervisory control over the orders of the commissioners court").
petition's allegations with a verified amended answer specifically contesting the allegations set for in the petition.
Accordingly, we find that appellants are not entitled to mandamus on this basis.
subsection (h) on this ground.
party, we need not address the propriety of the affidavits submitted by appellees. See City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.
turned on the complained-of evidence). Accordingly, we overrule issue two.
 Our colleague contends that we should reverse and remand based upon the statutory language of 232.008(b).
under this subsection. See Pat Baker Co. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Hines, 252 S.W.3d 496, 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

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