Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_requests_for_admission/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:47:53+00:00

Document:
Reliance On Expert Retained Opinions Can Demonstrate Reasonable Bases For RFA Denials.
On December 22, 2018, we posted on Orange County Water District v. The Arnold Engineering Co., Case No. D070763 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Dec. 19, 2018; partially published Jan.10, 2018), which was unpublished at the time. The appellate court reversed a hefty costs-of-proof sanctions award for denial of RFAs because expert opinions supported the RFA denials in some instances. We can now report that this aspect of the decision was partially published on January 10, 2018. However, the unpublished decision—relating to inadmissibility of the evidentiary submissions on expert costs—was not published, although it is instructive for practitioners when facing costs-of-proof sanctions as far as what needs to be competently introduced for purposes of obtaining a “sanctions” award in this area.
Lack Of Reporter’s Transcript Sealed The Result.
In Ayoub v. Candee, Case No. D073279 (4th Dist., Div. 1 May 31, 2018) (unpublished), adjoining rural property owners in Temecula got into an “ado” regarding easements. Eventually, the losing parties/appellants were hit with $59,700 in attorney’s fees for making unjustified requests for admission denials under CCP § 2033.420.
The attorney’s fees proof-of-sanctions award was affirmed.
The real problem here was the lack of an adequate record. No reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the award was provided, such that any merits challenged was forfeited. Beyond that, the challenges to specific time entries being causally related seemed to be reasonable to the RFAs subject to the award, again based on the sparse record provided by appellants. Affirmed.
Losing Side Had Reasonable Cause To Deny RFAs And Lack Of Agreement With Fees Clause Precluded 1717 Recovery.
In Preferred Auto Dealers Self Ins. Program, Inc. v. Anderson Enterprises, Inc., Case Nos. A148518 et al. (1st Dist., Div. 4 Mar. 2, 2018) (unpublished), PADSIP (a group self-insurer of workers’ compensation claims) lost a breach of contract claim against various defendant members/private employers in complicated litigation involving group and membership exposure under the workers’ compensation security scheme. Certain members then moved for an award of attorney’s fees under the RFA costs-of-proof sanctions provision (CCP § 2033.420) and under a contractual fees clause theory (Civil Code § 1717). The trial court denied the fee requests, prompting an appeal by several members.
Those determination were upheld on appeal.
With respect to the RFA costs-of-proof sanctions request, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that, although PADSIP’s legal theory of liability was erroneous, it was not unreasonable and based on a plausible interpretation of application regulations. Also, PADSIP was found to hold a good faith belief in the validity of its case. One membership group claimed there were discovery abuses in the case, but the Court of Appeal observed that CCP § 2033.420 in not a penalty or a discovery sanction for misuse of the discovery process, but rather a procedural compensatory mechanism to expedite trial by reducing the number of triable issues that must be adjudicated.
The problem with the Civil Code section 1717 theory was that there was no contract or agreement with a fees provision. Without a contractual predicate, no fees were recoverable.
Plaintiff Did Not Address All of the RFA Costs of Proof Sanctions Requirements, So Post-Trial Motion Denial Affirmed On Appeal.
If you are an appellant on an appeal, you must focus on the trial court’s written and/or tentative decision, concentrating on showing how each basis is legally and prejudicially erroneous. Appellant’s failure to do so in White v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B264675 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 8, 2017) (unpublished) was fatal on appeal.
Plaintiff brought a FEHA/related claims case, losing many claims on a trial judge nonsuit and the remainder after a jury trial. Even in the wake of the loss, plaintiff filed a motion to obtain $239,967 in costs-of-proof sanctions for the defense denial of 16 requests for admissions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420. The trial judge denied it in a detailed decision.
Plaintiff’s appeal was unsuccessful. The primary reason was that appellant only relied on a simplistic theory that the defense denied certain RFA facts which plaintiff proved at trial. This did not work because appellant failed to address responding party’s reasonableness/good faith, the materiality/importance of the RFAs, and requesting party’s proof of causation by only asking for expenses which were tied to RFA-related work. Expense denial affirmed.
Requests For Admissions: Attorney’s Fees Properly Awardable As A Condition To Granting Party Permission To Withdraw Admissions Mistakenly Made.
Issue Was Whether Attorney's Fees Were Costs Under CCP § 2033.300.
The trial court in Rhule v. WaveFront Technology, Inc., Case No. B267359 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Feb. 23, 2017) (published) permitted plaintiff to withdraw admissions he mistakenly made to two defense requests for admissions, especially since the withdrawal was done after plaintiff was deposed (meaning that further questioning would be necessitated given the RFA admission withdrawals). Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.330 provides that a trial court can allow such withdrawal but "may impose conditions on the granting of the motion that are just, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) An order that the party who obtained the admission be permitted to pursue additional discovery related to the matter involved in the withdrawn or amended admission. (2) An order that the costs of any additional discovery be borne in whole or in party by the party withdrawing or amending the admission." The trial judge accordingly ordered that plaintiff pay the defense $8,125 in attorney's fees (out of a requested $10,000), likely for the fees to be incurred in retaking plaintiff's deposition and fees on fees to file the motion to obtain fees under section 2033.330.
Plaintiff's appeal was unsuccessful. Although the lack of a reporter's transcript hampered review (a subject we will post on soon in a special post), the 2/5 DCA determined that "costs" under section 2033.330 did encompass attorney's fees. Beyond that, the omnibus "just" and "not limited to" language in the statutory provision also made imposition of attorney's fees a reasonable "additional" condition of relief.
Under our sidebar category “Requests for Admission” we have posted some five dozen times about published, as well as unpublished, appellate decisions affirming or denying a trial court’s grant or denial of cost-of-proof sanctions for failure to admit requests for admission. After doing this for eight years, we can now make a general observation: appellate courts more often affirm denials and reverse grants than they affirm grants and reverse denials of cost-of-proof sanctions. True, parties denying RFAs do sometimes get hit with costs-of-proof, and the award can be significant indeed. However, in our posts, nearly twice as many appellate cases affirm denials or reverse grants as compared to cases that affirm grants or reverse denials of cost-of-proof sanctions.
“(1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290. [Motion for compelling further responses].
(2) The admission was of no substantial importance.
(3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter.
(4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.” Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., section 2033.420(b).
A demurrer was granted so no costs-of-proof were involved.
A matter was stipulated to so no costs-of-proof were involved.
A matter was denied, but later admitted – for example in a deposition – so no costs-of-proof were involved.
The request for admission was propounded before there was a reasonable opportunity to do discovery, so that there was a reasonable basis for denying the request.
The denials were not unequivocal, and the propounding party failed to follow up with a motion.
The request for fees targeted an attorney, but only a party is liable for costs-of-proof.
Form interrogatory responses [17.1] did a reasonably good job of explaining the basis for a denial.
The party failed to establish true costs-of-proof by failing to allocate attorney time to the actual matter that was proved at trial.
Costs-of-proof were denied by the trial court, and the record on appeal was too deficient to mount a challenge to the denial.
A preemptive federal statute limited remedies that a party could recover.
However, RFA Costs Of Proof Sanctions For Plaintiff Were Reversed.
In Watkins v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., Case No. A145579 (1st Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 26, 2016) (unpublished), plaintiff won a $3,217.50 judgment against defendant based on a meal break claim, but lost nine other unrelated claims based primarily on discrimination. The lower court awarded plaintiff $41,300.28 in routine costs as well as $31,596 in costs-of-proof sanctions for allegedly improperly denying a request for admission later proven at trial.
This one was a “split” verdict on appeal, with the appellate court affirming the routine costs award but reversing the costs-of-proof sanctions award.
With respect to the routine costs award, plaintiff did receive a net monetary recovery, with Michell v. Olick, 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1199-1201 (1996) being “on all fours” because it recognized that prevailing on one claim with a net recovery could still entitle a plaintiff to costs even if the defense obtained dismissal of other claims where the successful claims was unrelated to the other dismissed claims. In reaching this result, the appellate court found that the reasoning of Sears v. Baccaglio, 60 Cal.App.4th 1136 (1998)—which held that an award of costs in these situations was “discretionary” rather than mandatory in nature—did not compel reversal because at least one other appellate court had disagreed with Sears on this point (see David S. Karton, A Law Corp. v. Dougherty, 231 Cal.App.4th 600, 613 (2014)) and the lower court’s decision was no abuse of discretion even under the Sears test. Defendant also argued that it was the successful party based on obtaining a dismissal of other claims, but the reviewing court found that this likely only relates to dismissal of an entire action (Brown v. Desert Christian Center, 193 Cal.App.4th 733, 738 (2011)) and was at odds with the result reached in Michell.
That brought the appellate court to the RFA costs-of-proof sanctions award. The award was found to be an abuse of discretion given that the defense fell within an exception—it had a good faith basis to deny the RFA. The defense did a good job of opposing the RFA sanctions motion below by showing it made an inquiry of an individual before making the RFA denial, which the appellate court found to be a credible basis for denying the RFA.
$2,890 In Costs Of Proof Sanctions Affirmed On Appeal.
We have blogged quite a bit on costs of proof sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, with cases collected on our home page under the category “Requests For Admission.” Most involve situations where facts were proved contrary to RFA denials at an actual trial.
However, we would refer our readers to Nicolosi Distributing, Inc. v. Annex Santa Clara, Inc., Case No. A144736 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Oct. 13, 2016) (unpublished) for an unpublished decision which applied costs of proof sanctions in a summary judgment context—one we have not seen before. There, in an automotive parts distribution dispute, a defendant won summary judgment against suing plaintiff, garnering $2,890 in costs of proof sanctions based on two unjustified denials of two material facts. Defendant did prove these facts as a matter of law in a summary judgment proceeding, with both the trial and appellate courts finding that this “paperless trial” context did not make any difference. Makes sense, given that a summary judgment is the equivalent of a trial and section 2033.420 does not limit costs of proof sanctions to just trial situations.
Remanded On Costs-Of-Proof Award; Expert Witness Fee Award Affirmed Based On Inadequate Appellate Record.
In Roldan v. Flores, Case No. B260336 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Oct. 5, 2016) (unpublished), a lower court awarded costs-of-proof sanctions in the amount of $48,000 for defendant’s failure to admit certain RFAs in a plaintiff motorized bicyclist-defendant car accident case, even though plaintiff recovered only $12,950 in damages. Also, the lower court awarded about $20,000 in expert witness fees to plaintiff after the defense failed to accept a 998 offer for $15,000. Defendant appealed.
Defendant won a remand on the costs-of-proof issue but lost the challenge to the expert fee award (challenging the denial of the defense motion to tax costs).
The costs-of-proof sanctions award was reversed because (1) some RFAs involved facts which the defense stipulated before trial such that no proof had to be introduced, (2) some RFA facts were never proven by plaintiff at trial, and (3) some of the RFA requests were not that important, such as to admit damages for very small levels when it was clear plaintiff would seek substantially higher damages at trial (which occurred). However, other RFA denials were found to give rise to C-O-P sanctions, such that a remand was necessary to award dollars only on the RFAs for which sanctions were justified.
Although defendant might have had some traction on the expert witness fees issue, her problem was failure to provide a reporter’s transcript of the motion to tax costs and failure to provide the order actually awarding the $20,000 in expert witness fees—despite the appellate court sending a request for these documents under penalty of waiver. No further documents were filed, such that a waiver was the determination which occurred!
RFA Denial Still In Bad Faith Where Total Delta On Invoices Asked To Be Admitted Was Less Than $6,000, And No Precise Amount Was Requested.
More and more, we are starting to see an increased reliance by litigators on “costs-of-proof” sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, especially where there is no contractual or statutory fee entitlement basis for a fee award, as an independent ground to recover fees. If you have the facts, not a bad idea.
That strategy worked in a somewhat convoluted UCC dispute, Hebberd-Kulow Enterprises, Inc. v. Kelomar, Inc., Case No. D066505 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 27, 2016) (unpublished).
There, plaintiff finally prevailed in a UCC goods battle, winning “net” compensatory damages of $412,023.05. However, plaintiff thought the defense denials of certain RFAs were in bad faith, so they sought costs-of-proof sanctions and were awarded them to the tune of $74,725.25.
Those RFA “sanctions” held up on appeal.
The defense principally argued that the denied RFAs were not proven as specified or were not significant in the overall case—arguments rejected because the lower court carefully showed why the RFA sanctions were justified. The RFAs did not ask for exact damages, but were within the range for which admissions were appropriate; however, the $6,000 delta difference in ultimate damages did give an inference that the denials were in bad faith. The denials did involve invoices at the center of the case, so the insignificant RFA denial did not go very far. Because it was impossible to apportion time between the RFA denials at issue, the appellate court applied attorney’s fees “inextricably intertwined” principles so as to sustain the $74,725.25 costs-of-proof award—the denials could not be apportioned given the gestalt of the overall discovery RFA responses.
Plaintiff’s Failure To Provide Accounting Precluded Costs Of Proof Sanctions.
Marie Jansen smoking and holding umbrella in beach scene. c1893. Library of Congress.
In re Tobacco Cases II, Case No. D065165 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Sept. 28, 2015) (published) is the likely denouement to a false advertising case against a large tobacco manufacturer involving Marlboro Lights. In the end, the trial court found plaintiffs had no competent evidence of loss, although proving liability, because most smokers said they got reasonable value for their smokes.
The trial judge awarded defendant $764,552.73 in routine costs, but denied CCP § 2033.420 costs-of-proof sanctions to plaintiff. Both determinations were affirmed on appeal. Defendant fell within 2 of the 4 prevailing party constructs of CCP § 1032, so that sufficed. With respect to denial of costs-of-proof sanctions, plaintiffs failed to provide an accounting, showing what fees/costs related to the denied RFAs—fatal at both the trial and appellate levels.
4/3 Unpublished Decision Certified For Publication.
On August 18, 2015, we posted on Grace v. Mansourian, a Fourth District, Division 3 unpublished decision which reversed the wholesale denial of RFA “costs-of-proof” sanctions in a case where certain denials in a personal injury case by the defense were found to be unreasonable on appeal. We now update readers to indicate that the decision, authored by Justice Thompson, was certified for publication on September 15, 2015.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) Analog “Costs of Proof” Sanctions At Issue.
The district judge in an antitrust claim brought by Magnetar Technologies Corp. against Intamin, Ltd. and European affiliates denied a Rule 37(c)(2) request for fees/costs after granting summary judgment because Magnetar did not submit sufficient evidence of a causal antitrust injury. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in Magnetar Technologies Corp. v. Intamin, Ltd., Nos. 13-56119/13-56333 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015) (published). It, too, found that there were potentially valid arguments which could have been made on both sides of the issue as to the sufficiency of evidence introduced to establish causal antitrust injury such that the failure to admit RFAs was not unreasonable in nature.
Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Rule On Matter Post-Trial During Appeal Pendency.
Plaintiff/cross-defendant prevailed in a bitterly contested real estate dispute after a jury trial as against defendant/cross-complainant. Then, after defendant/cross-complainant denied five key RFAs requiring plaintiff/cross-defendant to prove otherwise at trial, the lower court awarded prevailing plaintiff/cross-defendant RFA “cost-of-proof” sanctions in the amounts of $287,040 (attorney’s fees) and $7,448.05 (expert fees/costs) under CCP § 2033.420(b)(3).
The RFA sanctions held up on appeal in Farhoomand v. Caine, Case No. D064302 (4th Dist., Div. 1 June 25, 2015) (unpublished).
The denied RFAs were of substantial importance, such that cost-of-proof sanctions were in order. The lower court had jurisdiction, post-trial, to rule on the sanctions request given that the proceeding was ancillary or collateral to the appeal. (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal.4th 180, 190-191 (2005).) Losing plaintiff also ignored a “vast amount of evidence,” including her own handwritten documents, which contradicted her claims and affected her credibility with respect to the RFA subject matters. No abuse of discretion in affirming the large award, under the circumstances.
Costs Request Was Not Timely Served, Such That $13,512.81 Went To Governmental Entity On Appeal—With Rest Of The Results Sustained.
Downey Real Estate Holding, LLC v. L.A. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Case Nos. B244647/B247931 (2d Dist., Div. 3 June 9, 2015) (unpublished) is a situation where an inverse condemnation plaintiff suffered a dismissal of its inverse condemnation/nuisance claims as against MTA. MTA then moved for $85,528 in RFA cost-of-proof sanctions for plaintiff’s denial of 14 RFAs and also moved for $13,512.81 in routine costs. The trial court denied both the RFA sanctions and routine costs requests.
The appellate court largely affirmed, finding the merits dismissal and RFA cost-of-proof sanctions denial to have been properly decided. After all, MTA did not pinpoint its expenses so as allocate expenses as required under CCP § 2033.420 and also failed to show why the denials went to issues of substantial importance so as to give rise to expense shifting.
On the routine costs, the appellate court found that the longer 180 day filing period was at issue such that the entire $13,512.81 in costs should have been awarded, with the lower court concluding the request was untimely in nature. So, in the end, a lot of fees and resources were expended, with MTA garnering $13,512.81 in routine costs.
RFA “Sanctions” Are Not True Sanctions, But More Akin To Damages Or Attorney’s Fees Precluded By Federal Statute.
City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC, Case No. B249094 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Mar. 18, 2015) (published) is an interesting case showing how costs-of-proof sanctions relating to California request for admissions are not true “sanctions” in the discovery sense of the word, with this distinction being vital in a case where a preemptive federal statute limited the remedies which could be entered against a local cable franchising authority.
In this one, the trial judge entered CCP § 2033.420 costs-of-proof sanctions against Glendale (the governmental franchising authority) in a suit brought by Charter, Glendale’s cable provider, about whether Charter could realign Glendale’s public, educational and government channels without Glendale’s consent. Eventually, Charter won costs-of-proof sanctions relating to certain RFA items. However, this was reversed on appeal because the appellate court determined that a federal statute—47 U.S.C. § 555a(a), part of the Cable Communications Policy Act—“preempted” any ability to impose costs-of-proof sanctions given a remedy limitations restricting remedies to injunctive or declaratory relief. The 2/5 DCA panel determined that RFA costs-of-proof sanctions were not true “sanctions” (after all they are made after trial and in connection with activities to eliminate the need for proof, not like other discovery efforts which are aimed at obtaining proof), but more akin to damages or attorney’s fees precluded under the federal limiting statute.
Unless Truly Conflicting Proof Presented To Justify Denials, Then Costs Of Proof Sanctions In Play Where Nothing Supporting Certain Blanket Denials.
Usually, the abuse of discretion standard is difficult to surmount. However, where the proof only admits of one reasonable conclusion, don’t be surprised by some reversals depending upon the circumstances, as Crowe v. Tweten, Case No. E058311 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Dec. 29, 2014) (unpublished) demonstrates.
This case involved testamentary capacity, forgery, and related activities in connection with the validity of an amendment to a trust executed by trustors (husband and wife)—although the dispute focused on the capacity and signature of wife. Four RFAs were propounded by husband trustor (and beneficiary) Leonard, drawing boilerplate objections from the objecting children and one further word--“Denied.” Leonard prevailed after a bench trial, with Leonard then filing a motion seeking $1.5 million in fees as “costs of proof” sanctions for the RFA denials he claimed were material and unjustified. The lower court denied the costs of proof motion in entirety.
On appeal, the reviewing court found that the denials in three out of four instances constituted an abuse of discretion, while the forgery RFA costs of proof sanctions denial was proper.
Without getting into excruciating detail, the appellate court reviewed the opposition costs of sanction proof and simply found it was not credible with respect to denying three of the four RFAs. For example, wife’s intent to pass her assets to Leonard for his death was consistent throughout the evidence, such that the denial was baseless.
However, on the forgery RFA, the opposing children had a belief they might prevail because mother’s signature was not notarized and several handwriting experts expressed skepticism or an opinion that the signature was not mother’s.
Party Losing Party Could Not Prove Joint Tortfeasor Status in Indemnity Action.
In Zoura v. Burns and Sons Trucking, Inc., Case No. D063469 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 17, 2014) (unpublished), plaintiffs suffered a summary judgment in an indemnity action against defendant, with defendant also awarded “costs of proof” sanctions award under CCP § 2033.420, which allows a lower court to award attorney’s fees and costs for improper denial or objections to requests for admissions propounded by a party where certain elements are met and the other side indeed proves facts in derogation of the RFAs to the contrary.
Here, the appellate court affirmed under the abuse of discretion standard. The record demonstrated that plaintiffs had no reasonable grounds to believe the evidence would establish an indemnity claim against the defense, because defendant was not a joint tortfeasor. That justified affirmance of the “costs of proof” sanctions award.
Requests for Admission Costs Of Proof Sanctions Properly Included Expert Expenses.
In Amin’s Oil, Inc. v. Indrogit Biswas, Case No. B242081 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Aug. 5, 2014) (unpublished), plaintiff employer sued defendant for embezzlement/conversion, with defendant ex-employee suing for unpaid overtime wages. Employee prevailed, eventually awarded $16,215 in wages and penalties. Then, employee obtained $68,450 in attorney’s fees under Labor Code section 1194(a) for prevailing on the wage/hour cross-complaint (out of a requested $71,279.6, asking for a 50/50 allocation of time to the cross-complaint) as well as $60,700 in attorney’s fees (out of a requested $71,061.60) and $6,349 in expenses (out of a requested $12,735) under CCP § 2033.420 for the employer not admitting RFAs regarding employee’s failure to convert certain of employer’s property. Other routine costs of $24,637.32 were also awarded to employee.
Employer’s appeal did not go well.
The wage/hour fee award on employee’s cross-complaint was justified given that employee’s overtime claims were critical to his defense that he worked sufficient hours in regard to certain of employer’s claims. Employee did obtain over $16,000 in a favorable judgment, avoiding hundreds of thousands of exposure, so attorney’s fees under the Labor Code did not constitute any legal error.
On the RFA costs of proof sanctions, substantial evidence showed that employer was not justified in denying certain RFAs on conversion when the proof showed that employee was directed to misrepresent finances in order to inflate employer’s business value for a potential sale. Appellant argued that plaintiff was not entitled to recover defense expert witness fees as costs-of-proof sanctions, but the appellate court disagreed because they were indeed “reasonable expenses” under section 2033.420.
BLOG POINTER—Defendant/cross-complainant employee did a smart thing in allocating fees 50/50 as to the overtime cross-claim, with the lower court buying into it.
RFA Denial Was on Legal Accuracy of Survey, And On A Non-Key Issue.
Litigants in Bloxham v. Saldinger, Case No. H038040 (6th Dist. Aug. 1, 2014) (published) were involved in a common boundary line dispute, involving surveys going back as far as 1858, as well as consideration of such arcane doctrines as obliterated corners—something only real estate litigators could love.
The prevailing party then sought recovery of $123,196.58 in costs of proof sanctions for the losing party’s failure to admit one RFA, but the lower court denied the request.
The appellate court affirmed. Under CCP § 2033.420(a), (b), the RFA denial had to be in bad faith, directed to a substantial issue, and one which readily could be denied based on percipient or even expert knowledge available to the denying party. In this case, the RFA was not done in bad faith (the losing party toured the property and had basis to deny), was directed to an insubstantial issue (a grant deed description which was not the critical line location dispute), and could not be readily answered based on divergent information (each side having differing views on the issue).
Finally, although not really articulated, we believe the appellate court did not necessarily believe that all of the requested costs of proof were actually incurred on this one RFA denial as opposed to litigating other variant issues in the case—with fees and expenses being claimed in excess to what was involved on the one denied RFA.
Lower Court Reasonably Exercised Discretion on Costs-of-Proof Sanctions Request and Correctly Found $100,000 998 Offer Was Reasonable.
In Harman v. Safeway, Inc., Case No. A134891 (1st Dist., Div. 2 June 17, 2014) (unpublished), plaintiff won a $5,060 personal injury jury verdict against Safeway after he was hit by a runaway grocery cart. Before the verdict, the lower court had allowed the defense to withdraw some request for admissions. After the verdict, it denied plaintiff’s request for costs-of-proof sanctions of $51,269.20 for the defense’s denial of certain liability and causation admission requests. The trial judge also granted the defense motion to recoup costs based on plaintiff’s rejection of a $100,000 CCP § 998 offer, awarding $35,092.50 in a net judgment to the defense (i.e., $40,152.50 gross costs minus the $5,060 verdict in plaintiff’s favor).
Plaintiff’s appeal of the costs-of-proof sanctions denial and 998 costs award did not garner any changes in the lower court’s rulings.
The costs-of-proof sanction request order relating to denied RFAs is reviewed under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. On the record before it, the appellate court saw no error because the contested RFAs mainly went to comparative fault, which was a heavily contested issue at trial. Beyond that, plaintiff was too greedy by asking for all expert costs reimbursement, even though he would have had to present this proof anyway.
That left the reviewing court to pass on the reasonableness of Safeway’s $100,000 998 offer, which settlement amount was offered again by Safeway at a mandatory settlement conference. This did not seem to be a problem given that Safeway had heavily contested causation also and plaintiff gambled in trying to beat a reasonable offer based on the discovery/investigation in the case at the time of the offer.

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