Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83756:58151&catid=1588&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:12:32+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014 - SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners, v. RAMON ONG, Respondent.
SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners, v. RAMON ONG, Respondent.
This resolves a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that the June 28, 2012 decision2 and the December 19, 2012 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119270 be reversed and set aside.
As mentioned, the assailed June 28, 2012 decision of the Court of Appeals dismissed the Spouses Manuel's Rule 65 petition for lack of merit. The assailed December 19, 2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Spouses Manuel may be granted relief from the Regional Trial Court's June 28, 2010 order of default.
As a preliminary matter, we rule on whether jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel, as defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582, was validly acquired. This preliminary matter is determinative of whether the fifteen-day period within which they must file their answer started to run, thereby facilitating the context in which they could have validly been declared to be in default.
We hold that jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582 — the Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel — was validly acquired. This is so because personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales on March 16, 2010.
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
In this case, the sheriffs return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on the first occasion in deference to the medical condition of petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother. On the second occasion, he was constrained to tender the summons and copy of the complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept them.
The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the sheriffs return but claimed that no valid service of summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service of summons, was made. From this, they surmised that the "Sandra Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriffs return was someone other than petitioner Sandra Manuel.
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant's address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
A sheriffs return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff. In this case, the Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-serving) claim of maintaining residence elsewhere but failed to even allege that there was anything irregular about the sheriffs return or that it was otherwise incomplete.
Having alleged irregularities in the service of summons, it was incumbent upon the Spouses Manuel to adduce proof of their claims. All they mustered was their self-serving allegation of an alternative address. If at all, this claim of maintaining residence elsewhere should not even be lent an iota of credibility considering that, as respondent Ramon Ong pointed out, the barangay clearances, which the Spouses Manuel themselves attached to one of their pleadings (as proof of their identities), actually indicated that they were residents of Bacong Loacan, Itogon, Benguet.25cralawred Their lie is, thus, revealed by their own pleading.
As the Spouses Manuel not only failed in discharging the burden of proving their allegation but even succeeded in contradicting themselves, Sheriff Joselito Sales' recollection of events must be taken to be true. Thus, valid personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made. From this, it follows that jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners Benedict and Sandra Manuel was acquired by the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582.
As valid service of summons was made on them, it was incumbent upon the Spouses Manuel, pursuant to Rule 11, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,26 to file their answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2011. Having failed to do so, they were rightly declared to be in default.
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
Pursuant to Rule 9, Section 3, a court may proceed to render judgment as the pleading may warrant should a defendant fail to timely file his or her answer. However, a court may decline from immediately rendering judgment and instead require the plaintiff to present evidence. Per Rule 9, Section 3(a), a party declared to be in default shall nevertheless be "entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings," although he or she may no longer take part in the trial.
All these requisites were complied with by respondent Ramon Ong.
It is not disputed that Ong filed a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. It is also not disputed that the latter filed their answer after the fifteen-day period, counted from March 16, 2010, had lapsed. The Spouses Manuel only filed their answer along with their motion to lift order of default on September 13, 2010.
It is similarly settled that the Spouses Manuel were notified that a motion to declare them in default had been filed. They acknowledged in the present petition for certiorari that on June 23, 2010, Ong filed a compliance to the Regional Trial Court's April 30, 2010 order that required the submission of the registry return card evidencing the mailing to the Spouses Manuel of a copy of the motion to have them declared in default.
Not only were the requisites for declaring a party in default satisfied, the Spouses Manuel's motion to lift order of default was also shown to be procedurally infirm.
The heed for an affidavit of merit is consistent with Rule 8, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,32 which requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity."
In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel's motion to lift order of default was not made under oath. We add that this motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit specifying the facts which would show that their non-filing of an answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2010 was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel's motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of consideration.
However, in this case, the Spouses Manuel failed not only in attaching an affidavit of merit but also in making their motion under oath. They are, therefore, left without any alternative on which to rest. Their motion is utterly ineffectual.
Apart from their failure to make their motion to lift order of default under oath and to attach to it an affidavit of merit, the Court of Appeals also noted that the Spouses Manuel set their motion to lift order of default for hearing on the same date that they filed it (i.e., September 13, 2010). Thus, they also violated Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,38 which requires that service of a motion upon an adverse party must be made in such a manner that ensures receipt by the latter "at least three (3) days before the date of hearing. . . ."
Moreover, this liberality must be tempered with a recognition that, in the first place, it is. a defendant who is at fault in failing to timely file an answer.
Rule 9, Section 3(b) gives an exclusive list of only four (4) grounds that allow for relief from orders of default. Moreover, these grounds — extrinsic fraud, accident, mistake, and excusable negligence — relate to factors that are extraneous to a defendant, that is, grounds that show that a defendant was prevented, by reasons beyond his or her influence, from timely filing an answer.
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
Rule 17, Section 3 is qualified by the phrase "for no justifiable cause." Thus, in cases covered by Rule 17, Section 3, should the failure to comply with court processes be the result of the plaintiffs own fault, it is but logical that a plaintiff must suffer the consequences of his own heedlessness. Rule 9, Section 3 — on default — applies the same logic to a culpable defendant.
In this case, the Spouses Manuel only have themselves to blame in not properly receiving the summons and copy of the complaint served on them. It has been shown that their claim that service of summons was made on persons other than them deserves no credence. Quite the contrary, it is quite apparent that Sheriff Joselito Sales not only explained the contents of the summons and the complaint but actually told them that they must file their answer in fifteen (15) days. It was petitioner Sandra Manuel who refused to sign and receive the summons and the complaint. This is evidently an act of obstinate refusal to submit to and to comply with court processes. Thus, the r Spouses Manuel are not deserving of any leniency.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The June 28, 2012 decision and the December 19, 2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119270 are AFFIRMED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.
* Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1844 dated October 14, 2014.
4 Id. at 49 and 59.
9 Id. at 7 and 55.
15 Id. at 51 and 81.
17 Id. at 12, 51-52.
20 Id. at 49 and 53.
SEC. 1. Answer to the complaint. — The defendant shall file his answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
29Agravante v. Patriarca, 262 Phil. 127, 133 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
SEC. 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — In all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.
33 244 Phil. 49 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
34 Id. at 56. .
37Tanhu v. Judge Ramolete, 160 Phil. 1101,1115 (1975) [Per J. Barredo, Second Division].
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
39Acance v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 676, 689 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr, Second Division]; Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, 244 Phil. 49, 58 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
[A] defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiffs cause is, of course, presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint.
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.
42Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Ortiz, 234 Phil. 376, 385-386 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
SEC. 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
45 493 Phil. 676 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
46 Id. at 689-, citing Samartino v. Raon, 433 Phil. 173, 187 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

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