Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/306/153.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 11:14:47+00:00

Document:
[306 U.S. 153, 154] Messrs. John S. Burchmore and Nuel D. Belnap, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.
Messrs. Edward M. Reidy, of Washington, D.C., and J. R. Barse, of Chicago, Ill., for appellees the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Appellant concedes the correctness of the District Court's decree holding the Commission's order valid, dismissing the petition and denying a permanent injunc- [306 U.S. 153, 156] tion. 3 The appeal only seeks a review of the Court's action in ordering that the unlawful allowances accumulated after the date of the interlocutory injunction be retained by the Railroad and not paid to appellant.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has primary jurisdiction to determine whether the granting of allowances for services performed by shippers constitutes a discriminatory practice. 9 Here, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, the Commission considered the technical questions involved and made findings that the Railroad's practice was unlawfully preferential and discriminatory. In doing so, the Commission was acting in the interest of shippers generally and in behalf of the public and the national railroad system. The District Court, at the behest of this appellant, restrained the enforcement of the Commission's report and order embodying these findings. While thus acting in the interest of [306 U.S. 153, 158] a single shipper, the Court properly took steps to protect the other interests-represented by the Commission-from injuries that the injunction might cause. It did so by ordering the payments, which the Commission had found unlawful, to be continued-on condition that they be segregated or paid into a separate account, pending the Court's review of the Commission's finding of illegality. This segregated account thus accrued as a result of judicial restraint of administrative proceedings in which the payments had been declared unlawful. When the Court finally determined that the administrative findings and order were correct, appellant could claim an interest in the fund only by asserting a right to payments forbidden by law, and it became the duty of the Court promptly to allocate the fund to its lawful owner.
An Equity Court having lawful control of a fund, in which there may be interests represented only by a duly authorized governmental agency, has the power and is charged with the duty of protecting those interests in disposing of the fund. 10 Otherwise, rights (such as the right of this Railroad to restitution) might be impaired or cut off while an interlocutory injunction is in effect, as for instance by statutes of limitation. Here, the Court had the power and it was its duty so to fashion its equitable decree that appellant should not be the beneficiary of unlawful payments, and to prevent the dissipation of the Railroad's assets through unlawful preferences.
Third. The appellant takes the position that the Commission's purported postponement of its command to cease and desist (eighteen months after the interlocutory [306 U.S. 153, 160] injunction was granted) deprived the Court of authority to enforce the conditions of its interlocutory injunction. However, since the Court had exercised jurisdiction to review and suspend the Commission's report and order, the administrative body was without power to act inconsistently with the Court's jurisdiction, had it attempted to do so.13 But, since the Commission had already been enjoined from enforcing its report and order when it entered its postponement, there is no reason to construe the Commission's action as anything more than a recognition of the postponement actually effected by the Court's interlocutory injunction.
The Commission had exercised its primary jurisdiction and had found the allowances unlawful; upon review, the District Court properly approved this finding; the [306 U.S. 153, 161] amount in the special allowance account was exactly known and undisputed; this fund could have belonged only to the Railroad or to appellant; the Railroad was in possession of the fund and in equity and good conscience was entitled to retain it. Therefore, there was no necessity to take evidence, and the action of the District Court in disposing of the fund required no additional findings. The final decree of the District Court properly directed that the unlawful allowances should not be paid to appellant, and should be retained by the Railroad.
[ Footnote 1 ] 209 I.C.C. 747; 216 I.C.C. 8 (No. 228).
[ Footnote 2 ] 'Spotting' involves handling of cars between the point of interchange between the Railroad and appellant and the points at which such cars are unloaded or loaded in appellant's plant.
[ Footnote 3 ] See, United States v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 301 U.S. 402 , 57 S.Ct. 804; United States of America et al. v. Pan- American Petroleum Corp., 304 U.S. 156 , 58 S.Ct. 771.
[ Footnote 4 ] 28 U.S.C. 46, 28 U.S.C.A. 46.
[ Footnote 5 ] Cf., Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 364 , 59 S.Ct. 301.
[ Footnote 6 ] Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433 , 438; Meyers v. Block, 120 U.S. 206, 214 , 7 S.Ct. 525, 529.
[ Footnote 7 ] Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm., 290 U.S. 264, 271 , 54 S.Ct. 154, 157.
[ Footnote 8 ] Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Railway Co., 249 U.S. 134, 146 , 39 S.Ct. 237, 242; Smith v. Interstate Com. Comm., 245 U.S. 33, 42 , 43 S., 45, 38 S.Ct. 30, 32; cf., Ex parte Lincoln Gas & Electric Co., 256 U.S. 512, 517 , 41 S.Ct. 558, 560; 49 U.S. C. 15a, 43, 49 U.S.C.A. 15a, 43.
[ Footnote 9 ] Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., 230 U.S. 247 , 33 S.Ct. 916; St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Brownsville Nav. Dist., 304 U.S. 295 , 58 S.Ct. 868; Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 , 27 S.Ct. 350, 9 Ann.Cas. 1075.
[ Footnote 10 ] Central Kentucky Co. v. Railroad Comm., supra.
[ Footnote 11 ] 49 U.S.C. 6(7), 49 U.S.C.A. 6(7).
[ Footnote 12 ] Cf., Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 501, 511 , 51 S.Ct. 505, 509.
[ Footnote 13 ] Cf., Ford Motor Co. v. Nat. Labor Relations Board, supra. It is, therefore, immaterial that in No. 228 there were consecutive purported postponements of the command to cease and desist, each entered by the Commission before the expiration of the postponement immediately preceding.
[ Footnote 14 ] Cf. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 297 U.S. 500, 507 , 508 S., 56 S.Ct. 546, 548. A suit at law based on a past alleged discriminatory practice may be stayed in order to permit the plaintiff to obtain the necessary preliminary ruling by the Commission. See Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Penna. R. Co., 230 U.S. 304 , 33 S.Ct. 938; Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., supra; Southern Ry. Co. v. Tift, 206 U.S. 428 , 27 S.Ct. 709, 11 Ann.Cas. 846.

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