Source: https://www.dos.ny.gov/cnsl/lu15.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 01:58:58+00:00

Document:
Can Local Boards Regulate the Hours of Operation of a Business?
Municipal officials often ask whether, and by what means, a municipality can regulate the hours of operation of a business. The answer to this seemingly easy question is quite complicated.
The question, then, is whether the hours of operation of a business is a component of its “internal operation”. If it is, then it’s not within the reach of a municipality’s zoning power.
New York courts have struck down conditions imposed by planning and zoning boards that regulate the hours of operation of a business as an attempt to regulate its internal operations or details, unless there appeared to be substantial evidence relating the hours of the business’s operation to its impact on the surrounding neighborhood.
these conditions were outside the scope of the permit application, and therefore, unlawful.
As distinguished from zoning, the courts have not prohibited municipalities from regulating the hours of operation of a business through the use of its general police powers. There is no requirement that such regulations relate to the physical use of the land, nor is there a prohibition against the regulation of the internal operations of a business.
The courts have held that without showing a direct impact on the land, regulating the hours of operation of a business is not a proper purpose of zoning, but rather an improper attempt to regulate the internal operations of a business. While municipalities are restricted in their ability to regulate using their zoning powers, there does not appear to be a similar restriction on enacting legislation for non-zoning purposes.
1 See St. Onge v. Donovan, 71 N.Y.2d 507, 515, 527 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1988), citing Matter of Dexter v. Town Board, 36 N.Y.2d 102, 105, 365 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1975), which held that conditions imposed by local zoning boards must be reasonable and relate only to the land at issue and not to the person who owns or occupies the land. See also Province of Meribah Society of Mary Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Inc. Vil. Muttontown, 148 A.D.2d 512, 538 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dept., 1989); Rathkopf, A.H., Rathkopf, D.A. & Ziegler, E.H., Jr., The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 2:14 (rev. 2005), explaining that the authority under the zoning enabling statutes to impose restrictions or conditions must relate to the “objects and purposes of the enabling legislation”; Salkin, P.E., New York Zoning Law and Practice §§ 29:42 & 30:05 (4th ed., 2002).
3	See St. Onge v. Donovan, supra.
4	See Rathkopf, supra, note 1 at §§ 2:14 & 60:18, explaining that zoning restrictions and conditions relating to the use of land, such as landscaping, traffic access and open space, are proper objectives and purposes of regulation authorized and delegated by the zoning enabling statutes.
5	18 A.D.2d 940, 238 N.Y.S.2d 433 (2d Dept., 1963).
6 Id. at 941, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 434-35; Rathkopf, supra, note 1 at § 60:18, explaining that several court decisions have held that the zoning enabling authority extends to the regulation of the use of land and that zoning which controls the details of an owner’s operation is tantamount to an ultra vires act, beyond the statutory authority delegated.
7	82 A.D.2d 442, 442 N.Y.S.2d 73 (2d Dept., 1981).
9 Id., at 467, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 77, stating that there is strong public policy against a municipality imposing conditions on the details of the operation of the educational process. The court held that it is improper and beyond the powers conferred upon a municipality to impose such conditions.
10 Id. at 473, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
11	160 A.D.2d 805, 553 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dept., 1990).
12 Id. at 805, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
14 Id., stating that “there was no showing that the proposed use would have a greater impact on traffic than other uses which are unconditionally permitted in the area”.
15	N.Y. Law Journal, June 3, 1994, at 31, col 3 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County), aff'd 194 A.D.2d 607, 599 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2d Dept., 1993).
18.	See Old Country Burgers Corp., Inc. v. Town Board of Town of Oyster Bay, 160 A.D.2d 805, 805, 553 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (2d Dept., 1990); Schlosser v. Michaelis, 18 A.D.2d 940, 238 N.Y.S.2d 433 (2d Dept., 1963); Summit School v. Neugent, 82 A.D.2d 463, 442 N.Y.S.2d 73 (2d Dept., 1981); Louhal Properties, Inc. v. Strada, 191 Misc.2d 746, 743 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County, 2002) , aff’d 307 A.D.2d 1029, 763 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dept., 2003), explaining that a trend has been created where petitioners were unable to or did not provide the court with substantial evidence demonstrating that the conditions related to the use of land and not to the manner of operation of the owner’s business.
19	Old Country Burgers Corp., Inc. v. Tn. Bd. of Tn. of Oyster Bay, supra, at 805, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (citing Province of Meribah Society of Mary v. Village of Muttontown, 148 A.D.2d 512, 538 N.Y.S.2d 85); Summit School v. Neugent, supra, finding that the power to grant conditions is not unlimited.
20	249 A.D.2d 811, 671 N.Y.S.2d 831 (3d Dept., 1998).
21	Id. at 813, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 833, alluding to the requirements in N.Y. Gen. City L. § 81-b, N.Y. Town L. § 267-b & N.Y. Village L. § 7-712-b, that conditions be reasonable and directly related to the proposed use of the property and that such conditions “be imposed for the purpose of minimizing any adverse impact such variance may have on the neighborhood or community”.
24	Milt-Nik Land Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 24 A.D.3d 446, 806 N.Y.S.2d 217 (2d Dept., 2005). See also Matter of 1833 Nostrand Ave. Corp. v. Chin, 302 A.D.2d 460, 754 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Dept., 2003); Taylor Tree, Inc. v. Planning Board of Town of Montgomery, 272 A.D.2d 336, 707 N.Y.S.2d 193 (2d Dept. 2000); Town of Richmond v. BSD Soto, Inc., 6 Misc.3d 1040, 800 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct., Ontario Co., 2005).
25	See Oakwood Island Yacht Club, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of City of New Rochelle, 32 Misc.2d 677, 223 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct., Rockland Co., 1961). The court held that the condition attached to the issuance of a special use permit, imposing a curfew on the use of boats between 9 P.M. and 7 A.M., was an unreasonable restriction unrelated to the use applied for and thus beyond the power of the board. The court based its decision on the fact that nothing authorizes the board to impose such restrictions, holding that such a restriction “is a matter for legislative, not administrative, consideration”. See also De Ville Homes, Inc. v. Michaelis, 201 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, 1960), differentiating between legislative and administrative power, implying that certain conditions should be left for the governing board to deal with through legislation. The court stated “The power granted to or inherent in such Boards to impose reasonable conditions under proper circumstances applies to use of premises and not details of operation”.
27	Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co., June 13, 1994, Index No. 19836/91, aff’d 218 A.D.2d 733, 630 N.Y.S.2d 950 (2d Dept., 1995), lv. to app. den. 87 N.Y.2d 811, 644 N.Y.S.2d 144, 666 N.E.2d 1058 (1996).
31	Cited supra, n. 18; see also Westbury Trombo, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Village of Westbury, 307 A.D.2d 1043, 763 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dept., 2003).
32	See Village Law § 7-700, listing specific items, all relating to the use of land, that a village may regulate under such authority, such as size, height and location, and use of buildings. See also De Sena v. Gulde, 24 A.D.2d 165, 171, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dept., 1965), holding that zoning power must "operate in relation to the use of land and not for the accomplishment of purposes extraneous to that relation".
33 Louhal Properties, Inc. v. Strada, 191 Misc.2d at 751, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 814; see, e.g., Schlosser v. Michaelis, 18 A.D.2d 940, 238 N.Y.S.2d 433 (2d Dept., 1963) and Summit School v. Neugent, supra; see also St. Onge v. Donovan, supra; Rathkopf, supra, note 1 at § 1.02[a], explaining that regulations relating to the use of land or to the impact of land use on neighboring properties are treated differently than regulations that restrict the manner of operation.
34	Id. at 753, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 815, deriving this language from Old Country Burgers Corp., Inc. v. Town Board of Town of Oyster Bay, supra, 160 A.D.2d at 805, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
35	Louhal Properties, Inc. v. Strada, supra.
37	See id., stating that the courts have generally upheld regulations directed at the physical use of land, “such as light, air quality, safety, population density and traffic . . . property values, aesthetics or environmental values.”; see also St. Onge v. Donovan, supra (citing Matter of Pearson v. Shoemaker, supra.
38	See N.Y. Const. Art. IX § 2(c)(ii): “every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to:....(10) [t]he government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein.”; see also Mayor of City of New York v. Council of City of New York, 182 Misc.2d 330, 335, 696 N.Y.S.2d 761, 765 (Sup. Ct. New York County, 1999), holding that the “home rule provision of N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2, cl. (c) gives local governments broad police powers relating to the welfare of their citizens....” (citing New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 505 N.E.2d 915 (1987), aff’d 487 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988)).
40	236 A.D.2d 387, 653 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dept., 1997).
41 Id. at 388, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 365 (citing Matter of Borer v. Vineberg, 213 A.D.2d 828, 623 N.Y.S.2d 378 (3d Dept., 1995). In footnote 3, the court explained that the city may enact an ordinance regulating the hours of operation . . . if it was reasonably necessary to promote a public interest.
42	See Town Law § 130(13), providing that the town board may regulate “all places selling or offering for sale at retail for consumption on the premises any beverage or food stuff; providing for sanitation and cleanliness and the inspection thereof and defining the opening and closing hours and all other matters related thereto.” Municipalities are, however, preempted by Alcoholic Beverage Control Law from legislating with respect certain aspects of the sale of alcoholic beverages. See Matter of Lansdown Entertainment Corp. v. New York City Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 74 N.Y. 2d 761, 764, 545 N.Y.S.2d 82, 543 N.E.2d 725 (1989), stating that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law specifically preempts local regulation “concerning the subject matter of hours of operation, distribution, or consumption.”; see also People v. De Jesus, 54 N.Y.2d 465, 446 N.Y.S.2d 207, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (1981).
43	See Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12).

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