Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/251/15/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 17:59:17+00:00

Document:
A verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment, under an indictment charging murder in the first degree, is a conviction of murder in the first degree, and no less so because the jury adds "without capital punishment," as permitted by § 330 of the Criminal Code. P. 251 U. S. 17.
And when a sentence to life imprisonment, based on such a verdict, is reversed upon the defendant's application (the mandate calling for further proceedings), he is not placed twice in jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment when tried again under the same indictment, found guilty as charged, but without qualification as to punishment, and sentenced to be hanged. Id.
comments upon them in the presence of the prospective jurors are addressed to the discretion of the judge. P. 251 U. S. 18.
Error in overruling a challenge for cause made by the defendant in a capital case is not ground for reversal if he excluded the objectionable juror by a peremptory challenge, and was permitted to exercise, in addition, more peremptory challenges than the statute allowed, the record not showing that any juror who sat upon the trial was objectionable in fact. P. 251 U. S. 20.
A person committed a homicide while a prisoner in a penitentiary, and afterwards, while still so incarcerated, voluntarily wrote letters which, under the practice and discipline of the institution, without threat or coercion, were turned over to the warden, who furnished them to the United States attorney. Held that the use of the letter in the prosecution for the homicide was not violative of the constitutional provisions against compelling testimony from an accused and against unreasonable searches and seizures. P. 251 U. S. 21.
The case is stated in the opinion. See also post, 251 U. S. 380.
Robert F. Stroud was indicted for the killing of Andrew Turner. The indictment embraced the elements constituting murder in the first degree. The homicide took place in the United States prison at Leavenworth, Kansas, where Stroud was a prisoner and Turner a guard. The record discloses that Stroud killed Turner by stabbing him with a knife which he carried concealed on his person.
"Such further proceedings be had in said cause, in conformity with the judgment of this Court as according to right and justice and the laws of the United States ought to be had, the said writ of error notwithstanding."
In pursuance of this mandate, the district court issued an order vacating the former sentence, and ordered a new trial. The trial was had; the jury found Stroud guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in the indictment, making no recommendation dispensing with capital punishment. Upon this verdict, sentence of death was pronounced. This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the judgment.
It is alleged that the last trial of the case had the effect to put the plaintiff in error twice in jeopardy for the same offense, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. From what has already been said, it is apparent that the indictment was for murder in the first degree; a single count thereof fully described that offense. Each conviction was for the offense charged. It is true that, upon the second trial, the jury added "without capital punishment" to its verdict, and sentence for life imprisonment was imposed. This recommendation was because of the right of the jury so to do under § 330 of the Criminal Code. Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1152, 10 U.S.Comp. Stats.
§ 10504. This section permits the jury to add to the verdict, where the accused is found guilty of murder in the first degree, "without capital punishment," in which case the convicted person is to be sentenced to imprisonment for life. The fact that the jury may thus mitigate the punishment to imprisonment for life did not render the conviction less than one for the first degree murder. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U. S. 304, 178 U. S. 307.
The protection afforded by the Constitution is against a second trial for the same offense. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, and cases cited in the opinion. Each conviction was for murder as charged in the indictment, which, as we have said, was murder in the first degree. In the last conviction, the jury did not add the words "without capital punishment" to the verdict, although the court, in its charge, particularly called the attention of the jury to this statutory provision. In such case, the court could do no less than inflict the death penalty. Moreover, the conviction and sentence upon the former trials were reversed upon writs of error sued out by the plaintiff in error. The only thing the appellate court could do was to award a new trial on finding error in the proceeding, thus the plaintiff in error himself invoked the action of the court which resulted in a further trial. In such cases, he is not placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution. Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521, 199 U. S. 533.
jurors, the district judge stated from the bench that, in view of the statements set forth in the affidavit, he was compelled to feel that counsel had acted unprofessionally by not being there in court -- at least one of them; that said facts were commented upon by the public press of Leavenworth County, and created prejudice against defendant and his attorneys; that defendant never authorized any person or attorney to make any such proposal to attorneys for the government, concerning a plea of guilty, for the reason that the defendant was not guilty of the charge contained in the indictment, or of murder in any degree, and that, unless the jurors who had theretofore attended the court during the week of May 20, 1918, were discharged by order of the court, the defendant could not enjoy the right of a public trial by an impartial jury secured to him by the Constitution, and prayed an order transferring the case to another division of the district. The court overruled the motion except in so far as it asked for an exclusion of inhabitants of Leavenworth County as jurors; to that extent, it was sustained. The motion to quash the panel called to act as jurors was made on like grounds, and was also overruled.
The division in which Leavenworth County is situated consists of fifty counties, and, after hearing these applications, the district court excluded persons from the jury who were residents of Leavenworth County, and refused to quash the panel upon the grounds alleged. Matters of this sort are addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, and we find nothing in the record to amount to abuse of discretion such as would authorize an appellate court to interfere with the judgment. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 131 U. S. 24.
Williamson, the challenge should have been sustained. The juror was peremptorily challenged by the accused, and did not sit upon the jury. The statute, in cases of this character, allowed the accused twenty peremptory challenges; it appears that he was in fact allowed twenty-two peremptory challenges. Thus, his right to exercise peremptory challenges was not abridged to his prejudice by an erroneous ruling as to the challenge for cause. In view of this fact, and since there is nothing in the record to show that any juror who sat upon the trial was in fact objectionable, we are unable to discover anything which requires a reversal upon this ground. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 120 U. S. 71; Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 218 U. S. 248.
testimony required of the accused nor unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his constitutional rights.
Other objections are raised in the elaborate brief filed in behalf of the plaintiff in error. We do not find it necessary to discuss them. In view of the gravity of the case, they have been examined and considered with care, and we are unable to find that any error was committed to the prejudice of the accused.

References: § 330
 § 330

§ 10504
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