Source: https://casetext.com/case/4536-n-sheridan-condo-assn-v-maduff
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:05:38+00:00

Document:
4536 NORTH SHERIDAN CONDO ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. MICHAEL MADUFF, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellee.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 11 M1 705007 The Honorable Rodolfo Garcia, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hall and Reyes concurred in the judgment.
¶1 HELD: Counter-plaintiff failed to establish that counter-defendant Condominium Association had a duty to respond to his redevelopment plans in any formal or express manner. As a result, there were no genuine issues of material fact preventing summary judgment in favor of the Condominium Association on counter-plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Counter-plaintiff cannot support his remaining contentions of error. ¶2 Counter-plaintiff, Michael Maduff, appeals the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of counter-defendant, 4536 North Sheridan Condo Association (Condo Association), on his claims of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under the Illinois Condominium Act (Act) (765 ILCS 605/1 et seq. (West 1998)) and the condominium declarations. Maduff contends the circuit court erred where genuine issues of material fact existed barring the entry of summary judgment as to: (1) whether the Condo Association breached its fiduciary duty by failing to respond to or approve his plan for redevelopment of his condominium unit; (2) whether the Condo Association breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to act on his proposals; (3) whether the Condo Association improperly locked him out of his unit preventing him from maintaining it, thereby constructively evicting him; and (4) whether the doctrine of laches barred his claims. Based on the following, we affirm.
"As a matter of law under the Condominium Act and the Association's Declaration, there is no duty of the Condo Association to formally or expressly deny an association member's plans to redevelop the member's unit or otherwise formally consider Michael Maduff's plans. Accordingly, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted."
¶16 Maduff contends that, since the Condo Association admitted it had a fiduciary duty under the Act, there were genuine issues of material fact that prevented entry of summary judgment. Maduff additionally contends there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the Condo Association's reasons for failing to approve his plans in breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Next, Maduff contends there were genuine issues of material fact preventing summary judgment as to his claim for illegal lockout and constructive eviction. Finally, Maduff contends the circuit court erred in relying on the doctrine of laches to grant summary judgment. ¶17 Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010). The circuit court must view the documents and exhibits in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Banco Popular North America v. Gizynski, 2015 IL App (1st) 142871, ¶ 36. Summary judgment is a drastic measure and may be granted only if the movant's right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact, but rather to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (2002). We review the granting of summary judgment de novo, meaning we perform the same analysis that the circuit court performed. Bowman v. Chicago Park District, 2014 IL App (1st) 132122, ¶ 45.
(3) Ratify the action taken by the Unit Owner, and the Board may (but shall not be required to) condition such ratification upon the same conditions which it may impose upon the giving of its prior consent under this Section."
¶26 Simply stated, the declarations do not support Maduff's argument. Instead, the declarations establish the obligations of a unit owner prior to making any additions, alterations, or improvements, such as in this case. The declarations are silent as to any protocol for the Condo Association once a unit owner has sought permission to make those additions, alterations, or improvements. The declarations merely provide the Condo Association with recourse in the event a unit owner proceeds with additions, alterations, or improvement without prior written consent. As a result, the declarations do not provide a duty on the part of the Condo Association to take action following a unit owner's proposal, such as here. Accordingly, although the Condo Association did admit that it owed its unit owners a generalized fiduciary duty of care, there was nothing to support Maduff's claim that the Condo Association had a duty to respond in any manner to his redevelopment proposals. ¶27 Because Maduff cannot establish the existence of a duty, we need not consider his remaining arguments regarding the breach of that duty. We, therefore, conclude that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the Condo Association on Maduff's claim that the Condo Association breached its fiduciary duty to him by failing to respond to his redevelopment proposals.
¶29 Next, Maduff contends the Condo Association breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to act on his proposals for redevelopment of his condominium unit. ¶30 It is well established that a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract. Gore v. Indiana Insurance Co., 376 Ill. App. 3d 282, 286 (2007). The duty of good faith and fair dealing is a limitation on the exercise of one party's broad discretion in performing its obligations under the contract. Id. It requires that party to exercise the discretion reasonably and with proper motive, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the parties' reasonable expectations under the contract. Id. The duty of good faith and fair dealing, however, is not an independent source of duties for contracting parties. Id. Rather, it is a derivative principle of contract law used as a construction aid in determining the intent of the parties where an instrument is susceptible to conflicting interpretations. Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Rucker, 295 Ill. App. 3d 801, 807 (1998). ¶31 Because we have concluded that the Condo Association did not have a duty to formally or expressly respond to or deny Maduff's redevelopment proposals under either the Act or the declarations, we need not consider the duty of good faith and fair dealing. To the extent Maduff argues that the Condo Association breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing outside the Act and the declarations, Maduff fails to cite to any contract upon which that duty was based. We, therefore, find that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Condo Association on Maduff's claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
¶33 Maduff additionally contends the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Condo Association constructively evicted him from his condominium unit. ¶34 We initially note that Maduff did not include a claim for illegal lockout or constructive eviction in his counter-claim. Maduff did assert basic facts that he was prevented entry into his condominium unit, but those facts were presented to support his request for a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to abatement of his delinquent assessments. Moreover, on August 29, 2012, the circuit court entered an order granting the Condo Association's motion for summary judgment on its claim for possession of Maduff's condominium unit and for repayment of the outstanding assessments. In so doing, the circuit court found Maduff's defenses, which included constructive eviction and illegal lockout of his unit, did not preclude entry of judgment. The circuit court awarded the Condo Association $17,089.25 in assessments and granted an order of possession in its favor. The court's August 29, 2012, order disposed of Maduff's counter-claim requesting a declaratory judgment abating his assessments. Maduff did not challenge that order before the circuit court and has not appealed that order before this court. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (eff. Jan . 1 2015) requires that a notice of appeal "specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing court." Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2). Maduff's notice of appeal provides that he appealed the circuit court's June 16, 2015, order only. Maduff has made no argument on appeal that this court has jurisdiction to review the unspecified August 29, 2012, judgment as a step in the procedural progression leading to the June 16, 2015, judgment. See In re F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d 55, 69, (2004). We, therefore, find Maduff's contention regarding illegal lockout and constructive eviction is not properly before this court.
¶36 Maduff finally contends the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Condo Association based on the doctrine of laches. ¶37 There is nothing in the record to support Maduff's contention. The record contains the circuit court's June 16, 2015, written order granting summary judgment in favor of the Condo Association, finding "[a]s a matter of law under the Condominium Act and the Association's Declaration, there is no duty of the Condo Association to redevelop formally or expressly deny an association member's plans to redevelop the member's unit or otherwise formally consider Michael Maduff's plans." No mention of the doctrine of laches appears in the court's June 16, 2015, order. Maduff argues that the circuit court's oral ruling did address the doctrine of laches; however, no transcript or acceptable substitute appear in the record from that proceeding. ¶38 It was Maduff's burden, as the appellant, to present a sufficiently complete record of the circuit court proceedings to support his claim of error. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1984). In absence of such a record on appeal, we must presume that the circuit court's order was in conformity with law and had sufficient factual basis. Id. "Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant." Id. Because we have no transcript from the summary judgment hearing, we must presume the circuit court's order granting summary judgment was in conformity with the law and supported by the facts. We, therefore, conclude that the circuit court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Condo Association.
¶40 We affirm the judgment of the circuit court granting the Condo Association's motion for summary judgment of Maduff's counter-claims. ¶41 Affirmed.

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