Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81105:gr-181738-2013&catid=1566&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:55:38+00:00

Document:
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.VIOLETA L. VIAJAR, Respondent.
This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC), asking the Court to set aside the Decision2 dated September 21, 2007 and the Resolution3 dated January 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01734; and to reinstate the Decision4 dated October 28, 2005 and Resolution5 dated January 31, 2006 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000416-05.
GMC is a domestic corporation with principal office in Makati City and a manufacturing plant in Lapu-Lapu City.
On December 2, 2003, Viajar filed a Complaint7 for Illegal Dismissal with damages against GMC, its Human Resource Department (HRD) Manager, Johnny T. Almocera (Almocera), and Purchasing Manager, Joel Paulino before the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. VII, NLRC, Cebu City.
In her Position Paper,8 Viajar alleged that she was employed by GMC on August 6, 1979 as Invoicing Clerk. Through the years, the respondent held various positions in the company until she became Purchasing Staff.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondents acted in good faith in terminating the complainant from the service due to redundancy of works, thus, complainants refusal to accept the payment of her allowed separation pay and other benefits under the law is NOT JUSTIFIED both in fact and law, and so, therefore complainants case for illegal dismissal against the herein respondents and so are complainants monetary claims are hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring the validity of complainants termination due to redundancy is hereby AFFIRMED. Respondent General Milling Corporation is hereby ordered to pay complainants separation pay in the amount of P461,464.37.
Respondent Viajar filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated January 31, 2006.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision, dated 28 October 2005, and Resolution, dated 31 January 2006 respectively, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission-Fourth Division, Cebu City, in NLRC Case No. V-000416-05 (RAB VII-12-2495-03) are SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DECLARING the dismissal ILLEGAL and ordering respondent to reinstate petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits computed from the time she was dismissed on 30 November 2003 up to the date of actual reinstatement. Further, moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) each; and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award, are awarded.
Aggrieved by the reversal of the NLRC decision, GMC filed a motion for reconsideration. However, in its Resolution dated January 30, 2008, the CA denied the same; hence, this petition.
I. THE DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 AND THE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 30, 2008 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 AND THE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 30, 2008 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATE THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE OBSERVANCE OF RESPECT AND FINALITY TO FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
Furthermore, another exception to the general rule is when the said findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if on the basis of the available facts, the inference or conclusion arrived at is manifestly erroneous.27 Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.28 In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA that the conclusions arrived at by the LA and the NLRC are manifestly erroneous.
GMC claims that Viajar was validly dismissed on the ground of redundancy which is one of the authorized causes for termination of employment. The petitioner asserts that it has observed the procedure provided by law and that the same was done in good faith. To justify the respondents dismissal, the petitioner presented: (i) the notification Letter-Memorandum dated October 27, 2003 addressed to the respondent which was received on October 30, 2003;29 (ii) the "Establishment Termination Report" as prescribed by the DOLE;30 (iii) the two (2) checks issued in the respondents name amounting to P440,253.02 and P21,211.35 as separation pay;31 and (iv) the list of dismissed employees as of June 6, 2006 to show that GMC was in a "reduction mode."32 Both the LA and the NLRC found these sufficient to prove that the dismissal on the ground of redundancy was done in good faith.
While it is true that the "characterization of an employees services as superfluous or no longer necessary and, therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer,"36 the exercise of such judgment, however, must not be in violation of the law, and must not be arbitrary or malicious. The Court has always stressed that a company cannot simply declare redundancy without basis. To exhibit its good faith and that there was a fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining redundant positions, a company claiming to be over manned must produce adequate proof of the same.
In Asufrin, Jr. v. San Miguel Corporation, we ruled that it is not enough for a company to merely declare that it has become overmanned (sic). It must produce adequate proof of such redundancy to justify the dismissal of the affected employees.
In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA when it held that the petitioner failed to present substantial proof to support GMCs general allegations of redundancy. As shown from the records, the petitioner simply presented as its evidence of good faith and compliance with the law the notification letter to respondent Viajar;39 the "Establishment Termination Report" it submitted to the DOLE Office;40 the two (2) checks issued in the respondents name amounting to P440,253.02 and P21,211.35;41 and the list of terminated employees as of June 6, 2006.42 We agree with the CA that these are not enough proof for the valid termination of Viajars employment on the ground of redundancy.
The letter-memorandum which contains general allegations is not enough to convince this Court that Viajars termination of employment due to redundancy was warranted under the circumstances. There is no showing that GMC made an evaluation of the existing positions and their effect to the company. Neither did GMC exert efforts to present tangible proof that it was experiencing business slow down or over hiring. The "Establishment Termination Report" it submitted to the DOLE Office did not account for anything to justify declaring the positions redundant. The Court notes that the list of terminated employees presented by GMC was a list taken as of June 6, 2006 or almost three years after the respondent was illegally dismissed and almost a year after the LA promulgated its decision. While the petitioner had been harping that it was on a "reduction mode" of its employees, it has not presented any evidence (such as new staffing pattern, feasibility studies or proposal, viability of newly created positions, job description and the approval of the management of the restructuring,43 audited financial documents like balance sheets, annual income tax returns and others)44 which could readily show that the companys declaration of redundant positions was justified. Such proofs, if presented, would suffice to show the good faith on the part of the employer or that this business prerogative was not whimsically exercised in terminating respondents employment on the ground of redundancy. Unfortunately, these are wanting in the instant case. The petitioner only advanced a self-serving general claim that it was experiencing business reverses and that there was a need to reduce its manpower complement.
Furthermore, the Court cannot overlook the fact that Viajar was prohibited from entering the company premises even before the effectivity date of termination; and was compelled to sign an "Application for Retirement and Benefits." These acts exhibit the petitioners bad faith since it cannot be denied that the respondent was still entitled to report for work until November 30, 2003. The demand for her to sign the "Application for Retirement and Benefits" also contravenes the fact that she was terminated due to redundancy. Indeed, there is a difference between voluntary retirement of an employee and forced termination due to authorized causes.
While termination of employment and retirement from service are common modes of ending employment, they are mutually exclusive, with varying juridical bases and resulting benefits. Retirement from service is contractual (i.e. based on the bilateral agreement of the employer and employee), while termination of employment is statutory (i.e. governed by the Labor Code and other related laws as to its grounds, benefits and procedure). The benefits resulting from termination vary, depending on the cause. For retirement, Article 287 of the Labor Code gives leeway to the parties to stipulate above a floor of benefits.
Clearly, the instant case is not about retirement since the term has its peculiar meaning and is governed by Article 287 of the Labor Code. Rather, this is a case of termination due to redundancy under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Thus, the demand of GMC for the respondent to sign an "Application for Retirement and Benefits" is really suspect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, as well as its Resolution dated January 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 01734, are hereby AFFIRMED.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; id. at 26-38.
18 364 Phil. 912 (1999).
24 Eureka Personnel & Management Services, Inc. v. Valencia, G.R. No. 159358, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 36, 44.
25 Id.; see also Bernarte v. Philippine Basketball Association (PBA), G.R. No. 192084, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 745.
26 Janssen Pharmaceutica v. Silayro, G.R. No. 172528, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 628, 640.
27 Sunset View Condominium Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 87799, December 15, 1993, 228 SCRA 466, 470-471; Arc-Men Food Industries Corp. v. NLRC, 436 Phil. 371, 379 (2002).
28 Fujitsu Computer Products Corp. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 697, 716 (2005).
33 Lopez Sugar Corp. v. Franco, 497 Phil. 806, 818 (2005); Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 338, 355; Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 159641, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 175, 187.
34 G.R. No. 148132, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 434.
43 Andrada v. NLRC, G.R. No. 173231, December 28, 2007, 541 SCRA 538, 562.
44 See Asian Alcohol Corp. v. NLRC, supra note 18, at 927.
45 Copy of Newsmill, Official Newsletter of GMC, July-December 2003 Issues; rollo, p. 170.
46 Columbus Philippines Bus Corp. v. NLRC, 417 Phil. 81, 100 (2001).
47 G.R. No. 168927, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 438.
49 San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc., v. Gucaban, G.R. No. 153982, July 18, 2011, 654 SCRA18, 33.

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