Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180731_0001221.ENY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:37:17+00:00

Document:
PRO CUSTOM SOLAR., d/b/a MOMENTUM SOLAR, Defendant.
Plaintiff Todd Banks, individually and on behalf of a putative class, brings the instant action against Defendant Pro Custom Solar LLC, d/b/a Momentum Solar (“Momentum Solar”), alleging that Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (the “TCPA” or the “Act”) and New York General Business Law § 399-p (“NYGBL”) by initiating or authorizing two “robocalls” to Plaintiff's residential telephone number without Plaintiff's consent. Defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the amended complaint.
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the alleged facts allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” of a defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While this standard requires more than a “sheer possibility” of a defendant's liability, id., “[i]t is not the Court's function to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial” on a motion to dismiss, Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F.Supp.2d 556, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Instead, “the Court must merely determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient, and, in doing so, it is well settled that the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that the Calls violated the TCPA and NYGBL because they constituted unauthorized “robocalls.” (See generally Am. Compl.) Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant liable, either directly or vicariously, for the alleged violations. (Id.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims warrant dismissal because Plaintiff failed to plead sufficiently that Defendant initiated the Calls for purposes of direct liability. (Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Mot.”) at 9, ECF No. 23-1.) In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's “threadbare conclusions fail to construct a foundation” for any theory of vicarious liability. (Def.'s Mot. at 1.) The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff fails to plead direct liability; however, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads vicarious liability under the apparent authority doctrine.
The TCPA was passed primarily because “many consumers [were] outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance telemarketing calls to their homes.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372 (2012) (alterations omitted). The section of the TCPA relevant to this case prohibits, with certain exceptions not relevant here, “any person within the United States” from “initiat[ing] any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). As such, for direct liability, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant initiated an unlawful call in order to state a plausible claim.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that, during the course of his investigatory calls on January 10, 2017, Sunnova confirmed that it “works with” Defendant. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19). In addition, Sunnova stated that it “uses prerecorded telephone calls to seek new customers.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 20). These facts, at most, allow for the inference that Sunnova rather than Defendant is directly liable under the Act. See Jackson v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 88 F.Supp.3d 129, 133, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding allegation that “Adsource sent the text message to the [p]laintiff's cellular phone on behalf of CCL” plausibly alleged direct liability for Adsource but not CCL). In other words, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant initiated the Calls, which is required to successfully plead direct liability. Compare Jennings v. Cont'l Serv. Grp., Inc., 239 F.Supp.3d 662, 665 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for direct liability by alleging that “[the] [d]efendant made calls to the [p]laintiff's cell phone using ‘a blended pre-recorded and artificial message.'”), with Melito v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., No. 14-CV-02440, 2015 WL 7736547 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2015) (“Plaintiffs' conclusory assertions that Experian sent or caused the text message to be sent is simply a legal conclusion devoid of further factual enhancement. Because Plaintiffs do not plead that Experian ‘made,' i.e., physically placed or actually sent, the text messages, the [complaint] fails to state a claim.”).
With respect to apparent authority, such a relationship “arises from the ‘written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes [a] third person to believe that the principal consents to have [an] act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him.” Dinaco, Inc. v. Time Warner, Inc., 346 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Minskoff v. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co., 98 F.3d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1996)). In other words, the Court is to focus on the principal's conduct from a third party's perspective, and decide whether that conduct reasonably gives the appearance that an agent is authorized to act.

References: § 227
 § 399
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 227
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.