Source: https://andrewferguson.net/tag/search-and-seizure/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:57:58+00:00

Document:
…continued from A Man’s House is His Castle: Arguments Against Fourth Amendment Limitations.
It is the recommendation of this author that rights established in the Fourth Amendment be interpreted broadly. While this author recognizes the need for National Security, this author also realizes the dangers of ceding one’s rights to government power.
It seems clear to this author that while the main intent of the Framers was to prevent government from performing abusive searches and seizure of a person’s home and belongs in the name of tax collection, the Framers also intended the Fourth Amendment to prevent all forms of search and seizure, reasonable or not, without a proper warrant.
The warrant system is one of the many checks and balances employed by this great nation to ensure that no one person or organization has all the power. To allow the Government to suspend or eliminate the parts of the Fourth Amendment at will is no different from reinstating general warrants or writs of assistance.
To allow the United States to realize a time of general warrants or writs of assistance would be catastrophic and could lead to civil unrest.
The King is not above the law.
The President is not above the law.
The Constitution shall protect us.
…continued from A Man’s House is His Castle: Statement of Question and Arguments Favoring Fourth Amendment Limitations.
However, with the advent of the Internet and other forms of non-tangible communication, it seems as if history is doomed to repeat itself. While the Framers designed the Fourth Amendment with a particular set of circumstances in mind, it should not be construed that this was the sole objective of the Amendment.
Like all Amendments, the intent of the Fourth Amendment was to limit the Government in all its forms – executive, judiciary, legislative, and, by extension, militarily as well, from causing intrusion into the lives of the people.
In the battle between the right of the people and the power of the Government, the Court has often shown that it favors the right of the people.
This narrower limit on government power restored rights to the people and forced the Government to provide critical evidence to support its claims before it can suppress the rights of the Amendment.
But we do not think a case has been made for the requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards. The circumstances described do not justify complete exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech. Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent. We recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the President’s domestic security role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment5.
To see the Court vote unanimously on such the issue should only reaffirm the need to be ever vigilant in protecting the freedoms the Fourth Amendment offers.
…continued from A Man’s House is His Castle: Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, the stage is set. In light of recent global developments, specifically the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing “global war on terrorism,” should the right of unreasonable searches and seizures be limited to protect national security?
Like most issues that deal with constitutional law, there is a battle between the rights of the people and power of the Government. Under very rare and certain circumstances, there is compelling state interest to limit the scope of constitutional protection.
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right1.
Justice Holmes made it clear that even within a right as simple as freedom of speech, there is a line that the people cannot cross and still expect constitutional protection. Justice Holmes also noted that the line is subject to move during a time of war.
The Schenck decision sets a precedent that can easily be applied to the Fourth Amendment. While not engaged in a traditional war that consists of nation-on-nation fighting, the United States is engaged in a war with persons, both domestic and foreign, who are attempting to cause undue harm to America and its inhabitants. It would be a dereliction of duty for the United States not to perform its due diligence in attempting to thwart such attacks in the interest of National Security.
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), the Court held six-to-three that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.”2 This decision, in part, laid the groundwork for a memo written by John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the U.S. Department of Justice.
As such, there appeared to be a compelling state interest to limit the scope of the Fourth Amendment to protect the people of America. By limiting the Fourth Amendment and restoring writs of assistance, the Government is in a better position to more effectively prevent terrorism on home soil. For example, being able to more thoroughly conduct taps of telephones lines could lead to the arrest of suspects trying to cause harm.
…continued from A Man’s House is His Castle: Historic Development.
The Fourth Amendment has been in place for over 200 years. In that time, America and the world have changed drastically. Nations have literally come and gone within that time, and yet the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights have remained steadfast. There does, however, remain a question of how one should interpret the text of Fourth Amendment.
With the advent of electricity, telegraphs, telephones, radio communication, and the Internet, the question of what the Framers of the Fourth Amendment intended is more important now than it ever has been before.
Broken into sections, the Fourth Amendment seems straightforward in its meaning: People within America have the right not to be unreasonably searched themselves or in their place of residence. People within America also have the right not to have papers and other items seized unreasonably. These rights shall not be violated unless someone under oath (or affirmation) declares that there is probable cause that describes the places to be searched and/or the persons or items to be seized. Only then shall a warrant be issued for only the above-mentioned places described to be searched and/or the persons or items to be seized.
Based on Davis’ research, it then becomes entirely reasonable to assume that the Framers intended warrants to be used significantly more liberally than warrants are used currently. Thus, the only reason warrants are not used as liberally would be due to the expansion of the ex officio authority of peace officers to search and arrest, which is exactly what happened during the 19th century3.
The Court had already ruled that “[visual] surveillance [is] unquestionably lawful because “‘the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of trespass.'” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765)).”12 Thus, one might think there is little thought required to assume that the passive surveillance conducted by the Department of the Interior Agent is “unquestionably lawful.” The Agent simply shifted the frequencies of the emitted energy rays into ones that could be perceived by humans. However, the Court took a more philosophical approach.
When the Katz test is applied, is becomes apparent that Kyllo‘s right to privacy as provided by the Fourth Amendment was, in fact, violated.
While it is certainly possible to conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in this case that no “significant” compromise of the homeowner’s privacy has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.
“The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant14.
…continued from A Man’s House is His Castle: Introduction.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized1.
The Framers wrote the Fourth Amendment in response to both “English and American experiences of virtually unrestrained and judicially unsupervised searches”2 carried out by the British government. Indeed, the British government had not always had such a liberal display of search and seizure. The movement toward expanded powers began with the Tudor dynasty.
During the Tudor dynasty, which lasted from 1485 until 16033, the state licensed the production of printed matter to control the “seditious and nonconformist publications [that] had become a matter of intense state concern.”4 In order to suppress the undesirable publications, the Worshipful Company of Stationers and Newspaper Makers (more commonly called the Stationers’ Company)5 was “instructed ‘to make search wherever it shall please them in any place…within our kingdom of England…and to seize, take hold, burn…those books and things which are or shall be printed contrary to the form of any statute, act, or proclamation…’.”6 In exchange for performing this duty, the Stationers’ Company was granted a monopoly over the production of all printed material. However, the British government’s search and seizure power was not done expanding.
During the reign of James II, the Townshend Acts of 1767 were passed which “placed a tax on common products imported into the American Colonies, such as lead, paper, paint, glass, and tea.”7 It was not the tax that was most problematic, but rather the fact that the Act legalized writs of assistance – generally issued and open-ended search warrants that required all parties to help in its execution8. The writs of assistance, which only expired six months after the death of the issuing king, were issued to government officials and allowed them to search anyone or anywhere they pleased. Ergo, the desire and need for limits on search and seizures was born.
That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted12.
Virginia’s Article was the first “provision in any American constitution” that sought to limit the power of searches and seizures13. However, unscrupulous officials could easily take advantage of several gaping holes in Virginia’s Article, primarily, the clause that states warrants “ought not to be granted” but does not outright prohibit them14. In short, Virginia’s search and seizure Article is merely a suggestion.
Virginia diligently campaigned for inclusion of a similar article in the United States Constitution; however, Virginia eventually ratified the United States Constitution without such an article and instead pushed to have an even broader provision included in the Bill of Rights15.
I’ve spent the last several weeks working a paper for my Constitutional Law and Civil Rights class. I now present you with the fruits of my labor, presented as multipart serial. Today will be the title page, abstract, introduction, and works cited.
Abstract: The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect the people of the United States “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 However, the degree of that protection is a careful balance of the people’s right and the Government’s protection, especially when national security is involved.
The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect the people of the United States “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”2 However, the degree of that protection is a careful balance of the people’s right and the Government’s protection.
Recent global developments, specifically the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing “global war on terrorism,” have caused the Government to exercise power over the Fourth Amendment. However, doing so may be unconstitutional. This poses the question: Should the right of unreasonable searches and seizures be limited to protect national security?
The author will show that despite the Court’s varied interpretations over the years, national security is not a compelling enough interest to overturn the people’s right granted to them in the Fourth Amendment.
Also, note that this paper will deliberately not deal with the exclusionary rule or the concept surrounding “fruit of the poisonous tree.” This paper is strictly limited to warrants and the Fourth Amendment. Any instances of illegally performed searches and seizures fall outside the purview of this paper.
1. Constitution of the United States, Fourth Amendment.
2. Cohen, William and Danelski, David J. Constitutional Law: Civil Liberty and Individual Rights. New York : Foundation Press, 2002. 1-58778-075-5.
3. Tudor dynasty. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. [Online] Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., April 14, 2008. [Cited: April 17, 2008.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tudor_dynasty.
4. Worshipful Company of Stationers and Newspaper Makers. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. [Online] Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., March 39, 2008. [Cited: April 2008, 17.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worshipful_Company_of_Stationers_and_Newspaper_Makers.
5. Townshend Acts. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. [Online] Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., April 17, 2008. [Cited: April 17, 2008.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Townshend_Act.
6. Writ of Assistance. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. [Online] Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., April 10, 2008. [Cited: April 17, 2008.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Writs_of_Assistance.
7. United States Declaration of Independence.
8. Virginia Declaration of Rights. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. [Online] Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., April 2, 2008. [Cited: April 17, 2008.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia_Declaration_of_Rights.
9. Levy, Leonard W. Seasoned Judgments: The American Constitution, Rights, and History. New Brunswick : Transaction Publishers, 1995. 1-56000-170-4.
10. Davies, Thomas Y. Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment. Michigan Law Review. 1999, Vol. 98, 547.
11. Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, Washington, D.C. : Supreme Court of the United States, 1928.
12. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, Washington, D.C. : Supreme Court of the United States, 1967.
13. Kyllo v. United States. 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94, Washington, D.C. : Supreme Court of the United States, 2001.
14. Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470, Washington, D.C. : Supreme Court of the United States, 1919.
15. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 U.S. 259, Washington, D.C. : Supreme Court of the United States, 1990.
16. Yoo, C. John. Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense. Department of Justice, United States. 2003. Memorandum.
17. Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444, Washington, D.C. : Supreme Court of the United States, 1969.
18. United States v. U.S. District Court. 407 U.S. 297, Washington, D.C. : Supreme Court of the United States, 1972.
19. Hess, Pamela and Jordan, Lara Jakes. Memo Linked to Warrantless Surveillance. [Online] April 2, 2008. [Cited: April 14, 2008.] http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hJKgeE0Z-SivATjok-utYBdh9wDwD8VQ5HFO4.

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