Source: https://www.beiramee.com/blg-blog-post/tag/TILA
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:43:04+00:00

Document:
In McCray v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that a borrower stated a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq., (“FDCPA”) against a foreclosure law firm, noting that the definition of a “debt collector” does not require an “express demand for payment.” Rather, relying on its prior holding inWilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 374-76 (2006), the Court determined that Borrower sufficiently alleged that a law firm and substitute trustees were engaged in conduct regulated by the FDCPA, because their foreclosure activities were “in connection with” the collection of a debt or “an attempt” to collect a debt.
The Court also determined inapplicable the FDCPA’s exclusion from the definition of a “debt collector” for collection activities “incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation” noting that foreclosure is “central to,” not incidental, to the trustees’ obligation under the deed of trust.
Shortly after foreclosure proceedings commenced against her Maryland home, Borrower brought an action for damages under the FDCPA in federal court against the law firm (“Law Firm”), and attorneys within the firm who were appointed as substitute trustees under the deed of trust securing her mortgage loan (collectively “Substitute Trustees”). Borrower also sued the owner of the loan and her loan servicer, claiming, among other things, that they violated the federal Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. As to all defendants, Borrower alleged that defendants failed to provide her with certain notices and requested information purportedly required by these statutes. Regarding the owner of the loan, she claimed that it failed to provide her notice when it purchased the loan, as required under TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). As to her loan servicer, she asserted that an assignment of her deed of trust also required it to afford her notice under TILA.
The district court dismissed the FDCPA claims against Law Firm and the Substitute Trustees, distinguishing their role in initiating foreclosure proceedings, from a role focused on collecting the debt. The district court noted that, even where a communication included a provision indicating that it was “an attempt to collect a debt,” it does not qualify as an attempt to collect a debt under Blagogee v. Equity Trustees, LLC, 2010 Wl 2933962 at *5-6, “unless there is an express demand for payment and other ‘specific information about the debt, including the amount of the debt, the creditor to the debt is owned, the procedure for validating the debt, and to whom the debt should be paid.” Id. Applying the Blagogee factors, the district court concluded that Borrower had failed to “allege any facts indicating that [Law Firm] or the [Substitute Trustees] were engaged in any attempt to collect a debt.” Op. at 7.
The district court also either dismissed or granted summary judgment as to Borrower’s remaining claims against the lender and loan servicer. Borrower thereafter appealed.
Reversing the dismissal of the FDCPA claims against the Law Firm and Substitute Trustees, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Borrower had adequately alleged that they were debt collectors, and that their actions constituted debt collection activity regulated by the FDCPA. Op. at 16.
Citing the definition of a “debt collector” under Section 1692a(6), the Court determined that such definition does not include any requirement that a debt collector be engaged in an activity by which it makes a “demand for payment.” Op. at 11. Rather, to be actionable, a debt collector need only have used a prohibited practice “in connection with” the collection of a debt or in an “attempt” to collect a debt.” Op. at 12 (citing Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 782 F. 3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2014)).
The Court found dispositive its prior holding in Wilson, in which it determined that a law firm that sent the borrower notice that it was preparing foreclosure papers, and who later initiated foreclosure proceedings, could be a debt collector under the meaning of the FDCPA because those foreclosure actions constitute attempts to collect a debt.
Thus, here, the Court concluded that “[i]t is clear from the complaint in this case that the whole reason that the [Law Firm] and its members were retained by [the creditor] was to attempt, through the process of foreclosure to collect on the $66,500 loan in default.” Op. at 14. The Court observed that documents furnished by the Law Firm and/or Substitute Trustees to Borrower indicated that they were pursuing foreclosure because she missed one or more payments; indicated that if she did not bring the loan current, such as by repayment, a foreclosure action may be filed in court; and provided Borrower with the nature of the default and the amount necessary to cure. “Thus, all of the defendants’ activities were taken in connection with the collection of a debt or an attempt to collect a debt.” Op. at 15 (Emphasis in original).
The Fourth Circuit also found inapplicable the fiduciary exclusion to the definition of debt collector under Section 1692a(6)(F)(i) for collections activities “incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation.” Op. at 15-16. The Court noted that foreclosure was “central” – not incidental – to the trustee’s obligation under the deed of trust.
As to the TILA claim regarding allegations of failure to provide notice of the transfer of ownership of the loan under 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), the Court noted that Borrower failed to challenge the trial court’s determination that she was required to allege that the loan transferred after 2009, when the subject provision was enacted. Further, the Court also determined that, because Borrower conceded that she had notice of the transfer to the owner of the loan more than one-year prior to filing the lawsuit, the claim was barred by TILA’s one-year statute of limitations.
The Court also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the TILA claim against her loan servicer, determining that allegations of assignment of the beneficial interest under a deed of trust (as opposed to legal title) did not implicate the statute. In addition to failing to challenge such ruling, the Court observed that her allegations were inconsistent with her claims against the loan owner.
Consequently, the Court reversed only the dismissal of the FDCPA claims against the Law Firm and Substitute Trustees and remanded the case for further proceedings, expressly stating that its conclusion “is not to be construed to indicate, one way or the other, whether they, as debt collectors, violated the FDCPA.” Op. at 20.

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