Source: https://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/constitutional_torts_1983_bivens_rluipa/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:07:11+00:00

Document:
Est. of D. Bennett v. Wainwright, No. 07-2169. Mentally ill guy off his meds shoots at some cops. Mentally ill guy gets shot by cops.
There issues here of notes. The estate appeared to make a “loss of consortium” argument, but the First says that can’t be based on the liberty or property interest of the defendant. But, really, it seems like the plaintiff just made a bunch of legal-sounding noises (like “substantive due process”) and hoped the courts understood. Also, the First appears to provide some discussion of the difference between a Fifth Amendment taking and a Fourth Amendment taking.
Anyway, the First appears to take the qualified immunity arguments seriously. However, it sides with the cops. Based on the facts, I would say this is a great example of qualified immunity working. However, because courts seem too willing to apply it, I can’t take that too seriously.
SBT Holdings, et al v. Town of Westminster et al , 08-1512. This is a 1983 case for rich people. The First reverses the District Court and holds for the developers. SBT bought property. Storms came. Runoff started messing with the environment. The town and state suggested some remediation and prevention measures. But the town should have yieled to the state agencies on this (as a jurisdictional matter). The town sued in state court for an injunction. The developer won. The developer went to federal court and sued under 1983, alleging that the town violated his right to be protected equally as a “class of one.” The District Court dismissed. The First reverses pointing to a number of bits of evidence that show that the town-actors were out to get the developer. The First also rejects a claim preclusion claim, noting that the state court lawsuit wasn’t about constitutional rights. Finally, the First unravels a number of basic state-law issues about who the proper party is under state law.
Levasseur v. US Postal Service, No. 08-1266. This case would be interesting but for the fact that the plaintiff is a pro se. As you know, there is an exception in the FTCA for that preserves sovereign immunity for "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matters." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b). The plaintiff claims that “political campaign flyers that were diverted by a partisan postal employee to prevent them from being delivered to voters shortly before a municipal election.” The District Court said the exception applied, because that exception didn’t apply to intentional torts. The First says that Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978) doesn’t applying because Birnbaum didn’t involve a loss but rather CIA agents (many of whom were paid less than first year associates looked at peoples’ mail).
Ricci v. Okin, No. 07-2522, 07-2523. This case revolves around a consent decree meant to reform a mental hospital. The underlying litigation ended in 1993, with an “disengagement order.” Then, in 2006, the court issued an injunction prohibiting transfers of some of the patients, appointed the US Attorney to investigate, and concluded that by the terms of the 1993 order, the case should be reopened.
The First sides with the state and holds that the District Court doesn’t have the authority to reopen its case. The First says that the Disengagement Order allowed for hospitals to be closed, and whatever the case, the monitor found that the state was complying with the order as it stood by in 1993. And, since then, the “law” has moved away from the putting retarded people in institutions, but instead letting them trade mortgage-backed securities.
What this really comes down to is the “modification doctrine.” See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). But circumstances didn’t not change.
The First then says that there is no “inherent authority” to revisit the 1993 order, or would an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction under Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994) be warranted.
Thomas v. State of RI, No. 07-1985. This is yet another appeal regarding a raid onto the tribal lands. As you may recall, the First Circuit in Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (our coverage here) decided that “state officers could execute a search warrant on tribal lands and arrest members of the Tribe in order to enforce the State's laws.” . But, now they are arguing that the earlier cases didn't decide whether the state has jurisdiction over the tribe. The plaintiffs sought leave to amend, but that was denied.
The First says that the complaint in the second lawsuit didn't aledge of lack of probable cause, and the complaint was really just too vague. Moreover, the request for leave to amend didn't comply with local rules.
Welch v. Ciampa, No. 07-2470. This is one of those frequent cases where cops and politics result in lawsuits. See, although cops frequently tase poor people, they also like to sue each other. It is part of cop culture, too. They should have gone to law school.
But what else do cops like? Ah, misconduct. And retaliation. Recall elections. And being indicted.
Anyway, skipping over all the angst, here is what we got.
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977 ) can be applied to political discrimination cases, but the plaintiff must actually take whatever job action or harassment being complained of.
We can discern no principled basis for holding that an employee who supports an opposition group is protected by the First Amendment but one who chooses to remain neutral is vulnerable to retaliation. We recognize that a plaintiff’s active support of a candidate or cause may help the plaintiff meet her evidentiary burden of showing that the adverse employment decision was substantially motivated by her political affiliation.
Therefore, discriminating against people for being neutral can support a political discrimination claim.
The plaintiffs partially lose on their Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) claim which was essentially that the municipality put power into the kinds of people likely to engage in politically-motivated retaliation. On the other hand, one of the defendants actually did have policy-making capability, so they plaintiffs partially win.
So, with all that in mind, the plaintiffs also get a reversal on the state whistleblower, and tortious interference claims.

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