Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/413/266
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:07:17+00:00

Document:
Argued: March 19, 28, 1973.
Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid work permit, challenges the constitutionality of the Border Patrol's warrantless search of his automobile 25 air miles north of the Mexican border. The search, made without probable cause or consent, uncovered marihuana, which was used to convict petitioner of a federal crime. The Government seeks to justify the search on the basis of § 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides for warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances 'within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,' as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General. The Attorney General's regulation defines 'reasonable distance' as 'within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States.' The Court of Appeals upheld the search on the basis of the Act and regulation. Held: The warrantless search of petitioner's automobile, made without probable cause or consent, violated the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 269275.
(a) The search cannot be justified on the basis of any special rules applicable to automobile searches, as probable cause was lacking; nor can it be justified by analogy with administrative inspections, as the officers had no warrant or reason to believe that petitioner had crossed the border or committed an offense, and there was no consent by petitioner. Pp. 269272.
(b) The search was not a border search or the functional equivalent thereof. Pp. 272275.
The petitioner in this case, a Mexican citizen holding a valid United States work permit, was convicted of having knowingly received, concealed and facilitated the transportation of a large quantity of illegally imported marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 176a (1964 ed.). His sole contention on appeal was that the search of his automobile that uncovered the marihuana was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and that, under the rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, the marihuana should not have been admitted as evidence against him.
The basic facts in the case are neither complicated nor disputed. The petitioner was stopped by the United States Border Patrol on State Highway 78 in California, and his car was thoroughly searched. The road is essentially an east-west highway that runs for part of its course through an undeveloped region. At about the point where the petitioner was stopped the road meanders north as well as eastbut nowhere does the road reach the Mexican border, and at all points it lies north of U.S. 80, a major east-west highway entirely within the United States that connects the Southwest with the west coast. The petitioner was some 25 air miles north of the border when he was stopped. It is undenied that the Border Patrol had no search warrant, and that there was no probable cause of any kind for the stop or the subsequent searchnot even the 'reasonable suspicion' found sufficient for a street detention and weapons search in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612.
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, the Court held that administrative inspections to enforce community health and welfare regulations could be made on less than probable cause to believe that particular dwellings were the sites of particular violations. Id., at 534536, 538, 87 S.Ct., at 17331734, 1735. Yet the Court insisted that the inspector obtain either consent or a warrant supported by particular physical and demographic characteristics of the areas to be searched. Ibid. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943. The search in the present case was conducted in the unfettered discretion of the members of the Border Patrol, who did not have a warrant, 3 probable cause, or consent. The search thus embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior to the inspection. Camara, supra, 387 U.S., at 532533, 87 S.Ct., at 1733.
Two other administrative inspection cases relied upon by the Government are equally inapposite. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60, and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87, both approved warrantless inspections of commercial enterprises engaged in businesses closely regulated and licensed by the Government. In Colonnade, the Court stressed the long history of federal regulation and taxation of the manufacture and sale of liquor, 397 U.S., at 7677, 90 S.Ct., at 776777. In Biswell, the Court noted the pervasive system of regulation and reporting imposed on licensed gun dealers, 406 U.S., at 312 n. 1, 315316, 92 S.Ct., at 1594, 1596.
Moreover, in Colonnade and Biswell, the searching officers knew with certainty that the premises searched were in fact utilized for the sale of liquor or guns. In the present case, by contrast, there was no such assurance that the individual searched was within the proper scope of official scrutinythat is, there was no reason whatever to believe that he or his automobile had even crossed the border, much less that he was guilty of the commission of an offense.
It is undoubtedly within the power of the Federal Government to exclude aliens from the country. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603604, 9 S.Ct. 623, 628629, 32 L.Ed. 1068. It is also without doubt that this power can be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances seeking to cross our borders. As the Court stated in Carroll v. United States: 'Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.' 267 U.S., at 154, 45 S.Ct., at 285. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746.
'It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.' 267 U.S., at 153154, 45 S.Ct., at 285.
* The search here involved was carried out as part of a roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to the Mexican border. It was not a border search, nor can it fairly be said to have been a search conducted at the 'functional equivalent' of the border. Nor does this case involve the constitutional propriety of searches at permanent or temporary checkpoints removed from the border or its functional equivalent. Nor, finally, was the search based on cause in the ordinary sense of specific knowledge concerning an automobile or its passengers. 2 The question posed, rather, is whether and under what circumstances the Border Patrol may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in areas not far removed from the border for the purpose of apprehending aliens illegally entering or in the country.
The conjunction of these factorsconsistent judicial approval, absence of a reasonable alternative for the solution of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion on those whose automobiles are searchedpersuades me that under appropriate limiting circumstances there may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to conduct roving vehicular searches in border areas.
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry, for 'except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'UNREASONABLE' UNLESS IT HAS BEEN AUTHORIzed by a valid search warrant.' Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S., at 528529, 87 Term that the warrant clause reflects and important policy determination: 'The S.Ct., at 1731. I expressed the view last Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute. . . . But those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.' United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2136, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2046, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763764, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 20402041, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
But it does not follow from these distinctions that 'no warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible and meaningful.' Brief for the United States 36. Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial approval of the decision to conduct roving searches on a particular road or roads for a reasonable period of time. 3 According to the Government, the incidence of illegal transportation of aliens on certain roads is predictable, and the roving searches are apparently planned in advance or carried out according to a predetermined schedule. The use of an area warrant procedure would surely not 'frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.' Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S., at 533, 87 S.Ct., at 1733. It would of course entail some inconvenience, but inconvenience alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason for abrogating the warrant requirement. E.g., United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 321, 92 S.Ct., at 2139.
Although standards for probable cause in the context of this case are relatively unstructured (cf. id., at 322, 92 S.Ct., at 2139), there are a number of relevant factors which would merit consideration: they include (i) the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are known or reasonably believed to be transported within a particular area; (ii) the proximity of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads therein and the extent of their use, 4 and (iv) the probable degree of interference with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope of the proposed search, its duration, and the concentration of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of the road or area.
'This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search.' 387 U.S., at 532533, 87 S.Ct., at 1733.
Nor does the novelty of the problem posed by roving searches in border areas undermine the importance of a prior judicial determination. When faced with a similarly unconventional problem last Term in United States District Court, supra, we recognized that the focus of the search there involved was 'less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime,' and that '(d)ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government . . . and the protected rights of our citizens.' 407 U.S., at 322323, 92 S.Ct., at 2139. Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment commitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is feasible with due regard to the interests affected.
Trial and conviction in this case were in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California under an indictment charging that petitioner, contrary to 21 U.S.C. 176a (1964 ed.), had knowingly received, concealed, and facilitated the transportation of approximately 161 pounds of illegally imported marihuana. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. He appealed on the sole ground that the District Court had erroneously denied his motion to suppress marihuana allegedly seized from his automobile in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The motion to suppress was heard on stipulated evidence in the District Court. 1 United States Border Patrol Officers Shaw and Carrasco stopped petitioner's car shortly after midnight as it was traveling from Calexico, on the California-Mexico border, toward Blythe, California. The stop was made on Highway 78 near Glamis, California, 50 miles by road from Calexico. The highway was 'about the only northsouth road in California coming from the Mexican border that does not have an established checkpoint.' 2 Because of that, 'it is commonly used to evade check points by both marijuana and alien smugglers.' On occasions 'but not at all times,' officers of the Border Patrol 'maintain a roving check of vehicles and persons on that particular highway.' Pursuant to this practice 'they stopped this vehicle for the specific purpose of checking for aliens.' Petitioner's identification revealed that he was a resident of Mexicali, Mexico, but that he held a work permit for the United States. Petitioner had come from Mexicali, had picked up the car in Calexico and was on his way to Blythe to deliver it. He intended to return to Mexicali by bus. 3 The officers had been advised by an official bulletin that aliens illegally entering the United States sometimes concealed themselves by sitting upright behind the back seat rest of a car, with their legs folded under the back seat from which the springs had been removed. While looking under the rear seat of petitioner's car for aliens, the officers discovered packages believed by them to contain marihuana. Petitioner was placed under arrest and advised of his rights. His car was then searched for additional marihuana, which was found in substantial amounts.
On this evidence, the motion to suppress was denied, and petitioner was convicted. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, 452 F.2d 459 (CA9 1971), relying on its prior cases and on § 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3), which provides that officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall have the power, without warrant, to search any vehicle for aliens within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States. 4 I dissent from the reversal of this judgment.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court proceeding under the 'general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures,' id., at 20, 88 S.Ct., at 1879 (footnote omitted), weighed the governmental interest claimed to justify the official intrusion against the constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen. Id., at 2021, 88 S.Ct., at 18791880. The "need to search" was balanced "against the invasion which the search . . . entails" quoting from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534535, 536 537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 17331734, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). Terry, supra, 392 U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879. In any event, as put by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the 'question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure.' Id., at 9, 88 S.Ct., at 1873 (emphasis added).
Warrantless but probable-cause searches of the person and immediate surroundings have been deemed reasonable when incident to arrest, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); and in Terry, the stop of a suspected individual and a pat-down for weapons without a warrant were thought reasonable on less than traditional probable cause. In Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, an inspection of every structure in an entire area to enforce the building codes was deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without probable cause, or suspicion that any particular house or structure was in violation of law, although a warrant, issuable without probable cause, or reasonable suspicion of a violation, was required with respect to nonconsenting property owners. Also, in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970), Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court and recognizing that the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and seizures, ruled that the historic power of the Government to control the liquor traffic authorized warrantless inspections of licensed premises without probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, not to check on liquor quality or conditions under which it was sold, but solely to enforce the collection of the federal excise tax. 5 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972), involved the Gun Control Act of 1968 and its authorization to federal officers to inspect firearms dealers. The public need to enforce an important regulatory program was held to justify random inspections of licensed establishments without warrant and probable cause.
The Court has been particularly sensitive to the Amendment's broad standard of 'reasonableness' where, as in Biswell and Colonnade, authorizing statutes permitted the challenged searches. We noted in Colonnade that 'Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand,' 397 U.S., at 76, 90 S.Ct., at 777, and in Biswell we relied heavily upon the congressional judgment that the authorized inspection procedures played an important part in the regulatory system. 406 U.S. at 315317, 92 S.Ct., at 1596 1597. In the case before us, 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3), authorizes Border Patrol officers, without warrant, to search any vehicle for aliens 'within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States' and within the distance of 25 miles from such external boundary to have access to private lands, but not dwellings 'for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States . . ..' At the very least, this statute represents the considered judgment of Congress that proper enforcement of the immigration laws requires random searches of vehicles without warrant or probable cause within a reasonable distance of the international borders of the country.
It is true that '(u)ntil 1875 alien migration to the United States was unrestricted.' Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2581, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). But the power of the National Government to exclude aliens from the country is undoubted and sweeping. 'That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power.' Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603604, 9 S.Ct. 623, 629, 32 L.Ed. 1068 (1889). 'The power of congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively . . . is settled by our previous adjudications.' Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547, 15 S.Ct. 967, 970, 39 L.Ed. 1082 (1895). See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1021, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 9799, 23 S.Ct. 611, 613614, 47 L.Ed. 721 (1903); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289290, 24 S.Ct. 719, 722, 48 L.Ed. 979 (1904); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 335336, 29 S.Ct. 671, 674675, 53 L.Ed. 1013 (1909); United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425, 53 S.Ct. 665, 667, 77 L.Ed. 1298 (1933).
Since 1875, Congress has given 'almost continuous attention . . . to the problems of immigration and of excludability of certain defined classes of aliens. The pattern generally has been one of increasing control . . ..' Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, 408 U.S., at 761762, 92 S.Ct., at 2581. It was only as the illegal entry of aliens multiplied that Congress addressed itself to enforcement mechanisms. In 1917, immigration authorities were authorized to board and search all conveyances by which aliens were being brought into the United States. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, § 16, 39 Stat. 886. This basic authority, substantially unchanged, is incorporated in 8 U.S.C. 1225(a).
The judgment of Congress obviously was that there are circumstances in which it is reasonably necessary, in the enforcement of the immigration laws, to search vehicles and other private property for aliens, without warrant or probable cause, and at locations other than at the border. To disagree with this legislative judgment is to invalidate 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3) in the face of the contrary opinion of Congress that its legislation comported with the standard of reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment. This I am quite unwilling to do.
'Stopping the automobile ten miles from the Mexican border to search for illegal aliens was reasonable. See United States v. McDaniel, (463 F.2d 129 (CA5 1972)); United States v. Warner, 5 Cir. 1971, 441 F.2d 821; Marsh v. United States, 5 Cir. 1965, 344 F.2d 317, 8 U.S.C. 1225, 1357; 19 U.S.C. 482, 1581, 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1973); 19 C.F.R. §§ 23.1(d), 23.11 (1972). Once the vehicle was reasonably stopped pursuant to an authorized border check the agents were empowered to search the vehicle, including the trunk, for aliens.' Id., at 171.
Moreover, '(n)either Carroll, supra, nor other cases in this Court require or suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords.' Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S., at 50, 90 S.Ct., at 1980. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458 464, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 20332037, 29 L.Ed.2d 564.
I am in accord with the Court's conclusion that nothing in § 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3), or in 8 CFR § 287.1 serves to authorize an otherwise unconstitutional search.
The Solicitor General's brief in this Court states explicitly that 'We . . . do not take the position that the checking operations are justified because the officers have probable cause or even 'reasonable suspicion' to believe, with respect to each vehicle checked, that it contains an illegal alien. Apart from the reasonableness of establishment of the checking operation in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Border Patrol officers had any special or particular reason to stop petitioner and examine his car.' Brief for the United States 910.
Depending upon the circumstances, there may be probable cause for the search to be authorized only for a designated portion of a particular road or such cause may exist for a designated area which may contain one or more roads or tracks. Particularly along much of the Mexican border, there are vast areas of uninhabited desert and arid land which are traversed by few, if any, main roads or highways, but which nevertheless may afford opportunitiesby virtue of their isolated characterfor the smuggling of aliens.
The facts, except for when petitioner was stopped, are taken from the oral stipulation in open court. See App. 1114. The time petitioner was stopped is given by the Complaint as 12:15 a.m., App. 4, while petitioner testified at trial that he was 'stopped about 1:00.' 3 Tr. of Rec. 62.
In a separate dissent Mr. Justice Black, joined by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stewart, also emphasized that the ultimate test of legality under the Fourth Amendment was whether the search and seizure were reasonable. Id., at 7981, 90 S.Ct., at 778779.
In the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3) has also been sustained in, e.g., Mienke v. United States, 452 F.2d 1076 (1971); United States v. Marin, 444 F.2d 86 (1971); Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (1970); United States v. Sanchez-Mata, 429 F.2d 1391 (1970); United States v. Avey, 428 F.2d 1159 (1970); United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283 (1970); and United States v. Elder, 425 F.2d 1002 (1970). See also Valenzuela-Garcia v. United States, 425 F.2d 1170 (1970), and Barba-Reyes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91 (1967).
The United States does not contend, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, and I do not suggest that any search of a vehicle for aliens within 100 miles of the border pursuant to 8 CFR § 287.1 would pass constitutional muster. The possible invalidity of the regulation and of 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3) in other circumstances is not at issue here.
NEW YORK, Petitioner v. Joseph BURGER.
UNITED STATES v. John David KOPP.
UNITED STATES v. Ralph Allan ROSE.
Raymond J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellant, v. Douglas DEWEY et al.

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