Source: https://kurthking.com/tag/retaliation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:46:03+00:00

Document:
A staffing agency places you to work fairly long-term for a company. The company treats you as an independent contractor, and you sign numerous documents to that effect. The company pays a set amount to the staffing agency which pockets part and pays you, along with payroll taxes and insurance. Are you the company’s employee? Often the answer is YES.
with the staffing firm states that she is an independent contractor.
her work is unacceptable to the client.
are joint employers of CP.
As the EEOC indicates, it makes no difference that documents state that the worker is an independent contractor and not an employee. Substance trumps form.
Wright v. Habco: Missouri sides with the EEOC, its Supreme Court having dealt with this set of facts long ago in Wright v. Habco, 419 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1967). There plaintiff Wright fell off a scaffold and sued Habco at common law for his injuries. The trial court sustained Habco’s motion for summary judgment, ruling plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was under workers’ compensation law. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.
When he fell, Manpower, Inc. employed Wright. Manpower furnished workers to its customers, usually on a temporary basis. Manpower sent Wright out to work for defendant Habco on a project to extensively renovate a building.
Manpower furnished no equipment to plaintiff Wright, merely instructing him as to who to report to at Habco to begin his work. Habco’s foreman bossed Wright on the job, directing him as to what work to do. Without question, Habco controlled the work done by Wright.
Manpower paid Wright $1.25 an hour; Habco in turn paid Manpower $1.97 per hour that Wright worked. Manpower paid for workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance on Wright and its other workers, and withheld social security and income tax withholdings from Wright’s wages.
Habco’s president stated in his deposition that he did not consider Wright to have been its employee, but rather an employee of Manpower.
Regardless, the Court held Wright to have been an employee of Habco, and his relief limited to that afforded him under Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law.
Tolentino v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide: More recently, the Supreme Court held defendant Starwood (owner of Westin Hotel Management which operates the Westin Crown Center hotel in Kansas City, Missouri) to be the joint employer of plaintiff Tolentino, a housekeeper whose services Starwood contracted with a temporary staffing agency to receive. 437 S.W.3d 754 (Mo. banc 2014).
The arrangement was that Starwood informed GLS (the temporary staffing agency) how many housekeepers the hotel needed and GLS provided them. Starwood paid GLS $5 per room cleaned. GLS was to pay the housekeepers and satisfy payroll withholdings requirements. GLS paid Tolentino $3.50 per room cleaned.
In February 2008, GLS assigned Tolentino to clean at the hotel. In April of that year, Starwood notified GLS that it no longer wanted Tolentino to work as a housekeeper at the hotel because he failed to complete his work in a timely fashion.
Unfortunately, GLS failed to comply with Missouri’s Minimum Wage Law. Tolentino ended up filing a class action in Missouri state court against Starwood as his employer liable under the Law.
Starwood moved for summary judgment, denying that it was Tolentino’s employer. The trial court granted the motion. Tolentino appealed to the Western District of the Court of Appeals, asserting that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether GLS and Starwood were his joint employers.
(4) who maintains work records.
In Tolentino’s case, the appellate court found issues of fact existed regarding the hotel’s (Starwood) authority to hire and fire, finding that by directing GLS not to assign Tolentino to the hotel any longer, as a practical matter Starwood could prevent the worker from working for the hotel. Factor One favored Tolentino in the eyes of the Court.
Factor Two regarding supervision and control was also decided in favor of the worker—the hotel assigned rooms to be cleaned by particular housekeepers, upheld its cleaning standards, inspected the rooms for cleanliness, and required unsatisfactory work to be redone. Further, the work was simple and easily supervised.
The court also ruled Factor Three on rate and method of payment in favor of the worker, noting that the hotel paid GLS, which in turn paid the housekeepers. But, the hotel established, and raised, the pay per room arrangement, indicating the hotel retained substantial control over the rate and method of pay.
Tolentino also raised issue of fact with regard to Factor Four concerning maintenance of work records, asserting that the hotel maintained time sheets and productivity records which it used to “fire” him from working for the hotel/Starwood.
Based on these factors, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial.
Beaver v. Jacuzzi Brothers, 454 F.2d 284 (CA8 1972): This diversity case from Arkansas arose when a temporary worker from Kelly Girl, Inc., fell on a greasy floor while on temporary assignment to Jacuzzi Brothers. She sued Jacuzzi Brothers for common law tort. The District Court denied her, finding she was an employee of Jacuzzi Brothers and limited to workers compensation benefits based on the right of control of her performance Jacuzzi Brothers had over the work of the temporary employee.
In conclusion, workers may actually be the company’s employee–temporary or permanent–and entitled to protection by law from retaliation and discrimination.
The words of the WPA limits its application to “at-will” employment. What about cases where there a contract provision limits the reasons for which an employee may be lawfully terminated? Does the WPA apply to wrongful termination for violation of public policy in a contract setting? Apparently not.
Where a contract limits the reasons for which an employee may be discharged, the employment is not at-will in that regard. When a labor agreement or other contract (Corporate Integrity Agreement?) prohibits retaliatory firing of an employees in violation of public policy set forth by constitution/statute/regulation, the employment is not at-will and the WPA should not apply.
Missouri courts have long so held that employment is not at-will where “there is a contract “pertaining to the duration of the employment or limiting the reasons for which the employee may be discharged . . . .” Maddock v. Lewis, 386 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Mo. 1965) (suit against railroad for breach of union contract); Williams v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 294 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Mo. 1956) (count II against Anheuser-Busch for breach of collective bargaining agreement).
More recently, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Keveney v. Missouri Military Academy, 304 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Mo. banc 2010), where it extended the claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy to cover contract employees (a teacher), in addition to at-will employees.
In short, the new whistleblower law should apply only to at-will employees, not reaching claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where a contract limits the employer’s right to terminate an employee.
An informative case regarding constructive discharge of pharmaceutical and medical employees is Smith v. LHC Group, No. 17-5850, 2018 WL 1136072 (6th Circuit March 2, 2018). There the director of nursing reported to management certain health care fraud by co-employees. However, the profitable fraudulent practices continued, leaving Smith the choice of turning a blind eye which could cause criminal charges against her and the loss of her nursing license, or resign. The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiff nurse was constructively discharged, in a thorough and reasoned opinion.
The plaintiff’s case of constructive discharge would have been even stronger had she been personally instructed act in violation of law.
Note that HIPAA provides stiff fines and imprisonment for those that violate its provisions. Under 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6, violation of HIPAA by unauthorized access to PHI carries a maximum $50,000 fine, up to 1 year imprisonment, or both. If done for commercial advantage, the fine increases to $250,000 with 10 year imprisonment.
Sales representatives, employees, and contract workers who refuse the employer’s directions due to HIPAA violation concerns may find themselves between a rock and a hard place–eventual discharge or criminal law violations.
“The question of intent is paramount in any analysis of an alleged third party beneficiary situation.
Laclede Inv. Corp. v. Kaiser, 596 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1980), citing Stephens v. Great Southern Savings & Loan Assn, 421 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1967).
“The intention of the parties is to be gleaned from the four corners, and if uncertain or ambiguous, from the circumstances surrounding its execution.” Drury Company v. Missouri United School Insurance Counsel, 455 S.W.3d 30 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2014) (upheld subcontractor’s right to sue, as an intended beneficiary, an insurer on its property damage policy issued to the owner of property).
“Although it is not necessary that the third party beneficiary be named in the contract, the terms of the contract must express directly and clearly an intent to benefit an identifiable person or class.” L.A.C. ex rel. B.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 260 (Mo. 2002) (young girl raped at mall sued security company for breach of its contract with the mall; held she may do so as an intended beneficiary of the contract).
The Third Party Beneficiary doctrine may apply in many different situations. For example, a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA), between the pharma company and the government requiring reporting of non-compliance with laws and regulations, may well protect the employees from retaliation for such reports and for participating in investigations regarding those reports.
The question is whether those caps will stand. Similar damage caps were struck down as to medical malpractice actions in Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633 (Missouri Supreme Court 2012), as an unconstitutional restriction upon the common law right to trial by jury.
With the amendments to the Missouri Human Rights Act, effective August 2017, the contributing factor standard is no more.
Claimants now must meet a MOTIVATING FACTOR standard. “Motivating factor” means “the employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse action or decision and had determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.” See section 213.010(19), RSMo.

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