Source: http://www.sattlerbogen.com/recent-rulings/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:36:49+00:00

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Following a two-day trial, a jury in the District Court of Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska returned a verdict in favor of the railroad on an employee’s claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Plaintiff claimed he injured his right shoulder while working on a steel gang and operating a claw bar to remove a bent spike. After the incident, plaintiff underwent rotator cuff surgery and returned to work for the railroad.
Plaintiff complained the railroad failed to provide him with a hydraulic spike puller on the spiker machine to remove the spike. At trial, he conceded one was available elsewhere on the gang, but he never asked for it. Ultimately, the evidence showed that the hydraulic spike puller would have been unable to remove the spike due to the spike’s condition. Plaintiff then argued the claw bar was not reasonably safe because BNSF knew it could slip and did not do anything about it. Despite this claim, he admitted it was the right tool for the job, reasonably safe, and he was trained on how to use the tool and continues to use it.
The railroad demonstrated plaintiff’s negligence in operating the claw bar. A welding foreman who witnessed the incident testified that he saw plaintiff struggle using the claw bar and radioed for him to stop so the foreman could assist. The foreman claimed plaintiff made eye contact with him, but continued to push on the claw bar anyway and it slipped off the spike. The railroad showed that plaintiff was trained to use the claw bar to anticipate slipping and his overexertion while encountering difficulty was the reason the claw bar slipped. Eventually, plaintiff accepted some personal responsibility for the incident.
The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the railroad. Plaintiff did not appeal.
Frailey v. BNSF Railway Company, Case No. CI 13-641 (Neb.Dist.Ct. Feb. 14, 2017).
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit recently affirmed the decision of the District Court of Nebraska that granted the trucking company summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims. The Court held the trucking company’s policy of requiring sleep apnea screening for drivers with a body mass index (BMI) of 33 or greater was a permissible medical exam under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). The Court found that the trucking company’s evidence established the medical exam was job-related and consistent with business necessity.
Parker v. Crete Carrier Corp., In the U.S. District Court of Nebraska, aff’d, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir.) pet. for rehearing den’d (Nov. 16, 216).
The railroad was granted summary judgment on a driver’s negligence claims arising out of an incident where she drove her vehicle into a railcar at a railroad crossing. The driver initiated a lawsuit against the railroad claiming the railroad was negligent in occupying the railroad crossing, failing to warn of the train’s presence in the crossing, failing to reflectorize the railcar over the crossing and failing to comply with unidentified federal laws, regulations and/or internal policies.
The railroad moved for summary judgment on all of the driver’s claims arguing the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”) preempted her blocked crossing, inadequate warning device, and railcar reflectorization claims. The train was briefly over the crossing while the train crew was preparing to perform mandatory air brake tests after picking up railcars nearby. FRSA preemption was proper because the train crew complied with applicable federal regulations, federal funding participated in the installation of the reflectorized crossbucks at the crossing, the owner of the railcar had complied with federal regulations regarding reflectorization and the railcar was not required to be reflectorized at the time of the collision. The facts showed the locomotive horn was sounded prior to entering the crossing and the train was only stopped for about a minute before the driver ran into the railcar. The railroad also argued the claims failed as a matter of law because the driver could not show any of the alleged negligent conduct of the railroad caused her claimed injuries. Finally, the railroad argued the occupied crossing doctrine and the driver’s own negligence that was more than slight barred her claims.
The driver withdrew her failure to warn claims and the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota granted summary judgment on the remainder of her claims. Relying on authority from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and the District of South Dakota, the Court held that the FRSA preempted the blocked crossing claim. The driver argued for an exception to FRSA preemption based upon the railroad’s alleged violations of federal regulations and/or internal rules while the railroad produced evidence of its compliance. Ultimately, the Court stated it did not need to address the claimed violations because the driver could not show the claimed violation was the proximate cause of her injuries. The collision was not a foreseeable consequence of any possible violation of the regulation or rules. Summary judgment in favor of the railroad was proper.
Jennifer Lynn Stock v. BNSF Railway Company, Case No. 4:14-cv-04074, 2016 WL 4572188 (D.S.D. August 31, 2016).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit recently affirmed the decision of the U. S. District Court for the District of Nebraska that granted the railroad summary judgment in an obesity and perceived disability discrimination case. The Court held that the railroad did not discriminate against an obese job applicant in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12102 et seq., or as amended, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). After receiving a conditional job offer for a safety sensitive position, the applicant was denied employment “…in accordance with company policy that [the applicant] was ‘Not currently qualified for the safety sensitive Machinist position due to significant health and safety risks associated with Class 3 obesity (Body Mass Index of 40 or greater).’” (emphasis in original). The applicant claimed his morbid obesity was an impairment or he was perceived as having an impairment by the railroad.
The Court also found no evidence of perceived disability discrimination. Appellant argued that the railroad “refused to hire him because it considered his obesity to present an unacceptably high risk that he would develop certain medical conditions in the future, and that [the railroad] therefore perceived him as having a current physical impairment.” The Court explained, “The ADA does not prohibit discrimination based on a perception that a physical characteristic—as opposed to a physical impairment—may eventually lead to a physical impairment as defined under the Act. Instead, the plain language of the ADA prohibits actions based on an existing impairment or the perception of an existing impairment. As noted by the district court, the EEOC’s own interpretive guidance specifically states that ‘the definition [of impairment] … does not include characteristic predisposition to illness or disease.'” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App’x § 1630.2(h).
Morris 8th Cir Opinion 4-5-16.
Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1319407 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016). Oral argument, Bryan Neal, Thompson Knight; On the brief, Nichole Bogen.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment in favor of the railroad against three plaintiffs in a lawsuit alleging retaliation for engaging in a protected activity under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), 49 U.S.C. § 20109. During a train crew change in rural Iowa, an outbound crew member was injured. Plaintiffs in the FRSA case, three inbound crew members, and three additional crew members were subjected to a formal investigation, pursuant to their respective collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”), to determine whether they had violated company rules during the crew change. All six were disciplined for rules violations following the formal investigation. Plaintiffs claimed they were disciplined contrary to 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(1)(C) [providing information related to an investigation of “a violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation relating to railroad safety or security…”], when they reported “violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (“FELA”), in post-incident statements to their supervisor, to a claims representative, and while testifying at the formal investigation.
The railroad moved for summary judgment on three grounds. First, plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regarding some of their claims. Plaintiffs claimed administrative exhaustion was not mandatory. The Court held plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative remedies with OSHA under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d), citing the Eighth Circuit’s previous statement that “an employee may obtain de novo review of a retaliation claim in federal court after exhausting administrative remedies.” Kuduk v. BNSF Ry. Co., 768 F.3d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 2014). The Court found plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies related to post-incident statements provided to a claims representative, their claims of excessive operations testing post-incident, or to their claims that they withheld themselves from work to avoid further discipline.
Second, the railroad asserted that some of plaintiffs’ claims required arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (“RLA”), rather than litigation under the FRSA. The Court held plaintiffs’ claims were independent of their CBA and did not require CBA interpretation.
Third and most significantly, the Court agreed plaintiffs failed to set forth a prima facie case of FRSA retaliation. Initially, the Court held plaintiffs did not engage in a protected activity under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(1)(C). The Court held the FELA, a general negligence statute, did not specifically prohibit the conditions plaintiffs claimed were unsafe. Additionally, the Court noted the report of an unsafe condition under the FRSA would fall under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(b), “Hazardous safety or security conditions” and interpreting the report of an unsafe condition as also a report of a violation of federal law under section (a) would make the statutory provisions redundant.
Additionally, even if the Court accepted plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity, the Court found no evidence their activities contributed to the discipline they received. The Court explained that temporal proximity, without more, is insufficient to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation. Plaintiffs’ disagreements with the railroad regarding the legitimacy of their rules violations were not relevant to the Court’s analysis. The Court reaffirmed the Eighth Circuit’s admonition that “[f]ederal courts do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” See Kuduk, 768 F.3d at 792.
Foster, et. al. v. BNSF Railway Company, Case No. 4:14-cv-313 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 28, 2016). Order.
The Douglas County District Court of Nebraska granted partial summary judgment in favor of the railroad on plaintiff’s Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”), 49 U.S.C. § 20701, claim. Later, the Court denied the railroad’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51, claim, however the Court still dismissed plaintiff’s case for failure of prosecution. The case involved two falls by an engineer occurring on back-to-back days. On the first day, he claimed he fell down locomotive steps due to the lack of a handrail, and on the subsequent day, he fell on ballast that was “uneven” and “gave way” in a railyard while he was walking to a crew van. He claimed permanent and debilitating injuries to his knee.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of the railroad under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), 49 U.S.C. § 20109. The Court held the railroad did not discipline an employee as a result of filing a personal injury report. While working as a laborer replacing rail, plaintiff stepped between loose and fixed rail and his foot became pinned. The railroad investigated the incident determining plaintiff violated various rules and disciplined him accordingly. Plaintiff alleged the railroad disciplined him for reporting his work-related personal injury. Plaintiff argued the injury report was a contributing factor to his discipline because the railroad would not have known he violated any rules had he not suffered an injury as a result. He sought damages for lost wages, pain and suffering, attorneys’ fees and punitive damages.
The railroad moved for summary judgment asking the Court to dismiss the case because plaintiff could not prove a prima facie case under the FRSA. The railroad demonstrated plaintiff’s report of his work-related injury did not contribute to the discipline assessed and introduced evidence the railroad would have assessed the same discipline regardless of whether he reported his injury.
In the opinion, the Court reiterated the elements of a claim under the FRSA under Kuduk v. BNSF Railway Company, 768 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff was required to show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the railroad knew he engaged in a protected activity; (3) he suffered an adverse action; and (4) the circumstances raised an inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. In analyzing the last element of plaintiff’s claim, the Court stated, “the contributing factor that an employee must prove is intentional retaliation prompted by the employee engaging the protected activity.” In rejecting the plaintiff’s position, the Court found that it “cannot accept the implication that an injury report is a ‘contributing factor’ to an adverse action simply because it is a part of the administrative process which resulted in discipline.” The Court granted the railroad’s motion for summary judgment holding there was no evidence of intentional retaliation prompted by the plaintiff’s report of his injury.
Heim v. BNSF Railway Company, Case NO. 8:13-CV-369, 2015 WL 5775599 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2015).

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