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This book offers a unique comparison between state and individual responsibility for international crimes and examines the theories that can explain the relationship between these two regimes. The study provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the relevant international practice from the standpoint of both international criminal law, and in particular the case law of international criminal tribunals, and state responsibility. The author shows the various connections and issues arising from the parallel establishment of state and individual responsibility for the commission of the same international crimes. These connections indicate a growing need to better co-ordinate these regimes of international responsibility. The author maintains that a general conception, according to which state and individual responsibility are two separate sets of secondary rules attached to the breach of the same primary norms, can help to solve the various issues relating to this dual responsibility. This conception of the complementarity between state and individual responsibility justifies co-ordination and consistent application of these two different regimes, each of which aims to foster compliance with the most important obligations owed to the international community as a whole.
1920 (detail). Fresco by Giulio Rolland, XIX Century. University of Macerata, Aula Magna.
1. Criminal liability (International law) 2. International oﬀenses. 3. Government liability.
4. Administrative responsibility. 5. Superior orders (Criminal law) I. Title.
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers and VSP.
recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.
Chapter 4 The Overlap of the Psychological Element: Mens Rea v.
throughout the preparation of this book.
Needless to say, I bear sole responsibility for any errors or omissions.
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.
Max Planck Y. UN L.
NYU J. Int’l L. Pol.
to both individual and state crimes.
and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment, 26 February 2007, <www.icj-cij.org>.
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, TC, Judgment, 17 January 2005.
the mens rea necessary to ﬁnd an accused liable for the same crime under international criminal law.
Serbia and Montenegro instituted proceedings before the ICJ against ten NATO Member States.
Reports 2004, p. 865 et seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v.
1999, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 761 et seq.; ICJ, Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
ICJ Reports 1999, p. 916 et seq.
.un.org/Docs/sc>. This case is further discussed in Chapter 7.
SC Resolution 1593(2005) of 31 March 2005, <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 101, 2003.
further discussed in Chapter 3.
the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 11 July 1996, supra note 1, para. 32.
responsibility.” ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 142.
linked but does not clarify the elements of such a relationship.
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 30 NYU J. Int’l L. Pol. (1997–1998), pp. 161–162.
S. Rosenne, supra note 12, pp. 163–164.
A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 271.
P.-M. Dupuy, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsibility of the State’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?’, 18 EJIL (2007), pp. 631–648.
State Responsibility for Genocide’, 5 JICJ (2007), pp. 875–887.
Boston, M. Nijhoﬀ, 2005), pp. 253–270.
crimes. International jurisdictions are increasingly confronted by such problems.
crimes in a systematic and consistent manner.
Second, the relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes strikingly has not yet been the object of systematic theoretical inquiry.
and individual responsibility for international crimes has rarely been addressed.
emerge to enrich the debate on this subject.
the international community as a whole and its possible legal consequences.
out on the basis of a three-step analysis.
from the relationship between state and individual responsibility.
the most signiﬁcant problems entailed by the relationship between these regimes.
actually been addressed and solved.
more eﬀective co-ordination between them.
individual responsibility, may need some preliminary clariﬁcation.
CN.4/507/Add.4, para. 407; J. Crawford, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/517, paras. 48–9). This aspect is examined in detail infra in Chapter 8.
framework in which the following analysis will be developed.
international law are examined infra in this Chapter.
deﬁnition adopted by A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.
concerning international organizations) will not be taken into account.
Theoretical Framework’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. I (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 1999), p. 21; F. Malekian, ‘International Criminal Responsibility’, in M.C.
the punishment of individuals who have perpetrated international crimes.
S. Plawski, Etude des principes fondamentaux du droit international pénal (Paris, LGDJ, 1972); L.S.
and the crime of aggression, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>.
The developments concerning these crimes are illustrated infra in this Chapter.
For example, the Rome Statute explicitly gives the ICC jurisdiction only over natural persons.
the ICTY Statute (SC Res. 827(1993)), and Article 1 of the ICTR Statute (SC Res. 955 (1994)).
and the punishment of the oﬀenders are the tasks of competent criminal tribunals.
UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, p. 12, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/ index.html>.
A. Cassese, supra note 4, p. 57.
2008, 106 states have become parties to the ICC Statute (see <www.icc-cpi.int>).
E. Skaar et al. (eds.), Roads to Reconciliation (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2005), pp. 55–79.
World War I. For a study of the relevant practice, see R.S. Clark and M. Sann (eds.), The Prosecution of International Crimes (New Brunswick, London, Transaction Publishers, 1996); M.C.
nationales et crimes internationaux (Paris, PUF, 2002); A. Cassese, supra note 4, pp. 277–326.
40 GYIL (1997), pp. 280–299; M. Henzelin, Le principe de l’universalité en droit pénal international.
by bodies diﬀerent from those dealing with state responsibility.
in 1 JICJ (2003), p. 580 et seq.
12 September 2000, and Mexico Supreme Court, Decision of 11 June 2003, <www.derechos.
org>; House of Lords, Jones case, Judgment of 29 March 2006, <www.publications.parliament.
analysis will essentially focus on this speciﬁc regime of state responsibility.
interests of the entire international community. Today, aggravated state responsibility is supported by international practice and has been codiﬁed by the ILC.
Obligations in International Law’, 46 AJPIL (1994), pp. 131–166; A. Cassese, supra note 3, pp.
200–1; P. Picone, ‘Obblighi erga omnes e codiﬁcazione della responsabilità degli Stati’, 88 Riv.
la responsabilité des Etats (Paris, PUF, 2005). See also C.T. Eustathiades, ‘Les sujets du droit international et la responsabilité internationale. Nouvelles tendances’, 84 RCADI (1953), p. 534.
R. Ago, ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1976), vol. II(1), p. 24 et seq.
community of states as a whole as a norm from which non derogation is possible” (Article 53).
internazionale’, in Scritti giuridici in onore di Santi Romano, vol. III (Padova, Cedam, 1940), pp.
apartheid, and massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.
around the concept of obligations owed to the international community as a whole.
originates from the breach of obligations characterized by a particular structure.
to react against such breaches.
See infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
ILC commentary on Article 40, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol.
II(2), pp. 112–113, paras. 4–5.
provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on second reading, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L 600).
referred to the same examples of breaches entailing aggravated state responsibility.
codiﬁed in Article 41 and the consequences of serious breaches listed therein.
than a ‘cosmetic’ change in the law of responsibility”.
whole are aspects of a single basic idea, there is at the very least substantial overlap between them.
‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), pp. 111–112, para. 7).
the international community as a whole (see infra notes 31–34).
of the consequences but the subjects entitled to react against serious breaches.
response to those serious breaches.
J. Crawford, ‘First Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.2, para. 73.
ILC commentary to Article 41, ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol.
II(2), p. 114, para. 3.
been a matter of signiﬁcant concern to States (see, in particular, the comments on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility by Austria, France, Germany, and Ireland, UN Doc. A/CN.4/488).
19 on State Responsibility (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1989).
of General Interest’, 13 EJIL (2002), pp. 1221–1239.
those used to establish individual liability for international crimes.
Gulf crisis, the South Africa regime of apartheid, and interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
della proporzionalità nell’ordinamento internazionale (Milano, Giuﬀré, 2000), pp. 409–14.
13 EJIL (2002), pp. 1161–1180.
The seriousness requirement will be examined infra in Chapter 3.
considered to deﬁne this overlap with more precision.
See infra Chapters 5 and 8.
the international community as a whole. International law scholars are divided on the matter.
as far as primary norms39 are concerned.
entire international community, and having the same structure, that is, establishing a legal relation between the state or the individual and the international community as a whole.
The fact is that this unity apparently breaks down at the stage of secondary norms.
tra norme internazionali di jus cogens e norme che producono obblighi erga omnes’, 91 Riv. Dir.
Riv. Dir. Int. (2004), pp. 929–954.
of secondary rules, see, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.
79–99 (originally published in 1961).
secondary norms can be recomposed.
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 EJIL (2002), pp. 857–8, and infra Chapter 3).
of force in international relations, and that in particular it prohibits aggression.
with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted on 24 October 1970.
573(1985), 580(1985), 581(1986), 611(1988), and 667(1990), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>.
Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, <www.icj-cij.org>.
GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), adopted on 14 December 1974.
(ILC, ‘Report on the Work of its 53rd Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 112).
by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression”.
For a recent case, see House of Lords, Jones case, supra note 18.
After World War II, the importance of international humanitarian law was reafﬁrmed, together with the complete ban on the use of force in international relations.
The material element of the crime of aggression is discussed at length below (see infra Chapter 3).
The Hague regulations on the laws of war date back to the 19th Century. See in general J.W.
Garner, ‘Punishment of Oﬀenders against the Laws and Customs of War’, 14 AJIL (1920), pp.
International Approaches (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997).
Session’, YILC (2001), vol. II(2), p. 113, para. 5).
Sick in Armies in the Field.

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