Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180405_0000468.NIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:22:37+00:00

Document:
STUCKY, LAUER & YOUNG, LLP, Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Samuel Maloy's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 12]. The Plaintiff filed his Complaint [ECF No. 1] on August 9, 2017. Defendant Stucky, Lauer & Young LLP timely filed its Answer [ECF No. 9] on October 10, 2017. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff brings four claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., (FDCPA) against the Defendant. The instant matter involves only Count I, whether the Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this letter to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it. If you do not dispute it within that period, I'll assume that it is valid. If you do dispute it, I will as required by the law, obtain and mail to you proof of the debt.
The Defendant raised five affirmative defenses in its Answer, only two of which are pertinent to the instant Motion. The Defendant's Third Affirmative Defense raised a statutory defense based on bona fide error. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (“A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”). Its Fourth Affirmative Defense is based on the idea of a “safe harbor.” The Seventh Circuit has held that a debt collector can invoke the “safe harbor” doctrine to avoid liability under the FDCPA so long as the debt collector uses certain language in its initial communication. See Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997). The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's Third Affirmative Defense impermissibly states a legal conclusion and that the Defendant's Fourth Affirmative Defense must fail because the Defendant did not use the safe harbor language in its initial communication. As such, the Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to partial judgment on the pleadings.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment after the plaintiff has filed a complaint and the defendant has filed an answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The reviewing court must consider only the pleadings, which “include the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits.” N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). “Where the plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings, the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the non-moving party cannot prove facts sufficient to support [its] position.” Hous. Auth. Risk Retention Grp. v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 378 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing All Am. Ins. Co. v. Broeren Russo Const., Inc., 112 F.Supp.2d 723, 728 (C.D. Ill. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). Judgment may be granted on the pleadings only if “all material allegations of fact are admitted or not controverted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain to be decided by the district court.” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d ed. 2017).

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