Source: https://www.cunninghambounds.com/blog/2017/march/state-immunity-lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdicti/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 07:06:51+00:00

Document:
Woodfin v. Bender, [Ms. 1150797, Mar. 31, 2017] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2017). The Court, in a plurality opinion (Main, J., Stuart and Wise, J.J., concur; Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, and Bryan, J.J., concur in the result) holds the Jefferson Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to award 24 classified employees of the Birmingham Board of Education monetary relief stemming from their claims that the Superintendent of the Birmingham City School System and the members of the Birmingham Board of Education in their official capacities incorrectly miscalculated plaintiffs’ salaries following adoption in 2004 of a new salary schedule. The Court holds that because the amounts claimed for past-due salaries was disputed, the Birmingham Education officials had discretion in making salary determinations and payments and were therefore entitled to state immunity under Article I, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 872-73 (Ala. 2004).
“Section 14 immunity is not absolute; there are actions that are not barred by the general rule of immunity.
Ex parte Hampton, 189 So. 3d 14, 17-18 (Ala. 2015).
Vandenberg v. Aramark Educ. Servs., Inc., 81 So. 3d 326, 332 (Ala. 2011).
Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1130-31 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Alabama Dep’t of Transp. v. Harbert Int’l, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831, 839-40 (Ala. 2008)).
Here, however, the plaintiffs did not “seek construction of a statute and its application in a given situation.” Ms. *11, quoting Hampton, supra, 189 So. 3d at 18. Instead, the plaintiffs sought a construction of the Board’s policy and monetary relief. Therefore, the declaratory-judgment “exception” to § 14 immunity did not apply. Ms. *12, citing Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 2006).
“Generally, mandamus relief is available in certain situations to compel a State officer to perform the ministerial act of tendering payment of liquidated or certain sums the State is legally obligated to pay under a contract. State Highway Dep’t v. Milton Constr. Co., 586 So. 2d 872, 875 (Ala. 1991); see also [Alabama Agric. and Mech. Univ. v.] Jones, 895 So. 2d  at 877-79 [(Ala. 2004)](describing as ‘well-established [the] rule that a writ of mandamus will issue to compel payment of only such claims as are liquidated’ and noting that prior caselaw had held ‘that payment for goods or services, for which the State had contracted and accepted, could be compelled by mandamus’); and State Bd. of Admin. v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 124, 117 So. 757, 760 (1928) (‘the claim asserted [against the State was] for an amount fixed or determinable by the terms of the contract of sale,’ and was ‘definite and certain, ... and not an unliquidated claim, in the sense that would render mandamus unavailable’).
“We find our opinions in Milton Construction Co. v. State Highway Department, 568 So. 2d 784 (Ala. 1990) (‘Milton I’), and State Highway Department v. Milton Construction Co., 586 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1991) (‘Milton II’), dispositive on this issue. In Milton I, the plaintiff, Milton Construction Company, asked the trial court to declare the disincentive clause of an ‘incentive/disincentive-payments provision’ in two highway-construction contracts it had entered into with ALDOT (then called ‘the Highway Department’) void and unenforceable as a penalty. Milton Construction further asked the trial court to order the defendants – the State, ALDOT, and ALDOT’s director – to pay it the amounts of ‘disincentive payments’ ALDOT had allegedly wrongfully withheld. On appeal, this Court held that the ‘disincentive clause’ in the contracts was ‘void as a penalty and therefore unenforceable,’ 568 So. 2d at 791, and remanded the case.
“‘It is true that § 14 of the Constitution prevents a suit against the state as well as suits against its agencies. See Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81 (Ala. 1989); Rutledge v. Baldwin County Comm’n, 495 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1986). However, this Court has also recognized that there are certain established exceptions to the protection afforded the state or its agencies by sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65, 68 (Ala. 1981). Among those recognized exceptions are actions brought to force state employees or agencies to perform their legal duties. Id. See also Nix and Vercelli, Immunities Available In Alabama For Cities, Counties And Other Governmental Entities, And Their Officials, 13 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 615 (1989).
“‘... Once the Highway Department has legally contracted under state law for goods or services and accepts such goods or services, the Highway Department also becomes legally obligated to pay for the goods or services accepted in accordance with the terms of the contract. It follows that this obligation is not subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and is enforceable in the courts. See, e.g., Gunter v. Beasley, 414 So. 2d 41 (Ala. 1982); State Board of Administration v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 117 So. 757 (1928).
“‘It is undisputed that Milton Construction has already rendered the services called for under the contract. Consequently, we hold that this lawsuit is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because it is in the nature of an action to compel state officers to perform their legal duties and pay Milton Construction for services contracted for and rendered. Gunter, supra; Roquemore,supra.
“Milton II, 586 So. 2d at 875. This Court thus upheld the trial court’s judgment holding that the moneys withheld under the disincentive clause were due to be paid to Milton Construction.
990 So. 2d at 842-44.
Harbert, 990 So. 2d at 845-46.
990 So. 2d at 849 (Murdock, J., concurring specially).
Ms. *12-17, quoting Harbert, 990 So. 2d at 845-46. Because in this case the evidence established that the defendants did not act arbitrarily but instead based on the language in the 2004 policy afforded them discretion in making salary determinations, they were entitled to § 14 immunity, and the trial court was therefore divested of subject-matter jurisdiction.

References: v. 
 § 14
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 14
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 14
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 14