Source: https://www.stevenkriegerlaw.com/blog/category/plain%20english%20guide
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 17:09:16+00:00

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“Every attorney shall be liable to his client for any damage sustained by the client through the neglect of his duty as such attorney.” This statutory provision stands for the common sense principle that attorneys are responsible for the actions they take as counsellors and representatives of their clients—just like everyone else who acts on behalf of others or who interacts with others. However, because of the place where this principle stands, at the intersection of many areas of the law, this statutory obligation is not as straightforward as it appears.
In civil situations, which is the area where most people will come into contact with, or require the services of, attorneys, a standard of ordinary care applies. However, what happens when a client believes that his or her counsel has breached that ordinary duty of care?
The client was damaged as a proximate result of the attorney’s failure to perform.
Nevertheless, it is possible that a third party could be what is known in the legal world as a “third party beneficiary” of legal services, and therefore, can stand in the shoes of the client for purposes of a legal malpractice claim. For example, if a person engages an attorney to make out a will, and in the process names a specific beneficiary, that beneficiary is essentially the intended beneficiary of the agreement between the lawyer and the client. If the attorney fails to properly safeguard the estate while making a will so that the assets do not pass to the client’s intended beneficiary, that beneficiary may be able to state a claim for malpractice against the attorney if the attorney cannot correct the error after the death of the testator. This is precisely what happened in the case of Thorsen v. Richmond Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
In Thorsen, the Richmond SPCA was able to maintain an action for legal malpractice on the grounds that the SPCA, which was the testator’s sole surviving beneficiary, was unable to receive the testator’s bequest of real property due to the error of the attorney Thorsen when preparing the will. As a result, the property passed intestate to other members of the testator’s family, thereby damaging the SPCA and depriving it of the full bequest.
The Virginia Supreme Court held that the third-party beneficiary doctrine was a well-reasoned exception to the privity requirement, thereby permitting a party to proceed with a malpractice action. However, if a third party cannot claim beneficiary status, the rule of contractual privity will prevent that third party from asserting a malpractice claim, and a malpractice claim cannot be assigned by a client to another party.
While a third-party could bring a legal malpractice claims in other contexts, a client cannot assign a legal malpractice claim to someone else. This is due to the court’s concern that legal malpractice claims would be sold and traded like a commodity, which means that an attorney could be sued for malpractice by someone they never met before and for whom they never rendered legal advice or services.
The employment of counsel establishes a duty on the part of the attorney to the client, and failing to meet, or falling below the standard of care constitutes breach of the duty owed the client. The standard of care is based on what the ordinary, prudent attorney would do under the same or similar circumstances. In fact, the Virginia Supreme Court has stated: “[The attorney] is not to be answerable for every error or mistake, but on the contrary, will be protected if he acts in good faith, to the best of his skill and knowledge, and with an ordinary degree of attention.” In addition, a negligent attorney can also apply the defense of contributory negligence in the context of legal malpractice cases, or that the client’s own negligence contributed to the client’s resulting damages.
“‘Damage is an essential element of a cause of action. Without some injury or damage, however slight, a cause of action cannot accrue.’”  An injury may be something intangible, such as the loss of the right to pursue a legal claim because of an attorney’s failure to take timely action to sue; or an injury may be a tangible effect, such as having a judgment entered against the client, even if the client had not paid the judgment, due to an attorney’s manifest error.
However, it should be noted that in the event that the damage suffered by the client is so financially catastrophic that the client finds himself or herself filing for bankruptcy protection as a result, any claim for legal malpractice that arose prior to the bankruptcy filing would become part of the bankruptcy estate. As such, the future of the malpractice claim is determined by the bankruptcy trustee, who may opt either to prosecute the claim as an adversarial proceeding in the bankruptcy court, or abandon the claim, in which event the claim reverts to the client.
Collectibility is also an issue the courts consider when the damage is the loss of an otherwise viable claim due to the attorneys’ negligence. Collectibility of a claim can act as a limit on “the measure of the legal malpractice plaintiff’s damages to how much the legal malpractice plaintiff could have actually recovered from the defendant in the underlying litigation, absent the attorney’s negligence, not simply to the face value of the lost claim.” This collectibility issue goes to proving the attorney’s negligence was the proximate cause of the client’s damages.
One of the most important aspects of any legal claim is making the claim in a timely manner. This requires taking action before the “statute of limitations” runs out. A statute of limitations is a time period created by the legislature in which a legal action must be filed in court or the right to file the claim is lost forever. The purpose of statutes of limitations is to provide sufficient time for a potential plaintiff to take action, but not allow so much time to pass that the claim becomes stale, witnesses become difficult to locate, or memories of the events fragment. The time periods involved may appear to be somewhat arbitrary, but the time periods themselves are meant to strike a balance between the rights of an injured party, the interests of justice in a fair and complete hearing, and the interest of a potential defendant in finality.
Although there are notes of tort law in legal malpractice claims, the courts have largely concluded that the duty of the attorney arises out of the agreement to perform services for the client. Consequently, the claim is a contract claim and governed by the limitations period for contracts. This time frame is 3 years for an oral contract and 5 years for a written contract.
It is nevertheless possible to allege an “independent willful tort,” such as fraud, if the conduct of the attorney is of a type that would ordinarily be considered tortious, and the duty that the lawyer owes to the client arises in a manner not solely attributable to contract. As this concept suggests, the legal doctrines applicable to such unique situations can be highly complex, and necessitate analysis by experienced counsel to determine whether a given case involves a tort claim in addition to a contract claim.
The Code of Virginia states that the limitations period for contract claims commences on the date that the breach occurred, not the date that the breach was discovered by the client. Therefore, it is important to act quickly once you realize that your attorney or former attorney may have committed malpractice. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also held that the “continuing representation” rule applies in legal malpractice claims that tolls the statute of limitations. “[W]here there is an undertaking which requires a continuation of services, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the termination of the undertaking. . .This special rule is applicable to a continuing agreement between attorney and client.” This prevents the client from being placed in the awkward position of having to take action against an attorney who is still performing services under the original agreement. However, the termination of the last services performed on the particular undertaking is what controls the start of the statute of limitations period, even if the attorney represents the client for other matters.
As discussed above, there is a certain degree of latitude given to the lawyer who attempts to discern what a court will do, but chooses wrongly. This reasonable judgment rule commonly arises in litigation matters. These situations are often referred to as “cases within cases,” because in order to establish damages for a lost claim against a litigation opponent, it must first be established that but for the attorney’s malpractice, the client would have prevailed in the underlying action. This often necessitates a “mini trial” of the underlying claim to establish that the malpractice claimant would have won that original case. Consequently, whether or not your claim for litigation malpractice is a truly winnable case can be open to interpretation.
Like most situations involving complex legal issues, claims are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration all of the facts that are unique to you. Therefore, be sure to consult with competent counsel if you feel that you have a potential claim against an attorney that has represented you by contacting us for a consultation.
 Virginia does not have certifications for legal specialists, therefore, the general standard applies for all attorneys authorized to practice in the Commonwealth.
 Shipman v. Kruck, 593 S.E.2d 319, 324 (Va. 2004) (noting the “special trust and confidence inherent in the attorney-client relationship,” and quoting Allied Productions, Inc. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774, 776-77 (Va. 1977)).
 Bankers Credit Service of Vermont, Inc. v. Dorsch, 343 S.E.2d 339, 341 (Va. 1986) (“In order for an agreement to be binding, the parties must have assented to its terms. This assent, however, need not be communicated by express words, but may be inferred from the conduct of the parties.”).
 See Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108, 112-13 (1980) (noting that an adverse party cannot institute a legal malpractice claim, as adverse parties are not in contractual privity with the attorney, nor are they intended beneficiaries of the agreement between lawyer and client).
 786 S.E.2d 453 (Va. 2016).
 Id. at 463; cf Copenhaver v. Rogers, 384 S.E.2d 593, 596 (Va. 1989) (noting that “[t]here is a critical difference between being the intended beneficiary of an estate and being the intended beneficiary of a contract between a lawyer and his client.”) As Copenhaver indicates, although alleging third-party beneficiary status may permit a case to proceed, it is still necessary to prove that the individual claimant was specifically intended to benefit under the contract for legal services. Such a situation may occur where a parent engages an attorney for the representation of an adult child, for example. Although the child may also be considered a client of the attorney from a professional ethics standpoint, the child is clearly the intended beneficiary of the agreement between parent and lawyer.
 Johnson v. Hart, 692 S.E.2d 239, 243-44 (Va. 2010).
 MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Va. 1988).
 Glenn v. Haynes, 66 S.E.2d 509, 512-13 (Va. 1951).
 Lyle, Siegal, Croshaw & Beale, P.C. v. Tidewater Capital Corp., 457 S.E.2d 28, 32, 249 Va. 426, 432 (Va. 1995).
 Smith v. McLaughlin, 769 S.E.2d 7, 14 (Va. 2015).
 Shipman v. Kruck 593 S.E.2d 319, 323 (Va. 2004) (quoting Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 520, 352 S.E.2d 327, 332 (Va. 1987)).
 Williams v. Joynes, 677 S.E.2d 261, 265 (Va. 2009).
 Shipman, 593 S.E.2d at 326 (“A client who suffers the entry of a judgment against him indeed suffers a legal injury or damage”)..
 See In re Sheikhzadeh, Case No.: 14-14219-BFK at **10-11 (E.D. Va. Bankr. Jun. 26, 2018); see also Shipman at 323 (the cause of action accrued during the bankruptcy petition, which vested in the Bankruptcy Trustee).
 Property held by the debtor prior to the filing of the petition, and scheduled under Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code, reverts to the original holder after discharge and closure of the case if the property is not pursued by the trustee for the purpose of addressing the debtor’s debts through the bankruptcy estate. However, bankruptcy is a complex field of law, and questions surrounding choses in action where a bankruptcy is involved should be addressed by competent bankruptcy counsel.
 Smith, 289 Va. at 261, 769 S.E.2d at 17 (Va. 2015).
 Id. at 265 (What damages are recoverable in legal malpractice is governed by the law concerning damages in breach of contract cases, and thus “‘are limited to those losses which are reasonably foreseeable when the contract is made’” (quoting Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699, 706, 299 S.E.2d 514, 517 (Va. 1983)).
 Smith, 769 S.E.2d at 19.
 Id. (quoting O’Connell v. Bean, 556 S.E.2d 741, 743 (Va. 2002)).
 Oleyar v. Kerr, 225 S.E.2d 398, 400 (Va. 1976).
 Goodstein v. Weinberg, 245 S.E.2d 140, 142 (Va. 1978).
 McCormick v. Romans, 198 S.E.2d 651, 654-55 (Va. 1973); see also Keller v. Denny, 352 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1987) (holding that “the breach of contract or duty occurs and the statute of limitations begins to run when the attorney’s services rendered in connection with that particular undertaking or transaction have terminated.”).
 Shipman, 593 S.E.2d at 324 (Va. 2004) (holding “[t]he proper inquiry is not whether a general attorney-client relationship has ended, but instead, when the attorney’s work on the particular undertaking at issue has ceased”); see also Moonlight Enters., LLC v. Mroz, 293 Va. 224, 232-33, 797 S.E.2d 536, 540 (Va. 2017).
 See e.g., Smith, 796 S.E.2d at 10-11.
 Desetti v. Chester, 772 S.E.2d 907, 910 (Va. 2015) (citing Taylor v. Davis, 576 S.E.2d 445, 447 (Va. 2003); Adkins v. Dixon, 482 S.E.2d 797, 801-02 (Va. 1997)).
With alarming frequency, nursing homes are slipping arbitration clauses into the reams of paper elderly people musty sign when being admitted to a nursing home. There are 2.5 million Americans living in nursing homes or senior living centers. Some legal advocates believe that as many as 90% of large nursing homes in the U.S. now include arbitration agreements in their admissions contracts.
In many cases, these agreements allow nursing homes to avoid being sued in a normal civil court. This means there is no judge, no jury, and the proceedings in most cases will remain sealed from the public eye. If a person who is injured by a nursing home’s negligence as their case resolved through arbitration, the press will never hear about it, and a Google search will not reveal the case.
Arbitration was meant as a tool for business to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently to avoid courts. However, the use of arbitration has expanded over the past 30 years, and has been increasingly used to deprive consumers, who have little legal knowledge, of their rights. Today, asking the elderly to sign arbitration agreements has become standard industry practice.
​The nursing home industry argues that arbitration is good for business. Industry insiders say that claims subject to arbitration settle for 7% lower total cost to the business and three months sooner than claims with no arbitration. On the other hand, trial lawyers and consumer-rights advocates argue that arbitration agreements deprive consumers of a right to a fair trial and public proceeding.
There are several problems with arbitration agreements from my perspective. First, in many instances nursing home residents do not know what they are signing. Elderly consumers may have varying degrees of dementia and are presented with page after page of documents to sign before they can be admitted. Some provisions are benign – the nursing home first may ask the patient to sign a “resident’s rights” document. But, the nursing home may also bury an arbitration agreement in the middle. These agreements are very complex with legalese. The nursing home resident is anxious to be admitted and is not thinking about the wording of every sentence. If the resident has Alzheimer’s or dementia, it is unconscionable to ask such a person to sign a complex contract. But it happens all the time.
Second, arbitration agreements are known to result in lower awards. Instead of a jury hearing your case, who may be outraged by the allegations of neglect, an arbitrator will hear the case. An arbitrator is usually someone with knowledge of insurance disputes or an attorney. These people may have become numb to injury claims and may be less likely to award a large amount of money to a claimant. Further, arbitrators are often chosen from a short list of regional professionals. The same arbitrator can decide cases involving the same nursing home over and over again. This incentivizes arbitrators to keep repeat clients happy and give more favorable decisions to repeat offenders. Studies show that awards to plaintiffs can be as much as 35 percent lower.
Third, arbitration has different rules. What might be considered hearsay in civil court may be admissible under the lax rules of arbitration. Speculation about the cause of a resident’s injuries would be more likely to be heard in arbitration than in a regular court, which typically only allows expert witnesses to opine on causation.
Under Virginia Code § 8.01-581.01, “a written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Unfortunately, courts have held that Virginia law favors arbitration provisions. Bishop v. Med. Facilities of Am. XLVII (47) Ltd. P'ship, 65 Va. Cir. 187 (2004).
Agency – The nursing home resident did not sign the contract herself, and the family member, or nursing home employee, who did not have a valid authority to do so.
Competency – The nursing home resident did sign the contract herself, but was not competent to do so at the time. The contract can be invalidated by showing that the person had dementia or Alzheimer’s at the time the contract was signed.
Waiver – A nursing home may waive the right to arbitrate by litigating an issue covered by arbitration. For example, if the nursing home has filed a lien for unpaid medical bills, that may act as a waiver of the entire arbitration agreement.
Fraud – A nursing home may have fraudulently induced a nursing home resident to sign a contract by misrepresenting the contents of the agreement or making untrue promises with respect to the agreement, the nursing home, or nursing home arbitration clause.
Invalidating a nursing home arbitration clause is a tough task. If you are pursuing a nursing home negligence case (or another claim against the nursing home), it is important to hire an attorney who as experience in dealing with arbitration agreements. If you or loved one has a question about a nursing home arbitration clause or nursing home abuse, please contact us and we'll try to be helpful.
Thinking about drinking and driving?
You don’t have to worry about a DUI if you never put yourself in a position to get arrested for one. If you’re going to drink, plan ahead so that you’re not behind the wheel. Many innocent people have been charged with DUI, even though they were not drunk.
Even if you’re lucky enough to get your charge dropped, dismissed, or reduced, going through the court process is tedious, emotionally and psychologically draining, and very costly. In many cases, you may actually still get convicted, even if you weren’t actually driving under the influence! Of course, you may also get killed or seriously injured, or kill another driver. The risk to your safety and the risk of other charges related to a DUI accident alone are good reason to never drive under the influence.
But let’s examine the financial costs too. Next time you’re thinking about drinking and driving, do this simple math.
Cost of Getting car towed and retrieved: $150-$250.
So you can see roughly you will pay $165-$325 assuming the highest costs possible AND assuming your car will get towed (which usually does not happen).
Administrative car impound fee: $175-300.
Alcohol Safety Classes $600- $1200.
Ignition Interlock costs: $80 Installation plus $70-$80/month for 6 -12 months.
So a DUI charge can be very costly--well into the thousands of dollars. Even if you win, you will incur attorney’s fees in the process.
Throw in the incalculable costs of a one year license suspension, permanent criminal record, and employment consequences, and the decision becomes easier.
So there it is: The next time you’re thinking about drinking and driving, do that simple math and then ask yourself if it’s worth it, both financially and from a safety perspective.
If you're reading this post after you received a DUI, please contact us and we'll try to be helpful.
My Landlord Will Not Return My Security Deposit -- May I Recover My Attorneys' Fees if I Hire a Lawyer to File a Lawsuit Against My Landlord?
The short answer is, yes, thanks to recent changes by the Virginia legislature to the common law security deposit statute § 55-225.19.
There are two sets of laws that govern residential leases: common law (for private landlords unless they have multiple properties) or the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (mainly for institutional landlords, buildings, or private landlords with several properties). The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“VRLTA”) always had a provision for attorneys' fees (see § 55-248.15:1), but tenants renting from private landlords who were exempt from the VRLTA could not get their attorneys’ fees recovered in a lawsuit to related to the return of a security deposit.
For reference, the VRLTA protects tenant’s apartments, rental homes, and federally subsidized housing in many different ways by imposing requirements on institutional and large residential landlords (defined as three or more properties subject to a residential lease). For more information on the rights of tenants in Virginia, please see our recent blog post on the subject.
Let’s say you have just moved out of your rental apartment and you now want to collect the security deposit you paid at the start of your lease. In Virginia, your landlord is obligated to return your security deposit with or without any deductions, which should be itemized with written notice, provided by the landlord, within 45 days after the termination of the lease (for both common law and VRTLA leases).
There are several reasons that your landlord may decide to withhold payment, including outstanding rent payments (including late fees as specified in the rental agreement), money to cover unpaid utilities, excessive wear and tear on the unit, etc., The landlord must provide written notice of such payment obligations. Tenants should make sure landlords have updated address information where security deposits can be mailed and returned. In situations where there is more than one tenant subject to the rental agreement, the security deposit will be returned, less any deductions, with one check made payable to all tenants to a forwarding address provided (unless otherwise previously agreed to in writing).
Permit a tenant or his authorized agent or attorney to inspect such tenant's records of deductions at any time during normal business hours.
Upon request by the landlord to a tenant to vacate, or within five days after receipt of notice by the landlord of the tenant's intent to vacate, the landlord shall provide written notice to the tenant of the tenant's right to be present at the landlord's inspection of the dwelling unit for the purpose of determining the amount of security deposit to be returned. If the tenant desires to be present when the landlord makes the inspection, he shall so advise the landlord in writing who, in turn, shall notify the tenant of the time and date of the inspection.
Following the move-out inspection, the landlord shall provide the tenant with a written security deposit disposition statement including an itemized list of damages. If additional damages are discovered by the landlord after the security deposit disposition has been made, nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the landlord from recovery of such damages against the tenant, provided, however, that the tenant may present into evidence a copy of the move-out report to support the tenant's position that such additional damages did not exist at the time of the move-out inspection.
If the tenant has any assignee or sublessee, the landlord shall be entitled to hold a security deposit from only one party in compliance with the provisions of this section.
If you feel that your landlord has not complied with his/her obligations and has not returned your deposit appropriately, and you are unable to resolve the dispute informally, you may decide to take legal action against your landlord. While you may consider handling the dispute yourself, inside or outside of court, hiring a professional with expertise related to the specific landlord and tenant laws in Virginia, doesn’t have to be a huge expense. Professional legal assistance can make the difference in obtaining a favorable outcome and with the recent legislative changes you are also able to request your attorneys’ fees associated with the litigation to recover your security deposit.
Feel free to contact Steven Krieger Law if we may be helpful in your security deposit dispute.
Am I Able to Recover Money for My Emotional Distress in Virginia?
Virginia will only allow a plaintiff to recover for an emotional injury if it is (1) accompanied by a physical injury; or (2) the result of intentional or reckless conduct. While some states allow for recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Virginia does not permit this type of recovery.
In situations where a plaintiff has suffered a physical injury, emotional harm is effectively part of the damages associated with the physical personal injury. For example, if you are in a car accident that resulted in your broken arm, you might also begin to suffer from depression. You can then recover for the damages related to depression as part of the overall harm caused by the car accident. However, if you merely suffered from depression after the accident, no matter how severe, you have no cause of action for this injury in Virginia without physical injury or proving that the accident was really intentional. So, without being accompanied by physical injury or intentional conduct, sleeplessness, nausea, headaches, humiliation, fear, depression, or anxiety alone, are insufficient to state a claim for emotional distress in Virginia.
The Virginia Supreme Court has recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action in Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974). In Womack, the court held that four elements must be proved to establish an intentional infliction of emotional distress: 1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless; 2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable; 3) there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the resulting emotional distress; and 4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. Id. at 148.
This cause of action, however, is disfavored in Virginia because the courts fear that plaintiffs can easily exaggerate or lie about emotional distress. To guard against frivolous claims, the Courts require that a wrongdoer’s conduct to be so outrageous that it is utterly unconscionable in society. The Supreme Court articulated this standard in Russo v. White: "'Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Russo 241 Va. 23, 27 (1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46 cmt. j (1965)). So, insults, racial slurs, or even harassment are generally not sufficiently outrageous to reach this level of unconscionability.
“It is for the court to determine…whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery…” Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148. Merely insensitive or demeaning conduct does not amount to outrageous behavior. In Harris v. Kreutzer, for example, a brain injury patient alleged that a psychologist, intentionally inflicted emotional distress when she verbally abused the plaintiff, called her a faker and a malingerer, and accused the plaintiff of “putting on a show” despite knowing of the plaintiff’s condition. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed that these allegations, even if true, were insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188 (Va. 2006).
What then, is conduct so outrageous and intolerable enough to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress? In Magallon v. Verizon Wireless Unlimited, Inc., the Fairfax County Circuit Court found that the plaintiff alleged outrageous and intolerable behavior when she alleged that the defendant, her former manager, called her sexually demeaning names, threatened her with violence, profanely disparaged her character by accusing her of having sexual relations with the business owner, and took her car and house keys when she rebuffed his sexual advances. Magallon v. Verizon Wireless Unlimited, Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 460 (Fairfax County 2012).
In, Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir., 1999), a court held that a student who was bullied by a teacher who intentionally attempted to humiliate the student, knowing that she was suffering from clinical depression, may have constituted conduct that was so outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decent society. Id. at 472-473.
In Almy v. Grisham, 639 S.E.2d 182, 273 Va. 68 (Va., 2007), the Court concluded that the defendants’ plan to falsely accuse Almy of writing anonymous letters and wanting her to “really, really, suffer,” amounted to outrageous, intolerable conduct. In this case, Donna Swanson received several anonymous, handwritten letters that, among other things, accused Donna’s husband, Alan, of infidelity. In 1998, John Grisham, Jr., the author of The Firm and many other best-selling novels, also received an anonymous letter that appeared to have been written by the same person. Grisham and the Swansons suspected the letter writer as being Katherine Almy, and Almy then filed a suit in a Virginia state court against Grisham and the Swansons, alleging, in part, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Almy, claimed that the defendants devised a scheme to falsely accuse her of writing the letters. She alleged that the defendants gave David Liebman, a handwriting analyst, samples of Almy’s handwriting by including copies of confidential documents from her children’s school files, where Alan taught and Grisham served on the board of directors. Almy alleged that Grisham then influenced Liebman to report that Almy might have written the letters and misrepresented this report as conclusive, leading the police to confront Almy. Almy claimed that she then suffered severe emotional distress and depression, causing “a complete disintegration of virtually every aspect of her life” and requiring her “to undergo extensive therapy.” Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 639 S.E.2d 182 (2007).
The defandants’ conduct in this case - their stated intent to have Almy “really, really, suffer;” de­vising a scheme to falsely accuse her of writing the letters and that as part of this scheme, providing “confi­dential documents” removed from the files of Almy’s children’s school to a handwriting expert; and finally, misrepresenting that the handwriting report conclusively held Almy responsible for the letters leading the police to confront Almy - was sufficiently outrageous to the court to qualify as intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, most cases in Virginia do not actually meet the standard of “outrageous” or “intolerable” conduct in an intentional infliction of emotional distress case.
In cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must also prove by clear and convincing evidence that the emotional distress is extreme. Dean v. Morris, 756 S.E.2d 430, 433 (2014) (defining clear and convincing as “proof that is more than a mere preponderance but less than beyond a reasonable doubt”). Extreme emotional distress was defined by the Virginia Supreme Court in Russo v. White, as: The term "emotional distress" travels under many labels, such as, "mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock...It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea."...But liability arises only when the emotional distress is extreme, and only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Russo v. White 241 Va. 23, 27 (1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46 cmt. j (1965)).
It is quite difficult to win damages in an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in Virginia. In the view of the Supreme Court of Virginia “there are inherent problems in proving a claim alleging injury to the mind or emotions in the absence of accompanying physical injury,” and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Virginia is not favored. SuperValu, Inc. v. Johnson, 276 Va. 356, 370 (2008). The statute of limitations for such a claim in Virginia is two years, so if you think you are the victim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and you think you meet the criteria above, you should not delay.
Are Internet Loans in Virginia Legal?
In short, it depends on the type of loan (personal vs. business) and the loan terms. Personal loans are typically unsecured, meaning you do not have to put up any collateral and there is no down payment like home and auto loans require - it’s up to your creditworthiness to secure the loan. Not all internet loans are improper, but all personal loans made on the internet that violate the 12% APR rule are void and unenforceable, as are internet payday loans and many open-end internet loans.
Unless statutorily exempt under Virginia Code § 6.2-303, no contract shall be made for the payment of interest on a loan at a rate that exceeds 12% a year. One of the exemptions is for licensed Virginia consumer finance companies. (You can find the other exemptions listed in section B of Virginia code § 6.2-303.) A consumer finance company is defined as “a person engaged in the business of making loans to individuals for personal, family, household, or other nonbusiness purposes.” Virginia Code § 6.2-1500. These companies may charge more than 12% interest but there are no internet lenders licensed as a consumer finance company in Virginia, so any companies offering personal loans online are acting improperly.
Virginia Code § 6.2-1541 further regulates that if a lender makes a non-business loan without a Consumer Finance License and makes a loan for more than 12% APR, the contract is void and the lender is not entitled to collect any principal, interest or charges whatsoever on the loan (and the borrower is entitled to any principal or interest already paid on the loan). In interpreting the Virginia Code, the court in Virginia v. Cash N A Flash determined in 2010, that because the lender, Cash N A Flash, had not obtained a Consumer Finance License and because it charged more than a 12% APR, that a loan it provided was null and void and the court also granted a repayment of the interest and principal back to the borrower.
A payday loan, defined under Virginia Code § 6.2-1800, is a small, short-maturity loan based on the security of some income payable to you (not based on income tax refunds). These loans are permissible, but no internet lenders have a payday loan license, so you cannot get a payday loan online. It is a Class 2 misdemeanor to make such a loan without a license.
Installment loans are loans where the loan repayment is over a set period of time (weekly or monthly payments, for example). Internet installment loans don’t meet any of the statutory exceptions listed in subsection B of Virginia code § 6.2-303, so they are null and void if they charge more than 12% APR.
Open-end loans are those that do not have a set date to finish paying off the loan (similar to a credit card: as you pay it back, you can take out more money on the “credit line”). Under Virginia Code § 6.2-312, you have at least 25 days to repay the loan in full without incurring any charges or fees. There are some internet lenders pretending to offer open-end loans but they either do not meet the definition of an open-end loan under Virginia Code § 6.2-300, which is defined as “consumer credit extended by a creditor under a plan in which: (i) the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions; (ii) the creditor may impose a finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance; and (iii) the amount of credit that may be extended to the consumer during the term of the plan, up to any limit set by the creditor, is generally made available to the extent that any outstanding balance is repaid,” or they do not have the required 25-day grace period required by Virginia Code § 6.2-312. Finally, as noted above, if the interest charged exceeds 12% APR, the loan is null and void.
Different Laws in Different States?
Sometimes, a loan contract will contain a clause that applies a different state’s law to the loan. Even if you have agreed to this provision in the contract, if the lender does not have a Virginia license to make consumer loans with an interest rate greater than 12% APR, then the loan is void and the contract cannot be enforced.
Internet loans are easily available and well-marketed but there are only a few safeguards in place in Virginia to protect consumers. All loans made to Virginia residents over the internet for more than 12% APR, are unenforceable loans. All internet payday loans are illegal. And any open-end loan (that is not statutorily-exempt), must provide borrowers a 25-day grace period without any fees or charges. Make sure you are aware of these protections when entering into an internet loan. If you think you entered into an invalid loan and need assistance, please contact us.
La Ley de Arrendadores e Inquilinos (VRLTA) protege los apartamentos, casas de alquiler y viviendas subsidiadas por el estado de diferentes maneras, como imponiendo requisitos a propietarios institucionales y residenciales, que se definen como tres o más propiedades sujetas a un contrato de arrendamiento). La VRLTA obliga al arrendador a hacerle mantenimiento a la propiedad, que incluye cumplir los códigos de vivienda y edificación; a mantener las instalaciones y las áreas comunes en condición buena y habitable; a asegurarse del buen funcionamiento de las instalaciones; a prevenir la acumulación de humedad y moho; a proveer recipientes para la basura; y a ofrecer suficiente agua caliente y aire acondicionado (§ 55-248.13).
Como inquilino en el Commonwealth de Virginia, es su responsabilidad conocer sus derechos y comprender cómo protegerse contra diferentes acciones del propietario.
Cambios en la titularidad o administración de la propiedad y una lista completa de los agentes autorizados a actuar a nombre del propietario o compañía de administración (§ 55-248.12).
Si detecta defectos en la mampostería (§ 55-248.12:2).
Fecha en la que se aplicará pesticida en la propiedad (§ 55-248.13:3).
La presencia de moho en la propiedad y qué pasos se están tomando para eliminarlo (§ 55-248.11:2).
Si el propietario sabe que la propiedad era usada para elaborar metanfetamina y la propiedad no está limpia (§ 55-248.12:3).
Las cuestiones relacionadas con la seguridad están legisladas en Virginia bajo el código § 55-248.15:1. La VRLTA indica que un depósito de garantía no puede exceder el equivalente a dos meses de alquiler, y el propietario puede usarlo para cobrar meses y tasas sin pagar antes de devolverlo al inquilino.
El depósito de garantía debe ser devuelto al inquilino en no más de 45 días después de la terminación del contrato y de la devolución de la propiedad. Si el propietario se cobró algo del depósito de garantía, debe incluir una lista detallada de las deducciones al momento de devolverlo. Si el propietario no devuelve el depósito de garantía conforme a esta sección, el inquilino puede demandarlo y exigir incluso tasas de honorarios para el abogado, además del depósito de garantía.
Los residentes de Virginia no tienen el derecho a retener la renta de su arrendatario, pero las propiedades que no cumplan con los estándares de salud o de seguridad o en caso de incumplimiento de contrato, los inquilinos pueden tomar una serie de acciones específicas y pagar el alquiler en una cuenta de la corte, en lugar de la cuenta del propietario.
Un inquilino nunca debería retener la renta antes de realizar todo el debido proceso legal. Si no sigue el proceso, el propietario tiene el derecho de desalojar al inquilino.
En Virginia, los arrendatarios pueden solicitar el desalojo o la terminación de un contrato cuando el inquilino no cumple con el contrato. No solo cuando no paga la renta, como explica esta publicación. El proceso estándar para desalojar a un inquilino por un problema no relacionado con la falta de pago es darle al inquilino un aviso de 21 días para arreglar la violación según lo solicite el arrendatario. Si las violaciones no se resuelven en 21 días, la notificación indicará que el contrato se terminará nueve días después (en total, 30 días). Un inquilino con un historial de violaciones a condiciones del contrato podría enfrentar una terminación inmediata del contrato. Igualmente, si las acciones del inquilino se consideran como criminales.
También si el arrendatario no cumple materialmente con el acuerdo de alquiler o con una sección de la VRLTA, o si afecta materialmente la salud o seguridad del inquilino, este puede notificarle al arrendatario que el contrato terminará si no resuelve el problema dentro de los 21 días. Va. Código § 55-248.21.
Los inquilinos de Virginia tienen muchos derechos con la VRLTA, pero los propietarios también están protegidos por la ley. Los inquilinos que quieran cancelar un contrato antes de tiempo tendrán que negociarlo. Pero los inquilinos pierden sus derechos cuando se quedan en una propiedad y violan las condiciones del contrato o que no tienen intención de resolver los problemas.
Brian Mittman es uno de los socios de Markhoff & Mittman, P.C. Tiene mucha experiencia en casos de compensación laboral, seguro social y lesiones personales. Para obtener más información, visite AyudaMeLegal.com.
May I Cancel a Contract or Return a Product Within 3 Day of Making the Purchase in Virginia?
Buyer’s remorse, or a right of rescission, is a way of voiding a contract. It’s when you want things to go back to the status before a purchase. Unfortunately, unless the vendor or retailer specifically offers a return policy or a sale’s contract allows you to terminate the contract, there are only a limited number of laws, like the federal and Virginia law, that provide you with this rescission or canceling right.
Under federal law, The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has established some safeguards to protect consumers from the consequences of hasty decisions. In particular situations, there is a three-day cooling-off period during which a consumer can cancel a contract. For instance, consumers have the right to rescind contracts signed in their home when they are solicited by door-to-door salespeople. Additionally, consumers who purchase items at a temporary business location rented by a merchant on a short terms basis-- like at kiosks in a mall or at trade shows in convention centers -- have the same three-day “cooling-off” period (as do home-sale parties, and special sales held at hotels or restaurants).
An unequivocal statement that you are canceling the contract.
You can cancel the contract for 3 days after purchase.
You must give written notice of cancellation to the seller at the address stated in the agreement or offer to purchase.
You may cancel your purchase of computer software, online databases, software access contracts or e-books, if there is a material breach that has not been cured or waived.
You may give notice of cancellation in any way reasonable under the circumstances.
If you join a travel club, which is a group of business owners in the travel industry that join together and put together wholesale travel packages for an upfront cost, you may cancel the membership within seven days of purchase.
You may cancel by delivery, telegram, or mail with proper address and prepaid postage.
If you join a camping membership (a private campground open only to members who typically pay a one-time membership fee and annual dues for the right to use the campground), you may cancel the membership within seven days from the date of purchase.
You may cancel by: mailing notice of your intent to cancel by certified US Mail to the membership camping operator at the address shown in the membership camping contract.
A health club membership may be cancelled within three days after purchase.
If a health club closes or relocates its facilities, a buyer may cancel the contract if the club fails to provide comparable alternate facilities within five driving miles of the location designated in the health club contract.
A contract may be cancelled if you are physically unable to use a substantial portion of the services for 30 or more consecutive days.
notifying the health club of cancellation in writing, by certified mail return receipt requested, or personal delivery to the address of the health club as specified in the health club contract.
You (the borrower), have the right to cancel a loan at any time before the close of business on the next business day following the date that the loan was issued.
You may cancel by returning the cash or other good funds instrument (i.e., a certified check, cashier's check, money order or, if the licensee is equipped to handle such payments, payment by credit card) of the amount advanced, back to the lender.
You (the borrower), have the right to cancel the loan at any time before the close of business on the next business day following the day the loan agreement is executed.
You may cancel by by returning the original loan proceeds check to or paying to the licensee, in the form of cash or other good funds instrument (i.e., a certified check, cashier's check, money order or, if the licensee is equipped to handle and willing to accept such payments, payment by credit card, prepaid card, or debit card), the loan proceeds.
You (the borrower), may cancel the loan on or before the close of business on the next day of business.
You may cancel by either returning the original check issued for the loan or providing the amount of the loan in cash to the lender or the facilitator.
If you bought services to improve your credit, you have three days to cancel the services.
To cancel the contract you should mail or deliver a signed and dated copy of the cancellation notice.
You may cancel your fire insurance at any time after your purchase.
You may request a cancellation to the insurance company (there is no specified cancellation method).
within six days after the postmark date if the association disclosure packet is sent to the purchaser (or notice that the association disclosure packet will not be available), you may cancel by United States mail.
The purchaser may also cancel the contract at any time prior to settlement if the purchaser has not been notified that the association disclosure packet will not be available and the association disclosure packet is not delivered to the purchaser.
within six days after the postmark date of the resale certificate (or notice that the resale certificate will not be available) is sent to you by U.S. mail.
You may also cancel the contract at any time prior to settlement if you have not been notified that the resale certificate will not be available and the resale certificate is not delivered to you.
You cancel an interest in a real estate cooperative within ten days of the purchase.
mail notice by prepaid United States mail, to the offeror or to his agent for service of process.
You have seven days to cancel a purchase of a time share.
mailing the notice by certified United States mail, return receipt requested, to the developer or its agent designated in the contract. Notice sent by certified mail shall be effective on the date postmarked.
Virginia’s Lemon Law: ​In addition, Virginia has the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (Virginia’s “Lemon Law”). A car is classified as a “lemon” if it has been repaired three times or more since its purchase or if it has been repaired once for a serious safety defect. For more information, please see our blog post here. The Lemon Law requires that the dealer accept the vehicle for a refund or exchange or the purchaser may sue the dealer for the sales price and any other incurred damages (e.g., cost of repairs and attorney fees).
Although federal law has a “three-day rule,” or a “right of rescission” to cancel a contract, the law only applies in limited situations. Although Virginia laws expand the applicability of when you can cancel a contract, these laws also apply in only few, very specific situations (i.e., property purchases, health club memberships, and certain loans). In general, there aren’t many instances when you can return a purchase without a sales contract allowing you to make the return, so buyer beware!
﻿How Do I File for a Protection Order or Restraining Order in Washington, D.C.?
A protection order is the same thing as a restraining order in that both are designed to protect you against an abuser. In DC, a protection order requires that the person who is subject to the order, the respondent, stay away from you, the petitioner. However, a protection order can provide many other types of protection and relief, as explained in Section II below. You can obtain a protection order if the “respondent has committed or threatened to commit one or more criminal offenses against [you]” (see DC Code Section 16-1003(a)). There is no filing fee to request and obtain a protection order.
DC has three types of protection orders: the first is a Civil Protection Order, which is used when the person threatening or committing a crime against you is a family member, roommate, someone you dated or had a sexual relationship with, someone with whom you share a child, spouse, ex-spouse, or someone who dated your current boyfriend, girlfriend, or spouse (see DC Code Section 16-1001(6)-(9), (12), and DC Code Section 16-1003(a)). This type of protection order is also used in cases of stalking, sexual assault, and sexual abuse. A Civil Protection Order can last up to one year.
The second type is a Temporary Protection Order, which offers much of the same protections of a Civil Protection Order, but only lasts for up to two weeks (see DC Code Section 16-1004(b)). Because it is granted ex parte, or without the abuser present, this order is meant as a placeholder while you schedule and hold a hearing for the Civil Protection Order (though if the respondent fails to show up to the hearing, then the Civil Protection Order can be granted ex parte as well).
The final type is an Emergency Temporary Protection Order, which is similar to a Temporary Protection Order, except that it lasts for only five days (see DC Police’s Guide on Protection Orders). Only a police officer and an advocate from Survivors and Advocates for Empowerment (SAFE) can request this type of protection order.
Reimburse you for property damage, medical costs, and other expenses you incurred due to the respondent's actions.
Order any other relief that you show you need to protect you from harm.
To qualify for a protection order in DC, you must live or work in DC and at least one incident must have occurred in DC (see DC Code Section 16-1006). A protection order granted in DC is effective in all states in accordance with the U.S. Violence Against Women Act, which applies to all protective orders, regardless of whether the petitioner is a man or woman. Depending on the state, you may have to register your DC protection order with the court to make enforcement easier for the state. However, federal law requires the states to uphold a DC protection order regardless of whether it has been registered. If you move, you should also notify the DC court of your new address.
The time limit for filing for a protection order is two years. However, it is recommended that you file as soon as possible as judges view a long delay in filing less favorably. This is because the court will think that you were not really in danger, or else you no longer believed you were in danger, if you waited too long after the threat or crime. The judge will ask you why you waited so long after receiving the threat or injury to file for a protection order. If the judge is not satisfied with your reasons, he or she is more likely to deny your petition.
When seeking a protection order, be sure to have the abuser's work and home address, phone number, a physical description, and any aliases he or she uses. Also bring any evidence of harassment, stalking, or abuse inflicted upon or threats made to you or your children that you collected, such as police reports, hospital records, pictures, journals, notes, letters, emails, text messages, recordings, 911 calls, damaged clothing or objects, and so on. You should also contact any witnesses and ask if they would be willing to testify on your behalf at the Civil Protection Order hearing.
If seeking temporary custody of a child, have with you the addresses the child has lived at for the past five years and with whom the child lived at each address. You will also need to know if there is any pending court case concerning custody of the child and whether you know of any other person besides yourself or the respondent who claims to have custody of the child.
If seeking temporary child support from the respondent, you must bring proof of your income and the respondent's income to the Civil Protection Order hearing. This includes two recent pay stubs, tax returns for the last two years, or a completed financial statement. If there are any other child support orders that affect you or the respondent, then bring copies of them as well.
If seeking to have the respondent vacate your home, you must bring the lease or deed to the Civil Protection Order hearing. In addition, if seeking to have the respondent reimburse you for medical costs, property damage, and other expenses you incurred due to his or her actions, bring those bills, invoices, receipts, or estimates to the hearing.
To file for a protection order, you must go to the Domestic Violence Intake Center and fill out the Petition and Affidavit for Civil Protection Order form (available here). Because the filing process can take several hours, it is recommended you have plenty of time to arrive at court before it closes at 4:00 pm. If you have an emergency situation, including if the Domestic Violence Intake Center's offices are closed, you can contact the Domestic Violence Unit at Police Headquarters.
If filing with the Domestic Violence Intake Center, you can choose whether to file for just a Civil Protection Order or also a Temporary Protection Order, which must be filed with the Civil Protection Order. An intake officer will assist with filling out the paperwork. When writing about the incidents, use descriptive words and include as much details, times, and dates as possible. If you and the respondent share children who live with you, you can also file for child support. When you are finished with the paperwork, a court advocate will talk with you about the hearing and can help provide other resources, including counseling, emergency funds, and shelter housing.
If filing for a Temporary Protection Order, you will have a hearing in front of a judge that day. You must show the judge that you are “is immediately endangered by the respondent” (see DC Code Section 16-1004(b)(1)). For instance, if being threatened with death or bodily harm, that would be considered immediate danger. In cases of stalking, if the behavior is continuous or escalates in severity, this would constitute immediate danger. If you have a message from the respondent saying he or she is coming to find you, combined with a threat of committing a crime against you, that could also be a case of immediate danger. If granted, the Temporary Protection Order will remain in effect until the Civil Protection Order hearing, or up to two weeks. If denied, you will still have the Civil Protection Order hearing scheduled.
Regardless of whether a Temporary Protection Order is granted, during the period between filing and the Civil Protection Order hearing, the respondent must be served. Service, or delivering the petition to the respondent, cannot be done by you or any other party to the petition (see DC Code Section 16-1004(d)). You can arrange to have a non-party person who is 18 years of age or older to deliver the petition to the respondent. This person must sign a Return of Service confirming the petition was delivered, which you must bring to the hearing. You can also hire a private process server or request that the police serve the petition upon the respondent.
At the Civil Protection Order hearing, if the respondent does not appear at court and you have proof that the respondent was properly served, then you can obtain a default ruling if the judge finds there is reasonable belief that the harm you stated in the petition occurred. However, if the judge finds that the respondent was not properly served, you can ask to continue the case to give you time to serve the respondent again. If you have a Temporary Protection Order, you can also ask that it be extended until the continued hearing date.
If the respondent does appear, there is a negotiation requirement in DC where you meet with an attorney negotiator to see if you and the respondent can reach an agreement about the Civil Protection Order, such as if the respondent consents to the protection order. If an agreement is reached, the judge will review the agreement and make sure that all parties understand the details of the agreement. The judge will then sign the agreement, which will last for one year. On the other hand, if no agreement is reached during negotiations, you will present your evidence and any witnesses, including yourself, of the injuries or threats, and the respondent will submit evidence in defense. The judge will then decide whether to grant the Civil Protection Order if there is good cause to believe that the respondent committed or threatened to commit a prohibited act against you. If the judge states that a decision to grant or deny your petition will be made at a later date, be sure to ask that the Temporary Protection Order be extended until such time.
If the judge denies your petition for a protection order, you should contact a domestic violence resource center to get advice on staying safe. You can also reapply for a protection order if a new violation is committed or a threat to commit a crime is made against you. You may also consider appealing the judge's decision.
If the judge grants your Civil Protection Order, you should review the order and make sure there are no mistakes (if there are, see the clerk about correcting the order). Then make several copies, one to keep with you and the others to give to others, such as the front desk of your workplace, your children's school or daycare, sympathetic neighbors, and so on. Include a picture of the respondent with the copy.
While the protection order is in effect, if you are a renter, you can ask your landlord to change the locks if you make the request in writing (see DC Code Section 42-3505.08). If the respondent is a tenant in your apartment, you will have to include a copy of the protection order that states the respondent must stay away from you. The landlord will have five business days to change the locks to all entrance doors to your apartment. While the landlord pays the initial cost, you may have to reimburse the landlord if, within 45 days, you receive a bill with proof of the cost. There may also be an administrative fee associated with the lock change that you may have to pay as well if, for instance, your lease provides that the landlord can change the locks upon request for a fee.
If you discover that the abuser has violated the protection order, contact the police and provide any evidence of the violation. This evidence can include a journal or log, voicemail messages, letters or envelopes, cell phone bills, emails, and pictures. If there are witnesses to the violation, ask if they would be willing to testify at a hearing. If you were injured as a result of the violation, go to the hospital immediately afterwards, inform the staff that you have a protection order, and take pictures of the injuries. One could be held in contempt of court for violating a protection order, which is punishable by a $1,000 fine and/or up to 180 days imprisonment (see DC Code Section 16-1005(f)-(h)).
You can also notify the court of a violation and bring proceedings against the respondent yourself by filing a motion to adjudicate civil contempt or a motion to adjudicate criminal contempt. You would file a motion for the former if the respondent did something such as failing to pay ordered child support. You would file a motion for the latter if the respondent harmed or threatened to harm you.
Prior to the expiration of the protection order, you can file a motion to extend the protection order (see DC Code Section 16-1005(d)). At the same time, the respondent (and you) can file a motion to vacate the protection order if he or she can argue there is good cause as well. In addition, you can file a motion to change the terms of the protection order. If filing any of these types of motions, you must show “good cause” to the court to extend, modify, or vacate the protection order. Any motion you file must be served on the respondent in the manner explained previously.
For additional help, see the DC Police's Guide on Protection Orders and Pamphlet, the DC Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Women Empowered Against Violence Pamphlet, the DC Courts Guide on Domestic Violence Matters, and Womens Law Guide on Civil Protection Orders.
If you need assistance filing a protection order or representing you in court, please feel free to contact us for a free phone consultation.

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