Source: http://nebraskapen.org/Telecom/darkside.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:14:00+00:00

Document:
You likely don't know it but the very same company that is famous for its dime a minute phone calls is conspiring with State of Nebraska employees to take away those individual liberties and freedoms established by our founding fathers. These liberties, including the freedom of association with the right to privacy are being denied to anyone who communicates with a loved one, or anyone who happens to be in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (NDCS).
21st Century computerized telecommunications contains the threat of destroying privacy in communications. In their quest for profits, 21st century carpetbaggers, like Sprint Communications, casually ignore your right to privacy. This theft of freedom is outlined in the ongoing lawsuit, McCroy et al. v. Sprint Communications Co., L.P. et al. The technology of the 21st century allows these carpetbaggers to violate these freedoms and rights with the push of a button. When it is that easy it is easy to make mistakes. NDCS has already admitted they (accidentally?) recorded some privileged phone calls between inmates and their lawyers.
If you think this loss of freedom does not affect you as a law-abiding citizen, think again. Everyone has a chance of being confined in jail or prison sometime. If not you, then someone you know or care about. Whether you agree to it or not, any communication you have with them is no longer private even though there are laws to protect it. Aren't families and friends of those confined still members of the public who retain all their liberties and freedoms? Certainly, they are.
But don't stop at the prison walls, because the carpetbaggers won't. What freedom or right to privacy will they (accidentally?) take away next? At some point in the future will all calls to government offices and officials be recorded and monitored just because it is a call to a "public" facility? Where does this new one-sided definition of privacy lead us?
If the authorities can say that a family member has given up their right to privacy because they talk with an inmate (who they claim has no right to privacy) what about the other conversations of that family member? Do the people who talk to them now give up their right to privacy too? Where does the chain of "necessary security measures" end?
The McCroy case directly challenges the lawlessness of NDCS policies and practices for using the former telephone system and the changes made with the installation of Sprint's new Inmate Calling System (ICS). You can read that complaint here in the web site. The complaint might read like "legalese" so this article is designed to give you a simple explanation of the complaint. The complaint points out many of the statutory and constitutional privacy protections in Nebraska.
The laws and Constitution of the State of Nebraska safeguard and guarantee many rights and freedoms that are not lost or taken away just because a person is in the custody of the state. For a detailed review of these retained rights and freedoms, see Bostedoer v. Duling, 115 Neb 557, 564, 213 N.W.809, 812 (1927), and Neb.Rev.Stat. §83-4,111(3)(Reissue 1994), and Article I, §26 of the Nebraska Constitution. NDCS and Sprint are oppressing and obstructing these freedoms retained by those in custody. In that process, NDCS and Sprint are violating those rights of their family members, friends in the community, and members of the legal and medical community as well. In return for ignoring the law and the constitution, NDCS gets millions of dollars in federal funds and Sprint gets a very profitable collect calling business. For a detailed historical review of unauthorized police powers and Nebraska law, see First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Smith, 134 Neb 84, 113-115, 277 N.W. 762, 777-778 (1938); plus Neb.Rev.Stat. §§81-112 and 83-171 (Reissue 1994).
The new ICS mandates that an incarcerated person divulge to NDCS employees a list of names and addresses of those people the inmate may wish to place a collect call to. When NDCS approves the inmate's list of people, all calls to those people will be monitored by NDCS employees. These calls are recorded by a computerized system under the guise of "necessary security measures." These transgressions of freedom and privacy violate the 1st and 4th Amendments basic freedoms of association, access to petition and communicate with various governmental entities for the redress of grievances, the separation of church and state, and the prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure. In addition to these constitutional guarantees are numerous statutory protections also being violated by these false claims of "security." These statutes include Nebraska's Wire Intercept Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §86-701 et seq. , and The Administrative Procedures Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §84-901 et seq. Other forms of privacy violations by NDCS include the attorney-client relation Neb. Rev. Stat. §27-503, the physician-patient relation Neb. Rev. Stat. §27-504, the husband-wife relation Neb.Rev.Stat. §27-505, the clergy-practitioner relation Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-506, and the free flow of information to and from the media Neb.Rev.Stat. §20-146. All these basic freedoms and privileges are being violated on a daily basis by NDCS and Sprint. For further protections, see Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 81-1120.27, 81-1120.28, 86-201, 86-202, 86-304 (pursuant to §28-519), 86-702 (includes the personal privileges under§86-705), 86-707, and 86-707.3.
Who is Defending Your Right to Privacy?
As we head into the 21st century of high-tech devices and instantaneous communication, where do you think this chain of so-called "necessary security measures" ends? Will it end at your doorstep? Will these same measures soon become common place; so much so that what goes on in your home and on your private phone could be posted on the Internet to read? The steps NDCS and Sprint have already taken are a long way down the road toward this kind of "Big Brother" mentality. Who is defending you against this invasion of your right to privacy? The Attorney General isn't, he is helping NDCS violate these laws. What do you have when the state's highest legal authority condones and defends these practices rather than defending the constitutional rights of ordinary citizens as he is elected to do? When policemen break the law, then there is no law.
In this case the only course open is to fight fire with fire. When rights are taken away and violated the only way to regain them is in a court of law. Such a legal fight demands the best legal minds and representation that can be found. The plaintiffs in the lawsuit had been appointed counsel by the District Court but those attorneys withdrew. The inmate plaintiffs ask for the best and brightest members of the Bar to step forward and defend the Constitution and the right to privacy. We appeal to those of you who are skilled in the law because without your help the freedoms the law protects and guarantees may one day be a thing of the past. Please help with this vital legal defense if you can.
Further, it must have been considered by the trial court, as evidenced by his ruling in permitting the record and judgment of the criminal trial to be introduced in evidence, as well as in sustaining the motions to dismiss, that, by reason of the plaintiff's having been convicted of a felony, he was deprived thereby and by reason thereof of his civil rights, and therefore was without authority to prosecute this action. In support of this holding of the court, section 2, art. 15, of the Constitution, and sections 1894, 9933, and 10262, Comp. St. 1922, are cited. It will be seen that section 2, art. 15, of the Constitution, simply deprives the convicted persons of the right to hold office. By Section 1894, (currently §32-1048), he is deprived of his right to vote. Section 9933 (currently §29-112) renders him incompetent to serve as an elector or juror, or to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit within this state, unless pardoned. Under section 10262, (was §29-2634 which was replaced with §83-1,118(5)), rights denied him by statute are restored when he is discharged through the board of pardons.
"In accordance with the modern policy of a more humane administration of the criminal law, the early doctrines of the common law in regard to the attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of blood of convicts have been either entirely swept away or modified by constitutional and statutory provisions."
The meaning of a Constitution is fixed when it is adopted and it is not different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon it. The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom legitimate authority springs. Therefore, all power of government in this republic is vested in the people in their collective capacity, the electorate. They collectively, acting through the medium of Constitutions, create such governmental agencies, endow them with such powers and subject them to such limitations as in their wisdom will best promote the common good. With reference to the governmental agencies so created by them, the fundamental power to grant, the power to license, and the power to reserve, exercisable by the people, are coequal. A limitation, a reservation, and a grant, expressed in the term of a Constitution, are equally the exercise of the sovereign power. Nor can these fundamental principles be modified or in any manner controlled by the invocation by a state governmental agency of the doctrine of police power, if the power it seeks to exercise it has not in fact received, and is in any manner inconsistent with the express terms of the state Constitution. For section 26 of our Bill of Rights, in clear and unmistakable language, provides that, "all powers not herein delegated, remain with the people."
Art. 1.,Sec. 26 Powers retained by the people.
2) Any unpublished or nonbroadcast information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving, or processing of information for any medium of communication to the public.
20-147. Act, how cited. Sections 20-144 to 20-147 shall be known and may be sited as the Free Flow of Information Act.
27-503. Rule 503. Lawyer-client privilege; definitions; general rule of privilege; who may claim privilege; exceptions to the privilege.
(a) A client is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him.
(d) A communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(a) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (b) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, or (c) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, or (d) between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, or (e) between lawyers representing the client.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by the client, his guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client. His authority to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
27-504. Rule 504. Physician-patient privilege; professional counselor-client privilege; definitions; general rule of privilege; who may claim privilege; exception to the privilege.
(e) A communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those present to further the interest of (i) the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician, including members of the patient's family, or (ii) the client participating in professional counseling by a professional counselor.
(2)(a) A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his or her physical, mental, or emotional condition among himself or herself, his or her physician, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician, including members of the patient's family.
(b) A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made during counseling between himself or herself, his or her professional counselor, or persons who are participating in the counseling under the direction of the professional counselor, including members of the clients family.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by the patient or client, by his or her guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased patient or client. The person who was the physician or professional counselor may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient or client. His or her authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(4)(a) There is no privilege under this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for physical, mental, or emotional illness if the physician, in the course of diagnosis or treatment, has determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization or if a professional counselor deems it necessary to refer a client to determine if there is need for hospitalization.
(b) If the judge orders an examination of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient, communications made in the course thereof are not privileged under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(c) There is no privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the physical mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he or she relies upon the condition as an element of his or her claim or defense or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of his or her claim or defense.
(d) There is no privilege under this rule in any judicial proceedings under the Nebraska Juvenile Code regarding injuries to children, incompetents, or disabled persons or in any criminal prosecution involving injury to any such person or the willful failure to report any such injuries.
27-505. Rule 505. Husband-wife privilege, general rule of privilege; definitions; waiver; criminal cases; exceptions to the privilege.
(1) Neither husband nor wife can be examined in any case as to any confidential communication made by one to the other while married, nor shall they after the marriage relation ceases be permitted to reveal in testimony any such communication while the marriage subsisted except as otherwise provided by law. This privilege may be waived only with the consent of both spouses. After the death of one, it may be waived by the survivor. For purposes of this section (a) a confidential communication shall mean a communication which is made privately by any persons to his or her spouse with no intention that such communication be disclosed to any other person and (b) communication shall include any action on the part of a spouse if the action reasonably appears to have been intended to communicate a message from one spouse to the other. (2) During the existence of the marriage, a husband and wife can in no criminal case be a witness against the other. This privilege may be waived only with the consent of both spouses.
27-506. Rule 506. Communications to clergyman; definitions; general rule of privilege; who may claim privilege.
(1) As used in this rule: (a) A clergyman is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him; and (b) A communication is confidential if made privately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication. (2) A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual advisor.
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if he or she: (a) Damages property of another intentionally or recklessly; or (b) Intentionally tempers with property of another so as to endanger person or property; or (c) Intentionally or maliciously causes another to suffer pecuniary loss by deception or threat.
(2) Criminal mischief is a Class IV felony if the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of three hundred dollars, or a substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public service.
(3) Criminal mischief is a Class II misdemeanor if the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of one hundred dollars.
81-1120.27. Telecommunications system; uses; member of legislature; long-distance calls; how made.
(1) The facilities of the state's telecommunications systems are provided for the conduct of state business. In addition, the state's telecommunication systems may be used by state employees and officials for local calls and long-distance calls to children at home, teachers, doctors, day care centers, and baby-sitters, to family members to inform them of unexpected schedule changes, and for other essential personal business. The use of the state's telecommunications systems for essential personal business shall be kept to a minimum and shall not interfere with the conduct of state business. Essential personal long-distance calls shall be either collect, charged to a third party, non-state number, or charged to a personal credit card.
(2) A member of the Legislature, while engaged in legislative business, may make personal long-distance calls on the state telecommunications system or by using his or her state credit card. At the end of every month upon the member's receipt of his or her long-distance call record, the personal long-distance calls shall be designated by the member and the member billed for such calls. Reimbursement to the state for such personal long-distance calls by the member shall be made within thirty days from the date of the designation.
(1) Maintain and administer facilities requires for the custody, control, correctional treatment, and rehabilitation of persons committed to the department and for the safekeeping of such other persons as may be remanded to the department in accordance with law.
83-4,111. Rules and regulations; purpose; contents; rights and privileges of inmates.
(2) Such rules and regulations shall include, but not be limited to, criteria concerning (a) disciplinary procedures and a code of offenses for which discipline may be imposed, (b) disciplinary segregation, (c) grievance procedures, (d) good-time credit, (e) mail and visiting privileges, and (f) rehabilitation opportunities.
(4) Electronic, mechanical, or other device shall mean any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication other than (a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his or her duties or (b) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal.
(11) Mobile phone communication shall mean a radio communication that is transmitted on frequencies allocated under the rules of the Federal Communications Commission.
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in sections 86-701 to 86-707, it shall be unlawful to (a) Intentionally intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic, or oral communication; (b) intentionally use, endeavor to use, or procure any other person to use or endeavor to use, endeavor to use, or procure any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when (i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication or (ii) such device transmits communications by radio or interferes with the transmission of such communication; (c) intentionally disclose or endeavor to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic, or oral communication in violation of this subsection; (d) intentionally use or endeavor to use the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic, or oral communication in violation of this subsection; or (e) having knowledge that an investigative or law enforcement officer has been authorized or has applied for authorization under sections 86-701 to 86-712 to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, give notice or attempt to give notice of the possible interception to any person in order to obstruct, impede or prevent such interception. Except as provided in subdivisions (4)(a) and (5)(b) of this section, any person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.
86-705. Interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications; application;proof; order; contents; time limit; reports to judge; recording; custody of tape or wire; inspections; contents of communication; evidence, when; motion to suppress or denial of application; appeal.
86-707.03. Pen register; trap-and-trace device; restrictions on use.
(1) Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a pen register or trap-and-trace device without first obtaining a court order under section 86-707.05. Nothing in sections 86-701.14 shall be construed to prohibit an emergency operator from conducting a trap or trace of a phone number during an emergency.
(2) The prohibition of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply with respect to the use of a pen register or a trap-and-trace device by a provider: (a) Relating to the operation, maintenance, and testing of an electronic communication service, to the protection of the rights or property of such provider or to the protection of users of that service from abuse of service or unlawful use of service; (b) To record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of such service from fraudulent, unlawful, or abusive use of service, or (c) When the consent of the user of such service has been obtained.
86-703. Interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications; district court; authorize; application; order; procedure. The Attorney General or any county attorney may make application to any district court of this state for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications, and such court may grant, subject to sections 86-701 to 86-707, an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications by law enforcement officers having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which application is made, when such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of murder, kidnapping, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, or any conspiracy to commit any such offenses.

References: v. 
 v. 
 §83
 §26
 v. 
 §86
 §84
 §27
 §27
 §27
 § 27
 §20
 §28
 art. 15
 art. 15
 §32
 §29
 §29
 §83

Art. 1