Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82123:g-r-no-155306,-august-28,-2013-malayang-manggagawa-ng-stayfast-phils-,-inc-,-petitioner,-v-national-labor-relations-commission,-stayfast-philippines,-inc-maria-almeida,-respondents&catid=1573&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:43:48+00:00

Document:
MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA NG STAYFAST PHILS., INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, STAYFAST PHILIPPINES, INC./ MARIA ALMEIDA, Respondents.
This petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks a review and reversal of the Decision1 dated July 1, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59465, which dismissed the petition for certiorari of petitioner Malayang Mangggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc.
This is to certify that it appears from the “Minutes/Agreement” of conciliation conference dated July 15, 1997, which was further confirmed by Conciliator/Mediator Gil Caragayan[,] the Notice of Strike filed by MMSP-Independent on June , 1997, against Stayfast Philippines, Inc. is considered dropped/withdrawn from the business calendar of this office.
It is further certified that there is no new Notice of Strike filed by the same union.
This certification is being issued upon the written request of Atty. Edgardo R. Abaya.
(A) RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GROSS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT UPHELD THE LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION.
(B) COMPLAINANTS/APPELLANTS WHOSE TERMINATION RESULTED FROM THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE[,] UNION-BUSTING AND UNLAWFUL LOCKOUT OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ARE ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT WITH FULL BACKWAGES.
Hence, this petition for certiorari21 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
(1) The Honorable Justices of the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they upheld the rulings of the NLRC and disregarded the constitutional protection of labor as well as Article 248 (e) and Article 263 of the Labor Code.
The petition fails for many reasons.
First, this petition for certiorari is a wrong remedy.
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
For purposes of appeal, the Decision dated July 1, 2002 of the Court of Appeals was a final judgment as it denied due course to, and dismissed, the petition. Thus, the Decision disposed of the petition of petitioner in a manner that left nothing more to be done by the Court of Appeals in respect to the said case. Thus, petitioner should have filed an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in this Court. Where the rules prescribe a particular remedy for the vindication of rights, such remedy should be availed of.
Moreover, certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.28 In this case, petitioner received the Decision dated July 1, 2002 on August 2, 2002 and, under the rules,29 had until August 19, 2002 to file an appeal by way of a petition for review in this Court. Petitioner let this period lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on October 1, 2002.
Second, even assuming that a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy in this case, petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration.
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.30 The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.31 While there are well recognized exceptions to this rule,32 this petition is not covered by any of those exceptions. The Court of Appeals was not given any opportunity either to rectify whatever error it may have made or to address the ascription and aspersion of grave abuse of discretion thrown at it by petitioner. Nor did petitioner offer any compelling reason to warrant a deviation from the rule. The instant petition for certiorari is therefore fatally defective.
Third, petitioner was not able to establish its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that the issuance of the Decision dated July 1, 2002 of the Court of Appeals was patent and gross that would warrant striking it down through a petition for certiorari. Aside from a general statement in the Jurisdictional Facts portion of the petition and the sweeping allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the general enumeration of the grounds of the petition,35 petitioner failed to substantiate its imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. No argument was advanced to show that the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and hostility. Petitioner did not even discuss how or why the conclusions of the Court of Appeals were made with grave abuse of discretion. Instead, petitioner limited its discussion on its version of the case, which had been already rejected both by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Thus, petitioner failed in its duty to demonstrate with definiteness the grave abuse of discretion that would justify the proper availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Fourth, petitioner essentially questioned the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Petitioner cannot properly do that in a petition for certiorari.
Fifth, considering that petitioner basically presented an issue of fact, its petition for certiorari crumbles in view of the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were further upheld by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that findings of fact made by Labor Arbiters and affirmed by the NLRC are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality, and are considered binding if the same are supported by substantial evidence.40 That ruling is based on established case law.41 Furthermore, in arriving at the said ruling, the Court of Appeals even reviewed the rationale of the Labor Arbiter’s decision and was convinced that there was justifiable reason for the NLRC to uphold the same.42 This Court finds no compelling reason to rule otherwise.
Sixth, even on the merits, the case of petitioner has no leg to stand on.
Petitioner’s case rests on the alleged discriminatory acts of respondent company against petitioner’s officers and members. However, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC held that there was no sufficient proof of respondent company’s alleged discriminatory acts.43 Thus, petitioner’s unfair labor practice, union-busting and unlawful lockout claims do not hold water. Moreover, the established facts as found by the NLRC are as follows: the “sit-down strike” made by petitioner’s officers and members on July 21, 1997 was in violation of respondent company’s rules, and petitioner’s officers and members ignored the opportunity given by respondent company for them to explain their misconduct, which resulted in the termination of their employment.44 The Court of Appeals ruled that the said findings were supported by substantial evidence.45 This Court finds that such ruling of the appellate court is not grave abuse of discretion, nor could it be considered wrong.
In sum, there is an abundance of reasons, both procedural and substantive, which are all fatal to petitioner’s cause. In contrast, the instant petition for certiorari suffers from an acute scarcity of legal and factual support.
1Rollo, pp. 114-122; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Mario L. Guariña III, concurring.
3 Resolution dated January 14, 1998 in G.R. No. 125957 (Malayang Mangggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Stayfast [NLMS-Olalia] and Stayfast Philippines, Inc.).
6 Upon finality of the Resolution, entry of judgment was made on May 22, 1998.
10 CA rollo, p. 63.
11 Id. at 68-69; Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated April 27, 1999.
25 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 1.
26Bugarin v. Palisoc, 513 Phil. 59, 66 (2005).
27 523 Phil. 305, 309 (2006).
28Bugarin v. Palisoc, supra note 26 at 66-67.
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. – The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.
The 15th day after petitioner’s receipt of the Decision dated July 1, 2002 was August 17, 2002, a Saturday. Under Section 1, Rule 22, if the last day of the period “falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.” Hence, petitioner had until August 19, 2002, a Monday, to file the petition for review in this Court.
30Romy’s Freight Service v. Castro, 523 Phil. 540, 545 (2006).
31Villena v. Rupisan, 549 Phil. 146, 158 (2007).
33Abedes v. Court of Appeals, 562 Phil. 262, 276 (2007).
34 G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341, 348.
35Rollo, pp. 5 and 8.
37Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, 566 Phil. 1, 35 (2008).
38Ramcar, Inc. v. Hi-Power Marketing, 527 Phil. 699, 708 (2006).
39 Supra note 30 at 546.
40Spouses Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, 354 Phil. 918, 931 (1998).
41 For example, the doctrine is reiterated in Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 367 Phil. 259, 263 (1999).
43 Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated April 27, 1999, pp. 6-7 and NLRC Resolution dated January 31, 2000, pp. 9-11, rollo, pp. 71-72 and 95-97, respectively.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.