Source: http://www.houston-opinions.com/files/14thCoA-2008-In-Interst-of-SN-SMN-DAN-by-Yates-termination-of-parental-rights-constitutional-challenge.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:54:08+00:00

Document:
perfected and before the trial court must file findings of fact and conclusions of law."
States Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV §1; Tex. Const. art. I, §19.
appeal or in a statement combined with a motion for new trial.
law within twenty days from the date a judgment is signed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296.
expired, as was the case here.
as sole managing conservator. We affirm.
On November 25, 2005, DFPS received a referral alleging neglectful supervision and physical neglect of S.
arrived at the home, they discovered that the children were home alone and had been so for several hours.
police department. Thereafter, DFPS took the children into custody.
respectively, and the son, D.A.N., was two years old.
Involuntary termination of parental rights is a serious matter implicating fundamental constitutional rights.
parental rights, the burden of proof at trial is heightened to the clear and convincing standard. See Tex.
to the finding and consider that evidence in our analysis. Id.
or conviction as to the truth of the allegation sought to be established. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex.
subsection (2). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005); In re U.P., 105 S.
W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
result of the child's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.
removed and placed into DFPS's care.
it could easily have done so.
say what it meant; therefore, its words should be the surest guide to its intent. See Fitzgerald v.
Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999); Segal v. Emmes Capital, L.L.
904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.1995).
abuse or neglect as a required element of subsection (O). In re A.A.A., 2008 WL 2548802, at *5. The A.A.
it held that the evidence established parental conduct pursuant to section 161.001(1)(O) as a matter of law.
was removed under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect. Id.
trial court's finding that S.N., S.M.N., and D.A.N. were removed because of abuse or neglect.
doughnuts, and then left again. After waiting forty-five minutes for Vidaure, the officers left with the children.
termination was in the children's best interest pursuant to section 161.001(2).
termination under section 161.001(1) may be probative in determining the best interest of the child. In re A.A.
support a finding terminating a parent's rights. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d at 230.
With these considerations in mind, we review the evidence below.
that she had “something really good" to tell her - her foster parents wanted to adopt all three of them.
at the time of trial, the children had not mentioned appellant in over seven months.
We next examine the children's present emotional or physical considerations now and in the future.
were in danger of developing reactive attachment disorder if they were returned to an unstable environment.
that a system be put into place to ensure their safety and nurturing.
been responsible for feeding S.M.N. and D.A.N., putting them to bed, and dressing them in the morning.
addictive medications for his back injury and also for anxiety, but she was unaware of any drug problem.
quit mentioning him and now consider the foster parents to be their parents.
well" in their foster home.
parenting classes and other parts of the family services plan was due to a lack of transportation.
sufficient to support the trial court's finding. We overrule appellant's fifth issue.
we need not address it.
Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV §1; Tex. Const. art. I, §19.
possible, we must interpret a statute in a manner that renders it constitutional. See FM Props. Operating Co.
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
rather than as it operates in practice. See FM Props. Operating Co., 22 S.W.3d at 873.
appeal. The statement may be combined with a motion for a new trial.
as was the case here.
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid." See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
of points where the party shows good cause for its failure to timely file it. Tex. R. Civ. P. 5.
argument that section 263.405(i) is facially unconstitutional.
unconstitutionally when applied to the challenger's particular circumstances. See Texas Workers' Comp.
Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 n.16 (Tex. 1995); In re N.C.M., No. 04-08-00016-CV, __ S.W.3d.
766, 771 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
signed an order denying appellant's motion for new trial and issuing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
to him because it required him to address an issue of which he was unaware before filing his statement.
the issue in his statement. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 263.405(i). We disagree.
DAVID ALLEN NEUENSCHWANDER, JR. . . . duly and properly cited, appeared in court" (emphasis added).
appellant's paternity is established as to D.A.N. only and makes no mention of his paternity with regard to S.
N. and S.M.N. Moreover, paragraphs 9 and 10 are entitled “Termination of the UNKNOWN FATHER of [S.
appellant can hardly be heard to complain on appeal that he was unaware that the paternity of S.N. and S.M.
evidence to support the court's Findings of Fact 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 21.
8. No father has filed with the paternity registry of the bureau of vital statistics as the father of either [S.M.
time before judgment was rendered in this case.
10. The father of [S.M.N.] and [S.R.N.] is unknown.
 due diligence to determine the location and identify [sic] of the father(s) of [S.M.N.] and [S.R.N.].
appellate points, he failed to preserve his complaint for review.
appeal. Issue two is overruled.
Judgment rendered and Opinion filed October 14, 2008.
Panel consists of Justices Yates, Anderson, and Brown.
the court subsequently granted DFPS's motion for rehearing, withdrew its original opinion, and issued In re A.
2008, no pet. h.), in its stead.
 During this last visit, appellant, his grandmother, Vidaure, and her boyfriend went to visit the children.
DFPS told him that he could not see his children.
and provided for termination of the unknown fathers' rights to S.N. and S.M.N.
Establishment of Paternity: DAVID ALLEN NEUENSCHWANDER, JR.
to be, the father of the child [D.A.N.] . . . ."
conclude that Section 263.405(i) does not apply to alleged errors occurring after the fifteen day deadline.
Therefore, Section 263.405(i) is not unconstitutional on this basis." Id. At 19.

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