Source: http://www.laborlawtalk.com/forum/bankruptcy-law-forum/personal-debt/101258-legally-binding-contract-or-not
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:29:30+00:00

Document:
Legally binding contract or not?
Legal experts please help me out.
Is this challenge a legally binding contract ?
but this guy refused to pay out, could he be sued successfully?
In th UK there is a precedent in Hampden vs Walsh (1881).
laws, would this be a binding and enforceable contract?
Challenge application, once signed, becomes a contract").
If someone came forward with conclusive proof of ESPbut this guy refused to pay out, could he be sued successfully?
issue) perhaps also against James Randi, personally.
exposing fraud commonly associated with persons claiming to "prove"
UK precedents are not binding in US courts, of course. But still the law might be similar. Under US laws, specifically Florida laws, would this be a binding and enforceable contract?
would be asked to agree to a N.Y. choice-of-law provision.
The proposed JREF -w- would-be ESP-prover agreement was drafted with authority like Hampden v. Walsh in mind and was intended in part to provide the basis for an enforceable contract and for a rather basic reason: Mr. Randi is personally/politically/culturally committed to exposing fraud commonly associated with persons claiming to "prove" that there is "ESP" and believes based on his knowledge/experience that it is sufficiently unlikely that there will be actual such proof (as "proof" and related terms are defined by the proffered agreement) that there is very low risk to JREF or to him in making the offer referred to.
1) Under US law would this be a wager, as Hampden's challenge was?
unenforceable, as in the UK?
and the law is one area in which he has no expertise.
service to Randi, all he's done is demonstrate that Randi is mistaken.
Is proving a point adequate consideration?
then fails to do so, can Randi demand compensation?
On Tue, 14 Mar 2006, "Tommy Pierce" <[email protected]> wrote: The proposed JREF -w- would-be ESP-prover agreement was drafted with authority like Hampden v. Walsh in mind and was intended in part to provide the basis for an enforceable contract and for a rather basic reason: Mr. Randi is personally/politically/culturally committed to exposing fraud commonly associated with persons claiming to "prove" that there is "ESP" and believes based on his knowledge/experience that it is sufficiently unlikely that there will be actual such proof (as "proof" and related terms are defined by the proffered agreement) that there is very low risk to JREF or to him in making the offer referred to.
I think you've missed the point of my question. It comes down to two points: 1) Under US law would this be a wager, as Hampden's challenge was? Why, or why not? I think this IS a wager, if I'm wrong tell me what I'm missing. 2) Are wagering contracts legally enforceable in the US? Or are they unenforceable, as in the UK?
I believe this offer of a prize would be legally enforceable in the U.S.
support a straight contract conclusion, I'm only saying it is unecessesary.
And just because the challenge agreement SAYS that it is legally binding does not make it so. He doesn't always know what he's talking about and the law is one area in which he has no expertise. And a couple of other points: Under UK law a promise is only binding when supported by valuable consideration. Is that also true under US law?
Scratch the word "valuable" and the answer is Yes.
If so, where's the peppercorn? A successful applicant hasn't performed any valuable service to Randi, all he's done is demonstrate that Randi is mistaken. Is proving a point adequate consideration?
If it's a legally binding contract, can Randi sue failed applicants for breach of contract? If someone promises to demonstrate ESP and then fails to do so, can Randi demand compensation?
that he would be entitled to no prize if the conditions were not met.
you can provide a citation, I'd like to read it.
The proposed JREF -w- would-be ESP-prover agreement was drafted with authority like Hampden v. Walsh in mind . . .intended . . . to provide the basis for an enforceable contract and [not for a just apparent "contract" not enforceable on public policy grounds, e.g., as a "wager" that is not lawful] . . . .
I think you've missed the point of my question. It comes down to two points: Under US law would this be a wager, as Hampden's challenge was?
Why, or why not? I think this IS a wager, if I'm wrong tell me what I'm missing.
further comment below for "why").
Are wagering contracts legally enforceable in the US? Or are they unenforceable, as in the UK?
event not within the control of one or the other.
not be difficult for you to find like "definitions" in other U.S.
And just because the challenge agreement SAYS that it is legally binding does not make it so.
through its courts or otherwise).
insist that it is a porterhouse steak.
Randi/JREF offer to enter into the agreement plainly is not a "wager"
JREF/Randy promise to pay standing alone).
they are willing to pay the stated sum.
an earlier one had died); etc., etc., etc.
He doesn't always know what he's talking about and the law is one area in which he has no expertise.
enforceable by a court in the U.S. in a well-presented lawsuit.
And a couple of other points: Under UK law a promise is only binding when supported by valuable consideration. Is that also true under US law?
predicate for a law enforceable contract is not binding in the U.S.
is characterized as a "Challenge").
Randi/JREF offer actually states in this connection.
steps for verification of whether there has/hasn't been the "proof"
would be the contract's cancellation provision.
respect. Here, too, no different from any other contractual dispute.
By the way, I don't believe Hampden v. Walsh says what you say it says. If you can provide a citation, I'd like to read it.
Wager--Construction of Agreement--Action to recover Deposit--8 & 9 Vict. c.
decision plaintiff objected, and before defendant paid over the money to W.
paid over by defendant, he was entitled to judgment.
case, but all that is material is stated in the judgment of the Court.
1875. Nov. 12 and 15. Ambrose, Q.C. (with him Willis), for the plaintiff.
Robinson, Serjt. (with him J. O. Griffiths, Q.C.), for defendant.
cases were cited for the plaintiff: Robinson v. Mearns [FN1]; Batty v.
FN1 6 D. & R. 26.
FN2 5 C. B. 818, 827; 17 L. J. (C.P.) 215.
FN3 1 Q. B. 631.
intelligent referee a convex railway, canal, or lake."
or lake, by actual measurement and demonstration, to the satisfaction of Mr.
Welsh's Dam (six miles), to the extent of five feet more or less."
plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum so deposited by him.
9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, is prevented from maintaining this action.
the agreement is in effect a wager.
pay money to B. on the happening of a given event, in consideration of B.
time of a court of justice.
another, all wagers being made null and void at law by that statute.
FN4 1 Cr. & M. 797.
FN5 8 B. & C. 221.
have it returned, and it was held that he was entitled to recover.
FN6 1 Cr. & M. 797.
[FN8] the Court of Queen's Bench, following the prior cases of Cotton v.
FN7 10 Ex. 737; 24 L. J. (Ex.) 174.
FN8 8 B. & C. 221.
FN9 5 T. R. 405.
FN12 14 M. & W. at p. 712.
FN13 8 B. & C. 221.
FN14 8 B. & C. 221.
has been paid over. In the latter, the contract, prior to 8 & 9 Vict. c.
Greater difficulty, therefore, presented itself where, prior to 8 & 9 Vict.
King's Bench and Exchequer were at variance on this point. In Eltham v.
position of a stakeholder by this Court in the two cases of Eltham v.
Kingsman [FN18] and Hastelow v. Jackson [FN19]; and in that view we concur.
FN15 1 B. & Ald. 683.
FN16 14 M. & W. 728.
FN17 1 B. & Ald. 683.
FN18 1 B. & Ald. 683.
FN19 8 B. & C. 221.
any person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made."
Varney v. Hickman. [FN20] The plaintiff and one Isaacs had deposited 20l.
back his deposit, if demanded before the money was paid over.
FN20 5 C. B. 271; 17 L. J. (C.P.) 102.
his stake upon a repudiation of the wagering contract."
FN21 10 Ex. 737; 24 L. J. (Ex.) 174.
FN22 5 C. B. 271; 17 L.J (C.P.) 102.
winner. And the Court, taking the same view as had been taken in Varney v.
are to be reviewed, can only be reviewed in a court of appeal.
FN23 36 L. J. (Ex.) 178.
FN24 Ir. Rep. 2 C. L. 64.
FN25 5 C. B. 271; 17 L. J. (Ex.) 174.
FN26 10 Ex. 737; 24 L.J. (Ex.) 174.
Thus far we have dealt with the agreement between the parties as a wager.
a "wager." We can have no hesitation in holding it to be such.
once his authority had been countermanded.
FN27 1 B. & Ald. 683.
FN28 8 B. & C. 221.
Our judgment will therefore be for the plaintiff.
Solicitor for plaintiff: A. E. Copp.
Solicitor for defendant: W. Jaquet.
No (as I said earlier without missing the point of your earlier question).
Because you presume vaguely but without explicating specifically what a "wager" that a court would rule unenforceable as violative of some particular jurisdiction's anti-"wager" statute is (if there were such a statute that applied, although you did not say that there is in whatever are the places you have in mind) or, in common law terms, would be unenforceable "as against public policy" (re. which see further comment below for "why").
Uh, no. I presume nothing of the sort.
One also will find, however, numerous judicial rulings that purport to explain what, (based on your postings in this thread) undoubtedly, you might claim to be "wagering" or "gambling" are not that.
In sum, your here implied argument apparently with Randi (and, it seems, with me) is therefore premised on your painting with much too broad a definitional brush; although under your theory as you've so far summarized it, there apparently could not be any form of personal services contract that would be enforceable (in a jurisdiction which outlaws "wagering").
than I do myself, perhaps you should apply for the million.
I agree that a party's unilaterally made characterization of an agreement (or, for that matter, pretty much any form of law-releavnt activity) does not, standing alone, bind the State (whether acting through its courts or otherwise). Conversely, however, your just SAYING that the Randi/JREF contract is not legally binding (or is a "wager" and, as such, unlawful as against some particular state's penal law - which, however, you have not cited - or "public policy") does not make it so either any more than would it be correct for you to point to a pile of chopped liver and to insist that it is a porterhouse steak.
Sigh. I'm not SAYING any such thing. I'm ASKING. See the difference?
Nor did I say anything about it being against penal law.
I make no statement about Randi's challenge. I merely ask a question.
Why is Randi's challenge legally binding, if Hampden's wasn't ?
terms which you have not yet done.
- some fundamental difference between the nature of the two challenges.
reputation in order to win a big prize. Thus, (I think) it is a bet.
identical to Hampden's. Would that be legally enforceable?
Hampden is not current authority.
is a contract relating to gambling."
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s.
775.083." And Chapter 849.26 provides that gambling contracts are void.
or more of these elements is missing, the activity is not gambling."
In the UK . . . wagering contracts are considered to be a matter of honour between parties, and the courts won't intervene if the loser defaults.
It's not a contest; there are not two parties competing for the same prize. It's a challenge. It's someone who, as a result of extensive experience, doesn't believe you can do what you say you can do, daring you to do what you say you can do. It's a dare. It's not at all a friendly agreement. It's an adversarial arrangement, Kinda similar, right?
"If you do [actA] and if [resultY] occurs, I promise to pay you [$#]"
control quota is realized; etc., etc.
This is why I think Randi's challenge is legally a wager.
I make no statement about Randi's challenge. I merely ask a question. Why is Randi's challenge legally binding, if Hampden's wasn't ?
different standards of law apply in different jurisdictions.
"questions" imply thirty or forty years ago with respect to the U.S.
in the U.S., rationalized predominantly on asserted "public policy"
U.S. states could easily be given - is Intercontinental Hotels, etc.
I'm not actually claiming that you are wrong. I'm sure you know more about US law than I do. I just want you to explain the reason in simple terms which you have not yet done.
abandon formalism and instead to address competing economic interests.
Please explain either- some fundametal difference in the law between out two great counties OR- some fundamental difference between the nature of the two challenges.
defined "claimant" in their offer and proffered agreement).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v.

 v.

 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v.