Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83950:58790&catid=1590&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:24:05+00:00

Document:
TZE SUN WONG, Petitioner, v. KENNY WONG, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 15, 2007 and the Resolution3 dated October 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92607, affirming the deportation of petitioner Tze Sun Wong (petitioner).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration20 which was eventually denied by the BOI in a Resolution21 dated December 4, 2002. As such, petitioner filed an appeal before the Secretary of Justice.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari30 before the CA.
Petitioner sought reconsideration36 but was denied in a Resolution37 dated October 23, 2007, hence, this petition.
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly denied petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
The Court first discusses the propriety of petitioner’s recourse before the CA.
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly states that decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines) shall be appealed to the CA under this rule.
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens is vested on the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.49 Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the [Board of Commissioner (BOC)] is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with [the] ruling of the Court in [Commissioner] Domingo v. Scheer (see 466 Phil. 235, 264-284 2004), such party may file a motion for the reconsideration thereof before the BOC. The Court ruled therein that “there is no law or rule which provides that a Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC.” The Court, likewise, declared that in deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner and that the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order under Rule 37 of said Rules.
In this case, petitioner instituted an administrative appeal before the Secretary of Justice and thereafter sought direct recourse to the CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other available remedies, the first being a subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and, eventually, an appeal of the OP decision to the CA via Rule 43. While these remedies remained available to him, the Court deems that they would not afford him speedy and adequate relief in view of the plain imminence of his deportation, by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of deportation.56 The urgency of such circumstance therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari.
This notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless denies the petition on substantive grounds.
It must be highlighted that the case under consideration essentially calls for the Court to determine whether the CA’s dismissal of petitioner’s certiorari petition before it was correct.
Petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation imputed against him, claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation. However, the commission of said acts involves factual matters that have already been established during the proceedings before the BOI Board of Commissioners. In this regard, it is crucial to point out that “[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.”58 As petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to deviate from the BOI Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to defer to its judgment.
Besides, petitioner’s defenses anent what had actually transpired during the relevant incidents surrounding his driver’s license application apparently constitute mere self-serving allegations barren of any independent proof. While he blamed the unnamed fixer filling up the erroneous details in his application, his version of the story remained uncorroborated. The lack of testimony on the part of the fixer leaves much to be desired from petitioner’s theory.
Moreover, the Court’s review of the present case is via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s judgment or the appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts.59 None of these exceptions was, however, convincingly shown to attend in this case.
Sec. 8. Decision of the Board. - The board of Commissioners, hereinafter referred to in this Act, shall be composed of the Commissioner of Immigration and the two Deputy Commissioners. In the absence of a member of the Board, the Department Head shall designate an officer or employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve as a member thereof. In any case coming before the Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall prevail.
In particular, the presumption that the Judgment had been deliberated by the BOI Board of Commissioners as a collegial body stands. In any event, the lack of any concurrence or dissension from the two (2) other commissioners missing on the face of the October 2, 2002 Judgment has already been placated by their eventual signing of full concurrence in the subsequent Resolution dated December 4, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 15, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92607 are hereby AFFIRMED.
2 Id. at 10-17. Penned by Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, concurring.
6 Id. at 69 and 170.
9 See Charge Sheet dated February 14, 2002, docketed as D.C. No. ADD-02-983 issued by Acting Special Prosecutor Antonio M. Carolino; id. at 163-164.
11 Pertaining to Mission Order No. ADD-02-157 dated April 17, 2002 (not attached to the records of this case).
14 Id. at 170-173. Signed by Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo and Associate Commissioner Daniel C. Cueto.
16 Entitled “An Act to Control and Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the Philippines” (August 26, 1940).
18 Entitled “AN ACT AMENDING COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO REGULATING THE USE OF ALIASES” (August 4, 1969).
21 Id. at 189-190. Signed by Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo and Associate Commissioners Arthel B. Caronoñgan, Daniel C. Cueto, and Orlando V. Dizon.
25 See Motion for Reconsideration dated May 13, 2005; id. at 199-213.
26 Referring to Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo and Associate Commissioner Daniel C. Cueto.
28 Referring to Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo and Associate Commissioners Arthel B. Caronoñgan, Daniel C. Cueto and Orlando V. Dizon.
32 See id. at 17.
36 See Motion for Reconsideration dated June 4, 2007; id at 299-316.
38 Entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes” (August 14, 1981).
39 Amended by RA 7902 entitled “An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, Amending for the Purpose Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, As Amended, Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980” (March 18, 1995).
40 595 Phil. 56 (2008).
42 477 Phil. 891 (2004).
“(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.” (Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 772, 777, citing Rep. of the Phils. v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 97-98 ).
45 210 Phil. 67 (1983).
46 See Chapter 10, Title III, Book IV, Executive Order No. (EO) 292.
47Caoile v. Vivo, supra note 45, at 82 citing Board of Commissioners v. Hon. Domingo, 118 Phil. 680, 684 (1963).
48 518 Phil. 501 (2006).
Section 10. Power to Countermand Decisions of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. - The decision of the Board of Commissioners which has jurisdiction over all deportation cases shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from promulgation, unless within such period the President shall order the contrary.
50Kiani v. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, supra note 48, at 515-516.
51 The OP is one of the quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
52 526 Phil 852 (2006).
54Bordomeo v. CA, G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 269, 286.
55Francisco Motors Corp. v. CA, 535 Phil. 736, 748 (2006).
56 See dispositive portion of the October 2, 2002 Judgment of BOI Board of Commissioners; rollo, pp. 172-173.
57Bordomeo v. CA, supra note 54, at 289, citing Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 410, 422-423.
58Dwikarna v. Hon. Domingo, supra note 42, at 901; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
59Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.
61 Alcazar v. Arante, G.R. No. 177042, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 507, 517.
62 G.R. No. 160718, May 12, 2010, 620 SCRA 483.

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