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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:35:47+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 137862 - ALFREDO ESTRADA, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
ALFREDO ESTRADA, RENATO T. CANILANG and MANUEL C. LIM, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND BACNOTAN CEMENT CORPORATION (BCC), Respondents.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44324, promulgated on April 6, 1998, and the resolution2 dated February 24, 1999 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Alfredo Estrada, Renato T. Canilang and Manuel C. Lim, as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed on July 31, 1996, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI), Jeffrey Khong Hun as President of WFPI, Manuel Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales, and Ricardo Serrano as Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Court notes that the powers vested by law under Executive Order 192, Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984 are regulatory merely and for the purpose of determining whether pollution exists.
Respondent BCC then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking to reverse and set aside the orders dated December 6, 1996 and May 13, 1997 as well as to lift the writ of preliminary injunction dated December 11, 1996.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated December 6, 1996 and May 13, 1997 are hereby SET ASIDE. The writ of injunction issued by the public respondent under date of December 11, 1996 is forthwith, LIFTED and the Complaint insofar as petitioner BCC is concerned is ordered forthwith DISMISSED. No costs.
FIRSTLY. 'We find that the denial of said Motion to Dismiss by the Court a quo, was a grave abuse of discretion because of the doctrine of Administrative Remedy which requires that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought administratively first before the Court will take action thereon. As ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Abe Abe, et al. v. Manta (90 SCRA 524). "When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government but nevertheless a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the Judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the Court is based not only on respect for party litigants but also on respect for a co-equal office in the government. In fine, our Supreme Court has categorically explained in Aquino v. Mariano (129 SCRA 209) that whenever, there is an available Administrative Remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse can be made until such remedy has been availed of and exhausted for three (3) reasons that: (1) Resort to court maybe unnecessary if administrative remedy is available; (2) Administrative Agency may be given a chance to correct itself; and (3) The principle of Amity and Convenience requires that no court can act until administrative processes are completed. Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro (77 SCRA 264).
SECONDLY, it is a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court is general in character, referring to the existence of nuisance under the provision of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. On the other hand, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, through the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under R.A. 3931 as amended by P.D. 984, prescribes the Abatement of Pollution. In fine, when it comes to nuisance, the Court has general jurisdiction under the New Civil Code. But when it comes to pollution which is specific, the administrative body like the DENR has jurisdiction. Clearly, nuisance is general or broader in concept while pollution is specific. Following the rule that the specific issue of pollution, which is under the jurisdiction of DENR prevails over the general issue of nuisance which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC (Lagman v. City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579), there is no doubt that the DENR and not the Court should have jurisdiction. Hence, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner should have been GRANTED by the Court a quo. Since it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Its denial by public respondent was therefore a grave abuse of discretion, which is correctible by certiorari .
THIRDLY. We should not lose sight of the fact that the authority to construct in this case is necessarily required prior to the actual construction of petitioner's cement bulk terminal while the permit to operate likewise is required before the petitioner's cement bulk terminal commences its operation. In this case, the petitioner, at the time, had only the authority to construct, pursuant to a valid contract between the WFPI and the petitioner BCC, approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Subic and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales and pursuant to the requisite of DENR. Again, it should be remembered that, at the time, petitioner did not yet have the permit to operate (which should properly be made only after a factual determination of the levels of pollution by the DENR). Hence, the injunction issued in this case is premature and should not have been issued at all by public respondent.
FOURTHLY. The effect of the writ of injunction enjoining petitioner from operating the cement bulk terminal (Order of December 6, 1996) and the public respondent's refusal to defer the proceedings below, virtually preempt the DENR from making such determination, nay even the authority to issue the permit to operate is likewise preempted. How can we therefore enjoin operation before the issuance of the permit to operate? It is also a settled rule that the remedy of injunction is not proper where an administrative remedy is available. The permit to operate may not even be issued, at all, by the DENR (Buayan Cattle Co. Inc., v. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 276).
Evidently, the writ of injunction issued in this case, as We view it, is premature. In fact, by issuing the Order of Dec. 6, 1996, the public respondent wrestled the authority from the DENR to determine whether the cement bulk terminal will cause pollution or not, or whether the pollution may only be on acceptable level as to justify the issuance of the permit to operate.
While conceding that prior resort should be made to the DENR, the respondent Judge proceeded to take the contrary stand, following the private respondent's contention that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies are [sic] inapplicable, since it would cause irreparable injury if private respondents should avail of administrative step before taking Court action.
The respondents' contention is clearly baseless and highly speculative because how can it possibly produce irreparable injury before the actual operation since petitioner has not yet been issued permit to operate. Besides, We find no evidence shown in the complaint or alleged therein that will support the presence of pollution and which could properly be the subject of injunction.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the complaint filed by the private respondents has no prayer for preliminary injunction (it was not asked, why then should it be given?). Furthermore, the Sublease Agreement having been partly executed, it could no longer be enjoined.
The principal issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going to court.
we find, however, that the instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptional circumstances.
Petitioners claim that their action before the trial court, without going to the DENR first, is justified because they are in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of respondent's cement repacking plant and the DENR does not have the power to grant them the relief they are praying for.
Sec. 6. Powers and Functions - . . .
(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(j) serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
. . . under . . . Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the (PAB) (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." . . . [I]t is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima-facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life. . . .
The matter of determining whether there is'pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
Clearly, the claim of petitioners that their immediate recourse to the regular courts is justified because the DENR is powerless to grant them proper relief is without basis.
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court which renders their complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jainal Rasul and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio Labitoria and Marina Buzon; Rollo, pp. 61-77.
4 Id., Rollo, pp. 63-65.
12 PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, RENAMING IT AS THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
13 AN ACT CREATING THE NATIONAL WATER AND AIR POLLUTION CONTROL COMMISSION.
14 PROVIDING FOR THE REVISION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3931, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
20 Castro v. Gloria, G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001, 363 SCRA 417, 422.
21 Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas, G.R. No. 131442, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 530.
22 Paat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 1997, 266 SCRA 167, 175-176.
23 G.R. No. 106028, May 9, 2001, 357 SCRA 599.
25 Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 152058, September 27, 2004.
30 G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112.
32 Id., pp. 117-118, 123-124.
33 G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994, 231 SCRA 292.

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