Source: http://www.politicaexterna.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=4&Itemid=16
Timestamp: 2014-10-31 08:59:39+00:00

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"Până la sfârşitul anului trebuie găsită o soluţie pentru a se asigura intrarea Bulgariei şi României în 2012, lucru scris în protocol la cererea preşedintelu... "Astăzi, am atenţionat în mod expres asupra faptului că programul de recapitalizare a băncilor trebuie să aibă în vedere şi menţinerea nivelului de expunere a b�... Friday 31 October 2014
Acasa Romania Moldova
UE Balcani & Europa de est Rusia & CSI Caucaz Orientul Mijlociu China Asia & Pacific Africa America NATO Organizatii internationale Moldova
On 19 November, the EU Council acknowledged that Moldova has completed the first phase of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP), and agreed that it can move onto the second phase. Fulfilling the VLAP should lead to the abolition of Schengen visas. The Action Plan consists of two phases: preparation (drawing up reforms and legislative changes) and implementation (of the planned reforms).So far, the EU has granted the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation to Moldova (in January 2011) and Ukraine (in November 2010). In addition, on 20 November the Ukrainian parliament adopted two laws on biometric documents and the protection of personal data, the lack of which had been an obstacle to concluding the first phase of the VLAP. Commentary
Comentează Afişări: 185
Primul element pe care l-au remarcat observatorii vieţii bisericeşti din Rusia este că versiunii ruseşti a paginii oficiale de internet a Patriarhiei din preajma Kremlinului i s-a adăugat, în premieră absolută, versiunea în limba ucraineană. Această noutate nu reprezintă, aşa cum s-ar putea crede la prima vedere, o concesie generoasă făcută credincioşilor şi clericilor ucraineni care nutresc tendinţe de emancipare canonică de tutela Moscovei. Dacă ar fi fost aşa, „multinaţionala” Biserică rusă ar fi acceptat şi versiuni ale site-ului său oficial în limbile bielorusă şi română. Despre limbile altor popoare din Federaţia Rusă convertite integral sau parţial la Ortodoxie nici nu are rost să vorbim, întrucât Patriarhia Moscovei promovează în raport cu ele, în cel mai rău caz, o politică lingvistică asimilaţionistă, iar în cel mai bun caz, una de aculturaţie, ca primă etapă a rusificării.
Al doilea element ţine de conceptul „două limbi, un singur popor” lansat de patriarhul Kiril cu ocazia primei sale vizite la Kiev, la scurt timp după înscăunarea sa la Moscova. Acest concept presupune că ruşii şi ucrainenii, chiar dacă vorbesc două limbi diferite, dar intim şi puternic înrudite şi, în proporţie de 80 la sută, reciproc inteligibile, reprezintă o singură etnie, cu rădăcini comune în Rusia kieveană („Киевская Русь” în rusă şi „Київська Русь” în ucraineană).
După cum arătam, Patriarhia Moscovei, atât de aprig angajată într-o absurdă competiţie canonică cu Patriarhia Română în Republica Moldova, nu acceptă şi o versiune românească a site-ului său oficial. Este potrivit să ne întrebăm: de ce oare? Răspunsul este simplu şi stă la vedere. Patriarhia Moscovei, al cărei supus este, între alţii, ambasadorul României la Chişinău, Marius Lazurca, dar şi premierul Vladimir Filat şi interimarul Marian Lupu, este adepta teoriei „limbii moldoveneşti”, distincte de limba română şi a „etniei moldoveneşti”, distincte de etnia română. În plus, tributară încă panslavismului răsăritean, ea acceptă cu dificultate, ba chiar cu multă silă, alfabetul latin. Cu toate acestea, în ultimii doi ani am putut observa publicarea pe site-ul Patriarhiei Ruse a câtorva ştiri în versiune românească, cu specificarea: „Материал на: молдавском”, adică, material în limba moldovenească. Dacă ar fi indicat că respectivele materiale sunt în limba română, Patriarhia Moscovei şi-ar fi desfiinţat teoria privind aşa-zisele diferenţe etnice şi lingvistice dintre locuitorii băştinaşi ai României şi Republicii Moldova.
Să nu se supere nimeni pentru sintagma „subdiviziune canonică”. Statutul Patriarhiei Moscovei o consfinţeşte în articolul său 2: „Bisericile Autonome şi Autoconduse, Exarhatele, circumscripţiile mitropolitane, eparhiile, instituţiile sinodale, protopopiatele, parohiile, mănăstirile, frăţiile, instituţiile de învăţământ teologic, misiunile, reprezentanţele şi aşezămintele care intră în Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă (numite în continuare „subdiviziuni canonice” (aici şi în continuare sublinierile ne aparţin – nota noastră)) alcătuiesc canonic Patriarhia Moscovei”. Printre aceste „subdiviziuni canonice” este şi parohia „Sfântul Dumitru” din Chişinău al cărei foarte ataşat enoriaş este ambasadorul României la Chişinău Marius Lazurca, care dă un foarte prost şi molipsitor exemplu pentru protipendada de origine română de la noi. Acest soi de enoriaşi se simt confortabil în „subdiviziunea canonică” rusească, de vreme ce Patriarhia Moscovei se defineşte, în articolul 1 al Statutului său, astfel: „Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă este o Biserică multinaţională Autocefală Locală (…)”, ca, în articolul 3 al aceluiaşi Statut, să arate: „Jurisdicţia Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse se întinde asupra persoanelor de credinţă ortodoxă care locuiesc pe teritoriul canonic al Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse: în Rusia, Ucraina, Bielorusia, Moldova, Azerbaidjan, Kazahstan, Kirghizia, Letonia, Lituania, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Estonia, precum şi asupra ortodocşilor din alte ţări care aderă la ea benevol”. Între altele fie spus, faptul că Republica Moldova este menţionată în Statutul Patriarhiei Moscovei ca „Moldova” pur şi simplu, şi nu cu denumirea ei oficială, demonstrează o dată în plus poftele expansioniste ale Bisericii Ruse asupra întregii Moldove istorice până la Carpaţi. Altminteri, hipercentralizata Patriarhie de lângă Kremlin ar fi indicat corect denumirea statului nostru, aşa cum o face în cazul tuturor celorlalte state trecute în lista sa „teritorial-canonică”.
Cu tot centralismul religios impus de Moscova, după cum am arătat şi mai sus, „subdiviziunea canonică” de la Chişinău, recunoaşte oficial, cu jumătate de gură, ca să nu fie auzită în capitala Rusiei, că pe mica ei parcelă din „teritoriul canonic” al Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse se vorbeşte limba română! Chiar aşa, limba română, fără nici un fel de ghilimele sau paranteze! Articolul 6 al „subdiviziunii canonice” ruseşti de la noi glăsuieşte: „În locaşurile sfinte ale Bisericii Ortodoxe din Moldovaserviciile divine se oficiază în limba română. În unele parohii – în limbile slavonă, ucraineană, găgăuză sau bulgară, în dependenţă denaţionalitatea şi doleanţele credincioşilor din respectiva parohie”. Când recunoaşte, în răspăr cu centrul religios de la Moscova, că foloseşte limba română, „subdiviziunea canonică” recunoaşte că şi majoritatea covârşitoare a credincioşilor din parcela sa sunt de naţionalitate română. Logica juridică sănătoasă care transpare din articolul 6 al Statutului se sprijină pe legătura dintre limba de cult şi naţionalitatea credincioşilor, fie ei majoritari sau minoritari. Articolul 6 denunţă şi răstoarnă toată propaganda făţarnică a Patriarhiei Ruse care se străduieşte să-şi justifice jurisdicţia peste ortodocşii de naţionalitate şi de limba română din Republica Moldova prin nişte numai de ea ştiute „diferenţe” dintre „limba moldovenească” şi limba română, dintre „etnia moldovenească” şi etnia română. Este chiar de mare mirare că Patriarhia Moscovei nu a intervenit până acum şi nu a luat măsurile de rigoare, după cum îi stă în nărav, ca articolul 6 al Statutului „subdiviziunii canonice” din Republica Moldova să fie adus în conformitate cu doctrina Patriarhiei Ruse despre români şi moldoveni.
Preotul Mihail Jar
Ceea ce nu s-a ştiut până mai ieri, dar a transpirat deja din cercurile bisericeşti către presă, este că aceste pregătiri vizează „descălecarea patriarhală” nu doar în Republica Moldova, ci şi într-o altă zonă, tot în cuprinsul Moldovei istorice, mai exact în ţinutul Herţa din actuala regiune Cernăuţi incorporată Ucrainei. Este vorba de mănăstirea Bănceni condusă de preotul Mihail Jar, un cleric de origine română şi un înflăcărat adept al jurisdicţiei moscovite peste români. Raionul Herţa este un ţinut curat românesc, etnicii români constituind peste 95% din populaţie. Aceşti români, populând compact regiunea, sunt aproape sută la sută pe stil nou, o excepţie în tot cuprinsul Lumii Ruse. Mănăstirea de la Bănceni este însă singura „subdiviziune canonică” de stil vechi implantată în interiorul ţinutului Herţa. Dorinţa preotului Mihail Jar, ca şi intenţia patriarhului Kiril, este de a transforma mănăstirea de la Bănceni în stavropighie patriarhală, adică într-un avanpost canonic moscovit, subordonat direct Patriarhului întregii Rusii, la doar câţiva kilometri de actuala frontieră cu România. Astfel, Biserica Rusă vrea să mai împlânte un ţăruş „canonic” (patriarhul Kiril consideră că tot ceea ce este rusesc pe pământul Moldovei istorice este „foarte canonic”, după cum tot ceea ce este românesc este cât se poate de „necanonic”). Stavropighia patriarhală rusă de stil vechi înfiptă în inima ţinutului Herţa este gândită la Moscova şi ca un fel de bornă de hotar a „teritoriului canonic” al ceea ce patriarhul Kiril numeşte „Sfânta Rusie”. Este vorba despre o sfidare şi despre un avertisment adresate Bisericii Ortodoxe Române din trupul viu al căreia Patriarhia Moscovei a muşcat şi a înghiţit dintr-o înfulecare hălci mari şi grase: Basarabia întreagă, sfârtecată la rândul ei în trei, nordul Bucovinei şi ţinutul Herţa. Pentru că hălcile româneşti îi mai produc „Sfintei Rusii” indigestie, s-a decis „rumegarea” cu metodă şi sistem a respectivelor bucăţi (sau bucate?), deosebit de nutritoare pentru flămândul pântece imperial. Că stavropighia de la Bănceni are menirea unui focar de răspândire a limbii ruse, nu încape nici o îndoială, această mănăstire fiind singura din ţinutul Herţa în care paralelismul lingvistic româno-rus a fost deja impus. Sursele noastre bisericeşti susţin că pe românii din Herţa îi va podidi nu doar bucuria de a-i închina mănăstirea Bănceni patriarhului Kiril, ci şi de a-i primi, ca oaspeţi aleşi şi pe premierul rus Vladimir Putin, împreună cu preşedintele ucrainean Victor Ianukovici. Nu punem mâna în foc că va fi anume aşa, dar tot am da puţin crezământ surselor noastre bine informate, aflând că preotul Mihail Jar este duhovnicul preşedintelui Ianukovici.
Este naiv să credem că în octombrie „multinaţionalul” patriarh rus Kiril va sluji la Chişinău în limba română. Sau la Băncenii din românescul nostru ţinut Herţa. Şi nici nu-şi va citi discursurile în limba română, aşa cum a făcut-o fostul Papă polonez Ioan Paul al II-lea la Bucureşti, când a sărutat pământul strămoşilor noştri şi a omagiat Ortodoxia de limbă latină. Este la fel de naiv să credem că marele şi duhovnicescul părinte moscovit al ambasadorului Lazurca va dispune încropirea unei versiuni în limba română a paginii de internet a patriarhiei sale „multinaţionale” şi „multilingve”. Patriarhia Moscovei, de la care duhneşte rău a imperialism ţarist şi sovietic, se căzneşte să clădească o Lume Rusă nu de dragul românilor sau a limbii române, cu geniul şi frumuseţile ei. Văzându-i vorbele şi faptele de până acum, putem fi siguri că una dintre principalele idei, obsesivă şi atât de păgână, din capul patriarhului Kiril este cea imperială rusă. Iar imperiul rus a avut şi are tendinţa uniformizării, adică a rusificării. Dacă nu forţate ca înainte, silenţioase. Astăzi Moscova nu mai dă năvală peste noi, nici în Basarabia şi nici în Herţa, cu tancurile. Ea vine cu buze mieroase, cu tămâie şi cu agheasmă. Dacă ocupaţia cu tancurile sau alte drăcovenii nu mai merge, merge ocupaţia cu patrafirul şi omoforul. Iar Patriarhia Moscovei are omofor larg, încât chiar câteva planete sunt prea puţine ca să încapă sub el.
Comentează Afişări: 718
The consequences of electing the President of Moldova
On 16 March, Moldova’s parliament elected as president Nicolae Timofti, a judge, the candidate of the ruling Alliance for European Integration (AIE), and the chairman of the Supreme Judiciary Council. In addition to the members of the three parties forming the AIE (who together hold 58 seats in parliament) and one independent member, three deputies from the so-called Igor Dodon group (who left the Communist Party last year), voted for Timofti, which allowed the required majority to be reached. The opposition Communists refused to accept the legality of the choice, despite its confirmation on 19 March by the Constitutional Court, and urged the public to civil disobedience. On the day of the election in parliament, the Communist Party held a thirty-thousand strong demonstration in the centre of Chisinau, the largest protest since the post-election protests by the then anti-communist opposition in April 2009.
The election of the president has broken the political deadlock in which Moldova had found itself since the parliamentary elections in 2009, after which the parliament was unable to put together the qualified three-fifths majority required to elect a president. As a result of the expiry in April 2009 of Vladimir Voronin’s term as president of Moldova, the country lacked a head of state (a role which parliamentary speaker Marian Lupu filled on a temporary basis).
Nicolae Timofti is a new person in politics; he has had no ties to any party and does not have his own political base. His statements suggest that he fully supports the pro-European AIE program. The president has limited prerogatives, the most important being the right to designate a Prime Minister. It seems unlikely that President Timofti will use his powers against the current government, and will in fact play a role in consolidating the ruling coalition.
The election of the President means the danger of early parliamentary elections has been averted; these would probably have been won by the Communists. Thus, the current government will have two and a half years to implement the reforms it has announced, with the aim of bringing Moldova closer to the EU. Yet this does not mean the disappearance of threats to the Alliance’s rule. Strong opposition is provided by the Communists, who are demanding the dissolution of parliament. A continued pro-European course may also be threatened by the reconfiguration of the ruling coalition, if the pro-Romanian Liberal Party of Mihai Ghimpu is replaced by the pro-Russian Party of Socialists under Igor Dodon. However this scenario, which Dodon is openly working for, is not very likely, as it requires two conditions: acute conflict between the coalition parties, and the defection to the Socialist Party of at least two Communist deputies.
Moldova’s emergence from its long political crisis is a setback for Russia, which sees the present ruling coalition as excessively pro-Romanian and pro-European. It is symptomatic that the new president has not yet received congratulations from the Russian president, although the Presidents of Romania and Ukraine have found time to congratulate him, as have representatives of EU institutions. According to Russian media reports, on the day Nicolae Timofti was elected President, the Russian Security Council decided to grant the authorities of Transnistria a subsidy of US$150 million. This indicates that the election of a President of Moldova will not change Moscow's cool relations with Chisinau.
Comentează Afişări: 400
On 15 January, the leaders of the three parties in Moldova’s ruling coalition, the Alliance for European Integration, announced that a referendum would be held in April to modify the procedures for presidential elections. This change will involve reducing the number of votes needed in parliament to elect a president from 61 (a three-fifths majority) to 51 (50% +1). The Alliance hopes in this way to avoid another, third in a row, early parliamentary elections, fearing that the opposition Communist Party could win them. However, the Alliance’s initiative is risky, and could have counter-productive effects. A stable political crisis For nearly three years, Moldovan parliaments have failed to elect a president. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, a candidate must win the support of up to three-fifths of the deputies. Secondly, the political scene is polarised between the Communist camp (who are pro-Russian) and the anti-Communist camp (who are European-oriented), and there is deep distrust between the leaders of both camps. Thirdly, there is a stable distribution of electoral sympathies, which has not allowed either of the camps to win three-fifths of the seats in three consecutive elections. This inability to choose a president, in turn, destabilises the political situation in the country, because under the constitution a parliament which cannot choose a president must be dissolved. Together with the provision that early elections cannot be held within a year of the previous elections, this means that even a stable parliamentary majority cannot hope to remain in power longer than a year to year and a half. In this situation, it is not possible to govern the country efficiently, much less carry out the long-term reforms which Moldova urgently needs.Furthermore, the decision of the Constitutional Court on 12 January made choosing a president effectively impossible under the current rules. The court annulled the attempt made last 16 November to elect the president in parliament, by invoking a constitutional violation of the requirement to hold the ballot in secret (some of the deputies showed their completed ballots before putting them into the ballot box). This decision by the court opened up the possibility that in the future any group of deputies could sabotage the process of electing the president. The coalition’s tactics For the second time, the ruling Alliance has found itself in a situation where, because it does not have a three-fifths majority in parliament, and is unable to find a common candidate with the opposition, it is obliged after a year of government to call early elections once again. As a result, the coalition is once again trying to avoid early elections by proposing to hold a referendum to change the procedure for electing a president. The Alliance already made such an attempt in September 2010, when it proposed the introduction of universal direct presidential elections, an idea which enjoys wide public support. The majority of voters supported the project, but due to the low turnout (29% instead of the required 33%) the results of the referendum were not binding.There is a serious risk that resorting once again to a referendum will end in failure, even if the coalition abolishes the minimum turnout threshold. The Communists will seek to transform the referendum into a plebiscite on public trust in the government and a vote against the Alliance’s proposals. Recent opinion polls show an increase in the Communists’ popularity, and very low ratings for the Alliance government. Moreover, due to a constitutional ban on putting the same proposal to a referendum within two years, the Alliance cannot offer the direct elections which are popular among the public, but only a reduction of the required majority when electing the president in parliament, from three-fifths of the deputies to 50%+1. A recent public opinion poll suggests that the plurality of voters is against the election formula proposed by the ruling coalition (with only 30% supporting, 40% against and 30% undecided). Prospects for further development of the situation Paradoxically, even if the alliance wins the referendum on the matter, the Communists may benefit most. Some experts argue that for legal-constitutional reasons the modified procedure could not be used in the current parliament, and therefore it will have to be dissolved. If the Constitutional Court favours this view (and the Communists would certainly solicit its opinion), the Alliance would not avoid early elections, and the Communists would most likely win. Then, the amendment adopted in the referendum would allow them to choose a president without having to negotiate a compromise with the Alliance’s parties.The Alliance has adopted such a risky strategy, because the alternative – voting for Leonid Talmaci, a former head of the Central Bank who is formally unaffiliated with any political party and whom the Communists recently put forward for the post – seems even more dangerous. Prime Minister Filat might have feared that a new president who owed his position to the Communists would dismiss the government, and try to form a pro-Russian coalition with the Communists, Socialists and some members of the Democratic Party.The Alliance’s decision to hold a referendum will escalate the political conflict in Moldova. Due to the expected opposition from the Communists, and the disappointment of Alliance supporters with the performance of the current government, its chances of winning the referendum seem rather low – the more so as the parties forming the Alliance are unlikely to present a unified position during the pre-referendum campaign.The concentration of the ruling camp on the referendum campaign during the coming months will cause further delay in carrying out necessary reforms (announced in late 2011) to the judiciary, local government, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, even if the current government wins the referendum, it is possible that the Constitutional Court will deem that the new procedure for electing a president cannot be used by the current parliament, thus forcing its dissolution and – once again – early elections. Comentează Afişări: 995
Vlad CUBREACOV, Flux.md
Alegerea prin consens a unui candidat neafiliat politic în funcţia de Preşedinte al republicii.Bineînţeles că anume aceasta este formula de care are nevoie Republica Moldova, ţinând cont de configuraţia politică a Parlamentului emanat de populaţie. Vrea să ne spună domnul Filat de ce s-a opus unei asemenea formule pe durata celor doi ani cât a guvernat? Să fie acum la mijloc doar mintea sa cea de pe urmă? Posibil. Aplicarea acestei soluţii presupune, în mod obligatoriu, capacitate de dialog, spirit realist şi rezonabil, renunţarea la confruntare şi axarea pe interesul naţional de depăşire a crizei şi de asigurare a stabilităţii politice. De altfel, tot aici amintim că PPCD propune anume această formulă de câţiva ani buni, în scris, public, prin demersuri şi argumentări teoretice, cu exemple din modelul de republică parlamentară consacrată. În plus, reducerea atribuţiilor şefului statului, necesară în mod obiectiv, ar face actorii politici de prim rang să nu mai aspire la funcţia respectivă, ci la cea de premier, de membru al Guvernului, de deputat etc. Dar surzenia, miopia şi fudulia celor „de sus” i-au făcut să treacă cu vederea şi această iniţiativă. Acum, mai nou, Filat iese cu improvizaţia de amator, el, care zice că e jurist (să înţelegem că ceva mai instruit decât Ghimpu, lucru uşor de demonstrat în raport cu mizeria profesională a ultimului), a lansat o formulă naivă, care îi ascunde obsesiile prezidenţiale, de alegere a şefului statului fără analogii în lume. Aşadar, omul zice că după două tentative de alegere a Preşedintelui, eşuate în Parlament, ar trebui să urmeze alegerea directă a şefului statului prin vot universal? Curat-murdar! Ca la noi, la nimeni! Aşa îl învaţă nemţii pe Filat? De ce nu îi bagă în cap modelul german, de pildă? Aici e toată buba. Oricum ai suci-o, nu la reducerea atribuţiilor şefului statului se gândeşte Filat, ci la concentrarea întregii puteri în mâinile acestuia, funcţia respectivă fiind jinduită fie de el însuşi, fie pregătită pentru vreun ortac de-al lui. Ion Sturza, de pildă. Putere pentru bani şi bani pentru putere, iată cercul vicios din care nu poate ieşi Filat-politicianul, că Filat-omul de stat încă nu s-a născut.
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POSSIBLE PITFALLS FOR CHISINAU IN THE UPCOMING 5+2 NEGOTIATIONS
(Part Three of three )
Moscow and Berlin converge in asking Chisinau to give up the 2005 law on Transnistria conflict-resolution principles, renounce the unitary character of the state, and (backstage) to move toward federalizing Moldova (see EDM, June 6, 8). Chisinau may well face such demands on June 21 in Moscow, when the 5+2 negotiations resume after a five-year breakdown.
Berlin’s position is not that of the European Union. The EU, however, does not seem to have defined its collective position vis-à-vis the German initiative. The United States is taking a back seat, conceding the lead to the EU, even as Germany attempts to seize the lead from Brussels. However, Germany has no status in the 5+2 format, and no EU mandate to shape the agenda or negotiate with Moscow on the EU’s behalf.
At this point, only Moscow and Tiraspol are bringing their firmly entrenched goals to the upcoming negotiations. Chisinau has its own, fairly clear and constant objectives (see accompanying article), but is being asked to demonstrate a “constructive” attitude through concessions at the outset. Moscow has warned that it would hold Chisinau primarily responsible for blocking the process, unless Chisinau abandons the 2005 law and the “unitary” state (Interfax, June 6).
In Tiraspol, “president” Igor Smirnov has asked the Supreme Soviet to draft and adopt a law on Transnistria’s objectives in the negotiations, ahead of the June 21 Moscow meeting (Olvia press [Tiraspol], June 7). Obviously, Moscow and Tiraspol will offer another tradeoff, whereby Transnistriawould drop its new “law” in return for Moldova abandoning its 2005 law. Certain European diplomats will almost certainly ask Chisinau to be “reasonable” and accept such an asymmetrical trade-off. In almost 20 years of negotiations on the Transnistria conflict, Moldova was often asked for unilateral concessions, so as not to look “intransigent.” The Kremlin was always at the origin of such pressures on Chisinau. From time to time, Western partners would ask Chisinau for pre-emptive concessions, simply to induce Russia to restart negotiations that Moscow had itself blocked in the first place. Negotiations, while undoubtedly necessary and actively sought by Chisinau, had become a goal per se, without clearly defining the final objectives until 2005. In that year, the 5+2 negotiation format was created with US and EU participation. However, Russia (using Tiraspol as a cover) blocked that process after only five months (March 2006). To restart it now, it seems easier for Berlin (and a few like-minded chancelleries) to put the burden of “flexibility” on Moldova, rather than on Russia.
The resumption of negotiations on June 21 in Moscow holds several potential traps for Chisinau. The tandem of Moscow and Tiraspol can be expected to seek a “multi-level” negotiating process, i.e., supplementing the 5+2 format with two other formats: Chisinau-Tiraspol (1+1) and Chisinau-Tiraspol-Moscow (2+1). This would undercut the 5+2 format even as it re-starts. Russia would declare that anything agreed there would be subject to approval by the full-fledged 5+2. However, Moscow would seek to dilute Western influence and create faits accomplis through those parallel formats. By the same token, Tiraspol would seek some semblance of recognition in such formats. All this would confuse and delay an internationally negotiated solution to the conflict. The Moscow meeting can be expected to issue a statement of principle and purpose, serving as founding document of a revived 5+2 process. Russian diplomats from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov down, want Moldova to give up the 2005 law, replace the “unitary” with a “federal” state structure, and defer the issue of Russian troop withdrawal almost indefinitely. Judging from the long track record of this process, Russia (and parties receptive to Russia’s views) can draft a statement of principle and purpose with ambivalent formulations, potentially accommodating Moscow’s demands, though susceptible to interpretation and further bargaining. This could paralyze the future course of negotiations, enable Moscow to continue playing for time, and ultimately generate pressures on Moldova to accept Russia’s interpretations as a means to “unblock the process.”
Almost certainly, Moscow and Tiraspol will demand some acknowledgment of “past documents,” signed by Chisinau with Moscow and/or Tiraspol prior to 2005, or outside the 5+2 format after 2006. Those documents have no legal standing, however; they are no more than records (or “memoranda”) of conversations, with no binding effect. Moscow and Tiraspol, however, interpret any such document as “agreements,” constantly demanding recognition of “previously reached agreements” (“ranneye dostignutyie dogovoryonnosti” is the standard phrase). Even an indirect acknowledgment of such “earlier” documents by Chisinau--e.g., accepting to “examine” them, as has been suggested--could irreparably distort the future course of negotiations from the moment of their restart. What is being re-started, actually, is the 5+2 format, not anything that occurred prior to 2005, or after 2006 outside that format. Thus, Chisinau would be fully justified to acknowledge only documents that were (or would henceforth be) signed within the 5+2 format.
Comentează Afişări: 346
GERMAN INITIATIVES FAVOR RUSSIA ON TRANSNISTRIA TALKS
(Part Two of three) by Vladimir Socor
In the context of Russo-German special relations, the German government proposes to restart international negotiations on the Transnistria conflict from a modified basis, one largely favorable to Russian interests. On this issue, Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs implements a policy that originates in the Chancellor’s Office. The German non-paper, circulated confidentially to the interested governments, suggests certain tradeoffs at Moldova’s expense, both through its proposals (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Key Issues for a Solution to the Transnistria Conflict,” EDM, June 6) and through its gaps. Some of the accompanying diplomatic conversations strengthen this impression, ahead of the June 21 restart of negotiations in the 5+2 format.
Given that the German non-paper proposes an agenda for negotiations, this document’s gaps are at least as relevant as its proposals. Thus, Berlin’s document eliminates the following critical issues, or goals, from the current agenda: 1. withdrawal of Russian troops and the transformation/internationalization of that “peacekeeping” operation; 2. support for democratic reforms and demilitarization in Transnistria, during and as part of the conflict-resolution process; 3. codifying a special status (autonomy) for Transnistria within the framework of Moldova’s constitution; and 4. holding out a European integration perspective for Moldova, which would stimulate Transnistria’s population to support the country’s reunification. While Chisinau proceeds from these objectives in the negotiating process, Berlin omits them, in apparent deference to Moscow.
Those four goals are fundamental to Chisinau’s negotiating position, as reaffirmed in its confidential non-paper on the upcoming negotiations (Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Basic approaches to the Transnistria conflict-settlement process,” May 2011). Moldovan governments irrespective of party affiliations have pursued those objectives ever since the country adopted its clear-cut European orientation (from 2004 onward). Indeed, Chisinau designed that negotiating position to support its European course, instead of going for a deal on Russia’s terms.
If negotiations restart from premises jointly defined by Moscow and Berlin, those four critical gaps in Berlin’s position could lead to: 1. a settlement negotiated in the presence of Russian troops, distorting any political outcome; 2. agreements that legitimize a Kremlin-installed leadership in Tiraspol; 3. a “joint,” Chisinau-Tiraspol re-write of Moldova’s constitution, as some German diplomats actually suggest; 4. diminished appeal and reduced credibility of the EU in Transnistria and ultimately even in the rest of Moldova.
In conversations accompanying Berlin’s non-paper, German diplomats propose turning Moldova from a “unitary” state into a “federation.” Berrlin’snon-paper hints at this by “exclud[ing] a confederation,” thus allowing sufficient room for Moscow and Tiraspol to seek a Moldovan “federation.” German diplomacy favors apparently this on two counts: as an outright concession to Russia, and a pretense that federalism can work in Moldova/Transnistria more or less as it has in Germany. One far-reaching document, leaked in full to the Chisinau press, seems to show the tip of an iceberg. Ambassador Patricia Flor, head of the German Foreign Ministry’s Eastern Europe-South Caucasus-Central Asia division, is handling the Transnistria conflict negotiations for that ministry. She urges Chisinau to “get rid of its federalization-phobia,” imputing this to Moldovan politicians’ poor knowledge of successful federations in Europe. Ambassador Flor proposes creating a Chisinau-Tiraspol working group to draft a new, “federal” constitution for Moldova; and offers German assistance to that end, drawing on Germany’s successful model of federalism (Flux [Chisinau], April 22, May 2, 15; Jurnal de Chisinau, May 17).
Inviting Transnistria’s current administration, with its security apparatus and Russian troops in place, to re-negotiate Moldova’s constitution in accordance with Tiraspol’s wishes, would be a far cry from German federalism. It would derail Moldova from its European course, debilitate its politics, and potentially create a Russian-controlled statelet within a dysfunctional Moldovan state. This proposal would turn the clock back by almost a decade. It rehashes Russia’s attempts in 2002-2003 to “federalize” Moldova with Transnistria, starting from a “joint” Chisinau-Tiraspol rewrite of Moldova’s constitution. Some US field-level diplomats had joined forces with Russia on this issue then, treating Moldova as a currency of exchange at that time. Washington, however, reversed this move as Chisinau turned West. To shield the state from such pressures in the future, and protect its Western orientation, Moldova adopted the 2005 law on the principles for settling the Transnistriaconflict (see EDM, June 6).
Regardless of Berlin’s motives or missteps, the Moldovan government has welcomed Germany’s active role on the Transnistria issue in recent months. Chisinau still believes that Germany’s entry into this process can generate a positive dynamic, at least for re-starting the 5+2 negotiations. Moldovan Prime Minister, Vlad Filat, has held several productive meetings with Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany and elsewhere. Filat, his government, and the Parliament, however, would be unable to accept Russian or German proposals that would turn the clock back on Moldova. The existing constitutional setup, and unitary character of the state, can accommodate a special status for Transnistria, according to Filat returning from his latest German visit (Moldpres, May 20).
Comentează Afişări: 701
GERMAN DIPLOMACY TILTS TOWARD RUSSIA ON TRANSNISTRIA NEGOTIATIONS
(Part One of three) by Vladimir Socor
International negotiations on the Transnistria conflict are set to resume on June 21, for the first time since 2006, in the 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, the United States, European Union, Chisinau, and Tiraspol). Russia, which had authorized Tiraspol to cause the five-year breakdown, is now bringing Tiraspol back to the table and re-launching the negotiations in Moscow.
Moscow is thereby going for the tradeoff envisaged in the Meseberg Memorandum, signed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in June 2010 in the eponymous castle near Berlin. Under that document, Russia would cooperate to settle theTransnistria conflict, in return for which the EU would create a joint committee with Russia to regulate European security affairs. Russia would thus gain a role in EU decision-making, while the joint committee would bypass NATO and implicitly the United States. It is an ideological tenet of German neo-Ostpolitik to involve Russia in the EU’s and, potentially, NATO’s decision-making processes. In the German view, Russia’s cooperation on Transnistria should prove Moscow’s bona fides as a security partner to the EU.
To help elicit European support for its view, Berlin is asking Moscow for a token gesture on Transnistria. To facilitate this, Germany is nudging the negotiations toward an outcome favorable to Russia, as German diplomacy’s non-paper reveals (see below).
The EU holds “observer” status in the 5+2 negotiations, but Germany is acting in its own name with this initiative. This has never received the EU’s official endorsement, let alone being a part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. But neither has the EU disavowed this German proposal. In practice, Germany is attempting to substitute its own policy for that of the EU on this issue. Meanwhile, a wait-and-see attitude seems to prevail in Brussels.
The 5+2 negotiations in Moscow would start on the wrong footing, prejudging the entire subsequent process, if Russia and Germany combine in defining the parameters from the outset. This seems to be occurring at the moment, with Berlin basically doing an end-run around a passive EU.
Ahead of the Moscow restart, Berlin has circulated its defining terms in a “non-paper”. This is a normal opening move by a participant to a negotiating process, though not by Germany in this case. Germany, moreover, has opposed the issuance of a non-paper by the EU on the parameters of these negotiations. All this looks odd, since the EU is a participant in the 5+2 format while Germany never was, nor does it seek to join that format. Instead, Berlin seeks to shape the EU’s policy on this issue from within the EU, in conformity with Germany’s neo-Ostpolitik.
The German non-paper, circulated confidentially to the interested governments (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Key Issues for a Solution to theTransnistria Conflict”), proceeds from Moldova’s territorial integrity as its starting assumption. It defines the negotiations’ goal as ensuring a functional and fully operational state in a reunified Moldova, with a new constitutional setup that would at the same time ensure special rights for Transnistria. In this document and in accompanying conversations, however, German diplomacy contradicts its own starting premise. It makes the goal of a viable Moldovan state more difficult to achieve through excessive empowerment of Russian-controlled Transnistria within that state. And it renders the goal of Moldova’s territorial integrity more elusive by avoiding the issue of Russia’s “peacekeeping” troops stationed on Moldova’s territory.
Going beyond local autonomy for Transnistria, the German document proposes “representation and participation of Transnistria at the level of the unified state, in the government and the legislature,” as topics for negotiation. Participation of Tiraspol in Moldova’s central government, along with creating a bicameral parliament in Chisinau, were fixtures of Russia’s proposals in years past, including the 2003 Kozak Memorandum; and will undoubtedly be reprised by the Russian side in the upcoming negotiations. Russia hopes to see a hybrid, dysfunctional government in Chisinau, whose European orientation would be subject to permanent obstruction or outright veto from Tiraspol’s Russian-installed officials. Moscow deliberately confuses the issue of Transnistria’s autonomy with that of Transnistria’s participation in Moldova’s central government. The German position would make it easier for Russia to pursue this goal.
Berlin wants that “neither the Moldovan law on Transnistria [conflict-settlement] from 2005, nor Transnistria’s unilateral declarations of independence, should prejudge the settlement.” This view coincides exactly with Moscow’s, as stated most recently by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, previewing the restart of the negotiations (Interfax, June 5). Moldova’s 2005 law, unanimously adopted by a freely elected parliament, stipulates democratization and demilitarization in Transnistria as integral components of conflict-resolution. Its terms also rule out any kind of veto mechanism for Tiraspol vis-a-vis Moldova’s central government. Unsurprisingly, Russia wants this law scrapped, changed, or at least suspended. What is surprising is Berlin asking Moldova–also in bilateral diplomatic channels--to ignore the law of the land, and equating Moldova’s democratically adopted legislation withTransnistria’s Soviet-style referenda.
Comentează Afişări: 426
Russia’s superficial concession on Transnistria
MOSCOW, TIRASPOL RAISE PRECONDITIONS TO NEGOTIATING ON TRANSNISTRIA CONFLICT
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Limba este un fel de cod genetic al fiecărui popor, fiind depozitarul şi expresia istoriei sale. O limbă exprimă pe deplin identitatea inconfundabilă a unui popor în mozaicul lumii. Orice limbă este un organism viu şi se confundă cu fiinţa etnică a unui popor. De regulă, aria de răspândire a unei limbi coincide cu spaţiul etnic de geneză şi devenire a etniei respective. Alteori, intervenţiile brutale în istorie ale uno	Ukraine is becoming dependent on Russian loans
On 29 March, the state-owned Naftohaz announced that it is seeking to open a credit line for $2 billion with Russia’s Gazprombank for a period of 7 years. By way of explanation, Naftohaz said that it did not have the resources to pay for Russian gas, due to high prices and customers’ rising debts. The suspension of Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF in late 2010 resulted in a significant increase in credit costs for Ukrainian companies in Western banks. In this situation, Russian loans are	Rusia pierde o oportunitate cu Japonia
sursa: Romania Libera:
de YURIKO KOIKE
Schimbul recent de spioni dintre Rusia şi Statele Unite pare să demonstreze că „resetarea" relaţiilor dintre cele două ţări a funcţionat. În schimb, până acum, Rusia a făcut prea puţin pentru „a reseta" relaţiile sale cu Japonia. Aceasta nu este doar o oportunitate pierdută, având în vedere nevoia Rusiei de a-şi moderniza economia, dar şi o gravă eroare strategică, având în vedere îngrijorarea tot mai mare a Rusiei privind The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics Read more: The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics | STRATFOR The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics is republished with permission of STRATFOR.By Reva BhallaSomething extraordinary, albeit not unexpected, is happening in the Persian Gulf region. The United States, lacking a coherent strategy to deal with Iran and too distracted to develop one, is struggling to navigate Iraq’s fractious political landscape in search of a deal that would allow Washington to keep a meaningful military presence in the country beyond the end-of-201	How Ukrainian oligarchs view economic integration with the EU and Russia
The negotiations between Ukraine and the European Union on the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) have reached the final stage. Russia is opposed to Ukraine signing this agreement. Ukraine's main oligarchs can neither push forward nor impede the conclusion of the DCFTA as on the whole it does not directly affect their interests. The signing of the agreement does not bring any visible profits for Ukraine's key export branches as the EU market is re	Violenţele continuă în Grecia după aprobarea împrumutului de 110 miliarde de euro de la FMI şi UE
Riscurile extinderii crizei din Grecia în Portugalia şi Spania sunt discutate la reuniunea statelor din zona euro. Între timp, la Atena, situaţia este în continuare extrem de tensionată, după ce oficialii greci au aprobat, joi, planul de austeritate, prin care ţara va primi 110 miliarde de euro din partea FMI şi a Uniunii Europene. Fortele special ruse au eliberat un petrolier capturat de piratii somalezi
Conflict violent la granita dintre Macedonia si Kosovo: patru morti
Patru persoane si-au pierdut viata miercuri, la granita dintre Macedonia si Kosovo, in urma unui schimb de focuri dintre un grup armat si politisti.Conflictul violent a avut loc in noaptea de marti spre miercuri, langa satul Radusa. Se pare ca un grup de traficanti de arme a deschis focul asupra fortelor de ordine, iar politistii au raspuns folosind armamentul din dotare, relateaza Agentia Focus.Patru persoane au fost ucise, iar alte cateva ranite, iar pana acum au fost identificate doar trei The State of the World: Germany's Strategy
The idea of Germany having an independent national strategy runs counter to everything that Germany has wanted to be since World War II and everything the world has wanted from Germany. In a way, the entire structure of modern Europe was created to take advantage of Germany's economic dynamism while avoiding the threat of German domination. In writing about German strategy, I am raising the possibility that the basic structure of Western Europe since World War II and of Europ	Bani pentru Moldova? Capacitatea de absortie mica!
In perioada de cand Alianta pentru Integrare Europeana a preluat puterea la Chisnau a inceput concursul “Cine are cei mai multi bani de cheltuiut in Moldova”.
Louis M. Bacon is the head of Moore Capital Management, one of the largest and most influential hedge funds in the world. Last week, he announced that he was returning one quarter of his largest fund, about $2 billion, to his investors. The reason he gave to The New York Times was that he had found it difficult to invest given the impossibility of predicting the European situation. He was quoted as saying, "The political involvement is so extreme -- we have no	Talibanii pakistanezi ar putea fi plasati pe lista neagra a organizatiilor teroriste
Departamentul american de stat ia in considerare decizia de a-i include pe lista organizatiilor teroriste pe talibanii pakistanezi, dupa ce s-a anuntat ca acestia au avut o implicare in atentatul esuat cu masina capcana de la 1 mai, la New York. Potrivit agentiei France Presse, purtatorul de cuvant al Departamentului de Stat, Philip Crowley, a declarat ca responsabilii americani se gandesc "la modul cel mai serios" la aceasta problema, o propunere legislativa in acest sens fiind deja inaintata A risky attempt to break the political deadlock in Moldova
On 15 January, the leaders of the three parties in Moldova’s ruling coalition, the Alliance for European Integration, announced that a referendum would be held in April to modify the procedures for presidential elections. This change will involve reducing the number of votes needed in parliament to elect a president from 61 (a three-fifths majority) to 51 (50% +1). The Alliance hopes in this way to avoid another, third in a row, early parliamentary elections, fearing that the opposition Comm	Achiziţia avioanelor F-16: între eşec şi vulnerabilitate strategică
sursa: Civitats Politiics Blogs
Pe data de 3 august a expirat termenul limităpână la care România trebuia să accepte oferta Statelor Unite privind achiziţia de avioane F-16 C/D în uz. Această ofertă făcea parte dintr-un plan ambiţios al Forţelor Aeriene Române de a moderniza aviaţia militară românească şi de a accede la programul F-35 Lightning II sau Joint Strike Fighter, dezvoltat de Statele Unite in parteneriat cu alte opt state europene: Marea Brita	Românii din Timoc, infiltraţi de sârbi
Noua conducere a Consiliului Naţional al Minorităţii Române/Vlahe din Serbia (CNMRS), formată din socialişti şi democraţi, de orientare antiromânească, intenţ	The Libyan War of 2011
The mission is clearer than the strategy, and that strategy can’t be figured out from the first moves. The strat	Nigeria: Goodluck Jonathan a fost investit in functia de presedinte, dupa moartea lui Umaru Yar'dua
Strategia Rusiei pe termen scurt
Se pare că avansul Rusiei se accelerează, cel puţin în privinţa Ucrainei. La foarte scurt timp de la preluarea preşedinţiei de către Victor Ianukovici, politica şi economia ucraineană îşi cam predau atribuţiile Rusiei. Acelaşi lucru se petrece şi cu forţele armate şi serviciile secrete. Şeful de stat major al armatei Ivan Svida (instalat în administraţia lui Iushcenko) îşi dă demisia, aproape în acelaşi timp în care Ucraina anunţă că renunţă la Barack Obama a decis reducerea efectivelor militare în Irak
Odată cu încheierea misiunii de luptă în Irak, Statele Unite trec de la o prezenţă militară la operaţiuni de instruire şi îndrumare. Este explicaţia dată de preşedintele Barack Obama la Atlanta, în faţa veteranilor invalizi pentru confirmarea reducerii efectivelor americane în Irak, cu începere de la 31 august. Aproximativ 50 de mii de militari americani vor continua procesul de antrenare a armatei şi poliţiei irakiene, vor efectua în comun operaţiuni de com	Analiza STRATFOR: Social Media as a Tool for Protest
By Marko Papic and Sean NoonanInternet services were reportedly restored in Egypt on Feb. 2 after being completely shut down for two days. Egyptian authorities unplugged the last Internet service provider (ISP) still operating Jan. 31 amidst ongoing protests across the country. The other four providers in Egypt — Link Egypt, Vodafone/Raya, Telecom Egypt and Etisalat Misr — were shut down as the crisis boiled over on Jan. 27. Commentators immediately assumed this was a response to the organiz

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