Source: http://patents.hdp.com/?cat=42
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:24:04+00:00

Document:
In Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Products, Inc., [2018-1520, 2018-1521] (March 26, 2019), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s invalidity determination as to U.S. Patent No. 7,420,822, but reversed as to U.S. Patent No. 7,072,188 because the Board improperly considered Boyd, U.S. Patent No. 6,850,421 as prior art.
The Board concluded that Boyd, whose filing date of April 1, 2002, is about seven months before the October 2002 filing date of the ’188 patent, was prior art to the ‘188 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). The Board rejected Arctic Cat’s argument of prior conception and diligence in reduction to practice. The Board also rejected the argument that the allegedly anticipatory portions of Boyd are not actually “by another,” as required by 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), even though the only named inventor on Boyd is Mr. Boyd himself, not Mr. Janisch, the inventor of the ‘188 patent.
The Federal Circuit agreed that Janisch had shown prior invention, in particular that the record established that Mr. Janisch was reasonably diligent during the critical period so as not to have abandoned his invention or unreasonably delayed its reduction to practice. While the Board concluded that the evidence did not establish diligence throughout the period from April 1, 2002, to October 29, 2002, the Board’s analysis rested on too rigid a standard, and the record establishes diligence under the correct standard.
The Federal Circuit found that the gaps in activity relied upon by the Board could be explained by third party testing activity and that lack of diligence cannot be inferred from putting the invention into someone else’s hands for needed testing and awaiting test results for a short period commensurate with the testing need, at least where oversight was diligent. That course of action, as a way of reducing an invention to practice, does not give rise to an inference of unreasonable delay or abandonment of the invention.
In Enplas Display Device Corporation v. Seoul Semiconductor Company, Ltd., [2016-2599](November 19, 2018), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that claim 20 of U.S. Patent No. 6,007,209 and the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,473,554 are not anticipated; affirmed the district court’s denial of JMOL of no inducement; but reversed the denial of JMOL that the damages award was not supported by substantial evidence, and remanded. The ’209 and ’554 patents are directed to methods of back lighting display panels, particularly LED displays used in televisions, laptop computers, and other electronics.
On the anticipation of the ‘554 patent the Federal Circuit noted that it came down to conflicting expert testimony about the prior art, and that “when there is conflictingtestimony at trial, and the evidence overall does not make only one finding on the point reasonable, the jury is permitted to make credibility determinations and believe the witness it considers more trustworthy.” Because the jury’s verdict was based upon the reference itself as well as expert testimony, it was supported by substantial evidence.
On the issue of induced infringement, the Federal Circuit noted that in order to succeed on a claim of inducement, the patentee must show, first that there has been direct infringement, and second that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement. Mere knowledge of infringement is insufficient. Liability for inducement can only attach if the defendant knew of the patent and knew as well that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. Although the text of §271(b) makes no mention of intent, the Court infers that at least some intent is required, so both specific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven.
Although it was a close case, the Federal Circuit concludedthat there was substantial evidence whereby both Enplas’ knowledge and intent to induce infringement could be reasonably found. The Federal Circuit noted that Enplas also did not dispute that it was informed that the product it manufactured, co-developed, and sold to SSC was covered by SSC’s patents, and that Enplas knew its customers sold televisions in the US and other countries. SSC had sent Enplas a pre-suit letter,informing it that SSC had found infringing lenses made with Enplas parts in televisions sold in the United States. Further Enplas provided its customers with product specifications that recommended infringing configurations for its accused lenses. The Federal Circuit said that it has held that providing instructions to use a product in an infringing manner is evidence of the required mental state for inducing infringement.
Enplas argued that this evidence did not establish that it knew its lenses would be incorporated in U.S. televisions and that in any event mere knowledge was not enough to establish specific intent. The Federal Circuit agreed that mere knowledge of possible infringement is not enough, there was circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to reasonably find that Enplas had knowledge of the patents and of its customers’ infringing activity and that it intended to induce their infringement, and affirmed the denial of JMOL.
Finally on the issue of damages, Enplas argued that the only evidence supporting the $4 million award was testimony from SSC’s damages expert that explicitly and improperly included non-infringing devices in the royalty calculation. Enplas filed a Daubert motion regarding this testimony, that the district court deferred, and a motion in limine regarding this testimony, which the district court denied. SSC’s expert testified that the parties would have negotiated a premium freedom to operate” license to avoid the need to test and negotiate licenses for additional or future potentially infringing lenses that Enplas might sell, and to determine this premium that Enplas would pay, SSC’s expert assessed the volume of sales of all non-accused lenses made by Enplas, which the expert estimated from Enplas’ website.
in Nobel Biocare Services AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., [2017-2256] (September 13, 2018), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s determination that claims 1-5 and 19 of U. S. Patent No. 8,714,977,directed to dental implants, were anticipated.
“March 2003” on the cover. The ITC, applying a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, had previously determined that the claims were not anticipated, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Meanwhile, Instradent petitioned for IPR. While the Board adopted the same claim construction as the ITC, and considered the same evidence presented to the ITC, the Board also considered new evidence not considered by the ITC, including the declarations and deposition testimony of Hantman and Chakir that the catalog was available to the industry in March 2003. The Board determined that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the ABT Catalog qualifies as a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
as a “printed publication” under pre-AIA § 102(b). Whether a reference qualifies as a “printed publication” is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual findings, including whether a reference was publicly accessible. Public accessibility has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a “printed publication.” A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence can locate it.
The Federal Circuit noted that it was not bound by its prior affirmance of the ITC’s holding that there was insufficient evidence to find pre-critical date public accessibility, observing that the evidentiary standard in IPRs, “preponderance of the evidence” is different from the higher standard applicable in ITC proceedings. The Federal Circuit further noted that the Board also had more evidence on this issue than what was before the ITC. Finally the Federal Circuit said that under the substantial evidence standard, the inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.
his records thereafter. Furthermore, Hantman’s declaration included excerpts of his copy of the ABT Catalog taken from his files. The Board found that Hantman’s copy of the ABT Catalog and the copy offered as prior art by Instradent in the IPR had identical pages except for some handwriting on the cover of Hantman’s copy.
(8) impact of the invention on the industry, and the commercial value of its practice.
The Federal Circuit rejected the challenges to the claim construction, and affirmed the Board.
In TF3 Limited v. Tre Milano, LLC, [2016-2285] (July 13, 2018), the Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB’s decision in IPR2015-00649 that the claims in U.S. Patent No. 8,651,118 on a hair styling device were anticipated, holding that on the correct claim construction, the claims are not anticipated.
The claims, of course, do not stand alone. Rather, they are part of a fully integrated written instrument, consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For that reason, claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.
The Federal Circuit concluded that it is not reasonable to read the claims more broadly than the description in the specification, thereby broadening the claims to read on the prior art over which the patentee asserts improvement.
Claims are construed with reference to the specification and prosecution history, for these are the resources by which persons in the field of the invention understand what has been invented.
The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s construction was contrary to the specification, and concluded that The ’118 Patent claims, construed in light of the specification, do not read on the prior art and are not anticipated by the prior art.
In UCB, Inc. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., [2016-2610, 2016-2683, 2016-2685, 2016-2698, 2016-2710, 2017-1001] (May 23 2018), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that UCB’s patents on lacosamide, an anti-epileptic drug, were not invalid for obviousness-type double patenting, obviousness, and anticipation.
an obvious or anticipated modification of the earlier compound — the underlying patent in the double patenting analysis need not be prior art to the later claim. The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err by focusing its double patenting analysis on the claims’ differences, as well as the claims as a whole. The Federal Circuit said that proving that a claim is invalid for obviousness-type double patenting “requires identifying some reason that would have led a chemist to modify the earlier compound to make the later compound with a reasonable expectation of success. Acknowledging that it was a close case, because it discerned no clear error in the district court’s underlying fact finding that there would have been no reasonable expectation of success in making the modifications needed to make the claimed combination, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the asserted claims of the ‘551 patent were patentably distinct from the ’301 patent.
With respect to obviousness, the Federal Circuit applied a lead compound analysis, rejecting the proposition that the test does not apply in purification cases. The lead compound analysis first determines whether a chemist of ordinary skill would have selected the asserted prior art compounds as lead compounds, or starting points, for further development efforts, and then determines “whether the prior art would have supplied one of ordinary skill in the art with a reason or motivation to modify a lead compound to make the claimed compound with a reasonable expectation of success. The Federal Circuit found substantial evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have selected either of the proferred lead compounds.
On anticipation, appellants argued that because the prior art disclosed the chemical structure, it it necessarily disclosed the R-enantiomer (lacosamide) recited in claim 9 of the ’551 patent. The district court concluded that the prior art disclosed neither the R-enantiomer, nor any of its characteristics. The Federal Circuit noted that the novelty of an optical isomer is not negated by the prior art disclosure of its racemate, and that the references specifically stated that it prepared the racemic amino acid derivatives rather than the individual enantiomers. Thus, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the finding of no anticipation.
for draining contaminants, condensation, and other fluids that adversely affect the efficiency and function of a pressurized system.
On the obviousness rejections, the Board concluded in a “single paragraph” that the claims would have been obvious, but did not explain how the reference could be modified. The Federal Circuit also noted that the Board made no findings on any of the Graham factors. The Federal Circuit said that the Board must “explicate its factual conclusions, enabling us to verify readily whether those conclusions are indeed supported by ‘substantial evidence’ contained within the record,” but that the Board failed to do so, so the Federal Circuit remanded the case.
Methods of Making Same as anticipated by or obvious from U.S. Patent No. 6,426,448.
what is inherent in the disclosure. Second the declarations were not improper “secret data” — the were not used as prior art , but merely in support of prior art already of record. Third, the Federal Circuit offered no rebuttal evidence to the declarations.
The Federal Circuit further affirmed the obviousness determination, noting that PTAB did not rely solely on its finding of inherent anticipation, but explained that explained that a PHOSITA would have been motivated to modify the reference to meet the requirements of the claims.
In HTC Corp. v. Cellular Communications Equipment, LLC [2016-1880] (December 18, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s Final Written Decision, finding no error in the Board’s claim construction, and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that the challenged claims were not invalid.
methods and apparatuses for a radio communications system where a subscriber station, i.e., a mobile device, is assigned a plurality of codes for transmitting messages.
The Board did not expressly construe the term “message,” nor did HTC did not seek construction of the term. However, the Federal Circuit found that Board findings establishing the scope of the patented subject matter may fall within the ambit of claim construction, reviewable on appeal. However the Federal Circuit found HTC’s arguments unpersuasive and inconsistent.
On the asserted anticipation grounds, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion, and rejected arguments presented by HTC for the first time on appeal. On the asserted obviousness grounds, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s reading of the prior art, and found that HTC did not point to any evidence in the record that would undermine the Board’s findings on the scope and content of the prior art.
In CRFD Research, Inc., v. Matal, [2016-2198] (December 5, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed two Final Written Decisions invaliding claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,191,233 on user-directed transfer of an on-going software-based session from one device to another device, and reversed one Final Written Decision that the claims were not obvious.
To bar Hulu from pressing an argument it raised in a ground the Board found “redundant” and that it expressly incorporated into other proposed grounds of unpatentability on which the Board instituted would not only unfairly prejudice Hulu, but would also raise questions about the propriety of the Board’s redundancy decision.
Of course, even if it does “raise questions about the propriety of the Board’s redundancy decision,” that should not be a concern of the Federal Circuit because according to Cuozzo institution decisions are not reviewable. The Federal Circuit went on to find that Bates did in fact sufficiently teach what it did not exprsessly disclose, and reversed the Board’s determination that the claims were not shown to be obvious.
This case illustrates that some of the mischief that arises from a Board’s finding of redundancy. The petitioner is allowed to use the arguments in the non-instituted redundant ground to support its position in the instituted grounds — at least if they are sufficiently “incorporated.” Another problem with redundancy is that the estoppel effect is unclear. The Federal Circuit has indicated that estoppel does not apply to grounds that are not instituted. HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If this interpretation applies to grounds denied for redundancy, it means that a patent owner could prevail in the IPR, and later face a challenge based upon the redundant ground — one found by the Board to indistinguishable from the ground on which the patent owner prevailed.
In Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier Foundation, [2016-1123] (August 7, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s determination in an IPR that claims 31-35 of U.S. Patent No. 8,112,504, related to a system and apparatus for storing and distributing episodic media files, were unpatentable.
The Federal Circuit first addressed whether the Electronic Frontier Foundation had standing to participate in the appeal after Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014), where the Federal Circuit held that a challenger who was not a competitor did not have Article III standing to appeal a PTAB determination of patentability.
However the Federal Circuit concluded that because Personal Audio had standing to appeal the invalidation of its patent claims, the Electronic Frontier Foundation did not need Article III standing to merely participate in the proceeding in which the appellant had standing.
On the merits, the Federal Circuit rejected Personal Audio’s objections to the Board’s claim construction, and affirmed the Board’s decision that the claims were anticipated or obvious.

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