Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=84212:59760&amp;catid=1594&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:45:24+00:00

Document:
NESTOR BRACERO, Petitioner, v. RODULFO ARCELO AND THE HEIRS OF VICTORIANO MONISIT, namely: LOURDES MENCHAVEZ, ROGELIO RUELO, AND MARTINIANA APOR, Respondents.
Nestor Bracero filed this Petition1 for Review assailing the Court of Appeals' (a) August 28, 2013 Decision2 affirming in toto the Regional Trial Court Order3 denying his Urgent Motion to Vacate Order for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution Against Defendants Spouses Nestor and Lilia Bracero and to Furnish Copy of the Decision to their Counsel4 (Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution) and (b) April 14, 2014 Resolution5 denying the motion for its reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner Nestor Bracero filed this Petition.
For his part, respondent Rodulfo Arcelo filed the Manifestation59 dated September 10, 2014 waiving his right to file a Comment to the Petition.
This court finds no reversible error by the Court of Appeals in affirming the Regional Trial Court Order dated February 11, 2010 denying petitioner's Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution.
[c]ontrary to the allegations that counsel for the movant-petitioner did not received [sic] [a] copy of the Motion for Execution and that no certification from the post office was presented to this Honorable Court, in the comments filed by private respondents dated July 11, 2011 to the petition (p.4, par.2) a copy of the Motion for Execution was served on counsel for petitioner on September 11, 2009 with notice to submit said Motion for the consideration of the Honorable Court on September 15, 2009 at 9:00 in the morning. A certification to this effect was issued by Mandaue City Central postal office dated January 29, 2010 certifying that registry letter No. 971 addressed to Atty. Danilo Pilapil of Maguikay, Mandaue City was actually delivered and received by Vergie Pilapil on September 11, 2009. Said certification was attached to Annex "B" as Annex "A" thereof in the Comments to the Petition of herein private respondents dated July 11, 2011.
Thus, the issue to be resolved before this court is whether receipt of petitioner's counsel of a copy of the motion for execution amounts to effective official notice of the Regional Trial Court Decision dated April 16, 009 if he was not furnished a copy of the Decision.
Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that "[i]f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court."
Notice sent directly to client is not notice in law.63 Nevertheless, this rule admits of exceptions.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals ruled, and rightly so, that although Atty. Estaniel was not officially sent a copy of the trial court's January 31, 1996 decision, he was however, put on effective official notice thereof on April 1, 1996. He must, therefore, be mad accountable for his failure to seek, within the reglementary period counted from April 1, 1996, a review of said decision. . . .
The foregoing disposition and the premises holding it together commend themselves for concurrence. In particular, we agree with the designation of April 1, 1996 as the controlling date when Atty. Estaniel is considered to have effectively been put on notice of the trial court's decision and whence the period of appeal should accordingly be reckoned.
There can be no quibbling that Atty. Estaniel received a copy of Atty. Datukon's April 1, 1996 "MANIFESTATION" on the same date. Said manifestation carried all the basic earmarks of a proper pleading or like papers filed in court. It carried the precise case number and title. The exact branch of the handling RTC was particularly identified, the lawyers involved in the litigation were named and the specific subject covered by the manifestation, i.e., motion for execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 580, was clearly discernible. Atty. Estaniel, therefore, cannot plausibly feign ignorance as to what decision the motion for execution was about. . . .
The explanation of petitioner's counsel that his client only finished Grade 6 and lives in a remote mountain barangay77 fails to convince. Petitioner immediately informed his counsel about the Notice to Vacate on Execution on the same day he was served a copy.78 This contradicts counsel's explanation implying difficulty in communicating with his client. This even raises the possibility that his client did immediately inform him about the Regional Trial Court Decision upon receiving a copy.
Equally unconvincing and disappointing is the submission of petitioner's counsel that even if he received a copy of the motion for execution, "to require undersigned counsel to verify the existence of the decision with the Regional Trial Court is to unfairly burden the undersigned counsel and to unduly exonerate the clerk of court who was remiss in his duty in sending a copy of the Decision to the undersigned counsel,"79 and that the court in Danao is 30 kilometers away from his office in Mandaue.80 Counsels have the duty to serve their clients with competence and diligence.81 The distance from counsel's office to the court should not be used as an excuse by counsel from keeping himself updated with the status of the cases he is handling.
This court has held that "[r]elief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence."82 Petitioner, through his counsel, did not file an answer to the Complaint. After the trial court declared petitioner in default for failure to file an answer, his counsel did not file an opposition to or motion to lift the Order declaring him in default. After petitioner's counsel was furnished a copy of the motion for execution, he did not immediately file an opposition to the motion or raise the ground that he was not furnished a copy of the Decision.
* Designated acting member per S. 0. No. 1951 dated.March 18, 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 4-11. The Petition was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Id. at 47-53. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos (Chair) and Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap of the Eighteenth Division.
5 Id. at 62-63. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles (Chair) and concurred in by Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla of the Special Former Eighteenth Division.
10 Id. at 14 and 48. Lot No. 4327 was declared under the heirs of Victoriano Monisit in Tax Declaration No. 11877.
13 Id. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6815 with Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
26 Id. The Motion to Dismiss was denied on July 22, 2004, while his Motion for Reconsideration was denied on January 25, 2005.
27 Id. The Petition for Certiorari was dismissed on November 23, 2006, while his Motion for Reconsideration was denied on June 19, 2007.
35 Id. at 6 and 34-36.
36 Id. at 6 and 38. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Edito Y. Enemecio of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.
54 G.R. No. 85923, February 26, 1992, 206 SCRA 590 [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
63Ramos v. Spouses Lim, 497 Phil. 560, 565 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, Third Division], citing Mancenido v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 627, 633 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division], in turn citing Riego, et al. v. Riego, et al., 124 Phil. 659, 662 (1966) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc]; Spouses Soriano v. Soriano, 558 Phil. 627, 642 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division], citing De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 775, 788 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
64Santiago v. Guadiz, Jr., G.R. No. 85923, February 26, 1992, 206 SCRA 590, 597 [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
65 497 Phil. 560 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, Third Division].
70Rollo, pp. 50, 52, and 73.
73 Id. at 50 and 52-53.
74Ampo v. Court of Appeals, 517 Phil. 750, 756 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division], citing Macondray & Co., Inc., v. Provident Insurance Corporation, 487 Phil. 158, 168 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
75 Id. at 755, citing Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Judge Arciaga, 232 Phil. 400, 404 (1987) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
76 Id., citing Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Provident Insurance Corporation, 487 Phil. 158, 168 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
81 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 18.
82Ampo v. Court of Appeals, 517 Phil. 750, 756 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division], citing Cerezo v. Tuazon, 469 Phil. 1020, 1039 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
83Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 573 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.