Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20171219_0002719.SGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:12:55+00:00

Document:
WILLIAM DANFORTH, Former Warden; FRED GAMMAGE, Deputy Warden of Security, Telfair State Prison; ROBERT TOOLE, Field Operations Officer, Georgia Department of Correction; TERENCE KILPATRICK, Unit Manager, Telfair State Prison; ZACHARY MIXON, Sergeant of CERT Team, Telfair State Prison; PHILLIP HALL, Warden; and RODNEY MCCLOUD, Unit Manager, Defendants.
Plaintiff, an inmate at Telfair State Prison (“TSP”) in Helena, Georgia, brought this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Defendants' motion to dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (doc. no. 63) and all claims for monetary relief against Defendants be DISMISSED.
With respect to the remaining defendants in this action, Plaintiff alleges the following facts, which must be taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
The Eleventh Circuit formulated a two-step inquiry for evaluating motions to dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. First, the Court looks to the factual allegations made by both parties, taking the plaintiff's version as true where they conflict, and if in that light the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the defendant's motion will be granted. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082-83 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1074 (2008)).
If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step, then at step two the Court makes specific findings to resolve the disputed factual issues, with defendant bearing the burden of proving Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. Based on its findings as to the disputed factual issues, the Court determines whether the prisoner has exhausted his available administrative remedies and thus whether the motion to dismiss should be granted. Id. Because exhaustion “is treated as a matter of abatement and not an adjudication on the merits, it is proper for a judge to consider facts outside the pleadings and to resolve factual disputes so long as the factual disputes do not decide the merits and the parties have sufficient opportunity to develop a record.” Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376 (citations omitted).
Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement “applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002). Moreover, the Court does not have discretion to waive the requirement, even if it can be shown the grievance process is futile or inadequate. See Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App'x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
Furthermore, the PLRA also “requires proper exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). In order to properly exhaust his claims, a prisoner must “us[e] all steps” in the administrative process; he must also comply with any administrative “deadlines and other critical procedural rules” along the way. Id. at 90 (internal quotation omitted). If a prisoner fails to complete the administrative process or falls short of compliance with procedural rules governing prisoner grievances, he procedurally defaults his claims. Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005).
Additionally, “implicit in [the exhaustion] requirement is an obligation on the prisoner to provide those officials who will pass upon the grievance all the relevant information he has, including the identity of any officials he thinks have wronged him and any witnesses.” Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Sewell v. Ramsey, No. CV 406-159, 2007 WL 201269, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2007) (“a grievance satisfies § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement so long as it provides prison officials with enough information to investigate and address the inmate's complaint internally”). This does not require a prisoner to provide information he does not have or cannot reasonably obtain, but it does require a prisoner to include “relevant information about his claims, including the identity of those directly involved in the alleged deprivation . . . .” Brown, 212 F.3d at 1210; see also Thompson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV 510-069, 2011 WL 6941680, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 510-069, 2012 WL 12682 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2012), aff'd, 485 F. App'x 345 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiff need not have used any particular words or phrases in his informal grievances. Nevertheless, there must be some assertion set forth in a grievance, whether informal or formal, which would alert the person against whom the grievance was filed that the inmate's complaint concerned him or her.”).
Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition to filing an action in federal court, the Eleventh Circuit requires prisoners to complete the administrative process before initiating suit. Poole v. Rich, 312 F. App'x 165, 166 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000). Finally, under the PLRA, the Court has no discretion to inquire into whether administrative remedies are “plain, speedy, [or] effective.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; see also Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326. Rather, under the PLRA's “strict exhaustion” requirement, administrative remedies are deemed “available” whenever “‘there is the possibility of at least some kind of relief.'” Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1155, 1156.

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