Source: http://www.foodsafety.org.in/2011/02/honourable-high-court-judgement-in.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:59:56+00:00

Document:
1. Common questions arise for consideration in Criminal Petition Nos. 4325 of 2003, 3701 of 2004, 3856 of 2005, and 1007 of 2003, as to whether delay, in furnishing a copy of the analyst report beyond the "Best Before" date or the expiry date of the shelf life of the product, could, by itself, be said to have resulted in the accused being denied the opportunity of sending the sample for analysis to the Central Food/ Seeds Laboratory, and in their suffering prejudice thereby. While Crl. P. No. 4325 of 2003 and Crl. P. No. 1007 of 2003 arise under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Crl. P. No. 3701 of 2004 and Crl. No. 3856 of 2005 arise under the Seeds Act.
3. This petition is filed to have the proceedings in C.C. No. 213 of 2003, on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Jangaon, quashed.
3. Allegations in the complaint, are that the Food Inspector took samples of Lehar 7-Up, Lehar Carbonated Water and Pepsi-Cola beverages from M/s. Sony Agencies, for analysis. A-1 is the proprietor of M/s, Sony Agencies who sold the sample of Lehar 7-Up, Lehar Carbonated Water and Pepsi-Cola beverages. A-2 is M/s. Hyderabad Beverages Private Limited who supplied Lehar 7-Up, Lehar Carbonated Water to A-1 under invoice 008 dated 19.4.2001 and 024 dated 30.4.2001. On an inspection conducted on 2.5.2001 five cases, each containing 24 bottles of 300 ml. Lehar 7-Up manufactured on 30.4.2001 and 'best used within 6 months from the date of manufacture', were found. The Food Inspector purchased three sealed bottles of Lehar 7 Up and Lehar Carbonated Water and Pepsi-Cola and sent the sample for analysis on 2.5.2001. Notice in Form VII was issued to A-2. The Public Analyst, in his report submitted in Form VII on 6.6.2001, opined that the sample did not conform to the standards of total plate count and was therefore adulterated. With regards Lehar Carbonated Water and Pepsi, Analyst in his report dated 7.2.2001, opined that the sample did not conform to the standards of total plate count, that e-coli and yeast was present and the food product was therefore adulterated. Sanction for prosecution was sought on 3.8.2001 and was accorded on 7.10.2001. The complaint was filed on 22.4.2003.
4. Petitioner would contend that, since the shelf life of the product is six months from the date of manufacture on 30.4.2001 and the six months period expired on 30.10.2001, the complaint filed on 22.4.2003 was belated, and as they had been deprived of their right to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, before the shelf life of the product had expired, the complaint was liable to be quashed.
5. This petition is filed to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 1095 of 2001 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Medchal. On 24.3.1999, the Food Inspector conducted a raid on M/s. Vijaya Minerals Manufacturing Plant and purchased three one litre sealed bottles of Kavery Pure 'N' Safe Water bottles. He served a notice in Form-VI and on 25.3.1999 the sample bottle, along with Form VIII, was sent to the public analyst for analysis. The remaining two parts were deposited with the Director and State Local (Health) Authority, A.P., Hyderabad.
6. The Public Analyst, in his report, opined that the sample contained moulds and was therefore adulterated. After receipt of the public analysts report, the Food In-specter obtained particulars and thereafter submitted a detailed report to the Director, Institute of Preventive Medicine and the State Local (Health) Authority, A.P., Hyderabad. The Director accorded written consent for launching prosecution against the petitioners, vide letter dated 13.11.2001, and thereafter the complaint, dated 3.12.2001, was filed on 27.12.2001. The learned Magistrate took cognizance on 20.3.2002 and issued summons calling upon the petitioner to appear on 10.7.2002. On 20.7.2002, the accused were served copies of the charge-sheet and the public analyst's report. However, notice under Section 13(2) was served within ten days from 20.3.2002.
7. In the complaint filed, the petitioners herein are alleged to have committed offences under Sections 7(1) and 2(ia)(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 and Rule 50 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, liable for punishment under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954. Petitioners would contend that the Mineral Water was packed in the month of March 1999, that the label, affixed on the sample bottles, clearly Indicated 'Use before six months from the date of manufacture' which meant that the contents of the bottle were required to be used within that period, that Explanation VIII under Rule 32 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules was attracted and that no useful purpose would be served if the spare sample bottle was sent for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory, since the shelf life of the water bottle had already expired. Petitioners would contend that since the shelf life of the product or the "Best Before" date of the bottle had expired by the end of September 1999 Itself, instituting criminal proceedings in December 2001 and serving on them a copy of the report of the public analyst in July 2002 was belated and had deprived the petitioners of their valuable right of sending the sample for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory.
8. In this petition, proceedings In C.C. No. 37 of 2004, on the file of the VIth Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur are sought to be quashed.
9. The complaint in C.C. No. 37 of 2004 was filed under Section 7(b) read with Section 19 of the Seeds Act, 1966. Allegations In the complaint are that, on 24.7.2003, the Seeds Inspector and Assistant Director of Agriculture (Regular) Guntur inspected the premises of the 1st accused firm and took samples of "Hybrid Maize NMH-2255" for germination test, after Issuing notice to the dealer in Form No. VI and VIII dated 24.7.2003. The said samples were sent for analysis on 24.7.2003. The analyst, in his report dated 22.8.2003, informed that the sample of Hybrid Maize NMH-2255 was sub-standard and that the germination percentage was only 84.5% as against the prescribed standard of 90%. A copy of the Seed Analyst report was served on the 1st accused on 29.8.2003. The accused were issued a show cause notice on 3.9.2003 and they submitted their explanation thereto on 30.9.2003. Summons was served on the accused, in the 3rd week of March 2004, calling upon them to appear before the learned Magistrate on 29.3.2004.
10. This petition is filed to have the proceedings in C.C. No. 703 of 2004, on the file of the VII Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur, quashed.
11. The allegations in the complaint are that, on 16.7.2003, the Seeds Inspector inspected the premises of the 1st petitioner firm and took two samples of Hybrid Maize NMH-2255 and Castor GCH-4 for germination test. The sample was sent for analysis on 16.7.2003. The Seed Analyst, in his report dated 16.8.2003, informed that the two samples of Hybrid Maize NMH-2255 and Castor GCH-4 were substandard and the germination percentage was lower than the prescribed standards. Copy of the Seed Analyst report was served on the 1st accused on 23.8.2003, certain records were seized, a complaint was lodged in December 2004 and summons, in C.C. 703 of 2004, were served on the petitioners on 16.12.2004 asking them to appear in the matter. Petitioners would refer to Clause XXXI of the General Seed Certification Standards where-under the validity period of the certificate issued In respect of a particular seed is 9 months from the date of testing the seed in the laboratory of the company. Petitioners would contend that Hybird Maize NMH-2255 was tested in their laboratory on 3.4.2003 and Castor GCH-4 was tested on 25.6.2003 and that the validity period of nine months expired on 3.1.2004 and 25.3.2004 respectively. Petitioners would contend that though the Analyst's report was received by the Joint Director on 16.8.2003, the complaint was filed much later on 13.2.2004 and summons were served asking the petitioners to appear on 6.12.2004. Petitioners would contend that even by 13.2.2004, when the complaint was filed, the seed sample had lost its shelf life of nine months and, as the shelf life had expired, they could not ask the Court to send the samples to the Central Seed Laboratory for analysis as no useful purpose would be served in sending the samples for testing. Petitioners would contend that they have been denied their valuable right, under Section 16(2) of the Seeds-Act, to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory.
12. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, Sri V. Ravikiran Rao and Sri D. Krishna Murthy, learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that since the shelf-life of the product had expired long before the complaint was filed in Court, the petitioners had lost their valuable right of sending the sample for testing, under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, to the Central Laboratory. They place reliance on State of Punjab v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd. ; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram ; Chetumal v. State of Madhya Pradesh ; State of Haryana v. Unique Farmaid (P) Ltd. ; Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Pawan Kumar Saraf ; Matha Venkateswara Rao v. State of A.P. 2002 (1) ALD (Cri) 592 : 2002 Cri LJ 2891; Mallella Laxmi v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2003 (1) ALT (Cri) 67 : 2003 Cri LJ 638; Gupta Chemicals Private Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan 2002 (2) ALD (Cri) 571 (SC); Food Inspector, Div-III, Wrangle v. Balde Ramuloo 2004 (1) ALD (Cri) 804 (AP); Ahmed Dadabhai Advani v. State of Maharashtra ; P. Chandrakanth v. State of A.P. 2002 (2) ALD Cri 113 (AP); S.S. Sujala v. State of A.P. rep. by Public Prosecutor, Food Inspector, Krishnanagar, Kurnool District, Cri. P. No. 873 of 2002, D/- 8.3.2002 and Vivekananda Seeds v. The State rep., by the Asst. Director of Agriculture, Cri P. No. 972, and 1029 of 2005, dt. 8.3.2006.
13. The aforementioned judgments arise under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, (hereinafter referred to as PFA Act), the Seeds Act and the Insecticides Act. It is therefore convenient to refer to the relevant statutory provisions, the rules and the judgments under each of these enactments separately.
(i) if the container of the article is composed whether wholly or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious substance which renders its contents injurious to health.
(m) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability but which does not render it injurious to health : Provided that, where the quality or purity of the article, being primary food, has fallen below the prescribed standards or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability, in either case, solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency, then, such article shall not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this sub-clause.
(b) is not injurious to health, then, such resultant article shall not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this clause.
15. Under Section 7, no person shall himself, or by any person on his behalf, manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any adulterated food. Section 8 empowers the Central and State Governments to appoint Public Analysts. Section 11 prescribes the procedure to be followed by Food Inspectors while taking samples of food for analysis. Section 13 relates to the report of the Public Analyst. Under Sub-section (1) thereof, the Public Analyst shall deliver, in such form as may be prescribed, a report to the Local (Health) Authority of the result of the analysis of any article of food submitted to him for analysis. Under Sub-section (2), on receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under Sub-section (1), to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after institution of prosecution against the persons from whom the sample of the article of food was taken, and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14-A, forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person Or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that, if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. Under Sub-section (2A), when an application is made to the Court under Sub-section (2) the Court shall require the local (Health) Authority to forward the part or parts of the sample kept by the said Authority and upon such requisition being made, the said Authority shall forward the part or parts of the sample to the Court within a period of five days from the date of such requisition. Under Sub-section (2B), on receipt of the part or parts of the sample from the Local (Health) Authority, the Court shall after ascertaining that the mark and seal are intact and not tampered with, dispatch the part to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, who shall thereupon send a certificate to the Court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the part of the sample specifying the result of the analysis. Under Sub-section (2D), until receipt of the certificate of the result of the analysis from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, the Court shall not continue with the proceedings before it in relation to the prosecution. Section 13(3) provides that the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, under Sub-section (2B), shall supersede the report given by the public analyst under Sub-section (1). Under Section 14, no manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in any article of food shall sell such article to any vendor, unless he also gives a warranty in writing in the prescribed form about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor. Proviso thereunder prescribes that a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof shall be deemed to be a warranty. Section 14-A requires every vendor of an article of food, if so required, to disclose to the food inspect for the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom he purchased the article of food.
(1)(a) Samples of food for analysis under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act shall be sent either through a messenger or by registered post in a sealed packet, enclosed together with a memorandum in Form I in an outer cover addressed to the Director.
(b) Samples of food for analysis under Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act or under Clause (a) of Rule 3 shall be sent either through a messenger or by registered post in a sealed packet enclosed together with a memorandum in Form 1-A in an outer cover addressed to the Director.
(2) The container as well as the outer covering of the packet shall be marked with a distinguishing number.
(3) A copy of the memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal used to seal the container and the cover shall be sent separately by registered post to the Director.
(4) On receipt of a package containing a sample for analysis the Director or an officer authorized by him, shall compare the seals on the container and the outer cover with specimen impression received separately and shall note the condition of the seals thereon.
(5) After test or analysis, the certificate thereof shall be supplied forthwith to the sender in Form II.
(6) The fees payable in respect of such a certificate shall be "Rs. 1000" per sample of food analysed.
(7) Certificates issued under these rules by the Laboratory shall be signed by the Director.
(8) The fee payable in respect of analysis of samples of imported food analysed in any designated laboratory shall be Rs. 3000 per sample payable by the importer.
(1) On receipt of a package containing a sample for analysis from a Food Inspector or any other person the public analyst or an officer authorised by him shall compare the seals on the container and the outer cover with specimen impression received separately and shall note the condition of the seals thereon. Provided that in case sample container received by the public analyst is found to be in broken condition or unfit for analysis he shall within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of such sample inform the Local (Health) Authority about the same and send requisition to him for sending second part of the sample.
(2) The public analyst shall cause to be analysed such samples of articles of food as may be sent to him by Food Inspector or by any other person under the Act.
(3) The public analyst shall, within a period of (forty days) from the date of receipt of any sample for analysis, (send by registered post or by hand) to the Local (Health) Authority a report of the result of such analysis in Form III : Provided that where any such sample does not conform to the provisions of the Act or these rules, the public analyst shall (send by registered post or by hand) four copies of such report to the said Authority: Provided further that the public analyst shall forward a copy of such report also to the person who purchased an article of food and forwarded the same to him for analysis under Section 12 of the Act.
Note : In case of sample received under the proviso of Rule 7(1) or Rule 9-A, the period of forty days shall be counted from the date of receipt of the second part of the sample.
(a) Local (Health) Authority shall within a period of seven days of receipt of requisition for second part of the sample from public analyst under the proviso of Rule 7(1), send such sample to the public analyst.
(b) Local (Health) Authority, while sending second part of the sample under the provision of Sub-section (2-E) of Section 13 of the Act, shall do so within a period of 20 days from the date of receipt of the report from the first public analyst.
Rule 12 provides that the notice of intention to take sample for analysis should be given in Form VI. Rule 12-A relates to warranty and thereunder every manufacturer, distributor or dealer selling an article of food to a vendor shall give either separately or in the bill, cash memo or a label a warranty in Form VIA. Rule 14 prescribes the mariner of sending the sample for analysis. Rule 22 relates to the quantity of the sample.
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.
20. It is necessary to note that Form II was substituted by G.S.R. No. 530 (E) dated 29.7.2002 with effect from 29.1.2003, Under Form II the Central Food Laboratory is, among others, required to certify as to whether the sample was in a condition fit for analysis or was not fit for analysis. Where a sample is not in a condition fit for analysis, the reasons therefore are also required to be stated in the certificate.
...It appears to us that when a valuable right is conferred by Section 13(2) of pie Act on the vendor to have the sample given to him analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, it is to be expected that the prosecution will proceed in such a manner that that right will not be denied to him. The right is a valuable one, because to certificate of the Director supersedes the report of the Public Analyst and, is treated as conclusive evidence of its contents. Obviously, the right has been given to the vendor in order that, for his satisfaction and proper defence, he should be able to have the sample kept in his charge analysed by a greater expert whose certificate is to be accepted by Court as conclusive evidence. In a case where there is denial of this right on account of the deliberate conduct of the prosecution, we think that the vendor, in his trial, is so seriously prejudiced that it would not be proper to uphold his conviction on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst, even though that report continues to be evidence in the case of the facts contained therein.
We are not to be understood as laying down that, in every case where the right of the vendor to have his sample tested by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory is frustrated, the vendor cannot be convicted on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst. We consider that the principle must, however, be applied to cases where the conduct of the prosecution has resulted in the denial to the vendor of any opportunity to exercise this right. Different considerations may arise if the right gets frustrated for reasons for which the prosecution is not responsible.
... In the light of the reasons recorded by the learned Magistrate at para 18 and in the light of other findings recorded by the learned Magistrate at the preceding paras, it is no doubt true that the evidence of P.W. 1, the Food Inspector alone is available and it may be sufficient, but however, the fact remains that P.W. 2 did not support the version of the prosecution and taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, the learned Magistrate had recorded that the delay in launching prosecution had caused prejudice to the respondent/accused and had recorded an acquittal.
28. Under Section 14(1)(a)(b) of the Seeds Act, the Seed Inspector may take samples of any seed for analysis by the Seed Analyst of that area. Section 15 prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Seed Inspector and Section 16 relates to the report of the Seed Analyst.
(c) retain the remaining sample In the prescribed manner for production in case any legal proceedings are taken or for analysis by the Central Seed Laboratory under Sub-section (2) of Section 16, as the case may be.
(5) Where a Seed Inspector seizes any record, register, document or any other material object under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14, he shall, as soon as may be, inform a Magistrate and take his orders as to the custody thereof.
(1) the Seed Analyst shall, as soon as may be after the receipt of the sample under Sub-section (2) of Section 15, analyse the sample at the State Seed Laboratory and deliver, in such form as may be prescribed, one copy of the report of the result of the analysis to the Seed Inspector and another copy there of to the person from whom the sample, has been taken.
(2) After the institution of a prosecution under this Act, the accused-vendor or the complainant may, on payment of the prescribed fee, make an application to the Court for sending any of the samples mentioned in Clause (a) or Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 to the Central Seed Laboratory for its report and on receipt of the application, the Court shall first ascertain that the mark and the seal or fastening as provided in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 15 are intact and may then dispatch the sample under its own seal to the Central Seed Laboratory which shall thereupon send its report to the Court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the sample, specifying the result of the analysis.
(3) The report sent by the Central Seed Laboratory under Sub-section (2) shall supersede the report given by the Seed Analyst under Sub-section (1).
On receipt of a sample for analysis the Seed Analyst shall first ascertain that the mark and the seal or fastening as provided in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 15 are intact and shall note the condition of the seals thereon.
(2) The Seed Analyst shall analyse the samples in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Seed Testing Manual published by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research as amended from time to time.
(3) The Seed Analyst shall deliver in Form VII, a copy of the report of the result of analysis to the persons specified; in Sub-section (1) of Section 16, as soon as may be but not later than 30 days from the date of receipt of samples sent by the Seed Inspector under Sub-section (2) of the Section 15.
(4) The Seed Analyst shall from time to time forward to the State Government the reports giving the result of analytical work done by him.
31. Rule 24 prescribes the manner of taking samples. Rule 33 relates to the analysis of the sample. Rule 35 prescribes that the Form of the Analyst Report shall be delivered in Form VII.
Certificate of test and/or analysis by the Seed Analyst Certified that the sample(s) bearing number...purporting to be a sample of...received on...Memorandum No...dated... from...has/have been tested/analysed and that the result/ results of such test(s) analysis is/are as stated below.
...Prima facie, the shelf life certificate issued by the manufacturer has to be taken into consideration in the absence of any other material placed by the complainant or the averments made to that effect in the complaint. If that is taken into consideration, the shelf life of the seed expired long back.
34. In M/s. Vivekananda Seeds, it was contended before this Court that, unless Section 15(2) of the Seeds Act read with Rule 21(3) of the Seeds Rules, the Seed Analyst was bound to deliver a copy of his analysis report to the Seed Inspector and to the person from whom the sample was lifted within 30 days from the date of receipt of the sample, that this provision was included for the purpose of giving an opportunity to the accused, If aggrieved, to send the sample for retesting to the Central Seeds Laboratory and that an application for a second test had to be made by the accused to the Court after the complaint was filed. The petitioner contended that, because of the delay in filing the complaint, the mark and seal fastened on the sample may be spoilt and the seed could degenerate rendering the right of the accused, to have the second test, illusory. It is in this context that this Court, following the earlier decisions in Mallela Laxmi 2003 Cri LJ 638 and Matha Venkateswara Rao 2002 Cri LJ 2891, held that the prosecution in these cases could not be proceeded with and, by order dated 8.3.2006, quashed the proceedings.
35. Adulteration of food is a menace to public health. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted with the aim of eradicating that antisocial evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. Ishar Pas v. State of Punjab : 1972 Cri LJ 874. The object and purpose of the Adulteration Act is to eliminate danger to human life and health from the sale of unwholesome articles of food. Municipal Corporation. of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker . Strict adherence to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules framed thereunder is essential for safeguarding the interest of consumers of articles of food. Stringent laws will have no meaning if offenders could get away. Dayal Singh v. State of Rajasthan . No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social activities, in the guise of a respectable trader, jeopardize the health and well being of numerous innocent consumers. The adulterator is a social risk. It might be dangerous to leave him free to carry on his nefarious activities. Adulteration is an economic offence prompted by profit motive and is not likely to end itself easily to therapeutic treatment. Prem Ballab v. State Delhi Admn. .
36. In offences relating to food articles, strict liability is the rule. Nothing more than actus reus is needed where regulation of private activity In vulnerable areas like public health is Intended. Social defence reasonably overpowers individual freedom. Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act casts an absolute obligation regardless of scienter, bad faith and mens rea. Food offences should be deterrent dealt with. When primary necessities of life are sold with spurious admixtures for making profit the only protection which a common man, who otherwise is at the mercy of the vicious dealer, has is under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Court. If offenders could get away, the law would be brought into contempt Krishan Gopal Sharma v. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi .
The distribution of impure or adulterated food for consumption is an act perilous to human life and health hence a dangerous act, and cannot be made Innocent and harmless by the want of knowledge or by the good faith of the seller: It is the act itself, not the intent, that determines the guilt, and the actual harm to the public is the same in one case as in the other. Thus, the seller of food is under the duty of ascertaining at his peril whether the article of food conforms to the standard fixed by the statute or ordinance, unless such statutes or ordinances, expressly or by implication, make intent an element of the offence.
39. Similarly, the Seeds Act has been enacted to regulate the quality of certain seeds for sale and thereby ensure that only seeds of the prescribed standard are made available for agricultural purposes. The laudatory object of both these enactments cannot be permitted to be defeated by unscrupulous manufacturers/distributors/vendors who resort to adulteration which not only affect the health of the general public, and the farmers, but also impact, adversely, agricultural production.
40. Under Section 13(1) of the P.F.A. Act and Section 16(1) of the Seeds Act, the Public Analyst is required to submit a report of his analysis of the article of food/seed. It is only if the food/seed is, in the opinion of the analyst, adulterated/substandard, would prosecution be instituted against the offenders. The basis for launching prosecution, both under the P.F.A. Act and the Seeds Act, is the report of the Public Analyst opining that the food/seed is adulterated or is sub-standard.
41. Under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act, and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, the accused is furnished a copy of the report of Public Analyst and is given an opportunity to make an application to have the sample analysed by the Central Laboratory. Once such an option is exercised and the sample is analysed by the Central Laboratory, the report of the Central Laboratory supersedes the earlier report of the Public Analyst. If the Central Laboratory finds the sample to be in accordance with the standards, and not adulterated, no reliance can thereafter be placed by the prosecution on the earlier report of the Public Analyst to contend that the accused is guilty of adulteration.
42. Is it open for an accused, who chooses not to exercise the option under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act and does not make an application to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, to contend that the delay in making available a copy of the report of the Public Analyst has caused him prejudice?
43. One cannot loose sight of the fact that, since the report of the Public Analyst, opining that the sample is adulterated, forms the basis for institution of prosecution against the accused, prima facie, the food/ seed is adulterated. The opportunity given to the accused, under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, to have these samples analysed by the Central Laboratory, is to enable the accused to have a second opinion and ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the findings of the Public Analyst.
After the institution of a prosecution under this Act the accused vendor or the complainant may, on payment of the prescribed fee, make an application to the Court for sending the part of the sample mentioned in Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for a certificate; and on receipt of the application the Court shall first ascertain that the mark and seal or fastening as provided in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 are intact and may then despatch the part of the sample under its own seal to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory who shall thereupon send a certificate to the Court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the sample, specifying the result of analysis.
...This Court considering the language of Section 13(2) in Babu Lal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat held that the "accused had an opportunity to make an application to the Court for sending the sample to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. He did not avail the same. Therefore, it was no longer open to him to contend that he had no opportunity to send the sample in his custody to the Director, Central Food Laboratory under Section 13(2), since he did not make any application to the Court for sending it. This view was followed in Ajit Prasad Ramkrishan Singh v. State of Maharashtra . In Tulsiram v. State of M.P.
49. The consistent view of the Apex Court, as is clear from the aforesaid judgments, is that in the absence of any request by the accased, and an application made by him to the Court, to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, no prejudice can be inferred. An accused, who does not even make an application to the Court, as required under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory, cannot be heard to say that he has suffered prejudice.
50. Now to the judgments relied upon by the petitioners and other judgments in this regard.
51. In Ghisa Ram 1967 Cri LJ 939, the accused exercised his right under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the sample was sent, for analysis, to the Central Food Laboratory which found the sample not fit for analysis. It is in this context that the Supreme Court held that the delay in launching prosecution and the consequent delay in sending the sample for analysis had resulted in decomposition of the sample rendering it unfit for analysis and that the delay had, therefore, resulted in denial of right of the accused under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In cases where the delay on the part of the prosecution had resulted in the sample, sent for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory, being rendered unfit for analysis, it would undoubtedly cause prejudice to the accused and would amount to denial of his valuable right under Section 13(2) of the Act. There could also be other cases where the delay on the part of the prosecution could be found to have caused prejudice. Whether or not delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst has caused prejudice to the accused are matters which can only be decided, on the basis of evidence, by the learned Magistrate and not for this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to presume. In Babulal Hargovindas 1971 Cri LJ 1075, Sukhmal Gupta v. Corporation of Calcutta Judgment of the Supreme Court in Cri. Appeal No. 161 of 1966 dated 3.5.1968 and Ajit Prasad Ram Kishan Singh 1972 Cri LJ 1026, the earlier judgment in Ghisa Ram 1967 Cri LJ 939 was held inapplicable where the accused never applied to the Court to have the sample analysed by the Central Laboratory.
52. In Ahmed Dadabhai Advani 1991 Cri LJ 1418, the High Court had set aside the order of acquittal by the criminal Court and had convicted the accused. On being approached, by way of special leave, the Supreme Court found that the learned Magistrate, on the basis of evidence, had taken a view that there was undue delay in forwarding the copy of the Public Analyst's report to the accused as required under Rule 9-A and that the High Court invoking jurisdiction under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act had come to the conclusion that it must be taken to have been received in due course. The Supreme Court held that the expression "immediately" in Rule 9-A had to be appreciated, in the context of the fact and circumstances of each case, bearing in mind the purpose of furnishing the report. While it is always open to the accused, on the basis of the evidence on record, to satisfy the Magistrate that the delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the Public Analyst had caused prejudice to them, such a presumption ought not to be drawn or prejudice inferred, merely on the ground of delay, in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. This judgment, in Ahmed Dadabhai Advani 1991 Cri LJ 1418 was held in Prabhu 1994 AIR SCW 2649, as not to run counter to the consistent law laid down by the Supreme Court that no, prejudice could be inferred where the accused does not avail the remedy under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act.
53. In Chetumal, 1981 Cri LJ 1009 the question whether delay, in sending the sample for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory, had caused prejudice to the accused or not, did not arise for consideration. The question which arose therein was as to whether tampering of the seals of the packet in which the sample was sent to the Central Food Laboratory would necessitate "exclusion of the said report from consideration. It is in this context that the Supreme Court held that the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to which he was entitled for no fault of his. The judgment in Chetumal, therefore, has no application to the present cases.
54. In Pawan Kumar Saraf 1999 Cri LJ 1125, the question which arose for consideration was as to whether the certificate of analysis issued by the Central Food Laboratory was complete as the results of certain tests were not indicated therein. In the said case, the Central Food Laboratory had certified that the food article contained in the sample conformed to the standards prescribed. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation, which had instituted the prosecution, contended that this certificate was required to be ignored since results of certain tests had not been indicated in the report. The Supreme Court rejected this contention holding that the report of the Central Food Laboratory superseded the report of the Public Analyst and if this argument, of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, was upheld and the certificate of the Central Laboratory sidelined, the consequence was that there would not be anything surviving to show the quality or the standards of food article involved in the case and that apart, the accused would be deprived of his statutory right to disprove the report of the public analyst. The judgment In Pawan Kumar Sharaf, therefore, has no application to the present cases.
55. Now the Judgments under the Seeds Act.
...The question that falls for consideration is as to whether Rule 21(3) of the Rules is mandatory in its nature? Whether the prosecution would get vitiated on account of non-compliance of the same?
...It Is thus clear that unless it is shown that the sample became unfit for analysis by the Central Seed Laboratory on account of the delay and the same has caused prejudice to the accused entitling them to acquittal, mere delay on the part of the Seed Analyst In sending the report per se would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution.
57. In Mallella Laxmi 2003 Cri LJ 638, this Court, considering the earlier Judgments of this Court in G.S. Prasad 2003 Cri LJ (NOC) 231 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Unique Farmaid 2000 Cri LJ 2962 and National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., held that since the shelf life of the seed had expired there was no purpose in continuing the prosecution as it amounted to an abuse of process of Court.
58. Would expiry of the "Best Before" date of the food article, under the P.F.A. Act, or expiry of shelf-life of the seed under the Seeds Act, make any difference and require a departure from the consistent view of the Supreme Court, in Babulal Hargovindas 1971 Cri LJ 1075, Jagdish Prasad 1972 Cri LJ 1309, Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh 1972 Cri LJ 1026, Sukhmal Gupta and Prabhu, that no prejudice can be inferred where the accused does not even request or make an application to the Court to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory.
59. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the statutory provisions In this regard under the P.F.A. Rules. Rule 32 requires the package of food to carry a label and under Clause (1) thereunder, the month and year In capital letters up to which the product is best for consumption in the following manner.
(i) 'Beat-Before' means the date which signifies the end of the period under any stated storage conditions during which the product will remain fully marketable and will retain any specific qualities for which tacit or express claims have been made. However, provided that beyond the date the food may still be perfectly satisfactory.
(ii) In addition to the date of best before, any special conditions for the storage of the food shall be declared on the label if the validity of the date depends on such storage.
61. All that the prescription of "Best Before", under Rule 32(i) and Explanation VII there under entail is that, till the end of the period "Best Before", the manufacturer certifies that the product will remain fully marketable and will retain its specific qualities. This requirement is an additional precaution to consumers informing them that It is safe for them to consume the food article before the "Best Before" date. Expiry of the "Best Before" date, as is clear from Explanation VIII itself, does not mean that beyond that date the food is not satisfactory. The only obligation cast on the manufacturer is to ensure that under the stated storage conditions, the product retains its marketability and its specific qualities before the "Best Before" date. The rules do not provide, by legal fiction, that after the "Best Before" date or the expiry of the shelf life of the product, the food decomposes and is rendered unfit for analysis, or even that the food becomes adulterated. It is not for Courts to read something more than what has specifically been provided In these statutory provisions.
62. Under Section 16(1)(a)(1) of the PFA Act, a person who manufactures for sale or stores, sells or distributes any article of food which is adulterated, within the meaning of Sub-clause (m) of Clause (ia) of Section 2 or is misbranded within the meaning of Clause (ix) of the section or the sale of which is prohibited under any of the provisions of the Food Adulteration Act or any rule made thereunder, is liable for punishment. Under Section 7 no person shall himself, or by any person on his behalf, manufacture for sale or store, sell or distribute any adulterated food or any misbranded food. Under Section 2(1)(a), adulterated food not only includes an article whose quality or purity is below the prescribed standards, but also includes an article of food which contains , any other substance which affects injuriously the nature and substance and quality thereof. An article of food may be deemed to be adulterated under more than one clause of Section 2(1). Prem Ballab AIR 1977 SC 56. Thus a person can be punished under Section 16 not only where the article of food is found not to be of the prescribed standard but also if it contains any other substance or an inferior or cheaper substance, which affects injuriously the nature, substance or quality of the article of food. While it may be contended that, on expiry of the "Best Before" date, the specific qualities of the product can no longer be guaranteed by the manufacturer, would the expiry of the shelf life of the product or the "Best Before" date result In the sample containing any other article, which affects Injuriously the nature, substance and quality thereof, thereby rendering it adulterated? The answer thereto can only be in the negative.
...The other contention that the beverages require preservatives to be added and in the absence of any preservatives, the food article is not fit for analysis after expiry of the best before dated also cannot be accepted as the shelf life as certified under the Insecticides Act is different from that of the best before under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Even according to the petitioners it is not their case that the said food article is not fit for human consumption. According to Rule 32(1) of the Rules read with Explanation VIII (i) best before means the date which signifies the end of the period under any stated storage conditions during which the product will remain fully marketable and will retain any specific qualities for which tacit or express claims have been made. However, provided that beyond that date the food may still be perfectly satisfactory, which means the best before date only signifies that the said food article contains specific qualities In all circumstances of any weather cold, dry or rainy weather. Therefore, there is no prohibition for human consumption even after the best before, if that be so, the only question that arises for consideration Is as to whether the said food article is adulterated or not.
64. Chinna Venkata Narasimha Rao v. State of A.P. Judgment in Crl. P. No. 1396 of 2002 dated 17.4.2002 is also a case which arose under Section 482 Cr.P.C. This Court, after taking into consideration Explanation VIII (1) of Rule 32 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, herd that since the bottles offered for sale contained a notice that they are best before 12 months from the date of manufacture and since the complaint showed the date of manufacture as February, 2000, it was clear that the product would remain fully marketable and retain its specific qualities before the end of February, 2001. This Court held that since the prosecution was launched on 16.11.2001, long, after February 2001, before which period the sample taken would have been 'best for use', and since the reasons for the delay was not even stated in the complaint, the petitioner had lost the valuable right to seek examination of the sample for a second time to the Central Food Laboratory and, following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Unique Farmaid : 2000 Cri LJ 2962, held that the valuable right conferred on the accused to have the sample tested by the Central Food Laboratory was lost and, as prejudice was caused, the accused was entitled to acquittal.
65. In S.S. Sujala, a sample of mineral water was found adulterated by the public analyst and though the shelf life of the water bottle was only six months and though the public analyst report was received on 20.9.1999, it was not served on the petitioner till 20.2.2002. This Court held that the petitioner had lost his valuable right to send the sample for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory and thereby prejudice had been caused to him.
66. Whether the sample remains fit for analysis or has become unfit can only be ascertained when it Is, in fact, sent for analysis to Central Food Laboratory and It is certified as to whether the sample is fit or unfit for analysis. Rule 4(5) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, read with Form II of Appendix A thereof, requires the Central Food laboratory to certify, in its report, as to whether the sample of the Food sent for analysis is fit or unfit for analysis and the reasons therefor. Whether a sample has, on expiry of its "Best Before" date or its shelf life; become unfit for analysis on account of its being decomposed is a matter of evidence and not a matter of inference in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It Is only when a sample is sent for analysis, can the Central Laboratory on examination certify whether or not the sample has decomposed rendering it unfit for analysis.
In Rule 7(3) no doubt the expression "shall" is used but it must be borne in mind that the Rule deals with stages prior to launching the prosecution and it is also clear that by the date of receipt of the report of the Public Analyst the case is not yet instituted in the Court and it is only on the basis of this report of the Public Analyst that the concerned authority has to take a decision whether to institute a prosecution or not. There is no time limit prescribed within which the prosecution has to be instituted and when there is no such limit prescribed then there is no valid reason for holding the period of 45 days as mandatory of course that does not mean that the Public Analyst can ignore the time limit prescribed under the Rules. He must in all cases try to comply with the time limit. But if there is some delay, in a given case, there is no reason to, hold that the very report is void and on that basis to hold that even prosecution cannot be launched. May be, in a given case, if there is inordinate delay, the Court may not attach any value to the report but merely because the time limit is prescribed, it cannot be said that even a slight delay would render the report void or Inadmissible in law. In this context it must be noted that Rule 7(3) is only a procedural provision meant to speed up the process of investigation on the basis of which the prosecution has to be launched. No doubt, Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act confers valuable right on the accused under which provision the accused can make an application to the Court within a period of days from the receipt of copy of the report of Public Analyst to get the samples of food analysed in the Central Food Laboratory and in Case the sample is found, by the said Central Food Laboratory unfit for analysis due to decomposition by Passage of time or for any other reason attributable to the lapses on the side of prosecution, that valuable right would stand denied. This would constitute prejudice to the accused entitling him to acquittal but mere delay as such will not per se be fatal to the prosecution case even in cases where the sample continues to remain fit for analysis in spite of the delay because the accused Is In no way prejudiced on the merits of the case to respect of such delay. Therefore it must be shown that the delay has led to the denial of right conferred under Section 13(2) and that depends on the facts of each case and violation of the time limit given in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 by Itself cannot be a ground for the prosecution case being thrown out.
70. In Ajit Prasad Ramakishan Singh 1972 Cri LJ 1026, the Supreme Court, following its earlier Judgment in Sukhmal Gupta, held that it was wrong for Courts to decide, without any data, that the sample would decompose and become Incapable of analysis and that no useful purpose would be served in sending the sample for analysis to the Director, when there was no evidence that the sample had so deteriorated at the time of service of summons as to be incapable of being analysed. In the absence of evidence, that the sample has so deteriorated as to be incapable of analysis, such a presumption would not be justified.
71. An enquiry, as to whether the sample has decomposed, whether it is fit or unfit for analysis etc., is a statutory function required to be discharged by the Central Food laboratory and not for this Court, in proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to presume that every case of delay in furnishing a copy of the Public Analyst's report, beyond the shelf life of the product, would either result In the sample becoming decomposed or cause prejudice to the accused.
72. As held by the Apex Court in Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh 1972 Cri LJ 1026, Sukhmal Gupta, Charanji Lal 1984 Cri LJ 15 and T.V. Usman and this Court in G.S. Prasad 2003 Cri LJ (NOC) 231 and Gangalahnaldu Rama Krishna unless It is shown that the sample has been rendered unfit for analysis and the reasons therefor are on account of the delay in sending the sample for analysis and thereby prejudice has been caused to the accused entitling them to acquittal, mere delay In furnishing the report of the public analyst to the accused would not, by itself, be fatal to the case of the prosecution.
, to be directory and not mandatory. When no time limit is prescribed under the Act for launching prosecution and certain statutory provisions and rules, wherein time-limit is prescribed, were held to be directory and not mandatory, it cannot be said that mere delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst to the accused, by itself and without any thing more, is fatal to the prosecution.
74. On what basis can Courts presume that expiry of the "best before" date or expiry of the shelf-life of the product would, by itself, and without anything more, result: in rendering the sample unfit for analysis? The shelf life of products vary from one to the other. While in certain cases the shelf life may be as small as one week, in certain others the shelf life could be as long as a few years. Similarly, the delay in making available a copy of the report of the public analyst may also vary. The delay could range from a period of a few days, after the expiry of the shelf life or the "Best Before" date, to even a few years. Can the same yardstick be applied in all cases to hold that the delay in making available a copy of the public analyst report, beyond the shelf life of the product, has caused prejudice to the accused and denied him his valuable right under Section 13(2)? Even in cases where the report of the public analyst is made available within time, the accused may not exercise his right to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory. In such cases, the report of the public analyst is required to be accepted. Can a different yardstick be applied to cases, where despite a copy of the report of the public analyst being furnished Immediately after the shelf life of the product Has expired and the accused does not exercise his right to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, to hold that delay by itself has caused prejudice to the accused? Answers, thereto, have necessarily to be in the negative.
78. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. this Court does not take upon itself the task of examining the evidence or to record an independent finding that the delay in furnishing a copy of the public analyst's report has resulted in prejudice to the accused. Whether the delay is insignificant or inordinate, whether the delay is attributable to lapses of the prosecution in making available a copy of the public analyst's report, whether on account of the delay In making the report available, the right of the accused under Section 13(2) of the P.F.A. Act or Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act has been rendered illusory as the sample sent to the Central Laboratory is found unfit for analysis due to decomposition by passage of time or for any other reason attributed to lapses on the part of the prosecution, whether inordinate delay in sending the sample for analysis has, by passage of time, rendered the sample "adulterated" are all matters to be examined by the learned Magistrate, in the facts and circumstances of each case, on the basis of the evidence adduced. Delay, by itself and without anything more, cannot form the basis for the High Court, in exercise of its Jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings.
74. It is no doubt true that summoning an accused, in a criminal case, is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of course. The accused can approach this Court, under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to have the proceedings quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and he is still required to undergo the agony of a criminal trial, for the provisions of Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate . Under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends-of justice. But the expressions "abuse of the process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice can only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise, Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code. Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. .
80. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers but only saves the inherent power which the Court possesses. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debits Justifies to do real and substantial Justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. While judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, for, needless harassment, at the, same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that their decision, in exercise of this power, is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa , State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy .
81. Cases which require interference, under Section 482, Cr.P.C. are few and far between. The most common cases where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction.
The inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. must be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases, State v. Navjot Sandhu , State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla , M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka , Mohd. Malek Mondal v. Pranjal Bardalal (2005) 10 SCC 608 : 2005 Cri LJ 2613, for such a power does not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana .
83. It is necessary to note that the judgments, of the Supreme Court, relied upon on behalf of the petitioners, in National Organic Chemical Industries Limited, Unique Farmald (P) Ltd. 2000 Cri LJ 2962 and Gupta Chemicals (P) Ltd., all arose under the Insecticides Act.
Provided that where the insecticide is made up in containers of small volume, instead of dividing a sample as aforesaid, the Insecticide Inspector may, and if the insecticide be such, that it is likely to deteriorate or be otherwise damaged by exposure shall take three of the said containers after suitably marking the same and, where necessary, sealing them.
(1) The Insecticide Analyst to whom a sample of any insecticide has been submitted for test or analysis under Sub-section (6) of Section 22, shall, within a period of (Substituted for "Sixty" by the Insecticides (Amendment) Act, 2000) "Thirty" days, deliver to the Insecticide Inspector submitting It a signed report In duplicate In the prescribed form.
(2) The Insecticide Inspector on receipt thereof shall deliver one copy of the report to the person form whom the sample was taken and shall retain the other copy of use In any prosecution in respect of the sample.
(3) Any document purporting to be a report signed by an Insecticide Analyst shall be evidence of facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken has within twenty-eight days of the receipt of a copy of the report notified in writing the Insecticide Inspector or the Court before which any proceeding in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in contravention of the report.
(4) Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the Central Insecticides Laboratory, where a person has under Sub-section (3), notified his intention of adducing evidence in controversial of the Insecticide Analyst's report the Court may, of Its own motion or in its discretion at the request either of the complainant or of the accused, cause the sample of the Insecticide produced before the Magistrate under Sub-section (6) of Section 22 to be sent for test or analysis to the said laboratory, Substituted for "which shall make the test or analysis" by the Insecticides (Amendment) Act, 2000 "which shall, within a period of thirty days, make the test or analysis" and report In writing signed by, or under the authority of, the Director of the Central Insecticides Laboratory the result thereof, and such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.
(5) The cost of a test or analysis made by the Central Insecticides laboratory under Sub-section (4) shall be paid by the complainant or the accused as the Court shall direct.
(1) On receipt of a package from an Insecticide Inspector containing a sample for test or analysis, the Insecticide Analyst shall compare the seals on the packet with the specimen impression received separately and shall note the condition of the seals on the packet.
(3) After the test or analysis has been carried out under Sub-rule (2), the Insecticides Analyst shall forthwith supply to the Insecticide Inspector a report in triplicate in Form IX of the result or test or analysis.
7. Result of test or an analysis with protocols of test applied.... Date... Insecticide Analyst.
...Sub-section (1) of Section 30 which appears to be relevant only prescribes in effect that ignorance would be of no defence but that does not mean that if there are contraventions of other mandatory provisions of the Act, the accused have no remedy. Procedure for testing the sample is prescribed and if it is contravened to the prejudice of the accused, he certainly has right to seek dismissal of the complaint. There cannot be two opinion about that. Then In order to safeguard the right of the accused to have the sample tested from Central Insecticides Laboratory, it is incumbent on the prosecution to file the complaint expeditiously so that the right of the accused is not lost. In the present case, by the time the respondents were asked to appear before the Court, expiry date of the insecticide was already over and sending of sample to the Central Insecticides Laboratory at that late stage would be of no consequence. This issue is no longer res Integra. In The State of Punjab v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd. this Court in somewhat similar circumstances said that the procedure laid down under Section 24 of the Act deprived the accused to have sample tested by the Central Insecticides Laboratory and adduce evidence of the report so given in his defence. This Court stressed the need to lodge the complaint with utmost dispatch so that the accused may opt to avail the statutory defence. The Court held that the accused had been deprived of a valuable right statutorily available to him. On this view of the matter, the Court did not allow the criminal complaint to proceed against the accused. We have cases under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 involving the same question. In this connection reference be made to decisions of this Court in State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal 1998(5) SCC 3431 : 1998 Cri LJ 3287 under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 1940: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram AIR 1967 SC 9701 : 1967 Cri LJ 939: Chetumal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1981 3 SCC 721 : 1981 Cri LJ 1009 and Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Pawan Kumar Saraf 1999 (2) SCC 4001 : 1999 Cri LJ 1125 all under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
91. National Chemical Industries Ltd. is a case where the High Court, exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. and quashed the proceedings holding that the prosecution had delayed taking action and had deprived the accused of its valuable defence due to delay and in not sending the sample in its custody for analysis to the Central Pesticides Laboratory. The Supreme Court, while holding that prima fade they were not impressed by the reasons given by the High Court, however, held that the ultimate conclusion given was right. The Apex Court held that while the accused, without availing the remedy of the report of Central Insecticides Laboratory, may not be entitled to plead deprivation of their statutory defence, the complaint should be lodged with utmost dispatch so that the accused may opt to avail their of statutory defence and since the accused was not given the third sample they were depraved of their statutory right to have the sample tested by the Central Insecticides Laboratory resulting in their being deprived of the valuable defence statutorily available to them. The question as to whether delay, by itself, had caused prejudice to the accused, did not arise for consideration. Further, the accused was not given one of the three samples as statutorily required under Section 22(6) of the Insecticides Act. The earlier judgment of a co4 ordinate bench in T.V. Usman AIR 1994 SC 1818 was also not noticed.
Chemical Industries Ltd., held that since a procedure for testing the sample is prescribed and if it is contravened to the prejudice of the accused, he certainly has the right to seek dismissal of the complaint and in order to safeguard the rights of the accused to have the sample tested by the Central Insecticides Laboratory, it is incumbent on the prosecution to file the complaint expeditiously so that the right of the accused is not lost. In Unique Farmaid, the accused had notified its intention to adduce evidence in contra version of the report of the Insecticides Analyst and by the time summons were issued the shelf life of the pesticide had expired. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that, by the time the accused was to appear before the Court, the expiry date of the pesticide was already over and held that sending of the sample to the Central Insecticides Laboratory at a later stage Would be of no consequence.
93. It is necessary to note that while Ghisa Ram (1967 Cri LJ 939), Chetumal 1981 Cri LJ 1009, Pawan Kumar Saraf (1999 Cri LJ 1125) were cases which did riot arise under Section 482, Cr.P.C. and were all cases where the sample had been sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, in National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., the sample was itself not made available to the accused resulting in their not being able to send the sample for analysis to the Central Laboratory. 3n none of these cases did the question of delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the Public Analyst, by itself and without anything more, causing prejudice and depriving the accused of their right to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, arise for consideration.
94. In Gupta Chemicals, a petition was filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the complaint on the ground that the inordinate delay in filing the complaint had deprived the accused of their valuable right to get the samples analysed by the Central Insecticides Laboratory. The accused had intimated the Insecticides Inspector of their intention to have the sample tested in the Central Insecticide Laboratory within the prescribed period of 28 days of receipt of the copy of the Insecticide Inspector's report, and yet no step was taken by the Inspector either to send the sample to the Central Insecticides Laboratory or to file the complaint in the Court with promptitude in which case the appellants would have moved the Magistrate for appropriate orders. The Supreme Court held that the right to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, a right vested under the statute, was valuable for the defence, particularly, in a case where the allegations were that the material did not conform to the prescribed standard and that, due to sheer inaction on the part of the inspector, it had not been possible for the appellants to have the sample examined by the Central Insecticides Laboratory and in the mean time, the shelf life of the sample of the insecticide had expired and for that reason no further steps could be taken for its examination. It is in such circumstances that the Supreme Court held that continuation of criminal prosecution against the accused would be a futile exercise and an abuse of process of Court.
95. In all these three cases, i.e., National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., Unique Farmaid 2000 Cri LJ 2962 and Gupta Chemicals, the accused had exercised their right under Section 24(3) of the Insecticides Act and had notified their intention to adduce evidence in contra version of the report of the Government Analyst and it was in such circumstances that the Supreme Court held that expiry of the shelf life, before the complaint was lodged, had denied the accused their right to send the sample for analysis to the Central Insecticides Laboratory.
(1) The Government Analyst to whom a sample of any drug a[a] Chapter IVA consisting of Sections 33-B to 33-O inserted by the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act (13 of 1964), Section 26 (1.2.1969) for cosmetic has been submitted for test or analysis under Sub-section (4) of Section 23, shall deliver to the Inspector submitting it a signed report in triplicate in the prescribed form.
(2) The Inspector on receipt thereof shall deliver one copy of the report to the person from whom the sample was taken b(b) Substituted for the words and brackets "Ayurvedic (including Siddha) or Unani" by the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act (68 of 1982), Section 2(a) [and another copy to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 18A], and shall retain the third copy for use in any prosecution in respect of the sample.
(3) Any document purporting to be a report signed by a Government Analyst under this Chapter shall be evidence of the facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken b(b) Substituted for the words and brackets "Ayurvedic (including Siddha) or Unani" by the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act (68 of 1982), Section 2(a) or the person whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 18A] has, within twenty-eight days of the receipt of a copy of the report, notified in writing the Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that the intends to adduce evidence it controversial of the report.
(4) Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the Central Drugs Laboratory, where a person has under Sub-section (3) notified his intention of adducing evidence in a controversial of a Government Analyst's report, the Court may, of its own motion or in its discretion at the request either of the complainant or the accused, cause the sample of the drug a[a] Chapter IVA consisting of Sections 33-B to 33-0 inserted by the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act (13 of 1964), Section 26 (1.2.1969). [or cosmetic) produced before the Magistrate under Sub-section (4) of Section 23 to be sent for test or analysis to the said Laboratory, which shall make the test or analysis and report in writing signed by, or under the authority of, the Director of the Central Drugs Laboratory the result thereof, and such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.
98. In Brijlal Mittal, the Punjab & Haryana High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. had quashed the proceedings against the accused on the ground that the prosecution was launched after the shelf of the drug had expired and had held that, as a consequence thereof, the accused were deprived of their right to get the drugs tested by the Central Drugs Laboratory. The Supreme Court held that, under Section 25(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the report of Government Analyst shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken had, within 28 days of receipt of the report, informed in writing to the Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings, in respect of the sample, was pending that he intends to adduce evidence in contra version of the report. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 25, the right to get the sample tested by the Central Government Laboratory through the Court accrued to the accused only if he had earlier notified, in accordance with Sub-section (3), his intention of adducing evidence in contraversion of the report of the Government analyst. The Supreme Court held that, unless the requirement of Sub-section (3) was compiled with, the person concerned could not avail of his right under Sub-section (4). While holding that the Punjab & Haryana High Court had not properly considered the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 25, the Supreme Court held that the right to get the sample examined by the Central Drug Laboratory, through the Court before which the prosecution is launched, arises only after the person concerned notifies, in writing, the Inspector or the Court concerned, within 28 days from the date of receipt of the report of the Government analyst, that he intends to adduce evidence in contra version of the report and since the manufacturer did not exercise its right and had failed to notify the Inspector that he intended to adduce evidence in contraversion of the report, not only the right of the manufacturer to get the sample tested by the Central Drugs Laboratory, through the Court concerned, stood extinguished, but the report of the Government analyst also became conclusive evidence under Sub-section (3). The Supreme Court held that "the delay in filing the complaint till the expiry of the shelf life of the product could not, therefore have been made a ground by the High Court to quash the prosecution.
99. Pre-requisite for sending the sample for analysis to the Central Laboratory, under Section 24(4) of the Insecticides Act, is the notification by the accused of his intention to adduce evidence in contraversion of the report of the public analyst. Under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and under Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, after institution of prosecution, the accused may make an application to the Court to send the sample for analysis to the Central Laboratory. Right of the accused to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, both under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Seeds Act, is after prosecution is instituted. It is necessary to note that Sections 25(3) & (4) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is in part materia with Section 24(3) and (4) of the Insecticides Act. Since neither the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act nor the Seeds Act contain provisions similar to Section 24(3) of the Insecticides Act or Section 25(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and do not provide for the accused to notify his intention to adduce evidence in contraversion of the report of the public analyst, the judgments of the Supreme Court, in National Organics Chemical Industries Ltd., Unique Farmaid 2000 Cri LJ 2962 and Gupta Chemicals, all of which arose under the Insecticides Act, cannot automatically be applied to cases which arise either under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or the Seeds Act, for it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret the provisions of one enactment following the decisions rendered under a provision in another enactment when the two statutes are not in part materia Babu Khan v. Nazim Khan .
...As rightly submitted by learned Counsel for the appellants, provisions similar to Sections 3 and 9 of the Tenants Act were not under consideration in Hindustan Petroleum case.
Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Eculid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated, Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton 1951 AC 737 (AC at p. 761) Lord Mac Dermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D).
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970) 2 All ER 294 (All ER p. 297 g-h) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech...is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances". Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, In Herrington v. British Railways Board: (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c).
There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in. two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.
102. Since the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Seeds Act are not in pari materia with the provisions of the Insecticides Act, it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court, in National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., Unique Farmaid and Gupta Chemicals Ltd., all of which arose under Section 24(3) & (4) of the Insecticides Act.
103. 1. Since the object and purpose of the PFA Act is to eliminate danger to human life and health from the sale of unwholesome articles of food, strict adherence to the PFA Act and the rules made thereunder is essential. In offences relating to food articles, strict liability is the rule.
2. The report of the public analyst, under Section 13(1) of the PFA Act and Section 16(1) of the Seeds Act, forms the basis for institution of prosecution for adulteration offences. This report, prima facie, indicates that the accused have sold adulterated food/seed.
3. The option given for analysis to the Central Laboratory, is to enable them to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the findings of the public analyst. This valuable right, under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act and Section 16(2) of Seeds Act, if denied, would cause prejudice to the accused.
4. Denial of the right of the accused, under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, would arise only when the accused have applied to the Court to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory. Failure to exercise this option or to make an application to the Court, requesting that the sample be sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, would disentitle the accused from contending that they have been denied their right under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act. Babulal Hargovindas 1971 Cri LJ 1075, Sukhmal Gupta, Jagdish Prasad 1972 Cri LJ 1309, Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh 1972 Cri LJ 1026. Prabhu 1994 AIR SCW 2649, Tulsiram 1984 Cri LJ 1731, G.S. Prasad 2003 Cri LJ NOC 231, and Gangaiahnaidu Rama Krishna.
5. "Best Before date", under Rule 32 of the PFA Rules, merely requires the manufacturer to indicate the period during which the product would remain fully marketable and retain its specific qualities. Explanation VIII (i) thereunder provides that beyond the "Best Before date", the food may still be perfectly satisfactory.
6. Expiry of the "Best Before" date or the shelf life of the product would only enable a manufacturer to disclaim liability regarding the marketability and the specific qualities of the product. Expiry of the shelf life would not automatically render the sample unfit for analysis.
7. The "Best Before" date would vary from one article to another. Similarly the extent of delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst to the accused would vary from one case to another.
8. Rule 4(5) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, read with Form II of Appendix-A thereof, requires the Central Laboratory to certify as to whether the sample sent to it for analysis is fit for analysis or not and in case it is found unfit for analysis to certify the reasons therefor.
9. The PFA Act and the Rules made thereunder cast a duty on the Central Laboratory to certify whether or not the sample is set for analysis.
10. Whether the sample is fit for analysis or has decomposed to such an extent as to render it incapable of analysis are all matters to be examined by the Central Laboratory.
11. It is only if the Central Laboratory certifies that the sample is unfit for analysis and this has resulted due to the delay on the part of the prosecution to furnish a copy of the report of the public analyst to the accused, can the accused be said to have suffered prejudice. (Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh 1972 Cri LJ 1026, Sukhmal Gupta, Charanji Lal 1984 Cri LJ 15, T.V. Usman AIR 1994 SC 1818, G.S. Prasad 2003 Cri LJ NOC 231 and Gangaiahnaidu Ramakrishna).
12. If the sample has not been sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory and the Central Laboratory has not certified that the sample has decomposed, rendering it unfit for analysis, mere delay in furnishing the report of the public analyst to the accused cannot, by itself, be said to have caused prejudice to the accused.
13. Power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and in the rarest of rare cases. This power is not to be used to stifle legitimate prosecution. Inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. do not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.
14. In proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. the High Court does not take upon itself the task of appreciating the evidence on record or to record an independent finding that the delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst has resulted in prejudice to the accused.
15. Whether delay, in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst, has resulted in prejudice to the accused and whether the prosecution has furnished a satisfactory explanation for the delay, are all matters of evidence, to be examined by the trial Court and not for this Court to infer in proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
16. Section 24(3) and (4) of the Insecticides Act is in part materia with the provisions of Section 15(3) and (4) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Under Section 24(3) of the Insecticides Act and Section 25(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, on receipt of the report of the public analyst the person from whom the sample has been taken, or any other person concerned, is required, within 28 days of receipt of a copy of the report, to notify in writing, the Inspector or the Court, of his intention to adduce evidence in contraversion of the report.
17. In National Organics Chemical Industries Limited, Unique Farmaid (P) Ltd. 2000 Cri LJ 2692, and Gupta Chemicals, the accused had, under Section 24(3) of the Insecticides Act, notified their intention of adducing evidence in contraversion of the report of the public analyst.
18. In Brijlal Mittal 1998 Cri LJ 3287 the Supreme Court held that, in cases where the accused has not intimated his intention to adduce evidence in contraversion of the report of the public analyst the delay, in filing the complaint after the expiry of the shelf life of the product, could not be made a ground to quash the prosecution.
19. In cases where the accused have not even requested or made an application to the Court to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Laboratory, delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst, beyond the shelf life of the product, cannot be made a ground to quash the prosecution.
20. There is no provision similar to Section 24(3) and (4) of the Insecticides Act, either under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or the Seeds Act, requiring the accused to notify his intention to adduce evidence in contraversion of the report of the public analyst.
21. Where two statutes are not in pari materia, the decision rendered on a provision in one enactment would not constitute a binding precedent to interpret a provision in another enactment. Babu Khan AIR 2001 SC 1740 and N.R. Vairamani AIR 2004 SC 4778.
104. Though A. Chandrakant, Balde Ramuloo and Busa Gangadhar 2005 Cri LJ 1584 were not under Section 482, Cr.P.C. this Court observed that prejudice has to be inferred in the absence of a reasonable explanation, by the authorities concerned, for the delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst to the accused.
105. This Court, in G.S. Prasad 2003 Cri LJ NOC 231 and Gangaiah Naidu Ramakrishna, (proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C), has held that evidence has to be adduced before the criminal Court to show that the sample sent to the Central Laboratory has become unfit for analysis, and has thereby caused prejudice to the accused and that delay in furnishing a copy of the public analyst's report to the accused, after expiry of the shelf life of the product cannot, by itself, be said to have resulted in prejudice to the accused.
106. On the other hand in Matha Venkateswara Rao 2002 Cri LJ 2891, Mallela Laxmi, M/s. Vivekananda Seeds, China Venkata Narasimha Rao and S.S. Sujala, (Proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C). this Court held that the delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst, after expiry of the shelf life of the product, had resulted in denial to the accused of his right under Section 13(2) of the PFA Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act and in the absence of reasonable explanation for the delay, it must be inferred that the accused has suffered prejudice.
107. Would the conflicting views expressed in the aforesaid judgments of Single Judges of this Court necessitate these batch of cases being referred to a Division Bench for adjudication?
108. It is well to remember that certainty of the law and consistency of rulings are fundamental to the rule of law and form the core of judicial discipline. Judicial discipline envisages that a co-ordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier co-ordinate Bench. If a co-ordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by the other Bench, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench. But no decision can be arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the co-ordinate Bench. State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. , Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. . Benches of High Courts should not, normally, differ from earlier judgments tendered by benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction merely because they hold a different view on a question of law for the reason that certainty and uniformity in the administration of justice is of paramount importance, If, however, the earlier judgment is erroneous or adherence to the rule of precedents would result in manifest injustice, differing from the earlier judgment is permissible. Even in such cases of difference, the latter bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction has to refer the question for the decision of a larger bench. State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 1 SCC 139; M. Subbarayudu v. State ; and Commissioner of Income Tax v. B.R. Constructions (1994) 1 An. W.R. 450 (FB)). If a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction disagrees with another Bench of coordinate jurisdiction, whether on the basis of "different arguments" or otherwise, on a question of law, it is appropriate that the matter be referred to a larger Bench for resolution of the issue rather than to leave two conflicting judgments to operate, creating confusion. It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety, forms the basis of judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs. Vijay Laxmi Sadho (Dr.) v. Jagdish . If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view the result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a Judge sitting singly in the High Court is of the opinion that the previous decision of another Single Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench. In such a case lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all courts, subordinate to the High Court, would find themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissentient judgments of their own High Court. Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W.B. , Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur .
109. One cannot, however, loose sight of the fact that in Matha Venkateswarao 2002, Crl LJ 2891, Mallella Laxmi 2003 Cri LJ 638, Vivekananda Seeds, Chima Venkata Narasimha Rao, and S.S. Sujala, the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in Babulal Hargovindas 1971 Cri LJ 1075, Sukhmal Gupta, Jagdish Prasad 1972 Cri LJ 1309, Ajit Prasad Ramkishan Singh 1972 Cri LJ 1026, Prabhu 1994 AIR SCW 2649. Tulsiram 1972 Cri LJ 1309 and Charanji Lal 1984 Cri LJ 15. all of which arose under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, were not noticed.
110. In Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. the Supreme Court referred with approval to the observations, in Young v. Bristol Areoplane Co. Ltd. 1944 (2) All ER 293, that the "quotable in law", is avoided if it is rendered in ignorance of binding authority. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer . The law declared by the Supreme Court binds Courts in India Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. AIR 1965 SC 1887. It is well to remember that on the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Judicial discipline to abide by the declaration of law, of the Supreme Court, cannot be forsaken by any Court, be it even the highest Court in a State, oblivious of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Chandra Prakash ; State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Lunar . The decisions of the Supreme Court are of significance not merely because they constitute an adjudication on the rights of the parties and resolve the disputes between them but also because In doing so they embody a declaration of law operating as a binding principle in future cases. The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. (Chandra Prakash).
decides a principle it would be the duty of the High Court or a subordinate Court to follow the decision of the Supreme Court. A judgment of the High Court which refuses to follow the decision and directions of the Supreme Court or seeks to revive a decision pf the High Court which has been set aside by that Supreme Court is a nullity. See Narinder Singh v. Surjit Singh : and Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer : .
112. The judgments of the Supreme Court in Babulal Hargovindas 1971 Cri LJ 1075. Sukhmal Gupta, Jagdish Prasad 1972 Cri LJ 1309, Ajit Prasad Ramkishan singh 1972 Cri LJ 1026, Prabuhu 1994 AIR SCW 2649, Tulsiram 1984 Cri LJ 1731 and Charanji Lal 1984 Cri LJ 15, all of which arose under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, are binding both on the Division bench and Single Judges of this Court. As stated above, the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court were not noticed in Matha Venkateswara Rao 2002 Cri LJ 2891, Mallela Laxmi 2003 Cri LJ 638, Vivekananda Seeds, Chinna Venkatanarasimha Rao and S.S. Sujala. while a contrary view may have been taken in these judgments of this Court, in ignorance of the aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court, it needs no emphasis that, whatever may be the view expressed by this Court, it is the law laid down by the Supreme Court which is required to be followed.
113. In these four criminal petitions the accused have not exercised their option, under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Adulteration Act and Section 16(2) of the Seeds Act, and have not requested or made an application to the Court to send the sample for analysis to the Central Laboratory. The delay in furnishing a copy of the report of the public analyst cannot, therefore, be said to have caused prejudice to them. It is only if the petitioners herein had made a request and if, on the sample being sent thereafter to the Central Laboratory, the Central Laboratory had certified that the sample had so decomposed as to render it unfit for analysis, can the petitioners herein be said to have suffered prejudice. In any event these are all matters for the learned Magistrate to examine on the basis of evidence, in the facts and circumstances of each case, and not for this Court to infer in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
114. Criminal petition Nos. 4325 of 2003, 3701 of 2004, 3856 of 2005 and 1007 of 2003 fail and are accordingly dismissed.

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