Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/406/406mass508.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:00:58+00:00

Document:
Present: LIACOS, C.J., WILKINS, ABRAMS, O'CONNOR, & GREANEY, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 9, 1988.
The case was heard by William H. Welch, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Paul V. Mulkern, Jr., for the defendants.
Charles J. Maguire, Jr., for the plaintiffs.
Margery E. Williams, for Massachusetts Teachers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
whether Section 7A empowered the Wrentham town meeting to set unilaterally the town's rate of contribution toward the group health and life insurance provided to the town's employees. We conclude that Section 7A did not authorize the town meeting's action and reverse a Superior Court judgment that made a contrary determination.
The background of the case is as follows. On December 14, 1987, a special town meeting was convened in Wrentham. At the meeting, the voters agreed to accept G. L. c. 32B, Section 7A. [Note 4] The meeting then voted to pay 99% of the premium of the group life and health insurance for all the town's employees and their dependents and to transfer $150,000 from the town's treasury to pay for the costs of the additional contribution percentage. Approximately two weeks later, the board of selectmen (board) refused to comply with the special town meeting vote to pay 99% of the group life and health insurance premiums, but, rather stated that it would continue to fund only 50% of the insurance premium costs, the minimum amount required by Section 7A. The board's refusal to pay the additional 49% represents a net weekly loss to each participating town employee of $14.58 for individual coverage and $34.54 for family coverage.
contribution rate. [Note 5] The plaintiffs also sought an order directing the board to implement the town meeting vote on the rate. After the defendants filed their answer, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), 365 Mass. 824 (1974), essentially on the undisputed facts set forth above. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the plaintiffs' motion, concluding in his memorandum that "it is the town meeting . . . which sets the rate under G. L. c. 32B, Section 7A." A judgment entered declaring that the board was obligated to abide by the town meeting vote of December 14, 1987, that established the contribution rate at 99%. The judgment also stated that the relief ordered would operate prospectively with the 99% contribution rate to be used by the selectmen in negotiating the next insurance contract or contracts. The plaintiffs filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the determination that the new rate should not apply retroactively. That motion was denied. The defendants appealed from the entire judgment. The plaintiffs appealed from the portions of the judgment concerning the retroactivity of the new contribution rate. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.
role in the process of negotiations. See G. L. c. 150E, Section 1; [Note 7] Labor Relations Comm'n v. Natick, 369 Mass. 431, 438 (1976); Weymouth School Comm., 9 M.L.C. 1091, 1094 (1982).
The role of the town manager or board of selectmen in the collective bargaining process is an essentially executive function mandated by statute. We have held that, when a board of selectmen is acting in furtherance of a statutory duty, the town meeting may not command or control the board in the exercise of that duty. See Russell v. Canton, 361 Mass. 727 (1972); Breault v. Auburn, 303 Mass. 424 (1939); Lead Lined Iron Pipe Co. v. Wakefield, 223 Mass. 485 (1916). These decisions reflect an application of the more general principle that "[a] municipality can exercise no direction or control over one whose duties have been defined by the Legislature." Breault v. Auburn, supra at 428, quoting Daddario v. Pittsfield, 301 Mass. 552, 558 (1938).
the latter, the town meeting will have its say on the subject. Nothing further argued by the plaintiffs dissuades us from this view. [Note 11] Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the issue raised in the cross appeal by the plaintiffs with respect to the retroactive payment of the benefits voted by the town meeting.
The judgment is reversed. A new judgment is to enter which declares that the defendant board is not obligated to abide by the December 14, 1987, vote of the special town meeting which purported to establish under G. L. c. 32B, Section 7A, the town's rate of contribution on group insurance benefits paid the town's employees at 99%.
[Note 1] Two other Wrentham police officers, the town's fire chief and superintendent of public works, and the Wrentham Police Association, an "employee organization" within the meaning of G. L. c. 150E, Section 1 (1988 ed.).
[Note 2] The town of Wrentham.
"A governmental unit which has accepted the provisions of section ten [of c. 32B] and which accepts the provisions of this section may, as a part of the total monthly cost of contracts of insurance authorized by sections three and eleven C [of c. 32B], with contributions as required by section seven [of c. 32B], make payment of a subsidiary or additional rate which may be lower or higher than a premium determined by the governmental unit to be paid by the insured, the combination of which shall result in the governmental unit making payment of more, but not less, than fifty per cent of the total monthly cost for such insurance. No governmental unit, however, shall provide different subsidiary or additional rates to any group or class within that unit."
[Note 4] Sometime prior to this meeting, the town had voted to accept G. L. c. 32B in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 thereof.
[Note 5] There is no dispute that the town meeting properly accepted Section 7A in accordance with G. L. c. 32B, Section 7A (d).
[Note 6] A brief has been filed by the Massachusetts Teachers Association as amicus curiae which supports the result sought by the defendants on this issue.
[Note 7] With respect to unionized school employees, the town's bargaining agent is the school committee or its representative. See G. L. c. 150E, Section 1 (1988 ed.).
[Note 8] Furthermore, permitting resort to the town meeting on a subject of mandatory collective bargaining would enable a party to the negotiations to circumvent the bargaining process altogether. If a party was unable to achieve the desired contribution rate through collective bargaining, it could simply put the issue before the town meeting and pack the meeting with voters who supported its position. Such a practice would render the bargaining process an empty formality. "We do not attribute to the Legislature an intention to pass a largely ineffective collective bargaining statute . . . ." School Comm. of Newton, supra at 566. See Weymouth School Comm., 9 M.L.C. 1091, 1095 (1982) (Noting that, if a benefit can be obtained through collective bargaining, it would "undermine the purposes of Chapter 150E" to permit an end run around that process).
[Note 9] In fact, the procedure proposed by the plaintiffs in this case has been found to be impermissible on several occasions. In Town of Provincetown, 9 M.L.C. 1315 (1982), the town and its employees' union were engaged in collective bargaining for a new contract. The union presented a list of demands, which did not include an increase in the contribution to its members' insurance premiums. After negotiations stalled, the union put before the town meeting a proposal to authorize an additional 30% contribution under Section 7A. The town meeting adopted the proposal. Subsequently, the town filed a charge with the Labor Relations Commission alleging that the union had bargained in bad faith in violation of G. L. c. 150E, Section 10 (b)(1) & (2). Reasoning that "bypassing the employer's or employees' representative on mandatory subjects subverts collective bargaining," 9 M.L.C. at 1320, the commission held that the union's attempt to use Section 7A rather than collective bargaining to obtain the additional 30% contribution constituted illegal bad faith bargaining. See id. at 1321. Similar results have been reached in Commonwealth v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 404 Mass. 124 (1989) (unilateral executive action on mandatory subject of collective bargaining prior to impasse constitutes illegal bad faith bargaining); School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 388 Mass. 557 (1983) (same); Weymouth School Comm., 9 M.L.C. 1091 (1982) (recourse to town's legislative branch to obtain job benefit available through collective bargaining constitutes illegal bad faith bargaining).
[Note 10] The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 7A extends the benefits of any increase in the contribution rate obtained by unionized employees to nonunionized employees. However, a municipal employer may pay a higher premium percentage for certain employees pursuant to G. L. c. 32B, Section 15, as appearing in St. 1988, c. 82. See also St. 1989, c. 653, Section 37, amending G. L. c. 32B, Section 16.
[Note 11] In particular, we reject the plaintiffs' argument that the definition of the term "appropriate public authority" in G. L. c. 32B, Section 2 (a), settles the issue because the Legislature, if it had intended to include the board of selectmen in the process outlined in Section 7A, would have used "appropriate public authority" in place of "governmental unit." The Legislature's choice not to use the term "appropriate public authority" merely indicates that the Legislature did not intend to confer the authority stated in Section 7A solely on the board of selectmen. The choice by no means implies exclusion of the board from a proper role in the statutory process. Indeed, if the plaintiffs' argument is accepted, the school committee of a town or its representative would have no role to play establishing Section 7A benefits. This result also is not contemplated by G. L. c. 150E.

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