Source: http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2002/2002-026.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:46:19+00:00

Document:
State v. Murry(1) does not stand for the general proposition that law enforcement officers are authorized to obtain a warrantless extraction of blood once a person suspected of driving under the influence has refused, pursuant to K.S.A. 8-1001, to consent to a blood test. The statute currently authorizes additional testing after refusal only if the certifying officer has probable cause to believe that the person operated a vehicle while under the influence and in such a manner as to have caused the death of or serious injury to another person. Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-1001; 8-1002.
You request our opinion regarding the authority of law enforcement officers to obtain blood samples under the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1001 from individuals who have refused to submit to a blood test. You direct our attention to the Kansas Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Murry(2) and ask whether this case sanctions a warrantless extraction of a blood sample when there is probable cause to believe an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, but the individual has refused such testing.
These provisions clearly state that if a suspect refuses to submit to testing under K.S.A. 8-1001, additional testing shall not be administered unless there is probable cause to believe that the suspect was operating a vehicle in such a manner as to have caused the death of, or serious injury to, another. The Kansas Supreme Court held in State v. Adee(11) that these provisions create a statutory prohibition against compulsory testing of a person suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
"The Kansas implied consent law (K.S.A. 1986 8-1001) is premised, like those of the other states, on the theory that anyone who operates a motor vehicle upon public highways consents in advance to submission to a chemical test in order to determine the amount of alcohol in the driver's blood. See Note, The New Kansas DUI Law: Constitutional Issues and Practical Problems, 22 Washburn L.J. 340, 345 (1983) (prior consent to submit to chemical test the central feature of implied consent in all 50 states). The statute permits a driver to refuse to submit to the test. A refusal, however, triggers two-fold State action: temporary suspension of the driver's license, and admission of the refusal in evidence against the driver at any ensuing trial stemming from the alleged DUI incident. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-1001(f).
"In State v. Brunner, 211 Kan. 596, 602-03, 507 P.2d 233 (1973), we held that a compulsory blood alcohol concentration test for a person arrested for DUI was constitutionally permissible but statutorily prohibited.
In Adee, the issue was whether a warrant could be obtained to compel extraction of blood when the suspect has refused to submit to testing. The Court said no. In State v. Brunner,(13) the circumstances involved a warrantless extraction of blood subsequent to a consent that was found by the Court to have been given under duress (thus ineffective). The Court held the blood evidence inadmissable. Neither of these cases was overruled by the Court in Murry.(14) Thus, it is our opinion that Murry does not stand for the proposition that law enforcement officers are authorized to obtain a warrantless extraction of blood once a suspect has refused, pursuant to K.S.A. 8-1001, to consent to a blood test.
1. 271 Kan. 223 (2001).
3. Murry, 271 Kan. at 224.
4. It is difficult to determine why the issue of consent was not addressed. Some possibilities include: the Court views "refusal to consent" to require something more than not directly answering the request [but see Standish v. Department of Revenue, 235 Kan. 900, Syl. ¶ 2 (1984), In re Hamstead, 11 Kan.App.2d 527, Syl. ¶ 1 (1986) and Lund v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 16 Kan.App.2d 265, 267 (1991)]; once the suspect was rendered unconscious, any refusal or failure to consent was considered withdrawn; the facts fell within the exception to K.S.A. 8-1001(h); or the issue was not placed before the Court to decide.
5. Murry, 271 Kan. at 225-26.
6. 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).
7. Murry, 271 Kan. at 227.
9. K.S.A. 8-1001(h) (emphasis added).
10. K.S.A. 8-1001(k) (emphasis added). See also K.S.A. 8-1001(f)(D) and K.S.A. 8-1002 (refusal will result in suspension or revocation of driving privileges); 8-1001(f)(G) and (i) (refusal may be used against the person at trial).
11. 241 Kan. 825, 830-31 (1987).
12. Adee, 241 Kan. at 829-31.
13. 211 Kan. 596 (1973) (cited above in Adee quote).
14. Murry did, however, disapprove language found in State v. Brunner suggesting that an arrest is constitutionally required under the Fourth Amendment before a blood sample may be taken. 271 Kan. at 233.

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