Source: https://lonang.com/commentaries/conlaw/religious-liberty/c74c/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:57:14+00:00

Document:
1. Virginia Declaration of Rights, §16.
a. Duties owed to the creator (not to “God”).
b. Mere belief in a creator or the laws of creation is not religious, because the laws of creation apply to nonreligious matters. (Torcaso v. Watkins, contra).
c. Man’s duties owed to God can be objectively defined (per lonang) without entangling gov’t with religious doctrine.
d. Once a matter is found to be religious, all further gov’t action or inquiry regarding that matter must cease.
2. Not a subjective test (such as “sincerely held belief”). The legal definition of religion is objective, not subjective.
a. A capitulation to secular/religious dichotomy.
b. Free Exercise Clause covers religious, but not secular, opinions?
c. A legal definition of religion based on “sincerely held beliefs,” would make every person the judge of his own cause.
3. Subjective religion => “accommodation.” Religious freedom is not to be “tolerated” or “accommodated.” It is an inalienable right that can never be burdened, no matter how compelling the gov’t interest. But see, Seeger.
a. Accommodation leads to mere tolerance (not inalienable rights). Accommodated religion is balanced against weight of government interests.
b. Subjective religious beliefs cannot dictate public policy (because of the secular/religious dichotomy, that is, religious beliefs cannot dictate secular policies).
c. Thus, under “accommodation,” you can believe whatever you want, but government has total authority over your actions.
B. Free exercise includes conduct as well as belief.
1. Freedom of the mind.
a. Common root with free speech, free press, etc.
b. The law of jurisdiction – freedom of thought.
c. The view of Jefferson. The Virginia Statute.
Q: Is religion merely a matter of opinion?
2. “Religion” includes “manner of discharge.” Thus, free exercise of religion includes belief and conduct.
b. The position in Reynolds (quoting Jefferson).
3. Civil jurisdiction over deeds is partial, not complete.
II. Religious immunity to civil laws.
A. There is only one law of nature, and it applies to all creatures (thus, all people) without exception. Civil laws complying with lonang also apply without exception.
B. There is no civil immunity because of the separation of church and state. Church members are also state citizens, and laws having a valid civil purpose extend to all persons within the polity.
a. Everyone is governed by more than one authority.
b. The civil ruler must treat everyone equally (no partiality).
c. This includes individuals, families and churches.
2. Heavenly citizenship does not exempt anyone from civil laws.
a. Heavenly citizenship is concurrent, not exclusive.
b. Heavenly citizenship is individual, not corporate.
c. Heavenly citizenship does not “erase” our earthly citizenship.
3. The church is no more separate from the state than the family.
C. There is no civil immunity based on religious affiliation.
1. Christians have no added legal rights compared to others. Neither do Church members.
2. Further, gov’t cannot define what a valid church is, because that is a religious (i.e., a prohibited) inquiry.
3. Civil rights do not depend on associational ties (what groups a person belongs to).
D. There is no civil immunity based on religious belief.
1. Such an immunity presumes that religion is subjectively defined.
a. But, religion is not defined by a person’s subjective beliefs.
b. Just as the beliefs of everyone are free from regulation, so the deeds of everyone are subject to some regulation.
2. A subjective definition of religion defeats liberty of religious conduct.
a. Subjective religion is belief only (i.e., what a person thinks in their mind).
b. Mere belief tends to be culturally irrelevant (i.e., society cannot validate any belief, nor verify that it is “sincere.”) And since so many people have differing beliefs, none of them should control society.
c. Objective religion (Va. Declaration) includes “manner of discharge” (conduct).
a. Reynolds: Objective religion – no immunity.
b. Wisconsin v. Yoder: Subjective religion – selective immunity.
1) Scalia: Religion irrelevant – no immunity.
2) O’Connor: Subjective religion – some immunity (but not here).
3) Blackmun: Subjective religion – some immunity (including here).
III. Modern view – Free Exercise Clause.
A. Gov’t may not punish or burden anyone on the basis of the person’s religious beliefs.
4. Gov’t may not punish conduct just because it is religious or displays religious belief.
B. Public law as a function of subjective religious beliefs.
b. No one has the right to force another to conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.
a. The beliefs of the Indians are sincere and adversely affected by the land development.
3. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). The Court required an exemption for the Amish from a neutral law that required school attendance until age 16, because a fundamental tenet of Amish religion forbids secondary education.
1) The Amish are productive and law-abiding, therefore, the right to educate one’s children and the Free Exercise Clause outweighed the state’s interest here.
4) Additional schooling beyond the 8th grade does little to serve state interests in the case of the Amish (because of their unique community characteristics).
b. White (concurring): Sees a conflict between state educational interests and parental religious convictions which needs balancing.
c. Douglas (dissent): The free exercise rights of the children are at issue here, as well as those of the parents.
IV. Modern view of religious immunities.
1. States can regulate conduct in general, even if the regulation interferes with a person’s religious practices.
2. There is no general exemption from civil laws for people whose religious beliefs prevent them from conforming to the law.
h. Sales and use taxes [Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of California, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990)].
3) Uniform regulations serve a valid government interest.
b. Stevens (concurring): The members of all religious faiths must receive uniform treatment.
2. Employment Division v. Smith (1990). The Court held that no religious exemption was required from a religiously neutral prohibition against use of peyote, even though such prohibition interfered with sincerely held religious beliefs.
3) “Free exercise plus” analysis: This case is unlike Yoder, because it is not a “hybrid situation” where a free exercise claim is connected with any speech rights or parental rights. Yoder is seen as connected to parental rights.
4) This case is unlike Sherbert, because it involves a generally applicable criminal statute (whereas Sherbert did not).
6) Because peyote ingestion is generally prohibited in Oregon, and that prohibition is constitutional, the State may deny unemployment benefits because of violation of that statute.
3) The critical question is whether accommodating peyote use “will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.” In this case, the state interest in prohibiting use of a controlled substance is compelling.
1) There is no evidence or factual findings to support the assumption that the religious use of peyote is harmful to the user or society.
C. Unemployment Compensation. States must grant religious exemptions from unemployment compensation laws. Thus, if a person resigns from a job or refuses to accept a job because it conflicts with her religious beliefs, the state must pay her unemployment compensation if she is otherwise entitled.
1. Sherbert v. Verner (1963). S.Ct. held that a state cannot deny unemployment compensation merely because the applicant quit a job rather work on a “holy day” on which religious beliefs forbid work.
1) State laws favor Sunday worshippers over Saturday worshippers.
3) There is no evidence of fraud or deceit, hence, no compelling interest justifying the above religious discrimination.
1) Consistency with Braunfeld would require upholding validity of state law at issue here. Thus, overrule Braunfeld.
1) In no proper sense did state law discriminate against religious belief. Appellant chose not to work for reasons personal to her, and was therefore not “available for work” within the statutory definition.
2) The Court’s holding requires states to carve out an exception and to provide benefits for those who are unavailable to work because of their religious convictions.

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