Source: http://mlnappeals.blogspot.com/2015/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:22:45+00:00

Document:
In Guanopatin v. Flushing Acquisition Holdings, LLC, the plaintiff was injured when a one ton pre-cast concrete plank fell onto plaintiff's hand from a jack being used to raise the plank. In affirming summary judgment in plaintiff's favor pursuant to Labor Law 240(1), the Second Department found that the defendant had failed to raise a question of fact as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident. More specifically, the statement of plaintiff's employer that his accident investigation revealed that plaintiff disregarded a foreman's instructions to stop work and to not raise the plank to the maximum height level of the jack, were hearsay statements that, standing alone, were insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
In Singh v. 1221 Avenue Holdings, LLC, the plaintiff tripped over a screw protruding from a raised computer floor. In affirming so much of plaintiff's Labor Law 241(6) claim as was predicated on an alleged violation of Industrial Code 23-1.7(e)(2), which pertains to alleged "tripping" hazards in "working areas" caused by "materials" or "sharp projections," the First Department found that the screw was "integral and necessary" to the raised tile floor. In reinstating so much of plaintiff's Labor Law 241(6) claim as was predicated on an alleged violation of Industrial Code 23-1.7(e)(1), which pertains to alleged "tripping" hazards in "passageways" caused by "obstructions," the First Department expressly limited the "integral and necessary" test to 23-1.7(e)(2). The Court did not provide a detailed analysis as to why it reached this conclusion, but instead it simply cited to its earlier decision in Thomas v. Goldman Sachs Headquarters, LLC,, 109 AD3d 421 (1st Dept. 2013).
In Van Nostrand v. NYCM Fire Ins. Co., the plaintiff recovered an underlying judgment against NYCM's insured, Froehlich, in excess of Froehlich's liability insurance with NYCM. The plaintiff then took an assignment of Froehlich's "bad faith" claim against NYCM for refusal to settle within policy limits. Plaintiff commenced this action as subrogee of Froehlich and NYCM moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the basis that he represented plaintiff in the underlying action, and would therefore have to be a witness in the "bad faith" action. The Supreme Court agreed and the Second Department affirmed.
In Purcell v. Visiting Nurses Found. Inc., the plaintiff was standing on a closed A-frame ladder in the basement of a building that was undergoing a gut renovation. As he pulled on a "c-channel" attached to the first floor framing, an unsecured terracotta wall on the first floor collapsed, knocking plaintiff off the ladder. In distinguishing the case from Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co. (86 NY2d 487 ), the First Department concluded, without making a factual distinction, that the Court of Appeals in Misseritti had found that the hazard of a falling wall is an ordinary hazard of construction, whereas the wall at issue in the present case was an object that required securing for the purposes of the undertaking. Clearly, the First Department was suggesting that because the wall was positioned above the plaintiff, rather than next to the plaintiff (Misseritti), plaintiff was exposed to an elevation-related hazard. As to the closed A-frame ladder, since it had been positioned by plaintiff's foreman, the Court found that it was not properly placed to provide adequate protection. Therefore, the First Department reversed the lower court and granted partial summary judgment on liability in plaintiff's favor pursuant to Labor Law 240(1).
The Court of Appeals recently held, in Saint v. Syracuse Supply Company, that a plaintiff who was injured when he fell while installing a billboard advertisement and extension was engaged in the alteration of a structure and, therefore, Labor Law § 240(1) applied.
In Saint, plaintiff was employed as part of a three-person construction crew that was hired to replace an advertisement on a billboard in Erie County, New York. The billboard, which was elevated fifty-nine feet from the ground, was composed of a two-sided, inverted “V”-shaped metal frame that was set on a metal tube embedded in the ground. Each side of the metal frame contained panels that were secured to the frame by iron clips. Advertisements, comprised of vinyl materials, were attached to the panels with ratchet straps.
The billboard contained six catwalks, two of which were located on the exterior of either side of the metal frame and four of which were located on the interior of the frame, with lower and upper catwalks on each side, set ten feet apart. While all of the catwalks had safety cables, only the lower interior catwalks had a guardrail.
On the date of the incident, plaintiff and his crew were installing a new advertisement and four extensions made of plywood cutouts. The extensions were to be secured to the frame with nails, nuts, and bolts, and angle irons were to be bolted to the back of the extensions. While the crew was attempting to remove the old vinyl advertisement that was still located on the billboard in order to install the new advertisement, they required assistance. Plaintiff, who had been on the lower catwalk, went to the upper catwalk to assist them and, in so doing, detached his lanyard from the catwalk’s safety cable. A strong gust of wind caused the vinyl advertisement to strike plaintiff in the chest, knocking him ten feet below to the lower catwalk.
Plaintiff and his wife sued defendant, the owner of the property on which the billboard was located, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1), 240(2), and 241(6). Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff was not engaged in a covered activity under the Labor Law, and plaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the § 240(1) and § 241(6) claims. The Supreme Court denied both motions, holding that the Labor Law sections applied and a question of fact existed as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident.
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed and granted defendant summary judgment on the basis that “plaintiff’s work on the billboard did not constitute altering the building or structure for the purposes of Labor Law § 240, and instead was ‘more akin to cosmetic maintenance or decorative modification’” (p. 6, quoting Saint v. Syracuse Supply Co., 110 AD3d 1470, 1471 [4th Dep’t 2013]). Further, the Fourth Department found that plaintiff “was not engaged in construction work within the meaning of § 241(6)” (id.).
In reversing the Fourth Department’s decision, the Court of Appeals discussed that the purpose of Labor Law § 240(1) is to protect workers from elevation-related risks by placing absolute responsibility for safety practices on owners and contractors rather than the workers themselves and noted that the section is to be construed liberally. As such, the Court concluded that “because plaintiff’s work required the attachment, at an elevated height, of custom-made wooden extensions that changed the dimensions of the billboard frame, plaintiff was engaged in alteration of the structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)” (p. 2, 6-7).
First, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that the Court’s analysis of plaintiff’s activity should be limited to the moment of plaintiff’s injury because “[d]efendant’s interpretation would compartmentalize a plaintiff’s activity and exclude from the statute’s coverage preparatory work essential to the enumerated act” and would strip workers of § 240(1)’s exceptional protection (p. 8). In support, the Court cited Prats v. Port Authority (100 NY2d 878, 882 ), in which the totality of that plaintiff’s actions were considered where that plaintiff had performed heavy alteration work for the same project at the same work site on numerous days prior to his injury (p. 8).
Considering the totality of plaintiff’s actions with regard to the billboard, the Court then concluded that plaintiff was engaged in work that constitutes alteration within the meaning of the statute. The Court noted that altering a structure requires the making of a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the structure and does not include routine maintenance or decorative modification. Thus, the Court held, since plaintiff’s job, at the time he was injured, was to install a new advertisement, and this work required the attachment of extensions that “changed the dimensions of the billboard’s frame and transformed the shape of the billboard,” plaintiff was engaged in an alteration of the structure (p. 9).
The Court distinguished this case from others in which they found injured workers’ activities to be outside the coverage of the statute since those cases involved “simple tasks” and “minimal work” (p. 10). Moreover, the Court noted, the installation of a new advertisement with extensions was not merely a decorative modification because it involved more than a change to the billboard’s outward appearance. In this regard, the installation required a change to the billboard’s size and an adjustment of the frame. Further, the change to the frame would require subsequent alteration of the billboard’s structure when a new advertisement replaced the one plaintiff was installing (p. 11). The Court additionally noted that plaintiff was employed as a member of a “construction crew” and operated a crane used to hoist the extensions, which supports the conclusion that the work he was performing was covered by § 240(1). The Court rejected defendant’s argument that an alteration can only occur where there is a permanent change to the structure on the basis such an interpretation would be at odds with the Court’s prior decisions and would undermine the worker protection purpose of the statute.
The Court also found that it was error to dismiss plaintiff’s other Labor Law claims. Specifically, the Court held that Labor Law § 240(2) should have been dismissed because the billboard platform was fifty-nine feet above the ground and no safety railing was provided to surround the upper rear catwalk despite the fact that the statute requires such a safety railing on any scaffold more than twenty feet off the ground. As to section 241(6), the Court found that plaintiff was engaged in “construction work,” since the Industrial Code uses defines construction to include the alteration of a structure, in which, as discussed above, plaintiff was engaged.
Judge Stein, a former Third Department Justice, wrote this 5-1 opinion for the Court. Chief Judge Lippman dissented alone. Judge Fahey did not participate. It is worth noting that Judge Fahey was part of the Fourth Department panel for this case. He dissented in favor of awarding the plaintiff partial summary judgment on section 240(1) liability.
The plaintiff in Nicometi was injured while installing insulation between ceiling rafters at a newly developed apartment complex. For his task, the plaintiff wore stilts that raised him anywhere from 18 to 36 inches off the ground. While attempting to attach the insulation to the rafter, the plaintiff slipped on a thin patch of ice, fell to the ground, and was injured. Accounts differ as to who first noticed the ice patch and also differ as to whether the plaintiff’s supervisor forbade the plaintiff from working near the ice.
The plaintiff moved in Supreme Court for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. As relevant here, one defendant moved to dismiss this claim. Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, modified the order on appeal, finding a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident. Two judges, including then-Fourth Department Justice Fahey, dissented as they believed the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment. While the majority and dissenters unanimously agreed that Labor Law § 240(1) applied to the plaintiff’s accident, the Fourth Department subsequently granted leave to appeal and cross-appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Notably, Chief Judge Lippman's dissent argues in favor of section 240(1) liability because “the combination” of ice and stilts “presents and exacerbates elevation-related risks” (dissent at p. 3). The majority specifically rejected this argument in a footnote, pointing out that debris and a conduit in prior Court of Appeals opinions rejecting use of section 240(1) could also be said to have “amplified” inherent risks in working at an elevation. Thus “it remains the law that the plaintiff’s injuries must be caused by an elevation-related risk, ‘the type of extraordinary peril section 240(1) was designed to prevent’” (quoting Nieves v. Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 914, 916 ).
The majority also distinguished the plaintiff’s and the dissent's reliance on cases concerning the placement of ladders, such as Klein v. City of New York (89 N.Y.2d 833 ). In Klein, the Court held that failure to ensure “proper placement” of a ladder due to the condition of the floor constitutes a prima facie case of liability. The Nicometi majority, however, cautioned that section 240(1) should be “construed with a commonsense approach to the realities of the workplace at issue” (quoting Salazar v. Novalex Contr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 134, 140 ). “Unlike ladders, stilts are not ‘placed’ in a stationary position and expected to remain still to ensure their proper and safe use. Rather, stilts are intended to function as extensions of, and move with, the worker during performance of the designed task” (p. 14). As such, a ladder that slips due to an unsafe condition “on the floor in the area where it is placed is distinguishable from the circumstances of plaintiff’s accident here” (p. 14).
Chief Judge Lippman began his dissent by analogizing stilts to ladders: “The majority would have us believe that while ladders placed on slippery substances present an elevation-related risk, stilts under the same circumstances do not.” Lippman argued that “stilts placed on ice create the same ‘elevation-related risk’ as do ladders.” To those familiar with recent Labor Law § 240(1) decisions, it is no surprise that Chief Judge Lippman's writings emphasize that the statute must be interpreted “liberally to protect workers.” Here as well, Chief Judge Lippman argued that the majority’s interpretation extends Melber and did so in a way that does not favor the plaintiff. Chief Judge Lippman also added that “placement is equally important for stilts” because both are moved as workers move.
More broadly, the opinion suggests that Judge Stein has staked ground as a foil for Chief Judge Lippman on the expansiveness of Labor Law § 240(1). In many ways, the language of this opinion recalls an era of Labor Law jurisprudence during the 1990s and early 2000s. The opinion quoted heavily from cases using cautionary language about “extraordinary protections”, “narrow class of dangers,” “special hazards,” and “usual and ordinary dangers.” More than simply focusing on Melber, this opinion revives defense-friendly language from Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co. (78 N.Y.2d 509 ), Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co. (81 N.Y.2d 494 ), Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc. (96 N.Y.2d 259 ), Nieves (93 N.Y.2d at 916), Cohen v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr. (11 N.Y.3d 823 ), and similar cases. Even the warning in Ross that the statute does “not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity” is quoted by the majority.
In reviving the special hazard language, the opinion also appears to revive arguments about how section 240(1) should not apply if a plaintiff’s accident is “not ‘attributable to’ a ‘risk arising from construction work site elevation differentials’” (p. 11). To that end, the majority also opined that “section 240(1) is not applicable unless the plaintiff’s injuries result from the elevation-related risk and the inadequacy of the safety device” (p. 7).

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