Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/abbott-v-general-dynamics-corporation-1923-crb-2-93-12-8-31-95/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:37:48+00:00

Document:
The claimant was not represented at oral argument or at the formal hearing that resulted in the award on appeal here. At trial, he was represented by Thomas Albin, Esq., Embry Neusner.
The respondent was represented by Booth M. Kelly, Jr., Esq., Murphy Beane.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Taka Iwashita, Esq., Assistant Attorney General.
This Petition for Review from the December 10, 1993 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Second District was heard December 2, 1994 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse M. Frankl and Commissioners Angelo L. dos Santos and Nancy A. Brouillet.
The respondent has petitioned for review from the December 10, 1993 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Second District. The commissioner found that the claim of the decedent and his dependent daughter for compensable back and neck injuries was transferable to the Second Injury Fund upon the payment of 208 combined weeks of total disability and dependency benefits. The respondent claims that the commissioner improperly applied § 31-349 C.G.S. by requiring more than 104 weeks of disability to be paid before transfer. We affirm the trial commissioner’s decision.
C.G.S. In light of the pre-existing condition, the respondent attempted to transfer liability to the Second Injury Fund as of August 1, 1992, the 104th week of liability. However, the Fund refused to accept the claim until August 1, 1994, the 208th week of liability. Noting that the decedent was being furnished care for his back and neck conditions concurrently, the commissioner agreed with the Fund and ordered transfer of the claim after 208 weeks. The respondent appealed that decision.
The respondent argues that there is no provision in §31-349 for apportionment of the 104-week period between different body parts, nor does the statute require that 104 weeks be paid on each body part before transfer. It argues that neitherLovett v. Atlas Truck Leasing, 171 Conn. 577 (1976), norHernandez v. Gerber Group, 222 Conn. 78 (1992), requires the result reached by the trial commissioner.
In Hernandez, supra, the Court distinguished Lovett.
“Although all of the injuries in Lovett had the same cause, that cause was unrelated to the preexisting condition, and the preexisting condition entered the chain of causation only with respect to the injury to the right eye. In the present case, on the other hand, the preexisting condition was at the beginning of the causal chain: Hernandez had a heart condition that, in conjunction with his work assignment, led to a myocardial infarction, treatment of which led to a leg injury. As a factual matter, the requisite causal linkage therefore existed between preexisting disability and subsequent injury, permitting assignment of liability for the subsequent injury to the Fund.” Id., 86. The respondent contends that Hernandez rejects the argument that 104 weeks of compensation must be paid on each body part before liability can be transferred under § 31-349, or at the very least renders Lovett inapposite to the case at bar. We disagree.
The trial commissioner found that the claimant suffered from a pre-existing condition that materially and substantially contributed to the disability resulting from his compensable injury. Moreover, the commissioner found that the claimant had suffered distinct and unrelated injuries from the same accident. In Hernandez, the claimant’s injuries were causally related sequelae of a preexisting heart condition, and the claimant’s heart attack led to his leg injury. In the case before this Board, however, the claimant’s injuries are not related to each other, even though they are related to a pre-existing condition which renders them transferable to the Second Injury Fund. Therefore, Hernandez is not controlling here. The respondent’s contention that its holding prohibits the result reached by the trial commissioner is simply incorrect; Hernandez may distinguishLovett, but does not overrule it.
supra, we reiterate that “disability” as used in § 31-349(a) refers to each individual injury for the purpose of calculating the 104-week period. Lovett, supra, 585-86.

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