Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/384/158/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:42:15+00:00

Document:
Petitioners, federal employees working aboard government vessels, filed actions for wages in the Court of Claims, predicating jurisdiction on the Tucker Act, which permits suits in that court on contractual claims against the Government, and has a six-year statute of limitations. The Court of Claims granted respondent's motion to transfer the actions to various federal district courts on the ground that the claims were maritime in nature and justiciable solely under the Suits in Admiralty Act, with a two-year statute of limitations.
1. As demonstrated by statutes concerning wages of other government employees, Congress has traditionally treated employees like petitioners as public servants, rather than as seamen. Pp. 384 U. S. 161-163.
2. While the Suits in Admiralty Act was enacted after the Tucker Act, and would repeal the latter in case of conflict, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over suits such as these was unchallenged at least until 1960, and, in amending both statutes then, Congress did not indicate that it wished to deprive government-employed claimants of their rights under the Tucker Act. Pp. 163-165.
170 Ct.Cl. 898 reversed and remanded.
The case before us presents interesting problems of a jurisdictional nature. The Suits in Admiralty Act [Footnote 1] vests exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts when the suit is of a maritime nature. Under the Tucker Act, [Footnote 2] the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over contractual claims against the United States. This jurisdictional interaction presents itself here.
The petitioners are employees of various federal executive departments working aboard government vessels. They filed contractual actions in the Court of Claims, alleging they were entitled to back pay increases and overtime pay for their labors, invoking various federal pay statutes and regulations. In all these suits, the petitioners predicated jurisdiction on the Tucker Act, which has a generous six-year limitations period and provides a grace period as well, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1964 ed.). Their employer, the United States, filed motions to have the actions transferred to various federal district courts on the ground that the claims were of a maritime nature, and justiciable exclusively under the Suits in Admiralty Act. This Act provides only two years for claimants to file suit, and also requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964 ed.). The Court of Claims granted the motions without opinion, simply citing to three unreported cases in which it had made similar dispositions. To uphold this transfer would bar those claims which accrued more than two years prior to the time the actions were filed. We granted certiorari, 382 U.S. 810, and reverse.
affords an open berth in the district courts, provided the claims are of a maritime nature. The question is which Act should be applicable to the claims brought here, and this, in turn, depends on whether these seafaring petitioners are more appropriately classified as federal workers or as mere seamen.
The Government takes the position that these employees are to be deprived of the liberal benefits of the longer limitations period available to all other government employees under the Tucker Act. This is so, the Government reasons, because, for purposes of wage claims, the petitioners' status as seamen overrides their acknowledged role as federal workers. In assuming this posture, the Government seeks the best of both worlds. Congress is depicted as ambivalent in treating these petitioners either as seamen or as federal employees depending on which status may redound more to the benefit of the Government's proprietary interest.
343 U. S. 427, and the Suits in Admiralty Act, Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495. By virtue of their governmental employment, the petitioners' right to join unions and to select bargaining representatives, unlike that of private seamen, exists only by express leave of the President, Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed.Reg. 551 (1962), and they are forbidden, under pain of discharge, fine and imprisonment, from exercising or asserting the right to strike, 69 Stat. 624, 5 U.S.C. §§ 118p-118r (1964 ed.).
from the civil servants who deliver the mail, fight forest fires, construct public buildings, or who engage in countless other tasks which affect virtually every phase of the country's wellbeing. The wage scale of government-employed seamen is fixed by federal agencies; it is not automatically adjusted to the rate of pay prevalent in private industry, and, in some cases, the private pay rates are not easily ascertained. Further, these government employees -- unlike normal seamen -- benefit from wage pay increases won in the private industry only prospectively and to a limited degree. Often, in the maritime industry, private contract negotiations continue beyond the terminal date set in a collective bargaining agreement. When the agreement is signed, however, it generally provides that the private seamen receive the increased pay retroactively. The government seamen receive pay increases only from the actual date agreement is reached in the private sector. Therefore, the backpay claims are more appropriately catalogued on the government side of the ledger, although they may have a salty tang.
explicitly prescribed that overtime pay should be fixed in a uniform manner for all government wage-board employees, whether seamen or not. Furthermore, in determining the applicability of this uniform statutory requirement, the court will be interpreting the pay regulation of an executive department. This task is typically within the province and expertise of the Court of Claims.
We think the foregoing indicates that, with respect to these wage claims, Congress thought of these petitioners more as government employees who happened to be seamen than as seamen who by chance worked for the Government. The remaining problems relate to specific legislative amendments. The Government approaches this by noting that the Suits in Admiralty Act specifically repealed the Tucker Act so far as the two conflicted. This may readily be conceded, see, e.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U. S. 446, 345 U. S. 455-456; Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 352. Compare Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495. From this proposition, it adduces the principle that exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is now so deeply woven in the fabric of the law that congressional action is required to overturn it, cf. State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U. S. 451, 370 U. S. 458. This principle is sound where applicable, but such is not the case here.
had assumed jurisdiction over the suit, 101 Ct.Cl. 237, and the Government never disputed the issue. Subsequent cases are to the same effect. [Footnote 9] It was on this line of precedent that the petitioners relied in bringing suit. This fact is worthy of mention to illustrate the impact upon claimants whose suits would otherwise be time-barred if we were now to hold that the Suits in Admiralty Act restricted all suits in cases like the present to the district courts, cf. Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 317 U. S. 581.
courts, both on their admiralty and law sides, over cases against the United States which could be sued on in admiralty if private vessels, persons, or property were involved. [Footnote 10]"
The Government would have us believe that this oblique reference to private "persons" was designed to make inroads on the right of government employees to sue in the Court of Claims. We reject this argument. The legislative history surrounding this enactment contains no discussion whatever concerning claims brought by government-employed seamen. This is highly significant because of the active interest in nautical legislation generally taken by the maritime labor unions. If Congress had meant to lower the limitations period from six to two years, surely these unions would have been privy to the decision; this is all the more true when one considers that seamen are often stationed far away from their home ports, and need a lengthy period in which to register their claims. If they were governed by the maritime Act, they would be required not only to sue, but to exhaust administrative remedies as well within the shorter period, 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964 ed.).
e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 365 U. S. 758; Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 353 U. S. 228-229. Further, Congress had the opportunity in 1964 to deprive government-employed claimants of their rights when it amended the Tucker Act itself. Instead, Congress broadened the forums available to plaintiffs suing the Government for fees, salary or compensation for official services, giving the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims in matters of less than $10,000, 78 Stat. 699, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(d) (1964 ed.).
41 Stat. 525, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1964 ed.).
Annual and Sick Leave Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 679, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2066 (1964 ed.).
Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 736, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2103 (1964 ed.); Civil Service Retirement Act, 70 Stat. 743, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2267 (1964 ed.); Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 708, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3014 (1964 ed.).
43 Stat. 1112, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1964 ed.).
In 1962, Congress enacted the Federal Salary Reform Act, making an explicit declaration of policy that federal salary fixing should be comparable to private enterprise salary rates for the same levels of work, Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub.L. 87-793, 76 Stat. 841, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1174 (1964 ed.). Pursuant to congressional direction, the President issued an Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 11173, Aug. 20, 1964, 29 Fed.Reg. 11999, taking full cognizance of the congressional policy enunciated in the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962. So far as determining the compensation for wage board employees, as are these petitioners, Congress has evinced a similar concern, Pub.L. 85-872, 72 Stat. 1696, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1184 (1964 ed.). Thus, the whole trend in government compensation is to draw individuals into public service by providing salaries at least comparable to those they would earn on entering private industry.
"Employees whose basic rate of compensation is fixed on an annual or monthly basis and adjusted from time to time in accordance with prevailing rates by wage boards or similar administrative authority serving the same purpose shall be entitled to overtime pay in accordance with the provisions of section 673c of this title. The rate of compensation for each hour of overtime employment of any such employee shall be computed as follows: . . ."
See, e.g., Hearne v. United States, 68 F.Supp. 786, 107 Ct.Cl. 335, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858; Adams v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 133; Abbott v. United States, 169 F.Supp. 523, 144 Ct.Cl. 712. See also Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 156 F.Supp. 942, 140 Ct.Cl. 500.
"In cases where if such vessel [owned by the United States] were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States. . . . Such suits shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their principal place of business in the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo charged with liability is found. . . ."
precludes the interpretation that is now placed on the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq. (1964 ed.).
The Suits in Admiralty Act was enacted in 1920 to deal with problems created by the formation of a large government-owned merchant fleet during World War I. The Act established a method to sue the United States in admiralty that would protect the interests of libellants while at the same time prevent in rem attachments of government vessels during a possible emergency. See S.Rep. No. 223, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); H.R.Rep. No. 497, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1919); 58 Cong.Rec. 7317 (1919); 59 Cong.Rec. 1684-1688 (1920). Although the creation of this statutory procedure for suits in admiralty was occasioned by particular needs, the early cases, discussed below, held unmistakably, first, that the Act provided the exclusive admiralty remedy against the United States, and, second, that it was exclusive of all other remedies affording relief for an underlying claim cognizable in admiralty.
"[i]n cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained. . . ."
"the act also prevents a resort to any concurrent remedies against the United States . . . on like causes of action in the Court of Claims or in courts of law. . . ."
276 U.S. at 276 U. S. 214.
other agents for enforcement of the maritime causes of action covered by the Act."
280 U.S. at 280 U. S. 327. The Court concluded "that the remedies given by the Act are exclusive in all cases where a libel might be filed under it." Ibid.
"[t]hat where a remedy is provided by . . . [the Suits in Admiralty Act], it shall hereafter be exclusive of any other action by reason of the same subject matter against the agent or employee of the United States. . . ."
64 Stat. 1112, 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964 ed.).
See S.Rep. No. 2535, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), quoted in note 2, supra; H.R.Rep. No. 1292, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
The statutes affecting the Court of Claims directly were also altered by Congress to conform with the basic structure of the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. In 1948, the Tucker Act was amended to strike the word "admiralty" from the scope of that court's jurisdiction. Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 940, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964 ed). [Footnote 2/3] In 1960, an Act was passed to facilitate transfers of admiralty actions from the Court of Claims to the federal district courts and to toll the running of the statute of limitations in such cases so that litigants who sued, incorrectly, in the Court of Claims would not be required to file a new suit in the district court which might by then be time-barred. Act of September 13, 1960, 74 Stat. 912, 28 U.S.C. § 1506 (1964 ed.). Recognition of the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts prompted enactment of this statute. See H.R. Rep. No. 523, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S.Rep. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
owned or operated . . . , a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained." 46 U.S.C. § 742.
"The mariners of a ship are commonly said to be wards of the admiralty. Their wages, their rights, their wrongs and injuries have always been a special subject of the admiralty jurisdiction."
It is true that the claim against a private employer might also be litigated in a common law court, See Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185; 1 Benedict, supra, at 35. But the fact that there is concurrent jurisdiction over such a claim in private litigation is irrelevant for purposes of a suit against the sovereign, for as shown above, the Suits in Admiralty Act is exclusive over any action which "could be maintained" in admiralty. This is indubitably such a claim.
into the question whether the petitioners are more like federal employees than like mariners, and, after weighing the factors involved, concludes that they are more civil servants than seafarers. I believe this test presents a false basis for determining whether or not exclusive jurisdiction lies in admiralty, and puts a mischievous gloss on the relevant statutes.
Obviously these petitioners are both federal employees and seamen. One label refers to their employer, the other to the type of work they perform. This dual classification might well be made of the status of employees in many private industries. A large corporation might have thousands of employees, some of whom are employed in maritime activities. Because of the evolution of our legal system, these maritime employees can sue their employer in an admiralty court as well as at law; their land-based co-workers do not have that option. The fact that the contracts, pension rights, and other benefits and obligations may be similar for both types of employees is irrelevant for purposes of defining the admiralty court's jurisdiction over the claims of these maritime employees. Cf. 23 U. S. 10 Wheat. 428; International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50. The position of federal maritime employees should be no different. The argument of the Court showing that, in many respects, the rights of federal employees who are seamen are similar to the rights of federal employees who are not seamen, whatever its merits on its own terms, see 384 U. S. infra, does not negate the fact that the claims of these seamen are within the traditional scope of the admiralty jurisdiction. See McCrea v. United States, 294 U. S. 23,, a claim for wages, inter alia, under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
"with respect to these wage claims, Congress thought of these petitioners more as government employees who happened to be seamen than as seamen who by chance worked for the Government,"
ante, p. 384 U. S. 163. Putting aside the fact that there is nothing to show that Congress ever contemplated such a "jurisdictional" standard, replacing the straightforward "admiralty jurisdiction" test by the unpredictable "primarily of a maritime nature" rule is bound to introduce confusion and uncertainty into determinations of the appropriateness of a particular forum, the very type of question that should have a reasonably definitive answer.
the Tucker Act. Apart from anything else, this can be accomplished, however, only at the expense of forfeiting other substantial advantages available under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
First, an admiralty court is likely to be better acquainted with many underlying questions involved in suits such as these, and to be more sensitive to the tradition that seamen are the "wards of the admiralty." For example, the Classification Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 954, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1082(8) (1964 ed.), provides that federally employed crew members shall be compensated "as nearly as is consistent with the public interest in accordance with prevailing rates and practices in the maritime industry. . . ."
Third, interest provisions under the Suits in Admiralty Act are more favorable than under the Tucker Act. Under the latter statute, interest runs at most from the date of judgment, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2411(b), 2516 (1964 ed.), while, in admiralty, the court may award interest from the date the libel is filed. 46 U.S.C. §§ 743, 745 (1964 ed.). Greater court costs may also be awarded in admiralty. Compare 46 U.S.C. § 743 with 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1964 ed.).
Legislative history bearing on this aspect of the question is meager, although one colloquy during the House Committee on the Judiciary hearings on this bill suggests that concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims might have been contemplated in certain situations. Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on the Attorney General's Substitute for S. 3076 and H.R. 7124, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8 at 48 (1919).
"[t]o prevent future repetition of such mistake, the bill expressly restates the existing law that the remedy by suit against the United States is exclusive of every other type of action by reason of the same subject matter against the United States or against its employees or agents."
S.Rep. No. 2535, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1950).
"the Court of Claims has no admiralty jurisdiction, but the Suits in Admiralty Act . . . vests exclusive jurisdiction over suits in admiralty against the United States in the district courts."
H.R.Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., App. p. 138 (1947).
Compare Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427, and Patterson v. United States, 359 U. S. 495, in which it was held that the Federal Employees' Compensation Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 742, 5 U.S.C. § 751 et seq. (1964 ed.), provided the sole remedy for seamen injured on board government-owned vessels, thus barring suits under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
"shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their principal place of business in the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo charged with liability is found."

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