Source: https://nevada.lexroll.com/abell-v-district-court-58-nev-89-1937/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:55:52+00:00

Document:
GEORGE ABELL, APPLICANT, v. THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE, HONORABLE THOMAS F. MORAN, THE JUDGE THEREOF, AND LUVIE MOORE ABELL, RESPONDENTS.
No. 3203Supreme Court of Nevada.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in certiorari by George Abell against the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for Washoe County; Hon. Thomas F. Moran, the judge thereof, and Luvie Moore Abell, to set aside an order. Order annulled and setaside.
143 P. 429; Moore v. Superior Court (Cal.), 263 P. 1009; Scott v. Scott (Iowa), 156 N.W. 835; Blachly v. Blachly, 151 N.W. 447.
Even though the order was only temporary or interlocutory, notice was nevertheless necessary before the making and entry of the same. Gitsch v. Wight (Utah), 211 P. 705.
The order of May 14, 1937, is void for the reason that at the time the same was made and entered no affidavit or affidavits, or any other evidence at all, was before the court, showing that there has been a change or circumstances since the entry of the decree, warranting its modification. 42 C.J. 493, 494; Smith v. Smith, 245 N.W. 644; Dechert v. Dechert, 46 Nev. 140, 205 P. 593; Sweeney v. Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431, 179 P. 638; sec. 9462 N.C.L.; Cariens v. Cariens, 50 W. Va. 113, 40 S.E. 335, 55 L.R.A. 930; 9 R.C.L. 476, 477.
The applicant being absent from the county where his attorney resides and the attorney being better informed relative to the facts and matters stated in the application, verification thereof by the attorney was proper. 11 C.J. 154; Madison v. Piper, 53 P. 395; People v. Coleman, 41 Hun (N.Y.), 307; Matter of Belmont, 40 Misc. 133, 81 N.Y.S. 240.
Section 8573 N.C.L. enumerates the different ways that a defendant may appear in an action. We fail to see how the applicant could have exhausted his rights in the trial court without taking the procedure that he did, and how he could have exercised this right in any other way except by general appearance, in view of the foregoing section of the code. We believe the applicant would have been estopped had he not proceeded in the trial court as he did.
The order of May 14 is not a final order; it is a preliminary or interlocutory order. Elsman v. Elsman, 54 Nev. 28, 3 P.2d 1071.
It is well settled that certiorari will not lie to review an interlocutory order. 11 C.J. 126, 127.
Defendant appeared generally on May 24 when there was a hearing on his motion to vacate the order of May 14. Any error in granting an order without notice is cured by a hearing upon a motion to vacate the order. Thomas v. San Diego College, 43 P. 965.
The decree expressly reserved jurisdiction, and it has been held that in a divorce suit the action is pending as long as the court has any control over the status of minor children until such time as said children reach the age of majority. Gifford v. Gifford, 207 P. 1100; Ott v. Ott, 15 P.2d 897; Smith v. Smith, 132 S.W. 312; Kaplun v. Kaplun, 227 S.W. 984; Tinker v. Tinker, 290 P. 187.
No notice of the order of May 14 was required. Sections 9462 and 8921 N.C.L.; Kentz v. Kentz, 209 S.W. 200; Morrill v. Morrill, 77 A. 1.
Applicant is estopped from seeking a writ of certiorari, by his moving to vacate the order and consenting to the setting of plaintiff’s motion to modify the decree. 11 C.J. 138; Hart v. Winship, 146 N.W. 169; People v. Weld, 6 N.Y.S. 173.
Section 3232 N.C.L. does not provide that the application may be made on behalf of the applicant by his attorney.
Applicant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law or in equity.
This is an original proceeding in certiorari.
child (Tyler Abell) from the 15th day of May until the 15th day of November, in each year, and that respondent Luvie Moore Abell should have the custody of said child from the 15th day of November until the 15th day of May, in each and every year. The court reserved jurisdiction to enter further and different orders herein, relative to the custody of said minor child.
The motion was set for hearing for the 18th day of June 1937, at 10 o’clock, a.m.
“Good cause appearing therefor, and pending the hearing of the motion filed on May 14, 1937, to modify the decree entered in the above entitled court on April 18, 1935, relative to the custody and support of Tyler Abell, the minor child of the parties. It is ordered that the sole and exclusive care, custody, and control of the minor child of the parties, to-wit, Tyler Abell, is hereby ordered to the plaintiff until further order of the Court.
On May 24, 1937, applicant made a motion in said court for an order vacating and setting aside the foregoing order as unauthorized and void. The court denied applicant’s motion.
not verified by the applicant but by one of his attorneys, respondents contend that it was not made by the party beneficially interested. Dismissal of the writ is urged on this account. But the application is made by the person beneficially interested, to wit, the father of the minor child, through one of his attorneys. Verification by the attorney is not improper under the facts stated in the application. The statute does not require the affidavit to be made by the party beneficially interested. In this regard it reads: “The application shall be made on affidavit by the party beneficially interested.” Section 9232 N.C.L.
1, 2. The application in certiorari proceedings is a pleading. Madison v. Piper, 6 Idaho, 137, 53 P. 395. In the instant case it shows that the party is absent from the county where his attorney, the affiant, resides; further, that the affiant is better informed relative to the facts and matters stated in the application.
“The court, upon good cause shown, may change the custody of such minor children, if they should be satisfied that such change will be for the welfare of such children.” Section 9462 N.C.L.
The necessity, however, for giving notice in such a case finds general support in the authorities dealing with the question under statutes of a similar character. Blachly v. Blachly, 169 Iowa, 489, 151 N.W. 447; Rogers v. Rogers, 51 Ohio St. 1, 36 N.E. 310; Shallcross v. Shallcross, 135 Ky. 418, 122 S.W. 223; Kendall v. Kendall, 5 Kan. App. 688, 48 P. 940, 941; In re Culp, 2 Cal.App. 70, 83 P. 89; Phillips v. Phillips, 24 W. Va. 591; Gitsch v. Wight, 61 Utah, 175, 211 P. 705; Purdy v. Ernst, 93 Kans. 157, 143 P. 429; 19 C.J. 352.
The writ of certiorari was sustained.
3. The rule is thus stated in 19 C.J. 352; that proper notice of an application to modify a decree of divorce as to the custody of a minor child should be given to the adverse party, whether required by statute or not.
4. The question of the right of the parents to the custody of the minor child involved the determination of a substantive right. This was litigated and determined in the divorce proceeding. The decree in this respect was final on the conditions then existing, but this did not prevent a subsequent adjudication of the matter. An opportunity for the adverse party to be heard, however, was of the essence of any such proceeding. The denial of this was a denial to petitioner of his day in court.
If the order had been made on the motion of Luvie Moore Abell, it would have been the duty of the court to have denied it under rule 10 of the rules of the district court (4 N.C.L. p. 2477). It will be observed that the exceptions in said rule are cases where no substantive rights are involved.
The section of the Civil Code of Practice of Kansas authorizing the court after a divorce is granted to modify or change any order concerning the custody of the children does not provide for notice.
See authorities cited in note 38 to the text.
As stated by an eminent authority: “Proceedings for modification (as to custody) are in the nature of new proceedings and require proper notice to the opposite party, and new evidence not available in the divorce suit.” 2 Schouler, Marriage and Divorce (6th ed.), sec. 1899.
7. There is no merit in respondents’ claim that applicant is estopped from seeking the writ because he moved to vacate the order and afterwards consented to the setting of the motion to modify the decree for hearing.
City of Los Angeles v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 58 Nev. 1, 67 P.2d 1019.
8. The contention that the writ should not be granted because applicant had a remedy by appeal is also without merit. It would not have been adequate under the circumstances.
An order of this court has been made annulling and setting aside said order of May 14, 1937.

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