Source: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/ctappub/0507/opa041993-0726.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:17:48+00:00

Document:
Stephen Danforth, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent. A04-1993, Court of Appeals Published, July 26, 2005.
Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Forsberg, Judge.
����������� Because the rule set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure that implicates the fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding, the case does not apply retroactively.
����������� Does Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), apply retroactively?
����������� Retroactivity with regard to cases on collateral review is governed by Teague v. Lane, which sets forth two exceptions to the general principle that defendants whose convictions are final at the time a new rule of law is announced may not avail themselves of the new rule.� 489 U.S. 288, 310-12, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075-76 (1989).� The two exceptions are cases that place particular kinds of conduct beyond the proscriptive power of lawmaking authority and cases that set out �watershed� rules of criminal procedure.� Id. at 311-12, 109 S. Ct. at 1075-76. �Five of the six federal circuit courts that have considered the retroactive application of Crawford in light of Teague have held that Crawford does not apply retroactively: �Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 786, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1936 (2005); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 902 (2005).� We find the analyses in these cases persuasive.
����������� Mungo noted that, because Crawford will bar both �unreliable� and �highly reliable testimonial out-of-court statements,� it will both �improve . . . [and] impair the accuracy of the factfinding process.�� Mungo, 393 F.3d at 335-36. �Because Teague�s test of a watershed rule requires improvement in the accuracy of the trial process overall, we conclude that Crawford is not a watershed rule.�� Id. at 336.
����������� Brownconcluded that because Crawford �merely sets out new standards for the admission of certain kinds of hearsay� and because �Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis and thus may be excused . . . [i]t would . . . be difficult to conclude that the rule in Crawfordalters rights fundamental to due process.�� Brown, 381 F.3d at 1226-27.
Murillo, 402 F.3d at 789-90; see also Ferguson, 400 F.3d at 639 n.3 (citing Hiracheta v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 105 F. App. 937, 938 (9th Cir. 2004), for proposition that Crawford is not retroactive).
����������� Thus, the weight of authority from the six circuits that have addressed the issue clearly supports the view that Crawford does not have a retroactive application.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, � 10.
 See O�Meara v. State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Minn. 2004) (conviction is final when �judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied�).
 We note that, in light of Crawford, appellant was granted permission to move for reconsideration of the federal district court�s determination that his Confrontation Clause rights were not violated by admitting at trial the videotaped interview of the child.� See Danforth v. Crist, 2004 WL 1630830 (D. Minn. July 14, 2004), reconsideration granted in part by 2005 WL 1041491 *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2005).� At filing time, federal action remains pending.

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