Source: https://www.nycriminalattorneyblog.com/category/drug-possesion/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:15:13+00:00

Document:
In this case, defendant man was indicted for two counts of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, two counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, two counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree, two counts of Criminal Use of Drug Paraphernalia in the Second Degree, and Unlawful Possession of Marijuana.
The defendant man pled guilty to Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, a B felony. In exchange for his guilty plea, the defendant was to be sentenced to a term of incarceration of either two to six years, if a previous conviction was overturned by the Appellate Division, or a term of four and one-half to nine years, if the previous felony conviction was not reversed and he was considered a predicate felon. At the time of his plea, he was told by the Court that if he failed to return for sentencing he would face eight and one third to twenty-five years or twelve and one half to twenty-five years incarceration, depending on whether he was considered a predicate felon.
The defendant man failed to appear for sentencing and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On December 18, 2008, the defendant was returned involuntarily on the outstanding bench warrant after being arrested for burglary. At that time, the defendant also had a pending indictment for Bail Jumping in the First Degree, as a result of his failure to return for sentencing. The defendant man was finally sentenced in this matter to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of seven to twenty-one years. He is currently incarcerated pursuant to this sentence.
At about 1:00 a.m. on 2 September 2007, defendant ND’s vehicle was stopped at a New York State Police sobriety checkpoint on Fluvanna Avenue in the City of Jamestown. For allegedly displaying certain outward indicia of intoxication and failing four out of five field sobriety tests, defendant was asked to give a breath sample. This resulted in a reading of a .13% blood alcohol content level.
Consequently, the criminal defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having .08 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in her blood pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192  and operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 .
Defendant then moved to suppress any statement attributed to her, the results of any chemical analysis of her breath, and all other evidence allegedly obtained from her; and, challenged the constitutionality of the checkpoint stop on the ground that the New York State Police failed to follow their own self-established, written guidelines.
A man was sentenced to two years probation following his plea of guilty to attempted home invasion in the first degree in another state. He was subsequently sentenced to one hundred eighty days in jail.
Through a felony complaint, the man was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and seventh degrees. An indictment was filed and the man was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
Subsequently, the man plead guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree with the promise that upon the completion of a drug rehabilitation program, supervised by one institution, he would be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty. The court stated that the man would re-plead to a misdemeanor and receive a sentence of time served. If, however, he failed to complete the drug rehabilitation program, the court promised to sentence him to four and half to nine years in jail.
This proceeding was originated from the appeal of a man. The man, who is an inmate at one correctional facility, is challenging the computation of his jail time credit associated with his current sentence of imprisonment. The court then issued an order to show cause, and has received and reviewed the answer of the commissioner and the chief officer.
The court received and reviewed the affirmation submitted on behalf of the department of correction. The court also received and reviewed the man’s reply to the answering papers.
On 2006, the man was sentenced to a determinate term of two years, with two years’ post-release supervision, upon his conviction of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. He was then received into the custody as entitled to one hundred eleven days of jail time credit. Running the two year determinate term from that date, less one hundred eleven days of jail time credit, the officials determined the initial maximum expiration date of the man’s 2006 sentence to be on 2008.
A New York Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant is charged with Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fifth Degree (P.L. § 221.10(1)). In an omnibus motion, defendant seeks: (1) dismissal of the charge on grounds of facial insufficiency; (2) suppression of all physical evidence allegedly obtained from defendant; (3) to preclude the prosecution from presenting identification and statement testimony at trial for which they failed to give timely notice; and (4) to preclude the prosecution’s use of defendant’s prior or subsequent criminal history, or uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct.
A New York Drug Possession Lawyer said that, the defendant also seeks discovery, submits a Demand to Produce and a Request for a Bill of Particulars, and seeks reservation of rights to make additional applications based on the People’s production and subsequent case development. The People respond to the defendant’s motion, provide their Voluntary Disclosure Form, and seek discovery from the defendant.
The issue in this case is whether defendant’s omnibus motion should be granted.
A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered June 11, 1987, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree and criminally using drug crime paraphernalia in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
A Queens Drug Crime Lawyer said that, the police officer allegedly purchased a quantity of cocaine possession from the defendant during a planned “buy” operation. Although the drug sale was consummated in one apartment, the police surveillance of the defendant revealed that he entered a nearby apartment to obtain the needed amount of cocaine. Six days after the alleged drug purchase, the police simultaneously raided both apartments pursuant to a search warrant and arrested the occupants, including the defendant. Over defense counsel’s objections, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the undercover officer that when he was in the apartment, the defendant sold a gram of cocaine to another individual. After the charge to the jury was given, defense counsel requested that the Judge issue limiting instructions concerning the evidence of the uncharged drug crime. The application was denied.
Additionally, prior to the charge being given, defense counsel requested that the Judge instruct the jury that a police officer’s testimony is to be evaluated like any other witness. Although the Judge agreed to include such instruction in the charge, he failed to do so. After the charge was given, defense counsel once again asked that the Judge instruct the jury concerning the evaluation of a police officer’s testimony, but the Judge refused.
A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, in a proceeding pursuant to the Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from (1) an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County, dated December 15, 1987, which, upon a fact-finding order dated November 18, 1987, made upon the appellant’s admission, finding that he had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the drug crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for one year, and (2) an order of the same court, dated June 13, 1988, which, upon a fact-finding order dated May 10, 1988, finding that the appellant had violated his probation, placed him with the Division of Youth, Title II, for a period of one year. The appeals bring up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
A Queens Drug Crime Lawyer said that, the testimony adduced at the Mapp hearing supports the Family Court’s denial of suppression of physical evidence. The Police Officer, the only witness at the hearing, testified that on February 13, 1987, he was assigned to a “special post” in Jamaica, Queens, designed “to show presence and to prevent anyone on the streets from making drug or gun sales”. At approximately 1:25 P.M., while standing at the corner of 108th Avenue and 160th Street, he heard two gunshots. He took cover behind a car and observed a cloud of smoke coming from the roof of a building at the corner of 108th Avenue and 159th Street. As he started toward the building to investigate, he was passed by people hurriedly leaving the area of the building, who stated that someone was shooting a gun. When he turned the corner and approached the entrance of the building on 159th Street, he observed the appellant and two other youths in the doorway. One of the other youths pointed at the officer, who was in uniform, and all three fled in different directions. The officer pursued the appellant and reported the direction of the chase over his portable radio. After only a few minutes, during which time the officer never lost sight of the appellant, two uniformed housing police officers apprehended the appellant and placed him against a wall, facing the wall, with his hands over his head. The Officer quickly caught up and patted the appellant’s outer clothing. He noticed a bulge in the appellant’s right front pants pocket which he believed to be bullets. Upon removal of the objects from the pocket, the officer discovered 10 vials of the drug known as “crack”.
The issue in this case is whether the court erred in suppressing the physical evidence obtained against the defendant.
The Court credits the Officer’s testimony at the hearing.
On April 22, 23 and 28, 2008, this Court conducted a hearing pursuant to defendant’s 710.20 motion to suppress a gun, the magazine in the gun and the nine rounds of ammunition in that magazine. The issue of preclusion of other recovered objects is not before this court. A New York Marijuana Drug Possession Lawyer said that, the People called one witness New York City Police Officer who was assigned to the 75 Precinct Anti Crime-Unit at the relevant times. The defense called another New York City Police Officer who, at the relevant times, was the former Officer’s partner in the 75 Precinct Anti-Crime Unit; New York City Police Department Detective who, at the relevant times, was assigned to the Gun Enhancement Unit; and who, at the relevant times, was working in the Kings County District Attorney’s Office. The Court credits Police Officer’s testimony as set forth below and makes the following findings of facts and reaches the following conclusions of law.
A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, on November 29, 2006, the said Officer was on anti-crime patrol with the Officer and Sergeant. They were in plain clothes in an unmarked police car. The Officer was in the right front passenger seat, the other Officer was driving and the Sergeant was in the rear. The Officer received training in the Police Academy, about five years earlier, regarding the packaging of marijuana. Moreover, as a police officer he had experience with marijuana possession in that he had made about ten arrests for marijuana during which he had been exposed to the odor of both burning and unburnt marijuana. In addition, he had assisted in about 20 other arrests involving marijuana during which he again was exposed to odor of both burning and unburnt marijuana. At approximately 1:10 A. M., the three officers were driving north on Georgia Avenue towards Linden Boulevard, an industrial and drug prone location. At that time there was no vehicular or pedestrian traffic. The Officers had their windows down so they could hear gunfire and smell drugs such as marijuana.
A New York Criminal Drug Possession Lawyer said that, as the officers proceeded north on Georgia Avenue, a light-colored Infinity with Connecticut plates passed them. When the Infinity was about a half car length or six to ten feet in front of the unmarked police vehicle, Officer smelled a strong odor of burning marijuana emanating from the Infinity. He mentioned this to the other two officers who agreed that there was an odor of burning marijuana. The officers followed about six to ten feet or more behind the Infinity for about a block to Linden Boulevard where it took a right and then proceeded on Linden Boulevard for a block to Sheffield Avenue. During this time the Officer continued to smell burning marijuana. Near the intersection of Linden Boulevard and Sheffield Avenue, the officers, using their lights and sirens, stopped the Infinity.
A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant moves, at the commencement of his jury trial, for this Court to re-inspect the Grand Jury minutes and dismiss the Indictment. The defendant herein is charged with Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree. He alleges that his Indictment was improperly secured by virtue of the fact that the Assistant District Attorney failed to inform the Grand Jury that there was a cooperation agreement made by the District Attorney’s Office with a People’s witness. In addition, the defendant now maintains that the Grand Jury was not charged as to the legal requirement of corroborative evidence, pursuant to section 60.22 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
A Queens Drug Crime Lawyer said that, the People submit opposing papers which assert that the jury was properly advised as to corroboration, and while acknowledging that they did not inform the jury of the cooperation agreement, assert that they are under no obligation to inform the Grand Jury of such an agreement.
Upon the case being presented to the Grand Jury, People’s witness, who allegedly planned the murder, testified that he was the chief of the security force of a major drug crime gang and that he would, from time to time, assassinate individuals upon the orders of his superiors. In particular, he testified that he received orders from his superiors to have the victim herein, assassinated. He went on to state to the Grand Jury that the defendant, was one of the men involved in the killing and that he was present in a van used to transport the team of “hit” men to the place of execution.
On 24 May 2006 defendant JG, a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 2005, but a native citizen of the Dominican Republic was alleged to have been caught by detective R with cocaine possession and selling the same to two apprehended buyers in Kings County. Defendant was indicted on two counts each of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39), criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 220.31) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (Penal Law § 220.03). Initially, defendant was represented by two different attorneys: one at arraignment and another one who unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 and to suppress the recovered physical property. On 27 February 2008, now represented by AS, Esq., defendant accepted the People’s offer to plead guilty to a single count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree with all the felonies having to be dismissed on the People’s motion. This is in full satisfaction of the above-captioned indictment, in exchange for a promised sentence of a conditional discharge and forfeiture of $4,335, which had been recovered from him. In the plea minutes, AS assured the court that after an extensive discussion with the defendant and his immigration attorney, they accepted the offer. The court noted the independence of immigration authorities in implementing immigration laws and reiterated that a drug possession conviction can certainly lead to deportation. Thus, the defendant was then sentenced immediately. Thereafter, he has not appealed his judgment of conviction or engaged in any other post-conviction litigation.
Subsequent to his plea and sentence in the drug possession case, believing that his 2008 plea would not cause any immigration issues, he traveled outside the United States and attempted to re-enter at JFK International Airport on 13 April 2010. On April 14 2010 he was arrested by officials of Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the United States Department of Homeland Security (“ICE”) and charged him with violating sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I): commission of a crime of moral turpitude and 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II): commission of a crime relating to a controlled substance, of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). In defense, the defendant’s present attorney, AF, Esq., argued that the charge relating to the commission of a drug crime of moral turpitude for defendant’s 1996 New York attempted assault conviction, was improperly brought because defendant had previously obtained a waiver of that conviction when he obtained a green card in 2005. On 9 August 2010, at defendant’s first scheduled Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) hearing date, the Immigration Court dismissed section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the INA from the charging instrument. Here, he also insisted that in his CPL 440 affidavit, he would never have taken the plea had he been correctly informed by his counsel about the immigration consequences of that plea. The defendant was detained at that time by ICE in a York County Prison in Pennsylvania, pending the completion of deportation proceedings.
In the meantime, on 30 June 2010 the defendant through his newly retained counsel, AF filed a Criminal Procedure Law 440 motion (1) praying the Court for retroactive application to his case of a recent United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 2010 addressing this counsel’s obligations of informing his client about deportation consequences of a guilty plea, and (2) seeking to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of previous counsel for his failure to advise the defendant about the immigration consequences triggered by his 2008 guilty plea to a controlled substance offense.

References: § 1192
 § 1192
 § 221
 § 220
 § 220
 § 220
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