Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Supervisors_v._United_States_(85_U.S._71)
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:41:57+00:00

Document:
On the 13th of May, A.D. 1869, one Reynolds obtained in the court just named a judgment against Carroll County, Iowa, for the sum of $19,946. The judgment was for the amount due upon sundry county warrants issued for the ordinary expenditures of the county; all issued after Junuary 1st, 1865. An execution having been awarded upon the judgment and returned 'nulla bona,' Reynolds sued out a writ of mandamus to compel the board of supervisors of the county to levy a specific tax sufficient to pay the debt, interest, and costs, and to apply the same, when collected, to the payment. To this writ the supervisors returned, in substance (after averring that the judgment had been obtained upon ordinary county warrants issued for the ordinary expenditures of the county), that they had levied a county tax for the current year of four mills on the dollar of the taxable property of the county, and that they proposed to levy a similar tax for each succeeding year until the judgment should be paid. They further returned that they had no power to levy a tax at any higher rate. A general demurrer to this return was then interposed, and the Circuit Court sustained it. Hence this writ of error.
The question was whether, under the laws of Iowa, the board of supervisors had power to levy a special tax, beyond four mills on the dollar of the county assessment, in order to pay the relator's judgment.
The solution of this question and the consequent correctness of the action of the Circuit Court depended upon the fact whether that court had rightly interpreted certain sections in the Revised Code of Iowa.
'1st. For State revenue, one and one-half mills on a dollar, when no rate is directed by the census board, but in no case shall the census board direct a levy to be made exceeding two mills on the dollar.
'2d. For ordinary county revenue, including the support of the poor, not more than four mills on a dollar, and a poll tax of fifty cents.
'3d. For support of schools, not less than one nor more than two mills on a dollar.
By an act of April 2d, 1860, which took effect on the 1st of January, 1861, the board of supervisors became the financial agents in place of the county judge.
The sections following, to 260, contain the details for the submission of questions, and provide for carrying into effect the propositions mentioned in section 250, which may be adopted by a vote.
'SECTION 3274. Public buildings owned by the State, or any county, city, school district, or other civil corporation, and any other public property which is necessary and proper for carrying out the general purposes for which any such corporation is organized, are exempt from execution. The property of a private citizen can in no case be levied upon to pay the debt of a civil corporation.
The Circuit Court in overruling the demurrer considered, of course, that the provision in italic letters in the above-quoted section 3275 authorized a levy sufficient to pay the judgment.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has held uniformly that section 3275 does not invest corporations with the power to levy taxes. That court holds that this section directs duties to be performed by the taxing officers, under powers given elsewhere in the statute, but does not extend their powers beyond the limits prescribed in other parts of the statutes, where the power to levy taxes is expressly given, and the limit fixed beyond which taxes cannot be levied. The decisions of that court on this subject have been uniform, and extend through a term of about ten years. This was the point adjudged in Clark, Dodge & Co. v. The City of Davenport,  decided in 1863; and in The Iowa Railroad Land Company v. Sac County and Duffy, and in the case of the Same Plaintiff v. Sac County and Hobbs, decided in 1873, and not yet officially reported.
In addition to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa above cited, attention must be called to the fact, of which this court will take judicial cognizance, that the legislature by a code of 1873,  has re-enacted in the same language the material parts of section 3275 of the revision of 1860. The legislature has thus adopted the construction given to that statute by the Supreme Court. The re-enactment of a previous statute operates as a legislative adoption of the judicial construction of such statute. It is, therefore, as fully settled as legislative enactments and judicial determination can settle anything, that by the laws of Iowa, a special tax cannot be levied to pay a judgment against a county rendered upon ordinary county warrants. And that when the board of supervisors have levied an ordinary county tax of four mills on the dollar, they have levied the greatest tax which they have the power to levy for the payment of such judgment.
We are aware of the construction put by the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa upon section 3275. But with that construction full before it, this court, in Butz v. City of Muscaline,  has put an exactly opposite construction on it. Speaking by SWAYNE, J., this court there said that 'the limitation . . . touching the power of taxation by the city council, applies to the ordinary course of their municipal action. . . .
After such language as this, it is no answer to us to say that the case of Butz v. City of Muscatine differed in some minor points of fact or date from this case.
This court accordingly-disregarding the construction put upon the Code of Iowa by the Supreme Court of that State-reversed a judgment which refused a mandamus, and ordered a contrary judgment.
^1 Revision of 1860, or § 114 of the Code of 1851.
^4 Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wallace, 196.

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