Source: https://leastdangerousblog.com/2017/06/24/ad-fontes-the-week-in-scotus-part-deux/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:21:58+00:00

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As the Supreme Court’s term comes to a close here at the end of the month, the Court had a busy week issuing opinions to wrap up before the summer break. Here are quick takes on the decisions that came down on Thursday and Friday.
In Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, the Court decided a statutory-interpretation dispute regarding which court had appellate jurisdiction over particular types of appeals from the Board.
For civil servants under the Civil Service Reform Act, the Merit Systems Protection Board reviews certain personnel actions taken against them. Depending on the nature of the employee’s claim, review of an MSPB adjudication can be had either exclusively in the federal circuit or in federal district court. In “mixed cases,” where the employee’s claims traverse these distinct categories, and the MSPB dismissed the case either on its merits or on procedural grounds, review is proper in federal district court. The issue that arose here was whether, in a mixed case, review was proper in federal district court when the MSPB dismisses a case on jurisdictional grounds.
In Murr v. Wisconsin (a case argued by friends over at the Pacific Legal Foundation), the Court delved into the very messy world of regulatory takings to decide whether the state had to compensate the Murrs for effectively preventing them from selling a parcel of land that, at one time, had been a separate plot, but that had been effectively merged into an adjoining plot owned by the same family, for purposes of a complex regulatory scheme relating to land use on and around the St. Croix River.
Portion of the St. Croix River.
In Jae Lee v. United States, the Court held that, when a defendant receives erroneous advice from counsel regarding the collateral immigration consequences of accepting a plea deal, proceeds to accept the plea deal, and is subject to mandatory deportation thereafter as a consequence, the defendant can show prejudice for the purposes of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim if the defendant demonstrates that he would have gone to trial but-for that erroneous advice. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court and applying a previous related decision, concluded that “the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'” The Court rejected “a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial.” And the Court found that the defendant here adequately demonstrated that he would have gone to trial instead of accepting the plea deal, but-for the erroneous advice.
Before obtaining U.S. citizenship, an individual must swear that they had never given false information or otherwise lied to a government official to gain entry into the United States. What if it later emerges that someone who became a citizen did, in fact, give false information to gain entry into the United States? What if that false information, however, had no effect on the decision to permit entry or grant citizenship?
In Maslenjak v. United States, the Court held that the Government must demonstrate that the entrant’s illegal act played a role in her acquisition of citizenship. The majority opinion, written by Justice Kagan, works through the relevant statutory language to conclude that the opposite view advanced by the Government – namely, that the law only requires some violation of law committed in the course of procuring naturalization, rather than some violation of law that was relevant to procuring naturalization or citizenship – “falters on the way language naturally works.” The Court also looked to the broader statutory scheme and adopted a reading that would avoid the bizarre result that “some legal violations that do not justify denying citizenship . . . would nonetheless justify revoking it later.” Accordingly, the Government must “prove that the misrepresented fact was sufficiently relevant to one or another naturalization criterion that it would have prompted reasonable officials . . . to undertake further investigation,” and that any such “investigation would have borne disqualifying fruit.” If the Government carries its burden here, the defendant can overcome it by establishing she was qualified for citizenship nevertheless.
Turner v. United States addressed Brady claims brought by defendants who were convicted for an infamous 1984 murder that rocked D.C.
In Weaver v. Massachusetts, the Court held that, though a criminal defendant’s right to a public trial was violated by closure of the courtroom during jury voir dire, and this constituted a structural error that would normally warrant automatic reversal on direct review, the defendant in this case was not entitled to reversal. The Court concluded so because the defendant’s contention was raised in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim rather than on direct review, meaning that the defendant had to show that the error led to a fundamentally unfair trial or that, but-for the ineffective assistance, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Here, the harm of the closure was found to be inconsequential, meaning defendant had not met his burden.
Stay tuned as the Court wraps up OT 2016 this Monday (with the possibility of explosive cert grants and retirement news forthcoming)!

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