Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/04/15/vcaa-obligation-to-discuss-regulations-or-legal-theories-goodwin-v-peake-no-05-0876/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:27:50+00:00

Document:
whether, apart from VCAA issues, this case is affected by 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c). Pursuant to that provision, if, after it has issued a decision on a claim for benefits, VA receives additional service department records that “existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim,” VA will reconsider the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(3).
As a logical extension of Wilson, Dingess, and Locklear, all supra, we hold that VA has no obligation under the VCAA notification procedures to discuss regulations or legal theories not implicated by a liberal and reasonable reading of a claimant’s application.
SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.
Robert V. Chisholm, of Providence, Rhode Island, was on the brief for the appellant.
Washington, D.C., were on the brief for the appellee.
Before MOORMAN, LANCE, and DAVIS, Judges.
2007, decision, and issues this decision in its place.
PTSD, and that decision also became final.
RO issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) in March 2002 maintaining denial of the PTSD claim.
another NOD, seeking an earlier effective date and a permanent and total disability rating.
effective date earlier than April 2000 while granting permanency for the PTSD rating.
to as first-element, second-element, third-element, and fourth-element notice errors, respectively.
See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881, 886 (2007), petition for cert. filed, Peake v. Sanders (U.S.
Mar. 21, 2008) (No. 07-1209).
v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103, 120-21 (2005) (Mayfield I) (citation omitted).
errors, we held that the burden of establishing prejudice was on the claimant. Id. at 122-23.
particular elements of the claim. Id. at 487, 488-89.
to glean what evidence was lacking at the time of the initial adjudication. 444 F.3d at 1333.
content of the communications on which the Board relied in making that finding. Id. at 1334.
by the RO, strict compliance with the timing requirements set forth in Mayfield I was impossible.
remand, the Federal Circuit upheld this Court’s holding that an SSOC may serve as a readjudication.
error. Id. at 1324. The Federal Circuit did not, at that time, address our prejudicial-error analysis.
reaffirming the prejudicial error analysis in Mayfield I. Id. at 439.
error affected the essential fairness of the adjudication. Id.
had occurred. The Court affirmed the Board’s denial of service connection.
responsible for obtaining that information.” Mayfield II, 444 F.3d at 1333.
different purposes under different statutory requirements than pre-adjudicatory VCAA notice).
view of the fact that the appellant’s PTSD claim has been substantiated.
claims and to respond to VA notices,” rendered harmless any timing error. Record (R.) at 5.
the only unresolved matter as to which VCAA notice pertained after the grant of service connection.
information described in the notice”).
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”‘ Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App.
49, 52 (1990) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
the VCAA notice requirement was harmless error.” R. at 5.
concerning the effective date of the substantiated PTSD claim.
have the burden of demonstrating that no prejudice resulted.
has adversely affected the essential fairness of the adjudication?
(1999) (effective date is a “downstream matter” to be addressed after the benefit has been awarded).
the importance of claimant participation in the adjudication process. See 21 Vet.App. at 119-20.
of his or her claim.” Id. at 120. This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s holding in Dingess.
See Dingess, 19 Vet.App. at 484, aff’d sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir.
the various notice elements differently with regard to assigning the burden of proving prejudice.
as to why his claim was rejected and an opportunity to submit additional relevant evidence”).
elements. See Dunlap, 21 Vet.App. at 119.
her argument that § 3.156(c) applies in the instant case is premised on evidence already before VA.
notice, it would have addressed only the minimal information concerning effective date.
of a notice of disagreement with a decision.” Id. at 489.
appellant’s counsel reiterated this line of argument at length in a letter dated December 15, 2004.
This was the sole argument raised to the Board as to an earlier effective date.
This reasoning fails for at least two reasons. First, there is no pending unadjudicated claim.
decisions if there had been an appeal. Instead, the appellant allowed these decisions to become final.
history of the [VCAA] statute.” Dingess, 19 Vet.App. at 487 (emphasis added).
effective date by operation of 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156(c) and 3.400(q)(2).
entitled on the basis of her application to reopen.
As a logical extension of Wilson, Dingess, and Locklear, all supra, we hold that VA has no obligation under the VCAA notification procedures to discuss regulations or legal theories not implicated by a liberal and reasonable reading of a claimant’s application. Here, 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.156(c) is not implicated by a liberal and reasonable reading of the appellant’s application.
the basis of missing service records does not establish prejudice from lack of VCAA notice. That holding, however, does not necessarily end the analysis. See Robinson v. Mansfield, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board is required to consider all issues raised either by the claimant or by the evidence of record). What remains is whether, apart from VCAA issues, this case is affected by 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c). Pursuant to that provision, if, after it has issued a decision on a claim for benefits, VA receives additional service department records that “existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim,” VA will reconsider the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(3).
to the [Board] decision”). There is no indication that VA’s decision to grant service connection was based, in whole or in part, on previously unobtained service personnel or medical records.
to the Board for further consideration. See Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The mere assertion of a new theory on appeal, however, does not automatically warrant either this Court’s consideration or a remand in the absence of error. See Robinson, 21 Vet.App. at 558 (holding that “[i]n the absence of error or a justification for not raising the issue earlier,” it would be unfair to afford the appellant “special treatment,” and the Court will not remand his claim). In this instance, the record contains no support for the appellant’s current contention that the decision below was based on newly discovered service records. This argument, offered under the guise of the appellant’s allegations of prejudice, does not warrant remand.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, the February 18, 2005, Board decision is AFFIRMED.

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