Source: http://www.lehmannplc.com/article/exhibiting-unfinished-commissioned-work
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 23:17:01+00:00

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What do you get when you combine a Swiss artist, a football field-sized museum gallery, and $300,000 worth of materials, including a two-story Cape Cod-style house, a movie theater, cinderblock walls, sea containers, a mobile home, multiple vehicles, and thousands of found objects? An opportunity to discuss the legal and ethical implications of exhibiting unfinished commissioned works.
Whatever the verdict on VARA, the notoriety of the “Mess at Mass MoCA” should serve as a reminder to museums that not only must they conduct their installation commissioning practices with due care and an eye to the law, but also with an expansive view of the applicable legal and ethical principles involved. Insisting on written commission agreements, and establishing clear museum policies on commissioned works which incorporate these legal and ethical principles, can help to manage expectations and minimize disputes. However, important as these practices are, the relationship between artist and museum involves more than a simple commercial business transaction. Ultimately the relationship between artist and museum depends on creating and maintaining an atmosphere of mutual trust and a willingness on the part of both to work out their differences when they arise.
It is perhaps equally important to observe that museums do not operate exclusively in courts of law. They also operate in the court of public opinion. Increasingly, the court of public opinion is international in scope. As a result, foreign legal concepts such as “moral rights,” which may not be recognized by American courts and thus do not impose any direct legal obligation on American museums, may nevertheless have an impact on how museums choose to conduct themselves.
Several notable examples of the limitations of the traditional American approach to copyright protection include mutilation of important sculptures by Alexander Calder, 20 Isamu Noguchi, and Richard Serra,21 and misattribution of a mural by William Smith22 among others. None of these artists had recourse under then-existing copyright laws.23 In response, beginning with California in 1979, ten states enacted laws to protect the attribution and integrity rights of artists.24 When the United States became a member of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1989, U.S. copyright law nominally included moral rights by virtue of that treaty.25 The following year Congress specifically incorporated limited moral rights into American copyright law through enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).
According to some commentators, the “Mess at Mass MoCA” could have been averted if the Museum had followed its standard policy of negotiating a written commission agreement. 56 It is true that commissioning museums are sometimes reluctant to enter into specifically negotiated contracts with artists for fear of turning the aesthetic process into a base contractual relationship. In the absence of clearly articulated expectations misunderstandings are bound to occur.57 However, according to a representative from Mass MoCA, the museum had negotiated a commission agreement, but Büchel had refused to sign it.58 The mistake, then, was to begin work on the commission before the agreement had been formalized. The failure to have a “meeting of the minds” should have signaled a problem with the artist-museum relationship.
In addition to individually negotiated contracts, museums should adopt clearly articulated policies setting out the rights, obligations and expectations of the museum in commissioning new works. Museum commissioning policies should be drafted to reflect the growing appreciation for the protection of the “moral rights” of artists, regardless of whether these rights are recognized under American law. 59 A clear commissioning policy will streamline the contracting process, allow the parties to enter into the commissioning relationship with a clear understanding of their respective responsibilities, and serve as a foundation for arbitrating disputes. While it is important to have such policies in place, they are not a panacea. Mass MoCA did have an extensive commissioning policy in place but it did not avert the dispute.
At its most basic, the dispute between Mass MoCA and Büchel appears to have been the result of a clash of personalities. Perhaps the true moral of the mess at Mass MoCA is that ultimately the relationship between artist and commissioning museum must be based on trust and mutual respect by both parties. Museums must appreciate and respect the sensitivities of the artist and their relationship to their work. Artists must understand and respect the needs of the museum and in particular its obligations to its funders. In the end, the importance of fair dealing by both parties is crucial.
But then, what interesting topics would lawyers have to talk about?
Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Christoph Büchel, No. 3:07-cv-30089-MAP (D. Mass. filed July 12, 2007).
Randy Kennedy, Museum Can Show Disputed Artwork, Judge Rules, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2007.
Martha Lufkin, Mass MoCA dismantles artist’s unfinished installation, The Art News pAp e r, Sept. 27, 2007.
William M. Landes, What has the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished? The Law school of The University of chicago, John m. olin Law & economics working paper No. 123 (2d Series).
Ray Ming Chang, Revisiting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: A Follow-up Survey About Awareness and Waiver, Texas intellecual property Law Journal, Vol. 13:129 (2005). Chang notes that the vast majority of artists still do not use written commissioning agreements.
“Only a few VARA cases have been fully litigated. Nonetheless there is strong anecdotal evidence that the existence of VARA has had significant effects in negotiating rights between an artist and patron and in settling disputes outside of court.” Jeffrey P. Cunard, Moral Rights for Artists: the Visual Artists Rights Act (CAA 2002) (retrieved from www.darkwing.uoregon.edu/~csundt/ copyweb/CunardCAA2002.htm).
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to enact legislation “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.s. coNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The fair use doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
Marie C. Malaro, A Legal Primer On Managing Museum Collections (2nd ed. 1995) at 151.
For example, as a “work-for-hire” pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), or through assignment or license under 17 U.S.C. § 203.
17 U.S.C. § 109(b). For a discussion of the right of display, see Malaro at 168, fn 284.
Moral rights originated with the French legal concept of “le droit moral.” Economic rights are protected through the legal concept of “droit de suite” which allows artists to profit from the resale of their work. For a discussion of moral rights, see Malaro at 184.
Moral rights are based on “a belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit into the work and that the artist’s personality as well as the integrity of the work, should therefore be protected and preserved.” Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2 nd Cir. 1996).
Id. at 133, fn 18 citing Am. JUr. proof of facts, 3D, Proof of Infringement of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, § 2 (2003) (this concept is sometimes referred to as the “right of exposure”).
Caslon Analytics note moral rights cases (retrieved from www.caslon.com/au/mrcasenote1.htm).
Stephen E. Weil, Copyrights and Wrongs, museum News, July-Aug. 1993, at 40.
In 1958, an Alexander Calder black and white mobile which was donated to the Pittsburgh Airport was repainted green and gold, locked into place, and motorized contrary to the artist’s intentions. David M. Spatt, Moral Rights Survive the Sale and the Southern District (retrieved from www.artslaw.org/MORAL.HTM).
Id. In 1980 the Bank of Tokyo commissioned and then removed an Isamu Noguchi sculpture from its Manhattan lobby. In 1981, the General Services Administration removed Richard Serra’s “Tilted Arch” from the Federal Plaza in New York City.
In 1966 Maryland commissioned William Smith to create nine murals highlighting the state’s history, installed but altered the central panel and then refused to remove his name from the piece. Cynthia Esworthy, A Guide to the Visual Artists Rights Act (retrieved from www.harvard.edu/faculty/martin/art_law/esworthy.ht...). For other pre-VARA cases, see generally U.S. Copyright Office, Wiaver of Moral Rights In Visual Artworks, Executive Summary (October 24, 1996) (retrieved from www.copyright.gov/reports/exsum.html).
The states were California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island. See Chang, supra at 137.
The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5132, Dec. 1, 1990, codified in part at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A et. seq.
Id. In Pollara v. Seymour the court held that a banner commissioned by a legal group was an advertisement because the content was determined by the group, the banner promoted a lobbying message, and was displayed next to the group’s information table. Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2003).
The Copyright Act defines “work for hire” as “a work prepared by any employee within the scope of his or her employment.” or as a commissioned work provided that a written “work for hire” agreement has been signed by the artist. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1). In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. the Court of Appeals overturned the trial court ruling, holding that the work in question was actually a work for hire which was not covered by VARA because, among other things, the artists were paid a weekly salary and received employment benefits. 71 F.3d 77 (2 nd Cir. 1996). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Landes, supra at 12.
Chang, supra at 135 citing h.r. re p. No. 101-514, at 11 (1990). Whether works of mixed media or recorded performance art constitute works of visual art has been left up to the courts under the Act, which potentially puts the courts in a problematic position of having to make aesthetic judgments.
Id. citing Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). For a discussion of the meaning of the terms “honor” and “reputation” which are derived from European concepts of moral rights, see Landes, supra at 5.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). “Recognized stature” refers to society’s interest in protecting important works of art. See Landes at 5. In Martin v. City of Indianapolis., the city demolished a sculpture without giving prior notice to the artist. The court allowed the use of newspaper articles and letters about the sculpture to conclude that the work was one of “recognized stature”. 4 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. Ind. 1998) affirmed 192 F. 3d 608 (7 th Cir. 1999).
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) applies only to intentional or grossly negligent actions.
17 U.S.C § 106A(c)(2). For a discussion of negligence, see Landes, supra at 3. See also Martin, 4 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. Ind. 1998). In Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas, the court denied a claim under VARA because the alleged alteration had occurred prior to the effective date of the Act. The court denied a claim under VARA based on the on-going display of the altered work, saying that VARA does not cover display rights. However, the court allowed a claim based on New York’s Artists Rights Act which does cover display rights and is not preempted by VARA. 901 F.Supp. 620 (SDNY 1995). In Pfaff v. Denver Art Museum, an artist claimed that the Denver Art Museum damaged her work when it improperly dismantled it after an exhibit. 94 Civ. 9271. See Malaro at 187, fn 351.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3). For example, an artist cannot base a VARA claim on damage to reputation as the result of a dimly lit gallery, or a poor quality photo of the work in a pamphlet or website. See Landes at 3. In Peker v. Masters Collection, an artist who objected to the way that his work was being reproduced by a licensee brought claims under both VARA and the Copyright Act. The court dismissed the VARA on the grounds that the modification was to the reproductions and not to the artist’s original work. The court did find for the artist based on the copyright claim of unauthorized reproduction. 96 F. Supp.2d 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). In Berrios Nogueras v. Home Depot the court denied a claim under VARA for reproduction of an artist’s work in brochures and advertisements, stating that the rights of attribution and integrity do not apply to reproductions of an otherwise protected work when used in connection with works specifically excluded from the definition of “works of visual art.” 330 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.P.R. 2004).
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e). For sample VARA waiver forms, see Malaro at 196-7.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) includes VARA violations among the actions that infringe a copyright. The Copyright Act allows for enhanced damages for willful or intentional violations. In Martin v. City of Indianapolis, the court held that although the destruction of the artist’s sculpture had been intentional, the defendant’s actions were careless rather than willful. 4 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
17 U.S.C. § 301(f). See Chang, supra at 137. In Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the America’s, the court addressed the question of preemption with respect to a provision of the New York Artist’s Rights Act. 901 F. Supp. 620 (SDNY 1995).
If the work cannot be removed from a building without damage, the building owner must obtain a written waiver from the artist. If the work can be removed without damage, the building owner must notify the artist and provide an opportunity for the artist to remove the work at her own expense. No waiver is required for works installed prior to June 1, 1991 with the artist’s consent. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1) and (2). The Act also required the Copyright Office to establish a Visual Arts Registry that allows for the submission of statements regarding works installed in buildings. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(3). See 37 CFR 201 for procedures. As of October 31, 2007, only three such statements have been recorded.
Solenne Schmit, “Lots of money spent but no show” circA ArT mAgAz iNe, Oct. 31, 2007 (retrieved from www.recirca.com/ artnes/573.shtml). The work involved rebuilding a local movie theater within the museum, and filling the museum’s largest exhibit hall — football stadium-sized Building 5 — with massive found objects including an oil tanker, a smashed police car, a used mobile home, deactivated bomb shells, nine shipping containers, and a two-story house. The fuselage of 727 was also part of the planned installation. Geoff Edgers, “Behind doors, a world unseen – Dispute cloaks massive installation at MASS MoCA” N.Y. Ti m e s, Mar. 28, 2007.
For a detailed description of the dispute, see Schmit, supra. Museum staff actively participated in locating and purchasing the materials and constructing the elements of the work.
Framing the issue as whether the Museum had the right to exhibit the work (rather than whether the Museum had the right to destroy the work) allowed Mass MoCA to avoid what could otherwise have been considered a direct violation of VARA.
Büchel Memorandum of Law at 11.
Büchel Memorandum of Law at 18. Büchel also argued that mishandling of the installation by the Museum’s staff would expose them to liability under VARA and made arguments based on other provisions of the Copyright, including the right to display an original work under Section 109 of the Act.
For a discussion of “droit de divulgence” see text at page 3.
Martha Lufkin, Mass MoCA dismantles artist’s unfinished installation, The Art Newspaper, Sept. 27, 2007. See also Randy Kennedy, Museum can show disputed artwork, Judge rules, N.Y. Ti m e s, Sept. 22, 2007. As of this writing, no written opinion has been reported so this analysis is based on news reports of the oral argument and the Judge’s ruling from the bench.
17 U.S.C. 106A(c)(2). This exception is qualified in the case of “gross negligence.” The Act is silent on whether an intentional act of display would be actionable. However, a common-sense reading of this provision would suggest that it is meant only be applied to negligent, not intentional, acts.
As some critics have pointed out, high-profile artists like Büchel must also respect the views of museums and the public which fund their work. Schmit, supra. Some commentators have suggested that the entire dispute could have been avoided if a written agreement had been in place. See Sergio, Understanding MASS MoCA’s Actions, cL A Nc o July 28, 2007 (retrieved from www.clanco.com/ summary_judgment/understanding_mass_mocas_action_irrefle).The dispute clearly arose from a misunderstanding about the cost and scope of the project. See Christopher Benfey, “Mess MoCA” Slate, Sept. 25, 2007 (retrieved from www.slate.com/toolbar. aspx?action+print&id=2174656).
For a discussion about the importance of contracts for museum installations, and a sample contract, see mA L Ar o at 277-80.
Telephone interview with Kate Myers, Public Relations Mass MoCA, December 2007.
While VARA expressly allows artists to waive their VARA rights, museums should be cautious about taking this approach. Under European laws, artists cannot waive their moral rights.

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