Source: https://openjurist.org/347/us/637
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:06:33+00:00

Document:
Robert W. Ginnane, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Mrs. Blanch Freedman, New York City, for respondent.
After respondent was taken into custody, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The petition attacked the validity of the deportation order on the ground, among others, that he was not subject to deportation under § 19(a) since he had not made an 'entry' within the meaning of that section. The District Court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to order respondent's release from custody. 207 F.2d 398. We granted certiorari. 346 U.S. 914, 74 S.Ct. 274.
The sole question presented is whether respondent—who was born a national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, who came to the continental United States as a national prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, and who was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 and 1950 for crimes involving moral turpitude—may now be deported under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.
'For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917, * * * this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered as if they were aliens. For such purposes the Philippine Islands shall be considered as a separate country and shall have for each fiscal year a quota of fifty.' The Government urges that the reference in § 8(a)(1) to 'citizens of the Philippine Islands' includes Filipinos then residing in the United States; that by virtue of this provision the respondent was assimilated to the status of an alien for purposes of 'immigration, exclusion, or expulsion'; and that, having been twice convicted thereafter of crimes involving moral turpitude, he is deportable under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.
The Court of Appeals sustained respondent's contention that he had never made the requisite 'entry.' With this conclusion, we agree.
But for this Court's holding that § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 must be construed strictly and the word 'entry' given a special meaning, I would be content with the excellent dissent of Judge Bone in the court below. 207 F.2d 398, 402.
The effect of the Court's opinion is to construe the Act strictly in favor of the convicted criminal sought to be deported for his criminal acts, rather than in favor of the United States in protection of its citizens. I know of no good reason why we should be strained construction of an Act compel the United States to cling onto alien criminals. It is not the public policy of this country to construe its statutes strictly in favor of alien criminals whose convictions have already been established of record. Why should we give a strained construction to the word 'entry' in the instant case? The least we should do is to give the word 'entry' its ordinary meaning.
Cf. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 70 S.Ct. 329, 94 L.Ed. 307.
'In this case petitioner, of course, chose to return to this country, knowing he was in a foreign place. But the exigencies of war, not his voluntary act, put him on foreign soil. It would indeed be harsh to read the statute so as to add the peril of deportation to such perils of the sea. We might as well hold that if he had been kidnaped and taken to Cuba, he made a statutory 'entry' on his voluntary return. Respect for law does not thrive on captious interpretations.' 332 U.S. at page 391, 68 S.Ct. at page 12.
Because of the Court's strict construction of this statute, which has the effect of putting a liberal construction on the statute in favor of the alien criminal, which I believe to be contrary to the public policy of this country, I dissent.
Now 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1—5), (6)(D), (8, 12), (18)(d, e).
From the Spanish cession in 1898 until final independence in 1946, the Philippine Islands were American territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674—676, 65 S.Ct. 870, 881—882, 89 L.Ed. 1252. Persons born in the Philippines during this period were American nationals entitled to the protection of the United States and conversely owing permanent allegiance to the United States. They could not be excluded from this country under a general statute relating to the exclusion of 'aliens.' See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 12—13, 24 S.Ct. 177, 179, 48 L.Ed. 317; Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 411, 45 S.Ct. 563, 565, 69 L.Ed. 1016. But, until 1946, neither could they become United States citizens. See Toyota v. United States, supra; 60 Stat. 416.
The context of the latter sentence makes it clear that the Court regarded the word's 'ordinary meaning' as being "any coming of an alien from a foreign country". In the Delgadillo case, supra, the Court narrowed this definition even further by holding that a resident alien does not make an 'entry' from a foreign country if his arrival in the foreign country was unintentional.
Section 101(a)(29), 66 Stat. 170, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a) (29), defines 'outlying possessions' as American Samoa and Swains Island. By a special provision in the 1952 Act, the exclusion process is made applicable to any alien coming to the continental United States from Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands. 66 Stat. 188, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(7).
The respondent also attacks the validity of the deportation order on the grounds: (1) that he made no 'entry' because he was not an alien when he came to this country; (2) that § 8(a)(1) of the 1934 Philippine Independence Act did not apply to Filipinos already residing here and that hence he was not an alien in 1941 when he was sentenced for one of the two crimes involves in this proceeding; (3) that he is not an alien today because Congress lacked the power to deprive him of his status as a national. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider these contentions.

References: § 19
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