Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/223/437/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:24:39+00:00

Document:
A state statute which makes special entries in public records prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of the validity of the proceedings referred to deals with rules of evidence, and not with substantive rights.
One is not deprived of his property without due process of law by a statute making entries in public records prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence, of the validity of the proceedings referred to.
a subsequent state statute making the official entries in public records prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of the validity of proceedings for forfeiture.
The statute of Kansas of 1907, c. 373, making entries of default and proceedings for forfeiture made in usual course of business in the records of sales of school lands prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of the validity of forfeiture proceedings is not unconstitutional either as depriving one who had previously purchased land under the Act of 1879, c. 161, § 2, of his property without due process of law or as impairing the obligation of the contract under the Act of 1879.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of certain provisions of the laws of the Kansas in regard to sale of school lands, are stated in the opinion.
This was an action in a district court of the State of Kansas to recover the possession of a quarter section of land to which the parties were asserting adverse claims under the school land laws of the state. The plaintiff's claim originated in a contract of purchase with the state whereby he was required annually to pay interest on the unpaid purchase price at a stipulated rate. He failed for three years to comply with that requirement, and proceedings looking to a forfeiture of his rights under the contract resulted, in 1901, in a notation of forfeiture, as hereinafter explained. The defendant claimed under a like contract made, in 1902, upon the supposition that all rights under the prior contract had been extinguished.
In 1906, while the defendant was in possession and complying with his contract, the plaintiff made payment of the purchase price and interest under his contract, and a patent was issued to him. The action was begun in 1907, when the defendant was still in possession and complying with his contract. The controversy turned upon the validity of the forfeiture proceedings. If they were valid, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; otherwise he was.
provided, such purchaser, and all persons claiming under him, shall forfeit absolutely all rights and interest in and to such land, under and by virtue of such purchase."
"Received this notice this 13th day of July, 1901, and served the same by leaving a copy with C. C. Potter, who occupied the within premises, July 17, 1907;"
that, although not so stated in his return, the sheriff duly posted the notice in the office of the county clerk; that, when the notice was served the plaintiff, although not so stated in the sheriff's return, was not a resident of the state, and was absent therefrom; that he failed to pay the sum due within sixty days from the time of the service and posting of the notice, and that, upon the expiration of that period, the county clerk entered upon the school land record of the county the notation "Land forfeited," in such connection as to refer to the plaintiff's contract. Whether or not C. C. Potter, to whom a copy of the notice was delivered was the only person in possession of the land at the time did not appear.
forfeited for default in the payment of money due the state on such purchase, and such land was thereafter sold to a new purchaser, such entries shall be prima facie evidence, in any action or proceeding in any court in this state, that proper notice of the purchaser's default had been issued and legal service thereof made, and that all things necessary to be done as conditions precedent to the forfeiture of the right and interest of the purchaser, and all persons claiming under him, in and to such land, had been duly and properly done and performed, and that such forfeiture had been duly declared. Any entry upon said records of the county clerk as 'cancelled,' 'forfeited,' 'reverted to state,' 'state,' and the like, with or without date shall be held to be an entry indicating that the interest of the purchaser had been forfeited."
The district court ruled that this statute was applicable to pending causes; that the notation "Land forfeited" upon the school land record in the county clerk's office was prima facie evidence of the lawful service of the forfeiture notice and of the due declaration of the forfeiture, and that this prima facie evidence was not overcome by the other facts disclosed at the trial, and so gave judgment for the defendant. The judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state (80 Kan. 148), and the plaintiff then brought the case here upon the contention, denied by that court, that the statute of 1907 impaired the obligation of his contract, and therefore was violative of the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States.
statute dealt only with a rule of evidence, not with any substantive right. By making the entry of forfeiture upon the official record prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence that all preliminary steps essential to a valid forfeiture were properly taken, and that the forfeiture was duly declared, it but established a rebuttable presumption, which he was at liberty to overcome by other evidence. That such a statute does not offend against either the contract clause or the due process of law clause of the Constitution, even where the change is made applicable to pending causes, is now well settled. Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472, 54 U. S. 476; Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U. S. 172, 148 U. S. 181; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 187 U. S. 59; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 220 U. S. 81; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68; Cooley, Const.Lim., 7th ed., 409, 524-526.
It was because the plaintiff failed to assume and carry the burden of overcoming the rebuttable presumption established by the statute that he failed in his action.

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