Source: https://shayessite.wordpress.com/error-preservation-in-texas-civil-cases/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:20:55+00:00

Document:
Welcome to what I hope is the happiest New Year ever! In this first issue of the new year, JAJ reminds us of the saving graces in approving an order only as to form, and Gulley reminds us that preservation of error as to an expert’s opinion is two-headed beast, depending on whether the complaint is to methodology, technique, or foundational data (must be preserved), or as to speculative or conclusory testimony (does not have to be preserved).
Jury Charge: “JP Morgan also contends that it preserved error by submitting a proposed jury instruction on the partnership factors. Rule 276 provides in part, “When an instruction, question, or definition is requested and the provisions of the law have been complied with and the trial judge refuses the same, the judge shall endorse thereon ‘Refused,’ and sign the same officially.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 276. JP Morgan’s proposed charge does not contain any such endorsement. An endorsement is not the only means of obtaining a ruling, but if there is no endorsement, the record must establish that the trial court otherwise ruled on the request, expressly or implicitly, for potential error to be preserved. . . . Even though this proposed instruction was filed with the trial court ten days before trial, JP Morgan did not bring the requested instruction to the trial court’s attention during the charge conference and did not object to its omission from the charge. Also, there is no indication in the record that the trial court noticed or considered JP Morgan’s proposed charge. Therefore, we conclude JP Morgan did not preserve its capacity complaint by filing a proposed instruction on the partnership factors.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Prof’l Pharm. II, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13942, 24 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2014) raised by defendant , 33.1, not preserved.
Capacity: “JP Morgan  further contends that it preserved error by filing special exceptions and a motion to dismiss Pharmacy II’s declaratory judgment claims in which JP Morgan argued that (1) declaratory relief was not available to settle Pharmacy II’s status as a partnership because Pharmacy II was required to prove its status as a partnership as part of its claims for affirmative relief that were already pending before the court; (2) a declaration regarding Pharmacy II’s status as a partnership could not be resolved by a declaratory judgment action; and (3) Pharmacy II was not entitled to declaratory relief because it had not named as parties all persons or entities that had a claim or interest that would have been affected by the declaration. . . . By its special exceptions and motion to dismiss, JP Morgan did  not raise the issue of Pharmacy II’s lack of capacity as a partnership. Assuming without deciding that JP Morgan could preserve error through its special exceptions and motion to dismiss, JP Morgan has waived its complaint on appeal because it differs from the complaint presented to the trial court in its special exceptions and motion to dismiss.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Prof’l Pharm. II, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13942, 26-27 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2014) raised by defendant , 33.1, not preserved.
Jury Charge: “Although JP Morgan objected to jury question number one, its complaint was that the question was confusing to the jury absent any instructions that Pharmacy II was a partnership. While this objection did identify the lack of an instruction related to Pharmacy II’s status as a partnership, it was insufficient to apprise the trial court that JP Morgan was objecting to the lack of questions, definitions, or instructions on the issue of Pharmacy II’s capacity. JP Morgan’s complaint on appeal does not comport with the complaint it made in the trial court. Therefore, JP Morgan failed to preserve error.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Prof’l Pharm. II, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13942, 23 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2014).
Juvenile: “Neither Sandra nor her trial counsel complained about any deficiency in the statutory admonishments before testimony  began.6Link to the text of the note Thus, we hold that Sandra failed to preserve any error related to the failure of the trial court to admonish her on her right to confront witnesses.” In re S.A., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13878, 8-9 (Tex. App.– Texarkana Dec. 31, 2014). 33.1, not preserved, defendant asserted objection.
All for now. Hope this helps.
In terms of the kinds of rulings that are sort of surprising, and hence you might want to be aware of up front, I mention one case involving a jury charge objection. In that case, there were two related/overlapping type jury questions. One party objected without specifying whether it was objecting to the first, the second, or both questions. The Court of Appeals held that this failure to specify waived the objection as to the jury question the party complained about on appeal. See Irika Shipping S.A. v. Henderson, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13550, 28-29 (Tex. App.–Beaumont Dec. 18, 2014), below. I have to admit I find myself disagreeing with this holding, but it is probably better to be safe and object to both such questions, just to avoid having to fight the preservation issue on appeal.
Pay particular attention to the Jamshed case below on attorney’s fees. It deals with proving the reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees under Chapter 38 by making an affidavit under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001. I think the point of that case, for purposes of this paper, is this: if the other side has asserted a claim for attorney’s fees, and thirty days before evidence begins that party serves you with an affidavit allegedly proving up its fees, you need to immediately read and follow the directives of Section 18.001–or you might be surprised to find out that the other side already has enough evidence to support an award of fees.
Promissory Notes: “The Adames contend that, knowing that the FDIC was investigating Shay Wallace, the loan officer with whom the Adames regularly dealt, Vista Bank nonetheless allowed Wallace to represent the bank in dealing with the Adames. The Adames point out that the FDIC ultimately and formally found that Wallace “engaged or participated in violations of the law or regulations, unsafe or unsound banking practices, and/or breaches of fiduciary duty as an institution-affiliated party” and prohibited him by order from participation in certain activities related to banking. Asserting that the continued dealing with Wallace was unethical, the Adames raise the issue of Wallace’s ineligibility on appeal. Again, though, the Adames failed to raise the issue until appeal; the FDIC “Order [*6] of Prohibition from Further Participation” appears only in the Adames’ appendix on appeal. Consequently, we are constrained by general principles of error preservation as well as the well-established proposition that motions for summary judgment and responses to them “must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented to the trial court.” See D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd., 300 S.W.3d at 743; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (HN2″Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.”). We cannot reach the merits of the issue raised and, therefore, must and do overrule it.” Adame v. Vista Bank, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12227, 5-6 (Tex. App.–Amarillo Nov. 10, 2014).
There is nothing much earth shattering about the cases the last two weeks. That is how most of error preservation plays out–you have to timely raise it and get a ruling on it on the record and make it specific enough for the trial court to be aware what you’re complaining about.
Hearsay: “Gallardo argues in his brief that some of the evidence submitted by Tenants is incompetent. This includes the Tenants’ affidavits, two letters from Roman to Gallardo, and a city inspector’s report/complaint. Gallardo raised hearsay objections in the trial court to the city inspector’s report/complaint and to Roman’s letters, but he did not obtain a ruling on these objections. A hearsay objection is a defect of form which must be preserved by obtaining an adverse ruling in the trial court. . . . The trial court’s order granting summary judgment in Gallardo’s favor is not an implicit ruling sustaining the hearsay objection. . . . Consequently, Gallardo’s hearsay objections are waived.” Hernandez v. Gallardo, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11878, 5-6 (Tex. App. El Paso Oct. 29, 2014).
Summary Judgment Evidence: “BOA made a number of written objections to certain evidence Johnson relied on in opposition to BOA’s first motion for summary judgment. However, BOA failed to obtain a ruling on these objections before the trial court entered judgment on this motion. . . . Because BOA did not obtain a ruling on its objections to Johnson’s summary judgment evidence, BOA waived its objections to the evidence. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” Johnson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11900, *9 (Tex. App.–Beaumont Oct. 30 2014).
Sanctions: “Appellant also filed a motion to quash trial subpoenas and for protective order, objections to trial subpoenas, and motion for sanctions on February 20, 2013 and sought specific monetary sanctions against John and Andrea and their attorney. The trial court heard the motion on February 20, 2013, immediately prior to beginning the hearing on John and Andrea’s motion for sanctions, and quashed the complained-about [*17] subpoenas, but granted no further relief. This ruling by the trial court constituted an implicit denial of the requested sanctions. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A).” Bertrand v. Bertrand, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12040, 16-17 (Tex. App.–Dallas Nov. 4, 2014).
Finally, if you do not raise a complaint in the trial court, you cannot pursue it on appeal–including objections as to the reliability of an expert’s testimony, and an improper jury argument which can be cured by an objection.
Parent Child Relationship: “Mother asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in receiving and considering the testimony of Dr. Schutte, Mother’s evaluating psychologist, when he opined that Mother could not parent her children without additional support. She argues that this evidence should not be considered for any purpose because it is plain error, irrelevant, and in reasonable probability prejudicial to her. Mother specifically objects to Dr. Schutte’s conclusion that Mother’s parental abilities were negatively affected by her low or borderline I.Q. is “speculative, prejudicial, and bereft of methodological rigor.” . . . . Mother’s argument of “plain error” fails to cite to any state or federal statute or case to support her assertion that the trial court erred. Plain error is a federal doctrine in criminal cases that is codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)(“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention”). Implicit in this argument is Mother’s tacit acknowledgement that she failed to object to the testimony that she now complains of. Our review of parental termination cases has failed to uncover any application of the “plain error” doctrine. Therefore, we decline to do so in this case. Mother failed to lodge the requisite objection and obtain a ruling thereon regarding the complaint that she now raises on appeal. Further, she was afforded the opportunity to cross examine Dr. Schutte extensively upon his conclusions and did so. Consequently, Mother has failed to preserve this complaint for our consideration.” J.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11840, *22-23, 26 (Tex. App.–El Paso Oct. 29 2014).
Summary Judgment: “In Issue Three, Cohen notes that Loya’s motion for partial summary judgment sought both the trial court’s declaration that Loya had no liability under the 1% Agreement after February 20, 2009, and dismissal of Cohen’s breach of contract claim. Cohen complains that Loya failed to meet its burden to present evidence that it had rescinded the 1% Agreement, and was no longer liable under the agreement nor benefitting from Cohen’s services after February 20, 2009. . . . Loya responds [*27] that Cohen’s complaint was not raised in its response for consideration by the trial court. Cohen replies that it was Loya’s burden to demonstrate that it no longer reaped the benefits of the agreement as a component of proper termination, and argues that because Loya failed to carry that burden, Cohen had no duty to respond. Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer, or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Because these issues were not presented to the trial court in its summary judgment response, Cohen is not permitted to raise these arguments for the first time on appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); . . . .” Fred Loya Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Cohen, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12012, 26-27 (Tex. App. El Paso Oct. 31, 2014).
Summary Judgment Evidence: “In Issue Four, Cohen . . . complains that although the motion recites Martin’s deposition testimony that Cohen had not incurred any substantial expenditure in relation to his performance of the 1% Agreement, Loya failed to file the deposition excerpt as part of the summary judgment record. Accordingly, it argues that the absence of the excerpt in the record renders summary judgment improper. Moreover, it argues that had the excerpt been included as evidence, it is nevertheless silent as to whether Cohen incurred substantial expenditures in preparing for performance as opposed to expenditures incurred in relation to actual performance of the 1% Agreement. In its motion, Loya recited five questions and answers in an excerpt attributed to Cohen’s deposition testimony, referring to them by page and line numbers, and identified the excerpt as being included in the same “Exhibit 2” presenting summary judgment evidence that contains Cohen’s “indefinite duration” testimony. However, the referenced pages are not included in that exhibit [*29] to the motion. Loya argues that although the copies of the deposition excerpts were inadvertently omitted from the summary judgment exhibit and constitute “specific reference(s) to the discovery,” Cohen’s complaints cannot be sustained because it failed to raise the issue in the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); . . . . Here, the trial court had before it the recited language of the referenced deposition testimony, as well as references to the page and line numbers where that evidence [*30] could be found in the unfiled discovery, and Cohen failed to complain about that evidence in the trial court.” Fred Loya Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Cohen, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12012, 27-30 (Tex. App. El Paso Oct. 31, 2014).
In re RSR Corp. and Quemetco Metals Ltd. Inc.
The principal issues are (1) whether trial counsel should be disqualified for interviewing an opponent-party’s former employee who had access to and possession of confidential information involving a licensing-fee dispute (and who was later hired as a consultant for the case against his former employer) and (2) whether the opponent-party’s second, belated disqualification argument should be precluded because it was raised six months before trial and after extended litigation on a separate disqualification basis.
an unauthenticated or unsworn document, not supported by any affidavit, is not entitled to consideration as summary judgment evidence, and a complete absence of authentication may be raised for the first time on appeal.
Evidence: “The trial court preadmitted the document [*36] during a pretrial conference. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the document was hearsay and Jinchun was not “qualifi[ed] to authenticate” the document.15 FOOTNOTES 15 Later, during Jinchun’s testimony, defense counsel stated: ‘Your Honor, I’m going to renew the objection we previously made. So I don’t have to interrupt this line of questioning[,] may I have a running objection as to [Jinchun] testifying as to stock value?’ . . . . Although defense counsel made a running objection at trial to Jinchun’s testimony regarding the value of the stock, Zhang testified as to the value of the stock without any objection from defense counsel.17 If a party later permits the same or similar evidence to be introduced without objection, the error in the admission of testimony generally is harmless and is waived, unless the party obtains a running objection. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 907 (Tex. 2004); Bhatia v. Woodlands N. Houston Heart Ctr., PLLC, 396 S.W.3d 658, 669 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed). FOOTNOTES 17 Although Zhang’s testimony regarding the value of the stock was based in part on the information in the admitted document, defense counsel was required to object to this testimony to preserve error on this issue. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 907 (Tex. 2004).” Katy Int’l, Inc. v. Jinchun Jiang, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11543, *36, 37 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 23, 2014.
The Rule: “Gerardo’s fourth issue centers on the fact that Brandon’s expert, his chiropractor Barnes, was present in the courtroom during Brandon’s testimony. Gerardo asserts that the court denied his request to invoke “the Rule” and allowed the expert to remain in the courtroom. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 267. However, the record does not reflect that Gerardo raised this issue before the trial court. In his written pretrial motion in limine, Gerardo “invoke[d] The Rule.” However, the Rule was not invoked or mentioned at trial, and Gerardo made no objection to Barnes’s presence in the courtroom or to his being called as a witness. Gerardo first raised this issue in his motion for judgment notwithstanding the [*11] verdict. By failing to timely raise this complaint in the trial court, Gerardo has not preserved this issue for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).” Hernandez v. Hernandez, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11573, *10-11 (Tex. App.–Dallas Oct. 20, 2014).
Forceible Detainer: Appellant “ does not explain, nor it is clear from the record, how his claim of adverse possession, even if true, would deprive Fannie of its right to immediate possession. In addition, Borjas never argued or presented any evidence to the trial court in support of any claim that he possessed superior title to the property. “[I]f a party [to a forcible-detainer suit] fails to present ‘specific evidence to raise a genuine title dispute, the jurisdiction of the court [is] never at issue.'” Jaimes, 2013 WL 7809741, at *4 (citations omitted). We cannot conclude from Borjas’s bare assertion of superior title that the landlord-tenant relationship established under the deed of trust was negated or that the justice court and county court were deprived of jurisdiction [*10] over the forcible-detainer suit. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.” Borjas v. Fannie Mae, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11510, *9-10 (Tex. App.–Austin Oct. 17 2014).
Sanctions: “Not surprisingly, Appellant can nowhere direct us to any place in the record where he ever requested a bench warrant or the like to participate in either the sanctions hearing or the final trial. . . . ‘Respondent’s Affidavit of Property’ . . . . was not a request for a bench warrant or the like, but it practically and substantively negates any notion that Appellant was barred from presenting his case or otherwise denied his due process. . . . Appellant did not complain to the trial court that he was not provided notice of the sanctions hearing nor did he complain of the sanctions imposed and ask the trial court to reconsider its actions in imposing the sanctions. Thus, Appellant failed to preserve these complaints for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).” Stanton v. Stanton, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11489, *6 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 16 2014).
I did not find any cases the last couple of weeks where a court held that error was preserved in the trial court. I think that’s the first time in the last year and one month where that has happened. First time for everything, I guess.
I figured out I missed a few Supreme Court cases on error preservation toward the end of last fiscal year, so I’ll put those in first.
“In her third issue, Butler argues that the expert-report requirement diminishes the right to a jury trial. Appellees point out that Butler did not raise this complaint in the trial court and argue that to the extent she purports to make a constitutional challenge [*6] on appeal to the statutory expert-report requirement, her constitutional challenge is not preserved. We must agree, and we generally do not favor reversing a trial court’s ruling on unpreserved error. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).” Butler v. Whitten, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 10484, 5-6 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Sept. 18, 2014).
Well, out with the old, in with the new. We’re off to the second full year of compiling and distributing error preservation rulings in Texas civil cases. My, how time flies when you’re having fun.
If you have any of these issues in a case, you might want to get and read this paper.
Burbage v. Burbage, 2014 Tex. LEXIS 753, *18 (Tex. 2014). The Court quoted the comments made by the Petitioner during the charge conference, pointing out that his request for an additional question concerning a qualified privilege (in a defamation case) did not preserve his complaint that the trial court erred in submitting five other questions in the proposed charge. At *16. It wouldn’t hurt to review Burbage to be reminded of the challenges presented by the charge conference.
On to current cases. And before launching off into them, I think I have gleaned the following from having spent a year doing this little blog. In terms of the multitude of cases which hold that error was not preserved because the complaint was not made below, I doubt seriously you will get much out of those cases. The more helpful parts of this blog are probably those cases which held that error was preserved, or address whether the complaint was timely or was specific enough. So I try to put those cases at the first of the blog. Once you work through those, you have probably seen what you need to see.
“Even if all claimants objected to this defect in the trial court, they did not preserve error because none of them obtained a ruling.3 For this court to affirm based on this defect, this defect must be a defect in substance that may be raised for the first time on appeal rather than a defect in form that requires preservation of error in the trial court.[note omitted]. Less than two years ago, this court held that the same defect in authentication was a defect in form rather than a defect in substance.” In the Estate of Guerrero, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 10011 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 4, 2014) (Frost, CJ, dissenting).
“Further, Risner objected to the admission of the new petition pages when they were offered at the hearing on the permanent injunction, and he timely appealed from the trial court’s final judgment, wherein the trial court granted Salazar’s request for an opportunity to cure her defective application. We conclude that Risner did not waive his objection to the trial court’s order granting Salazar’s claim for relief.” Risner v. Harris County Republican Party, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9996 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 3, 2014).

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