Source: http://jcpa.org/article/the-use-of-palestinian-children-in-the-al-aqsa-intifada/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 07:01:02+00:00

Document:
Watching the television coverage of the daily Palestinian riots, known as the Al-Aqsa intifada,1 one is immediately struck by the near total absence of adults. Indeed, most of those hurling Molotov cocktails and stones are teenagers; many are even younger. Intoxicated by the challenge of becoming a hero, lacking the maturity to calculate the dangers they are assuming, these young people are easily motivated to place themselves in harm’s way.
Since the recent disturbances began, media reports have often highlighted instances in which Palestinian children have been killed or injured by Israeli troops or policemen. These reports have generated much criticism of Israeli policies, although few in the Western world have thought through the chaos they see on the news to consider whose interests are served by the violence. Even fewer have access to the information necessary to place in legal and historical context these weeks of death and disorder.
The appearance of Palestinian children in these riots, it will be demonstrated, is not accidental. The Palestinian Authority has intentionally mobilized Palestinian children to man the front line in its struggle against Israel, frequently using them as shields to protect Palestinian gunmen. This mobilization of Palestinian youth has, moreover, been facilitated by the long-term impact of Palestinian Authority (PA) curricula, government-controlled media, and summer camp programs, which indoctrinated the youth for armed confrontation with Israel even prior to the current crisis.
This study examines the causes of this phenomenon and its repercussions. In particular, it offers suggestions to protect Palestinian children from the physical and other dangers inherent in politically and religiously motivated street violence.
The visuals of a bleeding Palestinian child surrounded by screaming relatives all but obviate the need for most people to consider why and how the child was in harm’s way in the first instance. The tragic death of Mohammed Al-Dura, the twelve-year-old from Gaza who was caught in the cross-fire and shot dead in his father’s arms,3 mobilized sentiment around the world to condemn Israel for using excessive force.4 Claims were made that the besieged Israel Defense Forces (IDF) position from which the shooting likely came had intentionally targeted the boy and his father, even though the soldiers were returning fire at Palestinian gunmen a few meters away from Mohammed and his father.
Whatever the circumstances of Mohammed’s death, it is clear that a number of Palestinian children have been killed by Israeli gunfire and many more injured. Estimates of these child casualties, however, have varied. CBS News’ “Sixty Minutes” reported on October 24 that 40 Palestinian children had been killed; 5 an Amnesty International report dated October 19 stated that 27 children had lost their lives.6 A Physicians for Human Rights team concluded that 23 Palestinian minors under the age of 17 had been killed through October 29.7 Looking only at children under the age of 13, Ha’aretz columnist Ze’ev Schiff concluded that 6 to 8 children had died.8 The Palestine Red Crescent Society asserted that prior to October 27, 43 Palestinians below the age of 20 had been killed; within that group 13 were below the age of 16.9 The loss of a single child is a terrible tragedy, but clearly the divergent claims over the numbers of child casualties is indicative of the politically explosive nature of this aspect of the Al-Aqsa intifada.
The similarities of these violent tactics to childhood games like “tag” is not coincidental; the Palestinian leadership discovered a way to channel youthful energy into the uprising.
At that time Professor William V. O’Brien of Georgetown University noted that, “[i]t appears that a substantial number, if not the majority, of troops of the intifada are young people, including elementary schoolchildren. They are engaged in throwing stones and Molotov cocktails and other forms of violence.”33 During that uprising a Palestinian leaflet declared, “Every child must carry the stone and throw it at the occupier. The Molotov cocktail heroes of all ages must burn a fire in the face of the enemy and fight him face-to-face.”34 This is but one example of the propaganda which has chronically been used to incite Palestinian children to participate in violent and dangerous street battles.
Thanks to their empowerment under the Oslo peace process, the Palestinian Authority has new and varied vehicles to motivate their youth to participate in anti-Israeli street violence. Television and radio stations, school textbooks, a range of newspapers and magazines, and even the summer camp curriculum are all, directly or indirectly, under the control of the PA.
Question: What do you feel when you pray [for the souls of the martyrs]?
Sabri: I feel the martyr is lucky because the angels usher him to his wedding in heaven….
Question: Is it different when the martyr is a child?
Sabri: Yes, it is. It’s hard to express it in words. There is no doubt that a child [martyr] suggests that the new generation will carry on the mission with determination. The younger the martyr — the greater and the more I respect him….
Question: Is this why the mothers cry with joy when they hear about their sons’ death?
Other Palestinian institutions are also imbued with incitement. A New York Times reporter observed a PA-run summer camp program where the 25,000 campers stage the kidnapping of Israeli leaders, strip and assemble Kalachnikov assault rifles, and learn the art of ambushing.43 They are given camouflage uniforms and imitation guns.44 They parade and practice infiltration, crawling on their stomachs through obstacles. Training children for the armed struggle reminds one of the terrible price children have paid in other Middle Eastern wars. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian government recruited tens of thousands of child soldiers, dubbed “Revolutionary Guards.”45 Sent to the front to clear minefields and attack fortified Iraqi positions, these usually unarmed children faced near certain death.46 They were told that the little plastic key around their neck would open the gates to eternal paradise.
These examples of incitement may explain why a 13-year-old girl from Egypt tried to sneak into Gaza in order to “join the Palestinian children in anything, even throwing stones.” The girl’s father, Gamel Mabrouk, explains, “[t]his was over-enthusiasm in response to what they have seen on television.” A week earlier, a 12-year-old boy was stopped at the Israeli border after attempting the same thing.
The Preamble of the Oslo II interim peace agreement, signed by Arafat in 1995, reaffirms the parties’ “mutual commitment to act, in accordance with this Agreement, immediately, efficiently and effectively against acts or threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis.”59 Oslo II also contains provisions which obligate the Palestinian Legislative Council to “foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda…and…take legal measures to prevent incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.”60 This is followed by the requirement that “Israel and the Council will ensure that their respective educational systems contribute to the peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation.”61 The Palestinian police’s “duties and functions” include “combating terrorism and violence, and preventing incitement to violence.”62 However, since the Al-Aqsa intifada began, the Palestinian police, whose salaries, assault rifles, training, and uniforms were paid for by Western donors, have done absolutely nothing to stop incitement; many have even trained their rifles on the IDF.
a. Drawing on relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII(1) of the Interim Agreement and Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject.
In the most recent Sharm el-Sheikh interim agreement, signed by Arafat in 1999, which intended to implement the outstanding commitments of the previously signed agreements, the PA rededicated itself to: “8(a) …immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence.”68 But as demonstrated, none of the anti-incitement provisions in the interim peace agreements, each one signed by Arafat, have been honored in practice.
According to international law, in particular Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, Israel is obliged to ensure public order and safety in the areas it occupied in self-defense in the Six-Day War of 1967.91 This means that Israel must carry out necessary security measures in response to the widespread shooting and stoning that has characterized the Al-Aqsa intifada. Were the Palestinian police willing to perform their delegated local police function92 in Palestinian-populated areas, Israel would have no reason to intervene. But when just the opposite transpires, and the Palestinian police and security forces turn a blind eye to violence emanating from their areas, or join in the shooting, the IDF has no alternative but to fulfill its international law obligations.
The force employed by the IDF in response to these complex and dangerous confrontations is not indiscriminate. Nor is it intended to harm the Palestinian youths. Rather the goal is to restore safety on the highways and other locations where violence has been instigated. IDF regulations make every effort to avoid incurring unnecessary casualties. Especially strict rules apply to the employment of live ammunition,93 preferring to make due, whenever possible, with loudspeaker warnings, tear gas, stun grenades, and rubber bullets. Soldiers are prohibited from opening fire with live ammunition unless: (1) they are fired upon; (2) they are in a situation where despite verbal warnings there remains an immediate danger to their lives or the lives of Israeli civilians; or (3) they are apprehending an escaping suspect who is believed to have committed a serious crime.94 Any soldiers who violate the rules of engagement are subject to investigation, disciplinary trial and, in serious cases, court-martial, as well they should.
Article 3 of the UN Convention states that administrative authorities or legislative bodies of a state shall place “the best interest of a child” as their primary consideration98 and, with that principle in mind, a number of states have raised the minimum age to 18.99 Article 36 asserts that state parties shall protect the child against all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child’s welfare, which logically includes even their voluntary recruitment to participate in a conflict.100 Ironically, this standard appears to conform with Islamic law, which prohibits children under 15 from participating in a jihad.101 But neither international law nor Islamic law has curtailed the exploitation of children in the Al-Aqsa intifada.
While the PA has administrative responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the PA is not a sovereign entity,102 and therefore is not de jure bound by the above mentioned conventions.103 However, it is nothing less than hypocrisy for the PA to continuously pressure the international community to condemn Israel for violating human rights, while it blatantly disregards even the most rudimentary international standards of protection when it comes to its own children. Their misuse of children should set off an alarm for the world community; raising doubts as to whether a future Palestinian state would be a law-abiding member of the international community.
Israel, by contrast, is endeavoring under the most trying circumstances to respect international law as regards Palestinian children. Elaborate laws and regulations govern the treatment of the Palestinian civilian population, even when they engage in hostilities. These principles aim at sparing the innocent civilian population from the dangers of armed conflict. Israel’s active and liberal Supreme Court frequently reviews challenges to particular polices and conduct of the IDF, to keep the standards high.
Thus it is not the IDF, but rather the Palestinian leadership, which should ultimately be held responsible for the injury and death among their rioting children.
Israeli society revolves around the family. Jews as a people have always placed paramount emphasis on improving the lives of their children, and not only their own children. Israelis and Jews everywhere therefore deeply regret that Palestinian children have been caught up in the recent violence.
1. Palestinian sources have dubbed the current disturbances the “Al-Aqsa intifada.” Intifada is the Arabic word for “uprising” or “shaking off” and Al-Aqsa is the mosque in Jerusalem which observant Moslems regard as their third holiest site, after Mecca and Medina. See Lamia Lahoud, “Fatah Calls for Intifada Despite Summit,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 17, 2000. The current Al-Aqsa intifada should be distinguished from the earlier intifada, which began in December 1987, had practically disappeared by the time of the Gulf War in January 1991, and ended with the commencement of the Oslo peace process in mid-1993.
2. Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251 [Wye River Memorandum], art. II (C) 4.
3. Karen Laub, “12 Palestinians Killed in Clashes,” AP, Sept. 30, 2000.
4. Jerusalem Post staff and AP, “UN Condemns Israel’s ‘Excessive Force,'” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 10, 2000, at 2.
5. Bob Simon (CBS News), “Children on the Front Lines,” 60 Minutes II, Oct. 24, 2000, visited Oct. 26, 2000, http://cbsnews.cbs.com/now/story/0,1597,243723-412,00.shtml. It is clear that these casualties harm Israeli interests both locally and abroad. Locally, they stoke the calls for revenge and internationally they serve to generate sympathy and support for Palestinian objectives.
6. Ze’ev Schiff, “Getting the Numbers Straight,” Ha’aretz, November 3, 2000.
7. Evaluation of the Use of Force in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank: Medical and Forensic Investigation, A Report by Physicians for Human Rights, November 3, 2000. http://www.phrusa.org/fresearch/forensics/israel/Israel_force_2.html.
9. Palestine Red Crescent Society, visited Nov. 5, 2000, http://www.palestinercs.org.
10. Dale Gavlak, “Arabs Condemn Israel But Still Call for Peace,” UPI, Oct. 21, 2000. Ironically, Arafat’s frequent calls, directly and indirectly, for the annihilation of Israel violate the Genocide Convention, which criminalize not only acts of genocide but also incitement to commit genocide in articles II, III and IV. Louis Rene Beres, “Arafat, Genocide and International Law,” beres@polsci.purdue.edu.
11. Jack Kelley, “Street Clashes Now Deliberate Warfare,” USA Today, Oct. 23, 2000.
12. UN Security Council Res. 1322 (Sep. 28, 2000).
14. Jack Kelley, “Street Clashes.” Ironically, those very weapons were provided to them to maintain order against terrorism and incitement, under the interim peace agreements that Arafat signed.
15. Herb Keinon, “Israel to the UN: Keep Palestinians from Using Kids as Shields,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 8, 2000 at 1.
16. IDF Spokesman’s Office, Oct. 31, 2000.
17. See IDF Chief of Staff General Shaul Mofaz, Israel Radio interview, Oct. 25, 2000.
18. IDF Spokesman’s Office, “The ‘Ebb and Flow’ Conflict Divided According to Incident Characteristic 29/09-29/10/2000,” Oct. 31, 2000; Margot Dudkevitch, “3209 Violent Incidents in West Bank in October,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 1, 2000 at 3. Another report gave the figure of 780 shooting incidents in the previous month. Arieh O’Sullivan, “Gil Missile Used for First Time Against Beit Jallah,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 2, 2000 at 2.
20. IDF Spokesman, “Ebb and Flow”; Dudkevitch, “3209 Violent Incidents.” Some have claimed that stone-throwing is a purely symbolic act. Nothing could be further from the truth. It often causes serious injury and occasionally even death. Thus one of the Israeli fatalities was hit in the chest by a large rock that was thrown at his car near the Arab village of Jisr e-Zarka on the highway between Haifa and Tel Aviv, two of Israel’s largest cities. David Rudge, “2 Israeli Arabs Killed in Nazareth Clashes,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 10, 2000 at 1.
22. IDF Spokesman’s Office, “Netzarim Incident,” Oct. 10, 2000; visited Oct. 24, 2000. http://www.idf.il/english/news/netsar.stm.
23. This is a very serious matter indeed, as the protection offered to the wounded and those who tend to them hangs in the balance. Thus article 21 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 provides: “The protection to which fixed medical establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.” The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, art. 21.
24. Jack Kelley, “Street Clashes”; Margot Dudkevitch, “Stepped-up Clashes, Attacks Reported Throughout Territories,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 2, 2000 at 2.
27. Clinton Bailey, “Settlements or Security?,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 30, 2000 at 8.
29. Lecture by Colonel Raanan Gissin, IDF Spokesman’s Office, Jerusalem, Oct. 21, 2000.
30. Mike Hanna, Jerusalem Bureau Chief, CNN, Oct. 31, 2000.
31. “Diary,” Israel Radio’s News Magazine, Oct. 26, 2000.
32. Daoud Kuttab, “A Profile of the Stonethrowers,” 17 J. of Palestine Studies, no. 3 (Spring 1988):15, 18.
33. William V. O’Brien, Law and Morality in Israel’s War With the PLO (New York: Routledge, 1991), 249.
34. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel’s Measures in the Territories and Human Rights (1990) 29; see also IDF Spokesman, “Ricochets: Children as Instruments of the Intifada,” quoting Intifada Leaflet (1990), Nov. 16, May 17, 1991 at 1.
35. Matthew Dorf, “Palestinian Children’s Show Sparks Anger in Washington,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Aug. 17, 1998.
38. Michael Widlanski, “Special Report: Voice of Palestine Coverage of Peres-Arafat Agreement and Follow-up Announcement,” Israel Resource News Agency, http:\\www.israelbehindthenews.com, Jerusalem, Nov. 2, 2000.
39. George Will, “The Downfall of Israel?,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 16, 2000.
40. IRIS, “The Palestinians in Their Own Words,” Palestinian Quote Sheet #50, Oct. 16, 2000.
42. “PA Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine Discusses the Intifada,” Al-Ahram Al-Arabi (Egypt), Oct. 28, 2000, via MEMRI, Nov. 8, 2000.
43. John F. Burns, “Palestinian Summer Camp Offers the Games of War,” New York Times, Aug. 3, 2000 at 1; Steven Gross, Director of International Child Services, Hadassah Wizo Canada Research Institute, unpublished manuscript, (n.d.).
44. See video entitled “Jihad for Kids,” Jerusalem, Peace for Generations, 1998.
46. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988); Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
47. Lamia Awwad, “Ministry Reopens Schools After Week-Long Closure,” Jerusalem Times, Oct. 13, 2000.
48. See Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, “CMIP Launched in Congress,” CMIP Newsletter, no.1, Sept. 1998.
49. Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, CMIP Newsletter.
50. Ethan Bronner, “The World: Blueprint; Filling in Peace’s Details is the Painful Part,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1998 at 1.
52. Alan Baker, Legal Advisor to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Using Children in Conflict (Melbourne: AIJAC, n.d.).
53. Margot Dudkevitch, “Arafat: Rocket Attacks Won’t Stop Al-Aqsa Intifada,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 1, 2000 at 1.
54. Sam Kiley, “A Deadly Game,” The Times, Oct. 19, 2000.
55. al-Ayyam, October 26, 2000 (MEMRI).
56. Yasser Arafat, Letter to Yitzhak Rabin, Sept. 9, 1993, Judith Wrubel, ed., Peacewatch: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994) at 77.
57. Yitzhak Rabin, Letter to Yasser Arafat, Sept. 9, 1993. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sep. 1993.
58. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 33 I.L.M. 622, art. XII [Cairo Agreement].
59. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept., 28, 1995, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 557 Preamble [Oslo II]. It is interesting that here, as elsewhere in the interim agreements, incitement is grouped with terrorism as an evil to be combated.
60. Oslo II, art. XXII(1), (2).
62. Oslo II, Annex 1, art. IV(f).
63. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron and Related Documents, Jan. 17, 1997, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 650, Note for the Record, art. 2(b) [Hebron Protocol].
64. Wye River Memorandum; see Justus Reid Weiner, “Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, (forthcoming).
65. Wye River Memorandum, Section II, A(3).
66. Editorial, “No Apologies for Curriculum,” Jerusalem Times.
67. Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, CMIP Newsletter.
68. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, Nov. 4, 1999, art. 8(a) [Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum].
69. Margot Dudkevitch, “IDF: Palestinians Offer $2,000 for ‘Martyrs,'” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 6, 2000 at A3; cf. Tom Zeller, “Sticks and Stones: A Deadly Brand of Child’s Play,” New York Times, Oct. 8, 2000.
70. Chris Hedges, “The Glamour of Martyrdom,” New York Times, Oct. 29, 2000.
72. Lamia Lahoud, “Palestinians Disappointed in Results of Cairo Parley,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2000.
73. Gerald Steinberg, “Child Sacrifice is Palestinian Paganism,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 27, 2000 at 10.
75. O’Brien, Law and Morality.
76. al-Ayyam, October 26, 2000 (MEMRI).
77. Al Hayat-Al Jadida, Oct. 27, 2000, from Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem.
80. George Abu Al-Zulof, “Children Not Put on the Front Line,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 31, 2000 at 9.
81. The absurdity of this claim is readily seen. “Teenagers and younger kids marched off to the Ayosh junction, where territory controlled by the Palestinians meets up with land controlled by Israel….The Ayosh junction is way out of town; youths have to hike to the soldiers.” Trudy Rubin, “The Children’s Crusade,” (Philadelphia) Inquirer, Oct. 25, 2000.
82. The Tanzim are an armed militia of Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO. Virtually unknown prior to the Al-Aqsa intifada (possibly because Arafat was required to disarm all such militias under the interim peace agreements), they have taken a leading role in the shooting. The Tanzim, which have been shooting from Beit Jallah into the Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo (see Margot Dudkevitch, “Foreign Ministry Helps Hundreds of Christian Families Flee PA Areas,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2000 at 1), rejected the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement which President Clinton engineered to stop the violence. Its leader, Marwan Barghouti, defiantly referred to this agreement as “an Israeli agreement” and threatened to “accelerate the intifada, not stop it.” Barghouti attributed the group’s recent use of Hizbullah’s yellow flag and photos of Hizbullah Sheikh Nasrallah in demonstrations as displays of admiration for Hizbullah’s kidnapping of Israelis. Lamia Lahoud, “Tanzim Vow to Continue Intifada,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 18, 2000.
Hamas has also thrown in its lot with the statement of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, its founder and spiritual leader, who told a cheering crowd of thousands, “[w]e will never give up on any part of historic Palestine. Resistance will continue to either victory or martyrdom.” Hatem Lutfi, “Yassin: Hamas Forces Ready for Al-Aqsa Intifada,” Jerusalem Times, Oct. 13, 2000. Yassin praised the release of senior Hamas members from PA jails where they had been held for planning and participating in terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. The PA’s sudden release of Hamas senior leaders and bomb-makers prompted warnings that Arafat has given the green light for renewed suicide attacks. David Zev Harris and Herb Keinon, “Hamas Political Leader: All Israelis are Legitimate Targets,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 12, 2000; see Jonathan Krashinsky, “IDF: Senior PA Officials Involved with Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 17, 2000 at 4.
83. Charles Krauthammer, “Fight Back or Die,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 30, 2000 at 8.
85. Ibid. The utility of child soldiers has been addressed in the media: “Children ‘become in a very cynical way the best raw material to fashion into efficient, ruthless, unquestioning tools of war,’ Olara Otunnu, the UN special representative for children and armed conflict, said in an interview. ‘Because they are impressionable, they’re like a vessel. Whatever you want to shape them into, they’ll be shaped.'” Tina Susman and Geoffrey Mohan, “A Generation Lost to War,” Newsday.com, http://www.newsday.com/news/childwar/wchild1.htm .
86. Huda Al-Husseini, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), Oct. 27, 2000, translated by MEMRI, “Arab Journalist Decries Palestinian Child-Soldiers,” Special Dispatch no. 146, Nov. 1, 2000.
87. al-Ayyam, October 26, 2000 (MEMRI).
88. Palestine Ministry of Information, “Daily Press Review,” Nov. 7, 2000, citing Al-Hayat Al-Jadida http://www.pna.org/mininfo/press/eps_0711.htm.
90. David and Leah Ortiz, “Latest Update,” Oct. 25, 2000, ldortiz@attglobal.net.
91. Annex to Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [Hague Regulations].
92. See, e.g., Oslo II, art. XIV.
94. Telephone interview with Colonel Raanan Gissin, IDF Spokesman’s Office, Jerusalem, Nov. 8, 2000.
95. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 28 [Fourth Geneva Convention].
96. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 38, (1989). This Convention has been ratified by 191 states, making it the most widely ratified human rights instrument ever. UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Rights of the Child: Additional Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, Submitted in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 53/128,E/ CN.4/2000/71, Feb. 9, 2000, art. 2(6). The UN Security Council has also adopted Resolution 1261 which “strongly condemns…recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law.” UN Sec. Council Res. 1261 (1999), art. 3, 8, 13.
97. Baker, Using Children in Conflict.
98. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 38, (1989).
99. Marta Santos Pais, “The Convention on the Rights of the Child,” in the United Nations’ Manual on Human Rights Reporting 292, 414 (1997). The Council of Delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross has endorsed a plan of action to promote the principles of non-recruitment and non-participation in armed conflicts of children under the age of 18. This plan places blame as follows: “Responsibility for using children as soldiers lies with all of the adults who accept or encourage children to participate in armed conflict. These are parents and other adults from the child’s community, local commanders accepting children in their ranks, and peer groups glorifying the ‘free lifestyle’ of the soldiers.” ICRC Council of Delegates, Plan of Action Concerning Children in Armed Conflict, Objective 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 (1995), http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/8ec4e051a8621595c12564670032d7ef/9bcae5853.
100. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 36, (1989).
101. Baker, Using Children in Conflict.
102. The PLO maintains diplomatic relations of various types with over a hundred different governments even though it does not meet the standard indices of state sovereignty as set forth in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. See James Crawford, “The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?,” 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 307; Ruth Lapidoth and N.K. Calvo-Goller, “Les Elements Constitutifs de L’Etat et la Declaration du Conseil National Palestinien du 15 Novembre 1988,” R.G.D.I.P. 777 (1992) (French original). But see Francis A. Boyle, “The Creation of the State of Palestine,” 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 301; M. Flory, “Naissance d’un Etat Palestinien,” R.G.D.I.P. 385 (1989) (French original); Tal Becker, International Recognition of a Unilaterally Declared Palestinian State: Legal and Policy Dilemmas (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2000). This has been recognized by the senior Palestinian peace negotiator and the senior deputy to Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, who referred to the DOP by stating that, “[W]e do not claim that we signed an agreement that created an independent Palestinian state; none of the provisions of the Declaration of Principals make such a claim.” Mahmoud Abbas, Through Secret Channels (Redding, UK: Garnet, 1997), 218.
103. Similarly, in response to the PA’s declaration that it would adhere to the Geneva conventions of 1949 and the subsequent two protocols, the Swiss Federal Council stated that “it was not in the position to decide whether the letter constituted an instrument of accession,” and deferred from making a decision “due to the uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or non-existence of the state of Palestine.” Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949 and additional protocols of June 8, 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions, DD/JUR 98/820-CPS 32 (Dec. 31, 1998).
104. Lamia Lahood, “Fatah Promises Intifada Against Israeli Settlements,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 10, 2000.
105. Elie Weisel, Transcript of Speech, New York, Oct. 27, 2000.
107. Prime Minister Barak stated: “there is an understanding in the Arab world that Arafat and the PA, in their decision not to reach an agreement with us that was within reach, but rather to choose the path of violence, have taken upon themselves a heavy responsibility that changes the character of the [peace] process. At the moment the PA and Arafat have chosen the path of conflict in an attempt to make us fold and to get us to surrender our vital interests through force.” Herb Keinon and Lamia Lahoud, “Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa: Current Peace Process Over,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2000. Arafat’s violent course even threatens regional stability thanks to his successful appeals for mass protests in Arab countries.
Justus Reid Weiner is an international human rights lawyer and a member of the Israel and New York Bar Associations. He is a Scholar-in-Residence at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and an adjunct lecturer at Hebrew and Tel Aviv Universities. The author expresses his indebtedness to Alona Abramowitz and Joshua Wohl for their assistance in this project.

References: V. 
 art. 21
 V. 
 art. 2
 art. 8
 art. 43
 art. 28
 Art. 38
 art. 2
 art. 3
 Art. 38
 Art. 36