Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2010/2010-51968.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:33:11+00:00

Document:
[*1] People v Garlock 2010 NY Slip Op 51968(U) [29 Misc 3d 1223(A)] Decided on November 16, 2010 Just Ct of Town of Lockport, Niagara County Tilney, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected in part through November 19, 2010; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Leonard G. Tilney, Jr., J.
The Defendant, by written motion requested, inter alia, an Ingle Hearing (People vs. Ingle 36 NY2d 413) to determine the legality of the automobile stop. The People consented to the hearing. The arresting officer was the sole witness at the hearing. Both parties submitted written post-hearing arguments.
People assert Niagara County Sheriff Deputy Timothy Caughel had probable cause to stop the defendant on Driving While Intoxicated charges because the defendant violated Section 375(3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. People state the defendant's high beam lights were on before, during and after the time he passed Caughel, causing Caughel to look away, thus, creating a "detrimental effect."
Defendant asserts Deputy Caughel had no reason to pull him over, because Caughel was unaware of the statutory "detrimental effect" requirement.VTL 375(3) not being applicable meant there was no basis to stop the defendant and any reasons given by Caughel for the stop [*2]under that section of the statute were based on a mistake of law, to wit: defendant's high beams were not dimmed.
The standard of review is Probable Cause not Reasonable Suspicion.
An actual violation of the vehicle and traffic law need not be detectable all that is required is that the stop be not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. It is enough if the stop is based upon specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonable warrant the intrusion." citing Terry v. Ohio 392 US 1.
The particular Vehicle and Traffic Law section which the officer relies on to justify the stop must also be closely examined because on occasion, the courts have found that the officer made a mistake of law and ruled the stop invalid. Where the officer's belief is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, the stop is illegal at the outset and any further actions by the police as a direct result of the stop are illegal. Byer v. Jackson 241 AD2d 943 (Fourth Dept. 1997).
The two issues for this hearing to determine are: 1) whether or not Niagara County Deputy Sheriff Timothy Caughel had probable cause to stop the Vehicle driven by the Defendant, and 2) was that stop based on a mistake of law.
"Headlamps required pursuant to the provisions of subdivision two of this section may be of the multiple beam type designed to produce more than one distribution of light or of the single beam type designed to produce only one distribution of light.
Provided that, whenever a vehicle approaching from ahead is within five hundred feet, or when approaching a moving vehicle from the rear and within two hundred feet of the same, the headlamps, if of the multiple beam type, or the auxiliary front facing lamps, if the vehicle is so equipped, shall be operated so that dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of the approaching vehicle, or the vehicle being approached, and, whenever the highway is so lighted or traffic thereon is such that illumination of the highway for more than two hundred feet ahead of the vehicle by lights on such vehicle is unnecessary or impracticable, the headlamps, if of the multiple beam type, or the auxiliary front facing lamps, if the vehicle is so equipped, shall be operated with the lowermost distribution of light in use. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall be construed to prevent the use of flashing high beams to signify an intention to pass a vehicle or vehicles when two or more vehicles are traveling in the same direction, the operation of any headlamp as defined in paragraph d of subdivision two of this section, nor shall it apply to any auxiliary front facing lamp permitted to be displayed only on an authorized emergency vehicle."
Deputy Caughel's testimony was truthful, straight forward, candid and credible and, but for cross examination, uncontroverted. Clearly, Deputy Caughel observed what he thought was a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which would justify the stop of the defendant's motor vehicle. Whether or not Caughel charged the Defendant under the correct section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law or even charged any underlying violation is academic. The Fourth Department in People vs. Schroeder 229 AD2d 917 (1996) has indicated that a police officer is authorized to stop a motor vehicle on a public highway when the officer observes a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see, People v. Lamanda, 205 AD2d 934, 935 613 NYS2d 755, Iv denied 84 NY2d 828, 617 NYS2d 148, 641 NE2d 169; People v. May, 191 AD2d 1011, 1012, 595 NYS2d 165, Iv denied 81 NY2d 1016, 600 NYS2d 204, 616 NE2d 861; see also, People v. Ellis, 62 NY2d 393, 396, 477 NYS2d 106, 465 NE2d 826). It is clear Deputy Caughel stopped the defendant for failure to dim his high beam head lights. Only after the stop did Caughel notice the initial indicia of intoxication of the defendant, leading to a failure of sobriety tests and the arrest for driving while intoxicated in violation of Section 1192(3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
This was not a pretext stop. In any event Whren (Whren vs. United States, 517 US 806, 116 S.Ct. 1749) as adopted by the Court of Appeals in People vs. Robinson (97 NY2d 341, 741 NYS2d 147) allows this type of stop. See specifically People vs. Reynolds fact pattern decided with Robinson.
"State Trooper testified at the suppression hearing that on the morning in question, he was on routine patrol heading east on a particular road. As a westbound vehicle came within 200 to 300 feet of his marked vehicle, it appeared that it was operating with its headlights on high beam. [*5]The glare was so strong that the Trooper had to squint his eyes, hold up his hand to block the glare and pull to the side of the road. The Trooper immediately turned around and initiated a traffic stop." p. 870.
Here, the defendant had his low beams on and only when he approached the Chevy Tahoe with higher and brighter lights did he turn on his high beams. Nor did Deputy Caughel immediately pursue the defendant and stop him. Rather, Caughel followed the defendant for over a mile on two different roads before a stop was initiated. Caughel concedes the defendant's actions could have been in a time frame to flash his bright beams on and off. The fact that the defendant had his bright beams on when stopped can be explained because he turned them back on just as well as leaving them on all the time.
The Court of Appeals has indicated: "The mere flashing of lights, alone, does not constitute a violation of the statute (see People v. Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 397 ; People v. Hines, 155 AD2d 722, 724 , lv denied 76 NY2d 736 ; People v. Lauber, 162 Misc 2d 19, 20 ).
Our own Fourth Department, on a similar fact pattern, in 2009, reversed a conviction in the Steuben County Court (See People vs. Rose, cited, supra ). This court is bound by that case. This court finds the stop of defendant's automobile was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law by the arresting officer. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as the result of the stop of his vehicle is granted and the accusatory instruments are dismissed.
Caughel also testified that the defendant crossed over the center line of Dysinger, but it is clear to the court that defendant was only stopped for violating Section 375(3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. See Supporting Deposition amplifying the reason for the stop.
Defendant argues Deputy Caughel exaggerated his testimony after conferencing with the ADA. This is rejected by the court as the Deputy admitted he thought the statute required only that high beam headlights be dimmed (p 24 of hearing transcript and supporting deposition).

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