Source: https://www.wolfgreenfield.com/publications/articles/2015/more-than-just-marking-a-little-known-subsection-of-287
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:13:23+00:00

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A U.S. manufacturing company purchases a particular part from an overseas supplier. Unbeknownst to the U.S. company, importation and resale of the part in the U.S. infringes a U.S. patent because the part happened to be made using a patented process, and the U.S. company does not realize this until it is sued for patent infringement. The U.S. company may be able to defend itself using a little-known subsection of what is commonly referred to as the “marking statute,” 35 U.S.C. § 287.
Most practitioners are familiar with the portion of § 287 that punishes patentees who fail to adequately mark their products or control the marking of patent numbers on products sold by their licensees. Section 287 is less known for its later subsections, which have nothing to do with marking, but otherwise limit a patentee’s ability to recover damages and other remedies.
The second subsection, § 287(b), is a potentially valuable shield for those who have overseas suppliers for their goods. It places limitations on remedies available against entities accused of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) — i.e., sellers or importers of products allegedly made by a patented process outside the United States.
It is important to recognize that “notice of infringement” under the statute is broadly defined and limits the amount of exposure that § 287(b) can successfully block. The statute defines “notice of infringement” to be “actual knowledge … of information sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that it is likely that a product was made by a process patented in the United States,” or a detailed, written accusation of infringement — or both.
As the Southern District of New York has held, notice need not come from a patent holder. In Infosint SA v. H. Lundbeck A/S, the accused infringer moved for partial summary judgment, arguing it was entitled to a limitation of damages accrued prior to the patent owner’s first communication of infringement allegations, which in this case was the complaint itself. The court denied summary judgment, reasoning that lack of notice from the patent owner prior to filing the complaint “does not establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the defendant] knew it was likely that products in its possession were made by a process patented here.” While this set of facts was relatively straightforward — indeed, the defendant did not even argue it lacked notice prior to the lawsuit — the court took a close look at the statute’s legislative history.
This restrictive view on the applicability of § 287(b) has not as yet been adopted by other courts, so it is still worthwhile to carefully consider the defense even as a well-to-do, sophisticated retailer accused of infringing under § 271(g).
The Federal Circuit has recognized that “[b]y sending a request for information to the [manufacturer] to determine the process used, an alleged infringer can limit potential damages under section 271(g),” but the issue of what constitutes a “well grounded factual basis” has not been squarely addressed by the courts.
In sum, § 287(b) provides potentially valuable remedy limitations to accused § 271(g) infringers. Such entities should study carefully the various provisions of § 287(b), and take steps necessary to take full advantage of the limitations.

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