Source: https://pinggoylopez.wordpress.com/2018/03/31/provisional-dismissal-of-a-criminal-case/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 11:00:14+00:00

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DR. CLARO ROBLES, Defendant-Appellee.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for Appellant.
Elias C. Desembrana for Appellee.
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11065 is not provisional in character but one which is tantamount to acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
There is a close parallelism between the instant case and that of People v. Tecneng, Et Al., G.R. No. L-12082, which was decided by this Court only on April 30, 1959. In that case, the accused was charged with homicide before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. They pleaded not guilty, and the case was set for hearing. When the hearing came, the Fiscal asked for postponement alleging that he was not able to contact his witnesses, which was granted. When the case was again called for hearing, the Fiscal moved for another postponement alleging that his witnesses could not be found, and the hearing was againg postponed. But when the third hearing came and the Fiscal asked for another postponement, the accused vigorously objected to the postponement invoking his Constitutional right to a speedy trial. Considering that the case had been postponed twice and the whereabouts of the witnesses for the prosecution could not be ascertained, while on the other hand the accused were intitled to a speedy trial, the Court dismissed the case. However, one year and three months thereafter, the Provincial Fiscal filed another information for murder against the same defendants, with the onlu difference that the mayor of the place was included as co-accused. When the case came up for hearing, the defendants moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court entertained the motion and on appeal this Court rendered a confirmatory decision.
ARNOLD VEGAFRIA, Petitioner, v. JUDGE CATALINO CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge, Br. 17, RTC, Manila, RONILO A. AZARRAGA, Asst. City Prosecutor of Manila, and CARLOS V. DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
Recto Law Offices for Petitioner.
Cayanga, Zuñiga & Angel Law Offices for C. V. de Guzman.
The legal consequence of the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, based on an Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complaining witness, is the crux of this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON.
SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants.
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the effect that records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x x. It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnirs finding that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined – – – whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule.
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.
In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners meritorious.
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice.
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.
… An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex A.
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express conformity of the accused.
And with notice to the offended party.
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement, which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
You were present during the proceedings?
You represented the petitioner in this case?
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of probable cause?
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what should the Court do?
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim.
The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein.This the Court cannot and should not do.
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte. There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor, he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon) executed their respective affidavits of desistance. There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondents motion and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR. CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, Petitioners, v. PANFILO M. LACSON, Respondent.
The contentions of the respondent have no merit.
13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the “preliminary investigation” was dismissed for the reasons mentioned, there currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation can be had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a “sworn written statement charging a person with an offense” as basis for the commencement of a preliminary investigation under Rule 112.
You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime, for the killing of the 11 in 1995?
That is my submission, Your Honor.
Let us see your reason for it?
First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?
Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is my submission.
No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy?
They are two different claims.
That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it.
You are not invoking double jeopardy?
No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the Court to apply the doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson?
Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.
So, the answer is yes?
No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights of double jeopardy upon the accused who invokes it.
What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that later.
Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy you are resting your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of 8, 117?
On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is speedy disposition of cases which implemented 8, 117, that is our arguments in this bar.
Are you not resting on 8,117?
That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.
So, you are resting on 8,117?
The Constitution which gave life to 8,117.
Can a Court, let us see your theory then — your theory rest on two provisions: first, the Rules of Court 8,117 and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition?
Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar?
It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had already been arraigned before the Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the RTC.
You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City.
It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, [Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except [if] it is with the express conformity of the accused.
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
Don’t you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Sec. 14. Revival of cases provisionally dismissed.- The one or two- year period allowed for reviving a criminal case that has been provisionally dismissed shall be reckoned from the issuance of the order of dismissal. The dismissal shall become automatically permanent if the case is not revived within the required period. Such permanent dismissal shall amount to an adjudication of the case on the merits.
The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening the case should prevail.
We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial court for arraignment and trial.
SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused. Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash – the complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and the exception stated in Section 6.
Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations that should not be confused with one another.If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.
Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of the case that the RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CAs order is legally proper.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court’s issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel’s receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private counsel’s date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
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