Source: https://revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/corrv2notes.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:13:12+00:00

Document:
“On behalf of the President Mr Welles gave this reply to my secret letter to the President on Comrade Stalin’s behalf, delivered while Mr Roosevelt was on the ocean, concerning Finland.
2 In Placentia Bay (Newfoundland) on August 9-12, 1941, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill held a meeting known as the Atlantic Conference. They discussed further United States and British plans in connection with the radical change in the international situation following the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Hitler Germany. They coordinated the foreign policies of their two countries, and declared their war aims. On August 14, 1941, they adopted and made known a joint declaration (the Atlantic Charter), containing “certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries”. On September 24, 1941, the Soviet Government announced its concurrence with the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter.
3 Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in July 1941 as President Roosevelt’s personal representative and was received by J. V. Stalin.
4 That is, the conference between Soviet, British and U.S. representatives held in Moscow over September 29-October 1, 1941, to discuss reciprocal deliveries of war materials.
5 The writer refers to the Lend-Lease Act, adopted by the U.S. Congress on March 11, 1941. The Act empowered the U.S. Government to lend or lease to other countries various articles and materials essential to their defence, provided their defence was, according to the definition of the President, vital to U.S. defence. In November 1941 the Lend- Lease Act was extended to include the Soviet Union.
6 Following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war on the USA by Germany and Italy, the USA became a belligerent in the Second World War.
7 Negotiations were held in Moscow between Joseph Stalin and Britain’s Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on December 16-20, 1941 relating to Anglo-Soviet treaties of wartime alliance against Germany and post-war cooperation. The negotiations were broken off due to Britain’s refusal to recognise the Soviet western frontier of 1941.
8 President Roosevelt had not replied to this Stalin message.
9 On June 11, 1942, M. M. Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A. and U.S. Secretary of State Hull exchanged Notes to the effect that the Agreement Between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, signed on June 11, 1942, replaced and invalidated the previous agreements between the Soviet and U.S. Governments on the same subject, concluded by exchanging messages between Roosevelt and Stalin in November 1941 and February 1942.
10 The reference is to J. V. Stalin’s message, sent on February 18, 1942 (see Document No. 14).
11 On March 16, 1942, the U.S. Embassy in the U.S.S.R. telephoned the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., advising that this letter from President Roosevelt had been sent by U.S. diplomatic mail, via Tehran, in November 1941. The letter, which had been delayed en route, was delivered on March 15, 1942, to Kuibyshev, where the U.S. Embassy was in temporary residence.
12 See Document No. 4.
14 This term was applied to the countries which had signed the Declaration of Twenty-Six States in Washington on January 1, 1942, and those which later acceded to the Declaration.
15 The reference is to a protocol on U.S. and British deliveries of war equipment, ammunition and raw materials to the Soviet Union, signed on October 6, 1942, and covering the period from July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943.
17 U.S. marines landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi islands of the Solomon group, on August 1942, and consolidated their positions.
18 General Hurley delivered this message to J. V. Stalin on November 14, 1942.
19 See under No. 41 Stalin’s message of October 7, 1942, to Roosevelt.
20 The Soviet submarine L-16 was sunk in the Pacific on October 11, 1942, by a submarine of unknown nationality.
21 The allusion is to President Roosevelt’s and Winston Churchill’s conference in Casablanca (North-West Africa) on January 14-23, 1943.
22 Rabaul, a town in New Britain, an Island of the Bismarck Archipelago.
23 The reason for this document being included in the collection is that it says it is a joint message from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.
24 The allusion is to the Combined Anglo-American Staffs formed in Washington on February 6, 1942, to work on the problems of Anglo- American military cooperation.
25 The allusion is to Stalin’s message of May 26, 1943 (see Document No. 88).
26 The writer refers to V. M. Molotov, who during his visit to Washington in May and June 1942 was , for security reasons, known as “Mr Brown”.
27 See Document No. 70.
28 The arrangement in force at that time was the protocol mentioned in Note 15 above.
On October 19, 1943, the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.A., Canada and the Soviet Union signed a new protocol on reciprocal deliveries, covering one year – from July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944.
29 See Document No. 95.
30 On July 12, 1943, U.S. Secretary of State Hull informed A. A. Gromyko the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, that the U.S submarine Permit had sunk a Soviet trawler in the area of the Aleutians, having mistaken it for an enemy ship. Two members of the crew were killed the rest were picked up by the Americans. On his own behalf and on behalf of the U.S. Navy Department Mr Hull expressed deep regret at the accident.
31 The Italian General Castellano, who on instructions from Marshal Badoglio signed the “short terms” for the surrender of Italy on September 3, 1943.
32 Code name for the Allied invasion of Italy in the Naples area, carried out in September 1943.
In a letter of August 3, 1943, Mr Kerr communicated the “short terms” for the surrender of Italy. The document setting forth the “comprehensive terms” for the Italian surrender was transmitted to the Soviet Government on July 30, 1943, through the Soviet Embassy in London (it was handed by Mr Eden to A. A. Sobolev, the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Britain). On July 31,1943, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. informed the British Ambassador that the Soviet Government did not object to the terms and that it had instructed the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Britain to notify Mr Eden accordingly.
34 The reference should apparently have been made to paragraph I (c).
35 Code name for the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, which took place in Washington in May 1943.
36 Code name for the Azores.
37 That is, at Quebec.
38 The reference is to a joint message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, dated August 19, 1943 (see Document No. 102). It was sent to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. by British Ambassador Kerr on August 20, 1943, with some omissions. The supplements and corrections to the text came in on August 22. The full text of the message appears under No. 102.
39 The allusion is to the “short” and “comprehensive” terms for the surrender of Italy. The “short terms” consisted of eleven articles bearing chiefly on military matters. On August 3, 1943, British Ambassador Kerr communicated the text of the “short terms” to the Soviet Government, advising it that they had already been sent to General Eisenhower against the eventuality of the Italian Government directly approaching him with a request for armistice.
On August 26, 1943, the British and U.S. Ambassadors handed to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. the full text of the “comprehensive terms” for the Italian surrender, consisting of forty-four articles which contained not only military provisions, but also political, economic and financial stipulations bound up with the surrender. On August 27, 1943, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. notified the British and U.S. Ambassadors that the Soviet Government agreed to the “comprehensive terms” for the surrender of Italy and empowered General Eisenhower to sign those terms on behalf of the Soviet Government.
42 The reference is to the message received from President Roosevelt on September 11, 1943 (see Document No. 114) and the one from Prime Minister Churchill, dated September 10, 1913.
“Whereas the Italian Government and the Italian Supreme Command acknowledge that the Italian forces have been totally defeated and that Italy can no longer carry on the war against the United Nations and have accordingly unconditionally requested a suspension of hostilities; and whereas the United States and the United Kingdom Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are willing to lay down the terms on which they are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her allies are not obstructed, and that Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these Governments; the following terms have been presented by . . . . . . . . . .
duly authorised to that effect; and have been accepted by . . . . . . . . .
44 On October 2, 1943, A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., transmitted to the U.S. State Department the Soviet Government’s proposals for the agenda of the forthcoming conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S A and Britain in Moscow. The Soviet Government proposed in particular “measures to shorten the duration of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe.
“The British Ambassador, Mr Kerr, has informed the Soviet Government that the British Government would like the representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain on the military-political commission to hand to the French Committee of National Liberation on behalf of their Governments, identical Notes formally inviting a representative of the Committee to take part in the work of the commission. The draft Note submitted by the British Government says concerning the terms of reference of the military political commission that the representatives of the three Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation would give joint or separate advice to the three Governments or the Liberation Committee, but would not be empowered to take final action, it being understood as a matter of course that they would not interfere with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
“This is to advise you for your information that in its reply to the British Government, dated October 14, the Soviet Government signified its agreement to a representative of the French Committee being formally invited to participate in the military-political commission.
46 The allusion is to the following Memorandum, which Mr. Hamilton, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires, handed to A. Y. Vyshinsky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., on October 14, 1943: “Recently, the Government of the United States has received requests from the Chinese Government and from the Brazilian Government that they be accorded representation on the Political and Military Commission which is being set up at Algiers. The Government of the United States has likewise received similar requests from the Greek Government and from the Yugoslav Government. While certain disadvantages might be presented by such expansion in the size of the Commission, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that it is desirable to have these Governments represented on the Commission and the Government of the United States suggests that favorable consideration be given to their requests. The Government of the United States would appreciate receiving the views of the Soviet Government on the question of granting the requests made by the four Governments mentioned.
47 The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain held in Moscow between October 19 and 30, 1943.
51 This document was handed to Stalin by Roosevelt at Tehran on November 29, 1943.
53 Code name for the crossing of the Channel and the invasion of France, carried out by Allied forces in June 1944.
54 Code name for the landing on the south coast of France, carried out by the Allies on August 15, 1944.
55 The reference is to the Statement of the Soviet Government Concerning Soviet-Polish Relations, published on January 11, 1944, and the TASS Communication on the statement of the Polish Government in London, published on January 17, 1944.
“Your Note of January 19 reached me through Soviet Ambassador Gromyko on January 22.
“I have already conveyed my reply to Mr Harriman orally, and now advise you in writing that, while thanking you for your readiness to mediate, I must say to my regret that conditions for mediation are not ripe yet.
“The Soviet Government made concessions by declaring the 1939 frontier to be subject to revision and proposed the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish frontier. Yet the Polish Government in London reacted by evading the question of the Curzon Line and is using official documents to propagate the idea that the frontier established under the Riga Treaty is immutable.
“The Soviet Government severed relations with the Polish Government in London because of the latter’s participation in the Hitlerite slander over the ‘Katyn massacre’. At that time the Polish Government was headed by General Sikorski. The Mikolajczyk Government, instead of dissociating itself from the fascist act of the Sikorski Government, declared that it would continue Sikorski’s policy, and the Mikolajczyk Government far from disavowing its Ambassadors in Mexico and Canada and its supporters in the U.S.A. (the Matuszewski group), who are engaged in a campaign openly hostile to the Soviet Union, is actually abetting them.
“It will be seen from these facts that the Polish Government in London has called on the U.S. and British Governments to mediate, not with a view to reaching agreement with the Soviet Government, but in order to aggravate the conflict and involve the Allies in it , for it is obvious that in the absence of a common basis for agreement negotiation and mediation are doomed to fail.
“The Soviet Government would not like the friendly mission of mediation to be exposed to the threat of inevitable failure.
“That is why I believe conditions are not yet ripe for negotiation and mediation.
57 The Curzon Line, conventional name for the line recommended by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers on December 8, 1919, as Poland’s eastern frontier. The Curzon Line derived from the decision of the delegations of the principal Allied Powers, who considered it necessary to include only ethnographically Polish regions in the territory of Poland. On July 12, 1920, the British Foreign Secretary, Curzon, sent a Note to the Soviet Government proposing a line approved by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in 1919 as the eastern frontier of Poland. In the Note it said: “This line runs approximately as follows: Grodno-Jalovka-Nemirov-Brest-Litovsk-Dorohusk-Ustilug, east of Grobeshov-Krilov and thence west of Rava-Ruska, east of Pryemysl to Carpathians.” On August 16, 1945, a treaty signed in Moscow defined the Soviet-Polish frontier, according to its terms the frontier as a whole was established along the Curzon Line, with certain departures in favour of Poland.
58 The Soviet-Polish peace treaty was signed in Riga on March 18, 1921. Under it the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were ceded to Poland.
59 The agreement constituting the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was signed by representatives of 44 countries in Washington on November 9, 1943. A. A. Gromyko signed it on behalf of the Soviet Union. UNRRA was to render relief to countries that had suffered in the Second World War, and was to assist them in rehabilitating their economy. UNRRA was dissolved in 1947.
60 The writer is referring to the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, by representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain and China and saying that the four Governments recognised the necessity of establishing at the earliest possible date a universal international organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.
61 See Document No. 158.
62 The writer has in mind the memorandum “Fundamentals of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation”, which U.S. Secretary of State Hull submitted to the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain on October 22, 1943.
63 The reference is to the statement which the British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. made on March 19, 1944, insisting, on instructions from Prime Minister Churchill, that the Soviet Government should reach agreement with the Polish emigre Government along the lines proposed by Mr Churchill, that is, by postponing settlement of the Soviet- Polish frontier till the armistice conference. The Ambassador contended that if the Soviet Government’s point of view, stated in the course of the Anglo-Soviet discussions of the Polish question namely, that the Polish-Soviet frontier should follow the Curzon Line, became known to public opinion there would be general disillusionment both in Britain and in the United States. Soviet rejection of the Churchill proposal he said might give rise to difficulties in Anglo-Soviet relations, cast a shadow on the carrying out of the military operations agreed at Tehran and complicate the prosecution of the war by the United Nations as a whole.
“I hereby consider it necessary to communicate to you the reply of the Soviet Government with regard to the conference to be convened by the International Labour Organisation next April.
65 On February 21, 1944, A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., asked President Roosevelt’s aid in obtaining visas for a visit to the Soviet Union for Rev. Orlemański, a Catholic priest, Chairman of the Kościuszko Polish Patriotic League, who wished to visit Polish patriots in the Soviet Union and the Kościuszko Polish Division, and for Professor Oskar Lange of Chicago and Columbia Universities who wanted to travel to the Soviet Union in connection with Polish affairs. Both Orlemański and Lange had applied to the Consulate General of the U.S.S.R. in New York for visas.
66 On April 10, 1944, General Deane, head of the U.S. Military Mission and General Burrows, head of the British Military Mission, notified Marshal Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, that the British and U.S. High Commands planned to launch a cross- Channel operation on May 31, 1944, it being understood that the date might be shifted two or three days one way or the other depending on weather and tide.
67 Code name for the date of the Allied invasion of Europe across the Channel.
“In the name of the people of the United States of America, I present this scroll to the City of Stalingrad to commemorate our admiration for its gallant defenders whose courage, fortitude, and devotion during the siege of September 13, 1942 to January 31, 1943 will inspire forever the hearts of all free people. Their glorious victory stemmed the tide of invasion and marked the turning point in the war of the Allied Nations against the forces of aggression.
“In the name of the people of the United States of America, I present this scroll to the City of Leningrad as a memorial to its gallant soldiers and to its loyal men, women and children who, isolated from the rest of their nation by the invader and despite constant bombardment and untold sufferings from cold, hunger and sickness, successfully defended their beloved city throughout the critical period September 8, 1941 to January 18, 1943, and thus symbolized the undaunted spirit of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of all the nations of the world resisting forces of aggression.
70 On June 26, 1944, U.S. Ambassador Harriman handed this message from President Roosevelt and the scrolls to J. V. Stalin to be presented to Stalingrad and Leningrad in commemoration of the heroic defence of the two cities.
71 That is, Winston Churchill.
72 Oskar Lange lived in the U.S.A. at the time.
73 The meeting at Dumbarton Oaks of delegates of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain from August 21 to September 29, 1944, was concerned with establishing the United Nations Organisation.
74 The joint message from Stalin and Churchill, dated October 10, 1944 (see No. 232) was handed under this number to Roosevelt by the British Diplomatic Service.
75 The writer is referring to the plan for establishing under international control a zone comprising the Ruhr, Westphalia and the Saar. The plan was put forward by Mr Churchill and Mr Eden during discussions with J. V. Stalin in Moscow in October 1944.
76 The reference is to the “Proposals for the Establishment of General International Organization”, a document drawn up at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944.
“1. The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
“2. Any state, whether member of the Organization or not, may bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council.
“3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
“4. If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above fail to settle it by the means indicated in that paragraph, they should obligate themselves to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council should in each case decide whether or not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and accordingly, whether the Security Council should deal with the dispute, and, if so, whether it should take action under paragraph 5.
“5. The Security Council should be empowered, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
“6. Justifiable disputes should normally be referred to the international court of justice. The Security Council should be empowered to refer to the court, for advice, legal questions connected with other disputes.
77 On December 20, 1944, U.S. Ambassador Harriman informed the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. that this message had been sent by President Roosevelt on December 16 but had not been delivered to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow until December 20 owing to disturbances during transmission.
The words in parentheses (second paragraph of Document No. 248) were added by the U.S. Embassy to the U.S.S.R., whose Note contained the text of the message.
78 That is, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, whose seat was in Lublin, Poland.
“1. The Security Council should be so organized as to be able to function continuously and each state member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the Organization. It may hold meetings at such other places as in its judgement may best facilitate it s work. There should be periodic meetings at which each state member of the Security Council could if it so desired be represented by a member of the government or some other special representative.
“2. The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee.
“3. The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.
“4. Any member of the Organization should participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that member of the Organization are specially affected.
80 Code name for the conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers – the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain – held in the Crimea in February 1945.
81 The allusion is to the conference mentioned in Note 80 above.
82 The Soviet Government reacted favourably to the request for permission to base U.S. air force on Komsomolsk and Nikolayevsk.
83 That is, the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, which at that time had its seat in Lublin, Poland.
84 The Soviet Government replied favourably to the request contained in the Memorandum.
85 There were landing fields in the Poltava area which the U.S. Air Force used in 1944 and 1945 for bomb raids on enemy territory.
86 The San Francisco Conference was held between April 25 and June 26, 1945, to elaborate the Charter of the future international organisation for the maintenance of peace and security.
“On March 12 last you informed me that the German General Wolff , and Dolmann and Simmer who were accompanying him, had arrived in Berne on March 9 to discuss with United States and British Army representatives the surrender of the German armed forces in Northern Italy. You also informed me that Field Marshal Alexander had been instructed to send his officers to Berne to meet the persons mentioned, and you asked for the Soviet Government’s views on the matter.
“On the same day, March 12, I informed you that the Soviet Government had no objections to negotiations with General Wolff at Berne, provided Soviet officers representing the Soviet Military Command took part. In giving this reply, the Soviet Government had no doubt that the United States Government would react positively to its proposal for the participation of Soviet officers in the negotiations with the German General Wolff at Berne, and there and then named its representatives.
“Today, March 16, I am in receipt of a letter from you which shows that the United States Government is barring the Soviet representatives from the Berne negotiations. The U.S. Government’s refusal to admit Soviet representatives to the Berne negotiations came as a complete surprise to the Soviet Government and is inexplicable in terms of the relations of alliance existing between our two countries In view of this the Soviet Government finds it impossible to assent to discussions at Berne between representatives of Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and of the German commander, on the other, and insists on the discussions already begun at Berne being discontinued.
“Acknowledging receipt of your letter of March 21, 1945, regarding the Berne meeting between the German General Wolff and staff officers of Field Marshal Alexander, I hereby declare that I see no justification for your statement to the effect that the Soviet Government has a wrong view of the purpose of the contact at Berne between the German General Wolff and Field Marshal Alexander’s representatives, for what we have in this case is not an erroneous notion of the purpose of the contact nor a misunderstanding, but something worse.
“It appears from your letter of March 12 that the German General Wolff and those accompanying him came to Berne to negotiate with representatives of the Anglo-American Command the capitulation of the German forces in Northern Italy. The Soviet Government’s proposal that representatives of the Soviet Military Command should take part in the negotiations was rejected.
88 The Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., A. A. Gromyko, headed the Soviet Delegation at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of the U.S.S.R. the U.S.A. and Britain, held in August and September 1944 to discuss the establishment of the United Nations Organisation.
89 The Declaration of Liberated Europe was adopted at the Crimea Conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers – the Soviet Union the U.S.A. and Britain – in February 1945.
90 The allusion is to the government crisis in Roumania in February 1945, occasioned by the terror policy of the Radescu Government which was incompatible with the principle of democracy. The crisis was overcome by forming a new government under P. Groza on March 6, 1945.
91 The reference is to the commission set up at the Crimea Conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers – the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Britain – in February 1945. The commission was composed of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and British Ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. It was empowered to consult in Moscow primarily with members of the Polish Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders both from Poland and abroad with an eye to reorganising the Polish Provisional Government on a broader democratic basis to include democratic leaders from Poland proper and Poles from abroad.
92 See paragraph 5 of the Stalin message of April 7, 1945 (Document No. 289).
93 This document was handed to V. M. Molotov by H. S. Truman in Washington.
94 Field Marshal Alexander’s reports were thus franked.
“The Anglo-American armies will soon make contact in Germany with Soviet forces, and the approaching end of German resistance makes it necessary that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by their forces of zones which they will occupy in Germany and in Austria.
“2. Our immediate task is the final defeat of the German army. During this period the boundaries between the forces of the three Allies must be decided by the Commanders in the field and will be governed by operational considerations and requirements. It is inevitable that our armies will in this phase find themselves in occupation of territory outside the boundaries of the ultimate occupational zones.
“3. When the fighting is finished, the next task is for the Allied Control Commissions to be set up in Berlin and Vienna, and for the forces of the Allies to be re-disposed and to take over their respective occupational zones. The demarcation of zones in Germany has already been decided upon and it is necessary that we shall without delay reach an agreement on the zones to be occupied in Austria at the forthcoming meeting proposed by you in Vienna.
“4. It appears now that no signed instrument of surrender will be forthcoming. In this event the governments should decide to set up at once the Allied Control Commissions, and to entrust to them the task of making detailed arrangements for the withdrawal of forces to their agreed occupational zones.
“‘a) To avoid confusion between the two armies and to prevent either of them from expanding into areas already occupied by the other, both sides should halt as and where they meet, subject to such adjustments to the rear or to the flanks as are required, in the opinion of local commanders on either side, to deal with any remaining opposition.
“6. I request that you will be so good as to issue similar instructions to your commanders in the field.
“7. I am sending this message to you and President Truman simultaneously.
96 The allusion is to the possibility of inviting Poland to the conference for drafting the Charter of the future international organisation for the maintenance of peace and security, which took place in San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945.
98 The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was constituted by the Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain under a decision of the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference (October 19-30, 1943). It consisted of representatives of the three Powers. The purpose of the EAC was to study European problems designated by the three governments relating to termination of hostilities, and to give the three governments joint advice on these problems. On November 11, 1944 the Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain invited the Provisional Government of the French Republic to participate in the work of the European Advisory Commission with headquarters in London as its fourth permanent member. The EAC was dissolved in August 1945.
99 The reference is to a letter from the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in the U.S.S.R. to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated May 15, 1945, conveying the text of the instructions which the U.S. Government had given to its Ambassador in Belgrade. The latter was instructed to inform the Yugoslav Government that the United States Government expected it to agree immediately to the Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean establishing control over the area which was to include Trieste, Gorizia, Monfalcone and Pola, the lines of communication running through Gorizia and Monfalcone to Austria, as well as the area extending east of that line far enough to make possible the exercise of proper administrative control, and also that the Yugoslav Government would issue appropriate instructions to the Yugoslav forces in that area to cooperate with the Allied Commanders in establishing military administration in that area under the Allied Commander.
101 The reference is to the letter which the U.S. Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. sent to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on May 30, 1945. It contained the texts of a Note and of a military agreement between the Anglo-American Command in the Mediterranean and Tito, sent to the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade for the Yugoslav Government.
102 The Agreement between the Soviet and United States Governments on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War against Aggression was signed in Washington on June 11, 1942.
103 On June 9, 1945, an agreement was signed in Belgrade between the U.S., British and Yugoslav Governments for a provisional military administration in Venezia Giulia.
104 The Allied Control Council was constituted under agreements relating to the administration of Germany concluded by representatives of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Britain and France in Berlin on June 5, 1945. The purpose of the Council, which consisted of representatives of the four Powers, was the practical exercise in Germany of a single and agreed Allied policy in the period of occupation.
105 The writer has in mind the Crimea Conference agreement on Far Eastern matters, reached between the three Great Powers on February 11, 1945.
106 Code name for the Berlin Conference of the leaders of the three Powers – the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain – held in July- August 1945.
107 The U.S. President’s request, outlined in his message of July 21, 1945, was granted by the Soviet Government. U.S. aerological stations were set up in Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk. The purpose of the stations was to transmit weather reports to the U.S. naval and air forces operating against Japan. Both stations were dismantled in December 1945, after the war against Japan.
“The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the Joint Declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th, 1945 by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.
“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.
“The Emperor will be required to authorise and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and Japanese Imperial G.H.Q. of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval, and air authorities, and to all the forces under their control wherever located, to cease active operations and surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.
“Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transport.
“The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.
The reply was transmitted to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Government.
109 The reference is to the first session of the Foreign Ministers’ Council of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Britain, France and China held in London on September 11-October 2, 1945. The Council was formed by decision of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain (July 17-August 2, 1945).
110 The allusion is to the preparation of the draft peace treaties with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland by the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Britain, the U.S.A. and France.
112 The Allied Council for Japan – an international body constituted under an agreement reached at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain (December 16-26, 1945). The Council consisted of four members (one each from the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China, and one member representing Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India). The Supreme Commander of the allied occupation troops in Japan was obliged to consult with the Allied Council on occupation policy in Japan. The Council became inoperative in April 1953.
113 The Far Eastern Commission – an international body formed to work out agreed decisions ensuring the fulfilment by Japan of its commitments under the surrender terms signed on September 2, 1945. The Commission was constituted under an agreement reached at the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference (December 16-26, 1945). It consisted of representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippines.
It was joined by representatives of Pakistan and Burma in 1949. On April 25, 1952, the United States unilaterally announced the dissolution of the Commission.
114 This message was handed to J. V. Stalin by U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes.
115 The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain, which sat in Moscow from December 16 to 26, took decisions concerning a Far Eastern Commission and an Allied Council for Japan, and the drafting of peace treaties with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.
116 The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain, held in Moscow between December 16 and 26, 1945, resolved to submit to the United Nations General Assembly recommendations for a United Nations commission to explore problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters.

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