Source: http://www.annalsofhealthlaw.com/annalsofhealthlaw/vol__24_issue_1?pg=103
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 07:52:38+00:00

Document:
75. See Perkins & Boyle, supra note 13, at 126 (noting that long-waitlists are “[o]ne of the most common problems that Medicaid beneficiaries experience”); see also Feltz, supra note 11, at 189 (noting waiting list lawsuits in 15 states); 42 U.S. C. A. § 1396a(a)(8) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174) (providing that individuals who wish “to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have the opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals”).
76. See Perkins & Boyle, supra note 13, at 127 n.61 (citing Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1149 (E. D. Cal. 1994); Linton v. Carney, 779 F. Supp. 925, 936 (M. D. Tenn. 1990); Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572, 580 (E. D. Cal. 1990); Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1177 (E. D. Pa. 1987)).
77. See id. at 127, 129 (discussing Doe v. Chiles where the court held that “Florida’s waiting lists for intermediate care facility services violated the reasonable promptness requirement and ordered the state to establish a reasonable waiting period for ICF services not to exceed ninety days” and discussing Boulet v. Cellucci where the Massachusetts federal court ordered the “state Medicaid agency to provide the needed services within ninety days of the eligibility determination.”).
78. See, e.g., Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2012) (suit to enforce regulation requiring processing Medicaid applications within ninety days); Reynolds v. Giu-liani, 506 F.3d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs alleged that the City engaged in unlawful conduct aimed to discourage and deter plaintiffs from obtaining benefits to which they were entitled and that the state failed to properly oversee and supervise the City’s administration of assistance programs.”); Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. Lumpkin, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1027–28 (N. D. Ohio 2011). See supra Section II. A.2 (discussing waiting-list cases).
79. 42 C.F.R. § 435.912(c)(3) (West, WestlawNext through Oct. 30, 2014; 79 FR 64516).
80. 42 U.S. C. A. § 1396a(a)(3) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174).
81. See, e.g., Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. Lumpkin, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1027– 28 (N. D. Ohio 2011) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim to enforce the “ reasonable promptness,” “fair hearing,” and due process claims).

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