Source: https://www.lifeanddisabilitylaw.com/erisa-watch-failure-to-adequately-consider-social-security-award-is-evidence-of-disability-insurers-financial-conflict-of-interest/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:39:41+00:00

Document:
This week’s notable decision, Calhoun v. Life Insurance Company of North America, No. 15-3470, __F.App’x__, 2016 WL 7241398 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 2016), is unfortunately, not recommended for full-text publication, but is recommended (by me) for close reading. In Calhoun, a long-term disability case, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Life Insurance of North America (“LINA”) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Calhoun long-term disability benefits, reversed the district court’s judgment in LINA’s favor, and remanded the case to the district court for an order reinstating Calhoun’s benefits.
On the standard of review, the Court gave more weight to LINA’s financial conflict of interest due to its seemingly inconsistent positions that were both financially advantageous: LINA assisted Calhoun with his receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits and yet failed to address the SSDI award adequately when LINA terminated his LTD benefits claim.
On the merits of the claim, the Court also found that LINA’s treatment of the SSDI award weighs in favor of concluding that LINA acted arbitrary and capriciously. LINA encouraged Calhoun to apply for SSDI, financially benefitted from his receipt of SSDI, and then failed to explain why it is taking a position different from the SSA on the question of disability. The Court explained that even if LINA never assisted with Calhoun’s arguments or strategy before the SSA, it certainly encouraged Calhoun to apply for SSDI benefits through its “Social Security Assistance Program,” where LINA arranged and paid for Calhoun’s representation before the SSA. LINA also would have penalized Calhoun by reducing his benefits if he had not pursued a SSA claim. On LINA’s argument that it “received no net-benefit from the Social Security Award” because the plan allowed LINA to reduce Calhoun’s monthly benefits by his assumed Social Security award if he did not pursue the SSA claim, the Court explained that LINA did benefit financially by Calhoun’s pursuit and receipt of SSDI because if his claim had been denied, LINA would not have been able to reduce its monthly payments to him. Lastly, LINA’s consideration of the SSDI award was inadequate. LINA noted that it considered the award but rejected it because it was “in receipt of more current medical information than the [SSA] had at the time of their initial determination.” The court found that LINA failed to identify the “more current medical information” on which it relied in reaching a contrary decision and also failed to explain why this information warranted the conclusion that Calhoun was not totally disabled. Moreover, the Court found that the evidence post-dating the SSA decision—the peer reviews, the additional video surveillance, and the second and third transferrable-skills analyses—is not substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that LINA’s decision was the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process.
LINA obtained file reviews by Dr. David Trotter and Dr. Elena Antonelli. The Court found that LINA’s reliance on file reviews in denying Calhoun’s claim also weighs in favor of finding that the decision arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Trotter did not physically examine Calhoun as part of his review, but he nevertheless concluded that there is no credible evidence indicating Calhoun is unable to perform full time sedentary or light level work and he nowhere explained why he believed that the medical evidence did not support Calhoun’s claim. The Court found Dr. Antonelli’s review similarly inadequate for a number of reasons. Dr. Antonelli noted that a March 2012 functional-capacity analysis “likely reflects the minimum abilities of [Calhoun]” but she did not justify how the evaluation’s findings –which concluded that Calhoun would require at least one break every hour for 5-10 minutes from sustained sitting and could stand for only 15-20 minutes –would justify the conclusion that Calhoun could work on a full-time basis.
On the other evidence supporting LINA’s termination of benefits –the transferrable-skills analyses, the third round of video surveillance, and doctor visit notes – the Court all of this evidence to be either discredited or inadequate to explain the termination of Calhoun’s benefits. The transferrable-skills analyses were based solely on the Trotter and Antonelli file reviews. The video surveillance is not inconsistent with Calhoun’s reported limitations, nor does it demonstrate that Calhoun is capable of working on a full-time basis. In six days of surveillance, PhotoFax viewed a total of less than thirty minutes of notable activity. Lastly, LINA cherry-picked statements in Calhoun’s doctor visit notes and ignored statements supporting his claim. And although a physical-ability assessment accompanying the functional-capacity analysis indicated that Calhoun could sit “frequently,” the Court noted that this capacity to sit does not establish that he can work on a full-time basis, especially with his demonstrated restrictions in standing and walking. The district court found “troubling several aspects of LINA’s review of [Calhoun’s] claim,” but nevertheless found in favor of LINA because it felt “constrained by the extremely deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.” The 6th Circuit explained that “[t]his deferential standard of review, however, does not serve as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the plan administrator’s decision.” Because the objective medical evidence supported Calhoun’s disability, the Court remanded this case to the district court for reinstatement of Calhoun’s disability benefits from the date that they were terminated.
In case involving a claim for benefits by a group of plaintiffs who work or have worked for Xerox Corporation, finding that the participants are entitled to a reasonable attorneys’ fee and costs. Applying 2011 rates, the court awarded Plaintiffs $4,711,430.70 in fees and $174,174 in costs for the total amount of $4,885,604.70. Frommert v. Conkright, No. 00-CV-6311L, 2016 WL 7186489 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2016) (Judge David G. Larimer).
The court found that Plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment for Defendants’ violations of their fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to the Downey Inc. Profit Sharing Plan. Perez v. Coffman, No. 15-CV-1394-JPS, 2016 WL 7168113 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 8, 2016) (Judge J.P. Stadtmueller).
The court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim that the Plan Administrator breached a duty to provide Plaintiff with complete and accurate information regarding retirement benefits and the process for obtaining them when HR allegedly knew of the participant’s cancer diagnosis. The court found that the Plan and the Honeywell Retirement Service Center did not have a procedure, or the authority, to terminate a participant’s employment or complete a participant’s application for retirement benefits on behalf of a participant that would enable a participant to obtain retirement benefits “immediately” or that would expedite the time required for verification and approval of the retirement application. Thus, there was no process that the Plan Administrator should have disclosed. Further, there is no make-whole monetary relief available under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) which would entitle Plaintiff to an amount equivalent to the monetary benefit she would have received under the Plan. Angichiodo v. Honeywell Pension & Sav. Plan, & Salaried Employees Pension Plan of AlliedSignal, Inc., No. CV-15-00097-PHX-NVW, 2016 WL 7178666 (D. Ariz. Dec. 9, 2016) (Judge Neil V. Wake).
The court found that United’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits based on her conditions of fibromyalgia and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome was supported by substantial evidence from Dr. Britt Daniel’s IME and by the peer reviews from Dr. Adam Raff, Dr. Jeffrey Sartin, Dr. Paul Howard, and Dr. Michael R. Villanueva. United did not need to follow SSA’s determination of Plaintiff’s disability because United examined evidence that was not available to the SSA when it found Plaintiff disabled. Shindoll v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. 4:15-CV-00759, 2016 WL 7188837 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2016) (Judge Amos L. Mazzant).
Conflict of interest factor is entitled to greater weight due to LINA’s inconsistent position on Plaintiff’s SSDI claim and award. LINA’s termination of benefits was arbitrary and capricious where it inadequately considered Plaintiff’s SSDI award, relied on two faulty peer reviewers’ opinions not based on a physical examination, misinterpreted a functional capacity analysis, relied on a faulty transferrable skills analysis, and cherry-picked statements from a treating doctor’s visit notes. Court found Plaintiff disabled and remanded for an order reinstating benefits. Calhoun v. Life Insurance Company of North America, No. 15-3470, __F.App’x__, 2016 WL 7241398 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 2016) (BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, ROGERS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges).
The court granted Prudential’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, finding that its denial of long-term disability benefits was supported by three different “independent” reviewing physicians. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Prudential erred by only requesting records for the previous twelve months. Plaintiff’s last day of work was March 26, 2012 and the records retained by Prudential comprised of time periods both before and after Plaintiff’s last day of work. “Second, a long range review of Plaintiff’s medical records could actually result in an arbitrary and capricious review. For example, had Prudential sought medical records for the past ten years, the records would have shown that Plaintiff worked with her diagnosed conditions for almost ten years before filing her claim. Armed with this information, the Administrator could have more easily dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits without a reasoned, deliberate review.” Maher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:14CV2777, 2016 WL 7227881 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2016) (Judge Christopher A. Boyko).
In long-term disability benefit dispute, the court adopts the approach by other courts permitting conflict of interest discovery in the absence of any evidence of in the record that conflict tainted the decision making. The court declines to apply the “reasonable chance” standard to the extent that it would require Plaintiff to point to specific evidence in the administrative record that Hartford’s structural conflict affected its decision just to gain entitlement to discovery on that very issue. The court limited discovery to document requests and a deposition of a representative of Hartford pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), without prejudice to Plaintiff later seeking to depose other witnesses. Chau v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 1:14-CV-8484-GHW, 2016 WL 7238956 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) (Judge Gregory H. Woods).
Granting Liberty Life’s motion for trade secret protection of the following documents: (a) customized claims handling policies, procedures, and exceptions;(b) bonus plan for employees, as reflected in Liberty’s Variable Incentive Plan;(c) organizational structure of its claims and appeals units;(d) contracts with third party vendors;(e) contracts, including financial compensation, with its consulting physicians; and (f) training curricula provided to specific employees. Owens v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, No. 415CV00071JHMHBB, 2016 WL 7238816 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 14, 2016) (Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl).
In dispute over AD&D benefits, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint because Plaintiff’s proposed Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act claims are preempted by the civil enforcement mechanism in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) of ERISA. The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that ERISA’s “savings clause” captures his KUCSPA claims. Everett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:16-CV-00074-GNS, 2016 WL 7209678 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 2016) (Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin).
In suit seeking payment for two back surgeries, the court concluded that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, as required by the BCBS plan, and is thus barred from bringing suit in federal court. Here, Plaintiff did not appeal on her own, rather her medical providers initiated the appeal on her behalf. The court found that Plaintiff did not by writing authorize her providers to act on her behalf. Kojima v. Cross, No. 14-CV-1957-JLS-DHB, 2016 WL 7178852 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (Judge Janis L. Sammartino).
This matter involves a drawn out dispute over life insurance benefits on the life of Judith Thomas, sister of now deceased Raymond Thomas. The day after Mr. Thomas’s death, Life Insurance Company of North America paid Plaintiff the $208,000.00 in benefits demanded in the Second Amended Complaint. Defendant Bank of America as Successor to Countrywide Financial Corporation (“BOA”) filed the instant motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that it is not a proper defendant under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), that Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3) have already been dismissed, and requesting attorney’s fees and costs, either as a sanction for refusing to dismiss BOA from the action or pursuant to ERISA § 502(g)(1). The court granted BOA’s motion in part, finding that Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence that BOA fit within one of the categories of defendants that can be sued under § 502(a)(1)(B), and even if dismissal of the § 502(a)(3) claims was premature in January 2013, it is clearly appropriate now that Plaintiff has obtained the remedy that he sought to recover under § 502(a)(3). Further, any damage resulting from the delay in payments was not BOA’s fault. The court denied BOA’s motion for sanctions given the state of the developing law with respect to § 502(a)(3) claims. Estate of Raymond Thomas v. Cigna Grp. Ins., No. 09CV5029SLTRLM, 2016 WL 7235718 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) (Judge Sandra L. Townes).
In this case, Plaintiff contends that a 2005 Settlement Agreement required the Fund to credit her with service time dating back to March 26, 2002, when she was first hired, rather than September 26, 2005, when her position was restored. Had the Fund recognized her pre-2005 service, she would be entitled to an immediate early retirement benefit. The court found that because the Settlement Agreement provided Plaintiff with no back pay, she is not entitled to claim any additional hours of creditable service based on that settlement. Additionally, the court found that Plaintiff’s claim must also be dismissed for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. Dooley v. US Steel Workers of Am. PIUMPF, No. 16CV0402, 2016 WL 7178778 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2016) (Judge Arthur J. Schwab).
In suit challenging suspension of pension plan benefits, the court found that the Trustees did not abuse its discretion when it found that (1) Plaintiff did not “retire” under the terms of the Plan because his work as an estimator was within the “jurisdiction of the Plan” and he can only be considered retired if he has been withdrawn from work in the jurisdiction of the Plan for a period of 30 days or more; and (2) Plaintiff’s work as an Operations Manager is “work in the jurisdiction of the Plan” subject to a suspension of benefits. Maltese v. Nat’l Roofing Indus., No. 5:16CV11, 2016 WL 7191798 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 12, 2016) (Judge Frederick P. Stamp).
It was not arbitrary or capricious for the Trust to honor the notices of levy and send Plaintiffs’ benefits to the IRS. Additionally, the Trust’s application of the sixty-day deadline to Plaintiffs’ appeals of the decision regarding the notices of levy was not arbitrary or capricious. Amador v. Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, No. 16-3090, __F.App’x__, 2016 WL 7321200 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016) (Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS and McHUGH, Circuit Judges).
The Ninth Circuit in this case previously held that the plan beneficiaries’ claims regarding the selection of mutual funds in 1999 were time-barred under the six-year limit of 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1). The Supreme Court vacated the decision on the basis that fiduciaries have an ongoing duty to monitor investments even absent a change in circumstances. The en banc court held that Phillips v. Alaska Hotel & Rest. Emps. Pension Fund, 944 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1991), which held that when a fiduciary violated a continuing duty over time, the three-year limitations period set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2) began when the plaintiff had actual knowledge of a breach in a series of discrete but related breaches, does not apply to the continuing duty claims at issue under § 1113(1). To be considered timely, only a “breach or violation,” such as a fiduciary’s failure to conduct its regular review of plan investments, need occur within the six-year statutory period of § 1113(1); the initial investment need not be made within the statutory period. Tibble v. Edison International, No. 10-56406, __F.3d__, 2016 WL 7321373 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016) (Before: SIDNEY R. THOMAS, Chief Judge, and STEPHEN REINHARDT, BARRY G. SILVERMAN, M. MARGARET MCKEOWN, RICHARD A. PAEZ, RICHARD R. CLIFTON, CARLOS T. BEA, MILAN D. SMITH, JR., JACQUELINE H. NGUYEN, PAUL J. WATFORD and MICHELLE T. FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges).
Granting motion for default judgment and ordering Defendants to pay Plaintiffs the principal amount of $13,683.21, representing the amount of unpaid contributions to Plaintiff Funds and Union, and pre-judgment interest in the amount of $415.761 and liquidated damages amounting to $2,045.74. Employees Int’l Union Local 32BJ, Dist. 36 v. Shamrockclean Inc., No. CV 16-3374, 2016 WL 7178418 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2016) (Judge R. Barclay Surrick).
Denying motion for contempt against Defendant Schuh for frustrating Plaintiff’s attempt to obtain the payroll records to determine the amounts to which they are entitled by the default judgment without an additional step being taken first. Trustees of Local 309 Elec. Health v. Schuh, No. 16-CV-0275-MJR-RJD, 2016 WL 7188121 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2016) (Judge Michael J. Reagan).
In suit for unpaid contributions, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to avoid fraudulent transfer and to award attorney’s fees and costs. The Court directed Daniel Martinak to turn over the amount of $41,000 to Plaintiff within three days of entry of this order. Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois v. Martinak, No. 13 C 5720, 2016 WL 7188158 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2016) (Judge Matthew F. Kennelly).
Entering judgment against Defendants in the sum of $71,159.76 because Plaintiffs have established that defendant is liable to them for $64,937.50 in unpaid fringe benefit contributions, $697.41 in interest, and $4,224.09 in liquidated damages, for a total of $69,859.00, plus $1,300.76 in legal fees and costs. Louis-Kansas City Carpenters Reg’l Council v. Earl Banze Constr. Co., No. 4:16-CV-1196-CEJ, 2016 WL 7188132 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2016) (Judge Carol E. Jackson).
The court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and audit costs in the following amounts: $28,343.34 in attorney’s fees, $16,563.10 in audit costs, and $1,931.22 in court costs. These amounts were added to the previous summary judgment award of $95,854.99. Iron Workers St. Louis Dist. Council Annuity Trust v. United Ironworkers, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-00713-AGF, 2016 WL 7178747 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2016) (Judge Audrey G. Fleissig).
The court granted Defendant’s request for an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 granting it leave to file its proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, which adds numerous new factual allegations in support of its affirmative and other defenses and return-of-contributions counterclaim. BAC Local Union 15 Welfare Fund v. McGill Restoration, Inc., No. 16-CV-2082-JAR-TJJ, 2016 WL 7179464 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2016) (Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 V. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1132
 v. 
 v. 
 § 502
 § 502
 § 502
 § 502
 § 502
 § 502
 § 502
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1113
 v. 
 § 1113
 § 1113
 § 1113
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.