Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/407/143/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:47:21+00:00

Document:
Held: As Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, recognizes, a policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons when he has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Here, the information from the informant had enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop of petitioner and the protective seizure of the weapon, which afforded reasonable ground for the search incident to the arrest that ensued. Pp. 407 U. S. 145-149.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 407 U. S. 149. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 407 U. S. 151. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p. 407 U. S. 153.
Respondent Robert Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of illegal possession of a handgun found during a "stop and frisk," as well as of possession of heroin that was found during a full search incident to his weapons arrest. After respondent's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 157 Conn. 114, 249 A.2d 245 (1968), this Court denied certiorari. 395 U.S. 927 (1969). Williams' petition for federal habeas corpus relief was denied by the District Court and by a divided panel of the Second Circuit, 436 F.2d 30 (1970), but, on rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals granted relief. 441 F.2d 394 (1971). That court held that evidence introduced at Williams' trial had been obtained by an unlawful search of his person and car, and thus the state court judgments of conviction should be set aside. Since we conclude that the policeman's actions here conformed to the standards this Court laid down in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we reverse.
and informed him that an individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist.
"a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest."
Id. at 392 U. S. 22. The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response.
See id. at 392 U. S. 23. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. Id. at 392 U. S. 21-22; see Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236 (CA9 1971); United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 96 (CA8 1970).
"When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,"
he may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons. 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 24. The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence, and thus the frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law. So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, [Footnote 1] and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose. Id. at 392 U. S. 30.
Connecticut law, the informant might have been subject to immediate arrest for making a false complaint had Sgt. Connolly's investigation proved the tip incorrect. [Footnote 2] Thus, while the Court's decisions indicate that this informant's unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, see, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop of Williams.
had ample reason to fear for his safety. [Footnote 3] When Williams rolled down his window, rather than complying with the policeman's request to step out of the car so that his movements could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at Williams' waist became an even greater threat. Under these circumstances, the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was reasonable. The loaded gun seized as a result of this intrusion was therefore admissible at Williams' trial. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 30.
"upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 175 (1949).
See also id. at 338 U. S. 177. Under the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of the gun seized by Sgt. Connolly, the arrest on the weapons charge was supported by probable cause, and the search of his person and of the car incident to that arrest was lawful. See Brinegar v. United States, supra; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The fruits of the search were therefore properly admitted at Williams' trial, and the Court of Appeals erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.
Section 53-168 of the Connecticut General Statutes, in force at the time of these events, provided that a "person who knowingly makes to any police officer . . . a false report or a false complaint alleging that a crime or crimes have been committed" is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Figures reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate that 125 policemen were murdered in 1971, with all but five of them having been killed by gunshot wounds. Federal Bureau of Investigation Law Enforcement Bulletin, Feb.1972, p. 33. According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings -- A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963).
tip on the narcotics. Can it be said that a man in possession of narcotics will not have a permit for his gun? Is that why the arrest for possession of a gun in the free-and-easy State of Connecticut becomes constitutional?
secured through the Militia -- civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion."
Id. at 307 U. S. 178-179.
Critics say that proposals like this water down the Second Amendment. Our decisions belie that argument, for the Second Amendment, as noted, was designed to keep alive the militia. But if watering-down is the mood of the day, I would prefer to water down the Second rather than the Fourth Amendment. I share with Judge Friendly a concern that the easy extension of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, to "possessory offenses" is a serious intrusion on Fourth Amendment safeguards.
"If it is to be extended to the latter at all, this should be only where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows 'that criminal activity may be afoot.'"
436 F.2d at 39, quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 392 U. S. 30.
otherwise, at will, provided only they have a permit, Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 29-36 and 29-38, and gives its police officers no special authority to stop for the purpose of determining whether the citizen has one. . . ."
not reasonably have been ascertained should be the price."
"Terry v. Ohio was intended to free a police officer from the rigidity of a rule that would prevent his doing anything to a man reasonably suspected of being about to commit or having just committed a crime of violence, no matter how grave the problem or impelling the need for swift action, unless the officer had what a court would later determine to be probable cause for arrest. It was meant for the serious cases of imminent danger or of harm recently perpetrated to person or property, not the conventional ones of possessory offense. If it is to be extended to the latter at all, this should be only where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows 'that criminal activity may be afoot.' 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 30. . . . I greatly fear that, if the [contrary view] should be followed, Terry will have opened the sluice gates for serious and unintended erosion of the protection of the Fourth Amendment."
et al. Unfortunately, the flesh provided by today's decision cannot possibly be made to fit on Terry's skeletal framework.
"[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.' The exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.' '[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.'"
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 403 U. S. 454 455 (1971). In Terry, we said that.
"we do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure."
392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 20. Yet, we upheld the stop and frisk in Terry because we recognized that the realities of on-the-street law enforcement require an officer to act at times on the basis of strong evidence, short of probable cause, that criminal activity is taking place and that the criminal is armed and dangerous. Hence, Terry stands only for the proposition that police officers have a "narrowly drawn authority to . . . search for weapons" without a warrant. Id. at 392 U. S. 27.
searches far beyond anything heretofore recognized as legitimate. I dissent.
B. The Court erroneously attempts to describe the search for the gun as a protective search incident to a reasonable investigatory stop. But, as in Terry, Sibron and Peters, supra, there is no occasion in this case to determine whether or not police officers have a right to seize and to restrain a citizen in order to interrogate him. The facts are clear that the officer intended to make the search as soon as he approached the respondent. He asked no questions; he made no investigation; he simply searched.
There was nothing apart from the information supplied by the informant to cause the officer to search. Our inquiry must focus, therefore, as it did in Terry, on whether the officer had sufficient facts from which he could reasonably infer that respondent was not only engaging in illegal activity, but also that he was armed and dangerous. The focus falls on the informant.
"Q. Now, with respect to the information that was given you about homosexuals in the Bridgeport Police Station [sic], did that lead to an arrest? A. No."
"Q. An arrest was not made. A. No. There was no substantiating evidence."
"Q. There was no substantiating evidence? A. No."
"Q. And what do you mean by that? A. I didn't have occasion to witness these individuals committing any crime of any nature."
"Q. In other words, after this person gave you the information, you checked for corroboration before you made an arrest. Is that right? A. Well, I checked to determine the possibility of homosexual activity."
"Q. And since an arrest was made, I take it you didn't find any substantiating information. A. I'm sorry counselor, you say since an arrest was made."
"Q. Was not made. Since an arrest was not made, I presume you didn't find any substantiating information. A. No. "
"Q. And you still thought this person was reliable. A. Yes. [Footnote 2/1]"
Were we asked to determine whether the information supplied by the informant was sufficient to provide probable cause for an arrest and search, rather than a stop and frisk, there can be no doubt that we would hold that it was insufficient. This Court has squarely held that a search and seizure cannot be justified on the basis of conclusory allegations of an unnamed informant who is allegedly credible. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). In the recent case of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), Mr. Justice Harlan made it plain beyond any doubt that, where police rely on an informant to make a search and seizure, they must know that the informant is generally trustworthy and that he has obtained his information in a reliable way. Id. at 393 U. S. 417. Since the testimony of the arresting officer in the instant case patently fails to demonstrate that the informant was known to be trustworthy, and since it is also clear that the officer had no idea of the source of the informant's "knowledge," a search and seizure would have been illegal.
uphold a stop and frisk, [Footnote 2/3] is not directly in point, because the police officer in that case acted on the basis of his own personal observations. No informant was involved. But the rationale of Terry is still controlling, and it requires that we condemn the conduct of the police officer in encountering the respondent.
Terry did not hold that, whenever a policeman has a hunch that a citizen is engaging in criminal activity, he may engage in a stop and frisk. It held that, if police officers want to stop and frisk, they must have specific facts from which they can reasonably infer that an individual is engaged in criminal activity and is armed and dangerous. [Footnote 2/4] It was central to our decision in Terry that the police officer acted on the basis of his own personal observations, and that he carefully scrutinized the conduct of his suspects before interfering with them in any way. When we legitimated the conduct of the officer in Terry, we did so because of the substantial reliability of the information on which the officer based his decision to act.
Connecticut specifically authorizes persons to carry guns so long as they have a permit. Thus, there was no reason for the officer to infer from anything that the informant said that the respondent was dangerous. His frisk was, therefore, illegal under Terry.
"facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has been committed. . . ."
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642, 97 U. S. 645 (1878). "[G]ood faith is not enough to constitute probable cause." Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25, 263 U. S. 28 (1923).
was some sort of a tacit admission of guilt would be utterly absurd.
This case marks a departure from the mainstream of our Fourth Amendment cases. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948), for example, the arresting officer had an informant's tip and actually smelled opium coming from a room. This Court still found the arrest unlawful. And in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, we found that there was no probable cause even where an informant's information was corroborated by personal observation. If there was no probable cause in those cases, I find it impossible to understand how there can be probable cause in this case.
privacy and their government's urgent need for a narrow exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, today's decision demonstrates just how prescient MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS was.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), makes it clear that a stop and frisk is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When I use the term stop and frisk herein, I merely intend to emphasize that it is, as Terry held, a lesser intrusion than a full-scale search and seizure.
In Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), the Court held that the action of the policeman could not be justified as a stop and frisk. In Peters v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), the Court sustained the validity of a search and seizure by holding that it was incident to a legal arrest.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 29; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 64.
The Court appears to rely on the fact that the existence of the gun corroborated the information supplied to the officer by the informant. It cannot be disputed that there is minimal corroboration here, but the fact remains that the officer still lacked any knowledge that respondent had done anything illegal. Since carrying a gun is not per se illegal in Connecticut, the fact that respondent carried a gun is no more relevant to probable cause than the fact that his shirt may have been blue, or that he was wearing a jacket. Moreover, the fact that the informant can identify a gun on sight does not indicate an ability to do the same with narcotics. The corroboration of this one fact is a far cry from the corroboration that the Court found sufficient to sustain an arrest in Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959).

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