Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/373/379.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:50:56+00:00

Document:
1. Florida may not prohibit petitioner from performing within the State tasks which are incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications before the Patent Office. Pp. 381-402.
(a) The determination of the Supreme Court of Florida that the preparation and prosecution of patent applications for others constitutes the practice of law, within the meaning of the law of that State, is not questioned. P. 383.
(b) Florida has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the State, and, in the absence of federal legislation on the subject, it could validly prohibit nonlawyers from engaging in this circumscribed form of patent practice. P. 383.
(c) A federal statute, 35 U.S.C. 31, expressly permits the Commissioner of Patents to authorize practice before the Patent Office by nonlawyers; the Commissioner has explicitly granted such authority; and Florida may not deny to those failing to meet its own qualifications the right to perform acts within the scope of the federal authority. Pp. 384-385.
(d) There cannot be read into the federal statute and regulations a condition that such practice must not be inconsistent with state law, thus leaving registered patent practitioners with the unqualified right to practice only in the physical presence of the [373 U.S. 379, 380] Patent Office and in the District of Columbia, where that Office is now located. Pp. 385-387.
(e) The legislative history of the statute and its predecessor provisions shows that Congress recognized that registration in the Patent Office confers a right to practice before that Office, without regard to whether the State within which the practice is conducted would otherwise prohibit such conduct. Pp. 387-402.
(f) Since patent practitioners are authorized to practice only before the Patent Office, the State maintains control over the practice of law within its borders except to the limited extent necessary for the accomplishment of the federal objectives. P. 402.
2. As so construed, 35 U.S.C. 31 is constitutional. Pp. 403-404.
(a) By establishing the Patent Office and authorizing competent persons to assist in the preparation of patent applications, Congress has not exceeded the bounds of what is "necessary and proper" to the operation of the patent system established under Art. I, 8, Cl. 8, of the Constitution. P. 403.
(b) Having acted within the scope of the powers "delegated to the United States by the Constitution," Congress has not exceeded the limits of the Tenth Amendment, despite the concurrent effects of its legislation upon a matter otherwise within the control of the State. P. 403.
(c) In view of the standards prescribed in 35 U.S.C. 31 to guide the Patent Office in its admissions policy, it cannot be said that Congress has improperly delegated its powers to the administrative agency. Pp. 403-404.
140 So.2d 587, judgment vacated and cause remanded.
Carlisle M. Moore argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Oscar A. Mellin, LeRoy Hanscom and Jack E. Hursh.
F. Trowbridge vom Baur argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Sherwood Spencer, J. Lewis Hall, Donald J. Bradshaw and John Houston Gunn.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Guilfoyle, Louis F. Claiborne and Morton Hollander for the United States; by John R. Turney, D. W. Markham [373 U.S. 379, 381] and Nuel D. Belnap for the Association of Interstate Commerce Commission Practitioners; by Roger Robb for the American Association of Registered Patent Attorneys and Agents; and by Arthur B. Hanson and Emmett E. Tucker, Jr. for the American Chemical Society.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by F. Trowbridge vom Baur, H. H. Perry, Jr., Wayland B. Cedarquist, Raymond Reisler and Warren H. Resh for the American Bar Association; by Lyman Brownfield and Phillip K. Folk for numerous State Bar Associations; and by William H. Webb for the American Patent Law Association.
"6. otherwise engaging in the practice of law."
The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that petitioner's conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law which the State, acting under its police power, could properly prohibit, and that neither federal statute nor the Constitution of the United States empowered any federal body to authorize such conduct in Florida. 140 So.2d 587.
In his petition for certiorari, petitioner attacked the injunction "only insofar as it prohibits him from engaging in the specific activities . . . [referred to above], covered by his federal license to practice before the Patent Office. He does not claim that he has any right otherwise to [373 U.S. 379, 383] engage in activities that would be regarded as the practice of law." 1 We granted certiorari, 371 U.S. 875 , to consider the significant, but narrow, questions thus presented.
But "the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not contraverted, must yield" when incompatible with federal legislation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,211. Congress has provided that the Commissioner of Patents "may prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before the Patent Office," 35 U.S.C. 31, 3 and the Commissioner, pursuant to 31, has provided by regulation that "[a]n applicant for patent . . . may be represented by an attorney or agent authorized to practice before the Patent Office in patent cases." 37 CFR 1.31. (Emphasis added.) The current regulations establish two separate registers "on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent." 37 CFR 1.341. (Emphasis added.) One register is for attorneys at law, 37 CFR 1.341 (a), and the other is for nonlawyer "agents." 37 CFR 1.341 (b). A person may be admitted under either category only by establishing "that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patents valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist them [373 U.S. 379, 385] in the presentation and prosecution of their applications before the Patent Office." 37 CFR 1.341 (c).
The statute thus expressly permits the Commissioner to authorize practice before the Patent Office by nonlawyers, and the Commissioner has explicitly granted such authority. If the authorization is unqualified, then, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, Florida may not deny to those failing to meet its own qualifications the right to perform the functions within the scope of the federal authority. A State may not enforce licensing requirements which, though valid in the absence of federal regulation, give "the State's licensing board a virtual power of review over the federal determination" that a person or agency is qualified and entitled to perform certain functions, 4 or which impose upon the performance of activity sanctioned by federal license additional conditions not contemplated by Congress. 5 "No State law can hinder or obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act of Congress." Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 566.
The only language in either the statute or regulations which affords any plausible support for this view is the provision in the regulations that "[r]egistration in the Patent Office . . . shall only entitle the persons registered to practice before the Patent Office." 37 CFR 1.341. Respondent suggests that the meaning of this limitation is clarified by reference to the predecessor provision, which provided that registration "shall not be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to practice law." 3 Fed. Reg. 2429. Yet the progression to the more circumscribed language without more tends to indicate that the provision was intended only to emphasize that registration in the Patent Office does not authorize the general practice of patent law, but sanctions only the performance of those services which are reasonably necessary and incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications. That no more was intended is further shown by the contrast with the regulations governing practice before the Patent Office in trademark cases, also issued by the Commissioner of Patents. These regulations now provide that "[r]ecognition of any person under this section is not to be construed as sanctioning or authorizing the performance of any acts regarded in the jurisdiction where performed as the unauthorized practice of law." 37 CFR 2.12 (d). The comparison is perhaps sufficiently telling. But any possible uncertainty as to the intended meaning of the Commissioner must be dispelled by the fact that when the present regulations were amended in 1948, 6 it was first proposed to add a provision similar to that appearing in the trademark regulations. 7 After objection had been leveled [373 U.S. 379, 387] against the revision on the ground that it "indicated that the office thinks that the states have the power to circumscribe and limit the rights of patent attorneys who are not lawyers," 8 the more sweeping language was deleted and the wording modified to its present form.
Bereft of support in the regulations, respondent directs us to the legislative history of the statute to confirm its understanding that 31 and its predecessor provisions were not designed to authorize practice not condoned by the State. Insofar as this history provides any insight [373 U.S. 379, 388] into the intent of Congress, however, we are convinced that the interpretation which respondent asks us to give the statute is inconsistent with the assumptions upon which Congress has acted for over a century.
Examination of the development of practice before the Patent Office and its governmental regulation reveals that: (1) nonlawyers have practiced before the Office from its inception, with the express approval of the Patent Office and to the knowledge of Congress; (2) during prolonged congressional study of unethical practices before the Patent Office, the right of nonlawyer agents to practice before the Office went unquestioned, and there was no suggestion that abuses might be curbed by state regulation; (3) despite protests of the bar, Congress in enacting the Administrative Procedure Act refused to limit the right to practice before the administrative agencies to lawyers; and (4) the Patent Office has defended the value of nonlawyer practitioners while taking steps to protect the interests which a State has in prohibiting unauthorized practice of law. We find implicit in this history congressional (and administrative) recognition that registration in the Patent Office confers a right to practice before the Office without regard to whether the State within which the practice is conducted would otherwise prohibit such conduct.
The power of the Commissioner of Patents to regulate practice before the Patent Office dates back to 1861, when Congress first provided that "for gross misconduct he may refuse to recognize any person as a patent agent, either generally or in any particular case . . . ." 9 The "Rules and Directions" issued by the Commissioner in 1869 provided that "[a]ny person of intelligence and good moral character may appear as the attorney in fact or agent of [373 U.S. 379, 389] an applicant upon filing proper power of attorney." 10 From the outset, a substantial number of those appearing in this capacity were engineers or chemists familiar with the technical subjects to which the patent application related. "Many of them were not members of the bar. It probably never occurred to anybody that they should be." 11 Moreover, although a concentration of patent practitioners developed in Washington, D.C., the regulations have provided since the reorganization of the Patent Office in 1836 that personal attendance in Washington is unnecessary and that business with the Office should be transacted in writing. 12 The bulk of practitioners are now scattered throughout the country, and have been so distributed for many years. 13 As a practical matter, if [373 U.S. 379, 390] practitioners were not so located, and thus could not easily consult with the inventors with whom they deal, their effectiveness would often be considerably impaired. 14 Respondent's suggestion that practice by nonlawyers was intended to be confined to the District of Columbia thus assumes either congressional ignorance or disregard of long-established practice.
"Mr. STAFFORD. . . . I was under the impression that hereafter a person in order to practice before the Patent Office must be admitted to practice before some bar of a State.
"Mr. LAGUARDIA. That is my understanding.
"Mr. PERKINS. I will correct myself. He may be admitted to act as a patent agent, but after the passage of this act no one who is not admitted to the bar generally can hold himself out to be a patent attorney, patent lawyer, patent solicitor, or patent counselor.
"Mr. STAFFORD. A person without being a member of the bar may be registered as a patent agent to practice before the Commissioner of Patents?
Hence, during the period the 1922 statute was being considered, and prior to its readoption in 1952, 35 we find strong and unchallenged implications that registered agents have a right to practice before the Patent Office. The repeated efforts to assure Congress that no attempt was being made to limit this right are not without significance. Nor is it insignificant that we find no suggestion that the abuses being perpetrated by patent agents could or should be corrected by the States. To the contrary, reform was effected by the Patent Office, which now requires all practitioners to pass a rigorous examination, [373 U.S. 379, 396] 37 CFR 1.341 (c), strictly regulates their advertising, 37 CFR 1.345, and demands that "[a]ttorneys and agents appearing before the Patent Office . . . conform to the standards of ethical and professional conduct generally applicable to attorneys before the courts of the United States." 37 CFR 1.344.
"Is it not a fact that somewhere in the bill the distinguished Senator has reserved the right to a non-professional - that is, a man who is, not a lawyer - to appear, if the agency having jurisdiction permits it? That is, there is a discretion permitted, is there not? For example, take a case where a scientific expert would better represent before the Commission the interests involved than would a lawyer. The right to obtain that privilege is granted in the bill somewhere, is it not?
We have not overlooked respondent's constitutional arguments, but find them singularly without merit. We have already noted the source of Congress' power to grant patent rights. It has never been doubted that the establishment of the Patent Office to process patent applications is appropriate and plainly adapted to the end of securing to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries, nor can it plausibly be suggested that by taking steps to authorize competent persons to assist in the preparation of patent applications Congress has exceeded the bounds of what is necessary and proper to the accomplishment of this same end. Cf. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 ; United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576 . Congress having acted within the scope of the powers "delegated to the United States by the Constitution," it has not exceeded the limits of the Tenth Amendment despite the concurrent effects of its legislation upon a matter otherwise within the control of the State. "Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States." II Annals of Congress 1897 (remarks of Madison). The Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 ; Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 . Compare Miller, Inc., v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 . The authority of Congress is no less when the state power which it displaces would otherwise have been exercised by the state judiciary rather than by the state legislature. Cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 . Finally, 31 contains sufficient standards to guide the Patent Office in its admissions policy to avoid the criticism that Congress has improperly delegated its powers to the administrative [373 U.S. 379, 404] agency. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 16 -18.
It follows that the order enjoining petitioner must be vacated since it prohibits him from performing tasks which are incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications before the Patent Office. The judgment below is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
[ Footnote 1 ] Petitioner's right to refer to himself as a "Patent Attorney" has been mooted by his voluntary discontinuance of the use of the term "attorney."
[ Footnote 2 ] See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 40 -41; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 ; West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S. E. 2d 420; Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788.
[ Footnote 3 ] Act of July 19, 1952, c. 950, 1, 66 Stat. 795, 35 U.S.C. 31: "The Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, may prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before the Patent Office, and may require them, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, to show that they are of good moral character and reputation and are possessed of the necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office."
[ Footnote 4 ] Miller, Inc., v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 ; First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 ; cf. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 ; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 .
[ Footnote 5 ] Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235 -236; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69 ; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 449 (dissenting opinion); cf. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 .
[ Footnote 6 ] 13 Fed. Reg. 9596.
[ Footnote 7 ] Proposed Revision of Patent Rules 5.1, 611 O. G. Pat. Off., June 29, 1948, Supp. 8: "Registration of attorneys and agents. . . . Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall not be construed [373 U.S. 379, 387] as authorizing persons not members of the bar to practice law or to perform any acts regarded as practicing law in the jurisdiction where performed."
[ Footnote 8 ] "I think I know what you mean to say, but you have not said what you mean to say. If you stopped at the end of the first clause there and said that it does not authorize the persons not members of the bar to practice law, you might be closer to being right; but, as you have written it here, you have said that patent attorneys may not do in the states things which it may be necessary for them to do in order to prosecute their claims before the Patent Office. "In other words, you are giving it to the states to say what a patent attorney may do rather than leaving it up to the Congress and to the laws of the United States. "I may suggest that what patent attorneys do before the Patent Office might be construed as practicing law, were it not for the fact that their particular conduct is permitted by the acts of Congress and under the rules of the Patent Office. "The states cannot pass laws derogating from the rights of the patent attorneys as created by Congress and existing under the rules of the Patent Office. I think that the rule, as proposed, makes it possible for the states, or indicated that the Office thinks that the states have the power to circumscribe and limit the rights of patent attorneys who are not lawyers, which rights are created under the laws of Congress, and subject to the rules of the Patent Office rather than to regulation by the individual states. "I think you would have no power to pass this particular part of your proposed rule." Remarks of A. P. Kane, Attorney, Hearing on Proposed Revision of Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 281-282 (Sept. 30, 1948). See also id., at pp. 319-330.
[ Footnote 9 ] Act of March 2, 1861, c. 88, 8, 12 Stat. 247; see also Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 19, 16 Stat. 200, as amended, 66 Stat. 793, 35 U.S.C. 6.
[ Footnote 10 ] Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the Patent Office, 127 (Aug. 1, 1869).
[ Footnote 11 ] Letter from Edward S. Rogers, Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1928); cf. Hoosier Drill Co. v. Ingels, 15 O. G. Pat. Off. 1013; 2 Robinson, Patents, 431.
[ Footnote 12 ] "Personal attendance of the applicant at the Patent Office, to obtain a patent, is unnecessary. The business can be done by correspondence, (free of postage) or by power of attorney." Information to Persons Having Business to Transact at the Patent Office, 8 (July 1836). In 1854, it was first provided that "[a]ll business with the office should be transacted in writing. . . ." Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the Patent Office, 122 (Feb. 20, 1854). Compare 37 CFR 1.2.
[ Footnote 14 ] See Berle, Inventions and Their Management, 189-190; Hoar, Patent Tactics and Law (3d ed.), 256-257; Woodling, Inventions and Their Protection (2d ed.), 289-290, 333; Rivise, Preparation and Prosecution of Patent Applications, 42.
[ Footnote 15 ] See Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-18; 69 Cong. Rec. 6580; Spencer, The United States Patent Law System, 94-96. Berle, 184-186. Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1622, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3; H. R. Rep. No. 364, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 2; Information to Persons Having Business to Transact at the Patent Office, Patent Agents or Attorneys (1848).
[ Footnote 16 ] Rules of Practice in the United States Patent Office, 17 (July 18, 1899). Compare 17 in the edition of June 18, 1897.
[ Footnote 17 ] 252 O. G. Pat. Off. 967. Compare 37 CFR 1.345.
[ Footnote 18 ] Act of February 18, 1922, c. 58, 3, 42 Stat. 390. Compare Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 19, 16 Stat. 200, as amended, 35 U.S.C. 6, and Act of July 4, 1884, c. 181, 5, 23 Stat. 101, 5 U.S.C. 493.
[ Footnote 19 ] Letter from E. B. Moore, Commissioner of Patents, Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 23417, No. 1, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7. See also Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 210, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 16; Commissioner of Patents, Annual Report, xii (1908).
[ Footnote 20 ] The following colloquy regarding an identical bill introduced the session before passage occurred between Congressman Himes and the Commissioner of Patents: "Mr. HIMES. It seems to me that we should know just who the man practicing before the Patent Office happens to be. Must he be a member of the bar or are the requirements the same for the patent attorney who simply goes and gets a patent for his clients as the man that goes and practices before the Patent Office, before the Commissioner of Patents? "Mr. ROBERTSON. The Patent Office can register anyone who shows a degree of proficiency necessary to write specifications, whether or not he is a member of the bar. "Mr. HIMES. He must not be a member of the bar? "Mr. ROBERTSON. He need not be a member of the bar. That is not as bad as it sounds. Some of our best practitioners are not members of the bar. They are the older line of attorneys. There are some very fine ones who have been practicing before the Patent Office 30 or 40 years who are not members of the bar, but they are honest men, and there are some of the practitioners who are members of the bar who are not honest men. So it is a very difficult thing to reach." Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 210, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16. See also Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 5011, 5012, 7010, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 281.
[ Footnote 21 ] Commissioner of Patents, Annual Report, vi (1893).
[ Footnote 22 ] Commissioner of Patents, Annual Report, xiv (1915).
[ Footnote 23 ] Act of April 27, 1916, c. 89, 39 Stat. 54.
[ Footnote 24 ] 53 Cong. Rec. 6313.
[ Footnote 25 ] Act of May 9, 1938, 52 Stat. 342; now 66 Stat. 796, 35 U.S.C. 33.
[ Footnote 26 ] This was the so-called "Cramton bill," H. R. 699, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 5811, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 10735, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 5790, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
[ Footnote 27 ] E. g., 69 Cong. Rec. 6580; Hearings before Senate Committee on Patents on H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7, 51; Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 699, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 34, 49.
[ Footnote 28 ] E. g., 69 Cong. Rec. 6580; S. Rep. No. 628, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 4; Hearings before Senate Committee on Patents on H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 59; Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-25, 28-33, 56-76, 85-100; Hearings before Senate Committee on Patents on H. R. 699, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5, 10; Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 699, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5, 41.
[ Footnote 29 ] Prior to 1938, the Patent Office listed both lawyers and nonlawyers on a single register and referred to both as Patent Attorneys. The [373 U.S. 379, 394] legislation which was proposed would not have prohibited nonlawyers previously registered from continuing to use this appellation. E. g., H. R. Rep. No. 947, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. Although the several bills containing this provision failed to gain approval (though passing the House repeatedly), in 1938, the Commissioner, following suggestions made to him during the course of the Committee hearings, Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 5811, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 46; Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 26-27, established separate registers for lawyers and for nonlawyer agents, 495 O. G. Pat. Off. 715, and has since prohibited agents so registered from representing themselves to be attorneys, solicitors or lawyers. See 37 CFR 1.341, 1.345. The registration of those agents previously enrolled on the single register, of whom petitioner is one, was not changed.
[ Footnote 30 ] S. Rep. No. 1209, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1.
[ Footnote 31 ] H. R. Rep. No. 947, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 4; S. Rep. No. 626, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 4; H. R. Rep. No. 728, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3.
[ Footnote 32 ] Statement of E. W. Bradford, Chairman of the Committee on Ethics of the American Patent Law Association, Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 699, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 61.
[ Footnote 33 ] Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 15.
[ Footnote 34 ] 72 Cong. Rec. 5467.
[ Footnote 35 ] No changes of substance were intended by the 1952 revision. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4; H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6.
[ Footnote 36 ] See Committee on Administrative Practice of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Report on Admission to and Control Over Practice Before Federal Administrative Agencies (1938); Survey of the Legal Profession, Standards of Admission for Practice Before Federal Administrative Agencies (1953); House Committee on Government Operations, Survey and Study of Administrative Organization, Procedure, and Practice in the Federal Agencies, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print); Note, Proposed Restriction of Lay Practice Before Federal Administrative Agencies, 48 Col. L. Rev. 120.
[ Footnote 37 ] Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report, 124 (1941). Compare Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Report to the Congress on Legal Services and Procedure, 32-35, 40-44 (1955).
[ Footnote 38 ] Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on Federal Administrative Procedure, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (Serial No. 19) 33-34, Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (hereinafter referred to as "Legislative History").
[ Footnote 39 ] S. Comm. Print on S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (June 1945), Legislative History 26.
[ Footnote 40 ] 92 Cong. Rec. 2156, Legislative History 316-317.
[ Footnote 41 ] H. R. 2657, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. See Curry, Bills in Congress Sponsored by American Bar Association Seek to Prevent Nonlawyers From Practicing Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 14 I. C. C. Pract. J. 491.
[ Footnote 42 ] "Credentials for Agents "SEC. 6. If any agency shall find it necessary in the public interest and in the interest of parties to agency proceedings before it to authorize practice by individuals not subject to section 5 and provides by generally applicable rule therefore in any case in which the governing statute does not provide only for appearances in person or by attorney or counsel, any such individual may be admitted hereunder to practice as an agent before such agency except in proceedings pursuant to section 7 or 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act or in connection with any form of compulsory process. . . . On application, individuals subject to this section who have been individually authorized to practice before any agency, have maintained such standing, are actively engaged in practice so permitted, and are so certified by the agency with a specification of the extent to which they have been so qualified to practice and have practiced shall be given credentials enabling them to continue such practice. No agency, and nothing in this Act, shall be deemed to permit any person to practice law in any place or render service save the authorized participation in agency proceedings by holders of credentials; and no person shall hold himself out, impliedly or expressly, as otherwise authorized hereunder."
[ Footnote 43 ] Chicago Bar Assn. v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N. E. 2d 519 (1949) (Patent Office); Sharp v. Mida's Research Bureau, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 690 (1943), aff'd, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 799 (1944) (Patent Office); Schroeder v. Wheeler, 126 Cal. App. 367, 14 P.2d 903 (1932) (Patent Office); People ex rel. Colorado Bar Assn. v. Erbaugh, 42 Colo. 480, 94 P. 349 (1908) (Patent Office) (by implication); In re New York County Lawyers Assn. (In re Bercu), 273 App. Div. 524, 534-535, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 209, 218 (1948), aff'd, 299 N. Y. 728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949) (Treasury and Tax Court) (by implication); Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N. J. Eq. 599, 604, 53 A. 2d 800, 803 (1947), aff'd, 142 N. J. Eq. 484, 59 A. 2d 863 (1948) (N. L. R. B.); De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S. W. 2d 146 (1940) (I. C. C.); Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 426 (1939) (I. C. C.); Bennett v. Goldsmith, 280 N. Y. 529, 19 N. E. 2d 927 (1939) (Immigration Department); Public Service Traffic Bureau, Inc., v. Haworth Marble Co., 40 Ohio App. 255, 178 N. E. 703 (1931) (I. C. C.) (dictum); In re Gibbs, 35 Ariz. 346, 355, 278 P. 371, 374 (1929) (Land Office) (dictum); Mulligan v. Smith, 32 Colo. 404, 76 P. 1063 (1904) (Land Office); see also In re Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N. E. 2d 74 (1938) (bankruptcy); Brooks v. Mandel-Witte Co., 54 F.2d 992 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 559 (1932) (Customs Court). Compare Lowell Bar Assn. v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 184-185, 52 N. E. 2d 27, 33-34 (1943) (Treasury and Tax Court). Normally, the state courts have deemed the authority granted by the federal agency to be closely circumscribed. E. g., Chicago Bar Assn. v. Kellogg, supra; In re Lyon, supra; Public Service Traffic Bureau, Inc., v. Haworth Marble Co., supra. In recent years divergence in opinion has developed. Compare Battelle Memorial Inst. v. Green, 133 U.S. P. Q. 49 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (Patent Office), and Noble v. Hunt, 95 Ga. App. 804, 99 S. E. 2d 345 (1957) (Treasury and Tax Court), with Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (App. Dept. Super. Ct., 1954) (Treasury); Wisconsin v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 377, 114 N. W. 2d 796, now pending on certiorari as No. 429, 1962 Term (I. C. C.); Petition of Kearney, 63 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1953) (Treasury and Tax [373 U.S. 379, 401] Court); cf. Marshall v. New Inventor's Club, Inc., 69 O. L. Abs. 578, 117 N. E. 2d 737 (C. P. 1953) (Patent Office). State courts have frequently held practice before state administrative agencies by nonlawyers to constitute the unauthorized practice of law. E. g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assn. v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. 2d 941, 111 A. L. R. 1, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728 ; Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S. W. 2d 977. But compare State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N. W. 2d 685; Realty Appraisals Co. v. Astor-Broadway Holding Corp., 5 App. Div. 2d 36, 169 N. Y. S. 2d 121.
[ Footnote 44 ] Of the 73 patent practitioners in Florida, 62 are not members of the Florida Bar.
[ Footnote 45 ] Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, 142 Tex. 506, 509, 179 S. W. 2d 946, 948; Lowell Bar Assn. v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 180, 52 N. E. 2d 27, 31. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Report of the Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure, Part VI, Appendices and Charts, 169 (1955).
[ Footnote 46 ] Id., 158. The Patent Office noted the qualification that nonlawyers are able to advertise. Compare Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19, 71-72, 89, 90.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.