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A.W. WEBB c. ROYAUME-UNI
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partielllement recevable ; partielllement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9353/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-05-11;9353.81 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) EGALITE DES ARMES, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES ORAL, (Art. 6-3-c) ASSISTANCE D'UN DEFENSEUR DE SON CHOIX, (Art. 6-3-c) ASSISTANCE GRATUITE D'UN AVOCAT D'OFFICEParties : Demandeurs : A.W. WEBBDéfendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9353/8 1 A .W . WEBB v/the UNITED KINGDO M A .W . WEBB c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 11 May 1983 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 11 mai 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention : The whole oj the proceedirrgs in questiou nrust be considered in order to decide whether the refusal oj legal aid in a civil case prejttdiced the right of access to cotrrt aud the righl to a JÃ ir hearing (ref. Airey,judgment) . These rights are uot prejudiced ij the applicaut cotdd defend hinrselj iu persou . i not arbitrary . if account was tnkeu of the limit jtherusalogidws required ou cases devoid oj any chance of success and the jndge enstned the jairness and proper conduct of the proceedirrgs. Article 14 o( the Convention, in conj unctlon with Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention :/t is not discriminatory to reJLse legal aid to joalhardy litigants . when the person carcerned has the possibility of presentirrg his case in person .
Article 6, paragraphe I, de la Conventlon : Pour dÃ©terrniner si . dans un procÃ¨s civil. le rejrts de l'assistance judiciaire a portÃ© atteinte au droit d'accÃ¨s Ã un tribunal et au droit Ã un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable (rÃ©f. Ã l'anÃ©t Airey) . il convient d'errvisager l'ensemble de la procÃ©dure. Il n Ã¿ a pas atteinte Ã ces droits si le requÃ©rant pouvait dÃ©jendre sa cause en personne . si le rejus de l'assistance judiciaire n'u pas Ã©tÃ© urbitraire, s'il a teau compte des limites qui s'imposent pour les actions dÃ©pourvues de chances de succÃ¨s, et que le juge a veillÃ© au dÃ©roulemetit Ã©quitnble de la procÃ©dure . Artlcle 14 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec l'artlcle 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention :/l u'est pas discriminatoire de refuser l'assistmrce judiciaire aus plaideurs tÃ©rnÃ©raires . lorsque l'intÃ©ressÃ© a[a possibilitÃ© de dÃ©jertdre sa cause en persoame.
((rancais : voir p . 143 )
The facts, as they have been submitted by the applicant, a British citizen born in 1944, who has been represented before the Contmission since the grant of legal aid by Messrs . Kingsford . Flower, Pain, solicitors of Ashford, Kent may be suntmarised as fnllows : The applicant was subjected to affiliation proceedings under Section 1 of the AHiliation Proceedings Act 1957 before the Maidstone Magistrates' Court on 24 July 1979 . The proceedings were brought by the mother of a child born on 29 December 1978, with whom the applicant admitted cohabitating from November 1977 to February 1978 and having subsequently had intercourse . The Magistrates ntade an al7iliation order against the applicant in respect of the child and ordered him to pÃ¢y Â£10 per week towards its maintenance . The applicant maintains that the Magistrates were biased against him and ret'used to permit hint to have a blood test and thus reached their decision without factual evidence . The applicant, who had not been represented at first instance, appealed in accordance with Section 8 (1) of the Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957, as amended by Section 56 (2) of the Courts Act 1971, to the Crown Court and in July 1979 applied to the No . 2 Legal Aid Area Committee Brighton for legal aid, which was refused, on 13 August 1979, on the grounds that he had not shown that he had reasonable grounds for defending the proceedings and pursuing the appeal . The applicaut represeuted himself on his appeal before the Crown Court at Maidstone ou 31 March 1980, when the Court directed that blood tests should be made at the applicant's expense . The applicant then renewed his application for legal aid, but was advised to reapply after obtaining the results of the blood tests . The tests were prepared and the hearing resumed before the Crown Court on 4 August 1980, the applicant again being unrepresented, having applied for legal aid again, but having been refused on 7 July 1980 on the grounds that the applicant's own evidence, taken with the blood test evidence, made the prospects of his appeal succeeding minimal . However on 4 August 1980 the applicant made a request to the judge for legal aid t~ assist him in interpreting the results of the tests for the Court and the latter adjourned the hearing for a further application for legal aid to be made . The judge also gave the applicant a letter in the following terms to send to the Law Society Legal Aid Committee in support of his further application tor legal aid : "Her Honour Judge Cosgrave, Crown Court Maidstone, 4 August 1980 WEBB (Alau William) appeared in this Court this morning and sought an adjournment on the grounds that he required legal aid for his appeal which I understand has been refused .
I have seen blood test reports, which on the face of them indicate that he gould be the father, but there may be some discrepancy which requires claritication . It he qualilies on financial grounds, it would be of assistance to the Court if he should be represented . Yours truly, Margaret Cosgrave " The applicant submitted this letter, with his application for legal aid, to the Law Society on 6 August 1980 . His application was considered by the same Legal Aid sub-committee, which had considered the applicant's previous request in July, and refused on 28 August 1980 and the applicant was informed by letter of I September 1980 that the Legal Aid Committee "did not feel (that) they had sufficient grounds for departing from the reasoning set out in their previous letter ol' 7 July 1980" . The applicant's appeal was relisted for 6 October 1980 . The applicant applied to the Court on 8 September 1980 to adjourn the appeal until such tinte as he was granted legal aid on the same basis as that granted to the child's mother, who was legally aided . His application was refused on 12 September 1980 and on 6 October his appeal was heard by Rochester Crown Court, the applicant being unrepresented . The appeal was dismissed, but the maintenance payments were reduced to Â£5 .00 per week .
The applicant has subsequently been involved in enforcement proceedings in relation to the arrears of maintenance and has sought to have the orders varied and the arrears remitted on several occasions . He is currently appealing to the High Court against the order ol' the Maidstone Magistrates made on 13 April 1981 that he pay maintenance of Â£5 .00 per week and Â£0 .50 per week in respect of the accrued arrears .
COMPLAINTS . The applicant contplains first that his hearing before the Maidstone Magistrates' Court on 24 July 1979 was unfair and that the Magistrates retused to permit him to undergo a blood test . He also complains that he was denied legal aid for his appeal from the order of the Magistrates to the Crown Court, which was flnally determined on 6 October 1980 . The applicant invokes Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant complains first of bias and unfairness in the afriliation proceedings before the Maidstone Magistrates' Court on 24 July 1979 and that he was subsequently denied a fair hearing and adequate access to the Crown Court of his appeal from the Magistrates' order, by the refusal of his applications for legal aid, ultimately, on 28 August 1980 . His appeal was finally dismissed on 6 October 1980 . The applicant invokes Article 6(1) of the Convention which provides (inrer alia) : "In the determination ot' his civil rights and obligations . . . everyone is entitled to a fair . . . hearing . . . by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . " The respondent Government has contended that the applicant has failed to exhaust the ettective domestic remedies which were available to him, in that he failed to Ã¢pply to adjourn the affiliation proceedings and seek judicial review of the decision of the Legal Aid Area Committee of 28 August 1980, refusing him legal aid . ' The applicant contends that the complexity and technical nature of an application for judicial review made it impractical to expect him to pursue it without the means to employ a solicitor or without legal aid . However, he submits that it would be unreasonable to expect him to seek, or for the Area Committee to grant, further legal aid for him to take proceedings to challenge the Comntittee's refusal of legal aid in the afFiliation proceedings . He further submits that it would have been impossible in practice to obtain an adjournment of his appeal in the appeal proceedings, whilst he sought judicial review, as is illustrated by his application for an adjournment on 8 September 1982, which was rejected on 12 September 1982 . Finally the applicant submits that the remedy of judicial review would not have been effective, within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention, since it would, at most, require the legally correct application of criteria of Section 7 (5) ol'the Legal Aid Act 1974 to his application for legal aid . In his subntission these criteria do not correspond with those recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in the Airey case and, in particular, do not iuclude cousideration of whether the applicant would receive a fair hearing without legal aid whatever the merits of his appeal . The Commission uotes flrst that the applicant applied on separate occasions for the grant of legal aid, each of these applications being refused . Furthermore, although there is no provision for an appeal from the refusal of legal aid, the applicant applied to the judge presiding at his Appeal on 4 August 1980 for legal aid, and she wrote to the competent authorities statin g
that it would be of assistance to the Court for the applicant to be legally aided . Nevertheless legal aid was again refused . The respoudeut Government have contended that, notwithstanding this refusal, and the applicant's prior efforts, Article 26 required the applicant to ntount a collateral attack on the Area Committee's decision by way of judicial review . By these proceedings the applicant could have obtained the quashing of the Area Committee's decision, if he could show that they had failed to take into accouut a material factor, or had taken an irrelevant factor into account or had reached a decision which no reasonable Committee could have reached . As the Commission found in Application No . 7598/76 Kaplan v . the United Kingdom, such proceedings provide a formal review principally of the lawtÃ¹lness of a giveu decision, in particular from the procedural point of view, as well as providing a limited review of the merits of the decision to the extent that a decision which, given the facts, no reasonable Committee could have reached, and which was arbitrary, would be quashed . It is, however, clear that the High Court would uot intervene merely on the ground that it would have exercised a discretiouary power in a different manner to the authority vested with it (DR IS, p . 120 at p . 122) . In the present case the applicant submits that, even if the Area Committee did apply the criteria for deciding upon the applicant's application for legal aid correctly uuder English law, those criteria do not fully reflect the requirements recognised by the Comntission and the Court in the Airey case, which made the requirement that the applicant be afforded a decisive fair hearing . even if his prospects of success are not good on the merits . The applicaut did not allege that the Area Committee had acted unlawtully in refusing legal aid, nor that their decision was arbitrary or so "unreasonable" that the High Court would have quashed the decision in judicial review proceedittgs . The Conimissioit concludes that an application for judicial review would not, in these circumstances, have constituted an effective rentedy for the applicaut's coniplaint that the criteria for the refusal of his application for legal aid do uot correspond with those of the Convention in the light of the Airey case, and that the refusal denied him a fair hearing in the appeal proceedings . 2 . The applicant complains that he was denied a fair hearing, required by Article 6(1) of the Convention, since he was denied legal aid in pursuing the attiliation proceedings in the Crown Court . The Commission recalls that in Application No . 8315/78 . (DR 25, p . 203), it has concluded that paternity proceedings involve the determination of civil rights, since they are directly decisive for the private rights of the putative father, the child, and in certai n
cases, the mother . While it is clear that the affiliation proceedings in the present case were also concerned with the determination of civil rights and obligations, the Commission nevertheless notes that the applicant's complaint relates to the refusal of legal aid for an appeal from the decision of the Magistrates' Court at first instance, and that the applicant did not seek legal aid tor the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court . The applicant contends that, although legal aid is not guaranteed in all civil proceediugs to which Article 6(1) applies, the requirement of a fair hearing contained in that provision may necessitate the provision of legal aid in certain circumstances . In particular, he submits that the Court in the Airey case identified the following factors, which led to the conclusion that that applicant, although in theory able to present her case in person, was in practice denied the guarantee of access to court and a fair hearing contained in Article 6 (1) : 1 . The case involved complicated points of la w 2 . the case involved expert witnesses ;3 . the case involved the proof of established facts ; an d 4 . the case entailed an emotional involvement, incompatible with the objectivity required by forensic advocacy . (Judgment of 9 October 1979 . Series A, Vol . 32) . The applicant maintains that these factors were not, or were not adequately, reflected in the criteria imposed by Section 7(5) of the Legal Aid Act 1974, and that the Area Committee failed to take them into account in refusing the applicant legal aid, essentially on the basis of the poor prospects of success which his appeal offered . In addition he complains that the composition of the Area Committee, which considered his renewed applications for legal aid, should not be able to be the same as that which considered a previous application . The respondent Government submit that these factors would have been taken into account by the Area Committee in deciding whether the applicant had reasonable grounds for pursuing his appeal, in accordance with Section 7 (5) of the Legal Aid Act 1974 . They thus submit that the applicant's prospects of success in his appeal were only one of the factors which would be considered by the Committee on an application for legal aid . However, in the respondent Government's subniission the provision of legal aid in civil proceedings goes further than merely granting it where the factors referred to in the Airey case are present . since, in an appropriate case . Section 7 (5) of the Legal Aid Act 1974 would require the grant of legal aid even in the absence of these factors . The Commission recalls, however, that under the terms of Article 25 (I) of the Couvention it is required to consider the facts of the application before it and not the qtiestion of the general conformity of Section 7 (5) of the Lega l
Aid Act 1974 with the requirentents of the Convention . It must, therefore, consider the applicant's reliance upon the factor's mentioned above, especially in the light of paragraph 26 of the Court's decision in the Airey case (ibid, at page 15) to establish whether or not the applicant's undisputed personal right ol' appearance before the Crown Court on his appeal met the requirements of Article 6(I), In this respect the Commission also notes that the applicant has not shown that the contposition of the Committees which considered the applicant's requests for legal aid was in any way relevant to the ultimate question of the fairness ot' the aftiliation proceedings as a whole, since he has not alleged actual or potential bias by the Committee, which would have enabled the applicant to pursue judicial review to challenge their decisions . The Conimission does not find that the subject of the proceedings constituted in itsetf a complex point of law . The proceedings were brought to establish the aftiliation of a child born to a woman with whom the applicant had at one time been living . The legal issue, which would then determine the applicant's liability to support the child, was readily comprehensible to a lay person, and it is clear from the applicant's submissions that he fully understood the nature of the proceedings . It is also significant that, although the proceedings in question were on appeal, the Crown Court had full jurisdiction to make its own flndings of fact and to admit and examine new evidence, as it did, for example, in respect of the blood tests which had been couducted . The applicant was thus able to present his evidence and submissions afresh, notwithstanding the findings ot the Magistrates' Court, which he disputed, in a full hearing o( the matter, and he was not, therefore, restricted by the alleged inadequacies in the proceedings before the Magistrates' Court . The Comntission finds it appropriate to consider the second and third factors relied on by the applicant together, since the applicant obtained blood test evidence upon which his appeal relied, although no expert witness was specitically called . It is clear that the rules of evidence and its presentation and interpretation to a Court are matters of legal complexity in respect of which legal advocacy is an advantage . This is reflected by Judge Cosgrave's letter of 4 August 1980, which stated that it would be of assislance to ihe court for the applicant to be legallv aided in relation to the evaluation of a possible ambiguity in this evidence . However, the Commission must also take account of the fact that the applicant had written to the doctor who had prepared the tests and the accompanying evidence and obtained clarification from him, and that the applicant's request to Judge Cosgrave for leave to make a further application l'or legal aid was apparently taken as a preliminary point before the evidence would otherwise have been presented to the Court by the applicant . Furtherntore . when the appeal was tinally heard and dismissed on 6 October 1980 b y
another Judge, he was apparently satisfied with the applicant's ability to present the appeal without legal aid . In respect of the fourth factor, it is clear that the applicant was emotionally involved in the outcome of the proceedings, both because they involved his private, personal affairs, and also in the light of the financial implications which an affiliation order might impose on him . The Commission considers that these factors are not decisive in themselves of the question whether the applicant required legal aid in order that the hearing of his appeal would be fair, but must be evaluated in the context of the particular proceedings in which the applicant was involved . It refers, in this respect . to the significance placed by the Court in the Airey case upon the fact that the proceedings in question were in the High Court, and involved not only very high fees for representation, but also a very complex prncedure for institutingproceedings . In this respect the Commission finds a significant difference between appeal proceedings in the present case and the complexity of the proceedings at issue in the Airey case . In particular . the proceedings were instituted in the Magistrates Court, which is the court of lowest jurisdiction in the United Kingdom . The complexity of the Rules of Procedure and the formality of the proceedings is thus significantly less than in the High Court, a fact which remains true even on an appeal from the Magistrates' Court to the Crown Court . The Commission must therefore consider whether, in these circumstances, the applicant still had reasonable access to court and an opportunity for a fair hearing, notwithstanding the refusal of his applications for legal aid . The Commission recalls that in the Airey case the Court made it clear that it tett to the State a free choice of the means to be used to ensure the effective protection of these rights contained in Article 6 (1) Qudgment of 9 October 1979, Series A, Vol . 32, p . 15) . Furthermore the Commission has recognised in its decision on the admissibility of Application No . 8158/78 (X . v . the United Kingdom . DR 21, p . 95) that, given the limited resources available . a svstem of legal aid can only operate etfeetively by establishing a machinery to select which cases should be legally aided . Provided that the decision as to whether or not to grant legal aid is not taken arbitrarily, but recognises the practical restraints imposed oTi an action which is not likely to succeed, Article 6 (1) of the Conveution may be satisfied by the applicant securing his owo defence, provided that it is practical for him to do so, and given the ellective exercise of the powers and duties of every judge seized with jurisdiction to ensure the basic fairness and proper conduct of the proceedings before him . - 1qp -
In the present case the applicant does not allege that the refusal ot' his applications was arbitrary . Indeed, had this been his contention, it is possible that the remedy of judicial review would have been open to him and effective to resolve his complaints in the domestic jurisdiction . The applicant coniplains rather that the decision failed to take account ot'the inequality, which he contends arose from the fact that the mother was represented before the Crown Court, whereas he was not . In the notion of a lair hearing, Article 6 (1) of the Convention does not guarantee that both parties to any proceedings must necessarily be represented by counsel or be granted legal aid to that eftect . No such rigid principle is contained in, or implied by, this provision which does, however, require that the proceedings taken as a whole, must be fair (cf . the Commission's consistent case-law e .g . Application No . 2804/66, Cull . Dec . 27, p . 72 Pt) . As a result, the task of the judge or judges in proceedings to which Article 6 (1) applies is never passive, but includes the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the fairness of the proceedings, whether or not the parties are represented, and this safeguarding principle is especially relevant in contested proceedings where one of the prties appears in person . It follows that the Commission's examination of the fairness of the proceedings must be based upon their entirety and not on the isolated question of whether the applicant was granted legal aid . In the present case it appears from the transcript of the Crown Court's hearing of the appeal on 6 October 1980 that, having heard the applicant's pleading in person and the child's mother's counsel, the Court examined the evidence "in the utmost detail and sought to argue everything that could be argued" . After this full examination of all the evidence in the case and having tulty heard the applicant, the Court was faced with the task of evaluating the probability of the applicant's paternity . In these circumstances, the Commission is satistied that the Crown Court's decisibn was based on a full and thorough evaluatiou of the evidence and that there is nothing to show that the applicant failed to receive a fair hearing in the determination of his appeal before the Crown Court . It follows that this aspect of the applicant's complaint is manifestly itt-fouuded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . 5 . The applicant also invokes Article 14 of the Convention which provides "The enjoyntent of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour . language, religion, political or other opinion . national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status" . The Comntission recalls that in the Belgian Linguistic Case the Court recognised that it was not every differentiation which constitutes discriminatio n
contrary to Article 14 . The Commission, applying the criteria recognised in its constant case-law, must therefore consider whether the Area Committee's refusal of the applicaut's requests for legal aid, which resÃ»lted in his not being represented on his appeal due to his lack of other means to employ a lawyer . was a ditTerence in treatment without a legitimate aim, which disregarded the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies, and was disproportionate . The Commission recognises that the aim of Section 7 (5) of the Legal Aid Act 1974 is to ensure that the funds available for civil legal aid are not squandered in providing lawyers in vexatious, frivolous or other cases, where a prudent person, who could personally afford the costs of litigation, would be advised not to proceed . The Commission regards this aim as legitimate, both because it would be unreasouable for a legallv aided pa rt y to exploit that financial advantage against an unaided opponent, and because the result is to discourage fruitless Ãitigation which would overburden the courts . In this respect it must also be noted that the applicant's request for legal aid was first made for the appeal proceedings which he wished to pursue before the Crown Court, and that, as a result, the Legal Aid Committee which examined his request had before it the evidence which the Magistrates had heard, in order to assist them in evaluating the reasonableness of the proposed appeal . The applicant has contended that he should have been granted legal aid in the light of the fact that the child's mother, who had initiated the proceedings, was legally aided, but the Commission notes that the same criteria under Section 7 (5) of the Legal Aid Act 1974 would have been applied to her as to the applicant, and that this in itself cannot constitute discrimination . Furthermore, the Commission notes that a similar approach of applying a 'tilter', based in part on the prospects of success in the proposed action, in deciding upon applications for legal aid, is applied in a number of member states of the Council of Europe . The Commission has already found that in the light of the nature of the proceedings involved, the requirement that the applicant represent himself was not a denial of his right of access to court or of a fair hearing, guaranteed by Article 6(I) of the Convention . It follows that, since the applicant remained able to pursue his case in person, the denial of legal aid was not disproportionate to the aim sought to be achieved by Section 7 (5) of the Legal Aid Act 1974, and that this aspect of the applicant's complaint under Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 6(I), is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . For these reasons the Comntissio n DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION) . .V FAIT Les faits . tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, ressortissant britannique nÃ© eu 1944 et reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission, deouis l'octroi de l'Ã¢ssistance judiciaire, par le cabinet Kingsford Flower Pain, 'solicitors Ã Ashl'ord (Kent), peuvent se rÃ©sumet comme suit : Le requÃ©rant fit l'objet, devant le tribunal d'instance de Maidstone, le 24 juillet 1979, d'une action en recherche de paternitÃ©, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article I de la loi de 1957 sur la filiation . L'action fut engagÃ©e par la mÃ¨re d'un enfant nÃ© le 29 dÃ©cembre 1978, avec laquelle le requÃ©rant reconnaÃ®t avoir cohabitÃ© de novembre 1977 Ã fÃ©vrier 1978 et avoir eu par la suite des rapports sexuels . Le tribunal prononÃ§a contre le requÃ©rant une ordonnance d'assignation Ã pÃ¨re putatif et condamna l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã verser 10 livres par semaine pour l'entretien de l'enfant . Le requÃ©rant soutient que le juge Ã©tait prÃ©venu contre lui et a refusÃ© de faire procÃ©der Ã une analyse de sang, prenant ainsi sa dÃ©cision sans preuve . Le requÃ©rant, qui ne s'Ã©tait pas fait reprÃ©senter en premiÃ¨re instance, fit appel devant la Crown Court . conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 8, paragraphe 1, de la loi de 1957 sur la filiation, modifiÃ©e par l'article 56, paragraphe 2, de la loi de 1971 sur les tribunaux . En juillet 1979, il demande l'aide judiciaire Ã la commission judiciaire nÂ° 2 dudistrict de Brighton . Cette aide lui fut refusÃ©e le 13 aoÃ»t 1979, au motif que l'intÃ©ressÃ© n'avait pas invoquÃ© de moyens raisonnables pour se dÃ©fendre et faire appel .
Le requÃ©rant prÃ©senta lui-mÃªme son appel devant la Crown Court de Maidstone le 31 mars 1980 et le juge ordonna qp'il soit procÃ©dÃ© Ã des analyses de sang aux frais de l'intÃ©ressÃ© . Le requÃ©rant renouvela alors sa demande d'aide judiciaire maison lui conseilla de ne la prÃ©senter qu'aprÃ¨s avoir obtenu les rÃ©sultats des aualyses . 11 fut donc procÃ©dÃ© aux analyses et l'audience reprit devaut la Crown Court le 4 aoÃ»t 1980 . Le requÃ©rant n'y Ã©tait toujours pas reprÃ©sentÃ© car il avait sollicitÃ© Ã nouveau l'aide judiciaire et celle-ci lui avait Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e le 7 juillet 1980 au motif que les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve qu'il avait fournis, joints aux rÃ©sultats des analyses, rendaient minimes les chances de succÃ¨s de son appel . Le 4 aoÃ»t 1980 cependant, le requÃ©rant prÃ©senta au juge une demande d'aide judiciaire pour pouvoir interprÃ©ter les rÃ©sultats des analyses devant le tribunal et le juge ajourna l'audience pour permettre Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ© de prÃ©senter sa demande .
Le juge remit Ã©galement au requÃ©rant une lettre Ã adresser Ã la commission d'aide judiciaire de la "Law Society" afin d'appuyer sa nouvelle demande . La lettre Ã©tait ainsi libellÃ©e : "Mnte le juge Cosgrave , Crown Court Maidstone, le 4 aoÃ»t 198 0 Alan William Webb a comparu devant nous ce matin et demandÃ© un ajournement au motif qu'il rÃ©clamait l'aide judiciaire pour son appel, laquelle lui a Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e Ã ce que je crois comprendre . A premiÃ¨re vue, les rÃ©sultats de l'analyse de sang indiquent qu'il peut Ãªtre le pÃ¨re de l'enfant mais il peut y avoir des divergences d'interprÃ©tation qui appel . lent des prÃ©cisions .
Si l'intÃ©ressÃ© remplit les conditions tinanciÃ¨res voulues, il serait utile au tribunal qu'il se fasse reprÃ©senter . Salutations distinguÃ©es Margaret Cosgrave . " Le 6 ao0t 1980, le requÃ©rant soumit cette lettre, ainsi que sa demande d'aide judiciaire, Ã la Law Society . Sa demande fut examinÃ©e par la mÃªme sous-commission d'aide judiciaire qui avait dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© saisie de la premiÃ¨re requÃ¨te en juillet et l'avait refusÃ©e le 28 aoÃ»t 1980 . Le requÃ©rant fut informÃ© par lettre du 1er septembre 1980 que la commission d'aide judiciaire "ne voyait aucune raison valable de s'Ã©carter des motifs indiquÃ©s dans sa prÃ©cÃ©dente lettre du 7 juittet 1980" . L'appel du requÃ©rant fut donc rÃ©inscrit au rÃ´le du 6 octobre 1980 . Le 8 septembre 1980, le requÃ©rant demanda au juge d'ajourner l'exanten de l'appel jusqu'Ã ce que l'aide judiciaire lui soit accordÃ©e dans les nt@mes conditions qu'Ã la mÃ¨re de l'enfant . Sa demande fut refusÃ©e le 12 septembre 1980 et, le 6 octobre, son appel fut entendu par la Crown Court de Rochester, le requÃ©rant ne s'Ã©tant pas fait reprÃ©senter . Le juge dÃ©bouta l'appelant niais rÃ©duisit la pension alinientaire Ã cinq livres par semaine . Le requÃ©rant tit ensuite l'objet d'une procÃ©dure de recouvrement des arriÃ©rÃ©s de la peusion alimentaire et chercha Ã plusieurs reprises Ã faire moditier les ordomtances et remettre les arriÃ©rÃ©s . Actuellement, la High Court est saisie d'un appel contre l'ordonnance rendue le 13 avril 1981 par le juge d'instance de Maidstone condantnant le requÃ©rant Ã une pension alimentaire de cinq livres par semaine et Ã 0 .50 Â£ par semaine pour les arriÃ©rÃ©s .
Griefs Le requÃ©rant se plaint tout d'abord que sa cause n'a pas Ã©tÃ© entendue Ã©quitablentent le 24 juiltet 1979 par le tribunal d'instance de Maidstone et que cette juridiction n'a pas autorisÃ© une analyse de sang .
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Il se plaint Ã©galenteut de s'Ãªtre vu refuser l'aide judiciaire pour l'appel tormÃ© auprÃ¨s de la Crown Court contre la dÃ©cision du juge d'instance et qui tut tiualenteut trauchÃ© le 6 octobre 1980 . Le requÃ©rant invoque les articles 6 et 14 de la Convention .
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant se plaiut eu prentier lieu du caractÃ¨re partial et inÃ©quitable de la procÃ©dure de recherche de paternitÃ© qui s'est dÃ©roulÃ©e le 24 juillet 1979 devaut le tribuual d'itatance de Maidstone . 11 se plaint ensuite de s'Ãªtre vu ret'user uu accÃ©s couvenable Ã la Crown Court et une procÃ©dure Ã©quitable lorsqu'il a fait appel de l'ordonnance du juge d'instance refusant ses demandes d'aide judiciaire eu deruier lieu le 28 aoÃ»t 1980 . Son appel fut finalement rejetÃ© le 6 octobre 1980 . Le requÃ©rant invoque l'arlicle 6, paragraphe I, de la Convention, qui dispose uotantnteut : "Toute persouue a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement . . . par uu tribuual iudÃ©pendant et impartial, Ã©tabli par la loi, qui dÃ©cidera . . . des contestatious sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil" . Le Gouveruenient dÃ©fendeur soutient que le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les recours eliicaces dont il disposait en droit interne, puisqu'il n'a pas dentandÃ© l'ajournenteut de la procÃ©dure de recherche de paternitÃ© ni le contrÃ´le judiciaire de la dÃ©cision prise par la commission de district lui refusant l'aide judiciaire le 28 aoÃ»t 1980 .
Le requÃ©rant soutieut que- vu la complexitÃ© et le caractÃ¨re technique d'une dentaude de contrBle judiciaire . il lui Ã©tait impossible d'entreprendre cette actiou sans l'assistiuce d'un solicitor ou d'un conseil juridique . Il soutient cependant qu'il serait dÃ©raisonnable qu'il recherche ou se fasse accorder par la contmission d'aide judiciaire une aide judiciaire supplÃ©mentaire pour engager une procÃ©dure de contestation du refus d'aide judiciaire que la commissioului a opposÃ© dans la procÃ©dure de recherche de paternitÃ© . Il soutient en outre qu'en pratique il lui aurait Ã©tÃ© impossible de faire ajourner l'audience d'appel le temps de solliciter un contrÃ´le judiciaire, contnte le moutre le rejet le 12 septembre 1982 de la demande d'ajournement qu'il avait prÃ©sentÃ©e le 8 septembre 1982 . Enfin . le requÃ©raut soutient que le contrÃ´le judiciaire n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© uue voie de recours efficace . au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention, puisqu'il n'aurait pu tendre qu'Ã une application lÃ©galement correcte, pour sa demande d'aide judiciaire, des critÃ¨res posÃ©s Ã l'article 7, paragraphe 5, de la loi d e
1974 sur l'aide judiciaire . Selon lui, ces critÃ¨res ne correspondent pas Ã ceux fixÃ©s par la Cour europÃ©enue des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Airey et ne comportent pas, notantment, l'examen du point de savoir si le requÃ©rant bÃ©nÃ©ticierait d'uo procÃ¨s Ã©quitable sans aide judiciaire, que son appel soit ou uou tbndÃ© . La Commissiou relÃ¨ve tout d'abord que le requÃ©rant a plusieurs fois sollicitÃ© le bÃ©nÃ©tice de l'aide judiciaire et qu'il a toujours essuyÃ© un refus . En outre, s'il n'est pas prÃ©vu de recours contre le refus d'aide judiciaire, le requÃ©rant s'est uÃ©aumoins adressÃ© Ã ce sujet le 4 ao0t 1980 au juge prÃ©sidant l'audience d'appel, lequel a Ã©crit aux autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes en dÃ©clarant qu'il serait utile au tribuual que le requÃ©rant se fasse assister d'un conseil . Cependant, l'aide judiciaire a de nouveau Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu que, ntalgrÃ© ce refus et les efforts autÃ©rieuremeut dÃ©ployÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, l'article 26 obligeait l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã s'attaquer parallÃ¨lement Ã la dÃ©cision de la commission d'aide judiciaire du district en en rÃ©clamant son contrÃ´le par un juge . Par cette procÃ©dure, le requÃ©rant aurait pu obtenir l'annulation de la dÃ©cision de la commission d'aide judiciaire, Ã condition d'Ã©tablir que celle-ci u'avait pas tenu compte d'un Ã©lÃ©ment de fait, avait pris en considÃ©ration un facteur Ã©tranger Ã l'affaire ou encore pris une dÃ©cision qu'aucune commission raisonnable n'aurait prise . Comme la Commission l'a dÃ©clarÃ© au sujet de la requÃªte nÂ° 7598/76, Kaplan c/Royaunie-Uni, cette procÃ©dure tend principalement Ã un contrÃ´le formel de la lÃ©galitÃ© d'une dÃ©cision, notamment du point de vue de la procÃ©dure, mais elle permet aussi une rÃ©vision limitÃ©e du bien-fondÃ© de la dÃ©cision, dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle conduit Ã annuler une dÃ©cision qu'aucune commission raisonnable n'aurait prise en face de pareille situation de fait et qui est entachÃ©e d'arbitraire . Il est cependant clair que la High Court se retuserait Ã agir pour la seule raison qu'elle aurait exercÃ© un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire d'une maniÃ¨re diffÃ©rente de l'autoritÃ© qui la dÃ©tient (D .R . IS, p . 124, Ã la page 125) . En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant soutient que mÃªme si la commission de district a appliquÃ© correctement, au regard du droit anglais, les critÃ¨res requis pour statuer sur sa demande, ces critÃ©res ne reflÃ¨tent pas pleinement les exigences posÃ©es dans l'AtTaire Airey par la Commission et la Cour, qui considÃ¨rent comme dÃ©cisive la uÃ©cessitÃ© d'assurer un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable au requÃ©rant, mÃªme si ses chauces de succÃ¨s sont faibles quant au fond . Le requÃ©rant ue prÃ©tend pas que la commission de district ait commis une illÃ©galitÃ© eu lui refusant l'aide judiciaire . ni que la dÃ©cision ait Ã©tÃ© arbitraire ou Ã ce point "dÃ©raisonnablÃ©" que la High Court l'aurait annulÃ©e dans uue procÃ©dure de contrÃ´le judiciaire .
La Commission estime que dans ces conditions, une demande de rÃ©vision judiciaire n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© un moyen efrcace de faire droit au grief du requÃ©rant, Ã savoir que les critÃ¨res appliquÃ©s pour rejeter sa demande d'aide judiciaire ne correspondent pas Ã ceux de la Convention Ã la lumiÃ¨re de l'aHÃ¢ire Airey et que ce refus lui a dÃ©niÃ© la possibilitÃ© d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable en appel . Le requÃ©rant se ptaint de s'Ãªtre vu refuser un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable comme l'exige l'article 6, paragraphe l, de la Convention, puisqu'il n'a pas obtenu l'aide judiciaire pour se dÃ©fendre dans la procÃ©dure de recherche de paternitÃ© devaut la Crown Court . La Commission rappelle que, dans la requÃªte uÂ° 8315/78 (D .R . 15 . p . 207), elle a estimÃ© que la procÃ©dure de recherche de pateruitÃ© ou d'assiguation Ã pÃ¨re putatif emporte dÃ©termination de droits de caractÃ¨re civil puisqu'elle dÃ©termine directement les droits privÃ©s du pÃ¨re pulatif, de l'eufanl et parfois de la mÃ¨re . S'il est clair que la procÃ©dure de recherche de paternitÃ© a Ã©gafentent Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cisive en l'espÃ¨ce pour des droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil, la Commission relÃ¨ve nÃ©anmoins que le grief du requÃ©rant concerne le refus d'aide judiciaire pour l'appel formÃ© contre la dÃ©cision du tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance et que l'intÃ©ressÃ© n'avait pas demaudÃ© l'aide judiciaire pour la procÃ©dure en premiÃ¨re instance . Le requÃ©rant soutient que s'il est vrai que l'aide judiciaire n'est pas garantie dans toute procÃ©dure civile Ã laquelle s'applique l'article 6, paragraphe I, la coudition d'Ã©quitÃ© du procÃ¨s tigurant dans cette disposition nÃ©cessite dans certaius cas l'octroi de l'aide judiciaire . Il souligne notantntent que, dans l'affaire Airey, la Cour a identifiÃ© quatre Ã©lÃ©ments qui l'ont amenÃ©e Ã conclure que, dans cette affaire, la requÃ©rante, thÃ©oriquement en mesure de prÃ©senter sa cause en personne, s'Ã©tait vu en pratique refuser le droit d'accÃ¨s Ã un Iribuual et le droit Ã un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable garantis Ã l'article 6, paragraphe I . Ces Ã©lÃ©nieuts sont les suivants : 1 . l'allaire touche Ã des problÃ¨mes juridiques dÃ©licats 2 . l'aflaire exige le recours Ã l'expertise 3 . l'affaire oblige Ã prouver les faits ; 4 . l'afi'aire suscite une passion incompatible avec l'objectivitÃ© indispensable pour plaider en justice . (ArrÃ¨t du 9 octobre 1979, SÃ©rie A, Vol . 32) . Le requÃ©rant soutient que ces Ã©lÃ©ments ne se retrouvent pas ou se retrouveut ntal dans les critÃ¨res posÃ©s Ã l'article 7, paragraphe 5, de la loi de 1974 sur l'aide judiciaire et que la commission de district n'en a pas tenu compte pour refuser l'aide judiciaire au requÃ©rant en se fondant essentiellement sur les piÃ¨tres chances de succÃ¨s de l'appel . Le requÃ©rant estime aussi que la commission de district qui a examinÃ© ses nouvelles demandes d'aid e
judiciaire n'aurait pas dÃ» pouvoir y Ãªtre composÃ©e de la mÃªme maniÃ¨re que pour exaniiner ses demandes prÃ©cÃ©dentes . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient au contraire que la commission de district a tenu compte de ces Ã©lÃ©ments pour dÃ©cider, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 7, paragraphe 5, de la loi de 1974 sur l'aide judiciaire, si le requÃ©rant avait des motifs valables d'interjeter appel . Selon lui, les chances de succÃ¨s du requÃ©rant en appel n'ont Ã©tÃ© qu'un des Ã©lÃ©ments pris en compte par la commission pour statuer sur la demande d'aide judiciaire . Cependant, de l'avis du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, les conditions d'octroi de l'aide judiciaire pour un procÃ¨s civil vont plus loin que celles mentionnÃ©es dans l'affaire Airey puisque, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, l'article 7, paragraphe 5, de la loi de 1974 exigerait l'octroi de l'aide judiciaire mÃªme en l'absence de ces Ã©lÃ©ments .
La Commission rappelle toutefois qu'aux termes de l'article 25, paragraphe I . de la Conveution, elle est tenue d'examiner les faits dont elle est saisie et non pas la question gÃ©nÃ©rale de la conformitÃ© de l'article 7 . paragraphe 5, de la loi de 1974 sur l'aide judiciaire avec les exigences de la Convention . Elle doit dÃ¨s lors examiner les arguments du requÃ©rant Ã la lumiÃ¨re notamment du paragraphe 26 de l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour dans l'affaire Airey (ibid, Ã la page 15) . pour Ã©tablir si le droit incontestÃ© du requÃ©rant Ã compara4tre personnellement en appel devant la Crown Court suflisait Ã satisfaire aux exigences de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission relÃ¨ve Ã©galement que le requÃ©rant n'a pas dÃ©montrÃ© que la composition des commissions qui ont examinÃ© ses demandes d'aide judiciaire avait finalement une incidence sur l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure de recherche de paternitÃ© dans son ensemble car le requÃ©rant n'a allÃ©guÃ© aucun prÃ©jugÃ© rÃ©el ou possible de la part de la contmission, qui lui aurait permisd'engager une procÃ©dure de contrÃ´le judiciaire pour contester ses dÃ©cisions . ' La Commission n'estime pas que l'objet de la procÃ©dure ait constituÃ© en soi une question juridique complexe . L'action a Ã©tÃ© engagÃ©e pour Ã©tablir la paternitÃ© d'un enfant nÃ© d'une femme avec qui le requÃ©rant avait vÃ©cu Ã une certaine Ã©poque . Le point de droit duquel dÃ©pendÃ it ensuite la responsabilitÃ© du requÃ©rant dans l'entretien de l'enfant est facile Ã comprendre pour un non-juriste et, par son argumentation, le requÃ©rant a clairement montrÃ© qu'il avait bien compris la nature de la procÃ©dure . Il est Ã©galement important de noter que, bien qu'il se fÃ»t agi d'une procÃ©dure d'appel, la Crown Court avait pleine compÃ©tence pour procÃ©der Ã ses propres constatations en fait et pour admettre et examiner de nouveaux Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve . comme elle l'a fait par exemple pour les analyses de sang . Le requÃ©rant a donc pu, malgrÃ© les conclusions du tribunal d'instance qu'il contestait, prÃ©senter Ã nouveau ses preuves et arguments, lorsque l'affaire a Ã©tÃ© rÃ©examinÃ©e dans son entier . Il n'a donc pas Ã©tÃ© liniitÃ© par les insuffisances de la procÃ©dure en premiÃ¨re instance .
La Commission estime qu'il convient d'examiner ensemble les deuxiÃ¨me et troisiÃ¨me Ã©lÃ©ntents invoquÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, puisque ce dernier a obtenu les preuves (analyses de sang) sur lesquelles se fondait l'appel, bien qu'aucune expertise n'ait Ã©tÃ© expressÃ©ment dentandÃ©e . Il est clair que les rÃ¨gles de la preuve et leur prÃ©sentation et interprÃ©tation devant un tribunal sont des questions juridiquement complexes qu'il est avantageux de faire prÃ©senter en justice par un avocat . C'est ce que traduisait la lettre du juge Cosgrave en date du 4 ao0t 1980, indiquant qu'il serait utile au tribunal que le requÃ©rant soit assistÃ© par un avocat lorsqu'il s'agirait d'examiner une Ã©ventuelle ambiguÃ¯tÃ© de ce moyen de preuve . Cependant . la Commission doit Ã©galement tenir compte du fait que le requÃ©rant a Ã©crit au ntÃ©decin ayant procÃ©dÃ© aux analyses et Ã©tabli les documeuts qui y Ã©taient joints et qu'il en a obtenu des Ã©claircissements . Elle doit aussi tenir compte de ce que la dentande adressÃ©e par le requÃ©rant au juge Cosgrave de l'autoriser Ã formuler une nouvelle demande d'aide judiciaire semble avoir Ã©tÃ© considÃ©rÃ©e comme une question prÃ©liminaire, avant prÃ©sentatiou au juge des Ã©lÃ©ntents de preuve par le requÃ©rant . En outre, lorsque l'appel a Ã©tÃ© finalement entendu et rejetÃ© le 6 octobre 1980 par un autre juge, ce magistrat Ã©tait convaincu, semble-t-il, de l'aptitude du requÃ©rant Ã prÃ©senter son appel sans l'aide d'un avocat . Eu ce qui concerne le quatriÃ¨me Ã©lÃ©ment, il est clair que le requÃ©rant avait, pour l'issue de la procÃ©dure, un intÃ©rÃªt affectif, tant parce qu'elle touchait Ã sa vie privÃ©e et personnelle qu'en raison des incidences tinanciÃ¨res d'une Ã©ventuelle ordonnance d'assignation Ã pÃ¨re putatif . La Conimission estime que ces Ã©lÃ©ntents ne permettent pas en euxni@nies de trancher la question de savoir si le requÃ©rant avait besoin de l'aide d'un avocat pour faire Ã©quitablentent entendre sa cause en appel, mais qu'ils doivent @tre apprÃ©ciÃ©s dans le contexte de la procÃ©dure Ã laquelle le requÃ©rant Ã©tait partie . La Commission renvoie Ã cet Ã©gard Ã l'importance qu'attachait la Cour dans l'affaire Airey au fait que la procÃ©dure en question se dÃ©roulait devant la High Court et supposait non seulement des frais trÃ¨s Ã©levÃ©s de reprÃ©sentatiou, mais aussi des dÃ©marches trÃ¨s complexes pour engager la procÃ©dure . A cet Ã©gard . la Contmission estime qu'il existe une diffÃ©rence importante entre la procÃ©dure d'appel dont il s'agit en l'espÃ¨ce et la complexitÃ© de la procÃ©dure en jeu dans l'affaire Airey . En l'espÃ¨ce . la procÃ©dure engagÃ©e l'a Ã©tÃ© devant le tribunal d'instance, qui est la juridiction infÃ©rieure au Royaume-Uni . La complexitÃ© de la procÃ©dure de cette juridiction et les formalitÃ©s y sont donc beaucoup moins importantes que devant la High Court, et cette considÃ©ration vaut aussi dans le cas d'un appel formÃ© devant la Crown Court contre une dÃ©cision du tribunal d'instance .
La Commission doit donc examiner si, dans ces conditions, le requÃ©rant avait encore un accÃ¨s raisonnable au tribunal et bÃ©nÃ©ficiait de la possibilitÃ© de se faire entendre Ã©quitablentent malgrÃ© le refus opposÃ© Ã ses demandes d'aide judiciaire . La Commission rappelle que, dans l'affaire Airey, la Cour a indiquÃ© clairement que l'a rt icle 6 . paragraphe 1, laisse Ã l'Etat le choix des moyens Ã employer pour assurer une protection effective des droits qu'il consacre (ArrÃªt du 9 octobre 1979, SÃ©rie A, Vol . 32, p . 15) . De plus, la Commission a admis, dans sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la RequÃªte nÂ° 8158/78 ( X . c/RoyaumeUni, D .R . 21, p . 95) que, vu les limites des ressources disponibles . un systÃ¨me d'assistance judiciaire ne peut fonctionner efficacement que si un dispositif est Ã©tabli qui sÃ©lectionne les affaires devant bÃ©nÃ©ficier de l'assistance judiciaire . DÃ¨s lors que la dÃ©cision sur l'octroi de l'aide judiciaire non seulement Ã©chappe Ã l'arbitraire mais tient dÃ»ment compte des limites qui s'imposent lorsqu'une actiou est dÃ©pourvue de chances de succÃ¨s, les exigences de l'a rt icle 6, paragraphe 1 . peuvent se trouver satisfaites mÃªme lorsque le requÃ©rant comparait eu personne, Ã condition qu'il le puisse et que le juge compÃ©tent exerce efficacement ses pouvoirs et devoirs de veiller Ã l'Ã©quitÃ© et au bon dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure . En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant n'allÃ¨gue pas que le rejet de ses demandes ait Ã©tÃ© arbitraire . S'il l'avait soutenu, il est possible que la voie du contrÃ´le judiciaire lui aurait Ã©tÃ© ouve rte et aurait pu efficacement apaiser ses griefs grÃ¢ce aux tribunaux nationaux . Le requÃ©rant se plaint plutÃ´t de ce que la dÃ©cision n'a pas tenu compte de l'inÃ©galitÃ© nÃ©e, selon lui, du fait que la mÃ¨re Ã©tait assistÃ©e d'un avocat devant la Crown Cou rt , alors que lui ne l'Ã©tait pas . Avec la notion de procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, l'a rt icle 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention ne garantit pas que les deux pa rt ies au procÃ¨ s soient nÃ©cessairement reprÃ©sentÃ©es par un avocat ou bÃ©uÃ©ticient de l'aide judiciaire Ã cet effet . Ce tt e disposition ne contient ni explicitement ni implicitement aucun principe rigide de ce genre, mais exige cependant que la procÃ©dure dans son ensemble soit Ã©quitable (cf. la ju ri sprudeuce constante de la Commission, par exemple RequÃªte nÂ° 2804/66, Rec . DÃ©c . 27, p . 72 et ss .) . DÃ¨s lors, le ou les juges menant les procÃ©dures auxquelles s'applique l'article 6 . paragraphe I . n'ont jamais un rÃ´le passif mais ont la responsabilitÃ© ultime d'assurer l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure, que les parties soient ou non reprÃ©seutÃ©es . Ce principe de protection vaut tout particuliÃ¨rement pour les prÃ©sentes procÃ©dures, oÃ¹ l'une des parties a dÃ©fendu sa cause en personne . Il s'ensuit que l'examen par la Commission de l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure doit se fonder sur l'eusemble de celle-ci et uoo sur la question isolÃ©e de savoir si le requÃ©rant a ou non bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© de l'aide judiciaire . -150-
En l'espÃ¨ce, il ressort du compte rendu de l'audience d'appel devant la Crowu Court le 6 octobre 1980 qu'aprÃ¨s avoir entendu d'une part le requÃ©rant plaider sa cause en personne, d'autre part l'avocat de la mÃ¨re de l'enfant, le tribunal a examinÃ© les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve "dans le maximum de dÃ©tails, en cherchant Ã discuter tout ce qui pouvait l'Ãªtre" . AprÃ¨s cet examen approfondi des Ã©lÃ©ments de la cause et aprÃ¨s avoir pleinement entendu le requÃ©rant, le tribunal a eu pour tÃ¢che d'apprÃ©cier les probabilitÃ©s de paternitÃ© du requÃ©rant . Aussi, la Commissiou est-elle convaincue que la dÃ©cision de la Crown Court se foudait sur uue apprÃ©ciation pleine et entiÃ¨re des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve et que rien ne montre que le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas pu faire entendre Ã©quitablement sa cause lorsque la Crown Court a statuÃ© sur son appel . Il s'ensuit que cet aspect du grief du requÃ©rant est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au seits de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . 5 . Le requÃ©rant invoque Ã©galement l'article 14 de la Convention, ainsi libellÃ© : "La jouissance des droits et libertÃ©s reconnus dans la prÃ©sente Convention doit Ãªtre assurÃ©e, sans distinction aucune, fondÃ©e notamntent sur le sexe, la race, la couleur, la langue, la religion, les opinions politiques ou toutes autres opinions, l'origine nationale ou sociale, l'appartenance Ã une ntinoritÃ© nationale, la fortune, la naissance ou toute autre situation . "
La Commission rappelle que, dans l'Affaire linguistique belge, la Cour a recouuu que toute diftÃ«renciation ne constituait pas une discrimination coutraire Ã l'article 14 . La Commission, appliquant les critÃ¨res posÃ©s dans sa jurisprudence constante, doit donc examiner si les refus, opposÃ©s par la commission de district, aux dentandes d'aide judiciaire du requÃ©rant et qui ont abouti Ã ce qu'aucun avocat ne reprÃ©sente le requÃ©rant en appel, faute pour lui d'autre nioyen de s'en assurer les services, ont constituÃ© une diffÃ©rence de traitentent dÃ©pourvue d'objectif lÃ©gitime, mÃ©connaissant les priucipes prÃ©valant gÃ©nÃ©ralement dans les sociÃ©tÃ©s dÃ©mocratiques et disproportiouuÃ©e au but poursuivi . La Commission reconnait que l'article 7, paragraphe 5, de la loi de 1974 sur l'aide judiciaire vise Ã garantir que les fonds disponibles pour l'assistance judiciaire en matiÃ¨re civile ne sont pas gaspillÃ©s en services d'avocats pour des causes futiles, abusives ou autres, dans lesquelles une personne avisÃ©e pouvant se perntettre les frais d'un procÃ¨s n'engagerait cependant pas l'action . La Commission considÃ¨re cet objectif comme lÃ©gitime tant parce qu'il serait dÃ©raisounable que le bÃ©nÃ©ficiaire d'une aide judiciaire exploite cet avantage tinaucier coutre un adversaire non bÃ©nÃ©ficiaire de l'aide que parce que le rÃ©sultat est de dÃ©courager un contentieux stÃ©rile qui surchargerait les tribuuaux . Il faut Ã©galement relever Ã cet Ã©gard que la premiÃ¨re demand e
d'aide judiciaire prÃ©sentÃ©e par le requÃ©rant l'a d'abord Ã©tÃ© pour la procÃ©dure d'appel qu'il souhaitait engager devant la Crown Court et que, dÃ¨s lors, la commission d'aide judiciaire qui a examinÃ© la demande Ã©tait en possession, pour apprÃ©cier le caractÃ¨re raisonnable de l'appel proposÃ©, des Ã©lÃ©ments de . preuve dÃ©jÃ examinÃ©s par le juge d'instance . Le requÃ©rant a soutenu qu'il aurait dÃ» bÃ©nÃ©ficier de l'aide judiciaire puisque la mÃ¨re de l'enfant, qui avait engagÃ© la procÃ©dure, Ã©tait assistÃ©e d'un avocat, mais la Comniission relÃ¨ve qu'aux termes de l'article 7, paragraphe 5, de la loi de 1974 sur l'aide judiciaire, les mÃªmes critÃ¨res auraient Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©s Ã la mÃ¨re et que cela ne saurait constituer en soi une discrimination . La Commission relÃ¨ve en outre que, pour dÃ©cider des demandes d'aide judiciaire, plusieurs Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe ont adoptÃ© cette mÃªme mÃ©thode de "filtragÃ©" . fondÃ©e en partie sur les chances de succÃ¨s de l'actiou proposÃ©e . La Commission a dÃ©jÃ constatÃ© que, compte tenu de la nature de la procÃ©dure en jeu, la nÃ©cessitÃ© pour le requÃ©rant de se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃ©me ne constituait pas un refus d'accÃ©s Ã un tribunal ou un refus du procÃ¨s Ã©quitable garanti par l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que, le requÃ©rant Ã©tant en mesure de se dÃ©fendre en personne, le refus d'aide judiciaire n'Ã©tait pas disproportionnÃ© au but recherchÃ© par l'article 7, paragraphe S, de la loi de 1974 sur l'aide judiciaire . DÃ¨s lors, cet aspect du grief que le requÃ©rant tire de l'article 14, lu en liaison avec l'article 6, paragraph 1, est manifestement mal foudÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Conventioo .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTEIRRECEVABLE .
-152-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 11/05/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 8
 l'article 56
 l'article 26
 l'article 7
 l'article 26
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 7
 l'article 7
 l'article 7
 l'article 25
 l'article 7
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
 l'article 14
 l'article 14
 l'article 7
 l'article 7
 l'article 6
 l'article 7
 l'article 14
 l'article 6
 l'article 27