Source: https://conlawincontext.com/felkner-v-jackson-2011/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:22:54+00:00

Document:
[a]lthough a prosecutor is ordinarily entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges “for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome” of the case to be tried, United States v. Robinson (1976), the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.
Subsequently, in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), the Supreme Court rejected readings of Swain that said “proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” The Court described this interpretation as placing “on defendants a crippling burden of proof” which essentially immunized prosecutor’s peremptory challenges.
Instead, the Court articulated a new formulation that did not require a pattern of racially motivated peremptory challenges.
The standards for assessing a prima facie case in the context of discriminatory selection of the venire have been fully articulated since Swain. These principles support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. Partida (1977), and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits “those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.” Avery v. Georgia (1953). Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
In Felkner v. Jackson (2011), Steven Jackson was convicted of sexual offenses stemming from his attack upon an elderly woman. Jackson raised Batson claims regarding the prosecution’s exercise of peremptory challenges on two prospective black jurors. The prosecutor offered race-neutral explanations for both peremptory strikes. One juror was struck because he believed he had been stopped by the police multiple times because of his race. The second juror was struck because she was a social worker. “After listening to each side’s arguments, the trial court denied Jackson’s motion.” The California Court of Appeal affirmed Jackson’s conviction and upheld the denial of the Batson claim.
Jackson then sought federal habeas relief, a review governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The standard of review is that “federal habeas relief may not be granted unless the state court adjudication ‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.’ ” At the district court level, Jackson’s petition was denied. The district court found that the California Court of Appeal’s findings were not unreasonable.
On federal habeas review, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett (2010). Here the trial court credited the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations, and the California Court of Appeal carefully reviewed the record at some length in upholding the trial court’s findings. The state appellate court’s decision was plainly not unreasonable. There was simply no basis for the Ninth Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive manner.
Thus, the Court reversed the California Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

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