Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180329_0000555.ENY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:38:41+00:00

Document:
THE CITY OF NEW YORK; DETECTIVE KEVIN WARMHOLD; POLICE OFFICER YISEL CABRERA; DETECTIVE MICHAEL RISO; DETECTIVE JOHN GRIDLEY; and POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOE #1-10, Defendants.
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF United States District Judge.
Plaintiffs Kishor Kumar Rao and Poornima Kishor commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants City of New York, Detective Kevin Warmhold, Police Officer Yisel Cabrera, Detective Michael Riso, and Detective John Gridley violated Rao's civil rights on September 25, 2013 by, inter alia, unlawfully arresting him and using excessive force.Defendants now move for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56, on the grounds that Rao's federal and state law false arrest claims, his state law false imprisonment claim, as well as his malicious abuse of process claim, fail because the officers had probable cause to arrest. (See Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 64).) For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence of the non-movant “is to be believed, ” and the court must draw all “justifiable” or “reasonable” inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 n.2 (2004). Nevertheless, once the moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, “the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, '” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original), and “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation, ” Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing cases). In other words, the nonmovant must offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Where “the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case.” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a] defendant moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to come forward with enough evidence to create a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to an element essential to its case.” Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).
The elements of a Section 1983 claim for false arrest are “substantially the same” as those of a “claim for false arrest under New York law.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999). “Under New York state law, to prevail on a claim of false arrest a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.'” Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134- 35 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975)). “Under New York law, the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006).
Here, Rao brings a false arrest claim against Detective Warmhold and arresting officers Cabrera and Gridley. The defendants argue that Warmhold had probable cause to arrest Rao based on Kahn's complaint that Rao defrauded her. (Defs.' Mem. (Doc. No. 66) at 14-18.) Rao argues that Kahn's complaint alone was insufficient for probable cause; and even if the complaint gave rise to probable cause, intervening facts in the subsequent six months vitiated probable cause, including ADA Starling's decision not to prosecute. (Opp'n (Doc. No. 68) at 12-23.) For the reasons stated below, Rao's arguments are unavailing, and the officers had probable cause to arrest Rao.
An officer has probable cause to arrest when he has “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Jocks, 316 F.3d at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard here, Warmhold had probable cause to arrest Rao for grand larceny in the fourth degree, as well as other possible crimes. Under New York law, a person is guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree when “he steals property, ” such as money, and “[t]he value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars” or “the property, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion.” N.Y.P.L § 155.30. In addition, there was probable cause to arrest Rao for a scheme to defraud in the second degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 190.60.
The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that “an arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest . . .” Singer v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, the complaining victim's claims that Rao's medicine made her feel dizzy or drunk, her description of feeling intimidated, and the large sum of money involved, all indicated possible criminal activity. The police corroborated much of Khan's account by visiting Rao's business and the Chase Bank where she withdrew the $25, 600. This was sufficient to create probable cause.

References: § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 155
 § 190
 v. 
 v.