Source: http://jaapl.org/content/44/1/124
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:13:10+00:00

Document:
In State v. Dort, 106 A.3d 277 (2014), the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a trial court abused its discretion in declining to order a second competency evaluation after defense counsel, at the time of jury selection, raised new concerns to the court regarding his client's ability to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense, in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56d (2009). The court further delineated the threshold of evidence for trial courts to order an evaluation of competency in criminal proceedings.
In 2009, Joel Dort was arrested and charged with burglary in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, and strangulation in the second degree after an alleged incident of breaking into a former employer's office building and attacking one of Mr. Dort's prior supervisors there. In November 2009, he was ordered to undergo an evaluation of competency to stand trial, after which both defense and prosecution stipulated as to Mr. Dort's competence to proceed.
In June 2010 (seven months later) the court granted Mr. Dort's motion for a speedy trial and began the jury selection process the next day. On the following morning, defense counsel raised new concerns with respect to Mr. Dort's competence and requested a new evaluation. He reported most notably that “[t]here's a fundamental misunderstanding regarding what can be put forward as a defense in this case” and that “[h]e's indicated to me that there are things that he has withheld because he was waiting for trial” (Dort, p. 283). In response, the court replied that this report did not appear to represent substantial evidence of incompetence and denied the request for an evaluation. The court further declined to hear from Mr. Dort directly after he expressed a wish to speak himself. The trial proceeded and Mr. Dort was found guilty of burglary and kidnapping and was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment and 7 years of special parole.
He appealed to the state appellate court, asserting that the trial court had erred in denying the request for a second competency evaluation. The appellate court agreed and, in reversing the conviction, noted that Mr. Dort's due process rights had been violated by not having his competency properly evaluated (State v. Dort, 51 A.3d 1186 (2012)). It ordered that, if the state wished to re-prosecute the case, the trial court should conduct a hearing investigating the need to re-evaluate Mr. Dort's competency at that time before proceeding with the trial process.
Was the appellate court's determination of the inadequacy of the trial court's competency evaluation appropriate, given that the parties had not directly raised or briefed that issue on appeal?
Did the appellate court properly determine the trial court's inadequacy of investigation with regard to the defendant's competency?
If yes to both, was it proper for the appellate court to reverse the conviction and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the need for a new competency evaluation?
In its ruling, the state supreme court upheld the appellate court's prior decision on all three questions, with particular attention paid to the latter two. Specifically, it first affirmed the reversal of conviction and remand to the trial court. It further ordered that, should the state wish to re-prosecute the case, the trial court would need to conduct a hearing on whether to repeat the competency evaluation process prospectively before proceeding again.
This decision proceeded from the concept that prosecuting an incompetent defendant violates both constitutional due process protections as laid out in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), as well as Connecticut statutory protections in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56d (a) (2009): “A defendant shall not be tried … while the defendant is not competent.” The test for when the court is required to order a competency evaluation was explained based on prior case law. “As a matter of due process, the trial court is required to conduct an independent inquiry into the defendant's competence whenever he makes specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment” (Dort, p 290, quoting State v. Lloyd, 507 A.2d 992 (1986), as referring to Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)).
The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the defense counsel's stated concerns at the time of jury selection represented such specific factual allegations and that, by declining to further explore them via professional evaluation and a competency hearing, the trial court abused its discretion. The existence of an evaluation and ruling finding Mr. Dort competent seven months earlier did not weigh into the decision. The court further determined that, consistent with Supreme Court decisions in Dusky, Pate, and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), the state could not attempt to perform a retrospective competency evaluation, but rather must begin a new trial with a hearing to determine Mr. Dort's competency to stand trial again at that time, given that the prior conviction had been reversed.
This decision shines light on two important elements of a criminal defendant's due process right to stand trial only if competent. It first emphasizes the temporal nature of such an evaluation and ruling as cross-sectional and immediate rather than wide-ranging and fixed, and clarifies the court's obligation to order such an evaluation when concerns of incompetency are raised.
Unlike many other evaluations done in forensic settings, competency to stand trial evaluations focus not on the past (such as in examining criminal responsibility at the time of the action) or on the future (such as in risk assessments for commitment proceedings), but on the here-and-now capacities of the evaluee—specifically, on the two classic Dusky prongs of understanding the criminal process in his case and being able to work with counsel in his defense.
What this means for the courts is that a defendant's ability to meet the bar of competence can change over time, either as his own mental state changes, due to the natural course of an underlying illness or the stress of criminal proceedings, or as the situation changes, perhaps in a case where new and more complex features come into the defense strategy. A prior, even recent, finding of competency is no guarantee of current competency. The corollary is that competency cannot be fairly examined in hindsight, particularly many months to years after the fact, and attempts to do so have been struck down by the courts on numerous occasions as insufficient to protect the due process right to a fair trial.
Although the elements of competence are well-described in case law and statute, the trigger for when a court may or must request an evaluation by a professional is less clear. The state supreme court asserted that the trial court has a requirement to pursue such evaluation under a defined condition, when specific factual allegations have been raised, and that failure to do so represents abuse of discretion. The ruling did, of course, leave the lower courts some latitude in making this determination judiciously, confirming prior rulings that mere legal conclusions (as opposed to facts) are insufficient to trigger this requirement, and that “prisoners are not entitled … to make bald charges of incompetency” (Dort, p. 290). Regardless, they emphasize that concerns raised by the defendant or defense counsel must be taken seriously, with appropriate action by the court.

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