Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/anujee-et-al-v-lewis-et-al/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:17:47+00:00

Document:
Present: Soertsz and Nihill JJ.ANUJEE et al. v. LEWIS et al.
It} the Matter of an Application for a Writ ofProhibition.
A District Court has jurisdiction by virtue of section 62 of the CourtsOrdinance to entertain proceedings for the winding up of a BankingCompany not registered in Ceylon.
A Judge of Jaffna, prohibiting him from proceeding further with thecompulsory winding up of the Tranvancore and Quilon National Bank.
Jurisdiction must necessarily be expressly conferred upon a Court.There is no statutory provision which confers jurisdiction on our Courtsregarding companies which are not registered in Ceylon. In re LloydGenerate Italiano 1 is a relevant English case which was decided at a timewhen the law in England was similar to that which governs the presentcase. See also 8 Halsbury f2nd ed.) page 530, para. 1173, and pag° 533,para. 1179 summarizing the position.
When an inferior Court is exceeding its jurisdiction, a superior Court isbound to grant a writ of prohibition—The Mayor and Aldermen of theCity of London v. Cox et al.&apos;; Worthington v. Jeffries3; Farquharson v.Morgan&apos;.
1 (1885) 29 Ch. D. 219.■&apos; (1875) 10 C. P. 379.
* 0867) 2 H. L. 239 at 234, 277 et seq.&apos; (1894) 1 Q. B. 552.
Section 3 of Cap. 66 read with section 18 of the Interpretation Ordinance(Cap. 2) is large enough to embrace a matter of this-kind, and Englishlaw would be applicable in relation to all joint stock companies, whetherforeign or local. A foreign company registered abroad, is not denied aseparate existence, and an unregistered foreign company can be woundup—Bateman v. ServiceRussian and English Bank et al. v. BaringBrothers & Co., Ltd.1; Palmer’s Company Law (16th ed.) p. 461.
N. Nadarajah, for second, third, and fourth respondents.
N. E. Weerasooria, K.C., in reply.—“Civil matter” in section 62 ofCap. 6 is too wide a term to embrace a subject of a special nature likewinding-up proceedings. If it is to be given such an extensive meaning,section 69 of the same Ordinance (Cap. 6) which was introduced by way ofamendment in 1904 as the result of a decision of the Supreme Courtwould be an unnecessary provision in relation to lunatics, idiots, &c.Section 4 of the Insolvency Ordinance (Cap. 82) expressly conferringjurisdiction on the District Court would also be superfluous. It has beenheld that all matters regarding insolvency proceedings are of a specialnature—In re Goonewardene *. Section 62 of Cap. 6 cannot, therefore,be construed so as to confer residuary jurisdiction on the District Court.The District Court is not in the position of a Superior Court—In the matterof the Application of John Ferguson for a Writ of Prohibition against theDistrict Judge of Colombo 7; In the matter of Daisy Fernando 8. Sections 6,7, and 42 of the Courts Ordinance are conclusive on this point. See also8 Halsbury (2nd ed.) pp. 527-531, paras. 1168-1175.
1 (1868)6 Eg. C. 617.3(1936)164 L. T. Rep. 602.
1 (1934)36 ,v. L. R. 337.•4 C. L. Rer. 215.
3 /. L. R. (1905) 33 Cal. 927 at 930.7(1874)1 N. L. R. 181.
* (1881)6 A. C. 386.‘U896)2 N. L. R. 249.
section 100 of the Trusts Ordinance (Cap. 72). In Straits Settlements,an enactment similar to Cap. 66 was passed but the Privy Councilheld that although, under that enactment, the mercantile law of Englandwas introduced, the Moneylenders’ Act of England would not be appli-cable—Abdullah Bajerai v. Sockalingam Chettiar &apos;. Winding-up pro-ceedings are of a special nature. Even assuming that a District Courtis a superior Court, special legislation would be necessary on a matterwhich is of a special nature. In England, special legislation was passedconferring jurisdiction on the High Court regarding winding-up proceedings—8 Halsbury (2nd ed.) paras. 1278, 1284 ; Sections 338, 163, &c., of theCompanies Act. Even in regard to the High Court, only particular Judgesappointed by the Chancellor have power to wind up—section 164 (l)ofthe Companies Act. It is impossible, therefore, to import into CeylonEnglish procedure.
The three petitioners, whose petitions have been submitted to us forconsideration, are decree-holders against the Travancore National andQuilon Bank, Limited. They make their petitions to ask us to exercisethe jurisdiction conferred on us by section 42 of the Courts Ordinance,and issue a writ against the District Judge of Jaffna prohibiting him fromproceeding further with the compulsory winding-up of that Bank on whichhe has been engaged in Case No. L/2 of his Court, initiated at the instanceof the second, third, and fourth respondents. The first, respondent isthe Official Liquidator.
The petitioners’ case is that the District Court of Jaffna usurped ajurisdiction that was never given to District Courts in this Island, whenit addressed itself to the winding-up of a Bank that has not obtainedincorporation by registration under the provisions of Ordinance No. 4 of!861 and Ordinance No. 2 of IP-97, but is a Bank incorporated by regis-tration.in Quilon in the Native State of Travancore in South India.
If we are satisfied that District Courts ns constituted by our laws haveno jurisdiction to wind up companies other than those incorporated byregistration in Ceylon, -for the winding-up of which provision ^ made bythe Joint Stock Company Ordinance, we are at once face to face with acase of a patent lack of jurisdiction, and we are bound ex dcbito justitia?to grant the writ applied for regardless of the motives of the petitioner&apos;sor their delay in preferring their petition. Questions of motive anddelay may have an important bearing in cases in which there has beenencroachment by one Court on the jurisdiction apportioned to anotherCourt of the same class and not in cases in which there has been a manifestusurpation of jurisdiction. This fact emerges clearly in the judgment ofBrett J. in the case of Worthington v. Jeffries ’ and in the judgments of .Lord Halsbury and Lopes L.J. in Farquharson v. Morgan*. I indulgein these observations only because Counsel for the respondents commentedstrongly on the motives and the delay imputable to the petitioners.
* US9A) I Q. B. D. 552.
The proviso appended to this section leaves unaffected certain jurisdic-tions created by Imperial Statute or by certain local Ordinances, but withthem we are not at all concerned in this case.
Ordinance in conferring and apportioning jurisdiction on and amongvarious Courts have or have not resulted in the realization of that apriori probability.
It is conceded that a winding-up proceeding is not within any originalCivil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It, obviously, is not withinthe jurisdiction of Courts of Requests, or of Magistrates’ Courts. It,therefore, follows that it must be within the jurisdiction of DistrictCourts or must be regarded as an unfortunate casus omissus, unfortunate,because it is deplorable that local Courts should have no jurisdiction towind up companies which, though not registered here, have largely livedand moved and had their being here. In other countries, in Englandfor instance, certain Courts are empowered to wind up foreign andcolonial companies having assets and liabilities there—In re MercantileBank of Australia 1 ; North Australia Co. u. Goldsborough Co.1. The newlocal Companies Ordinance, No. 51 of 1938, makes provisions in Part X.for the compulsory winding-*up of unregistered companies. Have we,then, heretofore occupied an exceptional position? I think the answerto that question must be found in chapter VI. of the Courts and theirPowers Ordinance, and does not depend upon whether District Courtsare superior or inferior Courts of Record, I refer to this because there wasa great deal of argument on the point, and if it were necessary to findwhether a District Court is a superior or inferior Court of Record, Ishould” have no difficulty in holding that it is not a superior Court in thesense in which that term is understood in English Jurisprudence. Thatwas the view taken in “ In the matter of the application of John Fergusonfor a Prohibition against the District Judge of Colombo ", a ruling by aCollective Court.
* (1892) 2 Ch 204.-2 61 L. T. 710.
3 1 N. L. R. 1S1.
office of a company is situate shall have jurisdiction ”. The words “ shallhave jurisdiction ” as contrasted with the words “ the District Courthaving jurisdiction” might have afforded more plausible support to thesubmission that the conferment of a new jurisdiction is in contemplation.But even so the support obtained would have been plausible, and no more,for it seems clear that the words of section 161 in the new Ordinance arenot meant to confer a new jurisdiction on District Courts, but only toprovide a new test as the sole test by which to ascertain the particularDistrict Court which shall function in any particular winding-upproceeding.
may have to be decided in this Island with respect to the law of partner-ship, Joint Stock Companies, Corporations, Banks and banking . ..
For these reasons I come to the conclusion that jurisdiction to wind upcompanies is conferred on District Courts by section 62 of the Courtsand their Powers Ordinance, and that sections 67 and 68 of the OrdinanceNo. 4 of 1861 do no more than provide the test for ascertaining the partic-ular District Court for any given winding-up proceeding in regard tocompanies under that Ordinance.
In this view of the matter the major premise as I described it, on whichPetitioners’ Counsel based his submission proves to be invalid andinvalidates his submission that District Courts have no jurisdiction towind up companies not registered locally. Consequently the petitioners’application in the way in which it was presented to us fails. The peti-tioners made no request that the District Court of Jaffna be prohibitedfor some particular reason, as for instance, for the reason that Jaffna wasnot the principal place of business of this Bank in this Island, and I wishto state quite clearly that this order does not consider or deal with thataspect or with the propriety of several District Courts in the Island beingengaged simultaneously in the winding-up of this Bank as was said, in thecourse of the argument, to be the case.
The application fails and must be dismissed with costs.

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