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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 417 › Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.
The Policy Statement of the Federal Bureau of Prisons prohibiting personal interviews between newsmen and individually designated inmates of federal medium security and maximum security prisons does not abridge the freedom of the press that the First Amendment guarantees, Pell v. Procunier, ante p. 417 U. S. 817, since it "does not deny the press access to sources of information available to members of the general public," but is merely a particularized application of the general rule that nobody may enter the prison and designate an inmate whom he would like to visit unless the prospective visitor is a lawyer, clergyman, relative, or friend of that inmate. Pp. 417 U. S. 846-850.
161 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 494 F.2d 994, reversed and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, ante p. 417 U. S. 836. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 417 U. S. 850.
The respondents, a major metropolitan newspaper and one of its reporters, initiated this litigation to challenge the constitutionality of ¦ 4b(6) of Policy Statement 1220. lA of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. [Footnote 1] At the time that the case was in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, this regulation prohibited any personal interviews between newsmen and individually designated federal prison inmates. The Solicitor General has informed the Court that the regulation was recently amended "to permit press interviews at federal prison institutions that can be characterized as minimum security." [Footnote 2] The general prohibition of press interviews with inmates remains in effect, however, in three-quarters of the federal prisons, i.e., in all medium security and maximum security institutions, including the two institutions involved in this case.
with prison inmates abridges the protection that the First Amendment accords the newsgathering activity of a free press. The District Court agreed with this contention, and held that the Policy Statement, insofar as it totally prohibited all press interviews at the institutions involved, violated the First Amendment. Although the court acknowledged that institutional considerations could justify the prohibition of some press-inmate interviews, the District Court ordered the petitioners to cease enforcing the blanket prohibition of all such interviews and, pending modification of the Policy Statement, to consider interview requests on an individual basis and "to withhold permission to interview . . . only where demonstrable administrative or disciplinary considerations dominate." 357 F.Supp. 770, 775 (DC 1972).
The petitioners appealed the District Court's judgment to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. We stayed the District Court's order pending the completion of that appeal, sub nom. Kleindienst v. Washington Post Co., 406 U.S. 912 (1972). The first time this case was before it, the Court of Appeals remanded it to the District Court for additional findings of fact and particularly for reconsideration in light of this Court's intervening decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972). 155 U.S.App.D.C. 283, 477 F.2d 1168 (1972). On remand, the District Court conducted further evidentiary hearings, supplemented its findings of fact, and reconsidered its conclusions of law in light of Branzburg and other recent decisions that were urged upon it. In due course, the court reaffirmed its original decision, 357 F.Supp. 779 (DC 1972), and the petitioners again appealed to the Court of Appeals.
"be denied only where it is the judgment of the administrator directly concerned, based on either the demonstrated behavior of the inmate, or special conditions existing at the institution at the time the interview is requested, or both, that the interview presents a serious risk of administrative or disciplinary problems."
161 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 87-88, 494 F.2d 994, 1006-1007 (1974). Any blanket prohibition of such face-to-face interviews was held to abridge the First Amendment's protection of press freedom. Because of the important constitutional question involved, and because of an apparent conflict in approach to the question between the District of Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, [Footnote 3] we granted certiorari. 415 U.S. 956 (1974).
"inmates' families, their attorneys, and religious counsel are accorded liberal visituation privileges. Even friends of inmates are allowed to visit, although their privileges appear to be somewhat more limited."
"concentrated on a relatively small number of inmates who, as a result, [become] virtual 'public figures' within the prison society and gai[n] a disproportionate degree of notoriety and influence among their fellow inmates."
their repeated contacts with the press tend to become the source of substantial disciplinary problems that can engulf a large portion of the population at a prison.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals sought to meet this problem by decreeing a selective policy whereby prison officials could deny interviews likely to lead to disciplinary problems. In the expert judgment of the petitioners, however, such a selective policy would spawn serious discipline and morale problems of its own by engendering hostility and resentment among inmates who were refused interview privileges granted to their fellows. The Director of the Bureau testified that "one of the very basic tenets of sound correctional administration" is "to treat all inmates incarcerated in [the] institutions, as far as possible, equally." This expert and professional judgment is, of course, entitled to great deference.
In this case, however, it is unnecessary to engage in any delicate balancing of such penal considerations against the legitimate demands of the First Amendment. For it is apparent that the sole limitation imposed on newsgathering by Policy Statement 1220.1A is no more than a particularized application of the general rule that nobody may enter the prison and designate an inmate whom he would like to visit unless the prospective visitor is a lawyer, clergyman, relative, or friend of that inmate. This limitation on visituations is justified by what the Court of Appeals acknowledged as "the truism that prisons are institutions where public access is generally limited." 161 U.S.App.D.C. at 80, 494 F.2d at 999. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 385 U. S. 41 (1966). In this regard, the Bureau of Prisons visituation policy does not place the press in any less advantageous position than the public generally. Indeed, the total access to federal prisons and prison inmates that the Bureau of Prisons accords to the press far surpasses that available to other members of the public.
"that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally . . . finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court."
Id. at 417 U. S. 834-835. Thus, since Policy Statement 1220.1A "does not deny the press access to sources of information available to members of the general public," id. at 417 U. S. 835,we hold that it does not abridge the freedom that the First Amendment guarantees. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
"Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates. This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an interview. However, conversation may be permitted with inmates whose identity is not to be made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, programs and activities."
Letter of Apr. 16, 1974, to Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, presently on file with the Clerk.
See Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062, 1066-1067 (1973). See also Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F.Supp. 196, 199-200 (N D Cal.1973).
The Solicitor General's brief represents that "[m]embers of the press, like the public generally, may visit the prison to see friends there." Presumably, the same is true with respect to family members. The respondents have not disputed this representation.
Policy Statement 1220.1A ¦¦ 4b(5) and (7).
See id., ¦ 4b(6), set out in n 1, supra. The newsman is requested not to reveal the identity of the inmate, and the conversation is to be limited to institutional facilities, programs, and activities.
Id. ¦¦ 4b(1) and (2).
"approximately one half of the prison population on any one day will be released within the following 12 months. The average population is 23,000, of whom approximately 12,000 are released each year."
The Court today upholds the authority of the Bureau of Prisons to promulgate and enforce an absolute ban against personal interviews of prison inmates by representatives of the news media. [Footnote 2/1] In my view, the interview ban impermissibly burdens First Amendment freedoms. My analysis proceeds as follows. 417 U. S.
417 U. S. 417 U. S. and 417 U. S. 417 U. S.
The ban against press interviews is not part of any general news blackout in the federal prisons. Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A establishes the official policy regarding prisoner-press communications, and that policy in many respects commendably facilitates public dissemination of information about federal penal institutions. Inmate letters addressed to members of the news media are neither opened nor censored, and incoming mail from press representatives is inspected only for contraband and for content likely to incite illegal conduct. Furthermore, the Bureau officially encourages newsmen to visit federal prisons in order to report on correctional facilities and programs.
"Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates. This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an interview. However, a conversation may be permitted with inmates whose identity is not to be made public if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, programs and activities."
The Bureau's prohibition against press interviews is absolute in nature. It applies without regard to the record and characteristics of the particular inmate involved, the purpose of the interview, or the conditions then prevailingat the institution in question. At the time of the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the interview ban applied with equal rigor to every correctional facility administered by the Bureau, community treatment centers as well as major penitentiaries. By letter dated April 16, 1974, the Solicitor General informed us that the Bureau subsequently modified its policy to exempt minimum security facilities from the absolute prohibition of press interviews. This change affects approximately one-quarter of the inmate population of the federal prisons. For the remainder, the Bureau intends to continue its established policy.
The District Court received testimony on this point from six knowledgeable persons. [Footnote 2/4] All agreed that personal interviews are crucial to effective reporting in the prison context. A newsman depends on interviews in much the same way that a trial attorney relies on cross-examination.
Only in face-to-face discussion can a reporter put a question to an inmate and respond to his answer with an immediate follow-up question. Only in an interview can the reporter pursue a particular line of inquiry to a satisfactory resolution or confront an inmate with discrepancies or apparent inconsistencies in his story. Without a personal interview, a reporter is often at a loss to determine the honesty of his informant or the accuracy of the information received. [Footnote 2/5] This is particularly true in the prison environment, where the sources of information are unlikely to be well known to newsmen or to have established any independent basis for assessing credibility. Consequently, ethical newsmen are reluctant to publish a story without an opportunity through face-to-face discussion to evaluate the veracity and reliability of its source. Those who do publish without interviews are likely to print inaccurate, incomplete, and sometimes jaundiced news items. The detailed testimony on this point led the District Court to find as a fact that the absolute interview ban precludes accurate and effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances.
are simply incapable of communicating effectively in writing.
detaiIed testimony concerning the kinds of information that can only be obtained through personal interviews of individual inmates.
On the basis of this and other evidence, the District Court found that personal interviews are essential to accurate and effective reporting in the prison environment. The Court of Appeals endorsed that conclusion, noting that the trial court's findings of fact on this issue "are supported by a substantial body of evidence of record, and indeed appear to be uncontradicted." 161 U.S.App.D.C. at 82, 494 F.2d at 1001. The Government does not seriously attack this conclusion. Instead, it contends that the effect of the Bureau's interview ban on prisoner-press communications raises no claim of constitutional dimensions. It is to that question that I now turn.
Respondents assert a constitutional right to gather news. In the language of the Court of Appeals, they claim a right of access by the press to newsworthy events. However characterized, the gist of the argument is that the constitutional guarantee of a free press may be rendered ineffective by excessive restraints on access to information, and therefore that the Government may not enforce such restrictions absent some substantial justification for doing so. In other words, respondents contend that the First Amendment protects both the dissemination of news and the antecedent activity of obtaining the information that becomes news.
their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Pell v. Procunier, ante, at 417 U. S. 834. It is said that First Amendment protections for newsgathering by the press reach only so far as the opportunities available for the ordinary citizen to have access to the source of news. Because the Bureau of Prisons does not specifically discriminate against the news media, its absolute prohibition of prisoner-press interviews is not susceptible to constitutional attack. In the Court's view, this is true despite the factual showing that the interview ban precludes effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances. From all that appears in the Court's opinion, one would think that any governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how severe, would be constitutionally acceptable to the majority so long as it does not single out the media for special disabilities not applicable to the public at large.
I agree, of course, that neither any news organization nor reporters as individuals have constitutional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens. The guarantees of the First Amendment broadly secure the rights of every citizen; they do not create special privileges for particular groups or individuals. For me, at least, it is clear that persons who become journalists acquire thereby no special immunity from governmental regulation. To this extent I agree with the majority. But I cannot follow the Court in concluding that any governmental restriction on press access to information, so long as it is nondiscriminatory, falls outside the purview of First Amendment concern.
"in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants, and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the future."
Id. at 408 U. S. 695.
designated inmates, the latter characterization of the interview ban seems closer to the mark, but, in my view, the scope and meaning of First Amendmentguarantees do not hinge on these semantic distinctions. The reality of the situation is the same, certainly in this case, and there is no magic in choosing one characterization rather than the other. Simply stated, the distinction that formed the basis for decision in Zemel is not helpful here.
"Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
"The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources."
on an assessment of the competing societal interests involved in that case, rather than on any determination that First Amendment freedoms were not implicated. See especially id. at 408 U. S. 700-701.
In sum, neither Zemel nor Branzburg presents a barrier to independent consideration of respondents' constitutional attack on the interview ban. Those precedents arose in contexts far removed from that of the instant case, and, in my view, neither controls here. To the extent that Zemel and Branzburg speak to the issue before us, they reflect no more than a sensible disinclination to follow the right-to-access argument as far as dry logic might extend. As the Court observed in Zemel: "There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 16-17. It goes too far to suggest that the government must justify under the stringent standards of First Amendment review every regulation that might affect in some tangential way the availability of information to the news media. But, to my mind, it is equally impermissible to conclude that no governmental inhibition of press access to newsworthy information warrants constitutional scrutiny. At some point, official restraints on access to news sources, even though not directed solely at the press, may so undermine the function of the First Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to require the government to justify such regulations in terms more compelling than discretionary authority and administrative convenience. It is worth repeating our admonition in Branzburg that, "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 681.
and effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances. These subjects are not privileged or confidential. The Government has no legitimate interest in preventing newsmen from obtaining the information that they may learn through personal interviews or from reporting their findings to the public. Quite to the contrary, federal prisons are public institutions. The administration of these institutions, the effectiveness of their rehabilitative programs, the conditions of confinement that they maintain, and the experiences of the individuals incarcerated therein are all matters of legitimate societal interest and concern. [Footnote 2/7] Respondents do not assert a right to force disclosure of confidential information or to invade in any way the decisionmaking processes of governmental officials. Neither do they seek to question any inmate who does not wish to be interviewed. They only seek to be free of an exceptionless prohibition against a method of newsgathering that is essential to effective reporting in the prison context.
"There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action, but carry it out in the wisest way."
Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1954). In its usual application -- as a bar to governmental restraints on speech or publication -- the First Amendment protects important values of individual expression and personal self-fulfillment. But where, as here, the Government imposes neither a penalty on speech nor any sanction against publication, these individualistic values of the First Amendment are not directly implicated.
only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason, this Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas, as well as the right of free expression. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 408 U. S. 762 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 395 U. S. 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 319 U. S. 143 (1943).
people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve."
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 384 U. S. 219 (1966).
This constitutionally established role of the news media is directly implicated here. For good reasons, unrestrained public access is not permitted. The people must therefore depend on the press for information concerning public institutions. The Bureau's absolute prohibition of prisoner-press interviews negates the ability of the press to discharge that function, and thereby substantially impairs the right of the people to a free flow of information and ideas on the conduct of their Government. The underlying right is the right of the public generally. The press is the necessary representative of the public's interest in this context, and the instrumentality which effects the public's right. I therefore conclude that the Bureau's ban against personal interviews must be put to the test of First Amendment review.
"Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech."
"not to cases involving questions of 'prisoners' rights,' but to decisions of this Court dealing with the general problem of incidental restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in furtherance of legitimate governmental activities."
"First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. . . . Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."
416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 413.
"[W]hile we do not question that the concerns voiced by the Bureau are legitimate interests that merit protection, we must agree with the District Court that they do not, individually or in total, justify the sweeping absolute ban that the Bureau has chosen to impose. When regulating an area in which First Amendment interests are involved, administrative officials must be careful not only to assure that they are responding to legitimate interests which are within their powers to protect; they must also take care not to cast regulations in a broad manner that unnecessarily sacrifices First Amendment rights. In this case, the scope of the interview ban is excessive; the Bureau's interests can and must be protected on a more selective basis."
Id. at 86, 494 F.2d at 1005.
play a significant role in the creation of "big wheels" or in the enhancement of their prestige was a subject of dispute in the District Court. With appropriate regard for the expertise of prison administrators, that court found that the problems associated with the "big wheel" phenomenon "are all real considerations, and, while somewhat impressionistic, they are supported by experience and advanced in good faith." 357 F.Supp. 770, 774.
survey of prevailing practices reinforces the conclusion that the Bureau's prohibition of all prisoner-press interviews is not necessary to the protection of the legitimate governmental interests at stake.
institution at the time the interview is requested, or both, that the interview presents a serious risk of administrative or disciplinary problems."
161 U.S.App.D.C. at 87-88, 494 F.2d at 1006-1007.
The Bureau objects to the requirement of individual evaluation of interview requests. It argues that this approach would undermine inmate morale and discipline and occasion severe administrative difficulties. The line between a good faith denial of an interview for legitimate reasons and a self-interested determination to avoid unfavorable publicity could prove perilously thin. Not unnaturally, prison administrators might tend to allow interviews with cooperative inmates and restrict press access to known critics of institutional policy and management. Denials that were, in fact, based on an administrator's honest perception of the risk to order and security might be interpreted by some inmates as evidence of bias and discrimination. Additionally, a policy requiring case-by-case evaluation of interview requests could subject the Bureau to widespread litigation of an especially debilitating nature. Unable to rely on a correct application of a general rule or policy authorizing denial, prison officials would be forced to an ad hoc defense of the merits of each decision before reviewing courts. In short, the Bureau argues that an individualized approach to press interviews is correctionally unsound and administratively burdensome.
the Court of Appeals that the First Amendment requires the Bureau to abandon its absolute ban against press interviews, I do not believe that it compels the adoption of a policy of ad hoc balancing of the competing interests involved in each request for an interview.
This conclusion follows from my analysis in 417 U. S. supra, of the nature of the constitutional right at issue in this case. The absolute interview ban precludes accurate and effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate grievances, and thereby substantially negates the ability of the news media to inform the public on those subjects. Because the interview ban significantly impairs the constitutional interest of the people in a free flow of information and ideas on the conduct of their Government, it is appropriate that the Bureau be put to a heavy burden of justification for that policy. But it does not follow that the Bureau is under the same heavy burden to justify any measure of control over press access to prison inmates. Governmental regulation that has no palpable impact on the underlying right of the public to the information needed to assert ultimate control over the political process is not subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. Common sense and proper respect for the constitutional commitment of the affairs of state to the Legislative and Executive Branches should deter the Judiciary from chasing the right-of-access rainbows that an advocate's eye can spot in virtually all governmental actions. Governmental regulations should not be policed in the name of a "right to know" unless they significantly affect the societal function of the First Amendment. I therefore believe that a press interview policy that substantially accommodates the public's legitimate interest in a free flow of information and ideas about federal prisons should survive constitutional review. The balance should be struck between the absolute ban of the Bureau and an uninhibited license to interview at will.
Thus, the Bureau could meet its obligation under the First Amendment and protect its legitimate concern for effective penal administration by rules drawn to serve both purposes without undertaking to make an individual evaluation of every interview request. Certainly the Bureau may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions for press interviews. Such regulations already govern interviews of inmates by attorneys, clergymen, relatives, and friends. Their application to newsmen would present no great problems. To avoid media creation of "big wheels," the Bureau may limit the number of interviews of any give inmate within a specified time period. To minimize the adverse consequences of publicity concerning existing "big wheels," the Bureau may refuse to allow any interviews of a prisoner under temporary disciplinary sanction such as solitary confinement. And, of course, prison administrators should be empowered to suspend all press interviews during periods of institutional emergency. Such regulations would enable the Bureau to safeguard its legitimate interests without incurring the risks associated with administration of a wholly ad hoc interview policy.
class mailing privileges; a magazine or periodical of general distribution; a national or international news service; a radio or television network or station."
These comments are not intended to be exhaustive or to dictate correctional policy, but only to indicate the broad contours of the approach that I think should be available to the Bureau. I would affirm that portion of the judgment of the District Court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that invalidates the absolute ban against prisoner-press interviews, but remand the case with instructions to allow the Bureau to devise a new policy in accordance with its own needs and with the guidelines set forth in this opinion.
The Court's resolution of this case has the virtue of simplicity. Because the Bureau's interview ban does not restrict speech or prohibit publication or impose on the press any special disability, it is not susceptible to constitutional attack. This analysis delineates the outer boundaries of First Amendment concerns with unambiguous clarity. It obviates any need to enter the thicket of a particular factual context in order to determine the effect on First Amendment values of a nondiscriminatory restraint on press access to information. As attractive as this approach may appear, I cannot join it. I believe that we must look behind bright-line generalities, however sound they may seem in the abstract, and seek the meaning of First Amendment guarantees in light of the underlying realities of a particular environment. Indeed, if we are to preserve First Amendment values amid the complexities of a changing society, we can do no less.
Throughout this opinion, I use the terms "news media" and "press" to refer generally to both print and broadcast journalism. Of course, the use of television equipment in prisons presents special problems that are not before the Court in this case.
In at least two instances, federal wardens have permitted newsmen to interview randomly selected groups of inmates. Apparently, such occurrences re not widespread, and the basis for them is unclear. Neither in express terms nor by implication does the Policy Statement authorize such group interviews, and the Government does not suggest that the Bureau of Prisons officially approves the practice.
"great respect which the federal judiciary entertains for the Bureau by reason of its long and continuous history of distinguished and enlightened leadership. . . ."
161 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 77, 494 F.2d 994, 996. This is a sentiment which I fully share, for the Bureau has long been a constructive leader in prison reform.
The court received testimony from three experienced reporters, two academic journalists, and an attorney with special expertise in this area. The reporters were respondent Ben H. Bagdikian, a Washington Post reporter experienced in covering prisons and interviewing inmates; Timothy Leland, a Pulitzer prize winner who is Assistant Managing Editor of the Boston Globe and head of its investigative reporting team; and John W. Machacek, a reporter for the Rochester Times-Union, who won a Pulitzer prize for his coverage of the Attica Prison riot. The academic journalists were Elie Abel, Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism of Columbia University, and Roy M. Fisher, Dean of the School of Journalism of the University of Missouri and former editor of the Chicago Daily News. The sixth witness was Arthur L. Liman, an attorney who served as general counsel to the New York State Special Commission on Attica. In that capacity, he supervised an investigation involving 1,600 inmate interviews, at least 75 of which he conducted personally.
Both Dean Abel and Dean Fisher testified that the personal interview is so indispensable to effective reporting that the development of interviewing techniques occupies a central place in the curricula of professional journalism schools.
"We found that, in the group interviews, the inmates tended to give us rhetoric, rather than facts; and that . . . , in the interest of showing solidarity, inmates were making speeches to us, rather than confiding what I knew in many cases to be the fact."
"I should add that the basic problem in conducting interviews at a prison is that it is a society in which inmates face sanctions and rewards not just from the administration, but from other inmates; and that when an inmate sees you in private, he will tell you things about the administration that may not only be unfavorable but may in many cases be favorable. I found that, when we saw them in group, there was a tendency to say nothing favorable about the administration and instead simply to make a speech about how horrible conditions were. In fact, many of the inmates who would say this in group would say something different when they were seen alone."
"There is something which is not stressed in our description of conditions because we found it not to be a major factor at Attica, and that is the question or the issue of physical brutality toward inmates. The press, before this investigation, had played that up as the major grievance at Attica. We found, when we talked to inmates privately, that the incidence of physical confrontation between officers and inmates was rather limited, and that the real grievance was not about those incidents, but rather about what they would feel was a form of psychic repression, depriving people of their manhood. Therefore, I think a lot of the myth about physical beatings was dispelled."
"Yet in spite of all this development of the step-by-step details in the criminal adversary process, we continue, at the termination of that process, to brush under the rug the problems of those who are found guilty and subject to criminal sentence. In a very immature way, we seem to want to remove the problem from public consciousness."
"It is a melancholy truth that it has taken the tragic prison outbreaks of the past three years to focus widespread public attention on this problem."
Burger, Our Options Are Limited, 18 Vill.L.Rev. 165, 167 (1972). See W. Burger, For Whom the Bell Tolls, reprinted at 25 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. (Supp.) 14, 18, 23-24 (1970).
"Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government."
A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech 26 (1948) (emphasis in original).
"In short, are the limitations placed on First Amendment freedoms no greater than is necessary to protect the governmental interests asserted?"
"Q What are the particular talents or factors that would lead inmates to look upon particular persons among them as leaders?"
"A Well, it would depend in part on the native talents of the person, whether he was reasonably articulate, whether he has reasonable social skills. But that wouldn't be sufficient."
"He would also have to have some significant position in the prison, whether that would be the clerk of a cellhouse or whether that would be the assistant to a shop foreman or whether he would be a person who was a porter or a runner, which looks like a low status position to outsiders, but which position has great mobility, and therefore you can become a message sender and a message carrier, or persons who work in areas that give them access to goods in what is essentially a scarcity economy."
"So people who work in the kitchens or bakery or where other scarce supplies are, and therefore can distribute them illegitimately or serve other purposes of that kind, they tend to have leadership."
"Q Does the fact that an inmate is well known outside of prison tend to make him a leader within a prison among the inmates within the prison?"
"A It depends a great deal on the circumstances; that is, for instance, notoriety, by itself, can't bestow leadership."
"For instance, Sirhan Sirhan, for example, or Richard Speck are simply notorious, and that doesn't bestow leadership qualities on them. Or someone like Al Capone, for example, may have had great status outside of the prison, but when he was in prison, he became the object of revenge and attacks by persons who wanted to settle old scores, because it was felt that he couldn't implement enough power to retaliate in turn."
"On the other hand, there were persons, confidence men or spectacular burglars or armed robbers with big scores or something of that kind, where their reputation precedes them and follows them into prison, and that then is combined, and also with certain talents and social skill and articulateness, and if it also looks as though they have a future in the free community, either in the illegitimate world or the legitimate world, that can play a part in the phenomenon that we call leadership."
The other considerations advanced by the Bureau do not justify an absolute interview ban, but only indicate the difficulties of case-by-case evaluation of interview requests. These arguments are addressed in 417 U. S.
These five jurisdictions are California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
This approach is followed in Alaska, Georgia, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
The jurisdictions that generally permit personal interviews are Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont, Iowa, New York City, and the District of Columbia. Additionally, one jurisdiction, New Mexico, follows a unique policy that defies categorization.
The Court received such evidence from penal administrators in Illinois, Massachusetts, New York City, and the District of Columbia.
"be precisely drawn to prohibit an interview only where it can be established as a matter of probability on the basis of actual experience that serious administrative or disciplinary problems are, in the judgment of the prison administrators directly concerned, likely to be directly and immediately caused by the interview because of either the demonstrated behavior of the inmate concerned or special conditions existing at the inmate's institution at the particular time the interview is requested."
357 F.Supp. 779, 784. The Government interpreted this order to require that every denial of an interview request be supported by objective evidence, and argued that such a requirement would invade the proper exercise of discretion by prison administrators and undercut their authority to respond to perceived threats to institutional security and order. Apparently responding to these concerns, the Court of Appeals deleted the references to "likelihood" and "probability" and recast the relevant portion of the order in the language quoted in the text. The thrust of the order remains however, that prison administrators must decide on an ad hoc basis whether to grant each particular request for an interview.
The experience of prison systems that have generally allowed press interviews does not suggest that the Bureau would be flooded with interview requests. If, however, the number of requests were excessive, prison administrators would have to devise some scheme for allocating interviews among media representatives. I have assumed throughout this discussion that, priority of request would control, but I do not mean to foreclose other possibilities. It is a fairly common practice for media representatives to form pools that allow many newsmen to participate, either in person or by proxy, in a news event for which press access is limited. The Bureau could certainly cooperate with the news media in the administration of such a program without favoritism or exclusivity to ensure widespread and dependable dissemination of information about our prisons.

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