Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/204/204mass340.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:22:53+00:00

Document:
EDWIN A. FERGUSON v. OLD COLONY STREET RAILWAY COMPANY.
Negligence, Street railway. Practice, Civil, Order for judgment. Supreme Judicial Court.
A man sixty-two years of age, with good eyesight and hearing, cannot be said to be taking sufficient care for his own safety if, when driving in a grocery wagon for one hundred and fourteen feet on a private driveway from a yard toward a dangerous crossing of street railway tracks, his view of the tracks toward one side being so obstructed by trees and shrubbery that it is impossible for him to see a car approaching from that side at a greater distance than twenty or thirty feet away until he is upon the tracks, he does not listen for an approaching car, and, although he knows that cars pass that point every half hour, does not know how soon one is likely to come because he does not look at his watch, and looks in the direction from which the car is coming only twice, once when through the foliage from a point less than thirty feet from the track he gets a mere instantaneous glimpse of about thirty feet of the track, and the second time when his horse's feet are on the second rail of the track and he is from four to six feet from the nearest rail, when he sees a car ninety to one hundred feet from him which is approaching very rapidly, and which, although he starts his horse up, strikes his wagon and injures him.
Although it is true that there is no absolute rule of law requiring a traveller to look and listen before crossing the track of an electric street railway, the circumstances may be such that a failure to look or listen properly will show negligence.
In this case, where the trial judge at the close of the evidence was requested to rule that upon all the evidence the plaintiff could not recover and such request was refused, and, there having been a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant alleged exceptions and the plaintiff alleged none, this court, in sustaining the defendant's exceptions, was of opinion that the case had been fully tried and that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain his action, and therefore in accordance with St. 1909, c. 236, directed the entry in the trial court of judgment for the defendant.
TORT for personal injuries received by the plaintiff as he was driving in a grocery wagon out from the yard of one Clinton in East Braintree to and upon the tracks of the defendant on Quincy Avenue under the circumstances stated in the opinion. Writ dated November 10, 1906.
The case was tried before Crosby, J. The material facts are stated in the opinion. At the close of the evidence the defendant, among other requests, asked for a ruling that upon all the evidence the plaintiff could not recover. The presiding judge refused to rule as requested, there was a verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendant alleged exceptions.
Asa P. French, (J. S. Allen, Jr., with him,) for the defendant.
F. N. Nay, for the plaintiff.
Sheldon, J. It is sufficiently manifest upon reading this bill of exceptions and looking at the photographs which are referred to therein that this accident occurred at a very dangerous crossing. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff; he had driven his horse over the defendant's tracks into and out of Clinton's yard a great number of times, and was well aware of the danger that existed. It was his duty in coming out to and upon the defendant's tracks on this occasion, to use his senses actively for his own protection. The due care which one is bound to exercise varies with the existing circumstances of each particular case. Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray 274. Cunningham v. Hall, 4 Allen 268. Gardner v. Boston Elevated Railway, ante, 213. The circumstances here called for a high degree of care.
had this experience? A. It had not been called to my attention, and it has since very strongly.  Q. You knew as you came out of that yard your sense of sight could not help you any? A. I never thought anything about it. It never occurred to me in that way.  Q. It is true, is it not, your sense of sight could not help you any coming out of that yard? A. It might be.  Q. And didn't you realize that at the time? A. No.  Q. Why not? A. I do not know. ... Q. And you knew cars were hidden from anybody coming out of that driveway until they got almost on to the track, did you not, coming from the direction of Weymouth? A. I do not know as I ever gave it a thought if I knew it.  Q. You were coming along just as if it were not a dangerous place, were you not? A. I might have been.  Q. Were you not? A. I presume so.  Q. Doing just as you would have done if it had not been a dangerous place, were you not? A. Quite likely.  Q. No more and no less, that is true, is it not? A. I guess so."
you give any reason why you did not hear it? A. I do not know of any reason why I should not hear it.  Q. Did you see the car before you heard it? A. Yes. ...  Q. Can you think of any reason why you did not hear those sounds before you saw the car if you were listening? A. No, I cannot think of any without the noise of the teams on the street might have  Q. Can you think of any other reason? A. No.  Q. Did you think of that at the time? A. No, I did not.  Q. Did it occur to you that in such a place as that under the circumstances and the noise that was made by your wagon, the noise of this other coal team on the street, the little that you could see, the frequency with which cars came along there, that it would have been safer to stop and listen for a car; did it occur to you ?  A. It did not occur to me.  Q. Do you think now that it would have? A. I think now that it might have been.  Q. You did have the same knowledge on that morning of your situation that you have now, did you not? A. I cannot say that I did before it occurred.  Q. You had the same opportunity of observing the dangers there before this accident that you have had since? A. Probably, yes.  Q. But you had not observed them before, is that right? A. Yes, sir."
The bill of exceptions further states that it was the plaintiff's "recollection and belief that it was impossible for anybody driving out of that yard on to the track to have seen a car at a greater distance than twenty or thirty feet away, until the horse was on the track. He knew that it was slightly down grade from the direction of Weymouth for some distance, and that cars were in the habit of coasting down there; that there are not many houses about there; that there was a straight track for a long distance on either side of that driveway."
We find no other testimony in the exceptions that tends to vary or to explain these statements of the plaintiff.
traveller to look and listen before crossing the track of an electric street railway. Robbins v. Springfield Street Railway, 165 Mass. 30. Hennessey v. Taylor, 189 Mass. 583. But it is also true that the failure to take such a precaution is not evidence of the exercise of due care; and the circumstances may be such that a failure to look or listen properly will show negligence. Donovan v. Lynn & Boston Railroad, 185 Mass. 583. This plaintiff gave no thought to the danger to which he was exposing himself. He drove out of the yard and upon the street just as he would have driven if no such danger had confronted him. This case is governed in principle by Saltman v. Boston Elevated Railway, 187 Mass. 243; Fitzgerald v. Boston Elevated Railway, 194 Mass. 242; Kelly v. Boston Elevated Railway, 197 Mass. 420; Tognazzi v. Milford & Uxbridge Street Railway, 201 Mass. 7; Willis v. Boston & Northern Street Railway, 202 Mass. 463; Smith v. Boston Elevated Railway, 202 Mass. 489. Accordingly we need not consider any of the other questions raised in the case.
The cases cited by counsel for the plaintiff do not help him. In most of them there was evidence either that the person injured looked or listened for a car when that might avail him, or that he was run into from behind when he might reasonably have expected the motorman to avoid doing so. Robbns v. Dartmouth & Westport Street Railway, 203 Mass. 546, decided since this case was argued, turned on the fact that a traveller in the street could not be held to anticipate that a car would be run at the rate of forty miles an hour in a busy city street.

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