Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19761006-731775
Timestamp: 2016-10-28 20:26:53+00:00

Document:
LYNAS c. SUISSE
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7317/75Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1976-10-06;7317.75 Analyses : (Art. 10-1) LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION, (Art. 10-2) DEFENSE DE L'ORDRE, (Art. 10-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 10-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 10-2) PREVUE PAR LA LOI, (Art. 11) LIBERTE DE REUNION ET D'ASSOCIATION, (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 17) DESTRUCTION DES DROITS ET LIBERTES, (Art. 18) RESTRICTIONS DANS UN BUT NON PREVU, (Art. 5-1) ARRESTATION OU DETENTION REGULIERE, (Art. 5-1) LIBERTE PHYSIQUE, (Art. 5-1) VOIES LEGALES, (Art. 5-4) INTRODUIRE UN RECOURS, (Art. 6-1) ACCUSATION EN MATIERE PENALE, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVIL, (Art. 6-1) JUGEMENT PUBLIC, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) TRIBUNAL IMPARTIAL, (Art. 6-1) TRIBUNAL INDEPENDANT, (Art. 6-2) PRESOMPTION D'INNOCENCE, (Art. 6-3-b) FACILITES NECESSAIRES, (Art. 6-3-b) TEMPS NECESSAIRE, (Art. 6-3-c) SE DEFENDRE SOI-MEME, (Art. 6-3-d) INTERROGATION DES TEMOINSParties : Demandeurs : LYNASDéfendeurs : SUISSETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 7317/7 5 William Posnett LYNAS v/SWITZERLAND William Posne tt LYNAS c/SUISS E DECISION of 6 October 1976 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 6 octobre 1976 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Article 3 of the Convention : A person's extradition may, in exceptional circumstances, be contrary to the Convention and, in particular Article 3, where there are strong reasons to believe that this person will be subject to treatment prohibited by that Article, in the country to which he is be sent . Article 5, paragreph 1, /itt. tl, of the Convention : lf the proceedings for extradition are not been pursued with the requisite speed the deprivation of liberty may cease to be justified . Within these limits, the Commission may consider the length of detention pending extradition Inewjurisprudencel . Artic%5, paragraph 3, of the Convention : This provision onty concerns the length of a detention within the meaning of Article 5, paregraph 1, titt. cl, and not detention pending extradition .
Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Convention : a) Is this provision applicable to extradition proceedings before the authorities of the requested State? (unresotved) . b) Supposing it to be the case, an obligation on the person whose extradition is requested to prove his alibi is not an unfair one . Article 25 and Art/c/e 5, paragraph 4, of the Convention : The person who complains of not having had, at a particular time, a judicial remedy against his detention cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention if he did not pursue this judicial remedy when it wes available to him . Article 26 and Artic/e 5 of the Convention : Exhaustion of domestic remedies . A person who complains of the length of his detention should have drawn up-and at least reasonably renewed-a request for release. Article 3 de la Convention : L'extradition d'un individu peut, dans certaines circonstances exceptionnelles, se rÃ©vÃ©ler contraire Ã© la Convention et notamment Ã son article 3lorsqu Ã¯l y a des raisons sÃ©rieuses de croire que cet individu sera soumis, dans l'Etet vers lequel it doit Ã©tre dirigÃ©, A des traitements prohibÃ©s par cet article. Article 5, paragraphe 1, /itt . f.l, de la Convention : Si la procÃ©dure d'extradition cesse d'Ã©tre menÃ©e avec la diligence requise, la privation de libertÃ© peut cesser d'Ã©tre justifiÃ©e. Dans ces limites, la Commission peut Ã©tre amenÃ©e Ã apprÃ©cier la durÃ©e d'une dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition (nouvelle jurisprudence) .
Article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention : Cette disposition ne concerne que la durÃ©e d'une dÃ©tention visÃ©e par l'anicle 5, par. 1, litt. C), et non celle d'une dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition . Article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention : a) Cette disposition est-elle applicable Ã la procÃ©dure d'extradition devant les autoritÃ©s de 1'Etat requis ? (Question non rÃ©solue) . b) A supposer qu'elle le soit, l'obligation faite Ã celui dont l'extradition est demandÃ©e d'avoir Ã prouver l'alibi qu'il invoque n'est pas inÃ©quitab/e . Article 25 et article 5, paregrephe 4, de la Convention : Celui qui se plaint de n'avoir pas disposÃ©, Ã une certaine Ã©poque, d'un recours judiciaire contre son maintien en dÃ©tention ne peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Convention s'il n Ã¢ pas exercÃ© ce recours judicieire quand celui-ci lui a Ã©tÃ© accordÃ© . Article 25 et article 5 de la Convention : Epuisement des voies de recours internes. Celui qui se plaint de la durÃ©e de se dÃ©tention doit avoir formulÃ© - et au besoin raisonnablement renouvelÃ© - une demande de mise en libertÃ©.
I English : see p . 155)
Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : 1 . Le requÃ©rant, William Posnet Lynas, est nÃ© en 1934 Ã Honolulu . Il se dÃ©clare citoyen irlandais : certains des documents officiels suisses qu'il a produits le dÃ©signent comme tel, d'autres comme ressonissant des Etats-Unis, mais lui-mÃ©me affirme avoir perdu ce tte nationalitÃ© en 1970 et se rÃ©fÃ©re, quant Ã sa nationalitÃ© irlandaise, Ã une attestation Inon produite devant la Commissionl de la lÃ©gation d'Irlande en Suisse du 10 octobre 1974 . Au moment de l'introduction de sa requite, il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de district d'Affoltern (Zurich) . Sa requÃ©te a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e Ã la Commission par Mâ¢ Jean-Pierre Tschudi, avocat Ã Zurich . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© Ã GenÃ©ve le 17 avril 1972 et dÃ©fÃ©rÃ© au parquet de Zurich comme soupÃ§onnÃ© de faux commis en 1963 . Le parquet de Zurich a ordonnÃ© sa dÃ©tention provisoire (Untersuchungshaft) jusqu'au 28 juillet 1972 . Le 19 avril 1972, l'Ambassade des Etats-Unis Ã Berne, se fondant sur l'article VI du traitÃ© d'extradition du 14 mai 1900 entre la Suisse et les Etats-Unis d'AmÃ©rique, demanda aux autoritÃ©s suisses l'arrestation provisoire du requÃ©rant . Cette demande fut suivie, le 14 juin 1972, d'une demande d'extradition . Dans l'acte d'accusation qui y Ã©tait annexÃ©, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait accusÃ© d'avoir, le 27 octobre 1970, pris langue avec d'autres personnes pour introduire illÃ©galement de la cocaÃ¯ne sur le territoire des EtatsUnis et d'avoir, le 20 octobre 1971, effectivement introduit dans la rÃ©gion de Los AngelÃ¨s dix - neuf livres de cocaÃ¯ne en provenance d'AmÃ©rique du Sud avec la complicitÃ© d'une nommÃ©e Illene Felshaw . Le 14 juillet 1972, le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© par la police de Zurich ; il contesta les accusations transmises par les autoritÃ©s amÃ©ricaines . Le 28 juillet 1972, la Division de police du DÃ©partement fÃ©dÃ©ral suisse de Justice et Police ( ci-aprÃ¨s la Division de police) ordonna que le requÃ©rant fÃ»t dÃ©tÃ©nu en vue d'extradition ( Auslieferungshaft) . Le 6 septembre 1972, l'avocat du requÃ©rant dÃ©posa un mÃ©moire dans lequel il soutenait que les documents produits par les autoritÃ©s amÃ©ricaines Ã©taient insuffisants . Par dÃ©cision du 16 novembre 1972, la Division de police fit droit Ã la demande d'extradition aux Etats - Unis . - 142 -
Le requÃ©rant, reprÃ©sentÃ© d'abord par Mâ¢ Herbert Gross, puis par Mâ¢ Jean-Pierre Tschudi, l'un et l'autre avocats Ã Zurich, recourut le 22 dÃ©cembre 1972 auprÃ¨s du DÃ©partement fÃ©dÃ©ral de Justice et Police contre la dÃ©cision d'extradition . Il demandait en mÃªme temps sa mise en libertÃ© provisoire et la mainlevÃ©e de la saisie de certains biens lui appartenant, sÃ©questrÃ©s au moment de son arrestation . Sa mise en libertÃ© fut refusÃ©e par une dÃ©cision intÃ©rimaire du DÃ©partement du 1â¢ 1 fÃ©vrier 1973, dÃ©cision confirmÃ©e par le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral le 17 septembre 1973 . Quant Ã l'extradition, l'avocat du requÃ©rant dÃ©veloppa son recours le 25 mars 1974 . Celui-ci fut rejetÃ© par le DÃ©partement le 18 septembre 1974, de mÃªme que la demande de mainlevÃ©e de la saisie . Contre la dÃ©cision rendue par le DÃ©partement le 18 septembre 1974, le requÃ©rant a recouru au Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral le 28 octobre 1974 . Par dÃ©cision du 9 juin 1975, le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral ordonna que le recours fÃ¹t transmis au Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral, dans la mesure oÃ¹ il se fondait sur la loi fÃ©dÃ©rale sur l'extradition aux Etats Ã©trangers (LFE) ou sur le traitÃ© d'extradition larticle 23 LFE) et le rejeta pour le surplus . Par arrÃªt du 12 dÃ©cembre 1975, la Chambre de droit public du Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral a rejetÃ© le recours et autorisÃ© l'extradition du requÃ©rant aux Etats-Unis . L'arrÃ©t est motivÃ© comme suit IrÃ©sumÃ©l : AprÃ¨s avoir constatÃ© sa compÃ©tence en vertu du droit suisse pour examiner le recours, le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©rÃ¢l relÃ©ve que selon sa nouvelle jurisprudence il examine Ã©galement - mais . pas dans tous les cas - si les conditions formelles pour une extradition sont remplies . En effet, lorsque - comme en l'espÃ©ce - le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral a dÃ©jÃ© examinÃ© les conditions formelles il n'appartient plus au Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral de les rÃ©examiner . Le traitÃ© d'extradition Ã©numÃ©re les infractions pour lesquelles l'extradition est accordÃ©e Ã condition que les infractions soient punissables dans l'Etat requÃ©rant et dans l'Etat requis . En l'espÃ©ce, les infractions reprochÃ©es au requÃ©rant remplissent cette condition .
Le traitÃ© d'extradition est applicable Ã des personnes qui sont accusÃ©es d'une infraction commise sur le territoire d'un des deux Etats . Que l'on se base sur les principes du droit suisse, sur ceux qui dÃ©coulent du traitÃ© d'extradition ou sur ceux du droit amÃ©ricain, cette condition est remplie en l'espÃ©ce, l'infraction ayant dÃ©ployÃ© ses effets sur le territoire des Etats-Unis . ConformÃ©ment Ã sa jurisprudence, le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral n'examine pas des questions de fait ou de culpabilitÃ© . Le juge de l'extradition est liÃ© par les documents produits lors de la demande d'extradition . Cela n'exclut pas que le juge ne puisse pas tenir compte d'erreurs ou de lacunes manifestes . En l'espÃ©ce, le requÃ©rant n'a pas dÃ©montrÃ© qu'il n'aurait pas pu commettre les infractions Ã lui reprochÃ©es . Le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral estime que la dÃ©clarationâ¢ de M . A . ne prouve pas non plus que le requÃ©rant n'a pas pu commettre les infractions dont il s'agit . Le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral Ã©met d'ailleurs quelques rÃ©serves Ã l'Ã©gard de cette dÃ©claration . Il fait remarquer qu'on ne peut pas exclure qu'il y ait eu des contacts entre le requÃ©rant et M . A . En outre, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que le requÃ©rant n'a commencÃ© Ã faire Ã©tat de prÃ©tendus agissements de la C .I .A . qu'Ã© partir du moment oÃ¹ l'attention du public avait Ã©tÃ© attirÃ©e dans un autre contexte sur les activitÃ©s de ce service secret dirigÃ©es contre le Gouvernement Allende . cf . ci~aprAs
Selon l'article VII, Â§ 1 du traitÃ©, l'extradition n'est pas accordÃ©e pour une infraction politique . La Suisse a adhÃ©rÃ© Ã la Convention europÃ©enne d'extradition de 1957 . Le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral a dÃ©jA dÃ©cidÃ© que l'article 3, Â§ 2, de cette Convention est appliquÃ© par les autoritÃ©s suisses mÃªme Ã© l'Ã©gard d'un Etat qui n'y est pas partie lorsqu'il n'existe aucune convention bilatÃ©rale d'extradition entre la Suisse et cet Etat . Aux termes de cette disposition Â« La mÃªme rÃ©gle [c'est-Ã©-dire la rÃ¨gle selon laquelle l'extradition n'est pas accordÃ©e pour une infraction politiqueJ s'appliquera si la Partie requise a des raisons sÃ©rieuses de croire que la demande d'extradition motivÃ©e par une infraction de droit commun a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e aux fins de poursuivre ou de punir un individu pour des considÃ©rations de race, de religion, de nationalitÃ© ou d'opinions politiques ou que la situation de cet individu risque d'Ãªtre aggravÃ©e pour l'une ou l'autre de ces raisons Â» . Mais en l'espÃ©ce, la Suisse a conclu avec les Etats-Unis un traitÃ© d'extradition ne contenant pas de restriction analogue Ã© celle de l'article 3, Â§ 2, de la Convention europÃ©enne d'extradition . D'ailleurs, l'application de l'article 3 de la Convention europÃ©enne d'extradition n'affecte pas les obligations que les Parties assument aux termes de toute autre convention internationale de caractÃ¨re multilatÃ©ral (cf . article 3, Â§ 4, Convention europÃ©enne d'extraditionl . Selon la doctrine actuelle, il faut admettre qu'une extradition serait contraire Ã des rÃ©gles impÃ©ratives du droit international lorsqu'elle aurait pour effet de soumettre l'individu extradÃ© dans l'Etat requÃ©rant Ã un traitement contraire aux droits de l'homme . Or, il n'y a pas de raison de craindre que la procÃ©dure devant le tribunal amÃ©ricain compÃ©tent se dÃ©roule d'une maniÃ©re contraire au principe du respect des droits de l'homme . Enfin, le requÃ©rant ne devra pas Ãªtre poursuivi pour des infractions qui auraient Ã©tÃ© commises avant la demande d'extradition et qui ne sont pas mentionnÃ©es dans l'acte d'accusation communiquÃ© par les autoritÃ©s amÃ©riraines .
Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© extradÃ© aux Etats-Unis le 22 dÃ©cembre 1975 . Par lettre du 19 fÃ©vrier 1976 le conseil du requÃ©rant a communiquÃ© la nouvelle adresse du requÃ©rant Ã Los AngelÃ©s . 2 . Le requÃ©rant explique que sous la prÃ©sidence de Salvador Allende, il a dÃ©ployÃ© une activitÃ© plusieurs fois couronnÃ©e de succÃ©s pour permettre Ã© la RÃ©publique du Chili de se procurer des devises . Cette activitÃ© contrecarrait les efforts des Etats-Unis pour priver le Chili de ressources monÃ©taires, de sorte que la Â« Central Intelligence Agency x ICIAI aurait entrepris de l'Ã©liminer . Une tentative d'assassinat fut perpÃ©trÃ©e contre lui le 4 septembre 1971 mais le coup de feu, tirÃ© de trop loin, le rata . AprÃ©s cet Ã©chec, la CIA, changeant de tactique, aurait montÃ© contre lui de toutes piÃ©ces une affaire de trafic de stupÃ©fiants qui devait conduire Ã son arrestation oÃ¹ qu'il se trouvÃ¢t et, au besoin, Ã son extradition aux Etats-Unis . Le requÃ©rant est convaincu qu'une fois rendu sur le territoire des Etats-Unis il se trouvera Ã la merci de tueurs Ã la solde de la CIA et promptement assassinÃ© . A l'appui de ses dires, le requÃ©rant a produit devant les autoritÃ©s suisses et il produrt devant la Commission copie d'une dÃ©claration dÃ©taillÃ©e laffidavitl faite sous la foi du serment le 14 dÃ©cembre 1973 par un nommÃ© A . par devant Mâ¢ Kurt Wissmann, notaire Ã Zurich . A . dÃ©clare notamment qu'alors qu'il Ã©tait employÃ© par la sociÃ©tÃ© Chilteco, filiale chilienne de la SociÃ©tÃ© International Telephone and Telegraph Company, il fut mis en contact avec des agents de la CIA et accepta de travailler pour le compte de cette organisation pour empÃ©cher l'Ã©lection de Salvator Allende Ã la prÃ©sidence du Chili, puis pour abattre son rÃ©gime . En juillet 1970, il aurait Ã©tÃ© envoyÃ© suivre un e
formation spÃ©ciale auprÃ©s de l'a United States Southern Command s dans la Zone du canal de Panama . Il aurait ensuite connu le prix attachÃ© par ses chefs Ã l'Ã©limination de Lynas et aurait participÃ© lui-mÃ©me Ã l'attentat manquÃ© du 4 septembre 1971 . C'est en raison des prÃ©cautions prises par Lynas que la CIA aurait ensuite renoncÃ© Ã une autre tentative d'assassinat et aurait montÃ© l'affaire du trafic de stupÃ©fiants, dans laquelle Illene Felshaw, elle-mÃªme agente de la CIA, aurait jouÃ© un rÃ´le actif . A . dÃ©clare avoir eu personnellement connaissance des prÃ©paratifs . Il prÃ©cise qu'ayant dÃ©sirÃ© plus tard mettre fin au travail dont la CIA le chargeait au Chili, il subit des pressions et des menaces de ses chefs et s'enfuit Ã fin juin 1973 . A . ajoute qu'il a eu connaissance de l'acte d'accusation Ã©tabli par la r United States Federal Grand Jury - United States District Court, Central Division Â» de Los AngelÃ¨s (Californie) contre Lynas (Dossier NÂ° 9731 - CD) et a constatÃ© que les faits correspondent Ã ceux dont il a eu connaissance au cours de son activitÃ©s pour la CIA . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement produit la copie d'une lettre adressÃ©e le 15 fÃ©vrier 1975 Ã un haut fonctionnaire fÃ©dÃ©ral suisse par M . B ., dÃ©putÃ© au Conseil National, lequel dÃ©clare avoir Ã©tudiÃ© le dossier de Lynas avec l'aide de deux anciens hommes politiques chiliens et avoir la conviction que Lynas risque d'Ãªtre assassinÃ© dÃ¨s qu'il se trouvera sur le territoire des Etats-Unis . Au cours de la procÃ©dure d'examen de la demande d'extradition, le requÃ©rant a fait valoir que les autoritÃ©s suisses ne devaient pas se contenter des piÃ©ces fournies par les autoritÃ©s des Etats-Unis Ã l'appui de la demande . Les autoritÃ©s suisses auraient ainsi pu se persuader que toute l'accusation reposait sur de fausses dÃ©clarations d'Illene Felshaw et peut-Ãªtre s'Ã©tonner que les poursuites aient Ã©tÃ© abandonnÃ©es contre tous les co-accusÃ©s du requÃ©rant . Outre la dÃ©claration d'A ., le requÃ©rant a produit devant les autoritÃ©s suisses divers documents tendant Ã prouver qu'il se trouvait en Espagne au moment des faits qui lui Ã©taient reprochÃ©s dans l'affaire d'importation illÃ©gale de cocaÃ¯ne . Selon la jurisprudence suisse, en effet, seule la preuve immÃ©diate d'un alibi (liquider Alibiweis) peut conduire Ã refuser l'extradition, toutes autres questions de fait et de culpabilitÃ© relevant du juge du fond . Les autoritÃ©s suisses estimÃ¨rent toutefois qu'une telle preuve immÃ©diate n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© rapportÃ©e devant elles .
GRIEF S Le requÃ©rant invoque l'article 2 de la Convention de Sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des LibertÃ©s fondamentales . En dÃ©cidant son extradition, les autoritÃ©s suisses l'exposaient Ã un danger mortel, d'autant plus que les pratiques d'agents de la CIA pour supprimer des personnes gÃªnantes sont maintenant de notoriÃ©tÃ© publique . Si les autoritÃ©s suisses s'Ã©taient montrÃ©es aussi exigeantes, quant aux piÃ¨ces Ã fournir, que le sont les autoritÃ©s des Etats-Unis en prÃ©sence d'une demande d'extradition, elles n'auraient sans doute pas mis ainsi en danger la vie du requÃ©rant . Le requÃ©rant invoque ensuite l'article 5 de la Convention, et ceci Ã un triple titre :
a) Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© Ã GenÃ¨ve le 17 avril 1972 comme soupÃ§onnÃ© d'une infraction (affaire de chÃ¨ques) dont il s'est avÃ©rÃ© ensuite qu'elle faisait depuis longtemps l'objet d'un jugement ayant acquis force de chose jugÃ©e . b) Depuis la demande d'arrestation provisoire formulÃ©e le 19 avril 1972 par les autoritÃ©s des Etats-Unis, le requÃ©rant est demeurÃ© dÃ©tenu en vue d'extradition pendant trois ans et huit mois, ce qui est une durÃ©e excessive .
c) Le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© plusieurs fois sa mise en libertÃ© provisoire, mais celle-ci lui a Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e, en dernier lieu par dÃ©cision du Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral du 9 juin 1975 . Il n'existe en droit suisse aucun recours judiciaire contre une dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition, ce qui est contraire Ã l'a rt icle 5, Â§ 4, de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant invoque enfin l'a rt icle 18 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec l'a rt icle 5, Â§ 1c) et f), l'arrestation et la dÃ©tention en vue de l'extradition du requÃ©rant ayant servi Ã permettre l'Ã©limination d'une personne gÃªnante pour les Etats-Unis dans leurs rapports avec une autre puissance .
Le requÃ©rant demande Ã la Commission une intervention immÃ©diate auprÃ©s du Gouvernement suisse pour obtenir la suspension de l'extradition durant la procÃ©dure . Il demande aussi l'assistance judiciaire devant la Commission .
PROCÃDUR E 1 . La prÃ©sente requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© expÃ©diÃ©e le 18 dÃ©cembre 1975 . AussitÃ´t aprÃ©s avoir pris connaissance de la requÃ©te, le 22 dÃ©cembre 1975 au matin, le SecrÃ©taire de la Commission dÃ©cid a - de l'enregistrer ,
- d'informer le Gouvernement mis en cause de son introduction (article 41 du RÃªglement intÃ©rieur de la Commission) , - de soumettre au PrÃ©sident de la Commission la demande d'intervention immÃ©diate formulÃ©e par le requÃ©rant . A 10 h 45, le SecrÃ©taire informa le Gouvernement suisse IDivision fÃ©dÃ©rale de la Justice) par tÃ©lÃ©phone de l'introduction de la requÃ©te . A 12 h 10, le SecrÃ©taire fut en contact tÃ©lÃ©phonique avec le PrÃ©sident de la Commission, qui rendit aussitÃ´t une ordonnance par laquelle il dÃ©clarait la requÃ©te prioritaire (article 28 du RÃªglement intÃ©rieur) ; en mÃ©me temps, le PrÃ©sident indiquait au Gouvernement qu'il Ã©tait souhaitable de surseoir Ã l'extradition du requÃ©rant jusqu'Ã fin janvier 1976 (article 36 du RÃªglement intÃ©rieur) . Cette ordonnance fut notifiÃ©e par tÃ©lÃ©phone au Gouvernement suisse (Division fÃ©dÃ©rale de la Justice) Ã 12 h 25 . Le reprÃ©sentant de la Division fÃ©dÃ©rale informa le SecrÃ©taire que le requÃ©rant venait d'Ãªtre conduit dans un avion qui n'avait pas encore dÃ©collÃ© ; il annonÃ§a que le Conseiller fÃ©dÃ©ral chef du dÃ©partement de Justice et Police serait immÃ©diatement informÃ© de l'ordonnance du PrÃ©sident de la Commission . La notification de l'ordonnance fut confirmÃ©e le mÃªme jour (22 dÃ©cembre 1975) par lettre du SecrÃ©taire . Par lettre du 30 dÃ©cembre 1975, reÃ§ue le 5 janvier 1976, le Gouvernement suisse (Division fÃ©dÃ©rale de la Justice) informa le SecrÃ©taire de la Commission que le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© extradÃ© aux Etats-Unis le 22 dÃ©cembre 1975 . 2 . Le 8 janvier 1976, un membre de la Commission en qualitÃ© de Rapporteur examina l'affaire (article 40 du RÃªglement intÃ©rieur ) . Le 8 mars 1976, la Commission dÃ©cid a a) - d'informer le Gouvernement suisse que la Commission avait remarquÃ© que le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© extradÃ© peu aprÃ©s notification d'une ordonnance du PrÃ©sident indiquant au Gouvernement suisse qu'il serait souhaitable de retarder l'extradition du requÃ©rant ;
- d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement suisse sur l'article 36 du RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur de la Commission aux termes duquel (r la Commission ou, si elle ne siÃ©ge pas, le PrÃ©sident, peut indiquer aux parties toute mesure provisoire dont l'adoption parait souhaitable dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t des parties ou du dÃ©roulement normal de la procÃ©dure e ; - de rappeler au Gouvernement suisse la pratique de la Commission en la matiÃ¨re, selon laquelle la Commission ne fait usage de cette disposition que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles et urgentes oÃ¹ il semble, Ã premiÃ©re vue, que des mesures aux consÃ©quences irrÃ©versibles seraient sur le point d'Ãªtre prises, et de rappeler au Gouvernement qu'une pratique s'Ã©tait Ã©tablie auprÃ¨s des Gouvernements intÃ©ressÃ©s de donner suite Ã de telles communications ; b) - de communiquer l'ensemble de la requÃ©te au Gouvernement suisse larticle 42, Â§ 2 b) du RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieurl et d'inviter ce dernier Ã prÃ©senter par Ã©crit ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte dans un dÃ©lai de huit semaines ; - d'informer le Gouvernement suisse que la Commission attacherait du prix Ã ce que le Gouvernement s'exprime, entre autres, sur les deux points suivants : - Les autoritÃ©s suisses auraient-elles Ã©ventuellement pris certaines prÃ©cautions Ã l'Ã©gard des autoritÃ©s des Etats-Unis, en vue que le requÃ©rant se trouve protÃ©gÃ© contre les risques qu'il croit courir sur le territoire de cet Etat ; dans l'affirmative, lesquelles 7 - Quelle est l'opinion du Gouvernement suisse quant Ã l'application, dans la prÃ©sente affaire, du principe du dÃ©lai raisonnable, visÃ© Ã l'article 5, Â§ 3, ou dans toute autre disposition de la Convention qui pourrait concerner la durÃ©e d'une dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition (article 5, . 1 f) de la Convention ? Le 9 mars 1976, la Commission dÃ©cida d'ouvrir la procÃ©dure d'assistance judiciaire conformÃ©ment Ã l'Addendum au RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur .
4 . Le 3 mai 1976, le Gouvernement mis en cause prÃ©senta ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te . Le Conseil du requÃ©rant y rÃ©pondit par un mÃ©moire du 5 juillet 1976 . 5 . Le Rapporteur rÃ©examina l'affaire les 17 juin et 8 juillet 1976 (article 40 du RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieur) . Le 15 juillet 1976, la Commission dÃ©cida de fixer une audience sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte . Le 19 juillet 1976, le PrÃ©sident agissant au nom de la Commission larticle 3 . Â§ 3 et article 7 de l'Addendum au RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur) accorda au requÃ©rant l'assistance judiciaire . La Commission prit acte de cette dÃ©cision le 5 octobre 1976 . Le 5 octobre 1976, la Commission a entendu les reprÃ©sentants des parties au cours d'une audience . Ont comparu : pour le requÃ©rant, Mâ¢ J .-P . Tschudi, avocat Ã Zurich ; pour le Gouvernement mis en cause, M . J . Voyame, Directeur de la Division fÃ©dÃ©rale de la Justice, en qualitÃ© d'agent, assistÃ© de Mme M . Haller, juriste Ã© la Division fÃ©dÃ©rale de la Justice, et de M . L . Frei, juriste Ã la Division fÃ©dÃ©rale de la police . A l'issue de cette audience, la Commission est entrÃ©e en dÃ©libÃ©ration .
ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S 1 . Mise en danger du requÃ©ran t Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue en substance qu'en l'extradant aux Etats-Unis, les autoritÃ©s suisses l'exposent Ã© un danger mortel en raison des reprÃ©sailles qu'il peut craindre de la part de la C .I .A . Il invoque l'article 2 de la Convention . Il affirme Ã cet Ã©gard que l'accusation de trafic de stupÃ©fiants dirigÃ©e contre lui ne serait que le rÃ©sultat d'une machination . Que le requÃ©rant n'ait pu rÃ©ussir Ã© faire reconnaitre son alibi ne saurait Ã©tre retenu pour mettre en doute l'existence d'une menace rÃ©elle Ã l'encontre de sa personne .
Le requÃ©rant reconnait l'indÃ©pendance des tribunaux amÃ©ricains . Il craint cependant d'Ãªtre condamnÃ© en raison d'une fausse accusation . II est Ã©tonnant que lors de l'extradition les autoritÃ©s suisses n'aient pas cru opportun de prendre des prÃ©cautions pour protÃ©ger le requÃ©rant . Celui-ci admet, par ailleurs, que la publicitÃ© qui a entourÃ© son affaire lui donne une certaine protection . Le Gouvernement relÃ¨ve que la requÃªte est dirigÃ©e contre la Suisse . Or, le requÃ©rant invoque une menace de mort Ã©manant des agents de la C .I .A . La violation prÃ©tendue de l'article 2 de la Convention ne saurait Ãªtre imputÃ©e Ã la Suisse, mais Ã un Etat tiers . La Commission est donc incompÃ©tente ratione personae pour examiner ce grief . Par ailleurs, il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© portÃ© atteinte Ã la vie du requÃ©rant depuis son extradition .
D'autre part, le requÃ©rant n'a pu dÃ©montrer de maniÃ©re convaincante l'existence de menace rÃ©elle Ã l'encontre de sa personne . Compte tenu des motifs retenus par le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral Ã ce sujet et de l'indÃ©pendance des tribunaux amÃ©ricains, la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e dans la mesure oÃ¹ la violation de l'article 3 serait invoquÃ©e . Estimant que la menace invoquÃ©e par le requÃ©rant n'existe pas, les autoritÃ©s suisses n'ont pris aucune prÃ©caution particuliÃ©re pour le protÃ©ger . 2 . Arrestation du requÃ©ran t Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© le 17 avril 1972 comme soupÃ§onnÃ© d'une infraction dont il s'est avÃ©rÃ© ensuite qu'elle faisait depuis longtemps l'objet d'un jugement ayant acquis force de chose jugÃ©e . Il se plaint de ce fait d'une violation de l'article 5 de la Convention . Le Gouvernement estime que la Commission n'est pas compÃ©tente ratione temporis pour juger de cette arrestation .
DurÃ©e de la dÃ©tentio n Le requÃ©rant se prÃ©tend victime d'une violation de l'article 5 de la Convention en raison de la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention . Il relÃ¨ve que depuis la demande d'arrestation provisoire formulÃ©e le 19 avril 1972 par les autoritÃ©s des Etats-Unis, il est demeurÃ© dÃ©tenu en vue d'extradition pendant trois ans et huit mois, ce qui est une durÃ©e excessive . MÃªme si la Commission n'est compÃ©tente ratione temporis que pour les faits postÃ©rieurs au 28 novembre 1974, il ne faut pas perdre de vue la durÃ©e totale . On ne saurait prÃ©tendre que la procÃ©dure s'est dÃ©roulÃ©e avec toute la diligence possible . Le Gouvernement rappelle que la Commission n'est compÃ©tente ratione temporis que pour les faits intervenus entre le 28 novembre 1974 et le 22 dÃ©cembre 1975, jour de l'extradition .
Le requÃ©rant se trouvait en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du 17 avril 1972 au 28 juillet 1972 et en dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition du 28 juillet 1972 au 22 dÃ©cembre 1975 . La dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition ne sert qu'Ã© l'exÃ©cution de l'extradition et n'a pas pour objet une dÃ©cision au fond . ConformÃ©mÃ©nt Ã la pratique constante en la matiÃ¨re, les autoritÃ©s suisses n'examinent pas les objections touchant Ã des questions de culpabilitÃ© ou aux faits retenus Ã la charge de la personne Ã extrader . Selon le droit suisse, la dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition tombe donc sous le coup de l'article 5, . 1 f) de la Convention et non pas sous l'article 5, Â§ 1 c) (cette disposition concerne la privation de libertÃ© en vue de la comparution devant une autoritÃ© judiciaire pour statuer au fond) . La dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition ne saurait Ã©tre assimilÃ©e Ã la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive ; l'article 5 . Â§ 3 ne s'applique donc pas en l'espÃ©ce . La Commission n'est donc pas compÃ©tente ratione materiae pour examiner ce grief . Le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral a statuÃ© le 17 septembre 1973 sur la demande de mise en libertÃ© du requÃ©rant . Le requÃ©rant n'a plus renouvelÃ© sa demande, bien qu'il eÃ»t pu le faire, soir devant les autoritÃ©s administratives soit devant le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral . Le requÃ©rant a donc omis d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours internes . Si la Commission devait nÃ©anmoins estimer que le grief n'est pas irrecevable pour les motifs susmentionnÃ©s, ce grief devrait Ã©tre rejetÃ© pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . Seule la dÃ©tention postÃ©rieure au 28 novembre 1974 entre en ligne de compte . Le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral ayant statuÃ© le 17 septembre 1973 sur la demande de mise en libertÃ©, la procÃ©dure n'avait plus trait qu'Ã© l'extradition du requÃ©rant et Ã la restitution d'objets confisquÃ©s . Cette procÃ©dure s'est dÃ©roulÃ©e avec toute la diligence possible . Le retard d0 Ã l'examen de la question de savoir quelle autoritÃ© Atait compÃ©tente pour autoriser l'extradition rÃ©sulte de la requÃªte complÃ©mentaire du requÃ©rant lui-m@me . Voici les Ã© tapes de la procÃ©dure : - Le DÃ©partement fÃ©dÃ©ral des Finances et des Douanes IDFFDI, Ã qui incombait l'instruction du recours au Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral, invita le DÃ©partement fÃ©dÃ©ral de Justice et Police (DFJPI . en sa qualitÃ© d'autoritÃ© de premiÃ¨re instance, Ã se dÃ©terminer ; le DFJP se prononÃ§a en dÃ©cembre 1974 . - Le DFFD requit le 17 janvier 1975 l'avis du Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral sur une question de compÃ©tence . En effet, le requÃ©rant n'a prÃ©tendu qu'ultÃ©rieurement qu'il Ã©tait poursuivi par la C .I .A . Sa nouvelle argumentation se fondait ainsi sur la loi fÃ©dÃ©rale sur l'extradition aux Etats Ã©trangers et il se posait la question de savoir si le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral Ã©tait devenu, de ce fait, compÃ©tent pour autoriser l'extradition (cf . les articles 22 et 24 de la loi fÃ©dÃ©rale sur l'extradition aux Etats Ã©trangers) .
- Le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral estima le 11 fÃ©vrier 1975 que la motivation complÃ©mentaire du requÃ©rant Ã©tait recevable . - Le DFFD soumit ensuite au DFJP une proposition . AprÃ©s un Ã©change de vues entre ces dÃ©partements, le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral statua le 9 juin 1975 sur le recours du requÃ©rant . - Les dossiers furent transmis le 19 juin 1975 au Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral . Celui-ci invita le DFJP ainsi que le MinistÃ©re public fÃ©dÃ©ral Ã prendre position . Par lettres des 11 et 28 juillet 1975 respectivement, les deux autoritÃ©s y renoncÃ©rent . - Du 13 au 26 novembre 1975 il y eut un Ã©change de correspondance entre le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral et le DFJP concernant cinq piÃ¨ces du dossier . - Le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral se prononÃ§a le 12 dÃ©cembre 1975 . Le requÃ©rant fut extradÃ© le 22 dÃ©cembre 1975 .
Enfin, la question est de savoir si la procÃ©dure prÃ©vue par la loi elle-mÃ©me n'exige pas en soi beaucoup de temps . Le fait que la loi prÃ©voit pour la procÃ©dure d'extradition deux voies de recours profite aux intÃ©ressÃ©s, car il ne serait pas opportun que le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral soit compÃ©tent pour examiner tous les recours . La procÃ©dure serait sans doute plus courte si l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã©tait dÃ©finitivement limitÃ© Ã la voie de recours choisie, mais ceci irait Ã l'encontre des intÃ©rÃ©ts de la personne Ã extrader . Absence de recours Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue la violation de l'article 5, 4 4, de la Convention du fait que la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition ne pouvait pas Ãªtre examinÃ©e par un tribunal avant que le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral ait Ã©tÃ© saisi de son affaire . Dans ces conditions, on ne peut reprocher au requÃ©rant qu'aprÃ¨s examen d'une demande de mise en libertÃ© par le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral, le 17 septembre 1973, il n'a pas rÃ©itÃ©rÃ© sa demande devant les autoritÃ©s administratives . Le Gouvernement est d'avis que cette affirmation gÃ©nÃ©rale est inexacte . Il y a lieu de distinguer deux cas diffÃ©rents : l'autorisation d'extradition relÃ¨ve soit du Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral soit du Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral . L'autoritÃ© qui dÃ©cide de l'extradition est compÃ©tente pour dÃ©cider de la mise en libertÃ© (article 25, Â§ 2, de la loi fÃ©dÃ©rale sur l'extraditionl . En consÃ©quence, les personnes ayant soulevÃ© des objections se fondant sur la loi, sur le traitÃ© ou sur une dÃ©claration de rÃ©ciprocitÃ©, disposent d'un recours conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 5, Â§ 4, de la Convention len l'occurrence devant le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©rall . En revanche, les personnes n'ayant pas soulevÃ© des objections visÃ©es ci-dessus, n'ont pas de recours devant un tribunal . Ceci a incitÃ© le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral Ã proposer au Parlement une nouvelle lÃ©gislation qui prÃ©voit un recours au Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral . En l'espÃ©ce, le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral statua sur le recours du requÃ©rant contre la dÃ©cision d'extradition . Ayant ainsi bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un recours Ã un tribunal, il demande en rÃ©alitÃ© Ã la Commission d'examiner in abstracto la lÃ©gislation suisse . En consÃ©quence, la Commission n'est pas compÃ©tente ratione personae pour examiner ce grief .
L'unique demande de mise en libertÃ© du requÃ©rant fut examinÃ©e le 17 septembre 1973 par le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral, avant que l'intÃ©ressÃ© fasse valoir, le 25 mars 1974, de nouvelles objections de nature politique . Comme il a omis de rÃ©itÃ©rer sa demande il n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes . 5 . Violation du principe du procÃ¨s Ã©quitabl e Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue la violation du principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes dans la procÃ©dure d'extradition . Il est vrai que les paragraphes 2 et 3 de l'article 6 de la Convention donnant certaines garanties procÃ©durales Ã Â« toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction e, ne s'appliquent pas, selon la jurisprudence de la Commission (RequÃªte NÂ° 4247/69, Rec . 36, p . 75), Ã une procÃ©dure d'extradition . Le requÃ©rant admet la pertinence de cette jurisprudence dans les seuls cas oÃ¹ des motifs politiques ne sont pas invoquÃ©s . D'autre part, le requÃ©rant rappelle que des experts en matiÃ¨re d'extradition rÃ©unis en 1969 Icf . ComitÃ© europÃ©en pour les problÃ©mes criminels, Aspects juridiques de l'extradition entre Etats europÃ©ens, Conseil de l'Europe, 1970, p . 96) sont arrivÃ©s Ã la conclusion que l'extradition ne devrait pas Ã©tre accordÃ©e en vertu de la Convention europÃ©enne d'extradition si, en ce qui concerne les Etats contractants Ã la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, elle risque d'aboutir Ã une violation, par l'Etat requÃ©rant, des dispositions de celle-ci ou siâ en ce qui concerne les autres Etats, elle n'est pas conforme aux principes sur lesquels reposent les dispositions de ladite Convention . -150_
En consÃ©quence, dans une affaire ayant des implications politiques, les autoritÃ©s qui examinent la demande d'extradition dÃ©cident prima facie du bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale et ne se contentent pas d'examiner si, d'un point de vue formel, la demande d'extradition est conforme Ã la loi . Dans un tel cas, l'intÃ©ressÃ© a droit au respect du principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes . Or, ce principe a Ã©tÃ© violÃ© en l'espÃ©ce parce que le Gouvernement suisse a transmis au Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral des documents Ã©manant des autoritÃ©s amÃ©ricaines qui, selon le vo :u de ces autoritÃ©s, ne devaient pas Ã©tre communiquÃ©s au requÃ©rant . Il est vrai que le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral restitua alors lesdits documents au Gouvernement sans les joindre au dossier, mais il en a eu nÃ©anmoins connaissance sans que le ' requÃ©rant ait pu prendre position Ã ce sujet . De l'avis du requÃ©rant, l'a rt icle 6 a Ã© tÃ© Ã©galement violÃ© parce qu'en l'espÃ¨ce le Gouvernement n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© de produire des preuves Ã l'appui de la demande d'extradition et que le requÃ©rant fut invitÃ© Ã produire une preuve immÃ©diate d'un alibi - preuve presque suffisante - sans que les autoritÃ©s lui fournissent une aide quelconque . Le Gouvernement estime que l'a rticle 6 n'est pas applicable Ã une procÃ©dure d'extradition . D'abord perce qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un litige po rtant sur des droits de caractÃ©re civil . On ne saurait interprÃ©ter ce terme si largement qu'il doive comprendre la procÃ©dure d'extradition, sauf Ã admettre que tout litige est de Â« caractÃ©re civil r . A la question de savoir s'il s'agit du bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale, le Gouvernement rÃ©pond par la nÃ©gative . Bien que la matiÃ©re de l'extradition concerne indirectement le procÃ¨s pÃ©nal, la procÃ©dure d'extradition ne se confond pas avec une enqu@te pÃ©nale ni avec un procÃ¨s au fond ; elle tend simplement Ã assurer l'extradition d'une personne .
6 . DÃ©tention abusiv e Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend que sa dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition par les autoritÃ©s suisses aurait servi Ã permett re aux autoritÃ©s des Etats-Unis de l'a Ã©liminer Â» . Il allÃ¨gue la violation de l'a rt icle 18 combinÃ© avec l'a rt icle 5 de la Convention . Le Gouvernement rappelle qu'en raison de la complexitÃ© de l'affaire et du cours inhabituel de la procÃ©dure provoquÃ© par le requÃ©rant, la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention n'est pas dÃ©raisonnable . L'allÃ©gation selon laquelle ce retard aurait Ã©tÃ© provoquÃ© pour des mobiles prÃ©tendument illicites (Ã savoir faire durer la procÃ©dure afin de permettre aux Etats-Unis de Â« neutraliser Â» le plus longtemps possible le requÃ©rent) n'est pas soutenable . Ce grief est donc manifestement mal fondÃ© . EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue qu'en l'extradant aux Etats-Unis, les autoritÃ©s suisses l'exposent Ã un danger mortel en raison des reprÃ©sailles qu'il peut craindre de la part de la C .I .A . Il allÃ©gue la violation de l'article 2 de la Convention qui dispose : rt 1 . Le droit de toute personne Ã la vie est protÃ©gÃ© par la loi . La mort ne peut Ã¨tre infligÃ©e Ã quiconque intentionnellement, sauf en exÃ©cution d'une sentence capitale prononcÃ©e par un tribunal au cas oÃ¹ le dÃ©lit est puni de cette peine par la loi . 2 . La mort n'est pas considÃ©rÃ©e comme infligÃ©e en violation de cet article dans les cas oÃ¹ elle rÃ©sulterait d'un recours Ã la force rendu absolument nÃ©cessair e a) pour assurer la dÃ©fense de toute personne contre la violence illÃ©gale ; b) pour effectuer une arrestation rÃ©guliÃ¨re ou pour empÃªcher l'Ã©vasion d'une personne rÃ©guliÃ¨rement dÃ©tenue ;
c) pour rÃ©primer, conformÃ©ment Ã la loi, une Ã©meute ou une insurrection . n La Commission rappelle tout d'abord que, selon sa jurisprudence constante, aucun droit Ã ne pas Ãªtre extradÃ© ne figure, comme tel, au nombre des droits et libertÃ©s reconnus dans la Convention (cf . les dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃ©tes NÂ° 2143/64, Annuaire 7 p . 329 et NÂ° 1983/63, Annuaire 8 . p . 261) . Toutefois, ainsi que la Commission l'a dÃ©jÃ© constatÃ© Ã plusieurs reprises, l'extradition d'un individu peut nÃ©anmoins, dans certains cas exceptionnels, poser un problÃ©me dÃ©licat sur le terrain de la Convention, en particulier de son article 3, lorsqu'il existe des raisons sÃ©rieuses de craindre qu'une telle mesure puisse exposer cet individu, dans l'Etat vers lequel il sera dirigÃ©, Ã des traitements prohibÃ©s par ledit article (cf . les dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªtes NÂ° 1802, Annuaire 6, p . 481 et NÂ° 5012/72, Recueil de dÃ©cisions 40, p . 62) . Aux termes de l'article 3 de la Convention : Â« Nul ne peut Ã©tre soumis Ã la torture ni Ã© des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dÃ©gradants Â» . En l'espÃ©ce, le requÃ©rant n'a pas montrÃ© qu'en l'extradant aux Etats-Unis, les autoritÃ©s suisses l'avaient exposÃ© au danger qu'il prÃ©tendait courir . Ses allÃ©gations Ã cet Ã©gard, formulÃ©es assez tardivement devant les autoritÃ©s suisses, reposent essentiellement sur les dÃ©clarations d'une personne dont les relations exactes avec le requÃ©rant n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© mises en lumiÃ©re . La Commission n'estime pas que ces dÃ©clarations non corroborÃ©es constituent prima facie un Ã©lÃ©ment de preuve digne d'Ãªtre retenu . L'examen de ce grief ne permet donc de dÃ©celer aucune apparence de violation des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention et notamment par ses articles 2 et 3 .
Il s'ensuit que cette partie de la requÃ©te est manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, Â§ 2, de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'une violation de l'article 5 de la Convention en ce qu'il a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ¨tÃ© le 17 avril 1972 comme soupÃ§onnÃ© d'une infraction dont il s'est avÃ©rÃ© ensuite qu'elle faisait depuis longtemps l'objet d'un jugement ayant acquis force de chose jugÃ©e .
La Commission relÃ©ve que l'arrestation dont se plaint le requÃ©rant remonte Ã une Ã©poque antÃ©rieure au 28 novembre 1974, qui est la date de l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la Convention Ã l'Ã©gard de la Suisse . Or, selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus, la Convention ne gouverne, pour chacune des Parties contractantes, que les faits postÃ©rieurs Ã son entrÃ©e en vigueur Ã l'Ã©gard de cette Partie . Il s'ensuit que l'examen de la requÃªte, dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle a trait Ã ce grief, Ã©chappe Ã la compÃ©tence ratione temporis de la Commission . 3 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'une violation de l'article 5 de la Convention en raison de la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention . a . CompÃ©tence ratione temporis de la Commissio n La Commission constate que la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant peut Ã©tre divisÃ©e en deux pÃ©riodes :
Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© le 17 avril 1972 et dÃ©tenu jusqu'au 28 juillet 1972, soit trois mois et onze jours, comme soupÃ§onnÃ© d'escroquerie (Untersuchungshaft) . Cette pÃ©riode se situe entiÃ©rement avant l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la Convention Ã l'Ã©gard de la Suisse, de sorte que, en tant qu'il porte sur cette pÃ©riode, le grief Ã©chappe Ã la compÃ©tence ratione temporis de la Commission . Du 28 juillet 1972 au 22 dÃ©cembre 1975, soit pendant trois ans, quatre mois et vingt-quatre jours, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu en vue de son extradition (Auslieferungshaft) . Une partie de cette pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention, soit un an et cingt-quatr e
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jours, se situe aprÃ¨s l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la Convention Ã l'Ã©gard de la Suisse . En tant qu'il porte sur cette pÃ©riode, le grief relÃ©ve donc de la compÃ©tence ratione temporis de la Commission . b . CompÃ©tence ratione materiae de la Commissio n La Commission examinera d'abord la question de savoir si l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention est applicable en l'espÃ¨ce . L'article 5, paragraphe 3, dispose : Â« Toute personne arrÃ©tÃ©e ou dÃ©tenue, dans les conditions prÃ©vues au paragraphe 1 cl du prÃ©sent article, doit Ãªtre aussitÃ´t traduite devant un juge ou un autre magistrat habilitÃ© par la loi Ã exercer des fonctions judiciaires et a le droit d'Ãªtre jugÃ©e dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, ou libÃ©rÃ©e pendant la prÃ´cÃ©dure . La mise en libertÃ© peut Ãªtre subordonÃ©e Ã une garantie assurant la comparution de l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã l'audience . Â» La Commission souligne que cette disposition ne se rÃ©fÃ©re expressÃ©ment qu'aux privations de libertÃ© visÃ©es Ã l'article 5, Â§ 1 cl de la Convention . Aux termes de cette disposition Â« Toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© et Ã la sOretÃ© . Nul ne peut Ã©tre privÃ© de sa libertÃ©, sauf dans les cas suivants et selon les voies lÃ©gales : c) s'il a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© et dÃ©tenu en vue d'Btre conduit devant l'autoritÃ© judiciaire compÃ©tente, lorsqu'il y a des raisons plausibles de soupÃ§onner qu'il a commis une infraction ou qu'il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire Ã la nÃ©cessitÃ© de l'empÃªcher de commettre une infraction ou de s'enfuir aprÃ¨s l'accomplissement de celle-ci ; n Il ressort clairement des termes de cette disposition que celle-ci ne vise pas la dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition . En effet, l'article 5, Â§ 1 cl, concerne les privations de libertÃ© en vue de la comparution des personnes arrÃ©tÃ©es devant l'autoritÃ© judiciaire compÃ©tente . Cette disposition combinÃ©e avec l'article 5, Â§ 3, vise donc la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et non la dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition, qui a pour but de faciliter l'exÃ©cution de l'extradition Ã la suite d'une demande formulÃ©e par un Etat Ã©tranger . Au demeurant, la dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition est prÃ©vue par une disposition spÃ©cifique, Ã savoir l'article 5, Â§ i f) .
La Commission conclut donc Ã l'inapplicabilitÃ© de l'article 5, Â§ 3, Ã la dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition . Il reste Ã examiner si quelque autre disposition de la Convention autorise la Commission Ã examiner la durÃ©e d'une dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition . On relÃ¨vera Ã cet Ã©gard que l'article 5, Â§ 1 fl, permet manifestement Ã la Commission d'apprÃ©cier la rÃ©gularitÃ© (Â« dÃ©tention rÃ©guliÃ©re/lawful detention n) de la dÃ©tention d'une personne contre laquelle une procÃ©dure d'extradition Â« est en cours Â» (Â« action is being taken with a view to Â») . Le libellÃ© tant du texte franÃ§ais que du texte anglais signifie que seul le dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure d'extradition justifie, en pareil cas, la privation de libertÃ© . Il s'ensuit que si, par exemple, la procÃ©dure n'est pas menÃ©e avec la diligence requise ou si le maintien en dÃ©tention rÃ©sulte de quelque abus de pouvoir, la dÃ©tention cesse d'Ãªtre justifiÃ©e au regard de l'article 5, Â§ 1 f) . Dans ces limites, la Commission peut donc Ã©tre amenÃ©e Ã apprÃ©cier, au regard de la disposition prÃ©citÃ©e, la durÃ©e d'une dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition . En consÃ©quence, la Commission estime que le grief soulevÃ© en l'espÃ©ce ne saurait Ãªtre rejetÃ© comme incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention, au sens de son article 27, Â§ 2 .
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c. Epuisement des voies de recours interne s Aux termes de l'article 26 de la Convention, Â« la Commission ne peut Ãªtre saisie qu'aprÃ©s l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus Â» . Or, la Commission constate que pendant toute la pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention Ã laquelle elle peut avoir Ã©gard, c'est-Ã©-dire postÃ©rieurement au 28 novembre 1974, le requÃ©rant n'a pas formulÃ© une seule demande de mise en libertÃ©, ainsi que le lui permettait l'article 25 de la loi fÃ©dÃ©rale sur l'extradition aux Etats Ã©trangers . Le requÃ©rant, il est vrai, soutient qu'aprÃ©s son Ã©chec devant le Conseil fÃ©dÃ©ral, il eÃ»t Ã©tÃ© vain de renouveler la demande qu'il avait formulÃ©e en dÃ©cembre 1972 . Cet argument n'est pas dÃ©cisif aux yeux de la Commission . S'agissant d'une dÃ©tention qui ne pouvait trouver sa justification que dans le dÃ©roulement d'une procÃ©dure, l'Ã©volution des circonstances - au premier rang desquelles la prolongation elle-mÃªme de la dÃ©tention - peut justifier un rÃ©examen de la question de la mise en libertÃ© . En outre et surtout, le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral Ã©tant devenu compÃ©tent en juin 1975, soit prÃ¨s de deux ans plus tard, pour connaitre du maintien en dÃ©tention, il n'Ã©tait nullement exclu qu'une nouvelle demande du requÃ©rant fÃ¹t examinÃ©e selon une approche diffÃ©rente . La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que, pour ce qui a trait Ã la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention, le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes, de sorte que ce grief doit Ãªtre rejetÃ© par application de l'article 27, Â§ 3, de la Convention .
4 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'une violation de l'article 5, Â§ 4, de la Convention du fait que la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention ne pouvait pas Ãªtre examinÃ©e par un tribunal avant que le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral fÃ¹t saisi de son affaire . L'article 5, Â§ 4, reconnaÃ®t Ã toute personne privÃ©e de sa libertÃ© par arrestation ou dÃ©tention (r le droit d'introduire un recours devant un tribunal, afin qu'il statue Ã bref dÃ©lai sur la IAgalitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention et ordonne sa libÃ©ration si la dÃ©tention est illÃ©gale Â» . La Commission rappelle ici qu'Ã teneur de l'article 25 de la Convention, elle ne peut Ãªtre saisie d'une requÃ©te individuelle que si son auteur Â« se prÃ©tend victime Â» d'une violation de la Convention . Elle constate qu'Ã© partir du 9 juin 1975 tout au moins, date Ã laquelle le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral s'est trouvÃ© saisi du recours contre la dÃ©cision d'extradition, le requÃ©rant pouvait demander Ã ce tribunal de statuer sur la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention, en vertu de l'article 25 de la loi fÃ©dÃ©rale sur l'extradition aux Etats Atrangers . Or, le requÃ©rant n'en a rien fait, montrant ainsi qu'il n'entendait pas se mettre au bÃ©nÃ©fice de cette facultÃ© . La Commission note Ã cet Ã©gard que le requÃ©rant n'a articulÃ© aucun fait tendant Ã justifier son abstention . Elle estime en consÃ©quence que le requÃ©rant ne saurait se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Convention qui consisterait en l'absence d'un recours judiciaire, avant le 9 juin, dÃ¨s lors qu'il n'a pas fait usage d'un tel recours au moment oÃ¹ celui-ci lui Ã©tait ouvert . L'examen de ce grief par la Commission, tel qu'il a Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©, ne permet donc de dÃ©celer, mÃªme d'office, aucune apparence de violation des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention et notamment par la disposition prAcitÃ©e . Il s'ensuit que cette partie de la requÃªte est man'rfestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, Â§ 2, de la Convention . 5 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue que le principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes, contenu dans la notion de procÃ©s Ã©quitable n'a pas Ã©tÃ© observÃ© au cours de la procÃ©dure devant le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral . Il invoque Ã ce sujet l'article 6, Â§ 1, de la Convention qui dispose : ir Toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial , -1ryq_
Ã©tabli par la loi, qui dÃ©cidera, soit des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil, soit du bien-fondÃ© de toute accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle . . . n A supposer mÃªme que la disposition prÃ©citÃ©e soit d'application en l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant ne saurait se prÃ©tendre victime de sa violation, au sens de l'article 25 de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant n'a nullement allÃ©guÃ© qu'il se serait vu refuser l'accÃ©s Ã© tout ou partie du dossier de sa cause . Selon le requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme, les documents que l'administration fÃ©dÃ©rale aurait tentÃ© de soumettre confidentiellement au Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral auraient Ã©tÃ© Ã©cartÃ©s du dossier ; de plus, il ne ressort nullement de l'arrÃªt du Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral que ce dernier ait eu Ã©gard Ã de tels documents . D'autre part, s'agissant d'une procÃ©dure portant sur une demande d'extradition et non sur le bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation, il n'apparait pas en quoi l'obligation pour le requÃ©rant d'avoir Ã Ã©tablir l'alibi dont il se prÃ©valait pouvait avoir un raractÃ©re inÃ©quitable . La Commission note d'ailleurs, Ã titre d'exemple, que la Convention europÃ©enne d'extradition, conclue au sein du Conseil de l'Europe, n'oblige nullement les autoritÃ©s de l'Etat requis Ã© autoriser devant elles l'administration de preuves sur des faits touchant au bien-fondÃ© de l'accusation ou de la poursuite pÃ©nale . L'examen de ce grief ne permet donc de dÃ©celer, mÃ©me d'office, aucune appa-
rence de violation des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention et notamment par l'article 6 . II s'ensuit que cette partie de la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, Â§ 2, de la Convention . 6 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue enfin que sa dÃ©tention en vue d'extradition par les autoritÃ©s suisses aurait servi Ã permettre aux autoritÃ©s des Etats-Unis de l'rt Ã©liminer Â» . Il allÃ¨gue la violation de l'article 18 combinÃ© avec l'article 5 de la Convention .
L'article 18 dispose : Â« Les restrictions qui, aux termes de la prÃ©sente Convention, sont apportÃ©es auxdits droits et libertÃ©s ne peuvent Ãªtre appliquÃ©es que dans le but pour lequel elles ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©vues . Â»
La Commission estime qu'en l'Ã©tat du dossier cette allÃ©gation du requÃ©rant ne s'appuie pas sur le moindre Ã©lÃ©ment de preuve . L'examen de ce grief par la Commission, tel qu'il a Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©, ne permet donc de dÃ©celer, mÃªme d'office, aucune apparence de violation des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention et notamment par les dispositions prÃ©citÃ©es .
Il s'ensuit que, pour le surplus, la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, Â§ 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DECLARE LA REOUETEIRRECEVABLE .
(TRANSLATION) THE FACT S The facts of the application as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows : 1 . The applicant, William Posnet Lynas, was born in 1934 at Honolulu . He states he is an Irish citizen ; some Swiss official documents which he produced describe him a s _1 55 -
such, others as a United States national, but he himself states that he lost this nationality in 1970 and refers with reference to his Irish nationality to a certificate (which has not been produced to the Commission) of the Irish legation in Switzerland dated 10 October 1974 . At the time he lodged his application, he was detained in the Affoltern (ZÃ¼rich) district prison . His application was submitted to the Commission by Mr Jean-Pierre Tschudi, a barrister in Ziirich . The applicant was arrested in Geneva on 17 April 1972 and brought before the State Prosecutor's office in Ziirich under suspicion of forgery committed in 1963 . The State Prosecutor's office in ZOrich ordered his detention on remand (Untersuchungshaft) until 28 July 1972 .
On 19 April 1972, the United States Embassy in Berne relying on Article VI of the Extradition Treaty of 14 May 1900 between Switzerland and the United States of America, requested the Swiss authorities to arrange for the applicant's provisional arrest . This was followed on 14 June 1972 by a request for extradition . In the attached indictment, the applicant was accused of having entered into contact with other persons on 27 October 1970, illegally to introduce cocaine on to the territory of the United States and on 20 October 1971 in fact to have introduced in the region of Los Angeles 19 pounds of cocaine from South America with the assistance of one Illene Felshaw . On 14 July 1972, the applicant was questioned by the ZÃ¼rich police and he denied the charges sent by the American authorities . On 28 July 1972, the Police Division of the Federal Justice and Police Department (hereinafter called the Police Division), ordered the applicant to be detained with a view to extradition (Auslieferungshaft) . On 6 September 1972, the applicant's counsel filed a memorial in which he maintained that the documents produced by the American authorities were insufficient . By a decision of 16 November 1972, the Police Division granted the request for extradition to the United States . The applicant, who was at first represented by Mr Herbert Gross and later by Mr Jean-Pierre Tschudi, both barristers in ZÃ¼rich, appealed on 22 December 1972 to the Federal Justice and Police Department against the extradition order . At the same time, he applied for provisional release and the release from attachment of certain goods belonging to him which had been taken into custody at the time of his arrest . His release was refused by an interim decision of the Department on 1 February 1973 which was confirmed by the Federal Council on 17 September 1973 . On the question of extradition, the applicant's counsel submitted arguments in favour of his appeal on 25 March 1974. This was, however, rejected by the Department on 18 September 1973 together with the application to release goods from attachment . On 28 October 1974, the applicant appealed to the Federal Council from the Department's decision of 18 September 1974 . On 9 June 1975, the Federal Council ordered the appeal to be transferred to the Federal Court to the extent that it was founded on the Federal Extradition Act (FEA) or the extradition treaty (Section 23 FEA) dismissing the appeal on the remaining points . By its judgment of 12 December 1975, the Public Law Chamber of the Federal Court rejected the appeal, and authorised the applicant's extradition to the United States . The reasons for the judgment were as follows (summary ) After finding it had jurisdiction under Swiss law to examine the appeal, the Federal Court noted that, following its recent precedents, it should also-though not i n _1 56 -
all cases-examine the case to see whether the procedural requirements for extradition were satisfied . However, when-as in the present case-the Federal Council had already examined the procedural requirements, the Federal Court was not required to do so again . The extradition treaty sets out the offences for which extradition is granted provided that they are punishable in both the requesting and the requested State . In the instant case, the offences alleged to have been committed by the applicant fulfilled this condition . The extradition treaty is applicable to persons who are accused of an offence committed on the territory of one of the two states . Whether one relies on the principles of Swiss law, on those derived from the extradition treaty, or on those of American law, this condition is fulfilled in the instant case since the offence produced its effects on American territory . In accordance with its previous decisions the Federal Court does not examine questions of fact or the guilt of the person concerned . The extradition court is bound by the documents produced with the request for extradition . This does not prevent it from taking account of obvious errors and omissions . In the instant case, the applicant has not established that he could not have committed the offences with which he is charged . The Federal Court considers that the declaration' of Mr A . also fails to prove that the applicant could not have committed the offences in question . The court moreover expressed certain reservations with regard to this declaration . It pointed out that it could not be excluded that there might have been contacts between the applicant and Mr A . Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the applicant had not begun to speak of the alleged activities of the CIA until public attention had been attracted in another context to the action taken by this secret service against the Allende government .
Under Article VII (1) of the treaty, extradition may not be granted for a political offence . Switzerland has acceded to the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 . The Federal Court has already decided that Article 3 (2) of this Convention shall be applied by the Swiss authorities even with respect to a State which is not a party thereto when no bilateral extradition convention exists between Switzerland and the State in question . According to this provision "the same rule li .e . the rule that extradition shall not be granted for a political offencel shall apply if the requested party has substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal offence has been made with a purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, colour, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons" . But in the present case, Switzerland has entered into an extradition treaty with the United States containing no limitations similar to that in Article 3 (2) of the European Convention on Extradition . Moreover the application of Article 3 of the European Convention on Extradition does not affect the obligations undertaken by a party under any other international agreement of a multilateral character (cf . Article 3 (4) of the European Convention on Extradition) . According to contemporary legal theory, it must be admitted that an extradition would be contrary to the mandatory rules of international law if its effect would be t o See below
submit the person extradited to treatment contrary to human rights in the requesting State . There is, however, no reason to fear that the proceedings before the competent American court would be conducted in a manner contrary to the principles of human rights . Finally, the applicant must not be prosecuted for offences committed before the request for extradition, which are not mentioned in the indictment sent by the American authorities . The applicant was extradited to the United States on 22 December 1975 . By a letter of 19 February 1976, the applicant's counsel informed the Commission of his new address in Los Angeles .
2 . The applicant explains that under the presidency of Salvador Allende he engaged in activities which were on several occasions successful to enable the Republic of Chile to obtain foreign currency . This activity tended to frustrate the efforts of the United States to deprive Chile of monetary resources so that the Central Intelligence Agency ICIAI took steps to get rid of him . An attempt was made to murder him on 4 September 1971, but the shot, being fired from too great a distance, missed . After this failure, the CIA changed its tactics and fabricated against him an offence of dealing in narcotics which was intended to lead to his arrest, wherever he might be and, if necessary, his extradition to the United States . The applicant is convinced that, once on the territory of the United States, he would be at the mercy of the killers employed by the CIA and quickly murdered . In support of his allegation, he produced before the Swiss authorities and again before the Commission a copy of a detailed affidavit sworn by one A . before Mr Kurt Wissmann, a notary in ZÃ¼rich, on 14 December 1973 . A . states inter alia that, when employed by Chilteco Limited, a Chilean subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, he was brought into contact with CIA agents and agreed to work for that organisation to prevent the election of Salvador Allende as President of Chile and later to bring down his rÃ©gime . In July 1970, he was sent for special training by the United States Southern Command in the Panama Canal Zone . He later learnt of the importance attached by his superiors to the elimination of Lynas and himself took part in the unsuccessful attempt on his life on 4 September 1971 . Owing to the precautions taken by Lynas, the CIA abandoned a further attempt on him and fabricated the drug traffic offence, in which Illene Felshaw, herself an agent of the CIA, played an active part . A . says that he had personal knowledge of these preparations . He states that, desiring at a later period, to cease to work for the CIA in Chile, he was subjected to threats and pressure by his superiors, and fled at the end of June 1973 . He adds that he has been shown the indictment drawn by the United States Federal Grand Jury in the Central Division of the United States District Court of Los Angeles (California) against Lynas (file No . 9731 - CD) and found that the facts corresponded with those of which he learnt during his activities for the CIA . The applicant also produced a copy of a letter sent on 15 February 1975 to a senior Swiss Federal official by Mr B ., a deputy in the National Council, who states that he has studied Lynas' file with the assistance of 2 former Chilean politicians and was convinced that Lynas risked being murdered as soon as he arrived on American soil . During the proceedings relating to the examination of the request for extradition, the applicant argued that the Swiss authorities should not be satisfied with documents supplied by the United States in support of their request . The Swiss authorities coul d
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have convinced themselves that the whole charge was based on the false declarations of Illene Felshaw and would have perhaps been surprised to see that the prosecution against all the applicant's co-accused had been withdrawn . Apart from the affidavit of A ., the applicant produced to the Swiss authorities various documents to prove that he was in Spain at the time when the acts he is alleged to have committed in connection with the illegal import of cocaine occurred . According to established Swiss precedents, in fact, only the direct proof of an alibi (liquider Alibibeweis) can justify refusal of extradition, all other questions relating to the facts or the accused's guilt being a matter for the trial court . However, the Swiss authorities considered that this direct proof had not been established before them . COMPLAINTS The applicant relies on Article 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Huma n Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . In deciding on his extradition, the Swiss authorities had exposed his life to danger, particularly since the practices of CIA agents for getting rid of undesirable persons are now a matter of common notoriety . If the Swiss authorities were as strict in their requirements as to the documents to be supplied as are those of the United States when dealing with a request for extradition, they would certainly not have placed the applicant's life in danger in this way . The applicant then refers to Article 5 of the Convention on three ground s a . The applicant was arrested in Geneva on 17 April 1972 under suspicion of having committed an offence (the cheques case), which turned out afterwards to have been dealt with long ago by a final judgment . b. Since the request for his provisional arrest by the United States authorities on 19 April 1972, the applicant had remained in detention pending extradition for three yean: and eight months, which was an excessive period .
c. The applicant had made several requests for conditional release which had always been rejected, the last occasion being the Federal Council's decision of 9 June 1975 . Swiss law makes no provision for an appeal to a court against detention pending extiadition, which is contrary to Article 5 (4) of the Convention . Finally, the applicant relies on Article 18 of the Convention combined with Article Article 5(1) (c) end IA since his arrest and detention pending extradition had served the purpose of getting a person whose existence was embarrassing to the United States in their relations with another power out of the way . The applicant requests the Commission to make an immediate approach to the Swiss Government to stay the extradition during the proceedings . He also asks for legal aid before the Commission . PROCEDUR E 1 . This application was dispatched on 18 December 1975 . As soon as he learnt of the application on the morning of 22 December 1975, the Secretary to the Commission decided : - to register it , - to inform the respondent Government that it had been lodged (Rule 41 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure) , - to submit to the President of the Commission, the applicant's request for an immediate approach to the Swiss Government . -15g-
At 10 .45, the Secretary informed the Swiss Government (Federal Justice Division), that the application had been lodged . At 12 .10, the Secretary contacted the President of the Commission who immediately made an order that the application should be given precedence (Rule 28 of the Commission's Rules) . At the same time, the President informed the Government that it would be desirable to suspend the applicant's extradition until the end of January 1976 (Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure) . This order was notified by telephone to the Swiss Government (Federal Justice Division) at 12 .25 . The representative of the Federal Justice Division informed the Secretary that the applicant had just been taken to an aeroplane which had not yet taken off ; he stated that the Federal Councillor in charge of the Justice and Police Department would be immediately informed of the order made by the President of the Commission . The notification of the order was confirmed the same day (22 December 1975) by a letter from the Secretary .
By letter of 30 December 1975, received on 5 January 1976, the Swiss Government (Federal Justice Division) informed the Secretary of the Commission that the applicant had been extradited to the United States of America on 22 December 1975 . 2 . On 8 January 1976, a member of the Commission acting as Rapporteur examined the case (Rule 40 of the Commission's Rules) . 3 . On 8 March 1976, the Commission decided a . to inform the Swiss Government that the Commission had observed that the applicant had been extradited shortly after notification of an order by the President informing the Swiss Government that it would be desirable to postpone the applicant's extradition ; - to draw the attention of the Swiss Government to Rule 36 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure which provides that :"The Commission or, where it is not in session, the President may indicate to the parties any interim measure the adoption of which seems desirable in the interests of the parties, or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it" ; - to remind the Swiss Government of the Commission's practice on this question, i .e . that the Commission only makes use of this provision in urgent and exceptional circumstances where it appeared at first sight that steps entailing irreversible consequences were about to be taken, and to remind the the Government that a practice had been established among the governments affected of taking account of such communications ; b . to give notice of the whole application to the Swiss Government IRule 42 (2) Ibl of the Rules of Procedure) and invite it to submit its written observations on the admissibility of the application within a period of eight weeks ; - to inform the Swiss Government that the Commission would appreciate it if the Government expressed an opinion (inter alia) on the 2 following points : - had the Swiss authorities in fact taken certain precautions with respect to the United States authorities with a view to protecting the applicant against the risks to which he believed he was exposed on the territory of that State and, if so, which ? - what was the Swiss Government's opinion as to the application in the instant case of the principle of a reasonable time referred to in Article 5(3 ) , or any other provision of the Convention which might relate to the time spent in detention pending extradition (Article 5 (1) (f) of the Convention) ? - 160-
On 9 March 1976, the Commission decided to commence the procedure for legal aid in accordance with the Addendum to the Rules of Procedure . 4. On 3 May 1976 the respondent Government submitted its observations on the admissibility of the application . The applicant's counsel replied by a memorial of 5 July 1976 . 5 . The Rapporteur again examined the case on 17 June and 8 July 1976 (Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure) . On 15 July 1976, the Commission decided to fix a hearing on the admissibility of the application . On 19 July 1976, the President, acting on behalf of the Commission IRules 3 (3) and 7 of the Addendum to the Rules of Procedure) granted the applicant legal aid . The Commission took note of this decision on 5 October 1976 . On 5 October 1976, the Commission heard the representatives of the parties in the course of a hearing . Mr J .P . Tschudi, a barrister from Ziirich appeared for the applicant . Mr J . Voyame, Director of the Federal Division of Justice, appeared as agent for the government, assisted by Mrs M . Heller, lawyer in the Federal Justice Division and Mr L . Frei, lawyer in the Federal Division of Police . At the end of the hearing the Commission began deliberations .
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIE S 1 . Exposure to danger of the applicant .
The applicant alleges in substance that, by extraditing him to the United States, the Swiss authorities are exposing his life to danger on account of the reprisals he fears from the CIA . He relies on Article 2 of the Convention . He alleges in this respect that the charge brought against him of dealing in narcotics is a pure fabrication . The fact that the applicant had not succeeded in establishing his alibi could not be regarded as evidence tending to disprove the existence of a real threat to his~person . The applicant recognises the independence of the American courts . He is, however, afraid of being convicted on a false charge . It is surprising that the Swiss authorities did not consider it desirable to take precautions to protect the applicant in connection with the extradition . The latter admits moreover that the publicity given to his case has afforded him some degree of protection . The Government points out that the application is directed against Switzerland . The applicant however refers to a threat to murder him coming from agents of the CIA . The alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention was thus imputable not to Switzerland, but to another State . The Commission therefore lacks jurisdiction ratione personae to examine this complaint . Moreover, no attempt has been made on the life of the applicant since his extradition . Furthermore, the applicant has not been able to bring certain proof of the existence of a real threat to his life . Taking account of the reasons given by the Federal Court on this matter and the independence of the American courts, the application is manifestly ill-founded in so far as a violation of Article 3 is alleged . Since they considered that the threat referred to by the applicant was non-existent, the Swiss authorities had taken no special precautions for his protection .
2 . The applicant's arrest . The applicant was arrested on 17 April 1972 under suspicion of an offence which it later turned out had long since been dealt with in a final judgment, and he therefore complained of a violation of Article 5 of the Convention . The Government considers that the Commission lacks jurisdiction ratione temporis to make a decision relation to this arrest . 3 . Length of detention .
The applicant considers that he is the victim of a violation of Article 5 of the Convention on account of the length of his detention . He points out that, since the request for his provisional arrest by the United States authorities on 19 April 1972 he has remained in detention pending extradition for three years and eight months, which is excessive . Even though the Commission has jurisdiction ratione temporis only with respect to matters occurring after 28 November 1974, the total period must not be lost sight of . It could not be said that the procedure had been conducted with the greatest possible diligence .
The Government drew attention to the fact that the Commission only had jurisdiction ratione temporis for matters occurring between 28 November 1974 and 22 December 1975, the day on which extradition was effected . The applicant was in detention on remand from 17 April 1972 to 28 July 1972 and in detention pending extradition from 28 July 1972 to 22 December 1975 . The detention pending extradition was exclusively ancillary to the extradition, and not connected with any decision on the merits . In accordance with the standing practice in this field, the Swiss authorities did not examine objections relating to the question of guilt or facts alleged against the person to be extradited . Under Swiss law, therefore, detention pending extradition falls under Article 5 (1) (f ) of the Convention, and not under Article 5 (1) Icl (this provision relates to deprivation of liberty, with a view to bringing a person before a court for a decision on the merits) . Detention pending extradition could not properly be assimilated to detention on remand ; Article 5 ( 3) was therefore not applicable in the instant case . The Commission thus lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae to examine this complaint . The Federal Council made a decision on 17 September 1973 on the applicant's application for release . The applicant had not repeated his application, although he could have done so either before the administrative authorities or before the Federal Court . He had, therefore . failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies . Should the Commission nevertheless be of the opinion that the complaint is not inadmissible for the reasons given above it must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded . Only the period of detention subsequent to 28 November 1974 can be taken into account . Since the Federal Council had decided on the application for release on 17 September 1973 the proceedings now related exclusively to the extradition and the restitution of the confiscated objects . These proceedings had been conducted as rapidly as possible . The delay caused by investigating the question which authority had jurisdiction to order the extradition was the result of the applicant's own supplementary application . The stages in the procedure were as follows : - the Federal Department of Finance and Customs (Finance Ministry) which was responsible for preparing the appeal to the Federal Council called on the Federal Department of Justice and Police (Ministry of Justice) as the first instance authority to reach a decision ; the Ministry of Justice made its decision in December 197 4
- on 17 January 1975 the Finance Ministry applied for the opinion of the Federal Court on the question of jurisdiction . In fact it was not until later that the applicant alleged that he was being persecuted by the CIA . His new argument was based on the Federal Extradition Act and raised the question whether this fact conferred jurisdiction on the Federal Court to authorise the extradition (cf . Sections 22 and 24 of the Federal Extradition Act) ; - on 11 February 1975 the Federal Court decided that the applicant's further arguments were admissible ; - the Finance Ministry then submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Justice . After an exchange of views between the two ministries the Federal Council decided the applicant's appeal on 9 June 197$ ; - on 19 June 1975 the files were sent to the Federal CoÃ»rt which called on the Ministry of Justice and the Federal Attorney General's Office to state their positions . By letters of 11 and 28 July 1975 these two authorities waived this right ; - from 13 to 26 November 1975 there was an exchange of correspondence between the Federal Court and the Ministry of Justice about five documents on the file ; - the Federal Court gave its decision on 12 December 1975 . The applicant was extradited on 22 December 1975 . Finally, the question is whether the statutory procedure does not in itself require a great deal of time . The fact that the law prescribes two types of appeal in the extradition procedure is an advantage for those concerned for it would not be desirable for the Federal Court to have jurisdiction to deal with all the appeals . The procedure would undoubtedly be shorter if the person concerned was finally restricted to the type of appeal he had chosen but this would be contrary to his interests .
4 . Absence of proceedings before a cou rt . The applicant alleges a violation of Article 5 (4) of the Convention because it was not possible for the lawfulness of his detention pending extradition to be examined by a court until it was brought before the Federal Court . In these circumstances the applicant cannot be criticised for not repeating his application for release before the administrative authorities after the first such application had been rejected by the Federal Council on 17 September 1973 . The Government considers that this general statement is inaccurate . A distinction must be drawn between two different cases depending on whether the Federal Council or the Federal Court has jurisdiction to order extradition . . The authority which decides the question of extradition has jurisdiction to decide on release ISection 25 (2) of the Federal Extradition Act) . It follows that persons who have raised objections based on the Act, the treaty or a declaration of reciprocity have at their disposal proceedings of the type required by Article 5 (4) of the Convention (in the present case before the Federal Court) . On the other hand, those who have not raised such objections cannot bring proceedings before a court . This caused the Federal Council to suggest to Parliament legislation to provide for appeal to the Federal Court . In the instant case the Federal Court decided on the applicant's appeal against the extradition order . Having thus taken advantage of proceedings before a court he is in fact asking the Commission to make a theoretical examination of Swiss legislation . It follows that the Commission lacks jurisdiction ratione personae to examine this complaint .
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The applicant's only application for release was examined by Federal Council on 17 September 1973 before he raised new objections of a political nature on 25 March 1974 . As he failed to repeat his application he has not exhausted the domestic remedies . 5 . Violation of the principle of a fair tria l The applicant alleges a violation of the principle of equality of arms in the extradition procedure . It was true that, according to the Commission's earlier decisions paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 6 of the Convention, which confer certain procedural guarantees on "everyone charged with a criminal offence" lapplication No . 4247/69, Coll . 36, p . 75), did not apply to extradition proceedings .
However, these decisions applied only to cases in which political motives were not relied on . Moreover the experts on extradition, meeting in 1969, (cf . European Committee on Crime Problems, Legal Aspects of Extradition between European States, Council of Europe, 1970, p . 96) had reached the conclusion that extradition should not be granted under the European Convention on Extradition if, as regards the Contracting States to the European Convention on Human Rights, there was a risk that it might lead to a violation of the provisions of that Convention by the requesting State or, as regards other states, if it was not in accordance with the principles underlying the provisions of that Convention . It followed that in a case with political implications the authorities examining the request for extradition made a prima facie decision on a criminal charge and did not merely examine whether from a procedural point of view the request for extradition complied with the Act . In such a case the person concerned was entitled to have the principle of equality of arms respected . This principle had however been violated in the instant case because the Swiss Government had passed on the Federal Court documents received from the American authorities which the latter desired not to be communicated to the applicant . Admittedly the Federal Court returned these documents to the Government without placing them in the file but it nevertheless saw them without the applicant being able to express his views on the matter . In the applicant's opinion Article 6 was also violated because in the present case the Government had not been asked to produce evidence in support of the request for extradition while the applicant was required to produce direct proof of an alibi (for which the evidence was almost sufficient) without receiving any help whatever from the authorities . The Government considers that Article 6 does not apply to extradition proceedings . Firstly because it is not a dispute relating to civil rights . This term could not be interpreted so widely as to include extradition proceedings unless one were to concede that all proceedings were of "a civil nature" . Nor did such proceedings amount to a criminal charge . Although the subject matter of extradition was indirectly concerned with criminal proceedings the extradition proceedings themselves were not the same thing as a criminal investigation or a trial on the merits ; their sole purpose was to effect the extradition . 6. Improper detentio n The applicant states that his detention by the Swiss authorities pending extradition was a means of enabling the American authorities to "get him out of the way" and alleges a violation of Article 18 combined with Article 5 of the Convention .
The Government recalls that when account is taken of the complexity of the case and the unusual course of the proceedings brought about by the applicant the length of his detention was not unreasonable . The allegation that the delay was brought about for allegedly unlawful motives (i .e . to spin out the proceedings in order to enable the United States to "keep the applicant out of the way" for as long as possible) is without foundation . This complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant alleges that by extraditing him to the United States the Swiss authorities are exposing his life to danger owing to the reprisals to be feared from the CIA . He alleges a violation of Article 2 of the Convention which provides : "1 . Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law . No one shall be deprived of his lite intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law . 2 . Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary : a . in defence of any person from unlawful violenc e b . in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained ; c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection ." The Commission recalled that it has always decided that a right not to be extradited is not as such included among the rights and freedoms conferred by the Convention (cf . the decisions on the admissibility of applications No . 2143/64, Yearbook 7 p . 329 and No . 1983/63, Yearbook 8, p . 261) . Nevertheless as the Commission has already decided on several occasions a person's extradition may in certain exceptional cases raise a delicate problem under the Convention in particular in connection with Article 3 when there are substantial grounds to fear that such a step might expose the person concerned to the type of treatment prohibited by that article in the state to which he is to be sent (cf . the decisions on the admissibility of applications No . 1802/62, Yearbook 6, p . 481 and No . 5012/72, Collection of Decisions 40, p . 62) . According to Article 3 of the Convention :"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" .
In the instant case the applicant has not shown that by extraditing him to the United States the Swiss authorities did in fact expose him to the danger he alleges. His allegations on this matter, which were put before the Swiss authorities at a comparatively late stage, are based essentially on the evidence of a person whose exact relations with the applicant have not been clarified . The Commission does not consider that these uncorroborated declarations constitute satisfactory prima facie evidence . The examination of this complaint therefore discloses no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention in particular in Articles 2 and 3 . It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded whhin the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
2 . The applicant complains of a violation of Article 5 of the Convention in that he was arrested on 17 April 1972 on suspicion of an offence which it later turned out had long before been dealt with in a final judgment . The Commission notes that the arrest the applicant complains of occurred at a time prior to 28 November 1974 the date on which the Convention entered into force with respect to Switzerland . Moreover according to the generally recognised principles of international law the Convention only governs, with respect to each of the Contracting Parties, acts subsequent to its entry into force in relation to the Party concerned .
It follows that the examination of the application, to the extent that it deals with this complaint, is outside the Commission's jurisdiction ratione temporis . 3 . The applicant complains of a violation of Article 5 of the Convention on account of the length of his detention . a . The Commission's jurisdiction ratione temporis The Commission finds that the time the applicant spent in detention can be divided into two periods : The applicant was arrested on 17 April 1972 and kept in detention until 28 July 1972, i .e . three months and 11 days, under suspicion of fraud IUntersuchungshaftl . This period is entirely prior to the entry into force of the Convention in relation to Switzerland so that insofar as it concerns this period the complaint falls outside the Commission's jurisdiction ratione temporis . From 28 July 1972 to 22 December 1975, i .e. for three years, four months and twenty-eight days, the applicant was in detention pending extradition (Auslieferungshaft) . A part of this period of detention, i .e . one year and twenty-four days, is after the entry into force of the Convention with respect to Switzerland . Insofar as it relates to this period the complaint falls within the Commission's jurisdiction ratione temporis . b . The Commission's jurisdiction ratione meteriee The Commission will fi rst examine whether Article 5 (3) of the Convention applies to the instant case . Article 5 131 reads : "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trail . Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial . " The Commission notes that this provision refers expressly only to the kind of deprivation of liberty mentioned in Article 5 (1) Icl of the Convention . This provision reads : "No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law : . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringin g him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ; "
It is obvious from the wording of this provision that it does not refer to detention pending extradition . In fact Article (1) (c) deals with deprivation of liberty with a view to bringing arrested persons before the competent court . This provision combined with Article 5 (3) thus refers to detention on remand and not detention pending extradition, the purpose of which is to facilitate an extradition after receiving a request from a foreign state . Moreover, detention pending extradition is dealt with in a specific provision namely Article 5 ( 1) (f) . The Commission thus draws the conclusion that Article 5 (3) does not ipply to detention pending extradition . It remains to consider whether any other provision of the Convention authorises the Commission to consider the length of detention pending extradition . In this connection it may be noticed that Article 5 (1) VI clearly permits the Commission to decide on the lawfulness ("lawful detention/dAtention rÃ©guliArÃ©') of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to extradition (une procAdure d'extradition est en cours) . The wording of both the French and English texts makes it clear that only the existence of extradition proceedings justifies deprivation of liberty in such a case . It follows that if for example the proceedings are not conducted with the requisite diligence or if the detention results from some misuse of authority it ceases to be justifiable under Article 5 (1) ( f) . Within these limits the Commission might therefore have cause to consider the length of time spent in detention pending extradition from the point of view of the above cited provision . The Commission therefore considers that the complaint raised in the instant case cannot be rejected as incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 121 . c . Exhaustion of the domestic remedies Under Article 26 of the Convention, "The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law" . However, the Commission finds that throughout the period of detention which i t
can take into consideration i .e . that subsequent to 28 November 1974, the applicant did not make a single application for release as he was entitled to do underSection 25 of the Federal Extradition Act . It is true that the applicant argues that after his lack of success before the Federal Council it would have been pointless to repeat the application he made in December 1972 . In the Commission's opinion this' argument is not decisive . Being concerned with a form of detention which could only be justified by the existence of a certain type of proceedings, the changes in circumstances-in the first place the prolongation of the detention in itself-could justify a re-examination of the question of release . Besides, as jurisdiction had been conferred on the Federal Court in June 1975, i .e . nearly two years later, to decide on the continuation of his detention it was certainly not out of the question that a fresh application by the applicant might have beÃ©n examined from a different angle . The Commission therefore considers that with regard to the length of his detention the applicant has not exhausted the domestic remedies so that this complaint must be rejected pursuant to Article 27 (3) of the Convention . The applicant complains of .4 a violation of Article 5 (4) of the Convention becaus e the lawfulness of his detention could not be examined by a court until his case was brought before the Federal Court .
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Article 5 (4) confers on everyone deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention the right "to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful" . The Commission here recalled that according to Article 25 of the Convention it may not deal with an individual application unless the person concerned claims "to be the victim" of a violation of the Convention . It finds that at least as from 9 June 1975 when the appeal against the extradition order came before the Federal Court the applicant could have applied to that Court to decide on the lawfulness of his detention under Article 25 of the Federal Extradition Act . However the applicant took no such step thereby showing that he did not intend to take advantage of this right . The Commission notes in this respect that the applicant has not put forward any fact tending to justify his failure to do so . It therefore considers that he cannot claim to be the victim of a violation of the Convention consisting in the absence of available judicial proceedings before 9 June, seeing that he did not make use of such proceedings at a time when they were available to him . The consideration of this complaint by the Commission as submitted by the applicant thus discloses, including an ex officio examination, no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention and in particular by the above-cited provision .
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . 5 . The applicant alleges that the principle of equality of arms forming part of the concept of a fair trial was not respected during the proceedings before the Federal Court . In this connection he relies on Article 6 (1) of the Convention which reads as follows :
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . " Even if the above-quoted provision does apply in the instant case the applicant could not claim to be a victim of its violation within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention . The applicant has not alleged that he was refused access to part or the whole of the file in his case . According to the applicant himself, the documents which the Federal Administration attempted to submit confidentially to the Federal Court were not placed in the file ; furthermore it does not in any way appear from the Federal Court's judgment that the Court took account of such documents . Moreover as the proceedings related to a request for extradition and not to a criminal charge it is not clear how the obligation imposed on the applicant to establish an alibi of which he complains could be regarded as inequitable . Moreover the Commission notes by way of example that the European Convention on Extradition elaborated within the Council of Europe in no way obliges the authorities of the requested State to authorise the production before them of evidence of facts relating to the substance of the charge or the criminal prosecution . The consideration of this complaint therefore fails to disclose, including an examination ex officio, any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention and in particular by Article 6 . It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
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6 . Finally the applicant alleges that his detention pending extradition by the Swiss authorities had the effect of enabling the authorities of the United States to "get him out of the way" . He alleges the violation of Article 18 combined with Article 5 of the Convention . Article 18 read s "The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed . " The Commission considers that in the present state of the file there is not the slightest evidence to support this allegation by the applicant . The consideration of this complaint by the Commission as submitted fails to disclose, even an examination ex officio, any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, in particular in the above-cited provisions . It follows that the rest of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . Now, therefore, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE :
- 169 _Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 06/10/1976Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 3
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