Source: https://caselaw.lexroll.com/2018/12/05/the-regents-of-the-university-of-california-v-superior-court-no-b259424-cal-app-12-3-2018/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 07:04:24+00:00

Document:
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Gerald Rosenberg, Judge. Petition for writ of mandate granted in part.
Maranga Morgenstern, Kenneth A. Maranga, Paul A. Elkhort, Morgan A. Metzger and Dennis Newitt; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Timothy T. Coates and Feris M. Greenberger; University of California Office of the General Counsel, Charles F. Robinson, Karen J. Petrulakis and Normal J. Hamill; University of California, Los Angeles and Kevin S. Reed for Petitioners.
Reed Smith, Paul D. Fogel and Dennis Peter Maio for The California Community Colleges, California Institute of Technology, California State University, Chapman University, Claremont McKenna College, Pepperdine University, Pitzer College, Pomona College, Stanford University and The University of Southern California, as amici curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Brad S. Phillips and Grant Davis-Denny for JED Foundation, American College Counseling Association and NASPA: Student Affairs Administrators in Higher Education, as amici curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Alan Charles Dell’Ario; Panish, Shea & Boyle, Brian Panish and Deborah S. Chang for Real Party in Interest.
The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of California, as amicus curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Katherine Rosen, a student at the University of California at Los Angeles, was severely injured after being attacked by another student who had been receiving treatment for mental illness. Rosen filed a negligence action alleging that university personnel failed to take reasonable measures to protect her from the perpetrator’s foreseeable violent conduct. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that postsecondary schools do not have a duty to protect their students from third-party misconduct. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the defendants owed Rosen a duty of care, and that triable issues of fact existed whether they had breached that duty.
The defendants challenged the order through a petition for writ of mandate. A divided panel of this court granted the petition based on a finding of no duty. In Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607 (Regents), the Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that colleges and universities have a “duty to use reasonable care to protect their students from foreseeable acts of violence in the classroom or during curricular activities.” (Id. at p. 627.) The Court remanded the case to resolve several issues the majority did not address in our initial opinion.
We now deny defendants’ petition for writ of mandate, except with respect to defendant Nicole Green, concluding that: (1) the standard of care governing a university’s duty to protect its students from foreseeable acts of violence is the ordinary reasonable person standard; (2) triable issues of fact exist whether the defendants breached their duty of care to Rosen; and (3) although Civil Code section 43.92 precludes liability against defendant Nicole Green, the remaining defendants are not statutorily immune from suit.
Damon Thompson enrolled in the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) in the fall of 2008. Shortly after arriving on campus, he began to experience auditory hallucinations and paranoid thinking. Thompson informed multiple administrators, professors, teaching assistants and dorm personnel that other students in his classroom and dormitory were making offensive remarks to him, and trying to disrupt his work. In February of 2009, Thompson was transported to a hospital for a psychiatric evaluation after claiming that he had heard other students in his dormitory plotting to shoot him. He was diagnosed with possible schizophrenia, and began receiving mental treatment through the university.
Over the next several months, university personnel monitored Thompson, who continued to accuse other students of insulting him and to engage in other erratic behavior, which included repeatedly shoving a student for making too much noise. Immediately after the fall semester began in 2009, Thompson complained to his chemistry professor and teaching assistant that other students in his chemistry laboratory were calling him stupid. The professor informed school administrators of Thompson’s behavior, and requested advice on how to respond. On October 8, 2009, Thompson was working in the chemistry laboratory when he suddenly attacked fellow student Katherine Rosen with a kitchen knife. Rosen survived the attack, but sustained serious, life-threatening injuries.
Rosen filed a tort action against the Regents of the University of California and several UCLA employees who had knowledge of Thompson’s mental condition. The complaint alleged a single cause of action for negligence asserting that universities and their employees have a duty to protect their students from foreseeable acts of violence. The complaint further alleged defendants had breached their duty of care because they knew of Thompson’s “dangerous and violent propensities,” but failed to adopt reasonable measures to protect Rosen.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Rosen’s claim failed for three reasons. First, they argued that colleges and universities do not have a duty to protect their students from criminal conduct perpetrated by other students. Second, defendants contended that even if universities have such a duty, the undisputed evidence showed UCLA and its personnel had acted reasonably in addressing the threat Thompson posed to other students, and that his attack was not a foreseeable event. Third, defendants argued they were statutorily immune from Rosen’s claim under Government Code sections 856 and 820.2, and Civil Code section 43.92.
In her opposition, Rosen argued that colleges and universities have a special relationship with their students that gives rise to a duty to protect them from foreseeable acts of violence in the classroom. Rosen further asserted that there were triable issues of fact whether the defendants had breached this duty. In support, Rosen provided declarations from two expert witnesses stating that the university should have conducted a formal threat assessment on Thompson, and required that he participate in meaningful psychiatric treatment as a condition of his continued attendance. The experts further concluded that the university’s failure to undertake such precautions violated UCLA’s “own policies and procedures and the standard applicable to all universities.” Finally, Rosen argued that none of the statutes the defendants had identified in their motion immunized them from her claim.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that universities owe a duty to protect their students under the special relationship doctrine, and that the defendants were not immune from suit. The court also found that triable issues of fact existed as to whether defendants had breached their duty to protect Rosen.
The defendants challenged the trial court’s order in a petition for writ of mandate. A divided panel of this court granted the petition, the majority holding that universities do not have a duty to warn or protect students from third-party criminal conduct. Having concluded that the university did not have a duty to protect Rosen, the majority did not address whether the school and its employees were statutorily immune under Government Code section 856 and 820.2, nor did it address whether there was a disputed issue of material fact regarding breach of the duty.
The dissent, however, would have found colleges and universities owe a duty to protect students from foreseeable violent pursuant to the special-relationship doctrine. The dissent additionally concluded that the defendants were not immune from suit, and that there were triable issues of fact whether the university had breached its duty of care.
On remand, we address the three issues identified by the Supreme Court for our resolution. First, we must determine the standard of care that governs a university’s duty to protect its students from foreseeable acts of violence. Second, we must assess whether the defendants have demonstrated as a matter of law that they did not breach their duty. Third, we must decide whether the defendants are immune from Rosen’s negligence claim.
Defendants, however, argue that “the standard of care . . . should be that codified in Civil Code section 43.92, i.e., [¶] . . . [¶] limited to those situations where the defendant is aware that a student has communicated a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims, and believes the threat to be credible.” The statute defendants reference precludes liability against a particular class of persons, psychotherapists, for “failing to protect” potential victims from a patient’s violent behavior except when “the patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.” (Civil Code, § 43.92, subd. (a); see also Ewing v. Goldstein (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 807, 812 (Ewing).
We agree with Rosen that a university’s duty to protect students from foreseeable acts of violence is governed by the ordinary negligence standard of care, namely “that degree of care which people of ordinarily prudent behavior could be reasonably expected to exercise under the circumstances.” (Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 310, 317 [defining the “ordinary” standard of care]; see also People v. Superior Court (Sokolich) (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 434, 447 [“The general standard of care applicable to negligence is ‘“that of a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances”’ [citation], which constitutes an ‘objective reasonable person standard’”].) Although we recognize that “in particular situations a more specific standard [of care] may be established by judicial decision” (Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 824), there are several reasons we reject defendants request that we do so here.
First, although Regents declined to formulate the standard of care, the Court’s analysis of the duty a university owes to its students is more consistent with the ordinary reasonable person standard than the narrowly-drawn standard defendants have proposed. The Court’s opinion repeatedly states that the duty requires colleges and universities to use “reasonable care” to protect their students, emphasizing that “[r]easonable care will vary under the circumstances of each case.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 632; see also id. at p. 634 [“the reasonableness of a school’s actions in response to a potential threat is a question of breach”].) Moreover, the opinion contains no language suggesting a university can be held liable only when the evidence shows the perpetrator previously made an actual threat of harm against an identifiable victim.
Defendants have provided no explanation why the ordinary standard of care that governs the duty secondary schools owe to their students should not also govern the analogous duty universities owe to their students in the curricular setting. The policy arguments defendants have raised in support of their more specific standard of care—that lay school personnel should not be held to a broader standard of care in anticipating potentially violent students than the school district’s psychotherapists and protecting the medical information of medically ill students—apply equally in the context of secondary schools. The Supreme Court, however, has nonetheless concluded the ordinary standard of care is appropriate.
Finally, we note that although presented as an alternative standard of care, UCLA’s proposed limitations on when a university may be held liable for failing to protect students from foreseeable acts of violence would effectively operate to narrow the scope of the duty that Regents announced. As explained above, Regents held that colleges and universities have a duty to act “when aware of a foreseeable threat of violence in a curricular setting.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Under defendants’ theory, however, a college or university would only be liable if it had knowledge of an actual threat of harm against an identifiable victim. In effect, defendants appear to assert that foreseeability is present only when such a threat has been made.
If the Court had intended to limit foreseeability in the manner defendants propose, it would have stated as much in its decision. Instead, the Court’s decision emphasizes that foreseeability “is a case-specific question, to be examined in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 630.) Although the Court identified any “prior threats . . . by [the perpetrator], particularly if targeted at an identifiable victim” (ibid.), as one factor the jury may consider when assessing foreseeability, Regents contains no language suggesting that foreseeability is dependent on the existence of an actual threat of harm made against an identifiable victim.
We are not unsympathetic to the policy arguments the defendants have raised in support of their proposed standard of care. Defendants may be correct, for example, that imposing an ordinary standard of care might cause some school administrators to err on the side of caution, and take actions against mentally-ill students who exhibit conduct that is merely abnormal, rather than potentially violent. We also acknowledge that applying the ordinary standard of care may expose lay school personnel to broader liability than university psychotherapists who treat mentally-ill students. We believe, however, that the Legislature is better-suited to address those policy concerns. If the Legislature concludes that imposing the ordinary standard of care on universities and their employees will lead to undesirable consequences, it can pass a statute limiting the circumstances under which liability may attach, just as it did in passing Civil Code section 43.92. However, we find nothing in Regents or any other source of law that supports the judicial creation of a more specialized standard of care.
In their petition for writ of mandate, defendants argued that even if they had a duty to respond to foreseeable threats of violence, “[t]he undisputed evidence establishes that [they] acted reasonably as a matter of law and cannot be held liable.” According to defendants, “[t]he most the evidence remotely establishes is that Thompson was a mentally-ill student who once, months earlier, engaged in a dormitory noise-related pushing match with another student . . . and who frequently complained about other students (sometimes including Rosen) without ever threatening serious physical harm and specifically disavowed such an intent. . . .” Defendants assert that under such circumstances, no rational jury could conclude that Thompson presented a foreseeable risk of harm, or that the university could have reasonably done anything more to prevent the attack that occurred.
The parties’ evidence shows that shortly after arriving on campus in the fall of 2008, Thompson complained to his history professor that other students had made offensive remarks toward him during an examination, and that he was “outraged” because he believed it had affected his performance. (See Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 614.) In January of 2009, Thompson wrote the Dean of Students, Robert Naples, a three-page letter complaining that students in his dormitory had been harassing him, making unwanted sexual advances and spreading false rumors about him. Thompson warned Maples that if the university failed to discipline the responsible parties, the matter would likely “‘escalate into a more serious situation,’” and that he would “‘end up acting in a manner that will incur undesirable consequences.’” (Ibid.) Shortly after writing the letter, Thompson was transferred to a new dormitory.
In February of 2009, Thompson informed the resident director of his dormitory that he heard “‘voices coming through the walls calling him an idiot,’” and “believed the other residents were planning to shoot him.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 614.) Thompson also told the director he had called his father to report what had occurred, and that his father had advised him to “‘hurt the other residents.’” (Ibid.) Thompson said he had “thought about it,” but decided he “wasn’t going to do anything.” (Ibid.) The director contacted campus police, who transported Thompson to a hospital for a psychiatric evaluation.
During the examination, Thompson complained of “auditory hallucinations and paranoid thinking,” explaining that he “heard people talking about him and insulting him, even when ‘“there’s no one there.”’” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 615.) The medical examiners diagnosed Thompson with “possible schizophrenia and major depressive disorder.” Although Thompson rejected voluntary hospitalization, he agreed to start attending outpatient treatment at CAPS. (Ibid.) The resident director informed Cary Porter and the Response Team about the dormitory incident, and Thompson’s subsequent mental evaluation.
At his CAPS sessions, which began in March of 2009, Thompson informed university psychologist Nicole Green he was frustrated that nobody believed he was hearing voices, and stated that he would try to record what he was hearing. Thompson also reported that he continued to feel harassed by other students in his dormitory, which made him angry. Green diagnosed Thompson with schizophrenia, but concluded that he did not exhibit suicidal or homicidal ideation, and had not expressed any present intent to harm others. Thompson also met with CAPS psychiatrist Charles McDaniel. Thompson admitted to McDaniel that he had previously experienced “general ideations about harming others,” but clarified that he had never formulated an actual plan, or identified a specific victim. (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 615.) McDaniel recommended that Thompson voluntarily hospitalize himself, but Thompson declined. In April, Thompson informed Green he had stopped taking his psychotropic medication. He stopped attending his CAPS sessions shortly thereafter.
In June of 2009, Thompson was involved in an altercation in his dormitory. According to the campus police report, Thompson had knocked on the door of a sleeping resident, accused the resident of making too much noise and then pushed him in the chest. When the resident told Thompson he had not been making any noise, Thompson pushed him again, and threatened that this was his “last warning.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 615.) As a result of the incident, Thompson was expelled from university housing, and ordered to return to CAPS when the fall semester began.
During the remainder of the summer semester, Thompson complained to two faculty members about insults and harassment from other students in his chemistry laboratory. At the beginning of the fall quarter, Thompson informed his chemistry professor, Alfred Bacher, that other students were engaged in disruptive behavior that was interfering with his experiments.
The next day, September 30, Thompson told CAPS psychologist Tanya Brown that he still “occasionally” heard “voices of other students having ‘malice’ toward him and making critical and racist comments.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 616.) Thompson, however, denied any intent to harm anyone, including those who had criticized him. Brown noted that Thompson displayed slowed speech, delusional thought processes and impaired insight. McDaniel met with Thompson the same day and made similar observations about his appearance and thought process. Thompson agreed to begin receiving treatment at the university’s behavioral health clinic.
On October 6, two days before the attack, Thompson told his chemistry teaching assistant, Adam Goetz, that students in the laboratory were calling him stupid. Goetz, who had not heard anyone insult Thompson, informed Professor Bacher about Thompson’s behavior, and expressed concern that his outbursts were becoming a weekly “routine.” Goetz later testified that Thompson frequently identified Rosen as one of the students who called him stupid. A second teaching assistant informed Professor Bacher that Thompson had come into his chemistry lab from a different section, and accused students of verbally harassing him. The teaching assistant had not witnessed any harassment, and was skeptical of Thompson’s claims.
On October 7, Professor Bacher contacted Dean Porter and sought advice on how to proceed. Porter emailed Karen Minero, a member of the Response Team, who then forwarded the email to other members of the Response Team and to CAPS personnel. On the morning of October 8, Porter and Minero discussed Thompson, and decided to investigate whether he was having similar difficulties in other classes.
Later that afternoon, Thompson was working in Professor Bachman’s chemistry laboratory when, without warning or provocation, he stabbed Rosen in the chest and neck with a kitchen knife. When campus police arrived, Thompson admitted he had stabbed someone and explained that the other students had been teasing him.
Defendants argue that the evidence conclusively negates two factual determinations that Rosen must prove to establish the university breached its duty of care. First, they contend the evidence shows university personnel could not have foreseen that Thompson posed a threat to his fellow students. Second, they assert that even if a rational jury could find the university was aware of facts demonstrating that Thompson presented a foreseeable threat of harm, the evidence nonetheless shows the university exercised reasonable care in attempting to respond to that threat.
Based on the evidence summarized above, a reasonable jury could find the university was aware of information demonstrating that Thompson posed a foreseeable risk of violence. The record contains extensive evidence that university personnel were aware Thompson had been continuously experiencing auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions, all of which involved perceived harassment and insults by other students. On one occasion, Thompson’s hallucinations caused him to believe residents in his dormitory were plotting to shoot him. On a second occasion, the hallucinations caused Thompson to repeatedly push another student, resulting in Thompson’s expulsion from campus housing. Although Thompson consistently denied any present intent to harm himself or others, he told multiple UCLA employees that he had previously experienced general thoughts about harming the people who were harassing him. Moreover, he repeatedly warned school administrators that if the insults and harassing behavior did not stop, he would be forced to take matters into his own hands. Finally, both of Rosen’s experts concluded that Thompson’s continuous, erratic behavior demonstrated that he presented a foreseeable threat to his co-students. Considered together, this evidence is sufficient to support a rational inference that the university should have foreseen Thompson posed a threat.
We likewise conclude there is a triable issue of fact whether the university acted reasonably in response to the threat Thompson posed. In particular, as the dissent noted in our prior decision, the evidence suggests there may have been an unreasonable failure of communication and lack of coordination among the various professional teams responsible for responding to situations of the type presented by Thompson. Both of Rosen’s experts concluded that university personnel should have referred Thompson to the Violence Prevention Team, which could have then conducted a formal threat assessment and recommended interventions that would have mitigated the threat he posed to students. The defendants have presented no argument explaining why no rational juror could find that the university’s failure to involve the Violence Prevention Team at any time during Thompson’s extended period of erratic behavior was unreasonable.
Defendants may ultimately persuade the finder of fact that Thompson’s conduct was unforeseeable, or that university employees exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. However, this is not one of those exceptional cases where the question of negligence is properly decided by the court as a matter of law.
Defendants assert that even if they owed Rosen a duty of care and there are triable issues of fact regarding the breach of that duty, they are nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on immunity grounds pursuant to Government Code sections 856 and 820.2, and Civil Code section 43.92. Although the majority did not address this issue in the prior opinion because it found there was no duty, the dissent rejected it, concluding that while these statutes shield certain aspects of this tragic situation from liability, they do not, either singly or in combination, justify denying Rosen the right to present her negligence claim to a jury. The panel now unanimously agrees with that conclusion.
Rosen’s negligence claim, however, does not challenge any university decision regarding Thompson’s confinement. Instead, she seeks to impose liability based on other allegedly negligent behavior the university engaged in with respect to Thompson, including the failure to refer Thompson to the Violence Prevention Team, or to employ many of the other intervention techniques that were available to the school under its existing policies and procedures. This alleged conduct falls outside the scope of section 856’s immunity provision.
Under the analysis set forth in Barner, a university’s decision to create specific programs and protocols to identify and respond to threats of violence on campus would appear to qualify as a planning or policy determination, and thus “discretionary” within the meaning of section 820.2. Rosen’s claim, however, does not challenge the adequacy of the university’s safety programs or protocols. Instead, she challenges the manner in which the university and its employees executed those programs with respect to an individual student who Rosen alleges presented a foreseeable threat of harm. These alleged acts and omissions constitute “subsequent ministerial actions in the implementation of the basic decision” (Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 797) to adopt measures to maintain a safe campus. Even though the UCLA officials involved in this matter may have exercised highly skilled, professional judgment in making choices among complex alternatives in their responses to the situation presented by Thompson, Government Code section 820.2 does not bar Rosen’s negligence claim.
We reaffirm our prior finding that Green is entitled to judgment pursuant to Civil Code section 43.92. We further conclude, however, that her removal from the case does not preclude liability against the Regents if the negligence of other university employees is demonstrated.
The petition is granted with regard to defendant Nicole Green, and is denied in all other respects. Plaintiff shall recover her costs on the petition.

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