Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82647:56469&catid=1577&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:29:29+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 175768, December 11, 2013 - METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES EDGARDO M. CRISTOBAL AND MA. TERESITA S. CRISTOBAL, Respondents.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES EDGARDO M. CRISTOBAL AND MA. TERESITA S. CRISTOBAL, Respondents.
This is a Rule 45 appeal1 dated 26 December 2006 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. SP No. 80874, which affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Malolos, Bulacan in LRC Case No. P–65–2003, denying the Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession filed by the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (petitioner).
It is uncontroverted that the 12 month redemption period has not yet expired hence it is incumbent upon the petitioner bank to post bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months. However, petitioner did not proffer any evidence from whence the Court could base the bond required under Section 7 of Act 3135.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application is DENIED.
Acting on the “Ex–Parte Motion for Reconsideration (to the Decision dated June 30, 2003) with Motion for Leave of Court to Recall Petitioner’s Witness” and taking note that the 12–month period for redemption in this case has already expired as of September 11, 2003, the Court finds no useful purpose nor compelling reason to reconsider its decision dated June 30, 2003, the motion is DENIED.
Indeed, while the posting of a bond is no longer necessary upon the expiration of the redemption period, it is however required that ownership over the property be consolidated with the purchaser of the foreclosed property. Verily, the presentation of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the purchaser is a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a writ of possession.
We have examined the record vis–à–vis petitioner’s insistence on its entitlement to the writ and found that the claim is premature. The record is bereft of any indication that petitioner bank has consolidated its ownership over the subject parcels of land. x x x.
x x x Anent the claims of a supervening event, petitioner should be minded that it is not precluded from re–filing the petition for a writ of possession in the Court a quo especially so since it now meets the grounds for the issuance of the said writ.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
Considering that the 12–month redemption period has already lapsed and the need for a bond already dispensed with, we reduce the issue to whether or not consolidation of title is necessary before possession may be automatically given to petitioner.
We rule that a remand of this case to the trial court is necessary for the reception of evidence to determine if consolidation has taken place, this being a necessary requisite to the issuance of a writ of possession.
Petitioner can only demand possession after the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.
Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.
Hence, for petitioner to be issued a writ of possession, it must first clearly show that it has consolidated ownership of the subject properties in its name. It is only at this point that issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function of the courts.
The issue of whether or not petitioner has consolidated ownership in its name is a question of fact best left to the determination of the lower court.
[T]his Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Consequently, and in the interest of substantial justice, a remand of this case to the lower court is necessary to receive evidence if indeed consolidation has taken place, for the issuance of a writ of possession.
2 Id. at 26–36; CA Decision dated 10 August 2006, penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes, and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia–Salvador and Vicente Q. Roxas.
3 Id. at 37–38; CA Resolution dated 6 December 2006.
4 Id. at 87–88; RTC Order dated 5 March 2003, penned by Presiding Judge Andres B. Soriano.
28Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils., G.R. No. 175380, 22 March 2010, 616 SCRA 353, 360 citing De Vera v. Agloro, 489 Phil. 185 (2005). See also Sps. Sarrosa v. Dizon, G.R. No. 183027, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 556 citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Santos, G.R. No. 157867, 15 December 2009, 608 SCRA 222; Sps. Tolosa v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 183058, 3 April 2013, 695 SCRA 138 citing Sps. Lam v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, 569 Phil. 531, 536 (2008); and Torbela v. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528, 7 December 2011, 661 SCRA 633, 683.
29 G.R. No. 168523, 9 March 2011, 645 SCRA 75, 85–86 citing Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications, 563 Phil. 696, 706–707 (2007).
31Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Court of Appeals, 242 Phil. 497, 504 (1988), citing Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association–NATU v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 166 Phil. 505, 518 (1977).
32 G.R. No. 169067, 6 October 2010, 632 SCRA 338, 345, citing Leoncio v. De Vera, 569 Phil. 512 (2008). See also Binay v. Odeña, 551 Phil. 681, 689 (2007), citing Velayo–Fong v. Velayo, 539 Phil. 377, 386–387 (2006).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.