Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-centeno-34372
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:15:13+00:00

Document:
risked misleading the jury about the standard of proof. The judgment is reversed.
Defendant lived in a garage that had been converted into two living spaces.
and brother. Defendant‟s space did not have a door.
no contact with Jane or her brother.
interview was neither recorded nor introduced into evidence.
father walked in just as defendant was getting up.
recording of this interview was introduced into evidence.
previous statements, Jane began to cry, and the court recessed for the day.
on top of her. It was then that her father interrupted them.
children to enter their rooms.
father about the case or have any influence on his testimony.
gave rise to reasonable doubt.
was met if its theory was “reasonable” in light of the facts supporting it.
child under the age of 18.2 He was sentenced to five years in prison.
are to the Penal Code.
saw the Walk of Fame, I put my hands in Clark Gable‟s handprints in the cement.
You have a fourth witness who comes in and says, I have been to that state.
constitutionally ineffective for failing to object.
disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn.
“ „experiments‟ ” by courts and prosecutors. (Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p.
of error on a case-by-case basis.
would have shown part of the statue‟s face and the torch were missing (id. at pp.
any doubt in your mind, ladies and gentlemen, that that state is California? Okay.
based on the graphic alone, encouraging them to jump to a conclusion. (Id. at pp.
disregard the diagram and properly instructed on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nonetheless, it stressed that “[p]rosecutors would be wise to avoid such devices.
actual and familiar object unrelated to the evidence.
that the flaw here was simply an improper description of a permissible visual aid.
sufficiently compelling to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
explanation of reasonable doubt is a voyage to be embarked upon with great care.
300.) It is certainly proper to urge that the jury consider all the evidence before it.
an acceptable explanation of the jury‟s starting point, it is only the beginning.
People had met their burden. The failure of the prosecutor‟s reasoning is manifest.
account of the evidence satisfies the prosecutor’s burden of proof. In State v.
unreasonable inferences, with the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct. (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p.
admonition would not have cured the harm.
prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel‟s deficiencies resulted in prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (Strickland); People v.
strategy.‟ ” (People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 746, quoting People v.
that there was “ „ “no conceivable tactical purpose” ‟ for counsel‟s act or omission.
establishes counsel‟s incompetence” (People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 772).
standard, provided firm grounds for an objection at the time of defendant‟s trial.
of the evidence misstated the burden of proof.
The People offer two possible tactical reasons for counsel‟s omission.
evidence, cannot conceivably be viewed as beneficial to the defense.
reasonable tactical purpose for defense counsel‟s omission.
presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor‟s burden of proof.
recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law.” (Boyde v.
pp. 1268-1269.) Those saving factors are not present here.
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It did not, however, reinstruct on that concept.
been stricken for lack of an opportunity for meaningful cross-examination.
credibility in hopes of an acquittal.
Jean Ballantine, under appointment by the Supreme Court for Defendant and Appellant.
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct in closing argument by misstating the state's burden of proof?
Defendant lived in a two-room converted garage with seven-year-old Jane Doe and Jane’s family. In March 2008, child protective services received an anonymous report that Jane may have been sexually abused by the defendant. Jane’s father initially told deputies that he had seen the defendant lying on top of Jane. Defendant maintained that the encounter was innocent, and that he lost balance and rolled onto Jane when playing with a ball. In a forensic interview, Jane said that defendant had lain on her four other times and touched her inappropriately. However, at trial Jane’s father recanted his statement and Jane repeatedly denied that defendant had touched her improperly. Although she changed her testimony twice after leading questions to affirm that defendant had lain on top of her, she refused to answer many of the prosecutor’s other questions or any of the defense counsel’s questions.
The prosecutor focused on the reasonable doubt standard in the rebuttal portion of her closing argument, asking the jury to consider a hypothetical criminal trial. Displaying a diagram with the geographic outline of California, she characterized the issue at trial as “What state is this?” She then laid out hypothetical testimony given by witnesses that contained inconsistencies, omissions, and inaccuracies. She urged the jury that, despite problems with the evidence, they would have no reasonable doubt that the state was California. Thus analogizing to the facts of the case, the prosecutor argued that either the defendant had lain on top of Jane or that nothing improper happened at all. The jury’s essential task, the prosecution urged, was to decide which version of the facts was true. To that end, the prosecutor argued that defendant’s testimony was unreasonable, and conversely that the People’s burden was met if its theory was “reasonable” in light of the facts supporting it.
Defendant’s counsel did not object to these arguments or request that the jury be admonished to disregard them. On appeal, the defendant urged that his conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor committed misconduct, and his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, San Bernardino County, of two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14, and one misdemeanor count of annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18. He was sentenced to five years in prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review, superseding the opinion of the Court of Appeal.
The court considered whether the prosecution misstated the reasonable doubt standard in her closing argument, thus committing prosecutorial misconduct that could have prejudiced the jury’s verdict. The court also considered whether the defendant forfeited his claim of error by failing to object. Finally, the court examined whether defendant suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to object to the prosecution’s categorization of the reasonable doubt standard.
The Supreme Court found that using an iconic image like the shape of California, unrelated to the facts of the case, is a flawed way to demonstrate the process of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, the prosecutor’s conduct improperly diluted the burden of proof. Although the defendant forfeited his claim of error by failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument, the Court found that defense counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to object. Because there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for the prosecution’s unprofessional errors, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed.
The Court noted that reasonable doubt analogies and diagrams used in argument are not categorically denounced, and error must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. As such, the Court turned to three precedent cases where visual aids were found to misrepresent the standard of proof. In People v. Medina, (1995) 11 Cal.App.4th 694, the California Supreme Court cautioned against the prosecutor’s attempt to illustrate the concept of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt using two lines, one representing “100 percent certainty” and the other “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In People v. Katzenberger, (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1260, the California Court of Appeal disapproved of a slideshow depicting puzzle pieces of the Statute of Liberty. Although two of the pieces were missing, the Court found that the image was almost immediately recognizable, thus inviting jurors to guess or jump to a conclusion without considering all of the evidence, a task at odds with assessing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In People v. Otero, (2102) 210 Cal.App.4th 865, the Court of Appeal found the prosecutor’s use of an incomplete and inaccurate diagram of California to be a flawed analogy to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Following these cases, the Court reasoned that by depicting the shape of California, the prosecutor drew on the juror’s own knowledge rather than evidence presented at trial. The image of California was immediately recognizable, irrefutable, and unsupported by evidence admitted during the imaginary trial. Because the rules of procedure dictate that a juror may not reach beyond the trial record to supply unproven facts, analogizing a jury’s task to solving a picture puzzle depicting an actual and familiar object unrelated to the evidence is misleading. The hypothetical was also deceiving because it failed to accurately reflect the highly uncertain nature of the evidence in the case at hand. By presenting a hypothetical whose answer involved a single empirical fact, the prosecutor risked misleading the jury by oversimplifying and trivializing the deliberative process.
The prosecutor also erred by implying that the People’s burden was met so long as her interpretation of the evidence was reasonable. Contrary to this representation, it is not sufficient that the jury simply believe a conclusion is reasonable. It must also be convinced that all necessary facts have been proven. By repeatedly suggesting that the jury could find the defendant guilty based on a reasonable account of the evidence, the prosecutor diluted the People’s burden of proof.
Although the Court found the prosecutor’s argument improper, it held that the issue was forfeited by the defense’s failure to object during trial. However, it reversed the lower court’s conviction based on a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that the problems with the prosecutor’s arguments were easy to discern, and defense counsel needed only rely on California Penal Code § 1096 to conclude that the prosecutor’s argument misstated the burden of proof. Because the jury received no instructions to disregard the prosecutor’s argument, and because the case was very close, the Court found a reasonable probability that the prosecutor’s argument caused one or more jurors to convict the defendant based on a lesser standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
SCOCAL, People v. Centeno , 60 Cal.4th 659; 338 P.3d 938; 14 Cal. Daily Op Serv. 13,545; 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,015; No. S209957; 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 649; available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-centeno-34372) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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