Source: https://www.ptab.us/2009/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:07:16+00:00

Document:
A prior art rejection of a claim which is so indefinite that “considerable speculation as to meaning of the terms employed and assumptions as to the scope of such claims” are needed should not be made. In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962).
A rejection should not be based on "speculations and assumptions." In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962).
As such, we note that where a claim (and its terms) are so indefinite that “considerable speculation as to meaning of the terms employed and assumptions as to the scope of such claims” is needed, it would be imprudent for us to pass judgment on such a rejection (under § 103). See In re Steele, 305 F.2d at 862 (holding that the Examiner and the board were wrong in relying on what at best were speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims and basing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 thereon.).
Ex Parte Sasaki DIXON 112(1)/112(2)/103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 should not be based upon "considerable speculation as to the meaning of the terms employed and assumptions as to the scope of the claims." In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962).
Ex Parte Hanawa et al KRIVAK 103(a) APPLIED MATERIALS, INC.
Ex Parte Laughon MILLS 112(1)/112(2) LICATA & TYRRELL P.C.
Ex Parte Sato et al GAUDETTE 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
Ex Parte Jarvis OWENS 102(e)/103(a) DORITY & MANNING, P.A.
Ex Parte Burger et al McCARTHY 102(b) GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.L.C.
Ex Parte Wywialowski et al PATE, III 103(a) LISA M. SOLTIS ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC.
Appellants have chosen to employ language in the claims broader that the language used to describe the preferred embodiment and it would be improper to import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.”).
Ex Parte Campbell BLANKENSHIP 103(a) E. Eugene Thigpen Petroleum Geo-Services, Inc.
Ex Parte Breuer et al O’NEILL 103(a) GREIGG & GREIGG P.L.L.C.
Appellants have the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a rejection [under § 103] by showing insufficient evidence of prima facie obviousness or by rebutting the prima facie case with evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness.”) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
Ex Parte Fukuzawa HOFF 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
Ex Parte Mieney et al GREEN 112(1) DELPHI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Ex Parte Market et al NAPPI 101/102(b) SCHWEGMAN, LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A.
2 Notwithstanding the court’s statement in Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1007) ("We have never held that a manufacture is ever required to produce any result."), if an applicant chooses to claim the manufacture in terms of applying a mathematical algorithm (e.g., Appellants’ claim 19), then this two-part inquiry applies to determine if the claim is directed to eligible subject matter under § 101.
3 "Real-world" is not sufficient alone to establish patent-eligible subject matter absent tangibility. See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356.
4 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 68 (noting that the claim at issue was "so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses . . . .").
5 See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544 (noting that the claim’s recitation of "a rasterizer for creating a smooth waveform is not a mere field-of-use label having no significance.").
6 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
7 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 n.14) ("[I]neligibility under § 101 ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.’").
If the machine (or article of manufacture) claim involves a mathematical algorithm and fails either prong of our two-part inquiry, then the claim is not directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. Ex parte Gutta, No. 2008-4366, 2009 WL 2563524 (BPAI 2009) (per curiam) (expanded panel), at *1.
Ex Parte Ilsley et al GREEN 102(a)/102(e)/103(a)/obviousness-type double patenting AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.
Ex Parte Flick HAIRSTON 102(b) ALLEN, DYER, DOPPELT, MILBRATH & GILCHRIST P.A.
Ex parte MCMANUS et al DIXON 102(b)/103(a) PITNEY BOWES INC.
"[A]bsence from the reference of any claimed element negates anticipation." Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
In addition, we find that the claimed recitations “travel planning query” and “flight pricing queries” both contain non-functional descriptive material, which does nothing to change the utility of the underlying method. For example, the focus of the “query” does not affect any machine function, but represents mere data that is being sent. The content of non-functional descriptive material is not entitled to weight in the patentability analysis. See in re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Lowry does not claim merely the information content of a memory. . . . Nor does he seek to patent the content of information resident in a database.”). See also Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1887-90 (BPAI 2008) (precedential); Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272 (BPAI 2005) (informative), aff’d, No. 06-1003 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 12, 2006) (Rule 36); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.01 (Eighth ed., Rev. 7, Jul. 2008).
Ex parte ISHIMARU et al LEBOVITZ 103(a) WHITHAM, CURTIS & CHRISTOFFERSON & COOK, P.C.
“[D]rawings alone may be sufficient to provide the written description of the invention required by § 112, first paragraph.” Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Ex parte BARNS et al BAUMEISTER 102(e)/103(a) Dissenting-in-Part EASTHOM TROP, PRUNER & HU, P.C.
“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Ex parte GOULETTE et al MEDLEY 102(b)/103(a) DELPHI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Although Bolling does not anticipate the ring recited in Appellant’s claims 6 and 10, it renders it obvious because the difference between the claimed dimensions of “between about 3.3:4 . . . to 4:4 . . .” and the dimension of “about 3:4” taught in Bolling is minor, and Appellant’s specification does not provide sufficient evidence that the claimed dimension is critical. See Haynes Int’l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1577, n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“when the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is the range or value of a particular variable, then a prima facie rejection is properly established when the difference in range or value is minor.”); see also In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“When an applicant seeks to overcome a prima facie case of obviousness by showing improved performance in a range that is within or overlaps with a range disclosed in the prior art, the applicant must ‘show that the [claimed] range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.’”) (quoting In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, we enter a new grounds of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bolling for claims 6 and 8-20.
Ex Parte Busson et al ROBERTSON 103(a) GE HEALTHCARE BIO-SCIENCES CORP.
Ex Parte Walacavage et al DIXON 102(b)/103(a) BLISS MCGLYNN P.C.
Ex Parte Kim et al HAIRSTON 103(a) STAAS & HALSEY, L.L.P.
Functional language in a patent claim is “an attempt . . . to define something . . . by what it does rather than by what it is.” In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212, (CCPA 1971). “[T]here is nothing intrinsically wrong with the use of such a technique in drafting patent claims.” Id.
Ex Parte Lind et al GRIMES 112(1)/102(b) THE CULBERTSON GROUP, P.C.
The Examiner “‘bears the initial burden . . . of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.’ Insofar as the written description requirement is concerned, that burden is discharged by ‘presenting evidence or reasons why persons skilled in the art would not recognize in the disclosure a description of the invention defined by the claims.’” In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1996), quoting In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 “If . . . the specification contains a description of the claimed invention, albeit not in ipsis verbis (in the identical words), then the examiner . . . , in order to meet the burden of proof, must provide reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would not consider the description sufficient.” Alton, 76 F.3d at 1175.
Ex Parte Helbing GRIMES 102(b) RYAN KROMHOLZ & MANION, S.C.
Ex Parte Farrar et al SCHEINER 102(b)/103(a) FELDMANGALE, P.A.
If the Examiner’s proposed modification runs counter to the intended purpose of the prior art, the Examiner typically has failed to make a prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
“To serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent characteristic, such gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence. Such evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.” Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Ex Parte Lind et al GRIMES 103(a) THE CULBERTSON GROUP, P.C.
Ex Parte Wei et al LEBOVITZ 102(b)/103(a) DORITY & MANNING, P.A.
Ex Parte Flick BAHR 102(b)/103(a) ALLEN, DYER, DOPPELT, MILBRATH & GILCHRIST P.A.
It is well established that claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function, see, e.g., In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In order to satisfy the functional limitations in an apparatus claim, however, the prior art apparatus must be capable of performing the claimed function. Id. at 1478.
“Inherent anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material is ‘necessarily present,’ not merely probably or possibly present, in the prior art.” Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). ... As such, we agree with Appellants that the sheath 17 of Barath is not necessarily capable of radial compression, as the Examiner suggests. See Reply Br. 5.
We conclude that the Examiner’s overly broad interpretation is unreasonable because it ignores specific positively-recited claim limitations. Cf. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“In the patentability context, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretations . . . .”) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
The Examiner appears to be focusing on the “enhancing” element in isolation and is ignoring the context of the claim as a whole. However, claim terms are not to be interpreted in a vacuum, devoid of the context of the claim as a whole. See Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Converse Inc., 183 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“proper claim construction ... demands interpretation of the entire claim in context, not a single element in isolation.”); ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“While certain terms may be at the center of the claim construction debate, the context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered . . .”). This discussion buttresses our earlier finding that the Examiner’s overly broad interpretation of the claimed “enhancing” element is unreasonable because it ignores specific positively-recited claim limitations.
Ex Parte LaSalle BAHR 103(a)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) GORDON & JACOBSON, P.C.
Ex Parte Gochanour SILVERBERG 102(b)/103(a) GIFFORD, KRASS, SPRINKLE, ANDERSON & CITKOWSKI, P.C.
This is a situation where the word "parallel" is used ipsis verbis in the Specification (FF 8), even though ipsis verbis support is not required. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996). We think Appellant has the better argument here, since any person of ordinary skill would recognize that one embodiment of "substantially parallel" is "parallel" itself.
Ex Parte Edelman et al ADAMS 103(a)FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, L.L.P.
The claim does not involve the use of any machine or apparatus. Further, the claim does not involve the transformation of any physical objects or substances. As the court in Bilski noted, “[p]urported transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or substances.” 545 F.3d at 963.
“The test of obviousness vel non is statutory. It requires that one compare the claim’s ‘subject matter as a whole’ with the prior art ‘to which said subject matter pertains.’” In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103). Section 103 requires “a searching comparison of the claimed invention – including all its limitations – with the teaching of the prior art.” Id. at 1572.
Argument by counsel cannot take the place of evidence. In re Cole, 326 F.2d 769, 773 (CCPA 1964); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

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