Source: https://socialchangenyu.com/review/the-shifting-nature-of-stash-house-standing-and-sentencing/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:08:11+00:00

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Although numerous works have scrutinized Fourth Amendment standing jurisprudence, none have examined the relationship between standing and substantive criminal law precedent. To decide if a defendant has standing to challenge the search of a place, courts look to the defendant’s possessory and controlling interests in the place searched. Courts examine these same interests to decide if the evidence will sustain a conviction for maintaining a drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. § 856 (“§ 856”), or a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a drug-related premises, United States Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(12) (“the Enhancement”). Many federal drug-related cases before the courts involve § 856, the Enhancement, or both. One might expect Fourth Amendment standing and § 856/Enhancement inquiries to have the same resolution because each turns on evaluating the same interests of the defendant. However, in reality defendants are being told that their possessory and controlling interests are not enough to confer standing but rise to a level deserving of punishment. This article analyzes this contradiction, the reasons for it, and ways courts can reduce the dissonance between the two bodies of jurisprudence.
Although numerous works have scrutinized Fourth Amendment standing jurisprudence, none have examined the relationship between standing and substantive criminal law precedent. Under current precedent in many circuits, a defendant who does not have a sufficient interest in a premises to challenge a search of that premises can still have (1) a sufficient interest to sustain a conviction for maintaining a drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. § 856 (“§ 856”), and (2) a sufficient interest to receive a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a drug-related premises, United States Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 2D1.1(b)(12) (“the Enhancement”). That is, courts treat a defendant’s possessory and privacy interests in a premises used for drug-related purposes differently when evaluating her constitutional rights than when evaluating her criminal culpability.
Part II of this article outlines the legal frameworks for determining how a defendant’s interest in a drug-related premises affects her constitutional rights and criminal culpability. Part III offers potential explanations for courts’ disparate treatment of a defendant’s possessory and privacy interests in a premises when answering these questions. Part IV suggests ways that courts could harmonize this dissonance. Whatever approach that courts take, or do not take, simply recognizing the relationship between standing and substantive criminal law precedent would likely improve all jurisprudence.
Courts examine a similar list of factors when analyzing Fourth Amendment standing, § 856, and the Enhancement. Despite this similarity, courts tend to find a defendant’s possessory and controlling interest insufficient for the Fourth Amendment’s constitutional protections, but sufficient to sustain a § 856 conviction or to apply the Enhancement (collectively, “drug-related-premises precedent”). Before unpacking why this phenomenon occurs 1 whether this disparity warrants any corrective action,2 this section provides a brief history and legal background of both Fourth Amendment standing and drug-related-premises precedent.
The Fourth Amendment standing doctrine dates back to the early twentieth century, though the Supreme Court did not explicitly refer to standing or delineate a rule akin to the Court’s current jurisprudence at that time.5 For example, in 1923, the Court in Essgee Company of China v. United Statesdistinguished between a corporation’s right to object to a subpoena duces tecum and a corporate officer’s right to object to the introduction of corporate documents in proceedings against him.6 Two years later, in Agnello v. United States, the Court reversed Frank Agnello’s conviction on the ground that a warrantless search of his bedroom violated his Fourth Amendment rights, but simultaneously refused to do so for his equally charged codefendants, holding that “[t]he introduction of the evidence of the search and seizure did not transgress theirconstitutional rights.”7Decisions like these were precursors to modern standing doctrine.
Defining this objectively reasonable expectation of privacy becomes more difficult if the defendant does not own or rent the premises that was searched.36 The Court has remarked that “[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”37 How property law affects Fourth Amendment standing is largely intuitive: a tenant or hotel guest will have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a premises whereas someone who is “wrongfully” present on a premises—such as a burglar—has no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.38 Trespassers excluded, the Supreme Court has offered less guidance on how to evaluate a defendant’s expectation of privacy if she does not have a defined property right in the premises.
Yet it is hard to reconcile the logic of Olsonwith the outcome and factor test developed in Carter.47 Olsonreached a determination about legitimate expectations of privacy not by reference to fact-specific inquiries about the defendant’s reason for visiting, length of visit, or connection to the host, but by reference to the defendant’s status as a guest, albeit an overnight guest.48Hosting guests during the day—and protecting their privacy from outside intruders—is as long-standing a social custom as having overnight guests.49In Carter, the Supreme Court failed to explain why a daytime guest’s expectations of privacy are fact-specific while overnight guests have a facially valid expectation of privacy.50Carter and similar cases seem to suggest that, despite the lip service paid to freestanding “privacy” interests, courts do not reference empirical data or other objective indicators of society’s expectations of privacy in evaluating Fourth Amendment standing. Rather, courts look to “gossamer” property law concepts and facts that relate to a defendant’s possessory or controlling interest in a premises to decide whether she is more a casual visitor or a full-time resident.51Olson andCarter become easier to reconcileif Olsonis viewed via this fluid spectrum;52 that is, an overnight guest is closer to a resident, for purposes of privacy expectations, on that spectrum.
The holistic balancing approach used in the § 856 and Enhancement context bears striking similarities to courts’ analysis of Fourth Amendment standing.71 Yet despite these similarities and the factual similarities common between standing questions and § 856/Enhancement questions, courts often reach seemingly disparate results in resolving the two inquiries, i.e., holding that a defendant “maintained” the premises despite not qualifying for the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
The tension between the Clark andGray holdings is not anomalous. Courts routinely uphold § 856 convictions and application of the Enhancement on facts that would fail to establish Fourth Amendment standing under their precedent.77 This section examines a descriptive and a normative explanation for the dissonance.
Descriptively, differences between when and how these inquiries come before the courts might explain why courts reach seemingly divergent results—a phenomenon I refer to as “case presentation.” As a collective group, defendants who do not own or rent a drug-related premises have less incentive to develop facts supporting their possessory and controlling interest in the premises when it can still make a difference for standing purposes. In contrast, the government must develop a record regarding a defendant’s “maintenance” of a drug-related premises at trial and for sentencing. This affects a district court’s initial ruling and, relatedly, how an appellate court can evaluate a defendant’s interest in a drug-related premises.
In the end, the descriptive explanation can account for some, but not all, of the dissonance between standing and drug-related-premises precedent. The normative explanation can account for the remaining dissonance, but it presents its own contradictions upon further examination.
How and when facts about a defendant’s possessory and controlling interest in a premises come before a court might partially explain why standing and drug-related-premises precedent do not align. Burdens of proof, standards of review, and the types of cases that arise on appeal all can alter the record before a court and how a court analyzes that record.
Thus, defendants early in the trial process face a tough choice. Obviously, a defendant would prefer to suppress damning evidence found at the drug-related premises. However, if a defendant contests standing, she could expose information about her possessory interest in the drug-related premises to the prosecution, and this information—directly or indirectly—could give the government an upper hand at trial. It is true that a defendant’s statements at a suppression hearing cannot be used against her at trial in the government’s case-in-chief, e.g., to prove possession.84 But the government can still use the defendant’s testimony to impeach her if she testifies, and most defendants in drug-related-premises cases will be reticent to give the government information that it can use to pursue lines of investigation about an interest in the drug-related premises of which the government may not yet be aware.85 In many cases, this translates to less incentive for defendants to develop a robust record concerning their possessory or controlling interest in a drug-related premises at the motion to suppress stage.
On the other hand, the government has to produce such evidence, demonstrating a defendant’s possessory or controlling interest in a drug-related premises, at trial to support a § 856 conviction or application of the Enhancement.86 Therefore, district courts analyzing questions about a defendant’s possessory or controlling interest in a drug-related premises often receive more evidence about these matters at the trial stage or later—i.e., after the chance to contest a search has passed, or after a judge has already denied a motion to suppress.
The government also benefits from this favorable litigation position on appeal. Appellate courts employ a clear error standard to review the district court’s factual findings related to a motion to suppress, a § 856 conviction, or application of the Enhancement.87 While appellate courts ostensibly review legal determinations related to all of these conclusions de novo, they view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government when it prevailed below, crediting every inference that the judge or jury could have drawn in the government’s favor.88 The government is the prevailing party below in almost all appeals: with certain rare exceptions, the government cannot appeal an acquittal,89 but most convicted defendants have an incentive to exhaust their appeals, even when their challenges lack merit. Consequently, appellate courts more often confront these questions in contexts favoring the government, which at least in part explains why precedent would be less defendant-friendly in the aggregate.
If courts want to resolve drug-related-premises cases in more principled ways that harmonize their precedent and Supreme Court precedent, then they can take steps to modify (1) procedural precedent influencing case presentation and (2) substantive precedent concerning a defendant’s possessory and controlling interest in a drug-related premises across differing doctrinal arenas. This section surveys a few possible approaches in each context, but by no means exhaustively determines all possible approaches. It suggests places to begin narrowing the gaps between Fourth Amendment standing precedent and § 856/Enhancement precedent.
Although the Supreme Court has remarked that “it would be placing the cart before the horse to prohibit searches otherwise conforming to the Fourth Amendment because of a perception that the deterrence provided by the existing rules of standing is insufficient to discourage illegal searches,”170 it remains to be explained why courts should construe a defendant’s possessory or controlling interest in a drug-related premises narrowly for purposes of deterring constitutional violations and more broadly to deter drug-related crime. Indeed, the rule of lenity suggests that courts construing the definition of maintenance in the face of ambiguous guidance from both the statute and the guidelines should resolve close calls in favor of defendants.171 But even if courts construe drug-related-premises precedent broadly in favor of the government, they should reconcile this precedent with Fourth Amendment standing doctrine.
University School of Law, J.D. 2016; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, B.A. 2012. Thanks to Duke University School of Law for providing me with abundant support for my scholarly endeavors. Thanks to Judge Allyson K. Duncan, who has been an invaluable mentor, teacher, and friend. Thanks to my fellow law clerks, Megan Browder, Jake Charles, and Daniel Severson, for their helpful comments and edits.
SeeUnited States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980); see also Thomas K. Clancy,The Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation 135 (2d ed. 2014).
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978); see also Clancy, supranote 3, at135. For more on the history of the exclusionary rule, see Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution173–74 (2012).
Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 157 (1923).
Id.at 158 (“An officer of a corporation in whose custody are its books and papers is given no right to object to the production of the corporate records because they may disclose his guilt. He does not hold them in his private capacity and is not, therefore, protected against their production or against a writ requiring him as agent of the corporation to produce them.”).
Agnello v. United States,269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925) (emphasis added). The Court also alternatively held that introduction of the evidence did not result in prejudicial error against the codefendants, see id. at 34–36, but discussion of that analysis is outside the scope of this article.
See, e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 n.12 (1942) (surveying cases).
E.g.,compare McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453–56 (1948), with Agnello, 269 U.S. at 35–36. Some of these differences resulted from other, since-discarded exclusionary rule doctrines. The Court originally interpreted the government’s use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes as violating the Fifth Amendment’s right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. See, e.g., Agnello, 269 U.S. at 33–34; David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev.1, 21–22 (2013). This interaction between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments occasioned prejudicial-error-related inquiries about how, when, and against whom the government sought to introduce evidence. Agnello, 269 U.S. at 29–30, 33, 35–36; Amar, supra note 4, at 223. Similarly, when the Court first developed the exclusionary rule, defendants would actually petition or apply to the court to have their property returned. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388–99 (1914), overruled byMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920). When district courts denied defendants relief, complicated questions arose on appeal about whether the government had other evidence to sustain the conviction or whether the government used the evidence in a way that was prejudicial to a defendant or her codefendants. Compare McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453–56, with Agnello, 269 U.S. at 35–36.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960), overruled byUnited States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
Id.;see alsoChapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961); Amar, supra note 4, at 126–27.
Jones, 362 U.S. at 267.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129–30 (1978).
Id.at 132; see alsoEulis Simien, Jr., The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41Ark. L. Rev.487, 579 (1988) (explaining target theory of standing).
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This test actually comes from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, id.at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring), adopted by the Court as its standard in later opinions, see, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–35 (2001) (tracing the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). This test determines the level of Fourth Amendment protection that someone receives by asking whether society recognizes that person’s expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although Katz technically begins with the inquiry of whether an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy before moving on to the objective inquiry, courts pay little attention to the subjective inquiry. SeeOrin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev.113, 122 (2015).
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142–48.
See, e.g., id. at 143–44 n.12; see also Clancy,supranote 3, at149–50 & n.353.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149.
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980).
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980); see also Clancy, supranote 3, at135.
SeeMinnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
Id.at 141 n.9; Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1964).
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
Id.at 91; see also Thomas Y. Davies,The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology933, 1025–26 (2010).
See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 145, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 2000).
See Carter, 525 U.S. at 108–10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
SeeMinnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–100 (1990).
See Carter, 525 U.S. at 108–09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.at 86 (majority opinion), 91 (Scalia, J., concurring); Gray, 491 F.3d at 145, 151–54; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (noting that “property rights reflect society’s explicit recognition of a person’s authority to act as he wishes in certain areas”).
Admittedly, this reading of Olsonsomewhat contradicts the plain language of the opinion, which makes an overarching declaration about overnight guests’ interests. Olson, 495 U.S. at 98–100.
See, e.g., Gray, 491 F.3d at 145; see also Clancy,supranote 3, at157 n.371 (surveying cases).
Gray, 491 F.3d at 154.
SeeThomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment AfterLawrence, 57 UCLA L. Rev.1, 50 (2009).
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2016).
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 855–58 (5th Cir. 1997).
§ 2D1.1(b)(12) cmt. n. 17; see Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”).
§ 2D1.1(b)(12) cmt. n. 17. In upholding application of the Enhancement, some circuits have noted that “as long as [the drug-related purpose] is more than ‘incidental or collateral,’ [it] does not have to be the ‘sole purpose.’” United States v. Sanchez, 810 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting § 2D1.1(b)(12)).
Compare, e.g.,United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 532 (7th Cir. 2013) (interpreting the Enhancement), withUnited States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995) (interpreting § 856).
SeeFair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 6, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373 (2010) (“[T]he United States Sentencing Commission shall review and amend the Federal sentencing guidelines to ensure an additional increase of at least 2 offense levels if . . . the defendant maintained an establishment for the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance, as generally described in section 416 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 856)[.]”).
See, e.g., Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 532.
SeeUnited States v. Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2000).
Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 532 (quoting United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2003)); see alsoVerners, 53 F.3d at 296.
SeeUnited States v. Benitez, 809 F.3d 243, 249 (5th Cir. 2015); Verners, 53 F.3d at 296; United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 810 F.3d 494, 496–97 (7th Cir. 2016).
SeeUnited States v. Evans, 826 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2016); Sanchez, 810 F.3d at 497; United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 857–58 (5th Cir. 1997).
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 384 (1st Cir. 2015).
CompareRakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring), withFlores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 532, andVerners, 53 F.3d at 296.
United States v. Clark, 665 F. App’x 298, 301–03 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
CompareUnited States v. Jones, 949 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (D. Mass. 2013) (no standing), with United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 386 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding application of the Enhancement on same facts), and United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 855–58 (5th Cir. 1997) (§ 856), andUnited States v. Evans, 826 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding application of the Enhancement); see also United States v. Stanton, No. CRIM. 11-57, 2012 WL 4815402, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2012) (recognizing disconnect between contesting standing and charging a defendant with § 856).
Two other possibilities that I do not explore in depth in this article could also explain the divide: courts rendering holdings about standing separate from holdings about § 856 and the Enhancement may (1) not be aware of the dissonance or (2) feel no need to reconcile it. This article assumes that judges and clerks do competent and diligent work to get around the first possibility and hopes to illustrate the gap, and the need for reconciliation, for any judges fitting within the second possibility.
SeeSteagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 208–11 (1981) (analyzing standing in the Fourth Amendment context as a substantive merits claim that can be waived); United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2016); United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 669–70 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Clancy, supranote 3, at135; Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 93 Va. L. Rev.1663, 1687–88 (2007) (comparing Article III standing/justiciability issues to Fourth Amendment standing).
See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 208–09.
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); see alsoUnited States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 143–44 (4th Cir. 2007).
Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131–33 (1962); In reSearch of Elec. Commc’ns in the Account of chakafattah@gmail.com at Internet Serv. Provider Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 516, 525 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Marasco, 487 F.3d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Calandra, 706 F.2d 225, 227–28 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982). But seePerlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918); 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure§ 11.7(a) (5th ed. 2004).
United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1990); see alsoUnited States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 1991).
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); see also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1980); Davies, supra note 45, at 987.
For instance, if the defendant admits that someone gave her a key to the premises or allowed her to stay there overnight, the government will have new witnesses to interview and can use the defendant’s testimony for impeachment purposes if a defendant claims that she lacks knowledge of activity occurring on the drug-related premises. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624–29 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971); United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, 19 F.3d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1994); People v. Sturgis, 317 N.E. 2d 545, 548 (Ill. 1974); see alsoSimien, supra note 20, at 563.
SeeUnited States v. Facen, 812 F.3d 280, 289–90 (2d Cir. 2016) (government must prove all elements of § 856 beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 383–84 (1st Cir. 2015) (government must prove that the defendant “maintained” the premises by a preponderance of the evidence for purposes of the Enhancement).
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (motion to suppress); see alsoUnited States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 2007) (motion to suppress); Facen, 812 F.3d at 286, 289–90 (§ 856); Jones, 778 F.3d at 383 (Enhancement).
See, e.g., Facen, 812 F.3d at 286, 289–90; United States v. Slocumb, 804 F.3d 677, 681 (4th Cir. 2015).
See, e.g., Facen, 812 F.3d at 286 (exception for a district court’s judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict).
See18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2012).
See, e.g., Facen, 812 F.3d at 286.
United States v. Jones, 949 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (D. Mass. 2013); see also United States v. Stanton, No. CRIM. 11–57, 2012 WL 4815402, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2012) (defendant contested standing despite being charged with § 856 violation).
The rule of lenity points to this result. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 (1992).
United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 383–86 (1st Cir. 2015).
Jones, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
Jones, 778 F.3d at 384 (citing United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 1992) (alteration in original)).
United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856–57 (1st Cir. 1988); Jones, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 320 (citing these factors).
This similarity between the factors used for assessing standing, outlined supraPart II.A, and the factors that the majority of circuits cite in drug-related-premises precedent, outlined supraPart II.B, is consistent across other circuits.
SeeJones, 778 F.3d at 383–86; see also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Your Place or Mine? Privacy of Presence Under the Fourth Amendment, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev.253, 274 (1999).
Jones, 778 F.3d at 385.
Compare id. at 384–86, with Jones, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
SeeMinnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998). For example, in First Circuit Jones, the district court emphasized the fact that the defendant’s “primary activity [at the apartment] was selling drugs, an illicit commercial function that society doesn’t value.” Jones, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
This seems to be an animating principle behind Carter and related circuit court precedent. SeeCarter, 525 U.S. at 90–91; see also id. at 92–97 (Scalia, J., concurring); see, e.g., United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 152–54 (4th Cir. 2007).
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell L. Rev.905, 915 (2010); see alsoWilliam Cuddihy, Warrantless House-to-House Searches and Fourth Amendment Originalism: A Reply to Professor Davies, 44 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 997, 1000–11 (2012) (noting originalist understanding concerning the importance of protecting the home from warrantless searches); Amar, supra note 4, at 128–30 (noting the importance of “houses” to the founding understanding of the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); cf. Simien, supra note 20, at 555–56 (noting the Fourth Amendment’s protection of other premises besides the home).
SeeNew York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); see also Stern,supra note 108, at 922; Ramsey Ramerman, Shut the Blinds and Lock the Doors—Is That Enough?: The Scope of Fourth Amendment Protection Outside Your Own Home, 75 Wash. L. Rev.281, 287–89 (2000).
This can also be seen in the United States’ expansive list of possession offenses. Probable cause or reasonable suspicion of possession opens the door to the home and other areas of privacy. SeeMarkus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology829, 908–10 (2001).
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141 n.9 (1978); see also Amar, supra note 4, at 303 (“The word ‘unreasonable’ in the Fourth Amendment also authorizes interpreters to take evolving social norms into account.”).
SeeUnited States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 707 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 6, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373 (2010).
See Miller, 698 F.3d at 707 (noting that Congress “intended to deter the manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs . . . where children are being raised”); see also Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) Together, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 139, 149 (2016) (noting role that Congress plays in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97–99 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same).
Cf.Dubber, supra note 110, at 966–67 (noting how modern criminal law is based on the assumption that state and societal interests are identical); see also Amar, supra note 4, at 134 (“The enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment surely believed that congressional legislation would provide important evidence of proper national norms and baselines.”).
SeeWeinreb, supra note 99, at 274–75 (discussing precedent and noting that, regardless of a guest’s activity, “it is the guest’s own privacy that protects him from unauthorized surveillance”).
SeeKyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001); see alsoUnited States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2009).
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990).
United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 166–70 (4th Cir. 2007) (Michael, J., dissenting). In Jones, the defendant actually testified that he stayed overnight the night before the search occurred. United States v. Jones, 949 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (D. Mass. 2013). Olson’s holding should confer standing on such a defendant. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99; see alsoUnited States v. Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that overnight-guest inquiry does not turn on whether the guest-host relationship was social or commercial). However, such holdings may be reconcilable where the overnight guest is a trespasser. See Luke M. Milligan, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Trespassers: Searching for the Legitimacy of the Government-Notification Doctrine, 50 Emory L.J.1357, 1359 (2001).
Arguably, removing the no-privacy-interest-in-illegal-activity barrier would make it more likely that defendants could and would move to suppress evidence obtained against them in drug-related-premises cases, but this substantive change would not resolve all the procedural barriers described in this section.
Ultimately, sentencing enhancements are within the district court’s discretion, and the government does not need to affirmatively argue for or against them, but this proposal recommends that the district court take the government’s opposition to standing into account when deciding the propriety of an enhancement.
When the court construes the government’s decision as a conscious one, it refers to it as waiver; when it construes the government’s decision as inadvertent, it refers to it as forfeiture. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 227 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting differing procedural implications for waiver versus forfeiture).
See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981); United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2016); United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551–52 n.11 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Foster, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090 (D. Minn. 2011); Kontorovich, supra note 79, at 1687.
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 209; Sheffield, 832 F.3d at 304; United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1113, 1122 (5th Cir. 1985); see alsoUnited States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting exceptions to waiver of standing arguments).
See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 209; Gonzales, 79 F.3d at 419; Amuny, 767 F.2d at 1121–22 & n.5.
However, the Tenth Circuit and D.C. Circuit have outright rejected the doctrine. SeeDavid S. Coale, A New Framework for Judicial Estoppel, 18 Rev. Litig.1, 10 (1999).
“Very simply stated, the doctrine prevents a party from taking a position contradictory to a position which that party adopted previously.” Nicole C. Frazer, Reassessing the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel: The Implications of the Judicial Integrity Rationale, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1501, 1502 (2015); United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1983) (judicial estoppel in the criminal context); see also generallyKimberly J. Winbush, Judicial Estoppel in Criminal Prosecution, 121 A.L.R.5th551 (2004). Courts occasionally refer to judicial estoppel as a judicial admission, ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1065 (9th Cir. 2012), but the two doctrines are distinct because estoppel can sometimes bar contrary arguments about the facts and the law. Lawrence B. Solum, Caution! Estoppel Ahead: Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 32 Loy. L. Rev.461, 468–72 (1999).
The Supreme Court has noted that the “circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)); see alsoFrazer, supra note 127, at 1502–03, 1506–09 (noting that no uniform approach has emerged and examining the different approaches that the federal circuits take in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel).
Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895) (“It may be laid down as a general proposition that, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position . . . .”); Scarano v. Cent. R. Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 510, 513–14 (3d Cir. 1953); Coale, supra note 126, at 4–6 (surveying differing views of judicial estoppel in the majority of circuit courts); see alsoSolum, supra note 127, at 468–72.
Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1996); Coale, supra note 126, at 6–7 (outlining how courts apply the fast-and-loose approach to judicial estoppel); see alsoSolum, supra note 127, at 468–72.
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 750–51. Courts sometimes delineate between assertions of facts and assertions of law. SeeUnited States v. Villagrana-Flores, 467 F.3d 1269, 1278 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that judicial estoppel applies only to assertions of fact); Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that judicial estoppel applies to both factual and legal assertions).
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 751.
United States v. Grap, 368 F.3d 824, 830–31 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993); see alsoHilary S. Ritter, It’s the Prosecution’s Story, but They’re Not Sticking to It: Applying Harmless Error and Judicial Estoppel to Exculpatory Post-Conviction DNA Testing Cases, 74 Fordham L. Rev.825, 840–41 (2005). Some courts in rejecting application of judicial estoppel to the government in a criminal case cannot even find cases applying it. SeeNichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 129 n.7 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that “as far as [the court could] tell, this obscure doctrine has never been applied against the government in a criminal proceeding”).
See, e.g., United States v. Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011); see People v. Jones, 217 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); United States v. Sims, No. CR 10-01325 MMM, slip op. at 8 n.47 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2011), aff’d, 504 F. App’x 614 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788, 792 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The government should not be taking opposite factual positions in two different, but related, cases.”); Corniel-Rodriguez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 301, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying doctrine of equitable estoppel to government in an immigration case).
United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1983); see alsoPeople v. Gross, 465 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984).
See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 750–51; Frazer, supra note 127, at 1502 (“Judicial estoppel is an equitable, court-created, discretionary doctrine that may be invoked by either a party or the court sua sponte.”); Ritter,supranote 133, at 838.
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 749–50; Coale, supra note 126, at 2, 25; Frazer, supra note 127, at 1509–10.
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 749 (citing Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)); see alsoCoale, supra note 126, at 2, 25; Frazer, supra note 127, at 1509–10.
The doctrine of judicial admissions is not normally treated as an equitable doctrine, but a district court’s decision to treat something as a judicial admission or not is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1988).
United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004); Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1199 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Belculfine, 527 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1975); Judicial Admissions, 64 Colum. L. Rev.1121 (1964); see also id.at 1122 n.14 (noting occasional use of judicial admissions in criminal trials); Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258–59 (1942) (noting difference between judicial admissions and attempts to stipulate to governing criminal law);see generallyFortune, JudicialAdmissionsin Criminal Cases: Blocking the Introduction of Prejudicial Evidence, 17 Crim. L. Bull.101 (1981).
Belculfine, 527 F.2d at 944; see Coale, supra note 126, at 12–13.
Coale, supra note 126, at 2.
See, e.g., Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Hon. William J. Giacomo, Admissions: What They Are and How They Can Impact Litigation, 32 Pace L. Rev.436, 442 (2012); Coale, supra note 126, at 2.
SeeAnne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 Calif. L. Rev.1423, 1456 (2001) (“[H]aving successfully taken the position that a specific set of facts lead to a particular legal conclusion, the prosecution should not be permitted to shift to an inconsistent position.”); Simien, supra note 20, at 565–66; see also David K. Thompson, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79Colum. L. Rev.551, 568 (1979) (noting equitable consideration in applying estoppel doctrines); United States v. Stanton, No. CRIM. 11-57, 2012 WL 4815402, at *6–7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2012) (recognizing disconnect between contesting standing and charging a defendant with § 856).
See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 779 n.5 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The waiver doctrine is most appropriately applied when the government has taken inconsistent positions during the course of the litigation and such inconsistency has affected the factual record.”); United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1984) (barring government from contesting standing on appeal due to contradictory positions about defendant’s possessory interest in premises at motion to suppress and at trial); see alsoUnited States v. Garcia-Lopez, 309 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the government can waive arguments explicitly and implicitly); United States v. Jones, 23 F.3d 1307, 1311 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing concept of constructive waiver as it applies to criminal defendants); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. Agbebiyi, 575 F. App’x 624, 632 (6th Cir. 2014) (same). But seeUnited States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that government did not waive right to contest standing on appeal where it was unsuccessful at trial in persuading the jury that defendant controlled the premises).
SeeUnited States v. Blood, 806 F.2d 1218, 1220 (4th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that a prosecutor’s statements during pretrial proceedings and opening statements can act as judicial admissions). But seeUnited States v. Singleton, 987 F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993) (“We . . . conclude that the district court erred by relying solely on the government’s theory of the case in finding that Singleton had standing to contest the search.”). Another approach would be to allow defendants to admit the government’s statements in contesting standing as party admissions about the defendant’s possessory interest in a premises. See, e.g., Poulin, supra note144, at 1434–42. Treating this as a judicial admission would be similar to applying the law of variance. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935); see alsoUnited States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing genesis of the judicial admissions doctrine).
SeeUnited States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 756 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he district court concluded that under the rule of United States v. Issacs, the government was estopped from arguing that defendant was the culpable possessor of incriminating evidence, while denying that there was any expectation of privacy.” (internal citations omitted)). “In criminal cases, judicial estoppel should apply if the prosecution prevailed in a manner consistent with acceptance of the prior position.” Poulin, supra note 144, at 1454;see also Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that judicial estoppel does not require prior litigation of the issue in question); Poulin, supra note 144, at 1452–53 (arguing that courts should employ judicial estoppel to prevent prosecutors from taking inconsistent positions in separate proceedings). Similarly, appellate courts have discretion to treat statements in briefs as judicial admissions. Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 557 (9th Cir. 2003).
In addition, “[b]arring the prosecution from asserting a position inconsistent with an earlier position will promote fair enforcement of the criminal laws without unduly impeding the goal of law enforcement.” Poulin, supra note144, at 1426.
SeeUnited States v. Gomez, 276 F.3d 694, 698 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bustamante, 990 F.2d 1261 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rodriguez, 100 F. Supp. 3d 905, 918–19 (C.D. Cal. 2015); see alsoSimien, supra note 20, at 565 & n.323.
United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id.at 1368; see alsoUnited States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 489 (9th Cir. 1985); Morales, 737 F.2d at 763; United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (rejecting government’s argument on appeal that defendant lacked standing when jury found defendant guilty of possession and government argued that defendant’s trial tactic of denying knowledge of the bag containing narcotics stripped him of Fourth Amendment protections).
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
At least for judicial estoppel, this objection may have little practical significance. If a defendant successfully suppresses evidence found at a drug-related premises, then the government likely will not have enough evidence to support a § 856 conviction or Enhancement; if the defendant is unsuccessful, courts following the majority approach will not apply judicial estoppel. See Coale, supra note 126, at 4–6; Ritter,supranote 133, at 862–63. Such an approach comports with the principles animating Simmons, Morgan G. Graham, The Use of Suppression Hearing Testimony to Impeach, 59 Ind. L.J.295, 315 (1984), and those animating the rule of lenity, see United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 (1992).
Some courts have already begun to take this approach. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that “the use of a space for illegal activity does not alter the privacy expectations of a person who would otherwise have standing”); United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have previously rejected the argument that a person lacks a subjective expectation of privacy simply because he is engaged in illegal activity or could have expected the police to intrude on his privacy.”); see alsoUnited States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 82 (1993) (noting that participation in a criminal conspiracy does not add or detract from a defendant’s expectations of privacy).
SeeMaureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 125 Yale L.J.946, 1005 (2016) (“Personal-property law teaches that when a person expects continued exclusive control over an item, that expectation is likely to be clear to others, whether because others would expect the same with respect to their property under similar circumstances or because the owner has taken steps to make that expectation apparent.”); Simien, supra note20, at 565.
SeeMinnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998) (“If the illegality of the activity made constitutional an otherwise unconstitutional search, such Fourth Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent only, would have little force in regulating police behavior toward either the innocent or the guilty.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
SeeHuq, supra note 113, at 147; Weinreb, supra note 99, at 274–75; Bryan D. Lammon, The Practical Mandates of the Fourth Amendment: A Behavioral Argument for the Exclusionary Rule and Warrant Preference, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev.1101, 1102, 1111, 1121–23 (2007).
See Sandoval, 200 F.3d at 660; Lammon, supranote 162, at 1123;Weinreb, supra note 99, at 274.
SeeUnited States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 383–84 (6th Cir. 2016); see alsoUnited States v. Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2000).
SeeFlorida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Weinreb, supra note 99, at 274–75.
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011); see alsoLarry Yackle, Regulatory Rights: Supreme Court Activism, the Public Interest, and the Making of Constitutional Law87–88 (2007) (discussing the theory that constitutional rights serve a regulatory purpose in governing state action and noting that “the content of substantive rights is best understood as a general standard of conduct for government to observe”).
SeeUnited States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 255, 263 (2010); Donald L. Doernberg, The Right of the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev.259, 298 (1983); Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.821, 850–51 (2013).
SeeDavid M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 Cornell L. Rev.808, 850–51 (2004); Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev.1275, 1306 (2000); Gray, supra note 9, at 52; Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev.2466, 2509–10 (1996). One recent standing article in a law enforcement publication actually begins, “Because almost all defendants charged with crimes are in fact guilty, they have few legitimate ways to defend against the charges.” Devallis Rutledge, Understanding Fourth Amendment “Standing”,Police: L. Enforcement Mag.(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2014/12/understanding-fourth-amendment-standing.aspx [https://perma.cc/BU8H-UN4A].
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998) (“If the illegality of the activity made constitutional an otherwise unconstitutional search, such Fourth Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent only, would have little force in regulating police behavior toward either the innocent or the guilty.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 562 n.9 (1978).
United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 (1992).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (“If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law[.]” (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
This study uses interviews with judges to examine the role of remorse in judicial decisionmaking.

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