Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19781012-790977
Timestamp: 2017-07-22 17:22:49+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7909/77Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-10-12;7909.77 Analyses : (Art. 13) DROIT A UN RECOURS EFFECTIF, (Art. 34) RECOURS, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) SECURITE NATIONALE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA CORRESPONDANCE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA VIE FAMILIALE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA VIE PRIVEE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DU DOMICILE, (Art. 8-2) DEFENSE DE L'ORDRE, (Art. 8-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 8-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 8-2) PREVENTION DES INFRACTIONS PENALESParties : Demandeurs : X. et Y.Défendeurs : AUTRICHETexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 7909/74 X . and Y v/AUSTRI A X . et Y . c/AUTRICH E DECISION of 12 October 1978 on the admissibility of the applicatio n . DÃCISION du 12 octobre 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Article 6, paragraph 3 Ibl of the Convention a This provision can only be invoked by the accused, and not by his counsel personafly . b . Opening of the trial fixed at an early date . Examination in the light of the circumstances of .the concrete case, of the preparatory time of the defence by the appointed defence counse l Article 1, paragraph 2 of the First Protocof : The costs of a judiciaf procedure are "contributions" within the meaning of this provision . Examination of the question whether a law and its application can reasonably be considered as "necessary"
. Ibl de la Convention .Article6,pagh3t : a Cette disposition ne peut Ã©tre invoquÃ©e que par l'accusÃ©, non par so n
dÃ©fenseur personnellement . b . Fixation de l'ouverture du procÃ©s Ã une date rapprochÃ©e . Examen, au vu des circonstances de l'espÃ©ce, de la durÃ©e du temps de prÃ©paration de l'avocat de la dÃ©fense, nommÃ© d'office. Article 1, paragraphe 2, du Protocole additionnet : Les frais de justice sont des "contributions", au sens de cette disposition . Examen du point de savoir si une loi et son application peuvent raisonnablement Ãªtre jugÃ©s "nÃ©cessaires" .
I tranÃ§Ã ts : voir p . 164 1
At the end of 1976 crirrrinal proceedings were instituted against the first applicant, X ., accused of having converted funds to her own use to the detriment of her employer . At the time she was represented by Mr A . and was confined to a mental hospital. On 1 February 1977, Mr A . informed the regional court that his power of attorney had been terminated in agreement with his client . Having learned of the indictment, X . requested immediately that counsel for her defence be assigned to her . Y., the second applicant was assigned and received his appointment on 11 March . He visited X . on 18 March and discovered on the one hand that the case was complicated and on the other hand that it was almost impossible to discuss the matter with his client due to her state of health . On the same day he learned that the regional court had fixed the opening of the trial for 28 March . On 22 March, Y. applied for a postponement of rhe trial, but the application was rejected by a decision of 23 March by the Presiding Judge, as the minimum preparatory period of three days, provided for by Article 221 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had been respected . Y . appealed against that decision . The Court of Appeal's decision rejecting the appeal was nor taken before 20 April 1977 . The trial was in fact opened on 28 March 1977 after the indicrment had been read . Y ., who had consulted the Bar Council on this point, formulated another request for adjournment. After the Court had rejected this request, Y . declared rhar his professional conscience forbade him to represent X . under these circumstances and left the courtroom . Under Article 274 of rhe Code of Criminal Procedure the Court was left with no choice but to adjourn the trial, but it decided that the costs of the adjournmenr should be borne by counsel, Y ., personally . The trial eventually took place on 17 May 1977, and Y . continued to defend X. X was convicted and sentenced to a 5'h year prison term .
THE LA W 1 . The Commission has first considered the applicanis' complaint of a violation of their right under Article 6 (3) Ibl of the Convention to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence . a . In this respect it must be observed that the right in question can only be invoked by a person charged with a criminal offence Icf . the introductory phrase of Article 6 1311 . It follows that the second applicant, who is involved in the present case only as the first applicant's defenc e - 161 -
counsel, .cannot himself pretend to be a victim of a violation of this provision . This part of the application, insofar as it has been brought by the second applicant in hi 's'own name, is therefore ratio'ne personae ineompatible with the provisions of the Cohventibn IArticles 25 (1), 27 121 of the Convention) . b . Insofar as the above complaint has been brought on behalf of the first applicant, theCommission must however, also take into account the difficulties encountered by the second applicant to prepare the trial in an . . adequate way These difficulties were : i . the short period of time between his appointment as the first applicant's defence counsel and the datÃ¨ of the trial
ii . the scope and complexity of the cas e the difficulty to communicate with his client due to her bad psychologicaland physical condition . The Commission first observes that the procedure for the appointmen t .2 of thesecond applicant as the first applicant's defence counsel,(4 March 11 March 1977) was not unreasonably delayed . The period from his actual appointment 111 Marchl untilthe date of the trial (28 March 1977) lasted 17 days including 10 working days . This period can be divided into two phases, one preceding the fixing of the trial by the Presiding Judge 111 - 18 March) and one during which the date of the trial was already known (18 - 28 March) . . .3. a The question whether this period was adequate having regartltoihe provision of Article 6(3 ) (b) of the Convention cannot be determined i but only in relation to the circumstances of the concrete Ã©ase . Thnabstrco, e Commission considers in particular that there is no basis to establish an abstract relationship between the time allowed to the prosecution during .the period of the preliminary investigation, and the preparatorytimeof the defence in the main proceeding . The first applicant's ciiminal case was fairly complex . It involved a .b long series of complicated bdokkeeping manipulations during a period of eight years between 1968 and 1976 . These manipulations had been traced by the close scrutiny of the relevant documents undertaken by a- sworn bookkeping expert . However, at the relevant time there were proceedings , pending witfi a view to st rike the bookkeeping expert iri questiÃ´n off thÃ© court's register of experts . The matter was further complicated by the fact that the first applicant had originally admitted the malversations, but later denied them stating that the above admission had been extorted from her under duress . There was also the question of a possibly reduced criminal responsibility of the first applicant which had to be considered in the light of several medical opinions . Finally there was a problem of the correc t
qualification of the criminal acts which were characterised as embezzlement ISection 133 of the Penal Code) in the indictment, but which the court eventually found to be commercial fraud ISection 148 of the Penal Code) . Nevertheless the Commission considers that as such the task of the defence in this case could have been accomplished in the period available to the applicants of ten days including six working days between the summons and the date of the trial, taking into account that the whole evidence had to be produced and examined during the trial . c . It remains to be examined whether this preparatory time was also adequate in view of the first applicant's bad state of health and the second applicant's workload during the period under consideration which had the combined effect of making communications between the applicants extremely difficult . When determining the lenghth of the preparatory time needed, the court musi take into account not only the complexity of the case, but also the usual workload of a barrister who certainly cannot be expected to change his whole programme in order to devote all his time to a legal aid case in which he has been appointed as defence counsel . On the other hand it is not unreasonable to require a defence lawyer to arrange at least some shifts in the emphasis of his work if this is necessary in view of the special urgency of a particular case, even if it is a legal aid case . If that was not possible he had to ask the Bar Council to be discharged from his duty in this case . In the present case the court considered that the trial should be fixed at the earliest possible date in the interest of the first applicant herself, to alleviate the psychological strain on her which was the cause of her deplorable condition . It is true that having regard to the particular difficulties created by the first applicant's state of health the preparatory time which the court was willing to grant to the defence was exceptionnally short, but the Commission considers that in all circumstances of the case it was still sufficient under the standard of Article 6 (3) Ibl of the Convention . The Commission therefore concludes that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 121 of the Convention . 4 . The Commission has finally examined the second applicant's complaint that the imposition on him of the costs of the adjournmerit of the' trial constituted a deprivation of his possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No . 1 to the Convention . However, the Commission observes that paragraph 2 of this Article provides for the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary i .a to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions . The costs of a judicial procedure are contributions within the meaning of this provision . In the particular case, they were imposed under Section 274 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that in certain cases such costs have to be borne by the lawyer who is responsible for causing them This provision ,
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which corresponds to similar regulations in the law of other High Contracting Parrtles, can reasonably be considered as "necessary" within the meaning of Article 1 (2) of the Protocol, and the only remaining question is therefore whether its application in the particular case can also be justified under the above provision . The second applicant has submitted that he cannot be considered as "responsible" for the adjournment of the trial for which he was required to bear the costs . However the Commission finds that, whatever may have been the justification of his attitude at the trial of 28 March 1977, there can be no doubt as to the legal responsibility of the second applicant . Since the Commission has already foundthat the early date of the trial was still within thelimits of the Convention, it cannot be argued that ir was the court itself which provoked the situation . Also the fact that IhÃ© appliÃ§ant was backed by the Salzburg Bar Council does not affect his personal responsibility, because the instruction of the Bar Council was only to make a further application for a postponement of the trial, but ndt to refuse partlcipation in it if such postponement was refused . An advice to this effect was given to the applicant by the Vice President of the Bar Council only in his personal capacity, and the applicant was at all times well aware of Ihe private nature of this advice . It follows that there is no appearance of a violation of the second applicam's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions by the imposition of the costs in question, and this part of the application must therefore equally be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 121 of the Convention . For these reasons the Commission , DECLARES THIS APPLICATION
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits A la fin de 1976, des poursuites pÃ©nales ont Ã©tÃ© intentÃ©es contre X., la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante, soupÃ§onnÃ©e de dÃ©tournement de fonds au prÃ©judice de son employeur. Celle-ci, qui avait Ã l'Ã©poque pour dÃ©fenseur Me A, ., se trouvait alors internÃ©e dans une clinique psychiatriqde . Le 1^ fÃ©vrier 1977, Me A . informa . le tribunal rÃ©gional que son mandat avait pris fin d'un commun accord entre sa cliente et lui . Ayant appris le dÃ©pÃ´t de l'acte d'accusation, la requÃ©rante X . demanda aussitÃ´t - le 4 mars 1977 - la nomination d'un avocat d'office . Me Y., le second requÃ©rant, fut dÃ©signÃ© et en reÃ§ut notification le 11 mars. p se rendit
auprÃ©s d'X . le 18 mars et dÃ©couvrit, d'une part que l'affaire Ã©tait complexe, d'autre part que tout entretien avec sa cliente se rÃ©vÃ©lait trÃ©s difficile vu son Ã©tat de santÃ© . Le mÃ©me jour, il apprit que le tribunal rÃ©giona/ avait fixÃ© l'ouverture du procÃ¨s au 28 mars . Le 22 mars, Y . demanda le renvoi du procÃ©s mais sa demande fut rejetÃ©e le 23 par le prÃ©sident du tribunal, au motif que le dÃ©lai minimum de prÃ©paration de trois jours, prÃ©vu Ã© /'amc/e 221 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, Ã©tait respectÃ© . Y. recourut Ã la cour d'appel. Celle-ci ne devait statuer que le 20 avril 1977, rejetanr le recours . Le procÃ¨s s'ouvrit effectivement le 28 mars 1977. AprÃ¨s la lecture de l'acte d'accusation, Y ., qui avait consultÃ© sur ce point l'Ordre des avocats, formula une nouvelle demande d'ajournement . Le tribunal l'ayant rejetÃ©e, Y. dÃ©clara que sa conscience professionnelle lui interdisait de reprÃ©senter X . dans ces conditions et quirta la salle d'audience. En vertu de l'article 274 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, le tribunal fut alors obligÃ© d'ajourner le procÃ©s, mais dÃ©cida de mettre les frais de t'ajournement Ã la charge de l'avocat Y. personnellement . En dÃ©finitive, le procÃ¨s eut lieu le 17 mai 1977, Y . assurant la dÃ©fense d'X . . X. fut condamnÃ©e Ã 5 ans 7/2 de prison.
(TRADUCTION) EN DROI T 1 . La Commission a examinÃ© d'abord le premier grief des requÃ©rants, qui se plaignent que le droit, que leur garantit l'article 6, paragraphe 3(b ) de la Convention, de disposer du temps et des facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de leur dÃ©fense ait Ã©tÃ© violÃ© . Il convient de relever Ã cet Ã©gard que le droit en question ne peut Ãªtre a. invoquÃ© que par une personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction (cf . la phrase introductive de l'article 6, paragraphe 3) . II s'ensuit que le second requÃ©rant, qui ne participe Ã la prÃ©sente affaire qu'en tant qu'avocal de la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante, ne saurait lui-mÃªme prÃ©tendre Ãªtre victime d'une violation de cette disposition . Cette partie de la requÃ¨te, pour autant qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© introduite par le second requÃ©rant en son propre nom, est donc incompatible ratione personae avec les dispositions de la Convention larucles 25, paragraphe 1 et 27 paragraphe 2 de la Convention) . b . Pour autant que le grief ci-dessus a Ã©iÃ© formulÃ© au nom de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante, la Commission doit toutefois tenir Ã©galement compte des difficultÃ© s
rencontrÃ©es par le second requÃ©rant pour prÃ©parer le procÃ©s d'une maniÃ¨re satisfaisante . Ces difficultÃ©s Ã©taient les suivantes : -i . la briÃ©vetÃ© du dÃ©lai entre sa dÃ©signation, comme avocat de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante et la date du procÃ©s . l'ampleur et la complexitÃ© de l'affaire ;
iii . la difficultÃ© de communiquer avec sa cliente en raison du mauvais Ã©tait physique et psychique dans lequel elle se trouvait . La Commission relÃ©ve en premier lieu que la procÃ©dure pourla dÃ©signa.2 tion du second requÃ©rant comme avocat de la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante (4 mars 11-.mars19771 n'a pas subi un retard dÃ©raisonnable . L'intervallÃ¨ sÃ©parant, la dÃ©signation effective 111 marsl . et la date d u procÃ©s (28 mars) comprenait 17 jours, dont 10 jours ouvrables . Cette . pÃ©riode peut Ã©tredivisÃ©e en deux phases : la premiÃ©re prÃ©cÃ©dant la fixation du procÃ©s par le prÃ©sident du tribunal (11-18 mars) et la seconde, au cours de laquelle la date du procÃ©s Ã©tait dÃ©jÃ connue (18-28 mars) . 3 . a . La question de savoir si cette pÃ©riode Ã©tait suffisante, compte tenu de la disposition de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 b) de la Convention, ne peut Ãªtre tranchÃ©e dans l'abstrait, mais seulement en fonction des circonstances du cas d'espÃ¨ce . La Commission considÃ©re en particulier que rien ne saurait justifier l'Ã©tablissement d'une relation abstraite entre le temps allouÃ© Ã l'accusation pendant l'instruction prÃ©liminaire et le temps de prÃ©paration dont dispose la dÃ©fense dans la procÃ©dure de jugement . L'affaiie de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante Ã©tait assez complexe . Elle portai t .b sur une longue sÃ©rie de manipulations comptables compliquÃ©es qui s'Ã©tendaient sur une pÃ©riode de 8 annÃ©es ; de 1968 Ã 1976 . 'Ces manipulations avaient Ã©tÃ© dÃ©couvertes au cours de l'examen mÃ©thodique des documents pertinents, entrepris par un expert-comptable jurÃ© . NÃ©anmoins, Ã l'Ã©poque considÃ©rÃ©e, une procÃ©dure Ã©tait pendante en vue de rayer cet expert de la liste des experts prÃ¨s le tribunal . L'affaire Ã©tait rendue encore plus complexe par le fait que la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante avait, Ã l'origine, reconnu des malversations, pour les nier ensuite en prÃ©tendant que ses aveux lui avaient Ã©tÃ© extorquÃ©s par contrainte . Il fallait Ã©galement prendre en considÃ©ration l'Ã©ventualitÃ©, au vu de plusieurs avis mÃ©dicaux, d'une responsabilitÃ© pÃ©nale attÃ©nuÃ©e de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante . II y avait enfin le problÃ©me de la qualification exacte des infractions, qui Ã©taient qualifiÃ©es de dÃ©tournement de fonds dans l'acte d'accusation (article 133 du Code pÃ©nall et que le tribunal a finalement qualifiÃ©es d'escroquerie larticle 148 du Code pÃ©nall . La Commission considÃ©re nÃ©anmoins qu'en l'espÃ¨ce, la t&chÃ© dela dÃ©fensÃ© aurait pu Ãªtre accomplie dans le dÃ©laide dix jours, comprenant-six jours ouvrables, dont disposaient les requÃ©rants entre la fixation de la date du procÃ©s et cette dat e
elle-mÃªme, Ã©tant donnÃ© que tous les moyens de preuve devaient Ãªtre produits et examinÃ©s pendant le procÃ©s . c . Reste Ã examiner si ce dÃ©lai de prÃ©paration Ã©tait Ã©galement suffisant compte tenu du mauvais Ã©tat de santÃ© de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante et du volume de travail du second requÃ©rant pendant la pÃ©riode en question, Ã©lÃ©ments qui avaient pour effet combinÃ© de rendre les communications entre les requÃ©rants extrÃªmement difficiles . Pour dÃ©terminer la longueur du temps de prÃ©paration nÃ©cessaire, le tribunal doit prendre en considÃ©ration non seulement la complexitÃ© de l'affaire, mais aussi le volume de travail habituel d'un avocat, que l'on ne peut certes pas s'attendre Ã voir modifier tout son programme pour consacrer la totalitÃ© de son temps Ã une affaire d'assistance judiciaire dans laquelle il a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©signÃ© comme avocat de la dÃ©fense . En revanche, il n'est pas dÃ©raisonnable de demander Ã un avocat de modifier quelque peu, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, l'ordre de ses prioritÃ©s, compte tenu de l'urgence particuliÃ©re d'une affaire donnÃ©e, mÃªme s'il s'agit d'un cas d'assistance judiciaire . Si cela ne lui Ã©tait pas possible, il devait demander au conseil de l'Ordre de le relever de sa mission en l'espÃ©ce . Dans la prÃ©sente affaire, le tribunal a considÃ©rÃ© que le procÃ©s devait Ãªtre fixÃ© Ã la date la plus rapprochÃ©e possible dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante, pour attÃ©nuer les pressions psychologiques qui s'exerÃ§aient sur elle et qui Ã©taient la cause de son mauvais Ã©tat de santÃ© . Il est vrai que, compte tenu des difficultÃ©s particuliÃ©res crÃ©Ã©es par l'Ã©tat de santÃ© de la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante, le temps de prÃ©paration que le tribunal Ã©tait disposÃ© Ã accorder Ã la dÃ©fense Ã©tait exceptionnellement bref, mais la Commission considÃ©re que, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances de l'affaire il Ã©tait encore suffisant, dans le contexte des conditions imposÃ©es par l'article 6, paragraphe 3 b) de la Convention . La Commission estime donc que ce grief est manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . 4 . La Commission a examinÃ© enfin le grief soulevÃ© par le second requÃ©rant, selon lequel le fait de mettre Ã sa charge les frais entraPnÃ©s par l'ajournement du procÃ¨s constituait une privation de ses biens contraire Ã l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel . La Commission fait remarquer toutefois que le deuxiÃ©me alinÃ©a de cet article reconnait aux Etats le droit de mettre en vigueur les lois qu'ils jugent nÃ©cessaires pour assurer le paiement des impÃ´ts ou d'autres contributions . Les frais d'une procÃ©dure judiciaire sont des contributions, au sens de cette disposition . Dans le cas d'espÃ©ce, ils ont Ã©tÃ© mis Ã la charge du requÃ©rant en vertu de l'article 274 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, qui dispose que dans certains cas, ces frais doivent Ãªtre supportÃ©s par l'avocat qui en est responsable . Cette disposition, qui a des Ã©quivalents dans le droit d'autres Hautes Parties Contractantes, peut raisonnablement Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme Â« nÃ©cessaire Â», au sens de l'article 1, paragraphe 2 du Protocole additionnel, et la seule question qui reste Ã trancher est donc celle de savoir si son application au cas d'espÃ©ce pouvait Ã©galement se justifier e n
vertu de la disposition ci-dessus . Le second requÃ©rant a fait valoir qu'il ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme Â« responsable Â» de l'ajournement du procÃ©s dont les frais ont Ã©tÃ© mis Ã sa charge . La Commission estime toutefois que, quels que soient les motifs qui aient pu justifier l'attitude du requÃ©rant 8 l'audience du 2 8 mars 1977, il ne saurait y avoir de doute quant Ã sa responsabilitÃ© juridiqÃ¼e . Etant donnÃ© que la Commission a dÃ©jÃ© estimÃ© que la date rapproctiÃ©e du: procÃ©s demeurait dans les limites fixÃ©es par la Convention, on ne saurait soutenir que c'est le tribunal lui-mÃªme qui a crÃ©Ã© cette situation Le fait Ã©galement que le requÃ©rant ait reÃ§u le soutien du conseil de l'Ordre des avocats de Salzbourg n'affecie pas sa responsabilitÃ© personnelle, puisque celui-ci lui a seulement cÃ´nseillÃ© de demander une nouvelle fois l'ajournement du procÃ©s, mais non pas de refuser d'y participer si cet ajournement Ã©tait refusÃ© . Un tel conseil n'a Ã©tÃ© donnÃ© au requÃ©rant par le vice-bÃ¢tonnier qu'Ã© titre purement personnel, et le requÃ©rant atoÃ»jours Ã©tÃ© conscieni du caractÃ¨re privÃ© dÃ© ce conseil . Il s'ensuit qu'il n'existe pas d'apparence de violation dudroit dusecon d requÃ©rani au respect de ses biens du fait de la mise Ã sa charge des frais en question, et que cette partie de la requÃ©tedoit donc, elle aussi, .Ã©trÃ© rejetÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens'de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
DÃCLARELA REOUETEIRRECEVABLE .
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- %eOrigine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 12/10/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 274
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
 l'article 1
 l'article 274
 l'article 1
 l'article 27