Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81080:gr-169005-2013&catid=1566&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:08:05+00:00

Document:
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, v.COURT OF APPEALS and RUDY C. TESORO, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are the Decision1 dated April 11, 2005 and Resolution2 dated July 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82751.
The Report8 dated January 26, 2004 prepared by SVP-FOG Disuanco and Alfredo B. Pineda II of the OSVP-FOG concluded that the bidding process conducted by the BAC was flawed for non-compliance with the strict provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184. It was further observed that the field office committed oversights such as the presence of unofficial BAC members with no defined roles and the BACs failure to comply with the requirement of promptly replying to formal queries in consonance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6713.
On February 16, 2004, the GSIS Investigation Unit submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report11 recommending that administrative charges be filed against the following branch officials and employees: private respondent, Basa, Jr., Teruel, Branch Attorney Catherine Portia P. Corteza, Finance Division Chief Adelaida J. Jamantoc, Senior General Insurance Specialist Jose Ma. C. Capalla and Administrative Division Chief Lita L. Sonalan. It was further recommended that said officials be placed under preventive suspension.
That you approved the payment of 15% mobilization fee to Embrocal Builders, Inc. contrary to Section 91 of P.D. 1445, otherwise known as the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines." It was shown that on November 27, 2003 you were not anymore authorized to approve the payment in behalf of the GSIS Field Operations Group.
Private respondent was also placed on preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. On February 23, 2004, he filed his Answer to the charges, in addition to the previous joint explanation dated February 9, 2004 submitted to the Investigation Unit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent RUDY C. TESORO, is hereby found GUILTY OF GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and GRAVE MISCONDUCT pursuant to Section 46 (b) (3) and (4), Chapter 7, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987", in relation to Section 52 (A)(2) and (3), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS). Consequently, respondent is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, WITH PERPETUAL PROHIBITION FROM REEMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND CANCELLATION OF HIS ELIGIBILITY.
In his Comment19 filed before the CA on June 11, 2004, petitioner contended that private respondents petition for certiorari is already moot and academic with the rendition of the decision in the administrative case. Petitioner also pointed out that private respondent is misleading the appellate court when the petition alleged that the Formal Charge was issued without any preliminary investigation. Further, petitioner asserted that private respondent violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies when he filed the petition for certiorari despite the availability of appeal.
Private respondent filed his Reply to which a Rejoinder was filed by the petitioner.
(a) The administrative offense of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct and/or violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for which petitioner is charged is hereby set aside, and modified to the lower administrative offense of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.
is hereby set aside, and a new one is hereby rendered, finding the petitioner RUDY C. TESORO, GUILTY OF SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY pursuant to Section 52 (B) (I), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS). Consequently, petitioner is hereby meted the penalty of suspension for six (6) months, without pay, the period for which he was preventively suspended and subsequently dismissed shall be credited for the purpose of serving the penalty hereof. Accordingly, the respondent is directed to immediately reinstate the petitioner to his last position, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with payment of backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits from the time of his suspension and dismissal exceeding six (6) months until actual reinstatement. The petitioner is further sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
By Resolution dated July 20, 2005, the CA, citing the case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson28 denied petitioners motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration and merely noted private respondents motion.
In his Comment,30 private respondent argues that with the denial by the CA of petitioners motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration, the April 11, 2005 Decision of the CA is already final and executory. Hence, he prays for the outright dismissal of the present petition.
As to the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, private respondent contends that this case falls under the recognized exceptions to the said rule considering the purely legal issue involved and the violation of his right to due process. He further asserts that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA when it modified the charge against him considering that: (1) there was no document or evidence showing that he received the November 24, 2003 reassignment order on the date he signed the disbursement voucher (November 25, 2003) for the release of the 15% mobilization fee to Embrocal; (2) even assuming he was informed immediately on November 24, 2003 regarding his transfer, his act of signing the check and disbursement voucher was still valid and legal since he has not assumed the duties of the new position (SVP-CSG) at that time; (3) he was not in a position to overturn the decision and recommendation of the BAC and the previous signatories to the check and voucher; (4) he cannot be charged with gross neglect of duty in relying on the expert recommendation of the BAC members and his subordinates.
Petitioner counters that the private respondent may not deprive this Court of appellate jurisdiction over the CAs April 11, 2005 Decision, citing Barnes v. Padilla.31 He reiterates that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it ruled on the merits of the administrative case despite the absence of complete records and transformed the petition for certiorari filed by private respondent into an appeal. The CA also ignored the more than substantial evidence showing that private respondent was guilty of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct that would justify the imposition of a higher penalty.
Petitioner stresses that contrary to private respondents assertions, he was the final approving authority who could accept, modify or completely disregard the BACs recommendation after evaluation of the bidding process. The CA decision, in fact, had confirmed petitioners finding that private respondent was really remiss in his job and is actually to be blamed for the anomalous award to the highest bidder. Moreover, BAC members were not appointed for their expertise in the bidding process but are employees designated to said committee by virtue of their positions in the Iloilo City Field Office Department (ICFOD). Private respondents supervision over the ICFOD-BAC, as SVP-FOG, includes authority over their recommendations. On his continuing claim that he signed the disbursement voucher and check on November 25, 2003 prior to his receipt of the transfer order, petitioner cites the affidavit of Manager Teruel stating that the disbursement voucher and check were hand-carried from the Iloilo City Field Office to the OSVP-FOG for private respondents signature on November 27, 2003.
A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner. Petitioners counsel was understandably confused with the absence of an explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, which was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that was in effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyers negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
While private respondent filed his answer to the Formal Charge issued by petitioner, he filed a petition for certiorari in the CA questioning its validity and the order of preventive suspension, even before the hearing proper was conducted. The CA found no jurisdictional ground to invalidate the Formal Charge, and did not make any ruling on the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion attended the imposition of the preventive suspension order. However, the CA proceeded to review the merits of the administrative charge against private respondent, concurring with petitioners finding that private respondent was remiss in his duties and responsibilities but declaring private respondent liable for the lesser offense of Simple Neglect and imposing on him the lower penalty therefor. The CA thus exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction when it reviewed the alleged errors of the disciplining authority not only in finding a prima facie case against the private respondent but also in determining his guilt. This despite the fact that the rendition of the decision in Adm. Case No. 04-001 by the disciplining authority (GSIS) was earlier brought to the attention of the CA.
A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court.37 As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,38 and not a petition for certiorari.
Considering that the CA did not declare any act of the petitioner to have been exercised without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of relief to private respondent by sentencing him to a lower offense with reduced penalty cannot be sustained. Whether the private respondent may be held liable for Gross Neglect of Duty as stated in the Formal Charge or for the lower offense of Simple Neglect of Duty should be properly threshed out in Adm. Case No. 04-001 and thereafter in a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission, not in the certiorari proceedings before the CA seeking nullification of the Formal Charge and preventive suspension order.
In the case of People v. Court of Appeals,39 accused-respondents were convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 and accordingly sentenced with the prescribed penalty of imprisonment. Instead of appealing the RTC judgment after the denial of their motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, praying for the reversal of their conviction. The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record, its findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted one of the respondents of the crime charged.
x x x. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of error, the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the trial court on its merits. They questioned their conviction and the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being merely hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It behooved the appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of giving it due course and granting it.
Almuete of the crime charged.
In this case, records showed that private respondent appealed the May 24, 2004 Decision of petitioner finding him administratively liable for gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, to the CSC. He also separately appealed the preventive suspension order to the CSC. Later, however, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Appeal (both the preventive suspension and illegal dismissal cases) with the CSC on May 25, 2005, without mentioning the April 11, 2005 Decision of the CA modifying the Formal Charge and the aforesaid May 24, 2004 Decision of petitioner.
Since petitioner is vested with the requisite legal authority to issue the Formal Charge, after due investigation in accordance with existing rules and regulations of the Civil Service, and to commence administrative proceedings against the private respondent,44 and in the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of such powers, it behooved the CA to dismiss the petition instead of giving it due course and granting it. In resolving the merits of the decision rendered in the administrative case despite the pendency of private respondents appeal before the CSC assailing the correctness of the same decision, the CA clearly exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. The Decision dated April 11, 2005 and Resolution dated July 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 82751 are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated November 7, 2012 vice Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes who recused himself from the case for having penned the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.
1 Rollo, pp. 47-68. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Member of this Court) with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente concurring.
3 Id. at 181, 300.
4 Id. at 184, 302.
5 Id. at 188, 302-303.
6 CA rollo, pp. 90-91, 114-123, 127.
9 CA rollo, pp. 153-154.
10 Id. at 156-157, 160-167.
13 CA rollo, p. 2-15.
15 Rollo, pp. 297-323; ADM. Case No. 04-001.
19 CA rollo, pp. 45-74.
20 Rollo, pp. 446-496. Annexed to the Supplement to the Petition.
22 Id. at 505-506, 511.
25 CA rollo, pp. 342-344, 349-373.
28 No. L-70895, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 208.
31 G.R. No. 160753, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 675.
33 Barnes v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 533, 540 (Resolution denying motion for reconsideration).
34 Supra note 31, at 686-687.
35 Barnes v. Padilla, supra note 33, at 542-544.
36 Supra note 31, at 687.
37 Civil Service Commission v. Asensi, G.R. No. 160657, June 30, 2004, 433 SCRA 342, 345.
38 Suyat, Jr. v. Torres, G.R. No. 133530, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 265, 275.
39 G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.
42 Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 467, 477-478, citing Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148924, September 24, 2003, 412 SCRA 69, 85 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 479.
43 Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, id. at 480.
SECTION 45. Powers and Duties of the President and General Manager. The President and General Manager of the GSIS shall among others, execute and administer the policies and resolutions approved by the Board and direct and supervise the administration and operations of the GSIS. The President and General Manager, subject to the approval of the Board, shall appoint the personnel of the GSIS, remove, suspend or otherwise discipline them for cause, in accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations, and prescribe their duties and qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed.

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