Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/571-2d-790-d-632055645
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:46:30+00:00

Document:
Party Name: The UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, BALTIMORE ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Appellant, v. John R. WHITE, Appellee.
Thomas E. Starnes, with whom Thomas R. Kline, Washington, D.C. was on brief, for appellant.
Clement Theodore Cooper, Washington, D.C. for appellee.
Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and FERREN and BELSON, Associate Judges.
Appellant United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference (UMC) appeals from denials of its motions to dismiss the complaint and for reconsideration on the ground that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the Constitution preclude civil courts from adjudicating religious disputes involving the qualifications or fitness of clergy. Appellee John R. White alleged that he was wrongfully discharged as a minister in the United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference and sought his reinstatement in addition to compensatory and punitive damages for alleged breaches of his employment contract. We reverse.
George Washington University Medical Center. On November 13, 1984, the Executive Committee of the Board of Ministry voted to place Rev. White on a leave of absence pursuant to ¶ 450.1 of The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, (Discipline). In addition, pursuant to the requirements of the Discipline that a minister on leave of absence may not exercise his ministry beyond the confines of his local church and that his ecclesiastical endorsement must be withdrawn, the Division of Chaplains and Related Ministries, the General Board of Higher Education,  and the Ministry of the United Methodist Church sent a letter on September 16, 1985, to the Air Force withdrawing Rev. White's ecclesiastical endorsement.
A year and one half later, on May 13, 1987, the Baltimore Conference Board of Ministry recommended that Rev. White's conference membership be terminated. In accordance with the Discipline, ¶ 455.1(f), Rev. White was sent notice of the Board of Ministry's action by letter dated May 14, 1987. The contents of the letter were read to him on June 3, 1987. Eight days later, his counsel wrote to the Chairman of the Conference Relations Committee advising that he had "reviewed, in detail, the applicable provision of the Book of Discipline." Although Rev. White had only ten days after receiving notice of the termination of his conference membership to request a church trial, counsel did not request a church trial.
Rev. White's ministerial membership in the Baltimore Conference was terminated on June 9, 1987, pursuant to a vote of the Ministerial Executive Session of the 1987 Annual Conference due to "disobedience to the Order and Discipline of the United Methodist Church." On June 24, 1987, through counsel, he requested a church trial which was denied as untimely.
On March 28, 1988, Rev. White sued UMC for breach of contract seeking reinstatement of his ecclesiastical endorsement, a letter of apology, and compensatory and punitive damages. He also sought a declaration that he had exhausted his administrative remedies and demanded a jury trial. His complaint alleged that he was wrongfully discharged and divested of his ecclesiastical endorsement, denied related hospital and retirement benefits and compensation, and otherwise injured. UMC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion was denied on May 20, 1988. On June 6, 1988, UMC filed a motion for reconsideration or for allowance of an immediate appeal, which was also denied on July 20, 1988. UMC filed a notice of appeal on August 20, 1988.  Rev. White then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from was not a final order. This court initially dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but subsequently granted UMC's petition for rehearing.
First, it "must conclusively determine the undisputed question"; second, it must "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action"; third, it must be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."
Stein, supra, 532 A.2d at 643 (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1054, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984)). We hold that the denial of UMC's motion to dismiss on grounds of constitutional immunity meets these three tests.
First, the trial judge, by denying UMC's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration, has conclusively determined the disputed issue of UMC's claim of immunity from suit in the civil courts.
Second, the very nature of an immunity claim makes it collateral to and separable from the merits of Rev. White's claim of wrongful termination. The issue in this appeal is whether Rev. White's claims fall, as a matter of law, within the scope of UMC's First Amendment immunity. In contending that the First Amendment protects the church from judicial inquiry into Rev. White's suit, UMC does not address the merits of the assertions in Rev. White's complaint against the church. Rather, UMC contests the authority of the civil courts to adjudicate a dispute between UMC and its pastor. Thus, the elements of UMC's immunity claim are clearly independent of any liability that it may bear for Rev. White's termination. Therefore, the issues raised by the trial judge's denial of UMC's motion to dismiss are collateral to Rev. White's cause of action and will not "affect, or ... be affected by, decision of the merits of this case." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225.
Finally, UMC's claim of immunity under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution will be irreparably lost if not adjudicated before trial. Although Stein concerned an appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of statutory immunity, the Supreme Court has extended the same logic to constitutional immunities and guarantees. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1986) (essence of governmental immunity claim is freedom from legal liability for immunized acts); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508, 99 S.Ct. 2445, 2449, 61 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979) (purpose of Speech & Debate Clause immunity to prevent representative from defending themselves); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658-61, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-41, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) (denial of double jeopardy claim would undermine guarantee not to be tried twice for the same crime).

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