Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=30510:g-r-nos-57190-91-amp-58532-may-18,-1990-jose-s-santos-v-court-of-first-instance-of-cebu,-branch-vi,-et-al&amp;catid=1263&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:05:11+00:00

Document:
JOSE S. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH VI, CEBU CITY, HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Presiding, and CONSOLADOR LAO, Respondents.
JOSE S. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Branch VI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Respondent.
Jose S. Santos for and in his own behalf.
Filemon L. Fernandez and Fil. C. Veloso for Respondents.
These two consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul the following orders of respondent judge, to wit: (1) In G.R. Nos. 57190-91, the orders dated April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981 insofar as the same declare petitioner guilty of direct contempt; and (2) In G.R. No. 58532, the order dated August 17, 1981 suspending petitioner from the practice of law for the acts and omissions for which he has been found guilty of contempt of court.
What transpired thereafter is recited in the aforesaid order of April 20, 1981. 2 Respondent judge, in an order dated December 29, 1980, directed petitioner to submit his explanation on the contempt charges and set the hearing thereof on January 19, 1981 at 8:00 o’clock in the morning. On January 14, 1981, the court received petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file his explanation and for the resetting of the hearing to another date. On January 19, 1981, petitioner appeared before respondent court and reiterated his plea for time to file his explanation and for the resetting of the hearing. Petitioner was given up to February 6, 1981 to submit his explanation, whereupon he manifested that he was not taking the witness stand any more and that he would submit the incident for resolution on February 6, 1981. On February 5, 1981, respondent court received the petitioner’s answer to the contempt charges.
On February 6, 1981, petitioner did not appear in court. The hearing of the contempt motion was reset to February 27, 1981. On February 23, 1981, respondent court received petitioner’s motion to reset the hearing scheduled for February 27, 1981 to April 6, 1981 on the ground that he had accepted various engagements which were intransferable in nature such that his calendar for February and March, 1981 was full. On February 24, 1981, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioner’s motion since it did not specify what petitioner’s various engagements were, why they were intransferable and why it asked for a date more than 30 days away.
On February 27, 1981, petitioner did not appear in court. He merely sent to respondent court two telegrams requesting for the reconsideration of the denial of his motion to reset the hearing on the ground that he had to attend to cases in the Bicol area. For his failure to appear in court on this date, the hearing was reset to March 12, 1981 and petitioner was directed by telegram to appear on that date to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court.
On March 20, 1981, respondent court received petitioner’s explanation, dated March 16, 1981, explaining petitioner’s non-appearance before the court on February 27, 1981 and March 12, 1981. On March 23, 1981, petitioner still did not appear. Fiscal Gabiana reiterated the information he gave the court on March 12, 1981 that he was instructed by petitioner to tell the court that he was submitting the incident for resolution. Movant then wound up the presentation of evidence in support of the contempt motion and, in addition, presented evidence disputing certain assertions made by petitioner in his explanation. Thereupon, the incidents were submitted for resolution. On March 26, 1981, respondent court received petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the court orders dated February 27, 1981 and March 12, 1981.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Atty. Jose S. Santos guilty: a) of indirect contempt of court by abuse of legal process in frustrating the order of this Court of February 24, 1981, denying his motion to reset the hearing of February 27, 1981, by the simple expedient of transmitting to this Court two last-minute and improperly filed telegraphic motions for postponements, and in failing to observe truthfulness and candor with this Court with respect to the ground relied upon by him for his motion to reset the hearing of February 27, 1981 and his justification for his non-appearance on said date; b) of direct contempt for using a falsified document consisting of the supposed certification of the Collector of Customs of Bislig, Surigao del Sur, that Atty. Santos appeared before that office from March 9 to 13, 1981, and of claiming to have acquired knowledge of the hearing of March 12, 1981 only upon his return from his trip to Bislig, Surigao del Sur on the aforesaid dates.
"Accordingly, this Court sentences Atty. Jose S. Santos to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months on the first count and a fine of P200.00 and imprisonment for ten (10)days on the second count.
"Pursuant to the ruling of our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. versus Lumampao, 20 Phils. 168, the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu is hereby directed to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine the culpability of Atty. Jose S. Santos for violation of Art. 172, last paragraph, of the Revised Penal Code (use of falsified document) in connection with the presentation by Atty. Santos to this Court, as part of his justification for his non-appearance before this Court on March 12, 1981, of a falsified document consisting of the supposed certification of the Collector of Customs of Bislig, Surigao del Sur, that said Atty. Santos appeared before said office from March 9 to 13, 1981, and to file thereafter the corresponding information with the appropriate court.
"The Office of the Solicitor General is also hereby directed to determine the feasibility of instituting disbarment proceedings against Atty. Jose S. Santos on the basis of the premises herein-above cited.
2.	Direct contempt of the second and third charges relating to his false testimony in court regarding his employment and to his affidavit on his alleged agreement with this Court for its inhibition, and accordingly hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P200.00 and to suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days on each of said charges.
"Pursuant to the ruling of our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. Lumampao, 20 Phils. 168, the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu is hereby directed to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine the culpability of Atty. Jose S. Santos for perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and to file thereafter the corresponding information with the appropriate court.
"The Ministry of the Solicitor General is also hereby directed to determine the feasibility of instituting disbarment proceedings against Atty. Jose S. Santos on the basis of the premises hereinabove cited.
"WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
"Accordingly, for failure on the part of Atty. Santos to explain and show cause to this Court why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for the acts and omissions for which he has been found guilty of contempt of court in the Orders of this Court of April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981, this Court hereby suspends Atty. Jose S. Santos from his office as attorney and from the practice of law, for said acts and omissions and upon the grounds stated in said Orders which are hereby incorporated hereto in toto by reference, effective immediately and until otherwise lifted by this or a higher court.
The two petitions raise the following as the errors committed by respondent judge and as the central issues for resolution.
Respondent court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, without due process of law, without competent evidence, without legal basis, with extreme bias, and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt.
On the issue of contempt, we rule in favor of petitioner.
"As regards his non-appearance before this Court on March 12, 1981, Atty. Santos gives the impression to this Court that he came to know of the order of February 27, 1981, resetting the hearing of the pending incidents to March 12, 1981, only upon his return to his residence in Metro Manila from Bislig, Surigao del Sur, to which he had travelled officially, appearing before the office of the Collector of Customs of that place from March 9 to 13, 1981, per Annex ‘A’ to his explanation. This claim, however, of Atty. Santos appears belied by the manifestation of Fiscal Gabiana on March 12, 1981, to the effect that ‘the other day, the complaining witness in this case, Atty. Jose S. Santos, passed by Cebu on his way to Surigao and he was already aware of the hearing for today because not only (by) informing him of the resetting of this case today but also by a long distance telephone made by him, that was I think last Monday, wherein in our conversation I also informed him of the resetting for today’s hearing of his Motion and according to him Your Honor please, he is submitting this case for resolution of this court.’ (TSN-Ermita, 12 March 1981, pp. 2-3). This manifestation of Fiscal Gabiana appears to be supported by the evidence and even by the admission of Atty. Santos that he was in fact here in Cebu on March 11, 1981, the day before the scheduled hearing.
The aforesaid findings of respondent judge necessarily require that petitioner be granted the opportunity to meet said charges against him and to be heard in his defense. Although we agree with respondent judge that such acts are contumacious, nevertheless the same cannot be summarily punished with abuse of discretion and without due process of law. Even if the surmises of respondent judge are correct, the acts attributed to petitioner would at most be constitutive of indirect contempt. Direct contempt presupposes that the misbehavior was committed in order to interrupt the administration of justice or with disrespect to the court.
The charge that petitioner executed an affidavit imputing derogatory conduct to the court is not supported by the evidence on record. A cursory reading of the affidavit itself negates the findings of respondent judge that it gives the impression that he is approachable and willing to enter into an arrangement for the benefit of one party to the prejudice of the adverse party. Annexed to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed in the court a quo for relief from the orders declaring him in contempt, 19 said affidavit narrates petitioner’s request made to respondent judge in chambers for the latter’s possible inhibition, and that the latter supposedly agreed but thereafter changed his mind. It is actually an explanation for petitioner’s failure to testify coupled with, at the most, an expression of misgivings on his part over the denial by respondent judge of his motion for inhibition and the subsequent dismissal of the criminal cases wherein petitioner was the complaining witness. Said affidavit neither contains any derogatory statement nor uses disrespectful or contemptuous language.
". . . A citizen of this Republic is entitled to expect that our courts of justice are presided by judges who are free from bias and prejudice — and it should not be made a count against the citizen if he so expresses himself truthfully, sincerely and respectfully. A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. After all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties. And a judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
On the order suspending petitioner from the practice of law, we do not agree that the same was unlawfully issued for having been rendered without due process of law. It will be recalled that petitioner was first suspended in the two orders of April 10 and 20, 1981. On his motion for reconsideration, the suspension was recalled by respondent judge in an order dated June 3, 1981 and petitioner was given ten days from receipt thereof to explain and show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law. Petitioner opted to file a motion to quash the suspension proceedings, which was denied by respondent judge in his order dated July 16, 1981. In the same order, petitioner was granted another five days within which to submit his explanation, with a warning that his failure to do so would be considered as a waiver of his right to be heard and the matter would be resolved on the basis of the evidence on hand. Petitioner still failed to file any explanation, and in an order dated August 17, 1981, he was suspended from the practice of law.
However, under the factual milieu of this case, we believe that the suspension of petitioner from August 17, 1981, the date of the order of suspension, to February 10, 1982, when the temporary restraining order against its enforcement was issued by this Court, has subserved the disciplinary purpose and is sufficient punishment for his misconduct.
1.	Rollo, G.R. Nos. 57190-91, 44.
6.	Rollo, G.R. No. 58532, 95-96.
8.	Ibid., G.R. Nos. 57190-91, 166-168.
9.	Ibid., G.R. No. 58532, 109-111.
12.	Ibid., G.R. No. 57190-91, 1-3.
13.	Ibid., id., 309; Petitioner’s Brief, 1-3.
14.	G.R. No. L-10074, April 30, 1959 (unpublished).
15.	103 Phil. 1154 (1958).
16.	Sec. 3, Rule 71, Rules of Court.
17.	Rollo, G.R. No. 57190-91, 38-39.
19.	Rollo, G.R. No. 57190-91, 139-140.
20.	20 SCRA 1247 (1967).
21.	Pajao v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, etc., Et Al., 88 Phil. 588 (1951).
22.	Lipata v. Tutaan, etc., Et Al., 124 SCRA 877 (1983); Ceniza v. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 (1984).
24.	Vda. de Laig, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 86 SCRA 641 (1978).
25.	Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, Et Al., and Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988).
26.	Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility.
27.	Berenguer v. Carranza, 26 SCRA 673 (1969).
28.	Hernandez v. Villaruel, 107 SCRA 633 (1981).
29.	Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 584 (1956).

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