Source: http://www.marchankin.com/legislative_projects/ConshipProposalReChilton_8CalApp3d34andSullivan198Cal183/ConshipProposalReChilton_8CalApp3d34andSullivan198Cal183.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:52:18+00:00

Document:
Digest: Summary of existing law (statutory and/or as interpreted by the courts) and a very brief description of what the bill would do.
Unfortunately, it is common for the perpetrator of elder fiduciary abuse ("perp") to arrange for a lawyer to represent a proposed conservatee in opposing the appointment of a conservator, or in seeking to have the perp appointed as the conservator. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Chilton, 8 Cal.App.3d 34, 86 Cal. Rptr. 860 (Second Dist. 1970), where (according to the Court of Appeals) Attorney Arditto really was the lawyer for the perp, although he pretended to be the lawyer for the proposed conservatee. Arditto litigation in opposition to the conservatorship, and took other steps that were supportive of the financial abuser, who also entered into a subsequently voided marriage with the incompetent.
As the population ages, there are more and more Ardittos practicing law against the interests of their incompetent clients, deterring prosecutions, objecting to law enforcement and conservatorship discovery practice, and impeding or preventing the rescue of their "clients" from the perps in whose custody the incompetent clients sometimes die. These perps inflict serious harm on the vulnerable incompetent people who need conservatorships. These perps sometimes knowingly get the perp appointed as conservator, and usually drive attorneys fees up to the point that the victim lacks the funds to pay for the care they need. Result: when they survive the abuse, they end up prematurely institutionalized.
The case of Conservatorship of Chilton, 8 Cal.App.3d 34, 86 Cal. Rptr. 860 (Second Dist. 1970) stands for the proposition that the lawyer who appears "for" the proposed conservatee, to oppose a conservatorship, can be acting in reality for the perpetrator against the best interests of the manipulated and incompetent proposed conservatee.
The case of Sullivan v. Dunn 198 Cal. 183, 244 p. 343 (1926) indicates that the mere fact that a lawyer shows up and alleges that he or she represents the proposed conservatee does not mean that the proposed conservatee has the capacity to hire the lawyer. It is obvious that a party who cannot exercise any power or waive any right, and who lacks the capacity to contract (Civil Code § 40), cannot prosecute or dismiss an appeal or action on his own. "It is the statutory rule in this state that the power of an agent is terminated as to any person having notice thereof by the incapacity of the principal to contract." Sullivan v. Dunne, supra. "It is also well recognized by the authorities that the law of principal and agent is generally applicable to the relation of attorney and client (1 Weeks on Attorneys, p. 216), and that the insanity or incapacity of the client will therefore operate as a termination of the authority of the attorney [citations omitted.]" Sullivan v. Dunne, supra.
The duty of confidentiality is not absolute. Where there is a question concerning the legal mental capacity of a principal who has signed a durable power of attorney, if the agent needs the information to carry out his or her duties (i.e., because the principal has become incompetent), Probate Code ‘4235 requires the principal’s lawyer to disclose relevant information when requested by an attorney in fact, apparently regardless of the incompetent client’s objections to the disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the often raised contention that the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality is absolute is groundless.
The duty of confidentiality in California is part of the duty of loyalty which, at its core, is a duty to act in the client’s best interests. Case law in the criminal area establishes the proposition that a lawyer must sometimes tell the court that his/her client is incompetent. In People v. Stanley, 10 Cal.4th 764, 806-807, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481 (1995), defense counsel in a capital murder case presented substantial evidence of incompetence.
The lawyer was required by law to notify the court of his suspicion that his client was incompetent, even if the client objected to the disclosure. California Penal Code § 1367, and the 6th Amendment case right to the right to the effective assistance of counsel (e.g., Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (Dusky ); Drope V. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975)), imposed on the lawyer the duty to make those disclosures.
That body of law requires a lawyer to protect his/her client from being convicted of even the smallest crime, when the client/defendant lacks the capacity to "understand the nature of the proceeding" or effectively assist counsel. The paramount duty of a lawyer is to act in the client’s best interests. Clients are presumed to be competent, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and a lawyer should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the assumption that the client is competent. But where the lawyer knows that the client is incompetent, the lawyer may not act contrary to the client’s best interests, relying for authority on the utterances of a person who fails the tests set forth in Probate Code §§ 811 and 812.
People v. Stanley, supra, also stands for the proposition that the court can appoint an additional attorney to represent a person where the Court has serious doubts about that person’s competence. In People v. Stanley, the defendant later contended that he was competent, and so the trial court appointed an additional attorney at a competency hearing to represent defendant’s personal point of view that he was competent.
Upon appeal from a conviction, the California Supreme Court held that since the "defendant has an equally important interest in not being sent to a mental institution with his criminal case unresolved, if he is competent" (1) the defendant was not deprived of due process by the appointment of a second lawyer over his objections, or (2) the effective assistance of counsel, and (3) the court did not create a conflict of interest by appointing counsel to represent the defendant’s personal viewpoint. "In so doing [the trial court] permitted the jury to hear every side of the issue of defendant’s competence, thereby assuring defendant a fair trial."
The Court should have the same authority in a non-criminal proceeding, and lawyers should have the same duty in a non-criminal proceeding.
Why should civil law attorneys be put to any less of a burden to take cognizance of evident incompetence than  psychiatrists, who are required to report elder abuse to Adult Protective Services, or  criminal defense counsel (under Penal Code §1367 and the 6th Amendment case law cited above), and  lawyers for principals who have executed durable powers of attorney?
Respect for the legal system would not be enhanced by a rule allowing or requiring lawyers to inflict harm on a client whom the lawyer knows is incompetent, citing "The defense of civil liberties" to justify paying the lawyer for obeying the incompetent client’s instructions to litigate "to the limits of the law," seeking a harmful result, Sullivan, supra, and consigning an incompetent victim into the maw of the elder abuse beast.
The legal system’s strongest critics’ worst expectations certainly would be fulfilled by a lawyer who is handsomely paid for successfully defeating a conservatorship petition (or unsuccessfully waging a lengthy war of litigation against it), where the lawyer has clear and convincing evidence of his or her client’s incompetence (See, the standards for incapacity/incompetence in Prob. C. §§810-813, DPCDA), and knows of the high probability of physical and financial harm which will result to the client, absent the protection of a conservatorship.
The proposed bill does not address what the court appointed lawyer’s duties would be. The proposed bill merely would allow the court to appoint an attorney for the proposed conservatee, despite the fact that another member of the bar shows us and says s/he is the proposed conservatee’s lawyer and the proposed conservatee says that that is true.
Cf. CCP section 284, limiting the court’s authority to appoint legal counsel.
Cf. The latest version of draft new Rule 1.14 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (attached as Exhibit 1).
Application: How will this bill remedy the problem or deficiency in existing law?
Current statutory law does not tell the court that it indeed does have the authority to appoint an attorney for a proposed conservatee whose capacity to hire a lawyer is in question. This proposal would provide statutory authorization for the appointment of a lawyer and would provide procedures for the resolution of conflicts between the various lawyers purportedly representing the proposed conservatee.
Illustrations: Give at least one specific example, preferably drawn from real life of how this proposal would solve the problem described above.
In an unpublished Second District Court of Appeals decision in connection with the conservatorship of Harry Cassel (a case in which I was involved), the Second District reversed an order appointing conservator. The appellate decision seems to suggest that the L.A. Probate Court lacked the authority to appoint additional counsel for the proposed conservatee, Harry Cassel, because a lawyer showed up at a hearing, and contended that he was Harry Cassel’s lawyer, where Harry was able to identify that man as his lawyer. The opinion of the Court of Appeal suggests that that is enough evidence of the capacity to hire a lawyer.
The Second District’s approach to the issue of standing to represent a client, contradicts the sparse case law on  the subject of the legal mental capacity to hire a lawyer, and  the authority of the court to appoint another lawyer to represent a person about whose capacity (to hire a lawyer) the court has serious doubts. The law should be clarified concerning both of these topics. This proposal addresses the latter of the two topics.
Documentation: Does documentary evidence (e.g., studies, reports, statistics or facts) exist which supports your conclusion that there is a problem? If so, please list. Be as specific as possible and attach major sources.
Proponent is unaware of any studies, reports or statistics which support this proposal, although cases such as Sullivan v. Dunn, and People v. Stanley cited infra, and Conservatorship of Chilton, 8 Cal. App. 3d. 34, 86 Cal. Rptr. 860 (2nd District 1978) suggest that the problem is real . . . and growing, as the population ages.
History: Describe any similar proposals considered by the State Bar or the Legislature.
None known to proponent except AB 1491 of 1999, which was effectively dropped by the Section due to mostly unfounded objections by the Committee Analyst.
Pending Litigation: List any litigation currently pending of which you are aware which would be impacted by this legislation if enacted.
Likely Support/Opposition: Which major interest groups, organizations, professional associations, governmental agencies, key lawmakers, etc. are likely to support this proposal? Which are likely to oppose it? Why? What arguments will be made against it?
Proponent anticipates that possibly some mental health patient’s-rights advocate groups might oppose this, contending that, no matter how grievously mentally impaired a person is, he or she has the "right" to select an attorney (who can vigorously take advantage of, and abuse his or her position as the incompetent’s lawyer, litigating to the limits of the law, to the great financial and frequently physical detriment of an aging frail client).
Fiscal Impact: How much will it cost? How will these costs be funded?
This would possibly avoid unnecessary trials where certain lawyers, who avariciously act in bad faith, in effect expropriate an incompetent person, and use that person’s position (as a proposed conservatee) as a vehicle for full employment for the lawyer to litigate all the way through to a jury trial, running up outrageous bills, and causing harm to many people, and facilitating losses of funds while the litigation goes on.
Germaneness:	(1) Is the subject matter of the bill necessarily or reasonably related to the regulation of the legal profession or improvement of the quality of legal services? or (2) Does the matter require the special knowledge, training, experience or technical expertise of the section? Please discuss how and why.
The subject matter is directly related to the practice of the members of the Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section. The Section has the particular expertise pertaining to the management of the affairs of incompetent persons.
(a) No defendant shall be tried while mentally incompetent to stand trial.
(b) The test for determining mental competence to stand trial should be whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with defendant’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and otherwise to assist in the defense, and whether the defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings.
(c) The terms competence and incompetence as used within Part IV of this chapter refer to mental competence or mental incompetence. A finding of mental incompetence to stand trial may arise from mental illness, physical illness, or disability; mental retardation or other developmental disability; or other etiology so long as it results in a defendant’s inability to consult with defense counsel or to understand the proceedings.
1. Defendants should have a perception of the process not distorted by mental illness or disability. Whether phrased in terms of (a) an ability to perceive rationally and without distortion, [FN26] (b) an ‘understanding’ of the process, [FN27] or (c) an ‘awareness’ of the charge and possible verdicts, [FN28] or (d) couched in a codified requirement that defendants understand that there is a judge on the bench, a prosecutor who will try to convict, and defense counsel who will defend against criminal charges, the thrust of the requirement is that defendants understand the nature of the process and their functions as participants within that process free from undue perceptual distortion.
Standard 7-4.1(c) establishes a clear dichotomy between mental health or mental retardation concepts and legal principles governing present mental competency. If defendants are capable of meeting the articulated requirements for competence, the presence or absence of mental illness is irrelevant.
(a) Notwithstanding the fact that a legal representative purports to represent an allegedly incapacitated person, if the court has heard evidence sufficient to constitute probable cause to believe that an allegedly incapacitated person lacks the capacity to hire a legal representative, and the court determines that the appointment of an attorney for the allegedly incapacitated person either would be helpful to the resolution of the matter, or is necessary to protect the interests of the allegedly incapacitated person, the court may, at or before the time of the hearing, appoint the public defender or private counsel to represent the interests of the allegedly incapacitated person.
(b)	Pending the court’s determination whether a legal representative has the standing to represent the allegedly incapacitated person, the court shall hear and resolve any conflicts between a legal representative and the public defender or private counsel appointed to represent the allegedly incapacitated person.
(1)	To understand free from undue perceptual distortion that there is a trier of fact, a petitioner who will try to prove the need for conservatorship, and an attorney who will oppose the conservatorship, the nature of the process, and their functions as participants within that process.
(2)	To maintain the attorney-client relationship, including an ability to discuss the facts of a case with counsel without paranoid distrust, to advise and accept advice from counsel, to elect an appropriate plea, and to approve the legal strategy of the trial, including an ability to consult rationally about a pending case, which entails more than a superficial capacity to converse with others.
(3)	To recall, understand and relate factual information and factual occurrences, to a sufficient extent to be able to reveal exonerating circumstances to their counsel. This includes sufficient memory to relate answers to questions posed to him or her, to follow testimony reasonably well, and to realistically challenge witnesses’ testimony.
(4)	To testify, if that should prove appropriate.
(5)	To meet the competency criteria in the setting of the proposed conservatee’s collaboration with counsel outside the courtroom. The court should consider the extent of the proposed conservatee’s needed participation in trial proceedings, and the complexity of the case, a proposed conservatee’s mental ability in relation to the size of the estate, the risks facing the proposed conservatee’s estate or person, and the complexity of the case.
(1) the term "allegedly incapacitated person" means and includes a conservatee, proposed conservatee, or person alleged to lack legal capacity.
(2) The term "legal representative" means an attorney who alleges to the court that the allegedly incapacitated person has authorized him or her to represent the allegedly incapacitated person in the proceeding.
(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
 The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions.
 If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d).
 Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one.
 In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client.

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