Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/packer-v-super-ct-34374
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:20:43+00:00

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Home > Opinions > Packer v. Super. Ct.
for an alleged conflict of interest.1 The statute establishes a two-stage process.
In the present case, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion.
Accordingly, the trial court shall be directed to hold an evidentiary hearing.
unrelated felony charges more than six months later, in mid-January 2010.
eventually matched to the profiles derived from the Husted crime scene.
prosecutor is seeking the death penalty.
copulation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(F)).
In June 2012, the trial court consolidated both cases against petitioner.
the prosecution at the penalty phase.
himself. The Attorney General joined in opposing petitioner‘s motion.
testify at petitioner‘s penalty phase.
redacted various portions of the exhibits and affidavits.
through their mutual participation in a youth group known as Young Life.
youth group and had shared a room with petitioner and four other individuals.
of the record redacted by the trial court.
because he and his ex-wife had divorced some 15 years earlier.
were killed in which petitioner allegedly punched Cathcart.
petitioner was still involved in the organization.
support for petitioner following his arrest in the underlying proceedings.
was recorded, the prosecution‘s investigator advised him not to mention Elizabeth.
could not confirm whether Cathcart and Elizabeth had a dating relationship.
defense investigator spoke with Deputy Baugher about the failed service.
admissible as prior inconsistent statement of Deputy Baugher.
the defense-drafted affidavit, but refused to sign the affidavit.
who stated that Elizabeth was an adult and no longer lived at his residence.
or to review and sign a draft affidavit.
they should feel free to speak with the defense.
seeking to hold defense counsel in contempt for providing untimely discovery.
subpoena duces tecum to seek discovery from defense counsel‘s office.
discretion in deciding whether to hold evidentiary hearings under section 1424.
argued that the defense had ―manufactured‖ the apparent conflict.
have positive‖ mitigating penalty phase evidence ―that will be admissible‖ at trial.
was warranted without an evidentiary hearing.
visited the prosecutor‘s home to socialize with Elizabeth Frawley and her friends.
minimize his daughter Elizabeth‘s connection with petitioner and his friends.
prosecutor refused to provide the process server with Elizabeth‘s current address.
determinations in support of its ruling.
as a means of creating a conflict for purposes of section 1424.
conduct as simply impermissible gamesmanship without an evidentiary hearing.
cooperate with the defense or otherwise thwarted their access to her.
her whereabouts because her concealment would ―pay off‖ for her attorney father.
potentially significant mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of this capital case.
least, these prospects bear on whether the prosecutor should be recused.
of credibility that are necessary to evaluate petitioner‘s concerns.
disputed fact or the defendant‘s factual allegations are entirely without credibility.
illuminate the gravity of the conflict at issue here.
D. Totten, District Attorney, and Michelle J. Contois, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to recuse a prosecutor under California Penal Code section 1424. At issue: did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing as part of a motion to recuse a prosecutor under California Penal Code section 1424, where there were significant factual disputes about the nature of the relationship between the defendant and prosecutor’s children but also where the trial court might infer that the inclusion of the prosecutor’s children on the defense’s witness list was strategic gamesmanship?
In May 2009, a man entered Davina Husted’s home, sexually assaulted her, and then murdered both her and her husband, Brock. Months later, DNA samples taken from Davina led to the arrest of Joshua Graham Packer, the petitioner. Counts against Packer included first-degree murder, forcible oral copulation, use of a deadly weapon, an allegation that the murders were committed during the commission of a robbery, a special circumstance allegation that Davina’s murder was perpetrated during the commission of an act of forcible copulation, and a special multiple-murder circumstance allegation.
In September 2012, Packer filed a motion under California Penal Code section 1424 to recuse Chief Deputy District Attorney Michael Frawley, the lead prosecutor in the case. Packer’s motion contained many alleged conflicts of interest.
First, Packer alleged that Frawley appeared to have known victim Davina Husted through his ex-wife. Both Davina and Frawley’s ex-wife were involved with the National Charity League Juniors. Frawley’s affidavit countered that he had never met Davina, nor contributed to the charity in a way that would affect his handling of the case.
Next, Packer alleged that Frawley’s children knew Packer through youth group involvement and would be called as defense witnesses at the penalty phase. Young Life was a Christian youth group for high school students, which organized trips and events for its members. Packer alleged that he and Frawley’s children had attended many of these trips together. Packer further alleged that he had attended meetings and social gatherings at Frawley’s home. The district attorney countered that Frawley’s children did not consider Packer their “personal friend” and that Young Life was a large youth group with over 50 members. Frawley attested that his children's prior acquaintance with Packer would not impact any of his decisions in the case. The prosecution later stated it would have another deputy prosecutor cross-examine Frawley’s children should the defense call them as witnesses.
Next, Packer alleged that Frawley’s daughter dated one of Packer’s close friends, Thomas Cathcart. Neither Frawley’s daughter nor Cathcart offered affidavits attesting to this fact. Instead, Packer alleged that the prosecution coached both witnesses not to mention their prior relationship when interviewed. In his own affidavit, Frawley could not attest to his daughter’s and Cathcart’s relationship status.
Next, Packer alleged that prosecutors interfered with the defense investigation. Packer alleged that the prosecution actively frustrated the defense’s ability to contact Frawley’s daughter. Alleged prosecution tactics included deliberate concealment of Frawley’s daughter’s whereabouts and non-cooperation with defense subpoenas.
Finally, Packer alleged that Frawley had a personal interest in not having his children testify at trial. As evidence of this interest, Packer pointed to media reports where Frawley stated that his children would “have nothing to do” with the trial and that their inclusion on the defense’s witness list was “the lowest sort of trial tactics [he had] ever seen.” Frawley countered these allegations by stating that his relationship with his children would not cause him to exercise his “discretion and professional duties differently” than if they had never met Packer.
In support of his section 1424 motion, Packer submitted 54 pages of affidavits from eight people. In opposition, the district attorney presented affidavits from two people, one from the prosecutor himself. The Attorney General joined in opposition of Packer’s motion.
In November 2012, the trial court denied Packer’s request for an evidentiary hearing–a hearing contemplated by section 1424–on any of the allegations in his motion.
Packer challenged the trial court's ruling in a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, which summarily denied relief. Packer sought review in the California Supreme Court, which granted review and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order denying mandate and to issue an alternative writ. The Court of Appeal gave the trial court an opportunity to reconsider its ruling, but it declined to do so. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause and set the matter for oral argument. In late August 2013, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's ruling and denied the requested writ of mandate.
Packer then sought review of the Court of Appeal's decision. The California Supreme Court granted review in December 2013, limiting review to the issue whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing on the ground that petitioner had failed to make a prima facie showing that recusal was warranted.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing as part of a motion to recuse a prosecutor under California Penal Code section 1424, where there were significant factual disputes about the nature of the relationship between the defendant and prosecutor’s children, but also where the trial court might infer that the inclusion of the prosecutor’s children on the defense’s witness list was strategic gamesmanship?
Yes, the trial court abused its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing under section 1424. A hearing was necessary to determine whether the conflict in this case would render it unlikely that petitioner would receive a fair trial if the prosecutor is not recused as lead prosecutor in the underlying proceeding.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a thorough explanation of the relevant legal framework. California Penal Code section 1424 permits a defendant to seek to recuse a prosecutor for an alleged conflict of interest. Section 1424 establishes a two-stage process. First, the defendant files a motion containing “a statement of the facts setting forth the grounds for the claimed disqualification and the legal authorities relied upon by the moving party.” The factual allegations must be supported by “affidavits of witnesses who are competent to testify to the facts set forth in the affidavit.” (§ 1424(a)(1)). The district attorney and the Attorney General may file affidavits in opposition to the motion. After reviewing the motion and affidavits, the trial court "exercises its discretion" in determining whether the second stage, an evidentiary hearing, is necessary.
Section 1424, subdivision (a)(1) states that a motion to recuse the district attorney “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” The California Supreme Court has previously held that a “conflict” exists, for purposes of section 1424, “whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner.” (People v. Conner, 34 Cal.3d 141, 148 (1983)). “There is no need to determine whether a conflict is ‘actual,’ or only gives an ‘appearance’ of conflict.” Id.
The Supreme Court went on to explain that the mere existence of a conflict, by itself, is not sufficient to require recusal of the district attorney. (People v. Eubanks, 14 Cal.4th 580, 594 (1996)). Instead, the Supreme Court has held that it is the defendant's burden to allege facts which, if credited, not only establish a conflict of interest, but also establish that the conflict is serious enough “to make a ‘fair trial’ unlikely.” (Id.) This, the Supreme Court explained, involves a two-part inquiry: the first half of the inquiry asks only “whether a ‘reasonable possibility’ of less than impartial treatment exists”, while the second half asks “whether any such possibility is so great that it is more likely than not the defendant will be treated unfairly during some portion of the criminal proceedings.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.4th 706, 713 (2008)).
The Supreme Court then discussed the second stage of the process under section 1424, the evidentiary hearing. Under section 1424, an evidentiary hearing may be ordered if the defendant's affidavits establish a prima facie case for recusal. (Spaccia v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.4th 93, 111-12 (2012)). The decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing “contemplates an exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court in determining whether a hearing is necessary.” An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of that discretion. (Id.) Under this standard of review, “[t]he trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi, 43 Cal.4th at 711–12).
Because section 1424 simply states that “[t]he judge shall review the affidavits and determine whether or not an evidentiary hearing is necessary,” (§ 1424 (a)(1)), the Court of Appeal in Spaccia concluded that “the language [leaves] the issue of whether to hold a hearing to the trial court's discretion.” The Supreme Court agreed that one can infer from the statutory language “that the Legislature expressly chose not to limit evidentiary hearings to only those situations in which there exist disputed issues of material fact which could not be resolved on affidavits alone.” (Spaccia, 209 Cal.App.4th at 110-11).
With regards to the alleged conflicts involving Frawley’s wife’s relationship with Davina, Frawley’s daughters relationship with Cathcart, and Frawley’s children’s inclusion on the defense’s witness lists, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing.
However, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion with regards to “the more substantial issue of whether the prosecutor had become so personally involved in the case ‘as to render it unlikely that [Packer would] receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings.’” The Supreme Court found that the trial court’s “choice of one inference” (that the prosecutor's litigation positions were zealous but evenhanded discretionary calls, that the prosecutor had nothing to do with the witnesses' reluctance to fully cooperate with either party, and that the prosecutor's statements constituted public posturing in a high-profile case rather than an admission of a personal vendetta) “over another” (that the prosecutor was upset with [Packer] and was grinding that personal axe by tampering with witnesses, etc.) was improper and an abuse of discretion.
If the defense’s initial decision to place Frawley’s children on their potential witness list turned out to be “improper gamesmanship,” the Supreme Court had no doubt that the trial court, after hearing evidence of these significant factual disputes, could exercise its discretion and deny the motion to recuse.
SCOCAL, Packer v. Super. Ct. , S213894 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/packer-v-super-ct-34374) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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