Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/04/02/ingram-v-nicholson-no-03-2196-multiple-issues-raised/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:27:15+00:00

Document:
6. We conclude Deshotel and Andrews stand for the proposition that, where an RO decision discusses a claim in terms sufficient to put the claimant on notice that it was being considered and rejected, then it constitutes a denial of that claim even if the formal adjudicative language does not “specifically” deny that claim.
In summary, a sympathetic reading of the appellant’s pleadings cannot be based on a standard that requires legal sophistication beyond that which can be expected of a lay claimant and must consider whether the appellant’s submissions, considered in toto, have articulated a claim.
The duty to sympathetically read exists because a pro se claimant is not presumed to know the contents of title 38 or to be able to identify the specific legal provisions that would entitle him to compensation.
The Board focused on whether the appellant had alleged negligence or a lack of proper skill on the part of the VA physicians and whether he had expressed an intent to apply for section 1151 benefits. R. at 8-9. Both of these forms of analysis were legally incorrect.
As the Federal Circuit explained in Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998), when it announced the sympathetic-reading requirement based on the legislative history of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act and Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 1988, Congress intended to preserve the nonadversarial nature of the VA system wherein the Secretary provides claimants with assistance in submitting and substantiating claims.
Although there is no statutory or regulatory definition of “sympathetic reading,” it is clear from the purpose of the doctrine that it includes a duty to apply some level of expertise in reading documents to recognize the existence of possible claims that an unsophisticated pro se claimant would not be expected to be able to articulate clearly. Cf. Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1283 (holding that the duty to sympathetically read submissions does not apply to pleadings through counsel).
it is precisely because unsophisticated claimants cannot be presumed to know the law and plead claims based on legal elements that the Secretary must look at the conditions stated and the causes averred in a pro se pleading to determine whether they reasonably suggest the possibility of a claim for a benefit under title 38, regardless of whether the appellant demonstrates an understanding that such a benefit exists or of the technical elements of such a claim.
Finally, we hold that it was also error for the Board to suggest that it was limiting the material being reviewed to the “four corners” of the application and the statement in support of the claim. Cf. EF v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991) (holding that VA’s duty to give a liberal reading to an appeal of an RO decision applies to “all documents or oral testimony submitted prior to the B[oard] decision”).
allege negligence or lack of skill, measuring the appellant’s submissions against a strict pleading requirement is fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of a sympathetic reading and, therefore, constituted legal error by the Board. The application of such a pleading requirement violates the duty to sympathetically read submissions because it required the appellant to demonstrate a level of sophistication that would render moot the duty to sympathetically read his pleadings. In other words, it is precisely because unsophisticated claimants cannot be presumed to know the law and plead claims based on legal elements that the Secretary must look at the conditions stated and the causes averred in a pro se pleading to determine whether they reasonably suggest the possibility of a claim for a benefit under title 38, regardless of whether the appellant demonstrates an understanding that such a benefit exists or of the technical elements of such a claim. The Board’s suggestion that the appellant was required to articulate a specific intent to “claim . . . compensation benefits under the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. 1151” is similarly flawed. R. at 8, 9.
we conclude that the Federal Circuit has neither overruled the pending claim doctrine articulated in Norris nor created a general doctrine of sub silentio denials that supplants the pending claim doctrine. We conclude Deshotel and Andrews stand for the proposition that, where an RO decision discusses a claim in terms sufficient to put the claimant on notice that it was being considered and rejected, then it constitutes a denial of that claim even if the formal adjudicative language does not “specifically” deny that claim. Because we find no such denial in this case, the appellant is correct that we have jurisdiction over his appeal because it is not a collateral attack on the final 1986 RO decision.
Treating the Secretary’s failure to sympathetically read and adjudicate a reasonably raised claim as a pending claim benefits veterans because it protects their appellate rights and works no hardship on the Secretary in that it requires only that each claim be specifically addressed.
the Federal Circuit’s holding in Andrews has on this case. Specifically, the Court referred to Andrews’ conclusion that “when VA violates Roberson[ v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001),] by failing to construe the veteran’s pleadings to raise a claim, such claim is not considered unadjudicated but the error is instead properly corrected through a [clear and unmistakable error (CUE)] motion.” 421 F.3d at 1284.
Veterans benefits litigation is frequently piecemeal. Claims made in a single document may be decided by separate rating decisions if some need development while others do not. See VA Adjudication Procedure Manual (M21-1) Part III para. 2.01(h)(1)(b) (“Identifying Partial Grants”); see also Amicus PVA Br., Exhibit C (VA Adjudication Procedure Manual Rewrite, Part III, Subpart IV, Chapter 6, Section A (“Partial and deferred Rating Decisions”)). Furthermore, quite often a veteran will not submit a single document. Instead, he will submit a continuous stream of evidence and correspondence. Rather than holding all the claims until every one is ready to be decided, the Secretary develops and decides multiple claims separately-often over a period of years. A veteran could easily submit what he believes to be a claim and receive from the Secretary an adjudication of a previously raised claim for the same disability. The veteran could then submit more correspondence on the claim he was trying to raise and receive a request from the Secretary for evidence or to report for an examination. There could be years of intervening appeals, remands, and revised decisions before the claim is actually granted and the assignment of the effective date reveals that the Secretary did not recognize the initial submission as a claim for the benefit. In the meantime, the decision that sub silentio denied the claim that the appellant alleges was reasonably raised has become final and can only be challenged for CUE. Once again, the veteran would have been denied direct review of the sub silentio denial because he had no reason to know that was an issue at the time he could have appealed that decision.
disagreement as to which document raised a claim until after an effective date is assigned. Veterans benefits litigation is frequently piecemeal.
Rather than holding all the claims until every one is ready to be decided, the Secretary will develop and decide multiple claims separately-often over a period of years. A savvy veteran could easily submit what he believes to be a claim and receive from the Secretary an adjudication of a previously raised claim for the same disability. The veteran could then submit more correspondence on the claim he was trying to raise and receive a request from the Secretary for evidence or to report for an examination.
decisions before the claim is actually granted and the assignment of the effective date reveals that the Secretary did not recognize the initial submission as a claim for the benefit. In the meantime, the decision that sub silentio denied the claim that the appellant alleges was reasonably raised has become final and can only be challenged for CUE.
Arie M. Michelsohn, of Washington, D.C., with whom Mark R. Lippman of La Jolla, California was on the brief, for the appellant.
Jeffrey Schueller, with whom Tim S. McClain, General Counsel; R. Randall Campbell, Assistant General Counsel; Carolyn F. Washington, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Lavinia A. Derr were on the brief, all of Washington, D.C., for the appellee.
through counsel a December 12, 2003, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) that denied entitlement to an effective date earlier than April 15, 1992, for the grant of compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151 for residuals of a pneumonectomy. Record (R.) at 1-10. The parties each filed briefs, and the appellant filed a reply brief. Subsequently, the Court sua sponte ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing what impact, if any, the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005), has on this case.
Thereafter, the Court heard oral arguments in the case. For the reasons that follow, the Court will vacate the Board decision and remand the matter for further proceedings.
which contained the instruction that these items should be completed only if the applicant is applying for “non-service-connected pension.” R. at 25- 26.
am unable to continue in my skillful trade. R. at 34. On August 14, 1986, the RO denied a claim for non-service-connected pension benefits because he was not considered permanently unemployable. R. at 28. The appellant did not appeal that decision.
January 20, 2000, the RO awarded a 60% disability rating, effective from October 7, 1996. R. at 456-59. The appellant filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) in May 2000, and the RO issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) in February 2002 assigning an earlier effective date of April 15, 1992. R. at 461, 470-77. The veteran perfected his appeal to the Board. R. at 479.
than April 15, 1992. R. at 1- 10. In denying the appellant’s request for an earlier effective date, the Board determined, inter alia, that neither his May 1986 application for benefits nor his August 1986 statement in support of claim could have been construed as a claim for compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, and therefore, an effective date back to 1986 was not warranted. R. at 8-9. In reaching this conclusion, the Board stated: “There is nothing in the four corners of [the May 1986 application] that showed an intent that the veteran was claiming compensation benefits under the provisions of 38 U.S.C. 1151.
the provisions of 38 U.S.C. 1151. Again, the veteran was not claiming that the surgery was done improperly or that VA had committed negligence or showed lack of proper skill in performing the pneumonectomy.” R. at 9.
Based on this analysis, the Board concluded that the preponderance of the evidence was against finding that the veteran had filed a claim under section 1151 in 1986. R. at 9.
On appeal, the appellant asserts that the Board erred in 2003 when it determined that his May 1986 and August 1986 filings did not constitute informal claims for compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which would have entitled him to the assignment of an earlier effective date.
Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 3-9; see Norris v. West, 12 Vet.App. 413 (1999) (holding that when an RO fails to adjudicate a reasonably raised claim it remains pending). In this regard, he maintains that VA had a duty to sympathetically read his pro se pleadings and determine all potential claims raised by the evidence, and therefore, the Board erred when it treated his 1986 application as one exclusively for pension benefits. Br. at 4-5. In response, the Secretary maintains that there was no indication in either filing that demonstrated an intent by the appellant that he was claiming benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151. Secretary’s Br. at 4-10.
because a pro se claimant is not presumed to know the contents of title 38 or to be able to identify the specific legal provisions that would entitle him to compensation. Again, there would be no need for the duty to sympathetically read pleadings if pro se claimants had encyclopedic knowledge of veterans law.
it was limiting the material being reviewed to the “four corners” of the application and the statement in support of the claim. Cf. EF v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991) (holding that VA’s duty to give a liberal reading to an appeal of an RO decision applies to “all documents or oral testimony submitted prior to the B[oard] decision”). While it is not clear in the record that there were any other submissions by the appellant in connection with his 1986 application, the Board’s articulation of a “four corners” standard for reviewing the appellant’s pleadings is overly formal in a system where the Secretary must take a sympathetic view of an appellant’s pleadings to determine whether a claim has been made.
and intent of the claimant, as provided below”); M21-1, Part III, para. 2.02(a) (2005) (essentially same as above but without reference to item numbers on Form 21- 526); M21-1, para. 21.01(d) (1983-1990) (“Combined Claim for Compensation and Pension”) (“If the information specified” in both subparagraphs b (regarding claims for compensation) and c (regarding claim for pension) above is furnished, VA is to consider it “a claim for both benefits,” and “[i]f there is any doubt as to which benefits is sought,” VA is to adjudicate “both phases of the claim”); M21-1, Part III, para. 2.02(d) (2005) (essentially same). If the Board concludes that such a claim was raised, it must decide whether that claim was ever adjudicated or whether it was still pending at the time of the April 15, 1992, correspondence from the veteran. Based on its factual findings, the Board must address whether the appellant is entitled to an effective date earlier than April 15, 1992, for the grant of benefits under section 1151.
Accordingly, the December 12, 2003, Board decision is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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