Source: http://thecomplexlitigator.com/?offset=1482174338397&category=Civil+Procedure%3A+California+Courts
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:19:52+00:00

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The doctrine of continuous accrual serves to prevent the inequitable circumstance where one act of malfeasance is used to create immunity in perpetuity for even very recent bad acts. In Gilkyson, et al. v. Disney Enterprises, Inc., et al., the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Seven) found that the doctrine of continuous accrual should apply to a royalty contract for song reproduction rights.
Terry Gilkyson, a successful songwriter in the 1950’s and 1960’s. He wrote a number of songs for the animated film The Jungle Book, one of which was used in the movie. Gilkyson signed single-song contracts with Disney’s predecessor-in-interest, Walt Disney Productions, that obligated it to pay Gilkyson specified royalties for sales of sheet music and for licensing or other disposition of the mechanical reproduction rights. Disney paid Gilkyson over the years and, after his death in 1999, his heirs royalties for sheet music and for audio reproductions of Gilkyson’s songs (vinyl records, compact discs (CDs) and digital downloads). However, Disney did not pay, and has never paid, Gilkyson or his heirs royalties for the use of his songs in any audiovisual medium, including digital video disc recordings (DVDs). The heirs of Gilkyson sued Disney Enterprises, Inc. and other entities, alleging Disney had breached its contractual obligation to pay royalties in connection with the licensing or other disposition of the mechanical reproduction rights to Gilkyson’s songs. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit after sustaining Disney’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, ruling the Gilkyson heirs’ causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
Here, as in Aryeh, Disney’s obligation to pay royalties based on its licensing or other disposition of the mechanical reproduction rights to Gilkyson’s songs was unquestionably a continuing one. As alleged in the first amended complaint (consistent with the original complaint), the parties agreed in paragraph 6 of the single-song agreements that Gilkyson “will receive as a royalty ‘[an] amount of money equal to Fifty Percent (50%) of the net amount received by our music publisher on account of licensing or other disposition of mechanical reproduction rights in and to material so written by you.’” The first amended complaint also alleged Disney had issued quarterly royalty statements to Gilkyson and, after his death, to his heirs. The continuing nature of the obligation to pay periodic royalties renders each breach of that obligation separately actionable. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1201; see Armstrong, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392 [contract to provide periodic oil and gas royalties was severable, with each failure of the continuing obligation to pay a proper royalty separately actionable and subject to its own limitation period].) The result is that, while portions of the Gilkyson heirs’ contract claim are undoubtedly time-barred, the action is timely as to those breaches occurring within the four-year limitations period preceding the filing of the original lawsuit.
Slip op., at 8-9. The Court noted that it was not resolving the substantive issue, raised by Disney, of whether use of songs in DVDs and other audiovisual media was governed by the same portion of the agreement that governed mechanical reproduction.
Agencies love their power. They grow like a cancer, absorbing more and more of it from the body politic. But every now and then a court reminds an agency that its power is limited by the terms of its statutory authority. For instance, in Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center (Feb. 10, 2015), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) did just that with regard to a provision of an IWC Wage Order.
Health care workers sued their hospital employer in a putative class and private attorney general enforcement action for alleged Labor Code violations and related claims. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the hospital illegally let health care employees waive their second meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours. Under the Labor Code, employers are required to provide two meal periods for shifts longer than 12 hours. But an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) authorizes employees in the health care industry to waive one of those two required meal periods on shifts longer than 8 hours. The trial court, finding the IWC Wage Order valid, and granted summary judgment and denied class certification on that basis.
Slip op., at 8. In its discussion, the Court cited frequently to Bearden v. U.S. Borax, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 4th 429 (2006), which held that another provision of a Wage Order issued by the IWC was invalid as an act inconsistent with statutory provisions.
The Court then directed the trial court to determine the retroactive application of portions of the Court’s holding, since the issue of invalidity was not evaluated by the trial court, holding that “with the exception of plaintiffs’ premium wage claims based on section 226.7, the retroactive application of our decision must be litigated on remand.” The Court concluded that “there is no compelling reason of fairness or public policy that warrants an exception to the general rule of retroactivity for our decision partially invalidating section 11(D).” Slip op., at 17.
Evidence Code section 1414 provides: “A writing may be authenticated by evidence that: [¶] (a) The party against whom it is offered has at any time admitted its authenticity; or [¶] (b) The writing has been acted upon as authentic by the party against whom it is offered.” The Coats declaration satisfies both subdivisions.
Further, while Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 244 did say the declaration of the plaintiff’s attorney was not proper authentication for the disputed letter, the critical problem was that, “Plaintiff’s [own] declaration did not mention the letter.” The same is not true in this case.
Here, Gerard’s own declaration (an exhibit to the Coats declaration) states: “Attached as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of a portion of my time records from August of 2004 through March of 2008, which were produced by Defendant in this litigation. Also attached as Exhibit B are true and correct copies [of] a portion of my wage records from August of 2004 through March of 2008, which were produced by Defendant in this litigation.” A comparison of the bates numbers in Exhibit B reveals they are the same as the relevant documents in Exhibits 7 and 8.
Slip op., at 18. The Court concluded its analysis of the summary judgment motion by finding that triable issues of fact were shown by the plaintiffs.
McElroy and Carl argue the court improperly denied class certification for several reasons. Among other things they cite as an abuse of discretion the court’s community interest analysis based on its erroneous “legal assumption that ‘liability is not established by an illegal policy.’” Plaintiffs contend that assumption is contrary to the holding of Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 1033, and Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 232. We conclude this argument has merit.
Slip op., at 20. The Court remanded the matter for further consideration of the other aspects of certification that were not fully considered by the trial court.
Vasquez v. CA School of Culinary Arts (pub. ord. September 26, 2014) (Second Appellate District, Division Two) is ostensibly about an award of attorney's fees following the plaintiffs' successful opposition of a motion to quash their electronic records subpoena directed to student loan servicing entity Sallie Mae, Inc. After all, the Court describes the appeal as follows: "Sallie Mae, Inc. (Sallie Mae) appeals from an order awarding plaintiffs and respondents Daniel Vasquez, et al. (collectively, plaintiffs) $11,487 in attorney fees and costs incurred after plaintiffs successfully opposed Sallie Mae’s motion to quash a business records subpoena seeking electronically stored information pertaining to student loans made to them by Sallie Mae." Slip op., at 2.
The motion to quash was premised on the ground that the subpoena was improper because it required Sallie Mae to do more than produce records as they already exist and that Sallie Mae could not be compelled to perform research, or to compile data through a programming effort in order to create a spreadsheet.
Slip op., at 8. Citing Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D 674 (N.D.Cal. 2006), the Court held that "a nonparty cannot avoid complying with a subpoena seeking electronically stored information on the ground that it must create new code to format and extract that information from its existing systems." Slip op., at 9.
Until California Courts uniformly depart from this holding, or the statutory law is modified, it looks like federal courts will supply strong guidance in on the questions that arise during electronic discovery.
When despicable loan modification practices meet desperate homeowners filing their own lawsuit, you get Fleet v. Bank of America (pub ord. September 24, 2014), from the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate, Division Three).
In Luckey v. Superior Court (July 22, 2014), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Three), the Court considered a writ following the denial of a stipulation to utilize a temporary judge to handle a class settlement approval. Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging violation of FACTA arising from printing “more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date” on an electronically printed receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the transaction. (15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g).) The operative complaint alleged causes of action for violation of FACTA, negligence, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff defined the putative class as “All individuals who purchased merchandise using a personal credit card or personal debit card at any retail store operated by Defendant within the United States during the Class Period2 who: [¶] Subclass A: Were issued an electronically printed receipt that reflected more than the last five digits of the card; and/or [¶] Subclass B: Were issued an electronically printed receipt that reflected the card's expiration date....” Plaintiff sought, on behalf of the class, damages of between $100 and $1000 for each receipt which violated FACTA (with separate damages for each violation), punitive damages, and reasonable attorney fees. Plaintiff also sought an order declaring that Cotton On's credit and debit card receipt practices violate FACTA and an order enjoining Cotton On from continuing to do so. No responsive pleading was filed. The only other documents filed in this case consisted of stipulations for continuance of the initial status conference, and the stipulation for appointment of a temporary judge which is at issue in this writ proceeding. Plaintiff represented that, from the time the complaint was filed, the parties engaged in “informal discovery and exchanged information” in preparation for a mediation.
The mediation was held before a retired superior court judge. A class action settlement was reached at the mediation, and memorialized in a written settlement agreement. It is a class settlement, defining the settlement class as “all individuals who purchased merchandise using a personal credit card or personal debit card at any retail store operated by Cotton On within the United States since May 9, 2008, who were issued an electronically printed receipt that reflected more than the last five digits of the card and/or were issued an electronically printed receipt that reflected the card's expiration date.” It excludes persons who validly opt out of the class.
Under the terms of the settlement, the class was to receive compensation in the form of “Merchandise Credits,” which was really a $5 credit on any transaction at or exceeding $25 at one of Cotton On's retail stores, during one pre-selected week. Notice was to be provided to the class by means of e-mail notice to be provided “to all [Cotton On]'s customers in the United States for whom [Cotton On] possesses a valid e-mail address.” Notice would also be given on Cotton On's website and near each of its retail stores' cash registers.
Cotton On agreed to fund the settlement in the amount of $1,000,000. Of that amount, the parties agreed that Luckey's counsel could seek an award of attorney's fees and costs in an amount of $302,000. The parties also agreed that Luckey himself could receive a payment of $5,000 as class representative, and that $135,000 would be allocated to the administrative costs of the settlement.
In sum the settlement provided as for: (1) $5,000 paid to Luckey (whereas each class member would receive, at most, a merchandise credit for one one-thousandth of that amount); (2) $302,000 paid to Luckey's counsel (for work which, to that point, consisted of filing a complaint and amended complaint, and preparing for and attending a one-day mediation); and (3) a one-week $5 off $25 sale, of which Cotton On would send notice to its e-mail customer list.
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties stipulated for appointment of a temporary judge to hear the matter “until final determination thereof.” Specifically, the parties intended to submit to the temporary judge the issues related to preliminary and final approval of the class action settlement. The same retired judge who had served as the mediator in this matter was identified by the parties as the proposed temporary judge. The temporary judge would be privately compensated by the parties.
The stipulation was presented to the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division, as required by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Local Rules, rule 2.24(a)(1). On June 2, 2014, the court issued a minute order declining to approve the stipulation. The court's analysis explained that, although plaintiff’s counsel could stipulate to the appointment of the temporary judge on behalf of the plaintiff, the “submitted papers do not demonstrate that the named plaintiffs or the attorneys are authorized to speak for all class members.” Without the stipulation of all putative class members, the case could not be transferred to a temporary judge. The plaintiff filed a petition for a writ to compel appointment of the temporary judge. The Court of Appeal issued an Order to Show cause.
In this case, Luckey suggests that the Superior Court lacked standing to oppose his writ petition because the Superior Court “has presented no evidence that the issues presented impact the operations or procedures of the Court or that the decision will impose any financial obligations on the court's operations.” The argument is puzzling given the arguments Luckey makes in support of his petition. First, Luckey argues that he is, in fact, challenging a procedure of the court, not merely an isolated ruling. Luckey represents that the Superior Court previously “routinely issued orders appointing temporary judges to preside over class action matters,” but, “in or around November 2013,” the court “stopped” approving those stipulations and began denying them. Second, Luckey argues at length, although without evidentiary basis, that the court's financial obligations are, in fact, at issue. Luckey argues that lengthy delays are now the reality in class action litigation, and that parties should be permitted to avoid these delays by the use of temporary judges—a procedure which, according to Luckey, would “alleviate[ ] space for other litigants” at Superior Court. Indeed, Luckey represents that the Superior Court previously appointed temporary judges to serve in class action matters “in part[ ] due to congested and backlogged dockets.” As the Superior Court's procedures and financial obligations are at issue, the Superior Court has a right to appear.
[W]hile Luckey and Cotton On were the only “parties litigant” at the time of the stipulation to the temporary judge, they were also the only parties who could be bound by such a stipulation. As the conceded purpose of the stipulation was to bind all putative class members to the stipulation, and they could not be bound until they had been given notice and an opportunity to appear, the stipulation was ineffective. The state Constitution provides that, for a stipulation to a temporary judge to be effective, that stipulation must be made by the parties litigant. In a pre-certification class action, the parties litigant have not yet been identified; thus, no such stipulation can be effectively made.
Our consideration of the applicable rules of court leads us to the same conclusion. California Rules of Court, rule 2.835(b) governs requests to intervene in matters pending before temporary judges. It states, in pertinent part, “A motion for leave to file a complaint for intervention in a case pending before a temporary judge requested by the parties must be filed with the court and served on all parties and the temporary judge. The motion must be heard by the trial court judge to whom the case is assigned or, if the case has not been assigned, by the presiding judge or his or her designee. If intervention is allowed, the case must be returned to the trial court docket unless all parties stipulate ... to proceed before the temporary judge.” In other words, when a party seeks to intervene in a matter pending before a temporary judge, that party's right to intervene must be determined by the trial court, not the temporary judge. Furthermore, if intervention is permitted, the case must be returned to trial court unless the intervenor also agrees to the temporary judge.

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