Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-%C2%A7-205/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:45:51+00:00

Document:
As the petitioner correctly contends, CPLR 205(a) applies not only to actions but also to special proceedings under CPLR article 78 (see Matter of Morris Inv. v Commissioner of Fin. of City of N.Y. , 69 NY2d 933; Matter of Winston v Freshwater Wetlands Appeals Bd. , 224 AD2d 160). The toll of CPLR 205(a) would not apply, however, if the prior proceeding was dismissed on the merits; thus, the court must determine whether the order dismissing the prior proceeding is entitled to res judicata effect (see Yonkers Contr. Co. v Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp ., 93 NY2d 375, 380).
Here, the prior proceeding was dismissed after being marked off the calendar. Contrary to the Authority's contention, "[a] dismissal of an action by being marked off the Trial Calendar is not a dismissal on the merits," and "[a] new action on the same theory is therefore not barred by the doctrine of res judicata" (Lewin v Yedvarb , 61 AD2d 1025, 1026; see Morales v New York City Hous. Auth ., 302 AD2d 571, 571; Gallo v Teplitz Tri-State Recycling , 254 AD2d 253, 253-254; Medalie v Jacobson , 120 AD2d 652). Moreover, there is nothing in the order denying the petitioner's motion to restore the prior proceeding to the calendar which suggests that the prior proceeding was dismissed with prejudice (see Gallo v Teplitz Tri-State Recycling , 254 AD2d at 254).
Its a long decision, click the case to read the rest.
Zaborowski v Local 74, Serv. Employees Intl. Union, AFL-CIO, 2012 NY Slip Op 00366 (2nd Dept., 2012).
"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) on statute of limitations grounds, the moving defendant must establish, prima facie, that the time in which to commence the action has expired. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to raise an issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations is tolled or is otherwise inapplicable" (Baptiste v Harding-Marin, 88 AD3d 752, 753; see Rakusin v Miano, 84 AD3d 1051, 1052).
Here, in opposition to the appellant's prima facie showing that the time in which to commence this action has expired, the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to CPLR 205(a). CPLR 205(a) is not applicable to the instant case, since the plaintiff's similar and timely commenced federal action was terminated by [*2]means of a voluntary discontinuance pursuant to a stipulation which contains no express statement of intent to preserve the right to commence a new action (see Naval v Lehman Coll., 303 AD2d 662; Kourkoumelis v Arnel, 238 AD2d 313; cf. George v Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 NY2d 170, 180).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the appellant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it as time-barred.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death on behalf of the decedent, his wife, prior to obtaining letters of administration. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice on the ground that he lacked legal capacity to sue. The Supreme Court dismissed the action without prejudice to the commencement of a new action pursuant to CPLR 205(a). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that, since he ultimately obtained limited letters of administration, the Supreme Court should have granted him leave to amend the caption and complaint instead of dismissing the action. However, the plaintiff did not cross-move or even request such relief in his opposing papers and submitted only expired letters of administration. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint without prejudice (see Carrick v Central Gen. Hosp., 51 NY2d 242; George v Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 NY2d 170; Mendez v Kyung Yoo, 23 AD3d 354; Krainski v Sullivan, 208 AD2d 904; Ballav v Deepdale Gen. Hosp., 196 AD2d 520).
I haven't seen 205 pop up in a while.
The NYLJ has something special for you.
And onto the law. Yesterday's Law Journal had one of those special fancy pants pull out sections: Court of Appeals and Appellate Practice. One of the sections, indeed, the most important section is, Civil Practice: Substantive Impact of the CPLR. Sure, there are other sections, but you didn't come here for them. You can here to see if I would actually fight a statue of a cartoon character and read about the CPLR.
The section covers, among other things CPLR CPLR § 205(a), CPLR § 5511, CPLR § 5304, CPLR § 901(a).
In his discussion of class actions, namely CPLR 901(a), he refers to City of New York v Maul, 14 NY3d 499 (Ct. App. 2010), another case I managed to miss.
There's more. But you have to go read it for yourself.
Norman A. Olch, blogger and appellate guru, provides a several book reviews, including Making Your Case, by Scalia and Garner. Everyone should read it. You shouldnt need him to tell you to, but, if it that's what it takes, then fine.
Harry Steinberg has a must read section on how not to completely screw up your appeal. Part of it involves preserving the issues for appeal. A decision came out today on just that issue: Arrieta v Shams Waterproofing, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 06508 (App. Div., 1st 2010).
I might add some more later.
1. I'm recycling facebook updates today.
2. For more cases discussing what it means to be "aggrieved" click HERE. I think all of them are from the Appellate Division, Second Department. Mixon v TBV, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 05521 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010) is the most recent and probably the most useful.
Author DMGPosted on August 31, 2010 October 18, 2018 Categories Appellate Procedure, Books, CPLR § 205, CPLR § 5304, CPLR § 5511, CPLR § 901, Ct. App., [App Div 1st Dept], [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on The NYLJ has something special for you.
Recently the New York Court of Appeals and 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to discuss the recently amended CPLR § 205(a). First, the New York Court of Appeals. Underlying this decision is the Atlantic Yards fight that has been going on for some time. For more on the substance of the case, and its potential impact, head over to The Legal Satyricon and Popehat.
Petitioners’ initial challenge to ESDC’s determination authorizing condemnation of their properties was made in a timely federal court action. The gist of that action was that the disputed condemnation was not supported by a public use and thus violated the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution…In its answer, respondent, while defending the challenged determination on the merits, sought the petition’s dismissal on the ground that it had not been timely brought.
While the concurrence protests that failure to bar this proceeding because it was not commenced within 30 days of subject condemnation determination will impair the Legislature’s comprehensive plan for prompt adjudication of such determinations, this overlooks that it is not in the main the availability of CPLR 205 (a) that has delayed this condemnation, but the availability of a federal forum. Petitioners had every right to litigate their federal claims in federal court and to include in their federal action a supplemental state law cause of action (28 USC § 1367 [a]; City of Chicago v International Coll. of Surgeons, 522 US 156, 169, 171 ). And, even without a state tolling provision, petitioners would have had the right under federal law to recommence their unadjudicated pendant state law claim in state court at the federal action’s conclusion (28 USC § 1367 [d]). However much they may have wished to streamline the process, it was not within the power of state legislators to deprive condemnees of access to federal court to litigate federal constitutional public use issues or to limit the federal courts’ jurisdiction to adjudicate supplemental state law claims (see TBK Partners v Western Union Corp., 675 F2d 456, 460 n 3 [2d Cir 1982], citing Railway Co. v Whitton’s Administrator, 80 US [13 Wall] 270, 286 ; see also Marshall v Marshall, 547 US 293, 298-299, 313 ). This being the case, it is practically beside the point to cavil about the frustration of the state legislative design.
The decision from the Second Circuit discusses the old 205(a), and ultimately dismisses the lawsuit as untimely. You can find the decision over at Full Court Pass, where I found it. I have a comment there. With the recent amendment to § 205, and few decisions discussing the statute, these two cases provide some valuable insight. Neither case discusses what will happen when a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, where the court made none of the required findings.
(a) New action by plaintiff.
law and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff's claim (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; see also Sheridan v Town of Orangetown, 21 AD3d 365).
the record are not entitled to a presumption of truth (see Lutz v Caracappa, 35 AD3d 673, 674l; Matter of Loukoumi, Inc., 285 AD2d 595).
his or her employment (see Center v Hampton Affiliates, 66 NY2d at 784).
trigger the adverse interest exception to the in pari delicto doctrine.
the agent was acting in the scope of his or her employment (see Center v Hampton Affilliates, 66 [*4]NY2d at 784).
knowledge of it" (Wight v Bank America Corp., 219 F3d 79, 87).
or another's purposes (Center v Hampton Affiliates, 66 NY2d at 785).
with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from that order are brought up for [*2]review and have been considered on appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501[a]).
days of service of the answer (see CPLR 3211[e]).
triable issue of fact in response thereto (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320).
CPLR R.3211 Roundup with a smattering of CPLR § 308. CPLR § 205(a) too.
plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint" (Sheridan v Carter, 48 AD3d 444, 445; see International Oil Field Supply Servs. Corp. v Fadeyi, 35 AD3d 372, 375).
plaintiff Frank J. Stubbolo under Indictment Nos. 724/02 and 4133/03.
prosecutorial immunity (see Buckley v Fitzsimmons, 509 US 259, 269-270 ; Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 430-31 ; Hill v City of New York, 45 F3d 653, 661 [2d Cir 1995]).
state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a], ).
of the legal profession'" at that time (quoting Darby & Darby v VSI Intl., 95 NY2d 308, 313 ).
the requisite level of skill and care must await expert testimony (compare Merlin Biomed Asset Mgt., LLC v Wolf Block Schorr & Solis-Cohen LLP, 23 AD3d 243  [expert testimony required], with Darby & Darby, supra [legal malpractice counterclaim dismissed on summary judgment]).
Author DMGPosted on July 5, 2009 Categories CPLR § 205, CPLR § 306-b, CPLR § 308, CPLR R. 3211, [App Div 1st Dept], [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on CPLR R.3211 Roundup with a smattering of CPLR § 308. CPLR § 205(a) too.
As you may recall, CPLR § 205(a) was recently amended giving failure to prosecute dismissals the benefit of 205(a)'s tolling provision, provided certain conditions are satisfied. This amendment was the subject of a recent NYLJ article by David Siegel. I posted about about it here. Justice Lehner addressed this issue in one of the first cases to meet the issue head on.
thus the action is time barred, is denied.
Bars 'Neglect to Prosecute' Dismissal," NYLJ, Sept. 15, 2008, p. 4, c.
Rules memorandum dated July 1, 2008, in opposition to the Amendment.
Siegel; New York Practice, 4 ed., § 376].
to prosecute dismissal is warranted.
regarding dismissal for neglect to prosecute the action.
neglect to prosecute particularly where it falls outside Rule 3216.
Amending CPLR § 205 (a) to provide uniformity would reestablish the original legislative intent of this chapter.
An identical memorandum was submitted by Senator Dale Volker in support of the Senate bill (S2677).
court issue an adjudication on the issue of general delay.
Daluise v. Sottile, supra, at p. 802; Downtown Acupuncture P.C. v.
2831979. (App. Term 2nd & 11th Districts).
decision constitutes the order of the court.
the commencement of a timely new action.
the motion to dismiss. We affirm.
case, the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of CPLR 205(a) (cf. English v Ski Windham Operating Corp., 263 AD2d 443); and the second action was timely commenced.

References: § 205
 § 5511
 § 5304
 § 901
 § 205
 § 5304
 § 5511
 § 901
 § 205
 § 1367
 § 1367
 § 205
 § 308
 § 205
 § 205
 § 306
 § 308
 § 308
 § 205
 § 205
 § 376
 § 205
 v. 
 v.