Source: http://www.themediationgroup.org/news/still-fresh-legal-cliche
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:46:02+00:00

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Holmes, before he got to the subject of negligence, was exploring early forms of liability. The thing that caused injury was liable, not the owner or master of the thing. By way of example, Holmes cites (at page 7 of“The Common Law”) a passage from Exodus: “If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall surely be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit.” The Greeks adopted that view: “[A] dog that had bitten a man was to be delivered up bound to a log four cubits long.” “The Common Law” at p. 7.
Harley, the recidivist dog (7 bites), got a better deal. His master was found negligent for harboring and inadequately restraining a vicious animal. The master’s insurer had to pay for the injuries Harley had inflicted. Callahan v. Quincy Ins. Co., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 260 (2000).
So what is the utility of Holmes stumble-kick aphorism? In one case the actor means to harm; in the other the harm is the product of a mistake, which includes a failure to adhere to community standards of what a reasonable person (which includes inanimate persons like corporations) would do. Ah, that reasonable woman or man of the law – defined by what? That’s for juries and judges.
In settlement discussions the utility of the stumble/kick metaphor is that it helps to defang anger and self-righteousness.
2. In law school, I sat in a class taught by Austin Wakeman Scott, the author of the then leading treatise on the law of trusts. Scott said to us, in a memorable moment, “Sometimes it is wise to rise above principle.” At first blush that sounds cynical. On further thought, it is wisdom. In the context of mediation, parties sometimes state their position is a matter of principle. Prescinding from whether this is conviction or posture, it is fair to observe that there may even be a conflict of principles. Professor Scott’s remark did not denigrate standing on principle. He was teaching that obdurate adherence to principle might cause the contending parties to suffer the fate of the disputants in Dickens’ “Bleak House.” The legal costs of their controversy consumed the property they were fighting about.
4. It is a hardy “good cliché” of administrative law that reviewing courts owe deference to the experience, competence, specialized knowledge and discretionary authority of an administrative agency. Van Munching Co. v. Alcoholic Bevs. Control Commn., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 309-310 (1996). Then again, while reviewing courts “make a deep bow” to the administrative agency, that deference is not one of supine abdication. Police Commr. of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 (2000).
5. Among the chestnuts of the law of contract is that an agreement to agree is no agreement at all. Rosenfeld v. United States Trust Co., 290 Mass. 210, 217 (1935). Yes, but there is the reciprocal principle that a contract should be interpreted to give it life and enforceable effect. Lafayette Place Assoc., 427 Mass. 509, 517 (1998).
We do know that the meaning of a document, if placed in doubt, is construed against the party that wrote it. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Constitution Reins Corp. , 416 Mass. 839,845 (1994) , Beatty v. NP Corp. 31 Mass. App. Ct. 609, 612 1991).
6. Disbelief of testimony does not support a finding that the contrary is true. Commonwealth v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491, 498 (1983). Kunkel v. Alger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 76,86 (1980).
7. The decision whether to grant a continuence is within the sound of discretion of the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Miles. 420 Mass. 67, 85 (1995).
8. Circumstantial evidence is competent evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Henry David Thoreau stated the proposition playfully: “Some circumstantial evidence is very strong evidence, as when you find a trout in the milk.” Commonwealth v. Walter, 10 Mass. App. Ct.
That formulation was the instruction of choice to juries in Massachusetts and elsewhere for some 150 years and deviation from the sacred text risked tripping the reversal wire. Toward the end of the 20th century, however, the United States Supreme Court threw cold water on the use of the phrase “moral certainty.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1994). Current language usage, the court thought, might make the phrase “moral certainty” might suggest to jurors something less than the very high degree of probability that “beyond a reasonable doubt” connotes.
This may be enough for one session of reflections on familiar phrases of the law. To be continued.

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