Source: https://www.robinskaplan.com/resources/articles/undesignated-hitters
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 13:02:31+00:00

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The outcomes of trials are increasingly dependent upon expert testimony. As a result, comprehensive knowledge of the procedures required to properly identify expert witnesses in state and federal courts is crucial. Failure to abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the California Code of Civil Procedure, and the California Evidence Code may result in an unexpected and unnecessary failure of proof at trial.
Perhaps nowhere are the expert witness procedures more complex than in the case of parties' employees who have expert knowledge of some kind. The procedures are complicated by the analyses required to determine which opinions are expert and which are merely percipient. Thus counsel must be familiar with the scope of permissible opinion testimony in state and federal courts by employees not designated as experts in light of the often blurry distinction between expert and percipient opinion testimony.
The general rule in federal court is that nondesignated witnesses, including employees, are barred from providing expert opinion testimony at trial pursuant to Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rather, under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a nondesignated employee may only provide testimony at trial in the form of opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony.
Outside the context of employees, perhaps the best example of witnesses who are experts but need not submit to the extensive reporting requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) are treating physicians who are percipient fact witnesses.7 Still, all identified experts whose opinions may be offered at trial must submit to a deposition,8 even if they are not required to comply with the reporting requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
Finally, Rule 26(a)(2)(C) governs the timing of expert disclosure. The rule provides alternatives: All discovery shall be conducted in the sequence directed by the court, or initial expert disclosures must take place at least 90 days before the trial date, with rebuttal expert disclosures occurring within 30 days of the presentation of an initial expert disclosure to which rebuttal is sought.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
Relying on the plain meaning of Rule 701, courts routinely have allowed employees and other lay witnesses to render lay opinion testimony on a variety of topics when the testimony is based on personal knowledge and helpful to the trier of fact.14 However, some courts have stretched the scope of Rule 701 by allowing employees to give lay opinion testimony that appears to closely approach expert opinion under Rule 702.
The personal knowledge of appellant's balance sheets acquired by Zeitz as Teen-Ed's accountant was clearly sufficient under Rule 602 to qualify him as a witness eligible under Rule 701 to testify to his opinion of how lost profits could be calculated and to inferences that he could draw from his perception of Teen-Ed's books.
These dual criteria provide federal court practitioners with a sound framework to evaluate and develop case strategy regarding the identification of employees as expert or percipient trial witnesses.
In California state courts, expert disclosure is governed by Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034. A demand to exchange expert witness information must be made no later than the 10th day after the initial trial date has been set, or 70 days before that trial date, whichever is later.25 Since Section 2034 does not expressly permit courts or counsel to extend the time for making a demand, failure to make a timely demand may constitute a waiver of the right to present expert testimony at trial.
Once a demand is made, Section 2034(a)(1) requires that each party identify the name and address of every person whose expert opinion that party expects to offer at trial, or provide a statement that the party does not presently intend to offer expert testimony.26 A party must designate any witness who will offer opinion testimony on a subject sufficiently beyond common experience to assist the trier of fact.27 The designation must include not only those experts specially retained to provide testimony at trial but also individuals who may render opinions based on information perceived prior to litigation, including information acquired in the course of their job duties.
In addition, unlike federal courts, Section 2034(a)(2) specifically requires parties designating employees as expert witnesses to automatically provide an expert witness declaration under Section 2034(f)(2).28 In practice, lawyers seldom provide a declaration for employees who will offer testimony in the form of expert opinion at trial. Notably, however, Section 2034(a)(2) requires the production of an expert declaration by a party's employee irrespective of whether the employee is "retained" by the party.
A similar controlling question applies in federal and state courts: Is the subject of inquiry one of common knowledge that people of ordinary education would reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness, or is the matter beyond common experience that expert opinion would assist the trier of fact?33 In other words, does the employee's testimony add anything to the jury's common knowledge? If the answer is yes, counsel should designate the employee and provide a declaration.
The employee-expert scenario is not analogous to the situation involving a nonretained treating physician as discussed by the California Supreme Court in Schreiber v. Estate of Kaiser.34 The state supreme court held that a treating physician is not a retained expert for purposes of Section 2034(a)(2).35 Therefore, a treating physician need not provide an expert witness declaration in order to testify regarding a plaintiff's injuries and prognosis, or even regarding the standard of care or causation. However, if the treating physician provides testimony concerning matters that are outside the scope of the work he or she performed in treating the patient, then the physician is treated as a retained expert and counsel must comply with the declaration requirements of Section 2034(f)(2). Conversely, employee experts must provide a declaration under Section 2034(f)(2) merely by virtue of their status as employees.
Further, parties need not disclose the identity of employees who will provide strictly factual testimony. In Stone v. Foster, the defendant in a medical malpractice suit arising from a cosmetic procedure called another doctor who had performed a previous cosmetic procedure on the same patient.41 In precluding the doctor from testifying at trial, the trial court explained that the doctor had not been disclosed as an expert. The court of appeal reversed and explained that the defendant did not seek to elicit any opinion testimony (regarding, for example, the standard of care) but instead properly sought to obtain percipient testimony on whether the plaintiff was aware of the risk of the cosmetic procedure.
Given the increasing importance of expert testimony at trial, it is crucial that a party determine early in a case whether it will rely on its employees to provide trial testimony, and, if so, the nature and extent to which its employees will provide expert testimony. Compliance with expert disclosure rules will minimize unnecessary motion practice and avoid problems of proof at trial.
1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), 37(c).
2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A).
3 See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Further, Rule 703 provides that the facts or data on which the opinion is based may be made known to the expert at or before the trial and need not be admissible if reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field. See Fed. R. Evid. 703. In turn, Rule 705 states, "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefore without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." See Fed. R. Evid. 705.
4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
5 See Navajo Nation v. Norris, 189 F.R.D. 610, 613 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
6 See Kw Plastics v. United States Can Co., 199 F.R.D. 687, 690 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Signtech USA, Ltd., 177 F.R.D. 459, 460-61 (D. Minn. 1998).
7 See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(a)(2) ("The requirement of a written report in paragraph (2)(B), however, applies only to those experts who are retained or specially employed to provide such testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of a party regularly involve the giving of such testimony. A treating physician, for example, can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any requirement for a written report."). See also Sipes v. United States, 111 F.R.D. 59, 61 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("The Court further rules that it is improper to name treating physicians as expert witnesses where the information and opinions possessed by said physicians was obtained by virtue of their roles as actors or viewers of the transactions or occurrences giving rise to the litigation….Said physicians are percipient fact witnesses, and as such, the information and opinions they possess should be freely accessible to both parties to the present litigation, as would be the case with any other ordinary fact witness.").
8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) ("A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1)…is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed.").
10 See Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F. 2d 1290, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1988).
11 See Prentiss & Carlisle Co., Inc. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of Timberjack, Inc., 972 F. 2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F. 2d 1540, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's refusal to allow witness not listed as expert to testify concerning tests of a product involved in patent litigation).
12 Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F. 3d 1190, 1196-98 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
13 See Fed. R. Evid. 702.
14 United States v. Lawson, 653 F. 2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1981) (Opinion testimony regarding defendant's sanity was properly admitted.); United States v. McCullah, 745 F. 2d 350, 352 (6th Cir. 1984) (Testimony that tractor was hidden was admissible.). See also United States v. Sweeney, 688 F. 2d 1131, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that a PCP and methamphetamine drug user could testify as to identity of these drugs based on his prior use and knowledge and his sampling of the substance in question); United States v. Ranney, 719 F. 2d 1183, 1189 & n.11 (1st Cir. 1983) (permitting defrauded investors to testify regarding their investment); Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F. 2d 639, 643-44 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing the exclusion of lay opinion testimony about the value of stolen coins).
15 Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 620 F. 2d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980).
16 Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F. 2d 498, 510-12 (5th Cir. 1983).
17 Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F. 2d 1290, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1988).
18 State Office Sys., Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 762 F. 2d 843, 845-46 (10th Cir. 1985).
19 Joy Mfg. Co v. Sola Basic Indus., Inc., 697 F. 2d 104, 110-12 (3d Cir. 1982).
20 Eckert v. Aliquippa & S. R.R. Co., 828 F. 2d 183, 185 n.5. (3d Cir. 1987).
21 See Advisory Committee Notes to 2000 Amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 701 (internal citations omitted). See also Joseph, Emerging Expert Issues under the 1993 Disclosure Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 164 F.R.D. 97, 108 (1996) (noting that "there is no good reason to allow what is essentially surprise expert testimony," and that "the Court should be vigilant to preclude manipulative conduct designed to thwart the expert disclosure and discovery process.").
22 See Advisory Comm. Notes to 2000 Amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 701.
24 See Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
25 Code Civ. Proc. §2034(b).
26 Code Civ. Proc. §2034(f)(1); Kalaba v. Gray, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1416, 1419 (2002).
27 See Evid. Code §801.
28 Code Civ. Proc. §2034(a)(2), (f)(2); Bonds v. Roy, 20 Cal. 4th 140, 144 (1999); Kalaba, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 1421.
29 See Code Civ. Proc. §2034(a)(f)(2)(A)-(E).
30 Compare Evid. Code §720(a) with Fed. R. Evid. 702.
31 Estate of Toomes, 54 Cal. 509, 514 (1880).
32 Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 5 Cal. App. 4th 234, 274 (1992).
33 See Evid. Code §801; People v. Hernandez, 70 Cal. App. 3d 271, 280-81 (1977); People v. Arguello, 244 Cal. App. 2d 413, 420 (1966).
34 Schreiber v. Estate of Kaiser, 22 Cal. 4th 31 (1999).
36 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F. 3d 1101, 1106 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001); In re TMI Litig., 922 F. Supp. 997, 1003-04 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (Exclusion requires a showing of bad faith or failure to disclose when trial was imminent or in progress.). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (discussing duty to supplement incomplete or incorrect disclosure information).
37 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (providing that the facts known by consultants and their opinions are discoverable under a showing of "exceptional circumstances").
38 Code Civ. Proc. §2034(l).
39 Code Civ. Proc. §2034(m).
40 Stark v. City of Los Angeles, 168 Cal. App. 3d 276, 287 (1985), superseded by statute as stated in Thomas v. City of Richmond, 9 Cal. 4th 1154, 1161-62 (1995); Code Civ. Proc. §2034(m). See also Kennemur v. State of Cal., 133 Cal. App. 3d 907, 921-22 (1982); Mizel v. City of Santa Monica, 93 Cal. App. 4th 1059, 1067-68 (2001) (rejecting purported impeachment expert because undisclosed expert was expected to render contrary opinion, not to contradict underlying factual foundation of physician's direct testimony); Fish v. Guevara, 12 Cal. App. 4th 142, 145-46 (1993).
41 Stone v. Foster, 106 Cal. App. 3d 334, 351-52 (1980).
42 Kennedy v. Modesto City Hosp., 221 Cal. App. 3d 575, 580-81 (1990).
44 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). See also Quevedo v. Trans-Pac. Shipping, Inc., 143 F. 3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding district court's exclusion of expert testimony in summary judgment proceedings based on party's failure to designate the expert on a timely basis, and granting summary judgment).

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