Source: http://nyelaw.org/constitutional-rights-at-traffic-stops-101-field-sobriety-tests-blood-alcohol-supression/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:33:36+00:00

Document:
The Court’s holding, by its own express words, is very narrow. Mimms does not allow the police to order a driver from a vehicle except as a matter of safety (or as otherwise allowed under Terry) Mimms is not carte blanche for the police to order a driver from a vehicle.
Applying Mimms, the Michigan Court of Appeals expressly rejected a per se right of the police to order a driver from a vehicle, holding that there must be an allegation in support of officer safety or reasonable suspicion of a crime.
In People v Rizzo, 243 Mich App 151 (2000), the driver was pulled over for a broken license-plate light. Id. at 152 Solely on the basis of smelling alcohol, the police officer ordered the driver from the vehicle, then to perform field sobriety tests (which she failed), then to take a portable breath test (which she failed) then to take a Breathalyzer test (which she failed), and she was then arrested and charged.
The defendant/driver moved to suppress all of the alcohol-related evidence arguing that that the police had no lawful basis to order the driver from the car.
Therefore, under Rizzo, supra, before a police officer can order a driver from a vehicle, the officer must be able to: 1) articulate an actual or habitual need for safety, or 2) reasonable suspicion of a crime to warrant further Terry detention and investigation.
3. Once detained, the detention must be reasonable and may be extended if new, unrelated suspicions are aroused.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized at the traffic stop because “in the absence of independent reasonable suspicion, [the police officer’s] questions on matters unrelated to the traffic stop rendered the stop unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the shotgun was therefore ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.'” Id.
In other words, the overarching consideration is the officer’s diligence—i.e., his “persevering” or “devoted … application to accomplish [the] undertaking” of ascertaining whether the suspected traffic violation occurred, and, if necessary, issuing a ticket. … The question of the officer’s diligence, as with so much else in the Fourth Amendment context, is “determine[d] … under the totality of the circumstances….” United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 665 (6th Cir.1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997).
However, once the traffic stop is completed, and if there were no suspicions raised during the stop as a result of the police questioning, the traffic stop is over and the Fourth Amendment is reapplied immediately to further police conduct.
“Once the purpose of the initial traffic stop is completed, an officer cannot further detain the vehicle or its occupants unless something happened during the stop to cause the officer to have a ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity [is] afoot.’ ” Davis, 430 F.3d at 353; see United States v. Smith, 601 F.3d 530, 542 (6th Cir.2010); Torres–Ramos, 536 F.3d at 550. If an individual is held after the purpose of a traffic stop has been completed, the principles in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) apply. Everett, 601 F.3d at 488 (citing Hill, 195 F.3d at 264). A Terry stop “permits a police officer to briefly detain a person or property for investigative purposes if the officer has reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Davis, 430 F.3d at 354 (citing Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 543–44 (6th Cir.2002)).
10. the driver of the vehicle was not the registered owner of the vehicle, consistent with a drug courier.
“We first ask whether there was a proper basis for the stop, which is judged by examining whether the law enforcement officials were aware of specific and articulable facts which gave rise to reasonable suspicion. In answering this question, we examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the investigatory stop.
Once the defendant has alleged an illegal search or seizure, it is the prosecution’s burden to establish the legality of the police action. People v. White, 392 Mich. 404 (1974), cert den 420 U.S. 912 (1975).
Standardized field sobriety tests (“SFST”) must be performed by a police officer correctly. “… [In]correct administration … le[ads] to inaccurate interpretation of the results … ” and use of an inaccurately administered test in an affidavit for a search warrant for a blood sample is “at least reckless disregard for the truth” and is a basis to suppress any resulting evidence. People v Mullen, 282 Mich App 14, 24 (2008) In fact, any false statements of fact by the police officer in the affidavit as to the officers’ instructions on the SFSTs, the accused responses, failure to distinguish standardized factors, or other misrepresentations, are a basis to suppress evidence arising from a warrant based on such an affidavit. Id.
In Michigan, police officers obtain certification from the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards (“MCOLES”). MCL 28.609a The commission promulgates administrative rules and administers the education, training, and protocols for Michigan police officers. MCL 28.609 MCOLES adopted the NHSTA SFST standardized test battery for field sobriety testing and police officers are required to be trained in proper administration of the SFSTs.
Additionally, the NHTSA SFST training manual expressly provides that the tests are only “valid” when “administered in the prescribed standardized manner.” Further, it provides that “if any one of the standardized field sobriety test elements is changed, the validity is compromised.” Id.

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