Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/135/309.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:31:34+00:00

Document:
LINDA GATES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE SANTA CLARA COUNTY JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Sheldon Portman, Public Defender, and Stuart C. Rich, Deputy Public Defender, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Robert J. Logan, City Attorney, and George Rios, Deputy City Attorney, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Appellant, Linda Gates, was arrested for violation of San Jose Municipal Code 10.40.010 (hereafter the ordinance)--loitering [135 Cal. App. 3d 312] for the purpose of soliciting an act of prostitution. She challenges the ordinance on the grounds it is: (1) preempted by state law which fully occupies the field of criminal sexual conduct; (2) unconstitutionally vague for failure to give fair notice of the conduct it proscribes, and defective in its failure to provide uniform enforcement standards; (3) overbroad in making unlawful conduct protected by the First Amendment; and (4) violates federal and state equal protection guarantees by subjecting "known prostitutes and panderers" to discriminatory treatment.
Respondent People dispute appellant's standing to challenge the vagueness and overbreadth of the ordinance on the ground that her conduct clearly falls within that proscribed by it. Respondent also claims that the ordinance is simply a loitering law--which does not attempt to define criminal sexual conduct, and is thus not preempted by state law. According to respondent, the ordinance is clearly worded, and law enforcement officials are guided in enforcing it by probable cause standards which apply to all arrests. The People further argue that the ordinance does not threaten First Amendment rights and is therefore not overbroad. Finally, the People maintain that the classification of "known prostitutes and panderers" is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and so does not violate equal protection.
A misdemeanor complaint against appellant was filed on October 29, 1980, in respondent Santa Clara County Municipal Court, and assigned case No. C8029340.
Appellant demurred to the complaint, challenging the legality of section 10.40.010. The demurrer was overruled, and appellant filed a petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, also denied.
We express no opinion as to whether the standing issue would bar appellant if her case were before us on appeal: here she has challenged the ordinance by way of demurrer to the complaint fn. 3--and we have no factual record before us.
We thus read Aaron as standing for the rule that, reviewing and overruling a demurrer, we may consider vagueness problems arising from application generally and logically following from the terms of the ordinance, but not those which apply precisely and factually to the defendant. Plainly, a constitutional infirmity relating to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement can often be ascertained merely from reading an ordinance.
Language inThornhill v. Alabama (1939) 310 U.S. 88 [84 L. Ed. 1093, 60 S. Ct. 736], supports such an interpretation of Aaron. In Thornhill, the court stated: "The finding against petitioner was a general one. It did not specify the testimony upon which it rested. The charges were framed in the words of the statute and so must be given a like construction .... In these circumstances, there is no occasion to go behind the face of the statute or of the complaint for the purpose of determining [135 Cal. App. 3d 316] whether the evidence, together with the permissible inferences to be drawn from it, could ever support a conviction founded upon different and more precise charges. ... The State urges that petitioner may not complain of the deprivation of any rights but his own. It would not follow that on this record petitioner could not complain of the sweeping regulations here challenged." (Id, at p. 96 [84 L.Ed. at p. 1099].) The court proceeded to analyze the vagueness argument by examining the statute as enforced.
Our own high court has reached a similar conclusion. InPryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 238 [158 Cal. Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636], the constitutionality of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a), was challenged after declaration of a mistrial. The defendant objected to a retrial on the section 647, subdivision (a) charge on the grounds that the statute was facially unconstitutional. The court's review for "facial" vagueness included a consideration of both notice and enforcement infirmities which could be ascertained from a reading of the statute (thus supporting the idea that the "vagueness on its face" concept discussed in Aaron encompasses such a review).
We think it proper that a review of facial vagueness or overbreadth should include consideration of both notice and enforcement infirmities to the extent that they can be ascertained from reading the statute. Any other rule would preclude a defendant from claiming constitutional defects whenever it is claimed that his conduct falls precisely within the statutory proscriptions, in circumstances where the court would be powerless--for lack of an evidentiary record--to assess the true nature of such conduct.
[2a] Appellant next argues that San Jose Municipal Ordinance 10.40.010 is preempted by state law which regulates the full field of criminal sexual activity. Appellant views the ordinance as a pandering [135 Cal. App. 3d 317] and prostitution law, and submits that the area of criminal sexual activity has been preempted by the state.
The People maintain that the ordinance is an antiloitering law, not an ordinance regulating sexual activity; as such, pursuant to appellate decisions which have clearly ruled that the state has not fully occupied the field of loitering, it is not preempted.
Since, however, the ordinance also makes illegal conduct not prohibited by state criminal laws, remaining or loitering for the purpose of solicitation, it criminalizes conduct which is not embraced within existing state proscriptions against actual solicitation and prostitution.
The newly defined unlawful conduct is purportedly not simply solicitation, but loitering accompanied by acts or circumstances which indicate an intent to solicit an act of prostitution. For purposes of the preemption issue, the important factor is that the ordinance can be violated by conduct which does not amount to actual solicitation for criminal sexual activity.
We have found no case precisely in point.
In EWAP, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 97 Cal. App. 3d 179 [158 Cal. Rptr. 579], the court considered a municipal ordinance regulating the operation of picture arcades. A permit to operate such enterprises could be denied if the license application had knowingly allowed any sexual acts or solicitations in the arcade within the past two years. The ordinance also prohibited concealed or partially enclosed picture booths.
Finding that the purpose of the ordinance was not the regulation of lewd conduct pursuant to Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a) "a matter preempted by state law," the court concluded that the state [135 Cal. App. 3d 320] scheme regulating unlawful sexual conduct had not preempted the subject matter of the ordinance.
The same may not be said of the subject ordinance. First, it impinges on the fundamental right of free association. It creates a new category of crime, an indispensable element of which is an intention to violate state laws governing sexual conduct. The ordinance may not be violated except by a person who harbors an intent, a "purpose" of violating existing state statutes proscribing certain sexual activity. It has, in short, no other purpose than the regulation of sexual conduct and it merely attempts to create a new form of sexual crime akin to and yet different from, and vaguer, than criminal attempt.
Accordingly, we think the conduct at issue was intended to be and is preempted by state laws.
Having so concluded, we find it unnecessary to treat in detail the issue of vagueness. We will observe, however, that while the terms of the ordinance seem sufficiently definite to satisfy constitutional standards respecting fair notice (cf.Rose v. Locke (1975) 423 U.S. 48, 49-50 [46 L. Ed. 2d 185, 187-188, 96 S.Ct. 243]), grave problems arise in the enforcement context. No objective standards are described in the ordinance save one--that the offender must possess the status of "known prostitute" or "panderer." For the rest, plenary discretion is given the arresting authority, whose subjective judgment alone would determine whether sufficient "intent" accompanies the act of "loitering" or "remaining" in a public place.
Racnelli, P. J., and Bancroft, J., concurred.
"Unlawful Conduct. No person shall remain or loiter in or about any public place for the purpose of soliciting an act of prostitution or lewdness, if such person is a known panderer or prostitute, nor shall any such person procure or entice another to engage in or commit any act of prostitution or lewdness.
"(1) 'Public place' is any area generally visible to the public, including streets, sidewalks, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, automobiles (whether in motion or not), and buildings open to the public, including those which serve food or drink or provide entertainment, and including the driveways and entrances to such buildings or dwellings.
"(2) 'Soliciting' shall mean and include, repeatedly beckoning, stopping or attempting to stop passersby for the purpose of engaging in conversation; and/or repeatedly stopping or attempting to stop motor vehicles by an act of calling out, signalling, waving the arms or other bodily gestures.
"(3) 'Known prostitute or panderer' is a person who, within one year prior to the date of his or her arrest for violation of this section has, within the knowledge of the arresting officer, been convicted of any offense relating to the crime of prostitution or lewd conduct as defined in the California Penal Code or the San Jose Municipal Code. ..."
The People conceded in respondent court that the last phrase of the final paragraph of this ordinance--"nor shall any such person, procure or entice another to engage in or commit any act of prostitution or lewdness"--merely duplicates the state's "soliciting" law (Pen. Code, § 647, subds. (a) and (b)) and was stricken from the ordinance by respondent court. Therefore, the remainder of this memorandum shall concern itself only with the first portion of the ordinance.
FN 4. The People insist that an evidentiary record is available here: the police report of appellant's arrest which establishes at least probable cause to believe that appellant was loitering for the purpose of soliciting an act of prostitution as proscribed by the ordinance. In fact, the police report does include evidence which tends to establish a violation of the ordinance, several contacts which appellant had with police officers prior to her arrest, an oral admission made by appellant, as well as a prior arrest of appellant for prostitution.
But, the police report has not, at this point in the proceedings, been received as evidence. Since the present appeal is before us from an order overruling appellant's demurrer, we should proceed as if there is a lack of evidentiary matter in the record.
FN 5. We are mindful that a statute may be so clear in its wording as to apprise individuals of proscribed criminal conduct, but still suffer the infirmity of vagueness as applied, in that it does not provide a uniform standard for enforcement, as discussed infra.
FN 6. The analysis of appellant's vagueness claim herein will, therefore, be restricted to an examination of constitutional defects which can be ascertained from a reading of the ordinance. The term "vague on its face" will refer to the language of the ordinance and the fair notice requirement. The term "vagueness as applied" will describe the fair enforcement requirement.

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