Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/285/285mass192.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:48:22+00:00

Document:
GEORGE H. BROWN vs. ALEXANDER HENDERSON.SAME vs. CARRIE N. HENDERSON.
In an action of tort for personal injuries or death or damage to property, the presumption of due care on the part of the person injured or killed under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, s. 85, is not evidence and is operative only in the absence of credible evidence bearing on the conduct of that person; when there is such evidence, the presumption cannot aid the plaintiff.
Where, at the trial of an action for personal injuries, there was evidence which warranted a finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, there was no error in the refusal of rulings requested by the defendant that there "is no presumption that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care," and that "there is no [such] presumption" because "all the circumstances relating to the plaintiff's conduct are in evidence"; the first ruling requested was contrary to said s. 85, and the second assumed as proved facts which the jury might or might not find to have been proved.
At the trial above described, the trial judge instructed the jury in substance that there was such a presumption which "fades away" upon the introduction of evidence; that "the actual evidence . . . will control"; and that, while the plaintiff was "presumed to have been in the exercise of due care, when the evidence . . . [of his conduct] comes in," it was for the jury to say, "bearing in mind, of course, all the time the presumption," whether he had exercised due care. Upon exception by the defendant, the judge further instructed the jury as follows: "A presumption is not evidence; . . . and if there is no evidence as to the due care ... of ... [the plaintiff], then the presumption controls. When evidence is introduced then you are to consider the evidence. If you believe the evidence the presumption disappears; but just because somebody has said something and you do not believe a word of that evidence the presumption would control." Held, that, although there was error in the charge as first given in that it required the jury to bear the presumption in mind all the time, nevertheless, as the matter finally was left by the trial judge, no error appeared.
refused, and material portions of the judge's charge to the jury, are stated in the opinion. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in each action in the sum of $4,685. The defendants alleged exceptions.
J. S. McCann, for the plaintiff.
A. S. Allen, for the defendants.
whatever he did . . . then he cannot recover . . . . And if he was in the slightest degree careless, negligent, no matter what his injuries may have been, no matter how negligent the person who struck or hit him or did other injury to him may have been, he cannot recover. . . . But the burden of showing that he was not in the exercise of due care rests upon the defendant; whereas, the burden of showing negligence on the part of the defendant rests upon and is with the plaintiff." Counsel for the defendant then excepted to the portion of the charge to the effect that the jurors "were to bear the presumption in mind all the time, also that the presumption does not disappear until overcome by evidence." Thereupon the trial judge said: "I will instruct you on presumption again. A presumption is not evidence; it is merely a rule in reference to evidence; and if there is no evidence as to the due care in this case of Mr. Brown, then the presumption controls. When evidence is introduced then you are to consider the evidence. If you believe the evidence the presumption disappears; but jus.t because somebody has said something and you do not believe a word of that evidence the presumption would control." The defendants saved exceptions to "that last" and to the refusal to give their requests.
ing this statute in Duggan v. Bay State Street Railway, 230 Mass. 370, 378: "The presumption of due care created by the statute is not itself evidence. It is a simple rule to which resort is had when there is a failure of evidence. A presumption ordinarily is not evidence, but is a rule about evidence. . . . 'Presumptions ... are never allowed against ascertained and established facts. When these appear, presumptions disappear.' Lincoln v. French, 105 U. S. 614, 617. The presumption of the present statute is merely like numerous other presumptions. It stands only until the facts are shown." This statute is a highly important provision. It enables a plaintiff to make out a case sufficient to permit him to go to the jury by proving injury and damage due to the negligence of the defendant. It changed the preexisting law of this Commonwealth whereby, in addition to the factors just enumerated, a plaintiff was obliged also to prove due care on his own part in order to make out his case. The statute contains no provision as to when the presumption shall cease to be operative. It is a rebuttable presumption. Since, however, the statute creates merely a presumption and not evidence, such presumption can in the nature of things continue only while credible evidence of the facts is lacking. The presumption cannot be combined with the evidence to carry a plaintiff to the jury. If contributory negligence is proved by the evidence, the plaintiff must fail. When the facts are shown and are lacking in elements essential to the plaintiff's right of recovery, the presumption cannot be invoked. Bagnell v. Boston Elevated Railway, 247 Mass. 235, 238. Ferris v. Ray Taxi Service Co. 259 Mass. 401. Austin v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway, 269 Mass. 420, 424. Mahoney v. Boston Elevated Railway, 271 Mass. 274. Renwick v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway, 275 Mass. 145. Hughes v. Iandoli, 278 Mass. 530, 535.
all the time. Bagnell v. Boston Elevated Railway, 247 Mass. 235, 238. That was withdrawn. The sentences substituted were not erroneous; they required the jury to consider the evidence and to give weight to it only so far as found to be true. The charge as to the burden of proof was right. O'Connor v. Hickey, 268 Mass. 454.
case, indulges in what must needs be an academic discussion of its theoretical operation; and this, no matter whether that discussion conforms to the true theory of presumptions or not. Since the simple ground which has been stated requires the overruling of these exceptions, and we are dealing with a so called presumption which has no operative effect and only a verbal or theoretical existence, a discussion of the working of genuine presumptions would be superfluous.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.