Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/228/228mass57.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:18:46+00:00

Document:
Neurosis of the nerves supplying certain muscles, resulting from a posture which causes a cigar-maker when at his work to bend with shoulders forward so as to induce "pressure on the brachial plexus," is not a "personal injury" within the meaning of St. 1911, c. 751, Part II, s. 1, for which such employee may be awarded compensation under the workmen's compensation act.
Upon an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board in a claim under the workmen's compensation act the Superior Court may vacate a decree which was made by that court without notice of a pending petition by the insurer for a rehearing before the Industrial Accident Board.
APPEAL to the Superior Court under St. 1911, c. 751, Part III, s. 11, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, s. 14, from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board awarding compensation to Frank Maggelet, who was employed as a cigar-maker in the cigar factory of Breslin and Campbell, incorporated, in Boston.
The case was heard by Fox, J., who on November 11, 1916, made a decree awarding the employee the sum of $321.43. On November 14, 1916, the insurer filed a motion to vacate the decree on the ground that before the decree was made the insurer had filed with the Industrial Accident Board a petition for a rehearing and reopening of the case. On November 16, 1917, Fox, J. made an order vacating the decree and filed the following memorandum of decision: "At the hearing of the motion to vacate the decree, the counsel for the claimant admitted that when he presented the decree to the court for allowance he knew that the insurer bad filed with the board a petition for rehearing, and did not inform the court of this fact. The decree is therefore vacated on the ground that it was entered by inadvertence and under misapprehension concerning the state of the record."
On December 16, 1916, the Industrial Accident Board denied the insurer's petition for a rehearing and amended their former decision by striking out the words "and affirm and adopt the findings and decision of the committee of arbitration."
On December 18, 1916, by order of Lawton, J., a decree was entered reciting the amendment of the decision of the Industrial Accident Board and again ordering that the insurer should pay to the employee the sum of $321.43. The insurer appealed.
B. A. Lockhart, for the employee.
RUGG, C. J. This case comes before us on a finding and decision of the Industrial Accident Board with a report of all the material evidence. The finding is that "the employee was totally incapacitated for work by reason of a condition of occupational neurosis which arose out of and in the course of his employment."
It is undisputed that the employee was a cigar-maker by trade and had worked for the subscriber twenty-five years; and in March, 1916, he stopped work and on consulting a. physician was told that he was troubled with "occupational neurosis;" and that during the preceding six months his arm had troubled him. Dr.
of the nerves supplying these muscles. . . . It is very possible that there is a certain amount of pressure on the brachial plexus from the position cigar makers assume in their work; he traces it to the continued use of these muscles. . . . It is not peculiar to the cigar makers' trade."
Plass v. Central New England Railway, 169 App. Div. (N. Y.) 826; Archibald v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 448. No case has gone so far as to hold that a "neurosis of the nerves" supplying certain muscles, resulting from a posture which causes the employee "to bend forward with shoulders forward" so as to induce "pressure on the brachial plexus" is a personal injury.
does not constitute a commonly known and well recognized personal injury consequent upon employment. It is difficult to establish and define a plain line of division between what is personal injury within the act on the one hand and simple disease on the other hand. But personal injury and disease are not synonymous. They are different in meaning. One does not include the other. They are classifications differing from each other in kind, although they may overlap in some instances.
There is not enough in this record to show that the condition of the employee is a necessary result of his work. It arose on all the evidence from a bad posture of the body while at work. But there is nothing to show that this was a necessary incident of the employment. Scarcely anything is more difficult to control or influence than the position of the body of another. Whether one shall be erect or stooping of figure, whether the carriage of the person shall be lithe or stiff, whether the chest shall be narrow or broad and the space for the lungs correspondingly cramped or enlarged, whether breathing shall be deep and full, or short and impaired, depend in large degree upon the habit, temperament and appreciation of the requisites of right living on the part of the individual. Interference on these matters by the employer might be regarded as an unwarranted impairment of personal privilege. There are few employments which, pursued without regard to the laws of health and the requirements of correct method of life, may not invite some form of disease. This record is bare of any evidence to show that it is a reasonably necessary result of the employment that those following it should have neurosis or that the inducing proximate cause of that condition is the employment.
Ohio v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309. Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co. 90 Conn. 349. See Liondale Bleach, Dye & Paint Works v. Riker, 56 Vroom, 426. Nevertheless we remain content with our decisions in this particular. But the doctrine has not been established by these decisions that every disease caught by an employee in the course of his employment is a personal injury under the act. See in this Connection Turvey v. Brinton's, Ltd.  1 K. B. 328, 338; Brinton's, Ltd. v. Turvey,  A. C. 230, 238; Eke v. Hart-Dyke,  2 K. B. 677, 682.
It seems clear for these reasons that the present case cannot rightly be termed a personal injury within the meaning of those words in the act.
The case is before us properly. The entry of the first decree was manifestly caused by the failure of the employee to state the case truly and fully to the court, and therefore was entered at least through mistake and accident. It was within the power of the court to correct such an error. Karrick v. Wetmore, 210 Mass. 578. Hathaway v. Congregation Ohab Shalom, 216 Mass. 539. The only decree from which an appeal could be taken properly was the one of December 19, 1916.
It follows that the decree must be reversed and a new decree entered to the effect that the insurer is under no liability.

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