Source: https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/consultation-on-online-reputation/pos_or_201801/?platform=hootsuite
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:44:31+00:00

Document:
This draft policy position has been published for discussion and commenting purposes as part of our work on the issue of Reputation and Privacy. Please see our Consultation on online reputation web page for more information.
[We] will have helped to create an environment where individuals may use the Internet to explore their interests and develop as persons without fear that their digital trace will lead to unfair treatment.
To advance this goal, we undertook a consultation and call for essays on the issue of online reputation. Based on the 28 submissions received, along with our own analysis, the OPC has published a draft Position on Online Reputation that champions solutions that balance freedom of expression and the privacy interests of individuals.
We have heard from stakeholders and the Canadian public that while they recognize the personal and professional benefits of participating in the online world, they are increasingly concerned about their online reputation. In focus groups, Canadians told us they are concerned that they lack control to protect themselves from risks related to online reputation. Several stakeholders also raised the importance of respecting freedom of expression.
These measures include the right to ask search engines to de-index web pages that contain inaccurate, incomplete or outdated information; removal or amendment of information at the source; and education to help develop responsible, informed online citizens.
Two key mechanisms identified for enhancing one’s control over their online reputation – both of which can be found within PIPEDA – are de-indexing and source takedown.
De-indexing is the process by which a webpage, image or other online resource is removed from search engine results when an individual’s name is entered as the search term. Source takedown refers to the removal of the content from the internet.
This includes allowing individuals to challenge the accuracy, completeness and currency (the extent to which the information is up-to-date) of results returned for searches on their name. Such challenges should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and decisions to remove links should take into account the right to freedom of expression and the public’s interest in the information remaining accessible. Additional detail, criteria and discussion about this mechanism are presented in the report.
If an individual is able to successfully challenge the search result based on the above, it should be de-indexed. However, lowering the ranking of a result or flagging a link or content as inaccurate or incomplete could be sufficient alternatives in some cases.
With respect to source takedown, PIPEDA provides individuals the right to withdraw consent, and requires that personal information that is no longer needed be destroyed, erased or made anonymous. Taken together, this implies that individuals should have the ability to remove information that they have posted online.
Where the personal information in question has been posted by others, individuals do not have an unqualified right to remove it. However, similar to de-indexing, individuals should be provided a mechanism by which they can challenge the accuracy, completeness and currency of the information and, where such a challenge is successful, to have the information corrected, deleted or augmented, as appropriate.
In either of the above cases, where matters cannot be resolved with a website or search engine, individuals may lodge a formal complaint with the OPC.
While, in combination, the abilities to request de-indexing and/or source takedown of information in certain circumstances are similar to the “Right to Erasure (Right to be Forgotten)” in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), this paper does not import a European framework into Canada. Rather, it is an interpretation of current Canadian law, and the remedies related to online reputation that can be found therein.
While it is important to take action on de-indexing – as reputation is currently at risk, and the solutions we’ve proposed are, in our view, both balanced and workable – the report also recommends Parliament undertake a study of this issue. Elected officials should confirm the right balance between privacy and freedom of expression in our democratic society.
It is why OPC – along with its provincial and territorial counterparts – have sent a joint letter to the Canadian Council of Ministers of Education calling for privacy protection to be incorporated into curriculum for digital education.
A rights-based privacy education program will serve to develop good online citizens who have both the technical knowledge needed to protect themselves as well as a strong sense of how and why it is important to act responsibly online.
Not only is it important to educate young people, indeed all Canadians, on the use of mechanisms to control reputation such as takedown procedures, privacy settings and emerging privacy enhancing technologies, it is equally important to emphasize the importance of thinking about the potential impacts of one’s actions on others.
The OPC, in cooperation with other stakeholders, will continue to create resources to help inform people of reputational risks and privacy protections.
That an industry-wide code of practice be developed for takedown policies, privacy defaults and procedures.
After seeking stakeholder views on the proposals outlined in this draft position paper, the OPC will finalize its position and develop an action plan to put the new measures into practice. We invite you to review our complete Position on Online Reputation in the following pages.
In January 2016, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) launched a consultation and call for essays on the issue of online reputation, guided by a discussion paper.
Through this consultation, the OPC solicited input about new and innovative ways to protect reputational privacy, one of the OPC’s strategic privacy priorities. The aim was to enrich the public debate, ensure that we are in a better position to inform Parliament of a variety of solutions for addressing issues related to online reputation, and develop a policy position on this issue.
We received 28 submissions from a variety of stakeholders. We have taken this feedback, in combination with our own analysis and experience, and used it to develop our position and recommendations with respect to privacy and online reputation. This includes our views on what protections currently exist under Canada’s federal private sector privacy law, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), what legislative changes (to PIPEDA or to Canadian law more generally) might or should be considered to improve upon the status quo, and what other solutions should be promoted in relation to this matter.
Our consultation process has, if anything, validated the importance of this goal. Many submitters highlighted the legitimacy of providing individuals with at least some level of control over their online reputation. Where views varied – and where this paper will focus – was in defining the extent to which individuals should be permitted to control their online reputation in light of other important interests under existing law, and the mechanisms by which they could do so.
Of particular interest to submitters, and to our office, in the evaluation of reputation control mechanisms was the interplay between the protection of privacy and other societal values such as freedom of expression. For instance, while privacy interests may point in favour of allowing individuals to control the presence or accessibility of personal information, there will be in some cases a countervailing interest in ensuring that that information remains widely available. It is therefore necessary – and a primary objective of this paper – to consider how to strike an appropriate balance between an individual’s privacy interests and that of other relevant values, including freedom of expression.
Three values have been identified by the Supreme Court which underpin the right to freedom of expression: individual self-fulfillment, the search for truth and the promotion of democratic discourse. It is worth noting that the protection of reputation can advance these same interests; for instance, individuals with unduly damaged reputations may not be able to fully participate in public discourse – they may be ignored, not believed, or have their contribution to the “marketplace of ideas” judged based on their reputation instead of the content.
[T]o most people, their good reputation is to be cherished above all. A good reputation is closely related to the innate worthiness and dignity of the individual. It is an attribute that must, just as much as freedom of expression, be protected by society's laws.
Democracy has always recognized and cherished the fundamental importance of an individual. That importance must, in turn, be based upon the good repute of a person. It is that good repute which enhances an individual's sense of worth and value. … A democratic society, therefore, has an interest in ensuring that its members can enjoy and protect their good reputation so long as it is merited.
[T]he plaintiff’s interest in reputation may be just as worthy of protection as the defendant’s interest in self-realization through unfettered expression. … Charter principles do not provide a licence to damage another person’s reputation simply to fulfill one’s atavistic desire to express oneself.
While the above statements are both found in judgments related to libel, the argument can be extended to measures that protect reputation more generally – including privacy law.
Given the above, we have sought to avoid (to paraphrase a submission) “fetishizing” either an individual’s ‘right’ to curate their reputation or other values such as freedom of expression. Rather, we have endeavoured to develop a position which respects both freedom of expression and privacy interests.
As described in our summary, while the majority of submissions felt that the parameters of the right to request de-indexing in the European Union can be problematic, it was argued (by some) that the privacy principles which underlie de-indexing are consistent with Canadian law. Providing an individual with some measure of control over personal information disseminated on the Internet (especially where it creates a risk of harm, or where there is no public interest in the information) is connected to fundamental values such as privacy, dignity and autonomy.Footnote 10 This measure of control can help individuals “move on from the past”Footnote 11 and reduces the potential for self-censorship of actions and statements. Implementing such control via de-indexing can strike an appropriate balance between privacy and freedom of expression (particularly as compared to, for instance, preventing or removing speech altogether).
Does PIPEDA apply to the indexing of online content and display of search results by search engines?
If so, in what circumstances, if any, does PIPEDA require search engines to remove links in search results for searches of an individual’s name?
First, we must clarify that the discussion that follows refers strictly to search engines’ activity of indexing the web and generating search results based on that index. Many organizations that operate prominent search engines (Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, etc.) also have other business lines to which PIPEDA may or may not apply; they are not considered here.
In our view, by indexing webpages containing personal information, and returning links to those pages in search results, search engines are collecting, using and disclosing personal information within the meaning of PIPEDA. When users search for information about an individual by name, search engines can create a detailed profile of all relevant information concerning that individual and return that information to the user. Search engines themselves acknowledge that their activities may involve personal information and they have policies to remove certain kinds of personal information, such as social insurance numbers, from their results.
Although most search engines are free, most also display advertisements alongside search results. The ability of search engines to sell this advertising space would not exist were it not for the search service they provide. The two functions have been described as “inextricably linked”.Footnote 12 Thus, there also seems little doubt that search engines collect, use and disclose personal information “in the course of commercial activities”.
Some have argued that search engines are nevertheless exempt from PIPEDA because they serve a journalistic or literary function.Footnote 13 However, search engines do not distinguish between journalistic/literary material. They return content in search results regardless of whether it is journalistic or literary in nature. We are therefore not convinced that search engines are acting for “journalistic” or “literary” purposes, or at least not exclusively for such purposes as required by paragraph 4(2)(c).
Some have also pointed out that it is unclear how certain requirements in PIPEDA can sensibly be applied to a search engine. For instance, as we noted in the OPC’s Consent Report,Footnote 14 it may not be practicable for an intermediary such as a search engine to obtain consent to index all webpages on the Internet that contain personal information. In our Consent Report, we recommend that Parliament consider new, properly framed exceptions to consent to deal with situations, such as the indexing activities of search engines, where consent may be impracticable, or where implied consent would be stretched to absurdity. We continue to believe that such clarification would be desirable.
In the meantime, we are of the view that the indexing of webpages and display of search results by search engines is captured by PIPEDA. We must therefore apply the law as it stands to the best of our abilities. We will now turn to consider a search engine’s obligations under the Act.
ii) What Do Search Engines Actually Do?
For the analysis that follows, it is important to clarify the role of search engines. Search results do not simply and indiscriminately provide links to all web content associated with a search query. Rather, they are intended to provide users with results that a search engine considers most relevant to a user’s search query.
Search results will often differ between users, based on what is considered ‘most relevant’ to him or her (personalized results).
Websites that are considered “low quality” are regularly given diminished prominence in search results, or removed entirely.
In other words, search engines do not intend to simply create an index of what information exists online; rather, they seek to “provide people with access to relevant information from the most reliable sources available”Footnote 16.
While organizations subject to PIPEDA are required to meet all obligations set out by the Act, in the context of de-indexing by search engines, the two most relevant provisions of PIPEDA are Principle 4.6 of Schedule 1 (and related provisions, such as 4.9.5 and 4.10) and subsection 5(3). We will discuss how each of these provisions apply to search engines’ activities in turn.
4.6: Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used.
4.6.1: The extent to which personal information shall be accurate, complete, and up-to-date will depend upon the use of the information, taking into account the interests of the individual. Information shall be sufficiently accurate, complete, and up-to-date to minimize the possibility that inappropriate information may be used to make a decision about the individual.
4.9: An individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of [his or her personal information] and have it amended as appropriate.
4.9.5: When an individual successfully demonstrates the inaccuracy or incompleteness of personal information, the organization shall amend the information as required. Depending on the nature of the information challenged, amendment involves the correction, deletion, or addition of information.
4.10: An individual shall be able to address a challenge concerning compliance with the above principles to the [individual or individuals] accountable for the organization’s compliance.
Search engines – as with any organization subject to PIPEDA – are required to meet their obligations under the Act. As previously established, the “use” to which search engines are putting personal information when results are returned on searches for an individual’s name is the creation of a “profile of the most relevant information” about that name that is available online – a profile that is the personal information of the individual. Search engines should, thus, be responsive to challenges that the profile presented in the form of search results is not accurate, complete, or up-to-date.
If an individual is able to successfully challenge the accuracy, completeness or currency (that is, the extent to which the information is up-to-date) of the results generated by a search for their name (because, for instance, the information at one or more of the returned results is demonstrably inaccurate, incomplete or up-to-date) then, per Principle 4.9.5, the results returned should be amended accordingly. The most obvious means to make such an amendment is to de-index the offending result and remove the link; however, in some situations, other solutions (such as lowering the ranking of a result, or flagging it as inaccurate or incomplete) may also be appropriate.
It will be important, though, to consider whether a successful challenge has been made out in light of Principle 4.6.1, which states that the extent of accuracy, completeness and currency required depends on purpose for which the information is to be used, and on the interests of the individual. For instance, a single inaccurate statement or the omission of a single fact, within an otherwise wholly accurate webpage, may not warrant de-indexing of the page – particularly where the inaccuracy or omission does not materially impact the interests of the individual. This must be considered on a case-by-case basis, and should take into account the public interest in the information remaining accessible.
An organization may collect, use or disclose personal information only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider are appropriate under the circumstances.
Within the scheme of PIPEDA, subsection 5(3) is “an overarching requirement”Footnote 18 that is superimposed on an organization’s other obligations to ensure that their purposes for collection, use and disclosure of personal information are limited to only those which a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances.
Where the accessibility of the information may cause significant harmFootnote 21 to the individual, and there is either no public interest associated with the display of the search result, or the harm, considering its magnitude and likelihood of occurrence, outweighs any public interest.
As such, we consider that a search engine, once notified of one of the above circumstances by the individual whose personal information is at issue, should be required to remove the links to the content in question from its search results for searches performed on the individual’s name. These categories do not necessarily represent an exhaustive list of all such circumstances, for there may be others that emerge or evolve over time.
We are of the opinion that this represents an appropriate balance with freedom of expression, while having a significantly positive impact on an individual’s privacy rights. In particular, we note that in these scenarios a search engine’s actions do not remove the underlying content and do not affect its accessibility using other search terms. All that is removed is the link between the content in question and the individual’s name in search results. In the situations identified above, we consider that the limited prejudicial effects on access to the information in question are clearly outweighed by the beneficial impacts that removing the links in search results can have on the individual’s privacy and dignity.
whether the information relates to a minor (see section on Youth below).
The first two factors point towards a public interest in the information remaining accessible, whereas the last three may suggest the opposite. This list is of course not exhaustive. There may be other circumstances that are relevant to a particular case, and not all of the above factors may be relevant in any given situation. Ultimately, the overarching consideration is whether the public has a legitimate interest in accessing the information at issue.
A final point to emphasize is that the evaluation must be done in the specific context of a de-indexing request. In other words, the question is not whether the underlying information serves the public interest in the abstract, but whether its continued availability in search results for searches of an individual’s name is in the public interest.
Based on the above analysis of search engines’ obligations under PIPEDA, we are of the view that, individuals should be provided the ability to request the de-indexing of search results, and that there are some circumstances under which these requests should be honoured. In our view, our interpretation of the law strikes an appropriate balance between individuals’ privacy interests and the right to freedom of expression. However, we recognize a number of submissions to our consultation raised legitimate critiques about a right of individuals to request the de-indexing of search results. In this section, we discuss (and, to the extent possible, address) a number of them.
Some have argued that de-indexing is an ineffective remedy, since the underlying content remains available online. In our Office’s experience from past investigations, there is a difference between having information available to those who explicitly seek it out directly from source websites for specific purposes (for example, a lawyer doing jurisprudential research in CanLII or a journalist seeking out past articles on a given issue), and, the same information being “stumbled upon” or “fished out” by a snooping friend, colleague, neighbor or other acquaintance through a simple query search by an individual’s name.Footnote 22 The OPC believes that removal of links from search results in the limited circumstances identified above will have a significantly positive impact, even where the source information remains.
In submissions, it was suggested that it is inappropriate for a private sector organization to make decisions balancing privacy rights against the right to expression.
While this is a legitimate concern we also note that organizations do regularly engage in such balancing to some extent– for instance, in establishing terms of service which may result in content, statements or even entire accounts being removed. Search engines, in particular, already have in place mechanisms to consider de-indexing requests and remove content which is potentially harmful (e.g. credit card numbers; images of signatures) or illegal (e.g. copyright infringement) from their search results.
Search engines are therefore responsible for addressing requests to de-index results in accordance with their legal obligations under PIPEDA.
Beyond this, it is important to note that search engines have created the situation in which content is so readily linked to an individual’s name and are actively perfecting algorithms to personalize search results over time as part of their business model.
Nonetheless, we recognize the legitimacy of the concerns raised with respect to the role of the private sector in balancing rights. As such, this is an area which is worthy of future consideration.
Lastly, while we believe it is reasonable for search engines to assume this first level of responsibility, they are welcome to engage with regulators (and/or other relevant stakeholders) in the development of their de-indexing request assessment process.
In addressing this issue, we are cognizant of both the operational and logistical challenges that would be associated with any requirement for a search engine to engage with the source of information subject to a de-indexing request, and the fact that de-indexing as a means of establishing control over one’s reputation would become meaningless, or even harmful, if de-indexing requests became prominently known.
It must also be emphasized again that de-indexing in this context does not remove the source content from the web and only removes links to the source content from search results for searches on an individual's name‎. Thus, the impact of de-indexing on source websites will, in many cases, be minimal.
In submissions, it was also suggested that to establish and operate processes to adjudicate de-indexing requests was too high of a burden to place on search engines, and may hamper competition.
We acknowledge that the establishing and operation of a mechanism to handle takedown requests is not an insignificant cost. However, setting aside that all organizations are required under PIPEDA to “put procedures in place to receive and respond to complaints”Footnote 25, search engines are in the business of making information more accessible, and, in the cases of the most widely used search engines, they generate substantial revenue from doing so; it does not seem unreasonable that this would engender an obligation to address any inappropriate or harmful impacts caused by their own actions.
As stated prior, at minimum we believe that Canadians should be provided a mechanism to challenge compliance with PIPEDA with respect to information returned in search results, based on the obligations described above.
While an admittedly imperfect solution, we believe that for now, geo-fencing strikes the appropriate balance between effectiveness and appropriate territorial scope. We may revisit this position as Canadian and international law evolves.
De-indexing is a means of providing an effective remedy to individuals for certain privacy harms, but it is not without challenges and is not a perfect remedy for all harms to online reputation. We have taken the position that PIPEDA requires organizations, including search engines, to assume accountability for their actions, and provide some challenge-type mechanism that individuals can resort to when challenging compliance with relevant principles. We believe that the position set out above strikes a fair balance and is workable. Furthermore, we are of the view that, based on the current law, it is appropriate to take action given the significant privacy interests at stake. However, we recognize that submitters to our consultation have raised legitimate concerns about the impacts of such a mechanism on, among other things, rights, such as freedom of expression. These concerns, along with those noted immediately above, are worthy of further consideration. We would therefore recommend that Parliament also undertake a full examination of this issue to determine whether we have struck the right balance. We discuss this further in Section G of this paper.
Whereas de-indexing allows information to remain online (though breaking the immediate link between it and the individual), amendment/takedown at the source modifies or removes the information entirely. This is clearly a stronger privacy protection, but in at least some circumstances it can pose much greater challenge with respect to freedom of expression.
In examining the possibility of source amendment/takedown, we examine two different scenarios: (i) where the information in question was supplied by the individual him/herself; and, (ii) where the information was supplied by a source other than the individual to whom the information relates.
PIPEDA provides individuals the right to withdraw consent subject to legal or contractual restrictions (Principle 4.3.8), and requires that personal information that is no longer needed be destroyed, erased or made anonymous (Principle 4.5.3).
Taken together, these two principles imply that individuals should be provided the ability to remove information which they themselves have provided to an online forum that is involved in commercial activity (including, but not limited to, a social network). To the extent possible, this ability should be: (i) granular, (ii) self-directed, and (iii) effective. For instance, individuals should be able to delete one or more social media posts without having to delete their entire account, and they should be able to do so independently, without having to make a request subject to the organization’s response. Many social media sites (and other similar services) already offer such an ability, but as described in a submission, the quality and accessibility of takedown tools varies significantly.
This ability to delete self-posted information should be near-absolute, except to the extent that it is subject to legal or contractual restrictions. In particular, we do not believe that this ability should be subject to a public interest test; individuals should be able to delete information they have posted about themselves regardless of whether others would prefer it remain available.
It is worth noting that this ability to delete self-posted information applies only to the initial post; the situation in which other individuals have captured that information and re-posted it is discussed below.
Where personal information is provided to an organization by someone other than the subject (including where information posted by the individual is re-posted by another person), under PIPEDA individuals do not have an unqualified right to remove that content.
This said, there are at least two principles of PIPEDAFootnote 27 under which an individual can at least challenge information posted about them by another individual: accuracy and appropriateness.
As stated prior, Principle 4.9.5 creates an obligation for organizations to amend information that is demonstrated to be incomplete, inaccurate or not up-to-date. Thus, at minimum, where personal information is provided to an organization acting in the course of commercial activity by someone other than the individual to whom the information relates, the individual should be provided a mechanism by which demonstrably inaccurate, incomplete or out of date information can be challenged and amended. This is particularly the case where the organization is creating a profile of the individual based on information provided by others which is intended to allow for decisions to be made about the individual. In our view, correction, removal or other amendment to demonstrably inaccurate, incomplete or out of date information represents an appropriate balance with freedom of expression.
Accordingly, an individual should be able to challenge the accuracy, completeness, and currency of the posted information and the source website or social media platform (if commercial) should have a mechanism in place to provide an adequate response.
As well, subsection 5(3) – which requires personal information only be collected, used and disclosed for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate under the circumstances – may also operate to require organizations to remove content posted by others in respect of an individual. For instance, in our guidance on no-go zones, we take the position that purposes that are otherwise illegal, and the soliciting and posting of personal information for the purpose of incentivizing payment for its removal, would be considered inappropriate under subsection 5(3) of PIPEDA.
Alongside this inherent vulnerability, there is a recognition that the cognitive and emotional maturity level of children and youth is undergoing constant development, and that particular consideration should be provided to them. For instance, in our recent consent report, the OPC took the position that, save for exceptional circumstances, consent for the collection, use and disclosure of personal information of children under the age of 13 must be obtained from their parents or guardians. For youth aged 13 to 18, consent can only be considered meaningful if organizations have taken into account their level of maturity in developing their consent processes and adapted them accordingly.
Building on this position, we propose a number of additional measures for protecting the online reputation of children and youth. First, where subsection 5(3) of PIPEDA is being evaluated in the case of children or youth (either for the purposes of de-indexing search results or removing source content), consideration should typically weigh more heavily in favour of de-indexing or removal of the content. Second, in the case of information provided to an organization or otherwise posted by youth about themselves, the right to removal should be as close to absolute as possible, and unfettered by any contractual limitations. Parliament should consider formally enshrining such a right in statute as exists in other jurisdictions.
Finally, in the current social media age, we note that it is not uncommon for information about children and youth to be posted by their parents. A “cute” anecdote or photo may – at the time, or in the future - be highly embarrassing or even harmful to the child or youth, and youth have indicated a desire for greater control of this information.Footnote 30 Thus, we recommend that Parliament also consider providing youth with some ability, upon reaching the age of majority, to request and obtain removal of online information posted about them by their parents or guardians who until then had substitute decision-making power. Such an ability will, of course, need to be crafted in such a way as to be practical and respect the expressive rights of the parent.
The organizations which operate online services make frequent decisions about the incentives individuals have to share personal information (and the level of detail and sensitivity of information being shared) and the frequency with which individuals are presented with prompts related to privacy (e.g. controls over the visibility of all posts vs. controls over individual posts). These organizations are also able to create community standards with respect to the non-tolerance of abuse, and mechanisms by which individuals are encouraged to resolve disputes within the community (rather than needing to resort to an overseer or regulator). The organizations also make choices with respect to reputation control mechanisms, such as takedown mechanisms and the amount of time for which information is both retained and easily accessed.
All of these decisions, and the way that they are implemented and communicatedFootnote 31, have significant impacts on individuals – both directly, by allowing them to exercise self-responsibility, and indirectly, by creating an environment that lessens the likelihood of harms.
To the extent that the design decisions listed above relate to obligations under PIPEDA, we will seek to provide advice to organizations, and will encourage industry to develop codes of practice in some key areas.Footnote 32 In particular, it is recommended that organizations coordinate the development of an industry-wide Code of Practice related to information takedown policies, privacy defaults and procedures. At a minimum, such a Code would respect and implement the relevant “no-go zones” that the OPC has identified in its guidance and uphold de-indexing or take-down requests in the additional circumstances identified above. Ideally, such a Code would, over time, establish a reasonably consistent experience that would allow Canadians to understand the basis by which organizations are making decisions with respect to their de-indexing or takedowns requests.
Lastly, we note that the OPC has clearly indicated its intention to take a more proactive role in ensuring compliance with PIPEDA, to address broader, systemic privacy risks to Canadians. This will be of particular importance in the realm of Online Reputation, given the number of individuals who may be impacted by a single non-compliant organization, and the significant impacts on individuals that can result from non-compliance, particularly the disproportionate impact on vulnerable individuals, who may opt not to file complaints to our Office in order not to bring further attention to themselves, or open themselves to retribution. Each of these factors point to the benefits of curbing privacy risks up front, before problems occur, or in high-risk areas where problems may not be outwardly detectable.
In summary, the OPC does not see the burden of protecting reputation resting solely with individuals. Organizations have a role to play, and the OPC will continue to proactively seek opportunities to ensure this role is filled.
In terms of public education, the most effective strategy may well be to teach children about privacy at an early age. We therefore urge provincial and territorial governments to integrate privacy education into school curricula.
Internationally, we helped develop the 2016 Marrakech Resolution calling for the adoption of a competency framework for privacy education in schools. Currently we are participating, through the International Working Group on Digital Education, in efforts to further the inclusion of privacy and data protection skills in the education of students around the world.
Public education that takes a rights-based approach to online reputation can help reinforce norms that protect online reputation, in addition to spreading knowledge of the law, how to make use of architecture-based controls, and how to evaluate protections offered across a multitude of platforms.
Ensuring that educational messaging includes additional emphasis on the importance of thinking about the potential impacts of one’s actions on all relevant parties.
Education may also be an important element to some of the solutions presented previously in this paper – for instance, it should be made clear to Canadians that, in many (or most) cases, search results do not present a complete picture of an individual (only the information online about him or her). Thus, it should not be assumed that a decision made based on search results is a decision made on complete information.
Many stakeholder groups have offered to work with the OPC on the development and distribution of educational materials and we will continue to engage with these groups where appropriate. The OPC – along with its provincial and territorial counterparts – have also sent a joint letter to the Canadian Council of Ministers of Education calling for privacy protection to be incorporated into curriculum for digital education.
Lastly, as mentioned in the previous section, we will work with organizations to ensure that individuals have meaningful opportunities to exercise the learnings from this educational material.
As recommended by a number of submissions, the OPC will continue to research and consult on youth norms, attitudes and challenges with respect to reputational privacy in order to better understand and make recommendations with respect to what practices are appropriate for sites and online services aimed at young Canadians. We will also continue to solicit information about what measures may be needed, or how existing measures can be adapted, to address the reputational challenges faced by those groups that have been disproportionately targeted for, and impacted by, online abuse, such as women.
Individual online services have a responsibility to provide appropriate options and controls to their users; however, there is also benefit to the widespread availability and adoption of services and technologies for managing online reputation that are independent of any particular website. Similar to what we noted in our consent report, we believe that there is no shortage of technologies or good ideas for protecting online reputation; they have simply not been sufficiently developed and/or adopted.
As such, we will encourage research, development and adoption of new solutions for protecting online reputation. In particular, we invite proposals under our Contribution Program to research and develop new solutions for protecting online reputation, and we have included a special call for privacy enhancing technologies, or PETs, in the 2018-19 version of the Program.
Throughout this position paper, we have generally proposed solutions to the challenges associated with online reputation which the OPC and organizations can undertake given current authorities. However, there are also a number of matters which we believe should be considered by Parliament.
First, as discussed in the section on “De-Indexing,” the OPC is of the opinion that the position set out in this paper is workable, appropriately balances important rights and interests, and is supported by PIPEDA. However, we acknowledge that this position clearly raises issues around the balance of an individual’s right to privacy with the right to free expression, as well as around the appropriate role of private sector stakeholders in assessing this balance. It would be inappropriate for the OPC not to act on this issue – we must apply PIPEDA to the best of our ability and understanding, attempting to strike the appropriate balance. However, we also believe that it is important for Parliament to consider this issue, looking at the concerns raised in this paper as well as external factors, such as the impacts any differences between the Canadian and European legislative frameworks with respect to individuals’ control of online information may have on adequacy.
Next, there are opportunities to generally enhance the OPC’s powers to include stronger enforcement mechanisms, and enhanced ability to act proactively, under PIPEDA. In our consent paper, the OPC has called for order-making and fining powers, as well as more formalized powers to act proactively (including by requiring organizations to demonstrate accountability). The rationale and conclusions presented in that paper apply equally here. By way of example, we believe it would be of significant benefit for the OPC to be able to proactively examine how organizations are responding to the de-indexing requests and challenges to accuracy described above.
Establishing a stronger ability for youth to request and obtain the deletion of information they have themselves posted on social media, and in appropriate cases, information posted about them online by their parents or guardians when they reach the age of majority.
Lastly, a number of submissions spoke to the notion of “specific legislation” to address particular challenges related to reputation. We agree that if it becomes clear that a particular collection, use or disclosure of personal information is highly offensive to Canadians, Parliament should consider formalizing restrictions or prohibitions of that activity (such as has been done for non-consensual distribution of intimate images). This option will also be beneficial for addressing the challenges posed by the person-to-person interactions that can be extremely harmful, but which are outside PIPEDA’s reach and not covered by existing criminal laws.
During the OPC's 2015 Priority Setting Exercise, we heard from stakeholders and the Canadian public that while they recognize the personal and professional benefits of participating in the online world, they are increasingly concerned about their online reputation. The consultation paper that followed it aimed to start a discussion about potential ways to address issues associated with the permanency of personal information online and the effect on reputation.
We believe that the measures outlined above represent a significant step toward achieving our goal of helping to create an environment where individuals may use the Internet to explore their interests and develop as persons without fear that their digital trace will lead to unfair treatment. The position is being put forward as a draft, for consultation. Following a consultation period on this position paper, we will finalize our position and develop an Action Plan that will put these new measures into practice. We look forward to working with a broad range of stakeholders to bring in a new age of online reputation for Canadians.
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General),  1 SCR 927, p. 969.
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),  2 SCR 712 at para. 59.
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),  2 SCR 1326, pp. 1339-1340; R. v. National Post,  1 SCR 477 at para. 28.
Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa inc.,  1 SCR 591 at para. 62.
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto,  2 SCR 1130, at para. 121 (“Hill”).
Hill, ibid. at para. 107-108.
Grant v. Torstar Corp.  3 SCR 640, para 51.
Grant v. Torstar Corp.,  3 SCR 640 at para. 105, citing Raymond E. Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, vols. 2-4, 2nd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1999 (loose-leaf updated 2008, release 3), at pp. 15-137 and 15-138.
Korenhof & Gorzeman, as cited in Gratton/Polonetsky.
Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, at para. 60, aff’d 2015 BCCA 265, 2017 SCC 34.
Google – "Our latest quality improvements for Search"
To be clear, we assert that search engines create a profile of information about the individual, not a profile of the individual.
A.T. v. Globe24h.com, 2017 FC 114, paragraph 73 (“Globe24h.com”).
See, for instance, Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34.
As defined in section 10.1(7) of PIPEDA (not yet in force).
For instance, in the Globe24h.com matter, complainants to our office were not primarily concerned that their sensitive personal information existed in court and tribunal decisions published online. They were concerned when those decisions were copied and reposted in a manner that made them accessible through searches for their names in search engines: see A.T. v. Globe24h.com, 2017 FC 114.
As raised in the submission by Avner Levin. Submissions by Bricker et al., and Gratton & Polonetsky also recognize the need for a “simpler, cheaper and faster process” for processing de-indexing requests, suggesting that the current model (obtaining a Report of Findings from the OPC and, if necessary, bringing an action to Federal Court) would not suffice.
See, for instance, Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain …”, para. 23.
Geo-fencing could be accomplished, for instance, by limiting any de-indexing to searches performed from a Canadian IP address.
Assuming PIPEDA applies. Personal information that is collected, used or disclosed by an individual for personal or domestic (and no other) purposes will be outside the scope of PIPEDA: see s. 4(2)(b).
This includes laws such as Canada’s Youth Criminal Justice Act (which prevents publication of the names of youth offenders, and limits access to youth records) and newer laws aimed at the online environment such as California’s Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World, which allows youth to remove or obtain removal of any information provided to a website, app or online service.
A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46,  2 S.C.R. 567, para. 17.
See, for instance, Moser, C., Chen, T., and Schoenebeck, S. “Parents’ and Childrens’ Preferences about Parents Sharing about Children on Social Media.” CHI 2017, May 06 - 11, 2017, Denver, CO, USA.
For example, see the OPC’s updated Guidelines for Online Consent, which puts an increased responsibility on organizations to show that they have communicated relevant information to users in a meaningful, accessible manner.
Where these design decisions do not strictly fall under PIPEDA – such as the use of peer-to-peer dispute resolution mechanisms – we will seek to understand, and educate organizations about, their impacts on Canadians.
British Columbia Freedom of Information and Privacy Association.

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