Source: http://ak.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20171222_0000067.DAK.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 23:18:54+00:00

Document:
Before the Court is Defendant William Piers's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Convictions and Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed on February 23, 2017 at Docket 293. The Government responded at Docket 309; Mr. Piers's reply was filed thereafter at Docket 310. Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to the Court's determination.
On February 12, 2001, Mr. Piers was convicted by a trial jury of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), conspiracy to commit a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o), carrying a semi-automatic assault weapon during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (B)(ii), and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). On August 9, 2001, Mr. Piers was sentenced to 468 months' incarceration.
Mr. Piers filed an appeal in which he argued that the trial court's denial of his request for new trial counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Mr. Piers's convictions, with the exception of Count IV. On September 29, 2004, Mr. Piers filed a timely motion to vacate his sentence and convictions under § 2255, which was denied on October 21, 2005. Mr. Piers appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court on February 12, 2009.
On June 22, 2016, Mr. Piers submitted an Application for Leave to File Second or Successive Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Ninth Circuit initially rejected the application on July 8, 2016. However, on February 23, 2017, the Ninth Circuit found that Mr. Piers's application “makes a prima facie showing for relief under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)” and granted the application. Accordingly, Mr. Piers's June 2016 motion was then deemed filed.
Mr. Piers was self-represented when he initially submitted the application in June 2016. On March 9, 2017, Mr. Piers filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. On April 14, 2017, this Court granted the motion and an attorney was appointed for Mr. Piers. On June 27, 2017, Mr. Piers filed an amended motion to vacate.
Mr. Piers's amended petition contends that the elements of armed bank robbery as set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) do not constitute a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3); therefore, his convictions under § 924(c)(1) must be vacated. The Government maintains that Mr. Piers's petition is procedurally defaulted and if the Court reaches the merits of the petition it should be denied.
The Government maintains that Mr. Piers's § 2255 motion is procedurally defaulted because “this claim was available to him at the time of his trial, his initial appeal, and his first § 2255 motion [and he] failed to raise any objection concerning this issue until now.”The Government asserts that armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) is categorically a crime of violence under the “force clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).Therefore, Johnson II's holding under the residual clause is inapplicable.
Mr. Piers also argues that armed bank robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the “force clause” of § 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, he maintains that he is entitled to relief because armed bank robbery could only qualify as a crime of violence under the type of residual clause that Johnson II invalidated. However, Mr. Piers does not demonstrate why his argument regarding the force clause could not have been raised earlier. He asserts that federal armed bank robbery does not meet the standard set out in Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), which “interpreted [the force clause of] 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) to require violent force.” However, Johnson I was issued in 2010- several years before Mr. Piers filed this renewed motion-and therefore Mr. Piers cannot persuasively assert that his force clause argument was not reasonably available to him until now.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Government has made a persuasive showing that Mr. Piers's claim under the force clause has been procedurally defaulted.
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another . . . any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association . . . . Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years; or both.

References: § 2255
 § 371
 § 924
 § 924
 § 922
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 § 2254
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 § 924
 § 924
 § 2255
 § 2255
 § 924
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 § 924