Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/303/303mass401.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:00:23+00:00

Document:
MARY L. IRIS vs. TOWN OF HINGHAM.
Where the location of harbor flats belonging to the owner of a parcel of upland taken by eminent domain was in issue at the trial of the owner's petition for damages, it was error to admit in evidence a plan on which certain flats were marked as belonging to the petitioner, and to instruct the jury that he was the owner thereof.
It was error to admit in evidence, to prove the value of land taken by eminent domain, deeds of parcels of land near by sold in a single transaction, in one of which deeds a cash consideration was recited and in the other there was a certain reservation of use by the grantor for a period of ten years of indeterminate value, and to permit the grantor to give his opinion of the value of the right reserved and of the total consideration for both parcels.
At a trial where the value of land taken by eminent domain is in issue, the determination of the question, whether sales, evidence of which is offered, were of property similar to that taken and were within a reasonable time of the taking, is within the discretion of the trial judge and exceptions to the admission or exclusion of such evidence will not be sustained unless the record discloses that his decision was manifestly erroneous.
PETITION, filed in the Superior Court on May 27, 1933.
of Rugg, C.J., and the resignation of Pierce, J., was submitted on briefs to Lummus, Dolan, Cox, & Ronan, JJ.
A. E. Whittemore, (E. C. Mower, Jr., & L. Kaplan with him,) for the respondent.
H. F. Hathaway, (J. B. Mahar & J. R. Havey with him,) for the petitioner.
1932. At the time of the taking, the only structures upon the land were an old stable and a bath house. The assessed valuation of the land and buildings was $20,100 in the years 1931 and 1932 and $10,100 in 1933. There was testimony by various experts. The jury returned a verdict for the petitioner in the sum of $32,500, together with interest. The case is here upon the respondent's exceptions to rulings upon evidence and to certain instructions to the jury.
The respondent excepted to the exclusion of a certificate of title issued by the Land Court showing that one Barnes was the owner of Button Island, "together with the flats appurtenant thereto." The dimensions of this small island are not set forth in the certificate or in the record. It is located in Hingham Harbor, a short distance from three branches of the channel, and about thirteen hundred feet northeasterly of the petitioner's land. At low tide all the flats for the entire distance between the island and some of the uplands bordering the harbor are exposed. The respondent excepted to the introduction in evidence of a plan, prepared by one Gallagher, showing a rectangular area extending at right angles from the petitioner's land to the easterly branch of the channel. The single ground of this exception is that the plan shows this area of flats as belonging to the petitioner. This area contained about six hundred thousand square feet of flats. The respondent also excepted to the instruction that the petitioner was the owner of "those flats that have been described upon that [Gallagher] plan."
were in dispute and the burden was upon her to prove that she was the owner of the property that was taken by the town. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 187 Mass. 361. Barnes v. Springfield, 268 Mass. 497.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the petitioner and the other proprietors of the uplands had entered into any agreement by which the boundaries and areas of different parcels of flats were allotted to their respective parcels of upland. Neither was there any evidence that the petitioner's flats had been located, determined and defined in accordance with G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 240, Sections 19-26. The Gallagher plan discloses but a portion of Hingham Harbor and the surrounding shore. It shows three branches of the channel: one on the south abutting the Kimball wharf property and running to property abutting on Otis Street; the middle branch ending a short distance northeast of Button Island; and the northerly branch terminating about one thousand feet easterly of the petitioner's property. The colony ordinance declares a rule of property but prescribes no method for the division of flats. Each upland proprietor is entitled to a fair and proportionate share of the flats under all the circumstances including the width of his lot, the general shape of the shore line, the distance between ordinary high water mark and extreme low water mark, and the entire length of the low water mark which is opposite to his and the other upland properties. Whenever practicable, the width of the seaward end of his parcel of flats should be equal to that proportion of the entire low water mark that the width of his upland at ordinary high water mark bears to the total width of all the uplands to which the flats are adjacent. Walker v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 3 Cush. 1. Wonson v. Wonson, 14 Allen 71. Tappan v. Boston Water Power Co. 157 Mass. 24. Where the shore line is comparatively straight, the extensions of the side lines of the upland lots are the side lines of the adjacent flats. If the shore line is concave, then the side boundaries of the flats converge, and if the shore line is convex, they diverge. Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 85. Gray v. Deluce, 5 Cush. 9. Porter v. Sullivan, 7 Gray 441.
Wonson v. Wonson, 14 Allen 71. But these general rules cannot be used in a particular case where the physical characteristics of the locus are so peculiar and unusual that the application of these rules would be inequitable. Walker v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 3 Cush. 1, 22. Tappan v. Boston Water Power Co. 157 Mass. 24, 29.
of her flats. We do not think, upon this meagre record, that we should attempt to locate the petitioner's flats, as we are apprehensive that an injustice might result when an attempt was made to apply the location to the actual conditions. Furthermore, as there must be a new trial, the petitioner, on whom rests the burden of showing the extent of the respondent's taking, will have an opportunity of furnishing evidence sufficient to enable the trial judge to define her flats in accordance with the general principles above mentioned.
There was error in the admission of the Gallagher plan as evidence of ownership by the petitioner of the rectangular area shown thereon, but the plan could be considered as evidence of the general location of a portion of the shore and harbor. There was error in instructing the jury that the petitioner owned the flats shown in the rectangular area on this plan. Walker v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 3 Cush. 1. Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. Porter v. Sullivan, 7 Gray 441. Attorney General v. Boston Wharf Co. 12 Gray 553.
then the sale lost its probative weight as evidence, and the jury should not have been permitted to surmise or speculate as to the amount paid for such premises. The whole transaction became remote and collateral to the principal issue. Old Colony Railroad v. F. P. Robinson Co. 176 Mass. 387, 390. Rooney v. Porter-Milton Ice Co. 275 Mass. 254, 256. The price as a fact in appropriate instances in competent evidence of the value of similar property, but the price as a matter of opinion and judgment is inadmissible to prove the value of another parcel of land. Kimball's opinion on the value of the consideration paid by the town was as objectionable as if he had testified to his opinion as to the value of the land sold. An opinion of either nature ought not to be received. Beale v. Boston, 166 Mass. 53. McCabe v. Chelsea, 265 Mass. 494. The actual sale price would have been evidence that could be used as a standard. Such a sale price had not been shown. The judge was wrong in permitting the cross-examination of the respondent's experts upon the basis that the grantor had received $33,000 for the conveyance of the property to the town, and should not have permitted the petitioner to introduce evidence of this conveyance when the actual consideration could not be stated in terms of money or its equivalent. See Gardner v. Brookline, 127 Mass. 358, 363; Sanitary District of Chicago v. Boening, 267 Ill. 118; Jefferson Park District v. Sowinski, 336 Ill. 390.
jury properly to fix the value of the land in controversy; or whether, upon the whole, the land sold was not shown to be sufficiently similar to the land in question and, therefore, the introduction of evidence of the actual sale of such land would tend only to mislead and confuse the jury. The discretion of the presiding judge is not unlimited, and his decision when affirmatively shown upon the record to be manifestly erroneous will be reversed. Paine v. Boston, 4 Allen 168. Patch v. Boston, 146 Mass. 52. Lyman v. Boston, 164 Mass. 99. Fourth National Bank of Boston v. Commonwealth, 212 Mass. 66. Wright v. Commonwealth, 286 Mass. 371. We cannot say upon this record that any of these rulings has been clearly shown to be beyond the broad, though not unlimited, discretion of the presiding judge, although we ought to add that we should hesitate to disturb the ruling if in some instances it had been the other way. Lyman v. Boston, 164 Mass. 99. Stone v. Commonwealth, 181 Mass. 438, 440. Fourth National Bank of Boston v. Commonwealth, 212 Mass. 66.

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