Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/224/107/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:04:04+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 224 › Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co.
Under the laws of Idaho relating to appropriation of water, the extent of beneficial use is an inherent and necessary limitation upon the right to appropriate, and one who appropriates does not have further right to the current of the stream for the purpose of obtaining power to distribute the water required for the beneficial use which is the basis of his appropriation.
There is no rule of riparian rights in Idaho by which one whose land borders on a stream can appropriate the whole current thereof for the purpose of making fruitful the limited appropriation of water to which he is entitled for beneficial use.
The federal courts below rightly followed the decisions of the state courts of Idaho in holding that the common law doctrine of riparian rights had been abrogated to the extent that the provisions of the Constitution and statutes of Idaho in regard to the right of appropriators for beneficial use are in conflict therewith.
In this case, held that one who had lawfully appropriated the amount of water from a stream in Idaho to which he was lawfully entitled for beneficial use could not restrain those below him from raising the river so as to interfere with the power necessary to raise the water appropriated by him to a height necessary for distribution over his land; neither his appropriation nor his riparian rights gave him any control over the current of the stream.
The facts, which involve the extent of the right to appropriate water in Idaho, are stated in the opinion.
said lands and for a great number of people, being, as plaintiff is informed and believes, five thousand in number, there is no other supply available for irrigation, stock, domestic, or manufacturing purposes except the water from said canal. It is alleged that, by reason of this dam, the waters of Snake River have been backed up from said dam and to and beyond plaintiff's premises, and have destroyed the current in the river by means of which plaintiff's water wheels were driven and made to revolve and raise the water to the elevation required for distribution over plaintiff's lands. It is alleged that it is now impossible for plaintiff to so arrange or change his said dams or water wheels or flumes, or to build or construct other dams or water wheels or flumes that will raise any water whatever from said stream that can be used upon the plaintiff's lands, and by reason thereof plaintiff has not been able to irrigate said lands or any part thereof, or to raise profitable crops thereon, or to use the same as pasture lands, and will not in the future be able to irrigate said lands or to raise profitable crops or any crops thereon as long as defendant's dam is maintained; that there is no other supply of water available for use upon said lands except the waters of Snake River; that, by reason of the backing up of said water and stopping the plaintiff from using said water wheels to raise the waters of Snake River to and upon said lands, and cutting off the water supply from plaintiff's lands, he has been damaged in the aggregate sum of $56,650."
and the improper joinder of two separate causes of action. This special demurrer appears to be admitted."
"The defendant also interposed a general demurrer on the ground that the facts stated in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action against the defendant as to either or any of said counts. The demurrer was sustained by the circuit court, and the plaintiff has brought the cause to this court upon a writ of error."
"It is conceded and is beyond question that the statute law as well as judicial authority directly protects plaintiff in all the water he has actually appropriated, diverted, and used; but there is no statute, nor, so far as known, any judicial rulings, protecting him in the establishment and in the use of his water wheels, as he claims to, and must, use them for the diversion of water to his land."
that all water that plaintiff has legally appropriated belongs to him, but all other is subject to appropriation. It is unquestioned that what he has actually diverted and used upon his land, he has appropriated; but can it be said that all the water he uses or needs to operate his wheels is an appropriation? As before suggested, there is neither statutory nor judicial authority that such a use is an appropriation. Such use also lacks one of the essential attributes of an appropriation -- it is not reasonable."
another extensive irrigating scheme, known as Minidoka Project, which will take a large amount of the water, and so much that probably there will not be enough left, especially at low stages of the river, for the full operation of the plaintiff's wheels. . . ."
"Suppose from a stream of 1,000 inches a party diverts and uses 100, and in some way uses the other 900 to divert his 100; could it be said that he had made such a reasonable use of the 900 as to constitute an appropriation of it? Or, suppose that, when the entire 1,000 inches are running, they so fill the channel that, by a ditch he can draw off to his land his 100 inches; can he then object to those above him appropriating and using the other 900 inches, because it will so lower the stream that his ditch becomes useless? This would be such an unreasonable use of the 900 inches as will not be tolerated under the law of appropriation. In effect, this is substantially the principle that plaintiff is asking to have established."
available. Is this current and the means adopted for the diversion of the appropriated water part of or attached to plaintiff's right of appropriation? It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the current of the river is necessarily appurtenant to the water location, and that the means of utilizing that current is attached as an appurtenance to the appropriation. We have not been referred to any case -- and we know of none -- where either of these propositions has been upheld."
"If the plaintiff were permitted to own the current of the stream as appurtenant to his right of appropriation and diversion, he would be able to add indefinitely to the water right he would control and own. There might be a great surplus of water in the stream at and above plaintiff's premises, and an urgent demand for a portion of this surplus for beneficial uses, but if an appropriator above should divert a sufficient quantity to lower the current under plaintiff's water wheels so that they would not revolve, the plaintiff would have a cause of action to prevent such an appropriation. It is clear that in such a case the policy of the state to reserve the waters of the flowing streams for the benefit of the public would be defeated."
"There is, furthermore, the general principle that the right of appropriation must be exercised with some regard to the rights of the public. It is not an unrestricted right.
In Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 87 U. S. 683, the Supreme Court of the United States said:"
"Water is diverted to propel machinery in flour mills and saw mills, and to irrigate land for cultivation, as well as to enable miners to work their mining claims, and in all such cases the right of the first appropriator, exercised within reasonable limits, is respected and enforced. We say within reasonable limits, for this right to water, like the right by prior occupancy to mining ground or agricultural land, is not unrestricted. It must be exercised with reference to the general condition of the country and the necessities of the people, and not so as to deprive a whole neighborhood or community of its use, and vest an absolute monopoly in a single individual."
"In Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery, 20 Mont. 181, 187, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, after referring to what has been just quoted from Basey v. Gallagher, said:"
"While any person is permitted to appropriate water for a useful purpose, it must be used with some regard for the rights of the public. The use of water in this state is declared by the constitution to be a public use. Const. Art. 3, § 15. It is easy to see that, if persons, by appropriating the waters of the streams of the state, became the absolute owners of the waters, without restriction in the use and disposition thereof, such appropriation and unconditional ownership would result in such a monopoly as to work disastrous consequences to the people of the state. The tendency and spirit of legislation and adjudication of the northwestern states and territories have been to prevent such a monopoly of the waters of this large section of the country, dependent so largely for prosperity upon an equitable, and, as far as practical, free, use of water by appropriations."
water to surface irrigate ten times as much by proper application."
"A riparian proprietor in the State of Idaho has no right in or claim to the waters of a stream flowing by or through his lands that he can successfully assert as being prior or superior to the rights and claims of one who has appropriated or diverted the water of the stream and is applying it to a beneficial use. To this extent, therefore, the common law doctrine of riparian rights is in conflict with the Constitution and statutes of this state, and has been abrogated thereby."
"Sight should not be lost of the correct principle involved in such cases; namely, that a riparian owner, as such, acquires no right to the waters flowing by or through his lands that is prior or superior to that of a locator, appropriator, and used of such waters. In other words, there is no such thing in this state as a riparian right to the use of waters, as against an appropriator and used of such waters who has pursued the constitutional and statutory method in acquiring his water right. In order to acquire a prior or superior right to the use of such water, it is as essential that a riparian owner locate or appropriate the waters and divert the same as it is for any other user of water to do so."
from the river the quantity of water actually appropriated by him for beneficial use, and our decree of affirmance will therefore not in any way affect such rights.
Constitution of Idaho, Art. 14, § 3; Rev.Stat. of Idaho, §§ 3155 et seq.; Laws of Idaho 1903, p. 223.
Malad Valley Irrigating Co. v. Campbell, 2 Idaho 411; Geerston v. Barrack, 3 Idaho 344; Conant v. Jones, 3 Idaho 606; Wilterding v. Green, 4 Idaho 773; Boise City Irrigation & Land Co. v. Stewart, 10 Idaho 38; Sand Point Water & Light Co. v. Panhandle Development Co., 11 Idaho 405; Van-Camp v. Emery, 13 Idaho 202; Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484; Farmers' Cooperative Ditch Co. v. Riverside Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 525; Speer v. Stephenson, 16 Idaho 707.
"All persons, companies, and corporations owning or having the possessory title or right to lands adjacent to any stream have the right to place in the channel of or upon the banks or margin of the same rams or other machines for the purpose of raising the waters thereof to a level above the banks, requisite for the flow thereof to and upon such adjacent lands, and the right of way over and across the lands of others, for conducting said waters, may be acquired in the manner prescribed in the last two sections."

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