Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82526:56420&catid=1576&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:51:25+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 188395, November 20, 2013 - HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON, NAMELY: NICANORA G. BUCTON, ERLINDA BUCTON-EBLAMO, AGNES BUCTON-LUGOD, WILMA BUCTON-YRAY AND DON G. BUCTON, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GONZALO AND TRINIDAD GO, Respondent.
HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON, NAMELY: NICANORA G. BUCTON, ERLINDA BUCTON-EBLAMO, AGNES BUCTON-LUGOD, WILMA BUCTON-YRAY AND DON G. BUCTON, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GONZALO AND TRINIDAD GO, Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 27 May 2009 Decision2 rendered by the Special Twenty-First (21st) Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00888-MIN. In its assailed decision, the appellate court affirmed the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Branch 17, which upheld the title of the respondents Spouses Gonzalo and Trinidad Go (Spouses Go) over the subject property.
Sometime in March 1981, Felix received a phone call from Gonzalo Go (Gonzalo) informing him that he has bought the subject property thru a certain Benjamin Belisario (Belisario) who represented himself as the attorney-in-fact of Felix. Surprised to learn about the transaction, Felix made an inquiry whereby he learned that the owner’s duplicate certificate of title of the subject property was lost while in the possession of his daughter, Agnes Bucton-Lugod (Agnes). By an unfortunate turn of events, the said certificate of title fell into the hands of Belisario, Josefa Pacardo (Pacardo) and Salome Cabili (Cabili), who allegedly conspired with each other to unlawfully deprive Felix of his ownership of the above-mentioned property.
As shown in the annotation at the back of the title, the Spouses Bucton purportedly authorized Belisario to sell the subject property to third persons, as evidenced by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)6 allegedly signed by the Spouses Bucton on 27 February 1981. On the strength of the said SPA, Belisario, on 2 March 1981, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale7 in favor of the Spouses Go. Consequently, the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City cancelled TCT No. T-9830 in the name of Felix and issued a new one under TCT No. T-34210 in the names of the Spouses Go.
Meanwhile, Felix passed away leaving Nicanora, Erlinda Bucton-Eblamo, Agnes, Wilma Bucton-Yray and Don Bucton (Heirs of Felix), as his intestate heirs.
In their Answer,11 the Spouses Go refuted the allegations in the complaint by asserting that they are buyers in good faith and for value, and that they are in actual possession of the property from the time it was purchased in 1981. In insisting that their title is valid and binding, the Spouses Go argued that under the Torrens system, a person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title without the need of further inquiry. For this reason, they posited that the Court cannot disregard the right of an innocent third person who relies on the correctness of the certificate of title and they are entitled to the protection of the law.
After the pre-trial conference was terminated without the parties having reached at an amicable settlement, the RTC went on to receive testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties in support of their respective positions.
To prove forgery, the Heirs of Felix offered the testimony of an expert witness, Eliodoro Constantino (Constantino) of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified that significant differences existed between the signatures of Felix on the standard documents from the one found in the SPA of Belisario. His testimony, however, was disregarded both by the RTC and the Court of Appeals which upheld the validity of the SPA on the ground that it enjoys the presumption of regularity of a public document.
While it is true that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute.22 It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.23 The testimony of Constantino and Nicanora, had it been properly appreciated, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to public documents and to meet the stringent requirements to prove forgery.
The Court has stressed time and again that every person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry, and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent, and this is especially true where the act of the agent is of unusual nature. If a person makes no inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the agent’s authority, and his ignorance of that authority will not be any excuse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
2 Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring. Id. at 43-70.
3 Presided by Presiding Judge Florencia D. Sealana-Abbu. Records, pp. 578-586.
20 Factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review of such findings is not a function that this Court normally undertakes. It should be stressed that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review before this Court. However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits of exceptions, such as (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which — if properly considered — will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. See Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, 491 Phil. 249, 255-256 (2005).
21 Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano, 535 Phil. 384, 471-472 (2006).
22Eulogio v. Apeles, G.R. No. 167884, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 561, 571.
24 TSN, 20 June 2000, pp. 2-35.
25 TSN, 31 August 2000, pp. 2-19.
26Sanson v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 343, 355 (2003).
27 Cogtong v. Kyoritsu International, Inc., 555 Phil. 302, 307 (2007).
29 Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 463, 472-473 (1995).
34Rufloe v. Burgos, G.R. No. 143573, 30 January 2009, 577 SCRA 264, 273.
38 Cayana v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 830, 846 (2004).
40 G.R. No. 177598, 17 October 2008, 569 SCRA 767, 785.
41 Rufloe v. Burgos, supra note 34 at 275-276.
42 350 Phil. 544 (1998).
43 Civil Code, Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
44Titong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 42 at 556.
47 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

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