Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/279/749
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 12:36:02+00:00

Document:
Argued: and Submitted April 22, 23, 1929.
Messrs. George P. Hoover and Charles A. Douglas, both of Washington, D. C., and Martin W. Littleton, of New York City, for Sinclair and others.
Messrs. Daniel Thew Wright and Philip Ershler, both of Washington, D. C., for Day.
Mr. Owen J. Roberts, of Philadelphia, Pa., for the United States.
November 22, 1927, the United States, by their attorney, presented to the Supreme Court, District of Columbia, a written petition for an order requiring appellants Harry F. Sinclair, William J. Burns, W. Sherman Burns, and Henry Mason Day to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of that court.
That Day employed the agency through W. Sherman Burns, an officer then in New York. On the following day fifteen named operatives were assembled in Washington and assigned to spy upon, investigate, and shadow jurors. They continued so to do until November 2d.
That William J. Burns, then actively engaged in conducting the affairs of the detective agency, visited Washington October 12th, and 13th and arranged for the intended operations. November 3d he returned and, in pursuance of the general plan, procured a false affidavit concerning the conduct of Juror Glasscock which was presented to the trial judge.
That operatives and employees of the detective agency investigated incumbrances on the home of one juror, also the affairs of his neighbors; made an investigation of the brother and father of another juror; and one of them (McMullin) falsely reported that Juror Glasscock was seen in conference with an attorney for the United States.
That the operatives reported daily to their superior officer, who disclosed the result to Day and Sinclair, the original reports being sent to W. Sherman Burns, New York City.
The rule issued. Appellants presented separate answers under oath.
The challenged the sufficiency of the petition to charge anything done in the presence of the court or near thereto which obstructed or impeded due administration of justice, or tended so to do. They denied any purpose to establish 'contact' between an operative and a juror, or that there was such contact; also any purpose to exert improper influence. They asserted the legal right under the circumstances to shadow jurors without contact; admitted employment of detectives who diligently followed the jurors while without the courtroom and made daily reports in respect of them.
It is not questioned that counsel for the United States presented evidence to the court showing the activities of Burns detectives in shadowing jurors, also the misconduct of one of the jurors, and that by reason of these things a mistrial was entered on November 2d in United States v. Sinclair & Fall.
Trial upon the charge of contempt under the petition and answers above summarized commenced December 5, 1927, and terminated February 21, 1928. Much evidence was taken in open court-the condensation for the record occupies more than 750 printed pages. The appellants, except Sinclair, testified; also the fourteen operatives who shadowed the jurymen. Their daily reports were presented-more than 200 of them. These showed the details of the shadowing of each juror-except Flora, described in the sketch of him as a 'bull-headed man.' More than a hundred witnesses were called. During the hearing on question of guilt counsel made proffer of many witnesses to come from all parts of the United States for the purpose of showing that for a long time United States attorneys throughout the Union, under direction of the Department of Justice, by agents of the Department as distinguished from local marshals, had indulged in the custom of shadowing jurors, also to show indulgence in such practices on different occasions. This proffer was rejected.
Charged with conspiracy to defraud, Sinclair and Fall were put on trial October 17th, in the Supreme Court, District of Columbia. The jury-ten men and two women-was selected and finally sworn about midday October 18th. The Court made no order to lock them up. There was no request therefor. Immediately thereafter (about 3:30 o'clock) Sinclair gave biographical sketches of the jurors, secured by counsel before the trial began, to Day and instructed him to employ the William J. Burns International Detective Agency to supply a corps of operatives who should shadow them. On the 19th some fifteen operatives, including a manager, field men, etc., were assembled in Washington. One of them was assigned to each juror, except Flora, with instructions to go to the courtroom, identify and thereafter to keep his subject under as strict surveillance as possible 'outside of the court,' and report to the manager.
For some days these instructions were carried out. Jurors were kept under strict surveillance from early morning until late at night-11, 12, 3 o'clock, whenever not actually within the courthouse. Daily reports were turned in and their contents conveyed to Day. On October 24th a majority of the operatives were sent away and the remainder concentrated their efforts upon three jurors whose history did not indicate strength of character. Investigation was made concerning incumbrances upon the home of one of these; also to determine whether another had indicated his views during the trial. A report by Operative McMullin October 22, 1927, purposely and falsely stated that the third (Glasscock) had consulted a representative of the United States.
The evidence does not disclose that any operative was instructed to approach, or did approach, a juror; nor does it disclose that any juror actually knew that he was being shadowed. Some were suspicious. The court did not know, nor does it appear that Sinclair's counsel knew, the jury was being shadowed.
Called as a witness, Day gave rather full account of himself from his youth up, including his army service. He was not permitted to say that he had knowledge of a practice by United States attorneys to shadow juries in criminal cases after they were sworn.
Sinclair did not take the stand. The operatives severally testified that they were instructed in harmony with Sinclair's directions to Day and acted accordingly.
On November 2d and 3d William J. Burns was in Washington apparently with the purpose of doing something to offset criticism of the detective agency aroused by the disclosures concerning surveillance of the jury. He consulted with Operative McMullin and procured the making of an affidavit by the latter based upon the false report of October 22, 1927, concerning Juror Glasscock and caused it to be presented to the presiding judge. A few days later he spoke of efforts by parties representing the United States to tamper with the jury and the affidavit of McMullin to that effect.
After close of the evidence and arguments and after the court had declared appellants were guilty of contempt, counsel announced that upon the question of mitigation they re-offered the evidence tendered but excluded during the main case as to the custom of the Department of Justice to place juries under surveillance. This was overruled. Before sentence each appellant was called upon to make such statement as he might desire.
W. Sherman Burns was sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000; Sinclair to imprisonment for six months; Day for four months; and William J. Burns for fifteen days.
Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. That court certified certain questions here for instructions. Thereafter, we directed the entire record to be sent up for our consideration.
Both Sinclair and William J. Burns were in Washington on October 12 and 13, 1927, but there is no evidence of communication between them at that time. Sinclair had been a client of the Burns Agency. Circumstances connected with the making and filing of the false affidavit by McMullin, alias Long, based upon his false report of October 22d concerning Juror Glasscock, and its presentation to the court on November 4th, also certain statements then or thereafter made by him, might reasonably cause one to suspect William J. Burns was party to the plan for surveillance. But he emphatically denied this, and we can find no material evidence to support the charge against him. As to him, the judgment below must be reversed.
Section 1 of that act became R. S. § 725; Judicial Code, § 268; U. S. Code, title 28, § 385 (28 USCA § 385). The substance of section 2 appears in sections 5399 and 5404, R. S.; Federal Criminal Code, § 135; U. S. Code, title 18, § 241 (18 USCAs 241). See Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 S. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405; Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 9 S. Ct. 699, 33 L. Ed. 150.
Counsel maintain that the petition does not adequately charge and the record fails to show misbehavior by appellants which obstructed the administration of justice within section 268, Judicial Code, since there is neither averment nor evidence that any operative actually approached or communicated with a juror, or attempted so to do, or that any juror was conscious of observation. The insistence is that to establish misbehavior within that section it was essential to show some act both known by a juror and probably sufficient to influence his mind. We cannot accept this view. It would destroy the power of courts adequately to protect themselves-to enforce their right of selfpreservation. Suppose, for example, some litigant should endeavor to shoot a juror while sitting in the box during progress of the cause. He might escape punishment for contempt if some quick-witted attendant quietly thwarted the effort and kept the circumstances secret until the trial ended.
Under the doctrine so stated, we think the trial judge rightly held it unnecessary to allege or show actual contact between an operative of the detective agency and a juror, or that any juror had knowledge of being observed. The reasonable tendency of the acts done is the proper criterion. Neither actual effect produced upon the juror's mind nor his consciousness of extraneous influence was an essential element of the offense.
That the acts here disclosed, and for which three of the appellants were certainly responsible, tended to obstruct the honest and fair administration of justice, we cannot doubt. The jury is an essential instrumentality-an appendage-of the court, the body ordained to pass upon guilt or innocence. Exercise of calm and informed judgment by its members is essential to proper enforcement of law. The most exemplary resent having their footsteps dogged by private detectives. All know that men who accept such employment commonly lack fine scruples, often willfully misrepresent innocent conduct and manufacture charges. The mere suspicion that he, his family, and friends are being subjected to surveillance by such persons is enough to destroy the equilibrium of the average juror and render impossible the exercise of calm judgment upon patient consideration. If those fit for juries understand that they may be freely subjected to treatment like that here disclosed, they will either shun the burdens of the service or perform it with disquiet and disgust. Trial by capable juries, in important cases, probably would become an impossibility. The mistrial of November 2d indicates what would often happen. We can discover no reason for emasculating the power of courts to protect themselves against this odious thing. See United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 575, 27 S. Ct. 165, 51 L. Ed. 319, 8 Ann. Cas. 265.
The acts complained of were sufficiently near the court. Most of them were within the courtroom, near the door of the courthouse, or within the city. Certainly, they were not less remote than the publication denounced in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States. There was probable interference with an appendage of the court while in actual operation; the inevitable tendency was towards evil, the destruction, indeed, of trial by jury. In re Savin, Petitioners, supra.
During the hearing and before conviction of guilt, counsel proffered many witnesses by whom they proposed to show a practice of the Department of Justice to cause its officers to shadow jurors. This evidence was rightly excluded. That Department is not a lawmaker and mistakes or violations of law by it give no license for wrongful conduct by others.
After the judge had declared appellants guilty, counsel offered in mitigation of punishment the same evidence concerning the alleged custom of the Department of Justice theretofore tendered on the issue of guilt. The tender was refused. Very many witnesses, who it was said would testify to such custom, had been proffered and the proposed evidence rejected; all were again tendered. The offer did not limit the proposal to the appellants' knowledge or belief or mental state. They had answered under oath, with full opportunity to present whatever they deemed important. Before sentence each was accorded opportunity to make a statement. There was no request for permission to file affidavits. Counsel were fully heard. In the circumstances, the court did not exceed the limits of proper discretion.
By this language we did not intend to lay down any new or hard and fast rule concerning evidence to be heard in mitigation in proceedings for contempt; and certainly there was no purpose to restrict the discretion of the trial judge in such cases more narrowly than in ordinary criminal trials. See Wharton's Criminal Procedure (10th Ed.) § 1890. Moreover, the conscious purpose of Cooke was regarded as an essential element of the offense charged.
Always the language used in an opinion must be read in the light of the issues presented. Cooke was not accorded due opportunity at any stage of the proceedings to state the facts which might excuse or mitigate his conduct, and the words quoted were addressed to that situation. Here there was abundant opportunity for presentation of anything really important.
Under the circumstances here disclosed, to hear the many witnesses offered by counsel would have required unnecessary and intolerable extension of the long drawn out trial without material benefit. The answers relied or might have relied upon the knowledge possessed by appellants. By short affidavit or verbal statement any appellant could have advised the court again concerning facts within his knowledge, his beliefs, or general state of mind-matters which might possibly affect the degree of guilt.
The exclusion of some other evidence is assigned as error; but we think the claim is without merit and demands no extended comment.
Objections are offered to the admission of certain evidence. In answer, we need only refer to what was said in United States v. King, 7 How. 833, 854, 855 (12 L. Ed. 934): 'In some unimportant particulars, the evidence objected to was not admissible. But where the court decides the fact and the law without the intervention of a jury, the admission of illegal testimony, even if material, is not of itself a ground for reversing the judgment, nor is it properly the subject of a bill of exceptions. If evidence appears to have been improperly admitted, the appellate court will reject it, and proceed to decide the case as if it was not in the record.' Considering the whole record, we think appellants had a patient hearing upon adequately defined issues, with abundant opportunity to put forward all proper defenses and explanations. With the exception already stated, there is ample evidence to support the judgment; the punishments imposed are not excessive; the court kept within the limits of its reasonable discretion and did nothing which injuriously affected the substantial rights of the parties. Judicial Code, § 269; U. S. Code, title 28, § 391 (28 USCA § 391).
The judgment as to William J. Burns must be reversed; as to the other appellants it is affirmed.
Mr. Justice STONE took no part in the consideration or determination of this cause.

References: v. 
 § 725
 § 268
 § 385
 § 385
 § 135
 § 241
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1890
 v. 
 § 269
 § 391
 § 391