Source: http://www.myconstructionexpert.com/blog/tag/daubert-challenge/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:32:32+00:00

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Daubert Challenge Archives - Advise & Consult, Inc.Advise & Consult, Inc.
Crane and R.J. Reynolds appealed the trial court’s decision to admit the plaintiff’s expert causation testimony. Upon review, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that under Daubert, the trial court erred in admitting the plaintiff’s expert causation testimony. In addition, it remanded the case for a new trial against R.J. Reynolds and the entry of a directed verdict in favor of Crane.
The plaintiff appealed the appellate decision, arguing that in accordance with past precedent, the trial court correctly applied the Frye test rather than the Daubert test.
In the United States, all states apply a variation of either the “Frye” test or the “Daubert” test to determine the admissibility of expert opinions. Under Frye, expert testimony need only be generally accepted by a meaningful segment of the associated scientific community. Under Daubert, expert testimony is admissible if: (1) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (4) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. In 2013, the Florida state legislature codified the requirement that courts apply the Daubert test in Section 90.702 of the Florida Statutes. Prior to this legislation, Florida courts applied the Frye test.
In Delisle, the court addressed whether the legislature had the authority to legislate the appropriate test for the admissibility of expert testimony. In citing to Article II, Section 3 and Article V, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution, the court held that the state legislature did not have the authority to pass legislation that, “determine[s] matters of [court] practice or procedure” through a mere majority vote. It further held that the test for the admissibility of expert testimony is a procedural rule and, therefore, within the sole purview of the Judiciary. The court concluded by reaffirming “that Frye, not Daubert, is the appropriate test in Florida courts.” The court noted, however, that the Frye test is “inapplicable to the vast majority of cases because it applies only when experts render an option that is based on new or novel scientific techniques.” However, with respect to the medical causation testimony at issue, the court held that the trial court properly admitted the testimony because medical causation testimony is not new or novel, and not subject to a Frye analysis. This case serves as a good reminder that, prior to filing suit, subrogation practitioners should be aware of which test will apply to the admissibility of the testimony of the expert or experts involved in the case.
 It should be noted that the Florida Constitution does permit the repeal of a rule of the Court if the legislation is enacted by two-thirds votes of both houses of the legislature.
This year marks the 25th anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Daubert announced a new, “flexible” standard for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, holding that the “general acceptance” test of Frye v. United States, had been displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Since then, Daubert has been the test in the federal courts; its standard is now incorporated in the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
But the Daubert – Frye debate has continued in the state courts. In 2016, in litigation alleging that cell phone radiation causes brain tumors, the District of Columbia finally abandoned Frye in favor of Rule 702. By legislation effective in August 2017, Missouri adopted the Daubert standard. In August of this year, the New Jersey Supreme Court required trial courts to consider the Daubert factors, but stopped short of declaring New Jersey a “Daubert jurisdiction,” declining to accept the entire body of Daubert case law. At last count, Daubert states outnumbered Frye states by a ratio of about 4:1. (Three states – Nevada, North Dakota, and Virginia – maintain their own unique standards for admissibility.) Over the years, studies have shown that Daubert leads more often than Frye to the exclusion of expert testimony, especially in favor of defendants.
Perhaps no state has grappled with the Daubert – Frye decision more than Florida. But the debate has come to an apparent end with the decision in DeLisle.
DeLisle was that “case or controversy.” The plaintiff in DeLisle alleged that he had contracted mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos, both occupationally and in cigarette filters. The jury reached a verdict of $8 million in his favor. Reviewing the admission of the plaintiff’s expert testimony under Daubert, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, ordering a new trial for defendant R.J. Reynolds and entry of a directed verdict for defendant Crane. It held that the trial court had “failed to properly exercise its gatekeeping function” as to plaintiff’s causation experts.
The Supreme Court’s decision turned on whether the Daubert Amendment was properly characterized as substantive or procedural. The latter, it pointed out, could be enacted only by the Court itself, and repealed only by a supermajority of two thirds of each house of the legislature. Here, only the state Senate, not the House, had passed the bill by the requisite vote.
The majority opinion addressed the relative merits of Daubert and Frye only in a footnote, expressing concern that the amendment “would affect access to the courts…by imposing an additional burden on the courts.” A concurrence, however, offered a laundry list of objections to Daubert: any other approach “reflects a mistrust of the jury system”; it “has blocked more court access than it has enabled”; defendants “exploit” its requirements “as a sword against plaintiffs’ attorneys”; it applies more often than Frye”; it often requires expensive, multi-day hearings”; it increases the burdens on the parties.
Curiously, the majority described Frye as “the higher standard of reliability,” quoting its own decision in Brim v. State, yet also reaffirmed its view that “Frye is inapplicable to the vast majority of cases…” It ignored R.J. Reynolds’ argument that the DeLisle plaintiff’s expert testimony should be excluded under either standard. Without analysis and in a single paragraph, the Court held that “medical causation is not new or novel and is not subject to Frye analysis.” The Court thus effectively authorized “every exposure” testimony to reach the jury in Florida toxic tort cases without judicial screening.
The Supreme Court of Florida recently held that the Florida Legislature’s 2013 amendment of the Florida Rules of Evidence adopting the federal Daubert standard for admitting expert testimony was unconstitutional.
In so ruling, the Court returned Florida to the Frye standard for admitting expert testimony.
A copy of the opinion in Richard DeLisle v. Crane Co., et al. is available at: Link to Opinion.
The case involved the admissibility of expert testimony in a plaintiff’s personal injury action against several cigarette manufacturer defendants. The plaintiff used multiple experts to establish that smoking cigarettes caused his cancer. The trial court examined the admissibility of the expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the prevailing standard in Florida at the time of the trial.
As you may recall, in Daubert, the Supreme Court of the United States pronounced the standard to admit expert scientific testimony in federal court. In doing so, the Supreme Court announced that Federal Rules of Evidence 702 had superseded the prior standard to admit expert testimony announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Following Daubert hearings, the trial court admitted the experts’ testimony and the plaintiff prevailed at trial.
The defendants appealed to Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District reversed for a new trial as to one defendant and a directed verdict in favor of another defendant finding under Daubert that the trial court did not “properly exercise its gatekeeping function” for several of the experts.
The Supreme Court of Florida granted the plaintiff’s request for review.
The Court noted that it has worked with the Florida Legislature for almost 40 years “to enact and maintain codified rules of evidence.” In 1976 the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Evidence Code. In 1979, the Court adopted the Evidence Code to the extent that it was procedural.
In 2013, the Florida Legislature amended section 90.702, Florida Statutes to incorporate Daubert into the Florida Rules of Evidence and to cease applying the Frye standard to expert testimony. The Frye rule was the standard in Florida before the 2013 amendment.
Relevant here, Article V, section 2(a) gives the Court “the exclusive authority to ‘adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts.’ ” The Florida Constitution further provides that to repeal any court rule or decision, the Legislature must enact a law “by a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.” The Court concluded that the Legislature exceeded its authority because the vote to amend section 90.702 did not meet this requirement.
Next, the Court noted that to declare the 2013 amendment to section 90.702 unconstitutional it also had to “conflict with a rule of this Court.” The Court had little trouble finding that its rulings adopting the Frye standard created a procedural rule because the Court may pronounce a rule in case law.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Fourth District’s ruling and remanded to the trial court to reinstate the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

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