Source: http://macm.cc/e-journals-non-custodyparenting-time/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:50:58+00:00

Document:
The court held that non-party American Adoptions (American) was not denied its right to due process, and that it lacked standing to challenge the trial court’s failure to approve the payment of marketing fees by the petitioners-adoptive parents. However, it found that the trial court erred by disallowing the payment of administrative fees. Petitioners in these consolidated cases each adopted a child. American incurred various fees in each adoption. As part of the process, the trial court approved all the requested fees and costs related to the adoptions, with the exception of certain administrative fees and marketing fees. On appeal, the court rejected American’s argument that it was denied due process because it was unable to participate in the hearing related to the approval of the fees, noting the trial court “received materials to consider petitioners’ request to approve the fees, and among those materials was [American’s] letter outlining what the administrative fees covered.” However, the court agreed with American that the trial court erred when it denied the approval of the administrative fees, noting the expenses were for “items such as general contract labor, IT services, payroll, health insurance, professional insurance, office supplies, and rent.” Due to the nature of what these overhead services entailed, they were “not connected, or related in fact, to the two adoptions.” Lastly, the court held that American lacked standing to challenge the trial court’s failure to approve marketing fees in the adoptions, noting there was “no evidence of any connection between the marketing fees” and American. Reversed and remanded.
The court held that the 10-year limitations period in MCL 600.5809(3) did not apply to the entry of a proposed QDRO because it is not an enforcement of a noncontractual money obligation, and that the plaintiff-ex-wife’s request for entry of the proposed QDRO was not time-barred. The parties’ divorce judgment was entered in 2003. It ordered them to cooperate in the execution of a QDRO to transfer the interest awarded to plaintiff, and required them to “execute whatever documents may be necessary to complete the transfer.” For whatever reason, they did not promptly do so. Plaintiff submitted the proposed QDRO in 2015. The defendant-ex-husband unsuccessfully objected. The court disagreed with the premise that MCL 600.5809 controlled, noting that the statute “applies only to ‘action[s] to enforce  noncontractual money obligation[s].’” The court held in Neville that “when a judgment of divorce requires a QDRO to be entered, the QDRO is to be considered ‘as part of the divorce judgment.’” Because a “QDRO is part of the judgment, it necessarily cannot be viewed as enforcing that same judgment.” As the Tennessee Court of Appeals held in Jordan, “approval of the proposed QDRO is adjunct to the entry of the judgment of divorce and not an attempt to ‘enforce’ the judgment.” Further, entry of the order “did not compel the payment of any money to plaintiff.” A proposed QDRO entered by a trial court “is not enforceable until the plan administrator determines that the proposed QDRO is ‘qualified’ under ERISA.” Thus, plaintiff’s motion for entry of “the proposed QDRO was not an act to enforce a judgment or obligation.” Rather, under the circumstances, “the act to obtain entry of a proposed QDRO is a ministerial task done in conjunction with the divorce judgment itself.” The judgment established the distribution of the parties’ assets and expressly requested that they obtain entry of a proposed QDRO. Further, in contrast to “the standard enforcement case, neither party here is or has been prejudiced by the passage of time, because no party has changed any position relative to the annuity, nor has any party triggered the necessary preconditions for the application of the QDRO.” Affirmed.
Divorce; Property division; Hodge v. Parks; Woodington v. Shokoohi; Gates v. Gates; Korth v. Korth; Determination of fault; McDougal v. McDougal; Welling v. Welling; Witness credibility; Phillips v. Phillips; MCR 2.613(C); Retirement benefits; Boonstra v. Boonstra; MCL 552.18(1); MCL 552.101(3); Booth v. Booth; Survivor benefit; Vander Veen v. Vander Veen; Magee v. Magee; Methods for the valuation & distribution of pension benefits; Boyd v. Boyd; MCL 552.23(1); Attorney fees; Richards v. Richards; MCR 3.206(C); Whether the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing; B & B Inv. Group v. Gitler; Abandonment of the issue of reasonableness of the fees as to the hourly rate & number of hours billed; Head v. Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc.
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant-ex-wife’s request for attorney fees and costs pursuant to the parties’ consent judgment of divorce. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that she was entitled to attorney fees and costs, noting that neither the consent judgment nor the property settlement agreement provided for such relief. It noted that attorney fees and costs were not mandated under the provision in the consent judgment requiring “the party ‘determined by the presiding judge to be in default’ to pay attorney fees and costs to the non-defaulting party” because “the trial judge did not determine that plaintiff . . . was in default . . . .” For the same reason, attorney fees and costs were not mandated under the provision in the property settlement agreement requiring that “the presiding judge must make a determination that a party is in default of the agreement before the non-defaulting party may recover attorney fees and costs.” Finally, it noted that attorney fees and costs were not mandated under a second provision in the settlement agreement providing that “a breach of the agreement entitles the non-breaching party to recover attorney fees and costs.” It found that “[a]lthough that provision does not require the presiding judge to make a determination that a party breached the agreement, it still requires a breach.” Here, “the trial court’s ruling made plain that [plaintiff] was complying with the terms of the property settlement agreement and the consent judgment of divorce. In other words, there was no breach of the agreement.” Affirmed.
Holding that there was no error in finding the plaintiff-ex-wife in contempt of court or in awarding sanctions to the defendant-ex-husband, the court affirmed. The trial court found plaintiff in contempt for violating the parties’ consent judgment of divorce by attempting to undermine the sale of their cottage and by interfering with their child’s relationship with defendant. It later awarded defendant $22,439 in sanctions. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s show cause motion alleged a failure or refusal by plaintiff to allow parenting time on one particular weekday, but that the divorce judgment did not specify any particular weekday that he was entitled to parenting time. It found that defendant alleged plaintiff was “preventing defendant’s exercise of parenting time on a continuing or ongoing basis, and the reference to a date was merely to identify when plaintiff sent the text message.” It next found there was “overwhelming evidence that plaintiff violated the divorce judgment with respect to the cottage and its sale, including her own testimony that she had changed the locks.” The court rejected her claim that defendant disregarded a possible purchase of the cottage by her mother, noting there was never a written offer by her mother or father, “and even had there been a valid and timely offer, plaintiff’s remedy would have been to file a motion seeking an order to force” defendant to accept it, and it would not have excused her contempt. The court also rejected her contention that there was “‘no damage, no harm, no loss, and no violation of any court order (including the judgment) and certainly no interference’” with any court obligation, noting her “actions forced defendant to commence contempt proceedings, resulting in defendant incurring legal expenses.” Finally, it rejected her argument that there was no need for defendant to litigate a claim of contempt, noting “that defendant incurred legal expenses, as necessary to obtain plaintiff’s compliance with the divorce judgment, to close on the cottage’s sale, and to procure parenting time.” Also, defendant was not required to elicit independent expert testimony on attorney fees, defense counsel’s $350 per hour rate was not unreasonable, plaintiff’s alleged inability to pay was not relevant in the award, and attorney fees connected to consultation with a CPA on IRS-related property matters were relevant.
Holding that plaintiff-ex-wife failed to show that the award of modifiable spousal support of $1,000 a month for 5 years was inequitable, or that it was inequitable to hold her responsible for half of the parties’ 2015 tax debt, the court affirmed the divorce judgment. In determining its support award, the trial court considered the parties’ conduct and past relations. It found that “their relationship had been unstable since about 2006” as the defendant-ex-husband had twice left the marital home. It also “noted that plaintiff had not worked year-round,” as she was an elementary school cook, and “thus her earning ability was not truly reflected by her income. On the other hand, defendant worked long hours to maintain his pay and bonus checks.” Next, it noted that this was a long-term marriage (over 35 years). Third, it concluded that “both parties had the ability to work full-time.” Fourth, it noted that its property distribution was fairly equal. Fifth, it noted the parties’ ages (they were both 55) “and concluded that they both had the capacity to live full, complete lives.” Sixth, it “concluded that defendant’s income was significantly greater than plaintiff’s” and he had the ability to pay spousal support. Seventh, it concluded that she was going to stay in the martial home for 2 more years and would be paying $200 a month in rent. “Defendant would also be paying rent and his own living expenses.” Eighth, it found that plaintiff would need “financial assistance and defendant was in a position to provide” it. Ninth, “neither party had health issues that kept them from working.” Tenth, the trial court found that their standard of living would not significantly change, and eleventh, it concluded that neither party was responsible for anyone else’s support, although defendant helped their daughter with car expenses. Plaintiff failed to show that any of these factual findings were clearly erroneous. Further, examining the division of the tax debt in light of the entire properly division, splitting that debt was not unfair.
In an order, the court amended its published opinion (see e-Journal # 65601 in the 7/17/17 edition) to correct a clerical error. The order amended the first sentence in the last paragraph to read: “The trial court’s order is reversed to the extent it includes the entirety of plaintiff’s earned income beyond his taxable income in calculating his spousal support obligations.” The opinion remained unchanged in all other respects.
Holding that the trial court’s findings on best interest factors (d), (f), (g), and (j) were not against the great weight of the evidence, and that the plaintiff-father was not entitled to an award of attorney fees, the court affirmed the order denying his motion to change custody of the parties’ children and his request for attorney fees. As to factor (d), his reliance on Kessler was misplaced. The children had never lived in the city where plaintiff now lived (in a home owned by his fiancée) apart from staying there during his parenting time. The parties and the children lived elsewhere in Michigan “before moving to China in 2011. Although plaintiff asserts that the children were ‘uprooted’ from Michigan by defendant, it was in fact both parties as a married couple who moved with the children to China in 2011. In 2012, plaintiff left the family and moved back to Michigan, while defendant and the children continued living in China with plaintiff’s consent.” Defendant and the children moved from China to New Jersey in 2015 after she “obtained a job in New York City. Plaintiff has extended family members in the New York City area. The children have begun attending school, church, and catechism near their home in New Jersey.” Thus, the facts were “not even remotely similar” to those in Kessler, and the trial court’s finding that factor (d) favored defendant was not against the great weight of the evidence. The evidence also did not clearly preponderate against its finding that factor (f) favored her. Plaintiff cited “no authority establishing that moral transgressions which occurred before the entry of a divorce judgment are barred from consideration under factor (f) or establishing that only moral transgressions that occurred after the filing of a motion to change custody may be considered” under this factor nor did the court find any authority to this effect. The trial court’s findings that factor (g) favored defendant and that factor (j) did not favor either party were also not against the great weight of the evidence. The court also found within the range of principled outcomes the trial court’s determination that plaintiff did not establish either that he “was unable to pay his attorney fees or that defendant was able to pay” them.
Holding that the trial court properly found that defendant-Abdel had no interest in the property at issue, divided the proceeds, and imputed income to defendant-Ali but erred in ordering Ali to pay attorney fees and in entering its judgment, the court affirmed in part, but vacated the entry of the divorce judgment, reversed the order awarding attorney fees, and remanded. During their divorce, plaintiff claimed Ali owned the property, while Ali claimed it was owned by Abdel, who also claimed an interest in the property. The trial court joined Abdel in the action. Considering plaintiff’s testimony that Ali told her that he purchased the property, and the trial court’s determination that Ali and Abdel “were not credible, the trial court’s findings” that Ali owned the “property and was attempting to conceal his ownership of this asset” were not erroneous. The court also found that the trial court did not err by upholding its ruling that Abdel had no interest in the property in response to defendants’ motion for rehearing, reconsideration, new trial, or relief from judgment. They “failed to establish any error or irregularity considering that the trial court’s decision was based in large part on the credibility of” the witnesses, or that any of the evidence presented was newly discovered. The court upheld the award of 80% of the value of the property to plaintiff and only 20% of the value to Ali, finding there was “no indication that the trial court gave undue weight to principles of equity and the fact” that Ali tried to conceal the property. It further rejected the argument that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing income of $27,397 to Ali. However, the court held that the trial court erred by ordering Ali to pay plaintiff’s attorney fees in the amount of $8,718 from his portion of the proceeds of the property sale. It noted that plaintiff did not allege or show that Ali “refused to comply with any court order, and thus, she failed to show facts sufficient to justify the award.” Further, the trial court “did not find that plaintiff incurred attorney fees because defendant refused to comply with a previous court order.” The trial court also failed to determine reasonableness. Finally, the court found that the trial court erred by entering the judgment of divorce without giving defendants an opportunity to object, and by including in the judgment a provision that was not part of its opinion and order, noting it “failed to comply with any of the methods for entering a judgment identified in” the court rule, and the error was not harmless.
The court held that the trial court’s valuation of the business was based on findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, and the plaintiff-ex-wife should not be required to pay the defendant-ex-husband in order to make the property division equal based on the trial court’s business valuation finding. Thus, it remanded for an explanation on the record as to this matter. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that spousal support was not warranted, by ordering the parties to pay their own attorney fees, and not requiring defendant to pay for plaintiff’s expert’s testimony. Plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the expert’s valuation of approximately $513,000, and instead concluding that the business was worth $69,364. As to unreported cash income to company, the trial court did not err in crediting defendant’s testimony, but did clearly err by either (1) failing to account for the difference somewhere in its calculation or (2) failing to state in its opinion that the matter had no practical impact on valuation, so any dispute over the cash could be ignored for valuation purposes. The trial court also did not explain how it used a negative net profit rate and still arrived at a positive value for the company under the income approach, and this was error. As to non-operating assets, the trial court’s credibility determination was not error, in light of the expert’s admission that he never visited the company’s worksite. As to excess-operating fixed assets, the court held that by arriving at $69,364, it was mathematically impossible for the trial court to have adjusted for all of the flaws it identified. The court remanded for an explanation on the record as to how the trial court arrived at its determination of value and how its identification and consideration of the “flaws” it found in the valuation process affected this determination. Plaintiff also argued that the trial court’s low valuation of the business “skewed the entire property division,” resulting in an inequitable order that she pay defendant $81,017 in cash. “Plaintiff’s settlement from the property division consisted solely of her retirement accounts and life insurance policy, which were worth $600,366. Defendant received his business, the marital home, and other property worth $519,356.” The court agreed that the cash award to defendant was not equitable, and that the finding as to the valuation of the business was in error. Affirmed in part and remanded.
The court held that the defendant-ex-husband was entitled to summary disposition as to the plaintiff-ex-wife’s claims related to a pending lawsuit, but that plaintiff was entitled to leave to amend to add claims related to two missing statues. After their divorce, plaintiff sued defendant for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, silent fraud, and innocent misrepresentation. She claimed he falsely represented during the divorce proceeding that his medical practice would abandon a pending lawsuit it had filed against another business, that he concealed the existence of the litigation, and that he misrepresented the status of it. She then sought leave to amend to add the same claims with regard to two sculptures that had gone missing. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant as to the claims involving the litigation, but granted plaintiff leave to amend as to the claims involving the statues. On appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff that Grace and Foreman provided authority for allowing her amended complaint, and found Nederlander and Triplett distinguishable. It rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, noting the “prior litigation did not resolve issues of” fraud, and “the claims relate to evidence arising after the litigation in question.” As to his contention that the trial court erred in ordering the parties to arbitrate the claims in plaintiff’s amended complaint because the arbitration agreement did not encompass tort claims, the court found that, “at this stage in the proceedings, when plaintiff has simply been allowed to proceed on her amended complaint in the circuit court, it was premature for the court to refer any issue back to arbitration . . . .” The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in finding she failed to plead valid claims of fraud. It noted that the “litigation was not a secret and was clearly referenced in the federal district court’s” opinion, of which she had a copy. Finally, the court found her remaining claims untenable. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.