Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/aaron-v-conservation-commission-183-conn-532-1981/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:23:42+00:00

Document:
BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY, ARMENTANO and WRIGHT, Js.
The plaintiff, who owned real property in the town of Redding, sought, inter alia, a determination of the validity of certain regulations of the defendant Redding conservation commission, which is the inland wetlands agency for that town. The plaintiff had been informed that before he could be issued a building permit for a dwelling he planned to construct on certain of his Redding land, he would have to obtain an inland wetland permit from that commission because the septic system for the dwelling was to be located within 150 feet of a water course. On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court from the trial court’s judgment in favor of the defendants, held: 1. The challenged regulations, which were in conformity with the purpose behind the state’s inland wetland legislation, were valid. 2. The plaintiff did not prove that the installation of the proposed septic system was incidental to his enjoyment of residential property — there being no residence on the property at the time in question — so as to entitle him to a statutory (22a-40) exemption from regulation by the commission. 3. Municipal regulation of septic systems is not precluded by the authority of the state health department and of the state department of environmental protection over such systems.
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury and tried to the court, Hadden, J.; judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, which set aside the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings; on retrial, the court, Moraghan, J., rendered judgment for the defendants as to the declaratory judgment, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. No error.
Samuel M. Chambliss, for the appellees (defendants).
The plaintiff is a property owner and a builder in the town of Redding where he owns an 11.6 acre parcel of land and other land not involved in this case. The defendant is the conservation commission of the town of Redding, which is the inland wetlands agency for that town. The plaintiff instituted this action seeking both a declaratory judgment determining the validity of certain regulations of the commission and injunctive relief. The plaintiff has appealed to this court from the judgment declaring the rights of the parties and denying him injunctive relief.
(13), 22a-38 (16) and 22a-38 (15), respectively, and whether 5.1 of the regulations requiring an application to be made to the commission to determine if the anticipated activity is exempt from regulation, are valid; (2) whether a residential septic system is exempt from regulation by the commission as a use incidental to the enjoyment of residential property under General Statutes 22a-40 (a)(4); and (3) whether a domestic residential septic system is exempt from regulation by a local inland wetlands agency because of the allegedly exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of such systems of the Connecticut public health department and the state department of environmental protection (DEP).
septic system violated the town’s inland wetlands regulations. After being refused a building permit, the plaintiff applied to the commission for an inland wetland permit, reserving by letter his right to question the jurisdiction of the commission over his application. After he instituted an action sounding in mandamus, the commission issued the permit for the septic system.
Thereafter, the plaintiff sought to construct a second dwelling on the remainder of the 11.6 acre parcel. This second septic system would also be located within 50 feet of a wetland and 150 feet of a water course. The plaintiff could not obtain a building permit until he had first applied to, and had been granted a new inland wetland permit by, the commission. The plaintiff refused to make such an application to the commission, claiming, as he had earlier, that the commission had no jurisdiction because the septic system would be outside of any wetland or water course. He then brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
The trial court found for the defendants. In doing so, it essentially held that the commission’s challenged regulations were valid and that the commission had authority to regulate septic systems located outside of a wetland or water course, and that such a system, although designed by a licensed civil engineer and approved by the state health department and local sanitary officials, still required a permit from the commission. While the issues are framed in more detail by the parties, our summary of the ultimate disposition by the trial court presents the essence of its holding.
(1976). In taking this position, the defendant argues, in opposition to the plaintiff’s claim, that these regulations do not conflict with, but rather are in conformity with, the statute.
Before we discuss the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, we initially note that “[e]very intendment is to be made in favor of the validity of the ordinance[s], and it is the duty of the court to sustain the ordinance[s] unless [their] invalidity is established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Connecticut Theatrical Corporation v. New Britain, 147 Conn. 546, 553, 163 A.2d 548 (1960). An agency which has the authority to enact regulations is vested with a large measure of discretion, and the burden of showing that the agency has acted improperly rests upon the one who asserts it. Riley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 147 Conn. 113, 117, 157 A.2d 590 (1960).
authority over inland wetlands and water courses and that, within the statutory grant of authority, the defendant commission, as any administrative agency, has “considerable discretion” as to the content of its regulations. The plaintiff, however, argues that the commission may not, as the plaintiff claims it has, enlarge the statutory jurisdiction granted to it. He recognizes, nevertheless, that the statutory scheme envisions a dual system of regulation, and claims that the regulation of inland wetlands is “primarily a matter of state, not local, concern.
added.) General Statutes 22a-42 (e). This legislation demonstrates the legislative concerns in this area. It requires no construction to conclude that local regulation was not only anticipated, but expressly authorized. It is this broad statutory mandate authorizing regulations on both the state and local levels, with specific legislative findings and declaration of policy, that serves as the setting in which we evaluate the claims of the parties. In doing so, we are mindful that the statutory scheme of this legislation envisages its adaptation to infinitely variable conditions for the effectuation of the purposes of these statutes.
plaintiff claims that this regulatory concept of “setbacks” is invalid as it has no support in the statutes. We do not agree.
Use Regulation (1979), p. 130. Clearly, then, section 1.9 is not in conflict with or in excess of the statutory grant of authority; rather it reasonably implements the statutory authority to effectuate the legislative purpose.
That a matter is of concurrent state and local concern is no impediment to the exercise of authority by a municipality through the enactment of an ordinance, so long as there is no conflict with the state legislation. See State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 706, 125 A.2d 477 (1956); City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495, 498-99, 532 P.2d 1292 (1975). Where the state legislature has delegated to local government the right to deal with a particular field of regulation, the fact that a statute also regulates the same subject in less than full fashion does not, ipso facto, deprive the local government of the power to act in a more comprehensive, but not inconsistent, manner. See Connecticut Theatrical Corporation v. New Britain, supra; State v. Gordon, supra, 706; see also Page v. Welfare Commissioner, supra.
A local ordinance, enacted pursuant to the police power, is not necessarily inconsistent with a state law on the same subject just because the ordinance provides higher standards than the statute. See Hunter v. Adams, 180 Cal.App.2d 511, 519, 4 Cal.Rptr. 776 (1960); City of Beloit v. Lamborn, 182 Kan. 288, 292, 321 P.2d 177 (1958).
A test frequently used to determine whether a conflict exists is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids, or prohibits that which the statute authorizes; if so, there is a conflict. If, however, both the statute and the ordinance are prohibitory and the only difference is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition than the statute, but not counter to the prohibition in the statute, and the ordinance does not attempt to authorize that which the legislature has forbidden, or forbid that which the legislature has expressly authorized, there is no conflict. See City of Junction City v. Lee, supra; Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 208-209, 107 A.2d 99 (1954); 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations 374. Where a municipal ordinance merely enlarges on the provisions of a statute by requiring more than a statute, there is no conflict unless the legislature has limited the requirements for all cases. City of Junction City v. Lee, supra. Under this reasoning, we conclude that 1.9 of the commissioner’s regulations is not invalid. Likewise, as discussed below, we hold that the other regulations challenged by the plaintiff, although they contain language not found in the state statutes, do not conflict with the statutes, are “in conformity with” the statutes, and are therefore valid.
(16), which defines “water courses.” The thrust of the defendant’s objection is that the addition in 1.15 of the words “vernal or intermittent” to the definition of “water course” is a material change which “greatly enlarges the commission’s jurisdiction, and accordingly that portion of the definition is void as conflicting with section 22a-38 (16) . . . .” We disagree.
Section 22a-38 (16) states that “`[w]ater courses’ means rivers, streams, brooks, waterways, lakes, ponds, marshes, swamps, bogs and all other bodies of water, natural or artificial, public or private . . . not regulated pursuant to sections 22a-28 to 22a-35.” (Emphasis added.) This is a comprehensive definition; the incorporation of “vernal or intermittent” into the definition is reasonable and clarifying, and merely includes waters that could fairly be said to fall within the broad meaning of “water courses” in the statute. The plaintiff’s attack on section 1.15 cannot be sustained.
The plaintiff goes on to claim that 1.16 of the regulations is invalid because of certain additional language it contains not found in 22a-38 (15).
That statute provides that wetlands means “land, including submerged land . . . which consists of any of the soil types designated as poorly drained, very poorly drained, alluvial, and flood plain by the National Cooperative Soils Survey, as may be amended from time to time, of the Soil Conservation Service of the United States Department of Agriculture.” Section 1.16 contains almost verbatim the same language of this statute, but adds that such soil types “are generally shown for informational purposes only on a map on file in the office of the Town Clerk entitled `Soils Survey Map, Redding, Connecticut.’ In each instance, however, the actual character of the soil shall determine whether land in question is subject to regulations.” We disagree with the plaintiff’s contention that 1.16 is void because of this additional language. Because the same types of soil are being regulated, and because, in each instance, it is the type of soil which is determinative of whether certain land is a wetland, there is no conflict. This language does not expand the jurisdiction of the commission. While the statute defines “wetlands” and how it can be determined, the language in 1.16 implements the statutory purposes of the act by setting forth permissible standards to assist in determining, informationally, whether a particular location is the situs of a wetland.
We decline to conclude that 5.1 is invalid here for two reasons. First, the administrative requirement that one apply to the commission in order to determine if his application is one for an exempt use or operation under 22a-40 (a) is, in and of itself, valid and is administratively necessary for the commission to discharge its function under the enabling statutes. Second, the exemptions under 22a-40 (a)(4) for “uses incidental for the enjoyment and maintenance of residential property” do not appear to be unlimited, and there should be an administrative determination of any claimed exemption.
426 A.2d 1324 (1980); International Business Machines Corporation v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134, 355 A.2d 236 (1974). One claiming the benefit of an exception under a statute has the burden of proving that he comes within the limited class for whose benefit it was established. See Goodwin v. Giovenelli, 117 Conn. 103, 107, 167 A. 87 (1933). Exemptions are to be strictly construed. See Kulis v. Moll, supra, 110.
The exemption to which the plaintiff refers speaks to “[u]ses incidental for the enjoyment and maintenance of residential property . . .” (emphasis added); it also provides: “Such incidental uses shall include maintenance of existing structures and landscaping but shall not include removal or deposition of significant amounts of material from or onto a wetland or water course or diversion or alteration of a water course. . . .” “Maintenance” is defined to mean “the labor of keeping something (as buildings or equipment) in a state of repair or efficiency,” and “existing” is that “which has actual or real being.” Webster, Third New International Dictionary. It is apparent that 22a-40 (a)(4) is intended to apply only to that which is already in existence on residential property, including residences. As the defendant points out, it cannot be claimed that the “enjoyment” of property which is not actually residential, i.e., on which there is not a residence, requires the location of a septic system on it. We conclude that the plaintiff has not proven that under 22a-40 (a)(4) he is entitled to an exemption from a “regulated activity” under the commission’s regulation or 22a-38 (13).
General Statutes 22a-38 (13). Thus, to achieve the broader purposes of this act, the legislature has authorized municipalities to set up local inland wetlands agencies to promulgate regulations in conformity with those of the commission. See General Statutes 22a-42. That agency “shall serve as the sole agent for the licensing of regulated activities,” (emphasis added) as that term is defined under the Inland Wetlands and Water Courses Act. See General Statutes 22a-42 (c), 22a-38 (13).
Finally, although the statutes may seek to regulate the same activity, and thus the jurisdiction of the local and state agencies overlaps, it is not unusual for one seeking a permit for a certain use or operation to apply to and be given such permission or license by more than one agency of government.
 The town of Redding is also a named defendant which, of course, is bound by the judgment of the trial court and this court. For convenience, however, we will refer to the commission as the defendant.
 The Commission is authorized to act as the local inland wetlands agency of Redding under General Statutes 22a-39 through 22a-45 and a Redding town ordinance adopted on March 9, 1973.
 The trial court originally refused to entertain the plaintiff’s action, and concluded that he should be left to seek redress by other forms of procedure. After our reversal of that decision; see Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 178 Conn. 173, 422 A.2d 290 (1979); the trial court heard and decided the case on the merits.
 In addition, the parties stipulated to eight exhibits.
 In 1974, the commission had adopted regulations regulating septic systems, i.e., subsurface waste disposal systems, and other activities 150 feet outside of a water course and 50 feet outside of a wetland.
 After the plaintiff commenced this action, the Redding planning commission gave the plaintiff permission to subdivide the 11.6 acre parcel into two lots, one containing 6.4 acres and the other containing 5.1 acres. The plaintiff obtained a building permit and’ other necessary permits (including the one previously issued by the commission) for the 6.4 acre parcel and started site work on it. The 5.1 acre parcel is the subject of this appeal. It is for this parcel that the plaintiff has not made an application to the commission for a new inland wetland permit. He has, however, hired an engineer who did a septic system plan for the 5.1 acre parcel. The Redding town sanitarian acknowledged that the proposed septic system was in conformity with the public health code requirements, and the design and location of the proposed septic system had been approved by the Connecticut state health department.
 That case held that “[a]n administrative agency, in making rules and regulations, must act within its statutory authority, within constitutional limitations, and in a lawful and reasonable manner.” Page v. Welfare Commissioner, 170 Conn. 258, 262, 365 A.2d 1118 (1976).
(15), particularly when read together with the regulations defining the circumstances under which the Commissioner may issue summary finding, call a public hearing, or request further information.” Tondro, Connecticut Land Use Regulation (1979), p. 130.
 The plaintiff suggests that “[a] vernal or intermittent body of water is one which has water in it during only a portion of the year but which generally does not contain water.” “Vernal” is defined as “appearing or occurring in the spring . . . relating to, or characteristic of the spring.” Webster, Third New International Dictionary.
 The plaintiff also appears to attack that portion of 1.15 which, after setting forth the definition of “water courses,” includes the following language: “which are generally shown for informational purposes only on a map on file in the office of the Town Clerk entitled `Soils Survey Map, Redding, Connecticut.'” As with 1.16, we find no conflict with the state definition. See Connecticut General Statutes 22a-38 (16).
 We have assumed, without deciding, and because the parties have so treated it, that the installation of a septic system on residential property as defined in 22a-40 (a)(4) is a “use” under that statute. Our disposition of this claim does not require that we reach the question of what “use” might be “incidental” for the enjoyment and maintenance of such property, but we note that the plaintiff does say in his brief that “a septic system is thus a use incidental for the enjoyment and maintenance of residential property; indeed it is essential for the use of the residence.” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff recognizes that because there are no public sewers in Redding, and because under the public health code a residence must be served by a septic system, without one, a certificate of occupancy cannot be obtained for a residence.

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