Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=83160:57124&amp;catid=1584&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:54:09+00:00

Document:
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3554-RTJ], June 10, 2014 - EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA AND EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA, Respondent.
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA AND EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA, Respondent.
Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees. This case emphasizes the need for members of the judiciary and those within its employ to exhibit the impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing with parties in pending cases.
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito “Jun” Sison, Jr.,9 met with respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010.10 During this meeting, complainant informed respondent Pecaña of the delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked respondent Pecaña to check the status of the publication of the notice.11 Respondent Pecaña asked for complainant’s number so that she could inform her as soon as any development takes place in the case.12 Enrique13 and Perlito14 executed affidavits to corroborate these allegations.
From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet outside the courtroom until August 8, 2010.
Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue orders39 that would have allowed her to comply with her duties as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate.40 This included the order to conduct an inventory of the properties, rights, and credits of the deceased, subject to the authority of the administrator.
In her comment,54 respondent Pecaña did not deny meeting complainant on February 20, 2010 through the introduction of Enrique Sison.55 However, she claimed that the alleged meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia was merely a chance encounter.
Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment67 on January 17, 2011.
On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative complaint to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation.77 The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.
A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012 where complainant testified on the dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.
The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and 24, 2012.
In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecaña testified to the allegations in her comment and judicial affidavit. She alleged for the first time that the dinner meeting with complainant happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.
On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter, was presented as witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel testified that the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter had a meeting on March 10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Judge Rubia attended the meeting as shown in the attendance sheet identified by Rodel.
Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012,100 the parties filed their respective memoranda.
As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that the administrative case was not the proper recourse for complainant.108 The proper action for her was to pursue remedial action through the courts “to rectify the purported error”109 in the court proceedings.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.
The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable.
This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable for their actions.
The findings of fact of an investigating justice must be accorded great weight and finality similar with the weight given to a trial court judge’s since an investigating justice personally assessed the witnesses’ credibility.110 However, this rule admits of exceptions.
While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their version of the incident on all material points, complainant miserably failed on this regard. The Investigating Justice who had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of the respondent’s witness, Rodel Cortez (Cortez) during the hearing finds his forthright narration of facts credible and rang with truth. The clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez that the incident that transpired along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter, absent any ulterior motive for him to perjure, swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner meeting between Judge Rubia and Barias did not [take] place. A testimony is credible if it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a spontaneous, natural, and straightforward manner.
We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlan’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to their testimonies.
Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez, the Secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified him as a “disinterested” witness.
A disinterested witness’ testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in the outcome of the case. This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness’ testimony more believable. To actively take part in litigation as a party or a witness entails willingness to commit to the arduous and exacting nature of most judicial proceedings. The disinterested witness’ candor and submission to the proceedings before the court add credibility and believability to the content of his or her testimony.
To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the circumstances that surround his or her testimony.
The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint the reputation of the organization that the witness has been serving for more than 20 years. It would be a definite blow to the reputation of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, if its former President were to be found guilty of the offenses that complainant imputed upon respondent Judge Rubia. The possibility of Rodel testifying in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of his loyalty to the latter and the Rotary Club puts into question the characterization that he is disinterested.
The substance of Rodel’s narration of events should also be scrutinized.
The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the chance meeting of respondent Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecaña took place on March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle in Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on their way to the parking lot. This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do not disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by complainant, since the meeting of the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place on different dates.
Assuming that the alleged chance meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does not discount the veracity of complainant’s allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This could have allowed respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati.
The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet118 and the program of meeting that Rodel submitted corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on the attendance sheet and on the program of meeting was March 10, 2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to indicate the time of arrival or departure of the attendees. Neither was there an indication of the time when the meeting began or ended. The attendance sheet and the program of meeting, by themselves or taken as corroborative evidence of Rodel’s testimony, do not discount the distinct and tangible possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place.
On the other hand, we find the allegation that the dinner meeting took place on March 3, 2010 more credible.
Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from January to March 2010.119 She identified her cellular phone number120 as well as respondent Pecaña’s.121 Respondent Pecaña admitted that the number identified by complainant was her number.122 On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were made to respondent Pecaña’s number.123 Respondent Pecaña admitted that she had received a call from complainant before the latter picked her up at 6750 Makati City.124 However, no calls to respondent Pecaña were recorded on March 10, 2010 in the document presented.125 On the other hand, the calls made to respondent Pecaña as shown in the document coincided with complainant’s allegations.
Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only manifested that he would testify for himself and present respondent Pecaña as witness.126 He did not manifest that he would be presenting Rodel or any participant in the Rotary Club meeting as his witness.
The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge Rubia and Rodel’s narration of events.
The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The report failed to mention that complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia arrived late precisely because he came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati. These glaring inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to respondents’ claims. They only put into question the veracity of the exculpatory evidence.
After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her allegations, we find her account of the event to be genuine and believable.
Complainant’s narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events leading up to the dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged by complainant that took place with respondents during the meeting was replete with details.
The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaña belied respondents’ claim that the alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.
Respondent Pecaña used the phrase, “mkpg kta,” which may be translated to “have a meeting.” “Mkpg kta” can in no way mean a chance encounter.
Further, respondent Pecaña’s text messages sent to complainant belied her claim of an innocent chance encounter. She said that respondent Judge Rubia would get angry after complainant had informed her that her lawyer might file an administrative case against them. Respondent Judge Rubia would not have had a reason to get upset because of the possibility of administrative liability if an innocent and coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner meeting. However, if the meeting took place as alleged by complainant, this would have logically led to a hostile reaction from respondents, particularly respondent Judge Rubia.
In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental comment that you received a text coming from Emilie Barias saying her lawyer is mad with her because of that meeting, isn’t it?
In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and Judge Rubia in March 2010, isn’t it?
And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming from you and this is: [“]ha anong ipafile baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?[”] And another message says “bakit siya...another...did you do something to pacify her lawyer...so you affirm these message [sic]?
Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?
I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.
And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were explaining the context of these messages?
Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.
The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an administrative case is filed against us[,] we will be investigated like this, and our benefits and promotion chances we will be disqualified.
In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in an administrative case because you simply thought that it was a chance meeting?
You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was only a chance meeting?
Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why should I have to explain?
Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance meeting?
So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get mad because it was only a chance meeting?
Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent Pecaña as the latter is in the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Respondent Pecaña was having dinner with complainant whom she knew had a pending case before respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to have dealings with litigants.
There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaña to go out of her way to greet respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court employees should not have any dealings with litigants, respondent Pecaña should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.
The odds that complainant and respondent Pecaña would meet respondent Judge Rubia by pure coincidence are highly improbable. Granted, chance meetings between persons may take place, but a chance meeting between a litigant in the company of a court employee who acceded to assisting the litigant in a case and the judge deciding that case is outside the realm of common experience. The odds of such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a million. The sheer improbability of such an occurrence already puts into question the truth of respondents’ allegations.
Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and must be afforded greater evidentiary weight.
The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period between the alleged dinner meeting and the filing of the administrative complaint. The eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no consequence.
Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to question its veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an administrative case against judges and court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative complaint has been filed is high.
Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late husband’s estate. He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the proceedings.
Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint.
Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed. Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court personnel.
If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed more than twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the eight-month period cannot prejudice the complainant.
The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when the offense was officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of complainant’s allegations.
This court’s mandate to discipline members of the judiciary and its personnel is implemented by pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are disciplined based on whether their actions violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.135 Court personnel are also governed by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel136 and are appointed in accordance with the Civil Service Law, as provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. None of these rules for administrative discipline mandates a period within which a complaint must be filed after the commission or discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality the liability of erring members of the judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an administrative offense cannot be diminished by a delay in the filing of a complaint.
To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to ignore the distinct and tangible possibility that the offense was actually committed. The commission of the offense is not contingent on the period of revelation or disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on this ground is tantamount to attaching a period of prescription to the offense, which does not apply in administrative charges.
The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel for the opposing parties in the three cases pending in the sala of respondent Judge Rubia. Because of respondents’ actions, complainant and all who will be made aware of the events of this case will harbor distrust toward the judiciary and its processes. For this alone, respondents should be held administratively liable.
For respondent Pecaña, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecaña should have known better than to interact with litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the general public places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecaña should have refused to meet with complainant in her home. She should have refused any other form of extended communication with complainant, save for those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication between complainant and respondent Pecaña makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of propriety mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the former’s knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in addition to the text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of complainant’s attempts to communicate with her. Respondent Pecaña failed to do so. Instead, she continued to communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising complainant against filing an administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone. They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to influence their official acts or duties.
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Respondent Pecaña should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaña’s actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.140 As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their office.
Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings to all court employees not to intercede in any case pending before any court under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge.141 However, nothing in the record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of respondent Pecaña’s interactions with a litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable.
Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubia’s mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative liability.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. x x x Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.
Well-known is the judicial norm that “judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial.” Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting nature of judicial propriety. Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge Rubia’s meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge Rubia’s actions.
Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should have been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative.
Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and of justice. Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one's personal conduct and imposes upon him a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure up to the standards of conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like Caesar's wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to abide strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of integrity and impartiality essential to a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times.
Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent Judge Rubia violated the notions of propriety required of his office. Respondents have relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting was a chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself.
Respondent Judge Rubia’s actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their dealings inside and outside the courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost the requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands either. As a litigant, she is enjoined to act in such a way that will not place the integrity of the proceedings in jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not the subject of these proceedings. To ensure that these actions will no longer be committed by any party, respondents must be sanctioned accordingly, in keeping with the court’s mandate to uphold a character of trust and integrity in society.
WHEREFORE, the court resolved to redocket the case as a regular administrative matter. Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaña is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross misconduct.
This decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge Rubia is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the personal records of respondents.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
1Rollo, p. 2, complaint-affidavit of Emilie Sison-Barias. The case was docketed as Special Proceeding No. B-3809.
3 Id. at 3. The case was docketed as Special Proceeding No. B-3772.
5 Id. at 4. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-7981.
20 Id. at 456, 874.
23 Id. at 456, 874.
49 Id. at 117-122, order of Judge Marino Rubia denying the motion for reconsideration of the motion for inhibition with supplemental ground.
51 Id. at 1-39, complaint-affidavit of Emilie Sison-Barias.
53 Id. at 40, 41.
54 Id. at 42-55, comment of respondent Pecaña.
67 Id. at 56-86, comment of respondent Judge Rubia.
78 Id. at 246-267, motion for intervention of Atty. Zarate dated November 25, 2011.
88 Order of the Court of Appeals in A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 10-3554-RTJ dated March 12, 2012.
93 TSN, January 10, 2012, pp. 8-12. Document was marked as Exhibit D.
94 TSN, January 12, 2012, p. 17.
95 TSN, January 24, 2012, p. 12.
96 TSN, January 24, 2012, p. 12.
97 TSN, January 24, 2012, p. 21; rollo, p. 681.
98 TSN, January 24, 2012, pp. 24-49.
110J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr., 482 Phil. 1 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen: Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, 423 Phil. 916 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
111 482 Phil. 1 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
116 TSN, January 12, 2012, pp. 17-18.
119 Id. at 499-508, Annex “C” of complainant’s judicial affidavit.
122 TSN dated January 17, 2012, p. 5.
126 TSN, December 15, 2011, pp. 13-14.
127 Avancena v. Judge Liwanag, 446 Phil. 710, 718 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
129 Id. at 968-977, investigation report.
131 TSN, January 17, 2012, pp. 10-11.
132 TSN, January 17, 2012, p. 4.
133 467 Phil. 798 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, En Banc].
135 Administrative Matter No. 03-05-01-SC (2004).
136 Administrative Matter No. 03-06-13-SC (2004).
137Villahermosa v. Sarcia, A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/february2014/CA-14-28-P.pdf> [Per Curiam, En Banc].
138 459 Phil. 1 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
142 A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736, July 25, 2011, 654 SCRA 268 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
144 402 Phil. 671 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
146 276 Phil. 70 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
148De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, 402 Phil. 671, 681-682 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
150Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio, 447 Phil. 11, 20 (2003) [Per J. Quisimbing, Second Division], citing Gutierrez v. Santos, 112 Phil. 184, 189 (1961) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].
151 447 Phil. 11 (2003) [Per J. Quisimbing, Second Division].
153 A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, August 6, 2010, 627 SCRA 13 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
155Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, 508 Phil. 569, 579 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], citing Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Organo, 468 Phil. 111, 118 (2004) [ Per J. Panganiban, First Division].
156 112 Phil. 301 (1961) [Per J. Paredes, En Banc].
157 Id. at 306, citing In Re: Impeachment of Honorable Antonio Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].

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