Source: http://the9thcircuitwatch.com/wp/?cat=10
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:30:46+00:00

Document:
A federal district court judge in Jones decided the California death penalty was unconstitutional on grounds it violated the Eighth Amendment. The judge ruled, citing no case, after encouraging the petitioner to amend his original petition which had not alleged any Eighth Amendment violation. On appeal, the 9th Circuit panel cautiously reversed the district court pursuant to a Supreme Court decision disallowing new Constitutional rules by federal appellate courts on collateral review. The 9th Circuit has ignored that rule indirectly for over a decade.
The 9th Circuit appellate panel in Jones cited Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, a case holding that “federal courts may not consider novel constitutional theories on habeas review. That principle serves to ensure that gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when entered.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227.The 9th Circuit has reversed so many state court cases by citing its own precedents, and ignoring or distinguishing Supreme Court decisions, that its panel decision in Jones was a surprise. The panel reversed the district court.
But apparently other 9th Circuit panelists did not agree, and in Deck v. Jenkins the 2-1 majority wrote one of the worst opinions ever-and that is saying a lot. In Deck, six judges, responding to denial of an en banc hearing, wrote a scathing dissent contending the majority panel reversal of the state court decision disrespected Supreme Court decisions, particularly Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187 (2015). In Davis the Supreme Court specifically lashed the 9th Circuit verbally for ignoring AEDPA. According to the Supreme Court, federal habeas corpus exists only to review the failure of the state court procedural machinery. Never mentioned by ;the panel majority in Deck.
The 2-1 majority in Deck contended somehow Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. l619 undermined AEDPA. Aside from the dissenting judges in Deck, how this decision could possibly occur was repudiated by a footnote in the dissenting opinion. The late Justice Scalia citied fourteen cases of Supreme Court reversals of the 9th Circuit for failing to apply AEDPA.
This decision in Deck, surely to be granted cert., ought to be the final straw for the Supreme Court in allowing 9th Circuit jurisdiction in habeas cases from state courts.
Jurors in state court must now accept jurors only if they are lawyers, judges, justices, academics, law professors, rhetoricians, or linguistic experts in order to understand jury instructions.
The 9th Circuit has reversed the penalty in this death penalty case (as usual) in one of the most vicious, despicable, detestable cases ever tried in California. The defendant was convicted of not only murdering a small child, but also severing her reproductive organs from her body to prevent sexual identification. Although the defendant alleged another person responsible for the crime, the jury found him guilty of murder and kidnapping.
The death is so gruesome that any jury would impose the death penalty, and the jurors convicted the defendant on the charge of felony murder based on the underlying crime of kidnapping. The 9th Circuit panel did uphold the verdict of guilty, but held California law “special circumstances” instructions on the penalty phase require proof that the kidnapping was committed for an independent felonious purpose ,i.e. not merely “incidental to the murder.” The panel cited the California Supreme Court case in Peo. v. Green, 27 Cal.3d (1980). The defendant in Green planned to throw gasoline on the victim’s house, igniting a fire, and shoot the victim when he ran to escape the flames. Instead, the victim was trapped inside the house and burned to death. The wife was seriously burned but survived to suffer years `of surgery.
The Green court held the prosecution had shown no independent motive of murder by arson other than committing the arson, and the “special circumstances” jury instruction in the penalty phase (invented in the case) should have been given. This is the kind of academic unreality apparently held by one of the newly appointed California Supreme Court justices who has never tried a case in his life . The jury does not rely exclusively on jury instructions. They consider the depravity of the case, the defendant’s testimony-or lack thereof- the nature of the crime and the extent and kind of evidence submitted. The 9th Circuit panel confirmed the jury decisions on guilt and that alone should be enough without academic quibbling.
According to the panel, this inexplicable distinction written by the California Supreme Court occurred in compliance with Supreme Court jurisprudence. In other words, the jury can find the defendant guilty regardless of whether the underlying felony was “incidental” or not. But to support the death penalty, the crime had to be independent of the murder. Subsequent litigation by the state supreme court has modified that rule but the 9th Circuit prefers the Green rule.
Because the defendant was convicted in1982, AEDPA had not been enacted so the 9th Circuit could review this case de novo. You would think that no matter what the evidentiary standard, the appropriate penalty in this case was death-not a reversal from a lawyerly parsed instruction no juror could understand. And even if the “correct” jury instruction was not given, the error is so harmless that any juror would ignore the legal lingo or comprehend it. How can the prosecutor retry the penalty after 30 years, the delay attributable to the defendant petitioner on federal habeas corpus and an affirmed decision previously issued by the California Supreme Court?
Another case ready for cert.
Comparable to many cases deserving of the death penalty, the facts are chilling. The defendant Phillips explained a financial scheme to two men enabling them to defraud other people of their money. In order to facilitate the fraud, Phillips secured cash from both men who agreed to the scheme. At some point, the two men delayed paying money allegedly owed to Phillips but they agreed to meet and talk about it.
Phillips and a female companion drove to a remote location and met the two men who were seated in their car. After a few words were exchanged among them, Phillips pulled out a handgun and shot both men several times. He then poured gasoline on them and lit their clothes on fire. One man fled in burning clothes, but Phillips ran him over in his car. Phillips searched both men and took their wallets. Miraculously, one victim lived but the other man died.
Phillips and his companion fled the state, were arrested and charged with murder of one man, attempted murder of the other man, and robbery. In addition to testimony by the victim, the prosecution offered testimony by the female accomplice but without disclosing a promise of leniency to her. Evidence also was submitted that Phillips had arranged for a “hit man” to kill the witnesses, and had admitted killing one of the victims. Phillips testified to an alibi but admitted he lied. The robbery charge to the jury was required for the special circumstance of felony murder warranting the death penalty. The jury voted guilty on all counts, confirmed the special circumstance, and approved the death penalty.
On appeal of the conviction to the California Supreme Court Court, Phillips alleged the prosecutor had failed to disclose benefits promised to his female companion in exchange for her testimony. The state court affirmed. Phillips filed habeas corpus in district court. Denied. On appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed on grounds of ineffective counsel and returned the case for an evidentiary hearing; Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966 (9th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit. The 9th Circuit decision was so absurd that the reversal was obvious.
Phillips appealed the original district court decision denying his petition of habeas corpus to the 9th Circuit. The 9th Circuit panel 2-1 majority affirmed on the merits of the counts alleged (compelled to do so by the Supreme Court decision) but reversed the death penalty. The grounds alleged for reversal of the death penalty were the same as alleged in state court: failure of the prosecutor to disclose benefits to a prosecution witness in exchange for her testimony as an accomplice.
In one of the most inexplicable decisions ever written, the panel affirmed the merits of the case despite prosecution failure to disclose commitments to the witness, but invoked the same reason for reversing the death penalty. Here is the exercise in verbal prestidigitation: Under California law, felony murder is proven only if the death of the victim was committed to facilitate the robbery. Ordinary murder, committed by conduct unrelated to theft, does not constitute felony murder; Peo. v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1 (1980).
The 9th Circuit majority used the Green case to hold that the murder and attempted murder by Phillips was not to facilitate robbery. Just pure murder. Therefore, the special circumstance instruction requiring felony murder had not been proven in the absence of evidence that Phillips robbed the two men. Of course Phillips rummaged through the clothes of his victims and took their wallets. Apparently that doesn’t count.
This case was tried in 1977. Affirmed by the California Supreme Court and a U.S. District Court judge; wrongly reversed initially by the 9th Circuit panel whose decision was reversed by the Supreme Court; and in 2012 the panel unearthed an insignificant and meaningless legal distinction to vacate the death penalty . Even if correct, and the prosecutor faulted, the overwhelming evidence justified the jury decision.
The facts are set forth in detail to accentuate the inconceivable decision of a 9th Circuit opinion.
“According to her husband, Dixie Wilson left her home around 6:20 on the morning of April 6, 1981, to go to her job at the Baird Oil gas station. By 7:00 a.m she had been stabbed and shot repeatedly. Numerous witnesses testified that, when they found her on the gas station floor, she was breathing faintly and appeared to be unconscious, her “face was all bloody,” and blood was coming out of her mouth. One person noted that “her blouse was kind of up above her breasts,” and another said that her shirt was “pulled way up” so that “she was naked from … [the] top of her breast down to her pants line.” There was a pool of blood on the floor around her, and a knife blade was lying on the ground. The gas station’s money drawer was open, and contained only loose change, and no bills. An empty money bag was sitting out on the countertop.
A jury found her guilty in 1981, and the trial judge imposed the death penalty. In 2011 the 9th Circuit panel affirmed her conviction on habeas corpus but reversed the death penalty. Because this trial and conviction occurred prior to Congressional enactment of AEDPA in 1996, the panel could ignore state court rulings and retry the case. Although the evidence was compelling, the prosecution also offered the testimony of two witnesses in custody for other crimes who testified the defendant had confessed to them.
The state court on direct appeal agreed the prosecution had withheld communications between prosecutors in other jurisdictions indirectly offering these two witnesses consideration in exchange for their testimony. According to the state court, this evidence had no consequence in affecting the verdict or imposition of the death penalty.The 9th Circuit panel agreed the testimony insufficient to reverse the jury verdict, but did not comment on all the other evidence submitted by the prosecution-including the admission by the defendant that he was present at the time and place of the crime but his friend committed the murder)tried separately and convicted of murder).
According to the 9th Circuit panel, the trial court might not have imposed the death penalty if it had known the two witnessses were promised leniency in their cases. The court apparently assumes judges are innocent lambs unaware of witness credibility. One witness testified he was a “chronic liar.” Judges do not live in sheltered towns unaware that witnesses may have a motive to testify, and defense counsel will emphasize the danger of testimony from a witness who is probably going to be rewarded.
Cross examination of the witnesses by defense counsel, and in his argument to the jury not to rely on the testimony of the two witnesses with criminal backgrounds, was heard by the trial judge who undoubtedly intuited prosecution promises.
What rational person who heard the evidence described above would not have voted the death penalty? This vicious, heinous, inexcusable crime warrants the death penalty. And the 9th Circuit panel says nothing about “mitigation” evidence offered by the defendant to avoid the death penalty.
This case constitutes a 9th Circuit decade of decisions setting aside the death penalty. The 9th Circuit has not affirmed a single death penalty case in a decade.
In Brewer v. Landrigan (See, Blog) the Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision staying execution on grounds the FDA had not approved the lethal drug used by the State. In a unanimous per curiam opinion the Supreme Court dismissed this contention in a one page decision not even requring oral argument. In another decision the Court had approved the death penalty protocol used by Kentucky in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) but Dickens contended the Arizona protocol did not comport with Baze.
In Dickens v. Brewer counsel argued not that the protocol was invalid (indeed he conceded the validity of the protocol) but that nothing guaranteed that Arizona would implement the standards. According to Dickens, past mistakes in executions warrant a prediction of future errors.
The Ninth Circuit panel rejected both arguments. Dickens presented no evidence that Arizona would use the standards only as a facade. And every other Circuit Court rejected the complaint that previous errors in implementing the protocol would not establish failure or refusal to to comply in future applications of the protocol.
The 9th Circuit did not say so, but to grant a stay on the ground of the possibility of a State’s indifference or failure to apply the protocol would prevent an execution at any time in the future. The U.S. District Court had granted Arizona summary judgment. Affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court injunction (after the state court refused to do so) mandating Arizona officials to disclose the efficacy of a drug obtained from foreign sources and not specifically approved for use in execution. Arizona appealed to the Supreme Court. Here is the order of the Supreme Court reversing the Ninth Circuit: “There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the drug obtained from a foreign source is unsafe. The district court granted the restraining order because it was left to speculate as to the risk of harm. [Citing the District Court:'[T]he [District] Court is left to speculate. . .whether the non-FDA approved drug will cause pain and suffering.’]. But speculation cannot substitute for evidence that the use of the drug is ‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering;’ Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S. 35, 50 (2008). There was no showing that the drug was unlawfully obtained, nor was there an offer of proof to that effect. The motion to file documents under seal is denied as moot.” To say that the Ninth Circuit decision affirming the District Court injunction against the use of a drug not approved by the FDA is specious would be an understatement. Landrigan was convicted in 1989 and the Ninth Circuit continues to undermine the death penalty with ideology-not law.
Possibly worrying that the Supreme Court is aware of the usual “ineffective counsel” excuse the Ninth Circuit has used for the last decade in granting habeas corpus in state court cases, a three judge panel has discovered another method of delay for inmates in capital cases. In in re Gonzales, the panel held that the U.S. District Court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner can communicate with counsel. According to the petition submitted by the eleventh attorney to participate in state and federal post trial proceedings, the legally incompetent petitioner cannot effectively communicate with counsel. The District Court had held an earlier hearing and the doctor agreed to the questionable veracity of Gonzales (who had been convicted of murder in 1991). The remedy: Mandamus to the trial court to hold another competency hearing. The Ninth Circuit panel concedes that habeas corpus is based entirely on the record, and an appellate court is bound by the trial court proceedings. What can the inmate possibly communicate? The records are the the only documents available for appeal, as the District Court ruled in denying the petition. Time for rehearing en banc. This is not the first case the Ninth Circuit in which has used this device and it cites as precedent only its own decision on record anywhere; Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048, (9th Cir. 2009).

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