Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/655-F-3d-915-9th-Cir-2011-05-50170-United-States-v-Aguila-Montes-de-Oca-599010662
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:45:56+00:00

Document:
Party Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Guillermo AGUILA-MONTES DE OCA, Defendant-Appellant.
Attorney: Steven F. Hubachek and Vincent J. Brunkow, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for the defendant-appellant. Mark R. Rehe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division, San Diego, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Guillermo AGUILA-MONTES DE OCA, Defendant-Appellant.
Argued and Submitted March 25, 2010.
Steven F. Hubachek and Vincent J. Brunkow, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for the defendant-appellant.
Mark R. Rehe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division, San Diego, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-04-02175-RTB.
Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, PAMELA ANN RYMER, BARRY G. SILVERMAN, WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, RONALD M. GOULD, MARSHA S. BERZON, JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON, JAY S. BYBEE, CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM Opinion; Opinion by Judge BYBEE; Concurrence by Judge BERZON; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RAWLINSON.
approach doesn't apply " [w]hen the crime of conviction is missing an element of the generic crime altogether."
A different majority (Judge Bybee, joined by Chief Judge Kozinski and Judges Rymer, W. Fletcher, Berzon, M. Smith and N.R. Smith) overrules our prior decisions to the extent they hold that a conviction under California Penal Code § 459 qualifies as a generic burglary conviction if the defendant pleaded guilty to entering a building " unlawfully" or a jury found the defendant guilty as charged in an indictment reciting that allegation. This majority concludes that Aguila-Montes's prior conviction under California Penal Code § 459 cannot be used to enhance his sentence.
The district court's sentence is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the original three-judge panel for consideration of the remaining issues raised on appeal.
We granted rehearing in this case to reconsider the rule we adopted in Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc), to govern application of the modified categorical approach.
The categorical and modified categorical frameworks, first outlined by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), establish the rules by which the government may use prior state convictions to enhance certain federal sentences and to remove certain aliens. In the twenty years since Taylor, we have struggled to understand the contours of the Supreme Court's framework. Indeed, over the past decade, perhaps no other area of the law has demanded more of our resources. See, e.g., United States v. Strickland, 601 F.3d 963, 967-71 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 912-13 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc); United States v. Snellenberger, 548 F.3d 699, 700-02 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (per curiam); Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1159-60 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc); United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1086-90 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc); Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1073; United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 847-48, 851-52 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc); Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132-35(9th Cir.2006) (en banc); United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211-13 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc), superseded by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (" U.S.S.G." ) § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 4 (2002).
When the crime of conviction is missing an element of the generic crime altogether, we can never find that " a jury was actually required to find all the elements of" the generic crime. See Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892, 899-901 (9th Cir.2004) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (providing examples).
of the remaining issues Aguila raised on appeal.
Aguila is a native and citizen of Mexico. On July 5, 2004, Aguila attempted to enter the United States at the San Ysidro, California, point of entry. Customs officers determined by computer that Aguila had been previously deported from the United States, and arrested him. The government charged Aguila in the Southern District of California with illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. A jury convicted him, and the district court sentenced Aguila to 120 months in prison and two years of supervised release.
During sentencing, the district court determined that, in 1988, Aguila had pled guilty to first degree residential burglary, in violation of California Penal Code § 459. That statute punishes " [e]very person who enters [various structures] ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony." CAL. PENAL CODE § 459. Based on this prior offense, the district court enhanced Aguila's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which provides a sixteen-level enhancement for defendants previously deported after " a conviction for a felony that is ... a crime of violence." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The Guidelines' Application Notes specifically define " crime of violence" to include " burglary of a dwelling." Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The district court held that Aguila's California burglary conviction qualified as " burglary of a dwelling" and accordingly enhanced his sentence by sixteen levels.
that because the documents of conviction, see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), " reveal[ed] that [Aguila's] entry was unlawful," his prior offense " satisfie[d] the generic definition of burglary of a dwelling." Aguila I, 523 F.3d at 1078.

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