Source: http://freeassembly.net/foaa-online/restrictions-3-prong-test/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:51:58+00:00

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The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is not absolute, and restrictions may be imposed. The main international treaties guaranteeing the right set out a similar strict test for restrictions (see Article 21 of the ICCPR, Article 11 of the ACHPR, Article 15 of the ACHR and Article 11(2) of the ECHR). Under this test, restrictions to freedom of peaceful assembly are only permissible when they: (1) are imposed in conformity with the law; (2) pursue a legitimate aim; and (3) are necessary in a democratic society, meaning that any restriction must comply with a strict test of necessity and proportionality.
4.1 What constitutes a restriction?
[A]n interference with the exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly does not need to amount to an outright ban, whether legal or de facto, but can consist in various other measures taken by the authorities. The term “restrictions” in Article 11 § 2 must be interpreted as including both measures taken before or during an act of assembly and those, such as punitive measures, taken afterwards. See, for example, Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 October 2015, para. 50; Gülcü v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 19 January 2016, para. 91.
Thus, actions such as preventing an individual from traveling to an assembly, the dispersal of the assembly and the arrest of participants or the imposition of penalties for having taken part in an assembly all qualify as restrictions. Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 October 2015, para. 50. The ECtHR has clarified that penalties imposed for other offenses, such as disobedience towards the police, still constitute restrictions if the penalty is in reality directly related to the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 October 2015, para. 50.
International mechanisms have made it clear that the first prong of the test means, firstly, that a restriction on freedom of assembly should be based on an appropriate instrument of domestic law, and secondly, that that instrument must meet the requirement of legality, meaning it should be publicly available and clear and precise enough to prevent arbitrary interferences.
a general legal norm tied to the general welfare, passed by democratically elected legislative bodies established by the Constitution, and formulated according to the procedures set forth by the constitutions of the States Parties for that purpose. IACtHR, The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, May 9, 1986, para. 38.
Thus, restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly cannot be imposed through a government order or administrative decree, IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 66, 31 December 2011, para. 165. unless the power to issue that order or decree is itself based on a law which meets the requirements stated above. The IACtHR stresses that any such delegation must be authorized by the Constitution; that the executive body should respect the limits of its delegated powers; and that it should be subject to effective controls. IACtHR, The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, May 9, 1986, para. 36.
The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights has also stated that limitations to rights guaranteed under the ACHPR “must take the form of ‘law of general application’”. Tanganyika Law Society and the Legal and Human Rights Centre v. Tanzania, African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Judgment of 14 June 2014, para. 107.1. The ECtHR, however, takes a somewhat different approach; it takes the term ‘law’ in its ‘substantive’ sense and not necessarily in its formal one. It allows restrictions to be imposed through lower ranking statutes (even including regulatory measures taken by professional regulatory bodies under powers delegated to them) and even unwritten, judge-made law. See Gülcü v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 19 January 2016, para. 104, and references therein. However, the ECtHR, similarly to the IACtHR, has emphasized that where powers are given to executive bodies to restrict the right to assemble, “the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion and the manner of its exercise.” Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 411.
[A] norm, to be characterized as a “law”, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution. Laws must provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their execution to enable them to ascertain what sorts of expression are properly restricted and what sorts are not. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of expression and opinion), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), para. 25.
[T]he expression “prescribed by law” in Article 11 of the Convention not only requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of law in question. The law should be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. See, for example, Shmushkovych v. Ukraine, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 November 2013, para. 37; Rekvényi v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 20 May 1999, para. 34.
The IACtHR Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, IACtHR, Judgment of November 29, 2011, para. 90. and the AComHPR’s Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa AComHPR, Report of the Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, 2014, p. 20, para. 5. take a very similar view.
The Committee notes that if the State imposes a restriction, it is up to the State party to show that it is necessary for the aims set out in this provision. Vladimir Sekerko v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 28 October 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/109/D/1851/2008, para. 9.4.
In its General Comment No. 34, the Human Rights Committee provided clarification on the meaning of specific legitimate aims. Public order refers to the sum of rules ensuring the peaceful and effective functioning of society, while national security refers to the political independence and/or territorial integrity of the State.  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of expression and opinion), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), para. 33. The Joint report on the proper management of assemblies clarified specifically that “national, political or government interest is not synonymous with national security or public order.” UN Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 49.
With regard to public morality, the Committee observes that its content may differ widely from society to society. However, it clarifies that the concept of morals cannot be derived exclusively from a single tradition. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of expression and opinion), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), para. 33. Similarly, the ECtHR has found on many occasions that democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority (or the collective) must always prevail. Fair and proper treatment of minorities must be assured and abuse of dominant positions must in general be avoided. See Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgement of 13 August1981, para. 63. Economic interests as such are equally not part of the interests as enumerated. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/36, 10 August 2016, para. 33.
use of an amorphous concept … to justify invasive limitations on the enjoyment of human rights … The concept is broadly defined and is thus vulnerable to manipulation by the State as a means to justifying actions that target vulnerable groups. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, 17 April 2013, para. 60.
Arguments thus need to be specific; they cannot be made in abstracto or by indicating general, unspecified risks, Alekseev v. Russian Federation, Human Rights Committee, Views of 25 October 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009, para. 9.6: The State argued that the subject addressed by the demonstration would provoke negative reaction that could lead to violations of public order. The Committee found that “an unspecified and general risk of a violent counterdemonstration or the mere possibility that the authorities would be unable to prevent or neutralize such violence is not sufficient to ban a demonstration.” See also Mr. Jeong-Eun Lee v. Republic of Korea, Human Rights Committee, Views of 20 July 2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/1119/2002, para. 7.3. but must be made in an individualized fashion, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of expression and opinion), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), para. 33. applied in the particular case Schumilin v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/105/D/1784/2008, Views of 23 July 2012 para. 9.4 (the Committee found the restriction violated the ICCPR because the state had not explained “how, in practice, in this particular case, the author’s actions affected the respect of the rights or reputations of others, or posed a threat to the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals”). or with a specific justification. Kim v. Republic of Korea, Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994, Views of 4 January 1999, para. 12.5.
Under international law, restrictions on freedom of assembly must be “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of the aim they pursue.
[A]ny restrictions on the exercise of the rights guaranteed under articles 19 and 21 must conform to strict tests of necessity and proportionality and be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on which they are predicated. Praded v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 29 November 2014, UN Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2029/2011, para. 7.5.
[I]t is not enough, for example, to demonstrate that a law performs a useful or desirable purpose; to be compatible with the Convention, the restrictions must be justified by reference to collective purposes which, owing to their importance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full enjoyment of the right … Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, IACtHR, Judgment of August 31, 2004, para. 96.
An interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. Kasparov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 3 October 2013, para. 86.
[T]he State party did not show how rejection of the request to demonstrate constituted a proportionate interference with the right of peaceful assembly –i.e., that it was the least intrusive measure to achieve the purpose sought by the State party and that it was proportionate to the interests the State party sought to protect. Vasily Poliakov v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 17 July 2014, UN Doc. CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011, para. 8.3.

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