Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/101941/sibron-vs-new-york
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 13:06:34+00:00

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1. Sibron's completion of service of his sentence does not moot his appeal. Pp. 392 U. S. 50 -58.
(a) A State may not effectively deny a convict access to its appellate courts until his release and then argue that his case has been mooted by his failure to do what it has prevented him from doing. P. 392 U. S. 52 .
(b) Even though Sibron was a multiple offender, he "had a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him." Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211 (1946), followed; St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41 (1943), qualified. Pp. 392 U. S. 55 -58.
2. A confession of error, though entitled to great weight, does not relieve this Court from making its own examination of the record of a case where a conviction has been erroneously obtained, particularly where a judgment of the State's highest court interpreting a state statute is challenged on constitutional grounds and the confession of error has been made by a local official, rather than by an official authorized to speak for the State as a whole. Pp. 392 U. S. 58 -59.
3. Since the question in this Court is not whether the search (or seizure) was authorized by § 180-a, but whether it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court does not pass upon the facial constitutionality of the statute. Pp. 392 U. S. 59 -62.
4. In No. 63, the heroin was illegally seized, and therefore inadmissible in evidence. Pp. 392 U. S. 62 -66.
(a) The search of Sibron cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest, since no probable cause existed before the search. Pp. 392 U. S. 62 -63.
(b) There were no adequate grounds for the officer to search Sibron for weapons, since the officer had no reason to believe that Sibron was armed and dangerous, and even if there arguably had been such a justification, there was no initial limited exploration for arms before the officer thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket. Terry v. Ohio, ante, p. 392 U. S. 1 , distinguished. Pp. 392 U. S. 63 -65.
5. In No. 74, the search was reasonable, and the evidence seized was admissible. Pp. 392 U. S. 66 -67.
(a) The search of Peters was incident to a lawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 392 U. S. 66 -67.
(b) The "arrest" of Peters had taken place before the search, and, after the arrest, the officer had authority to search Peters. P. 392 U. S. 67 .
(c) The incident search, which was limited in scope, was justified by the need to seize weapons as well as the need to prevent destruction of evidence of the crime. P. 392 U. S. 67 .
the heroin seized from his person by the arresting officer, Brooklyn Patrolman Anthony Martin. After the trial court denied his motion, Sibron pleaded guilty to the charge, preserving his right to appeal the evidentiary ruling. [ Footnote 2 ] At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Martin testified that, while he was patrolling his beat in uniform on March 9, 1965, he observed Sibron "continually from the hours of 4:00 P. M. to 12:00, midnight . . . in the vicinity of 742 Broadway." He stated that, during this period of time, he saw Sibron in conversation with six or eight persons whom he (Patrolman Martin) knew from past experience to be narcotics addicts. The officer testified that he did not overhear any of these conversations, and that he did not see anything pass between Sibron and any of the others. Late in the evening, Sibron entered a restaurant. Patrolman Martin saw Sibron speak with three more known addicts inside the restaurant. Once again, nothing was overheard and nothing was seen to pass between Sibron and the addicts. Sibron sat down and ordered pie and coffee, and, as he was eating, Patrolman Martin approached him and told him to come outside. Once outside, the officer said to Sibron, "You know what I am after." According to the officer, Sibron "mumbled something and reached into his pocket." Simultaneously, Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into the same pocket, discovering several glassine envelopes, which, it turned out, contained heroin.
"As the officer approached the defendant, the latter being in the direction of the officer and seeing him, he did put his hand in his left jacket pocket and pulled out a tinfoil envelope and did attempt to throw same to the ground. The officer, never losing sight of the said envelope, seized it from the def[endan]t's left hand, examined it, and found it to contain ten glascine [ sic ] envelopes with a white substance alleged to be Heroin."
Officer Lasky opened his door, entered the hallway and slammed the door loudly behind him. This precipitated a flight down the stairs on the part of the two men, [ Footnote 7 ] and Officer Lasky gave chase. His apartment was located on the sixth floor, and he apprehended Peters between the fourth and fifth floors. Grabbing Peters by the collar, he continued down another flight in unsuccessful pursuit of the other man. Peters explained his presence in the building to Officer Lasky by saying that he was visiting a girlfriend. However, he declined to reveal the girlfriend's name, on the ground that she was a married woman. Officer Lasky patted Peters down for weapons, and discovered a hard object in his pocket. He stated at the hearing that the object did not feel like a gun, but that it might have been a knife. He removed the object from Peters' pocket. It was an opaque plastic envelope, containing burglar's tools.
At the outset, we must deal with the question whether we have jurisdiction in No. 63. It is asserted that, because Sibron has completed service of the six-month sentence imposed upon him as a result of his conviction, the case has become moot under St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41 (1943). [ Footnote 8 ] We have concluded that the case is not moot.
In the first place, it is clear that the broad dictum with which the Court commenced its discussion in St. Pierre -- that "the case is moot because, after petitioner's service of his sentence and its expiration, there was no longer a subject matter on which the judgment of this Court could operate," (319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 42 ) -- fails to take account of significant qualifications recognized in St. Pierre and developed in later cases. Only a few days ago, we held unanimously that the writ of habeas corpus was available to test the constitutionality of a state conviction where the petitioner had been in custody when he applied for the writ, but had been released before this Court could adjudicate his claims. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968). On numerous occasions in the past, this Court has proceeded to adjudicate the merits of criminal cases in which the sentence had been fully served or the probationary period during which a suspended sentence could be reimposed had terminated. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968); Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 (1954); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211 (1946). Thus, mere release of the prisoner does not mechanically foreclose consideration of the merits by this Court.
was a plain recognition of the vital importance of keeping open avenues of judicial review of deprivations of constitutional right. [ Footnote 9 ] There was no way for Sibron to bring his case here before his six-month sentence expired. By statute, he was precluded from obtaining bail pending appeal, [ Footnote 10 ] and, by virtue of the inevitable delays of the New York court system, he was released less than a month after his newly appointed appellate counsel had been supplied with a copy of the transcript, and roughly two months before it was physically possible to present his case to the first tier in the state appellate court system. [ Footnote 11 ] This was true despite the fact that he took all steps to perfect his appeal in a prompt, diligent, and timely manner.
Id. at 346 U. S. 512 -513.
Three years later, in Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354 (1957), the Court abandoned all inquiry into the actual existence of specific collateral consequences and, in effect, presumed that they existed. With nothing more than citations to Morgan and Fiswick and a statement that "convictions may entail collateral legal disadvantages in the future," id. at 352 U. S. 358 , the Court concluded that "[t]he possibility of consequences collateral to the imposition of sentence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the merits." Ibid. The Court thus acknowledged the obvious fact of life that most criminal convictions do, in fact, entail adverse collateral legal consequences. [ Footnote 15 ] The mere "possibility" that this will be the case is enough to preserve a criminal case from ending "ignominiously in the limbo of mootness." Parker v. Ellis, 362 U. S. 574 , 362 U. S. 577 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
None of the concededly imperative policies behind the constitutional rule against entertaining moot controversies would be served by a dismissal in this case. There is nothing abstract, feigned, or hypothetical about Sibron's appeal. Nor is there any suggestion that either Sibron or the State has been wanting in diligence or fervor in the litigation. We have before us a fully developed record of testimony about contested historical facts, which reflects the "impact of actuality" [ Footnote 19 ] to a far greater degree than many controversies accepted for adjudication as a matter of course under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
the case here. Sibron "has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him." Fiswick v. United States, supra, at 329 U. S. 222 . The case is not moot.
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 , 386 U. S. 61 (1967).
with respect to a statute of this peculiar sort, as the Court of Appeals of New York recognized, is "not so much . . . the language employed as . . . the conduct it authorizes." People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 245, 219 N.E.2d 595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 222 (1966). We have held today in Terry v. Ohio, ante, p. 392 U. S. 1 , that police conduct of the sort with which § 180-a deals must be judged under the Reasonable Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The inquiry under that clause may differ sharply from the inquiry set up by the categories of § 180-a. Our constitutional inquiry would not be furthered here by an attempt to pronounce judgment on the words of the statute. We must confine our review instead to the reasonableness of the searches and seizures which underlie these two convictions.
until after the search had turned up the envelopes of heroin. It is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 16 -17 (1948). Thus, the search cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest.
If Patrolman Martin lacked probable cause for an arrest, however, his seizure and search of Sibron might still have been justified at the outset if he had reasonable grounds to believe that Sibron was armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, ante, p. 392 U. S. 1 . We are not called upon to decide in this case whether there was a "seizure" of Sibron inside the restaurant antecedent to the physical seizure which accompanied the search. The record is unclear with respect to what transpired between Sibron and the officer inside the restaurant. It is totally barren of any indication whether Sibron accompanied Patrolman Martin outside in submission to a show of force or authority which left him no choice, or whether he went voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation with the officer's investigation. In any event, this deficiency in the record is immaterial, since Patrolman Martin obtained no new information in the interval between his initiation of the encounter in the restaurant and his physical seizure and search of Sibron outside.
to be considered in the decision to make an arrest. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949); Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931), see Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 , 361 U. S. 103 (1959).
Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 , 376 U. S. 367 (1964). Moreover, it was reasonably limited in scope by these purposes. Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thoroughgoing examination of Peters and his personal effects. He seized him to cut short his flight, and he searched him primarily for weapons. While patting down his outer clothing, Officer Lasky discovered an object in his pocket which might have been used as a weapon. He seized it and discovered it to be a potential instrument of the crime of burglary.
In St. Pierre, the Court noted that the petitioner could have taken steps to preserve his case, but that "he did not apply to this Court for a stay or a supersedeas." 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 43 . Here however, it is abundantly clear that there is no procedure of which Sibron could have availed himself to prevent the expiration of his sentence long before this Court could hear his case. A supersedeas from this Court is a purely ancillary writ, and may issue only in connection with an appeal actually taken. Ex parte Ralston, 119 U. S. 613 (1887); Sup.Ct.Rule 18; see R. Robertson & F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 435, at 883 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland ed., 1951). At the time Sibron completed service of his sentence, the only judgment outstanding was the conviction itself, rendered by the Criminal Court of the City of New York, County of Kings. This Court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that judgment, since it was not rendered by the "highest court of a State in which a decision could be had," 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and there could be no warrant for interference with the orderly appellate processes of the state courts. Thus, no supersedeas could have issued. Nor could this Court have ordered Sibron admitted to bail before the expiration of his sentence, since the offense was not bailable, 18 U.S.C. § 3144; see n 10, supra. Thus, this case is distinguishable from St. Pierre in that Sibron "could not have brought his case to this Court for review before the expiration of his sentence." 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 43 .
Compare Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 , 390 U. S. 633 , n. 2 (1968), where this Court held that the mere possibility that the Commissioner of Buildings of the Town of Hempstead, New York, might "in his discretion" attempt in the future to revoke a license to run a luncheonette because of a single conviction for selling relatively inoffensive "girlie" magazines to a 16-year-old boy was sufficient to preserve a criminal case from mootness.
We note that there is a clear distinction between a general impairment of credibility, to which the Court referred in St. Pierre, see 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 43 , and New York's specific statutory authorization for use of the conviction to impeach the "character" of a defendant in a criminal proceeding. The latter is a clear legal disability deliberately and specifically imposed by the legislature.
This factor has clearly been considered relevant by the Court in the past in determining the issue of mootness. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211 , 329 U. S. 221 -222 (1946).
Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 1002, 1006 (1924). See also Parker v. Ellis, 362 U. S. 574 , 362 U. S. 592 -593 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
It is not apparent, for example, whether the power to "stop" granted by the statute entails a power to "detain" for investigation or interrogation upon less than probable cause, or, if so, what sort of durational limitations upon such detention are contemplated. And while the statute's apparent grant of a power of compulsion indicates that many "stops" will constitute "seizures," it is not clear that all conduct analyzed under the rubric of the statute will either rise to the level of a "seizure" or be based upon less than probable cause. In No. 74, the Peters case, for example, the New York courts justified the seizure of appellant under § 180-a, but we have concluded that there was, in fact, probable cause for an arrest when Officer Lasky seized Peters on the stairway. See infra at 392 U. S. 66 . In any event, a pronouncement by this Court upon the abstract validity of § 180-a's "stop" category would be most inappropriate in these cases, since we have concluded that neither of them presents the question of the validity of a seizure of the person for purposes of interrogation upon less than probable cause.
The statute's other categories are equally elastic, and it was passed too recently for the State's highest court to have ruled upon many of the questions involving potential intersections with federal constitutional guarantees. We cannot tell, for example, whether the officer's power to "demand" of a person an "explanation of his actions" contemplates either an obligation on the part of the citizen to answer or some additional power on the part of the officer in the event of a refusal to answer, or even whether the interrogation following the "stop" is "custodial." Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). There are, moreover, substantial indications that the statutory category of a "search for a dangerous weapon" may encompass conduct considerably broader in scope than that which we approved in Terry v. Ohio, ante, p. 392 U. S. 1 . See infra at 392 U. S. 65 -66. See also People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 229 N.E.2d 581, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967). At least some of the activity apparently permitted under the rubric of searching for dangerous weapons may thus be permissible under the Constitution only if the "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity rises to the level of probable cause. Finally, it is impossible to tell whether the standard of "reasonable suspicion" connotes the same sort of specificity, reliability, and objectivity which is the touchstone of permissible governmental action under the Fourth Amendment. Compare Terry v. Ohio, supra, with People v. Taggart, supra. In this connection, we note that the searches and seizures in both Sibron and Peters were upheld by the Court of Appeals of New York as predicated upon "reasonable suspicion," whereas we have concluded that the officer in Peters had probable cause for an arrest, while the policeman in Sibron was not possessed of any information which would justify an intrusion upon rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.
I would hold that, at the time Lasky seized appellant, he had probable cause to believe that appellant was on some kind of burglary or housebreaking mission. * In my view, he had probable cause to seize appellant, and accordingly to conduct a limited search of his person for weapons.
opinion in Terry v. Ohio, ante, p. 392 U. S. 34 . While patting down Peters' clothing, the officer "discovered an object in his pocket which might have been used as a weapon." Ante at 392 U. S. 67 . That object turned out to be a package of burglar's tools. In my view, those tools were properly admitted into evidence.
The considerable confusion that has surrounded the "search" or "frisk" of Sibron that led to the actual recovery of the heroin seems to me irrelevant for our purposes. Officer Martin repudiated his first statement, which might conceivably have indicated a theory of "abandonment," see ante at 392 U. S. 45 -46. No matter which of the other theories is adopted, it is clear that there was at least a forcible frisk, comparable to that which occurred in Terry, which requires constitutional justification.
Ante at 392 U. S. 30 . The interpretation of the New York statute is, of course, a matter for the New York courts, but any particular stop must meet the Terry standard as well.
For these reasons, I would hold that Officer Martin lacked reasonable grounds to intrude forcibly upon Sibron. In consequence, the essential premise for the right to conduct a self-protective frisk was lacking. See my concurring opinion in Terry, ante, p. 392 U. S. 31 . I therefore find it unnecessary to reach two further troublesome questions. First, although I think that, as in Terry, the right to frisk is automatic when an officer lawfully stops a person suspected of a crime whose nature creates a substantial likelihood that he is armed, it is not clear that suspected possession of narcotics falls into this category. If the nature of the suspected offense creates no reasonable apprehension for the officer's safety, I would not permit him to frisk unless other circumstances did so. Second, I agree with the Court that, even where a self-protective frisk is proper, its scope should be limited to what is adequate for its purposes. I see no need here to resolve the question whether this frisk exceeded those bounds.
Officer Lasky testified that, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, he heard a noise at the door to his apartment. He did not testify, nor did any state court conclude, that this "led him to believe that someone sought to force entry." Ante at 392 U. S. 66 . He looked out into the public hallway and saw two men whom he did not recognize, surely not a strange occurrence in a large apartment building. One of them appeared to be tiptoeing. Lasky did not testify that the other man was tiptoeing or that either of them was behaving "furtively." Ibid. Lasky left his apartment and ran to them, gun in hand. He did not testify that there was any "flight," ante at 392 U. S. 66 , [ Footnote 2/2 ] though flight at the approach of a gun-carrying stranger (Lasky was apparently not in uniform) is hardly indicative of mens rea.
The second possible source of confusion is the Court's statement that "Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thoroughgoing examination of Peters and his personal effects." Ante at 392 U. S. 67 . Since the Court found probable cause to arrest Peters, and since an officer arresting on probable cause is entitled to make a very full incident search, [ Footnote 2/5 ] I assume that this is merely a factual observation. As a factual matter, I agree with it.
Under Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 , a parallel standard is applicable to warrantless arrests by state and local police.
Compare Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 , in which the Court said there was "far from enough evidence . . . to justify a magistrate in issuing a warrant." Id. at 361 U. S. 103 . Agents knew that a federal crime, theft of whisky from an interstate shipment, had been committed "in the neighborhood." Petitioner was observed driving into an alley, picking up packages, and driving away. I agree that these facts did not constitute probable cause, but find it hard to see that the evidence here was more impressive.
The leading case is United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 .
Ante at 392 U. S. 63 . And it seems to me to be a reasonable inference that, when Sibron, who had been approaching and talking to addicts for eight hours, reached his hand quickly to his left coat pocket, he might well be reaching for a gun. And as the Court has emphasized today in its opinions in the other "stop and frisk" cases, a policeman under such circumstances has to act in a split second; delay may mean death for him. No one can know when an addict may be moved to shoot or stab, and particularly when he moves his hand hurriedly to a pocket where weapons are known to be habitually carried, it behooves an officer who wants to live to act at once, as this officer did. It is true that the officer might also have thought Sibron was about to get heroin, instead of a weapon. But the law enforcement officers all over the Nation have gained little protection from the courts through opinions here if they are now left helpless to act in self-defense when a man associating intimately and continuously with addicts, upon meeting an officer, shifts his hand immediately to a pocket where weapons are constantly carried.
In appraising the facts as I have, I realize that the Court has chosen to draw inferences different from mine and those drawn by the courts below. The Court, for illustration, draws inferences that the officer's testimony at the hearing continued upon the "plain premise that he had been looking for narcotics all the time." Ante at 392 U. S. 47 , n. 4. But this Court is hardly, at this distance from the place and atmosphere of the trial, in a position to overturn the trial and appellate courts on its own independent finding of an unspoken "premise" of the officer's inner thoughts.
D.C. should be most cautious. Due to our holding in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , we are due to get for review literally thousands of cases raising questions like those before us here. If we are setting ourselves meticulously to review all such findings, our task will be endless, and many will rue the day when Mapp was decided. It is not only wise but imperative that, where findings of the facts of reasonableness and probable cause are involved in such state cases, we should not overturn state court findings unless in the most extravagant and egregious errors. It seems fantastic to me even to suggest that this is such a case. I would leave these state court holdings alone.

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