Source: https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-5-3-2014/4097
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 19:45:58+00:00

Document:
With the recent revelations by Snowden about the NSA, privacy and the value of privacy have once again moved to the center of public debate. While some argue that privacy is dead, others feel that it is now more than ever that privacy needs protection. What all agree upon is that the concept and value of privacy need careful rethinking, as the traditional approach to privacy seems unfit to address the threats posed by Big Data, cloud computing and profiling. Big Data, for the purpose of this study, is defined as gathering massive amounts of data without a pre-established goal or purpose, about an undefined number of people, which are processed on a group or aggregated level through the use of statistical correlations. A reformulation of privacy and a shift in its underlying value would not be a novelty; privacy has changed its meaning, definition and scope many times. It is quite clear that in different epochs,  in different cultures  and in different situations,  privacy plays a different role. What makes privacy even more difficult to grasp is that its value and meaning differs from person to person; what one would qualify as a violation of his privacy, the other would disregard as unimportant and trivial. Consequently, the value of privacy is difficult to grasp and define. Moreover, in contrast to autonomy, freedom, or dignity, which are commonly ascribed an intrinsic value, in literature, privacy is almost without exception described as an instrumental value.  Although there is no agreement among scholars in terms of which value privacy can be best defined, generally two concepts play an important role, namely negative freedom and autonomy.
Another constant factor in privacy theories has been the suggestion that the protection of the private sphere is necessary for the development of the autonomous individual. Theories that link the respect for privacy to the development of autonomous individuals are dominant in the current privacy debate. They are defended predominantly by liberal scholars, who focus on the notion of control and informed consent of the individual. For example, Beate Roessler has built a theory around the argument that respect ‘for a person’s privacy is respect for her as an autonomous subject.’  This focus on control and autonomy has been predominantly, though not exclusively, developed in privacy theories that focus on the processing of and control over personal information (informed consent).  In medical cases, such as relating to abortion and euthanasia, this principle is known as ‘decisional privacy’; reference is often made to the decision by the US Supreme Court in Roe v Wade, in which a woman was granted the right to abortion as part of her right to privacy and bodily integrity.  Finally, reference is often made to procedural requirements, such as access to information and a right to be heard, which strengthen a person’s autonomy and ensures that he can actively steer matters which affect his private or family life.
This article will discuss how the underlying value of privacy, and its scope, has changed considerably over time under the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR). It will argue that the ECHR acknowledges both negative freedom (section 2) and autonomy (section 3) as important underlying values when discussing cases under Article 8 ECHR. It will then stress (section 4) that in more and more cases it goes beyond these classic notions and focuses, instead, on the protection of individual or group identity, personal development, and human flourishing. Finally, it will be discussed (section 5) that although human rights are often placed in a Kantian (deontological) framework, which focuses on individual autonomy and human dignity, it might be suggested that virtue ethics, to which the notion of human flourishing is connected, is a better framework to explain the Court’s focus on issues that go beyond the protection of negative freedom and autonomy. This shift towards virtue ethics might prove vital for privacy protection in the age of Big Data, in which two fundamentals of the current paradigm are increasingly put under pressure: the focus on individual rights and on individual interests. So is the remit of the paper both an explanation of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and a discussion of the potential value of virtue ethics for privacy protection in the age of Big Data.
Consequently, while the original focus of the European Convention, in general, and the right to privacy, in particular, relied on negative obligations for states and the negative freedom of individuals, this rationale has weakened over time. The element of positive obligations for the state has brought with it that states are held, among others, to ensure adequate protection of privacy in horizontal relationships; for example, in relation to the prevention of violence and the protection of privacy in terms of data protection and family relations.  However, most prominently, it plays a role in matters in which the freedom of expression is used to infringe upon the privacy or reputation of another.
Finally, from 2007 onwards, the Court accepts matters under the scope of Article 8 in which the applicant complains of an infringement with his honor and reputation in horizontal relations, either because the state did not allow him to prevent certain publications or because he was unable to get sufficient compensation for defamatory statements. In the first case in which it overturned its earlier case law and diverged from the intentions of the Convention authors, that of Pfeifer v. Austria (2007), the Court referred to its earlier case law and held ‘that a person's reputation, even if that person is criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also falls within the scope of his or her “private life”. Article 8 therefore applies.’  In A. v. Norway (2009), the Court finally extrapolated its views to the right to honor: ‘In more recent cases decided under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court has recognised reputation and also honour as part of the right to respect for private life. In Pfeifer, the Court held that a person’s reputation, even if that person was criticised in the context of a public debate, formed part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also fell within the scope of his or her “private life”. The same considerations must also apply to personal honour.’  Consequently, besides the protection of negative freedom in vertical relations, Article 8 ECHR also protects citizens from the actions and expressions of other citizens and/or companies.
Most cases in which these procedural requirements play a role regard parental authority, such as with regard to the custody over a child by divorced parents or the placing in a foster home of children living in an unstable environment. It follows from the fact that the child’s interest always prevails that if a parent is separated for an extensive period from his child, it is often not in the interest of the latter to be reunited with either his father, mother or both. From this fact follows an increased importance of a speedy and resolute process, since lengthy procedures may lead to the de facto determination of a case.  Moreover, a fair balance should be struck between the interests of the mother and the father. Although the Court has been reluctant to focus on substantive rights in such matters, it has granted both parents, inter alia, the right to be heard, to be informed in full about existing reports and documents, and to have their interests weighed in a fair and balanced manner.  The parents should thus be equally and fully informed and have an equal opportunity to defend their case before the national authorities and courts. The right to take part in the decision-making process regarding the future of his child enhances a person’s autonomy and provides him with a possibility to exert control over and be informed about one’s private and family life.
In the case law of the Court, however, these principles have also been increasingly adopted under the right to privacy in other matters, such as the loss of one’s home due to destruction or expropriation,  cases in which immigrants are expelled  , and cases that regard the quality of the living environment. For example, the Court has held that where ‘a State must determine complex issues of environmental and economic policy, the decision-making process must firstly involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to allow them to predict and evaluate in advance the effects of those activities which might damage the environment and infringe individuals’ rights and to enable them to strike a fair balance between the various conflicting interests at stake. The importance of public access to the conclusions of such studies and to information which would enable members of the public to assess the danger to which they are exposed is beyond question. Lastly, the individuals concerned must also be able to appeal to the courts against any decision, act, or omission where they consider that their interests or their comments have not been given sufficient weight in the decision-making process.’  Consequently, under Article 8 ECHR, citizens now have a right to actively steer and influence decisions that affect their lives in general.
Although negative freedom and autonomy are thus important fundamentals underlying the right to privacy in the European Convention on Human Rights, in more and more recent cases, the Court focuses on the right to individual and group identity, the development of one’s personality and the right to human flourishing. The Court has provided protection to a range of activities under Article 8 ECHR that it sees as essential to the right to personal development.  The obligation to wear prison clothes has been held to interfere with a prisoner’s private life due to the stigma it creates.  The refusal of the authorities to allow an applicant to have his ashes scattered in his garden on his death was held so closely related to his private life that it came within the sphere of Article 8 of the Convention ‘since persons may feel the need to express their personality by the way they arrange how they are buried’.  The Court has accepted that a person has a right to live and work in a healthy living environment.  And so one could go on. It goes too far to discuss all these cases. Four matters will be discussed instead: the protection of and freedom to develop one’s personal identity, minority identity, relational identity and public identity.
Minority identity: Not only with regard to transsexuals, but more in general, the Court is hesitant to allow national laws that have the aim or effect of creating inequality among certain groups in society. The Court stresses that the respect for and the right to develop and express one’s minority identity is of pivotal importance for a person to prosper and flourish. That is why, in contrast to its general approach, the Court has accepted that in this field, applicants may not only successfully complain about concrete harm and individual injury, but also about general policies and laws as such (so called in abstracto claims), without them having been directly applied to the applicants.  In this sense, these types of cases do not regard the protection of harm to an individual’s negative freedom or autonomy, as the laws did not have any concrete effect on his private life, but they may hamper a person’s interest in exploring his identity or developing his personality, which may be hampered through a social or legal stigma.
Relational identity: Furthermore, not only is the formation of one’s identity and the development of one’s personality essential under Article 8 ECHR, but also particularly pertinent to the right to privacy under both the Declaration and the Convention is that it provides protection for family life. Although the Declaration and especially the Convention primarily contain individual rights, the protection of the family sphere is best described as a ‘relational’ right which can only be enjoyed in association with others.  This element was heavily discussed by the authors of both documents, as the right to privacy was considered the most ‘private’ of all human rights and the relationships with the outside world would, according to some, be asymmetric to the right to protection of one’s private life, home, and correspondence. Moreover, this element was seen as redundant as both documents contain a separate provision, Article 16 UDHR and Article 12 ECHR, laying down the right to marry and to found a family.  However, the protection of the family life was finally accepted as part of both Article 12 UDHR and Article 8 ECHR both because it was seen as essential to the right to privacy and because, in contrast to Article 16 UDHR and Article 12 ECHR, it granted protection to the already-existing family life, instead of founding it, emphasizing the character of a negative right.
This notion of personal development in external relationships and professional affairs has led the Court to accept many cases which solely or primarily regard professional conduct under the right to privacy. Among others, it has held that restrictions imposed on access to certain professions may have a significant impact on a person’s private life  and dismissal from office has been found to interfere with the right to respect for private life.  For example, the Court has held that the dismissal ‘from the post of judge affected a wide range of his relationships with other persons, including the relationships of a professional nature. Likewise, it had an impact on his “inner circle” as the loss of job must have had tangible consequences for material well-being of the applicant and his family.’  Consequently, the protection of the working space and the personal development in the professional sphere have been accepted under the realm of privacy as protected by Article 8 ECHR.
This article has discussed which value underlies Article 8 ECHR. Although there is no agreement among scholars in terms of which value privacy can be best defined, generally two concepts play an important role, namely negative freedom and autonomy. Negative freedom is the situation in which one is free from being acted upon by others. Autonomy revolves around a form of control, active influence or informed consent. In this article, three points have been made. First, that the origins of the Convention as a whole and the right to privacy in particular lie in defending a concept of negative freedom in vertical relations, that is between the state and the citizen. In this line, the Court still holds that the ‘essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public authorities’. This rationale is most apparent in security-related cases-- when wire-tapping telecommunication, when officials enter private houses in order to arrest a habitant or to seize certain documents or objects, with regard to general surveillance measures by secret service organizations, or matters in which the territorial integrity of the state is at stake. However, the Court has gradually diverged from the original approach by the Convention authors by accepting both positive obligations for national states and granting a right to positive freedom to individuals under the right to privacy. Consequently, states are held, among others, to ensure adequate protection of privacy in horizontal relationships. Most prominently, this development plays a role in matters in which the freedom of expression is used to infringe upon the privacy or reputation of others. Although the right to reputation and honor had been explicitly omitted from Article 8 ECHR by the authors of the Convention, in its case law from 2007 onward, the Court has nevertheless accepted it as a subjective right falling under the protection of privacy.
The second point is that more and more emphasis has been placed on the concept of autonomy. Although the Convention does not contain a right to data protection as such, the Court has accepted many of the core concepts that enhance the individual’s control over his personal data under the scope of Article 8 ECHR. Moreover, in matters in the medical sphere, such as relating to euthanasia, abortion and sterilization, the Court has stressed that the notions of ‘personal autonomy and quality of life’ underpin the right to privacy. ‘Informed consent’ is the basic concept with which it works. Finally, the ECtHR has also accepted that Article 8 ECHR contains implicit procedural requirements that enhance a person’s autonomy and control in (national,) judicial or administrative judgments that affect his private or family life. These requirements play an especially important role in cases revolving around parental authority and custody. The Court has granted parents, among others, the right to be heard, to be informed in full about existing reports and documents, and to have their interests weighed in a fair and balanced manner.
Finally, it has been argued that more and more cases concern a form of positive freedom, such as the right to explore, develop and express one’s identity, to found a family and maintain and develop family relations, to develop contacts with others, to experiment with one’s personality, and to flourish as a human being both in private and in professional environments. These matters seem to go beyond the traditional concepts of autonomy and negative freedom. For example, the idea that private life ‘encompasses the right for an individual to form and develop relationships with other human beings, including relationships of a professional or business nature’, that it also ‘protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world’ and that activities of a professional or business nature fall within the scope of the right to privacy as it is in ‘the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world’, seem too far removed from negative freedom and autonomy, or even human dignity, to be able to explain the Court’s approach in a satisfactory manner.
It has been suggested that the notion of human flourishing, a key concept in virtue ethics, might instead be able to provide a solid theoretical explanation for the broad approach taken by the ECtHR.  Human flourishing is directed at the optimal personal development a person can attain – it therefore knows virtually no boundaries, as almost everything could be instrumental to maximum flourishing, especially as what it is for a human to flourish may differ from person to person. For example, John Finnes has suggested that human flourishing embodies the protection of, inter alia, life itself; for example, in relation to health and safety, knowledge, excellence in work and play, friendship and self-expression.  Consequently, it should be noted that human flourishing does not only focus on positive freedom, but sees negative freedom and autonomy-- for example, through safeguarding health and security-- as a precondition for personal development. This broad list of categories already comes quite close to the different matters the Court has provided protection to under the scope of Article 8 ECHR. Moreover, the specific focus on ‘the development and fulfillment of one’s own personality’, both in the private and in the public realm, seems aligned to the teleological approach of virtue ethics in which the focus lies on the inherent development toward optimal ends. Finally, the increased focus on positive obligations for the state, which already make up a substantial part of the cases concerning Article 8 ECHR, fits well in the virtue ethical paradigm, in which the state may have a duty to facilitate the human flourishing of its citizens (it might even be called its raison d'être). In contrast, such an active role by the state seems difficult to reconcile with the rationale of negative freedom and only in partial harmony with a focus on individual autonomy.
If it is accepted that human flourishing could provide a satisfactory explanation for the Court’s approach, this would mean that the established idea that human rights are grounded primarily in a Kantian (deontological) paradigm, which provides protection for human dignity, negative freedom, and personal autonomy, should be complemented with the notion of human flourishing central to virtue ethics. Although Kant has often been called the father of human rights,  Aristotle, the founder of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics may become a new and important addition to understanding the background, value, and scope of the right to privacy. This is not only of theoretical importance; it has practical significance for privacy protection in the age of Big Data. Adequate protection currently suffers from two important aspects of the present privacy paradigm. First, the current privacy paradigm is focused on individual rights. Second, it is focused on individual interests.
Virtue ethics could provide alternatives on both points. First, as has been stressed above, virtue ethics is not focused on individual rights or claims but on virtue-duties. It thus shifts from, what is called, a patient-based theory, in which the focus lies on the one being acted upon through, for example, a privacy violation, to an agent-based theory, which assesses the behavior of the actor of, for example, a privacy violation. The correlation between rights and duties (if you have a right, I have a duty to respect it) is broken. Agents should act in a virtuous manner and possess a virtuous character, whether somebody else has a right to it or not. The focus on character is especially important in virtue ethics. Not only are the consequences of actions assessed, the intentions and responsibilities of the agent also play an important role. Thus, if an agent acted in a way which may be called unvirtuous, for example negligent or uninterested, without any concrete damage or harm following from it, virtue ethics may still find that person culpable.
It takes a broader perspective on the responsibilities of the agent and takes as starting point the optimal or best behavior imaginable of an agent. For the state, this might lead to a number of positive obligations, not only to avoid actual and concrete harm but also to avoid abuse of power (connected to the virtue of temperance) and to be fully transparent about the use of power (connected to the virtue of honesty). Consequently, it shifts the focus from the citizen, having a subjective right, to the state, having an obligation to make sure that it acts in a good and transparent manner. Thus, even if Big Data processes, such as the data collection by the NSA or other intelligence services, do not amount to any concrete and actual harm of citizens, they may still conflict with virtue duties if the use of power was disproportional and intransparent (which indeed seems the case with the NSA). This solves the problem, signaled earlier, that it is becoming increasingly difficult to claim and invoke an individual right in the new technological environment.
Consequently, there is a shift from rights to obligations. This obligation is principally connected not to the interests of others but to the need to act as a responsible and virtuous agent (independent of any right or claim by others). Still, this does not mean that the consequences for others are excluded from virtue ethics. If a person wants, for example, to help his handicapped neighbor (as a virtuous agent should) by mowing the lawn and, though genuinely and thoughtfully goes about, fails at it (e.g. ruins the lawn), a virtue ethical theory would not judge that agent culpable. However, if he does not learn from his mistakes and ruins the lawn a second time, he may be culpable, as ‘in an important sense agent-based moralities do take consequences in account because they insist on or recommend an overall state of motivation that worries about and tries to produce good consequences.’  Consequently, the agent needs to improve himself if he is genuinely concerned with producing good results; it may even be so that a particular clumsy person or a person particularly bad at a certain task (e.g. mowing the lawn) needs to abstain from acting, even though the intentions are good. Furthermore, a person should obtain sufficient information to be able to make a careful and reasoned judgment. If an agent acts without making a reasonable effort to gather relevant facts, he is not qualified a virtuous agent.
Thus, the consequences of actions and the interests of others are partially taken into account. Still, these interests are different from the traditional interests central to privacy theories and practice. Reference can be made to Feinberg who, defining harm as a setback to interests, distinguished between two types of interests. ‘According to one of these, a person’s more ultimate goals and aspirations are his more important ones: such aims as producing good novels or works of art, solving a crucial scientific problem, achieving high political office, successfully raising a family . By a quite different and equality plausible standard, however, a person’s most important interests are by no means as grand and impressive as these. They are rather his interests, presumably of a kind shared by nearly all his fellows, in the necessary means to his more ultimate goals, whatever the latter may be, or later come to be. In this category, are the interests in the continuance for a foreseeable interval of one’s life, and the interests in one’s own physical health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning of one’s body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering or grotesque disfigurement .’  Consequently, the first category of, what Feinberg calls, ulterior interests are interests that protect the individual’s desire to attain the maximum gratifying life possible. By contrast, the second category of, what Feinberg calls, welfare interests protect everyone’s concerns regarding the minimum necessities of human life.
Privacy protection has always been linked to the protection of welfare interests. It is said to protect either a person’s negative freedom, autonomy, his human dignity or the ‘person as a person’, meaning his capacity to choose as a rational individual.  These interests are the minimum conditions of a human (worthy) life, as without autonomy, dignity or respect for their rational capacity, people are treated not as humans but as animals. By contrast, human flourishing protects the individual’s interests in striving for the maximum gratifying life. Not only is there a difference between the character of these two rights, there is also an important difference on the matter of defining harm. Welfare interests, those connected to the minimum standards of human life, are shared (to a large extent) by every human being. They thus contain a relatively objective and verifiable component. Ulterior interests, by contrast, differ from person to person. What person A regards as a maximum gratifying life-- for example, hiking mountains-- may sound ridiculous to person B, who’s dream it is to write a novel. Ulterior interest are thus highly subjective and only the subject itself can reasonably assess whether these interests are hampered and to what extent.
Not surprisingly, many scholars increasingly focus on harm to ulterior interests, instead of welfare interests, when discussing privacy violations following from Big Data processes. Neil Richards has, for example, held that ‘surveillance is harmful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect to civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are thinking, reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant ideas.’  He argues that in order to protect our intellectual freedom to think without state oversight or interference, we need, what he calls, “intellectual privacy.”  Intellectual privacy protects a person’s freedom to develop one’s identity and personality to the fullest, by experimenting freely in private and in public, offline and online. The interests of a person to flourish to the fullest extent is clearly an ulterior interest. Richard also stresses the need for a subjective standard for determining harm, as he criticizes the American courts.
On this point, the ECtHR seems to have an advantage. It grants protection to a wide variety of matters related, in general, to the development of one’s personality and identity, it accepts not only the protection of welfare but also of ulterior interests and it increasingly refers to abstract harm-- for example, following from a social or legal stigma-- to determine whether complainants have suffered from particular privacy violations, and to subjective harm. A move to virtue ethics could explain and facilitate this move. Of course, such a move triggers a number of questions and remarks. - Law is about actions and consequences. How can notions such as character and virtues play a role in this? - Can amorphous creatures, i.e. legal persons such as states, have a character or be called virtuous? - Who decides what virtuous behavior is and is it not dangerous to impose on others such an ideal? - Privacy is about autonomy and negative freedom, a theory that focuses on human flourishing should simply not be called a privacy doctrine. – Law should be codifiable and enforceable, virtue ethics is neither. - As always, further research is needed to determine how far these types of critiques are valid and, if so, insurmountable. Still, it needs to be pointed out that many of these question could also be directed at the case law of the Court, as its current approach to Article 8 ECHR already includes many virtue ethical notions as discussed in this contribution.
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 It specifies: Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948; Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared.
 The authors of the Convention began their deliberation on the basis of a ‘short list’ of the rights and freedoms contained in the Declaration. A.H. Robertson, ‘Collected edition of the 'travaux préparatoires' of the European Convention on Human Rights = Recueil des travaux préparatoires de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme. Vol. 1 Preparatory Commission of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Consultative Assembly, 11 May-8 September 1949’, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1975.
 See regarding the origins of the Universal Declaration among others: M.G Johnson & J. Symonides, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a history of its creation and implementation, 1948-1998’, Paris, Unesco, 1998. A. Eide & T. Swinehart, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a commentary’, Oslo, Scandinavian University Press, 1992. A. Verdoodt, ‘Naissance et signification de la Déclaration Universelle des droits de L’Homme’, Louvain, Warny, 1964. N. Robinson, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: its origin, significance, application, and interpretation’, New York, World Jewish Congress, 1958. G. Johnson & J. Symonides, ‘La Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme: 40e anniversaire, 1948-1988’, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1990.
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 See regarding the right to property protected under the First Protocol: C.B. Schutte, ‘The European fundamental right of property: article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights: its origins, its working and its impact on national legal orders’, Deventer, Kluwer, 2004.
 H. Tomlinson, ‘Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights’, <http://bit.ly/17U9TDa>, p. 2.
 See among others: ECtHR, Arvelo Apont v. the Netherlands, application no. 28770/05, 3 November 2011, § 53.
 ECtHR, Keegan v. the United Kingdom, application no. 28867/03, 18 July 2006. ECtHR, Mancevschi v. Modova, application no. 33066/04, 07 October 2008.
 S. Greer, ‘The exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, Council of Europe, 1997, p. 19.
 ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, application no. 9248/81, 26 March 1987. ECtHR, Klass and others v. Germany, application no. 5029/71, 06 September 1978. ECtHR, Erdem v. Germany, application no. 38321/97, 05 July 2001.
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 ECtHR, L. L. v. France, application no. 7508/02, 10 October 2006.
 ECtHR, Pfeifer v. Austria, application no. 12556/03, 15 November 2007, § 35.
 ECtHR, A. v. Norway, application no. 28070/06, 09 April 2009, § 64.
 Article 2 (h) & article 7 Data Protection Directive.
 Recital 46 & article 17 Data Protection Directive. Article 10 Data Protection Directive.
 Article 12 (b) & (c) Data Protection Directive.
 See for the classic cases: ECtHR, Peck v. the United Kingdom, application no. 4467/98, 28 January 2003. ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 44787/98, 25 September 2001. ECtHR, Halford v. the United Kingdom, application no. 20605/92, 25 June 1997. ECtHR, Perry v. the United Kingdom, application no. 63737/00, 17 July 2003. ECtHR, Klass e.a. v. Germany, application no. 5029/71, 06 September 1978. ECtHR, Malone v. the United Kingdom, application no. 8691/79, 02 August 1984. ECtHR, Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, application no. 10454/83, 07 July 1989. ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, application no. 9248/81, 26 March 1987. See for more recent cases: ECtHR, Szulc v. Poland, application no. 43932/08, 13 November 2012. ECtHR, Avram and others v. Moldova, application no. 41588/05, 05 July 2011. ECtHR, Van Vondel v. the Netherlands, application no. 38258/03, 25 October 2007.
 Following criteria specified in paragraph 2 of Article 8.
 See in general: A.R. Mowbray, ‘The development of positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004.
 ECtHR, Copland v. the United Kingdom, application no. 62617/00, 03 April 2007. ECtHR, Halford v. the United Kingdom, application no. 20605/92, 25 June 1997. ECtHR, Amann v. Switzerland, application no. 27798/95, 16 February 2000.
 See: ECtHR, Peck v. the United Kingdom, application no. 4467/98, 28 January 2003. ECtHR, Amann v. Switzerland, application no. 27798/95, 16 February 2000. ECtHR, Rotaru v. Romania, application no. 28341/95, 04 May 2000.
 ECtHR, Fyodorov and Fydorova v. Ukraine, application no. 39229, 07 July 2011. ECtHR, Csoma v. Romania, application no. 8759/05, 15 January 2013.
 ECtHR, Hristozov and others v. Bulgaria, application nos. 47039/11 and 358/12, 13 November 2012.
 ECtHR, Munjaz v. the United Kingdom, application no. 2913/06, 17 July 2012, § 80.
 ECtHR, N.B. v. Slovakia, application no. 29518/10, 12 June 2012. ECtHR, I.G. a.o. v. Slovakia, application no. 15966/04, 13/11/2012. ECtHR, V.C. v. Slovakia , application no. 18968/07, 08/11/2011.
 See among others: ECtHR, P. and S. v. Poland, application no. 57375/08, 56 May 2011. ECtHR, Bosso v. Italy, application no. 50490/99, 05 September 2002. ECmHR, Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Germany, application no. 6959/75, 19 May 1976.
 ECtHR, Haas v. Switzerland, application no. 31322/07, 20 January 2011. ECtHR, Koch v. Germany, application no. 497/09, 19 July 2012.
 ECtHR, Pretty v. the United Kingdom, application no. 2346/02, 29 April 2002, § 61.
 ECtHR, Juhnke v. Turkey, application no. 52515/99, 13/05/2008, § 82.
 ECtHR, Csoma v. Romania, application no. 8759/05, 15 January 2013, § 42.
 ECtHR, B. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 9840/82, 8 July 1987, § 63-64. ECtHR, R. v. the United Kingdom , application no. 10496/83, 8 July 1987. ECtHR, W. v. The United Kingdom, application no. 9749/82, 8 July 1987. ECtHR, Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, application no. 32250/08, 27 September 2011.
 ECmHR, M. M. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 13228/87, 13 February 1990.
 ECtHR, Karrer v. Romania, application no. 16965/10, 21 February 2012. ECtHR, Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, application no. 32250/08, 27 September 2011.
 ECtHR, Buckland v. the United Kingdom, appl.no. 40060/08, 18 September 2012.
 ECtHR, Alim v. Russia, appl.no. 39417/07, 27 September 2011. ECtHR, Liu v. Russia (no. 2), Liu v. Russia, appl.no. 29157/09, 26 July 2011.
 ECtHR, Taskin and others v. Turkey, appl.no. 46117/99, 10 November 2004, § 119.
 L. Loucaides, ‘Environmental protection through the jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights’, British Yearbook of International Law, 2005.
 ECmHR, McFeeley v. the United Kingdom, application no. 8317/78, 15 May 1980. ECmHR, X. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 8231/78, 06 March 1982.
 ECmHR, X. v. Germany, application no. 8741/79, 10 March 1981.
 See among others: ECtHR, Ledyayeva, Dobrokhotova, Zolotareva and Romashina v. Russia, application nos. 53157/99, 53247/99, 56850/00 and 53695/00, 26 October 2006. ECtHR, Gadeyeva v. Russia, application no. 55723/00, 09 June 2005. ECtHR, Guerra and others v. Italy, application no. 14967/89, 19 February 1998. ECtHR, Dubetska and others v. Ukraine, application no. 30499, 10 February 2011. ECtHR, Grimkovskaya v. Ukraine, application no. 38182/03, 21 July 2011.
 ECtHR, Odievre v. France, application no. 42326/98, 13 February 2003.
 ECtHR, Mikulic v. Croatia, application no. 53176/99, 07 February 2002. ECtHR, Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, application no. 10454/83, 07 July 1989.
 ECtHR, Jäggi v. Switzerland, application no. 58757/00, 13 July 2006.
 ECmHR, X. v. Austria, application no. 8278/78, 13 December 1979. See also: ECtHR, Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, application no. 23890/02, 20 December 2007. ECtHR, M. G. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 39393/98, 24 September 2002.
 ECmHR, K. B. v. the Netherlands, application no. 18806/91, 01 September 1993.
 See further: ECtHR, Tekeli v. Turkey, application no. 29865/96, 16 November 2004. ECtHR, Guillot v. France, application no. 22500/93, 24 October 1996. ECmHR, Salonen v. Finland, application no. 27868/95, 02 July 1997. ECtHR, Bijleveld v. the Netherlands, application no. 42973/98, 27 April 2000. ECtHR, G. M. B. and K. M. v. Switzerland, application no. 36797/97, 27 September 2001. ECtHR, Tjerna v. Finland, application no. 18131/91, 25 November 1994.
 ECtHR, X. and Y. v. the Netherlands, application no. 8978/80, 26 March 1985.
 ECtHR, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, application no. 28957/95, 11 July 2002. ECtHR, B. v. France, application no. 13343/87, 25 March 1992.
 ECtHR, I v. the United Kingdom, application no. 25680/94, 11 July 2002, § 57.
 ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, application no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010.
 ECmHR, Tauira and 18 others v. France, application no. 28204/95, 04 December 1995.
 ECmHR, Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Germany, application no. 6959/75, 19 May, 1976.
 ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, application no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979.
 ECtHR, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, application no. 7525/76, 22 October 1981, § 41. ECmHR, Johnson v. the United Kingdom, application no. 10389/83, 17 July 1986. ECtHR, Modinos v. Cyprus, application no. 15070/89, 22 April 1993. ECtHR, Norris v. Ireland, application no. 10581/83, 26 October 1988.
 ECmHR, G. and E. v. Norway, application no. 9278/81, 03 October 1983.
 See also: ECtHR, Ry and others v. Finland, application no. 42969/98, 18 January 2005.
 ECmHR, Smith v. the United Kingdom, application no. 14455/88, 04 September 1991. ECmHR, Smith v. the United Kingdom, application no. 18401/91, 06 May 1993.
 ECtHR, Chapman v. the United Kingdom, application no. 27238/95, 18 January 2001, § 73.
 ECtHR, Aksu v. Turkey, application no. 4149/04 and 41029/04, 27 July 2010, § 49.
 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Aksu v. Turkey, application nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, 15 March 2012, § 58 & 75.
 See for the application of relational rights to informational questions: C. M. Emery, ‘Relational privacy - a right to grieve in the information age: halting the digital dissemination of death scene images’, Rutgers Law Journal, Spring, 2011, Vol.42 (3).
 See for a more general overview: <http://echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/77A6BD48-CD95-4CFF-BAB4-ECB974C5BD15/0/DG2ENHRHAND012003.pdf>.
 ECtHR, Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, application no. 32250/08, 27 September 2011. ECtHR, Kosmopoulou v. Greece, application no. 60457/00, 5 February 2004. ECtHR, Zawadka v. Poland, application no. 48542/99, 23 June 2005. ECtHR, Hoppe v. Germany, application no. 28422/95, 05 December 2002.
 ECtHR, Keegan v. Ireland, application no. 16969/90, 26 May 1994.
 ECmHR, McFeeley v. the United Kingdom, application no. 8317/78, 15 May 1980.
 ECmHR, Wakefield v. the United Kingdom, application no. 15817/89, 01 October 1990.
 ECtHR, Silver and others v. the United Kingdom, application nos. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75 and 7136/75, 25 March 1983.
 ECtHR, Dickson v. the United Kingdom, application no. 44362/04, 04 December 2007.
 ECtHR, Evans v. the United Kingdom, application no. 6339/05, 10 April 2007.
 ECtHR, Lashin v. Russia, application no. 33117/02, 22 January 2013.
 Laskey and others v. the United Kingdom, application nos. 21627/93, 21826/93, 21974/93, 21627/93, 21826/93 and 21974/93, 19 February 1997. ECmHR, X. and Y. the United Kingdom, application no. 9369/81, 03 May 1983. ECtHR, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, application no. 7525/76, 22 October 1981. ECmHR, S. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 11716/85, 14 May 1986.
 ECtHR, Niemitz v. Germany, application no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, § 29.
 ECtHR, Chappell v. the United Kingdom, application no. 10461/83, 30 March 1989.
 ECtHR, Stes Colas Est and others v. France, application no. 37971/97, 16 April 2002.
 ECtHR, C. v. Belgium, application no. 21794/93, 07 August 1996, § 25.
 See among others: ECtHR, Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, application nos. 55480/00, 59330/00, 55480/00 and 59330/00, 27 July 2004. ECtHR, Coorplan-Jenni GMBH and Hascic v. Austria, application no. 10523/02, 24 February 2005.
 ECtHR, Ozpinar v. Turkey, application no. 20999/04, 19 October 2010.
 ECtHR, Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, application no. 21722/11, 09 January 2013, § 166.
 See further: M. C. Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities and Human Rights’, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273, 1997.
 S. Alkire, ‘Dimensions of Human Development’, World Development Vol. 30, No. 2, 2002, p. 186.
 See among others: M. D. White, ‘Kantian ethics and economics: autonomy, dignity, and character’, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2011. I. Kant, ‘The moral law: Kant's groundwork of the metaphysics of morals’, transl. and analysed by H.J. Paton, London, Hutchinson Repr., 1981. I. Kant, ‘The metaphysics of morals’, translated and edited by M. Gregor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. See also the references to dignity: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, preamble.
 B. van der Sloot, ‘Privacy in the post-NSA era: time for a fundamental revision?’, JIPITEC, 2014-1.
 M. Slote, ‘Morals from Motives’, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 34.
 J. Feinberg, ‘Harm to others’, New York, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 37.
 S. I. Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons’, p. 223-244. In: F. Schoeman (ed.), ‘Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: an Anthology’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.
 N. M. Richards, The dangers of surveillance, Harvard Law Review <http://harvardlawreview.org/2013/05/the-dangers-of-surveillance/>.
Bart van der Sloot, Privacy as human flourishing: Could a shift towards virtue ethics strengthen privacy protection in the age of Big Data?, 5 (2014) JIPITEC 230 para 1.

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