Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/281/281mass47.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:46:18+00:00

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LOUIS D. BARNES vs. BERKSHIRE STREET RAILWAY COMPANY.
(2) The evidence did not require a ruling of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
At the trial of an action of tort for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by negligence of the defendant, there was no error in the refusal by the trial judge of requests by the defendant for instructions to the jury that, if they should find certain of the subsidiary facts of which there was evidence, the plaintiff would be guilty of contributory negligence, where the evidence warranted also the finding of different or additional facts relating to the issue of contributory negligence, and where the instructions requested did not present a crucial test by which such issue could be determined.
TORT. Writ dated February 5, 1930.
judge denied a motion by the defendant that a verdict be ordered in its favor. Subject to leave reserved under G. L. c. 231, s. 120, a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $6,000 was recorded. The judge subsequently ordered that the verdict stand. The defendant alleged exceptions.
W. A. Heaphy, for the defendant.
J. M. Rosenthal, for the plaintiff.
parts of his testimony estimated at "four or five seconds, or ten seconds" and at "a minute and it might be a little over a minute," trying unsuccessfully to move the automobile, until a street car of the defendant came from the west and hit the automobile at the front of its right side, swinging it around, moving it nine feet, and knocking the plaintiff into the left side of the street car. Neither Reynolds nor the plaintiff saw or heard the street car in season to escape.
The first ground upon which the defendant rests its motion is that there was no sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of its motorman. This was not stressed by counsel in argument, and requires little discussion. The evidence already stated, and further evidence that no gong was sounded until too late to be of use, that the street car slid with locked wheels about eighty feet without slowing up before the collision, and that, according to some witnesses, the street car was going on a normal rail, not slippery, only twelve miles an hour, while according to others it was going so fast on a slippery rail that it was swaying, make the case manifestly one for the jury on the issue of the defendant's negligence.
232 N. Y. 176; 19 Am. L. R. 1, and note. Lesser risks may be justified by lesser occasions. There is no absolute safety in life, and the most ordinary acts involve possible danger. Mere knowledge that some danger exists is not conclusive of the negligence of one who fails to avoid it. McGuinness v. Worcester, 160 Mass. 272. Thompson v. Bolton, 197 Mass. 311. Frost v. McCarthy, 200 Mass. 445. Naze v. Hudson, 250 Mass. 368. Mitchell v. Springfield, 261 Mass. 188. Slack v. Boston, 275 Mass. 187. One is not negligent unless he takes greater risks than a man of ordinary prudence would take in a Eke situation. The degree of risk taken by the plaintiff does not require a ruling that he was negligent, in view of the exigency of the situation. Lemay v. Springfield Street Railway, 210 Mass. 63, 67. Burns v. Oliver Whyte Co. Inc. 231 Mass. 519. Fitch v. Bay State Street Railway, 237 Mass. 65. Pierce v. Hutchinson, 241 Mass. 557, 564. The case of Renwick v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway, 275 Mass. 145, and cases cited therein, are distinguishable on the facts.
gin, 15 Gray 264, to Schusterman v. Rosen, 280 Mass. 582, the rule that instructions cannot be required as to the legal effect of a fragment only of the evidence or subsidiary facts bearing upon a particular issue.
In many of the reported cases applying this rule, as in the present case, the requested instruction was, that if the jury should find certain stated facts bearing upon an issue, such as negligence, such facts would be decisive of the issue. Where the evidence warranted also the finding of different or additional facts relating to the same issue, the trial judge has been upheld in refusing such a request, without regard to its legal accuracy. The following cases suffice as illustrations. Stebbins v. Miller, 12 Allen 591, 597. Dolphin v. Plumley, 175 Mass. 304. American Tube Works v. Tucker, 185 Mass. 236, 240. Nicholson v. Feindel, 219 Mass. 490. Director General of Railroads v. Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc. 245 Mass. 385, 401. McDonough v. Vozzela, 247 Mass. 552, 559. Dutton v. Bennett, 256 Mass. 397, 404. Rio Grande Western Railway v. Leak, 163 U. S. 280, 287, 288. Rexter v. Starin, 73 N. Y. 601. The original papers show that the requests in Hicks v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 164 Mass. 424, 428, and Ferris v. Ray Taxi Service Co. 259 Mass. 401, were of the same sort. If such a request is accurate in law, that permits, but does not require, the judge to grant it. Hicks v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 164 Mass. 424, 428. Shattuck v. Eldredge, 173 Mass. 165, 168. Kenny v. Ipswich, 178 Mass. 368, 373. Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 163, 164. The extent to which a judge shall discuss the evidence or the subsidiary facts is generally within his discretion.
see Miner v. Connecticut River Railroad, 153 Mass. 398; Baker v. Seavey, 163 Mass. 522; Houle v. Lewonis, 245 Mass. 254. Since the law gives definite effect to contributory intoxication or other violation of criminal law or of specific statutory duty, a judge on request must instruct the jury as to that,, apart from contributory negligence. Jones v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 275 Mass. 139. Newcomb v. Boston Protective Department, 146 Mass. 596. Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 209 Mass. 24. Medlin v. Bloom, 230 Mass. 201. Labrecque v. Donham, 236 Mass. 10, 14, 15. Bilodeau v. Fitchburg & Leominster Street Railway, 236 Mass. 526, 534. McCarthy v. Beckwith, 246 Mass. 409. Bogert v. Corcoran, 260 Mass. 206. Cook v. Crowell, 273 Mass. 356.
Furthermore, the rule is subject to a genuine exception based, like the rule itself, on practical grounds. Sometimes the issue depends upon the existence of some fact, theoretically subsidiary but practically decisive if found. In such a case, for a judge to ignore the simple concrete test and submit the case upon abstract general instructions blurs the point and may mislead the jury. Accordingly, in Krock v. Boston Elevated Railway, 214 Mass. 398, it was held error to refuse a requested instruction that the plaintiff could not recover if She got hurt by stepping off a moving,car. For other examples see Mason v. Winthrop, 196 Mass. 18; Jaglenaski v. Andersen Coal Mining Co. 214 Mass. 573; Carey v. Mercer, 239 Mass. 599; Simoneau v. Keene Electric Railway, 78 N. H. 363.
these may have required the judge in his charge to cover adequately the issues upon which the requests bore. This the judge did. He was not bound to do more.

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