Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/409/418/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:55:50+00:00

Document:
The District of Columbia is not a "State or Territory" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Court of Appeals therefore erred insofar as that court sustained respondent's claims for deprivation of civil rights pursuant to that statute. Pp. 409 U. S. 420-433.
144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 447 F.2d 358, reversed.
"[w]ords generally have different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the intent of the lawmakers; and this meaning in particular instances is to be arrived at not only by a consideration of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed."
Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co. (P. R.), Ltd., 302 U. S. 253, 302 U. S. 258 (1937); see Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 293 U. S. 86, 293 U. S. 87-88 (1934); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 286 U. S. 433 (1932).
"[w]here the subject matter to which the words refer is not the same in the several places where they are used, or the conditions are different, or the scope of the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that exercised in another, the meaning well may vary to meet the purposes of the law. . . ."
"there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed . . . with different intent."
This provision was enacted as a means to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment's proclamation that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 392 U. S. 437-438 (1968).
Amendment 'is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.'"
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 109 U. S. 20 (1883); see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 403 U. S. 105 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, at 392 U. S. 437-440; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207, 197 U. S. 216, 197 U. S. 218 (1905). Thus, it cannot be doubted that the power vested in Congress to enforce this Amendment includes the power to enact laws of nationwide application.
ample justification for the holding in Hurd that § 1982 was intended to outlaw racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property in the District of Columbia as well as elsewhere in the United States.
"[d]ifferent problems of statutory meaning are presented by two enactments deriving from different constitutional sources. See the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3. Compare 341 U. S. Williams, [341 U.S. 70], with Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91."
Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 365 U. S. 205-206 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
and its officers are at least facially exempt from it proscriptions. Thus, unlike the situation presented in Hurd, the instant case does not involve a constitutional provision and related statute of universal applicability. This being so, the considerations that led to an expansive reading of § 1982 so as to include the District of Columbia simply do not apply with respect to § 1983. We must therefore examine the legislative history of § 1983 to determine whether the purposes for which the Act was adopted support a similarly broad construction.
white or black, invokes their aid. Then Justice closes the door of her temples."
"Now, it is an effectual denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws when any class of officers charged under the laws with their administration permanently and as a rule refuse to extend that protection. If every sheriff in South Carolina refuses to serve a writ for a colored man and those sheriffs are kept in office year after year by the people of South Carolina, and no verdict against them for their failure of duty can be obtained before a South Carolina jury, the State of South Carolina, through the class of officers who are its representatives to afford the equal protection of the laws to that class of citizens, has denied that protection."
"The United States courts are further above mere local influence than the county courts; their judges can act with more independence, cannot be put under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage; the jurors are taken from the State, and not the neighborhood; they will be able to rise above prejudices or bad passions or terror more easily. . . . We believe that we can trust our United States courts, and we propose to do so."
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 180.
decision not to enact legislation similar to § 1983 with respect to federal officials -- the assumption that the Federal Government could keep its own officers under control -- is equally applicable to the situation then existing in the District of Columbia.
as broad as that enjoyed by the States. . . ."
which was necessarily limited to the period of pupilage."
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 289 U. S. 537 (1933); see McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 141 U. S. 188 (1891). Thus, in light of the transitory nature of the territorial condition, Congress could reasonably treat the Territories as inchoate States, quite similar in many respects to the States themselves, to whose status they would inevitably ascend.
"the very heart -- of the Union itself, to be maintained as the 'permanent' abiding place of all its supreme departments, and within which the immense powers of the general government were destined to be exercised. . . ."
Id. at 289 U. S. 539. Unlike either the States or Territories, the District is truly sui generis in our governmental structure.
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, Rev.Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Officer Carlson was never found for service of process. The precinct captain and police chief moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Their supporting memorandum argued that no tort on their part had been committed, and that, in any event, they were protected by the doctrine of official immunity. The District of Columbia moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and also on the ground of sovereign immunity.
We therefore have no occasion to determine whether, as urged by petitioner, the District is not a "person" for the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, we intimate no view on the merits of respondent's claims insofar as they are predicated on other theories of liability.
Compare Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948); Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438 (1891); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 (1890); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1888), with Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954); Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371 (1901); Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (1805).
The Court of Appeals also cited Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (CA4 1961), which, relying upon Hurd, also held that the District of Columbia is a "State or Territory" within the meaning of § 1983. That decision is likewise disapproved.
See Jones v. Alfred N. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 392 U. S. 422-436 (1968).
Although the legislative debate over the 1866 Act did not focus specifically on the District, there are numerous indications that the Act was designed to "extend to all parts of the country." Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (Sen. Trumbull); see, e.g., id. at 392 U. S. 426, 392 U. S. 474.
This is not to say, of course, that Congress may not proscribe purely private conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 383 U. S. 762 (1966)(Clark, J., concurring); id. at 383 U. S. 782-784 (BRENNAN, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966).
Thus, unlike the situation with respect to § 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment, inclusion of the District of Columbia in § 1983 cannot be subsumed under Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but, rather, would necessitate a wholly separate exercise of Congress' power to legislate for the District under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
It should be observed that, unlike § 1982, which uses the phrase "every State and Territory" as a mere geographical description, the expression "any State or Territory" in § 1983 constitutes a substantive limitation upon the types of conduct that are prohibited.
As initially enacted, § 1 of the 1871 Act applied only to action under color of the law of any "State." 17 Stat. 13. The phrase "or Territory" was added, without explanation, in the 1874 codification and revision of the United States Statutes at Large. Rev.Stat. § 1979 (1874). Since the Territories are not "States" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, see South Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Buscaglia, 154 F.2d 96, 101 (CA1 1946); Anderson v. Scholes, 83 F.Supp. 681, 687 (Alaska 1949), this addition presumably was an exercise of Congress' power to regulate the Territories under Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
See generally K. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (1965); A. Nevins, The Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1878 (1927).
See Nevins, supra, n 12, at 351. For an appreciation of the nature and character of the Ku Klux Klan as it appeared to Congress in 1871, see S.Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871), and the voluminous report of the Joint Select Committee to inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the late Insurrectionary States, published as S.Rep. No. 41, pts. 1-13 and H.R.Rep. No. 22, pts. 1-13, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872).
See Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 116-117.
See id. at App. 226.
See Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 317.
See, e.g., id. at 154-159 (Sen. Sherman), 322 (Cong. Stoughton), 374 (Cong. Lowe), 428 (Cong. Beatty), 516-519 (Cong. Shellabarger), 653 (Sen. Osborn); id. at App. 72 (Cong. Blair), 78 (Cong. Perry), 100-110 (Sen. Pool).
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 505.
"original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . ."
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. The jurisdictional amount has since been raised from $500 to $2,000 by the Act of Mar. 3, 1887, § 1, 24 Stat. 552; to $3,000 by the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091; and to $10,000 by the Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415. The provision is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
The only exception was § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85, providing for Supreme Court review whenever a claim of federal right was denied by a state court.
Thus, as originally enacted, § 1 of the 1871 Act provided that the proceedings authorized by the Act are "to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States. . . ." 17 Stat. 13. This aspect of § 1 is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 460.
"[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat of Government of the United States. . . ."
The District of Columbia police system, for example, was operated under the direction of a board of five commissioners appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutes creating the metropolitan police system established a network of regulations and reporting requirements that enabled the Federal Government to keep a watchful eye over police conduct. See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, 12 Stat. 320; Act of July 16, 1862, 12 Stat. 578.
Respondent seeks to make much of the fact that, in 1871, Congress established a "territorial" form of government for the District of Columbia, with a governor and legislative assembly, to which the general administration of the affairs of the District was committed. Act of Feb. 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419. In light of this development, respondent argues, Congress must have intended the word "Territory" in § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act to include the District of Columbia. What respondent apparently overlooks, however, is that, on June 20, 1874, the very day that the phrase "or Territory" was formally enacted into the revised version of § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, see n 11, supra, Congress also abolished the "territorial" form of government in the District and, in its stead, authorized the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint a commission of three members to exercise the power previously vested in the governor and assembly. Act of June 20, 1874, c. 337, 18 Stat. 116.
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States. . . ."
Moreover, unlike the courts of general jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, which were created under the authority vested in Congress by Art. III, § 1, see O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933), the federal courts in the Territories were established under Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530 (1962); American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (1828). This distinction also has significance for our problem, for, unlike judges in the District, territorial judges were appointed for terms of only four years. Rev.Stat. § 1864 (1874). As a result, the territorial judges were peculiarly susceptible to local pressures, since their reappointments were often dependent upon favorable recommendations of the territorial legislatures. See Pomeroy, supra, n 27, at 98-102.

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