Source: http://academy.lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/people-v-atkinson-2013-cal-app-unpub-lexis-313-ca-ct-app-2013/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:17:21+00:00

Document:
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CURTIS ATKINSON III, Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Curtis Atkinson III killed his father. The death was unintentional. Defendant’s father was an alcoholic. While staying at defendant’s apartment, he became heavily intoxicated and started a physical fight after defendant removed his bottle of whiskey. Defendant’s father was known for becoming violent when intoxicated and knew how to handle himself in a fight. After a few blows were exchanged, defendant placed his father in a chokehold, believing this would subdue him without causing injury. He was wrong. Defendant released the hold after his father stopped fighting. He then realized his father’s breathing was labored, called 911, and administered CPR until paramedics arrived. His father died of asphyxia caused by neck compression.
Defendant objected to the trial court’s ruling, arguing that it deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense. He renews this argument on appeal. We agree and reverse his conviction. As we explain, where self-defense is raised in a homicide case, evidence of the aggressive and violent character of the victim is admissible and may be proven by specific acts of violence committed by the victim. (ß 1103.) And while “[s]ection 352 permits the trial judge to strike a careful balance between the probative value of the evidence and the danger of prejudice, confusion and undue time consumption,” these dangers must “substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. This balance is particularly delicate and critical where what is at stake is a criminal defendant’s liberty.” (People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 744.) Thus, “section 352 must bow to the due process right of a defendant to a fair trial and his right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his defense.” (People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599.) We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in determining the probative value of the excluded testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger that the presentation of this evidence would take too long. And because this error undermines our confidence in the verdict, we must reverse defendant’s conviction.
On July 21, 2010, defendant and Melanie Toney decided to go to the river to celebrate Toney’s birthday. Defendant and Toney had two children together and were seeing each other periodically following their break-up the previous September. Defendant’s father, Curtis Atkinson II (Atkinson), agreed to watch the children at defendant’s apartment while defendant and Toney were at the river. Atkinson was an alcoholic, but promised not to drink while watching the children.
Defendant and Toney brought some beer to the river. They each drank around a dozen beers over the course of seven to eight hours. Toney also drank some vodka. On the way back to the apartment, they went to the store and bought a bottle of whiskey and some clams for Toney’s birthday dinner. When they arrived home, defendant steamed the clams for Toney and cooked steak for the rest of the family. Atkinson, who had remained sober while watching the children, began to drink whiskey at dinner.
After dinner, defendant put the children to bed and then retired to the master bedroom with Toney. Atkinson stayed up in the living room and continued to drink, but promised that he would “keep his drinking to a minimum [because] the kids were in the house.” At some point, Atkinson began yelling at the television. Defendant got up, opened the bedroom door, and asked his father to “keep it down.” Atkinson apologized and said that he would. Defendant went back to sleep. A short time later, defendant was again awakened by his father’s yelling. Defendant opened the door and said: “Hey, man, you are going to wake up the kids.” His father again apologized. Defendant returned to bed, but could not go back to sleep. When Atkinson began yelling a third time, defendant went into the living room and told him that he had broken his promise about keeping the drinking to a minimum. Defendant then took his father’s drink, poured it down the kitchen sink, brought the whiskey bottle into the bedroom, and returned to bed.
Defendant released the chokehold when he was sure his father had stopped fighting and caught his breath for a couple minutes. Atkinson was not moving and his breathing sounded labored. Defendant then pulled his father into his lap and tried to wake him up, repeating: “Come on, old man. It’s time for you to go home. Wake up.” Atkinson did not respond. At this point, “three to five minutes” after Toney had returned to the bedroom, she came out and saw defendant with his father in his lap. Defendant told Toney they needed to call 911. Toney handed him the phone and said he was the one who needed to call. Defendant called 911 and performed CPR until paramedics arrived. Atkinson died of asphyxia.
At trial, defendant asserted that he acted in self-defense. In addition to the circumstances surrounding his father’s death, recounted above, defendant testified that Atkinson was “really loved in the family” and was “somebody that everybody looked up to,” but that he was also “violent with the people he was closest to,” especially when he was drinking. Defendant testified that his father had physically abused him “lots of times” during his life, and that he had also assaulted other family members, friends, and strangers. Defendant explained that his father was “feared” and “renowned” for being a “tough guy, somebody who got into a lot of street fights.” Defendant also testified that, in March 2009, Atkinson moved into the apartment for about three weeks and routinely came home drunk. One night, he came home “pretty beat up” and “told [defendant] that he had been in a bar fight,” but was too drunk to coherently explain what had happened. Defendant had also heard about an incident that occurred before Atkinson moved into the apartment, in which Atkinson said he got into a fight with a man named Kevin while the two were “out drinking” and “significantly” injured the man. On another occasion, Atkinson was drunk and pulled a pocket knife on defendant and his brother.
Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by excluding testimony from his mother and cousin concerning six specific incidents of his father’s prior violent conduct. We agree.
The People moved to exclude evidence of Atkinson’s prior violent conduct “based on the remoteness of the claimed conduct.” As relevant to this appeal, the prior incidents of violent conduct sought to be introduced are the following. Defendant’s cousin, Elizabeth Dahl, was to testify concerning two such incidents. In the first, while Atkinson was married to Emery between 1979 and 1985, he became violent to the point that he “‘demolished’ his trailer.” In the second, Dahl “saw [Atkinson] get into a bar fight with a guy named ‘John’ in the 1990’s and saw [Atkinson] hit John’s head into the wall several times.” Defendant’s mother, Emery, was to testify about five violent assaults committed by Atkinson. In the first, about seven years before trial, Emery went to Atkinson’s house to talk to him about defendant. He was intoxicated and became violent, pulling her ponytail, punching her in the head, and throwing a trash can at her. In the second, about 14 years before trial (when defendant was 17 years old), Atkinson was intoxicated and “punched [defendant] in the face” for “being mouthy.” In the third, about 18 years before trial (when defendant was 13 years old), Atkinson was working on his van and defendant handed him the wrong wrench. Atkinson threw the wrench at defendant, hitting him in the ankle. In the fourth, about 26 years before trial (when defendant was five years old), Emery told Atkinson she was moving to Florida and taking defendant with her. Atkinson pulled her hair and punched her two or three times. In the fifth, when defendant was very young, Atkinson was intoxicated and threw a coffee cup at Emery “because he didn’t like what [she] said.” Emery also would have testified that Atkinson beat her “once every two or three months” during this time period.
During the initial hearing on the motion to exclude these incidents of violent conduct, the People cited People v. Gonzales (1967) 66 Cal.2d 482 (Gonzales) and argued the remoteness of the prior acts made them irrelevant. The People also argued that these incidents should be excluded under section 352 because the probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability their admission would necessitate undue consumption of time or create the danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. Defense counsel distinguished Gonzales and argued that, despite the remoteness of some of the prior incidents, they were relevant and highly probative of defendant’s state of mind when he placed his father in the chokehold. Defense counsel also estimated she could present the testimony regarding these prior incidents in “a couple of hours.” The trial court deferred ruling on the motion.
Here, because defendant claimed self-defense, evidence of Atkinson’s prior violent conduct was admissible under section 1103 to prove he was the aggressor in the fight that led to his death. And because defendant claimed to have been aware of his father’s prior violent conduct during the fight, this evidence was also admissible to prove defendant’s state of mind. In particular, this evidence would have bolstered his claim that he reasonably believed in the need to defend against imminent harm and that he used a reasonable amount of force under the circumstances.
Nevertheless, the Attorney General argues that the specific instances of prior violent conduct sought to be admitted in this case were properly excluded under sections 350 and 352 because of their remoteness. We turn to these sections now and conclude the evidence was improperly excluded from the trial.
The Attorney General argues that because the specific violent acts excluded by the trial court occurred “well beyond the seven years which the Supreme Court determined to be too remote to be of present probative value” in Gonzales, they must also lack present probative value in this case. We disagree for two reasons. First, in Gonzales, the only evidence of Lujano’s violent character was evidence that he had a reputation for being violent seven years before the fight occurred. As we explained in People v. Shoemaker, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d 442, “the time of character evidence ‘. . . as a question of Relevancy, is simple enough . . . . Character at an earlier or later time than that of the deed in question is relevant only on the assumption that it was substantially unchanged in the meantime, i.e., the offer is really of character at one period to prove character at another, and the real question is of relevancy of this evidence to prove character, not of the character to prove the act.'” (Id. at p. 447, quoting Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) ß 60, p. 463.) Accordingly, evidence that Lujano had a reputation for violence seven years before the fight was evidence that he then had a violent character; but without evidence that this violent character was substantially unchanged in the meantime, the evidence was not probative of his character at the time of the fight. Here, a number of witnesses testified that Atkinson’s reputation for becoming violent when intoxicated continued until his death, defendant testified to an incident that occurred less than two years before the fight, and Emery testified to an incident that occurred about seven years before trial. While the violent incidents excluded by the trial court are more remote than the evidence at issue in Gonzales, occurring more than 10 years before the fight, they are nevertheless probative of Atkinson’s character at the time of the fight because the more recent evidence demonstrates that Atkinson’s character remained the same throughout his life.
Here, the probative value of the excluded evidence was significant. Defendant’s sole theory to support an acquittal was self-defense. As we have explained, evidence of Atkinson’s prior violent conduct was probative of his character for violence, making it more likely that he was the aggressor during the fight with his son. For this purpose, as the Law Revision Commission advises in its comments on section 1103, even evidence of “slight probative value” should generally be admitted because even “weak” evidence of the victim’s violent character “[m]ay be enough to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact concerning the defendant’s guilt.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2009 ed.) foll. ß 1102, p. 312.) However, in this case, the evidence of Atkinson’s violent character was neither weak nor of slight probative value. While the excluded incidents of violence were over 10 years old, there was evidence suggesting that Atkinson’s character for violence, especially while intoxicated, remained the same throughout his life. Moreover, the excluded incidents would have added to the jury’s understanding of Atkinson’s pattern of violence. Such a pattern is more probative than a single incident. (See People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 59, 66 [“series of crimes relevant to credibility is more probative than is a single such offense”]; see also People v. Muldrow (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 636, 648.) The excluded evidence painted a picture of a person whose violent character never abated.
Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger that its admission would require an undue consumption of time. This was an abuse of discretion. Defense counsel estimated she could present the evidence in “a couple of hours.” Indeed, the two witnesses who would have testified concerning the prior incidents testified about Atkinson’s reputation for violence. And Emery also testified about one prior incident. Adducing testimony concerning the remaining incidents would not have consumed an undue amount of time. (See People v. Burrell-Hart, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 600 [“since the evidence was to be presented by the testimony of three witnesses, two of whom testified anyway, the presentation of said evidence would not consume an undue amount of time”].) Nor do we believe the excluded evidence was merely cumulative. While several witnesses testified that Atkinson had a reputation for becoming violent while drinking, and while Emery testified to the facts of one violent assault, we believe defendant was entitled to paint a more complete picture of his father’s violent background.
Our dissenting colleague disagrees. He would affirm defendant’s conviction based on his assessment that any error was harmless because “the proffered evidence in fact added little, if anything, to what the jury already knew about the victim as it related to defendant’s claim of self-defense.” He cites the testimony of defendant’s mother, aunt, uncle, and cousin that Atkinson was known by the family to be extremely violent when intoxicated. He also cites the specific violent incidents testified to by defendant and the one such incident testified to by defendant’s mother. Our colleague concludes, “[i]t would have added little for the jury to know of other incidents, similar to those of which it was already aware, occurring 14 to 26 years before trial.” Were we to assume the jury believed defendant’s account of his father’s prior violent acts, we might agree. But that is the problem. The only evidence corroborating defendant’s account of his father’s prior violent conduct was reputation testimony from family members and one specific incident testified to by defendant’s mother, a witness who was unquestionably biased in favor of her son. The excluded incidents of violent conduct corroborated defendant’s testimony. Moreover, as we have already explained, the specific incidents involving violence against defendant were highly probative of defendant’s state of mind at the time of the altercation. And the incident in which Atkinson got into a bar fight and slammed his opponent’s head into a wall several times was highly probative of the nature of the threat defendant faced in his hallway and, in turn, the reasonableness of his decision to place his father in the chokehold that resulted in his unfortunate and unintended death.
In sum, while our dissenting colleague finds no reasonable probability that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the excluded evidence been given to the jury, we find “at least such an equal balance of reasonable probabilities as to leave [us] in serious doubt as to whether the [exclusion of this evidence] has affected the result. But the fact that there exists at least such an equal balance of reasonable probabilities necessarily means that [we are] of the opinion ‘that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.'” (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.) Stated differently, the erroneous exclusion of evidence of Atkinson’s prior violent conduct undermines our confidence in the verdict, requiring reversal of defendant’s conviction.
In this matter, the majority concludes the trial court erred in excluding, pursuant to section 352 of the Evidence Code (hereafter ß 352), certain proffered evidence regarding the victim’s propensity for violence, especially while intoxicated, and that the trial court’s error was prejudicial. As to the latter point, I disagree.
In assessing a claim of error of this sort, the appellate court is guided by well-settled rules.
At trial, defendant admitted he killed his father, but claimed he did so in self-defense. In support of that defense, he presented to the jury the following evidence, which was uncontested, regarding his father’s history of violence toward others, particularly when the father was intoxicated.
After the third instance of his father yelling at the television, defendant left his bedroom, poured his father’s drink in the sink, took his father’s whiskey and went back to bed. This apparently prompted the father to pound on defendant’s bedroom door until it opened and slammed into the dresser.
In March 2009, his father, while living at defendant’s home for a few weeks, routinely came home drunk. One night when he came home, he was “pretty beat up,” and told defendant he had been in a bar fight but was too drunk to explain what had happened. Defendant also heard about an incident before his father moved into the apartment where his father got into a bar fight and significantly injured a friend he was fighting with. On another occasion defendant’s father was drunk and pulled a pocket knife on defendant and his brother. Defendant said, based on prior experiences with his father, he was “very much afraid” during the fight on the night his father died.
Defendant knew his father was an “experienced fighter” who could “really hurt” defendant.
Defendant’s mother, aunt, and cousin also testified that defendant had a reputation for being violent when intoxicated.
In addition to the above evidence, defendant sought to place before the jury additional incidents of the victim’s violent conduct toward family members and others. Specifically, the defendant offered his cousin’s testimony that, sometime between 1979 and 1985, defendant’s father became violent to the point that he “demolished his trailer.” Further, defendant’s cousin was prepared to testify that she saw defendant’s father get into a bar fight in the 1990’s and saw him hit his co-combatant’s head into a wall several times.
The defendant also wanted the jury to hear further evidence from his mother that: (1) defendant’s father punched defendant in the face for being “mouthy” approximately 14 years before trial, (2) defendant’s father, while working on a car 18 years before trial when defendant was 13 years old, threw a wrench at defendant hitting defendant in the ankle, (3) defendant’s father pulled the mother’s hair and punched her two or three times when she told him, 26 years before trial, that she was moving away and taking defendant with her, and (4) when defendant was very young, his father threw a coffee cup at defendant’s mother, and that, during that time, defendant’s father beat the mother once every two or three months.
The People objected to this additional testimony on the basis that it described incidents that were too remote to have any probative value or that whatever probative value they had was outweighed by the countervailing considerations set forth in section 352. The trial court excluded the evidence and the majority here concludes that the court erred in doing so.
It is unnecessary for me to decide whether the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence exceeded the bounds of reason and thus was an abuse of discretion. The error, if there was one, was harmless and does not merit a reversal of defendant’s conviction.
I suspect the trial court was motivated in its ruling by the same thought that motivates me to disagree with my colleagues here, at least as to the effect of the error the majority has concluded occurred at trial, and that is that the proffered evidence in fact added little, if anything, to what the jury already knew about the victim as it related to defendant’s claim of self-defense.
The jury knew without dispute that defendant’s father was drunk on the night in question and the jury knew, without dispute and according to numerous family members in addition to defendant, that the victim had been known by his family up to the day he died as a “Jekyll & Hyde” who would become “your worst nightmare” and “extremely–extremely violent” when he was drinking. It would have added little for the jury to know of other incidents, similar to those of which it was already aware, occurring 14 to 26 years before trial. I suspect that defendant wanted to have the jury hear the additional evidence as part of an understandable effort by defendant to convince the jury to dislike the father so much that it would acquit the son.
I note that the fight with his father that resulted in his father’s death was not an isolated instance of anger or violence committed by a man not himself inclined to anger and violence with family members. Defendant testified at trial and admitted on cross-examination that on July 4–the year was not specified–he had been down by a river with his father and his brother and that, although defendant did not remember much of anything that day, he was told later he was being a “rowdy idiot,” “a jackass” towards his father and his brother and that his brother had to tackle defendant to the ground. While the year of this incident was not specified in the testimony, reading defendant’s testimony in context suggests to me that the incident occurred 17 days prior to defendant’s fight with his father that ended in the father’s death.
Defendant in turn admitted that he grabbed the mother of his children by the throat “on several occasions” and that on the last occasion he had one hand on her throat and was choking her.
The point of this is that the focus of the matter at trial was whether defendant was merely defending himself during the altercation that led to his father’s death. The fact of family violence by the father and by the son was a given and well known to the jury from the evidence it heard. Apprising the jury of still more incidents of such violence by the father many years earlier would have made little difference to this jury given the issue it was asked to decide.
In sum, I cannot say there was a miscarriage of justice here; that, after an examination of the entire cause, it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the excluded evidence been given to the jury.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
2 As the Attorney General points out, the trial court also mentioned that Emery did not see Atkinson punch defendant in the face when he was 17 years old. However, Emery need not have seen the punch in order to testify about the incident. Emery testified during the section 402 hearing that she came into the room after the punch and took defendant to the dentist because it knocked his teeth loose. Thus, she had personal knowledge of the condition of defendant’s face when she walked into the room. And if defendant told her Atkinson punched him in the face when she walked into the room, such a spontaneous statement would be admissible [*15] hearsay under section 1240. The trial court also mentioned that the incident involving the wrench “did not feel part of the same pattern,” i.e., Atkinson becoming violent while intoxicated, but instead, this seemed to be a situation in which Atkinson was simply “frustrated.” However, while Atkinson’s “pattern” of becoming violent while intoxicated is important to establish that he was the aggressor in the fight that led to his death, any violent act perpetrated against defendant is relevant to defendant’s state of mind.
4 While the trial court did not base its ruling on the danger of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, we conclude these dangers do not substantially outweigh the probative value of the excluded evidence. Additional examples of Atkinson’s violent conduct would have enlightened the jury concerning the nature of the threat defendant faced in his hallway the night of the fight. Nor would these examples have confused the issues since the key issue raised by the defense was whether defendant reasonably believed in the need to defend against imminent harm [*32] and used a reasonable amount of force in doing so. The excluded prior incidents went directly to that issue.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.