Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/967-so-2d-155-614421415
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:02:11+00:00

Document:
Party Name: Juan Raul CUERVO, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 2007.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Thomas J. Lukashow and Leonard R. Ross, Assistant Public Defenders, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Petitioner.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Kristen L. Davenport and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent.
We review Cuervo v. State, 929 So.2d 640 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), which is in express and direct conflict with State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1997), Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1992), and Dooley v. State, 743 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), on the admissibility of statements made by a suspect in response to police questioning after the suspect has indicated that he or she wishes to remain silent. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we quash Cuervo and approve Dooley.
right. He does not have to. Just let him know that.
Um, he's saying that um, he does, he does not wish to speak because he doesn't know if the victim already said anything um, or the victim's mother, 'cause uh, he's afraid that they've been here for thirty years or more and that they can use anything against him to um, (inaudible).
Palmieri: Okay. Does he have an attorney that we can speak with?
Garcia: Okay. He doesn't know anybody in this country. He does not have an attorney. Um, he's by himself in this country. He doesn't have any family (inaudible).
Palmieri: Okay, so at this time, he's refusing to talk?
Well, basically, understand that there was the communication barrier and it's hard for me to understand what's going on when someone else is speaking Spanish. Originally, I told Deputy Garcia to have him--read him the rights, and to have him initial to make sure he understands. And, I guess, at that point Deputy Garcia told me he does not want to talk. But when I looked down at the paperwork, it showed that he did not sign it. So I told him please go back, have him initial it, and make sure he understands. And I said make sure he understands this is his opportunity to speak. But I just wanted to make sure that was clear, only because he didn't speak [English] and I wanted to make sure he knew his rights, and I wanted it initialed.
Garcia was "No, I don't want anything." The trial court then found, given this translation, that Cuervo's response was equivocal and that the exchange that followed was only for clarification and did not amount to a violation of Cuervo's constitutional rights.
At the very least, the brief exchange between Palmieri and Cuervo, with Garcia translating, was sufficiently uncertain to allow clarifying questions. The entire dialogue took only about five minutes and arose in the context of a translation. Cuervo began by responding that he did not want to "declare anything." The follow-up question elicited from him an odd narrative about his family that was the opposite of "not speaking" and which compounded the ambiguity about whether he wished "to speak" or not. In response to the question about whether he had counsel the police could talk to, he responded by volunteering to answer questions put to him--or not--as he chose. In the entire exchange, there was manifestly no coercion of any sort, no effort to overcome a settled decision to invoke his right to remain silent, no interrogation.
Bright lines are valuable tools in this area of the law, but there is nothing in this brief exchange, as it is communicated back and forth in two languages for which the protection of Miranda is required. When asked point blank if he was refusing to speak, Cuervo could simply have said, "yes." He chose, instead, to hear the investigator's questions and to respond--or not, as he chose.
Id. at 642-43. Accordingly, the Fifth District affirmed Cuervo's convictions.
In contrast to Owen, Cuervo made two statements that clearly showed he did not wish to speak to the police.... Both officers specifically testified that Cuervo stated he did not want to speak to them; that expression sufficed. See Smith v. State, 915 So.2d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (dismissing State's contention that defendant's assertion was ambiguous). Courts have held that admitting statements after such an expression is error, even if improper questioning quickly leads a suspect to change his mind. See Dooley, 743 So.2d at 67-69.
Here, the State's argument that Palmieri's questions were clarifying rather than substantive is sleight of hand. Taken to its logical conclusion, an officer can testify that clarifying questioning continued because the defendant appeared confused or puzzled. An officer could also state that, in light of defendant's minimal education, clarification was needed to be sure the defendant understood his rights. If nothing else, Miranda stands for the proposition that police questioning must stop when the defendant invokes his rights.
929 So.2d at 644 (Thompson, J., dissenting). We granted review based on express and direct conflict with our decisions in Traylor and Owen and the Fourth District's decision in Dooley.

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