Source: http://patentsbyfrip.com/ptabandsec1012015.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:18:04+00:00

Document:
Ex Parte Cui et al; 12/3/2015; TC 2600; APJs Courtenay (author), Dang, Hume; Possible real party in interest, AT&T. The claimed invention related to methods and apparatus to upgrade communication services in subscriber distribution areas. Regarding Section 101, in a footnote the Board noted that the recited “tangible computer readable storage device or storage disk” of claim 16 was not claimed as non-transitory, and the originally-filed Specification did not expressly and unambiguously disclaim transitory forms via a definition. Thus claim 16 was not limited to non-transitory forms and appeared ineligible under Section 101. The Board cited Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PTAB 2013) (precedential) (holding recited machine-readable storage medium ineligible under § 101 since it encompassed transitory media).
Ex Parte Bak et al; 10/19/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fischetti, Hoffmann (author), Bayat; Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to the automated scheduling of meetings on calendars and the organization of such calendars of invitees based upon the importance of a set of predetermined attributes of such meetings. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-8, although designating the rejection as a new ground of rejection. The Board applied the two-step analysis of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). First, independent claim 1’s method of scheduling meetings on calendars of invitee users constituted a patent-ineligible abstract idea. And second, to the extent that claim 1 required a network of computer controlled user interactive display stations and a sending display station, it did no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions, such as communicating with other devices. Thus the claim was not directed to significantly more than the abstract idea.
Ex Parte Jung et al; 9/28/2015; TC 2600; APJs Thomas, Winsor (author), Trock; Real party in interest, Searete, LLC. The claimed invention related to sharing mechanisms that allowed sharing images between multiple devices at least partially based on a regional proximity of the devices. Concerning Section 101, the Board found no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 95. The Examiner had concluded that claim 95 encompassed non-functional descriptive matter because it recited instructions on non-transitory media without reciting that the non-transitory media was used or usable in a computer or machine. The Board essentially agreed. Claim 95 was not a claim to a process; rather it was a claim to media bearing instructions for a process. Although the Examiner did state that the claim “raises a question as to whether the claim is directed merely to an abstract idea,” the actual rejection articulated by the Examiner was based on a finding that the claim was directed to non-functional descriptive matter, in accordance with what was sometimes known as the printed matter doctrine. In other words, the Examiner had found that claim 95 did not preclude embodiments that were merely printed instructions on paper, which was a non-transitory medium. See In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (CCPA 1969) (“printed matter by itself is not patentable subject matter, because [it is] non-statutory . . .”). Here, unlike the claim at issue in Miller, claim 95 encompassed printed matter by itself, and not in a new and unobvious relationship with its substrate.
Ex Parte Lazar; 9/24/2015; TC 3600; APJs Bahr, Hoskins (author), Mayberry. The claimed invention was a plasma jet guard for defense against violent atmospheric cyclones. The guard consisted of a controlled meteorological missile. Concerning Section 101 the Examiner rejected claims 1-7. The Examiner determined that “claim 4 sets forth that the apparatus of claim 1 (‘A Plasma Jet Guard’) further comprises ‘a method of Technological Defense against atmospheric violent cyclones . . . .” According to the Examiner, “such a combined apparatus and method claim is directed to neither a process nor a machine, but rather embraces or overlaps two different statutory classes of invention set forth in 35 U.S.C. 101 which is drafted so as to set forth the statutory classes of invention in the alternative only.” The Board affirmed the rejections because the Appellant’s responses did not address the issues.
Ex Parte Meiby; 9/23/2015; TC 2600; APJs MacDonald, Quinn, Hamann. The claimed invention related to user input displays, including displays that utilized touch-sensitive data and optical data to identify selected input keys. Concerning Section 101, the Examiner rejected claims 15 and 17-19. The claims were not argued. Consequently, the Board summarily affirmed the rejections.
Ex Parte Kryzpow et al; 9/22/2015; TC 3700; APJs Kerins (author), McCarthy, Barrett; Possible real party in interest, Orbital Research Inc. The claimed invention was directed to an electrode harness for physiological monitoring of a subject. Concerning Section 101, the Board did not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 27-31 and 33-35. The Examiner took the position that the limitation in claim 27 directed to “the electrical pathway being electrically shielded between the subject and the electrical pathway from large defibrillator voltages,” inferentially included the human body as an element of the harness. The Board, however, agreed with the Appellants that the claim language at issue was merely “point[ing] out that the claimed shielding is located between the electrical pathway and the subject” in terms of how the harness was to be placed on the subject.
Ex Parte Piepenbrink et al; 9/15/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting, Mohanty (author), Hutchings; Possible real party in interest, AT&T. The claimed invention was directed to communications networks and a unified storefront. Concerning Section 101, the Examiner had rejected claims 1-25. The Board sustained the rejection of claims 1-12 as being directed to software per se. The recited database, engines, and modules could be drawn to software per se. The Board, however, did not sustain the rejection of claims 13-25, which the Examiner had done under the machine-or-transformation test of Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010). The Board implied that further analysis was needed as to whether was the claims involved an abstract idea.
Ex Parte Kermani; 9/9/2015; TC 2100; APJs Evans, Bui (author), Beamer; Real party in interest, Alcatel-Lucent. The claimed invention related to methods and systems for abstracting an electronic document that allowed a reader to choose between various levels of abstraction for the electronic document, thereby permitting that reader to read the electronic document according to his or her personal needs, preferences, or time constraints. Concerning Section 101, the Board suggested that the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, consider the following rejections: (1) claims 1– 22 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, that is, an abstract idea in light of the two-steps framework set out in the Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); and claim 22 as being directed to nonstatutory subject matter, that is, carrier waves in light of the Board precedential decision in Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PTAB 2013).
Ex Parte Steinberg et al; 9/3/2015; TC 3700; APJs Hoelter, Browne, Osinski (author). The claimed invention was a method of teaching mathematical operations. Claim 1 had eight steps: (1) forming a vertical line to produce an image on a fixed medium; (2) positioning points along the line; (3) identifying a desired numerical value; (4) adding one or more lines perpendicular to the vertical line; (5) representing a number value by the sum of the value of the perpendicular lines; (6) increasing the numerical value of the numerical notation form; (7) decreasing the numerical value of the numerical notation form; and (8) teaching a user to perform a mathematical operation through manipulation of the numerical notation system method.
Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3 and 5-24. The Examiner’s decision had been based primarily on the machine-or-transformation test cited as an important clue, an investigative tool, by the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010). The Board was not persuaded that “machine” included the simple piece of paper of the claimed invention. Nor was the Board persuaded that recording something on a fixed medium amounted to a transformation. The Board then turned to the two-step analysis of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). Because the steps of the claims could be performed in the human mind, or by a human using pen and paper, the claims were directed to the mental process or abstract intellectual concept of teaching mathematical operations. And the recited steps were simply steps for manipulating and recording numerical data, thus being insufficient to supply the inventive concept to transform abstract claims into patentable subject matter.
Ex Parte Boyden et al; 9/2/2015; TC 1600; APJs Grimes, Jenks, Pollock (Opinion Per Curiam); Real party in interest, Searate, LLC. The claims were directed to methods, computer programs, and systems for determining disease treatment characteristics based on polypeptide sequences. Regarding Section 101, the Board affirmed the rejection of claims 1, 3, 6–8, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28, 32, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 49, 52, 53, 57, and 111–115 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, but designated the affirmance as a new ground of rejection. The Board also entered a Section 101 rejection for claim 109.
In its analysis, the Board applied the two-step procedure of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). The focus of the analysis was independent claims 1, 53, 57, 109, and 111, particularly claim 1. Claim 1 was directed to a method that could be conducted in the mind of one of skill in the art while reading a scientific paper that identified amino acid sequence alterations in a disease associated polypeptide as compared to the normal or non-disease associated polypeptide. Claim 1 did not require the step of sequencing a protein, but rather required determining at least one amino acid sequence alteration in an amino acid sequence relative to another amino acid sequence. Although the Specification disclosed that the amino acid sequences to be compared could be contained in computer databases, the Specification did not specifically define how the determining steps or the relating step of claim 1 were to be conducted, and thus claim 1 was broad enough to include performing the steps mentally, which fell within the judicial exception of an abstract idea.
Regarding the second step of the Alice-Mayo procedure, the Board considered the elements of claim 1 “both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” The recited elements, and the particular order of the elements, i.e., determining amino acid sequences and then comparing them to identify altered sequences in disease associated polypeptides, were all conventional in the art, and claim 1 contained no inventive concept. Thus, claim 1 was directed to an unpatentable abstract idea. The other independent claims were directed to computer-environment implementations of the process of claim 1. The mere recitation of generic computer elements in the claims could not transform a patent ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Likewise, limiting an abstract idea to a computer environment did not make an invention patent-eligible.
Ex Parte Salowey; 8/25/2015; TC 2400; APJs Droesch (author), Galligan, Khan; Real party in interest, Cisco Systems. The claimed invention was related to systems and methods for policy-based revocation of network security credentials, such as digital certificates and passwords. Concerning Section 101, The Board direct the Examiner’s attention, in the event of further prosecution, to claim 29 and the Specification. Claim 29 recited a computer-readable volatile or non-volatile medium. The Specification said that “Such a medium may take many forms, including but not limited to, non-volatile media, volatile media, and transmission media. . . . Transmission media can also take the form of acoustic or light waves, such as those generated during radio wave and infrared data communications.” The claim and Specification should be examined in the light of Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1859 (PTAB 2013), and the 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014).
In the event of further prosecution of this application, we leave it to the Examiner to determine whether independent claim 25 meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth paragraph, for failing to further limit the subject matter of claim 28. Claim 25 recites, “A computer program product for monitoring a network, comprising a non-transitory computer readable storage medium having computer readable program code embodied therein, the computer readable program code being configured to carry out the method of Claim 28.” (Emphasis added). However, claim 25 fails to specify a further limitation of the subject matter of claim 28 to which it refers, because the recited “computer program product” (“manufacture” statutory class under § 101) is completely outside the scope of the method (“process” statutory class under §101) of claim 28. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Ex Parte Gang; 8/19/2015; TC 2400; APJs Courtenay (author), Dang, Hume; Possible real party in interest, AOL Inc. The invention related to matching online members with shared interests. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote said that, in the event of further prosecution, the Examiner might want to considered claim 1 and its dependent claims. To the extent claim 1 might require some unspecified conventional computer hardware to implement the method (i.e., reciting an “online communication service”), it might amount to a mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on a computer. The Board cited Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358, (2014).
Ex Parte Mordvinov et al; 8/18/2015; TC 2100; APJs Nappi, McMillin, Lentivech (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention generally related to “a method of and apparatus for processing query representation, and particularly to a method of and apparatus for extraction and analysis of macro operations within query language statement.” Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22 because the “computer readable storage medium” recited in the claim encompassed both transitory and non-transitory subject matter. The Board also stated that, in the event of further prosecution, the Examiner might want to review claims 1–4, 7–14, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 23 for compliance under Section 101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Deeming et al; 8/17/2015; TC 3600; APJs Medlock (author), Hoffmann, Hutchings; Real party in interest, AOL Inc. The claimed invention generally related to the field of advertisements, and more particularly to location-specific web advertisements. Concerning Section 101, the Examiner rejected claims 1-20. The Board reversed the rejections of claims 1-10 because the Examiner had relied only on the machine-or-transformation test, which the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), had held was not dispositive of a Section 101 inquiry. The Board, however, sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11-20, agreeing with the Examiner that the phrase “computer readable storage medium,” encompassed transitory signals, which were not statutory subject matter.
Ex Parte Payne et al; 8/12/2015; TC 2400; APJs Bui, Beamer (author), Lentivech; Real party in interest, AT&T Mobility II LLC. The claimed invention was directed to collecting data within a wireless communications network to facilitate providing insurance coverage for connected devices. Concerning Section 101, the Board said that in the event of further prosecution, the Examiner consider rejection of claim 1-5, 7-9, and 13-24 in light of the two-step procedure set out in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
Ex Parte Klish; 7/29/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting, Hoffmann, Wielder (author); Real party in interest, Yahoo! Inc. The claimed invention related to creating web user interfaces in a social web site. The Board reversed the Examiner’s Section 101 rejections of claims 1-8 and 10-12 because the Examiner had applied the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for deciding patent-eligible subject matter. But applying the two-part framework of Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), the Board entered a new Section 101 Ground of Rejection against claims 1-8, 10-25, 27, and 28. First, the claims were directed to an abstract idea. The preamble to claim 1 recited that it was a method of creating a web user interface. The three steps in claim 1 resulted in providing a web user interface with an “endorsement object” to promote a product or a service provider. The Specification recited that the invention related to “creating advertising web user interfaces.” This evidence showed that claim 1 was directed to providing an advertisement in a web user interface, that is, a business promotion, which was an abstract idea.
Second, taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process was purely conventional. Using a computer to generate an object, that is, data, obtain rules, build a user interface, and display that interface amounted to electronic data presentation—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions were well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry. In short, each step did no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of the method added nothing that was not already present when the steps were considered separately. Viewed as a whole, the Appellant’s method claims simply recited the concept of advertising, that is, business promotion, as performed by a generic computer. The method claims did not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims at issue amounted to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of business promotion using some unspecified, generic computer.
Ex Parte Ohno; 7/28/2015; TC 2600; APJs Winsor (author), McMillin, Jivani; Real party in interest, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha. The claimed invention was related to “releasing a power-saving mode in a printer connected to a network.” Concerning Section 101, the Board issued a new ground of rejection for claims 17-24. Independent claim 17 recited a “computer-readable medium storing a computer-executable program used to direct an information processing apparatus.” The Specification was silent as to the meaning of “computer-readable medium” and thus did not exclude transitory media from the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term. Nor did the recitation of the medium “storing a . . . program” preclude transitory media. Thus claim 17 encompassed non-statutory subject matter.
Ex Parte Khvorova et al; 7/10/2015; TC 1600; APJs Adams, Fredman (author), Harlow; Real party in interest, Dharmacon, Inc., a subsidiary of Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. The claims involved a method for obtaining a siRNA sequence for a target gene. The Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 85, 87, and 88. The claimed invention involved (1) generating data related to candidate sequences based on a target gene for siRNA; (2) applying an algorithm to the data; and (3) determining, based on the result, whether a particular siRNA would result in gene silencing. Thus the claims purported to apply natural laws describing the relationship between siRNA sequence data and gene silencing to predict the likelihood that a particular siRNA sequence would result in gene silencing. Following the analytical framework set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012), the Board determined, first, that the claims were directed to a naturally occurring phenomena and thus to a patent-ineligible application. Second, the Board held that there was no inventive concept sufficient to overcome the presumption of patent-ineligibility. Claim 85 did not recite a specific algorithm, and preempted any algorithm for designing siRNA sequences. The claim limitation recited by the Appellants regarding the four asserted “variables” could simply represent the presence or absence of the four alternative bases possible in siRNA: adenine, guanine, cytosine, and uracil. The claim required no particular coefficient for the algorithm, nor did the claim impose any specific metric to identify improved gene silencing.
Ex Parte Johnson et al; 7/8/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fischetti, Kim (author), Bayat; Possible real party in interest, AT&T. The claimed invention related generally to “more efficient systems and methods for both viewing data-intensive images at remote locations and supplying notification of the readiness of such images for viewing to the relevant individuals.” Concerning Section 101, the Examiner rejected claims 18-20 for failing to recite statutory subject matter. The Appellants did not challenge the rejections. Consequently, the Board summarily sustained them.
Ex Parte Carbone et al; 7/6/2015; TC 2100; APJs Courtenay, Dang, Hume (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to “hardware emulation using on-the-fly virtualization.” Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote directed the Examiner’s attention, in the event of further prosecution, to Ex Parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ 1875 (PTAB 2013, which held that machine-readable storage medium was ineligible under Section 101 because the term encompassed transitory medium. Similarly, in the instant case claims 20-22 and 28, reciting “computer program product,” did not appear to be limited to non-transitory forms.
Ex Parte Flinn et al; 7/1/2015; TC 2100; APJs MacDonald (author), New, Pyonin. The claimed invention involved a computer-implemented experimentation method and an adaptive decision method. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote said that the Examiner might wish to review the claims in light of the Director's examination guidance on patent eligible subject matter. See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74619 (Dec. 16, 2014)(and any updates thereof), which supplemented the “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Felter et al; 6/24/2015; TC 2100; APJs Stephens, Beamer (author), Jivani; Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention was directed to providing a customized power rating for computer equipment. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 14–17, 22–25, 30, and 31 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Independent claim 14 was directed to “A computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having a computer readable program stored therein.” The Appellants argued that a “storage medium” was by definition nontransitory, and therefore was a “manufacture” qualifying as patentable subject matter under Section 101. The Board, however, agreed with the Examiner that a claim to “computer readable storage medium” was insufficient to limit the claim to non-transitory media. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1862 (PTAB 2013).
Ex Parte Dubinsky et al; 6/15/2015; TC 2100; APJs New, Silverman, Haapala (author). The claimed invention was directed to creating legally binding electronic documents. The Board issued a new ground of rejection under Section 101 for claims 1, 10, and 18. The Board applied the two step analysis derived from Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank lnt’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014), and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S.Ct 1289, 1300 (2012). Under the first step, the Board found that the claims were directed to an abstract idea because they were directed to the fundamental process of creating an executable document by presenting a document to a user for signing and obtaining the signature. Under the second step, the Board found that the claims did not have any additional elements that amounted to significantly more than the abstract idea of creating an executable document. The additional steps in the claims required no more than the conventional steps of transforming a document into a graphic image format, creating a display representation in the graphic image format, adding data (“populating”) to the electronic document, and printing the document.
Ex Parte Harrison et al; 6/10/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting (author), Kim, Hoffmann. The claimed invention was a way of making a payment to a third party via a financial service provider using a network–based device. The Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejections over art and consequently did not feel the need to consider the Examiner’s Section 101 rejections.
Ex Parte Boyle et al; 5/29/2015; TC 3600; APJs Lorin, Fetting (author), McCarthy. The claimed invention was an automated reconciliation of investment manager and related custody accounts. The Board rejected a number of claims under both Section 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter and Section 103(a) as unpatentable over prior art. The Board upheld the Section 103(a) obviousness rejections and consequently did not feel compelled to reach the Section 101 rejections.
Ex Parte Gustafson et al; 5/27/2015; TC 2100; APJs Bui, Jurgovan (author), Trock; Real party in interest, NBCUniversal Media, LLC. The claims were directed to a system and method for “intent mining,” which was a type of document analysis in which willingness of an author to perform an action was analyzed through grammatical patterns. Regarding Section 101, the Board newly rejected claims 1 and 8. The Board cited the 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility. 79 Fed. Reg. 74,619 –74,633 (Dec. 16, 2014), which implemented Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014), and the two-step test for determining subject matter eligibility set forth in Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012). First, the Board found that claim 1 recited an abstract idea, namely, “intent mining.” Second, the Board determined that the claim did not recite additional elements amounting to significantly more than the abstract idea. Interpreted in the context of the Specification, the claim involved complex data processing, and recited steps that were unconventional. These steps, however, were not applied to any particular application. Further, there was no particular machine expressly applied to perform the recited method. It was also possible to think of simple cases in which a person could perform the method recited in claim 1 mentally, or with pen and paper.
Claim 8 was similar to claim 1 but recited in its preamble processing circuitry configured to perform the claimed functions. The mere implementation of an abstract idea on a computer, however, was not sufficient to render a claim patentable.
Ex Parte Burchianti et al; 5/22/2015; TC 3600; APJs Mohanty, Medlock (author), Bayat; Real party in interest, Celtic Healthcare, Inc. The claimed invention “relates to an integrated system for managing and delivering workflow and documents related to providing home healthcare services, and particularly to an integrated system that tracks and processes information at various levels of providing the home healthcare services.” Regarding Section 101, the Board summarily sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19 and 20. The Appellants had not contested the Examiner’s rejection and had attempted to cancel the claims.
Ex Parte Huynh et al; 5/22/2015; TC 2800; APJs Pak, Delmendo (author); Franklin; Real party in interest, Active-Serni, Inc. (BVI). The claimed invention related to the design and layout of integrated circuits and, more specifically, to a modular partition approach used to create extremely versatile high performance, application-specific integrated circuits in the shortest possible time frame. The Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection under Section 101 of claims 56-65. Although claim 56 recited a method of making an integrated circuit comprising the steps of “specifying” the recited modular tiles and “generating a physical layout for the integrated circuit,” the claimed method was not tied to a particular machine or apparatus. Nor did it transform an article to a different state or thing. Rather, the claimed method could consist entirely of the mental steps of “specifying” the recited molecular tiles and “generating a physical layout for the integrated circuit.” The step of “generating a physical layout for the integrated circuit such that . . .” did not require the manufacture of an integrated circuit but merely the generation of a layout (that is, the generation of a design drawing of a circuit). Absent further steps that were positively recited to require actual manufacturing of the integrated circuit, there was no error in the Examiner’s determination that the claimed method attempted to cover an abstract idea. And To the extent that the preamble language “method of making an integrated circuit” might be construed to necessarily require manufacturing steps, the Appellants themselves indicate that the “tile modules are used to specify and form the IC in a standard IC fabrication process” Thus, the claimed method was nothing more than a drafting effort to monopolize the abstract idea of specifying and generating a design for the integrated circuit.
Ex Parte Kaneshiro et al; 5/21/2015; TC 2100; APJs Mills, Schopfer, LaVier (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to providing email senders with “control over which historical messages are to be included in a forwarded or replied electronic mail message.” Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote said, in the event of further prosecution, that the Examiner might want to consider whether claim 1 was directed to statutory subject matter. The Board cited Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 2013 WL 4477509 (PTAB 2013), in which the broadest reasonable interpretation of “machine-readable storage medium” included signals per se.
Ex Parte Villena et al; 5/20/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting, Medlock, McShane (author). The claimed invention related to a system for the creation and maintenance of databases identifying specific real estate properties and their Automated Valuation Method (AVM). Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 133-151 and 155. Applying the first step of the Alice analysis (Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), the Board agreed that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of providing AVMs, a fundamental real estate practice, which was known in the real estate practice at the time of the invention. Turning to the second step of the analysis to determine whether there were additional elements that transformed the nature of the claims into a patent eligible application, the Board agreed that although the Appellants’ claims required a computer and network, these were merely generic computing elements that performed generic known functions as claimed. The evidence did not demonstrate that the Appellants’ purported features of decreased latency times, benefits for larger areas, and identification of prices below market value as compared to other real estate AVM systems were due to inventive concepts that were significantly more than what was achieved by implementing an abstract concept to operate faster and more efficiently on a computer and network.
Ex Parte Richter; 5/20/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting (author), Kim, Wieder. The claimed invention was a sporting league in which athletes were compensated based on the price of shares of stock issued in the names of each of the athletes. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-10. Although the invention was characterized as relating to sporting leagues and compensating athletes, the claims were actually drawn to the abstract idea of creating and trading financial security shares. And the use of a generic computer at each step of the process was purely conventional, adding nothing new to the process.
Ex Parte Green et al; 5/11/2015; TC 2400; APJs Pyonin (author), Dejmek, Kaiser. The claimed invention related to a user interface for use with a content delivery system. Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8-14, which were directed to a “tangible computer readable medium having instructions stored thereon.” First, the Board rejected the argument that a “medium storing instructions cannot reasonably be construed as a propagating signal or carrier wave.” In Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1862 (PTAB 2013) (precedential), the Board held that a recited machine-readable storage medium, having a program stored thereon, and absent an express limitation of scope to non-transitory storage media, was ineligible under Section 101 because it encompassed transitory media. Second, the term “tangible” did not necessarily connote patentable subject matter. Stated another way, a statement that articles of manufacture were tangible did not support the proposition that all tangible things were articles of manufacture. Accordingly, the Board was not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding the broadest reasonable interpretation of a “tangible” medium included non-statutory transitory signals. Further, the Specification provided only a non-limiting list of examples of storage devices and types of computer readable digital media, including “any other suitable media.” Thus, the Specification did not limit a “tangible computer readable medium having instructions stored thereon” to non-transitory media.
Ex Parte Kuester et al; 5/6/2015; TC 3700; APJs Staicovici, Browne, Goodson (author). The claimed subject matter was a method of teaching the included steps for arranging cards on a base to indicate a path of movement, playing a game on the base, and retaining each card in place for the duration of the game. Concerning Section 101, the Board did not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12-17, 24, and 25. The Board applied the two-step of Alice and Mayo. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). Regarding the first step, the Board agreed with the Examiner that independent claim 12 was directed to the rules for playing a type of game, and that rules for playing a game constituted an abstract idea. Also, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure identified “a game defined as a set of rules” as an example of a claim not directed to one of the statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter. See MPEP § 2106 (9th ed., Mar. 2014).
But the Board did not agree with the Examiner that there was no tie to a particular apparatus. The Examiner inappropriately read limitations out of claim 12. The claim recited that the base included compartments “sized and shaped to receive and retain each card in place for the duration of a game after said cards have been arranged in one of a plurality of different configurations.” (Emphasis added). The claim further recited “retaining each card in place for the duration of a game.” Thus, contrary to the Examiner’s position, the method could not be performed with a generic deck of cards and a table because playing a game on an ordinary table would not satisfy these limitations. These limitations tied the method to a base having specific structural characteristics that allowed it to perform a specified function in the claimed method. Accordingly, these limitations added a degree of particularity so as to transform the claimed abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.
Ex Parte Jung et al; 4/30/2015; TC 2400; APJs Abrams (author), Browne, Hill. The claimed invention was directed to a method, system, and program product interface for creation of limited-use electronic mail accounts. Regarding Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 27, 28, and 42. Claim 27 was drawn to a “program product” comprising “an article of manufacture tangibly including a computer readable medium.” The claim was amended but still could be interpreted to include carrier waves. The Specification did not explicitly state that “a signal bearing computer readable storage medium” was strictly limited to non-transitory forms of computer readable storage media.
Ex Parte Hyde et al; 4/29/2015; TC 3600; APJs Barrett (author), Kumar, Shiang. The invention related to a method and system for monitoring at least one health attribute of an individual during an artificial sensory experience, associating a characteristic of the artificial sensory experience with the at least one health attribute of the individual, and modifying at least one of a bioactive agent or the artificial sensory experience at least partly based on associating a characteristic of the artificial sensory experience with the at least one health attribute of the individual.
The Examiner rejected independent claim 36 and its dependent claims 38, 39, 41-43, 47-49, 52, 55, and 59-71 as being broad enough to cover software per se. The Board reversed. Although claims broad enough to read on software per se, and thus on both statutory and non-statutory subject matter, were non-statutory, the claims in the instant case were drafted in “means-plus-function” language. Such language required that the claims be construed to cover the structure disclosed in the Specification and its equivalents. In the instant case, the “means” were supported by the structure. Also, the “circuitry” in claim 71 was limited to structure. The Board did say in a footnote that the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, might wish to consider whether the claims passed muster under Section 101 in light of the most recent Office and Federal Circuit guidance on that Section.
Ex Parte Himmelstoin; 4/24/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fischetti, Moore (author), Bayat. The claims were directed to an electronic real estate bartering system. The Board reversed the Examiner’s Sections 102(b) and 103(a) rejections but entered new rejections under Section 101 for claims 2-15 and 21-26. The Board found that independent claims 2 and 3 were directed to the abstract idea of performing a deferred exchange in which currency was used to account for differences in value between the items exchanges. As described in the Specification, the system effectuated a tax-deferred exchange of barter items, such as real estate. Deferred exchanges were a tax strategy designed to permit a property owner to trade one property for another without incurring federal income tax liability. Thus, like the claims that were held to be invalid in Alice, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014), claims 2 and 3 of the application were directed to the abstract idea of a performing a well-known type of business transaction that involved the mental exercise of barter, a mental process known to humankind since its beginnings. Claims 2 and 3 were, therefore, directed to subject matter that was not patent-eligible under Section 101.
Applying the second step of the Alice analysis, the Board found that independent claims 2 and 3 did not contain subject matter sufficient to transform the abstract idea of a deferred exchange of real estate into a patent-eligible invention. While the claims required a processor and memory, these were merely generic computing elements that performed generic computer functions. Such limitations, specified at a high level of generality, did not make the abstract idea of performing a deferred exchange of real estate items patentable. Similarly dependent claims 4–15 and 21–26 did not contain subject matter sufficient to transform the abstract ideas of independent claims 2 and 3 into patent-eligible inventions. Claims 4–15, 21, and 25 merely specified conventional limitations on the types of properties that were exchanged, the criteria used to select properties, the manner in which differences in property values were accounted for, and the manner in which transaction fees were computed. Claims 22–24 and 26 specified other types of conventional limitations, such as providing telephone access to a real estate agent, providing virtual property tours, specifying the time at which an exchange occurred, and using an intermediary to complete a transaction. Simply adding these types of conventional limitations, at a high level of generality, was not enough to supply an inventive concept.
Ex Parte Hyde et al; 4/16/2015; TC 2100; APJs Nappi, Morgan, Dejmek (author). The claimed invention was directed to “methods and systems for combining a bioactive agent with an artificial sensory experience.” Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claim 67. The Appellants argued that due to its dependency on claim 64, claim 67 was similarly directed to statutory subject matter. In particular, the Appellants contended claim 64 expressly recited that the “computer-readable medium” was “non-transitory” and that, as a dependent claim, claim 67 also included this limitation. The Board, however, agreed with the Examiner that the communications media included transitory signals in the form of energy.
Ex Parte Tomastik et al; 4/13/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fischetti, Mohanty, Bayat (author); Real party in interest, United Technologies Corporation. The claimed invention related to a method for optimizing maintenance work schedules for fleet management programs. Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-7. The Board applied the two-step test of Alice and Mayo (Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)). First, claim 1 was directed to the abstract idea of cost optimization. Claim 1 was drawn to a process for optimizing maintenance work schedules in a fleet management program for at least one engine including the steps of creating a workscope decision and an unscheduled engine repair scenario for the workscope decision, selecting the unscheduled repair engine scenario, calculating an expected cost for the selected scenario, determining a lowest expected cost of said expected cost, selecting a workscope decision having said lowest expected cost, and performing a repair upon an engine based on the selected workscope decision having the lowest expected cost.
Second, claim 1 did not contain an inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. Claim 1 failed to even suggest the use of a computer in carrying out the process. Additionally, claim 1’s method could largely be performed by a human using a pen and paper. Further, claim 1 failed the machine-or-transformation test. And claim 1 did not recite any limitation that, in practical terms, limited the scope so that it did not fully cover the abstract idea itself.
Ex Parte Brown et al; 4/8/2015; TC 3700; APJs Hoelter, Browne (author), Reimers. The claims were directed to a method of cutting hair. The method involved five steps: defining a head shape; designating the head into at least three partial zones; identifying at least three hair patterns; assigning at least one of the three hair patterns to each of the partial zones to either build weight or remove weight in at least two of the partial zones; and using scissors to cut hair. The Board agreed with the Examiner that the claims were directed to an abstract idea. And there was no inventive concept. The limitations of claim 1 did not transform the abstract idea of a method of cutting hair because the claims simply instructed the practitioner to implement the abstract idea with the routine, conventional activity of using a pair of scissors. None of the five recited steps viewed “both individually and ‘as an ordered combination,’” transformed the nature of the claim into patent-eligible subject matter.
Ex Parte Svendsen; 4/3/2015; TC 2400; APJs MacDonald (author), Nappi, Baer. The claimed invention was a method and system for propagating a media item recommendation. Concerning Section 101, the Board newly rejected claims 1-36 as being directed to ineligible subject matter. Applying the two-step procedure of Alice and Mayo (Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)), the Board first concluded that claims 1–36 were directed to the abstract idea of a first and second “message” each having content “information” (that is, data) comprising “a media item identifier of a media item and presence information.” “Data in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply information that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible subject matter under section 101.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elec. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The Board’s second conclusion was that claims 1–36, which merely required generic “network,” “control system,” and “computer-readable medium” implementation, failed to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Separately, the generic computer network elements were purely conventional. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components added nothing that was not already present when the elements were considered separately. Viewed as a whole, the claims simply recited the concept of sending and receiving particular data as performed by a generic computer network. The claims did not, for example, purport to improve the storage operation of the computer network itself. Nor did they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims at issue amounted to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of sending and receiving particular abstract data using some unspecified, generic computer network elements. That was not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. None of the hardware recited by the claims offered a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the use of the data to a particular technological environment, that is, implementation via computer networks. Simply appending a conventional computer network, control system, or computer-readable medium, specified in general terms, was not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
In a footnote, the Board said that it addressed claims 1–36 under Section 101 to highlight that, under Alice, where claims were distinguished over conventional prior art based solely on information content (in this case, the information content of the received first and second message) with conventional prior art limitations appended thereto, the appended conventional prior art limitations might not be enough to supply an inventive concept. This interrelationship of information content and Section 101 was previously noted by the reviewing court in discussing the printed matter doctrine. See In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (CCPA 1969).
Ex Parte Moody; 3/31/2015; TC 3700; APJs Hoelter, Reimers (author), Warner. The claimed subject matter “relates primarily to video poker games, and more particularly to video poker games that are programmed to play on an electronic video poker machine.” The Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 2 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter but characterized the affirmance as a new ground of rejection. Applying the two-step procedure of Alice and Mayo (Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)), the Board first found that independent claim 1, which recited a method of playing a card game, was directed to an abstract idea. The Board then held that the steps for playing the card game, recited in claim1, taken individually or as an ordered combination, were merely necessary and conventional steps in playing a poker card game. They constituted, pre- or post-, extra-solution activity, and did not add enough to the claims to transform the recited methods into patent-eligible subject matter.
Ex Parte Borghetti et al; 3/27/2015; TC 2400; APJs Whitehead, Strauss (author), Galligan; Possible real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention was directed to a secure system access without password sharing. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9-16. Claim 9 recited a computer program product comprising a computer storage medium having computer readable program stored thereon. The Board rejected the argument that the inclusion of the word “storage” moved the subject matter from the transitory non-patentable category into the non-transitory patentable category. The addition of the word “storage” standing alone did not exclude transitory media. Furthermore, the Board disagreed with the argument that a signal could not store a computer readable program. In circulating memory devices, data was stored by repeatedly transmitting, receiving, refreshing, and retransmitting a transitory signal so that the recirculated signal stored the data, including any computer program represented by the data.
The Board added in passing and without reliance in the affirmance of the appealed rejection that the Specification further described “computer-usable or computer-readable medium” as including “paper or another suitable medium upon which the program is printed, as the program can be electronically captured, via, for instance, optical scanning of the paper or other medium, then compiled, interpreted, or otherwise processed in a suitable manner, if necessary, and then stored in a computer memory.” (Emphasis added). Although the computer-readable program of claim 9 caused a computing device to implement a method when executed, the program must first at least be scanned and stored for execution before the code was executed. Thus, the program was mere nonfunctional descriptive material. Moreover, the Board was unable to discern any novel or nonobvious manner in which the program was related to the paper on which it might be printed, further evincing the program was mere nonfunctional descriptive material. Accordingly, claim 9 represented mere printed matter—an abstraction that by itself did not perform a function. That is, a computer storage medium including paper added nothing of substance to the underlying abstraction of printed matter.
Ex Parte Victor; 3/27/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting (author), Astorino, Hoffmann. The claimed invention was a way of rewarding contestants involved in a reality–based wide area network competition. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote said, in the event of further prosecution, that the Examiner might want to review the claims in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Yu; 3/27/2015; TC 2400; APJs Saadat (author), Stephens, Trock; Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to managing transactions between a service client and a service provider. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote invited the Examiner, in the even of further prosecution, to consider Section 101 compliance. The Board specifically mention paragraphs 71–73 of the Specification and cited David J. Kappos, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010), and In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Ex Parte Stanley et al; 3/26/2015; TC 3600; APJs Crawford (author), Mohanty, Medock. The claimed invention was directed to a method of providing accurate fit recommendations for individuals for footwear, garments, or both. Concerning Section 101, the Examiner had rejected claims 1–8, 10, 11, 16, and 20, mostly on the grounds of failing to meet the machine-or-transformation test. The Board reversed, concluding that the Examiner’s almost sole reliance on the machine-or-transformation test was too narrow an analysis.
Ex Parte Lundberg; 3/26/2015; TC 3600; APJs Lorin, Fetting, Worth (author); Real party in interest, FoundationIP, LLC. The claimed invention related to a method and non-transitory machine readable medium for “determining which patents to maintain in force and which to let go abandoned by non-payment of annuity or maintenance fees.” Concerning Section 101, the Examiner had rejected claims 3, 5, and 13-17. The Board, however, reversed the rejections because the Examiner’s explanation of the machine or transformation test appeared to be too rigid. Since the Examiner’s analysis, the Supreme Court had further elucidated the law in, among others, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), and the USPTO had issued implementing guidance for Examiners.
Ex Parte Muller et al; 3/25/2015; TC 2100; APJs Homere (author), Whitehead, Shiang; Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention was a method and system for managing reciprocal tagging relationships between resources within a computer communications network. Concerning Section 101, the Examiner had rejected claims 8-16. The Board sustained the Section 101 rejections of claims 10-16 but reversed the Section 101 rejections of claims 8 and 9. Claim 8 recited a data processing system that the Examiner did not believe encompassed a machine. The Board, however, said one of ordinary skill would have readily appreciated that the data processing system recited in the claim necessarily implicated the utilization of a processor/hardware (for example, a social bookmarking system) for executing reciprocal tags stored in the data store. On the other hand, the Specification did not define the computer-usable storage medium in claim 10 to exclude transitory media. Thus the claimed medium encompassed transitory media, which was not patent eligible. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PTAB 2013) (precedential).
Ex Parte Pullman; 3/24/2015; TC 3600; APJs Lorin, Fetting, Fischetti (author). The claimed invention was a methods and devices for valuing and securitizing intellectual property assets. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote said that the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, might want to review the claims for compliance under the most recent PTO Section 101guidance, which was found in “2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,” 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), which in turn supplemented the “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Aydar et al; 3/24/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fischetti (author), Astorino, Medlock. Real party in interest, MySpace Music LLC. The claims were directed to a method of regulating downloading and other machine reproductions of digitally stored memory contents based on the rights of the owners of the content. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 26-30 and 47-63. Claim 26 was drawn to the abstract idea of using a database to access data, update data, and store updated data in the database file, a thought process long practiced by humans. The claims lacked any substantial ties to a machine or apparatus. The claims covered the simple concept of updating a memory. Moreover, the use of the word digital in claim 26 did not transform the abstract idea of monitoring and compensating for the sale of content, into a patent-eligible invention. The mere recitation of content did not add any meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the abstract method to a general purpose computer.
Ex Parte Martin; 3/24/2015; TC 3600; APJs Crawford, Mohanty (author), Gerstenblith. The claimed invention was directed to distributing media content. Concerning Section 101, the Board reversed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-19. The Examiner’s analysis was incomplete. It relied on only parts of machine-or-transformation test and did not take into account other factors. Moreover, the Supreme Court has determined that the machine-or-transformation is not dispositive of the Section 101 issue. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
Ex Parte Heller et al; 3/23/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fischetti (author), Medlock, Hoffmann; Real party in interest, FreeWheel Media, Inc. The claimed invention involved managing a multi-directional content and advertising value chain. Concerning Section 101, the Board concluded that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 3-8, 15, and 17-20. Claims 1 and 15 were drawn to the abstract idea of compensating plural entities tied to content to prorate compensation to the plural entities for both the creation of the digital content asset and the origination of a consumer’s consumption of the content, a thought process that humans had practiced since early commerce, namely, awarding value based on merit and use. [Editor’s note: Huh?] Thus the claims at issue were directed to an abstract idea. On their face, the claims were devoid of substantial ties to a machine or apparatus and rather covered the concept of compensating based on the use and ownership of an asset. The concept of compensating all entitled to be reimbursed based on success of a product was a fundamental practice in commerce. Thus, the idea of fairly compensating parties involved in the development of an asset, like the idea of hedging, was an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of Section 101.
Moreover, the introduction of a plurality of communication devices and a graphic user interface recited in claims 1 and 15 did not transform the abstract idea of consumption-based compensation to all parties involved in a transaction, into a patent-eligible invention. The mere addition of a VCM computer to perform these steps and a GUI to present the idea did not add any meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the abstract method to a general purpose computer. Adding a nominal recitation of a computer to a claim covering an abstract concept was insufficient to make a claim patent-eligible. See Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.¸ 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Circ. 2012).
Ex Parte Chan et al; 3/20/2015; TC 2400; APJs Courtenay, Dang (author), Hume. The claimed invention related to port security states, with claim 1 being a method for graphically displaying a port security state of a network device. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote directed the Examiner’s attention, in the event of further prosecution, to the question of whether the claims were patent-eligible in light of the “2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,” Dec. 16, 2014. All of the claims on appeal appeared to be merely directed to displaying data of a particular type or content, even though several of the claims nominally recited an “interface” comprising a “display” for displaying such data.
Ex Parte Musgrove; 3/20/2015; TC 2100; APJs MacDonald, Strauss, Baer (author). The claimed invention was directed to “a system and method for interlinking differing taxonomies of corpora.” Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote instructed the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, to review the claims for compliance in view of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), and “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.” The Examiner should also consider whether any claims (for example, claims 33–37) encompassed non-statutory transitory media such as signals sent over optical or electronic communication links. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also MPEP § 2106(1) (9th ed., Rev. 11 Mar. 2014) and Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1859 (PTAB 2013) (precedential opinion).
Ex Parte Chu; 3/20/2105; TC 2600; APJs Dang (author), Hughes, Hume. The claimed invention related to a remote host providing virtual community participation in a remote device. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a long, long footnote left it to the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, to evaluate the claims of in view of Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), MPEP revised § 2106.01 (August 2012), and post-Bilski decisions, including CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding a method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the Internet to be nonstatutory as an abstract idea capable of being performed in the human mind or by a human using a pen and paper). That is, the Examiner was to evaluate whether claim 1's “establishing,” “adding,” and “granting access” steps comprised an abstract idea capable of being performed in the human mind or by a human using a pen and paper. The Board particularly referred to Digitech Image Tech., LLC v. Electr. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014), where the Federal Circuit held that claims to a process of organizing information through mathematical correlations were not tied to a specific structure or machine, and thus constituted an abstract idea. The Board also cited Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that fundamental concepts, by themselves, were patent-ineligible abstract ideas. A mere tangential relationship to a specific structure or machine did not create patent-eligibility.
Ex Parte Cuomo et al; 3/20/2015; TC 2100; APJs Smith, Fishman, Galligan (author). Real party in interest, IBM. As set forth in claim 1, the invention was a virtualization data processing system comprising: a hypervisor configured for execution in a host computing platform in a computer system of at least one computer with memory and at least one processor; a virtual machine (VM) image managed by the hypervisor; a configuration applied to the VM image, the configuration specifying a set of resources in the host computing platform accessible by applications executing in the VM image; and re-tasking logic coupled to the hypervisor, the logic comprising program code enabled to select a new role for the VM image, to determine a new configuration for the new role, and to apply the new configuration to the VM Image.
Independent claim 12 was directed to a “computer program product comprising a computer usable storage medium storing computer usable program code for VM re-tasking.” The Board and the Examiner rejected the argument that the addition of the word “storage” to the phrase “computer usable medium” created a patent-eligible item. The Specification stated: “For the purposes of this description, a computer-usable or computer readable medium can be any apparatus that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport the program for use by or in connection with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. The medium can be an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system (or apparatus or device) or a propagation medium.” Each of these examples of media qualified as a “computer usable storage medium.” A propagation medium (signal), in particular, was a non-patentable transitory computer usable storage medium that stored data (for example, program code) during transmission from a transmitter to a receiver. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PTAB 2013) (precedential-in-part).
Ex Parte Peterson; 3/19/2015; TC 3700; APJs Staicovici, Hoelter, Smegal (author). The claimed invention related to a board game where “a chance device controls the amount of movement of a token along a track.” Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1−5, 9, and 10, but under a rationale that the Board characterized as a new ground of rejection. The claimed method required no machine implementation, required no transformation of a particular article, and was an attempt to receive patent protection for an abstract idea in the form of a new set of rules for a game. The use of a random number generator in independent claim 1 did not make the claim machine-dependent. Reciting multiple routine, conventional steps, including “providing a game apparatus with a playing surface divided into a path with discrete steps for movement of tokens,” “placing tokens” on an initial step, “advancing tokens along the path in accordance with a chance device,” “gaining or losing pecuniary and non-pecuniary currency as a result of token advancement,” “making inter-currency exchanges,” and “eliminating a player who’s non-pecuniary currency rises to a predetermined cutoff value,” was insufficient to transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. In addition, the claim recitations appeared to merely be an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea of following the rules of the board game and the abstract idea of “teaching that money isn’t everything,” “to a particular technological environment.” This was insufficient to transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F. 3d. 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
Unlike claim 1, claims 9 and 10 were not limited to the use of a random number generator, that is, a “chance device,” or any of the other method steps recited by claim 1. Claims 9 and 10 merely recited the mental step of “encountering simulations of life events.” In the absence of arguments by the Appellant on claims 9 and 10, the Board summarily affirmed the Examiner’s rejection.
Ex Parte Dressler et al; 3/19/2015; TC 2600; APJs Whitehead, Smith, Jurgovan; Real parties in interest, Polaris Wireless, Inc., and DeMont & Breyer LLC. The claims were directed to an efficient deployment of mobile test units to gather location-dependent radio-frequency data. Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-46. The claims were nominally directed to methods that were statutory processes, and they did not wholly preempt the abstract ideas, namely, economic cost-benefit analyses, recited therein. But the claims failed the two-step test for determining subject matter eligibility as set forth in Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012). The claims all recited economic cost-benefit analyses, which were mental processes, and were thus directed to abstract ideas. Moreover, claims directed to economic practices or theories were generally not directed to patentable subject matter. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014) (claims directed to mitigating settlement risk found patent-ineligible); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (claims directed to hedging found patent-ineligible). Although the recitation of the cost-benefit analyses was in the context of generating a drive-test plan for performance of RF measurements in a geographic region using a server, the basic thrust of the claims was nonetheless performance of cost-benefit analyses. And computerizing cost-benefit analysis in the claimed context did not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea of cost-benefit analysis itself. Adding conventional elements to an abstract idea did not render it patent-eligible.
Ex Parte Murthy; 3/18/2015; TC 2100; APJs Courtenay (author), Dang, Hume. The claimed method was directed to generating a second modeling language representation of the system under test based on a first graphical modeling language representation of the system under test. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote suggested, in the event of further prosecution, that the Examiner review all the claims for compliance under Section 101, citing “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014. The Board further noted that the “computer-readable tangible storage media” of independent claim 18, and the claims depending therefrom, might not be directed to statutory subject matter under Section 101 for an additional reason. The scope of the recited “computer-readable tangible storage media” appeared to encompass transitory media such as signals or carrier waves. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PTAB 2013) (precedential). The recited “computer-readable tangible storage media” was not claimed as non-transitory, and the originally-filed Specification did not expressly and unambiguously disclaim transitory forms, such as signals, via a definition or disclaimer.
Ex Parte Gruetzner et al; 3/18/2015; TC 2100; APJs Krivak, Fishman, Kaiser (author). The claimed invention related to a method for processing a graph containing a set of nodes. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote recommended that, in the event of further prosecution, the Examiner determine whether claim 17, which recited “a computer usable storage medium,” encompassed transitory media. Transitory signals were unpatentable as non-statutory subject matter under Section 101. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PTAB 2013) (precedential-in-part).
Ex Parte Al-Shaykh et al; 3/17/2015; TC 2100; APJs Homere, Shiang, Galligan (author); Real Party in interest, PacketVideo Corp. The claimed invention was a method for rendering internet multimedia content in a network connected to the internet wherein the rendering device was connected to the network. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote stated that, in the event of further prosecution, the Examiner night wish to ascertain whether the “computer-readable medium” of claim 21 encompassed transitory media, rendering the claim patent ineligible. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PTAB 2013) (precedential-in-part). Specification 20 listed as examples of a computer readable medium “a compact disc, a DVD, a computer memory, a hard drive and/or the like” but did not exclude any particular medium.
Ex Parte Kato et al; 3/17/2015; TC 2400; APJs MacDonald (author), Morgan, McMillin. The claimed invention was a computer system that supported setting of a destination address of an email. Concerning Section 101, the Board found no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11, which recited “computer usable storage medium.” The recited term was not claimed as non-transitory, and the Specification did not expressly and unambiguously limit that medium to solely non-transitory forms via a definition or similar limiting language. Further, the Board rejected the Appellants’ argument that numerous Board decisions had allowed the patenting of “computer usable storage medium.” The intellectual property industry had established a broader meaning for the claim term “computer readable storage medium” in the area of computer related patent claims so as to encompass transitory media such as signals or carrier waves. A full discussion of this broader meaning was set forth in Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 2013 WL 4477509 (PTAB 2013) (precedential).
Ex Parte Akiyama et al; 3/17/2015; TC 2100; APJs Courtenay, Dang (author), Hume; Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to supporting creation of a search expression in an information search that employed a plurality of words as a key. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote directed the Examiner’s attention, in the event of further prosecution, to whether the claims were patent-eligible in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent-eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014. Abstract ideas had been identified by the courts by way of example, including fundamental economic practices, certain methods of organizing human activities, an idea “of itself,” and mathematical relationships and formulas. The claims on appeal appeared to be merely directed to displaying data in various forms, even though several of Appellants’ claims nominally recited otherwise an “apparatus” configured for performing such display method.
Ex Parte Mushkat et al; 3/17/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting, Kim (author), Medlock. The claimed invention related generally to “customer interactions, and more particularly to customer experiences relating to such interactions.” Concerning Section 101, the Board said, upon any further prosecution, that the Examiner might wish to review independent claims 1, 20, and 21 as related to non-patentable subject matter. See “2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,” 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), which supplements the “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Foss; 3/16/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting (author), Hoffmann, Hoskins; Possible real party in interest, Intuit. The claimed invention was a way of processing a payment from a payor. Concerning Section 101, the Board said, in the event of further prosecution, that the Examiner might wish to review the claims for compliance under that section in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Squillante; 3/13/2015; TC 2100; APJs MacDonald, Morgan, Lentivech (author). The claimed invention related to an electronic searchable directory of products and services. Concerning Section 101, the Board said that the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, might want to review the claims for compliance under that section in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Apostolopoulos et al; 3/13/2015; TC 2400; APJs Saadat, Nappi, Chung (opinion per curiam); Real party in interest, Hewlett-Packard Development Company. The claimed invention related to optimizing portions of data streams at a transcoding node. In a footnote, the Board invited the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, to consider the claims for their compliance with the statutory subject matter requirements under Section 101 in view of the guidelines discussed in David J. Kappos, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010) and In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 135657 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Ex Parte Peter et al; 3/13/2015; TC 2100; APJs Homere, Kumar, Fishman (author). The claimed invention related to attachment-based mass data input and output for a distributed application system. Concerning Section 101, the Board entered a new ground of rejection for claims 1-14. Independent claims 1 and 12 recited a “machine-readable storage medium.” The Specification was silent as regards defining “machine-readable storage medium.” Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of “machine-readable storage medium” encompassed a transitory, propagating signal and, therefore, claims 1 and 12 and their dependent claims were directed towards non-statutory subject.
Ex Parte Reynolds et al; 3/11/2015; TC 2400; APJs Fetting, Mohanty (author), Medlock; Possible real party in interest, Hewlett-Packard Company. The claimed invention was directed to systems and methods for inferring casual paths from messages communicated between nodes in a distributed computing environment. Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–27 and 51–60. In claim 1, the recited method steps could be performed essentially in a series of mere mental steps. That is, claim 1 recited a mental process, which was patent-ineligible subject matter. None of the elements of the claim, individually or as an ordered combination, transformed the claim into patent-eligible subject matter. Claim 51 and claim 55 similarly recited method steps, for example, estimating an average causal delay, or standard delay, between nodes, that could be performed in a series of mere mental steps. Further, in both of claims 51 and 55, none of the elements of either respective claim, individually or as an ordered combination, transformed the claim into patent-eligible subject matter.
Ex Parte Gibbens; 3/9/2015; TC 2400; APJs MacDonald (author), Krivak, Horvath. The claimed invention was a method comprising the step of adjusting a validity interval of a key for decrypting content in accordance with a time difference between a secure time value and a current time value. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-4. The Appellant had attempted to demonstrate that claim 1 passed muster under the transformation branch of a machine-or-transformation based analysis. The Board, however, noted that “transformation” did not include mere transformation of information. There had to be transformation of an “article,” and information was not an article. “To qualify as a manufacture, the invention must be a tangible article that is given a new form, quality, property, or combination through man-made or artificial means.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014), (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
Ex Parte McMahan et al; 3/6/2015; TC 2400; APJs Crawford, Fetting, Kim (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related generally to a form multiplexer for a portal environment and method and system for handling or managing submission of inputs from multiple portlets of a portal page. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 16 and 18–20. The Board was unpersuaded that there was a substantive difference between the recited “computer usable storage medium” and the “computer usable or computer readable medium” set forth in the cited portions of the Specification. How a medium could be usable or readable by computer if it was not capable of storage was unclear. Given this, the cited portions of the Specification injected ambiguity as to the metes and bounds of “computer usable storage medium.” For example, the Specification disclosed “an entirely software embodiment,” which would encompass non-statutory signals. Furthermore, the Specification disclosed that the medium could be “paper,” and that the disclosed list of media was “non-exhaustive,” which would lead one of ordinary skill to believe that the recited medium was extremely broad, and thus could encompass non-statutory signals.
Ex Parte Bridges et al; 3/3/2015; TC 2100; APJs Courtenay, Dang, Hume (author); Real party in interest, Lockheed Martin Corp. The claimed invention related to a method and apparatus that provided dynamic refinement of geospecificity of geospatial content in geographic information systems. Concerning Section 101, in a footnoted the Board invited the Examiner’s attention to claims 9-16 and 25-30, which variously recited a “computer-readable program storage medium” that appeared to encompass patent-ineligible transitory media such as signals or carrier waves. Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857 (PTAB 2013) (precedential). Moreover, the body of claim 26 merely recited an arrangement of data (that is, a data structure per se) encoded on a medium. Non-functional descriptive material referred to data content that did not exhibit a functional interrelationship with the substrate and did not affect the way the computing processes were performed. See MPEP 2601.01. Because the data elements recited in the body of claim 26 were not positively recited as executable code, or as data structures that exhibited any functional relationship with the claimed substrate (storage medium), the “at least one data layer; and a ground control layer” appeared to be non-functional descriptive material (a data structure per se) that represented a non-statutory abstract idea. For example, the broad scope of claim 26 would appear to cover a GPS-encoded (that is, ground control layer) digital photograph (data layer image) stored on a disk. Merely storing a photograph on a disk (medium) did transform the content of the photograph such that it fell under the subject matter of a utility patent. Such subject matter content properly fell under existing copyright law, assuming the photograph was fixed and original.
Ex Parte Dressler et al; 3/3/2015; TC 2600; APJs Whitehead, Smith, Jurgovan (author); Real party in interest, Polaris Wireless, Inc., and Demont & Breyer LLC. The claimed invention was directed to efficient deployment of mobile test units to gather location-dependent radio-frequency data. Concerning Section 101, the Board agreed with the Examiner that claims 1-44 recited economic cost-benefit analyses, which were mental processes. Thus the claims were directed to abstract ideas. Computerizing cost-benefit analysis in this instance did not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea itself.
Ex Parte Fitt; 3/2/2015; TC 2100; APJs Horvath, Saadat, Evans (author). The claimed invention was directed to a system and method for creating an index structure for spatial data. The Board entered a new ground of rejection under Section 101 for claims 1-17. Claims 1–6 and 12–17 were directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea, and claims 7–11 were directed to a patent-ineligible mathematical object that was not a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
Claims 1 and 5 were directed to a method of creating a mathematical graph (that is, a network of nodes and edges) that represented a product structure (claim 1) or an unconfigured structure (claim 5). The nodes of the graph represented the components of the structure and their geometric bounds, while the edges of the graph represented connections between components and how the geometric bounds were propagated from one component to another. The claims were thus directed to the abstract idea of creating a mathematical graph to represent a structure as a geometric dependency network and did not recite any limitations that went beyond those required to implement the abstract idea.
Claims 12, 13, and 17 were directed to computer and data processing systems for creating a mathematical graph to represent an unconfigured structure as a geometric dependency network. They thus limited the abstract idea recited in claims 1–6 to a method performed on a computer system that included a memory, processor, input device and display (claims 12 and 13) or a data processing system that included a memory and processor. They were no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recited the abstract idea. The system claims recited a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. The mere recitation of a generic computer could not transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S.Ct. at 2360, 2358.
Claims 14–16 were directed to a data management system that included a geometric model having a plurality of geometric model objects, a list of corresponding data model objects that defined a product structure, and a spatial index that supported queries on the list of data model objects. The geometric model could be a mathematical graph (network of nodes and edges) in the form of a geometric dependency network that described the geometric use or containment of the geometric model. Thus the claims were directed to an abstract idea. Moreover, the claims did not recite any limitations that went beyond the abstract idea of a system that linked objects in a geometric model with objects in a data model. In fact, the claims did not even limit the recited geometric or data model objects or the spatial index correlating the geometric and data model objects to particular physical or tangible things, such as instantiations in a computer or computer readable memory. Thus, the claims were broad enough to read on a person’s thoughts as the person pondered relationships (that is, a spatial index) correlating objects in a mentally constructed geometric model with objects in a mentally constructed data model defining a product. The limitations recited in claims 14–16 did not limit the claims to a particular application of the abstract idea of a system that linked objects in a geometric model with objects in a data model. Claims 14–16 were thus directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
Claims 7–11 were patent-ineligible because they were not directed to anything that existed in a physical or tangible form. Rather, claims 7–11 were directed to a spatial index—that is, to a collection of information about a product structure that was represented in a mathematical graph having nodes and edges. Each node of the graph was provided with a geometric bound. The geometric bounds were accumulated by propagation from node to node along the edges of the graph, and could be simplified at each node. A data model, corresponding to the product structure, was matched to or allied with the nodes of the graph. The product structure could be unconfigured—that is, not completely specified. The mathematical graph (referred to as a network of nodes and edges) could represent the geometric dependency of the product structure—that is, it could describe the geometry or geometric containment of the product structure. The claims had no recited limitation that limited the spatial index to a physical or tangible thing. The spatial index could simply be an idea formulated in someone’s mind—that is, an entirely mental construct. Consequently, claims 7–11 failed to recite a statutory category of patent-eligible subject matter. See, Digitech Image Tech. 758 F.3d at 1349–1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Ex Parte Velusamy; 3/2/2015; TC 2400; APJs Strauss (author), Shiang, Chung; Real party in interest, Verizon Business Global, LLC, and Cellco Partnership. The claimed invention was directed to providing user control of video views. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote observed that claims 10 and 23 were directed to a “computer-readable storage medium.” Rather than excluding transitory media, however, the Specification disclosed “‘computer-readable medium’ as used herein refers to any medium that participates in providing instructions to the processor. . .for execution” including “transmission media.” Consequently, the claimed computer-readable storage medium encompassed transitory media, which was not patent eligible. In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner should consider a Section 101 rejection of claims 10 and 23 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Ex Parte Moore et al; 3/2/2015; TC 2400; APJs Whitehead, Winsor, Kaiser. This was a decision on request for rehearing. The Appellants’ request for rehearing was limited to the Board’s affirmance of the Examiner’s Section 101 rejection of claims 12 and 14–19 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Specifically, the Appellants contended that the Board misapprehended or overlooked its obligation to review claims 12 and 14–19 as amended to recite a “storage medium.” The Board declined to change the decision, saying that the matter had been fully addressed in the decision. The claims as amended had not been examined or rejected. Because in ex parte appeals, the Board reviews rejections made by patent examiners, Ex parte Gambogi, 62 USPQ2d 1209, 1211 (BPAI 2001), the Board declined to review claims not so examined or rejected, as in this instance.
Ex Parte Fair; 2/27/2015; TC 2100; APJs Krivak (author), Smith, Kumar. The claimed invention was directed to efficiently calculating storage required to split a clone volume from a parent volume. In a footnote, the Board suggested that the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, might want to review independent claims 1, 10, and 19 under Section 101 as related to non-patentable subject matter. The most recent Office guidance on Section 101 was found at “2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,” 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), which supplemented the “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014. Also, claim 10 included a computer readable storage medium that was not limited to a non-transitory medium.
Ex Parte Fritsch et al; 2/27/2015; TC 2100; APJs Courtenay, Dang, Hume (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention addressed deficiencies of the art in respect to software license management and provided a method, system, and computer program product for authorizing customer managed software installation. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote observed that the Examiner had withdrawn the rejection of claims 8–13 under Section 101. The Board invited the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, to re-review those claims for compliance with the statutory subject matter requirements of Section 101 in light of the precedential decision in Mewherter to ensure that a “computer program product comprising a computer usable storage medium” was drawn to statutory subject matter. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1862 (PTAB 2013) (precedential).
Ex Parte Brodeur et al; 2/27/2015; TC 2100; APJs Courtenay (author), Dang, Hume; Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to Service Component Architecture (SCA), and more particularly to apparatus and methods for analyzing and resolving SCA runtime errors in process servers, such as WebSphere Process Server. Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19-24. The recited “computer-readable storage device” of those claims was not claimed as non-transitory, and the Specification did not expressly and unambiguously disclaim transitory forms such as propagating signals via a definition or disclaimer. In addition, the Board in a footnote observed that the steps or acts of method claim 1 appeared to be capable of being performed as mental steps by a person, with the aid of pen and paper. See Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In the event of further prosecution of the application, and to the extent the claims were directed to an abstract idea, the Examiner might want to review all the claims for compliance under Section 101 in light of the recently issued 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility. “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Poisson; 2/26/2015; TC 3700; APJs Astorino (author), Medlock, Murphy. The claimed invention was a method for playing a card game that simulated a game of football with kibitz and side bet options. The Examiner had rejected claims 1-20. The Examiner had concluded that the invention was an attempt to claim a new set of rules for playing a card game, which the Examiner opined was an abstract idea and thus not patentable. The Board disagreed, applying the two step procedure of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014), but only getting to the first step. The Board did not agree that claim 1 was directed to “a new set of rules for playing a card game.” Indeed, inasmuch as the rules governing football games were old and well-known, it was more accurate to find the rules used in the claimed invention–which simulated a football game–likewise old and well-known, notwithstanding that the rules were implemented using a table and two decks of cards. In the Board's view, claim 1 was directed to the playing of a football game, using a table and cards, with kibitzing and betting features, that is, a simulation of a football game using a table and cards. Thus, in the first step of the Alice analysis, the question was whether claim 1, that is, as a simulation of a football game using a table and cards, was directed to an abstract idea. That determination had not been made in this case based on evidence. Instead, the Examiner merely expressed an opinion that “a set of rules qualifies as an abstract idea.” Thus a prima facie case of patent-ineligible subject matter had not been established.
Ex Parte Madnani et al; 2/25/2015; TC 2100; APJs Krivak, Whitehead, Fink. The claimed invention appeared to concern data recovery and non-disruptive data migration. In a footnote, the Board observed that independent claim 15 recited a “computer program product comprising: a computer-useable medium . . . .” In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner might want to consider whether the claimed “computer program product comprising: a computer-useable medium” could be broadly, but reasonably, construed to encompass both non-transitory tangible media and transitory propagating signals, the latter constituting non-statutory subject matter. See David J. Kappos, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010).
Ex Parte Moore; 2/25/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting, Hoffmann, Bayat (author); Real party in interest, Genbook, Inc. The claimed invention related to an online booking method for managing bookings for a plurality of service providers. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-22. The Board applied the two-step procedure of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014). Claim 1 was drawn to a method of “providing booking services” and included the steps of providing a booking engine, providing service provider entries and corresponding booking links, hosting service provider interfaces, receiving a booking request, and using the booking request to access a corresponding booking interface. Similar to Alice, the concept of booking––the practice of making reservations––was a well-known economic practice long prevalent in commerce. An arrangement whereby something was booked or reserved in advance provided assurances to the consumer and the service provider. Thus, booking, like the concept of intermediated settlement, was an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of Section 101. As for the second step, the inventive concept, claim 1 merely suggested the use of a computer by utilizing an interface or link. The introduction of a generic element, such as a computer (server) or storage medium, into a method, apparatus, or article claim, was insufficient to transform a patent-ineligible claim into one that was patent-eligible. In addition, the claim steps did not recite a specialized algorithm that could move the claims from the abstract to the concrete, and simply executing an abstract concept on a computer did not render a computer “specialized.” Further, the recited claim limitations both individually and as an ordered combination failed to transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. Therefore, independent claim 1 did not recite any limitation that, in practical terms, limited the scope of the claim so it did not fully cover the abstract idea itself.
Ex Parte Rochman; 2/25/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fischetti (author), Medlock, Worth. The claimed invention was a sales system and method that encouraged sales through the provision of incentives. Concerning Section 101, the Examiner had rejected claims 1, 7, 11, and 43-46. The Board, applying the two-step procedure of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), affirmed the rejections. In the first step of the Alice analysis, the Board concluded that the claims were drawn to the abstract idea of rewarding the lowest bidder in an auction. Like the risk hedging in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 393 (2010), the concept of conferring an award to a winning bidder in an auction was a fundamental practice of the competitive bidding process. Thus, the idea of an awards-based competitive bidding process was, like hedging, an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of §101. In the second step of the Alice analysis, the Board found that the claim recitation of “a computer implemented disparate incentivization method for online auctions” did not transform the abstract idea of an award based bidding program into a patent-eligible invention. The recitation of a computer in the claims appeared only in the preamble and was not incorporated in the body of the claims. Thus the recitation did not constitute a positive limitation of the computer. Even if the computer were positively recited in the claims, the mere addition of having a computer perform the steps did not add any meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the abstract method to a general purpose computer.
Ex Parte Hartley et al; 2/24/2015; TC 2100; APJs Homere, Fishman (author), Shiang. The claimed invention related to “business process servers (especially business process servers implemented with Service Oriented Architecture, or ‘SOA’), enterprise models, enterprise meta models and enterprise databases.” The invention provided for “an information meta model and a process model, where automated tools are used to maintain some degree of equivalence and/or synchronization between the two models.” Concerning Section 101, in a footnote the Board suggested that should there be further prosecution the Examiner might want to review the claims for compliance under 35 U.S.C. §101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Salle et al; 2/23/2015; TC 2100; APJs Weinberg, Bui (author), Fishman; Real party in interest, Hewlett-Packard Company. The claimed invention related to management of service models for delivery and support of information technology (IT) services to meet business processes and/or requirements of an organization, including transforming a functional representation of a service model into a corresponding structural service capable of being implemented. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote suggest that, in the event of further prosecution, the Examiner evaluate claims 1–19 for compliance with Section 101 in view of Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010), Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014), and the recently issued “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014 (“post-Alice guidance”).
Ex Parte Muller et al; 2/23/2015; TC 3600; APJs Fetting (author), Kim, Medlock. The claimed invention was a “ method, system and computer program product for live intention management in a computer communications network.” Concerning Section 101, the Board found the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-10 was proper. The Board applied the two-step test of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Intl., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). First, the claims were directed to the abstract concept of managing intent. Intention per se, being a precursor thought, was the epitome of abstraction. Managing that thought, even by displaying it, was yet more thought with some visual representation, as in doodling. Second, the introduction of a computer did not add enough to create patent eligibility. The claims at issue amounted to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of managing intent using some unspecified, generic graphical interface.
Ex Parte Dawson et al; 2/18/2015; TC 3700; APJs Staicovici, Hoelter, Smegal (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention was a method for customizing a wait state experience for a user represented by an avatar in a virtual universe. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner's rejection of claim 16. Although the Specification described various forms of machine-readable devices, such as floppy disks, CDs, flash drives, and memory modules, it also described “another embodiment option of the present invention” that incorporated “wireless . . . electro-optical, and optical signaling systems.” Thus, the Specification discussed employing non−statutory subject matter such as signals. Including the terms “tangible” and “device” in claim 16 did not remedy this issue.
Ex Parte Acker et al; 2/18/2015; TC 2100; APJs Whitehead (author), Smith, Fishman. The claimed invention was directed to a multi-document editor system that had a repository for storing a plurality of documents having code fragments. Regarding Section 101, the Board in a footnote suggested that the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, review claims 15–19 for compliance under Section 101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Haslam; 2/13/2015; TC 2400; APJs Courtenay (author), Dang, Hume; Possible real party in interest, AT&T. The claimed invention pertained to providing podcast content, “wherein the podcast content is categorized into various topics, and the podcast file includes podcast content of a particular topic.” Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote stated that although claim 1 nominally recited generic computer hardware (a remote server, storage, and a processor), the Appellant’s arguments urging patentability focused solely on the informational content of the claimed “podcast content,” which the Board concluded broadly covered speech and/or music. In the event of further prosecution of the application, the Board suggested that the Examiner review all the claims for compliance under 35 U.S.C. §101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Naik; 2/13/2015; TC 2100; APJs Courtenay (author), Dang, Hume. The claimed invention related to “business methods, and in particular to a set of processes enabled by means of information technology products and services to capture, define, relate, structure, collect, score, display, and navigate context, ideas and reasoning relationships within and across online textual content.” Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote observed that the invention on appeal related “to business methods” and was further described as being “useful in evaluating topics of  online textual content including [inter alia] philosophy, ethics, religion; business content such as investment advice, industry information, company information and economics ... personal growth content such as motivational and ‘self-betterment’ information; business news; general news ... mathematics content; arts content; culture content; and sports content.” In the event of further prosecution of the application, and to the extent the Appellant’s claims were directed to an abstract idea, the Board suggested that the Examiner review all the claims for compliance under 35 U.S.C. §101 in light of the recently issued 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter. See "Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.," Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Faynberg et al; 2/12/2015; TC 2400; APJs Moore, Baumeister, Curcuri (author). The claimed invention related to “authenticated user-access to Kerberos-enabled applications based on an Authentication and Key Agreement mechanism.” Concerning Section 101, the Board agreed with the Examiner that the recited tangible machine readable recordable storage medium encompassed transitory media. The Specification did not limit the storage to non-transitory forms.
Ex Parte Zhao et al; 2/11/2015; TC 2600; APJs Homere, Fishman, Shiang (author). The invention was not described in the Board’s decision. Concerning Section 101, the Board in a footnote noted that claim 19 recited a computer-readable storage medium. In the event of further prosecution, the Board recommend that the Examiner determine whether claim 19 and corresponding dependent claims encompassed transitory media and therefore, non-statutory subject matter. See Ex parte Mewherter, Appeal No. 2012-007692 (PTAB May 08, 2013) (precedential-in-part).
Ex Parte Hartmann et al; 2/10/2015; TC 3700; APJs Fredman (author), Paulraj, Pollock; Real party in interest, Medela Holding AG. The claimed invention involved claims to a method of rapidly determining milk production capacity of a nursing mother. Concerning Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claim 27. The Board applied the analytical framework of the recently revised USPTO utility guidelines, which are consistent with the Mayo and Alice decisions (79 Fed. Reg. 74622 (Dec. 16, 2014). The guidelines provide that after a determination is made as to what the invention is, a further determination is made as to whether a claim is directed to a judicial exception to patentability. Such a judicial exception to patentability occurs when the claim recites a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea. If a judicial exception to patentability is involved, Examiners are to “[d]etermine whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception.” Limitations not found to be enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim with a judicial exception to patentability include simply appending well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. A claim requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry was such a limitation.
Claim 27 set forth a “law of nature” or “abstract idea,” namely, the relationship between the volume of milk expressed by a woman in a pumping session and the time interval between pumping sessions, in order to identify optimal time intervals for pumping sessions to maximize intervals and milk production. While it took a human action (measuring and calculating the amount of milk expressed in several pumping sessions) to trigger a manifestation of this relation in a particular person, the relation itself existed in principle apart from any human action. The relation was a consequence of the way in which mammary tissue produced milk, an entirely natural process. As the Specification itself explained, “the underlying rate of milk production from the third to seventh pumping represented the intrinsic synthetic (production) capacity of the breast.” It was this intrinsic production capacity that was being addressed in claim 27, and therefore claim 27, which described that relation, simply set forth a natural law.
The issue then became “do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?” The single step in claim 27 was “administering an expression protocol,” which step referred to informing a woman of the optimal time intervals that she should use for pumping milk in order to optimize the volume of milk produced. Methods for determining optimal time intervals for the pumping of milk were already known in the art, and the process at issue amounted to nothing more than an instruction to the physician to explain the applicable natural law regarding time intervals for optimal milk expression to nursing mothers. “Wherein” clauses in claim 27 simply functioned to limit the analysis to third and later pumping sessions, which were the precise sessions identified by the Specification as providing “the intrinsic synthetic (production) capacity of the breast” versus the fuller or enlarged capacity present in the first or second sessions. Therefore, these “wherein” clauses reinforced the conclusion that claim 27 applied to calculation of the intrinsic milk production of a breast, an unpatentable natural correlation.
In addition to affirming the Examiner’s rejection of claim 27 under Section 101, the Board entered a new ground of rejection of claims 1–10, 12, and 20–24 under Section 101. Claim 1 differed from claim 27 in reciting the use of a breast-pump in the “measuring” and “administering” stages. The inclusion of a breast-pump into independent claims 1, 10, and 20 did not make patent eligible a “law of nature” or “abstract idea,” namely, the intrinsic relationship between the volume of milk produced by a woman in a time period and expressed in a pumping session and the optimal time interval between pumping sessions. The use of a breast-pump did not impart a meaningful limitation to the claimed invention, as it was merely a well-known prior art device used to express milk (the alternative being nursing by the baby).
Ex Parte Karnik; 2/6/2015; TC 2400; APJs Courtenay, Dang, Hume (author); Real party in interest, General Motors, Inc. The claimed invention related to methods that adaptively verified data in resource constrained systems by employing an adaptive verification mode to balance cost, performance, and security requirements. Concerning Section 101, the Board observed in a footnote that all the steps of at least claim 1 could be performed as mental steps by a person who received (hears and/or sees) a message “at a receiver device” (e.g., a person listening to a radio or viewing a television message). In the event of further prosecution of the application, the Examiner might want to review all the claims for compliance under 35 U.S.C. §101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014. Although the Board was authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. §41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elected not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) 1213.02.
Ex Parte Chang et al; 2/3/2015; TC 2400; APJs Morgan, Strauss, Silverman (author); Real party in interest, AT&T Intellectual Property I, LP. The claimed invention related to methods and apparatus for communicating through a multi-fidelity gateway. Concerning Section 101, the Board reversed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 40-43. The claims expressly recited and were thereby limited to “[an] article of manufacture.” Because the claimed invention was directed to an article of manufacture, the claimed invention did not encompass transitory media. The Examiner had viewed the claims as encompassing transitory media.
Ex Parte Wong; 2/2/2015; TC 3700; APJs Kerins, Browne, Warner (author); Real party in interest, Gamelot, Inc. The claimed invention related to a method of playing a poker game. The Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-13 under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. Applying the two-step process of Alice (Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), the Board first concluded that the claims were directed to a set of rules for playing a poker game, which constituted a patent-ineligible abstract idea. And providing a deck of cards as set forth in the claims, taken individually or as an ordered combination, was merely a necessary step in playing the game. It constituted, pre- or post-, extra-solution activity, and did not add enough to the claims to transform the recited methods into patent-eligible subject matter.
Ex Parte Grems et al; 1/30/2015; TC 2100; APJs Barrett, Lee (author), Barrett, Ken, and Whitehead. The claimed invention related to a computer method, apparatus, and system to support an Engineering Review Process (ERP) for an enterprise program. Concerning Section 101, the Board entered a new rejection for claims 1, 2, 6-14, and 17-21 as encompassing an abstract idea without significantly more. The abstract idea was representing an engineering problem as a database entity called an “engineering item,” which included the information of (a) a description of the engineering problem, (b) an engineering team, and (c) an action item. A database entity per se was an abstract idea comprising nothing more than an abstract collection of information with no physical form and did not fit within any statutory category. As for the second element of the Alice analysis, neither the step of using a computer processor defining an abstract collection of data nor the step of using the computer processor “supporting managing by a review board” transformed the nature of the claim into patent-eligible subject matter.
Ex Parte Kaiser et al; 1/30/2015; TC 3600; APJs Crawford (author), Fischetti, Worth. Possible real party in interest, Caterpillar. The claimed invention was a method for managing a plurality of processes associated with a supply chain network using a computer. Concerning Section 101, the Board reversed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15-16 and 20-26. The Board agreed with the Appellants that because the claims were drawn to “a non-transitory computer medium,” they were directed to more than software per se.
Ex Parte Martin et al; 1/30/2015; TC 2400; APJs Saadat, MacDonald (author), Nappi; Possible real party in interest, Sprint Communications Company. The claimed invention involved a method for accessing log file information for a web server, parsing and grouping the information, and calculating and storing web service performance metrics. Concerning Section 101, the Board issued new rejections for claims 19 and 20. Applying the first step of the framework of Mayo and Alice (Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)), the Board concluded that claims 19 and 20 were directed to the abstract idea of “data representing” seven web server performance metrics. And applying step two of the Mayo and Alice framework, the Board concluded that merely requiring generic “computer storage media” and “data structure” implementation failed to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Ex Parte Jania et al; 1/29/2015; TC 2400; APJs Weinberg, Fishman, McMillin (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to the field of email message delivery and, more specifically, to the field of email message rendering to a user. Regarding Section 101, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19 and 20. The use of the word “storage” to modify “medium” within the phrase “computer readable storage medium” did not eliminated the possibility that non-patentable transitory embodiments such as signals (signals per se) were included in the phrase’s coverage.
Ex Parte Hart; 1/29/2015; TC 2400; APJs Curcuri, McKeown (author), Branch; Real party in interest, Intuit, Inc. The claimed invention generally related to a system that improved security during web-browsing. More specifically, the system received a URL from the user and queried a DNS server for an IP address for the URL. The system determined a public-key associated with the URL and used the public-key to encrypt a string that was sent to a remote system. The system could receive a response from the remote system and determine whether the DNS server had been compromised. If it was determined that the DNS server had been compromised, the system alerted the user. Concerning Section 101, the Examiner had rejected claims 8-13 and 20-24. As the Appellant presented no arguments with respect to the rejections, the Board summarily affirmed them.
Ex Parte Liu et al; 1/29/2015; TC 2600; APJs Mercader, Nappi, Silverman (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to generating an anonymous graph of a network in which nodes represented identities and edges represented relationships and wherein privacy of the nodes was improved. Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-25. Independent claim 1 was directed to a mathematical method for producing a mathematical based graph, an abstract idea. The preamble of the claim included features such as computer-based method, processor, and computer storage medium, but these features were not set forth in the method steps. Moreover, the features were the type of generic elements insufficient to transform a patent-ineligible claim into one that was patent-eligible. In other words, the abstract claims contained insufficient inventive concept.
Ex Parte Paturu; 1/27/2015; TC 3600; APJs Lorin, Fischetti (author), Worth. The claimed invention was a method of scheduling, filing, and tracking anyone periodically administered a PAP test. Regarding Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 26-33 and 35-45. The claims were drawn to the abstract idea of logging names into a paper file and periodically scheduling targeted names for screening. The mere addition of having a computer perform certain steps did not add any meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the abstract method to a general purpose computer. The computer contribution was merely one that provided only a general target list from which the appointments were scheduled without automation.
Ex Parte Connell et al; 1/27/2015; TC 3600; APJs Crawford, Medlock, Bayat (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to a method and system for determining a restocking state of a product. Concerning Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11-16. As described in the Specification, the recited “computer-readable medium” could comprise information conveyed by a “modulated data signal,” which was a transitory, propagating signal that was not patentable subject matter.
Ex Parte Hyser et al; 1/27/2015; TC 2100; APJs Barrett (author), Whitehead, Weinberg; Possible real party in interest, Hewlett-Packard Company. The claimed invention was an automated placement of virtual machines on physical machines in a system. Plural layouts corresponding to different placements were considered, where one of the plural layouts was selected based on predefined criteria. The criteria could be a target quality-of-service level, loading criteria, balancing criteria, cooling criteria, power criteria, and other criteria. Parameters corresponding to the various criteria were measured or estimated and used to compute an indicator associated with a layout.
Concerning Section 101, the Board entered new rejections of claim 1-11 as directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Independent claim 1 did not recite doing any step with the selected layout that would take it out of the realm of an abstract idea. And merely reciting the use of a processor to perform the steps of computing, comparing, and selecting did not amount to additional elements sufficient to create patent-eligibility.
Ex Parte Haller; 1/27/2015; TC 3600; APJs Lorin, Fetting (author), Fischetti. The claimed invention was a way to create secure process execution environments. Concerning Section 101, the Board reversed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-10. The claims were directed to more than software per se because they recited a computer readable medium.
Ex Parte Asher et al; 1/26/2015; TC 3600; APJs Lorin (author), Mohanty, Wieder; Real party in interest, Cantor Index, LLC. The claimed invention was a method for establishing a wager. Concerning Section 101, the Board entered new rejections of claims 3-17, 19-33, and 35-51. The concept of gambling was a fundamental economic practice, and thus independent claim was directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. Moreover, there was no inventive concept. A set of calculations involving various values covering the range from 0 to 100, some of which were performed via a nominal use of a general purpose computer, as claimed, did not amount to a patent-eligible application of the concept of gambling. At most it was an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea of gambling to satisfy, for example, a “patron’s wagering needs or desires.” This did not add anything of significance to the abstract idea of gambling.
Ex Parte Kasriel; 1/23/2015; TC 2400; APJs Homere, Weinberg, McCartney (author). The claimed invention related to the field of computer networks, and in particular to a system and method that facilitated an analysis of the performance of sites on a network. Regarding Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 18, and 30 and their respective dependent claims. The Examiner had found that the appealed claims encompassed non-statutory subject matter because the claims were “directed to [a] program . . . [and] not limited to tangible embodiments since they do not claim physical articles or objects.” In its analysis, the Board noted that the Specification indicated the “system” recited in claim 1 was simply a toolbar integrated with a web browser: “These objects and others are achieved by providing an integration between a web-site performance system and a website navigation system. A user is provided a toolbar that is synchronized with a web-site navigation system, such as the Microsoft Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator browser systems. The toolbar provides an interface . . . .” (emphasis added).
And although claims 1 and 18 used the word “display” in various contexts, none of these uses limited claim 1 or claim 18 to a machine or physical structure. For example, claim 1 recited first and second “display components,” and both claim 1 and claim 18 recited a “browser display.” As admitted by the Appellant, the recited “display components” were parts of a web browser, and the Appellant’s drawings indicated that a “browser display” consisted of the entire web browser. Further, in citing a dictionary definition of “display,” the Appellant omitted a meaning of simply “visual information.” Thus, the word “display,” when given its broadest reasonable interpretation, encompassed simply visual information.
As for claim 30, the Appellant cited a definition that made clear claim 30 was not limited to a machine or physical structure. Claim 30 recited a “web-based service,” and the Appellant contended the definition of “web service” from a W3C Working Group established that a web service included parts of a machine. But that definition stated that a “web service” was “[a] software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network.” (emphasis added).) Accordingly, the term “web-based service” encompassed software.
Ex Parte Devins et al; 1/21/2015; TC 2400; APJs Saadat, Evans, Horvath (author). The claimed invention was directed to a method of communicating or transferring data between multiple peer processors in a system-on-chip (“SoC”) design verification environment. Regarding Section 101, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claim 35. The Examiner had found that the recited “computer usable storage medium” included signal transmission media. Neither portion of the Specification argued by the Appellants defined a “computer usable storage medium” or expressly limited the term’s meaning to statutory, non-transitory storage medium. An enumerated list in the Specification identifying different types of storage media—“such as a diskette, hard disk, CD-ROM, DVD-ROM or tape”—was open-ended and therefore did not limit storage media to non-transitory media.
Ex Parte Unz; 1/15/2015; TC 2100; APJs Whitehead (author), Smith, Fishman. The claimed invention was directed to “data processing” and “more specifically to methods of organizing and presenting digitized books and other content material on the Internet.” Concerning Section 101, the Board suggested, in the event of further prosecution, that the Examiner review claims 12-22 for compliance under Section 101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Card; 1/15/2015; TC 2100; APJs Morgan, Kumar, Haapala (author). The claimed invention was directed to a technique for controlled modification of a current time value. In a footnote, the Board noted that claim 10 recited “A computer-readable storage medium.” In the event of further prosecution of claim 10, the Board suggested that the Examiner ascertain whether such claim was directed to statutory subject matter under Section 101. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1862 (PTAB 2013) (precedential); David J. Kappos, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010).
Ex Parte Zhou et al; 1/14/2015; TC 2400; APJs Whitehead, Smith (author), Shiang; Probable real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention was a media streaming apparatus for processing encrypted media content for distribution among multiple computing devices. Without discussion, the Board sustained the Examiner’s rejection of claims 24-28 under Section 101.
Ex Parte Jagadeesan et al; 1/14/2015; TC 2600; APJs Krivak, Whitehead (author), Fishman. The claimed invention was directed to a “handoff of communication sessions between cellular and desktop telephones.” Concerning Section 101 the Board suggested, in the event of further prosecution, that the Examiner review claims 23-33 for compliance under Section 101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Emigh et al; 1/14/2015; TC 2400; APJs Crawford, Kim (author), Moore. The claimed invention related generally to improved techniques for electronic messaging. Concerning Section 101, the Board suggested, in the event of further prosecution, that the Examiner review the claims for compliance under Section 101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Biazetti et al; 1/12/2015; TC 2100; APJs Homere, Smith, Stephens (author). The claimed invention generally related to dynamic creation of policies that provided for high availability computing. Concerning Section 101, the Board agreed with the Examiner that the limitation “computer usable storage medium” in claim 8 appeared to cover transitory and non-transitory embodiments and thus encompassed non-statutory subject matter such as transitory propagating signals. The Board also suggested that the Examiner, in the event of further prosecution, review claims 1-7 for compliance under Section 101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Li et al; 1/9/2015; TC 2100; APJs Kumar, Strauss, Engels (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention was directed to a method for analyzing testing coverage of software modules to provide process coverage statistics. Concerning Section 101, the Board suggested, in the event of further prosecution, that the Examiner review the claims for compliance under Section 101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014.
Ex Parte Ting et al; 1/8/2015; TC 2400; APJs Hoff, Baumeister (concurring opinion), Pothier (author), Hoff; The claimed invention involved a user authentication technique for computer systems that selectively compares user-provided biometric authentication credentials to a subset of credentials. Concerning Section 101, the Board summarily sustained the Examiner’s rejections of claims 37-40, 42, 50, and 57 because the Appellants presented no arguments.
Ex Parte Ryan et al; 1/8/2015; TC 2400; APJs Krivak, Smith, Boudreau (author); Real party in interest, IBM. The claimed invention related to the field of electronic messaging and more particularly to processing meta-data for electronic messages in a messaging client. Concerning Section 101, the sustained the Examiner’s rejections of claims 11-16. The Board agreed that the term “computer readable storage medium” could include non-statutory subject matter. Neither the claims nor the Specification expressly limited the term to a non-transitory medium.
Ex Parte Nguyen; 1/8/2015; TC 3600; APJs Mohanty, Medlock (author), Hoffmann. The claimed invention related to the field of commercial transactions, and more specifically to management of commercial transactions. Concerning Section 101, the Board reversed Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-11 but sustained the Examiner’s rejections of claims 12-23. Claims 1-11 recited a “portal,” which the Examiner was not within any of the four classes of patentable subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter. The Board, however, said that as described in the Specification and recited in claim 1, a portal was a machine. The Specification stated that the portal included a transaction management portal engine, a management database, and a user interface, and provided functionalities for a point of access on the Web.
Regarding claims 12-23, the Board applied the two-step framework of Alice and Mayo (Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–97 (2012)). First, independent claim 12 was directed to the concept of conducting a commercial transaction involving the sale of a product or service. This was a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce, and was an abstract idea beyond the scope of Section 101. Second, the claim added nothing of substance to the abstract idea. Each step of the claimed method did no more than require a generic computer to perform a generic computer function.

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