Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/93889/a-g-spalding-bros-vs-edwards
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:17:39+00:00

Document:
Appellant A. G. Spalding and Bros.
1. A sale of goods made in this country to a commission merchant for a foreign consignee, for the sole purpose of export, and consummated only when the goods, addressed to the foreign consignee, are delivered by the vendor to the exporting carrier, is a step in their exportation, and, under Const., Art. I, § 9, cannot be taxed by the United States, even though the law under which the tax is imposed is a general one, not aimed specially at exports. P. 262 U. S. 67 .
2. Goods were started in exportation when so delivered to the carrier, notwithstanding the fact that the bill of lading was not issued until later, and notwithstanding the possibility that the commission merchant, holding the title might change his mind and divert them from their foreign destination. P. 262 U. S. 69 .
The fact that the law under which the tax was imposed was a general law touching all sales of the class, and not aimed specially at exports, would not help the defendant if, in this case, the tax was "laid on Articles exported from any state," because that is forbidden in terms by the Constitution. Article I, § 9. United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1 , 237 U. S. 18 ; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292 . Articles in course of transportation cannot be taxed. William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 , 247 U. S. 173 . So we return to the question that we have stated. To answer it with regard to any transaction, we have to fix a point at which, in view of the purpose of the Constitution, the export must be said to begin. As elsewhere in the law, there will be other points very near to it on the other side, so that, if the necessity of fixing one definitely is not remembered, any determination may seem arbitrary. In this case, for instance, while the goods were in process of manufacture, they were nonetheless subject to taxation if they were intended for export and made with specific reference to foreign wants. Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418 ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 . On the other hand no one would doubt that they were exempt after they had been loaded upon the vessel for Venezuela and the bill of lading issued. It seems to us that the facts recited are closer to the latter than to the former side, and that the export had begun.
so long as they were only the regular steps to the contemplated result. Getting the bill of lading stands no differently from putting the goods on board ship. Neither does it matter that the title was in Scholtz & Co. and that, theoretically, they might change their mind and retain the bats and balls for their own use. There was not the slightest probability of any such change, and it did not occur. The purchase by Scholtz & Co. was solely for the purpose of Delgado & Cia., and for their account and risk. Theoretical possibilities may be left out of account. In Railroad Commission of Louisiana v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 229 U. S. 336 , the consignees might have retained the goods at New Orleans instead of shipping them abroad. The fact that they came to New Orleans by rail from another place in the state made no difference. The same principle was applied in Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111 , 227 U. S. 123 . The overt act of delivering the goods to the carrier marks the point of distinction between this case and Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418 . To put it at any later point would fail to give to exports the liberal protection that hitherto they have received, of which an example may be seen in Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 237 U. S. 19 .

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