Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/164/1029/488765/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:28:12+00:00

Document:
William C. Hindenlang, a Chapter 7 debtor in bankruptcy, seeks to discharge certain federal tax liabilities under 11 U.S.C. § 727. The United States argues that Hindenlang falls under the exceptions to discharge provision in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1) (B), which prohibits discharge of taxes for which the debtor did not file a return. Here, Hindenlang filed Forms 1040 only after the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") had calculated its own assessment of Hindenlang's liability by its authority under 26 U.S.C. § 6201, after which Hindenlang's late-filed forms served no purpose under tax law, and therefore the United States argues that his Forms 1040 were no longer "returns" under § 523(a) (1) (B). The district court ruled in favor of Hindenlang. We hold that Hindenlang's Forms 1040 were not returns, and we therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court.
Finally, in 1993, two years after assessment, Hindenlang sent the IRS what was purported to be individual income tax returns for the years in question.2 Hindenlang used the proper Forms 1040, see 26 C.F.R. § 1.6012-1(a) (6), and calculated the taxes substantially the same as in the SFRs previously prepared by the IRS. Hindenlang still did not pay any of the deficiencies.
On January 22, 1996, Hindenlang filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. He then instituted an adversary proceeding seeking a bankruptcy court determination that the tax liability in question was dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).3 Both parties moved for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Hindenlang, and the district court affirmed. See United States v. Hindenlang (In re Hindenlang), 214 B.R. 847 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
Bankruptcy court orders granting summary judgment are final appealable orders and are reviewable by the district court. See Oakland Gin Co. v. Marlow (In re Julien Company), 44 F.3d 426, 428 (6th Cir. 1995). We have jurisdiction over bankruptcy appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), which authorizes appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of the district courts that reviewed bankruptcy court determinations pursuant to § 158(a).
The issue of whether Forms 1040 filed after the IRS has made an assessment can constitute returns for purposes of § 523(a) (1) (B) is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo. See Wesbanco Bank Barnesville v. Rafoth (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs.), 106 F.3d 1255, 1259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S. Ct. 65, 139 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1997). For purposes of summary judgment, this court must consider all the relevant facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether the movant must prevail as a matter of law. See General Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1097 (6th Cir. 1994). There are no material disputed fact issues in this case, so we proceed to the legal issue.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1) (emphasis added).
Under this provision, when a debtor files for bankruptcy, "tax on or measured by income or gross receipts" for the last three taxable years is not dischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a) (8) (A), 523(a) (1) (A). Furthermore, only taxes for which a return was filed more than two years before the petition for bankruptcy are dischargeable. See § 523(a) (1) (B) (ii). Finally, if "the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax," the tax is not dischargeable. See § 523(a) (1) (C).
This provision appears to serve two purposes. First, the requirement of a two-year waiting period after filing a late return but before seeking discharge prevents a debtor who has ignored the filing requirements of the Internal Revenue Code from waiting until the eve of bankruptcy, filing a delayed but standard tax return form, and seeking discharge the next day. It is, in a sense, a provision affording notice and an opportunity to act, giving the IRS time to seek payment by levy or court proceeding. Second, § 523 forbids discharge when the debtor has acted fraudulently or in a manner calculated to evade or defeat a tax. This corresponds with the notion that "good faith and candor are necessary prerequisites to obtaining a fresh start." Industrial Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
Hindenlang filed Forms 1040 for the years in question after the IRS had already made independent assessments of his tax liability. He waited the requisite two years required by § 523 before filing for bankruptcy. The government does not claim that the Forms 1040 were fraudulent in any respect. Finally, the government does not attempt to argue that the act of filing late Forms 1040, however delinquent, could be construed as an attempt to evade or defeat taxes due under § 523(a) (1) (C). The government's argument is that once a taxpayer has been assessed a deficiency, a Form 1040 submitted by the taxpayer to the IRS no longer qualifies as a return under § 523(a) (1) (B). We are left, therefore, with the threshold question of what constitutes a return under § 523(a) (1) (B) of the Bankruptcy Code.
See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-1(a), (b). Most individuals are required to file returns. See 26 U.S.C. § 6012. As the Supreme Court has stated, " [t]he purpose [of the return] is not alone to get tax information in some form but also to get it with such uniformity, completeness, and arrangement that the physical task of handling and verifying returns may be readily accomplished." Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 223, 64 S. Ct. 511, 88 L. Ed. 684 (1944). " [I]t is clear that the existing tax system could not function properly if the great majority of taxpayers did not report the correct amount of tax without the government's prior determination of tax liability." BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN, KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 201 (1995). Although the general view is that substantial compliance is sufficient to comply with the law, see BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS § 40.1 (1988), the Internal Revenue Code does not specifically set out how accurate, thorough, or complete the requisite form must be in order to qualify as a return under the many sections of the Code that reference a return. The Code also does not specify when a late tax form will no longer qualify as a return under the tax law.
This test was derived from two Supreme Court cases: Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 304, 60 S. Ct. 566, 84 L. Ed. 770 (1940), and Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172, 55 S. Ct. 127, 79 L. Ed. 264 (1934). In Germantown, the Court was asked to decide whether a fiduciary Form 1041 filed by the petitioner, that stated no tax was due, qualified as a return under § 275(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932. Id. at 306, 60 S. Ct. 566. The determination would control the onset of the limitations period for assessing a deficiency. Id. at 307, 60 S. Ct. 566. The Court held "that where a fiduciary, in good faith, makes what it deems the appropriate return, which discloses all of the data from which the tax ... can be computed," a proper return has been filed. Id. at 309, 60 S. Ct. 566. The Court in Zellerbach, also discussing the date at which the limitations period against the IRS begins to run for deficiency assessments, held that " [p]erfect accuracy or completeness is not necessary to rescue a return from nullity, if it purports to be a return, is sworn to as such, and evinces an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the law." 293 U.S. at 180, 55 S. Ct. 127.
The Tax Court, in Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 1984 WL 15573 (1984), aff'd, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986), combined the principles of Zellerbach and Germantown to arrive at the four-part test quoted above. See 82 T.C. at 777. A number of bankruptcy courts, and others, have since adopted or approved of this basic format. See, e.g., Billman v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Billman), 221 B.R. 281, 282 (Bankr.S.D. Fla. 1998); Pierchoski v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Pierchoski), ), 220 B.R. 20, 24-25 (Bankr.W.D. Pa. 1998); McGrath v. United States (In re McGrath), 217 B.R. 389, 392 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1997). See also 13 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 47.50 (1992) (citing Zellerbach and listing the same four-part test). Both parties in this case, and the district court below, applied the Beard test to define "return," and we will adopt it as the applicable test.
Hindenlang has not indicated any tax purpose under the Internal Revenue Code for filing his Forms 1040. Although filing a return commences a three-year statute of limitations on the Secretary's authority to enter an assessment, see 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a), a document purporting to be a return but filed after the assessment has already been made is too late to have any effect on this limitation. Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Code's ten-year limitation on the IRS's right to collect on the assessment through levy or judicial proceeding begins at the moment the assessment is made, regardless of whether a return was filed. See 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a) (1).
Hindenlang's purported return also would have failed to mitigate or absolve him from civil or criminal liability had the IRS sought to impose such liability. Willful failure to file a timely return is a misdemeanor under 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Late filing of a return or a document purporting to be a return does not remove this criminal liability. Failure to file a return without reasonable cause also subjects a delinquent taxpayer to a five-percent penalty per month up to a maximum of twenty-five percent of the taxes owed. See 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a) (1). Hindenlang filed his Forms 1040 with the IRS well past any time that would bring him under the twenty-five-percent maximum.
Under Hindenlang's theory, a person filing a Form 1040 after assessment would be better off in bankruptcy than someone who did not, even though the Form 1040 serves no tax purpose. Nothing in § 523(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code suggests that a document that does not qualify as a return under the Internal Revenue Code should nonetheless qualify as a return for purposes of bankruptcy discharge. Such a result would create an unjustifiable inconsistency in the law. We conclude that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1), which refers to tax returns that are required by the Internal Revenue Code to be filed, sought to encompass only those documents that would qualify as returns under the Internal Revenue Code.
We conclude that if a document purporting to be a tax return serves no purpose at all under the Internal Revenue Code, such a document cannot, as a matter of law, qualify as an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law.7 Therefore the document is not a "return" for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1) (B).

References: § 727
 § 523
 § 6201
 § 523
 § 1
 § 727
 v. 
 v. 
 § 158
 § 158
 § 523
 v. 
 v. 
 § 523
 § 523
 § 523
 § 523
 v. 
 § 523
 § 523
 § 523
 § 523
 § 1
 § 6012
 v. 
 § 201
 § 40
 v. 
 v. 
 § 275
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 47
 § 6501
 § 6502
 § 7203
 § 6651
 § 523
 § 523
 § 523