Source: http://ipmall.info/content/bpai-board-patent-appeals-and-interferences-patent-and-trademark-office-pto-1-verbruggen-v
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:31:55+00:00

Document:
The propriety of allowing Verbruggen to take testimony regarding the issue of Wells' support (35 USC 112, first paragraph) for his claims 11-36 corresponding to the count.
The burden falls upon Verbruggen to make out a prima facie case for the alleged lack of support. However, he has presented insufficient evidence, within the meaning of § 1.639(a), to make out such a case.
The Examiner-in-Chief also issued an order to show cause against Verbruggen under 37 CFR 1.640(d)(1) and (3).
*2 We do not agree with Wells that having failed in his preliminary motion to present the precise evidence now requested, Verbruggen is somehow estopped from now presenting it. The requirements for an appropriate preliminary motion are set forth at 37 CFR 1.637(a). Wells does not argue that the rule was not complied with. Rather he argues, "... Verbruggen's failure to comply with the rules, which is the basis for his losing on the preliminary motions, is insufficient to demonstrate 'good cause' for supporting his present Request." However, Wells does not set forth which rule(s) was (were) violated by Verbruggen. No reason has been set forth for suspecting that other than good faith was employed by Verbruggen in believing originally that such evidence as now requested was not required. Of course, Wells is correct to the extent he may be arguing that Verbruggen is prohibited from raising matters not specifically raised in his preliminary motion. Cf. Payet v. Swidler, 207 USPQ 168 at 171 (Bd.Pat.Int.1980).
... this two step procedure of presenting a motion a first time, losing for lack of evidence, and then being allowed to obtain such evidence to present the same motion a second time, is foreign to the entire purpose of the revised rules of interference practice, and especially § 1.639, which was to shorten, simplify and render less expensive final resolution of interference contests, again in response to critics of the interference practice. (Petition, pp. 16-17).
Verbruggen, in opposition to the position, notes that in his reply to Wells' opposition to Verbruggen's motion for testimony (Paper No. 33), he stated that he did not believe that additional testimony was necessary to support his preliminary motion. He asserts that he should not be prevented from now presenting evidence simply because he reasonably believed that it was unnecessary.
There does not appear to be any disagreement that noncompliance with § 1.639(c) would constitute a proper basis for denying a motion under § 1.651(c)(4). § 1.639(c) would be rendered a nullity if a party could withhold from the Examiner-in-Chief a description of testimony which the party believed necessary to support or oppose a motion under §§ 1.633 or 1.634 and then, if the motion were decided adversely to him, introduce such testimony during a testimony period set pursuant to § 1.651(c)(4). On the other hand, it should be noted that the fact that a party does not submit certain evidence in support of a preliminary motion under § 1.633 does not necessarily preclude him from presenting that evidence during a subsequent testimony period. Nabial v. May, 2 USPQ2d 1452 (BPAI 1986).
*3 Wells seems to construe the Board's decision, Paper No. 40, as holding that a bare assertion that testimony was not believed necessary would be sufficient in every case to comply with § 1.639(c). However, the decision does not appear to be so far reaching. As stated in the above quotation from Paper No. 40, the Board found no reason to suspect that Verbruggen's belief that testimony was unnecessary was not in good faith. The Board did not indicate that it would have granted Verbruggen's motion if the situation had been such that the necessity for testimony was so apparent that Verbruggen's belief could not have been in good faith.
As a practical matter, it does not appear that the "objective test" proposed by Wells and the test applied by the Board are substantially different. In finding no reason to suspect that Verbruggen's belief was not in good faith, the Board in effect found that it was not unreasonable for Verbruggen to believe that testimony was not necessary to support his preliminary motion. Such an approach to determining whether there was compliance with § 1.639(c) is considered correct, and no manifest error or abuse of discretion is found in the conclusion reached by the Board.
(1) The petition is from a decision of an examiner-in-chief or a panel and the examiner-in-chief or the panel shall be of the opinion (i) that the decision involves a controlling question of procedure or an interpretation of a rule as to which there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion and (ii) that an immediate decision on petition by the Commissioner may materially advance the ultimate termination of the interference.
FN2. § 1.651 Setting times for discovery and taking testimony, parties entitled to take testimony.
(4) A motion (§ 1.635) is filed showing good cause why a testimony period should be set.
FN3. § 1.639 Evidence in support of motion, opposition, or reply.
(c) When a party believes that testimony is necessary to support or oppose a preliminary motion under § 1.633 or a motion to correct inventorship under § 1.634, the party shall describe the nature of the testimony needed. If the examiner-in-chief finds that testimony is needed to decide the motion, the examiner-in-chief may grant appropriate interlocutory relief and enter an order authorizing the taking of testimony and deferring a decision on the motion to final hearing.

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