Source: http://www.emcglonelaw.com/blog/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:28:45+00:00

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Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde was famous for saying “You have to read the statutes.” Never was this so true as in the case of President Trumps “Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.” The White House has touted this order as fulfilling his campaign promise to crack down on sanctuary cities. It does no such thing.
The relevant provisions are Sections 8 and 9. Section 8 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to engage with state and local officials, “for the purpose of preparing to enter into agreements under section 287(g) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1357(g)).” 8 U.S.C. 1357(g) authorizes the Attorney General to enter agreements with state and local governments authorizing local law enforcement officers to assist in the enforcement of the immigration act. Significantly, states and cities cannot be forced to participate in this program; and sanctuary cities are unlikely to do so. 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)(9).
The heart of President Trump’s attack is Section 9 which establishes an executive branch policy of ensuring that state and local governments comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373. That statute bars governmental entities from prohibiting or restricting the communication of individual immigration status to or from the immigration service. The Executive Order goes on to grant the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security discretionary authority to restrict funding to jurisdictions that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373”. This is what is being described as defunding sanctuary cities.
It is important to keep in mind exactly the limited nature of 8 U.S.C. 1373. While it prohibits adoption of restrictions on the voluntary communication of immigration status information, it imposes no affirmative obligation on state or local governments. It does not require them to enforce immigration law. It does not require them to inquire into an individual’s immigration status. It does not require them to permit their employees to make such inquiries. Actions such as these do not amount to willful refusal to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 and provide no basis for the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security to exercise the discretionary granted by the President.
Most sanctuary provisions already comply with the narrow prohibitions of 8 U.S.C. 1373. For example, Oregon law prohibits the use of government resources to enforce the immigration law while providing an exception for immigration status requests. See: ORS 181A.820. If a sanctuary policy violates 8 U.S.C. 1373, it is easily revised to eliminate the offending provision while remaining true to the original intent of the designation. Considering this, the Trump administration will have little opportunity to flex this new policy.
When employers learn of threatening conduct by employees they often schedule a fitness for duty exam to determine if that employee presents an ongoing threat. May an employer still discipline for that past threatening conduct if the examiner concludes the employee is not a threat? The Ninth Circuit answered that question yes in yesterday’s opinion in Curley V. City of North Las Vegas.
In December 2008, Curley filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that the City had failed to accommodate his hearing impairment and that it was retaliating against him for having filed a prior charge of retaliation and race and age discrimination. The next month he requested a new accommodation for his hearing loss, which the City also rejected. Instead the City recommended that he use dual hearing protection. Shortly after this Curley responded inappropriately to a coworker’s request that Curly remove his hearing protection so they could talk about a work related task. The City placed Curly on leave and started an investigation into his behavior, which included a fitness for duty exam. While the examiner concluded that Curly was fit for duty and not a danger, the investigation found that Curley had repeatedly threatened coworkers, supervisors, and their families. This included threats of violence.
Employment litigators are advised to read footnote 3 to the opinion. In it Judge Friedland details when a plaintiff’s successful attack on one of an employers proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment action is sufficient to undermine all the employers reasons. In this case the court concluded that even if plaintiff’s attack on the past threat reason were successful, that argument did not undermine the remaining reasons offered by the employer, providing a second reason to affirm the District Courts ruling.
In less than two weeks the U.S. Supreme Court will again start holding oral arguments. One of the first cases up is a search and seizure case!
Below are cases accepted for review which may be of interest to government litigators and their clients. Each case is linked with its docket on the Scotus Blog, where you can access the briefs. If available, a link to the Legal Information Institute’s argument preview has also been provided.
Heien v. North Carolina – Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.
Holt v. Hobbs – Does a prison policy that restricts beards on inmates violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, LLC v. Owens – Whether a defendant seeking removal to federal court is required to include evidence supporting federal jurisdiction in the notice of removal.
T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, GA – Must a decision denying a request to place, construct, or modify a cell tower state the reasons for the denial, for a state or local government to satisfy the Communications Act’s “in writing” requirement.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona – whether a municipal sign ordinance, which differentiates between certain types of temporary noncommercial signs, is consistent with the First Amendment.
Mach Mining v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission – Whether and to what extent a court may enforce the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s mandatory duty to conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit.

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