Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/454/339/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:18:18+00:00

Document:
1. The Court of Appeals erred when, without first determining whether an inconsistent verdict would be unconstitutional, it directed the state trial judge to provide an explanation of the apparent inconsistency in his verdicts. Federal judges have no general supervisory power over state trial judges, and may not require the observance of any special procedures except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal Constitution.
2. An apparent inconsistency in a trial judge's verdict does not give rise to an inference of irregularity in his finding of guilt that is sufficiently strong to overcome the well established presumption that the judge adhered to basic rules of procedure. Here, even assuming that the codefendant's acquittal was logically inconsistent with respondent's conviction, respondent, who was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after a fair trial, has no constitutional ground to complain that his codefendant was acquitted.
Certiorari granted; 643 F.2d 86, reversed.
Each of the three intruders was indicted on five separate charges arising out of this one episode. [Footnote 1] They were tried jointly by a justice of the Supreme Court of New York sitting without a jury. The principal government witness was the victim Torres; Robinson was the only defense witness. If the judge had credited all of the testimony of Torres, presumably he would have found all three defendants guilty on all counts; acquittals presumably would have been rendered if the judge had credited all of Robinson's testimony. However, he found all defendants not guilty on three counts, acquitted Robinson on all counts, and convicted respondent and his wife of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, and burglary in the third degree. [Footnote 2] Respondent's convictions were affirmed on appeal. People v. Rivera, 57 App.Div.2d 738, 393 N.Y.S.2d 630, leave to appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 894, 366 N.E.2d 887 (1977).
"a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
stressed the unreviewable power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons. [Footnote 15] It is argued that a different rule should be applied to cases in which a judge is the factfinder.
Other explanations for an apparent inconsistency are far more likely. Most apparent is the likelihood that the judge's actual observation of everything that transpired in the courtroom created some doubt about the guilt of one defendant that he might or might not be able to articulate in a convincing manner. [Footnote 18] In this case, if the judge was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent and his wife were both guilty, it would be most unfortunate if a concern about the plausibility of a lingering doubt about Robinson should cause him to decide to convict all three rather than to try to articulate the basis for his doubt.
Even the unlikely possibility that the acquittal is the product of a lenity that judges are free to exercise at the time of sentencing, but generally are forbidden to exercise when ruling on guilt or innocence, would not create a constitutional violation. We are aware of nothing in the Federal Constitution that would prevent a State from empowering its judges to render verdicts of acquittal whenever they are convinced that no sentence should be imposed for reasons that are unrelated to guilt or innocence. The Constitution does not prohibit state judges from being excessively lenient.
They were indicted for robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, possession of a dangerous weapon, grand larceny in the third degree, and burglary in the second degree.
The grand larceny count was dismissed at the sentencing stage as a lesser included count within robbery in the second degree.
"The next argument set forth is directed at the sufficiency of the evidence presented in petitioner's state court criminal trial. Such an allegation is beyond the scope of federal habeas corpus review, and does not rise to the level of a constitutional infringement, United States ex rel. Nersesian v. Smith, 418 F.Supp. 26, 27 (SDNY 1976) unless 'there was no proof whatever of the crime charged.' United States ex rel. Terry v. Henderson, 426 F.2d 1125, 1131 (2d Cir.1972). I have reviewed the trial transcript. Any allegation that the trial record is devoid of evidence must be rejected, as are Petitioner's Points IV, VI, VII, and VIII, which, when liberally read, are variations on the claim of insufficiency of the evidence."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-12. The District Court's ruling predated this Court's decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979). The Court of Appeals held, however, that the insufficiency of the evidence claim is without merit even under the test of Jackson. 643 F.2d 86, 90, n. 2 (CA2 1981).
"when verdicts in a nonjury trial are facially inconsistent, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a conviction to stand unless the trial court demonstrates by appropriate findings that the conviction validly rests on a rational basis."
"For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court's judgment and remand with directions to enter an order conditionally vacating petitioner's conviction and awarding him a new trial unless the state trial court demonstrates by appropriate findings rendered within ninety days that petitioner's conviction is valid."
"If the state trial court makes findings purporting to demonstrate the validity of the conviction, petitioner may return to the District Court and renew his habeas corpus challenge to his conviction. At that point, the issue will be whether the state court conviction, considered in light of the acquittal of petitioner's codefendant and in light of the state trial court's findings, denies petitioner his liberty without due process of law."
Id. at 97-98 (footnote omitted).
"in prohibiting inconsistent bench trial verdicts, Maybury does not purport to rest on any provision of the Constitution, and may well have been decided solely in the exercise of the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice within this Circuit."
"To our knowledge, however, this is the first time that a habeas applicant has asked us to overturn a state conviction on the basis of the Maybury rule."
"Within such a unitary jurisdictional framework, the appellate court will, of course, require the trial court to conform to constitutional mandates, but it may likewise require it to follow procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice, although in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution. Thus, even substantial unanimity among federal courts of appeals that the instruction in question ought not to be given in United States district courts within their respective jurisdictions is not, without more, authority for declaring that the giving of the instruction makes a resulting conviction invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Before a federal court may overturn a conviction resulting from a state trial in which this instruction was used, it must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally condemned,' but that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment."
It is noteworthy that the Courts of Appeals are not in agreement that the Maybury holding is an appropriate exercise of the supervisory power over federal district courts. See, e.g., United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545 (CA8), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497, 434 U. S. 517 (1978) ("Review of any trial court decision is, of course, facilitated by findings and by an explanation of the reasons supporting the decision. No matter how desirable such procedural assistance may be, it is not constitutionally mandated in a case such as this").
See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 408 U. S. 489 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 418 U. S. 564-565 (1974).
Moreover, when other procedural safeguards have minimized the risk of unfairness, there is a diminished justification for requiring a judge to explain his rulings. See Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 452 U. S. 472 (1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Our holding that the risk of constitutional error inherent in facially inconsistent bench trial verdicts is not substantial, see discussion infra at 454 U. S. 345-348, undercuts the initial premise of the Court of Appeals' analysis of the question whether a state prisoner is constitutionally entitled to an explanation of such verdicts.
Accord, Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 418 U. S. 101 (1974). Cf. Hartzell v. United States, 322 U. S. 680, 322 U. S. 682, n. 3 (1944) (the trial court's setting aside of the conspiracy convictions of petitioner's only alleged coconspirators "makes it impossible to sustain the petitioner's conviction upon . . . the conspiracy count"); but cf. Standefer v. United States, 447 U. S. 10 (1980) (a defendant accused of aiding and abetting in the commission of a federal offense may be convicted after the named principal has been acquitted of that offense in a previous trial).
"Equally baseless is the claim of Dotterweich that, having failed to find the corporation guilty, the jury could not find him guilty. Whether the jury's verdict was the result of carelessness or compromise or a belief that the responsible individual should suffer the penalty instead of merely increasing, as it were, the cost of running the business of the corporation, is immaterial. Juries may indulge in precisely such motives or vagaries. Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390."
"'The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that, either in the acquittal or the conviction, the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.'"
"That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters."
284 U.S. at 284 U. S. 393-394.
See 643 F.2d at 94-95.
"[In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), the] Court concluded that"
"Id. at 372 U. S. 314-315. A silent record is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the state judge has committed constitutional error; the mere possibility of error is not enough to warrant habeas corpus relief."
In fact, the New York Supreme Court Justice who tried this case stated that he had a reasonable doubt as to Robinson's guilt. 643 F.2d at 90.
"The question whether the evidence is constitutionally sufficient is, of course, wholly unrelated to the question of how rationally the verdict was actually reached. Just as the standard announced today does not permit a court to make its own subjective determination of guilt or innocence, it does not require scrutiny of the reasoning process actually used by the factfinder -- if known."
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 319-320, n. 13.
"The strong interest in preserving the finality of judgments [citations omitted], as well as the interest in orderly trial procedure, must be overcome before collateral relief can be justified. For a collateral attack may be made many years after the conviction, when it may be impossible, as a practical matter, to conduct a retrial."
On remand from the federal habeas court, the state trial judge, if he is still on the bench, may not remember the criminal case, much less the reasons for convicting one codefendant but acquitting another. Confronted by defense counsel's assertion that the evidence of guilt was the same for both codefendants, he may well decide that he erroneously acquitted one codefendant; such a finding would have to satisfy the federal habeas court, but would hardly placate the habeas petitioner.
Moreover, by deciding cases summarily, without benefit of oral argument and full briefing, and often with only limited access to, and review of, the record, this Court runs a great risk of rendering erroneous or ill-advised decisions that may confuse the lower courts: there is no reason to believe that this Court is immune from making mistakes, particularly under these kinds of circumstances. As Justice Jackson so aptly put it, although in a somewhat different context: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 344 U. S. 540 (1953) (concurring in result). I believe that this Court should reserve its final imprimatur for those cases to which we give plenary review, after full briefing and argument.
This is not to say that I believe that summary disposition is never appropriate. In my view, however, this Court should utilize this practice with more caution than has been true in the recent past.

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