Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/23/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 11:56:40+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 539 › Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
some of New Line's Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them as its own. However, Dastar has instead taken a creative work in the public domain, copied it, made modifications (arguably minor), and produced its very own series of videotapes. If "origin" refers only to the manufacturer or producer of the physical "good" that is made available to the public (here, the videotapes), Dastar was the origin. If, however, "origin" includes the creator of the underlying work that Dastar copied, then someone else (perhaps Fox) was the origin of Dastar's product. At bottom, the Court must decide what § 43(a) means by the "origin" of "goods." Pp.28-31.
(b) Because Dastar was the "origin" of the physical products it sold as its own, respondents cannot prevail on their Lanham Act claim. As dictionary definitions affirm, the most natural understanding of the "origin" of "goods"-the source of wares-is the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace, here Dastar's Campaigns videotape. The phrase "origin of goods" in the Lanham Act is incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas that "goods" embody or contain. The consumer typically does not care about such origination, and § 43(a) should not be stretched to cover matters that are of no consequence to purchasers. Although purchasers do care about ideas or communications contained or embodied in a communicative product such as a video, giving the Lanham Act special application to such products would cause it to conflict with copyright law, which is precisely directed to that subject, and which grants the public the right to copy without attribution once a copyright has expired, e. g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230. Recognizing a § 43(a) cause of action here would render superfluous the provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act that grant an artistic work's author "the right ... to claim authorship," 17 U. S. C. § 106A(a)(1)(A), but carefully limit and focus that right, §§ 101, 106A(b), (d)(l), and (e). It would also pose serious practical problems. Finally, reading § 43(a) as creating a cause of action for, in effect, plagiarism would be hard to reconcile with, e. g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U. S. 205, 211. Pp.31-38.
David A. Gerber argued the cause for petitioner. him on the briefs were Stewart A. Baker, Bennett Cooper, and David Nimmer.
Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Mark S. Davies.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the International Trademark Association by Bruce R. Ewing; and for MalIa Pollack et al. by Ms. Pollack, pro se.
called Crusade in Europe, based on the book, and Time assigned its copyright in the series to Fox. The television series, consisting of 26 episodes, was first broadcast in 1949. It combined a soundtrack based on a narration of the book with film footage from the United States Army, Navy, and Coast Guard, the British Ministry of Information and War Office, the National Film Board of Canada, and unidentified "Newsreel Pool Cameramen." In 1975, Doubleday renewed the copyright on the book as the" 'proprietor of copyright in a work made for hire.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. Fox, however, did not renew the copyright on the Crusade television series, which expired in 1977, leaving the television series in the public domain.
beginning and retitled it as a "preview"; and removed references to and images of the book. Dastar created new packaging for its Campaigns series and (as already noted) a new title.
Dastar manufactured and sold the Campaigns video set as its own product. The advertising states: "Produced and Distributed by: Entertainment Distributing" (which is owned by Dastar), and makes no reference to the Crusade television series. Similarly, the screen credits state "DASTAR CORP presents" and "an ENTERTAINMENT DISTRIBUTING Production," and list as executive producer, producer, and associate producer employees of Dastar. Supp. App. 2-3, 30. The Campaigns videos themselves also make no reference to the Crusade television series, New Line's Crusade videotapes, or the book. Dastar sells its Campaigns videos to Sam's Club, Costco, Best Buy, and other retailers and mail-order companies for $25 per set, substantially less than New Line's video set.
1 Passing off (or palming off, as it is sometimes called) occurs when a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else's. See, e. g., O. & W Thum Co. v. Dickinson, 245 F.6d 9, 621 (CA6 1917). "Reverse passing off," as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else's goods or services as his own. See, e. g., Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168, 172 (CA3 1982).
resolution of the Lanham Act claim as controlling on the state-law unfair-competition claim because "the ultimate test under both is whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused," id., at 54a. The court awarded Dastar's profits to respondents and doubled them pursuant to § 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U. s. C. § 1117(a), to deter future infringing conduct by petitioner.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment for respondents on the Lanham Act claim, but reversed as to the copyright claim and remanded. 34 Fed. Appx. 312, 316 (2002). (It said nothing with regard to the state-law claim.) With respect to the Lanham Act claim, the Court of Appeals reasoned that "Dastar copied substantially the entire Crusade in Europe series created by Twentieth Century Fox, labeled the resulting product with a different name and marketed it without attribution to Fox[, and] therefore committed a 'bodily appropriation' of Fox's series." Id., at 314. It concluded that "Dastar's 'bodily appropriation' of Fox's original [television] series is sufficient to establish the reverse passing off." Ibid.2 The court also affirmed the District Court's award under the Lanham Act of twice Dastar's profits. We granted certiorari. 537 U. s. 1099 (2003).
2 As for the copyright claim, the Ninth Circuit held that the tax treatment General Eisenhower sought for his manuscript of the book created a triable issue as to whether he intended the book to be a work for hire, and thus as to whether Doubleday properly renewed the copyright in 1976. See 34 Fed. Appx., at 314. The copyright issue is still the subject of litigation, but is not before us. We express no opinion as to whether petitioner's product would infringe a valid copyright in General Eisenhower's book.
the registration, use, and infringement of trademarks and related marks, § 43(a), 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a) is one of the few provisions that goes beyond trademark protection. As originally enacted, § 43(a) created a federal remedy against a person who used in commerce either "a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation" in connection with "any goods or services." 60 Stat. 441. As the Second Circuit accurately observed with regard to the original enactment, however-and as remains true after the 1988 revision-§ 43(a) "does not have boundless application as a remedy for unfair trade practices," Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (1974). "[B]ecause of its inherently limited wording, § 43(a) can never be a federal 'codification' of the overall law of 'unfair competition,'" 4 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:7, p. 27-14 (4th ed. 2002) (McCarthy), but can apply only to certain unfair trade practices prohibited by its text.
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation." 60 Stat. 441.
"shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act." 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a)(I).
Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 963-964, n. 6 (CADC 1990) (Thomas, J.).
Thus, as it comes to us, the gravamen of respondents' claim is that, in marketing and selling Campaigns as its own product without acknowledging its nearly wholesale reliance on the Crusade television series, Dastar has made a "false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion ... as to the origin ... of his or her goods." § 43(a). See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 8, 11. That claim would undoubtedly be sustained if Dastar had bought some of New Line's Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them as its own. Dastar's alleged wrongdoing, however, is vastly different: It took a creative work in the public domain-the Crusade television series-copied it, made modifications (arguably minor), and produced its very own series of videotapes. If "origin" refers only to the manufacturer or producer of the physical "goods" that are made available to the public (in this case the videotapes), Dastar was the origin. If, however, "origin" includes the creator of the underlying work that Dastar copied, then someone else (perhaps Fox) was the origin of Dastar's product. At bottom, we must decide what § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act means by the "origin" of "goods."
under the original version of § 43(a)) 5 to include not only the actual producer, but also the trademark owner who commissioned or assumed responsibility for ("stood behind") production of the physical product. But as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase "origin of goods" is in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that "goods" embody or contain. Such an extension would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act and inconsistent with precedent.
5 Under the 1946 version of the Act, § 43(a) was read as providing a cause of action for trademark infringement even where the trademark owner had not itself produced the goods sold under its mark, but had licensed others to sell under its name goods produced by them-the typical franchise arrangement. See, e. g., My Pie Int'l, Inc. v. Debould, Inc., 687 F.2d 919 (CA7 1982). This stretching of the concept "origin of goods" is seemingly no longer needed: The 1988 amendments to § 43(a) now expressly prohibit the use of any "word, term, name, symbol, or device," or "false or misleading description of fact" that is likely to cause confusion as to "affiliation, connection, or association ... with another person," or as to "sponsorship, or approval" of goods. 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).
ham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.
It could be argued, perhaps, that the reality of purchaser concern is different for what might be called a communicative product-one that is valued not primarily for its physical qualities, such as a hammer, but for the intellectual content that it conveys, such as a book or, as here, a video. The purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity of the producer of the physical tome (the publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in the identity of the creator of the story it conveys (the author). And the author, of course, has at least as much interest in avoiding passing off (or reverse passing off) of his creation as does the publisher. For such a communicative product (the argument goes) "origin of goods" in § 43(a) must be deemed to include not merely the producer of the physical item (the publishing house Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or the video producer Dastar) but also the creator of the content that the physical item conveys (the author Tom Wolfe, or-assertedly-respondents).
right monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution. Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been "careful to caution against misuse or over-extension" of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright. TrafFix, 532 U. S., at 29. "The Lanham Act," we have said, "does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity." Id., at 34. Federal trademark law "has no necessary relation to invention or discovery," Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 94 (1879), but rather, by preventing competitors from copying "a source-identifying mark," "reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions," and "helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product," Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U. S. 159, 163-164 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar's representation of itself as the "Producer" of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's "federal right to 'copy and to use'" expired copyrights, Bonito Boats, supra, at 165.
thor," § 106A(d)(1). Recognizing in § 43(a) a cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would render these limitations superfluous. A statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of course to be avoided. E. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837, and n. 11 (1988).
think the Lanham Act requires this search for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.
mara would merely have had to argue that it was the "origin" of the designs that Wal-Mart was selling as its own line. It was not, because "origin of goods" in the Lanham Act referred to the producer of the clothes, and not the producer of the (potentially) copyrightable or patentable designs that the clothes embodied.
Similarly under respondents' theory, the "origin of goods" provision of § 43(a) would have supported the suit that we rejected in Bonito Boats, 489 U. S. 141, where the defendants had used molds to duplicate the plaintiff's unpatented boat hulls (apparently without crediting the plaintiff). And it would have supported the suit we rejected in TrafFix, 532 U. S. 23: The plaintiff, whose patents on flexible road signs had expired, and who could not prevail on a trade-dress claim under § 43(a) because the features of the signs were functional, would have had a reverse-pas sing-off claim for unattributed copying of his design.
§ l03(a). Had Fox renewed the copyright in the Crusade television series, it would have had an easy claim of copyright infringement. And respondents' contention that Campaigns infringes Doubleday's copyright in General Eisenhower's book is still a live question on remand. If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially copied the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that the video was quite different from that series, then one or more of the respondents might have a cause of action-not for reverse passing off under the "confusion ... as to the origin" provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the "misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities" provision of § 43(a)(1)(B). For merely saying it is the producer of the video, however, no Lanham Act liability attaches to Dastar.

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