Source: https://openjurist.org/407/us/366
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:36:32+00:00

Document:
'(Petitioner) on the 25th day of December, 1968 . . . did unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and violently take from the person of one Larry Wayne Yates . . . a sum of money in excess of $300.00 . . . forcibly and against the will of the said Larry Wayne Yates . . . and while perpetrating said crime of robbery as aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully and with malice aforethought, and with premeditation and deliberation did kill and murder one Larry Wayne Yates . . ..' On April 24, 1969, petitioner received a general verdict of acquittal on this information.
Petitioner contends that Fifth Amendment principles of double jeopardy, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), prevent his trial on the robbery indictment, because the State is collaterally estopped from relitigating those issues already determined in his favor at the murder trial, determinations that make his conviction on the robbery charge a logical impossibility. Collateral estoppel is part of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy guarantee, Ashe v. Swenson, supra, and it is 'a matter of constitutional fact (this Court) must decide through an examination of the entire record.' Id. 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct., at 1194. Thus, the rejection of petitioner's claim by the Arkansas Supreme Court on procedural grounds does not foreclose our inquiry on this issue.
In Ashe, the defendant had been tried and acquitted by a general verdict of the robbery of one member of a poker game. He was then tried and convicted of the robbery of another of the poker players. This Court reversed his conviction, concluding that '(t)he single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury (in the first trial) was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers,' 397 U.S., at 445, 90 S.Ct., at 1195, and that, this issue once having been determined by a jury in the petitioner's favor, the State was forestalled from relitigating it.
'An accessory is one who stands by, aids, abets, or assists . . . the perpetration of the crime.
Had the jury found petitioner present at the crime scene, it would have been obligated to return a verdict of guilty of murder even if it believed that he had not actually pulled the trigger. The only logical conclusion is that the jury found him not present at the scene of the murder and robbery, a finding that negates the possibility of a constitutionally valid conviction for the robbery of Yates. This case is thus squarely controlled by Ashe v. Swenson, supra, and must be reversed. See Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 92 S.Ct. 183, 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971).
The writ of certiorari is granted, the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Mr. Justice REHNQUIST joins, concurring.
Given the decision in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (see, however, my dissent in Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57, 92 S.Ct. 183, 185, 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971)), I join the judgment of the Court.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, rather than taking summary action in this case, would hear oral argument and give the matter plenary consideration.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.