Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2015/05/11/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:47:50+00:00

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Editor’s note: This is Part 23 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.
Marin Metropolitan District v. Landmark Towers Assn., Inc.
In 2007, a developer and five affiliated individuals (organizers) commenced proceedings under C.R.S. §§ 32-1-101, et seq., to form a special metropolitan district within the boundaries of Greenwood Village. The organizers filed a service plan with the municipality, and the city council approved it.
On September 5, 2007, a petition for organization was filed with the Arapahoe County District Court pursuant to C.R.S. § 32-1-301, and a hearing was set for October 4, 2007. Notice was published in the local newspaper and the clerk of the court issued a notice of the hearing. At the hearing, the district court entered an order directing an organizational election be held on November 6, 2007. The election was held, and on December 6, 2007, the district court entered findings and an order and decree creating the special district. The order included within the special district the Landmark Towers condominiums, which were under construction. Approximately 130 people were under contract to purchase, but no sales had been completed.
The Landmark homeowners association alleged it was not until several years after the Marin Metropolitan District (District) was formed that the owners discovered facts indicating that the District had been organized through alleged misrepresentations and a “fraud on the court.” In 2012, Landmark intervened in the annexation case and moved pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), (3), and (5) to set aside the December 2007 order for alleged fraud on the court, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction to approve the special district, and invalidity of the order due to lack of due process. The court held a three-day evidentiary hearing and issued an order on December 17, 2012, dismissing Landmark’s motion pursuant to C.R.S. § a32-1-305(7).
The court of appeals reviews the pertinent provisions of the statutory scheme for creating a special district. Landmark argues that regardless of subsection (7), a court has inherent power to vacate a void judgment, notwithstanding a statutory time bar; has jurisdiction to set aside a previously entered order based on fraud on the court; and has a duty to provide constitutional due process, providing jurisdiction to set aside an order that is void for lack of notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court disagrees.
C.R.S. § 32-1-305(7) states that once an order establishing a special district is entered, it “shall be deemed final, and no appeal or other remedy shall lie therefrom.” There is only one exception, which allows for an action in the nature of quo warranto commenced by the attorney general within thirty days after entry of the organizational order. Finally, the subsection mandates that the organization of the district “shall not be directly or collaterally questioned in any suit, action, or proceeding except as expressly authorized in this subsection (7).” The jurisdictional issue is dispositive. The order is affirmed.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari GRANTED, January 27, 2014.
Whether the court of appeals erred by holding that under C.R.C.P. 50, a trial court cannot direct a verdict as to some but not all issues within a single claim against a single defendant.
On Monday, May 11, 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court issued two opinions.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Beren v. Beren on Monday, May 11, 2015.
Colorado Probate Code—Elective Share—CRS §15-11-202(1)—Equitable Authority—CRS § 15-10-103.
The Supreme Court considered whether, and to what extent, the Colorado Probate Code displaces a probate court’s authority to award an equitable adjustment supplementing a spouse’s elective share of the decedent’s estate. The Court held that the Probate Code’s plain language demonstrates that a particular statutory provision dealing with the spouse’s elective share, CRS §15-11-202(1), fixes the value of the property comprising the augmented estate on the decedent’s date of death. This provision controls over the general equitable authority the probate court may exercise under CRS §15-10-103. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the probate court erred by linking its equitable award to appreciation and income to the entire augmented estate. Nevertheless, CRS §15-10-103 expressly reserves the probate court’s equitable authority to the extent that it is not displaced by a specific statutory provision. On remand, the probate court has tools at its disposal to exercise equity consistent with the statutory elective-share framework.
The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court set aside the court of appeals’ judgment requiring the spouse to repay the entire $24.5 million equitable award with interest. The probate court shall determine on remand what equitable relief is available to the spouse under the specific facts of this case. The probate court may take additional evidence and argument, and may order further relief and enter a final judgment consistent with this opinion.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District v. Wolfe on Monday, May 11, 2015.
CRCP 54(b)—Final Judgment of a Claim—Dismissal of Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction—Prayer for Relief in a Change of Water Right Application Case.
The Supreme Court held that this appeal was not properly before it under CRCP 54(b) because the trial court did not enter final judgment on any claim for relief in this litigation. Here, East Cherry Creek Valley’s application pleaded one claim for relief: that the water court issue a change decree granting its change of water right application from irrigation use to domestic, municipal, augmentation, and exchange uses in connection with the 5.472 Greely Irrigation Company shares it owns. Accordingly, the Court reversed the water court’s certification order, dismissed the appeal, and returned the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On Monday, May 11, 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and two unpublished opinions.

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