Source: https://meurrensonimmigration.com/factors-in-determining-whether-a-temporary-worker-will-voluntarily-leave-canada/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 12:19:29+00:00

Document:
The following are examples of how IRPR s. 179 may be applied to individual applications. They are scenarios that IRCC provides visa officers for the purposes of training.
While the applicant’s compliance with Australian immigration rules is not evidence directly related to the matter of complying with periods of authorization in Canada, it does indicate in my estimation that the applicant has respected immigration policy in the past, and there is no further evidence to the contrary.
As well, while previous travel history may be a good indicator as to the likelihood of compliance to immigration laws, an absence of travel is at best a neutral indicator, as the Federal Court found in Momi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2013 FC 162. and as was affirmed in Adom v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), 2019 FC 26.
having a “permanent job” in Canada does not allow for an inference that the applicant will break the law and remain in this country past the expiry of the work permit. There is no evidence on the record that the applicant would have ties in Canada such that he would be tempted to stay for that reason alone. We should guard against connecting temporary residence and becoming a permanent resident (section 22 of the Act).
The fact that the applicant seeks to obtain the appropriate visa from Canada because his immigration situation in Australia will become precarious would in my view militate in favour of considering the applicant as law abiding. As this Court has held in the past, previous immigration encounters are good indicators of an applicant’s likelihood of future compliance (see Calaunan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1494 at para 28 and Murai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 186).
 Second, the other fact which the officer draws upon to conclude that the applicant will not leave Canada at the end of the study period is her continued presence in Canada since March 2002 with either work or study permits. This is unreasonable. A foreign national who has remained in Canada under validly issued work or study permits should not be penalized for having followed the immigration legislation of this country. The simple fact the applicant has legally remained in Canada cannot reasonably support a conclusion that she would choose to go “underground” or try to stay in Canada without authorization once her study permit expires.
The officer concluded the applicant had only weak family ties to Sri Lanka. As there is no elaboration on this finding, one can only assume the officer concluded the ties are weak due to only a single family member being in that country. However, to judge family ties solely based on the quantity of family members is to ignore the relevant factor of the strength of the child-parent bond (see Guo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1353 at paragraph 15,  FCJ No 1851). The officer may have had legitimate reasons for doubting the strength of that bond in this case. The record is silent, making it very difficult for this Court to see this finding as reasonable.
While the family tie was only one part of the evidence considered by the officer on the issue of intention to leave Canada, it clearly was central to that determination and I cannot discern how the officer would have decided absent that finding.
See also Shakeri v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration).
The second issue concerns the Officer’s failure to consider the Applicant’s family ties in the Philippines in reaching the Decision. This is particularly egregious as the Officer claimed to be unsatisfied that the Applicant demonstrated strong socio-economic ties to that country whereas there was evidence on file that the Applicant’s wife and young child would remain in the Philippines during the Applicant’s studies in Canada. In failing to engage with these facts in any way, particularly in failing to assess whether the Applicant would return to his wife and son in the Philippines, the Officer overlooked some crucial facts in making his decision.
In Cao v. Canada, a 27-year old citizen of the People’s Republic of China who was offered a job as a cook at a Chinese restaurant in Quebec. The visa officer refused his application as he was not satisfied that the applicant was a genuine visitor who would leave Canada upon the expiry of his work permit. The officer based this decision the applicant’s insufficient financial ties to China, his modest salary, and limited advancement opportunities in China. Justice Martineau found the Officer’s rejection on the basis of s. 179 of the IRPR to be completely unreasonable. He noted that the rejection of the work permit application because the applicant would make more money in Canada than in China relied on the very factor which would induce someone to come here temporarily in the first place as the main reason for keeping that person out.
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Newfoundland Nurses has greatly complicated matters. By getting rid of the “adequacy of reasons” test as a stand-alone ground for judicial review, the Supreme Court of Canada has in effect signalled to Citizenship and Immigration Canada that it can refuse decisions based on boilerplate, minimal reasons, knowing that reviewing judges must consider whether the decision was reasonable based on the record as a whole.
The applicant in the written submissions argues that the officer breached the duty of fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons for his decision, and also that the decision is unreasonable. The respondent is quick to point out, correctly, that “adequacy of reasons” is no longer a stand-alone ground of judicial review, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision inNewfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 [Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union] at para 14. I agree; however, the decision rendered must still be reasonable in terms of “the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and] whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law:” Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47.
In the absence of any real reasons in the CTR as to why the officer reached his conclusion that the applicant had not satisfied him that the applicant would not leave Canada at the end of her intended three week stay, this decision is unreasonable and must be set aside. Although this Court should first look to supplement before subverting the officer’s reasons and may look to the record to do so (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union, above, at para 12), a review of the record almost exclusively reveals factors – those canvassed immediately above – that strongly support the opposite conclusion to that reached by the officer; namely she has been invited by a Canadian friend to visit and holiday with her for three weeks (and the friend provides an affidavit to the effect), and she leaves behind in Nigeria a job, a husband, two minor children, and property. How on those facts can it reasonably be said that she has failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that she will leave Canada at the conclusion of her visit?
As well, the fact that a statement may be self serving does not mean that an officer can disregard it, as an applicant will necessarily produce evidence that is beneficial to their case. . This has been affirmed in several cases, including LOTM v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2013 FC 957, at para.27-29, citing SMD v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 319, Ugalde v Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 458, and Ahmed v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2004 FC 226), and Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1210.
In Agidi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2013 FC 691, the Federal Court found that a (compelling) reason to visit Canada is not required in order to issue a TRV.
In Guillermo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 61, the Federal Court affirmed that visits to close family members are an acceptable purpose of visit.
What appears to have been the most important factor in the refusal was the fact that the applicant is a Syrian national who has been living outside of Syria for most of his life. The decision-maker seems to have concluded that given the situation in his country of origin, he would not be inclined to go back to his country of nationality if his residence status in the United Arab Emirates were to change. Given the record as it is before the Court, this looks more like a hunch based on speculation than a justification supported by some evidence. If that could constitute some form of justification, this would lack transparency and intelligibility without a more complete articulation.
Pursuant to the Federal Court of Canada’s decision in Sangchai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 376, visa officers must ensure that they do not apply the same standards in assessing the various checklist factors when assessing visitor visa applications for children. For example, it would be unreasonable for an officer to discount the evidence of school enrollment on the ground that it could be cancelled at any time as this could be true of any applicant attending an educational institution in their home country.
Unfortunately, there may be other factors that are not relevant to the individual that can impact whether a visa will be refused. As demonstrated in the image below, a visa officer training guide states that borderline cases from Liaoning, Guangdong, Hebei, Fujian, and Henan would likely be refused, simply because the applicants are from areas of high risk. While one hopes that this is not the case, it is difficult to completely discard training manuals which contain instructions like this.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.