Source: https://www.rulingimagination.com/blog/archives/11-2015
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:15:51+00:00

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Bow down to your corporate overlords and accept that being cheated is merely the way consumer culture works.
Back in 2009, I wrote 2 guest posts (Part 1 & Part 2) for Karl Bayer's Disputing Blog about contractual arbitration clauses that deprive individuals of any realistic way of holding corporations responsible for ways in which those corporations cheat individuals. The clauses do so by requiring in virtually any purchase or loan--without any possibility of negotiating otherwise--that individual, rather than class, arbitration be used to resolve any disputes that might arise between the corporation and the individual. By eliminating the possibility of class action lawsuits, these arbitration clauses effectively deprive individuals of any legal remedy; the corporations always have enough money to make the process too expensive for the individual to pursue on his or her own.
In 2008, recognizing the injustices at work, courts were increasingly refusing to enforce those arbitration clauses. But in 2011 the Supreme Court stopped that trend in its tracks, upholding the legitimacy of contract clauses that require consumers to arbitrate individually any disputes over their transactions. The result, as I predicted and as the New York Times makes clear in a 2-part series (Part 1 & Part 2) this past weekend, is that there is no longer any legitimate opportunity to hold companies responsible for actions that cheat consumers. Even more alarmingly, as the Times discusses, "at stake are [also] claims of medical malpractice, sexual harassment, hate crimes, discrimination, theft, fraud, elder abuse and wrongful death."
Fortunately, however, courts have very recently begun to refuse to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer transaction because they are recognizing, as the Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia quoted above states, there are “grounds in law or in equity” for doing so. Two years ago, in Douglas v. Talk America, (9th Cir. 2007), the plaintiff challenged, by means of a class action complaint, the validity of an amendment made to the contract governing his telephone service. The amendment to the contract, among other things, required arbitration of all disputes arising under the contract. Moreover, the amendment was made unilaterally and without any notice other than the posting of the revision on the defendant’s web site. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, applying California law, held that the amended contract, including the arbitration provision, was unenforceable and dismissed the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The court rejected the reasoning applied by the New York courts that the plaintiff had “meaningful alternative choices for telephone service.” Id. at 8. The court also made clear that, absent the inclusion of the arbitration clause in the defendant’s unilateral modification of the original contract, a relinquishment of the right to bring a class action also “may be” unenforceable under California law, though it would be enforceable under New York law. Id. at 8-9. Douglas, however, may be of limited use as precedent in challenging mandatory arbitration clauses even outside of New York because the arbitration clause was added by means of the defendant’s unilateral amendment to the contract, an amendment that was unenforceable merely by virtue of the fact that a party can’t unilaterally change the terms of a contract; it must obtain the other party’s consent before doing so.” Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
This 9th Circuit’s reasoning in Douglas was extended in Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc. (N.D. Tex. April 15, 2009). In Harris, the court, applying Texas law, refused to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause in an online transaction despite the fact the clause was in the original contract and the contract had not been amended. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that the contract was unenforceable merely because the defendant had reserved the right to unilaterally amend its all of its terms, including the arbitration clause. Thus, the court concluded, the original contract had been “illusory.” Harris represents an extension of Douglas in that the right to amend even in the absence of amendment voids the entire contract. Nonetheless, as a matter of contract doctrine the case is problematic, at least outside of Texas. Generally, courts will find consideration supporting a contract that has not been amended, even if the contract purports to grant a right of unilateral amendment. Given the presence of consideration, the unmodified original contract would not be “illusory.” Indeed, the court in Douglas seemed to be operating on the assumption that under California law the contract in that case would have been enforceable had it not been amended (though the unmodified original contract in Douglas did not require arbitration).
Even more recently, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court faced squarely the consumer protection concerns implicated by mandatory arbitration clauses and refused to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause in an online transaction without engaging in strained academic application of the doctrine of consideration. Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., ___ P.3d ___ (N.M. June 27, 2008). Instead, the court in Fiser struck down the arbitration provision and class action waiver precisely because the agreed upon arbitration procedure would preclude class action arbitration or litigation and was therefore “contrary to fundamental New Mexico public policy.” Id. at 4. The plaintiff in Fiser had filed a class action complaint against Dell Computer alleging, among other things, violations of New Mexico’s laws governing unfair business practices and false advertising. The complaint alleged that Dell Computer had “systematically misrepresent[ed] the memory size of its computers.” Id. at 3. Importantly, the complaint also alleged that the monetary damage suffered by each class member was only $10-$20. Id. Dell moved to stay the class action and compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual claim based on the mandatory arbitration clause set forth in the online agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff had purchased his Dell computer. Id. at 3-4. The trial court granted the motion, the court of appeals affirmed, and the New Mexico Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Id.
The opportunity to seek class relief is of particular importance to the enforcement of consumer rights because it provides a mechanism for the spreading of costs. The class action device allows claimants with individually small claims the opportunity for relief that would otherwise be economically infeasible because they may collectively share the otherwise prohibitive costs of bringing and maintaining the claim. See, e.g., 1 Alba Conte & Herbeli B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 21 1.6, at 26 (4th ed. 2002). “In many cases, the availability of class action reIief is a sine qua non to permit the adequate vindication of consumer rights.” State ex reI. 2 Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278 (W. Va. 2002). “The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those who command the status quo.” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
[B]eyond merely a procedural tool, the class action functions as a gatekeeper to relief when the cost of bringing a single claim is greater than the damages alleged. When viewed in this light, a contractual provision that purports to ban class actions for small claims implicates not just the opportunity for a class action but the more fundamental right to a meaningful remedy for one’s claims. This Court has recognized that the right of access to the courts is part of the right to petition for redress of grievances guaranteed by both the United States and New Mexico constitutions. Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 426, 659 P.2d 311, 312 (1983); see also U. S. Const. amends. I, XIV; N.M. const., art. II, § 18. While the class action ban may or may not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, a prohibition on class relief where there is no meaningful alternative for redress of injury certainly does not provide for effective vindication of rights. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, [a] statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”).
Id. at 7-8. In short, “by attempting to prevent him from seeking class relief, [Dell Computer] has essentially foreclosed the possibility that Plaintiff may obtain any relief.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
[C]lass arbitrations do in fact occur. See In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., [554 F.3d 300, 310 n.7 (2d Cir. 2009)], quoting Clancy, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63 Bus. Law. 55, 56 (2007) (“It is apparent that ‘[c]lass arbitration is a swiftly growing phenomenon'”); McKee v. AT&T Corp., 164 Wash. 2d 372, 395 (2008) (“Class actions are often arbitrated”). Moreover, a majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court has, at least implicitly, indorsed class arbitrations as consistent with the FAA. See Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003).
Courts are acting in legitimate ways when they require disputes to be resolved in ways that provide relief for and deterrence of wrongdoing. Institutions that administer arbitrations are beginning to recognize the problems as well. This month, the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) has entered into a consent decree, settling a suit brought by the Minnesota Attorney General, pursuant to which the NAF has agreed to refrain from arbitrating consumer transactions altogether. And the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) has voluntarily imposed a moratorium on the administration of debt collection arbitration programs in all consumer transaction cases. It is time for legislatures to step in as well.
For companies, the allure of arbitration grew after a 2011 Supreme Court ruling [that is, ATT v. Concepion] cleared the way for them to use the clauses to quash class-action lawsuits. Prevented from joining together as a group in arbitration, most plaintiffs gave up entirely, records show.
​Citizens United was an alarming empowerment of corporations over individuals. But perhaps nothing has done for harm to individuals in their struggles with the corporate "persons" who sell them everything they must buy as the 5-4 decision of the Roberts' Court in ATT Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.

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