Source: https://www.freedomformula.us/articles/dyett-v-turner-utah-supreme-court-1968/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 23:52:17+00:00

Document:
Accordingly, the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be and is hereby denied, without prejudice to the filing of a further petition at such time as plaintiff may have exhausted his state remedies upon the specific claim herein discussed. 28 U. S. C. # 2254.
We feel that our decision in this matter should not be subject to reversal by inferior courts of the federal system. However, it is rather obvious that such a proceeding is likely to occur unless we turn the prisoner loose upon society. While we deplore such a situation as is now foisted upon the states by various rulings of the United States Supreme Court and acts of Congress based upon such rulings, yet we want it understood that we do not think the particular Utah federal district judge is in any manner to blame. He acts under the direction of the Supreme Court of the United States and must faithfully carry out the law as he believes that court would have him to do. We personally know him to be one of the finest of men, an excellent lawyer, and a good judge. What we have to say hereafter is not meant as any reflection upon him in any manner whatsoever.
This situation presents an opportunity to review the constitutional provisions in order to determine if any rights of this defendant have been violated.
It does not say he shall have counsel. It only says he shall have the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, and the right to have counsel does not justify a court in forcing a lawyer upon an accused who does not want one. See State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P. 2d 195; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 S. Ct. 191, 2 L. Ed. 2d 167.
For over 140 years more than 70 justices of the Supreme Court consistently held that the first ten amendments to the Constitution applied as a limitation to the Federal Government only and not in any manner to the states, and for 70 years following the so-called adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment some 35 justices from every corner of the Nation have held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not make the first ten amendments applicable to the states. Some of those justices had helped to frame the original Constitution and the first ten amendments and had worked to secure the adoption thereof. Others had participated in the war between the states and were acquainted at first hand with the purposes intended to be accomplished by the Fourteenth Amendment. All of them interpreted the Constitution, including the amendments, with knowledge and wisdom born of intimacy with the problems which had called forth the documents in the first place.
The United States Supreme Court, as at present constituted, has departed from the Constitution as it has been interpreted from its inception and has followed the urgings of social reformers in foisting upon this Nation laws which even Congress could not constitutionally pass. It has amended the Constitution in a manner unknown to the document itself. While it takes three fourths of the states of the Union to change the Constitution legally, yet as few as five men who have never been elected to office can by judicial fiat accomplish a change just as radical as could three fourths of the states of this Nation. As a result of the recent holdings of that Court, the sovereignty of the states is practically abolished, and the erstwhile free and independent states are now in effect and purpose merely closely supervised units in the federal system.
We do not believe that justices of once free and independent states should surrender their constitutional powers without being heard from. We would betray the trust of our people if we sat supinely by and permitted the great bulk of our powers to be taken over by the federal courts without at least stating reasons why it should not be so. By attempting to save the dual relationship which has heretofore existed between state and federal authority and which is clearly set out in the Constitution, we think we act in the best interest of our country.
We feel like galley slaves chained to our oars by a power from which we cannot free ourselves, but like slaves of old we think we must cry out when we can see the boat heading into the maelstrom directly ahead of us; and by doing so, we hope the master of the craft will heed the call and avert the dangers which confront us all. But by raising our voices in protest we, like the galley slaves of old, expect to be lashed for doing so. We are confident that we will not be struck by 90 per cent of the people of this Nation who long for the return to the days when the Constitution was a document plain enough to be understood by all who read it, the meaning of which was set firmly like a jewel in the matrix of common sense and wise judicial decisions. We shall not complain if those who berate us belong to that small group who refuse to take an oath that they will not overthrow this government by force. When we bare our legal backs to receive the verbal lashes, we will try to be brave; and should the great court of these United States decide that in our thinking we have committed error, then we shall indeed feel honored, for we will then be placed on an equal footing with all those great justices who at this late date are also said to have been in error for so many years. In addition to what we have said about the meaning of the Federal Constitution, we are disturbed in the attitude of the criminal element in our society since the federal courts have arrogated unto themselves the powers and duties which rightfully belong to the state courts. It is a daily occurrence when some known burglar or thief flouts a police officer and threatens to “get his badge,” and threatens the trial judge with having him taken before the judge of the federal court.
The records of the Adult Probation and Parole Board show that some 63 per cent of all defendants who are either found guilty or who plead guilty are placed on probation, and of that number 75 per cent are faithful to their probationary obligations. Those records further show that of those more hardened criminals who are first committed to prison and then placed on parole, over 62 per cent keep faith with their trust. Always the welfare of the man is the principal objective in the attempt to make useful citizens out of prisoners. We have an accredited high school within the prison walls from which one may graduate and receive a high school diploma recognized by all colleges as a basis of entrance. Trades are taught inmates, such, for example, as welding, painting, carpentry, upholstery, auto mechanics, boiler making, cooking, printing, etc.
The prime prerequisite toward a good relationship between a prisoner and his rehabilitation is his acknowledgment and acceptance of the fact that he has done wrong and a realization on his part that society is his benefactor trying to improve his lot, so that he cam become a useful citizen. It is difficult to supervise a man who is looking for loopholes through which he may escape from the results of his criminal tendencies. Each time he is let out on a technicality, he believes the court is on his side, and so he does not have to conform to any standard except that which he sets for himself. A constant stream of writs of habeas corpus flows from the prison daily, complaining about the lack of beefsteak and pie and other frivolous matters. Suits are filed against judges who, in the performance of their duties, sentence criminals to prison, etc.
The time was when a lawyer could counsel his client to plead guilty and receive supervision and training, so that he might be a better citizen when he had paid his debt to society. Such advice came from honest lawyers who thought more of the future of the defendant than they did of getting a guilty man off. No longer can an attorney safely do that, for to do so will likely result in a release of the prisoner on habeas corpus upon the ground that the lawyer was incompetent and had not put the state to as much expense as possible.
It has been intimated that a rich man can hire a loophole lawyer, and it is, therefore, a denial of due process to fail to furnish a poor man a loophole lawyer also. The answer seems to be that courts should make an example of loophole lawyers wherever they may be found – if any there be. If courts would direct attention to seeing that innocent men are not found guilty or allowed to plead guilty rather than trying to find imaginary legal technicalities which allow the guilty to escape punishment, the stature of the courts and of lawyers would rise immensely in the eyes of the public.
In regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, which the present Supreme Court of the United States has by decision chosen as the basis for invading the rights and prerogatives of the sovereign states, it is appropriate to look at the means and methods by which that amendment was foisted upon the Nation in times of emotional stress. We have no desire at this time to have the Fourteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In fact, we are not asked to do that. We merely want to show what type of a horse that Court has to ride in order to justify its usurpation of the prerogatives of the states.
It is common knowledge that any assumption of power will always attract a certain following, and if no resistance is offered to this show of strength, then the asserted powers are accepted without question. It is therefore our purpose to try to give a ray of hope to all those who believe that the states are capable of deciding for themselve[s] whether prayer shall be permitted in schools, whether their bicameral legislatures may be composed of members elected pursuant to their own state constitutional standards, yes, and even whether a prisoner who says he does not want counsel shall be turned loose because the court did not tell him that he could have one for free.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; . . .
Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the act of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens, of the Union. If this were otherwise, the State must have become foreign, and her citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have become a war for conquest of subjugation.
Our conclusion therefore is, that Texas continued to be a State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first outbreak of the rebellion.
The Constitution of the United States is silent as to who should decide whether a proposed amendment has or has not been passed, according to formal provisions of Article V of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States is the ultimate authority on the meaning of the Constitution and has never hesitated in a proper case to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional – except when the act purported to amend the Constitution. The duty of the Secretary of State was ministerial, to wit, to count and determine when three fourths of the states had ratified the proposed amendment. He could not determine that a state once having rejected a proposed amendment could thereafter approve it, nor could he determine that a state once having ratified that proposal could thereafter reject it. The court and not Congress should determine such matters. Consistency would seem to require that a vote once cast would be final or would not be final, whether the first vote was for ratification or rejection.
In order to have 27 states ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, it was necessary to count those states which had first rejected and then under the duress of military occupation had ratified, and it also to count those states which initially ratified but subsequently rejected the proposal.
We have spoken in the hope that the Supreme Court of the United States may retreat from some of its recent decisions affecting the rights of a sovereign state to determine for its self what is proper procedure in its own courts as it affects its own citizens. However, we realize that because of that Court’s superior power, we must pay homage to it even though we disagree with it; and so we now discuss the merits of this case just the same as though the sword of Damocles did not hang over our heads.
We have only one question to decide: Did the defendant below (the plaintiff in this petition) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive counsel? Let us look at the record of what he said at the time he waived counsel.
THE COURT: Do you understand that this charge carries with it a penalty of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison?
THE COURT: Do you have a prior record?
THE COURT: Do you Do you have an attorney?
THE COURT: Do you desire to be represented by counsel?
THE COURT: Do you understand that you are entitled to be represented by counsel?
THE COURT: Is it your desire to waive counsel?
THE COURT: Are you free on bail?
THE COURT: The record may show that the defendant has waived his right to counsel.
The Statute allows you additional time before you are required to enter a plea, or you may waive that time and enter a plea at this time. What is your desire?
DEFENDANT DYETT: I will waive.
THE COURT: You waive your time?
THE COURT: And enter a plea now?
THE COURT: To the charge of issuing a check against insufficient funds, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
DEFENDANT DYETT: I plead guilty and request a probationary.
THE COURT: Have you conferred with an attorney?
THE COURT: Why do you think that you are entitled to probation?
DEFENDANT DYETT: Well, I don’t know why. it’s just my wishes, probationary.
At the time of arraignment the Court asked the defendant why he wrote the check, and the defendant answered, “well, just didn’t have any money, and I wrote it. That’s all there is to it.” He also said he had written other checks which had not been paid for. The prosecuting attorney had six of the worthless checks which had been turned over to the sheriff by merchants who had been defrauded.
The defendant was not shown to be illiterate or feeble minded. He was guilty and knew it and also knew that the State could prove it. He did not want either a trial or a lawyer. One would have to stretch his imagination to find that this defendant did want a lawyer. So much notoriety has been given to the right to counsel on the part of defendants charged with criminal acts that it is difficult to believe any grown man who is smart enough to defraud seven merchants into casing worthless checks would not know about it.
It must be remembered, however, that a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by collateral attack, even on habeas corpus. When collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of regularity. Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
… The court feels that the question of whether a defendant “wants” counsel “fairly implies the availability of the assistance of the court in obtaining counsel if he wished it.” Starks v. United States, 264 F. 2d 797, 800 (4 Cir. 1959 ). And see Post v. Boles, 332 F. 2d 738, 740 (4 Cir. 1964 ). Thus, the Court feels that the State has borne its initial burden of proving Cost’s “affirmative acquiescence” in proceeding without counsel.
Thus the burden of proof at the Rule 93 hearing rested on defendant to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and this burden required him to so convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations omitted.] He failed to meet this burden, and we are of the opinion that the evidence substantially supports the findings of the trial court.
The case of Nielsen v Turner___Utah 2d____, 435 P.2d 921 is on all fours with the instant case and in that case relief was denied to the petitioner.
We can see no reason to start talking about who is going to pay a lawyer until somebody wants one. In fact, it should be remembered that all the court can do is to appoint a lawyer to work for the client. It is not the province of the judge to make him do it for free. That could be taking property without due process of law. The defendant who commits a crime is entitled to have counsel but he is not entitled to have a free ride at the expense of the public upon whom he has just been preying. The widow and the orphan whose breadwinner has been murdered in cold blood should not be taxed to help the guilty defendant escape the consequences of his evil deed. He at least should pay the lawyer for the services rendered if he ever becomes able to do so. The lawyer under his oath will perform just as faithfully on credit as he will for cash. For a court to say that a lawyer will not be faithful to his client who has not paid the fee in advance is but a reflection upon the standard of ethics of that particular court. It would not say that when a doctor operates on a patient who cannot pay, the patient will not receive the best the doctor can give, and it ill becomes a judge – who theoretically is an ex-lawyer- to say that the lawyer is not as loyal to his client as the surgeon to his patient. We are not acquainted with any lawyer who would not put forth his best efforts in behalf of his client simply because he had not been paid for his services.
This blatant (defendant below) is guilty and admits it. He said he did not want a lawyer, and we should respect his wish.
By bringing the instant writ of habeas corpus before this court, the petitioner has elected to rely upon the record, since evidence cannot be presented in testimonial form before this court. It seems clear to us that he knowingly and intelligently waived counsel, and we, therefore, deny his petition.
CALLISTER, J., Concurs in the result.
HENRIOD, J., Concurs in the result and the reasoning.
I concur in the order denying the petitioner’s release on the ground that in lawful and orderly proceedings he stands convicted and sentenced of the crime for which he is imprisoned; and as is stated near the conclusion of justice Ellett’s opinion this case “is on all fours” with the case of Nielsen v. Turner___Utah 2d___, 435 P. 2d 921. See also Sydall v. Turner,___Utah 2d___437 P. 2d 194, and State v. Workman,___Utah 2d,___, 435 P. 2d 919, recently decided by this Court.
TUCKETT, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Crockett.

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