Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82828:56670&catid=1581&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:20:22+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 171496, March 03, 2014 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Respondents.
Owners whose properties were taken for public use are entitled to just compensation.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Court of Appeals’ resolution dated October 14, 2005. The Court of Appeals’ resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court granting private respondent Ortigas’ petition for authority to sell. This petition also seeks to nullify the Court of Appeals’ resolution dated February 9, 2006, which denied petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated March 9, 2001,10 the Regional Trial Court set the case for hearing on April 27, 2001, giving opportunity to any interested person to appear, oppose, and show cause why respondent Ortigas’ petition may not be granted. In the same order, respondent Ortigas was directed to cause the publication of both the Regional Trial Court’s order and respondent Ortigas’ petition. The trial court also directed the Sheriff to serve copies of its order and respondent Ortigas’ petition to the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Department of Public Works and Highways, City Engineer of Pasig, and the Register of Deeds of Pasig.
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the appeal from the trial court order granting respondent Ortigas authority to sell the land to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.
The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question involves the interpretation and application of the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The proper mode of appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground.
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if “it puts an end to a particular matter,”46 leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision.
“An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.”47 It is an appeal from a final decision or order.
The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its property to the government was not an interlocutory order because it completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used the wrong mode of appeal.
In any event, we resolve the substantive issue on whether respondent Ortigas may not sell and may only donate its property to the government in accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road purposes.
Section 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not constitute a subdivision project as defined and provided for under P.D. No. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ reliance on Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree is erroneous. Section 50 contemplates roads and streets in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private property that was taken from an owner for public purpose. A public thoroughfare is not a subdivision road or street.
All of the above elements are present in this case. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ construction of a road — a permanent structure — on respondent Ortigas’ property for the use of the general public is an obvious permanent entry on petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ part. Given that the road was constructed for general public use stamps it with public character, and coursing the entry through the Department of Public Works and Highways gives it a color of legal authority.
As a result of petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ entry, respondent Ortigas may not enjoy the property as it did before. It may not anymore use the property for whatever legal purpose it may desire. Neither may it occupy, sell, lease, and receive its proceeds. It cannot anymore prevent other persons from entering or using the property. In other words, respondent Ortigas was effectively deprived of all the bundle of rights50 attached to ownership of property.
It is true that the lot reserved for road widening, together with five other lots, formed part of a bigger property before it was subdivided. However, this does not mean that all lots delineated as roads and streets form part of subdivision roads and streets that are subject to Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree. Subdivision roads and streets are constructed primarily for the benefit of the owners of the surrounding properties. They are, thus, constructed primarily for private use — as opposed to delineated road lots taken at the instance of the government for the use and benefit of the general public.
In this case, the lot was reserved for road widening at the instance of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. While the lot segregated for road widening used to be part of the subdivided lots, the intention to separate it from the delineated subdivision streets was obvious from the fact that it was located at the fringes of the original lot51 — exactly at petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ intended location for the road widening project. Moreover, petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ intention to take the property for public use was obvious from the completion of the road widening for the C-5 flyover project and from the fact that the general public was already taking advantage of the thoroughfare.
Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public use, remain private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by donation or through expropriation proceedings.52 An owner may not be forced to donate his or her property even if it has been delineated as road lots because that would partake of an illegal taking.53 He or she may even choose to retain said properties.54 If he or she chooses to retain them, however, he or she also retains the burden of maintaining them and paying for real estate taxes.
Further, since the Constitution proscribes taking of private property without just compensation,56 any taking must entail a corresponding appropriation for that purpose. Public funds, however, may only be appropriated for public purpose.57 Employment of public funds to benefit a private individual constitutes malversation.58 Therefore, private subdivision streets not taken for public use may only be donated to the government.
As with all laws, Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree cannot be interpreted to mean a license on the part of the government to disregard constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The right to compensation under Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution was put in place to protect the individual from and restrain the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain,60 which is the government’s power to condemn private properties within its territory for public use or purpose.61 This power is inherent and need not be granted by law.62 Thus, while the government’s power to take for public purpose is inherent, immense, and broad in scope, it is delimited by the right of an individual to be compensated. In a nutshell, the government may take, but it must pay.
Respondent Ortigas, immediately upon the government’s suggestion that it needed a portion of its property for road purposes, went so far as to go through the process of annotating on its own title that the property was reserved for road purposes. Without question, respondent Ortigas allowed the government to construct the road and occupy the property when it could have compelled the government to resort to expropriation proceedings and ensure that it would be compensated. Now, the property is being utilized, not for the benefit of respondent Ortigas as a private entity but by the public. Respondent Ortigas remains uncompensated. Instead of acknowledging respondent Ortigas’ obliging attitude, however, petitioner Republic of the Philippines refuses to pay, telling instead that the property must be given to it at no cost. This is unfair.
In a negotiated sale, the government offers to acquire for public purpose a private property, and the owner may accept or reject it. A rejection of the offer, however, would most likely merely result in the commencement of an expropriation proceeding that would eventually transfer title to the government. Hence, the government’s offer to acquire for public purpose a private property may be considered as an act preparatory to an expropriation proceeding. Therefore, a private owner’s initiative to segregate a property to accommodate government needs saves the government from a long and arduous expropriation proceeding. This is a commendable act on the part of the owner. It must be encouraged, not dampened by threats of property deprivation without compensation.
Respondent Ortigas, which merely accommodated petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ request, remains uncompensated for the taking of its property. Respondent Ortigas could have brought action to recover possession of the property, but it instead chose to sell its property to petitioner Republic of the Philippines. This is both fair and convenient as the road construction had long been completed, and the road is already being utilized by the public.
Taking of private property without just compensation is a violation of a person’s property right. In situations where the government does not take the trouble of initiating an expropriation proceeding, the private owner has the option to compel payment of the property taken, when justified. The trial court should continue to proceed with this case to determine just compensation in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court is directed to proceed with the case with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this decision.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, *Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
* Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin was designated as Acting Member of the Third Division, vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1640 dated February 19, 2014.
8 Id. at 8 and 82.
21 Id. at 9, 92-94.
Section 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not constitute a subdivision project has defined and provided for under P.D. No. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
32 73 Phil. 537, 552 (1941).
37 RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, sec. 2 (c).
38 See Badillo v. Court of Appeals, 578 Phil. 404, 416-417 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division; C.J. Puno, JJ. Corona, Azcuna, and Leonardo-De Castro, concur], citing Sevilleno v. Carilo, 559 Phil. 789, 791-792 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division].
39 See Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, 596 Phil. 76, 89 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
40 See Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38, 46 [Per J. Reyes, Second Division; JJ. Carpio, Brion, Perez, and Sereno, concur].
42 See Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, 596 Phil. 76, 90 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
43Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38, 47 [Per J. Reyes, Second Division; JJ. Carpio, Brion, Perez, and Sereno, concur].
44Jose v. Javellana, et al., G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 11, 19 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division; JJ. Corona, Leonardo-De Castro, Abad, and Villarama, concur], quoting Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553.
45 See Nabua v. Lu Ym, 594 Phil. 515, 527 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R.T., Third Division; JJ. Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, concur].
47 Id., citing Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 145911, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 631, 638.
48 See DESAMA v. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457, 477 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division; C.J. Panganiban, JJ. Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., concur].
49 Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, et al., 157 Phil. 329, 345-347 (1974) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
50 CIVIL CODE, Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. SEE A. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2 45-46  enumerates the bundle of rights: 1) the right to enjoy which includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces or jus utendi, and the right to consume the thing by its use or jus abutendi; 2) the right to dispose or jus disponendi; and 3) the right to exclude others from the possession of the thing or jus vindicandi.
51 See map, rollo, p. 75.
52 See also White Plains v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 184, 207 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division; (Acting) C.J. Regalado, JJ. Melo, and Mendoza, concur] [J. Puno, no part due to close relation with some parties], citing Young v. City of Manila, 73 Phil. 537 (1941).
55 Consti., art. III, sec. 9; See also Brgy. Sindalan v. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 542, 558 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division; JJ. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Tinga, concur].
56 Consti., art. III, sec. 9.
57 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331, 340 (1960) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc; C. J. Parás, JJ. Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutiérrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, concur].
58 See also Brgy. Sindalan v. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 542, 559 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division; JJ. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Tinga, concur].
60 See Manapat v. Court of Appeals, 562 Phil. 31, 47 (2007) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division; JJ. Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Reyes, concur].
61DESAMA v. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457, 476 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division; C.J. Panganiban, JJ. Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., concur].
62 Id.; See Manapat v. Court of Appeals, 562 Phil. 31, 47 (2007) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division; JJ. Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Reyes, concur].
63 106 Phil. 1017 (1960) [Per J. Montemayor].
65Herrera v. Auditor General, 102 Phil. 875, 882 (1958) [Per J. Montemayor].
66 See for example Republic Act No. 8974 (2000), Sec. 3; Executive Order No. 1035 (1985), Secs. 6-7.

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