Source: https://www.ucmjdefense.com/resources/self-incrimination/effect-of-implementing-the-rights/the-fifth-amendment-miranda-right-to-counsel.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:46:41+00:00

Document:
The Fifth Amendment (Miranda) Right to Counsel.
Mil. R. Evid. 305(e)(1); 305(g)(2)(B).
The per se rule of Edwards.
a. When a subject has invoked his right to counsel in response to a Miranda warning, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation, even if he has been advised of his rights. “Having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, the subject is not subject to further interrogation . . . until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 (1981); seetr also United States v. Harris , 19 M.J. 331 (C.M.A. 1985) ( Edwards applies to military interrogations).
b. There is no exception to Edwards for police-initiated, custodial interrogations relating to a separate investigation once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. “As a matter of law, the presumption raised by a suspect’s request for counsel – that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance – does not disappear simply because the police have approached the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation.” Additionally, the fact that the officer conducting the second interrogation does not know of the request for counsel is of “no significance.” Knowledge of the suspect’s invocation is imputed to other officers. Arizona v. Roberson , 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
c. The Edwards requirement that counsel be “made available” means more than an opportunity to consult with an attorney outside the interrogation room. In Minnick v. Mississippi , 498 U.S. 146 (1990), the Supreme Court held “that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” 14 But see McNeil v. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 (1991) (limiting Minnick holding regarding Edwards rule to periods of continuous custody). 14 See Mil. R. Evid. 305(e)(1). In 1994, this subdivision was amended to conform military practice with the Supreme Court’s decision in Minnick.
d. United States v. Mitchell , 51 M.J. 234 (C.A.A.F. 1999). After a clear invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the accused was asked by his work supervisor during a brig visit if it was worth committing the alleged misconduct. Even though the accused’s supervisor was not a law enforcement official, the CAAF held that the questioning of the accused in custody, after invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, violated the protections of Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
e. United States v. Gray , 51 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1999). At trial, the prosecutor introduced the accused’s statements that were made as part of a separate state plea agreement. Prior to making the statements, the accused unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, however, since counsel was present during the interview, the CAAF held that there was no violation of the Fifth Amendment.
f. United States v. Thompson , 67 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 2009). After accused was placed in pretrial confinement and given defense counsel, a CID agent questioned accused without defense counsel notified or present, but after a rights waiver was signed. The CAAF presumed that the confession was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The confession was not ultimately admitted, except in redacted form by the defense. The confession only contained statements regarding the offenses for which he was acquitted or pled guilty.
Limits of the Edwards rule.
Maryland v. Shatzer , 130 S.Ct. 1213 (2010). The Supreme Court held that a fourteen-day period of time is sufficient to overcome the Edwards barrier, regardless of the availability of counsel. The Court also held that post-trial incarceration for an unrelated offense does not trigger “custody” for Miranda /Edwards purposes.
United States v. Watkins , 32 M.J. 1054 (A.C.M.R. 1991), aff’d , 34 M.J. 344 (C.M.A. 1992). Accused reinitiated conversation by asking CID if he should get a civilian attorney and how much time the agent thought the accused might get. (5) United States v. McDavid , 37 M.J. 861 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993). Despite previous invocation of his right to counsel, accused initiated the conversation with OSI agents by asking if he could explain something.
c. Waiver after re-initiation by the accused. (1) Oregon v. Bradshaw , 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). If initiation by the accused is found, then a separate inquiry must be made whether, on the totality of the circumstances, the accused voluntarily waived his rights. (2) United States v. McLaren , 38 M.J. 112 (C.M.A. 1993). In reinitiating conversation with interrogators by answering a question asked before his rights invocation, accused impliedly waived previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
When are requests for counsel effective?
a. Premature invocations. (1) The right to counsel arises upon initiation of custodial interrogation. (2) But, where a suspect is in custody and requests counsel from a person in apparent authority shortly before initiation of the interrogation, “it is artificial to draw a distinction between the formal interview . . . and these events which led up to it.”16 (3) McNeil v. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 (1991). In dicta, Justice Scalia opines that peremptory counsel elections are invalid. “We have never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights ‘anticipatorily’ in a context other than custodial interrogation.” (4) United States v. Schroeder , 39 M.J. 471 (C.M.A. 1994). Even though under arrest (civilian law enforcement agents), accused’s request to speak to an attorney before non-consensual urinalysis was “too little and too early” to qualify as invocation of his Miranda right to counsel. Accused had not been read his Miranda warnings or subjected to custodial interrogation. (5) United States v. Kendig , 36 M.J. 291 (C.M.A. 1993). Electing to consult counsel during Article 15 proceeding: 1) does not constitute invoking Fifth Amendment right to counsel; 2) does not invoke a Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and, 3) does not require notice to counsel under Mil. R. Evid. 305(e), since subsequent interview concerned unrelated offenses.
Smith v. Illinois , 469 U.S. 91 (1984)”), rev’d per curiam , 22 M.J. 22 (C.M.A. 1986), modified , 22 M.J. 247 (C.M.A. 1986), on remand , 22 M.J. 947 (A.C.M.R. 1986).
United States v. Ford, 51 M.J. 445 (C.A.A.F. 1999). An explosive device was found in the accused’s barracks room during an inspection. Without giving warnings, an investigator questioned the accused at the barracks. When the accused “asked to have a lawyer present, or to talk to a lawyer,” the investigator stopped the questioning. The investigator transported the accused to the CID office and, after obtaining a waiver of rights, questioned the accused again. The accused eventually gave a written confession. During the interview, however, the accused said that he didn’t want to talk and thought he should get a lawyer. The investigator sought clarification and the accused responded that he wanted a lawyer if the investigator continued accusing him of lying. After further clarification, the accused agreed to continue with the questioning. The CAAF found that the accused did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel during the barracks’ questioning. Further, the court held that accused’s comment about a lawyer during the CID office interrogation was an ambiguous request for a lawyer and did not invoke the Mirandaor Edwards protections. (8) United States v. Delarosa , 67 M.J. 318 (C.A.A.F. 2009). Accused was questioned by civilian law enforcement for homicide charges related to the death of his infant son. After repeatedly telling investigators that he wanted to talk to them, he signed “no” on the form next to the block that read, “I further state that I waive these rights and desire to make a statement.” After investigators attempted to clarify, accused asked for a command representative. Investigators denied this request and left accused alone. Several hours later, accused asked to talk. He was re-adaccuvised of his rights and waived them. The CAAF found the first invocation to be ambiguous, but held that officers could continue to attempt clarify his initial ambiguous invocation and resume questioning at any time. (9) Practice tip: Clarification of ambiguous requests is probably still a good idea. Clarification will preclude later disputes over whether request was ambiguous as a matter of law.
Edwards applies to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

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