Source: https://www.csklegal.com/tck_publications/2011/05/?post_type=tck_publications
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 15:00:31+00:00

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The bedbug infestation has reached such a degree of proliferation that the first North American Bed Bug Summit was held in Rosemont, Illinois on September 21, 2010.4 With paranoia and stigma riding the coattails of the bedbugs into the spotlight, lawsuits too, have followed. Courts across the country have had to determine factual and legal thresholds for lawsuits involving bedbugs. Most of the recent cases have sounded in negligence.
Despite the recent media reports, a well prepared defense team can mount successful challenges to bedbug plaintiffs. There is not a presumption of negligence merely because bedbugs are found in a hotel or store.23 Negligence must be proved. The nexus between duty and liability is proof of negligence.24 Negligence in this context requires not only proof of the condition which caused the injury but that the condition was known or should have been known by the landlord prior to the occurrence, so that he had an opportunity to correct it.25 Even knowledge of a prior bed bug infestation in another apartment or hotel room does not necessarily impute knowledge of a similar condition elsewhere on the property.26 While the best defense to bedbug litigation is an aggressive policy of pest control prevention, and immediate remedial efforts upon the discovery of the vampiric visitors, the law does not impose strict liability on landlords, and the negligence standard places a seasoned defense team in a much more tenable position. The potential damage to a business from a bedbug claim could be staggering. As such, defense teams should place a strong emphasis on confidentiality agreements in settlement, and stiff penalties for violations of such an agreement.
These tiny insects are not known to carry any diseases, and their bite typically does not even rouse a sleeping person from their slumber, yet they have certainly left a mark on the psyche of the nation and its juries. While a prompt and fair evaluation of a bedbug case can certainly mitigate the potential issues faced by hotels, resorts, retailers, multiunit buildings and their insurance providers, the bedbugs have announced their presence on the litigation scene, and they are ready to dine on sleeping invitees and unprepared litigants alike.
1 Hager, Emily (August 20, 2010). “What Spreads Faster Than Bedbugs? Stigma”. The New York Times.
2 Jacobs, Andrew (November 27, 2005). “Just Try to Sleep Tight. The Bedbugs Are Back”. The New York Times.
3 Robertson, Lindsay (August 21, 2009). “We Are Still Living in the Age of Bedbugs”. New York Magazine.
4 CTV.ca News Staff (November 27,. 2010). “Landlords, tenants seek solutions in bed bug fight.” CTV Toronto.
5 Livingston v. H. I. Family Suites, Inc., 2006 WL 1406587 (M. D. Fla. 2006).
6 Dent v. Florida Power & Light Co., 633 So.2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA, 1994) (citing Sullivan v. Streeter, 485 So.2d 893,895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
7 See Livingston v. H. I. Family Suites, Inc., 2006 WL 1406587 (M. D. Fla. 2006).
11 See Livingston v. H. I. Family Suites, Inc., 2006 WL 1406587 (M. D. Fla. 2006).
13 See Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 752 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla.2000).
14 See St. Joseph Hospital v. Cowart, 891 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
15 See Livingston v. H. I. Family Suites, Inc., 2006 WL 1406587 (M. D. Fla. 2006).
17 Elgandy v. Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 2003 WL 24571854 (Miss. 2003).
18 Huynh v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 2008 WL 4145883 (N.J. 2008).
19 Matthias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc; Motel 6 Operating LP, 2003 WL 25147946 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
21 Watson, Bruce (July 27, 2010). “Bedbugs Are Back and They’re Bleeding Us Dry.” Daily Finance.
23 Mitchell v. Capitol Management Corp., 2010 WL 4074940 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2010).
24 Dwyer v. Skiline Apartments, 123 N.J. Super 48, 52 (App.Div.), aff’d, 63 N.J. 577 (1973).
25 Mitchell v. Capitol Management Corp., 2010 WL 4074940 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2010).
Although an uninsured motorist carrier (“UMC”) is entitled to set off the payments made by a workers’ compensation insurer (“WCI”) to the plaintiff from the damages to be paid by the UMC, the determination of how that set off is calculated is crucial for ensuring that the UMC is not providing recovery to the plaintiff that should have been provided by the WCI. By adding a provision to their insurance policies that they will not compensate the claimant for injuries that were compensated or could have been compensated by a WCI, UMCs may be in a better position to set off their damages to a plaintiff by the amount that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the WCI rather than simply what the plaintiff did in fact recover.1 An insured may have received less than the amount to which she was entitled because she may have settled out of haste in order to receive funds from a WCI or because she choose to receive treatment from a non-workers’ compensation doctor. She even may have planned that the UMC would later pay the remainder of her damages up to the point of permissible coverage.
[t]he coverage [provided by the UMC] described under this section shall be over and above, but shall not duplicate, the benefits available to an insured under any workers’ compensation law, personal injury protection benefits, disability benefits law, or similar law; . . . and such coverage shall cover the difference, if any, between the sum of such benefits and the damages sustained, up to the maximum amount of such coverage provided under this section.2 (emphasis added).
Thus, a UMC is only required to compensate an insured for damages that have not been covered by workers’ compensation benefits or similar law. Florida courts have found that payments by a UMC to the insured are to be reduced by the present workers’ compensation benefits that have been paid or are due and payable.3 Thus, an insured may settle for a lower amount to receive funds immediately and then seek full damages from a UMC. Additionally, an insured could seek medical treatment from a non-workers’ compensation doctor and then seek have UMC cover those costs when she could have been treated by a doctor who would have been paid for by a WCI. In so doing, the insured would claim that only the amount received, rather than the larger amount that could have been received, should be set off as the higher amount is no longer “available” under Fla. Stat. § 627.727, despite the fact that it had been available.
A provision in a UMC’s insurance policy that states that the UMC will be entitled to a setoff of the workers’ compensation benefits that are or were available to the insured may be enforceable because such a provision should be compatible with both Florida statutes and public policy. First, policy language that would permit the UMC to setoff workers’ compensation benefits that “were available” would closely mimic the language already present in Fla. Stat. § 627.727. Importantly, the language in Fla. Stat. § 627.727 focuses on availability of the benefits but does not specify when those benefits are to be available, i.e. in the past or in the future. There is even an argument to be made that a contract provision would not be necessary to setoff benefits that had been available but not received because of the temporally ambiguous “available” language contained in Fla. Stat. § 627.727. A clear contractual provision, however, would be more likely to succeed than an argument only based on the statutory language.
Moreover, prohibiting UMCs from setting off their damages by the amount that could and should have been paid by a WCI would force UMCs to increase rates for fear that they would be required to cover expenses and risks that they reasonably believed would be covered by WCIs. Such a rule would thereby increase the cost of uninsured motorist coverage, and decrease the availability of uninsured motorist insurance for those individuals who truly need coverage for the expenses it was designed to cover. Thus, it should not be the responsibility of a UMC to cover for expenses that ought to be paid by a WCI. Therefore, it should not violate public policy to require a party to seek the highest amount of coverage possible from a WCI before demanding payment from a UMC. As a result, UMCs should adopt clear language in their policies that provides for a setoff of workers’ compensation benefits that both are available and were available in order to increase any potentially obtainable setoff of workers’ compensation benefits.
1 Although many UMC policies contain a clause that UMCs will not pay for any element of loss if a person is entitled to receive payment for that loss by a WCI, this clause may not be broad enough to cover elements of loss for which a person had been entitled to receive payment from a WCI.
2 Fla. Stat. § 627.727 (2010).
3 See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Blackmon, 754 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also Lobry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 877 (5th DCA 1981).
4 See USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDermott, 929 So. 2d 1114 (2nd DCA 2006).
5 See id. at 1119.
7 See Dwight v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 701 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
8 See id. at 622.
Just prior to publication, the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming the Fourth District’s ruling in Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 36 Fla. L. Weekly S187a (Fla. 2011). The law in Florida is now settled: The Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C § 30106, preempts Florida Statute § 324.021(9)(b)2 (2007), thereby insulating rental car companies from vicarious liability while engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles. In affirming, the Florida Supreme Court also upheld that Florida Statute § 324.021(9)(b)2 is not a financial responsibility law and that the Graves Amendment violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
The challenges to the Graves Amendment in Florida have arisen precisely because the application of the federal law changed the landscape of Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine and the application of the vicarious liability laws.3 Whether the Graves Amendment will continue to shield businesses leasing cars in Florida may soon be decided by the Florida Supreme Court.4 As of the preparation of this article, the Court had not yet rendered an opinion on the certified question that has been fully briefed and argued before it: Whether the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, preempts § 324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2007)?
The Doctrine, as applied to motor vehicles, is unique to Florida and has been applied with very few exceptions.8 The Florida Supreme Court, in 2000, noted that “if Florida’s traffic problems were sufficient to prompt its adoption in 1920, there is all the more reason for its application to today’s high-speed travel upon crowded highways.”9 In 1999, the Florida Legislature codified § 324.021(9)(b), Fla. Stat., creating an exception to the Doctrine, thereby limiting the amount that a short-term lessor of automobiles (less than one year) is liable.10 As a result of the exception, a short term lessor is liable only up to $100,000.00 per person and up to $300,000.00 total for bodily injury and up to $50,000.00 for property damage, with an additional $500,000.00 allowed if the lessee is uninsured.11 That law remained undisturbed until the federal Graves Amendment was codified in 2005.
In Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has noted that “the common usage of financial responsibility thus means an insurance equivalent, that level of security required to pay for damages arising from motor vehicle accidents, as a condition of acquiring a driver’s license or registering a vehicle. . . .”14 Furthermore, the District Courts of Appeal in Florida have all reached decisions holding that the Graves Amendment preempts § 324.021(9)(b), Fla. Stat., thereby insulating rental car leasing companies from any liability so long as they are not negligent or engaged in criminal wrongdoing during the leasing process.
The results of the Graves Amendment are not so “grave” for lessors of rental cars in the current legal environment. Currently, lessors are protected in Florida but await the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on this matter. Of course, if the Florida Supreme Court rules against preemption, defendants may request the matter be heard by the Eleventh Circuit, which has clearly ruled that the Graves Amendment preempts Florida state law.35 But should the Florida Supreme Court affirm the District Courts of Appeal in determining that the Graves Amendment preempts the Doctrine, it will shore up existing precedent and force plaintiffs to seek alternatives such as filing direct negligence claims against rental car companies for lack of maintenance, repair, and other defective conditions. We will also likely see a rise in negligent entrustment claims against rental car companies. How “grave” the Graves Amendment will be remains to be seen.
1 Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 821 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
2 Kamarsingh v. PV Holding Corp., 983 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
3 See Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959); Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1947) overruled in part on other grounds by Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984); Poole v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Orlando, 2006 WL 1388442 (2006).
4 See Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 993 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Tocha v. Richardson, 995 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); West v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 997 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Karling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 2 So. 3d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
5 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 445 (Fla. 1920).
6 Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000).
7 Id. citing Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1993).
8 Id. citing Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990).
10 § 324.021(9)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (2007).
11 Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 993 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 4thDCA 2008).
12 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2005).
13 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) (2005).
14 Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 993 So. 2d 614, 619 (Fla. 4thDCA 2008).
15 Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000) citing Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990).
16 Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Druin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
18 Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Druin, 2009 WL 995141 (2009) citing Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008).
19 Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
23 Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008).
24 Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 993 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
30 See St. Orange v. White, 988 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Blanks v. Enterprise Leasing Co. et al., (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing, Co., 993 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Karling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., 2 So. 3d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
31 Tocha v. Richardson and Dollar Thrifty Auto. Group, Inc., 995 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
32 West v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 997 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
33 Karling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 2 So. 3d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
34 Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 28 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 2009).
35 Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008).
The Internet is a powerful medium of communication in which information can easily be accessed by millions of people worldwide through a global network of computers. Information on the Internet can be disseminated via email, posted on newsgroups, discussed in chat rooms or displayed on home pages in various formats such as sound, video or text. Unlike traditional forms of media, the Internet is unique in that publishers and editors are primarily absent in cyberspace. The birth of the Internet created tension when courts attempted to apply traditional defamation law to this burgeoning new world. To better protect internet service providers (“ISPs”) and website operators from third-party claims for defamation committed on the Internet; Congress enacted section 230 of the Communication Decency Act (“CDA”).1 The creation of section 230 provides federal immunity to providers and users of an interactive computer for defamatory content made by a third party on the website.
Subsection (c) of the CDA, known as the “Good Samaritan” provision, states that “no provider or user of an interactive computer shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”2 This section also states that no provider of an interactive computer shall be liable for any action that is taken voluntarily and in good faith to restrict access to inappropriate material, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.3 Due to potential liability faced by ISPs and website operators, interactive service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers and websites to avoid any such restrictive effect.4 In doing so, Congress made a policy choice to remove the Internet from traditional defamation law. This choice holds the original publisher liable for his defamatory speech, but shelters publishers and distributors from any liability for speech that did not originate with them.
The blanket immunity provided by section 230 is not without limits. In many cases, the courts have continued to find that the ISPs and websites are “information content providers,” thereby denying them immunity. In Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., the court found that Yahoo! was not absolved from liability under section 230 for assisting a third-party in distributing misrepresentations.11 Although a third-party created the defamatory content, Yahoo! was not entitled to immunity because Yahoo! assisted in the transmission of the defamatory content. Similarly, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, the court found that the Defendant was an “information content provider” and immune from liability under the CDA.12 The Ninth Circuit repeatedly stated throughout its en banc opinion that the Roommates.com website required its users to provide certain information as a condition of its use and was, therefore, an information content provider.
Section 230 provides a valuable and necessary resource for protecting internet service providers and websites from the unpredictable behavior of the billions of users of the Internet. ISPs and websites need to assume some responsibility for the content posted on its website, but it is unrealistic to require all content to be monitored. Further, without section 230, the courts would be inundated with lawsuits against ISPs and websites. In turn, to avoid litigation, websites would likely restrict all third party content, consequently limiting forums available to express one’s thoughts.
In a world where the Internet is quickly becoming the most commonly used media forum, it is important to know what safe guards are available to websites and internet service providers. As the internet expands in the future, section 230 provides an important safeguard for Internet service providers and websites from a vast amount of litigation for the defamatory comment of third parties.
1 47 U.S.C. § 230.
2 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
3 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
4 Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
5 Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330.
6 Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. American Online, Inc., 206 F. 3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).
7 Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
8 Zeran , 129 F. 3d at 330.
9 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp.44, 52-53(D.D.C. 1998).
11 Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp.2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
12 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).

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