Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20091203_0004898.CCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:11:23+00:00

Document:
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; OFFICE OF THE ASSESSOR; SEIU LOCAL 721 AND SOLEDAD SARMIENTO-OSBORNE; ANNE SUAREZ; SEPIDEH A. SOURIS; WILLIAM T. FUJIOKA; MICHAEL J. HENRY; FRANK DOMINGUEZ; ROSE RANGEL, DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiff Chih Cheng Tsao ("Plaintiff"), appearing pro se, filed this suit alleging unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") against the defendants the County of Los Angeles Office of the Assessor (the "County"), Soledad Sarmiento-Osborne, Anna Suarez, Sepideh A. Souris, and William T. Fujioka (collectively the "Individual County Defendants"); as well as SIEU Local 721 (the "Union"), Frank Dominguez, and Rose Rangel (collectively the "Individual Union Defendants").
This matter comes before the Court on the County and Individual County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike, the Union and Individual Union Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. After reviewing the papers submitted by the parties, Court (1) grants in part and denies in part the County and Individual County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, (2) grants in part and denies in part the County and Individual County Defendants' Motion to Strike, (3) grants the Union and Individual Union Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and (4) denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
During the course of the next year, Plaintiff claims that she was subject to different terms and conditions of employment in retaliation for having filed EEOC complaints against the County. Among other things, Plaintiff claims the County subjected her to unlawful retaliation by: (1) denying her an opportunity to do "ARB work" and to use an "ARB computer," (FAC ¶ 3); (2) denying her a promotion, (FAC Ex. A, Charge of Discrimination No. 480-2008-00197); (3) denying her the right to have her interview results reevaluated, (FAC Ex. A, Charge of Discrimination No. 480-2007-01392); (4) requiring her to undergo a psychological evaluation, (FAC Ex. A, Charge of Discrimination No. 480-2008-00197); and (5) denying her appeal "not to appear for a psychological reevaluation", (FAC ¶ 3; Ex. A, Charge of Discrimination No. 480-2008-01858).
On June 30, 2009, the County and the Individual County Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for (1) insufficiency of process and service of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4)-(5); (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); and (3) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for both retaliation and NIED. (Dkt. No. 33.) The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to (1) properly serve the individual County Defendants with the FAC;*fn1 (2) exhaust her administrative remedies; and (3) state a claim for retaliation and NIED. The County filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's requests for: (1) damages for NIED; (2) attorney's fees; (3) prejudgment interest; (4) compensation for a car accident; and (5) new employment.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and thus a plaintiff's claim must invoke either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. A court will dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the complaint or relevant extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Federal question jurisdiction is governed by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which provides that subject matter jurisdiction is proper only when a question arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States appears on the face of a proper complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). It is well-established, however, that a court is to "liberally construe" the complaint of a plaintiff appearing pro se. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).
"A person seeking relief under Title VII must first file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice...." Surrell v. Cal. Water Svc. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). If the EEOC decides not to bring suit based upon the charge, it must "notify the person aggrieved" that she can file suit by issuing a right to sue letter. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). After the plaintiff has received a right-to-sue letter, she must file suit within 90 days. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).
However, "failure to obtain a federal right-to-sue letter does not preclude federal jurisdiction." Id. To the contrary, "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); see also Temengil v. Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, 881 F.2d 647, 654 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Pursuit of administrative remedies is a condition precedent to a Title VII claim. The requirement, however, is not jurisdictional.") (citations omitted).

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