Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/04/12/fedcir-requirement-of-medical-evidence-demonstrating-an-etiological-link-directly-contradicts-%C2%A7-3303b-groves-v-peake-no-2007-7241/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:35:26+00:00

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The Board’s, and subsequently the Veterans Court’s, requirement of medical evidence demonstrating an etiological link directly contradicts this interpretation of § 3.303(b) under which Mr. Groves was entitled to a presumption of service connection given that his condition diagnosed in service was chronic.
38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) provides that service connection “may be accomplished by affirmatively showing inception or aggravation during service . . .” This provision further instructs that “[d]eterminations as to service connection will be based on review of the entire evidence of record, with due consideration to the policy of the Department of Veterans Affairs to administer the law under a broad and liberal interpretation consistent with the facts in each individual case.” Id. § 3.303(a). Section 3.303(a) provides that each disabling condition for which a veteran seeks service connection “must be considered on the basis of . . . all pertinent medical and lay evidence.” See also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
With chronic disease shown as such in service (or within the presumptive period under § 3.307) so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes.
The plain language of § 3.303(b) establishes a presumption of service connection (rebuttable only by “clearly attributable intercurrent causes”) for a chronic disease which manifests during service and then again “at any later date, however remote.” Id. The Board’s, and subsequently the Veterans Court’s, requirement of medical evidence demonstrating an etiological link directly contradicts this interpretation of § 3.303(b) under which Mr. Groves was entitled to a presumption of service connection given that his condition diagnosed in service was chronic.
Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board). The Board held that a March 1982 regional office rating decision, which denied service connection for paranoid schizophrenia, did not contain clear and unmistakable error. We reverse and remand.
in December 1979, Mr. Groves received a diagnosis of “antisocial personality disorder, chronic, severe.” This diagnosis did not mention schizophrenia, neither confirming nor denying Mr. Groves’ earlier diagnoses.
and diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. This second evaluation noted that Mr. Grove exhibited no symptoms of any personality disorders.
unmistakable error and accordingly denied Mr. Groves an earlier effective date for his benefits.
the record at the time did not necessitate a change in outcome as it failed to contain medical evidence linking Mr. Groves’ post-service diagnosis of schizophrenia with his in-service diagnosis of schizophrenia.
Mr. Groves moved for reconsideration, asserting that, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), his in-service diagnosis was presumptively linked to his present diagnosis such that there was no need for him to provide further etiological medical evidence to establish the same. The Veterans Court granted his motion, issuing essentially the same opinion but adding that Mr. Groves’ “ultimate in-service diagnosis was antisocial personality disorder” and that reasonable minds could conclude that his personality disorder diagnosis at discharge was distinct from his schizophrenia diagnosis.
statutory right; or without observation of a procedure required by law. Id. § 7292(d)(1); Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
direct contradiction to a proper interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. We agree.
under which Mr. Groves was entitled to a presumption of service connection given that his condition diagnosed in service was chronic.
1 Even if paranoid schizophrenia were not defined as chronic by the regulations, § 3.303(b) further provides that: “When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after discharge is required to support the claim.” The parties do not dispute that Mr. Groves was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia in September 1979 (during service) and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia again in September 1981 (shortly after discharge).
decision contained clear and unmistakable error. Mr. Groves is entitled to an earlier effective date for his benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the determination of the Veterans Court and remand for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

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