Source: https://www.mediainstitute.org/2015/06/30/the-prior-restraint-question-in-garcia-v-google/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 07:47:22+00:00

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In a recent IP Viewpoints post my colleague Professor Randal Picker discussed the recent Ninth Circuit en banc opinion in Garcia v. Google.1 At the end of Professor Picker’s excellent essay he notes that he had chipped away at a part of Garcia, and expected other posts to perhaps take on other elements of the case.
In the spirit of that invitation I offer a few thoughts on an issue raised at the end of the majority en banc opinion, the question of injunctive relief and prior restraint doctrine in copyright law.
Professor Picker focused largely on the fundamental copyright issues in this fascinating case, examining issues of authorship, originality, and fixation in the context of the many different creative participants involved in the making of a film. He notes that copyright law is not stupid, and offers highly sensible solutions based on default doctrines such as “work-for-hire” and “joint work” principles, as well as the relative ease with which contract law may alter arrangements, to sort through many of the problems posed by Garcia.
For my part, I think it is worth taking note of the intriguing First Amendment issues discussed by the majority at the end of its opinion.
Judge Kozinski’s original panel opinion represents one strain of orthodoxy regarding injunctive relief in copyright law, which is essentially that the question of whether a copyright plaintiff is granted an injunction is determined entirely by the internal law of copyright, as supplemented by the law of remedies – the body of equitable principles that govern the grant or denial of injunctions, with no independent place for the First Amendment. The reasoning is relatively simple and mechanical. Once copyright infringement is shown, the expression at issue by definition is stripped of First Amendment protection. This by definition means that an injunction prohibiting further or ongoing infringement (such as an injunction ordering a film clip taken down from YouTube) cannot be an unconstitutional “prior restraint” because the expression itself is not protected by the First Amendment. This is bolstered by the fact that Congress itself has authorized injunctive relief among the remedies provided in the Copyright Act. Preliminary and permanent injunctions, of course, are still equitable remedies, and so a plaintiff must meet the burdens imposed by rules of equity. In the case of preliminary injunctions, for example, this includes proof of likelihood of success on the merits, demonstration of irreparable harm, weighing of the balance of hardships, and the public interest. Judge Kozinski’s formulation, however, appears to recognize no additional role for the First Amendment, including the First Amendment’s heavy presumption against prior restraints.
Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion in the original Ninth Circuit panel decision, as well as Judge McKeown’s opinion for the en banc majority, treated the First Amendment and prior restraint doctrine as an additional factor weighing against injunctive relief, over and above the internal law of copyright or principles of equity.
Note that although Judge Smith cited First Amendment principles, he treated those principles as part of the public interest factor to be weighted in granting equitable relief.
This is an issue inviting greater reflection and investigation, but my preliminary thoughts are with Judge McKeown. To say that First Amendment prior restraint principles do not apply whenever the expression at issue is an infringement of copyright, let alone a mere alleged infringement of copyright, is to conflate the question of whether the speech is ultimately protected by the First Amendment with the question of whether the remedy, if the speech is not protected, should be a “subsequent punishment” or a “prior restraint.” Expression alleged to violate copyright, or even finally adjudicated to violate copyright, is not invisible to the First Amendment. It is useful to compare, for example, the classic rules governing remedies in defamation law, in which even speech found to be defamatory is normally deemed by common law principles, equitable maxims, and First Amendment doctrine to be ineligible for injunctive relief. There have been inroads on this traditional rule, but the mainstream view, a view informed and influenced by First Amendment prior restraint law, is that equity will not enjoin a libel.
There are cases, I am sure, in which the First Amendment ought not bar even preliminary injunctive relief protecting the interests of copyright owners. But I am persuaded by Judge McKeown’s position that the First Amendment needs to be part of the conversation.
1. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 736, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
2. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 736, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
3. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
4. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
5. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
6. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
7. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), citing Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 831 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147 (1998).
8. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221, 123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003).
9. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993) (“Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions – i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities – are classic examples of prior restraints.”).
10. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
11. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 2014 Copr.L.Dec. P 30,570, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d 1799, 42 Media L. Rep. 1309, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2045, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2351(9th Cir. 2014).
12. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 2014 Copr.L.Dec. P 30,570, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d 1799, 42 Media L. Rep. 1309, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2045, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2351(9th Cir. 2014), citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-220, 123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003).
13. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1277, 2014 Copr.L.Dec. P 30,570, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d 1799, 42 Media L. Rep. 1309, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2045, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2351(9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting).
14. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1277-78, 2014 Copr.L.Dec. P 30,570, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d 1799, 42 Media L. Rep. 1309, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2045, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2351(9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting).
15. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 747, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607, 43 Media L. Rep. 1723, 15 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4836, 2015 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5422 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

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