Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/338-f-2d-911-595702186
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:44:21+00:00

Document:
Party Name: Robert D. PUTMAN, Appellant, v. ERIE CITY MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al., Appellees.
ERIE CITY MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al., Appellees.
Joyce Hill, A. W. Salyars, Lubbock, Tex., for appellant.
J. Orville Smith and Crenshaw, Dupree & Milam, Lubbock, Tex., for appellees.
Before BROWN, WISDOM and BELL, Circuit Judges.
Once again Erie 1 thrusts the Court into the field of products liability. 2 Once again state guidelines are hard to find and follow. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 1942, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479, a case of national importance, firmly settled the law of Texas that in a food case privity of contract is not a prerequisite to recovery for breach of a manufacturer's warranty of fitness for human consumption; the warranty is implied by law as a matter of public policy. But the Supreme Court of Texas has not committed itself to a position on the necessity for privity as a prerequisite to recovery in non-food cases. In the case before the court the defective product is a wheel chair. Making an Erie educated guess, we hold: Today, the Supreme Court of Texas would follow Decker to its logical conclusion and rule that a manufacturer or assembler of a defective product, unreasonably dangerous to the user, is subject to strict liability to the user for an injury caused by the defect, even though the product is not a food for human consumption, there is no proof of negligence, and there is no privity between the user and the manufacturer or assembler.
the district court overruled the plaintiff's motion for judgment and entered judgment for the defendants. We reverse.
In Henningsen, characterized by Dean Keeton 5 as 'one of the most significant cases since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.', 6 the court, quoting extensively from Decker, could 'see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile'. Sitting as an Erie court in Texas, and also relying on the reasoning in Decker, we see no rational doctrinal difference to justify any distinction between an upset stomach caused by a fly in a coke and a broken leg caused by a weak axle of a wheel chair.
more modern contractual warranty, but is an obligation imposed by law to protect public health. * * * The doctrine of privity of contract and of the necessity therefor in order to sustain an action grew out of the later action of assumpsit. It (applied) only when one is seeking to enforce a contract. Here the liability of the manufacturer and vendor is imposed by operation of law as a matter of public policy for the protection of the public, and is not dependent on any provision of the contract, either express or implied.' (Emphasis supplied) 164 S.W.2d 831.
special protection--the old, the infirm, the crippled. Such persons would seem to have as much of a claim to protection externally as those who are entitled to protection internally because of their consumption of drugs and medicines. If the Decker doctrine extends beyond food products, and we think that it does, a wheel chair case is an a fortiori case for holding a manufacturer and assembler strictly liable to a user.
Turning now to Texas cases since Decker, we find cross-currents, especially in the decisions of the Courts of Civil Appeals, but a general trend toward relaxing the requirement of privity.
The day Decker was decided, the Texas Supreme Court decided Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 1942, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835, 142 A.L.R. 1424, extending the same strict liability to retailers as to manufacturers. In Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 1952, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153, however, a majority of the court declined to extend the doctrine to a wholesaler who simply passes on to a retailer a product in a sealed package, and expressed doubt as to retailer's liability. Justice Garwood, joined by others, in a strong dissent approved the Griggs doctrine of retailer liability and argued that wholesaler liability was a logical corollary. This Court has said: 'We see nothing in Bowman to detract from Decker. Nor does it, standing alone, or in conjunction with decisions of the Courts of Civil Appeals, reveal a purpose to retract or constrict the philosophy which Decker set forth'. Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 5 Cir. 1959, 267 F.2d 138, 139.

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