Source: http://co.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180402_0000436.DCO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:53:41+00:00

Document:
C/O MULLEN, in his official and individual capacity, Defendant.
This matter is before the court sua sponte pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(d). As of the date of this Order, Defendant has not filed a motion for new trial as is permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, although the time within which he may do so has not yet expired. Rule 59(d) authorizes a trial court to order a new trial on its own initiative for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, but limits this authority by requiring such action be taken within twenty-eight days after entry of judgment. The original judgment in this case [Doc. No. 120] was entered on March 9, 2018. Hence, under Rule 59(d), this court's Order for a New Trial is authorized by the Rule. Kain v. Winslow Mfg., Inc., 736 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984); Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952). The court finds further that it is not required to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to the parties prior to entry of this Order for a New Trial because there is no pending Rule 59 motion and therefore this Order is not based upon “a reason not stated in the motion.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
“A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant [ ] a new trial.” Harvey By & Through Harvey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1989). A federal court may set aside a jury verdict if the ends of justice require it. Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 86, 88-89 (10th Cir. 1972).
[t]he motion for a new trial may invoke the discretion of the court in so far as it is bottomed on the claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair . . . .
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). Although motions for a new trial are generally committed to a court's discretion, they are disfavored and should be granted with “great caution.” Richins v. Deere and Co., 231 F.R.D. 623, 625 (D.N.M. 2004); Guidance Endodontics, LLC v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 749 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1256 (D.N.M. 2010).
A jury's determination of damages is considered inviolate unless an award is so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience and raises an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial. Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir. 1981); Xiong v. Knight Transportation, Inc., 77 F.Supp.3d 1016, 1020-21 (D. Colo. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Pahoua Xiong v. Knight Transportation, Inc., 658 F. App'x 884 (10th Cir. 2016). See also Blangsted v. Snowmass-Wildcat Fire Prot. Dist., 642 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1256 (D. Colo. 2009). A verdict will not be set aside on this basis, however, unless it is so plainly excessive as to suggest that it was the product of such passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Id. Such bias, prejudice or passion can be inferred from excessiveness. Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168. See also Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 1995); Wells v. Colo. College, 478 F.2d 158, 162 (10th Cir. 1973). Focus should be on “whether the compensatory award was excessive in relation to the injury[.]” McInerney v. United Air Lines, Inc., 463 F. App'x 709, 723 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1169; Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F.Supp.3d 1112, 1150 (D. Kan. 2017)). Cases analyzing the grant of a new trial where damages shock the conscience with their excess recognize the principle that if the court determines that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, or for any other reason it appears that the jury erred or abused its discretion on not only on the issue of damages but also on the issue of liability, the court must unconditionally order a new trial and cannot give the plaintiff the option to accept a lesser amount. Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168 (emphasis added). See also Minneapolis St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521-22 (1931) (“In actions under the federal statute no verdict can be permitted to stand which is found to be in any degree the result of appeals to passion and prejudice.”); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160 (1967) (“a verdict based on jury prejudice cannot be sustained even when punitive damages are warranted”). If the court finds that an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial, “then the court must order a new trial on all issues because it is impossible to determine the degree to which these factors affected the jury generally and therefore influenced the determination of liability.” Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 564 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1201 (D. Colo. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 618 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2010). See also Higgs v. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d 840, 860-61 (Colo. 1985); Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168; Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1560 (10th Cir. 1991).
In this case, the jury awarded the Plaintiff compensatory damages of $5, 000, 000.00 on a record supporting, at best, only nominal damages. Additionally, the jury awarded $1, 000, 000.00 in punitive damages on a record which was bereft of any evidence of wrongdoing except that based solely on the testimony of an agitated convicted felon who had known the Plaintiff for only one week, who knew nothing about Plaintiff's seizure disorder nor his use of Coumadin, a blood thinner causing excessive bleeding of any skin laceration, nor the Plaintiff's physical condition at the time his second seizure commenced.
In the late morning on March 7, 2013, the Plaintiff, Jayson Oslund, suffered a seizure during which he fell backward from a full standing position and landed on his head on the cement floor of the Sterling Correctional Facility (“SCF”). Fellow inmate Ernest Montoya, who was with Plaintiff at the time, testified that Mr. Oslund “just fell out and then busted his head on the cement.” Plaintiff was taken to the medical unit where he was examined, his bleeding was stopped and his scalp wound stitched. Dr. Maurice Fauvel, a staff physician at SCF, testified that when he first saw the Plaintiff that day, Mr. Oslund had a laceration on his head consistent with falling backward onto concrete. Dr. Fauvel testified that the Plaintiff knew he had a seizure disorder but Plaintiff refused to take medications which had been prescribed for him to control his seizures. After this seizure, Dr. Fauvel administered anti-seizure medication; however, he explained that such medications are not instantly effective, but rather have to build up in the system of the patient. Dr. Fauvel noted that Plaintiff had a hematoma on his head from swelling and bruising that the doctor found to be predictable because of Plaintiff's use of blood thinners to manage a clotting disorder.
The activities which spawned this case arose five to six hours subsequent to Plaintiff's injury-causing seizure and fall, after Plaintiff left the medical unit in a wheelchair and was transported to his new ground floor cell.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.