Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_us_rule52
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:06:37+00:00

Document:
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 47.
Pillage is also prohibited in the territory of the parties to a conflict as well as in occupied territory.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 272.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 397.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 504(j).
(8) Plunder or pillage of public or private property.
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 15-3(c)(8).
When searching dwellings in enemy towns or villages, do not take nonmilitary items. Theft is a violation of the laws of war and US law. Stealing private property will make civilians more likely to fight you or to support the enemy forces. You do not want to have to fight both the enemy armed forces and civilians.
Under the US Instructor’s Guide (1985), pillage means “to loot, to deprive of money or property by violence”.
United States, Instructor’s Guide – The Law of War, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, April 1985, p. 28.
The US Rules of Engagement for Operation Desert Storm (1991) prohibits looting.
United States, Desert Storm – Rules of Engagement, Pocket Card, US Central Command, January 1991, reprinted in Operational Law Handbook, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1995, pp. 8-7 and 8-8, § F.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 6.2.5(8).
(4) The appropriation or seizure took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict.
c. Maximum punishment. Confinement for 20 years.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part IV, § 6(5), p. IV-5.
The US Naval Handbook (2007) states that “[p]lunder and pillage of public or private property” are examples of acts that could be considered war crimes.
(4) The appropriation or seizure took place in the context of and was associated with hostilities.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, § 5(5), p. IV-5.
The US Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region I (1945) established military commissions which had jurisdiction over offences such as “plunder of public or private property”.
The US Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region II (1945) established military commissions which had jurisdiction over offences such as “plunder of public or private property”.
Under the US Uniform Code of Military Justice (1950), abandoning one’s place of duty to plunder or pillage and engaging in looting or pillaging are punishable offences.
United States, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1950, Articles 99 and 103.
Under the US War Crimes Act (1996), violations of Article 28 of the 1907 Hague Regulations are war crimes.
“(5) PILLAGING.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally and in the absence of military necessity appropriates or seizes property for private or personal use, without the consent of a person with authority to permit such appropriation or seizure, shall be punished as a military commission under this chapter may direct.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2626, § 950v(b)(5).
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 950t(5).
In the Pohl case before the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1947, the accused, top ranking officials of the SS, were charged with taking part in the commission of plunder of public and private property. They were found guilty, inter alia, of the looting of property of Jewish civilians in eastern occupied territories.
In its judgment in the John Schultz case in 1952, the US Court of Military Appeals listed robbery, larceny and burglary as crimes “universally recognized as properly punishable under the law of war”.
In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense condemned the following Iraqi war crimes: “looting of civilian property in violation of [the 1907 Hague Regulations]”, “pillage, in violation of Article 47 [of the 1907 Hague Regulations]” and “pillage of Kuwaiti civilian hospitals, in violation of Articles 55, 56, 57, and 147 [of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV]”.
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 632 and 635.
In the Flick case before the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1947, the accused, the principal proprietor of a large group of German industrial enterprises (and four officials of the same group), which included coal and iron mines and steel producing plants, was charged with war crimes, inter alia, for the plunder of public and private property, and spoliation, in the countries and territories occupied by Germany. Flick was found guilty of this count of indictment. The Tribunal stated that “no defendant is shown by the evidence to have been responsible for any act of pillage as that word is commonly understood”, but it, however, quoted Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Regulations as one of the articles relevant in casu.
Spoliation of private property … is forbidden under two aspects; firstly, the individual private owner of property must not be deprived of it; secondly, the economic subsistence of the belligerently occupied territory must not be taken over by the occupant or put to the service of his war effort – always with the proviso that there are exemptions from this rule which are strictly limited to the needs of the army of occupation in so far as such needs do not exceed the economic strength of the occupied territory.
The Hague Regulations do not specifically employ the term “spoliation”, but we do not consider this matter to be one of legal significance. As employed in the Indictment, the term is used interchangeably with the words “plunder” and “exploitation”. It may therefore be properly considered that the term “spoliation”, which has been admittedly adopted as a term of convenience by the Prosecution, applies to the widespread and systematised acts of dispossession and acquisition of property in violation of the rights of the owners which took place in territories under the belligerent occupation or control of Nazi Germany during World War II. We consider that “spoliation” is synonymous with the word “plunder” as employed in Control Council Law No. 10, and that it embraces offences against property in violation of the laws and customs of war of the general type charged in the Indictment.
In our view, the offences against property defined in the Hague Regulations are broad in their phraseology and do not admit of any distinction between “plunder” in the restricted sense of acquisition of physical properties, which are the subject matter of the crime, the plunder or spoliation resulting from acquisition of intangible property such as is involved in the acquisition of stock ownership, or of acquisition of ownership or control through any other means, even though apparently legal in form.

References: § 47
 § 272
 § 397
 § 504
 § 15
 § 6
 § 6
 § 5
 § 950
 § 950
in casu