Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/lopez-ramirez-v-united-694891665
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:43:13+00:00

Document:
Party Name: Gilberto Lopez-Ramirez, Appellant, v. United States, Appellee.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (DVM-2363-14) Hon. Neal E. Kravitz, Trial Judge.
Daniel S. Harana, Public Defender Service, with whom Samia Fain and Alice Wang, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant.
Lauren R. Bales, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Channing D. Phillips, United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello, and Candice C. Wong, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before FlStlHR and Beckwith, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.
After a bench trial, appellant Gilberto Lopez-Ramirez was convicted of attempted misdemeanor sexual abuse,  but acquitted of three counts of contempt.2 Appellant argues that he should have received a jury trial because his "total financial exposure" was greater than $4, 000 when taking into account assessments under the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act (VVCCA). We affirm the decision of the Superior Court denying appellant's request for a jury trial. We remand for the limited purpose of correcting appellant's sentence.
VVCCA assessments are mandatory payments "imposed upon each person convicted of or pleading guilty or nolo contendere to the offense in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or any other court in which the offense is charged." D.C. Code § 4-516 (a) (2012 Repl.). A defendant must pay "an assessment of between $50 and $250 for . . . misdemeanor offenses, and an assessment of between $100 and $5, 000 for each felony offense[.]" hi. The assessments are placed in a fund that is used to compensate victims of crime in the District of Columbia. See Parrish v. District of Columbia, 718 A.2d 133, 133-34 (D.C. 1998); see also D.C. Code § 4-515 (2012 Repl.) (Crime Victims Compensation Fund).
D.C. Code § 16-705 (b)(1)(B) (2012 Repl.) allows a defendant to demand a trial by jury if he "is charged with 2 or more offenses which are punishable by a cumulative fine or penalty of more than $4, 000 or a cumulative term of imprisonment of more than 2 years[.]" On the day before trial, appellant moved for a jury trial, arguing that an assessment under the VVCCA should be considered a "fine or penalty" within the meaning of this statutory provision.
Standing alone, the charge of attempted misdemeanor sexual abuse exposed appellant to paying $750: a $500 fine, plus a $250 VVCCA assessment. See D.C. Code §§ 22-3006, -3018 (2012 Repl.) (setting a maximum fine of $500 for attempted misdemeanor sexual abuse). Appellant was exposed to a potential payment of $3, 750 if convicted of the three contempt counts: $3, 000 in fines, and $750 in VVCCA assessments. See D.C. Code §§ 23-1329 (c), 22-3571.01 (2012 Repl.) (setting a maximum fine of $1, 000 for each contempt violation). Appellant therefore faced total potential payments of $4, 500. Because this amount exceeded the $4, 000 threshold for fines or penalties in D.C. Code § 16-705 (b)(1)(B), appellant argued that he was entitled to a jury trial.
Gotay v. United States, 805 A.2d 944 (D.C. 2002), in which this court noted that the VVCCA "does not call [these sums] fines; moreover, fines are generally prescribed in the statutes that define particular crimes and establish the penalties for them." Id. at 948 n.9. The Gotay court decided to adhere to the statutory term "assessments" when referring to VVCCA payments. Id. However, the court in Gotay was not presented with the question we consider here whether a VVCCA assessment should count as a "fine or penalty" for purposes of determining the statutory right to a jury trial.
Because appellant only faced a maximum payment of S3, 500 if VVCCA assessments were not included, Judge Cordero's ruling meant that he could not cross the $4, 000 threshold established in D.C. Code § 16-705 (b)(1)(B) to obtain a jury trial. After convicting appellant of attempted misdemeanor sexual abuse, Judge Neal E. Kravitz sentenced him to 180 days' incarceration, with execution of sentence suspended as to all but thirty days; two years of probation; and a $50 payment under the VVCCA. On appeal, Mr. Lopez-Ramirez reiterates his argument that VVCCA assessments should be treated as fines or penalties under D.C. Code § 16-705 (b)(1)(B), thus making his case jury-demandable.
We note as an initial matter that our inquiry focuses on the statutory right to a jury trial conferred in the District of Columbia. Appellant has not asserted that his constitutional right to a jury trial has been violated, and such a claim would fail under Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Lewis v. United Slates, 518 U.S. 322, 323 (1996) (holding "that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses"); United States v. Naehtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1993) (holding that a defendant was "not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial" because he was charged with a "petty offense" even though the penalties for the offense included a maximum fine of $5, 000). The issue presented is entirely a matter of legislative intent: did the Council of the District of Columbia intend that a VVCCA assessment be treated as a fine or penalty for purposes of applying D.C. Code$ 16-705?
Our review of questions of statutory interpretation is de novo. Peterson v. United States, 997 A.2d 682, 683 (D.C. 2010). "We begin by looking first to the plain language of the statute to determine if it is clear and unambiguous." Id. at 684 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are mindful, however, that "[statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor[.]" Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123, 1127 (D.C. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Washington Gas Light Co. v. Pub. Sen: Comm'n, 982 A.2d 691, 716 (D.C. 2009)). "When interpreting a statute, the judicial task is to discern, and give effect to, the legislature's intent." //; re C.G.H., 75 A.3d 166, 171 (D.C. 2013) (quoting A.R. v. F.C., 33 A.3d 403, 405 (D.C. 2011)). Indeed, "the primary rule" of statutory construction "is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent and to give legislative words their natural meaning; should effort be made to broaden the meaning of statutory language by mere inference or surmise or speculation, we might well defeat true legislative intent." Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 237-38 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (alterations omitted) (quoting Banks v. United States, 359 A.2d 8, 10 (D.C. 1976)).
Thus, "[t]he words of a statute are a primary index but not the sole index to legislative intent; the words cannot prevail over strong contrary indications in the legislative history." Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted). "It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." O 'Rourke v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters' Ret. & Relief Bd., 46 A.3d 378, 383 (D.C. 2012) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133(2000)).
We begin by looking at the statutory texts. "Fine" and "penalty" are not defined in D.C. Code § 16-705, but the legislature could not have thought that VVCCA assessments fell within those terms when it first enacted that statute. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 11-715a (1961 ed.) (recodifying the provision that a defendant may demand a jury trial when the "fine or penalty" exceeds certain thresholds). VVCCA assessments were not created until 1982. See 29 D.C. Reg. 983-85 (1982). Appellant nonetheless argues that VVCCA assessments should be considered to be fines or penalties under D.C. Code § 16-705 because, among other reasons, they "place a financial burden on the defendant, " they "are imposed as part of a defendant's sentence, " they have characteristics that seem to fall within dictionary definitions of "fine" and "penalty, " and the "failure to pay them will result in the same treatment as the failure to pay any other fine or penalty."

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