Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Humiston_v._Stainthorp
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:17:20+00:00

Document:
STAINTHORP and Seguine had filed a bill in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York, against Humiston, for infringing a patent for moulding candles; and had obtained a decree against him.
Mr. Gifford, in favor of the motion of dismissal: An appeal lies only from a final decree; this is an interlocutory one. A final decree in equity is one which finally decides and disposes of the whole merits of the case, and reserves no questions or directions for the future judgment of the court from which an appeal could be taken. This court will not allow a case to be divided up into a plurality of appeals.
In Perkins v. Fourniquet,  the decree was that the complainant was entitled to two-sevenths of certain property, and referred it to a master to take and report an account of it, reserving all other questions until the coming in of the master's report. It was held that this was not a final decree on which an appeal could be taken.
In Pulliam et al. v. Christian,  the decree set aside a deed and directed an account from trustees. This was held not to be a final decree, and an appeal from it was dismissed.
In Craighead et al. v. Wilson,  a bill was filed claiming property as heirs. A decree was made, which, among other things, referred it to a master to take an account. The court held that this decree was interlocutory, and that no final decree could be made until after the coming in of the master's report, and the appeal was dismissed.
I. The precise question whether an appeal may be taken from such a decree does not seem to have arisen in this court, but the principles which have controlled the decisions concerning appeals, establish the right of appeal from the decree herein.
In Forgay v. Conrad,  where the decree set aside as void certain deeds of lands and slaves, and directed an account of profits, and expressly retained a part of the bill for further decree, it was held that an appeal from same was well taken.
In Barnard v. Gibson,  relied on by the other side, where the decree was for an injunction and an account of profits, and expressly reserved 'the question of costs and all other questions' not specifically passed upon, it was held that from such decree an appeal would not lie; and in that case this court did not undertake to reverse its former decisions, but to abide thereby.
Now the decree in this case, though different from that in either of the cases thus referred to, is much nearer that in Forgay v. Conrad than the one in Barnard v. Gibson, for it fully disposes of the merits, without reserving any question whatever, and leaves nothing uncompleted but an accounting, like that in Forgay v. Conrad; and upon the principle established in those cases, the appeal was well taken. That principle is, that whenever a decree decides the merits of the controversy, it is final, for the purposes of an appeal, though ulterior proceedings have to be had and a further or additional decree yet remains to be made. Thus in Forgay v. Conrad, the court say of the decree therein, 'undoubtedly it is not final, in the strict technical sense of the term,' and then adopting a wider view of the act of Congress, lay down the principle that when a decree decides the right in controversy, and permits it to be carried into execution, it is pro tanto, final for the purposes of an appeal. And the only way of reconciling Barnard v. Gibson with that case is, that it reserved the question of costs and other questions.
1st. Because it disposes of the entire merits, and leaves nothing but a mere accounting.
2d. Because the court below has power to render and enforce such a decree (and the practice of rendering and enforcing such decrees has become very general), and unless an appeal be allowed therefrom, the right of appeal to this court is virtually annulled in this class of cases, where the decree is for the complainant.
3d. Because the accounting in such cases is necessarily tedious and expensive, and should therefore be postponed until the merits are finally disposed of; for if the decree be reversed the accounting becomes a needless waste of time and money, and even if it be modified, as to the nature or extent of the patent or of the infringement of same, such accounting becomes almost equally useless.

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