Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/451/355/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 16:10:16+00:00

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The Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (District), a governmental entity, stores and delivers untreated water to the owners of 236,000 acres of land in central Arizona, and, to subsidize its water operations, sells electricity to hundreds of thousands of people in an area including a large part of metropolitan Phoenix. Under state law, the system for electing the District's directors limits voting eligibility to landowners and apportions voting power according to the number of acres owned. A class of registered voters living within the District but owning either no land or less than an acre of land there filed suit, claiming that the election scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that, because the District has such governmental powers as the authority to condemn land and sell tax-exempt bonds, and because it sells electricity to virtually half the State's population and exercises significant influence on flood control and environmental management, its policies and actions substantially affect all District residents, regardless of property ownership. The District Court upheld the constitutionality of the voting scheme, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the case was governed by the one-person, one-vote principle established in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, rather than by the exception to that principle established in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U. S. 719, which upheld a state law permitting only landowners to vote for directors of a water district because of its special limited purpose and the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group.
Held: The District's purpose is sufficiently specialized and narrow and its activities bear on landowners so disproportionately as to release it from the strict demands of the Reynolds principle. As in Salyer, supra, the voting scheme for the District is constitutional because it bears a reasonable relationship to its statutory objectives. Pp. 451 U. S. 362-371.
powers that invoke the strict demands of Reynolds. It cannot impose ad valorem property taxes or sales taxes or enact laws governing citizens' conduct. Nor does it administer normal government functions such as the maintenance of streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare services. Pp. 451 U. S. 365-336.
(b) The District's water functions, which constitute its primary and originating purpose, are relatively narrow. Although, unlike in Salyer, as much as 40% of the water delivered by the District goes for nonagricultural, urban purposes, the constitutionally relevant fact is that all water is distributed according to land ownership, and the District cannot control the use to which the water is put by the landowners. Pp. 451 U. S. 367-368.
(c) Nor is the legality of the District's property-based voting scheme affected by the fact that, as one of the largest suppliers of electric power in the State, it meets most of its capital and operating costs by the selling of such power. The provision of electricity is not, in itself, the sort of general or important governmental function that would make the government provider subject to the Reynolds doctrine. And, in any event, the District's electric power functions are only incidental to, and thus cannot change the character of, its water functions. Pp. 451 U. S. 368-370.
(d) And the District's functions bear a disproportionate relationship to the specific class of people whom the system makes eligible to vote. Voting landowners are the only residents of the District whose lands are subject to liens to secure District bonds, who are subject to the District's acreage-based taxing power, and who committed capital to the District. Pp. 451 U. S. 370-371.
613 F.2d 180, reversed and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 451 U. S. 372. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 451 U. S. 374.
This appeal concerns the constitutionality of the system for electing the directors of a large water reclamation district in Arizona, a system which, in essence, limits voting eligibility to landowners and apportions voting power according to the amount of land a voter owns. The case requires us to consider whether the peculiarly narrow function of this local governmental body and the special relationship of one class of citizens to that body releases it from the strict demands of the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The public entity at issue here is the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, which stores and delivers untreated water to the owners of land comprising 236,000 acres in central Arizona. [Footnote 1] The District, formed as a governmental entity in 1937, subsidizes its water operations by selling electricity, and has become the supplier of electric power for hundreds of thousands of people in an area including a large part of metropolitan Phoenix. Nevertheless, the history of the District began in the efforts of Arizona farmers in the 19th century to irrigate the arid lands of the Salt River Valley, and, as the parties have stipulated, the primary purposes of the District have always been the storage, delivery, and conservation of water.
that Act, the United States gave interest-free loans to help landowners build reclamation projects. The Salt River Project, from which the District developed, was created in 1903 as a result of this legislation. In 1906, Congress authorized projects created under the Act to generate and sell hydroelectric power, 43 U.S.C. § 522, and the Salt River Project has supported its water operations by this means almost since its creation. The 1902 Act provided that the water users who benefited from the reclamation project had to agree to repay to the United States the costs of constructing the project, and the Salt River Valley Water Users Association was organized as an Arizona corporation in 1903 to serve as the contracting agent for the landowners. The Association's Articles, drafted in cooperation with the Federal Reclamation Service, gave subscribing landowners the right to reclamation water and the power to vote in Association decisions in proportion to the number of acres the subscribers owned. The Articles also authorized acreage-proportionate stock assessments to raise income for the Association, the assessments becoming a lien on the subscribing owners' land until paid. For almost 15 years, the Federal Reclamation Service operated and maintained the project's irrigation system for the landowners; under a 1917 contract with the United States, however, the Association itself took on these tasks, proceeding to manage the project for the next 20 years.
raise money through an acreage-proportionate taxing power that mirrors the Association's stock assessment scheme, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 45-1014, 45-1015 (1956), or through bonds secured by liens on the real property within the District, though the bonds can simultaneously be secured by District revenues, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 45-936 (Supp. 1980-1981).
This lawsuit was brought by a class of registered voters who live within the geographic boundaries of the District and who own either no land or less than an acre of land within the District. The complaint alleged that the District enjoys such governmental powers as the power to condemn land, to sell tax-exempt bonds, and to levy taxes on real property. It also alleged that, because the District sells electricity to virtually half the population of Arizona, and because, through its water operations, it can exercise significant influence on flood control and environmental management within its boundaries, the District's policies and actions have a substantial effect on all people who live within the District, regardless of property ownership. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the appellees claimed that the acreage-based scheme for electing directors of the District violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
in Salyer resulted from this Court's examination of the nature of the services provided by the water district in that case, and its conclusion that, "by reason of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group," the water district there was not subject to the strict one-person, one-vote demands of the Reynolds decision. 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 728. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of the Salt River District's electoral system by comparing the purposes and effects of the activities of the Salt River District with those of the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District.
The Court of Appeals was correct in conceiving the question in this case to be whether the purpose of the District is sufficiently specialized and narrow, and whether its activities bear on landowners so disproportionately, as to distinguish the District from those public entities whose more general governmental functions demand application of the Reynolds principle. We conclude, however, that, in its efforts to distinguish Salyer the Court of Appeals did not apply these criteria correctly to the facts of this case.
"a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents."
"It is, of course, possible that there might be some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds . . . might not be required. . . ."
"its primary purpose, indeed the reason for its existence, is to provide for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin."
The Court concluded that the California Legislature could have reasonably assumed that, without voting power apportioned according to the value of their land, the landowners might not have been willing to subject their lands to the lien of the very assessments which made the creation of the district possible. 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 731.
by the selling of electric power. [Footnote 10] Nevertheless, a careful examination of the Salt River District reveals that, under the principles of the Avery, Hadley, and Salyer cases, these distinctions do not amount to a constitutional difference.
"to support the primary irrigation functions by supplying power for reclamation uses and by providing revenues which could be applied to increase the amount and reduce the cost of water to Association subscribed lands."
number of people they affect serve to transform the District into an entity of general governmental power. But no matter how great the number of nonvoting residents buying electricity from the District, the relationship between them and the District's power operations is essentially that between consumers and a business enterprise from which they buy. [Footnote 18] Nothing in the Avery, Hadley, or Salyer cases suggests that the volume of business or the breadth of economic effect of a venture undertaken by a government entity as an incident of its narrow and primary governmental public function can, of its own weight, subject the entity to the one-person, one-vote requirements of the Reynolds case.
The review in this opinion of the history, organization, functions, and financing of the District is drawn from the stipulation of facts in the District Court.
In recent years, the method of electing the Board of Directors has departed somewhat from the strict one-acre, one-vote system originally used by the Association and the District. In 1969, the state legislature amended the Agricultural Improvement Act to permit owners of less than one acre to cast fractional votes in proportion to their acreage. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 45-983C (Supp. 1980-1981). A second change had to do with the membership of the Board of Directors itself. Before 1976, there were 10 directors, each elected from a designated geographical part of the District. In 1976, after the District Court had dismissed the complaint in this case, the state legislature enlarged the Board to 14 members and provided that the 4 new members were to be elected at large, with each landowner in the District having one vote in the at-large election. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 45-961B, 45-963 (Supp. 1980-1981). Each special water district also has a President and Vice President, elected at large on an acreage-weighted basis. § 4963.
"[T]he scale of the District's operations simply does not permit the interpretation that the electric utility is a side venture that the District dabbles in to pick up a little extra money in order to benefit the landowners. The operation of the utility has taken on independent significance. . . . The electric utility operations of the District are so substantial in scope and are so closely interwoven with the water delivery functions of the District that it is not a special limited purpose district whose operations have a disproportionate effect on landowners as a class."
Among the duties of the County Commissioners Court in Avery were establishing courthouses and jails, appointing health officials, building roads and bridges, administering welfare, setting the county tax rate, adopting the county budget, and equalizing tax assessments. 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 476.
"[T]he Constitution does not require that a uniform straitjacket bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local problems."
Id. at 390 U. S. 485.
The Court held that the Junior College District in Hadley did not fall within this exception because "[e]ducation has traditionally been a vital governmental function, and these . . . are governmental officials in every relevant sense of that term." 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 56.
On the same day it decided Salyer, the Court upheld a similar scheme in Wyoming, under which the voters in a referendum on the creation of a water district had to be landowners, and in which the decision to create the district required the votes of landowners representing a majority of the acreage of the lands within the proposed district. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U. S. 743 (per curiam).
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621, 395 U. S. 627, the Court stated that the exclusion of otherwise qualified voters from a particular election must be justified by some compelling state interest. But in considering whether the voting scheme for the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District bore some relevancy to the purpose for which the scheme was adopted, Salyer imposed no such requirement.
Approximately 15% of the water delivered by the District is used in farming areas for nonagricultural irrigation purposes such as schools, playgrounds, and parks. Another 25% is delivered to municipalities. Of the latter, some belongs to the municipalities themselves as landowners, and some belongs to landowning city residents who have chosen the cities as their receiving agents.
As the Court of Appeals noted, the District has $290 million of general obligation bonds outstanding that are secured by the statutory lien on District lands, but the bonds have been serviced entirely out of the District's power earnings, and, since 1973, all borrowing for capital improvements has been secured by pledges of revenues. The District now has outstanding $600 million of these revenue bonds, which are junior to the general obligation bonds. The voting landowners have also committed some capital to the Salt River Project, through stock assessments charged by the Association, but the Association last exercised its assessment power in 1951.
In Salyer, we recognized that the powers to contract for and staff projects, to condemn property, and to issue bonds do not amount to such general governmental authority. 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 728, n. 8. And as recognized by the dissenting opinion in the companion case to Salyer, the power to levy and collect special assessments also does not create such general governmental authority. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., supra, at 410 U. S. 749 (Douglas, J.).
In other cases, the Court has found invalid state laws tying voting eligibility to property ownership in elections to approve issuance of bonds to finance a city library, Hill v. Stone, 421 U. S. 289, and a municipal utility, Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (per curiam), and to issue general obligation bonds secured by a lien on real property, Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204. In those cases, however, the elections concerned the operations of traditional municipalities exercising the full range of normal governmental powers, and so the cases do not bear on the question of a special-purpose governmental entity like the Salt River District. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 727.
The appellees have alleged that the District's power over flood control affects all residents within District boundaries, and therefore represents the sort of important governmental function that invokes the Reynolds one-person, one-vote doctrine. However, as we held in Salyer, where such a power over flood control is incidental to a District's primary water functions, it is not of decisive constitutional significance. 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 728, n. 8. Indeed, in both the Salyer and Associated Enterprises, Inc., cases, control of erosion and flooding was one of the express statutory purposes of the water districts; the Salt River District has no such express statutory power, and so any influence it exerts over flood control is simply an effect of the exercise of its more limited statutory water functions.
The Court of Appeals slightly misconstrued the facts in stating that a significant portion of water delivered by the District "is used and paid for in a manner unrelated to agriculture or land ownership." 613 F.2d at 184 (emphasis added). Though some landowning city residents have designated their cities as contracting agents to receive their water allotments, see n 9, supra, the stipulated facts show that all entitlement to water in the District derives from land ownership, whether rights to surface water appurtenant to land or acreage-based entitlements to stored water.
Significantly, though the District's nominal status as a governmental body technically exempts it from state taxes, it makes ad valorem contributions to the state treasury according to the same formula by which the State's private utilities pay property taxes. Ariz.Rev.Stat. nn. § 42201 et seq. (Supp. 1980-1981).
The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District in Salyer had the statutory power to generate and sell electricity at any time and in any manner, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 724, but that fact did not alter the Court's view that the district's purpose was too narrow to invoke the Reynolds principle.
The stipulated facts show that, measured as a percentage of gross power revenues, the amount of District revenues used to support the water operations is roughly equal to the sum of the dividends paid to common stockholders in a comparable private electric utility.
"Most municipal corporations are owned by the public and managed by public officials. . . . Such is not the case here. . . . The public does not own the District. The governmental entity such as a city or town does not manage or benefit from the profits of this District. Instead, the owners are private landholders. The profits from the sale of electricity are used to defray the expense in irrigating these private lands for personal profit. The public interest is merely that of consumers of its product, for which they pay. . . . The District does not function to 'serve the whole people,' but rather the District operates for the benefit of these 'inhabitants of the district' who are private owners."
Local 266, I.B.E.W. v. Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 44, 275 P.2d 393, 402-403.
Indeed, this consumer-business relationship is somewhat obscured by the appellees' claim of standing. The stipulated facts show that the District delivers 15% of its electric power to customers outside the District boundaries, and that 15% of lands within the District receive electricity from a private utility, rather than the District. Thus, if the appellees' claim of a constitutional right to vote for directors of the District rests on their relationship to the power functions of the District, they represent the wrong class of putative voters.
The Court of Appeals found it significant that 98% of the District's revenues come from sales of electricity, and only 2% from charges assessed for water deliveries. 613 F.2d at 184. This fact in no way affects the constitutionality of the voting scheme. When the consumers of electricity supply those power revenues, they are simply buying electricity; they are neither committing capital to the District nor committing any of their property as security for the credit of the District.
The appellees, of course, are qualified voters in Arizona, and so remain equal participants in the election of the state legislators who created and have the power to change the District.
It in no way upsets the rationality of this scheme that the 40% of District acreage owned by corporations and municipalities is not voted at all. The lands owned by the corporations and cities are exclusively streets, alleys, canal rights of way, and the bed of the Salt River. Moreover, those lands are not subject to the District's acreage-based taxing power. Finally, it can hardly be said that the legislature acted irrationally in limiting voting eligibility to landowners who were otherwise qualified electors under state law.
I concur fully in the Court's opinion, and write separately only to emphasize the importance to my decision of the Arizona Legislature's control over voting requirements for the Salt River District.
Our cases have recognized the necessity of permitting experimentation with political structures to meet the often novel problems confronting local communities. E.g., Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 439 U. S. 71-72 (1978). As this case illustrates, it may be difficult to decide when experimentation and political compromise have resulted in an impermissible delegation of those governmental powers that generally affect all of the people to a body with a selective electorate. But state legislatures, responsive to the interests of all the people, normally are better qualified to make this judgment than federal courts. [Footnote 2/2] Given the broad reforms effected by Reynolds v. Sims, we should expect that a legislature elected on the rule of one person, one vote will be vigilant to prevent undue concentration of power in the hands of undemocratic bodies. The absence of just such a political safeguard was a major justification for the Court's role in requiring legislative reapportionment. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 258-259 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
interest of Arizona landowners in irrigation, not because of their inherent character nor an insistent demand that the people as a whole decide how much water each will receive or how much each will pay for electricity.
Appellees argue that control of water is of prime importance in the Southwest, and that many people purchase electricity from the District. These observations raise the question whether this Court should interfere with the constitution of the District, but do not answer it. The Arizona Legislature recently has demonstrated its control over the electoral processes of the District. It has reformed the District to increase the political voice of the small householder at the expense of the large landholder. Ante at 451 U. S. 359, n. 2. This reform no doubt reflects political and demographic changes in Arizona since the District was established.
The authority and will of the Arizona Legislature to control the electoral composition of the District are decisive for me in this case. The District is large enough and the resources it manages are basic enough that the people will act through their elected legislature when further changes in the governance of the District are warranted. We should allow the political process to operate. For this Court to dictate how the Board of the District must be elected would detract from the democratic process we profess to protect.
The Court has held that school boards must be elected on a strictly majoritarian basis. Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969). These cases reflect the Court's judgment as to the unique importance of education among the functions of modern local government. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 347 U. S. 493 (1954). Cf. Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60 (1978) (nonresidents may be subject to "police jurisdiction" of neighboring city without being constitutionally entitled to vote in the city).
The Court deprecated the significance of control of voting requirements for a special purpose election by a fairly elected legislature in Kramer, supra, at 395 U. S. 628. See also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474, 390 U. S. 481, n. 6 (1968). The holding in Kramer is affected neither by Salyer nor by the decision of the Court today, see n. 1, supra, but it must be evident that some of the reasoning in that case has been questioned. See, e.g., ante at 451 U. S. 364-365, n. 8.
In concluding that the District's "one-acre, one-vote" scheme is constitutional, the Court misapplies the limited exception recognized in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U. S. 719 (1973), on the strained logic that the provision of water and electricity to several hundred thousand citizens is a "peculiarly narrow function." Because the Court misreads our prior cases and its opinion is conceptually unsound, I dissent.
The right to vote is of special importance because the franchise acts to preserve "other basic civil . . . rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 377 U. S. 562 (1964). It is presumed that "when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision," the Fourteenth Amendment "does not permit . . . the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise." Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204, 399 U. S. 209 (1970). Any state statute granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis poses the "danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives." Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621, 395 U. S. 627 (1969). [Footnote 3/1] See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968). As a result, any classification restricting the franchise, except those involving residence, age, or citizenship, is unconstitutional "unless the district or State can demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling state interest." Hill v. Stone, 421 U. S. 289, 421 U. S. 297 (1975). See Kramer, supra, at 395 U. S. 626-627; Phoenix, supra, at 399 U. S. 209 (giving power to property owners alone "can be justified only by some overriding interest of those owners that the State is entitled to recognize").
schools. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969), a case with particular relevance to the present action, the Court invalidated a state law which limited participation in a bond election for the support of a municipal utility system to property holders. The revenue bonds, secured by funds generated by the utility system itself, did not create any enforceable lien against any property in the city. Id. at 395 U. S. 705. Noting that the impact fell on property and nonproperty owners alike, since all persons "use the utilities and pay the rates," the Court rejected the voting classification scheme disenfranchising nonproperty owners. Nor may the vote be limited to property owners in bond issuance elections with respect to general obligation bonds secured by property tax revenues. Phoenix, supra, at 399 U. S. 209-213. See also Police Jury of Parish of Vermilion v. Hebert, 404 U. S. 807 (1971), summarily rev'g 258 La. 41, 245 So.2d 349 (cannot limit vote for road improvement bonds to property holders). The Court has thus rejected the view that, simply because property is directly burdened because of some governmental action, that fact alone justifies limiting the franchise to property owners where nonowners are also substantially affected. Hill, supra, at 421 U. S. 299.
Watershed Improvement District, 410 U. S. 743 (1973). But nothing in Salyer changed the relevant constitutional inquiry. Rather, the Court held the Reynolds-Avery-Kramer line of cases inapplicable to the water district because of its "special limited purpose and the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group. . . ." 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 728 (emphasis supplied). Although the water district there involved exercised certain governmental authorities, its purposes were quite narrow. The Water Storage District was also found to have only an insubstantial effect on nonvoters. Only 77 persons lived within its boundaries, and most worked for one of the four corporations which owned 85% of the land within the District. On the other hand, the burdens of the District fell entirely on landowners, since all of the costs associated with the District's projects were assessed against landowners in proportion to the benefits received. There was "no way that the economic burdens of district operations can fall on residents qua residents. . . ." Id. at 410 U. S. 729.
An analysis of the two relevant factors required by Salyer demonstrates that the Salt River District possesses significant governmental authority, and has a sufficiently wide effect on nonvoters to require application of the strict scrutiny mandated by Kramer.
Constitution or any law of the State or of the United States."
"a public, political, taxing subdivision of the state, and a municipal corporation to the extent of the powers and privileges conferred by this chapter or granted generally to municipal corporations by the constitution and statutes of the state, including immunity of its property and bonds from taxation."
including the possible use of nuclear power. Obviously, this broad authorization over the field of energy transcends the limited functions of the agricultural water storage district involved in Salyer.
The District here also has authority to allocate water within its service area. It has veto power over all transfers of surface water from one place or type of use to another, and this power extends to any "watershed or drainage area which supplies or contributes water for the irrigation of lands within [the] district. . . ." Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 45-172.5 (Supp. 1980-1981).
and electricity, the District's power is immense, and its authority complete.
"no other general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body."
"because the district meetings and the school board do not have 'general' legislative powers. Our exacting examination is not necessitated by the subject of the election; rather, it is required because some resident citizens are permitted to participate, and some are not."
395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 629. In Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50 (1970), the Court applied Kramer despite the fact that the powers exercised by the trustees of a Junior College District were substantially less significant than those exercised in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968). It was sufficient that the trustees performed important governmental functions with sufficient impact throughout the District.
I therefore cannot agree that this line of cases is not applicable here. The authority and power of the District are sufficient to require application of the strict scrutiny required by our cases. This is not a single-purpose water irrigation district, but a large and vital municipal corporation exercising a broad range of initiatives across a spectrum of operations. Moreover, by the nature of the state law, it is presently exercising that authority without direct regulation by state authorities charged with supervising privately owned corporations involved in the same business. The functions and purposes of the Salt River District represent important governmental responsibilities that distinguish this case from Salyer.
In terms of the relative impact of the Salt River District's operations on the favored landowner voters and those who may not vote for the officers of this municipal corporation, the contrast with the Water District in Salyer is even more pronounced. A bird's-eye view of the District's operations will be helpful. Historically, the Salt River District was concerned only with storing water and delivering it for agricultural uses within the District. This was a crucial service, but it proved too expensive for a wholly private concern to maintain. It needed public help, which it received. It became a municipal corporation, a transformation which rendered its bonds and property tax exempt. It also needed a public subsidy, which was provided by authorizing it to engage in the generation and sale of electricity. It was also authorized to supply water for municipal and other nonagricultural uses.
had a total operating income of approximately $450 million, 98% of which was derived from the generation of electricity and its sale to approximately 240,000 consumers. See Salt River Project, 1979-1980 Annual Report, p. 25. The District is now the second largest utility in Arizona. Furthermore, as of April 30, 1980, the District had outstanding long-term debt of slightly over $2 billion. Approximately $1.78 billion, or about 88%, of that debt are in the form of revenue bonds secured solely by the revenues from the District's electrical operations. All of the District's capital improvements since 1972 have been financed by revenue bonds, and the general obligation bonds, now representing a small fraction of the District's long-term debt, are being steadily retired from the District's general revenues. It must also be noted that, at the present time, 40% of the water delivered by the District is used for nonagricultural purposes -- 25% for municipal purposes and 15% to schools, playgrounds, parks, and the like.
of the Water District fell entirely on the landowners who were served by the District. Here the landowners could not themselves afford to finance their own project and turned to a public agency to help them. That agency now subsidizes the storage and delivery of irrigation water for agricultural purposes by selling electricity to the public at prices that neither the voters nor any representative public agency has any right to control. Unlike the situation in Salyer, the financial burden of supplying irrigation water has been shifted from the landowners to the consumers of electricity. [Footnote 3/6] At the very least, the structure of the District's indebtedness, together with the history of the District's operations, compels a finding that the burdens placed upon the lands within the District are so minimal that they cannot possibly serve as a basis for limiting the franchise to property owners.
to characterize the District as functioning solely for the benefit of the landowners."
"Of course, the operation of the utility systems -- gas, water, and electricity -- affects virtually every resident of the city, nonproperty owners as well as property owners. All users pay utility bills, and the rates may be affected substantially by the amount of revenue bonds outstanding. Certainly property owners are not alone in feeling the impact of bad utility service or high rates, or in reaping the benefits of good service and low rates."
"no towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities designed to improve the quality of life within the district boundaries, and it does not have a fire department, police, buses, or trains."
"'Government is not partly public or partly private, depending upon the governmental pedigree of the type of a particular activity or the manner in which the Government conducts it.' Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 332 U. S. 383-384. On the other hand, it is hard to think of any governmental activity on the 'operational level,' our present concern, which is 'uniquely governmental,' in the sense that its kind has not, at one time or another, been, or could not conceivably be, privately performed.'"
In Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978), JUSTICE STEWART, after quoting the above passage from Indian Towing Co., described the distinction between "proprietary" and "governmental" activities as a "quagmire" involving a distinction "so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formulation.'" Id. at 435 U. S. 433 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Indian Towing Co., supra, at 350 U. S. 68). JUSTICE STEWART went on to conclude that, whether proprietary or not, the action of providing electrical utility services "is surely an act of government." 435 U.S. at 435 U. S. 434.
that the provision of electrical, water, and gas utility services was a sufficiently important governmental service to require application of the Fourteenth Amendment's strict scrutiny safeguards. 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 705. If the provision of electrical and other utility services by a municipal corporation was so "proprietary" or "private" as not to require application of the stricter standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, Cipriano could not have been decided as it was. The Court's facile characterization of the electrical service provided by the municipal corporation in this case as essentially a private function is a misreading of our prior holdings.
in Salyer does not save this voting arrangement. I cannot agree with the Court's extension of Salyer to the facts of the case, and its unwise suggestion that the provision of electrical and water services are somehow too private to warrant the Fourteenth Amendment's safeguards. Accordingly, I dissent.
States, of course, have substantial latitude in structuring local government, and nonlegislative positions need not be elected at all. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 629. But once a State provides for elections, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that any discriminations be scrutinized under the principles enunciated in Kramer and its progeny.
The possibility of departing from the one-person, one-vote logic of Reynolds in the case of special purpose districts was suggested in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968). But the Court left open the question whether a special purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents "may be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization's functions." Id. at 390 U. S. 483-484. Thus, even assuming that the landowners are more directly affected, Avery suggests that there may be situations where total exclusion is unconstitutional, but where the exact one person, one vote rule does not apply. The Court's decision today ignores the possibility of some alternative plan and instead sanctions an unjustifiable total exclusion.
Arizona state court decisions have described such agricultural improvement districts as primarily business-oriented. See ante at 451 U. S. 368. See also Local 266, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954); Mesa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist., 92 Ariz. 91, 373 P.2d 722 (1962), appeal dism'd, 372 U. S. 704 (1963). Of course, these state court descriptions do not control the question whether the municipal corporation possesses sufficient authority or function to require application of the voting procedures mandated.by the Fourteenth Amendment. That inquiry is a constitutional question to be resolved by the courts.
"For the purpose of acquiring or assuring a supply of electric power and energy to serve the district's customers, the board, for the and in the name of the district may, without the boundaries of the state, acquire, develop, own, lease, purchase, construct, operate, equip, maintain, repair and replace, and contract for . . . any form of energy or energy resources including but not limited to coal, oil, gas, oil shale, uranium and other nuclear materials, hot water, steam, and other geothermal materials or minerals, solar energy, wind, water, and water power and compressed air. . . ."
"District provides a reliable supply of essential electric energy and water in substantial portions of the Salt River Valley; thus, the District operation is important to the development of the Salt River Valley."
"During the last ten years, about 83% of the water system costs have been financed with power revenues. In 1974, revenues from water and irrigation activities were $2,613, 184. The expenses, including depreciation, for irrigation and water operations exceeded revenues by about $14,000,000, and that deficit was met from power revenues. Water support has averaged approximately $10,000,000 annually since 1965. These amounts do not include expenditures for additions and improvements to the irrigation plant and for repayment of long-term debt, which must also be met from power revenues. Any decrease in support from power revenues would have to be met from increased water delivery charges."
The Salt River District authorities thought the issue in Cipriano to be so substantially akin to the issue with respect to its operations that it decided to file an amicus brief in that case. See Brief for the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District as Amicus Curiae, O.T. 1968, No. 705. The District argued that the bonds at issue in Cipriano went only to the city's conduct of its utility function, and thus affected "only a particular segment of those general governmental powers," id. at 5, so that Kramer should not be applied. We necessarily rejected the District's arguments on the merits in Cipriano.
It may well be that, if given a chance to participate, nonproperty owners will seek to lessen the subsidy. But this is no excuse for denying them the vote. A State is constitutionally prohibited from disenfranchising any "sector of the population because of the way they may vote. . . ." Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 380 U. S. 94 (1965).
Nothing in Cipriano turned on the fact that the city's utility activities were connected with its broader grants of police power and were not conducted by a separately elected board or commission. While the Court noted that any profits from the utility operations would go into the city's general fund, this fact did not contribute to the Court's decision to extend the franchise. Rather, the Court noted that property and nonproperty taxpayers may have different views concerning provision of city funds for utilities, and that it was this concern with the utility services which required application of Kramer.
It is also significant that the Court's decision today is inconsistent with the narrow, and correct, reading given Salyer in various other courts in circumstances akin to those in the present case. See, e.g., Choudhry v. Free, 17 Cal.3d 660, 552 P.2d 438 (1976); Johnson v. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 99 Idaho 501, 584 P.2d 646 (1978).
In this regard, the Court's citation of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974), is totally misplaced. In that case, the Court held that actions of a privately owned utility do not constitute state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the provision of utility services is "not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State." Id. at 419 U. S. 353. But this observation necessarily implies that the provision of utilities, if actually provided by the State, is a valid government activity. Thus, the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment may require certain safeguards if the State, in fact, does itself provide utility services is in no way reached by Jackson. See id. at 419 U. S. 354, n. 9 (States may not segregate public schools so as to exclude any religious group while private religious schools may so exclude). Once a State provides such services, constitutional safeguards necessarily apply.
It is suggested by the Court in a footnote, see ante at 451 U. S. 371, n. 20, and by JUSTICE POWELL in his concurring opinion, that, since the nonvoters living in the District may, of course, vote in the state legislature elections, their interests are sufficiently represented, since the state legislature maintains ultimate control over the operation and authority of the District. This suggestion lacks merit, and has been specifically rejected in past decisions of this Court. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 481. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 628, n. 10. In most situations involving a state agency or even a city, the state legislature, and ultimately the people, could exercise control, since any municipal corporation is a creature of the State. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a far more direct sense of democratic participation in elective schemes which is not satisfied by the indirect and imprecise voter control suggested by the Court and by JUSTICE POWELL. Cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 435 U. S. 406 (1978) (rejecting argument that Sherman Act should not apply to municipally owned utility because dissatisfied consumers had recourse in state legislature).

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