Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40364:a-m-no-rtj-99-1518-august-14,-2000-luzviminda-c-comia-v-conrado-r-antona&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:37:33+00:00

Document:
LUZVIMINDA C. COMIA, Complainant, v. JUDGE CONRADO R. ANTONA, Respondent.
C)	Deliberately violating existing doctrines and jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court.
"On 04 December 1998, respondent Judge issued the second warrants of arrest against accused Fajardo Sr., Filipina and Pio. While still at large, Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac, Sr. filed an Urgent Petition for the Grant of Bail to Accused Dante Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Arce with Supplemental Motion for Reduction of Bail Recommended for Accused Pio Arce, Jr. dated 14 December 1998.
On 16 December 1998, respondent Judge merely directed that the urgent petition be filed with the records it appearing the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all accused who are still at large.
"On 04 January 1999, acting on the manifestation/motion of counsel for the accused, respondent Judge issued an order setting tentatively the hearing of the petition for bail of Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Arce and reduction of bail of Pio Arce, Jr. on 06 January 1999 at 9:30 a.m. In the same order, respondent judge directed that a copy thereof be furnished the City Prosecutor, and upon request of the defense counsel, subpoena ad testificandum be issued to three witnesses named in the request.
"Defense’s counsel retorted the proceedings was for petition for bail and since the court had ruled that the petition could not be heard without the accused-movants submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, they surrendered themselves to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of the PNP, Camp Crame and were pressing (sic) for a speedy trial.
During the course of the bail hearing, the defense further moved - to the objection of the prosecution — that the accused be held in custody at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Camp Crame, claiming that accused, Fajardo, Sr., was then scheduled for medical operation "as early as December 14th." 2 Respondent judge granted the motion of defense counsel.
In an order 3 dated 01 February 1999, respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to which the prosecution moved to reconsider said order. On 03 February 1999, respondent judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the prosecution and declared the bail hearings terminated.
Upon arraignment, Accused Fajardo Sr. and Filipina Fajardo-Arce pleaded not guilty to the charge against them.
Acting on the sworn affidavit-complaint filed by herein complainant Luzviminda Comia and considering the gravity of the charges imputed therein, the, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended to the High Court that the instant administrative matter be referred to the Court of Appeals for immediate raffle, investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Resolution dated 06 December 1999, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals and, upon subsequent raffle, was assigned to Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero for investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings and recommendations of the investigating justice are well-taken. A thorough perusal of the records and evidence adduced by the complainant lend credible substantiation to the charge of gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent judge. Verily, the actuation of respondent judge specifically in the handling, hearing and resolution of the petition for bail constitutes not only ignorance of fundamental rules relating to bail applications, but demands stern rebuke from this Court as well.
Under the present circumstances, respondent Judge Antona — fully cognizant that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused considering that the latter were "at large" — still entertained the application for bail by setting a date of hearing therefore albeit tentatively, and conditioned upon the voluntary surrender of the accused. In doing so, respondent judge indubitably violated settled jurisprudential doctrines regarding the purpose of bail which is to secure the temporary liberty of persons under the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of freedom.
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date "tentatively" scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons, who at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.
In the instant administrative matter, proof is extant that in the bail hearings the prosecution was not afforded adequate opportunity within a reasonable time to present evidence within its grasp to substantiate the degree and gravity of guilt of the accused, for purposes of resolving the bail petition. As gleaned from the order dated 15 February 1999, respondent judge relied solely on, and made strict mention of the evidence adduced by the defense without incorporating in said order a recital of the evidence for the prosecution. Respondent judge ruled and concluded, albeit erroneously, that the prosecution waived its right to adduce evidence; in effect, the prosecution was denied the opportunity to submit all the evidence it desired to present.
On the same score, this Court finds no compelling evidence on record to substantiate the charge that respondent judge deliberately violated existing doctrines and jurisprudence enunciated by the High Court. To our mind, the procedural lapses and irregularities in the bail hearings were not consciously, purposely, and intentionally perpetrated by respondent judge so as to render him liable for said charge. At the most, respondent judge’s actuation were borne by an ignorance of the pertinent rules and applicable jurisprudence and were not, in our considered view, products of a grand design to deliberately perpetrate injustice.
All told, this Court once again seizes the moment to remind judges to keep abreast of the rules and recent pronouncements of this Court, so they may evolve into more effective dispensers of justice — magistrates of the law in the truest sense of the word.
Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
1.	Memorandum dated 12 April 2000, p. 35.
10.	2 SCRA 888, cited in Aguirre v. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778.
11.	Aguirre v. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778.
12.	Cortes v. Catral 279 SCRA 1.
14	Rollo, p. 12; ANNEX "E"
15.	Cartes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1.
16.	People v. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489.
17	People v. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.
18.	Aguirre v. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778.
19.	Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1; Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 .

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