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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:49:34+00:00

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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI SUBJECT : Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1956 W.P.(C) No. 5114/2005 Judgment decided on: C.D. SINGH Through: Mr Ranjan Mukherjee, Advocate....Petitioner Versus INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. Through: Mr Rajat Arora, Advocate...Respondent Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH MANMOHAN SINGH, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the service record of the petitioner for the period of 1966 to 1968 resulting in denial of suitable time scale to the petitioner and to issue direction to the respondent to allow the petitioner the grade and pay scale from the date his juniors were promoted to that scale of pay w.e.f and thereafter. 2. The facts of the case are that in the year 1969 the petitioner was illegally removed from service by the respondent and against this action of the respondent the petitioner filed a complaint being case B.S.E. Case No. 23 of 1969 before the Labour Court, Ranchi, under section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, The Labour Court by its order dated set aside the dismissal of the petitioner and directed reinstatement of the petitioner with full back wages and all the other benefits.
4 that by order dated , limited liberty was given to the petitioner with regard to the correctness of the records, thus, the issues which have already been raised and decided by the earlier writ petitions cannot be allowed to be raised in the present writ petition. 13. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that the Patna High Court while disposing of writ petition No.5877/1983 vide order dated had only directed that the petitioner be given a consideration and the same was given to him by constituting a committee and considering his Annual Appraisal Reports, the respondent found that the grading of the petitioner was such that no persons with similar grading had been promoted and therefore, the petitioner could not be promoted. 14. It was also argued that promotion is not a vested right and it is only a right of the petitioner that he be considered for promotion which has been done in the present case. The petitioner has been given a reasonable and fair consideration by the respondent corporation. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent referred to the following judgments: 1. Union of India v. K.V. Vijeesh: AIR 1996 SC Shankarasan Dash v. Union of India: AIR 1991 SC Ashish Mohan v. Union of India: (2002) 7 AD (Delhi) 488 (DB). 15. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim promotion as his right. His right was only to be considered for the promotion and the same has been done. Now, there is no issue left to be settled. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made the statement before this Court that in the present writ petition, the petitioner confines his relief to the extend of challenging the correctness of the service record as directed by this Court in earlier Writ Petition (C) No. 2641/1990 disposed of by order dated He admits that petitioner is not claiming any other relief except mentioned in the said order. 17. It is also argued by the petitioner that it was incorrect on the part of the respondent to compare the petitioner s records with that of his junior as the present is a case of reinstatement and not of regular promotion. The submission of the petitioner, no doubt, is fortified with the order passed by the Patna High Court where specific directions were passed to examine the petitioner on the basis of petitioner s service records for which the petitioner was entitled as per finding of the Labour Court.
6 Rule 31 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1980 for holding enquiry was not followed. 22. The relevant Rules 29 and 31 are as under: 29. Penalties: The following penalties may be imposed on an employee, as hereinafter provided, for misconduct committed by him or for any other good and sufficient reasons. Minor Penalties: (a)... (b)... Major Penalties: (c) Withholding of increment of pay with or without cumulative effect. (d) Withholding of promotion. (e) Reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale. (f) Removal from service. (g) Dismissal. 31. Procedure for Imposing Major Penalties: (1) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in Rule 29 shall be made except after an enquiry is held in accordance with this rule. 23. In view of the Rules of the respondent i.e. Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1980, it is clear that major penalty under Rule 29 could not be imposed without following the procedure as prescribed under Rule 31(1) for holding an enquiry. Admittedly, in the present case no enquiry was held against the petitioner before imposing the major penalty. 24. As regards the adverse remarks for the years 1966, 1967 and 1968 against the petitioner is concerned, there is a force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent could not have acted upon them without first communicating the same to the petitioner. Since this procedure was not adopted by the respondent in the present case, therefore, the same is also in violation of Rule 31 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1980.
7 25. It is cardinal principle of natural justice that before imposing an order of punishment upon an employee, the delinquent employee is required to be put to notice. However, in this case, the said compliance was not made. 26. In the similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in the following cases has held as under: (1). In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab and others: AIR 1979 SC 1622 held as under: 17. The principle is well-settled that in accordance with the rules of natural justice, an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny promotional opportunities unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the report. Such an opportunity is not an empty formality, its object, partially, being to enable the superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified. Unfortunately, for one reason or another, not arising out of any fault on the part of the appellant, though the adverse report was communicated to him, the Government has not been able to consider his explanation and decide whether the report was justified. In these circumstances, it is difficult to support the non- issuance of the integrity certificate to the appellant. The chain of reaction began with the adverse report and the infirmity in the link of causation is that no one has yet decided whether that report was justified. We cannot speculate, in the absence of a proper pleading, whether the appellant was not found suitable otherwise, that is to say, for reasons other than those connected with the non-issuance of an integrity certificate to him. 18. We may also indicate, since the High Court saw the file and discovered that the appellant was not brought on the Select List because he was "not found suitable otherwise", that regulation 5 which deals with the preparation of a list of suitable officers provides by clause 7 that "if in the process of selection, review or revision it is proposed to supersede any member of the State Civil Service, the Committee shall record its reasons for the proposed supersession". While dealing with an identical provision in clause 5 of regulation 5 of the same Regulations as they stood then, this Court observed in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor; (1974) 1 SCR 797 that "rubberstamp" reasons given for the supersession of each officer to the effect that the record of the officer concerned was not such as to justify his appointment "at this stage in preference to those selected", do not amount to "reasons for the proposed supersession" within the meaning of clause 5.
11 to give benefit of higher pension and balance of arrears and to pay the same with 6% p.a. interest. 33. With these observations, this writ petition is allowed. No costs. Sd/- MANMOHAN SINGH, J.
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