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SCOTTS' OF GREENOCK (Estd. 1711) Ltd, LITHGOWS Ltd (formerly LITHGOWS HOLDINGS Ltd) contre le ROYAUME-UNI
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche SCOTTS' OF GREENOCK (Estd. 1711) Ltd, LITHGOWS Ltd (formerly LITHGOWS HOLDINGS Ltd) contre le ROYAUME-UNI
Type d'affaire : DécisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9599/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-03-11;9599.81 Analyses : (Art. 13) DROIT A UN RECOURS EFFECTIF, (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINEParties : Demandeurs : SCOTTS' OF GREENOCK (Estd. 1711) Ltd, LITHGOWS Ltd (formerly LITHGOWS HOLDINGS Ltd)Défendeurs : le ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 9599/8 1 SCOTTS' OF GREENOCK (Estd . 1711) Ltd, ) v/the UNITED KINGDOM LITHGOWS Ltd (formerly LITHGOWS HOLDINGS Ltd) c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of I I March 1985 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 11 mars 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 26 of the Convention : Compensation on nationalisation. 7he six months' period runs from dare of the final decision following effective and adequate remedies or, if there are no remedies, the challenged act or decision if it determines ftnally the individual's position at the domestic level . Applicarion relating to the amount of compensarion following nationalisation of a business : the six months' period runs not from the date of the nationalising legislation but from rhe moment when the compensafion to shareholders is determined . To the extent that the applicants challenge the legal norms governing compensation following nationalisation of their business, but not the way in which such norms were applied by the competent authority in their case, a cou rt appeal purely on points of law is not a remedy which must be exhausted. Article 1 orthe First Protocol : Dispute on compensation to shareholders following nationalisation of a business (Application declared admissible) .
A rticle 26 de la Convention : /ndemnisation aprÃ¨s narionalisation . Le dÃ©lai de six mois court dÃ¨s la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive aprÃ¨s exercice des recours intemes efi'icaces et suffisants ou, s'il n'esiste pas de recours, dÃ¨s l'acte ou la dÃ©cision incrintinÃ©s s'ils fixent dÃ©finitivement la siruation de l'intÃ©ressÃ© au plan interne. S'agissant d'une requÃ©te poriant sur le montant d'une indemnitÃ© aprÃ¨s nationalisation d'une entreprise, le dÃ©lai de six mois coun non Ã partir de la loi ponant nationalisation mais Ã partir du moment oÃ¹ est fixÃ©e l'indemnitÃ© Ã payer aux actionnaires.
Dans la mesure oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants s'en prennent aux nonnes lÃ©gales d'indemnisation aprÃ¨s nationalisation de leur entreprise, mais non Ã la maniÃ¨re dont ces normes ont Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©es dans leur cas par l'aworitÃ© comp(tente, un recours judiciaire de pure lÃ©galitÃ© n'est pas un recours dont !'e.rercice est requis . Article 1 du Protocole additionnel : La'tige portant sur l'indemnisation des actionnaires aprÃ¨s nationalisation d'une entreprise (RequÃªte dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable) .
(franÃ§ais : voir p . 43)
The facts of the case as submi tt ed by the parties may be stnnrnarised as follows : The first and second applicants . Scotts' of Greenock (Estd . 1711) Limited and Lithgows Limited (formerly Lithgows Holdings Limited), are limited companies incorporated in Scotland with registered offices in Greenock . These two applicants were originally joined by a third, the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company (Bahamas) Limited . However, on 22 July 1983 this third applicant notified the Commission of the withdrawal of its application on the ground that its claim was clearly inadmissible following the Commission's decision on admissibility in the Nationalisation Cases (Applications No . 9006/80 and others) (I) . The applicants are represented by Mr . D . Ross Macdonald, solicitor, of Messrs . Neill, Clark & Murray, Solicitors of Greenock and Mr . Neville MaryanGreen, Barrister-at-law and Avocat at the Paris Coun of Appeal . The applicants are long-established companies involved in shipbuilding, submarine construction and related trades . They have been based in Greenock and Port Glasgow on the lower Clyde throughout their history . The report of the Shipbuilding Enquiry Committee established by the Government was published in March 1966 . This recommended that the 9 shipyards in the River Clyde be nationalised, preferably into not more than 2 group companies . In anticipation of this report, and following its publication, the first and second applicants had been cooperating closely with a view to a possible merger in order to avoid the threat of a forced merger with other shipyards on the Upper Clyde which were not all in a sound commercial position . In May 1967 the first and second applicants merged and took equal interest s in a company known as Scott Lithgow Drydocks Limited ("Scon Lithgow Drydocks") . This new company operated a dry dock, repair quay and tank cleaning installation at Greenock . The construction of these facilities was completed in 1965, at a total cost of f 4,534,969 . They were originally owned by the Firth of Clyd e (1) See No . 9266/81, D .R . 30 p . 155 .
Drydock Company Limited, but were acquired by Scott Lithgow Drydocks in May 1967 from the liquidator of that company at a price of Â£ 1,100,000 . This is described by the applicants as a "bargain price" which arose in special circumstances, and is irrelevant to the valuation of the facilities . On I July 1977 the shares of Scott Lithgow Drydocks vested in British Shipbuilders by virtue of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977 ("the 1977 Act") under which various companies engaged in the aircraft and shipbuilding industries were nationalised . Compensation for the shares in the company was payable in accordance with the provisions of Part ll of the 1977 Act . The amount payable thereunder was the "base value" of the securities, subject to various deductions (Sections 35 and 39) . The "base value" in the case of securities listed on the Stock Exchange was, broadly speaking, the average amount at which they were quoted over a six month period ("the reference period") mnning from I September 1973 to 28 February 1974 (Sections 37 and 56) . However, in the case of securities not listed on the Stock Exchange the "base value" was to be such as might be determined by agreement between the Secretary of State and a"Stockholders' Representative", or in default of agreement such as might be determined by an Arbitration Tribunal set up under the 1977 Act to be the base value which the securities would have had if they had been listed throughout the reference period (Section 38) . The Scott Lithgow Drydocks shares were not listed on the Stock Exchange . A Stockholders' Representative was immediately appointed by the first and second applicants pursuant to the terms of the 1977 Act and he commenced negotiations on behalf of the applicants with the respondent Government as to the amount of compensation to be paid . Despite protracted negotiations the Stockholders' Representative was unable to alter the view of the respondent Government that the value of Scott Lithgow Drydocks in terms of the 1977 Act was between Â£ 500,000 and f 600,000 . The f-irst and second applicants consequently instructed the Stockholders' Representative to refer the question of compensation to the Scottish Arbitration Tribunal constituted pursuant to the 1977 Act . The principal dispute in the arbitration proceedings concemed the assumption which ought to be made as to the manner in which the business would have been mn if Scott Lithgow Drydocks had been listed on the Stock Exchange during the reference period rather than being (as was in reality the case) a subsidiary company run largely for the benefit of other companies within the group . On 29 September 1981 the Tribunal issued its decision valuing the company at Â£ 3 .5 million on the basis of the statutory formula . Pursuant to Section 36 (6) of the 1977 Act two payments to account of compensation were made on 15 May 1978 and 6 December 1978 by the issue of Governmen t
stock to a value of Â£ 150 .000 and Â£ 300 ,000 respectively . The balance of E 3 .05 million was paid on 14 October 1981 in the form of Government Stock . Interest was also paid from 1]uly 1977 to the date of issue of the Stock at the re levant rates applicable to such stock . The applicants maintain that the compensation they received, which is subject to tax, was grossly inadequate . In the pa rticular circumstances of the present case, the only fair way to value the company was on the basis of its assets . Its asset value was Â£ 6,660,667 during the reference period . Allowing for inflation the amount payable in July 1981 would have been f 20 .172,111 .
In a telex dated 26 FebrUary 1985 the applicants state that, after nationalisation and while in state ownership, the Drydock, buildings and other land belonging to Scott Lithgow Drydocks was transferred to the ownership of Scott Lithgow Limited . It was later disposed of in 1984 by the respondent Government in the course of the sale of Scon Lithgow Limited to a third party involved in the oil industry .
COMPLAINTS AND INITIAL SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPLICANT S Article 2 5 The applicants do not cease to be "vicitms" of the loss of the company merely because they have received the compensation awarded by the Arbitration Tribunal . This compensation award, although amounting to 6 or 7 times more than the sum offered by the respondent Govemment, was nevertheless unsatisfactory . It was, moreover, inevitable that the tribunal would fail to award a proper sum in compensation because it was tied to the hypothetical stock market base value notion as the criterion for calculating such a sum . In the particular circumstances of Scott Lithgow Drydocks the only criterion capable of producing a fair value for compensation was the real value of the company's assets . Moreover, the tribunal failed to index the compensation in order to retain its value over the period between the reference period and the date of the award (some eight years) . 2 . Article 26 The applicants exhausted the domestic remedies available by referring the question of compensation to the Scottish Arbitration Tribunal pursuant to the 1977 Act . The present application was introduced within 6 months of the handing down of the award by the Arbitration Tribunal . 3 . Article 6 The delay between the vesting day (I July 1977) and the date of payment of compensation (29 September 1981) is not a "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 6 .
Anicle / of Protocol No. l The compensation was unfair, contrary to the expressed intentions of the respondent Govemment and contrary to standard practice in previous nationalisation measures . The Commission is therefore invited to consider whether the applicants have been treated "subject to the conditions provided for by law" . The "general principles of intemational law" are also applicable . This is clear from the text of Article I Protocol No . I which provides that "no one" should be deprived of his possessions save in accordance with the three conditions set out . 1t would do violence to elementary principles of interpretation to give "no one" a different meaning in relation to one of these conditions than that which it bears in relation to the other two . The matter was not sufficiently argued in previous cases where the Commission indicated that these principles were not applicable to nationals (e .g . No . 511/59, Dec . 20 .12 . 60, Gudmundsson v . Iceland, Collection 4) . The text is clear ; to create a distinction in the protection afforded would contradict Article 14 . A close reading of the travaux prÃ©paratoires, to which the applicants refer in detail, does not demonstrate that the intention of the parties was to distinguish between nationals and aliens, but rather that the international law standard of compensation was incorporated into the Convention . In any event, under the standard rules of treaty interpretation as set out in Articles . 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties it is necessary first to attempt an interpretation under the general mle (Article 31), and only if that proves difficult to resort to the travau .r prÃ©paratoires . The search for an interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words used leads direcdy to a consideration of the relevant mles of intemational law . Save in the human rights field, such law is concerned only with relations between States . It is not correct to say that it protects aliens, the protection being afforded to the State . It is thus wrong to interpret the reference to intemational law in Article I as applying protection to the property of one class of beneficiaries (aliens) and not that of others . The general principles of international law require the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation . The compensation here was not "prompt" in view of the delay between vesting day and payment . It was inadequate, panly because of the effects of delay since the valuation reference period, and partly because of the use of an inappropriate valuation method . As regards the valuation method . the property nationalised was the shares in Scott Lithgow Drydocks . On a practical and realistic view of the company these shares amounted to shares in the assets of the company, namely the dry dock, repair quay and oil tanker cleaning facility . Scott Lithgow Drydocks was no more than a medium of ownership and operation of these facilities . The company was not managed in order to make a profit for itself and its shareholders ; it was organised in
order to make these facilities available to other companies within the group free of charge . Thus, to value Scott Lithgow Drydocks one must value the facilities, which were valued on 31 December 1973, in the middle of the reference period, at E 6,196,000 . Together with various other minor assets the real asset value of the company at that date was f 6,660,667 . There was in all the circumstances sufficient evidence of future profitability for it to be realistic to assume that Scon Lithgow Drydocks was in no danger of going into liquidation . Accordingly, compensation on the basis of the real and objective value of the assets is the only valuation method which is fair and equitable . General principles of intemational law require payment of the "value" of assets at the time of taking, or earlier as in this case . The amount of money awarded should reflect this value, and where there is reliable evidence that the currency in which this value is expressed varies, and such variation may be measured, the amount should similarly be varied in order to re0ect the same value at the time of the award as at the time of the taking . Such variation is irrespective of any award of interest, which is meant to compensate the owner for being kept out of his money . In the present case, the value of sterling halved between the end of the reference period and the date of taking and so the award should have been indexed accordingly . Moreover where, as in the present case, a considerable period of time elapses before the final decision as to the value is made, then for the same reasons the amount expressive of this value should once again be indexed upwards . The applicants would nevertheless accept a suitable payment of interest in place of this further indexation . Of the 38 companies nationalised pursuant to the 1977 Act only one was listed on the Stock Exchange . The computation of the remaining 37 was based on a theoretical stock exchange listing . For Scott Lithgow Drydocks and many of the other companies this method was irrelevant and inappropriate . Scott Lithgow Drydocks had always carried on its business with no regard to the needs of a company which was listed on the Stock Exchange (as explained above) . If adequacy of compensation were the only relevant factor the applicants would claim approximately Â£ 12 .5 million, being the true net asset value at the reference period (approximately Â£ 6 .6 million) indexed upwards in order to take account of the fall in the value of money during the period up to the vesting date (I July 1977) . However, the delay in paying the compensation means that the sum which should have been payable on the date the compensation actually paid was received by the applicants (I July 1981) is approximately Â£ 20 million . The applicants would altematively accept interest at an appropriate rate on the sum of E 12 .5 million from I July 1977 until eventual payment, although they do feel that they are entitled to receive indexation up to the time of payment . The tertns in which the Government prefaced Iheir subsequent failure to make prompt payment of compensation indicate that, although the Govemment may have been trying to be fair, there was nevertheless an element of confiscation in their establishment of the compensation formula .
Funhertnore, the encashment of the Government Bonds in which form the compensation was paid to the applicants will render them liable to Capital Gains Tax at the rate of 30% of the excess of the realisation price over the original acquisition price . The applicants claim that this amounts to the Government taking back 30% of the compensation paid . The compensation was also not "effective" . This implies payment which is freely transferable and encashable into money, and thus available for reinvestment . Although a Treasury Bond maturing in a reasonably short period exfacie meets these requirements . this is not so in practice because of the effects of the capilal gains taxation . Whilst the applicants have no general objection to taxation, compensation should put them back in the position they were in before the removal of their assets . Compensation should therefore either be free of tax, or increased to allow for tax . The applicants refer to the statement of the Secretary of State for Industry of 7 August 1980 in which he stated that the respondent Government agreed that the compensation "imposed by the 1977 Act" had been "grossly unfair to some of the companies" . This indicates that the respondent Government share their judgment of the compensation received as being inadequate . They summarise their contentions as being that the compensation received pursuant to the terms of the 1977 Act was inadequate both because of the delay be tween the date of assessment of value and the date of payment of compensation and also because of the improper and entirely inadequate guidelines for the contputation of the compensation itself as prescribed by the 1977 Act .
5 . Article 1 3 The 1977 Act provides no remedy against its own tetms, and the applicants have no other national body before which they may challenge the terms of the statute . The Arbitration Tribunal, being a creation of the 1977 Act, provides no remedy . 6 . Article 1 4 Since the basis of computation of compensation was only appropriate for companies quoted on a stock exchange, the respondent Govemmenl discriminated against companies which were not so listed, and in particular against Scott Lithgow Drydocks which belonged to the applicants . Moreover, insofar as the applicants are shown to have received a lower percentage of the asset value of Scott Lithgow Drydocks than that received by the owners of other nationalised concems, this also amounts to discrimination .
THE LA W 1. The applicants complain that they were not properly compensated for the taking of their respective shareholdings in Scott Lithgow Drydocks and invoke Article I of Protocol No . I alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, and also Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention . The respondent Government maintain that the application is inadmissible under Article 27 para . 3 of the Convention for noncompliance with the conditions in Article 26 . They further submit that it is inadmissible under Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention, as manifestly ill-founded . The Commission has first considered whether the application is inadmissible under Article 26 of the Convention, which provides as follows : "The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised mles of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken . " The respondent Government maintain that, in so far as the application is directed against the statutory compensation formula itself, it is out of time, not having been introduced within six months of the passing of the 1977 Act or of vesting day under the Act . In the De Becker Case (No . 214/56, Dec . 9 .6 .58 . Yearbook 2 p . 214 at p .242) the Commission made the following observations concerning the interpretation of Artcile 26 of the Convention : "Whereas the Commission notes, in this connection, that the two rules contained in Article 26 concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies and conceming the six months period, are closely interrelated, since not only are they combined in the same Anicle, but they are also expressed in a single sentence whose grammatical construction implies such correlation ; and whereas the term 'final decision', therefore, in Article 26 refers exclusively to the final decision concemed in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the generally recognised mles of international law, so that the six months period is operative only in this context ; whereas furthermore, the preparatory work of the Convention, in particular the report prepared in June 1950, by the Conference of Senior Officials, confirm this interpretation . " It has subsequently developed this interpretation of Article 26 to the extent of holding that where no domestic remedy exists, the act or decision complained of must itself normally be taken as the "final decision" for the purposes of Article 26 . In this connection, in No . 7379/76, Dec . 10 .12 .76 . D .R . 8 p . 21 1, the Commission made the following observations : "However having considered its previous interpretation of Article 26 of the Convention in the light of the facts of the present case, the Commission has conte to the view that where no domestic remedy is available, the act or
decision complained of must itself normalty be taken as the 'final decision' ('dÃ©cision inteme dÃ©finitive') for the purposes of Article 26 . The six months rule laid down in Article 26 was clearly intended to require an applicant to decide whether or not to refer his case to the Commission within a period of six months after his position had been finally detennined on the domestic level . Where no question of a continuing violation of the Convention arises, this requirement is equally applicable whether the applicant's position is finally deterrnined by the final decision taken in the course of exhaustion of a domestic remedy or, in the absence of any domestic remedy, by the act or decision which is itself alleged to be in violation of the Convention . " It has followed this interpretation of Article 26 in a number of subsequent cases (for example, No . 8007/77, Dec . 10 .7 .78 . D .R . 13 p . 85 at p . 1 53) . It follows from this case-law that the six months period referred to in Article 26 may begin to mn either from the date of a "final decision" taken in the exhaustion of an effective and sufficient domestic remedy, or from the date of the act or decision complained of where such actor decision finally determines the applicant's position on the domestic level . However, Anicle 26 cannot be interpreted to require an applicant to seize the Commission before his position in connection with the matter complained of has been finally determined or settled on the domestic level . Only when there has been a "final decision" ("dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive") or some equivalent act or measure, does the six months period start to mn . The Commission notes that in the present case the applicants do not suggest that the taking of their property under the 1977 Act was in itself contrary to the Convention . They complain, in substance, that the property was taken without payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation and that the payment of the compensation which was paid was discriminatory . Although the applicants criticise the compensation formula in various respects, their complaints are also substantially directed against its application to the circumstances of their company . The 1977 Act did not itself detennine either the amount of compensation, or the promptness with which payments should be made, or other matters relevant to the applicants' complaint, such as the terms on which the compensation stock was issued . On the contrary, the 1977 Act left these matters to be determined subsequently . The Commission cannot therefore accept that either the 1977 Act itself or the taking of the applicants' property on vesting day, can be taken as equivalent to a "final decision" on the question of compensation . The Commission observes in this respect that the situation in the present case is fundamentally different frÃ´m that which it considered in Application No . 7379/76 (sup cit) . In that case the applicant complained of having been deprived of an interest in certain land by an Act of Parliament which had immediate effect and which contained no provision for any subsequent proceedings conceming compensation or other redress . As soon as that Act came into effect the applicant was thus finall y 41
deprived of his interest in the land and no further question relevant to his complaint under Lhe Convention remained to be determined on the domestic level . In the present case, by contrast, the question of compensation, the subject matter of the applicants' complaint, was left to be determined in accordance with a procedure laid down in the 1977 Act, either by agreement or by arbitration . The applicants' position was not finally determined by the 1977 Act itself and in the Commission's view they were entitled, if not bound, to wait until the amount of compensation had been fixed under the statutory compensation procedures before bringing their complaints concerning compensation before the Commission . In this respect the Commission recalls its decision of 28 January 1983 on admissibility of Application No . 9006/80, Lithgow v . the United Kingdom . In the present case the Stockholders' Representative failed to reach an agreement with the Govemment over the amount of compensation due to the applicants following the nationalisation of Scott Lithgow Drydocks . In March 1980 the Stockholders' Representative referred this matter to the Scottish Arbitration Tribunal, the body created by Section 42 of the 1977 Act to decide, in default of any negotiated agreement, upon inter a/ia, the amount of compensation payable following the nationalisation of any panicular concem . After hearing arguments on behalf of Lhe Stockholders' Representative and the Govemment the Tribunal awarded compensation in the sum of Â£ 3 .5 million pursuant to the statutory formula laid down by the 1977 Act . The Tribunal's award was issued on 29 September 1981 . The present application was introduced on 18 November 1981, within the six months of the issue of the award of the Arbitration Tribunal . Accordingly the Commission does not consider that the application, or any part of it, is out of time . 2 . The Commission must also consider whether the applicants have satisfied the condition as to the exhaustion of the available domestic remedies . The applicants do not claim that the compensation formula as set out in the 1977 Act was applied incorrectly by the Arbitration Tribunal to the facts before it . They claim that such a formula inevitably produced inadequate and discriminatory compensation when applied to Scon Lithgow Drydocks . It is accepted by all parties that the Arbitration Tribunal did not err in law in reaching its decision, and that consequently the possibility of appeal by way of a case stated to the Court of Session was not available to the applicants . It further appears that no alternative national forum existed, before which the applicants could have challenged the Arbitration Tribunal's award . In these circumstances the Commission considers that Lhe applicants have exhausted the domestic remedies available to them under the 1977 Act as required by the tertns of Article 26 of Lhe Convention . The Conunission concludes therefore that the requirements of Article 26 have been satisfied as regards both applicants .
3 . The Contmission has made a preliminary examination of the parties' submissions under the Articles of the Convention and Protocol No . I invoked by the applicants . It finds that the case raises complex and important issues conceming the interpretation and application of the Convention and Protocol No . I and that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded . The case must therefore be declared admissible, no ground of inadmissibility having been established . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
(/RADUCTION)
EN FAIT Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les panies, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Les premiÃ©re et seconde requÃ©rantes, Scotts' of Greenock (Estd . 1711) et Lithgows Limited (anciennement Lithgows Holdings Limited), sont des sociÃ©tÃ©s commerciales Ã©cossaises ayant leur siÃ©ge social Ã Greenock . A ces deux requÃ©rantes s'Ã©tait jointe initialement une troisiÃ¨me sociÃ©tÃ©, la Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company (Bahamas) Limited . Cependant, le 22 juillet 1 983, la troisiÃ¨me requÃ©rante a indiquÃ© Ã la Commission qu'elle retirait sa requÃªte, estimant son grief manifestement irrecevable aprÃ¨s la dÃ©cision rendue par la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© des affaires de nationalisation (RequÃªtes No 9006/80 et autres) (I) . Les requÃ©rantes sont reprÃ©sentÃ©es par M . D . Ross Macdonald, solicitor, du cabinet Neill, Clark Murray, Solicitors Ã Greenock et Me Neville Maryan-Green, avocat Ã la Cour d'appel de Paris . Les requÃ©rantes sont des sociÃ©tÃ©s Ã©tablies depuis longtemps dans la construction de bateaux et sous-marins et dans des activitÃ©s commerciales connexes . De tout temps elles ont Ã©tÃ© basÃ©es Ã Greenock et au port de Glasgow sur la Basse-Clyde . Le rapport de la commission d'enquÃ¨te sur les industries aÃ©ronavales, crÃ©Ã©e par l e (I) Voir No 9266/81, D.R . 30 p . 155
Gouvernement, fut publiÃ© en mars 1966 . Il recommandait la nationalisation de neuf chantiers navals sur la Clyde, de prÃ©fÃ©rence regroupÃ©s en deux sociÃ©tÃ©s au maximum . Suite Ã la publication de ce rapport et devanÃ§ant ses propositions, les premiÃ¨re et deuxiÃ©me requÃ©rantes ont renforcÃ© leur collaboration de faÃ§on Ã fusionner Ã©ventuellement pour Ã©viter la menace d'une fusion forcÃ©e avec d'autres chantiers navals de la Haute-Clyde qui n'avaient pas tous une situation commerciale saine . En mai 1967, les premiÃ¨re et seconde requÃ©rantes ont fusionnÃ© et pris des participations Ã©gales dans une sociÃ©tÃ© appelÃ©e Scott Lithgow Drydocks Limited ("Scott Lithgow Drydocks") . Cette sociÃ©tÃ© nouvelle exploitait Ã Greenock des installations de cale sÃ¨che, de radoub et de nettoyage de pÃ©troliers . La construction de ces installations fut achevÃ©e en 1965, pour un coÃ»t total de 4 .534 .969 livres sterlings . Initialement propriÃ©tÃ© de la Firth of Clyde Drydock Company Limited, ces installations furent acquises en mai 1967 par Scott Lithgow Drydocks auprÃ¨s du liquidateur de la premiÃ¨re sociÃ©tÃ© pour un prix de 1, 1 million de livres . Les requÃ©rantes qualifient ce chiffre de â¢ prix exceptionnel Â» dÃ» aux circonstances spÃ©ciales et sans aucun rapport avec la valeur des installations . Le 1Â°' juillet 1977 les actions de Scott Lithgow Drydocks se trouvÃ¨rent transfÃ©rÃ©es Ã British Shipbuilders en vertu de la loi de 1977 sur les industries de construction navale et aÃ©ronavale (Â« La loi de 1977 Â» ) en vertu de laquelle furent nationalisÃ©es diverses sociÃ©tÃ©s de constrvction aÃ©ronautique et de chantiers navals . Une indemnisation pour les actions de la sociÃ©tÃ© devait Ãªtre versÃ©e conformÃ©ment aux dispositions du Titre II de la loi de 1977 . Le montant Ã verser Ã ce titre Ã©tait la -valeur de baseÂ» des titres, aprÃ¨s diverses dÃ©ductions (articles 35 et 39) . Pour les titres cotÃ©s en bourse, la Â« valeur de base . reprÃ©sentait en gros la moyenne des cotations pendant une pÃ©riode de six mois ( Â« la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence-) allant du I^' septembre 1973 au 28 fÃ©vrier 1974 (articles 37 et 56) . Cependant, lorsque les titres n'Ã©taient pas cotÃ©s en bourse, la â¢valeur de baseâ¢ devait Ãªtre fixÃ©e par accord entre le ministre et un . reprÃ©sentant des actionnairesâ¢ ou, Ã dÃ©faut, par un tribunal d'arbitrage crÃ©Ã© en vertu de la loi de 1977, auquel cas la valeur de base serait celle que les titres auraient eue s'ils avaient Ã©tÃ© cotÃ©s pendant la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence (anicle 38) . Les actions de Scott Lithgow Drydocks n'Ã©taient pas cotÃ©es en bourse. ConformÃ©ment Ã la loi de 1977, les premiÃ¨re et deuxiÃ©me requÃ©rantes dÃ©signÃ¨rent un - ReprÃ©sentant des actionnaires - qui entama en leur nom des nÃ©gociations avec le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur sur le montant de l'indemnisation Ã verser . En dÃ©pit de longues nÃ©gociations, le reprÃ©sentant des actionnaires ne fut pas en mesure de modifier le point de vue du Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur selon lequel, par application de la loi de 1977, la valeur de Scott Lithgow Drydocksse situait entre 500 .000 et 600 .000 livres sterlings . Les premiÃ¨re et deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rantes chargÃ¨rent donc leur reprÃ©sentant de saisir le tribunal Ã©cossais d'arbitrage constituÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã la loi de 1977 . Dans la procÃ©dure d'arbitrage, le point litigieux principal concernait l'hypothÃ¨se Ã formuler sur la maniÃ¨re dont l'affaire aurait Ã©tÃ© menÃ©e s i
4 . Anicle I of Protocol No. I The compensation was unfair, contrary to the expressed intentions of thÃ© respondent Government and contrary to standard practice in previous nationalisation measures . The Commission is therefore invited to consider whether the applicants have been treated "subject to the conditions provided for by law" . The "general principles of international law" are also applicable . This is clear from the text of Article I Protocol No . I which provides that "no one" should be deprived of his possessions save in accordance with the three conditions set out . It would do violence to elementary principles of interpretation to give "no one" a different meaning in relation to one of these conditions than that which it bears in relation to the other two . The matter was not sufficiently argued in previous cases where the Commission indicated that these principles were not applicable to nationals (e .g . No . 51I/59, Dec . 20 .12 .60, Gudmundsson v . Iceland, Collection 4) . The text is clear ; to create a distinction in the protection afforded would contradict Article 14 . A close reading of the [ravaur prÃ©paratoires, to which the applicants refer in detail, does not demonstrate that the intention of the parties was to distinguish between nationals and aliens, but rather that the international law standard of compensation was incorporated into the Convention . In any event, under the standard rules of treaty interpretation as set out in Articles . 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties it is necessary first to attempt an interpretation under the general mle (Article 31), and only if that proves difficult to resort to the rravaa .r pr(paratoires . The search for an interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words used leads directly to a consideration of the relevant rvles of international law . Save in the human rights field, such law is concerned only with relations between States . It is not correct to say that it protects aliens, the protection being afforded to the State . It is thus wrong to interpret the reference to international law in Article I as applying protection to the property of one class of beneficiaries (aliens) and not that of others . The general principles of intemational law require the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation . The compensation here was not "prompt" in view of the delay between vesting day and payment . It was inadequate, partly because of the effects of delay since the valuation reference period, and partly because of the use of an inappropriate valuation method . As regards the valuation method, the propeny nationalised was the shares in Scott Lithgow Drydocks . On a practical and realistic view of the company these shares amounted to shares in the assets of the company, namely the dry dock, repair quay and oil tanker cleaning facility . Scott Lithgow Drydocks was no more than a medium of ownership and operation of these facilities . The company was not managed in order to make a profit for itself and its shareholders ; it was organised i n
order to make these facilities available to other companies within the group free of charge . Thus, to value Scott Lithgow Drydocks one must value the facilities, which were valued on 31 December 1973, in the middle of the reference period, at Â£ 6,196 .000 . Together with various other minor assets the real asset value of the company at that date was f 6,660,667 . There was in all the circumstances sufficient evidence of future profitability for it to be realistic to assume that Scott Lithgow Drydocks was in no danger of going into liquidation . Accordingly, compensation on the basis of the real and objective value of the assets is the only valuation method which is fair and equitable . General principles of international law require payment of the "value" of assets at the time of taking, or earlier as in this case . The amount of money awarded should reflect this value, and where there is reliable evidence that the currency in which this value is expressed varies, and such variation may be measured, the amount should similarly be varied in order to reflect the same value at the time of the award as at the time of the taking . Such variation is irrespective of any award of interest, which is meant to compensate the owner for being kept out of his money . In the present case, the value of sterling halved between the end of the reference period and the date of taking and so the award should have been indexed accordingly . Moreover where, as in the present case, a considerable period of time elapses before the final decision as to the value is made, then for the same reasons the amount expressive of this value should once again be indexed upwards . The applicants would nevertheless accept a suitable payment of interest in place of this further indexation . Of the 38 companies nationalised pursuant to the 1977 Act only one was listed on the Stock Exchange . The computation of the remaining 37 was based on a theoretical stock exchange listing . For Scott Lithgow Drydocks and many of the other companies this method was irrelevant and inappropriate . Scott Lithgow Drydocks had always carried on its business with no regard to the needs of a company which was listed on the Stock Exchange (as explained above) . If adequacy of compensation were the only relevant factor the applicanLs would claim approximately Â£ t2 .5 million, being the true net asset value at the reference period (approximately Â£ 6 .6 million) indexed upwards in order to take account of the fall in the value of money during the period up to the vesting date (I July 1977) . However, the delay in paying the compensation means that the sum which should have been payable on the date the compensation actually paid was received by the applicants (I July 1981) is approximately Â£ 20 million . The applicants would ahernatively accept interest at an appropriate rate on the sum of Â£ 12 .5 million from I July 1977 until eventual payment, although they do feel that they are entitled to receive indexation up to the time of payment . The terms in which the Government prefaced their subsequent failure to make prompt payment of compensation indicate that, although the Govertuoent may have been trying to be fair, there was nevertheless an element of confiscation in their establishment of the compensation formula .
Furthermore, the encashment of the Government Bonds in which form the compensation was paid to the applicants will render them liable to Capital Gains Tax at the rate of 30% of the excess of the realisation price over the original acquisition price . The applicants claint that this amounts to the Government taking back 30 % of the compensation paid . The compensation was also not "effective" . This implies payment which is freely transferable and encashable into money, and thus available for reinvestment . Although a Treasury Bond maturing in a reasonably short period exfacie meets these requirements, this is not so in practice because of the effects of the capital gains taxation . Whilst the applicants have no general objection to taxation, compensation should put them back in the position they were in before the removal of their assets . Compensation should therefore either be free of tax, or increased to allow for tax . The applicants refer to the statement of the Secretary of State for Industry of 7 August 19 80 in which he stated that the respondent Government agreed that the compensation "imposed by the 1977 Act" had been "grossly unfair to some of the companies" . This indicates that the respondent Government share their judgment of the compensation received as being inadequate . They summarise their contentions as being that the compensation received pursuant to the terms of the 1977 Act was inadequate both because of the delay betweon the date of assessment of value and the date of payment of compensation and also because of the improper and entirely inadequate guidelines for the computation of the compensation itself as prescribed by the 1977 Act .
5 . Anicle 1 3 The 1977 Act provides no remedy against its own terms, and the applicants have no other national body before which they may challenge the terms of the statute . The Arbitration Tribunal, being a creation of the 1977 Act, provides no remedy . 6 . Article 1 4 Since the basis of computation of compensation was only appropriate for companies quoted on a stock exchange, the respondent Government discriminated against companies which were not so listed, and in particular against Scott Lithgow Drydocks which belonged to the applicants . Moreover, insofar as the applicants are shown to have received a lower percentage of the asset value of Scott Lithgow Drydocks than that received by the owners of other nationalised concems, this also amounts to discrimination . ...............
THE LAW The applicants complain that they were not properly compensated for the taking 1. of their respective shareholdings in Scott Lithgow Drydocks and invoke Article I of Protocol No . I alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, and also Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention . The respondent Government maintain that the application is inadmissible under Article 27 para . 3 of the Convention for noncompliance with the conditions in Article 26 . They funher submit that it is inadmissible under Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention, as manifestly ill-founded . The Commission has first considered whether the application is inadmissible under Article 26 of the Convention, which provides as follows : "The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken . " The respondent Government maintain that, in so far as the application is directed against the statutory compensation fortnula itself, it is out of time, not having been introduced within six months of the passing of the 1977 Act or of vesting day under the Act . In the De Becker Case (No . 214/56, Dec . 9 .6 .58, Yearbook 2 p . 214 at p .242) the Commission made the following observations concerning the interpretation of Ancile 26 of the Convention : "Whereas the Commission notes, in this connection, that the two mles contained in Article 26 conceming the exhaustion of domestic remedies and concerning the six months period, are closely interrelated, since not only are they combined in the same Article, but they are also expressed in a single sentence whose grammatical construction implies such correlation ; and whereas the term 'final decision', therefore, in Article 26 refers exclusively to the final decision concerned in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of intemational law, so that the six months period is operative only in this context ; whereas furthermore, the preparatory work of the Convention, in particular the report prepared in June 1950, by the Conference of Senior Officials, confirm this interpretation . " It has subsequently developed this interpretation of Article 26 to the extent of holding that where no domestic remedy exists, the act or decision complained of must itself normally be taken as the "final decision" for the purposes of Article 26 . In this connection, in No . 7379/76, Dec . 10 .12 .76, D .R . 8 p . 21 1, the Commission made the following observations : "However having considered its previous interpretation of Article 26 of the Convention in the light of the facts of the present case, the Commission has come to the view that where no domestic remedy is available, the act o r
decision complained of must itself normally be taken as the 'final decision' ('dÃ©cision inteme dÃ©finitive') for the purposes of Article 26 . The six months rule laid down in Article 26 was clearly intended to require an applicant to decide whether or not to refer his case to the Commission within a period of six months after his position had been finally determined on the domestic level . Where no question of a continuing violation of the Convention arises, this requirement is equally applicable whether the applicant's position is finally determined by the final decision taken in the course of exhaustion of a domestic remedy or, in the absence of any domestic remedy, by the act or decision which is itself alleged to be in violation of the Convention . " It has followed this interpretation of A rt icle 26 in a number of subsequent cases ( for example, No . 8007177, Dec . 10 .7 .78 . D .R . 13 p . 85 at p . 153) . It follows from this case-law that the six months period referred to in A rt icle 26 may begin to mn either from the date of a "final decision" taken in the exhaustion of an effective and sufficient domestic remedy, or from the date of the act or decision complained of where such act or decision finally determines the applicant's position on the domestic level . However, Art icle 26 cannot be interpreted to require an applicant to seize the Commission before his position in connection with the matter complained of has been finally determined or settled on the domestic level . Only when there has been a "final decision" ( "dÃ©cision inteme dÃ©finitive") or some equivalent act or measure, does the six months period start to run . The Commission notes that in the present case the applicants do not suggest that the taking of their prope rt y under the 1977 Act was in itself contra ry to the Convention . They complain, in substance, that the prope rt y was taken without payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation and that the payment of the compensation which was paid was discriminato ry . Although the applicants criticise the compensation formula in various respects, their complaints are also substantially directed against its application to the circumstances of their company . The 1977 Act did not itself determine either the amount of compensation, or the promptness with which payments should be made, or other matters relevant to the applicants' complaint, such as the terms on which the compensation stock was issued . On the contra ry , the 1977 Act left these ma tt ers to be determined subsequently . The Commission cannot therefore accept that either the 1977 Act itself or the taking of the applicants' property on vesting day, can be taken as equivalent to a"final decision" on the question of compensation . The Commission observes in this respect that the situation in the present case is fundamentally different from that which it considered in Application No . 7379/76 (sup cit) . In that case the applicant complained of having been depri ved of an interest in cenain land by an Act of Parliament which had immediate effect and which contained no provision for any subsequent proceedings concerning compensation or other redress . As soon as that Act came into effect the applicant was thus finall y 41
deprived of his interest in the land and no further question relevant to his complaint under the Convention remained to be deternÃ¹ned on the domestic level . In the present case, by contrast, the question of compensation, the subject matter of the applicants' complaint, was left to be determined in accordance with a procedure laid down in the 1977 Act, either by agreement or by arbitration . The applicants' position was not finally determined by the 1977 Act itself and in the Commission's view they were entitled, if not bound, to wait until the amount of compensation had been fixed under the statutory compensation procedures before bringing their complaints conceming compensation before the Commission . In this respect the Commission recalls its decision of 28 January 1983 on admissibility of Application No . 9006/80, Lithgow v . the United Kingdom .
In the present case the Stockholders' Representative failed to reach an agreement with the Government over the amount of compensation due to the applicants following the nationalisation of Scott Lithgow Drydocks . In March 1980 the Stockholders' Representative referred this matter to the Scottish Arbitration Tribunal, the body created by Section 42 of the 1977 Act to decide, in default of any negotiated agreement, upon inter a(ia, the amount of compensation payable following the nationalisation of any particular concern . After hearing arguments on behalf of the Stockholders' Representative and the Government the Tribunal awarded compensation in the sum of f 3 .5 million pursuant to the statutory formula laid down by the 1977 Act . The Tribunal's award was issued on 29 September 1981 . The present application was introduced on I8 November 1981, within the six months of the issue of the award of the Arbitration Tribunal . Accordingly the Commission does not consider that the application, or any part of it, is out of time . 2 . The Commission must also consider whether the applicants have satisfied the condition as to the exhaustion of the available domestic remedies . The applicants do not claim that the compensation fotmula as set out in the 1977 Act was applied incorrectly by the Arbitration Tribunal to the facts before it . They claim that such a formula inevitably produced inadequate and discriminatory compensation when applied to Scott Lithgow Drydocks . It is accepted by all parties that the Arbitration Tribunal did not err in law in reaching its decision, and that consequently the possibility of appeal by way of a case stated to the Court of Session was not available to the applicanis . It further appears that no alternative national forum existed, before which the applicants could have challenged the Arbitration Tribunal's award . In these circumstances the Commission considers that the applicants have exhausted the domestic remedies available to them under the 1977 Act as required by the terms of Article 26 of the Convention . The Conunission concludes therefore that the requirements of Article 26 have been satisfied as regards both applicants .
3 . The Commission has made a preliminary examination of the parties' submissions under the Articles of the Convention and Protocol No . I invoked by the applicants . It finds that the case raises complex and important issues conceming the interpretation and application of the Convention and Protocol No . I and that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded . The case must therefore be declared admissible, no ground of inadmissibility having been established . For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les parties, peuvent se rÃ©su mer comme suit : Les premiÃ©re et seconde requÃ©rantes, Scotts' of Greenock (Estd . 1711) et Lithgows Limited ( anciennement Lithgows Holdings Limited), sont des sociÃ©tÃ©s commerciales Ã©cossaises ayant leur siÃ¨ge social Ã Greenock . A ces deux requÃ©rantes s'Ã©tait jointe initialement une troisiÃ¨me sociÃ©tÃ©, la Bank of Nova Scotia Tmst Company (Bahamas) Limited . Cependant, le 22 juillet 1983, la troisiÃ¨me requÃ©rante a indiquÃ© Ã la Commission qu'elle retirait sa requÃªte, estimant son grief manifestement irrecevable aprÃ¨s la dÃ©cision rendue par la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© des affaires de nationalisation (RequÃªtes No 9006/80 et autres) (I) . Les requÃ©rantes sont reprÃ©sentÃ©es par M . D . Ross Macdonald, solicitor, du cabinet Neill, Clark Murray, Solicitors Ã Greenock et Me Neville Maryan-Green, avocat Ã la Cour d'appel de Paris . Les requÃ©rantes sont des sociÃ©tÃ©s Ã©tablies depuis longtemps dans la construction de bateaux et sous-marins et dans des activitÃ©s commercia)es connexes . De tout temps elles ont Ã©tÃ© basÃ©es Ã Greenock et au port de Glasgow sur la Basse-Clyde . Le rapport de la commission d'enquÃªte sur les industries aÃ©ronavales, crÃ©Ã©e par l e (I) Voir No 9266/91, D .R . 3 0 p . 155.
Gouvernement, fut publiÃ© en mars 1966 . II recommandait la nationalisation de neuf chantiers navals sur la Clyde, de prÃ©fÃ©rence regroupÃ©s en deux sociÃ©tÃ©s au maximum . Suite Ã la publication de ce rapport et devanÃ§ant ses propositions, les premiÃ¨re et deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rantes ont renforcÃ© leur collaboration de faÃ§on Ã fusionner Ã©ventuellement pour Ã©viter la menace d'une Posion forcÃ©e avec d'autres chantiers navals de la Haute-Clyde qui n'avaient pas tous une situation commerciale saine . En mai 1967, les premiÃ¨re et seconde requÃ©ranles ont fusionnÃ© et pris des participations Ã©gales dans une sociÃ©tÃ© appelÃ©e Scott Lithgow Drydocks Limited ("Scott Lithgow Drydocks") . Cette sociÃ©tÃ© nouvelle exploitait Ã Greenock des installations de cale sÃ©che, de radoub et de nettoyage de pÃ©troliers . La construction de ces installations fut achevÃ©e en 1965, pour un coÃ»t total de 4 .534 .969 livres sterlings . Initialement propriÃ©tÃ© de la Firth of Clyde Drydock Company Limited, ces installations furent acquises en mai 1967 par Scott Lithgow Drydocks auprÃ¨s du liquidateur de la premiÃ¨re sociÃ©tÃ© pour un prix de 1,1 million de livres . Les requÃ©rantes qualifient ce chiffre de Â« prix exceptionnel . dÃ» aux circonstances spÃ©ciales et sans aucun rapport avec la valeur des installations . Le 1Â° 1 juillet 19771es actions de Scott Lithgow Drydocks se trouvÃ©renl transfÃ©rÃ©es Ã British Shipbuilders en vertu de la loi de 1977 sur les industries de construction navale et aÃ©ronavale (Â« l-a loi de 1977Â») en vertu de laquelle furent nationalisÃ©es diverses sociÃ©tÃ©s de construction aÃ©ronautique et de chantiers navals . Une indemnisation pour les actions de la sociÃ©tÃ© devait Ã©tre versÃ©e confonnÃ©ment aux dispositions du Titre Il de la loi de 1977 . Le montant Ã verser Ã ce titre Ã©tait la Â« valeur de base Â» des titres, aprÃ¨s diverses dÃ©ductions (articles 35 et 39) . Pour les titres cotÃ©s en bourse, la Â« valeur de base- reprÃ©sentait en gros la moyenne des cotations pendant une pÃ©riode de six mois (. la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence â¢) allant du 1Â°' septembre 1973 au 28 fÃ©vrier 1974 (articles 37 et 56) . Cependant, lorsque les titres n'Ã©taient pas cotÃ©s en bourse, la â¢valeur de base - devait Ã©tre fixÃ©e par accord entre le ministre et un - reprÃ©sentant des actionnaires - ou, Ã dÃ©faut, par un tribunal d'arbitrage crÃ©Ã© en vertu de la loi de 1977, auquel cas la valeur de base serait celle que les titres auraient eue s'ils avaienl Ã©tÃ© cotÃ©s pendant la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence (article 38) . Les actions de Scott Lithgow Drydocks n'Ã©taient pas cotÃ©es en bourse . ConformÃ©ment Ã la loi de 1977, les premiÃ©re et deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rantes dÃ©signÃ©renl un - ReprÃ©sentant des actionnaires â¢ qui entama en leur nom des nÃ©gociations avec le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur sur le montant de l'indemnisation Ã verser . En dÃ©pit de longues nÃ©gociations, le reprÃ©sentant des actionnaires ne fut pas en mesure de modifier le point de vue du Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur selon lequel, par application de la loi de 1977, la valeur de Scott Lithgow Drydocks se situait entre 500.000 et 600 .000 livres sterlings . Les premiÃ¨re et deuxiÃ¨me requÃ©rantes chargÃ¨rent donc leur reprÃ©sentant de saisir le tribunal Ã©cossais d'arbitrage constituÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã la loi de 1977 . Dans la procÃ©dure d'arbitrage, le point litigieux principal concernait l'hypothÃ©se Ã formuler sur la mani8re dont l'affaire aurait Ã©tÃ© menÃ©e s i 44
Scott Lithgow Drydocks avait Ã©tÃ© cotÃ©e Ã la bourse pendant la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence au lieu d'Ã¨tre (comme c'Ã©tait le cas en rÃ©alitÃ©) une fi liale gÃ©rÃ©e essentiellement au profit d'autres sociÃ©tÃ©s au sein du groupe . Le 29 septembre 1981, le t ri bunal rendit sa sentence Ã©valuant la sociÃ©tÃ© Ã 3,5 millions de livres sur la base de la formule prÃ©vue par la loi . ConfortnÃ©ment Ã l'article 36 par . 6 de la loi de 1977, deux versements furent effectuÃ©s Ã titre d'indemnisation les 15 mai et 6 dÃ©cembre 1978 grÃ¢ce Ã l'Ã©mission de bons du TrÃ©sor pour une valeur de 150 .000 et 300 .000 livres respectivement . Le solde de 3,05 millions de livres fut payÃ© le 14 octobre 1981 sous forme de bons du TrÃ©sor . Un intÃ©rÃ©t fut Ã©galement versÃ© Ã partir du IÂ°' juillet 1977 jusqu'Ã la date d'Ã©mission des bons, au taux applicable Ã ce type de bons . Les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes soutiennent que l'indemnisation qu'elles ont reÃ§ue, imposable de surcroit, Ã©tait tout Ã fait insuffisante . Dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce, le seul moyen Ã©quitable d'Ã©valuer leur entreprise Ã©tait de partir de ses avoirs . Or, la valeur de ces avoirs Ã©tait de 6 .660 .667 livres pendant la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence . Compte tenu de l'inflation, le montant qui aurait d0 Ãªtre versÃ© en juillet 1981 Ã©tait de 20 .172 .111 livres . Dans un tÃ©lex du 26 fÃ©vrier 1985, les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes dÃ©clarent qu'aprÃ©s nationalisation et pendant qu'elles Ã©taient propriÃ©tÃ© de l'Etat, les installations, bÃ¢timents et terrains appartenant Ã Scott Lithgow Drydocks furent transfÃ©rÃ©s Ã la sociÃ©tÃ© Scott Lithgow Limited . Le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur en disposa par la suite en 1984 lorsqu'il vendit Scott Lithgow Limited Ã un tiers de l'industrie pÃ©troliÃ©re .
GRIEFS ET ARGUMENTATION INITIALE DES REQUÃRANTES Anicle 2 5 Les requÃ©rantes n'ont pas cessÃ© d'Ãªtre â¢victimesâ¢ de la perte de leur sociÃ©tÃ© pour avoir simplement reÃ§u l'indemnisation accordÃ©e par le tribunal d'arbitrage . En effet, l'indemnisation offerte, bien que six Ã sept fois plus Ã©levÃ©e que la somme proposÃ©e par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, n'en demeure pas moins insuffisante . Il Ã©tait du reste inÃ©vitable que le tribunal n'accorde pas une indemnitÃ© convenable puisque, pour calculer cette somme, il Ã©tait tenu de prendre pour base une valeur boursiÃ©re hypothÃ©tique . Or, dans les circonstances propres Ã Scott Lithgow Drydocks, le seul critÃ¨re pouvant conduire Ã une valeur Ã©quitable d'indemnisation Ã©tait la valeur rÃ©elle des avoirs de la sociÃ©tÃ© . En outre, le tribunal n'a pas indexÃ© l'indemnisation, ce qui aurait permis d'en maintenir la valeur pendant la pÃ©riode se situant entre la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence et la date de l'octroi de l'indemnisation (environ huit ans) . 45
2 . Article 2 6 Les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes ont Ã©puisÃ© les recours intemes Ã leur disposition puisque, conformÃ©ment Ã la loi de 1977, elles ont saisi le tribunal Ã©cossais d'arbitrage de la question de l'indemnisation . Elles ont par ailleurs introduit la prÃ©sente requÃªte dans les six mois suivant la dÃ©cision du tribunal d'arbitrage .
3 . Article 6 Le dÃ©lai Ã©coulÃ© entre le jour de l'octroi de l'indemnisation (1Â°juillet 1977) et la date du versement de l'indemnitÃ© (29 septembre 1981) n'est pas un Â«dÃ©lai raisonnable au sens de l'article 6 . 4 . Article / du Protocole additionne l L'indemnisation n'Ã©tait pas Ã©quitable . contrairement aux intentions exprimÃ©es par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur et Ã la pratique habituellement suivie pour les nationalisations . La Commission est dÃ¨s lors invitÃ©e Ã examiner le point de savoir si les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes ont Ã©tÃ© traitÃ©es Â«dans les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi . . Les .principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit internationalâ¢ sont Ã©galement applicables . Cela ressort clairement du texte de l'article I du Protocole additionnel, qui prÃ©voit que -nul â¢ ne peut Ãªtre privÃ© de sa propriÃ©tÃ© que conformÃ©ment aux trois conditions prÃ©vues . Ce serait violer les principes Ã©lÃ©mentaires d'interprÃ©tation que de donner au mot - nul Â» un sens diffÃ©rent par rapport Ã l'une de ces conditions qu'il n'en a pour les deux autres . La question n'a pas Ã©tÃ© suffisamment examinÃ©e dans la jurispmdence antÃ©rieure de la Commission qui a indiquÃ© que ces principes n'Ã©taient pas applicables aux nationaux (par exemple No 511/59, dÃ©c . 20 .12 .60, Gudmundsson c/Islande, Recueil 4) . Le texte est clair : crÃ©er une distinction dans la protection offerte serait contraire Ã l'article 14 . La lecture attentive des travaux prÃ©paratoires, auxquels les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes se rÃ©f8rent en dÃ©tail, ne fait pas apparaÃ®tre l'intention des parties de distinguer entre nationaux et Ã©trangers, mais montre plutÃ´t que la rÃ¨gle d'indemnisation prÃ©vue par le droit international a Ã©tÃ© incorporÃ©e Ã la Convention . Quoi qu'il en soit, selon les rÃ¨gles habituelles d'interprÃ©tation des traitÃ©s telles qu'Ã©noncÃ©es aux articles 31 et 32 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traitÃ©s, il faut tout d'abord s'efforcer d'interprÃ©ter le texte selon la rÃ¨gle gÃ©nÃ©rale (article 31) et ne recourir aux travaux prÃ©paratoires qu'en cas de difficultÃ©s . La recherche d'une interprÃ©tation conforrne au sens ordinaire des mots employÃ©s conduit directement Ã examiner les rÃ¨gles pertinentes du droit international . Hormis le domaine des droits de l'homme, ce droit ne concerne que les relations entre Etats . Il n'est pas exact d'affirmer que ce droit protÃ¨ge les Ã©trangers, car c'est plutÃ´t Ã l'Etat qu'il accorde sa protection . Il est donc erronÃ© d'interprÃ©ter la rÃ©fÃ©rence au droit international ftgurant Ã l'article I comme concemant la protection de la propriÃ©tÃ© d'un type de bÃ©nÃ©ficiaires (les Ã©trangers) et pas celle des autres .
Les principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international exigent le versement d'une indemnisation rapide, adÃ©quate et effective . Or ici, l'indemnisation n'a pas Ã©tÃ© â¢ rapide . compte tenu du dÃ©lai qui s'est Ã©coulÃ© entre le jour de la nationalisation et la date du paiement . Elle a Ã©tÃ© inadÃ©quate, en partie en raison des effets du dÃ©lai Ã©coulÃ© depuis la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence choisie pour l'Ã©valuation et en partie par le recours Ã une mÃ©thode d'Ã©valuation inappropriÃ©e . Pour ce qui est de la mÃ©lhode d'Ã©valuation, les biens nationalisÃ©s Ã©taient les actions de la sociÃ©tÃ© Scott Lithgow Drydocks . Si l'on envisage la sociÃ©tÃ© sous un angle pratique et rÃ©aliste, ces actions Ã©quivalaient Ã des parts des avoirs de la sociÃ©tÃ© . Ã savoir la cale sÃ¨che, le bassin de radoub et les installations de nettoyage de pÃ©troliers . Scott Lithgow Drydocks n'Ã©tait rien d'autre qu'un moyen de possÃ©der et d'exploiter ces installations . La sociÃ©tÃ© ne servait pas Ã rÃ©aliser des bÃ©nÃ©fices pour elle-mÃ©me et ses actionnaires ; elle Ã©tait organisÃ©e pour mettre ces installations gratuitement Ã la disposition d'autres sociÃ©tÃ©s membres du groupe . DÃ¨s lors, pour Ã©valuer Scott Lithgow Drydocks, il fallait Ã©valuer les installations, estimÃ©es au 31 dÃ©cembre 1973 - milieu de la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence - Ã 6 . 196 .0001ivres sterling . Si l'on y ajoute divers autres avoirs mineurs, la valeur rÃ©elle en capital de la sociÃ©tÃ© Ã©tait Ã cette date de 6 .660 .667 livres . Il y avait dans tous les cas suffisamment d'Ã©lÃ©ments prouvant la renlabilitÃ© future de la sociÃ©tÃ© pour qu'il soit rÃ©aliste de supposer que Scott Lithgow Drydocks ne risquait absolument pas la dÃ©confiture . Aussi l'indemnisation calculÃ©e Ã partir de la valeur rÃ©elle et objective des biens Ã©tait-elle l'unique mÃ©thode pour parvenir Ã une Ã©valuation juste et Ã©quitable . Les principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international exigent le versement de la .valeurâ¢ de l'actif au moment de la dÃ©possession, ou plus tÃ´t, comme dans ce cas prÃ©cis . Le montant de la somme accordÃ©e doit reflÃ©ter cette valeur et lorsque des Ã©lÃ©ments valables prouvent les fluctuations de la monnaie exprimant cette valeur et que cette variation est mesurable, la somme doit Ãªtre modulÃ©e en consÃ©quence de faÃ§on Ã reflÃ©ter la mÃ©me valeur Ã l'Ã©poque de l'octroi de l'indemnisation qu'Ã l'Ã©poque de la dÃ©possession . Cette variation est indÃ©pendante de l'intÃ©rÃªt Ã©ventuellement fixÃ©, intÃ©rÃªt qui sert Ã indemniser le propriÃ©taire qui est privÃ© de son argent . En l'occurrence, la valeur de la livre sterling ayant Ã©tÃ© rÃ©duite de moitiÃ© entre la fin de la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence et la date de la dÃ©possession, l'indemnisation accordÃ©e devait Ãªtre indexÃ©e en consÃ©quence . Lorsqu'en outre- comme c'est le cas ici, il s'Ã©coule un dÃ©lai considÃ©rable avant que ne soit prise la dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive sur l'Ã©valuation, il faut lÃ encore et pour les mÃªmes raisons indexer Ã la hausse le montant exprimant cette valeur . A la place de cette nouvelle indexation, les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes accepteraient cenendant le versement d'un intÃ©rÃªt convenable . Sur les trente-huit sociÃ©tÃ©s nationalisÃ©es en venu de la loi de 1977, une seule Ã© tait cotÃ©e en bourse . Pour Ã©valuer l'actif des trente-sept autres, le Gouvemement s'est fondÃ© sur une cotation boursiÃ¨re thÃ©orique . Pour Scott Lithgow Drydocks e t 47
bon nombre d'autres sociÃ©tÃ©s, cene mÃ©thode n'Ã©tait ni valable ni adaptÃ©e . Sco tt Lithgow Drydocks en effet a toujours menÃ© ses activitÃ©s sans tenir compte des besoins d'une sociÃ©tÃ© cotÃ©e en bourse ( comme expliquÃ© supra) . S'il fallait considÃ©rer uniquement le montant suffisant de l'indemnisation, les sociÃ©tÃ©s re quÃ©rantes rÃ©clameraient environ 12,5 millions de livres : ce chiffre reprÃ©sente la valeur rÃ©elle ne tte des biens lors de la pÃ©riode de rÃ©fÃ©rence ( environ 6,6 millions de livres), indexÃ©e Ã la hausse de faÃ§on Ã tenir compte de la chute de valeur de la livre pendant la pÃ© ri ode de rÃ©fÃ©rence et jusqu'Ã la date de versement de l'indemnisation (1Â°1 juillet 1977) . Cependant, vu le dÃ©lai mis Ã verser l'indemnisation, la somme qui aurait dÃ¹ Ã©tre versÃ©e au moment oÃ¹ l'indemnisation a Ã©tÃ© effectivement perÃ§ue par les requÃ©rants ( 1Â°' juillet 1981) avoisine 20 millions de livres . Les requÃ©rants accepteraient Ã titre subsidiaire le versement d'un intÃ©rÃªt appropri Ã© pour la somme de 12 .5 millions Ã pa rt ir du 1^' juillet 1977 et jusqu'au versement final, bien qu'ils estiment avoir droit Ã percevoir le montant d'une indexation calculÃ©e jusqu'Ã la date du versement . Les explications que donne le Gouvernement du fait de n'avoir pas effectuÃ© un versement rapide de l'indemnisation indiquent que, mÃªme s'il a peutÃªtre essayÃ© d'Ã©tre juste, il a nÃ©anmoins fait place Ã un Ã©lÃ©ment de confiscation dans le mode d'Ã©tablissement de sa formule d'indemnisation . En outre, l'encaissement des bons du trÃ©sor - mode de versement de l'indemnisation - assujettit les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes Ã l'impÃ´t sur les gains en capital au taux de 30 % dans la mesure oÃ¹ le prix de rÃ©alisation dÃ©passe le prix d'acquisition Ã l'origine . Les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes estiment que cela revient pour le Gouvemement Ã reprendre 30 % de l'indemnitÃ© versÃ©e . L'indemnisation n'a pas non plus Ã©tÃ© - effective- . Il aurait fallu pour cela que le versement fÃ»t une somme librement transfÃ©rable et encaissable en argent, disponible pour rÃ©investissement . A premiÃ¨re vue, un bon du trÃ©sor venant Ã Ã©chÃ©ance dans un temps relativement court rÃ©pond Ã ces conditions, mais il n'en est pas ainsi en pratique en raison des effets de l'imposition sur les gains en capital . Les requÃ©rantes n'ont certes pas d'objection Ã ce que leur indemnitÃ© soit imposÃ©e, mais l'indemnisation doit les replacer dans la situation oÃ¹ elles Ã©taient avant que leurs avoirs ne leur soient enlevÃ©s . Il faut donc ou bien que le montant de l'indemnisation ne soit pas imposable ou bien qu'il soit augmentÃ© pour tenir compte de l'impÃ´t . Les requÃ©rantes renvoient Ã la dÃ©claration faite le 7 aoÃ»t 1980 par le ministre de l'Industrie, disant que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur reconnaissait le caractÃ¨re . trÃ¨s inÃ©quitable pour certaines des sociÃ©tÃ©s Â» de l'indemnisation - imposÃ©e par la loi de 1977Â» . Ceci montre bien que le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur partage leur analyse quant Ã l'insuffisance de l'indemnitÃ© perÃ§ue . Les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes rÃ©sument leur argumentation en disant que l'indenutisation reÃ§ue en vertu de la loi de 1977 Ã©tait insufftsante, tant en raison du dÃ©lai Ã©coul Ã©
entre la date d'Ã©valuation et celle du versement de l'indemnitÃ© qu'en raison du caract8re impropre et tout Ã fait inadÃ©quat des rÃ©gles de calcul de l'indemnisation prÃ©vues par la loi de 1977 . Article 1 3 La loi de 1977 ne prÃ©voit pas de recours contre les conditions qu'elle prescrit et les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes ne voient aucun organe national devant lequel elles pourraient contester les termes de la loi . Le t ribunal d'arbitrage Ã© tant une crÃ©ation de la loi de 1977 ne constitue pas un recours valable .
6 . Anicle 1 4 Etant donnÃ© que la base du calcul de l'indemnisation ne valait que pour les sociÃ©tÃ©s cotÃ©es en bourse, le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur a pratiquÃ© une discrimination Ã l'enconlre des sociÃ©tÃ©s qui n'Ã©taient pas cotÃ©es et notamment de la Scott Lithgow Drydocks, propriÃ©tÃ© des sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes . Du reste, dans la mesure oÃ¹ les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes apport ent la preuve qu'elles ont reÃ§u un pourcentage plus faible de la valeur en capital de Scott Lithgow Drydocks que n'en ont reÃ§u les propriÃ©taires d'autres entreprises nationalisÃ©es, il y a lÃ Ã©galement une discrimination .
EN DROI T 1 . Les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes se plaignent de n'avoir pas Ã©tÃ© convenablement indemnisÃ©es pour la nationalisation de leurs participations respectives Ã Scott Lithgow Drydocks et invoquent Ã cet Ã©gard l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel lu isolÃ©ment et en liaison avec l'article 14 de la Convention, ainsi que les articles 6 et 13 de la Convention . Le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur soutient que la requÃªte est irrecevable en vertu de l'article 27 par . 3 de la Convention puisque les conditions Ã©noncÃ©es Ã l'anicle 26 n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© remplies . II soutient Ã©galement que la requÃ©te est irrecevable en vertu de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention, pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . La Commission a d'abord examinÃ© si la requ2te Ã©tait irrecevable au regard de l'article 26 de la Convention, ainsi libellÃ© : Â« La Commission ne peut Ãªtre saisie qu'aprÃ¨s l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours intemes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit intemational gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus et dans le dÃ©lai de six mois, Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que, dans la mesure oÃ¹ la requÃ©te s'attaque Ã la formule d'indemnisation prÃ©vue par la loi elle-mÃªme, elle est tardive puisqu'elle n'a pas Ã©tÃ© introduite dans les six mois suivant le vote de la loi de 1977 ou suivant le jour du transfert des participations en vertu de la loi .
Dans l'affaire De Becker (No 214/56, dÃ©c . 9 .6 .58, Annuaire 2 p . 214 Ã p . 242), la Commission a formulÃ© sur l'interprÃ©tation de l'article 26 de la Convention les observations suivantes : Â« Que la Commission constate, Ã cet Ã©gard, qu'il existe une Ã©troite corrÃ©lation entre les deux rÃ¨gles qu'Ã©nonce ledit article 26, Ã savoir celle de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours intemes et celle du dÃ©lai de six mois, car les deux rÃ¨gles, non seulement font l'objet d'un article unique, mais figurent cÃ´te Ã cÃ´te dans une seule et mÃ©me phrase dont la structure grammaticale impose l'idÃ©e de pareille corrÃ©lation ; que par dÃ©cision inteme dÃ©finitive, l'article 26 dÃ©signe donc exclusivement la dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive rendue dans le cadre normal de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours intemes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit intemational gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus, de sorte que le dÃ©lai de siX mois ne peut fonctionner que dans ce cas ; au surplus les indications qui se dÃ©gagent des travaux prÃ©paratoires de la Convention, notamment du rapport rÃ©digÃ© en juin 1950 par la ConfÃ©rence des Hauts Fonctionnaires, confirment cette interprÃ©tation . . La Commission a ultÃ©rieurement dÃ©veloppÃ© cette interprÃ©tation de l'article 26 en dÃ©clarant que lorsqu'il n'existe pas de recours inteme, l'acte ou la dÃ©cision incriminÃ©s doivent eux-mÃªmes Ã©tre nortnalement considÃ©rÃ©s comme Â« la dÃ©cision inteme dÃ©finitiveÂ» visÃ©e Ã l'article 26 . A cet Ã©gard, dans l'affaire No 7379/76, dÃ©c . 10 .12 .76, D .R . 8 p . 211, la Commission a fonnulÃ© les observations suivantes : â¢Toutefois, envisageant sa prÃ©cÃ©dente interprÃ©tation de l'anicle 26 de la Convention Ã la lumiÃ¨re des faits de la prÃ©sente affaire, la Commission parvient Ã la conclusion que, lorqu'il n'existe pas de voie de recours inteme, l'acte ou la dÃ©cision incriminÃ©s doivent eux-mÃ¨mes Ã¨tre normalement considÃ©rÃ©s comme la dÃ©cision inteme dÃ©finitive visÃ©e Ã l'article 26 . La rÃ¨gle des six mois Ã©noncÃ©e Ã l'article 26 vise manifestement Ã contraindre tout requÃ©rant Ã dÃ©cider, dans un dÃ©lai de six mois Ã panir de la dÃ©cision interne fixant dÃ©finitivement sa situation, de saisir ou de ne pas saisir la Commission . Lorsque la question d'une violation continue de la Convention ne se pose pas, cette condition s'applique au mÃªme titre, que la situation du requÃ©rant soit dÃ©finitivement fixÃ©e par une dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive rendue dans le cadre normal de l'Ã©puisement d'une voie de recours interne ou, en l'absence de toute voie de recours inteme, par l'acte ou la dÃ©cision prÃ©tendument incompatibles avec la Convention . Â» La Commission a confirmÃ© cette interprÃ©tation de l'anicle 26 dans un certain nombre d'affaires ultÃ©rieures (par exemple No 8007/77, Chypre c/Turquie, dÃ©c . 10 .7 .78, D .R . 13 p . 85 Ã p . 153) . Il dÃ©coule de cette jurispmdence que le dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26 peut commencer Ã courir soit Ã dater de la â¢dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive - prise dans le cadre de l'Ã©puisement d'un recours inteme effectif et suffisant, soit Ã dater d e
l'acte ou de la dÃ©cision incriminÃ©s lorsque cet acte ou cette dÃ©cision fixent dÃ©finitivement la situation du requÃ©rant au niveau inteme . L'article 26 ne saurait cependant s'interprÃ©ter comme exigeant d'un requÃ©rant qu'il saisisse la Commission avant que sa situation au regard du point litigieux n'ait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©finitivement fixÃ©e ou rÃ©glÃ©e au niveau interne . Ce n'est que lorsqu'il y a eu une Â« dÃ©cision interne dÃ©,(+nirive . ou un acte ou une mesure Ã©quivalents que le dÃ©lai de six mois commence Ã courir . La Comntission relÃ¨ve qu'en l'espÃ¨ce les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes ne prÃ©tendent pas que la nationalisation de leurs biens en vertu de la loi de 1977 ait Ã©tÃ© en soi contraire Ã la Convention . Elles se plaignent pour l'essentiel d'une part de ce que la dÃ©possession de leurs biens n'a pas Ã©tÃ© assortie du versement d'une indemnitÃ© rapide, adÃ©quate et effective et, d'autre part, de ce que l'indemnisation a Ã©tÃ© discriminatoire . Si les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes critiquent Ã divers Ã©gards la mÃ©thode d'indemnisation, elles dirigent essentiellement leurs griefs contre son application au cas de leurs sociÃ©tÃ©s . La loi de 1977 ne fixe elle-mÃªme ni le montant de l'indemnitÃ©, ni les dÃ©lais de paiement, ni aucune autre question touchant aux griefs des requÃ©rantes, par exemple les conditions d'Ã©mission des bons tenant lieu d'indemnisation . Au contraire, la loi de 1977 indiquait que ces questions seraient tranchÃ©es ultÃ©rieurement . La Commission ne saurait donc accepter que le jour de l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la loi de 1977 ellemÃªme ou celui de la nationalisation des biens des requÃ©rantes puisse Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme Ã©quivalant Ã une â¢dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive Â» sur la question de l'indemnisation . La Commission remarque Ã cet Ã©gard que la situation est en l'espÃ¨ce fondamenlalement diffÃ©rente de celle qu'elle a examinÃ©e dans la requÃªte No 7379/76 (cit . supra) . Dans cette derniÃ©re affaire, le requÃ©rant se plaignait d'avoir Ã©tÃ© privÃ© de son droit de propriÃ©tÃ© sur un ce rtain terrain par une loi entrÃ©e immÃ©diatement en vigueur et qui ne prÃ©voyait aucune procÃ©dure d'indemnisation ou autre type de remÃ¨de . DÃ¨s l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la loi, le requÃ©rant avait donc Ã© tÃ© dÃ©finitivement privÃ© de sa propriÃ©tÃ© sur le terrain et il ne restait Ã trancher au plan inteme aucune autre question touchant Ã son grief sous l'angle de la Convention . En l'espÃ¨ce au contraire, la queslion de l'indemnisation, objet du grief des sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes, devait Ãªtre tranchÃ©e ultÃ©rieurement selon une procÃ©dure prÃ©vue par la loi de 1977, c'est-Ã -dire soit par accord, soit par arbitrage . La situation des sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes n'a donc pas Ã©tÃ© fixÃ©e dÃ©finitivement par la loi de 1977 elle-mÃªme et aux yeux de la Commission, les intÃ©ressÃ©s Ã©taient en droit, voire dans l'obligation d'attendre jusqu'Ã la fixation du montant de l'indemnitÃ© conformÃ©ment aux procÃ©dures prÃ©vues par la loi avant de saisir la Commission de la question de l'indemnisation . La Commission rappelle Ã cet Ã©gard la dÃ©cision qu'elle a rendue le 28 janvier 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte No 9006/80, Lithgow c/Royaume-Uni . En l'espÃ¨ce, le reprÃ©sentant des actionnaires n'a pas pu pa rv enir Ã un accord avec le Gouvernement sur le montant de l'indemnitÃ© due aux sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes aprÃ¨s la nationalisation de Scott Lithgow D rydocks . En mars 1980, il porta l'affaire devant le tribunal Ã©cossais d'arbitrage, organe crÃ©Ã© par l'article 42 de la loi de 197 7
pour dÃ©cider notamment, Ã dÃ©faut d'un accord nÃ©gociÃ©, du montant de l'indemnitÃ© Ã verser apr8s nationalisation . AprÃ¨s avoir entendu l'argumentation prÃ©sentÃ©e au nom du reprÃ©sentant des actionnaires et du Gouvemement, le tribunal fixa l'indemnitÃ© Ã 3,5 millions de livres sterling, conformÃ©ment Ã la mÃ©thode prÃ©vue par la loi de 1977 . La sentence arbitrale du tribunal fut rendue le 29 septembre 1981 . La prÃ©sente requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© introduite le 18 novembre 1981, donc dans les six mois qui suivaient la sentence arbitrale . En consÃ©quence, la Commission n'estime pas que la requÃ¨te soit tardive, ni en tout ni en panie . 2 . La Commission doit Ã©galement examiner si les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes ont rempli la condition de l'Ã©puisement des recours intemes disponibles . Les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes ne prÃ©tendent pas que la mÃ©thode d'indemnisation fixÃ©e par la loi de 1977 ait Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©e de maniÃ¨re incorrecte par le tribunal d'arbitrage aux faits dont il Ã©tait saisi . Elles prÃ©tendent que cette mÃ©thode a conduit inÃ©vitablement Ã une indemnisation insuffisante et discriminatoire lorsqu'elle a Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©e Ã Scott Lithgow Drydocks . Les parties reconnaissent que le tribunal d'arbitrage n'a pas commis d'erreur de droit lorsqu'il s'est prononcÃ© et les requÃ©rantes n'avaient donc pas la possibilitÃ© de se pourvoir devant la Court of Session . Il apparaÃ®t en outre qu'il n'existait pas d'autre organe inteme devant lequel les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes auraient pu contester la sentence arbitrale . Dans ces conditions, la Commission estime que les requÃ©rantes ont Ã©puisÃ© les recours intemes que leur offrait la loi de 1977, comme l'exige l'article 26 de la Convention . La Commission en conclut que les conditions posÃ©es Ã l'article 26 ont Ã©tÃ© remplies en ce qui conceme les deux sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes . 3 . La Commission a procÃ©dÃ© Ã un examen prÃ©liminaire de l'argumentation avancÃ©e par les parties sous l'angle des articles de la Convention et du Protocole additionnel invoquÃ©s par les sociÃ©tÃ©s requÃ©rantes . Elle constate que la requÃªte pose des questions importantes et complexes concemant l'interprÃ©tation et l'application de la Convention et du Protocole additionnel et qu'elle ne saurait dÃ¨s lors Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e . La requÃªte doit donc dtre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable, aucun motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE .
52Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 11/03/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 36
 l'article 6
 l'article 14
 l'article 1
 l'article 14
 l'article 27
 l'article 27
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 L'article 26
 l'article 42
 l'article 26
 l'article 26