Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/58086481/Jeff-Kosseff-Defending-Section-230-The-Value-of-Intermediary-Immunity
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:31:56+00:00

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This Article, published by Jeff Kosseff in Volume 15 of the Journal of Technology Law & Policy at the University of Florida, examines Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which immunizes websites and other online services providers over content provided by a third party. Critics argue that the statute's immunity should be narrowed or eliminated because Congress never contemplated such broad immunity for websites from defamation and other torts. This Article responds to those critics and argues that such changes would be imprudent and inconsistent with Congress's intentions and First Amendment principles. Section 230 has allowed the Internet to flourish as an open medium in which all consumers provide content. If websites were not immune for third-party content, the Internet likely would not be as open as it is today.
* Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2010; University of Michigan, M.P.P. 2001, B.A. 2000. This Article originated from a paper written for a seminar taught by Professor Rebecca Tushnet, who provided valuable feedback throughout the writing and editing process. Special thanks to Barbara Wall, vice president and senior associate general counsel of Gannett Co., Inc., a truly inspirational mentor.
consistent with the intent of Congress and has produced a number of troubling results.); Jennifer Benedict, Deafening Silence: The Quest for a Remedy in Internet Defamation, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 475, 509 (2009) (Currently, the law allows a type of wild west where anything goes, and people are left alone to fend for themselves.). 12. The rapid growth of third-party content can be seen in the success of blogs and social networking websites such as Facebook, which rely on content created by its users. In August 2009, 17% of U.S. Internet usage was consumed by social networks and blogs, three times the percentage of time that was spent on such sites a year earlier. Press Release, Nielsen Co., Nielsen Reports 17 Percent of Time Spent on the Internet in August Devoted to Social Networking and Blog Sites, Up from 6 Percent a Year Ago (Sept. 23, 2009) (on file with author).
poster. The Article finally reviews the practices and policies regarding third-party comments of the largest social networking and news websites, and it finds consumers expectations for civility and standards drives many of the websites to voluntarily remove objectionable content. It is more consistent with First Amendment values to allow intermediariesrather than the courtsdetermine content standards. Websites and Internet service providers have tailored their practices and policies in response to consumer demand. This free-market approach to free speech is well established in the First Amendment. This Article does not trivialize the legitimate concerns about Section 230. With the vast amount of information available on the Internet, it is easy for an anonymous comment to ruin an individuals reputation who understandably wants to recover damages. But the fairest method of recovery is to sue the person who posted the damaging content, not the passive intermediary that played little or no role in the creation. Rather than propose sweeping changes to Section 230 or alternative interpretations of the statute, this Article argues that judicial interpretations of Section 230 are correct as matters of statutory law and policy. The general reasons for Section 230s broad immunity are supported by constitutional decisions that limit liability for speech in other contexts. Although Internet service providers and websites have not faced significant tort liability, they have adopted many of the content protection measures that Congress envisioned when it passed the unprecedented statutory immunity. II. CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE OF SECTION 230 Courts have broadly applied Section 230 to websites that are sued over content posted by third parties.13 Some critics have argued that this broad interpretation is inappropriate and contrary to Congresss intentions when it passed Section 230.14 They argue that Congress never imagined the statute would provide sweeping immunity to websites. For example, one critic wrote that [c]ourts have interpreted this immunity provision so broadly as to provide virtually complete immunity for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from defamation liability for third13. See infra Part IV. 14. See Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-mail and Employer Liability: Why Razing Zeran v. America Online is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25, 9 (2000) (stating that Congress intended Section 230 to force ISPs to stop policing their servers in order to minimize libel suits); Carl S. Kaplan, How is Libel Different in Cyberspace?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001 (Ian Ballon, a lawyer with Manatt, Phelps & Phillips in Palo Alto and editor of a cyberlaw treatise, E-Commerce and Internet Law (Glasser LegalWorks, 2001), said that he believed that many courts, including Judge Richmans, have construed the scope of section 230 more broadly than Congress intended.).
15. Lee, supra note 8. 16. See infra Part II.B. 17. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 988 (2008).
18. Restatement (Second) Torts 578 (1977). See infra Part II.B, for a discussion of the distinction between common-law liability for primary publishers and secondary publishers, also known as distributors. 19. Hoover v. Peerless Publns, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 20. See infra Part III. 21. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 22. Id. at 137. 23. Id. 24. Id. at 138. 25. Id. at 139 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See infra Part III.A, for a discussion of the First Amendment foundations for this limitation. 26. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1) (1998). Section 230 defines interactive computer service as any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2). Courts have widely held that websites and Internet service providers are considered interactive computer services for the purposes of Section 230. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2008); 47 U.S.C. 230(e) (1998). 32. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of--(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2) (1998). 33. 47 U.S.C. 230(e) (1998). 34. H.R. REP. NO.104-458, at 174 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 35. Id.
36. 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (1995). 37. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE ON THE INTERNET 154 (2007).
Section 230 might be read to grant immunity only before the operator of a website is alerted that something posted there by another violates somebodys privacy or defames her. If the operator of a website becomes aware of the problematic material on the site, yet doesnt remove it, then the operator could be liable. Id. 38. Chi. Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).
521 U.S. 844 (1997). 141 CONG REC. H8460 (1995) [hereinafter Statement of Congressman Cox] Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 581, cmt. C (1977); W. Page Keeton, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 113 (5th ed. 1984). Critics of Section 230 tend to use the term distributors, because this distinguishes them from primary publishers. Defenders of the immunity refer to websites and ISPs as secondary publishers. But the terms are interchangeable. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2009) (Secondary publishers came to be known as distributors.). 43. Barnes, 564 F. 3d at 562. 44. See infra Part III.C, for a discussion of this constitutional limitation and how it relates 39. 40. 41. 42.
to Section 230 immunity. 45. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 46. See infra Part III.A, for a discussion of the First Amendment reasons for this limitation on distributor liability. 47. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 48. See supra note 8. 49. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 50. Id. at 328. 51. Id. 52. Id. at 330. 53. Id. 54. Id. at 331. 55. Id. at 331-32. 56. Id. at 332.
57. Id. 58. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 640 (2001) (The court ignored the argument that when a distributor has notice of defamation, its refusal to cease distribution justifies according it the same level of responsibility as a primary publisher.); David Wiener, Comment: Negligent Publication of Statements Posted on Electronic Bulletin Boards: Is There Any Liability Left After Zeran?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 905, 929-30 (1999). Although Congress wished to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet, the statute should not necessarily protect system operators from all torts related to the publication of third party statements. Immunizing a system operator who knowingly and willfully transmits inaccurate content on an electronic bulletin board does not promote the vibrant speech policy behind the CDA. Id.; David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 168 (1997) (arguing that both the text of the CDA and its meager legislative history support the conclusion that when Congress said publisher, it meant publisher, and not distributor.) 59. See 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 905 at 929. 60. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 522 (Cal. 2006) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (Aug. 4, 1995)). 61. Id. 62. Id.
holding them responsible for content created by third parties. As the Fourth Circuit explained in Zeran, The amount of information communicated via interactive computer services is therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect.63 Therefore, Congress sought to allow websites to screen third-party content based on their own standards without worrying whether those standards were sufficient to protect them from defamation lawsuits. Six years after the passage of the Communications Decency Act, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, where the bill originated, endorsed the interpretation in Zeran: The Committee notes that ISPs have successfully defended many lawsuits using section 230(c). The courts have correctly interpreted section 230(c), which was aimed at protecting against liability for such claims as negligence (See, e.g., Doe v. America Online, 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001)) and defamation (Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980 (2000); Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (1997)).64 Although such a congressional statement is not binding, it demonstrates that less than a decade after Section 230s enactment, the committee who wrote the bill endorsed the interpretation in Zeran. From Section 230s legislative history, Congress wanted to promote robust growth of the Internet. Had Congress wanted to immunize websites and ISPs that do not qualify as distributors under the common law, Section 230 would have had little impact. It would allow courts to impose liability on a website that had knowledge of defamatory content but took no action to remove it. Granted, Congress would have been able to eliminate these objections by stating that publishers in Section 230 means both primary publishers and secondary publishers, but such a distinction was unnecessary, as the Fourth Circuit demonstrated in Zeran.65 In short, the critics who argue that distributors are not covered by Section 230 misinterpret Congresss actions as well as the definition of publisher. Although the common law established multiple categories of publisher, there is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress only intended to cover one type of publisher.
63. Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 64. H.R. REP. NO. 107-449, at 13 (2002). 65. 129 F.3d at 332.
66. JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 106 (2008). 67. Benedict, supra note 11, at 475. 68. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1964). 69. See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Ariz. 1996); Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476-77 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Id. at 148. Id. at 149. Id. at 150. Id. at 152-53. Id. at 152. See Statement of Congressman Cox, supra note 40. 361 U.S. at 152-53.
78. Id. 79. Id. at 155-56 (Black, J. concurring). 80. Id. at 156.
81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 475 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). Id. Id. Id. at 236. Id. 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992). Id. at 931. Id. Id. at 932.
90. See, e.g., Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1174, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972); OBrien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 220-21, 225 (E.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1991); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-92 (D. Ariz. 1996); Winn v. Associated Press, 903 F. Supp. 575, 579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Holden v. Clary, No. 92-313, 1992 WL 373145, at *1, *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 1992); Winn v. United Press Intl, 938 F. Supp. 39, 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1996), affd, No. 96-7217, 1997 WL 404959 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 1997); Brown v. Courier Herald Publg Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 537-538 (S.D. Ga. 1988); Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476-77 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12, 16-17 (D. Alaska 1979); Kendrick v. Fox Television, 659 A.2d 814, 824 (D.C. 1995); McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 295, 297 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Van Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 N.W.2d 105, 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); Rust Commcns Group, Inc. v. 70 State St. Travel Serv. Ltd., 122 A.D.2d 584 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Zetes v. Richman, 86 A.D.2d 746, 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); MacGregor v. Miami Herald Publg Co., 119 So. 2d 85, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). 91. See, e.g., Waskow, 462 F.2d at 1173; OBrien, 735 F. Supp. at 218; Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 931 F. Supp. at 1487; Winn, 903 F. Supp. at 575; Holden, 1992 WL at 373145; Winn, 938 F. Supp. at 39; Brown, 700 F. Supp. at 534; Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1468; Gay, 486 F. Supp. at 12; Kendrick, 659 A.2d at 814; McKinney, 393 S.E.2d at 295; Van Straten, 447 N.W.2d at 105; Rust Commcns Group, Inc., 122 A.D.2d at 584; Zetes, 86 A.D.2d at 746; MacGregor, 119 So. 2d at 85. 92. 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933). 93. Id. at 235. 94. Id. at 238.
95. 462 F.2d 1173, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 96. Id. at 1175-76. 97. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Ariz. 1996). 98. 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000). 99. Id. 100. Id. at 985 101. Id. at 986. 102. See also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting Section 230 immunity to America Online in a defamation lawsuit involving the Drudge Report, which America Online contracted to provide to its subscribers).
103. 104. 105. 106. 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964). Id. at 279. Id. at 256. Id. at 279-80, 285-86.
107. Id. at 287. 108. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1005 (Sullivan was a case about the Times as intermediary, displaying another entitys supposedly defamatory ad after only minimal screening.). 109. Curtis Publg Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967). 110. Ed Magedson, Ripoff Editorial (Sept. 1, 1999), http://www.ripoffreport.com/ consumerssaythankyou/aboutus.aspx. 111. Latest Reports, http://www.ripoffreport.com/search/recent/3months.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 112. Ripoff Report, http://www.ripoffreport.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). 113. About Us: Want to Sue Ripoff Report?, http://www.ripoffreport.com/ConsumersSay ThankYou/WantToSueRipoffReport.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). 114. Id. 115. Sarah Fenske, The Real Rip-Off Report, PHONEIX NEW TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-02-01/new/the-real-rip-off-report. 116. Eric Goldman, Ripoff Report Folks Sue Newspaper and Reporter for Defamation, Apr. 30, 2008, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/ripoff_report_f.htm.
117. About Us, supra note 113 (Based on the protection extended by the CDA, Ripoff Report has successfully defended more than 20 lawsuits in both state and federal courts. Each time, the courts have consistently found that the CDA shields Ripoff Report from any claims seeking to treat it as the speaker or publisher of information posted by a third party.). See, e.g., Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2008); GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, NO. 3:07-CV-976-O, 2009 WL 62173 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009). 118. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 119. Id. at 344.
136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 2008). 142. 143. 144. Id. at *27. Id. 629 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2008). Id. at 1307. Id. at 1306 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). No. 6:07-cv-1626-Orl-19KRS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68154 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, Id. at *10-11. 202 P.3d 126, 128 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). Id. at 133.
145. Id. 146. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 147. Id. at 1190. 148. Id. at 1196. 149. Id. at 1199. 150. See Eric Goldman, Website Initially Denied 230 Dismissal But Gets It on Appeal, available at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/12/website_initial.htm (Dec. 21, 2009). I believe there are some folks who believe that a website becomes liable for any user content it encourages. This is one possible reading of Roommates.com, and it underlies the government enforcement agencies (e.g., SEC and FTC) content endorsement theories. However, I dont see precedent supporting that proposition at all. Id.
151. See, e.g., Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (dismissing invasion-of-privacy lawsuit filed by noted animal rights activist against search engines); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 546-47 (E.D. Va. 2008) (dismissing lawsuit against consumer review website filed by automotive dealerships); Best Western Intl, Inc. v. Furber, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70552, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008) (dismissing lawsuit filed by association of hotel operators against website); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 930 (D. Ariz. 2008) (dismissing lawsuit under Section 230 filed by large consumer retailer against consumer review website); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 2:04-cv-47-FtM-34SPC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11632, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2008) (dismissing defamation lawsuit filed by large company against consumer review website). 152. See, e.g., Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53246, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (dismissing a claim under both Section 230 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim); McDermott v. N.Y. Metro LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 294, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing claim for lack of standing); Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. C 07-03967 MHP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16561, at *29, *41-43 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2008) (dismissing lawsuit against website under Section 230 as well as failure to state a claim for fraud); Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found., Inc., No. CV 08-0054-PHX-SMM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109347, at *12-15 (D. Ariz. July 8, 2008) (dismissing lawsuit against website host both under Section 230 and because plaintiff failed to state a valid RICO claim); Steele v. Mengelkoch, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 927, at *2-6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing claim against website under Section 230 and failure to state a claim of conspiracy). 153. See, e.g., Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., No. 07-cv-286-JL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38177, at *4-5 (D.N.H. May 8, 2008) (dismissing lawsuit against dating website that removed profile of plaintiff that was created by a third party).
154. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 66. 155. See id. 156. For a list of the many recent attempts to unmask anonymous Internet commenters, see Citizens Media Law Projects website regarding anonymous website poster subpoenas, available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/subject-area/subpoenas. 157. Jonathan D. Jones, Note, Cybersmears and John Doe: How Far Should First Amendment Protection of Anonymous Internet Speakers Extend?, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 421, 424-25 (2009) 158. Id. 159. Id. at 422-23 (articulating the various First Amendment balancing tests used to determine whether to allow a subpoena for the identity of an online poster). 160. Best Western Intl, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006). 161. Id.
162. 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008). 163. Id. at 252. 164. Id. at 257. 165. About Us: False Report About me on this Site!, http://www.ripoffreport.com/ ConsumersSayThankYou/FalseReport.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). 166. Press Release, Media Law Resource Center, Annual Study Sees Lowest Number of Media Verdicts Since 1980, available at http://www.medialaw.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ About_MLRC/News/2008_Bulletin_No_1_.htm.
is more practical, that still could result in an unfair burden on speech. Such a system likely would result in automatic deletion, because websites generally do not have the ability or resources to investigate every claim of inaccuracy or other harm in third-party content. Although the Digital Millennium Copyright Act imposes a notice-andtakedown system for alleged copyright violations, it is easier to determine that a video or picture infringes copyright than determine whether an online bulletin board post is accurate.167 Therefore, the likely result in holding intermediaries responsible would be prohibition of third-party content. All content would be created and provided by the websites, an online version of the print newspaper. Such a change would destroy the open community environment for which the Internet is known. Although it would prevent the small amount of harmful thirdparty speech that has spurred the criticism of Section 230, this change would stifle a much larger amount of socially valuable speech. Although it is easierand possibly more lucrativeto sue the website on which defamatory content appeared rather than an anonymous individual, it is fairer to seek compensation from the individual who actually created the allegedly harmful content. In his famous law review article examining fairness and reciprocity in tort liability, Professor George P. Fletcher captured the two often competing goals of tort law: 1) protecting individuals interests, and 2) maximizing societys benefits:Protecting innocent victims from socially useful risks is one issue. The relative rationality of defining risks and balancing consequences is quite another. That there are these two levels of tension helps explain the ongoing vitality of both paradigms of tort liability.168 Imposing liability on intermediaries, rather than on the parties who created the content, does not adequately accomplish either of those goals. Intermediary liability fails to adequately protect individual interests because it allows the actual tortfeasorthe creator of the defamatory contentto escape responsibility. Intermediary liability harms society because intermediaries risk aversion reduces the amount of legal speech. By imposing liability on the intermediary, a court is harming society at large by reducing the amount of speech on the Internet. A tort system that imposes the costs on the person who engaged in the legal riskthe anonymous commenteris the fairest method of imposing liability.
167. Benedict, supra note 11. 168. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 572 (1972).
D. Websites have Developed Content-Screening Policies Consistent with Congresss Intent Section 230 is based on the assumption that allowing a free marketplace of speech is the most efficient way to address concerns about content. By protecting websites from most civil lawsuits rather than forcing websites to censor certain content, Congress assumed that the market would demand a certain level of decency and civility online. That is precisely what has happened; websites and ISPs have developed a wide range of content standards and moderation policies in response to consumer demand. Such a marketplace concept is rooted in free-speech principles. In 1644, John Milton wrote: And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors in a free and open encounter?169 In the United States, the First Amendment partly developed with a similar marketplace foundation. Justice Holmes wrote that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideasthat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.170 Critics of Congresss approach in Section 230 could argue that an intermediarys content standards are no better than government censorship. Therefore, a truly free marketplace of speech has not emerged. Although this concern is valid, there is a key difference: websites develop content policies in response to customer demand. For example, a newspaper website is unlikely to allow users to post obscene comments or pornographic pictures beneath a news article; such behavior would drive away many customers. Conversely, a newspaper realizes that some readers value the ability to debate issues on its website, so the newspaper might hesitate before banning third-party comments altogether. Because they seek to please their customers, intermediaries are more likely than courts to develop content standards that conform to basic community values. Such standards may vary by website, allowing consumers to choose. In contrast, if courts or legislatures impose content standards, they likely will apply to all websites equally. This market-based system, of course, is not perfect.
169. JOHN MILTON, MILTON AREOPAGITICA, 51-52 (John W. Hales, ed. Clarendon Press 3d. ed. 1884) (1644). 170. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
182. See supra note 171. 183. See supra note 177. 184. See supra note 174. 185. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 186. Id. at 1109. 187. Id. at 1107 (Promising is different because it is not synonymous with the performance of the action promised.).
188. Id. 189. Scott P. v. Craigslist, No. CGC-10-496687 at *20 (Cal. Sup. Ct., County of San Francisco), transcript of June 2, 2010 hearing available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/cit medialaw.org/files/2010-06-02-Scott%20vP.%20v.%20Craigslist%20Hearing.pdf (last visited on Sept. 28, 2010). 190. Id. 191. CraigslistFlags and Community Moderation, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help/ flags_and_community_moderation (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). 192. Making Light, Autodisemvoweling, Sept. 27, 2005, http://nielsenhayden.com/making light/archives/006871.html (last visited on Jan. 3, 2010). 193. The Consumerists, Anonymous Comments and Facebook Connect Deactivated, July 28, 2009, http://consumerist.com/2009/07/anonymous-comments-and-facebook-connect-deactiv ated.html (last visited on Jan. 3, 2010). 194. Pentagraph, To our readers: Comments on Local Content Suspended, http://www. pantagraph.com/news/local/article_766adc82-f58a-11de-b4cc-001cc4c03286.html (last visited on Jan. 3, 2010).
195. David Margolick, Slimed Online, PORTFOLIO.COM, Feb. 11, 2009 available at http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2009/02/11/Two-Lawyers-Figh t-Cyber-Bullying/index.html (Things have calmed down on AutoAdmit, where, Cohen says, hes driven away the worst actors and enlisted volunteer moderators.). 196. Id. ([L]ast spring, Cohen quietly removed the offending threads.). 197. Id.
intermediaries to experiment with various policies and practices that allow free speech to thrive on the Internet.

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