Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/118/271/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:00:04+00:00

Document:
When the authority of the Attorney General of the United States to commence proceedings to vacate a patent for public lands does not appear on the face of the bill, it may be shown in this Court if the bill is objected to here for want of it.
Coal lands are mineral lands within the meaning of that term as used in the statutes regulating the disposition of the public domain.
As coal lands were excepted from the grants to California of Sections 16 and 36 in § 6 of the Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 244, 246, the state could not under the provisions contained in § 7 of that act, ib., 247, select coal lands in lieu of such Sections 16 and 37 as might be occupied before survey or reserved for public uses or taken by private claims.
The United States can maintain a suit in equity in its own name to vacate the selection and listing of coal lands to the California by the proper authority of the government under the Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 244 and, upon its appearing that the lands so listed were coal lands and were known to be such at the time of the listing and selection by the state officers and by those for whose benefit the listing was made, a decree should be entered vacating the title of the state and of those claiming under it.
This was a bill in equity to annul and set aside a listing of coal lands to the State of California and patents of the same granted by the state. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
The land in question lies in the midst of a coal-bearing district, and has upon it a valuable coal bed. It is rugged and broken and of very little if any value for agricultural purposes. As early as 1861, the Black Diamond Coal Mining Company took possession of it and opened a coal mine. The company erected at great expense upon this and adjoining land all the necessary works for mining, hoisting, and shipping the coal, and continued its operations on the property extensively from the time it entered into possession until evicted in 1877 at the suit of Avery. Its possession was open and notorious, and the principal market for its coal was in San Francisco or with persons trading there. There was also located on this and adjoining property quite a large mining town which sometimes had more than 1,000 inhabitants. The lands in the township were surveyed and divided into sections in March, 1864, under the direction of the United States Surveyor General. In the progress of these surveys, the mines were found and to some extent indicated on the plats, which contained abundant evidence of the coal-bearing character of this particular tract.
On the 13th of May, 1865, Frank Barnard, an officer or agent of the Black Diamond Coal Mining Company, applied to the locating agent of the State of California, under the provisions of a statute of the state entitled "An act to provide for the sale of certain lands belonging to the state," approved April 27, 1863, to purchase these lands, and to have them located under the authority of an Act of Congress of March 3, 1853, c. 145, § 7, 10 Stat. 247, in lieu of an equal quantity of school lands which had in some way been lost to the state. In accordance with this application, the location was made for the use of Barnard on the 30th of June, 1865, and approved by the state surveyor general on the 11th of August. Barnard, however, did not pay for the land, and consequently his title under the location was never perfected.
and for the use of John Mullan. Said land is described as follows:"
"N. 1/2 of sec. 8, T. 1 N., R. 1 E., Mount Diablo meridian."
"Taken in lieu of E. 1/2 of sec. 16, T. 2 N., R. 8 W., Mount Diablo meridian."
"This location has been made by me in the name and for the benefit of the State of California at the U.S. Land Office for the San Francisco District in the City of San Francisco, and with the consent of John F. Swift, register of said district, bearing date the 28th day of May, A.D. 1865, and the same is entered and numbered upon my register of locations. The said location is hereby approved, and the Treasurer of Contra Costa County shall receive in payment therefor, from John Mullan, one hundred and one 65/100 (101.65) dollars, within fifty days from the date of the surveyor general's approval, being twenty percent of the purchase money, and interest on the balance in advance at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the approval of the location in the surveyor general's office."
"JOHN W. BOST, Surveyor General"
had resided in San Francisco for at least a year before he made his application for the purchase, and was engaged in real estate business. Avery had also resided there from December 3, 1868, and, from his testimony, appears to have been familiar with operations of the character of those in which Mullan was engaged.
Not long after Avery got his patent, he brought suit against the Black Diamond Company to recover possession of the property and $1,350,000 for the value of coal taken from it. This suit resulted in a judgment in his favor on the 6th of June, 1877, for the land and $1,500 damages. He then brought another suit to recover the value of coal taken from the land during the pendency of the former one, in which he claimed damages to the amount of $3,000,000.
"upon the understanding that any and all costs and expenses in the matter shall be defrayed by the applicants, and that the proceeding shall be subject to the direction and control of the Attorney General, in order that the interests of the government may be fully protected, and justice done to any and all parties interested."
"United States Attorney for the District of California."
Upon these facts, the circuit court entered a decree vacating the title of the state, and of Mullan and Avery, and from that decree this appeal was taken.
it does not show its face that it was filed by the Attorney General. On the argument, however, the assistant Attorney General produced from the Department of Justice a certified copy of an order of the Attorney General directing the United States attorney for the district of California to proceed in the matter, and this, it was held in Western Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 108 U. S. 512, was enough to overcome such an objection. There is no doubt that the bill was filed on the request of the coal company, and that it is expected some advantage will accrue indirectly to that company from a decree vacating the title under the state selection; but if the title is vacated, the lands will be restored to the public domain, and be subject to sale by the United States, as coal lands. The United States have therefore a direct pecuniary interest in the suit, and this being the case, it is a matter of no importance that others may possibly be benefited by the decree which may be obtained. The acts of July 1, 1864, 13 Stat. 343, c. 205, and March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 529, c. 107, make ample provisions for the sale of such lands at a price not less than twenty dollars an acre.
"the grant of the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of public land to the State of California for school purposes, made by the Act of March 3, 1853, was not intended to cover mineral lands. Such lands were, by the settled policy of the general government, excluded from all grants"
"if sections 16 and 36, being mineral lands, do not pass by the term of the statute, there certainly is no good reason for permitting the same kind of lands to be selected under section 7, in lieu of sections 16 and 36."
lands are mineral lands, within the meaning of that term as used in the statutes regulating the disposition of the public domain.
"any tracts embracing coal beds or coal fields, constituting portions of the public domain, and which as 'mines' are excluded from the preemption act of 1841, and which under past legislation are not liable to ordinary private entry,"
and the Surveyor General of California when he made his purchase.
At the time the selection was actually made therefore it cannot be doubted that the land was mineral land, both in law and in fact within the meaning of the act under which the state, and those who purchased from the state, undertook to acquire title, and we agree with the circuit court in the opinion that the rights of the parties are to be determined by the law as it stood then. Such being the case, we have no hesitation in deciding that the land was not open to the state for selection.
grant, and the officer who issues it acts ministerially and not judicially. If he issues a patent from land reserved for sale by law, such patent is void for want of authority. But one officer of the land office is not competent to cancel or annul the act of his predecessor. That is a judicial act, and requires the judgment of a court."
This language is equally applicable to the present case, and its correctness has been often recognized. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 533; United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 396; Steel v. Smelting Company, 106 U. S. 454; Moffat v. United States, 112 U. S. 24.

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