Source: https://www.ptab.us/2016/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:35:41+00:00

Document:
The Examiner finds the combination of Sirola, Binstead, and Gibson teaches the limitations of claim 9, and reasoned that "two-sided panel [display] is a combination of two display[ s] back to back. To use additional display and additional sensor still is obvious variation of prior art of the record." Ans. 4. The Examiner finds "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention to interchange value the number of sensors and display panels." Final Act. 5 (citing In re Rose, 220 F.2d 459, 105 U.S.P.Q. 237 (C.C.P.A. 1955)).
Appellant argues the Examiner's reliance on In re Rose is misplaced because the case merely holds that creating multiple bundles of wood rather than a single bundle of wood is not inventive. App. Br. 10 (citing In re Rose, 220 F .2d at 463). Appellant argues claim 9 "implicates far more than a mere change in size." App. Br. 11.
Appellant has persuaded us of Examiner error.
In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329-330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("In cases involving overlapping ranges, we and our predecessor court have consistently held that even a slight overlap in range establishes a prima facie case of obviousness.").
Claims 21—24 each require that certain structures comprise ceramic material. Appeal Br. 20 (Claims App.). For these claims, the Examiner acknowledged that the relied-upon prior art does not disclose ceramic material but concluded that it would have been obvious to modify the reliedupon prior art to use ceramic material in the manners recited in each of these claims "since it has been held to be within the general skill of a worker in the art to select a known material on the basis of its suitability for the intended use as a matter of obvious design choice." Final Act. 6—7, 8, 12 (each citing In re Leshin, 277 F.2d 197 (CCPA 1960)).
For each of these claims, Appellants contend that nothing in the relied-upon prior art "suggests that ceramic materials are suitable for use" in the structures required to comprise ceramic material. Appeal Br. 8 (claims 21 and 22), 13—14 (claim 23), 17 (claim 24). We agree with Appellants that this issue undermines the rejections of these claims.
Here, the Examiner has not made sufficient findings to present a prima facie case of obviousness as to claims 21—24. The facts here are distinguishable from those in In re Leshin. In that case, the court addressed dependent claims requiring that the "container-dispenser for cosmetics" recited in the parent claim be made from molded plastic materials. Leshin, 277 F.2d at 198—99. Before the court was a secondary reference (Anderson) teaching the use of molded plastic in a "similar container." Id. at 199. On those facts, the court held that "[m]ere selection of known plastics to make a container-dispenser of a type made of plastics prior to the invention, the selection of the plastics being on the basis of suitability for the intended use, would be entirely obvious." Id.
In contrast, here, the Examiner has not shown that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that "ceramic material(s)" could be used for the same or similar applications at issue in claims 21—24— comprising certain materials in a reciprocating machine. Even assuming that the Examiner is correct that, at the time of the invention, ceramics were "known lightweight composite materials" (Ans. 4), this does not show that ceramic material was known to be suitable for the intended uses here. See Leshin, 277 F.2d at 199. The lack of record support on this issue distinguishes this record from that in In re Leshin, and undermines the rejections here. Thus, we do not sustain the rejections of claims 21—24.
As an initial matter, we reject the Examiner's position that the limitations of claims 1, 9, and 18 reciting structure "configured to" send data and, in claims 1 and 18, to also send a "request for standardization," are not "limitation[ s] of the claimed processor but rather [are statements of] intended use and as such does not further limit the claim." Final Act. 2. When claimed functional language is associated with programming or some other structure required to perform the function, that programming or structure cannot be ignored by the Examiner when applying the prior art. See, e.g., Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
For a prior art reference to anticipate a claim, "it [must] disclose each and every element of the claimed invention ... arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim." Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
See Antares Pharma, Inc. v. Medac Pharma Inc., 771 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[F]or § 251, it is not enough that an invention might have been claimed in the original patent because it was suggested or indicated in the specification. Rather, the specification must clearly and unequivocally disclose the newly claimed invention as a separate invention.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Section 101 states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor." However, the "Court has long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception. '[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas' are not patentable.' Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). In addition, "to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words 'apply it."' Id. at 1294. Furthermore, a "'new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made."' Id. at 1298 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)).
3686 Ex Parte Coffman et al 13185427 - (D) KIM 102 McDermott Will & Emery LLP PAULSON, SHEETAL R.
Thus, even when guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format, the specification may define claim terms by implication such that their meaning may be ascertained by reading the patent documents. Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

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