Source: https://ceb.com/effective-introduction-of-evidence-in-california?utm_source=sm/bl&utm_medium=bl&utm_campaign=CP94230
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:51:33+00:00

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In Effective Introduction of Evidence in California, 2d Ed., highly experienced attorneys take you through the preparation and presentation of evidence, so that you can confidently examine and cross-examine witnesses in civil or criminal trials, hearings, and depositions.
This authoritative guide to the California Evidence Code includes a timely chapter on electronic and social media evidence and succinctly treats other areas of the code in their own chapters, providing a veritable roadmap to statutory and case law. In Effective Introduction of Evidence in California, 2d Ed., highly experienced attorneys take you through the preparation and presentation of evidence, so that you can confidently examine and cross-examine witnesses in civil or criminal trials, hearings, and depositions.
Summarized below are some of the more important developments included in this update since publication of the November 2017 Update.
Hospital records may be admissible as business records if a custodian of records or an affidavit provides proper authentication to meet the foundational requirements of the hearsay exception for business records; however, in People v McVey (2018) 24 CA5th 405, 414, the hospital records were not authenticated in any way. See §11.18.
To determine whether the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs the prejudice, the “prominent factors” are whether the prior conviction “(1) reflects on honesty and (2) is near in time.” People v Brooks (2017) 3 C5th 1, 52. See People v Mireles (2018) 21 CA5th 237, 247 (applying Brooks, defendant’s convictions for similar crimes occurring 3 and 5 years before trial are “neither remote in time nor unduly prejudicial,” but witness’ 20-year-old conviction was properly excluded), discussed in §26.3.
In People v Garton (2018) 4 C5th 485, 501, the court of appeal stated that a witness’ demeanor can include “everything from facial expressions and hand gestures to tone and attire,” possibly even including the wearing of a wedding ring in some cases. See §19.2.
The court in People v Gallardo (2017) 18 CA5th 51, 70, quoting People v Duarte (2000) 24 C4th 603, 611, held that jailhouse statements to informants identifying codefendants as the shooter and the driver of car from which shots were fired were too “‘self-serving and unreliable’” to qualify as declarations against penal interest. See §20.18.
Viewed in context, the jailhouse statements by the codefendant were disserving to the codefendant’s penal interest and thus admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule. See People v Almeda (2018) 19 CA5th 346, 362, in §20.19.
In People v Perez (2017) 18 CA5th 598, 619, the witness identified an exhibit depicting screen shots of text messages on his phone. The court held that there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the text messages for the jury to ultimately decide on their authenticity. See §§54.11, 54.19.
The court in Apple, Inc. v Superior Court (2018) 19 CA5th 1101, 1118, held that the gatekeeping analysis in Sargon Enters., Inc. v University of S. Cal. (2012) 55 C4th 747 must be applied to expert testimony offered at class certification. See §24.25.
The scope of permissible cross-examination of an expert witness is broad, but it does not extend to the admission of case-specific testimonial hearsay in violation of a defendant’s right of confrontation. See People v Malik (2017) 16 CA5th 587, 597, in §24.31.
In People v Jo (2017) 15 CA5th 1128, 1176, the court held that the expert testimony did not usurp the jury’s fact-finding role because the expert provided an overview of the statute but did not express her opinion as to whether it applied to the facts of the case. See §24.3.
The court in People v Veamatahau (May 31, 2018, A150689) 2018 Cal App Lexis 513, *7, found that the expert’s testimony that he relied on a database to compare the appearance and thus identify the pills that were taken from defendant was admissible. The court expressly disagreed with the contrary ruling in People v Stamps (2016) 3 CA5th 988. See §24.25.
In People v Pettie (2017) 16 CA5th 23, 63, the court of appeal held that the admission of testimonial hearsay statements by the prosecution’s gang expert violated the defendants’ right to confrontation. By contrast, the court in People v Mooring (2018) 15 CA5th 928, 942, found no confrontation clause violation because the challenged hearsay, a pharmaceutical identification website, is not testimonial. See §20.20B.
In People v Martinez (2018) 19 CA5th 853, 859, the trial court erred in admitting a gang expert’s case-specific hearsay testimony; the error was prejudicial. See §24.25.
Summons letters prepared by a Russian court were properly admitted under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. See AO Alfa-Bank v Yakovlev (2018) 21 CA5th 189, 205, in §36.2.
In Candelore v Tinder, Inc. (2018) 19 CA5th 1138, 1156 n9, the court denied the request for judicial notice because group data sought to be judicially noticed is insufficient to justify alleged discrimination at issue. See §31.3.
California Supreme Court found that it was prohibited from taking judicial notice of an unpublished decision in Hernandez v Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 C5th 260, 269 n2. See §31.2.
The court in Medical Bd. v Superior Court (2018) 19 CA5th 1, 8 n6 took judicial notice of the legislative history and supporting documentation concerning the enactment of Bus & P C §492. See §31.13.
An out-of-court statement is offered for nonhearsay purpose when it is used to corroborate other evidence. See People v Henriquez (2017) 4 C5th 1, 30 (out-of-court statement that defendant was “into heavy stuff” was not offered to prove truth of statement but to corroborate other evidence that provided motive for murder), in §35.2.
In People v Rodriguez (2017) 16 CA5th 355, 375, the court found that the computer-generated report of the GPS data generated by defendant’s ankle monitor did not consist of statements of a person, and thus did not constitute hearsay. Similarly, photographs and X rays do not constitute hearsay because hearsay may only include nonverbal conduct of a person. People v Garton (2018) 4 C5th 485, 506. See §35.1A.
In IIG Wireless, Inc. v Yi (2018) 22 CA5th 630, 643, the court held that parol evidence was admissible to prove the parties’ different understandings of the agreement based on fraudulent misrepresentations. See §37.2. By contrast, the court in Doyle v Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2018) 21 CA5th 33, 40 did not consider the insured’s expectations at the time of contracting based on extrinsic parol evidence because the contract terms were unambiguous. See §37.3.
Evidence Code §956 is amended to provide that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege does not apply to legal services rendered in compliance with state and local laws on medicinal cannabis or adult-use cannabis, and confidential communications provided for the purpose of rendering those services are confidential communications between client and lawyer as long as the lawyer also advises the client on conflicts with respect to federal law. See §43.11.
In Wilson v Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2018) 21 CA5th 786, 806, the court found that the evidence of stray voltage incidents at other houses and at plaintiff’s house before she bought it was not relevant to plaintiff’s nuisance claim, which must be based on interference with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her property. See §45.3.
Evidence Code §§351.3 and 351.4 were added in May 2018 to prohibit, in criminal actions and civil actions for personal injury or wrongful death, evidence of a person’s immigration status. For other civil actions, immigration status must not be disclosed in open court unless the evidence has first been deemed admissible after an in camera hearing. See §45.3.
WILLIAM H. ARMSTRONG, B.A., 1964, Stanford University; LL.B., 1967, Stanford Law School. Mr. Armstrong is a partner of DeHay & Elliston, LLP in Walnut Creek. He has tried about 80 cases, including 8 in federal court and six in states outside California, with an average duration of 4 weeks. He was the mayor of Walnut Creek from 1980 to 1981, a member of the Walnut Creek City Council from 1977 to 1982, and the president of the Regional Arts Fundraising Campaign in Walnut Creek from 1983 to 1993. He has been a member of the Stanford Law School Advisory Committee on Environmental and Toxic Tort Law since 1992. Mr. Armstrong has served as the update author during the entire life of this book.
RICHARD P. CAPUTO, B.S., 1953, Santa Clara University; LL.B., 1956, Santa Clara Law School. Mr. Caputo is a partner of Caputo & Caputo in San Jose. He specializes in personal injury, products liability, and professional negligence cases. Mr. Caputo is a litigation specialist certified by the National Board of Trial Advocacy and by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys. He was the president of the Santa Clara County Trial Lawyers’ Association in 1982 and was on the California Trial Lawyers’ Association Board of Governors from 1983 to 1993. The Santa Clara County Trial Lawyers’ Association recognized him with the “Outstanding Trial Lawyer Award” in 1993.
ROBERT A. FRANKLIN, B.S., 1976, Santa Clara University; J.D., 1979, Southwestern Law School. Mr. Franklin practices with Murray & Murray in Palo Alto. He specializes in civil litigation with an emphasis in commercial and secured transactions and insolvency. Mr. Franklin served as the chair of the Executive Committee of the Bankruptcy and Commercial Law Section of the Santa Clara County Bar Association in 1998.
HOLLY J. FUJIE, A.B., 1975, and J.D., 1978, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Ms. Fujie is a judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Before becoming a bench officer, Judge Fujie was a litigation shareholder of Buchalter Nemer, PC in Los Angeles. She specialized in complex civil litigation, and served as the chair of the firm’s insurance group. She is a past president of the California State Bar and also served as a member of the Bar’s Board of Governors. She is also a member of numerous other boards of professional associations, and speaks frequently on diversity, litigation, and work balance issues. Ms. Fujie is an author of chapter 4 on compelling attendance and production of evidence in California Trial Practice: Civil Procedure During Trial (3d ed Cal CEB).
DONALD D. HOWARD, B.A., 1965, University of Kansas; LL.B., 1968, Stanford Law School. Mr. Howard practiced law in San Jose from 1973 to 1998 and now practices in Monterey, specializing in business litigation and products liability. He served as a trial and defense counsel and military judge with the United States Navy from 1969 to 1973.
JAN NIELSEN LITTLE, A.B., 1978, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1981, Yale Law School. Ms. Little is a partner of Keker & Van Nest, LLP in San Francisco. She specializes in complex business litigation and white collar criminal defense. She is a current member of the U.S. Attorney’s Defense Liaison Group and the U.S. District Court’s Criminal Justice Working Group. For over a decade, she has lectured extensively for both state and national continuing legal education providers, with an emphasis on litigation and white collar crime issues. She has been listed in “Best Lawyers in America” since 2005 and has been honored with numerous other awards. In 1995, she received the first “Significant Contributions to Justice Award” from the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. She clerked for Judge William W. Schwarzer in the Northern District of California from 1981 to 1982. Ms. Little served as a trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice from 1982 to 1986, where she received a Special Commendation Award in 1984.
DAVID E. MALNICK, B.A., 1967, American University; J.D., 1971, McGeorge Law School. The late Mr. Malnick practiced law in San Jose, specializing in professional liability, products liability, and personal injury cases. He was president of the Santa Clara County Trial Lawyers’ Association in 1987 and held certificates of recognition as an experienced trial lawyer in the fields of products liability and professional liability from the California Trial Lawyers’ Association. He had lectured on trial advocacy at Stanford University Law School and the University of Santa Clara Law School, and had served as a faculty member of the federal practice program, U.S. District Court, Northern District. Mr. Malnick had also lectured at Kazakhstan National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
E. STEWART MORITZ, B.A., 1990, Yale University; J.D., 1995, Vanderbilt University School of Law. Mr. Moritz formerly practiced law with Keker & Van Nest in San Francisco, specializing in civil litigation. He clerked for the Hon. Gilbert S. Merritt, chief judge of the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals, from 1995 to 1996.
NANCY M. NAFTEL, A.B., 1964, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1980, Western State University College of Law. Ms. Naftel was a deputy district attorney with the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office from 1983 until her retirement in November 1999. She worked in the Labor Relations Division in the Office of the County Counsel in Los Angeles from 1981 to 1983.
Explains how to identify and prepare evidentiary foundations in compliance with rules of evidence. Primarily for the attorney seeking to introduce evidence at trial but also includes grounds on which opposing counsel may object to admission of evidence. Includes judicial perspective.
This classic resource—relied on and kept current by attorneys and judges, and widely quoted for more than four decades—is the best way to research evidence issues before a deposition, mediation, hearing, or trial. Published jointly with the California Judges Association.
OnLAW’s digital libraries deliver substantive analysis of the law, step-by-step procedural assistance, and best-practice strategies in seven practice areas. CEB’s rigorous standards and methodical editorial process ensure accuracy, clarity, completeness, timeliness, and coverage of the issues. Full of commentary, practice advice, and sample documents, the Litigation Library can help you from initial filings and discovery, through pretrial motions, all the way to trial and post-trial review.

References: §11
 §26
 §19
 §20
 §20
 §24
 §24
 §24
 §24
 §20
 §24
 §36
 §31
 §31
 §492
 §31
 §35
 §35
 §37
 §37
 §956
 §43
 §45
 §45