Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/16/16massappct20.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:52:26+00:00

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JOANNE MORIN vs. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE.
Present: HALE, C.J., ROSE, & WARNER, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 17, 1981. The case was heard by Meagher, J., on motion for summary judgment. Allan R. Fierce for the plaintiff. John P. Graceffa, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.
WARNER, J. The case before us grew out of the following sequence of events. On September 3, 1981, the Department of Social Services (DSS) brought a petition under G. L. c. 119, Section 24, in a juvenile session of a District Court alleging that the four minor children of the plaintiff were in need of care and protection. On the same day, after an ex parte hearing, a temporary order was entered transferring custody of the children from the plaintiff to DSS. On September 8, 1981, after a hearing pursuant to Section 24, at which the plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, the temporary order was extended to December 8, 1981, the date set for hearing of the petition on the merits. See G. L.
c. 119, Section 26. By notice dated September 10, 1981, the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) informed the plaintiff of its decision to terminate assistance to her under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) (42 U.S.C. Section 601, et seq. [1976 & 1981 Supp.]; G. L. c. 118) because of the absence of the children from the plaintiff's home. The plaintiff appealed the decision and was granted a hearing, at which she was present and represented by counsel, before a referee of DPW. See 106 Code Mass. Regs. 343.230, 343.240 (1979). [Note 1] The referee denied the plaintiff's appeal, and she filed a complaint for judicial review in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, Section 14. See 106 Code Mass. Regs. 343.720 (1979). On the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment the judge entered summary judgment for DPW (Mass.R.Civ.P. 56[c], 365 Mass. 824 ), and the plaintiff appealed. The question presented is whether DPW erred in concluding that, under Massachusetts regulations, DPW may terminate AFDC benefits to a mother whose children have, by court order under G. L. c. 119, Section 24, been temporarily removed from her care and custody and placed in the legal and physical custody of DSS pending an adjudication of a care and protection petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, Section 26. 1. The standards for eligibility. "The AFDC program is based upon a `scheme of cooperative federalism' in which the Federal government finances a program administered by the States for the benefit of needy, dependent children. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). In order to participate in this program, the State plan implementing it must provide that benefits are `furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.' 42 U.S.C. Section 602(a)(10) (1976). King v. Smith, supra at 317. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285 (1971). The grant of benefits `must be measured by federal standards.' Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600 (1972)." McCarthy v. Commissioner of Pub.
5. Disposition. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court with the direction that it be remanded to DPW. Upon remand, DPW shall determine the amount of retroactive AFDC benefits due to the plaintiff and her current eligibility for such benefits. DPW shall report its determinations to the Superior Court, which shall retain jurisdiction and, after such further proceedings as may be appropriate, enter a new judgment consistent with this opinion. So ordered.
[Note 1] There is no question that the plaintiff was afforded procedural due process. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
[Note 2] We do not have before us the record of the proceedings in the juvenile session of the District Court on the care and protection petition by DSS. The parties are in agreement, however, that the petition was brought under Section 24 and that a temporary emergency order was entered and extended thereunder.
[Note 3] The juvenile sessions of District Courts have the same authority.
[Note 4] In this case the first order was entered on September 3, 1981, a Thursday. Monday, September 7, 1981, was Labor Day. The hearing on September 8, 1981, on the extension of the order was timely held. See Muldoon v. West End Chevrolet, Inc., 338 Mass. 91, 94-95 (1958).
[Note 5] The same referee who decided the case which is the subject of this appeal issued a decision seven months earlier in which he concluded, on facts virtually identical to those in this case, that under the regulation "eligibility [for AFDC benefits] continues when the case is still under the jurisdiction of the Court -- i.e. not adjudicated." In her reply brief the plaintiff suggests that subsequent to the decision in the case before us another decision of DPW was rendered declaring eligibility under similar circumstances, but the latter is not part of the record.
[Note 6] The provisions with respect to temporary emergency orders were inserted in G. L. c. 119, Section 24, by St. 1977, c. 799. Prior to that amendment temporary custody orders were apparently governed only by G. L. c. 119, Section 25, inserted by St. 1954, c. 646, Section 1, which provided (as it does now), inter alia, that a child "may be committed to the custody of the department, pending a hearing on said petition" (emphasis added). This provision may have been superseded by the 1977 amendment to Section 24 which, significantly, did not use the word "committed" in connection with temporary emergency orders. On the other hand, Section 25 may have some vitality in nonemergency situations. In any event, no temporary order was issued under Section 25.
[Note 7] This regulation refers to the court entering a temporary emergency order of transfer of custody under G. L. c. 119, Section 24, as the "committing court," and to the child who is the subject of the order as being "committed." The use of these words does not control or influence our construction of the words "court committed" in the DPW regulation involved in this case and may well be founded on the use of the word "committed" in G. L. c. 119, Section 25, or in a failure to distinguish the actions of a court under Sections 24 and 26.
[Note 8] General Laws c. 119, Section 21, allows the exercise of far reaching powers and also provides for court review of the exercise.
[Note 9] We note that the regulations are entirely consistent with, and obviously designed to implement, the policy of the Commonwealth to strengthen and encourage family life and to insure the protection and care of children. See G. L. c. 119, Section 1.
[Note 10] We express no opinion as to the effects on eligibility for AFDC benefits of other permissible dispositions under Section 26.
[Note 11] We recognize that there may be valid policy reasons for limiting the time period within which AFDC benefits may be received by a custodian from whom the custody of a child has been transferred to DSS under a temporary order pursuant to Section 24 or for making the receipt of such benefits subject to periodic review. The regulation before us contains no such limitations. Compare, e.g., the Minnesota regulation set forth in Brunner v. Minnesota, 285 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 1979). There may also be valid policy reasons for providing for the proration of benefits to a custodian in these circumstances, taking into account fixed expenses, those incurred incident to visitation and to the implementation of a service plan designed to reunite the family, and those not incurred while the children are absent from the home. The regulation, however, presents an all or nothing proposition, and neither party has argued that proration is appropriate in this case. Cf. McCarthy v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 609 n.10 (1979).

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