Source: https://openjurist.org/355/us/570
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:24:08+00:00

Document:
Mr. Ralph S. Spritzer, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Mr. Warren B. King, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
'All attorneys residing outside of the State of Iowa and having civil matters in the court shall associate with them a resident attorney on whom notice may be served and who shall have the authority to act for and on behalf of the client in all matters * * *. Non-resident attorneys who have so associated with them a resident attorney shall be permitted to participate in a particular case upon satisfactory showing of good moral character.
Appellee, an attorney residing and maintaining his office in Minneapolis, Minnesota, had instituted two actions in the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, as counsel for citizens of Iowa, seeking damages for bodily injuries which they had sustained in that State. On October 3, 1955, the court, acting under its Rule 3, entered an order scheduling a hearing to be held by the court on October 12, 1955, for the purpose of affording an opportunity to appellee to show that his connection with the two damage suits was not brought about in violation of the standards of conduct specified in its Rule 8, and directing appellee to appear at that time and to submit to an examination under oath, if he wished further to participate as counsel in those actions. Appellee appeared at the hearing and, after being sworn by the Clerk, was examined by the District Attorney on matters deemed relevant to the hearing. On November 1, 1955, the court entered an order finding that 'the applicant (had) not made satisfactory showing of the matters which must be satisfactorily shown under said Local Rule 3,' and it struck his appearance as counsel in the two damage actions from the record.
On March 20, 1956, a four-count indictment was returned against appellee in the same District Court. Each count charged that appellee, while under oath as a witness at the hearing of October 12, 1955, 'unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly, and contrary to (his) oath, (stated) material matters which he did not believe to be true' (in particulars set forth in each count), 'in violation of Section 1621, Title 18 United States Code.' Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment for failure of any of the counts to state an offense against the United States. The court,3 after full hearing upon the motion, concluded 'that Rule 3, under which the defendant took his oath, is not such a law of the United States as was intended by Congress to support an indictment for perjury,' and, on that ground, dismissed the indictment. 147 F.Supp. 594, 597. The Government brought the case here by direct appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731. We postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits, 353 U.S. 980, 77 S.Ct. 1282, 1 L.Ed.2d 1140.
Such is the case here, and the result is that we have jurisdiction of this appeal.
This brings us to the merits. The scope of this appeal is very limited. No question concerning the validity of the District Court's Rule 3 is properly before us. Nor are we at liberty to consider any question other than the single one decided by the District Court, for when, as here, 'the District Court has rested its decision upon the construction of the underlying statute this Court is not at liberty to go beyond the question of the correctness of that construction and consider other objections to the indictment. The Government's appeal does not open the whole case.' United States v. Borden Co., supra, 308 U.S. at page 193, 60 S.Ct. at page 186.
'The essential elements of the crime of perjury as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621, are (1) an oath authorized by a law of the United States, (2) taken before a competent tribunal, officer or person, and (3) a false statement wilfully made as to facts material to the hearing.' United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376, 74 S.Ct. 113, 115, 98 L.Ed. 92. Only the first element of perjury is involved here because the District Court's dismissal of the indictment was upon the sole ground that 'Rule 3 * * * is not such a law of the United States as was intended by Congress to support an indictment for perjury.' Therefore, the only question open here is whether the admission hearing, held under the District Court's Rule 3, and at which appellee testified under oath, was a 'case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,' within the meaning of that clause as used in the perjury statute. We think it was.
'The charge of crime must have clear legislative basis. * * * This statute (the perjury statute, in precisely the same terms as the present one) takes the place of the similar provision of § 5392 of the Revised Statutes (18 U.S.C.A. § 1621), which in turn was a substitute for a number of statutes in regard to perjury, and was phrased so as to embrace all cases of false swearing, whether in a court of justice or before administrative officers acting within their powers. * * * It cannot be doubted that a charge of perjury may be based upon (the perjury statute) where the affidavit is required either expressly by an act of Congress, or by an authorized regulation of the General Land Office, and is known by the affiant to be false in a material statement. * * * (W)hen, by a valid regulation, the Department requires that an affidavit shall be made before an officer otherwise competent, that officer is authorized to administer the oath within the meaning of (the perjury statute). The false swearing is made a crime, not by the Department, but by Congress; the statute, not the Department, fixes the penalty.'5 Id. 236 U.S. at pages 408, 409, 35 S.Ct. at pages 349, 350.
It follows that the admission hearing, held under the District Court's Rule 3, and at which appellee testified under oath, was a 'case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,' within the meaning of that clause as used in the perjury statute.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS agrees that the Court has jurisdiction of the appeal; but he dissents on the merits. In his view this judge-made rule is not 'a law of the United States' within the meaning of the perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621.
Rule 8 is a substantial adoption of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.
Which was then being presided over by a district judge from another district, sitting by designation.
The author there shows that the requirement that a witness must take an oath before giving testimony goes back to early civilizations and has a long history at common law (§ 1815), and that for centuries Anglo-American law has remained faithful to the precept that 'for all testimonial statements made in court the oath is a requisite.' § 1824.
These cases, as well as United States v. Morehead, 243 U.S. 607, 37 S.Ct. 458, 61 L.Ed. 926, show that the perjury statute covers ex parte proceedings or investigations as well as ordinary adversary suits and proceedings.

References: § 3731
 § 3731
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 § 1621
 § 1621
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 § 5392
 § 1621
 § 1621
 § 1621
 § 1824
 v.