Source: https://openjurist.org/364/us/253
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:33:18+00:00

Document:
An indictment filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California charged the petitioner with unlawful receipt and concealment of narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174, 21 U.S.C.A. § 174. Before trial the petitioner made a motion to suppress for use as evidence a package of heroin which, so a California court had found, Los Angeles police officers had obtained from the petitioner in an unconstitutional search and seizure. After a hearing the District Court denied the motion to suppress, finding that federal agents had not participated in the search, and finding also that the California officers had obtained the evidence in a lawful manner. The package of narcotics was admitted in evidence over the petitioner's renewed objection at his subsequent trial. He was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison.
'1. Independently of the state court's determination, was the evidence used against petitioner in the federal prosecution obtained in violation of his rights under the Constitution of the United States?
In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, the Court has answered the second question by holding that evidence seized in an unreasonable search by state officers is to be excluded from a federal criminal trial upon the timely objection of a defendant who has standing to complain. The only question that remains in this case, therefore, is whether the Los Angeles officers obtained the package of heroin 'during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.' 364 U.S. at page 223, 80 S.Ct. at page 1447. As in most cases involving a claimed unconstitutional search and seizure, resolution of the question requires a particularized evaluation of the conduct of the officers involved. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51 S.Ct. 153, 158, 75 L.Ed. 374.
At about ten o'clock on the night of February 18, 1957, two Los Angeles police officers, dressed in plain clothes and riding in an unmarked car, observed a taxicab standing in a parking lot next to an apartment house at the corner of First and Flower Streets in Los Angeles. The neighborhood had a reputation for 'narcotics activity.' The officers saw the petitioner look up and down the street, walk across the lot, and get into the cab. Neither officer had ever before seen the petitioner, and neither of them had any idea of his identity. Except for the reputation of the neighborhood, neither officer had received information of any kind to suggest that someone might be engaged in criminal activity at that time and place. They were not searching for a participant in any previous crime. They were in possession of no arrest or search warrants.
In holding that the package of heroin which had been seized by the state officers was admissible as evidence in the federal trial, the District Court placed prime reliance upon the silver platter doctrine, there having been no participation by federal agents in the search and seizure. But the court also expressed the opinion, based upon the transcript of the state court proceedings and additional testimony of the two Los Angeles police officers at the hearing on the motion to suppress, that the officers had obtained the evidence lawfully. The court was of the view that the seizure was permissible as an incident to a legal arrest, or, alternatively, that the petitioner had abandoned the narcotics when he dropped them to the floor of the taxicab. At the time this opinion was expressed, however, the district judge had not yet heard the taxicab driver's version of the circumstances surrounding the arrest and seizure. The driver did not testify until the trial itself. After he had testified, the package of heroin was offered in evidence. The petitioner's counsel objected, and the court overruled the objection without comment. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 312—313, 41 S.Ct. 261, 266, 65 L.Ed. 647; Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316—317, 41 S.Ct. 266, 267—268, 65 L.Ed. 654; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264, 80 S.Ct. 725, 732, 4 L.Ed.2d 697. For all that appears, this ruling may then have been based solely upon the silver platter doctrine. Moreover, the Court of Appeals gave no consideration to the question of the legality of the state search and seizure, relying as it did upon the silver platter doctrine and rejecting the petitioner's contention that the state court's determination of illegality precluded the federal trial court from making an independent inquiry into the matter.
With the case in such a posture, we have concluded that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding the case to the District Court. There, free from the entanglement of other issues that have now become irrelevant, the lawfulness of the policemen's conduct can be determined in accord with the basic principles governing the validity of searches and seizures by federal officers under the Fourth Amendment.
If, therefore, the arrest occurred when the officers took their positions at the doors of the taxicab, then nothing that happened thereafter could make that arrest lawful, or justify a search as its incident. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436; Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134. But the Government argues that the policemen approached the standing taxi only for the purpose of routine interrogation, and that they had no intent to detain the petitioner beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission. If the petitioner thereafter voluntarily revealed the package of narcotics to the officers' view, a lawful arrest could then have been supported by their reasonable cause to believe that a felony was being committed in their presence.6 The validity of the search thus turns upon the narrow question of when the arrest occurred, and the answer to that question depends upon an evaluation of the conflicting testimony of those who were there that night.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The petitioner later broke free from the policeman's grasp and ran into an alley. There the officer apprehended him after shooting him in the back.
'Q. Will you just tell us in your own words, Mr. Smith, what happened immediately after the time you saw Officer Beckmann?
'The Court: Then what happened?
'The Witness: Then I believe he turned toward the defendant who was riding in the back of the cab and I think he motioned with his billford toward the defendant and he opened the door. Now somewhere along in here I think Beckmann disposed of his flashlight. I didn't notice exactly what happened there.
'Q. What did the defendant do? What was happening as far as the defendant was concerned? A. Well, he appeared to be becoming quite agitated.
'Q. While he was inside the cab? A. While he was inside the cab, yes.
'Q. When the door opened did he get out? A. Well, there are other events before he got out.
'The Court: What were they?
'I thought probably it was just a routine examination. I work the night shift, have for some time, and I have been stopped by the police and they have checked the occupants of my cab. There have been quite a few holdups of taxi drivers and I just thought it was a routine thing.
'But the defendant was getting quite agitated and I noticed at this time that Officer Beckmann had his revolver drawn, which seemed to me somewhat extraordinary just to stop and question an occupany of a cab, and said something to the effect that you are scaring him, what is the big idea, something like that. I don't remember my exact words.
'The Court: How could you tell the defendant was agitated?
'Q. What occasioned the presentation of this case to the Federal grand jury after the ruling in the Superior Court across the street, Mr. Beckmann, in this particular case? A. After the ruling in the Superior Court, approximately a week or two weeks later, I conferred with my divisional commander, Captain Clavis, about the case, and at that time I showed him the arrest reports and discussed the case with him.
'He then called Captain Madden of the Narcotics Division of the Los Angeles Police Department. I then went over and talked to Captain Madden of the Los Angeles Police Department. Captain Madden then looked at the arrest report, and I discussed the case with him going to the Federal Narcotics to present the case.
'Q. Whose idea was that? Was that yours or Captain Madden's? A. Mine.
'1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
'2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
'3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
'4. On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested.
'5. At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a felony.' Cal.Penal Code, (1956 ed.), § 836 (later amended, Stat.1957, c. 2147, § 2).
A passenger who lets a package drop to the floor of the taxicab in which he is riding can hardly be said to have 'abandoned' it. An occupied taxicab is not to be compared to an open field, Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898, or a vacated hotel room, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668.

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