Source: http://operationkosovo.kentlaw.edu/resources/legal/kosovo/wechtler.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:15:16+00:00

Document:
Kosovo, like many other post-socialist territories, is undergoing a complicated and controversial transition to rule of law and market economics. Privatization of socially and publicly owned enterprises is an essential step in Kosovo’s progress, but it is the subject of great controversy because it touches upon some of Kosovo’s most sensitive social issues: ethnic tension, unemployment, slow progress under United Nations administration, and ownership and sovereignty over the territory and its assets.
The Special Chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court stands as the arbiter of nearly all legal disputes that will arise from the privatization process. If parties bring the expected number of complaints, the Special Chamber may face overload. If parties bring the expected variety of complaints, the Special Chamber may be charged with resolving disputes better suited for a forum other than the courtroom. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms like negotiation, mediation, and arbitration could provide the Special Chamber with the tools better to serve parties and society as a whole.
This paper seeks to examine current conditions and responses in Kosovo to determine whether alternative dispute resolution would be a helpful endeavor. It then analyzes various types of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, weighing the strengths and weaknesses of each. This paper also summarizes the results of several alternative dispute resolution projects in developing countries and in Kosovo, seeking trends that would highlight effective approaches. Finally, this paper provides an overview of an alternative dispute resolution package that could help the Special Chamber meet its goals.
Five years after the NATO strikes ending Milosevic’s aggression in Kosovo,  the former autonomous province of Yugoslavia remains in serious economic trouble. Shortly after NATO forces drove Milosevic’s army out of Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1244, establishing the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”). UNMIK is the UN-run interim administration charged with providing “transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.”  As a result of intense international efforts and work by local Kosovar authorities,  great strides have been made towards the protection of human rights and the rule of law.
Slow economic development, however, impedes improvement in the daily life of Kosovo’s residents. During the era of Yugoslav power, industries were set up as Socially Owned Enterprises (“SOE”s). This was a murky form of property ownership in which workers’ councils held possessory rights, but not ownership, of the enterprises.  Kosovo’s industries became dependent on the internal Yugoslav market for their supplies and for sale of their products.  From 1989 to 1992, Yugoslavia stripped Kosovo of its autonomous province status and subsequently forced most Kosovar Albanians out of their jobs.  With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo’s industries lost their market and fell into disuse.  “Few of the SOEs are producing anything at all today, and even fewer are able to bring their product to market.”  Equipment and infrastructure are outdated and in serious disrepair. Some enterprises owe hundreds of thousands of DM in unpaid bills to utility companies.  Last May, the United Nations Development Programme reported that 49 to 57% Kosovo’s population remains unemployed.  The population is 50% composed of 16 to 24 year olds, and more than 70% of these residents are unemployed.  The combination of high unemployment, slow progress, and young population is a recipe for frustration.
One step in remedying this situation is the privatization of socially and publicly owned enterprises.
Once the privatization process begins full operation, however, former Chief Justice John Murphy expects the Special Chamber to receive up to 700 legitimate cases.  Claims by employees of SOEs undergoing privatization may constitute the largest percentage of these cases. Under UNMIK Regulation 2003/13, employees of socially owned enterprises undergoing the type of privatization described in section 8 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/12 are entitled to 20% of the proceeds from the sale of shares of the subsidiary corporation.  Each SOE’s representative body of employees must work with the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo to create a list of eligible employees.  The Kosovo Trust Agency reviews the lists and posts them officially, then places the reserved privatization proceeds into an escrow account for distribution by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo.  The Special Chamber has jurisdiction to resolve complaints about the Agency’s list of eligible employees and the distribution of funds.  Workers and other complainants must make their complaints within twenty days of the Agency’s posting of the eligible employee lists.  The Special Chamber then has only forty days to resolve each claim.  Workers have already engaged in several demonstrations pressing their views of privatization’s shortcomings,  and are likely to continue their efforts by resorting to the Special Chamber.
In sum, the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court is likely to receive a mix of claims by and against the KTA, Kosovo residents (natural persons), Serbian citizens and authorities, and businesses from Kosovo and abroad. The Special Chamber will, in turn, need to use a mix of case management tools to deal with the special characteristics of each type of dispute. For example, workers’ claims for their share of privatization proceeds will require the Special Chamber to act quickly and with sensitivity to workers’ legal inexperience. Claims by foreign investors will, on the other hand, require the Special Chamber to operate in the well-developed and sophisticated field of international commercial litigation.
In the context of rebuilding an economy devastated by years of Socialist control and ethnic war, the Special Chamber must meet a number of special needs. Former Chief Justice Murphy expresses particular concern about operating with the backdrop of Kosovo’s underdeveloped “culture of litigation.”  He explains that many claimants appear at the Special Chamber with no legal representation, and having had no help in preparing their filings.  While pro se litigants can get a list of attorneys from Kosovo Legal Services, many cannot afford lawyers, and pro bono representation is not common.  Even when parties are able to hire lawyers, most currently practicing lawyers were trained under the old socialist system,  and virtually all Kosovar Albanian lawyers had a period of ten years during which they were prohibited from practicing.  Many pleadings are presented in handwritten Albanian with no English translation and no copies.  Registrar Steven Farrell is regularly put in the position of explaining to complainants what their pleadings must include.  This misunderstanding of litigation procedure and underavailability of affordable legal representation create a special need for the Special Chamber to accommodate parties who are not legally savvy.
Additionally, the Special Chamber is charged with adjudicating cases that have a special need for quick decision. As previously discussed, the privatization drive is one of the key components of Kosovo’s strategy to improve the economy, reduce unemployment, and move Kosovo towards a better future. Kosovars are increasingly frustrated with the lack of jobs,  and they are increasingly believing that UNMIK does not support privatization and therefore does not support reaching the standards that many demand before status talks.  Delays cause by lengthy litigation of privatization disputes will only increase this frustration. The privatization process has operated in fits and starts since its beginning,  so the Special Chamber would serve its constituents well if it could handle disputes expeditiously and consistently once the process is up and running again.
In private arbitration, parties choose to take their dispute to arbitration, and their agreement normally provides that the arbitrators’ decision will be final and binding. In this type of arbitration, the parties exercise great control over the proceeding. They can choose the individuals who will serve as arbitrators, what substantive law will apply, what procedural rules will be followed, and many other specific aspects of the process.  Arbitration has many special features that both offer benefits and include negative implications. Arbitration is less formal than court adjudication. This offers the benefits of speed and ease for the parties, but necessarily reduces procedural protections like discovery and rules of evidence.  This reduction in procedural protection can weigh heavily on unrepresented and inexperienced parties who face institutional repeat customers. Private arbitration allows the parties to choose their arbitrators.  They can therefore choose specialists and individuals who sympathize with their positions.  On the other hand, this freedom can exacerbate differences in bargaining power between parties, because less experiences parties will be less able to choose the best arbitrators and will not be afforded the same impartiality that a judge should provide.  Private arbitration proceedings and awards can be kept confidential.  This can facilitate freer communication and can make resolution of disputes less onerous to businesspeople who wish to protect their reputation and business secrets. Confidentiality can, however, undermine the evenhanded application of the law and upset public perception that justice is being done because it reduces accountability of decisionmakers and hides justice from public view.  Arbitration is also typically viewed as being less costly than court adjudication.  This may be more true in common law systems than in civil law systems, because civil law litigation tends not to cost as much as complex common law litigation. Finally, arbitration generally produces results that are more psychologically satisfying for parties because it has less of a tendency to polarize positions than court adjudication does.  This, too, may be more true in common law systems than in civil law ones.
Many developing countries have used alternative dispute resolution to achieve their access-to-justice goals. For example, Argentina uses mediation to reduce greatly the caseload in its courts and to help provide timely access to justice.  During a one year pilot program starting in April of 1996, Argentina sent 75,010 cases to mediation, and only 17,526 (23.15%) were returned to the courts for trial.  During the same year, 29,986 cases were drawn from the Commercial Court of Appeals, and only 9167 (30.57%) were brought back to the courts.  These successes led the Argentinean government to endorse and expand alternative dispute resolution in the country, resulting in the establishment of Community Justice Centers, the spread of private arbitration of commercial disputes, and provision of pretrial labor conciliation.  Other Latin American countries, including Brazil, Columbia, and Costa Rica, have followed Argentina’s example and used arbitration to speed their integration into the globalized economy.  These Latin American experiences show that alternative dispute resolution of commercial claims is within the reach of developing economies, and that it can provide a basis for more widespread acceptance of mediation and arbitration.
Alternative dispute resolution has also provided success throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Poland has used arbitration and mediation in its privatization program, addressing conflicts that arise during the transfer ownership from the state to private investors.  Poland and Hungary use mediation to resolve labor disputes.  Because it recognizes that dispute resolution mechanisms are critical to the development of a strong market economy, the World Bank approved credit supporting Albania’s creation of commercial mediation and arbitration processes.  These Central and Eastern European experiences show that alternative dispute resolution is an effective option for dealing with economic and social reform in the post-socialist context.
The Special Chamber already has the authority to “encourage the parties to reach a negotiated settlement,”  which becomes final and binding once the Special Chamber has received the result in writing and endorsed it.  The Special Chamber should exercise this authority robustly. Special care should be taken, however, in cases where unrepresented or inexperienced parties (e.g. former SOE employees) are confronting the KTA or another institutional party that has sophisticated representation and/or litigation experience. When making the decision whether to endorse a written settlement agreement pursuant to Administrative Direction No. 2003/13, section 23.4, the Special Chamber should consider the differential in the parties’ negotiating power.
Availability of mediation, particularly court-annexed mediation, would benefit the Special Chamber and the parties it serves. Mediation would be particularly well-suited to cases in which parties are evenly matched in resources, education, and litigation experience. Mediation would provide an informal forum in which parties with little understanding of formal rule of law could gain better understanding of the law while reaching a mutually agreeable solution. Mediation would also be particularly beneficial in such cases because its high compliance rate would further the rule of law among those residents who need it most.
While private mediation would help parties to reach an agreement without initiating litigation in the Special Chamber, several interests would be served better by court-annexed mediation. Most importantly, court-annexed mediation would allow the Special Chamber to play a supervisory role in the mediation. One major downfall of mediation is the lack of procedural protection for unrepresented and inexperienced parties, and mediators appointed by and supervised by the court could go a long way towards leveling the playing field between the KTA and unrepresented parties submitting pleadings in handwritten Albanian. Additionally, court-annexed mediation would be useful for streamlining issues for litigation by the Special Chamber. Because of the potential complexity of privatization disputes, and because many parties appear at the Special Chamber with claims that have not been framed as legal issues, mediation could bring a great deal of clarity to court proceedings.
Availability of arbitration would also benefit the people of Kosovo, foreign investors, and the Special Chamber. Private arbitration would offer expeditious decision at little or no cost to the public, while providing some degree of procedural protection. Quick decision of cases would help to jumpstart the faltering privatization process and hopefully allow resources to begin flowing within the Kosovar economy. Private arbitration would lighten the Special Chamber’s anticipated caseload if lightening becomes necessary, allowing it to address only the more novel questions of law and public policy. It would also make Kosovo’s privatization process much more appealing to investors.
Private arbitration does, however, face some practical difficulties in addition to the negative implications previously addressed. One serious concern is that allowing private arbitration might lead domestic investors to refuse to sign a contract with the KTA unless it contained a mandatory arbitration clause. If this were to occur, a large number of cases would be prevented from reaching the Special Chamber, undermining the Court’s ability to establish any consistent application of law to Kosovo’s privatization process. The Special Chamber’s credibility might also be undermined if all experienced investors choose private arbitration over litigation. Given the Special Chamber’s special need to build confidence and to build local capacity, private arbitration could detract from its mission.
Court-annexed, non-binding arbitration may be a better option for the Special Chamber. Though some benefits associated with arbitration are less pronounced in court-annexed non-binding arbitration, court-annexed arbitration could provide the needed balance between the benefits of arbitration and the detriments of private decisionmaking. If court-annexed arbitration were implemented, the Special Chamber could have discretion over which cases it refers to mandatory arbitration and which cases it approves for voluntary arbitration, thus allowing it to keep those cases it needs to establish consistency and credibility. It could refer routine cases to arbitration, decreasing its caseload. Court-annexed arbitration would not provide the same level of caseload relief as private arbitration because the Special Chamber would still be responsible for oversight and assignment, but resources could still be saved. To maintain the speed and certainty benefits of private arbitration, the Special Chamber could institute a rule of procedure requiring parties to pay a penalty if they reject an arbitral award then continue to court adjudication and receive a less favorable award.
- Mandatory non-binding arbitration of disputes chosen on a case-by-case basis by the full court, with arbitrators appointed by the court.
Appointment of an ADR Administrator would help ensure the creation and maintenance of a high-quality system of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution. The ADR Administrator should be an outside expert in alternative dispute resolution with experience in the establishment and functioning of court-annexed systems. The Administrator could begin his or her work by helping the Special Chamber to design and implement a system that meets the needs of the Court and Kosovar society. The Administrator could participate in selection and training of mediators and arbitrators. He or she could also ease the burden on the Court caused by the process of screening cases for referral to ADR by interviewing parties and passing on reports or recommendations to the judges. At the outset, the Administrator could work with the judges to establish guidelines on which types of cases would be best suited to mediation or arbitration. He or she would be available to answer questions from parties considering the various forms of ADR and from judges in the process of referring cases or approving cases for voluntary ADR.
A “help desk” positioned as the first stop for potential litigants when they visit the Special Chamber would help to address the difficulties caused by Kosovo’s underdeveloped culture of litigation. The help desk would work closely with the Registrar and with the ADR Administrator to assist those offices and to comply with due process and impartiality requirements while assisting potential litigants. Ideally, the help desk would be operated by an independent body to allow the Special Chamber to remain in the role of impartial decisionmaker while the help desk takes on a more advocacy-driven role. When represented parties arrive at the building seeking to file claims, the party’s attorney could simply check in with the help desk and proceed to file their complaints with the Registrar. When unrepresented and inexperienced parties arrive at the building seeking to file claims, representatives at the help desk could discuss the claims with the parties and help the parties to frame their claims as proper allegations for submission to the Court. Help desk representatives could also screen complaints to ensure that formalities are met. Ideally, the help desk would be equipped with a computer where parties or help desk representatives could type up handwritten claims and print the requisite number of copies for parties who could prove financial need. If possible, the help desk could be staffed by some representatives who speak both Albanian and English or both Serbian and English so that translation assistance could be offered to applicants who can show financial need. These steps would provide the Registrar with properly formulated claims, relieving that office’s current burden of sorting through raw information, and allowing the Registrar to maintain greater impartiality. Like some “help desk” setups in the United States, the Special Chamber help desk could be staffed by law students and volunteers, with supervision by one or two licensed and compensated lawyers.
As previously discussed, the Special Chamber should robustly exercise its authority to encourage negotiated settlement. Though the judges take no part in the negotiation and cannot direct the process,  the Court should encourage parties to set conference dates. Perhaps the Special Chamber could also provide information on negotiated settlement and maintain a room for use by the parties.
In terms of actual mediation and arbitration mechanisms, the Special Chamber could establish a system in which parties could voluntarily agree to take their cases to court-annexed ADR, and in which the full court can, in its discretion, refer some cases to mandatory mediation or arbitration. In consultation with the ADR Administrator or other ADR expert, the Special Chamber could establish guidelines for determining which cases to refer to ADR. Also in consultation with an ADR expert, the Special Chamber should establish whether any categories of cases should be excluded from using the Court’s alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. For example, the Special Chamber judges may wish to keep control over cases alleging discrimination in the creation of employee eligibility lists for privatization proceeds, so that it can ensure consistent, unbiased, and visible decision on this issue. When parties voluntarily agree to mediate or arbitrate, the Rapporteur assigned to the case could be given authority to deny the request if submitting the case to ADR would undermine the public interest or cause injustice to the parties. When the Special Chamber designates cases for mandatory ADR, parties should be permitted to submit motions to reconsider, which the Court would grant if characteristics of the case so require.
For use by all three options, the Court could maintain a list of qualified mediators and arbitrators. When parties voluntarily agree to use the court-annexed ADR options, they should be allowed to choose their own neutral(s) from the list because of the benefits associated with party participation in the process. In the case of mediation, the parties could choose their mediator by agreement or by striking candidates from a short list provided by the Court or ADR Administrator and then receiving a random assignment from the remaining candidates. For arbitration, the parties could each choose one arbitrator from a list of candidates with applicable expertise provided by the Special Chamber or the Administrator, then the two selected arbitrators could choose a third from the same list. For mandatory ADR, the Special Chamber judges or ADR Administrator should assign mediators and arbitrators to avoid causing injustice to unrepresented, inexperienced, or otherwise less-powerful parties who may not be equipped to choose neutrals who would serve their interests. The Court or ADR Administrator could evaluate the case and select a group of neutrals with applicable expertise from its standing list, then randomly assign mediators and arbitrators to help avoid any appearance of favoritism.
The Special Chamber should seek to ensure that its list includes well-qualified neutrals with a variety of professional, personal, ethnic, national, and gender backgrounds. Like many courts in the United States that maintain similar lists, the Special Chamber could seek recommendations from the bar association and other organizations. Such other organizations could include the office of the SRSG; the PISG; the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo; workers’ councils from various SOEs; local governments, courts, and civil institutions in Serb enclaves; and any of the wide variety of law and business-focused international organizations. Mediators and arbitrators may be lawyers, but not all need be. Because of the more formal and legalistic nature of arbitration, lawyers are often well-suited to serve as arbitrators. Like some U.S. jurisdictions, the Special Chamber could allow properly trained law students to serve as volunteer mediators. Once the Special Chamber receives recommendations, the ADR Administrator or other ADR expert could work with the judges of the Court to evaluate candidates and select neutrals representing the necessary variety of backgrounds. The candidates would then be trained by an independent organization or by the ADR Administrator or other exert working with the Special Chamber. Candidates who complete the training and display adequate aptitude would then be added to the list.
If the Court prefers to maintain a long list of approved neutrals (perhaps to prevent institutional mindset), the neutrals could maintain other employment and be “on call” for infrequent assignment. If the Court prefers to maintain a short list (perhaps to build a small corps of experienced, closely supervised neutrals), neutrals would serve the Special Chamber on a near full-time basis.
A system of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution could help the Special Chamber to meet it goals, while maintaining supervision over the handling of each case. Negotiation, mediation, and arbitration can provide quick, relatively inexpensive results that are appropriate to the cultural, social, and economic conditions in Kosovo. Alternative dispute resolution overseen by the Special Chamber could reduce the Court’s expected caseload, provide timely resolution of privatization claims that have been bogged down by controversy, and serve as a tool for expanding the use of ADR in the territory as a whole. Support structures for the Special Chamber and for alternative dispute resolution can help ensure the professional establishment and management of such an ADR system.
If the Special Chamber proceeds with the creation of a court-annexed system of alternative dispute resolution, other issues outside the scope of this paper will need to be addressed. Future efforts might include plans for the timing of each step of the process, standards for the appeal of ADR results to the full Court, and funding.
 NATO forces drove Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo in June 1999. American Bar Association Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (“ABA CEELI”), Legal Information for Kosovo, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/kosovo/legalinfo.html (accessed April 23, 2004).
 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) ¶ 10 (available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm).
 For its first full year of operation, the UN administration’s Kosovo Consolidated Budget included 562 million DM just for recurrent expenditures. UNMIK, UNMIK-JIAS Fact Sheet: Kosovo Consolidated Budget, http://www.unmikonline.org/1styear/kcb.htm (accessed May 20, 2004). In 1999 alone, the European Union gave 127 million Euro for reconstruction assistance. EU External Relations, Kosovo - One Year On: The European Contribution, http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/extrel/formyugo/Kosovo/kosovo.htm (accessed May 20, 2004). From 1999 to 2000, capital city Pristina’s population increased from 200,000 to 450,000, largely due to the influx of international personnel. Rhoda Margesson, Kosovo Casualty: Environment (May 9, 2000) (available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/news/2000/may/margesson.html, reprinted from the Christian Science Monitor).
 See Ana Stanič, Financial Aspects of State Succession: The Case of Yugoslavia, 12 Eur. J. Intl. L. 751, 764-765 (2001)(available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol12/No4/120751.pdf)(describing social ownership in former Yugoslavia as a system in which federal authorities were granted exclusive possession and management rights, but not official ownership, over certain socially owned enterprises).
 Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit of the EU Pillar of UNMIK European Stability Initiative, De-industrialization and its Consequences, A Kosovo Story, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_33.pdf, pp. 6-7 (March 2002).
 Id. at p. 3 (using SOEs in the city of Peja as a case study).
 For example, the Peja Wood Combine owes electric company KEK over 170,000 DM. Id. at p. 3 n. 10.
 United Nations Development Programme Kosovo, Factsheet 1: Unemployment, http://www.kosovo.undp.org/Factsheets/factsheets/unemployment_may2003.pdf (accessed May 20, 2004).
 UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/12 On the Establishment of the Kosovo Trust Agency (available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2002/RE2002_12.pdf).
 Id. at §§ 1.2, 2.1.
 UNMIK Regulation No. 2003/13 On the Transformation of the Right to Use Socially-Owned Immovable Property (available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2003/RE2003_13.pdf); Stefan Armbruster, UN Launches Kosovan sell-off, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2932328.stm, BBC News Online (accessed March 16, 2004).
 Kosovo Trust Agency, Objectives of the Kosovo Trust Agency, http://www.kta-kosovo.org/html/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=1 (accessed April 23, 2004).
 UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/13, On the Establishment of a Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Related Matters (available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2002/RE2002_13.pdf).
 Steven Komonytsky interview with Registrar Steven Farrell and then-Chief Judge John Murphy, January 1, 2004, Pristina (hereinafter “Interview”).
 UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/13, supra n. 28, at § 4.1.
 UNMIK Administrative Direction No. 2003/13, Implementing UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/13 on the Establishment of a Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Related Matters, § 24.1 (available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/admdirect/2003/ADE2003_13.pdf).
 Id. at §§ 22.7, 22.8.
 The European Court of Human Rights, Historical background, organisation, and procedure, http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm#book4, § II(B)(1)(13)(September 2003).
 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention on Human Rights”)(available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf)(introduction states that the governments signing the document are members of the Council of Europe). All members of the Council of Europe and of the European Convention on Human Rights are states. The United Nations and the European Union are not members. See Council of Europe, States: Documents and Visits, http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states.htm (accessed May 16, 2004).
 UNMIK Regulation No. 2003/13, supra n. 15, at § 10.1.
 See UNMIK Division of Public Information, Media Monitoring Headlines, 13 March, http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/mon/mar/lmm130304.pdf (March 13, 2004)(“on Thursday, 18th March, workers and citizens of Kosovo will rise in protest against Marie Fucci and the Kosovo Trust Agency, which have blocked the process of privatization in Kosovo…”).
 International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo; ICG Europe Report N155, 22 April 2004, http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/europe/balkans/155_collapse_in_kosovo_revised.pdf, p. 6.
 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Resolving Claims When Countries Disintigrate: the Challenge of Kosovo, DRAFT, p. 26.
 See Elanor Beardsley, Who owns what? UN tackles Kosovo housing tangle, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 10, 2002 (available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0110/p7s1-woeu.html).
 BBC Monitoring European, Kosovo Trust Agency threatened with legal action over privatization delay, January 22, 2004.
 BBC Monitoring European, Serbian Official tells UN Kosovo chief to halt privatization or face lawsuit, December 14, 2003.
 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) MISSION IN KOSOVO, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Remedies Catalogue, http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/08/983_en.pdf, p. 63 (August 5, 2003).
 Perritt, supra n. 72, at p. 22.
 See BBC Monitoring European, Holkeri given go-ahead to continue Kosovo privatization process, November 18, 2003 (the Special Chamber “deals with complaints of all alleged owners of the socially owned enterprises in Kosova).
 ABA CEELI, supra n. 1.
 Barbara Jones, Minnesota judges help bring justice to Kosovo, Minnesota Lawyer, September 1, 2003.
 See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) MISSION IN KOSOVO, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Legal System Monitoring Section, Kosovo Review of the Criminal Justice System, “The Administration of Justice in the Municipal Courts,” March 2004, pp. 8-17 (hereinafter “Criminal Justice System”)(examining delays in civil and criminal cases in Kosovo’s municipal courts, and addressing reasons).
 Criminal Justice System, supra n. 92, at p. 25.
 See Beardsley, supra n. 74.
 Many claim that unemployment and slow progress by UNMIK are some of the most important factors contributing to the unrest in March 2004. See e.g. BBC Monitoring European, Kosovo party leader Thaci tells EU envoy privatization must resume, April 9, 2004.
 International Crisis Group, supra n. 69, at p. 6.
 Privatization began with the first round of tenders on May 15, 2003. Central and Eastern Europe Business Information Center (“CEEBIC”), Privatization Programs in Kosovo, http://www.mac.doc.gov/ceebic/TLkosovo1.htm (accessed May 21, 2004). By November 21, 2003, the KTA had conducted three rounds of privatization, halted privatization, and agreed to continue the process after changing its operating policies and making a case-by-case review of every enterprise offered in the first three rounds. CEEBIC, Southeastern Europe Business Brief, Volume 8.42, http://www.mac.doc.gov/ceebic/balkan/seebb/842.htm (Nov. 21, 2003). On April 10, 2004, the SRSG dismissed the KTA director, Marie Fucci, under pressure from representatives of Albanian Kosovars. BBC Monitoring European, Kosovo Premier Welcomes UNMIK Dismissal of Head of Privatization Agency, April 22, 2004. “Kosovo’s privatization process has stalled.” Randloph Walerius, Privatization in Kosovo Comes to a Standstill, The Wall Street Journal Europe (Feb. 12, 2004).
 See James M. Cooper, Essay: Access to Justice 1.1, 30 Cal. W. Intl. L. J. 429, 433 (2000)(describing alternative dispute resolution in Latin America).
 Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).
 See id. (“Negotiation usu. involves complete autonomy for the parties involved, without the intervention of third parties”).
 National Institute for Trial Advocacy, Arbitration Advocacy, § 1.1 (1997).
 For example, in United States federal courts, the court can, and usually does, conduct pretrial conferences to facilitate settlement of cases. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a)(5).
 Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 5 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin, eds., 5th ed., BNA Books 1999); Arbitration Advocacy, supra n. 104, at § 1.1.
 American Arbitration Association, A Guide to Mediation and Arbitration for Business People, July 2003 (available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15727&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\ADR_Guides\AAA035current.htm#AGUIDETOMEDIATION).
 American Arbitration Association, supra n. 107.
 National Institute for Trial Advocacy, Mediation Advocacy, § 1.2 (2002).
 Arbitration Advocacy, supra n. 104, at § 1.1.
 Id. at §§ 1.2, 1.3.
 See id. at § 1.1; American Arbitration Association, supra n. 107.
 Arbitration Advocacy, supra n. 104 at § 1.3.
 See id. at § 2.6 (one advantage of a panel of arbitrators is the ability to choose experts on several areas of law that may be involved in a case).
 Id. at §§ 2.1, 2.6.
 See id. at § 1.3 (expressing concern about lack of accountability).
 Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 1189, 1205 (2003).
 Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase, 97 A.J.I.L. 643, 647 (2003).
 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Art. III (New York, June 10, 1958) (available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.recognition.and.enforcement.convention.new.york.1958/doc.html).
 United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL), Status of Conventions and Model Laws, http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/status-e.htm (last updated April 16, 2004).
 Cymie Payne, ed., International Arbitration, 90 Am. Socy. Intl. L. Porc. 244, 250 (March 27-30, 1996) (comment by Charles Brower: “international arbitration is adopted 99 percent of the time as a substitute for national court litigation and people do not care that much about the cost and the expedition and so forth: they just do not want to be where they otherwise would be”).
 Margaret Pedrick Sullivan, The Scope of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1113, 1123 (1988).
 CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Court ADR Elements of Program Design, § 1.01 (1992).
 Arbitration Advocacy, supra n. 104 at § 1.4.
 Court ADR Elements of Program Design, supra n. 134 at § 1.02(A).
 Raymond Shonholtz, A General Theory on Disputes and Conflicts, 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 403, 405 (2003).
 Cooper, supra n. 101 at 433.
 Shonholtz, supra n. 139, at 406, 414 n. 13.
 Id. at 406, 414 n. 14.
 Id. at 406, 414 n. 15.
 UNMIK Regulation No. 2003/8, On the Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, §§ 1.2, 2.1 (available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2003/RE2003_08.pdf).
 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/ (accessed April 24, 2004).
 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Rules of Procedure, Rule 1.3(e), http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/ (follow “Legal Basis” link)(accessed April 24, 2004).
 Id. at Rules 14.1, 14.3.
 Id. at Rules 19, 20.
 Id. at Rules 17.2, 17.3.
 Partners for Democratic Change, Centers: Partners-Kosovo, http://www.partnersglobal.org/centers/centers_kosova.html (accessed April 24, 2004).
 Partners for Democratic Change, Partners’ Mediation Services, http://www.partnersglobal.org/case_studies/Supp%20Materials/Kosovo-MediationBrochure.doc (accessed April 25, 2004).
 Centers: Partners-Kosovo, supra n 163.
 Kosova Chamber of Commerce, Court of Arbitration, http://www.kosovo-eicc.org/oek/index.php?page_id=54 (accessed April 25, 2004).
 UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/3, On Foreign Investment in Kosovo, § 17 (available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg03-01.html).
 Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo, Rule 28 On the Establishment of an Arbitration Forum to Resolve Disputes on Claims (available at http://www.bpk-kos.org/Regulation/Insurance%20Rule/Rule%2028%20Arbitration%20Forum.pdf).
 UNMIK Administrative Direction No. 2003/13, Implementing UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/13 on the Establishment of a Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Related Matters, § 20.2 (available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/admdirect/2003/ADE2003_13.pdf).
 UNMIK Regulation No. No. 2001/3, supra n. 168, at § 17.
 UNMIK Press Office, Press Release: Standards for Kosovo, http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/pressr/pr1078.pdf (Dec. 10, 2003).

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