Source: https://openjurist.org/395/us/62
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:07:16+00:00

Document:
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1969.
See 395 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 2125.
Joseph J. Connolly, Washington, D.C., for petitioner, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.
G. Bernhard Fedde, Portland, Or., for respondent.
This case involves the type of hearing to which an alien crewman is entitled on his claim that he would suffer persecution upon deportation to his native land. The Court of Appeals, 9 Cir., 393 F.2d 539, sustained the respondent crewman's contention that he must be heard by a special inquiry officer1 in a proceeding conducted under § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 Petitioner, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, argues that respondent's claim was properly heard and determined by a district director.3 We brought the case here, 393 U.S. 912, 89 S.Ct. 235, 21 L.Ed.2d 197 (1968), to resolve the conflict on this score between the decision below and that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (1967).
'the period of time (not exceeding twenty-nine days) during which the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived remains in port, if the immigration officer is satisfied that the crewman intends to depart on the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived.' Ibid.
Thus, although respondent was admittedly deportable under the terms of § 252(b), he was not immediately returned to his vessel. On January 7, he was offered the opportunity to present evidence to the District Director in support of his claim of persecution.
Respondent presented no evidence to the District Director. Rather, he contended that he had not been given sufficient time to prepare for the hearing, and he also argued that he was entitled to have his claim heard by a special inquiry officer in accordance with the general provisions of § 242(b). The District Director ruled against respondent and, in the absence of any evidence of probable persecution, ordered him returned to the M/V Sumadija, which was then still in port.
Respondent immediately sought relief in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon,6 which, without opinion, temporarily stayed his deportation and referred the matter back to the District Director for a hearing on the merits of respondent's claim. On January 25, 1965, after a hearing at which respondent was represented by counsel and presented evidence, the District Director held that respondent 'has (not) shown that he would be physically persecuted if he were to return to Yugoslavia.' Appendix 22.
On respondent's supplemental pleadings, the District Court held that the District Director's findings were supported by the record. The court rejected respondent's claim that he was entitled to a § 242(b) hearing before a special inquiry officer, relying on the last sentence of § 252(b), which provides: 'Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the procedure prescribed in section 242 of this Act to cases falling within the provisions of this subsection.' Vucinic (and Stanisic) v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 243 F.Supp. 113 (D.C.1965).
Respondent did not appeal the District Court's decision. Instead, in July 1965, he petitioned Congress for a private bill, pending action on which the Service stayed his deportation. Respondent's effort proved unsuccessful, and on June 21, 1966, the Service ordered him to appear for deportation to Yugoslavia.
The following day, respondent reasserted his claim of persecution before the Service, and requested that the matter be heard by a special inquiry officer pursuant to § 242. The Service, and subsequently the District Court, denied relief, both holding that this issue had previously been determined adversely to respondent.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Stanisic v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 393 F.2d 539 (1968), holding that the matter was not res judicata because of a significant change of circumstances: the District Director's adverse determination in 1965, and the District Court's unappealed approval thereof, were based on the unstated premise that the M/V Sumadija was still in port;7 but now the ship had long since sal ed, and respondent still had not been deported. The court held that § 252(b) only authorized respondent's 'summary deportation aboard the vessel on which he arrived or, within a very limited time after that vessel's departure, aboard another vessel pursuant to arrangements made before * * * (his) vessel departed.' 393 F.2d, at 542—543. Since neither of these conditions was met, respondent could no longer be deported pursuant to the District Director's 1965 determination; he was entitled to a de novo hearing before a special inquiry officer under § 242(b) of the Act.
At the outset, it is important to recognize the distinction between a determination whether an alien is statutorily deportable something never contested by respondent—and a determination whether to grant political asylum to an otherwise properly deportable alien.
Section 242(b) provides a generally applicable procedure 'for determining the deportability of an alien * * *.' Section 252(b) provides a specific procedure for the deportation of alien crewmen holding D—1 landing permits. Neither of these sections is concerned with the granting of asylum.
No statute prescribes by what delegate of the Attorney General, or pursuant to what procedure, relief shall be granted under these provisions. By regulation, the decision to grant parole pursuant to § 212(d)(5) rests with a district director, 8 CFR §§ 212.5(a), 253.2; and by regulation, the decision to withhold deportation of most aliens pursuant to § 243(h) is presently made by a special inquiry officer.8 8 CFR §§ 242.8(a), 242.17(c).
The Service could provide that all persecution claims be heard by a district director, and we see no reason why the Service cannot validly provide that the persecution claim of an alien crewman whose D—1 landing permit has been revoked be heard by a district director, whether or not the ship has departed. It might be argued, however, that the Service has not done so; that 8 CFR § 253.1(e) was designed to govern the determination of persecution claims only when § 252(b) of the Act governed determinations of deportability; and that if departure of the vessel renders § 252(b) inapplicable (a suggestion we consider and reject in Part III, below), then 8 CFR § 253.1(e) likewise becomes inapplicable.
Section 253.1(e) applies, however, to '(a)ny alien crewman * * * whose conditional landing permit issued under § 252.1(d)(1) (of 8 CFR) * * * is revoked'—precisely respondent's situation—and makes no reference to the departure, vel non, of the vessel. Granting that this regulation and its successor provision are not free from ambiguity, we find it dispositive that the agency responsible for promulgating and administering the regulation has interpreted it to apply even when the vessel has departed. E.g., United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (1967); Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F.Supp. 24 (1963), aff'd 340 F.2d 91 (1964). '(T)he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945).
In sum, it is immaterial to the decision in this case whether § 252(b)'s exception to the § 242(b) procedure is, or is not, applicable to respondent. These two provisions govern only the revocation of temporary landing permits and the determination of deportability, and we reiterate that respondent does not contest the District Director's action on either of these scores. These sections do not state who should hear and determine a request for asylum. That is a matter governed by regulation, and under the applicable regulation the respondent received his due.
We do not rest on this ground alone, however. Both the court below and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (1967), assumed that a crewman's statutory entitlement to a s 242(b) hearing on his request for asylum was coextensive with his right to a § 242(b) hearing on his statutory deportability, and the case was argued here primarily on that basis. For the balance of the opinion we thus make, arguendo, the same assumption. We conclude, contrary to the court below, that an alien crewman may properly be deported pursuant to § 252(b) even after his ship has sailed.
Section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides a generally applicable administrative procedure pursuant to which a special inquiry officer determines whether an alien is deportable. See nn. 1 and 2, supra.
'(T)he temporary 'shore leave' admission of alien seamen who remain illegally constitutes one of the most important loopholes in our whole system of restriction and control of the entry of aliens into the United States. The efforts to apprehend these alien seamen for deportation are encumbered by many technicalities invoked in behalf of the alien seamen and create conditions incident to enforcement of the laws which have troubled the authorities for many years.' Id., at 550.
'Authority should be granted to immigration officers in a case where the alien crewman intends to depart on the same vessel on which he arrived, upon a satisfactory finding that an alien is not a bona fide crewman, to revoke the permission to land temporarily, to take the alien into custody, and to require the master of the vessel on which he arrived to detain him and remove him from the country.' Id., at 558.
Unlike § 242(b), § 252(b) does not prescribe the procedures governing the determination of the crewman's deportability, nor does it confine that determination to a special inquiry officer.
As the Court of Appeals noted, the § 252(b) procedure governs a narrow range of cases only. It is entirely inapplicable to persons other than alien crewmen. It does not apply to an alien crewman who enters the United States illegally without obtaining any landing permit at all, or who enters on a 'D—2' permit allowing him to depart on a different vessel. See n. 4, supra. The Service has held § 252(b) to be inapplicable even to a crewman issued a D—1 permit unless formal revocation—as distinguished from actual deportation—takes place before his vessel leaves American shores.11 Matter of M—-, 5 I. & N.Dec. 127 (1953); 8 CFR § 252.2; see Cheng Fan Kwok v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206, 207, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 1971, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968).
Section 252(b) most plainly governs the situation in which a D—1 landing permit is revoked and the alien crewman is immediately returned to the vessel on which he arrived, which, by hypothesis, is still in a United States port. At the time of revocation, the crewman usually has not traveled far from the port,12 so the burden of transporting him back to the vessel is small; there is a readily identifiable vessel and place to return him to; and during his brief shore leave, which cannot exceed 29 days, the crewman is unlikely to have established significant personal or business relationships in the United States. In short, the crewman's deportation may be expedited, with minimum hardship and inconvenience to him, to the transportation company responsible for him,13 and to the Service.
These provisions contemplate that an alien crewman whose temporary landing permit is revoked pursuant to § 252(b) may be deported on a vessel other than the one on which he arrived. The other vessel should preferably be one owned by the transportation company which which brought him to the United States,15 but if this is not feasible, the Attorney General may order him deported by other means, at the company's expense.
The Court of Appeals recognized that an alien crewman might properly be deported on a vessel other than the one which brought him. It noted, however, that § 254(c) holds the owner of that vessel responsible for all of the expenses of his deportation and further provides that the vessel shall not be granted departure clearance until those expenses are paid or their payment is guaranteed.16 From this it concluded that 'the section contemplates that the alternative arrangement shall be made while the vessel upon which the crewman arrived is still in port * * *.' 393 F.2d, at 546. Since arrangements for respondent's deportation had not been made before the M/V Sumadija departed, the § 254(c), and hence the § 252(b), procedures were no longer applicable: with the ship's departure, respondent became entitled to a hearing pursuant to § 242(b).
Strong policies support the conclusion that a properly commenced § 252(b) proceeding does not automatically abort upon the departure of the crewman's vessel. If the crewman whose landing permit has been revoked pursuant to § 252(b) attacks the district director's action in a federal court, the court would usually stay his deportation pending at least a preliminary hearing. Even courts with dockets less crowded than those of most of our major port cities19 may not be able to hear the matter for several days or more, during which time the vessel may often have departed according to schedule. It requires little legal talent, moreover, to manufacture a colorable case for a temporary stay out of whole cloth, and to delay proceedings once in the federal courts. The Ninth Circuit's construction would, thus, encourage frivolous applications and intentional delays designed to assure that the crewman's vessel departed before the case was heard. Alternatively, it would so dispose federal judges not to grant stays that persons presenting meritorious applications might be deported without the opportunity to be heard.
We agree with the court below that § 252(b) is a provision of limited applicability. But we conclude that the court's construction would restrict its scope to a degree neither intended by Congress nor supported by the language of the Act, and that it would, as a practical matter, render § 252(b) useless for the very function it was designed to perform.
We hold that an alien crewman whose temporary landing permit is properly revoked pursuant to § 252(b) does not become entitled to a hearing before a special inquiry officer under § 242(b) merely because his deportation is not finally arranged or effected when his vessel leaves, and that under these circumstances the Attorney General may provide—as he did in 8 CFR § 253.1(e), now 8 CFR § 253.1(f) that the crewman's request for political asylum be heard by a district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Two procedures for the deportation of aliens are relevant in this case. The first is set forth in § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), and is the procedure required in most instances when the Government seeks to deport an alien. Under § 242(b) a number of procedural safeguards are specified to insure that an alien is given the full benefit of a complete and fair hearing before the harsh consequence of deportation can be imposed on him.1 The second procedure involved in this case is set forth in § 252(b). It is applicable only under very special circumstances involving alien seamen who enter this country under conditional landing permits. Section 252(b) provides for a short, summary procedure.2 Unlike § 242(b), the first provision mentioned, this second provision does not require that the hearing officer be someone unconnected with the investigation and prosecution of the case. It does not require specific trial safeguards such as the rights to notice, counsel, and crossexamination of witnesses. Indeed, § 252(b) apparently does not require that the alien be given any hearing at all but would seem to authorize an immigration officer to order immediate arrest and summary deportation on the basis of any information coming to him in any way at any time. The question before the Court is therefore not the apparently insignificant question suggested by the Court's opinion—namely, whether this alien's case was properly determined by an official with one title, 'District Director,' rather than another title, 'special inquiry officer.' Instead, the question is the crucially significant one whether an alien seaman about to be forced to leave the country is entitled under the circumstances of this case to the benefit of safeguards that were carefully provided by Congress to insure greater fairness and reliability in deportation proceedings.
The regulations relied on by the Court in Part II of its opinion do not provide an independent basis for its holding. Among the relevant regulations, 8 CFR § 242.8(a) applies '(i)n any proceeding conducted under this part,' namely 'Part 242 Proceedings to Determine Deportability of Aliens in the United States: Apprehension, Custody, Hearing, and Appeal.' The regulation is thus designed to spell out further the details of proceedings required to be conducted under § 242 of the statute, and this regulation explicitly authorizes the special inquiry officer 'to order temporary withholding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of the Act (the political persecution provision).' In contrast, the regulations relied upon by the Court as authorizing a District Director to decide this issue, in particular former 8 CFR § 253.1(e), apply by their own terms only to the procedure for 'parole' of an alien under § 212(d) (5), a remedy distinct from the withholding of deportation under § 243(h), and by the Government's own admission these regulations are applicable only to 'requests for asylum made by crewmen against whom proceedings under Section 252(b) have been instituted.' Brief for Petitioner 37. Thus, the regulations serve only to spell out the procedures to be followed under both § 242(b) and § 252(b) and do not even purport to specify when one of the sections rather than the other is in fact applicable. The fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Service has applied the regulations differently does not change this meaning. As the Court concedes, the regulation is 'not free from ambiguity,' ante, at 72, and of course the ambiguity in the regulation is precisely the same as the ambiguity in the statutory provision from which the wording of the regulation was drawn. It seems clear that the way in which the Service has applied the regulation has been determined by its interpretation of the statute, an interpretation that is in no way binding on us. Both the statute and the regulation are ambiguous, and there is no doubt in my mind that this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the alien who is seeking a full and fair hearing. With all due respect, I think the Court's involved argument based upon the regulations, which goes beyond anything suggested by the Government itself in this case, provides no basis whatsoever for avoiding the fundamental question of statutory interpretation as to which of the two procedures, § 242(b) or § 252(b), was required to be followed in this case.
'The section (252(b)) exception (to the general procedure requirements of § 242(b)) is very narrowly drawn. It does not apply to the deportation of crewmen who have 'jumped ship' and entered the United States illegally, with no permit at all. As noted above, it does not apply to crewmen issued landing permits authorizing them to depart on vessels other than those on which they arrived. It does not apply to crewmen who have overstayed the twenty-nine day leave period without revocation of their landing permits. It does not apply to crewmen who were to leave on the vessel on which they arrived if their vessels have departed before their landing permits are revoked. In all of these situations crewmen may be deported only in accordance with (§ 242(b)) procedures.' 393 F.2d 539 544.
As the legislative history of the Act, quoted in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, shows, the special truncated procedure of § 252(b) was intended to be used only when the need for speed was truly pressing—when the ship was about to leave port. But the seaman in this case was subjected to this truncated, summary procedure even though his ship had already gone and the need for haste in completing these important legal proceedings no longer existed. There is no reason to suspect that Congress wanted a seaman to be deprived under these circumstances of the vital procedural safeguards so carefully specified in § 242(b) of the Act.
A special inquiry officer is 'any immigration officer who the Attorney General deems specially qualified to conduct specified classes of proceedings * * *.' Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(b)(4), 66 Stat. 171, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4). The special inquiry officer has no enforcement duties. He performs 'no functions other than the hearing and decision of issues in exclusion and deportation cases, and occasionally in other adjudicative proceedings.' 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 5.7b, at 5—49 (1967); see generally id., § 5.7.
A district director is the officer in charge of a district office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He performs a wide range of functions. See 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 1.9c (1967); 8 CFR § 103.1(f).
'D—1' and 'D—2' landing permits are permits issued pursuant to 8 CFR §§ 252.1(d)(1) and 252.1(d)(2), which implement §§ 252(a)(1) and 252(a)(2) of the Act.
26 Fed.Reg. 11797 (December 8, 1961). Effective March 22, 1967, the section was amended and redesignated § 253.1(f), 32 Fed.Reg. 4341—4342.
Because the District Director's determination was not pursuant to § 242(b), the District Court had jurisdiction to review his action. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968); Stanisic v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 393 F.2d 539, 542 (1968); Vucinic (and Stanisic) v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 243 F.Supp. 113, 115-117 (1965); 5 U.S.C. § 1009.
Actually, the ship sailed from the United States on or about January 16, 1965, or between the date on which the District Director revoked respondent's landing permit (January 6, 1965), and the date on which, after a hearing, he denied respondent's persecution claim (January 25, 1965). This fact was not in the record before the Court of Appeals.
This was not always so. Until 1962, the final determination was made by a regional commissioner of the Service. 8 CFR § 243.3(b)(2) (1958 rev.); see Foti v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217, 230, n. 16, 84 S.Ct. 306, 314, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963).
The only substantial difference is that the regulation, but not the statute, is limited to Commn ist-inspired persecution.
For this reason, we have no occasion to decide whether or not respondent was 'within the United States.' Compare United States ex rel. Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F.Supp. 491 (1960), with United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (1967), and Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F.Supp. 24 (D.C.1963), aff'd, 340 F.2d 91 (5 Cir. 1964). It may further be noted that § 243(h), by its terms, 'authorizes' but does not require the consideration of persecution claims.
8 CFR § 252.2(d) provides that a 'crewman granted a conditional permit to land under section 252(a)(1) of the Act * * * is required to depart with his vessel from its port of arrival and from each other port in the United States to which it thereafter proceeds coastwise without touching at a foreign port or place; however, he may rejoin his vessel at another port in the United States before it touches at a foreign port or place if he has advance written permission from the master or agent to do so.' In the latter case the crewman may journey some distance from the port at which he arrived.
See infra, this page and at 76.
66 Stat. 221, 8 U.S.C. § 1284.
This is doubtless an accommodation made in the light of the transportation company's liability for the expenses of deportation.
'All expenses incurred in connection with such deportation, including expenses incurred in transferring an alien crewman from one place in the United States to another under such conditions and safeguards as the Attorney General shall impose, shall be paid by the owner or owners of the vessel or aircraft on which the alien arrived in the United States. The vessel or aircraft on which the alien arrived shall not be granted clearance until such expenses have been paid or their payment guaranteed to the satisfaction of the Attorney General. * * *' § 254(c).
Thus, if and when respondent is deported, the owners of the M/V Sumadija will be responsible for the related expenses incurred by the United States.
And, although we do not decide this question, § 254(c) would appear to allow the Attorney General to require security for the payment of anticipated expenses of deporting an alien crewman, even though no final arrangements have been made before the vessel that brought i m departs.
See generally 1968 Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Ann.Rep., Tables C, D, and X (1968).
See supra, at 68; Appendix 18—22 passim.
Respondent contends that his 1965 proceeding was infected with various constitutional errors, including the District Director's alleged bias and his combination of prosecutorial, investigative, and adjudicatory functions. Because that proceeding is not before us, and because we remand for a new hearing, we have no occasion to consider these arguments, except to note that neither § 252(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act nor 8 CFR § 253.1(f), under which respondent will be heard on remand, is unconstitutional on its face. Likewise, it is premature to consider whether, and under what circumstances, an order of deportation might contravene the Protocol and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded on November 1, 1968. See Dept State Bull., Vol. LIX, No. 1535, p. 538.

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