Source: http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180328_0000318.EKY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:54:13+00:00

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Steven Victor Pinson seeks judicial review of an administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, which denied his claim for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. Mr. Pinson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), alleging various errors on the part of the ALJ considering the matter. The Court, having reviewed the record and for the reasons set forth herein, will DENY Mr. Pinson's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANT the Commissioner's.
Plaintiff Steven Victor Pinson initially filed an application for Title II disability insurance benefits on April 16, 2014, alleging disability beginning on February 20, 2010. [Transcript (hereinafter, “Tr.”) 20.] Administrative Law Judge Benton denied this request on June 27, 2014, and again denied it upon reconsideration on September 10, 2014. Id. Mr. Pinson filed a request for a hearing on September 12, 2014, which was held on May 10, 2016. Id. On September 1, 2016, ALJ Benton again denied Mr. Pinson's application. Id. at 17. The Appeals Council denied Mr. Pinson's request for review on August 22, 2017. Id. at 1.
To evaluate a claim of disability for Title II disability insurance benefit claims, an ALJ conducts a five-step analysis. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (disability insurance benefit claim) with 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (claims for supplemental security income). First, if a claimant is performing a substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, if a claimant does not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limit his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, he does not have a severe impairment and is not “disabled” as defined by the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, if a claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, he is “disabled.” C.F.R. § 404.1530(d). Before moving on to the fourth step, the ALJ must use all of the relevant evidence in the record to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC), which assess an individual's ability to perform certain physical and metal work activities on a sustained basis despite any impairment experienced by the individual. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant work, and if a claimant's impairments do not prevent him from doing past relevant work, he is not “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Fifth, if a claimant's impairments (considering his RFC, age, education, and past work) prevent him from doing other work that exists in the national economy, then he is “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Through Step Four of the analysis, “the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work.” Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs that accommodate the claimant's profile, but the claimant retains the ultimate burden of proving his lack of residual functional capacity. Id.; Jordan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2008).
[Mr. Pinson] had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R 404.1567(b) except the claimant (1) could occasionally climb stairs and ramps; (2) could never climb ladders or scaffolds; (3) could frequently balance; (4) could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; (5) must have avoided concentrated exposure to dust, odors, fumes and other pulmonary irritants; (6) must have avoided concentrated exposure to hazards such as moving mechanical parts and unprotected heights; and (7) would need the opportunity to very briefly change position, while remaining on task, after sitting or standing for approximately 30 minutes. Further, the claimant could (1) understand, remember and carry out simple instructions; (2) have occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; (3) only make simple, work-related decisions; and (4) only tolerate occasional change in work location.
The Court's review is generally limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003); Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1987). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which [administrative] decision makers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).

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