Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/3-so-3d-1035-614819263
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:56:52+00:00

Document:
Party Name: Kelly WALLACE, Petitioner, v. Ed DEAN, Sheriff of Marion County, Respondent.
Attorney: Sharon H. Proctor, Lake Saint Louis, MO, and Mark A. Avera of Avera and Smith, LLP, Gainesville, FL, for Petitioner. Bruce R. Bogan of Hilyard, Bogan and Palmer, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Respondent.
Ed DEAN, Sheriff of Marion County, Respondent.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 2009.
Sharon H. Proctor, Lake Saint Louis, MO, and Mark A. Avera of Avera and Smith, LLP, Gainesville, FL, for Petitioner.
Bruce R. Bogan of Hilyard, Bogan and Palmer, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Respondent.
Hartley v. Floyd, 512 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), which applied the undertaker's doctrine and held that a common-law duty existed when a sheriff's deputy assured a 911 caller that he would conduct a safety check (and later claimed that he did conduct such a check) when, in fact, he never responded to the scene. See id. at 1024 (relying upon Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Kropff, 491 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and Padgett v. Sch. Bd. of Escambia County, 395 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)).
In addition to the jurisdictional bases described in Nielsen, conflict jurisdiction also exists here based upon misapplication of our decisions in Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732 (Fla.1989), Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936 (Fla.1985), and Trianon Park Condominium Association v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla.1985).6 First, in opposition to Kaisner, the decision below improperly conflated the separate questions of duty and sovereign immunity by holding that the deputies in this case were engaged in a " discretionary" function (i.e., a question related to whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies) and then perplexingly stating that it " need not discuss the issue of sovereign immunity." Wallace, 970 So.2d at 867-69. Second, the decision below misapplied Everton, as we expressly limited our holding in that case to the question of whether a law-enforcement officer's decision to make an arrest or to enforce the criminal law is a discretionary function insulated from tort liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Wallace, 970 So.2d at 867, 868. Third and finally, the decision below misapplied Trianon by classifying the affirmative response of the Sheriff's deputies involved in this case as a category II activity when, in reality, this type of response falls within category IV of the Trianon taxonomy. See Wallace, 970 So.2d at 867.
tortious acts is the operational/planning formula set forth in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979)." ).
Plaintiff-petitioner, Kelly Wallace (the decedent Brenda Wallace's daughter), originally filed an action pursuant to Florida's Wrongful Death Act (sections 768.16-.26, Florida Statutes (2004)), against Ed Dean in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Marion County. In the initial complaint, the plaintiff alleged that two Marion County Sheriff's deputies responded to a 911 call, undertook to determine Brenda's safety, thereby assumed a duty of care, and negligently increased the risk of harm that Brenda faced by failing to summon an ambulance, which proximately resulted in Brenda's death. After two subsequent amendments, which (i) added additional factual information concerning these events (i.e., Brenda was totally unresponsive to the deputies' repeated and concerted attempts to physically and verbally awaken her) and (ii) further alleged that the deputies " rebuffed" the suggestions of third parties that Brenda was in a diabetic coma and that the deputies should summon an ambulance, the circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6). To support its order of dismissal, the circuit court provided the following legal bases: (1) the Sheriff did not owe the plaintiff's decedent a common-law duty of care; (2) by responding to the 911 call and conducting a safety check, the Sheriff's deputies were performing a quasi-legislative discretionary function for which the Sheriff enjoys sovereign immunity; (3) the court was concerned with a hypothetical " chilling effect" that liability might have on the Sheriff's future willingness to conduct safety checks; 9 and (4) the deputies never created a " special relationship" with the decedent or the plaintiff, which otherwise could have subjected the Sheriff to liability. Thereafter, the plaintiff-petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the Fifth District.
A failure to conform to the standard [of care] is negligence, therefore, even if it is due to clumsiness, stupidity, forgetfulness, an excitable temperament, or even sheer ignorance. An honest blunder, or a mistaken belief that no damage will result, may absolve the actor from moral blame, but the harm to others is still as great, and the actor's individual standards must give way in this area of the law to those of the public. In other words, society may require a person not to be awkward or a fool.

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