Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83309:57299&catid=1586&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:24:21+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 171212, August 20, 2014 - INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Petitioner, v. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO, Respondents.
INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Petitioner, v. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO, Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to review, reverse and set-aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated May 30, 2005, and its Resolution2 dated January 10, 2006 in the case entitled Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. v. Hon. Rolando R. Velasco and Engr. Salvador Adviento, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83099.
Subsequently, respondent filed another Complaint9 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy and workable environment.
In reply, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss22 on the ground that: (1) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (LA) under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code; and (2) there is another action pending with the Regional Arbitration Branch III of the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga, involving the same parties for the same cause.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion to dismiss to be without merit, the Court denies the motion to dismiss.
On February 9, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, which was likewise denied in an Order issued on even date.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
From the aforesaid Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was nevertheless denied for lack of merit in the CA’s Resolution29 dated January 10, 2006.
Hence, petitioner interposed the instant petition upon the solitary ground that “THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.”30 Simply, the issue presented before us is whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent’s complaint praying for moral damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent.
The delineation between the jurisdiction of regular courts and labor courts over cases involving workers and their employers has always been a matter of dispute.31 It is up to the Courts to lay the line after careful scrutiny of the factual milieu of each case. Here, we find that jurisdiction rests on the regular courts.
Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs. For if the Labor Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes amending it and whether or not they have retroactive effect is unnecessary.
As early as Singapore Airlines Limited v. Paño, we established that not all disputes between an employer and his employee(s) fall within the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals. We differentiated between abandonment per se and the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment and ruled that the first, is a labor case, while the second, is a civil law case.
Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters [citation omitted], in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law.
In the case at bench, we find that such connection is nil.
It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial.48 Neither can jurisdiction of a court be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss.49 In this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction.
Guided by the aforequoted doctrines, we find no reason to reverse the findings of the CA. The RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent’s complaint praying for moral damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 30, 2005, and its Resolution dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83099 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson) Villarama, Jr.,* Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; Annex "H" to Petition, rollo, pp. 103-112.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, concurring; Annex "K" to Petition, id. at 123-124.
3 Supra note 1, at 104.
5 Annex “E” to Petition, rollo, p. 51.
9 Supra note 5, at 51-55.
22 Annex “H” to Petition, id. at 61-69.
23 Annex “L” to Petition, id. at 78-81.
26 Supra note 5, at 38.
31San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, 377 Phil. 733, 745 (1999).
36San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, supra note 31.
38San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 244 Phil. 741, 748 (1988).
39 202 Phil. 163 (1982).
41 G.R. No. 196539, 683 SCRA 568 (2012).
42Portillo v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc., supra, at 577. (Emphasis ours; italics in the original).
45 Supra note 5, at 51-55.
48 Supra note 37, at 447.
51Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., G.R. No. 180440, 687 SCRA 162, 194.
52 Supra note 5, at 53.
53 Supra note 51, at 193.
54 504 Phil. 437 (2005).
55Yusen Air and Sea Services Phils., Inc. v. Villamor, supra, at 446-447.
56San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, supra note 31, citing Da-Chi Electronics Manufacturing v. Villarama, G.R. No. 112940, November 21, 1994, 238 SCRA 267, 271.
57Portillo v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc., supra note 41, at 584-585.
59San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, supra note 31, at 743.

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