Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2015/06/25/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:05:39+00:00

Document:
Answer #1: They’re all the future of law.
Mindfulness and Meditation must be all the rage when The Wall Street Journal features “Lawyers Go Zen, With Few Objections.” Check this trend out for yourself next week at the Better Lawyering Through Mindfulness Workshop with bankruptcy lawyer Jeena Cho, who’s quoted in the WSJ and is on a national tour promoting her book The Anxious Lawyer: An 8-Week Guide to a Happier, Saner Law Practice Using Meditation.
Hacker Law. Legalhackers.org proclaims, “We are explorers. We are doers. We are Legal Hackers.” Legal hacking, it says, is “a global movement of lawyers, policymakers, technologists, and academics who . . . spot issues and opportunities where technology can improve and inform the practice of law.” Here’s how one legal hacker pursues justice. And, in the interests of equal time, here’s a skeptic’s take on the topic.
The new Master of Science in Legal Studies (MLS) is designed for those who want to improve their legal fluency in areas related to industry regulations, compliance, deal making and more without committing to three or four years of law school. “The goal is to provide legal literacy,” Scott said.
Our technology infrastructure . . . features multi-homed, fully redundant connectivity and power management controls, providing superior physical and electronic security for your data. Our scalable compute power, architected by industry technology experts, is built on high-performance, high-availability systems. Fully redundant servers, enterprise-class storage, and market-leading infrastructure monitoring and management solutions ensure the integrity, security, and responsiveness of your data.
On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, Governor Hickenlooper announced his appointment of current Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Richard L. Gabriel to the Colorado Supreme Court. Judge Gabriel’s appointment is effective September 1, 2015, following the August 31 retirement of Justice Gregory Hobbs.
Judge Gabriel was appointed to the Colorado Court of Appeals in 2008. Prior to his appointment, Judge Gabriel was a long-time partner with Holme Roberts & Owen LLP (now, Bryan Cave LLP) in Denver, where his practice focused on commercial, intellectual property, probate, and products liability litigation, including appeals, and where he headed the firm’s intellectual property practice group. While in practice, Judge Gabriel also served as the City Prosecutor for the City of Lafayette, Colorado, where he tried some 200 cases, and he devoted substantial time to pro bono and community efforts, including work for the Rocky Mountain Children’s Law Center and the ACLU, representation of an Oklahoma death row inmate, and service on many nonprofit boards. He has received numerous awards for his service to the community, including the Denver Bar Association’s Award of Merit, a Rocky Mountain Children’s Law Center Champions for Children award, and the Richard Marden Davis Award, which is presented annually by the Denver Bar Foundation and the law firm of Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP to a lawyer under the age of forty who combines excellence in the practice of law and creative community leadership.
Judge Gabriel is a member of the state bars of New York and Colorado, the bars of numerous federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, and the American, Colorado, New York, and Denver Bar Associations, where he serves on various committees, including the Colorado Bar Association’s Board of Governors and Judicial Liaison Committee, the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations’ Joint Professionalism Coordinating Council, and the Denver Bar Association’s Board of Trustees. Judge Gabriel is also a member of the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professional Development and chair of that organization’s Professionalism Working Group; he remains active on the board of the Colorado Judicial Institute, which he previously chaired; he currently serves on the executive council of the Minoru Yasui Inn of Court; he is a member of the executive committee of and a frequent speaker for the Our Courts program; and he writes and speaks frequently on matters relating to the judiciary, trial and appellate practice, and professionalism.
Judge Gabriel received his B.A. in American Studies from Yale University in 1984 and his J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania School of Law in 1987. In his spare time, Judge Gabriel plays the trumpet professionally with, among other groups, the Colorado Wind Ensemble and the Flagstaff Brass Quintet.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Stoesz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. on Thursday, June 18, 2015.
Underinsured Motorist Benefits—Statute of Limitations—Meaning of “Payment”—Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff Stoesz, an insured of defendant (State Farm), was injured when an underinsured motorist rear-ended her car. Three days before the statutorily required three-year limitations period expired, Stoesz sent an e-mail to the underinsured motorist’s liability insurer, Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive), confirming a policy limits settlement. Shortly after the limitations period had ended, State Farm approved the settlement at Stoesz’s request. Within two years of receiving the settlement payment from Progressive, Stoesz commenced this action to recover underinsured motorist benefits from State Farm. The trial court entered summary judgment against Stoesz on the basis that this settlement agreement did not constitute payment that would have extended the limitations period for an additional two years. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
On appeal, State Farm argued that, pursuant to CRS § 13-80-107.5(1)(b), payment must be made during the three-year limitations period, which was not met here, and a tolling agreement between Progressive and Stoesz did not affect its rights. The Court agreed. Under the clear wording of the statute, an insured is allowed an additional two years only if the underlying bodily injury liability claim against the underinsured motorist has been preserved by commencing an action against the underinsured motorist or by payment of either the liability claim settlement or judgment. No action was commenced and no payment occurred within the limitations period. The summary judgment was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of C.Z. on Thursday, June 18, 2015.
Dependency and Neglect—Termination of Parent–Child Legal Relationship—Americans with Disabilities Act.
The Weld County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a dependency and neglect petition after mother was unwilling to follow through with treatment to address her multiple mental health diagnoses. The Department also asserted father had been diagnosed with severe depression. The court granted the Department custody of the child.
The court then adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and approved a treatment plan for the parents. After receiving the psychological and parent–child interactional evaluations, the Department moved to terminate the parents’ parental rights, asserting that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised to address their unfitness. Following a contested hearing, the court terminated the parent–child legal relationship.
On appeal, mother and father argued that CRS § 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) conflicts with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because it allows the court to terminate parental rights of disabled parents without requiring the Department to provide them the rehabilitative services that other parents receive. The Court first addressed the Department’s assertion that the parents’ contention should be summarily rejected because the ADA is not a defense to termination of parental rights. Title II of the ADA does not limit the court’s authority to terminate a disabled parent’s rights when the parent is unable to meet his or her child’s needs. However, it does apply to the provision of assessments, treatment, and other services that a department provides to parents through a dependency and neglect proceeding before a termination hearing. Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether CRS § 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) is preempted by the ADA.
The type of preemption at issue here was conflict preemption, which voids a state statute that conflicts with a valid federal law. A conflict is found when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and full execution of the purposes and objectives of federal law.
CRS § 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) permits termination of parental rights of mentally impaired parents without requiring the Department to provide them treatment plans. However, the Court held this does not conflict with the ADA’s requirement that a public entity make reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities. If rehabilitative services can be offered to address a parent’s mental impairment so that he or she can meet the child’s needs within a reasonable time, then termination is not authorized under CRS § 19-3-604(1)(b)(I). A finding that no treatment plan can be devised to address a parent’s unfitness caused by mental impairment is the equivalent of a determination that no reasonable accommodations can be made to account for the parent’s disability under the ADA.
In determining whether reasonable accommodations can be made to address the parent’s disability under the ADA, the court’s paramount concern is the child’s health and safety. The ADA does not protect an individual who poses a safety risk to others. The Court concluded that the trial court’s findings here satisfy the ADA requirement that no reasonable accommodations could be made to enable mother and father to participate in an appropriate treatment plan and rehabilitative services.
Father also argued the termination of his parental rights solely on the basis of his mental disability violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court disagreed. Parents who are unable to meet their children’s needs within a reasonable time, whether because of mental impairment or another statutorily enumerated reason, are not similarly situated to parents who have the ability to become fit within a reasonable time. The judgment was affirmed.
On Wednesday, June 24, 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and five unpublished opinions.

References: v. 
 § 13
 § 19
 § 19
 § 19
 § 19