Source: http://www.gerryarmstrong.org/50k/legal/a4/2595.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:58:30+00:00

Document:
While the religious beliefs of Gerald Armstrong may seem ludicrous and incredible to some, his right to maintain those beliefs is the subject of one of the Constitution's most dear protections, freedom of religion. At first blush it is difficult to overcome the inferences which arise from the fact that Armstrong received $800,000 from Scientology to keep his mouth shut, but that is not what Scientology paid him to do. It paid him to dismiss his cross-complaint and mutually agreed to maintain confidentiality as to him in consideration for his reciprocal promise. When Scientology breached this promise, Armstrong was free to speak about it.
Armstrong asks the Court to not continue to be misled by Scientology's long list of Armstrong's actions which it claims to violate the agreement. Indeed, such would have violated the agreement had Scientology not induced Armstrong to enter it based on the fraudulent representations that it wanted a chance to forsake its practice of fair game, both as to the world in general and Armstrong in particular. Of course, continuing to engage in such conduct invalidates the agreement Scientology would have this Court enforce. After all, why would the man - whose defense caused a Los Angeles County Superior Court judge to find that L. Ron Hubbard was a "pathological liar" and the Scientology Organization to be "schizophrenic" and both to systematically violate the civil rights of members - agree that Scientology could slander him for life - Would such a man sell his reputation for $800,000 - No, he would not sell his reputation for any amount of dollars.
Armstrong also asks the court to listen to and consider his facts regarding Scientology's conduct leading up to and after the agreement's execution. If the Court does so, and provides a fair hearing to Mr. Armstrong, it will have no choice but to deny summary judgment.
"One of the key ingredients to completing these settlements, insisted upon by all parties involved, was strict confidentiality respecting: (1) the Scientology parishioner or staff member's experiences with the Church of Scientology; (2) any knowledge possessed by the Scientology entities concerning those staff members or parishioners."
Although the agreement states that Armstrong waived his right to oppose Scientology's appeal of Judge Breckenridge's 1984 decision, the Court of Appeal nonetheless allowed Armstrong to so do. (Id. at ¶ 113-115) In addition, a trial judge has condemned the agreement as one-sided and fundamentally unfair.
An essential element of a contract is consent. (Civil Code § 1550 (2). ) An apparent consent is not real or free when it has been obtained through duress or menace. ( Civil Code § 1567 (1)(2).) Sections 1569 (1) and (3) of the Civil Code defines duress as the (1) "[u]nlawful confinement of the person of the party, . . ." or (2) "[c]onfinement of such person, lawful in form, but fraudulently obtained, or fraudulently made unjustly harassing or oppressive." The cases, however, have established much broader definitions, and consequently, the language of the decisions can rarely be reconciled with the statutory language. For example, in Harlan v: Cladding, McBean & Co. (1907) 7 Cal.App. 49, duress means a condition of mind produced by improper external pressure or influence that practically destroys the free will of a person and causes him to do an act or enter into a contract not of his own volition. In Sistrom v. Anderson (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 213, duress is effectuated by an unlawful threat which overcomes the will of the person threatened and induces him to do an act that he is not bound to do and would not otherwise have done. Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 494, states that the test of duress, at its harshest, is what would have influenced the conduct of a reasonable man. Indeed, the modern tendency is to find duress wherever one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will. See Keithley v. Civil Service Board (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 443; Balling v. Finch (1962) 203 Ca1.App.2d 413; Gross v. Needham (1960) 184 Ca1.App.2d 446; Lewis v. Fahn (1952) 113 Ca1.App.2d 95; Sistrom, 51 Ca1.App.2d at 213. Under this standard, duress is to be tested, not by the nature of the threat, but by the state of mind induced in the victim. Balling, 203 Ca1.App.2d at 413; Lewis, 113 Ca1.App.2d at 95.
Flynn told Armstrong that if he didn't sign the agreement, Armstrong would continue to be targeted for further fair game activities. (Id. at ¶ 1, C) Flynn also told Armstrong that the other fifteen people involved in the "global settlement," of which the Armstrong agreement was a part, would continue to be attacked by Scientology. (Id. at ¶ 1, D).
Given Scientology's unrelenting attacks on Armstrong, his lawyer and all the "enemies" whom Mr. Flynn represented, it is clear that Armstrong's consent to the agreement was obtained by duress and menace, and therefore not free.
The act constituting actual fraud may be concealment or "any other act fitted to deceive." Specifically, "[t]he suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge or belief of the fact" is actual fraud. (Civil Code § 1572 (3); Williamson & Vollmer Engineering v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 261, 273; 1 Witkin, Summary of California Law, § 398.) The Restatement points out that concealment is an affirmative act, equivalent to a misrepresentation (comment a), and that it usually consists either in actively hiding something from the other party, or preventing him making an investigation that would have disclosed the true facts (Comment b).
The purpose of the catch-all statement, "any other act" is suggested in Wells v. Zenz (1927) 83 Cal.App. 137.
"Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another. No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, and it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and unfair way by which another is deceived. The statutes of California expressly provide that . . . any other act fitted to deceive is actual fraud."
C. Even If The Contract Was Not Obtained By Duress, Menace, And Fraud, Scientology Cannot Enforce The "Confidentiality" Provisions Because It Breached The Express And Implied Covenant That It Would Say Nothing About Armstrong After The Settlement.
1 Armstrong asks the Court to realize that this argument was never presented to Judge Sohigian when the parties litigated the preliminary injunction in May 1992.
Paragraph 7-I of the agreement states that the slate between Scientology and Armstrong is wiped clean and that neither party shall use in the future any information obtained regarding the other that was the subject of the settled litigation. (Sep.St. 99) The parties' intent in this regard was clearly articulated by Scientology attorney Lawrence Heller almost three years later.
[T]he contract must be construed as a whole and the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the consideration of the entire contract, not some isolated portion [citations]; a contract entered into for the mutual benefit of the parties is to be interpreted so as to give effect to the main purpose of the contract and not to defeat the mutual objectives of the parties [citations]; language which is inconsistent with the objective of the contract shall be rejected [citations]. Also, where a contract is susceptible of two interpretations, the courts shall give it such a construction as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable and capable of being carried into effect if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties [citations]. And last, but not least, the court shall avoid an interpretation which will make a contract extraordinary, harsh, unjust, inequitable or which would result in absurdity [citations].
itself for this purpose in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting.
both Armstrong and Scientology. Indeed, a review of the agreement makes it clear that both parties desired to terminate their disputatious interactions with one another and leave one another alone. There is nothing in the agreement that states that Scientology could make whatever public statements it wanted to about Armstrong, but that he would have to remain silent no matter what aspersions were cast his way. To impose such a condition would make no sense because it would allow Scientology to slander Armstrong and literally re-write history in order to suit its own ends without any regard to truth or accuracy. Armstrong's history in the litigation before Judge Breckenridge illustrates a profound rejection of any such result. 3 Thus, under the circumstances there is a legal necessity for the Court to imply that the settlement terms were reciprocal because it would be grossly unfair to Armstrong since it was never his intent to have his own personal history revised according to the predilections of Scientology, and ultimately be jailed after a Court issued injunctive relief based on the agreement that he could never respond thereto.
The agreement expressly states that Armstrong was not to discuss his knowledge or experience with respect to Scientology. Although the agreement is silent whether Scientology was similarly prohibited from discussing its knowledge of Armstrong, Mr. Heller was not. Therefore, to imply that the parties' intention was for Scientology to be subject to the same confidentiality as was Armstrong does not contravene any express term of the agreement and conforms with Mr. Heller's initial representations to the judiciary regarding the intent of the agreement. To imply reciprocity would not violate the intent of the parties. Indeed, not to imply such a term would violate the expectations of Armstrong and deny him the fruits of his bargain. "If without the implied obligation the fruits of the contract would be denied to one of the parties, the intent that such an obligation should not exist must clearly appear from the express terms of the contract." (Bergum v. Weber (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 389, 288 P.2d 623, 626.) Moreover, the "clean slate" provision supports the conclusion that the confidentiality provisions were reciprocal, and rebuts the conclusion that the parties intended that Scientology could say whatever it wanted about Armstrong, and that it could sue him if he tried to respond.
California v. Armstrong, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. C 420153.
With respect to the agreement at bar, Scientology acted in bad faith by unfairly depriving Armstrong of the benefit of the bargain of the settlement agreement. Rather than leave its history with Armstrong to rest silently in the past insulated by mutual promises of confidentiality, Scientology resurrected its old conflict with Armstrong when to do so suited whatever was its particular litigation or public relations strategy of the moment. Such conduct violates the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and excuses counter-performance by Armstrong.
Scientology repeatedly breached its covenant to remain silent about Armstrong. (Sep.St. 105 (D-H) Scientology cannot have it both ways.
It is rote that "equity will not lend its aid to enforce contracts which upon their face are so manifestly harsh and oppressive as to shock the conscience; it must be affirmatively shown that such contracts are fair and just." (Jacklich v. Baer (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 684, 135 P.2d 179, 183.) The rationale for this rule is grounded in a common sense recognition of the rules of fair play, not fair game.
It is said . . . that the doctrine that he who seeks equity must do equity means that the party asking the aid of the court must stand in a conscientious relation to his adversary; that the transaction from which his claim arises must be fair and just and that the relief itself must not be harsh and oppressive upon the defendant. And that specific performance will always be refused when a contract itself is unfair, one-sided, unconscionable, or affected by any other such inequitable feature, and when specific performance would be oppressive upon the defendant, or would prevent the enjoyment of his own rights, or would in any other manner work injustice.
4. If his assent was given under the influence of mistake, misapprehension, or surprise, except that where the contract provides for compensation in the case of mistake, a mistake within the scope of such provision may be compensated for, and the contract specifically enforced in other respects, if proper to be so enforced."
The primary issue with respect to fairness is whether it is fair for the Court to support Scientology's position that it purchased Armstrong's First Amendment Right to Free Speech with respect to activities (concerning which Scientology would otherwise assert falls within its First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion because it involves the time Armstrong was a practicing Scientologist) which for Armstrong constitutes an unquestionably religious experience twelve years in duration, for $800,000. That is an undeniably large sum of money. Scientology, however, did not purchase Armstrong's silence without also giving up its right to talk about him. When determining what Scientology's money bought, the court must consider the overall context of the litigation and the relations of the parties in December 1986. In June 1984, Judge Breckenridge had severely condemned Scientology when holding for defendant Armstrong in the original litigation. 5 Armstrong's cross-complaint seeking compensation for Scientology's fair game actions against him involved serious charges of heinous misconduct was set for trial in early 1987. In July 1986 a Los Angeles County Superior Court jury had awarded Lawrence Wollersheim $5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000,000 in punitive damages against Scientology. Mr. Heller confirmed that the intention of the parties in the settlment was not only that Armstrong not to talk about Scientology, but also that Scientology would not talk about him. In light of these facts, the issue no longer is as clear cut as Scientology presents: it bought Armstrong's First Amendment Free Speech Rights for $800,000. Indeed, it appears that Scientology bought a dismissal of a potentially explosive cross-complaint and agreed to bury the hatchet.
the face of such attacks. Since Scientology has not done equity under the terms of the agreement as interpreted by its lead settlement counsel, he cannot ask this Court to enjoin Armstrong from speaking about it.
In addition to the arguments which relate to the unenforceability of the agreement, it is also void against public policy. What Scientology is seeking to do is to remove Armstrong, and all others like him, from playing any role in the truth seeking process, whether such process be in competition found in the public marketplace of ideas, or in the truth-seeking forum provided by the judiciary. Thus, by eliminating those who are knowledgeable of its history and practices, Scientology seeks, quite literally, to shape public opinion and skew judicial decision-making by writing its own script. Thus, with no regard for the truth, Scientology may rest secure in the knowledge that it has purchased the silence of witnesses adverse to it and the Courts will enforce it.
Since an agreement to suppress evidence or to conceal a witness is illegal, (Witkin, § 611 at 550.
Thus, where a contract is made either (1) to achieve an illegal purpose, or (2) by means of consideration that is not legal, the contract itself is void. Witkin, Summary of California Law (9th Ed. 1987) Vol. 1, Contracts, § 441 at 396.
Based on Judge Breckenridge's decision alone, it is clear what Scientology seeks to suppress. The judiciary should not be used for such a purpose.
Judge Breckenridge found Armstrong to possess a "dedication to the truth" (Ex. 1 (A)(A) at 5:9), and to be "credible [and] extremely persuasive." (Id. at 7:9-12) He found that "the Church or its minions is fully capable of intimidation or other physical or psychological abuse if it suits their ends." (Id . at 8:3-5) Armstrong communicates with God and God has guided Armstrong to continue his devotion to the truth at whatever cost. Armstrong believes that his entire relationship with Scientology over the past 25 years to have been divinely inspired, and that God has called upon Armstrong to speak out and tell the truth about Scientology in order to protect people from fair game. (Sep.St. 139-174) Scientology, a religion, is asking the Court to use its power to censor Armstrong's speech regarding his experiences while he was a member of the Scientology religion, concerning which Armstrong says he was misled into believing and concerning which error he says God enlightened him. 6 Since fair game is a sectarian scripture of the Scientology religion which includes deception and character assassination as preferred methods of conduct, for the Court to enforce the agreement and silence Armstrong is to prefer Scientology's malevolent sectarianism over Armstrong's right to religiously based speech. It must be remembered that Armstrong has done nothing more than speak. To enforce the agreement not only would violate Armstrong's First Amendment right to Free Speech and Free Exercise, it would also violate the anti-establishment clause.
religions, the words of the Constitution's text also shields conduct undertaken for reasons of faith. "[T]he right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions." (McDaniel v. Paty (1978) 435 U.S. 618, 626 (Burger, C.J.) (plurality opinion), See also Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U. S. 205, 220 ["there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability"]).
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor a federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
(330 U.S. at 15-16) Thus, the First Amendment's anti-establishment clause" (Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 884) guarantees citizens that the government will not use its resources to impose religion on us. (Ibid.) Since "dead agenting" Armstrong by means of "black propaganda" is an application of fair game as is the use of the law to destroy critics, what is at issue here is Scientology's sectarian doctrine and practice to neutralize " suppressive person" defendant Armstrong. Since this strategy is being exercised by means of judicial force, the Court is preferring the Scientolological approach to Truth over the approach employed by Armstrong. Such is not only unconstitutional, it is wrong.
United States Mail at San Anselmo, California.
that the above is true and correct.

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