Source: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/209/posadas-de-puerto-rico-associates-v-tourism-company-of-puerto-rico
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:35:17+00:00

Document:
The commercial speech decision by the Supreme Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), is known primarily for the analysis used by Justice William H. Rehnquist in his majority opinion, a position that the Court has repudiated in later decisions when it granted more protection to commercial speech.
In 1948 the Puerto Rico legislature legalized certain forms of casino gambling but prohibited advertisement of gambling to the public of Puerto Rico. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates opened a casino in 1975 and was fined several times for violating the advertising restrictions. When the regulatory agency Tourism Company of Puerto Rico threatened Posadas with nonrenewal of its gambling license, Posadas sued, claiming violation of its commercial speech rights under the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court ultimately decided the case by applying the four-part test for determining the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations developed in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980). Posadas lost 5-4. Three examples of Justice Rehnquist’s now-discredited analysis in Posadas are worth noting.
Second, Posadas argued that the Puerto Rico legislature should have advanced a counter-speech campaign discouraging gambling. Justice Rehnquist rejected this less speech-restrictive means for achieving the government’s goal, asserting that “it is up to the legislature to decide” which approach is more effective. Ten years later, four justices of the Court explicitly concluded in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996) that “Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy.” In two other decisions — Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. (1995) and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States (1999) — the Court explicitly rejected legislative regulatory systems on the grounds that they were inconsistent and irrational — hardly a ringing endorsement of legislative autonomy.
Gollin, Andrew S. “Improving the Odds of the Central Hudson Balancing Test: Restricting Commercial Speech as a Last Resort.” Marquette Law Review 81 (Spring 1998): 873–918.
Kurland, Philip. “Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: ‘Twas Strange, ‘Twas Passing Strange; ‘Twas Pitiful, ‘Twas Wondrous Pitiful.” Supreme Court Review (1986): 1–17.
Mauro, Albert P. Jr. “Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep’s Clothing.” Tulane Law Review 66 (June 1992): 1931–1969.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.