Source: https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/walker-v-city-calhoun-court-appeals-decision-0
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 01:16:22+00:00

Document:
Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES, and O’SCANNLAIN,* Circuit Judges.
The statute does not provide for any possible jail sentence.
and he was confined to a single-person cell except for one hour each day.
20, 2015, by entry of a bond forfeiture.
depending on the type of offense charged and the financial means of the arrestee.
subsequently to appear in court.
Rule of Civil Procedure 65 because it was insufficiently specific. See Walker v.
forty-eight hours for a hearing.” Walker v. City of Calhoun, Ga. (Walker III), No.
money bail.” Id. at *4.
sworn before an authorized official.
making secured bail . . . or subject to release on an unsecured bond.” Id.
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
raises to the district court’s ability to enjoin the City at all.
jurisdiction altogether under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions.’” Hughes v.
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989)).
Abstention, however, has become disfavored in recent Supreme Court decisions.
and decide a case is virtually unflagging,” and “only exceptional circumstances . . .
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
the criminal prosecution.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108 n.9. So too here.
would entail intrusive federal court interference with State prosecutions generally.
they seek are in place.”).
cannot be liable for any constitutional violations related to bail under 42 U.S.C.
Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016).
Here, Georgia law indicates that the City has the authority to set bail policy.
inhabitants.” Charter of Calhoun, Georgia § 1-102(a).
the citation, shall release such person from custody.” Calhoun Mun. Code § 90-39.
statutes], and as provided by applicable municipal charter or ordinance.” Ga.
Unif. Mun. Ct. R. 18.1 (emphasis added).
1(f)(1), implicitly strips municipalities of concurrent authority to set bail policy.
2 See, e.g., Albany Mun. Code § 22-164; Doraville Mun. Code § 11-1; Kennesaw Mun.
Code § 38-46; Nashville Mun. Code § 17-1; Smyrna Mun. Code § 34-49(a); Stockbridge Mun.
persons charged with a misdemeanor.” Ga. Code Ann. § 17-6-2(b); see also Ga. Code Ann.
Thomaston Mun. Charter § 25; Warner Robins Mun. Code § 15-8.
Cir. 1995), so his Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. No. 72) is GRANTED.
of success on the merits.
scrutiny to the City’s bail policy. We consider each challenge in turn.
excessive bail” was incorporated by Schilb).
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952)).
presumption of innocence and with their constitutional guarantees intact.” Id.
Amendment. See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018).
Walker alleges invidiously discriminates against the indigent.
imprisonment; the indigent cannot escape imprisonment”).
simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine.
protection and due process principles.
because there is no suspect classification involved or fundamental right at stake.
this case. See Walker III, 2017 WL 2794064, at *3 n.2.
and those who could not, it was subject to heightened scrutiny. See id. at *3 & n.2.
differential treatment by wealth is analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause.
The definitive explanation comes from San Antonio Independent School District v.
system of apportioning school funds based principally on local tax bases. 411 U.S.
precisely equal advantages.” Id. at 24.
released in a lawful manner.” In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 81 (Fla.
indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly.” In M.L.B.
in a total deprivation of a benefit because of poverty.
under the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
incarcerated before trial “if he presents a risk of flight or a danger to witnesses,” id.
scrutiny and that it should be applied to his case.
procedural due process analysis than it was any form of heightened scrutiny.
. . . adequate to authorize the pretrial detention?” Id. at 263–64 (citations omitted).
That analysis is a far cry from strict—or even intermediate—scrutiny.
its contrary conclusion on that issue is the foundation for the rest of its analysis.
the excessiveness of bail conditions and so should be evaluated under the Eighth Amendment.
pretrial liberty. See, e.g., William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 Alb. L.
states, bail bonds were set without reference to the financial circumstances of the accused.
in Rodriguez and its successors.
“The person who has money pays it and matriculates at the state university.
specialized art classes—then, in the dissent’s world, they would have prevailed.
inconsistent with the thrust of Rodriguez and its successors.
heightened scrutiny to wealth-based equal protection arguments. Dissent at 66.
cannot adopt it on the unprincipled ad hoc basis urged by the dissent.
claim into the Equal Protection Clause.
scrutiny from traditional equal protection analysis.
of the vital interests of the state with those of the individual.”).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
protection and due process guarantees.
preliminary injunction and the Standing Bail Order.
required by the preliminary injunction.
matter, comply with the promptness requirement.” Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
suggested by Justice Scalia in dissent. See id. at 57–58.
ensure that it satisfies the due process mode of analysis in Bearden and Rainwater.
was therefore “too strict.” Id.
12 The dissent accuses us of opening a split with the Fifth Circuit’s ODonnell decision.
frequent bail hearings than can the City’s one-judge municipal court.
“any opportunity to submit evidence of relative ability to post bond at the scheduled amount,” id.
demand more and so is inconsistent with ODonnell.
comply with the 48-hour rule “will be immune from systemic challenges.” Id. (emphasis added).
particular case is unreasonable, . . . courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility.” Id.
Bail Order’s system based on judicial bail hearings before the Municipal Court.
(1977)); id. at 1058 & n.8.
government’s interest in assuring his subsequent appearance.
jurisprudence envisions that bail determinations will be made at judicial hearings.
unjustified contrary conclusion was legal error and hence an abuse of discretion.
succeed on the merits of his claim that the Standing Bail order is unconstitutional.
bail hearing in lieu of an affidavit-based process runs afoul of the Constitution.
district court erred in granting it.
additional conditions nowhere required by the Constitution.
now moot, and no relief may follow from it.
policy and acted promptly to rectify it.
falls heavily on the party asserting it.” Id. at 1256.
the government “will reverse course and reenact the allegedly offensive” policy.
and the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it.” Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc.
course and reenact the allegedly offensive” bail policy after this litigation ends. Id.
that” the Bar had “changed course simply to deprive the court of jurisdiction.” Id.
Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cty., 382 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir.
was executed by the Chief Judge of the Municipal Court.
original bail policy is unambiguous. Harrell, 608 F.3d at 1266–67.
may enjoin the City’s future use of that policy.
able to meet a bail schedule.
would be absurd to so hold.
regardless of the City’s motivation for the Standing Bail Order.
was unconstitutional, the district court may enjoin a return to that original policy.
constitutional Standing Bail Order, so the preliminary injunction cannot stand.
in Part (Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED.
amount of time to receive the same benefit as the more affluent.” Maj. Op. at 27.
recognize this infringement on the rights of indigents, so I dissent.
appeal in part. See id. at 15 n.4, 53 n.15.
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
impermissible discrimination that rests on ability to pay”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine”); Bearden v.
burdensome nature of pretrial confinement.” 572 F.2d at 1056.
the Bearden-like cases that raise both due process and equal protection concerns.
Protection Clause to the City’s bail policy. See id. at 28.
The Majority relies on San Antonio Independent School District v.
composed only of persons who were totally unable to pay.” Id. at 20, 22, 93 S. Ct.
deprivation” of a benefit. See id. 20, 93 S. Ct. at 1290.
uses indigency as a classification, and offer this simple example in support.
accord ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 162–63 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2018).
intervening to make pricier express mail options available to all postal patrons.
expressly established limiting principles for equal protection claims by indigents.
cases. Id. at 123–25, 117 S. Ct. at 568.
refers to this person’s time in jail as just a “diminishment of a benefit.” Maj. Op.
hearing within 48 hours survives all systemic due process challenges. Maj. Op. at 37–39.
by the Court in Rainwater.
and indirect costs of incarceration.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S.
detention targeting indigents is one without a difference.”).
policies as they existed before the injunction was issued. See Maj. Op. at 27 n.10.
based on cases of the former Fifth Circuit that are binding precedent in this circuit”).
mere inconvenience. There are very real consequences for detained indigents.
process framework approved of in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct.
665, 103 S. Ct. at 2068–69.
safeguards it promises in the Standing Bail Order and detains indigents longer than 48 hours, Mr.
Walker will be able to revive his equal protection challenge under a heightened scrutiny review.
cases criminal or quasi criminal in nature.” M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123–24, 117 S. Ct.
pretrial detention based solely on indigency is subject to heightened scrutiny.
the legitimacy of fencing out [individuals] based solely on their inability to pay core costs.” Id.
U.S. at 120, 117 S. Ct. at 566.
are up to the task.
In sum, I read Rodriguez (and Bearden for that matter) to require that Mr.
process theory, arguing there is a fundamental right to pretrial liberty. See United States v.
protection analysis, I do not address the substantive due process theory.
legitimate state objectives.” See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144, 92 S. Ct.
the kind of tailoring required between the competing interests. Thus, I use its standard.
personal recognizance bond? Wouldn’t 47 work just as well? Forty, perhaps?
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to [pretrial] detention.” 420 U.S.
general matter, comply with the promptness requirement.” Id. at 55–56, 111 S. Ct.
“delay [is] for delay’s sake.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S. Ct. at 1670.
releases all arrestees after booking, except for female, black, or Catholic arrestees.
Those arrestees are detained for 48 hours, given a hearing, and then released.
sufficiently tailored to accomplish the City’s legitimate or compelling objective.
So the same goes for wealth-based classifications in the criminal justice system.
treat poor people differently from all others by keeping them in jail for 48 hours.
abandoned. See Mesa Air Grp., Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 573 F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (11th Cir.
that it did not need to justify its policy.
and make the showing necessary to survive heightened scrutiny.
ODonnell is remarkably similar to what the District Court ordered in this case.
those who are not so released, “a hearing within 48 hours of arrest.” Id. at 164–65.
hearing is necessary; and the hearing must be held within 48 hours.
preliminary injunction. See Palmer, 287 F.3d at 1329.
different result when this case is considered on the merits.

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