Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/198/299.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 19:31:32+00:00

Document:
'First. The steamer Hampton Roads, between Fort Monroe and Hampton and Norfolk.
'Second. The steamer Mobjack, between points in Mathews and Gloucester counties and Norfolk.
'Third. The steamers Luray and Accomac, between Smithfield and Norfolk.
'Fourth. The steamer Virginia Dare, between Suffolk and Norfolk.
'Fifth. The steamers Berkeley and Brandon, between Richmond and Norfolk; and [198 U.S. 299, 301] 'The steamers Berkeley and Brandon ply between Richmond and Norfolk. These two steamers were completed in the year 1901, or early in 1902, one of them having been constructed at the William R. Trigg shipyard in the city of Richmond, and the other outside of the state of Virginia. Early in the year 1902 they were placed upon the line between Norfolk and Richmond, one steamer leaving Richmond each evening and arriving in Norfolk each morning, thus giving a night trip every night each way between Richmond and Norfolk. At the time these steamers were placed upon this route, and since that time, the Old Dominion Steamship Company has, by public advertisement, called attention to the fact that these two steamers were especially fitted in the matter of stateroom accommodations for carrying passengers between Richmond and Norfolk, and the said two steamers have since that time been advertising for the carriage of passengers and freight on their route between Richmond and Norfolk, and have been regularly carrying freight and passengers between the said two points in Virginia as well as taking on freight and passengers for further transportation on their ocean steamers at Norfolk. The Old Dominion Steamship Company applied, under the revenue laws of the state of Virginia, for a license to sell liquor at retail on each of these steamers, and on July 1st, 1902, there was granted, through the commissioner of the revenue of the city of Richmond, a license to the Old Dominion Steamship Company for the sale of liquor at retail on each of these steamers, said licenses to expire on April 30th, 1903. On or about the same time the said steamship company complied with the revenue laws of the United States, and paid the necessary revenue tax through the custom house at the city of Richmond for the purpose of selling liquor at retail on each of these steamers. In the spring of 1903 the said steamship company, in order to obtain licenses to sell liquor at retail on each of these steamers, applied for the same in the city of Richmond, and complied with the requirements of 143 of the new revenue law, approved April 16th, 1903, and so ob- [198 U.S. 299, 302] tained licenses for the year 1903-1904 to sell liquor at retail on each of these steamers on their route between the cities of Richmond and Norfolk, and likewise, on or about the same time, complied with the revenue laws of the United States in the matter of selling liquor at retail on each of the said steamers on said route.
'Sixth. The steam tug Germania, which was used in the harbor of Norfolk and Hampton Roads for the purpose of docking the large ocean-going steamers of the Old Dominion Steamship Company, and the transferring from different points in those waters freight from connecting lines destined to points outside of Virginia.
To review this order the Old Dominion Steamship Company sued out this writ of error.
Mr. William H. White for plaintiff error.
[198 U.S. 299, 303] Mr. William A. Anderson for defendant in error.
The same doctrine is laid down in the same case by Mr. Chief Justice Taney (p. 479, L. ed. p. 784). See also Wheeling, P. & C. Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273 , 25 L. ed 412. That the service in which these vessels were engaged formed one link in a line of continuous interstate commerce may affect the state's power of regulation, but not its power of taxation. True, they were not engaged in an independent service, as the cabs in New York ex rel. Pennsylvania R. co. v. Knight, 192 U.S. 21 , 48 L. ed. 325, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, but, being wholly within the state, that was their actual situs. And, as appears from the authorities referred to, the fact that they were engaged in interstate commerce does not impair the state's authority to impose taxes upon them as property. Indeed, it is not contended that these vessels, although engaged in interstate commerce, are not subject to state taxation, the contention being that they are taxable only at the port at which they are enrolled. In support of this contention the two principal cases relied upon are Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. 17 How. 596, 15 L. ed. 254, and Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471, 21 L. ed. 303.
This object does not require, and there is no suggestion in the statutes, that vessels registered or enrolled are exempt from the ordinary rules respecting taxation of personal property. It is true by 4141 there is created what may be called the home port of the vessel, an artificial situs, which may control the place of taxation in the absence of an actual situs elsewhere, and to that extent only do the two cases referred to go.
Clearly the ruling was that these steamers had acquired no actual situs within the state of California; that occasionally touching at ports in the state did not make them incorporated with the other personal property of the state. Hence, having no situs in California, they were not subject to taxation there, but were subject to state taxation at the artificial situs established by their registry.
'The fact that the vessel was physically within the limits of the city of Mobile, at the time the tax was levied, does not decide the question. Thus, if a traveler on that day had been passing through that city in his private carriage, or an emigrant with his worldly goods on a wagon, it is not contended that the property of either of these persons would be subject to taxation, as property within the city. It is conceded by the respective counsel that it would not have been.
In other words, here, as in the prior case, there was no actual situs of the vessel. She had not become commingled with the general property of the state, and was therefore subject to taxation at the artificial situs,- the port of her registry.
Of course, if the enrolment does not exempt vessels from taxation as other personal property, the place of enrolment, whether within or without the state in which the property is actually situated, is immaterial, for other like property is taxable at its actual situs.
So far as the state authorities are concerned, reference may be made to Lott v. Mobile Trade Co. 43 Ala. 578; National Dredging Co. v. State, 99 Ala. 462, 12 So. 720; Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Chehalis County, 25 Wash. 95, 54 L. R. A. 212, 87 Am. St. Rep. 747, 64 Pac. 909.
Our conclusion is that where vessels though engaged in interstate commerce, are employed in such commerce wholly within the limits of a state, they are subject to taxation in that state, although they may have been registered or enrolled at [198 U.S. 299, 310] a port outside its limits. The conclusion, therefore, reached by the Court of Appeals of Virginia was right, and its judgment is affirmed.

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