Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40396:g-r-no-119064-august-22,-2000-neng-quot-kagui-kadiguia-quot-malang-v-corocoy-moson,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:39:50+00:00

Document:
NENG "KAGUI KADIGUIA" MALANG, Petitioner, v. HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Shari’a District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and MABAY GANAP MALANG, Respondents.
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aida’s dowry (mahr or majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for the second time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji Abdula’s second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, TaIayan, Maguindanao and soon they had a daughter named; Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of buying and selling of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and selling of agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Shari’a District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
4)	That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their Project of Partition for approval, not later than three (3) months from receipt of this order.
ARTICLE 145.	Finality of Decisions. — The decisions of the Shari’a District Courts whether on appeal from the Shari’a Circuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.
As petitioner sees it, "the law applicable on issues of marriage and property regime is the New Civil Code", under which all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Shari’a Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law, and held the applicable property regime to be complete separation of property under P.D. 1083.
Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few of the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce are established by the record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not register acts, events or judicial decrees affecting civil status. 29 It also explains why the evidence in the instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the three which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives — namely, Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai — all divorces of which took place before the enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws were in force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394 ("R.A. 394"), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.
Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92.
Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between Muslims thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said Code.
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages. 32 It is also not to be disputed that the only law in force governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950.
ARTICLE 186.	Effect of code on past acts. — (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their. execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. "Bigamous or polygamous marriages" are considered void and inexistent from the time of their performance. 37 The Family Code which superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void. 38 These provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced.
In People v. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it was not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it appears that the consent of the bride’s father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim marriages and as Mora Dumpo’s father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy.
This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from and after August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife, and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired.
ARTICLE 119.	The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
ARTICLE 135.	All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal.
ARTICLE 136.	The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
ARTICLE 142.	By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
ARTICLE 143.	All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.
ARTICLE 147.	When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of any property shall .be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
ARTICLE 148.	In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties "live together as husband and wife" the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they "live exclusively with each other as husband and wife." Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their "actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry" and only to the extent of their proportionate interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo v. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related cases are embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the share of the party validly married to another shall accrue to the property regime of such existing marriage.
Meanwhile; the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.
ARTICLE 255.	Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
(3).	By the serious illness of the husband.
ARTICLE 256.	The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
ARTICLE 58.	Legitimacy, how established. — Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child.
(1).	Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation.
(2).	Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of the child.
ARTICLE 60.	Children of subsequent marriage. — Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of her ‘idda, the child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.
(d).	The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother.
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedent’s son, she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the estate. 44 The respective shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.
1.	Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of the marriages were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
2.	There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law.
b.	Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively.
c.	Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code during the period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
d.	Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties.
4.	Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdula’s legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force at the time of Hadji Abdula’s death, will govern the determination of their respective shares.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
2.	Exhs. C-1, D-1 & E-1.
8.	These banks were allegedly: (1) United Coconut Planters Bank; (2) Solidbank; (3) Far East Bank and Trust Company; (4) Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank; (5) Bank of the Philippine Islands; (6) Metrobank; (7) Philippine National Bank; (8) Land Bank of the Philippines, and (9) Development Bank of the Philippines.
9.	Record, pp. 50 & 59.
10.	Ibid., p. 52 & 61.
11.	Ibid., p. 220 (Exh. CC).
12.	Ibid., p. 219 (Exh. BB).
13.	Ibid., p. 221 (Exh. DD).
21.	Order of September 26, 1994, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 25-56.
25.	Petition, pp. 5 & 10.
26.	Retired Justice of the Court of Appeals and former Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law professor, and law practitioner. He was also a member of the Family Code Revision Committee.
27.	Former Congressman, law practitioner, and member of the Presidential Code Commission which reviewed P.D. 1083.
28.	Justice Puno’s Compliance by Amicus Curiae was submitted on June 27, 2000 while Congressman Mastura’s Memorandum was submitted on March 29, 2000.
29.	The registration of marriages, divorces, revocations of divorce and conversions into Islam is now required under Title VI (Civil Registry) of P.D. 1083.
30.	TSN, Oral Argument of July 27, 2000, p. 26.
31.	As amended by Republic Act No. 6268, which was approved on June 19, 1971 and was made to take effect as of June 18, 1969.
34.	Includes all laws on personal status, marriage and divorce, matrimonial and family relations, succession and inheritance, and property relations between spouses. Muslim Code, Art. 7, par. (i).
35.	Commissioner v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc., 164 SCRA 27; Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 6 SCRA 886; Ichiong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
36.	Segovia v. Noel, 47 Phil. 220.
37.	Civil Code, Art. 80, par. 4.
38.	Family Code, Arts. 52, 53.
39.	The Marriage Law, approved on December 4, 1929, preceded the Civil Code of 1950 and was the governing law when People v. Subano was promulgated.
41.	Adriano v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 124118, March 27, 2000; Belcodero v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 303; Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306; Camporodendo v. Aznar, 102 Phil. 1055, Osmeña v. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. 5526; Malajacan v. Rubi, 42 O.G. 5576.
43.	Civil Code, Art. 160; Adriano v. Court of Appeals, supra; Belcodero v. Court of Appeals, supra.
44.	Art. 112, Muslim Code.
45.	The 20-year period expired on June 13, 1969, considering that there were five leap years (1952, 1956, 1960, 1964 and 1968) since the approval of R.A. 394 in 1949.
47.	Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, p. 9.
48.	Ibid., pp. 9, 27, 35-37, 42. Congressman Mastura particularly suggests that the Court take judicial notice of the principle of sa-pancharian on property acquired through the joint efforts of the husband and wife, Judicially recognized by the Muslim courts of Malaysia and Singapore and also allegedly practiced as custom by Muslims in Mindanao.
49.	Ibid., pp. 12, 18; TSN, Oral Argument, pp. 15-17.
50.	TSN, Oral Argument, p. 18 et. seq.
51.	TSN, Oral Argument, p. 24; Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, p. 14.

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