Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/250/250mass537.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:58:24+00:00

Document:
Negligence, Of proprietor of safe deposit vault. Agency, Scope of authority. Attorney at Law.
Where, at the trial of an action by the executors of a will against the proprietor of safe deposit vaults for loss resulting from an attorney for the plaintiffs being given access when alone to a safe rented to the plaintiffs, when he purloined bonds which the plaintiffs were unable to recover, the evidence in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiffs tended to show that the safe was engaged with the defendant by the attorney, the plaintiffs approving of all arrangements of the attorney; that the arrangements made permitted the attorney to have access without the presence of any one else; that he was permitted to retain the key to the safe; and that all writings entered into with the defendant were by the attorney in behalf of the plaintiffs and confirmed the arrangements made as above described, a verdict for the defendant properly was ordered.
CONTRACT OR TORT for loss sustained by the plaintiffs as executors of the will of William Firth, late of Newton, by reason of alleged conduct of the defendant in wrongfully permitting Amos L. Hatheway to have access alone to the safety deposit box of the plaintiffs in the vaults of the defendant. Writ dated September 1, 1921.
In the Superior Court, the action was tried before Lawton, J. Material evidence is described in the opinion. At the close of the evidence, by order of the trial judge, a verdict was entered for the defendant. The judge thereupon reported the action to this court for determination.
E. F. McClennen, for the plaintiffs.
C. F. Choate, Jr., (W. E. Tucker with him,) for the defendant.
ant having permitted Hatheway to open the safe, is liable in damages for the breach. The answer in substance is a general denial.
The weight or preponderance of evidence might shift with varying aspects of the trial, but the burden of proof rested on the plaintiffs to maintain the issue presented by the pleadings. Carroll v. Boston Elevated Railway, 200 Mass. 527.
told Hinckley he understood Hatheway had taken a box in the name of the estate, and " they wanted it fixed so that two would have to be present to enter. Hinckley said ' all right.' This talk . . . was at the time when Browne signed exhibit 5, " and Hinckley also said, "they knew Hatheway and let him go and come as he pleased." The evidence in the direct examination of the plaintiff West in so far as material was, that he understood that while Hatheway had a key, access to the box could only be had by Browne and Hatheway together. But in cross-examination he admitted having written the defendant June 8, 1921, that he understood, "that either Mr. Browne or Amos L. Hatheway . . . has access to the estate securities." The deposition of Smith in substance is that at the meeting of July 9, 1920, no objection was made to Hatheway " getting a box," nor was anything said as to " who should have the right to go to the box, or that Hatheway should be accompanied by one or more of the executors or trustees when he went to the box."
Reference O. K. A. L. H.
It is signed on the back, " Amos L. Hatheway, Alexander S. Browne, Estate of William Firth by Amos L. Hatheway."
9, 1920, had been expressly authorized by the executors to hire the safe. The unequivocal conduct of Browne, to whom must be imputed knowledge of all the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, shows full acquiescence in what Hatheway had done. The defendant, who acted in good faith relying on the records, had a right therefore to recognize Hatheway as a person having lawful access to the safe, until notified that his right had been revoked. Foster v. Rockwell, 104 Mass. 167, 172. Harrod v. McDaniels, 126 Mass. 413. Auringer v. Cochrane, 225 Mass. 273, 275. See Rackemann, v. Riverbank Improvement Co. 167 Mass. 1, 4; 57 Am. St. Rep. 427.
The conclusion is the same if the receipt, and the records, which are incorporated by express reference, are treated, as the plaintiffs contend, as constituting a contract, which cannot be varied by parol evidence. Abbott v. Frazier, 240 Mass. 586, 593. Dunbar v. Broomfield, 247 Mass. 372, 384. The case at bar is plainly distinguishable from DeFriest v. Bradley, 192 Mass. 346, Mears v. Smith, 199 Mass. 319, Glackin v. Bennett, 226 Mass. 316, Goyette v. C.V. Watson Co. 245 Mass. 577, 588, 589. At the time the receipt was given, and payment accepted, Hatheway had been designated in writing on the records as a person who could have access to the safe, and the executors through Browne had knowledge of the rule, and also that Hatheway, having been thus designated, had received and retained a key. It follows under the contract, that he became the plaintiff's deputy. Secoulsky v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. 223 Mass. 465, 466.
The entry must be, judgment for the defendant on the verdict.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.