Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/333/203/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:23:29+00:00

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Public schools cannot allow religious groups to use their facilities to provide religious instruction to children.
With the permission of a board of education, granted under its general supervisory powers over the use of public school buildings, religious teachers, employed subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools by a private religious group including representatives of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths, gave religious instruction in public school buildings once each week. Pupils whose parents so requested were excused from their secular classes during the periods of religious instruction and were required to attend the religious classes; but other pupils were not released from their public school duties, which were compulsory under state law. A resident and taxpayer of the school district whose child was enrolled in the public schools sued in a state court for a writ of mandamus requiring the board of education to terminate this practice.
1. A judgment of the State Supreme Court sustaining denial of the writ of mandamus on the ground that the state statutes granted the board of education authority to establish such a program drew into question "the validity of a statute" of the State within the meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code, and was appealable to this Court. P. 333 U. S. 206.
2. As a resident and taxpayer of the school district and the parent of a child required by state law to attend the school, appellant had standing to maintain the suit. P. 333 U. S. 206.
3. Both state courts having ruled expressly on appellant's claim that the state program violated the Federal Constitution, a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed properly to present that question in the State Supreme Court cannot be sustained. P. 333 U. S. 207.
4. This utilization of the State's tax supported public school system and its machinery for compulsory public school attendance to enable sectarian groups to give religious instruction to public school pupils in public school buildings violates the First Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 333 U. S. 209-212.
396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.2d 161, reversed.
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed a denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus requiring a board of education to terminate the giving of religious instruction by private teachers in the public schools. 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.2d 161. On appeal to this Court, reversed and remanded, p. 333 U. S. 212.
instruction insofar as that power may be restricted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
The appellant, Vashti McCollum, began this action for mandamus against the Champaign Board of Education in the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Illinois. Her asserted interest was that of a resident and taxpayer of Champaign and of a parent whose child was then enrolled in the Champaign public schools. Illinois has a compulsory education law which, with exceptions, requires parents to send their children, aged seven to sixteen, to its tax-supported public schools, where the children are to remain in attendance during the hours when the schools are regularly in session. Parents who violate this law commit a misdemeanor punishable by fine unless the children attend private or parochial schools which meet educational standards fixed by the State. District boards of education are given general supervisory powers over the use of the public school buildings within the school districts. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 122, §§ 123, 301 (1943).
"adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction in and teaching of religious education in all public schools in Champaign School District Number 71, . . . and in all public school houses and buildings in said district when occupied by public schools. "
The board first moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that, under Illinois law, appellant had no standing to maintain the action. This motion was denied. An answer was then filed, which admitted that regular weekly religious instruction was given during school hours to those pupils whose parents consented, and that those pupils were released temporarily from their regular secular classes for the limited purpose of attending the religious classes. The answer denied that this coordinated program of religious instruction violated the State or Federal Constitution. Much evidence was heard, findings of fact were made, after which the petition for mandamus was denied on the ground that the school's religious instruction program violated neither the federal nor state constitutional provisions invoked by the appellant. On appeal, the State Supreme Court affirmed. 396 Ill. 14 71 N.E.2d 161. Appellant appealed to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), and we noted probable jurisdiction on June 2, 1947.
The appellees press a motion to dismiss the appeal on several grounds, the first of which is that the judgment of the State Supreme Court does not draw in question the "validity of a statute of any State" as required by 28 U.S.C. § 344(a). This contention rests on the admitted fact that the challenged program of religious instruction was not expressly authorized by statute. But the State Supreme Court has sustained the validity of the program on the ground that the Illinois statutes granted the board authority to establish such a program. This holding is sufficient to show that the validity of an Illinois statute was drawn in question within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 344(a). Hamilton v. Regents of U. of Cal., 293 U. S. 245, 293 U. S. 258. A second ground for the motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks standing to maintain the action, a ground which is also without merit. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 307 U. S. 443, 307 U. S. 445, 307 U. S. 464.
A third ground for the motion is that the appellant failed properly to present in the State Supreme Court her challenge that the state program violated the Federal Constitution. But in view of the express rulings of both state courts on this question, the argument cannot be successfully maintained. The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.'"
Id. at 330 U. S. 15-16. The majority in the Everson case, and the minority as shown by quotations from the dissenting views in our notes 6 and | 6 and S. 203fn7|>7, agreed that the First Amendment's language, properly interpreted, had erected a wall of separation between Church and State. They disagreed as to the facts shown by the record and as to the proper application of the First Amendment's language to those facts.
Recognizing that the Illinois program is barred by the First and Fourteenth Amendments if we adhere to the views expressed both by the majority and the minority in the Everson case, counsel for the respondents challenge those views as dicta, and urge that we reconsider and repudiate them. They argue that, historically, the First Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one religion over another, not an impartial governmental assistance of all religions. In addition, they ask that we distinguish or overrule our holding in the Everson case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment applicable as a prohibition against the States. After giving full consideration to the arguments presented, we are unable to accept either of these contentions.
exercise of religion. For the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere. Or, as we said in the Everson case, the First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and impregnable.
Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State.
The cause is reversed and remanded to the State Supreme Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Appellant, taking issue with the facts found by the Illinois courts, argues that the religious education program in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution for any one of the following reasons: (1) In actual practice certain Protestant groups have obtained an overshadowing advantage in the propagation of their faiths over other Protestant sects; (2) the religious education program was voluntary in name only, because, in fact, subtle pressures were brought to bear on the students to force them to participate in it, and (3) the power given the school superintendent to reject teachers selected by religious groups and the power given the local Council on Religious Education to determine which religious faiths should participate in the program was a prior censorship of religion.
In view of our decision, we find it unnecessary to consider these arguments or the disputed facts upon which they depend.
". . . Admission to the classes was to be allowed only upon the express written request of parents, and then only to classes designated by the parents. . . . Cards were distributed to the parents of elementary students by the public school teachers requesting them to indicate whether they desired their children to receive religious education. After being filled out, the cards were returned to the teachers of religious education classes either by the public school teachers or the children. . . ."
". . . those students who have obtained the written consent of their parents therefor are released by the school authorities from their secular work, and in the grade schools for a period of thirty minutes' instruction in each week during said school hours, and forty-five minutes during each week in the junior high school, receive training in religious education. . . . Certain cards are used for obtaining permission of parents for their children to take said religious instruction courses, and they are made available through the offices of the superintendent of schools and through the hands of principals and teachers to the pupils of the school district. Said cards are prepared at the cost of the council of religious education. The handling and distribution of said cards does not interfere with the duties or suspend the regular secular work of the employees of the defendant. . . ."
"The record further discloses that the teachers conducting the religious classes were not teachers in the public schools, but were subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent. . . ."
"Before any faith or other group may obtain permission from the defendant for the similar, free and equal use of rooms in the public school buildings, said faith or group must make application to the superintendent of schools of said School District Number 71, who in turn will determine whether or not it is practical for said group to teach in said school system."
". . . The Protestants would have one group and the Catholics, and would be given a room where they would have the class and we would go along with the plan of the religious people. They were all to be treated alike, with the understanding that the teachers they would bring into the school were approved by the superintendent. . . . The superintendent was the last word so far as the individual was concerned. . . ."
"I am affiliated with the Christian church. I also work in the Methodist Church, and I taught at the Presbyterian. I am married to a Lutheran."
". . . If any pupil is absent, we turn in a slip just like any teacher would to the superintendent's office. The slip is a piece of paper with a number of hours in the school day and a square, and the teacher of the particular room for the particular hour records the absentees. It has their names and the grade and the section to which they belong. It is the same sheet that the geography and history teachers and all the other teachers use, and is furnished by the school. . . ."
"The problem then cannot be cast in terms of legal discrimination or its absence. This would be true even though the state, in giving aid, should treat all religious instruction alike. . . . Again, it was the furnishing of 'contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves' that the fathers outlawed. That consequence and effect are not removed by multiplying to all-inclusiveness the sects for which support is exacted. The Constitution requires, not comprehensive identification of state with religion, but complete separation."
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 59, 330 U. S. 60.
"In view of this history, no further proof is needed that the Amendment forbids any appropriation, large or small, from public funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises. . . . Legislatures are free to make, and courts to sustain, appropriations only when it can be found that, in fact, they do not aid, promote, encourage or sustain religious teaching or observances, be the amount large or small."
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 41, 330 U. S. 52-53.
We dissented in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, because, in our view, the Constitutional principle requiring separation of Church and State compelled invalidation of the ordinance sustained by the majority. Illinois has here authorized the commingling of sectarian with secular instruction in the public schools. The Constitution of the United States forbids this.
of a spacious conception like that of the separation of Church from State is unfolded as appeal is made to the principle from case to case. We are all agreed that the First and the Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an "established church." But agreement, in the abstract, that the First Amendment was designed to erect a "wall of separation between church and State" does not preclude a clash of views as to what the wall separates. Involved is not only the Constitutional principle, but the implications of judicial review in its enforcement. Accommodation of legislative freedom and Constitutional limitations upon that freedom cannot be achieved by a mere phrase. We cannot illuminatingly apply the "wall of separation" metaphor until we have considered the relevant history of religious education in America, the place of the "released time" movement in that history, and its precise manifestation in the case before us.
To understand the particular program now before us as a conscientious attempt to accommodate the allowable functions of Government and the special concerns of the Church within the framework of our Constitution and with due regard to the kind of society for which it was designed, we must put this Champaign program of 1940 in its historic setting. Traditionally, organized education in the Western world was Church education. It could hardly be otherwise when the education of children was primarily study of the Word and the ways of God. Even in the Protestant countries, where there was a less close identification of Church and State, the basis of education was largely the Bible, and its chief purpose inculcation of piety. To the extent that the State intervened, it used its authority to further aims of the Church.
taught. [Footnote 2/2] In Massachusetts, largely through the efforts of Horace Mann, all sectarian teachings were barred from the common school to save it from being rent by denominational conflict. [Footnote 2/3] The upshot of these controversies, often long and fierce, is fairly summarized by saying that long before the Fourteenth Amendment subjected the States to new limitations, the prohibition of furtherance by the State of religious instruction became the guiding principle, in law and feeling, of the American people. In sustaining Stephen Girard's will, this Court referred to the inevitable conflicts engendered by matters "connected with religious polity," and particularly "in a country composed of such a variety of religious sects as our country." Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127, 43 U. S. 198. That was more than one hundred years ago.
people. [Footnote 2/4] A totally different situation elsewhere, as illustrated, for instance, by the English provisions for religious education in State-maintained schools, only serves to illustrate that free societies are not cast in one mould. See the Education Act of 1944, 7 and 8 Geo. VI, c. 31. Different institutions evolve from different historic circumstances.
free from entanglement in the strife of sects. The preservation of the community from divisive conflicts, of Government from irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of religion from censorship and coercion, however subtly exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to instruction other than religious, leaving to the individual's church and home indoctrination in the faith of his choice.
This development of the public school as a symbol of our secular unity was not a sudden achievement, nor attained without violent conflict. [Footnote 2/5] While, in small communities of comparatively homogeneous religious beliefs, the need for absolute separation presented no urgencies, elsewhere the growth of the secular school encountered the resistance of feeling strongly engaged against it. But the inevitability of such attempts is the very reason for Constitutional provisions primarily concerned with the protection of minority groups. And such sects are shifting groups, varying from time to time and place to place, thus representing in their totality the common interest of the nation.
"Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar appropriated for their support shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian schools. Resolve that neither the State nor nation, nor both combined, shall support institutions of learning other than those sufficient to afford every child growing up in the land the opportunity of a good common school education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas. Leave the matter of religion to the family altar, the church and the private school, supported entirely by private contributions. Keep the church and the state forever separate."
"The President's Speech at Des Moines," 22 Catholic World 433, 434-35 (1876).
"It is not a question of religion, or of creed, or of party; it is a question of declaring and maintaining the great American principle of eternal separation between Church and State."
Sunday school, which acquired national acceptance, tended to relegate the child's religious education, and thereby his religion, to a minor role not unlike the enforced piano lesson.
Out of these inadequate efforts evolved the week-day church school, held on one or more afternoons a week after the close of the public school. But children continued to be children; they wanted to play when school was out, particularly when other children were free to do so. Church leaders decided that, if the week-day church school was to succeed, a way had to be found to give the child his religious education during what the child conceived to be his "business hours."
children be excused from public school on Wednesday afternoon, so that the churches could provide "Sunday school on Wednesday." This was to be carried out on church premises under church authority. Those not desiring to attend church schools would continue their normal classes. Lest these public school classes unfairly compete with the church education, it was requested that the school authorities refrain from scheduling courses or activities of compelling interest or importance.
participated in "released time" programs during 1947. [Footnote 2/16] A movement of such scope indicates the importance of the problem to which the "released time" programs are directed. But to the extent that aspects of these programs are open to Constitutional objection, the more extensively the movement operates, the more ominous the breaches in the wall of separation.
system." If no provision is made for religious instruction in the particular faith of a child, or if for other reasons the child is not enrolled in any of the offered classes, he is required to attend a regular school class, or a study period during which he is often left to his own devices. Reports of attendance in the religious classes are submitted by the religious instructor to the school authorities, and the child who fails to attend is presumably deemed a truant.
instruction such momentum and planning. To speak of "released time" as being only half or three quarters of an hour is to draw a thread from a fabric.
We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not before us which, though colloquially characterized as "released time," present situations differing in aspects that may well be constitutionally crucial. Different forms which "released time" has taken during more than thirty years of growth include programs which, like that before us, could not withstand the test of the Constitution; others may be found unexceptionable. We do not now attempt to weigh in the Constitutional scale every separate detail or various combination of factors which may establish a valid "released time" program. We find that the basic Constitutional principle of absolute Separation was violated when the State of Illinois, speaking through its Supreme Court, sustained the school authorities of Champaign in sponsoring and effectively furthering religious beliefs by its educational arrangement.
Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks of a "wall of separation," not of a fine line easily overstepped. The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart. "The great American principle of eternal separation" -- Elihu Root's phrase bears repetition -- is one of the vital reliances of our Constitutional system for assuring unities among our people stronger than our diversities. It is the Court's duty to enforce this principle in its full integrity.
"we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion."
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 59. If nowhere else, in the relation between Church and State, "good fences make good neighbors."
* MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE and MR. JUSTICE BURTON concurred also in the Court's opinion.
For an exposition of the religious origins of American education, see S.W. Brown, The Secularization of American Education (1912) cc. I, II; Knight, Education in the United States (2d rev. ed. 1941) cc. III, V; Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934) cc. II, III.
See Boese, Public Education in the City of New York (1869) c. XIV; Hall, Religious Education in the Public Schools of the State and City of New York (1914) cc. VI, VII; Palmer, The New York Public School (1905) cc. VI, VII, X, XII. And see New York Laws 1842, c. 150, § 14, amended, New York Laws 1844, c. 320, § 12.
S. M. Smith, The Relation of the State to Religious Education in Massachusetts (1926) c. VII; Culver, Horace Mann and Religion in the Massachusetts Public Schools (1929).
It has been suggested that secular education in this country is the inevitable "product of the utter impossibility of harmonizing multiform creeds.'" T.W.M. Marshall, Secular Education in England and the United States, 1 American Catholic Quarterly Review 28, 308. It is precisely because of this "utter impossibility" that the fathers put into the Constitution the principle of complete "hands off" for a people as religiously heterogeneous as ours.
See Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934) pp. 230 et seq.; Zollmann, The Relation of Church and State, in Lotz and Crawford, Studies in Religious Education (1931) 403, 418 et seq.; Payson Smith, The Public Schools and Religious Education, in Religion and Education (Sperr, Editor, 1945) pp. 32 et seq.; also Mahoney, The Relation of the State to Religious Education in Early New York 1633-1825 (1941) c. VI; McLaughlin, A History of State Legislation Affecting Private Elementary and Secondary Schools in the United States, 180-1945 (1946) c. I, and see note 10, infra.
President Grant's Annual Message to Congress, December 7, 1875, 4 Cong.Rec. 1, 5 et seq.; Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States during the First Century of its History, H.R.Doc. No. 353, Pt. 2, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., pp 277-278. In addition to the first proposal, "The Blaine Amendment," five others to similar effect are cited by Ames. The reason for the failure of these attempts seems to have been in part that the "provisions of the State constitutions are in almost all instances adequate on this subject, and no amendment is likely to be secured." Id.
"No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under any State. No public property, and no public revenue of, nor any loan of credit by or under the authority of, the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or municipal corporation, shall be appropriated to, or made or used for, the support of any school, educational or other institution, under the control of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein the particular creed or tenets of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination shall be taught. And no such particular creed or tenets shall be read or taught in any school or institution supported in whole or in part by such revenue or loan of credit, and no such appropriation or loan of credit shall be made to any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or to promote its interests or tenets. This article shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution, and it shall not have the effect to impair rights of property already vested. . . ."
H.Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876).
See Constitutions of the States and United States, III Report of the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (1938) Index, pp. 1766-67.
"The manifest object of the men who framed the institutions of this country was to have a State without religion, and a Church without politics -- that is to say, they meant that one should never be used as an engine for any purpose of the other. . . . Our fathers seem to have been perfectly sincere in their belief that the members of the Church would be more patriotic, and the citizens of the State more religious, by keeping their respective functions entirely separate. For that reason, they built up a wall of complete and perfect partition between the two."
From Religious Liberty (1856) in Black, Essays and Speeches (1886) 51, 53; cf. Brigance, Jeremiah Sullivan Black (1934). While Jeremiah S. Black and Elihu Root had many things in common, there were also important differences between them, perhaps best illustrated by the fact that one became Secretary of State to President Buchanan, the other to Theodore Roosevelt. That two men, with such different political alignment, should have shared identic views on a matter so basic to the wellbeing of our American democracy affords striking proof of the respect to be accorded to that principle.
"provide, by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of said States . . . for the establishment and maintenance of systems of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of said States, and free from sectarian control. . . ."
The same provision was contained in the Enabling Act for Utah, 28 Stat. 107, 108; Oklahoma, 34 Stat. 267, 270; New Mexico and Arizona, 36 Stat. 557, 559, 570. Idaho and Wyoming were admitted after adoption of their constitutions; that of Wyoming contained an irrevocable ordinance in the same terms. Wyoming Constitution, 1889, Ordinances, § 5. The Constitution of Idaho, while it contained no irrevocable ordinance, had a provision even more explicit in its establishment of separation. Idaho Constitution, 1889, art. IX, § 5.
See, e.g., the New York experience, including, inter alia, the famous Hughes controversy of 1840-42, the conflict culminating in the Constitutional Convention of 1894, and the attempts to restore aid to parochial schools by revision of the New York City Charter, in 1901, and at the State Constitutional Convention of 1938. See McLaughlin, A History of State Legislation Affecting Private Elementary and Secondary Schools in the United States, 1870-1945 (1946) pp. 119-25; Mahoney; The Relation of the State to Religious Education in Early New York 1633-1825 (1941) c. VI; Hall, Religious Education in the Public Schools of the State and the City of New York (1914) pp. 46-47; Boese, Public Education in the City of New York (1&69) c. XIV; compare New York Laws 1901, vol. 3, § 1152, p. 492, with amendment, id. p. 668; see Nicholas Murray Butler, Religion and Education (Editorial) in 22 Educational Review 101, June, 1901; New York Times, April 8, 1901, p. 1, col. 1; April 9, 1901, p. 2, col. 5; April 19, 1901, p. 2, col. 2; April 21, 1901, p. 1, col. 3; Editorial, April 22, 1901, p. 6, col. 1.
Compare S. 2499, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., providing for Federal aid to education, and the controversy engendered over the inclusion in the aid program of sectarian schools, fully discussed in, e.g., "The Nation's Schools," January through June, 1947.
For surveys of the development of private religious education, see, e.g., A. A. Brown, A History of Religious Education in Recent Times (1923); Athearn, Religious Education and American Democracy (1917); Burns and Kohlbrenner, A History of Catholic Education in the United States (1937); Lotz and Crawford, Studies in Religious Education (1931) Parts I and IV.
Reference should be made to Jacob Gould Schurman, who, in 1903, proposed a plan bearing close resemblance to that of Champaign. See Symposium, 75 The Outlook 635, 636, November 14, 1903; Crooker, Religious Freedom in American Education (1903) pp. 39 et seq.
For the text of the resolution, a brief in its support, as well as an exposition of some of the opposition it inspired, see Wenner's book, Religious Education and the Public School (rev. ed.1913).
The French example is cited not only by Wenner, but also by Nicholas Murray Butler, who thought released time was "restoring the American system in the state of New York." The Place of Religious Instruction in Our Educational System, 7 Vital Speeches 167, 168 (Nov. 28, 1940); see also Report of the President of Columbia University, 1934, pp.22-24. It is important to note, however, that the French practice must be viewed as the result of the struggle to emancipate the French schools from control by the Church. The leaders of this revolution, men like Paul Bert, Ferdinand Buisson, and Jules Ferry, agreed to this measure as one part of a great step towards, rather than a retreat from, the principle of Separation. The history of these events is described in Muzzey, State, Church, and School in France, The School Review, March through June, 1911.
"Public elementary schools will be closed one day a week in addition to Sunday in order to permit parents, if they so desire, to have their children given religious instruction outside of school buildings."
Law No. 11,696, March 28, 1882, Bulletin des Lois, No. 690. This then approximates that aspect of released time generally known as "dismissed time." No children went to school on that day, and the public school was therefore not an alternative used to impel the children towards the religious school. The religious education was given "outside of school buildings."
The Vichy Government attempted to introduce a program of religious instruction within the public school system remarkably similar to that in effect in Champaign. The proposal was defeated by intense opposition, which included the protest of the French clergy, who apparently feared State control of the Church. See Schwartz, Religious Instruction under Petain, 58 Christian Century 1170, Sept. 24, 1941.
Of the many expositions of the Gary plan, see, e.g., A. A. Brown, The Week-Day Church Schools of Gary, Indiana, 11 Religious Education 5 (1916); Wirt, The Gary Public Schools and the Churches, id. at 221 (1916).
See the 1947 Yearbook, International Council of Religious Education, p. 76; also New York Times, September 21, 1947, p. 22, col. 1.
Respects in which programs differ include, for example, the amount of supervision by the public school of attendance and performance in the religious class, of the course of study, of the selection of teachers; methods of enrolment and dismissal from the secular classes; the amount of school time devoted to operation of the program; the extent to which school property and administrative machinery are involved; the effect on the public school program of the introduction of "released time"; the proportion of students who seek to be excused; the effect of the program on nonparticipants; the amount and nature of the publicity for the program in the public schools.
The studies of detail in "released time" programs are voluminous. Most of these may be found in the issues of such periodicals as The International Journal of Religious Education, Religious Education, and Christian Century. For some of the more comprehensive studies found elsewhere, see Davis, Weekday Classes in Religious Education, U.S. Office of Education Bulletin 1941, No. 3; Gorham, A Study of the Status of Weekday Church Schools in the United States (1934); Lotz, The Weekday Church School, in Lotz and Crawford, Studies in Religious Education (1931) c. XII; Forsyth, Week-Day Church Schools (1930); Settle, The Weekday Church School, Educational Bulletin No. 601 of The International Council of Religious Education (1930); Shaver, Present-Day Trends in Religious Education (1928) cc. VII, VIII; Gove, Religious Education on Public School Time (1926).
It deserves notice that, in discussing with the relator her son's inability to get along with his classmates, one of his teachers suggested that "allowing him to take the religious education course might help him to become a member of the group."
The divergent views expressed in the briefs submitted here on behalf of various religious organizations, as amici curiae, in themselves suggest that the movement has been a divisive and not an irenic influence in the community: The American Unitarian Association; The General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists; The Joint Conference Committee on Public Relations set up by the Southern Baptist Convention, The Northern Baptist Convention, The National Baptist Convention Inc., and the National Baptist Convention; The Protestant Council of the City of New York, and The Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council.
There is a prolific literature on the educational, social and religious merits of the "released time" movement. In support of "released time," the following may be mentioned: The International Council of Religious Education, and particularly the writings of Dr. Erwin L. Shaver, for some years Director of its Department of Weekday Religious Education, in publications of the Council and in numerous issues of The International Journal of Religious Education (e.g., They Reach One-Third, Dec., 1943, p. 11; Weekday Religious Education Today, Jan., 1944, p. 6), and Religious Education (e.g., Survey of Week-Day Religious Education, Feb., 1922, p. 51; The Movement for Weekday Religious Education, Jan.-Feb., 1946, p. 6); see also Information Service, Federal Council of Churches of Christ, May 29, 1943. See also Cutton, Answering the Arguments, The International Journal of Religious Education, June, 1930, p. 9, and Released Time, id. Sept., 1942, p. 12; Hauser, "Hands off the Public School?", Religious Education, Mar.-Apr., 1942, p. 99; Collins, Release Time for Religious Instruction, National Catholic Education Association Bulletin, May, 1945, pp. 21, 27-28; Weigle, Public Education and Religion, Religious Education, Apr.-June, 1940, p. 67; Nicholas Murray Butler, The Place of Religious Instruction in Our Educational System, 7 Vital Speeches 167 (Nov. 28, 1940); Howlett, Released Time for Religious Education in New York City, 64 Education 523, May, 1944; Blair, A Case for the Weekday Church School, 7 Frontiers of Democracy 75, Dec. 15, 1940; cf. Allred, Legal Aspects of Release Time (National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1947). Favorable views are also cited in the studies in note 17, supra. Many not opposed to "released time" have declared it "hardly enough" or "pitifully inadequate." E.g., Fleming, God in Our Public Schools (2d ed.1944) pp. 80-86; Howlett, Released Time for Religious Education in New York City, Religious Education, Mar.-Apr., 1942, p. 104; Cavert, Points of Tension Between Church and State in America Today, in Church and State in the Modern World (1937) 161, 168; F. E. Johnson, The Church and Society (1935) 125; Hubner, Professional Attitudes toward Religion in the Public Schools of the United States Since 1900 (1944) 108-109, 113; cf. Ryan, A Protestant Experiment in Religious Education, The Catholic World, June, 1922; Elliott, Are Weekday Church Schools the Solution?, The International Journal of Religious Education, Nov., 1940, p. 8; Elliott, Report of the Discussion, Religious Education, July Sept., 1940, p. 158.
For opposing views, see V. T. Thayer, Religion in Public Education (1947) cc. VII, VIII; Moehlman, The Church as Educator (1947) c. X; Chave, A Functional Approach to Religious Education (1947) 104-107; A. W. Johnson, The Legal Status of Church-State Relationships in the United States (1934) 129-130; Newman, The Sectarian Invasion of Our Public Schools (1925). See also Payson Smith, The Public Schools and Religious Education, in Religion and Education (Sperry, Editor, 1945) 32, 42-47; Herrick, Religion in the Public Schools of America, 46 Elementary School Journal 119, Nov., 1945; Kallen, Churchmen's Claims on the Public School, The Nation's Schools, May, 1942, p. 49; June, 1942, p. 52. And cf. John Dewey, Religion in Our Schools (1908), reprinted in 2 Characters and Events (1929) 504, 508, 514. "Released time" was introduced in the public schools of the City of New York over the opposition of organizations like the Public Education Association and the United Parents Associations.
The arguments and sources pro and con are collected in Hubner, Professional Attitudes toward Religion in the Public Schools in the United States since 1900 (1944) 94 et seq. And see the symposia, Teaching Religion in a Democracy, The International Journal of Religious Education, Nov., 1940, pp.6-16; The Aims of Week-Day Religious Education, Religious Education, Feb., 1922, p. 11; Released Time in New York City, id. Jan.-Feb., 1943, p. 15; Progress in Weekday Religious Education, id. Jan.-Feb., 1946, p. 6; Can Our Public Schools Do More about Religion?, 125 Journal of Education 245, Nov., 1942, id. at 273, Dec., 1942; Religious Instruction on School Time, 7 Frontiers of Democracy 72-77, Dec. 15, 1940, and the articles in 64 Education 519 et seq., May, 1944.
See note 14, supra. Indications are that "dismissed time" is used in an inconsiderable number of the communities employing released time. Davis, Weekday Classes in Religious Education, U.S. Office of Education Bulletin 1941, No. 3, p. 22; Shaver, The Movement for Weekday Religious Education, Religious Education, Jan.-Feb., 1946, pp.6, 9.
I join the opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, and concur in the result reached by the Court, but with these reservations: I think it is doubtful whether the facts of this case establish jurisdiction in this Court, but, in any event, that we should place some bounds on the demands for interference with local schools that we are empowered or willing to entertain. I make these reservations a matter of record in view of the number of litigations likely to be started as a result of this decision.
First. When a person is required to submit to some religious rite or instruction or is deprived or threatened with deprivation of his freedom for resisting such unconstitutional requirement. We may then set him free or enjoin his prosecution. Typical of such cases was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624. There, penalties were threatened against both parent and child for refusal of the latter to perform a compulsory ritual which offended his convictions. We intervened to shield them against the penalty. But here, complainant's son may join religious classes if he chooses and if his parents so request, or he may stay out of them. The complaint is that, when others join and he does not, it sets him apart as a dissenter, which is humiliating.
Even admitting this to be true, it may be doubted whether the Constitution, which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be construed also to protect one from the embarrassment that always attends nonconformity, whether in religion, politics, behavior or dress. Since no legal compulsion is applied to complainant's son himself, and no penalty is imposed or threatened from which we may relieve him, we can hardly base jurisdiction on this ground.
had jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of the levy and to protect against it if a majority had agreed that the subsidy for transportation was unconstitutional.
In this case, however, any cost of this plan to the taxpayers is incalculable and negligible. It can be argued, perhaps, that religious classes add some wear and tear on public buildings, and that they should be charged with some expense for heat and light, even though the sessions devoted to religious instruction do not add to the length of the school day. But the cost is neither substantial nor measurable, and no one seriously can say that the complainant's tax bill has been proved to be increased because of this plan. I think it is doubtful whether the taxpayer in this case has shown any substantial property injury.
"ordering it to immediately adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction in and teaching of religious education in all public schools . . . and in all public school houses and buildings in said district when occupied by public schools."
called the Christian's Guide Book, the Holy Writ and the Word of God," and many other similar matters. This Court is directing the Illinois courts generally to sustain plaintiff's complaint without exception of any of these grounds of complaint, without discriminating between them and without laying down any standards to define the limits of the effect of our decision.
To me, the sweep and detail of these complaints is a danger signal which warns of the kind of local controversy we will be required to arbitrate if we do not place appropriate limitation on our decision and exact strict compliance with jurisdictional requirements. Authorities list 256 separate and substantial religious bodies to exist in the continental United States. Each of them, through the suit of some discontented but unpenalized and untaxed representative, has as good a right as this plaintiff to demand that the courts compel the schools to sift out of their teaching everything inconsistent with its doctrines. If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public education in shreds. Nothing but educational confusion and a discrediting of the public school system can result from subjecting it to constant law suits.
of youth to any religious influences. Music without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incomplete, even from a secular point of view. Yet the inspirational appeal of religion in these guises is often stronger than in forthright sermon. Even such a "science" as biology raises the issue between evolution and creation as an explanation of our presence on this planet. Certainly a course in English literature that omitted the Bible and other powerful uses of our mother tongue for religious ends would be pretty barren. And I should suppose it is a proper, if not an indispensable, part of preparation for a worldly life to know the roles that religion and religions have played in the tragic story of mankind. The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity -- both Catholic and Protestant -- and other faiths accepted by a large part of the world's peoples. One can hardly respect a system of education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of the currents of religious thought that move the world society for a part in which he is being prepared.
But how one can teach, with satisfaction or even with justice to all faiths, such subjects as the story of the Reformation, the Inquisition, or even the New England effort to found "a Church without a Bishop and a State without a King," is more than I know. It is too much to expect that mortals will teach subjects about which their contemporaries have passionate controversies with the detachment they may summon to teaching about remote subjects such as Confucius or Mohammed. When instruction turns to proselyting and imparting knowledge becomes evangelism is, except in the crudest cases, a subtle inquiry.
The opinions in this case show that public educational authorities have evolved a considerable variety of practices in dealing with the religious problem. Neighborhoods differ in racial, religious and cultural compositions. It must be expected that they will adopt different customs which will give emphasis to different values and will induce different experiments. And it must be expected that, no matter what practice prevails, there will be many discontented and possibly belligerent minorities. We must leave some flexibility to meet local conditions, some chance to progress by trial and error. While I agree that the religious classes involved here go beyond permissible limits, I also think the complaint demands more than plaintiff is entitled to have granted. So far as I can see, this Court does not tell the State court where it may stop, nor does it set up any standards by which the State court may determine that question for itself.
"to immediately adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction in and teaching of religious education in all public schools,"
is to decree a uniform, rigid and, if we are consistent, an unchanging standard for countless school boards representing and serving highly localized groups which not only differ from each other, but which themselves, from time to time, change attitudes. It seems to me that to do so is to allow zeal for our own ideas of what is good in public instruction to induce us to accept the role of a super board of education for every school district in the nation.
begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in any other legal source. It is a matter on which we can find no law but our own prepossessions. If, with no surer legal guidance, we are to take up and decide every variation of this controversy, raised by persons not subject to penalty or tax but who are dissatisfied with the way schools are dealing with the problem, we are likely to have much business of the sort. And, more importantly, we are likely to make the legal "wall of separation between church and state" as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded.
convinced that this interpretation of the First Amendment is erroneous, I feel impelled to express the reasons for my disagreement. By directing attention to the many instances of close association of church and state in American society, and by recalling that many of these relations are so much a part of our tradition and culture that they are accepted without more, this dissent may help in an appraisal of the meaning of the clause of the First Amendment concerning the establishment of religion and of the reasons which lead to the approval or disapproval of the judgment below.
"The foregoing facts, without reference to others that appear in the record, show the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council in promoting religious education. . . . And it falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1."
"We do not now attempt to weigh in the Constitutional scale every separate detail or various combination of factors which may establish a valid 'released time' program. We find that the basic Constitutional principle of absolute separation was violated when the State of Illinois, speaking through its Supreme Court, sustained the school authorities of Champaign in sponsoring and effectively furthering religious beliefs by its educational arrangement."
leave open for further litigation variations from the Champaign plan. Actually, however, future cases must run the gauntlet not only of the judgment entered, but of the accompanying words of the opinions. I find it difficult to extract from the opinions any conclusion as to what it is in the Champaign plan that is unconstitutional. Is it the use of school buildings for religious instruction; the release of pupils by the schools for religious instruction during school hours; the so-called assistance by teachers in handing out the request cards to pupils, in keeping lists of them for release and records of their attendance; or the action of the principals in arranging an opportunity for the classes and the appearance of the Council's instructors? None of the reversing opinions say whether the purpose of the Champaign plan for religious instruction during school hours is unconstitutional, or whether it is some ingredient used in or omitted from the formula that makes the plan unconstitutional.
"We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not before us which, though colloquially characterized as 'released time,' present situations differing in aspects that may well be constitutionally crucial."
sects, "obvious pressure . . . to attend," and "divisiveness" lead to the stated conclusion. From the holding and the language of the opinions, I can only deduce that religious instruction of public school children during school hours is prohibited. The history of American education is against such an interpretation of the First Amendment.
"The operation of the state's compulsory education system thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects,"
"This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith,"
the intention of its author is to rule that this practice is a law "respecting an establishment of religion." That was the basis of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1. It seems obvious that the action of the School Board in permitting religious education in certain grades of the schools by all faiths did not prohibit the free exercise of religion. Even assuming that certain children who did not elect to take instruction are embarrassed to remain outside of the classes, one can hardly speak of that embarrassment as a prohibition against the free exercise of religion. As no issue of prohibition upon the free exercise of religion is before us, we need only examine the School Board's action to see if it constitutes an establishment of religion.
were financed and regulated by the Council of Religious Education, not the School Board.
"Mr. Madison said he apprehended the meaning of the words to be that Congress should not establish a religion and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience. [Footnote 3/7]"
"Should the religious sects of this State, or any of them, according to the invitation held out to them, establish within, or adjacent to, the precincts of the University, schools for instruction in the religion of their sect, the students of the University will be free, and expected to attend religious worship at the establishment of their respective sects, in the morning, and in time to meet their school in the University at its stated hour. [Footnote 3/13] "
Thus, the "wall of separation between church and State" that Mr. Jefferson built at the University which he founded did not exclude religious education from that school. The difference between the generality of his statements on the separation of church and state and the specificity of his conclusions on education are considerable. A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech.
of the Gospel of their denomination, or the providing places of divine worship, and to none other use whatsoever. . . ."
The conclusive legislative struggle over this act took place in the fall of 1785, before the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The Remonstrance had been issued before the General Assembly convened, and was instrumental in the final defeat of the act, which died in committee. Throughout the Remonstrance, Mr. Madison speaks of the "establishment" sought to be effected by the act. It is clear from its historical setting and its language that the Remonstrance was a protest against an effort by Virginia to support Christian sects by taxation. Issues similar to those raised by the instant case were not discussed. Thus, Mr. Madison's approval of Mr. Jefferson's report as Rector gives, in my opinion, a clearer indication of his views on the constitutionality of religious education in public schools than his general statements on a different subject.
no legal duty of school attendance is violated. 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.2d 161. If the sentence in the Court's opinion concerning the pupils' release from legal duty is intended to mean that the Constitution forbids a school to excuse a pupil from secular control during school hours to attend voluntarily a class in religious education, whether in or out of school buildings, I disagree. Of course, no tax can be levied to support organizations intended "to teach or practice religion." I agree, too, that the state cannot influence one toward religion against his will, or punish him for his beliefs. Champaign's religious education course does none of these things.
of religion. [Footnote 3/18] While obviously in these instances the respective churches, in a certain sense, were aided, this Court has never held that such "aid" was in violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendment.
is given outside of the school buildings; in others, within these buildings. Metropolitan centers like New York usually would have available quarters convenient to schools. Unless smaller cities and rural communities use the school building at times that do not interfere with recitations, they may be compelled to give up religious education. I understand that pupils not taking religious education usually are given other work of a secular nature within the schools. [Footnote 3/22] Since all these states use the facilities of the schools to aid the religious education to some extent, their desire to permit religious education to school children is thwarted by this Court's judgment. [Footnote 3/23] Under it, as I understand its language, children cannot be released or dismissed from school to attend classes in religion while other children must remain to pursue secular education. Teachers cannot keep the records as to which pupils are to be dismissed and which retained. To do so is said to be an "aid" in establishing religion; the use of public money for religion.
constitutionality has been generally upheld. [Footnote 3/24] Illinois itself promptly struck down as violative of its own constitution required exercises partaking of a religious ceremony. People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251. In that case, compulsory religious exercises -- a reading from the King James Bible, the Lord's Prayer and the singing of hymns -- were forbidden as "worship services." In this case, the Supreme Court of Illinois pointed out that, in the Ring case, the activities in the school were ceremonial and compulsory; in this, voluntary and educational. 396 Ill. 14, 221, 71 N.E.2d 161, 164.
held in the Cadet Chapel, the Catholic in the Catholic Chapel, and the Jewish in the Old Cadet Chapel; at Annapolis, only Protestant services are held on the reservation, midshipmen of other religious persuasions attend the churches of the city of Annapolis. These facts indicate that both schools, since their earliest beginnings, have maintained and enforced a pattern of participation in formal worship.
not bar every friendly gesture between church and state. It is not an absolute prohibition against every conceivable situation where the two may work together, any more than the other provisions of the First Amendment -- free speech, free press -- are absolutes. [Footnote 3/32] If abuses occur, such as the use of the instruction hour for sectarian purposes, I have no doubt, in view of the Ring case, that Illinois will promptly correct them. If they are of a kind that tend to the establishment of a church or interfere with the free exercise of religion, this Court is open for a review of any erroneous decision. This Court cannot be too cautious in upsetting practices embedded in our society by many years of experience. A state is entitled to have great leeway in its legislation when dealing with the important social problems of its population. [Footnote 3/33] A definite violation of legislative limits must be established. The Constitution should not be stretched to forbid national customs in the way courts act to reach arrangements to avoid federal taxation. [Footnote 3/34] Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with accepted habits of our people. This is an instance where, for me, the history of past practices is determinative of the meaning of a constitutional clause, not a decorous introduction to the study of its text. The judgment should be affirmed.
"'The Champaign Council of Religious Education' [is] a voluntary association made up of the representatives of the Jewish, Roman Catholic and Protestant faiths in the school district."
There is no extra cost to the state, but, as a theoretical accounting problem, it may be correct to charge to the classes their comparable proportion of the state expense for buildings, operation and teachers. In connection with the classes, the teachers need only keep a record of the pupils who attend. Increased custodial requirements are likewise nominal. It is customary to use school buildings for community activities when not needed for school purposes. See Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 122, § 123.
"CHAMPAIGN COUNCIL OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION"
"Please permit _______________ in Grade ___ at ____________ School to attend a class in Religious Education one period a week under the Auspices of the Champaign Council of Religious Education."
"(Check which) Date _________ ____ ( ) Interdenominational"
"Telephone No. _________ Address _______________________"
"A fee of 25 cents a semester is charged each pupil to help cover the cost of material used."
"If you wish your child to receive religious instruction, please sign this card and return to the school."
Mae Chapin, the Director, was not a school employee.
"The superintendent testified that Jehovah's Witnesses or any other sect would be allowed to teach provided their teachers had proper educational qualifications, so that bad grammar, for instance, would not be taught to the pupils. A similar situation developed with reference to the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church. The evidence tends to show that, during the course of the trial, that group indicated it would affiliate with the Council of Religious Education."
"Before any faith or other group may obtain permission from the defendant for the similar, free and equal use of rooms in the public school buildings said faith or group must make application to the superintendent of schools of said School District Number 71, who, in turn, will determine whether or not it is practical for said group to teach in said school system."
"The court feels from all the facts in the record that an honest attempt has been made and is being made to permit religious instruction to be given by qualified outside teachers of any sect to people of their own faith in the manner above outlined. The evidence shows that no sect or religious group has ever been denied the right to use the schools in this manner."
"The curriculum of studies in the Protestant classes is determined by a committee of the Protestant members of the council of religious education after consultation with representatives of all the different faiths included in said council. The Jewish classes, of course, would deny the divinity of Jesus Christ. The teaching in the Catholic classes, of course, explains to Catholic pupils the teaching of the Catholic religion, and are not shared by other students who are Protestants or Jews. The teachings in the Protestant classes would undoubtedly, from the evidence, teach some doctrines that would not be accepted by the other two religions."
"The testimony shows that sectarian differences between the sects are not taught or emphasized in the actual teaching as it is conducted in the schools. The testimony of the religious education teachers, the secular teachers who testified, and the many children, mostly from Protestant families, who either took or did not take religious education courses, is to the effect that religious education classes have fostered tolerance, rather than intolerance."
The Supreme Court of Illinois said: "The religious education courses do not go to the extent of being worship services, and do not include prayers or the singing of hymns." 396 Ill. 14, 21, 71 N.E.2d 161, 164.
8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington ed., 1861) 113.
Acts of the Assembly of 1818-19 (1819) 15; Phillips v. The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 97 Va. 472, 474 75, 34 S.E. 66, 67.
19 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial edition, 1904) 408, 409.
"It was not, however, to be understood that instruction in religious opinion and duties was meant to be precluded by the public authorities, as indifferent to the interests of society. On the contrary, the relations which exist between man and his Maker, and the duties resulting from those relations, are the most interesting and important to every human being, and the most incumbent on his study and investigation. The want of instruction in the various creeds of religious faith existing among our citizens presents, therefore, a chasm in a general institution of the useful sciences. . . . A remedy, however, has been suggested of promising aspect which, while it excludes the public authorities from the domain of religious freedom, will give to the sectarian schools of divinity the full benefit the public provisions made for instruction in the other branches of science. . . . It has therefore been in contemplation, and suggested by some pious individuals, who perceive the advantages of associating other studies with those of religion, to establish their religious schools on the confines of the University so as to give to their students ready and convenient access and attendance on the scientific lectures of the University and to maintain, by that means, those destined for the religious professions on as high a standing of science, and of personal weight and respectability, as may be obtained by others from the benefits of the University. Such establishments would offer the further and greater advantage of enabling the students of the University to attend religious exercises with the professor of their particular sect, either in the rooms of the building still to be erected, and destined to that purpose under impartial regulations, as proposed in the same report of the commissioners, or in the lecturing room of such professor. . . . Such an arrangement as would complete the circle of the useful sciences embraced by this institution, and would fill the chasm now existing, on principles which would leave inviolate the constitutional freedom of religion, the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights, over which the people and authorities of this state, individually and publicly, have ever manifested the most watchful jealousy; and could this jealousy be now alarmed, in the opinion of the legislature, by what is here suggested, the idea will be relinquished on any surmise of disapprobation which they might think proper to express."
"And by bringing the sects together, and mixing them with the mass of other students, we shall soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize their prejudices, and make the general religion a religion of peace, reason, and morality."
12 Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, (Fed. ed., 1905), 272.
3 Randall, Life of Thomas Jefferson (1858) 471.
19 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial edition, 1904) 449.
The texts of the Memorial and Remonstrance and the bill against which it was aimed, to-wit, A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, are set forth in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 28, 63-74.
See generally the dissent of MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, 330 U. S. 330 U.S. 1, 330 U. S. 28.
"Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, That for the support of Christian teachers, percentum on the amount, or in the pound on the sum payable for tax on the property within this Commonwealth, is hereby assessed, and shall be paid by every person chargeable with the said tax at the time the same shall become due, and the Sheriffs of the several Counties shall have power to levy and collect the same in the same manner and under the like restrictions and limitations, as are or may be prescribed by the laws for raising the Revenues of this State."
"And be it enacted, That for every sum so paid, the Sheriff or Collector shall give a receipt, expressing therein to what society of Christians the person from whom he may receive the same shall direct the money to be paid, keeping a distinct account thereof in his books. . . ."
60 Stat. 230, ch. 281, §§ 4, 11(d)(3).
See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 245 U. S. 390; Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50.
Ed.Code of Cal. (Deering, 1944) § 8286; 6 Ind.Stat.Ann. (Burns, 1933) 1945 Supp. § 28-505a; 1 Code of Iowa ch. 299, § 299.2 (1946); Ky.Rev.Stat. (1946) § 158.220; 1 Rev.Stat. of Maine (1944) ch. 37, § 131; 2 Ann.Laws of Mass. (1945) ch. 76, § 1; Minn.Stat. (1945) § 132.05; N.Y. Education Law § 3210(1); 8 Ore.Comp.Laws Ann. (1940) § 111-3014; 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. (Purdon, 1930) 1947 Supp. § 1563; 1 Code of S.D. (1939) § 15.3202; 1 Code of W.Va. (1943) § 1847.
"a. A minor required by the provisions of part one of this article to attend upon instruction shall attend regularly as prescribed where he resides or is employed, for the entire time the appropriate public schools or classes are in session and shall be subordinate and orderly while so attending."
"b. Absence for religious observance and education shall be permitted under rules that the commissioner shall establish."
"1 Absence of a pupil from school during school hours for religious observance and education to be had outside the school building and grounds will be excused upon the request in writing signed by the parent or guardian of the pupil."
"2 The courses in religious observance and education must be maintained and operated by or under the control of a duly constituted religious body or of duly constituted religious bodies."
"3 Pupils must be registered for the courses and a copy of the registration filed with the local public school authorities."
"4 Reports of attendance of pupils upon such courses shall be filed with the principal or teacher at the end of each week."
"5 Such absence shall be for not more than one hour each week at the close of a session at a time to be fixed by the local school authorities."
"6 In the event that more than one school for religious observance and education is maintained in any district, the hour for absence for each particular public school in such district shall be the same for all such religious schools."
On November 13, 1940, rules to govern the released time program of the New York City schools were adopted by the Board of Education of the City of New York. Under these rules, the practice of the religious education program is this: classes in religious education are to be held outside of school buildings; establishment of the program rests in the initiative of the church and home; enrollment is voluntary, and accomplished by this technique: the church distributes cards to the parents, and these are filled out and presented to the school; records of enrollment and arrangements for release are handled by school authorities; discipline is the responsibility of the church, and children who do not attend are kept at school and given other work. See Rules of the Board of Education of the City of New York adopted Nov. 13, 1940; Public Education Association, Released Time for Religious Education in New York City's Schools (1943); id. (1945).
Constitutional approval by the New York Court of Appeals of these practices was given before the passage of Education Law § 3210(1). People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y.195, 156 N.E. 663.
The New York City program is supervised by The Greater New York Coordinating Committee on Released Time, a group of laymen drawn from Jews, Protestants and Roman Catholics. This Committee is an example of a broad national effort to bring about religious education of children through cooperative action of schools and groups of members of various religious denominations. The methods vary in different states and cities, but are basically like the work of the New York City Committee. See Brief Sketches of Weekday Church Schools, Department of Weekday Religious Education, International Council of Religious Education, Chicago, Illinois (1944).
The use of school buildings is not unusual. See Davis, Weekday Classes in Religious Education, U.S. Office of Education (Bulletin 1941, No. 3) 27; National Education Association, The State and Sectarian Education, Research Bulletin (Feb.1946) 36. The International Council of Religious Education advises that church buildings be used if possible. Shaver, Remember the Weekday, International Council of Religious Education (1946).
"Today, approximately two thousand communities in all but two states provide religious education in cooperation with the public schools for more than a million and a half of pupils."
Shaver, The Movement for Weekday Religious Education, Religious Education (Jan.-Feb.1946), p. 7.
Many uses of religious material in the public schools in a manner that has some religious significance have been sanctioned by state courts. These practices have been permitted: reading selections from the King James Bible without comment; reading the Bible and repeating the Lord's Prayer; teaching the Ten Commandments; saying prayers, and using textbooks based upon the Bible and emphasizing its fundamental teachings. When conducted in a sectarian manner, reading from the Bible and singing hymns in the school's morning exercise have been prohibited, as has using the Bible as a textbook. There is a conflict of authority on the question of the constitutionality of wearing religious garb while teaching in the public schools. It has been held to be constitutional for school authorities to prohibit the reading of the Bible in the public schools. There is a conflict of authority on the constitutionality of the use of public school buildings for religious services held outside of school hours. The constitutionality, under state constitutions, of furnishing free textbooks and free transportation to parochial school children is in conflict. See Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930; Findley v. City of Conneaut, 12 Ohio Supp. 161. The earlier cases are collected in 5 A.L.R. 866 and 141 A.L.R. 1144.
Rules of the House of Representatives (1943) Rule VII; Senate Manual (1947) 6, fn. 2.
Army Reg., No. 60-5 (1944); U.S. Navy Reg. (1920), ch. 1, § 2 and ch. 34, §§ 1-2.
Board of Education Rules, ch. VI, § 4.
"Attendance at chapel is part of a cadet's training; no cadet will be exempted. Each cadet will receive religious training in one of the three principal faiths: Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish."
"Midshipmen shall attend church services on Sundays at the Naval Academy Chapel or at one of the regularly established churches in the city of Annapolis."
Morning prayers are also required at Annapolis. U.S. Naval Academy Reg., Art. 4301(a): "Daily, except on Sundays, a Chaplain will conduct prayers in the mess hall, immediately before breakfast." Protestant and Catholic Chaplains take their turn in leading these prayers.
The principles of the First Amendment were absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pennecamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 328 U. S. 335.
See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 274 U. S. 371; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 98 U. S. 166; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 303; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 312 U. S. 574, 312 U. S. 576; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 315 U. S. 571; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158.
Cf. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28.
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331; Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280; Lusthaus v. Comm'r, 327 U. S. 293.

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