Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/450/582/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:57:47+00:00

Document:
Sections 309(a) and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934 (Act) empower the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to grant an application for renewal or transfer of a radio broadcast license only if it determines that "the public interest, convenience, and necessity" will be served thereby. In implementation of these provisions, the FCC, pursuant to its rulemaking authority, issued a Policy Statement concluding, with respect to ruling on applications for license renewal or transfer, that the public interest is best served by promoting diversity in a radio station's entertainment formats through market forces and competition among broadcasters, and that review of an applicant station's format changes was not compelled by the Act's language or history, would not advance the radio-listening public's welfare, and would deter innovation in radio programming. On respondent citizen groups' petition for review of the Policy Statement, the Court of Appeals held that it violated the Act, concluding that the FCC's reliance on market forces to develop diversity in programming was an unreasonable interpretation of the Act's public interest standard, and that, in certain circumstances, the FCC is required to regard a change in entertainment format as a substantial and material fact requiring a hearing to determine whether a license renewal or transfer is in the public interest.
Held: The FCC's Policy Statement is not inconsistent with the Act, and is a constitutionally permissible means of implementing the Act's public interest standard. Pp. 450 U. S. 593-604.
and has conclude that its statutory duties are best fulfilled by not attempting to oversee format change. Pp. 450 U. S. 595-596.
(b) The FCC's implementation of the public interest standard, when based on a rational weighing of competing policies, is not to be set aide by the Court of Appeals, for "the weighing of policies under the public interest' standard is a task that Congress has delegated to the Commission in the first instance." FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775, 436 U. S. 810. Here, the FCC's position on review of format changes reflects a reasonable accommodation of the policy of promoting diversity in programming and the policy of avoiding unnecessary restrictions on licensee discretion. P. 450 U. S. 596.
(c) The Policy Statement is consistent with the legislative history of the Act and with the FCC's traditional view that the public interest is best served by promoting diversity in entertainment programing through market forces. Pp. 450 U. S. 597-599.
(d) The Policy Statement does not conflict with the First Amendment rights of listeners, since the FCC seeks to further the interests of the listening public as a whole, and the First Amendment does not grant individual listeners the right to have the FCC review the abandonment of their favorite entertainment programs. Pp. 450 U. S. 603-604.
197 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 610 F.2d 838, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 450 U. S. 604.
whether there are circumstances in which the Commission must review past or anticipated changes in a station's entertainment programming when it rules on an application for renewal or transfer of a radio broadcast license. The Commission's present position is that it may rely on market forces to promote diversity in entertainment programming, and thus serve the public interest.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That court held that the Commission's Policy Statement violated the Act. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
"preservation of a format [that] would otherwise disappear, although economically and technologically viable and preferred by a significant number of listeners, is generally in the public interest."
"Congress intended to leave competition in the business of broadcasting where it found it, to permit a licensee . . . to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his programs attractive to the public. [Footnote 13]"
"the market is the allocation mechanism of preference for entertainment formats, and . . . Commission supervision in this area will not be conducive either to producing program diversity [or] satisfied radio listeners. [Footnote 20] "
to review format changes whenever there is "strong prima facie evidence that the market has, in fact, broken down." Id. at 332, 610 F.2d at 851. Second, the court stated that the administrative problems posed by the format doctrine were not insurmountable. Hearings would only be required in a small number of cases, and the Commission could cope with problems such as classifying radio format by adopting "a rational classification schema." Id. at 334, 610 F.2d at 853. Third, the court observed that the Commission had not demonstrated that the format doctrine would deter innovative programming. [Footnote 24] Finally, the court explained that it had not directed the Commission to engage in censorship or to impose common carrier obligations on licensees: WEFM did not authorize the Commission to interfere with licensee programming choices or to force retention of an existing format; it merely stated that the Commission had the power to consider a station's format in deciding whether license renewal or transfer would be consistent with the public interest. 197 U.S.App.D.C. at 332-333, 610 F.2d at 851-852.
Rejecting the Commission's reliance on market forces to develop diversity in programming as an unreasonable interpretation of the Act's public interest standard, the Court of Appeals held that, in certain circumstances, the Commission is required to regard a change in entertainment format as a substantial and material fact in deciding whether a license renewal or transfer is in the public interest. With all due respect, however, we are unconvinced that the Court of Appeals' format doctrine is compelled by the Act, and that the Commission's interpretation of the public interest standard must therefore be set aside.
The Commission has provided a rational explanation for its conclusion that reliance on the market is the best method of promoting diversity in entertainment formats. The Court of Appeals and the Commission agree that, in the vast majority of cases, market forces provide sufficient diversity. The Court of Appeals favors Government intervention when there is evidence that market forces have deprived the public of a "unique" format, while the Commission is content to rely on the market, pointing out that, in many cases, when a station changes its format, other stations will change their formats to attract listeners who preferred the discontinued format. The Court of Appeals places great value on preserving diversity among formats, while the Commission emphasizes the value of intra-format as well as inter-format diversity. Finally, the Court of Appeals is convinced that review of format changes would result in a broader range of formats, while the Commission believes that Government intervention is likely to deter innovative programming.
all relevant facts ha[d] been fully explored in an evidentiary hearing, [the Commission] would have no assurance that a decision finally reached by [the Commission] would contribute more to listener satisfaction than the result favored by station management.'"
Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 865 (1976). It did not assert that reliance on the marketplace would achieve a perfect correlation between listener preferences and available entertainment programming. Rather, it recognized that a perfect correlation would never be achieved, and it concluded that the marketplace alone could best accommodate the varied and changing tastes of the listening public. These predictions are within the institutional competence of the Commission.
Act, Congress did not unequivocally express its disfavor of entertainment format review by the Commission, but neither is there substantial indication that Congress expected the public interest standard to require format regulation by the Commission. The legislative history of the Act does not support the Court of Appeals, and provides insufficient basis for invalidating the agency's construction of the Act.
"take an extra hard look at the reasonableness of any proposal which would deprive a community of its only source of a particular type of programming. [Footnote 42]"
However, the Commission's later Policy Statement concluded that this approach was "neither administratively tenable nor necessary in the public interest." [Footnote 43] It is thus apparent that, although the Commission was obliged to modify its policies to conform to the Court of Appeals' format doctrine, the Policy Statement reasserted the Commission's traditional preference for achieving diversity in entertainment programming through market forces.
"a substantial and material question of fact [requiring an evidentiary hearing] is raised only when it appears that the licensee has abused its broad discretion by acting unreasonably or in bad faith."
the amount of nonentertainment programming radio stations must offer, formal requirements governing ascertainment of community needs, and guidelines limiting commercial time. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed.Reg. 13888 (1981) (to be codified at 47 CFR Parts O and 73).
These cases do not require us to consider whether the Commission's present or past policies in the area of nonentertainment programming comply with the Act. We attach some weight to the fact that the Commission has consistently expressed a preference for promoting diversity in entertainment programming through market forces, but our decision ultimately rests on our conclusion that the Commission has provided a reasonable explanation for this preference in its Policy Statement.
"If time and changing circumstances reveal that the 'public interest' is not served by application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations."
319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 225.
Contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Commission's Policy Statement is not inconsistent with the Act. It is also a constitutionally permissible means of implementing the public interest standard of the Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
* Together with No. 79-825, Insilco Broadcasting Corp. et al. v. WNCN Listeners Guild et al.; No. 79-826, American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., et al. v. WNCN Listeners Guild et al.; and No. 79-827, National Association of Broadcasters et al. v. WNCN Listeners Guild et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
We shall refer to transfers and assignments of licenses as "transfers."
"Subject to the provisions of this section, the Commission shall determine, in the case of each application filed with it to which section 308 of this title applies, whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such application, and, if the Commission, upon examination of such application and upon consideration of such other matters as the Commission may officially notice, shall find that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall grant such application."
"No construction permit or station license, or any rights thereunder shall be transferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or by transfer of control of any corporation holding such permit or license, to any person except upon application to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby."
The Act requires broadcasting station licensees to apply for license renewal every three years. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d). It provides that the Commission shall grant the application for renewal if it determines that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a).
Section 309(d)(1) of the Act provides that any party in interest may petition the Commission to deny an application for license transfer or renewal, but the petition must contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that granting the application would be "prima facie inconsistent" with the public interest. If the Commission determines on the basis of the application, the pleadings filed, or other matters which it may officially notice that no substantial and material questions of fact are presented, it may grant the application and deny the petition without conducting a hearing. § 309(d)(2). However, if a substantial and material question of fact is presented or if the Commission is unable to determine that granting the application would be consistent with the public interest, the Commission must conduct a hearing on the application. § 309(d)(2).
Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 506 F.2d 246 (1974) (en banc); Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 478 F.2d 926 (1973); Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. FCC, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 478 F.2d 919 (1973); Hartford Communications Committee v. FCC, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 467 F.2d 408 (1972); Citizens Committee to Preserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v. FCC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 436 F.2d 263 (1970).
We shall refer to the Court of Appeals' views on when the Commission must review changes in entertainment format as the "format doctrine," and we shall often refer to a change in entertainment programming by a radio broadcaster as a change in format.
In Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, for example, the court directed the Commission to consider whether a "fine arts" format was a reasonable substitute for a classical music format. 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 203-204, 506 F.2d at 264 265. The court observed that 19th-century classical music and 20th-century classical music could be classified as different formats, since "the loss of either would unquestionably lessen diversity." Id. at 204, n. 28, 506 F.2d at 265, n. 28.
These criteria were summarized by the Court of Appeals in the opinion below. 197 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 323-324, 610 F.2d 838, 842-843 (1979). It was also stated that the format doctrine logically applies to renewal, as well as transfer, applications. The court noted that a mid-term format change would not be considered until the broadcaster applied for license renewal. Id. at 330, and n. 29, 610 F.2d at 849, and n. 29. See also Citizens Committee to Preserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v. FCC, supra at 118, 436 F.2d at 272.
See Citizens Committee to Preserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v. FCC, supra at 113, 436 F.2d at 267. See also 197 U.S.App.D.C. at 330, n. 31, 610 F.2d at 849, n. 31.
Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, supra, at 207, and n. 34, 506 F.2d at 268, and n. 34.
"[F]ailure to render a reasoned decision will be, as always, reversible error. No more is required, no less is accepted."
156 U.S.App.D.C. at 24, 478 F.2d at 934.
Notice of Inquiry, Development of Policy re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1976).
The Commission also invited interested parties to consider the impact of the format doctrine on First Amendment values.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (Policy Statement), reconsideration denied, 66 F.C.C.2d 78 (1977).
The Commission observed that radio broadcasters naturally compete in the area of program formats, since there is virtually no other form of competition available. A staff study of program diversity in major markets supported the Commission's view that competition is effective in promoting diversity in entertainment formats. Policy Statement, supra at 861.
"Our traditional view has been that the station's entertainment format is a matter best left to the discretion of the licensee or applicant, since he will tend to program to meet certain preferences of the area and fill significant voids which are left by the programming of other stations. The Commission's accumulated experience indicates that . . . [f]requently, when a station changes its format, other stations in the area adjust or change their formats in an effort to secure the listenership of the discontinued format."
Section 3(h) of the Act provides that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not . . . be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h). See also FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 309 U. S. 474 (1940) ("[B]roadcasters are not common carriers, and are not to be dealt with as such. Thus, the [Communications] Act recognizes that the field of broadcasting is one of free competition") (footnote omitted).
The Commission discussed the problems arising from "the obligation to continue service" created by the Court of Appeals' format doctrine. The Commission apparently used this phrase to describe those cases in which it thought the Court of Appeals would hold that an application for license transfer or renewal should have been denied because the abandonment of a unique entertainment format was inconsistent with the public interest. Although the format cases only addressed whether a hearing was required, the Court of Appeals implied that, in some situations, the Commission would be required to deny an application because of a change in entertainment format. See Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 156 U.S.App.D.C. at 24, 478 F.2d at 934.
"[t]he existence of the obligation to continue service . . . inevitably deprives the public of the best efforts of the broadcast industry and results in an inhibition of constitutionally protected forms of communication with no off-setting justifications, either in terms of specific First Amendment or diversity-related values or in broader public interest terms."
Policy Statement, supra, at 865.
In the Notice of Inquiry, the Commission discussed the difficult task of categorizing formats, noting that the Court of Appeals had suggested in the WEFM case that 19th-century classical music should be distinguished from 20th-century classical music. Notice of Inquiry, supra at 583, and n. 2.
Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d at 862-864.
The Commission pointed out that a significant segment of the public may strongly prefer one station to another even if both stations play the same type of music. Although it would be difficult for the Commission to compare the strength of intra-format preferences to the strength of inter-format preferences, market forces would naturally respond to intra-format preferences, albeit in an imperfect manner. Id. at 863-864.
Id. at 866, n. 8.
The court was of the view that the Commission's "Notice of Inquiry" revealed a substantial bias against the WEFM decision, and that the Commission had overstated the administrative problems created by the format doctrine.
"Petitioners urge this defect as an independent ground for overturning the Commission. We agree that the study does raise serious questions about the overall rationality and fairness of the Commission's decision. However, because certain broader defects, of which the study is symptomatic, are fatal to the Commission's action, we need not decide whether the failure to obtain public comment on the study is itself of sufficient gravity to warrant rejection of the Policy Statement."
197 U.S.App.D.C. at 328, n. 24, 610 F.2d at 847, n. 24.
Respondents urge the Court to set aside the Policy Statement because of this alleged procedural error if the Court determines that the Commission's views do not conflict with the Act or the First Amendment. We have considered the submissions of the parties and do not consider the action of the Commission, even if a procedural lapse, to be a sufficient ground for reopening the proceedings before the Commission.
The court observed, as it had in WEFM, that, because broadcasters rely on advertising revenue, they tend to serve persons with large discretionary incomes. 197 U.S.App.D.C. at 332, 610 F.2d at 851. The dissenting opinion noted that the Commission had not rejected this assumption. Id. at 341, 610 F.2d at 861.
The court stated that the Commission's staff study demonstrated that licensees had continued to develop diverse entertainment formats after the WEFM decision.
The court acknowledged that Congress had entrusted to the Commission the task of ensuring that license grants are used in the public interest. Nevertheless, the Commission's position on review of entertainment format changes "could not be sustained even when all due deference was given that construction." 197 U.S.App.D.C. at 336, n. 51, 610 F.2d at 855, n. 51.
The Court of Appeals was not satisfied that the market functioned adequately in every case; nor was it persuaded that the loss of a unique format is comparable to the loss of a favorite station within a particular format.
Two judges dissented, arguing that the Policy Statement should have been upheld, since the Commission had made a reasonable judgment that the format doctrine was unnecessary to further the public interest. A third judge agreed with the dissenters that the majority had not accorded sufficient deference to the Commission's judgment, but concluded that the Commission's order should be vacated so that the record could be reopened to permit public comment on the staff study.
The Act provides in general terms that the Commission shall perform administrative functions "as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires." 47 U.S.C. § 303.
See 47 U.S.C. § 303(r), quoted in n 12, supra.
"The reviewing court shall -- "
"(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. . . ."
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, we observed that a reviewing court applying this standard "is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.'" 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 803, quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 401 U. S. 416 (1971).
FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra at 436 U. S. 814, quoting FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 365 U. S. 29 (1961) .
See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 440 U. S. 705 (1979) (recognizing the "policy of the Act to preserve editorial control of programming in the licensee"); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 412 U. S. 120 (1973) (discussing the Commission's duty to chart a workable "middle course" to preserve "essentially private broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable to public interest standards").
Congress rejected a proposal to allocate 25% of all radio stations to educational, religious, agricultural, and similar nonprofit associations. See 78 Cong.Rec. 8843-8846 (1934).
44 Stat. 1162. The Radio Act of 1927 was the predecessor to the Communications Act.
This bill would have required the administrative agency created by the Radio Act of 1927 to prescribe "priorities as to subject matter to be observed by each class of licensed stations." H.R. 7357, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1(B) (1924).
Hearings on H.R. 5589 before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1926).
44 Stat. 1172-1173. See Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1754 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 (1926); H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 16-19 (1927).
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), the Court concluded that, although this section prohibits the Commission from editing proposed broadcasts in advance, it does not preclude subsequent review of program content. Id. at 438 U. S. 735, 438 U. S. 737.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 395 U. S. 381 (1969). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra at 412 U. S. 121.
See, e.g., En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2308-2309 (1960); Bay Radio, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 1351, 1364 (1957).
Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 679-680 (1971).
"Our view has been that the station's program format is a matter best left to the discretion of the licensee or applicant, since, as a matter of public acceptance and economic necessity, he will tend to program to meet the preferences of the area and fill whatever void is left by the programming of other stations."
The Commission noted that this policy only applied to entertainment programming.
"It does not include matters such as an increase in commercial matter or decrease in the amount of non-entertainment programming, both of which are subjects of review and concern, and have been for some time."
Id. at 679, n. 15.
"To the extent that the Commission exercises some direct control of programming, it is primarily through the fairness doctrine and political broadcasting rules pursuant to Section 315. In both cases, the Commission's role is limited to directing the licensee to broadcast some additional material so as not to completely ignore the viewpoints of others in the community. . . . These regulations are extremely narrow, the Commission's role is limited by strictly defined standards, and the licensee is left with virtually unrestricted discretion in programming most of the broadcast day. In contrast, [under the format doctrine] we would be faced with the prospect of rejecting virtually the entire broadcast schedule proposed by the private licensee. . . ."
Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 231 (1973) (additional views of Chairman Burch).
Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d at 86, n. 8.
It is asserted that the Policy Statement violates the Act because it does not contain a "safety valve" procedure. The dissent relies primarily on National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943), and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 (1956). In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, the Court noted that license applicants had been advised by the Commission that they could call to its attention any reason why the challenged chain broadcasting rule should be modified or held inapplicable to their situations. 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 207. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., the Court observed that, under the Commission's regulations, an applicant who alleged "adequate reasons why the [Multiple Ownership] Rules should be waived or amended" would be granted a hearing. 351 U.S. at 351 U. S. 205. In each case the Court considered the validity of the challenged rules in light of the flexibility provided by the procedures. However, it did not hold that the Commission may never adopt a rule that lacks a waiver provision.
"The ascertainment of the needed elements of the broadcast matter to be provided by a particular licensee for the audience he is obligated to serve remains primarily the function of the licensee. His honest and prudent judgments will be accorded great weight by the Commission. Indeed, any other course would tend to substitute the judgment of the Commission for that of the licensee."
Respondents place particular emphasis on the role of foreign language programming in providing information to non-English-speaking citizens. However, the Policy Statement only applies to entertainment programming. It does not address the broadcaster's obligation to respond to community needs in the area of informational programming. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 81 (remarks of counsel for the Commission).
Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94 (1973) (the First Amendment does not require the Commission to adopt a "fairness doctrine" with respect to paid editorial advertisements).
Under §§ 309(a) and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
The Commission further contends that enforcement of the format doctrine would impose "common carrier" obligations on broadcasters and substitute for "the imperfect system of free competition . . . a system of broadcast programming by government decree." [Footnote 2/7] Were this an accurate description of the format doctrine, I would join the Court in reversing the judgment below. [Footnote 2/8] However, I agree with the Court of Appeals that "the actual features of [its format doctrine] are scarcely visible in [the Commission's] highly colored portrait." 197 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 332, 610 F.2d 838, 851 (1979).
"the Commission's obligation to consider format issues arises only when there is strong prima facie evidence that the market has, in fact, broken down,"
dissenting is no substantial support for the endangered format as evidenced by an outcry of public protest, (3) the devotees of the endangered format are too few to be served by the available frequencies, or (4) the format is not financially viable."
Id. at 332, 610 F.2d at 851. Finally, the Court of Appeals indicated that the Commission's obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing is limited to those situations in which the record presents substantial questions of material fact. Id. at 324, 610 F.2d at 843. The Court of Appeals thus made clear that the format doctrine comes into play only in a few limited situations. Consequently, the issue presented by these cases is not whether the Commission may adopt a general policy of relying on licensee discretion and market forces to ensure diversity in entertainment programming formats. Rather, the question before us is whether the Commission may apply its general policy on format changes indiscriminately, and without regard to the effect in particular cases.
And we have recognized "the long-established regulatory goals of . . . diversification of programming." FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 440 U. S. 699 (1979). At the same time, our cases have acknowledged that the Commission enjoys broad discretion in determining how best to accomplish this goal. See FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775 (1978); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra. The Commission has concluded that a general policy of relying on market forces is the best method for promoting diversity in entertainment programming formats. As the majority notes, ante at 450 U. S. 595, this determination largely rests on the Commission's predictions about licensee behavior and the functioning of the radio broadcasting market.
I agree with the majority that predictions of this sort are within the Commission's institutional competence. I am also willing to assume that a general policy of disregarding format changes in making the "public interest" determination required by the Act is not inconsistent with the Commission's statutory obligation to give individualized consideration to each application. The Commission has broad rulemaking powers under the Act, [Footnote 2/11] and we have approved efforts by the Commission to implement the Act's "public interest" requirement through rules and policies of general application. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra; United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 (1956); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra.
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra. The Act imposes an affirmative duty on the Commission to make a particularized "public interest" determination for each application that comes before it. As we explained in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra at 319 U. S. 225, the Commission must, in each case, "exercise an ultimate judgment whether the grant of a license would serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity.'" The Policy Statement completely forecloses any possibility that the Commission will reexamine the validity of its general policy on format changes as it applies to particular situations. Thus, even when it can be conclusively demonstrated that a particular radio market does not function in the manner predicted by the Commission, the Policy Statement indicates that the Commission will blindly assume that a proposed format change is in the "public interest." This result would occur even where reliance on the market to ensure format diversity is shown to be misplaced, and where it thus appears that action by the Commission is necessary to promote the public interest in diversity. This outcome is not consistent with the Commission's statutory responsibilities.
Moreover, our cases have indicated that an agency's discretion to proceed in complex areas through general rules is intimately connected to the existence of a "safety valve" procedure that allows the agency to consider applications for exemptions based on special circumstances. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U. S. 112, 430 U. S. 128 (1977); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 390 U. S. 771-772 (1968); FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 377 U. S. 40-41 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., supra at 351 U. S. 204-205; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra at 319 U. S. 207, 319 U. S. 225. See also WAIT Radio v. FCC, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 321, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (1969); American Airlines v. CAB, 123 U.S.App. D C. 310, 359 F.2d 624 (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (CA2), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968).
"Commission provided that 'networks will be given full opportunity, on proper application . . . to call our attention to any reasons why the principle should be modified or held inapplicable.'"
"the Commission is charged with administration in the 'public interest.' That an agency may discharge its responsibilities by promulgating rules of general application which, in the overall perspective, establish the 'public interest' for a broad range of situations, does not relieve it of an obligation to seek out the 'public interest' in particular, individualized cases. A general rule implies that a commission need not re-study the entire problem de novo and reconsider policy every time it receives an application for a waiver of the rule. On the other hand, a general rule, deemed valid because its overall objectives are in the public interest, may not be in the 'public interest' if extended to an applicant who proposes a new service that will not undermine the policy, served by the rule, that has been adjudged in the public interest."
WAIT Radio v. FCC, supra at 321, 418 F.2d at 1157.
"take an extra hard look at the reasonableness of any proposal which would deprive a community of its only source of a particular type of programming. [Footnote 2/13]"
the circumstances in which the Commission must temper its general policy in view of special circumstances. Perhaps the court would have been better advised to leave the task of defining these situations to the Commission. [Footnote 2/14] But one need not endorse every feature of the Court of Appeals' approach to conclude that the court correctly invalidated the Commission's Policy Statement because of its omission of a "safety valve" procedure.
system of broadcasting must serve significant minorities among our population, and the less dominant needs and tastes which most listeners have from time to time. [Footnote 2/18]"
area. [Footnote 2/27] In each case, the Commission reviewed submissions ranging from general summaries to transcripts of programs, to determine whether the licensee's programming met the public interest standard.
"is limited to directing the licensee to broadcast some additional material so as not to completely ignore the viewpoints of others in the community. [Footnote 2/28]"
This "limited involvement in licensee decisionmaking in the area of news and public affairs" [Footnote 2/29] is contrasted, in the Commission's view, to "the pervasive, censorial nature of the involvement in format regulation." [Footnote 2/30] The majority presumably concludes that the Commission has provided a rational explanation for distinguishing between entertainment and nonentertainment programming. With all due respect, I disagree.
In the first place, the distinction the Commission tries to draw between entertainment and nonentertainment programming is questionable. It is not immediately apparent, for example, why children's programming necessarily falls on the "nonentertainment" side of the spectrum, and the Commission has provided no explanation of how it decides the category to which particular programming belongs. Second, I see no reason why the Commission's review of entertainment programming cannot be as limited as its review of nonentertainment programming. Nothing prevents the Commission from limiting its role in reviewing format changes to "directing the licensee to broadcast additional material," thereby ensuring that the viewpoints of listeners who complain about a proposed format change are not completely ignored. Third, and most important, neither the fairness doctrine nor the political broadcasting rules have anything to do with the various situations described above in which the Commission has not hesitated to consider program formats in making the "public interest" determination. The fairness doctrine imposes an obligation on licensees to devote a "reasonable percentage"
of broadcast time to controversial issues of public importance, and it requires that the coverage be fair in that it accurately reflect the opposing views. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1069). The political broadcasting rules regulate broadcasts by candidates for federal and nonfederal public office. See The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209 (1978). The Commission's examination of whether a broadcaster's format includes programming directed at women or at residents of the local community, or its requirement that licensees provide programming designed to serve the unique needs of children, simply has nothing to do with either the fairness doctrine or the political broadcasting rules. Thus, the Commission's purported justification for its inconsistency is no explanation at all, and I am puzzled by the majority's apparent conclusion that it provides a rational basis for the Commission's policy.
The majority attempts to minimize the inconsistency in the Commission's treatment of entertainment and nonentertainment programming by postulating that the difference "is not as pronounced as it may seem," ante at 450 U. S. 602. This observation, even if accurate, is simply beside the point. What is germane is the Commission's failure to consider listener complaints about entertainment programming to the same extent and in the same manner as it reviews complaints about nonentertainment programming. Thus, whereas the Commission will hold an evidentiary hearing to review complaints about nonentertainment programming where "it appears that the licensee has . . . act[ed] unreasonably or in bad faith,'" ibid. (quoting Mississippi Authority for Educational TV, 71 F.C.C.2d 1296, 1308 (1979)), the Commission will not consider an identical complaint about a licensee's change in its entertainment programming. As I have indicated, see supra at 450 U. S. 614-616, neither the Commission nor the majority is able to offer a satisfactory explanation for this inconsistency.
"'[e]ven after all relevant facts [h]ad been fully explored in an evidentiary hearing, [the Commission] would have no assurance that a decision finally reached by [the Commission] would contribute more to listener satisfaction than the result favored by station management.'"
Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 865 (1976), quoting Notice of Inquiry, 57 F.C.C.2d 580, 586 (1976). The same must be true of the decisions the Commission makes after reviewing listener complaints about nonentertainment programming, and I do not see why the Commission finds this result acceptable in one situation but not in the other. Much the same can be said for the majority's suggestion that the Commission should be spared the burden of "presuming to grasp, measure and weigh . . . elusive and difficult factors" such as determining the number of listeners who favor a particular change and measuring the intensity of their preferences, ante at 450 U. S. 601. But insofar as the Commission confronts these same "elusive and difficult factors" in reviewing nonentertainment programming, it need only apply the expertise it has acquired in dealing with these problems to review of entertainment programming.
nightmare" [Footnote 2/32] that would impose "enormous costs on the participants and the Commission alike." [Footnote 2/33] But at oral argument before the Court of Appeals, Commission counsel conceded that the "`administrative nightmare'" argument was an "`exaggeration'" which was not "`very significant at all'" to the Commission's ultimate conclusion. 197 U.S.App.D.C. at 330, 610 F.2d at 849. The Commission's reliance on claims that its own counsel later concedes to lack merit hardly strengthens one's belief in the rationality of its decisionmaking.
Although it has abandoned the "administrative nightmare" argument before this Court, the Commission nonetheless finds other "intractable" administrative problems in format regulation. For example, it insists that meaningful classification of radio broadcasts into format types is impractical, and that it is impossible to determine whether a proposed format change is in the public interest because the intensity of listener preferences cannot be measured. [Footnote 2/34] Moreover, the Commission argues that format regulation will discourage licensee innovation and experimentation with formats, and that its effect on format diversity will therefore be counterproductive.
a welcome contrast to the Commission's speculation -- undermines the Commission's claim that format regulation will disserve the "public interest" because it will inhibit format diversity.
The Commission's Policy Statement is defective because it lacks a "safety valve" procedure that would allow the necessary flexibility in the application of the Commission's general policy on format changes to particular cases. In my judgment, the Court of Appeals' format doctrine was a permissible attempt by that court to provide the Commission with some guidance regarding the types of situations in which a reexamination of general policy might be necessary. Even if one were to conclude that the Court of Appeals described these situations too specifically, a view I do not share, I still think that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Commission's Policy Statement must be vacated.
The pertinent portions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a) and 310(d) are quoted in the majority opinion, ante at 450 U. S. 584-585, n. 2.
I will follow the majority, see ante at 450 U. S. 586, n. 4, in referring to a broadcaster' change in entertainment programming as a format change.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (Policy Statement), reconsideration denied, 66 F.C.C.2d 78 (1977) (Denial of Reconsideration).
The opinion of the Court traces the development of the Court of Appeals' "format doctrine" and the Commission's "Policy Statement," see ante at 450 U. S. 586-593. I will not repeat that discussion here.
Notice of Inquiry, Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580, 582 (1976) (Notice of Inquiry).
Policy Statement, supra at 865 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 619-620 (1971)).
Denial of Reconsideration, supra at 81.
"[t]here would no doubt be severe statutory and constitutional difficulties with any system that required intrusive governmental surveillance, dictated programming choices, forced broad access obligations, or imposed an obligation to continue in service under any and all circumstances."
197 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 331-332, 610 F.2d 838, 850-851 (1979).
See D. Ginsburg, Regulation of Radio Broadcasting 294 (1979) ("An argument against the desirability of diversity' in broadcast programming is difficult to imagine"). See generally Note, A Regulatory Approach to Diversifying Commercial Television Entertainment, 89 Yale L.J. 694 (1980).
Section 303(g) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), directs the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest."
The Commission is authorized to promulgate "such rules and regulations . . . not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act]." 47 U.S.C. § 303(r).
The majority argues, ante at 450 U. S. 601, n. 44, that although the Court considered the presence of a "safety valve" procedure in upholding the rules challenged in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., the Court "did not hold that the Commission may never adopt a rule that lacks a waiver provision." Since this general question was not before the Court in those cases, it is hardly surprising that it did not render an advisory opinion to this effect. What is instructive, however, is the majority's inability to explain why a waiver provision was necessary in those cases, but is not required in the instant situation. As the cases cited in text make clear, this Court and the lower federal courts have insisted on a "safety valve" feature in upholding general rules promulgated by a variety of agencies. I believe it is incumbent on those who would depart from this practice to explain their reasoning.
Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 231 (1973) (additional views of Chairman Burch) (joined by a majority of the Commissioners).
Confronted as it was by the Commission's resistance to its format doctrine, it is easy to understand why the Court of Appeals felt compelled to undertake this task.
Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d at 863.
Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946).
En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1974).
Channel 20, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 1770 (1979).
Central California Communications Corp., 70 F.C.C.2d 1947 (1979).
Mississippi Authority for Educational TV, 71 F.C.C.2d 1296 (1979); Alabama Educational Television Comm'n, 33 F.C.C.2d 495 (1971), renewal denied, 50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975).
Educational Broadcasting Corp., 70 F.C.C.2d 2204 (1979).
As the majority notes, ante at 450 U. S. 602-603, the Commission recently voted to reduce its role in regulating several aspects of commercial radio broadcasting, including regulation of nonentertainment programming. Thus, the Commission has announced its intention of eliminating its current guideline on the amounts of nonentertainment programming that radio stations should air. And the Commission has indicated that petitions to deny license renewals based on only the quantity of a licensee's nonentertainment programming will no longer be sufficient to support a challenge. For example, a petitioner would have to show that a licensee is doing little or no programming responsive to community issues in order to successfully challenge renewal of the license. Nonetheless, the Commission reiterated that nonentertainment programming is still a relevant issue for petitions to deny, that licensees have an obligation to offer nonentertainment programming addressing issues facing the community, and that the Commission will continue to inquire into the reasonableness of licensee programming decisions. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed.Reg. 13888, 13890-13897 (1981) (to be codified at 47 CFR Parts 0 and 73).
Denial of Reconsideration, 66 F.C.C.2d at 83 (emphasis in original).
Brief for Federal Communications Commission and United States 35.
Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d at 856.
The Commission also insists that any findings about the financial viability of a particular format would be entirely speculative.
See Policy Statement, supra at 873-881.
There have been a number of comments and suggestions about how the Commission might best accomplish this task. See, e.g., 57 F.C.C.2d at 587-589 (concurring statement of Commissioner Hooks); D. Ginsburg, supra, n. 9, at 316; Note, Judicial Review of FCC Program Diversity Regulation, 75 Colum.L.Rev. 401, 436-437 (1975).
"dispensing altogether with the need for classifying formats by simply taking the existence of significant and bona fide listener protest as sufficient evidence that the station's endangered programming has certain unique features for which there are no ready substitutes."
"this approach would focus attention on the essentials of the format doctrine, namely, that, when a significant sector of the populace is aggrieved by a planned programming change, this fact raises a legitimate question as to whether the proposed change is in the public interest."
Id. at 334-335, n. 47, 610 F.2d at 853-854, n. 47.
See Policy Statement, supra at 875-880.
Nor do I find merit in the Commission's claim that there are serious First Amendment problems with format regulation. In the first place, I see no reason to find constitutional defect in limited review of entertainment formats when no such defect arises with review of nonentertainment programming. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 395 U. S. 395 (1969), we held that the Commission does not transgress the First Amendment "in interesting itself in general program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees." Indeed, First Amendment principles, if anything, would support format review as requested by listeners, for, as we indicated in Red Lion, "[i]t is the [First Amendment] right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. at 395 U. S. 390.
All this suggests that the "practical difficulties" the Commission has identified are not intractable, and that these problems could be solved if the Commission channelled as much energy into devising workable standards as it has devoted to mischaracterizing the Court of Appeals' format doctrine.

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