Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/appellate/119wnapp/119wnapp0405.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:34:12+00:00

Document:
119 Wn. App. 405, City of Bellevue v. E. Bellevue Cmty. Mun. Corp.
THE CITY OF BELLEVUE, Appellant, v. EAST BELLEVUE COMMUNITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
Elaine L. Spencer (of Graham & Dunn, P.C.), for appellant.
Carol A. Morris (of Law Office of Carol A. Morris, P.C.); Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Eckholm, Assistant; and John R. Aramburu, for respondent.
BAKER, J. - The city of Bellevue (City) challenges a Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board (Board) decision invalidating an ordinance which exempts shopping center redevelopment from certain Growth Management Act«1» (GMA) requirements. The City also seeks a writ of prohibition preventing the East Bellevue Community Municipal Corporation from bringing challenges to the City's actions before the hearings board when such actions fall outside the community corporation's limited legal powers.
Because the community does not have authority to bring suits challenging ordinances outside its service area, we grant the requested writ of prohibition. But because individual citizens have raised identical challenges to the ordinance, we address the Board's decision. We conclude that the GMA does not allow a city to circumvent its own statutorily required concurrency ordinance, and affirm the board's decision invalidating Bellevue's ordinance.
Bellevue first argues that the East Bellevue Community Municipal Corporation exceeded its power in mounting this appeal to the Board, and that the only appropriate remedy available is a writ of prohibition.
It is undisputed that the Growth Management Hearings Board had jurisdiction to hear the community's petition.«4» At issue is whether the community council had the authority to bring the appeal before the Board.
«3» Brower v. Charles, 82 Wn. App. 53, 57, 914 P.2d 1202 (1996) (citing Winsor v. Bridges, 24 Wash. 540, 543, 64 P. 780 (1901)).
«4» RCW 36.70A.280. The statute requires that the Board hear and determine petitions filed by the state, county, city, or a person. The statute defines person as an "individual, partnership, corporation, association, . . . or public or private organization." RCW 36.70A.280(3).
«5» 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW § 4.6 (1995).
«6» STOEBUCK, supra. Before allowing a community municipal corporation, RCW 35.14.010 requires that (1) the service area would be eligible for incorporation as a city or town; or (2) the service area has at least 300 inhabitants and 10 percent of the population of the annexing city or town; or (3) the service area has a minimum population of 1,000 inhabitants.
«11» Sammamish Cmty. Council v. City of Bellevue, 108 Wn. App. 46, 49, 29 P.3d 728 (2001) (quoting 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.03, at 299 (Dennis Jensen & Gail A. O'Gradney eds., 3d ed. rev. vol. 1996) (footnote omitted)), review denied, 145 Wn.2d 1037 (2002).
The only case addressing the scope of a community council's authority under RCW 35.14.040 is City of Bellevue v. East Bellevue Community Council.«12» In that case, the Supreme Court recognized that RCW 35.14.040 gave community councils final decision-making authority over subjects listed in RCW 35.14.040 applying to land, buildings, or structures within their geographic jurisdictions.«13» But the Supreme Court did not consider whether a council's power extended beyond the explicit scope of the ordinance.
Express language in the statute grants a community council only the power to reject land-use decisions applying to land buildings or structures within the council's service area. The sole other grant of power is the power to advise and consult with municipal corporations on other related matters. We conclude that East Bellevue cannot bring actions before the Board or in superior court that do not fall within its explicit grant of authority, and accordingly, we grant Bellevue's writ of prohibition.
We proceed to address Bellevue's challenge to the merits of the Board's decision because individual petitioners raised identical issues before the Board. Bellevue does not challenge these petitioners' standing.
«12» 138 Wn.2d 937, 983 P.2d 602 (1999).
«13» E. Bellevue, 138 Wn.2d at 940.
«19» The maximum traffic allowed in downtown Bellevue is 0.950 of the road's capacity, while the East Bellevue area's LOS is 0.850 of capacity. BELLEVUE CITY CODE 14.10.030.
«20» Sammamish Cmty. Council, 108 Wn. App. at 50.
«21» Montlake Cmty. Club v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 110 Wn. App. 731, 735, 43 P.3d 57 (2002).
«23» See, e.g., ch. 14.10 BELLEVUE CITY CODE.
C. Level-of-service standards for each mobility management area, to include: reflection of availability of other mobility options; adjustment of levels of service where appropriate; interim standards for specific areas until completion of interlocal negotiations; consideration of trips crossing mobility management area boundaries; use of area-average method of evaluating roadway system adequacy, and use of an averaged two-hour p.m. peak period representing extended high trip volume periods.
«25» The statute previously included exemptions for public transportation facilities, public parks, private not-for-profit social services, public libraries, hospitals, publicly funded education facilities, affordable housing, and nonprofit child care facilities. See BELLEVUE CITY CODE 14.10.020.
a ninth exemption for neighborhood shopping center redevelopment projects.«26» The City justified this exemption on the grounds that these projects would decrease traffic and provide a broad array of necessary goods and services.
Bellevue appeals the Board's decision invalidating the exemption. It argues that the general goals found in RCW 36.70A.020 allow a local municipality to exempt certain developments from the concurrency requirements found in RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b).
When reviewing an administrative decision, this court sits in the same position as the superior court. With respect to issues of law, we apply a de novo standard, giving substantial weight to the Board's interpretation of the statute it administers.«27» While we accord "deference to an agency interpretation of the law where the agency has specialized expertise in dealing with such issues," we are not bound by the agency's conclusions of law.«28» But the burden of showing that the Board erroneously interpreted the law lies on the party who asserts that an error was made.
«26» BELLEVUE CITY CODE 14.20.020.
«27» King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wn.2d 543, 553, 14 P.3d 133 (2000).
«28» City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wn.2d 38, 46, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998).
Bellevue argues that the concurrency requirement cannot trump all other goals of the GMA. The portion of the GMA that Bellevue infers might conflict with imposing a concurrency requirement for neighborhood shopping centers is found in RCW 36.70A.070(2).«32» But concurrency is not a goal, it is a requirement. Moreover, we do not agree that invalidating Bellevue's exemption would lead to a conflict between provisions of the GMA. Rather, concurrency is one of several factors that must be satisfied in order to allow development.«33» Under the clear and plain language of RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b), the City cannot create exemptions to its concurrency ordinance.
(2) A housing element ensuring the vitality and character of established residential neighborhoods that: (a) Includes an inventory and analysis of existing and projected housing needs that identifies the number of housing units necessary to manage projected growth; (b) includes a statement of goals, policies, objectives, and mandatory provisions for the preservation, improvement, and development of housing, including single-family residences; (c) identifies sufficient land for housing, including, but not limited to, government-assisted housing, housing for low-income families, manufactured housing, multifamily housing, and group homes and foster care facilities; and (d) makes adequate provisions for existing and projected needs of all economic segments of the community.
measure traffic impacts from a development proposal for compliance with the GMA, the city can alter the methodology it uses to calculate traffic volume. And, if a proposed development project violates the city's adopted LOS, the city has a variety of options available to it. These may include changing the relevant LOS; modifying traffic patterns so as to reduce nonresident commuter traffic, thus reducing traffic congestion; or creatively addressing traffic mitigation expenses. But a city cannot simply exempt the proposal from compliance with traffic standards it has adopted pursuant to the GMA.
We affirm the Board's conclusion that the ordinance failed to conform to the GMA's concurrency requirements, and is therefore invalid.
COLEMAN and APPELWICK, JJ., concur.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 4
 v. 
 § 10
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.