Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1986/12/31/1-wickremaratne-and-aother-v-alpenis-perera/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:35:17+00:00

Document:
NOVEMBER 18-21.26. 28 AND 29. 1985.
Prescription among co-owners-Proof of ouster-Partition action.
In a partition action for a lot of land claimed by the plaintiff to be a divided portion of alarger land, he must adduce proof that the co-owner who originated the division andsuch co-owner&apos;s successors had prescribed to that divided portion by adversepossession for at least ten years from the date of ouster or something equivalent toouster. Where such co-owner had himself executed deeds for undivided shares of thelarger land after the year of the alleged dividing off it will militate against the plea ofprescription. Possession of divided portions by different co-owners is in no wayinconsistent with common possession.
A coowner&apos;s possession is in law the-possession of other co-owners. Every.co-owneris presumed to be in possession in his capacity as co-owner. A cp-owner cannot put anend to his possession as co-owner by a secret intention in h&apos;is rriindr.Nothing shorp&apos;olouster or something equivalent to ouster could bring about that result.
taken for the first time in appeal..
MohamedalyAdamjee v. Hadad Sadeen (1956) 58 NLR 2.1 7, 225.
Girigoris Appuhamy v. Maria Nona (1956) 60 NLR 330, 331.
Kodituwakku v. Anver and Others C:A. 13/81 D.C. Matara 7475/P. G.Aof 10.12. 1985.
.(6) Karunaratne v. Sirimalie (1951) 53 NLR 444.
(.7) Sediris Appuhamy v. James Appuhamy (1.958) 60 NLR 297. 302- 303.
(8) Danton Obeysekera v. Endoris (1962) 66 NLR 457.
APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of Gampaha.
N. R. M. Datuwatte. P.C. with Miss S. Nandadasa for plaintiff-respondent.
G. P. S. DE SUVA, J.
"(4) The said Don Heras in lieu of his undivided interests in the landdescribed in schedule (I) hereunder divided and separated twoportions of land and possessed them exclusively and adverselyand acquired a prescriptive title to the said two lots.
That one of the said lots referred to in the preceding paragraphhereof is more fully described in schedule 2 hereto and formsthe subject matter of this action."
It is right to add that the original owner Carolis transferred the balancehalf share to his son Girigoris on 6D1 executed on the same date as&apos; P.1: The interests of Girigoris devolved on his .children Abraham,Seetmona. Jane Nona. Sara Nona, Delin Nona (1st defendant),William and Laisa Nona (widow). It may be noted that William (towhom reference is made later) was admittedly one of the co-owners&apos;of the entire land.
Has Heras in or about 1936 separated off the divided andseparate portion of Horagahahena described in the 2ndschedule to the plaint?
Has the said Heras and his successors in title prescribed to thesaid lot?
Is the plaintiff seeking to partition in this action an undividedportion of the land described in the first schedule to the plaint?
have and maintain this action?
CAWickremaratne v. Alpenis Perera (G. P: S. De SHva, J-.).: .-. !193.
The one submission that Mr. Samarasekera pressed before us isthat the finding of the District Judge that the land -sought .to bepartitioned is a divided and separate portion.carved out of the entireland described in the 1 st scheduled the plaint is clearly insupportable,.,having regard to the evidence. Counsel stressed the fact that theplaintiff has failed to produce a deed of partition or cross conveyance,or any plan indicative of a partition. Although one of the witnessesclaimed that there was a survey and a division of the land, no surveyorwho effected such division was called to give evidence. What is more,,counsel urged that the documentary evidence in the case completely.,contradicts the theory of the alleged division and separation and thatthe oral evidence falls far short of the proof&apos;required to establish thefact that Heras had prescribed to the land sought to be partitioned asagainst all the co-owners of the larger land.-In short, Mr.Samarasekera.submitted that there was in -law no separation ordivision of the entire land and the evidence at best showed that someof the co-owners possessed different portions of the land purely forconvenience of possession.
portion of the larger land.
Now, on the pleadings and issues it is clear that the plaintiffs casewas that the .corpus in dispute was prior to 1936 a portion of thelarger land described in schedule (1) to the plaint. In or about -1936Heras separated off the corpus from the larger land and commenced‘ to possess it adversely to all the other co-owners of the larger land. In• other words, the allegation of the plaintiff was that around 1936 a. new corpus, separate and dis.tinct from the rest of the land, came into..existence and that Heras as owner of that corpus possessed it at leastfor a period of TO years and acquired a prescriptive title thereto. AsMr; Daluwatte himself submitted, the foundation of the plaintiff&apos;s casewas a unilateral act of separation which was not opposed by theco-owners of the larger land.
196Sri Lanka Law Reports11986] I Sri L. R.
portions of the larger land. Although the witnesses claimed that asurveyor effected the division, no surveyor was called nor was anyplan of any kind produced in support of any sort of division. Not oneplan was produced to show that even a single co-owner has separatedoff his portion. But the matter does not rest there. The documentaryevidence produced on behalf of the contesting defendants clearly andunmistakably negatived the story of the division of .the entire land anddivided possession. The trial judge, however, summarily dismissed theoverwhelming documentary evidence and preferred to accept the oralevidence.
1936. The documents show that even as late as 1959 Herasconsidered himself a co-owner of the undivided larger land. The firstdeed in respect of a, divided portion of the land was written only in1 963 (P4), that is 4 years prior to the action. It is significant that P4executed by Heras for the first time refers to the corpus as a "dividedportion". If such a division had taken place&apos;earlier, then the previousdeeds would have referred to the fact of separation and division. Theonly two deeds which speak of a divided lot are P3 and 1D1 executedin 1963 and 1964 respectively. No other document has beenproduced to show that any of the admitted co-owners like Gunasekeraor Pathiraja have dealt with divided lots. The documents are of greatimportance as they reflect the state of mind of Heras in particular andof the other admitted co-owners. It would appear that on thedocuments Heras considered himself to be the sole owner of thecorpus only in 1963.
to prescription in favibur of the plaintiff.
198Sri Lanka Law Reports(1986] t Sri L.R.
(Subsidiary Legislation. Vol. II. Chap. 117). Mr. Samerasekera reliedon the particulars of the transactions entered in the register. Thesecertified extracts were in the forefront of the appellant&apos;s case at thetrial. There is no question that the plaintiff was fully aware of thepurpose for which the registration extracts were produced by thecontesting defendants. Having regard to the issues in the case, itcannot be denied that the registration extracts were intensely relevant,(see also the observations of the Privy Council in MohamedalyAdamjee v. Hadad Sadeen (3)). Had the objections now taken by Mr.Daluwatte been taken at the trial, the appellants would have had anopportunity of producing the documents relating to the relevanttransactions shown in the extracts. This was not done, and we cannotnow permit an objection of this kind to be taken for the first time inappeal.
"There is no doubt that the land is possessed in different lots bydifferent co-owners but such a mode of possession is in no wayinconsistent with common possession. It would have been differentif the co-owners had executed deeds for divided shares: someweight would then have been lent to the theory that there had beena division of the entire land many years ago."
auction a portion of his land. But the 5th defendant has stated that theauction sale was only in 1971, that is after the institution of thisaction. In any event, an auction sale would afford only a good startingpoint for prescription. Although Mr. Daluwatte stressed the fact thatno other co-owners made a claim before the Surveyor or filed astatement of claim, it seems to me that little importance could beattached to this fact. There may be several reasons for the failure ofthe co-owners to prefer a claim. Some of them may be living awayfrom the village in which the land is situated. Some others may nothave had notice of the action for varying reasons. Still others may be inpossession of an extent more than their entitlement and would preferto remain silent. No case was cited before us where a court hasattached any importance to the failure of co-owners to prefer a claimin court or before the Surveyor. Mr. Daluwatte contended that the 6thdefendant lacked locus standi to raise the objection that the corpuswas an undivided portion of the larger land for the reason that he gotrights on 6D3 after the institution of the action and that he was nomore than a tenant under the 1 st defendant. Apart from the fact thequestion of locus standi was not put in issue at the trial, the lack oflocus standi in the 6th defendant is not an infirmity which in any eventaffects the 7th defendant who is the other appellant before us.
resolve j:he disputes*that are set out by the parties in their issues,the court has a supervening duty to satisfy itself as to the identity ofthe corpus and also as to the title of each and every party whoclaims title to it."
Heras. Heras was married to William&apos;s sister and William was marriedto the sister of Heras. William could not have lost his rights in theabsence of evidence of ouster or something equivalent to ouster.
It seems to me that the entirety of the evidence led in the caseshows that at the most some of the co-owners were in possession ofdivided lots not as a permanent mode of possession, but for mereconvenience of possession. A division of the. land on the basis ofconvenience of possession does not result in the termination ofco-ownership.
Sinnetambv, J. in Sediris Appuhamy v. James Appuhamy (7).
Mr. Daluwatte stressed the fact that the oral evidence showed thattwo of the admitted co-owners, namely Gunasekera and Pathirajawere in possession of separate and divided lot;. But the deeds theyexecuted as shown by the registration extracts do not indicate thatthey considered themselves owners of divided lots. In fact thequestion whether Gunasekera and Pathiraja separated off portions ofthe larger land and possessed them as their own, was not a matterwhich arose for decision at the trial. As stated earlier, it was not theplaintiff&apos;s case that there was an amicable division of the entire landamongst all the co-owners.
supported the separation of the lot and was also evidence of ouster.The plans showed that the lot in dispute was possessed as a separateentity. In the appeal before us, there is a total lack of evidence of thisnature.
The best answer to the plaintiffs case of separation&apos;of the lot indispute and the division of the land are the deeds executed by Herashimself. It was only as late as 1963 that Heras executed for the firsttime a deed (P4) on the basis that he was the sole owner of thecorpus. In short, the deeds of Heras himself disprove the plaintiff&apos;scase, not to mention the deeds of the other co-owners. The evidencedoes not disclose an ouster and there is nothing to warrant apresumption of ouster.
am therefore of the view that the District Judge was in^error whenhe answered issues 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff and issues 3 and4 against the contesting defendants. I hold that the plaintiff has failedto establish that the corpus sought to be partitioned is a separate anddivided portion of the larger land. Therefore this action cannot bemaintained. I accordingly set aside the judgment and interlocutorydecree and dismiss the plaintiff&apos;s action. The plaintiff-respondent.mustpay the defendants-appellants the costs of appeal fixed at Rs. 210.

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