Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/18/184/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:17:21+00:00

Document:
The eighth section of the Act of 30 April 1790, ch. 36, for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States is not repealed by the Act of 3 March 1819, ch. 76, to protect the commerce of the United States and punish the crime of piracy.
In an indictment for a piratical murder under the act of 30 April, 1790, ch. 36, s. 8, it is not necessary that it should allege the prisoner to be a citizen of the United States, nor that the crime was committed on board a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, but it is sufficient to charge it as committed from on board such a vessel by a mariner sailing on board such a vessel.
A citizen of the United States fitting out a vessel in a port of the United States in order to cruise against a power in amity with the United States is not protected, by a commission from a belligerent from punishment for any offense committed against vessels of the United States.
The courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a murder committed on the high seas from a vessel belonging to the United States by a foreigner being on board of such vessel upon another foreigner being on board of a foreign vessel. It is not necessary to produce documentary evidence in order to prove the national character of a vessel on an indictment for piracy.
The courts of the United States have not jurisdiction of a murder committed by one foreigner on another foreigner, both being on board a foreign vessel.
It is competent, in an indictment for piracy, for the jury to find that a vessel within a marine league of the shore, at anchor in an open roadstead, where vessels only ride under shelter of the land at a season when the course of the winds is invariable, is upon the high seas.
The words "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state" in the act of 30 April, 1790, ch. 36, s. 8, must be construed to mean out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the Union.
The Act of 3 March 1819, ch. 76, s. 5, furnishes a sufficient definition of piracy, and it is defined to be robbery on the seas.
A vessel loses her national character by assuming a piratical character, and a piracy committed by a foreigner from on board such a vessel upon any other vessel whatever is punishable under the eighth section of the Act of 30 April, 1790, ch. 36.
On an indictment for piracy, the jury may find the national character of a vessel upon such evidence as will satisfy its mind, without the certificate of registry or other documentary evidence being produced and without proof of their having been seen on board.
On an indictment for piracy, the national character of a merchant vessel of the United States may be proved without evidence of her certificate of registry.
Each count in an indictment is a substantive charge, and if the finding of the jury conform to any one of the counts which, in itself, will support the verdict, it is sufficient and judgment may be given thereon.
1st. Because the indictment does not charge the prisoner as a citizen of the United States.
2d. Because the indictment does not charge the act as committed on board of an American vessel, but charges it as committed on board of a foreign vessel or vessel of owners unknown.
3d. Because the 8th section of the Act of 30 April, 1790, c. 36. is virtually repealed by the Act of 3 March, 1819, c. 76, to protect the commerce of the United States and punish the crime of piracy.
Upon which grounds, the judges being divided in opinion, at the request of the counsel for the prisoner, it was ordered that the indictment and proceedings thereon, together with the grounds of the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, be transcribed by the clerk of the circuit court, and certified by him, under the seal of the court, and sent to this Court for its decision.
UNITED STATES v. JOHN FURLONG, alias HOBSON.
This was another indictment against the same prisoner before the same court on the Act of Congress of 30 April, 1790, c. 36, for the piratical murder of David May. Verdict, guilty. The same statement appears in the record, as in the case of the indictment of Furlong, for the murder of Thomas Sunley.
This was another indictment against the same prisoner before the same court on the Act of 3 March, 1819, c. 76, for the piratical seizure of an unknown vessel. Verdict, guilty. The offense was committed on a foreign vessel by a foreigner from a vessel of the United States which had been run away with by the captain and crew. It was moved by the prisoner's counsel that the judgment be arrested on the ground that, as the Constitution of the United States gives the power to Congress to define and punish the crime of piracy, it is necessary that Congress define before it can punish, and that a reference to the law of nations is not such a definition as the Constitution requires. Upon which ground, the judges being divided in opinion, upon request of counsel for prisoner, it was ordered that the indictment and proceedings thereon, together with the ground of the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, be transcribed by the clerk of the circuit court and certified by him under the seal of the court and sent to this Court for its decision.
April, 1790, c. 36, for a piratical robbery committed on an American ship. Verdict, guilty. The offense was committed on a vessel of the United States from a vessel of the United States which had been run away with by the captain and crew. The prisoner is an English subject. It was moved by the prisoner's counsel that the judgment be arrested on the ground that the 8th section of the Act of 30 April, 1790, c. 36, on which the indictment is founded, is virtually repealed by the Act of 3 March, 1819, c. 76, entitled, "an act to protect the commerce of the United States and punish the crime of piracy." Upon which ground the judges being divided in opinion, upon the request of the counsel for the prisoner it was ordered that the indictment and proceedings thereon, together with the grounds of the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, be transcribed by the clerk of the circuit court and certified by him, under the seal of the court, and sent to this Court for its decision.
UNITED STATES v. BENJAMIN BRAILSFORD and JAMES GRIFFEN.
for any offense committed by him against vessels of the United States.
2d. Whether it is competent for a jury to find that a vessel within a marine league of the shore, at anchor in an open roadstead, where vessels only ride under shelter of the land at a season when the course of the winds is invariable, is upon the high seas.
3d. Whether the words "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state" in the 8th section of the Act of Congress of 30 April, 1790, c. 36, entitled "An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States" must be construed to mean out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the United States.
4th. Whether the said 8th section of the said act is virtually repealed by the 5th section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1819, c. 76.
5th. Whether the said 5th section of the said Act of March 3, 1819, c. 76, furnishes any and what definition of the crime of piracy.
UNITED STATES v. DAVID BOWERS and HENRY MATHEWS.
Buenos Ayres and commanded by Captain Almeida. There is no proof of her being American owned. The prisoners are American citizens, and the piracy for which they are convicted was committed on the ship Asia, bearing the American flag. The captain asserted himself and vessel to be American, and on her stern was painted "New York." The ship Asia, at the time of the robbery, was at anchor in an open roadstead at the Island of Bonavista. The register of the ship Asia was not produced in evidence. Verdict, guilty.
1st. That it is not competent to prove the national character of an American vessel without evidence of her register.
2d. It is not competent for the jury to find that the piracy was committed on the high seas when the evidence ascertained the Asia, at the time she was boarded, to have been at anchor in an open roadstead, at the Island of Bonavista.
3d. That the prisoners are not punishable under the 8th section of the act of 30 April, 1790, c. 36, entitled, "An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," the same having been virtually repealed by the act of 1819, c. 76, to protect the commerce of the United States and to punish the crime of piracy.
have been committed in a certain haven, near the Island of Bonavista, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, and that it is not competent for a jury to find a general verdict of guilty on both counts.
Upon which grounds the judges being divided in opinion, it was ordered, that the indictment and proceedings thereon, together with the grounds of the motion in arrest of judgment, be transcribed by the clerk of the circuit court and certified by him under the seal of the court and sent to this Court for its decision.
1st. That the Act of 30 April, 1790, c. 36, eighth section, does not extend to piracy committed by the crew of a foreign vessel on a vessel exclusively owned by persons not citizens of the United States.
April, 1790, c. 36, entitled "An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," has been virtually repealed by the Act of 3 March, 1819, c. 76, entitled "An act to protect the commerce of the United States and to punish the crime of piracy."
Upon which grounds, the judges being divided in opinion, it was ordered, that the indictment and proceedings thereon, together with the grounds of the motion in arrest of judgment, be transcribed by the clerk of the circuit court and certified by him under the seal of the court and sent to this Court for their decision.
A variety of questions have been referred to this Court in these cases, and in the decisions to be certified to the circuit court it will be necessary to notice each question in every case, but in the opinion now to be expressed the whole may be considered in connection, as they all depend upon the construction of the same laws.
is such as to set at nought the idea of thus acting under allegiance to any acknowledged power. From which it follows that when embarked on a piratical cruise, every individual becomes equally punishable under the law of 1790, whatever may be his national character or whatever may have been that of the vessel in which he sailed or of the vessel attacked.
This decision furnishes an answer to all those questions made in the above cases, which are founded on distinctions in the national character of the prisoner or in that of the vessels in relation to the piracies committed by the crew of the Louisa. The moment that ship was taken from her officers and proceeded on a piratical cruise, the crew lost all claim to national character and, whether citizens or foreigners, became equally punishable under the act of 1790. It also furnishes an answer to all the exceptions taken in the case of piracy charged against Furlong. For whatever the court might have thought on the effect of the act of 1819, he would have been still punishable under the act of 1790. The indictment against him is general, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and it matters not that his offense was committed subsequent to passing the act of 1819, since the other act still remains in force and reaches his case.
It would seem to be unnecessary to go further in the cases against Furlong, as this conclusion decides his fate; but this Court cannot foresee how far it may be necessary to the administration of justice, against accessories or otherwise, that the question in the cases of murder should also be decided.
The question whether murder committed at sea on board a foreign vessel be punishable by the laws of the United States if committed by a foreigner upon a foreigner is one which involves a variety of considerations, and which, in the two cases before us, is presented under an obvious distinction -- on the one indictment it appears as having been committed simply on board the Anne of Scarborough, a foreign vessel, by a foreigner upon a foreigner; on the other, as committed on board the Anne of Scarborough, from an American vessel by a mariner of the American vessel. It is obvious that neither case comes within the express words of the decision in Palmer's Case. And with regard to the case in which the American vessel is brought in view, there can exist but one difficulty.
No difference can be supposed to exist between the case of a murder committed on the seas by means of a gun discharged from a vessel, and by means of a boat's crew dispatched for that purpose, as was actually the case here. And as to the right of the United States to punish all offenses committed on or from on board their own vessels, it cannot be doubted, nor has it been doubted that the act of 1790 extends to such offenses when committed on the seas. But we have decided that in becoming a pirate, the Mary of Mobile, from which the prisoner committed this offense, lost her national character. Could she then be denominated an American vessel?
committed from her was equally punishable, and the words of the act extend to her in both characters. But if it were necessary to decide the question, we should find no difficulty in maintaining that no man shall, by crime, put off an incident to his situation which subjects him to punishment. A claim to protection may be forfeited by the loss of national character where no rights are acquired or immunity produced by that cause. The other case presents a question of more difficulty. It includes the case of a murder committed by one of a crew upon another on board a foreign vessel on the high seas. The prisoner is a British subject, the deceased was the same, and the ship also British.
This, though not in all its circumstances the same, is in principle precisely that of United States v. Palmer. The only difference is that the case of Palmer supposes the prisoner and the deceased to belong to different vessels, and the certificate of the court would seem to cover the case of an American as well as a foreigner who commits an offense on board a foreign vessel.
construing it, we should test each case by a reference to the punishing powers of the body that enacted it. The reasonable presumption is that the legislature intended to legislate only on cases within the scope of that power, and general words made use of in that law ought not in my opinion to be restricted so as to exclude any cases within their natural meaning. As far as those powers extended, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to legislate unless their express language shall preclude that conclusion.
It is true that the 8th section declares murder as well as robbery to be piracy; but in my view, if anything is to be inferred from this association, it is only that they meant to assert the right of punishing murder to the same extent that they possessed the right of punishing piracy, which would be carrying the construction beyond what I contend for. The contrary conclusion, viz., that they meant to limit the cases of piracy made punishable under that act to the cases in which they might, upon principle, punish murder is rebutted by the generality of the terms used, and it would seem that with this object in view, they ought to have taken the contrary course and declared piracy to be murder.
laws of another state, it is the result of their own act in subjecting themselves to those laws.
Nor is it any objection to this opinion that the law declares murder to be piracy. These are things so essentially different in their nature that not even the omnipotence of legislative power can confound or identify them. Had Congress in this instance declared piracy to be murder, the absurdity would have been felt and acknowledged; yet with a view to the exercise of jurisdiction, it would have been more defensible than the reverse, for in one case it would restrict the acknowledged scope of its legitimate powers, in the other extend it. If by calling murder piracy it might assert a jurisdiction over that offense committed by a foreigner in a foreign vessel, what offense might not be brought within their power by the same device? The most offensive interference with the governments of other nations might be defended on the precedent. Upon the whole, I am satisfied that Congress neither intended to punish murder in cases with which they had no right to interfere nor leave unpunished the crime of piracy in any cases in which they might punish it, and this view of the subject appears to me to furnish the only sufficient key to the construction of the 8th section of the act of 1790.
such cases occur under the act of 1790, I shall respectfully solicit a revision of Palmer's Case if it be considered as including those cases. And shall do the same in the case of murder committed by an American in a foreign ship if it ever occur, under the belief that it never could have been the intention of Congress that such an offender should find this country a secure asylum to him.
There are a few minor points presented in these cases which it is necessary to notice.
It was moved in favor of the prisoners that the only legal testimony of the character of the ships plundered must have relation to their register, or rather to the documentary papers which establish their national character. But this we think wholly indefensible. It is obvious that such testimony might be suppressed in various ways by the aggressors. Nor is it at all decisive of the real ownership of a vessel. Our laws recognize the possibility of the register's existing in the name of one whilst the property is really in another person. The laws that require such documents to be on board a vessel have relation to financial, commercial, or international objects, but are not decisive or necessary in a prosecution for this offense. Property or character is a matter in pais, and so to be established. However, it is unnecessary to examine the question further, as we have decided that the national character of the vessels plundered was in these cases wholly immaterial to the crime.
1. Because the words, "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state" in the 8th section of the act of 1790 includes foreign, as well as domestic states.
2. Because a vessel at anchor in a road is not a vessel on the high seas, as charged in the indictment.
On the first point, we think it obvious that "out of any particular state" must be construed to mean "out of any one of the United States." By examining the context, it will be seen that particular state is uniformly used in contradistinction to United States. For what reason it is not easy to imagine, but it is obvious that the only piracies omitted to be punished by that act are land piracies and piracies committed in our waters.
for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.
It was also moved in the same cases that as there were two counts in the indictment, the one charging the offenses as committed on the high seas, the other in a haven, basin or bay, a general verdict of guilty could not be sustained on account of repugnancy and inconsistency, as both facts could not be true. But on this it is only necessary to remark that each count is a distinct substantive charge. Internal repugnancy in any one is a good exception, but non constat as to the whole, taken severally, but each may be for a distinct offense.
There is finally another question certified to this Court in one of the cases which arose under the captures made by the Louisa. It is whether an American citizen, fitting out a vessel in an American port, really to cruise against a power at peace with the United States, is protected by a commission from a power belligerent as to the power against which he undertakes to cruise, from offenses committed by him against the United States?
proper to remark that in Klintock's Case it has been decided that a belligerent character may be put off and a piratical one assumed even under the most unquestionable commission. And if the laws of the United States declare those acts piracy in a citizen when committed on a citizen which would be only belligerent acts when committed on others, there can be no reason why such laws should not be enforced. For this purpose the 9th section of the act of 1790 appears to have been passed. And it would be difficult to induce this Court to render null the provisions of that clause by deciding either that one who takes a commission under a foreign power can no longer be deemed a citizen or that all acts committed under such a commission must be adjudged belligerent, and not piratical, acts.
UNITED STATES v. JOHN FURLONG, alias JOHN HOBSON.
CERTIFICATE. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Georgia, and on the question on which the judges of that court were divided in opinion, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion that the 8th section of the act of 30 April, 1790, on which the indictment is founded, is not repealed by the act of 3 March, 1819, entitled, "an act to protect the commerce of the United States, and to punish the crime of piracy."
CERTIFICATE. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Georgia and on the questions on which the judges of that court were divided in opinion, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof this Court is of opinion, as to the first and second questions stated by said circuit court, that it was not necessary the indictment should charge the prisoner as a citizen of the United States, nor the crime as committed on board an American vessel, inasmuch as it charges it to have been committed from on board an American vessel by a mariner sailing on board an American vessel. And as to the third question, that the Act of 30 April, 1790, is not virtually repealed by the Act of 3 March, 1819, entitled, "an act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy."
UNITED STATES v. GRIFFEN and BRAILSFORD.
1. That an American citizen fitting out a vessel in an American port really to cruise against a power at peace with the United States is not protected by a commission from a belligerent from punishment for any offense committed by him against vessels of the United States.
3. That the words "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state" in the 8th section of the Act of Congress of 30 April, 1790, entitled "An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," must be construed to mean out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the United States.
4. That the 8th section of the Act of 30 April, 1790, entitled "an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States" is not repealed by the 8th section of the Act of 3 March, 1819, entitled, "an act to protect the commerce of the United States, and to punish the crime of piracy."
5. That the 5th section of the Act of 3 March, 1819, furnishes a sufficient definition of piracy, and that it is defined "robbery on the seas."
make him punishable with death inasmuch as both vessel and crew no longer retained any pretension to national character after assuming that of a pirate.
7. That the national character of a vessel is a fact which a jury may find upon such evidence as will satisfy its mind without production of the register or proof of its having been on board of her.
1. that the act of 30 April, 1790, entitled, &c., section 8th, does extend to piracy committed by the crew of a foreign vessel on a vessel exclusively owned by persons not citizens of the United States, in the case of these prisoners, in which it appears that the crew assumed the character of pirates, whereby they lost all claim to national character or protection.
2. That the 8th section of the act of 30 April, 1790, entitled, &c., has not been repealed by the 8th section of the act of March 3, 1819, entitled, &c.
1. That it is competent to prove the national character of an American vessel without evidence of her register.
2. That it is competent for the jury to find that the piracy was committed on the high seas upon evidence that the Asia, at the time she was boarded, was at anchor in an open roadstead at the Island of Bonavista.
3. That the 8th section of the Act of 30 April, 1790, entitled, &c., is not repealed by the 8th section of the Act of March 3, 1819, entitled, &c.
4. That each count in an indictment is a substantive charge, and if the finding conform to anyone of them which in itself will support the verdict, it is sufficient to give judgment.

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