Source: https://westhamptonlawyer.wordpress.com/category/case-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:40:59+00:00

Document:
Michael D. Weinstein, Tarrytown, N.Y., for appellant.
Mark L. Cortegiano, Middle Village, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action for the equitable distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Esposito, J.), dated June 22, 2011, which denied her motion, in effect, for leave to reargue and renew that branch of her prior cross motion which was to compel disclosure, which had been denied in an order of the same court dated September 21, 2009 (Fitzmaurice, J.).
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly treated the instant motion as a motion for leave to reargue and renew that branch of her prior cross motion which was to compel disclosure. Although the instant motion was predicated on a different legal argument and supported by evidence not submitted on the prior cross motion, both motions essentially sought identical relief, i.e., disclosure of the plaintiff’s income and assets acquired between the date of a foreign judgment of divorce and the date of commencement of this action for equitable distribution. Thus, the instant motion was, in actuality, one for leave to reargue and renew (see Cunningham v Diers, 14 AD3d 528, 529; Agayeva v KJ Shuttle Serv., 284 AD2d 488; Cangro v Cangro, 272 AD2d 286; Mucciola v City of New York, 177 AD2d 553, 554).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the instant motion which was, in effect, for leave to renew. A motion for leave to renew “shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination” and “shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the [*2]prior motion” (CPLR 2221[e], ; see DeMarquez v Gallo, 94 AD3d 1039; Matter of Choy v Mai Ling Lai, 91 AD3d 772). Although the requirement that a motion for renewal must be based on new facts is a flexible one (see DeMarquez v Gallo, 94 AD3d 1039; Matter of Beren v Beren, 92 AD3d 676, 677), a motion to renew is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation, and the Supreme Court lacks discretion to grant renewal where the moving party omits a reasonable justification for failing to present the new facts on the original motion (see Bazile v City of New York, 94 AD3d 929; Eskenazi v Mackoul, 92 AD3d 828, 829; Worrell v Parkway Estates, LLC, 43 AD3d 436, 437; Renna v Gullo, 19 AD3d 472, 473). Here, the defendant relied on additional facts known to her at the time of her prior cross motion without demonstrating a reasonable justification for failing to submit these facts on the earlier cross motion (see Bazile v City of New York, 94 AD3d 929; Eskenazi v Mackoul, 92 AD3d at 829; Dervisevic v Dervisevic, 89 AD3d 785, 787). In any event, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the additional facts she submitted would change the Supreme Court’s prior determination denying that branch of her cross motion which was to compel discovery (see Eskenazi v Mackoul, 92 AD3d at 829).
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING: Information herein and is not intended to be, legal advice. This sample legal document is provided as part of a free public educational service by Zachary Irtaza Riyaz, Esq., attorney at law in the State of New York (Westhampton – Tel. 516-234-0348), for reference only. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO GIVE LEGAL ADVICE ABOUT A SPECIFIC LEGAL PROBLEM, NOR DOES IT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. Due to the importance of the individual facts of every case, the generalizations I make may not necessarily be applicable to any particular case. Statutes and codes such as Domestic Relations Law (DRL)are frequently amended and may affect the validity of the above legal document and no representation is made that the above sample is going to be enforceable in the future.Changes in the law could at any time make parts of this web site content obsolete. Updated statutes and codes may be available at the New York State Legislature Website. No statute or sample legal document should be relied on without understanding controlling case law which may further interpret it. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF LEGAL ADVICE IS REQUIRED THE SERVICES OF A COMPETENT ATTORNEY WILL BE CONSULTED.
CPLR 4404(a) states, inter alia, that a court may set aside a jury verdict and “order a new trial . . . where the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” “A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the evidence so preponderate[s] in favor of the [moving party] that the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence'” (Seong Yim Kim v New York City Tr. Auth., 87 AD3d 531, 532, quoting Acosta v City of New York, 84 AD3d 706, 708). “It is within the province of the jury to determine issues of credibility, and great deference is accorded to the jury given its opportunity to see and hear the witnesses” (Palermo v Original California Taqueria, Inc., 72 AD3d 917, 918).
Money or property belonging to you may have been taken or held in order to satisfy a judgment which has been entered against you. Read this carefully.
State and federal laws prevent certain money or property from being taken to satisfy judgments or orders. Such money or property is said to be “exempt”.
“Jurisdiction under CPLR 301 may be acquired over a foreign corporation [or other business entity] only if that corporation [or entity] does business here not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity’ so as to warrant a finding of its presence’ in this jurisdiction” (Sedig v Okemo Mtn., 204 AD2d 709, 710 [some internal quotation marks omitted]. Moreover, “[a]n individual cannot be subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 301 unless he is doing business in New York as an individual rather than on behalf of a corporation”.
Under CPLR 302(a)(1), “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” (id.).
“CPLR 302(a) is a single act statute [and] . . . proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted'” (Kimco Exch. Place Corp. v Thomas Benz, Inc., 34 AD3d 433, 434, quoting Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71, cert denied 549 US 1095). “Purposeful activities are those with which a defendant, through volitional acts, avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws'” (Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375, 380, quoting McKee Elec. Co. v Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 NY2d 377, 382).
“While the ultimate burden of proof rests with the party asserting jurisdiction . . ., the plaintiff[ ], in opposition to a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), need only make a prima facie showing that the defendant[s] w[ere] subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” (Cornely v Dynamic HVAC Supply, LLC, 44 AD3d 986, 986 [citation omitted]; see Lang v Wycoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 55 AD3d 793, 794; Alden Personnel, Inc. v David, 38 AD3d 697, 698).
When opposing a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) on the ground that discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction is necessary, plaintiffs need not make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, but instead “need only demonstrate that facts may exist’ to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant” (Ying Jun Chen v Lei Shi, 19 AD3d 407, 407-408, quoting CPLR 3211[d]; see Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467). If “it appear[s] from affidavits submitted in opposition to [the] motion . . . that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated,” a court may, in the exercise of its discretion, postpone resolution of the issue of personal jurisdiction (CPLR 3211[d]; see Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d at 467; Ying Jun Chen v Lei Shi, 19 AD3d at 407-408).
A party’s acknowledged failure to comply with certain provisions of a pendente lite Order (in motion papers) may result in an Order holding the other party in contempt of Court, without a hearing (on papers alone), (see Domestic Relations Law § 245; Lopez v Ajose, 33 AD3d 976; York v York, 250 AD2d 838; Turk v Turk, 226 AD2d 448; Farkas v Farkas, 209 AD2d 316); where the nonmoving party’s claim of reduced income is unsubstantiated and thus “insufficient to warrant a hearing” (Farkas v Farkas, 209 AD2d at 317-318; see Lopez v Ajose, 33 AD3d 976; Ovsanikow v Ovsanikow, 224 AD2d 786; Rosenblitt v Rosenblitt, 121 AD2d 375).
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING: Information herein and is not intended to be, legal advice. This sample legal document is provided as part of a free public educational service by Zachary Irtaza Riyaz, Esq., attorney at law in the State of New York (Westhampton – Tel. 516-234-0348), for reference only. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO GIVE LEGAL ADVICE ABOUT A SPECIFIC LEGAL PROBLEM, NOR DOES IT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. Due to the importance of the individual facts of every case, the generalizations I make may not necessarily be applicable to any particular case. Statutes and codes such as Domestic Relations Law (DRL)are frequently amended and may affect the validity of the above legal document and no representation is made that the above sample is going to be enforceable in the future. Changes in the law could at any time make parts of this web site content obsolete. Updated statutes and codes may be available at the New York State Legislature Website. No statute or sample legal document should be relied on without understanding controlling case law which may further interpret it. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF LEGAL ADVICE IS REQUIRED A COMPETENT ATTORNEY SHALL BE CONSULTED.
“[A] custody [and visitation] determination is a matter entrusted primarily to the discretion of the trial court which is in the most advantageous position to evaluate the testimony, character, and sincerity of the parties” (Santoro v Santoro, 224 AD2d 510, 511; see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171).
“In determining whether a custody agreement should be modified, the paramount issue before the court is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a modification of custody is in the best interests of the child” (Cuccurullo v Cuccurullo, 21 AD3d 983, 984; see Teuschler v Teuschler, 242 AD2d 289, 290; Kuncman v Kuncman, 188 AD2d 517).
“Along with the factors considered in any custody determination, the court must also consider the stability and continuity afforded by maintaining the present arrangement” (Gonzalez v Gonzalez, 17 AD3d 635, 636). “When . . . there is no indication that a change of [physical] custody will result in significantly enhancing the child’s welfare, it is generally considered in the child’s best interests not to disrupt his life” (Matter of Salvati v Salvati, 221 AD2d 541, 543; see Matter of Russell v Russell, 72 AD3d 973, 974-975).
“[A] noncustodial parent should have reasonable rights of visitation, and the denial of those rights to a natural parent is a drastic remedy which should only be invoked when there is substantial evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the child” (Matter of Mera v Rodriguez, [*3]73 AD3d 1069, 1069 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Sinnott-Turner v Kolba, 60 AD3d 774, 775; Matter of Grisanti v Grisanti, 4 AD3d 471, 473). ” While not determinative, the child’s expressed preference is some indication of what is in the child’s best interests,'” provided that the court consider ” the age and maturity of the child and the potential for influence having been exerted on the child'” (Matter of Schouten v Schouten, 155 AD2d 461, 463, quoting Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 173).
Spoliation is the destruction of evidence whether intentional or by accident. … Sanctions for spoliation are appropriate ‘where a litigant, intentionally or negligently, disposes of crucial items of evidence involved in an accident before the adversary has had an opportunity to inspect them.’ Dismissal of an action, or the striking of pleadings, while severe, is an appropriate remedy when the evidence spoiled is a ‘key piece of evidence’, (emphasis added) whose destruction precludes inspection by an adverse party. In determining the severity of the spoliation sanction, it is important to ascertain what prejudice if any the party seeking the sanction has incurred by the absence of the spoiled evidence. . . . [I]n cases where the spoiled evidence is not crucial to a litigant’s case, such that its absence does not prevent the outright prosecution or defense of a case, preclusion of evidence, rather than outright dismissal of pleadings, is the preferred remedy (Shea v. Spellman, 2004 NY Slip Op 50785U, [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2004][internal citations omitted]).
The party requesting sanctions for spoliation has the burden of demonstrating that a litigant intentionally or negligently disposed of critical evidence, and “fatally compromised its ability to defend (the) action’“ (Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Berkoski Oil Company, supra at 718 , quoting Lawson v. Aspen Ford, Inc. 15 A.D.3d 628, 629, 7912d 119 (2d Dept. , 2005), and citing Kirschen v. Marino, 16 A.D.3d 555, (2dDept., 2005)). “The Court ‘may, under appropriate circumstances, impose sanction even if the destruction occurred through negligence rather than willfulness, and even if the evidence was destroyed before the spoliator became a party, provided (the party)…. . was on notice that the evidence might be needed for future litigation ‘” (Kovit v. CVS, 14 Misc.3d l21O(A), 2006 WL 3833653 (Supreme Cour, Nassau County 2006), quoting Iannucciv. Rose 8 A.D.3d437, 778 N. 2d 525 (2dDept. , 2004), quoting DiDomenico v. C & SAeromatikSupplies 252A. 2d4l, 682N. 2d452 (2dDept., 1998), and citing Favish v. Tepler 294 A. 2d 396, 741 N. 2d 910 (2d Dept. , 2002) and Baglio v. St. John s Queens Hosp. 303 A. 2d 341 , 755 N. 2d 427 (2d Dept., 2003).
When a party negligently loses or intentionally destroys key evidence, thereby depriving the non-responsible party from being able to prove its claim or defense, the responsible par may be sanctioned by the striking of its pleading. Utica MutualInsurance Company v. Berkoski Oil Company, 58 A.D.3d 717, 872 N. 2d 166 (2d Dept., 2009), quoting Denoyelles v. Gallagher, 40 A.D.3d 1027, 834 N. 2d 868 (2d Dept., 2007). “If the Court in its analysis concludes that because of the spoiled evidence one party has destroyed critical physical proof, such that its opponents are ‘prejudicially bereft of appropriate means to [either present or] confront a claim with incisive evidence’, the spoliator’s pleading is properly stricken in Order to obviate a trial that is ‘based on rank swearing contests” (emphasis added) (Id.) (Citations omitted). While a spoliator of key evidence can be punished by the striking of its pleading, the court must determine whether such a drastic remedy is necessary as a matter of fundamental fairness, or whether a less drastic sanction is appropriate (Iannucci v. Rose, 8 AD3d 437 [2d Dept 2004]).
The main question that must be answered in order to determine whether spoliation sanctions are appropriate is whether the alleged spoliator was on notice of the litigation at the time of the destruction of the evidence (Hennessy v. Restaurant Associates, Inc., 25 AD3d 340 [1st Dept 2006]; Montiero v. R.D. Werner Co.. Inc., 301 AD2d 636 [3d Dept 2003) Such notice creates a duty to preserve the evidence. (Id.).
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING: Information herein and is not intended to be, legal advice. This sample legal document is provided as part of a free public educational service by Zachary Irtaza Riyaz, Esq., attorney at law in the State of New York (Westhampton – Tel. 516-234-0348), for reference only. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO GIVE LEGAL ADVICE ABOUT A SPECIFIC LEGAL PROBLEM, NOR DOES IT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. Due to the importance of the individual facts of every case, the generalizations I make may not necessarily be applicable to any particular case. Statutes and codes such as Domestic Relations Law (DRL)are frequently amended and may affect the validity of the above legal document and no representation is made that the above sample is going to be enforceable in the future. Changes in the law could at any time make parts of this web site content obsolete. Updated statutes and codes may be available at the New York State Legislature Website. No statute or sample legal document should be relied on without understanding controlling case law which may further interpret it. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF LEGAL ADVICE IS REQUIRED THE SERVICES OF A COMPETENT ATTORNEY SHOULD BE CONSULTED.
The nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is within the broad discretion of the motion court (see Zletz v Wetanson, 67 NY2d 711, 713; Pirro Group, LLC v One Point St., Inc., 71 AD3d 654, 655; Novick v DeRosa, 51 AD3d 885; Martin v City of New York, 46 AD3d 635; Bomzer v Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner Lambert Co., 41 AD3d 522). “The striking of a pleading may be appropriate where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful and contumacious” (McArthur v New York City Hous. Auth., 48 AD3d 431, 431; see Workman v Town of Southampton, 69 AD3d 619, 620; Northfield Ins. Co. v Model Towing & Recovery, 63 AD3d 808, 809).
em>ATTORNEY ADVERTISING: Information herein and is not intended to be, legal advice. This sample legal document is provided as part of a free public educational service by Zachary Irtaza Riyaz, Esq., attorney at law in the State of New York (Westhampton – Tel. 516-234-0348), for reference only. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO GIVE LEGAL ADVICE ABOUT A SPECIFIC LEGAL PROBLEM, NOR DOES IT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. Due to the importance of the individual facts of every case, the generalizations I make may not necessarily be applicable to any particular case. Statutes and codes such as Domestic Relations Law (DRL)are frequently amended and may affect the validity of the above legal document and no representation is made that the above sample is going to be enforceable in the future. Changes in the law could at any time make parts of this web site content obsolete. Updated statutes and codes may be available at the New York State Legislature Website. No statute or sample legal document should be relied on without understanding controlling case law which may further interpret it. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF LEGAL ADVICE IS REQUIRED THE SERVICES OF A COMPETENT ATTORNEY SHOULD BE CONSULTED.
“The manner in which a police officer operates his or her vehicle in an emergency situation may not form the basis for civil liability to an injured third party unless the officer acted in reckless disregard for the safety of others” (Puntarich v County of Suffolk, 47 AD3d 785, 786; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[e]; Badalamenti v City of New York, 30 AD3d 452, 453). “The reckless disregard’ standard requires proof that the officer intentionally committed an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow” (Badalamenti v City of New York, 30 AD3d at 453; see Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501; Puntarich v County of Suffolk, 47 AD3d 785).

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