Source: http://kenketchum.tripod.com/newyorkchristianlawlibrary/id20.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:34:04+00:00

Document:
Digests breaks the law into hundreds of legal topics as opposed to statutes.
Petitioner Alison D established a relationship in 1977 and began living together in March 1978. In March 1980, they decided to have a child and agreed that respondent would be artificially inseminated. Together they planned for the conception and birth of the child and agreed to share jointly all rights and responsibilities of child rearing. In July 1981 respondent gave birth to a baby boy, who was given petitioners last name as his middle name and respondents last name became his last name. Respondent shared all birthing expenses and after the boys birth, continued to provide for his support. During the boys first two years, both parties jointly cared for and made decisions regarding the child.
In November 1983 when the child was two years and four months, both parties terminated their relationship and petitioner moved out of the home they jointly owned. Both parties agreed to a visitation schedule whereby petitioner continued to see the child a few times a week. Petitioner also agreed to pay one half of the mortgage and major household expenses. By this time, the child had referred to both parties as mommy. Petitioners visitation with the child continued until 1986, at which time respondent bought out petitioners interest in the house and then began to restrict petitioners visitations with the child. In 1987 petitioner moved to Ireland but continued her attempts to communicate with the child. Thereafter respondent terminated all contact between petitioner and the child, returning all of petitioners gifts and letters. No dispute exists that respondent is a fit parent. Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking visitation rights pursuant Domestic Relations Law §70.
Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 70 either parent may apply to Supreme Court with a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before such court and the court may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of such child to either parent as the case may require.
Although the court is mindful of petitioners understandable concern for and interest in the child and of her expectation and desire that her contact with the child would continue, she has no right under Domestic Relations Law §70 to seek visitation and thereby limit or diminish the right of the concededly or agreeably fit biological parent to choose with whom her child associates. She is not a parent within the meaning of §70.
Petitioner concedes that she is not the childs parent; that is she is not the biological mother of the child nor is she a legal parent by virtue of an adoption. Therefore, she claims that she has standing to seek visitation rights. She claims to have acted in fact as a parent or she should be viewed as a parent by way of her earlier contributions to the childs rearing. Traditionally, in this State it is the childs mother and father, assuming fitness, have the right to the care and custody of their child, even I situations where the non-parent has exercised some control over the child with the parents consent. It has long been recognized that, as between a parent and a third person, parental custody of a child may not be displaced absent grievous cause or necessity. To allow the courts to award visitation, a limited form of custody, to a third person would necessarily impair the parents right to custody and control. Petitioner concedes that respondent is a fit parent. Therefore, she has no right to petition the court to displace the choice made by this fit parent in deciding what is in the childs best interest.
§70 gives parents the right to bring proceedings to insure the proper exercise of their care, custody and control. Where the legislature deemed it appropriate, it gave other categories of persons standing to seek visitation and it gave the courts the power to determine whether an award of visitation would be in the childs best interest. We decline petitioners invitation to read the term parent in §70 to include categories of non-parents who have developed a relationship with the child or who have had prior relationships with a childs parents and who wish to continue visitation with the child. While one may dispute in an case, whether it would be beneficial to a child to have continued contact with a non-parent, the legislature did not in §70 give such non-parent the opportunity to compel a fit parent to allow them to do so. (See Ronald FF. v. Sidney GG, 70 N.Y. 2d 141) (giving any person including but not limited to a foster parent, step parent, grand parent, who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child the right to seek visitation or other right of custody).
Argue the petitioners side. Argue on behalf of Alison d.
We all have limitations you cannot force the world on someone.

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