Source: https://www.ptab.us/2012/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:46:27+00:00

Document:
the recapture rule is violated when a limitation added during prosecution is eliminated entirely, even if other narrowing limitations are added to the [reissue] claim. If the added limitation is modified but not eliminated, the claims must be materially narrowed relative to the surrendered subject matter such that the surrendered subject matter is not entirely or substantially recaptured.
In re Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
In Mostafazadeh, our reviewing court acknowledged that the recapture rule may not be triggered if the subject matter of the reissue claim is “wholly unrelated” to the subject matter surrendered during prosecution. Id., 643 F.3d at 1360. The court suggested that such a situation might arise if the reissue claim recites additional inventions, embodiments or species not originally claimed, that is, overlooked aspects of the invention as disclosed. Id. (construing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) 5 § 1412.02(I)(C)).
See, e.g., B.E. Meyers & Co. v. United States, 56 USPQ2d 1110, 1116 (Ct. Fed. Cls. 2000)(example of a case, cited in § 1412.02 of the MPEP, illustrating when the subject matter of the reissue claim might be “wholly unrelated” to the subject matter surrendered during prosecution).
An artisan would interpret that removably secured or attached legs are those that they may be removed in the ordinary sense of the word, such as by unscrewing a screw. See K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (interpreting that rivets and laminate permanently affix while, in contrast, screws are removable).
see also Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[W]here there are several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meaning.”).
“Such broadening usages as ‘about’ must be given reasonable scope; they must be viewed by the decisionmaker as they would be understood by persons experienced in the field of the invention. Although it is rarely feasible to attach a precise limit to ‘about,’ the usage can usually be understood in light of the technology embodied in the invention.” Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. ITC, 75 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
Regarding the “if” clauses found in limitations (b) and (c) of claims 10 and 31, we are not persuaded that these clauses are optional statements as noted by the Examiner (Ans. 8-9, 13). Optional statements include those limitations “stated in the permissive form ‘may’” as in Johnston (“said wall may be smooth”) and “do not narrow the claim because they can always be omitted” (Johnston 435 F.3d at 1384). Conditional statements, on the other hand, leave open the situation where the condition is not satisfied; but if the condition is satisfied, then a stated action occurs (Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp, 318 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). In Altiris, the court stated that “[t]he body of the claims, by using conditional language in the ‘booting normally’ step (‘if said testing step indicates a normal boot sequence’) indicates that the ‘testing’ step must occur before the computer boots normally” (Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1372). The court continued stating that “[i]t is the result of this ‘testing’ step that determines whether the automation boot sequence….occurs, or whether the ‘booting normally’ step occurs” (Id.). This is consistent with MPEP § 2106 II C relied on by the Examiner which states “[l]anguage that suggests or makes optional but does not require steps to be performed…does not limit the scope of a claim” (italics added). Here, limitations (b) and (c) are not optional because if their condition is satisfied, these limitations require certain steps to be performed. For example, if the mobile terminal is in view of a communication satellite, then transmission of the location data to the satellite occurs and if the mobile terminal is in view of a more terrestrial cellular mobile telephone network, then transmission of the location data to a cell tower occurs. We thus disagree with the Examiner that limitations (b) and (c) of claim 10 are optional (i.e. are stated in the permissive form) as found in Johnston.
The subject matter of claim 204 is not all magnetic particles; rather, claim 204 covers magnetic particles that are part of a mascara product. Therefore, the preamble serves to further define the structure of the article claimed. See Kropa v. Robie, 187 F2d 150, 152 (CCPA 1951).
Evidence of obviousness must come from the prior art, not the applicant’s own disclosure. In re Dance, 160 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]o invoke ‘common sense’ or any other basis for extrapolating from prior art to a conclusion of obviousness,” the fact finder “must articulate [his or her] reasoning with sufficient clarity for review.” Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); see also, In re Vaidyanathan, 381 Fed.Appx. 985, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (non-precedential) (“KSR did not free the PTO’s examination process from explaining its reasoning. In making an obviousness rejection, the examiner should not rely on conclusory statements that a particular feature of the invention would have been obvious or was well known. Instead, the examiner should elaborate, discussing the evidence or reasoning that leads the examiner to such a conclusion.”).

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