Source: http://foiaproject.org/case_detail/?title=on&style=foia&case_id=22896
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:00:14+00:00

Document:
FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Randolph Moss has ruled that the FBI cannot use either Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques) or Exemption 2 (internal practices and procedures) to withhold processing documents associated with dozens of FOIA requests. In response to requests from National Security Counselors, journalists Jeffrey Stein and Jason Leopold, and researcher Ryan Shapiro for processing records for requests filed by themselves and others, the agency categorically refused to disclose any processing documents generated for FOIA requests submitted in the last 25 years for material contained in investigative files�"which the agency withheld under Exemption 7(E)�"or any case evaluation forms�"which track and evaluate the performance of FBI employees processing FOIA requests�"under Exemption 2. The plaintiffs specifically requested search slips and FDPS case processing notes, documenting the efforts of FOIA analysts to search for files in response to FOIA requests, and case evaluation forms, which are kept in the personnel files of FOIA analysts for purposes of tracking and evaluating employee performance. Moss first explored the roots of the FBI's Exemption 7(E) non-disclosure policy. "The search slips and notes, the FBI explains, may refer to files on individuals that would be exempt from withholding under a specific FOIA exemption, and that in fact were withheld from the original requester. But more importantly, they may also contain references to files that are excludable under [one of the three exclusions contained in Section (c)]�"that is, files whose very existence the FBI is permitted to deny. Indeed, the FBI points out, the search slips may contain references to files that were excluded from its response to the original requester�"that is, files that the FBI told the requester did not exist. Requests for search slips therefore put the FBI in a difficult position. The FBI cannot plausibly deny that the search slip exists�"because search slips are created as a matter of course in responding to FOIA requests�"but it argues that it also cannot release the search slip, as the search slip would reveal the existence of the file that the FBI told the requester did not exist. And, for similar reasons, the FBI cannot release a redacted version of the search slip, even if the redaction would tell the requester nothing about the underlying file, the FBI argues, [because] the existence of the redaction would 'tip off' the requester that some file existed, contradicting the FBI's prior assertion that no responsive records existed. Likewise, the FBI argues that it cannot withhold the entire search slip under one of the exemptions because the withholding itself would 'tip off' the requester that the search slip must refer to a file that he or she had previously been told did not exist." The FBI's dilemma, Moss indicated, led the agency to argue that "the only option available to it is to withhold all search slips and processing notes that it has created in responding to FOIA requests for investigative files in the last 25 years." Moss did not deny that the FBI's problem was serious, but he noted that "the question before the Court, however, is not the existence or gravity of the problem facing the FBI, but whether the solution the FBI has adopted is consistent with FOIA. Although the question is a difficult one, the Court concludes that the FBI's proposed reading of the statute cannot be squared with its text or the governing precedent." He pointed out that the three exclusions in Section (c) "relate to sensitive matters of law enforcement and national security. They have nothing to do with the day-to-day administration of FOIA itself." He continued: "To be sure, a particular search slip might, on a rare occasion, replicate excludable records and thus also fall within one of the FOIA exclusions, in full or in part. But the overwhelming majority of FBI processing documents are not excludable under any reasonable construction of Section 552(c). . .In the most recent fiscal year, the Justice Department invoked an exclusion only 145 times�"or in 0.23% of the over 60,000 requests that it processed. The FBI's sweeping policy of withholding all search slips for investigative records, as a result, cannot be justified on the plain terms of Section 552(c)." Having found no support for the FBI's withholding policy in Section (c), Moss pointed out that Exemption 7(E), upon which the agency was basing its categorical exemption claim, "does not authorize the policy either." He explained that "the search slips are not themselves 'records. . .compiled for law enforcement purposes;' they are records compiled for the purpose of responding to FOIA requests. . . [T]he FBI is not seeking to withhold specific law enforcement information compiled in the search slips on the basis of Exemption 7(E); it is seeking to withhold all of the search slips in their entirety on the basis of Exemption 7(E)." He observed that "in the absence of a showing that all of the withheld search slips in their entirety constitute records 'compiled for law enforcement purposes,' the FBI's categorical reliance on Exemption 7 fails at the threshold." Moss pointed out that the search slips did not qualify as the kind of "techniques" or "procedures" to which Exemption 7(E) referred. He noted that "the purpose of Exemption 7(E) is to prevent the public from learning about the existence of confidential law enforcement techniques, not to prevent it from learning about the use of already-disclosed law enforcement techniques. It is thus implausible that the disclosure of the FBI's use of Section 552(c) exclusions�"although in some instances harmful�"would be harmful in a way that would bring the search slips within Exemption 7(E)'s grant of authority." The agency argued that Moss should recognize a judicial gloss for these records akin to the Glomar doctrine, allowing an agency to neither confirm nor deny the existence of records, or the mosaic theory, allowing a court to consider that disclosure of certain non-exempt information might allow a requester to infer the nature of related exempt information. Moss declined the agency's invitation, noting that "the FBI is not making a 'mosaic' claim, nor could it. It is only arguing that by withholding all search slips, even those not protected by FOIA, it can amass a haystack in which to hide the search slips that are protected." He pointed out that "although the Glomar doctrine may constitute a gloss on FOIA's text, it does not lead to results fundamentally at odds with the statute. The FBI's present policy does." He observed that "there may be compelling reasons to authorize the FBI to withhold search slips and similar processing records. But FOIA itself does not do so, and the FBI cannot act on the basis of an exemption or exclusion that Congress has not provided." The agency's other categorical claim was that evaluations forms for FOIA analysts assessing their performance were completely protected under Exemption 2 since they qualified as personnel records. But Moss noted that while the Supreme Court in Milner v. Dept of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011), held that Exemption 2 focused on personnel-related records, its prior ruling in Dept of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976), explained that even personnel records could be disclosed if there was a significant public interest. Moss indicated that "Milner does nothing to overrule or undermine that holding" and added that "unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by Congress, the Supreme Court's holding in Rose continues to bind this Court. . .The test articulated in Rose thus remains the law, and it excludes 'matters [that are] subject to a genuine and significant public interest' from the reach of Exemption 2." Agreeing with the plaintiffs that the evaluation forms reflected on the agency's operations, Moss pointed out that "the fact that the FBI uses the forms solely for the purpose of evaluating individual employees does not mean that the forms 'relate solely' to employee management. To the contrary, the forms reflect information regarding how the FBI goes about fulfilling its obligations under FOIA and, thus, at least in that sense 'relate' to far more than issues of internal management. Viewed from this perspective, the forms 'relate'�"at least in part�"to how the FBI performs one of its statutory obligations."
FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Randolph Moss has ruled that the restrictions on the government to offer new exemption claims during litigation, first expressed by the D.C. Circuit in Maydak v. Dept of Justice, 218 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000), still has considerable vitality. The Maydak decision put an end to a common practice of law enforcement agencies to claim that records were categorically exempt under Exemption 7(A) (ongoing investigation or proceeding), but then withdraw the 7(A) claim during litigation because the investigation had been closed. Agencies then would start reviewing the records for application of other exemptions, which would become the basis for their claims in court. The decision in Maydak made it clear that agencies were required to claim all exemptions they intended to assert at the beginning of litigation and not sometime later during the litigation, subject to two exceptions�"where the failure to invoke an exemption was the result of human error and disclosure could compromise national security or privacy, and where there substantial was change in either the facts of the case or an interim development in applicable law. Moss' ruling came in a case involving multiple requests made by researcher Ryan Sharpiro, reporter Jeffrey Stein, National Security Counselors, and Truthout to the Justice Department. Several requests sought FBI search slips and processing notes for FOIA requests. The FBI told the requesters that such records were categorically exempt. In his earlier opinion, Moss disagreed, finding the agency was required to process the records. This time, the FBI told Moss that it had abandoned its previous policy and had adopted a policy whereby it would deny requests for search slips and processing notes only where the agency issued a no record response or a Glomar response to the underlying FOIA request. The agency asked Moss to rule on whether or not the agency could apply its new policy to the requests involved in this case. Moss considered whether the FBI's request fell within one of the exceptions to Maydak. He noted that "the FBI does not contend that some change in law or fact has required it to reevaluate its policy with respect to requests for search slips or processing records. Indeed, it represents that it changed its policy in May 2015, eight months before the Court issued its opinion in this matter. The FBI does not point to any 'interim development,' at least not to one outside its control; it only represents that it has developed a new policy that it would like to apply to the plaintiffs' requests." Instead, Moss noted, the agency would have to proceed under the exception for a failure to claim an exemption as the result of "pure human error" where disclosure might endanger national security or privacy interests. He concluded that "the FBI cannot satisfy this standard." He indicated that "its request to apply its new policy to the plaintiffs' long-pending FOIA requests bears more resemblance to 'an attempt to gain a tactical advantage over the FOIA requester' than it does to a simple mistake. The FBI represents that it adopted its new policy in May 2015, after briefing in this case was complete but well before the court heard oral argument and issued its decision. But the FBI did not inform the Court about the existence of its new policy at any point between May 2015, when the new policy was adopted, and February 26, 2016, when the Court held a status conference to discuss the implementation of its December 2015 opinion. The FBI has not lacked for opportunities to inform the Court or the plaintiffs that it had adopted a new policy regarding search slips." He observed that "in light of the FBI's inability to establish that its failure to invoke the new policy in a timely manner was the result of a simple mistake, the Court will decline to permit it to rely on that policy at this stage in the proceeding." He added, however, that he would permit the FBI to show if disclosure of any records might harm national security or privacy interests. He cautioned that "this is not an opportunity for the FBI to advance its new policy regarding search slips. The FBI is free to apply that policy to future FOIA requests (and future FOIA requesters are, in turn, free to challenge it). But this is not the forum for such a proceeding." The FBI proposed an alternative argument in its attempt to get its new policy into court. The agency claimed that it had erred in not providing specific document-by-document exemption claims for the search slips and processing notes but that it had alluded to the fact in its affidavit that other exemptions might apply to such records. The FBI asked Moss to permit it to now review the records for such claims. Moss rejected this claim as well. He noted that "to the extent that the FBI argues either that it adequately preserved the exemptions that it now seeks to assert or that it would have been too burdensome to do so, Maydak disposes of both arguments. As in Maydak, the FBI here did not adequately preserve any document-by-document exemptions, stating only that additional records 'may be exempt.' And, as in Maydak, it would not have been burdensome for the FBI to have asserted both categorical and document-by-document exemptions at the same time�"indeed, this is precisely what it did in response to [one of the plaintiff's] second request." Moss pointed out that the FBI's request did not qualify under the "pure human error" exception to Maydak. He noted that "although it is conceivable that the FBI's failure to assert any document-by-document exemptions with respect to the plaintiffs' requests resulted from 'pure human error,' that seems unlikely given the FBI's assertion of those same exemptions in response to [one of the plaintiff's] second request. Furthermore, although some of the records the FBI requests permission to withhold at this stage might implicate the disclosure of 'national security or sensitive, personal, private information,' it is clear that not all of them will." He observed that "the Court will�"in its discretion�"permit the FBI to assert untimely exemptions to the extent that it can show that the disclosure of such records will 'compromise national security or sensitive, personal, private information.'"
FOIA Project Annotation: Clarifying his previous holding, Judge Randolph Moss has ruled that the FBI may assert claims made under Exemption 7(A) (interference with ongoing investigation or proceeding) and Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques), as well as claims of attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product privilege under Exemption 5 (privileges), but has waived its ability to claim that the deliberative process privilege applies to other records. Dealing with a number of requests from researcher Ryan Shapiro, reporter Jeffrey Stein, National Security Counselors, and Truthout for records pertaining to the agency's processing of FOIA requests, Moss previously ruled the agency could not claim such records were categorically exempt under Exemption 2 (internal practices and procedures) or Exemption 7(E). When the FBI asked Moss if it could make other claims, he next ruled that Maydak v. Dept of Jusice, 218 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and August v. FBI, 328 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2003), prevented agencies from bringing up exemptions not claimed originally unless the failure to do so was clearly a matter of human error. Moss found that was not the case here, but, in line with Maydak and August allowed the agency to make additional exemption claims where they pertained to matters of national security or privacy. The FBI asked for reconsideration, arguing this time that Maydak and August only applied where an agency asserted a new claim at the appellate level, not at the district court level. Moss indicated that "the Court agrees with both parties that the D.C. Circuit has not explicitly addressed the principles that should govern a district court's consideration of such an untimely assertion�"that is, an assertion of a FOIA exemption that is made after the parties have filed comprehensive cross-motions for summary judgment and the district judge has adjudicated those cross-motions." Finding recent case law suggested that district court judges should retain discretion in deciding whether to accept new exemption claims, Moss observed that "basic principles of fairness, efficiency, and finality, moreover�"principles inherent in the rules of civil procedure that apply with extra force in the context of FOIA litigation�"counsel in favor of requiring the government to make some threshold showing of good cause to avoid a finding of forfeiture. Such a showing need not be an onerous requirement." But, he noted, "what the government cannot argue is that it is permitted to assert additional FOIA exemptions absent any showing of good cause whatsoever. That rule would sweep too broadly." He added that "to the extent that the FBI argues that the D.C. Circuit's caselaw permits it to advance a FOIA exemption now that it did not advance previously absent a showing of good cause, it is wrong." Clarifying his earlier ruling, Moss permitted the FBI to assert exemption claims under Exemption 7, indicating that "such documents may implicate both national security and privacy issues. . .In any event, the FBI has represented that the records at issue here could, if revealed, jeopardize ongoing FBI investigations." By contrast, Moss pointed out that the agency's Exemption 5 claims did not implicate national security or privacy issues. However, he permitted the agency to assert attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product privilege to a handful of records there were sufficiently similar to other disputed records the agency had claimed were privileged. But Moss rejected the agency's attempt to assert the deliberative process privilege. He explained that "to the extent the FBI's present argument is not a categorical one, but instead turns on a case-by-case application of the deliberative-process privilege to the records it now seeks to withhold, such an argument presents a substantial risk of expanding the scope and duration of the present litigation. The FBI appears to have asserted the deliberative process privilege to protect information contained in over 450 pages of records. . .[which] significantly increases the likelihood that the present litigation will be prolonged." The FBI had requested a stay until a final judgment, but, while agreeing with the need for a stay, Moss sided with the plaintiffs in giving the agency a 60-day stay.
FOIA Project Annotation: In a recent decision pertaining to multiple requests filed by researcher Ryan Shapiro and others for records concerning the way in which the FBI processes FOIA requests, Judge Randolph Moss has discovered that his initial ruling that search slips are not protected by Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques) is considerably more complicated than he may have at first imagined. This time around, Moss agreed with the agency's refined position invoking the mosaic theory. In his first decision in the case, Moss ruled that the FBI could not categorically withhold case evaluation forms used to track and evaluate the performance of FBI FOIA analysts in processing FOIA and Privacy Act requests. The FBI asked Moss to reconsider his ruling, explaining that it no longer claimed that case evaluation forms could be categorially withheld, but only to FOIA requests that had resulted in a "no records" response or a Glomar response neither confirming nor denying the existence of records. While Moss found that Maydak v. Dept of Justice, 218 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000), in which the D.C Circuit held that agencies were required to make all their exemption claims at the beginning of litigation, he agreed that ordering disclosure of the records might compromise sensitive national security or privacy information and allowed the agency to brief the matter further. Moss began by explaining that the exclusions under subsection (c) allowed the FBI to claim that it had no records in response to a request where "the explicit assertion of a FOIA exemption might permit a FOIA requester or other member of the public to infer the precise information that the FOIA exclusion is intended to secure." Moss explained that "plaintiffs' practice of filing FOIA requests for records generated in responding to prior FOIA requests, however, puts this practice to the test. Because the FBI inevitably generates records, such as search slips and processing notes, when it receives any FOIA request, the FBI faces a conundrum," because disclosure might reveal information protected by an exclusion. The FBI, however, had initially asserted a categorical exemption for such records, which Moss had rejected. But at this point in the litigation, the FBI was asserting a more targeted claim that Exemption 7(E) protected 42 "no records" responses to 58 of Shapiro's requests for records pertaining to the processing of previous FOIA requests. The FBI contended that "at least in the current context, which involves an array of FOIA requests relating to domestic terrorism investigations, the implicit disclosure of the existence or nonexistence of the use of the FOIA exclusion poses a risk of circumvention of the law." Moss agreed with the refinements the FBI had made to its claim. He pointed out that "to be sure, those search records were not themselves compiled for law enforcement purposes; rather, they were compiled to comply with FOIA. But to the extent they replicate information that was compiled for law enforcement purposes, that distinction is immaterial. Nor does it make a difference whether any underlying records exist or not. Exemption 7 protects 'information compiled for law enforcement purposes,' and the absence of a record can reflect 'information' compiled by the agency just as much as the existence of a record." Having found that the records qualified as law enforcement records under Exemption 7, Moss considered the FBI's claim that the search slips were protected by Exemption 7(E). He noted that "the fact that the FBI is permitted to issue 'No Records' responses based on the §552(c) exclusion is not a confidential 'technique' or 'procedure'�"rather, that fact is embodied in the statute and judicial precedent. Although the FBI has now further elaborated on its arguments, it is safe to say that it still has not identified a relevant law enforcement 'technique' or 'procedure' with crystal clarity." Having said that, Moss concluded the FBI had shown why such records could reveal investigative techniques or procedures. He pointed out that "there is little meaningful difference between records compiled for law enforcement purposes and information relating to the search of those records. In both cases, knowledge of the existence or non-existence of an investigation, for example, might assist those seeking to evade detection." The FBI relied on the mosaic theory�"that even pieces of mundane information might disclose protected information when put together with other such information�"arguing that disclosure of the search slips when put in context with other information could reveal protected information. Noting that there was little case law concerning when to apply the mosaic theory, Moss observed, that "the search slips at issue are part of a complex mosaic relating to on-going FBI operations, involving one of the FBI's domestic terrorism priorities, which has been the subject of a staggering number of FOIA requests seeking information about many specific individuals and organizations. In this context, the Court concludes that the FBI has met its modest burden of showing 'logically how the release of [the processing records] might create a risk of circumvention of the law.'" Beyond the search slips, the FBI also contended that disclosure of file numbers would implicate the mosaic theory. Shapiro argued that file numbers were created for administrative purposes, not law enforcement purposes. Moss disagreed. He noted that "although Plaintiffs are correct that files numbers serve an administrative purpose�"permitting the FBI to track and organize documents�"they ignore the fact that the tracking system is based on information collected for law enforcement purposes. The relevant file numbers are not generated at random, but, rather, incorporate information compiled in the course of enforcing the criminal laws. . . As relevant here, moreover, a collection or 'mosaic' of FBI file numbers might show�"or at least suggest�"whether the FBI devotes a small amount of attention, or a great deal of attention, to animal rights extremism in each relevant region of the country. That information is, as a matter of ordinary usage, 'compiled' in the FBI filing system�"that is, it is 'collected and assembled from various sources or other documents.' It is not difficult to conclude, moreover, that a 'rational nexus' exists between the compilation of this information and 'one of the agency's law enforcement duties.'" Moss added that "moreover, as the FBI observes, although a single file number may be unilluminating, Plaintiffs' requests must be construed as part of a larger mosaic. Understood in that manner, aggregate information about the numbers of files or document that bear a designation for domestic terrorism/animal rights extremism may shed considerable light on the overall resources that a particular office of the FBI has devoted, or is devoting, to investigating related crimes. The conclusion that the disclosure of FBI filed numbers can�"in theory�"reveal sensitive law enforcement techniques, however, does not answer the question whether disclosure of the file numbers at issue here would, in fact do so." Shapiro argued that the fact that the agency had not invoked Exemption 7(A) (ongoing investigation or proceeding) for any of the records implied that they did not concern ongoing investigations. Moss indicated, however, that "the Court is not convinced that the mere fact that an investigation is closed severs the 'logical' link between release of the information and the risk of circumvention; knowing that the FBI has historically focused its enforcement efforts in a particular region, for example, might aid a criminal in circumventing the law." He explained that because Shapiro now argued that the agency had waived its right to withhold some file numbers due to official acknowledgment, he would give the FBI a chance to respond to that claim. He revealed, however, that the records did confirm that the FBI had closed its investigation into the unsolved murder of Hyram Kitchen more than 25 years ago and told the agency that it could no longer claim those records were protected under Exemption 7(A). Moss agreed with Shapiro that there was still a dispute over whether the agency had properly segregated non-exempt information from declarations filed in previous litigation. He noted that "in light of Plaintiffs' colorable contention that the declarations submitted in prior litigation revealed significant details about the searches and that the FBI has waived any right to object to disclosure of that information and given the potential value to Plaintiffs and the public of an ability to look behind the types of agency declarations that typically dominate FOIA litigation, the Court will require the FBI to file copies of the search slips from one randomly selected FOIA request, from which only the non-public information has been redacted."

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