Source: https://www.queenslandjudgments.com.au/case/id/308365
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:22:26+00:00

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FC 45 - Antonio Perez v Transfield (Qld) Pty. Ltd.
Antonio Perez v Transfield (Qld) Pty. Ltd.
MR. JUSTICE LUCAS: In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I publish my reasons.
MR. JUSTICE HOARE: In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I publish my reasons. I also agree with the reasons of my brother the presiding judge.
MR. JUSTICE KELLY: In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I agree with the reasons published by my brother the presiding judge and also with the reasons published by my brother Hoare.
MR. JUSTICE LUCAS: The order of the court is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Reasons for Judgment delivered by Lucas J. and Hoare J. on the 29th June, 1979. Kelly J. concurring.
The corresponding English rule, O. 70 r. 1, and later, O. 2 r. 1, was in the same form, subject to a verbal change (“shall so direct” instead of “directs”), until 1st October 1964 (for the date, see the judgment of Payne J. in Brady v. Barrow steel Works Ltd. (1965) 2 QB 182 at p. 188).
Under a rule in this form, it was important to determine whether proceedings which did not comply with the rules were irregularities or nullities; if the former, they could be cured by applying O. 93 r. 17; if the latter, they could not.
It is not necessary to set out the contents of rules 2 and 3.
The other two members of the court do not appear to have gone quite so far, and it may be, as my brother Hoare has said, referring to the note to the English O. 2 r. 1 in the Annual Practice, that the failure to comply with a statutory requirement, or the taking of a step which could be regarded as a serious impropriety, would render the proceedings a nullity. We are not in this case, however, called upon to define precisely the ambit of O. 93 r. 17.
Neither of the other members of the court specifically referred to the argument. The question did not arise in that case, for no step at all had been taken in the action for more than six years.
The question does, however, directly arise in this case, by reason of the fact that the respondent entered the action for trial and gave notice of trial on 15th October 1976, more than three years after the last step had been taken. The argument for the respondent was that the entering of the action for trial, notwithstanding that it was done after the expiration of more than three years after the last step, was to be treated as an irregularity only. Since no application had been made within a reasonable time to set aside the entry of trial (see O. 93 r. 18) it stood. It followed that the judge in chambers really only had before him in this case an application by the defendant for dismissal of the action for want of prosecution; he could not be said to have been wrong in refusing that relief.
I can see no escape from the argument. The taking of a step in a proceeding, without leave, notwithstanding that more than three years has elapsed since the last step was taken, comes literally within the wording of O. 93 r. 17(1), for in taking such a step “there has been, in the course of proceedings, by reason of a thing done, a failure to comply with the requirements of these rules in respect of time”. All these words are taken from the rule, and it follows that the failure is to be treated as an irregularity.
I would not have written at such length about this aspect of the matter had I not been of the opinion that this result is not in accordance with the intention disclosed in O. 90 r. 9. As a member of the committee which was responsible for the revision of the rules in 1965, I must take a share of the blame.
If a party takes a step out of time without leave, it will henceforward be necessary for the other party to apply promptly to have the step set aside, and this should be given the widest publicity within the profession. I am quite satisfied that it was not the intention of O. 90 r. 9 to require the other party to assume such a burden. If it is found that parties are ignoring the requirements of O. 90 r. 9 with any frequency, consideration should in my opinion be given to amending that rule.
I should add, since William Crosby & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (1963) 109 C.L.R. 490 has been regarded as a binding authority in the application of O. 90 r. 9, that the High Court Rules have not adopted the amendments to O. 93 r. 17 made in Queensland and in England (See O. 60 r. 12(2) and O. 64 r. 1).
In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Central Judge granting leave to proceed to the respondent plaintiff and dismissing an application by the appellant defendant that the action be dismissed for want of prosecution.
The incident out of which the action was instituted occurred on 25th July, 1968. The writ was issued out of the Central District Registry on 9th July, 1971. It was duly served on State Government Insurance Office. This service was effected on the basis that it was alleged that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant and was injured in the course of his employment in consequence of the defendant's negligence or breach of duty and State Government Insurance Office was the insurer of the defendant under a policy of accident insurance within the meaning of the “Workers' Compensation Acts” of Queensland. However, it is also alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant was negligent in allowing a mobile crane which it owned, to be operated by an employee who was unskilled and/or unqualified and through its servant or agent failed to use reasonable care in the operation of the mobile crane whereby injury was caused to the plaintiff. It appears that the mobile crane was insured under a policy of insurance within the meaning of “The Motor Vehicles Insurance Acts” of Queensland with Eagle Star Insurance Company Limited. The writ was not served on Eagle Star Insurance Company Limited until the expiration of more than one year from its issue. However, due service was admitted in the defence. Counsel for the defendant concede that nothing now hinges on this late service.
In April, 1973 the Solicitors for the defendant caused the issue of third party notices on State Government Insurance Office and on Eagle Star Insurance Company Limited. In May, 1973 the plaintiff delivered his Statement of Claim and in June, 1973 the defendant delivered its Statement of Claim to the third parties and defences of each of the third parties were delivered in June and July of 1973.
Then followed a long delay which indisputably was caused by the failure of the plaintiff's solicitor to take steps to press on with the litigation. It appears from the solicitor's Affidavit that he was greatly overworked and for a time was unable to obtain professional assistance. He suffered a breakdown in health. However, it is clear that there was a delay of nearly two years in prosecuting the action (from 1973 to 1975) and this delay was the responsibility of the plaintiff's solicitor. As he could not attend to the matter himself his duty was to so advise the plaintiff who would have been at liberty to engage another solicitor had he thought that course appropriate in the circumstances. It would appear that no such advice was given to the plaintiff.
Eventually the solicitor obtained the services of a solicitor to assist him in his practice and on 10th September, 1975 notice of intention to proceed was served on the solicitors for the defendant and for the third parties. Shortly afterwards the solicitors for the secondnamed third party wrote to the plaintiff's solicitor asking that the plaintiff submit to medical examinations. Then followed a protracted series of communications between the solicitors for the secondnamed third party and the plaintiff's solicitor in relation to medical examinations. Various appointments were made and changed from time to time, sometimes at the request of the plaintiff although in at least one case, at the instance of a medical practitioner.
On 18th March, 1976 the solicitor for the secondnamed third party wrote inter alia to the solicitor for the plaintiff “Eagle Star Insurance Co. Limited has instructed us to make application .... to have the matter struck out for want of prosecution unless the matter is brought forward for hearing and/or settled at an early date.” Following this intimation new appointments for medical examinations were made.
It appears that the plaintiff's solicitor formed the incorrect impression that the solicitors for Eagle Star Insurance Company Limited had the carriage of the action on behalf of the defendant.
“So far as we are aware no step has been taken in this action since we delivered our client's reply to the defence of the third party, Eagle Star Insurance Company Limited on 21st, August, 1973.
If this is correct then pursuant to Order 90 rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules your client is obliged to obtain the leave of a court or a judge before the action can proceed.
No action was taken by the plaintiff's solicitor in response to this letter but medical examinations were arranged, in due course, between the solicitors for the secondnamed third party and the plaintiff's solicitor. I note that there was a long delay in the solicitors for the secondnamed third party obtaining a copy of one report. It is not clear to what extent the plaintiff himself was responsible for these delays but it has not been shown that he bore no personal responsibility in this respect. The secondnamed third party was actively pursuing the possibility of a settlement of the action until about six months before the application to dismiss for want of prosecution was made by the defendant.
It is true that the plaintiff's solicitor was not entitled to regard the solicitors for the secondnamed third party is having the conduct of the action. However, it is quite common for solicitors for an insurance company which is by statute legally liable to meet a judgment for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff arising out of or in consequence of an accident to a meter vehicle, to negotiate a settlement of the action. In the present action the secondnamed third party had reserved its rights against the defendant in consequence of an asserted breach of the policy conditions. Thus, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the appellant had a very real interest in the proceedings. It is submitted in effect that the fact that negotiations had continued for a long period with this particular third party was not a circumstance which should be regarded as excusing the plaintiff from either pressing on with his action or obtaining the acquiescence of the defendant to the delays which attended the medical examinations and reports sought by the secondnamed third party. There is merit in such a submission but on the other hand there is no material to suggest that the defendant was prejudiced in any way other than the prejudice likely to arise from the long delay which has occurred.
Another matter which should be mentioned is that the plaintiff is a migrant, born in Spain, with a limited knowledge of English. No doubt this circumstance led to some communication problems.
In the circumstances I do not deem it necessary to analyse in very close detail the various delays which have occurred. It is sufficient to say that, having regard to the delays at all stages of the action, including the fact that the writ was not issued until nearly three years alter the incidents said to give rise to the course of action, had the learned judge ordered that the action be dismissed for want of prosecution, in my opinion it would have been impossible to demonstrate that such an order was beyond the limits of a soundly exercised discretion. However, it does not follow that a discretion exercised to allow the action to continue was necessarily wrong.
These observations were cited with approval by Moffitt P. in Wright v. Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 697 at pp. 701, 702. Class J.A. agreed with these reasons. In my opinion these observations on the requirement to give reasons are undoubtedly correct. There would be much to commend a proposition that the absence of reasons for a particular decision which should be made in the exercise of a discretion, should change the basis on which an appellate court acts on an appeal. However, as I understand the law, the absence of such reasons does not alter the basis on which an appellate court should act. These principles have been stated in a number of cases including Evans v. Bartlam (1936) A.C. 473 at pp. 480, 481 (per Lord Atkin) and at pp. 486, 487 (per Lord Wright).
One important matter canvassed by counsel for the respondent plaintiff relates to the effect of R.S.C. O. 93 R. 17(1). Counsel submit that in the present case the entry of the action for trial although it was contrary to the provisions of O. 90 R. 9, was nevertheless a mere irregularity and not a nullity. Counsel submit that the remedy available to the appellant defendant would have been to apply to the court under the provisions of O. 95 R. 17(2) and such an application must be made within a reasonable time (O. 93 R. 18). No such application was made within a reasonable time. Thus it is submitted that the entry of trial was not a nullity but was a mere irregularity and no application having been made by the defendant the entry of trial has, as it were, been validated. Counsel submit that this being so the application to dismiss the action for want of prosecution, being one in which the action has actually been entered for trial and the only subsequent delays of any consequence relate to attempts to settle the action, was one which was almost bound to fail.
If the argument of counsel for the respondent as to the effect of O. 93 R. 17 is soundly based then it offers much support for the exercise of a discretion in the way it was exercised by the Chamber Judge.
It should be noted that the present O. 93 R. 17 follows 30 2 R. 1. The English rule was introduced in 1964 following the decision of the court of appeal in Re Pritchard Deceased (1963) Ch. 502. Had the present problem arisen while the previous O. 93 R. 17 (which was identical with the then EO 70 R. 1) was in force, then without any doubt any step taken in the action contrary to the provisions of O. 90 R. 9 would have been treated as a nullity. It is clear that the solicitors for the defendant in this case so regarded the purported entry of trial.
The notes to the White Practice under EO 2 R. 1 state the effect of the rule as follows “... under it the ... distinction between nullity and mere irregularity disappears (see Harkness v. Bell's Asbestos & Engineering Limited (1967) 2 Q.B. 729 at p. 735, C.A.) at any rate in regard to ‘a failure to comply with the requirements of those rules,’ though it may still be that there are other failures to comply with statutory requirements or other improprieties so serious as to render the proceedings in which they occur, and any order made therein, a nullity.” I should think that an order made in breach of a statute would, generally speaking, be void. However, it does not necessarily follow that a step taken in an action in breach of O. 90 R. 9 should be similarly regarded. I agree with respect with the observations of Lord Denning M.R. in the Harkness case (supra) at p. 735-736 “Every omission or mistake in practice or procedure is henceforward to be regarded as an irregularity which the courts can and should rectify so long as it can do so without injustice.” It is interesting that Lord Denning further observed “It can at last be asserted that it is not possible for an honest litigant in Her Majesty's Supreme Court to be defeated by any mere technicality, any slip, any mistaken step in his litigation.” An earlier observation by Bowen L.J. was not borne out. (du Pontin v. Wood (1962) 1 Q.B. 594 per Holroyd Pearce L.J. at p. 609).
I see no valid reason why the provisions of O. 93 R. 17 should be read down in such a way that the provisions do not apply to proceedings referred to in O. 90 R. 9. A litigant should observe the requirements of the Rules including O. 90 R. 9. Should he fail to do so then the onus is on the other side to apply to the court under the provisions of O. 93 R. 17(2). Such an application must be made within a reasonable time, (O. 93 R. 18) otherwise that party will lose his rights under Order 93 R. 17(2). So understood the effect of O. 90 R. 9 will generally remain unimpaired. A prudent litigant will continue to make application to the court as required by the rule. Should he fail to do so the onus is on the other side to make the application. It is only if he fails to make the application within a reasonable time that the party loses his rights to rely on the provisions of O. 90 R. 9.
It seems to me that O. 90 R. 9 should be regarded as a procedural provision. It is true that in its earlier form when the time prescribed was six years, this period coincided with most statutory periods of limitation and in its present form coincides with many such periods of limitation, nevertheless it does not purport to operate as a bar to the bringing of a fresh action. Thus while I appreciate that the underlying reason for such a provision (See William Crosby & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (1963) 109 C.L.R. 490 at p. 496) affords an argument for treating the rule differently from other procedural provisions nevertheless it is a procedural provision and I am not satisfied that there is justification for “reading down” the provisions of O. 93 R. 17(1).
Having taken this view as to the effect of O. 93 R. 17 it seems to me that the purported entry of trial was not a nullity but was an irregularity. As the defendant's solicitors did not make an application to the court within a reasonable time they, in effect, have waived the irregularity. I see no sufficient reason why an irregularity of this nature cannot be waived by the party for whose benefit the provision would operate. For example a defendant might know that a plaintiff would in any event commence a new action which would not be statute barred. In such circumstances a defendant could well decide to waive the benefits of the rule.
It is ture that before the present action can be heard other steps are necessary including filing certificates of readiness (O. 39 R. 30A). Also, after the action was entered for trial (albeit wrongly) the secondnamed third party was actively pursuing the possibility of settlement of the action until about six months before the application was made by the defendant to dismiss the action for want of prosecution. This is an important circumstance even after making full allowance for the many delays which had occurred in relation to the late issue of the writ and the many delays which had occurred thereafter. Viewing the proceedings overall, I am not persuaded that the order of the Chamber Judge refusing the appellant defendant's application to dismiss the action was one which lay outside the limits of a sound discretion. In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed. I have read the reasons for judgment of Lucas J. in draft form and I agree with his reasons.

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