Source: http://blog.mikebakerlaw.com/2010/03/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 21:01:12+00:00

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In a case with implications for aliens facing domestic violence deportation charges or with aggravated-felony crime of violence convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v. U.S., 2010 WL 693687, held that the Florida felony offense of battery by “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another person does not have “as an element the use ... of physical force against the person of another” and thus does not constitute a “violent felony” under 18 USCA § 924(e).
528 F. 3d 1318, reversed and remanded.
physical injury to another.” §924(e)(2)(B).
Johnson’s indictment specified five prior felony convictions. The Government contended that three of those convictions—for aggravated battery and for burglary of a dwelling in October 1986, and for battery in May 2003—rendered Johnson eligible for sentencing under §924(e)(1). At the sentencing hearing, Johnson did not dispute that the two 1986 convictions were for “violent felon[ies],” but he objected to counting his 2003 battery conviction. That conviction was for simple battery murder Florida law, which ordinarily is a first-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat. §784.03(1)(b), but is a third-degree felony for a defendant who (like Johnson) has been convicted of battery (even simple battery) before, §784.03(2).
defendant “[i]ntentionally caus[ed] bodily harm,” that he “intentionally str[uck]” the victim, or that he merely “[a]ctually and intentionally touche[d]” the victim.
Since nothing in the record of Johnson’s 2003 battery conviction permitted the District Court to conclude that it rested upon anything more than the least of these acts, see Shepard v. United States , 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (plurality opinion), his conviction was a predicate conviction for a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act only if “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another person constitutes the use of “physical force” within the meaning of m§924(e)(2)(B)(i). The District Court concluded that it does, and accordingly sentenced Johnson under §924(e)(1) to a prison term of 15 years and 5 months.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 528 F. 3d 1318 (2008).
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, the Court first rejected the petitioner's argument that, in deciding whether any unwanted physical touching constitutes “physical force”m under 18 USCA § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), it was bound by the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007), am case involving a Florida statute similar to the ACCA that held that, since § 784.03(1)(a) requires proof of only the slightest unwanted physical touch, “the use ... of physical force” was not an element of the offense. Rather, the Court said, the meaning of “physical force” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is a question of federal law, not state law, and in answering that question the Court is not bound by a state court's interpretation of a similar or even identical state statute. However, in determining whether a felony conviction for battery under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.03(2) meets the definition of “violent felony” in 18 USCA § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the Court said, it was bound by the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.03(2).
In construing both parts of § 16, we cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term “crime of violence.” The ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16's emphasis on the use of physical force against another person (or the risk of having to use such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes.... 543 U.S. at 11, 125 S.Ct. 377.
The Court also found it significant that the meaning of “physical force” that the government sought to import into the meaning of “violent felony” is a meaning derived from a common-law misdemeanor and concluded that it is unlikely that Congress would select as a term of art defining “violent felony” a phrase that the common law gave peculiar meaning only in its definition of a misdemeanor.
enactment of the language in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
before the Court, and the Court explicitly did not decide it.
Similarly the Court dismissed both (1) the government's concern that the Court's interpretation would make it more difficult to remove, pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(E) [8 USCA § 1227(a)(2)(E)], an alien convicted of a “crime of domestic violence,” which is defined to mean “any crime of violence (as defined in [18 USCA § 16])” committed by certain persons, including spouses, former spouses, and parents, where the alien is convicted of a battery under a statute, like Florida's, that does not require the use of violent physical force, and (2) the dissent's concern that, in states that have generic felony-battery statutes that cover both violent force and unwanted physical force, the Court's interpretation will render convictions under those statutes outside the scope of the ACCA. The majority found these arguments to exaggerate the effect of its decision since, when the law under which the defendant has been convicted contains statutory phrases that cover several different generic crimes, some of which require violent force and some of which do not, the Court's modified categorical approach, Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009), permits a court to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting the trial record--including charging documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact and conclusions of law from a bench trial, and jury instructions and verdict forms. In this regard, the Court pointed out, the government has in the past obtained convictions under the ACCA in precisely this manner.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the ACCA defines a “violent felony” to mean, among other things, “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” and the classic definition of the crime of battery is the “intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another,” so that the crime of battery, as traditionally defined, falls squarely within the plain language of the ACCA. Justice Alito opined that the ACCA was meant to incorporate this traditional definition and that therefore the decision of the court of appeals should have been affirmed.
The Department of State's (DOS') Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has released the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009. As with 2008, there are a total of 194 country reports.
According to the information reported, “there still are an alarming number of reports of torture, extrajudicial killings, and other violations of universal human rights” occurring primarily in countries in which conflicts are occurring. The governments of Afghanistan, Burma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan were all cited has having committed such acts. For example, in Nigeria, the report noted that, “[b]etween July 26 and July 29, police and militant members of Boko Haram, an extremist Islamic group, clashed violently in four northern states, resulting in the displacement of approximately 4,000 people and more than 700 deaths, although this figure is not definitive because quick burials in mass graves precluded an accurate count.” Also, although Pakistan's civilian authorities took some positive steps, significant human-rights challenges remain. Major problems included extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances as some 825 civilians were killed by militant forces, security operations to repel the militants from Malakand Division and parts of the FATA displaced almost three million persons at the peak of the crisis (although by year's end, approximately 1.66 million had returned to their home areas), and security forces allegedly committed 300 to 400 extrajudicial killings during counterinsurgency operations.
Many governments continued to exert control over information that came into and was produced within their countries. This was accomplished by hindering the ability to organize in public, online, or through use of new technologies, by restricting the dissemination of information on the Internet, radio, or television or through print media, and constructing legal barriers that made it difficult for NGOs to establish themselves. According to the National Endowment for Democracy, 26 laws in 25 countries have been introduced or adopted since January 2008 that impede civil society.
The governments of Belarus, China, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan were all mentioned in this category. China, for example, increased its efforts to monitor Internet use, control content, restrict information, block access to foreign and domestic Web sites, encourage self-censorship, and punish those who violated regulations. Further, in Colombia, while independent media were active and expressed a wide variety of views without restriction and all privately owned radio and television stations broadcast freely, members of illegal armed groups intimidated, threatened, kidnapped, or killed journalists, which, according to national and international NGOs, caused many to practice self-censorship; others, 171 to be specific, received protection from the government. In Venezuela, the government's harassment of Globovision, the largest private television network, included raiding the home of the company's president and publicly calling for the company's closure. At year's end, 32 radio stations and two television stations had been closed, and 29 other radio stations remained under threat of closure.
Vulnerable groups, including racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, the disabled, women and children, migrant workers, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals, were marginalized and targets of societal and/or government-sanctioned abuse. Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic were cited as seeing a rise in killings and incidents of violence against Roma, the largest and most vulnerable minority in Europe. Other countries noted for violations included China, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and Uganda. Anti-Semitism continued to arise, and a spike in such activity followed the Gaza conflict in the winter of 2008-2009. Attacks on Christians rose in Egypt, and, in Uganda, a bill providing the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality” and for homosexual “serial offenders” resulted in increased harassment and intimidation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered persons during the year.
Whether an alien has presented sufficient evidence to establish a well-founded fear of persecution is a legal determination that is reviewed de novo by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
In order to determine, under de novo review, whether specific facts are sufficient to meet a legal standard such as a “well-founded fear,” the Board has authority to give different weight to the evidence from that given by the Immigration Judge.
State Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence and are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.
The evidence presented by the respondents, considered in light of State Department country reports specific to Fujian Province, failed to establish a reasonable possibility that either respondent would be subject to forced sterilization due to having two children born in the United States or would face penalties or sanctions so severe that they would rise to the level of persecution.
Petition for review BIA's decision that petitioners' untimely applications and failure to provide the required biometrics meant they had abandoned their applications for relief is denied where: 1) the petitioners were given ample time to file their applications for relief and provide biometrics and did not have good cause for their delay; and 2) the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying their motion for a continuance; and 3) IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying their requests for relief because of their failure to comply with these application prerequisites.
Bd. did not err in affirming IJ's removal order after IJ found that aliens' applications seeking relief from removal were untimely since they were filed 14 months after deadline set forth by IJ and lacked required set of fingerprints. Applicable regulatory scheme (8 CFR section 1003.31(c)) permits IJs to set time limits for filing applications seeking relief from removal, and instant failure by aliens to file timely applications or supply required fingerprints within deadline constituted waiver of applications. Fact that one alien's asylum application had been filed prior to April 1, 2005 effective date of instant regulations was irrelevant.
The petitioners are a mother and son from Guatemala who entered the U.S. illegally in 1989 and 1997, respectively. The mother filed for asylum after her arrival, but the immigration authorities did not adjudicate the application. Removal proceedings were commenced against both petitioners in 2004, and they conceded the charges. The lead respondent, Ms. Juarez, advised the IJ that she intended to file for cancellation of removal and to pursue her asylum application filed in 1990. Her son expressed an intention to file his own asylum application as he was not considered a derivative on his mother's case. The petitioners' attorney advised the IJ that he required 60 days to file the applications. The IJ approved this request and set the filing date for September 26, 2005, with the individual hearing date set for November 13, 2006. The IJ informed both petitioners that they needed to provide fingerprint and biographical information before the date of the next hearing in order to be eligible for relief. Indeed, the IJ addressed the petitioners individually and instructed them both to “pester your attorney” to get the fingerprints submitted on time. Their attorney acknowledged his familiarity with the biometrics procedures and said that he understood that the process could take some time. The applications were not filed within the time set by the IJ nor did the petitioners comply with the biometrics requirements. Less than a week before the November 2006 hearing, they filed motions asking for a continuance. Their attorney advised the IJ that the applications had been filed, but he had not yet received official confirmation in order to arrange the fingerprinting appointment. Counsel admitted that he had been unable to devote adequate time to preparing his clients' cases.
The IJ denied the continuance motion, reasoning that good cause had not been shown. The asylum application actually arrived at the court five days before the individual hearing date and the cancellation application arrived on the hearing date, but after the hearing had been concluded. As pointed out by the circuit court, the applications were filed 14 months late. Although conceding that good cause was absent, petitioners' counsel argued before the IJ that his clients should not be penalized for missing the court's deadlines when the immigration authorities had not acted on the lead petitioner's asylum application for more than a decade. The IJ agreed with DHS counsel that the petitioners had abandoned their claims by failing to submit fingerprints or timely filing their relief applications, and consequently ordered their removal. An appeal was filed with the BIA, but the petitioners' attorney failed to file a brief. Finding the IJ's decision to be valid, the Board dismissed the appeal.
The circuit court explained that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010) (holding that the courts have jurisdiction to review denials of motions to reopen), its review in regard to the denial of the continuance was plenary, thus retreating from its prior decision in Iqbal Ali v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2007), which held that the court lacked jurisdiction over such a matter. The court cited to the applicable regulation--8 CFR § 1003.31(c)--authorizing IJ's to set and extend time limits for filing of applications and related documents, and providing that if an application is not filed within the time period it shall be deemed to be waived. It also cited to 8 CFR § 1003.47(c), providing that an alien's failure to comply with processing requirements for biometrics and other biographic information within the time allowed will result in dismissal of the application, unless the applicant demonstrates that such failure was the result of good cause. It also referred to 8 CFR § 1003.29, which provides that an IJ may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.
The court concluded that the IJ was well within his discretion in denying the petitioners' continuance motion and their requests for relief from removal as well. It rejected the petitioners' contention that 8 CFR § 1003.47 (the biometric regulation) is ultra vires, pointing out that by statute the Attorney General (AG) is prohibited from granting asylum to any applicant until his or her identity is checked against all appropriate records or databases to determine any ground on which the alien may be inadmissible or deportable from the U.S. or ineligible to apply for or be granted asylum, citing to INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(i) [8 USCA § 1158(d)(5)(A)(i)]. The court declared that the 60 days provided to file was “plenty of time.” The court also ruled that the government's delay in the matter was not a relevant factor, citing to Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (decision when to initiate removal proceedings is in the discretion of immigration authorities). The court observed that the petitioners had been represented by the same attorney throughout the proceedings so there was no claim for ineffective assistance of counsel; however, the court directed the court clerk to transmit a copy of the opinion to the Arkansas Committee on Professional Conduct and the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review.
While the immigrant population of the United States increased by 6.9 million between 2000 and 2008, the impact of this growth varied considerably from state to state in terms of population size and characteristics. To facilitate analysis of these differences, the interactive map below provides national and state-by-state data on immigrant populations from the 1990 and 2000 Decennial Censuses and the 2007 American Community Surveys (ACS). Click the desired state to generate fact sheets about the demographic & social, &education, workforce, and income & poverty characteristics.
Income and Poverty: average incomes, income distributions, poverty rates.
To view the 2000 version of the data tool, click here.
This data tool is a project of MPI's National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy. It was made possible with generous support from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
A postconviction sentence modification may be effective in avoiding a conviction for immigration purposes or to eliminate an aggravated-felony ground of deportability.
Where a criminal court vacated the 1-year prison sentence of an alien convicted of a theft offense and revised the sentence to 360 days of imprisonment, the alien does not have a conviction for an aggravated felony within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (Supp. V 1999). Matter of Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. 173 (BIA 2001).
The Board gave effect to a sentence reduction and terminated removal proceedings for Min Song, an individual whose one-year sentence for theft was decreased to 360 days. The reduced sentence, the BIA ruled, effectively removed Song from the reach of provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act relating to the definition of "aggravated felony."
Song, a native Korean who had been admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1981, was convicted of theft and sentenced to a year in prison in the late 1980s. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 amended the INA's definition of "aggravated felony" to include theft offenses for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. Individuals found removable for aggravated felony convictions are also rendered ineligible for any relief from removal. Based on his theft conviction, Song was placed in removal proceedings and subsequently ordered removed by the immigration court.
On appeal, Song challenged the immigration court's finding that his aggravated felony conviction made him ineligible for relief under the INA. Prior to filing his appellate brief, Song applied for and obtained an order vacating and revising his previous sentence nunc pro tunc to 360 days. Nunc pro tunc orders are used by courts to revise prior judgments or orders in matters where the court originally had jurisdiction. The new order replaces the original and is considered to have the same status, notwithstanding the modification.
In his appellate brief, Song presented new evidence demonstrating that his criminal sentence had been reduced to 360 days. As Song's new conviction was for a term of less than one year, the BIA determined that he could no longer be considered an aggravated felon. In reaching its decision, the BIA relied on Matter of Martin, 18 Int. Dec. 226 (1982), in which it ruled that where an individual is resentenced for a crime, the new sentence determines whether or not he or she is deportable.
The BIA distinguished its ruling in Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, Int. Dec. 3377 (BIA 1999), which held that the IIRIRA provision defining "conviction" for immigration purposes precludes the BIA from giving effect to expungements or other post-conviction state rehabilitative orders. In this case the definition of "conviction" is not at issue; the sentence reduction did not eliminate the fact that there was a conviction, but rather changed the term of imprisonment such that the conviction falls outside the definition of an aggravated felony.
There are several different sentencing options which judges may exercise when sentencing someone for a criminal offense. These options can include a sentence to incarceration, deferred adjudication, probation, supervision, conditional discharge, and first-offender probation.
A deferred adjudication sentence is a form of judge-ordered supervision which permits a defendant to accept responsibility for the crime without suffering all of the potential consequences and liabilities from the entry of a formal conviction under state law. The judge defers final decision on the charge, places the person on probation, and sets conditions of probation which, if fulfilled, avoid a final conviction under state law.
Where a deferred adjudication statute requires a plea of guilty, a plea of nolo contendere (no contest), or an admission of sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt and some form of punishment is ordered (i.e., the program itself), such adjudication is considered a conviction for immigration purposes.
Imposition of court costs and surcharges qualifies as a penalty or punishment for immigration purposes under INA § 101(a)(48)(A)(ii). In Matter of Cabrera, the Board addressed the issue of whether the imposition of costs and surcharges following a plea in criminal proceedings constitutes a “penalty” or “punishment” and, therefore, a conviction under INA § 101(a)(48)(A)(ii).In that case, the noncitizen entered a plea of nolo contendere in Florida state court to the charge of possession of a controlled substance, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. Under Florida law, people who plead guilty or nolo contendere, including in cases where adjudication is withheld, can be assessed additional costs and surcharges. The noncitizen in this case was assessed $458 following his plea. The Board, in reaching its decision, reviewed federal and state case law which held that costs, surcharges and other assessments constitute a “penalty” or “punishment” within the criminal scheme. For these reasons, the Board held that the noncitizen was subject to removal as a result of a conviction of violating a law relating to controlled substances.
Iqbal v. Bryson, 2009 WL 192505 (E.D. Va. 2009)(New York pretrial diversion adjudication not a conviction for immigration purposes where it does not require defendant to make a plea of guilty).
In re Cota-Vargas, 23 Dec. 849, 2005 WL 3105750 (B.I.A. 2005)(Board gave effect to sentence reduction even where the sole purpose was to avoid immigration consequences, holding that, where a sentence was modified nunc pro tunc expressly to avoid deportation for an aggravated felony, the immigration court and the Board must recognize the modified sentence); In re Pickering, 23 Dec. 621, 2003 WL 21358480 (B.I.A. 2003)(distinguished).
Last year, Appleseed and the Chicago Appleseed Fund for Justice released a comprehensive report, "Assembly Line Injustice," outlining findings that American immigration courts regularly fall beneath basic standards of justice. The report compiled the reports of trained court-watchers as well as more than 100 interviews with individuals who are involved in immigration court on a day-to-day basis, including practitioners (pro bono and fee-charging), officials of nonprofit associations and professional organizations, academics and governmental players. The report offered 34 recommendations aimed at promoting accuracy, efficiency and legitimacy throughout the immigration court process.
Many of these recommendations are practical reforms that would help repair many of the problems cited in our report without dramatic overhaul of the entire system. Others involve more sweeping changes.
Moreover, Appleseed and Chicago Appleseed are not alone in calling for reform. The American Bar Association recently released its own report on the immigration court system, calling for new policies and practices. Many of these reforms overlap the recommendations found in "Assembly Line Injustice." It is clear that the immigration court system is in need of substantial, immediate change.
There are many fine immigration judges and government attorneys working in this underfunded but critically important judicial system. But we heard of too many cases in which judges engaged in verbal abuse, mocking a pro bono attorney for being a "New York big firm do-gooder," or yelling at an immigrant for not looking him in the eye, not understanding that eye contact was inappropriate in the immigrant's culture.
We heard repeatedly that training of immigration judges is inadequate. In one case, responding to an immigrant's claim that he faced persecution as a result of sexual orientation, a judge declared that the immigrant "didn't look gay" and denied asylum.
Professionalism is certainly not the only thing that is too often lacking in the immigration court system. More than 85 percent of those who enter removal proceedings require translation services that are too often inadequate. A large percentage of immigrants in removal proceedings appear without counsel. These individuals are not given the tools they need to navigate through a Byzantine court system, and are instead subjected to procedures that are dehumanizing and wasteful of taxpayer money. Where the Supreme Court itself said, "Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice," our immigration court system is widely recognized as ineffectual and unfair.
Many urge the restructuring of the immigration court as an Article I court to combat political bias. While independence as an Article 1 court can combat a number of the issues, more targeted actions are necessary in the meantime to restore legitimacy to the immigration court system.
In meetings with DOJ and DHS, Appleseed reviewed several in-the-trenches, practical reforms that would repair many of the problems cited in our research. It is particularly necessary to address inefficiencies that can, for example, lead to months-long stays at detention facilities when immigrants' removal proceedings drag on far longer than necessary. Detention can cost upward of $200 per day per detainee, totaling $2.4 billion annually for detention operations.
Reinforce professionalism standards for immigration judges. Situations in which judges bully immigrants and attorneys are unacceptable, and the judges' Code of Conduct must be updated and enforced. Regular, mandatory training sessions for judges will address issues of cultural competence and impartiality. In the case mentioned above where a judge ruled on the basis of sexual orientation stereotypes, training was provided by the court of appeals and the judge reconsidered his decision.
Hire more immigration judges and law clerks. Though DOJ has sworn in six immigration judges recently and claims to be in the process of hiring more, reducing each judge's caseload by only one case per day would require the hiring of nearly 60 more, plus a corresponding number of judicial clerks. Judges have less than two hours to review each case file, conduct a hearing, and render a decision. Even with regular training on professionalism and efficiency, this reality denies both judges and immigrants the right to a reasoned, accurate decision.
Reform the hiring process for judges and Board of Immigration Appeals members. This includes depoliticizing the hiring process, as well as broadening the candidate pool for immigration judges beyond its current "farm team" of Department of Homeland Security trial attorneys. Drawing from the ranks of experienced private attorneys and academics will balance what is currently a pool of judges predisposed to rule in favor of the government.
Improve translation services. In one asylum case, despite the prohibition on opining, an interpreter refused to translate an immigrant's claim that he had been attacked by anti-Semites in the Ukraine. The interpreter responded, "That sort of stuff doesn't happen in the Ukraine." Not only must certification standards be improved, DOJ must design complaint-tracking and removal procedures for interpreters. In addition, simultaneous translation of everything said in court, not only communication between judge and immigrant, should be mandated, such that immigrants may understand the context of questions asked.
Eliminate videoconferencing in merits hearings. In one case, a judge ruled that a client's story about physical abuse was not credible because she could not see the scars on the immigrant's dark skin on the small, dimly lit television screen. Though implemented in the name of efficiency, videoconferencing dehumanizes immigrants, denies them the right to confer privately with their lawyers, and undermines the ability of a judge to make credibility and demeanor judgments, which are especially important in immigration cases.
Improve document availability. An immigrant must submit a Freedom of Information Act request for his own records, though less than 1 percent of these requests are rejected by DOJ and DHS. This statistic reveals a process that consumes resources rather than one that enhances justice - again, costing taxpayers millions of dollars.
Ensure that trial attorneys are handling cases professionally and efficiently. DHS trial attorneys have only about 20 minutes to prepare for each case. Despite this time limitation, they often neglect to settle minor issues out of court or drop weak cases, charging ahead to seek the worst possible outcome for every immigrant. In one case, a trial attorney argued that a man provided "material support" to Burundi terrorists when they robbed him of $4.12 and his lunch. Ensuring professionalism and efficiency for trial attorneys will include updating the mission statement, mandating pre-trial conferences at the request of either party, encouraging prosecutorial discretion to reduce time-wasted on petty matters, and extending immigration judges' sanctioning authority to attorneys who appear in court unprepared.
Fix the appeal process. Multiple interviewees reported that the appeal process is often simply a regurgitation of the previous decision. Requiring fully reasoned written opinions and eliminating affirmance without opinion, as well as a return to three-member panels in situations where motions decide the outcome of a case, are necessary to keep the appeal process from being simply another waste of resources.
Several of these recommendations fall under the individual responsibilities of DOJ and DHS, but many address actions by both, and are for the most part cost-effective, in-the-trenches reforms rather than high-cost overhauls. Appleseed has met with officials in both agencies who have acknowledged that these reforms are necessary and indicated that they will be addressed.
We look forward to continuing conversations that we deem necessary to restore professionalism, efficiency, and legitimacy to an immigration court system that has fallen beneath the standards of American justice.
The Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has recently released its Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Statistical Year Book, summarizing the work of the EOIR for the past five years. The 129-page report was prepared by the EOIR's Office of Planning, Analysis and Technology. The report predominately covers cases before immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) but also includes cases received and completed by the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO).
The report begins with a list of highlights for FY 2009. According to the report, receipts by the immigration courts increased by 11% between FY 2008 (when they were 351,477) and FY 2009 (when they were 391,829). Immigration court completions in FY 2009 (353,082) increased by 4% from FY 2008 (339,440). Decisions by immigration judges (IJs) were found to have increased by about 1.5% between FY 2008 (229,316) and FY 2009 (232,212) but were down 12% compared to the recent high in FY 2005 (264,785). Thirty-nine percent of all completed court proceedings involved legal representation in FY 2009, a 1% decrease from 40% of represented cases in FY 2008. Among immigration court case completions, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and China were the leading nationalities of the aliens in the immigration court completions.
The overall failure-to-appear rate fell to 11% of cases, a new five-year low, resulting in 25,330 in absentia orders being issued. The failure-to-appear rate for aliens who were once detained but subsequently released on bond or on their own recognizance decreased to 22% (23% in FY 2008), and the rate for those aliens who were never detained decreased to 27% (29% in FY 2008).
With respect to asylum statistics, the FY 2009 asylum filings at the immigration courts continued to decrease with a drop of 7,400 applications, with the decrease split nearly equally between affirmatively-filed and defensively-filed applications. Atlanta, Georgia; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; New York City, New York; and San Francisco, California, received over half of all asylum filings in FY 2009.
While the rate at which asylum applications were granted increased slightly from 45% in FY 2008 to 47% in FY 2009, the actual number of grants decreased over the same time frame, with a total of 10,757 being granted in FY 2008 and only 10,186 in FY 2009. The five immigration courts that heard at least 100 cases and have the highest percentage of approved asylum cases are East Mesa, California (90%, 99 grants out of 110 cases), Arlington, Virginia (74%, 372/505), New York City, New York (73%, 4,076/5,608 grants), Honolulu, Hawaii (72%, 119/165), and San Diego, California (69%, 264/384 grants). The five immigration courts that heard at least 100 cases and have the lowest grant rates are Krome North SPC, Florida (8%, 221/249 denials), Eloy, Arizona (8%, 92/100 denials), Florence SPC, Arizona (11%, 93/104), Omaha, Nebraska (12%, 199/226) and Denver, Colorado (165/209). A table from the FY 2009 Statistical Year Book showing FY 2009 asylum grant rates listed by specific immigration court location is reproduced below.
There were a total of 25,665 cases filed under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT or Convention Against Torture). Of those, 504 were granted some form of relief, 10,894 were denied, 5,583 were withdrawn, 1,340 were abandoned, and 7,344 resulted in some other type of action not listed.
Turning to the BIA, the number of cases filed with the BIA decreased slightly to 32,859 in FY 2009, down from 33,464 in FY 2008. Only 8% of the decisions made by IJs were appealed to the BIA in FY 2009.
At the end of FY 2009, there were 27,969 cases pending at the BIA, down slightly from FY 2008 in which 28,874 were pending at the end of the fiscal year.
Cases in which aliens are represented remained about the same, with 77% of completed cases, or 22,770, having some representation for the alien.
The FY 2009 edition of the EOIR Statistical Year Book, which includes many charts, graphs, and a glossary of terms, can be found at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf.

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