Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104964/donovan-vs-dewey
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:22:48+00:00

Document:
Held: The warrantless inspections required by § 103(a) do not violate the Fourth Amendment, but instead are reasonable within the meaning of that Amendment. Pp. 452 U. S. 598 -606.
(a) Unlike searches of private homes, which generally must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate that Amendment. A warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme, and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes. Pp. 452 U. S. 598 -602.
interstate commerce, Congress could reasonably determine that a system of warrantless inspections was necessary "if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection made effective." United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 , 406 U. S. 316 . Pp. 452 U. S. 602 -603.
(c) Moreover, the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 , distinguished. Pp. 452 U. S. 603 -604.
(d) The fact that stone quarries, as opposed to underground mines, do not have a long tradition of Government regulation does not, in itself, mean that the warrantless inspection in question violated the Fourth Amendment. It is the pervasiveness and regularity of federal regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program reasonable under that Amendment. If the length of regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur which the Fourth Amendment's concept of reasonableness would not tolerate. Pp. 452 U. S. 604 -606.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 452 U. S. 606 . REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 452 U. S. 608 . STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 452 U. S. 609 .
In July, 1978, a federal mine inspector attempted to inspect quarries owned by appellee Waukesha Lime and Stone Co. in order to determine whether all 25 safety and health violations uncovered during a prior inspection had been corrected. After the inspector had been on the site for about an hour, Waukesha's president, appellee Douglas Dewey, refused to allow the inspection to continue unless the inspector first obtain a search warrant. The inspector issued a citation to Waukesha for terminating the inspection, [ Footnote 3 ] and the Secretary subsequently filed this civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking to enjoin appellees from refusing to permit warrantless searches of the Waukesha facility.
Secretary appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Because the District Court's ruling invalidated an important provision of the Mine Safety and Health Act, we noted probable jurisdiction. [ Footnote 5 ] Sub nom. Marshall v. Dewey, 449 U.S. 1122 (1981).
individual's home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections. United States v. Biswell, supra, at 406 U. S. 316 .
The interest of the owner of commercial property is not one in being free from any inspections. Congress has broad authority to regulate commercial enterprises engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, and an inspection program may in some cases be a necessary component of federal regulation. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects the interest of the owner of property in being free from unreasonable intrusions onto his property by agents of the government. Inspections of commercial property may be unreasonable if they are not authorized by law or are unnecessary for the furtherance of federal interests. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 397 U. S. 77 . Similarly, warrantless inspections of commercial property may be constitutionally objectionable if their occurrence is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected by government officials. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at 436 U. S. 323 .
Colonnade Corp. v. United States, supra, at 397 U. S. 77 . In such cases, a warrant may be necessary to protect the owner from the "unbridled discretion [of] executive and administrative officers," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at 436 U. S. 323 , by assuring him that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 , 387 U. S. 538 (1967).
406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 316 . These decisions make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.
Id. at 436 U. S. 321 .
406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 316 .
inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of inspection. Representatives of the Secretary must inspect all surface mines at least twice annually, and all underground mines at least four times annually. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Similarly, all mining operations that generate explosive gases must be inspected at irregular 5-, 10-, or 15-day intervals. § 813(i). Moreover, the Secretary must conduct followup inspections of mines where violations of the Act have previously been discovered, § 813(a), and must inspect a mine immediately if notified by a miner or a miner's representative that a violation of the Act or an imminently dangerous condition exists. § 813 (g). [ Footnote 9 ] Second, the standards with which a mine operator is required to comply are all specifically set forth in the Act or in Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Indeed, the Act requires that the Secretary inform mine operators of all standards proposed pursuant to the Act. § 811(e). Thus, rather than leaving the frequency and purpose of inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government officers, the Act establishes a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence. Like the gun dealer in Biswell, the operator of a mine "is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task." 406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 316 .
406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 315 . Of course, the duration of a particular regulatory scheme will often be an important factor in determining whether it is sufficiently pervasive to make the imposition of a warrant requirement unnecessary. But if the length of regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur. Under appellees' view, new or emerging industries, including ones such as the nuclear power industry, that pose enormous potential safety and health problems could never be subject to warrantless searches, even under the most carefully structured inspection program, simply because of the recent vintage of regulation.
Absent consent or exigent circumstances, a private home may not be entered to conduct a search or effect an arrest without a warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948). Of course, these same restrictions pertain when commercial property is searched for contraband or evidence of crime. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338 , 429 U. S. 352 -359 (1977).
In contrast, the inspection scheme considered in Barlow's did not require the periodic inspection of businesses covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and instead left the decision to inspect within the broad discretion of agency officials. Thus, when a Government official attempted to inspect the facility in that case, the owner had no indication of "why an inspection of [his] establishment was within the program." 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 323 , n. 20.
Like JUSTICE STEWART, I believe the Court erred in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 , when it overruled Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 . See post at 452 U. S. 609 (dissenting opinion). I also share JUSTICE STEWART's conviction that each of us has a duty to accept the law as it is; disagreement with the holding in a prior case is not a sufficient reason for refusing to honor it. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Unlike him, however, I also think the Court erred in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 , when it concluded that Camara required it to invalidate the safety inspection program authorized by Congress in the Occupational Safety and Health Act. As I explained in my dissent in that case, neither the longevity of a regulatory program nor a businessman's implied consent to regulations imposed by the Federal Government determines the reasonableness of a congressional judgment that the public interest in occupational health or safety justifies a program of warrantless inspections of commercial premises. See 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 336 -339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
reasoning that would support it could only be found in dissenting opinions, see 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 546 -555 (Clark, J., dissenting); 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 325 -339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), or in the earlier Court opinion in Frank that had itself been overruled in Camara.
See Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 , 450 U. S. 151 (STEVENS, J., concurring).
Our prior cases hold that, absent consent or exigent circumstances, the government must obtain a warrant to conduct a search or effect an arrest in a private home. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). This case, however, involves the search of commercial property. Though the proprietor of commercial property is protected from unreasonable intrusions by governmental agents, the Court correctly notes that "legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment." Ante at 452 U. S. 598 .
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 , 265 U. S. 59 (1924). I necessarily reserve judgment on the extent to which the Fourth Amendment would prevent the implementation of § 103(a) of the Act in the absence of the particular fact situation presented here.
in those businesses with "a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware." 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 313 . Because the Court today departs far from this principle, I respectfully dissent.
In Camara, the Court announced the general rule that a warrantless inspection of a private dwelling by municipal administrative officers without proper consent is unconstitutional "unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 528 -529. In the companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 , the Court held that the general rule of Camara applies also to administrative inspections of commercial premises.
Until today, exceptions to the general rule have been found in only two cases. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 , the Court upheld against constitutional attack a statute that authorized warrantless searches of a liquor licensee's premises by Internal Revenue agents. And in United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 , the Court held that federal Treasury agents could search the premises of a licensed gun dealer to determine whether he was in compliance with the Gun Control Act.
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, the Court made clear that Colonnade and Biswell were only limited exceptions to the general rule of Camara, and that they did not signal a trend away from that rule. The Court stated that, "unless some recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies," warrants for administrative inspections are mandatory. 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 313 .
" The element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must be aware."
added). The rationale for the exception was unmistakably that of implied consent. The Court reasoned that " [t]he businessman [in an industry with a long tradition of close government supervision] in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.'" [ Footnote 3/2 ] (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 , 413 U. S. 271 ).
In Barlow's, consent could not be found for inspections of the premises of the myriad businesses regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The Court was unmoved by the Government's claims that warrantless inspections were necessary for effective enforcement, and that warrants would impose serious burdens upon the inspection system and the courts. 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 316 -320. And the Court found similarly unpersuasive the Secretary of Labor's argument that a warrant requirement for OSHA inspections would mean that, "as a practical matter, warrantless search provisions in other regulatory statutes are also constitutionally infirm," id. at 436 U. S. 321 .
Ante at 452 U. S. 600 . It then says that "this" exception to the warrant requirement was reemphasized in Barlow's. Ante at 452 U. S. 600 .
436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 313 .
The Court today does not, to be sure, rid its reinterpretation of Colonnade and Biswell of all traces of implied consent. It says that under its new test, "the owner . . . cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections for specific purposes." Ante at 452 U. S. 600 . But, as the Court must realize, this purported limitation is meaningless. The Court never explains how operators of stone quarries could possibly be aware that the quarries would be subject to warrantless inspections until Congress told them they would be.
Warrants are issued ex parte. If a warrant were sought after a mine operator's refusal to permit inspection, the time of execution of the warrant would not have to be made known to the operator. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 320 . And when it was anticipated that consent would not be given for a search, a warrant could be issued in accordance with an administrative plan based on specific neutral criteria in advance of the planned inspection. The Court's expressed fear that the obtaining of a warrant would give advance notice to a quarry operator of a forthcoming inspection is thus groundless.
Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 323 . On the other hand, warrantless inspections will allow inspectors "almost unbridled discretion . . . as to when to search and whom to search," ibid., precisely the type of arbitrary government interference with privacy that, it has been held in this context, the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. Camara, 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 528 ; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 , 387 U. S. 545 .

References: § 103
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1252
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 813
 § 813
 § 813
 § 813
 § 811
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 103
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.