Source: https://patentlyo.com/patent/patent-cases-2005
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:28:52+00:00

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This case involved two patents (the ‘693 and the ‘063) on treating skin damage or disorders–particularly sunburn–by the application of ascorbyl fatty acid ester (vitamin C in a fat soluble form). On summary judgment, the district court determined that the asserted claims of both patents were invalid due to anticipation and double-patenting. On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the district court’s decisions in all respects but one: according to the majority, the district court erred when it determined that four claims to methods of treating “skin sunburn” by the application of ascorbyl fatty acid ester were anticipated by a prior art patent (“Pereira”) disclosing ascorbyl fatty acid ester as “suitable for topical application to the skin or hair.” Judge Rader wrote the opinion for the court, which Judge Linn joined, while Judge Bryson dissented.
A method for treating skin sunburn comprising topically applying to the skin sunburn a fatty acid ester of ascorbic acid effective to solubilize in the lipid-rich layers of the skin an amount effective to scavenge therefrom free radicals present as a result of transfer of energy to the skin from the ultraviolet radiation which produced said sunburn.
NOTE: This case review was written by a patent attorney (not me) who wishes to remain anonymous.
LabCorp v. Metabolite (on writ of certiorari).
This case involves a patented method of correlating a body protein level with a vitamin B deficiency. (U.S. Patent No. 4,940658). The claim in question (Claim 13) includes two steps: (1) assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine and (2) correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine with a folate deficiency. (paraphrased).
Interestingly, the question presented is not firmly grounded in any particular rule of patent law. Rather, it implicitly raises issues of indefiniteness, enablement, written description, and patentable subject matter. (to name a few). However, the Supreme Court has given some indication that it is most interested in this case because of the issue it raises regarding the patenting of natural phenomena under Diehr.
In Part I, Petitioner LabCorp’s stance is essentially that the law is correct, but that it has been misapplied in this case.
According to LabCorp, the claim involves “no actual invention beyond the scientific discovery it recites.” The claimed correlation is a scientific principle or law of nature, and its discovery alone cannot be patentable. The “trivial pre-solution” activity of assaying “cannot transform claim 13 into a patentable invention.” Here, Petitioner never strays far from the precedential pillars of Diehr, Chakrabarty, Funk Bros., and Flook.
In Part II, LabCorp goes on to argue that the claim is neither definite, enabled, nor adequately described. The Brief appears to ask the court to invalidate any claim that includes a “correlating” step unless the process of how to calculate a correlation is spelled out in the specification.
More is required for a valid claim. . . .
In the remaining sections of the Brief, Petitioner argues that, on policy grounds, a very broad claim hinders scientific and technological progress and that the lower court judgment should be reversed.
The Solicitor General with assistance from the PTO’s counsel has filed its brief that falls closely in line with its prior unsuccessful brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari.
IPO realized that the question presented for review in this case does not directly challenge the current standards for patentable subject matter. However, the Supreme Court has indicated an interest in considering whether the patent-in-suit claimed patentable subject matter.
Diehr, correctly delineate between those innovations that should be eligible for patent protection and those that should not. Accordingly, IPO believes that this case should not serve as a vehicle for overturning or altering those standards. Rather, this case should reinforce the standards of Diehr and thus, support the expectation that innovations in yet unknown areas of technology will be eligible for patent protection.
Specifically, IPO argues that a broad scope of subject matter eligibility properly places research and development decision-making into the hands of individuals and private entities rather than in the judiciary. This “free market” approach “beset allocates research and development resources without judicial entanglement.” The requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and description protect against over-reaching patents and warrant against further restricting patentability based on subject matter.
* NOTE: I was a coauthor of the IPO brief along with Paul Berghoff and Joshua Rich from MBHB as counsel for IPO. The IPO Board of Directors approved the Brief.
Affymetrix is a supplier of commercial DNA microarrays and “has an interest in ensuring that patents not issue on basic laws of nature so as to impede scientific progress in analyzing DNA and gene expression.” Affymetrix argues that the fact that “elevated levels of an amino acid in the blood correlated to a vitamin deficiency” is a natural phenomenon that leaves claim 13 unpatentable under current precedent.
Interestingly, Affymetrix argues that ambiguity of whether a claim impermissibly covers a natural phenomena should be resolved in favor of invalidity to avoid serious constitutional questions. (citing Feist).
PubPat argues that the CAFC has gone astray by over-reaching the permissible bounds of patentable subject matter. (Citing Alappat and State Street). Rather, PubPat would have the Court return directly to Flook.
The BlackBerry patent battle continues. In a well written petition, RIM has requested that the Supreme Court hear its appeal from the Federal Circuit’s decision that that was decided in NTP’s favor in August, 2005.
Under § 271(a) of the Patent Act, “use” infringement is expressly limited to use of a patented invention “within the United States.” The question presented is: Whether an Internet-based global telecommunications system, such as the BlackBerry wireless email system, is used “within the United States,” where components crucial to the system’s operation are located outside the United States.
RIM, a Canadian company, maintains its routers in Canada and has argued that because a portion of its allegedly infringing system was outside of the US that it could not infringe a US patent. NTP argued the other side — that the mere fact that some servers were located abroad (while many others were within the US) cannot let RIM escape judgment. For its part, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit split-the-baby and differentiated between system claims and method claims.
For infringement of method claims, each and every step must be performed in the US.
For infringement of system claims, the US must be the place where control of the system is exercised adn beneficial use of the system obtained..
In the past two years, the Court has turned down at least two cases involving extraterritorial application of the patent laws.* Perhaps setting the stage for certiorari here. (odds are still low).
Download RIM’s Petition for Cert (PDF).
Crouch, BlackBerry Settlement Found Unenforceable, Patently-O: Patent Law Blog (November 30, 2005).
* Pellegrini v. Analog Devices and Microsoft v. Eolas.
Allow post-grant opposition for newly issued patents — opposer would fund a new examination.
Read the proposal here: What To Do About Bad Patents?
The upcoming MercExchange case is important, but it will not lead directory to a compulsory patent licenses on any large scale. In this case, patentee MercExchange won its infringement suit against eBay, but was denied a permanent injunction. The district court gave four reasons for denying the injunction.
MercExchange’s failure to request a preliminary injunction.
It is unclear at this point what a damages calculation would be in a case where a permanent injunction is denied — probably most importantly is whether a patentee will be allowed treble damages for the ongoing infringement.
Court Finds Standing for Consumers to Bring Antitrust Claim of Asserting an Invalid Patent.
MDL, a purchaser of Thermus aquaticus DNA polymerase or “Taq” (a component used in performing polymerase chain reaction), brought suit against Roche, Applera and others for violations of the Sherman Act, allegedly arising from Roche’s enforcement of U.S. Patent No. 4,889,818 (“the ‘818 patent”) knowing that it had been procured through inequitable conduct. The ‘818 patent claims a thermostable DNA polymerase isolated from the Thermus aquaticus bacteria. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on several bases including (1) lack of standing, (2) tolling of the statute of limitations, (3) failure to sufficiently allege a conspiracy, and (4) failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 9. The D.C. District Court denied Defendants’ motion in its entirety, with a minor exception that precluded MDL from seeking damages for the period prior to the four year statute of limitations period prior to its filing of the suit.
Claim Construction: “A sodium phosphate” limited to one type of sodium phosphate.
Norian v. Stryker (Fed. Cir. 2005).
In the second claims construction appeal, the CAFC found that the term “a sodium phosphate” was limited to a single type of sodium phosphate. In its decision, the Court found that if the patentee had intended to cover multiple types of sodium phosphate then it should have used “at least one” language. This decision was supported by two factors: (1) the claim was amended to use the transition “consisting of” rather than the open ended “comprising” and (2) none of the listed examples in the specification used multiple types of sodium phosphate.
Norian v. Stryker — First Decision (Fed. Cir. 2004).
eBay v. MercExchange (on petition for certiorari).
The Supreme Court has agreed to review the question of “when it is appropriate to grant an injunction against a patent infringer” and will question the century-old precedent of Continental Paper Bag (1908).
Whether the Federal Circuit erred in setting forth a general rule in patent cases that a district court must, absent exceptional circumstances, issue a permanent injunction after a finding of infringement. (Question proposed by eBay).
Whether this Court should reconsider its precedents, including Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), on when it is appropriate to grant an injunction against a patent infringer. (Question proposed by Supreme Court).
Whether a balance of hardships would tip in the plaintiff’s favor.
An injunction in this case would not threaten eBay’s core business, but is directed to the “buy-it-now” feature of the online auctioneer.
In the wake of the CAFC’s recent IPXL v. Amazon opinion, the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals has decided its own Section 101 case — rejecting a patent application based on its use of mixed use of method limitations and apparatus limitations in a single claim.
The statutory categories under 35 U.S.C. § 101 are expressed in the alternative, i.e., process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter. Thus, the appellants’ claim 24, which encompasses two statutory categories, i.e., apparatus and method, violates 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Ex parte Lyell, 17 USPQ2d 1548, 1551 (BPAI 1990).
Interestingly, the Examiner did not raise this issue – rather, it was raised, apparently sua sponte, by the Board after the Examiner’s reasons for rejection were themselves rejected.
System Claim that Includes a Method Step is Invalid as Indefinite.
IPXL Holdings v. Amazon.com (Fed. Cir. 2005).
IPXL sued Amazon, arguing that its one-click purchasing system infringed on IPXL’s patent. Amazon won at trial and on appeal.
A system for performing the method of claim 1.
A system comprising X and Y, wherein X operates at a high rate of speed.
The case does not mention product-by-process claims.
The analysis of indefiniteness here is quite different than the Court used in recently in Fisher-Price v. Graco. There, indefiniteness required “severe” defects in the claims.
Rule 54(d)(2)(B): Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, the motion [for costs and attorney fees] must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of judgment; must specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the moving party to the award; and must state the amount or provide a fair estimate of the amount sought. If directed by the court, the motion shall also disclose the terms of any agreement with respect to fees to be paid for the services for which claim is made.
Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories (Fed. Cir. 2005).
By Donald Zuhn, Ph.D. (Patently-O Guest Author).
In an appeal from a District Court judgment invalidating more than two hundred claims in three Invitrogen patents as being anticipated under § 102(g)(2), the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the District Court misapplied the law of appreciation when determining the date of conception for researchers at Columbia University. The Federal Circuit, however, affirmed the District Court’s rulings on enablement, written description, and infringement.
The patents at issue relate to a genetically modified version of the enzyme reverse transcriptase, that has use in the field of molecular biology. Naturally-occurring (or unmodified) reverse transcriptase possesses both DNA polymerase and RNase H activities, the former permitting the enzyme to synthesize a DNA copy (cDNA) of a messenger RNA (mRNA) template, and the latter permitting the enzyme to degrade the mRNA template following cDNA synthesis. In contrast, the genetically modified enzyme lacks RNase H activity, and therefore, is unable to degrade the mRNA template following cDNA synthesis, allowing researchers to reuse the mRNA template to create additional cDNA copies..
While neither party disputed the District Court’s determination that Invitrogen had reduced a modified reverse transcriptase lacking RNase H activity to practice in January of 1987, Invitrogen did find fault with the lower court’s ruling that Drs. Stephen Goff and Naoko Tanese, two researchers at Columbia University, had conceived of such an enzyme before Invitrogen had reduced the enzyme to practice. Drs. Goff and Tanese had begun their work in 1984 by preparing a panel of bacterial mutants having modified reverse transcriptase genes. The panel included two mutants that the Columbia University researchers would later show possess modified reverse transcriptase lacking RNase H activity. However, due to limitations in the assays that Drs. Goff and Tanese were using to measure RNase H activity, they were unable to conclusively establish that any of the mutants possessed modified reverse transcriptase lacking RNase H activity at the time the mutant panel was prepared. In March of 1987, Drs. Goff and Tanese used a new assay that they had developed to finally establish that two of the mutants from their panel possessed the modified enzyme. They were also able to correlate the results obtained with their new assay with their late 1986 sequencing analysis of the mutants.
Following a series of pre-trial motions regarding the issues of conception, enablement, written description, and infringement, the District Court determined, inter alia, that Drs. Goff and Tanese (a) had conceived of a genetically modified reverse transcriptase lacking RNase H activity either in December of 1984 when they had isolated mutants possessing modified reverse transcriptase, or in January of 1986 when they had sequenced the reverse transcriptase genes in these mutants; (b) had actually reduced their invention to practice in March of 1987 when they established that two mutants from their panel possessed modified reverse transcriptase; and (c) were diligent in reducing their invention to practice, and did not abandon, conceal, or suppress it. However, despite these rulings, the District Court refused to find that the work of Drs. Goff and Tanese anticipated Invitrogen’s patents under § 102(g)(2), arguing that anticipation posed factual questions requiring resolution on a claim by claim basis.
However, while the Federal Circuit determined that the evidence excluded both dates of conception proposed by the District Court, the Federal Circuit also found that Dr. Goff’s deposition testimony precluded it from finding that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant partial summary judgment for Invitrogen on the issue of conception. In particular, Dr. Goff had testified that he had formed a suspicion in late 1986, based on his difficulties analyzing the mutants, that two of the mutants possessed modified reverse transcriptase lacking RNase H activity. Because a reasonable fact-finder presented with Dr. Goff’s testimony could conclude that the evidence preceding the researchers’ March 1987 testing might suffice, under the applicable standard, to corroborate Dr. Goff’s suspicions about the two mutants, the Federal Circuit vacated the District Court’s invalidity judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
NOTE: This post was written by patent attorney Donald Zuhn, PhD. Don is a true expert in cutting edge biotech patent law and practices both litigation and prosecution at MBHB LLP in Chicago. (zuhn@mbhb.com).
AWH has petitioned the Supreme Court to take-up this landmark case with the broad question of whether patent claims should be reviewed de novo on appeal.
Question Presented: Whether the Federal Circuit is correct in holding that all aspects of a district court’s patent claim construction may be reviewed de novo on appeal.
This petition picks up where Judge Mayer and Newman’s dissent left off in the en banc Phillips decision. In their dissent, the judges focused their attention on the “futility [and] absurdity” of the de novo rule.
Now more than ever I am convinced of the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court’s persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid of any factual component. Because any attempt to fashion a coherent standard under this regime is pointless, as illustrated by our many failed attempts to do so, I dissent.
Left to its own devices, the Federal Circuit will continue to improperly devote the chief measure of its energy to rejudging the facts of patent claim constructions, rather than to fulfilling its purpose of bringing uniformity to patent law.
A Phillips reply brief will be due shortly.
Notably, the Brief cites a recent article by Peter Zura, author of the 271 Blog.
Phillips v. AWH en banc decision.
CAFC: Claim implied at least two styles.
These companies make business intelligence software. Microstrategy filed suit against Business Objects alleging both patent infringement and several business tort claims. The patent at issue involved automatic broadcasting of information to multiple types of subscriber devices and then formatting the output.
Patent Claims: After a Markman hearing, the defendant, Business Objects, was granted summary judgment of non-infringement. On appeal, Microstrategy did not fight the claim construction, but rather the interpretation and application of the claim construction. The question was whether the claim language of “each user output device . . . be associated with a device-specific style” required at least two different styles.
MicroStrategy argues that this Markman construction and the context of the invention do not require support for more than one type of output device. In particular, MicroStrategy notes that the specification contemplates a system with “one or more” output devices. Thus, MicroStrategy reads the claim and the district court’s Markman construction to permit a system with support for just one type of user device.
The CAFC, disagreed. Because the claim required that “each user output device . . . be associated with a device-specific style,” the Court determined that the claim implicitly required at least two different styles. Because the defendant only supported one style, the non-infringement decision was affirmed.
The Appellate panel did, however, reverse the lower court’s findings regarding one of the business tort claims under Virginia law.
Symbol Tech. v. Lemelson (Fed. Cir. 2005) (order).
In a recent decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding that Lemelson’s patents were unenforceable due to prosecution laches. Lemelson filed a petition for rehearing. In an order based on that petition, the CAFC declined the opportunity to rehear the case except by further punishing the long-time patent holder.
Although the district court did not make its resolution of the laches issue applicable to the remaining claims, holding that the question would be decided only if it later became necessary to do so, in our view, the more appropriate course of action is to apply the laches holding to all of the claims in the 14 asserted patents. Lemelson does not provide any persuasive reason why that should not be so.
In this ongoing patent infringement case involving the Canadian RIM’s BlackBerry system, the U.S. Government has submitted a brief to District Court Judge Spencer. The brief notes that under Trojan v. Shat-R-Shield, the Federal Government cannot be enjoined against using a patented invention and thus, asks the court to fashion any injunction in such a way to continue to allow the U.S. Government workers to continue to use the BlackBerry.
The Government is in the process of determining how long it would take to provide user names and information to RIM, and thus asked for a 90 day stay in the proceedings to determine whether they believe an injunction would implicate other public interests.
Chief Judge James R. Spencer is a Reagan appointee and Harvard Law graduate.
In re: Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation (2nd Cir. 2005).
Just in time for the Supreme Court’s decision on certiorari in FTC v. Schering-Plough, the Second Circuit court of appeals has released its decision in the Tamoxifen Citrate case — finding that reverse payments to a generic manufacturer were not sufficient to show a per se violations of the antitrust laws. In addition, the Court went on to hold that even “excessive reverse payments” might not be unlawful. The Court did recognize the suspicious nature of reverse payments.
There is something on the face of it that does seem “suspicious” about a patent holder settling patent litigation against a potential generic manufacturer by paying that manufacturer more than either party anticipates the manufacturer would earn by winning the lawsuit and entering the newly competitive market in competition with the patent holder. Why, after all — viewing the settlement through an antitrust lens — should the potential competitor be permitted to receive such a windfall at the ultimate expense of drug purchasers? We think, however, that the suspicion abates upon reflection. In such a case, so long as the patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the patented product.
In dissent, Judge Pooler argued the antitrust analysis can be applied to settlements concerning patented products.
The requirement that—unless an antitrust plaintiff demonstrates that a settlement agreement exceeds the scope of the patent—it must show that the settled litigation was a sham, i.e., objectively baseless, before the settlement can be considered an antitrust violation is not soundly grounded in Supreme Court precedent and is insufficiently protective of the consumer interests safeguarded by the Hatch-Waxman Act and the antitrust laws.
Dorel v. Graco (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Dorel sued Graco for infringement of its patents on child car seats with retractable cup holders. Graco won its motion for summary judgment of non-infringement based on the argument that its seats did not include a seat “removably secured to the base.” The court reasoned that the seat could not be removably secured to the base because there was no separate base.
On appeal, the CAFC reversed, finding that the district court had “invaded the province of the finder of fact . . . in deciding the infringement question.” Here, the CAFC determined that a question of fact existed because as to whether there was a separate base because the seat portion of Graco’s product could easily be separated (with a screwdriver) into a top and bottom portion that could be termed a seat and a base respectively.
The Graco carseat is a permanent assembly whose molded parts are permanently screwed together with six “one-way” screws. Upon unscrewing and disassembly, the Graco seat becomes a collection of loose parts, the cup holder incapable of its function of supporting a cup. . . . Removal of the top part of the Graco carseat (for example, to carry the infant into grandma’s house), would require removing the upholstery, upending the carseat (requiring removal of the entire assembly from its crash-proof installation), and removing the six unremovable screws with the special tool needed for removing unremovable screws — and then repeating the operation in reverse upon returning to the car with the top part and its infant cargo. The panel majority’s redefinition of the patented invention to cover such a carseat is devoid of support.
Fisher-Price v. Graco (Fed. Cir. 2005) (NOT PRECEDENT).
a shield coupled to said seat and extending upwardly from said seat and disposed between said reconfigurable swing area and said seating area.
After a Markman hearing, the district court found several limitations of the claim indefinite (italicized) and thus invalid.
CAFC reverses jury finding of invalidity and noninfringement.
Callicrate v. Wadsworth (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Callicrate sued Wadsworth for infringement of its patented bull castration tools. After a trial, a jury found all of the claims anticipated, obvious, and not infringed. On appeal, the CAFC disregarded the jury verdict and reversed.
Infringement: The defendant admitted that its devices include all of the claim elements. Based on that admission, the CAFC determined that the jury had “no basis” for finding no infringement and that there is “no reason for a new trial.” (Although each element was included, the defendant argued that the components were “not connected in the particular manner recited in the claims. The CAFC does not seem to have addressed that point specifically since the jury instructions asked simply whether “each and every element” of the claim was included).
Enabling Disclosure: Callicarate’s patent claim priority to an earlier patent, but could be invalidated if they were shown to be not fully enabled by the earlier patent. The district court found that the earlier patent did not contain adequate disclosure to support the claimed mechanism because (1) the only disclosure of the claimed mechanism is in the background section of the earlier patent; (2) the background section contains disparaging remarks about this mechanism; and (3) the patentee distinguished his assembly mechanism from the claimed mechanism during prosecution.
However, the CAFC held that these reasons were insufficient for a finding of a lack of enablement. First, the background section can be used to enable a claim. Second, disparaging remarks do not make it any less likely that one of ordinary skill in the art would, after reading the background, know how to make and use the invention.
Defendant Challenging Claim Construction: In a cross-appeal, the defendant challenged certain claim construction terms. However, the CAFC refused to hear that appeal because the defendant had not objected to the district court’s construction and had conceded infringement of the newly challenged element. (note: the CAFC has finally drawn a line for when it will not review claim construction).
Conclusion: Reversed and remanded because jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

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