Source: https://www.spinalinjurylawyer24-7blog.com/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:35:38+00:00

Document:
Two Queens male drivers were involved in an automobile accident on July 5, 2007. One of the drivers filed a complaint for damages under the “no fault” Insurance Law. Under this law, in order to maintain a personal injury action, the injured party must prove that he sustained a serious injury.
One of the male drivers sued under the Insurance Law, a spinalinjury or a knee injury may be compensable if it is proved that the injured party has experienced a significant loss of use of the spine or knee that was injured.
In this action, the injured male driver presented the medical report prepared by his attending physician. His own Staten Island physician stated in his report that he suffered sprains and/or strains in his spine and in his right knee. He also opined that the prognosis for recovery of the injured male driver was excellent. That is, the injured male driver can look forward to full healing and full use without impairment of his spine and his right knee.
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle owned and leased by the defendant Enterprise, and operated by the defendant Driver. The accident occurred on South Edgemere at or near its intersection with South Elmwood in the Town of East Hampton, Suffolk County, New York. By her bill of particulars, a rep said that the plaintiff alleges that as a result of said accident she sustained serious injuries including central posterior protruded disc herniation at C2-3, C3-4, C4-5; left paramedian posterior protruded disc herniation at C5-6 and C6-7; acute cervical sprain and strain with radiculitis; bilateral C5-6 cervical radiculopathy; aggravation of pre-existing spine injury to the lumbar spine; disc bulge at L3-4; disc bulge at L4-5 contacting left L4 nerve roots within the neural foramen; supraspinatus tendinosis in right shoulder; brachial neuritis; and tinitus in right and left ears. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that she was confined to bed from July 4, 2009 until August 4, 2009, except to attend medical appointments, and was confined to home from July 4, 2009 until September 29, 2009 and intermittently thereafter except to attend medical appointments. The plaintiff also claims that following said accident she was incapacitated from her employment as a director of resident relations in a company, as an assisted living facility, in Massapequa, New York from July 4, 2009 until September 29, 2009, from December 5, 2009 until December 9, 2009, and from December 30, 2009 until January 6, 2010.
A source said that, the NYC defendant Enterprise now moves for dismissal of the claims against it for failure to state a cause of action as well as for summary judgment based on 49 USC § 30106 (the Graves Amendment). Defendant Enterprise submits a faxed copy of an affidavit of its employee, that lacks an original signature. The Court considers said affidavit despite its defect. The said employee indicates in his affidavit that he is a regional risk supervisor for defendant Enterprise, and that the day before the subject accident, defendant Enterprise rented its vehicle, a Chevy vehicle, to defendant Driver who signed a rental agreement. He also indicates that a search of records related to said vehicle revealed no pre-accident complaints or evidence of any performance or maintenance problems, and that defendant Driver was not employed by defendant Enterprise on the date of the accident.
On August 10, 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), a comprehensive transportation bill that included the Graves Amendment, was signed into law. The Act is now codified at 49 USC § 30106. The section is entitled “Rented or leased motor vehicle safety and responsibility”. “The section applies to all actions commenced on or after August 10, 2005, and has been enforced as preempting the vicarious liability imposed on commercial lessors by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388”.
A woman took the bus. As she was about to go down from the bus, while walking down the aisle toward the exit, she slipped on something slippery on the floor. She had a slip and fallwhich landed her on her bottom. She sustained spinal injury, specifically in her lumbar spine and cervical spine.
The Staten Island woman sued the transit authority which operated the bus along with the city government which owned the bus. After the depositions were taken and discovery was closed, the transit authority filed a motion for summary procedure asking that the woman’s complaint be dismissed for failure to show that she sustained a serious injury.
The woman opposed the motion for summary judgment arguing that this is not the usual motor vehicle accident and that she was not suing merely under a “no fault” law. She claims to have raised issues of negligence. She claims that the transit authority and the city government did not exercise reasonable care in keeping the buses safe for passengers and clean enough so that passengers would avoid a slip and fall while riding on the bus.
A forty-seven year old Staten Island warehouseman for a closet manufacturing company was operating a forklift at the workplace. This was his regular duty for the past three and a half years of employment there. Also as part of his regular job, he lifted boxes to and from the stocks. On May 16, 1996, the warehouseman was unloading a pallet of boxes. A box fell from the pile and hit him on the back of the head. He experienced pain and the weight and sudden impact of the box caused him to fall on his knee. After that incident at work, he began to experience backand neck pain.
He went to see a Westchester neurosurgeon to determine the injury he suffered and to get a diagnosis of what caused his pain. The employer and the servicing agent agreed to compensate the warehouseman and to pay him temporary disability benefits. Medical tests were conducted and the neurosurgeon discovered that the warehouseman had a preexisting medical condition called spinal stenosis. It is a kind of arthritis of the spine. It is congenital and degenerative. A traumatic injury is sometimes the first sign that a person suffers from spinal stenosis. Here, when the box fell on the warehouseman’s head, his back was twisted and the nerves in his lower spine bruised against his bone causing pain.
The neurosurgeon recommended treatment through physical therapy and restricted his lifting of heavy objects at work and in daily activities. The warehouseman’s back and neck pain was not resolved so the neurosurgeon recommended that he go on a diet to lose excess weight to relieve the weight carried by his spine but still the pain was not alleviated. In 1997, a year after the accident, the neurosurgeon recommended surgery to repair the damage to his spine.
In this case, plaintiffs filed an action to recover damages against the defendants for the injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in a car accident on February 16, 2009, on Motor Parkway at or near its intersection with Express Drive North, County of Suffolk, State of New York, when Plaintiff was operating his vehicle and it was struck by the vehicle owned by defendants.
Plaintiff alleged that he sustained injuries consisting of, inter alia, lumbar disc herniation at L4-5 impinging on the anterior aspect of the spinal canal and the nerve roots bilaterally; lumbar sprain and strain with muscle spasms, severe pain, tenderness, swelling, and permanent and significant restriction and limitation of motion; posterior disc herniation at C5-6 and C6-7 abutting the anterior aspect of the spinal cord; possible cervical radiculopathy; cervical sprain, strain, with muscle spasms, severe pain, swelling, tenderness, and permanent and/or significant restriction and limitation of motion; right knee sprain, strain, contusion; peripatellar bursitis; severe pain, swelling, tenderness, and permanent and/or significant restriction and limitation of motion.
The defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the basis that the injuries claimed failed to meet the threshold imposed by Insurance Law § 5102 (d).
A Brooklyn bagel shop clerk met an accident while driving near the corner of West Merrick and Rockaway Avenue: her car collided with another car on August 21, 2007. As a result of the accident, the bagel shop clerk missed two weeks of work. The pain she felt prevented her from lifting baskets of bagels as she had been doing previous to the accident. She was unable to stand behind the counter for long periods of time as she had been doing before the accident. She held down another part-time job at a clam bar and was also enrolled as a full time college student. She missed two weeks of classes after the accident and she had to stop working at the clam bar.
The owner of the bagel shop allowed the clerk to reduce the number of hours she had to work. She also allowed her more frequent breaks and excused her from having to lift heavy objects while on duty. Still, the woman was unable to continue working full time: she began working part-time and clocked only eighteen hours of work every week. The pain in her neck and back intensified and she resigned from her employment.
She received treatment consistently since the accident and stopped treatment and therapy only when her “no-fault” insurance ran out and she could no longer afford the treatments and therapy. She filed a case in damages seeking compensation for her spinal injury under the Insurance Law. She claims that the use of her cervical spine and lumbar spine has been significantly limited; she also claimed that the spinal injury she sustained resulted in non-permanent impairment which prevented her from performing all the activities of daily living within ninety days from the accident.
A fifty-three year old Nassau medical secretary had been working at a hospital for a number of years when on December 29, 1967 she slipped on a door sill. The medical secretary fractured her left hip. A nail and a pin were used to repair the medical secretary’s hip. She was confined to bed at a nursing home for six months. The medical secretary filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits. After her surgery, a neurologist examined the medical secretary and found that she was also suffering from a spinal degenerative process and that around thirty to fifty per cent of her condition was related to the degenerative disease instead of to the accident.
For this cause, the employer refused to pay the permanent total disability benefits after six months. The employer claims to have paid for her medical care until maximum medical improvement had been reached. After the sixth month, the total disability of the medical secretary was no longer due to the accident at work but it was due to the pr-existing spinal disease.
At the trial, the Suffolk doctor to whom the medical secretary was assigned testified that the medical secretary had worked for him for years. And he had been largely satisfied with the medical secretary’s work performance. However, he had noticed that the medical secretary’s health has been consistently and continuously deteriorating. She had lost a lot of weight and appeared severely malnourished. She had difficulty walking and often, she had to brace herself because she was unsteady on her feet. The doctor testified that had the medical secretary not injured herself, he would have asked her to resign. Her work has deteriorated just before the accident. If the medical secretary applied for a job on the day of his accident, he would not have hired her. He thought that the woman’s severe malnutrition could also be the reason why a slip resulted in a severe fracture.
On 7 March 1991 and on 14 June 1991, the Family Court of New York County made a finding of neglect against the subject parents and ordered a year of minimal supervision by the Child Welfare Administration, respectively. An appeal from the order followed.
The court finds that the orders must be are affirmed, without costs.
Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR § 3212, for an order granting summary judgment due to plaintiff’s failure to meet the threshold limits set by New York State Insurance Law §§ 5102 and 5104. Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion. A Lawyer said that, the action arises from a motor vehicle accident involving a collision between a motor vehicle operated by plaintiff and a motor vehicle owned and operated by defendant. The accident occurred at approximately 4:00 p.m. on August 21, 2007, on West Merrick Road at its intersection with Rockaway Avenue, Valley Stream, Long Island. On or about May 21, 2008, plaintiff commenced this action by service of a Summons and Verified Complaint. Issue was joined on June 19, 2008.
The issue in this case is whether The Bronx defendant is entitled to his motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not sustained serious injury as defined under the Insurance law.
The Court held that, it is well settled that the proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by providing sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact. To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must establish its claim or defense by tendering sufficient evidentiary proof, in admissible form, sufficient to warrant the court, as a matter of law, to direct judgment in the movant’s favor. Such evidence may include deposition transcripts, as well as other proof annexed to an attorney’s affirmation. If a sufficient prima facie showing is demonstrated, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with competent evidence to demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact, the existence of which necessarily precludes the granting of summary judgment and necessitates a trial. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the function of the court is not to resolve issues but rather to determine if any such material issues of fact exist.
The plaintiff sustained serious and catastrophic injuries when he fell while traversing a trench at a construction site in the Bronx. As a result of plaintiff’s fall into a trench at the job site he became impaled on a reinforcement bar (rebar) that was surgically removed several hours after his admission to the hospital. It is in this setting that the jury, after a trial and after hearing testimony from plaintiff’s physicians and other experts regarding the devastating and traumatic nature of the personal injuries he sustained, rendered a verdict in the sum of $86 million including $20 million for past pain and suffering and $55 million for future pain and suffering.
A Lawyer said that, plaintiff’s treating physician, the Director of Spinal Cord Services at Helen Hayes Hospital, described in explicit detail the nature and effect of the spinal injuries plaintiff incurred. The Doctor provided the court and jury, inter alia, with a graphic picture of plaintiff’s suffering, stating in part, that the pain plaintiff continues to experience “is of two types. He has nerve pain in his legs, and that nerve pain is perhaps one of the worst pains that you could think of. Imagine somebody stabbing you with a knife, a gazillion times, or with a pin all over the place. That numbness, that tingling, that stabbing sensation” is “present all the time, but it is a constant pain and that pain will not go away.” He depicted plaintiff’s chronic pain by providing the jury with a vivid description of the damage to plaintiff’s spinal column when the rebar went into the area of his spinal cord and the compression fracture also caused by the pipe entering his body. He described the emotional pain sustained by the plaintiff caused by the distress of no longer having the ability to walk and the nerve pain emanating from his legs which he testified was permanent. The jury also heard testimony regarding plaintiff’s chronic bed sores, his cauterization in order to urinate, his inability to control bowel movements, constant urinary tract infections and repeated hospitalization for the conditions described by the Brooklyn Doctor.
A Lawyer said that, the defendant moves pursuant to CPLR §4404 and §5501, to reduce the damages awarded to the plaintiff, after a jury trial, contending that the award is excessive and materially deviates from fair and reasonable compensation.

References: § 30106
 § 30106
 § 388
 § 5102
 § 3212
 §4404
 §5501