Source: https://cyber.harvard.edu/daubert/mn.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 13:05:48+00:00

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If one accepts the proposition that the trial judge has a duty to exclude unreliable experts, a host of concerns inevitably follows. How is a trial judge to assess the scientific or technical adequacy of expert testimony if even a cursory understanding of the issues requires specialized training? Can anyone without such training fully understand the issues and come to a rational conclusion as to their validity? To what degree can the trial judge rely on the expert's own assertions about his or her qualifications? All of these concerns carry heavy weight for in many cases the trial judge is hardly a more qualified assessor of scientific credibility than the jury itself. In this introduction and the papers which follow it, we have laid out some possible answers to the myriad questions raised by judicial gatekeeping. This first paper attempts to establish a historical perspective on gatekeeping in Minnesota. The papers which follow it give a more generalized picture of the gatekeeping debate. Ultimately we hope that you find these materials helpful in formulating or fine tuning your own approach to science in the courts.
Interestingly, the focus in Minnesota on determining whether there is wide agreement that the results are "scientifically reliable" is a slightly different inquiry than the traditional Frye general acceptance standard. Acknowledging this subtle difference in focus, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Schwartz(8) indicated that, "[w]e have rephrased the Frye standard to require that experts in the field generally agree that the evidence is reliable and trustworthy." This interpretation has kept the Frye/Mack standard viable even in light of the adoption of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence in 1977.
Earlier in Schwartz, the state supreme court noted that it was "[u]nconvinced . . . of the need for or the wisdom of overruling these prior [Frye] decisions" in favor of a Daubert-like relevancy / reliability approach.(11) Fearing that "[w]ithout this [the Frye] safeguard . . . an undesired element of subjectivity is possible in evidentiary rulings," the Schwartz court "reaffirm[ed] that the admissibility of novel scientific evidence is determined by the application of the Frye standard."(12) Minnesota's rejection of such a relevancy / reliability approach both presaged Daubert and foreshadowed Minnesota's future reluctance to embrace the Daubert approach to admissibility.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has neither embraced nor specifically denounced Daubert. In Alt, the Court of Appeals noted that although Daubert does not by its terms apply to state court proceedings, its persuasive force may be strengthened by the fact that the Minnesota Rules of Evidence are modeled after the federal rules.(13) Similarly, the Court of Appeals in State v. Bauer refrained from ruling on whether Daubert supplanted Frye in Minnesota by noting that the state supreme court is the proper forum for determining such issues.(14) Moreover, in a case involving an admissibility challenge a mere four months after Bauer, the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically chose not to rule on the "continued validity of the Frye test in Minnesota."(15) Despite this apparent unwillingness to reject Daubert unequivocally, the Frye/Mack general acceptance approach remains the prevalent standard in Minnesota.
Upholding a judge's right to exclude given expert testimony on the basis of perceived analytical gaps in the science is an unprecedented broadening of the gatekeeper role. Such a ruling at first seems to run contrary to the "liberal thrust" of the Rules of Evidence as articulated in Daubert. It is uncertain whether courts will be as deferential when judges exercise their discretion in favor of admissibility of arguably questionable scientific evidence. Whether Joiner will effect Minnesota and states like her that have chosen not to adopt Daubert also remains to be seen.
6. See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1989); State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1985) (graphological personality assessment); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980) (hypnotically induced testimony); State v. Kolander, 52 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Minn. 1952) (lie detector tests).
7. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768.
8. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 424.
9. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1998) and Minn. R. Evid. 702 (1998) are identical and read: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
10. State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
11. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 424.
13. See Alt, 504 N.W.2d at 45.
14. See 512 N.W.2d 112, n. 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
15. State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, n. 1 (Minn. 1994).
16. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
18. See id. at 516.
21. See id. citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 865 F. Supp., 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
22. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
23. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517 (citations omitted)..
24. Id. at 518 (citations omitted).

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