Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/miller-v-dept-agric
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 01:16:51+00:00

Document:
Full Case Name: Kim MILLER v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al.
Summary: The Plaintiff, Kim Miller, argued “a severe deprivation” of her rights when the Superior Court dismissed her appeal to prevent her dogs from being euthanized. Miller owned two Rottweiler dogs that attacked the victim Cynthia Reed, causing injuries to Reed's head, the back of her neck, and her back. An animal control officer issued two disposal orders to euthanize Miller’s dogs. The Defendant, Connecticut Department of Agriculture, then affirmed the orders and Miller appealed. The Superior Court also dismissed the appeal, and Miller appealed further to the Appellate Court of Connecticut. Here, Miller argues, among other things, that her Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated when witnesses were not available for cross-examination. Plaintiff Miller also claims that there were procedural violations in the initial hearing because of lack of written rules that applied to dog disposal orders and claimed error when the hearing officer acted acted arbitrarily and capriciously by “interject[ing] his opinion” while questioning a witness. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) did not preclude the admission of statements from the victim and an eyewitness, even though the victim and witness did not testify at the hearing. The court reasoned that in administrative proceedings under the UAPA, evidence is not inadmissible solely because it constitutes hearsay, as long as the evidence is reliable and probative. Additionally, a party to an administrative proceeding under the UAPA is not required to call any particular witness. (2) A dog owner's appeal of disposal orders for a biting animal is not a criminal prosecution that invokes Sixth Amendment protections. The court reasoned that the issuance of a disposal order does not, by itself, trigger the imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner. Rather, by obviating the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public, the provision is remedial and civil in nature. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal was affirmed.
The plaintiff, Kim Miller, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing her appeal from the final decision of the defendant Department of Agriculture (department),1 to uphold, pursuant to General Statutes § 22–358, two disposal orders of an animal control officer of the town of Hamden to euthanize the plaintiff's two rottweiler dogs after they attacked the victim, Cynthia Reed.2 The plaintiff argues that the court erred in dismissing her appeal because the Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture (commissioner), prior to adopting the recommendation of the department hearing officer, Bruce Sherman, to affirm the disposal orders, overlooked “a severe deprivation” of her rights by the hearing officer. The plaintiff claims that the hearing officer violated her constitutional rights to due process and to confront the witnesses against her, acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rendering his proposed final decision, and made his decision upon unlawful procedure. See General Statutes § 4–183(j)(3) (Superior Court may overturn administrative decision “made upon unlawful procedure”).3 More specifically, the plaintiff claims that the hearing officer: (1) violated her right under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution to confront the witnesses against her when he allowed the statements of Reed and another witness to the attack, Monique Jones, to be admitted as evidence despite the fact that they did not testify and were not available for cross-examination; (2) improperly forced one of the plaintiff's witnesses to leave the hearing before testifying, thereby depriving the plaintiff of due process; (3) issued a proposed final decision that was made upon unlawful procedure because the department lacked written rules of procedure that applied specifically to hearings on dog disposal orders; and (4) acted arbitrarily and capriciously when he “interjected his opinion” about a substantive matter while questioning a witness for the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal.
The following facts and legal conclusions, as set forth by the commissioner,4 are relevant to this appeal. On October 16, 2012, Hamden animal control officer Christopher Smith issued disposal orders concerning two dogs owned by the plaintiff. The disposal orders were based upon an October 3, 2012 incident in which Reed sustained bite injuries from the two dogs outside of her residence in Hamden. After the two dogs escaped from their fenced enclosure located at the plaintiff's residence, a witness, Corey Saulsbury, saw the dogs approaching from the street on which the plaintiff resided and making a “beeline” toward a little girl, Reed's granddaughter, who began crying and screaming. The dogs first jumped on Reed's granddaughter and pawed her. Once Reed exited her upstairs apartment on the building's exterior stairs and came down to see what was happening to her granddaughter, the dogs jumped on her, bit her, pulled her, and dragged her from the stairs, eventually dragging her across the curb, grass, driveway, and sidewalk. Saulsbury observed the dogs “pulling off chunks of [Reed's] neck and her back.” At this point, Reed was on Saulsbury's automobile asking for help as the dogs pulled and bit her. Saulsbury attempted to use his automobile to hit the dogs in order to halt the attack. Later, two male bystanders retrieved a baseball bat and a pole and struck the dogs until they stopped attacking Reed and ran away. After the attack, there was blood on the driver's side window of Saulsbury's automobile, where Reed had approached in an attempt to obtain assistance. The dogs were later located at the plaintiff's residence and a fourteen day quarantine order was issued for them. After conducting an investigation, in which he concluded that Reed did not strike the dogs at all, Smith issued disposal orders.
Reed's injuries required onsite treatment by emergency medical personnel and transport to a hospital in New Haven for further treatment for dog bite injuries to her head, the back of her neck, and her back. Reed remained hospitalized until her release on October 5, 2012.
The commissioner concluded in relevant part as follows: “Because the dogs did not merely bite and release [Reed] after their physical contact with her, but continued to attack and bite her until they were physically beaten or removed from her body, it is not difficult to conclude that the injuries to [Reed] could have been even worse if these citizens did not risk their own welfare to come to her aid. The evidence in the record establishes that the attack and dog bite involving [the two dogs] that occurred on October 3, 2012, was a dangerous incident, impacting public safety.
After the issuance of the disposal orders pursuant to § 22–358,7 the plaintiff appealed to the commissioner. Thereafter, a notice of hearing was provided to the parties by certified mail, which provided the time and location of the appeal and the commissioner's authority for the hearing under § 22–358(c) in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA); General Statutes § 4–166 et seq.; and the department rules of practice, §§ 22–7–20 through 22–7–38 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. The applicable regulations and a copy of the department's order of procedure8 were provided to the parties' attorneys, along with a copy of the notice of hearing. The department appointed a hearing officer, Sherman, and convened a formal administrative hearing to determine whether the orders should stand. The hearing was held and concluded in its entirety on October 23, 2013, before the hearing officer. The hearing officer issued a proposed final decision recommending affirmance of Smith's two orders. After reviewing the entire record, hearing oral argument from the parties, and considering the plaintiff's brief in response to the hearing officer's proposed final decision, the commissioner issued a final decision affirming the two disposal orders. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which rejected the first, second, and fourth claims she raises on appeal to this court. The trial court found “ample evidence to support the conclusion that the bites were severe and that disposal was an appropriate remedy,” and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The plaintiff first claims that her right under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution to confront the witnesses against her was violated when the statements of Reed and Jones were admitted as evidence by the hearing officer, despite the fact that these two witnesses did not testify and were not available for cross-examination.9 Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the administrative hearing was “quasi-criminal” in nature, and, as such, the right to cross-examine one's accusers attaches. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, “the [commissioner] should not be able to rely on or use any statements, allegations, conclusions, etc., by Reed or Jones in [his final] decision as neither was ... present for cross-examination.” We do not agree.
The following additional facts are relevant to this issue. At the proceeding before the hearing officer, the town of Hamden submitted as evidence statements made to the police by Reed and Jones, as well as police reports containing references to statements made by Reed and Jones about the dogs' attack.10 Over the plain-tiff's objections that such evidence was inadmissible hearsay because neither Reed nor Jones was present at the hearing,11 the hearing officer admitted the evidence on the ground that hearsay is admissible in administrative hearings. On appeal, the trial court, Schuman, J., concluded that the sixth amendment to the federal constitution was not implicated because the proceeding was not quasi-criminal in nature, and that the statements were properly admitted as reliable and probative hearsay evidence.
Our analysis begins by setting forth the applicable standard of review. “Our standard of review of administrative agency rulings is well established.... Judicial review of an administrative decision is a creature of statute ... and [§ 4–183(j) ] permits modification or reversal of an agency's decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1)[i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error or law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tele Tech of Connecticut Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 270 Conn. 778, 787, 855 A.2d 174 (2004).
Under the UAPA, the scope of our review of an administrative agency's decision is “very restricted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 257 Conn. 128, 136, 778 A.2d 7 (2001). “[R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.... Neither [the appellate] court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact.... Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.”12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, 304 Conn. 317, 324, 39 A.3d 1095 (2012). “We have stated that not all procedural irregularities require a reviewing court to set aside an administrative decision.... The complaining party has the burden of demonstrating that its substantial rights were prejudiced by the error.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tele Tech of Connecticut Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 270 Conn. at 787–88, 855 A.2d 174. “It is fundamental that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the [agency], on the facts before [it], acted contrary to law and in abuse of [its] discretion....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 254 Conn. 333, 343–44, 757 A.2d 561 (2000).
“In addition, although we have noted that [a]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts ... we have maintained that [c]ases that present pure questions of law ... invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tele Tech of Connecticut Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 270 Conn. at 788, 855 A.2d 174. The plaintiff's constitutional claims are therefore entitled to plenary review. See FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 313 Conn. 669, 711, 99 A.3d 1038 (2014).
In administrative proceedings under the UAPA, evidence is not inadmissible solely because it constitutes hearsay. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Commissioner of Children & Families, 155 Conn.App. 610, 620, 110 A.3d 512, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 917, 113 A.3d 70 (2015); see also Roy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 67 Conn.App. 394, 397, 786 A.2d 1279 (2001) ( “[a]dministrative tribunals are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence ... so long as the evidence is reliable and probative” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Additionally, a party to an administrative proceeding under the UAPA is not required to call any particular witness.13 Therefore, the UAPA did not bar admission of and the commissioner did not err in considering the statements of Reed and Jones, the victim of the attack and an eyewitness to it, which the commissioner found to be “reliable and probative.”14 We thus turn to the plaintiff's constitutional claim.
The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him....” (Emphasis added.) The right to confrontation guaranteed by this provision is thus expressly limited to criminal proceedings. It is well established in the case law that “[t]he sixth amendment relates to a prosecution of an accused person which is technically criminal in its nature.” United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481, 16 S.Ct. 641, 40 L.Ed. 777 (1896); see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 and n. 4, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) ( “The protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are explicitly confined to ‘criminal prosecutions.’ As a general matter, th[e] Court's decisions applying constitutional protections to civil forfeiture proceedings have adhered to th [e] distinction between provisions that are limited to criminal proceedings and provisions that are not. Thus, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in forfeiture proceedings ... but that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not....” [Citations omitted.] ); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (“The distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of some constitutional import. The Self–Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, for example, is expressly limited to ‘any criminal case.’ Similarly, the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are available only in ‘criminal prosecutions.’ Other constitutional protections, while not explicitly limited to one context or the other, have been so limited by decision of this Court.”); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 n. 16, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960) (“[The Sixth] Amendment is specifically limited to ‘criminal prosecutions,’ and the proceedings of the Commission [on Civil Rights] clearly do not fall within that category.”). Our Supreme Court and this court have held likewise. See State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 159, 425 A.2d 939 (1979) (“[t]he right to effective assistance of counsel ... is grounded in the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, which is expressly limited to a defendant in a criminal action”); see also In re Noel M., 23 Conn.App. 410, 420–21, 580 A.2d 996 (1990) (concluding that confrontation rights under sixth amendment “cannot logically be extended to ... [parental] neglect hearing”).
An appeal of a disposal order for a biting animal pursuant to § 22–358(c) is not a criminal prosecution.15 The issuance of a disposal order under § 22–358(c) does not, by itself, trigger the imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner.16 Rather, by obviating the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public, the provision is remedial and civil in nature.
The plaintiff nonetheless argues that “[s]ince the seizure and subsequent [disposal] orders [concerning her dogs] were the result of an arrest of [the plaintiff], the proceedings to determine whether [the dogs] should be destroyed were quasi-criminal, and, therefore, [the plaintiff's] constitutional rights, including her sixth amendment right to confrontation, should have been observed and protected.” There are several problems with this argument. First, the record does not reveal an arrest of the plaintiff.17 The record does reveal, however, that the town of Hamden issued infractions against the plaintiff for nuisance under General Statutes § 22–363,18 and intentional or reckless release of a domestic animal that causes damage under General Statutes § 22–364a.19 In Connecticut, however, an infraction is not a crime. See State v. Caracoglia, 134 Conn.App. 175, 187, 38 A.3d 235 (2012) (“An infraction is not defined as a crime or criminal prosecution by the applicable General Statutes. [General Statutes § ] 53a–24 [a] provides that ‘the term crime comprises felonies and misdemeanors.’ An infraction is neither.”). Second, even if the plaintiff were charged with a criminal offense as a result of the biting incident, such prosecution does not automatically render criminal in nature any civil actions arising from the same incident. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (“[i]t is well settled that Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also State v. Burnell, 290 Conn. 634, 641–42, 966 A.2d 168 (2009) (administrative license revocation proceeding and criminal prosecution arising out of same offense did not violate federal or state double jeopardy clauses).
Finally, with respect to the plaintiff's claim that she was deprived of her right to confront Reed and Jones, we note that the plaintiff was free to subpoena both witnesses to compel their attendance at the hearing, or, in the alternative, to request that the hearing be held open in order to afford her more time to prepare such subpoenas or to submit a request to file late any affidavits refuting their testimony. The record does not disclose that the plaintiff attempted to pursue any of these options.
We conclude that the hearing officer's admission of the hearsay statements of Reed and Jones did not violate the sixth amendment to the United States constitution and that these statements were therefore properly considered by the commissioner prior to issuing his final decision.
The plaintiff next contends that the commissioner erred in failing to find that the hearing officer improperly forced one of her witnesses to leave the hearing before testifying.20 Specifically, the plaintiff claims that “a witness essential to the matter, with facts surrounding the incident ... was forced to leave the hearing despite a medical condition that was the reason for her behavior.” This claim is wholly without merit.
The following additional facts are pertinent to this issue. The record discloses that the hearing officer twice admonished Satanya Hudson, a friend of the plaintiff, for creating some sort of disturbance in the hearing room.21 The precise nature of the disturbance is not apparent on the record. It further appears that Hudson later left the hearing room to tend to a medical condition and never returned.22 The commissioner found that the hearing officer did not request, require, or force Hudson to leave the hearing, but merely asked that she not be disruptive, and that Hudson did not state or reveal that a medical condition caused her to be disruptive. He further found that it was not the hearing officer's responsibility to ascertain whether counsel for the plaintiff wanted to call Hudson to testify. On appeal, the trial court concluded that there was nothing in the record to support the plaintiff's claim that Hudson was forced out of the hearing room and that, in any event, the plaintiff failed to establish any prejudice arising from the episode as no proffer by counsel for the plaintiff regarding Hudson's proposed testimony was ever made.
The premise of the plaintiff's claim is belied by the record, which is simply bereft of any indication that the hearing officer “forced [Hudson] to leave and not testify” or that she “was not allowed back to testify.” Notably, at no time during the hearing did the plaintiff object by claiming that Hudson had been forced to leave or had not been allowed back to testify. Additionally, as the commissioner found, “[t]here was no request made to the hearing officer to have [Hudson] testify after a break or recess, there was no request to continue or hold open the hearing to have [Hudson] testify on another date, [and] there was no proffer by counsel for [the plaintiff] regarding the alleged nature of [Hudson's] testimony .” Further, “[t]here was no request to file an affidavit regarding the nature of [Hudson's] testimony ... and no request was made to late file such an exhibit.” Thus, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that her right to due process of law was violated as a result of the hearing officer's verbal exchanges with Hudson.
The plaintiff next argues that the proposed final decision of the hearing officer was made upon unlawful procedure because the department lacked written procedures that applied specifically to hearings on dog disposal orders, thereby depriving the plaintiff of due process.23 According to the plaintiff, the hearing officer “rel[ied] solely on the codified sections of the [UAPA] ... and the Department of Agriculture's rules of practice, both of which are general in nature and apply to all hearings before the department, and not specifically to appeals of dog disposal orders.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the plaintiff asserts, her right to due process was violated because the hearing officer lacked sufficient guidance as to how to conduct the administrative hearing. As support for this claim, the plaintiff relies on a transcript of a status conference in an unrelated case before the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which the plaintiff claims, shows the lack “of any written rules, procedures or guidelines used by the department ... as they relate to the department's practices and procedures pursuant to § 22–358.” This claim, including its reference to the appended transcript, is raised for the first time before this court. We therefore decline to review it.
“Practice Book § 60–5 provides in relevant part that [this] court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court.... Indeed, it is the appellant's responsibility to present such a claim clearly to the trial court so that the trial court may consider it and, if it is meritorious, take appropriate action. That is the basis for the requirement that ordinarily [the appellant] must raise in the trial court the issues that he intends to raise on appeal.... For us [t]o review [a] claim, which has been articulated for the first time on appeal and not before the trial court, would result in a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge.... We have repeatedly indicated our disfavor with the failure, whether because of a mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to errors occurring in the course of a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected, and thereafter, if the outcome of the trial proves unsatisfactory, with the assignment of such errors as grounds of appeal.... This rule applies to appeals from administrative proceedings as well.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferraro v. Ridgefield European Motors, Inc., 313 Conn. 735, 758–59, 99 A.3d 1114 (2014); see also Dragan v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 223 Conn. 618, 632, 613 A.2d 739 (1992) (“A party to an administrative proceeding cannot be allowed to participate fully at hearings and then, on appeal, raise claims that were not asserted before the board. We have made it clear that we will not permit parties to anticipate a favorable decision, reserving a right to impeach it or set it aside if it happens to be against them, for a cause which was well known to them before or during the trial.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ).
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the commissioner erred in finding that the hearing officer did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when he “interjected his opinion” about a substantive matter while questioning a witness for the plaintiff. Because the plaintiff failed to adequately brief this issue, we decline to review its merits.
“Whe[n] an issue is merely mentioned, but not briefed beyond a bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been waived.... In addition, mere conclusory assertions regarding a claim, with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record, will not suffice.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 87, 942 A.2d 345 (2008).
“[The Hearing Officer]: So do you think if that bite to the neck coupled with dragging, dragging the victim, might be more than just flight?
“[The Witness]: Potentially. But there are a lot of variables, especially with this case here.
The plaintiff's brief does not explain how the hearing officer's statement constitutes error except to say that it is an example of his “interject[ing] his opinion rather than acting as a finder of fact,” and that, from what we can discern from a section heading earlier in the plaintiff's appellate brief, it is claimed to be possibly arbitrary and capricious as well. The plaintiff cites no legal authority in support of this argument, provides no further reference to the record, and engages in no further analysis. We thus deem this claim abandoned and decline to review it.
The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plain-tiff's appeal is affirmed.
1 Because the Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture acts on behalf of the department, references in this opinion to the department include the commissioner.
2 The town of Hamden is also a defendant in this appeal and has adopted the department's brief in full.
3 Administrative hearings to consider appeals of disposal orders issued pursuant to § 22–358(c) are conducted in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA); General Statutes § 4–166 et seq.; and the department rules of practice, specifically, §§ 22–7–20 through 22–7–38 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. Pursuant to General Statutes § 4–176e, hearings in contested cases in agency proceedings may be conducted before a hearing officer, who, pursuant to General Statutes § 4–179, renders a written, proposed final decision to the commissioner. After affording each party adversely affected by the proposed final decision an opportunity to file exceptions and present briefs and oral argument pursuant to § 4–179(a), the commissioner is vested with the authority to render the final decision in matters involving disposal orders under § 22–358(c).
4 In his final decision, the commissioner set forth detailed factual findings of the events underlying this case, many of which were in agreement with the factual findings contained in the hearing officer's proposed final decision.
6 The commissioner also took note of the fact that Hamden police officer Michael Cirillo, who arrived on the scene following the attack, “[had] responded to an estimated [forty to sixty] dog bites in his career [and, based upon his observations] ... the injuries to [Reed] were the most significant in terms of injuries he has encountered.” (Citation omitted.) Similarly, the commissioner noted that Smith, who observed Reed's bandaged injuries following her discharge from the hospital, “[had] seen a couple dozen dog bites in his career as an animal control officer and in terms of injuries to the victim, this was the most severe.” A video depicting Reed's injuries, also was submitted in evidence as a full exhibit.
8 The order of procedure consisted of: (1) the hearing officer's opening remarks; (2) introduction of the hearing participants and witnesses; (3) the parties' opening statements; (4) documentary evidence marked foridentifica-tion; (5) the municipality's case-in-chief, including (a) direct examination of the witnesses and offering of documentary evidence, (b) cross-examination by the opposing side, (c) questions from the hearing officer, (d) redirect examination, (e) recross-examination, if necessary, and (f) questions from the hearing officer; (6) the animal owner's case presentation, which would proceed in the same order as the municipality's case-in-chief; (7) rebuttal; (8) the parties' closing statements; and (9) closure of the hearing.
First, as part of her sixth amendment claim, the plaintiff asserts that the hearing officer violated her right to confrontation under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. However, “[b]ecause the [plaintiff] has not set forth a separate state constitutional analysis pursuant to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we deem that claim abandoned,” and therefore proceed by evaluating the plaintiff's confrontation claim under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution. State v. Benedict, 158 Conn.App. 599, 604 n. 5, 119 A.3d 1245, cert. granted on other grounds, 319 Conn. 924, 125 A.3d 200 (2015).
Second, the plaintiff appears to argue separately that the violation of her right to confrontation also deprived her of due process under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, at one point stating that “the town of Hamden violated [the plaintiff's] due process rights to cross-examine.” (Emphasis added.) Whether this is a separate constitutional claim, or merely a recognition that the sixth amendment has been applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); or both, is not entirely clear. To the extent that the plaintiff relies on the fourteenth amendment, however, we view that argument, in its essence, to be the functional equivalent of her sixth amendment claim, and reject it.
Third, the plaintiff adds in passing that, by admitting statements of the two witnesses as evidence at the hearing when they did not testify, the hearing officer also violated the plaintiff's rights under the fifth amendment to the United States constitution. The plaintiff provides no further elaboration or analysis of this issue. We therefore consider it inadequately briefed and decline to review it. See Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 87, 942 A.2d 345 (2008).
10 These items were far from the only sources of information about the attack. At the hearing, Saulsbury provided detailed eyewitness testimony about the attack. Furthermore, police officer Michael Cirillo and Smith both testified about their observations of Reed's injuries.
12 Our restricted scope of review is further constrained by the fact that the legislature, by promulgating § 22–358, vested the animal control officer with broad discretion to make orders that “such officer deems necessary” with respect to “the restraint or disposal of any biting dog....” General Statutes § 22–358(c).
13 Of course, if a witness does testify at an administrative proceeding, he or she is subject to cross-examination. See General Statutes § 4–177c.
14 We note that during the proceedings before the hearing officer, the plaintiff objected to the statements of Reed and Jones only due to the fact that neither of them was present. The plaintiff did not argue that their statements were unreliable or not probative.
15 In so holding, we also conclude that it is immaterial for purposes of the sixth amendment whether the disposal orders are quasi-criminal or not. As explained previously in the body of this opinion, it is well established that confrontation rights under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution are afforded only to criminal defendants. The cases that the plaintiff cites are inapposite because they do not involve sixth amendment claims. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617–18, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), for instance, involved a proceeding by the United States to execute the forfeiture of cases of plate glass, which allegedly had been illegally imported without payment of the customs duty. The Supreme Court held that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of property by reason of crimes committed by the owner, though civil in form, are quasi-criminal in nature, and, therefore, under the fourth and fifth amendments, the owner cannot be compelled to produce documents that justify the forfeiture by proving the criminal violation occurred. Id., at 634–35. Similarly, in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the state could not seize evidence in violation of the fourth amendment for use in a quasi-criminal forfeiture proceeding intended to penalize the owner of an automobile for the commission of a criminal offense. In that case, police officers stopped an automobile and searched the rear and trunk without a warrant and without probable cause, ultimately finding thirty-one cases of liquor not bearing Pennsylvania tax seals, which constituted aviolation of Pennsylvania law. Id., at 694–95. In the present case, by contrast, the animal control officer was not required to find that the plaintiff violated any criminal law in order to justify his disposal orders under § 22–358(c).
16 A municipality may assess on the owner certain fees, including a nominal “redemption fee” for owners claiming a captured or impounded animal, and a payment representing the cost to the municipality of quarantining a biting animal. General Statutes § 22–333. These fees, however, merely compensate a municipality for costs incurred while impounding an animal, and thus cannot be described as punitive in nature. Compare Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed.1999) p. 629 (defining “fee” as “[a] charge for labor or services, esp. professional services”), with Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at p. 647 (defining “fine” as “[a] pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the public treasury”).
And, although, pursuant to § 22–358(c), the state may punish an animal owner with a thirty day prison term and $250 fine for failing to comply with a quarantine order issued after a biting incident, such criminal penalty is distinct from a disposal order, and, in any event, is not at issue in this case.
17 At the administrative hearing, the plaintiff's prior counsel acknowledged that the plaintiff was not arrested.
20 In a section heading of her appellate brief, the plaintiff also asserts that this alleged conduct violated her constitutional right—presumably under the sixth amendment—to call witnesses on her own behalf. Although such a claim is not adequately presented, we note that our analysis herein would also govern our analysis of such claim.
“[The Hearing Officer]: I'll step in here too.
“[Hudson]: I am tired. I am sorry.
“[The Defendant's Counsel]: Yeah, but this started first thing in the morning.
“[The Defendant's Counsel]: I understand you may not agree with my questions, you may not agree with some of the answers, but now it is getting distracting.
“[Hudson]: I am sorry. I apologize to you, sir.
“[The Hearing Officer]: And if you want to stay in the hearing that is going to have to stop.
“[The Hearing Officer]: So, if you had a five year old child or four year old child out in its yard, these two dogs got loose after you, well let's say before you train them. These two dogs got loose, and they, you know, they travelled a few hundred feet, couple blocks—ma‘am, one more time. This is the second warning.
“[Hudson]: I am not doing anything, sir. I am falling asleep.
“[The Hearing Officer]: As far as I can see, you are.
“[The Hearing Officer]: Well, you know.
“[The Hearing Officer]: Excuse me.
“[Wilson]: I apologize. I just need the keys to her truck. Satanya is on medication and she is having seizures, which is also the reason why she is having issues.
“[The Hearing Officer]: All right.
This final exchange is the first time that a reference to Hudson's medical condition appears on the record.
23 In her brief, the plaintiff frames this alleged error as arbitrary and capricious conduct by the hearing officer. In substance, however, this claim is one of unlawful procedure under § 4–183(j)(3). Accordingly, we refer to it as such.

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 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 22
 § 22
 § 22
 § 22
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 22
 § 60
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 22
 § 4
 § 4
 § 4
 § 4
 § 22
 § 8
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 22
 § 22
 § 4
 v. 
 v. 
 § 22
 § 22
 § 22
 § 4