Source: https://www.ksbar.org/blogpost/1618780/Appellate-Court-Digests?tag=&DGPCrSrt=&DGPCrPg=2
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:56:31+00:00

Document:
FACTS: Nickey and Roslyn married in 1994. For almost their entire marriage Nickey was an active-duty service member. After both spouses filed for divorce, they agreed to mediate. That mediation resulted in a property settlement agreement which, in part, gave Roslyn 43% of Nickey's military retirement and disability pay. The district court issued a divorce decree but postponed a final property settlement agreement after disagreements arose. Specifically, Nickey claimed that the district court lacked the authority to divide his military disability pay. The district court disagreed and ruled that Nickey was bound by the mediation agreement. He appealed.
HELD: There are federal laws which pre-empt state courts from treating military disability pay as community property subject to division. These laws are strictly construed, most recently by the United States Supreme Court in Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. __ (2017). For this reason, the district court could not force Nickey to contract away his disability pay and the property settlement agreement must be vacated. On remand, the district court may consider the financial impact of the disability pay when dividing assets and ordering spousal support.
FACTS: As part of a diversion agreement, Kurth stipulated to violations of KRPC 1.3 (diligence), 1.4(a) (communication), 1.5(a) (fees), and 1.16 (d) (termination of representation). Kurth was unable to successfully complete the diversion. In general, Kurth did not dispute the legal conclusions on these violations, but she did contest the recommended discipline of suspension. Kurth abruptly left her practice in order to care for her adult daughter who became ill and later died. This left her clients without representation during the absence.
HEARING PANEL: The hearing panel found evidence to support all charged disciplinary violations. It considered several aggravating factors including Kurth's inability to complete the diversion. The hearing panel also heard the mitigating factors of Kurth's physical and mental health and her use of prescription medication. The panel had no doubt that Kurth's mental disability contributed to the misconduct. But she showed no sustained recovery, and there was expert testimony that her medication could make it difficult for her to practice law. Kurth strenuously objected to the hearing panel evaluating her fitness to practice. However, a majority of the panel noted both Kurth's history and her conduct at the hearing and concluded that she was not capable of representing clients. Accordingly, the panel proposed a two-year suspension.
HELD: The primary argument before the court centered on whether Kurth would be required to undergo a Rule 219(d) reinstatement hearing before being allowed to practice after a suspension. Kurth argued for discipline of published censure, claiming the hearing panel recommended harsher discipline than was warranted because of her unconventional appearance and communication style. Given the total weight of the evidence, the court imposed discipline of a 6-month suspension with the requirement that Kurth complete a Rule 219(d) reinstatement hearing before the suspension is lifted.
FACTS: A hearing panel determined that Grillot violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4(a) (communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.15 (safekeeping property), 1.16(d) (termination of representation), 3.3(a)(1) (candor toward tribunal), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The misconduct centered on Grillot's failure to compete work for a client and for his misappropriation of funds from an estate.
HEARING PANEL: The hearing panel noted that Grillot misappropriated funds over a period of time as part of multiple rule violations. There were mitigating factors in the form of Grillot's mental health and the illnesses of various family members. Grillot also paid restitution to the estate and fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. The disciplinary administrator recommended that Grillot be disbarred. Grillot asked for a one-year suspension. A majority of the hearing panel recommended an indefinite suspension.
HELD: The hearing panel's findings were deemed admitted. The court agreed with the disciplinary administrator that disbarment was the appropriate discipline.
FACTS: Jamerson was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Sentence imposed included aggravated robbery sentence to run consecutive to second-degree murder sentence, and the conspiracy sentence to run concurrent with both. He filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence arguing district court used an incorrect criminal history score in sentencing for second-degree murder. District court agreed and also noticed Jamerson’s criminal history had been erroneously applied to non-base sentences of aggravated robbery and conspiracy. District court addressed all three errors at resentencing and ordered all sentences to run consecutive. Jamerson appealed, arguing district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the unchallenged aggravated robbery and conspiracy sentences. In unpublished opinion, court of appeals concluded the resentencing court had jurisdiction to modify the conspiracy sentence, but lacked jurisdiction to resentence for aggravated robbery, and lacked jurisdiction to deviate from the original sentence by making the conspiracy sentence run consecutive. State’s petition for review was granted.
HELD: State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763 (2012), and State v. Morningstar, 299 Kan. 1236 (2014), apply to resentencing based on a motion to correct an illegal sentence. When one or more sentences in a multi-conviction case is illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504, district court may only correct the illegal sentence(s). The district court must vacate the illegal sentence and correct it by resentencing in accord with the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), but lacks authority to resentence anew for all convictions in a multiple conviction case. In this case, district court erred in increasing the legal aggravated robbery sentence, but had authority to resentence the illegal sentences for second-degree murder and conspiracy. This included the authority to order the conspiracy sentence to run consecutive to the others. Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the original sentence for aggravated robbery.
CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT (Johnson, J., joined by Beier, J.): In conformance with Guder, agrees that the district court erred when it modified the original sentence for aggravated robbery because that sentence was legal and not subject to correction. Also agrees that when district court discerned the original sentences for second-degree murder and conspiracy were illegal, it had authority under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) to correct the illegality. Disagrees that K.S.A. 22-3504(1) invests a district court with discretion to modify the legal portions of a previously imposed sentence. Majority’s incorporation of the entire KSGA into a plainly worded statute is contrary to basic statutory construction concepts. In changing concurrent conspiracy sentence to a consecutive sentence, district court was exercising discretion only available for sentencing under KSGA. Would hold the district court erred in resentencing Jamerson to serve his conspiracy sentence consecutively.
FACTS: PCD hired Lerner to represent it in a federal breach of contract action. The case involved highly technical design and engineering work. PCD sued a contractor for allegedly stealing intellectual property. At the time he was retained, Lerner knew that the statute of limitations would be an issue since Kansas' five-year limitation had already expired. Lerner filed suit in Massachusetts—the defendant's home state—because it has a six-year limit for breach of contract claims. The defendant argued that the breach of contract occurred earlier than Lerner contended. The district court agreed and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The parties eventually settled the matter. PCD then filed a legal malpractice action against Lerner. After a trial, a jury found that Lerner was negligent for failing to provide timely legal services to PCD and that PCD's negligence action would have been successful but for the malpractice. Lerner filed a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law. The motion was granted and the jury's verdict set aside after the district court determined that PCD failed to prove that the defendant breached the underlying contract. In the alternative, the district court also found that the jury instructions were improper and that PCD was not entitled to recover attorney fees spent in the underlying tort case. PCD appealed.
HELD: In order to prevail on its legal malpractice claim, PCD was required to prove that it would have prevailed in the underlying breach of contract claim. An attorney's opinion of the underlying case, or statements made by the attorney in pleadings, are not evidence of any of the claims made in the underlying lawsuit. PCD failed to present expert testimony in its malpractice case which left it without evidence to supports its claim. In the absence of that evidence, the judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Lerner's work for PCD was, in effect, an employment contract. But there is no evidence that Lerner made an express promise to timely file suit. In the absence of an express contract, the district court properly refused to instruct the jury on PCD's breach of contract claims.
FACTS: Hubbard answered officer’s knock on apartment door. Based on smell of marijuana, officers ordered everyone to leave the apartment, and then conducted security sweep to ensure no one remained inside. Search warrant obtained and executed, finding drug evidence. Hubbard convicted of possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. He appealed claiming drug evidence should have been suppressed because: (1) the initial warrantless entry into his apartment for a security sweep was illegally premised on officer’s report of smelling raw marijuana while standing at the front door; and (2) officer’s suppression-hearing testimony about smelling raw marijuana odor was inadmissible expert testimony. Court of appeals affirmed in unpublished opinion, finding smell of marijuana provided probable cause to believe that crime had been committed, that apartment held evidence of that crime, and that sweep of the apartment was justified by need to preserve evidence. Review granted.
HELD: On facts found by district court, the smell of marijuana provided probable cause, and threat of evidence destruction was an exigent circumstance. To the extent drug evidence and the search warrant were fruits of a warrantless search, the sweep was not illegal and the challenged evidence is not subject to exclusion. United States Supreme Court cases addressing relationship between odors and probable cause are reviewed.
District court did not err by admitting officer’s testimony about smelling raw marijuana as lay opinion. State v. Sasser, 305 Kan 1231 (2017), is reviewed, similarly finding in this case that officers’ opinions that they smelled raw marijuana, based on their perception and specialized training, qualified as lay opinion admissible under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-456(a).
DISSENT (Beier, J., joined by Rosen and Johnson, JJ.): Dissents from majority’s result and rationale. Would hold the district judge applied the wrong legal standard in admitting and considering the officers’ suppression-hearing testimony, treating their expert opinions on the source of the odor they perceived as facts. Subsection (b) of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-456, is controlling, rather than subsection (a). Would also hold district judge’s conclusion, that sweep was justified by existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances, erroneously relied in part upon absence of State evidence. Would reverse the convictions, vacate the sentence, and remand to district court for new evaluation of the motion to suppress.
FACTS: Officer in unmarked car activated his red and blue emergency lights and “wig wag” lights in attempt to stop vehicle driving without lights after dark, and observed driver’s furtive movements toward console as vehicle continued without stopping. Vehicle eventually pulled into grocery store parking lot where driver (Parker) exited and locked the vehicle. Officer arrested Parker who refused consent to search of the vehicle. Parker then waited in police car approximately an hour for K9 unit to arrive and alert on the vehicle. Drug charges filed based on evidence found in subsequent search of vehicle’s console. Parker filed motion to suppress, challenging the duration of the stop and alleging incrimination statements were made in violation of Miranda. District court denied the motion. Jury convicted Parker as charged. On appeal, Court of appeals remanded on Parker’s Batson jury selection claim, but affirmed on claims challenging: (1) district court’s refusal to suppress evidence; (2) sufficiency of the evidence supporting the feeing or eluding offense because the police vehicle was not properly marked; and (3) the use of Parker’s prior crimes to enhance the sentence. Review granted on these three claims.
HELD: The seizure of Parker was lawful—the initial seizure of his person did not violate Fourth Amendment, and his extended holding in the police car did not make his seizure unlawful. Applying test for property seizure, on record in this case, the vehicle was not seized between the time Parker exited and locked it and the time of the K9 alert, and Parker was not deprived of a possessory interest in the vehicle after his arrest while it sat locked in a public parking lot.
Statutory challenge to K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-1568 is rejected. Officer was driving an unmarked car outfitted with standard police equipment and lights which were activated to stop Parker who did not stop for a considerable period. Sufficient evidence was presented to support the fleeing conviction.
Sentencing claim defeated with no departure from decisions rejecting this same claim.
CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT (Johnson, J.): Dissents on the suppression issue, finding no factual or legal support for majority’s holding that the vehicle was not continually seized after Parker’s arrest. Disagrees that seizure of the stopped vehicle ended when Parker exited and locked it. Would hold that State unlawfully detained Parker’s vehicle beyond the time and detention warranted by the totality of the circumstances, requiring reversal of conviction based on the ensuing unlawful search.
FACTS: Officers conducting a welfare check smelled raw marijuana at Regelman’s front door. Officers ordered Regelman to remain outside while search warrant was obtained, and handcuffed him to prevent him from putting hands in his pockets. Search warrant affidavit included incriminating statements Regelman made. Execution of the warrant disclosed drug related items inside a thick wooden box by a couch, several feet from front door. Regelman arrested and Miranda rights given for first time. Regelman filed motion to suppress. District court granted the motion, finding Regelman’s statements about drug use occurred during questioning in violation of Miranda. District court further held the smell of marijuana by itself does not provide probable cause for a search, and good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. State filed interlocutory appeal. Court of appeals affirmed in unpublished opinion. State’s petition for review granted.
HELD: Regelman’s drug use statements are scrutinized under Fifth Amendment. Miranda warnings were required when questioning of Regelman turned into a custodial interrogation by ordering him to stop walking away and either sit on the steps or in a patrol car. The search warrant affidavit contained this unlawfully obtained information, but under State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272 (2007), the affidavit as a whole is not invalid if it supplied a substantial basis for finding probable cause without the unlawfully obtained information.
State v. Hubbard (decided this same date), held the totality of circumstances surrounding a police officer’s detection of the smell of raw marijuana emanating from a residence can provide probable cause to believe the residence contains contraband or evidence of a crime. District court holding to the contrary was error as a matter of law. Applying Fisher, even without the drug-use statements, information remaining in the affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in the home. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
CONCURRENCE (Beier, J.): Concurs in the result because Regelman made no effort to challenge admission of officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing on the basis that he was not qualified to give an expert opinion on the existence or strength of the odor of raw marijuana. Does not concur in majority’s rationale, which turns a blind eye to gatekeeping requirement under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-456(b).
DISSENT (Johnson, J., joined by Rosen, J.): Agrees with Justice Beier’s criticism of majority’s rationale, but cannot concur with majority’s result. Would affirm district court’s suppression of the evidence. Because this case involved the long-range detection of odor of raw marijuana in a closed container, questions whether State could make the required foundation for the officer’s testimony by establishing the officer was in a position that would rationally allow him to perceive odor of raw marijuana.

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