Source: https://indianipr.in/2018/06/23/in-view-of-section-13-of-act-copyright-subsists-in-original-works-including-original-literary-dramatic-and-artistic-works-and-cinematograph-films-a-title-is-not-an-original-literary-work-as-held/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:34:15+00:00

Document:
In view of Section 13 of Act, copyright subsists in, original works including original literary, dramatic and artistic works and cinematograph films. A title is not an original literary work, as held by Supreme Court in case of Krishika Lulla and Ors. v. Shyam Vithalrao Devkatta and Anr. A title does not qualify for being described as work. There is no originality in adoption of title “KARU”, which is a common Tamil word, which means “foetus” and figuratively “concept” and/or “theme”.
Indira Banerjee, C.J. and Abdul Quddhose, J.
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: P.L. Narayanan, Adv.
Plain tiff/Respondent No. 1 to exclusive use of title so registered, to exclusion of other producers. Single Bench erred in arriving at conclusion that Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 had prima facie case as Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 had registered title “KARU” for motion picture as early as on 3rd September, 2011 and had renewed same from time to time. Interim order of Single Bench cannot be sustained and same was set aside. Appeal allowed.
in the suit being C.S. No. 65 of 2018.
Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 is 9880.
with the Second or the Third Defendant/Respondent.
to use the titles registered with the Second and Third Defendants/Respondents to the exclusion of other members. The titles so registered by members cannot be used by others, even as prefix or suffix with other words.
started production of a film titled “KARU”. The Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 claims to have made huge investments for his aforesaid film monetarily as also by way of labour, publicity etc. It is, however, not in dispute that the film has not yet been completed and the same is not ready for release.
under the same title “KARU”, which is directed by one Vijay.
remaining part is likely to be completed within a short time.
embarrassment and loss of name and reputation to the Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1.
Second Defendant/Respondent, of which the Appellant/First Defendant is a member.
Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 for his film “KARU” are in deep peril.
(iv) grant such further or other relief.
The Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 filed an interlocutory application, being O.A.
any other suffix or prefix or any other word joined to the title “KARU”.
based on a ghost story. There is no similarity between the two films.
M/s. Think Big Studios, represented by its Partner Mr. A.L. Azhagappan.
film as “LYCAVIN KARU” on 28lh September, 2017.
original motion film titled “KARU”.
(iii) in the case of work of architecture, the work is located in India.
Explanation.- In the case of a work of joint authorship, the conditions conferring Copyright specified in this Sub-section shall be satisfied by all the authors of the work.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, a copy which has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy already in circulation.
“visual recording” means the recording in any medium, by any method including the storing of it by any electronic means, of moving images or of the representations thereof, from which they can be perceived, reproduced or communicated by any method.
in relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the person who causes the work to be created.
and cinematograph films. A title is not an original literary work, as held by the Supreme Court in Krishika Lulla and Ors. v. Shyam Vithalmo Devkatta and Anr.1 reported in (2016) 2 SCC 521. A title does not qualify for being described as work. It is incomplete in itself and refers to the work that follows.
Names and titles as literary works.-In the same vein is the reluctance of English Courts to confer Copyright protection on titles of newspapers, magazines, books and the like. In relation to books in particular, the title normally forms part of a Copyright work consisting of the book as a whole and the issue here may be whether the copying of the title amounts to the taking of a substantial part of the whole work. General statements can nevertheless be found in non-copyright cases to the effect that there is no property in a name or title standing alone unless it is the subject of goodwill or a registered Trade mark.
…As we have earlier affirmed, there is no Copyright in the title and purchasers, whether of the original work or of the guide, are most unlikely to be illiterate, or unacquainted with English. It will be perfectly clear to them, from the words enclosed in brackets as a subtitle, that they were acquiring, not the original work, but a ‘guide for university students’.
…What, therefore, follows is that if a junior user uses the senior user’s literary title as the title of a work that by itself does not infringe the Copyright of a senior user’s work since there is no Copyright Infringement merely from the identity or similarity of the titles alone.
register the title of the films they intend to make.
registration certificates without getting clearance from each other.
could not even be used with a suffix or prefix.
above, there is no Copyright in a mere title.
members of the Third Defendant/Respondent.
It is nobody’s case that the title has acquired any goodwill or reputation.
weigh against the grant of an injunction in favour of the Plain tiff/Respondent No. 1.
figuratively means “concept” and/or “theme”.
It is generally acknowledged by the Court in India that the definitions in Sections 13 and 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957, do not go beyond the literary work or musical work and the title ordinarily of any such work is not a part of composition or work of the author or the composer. His workmanship is confined to the work and not to the title. It is indeed the law that there is no property in the name which is the term of description used to identify the work and any other person can, with impunity, adopt it.
co-ordinate strength of the same High Court.
In Padma Sundara Rao v. State o/T.N.8 [(2002) 3 SCC 533] it is stated: (SCC p.
There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board [(1972) 2 WLR 537: 1972 AC 877: (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] (Sub nom British Railways Board v. Herrington). Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.
As often enough pointed out by us, words and expressions used in a judgment are not to be construed in the same manner as statutes or as words and expressions defined in statutes.
judgment based on the combined effect of the above.
5 SCC 568, a judgment and/or decision is an Authority for what it actually decides.
decided is alone binding as a precedent.
given, and what was the point which had to be decided.
plot, characterization, dialogure, song etc. is not the subject of Copyright Law. Thus, a Copyright on a literary work would not include exclusive right to use the title on any other work. What, therefore, follows is that if a junior user uses the senior user’s literary title as the title of a work that by itself does not infringe the Copyright of a senior user’s work since there is no Copyright Infringement merely from the identity or similarity of the titles alone. Same is the position under Copyright Law in India.
applicant had no case on the Copyright in respect of the title “Raja Rani”.
r 50. The ratio decidendi in R. Radhakrishnan, is that there is no Copyright in the title of a literary work or a cinematograph film. This proposition of law operates as a precedent to be followed by Bench of co-ordinate strength.
In our view, judicial propriety demands that a Single Bench should follow the verdict of the other Single Bench and if it is unable to agree, the Single Bench should refer the matter to the Chief Justice for constitution of a Division Bench. The learned 8 Single Bench fell in error in holding that the judgment of the Single Bench in R. Radha Krishnan v. A.R. Murugadoss, reported in 2013 (5) LW 429 was distinguishable on facts. The learned Single Bench should have appreciated minor differences like one film being a short film and the other film being a feature film could not make any difference to the proposition that there was no Copyright to a title.
facts would not denude a decision of its precedential value and in distinguishing a precedent on the ground of factual differences, it would be necessary to clearly indicate the distinguishing features and how the distinguishing features could have rendered the proposition of law enunciated and/or re-enunciated in the decision inapplicable. The learned Judge has, with the greatest of respect, not indicated the reasons for his view that the distinguishing features noted in the judgment under appeal render the judgments cited on behalf of the Appellant/Defendant No. 1, holding that there was no Copyright in a title, inapplicable.
would apply to all feature films.
was raised as an alternative contention.
If production work has not commenced during the year i.e. during the registration period of One Year of title then renewal for another (six) 6 months only will be considered by the Executive Committee, on furnishing satisfactory reasons, for delay in starting the production.
In registering any title for a film of Guild takes no responsibility whatsoever in regard to and infringement of Copyright or any other legal right and Titles Registration is done purely on “Self Regulation Scheme”, Guild does not take any legal responsibilities pertaining to Titles Registration.
legal right and title registration was done purely on “Self Regulation Scheme”.
by the rules of the Third Defendant/Respondent.
Appellant/First Defendant, is in our view, not material.
3rd September, 2011 and had renewed the same from time to time.
film which had been completed and was due to be released on 23rd February, 2018.
Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 cannot injunct others from using a title. In any case, the title is different preceded by “LYCAVIN KARU”. Even assuming that the cinematographic film of the Plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 is 90 per cent complete as claimed, the film of the Appellant/First Defendant is complete and scheduled to be released on 23rd February, 2018, which is tomorrow. We are informed that the date of the release has likely been postponed by reason of the interim injunction passed by the learned Single Bench. The interim order of the learned Single Bench cannot be sustained and the same is set aside.
The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. No costs. Consequently, CMP. Nos. 3492 and 3493 of 2018 are closed.

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