Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81692:gr-196907-2013&catid=1568&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:38:43+00:00

Document:
NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
Before this court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the May 13, 2011 Resolution1 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Bane in C.T.A. E. B. No. 505 (C.T.A. Case No. 6688) entitled Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation.
On January 26, 2009, the First Division of the CTA denied the petition for insufficiency of evidence.5 Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the CTA First Division promulgated its Amended Decision,6 dated March 24, 2009, ordering the respondent, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to issue a tax credit certificate in favor of petitioner in the amount of P10,928,607.31 representing excess or unutilized input tax for the second, third and fourth quarters of 2001. The CTA First Division took judicial notice of the records of C.T.A. Case No. 6967, also involving petitioner, to show that the claim of input tax had not been applied against any output tax in the succeeding quarters. As to the timeliness of the filing of petitioner's administrative and judicial claims, the CTA First Division ruled that while the administrative application for refund was made within the two-year prescriptive period, petitioner's immediate recourse to the court was a premature invocation of the court's jurisdiction due to the non-observance of the procedure in Section 112(D)7 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) providing that an appeal may be made with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision of the CIR denying the claim or after the expiration of the 120-day period without action on the part of the CIR. Considering, however, that the CIR did not register his objection when he filed his Answer, he is deemed to have waived his objection thereto.8 The CIR sought reconsideration but his motion was denied in the June 16, 2009 Resolution9 of the CTA First Division.
The CIR elevated the case to the CTA En Banc which, on June 11, 2010, reversed and set aside the March 24, 2009 Amended Decision and the June 16, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division.10 Accordingly, petitioner's claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate was denied for lack of merit. The CTA En Banc ruled that the sales invoices issued by petitioner were insufficient to establish its zero-rated sale of services. Without the proper VAT official receipts issued to its clients, the payments received by petitioner could not qualify for zero-rating for VAT purposes. As a result, the claimed input VAT payments allegedly attributable to such sales could not be granted.
The CTA En Banc later changed its position on September 22, 2010 when it issued its Amended Decision11 granting petitioner's motion for reconsideration, setting aside its own June 11, 2010 Decision and affirming the March 24, 2009 Amended Decision of the CTA First Division. In view of the pronouncement of the Court in the case of AT&T Communications Services Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,12 that Section 113 of the NIRC did not distinguish between a sales invoice and an official receipt, the CTA En Banc found petitioner's sales invoices to be acceptable proof to support its claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate representing its excess or unutilized input VAT arising from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales.
In another reversal of opinion, the CTA En Banc set aside the March 24, 2009 Amended Decision and the June 16, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division and dismissed the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. In its May 13, 2011 Resolution,14 the CTA En Banc held that the 120-day period under Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which granted the CIR the opportunity to act on the claim for refund, was jurisdictional in nature such that petitioner's failure to observe the said period before resorting to judicial action warranted the dismissal of its petition for review for having been prematurely filed, in accordance with the ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.15 With respect to the use of official receipts interchangeably with sales invoices, the tax court cited the ruling of the Court in Kepco Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue16 which concluded that a VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be confused as referring to the same thing. A VAT invoice was the seller's best proof of the sale of the goods or services to the buyer while the VAT receipt was the buyer's best evidence of the payment of goods and services received from the seller.
The Court finds the petition to be without merit.
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA-708 ).
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 ; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 ; Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 ).
Moreover, contrary to petitioner's position, the 120+30-day period is indeed mandatory and jurisdictional, as recently ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation.23 Thus, failure to observe the said period before filing a judicial claim with the CTA would not only make such petition premature, but would also result in the non-acquisition by the CTA of jurisdiction to hear the said case.
Because the 120+30 day period is jurisdictional, the issue of whether petitioner complied with the said time frame may be broached at any stage, even on appeal. Well-settled is the rule that the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any time during the proceedings.
Jurisdiction cannot be waived because it is conferred by law and is not dependent on the consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them.24 Consequently, the fact that the CIR failed to immediately express its objection to the premature filing of the petition for review before the CTA is of no moment.
Pursuant to the ruling of the Court in San Roque, the 120+30-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional from the time of the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. The Court, however, took into consideration the issuance by the BIR of Ruling No. DA-489-03, which expressly stated that the taxpayer need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before seeking judicial relief. Because taxpayers cannot be faulted for relying on this declaration by the BIR, the Court deemed it reasonable to allow taxpayers to file its judicial claim even before the expiration of the 120-day period. This exception is to be observed from the issuance of the said ruling on December 10, 2003 up until its reversal by Aichi on October 6, 2010. In the landmark case of Aichi, this Court made a definitive statement that the failure of a taxpayer to wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period will render the tiling of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.26 As a consequence, its promulgation once again made it clear to the taxpayers that the 120+ 30-day period must be observed.
As laid down in San Roque, judicial claims filed from January 1, 1998 until the present should strictly adhere to the 120+ 30-day period referred to in Section 112 of the NIRC. The only exception is the period from December 10, 2003 until October 6, 2010, during which, judicial claims may be tiled even before the expiration of the 120-day period granted to the CIR to decide on the claim for refund.
Based on the foregoing discussion and the ruling in San Roque, the petition must fail because the judicial claim of petitioner was filed on April 25, 2003, only one day after it submitted its administrative claim to the CIR. Petitioner failed to wait for the lapse of the requisite 120-day period or the denial of its claim by the CIR before elevating the case to the CT A by a petition for review. As its judicial claim was filed during which strict compliance with the 120+ 30-day period was required, the Court cannot but declare that the filing of the petition for review with the CT A was premature and that the CTA had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Having thus concluded, the Court sees no need to discuss other issues which may have been raised in the petition.
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1430 dated March 12, 2013.
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of theapplication filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
26 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., supra note 15, at 443.

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