Source: https://fr.scribd.com/document/395177925/SDNY-Cohen-Sentencing-Memo
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:56:34+00:00

Document:
memorandum dated November 30, 2018 (“Def. Mem.”).
friends and family members who wrote on his behalf).
range, recommending a sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment, albeit for different reasons.
extensive course of criminal conduct, described below.
from these consulting arrangements, his promises of insight and access proved essentially hollow.
minimal work, and many of the consulting contracts were ultimately terminated.
provided by Taxi Operator-2 directly to Cohen personally and deposited into his personal account.
income to be reported. (PSR ¶ 26).
Cohen routinely refused to pay for any work by his accountant not specifically approved by Cohen.
that it had been paid off, neither of which was true.
Bank-3 by omitting at least $70,000 in monthly interest payments due to Bank-2 on that debt.
institutions in connection with credit applications.
disclosed in Cohen’s subsequent credit applications to Bank-2 and Bank-3.
agreement. For ease of reference, this memorandum will simply refer to the debt at Bank-2.
(which, as noted, had not been reflected on Cohen’s 2013 application to Bank-3 for a mortgage).
affirmatively told the bank that the $14 line of credit was closed.
have approved but for Cohen’s concealment of truthful information about his financial condition.
false financial information Cohen had provided to Bank-2 just weeks earlier in the negotiations.
event: It was one in a long-series of self-serving lies Cohen told to numerous financial institutions.
and supporter of Individual-1. (PSR ¶ 39).
attorney (“Attorney-1”) to represent her in this matter. (PSR ¶ 41).
Cohen to tell him about the offer. (PSR ¶¶ 40-41).
influencing the election. (PSR ¶¶ 41-42).
$125,000. That assignment was never completed, however. (PSR ¶¶ 43-44).
confidential settlement agreement and a separate side letter from Attorney-1. (PSR ¶ 45).
Cohen did not immediately execute the settlement agreement, nor did he pay Woman-2.
the payment and then called Attorney-1 to finalize the deal. (PSR ¶ 46).
the final, signed confidential settlement agreement and side letter agreement from Attorney-1.
SCO in 18 Cr. 850 (WHP). (See also PSR ¶¶ 62-73).
to the SCO was ultimately credible and useful to its ongoing investigation.
To be clear, neither the SCO nor this Office is making a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
a modest variance is appropriate.
reliability impact his utility as a witness.
participation of others in the campaign finance crimes to which Cohen had already pleaded guilty.
past.4 Cohen further declined to meet with the Office about other areas of investigative interest.
for any and all misconduct, are credible to law enforcement and, hopefully, to judges and juries.
For this reason, Cohen is not being offered a cooperation agreement or a 5K1.1 letter.
a reduced sentence – particularly when one waits until he is charged with federal crimes before doing so.
that they would otherwise have obtained via subpoena.
approach the credit typically given to actual cooperating witnesses in this District.
22-26.) Each claim is meritless.
offense is to be construed broadly.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 app. n. 6.
counts, but it does not affect the Guidelines calculation. (PSR ¶ 88).
Napoli, cited by Cohen, actually supports the Office’s position.
so even though, at the time, the tax and fraud offense tables no longer had identical thresholds.
is binding here in the Second Circuit.
of Cohen’s conduct, and each serves a unique purpose under the Guidelines.
constitute the use of “sophisticated means,” and Cohen does not and cannot argue to the contrary.
be 27, yielding a much higher Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment.
documents, appraisals, and blueprints constituted sophisticated means); see also United States v.
earnings statements constituted sophisticated means).
side letter that was designed specifically to conceal the identities of the parties. (PSR ¶ 45).
experienced attorney to prepare an assignment of income in an effort to avoid income tax).
use of multiple accounts and corporate names); United States v. Rice, 52 F.3d 843, 851 (10th Cir.
simple version of the crime”).
does not, however, consider Cohen’s provision of information to the SCO.
of taxes; transparent and fair elections; and truthfulness before government and in business.
arise when individuals like Cohen act as if the political process belongs to the rich and powerful.
non-existent legal services ostensibly performed pursuant to a non-existent “retainer” agreement.
fact that he was reimbursed.
Matter of Donald J. Trump, Michael Cohen, et al., MUR 6462 (Sept. 18, 2013).
television crime drama Ray Donovan.
Individual-1 from damaging press and embarrassment.
legal work, and underreported payments he received from his ownership of taxi medallions.
of income listed on Cohen’s tax returns.
omit that liability from the draft of his application.
negative effects on lenders and the banking system as a whole.
deter him from further fraudulent conduct, whether out of greed or for power, in the future.
Certainly, Cohen has no prior convictions, and is well-educated and professionally successful.
history and lack of prior convictions are not a significant mitigating factor.
precisely the wrong message to the public. General deterrence is a significant factor here.
whom are sure to be aware of the Court’s sentence here, from violating campaign finance laws.
systems, and Government buildings – shirk their responsibilities as American taxpayers.
deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary consideration underlying these guidelines.
sentences for cases like this one.
institutions. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) & (a)(2)(B).
Department recommend. When considering “the kinds of sentences available,” 18 U.S.C.
of punishment,” which warrants a sentence of time served. (Def. Mem. at 26.) They do not.
not ordinarily relevant); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 (family ties and responsibilities not ordinarily relevant).
loss of his CPA license, and his felony conviction).
not saying it as a threat. It’s a fact.
The full recording is available at: www.npr.org/player/embed/615843930/615845621.
consideration. Rather, it is Cohen’s serious crimes that should be the Court’s lodestar.
defendants to be involved in charities and to have strong professional and personal relationships.
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2005); see also United States v. Fishman, 631 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y.
which one is held by others.” United States v. Binday, 12 Cr. 152 (CM), Dkt. 349, at 44-45.
Simmons, tax evasion is but one of the crimes for which sentence is to be imposed in this case.
considered explicitly authorized. U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(a)(2).
taxpayers through his deceptions”); Sent. Tr. at 22-23, United States v. Joseph Ciccarella, 16 Cr.
that his tax crimes were uncovered in the midst of an investigation of his numerous other crimes.
expenditure – a different offense under the campaign finance laws.
facts here, where substantial custodial sentences were imposed for campaign finance offenses.
laundering, and filing false tax returns); United States v. Tyler Harber, No. 14 Cr. 373 (LO) (E.D.
in illegal contributions); United States v. Robert Braddock, Jr., No. 3:12 Cr. 58 (LRH) (D. Conn.
such a sentence here for the reasons stated above.
Lastly, Cohen places heavy reliance on his provision of information to law enforcement.
with a cooperation agreement and a 5K1.1 letter would merit.
MBIA Insurance Corporation v. Bank of America Corp., Country Wide Financial Corporation, Country Wide Home Loans, Et. Al.

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