Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/162/592/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:26:05+00:00

Document:
An affidavit to a petition for removal filed under section 641 of the Revised Statutes to the effect that the facts therein stated are true to the best of the knowledge and belief of the accused is not evidence in support of a motion to quash the indictment unless the prosecutor agrees that it may be so used or unless by the order of the trial court it is treated as evidence.
A motion to quash an indictment against a person of African descent upon the ground that it was found by a grand jury from which were excluded because of their race persons of the race to which the accused belongs can be sustained only by evidence independently of the facts stated in the motion to quash.
The plaintiff in error, Charley Smith, was charged by indictment in the Circuit Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi, with having on the 14th day of May, 1894, in that county, willfully, feloniously, and of malice aforethought, killed and murdered one Wiley Nesby.
"because of the prejudice against him and his race on account of their color, the grand jury aforesaid was purposely selected of the white race, to the exclusion of the colored persons of the county competent for jury service, by the officers charged therewith, under the state law, on account of their color, for the purpose of procuring this indictment against defendant in violation of his constitutional right to be tried for his life upon the charge of murder herein in the circuit [court] of Bolivar County, state aforesaid;"
"was not a duly elected and legally impaneled grand jury, as contemplated in the guaranties of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi and the Constitution of the United States."
The accused was then arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. He demanded a special venire. Thereupon fifty names were drawn from the jury box in open court and process was issued for those persons.
the registration roll of said county; said order fails to show that the persons so named in the list were citizens of said county, or were selected according to the laws of the state, or that they were qualified voters, duly registered according to law, and further fails to show that they, the persons so selected, were so selected to serve in Bolivar County, state aforesaid. Relator further states that the certificate of the circuit clerk of the said county, the sheriff of said county, and the chancery clerk of said county, which is attached to the list of names drawn from the jury box, constituting the petit jurors for the first week of said May term of circuit court of said county and copied in the minutes of the first day's proceedings of the said court is void: First, because the circuit clerk, J. E. Ousley, did not personally attend the drawing of said list, but said certificate shows that he was represented in said drawing by deputy clerk. The statute prescribes that the circuit clerk shall officiate at said drawing, which must not be more than fifteen days before first day of said term. Second, because the said officers charged with the drawing of said jurors failed to certify, as the law directs, 'whether the envelopes containing the names appeared to have been opened or disfigured,' and this list of names contained the names of the persons who were selected by the circuit court on the first day of said May term, 1894, as grand jurors, which grand jury presented relator on said indictment."
colored voters' names, but to the prejudice of defendant in the indictment and relator therein, said colored voters were, on account of their color, purposely excluded, and no black person has been summoned to serve as such juror in said county since the adoption of the new constitution on account of the great prejudice against the black race by those in authority, and of the white race, and relator asks subpoenas for said officers to prove same. Relator charges that his right to equal protection by the laws of the state, as guarantied in Article XIV of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, was purposely ignored on account of his color and race by the officers charged with the selection of said jury at said term. This he is ready to prove, and prays subpoenas for said officers. That he is not indicted according to the due course of the law of the said state, and therefore prays that his trial under said indictment be removed from this court to the United States Circuit Court for the Western Division of the Southern District of the State of Mississippi, and that the record bear evidence of such an order of this Court, and that said removal of said case be granted by this court upon such terms and conditions as the law directs."
The petition to remove the cause was verified by the oath of the accused to the effect that the facts set out in it were "true to the best of his knowledge and information and belief."
The defendant then moved that the trial be postponed to a future day of the term on account of the absence of certain witnesses without whose testimony, he alleged, he could not safely go to trial. Evidence was heard upon this motion, and the application to postpone the trial was denied.
to-wit, the chancery and circuit clerks and sheriff of the county, and that said list of the venire, as appears in the record of the first day's proceedings of the term, is not certified to by the officers of the county charged with the selection of the jury as the law directs, but said jury as now answers to their call as said venire for said week is an illegal venire, and a trial by said jurors, or any of them, as such venire will be contrary to his rights under the Constitution of the State of Mississippi and his rights under the Constitution of the United States, and that defendant being a citizen of the State of Mississippi and of the United States, he insists upon his right to be tried for this offense by due course of law."
Constitution of the State of Mississippi and the Constitution of the United States, and the panel now tendered him, from which members of his race are purposely excluded by the officers charged therewith, for no other reason than their color, and that 1,500 colored men duly qualified to serve as jurors being in the county, to 500 whites, is an abridgment of his rights under the federal Constitution."
The trial of the case was then entered upon, and the defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer the punishment of death.
"On the 6th day of December, 1894, being a day of the said criminal term of said court, the defendant having informed the court on the day of his conviction, before sentence was pronounced on him by the court, that he wished to be allowed to prepare a motion in arrest of judgment, the court held that the motion in arrest of judgment and the motion for a new trial could be made in one motion, but on said 5th day aforesaid the court ordered counsel to present both motions in one; that it would fine defendant's counsel for contempt unless he combined the motion in arrest of judgment and the motion for a new trial; that both might be heard as one motion; to which action the defendant then and there excepted."
impartially selected according to the laws of Mississippi and the Constitution of the United States, and was not convicted by due process of law, but was denied equal protection under the laws of the state on account of his race.
"The action of the court below in overruling the application for removal was not error. See Gibson v. State, decided at the present term of this Court. The motion to quash the indictment was properly denied. There was either no evidence offered in support of the motion, or, if offered, it does not appear in the record, and in this case we can do nothing but affirm the action of the court in denying this motion. The affidavit appended to the motion, in its terms, affords no sort of evidence (even if it had been agreed to be considered as such, as was the case in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370) that the affiant had any personal knowledge touching any of the facts relied upon as grounds for upholding the motion. It was made 'as to the affiant's knowledge and belief,' and yet the affiant may have no personal knowledge whatever as to any of the material facts. The affidavit was not evidence to support the motion. In Neal v. Delaware, supra, the verified petition for removal was treated by the court as evidence for the motion to quash, because of the agreement of the Attorney General of Delaware with the prisoner's counsel to that effect, as the same was construed by the majority of the court. "
1. For the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court in Gibson v. Mississippi, ante, 162 U. S. 565, it must be adjudged that the petition of the accused for the removal of the prosecution into the circuit court of the United States was properly denied. Neither the Constitution nor the laws of Mississippi, by their language, reasonably interpreted or as interpreted by the highest court of the state, show that the accused was denied or could not enforce in the judicial tribunals of the state or in the part of the state where such suit or prosecution is pending "any right secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the United States." Rev.Stat. § 641.
"The only object which the prisoner's counsel could have had in filing the affidavit was to establish the grounds upon which the motions to quash were rested. It was in the discretion of the court to hear the motions upon affidavit. No counteraffidavits were filed in behalf of the prosecution."
of the accused -- which appears to have been filed in support of the motions, without objection as to its competency as evidence, and was uncontradicted by counter affidavits or even by a formal denial of the grounds assigned -- should have been sustained. If, under the practice which obtains in the courts of the state, the affidavit of the prisoner could not, if objected to, be used as evidence in support of a motion to quash, the state could waive that objection, either expressly or by not making it at the proper time. No such objection appears to have been made by its attorney general. On the contrary, the agreement that the prisoner's verified petition should be treated as an affidavit 'in the consideration and decision' of the motions implied, as we think, that the state was willing to risk their determination upon the case as made by that affidavit, in connection, of course, with any facts of which the court might take judicial notice."
The case before us is presented, so far as the present question is concerned, in a different aspect. The facts stated in the written motion to quash, although that motion was verified by the affidavit of the accused, could not be used as evidence to establish those facts except with the consent of the state prosecutor or by order of the trial court. No such consent was given. No such order was made. The grounds assigned for quashing the indictment should have been sustained by distinct evidence introduced or offered to be introduced by the accused. He could not of right insist that the facts stated in the motion to quash should be taken as true simply because his motion was verified by his affidavit. The motion to quash was therefore unsupported by any competent evidence. Consequently, it cannot be held to have been erroneously denied.
3. It is assigned for error that the trial court refused to postpone the trial, to quash the weekly venire of jurors and the panel of jurors, or to sustain the exception of the accused to the qualifications of jurors tendered to him. None of these motions is so presented by the record as to raise any question as to the deprivation of rights secured to the accused by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
matter which this Court can reexamine upon writ of error, the granting or refusing of such a motion being a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
5. In view of the order of the trial court directing the motion for a new trial and a motion to arrest the judgment to be embraced in one motion, we have, in our consideration of the case, treated the motion for new trial as having been intended to be also one to arrest the judgment. We are of opinion, for the reasons stated in Gibson v. Mississippi as well as in this opinion, that no error of law was committed by the trial court in declining to arrest the judgment. As the application to remove the cause into the circuit court of the United States was properly overruled, and as the motion to quash the indictment was for the reasons above stated also properly overruled, the order refusing to arrest the judgment cannot be held to be erroneous upon any ground of which this Court can take cognizance in its review of the proceedings of the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

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