Source: https://jud.ct.gov/LawLib/LawLibNews/Default.aspx?CatID=8
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:18:03+00:00

Document:
AC38734 - Day v. Seblatnigg ("The principal issue in this case is whether a settlor of a revocable trust who is later under a voluntary conservatorship may, while under conservatorship, acting on her own behalf, convert the trust to an irrevocable trust without action by her conservator and without her conservator obtaining Probate Court approval. The defendant, First State Fiduciaries, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion of the plaintiff, Margaret E. Day, coconservator of the estate of Susan D. Elia, for summary judgment and declaring that the Susan D. Elia Irrevocable Trust dated September 15, 2011 (Delaware irrevocable trust) was void ab initio and unenforceable, and that all transfers of assets from Elia's conservatorship estate to the Delaware irrevocable trust or its wholly owned limited liability company, Peace at Last, LLC, were unauthorized and improper and ordering that the assets from Elia's conservatorship estate that were transferred to the Delaware irrevocable trust to Peace at Last, LLC, shall be immediately returned to Elia's conservatorship estate.
AC39163 Appendix- Davis v. Property Owners Assn. at Moodus Lake Shores, Inc.
AC39074 - Bueno v. Firgeleski ("'A covenant that is a servitude "runs with the land".' 1 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes § 1.3 (1), p. 23 (2000). 'When a change has taken place since the creation of a servitude that makes it impossible as a practical matter to accomplish the purpose for which the servitude was created, a court may modify the servitude to permit the purpose to be accomplished. If modification is not practicable, or would not be effective, a court may terminate the servitude.' 2 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes § 7.10 (1), p. 394 (2000).
This declaratory judgment action concerns the viability of a restrictive covenant (restriction) contained in a 1941 committee deed conveying 1.544 acres of a thirty acre farm in Darien that was once owned by Wilbur N. Waterbury (Waterbury land). The plaintiffs, Luz E. Bueno and Edward R. den Dooven, own 1.38 acres of the Waterbury land. The defendants, Michael Firgeleski, Allison Firgeleski, Pole M. Chan, Jessica M. Chan, Richard B. Myers, Margaret Q. Myers, Scott J. Cronin, and Eileen M. Cronin (collectively, Briar Brae defendants), and Kenneth S. Martin and Rachel P. Martin (Martins), own lots that were created from a portion of the remainder of the thirty acres of the Waterbury land and are adjacent to the plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring the restriction void and unenforceable to permit the sale of a portion of their property. In its judgment, the court declared unenforceable the portion of the restriction that limits the plaintiffs’ use of their property to one dwelling house, prohibits the erection of any building within twenty-five feet of the southern boundary, and requires approval of the grantor before erecting a structure on the property.
SC19618 - Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak ("This declaratory judgment action concerns whether an insurer is obligated to indemnify a business owner under a personal insurance policy for liability arising from his false imprisonment of his company’s employee at her workplace and the evidentiary basis on which such a determination is to be made. In this certified appeal, the defendant Jeffrey S. Pasiak challenges the Appellate Court’s determination that such liability fell under the business pursuits exclusion to coverage under his personal umbrella policy. The plaintiffs, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, contend that coverage not only is barred under the business pursuits exclusion, but also that (1) coverage is barred under policy exclusions for workers’ compensation obligations and for mental abuse, (2) construing the policy to provide indemnification for common-law punitive damages arising from intentional wrongdoing violates public policy, and (3) the trial court improperly limited the scope of discovery and the declaratory judgment trial, depriving the plaintiffs of a trial de novo on coverage issues that they could not litigate in the underlying tort action.

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