Source: https://casetext.com/case/aguon-v-astrue
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:14:30+00:00

Document:
No. 2:09 CV 61 DDN.
This action is before the court for judicial review of the final decision of defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying the application of plaintiff Madeline Aguon for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. The parties have consented to the exercise of plenary authority by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 7.) For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is remanded.
On December 5, 2005, Aguon applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, alleging that she became disabled on April 19, 2004 on account of depression, anxiety, and back problems. (Tr. 129, 137, 169.) She received a notice of disapproved claims on February 27, 2006. (Tr. 79.) She filed a written request for reconsideration on May 25, 2006, and her application was denied again on October 10, 2006. (Tr. 88, 90.) On November 2, 2006, she filed a written request for a hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. 95.) After a hearing on January 15, 2008, the ALJ denied benefits on February 27, 2008. (Tr. 8-21.) On October 5, 2009, the Appeals Council denied her request for review. (Tr. 1-3.) Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
Prednisone is a corticosteroid hormone that decreases the patient's immune system's response to various diseases to reduce symptoms such as swelling and allergic-type reactions. It is used to treat conditions such as arthritis, blood disorders, breathing problems, certain cancers, eye problems, immune system diseases, and skin diseases. Skelaxin relaxes muscles, and is used with rest and physical therapy to reduce muscle pain and spasms associated with muscle strains and sprains. Vicodin is used to relieve moderate to severe pain. It contains a narcotic pain reliever (hydrocodone) and a non-narcotic pain reliever (acetaminophen). http://www.webmd.com/drugs/ (last visited February 17, 2011).
Toraldol is used for the short-term treatment of moderate to severe pain in adults. Phenergan is used to prevent and treat nausea and vomiting related to certain conditions.http://www.webmd.com/drugs/ (last visited February 17, 2011).
A Nubain injection is administered for a variety of reasons, including treating pain. http://www.webmd.com/drugs/ (last visited February 17, 2011).
A somatization disorder is a mental disorder characterized by presentation of a complicated medical history and of physical symptoms referring to a variety of organ systems, but without a detectible or known organic basis. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 571 (28th ed. 2006).
A GAF score, short for Global Assessment of Functioning, helps summarize a patient's overall ability to function. A GAF score has two components. The first component covers symptom severity and the second component covers functioning. A patient's GAF score represents the worst of the two components.
On the GAF scale, a score from 51 to 60 represents moderate symptoms (such as flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks), or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (such as few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32-34 (4th ed., American Psychiatric Association 2000).
On the GAF scale, a score from 61 to 70 represents mild symptoms (such as depressed mood and mild insomnia), or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (such as occasional truancy), but the individual generally functions well and has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32-34 (4th ed., American Psychiatric Association 2000).
The administrative record does not contain any records from Dr. Dhuna.
Although the records state that Aguon was given samples of "Equip," based on subsequent records, this appears to be a typographical error, and that the actual medication given was "Requip."
Paxil is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor used to treat depression, panic attacks, obsessive-compulsive disorder, anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a severe form of premenstrual syndrome. Requip is used to treat extreme discomfort in the patient's calves when sitting or lying down.http://www.webmd.com/drugs/ (last visited February 17, 2011).
On the GAF scale, a score from 41 to 50 represents serious symptoms (such as thoughts of suicide, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting), or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (such as the inability to make friends or keep a job). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32-34 (4th ed., American Psychiatric Association 2000).
Clonazepam is used to treat seizure disorders and panic attacks. It acts on the brain and nerves to produce a calming effect. http://www.webmd.com/drugs/ (last visited February 17, 2011).
The administrative record does not contain any records from Dr. Yeager.
The court's role on judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings comply with the relevant legal requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion." Id. In determining whether the evidence is substantial, the court considers evidence that both supports and detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Id. As long as substantial evidence supports the decision, the court may not reverse it merely because substantial evidence exists in the record that would support a contrary outcome or because the court would have decided the case differently. See Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).
To be entitled to disability benefits, a claimant must prove she is unable to perform any substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that would either result in death or which has lasted or could be expected to last for at least twelve continuous months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(D), (d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. A five-step regulatory framework is used to determine whether an individual qualifies for disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (describing the five-step process);Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942.
Steps One through Three require the claimant to prove (1) she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) she suffers from a severe impairment, and (3) her disability meets or equals a listed impairment. Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. If the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the Commissioner's analysis proceeds to Steps Four and Five. Id. Step Four requires the Commissioner to consider whether the claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work. Id. The claimant bears the burden of demonstrating she is no longer able to return to her past relevant work. Id. If the Commissioner determines the claimant cannot return to past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five to show the claimant retains the RFC to perform other work. Id.
In this case, the Commissioner determined that Aguon could not perform her past work, but that she maintained the RFC to perform other work in the national economy.
Aguon argues that the ALJ's findings regarding her degree of functional loss resulting from her mental impairments ignore and contradict the medical evidence.
Under the regulations, the ALJ must evaluate the degree of functional loss caused by mental impairments by gauging their impact on four functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3). In making these findings, the ALJ's decision "must show the significant history, including examination and laboratory findings, and the functional limitations that were considered in reaching a conclusion about the severity of the mental impairment(s)." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)(4). The ALJ's decision also must "include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional areas described in [20 C.F.R. § 1520a(c)(3)]." Id. Failure of the ALJ to include analysis of the psychiatric review technique in the decision may warrant remand. See Nicola v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2007).
Therefore, the ALJ's findings regarding Aguon's functional limitations from her mental impairments were not so deficient as to warrant remand. See Jumping Eagle v. Barnhart, No. Civ. 05-5016-RHB, 2006 WL 858972, at *4 (D.S.D. Mar. 27, 2006). See also Strickland v. Astrue, No. 4:07 CV 1228 BD, 2009 WL 385865, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 12, 2009); Peterson v. Astrue, No. 07-4068 ADM/RLE, 2008 WL 4323717, at *26 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2008).
Aguon also argues that the ALJ did not consider certain evidence in making his findings. Specifically, Aguon points to the treatment notes of Dr. Cohen, Ms. Paddock's notes, her most recent suicide attempt, and her abusive relationship with her husband. Aguon argues that based on this evidence, she has, at a minimum, marked limitations in her daily activities, social functioning, and ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace.
"It is the ALJ's function to resolve conflicts among the various treating and examining physicians." Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001). In doing so, the ALJ must explain the reasons for the determination. Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2007); Cruz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 244 Fed. App'x 475, 479 (3d Cir. 2007). "While a deficiency in opinion-writing is not a sufficient reason to set aside an ALJ's finding where the deficiency [has] no practical effect on the outcome of the case, inaccuracies, incomplete analyses, and unresolved conflicts of evidence can serve as a basis for remand." Draper v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 2005).
However, the ALJ did not discuss the weight he assigned to Dr. Cohen's opinion, or otherwise incorporate Dr. Cohen's opinion in his determination. (Tr. 19.) As a treating physician, Dr. Cohen's opinion would generally be given greater weight than that of a non-treating physician. Dewald v. Astrue, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1200 (D.S.D. 2008); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). The ALJ must provide "good reason" for not crediting the opinion of a treating physician. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2). Failure to do so is a ground for remand. Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999).
"Treating physicians are defined broadly by the regulations as any physician who has provided the claimant with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with the claimant." Dewald v. Astrue, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1200 (D.S.D. 2008). Although the record states that Dr. Cohen only saw Aguon twice, a physician "need not provide treatment at all times to be considered a treating physician." Id. Even if Dr. Cohen was only an examining physician, his opinions "were entitled to more weight than nonexamining sources." Id. at 1201; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1); 416.927(d)(1).
That the ALJ did not discuss Dr. Cohen's status as a treating physician or analyze the weight given to his opinion constitutes reversible error, because there is "no way to definitively assess whether the [physician's] opinion [was] properly discounted."Dewald, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. See also id. at 1201-03 (remanding because ALJ did not specify whether physician was a treating physician and did not discuss weight given to physician's opinion).
Similarly, although the ALJ recognized the existence of Ms. Paddock's notes, the ALJ did not fully recognize that the notes stated that Aguon had pain issues, depression, was not working, was living at a shelter, had a "range of affect," and appeared to have difficulty concentrating (Tr. 480), or provide an analysis of Ms. Paddock's notes in making his determination.
Ms. Paddock's notes and opinion must be accorded some measure of consideration, regardless of her status. Cf. Willcockson v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 878, 880-81 (8th Cir. 2008) ("statements of lay persons regarding a claimant's condition must be considered when an ALJ evaluates a claimant's subjective complaints of pain.").
Therefore, the case must be remanded to the ALJ to resolve the conflict between Dr. Cohen's opinion, Dr. Martin's opinion, and Ms. Paddock's notes, and to provide a complete analysis of the weight given thereto. See, e.g., Love v. Astrue, 2008 WL 877762, at *4-5 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 26, 2008) (remanding because the ALJ's decision was deficient in failing to explain her reasons for disagreeing with medical evidence); Strom v. Astrue, Civil No. 07-150 (DWF/RLE), 2008 WL 583690, at *27 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2008) (remanding because ALJ did not explain how he resolved the conflict in the medical opinion evidence); Anderson v. Barnhart, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1194 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (remanding because ALJ did not discuss or give good reason for the weight given to treating physician's opinion).
Regarding Aguon's most recent suicide attempt, the ALJ stated, "Although [Aguon] had one suicide attempt during the period relevant to this decision, it appears to be related to an argument with her brother-in-law about her housing arrangements, and the suicidal ideations soon passed." (Tr. 19).
In sum, the ALJ adequately discussed his analysis in this regard, and substantial evidence supports his conclusion.
Although Aguon argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider her sexual assault and abusive relationship, Aguon has not shown how either has impacted her mental impairments.
Therefore, the ALJ did not err in not including discussion of Aguon's sexual assault or abusive relationship.
Aguon argues that the medical evidence triggered the ALJ's duty to develop the record to determine if Dr. Cohen's opinion deserved controlling weight.
Although "the ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record,"Smith v. Barnhart, 435 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2006), Aguon does not identify a specific reason why the ALJ would need to contact Dr. Cohen for additional information. There is no indication that Dr. Cohen's notes are incomplete, ambiguous, or inherently contradictory. Cf. 20 C.F.R. 404.1512(e)(1) (ALJ must contact treating physician for clarification if the treating physician's report "contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, the report does not contain all the necessary information, or does not appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques").
Therefore, the ALJ may, but need not necessarily contact Dr. Cohen for additional information on remand.
Aguon argues that although the ALJ discussed the correct factors to be weighed in evaluating her credibility, the ALJ did not apply these factors to the evidence and thus improper determined her credibility.
When weighing a claimant's testimony, the ALJ must take into account the Polaski factors, which include: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) any functional restrictions. Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 695 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984)). However, the ALJ's decision need not discuss the relation of every Polaski factor to the claimant's credibility.Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004).
The credibility of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily a decision for the ALJ, not the courts. Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1218. While an ALJ may not disregard subjective complaints solely because they are not fully supported by medical evidence, the ALJ may discount such complaints if they are inconsistent with objective medical findings. Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 975 (8th Cir. 2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 2002). Deference is given to the ALJ's credibility determinations so long as they are supported by good reasons and substantial evidence. Jones, 619 F.3d at 975.
Aguon argues that the ALJ erred in his credibility analysis because the evidence regarding her physical and mental impairments supported her testimony. For the reasons discussed below, the court disagrees.
Regarding Aguon's credibility of her physical impairments, the ALJ held that her "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible." (Tr. 14.) The ALJ then summarized medical evidence that was inconsistent with Aguon's testimony. An ALJ may discount a claimant's complaints if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole. Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination. As the ALJ noted, Aguon's lower back pain improved after seeing Dr. Fritz (Tr. 331), "markedly improved" by the time she saw Dr. Mooney (Tr. 316), and continually improved during her physical therapy sessions. (Tr. 281-97.) At her last physical therapy session, she said she was 75 percent better with the therapy and epidural steroid injections. (Tr. 295.) "If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling." Brace v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2009).
The ALJ also properly weighed the fact that Aguon missed two scheduled appointments with Dr. Fritz (Tr. 330) against her credibility. Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004). See also Owen v. Astrue, 551 F.3d 792, 800 (8th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ correctly noted that although Dr. Mooney's examination revealed that Aguon had spasms, a reduced range of motion in her cervical spine, tenderness in her levator, and tightness in her muscles, she had a normal range of motion in her shoulders, no sensory loss, and normal grip strength and wrist motion. (Tr. 268.) Dr. Mooney also noted no tenderness in Aguon's lumbar or thoracic spine, and only mild degenerative changes of her cervical spine. (Id.) Similarly, Dr. Jameson noted no weakness of Aguon's upper or lower extremities. (Tr. 316.) Dr. Alkurdy noted that Aguon had normal strength; deep tendon reflexes in both her upper and lower extremities; no abnormal movements; normal sensory testing; a normal gait; normal grip strength bilaterally; normal range of motion; and an unremarkable neurological examination. (Tr. 322-23.) These inconsistencies support the ALJ's credibility determination. Howe v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 835, 841 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming the ALJ's credibility finding "[b]ecause the ALJ described the inconsistences on which he relied in discrediting [the claimant's] complaints and because those inconsistencies were supported by the record"); Manning v. Astrue, No. 4:07 CV 1244 FRB, 2008 WL 2906862, at *14 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2008).
The ALJ also noted that Aguon "does not take particularly strong doses of pain medication." (Tr. 16.) Dr. Alkurdy's notes state that Aguon mainly took over-the-counter medications for her pain. (Tr. 321.) "A claimant's allegations of disabling pain may be discredited by evidence that he or she has received minimal medical treatment and/or has taken medications, other than aspirin, for pain only on an occasional basis." Williams v. Bowen, 790 F.2d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 1986). See also Wilson v. Chater, 76 F.3d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1996); Barrett v. Astrue, 2008 WL 2783265, at *4 (W.D. Ark. July 15, 2008).
The ALJ also noted that there were "few instances" in which Aguon complained of lumbar and cervical pain after December, 2004. (Tr. 15.) According to the record, after receiving treatment for leg pain on December 25, 2004 (Tr. 275-80), Aguon only sought treatment for her alleged physical impairments from Dr. Anderson on April 27, 2006 (Tr. 333) and November 1, 2006 (Tr. 405), and from Mercy Medical Center while admitted for psychiatric treatment from June 21, 2007 to June 24, 2007 (Tr. 422, 425, 431, 437, 444-46, 449). An ALJ may discredit a claimant's credibility because of his failure to seek medical treatment. Torres v. Astrue, 372 Fed. App'x 683, 693 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Aguon testified that she had not sought medical treatment because she could not afford it and she and her husband were uninsured. (Tr. 38, 49.) Although an inability to pay may justify a claimant's failure to seek medical care, Vasey v. Astrue, No. 1:08 CV 46 SWW/JTR, 2009 WL 4730688, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 3, 2009); Skovlund v. Astrue, No. CIV 08-4078, 2009 WL 3055421, at *24 (D.S.D. Sept. 24, 2009), a claimant must present "supporting evidence" that her failure to seek medical treatment was due to the expense. George v. Astrue, 301 Fed. App'x 581, 582 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). See also Carrigan v. Astrue, No. 4:08 CV 4018, 2009 WL 734116, at *6-7 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2009) (claimant's "bare statement" that she is unable to afford medical treatment is insufficient to establish that inability). Because Aguon did not "identify any steps [she] took to obtain low cost medical care," and because "[she] did not testify that [she] was denied medical care because of [her] financial condition," the ALJ properly discounted her credibility because of her irregular medical treatment since December 25, 2004. Weaks v. Shalala, 1993 WL 498046, at *1, 12 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion); see also Osborne v. Barnhart, 316 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2003); Carrigan, 2009 WL 734116, at *7.
Aguon testified that she applied for Iowa Care and wanted to apply for Medicaid, but that social services told her that she had to be on disability before she could apply for Medicaid. (Tr. 38-39.) Ultimately, however, Aguon "has not provided adequate proof demonstrating that she has attempted to obtain financial assistance." Trevino v. Astrue, No. 1:08-cv-820-WGH-RLY, 2009 WL 405862, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 18, 2009) (rejecting the claimant's argument that the ALJ should have considered her inability to pay for medical treatment because "she was told by her sisters that she was not eligible for Medicaid").
In addition, the record states that Aguon had smoked a pack of cigarettes each day for 40 years. (Tr. 315, 322, 495.) This undermines her claim that she could not afford medical treatment.Riggins v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 1999); Turner v. Astrue, No. 4:08 CV 107 CAS, 2009 WL 512785, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 27, 2009) ("In addition, although Plaintiff claims that he could not afford his medication, the ALJ properly relied upon the fact that Plaintiff did not forgo smoking to help finance his medication.").
The ALJ found that no doctor has declared Aguon totally incapacitated on a long term basis. That an examining physician did not "submit a medical conclusion that [the claimant] is disabled and unable to perform any type of work" is a significant factor for the ALJ to consider. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 (8th Cir. 2009).
Similarly, the ALJ noted that no physician had imposed any specific physical work-related limitations more restrictive than those he found, and that Dr. Alkurdy's and Dr. Griffith's restrictions were less than those imposed by him. Compare (Tr. 11) with (Tr. 323) and (Tr. 354-61.) This further supports the ALJ's credibility determination. See McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010).
The ALJ also reasoned that he did not observe credible signs of significant motor deficits or serious discomfort during the hearing. Aguon argues that the ALJ erred by considering this in making his credibility determination. However, "[t]he ALJ's personal observations of the claimant's demeanor during the hearing is completely proper in making credibility determinations." Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (8th Cir. 2001). Because the ALJ did not rely solely on Aguon's demeanor during the hearing in discounting her credibility, the ALJ did not err. See Schultz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-550 (RHK/JJK), 2009 WL 81018, at *13 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2009).
Although Aguon testified to limitations of her daily activities, the ALJ found that the limitations are self-imposed.See Forte v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 965 (8th Cir. 1996). Further, Aguon's testimony regarding her limitations is contradicted by her daily activities that she reported performing to her physicians. Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2008).
Given the inconsistencies in the record, the ALJ did not err in discounting Aguon's credibility regarding her physical impairments.
Aguon argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility regarding her functional limitations from her mental impairments. Specifically, Aguon argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility based on her demeanor during the hearing, and that substantial evidence does not otherwise support the ALJ's decision.
In discounting Aguon's credibility regarding the functional limitations stemming from her mental impairments, the ALJ stated, "Although [Aguon] cried during part of the hearing, she did no display any signs of significant mental dysfunction during the course of the hearing." (Tr. 19.) As with Aguon's credibility regarding her physical impairments, the ALJ did not improperly consider Aguon's demeanor during the hearing in assessing her credibility regarding her mental impairments. The ALJ provided other legitimate reasons for discrediting Aguon's credibility, including Dr. Martin's findings, Aguon's lack of consistent medical treatment, and the effectiveness of Aguon's medication.
Therefore, the ALJ did not err in considering Aguon's demeanor as a factor in discounting her credibility regarding the functional limits of her mental impairments, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination.
Aguon argues that the ALJ erred in failing to adopt the VE's testimony given in response to hypotheticals four, five, and six.
Because remand is appropriate for further consideration and analysis of Dr. Cohen's treating opinion and Ms. Paddock's therapy notes, Aguon's argument is moot.
Aguon argues that the ALJ was predisposed to denying her claim, particularly because she alleged a mental impairment. She notes that, in 2006, the ALJ's disability claim approval rate was 36%, and that the national average rate of grading disability claims of 62% that year. Aguon also notes that of the 43 claimants represented by her counsel's law firm who appeared before this ALJ and alleged mental impairments, 36 were either denied or found not to have a disabling mental impairment, and 7 were found to have disabling mental impairments, yielding a 83.7% denial rate.
A Social Security disability claimant has the right to a full and fair hearing before an impartial ALJ. Valenti v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 373 Fed. App'x 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2010); Meyler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 238 Fed. App'x 884, 889 (3d Cir. 2007). ALJs are presumed to be unbiased, although this presumption can be rebutted by a showing of a "conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification." Valentine v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 2009); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001). The claimant bears the burden of showing that the ALJ's behavior, in the context of the whole case, "was so extreme as to display [a] clear inability to render a fair judgment." Rollins, 261 F.3d at 858.
The statistics provided by Aguon, standing alone, cannot support a finding of bias. See Perkins v. Astrue, 2:09 CV 38 AGF, 2010 WL 3908598, at *15-16 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2010); Doan v. Astrue, No. 04 CV 2039 DMS (RBB), 2010 WL 1031591, at *14-15 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010). To prove an ALJ's general bias, a claimant should be able to show both direct and circumstantial evidence of bias. Doan, 2010 WL 1031591, at *14. Relevant evidence considered in determination whether bias is present includes "(1) admissions by the ALJ indicating generalized bias or predisposition against Social Security claimants generally or certain groups specifically; (2) testimony from attorneys regarding the ALJ's regular use of incorrect law; (3) statistical evidence showing the number of cases involving problematic credibility determinations; and (4) statistical evidence showing the number of times claimants received benefits after remand or on subsequent applications." Perkins, 2010 WL 3908598, at *15.See also Doan, 2010 WL 1031591, at *14-*15.
In this case, the ALJ provided Aguon with a hearing that lasted over an hour an a half. (Tr. 29-73). None of the ALJ's comments or questions during the hearing can be seen as showing bias or disrespect, nor does the ALJ's opinion display a bias against Aguon's claims. Aguon has not provided any evidence that the ALJ has previously made derogatory statements about Social Security claimants, nor has she argued that the ALJ regularly uses incorrect legal standards. Aguon has also not provided statistics "showing how many of the ALJ's decisions have been reversed and/or remanded by the Appeals Council or a court, or how many times claimants have subsequently received benefits." Perkins, 2010 WL 3908598, at *16. In sum, Aguon has not established that the ALJ showed a particular bias against her in this case. See Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Civil Action No. 09-4901 WJM, 2009 WL 4666933, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2009) ("Alleged examples of bias displayed by [the ALJ] in prior cases involving different plaintiffs are not relevant."); Smith v. Astrue, Civil Action No. H-07-2229, 2008 WL 4200694, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2009) ("[D]istrict courts are in no position to judge what threshold percentage of `favorable' decisions is necessary to acquit an ALJ of suspicion of intolerable bias against Social Security claimants.").
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is reversed and remanded under Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further evaluation. On remand, the ALJ shall reconsider the functional limitations of Madeline Aguon resulting from her mental impairments in light of (1) the treatment by and the findings and opinions of treating physician Katherine Cohen, D.O.; and (2) the counseling therapy provided by and expert opinions and findings rendered by Jana Paddock. The ALJ shall specifically describe his consideration of this material. An appropriate Judgment Order is issued herewith.
Signed on March 7, 2011.

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