Source: https://www.abi.org/member-resources/st-johns-case-blog/taxonomy/term/6?page=6
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:59:33+00:00

Document:
In In re Murray, chapter 13 debtor Mr. Murray (the “Debtor”), sued Revenue Management Corporation and Donald Aucoin (“Defendants”), alleging that the Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). According to the Debtor, the Defendants violated the FDCPA by including a reference to purported litigation as reflected by inserting a “vs” between the Defendants’ names and the Debtor in the top right corner of a collection letter.
Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code preserves a vendor’s right to reclaim goods sold to an insolvent debtor within forty-five days of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. Courts have had to address whether a post-petition lender’s subsequently perfected security interest defeats the vendor’s reclamation rights when a post-petition loan is used to repay the debtor’s prepetition secured loan, which are generally subject to reclamation rights. In In re Reichold Holdings US, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware overruled a liquidating trustee’s objection to a vendor’s reclamation claim, holding that the vendor’s reclamation rights arose before a post-petition DIP lender’s liens attached, and as such, those liens were subject to the prior reclamation rights of the vendor.
In Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, the Third Circuit held that an award of damages after the dismissal of an involuntary bankruptcy petition does not preempt a claim for tortious interference with contracts and business relationships brought against the petitioning creditors by injured parties who were not alleged debtors. There, an involuntary bankruptcy was brought against a medical imaging company to collect on leases for various medical equipment. After the involuntary petition was dismissed, the alleged debtor sued the petitioning creditors to recover costs, attorney’s fees, and damages for the bad faith filing of the involuntary petition. The jury awarded the alleged debtor $1.1 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.
In In re Genesys Research Institute, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts denied motions for reconsideration holding there was no error in approving the sale and disposition of research equipment and biological samples free and clear of liens, claims, and interests. In support of its motion to sell research equipment by public auction and destroy experimental cancers cells, the Trustee of Genesys Research Institute, a debtor, argued that the costs and burdens of maintaining the biological materials warranted the prompt disposition of them. The Trustee noted that no party appeared to take custody and control of the biological materials despite all marketing efforts. The Trustee also represented that he had no ability to reorganize the research lab and that he was required to liquidate the debtor’s assets in furtherance of his duties as a chapter 11 trustee. The Court approved the disposition of the cells and the sale of the equipment free and clear of all interest and liens over the objection of, among others, the Department of Energy (“DOE”). The disposition of the research led to the incineration of (hundreds) of biological samples, backed by thousands of dollars in grants, which were part of vital cancer research. The researcher’s work was considered to be “groundbreaking and paradigm-shifting in the field of cancer biology” because they were able to turn normal human cells into cancer cells.
In Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Bernie L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that a recipient should return fictitious profits he gained through the Ponzi scheme operated by Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (“BLMIS”). Andrew Cohen withdrew approximately $4 million from his account at BLMIS between January 18, 1996 and December 11, 2008. Of that withdrawal, approximately $1.1 million was fictitious profit. Irving Picard, as the trustee of BLMIS, sought to recover the fictitious profits from several recipients, including Cohen, under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. As a defense, Cohen asserted that he gave “value” to BLMIS when he received the fictitious profits. The bankruptcy court, however, rejected this defense and concluded that the District Court should find in favor of Picard.
In In re G-I Holdings, Inc., the Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) could not repackage a claim for damages against G-I Holdings in the hopes of circumventing federal bankruptcy laws. G-I Holdings was the manufacturer of housing products containing asbestos. Seeking to address its asbestos related lawsuits, in 2001 GI Holdings filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. NYCHA submitted a half-billion dollar claim against G-I Holdings for property damage to its buildings. NYCHA claimed it had to take expensive measures to remove asbestos containing material from its buildings. In 2009, the District Court for the District of New Jersey and the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a plan of reorganization that disposed all covered claims against G-I Holdings. Claim holders were also barred from reasserting such claims.
A “foreign representative” must obtain recognition of a foreign proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1517 prior to “apply[ing] directly to a court in the United States.” However, under § 1509(f), a foreign representative may sue in a United States court “to collect or recover a claim which is the property of the debtor” without first obtaining recognition. The scope of this exception, however, is unclear.
In In Re Omni Enterprises, an Alaska Bankruptcy Court held that a bank may enforce the security interest of a prior loan that has already been repaid to cure a new loan that is in default. In 2009, a borrower entered into a loan agreement with a bank for $1.3 million. The loan was partly secured by the borrower’s deposit accounts. After the 2009 loan was repaid, the borrower entered into a new loan agreement with the same bank for $2.6 million. The new loan was secured by, among other things, the borrower’s equipment, furnishings, and fixtures, but did not explicitly include the deposit accounts. In 2015, the borrower defaulted on the loan and the bank swept the deposit accounts, causing the borrower to file for chapter 7 under the Bankruptcy Code. According to the bank, it continued to have a lien on the deposit accounts notwithstanding the repayment of the 2009 loan. The borrower’s trustee then filed suit in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska. The Court ultimately agreed with the bank’s interpretation of the loan agreements, and held that the sweeping of the deposit accounts was permissible.
In In re LMM Sports Management, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order disallowing a proof of claim that was filed after the deadline to file claims against the debtor (the “Bar Date”). Appellant Warner Angle Hallam Jackson & Formancek, P.L.C. (“Warner Angle”) filed proofs of claim against the debtor, LMM Sports Management (“LMM” or the “Debtor”), for legal services it provided to LLM in connection with a prior state court case against Your Source Pacific Fund I, LLP (“Your Source”). In the state court case, Your Source obtained a $2.4 million judgment against LLM, causing LLM to file for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court approved a settlement of $1.5 million between Your Source and LMM (represented by new counsel) in full satisfaction of Your Source’s judgment over Warner Angle’s objection. Warner Angle filed its objection to the Debtor’s settlement motion on February 17, 2015, two months after the bar date. One day later, Warner Angle belatedly filed the proofs of claim. The Debtor objected to the proofs of claim arguing they should be disallowed as untimely. Warner Angle then filed a cross-motion requesting that the proofs be treated as timely because the late filing was the result of excusable neglect. The bankruptcy court rejected Warner Angle’s excusable neglect argument and denied its reconsideration motion. Warner Angle appealed.
In In re Motors Liquidation Co., the Second Circuit reversed the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York’s holding that the “free and clear” provision in the sale order barred plaintiff’s claims against New GM arising out of ignition switch defects. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the bankruptcy court was correct in concluding that even though the cars were not recalled for ignition switch defects until 2014, five years after the § 363 sale, there was ample evidence that Old GM knew or should have known about the ignition switch defect prior to bankruptcy. Therefore, due process dictates that claimants were entitled to notice of the sale by direct mail or an equivalent means. Unlike the bankruptcy court, the Second Circuit found that ignition switch claimants were prejudiced by this lack of notice. The Second Circuit could not confidently say that, given the circumstances, the outcome of the § 363 sale motion would have been the same if the claimants were notified and thus afforded the opportunity to be heard and partake in the negotiation.

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 § 1517
 § 1509
 § 363
 § 363