Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/151/112/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:18:11+00:00

Document:
When the jurisdiction of a circuit court has fully attached against the tenant in possession in an action of ejectment, the substitution of the landlord as defendant will in no way affect that jurisdiction, although he may be a citizen of the same state with the plaintiff.
By the laws of Oregon in force in 1872, a testator was authorized and empowered to devise after-acquired real estate.
A will in Oregon, duly executed May 15, 1872, and duly proved after the testator's death in 1886, in which he devised to his sister "all my right, title, and interest in and to all my lands, lots, and real estate lying and being in the Oregon" except specific devises previously made, and also "all my personal property and estate," shows an intent not to die intestate, and passes after-acquired real estate.
estate, real and personal, saving to the widow her dower."
The court below held that it had jurisdiction in spite of the fact that the plaintiff and one of the defendants were citizens of the same state, and held that the after-acquired property passed to the sister under the will. 33 F. 872. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error.
The principal questions presented by the record in this case are first whether, by the laws of Oregon in force in 1872, a testator was authorized or empowered to devise after-acquired real property, and second whether, if such power existed, the after-acquired real estate in controversy passed by the testator's will in the present case.
"all my right, title, and interest in and to all my lands, lots, and real estate lying and being in the State of Oregon or elsewhere, except as aforesaid; also, all my personal property and estate, of whatsoever kind and nature."
At the date of the will the testator owned certain real property in Portland, Oregon, and in January, 1882, some ten years after the will was executed, he purchased, and at the time of his death owned, a parcel of land in the City of Portland valued at $30,000, which is the subject of controversy in this suit.
Ellen E. Ray, the devisee under the third clause of the will, died intestate in 1873, leaving, as her heirs, Thomas L. Ray, Rachel L. Ray, Hylah E. Ray, and Mary E. Arbuckle, citizens of Oregon; John De Witt Ray, a citizen of Illinois, and Sarah A. Ray, a citizen of New York. Upon the death of the testator, these heirs of Ellen E. Ray, who, under the laws of Oregon, § 3077, Hill's Ann.Laws of Oregon, succeeded to her rights as devisee, took possession of the premises in controversy, as well as other real property in Oregon owned by the testator at the time the will was executed.
and demanded an interest in common with the heirs of Ellen E. Ray in the real property acquired after the execution of the testator's will on the ground that as to those lands he died intestate. This claim was denied, and he thereupon brought an action at law in the nature of ejectment against Charles Sliter, J. C. Miller, and W. H. West, citizens of Oregon, who were in possession of the demanded premises as tenants of the heirs of Mrs. Ellen E. Ray.
in possession, the substitution of the landlord as a defendant for such tenant will in no way affect or defeat the jurisdiction of the court.
By stipulation of parties, the trial of the cause by jury was waived and all questions of law and fact were submitted to the court for its decision. The court found the facts substantially as set out above, and the conclusions of law announced were to the effect that at the time the will was made, the testator was empowered and authorized by the laws of Oregon to devise any real estate situated in that state, whether acquired before or after the making of the will, of which he might die seised and possessed; also, that the intention of the testator, as manifested by the will in the present case, was to devise all of his real estate situated in the State of Oregon to Ellen E. Ray, and that, under and by virtue of the devise, the demanded premises, on the death of the testator, vested in the defendants as her heirs, and that they were entitled to the exclusive possession thereof. 33 F. 812.
For the plaintiff in error, it is contended that the testator died intestate in respect to the demanded premises for the reasons that at the time of the execution of his will, he possessed no testamentary power to devise after-acquired lands, and because his will manifests no intention to dispose of such property. If either of these propositions can be sustained, the judgment of the court below must be reversed.
thereof by will, and was construed as restricting the right of devising lands to such an interest, only, as the testator had at the time of the execution of the will. Under this statute, real estate subsequently acquired could not pass by devise -- in other words, under the statute of 32 Hen. 8, the will, as to lands, spoke from the date of its execution; so that a general devise of all the testator's estate would comprehend and include all the personalty to which he was entitled at the time of his death, but would not embrace after-acquired land, though such might be the expressed intention of the testator. The reason given for the distinction between real and personal estate was that a devise of land was regarded in the same light as a conveyance, and, as a conveyance at common law would not vest for want of seisin, it was therefore held to be operative only on such real estate as the testator might have at the time of the making of the will -- that is to say that a devise was in the nature of a conveyance or appointment of real estate then owned, to take effect at a future date, and could not therefore operate on future acquisitions.
While this strict and arbitrary rule of the common law has been modified by the statutes of most, if not all, of the states of the union, it is contended for the plaintiff in error that the rights of the parties in the present case are controlled by it, for the reason that the Legislature of Oregon did not confer by statute testamentary power to dispose of after-acquired real property until February, 1891.
"all the statute laws of Iowa Territory passed at the first legislative assembly of that territory and not of a local character and not incompatible with the conditions and circumstances of this country, shall be the law of this country unless otherwise modified, and the common law of England, and principles of equity, not modified by the statutes of Iowa and of this government and not incompatible with its principles shall constitute the law of the land."
"SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the council and the House of Representatives of the Territory of Iowa that any person having an estate in any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any annuity or rent charged upon, or issuing out of the same, or any goods or chattels, rights, credits, and choses in action, or in possession, and property of every description, whatever, may give or devise the same to any person by last will and testament by him or her lawfully executed."
Laws of the First Session of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Iowa, 1838-39, 471.
This statute was substantially the same as that of 32 Hen. 8, under which, as settled by the decisions of the English courts and by those of the states where that statute is in force, after-acquired real estate could not pass by will.
"all the estate, right, title, and interest in possession, reversion, or remainder, which he or she hath, or at the time of his or her death, shall have of, in, or to, lands, tenements, etc.; also all goods and chattels."
into the Union, in 1859, the Legislature of Oregon, in 1862, reenacted without change the above-quoted section conferring testamentary power, which has since continued to be the law of Oregon. § 3066, Hill's Code.
"Any estate or interest in real property, acquired by any one after the making of his or her will shall pass thereby, unless it clearly appears therefrom that such was not the intention of the testator; nor shall any conveyance or disposition of real property by any one after the making of his or her will prevent or affect the operation of such will upon any estate, or interest therein, subject to the disposal of that testator at his or her death."
disposition of all the testator's property, without any distinction between real and personal property, and not a mere power of particular disposition. It is more in the nature of a Roman will than an English devise of real property. But, however this may be, when we consider the plan of revising that was adopted, the impolicy of creating changes in laws of daily practical importance, the little probability, when all around us were abandoning the old, narrow construction of the testamentary power, that our legislature should adopt it, for the first time by an express provision for that purpose, and when we consider, too, that neither the community nor the profession have generally, as we believe, been aware of the supposed change, . . . we do not think we would be warranted in declaring that the legislature, by the change in the language, intended to effect the substantial change in the meaning of the law that is supposed, and we shall accordingly give to the act, as it now stands, as liberal a construction in favor of the testamentary power as we should have felt constrained to have given to the original act."
"We consider that the case of Liggatt v. Hart, 23 Mo. 127, settles the one now under consideration. That case determines that the power over the after-acquired lands possessed by the testator is the same as that which he possessed over lands which he owned at the making of the will; that with respect to after-acquired lands, when the question arises whether they have passed by the will, it is just the same, and to be determined on the same considerations, as would determine the question whether lands owned by the testator at the date of his will passed by it, or, in other words, that after-acquired lands, as to the power of disposition, rests on the same ground as the lands owned by the testator at the date of his will, and the personal estate. According to this, there can be no question but that the lands in Missouri passed by the will."
"Our statute of wills is an exact copy of the Missouri statute, and, the courts of that state having been called upon frequently to construe it, we must look principally to the decisions of that state to ascertain its judicial construction."
This approval of the construction placed by the Supreme Court of Missouri upon the statute after its adoption by the territorial government, in connection with its reenactment by the legislature of the state in 1862, after the date of the Missouri decisions, may be fairly considered as settling its proper interpretation by the courts of Oregon. If the same construction had been placed upon the statute by the courts of Missouri before its original adoption by the territorial government of Oregon, it is clear upon the authorities that that construction would have been adopted with the statute, and the same effect would seem properly to follow from an approval by the supreme court of the state of the construction placed upon the statute by the Supreme Court of Missouri, prior to its reenactment in 1862 by the Legislature of the State of Oregon.
confers a larger and broader power of disposition over real estate of which the testator may die seised and possessed, and extends to and includes after-acquired real estate.
In respect to the question of testamentary power of disposition over real estate, the Missouri act adopted by the territorial government, and reenacted by the State of Oregon, was unquestionably intended to be as broad and comprehensive as the Virginia act of 1785, which conferred the testamentary power to devise after-acquired land, and was more comprehensive than the prior act of 1844, taken from the Iowa statute. As already stated, the language of the statute makes no distinction between personalty and realty. It confers the power to dispose of the realty as broadly as the personalty. The saving to the widow her dower is itself indicative of an intention to make the will speak as of the date of the testator's death at which time the widow's right of dower would come into actual possession and practical enjoyment, whether the dower right extended to all lands owned during coverture or possessed by the husband at his death.
In conformity with this construction, the Supreme Court of Oregon has held, in Morse v. Macrum, 22 Or. 229, that the will, as a general rule, speaks from the death of the testator, and not from its date, unless its language, by a fair construction, indicates a contrary intention, in this respect adopting the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Canfield v. Bostwick, 21 Conn. 550, and Gold v. Judson, 21 Conn. 616, where it is stated to be the general rule that a will speaks from the death of the testator where there is nothing in its language to indicate a different intention.
prescribe a rule for the construction of wills in respect to which the authorities have been and are in great conflict, many of the cases holding, as in Smith v. Edrington, 8 Cranch 66, that even where the power exists to dispose of after-acquired real property, it would not pass unless such was the clear and manifest intention on the part of the testator -- in other words, that the presumption in respect to such property was in favor of the heir at law. This rule of presumption or construction the Oregon statute of 1891 may have been intended to change by declaring that, unless it appeared clearly from the will it was not the intention of the testator, such after-acquired real property would pass.
On this branch of the case, our conclusion is that the testator (Hardenbergh) possessed the testamentary power to devise the after-acquired lands in controversy.
The remaining question is whether, by the third and last clause of his will, the testator intended to dispose of all the real estate in Oregon or elsewhere of which he might die seised and possessed.
"the intention of the testator expressed in his will shall prevail, provided it be consistent with the rules of law. This principle is generally asserted in the construction of every testamentary disposition. It is emphatically the will of the person who makes it, and is defined to be 'the legal declaration of a man's intention, which he wills to be performed after his death.' These intentions are to be collected from his words, and ought to be carried into effect if they be consistent with law."
Ohio St. 396; Leigh v. Savidge, 14 N.J.Eq. 124; Gourley v. Thompson, 2 Sneed 387; Appeal of Boards of Missions, 91 Penn.St. 507.
"the law prefers a construction which will prevent a partial intestacy to one that will permit it, if such a construction may be reasonably given (Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N.Y. 351), and certainly when, as in this case, the intent to make a complete disposition of all the testator's property is manifest throughout his will, its provisions should be so construed, if they reasonably may be, as to carry into effect his general intent."
as well include what the testator expects to acquire as what he then actually holds. The term, 'all my property,' may as well include all which may be his at his decease as all which is his at the date of the will, and will be construed to be so intended, unless there are words in the description which limit and restrain it. We are then brought back to the particular description, 'the whole of my lands and buildings lying and being in the Town of Hatfield.' There are certainly no words, and nothing in the will, showing an intent to limit it to the lands and buildings then held by him. No such intent can be presumed. Had it been 'all my lands and buildings in Hatfield or elsewhere' in the original will, the law would have equally restrained its operation to lands then held, not because it was the intent of the testator that it should so operate, but because, assuming that it was his intent that all should pass, such intent is in contravention of the rule of law, and cannot be carried into effect."
republication and held by the testator at the time of the republication. Had there been a general residuary clause, for instance, such would clearly have been the effect of a republication. But the only difference is that a residuary clause embraces all estate, whenever acquired; but, if the description actually used is sufficiently large to embrace the estate in controversy, the result must be the same as to such estate."
It may therefore be laid down as a general proposition that where the testator makes a general devise of his real estate, especially by residuary clause, he will be considered as meaning to dispose of such property to the full extent of his capacity, and that such a devise will carry not only the property held by him at the execution of the will, but also real estate subsequently acquired, of which he may be seised and possessed at the date of his death, provided there is testamentary power to make such disposition. 1 Jarman on Wills 326, 5th ed., and other authorities cited.

References: § 3077
 § 3066
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