Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/unemployment/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:25:06+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Yotes, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office on Thursday, August 15, 2013.
In this unemployment compensation case, petitioner Yotes, Inc. (employer) sought review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) reversing a hearing officer’s decision and awarding unemployment compensation benefits to claimant under CRS § 8-73-108(4). The Court of Appeals set aside the order.
The hearing officer found that claimant resigned because he believed that employer was not acting quickly enough in responding to his complaint of sexual harassment from a coworker. The hearing officer also found that employer was taking the complaint seriously and claimant did not allow employer reasonable time to conduct an investigation and determine the appropriate action. Therefore, the hearing officer concluded that claimant was at fault for the separation and that a disqualification of unemployment benefits was warranted. The Panel reversed the hearing officer’s decision and awarded benefits to claimant.
Employer contended that the Panel erred when it awarded benefits to claimant under CRS § 8-73-108(4)(o). When an employee quits “because of personal harassment by the employernot related to the performance of the job,” benefits must be awarded to the employee. Here, claimant’s coworker was not an employer under the statute. Therefore, the Panel erred as a matter of law when it defined “employer” to include claimant’s coworker. Further, there was no evidence of personal harassment by employer. Because employer had indefinitely removed claimant from the adverse working conditions and claimant did not remain at the job long enough to learn whether the adverse conditions would be eliminated, claimant was not entitled to benefits. Accordingly, the Panel erred in awarding benefits to claimant and the order was set aside.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Russell on Thursday, August 15, 2013.
Defendant Beau Thomas Russell appealed the trial court’s restitution order, which included a mandated statutory penalty following his plea of guilty to one count of forgery. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Russell’s plea resulted from his receipt of $3,321 of unemployment compensation benefits over a two-month period, after he falsely reported himself as unemployed to the Unemployment Benefits Division of the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment. Russell asserted that the trial court erred when it included the statutory penalty in the restitution order. The trial court could not impose the statutory penalty without proof of a correlation between Russel’s actions and the amount of the statutory penalty. Because there was no evidence in the record that the statutory penalty relates in any way to the cost of investigating Russell’s conduct, the trial court abused its discretion by including the statutory penalty in the restitution order. Therefore, the restitution order was reversed as to the penalty, and the case was remanded for the trial court to amend the order by deleting the 50% penalty amount from the restitution award. The order was affirmed in all other respects.
On Monday, February 4, 2013, Sen. Rollie Heath introduced SB 13-157 – Concerning the Continuation of the “Colorado Work Share Program.” This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.
The “Colorado Work Share Program” (program) was created by the general assembly in 2010 to allow employees whose work hours have been reduced to collect prorated unemployment benefits as long as certain requirements are met by the employer and the employee.
The bill makes changes to the program to bring it into compliance with federal law, including required features of a work share plan to make it eligible for approval by the director of the division of unemployment insurance. The bill extends the program indefinitely. The bill also allows eligible employees to participate in certain job training programs. The bill repeals a mechanism that triggers a repeal of the program.
Currently, the federal government will reimburse states for unemployment compensation benefits paid under the program. The bill clarifies that the employer’s account will only be charged for the unemployment compensation benefits if the federal money is not available. The bill also increases the cap on the number of weeks that employees may be paid benefits under the program from 18 to 26 weeks. On Feb. 27, the Business, Labor, & Technology sent the unamended bill to the Appropriations Committee for consideration of the fiscal impact.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Communications Workers of America 7717 v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office on August 30, 2012.
Communications Workers of America 7717 (employer) sought review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirming a hearing officer’s decision determining that claimant was entitled to an award of unemployment compensation benefits. The order was affirmed.
From 2003 until February 2011, claimant worked part-time for employer, serving as union president. He was supervised by employer’s executive board. He also worked full-time for another employer (Qwest).
The hearing officer found that when the union wanted claimant to work on union business during times that he would be working for Qwest, employer paid him the equivalent wage he would have received from Qwest. The officer found employee was separated from this employment when employer merged with another local union chapter. The officer found no reason that claimant should be disqualified from receiving benefits based on the reason for the separation, and no reason that employer should be exempt from paying them.
On review to the Panel, employer argued the money it paid to employee did not constitute “wages” under the statute and that employee still had his full-time job with Qwest and therefore suffered no wage loss. The Panel held the nature of the payments made did not exempt employer from paying benefits and that the issue of ongoing work for Qwest was not properly before it. The hearing officer’s decision was affirmed by the Panel.
On appeal, employer renewed its argument that it did not pay “wages” to employee. CRS § 8-70-141(1)(a) defines “wages” as “[a]ll remuneration for personal services.” The undisputed evidence established that claimant provided personal services to employer by performing work as its president and was remunerated by employer with payments. The Court of Appeals saw no error in the finding that claimant was paid “wages” under the statutory scheme.
Employer also argued that claimant suffered no wage loss because he was still employed by Qwest. The Court agreed with the Panel that this was not properly before it for review. The judgment was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its decision in Softrock Geological Services, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Panel on June 7, 2012.
Unemployment Tax Liability—Covered Employment—Colorado Employment Security Act.
In this unemployment tax liability case, petitioner Softrock Geological Services, Inc. (Softrock) sought review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) reversing a hearing officer’s decision and concluding that services performed for Softrock by Waterman Guy Ormsby constituted covered employment under the Colorado Employment Security Act (Act), CRS §§ 8-70-101 to 8-82-105. The order was set aside and the case was remanded to the Panel with directions.
Softrock provides geological services in the oil and gas industry. Ormsby is a geologist who provided well site services to Softrock on a project basis from 2007 through 2010 under a written agreement with Softrock. Softrock did not train him. Ormsby used his own vehicle, clothing, tools, and equipment, except for some specialized and expensive laboratory equipment that he rented from Softrock. He had his own business cards, paid his own liability insurance, and did not represent himself to be a Softrock employee.
In March 2011, the Division of Employment (Division) conducted an audit of Softrock and issued a notice of liability, finding that Ormsby was a covered employee for purposes of the Colorado Employment Security Act (Act). The hearing officer reversed the Division’s decision. The Panel agreed that Ormsby had not been under the direction and control of Softrock, but reversed on the ground that Ormsby’s business as a geologist did not survive independently of his relationship with Softrock, because he only worked for Softrock during 2007 to 2010.
On appeal, Softrock argued that the Panel erred by substituting its findings of fact for those of the hearing officer and in using only one factor to hold that Ormsby was not customarily engaged in an independent trade or business. The Court agreed that the Panel improperly based its decision on only one factor and remanded the case with instructions that it look at other factors.
Under the Act, the putative employer must overcome a rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship. Even if the presumption is rebutted, the trier of fact still must determine whether the worker is free from control and direction, and is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed.
The determination of whether a worker is engaged in a separate business venture is a multifactor test. Here, it was undisputed that Ormsby provided no services for others between 2007 and 2010. Softrock, however, argued that other factors support its contention that Ormsby was an independent contractor. The Court found that the Panel needed to at least consider and make findings regarding the other factors and could not make its determination just based on the exclusive service relationship during the noted period. It remanded to the Panel for consideration of all factors relevant to Ormsby’s relationship with Softrock.

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