Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/pa-commonwealth-court/1587235.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:09:13+00:00

Document:
COMMONWEALTH v. Appeal of Dalayna Williams.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. $15,000 U.S. CURRENCY Appeal of Dalayna Williams.
BEFORE: PELLEGRINI, Judge, and BROBSON, Judge, and McCULLOUGH, Judge. Michael A. Ventrella, Tannersville, for appellant. Andrea F. McKenna, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Harrisburg, for appellee.
Dalayna Williams (Williams) appeals the April 4, 2011 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court), which granted the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's (Commonwealth) petition for forfeiture of Williams' claim of right, title, or interest in $15,000.00 found in a rental car rented in Williams' name,1 pursuant to what is commonly known as The Controlled Substance Forfeiture Act (Forfeiture Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6801–6802. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court.
On appeal,3 Williams essentially argues that the trial court's decision is contrary to law, because the Commonwealth failed to establish evidence of a nexus between the forfeited money and any illegal activity. Specifically, Williams argues that the trial court erred in failing to follow this Court's decision in Collins.
In forfeiture proceedings where money has been seized, the Commonwealth bears the initial burden of proving either (1) that the money was furnished in exchange for a controlled substance or represents the proceeds traceable to such an exchange, or (2) that the money was used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the Controlled Substance Act. Commonwealth. v. Three Hundred Ten Thousand Twenty Dollars ($310,020.00) In United States Currency, 894 A.2d 154, 161 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). The Commonwealth must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a nexus exists between the money and a violation of the Controlled Substance Act. Commonwealth v. One Thousand Two Hundred & Twenty Dollars Cash, 749 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), appeal denied, 563 Pa. 704, 761 A.2d 551 (2000). Preponderance of the evidence is tantamount to a “more likely than not” standard. Commonwealth v. $11,600.00 Cash, U.S. Currency, 858 A.2d 160, 163–64 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004). Forfeiture cases “are very fact sensitive.” Collins, 8 A.3d at 384 (quoting $310,020.00, 894 A.2d at 161). Circumstantial evidence can be used to establish a party's involvement in drug activity to support a forfeiture. Commonwealth v. McJett, 811 A.2d 104, 110 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 749, 829 A.2d 1158 (2003). The Commonwealth, however, need not produce evidence directly linking the seized property to illegal activity in order to show the requisite nexus. Id. If the Commonwealth proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the nexus exists between the money and illegal activity, the burden shifts to the claimant to establish that he owns the money, that he lawfully acquired it, and that it was not unlawfully used or possessed by him. Section 6802(j) of the Forfeiture Act. There is no requirement that drugs be present in order to subject seized property to forfeiture, and there is similarly no requirement that a criminal prosecution or conviction result from the incident. Esquilin, 583 Pa. at 556, 880 A.2d at 530.
Notably, our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Marshall held that evidence of a canine alert, the method of bundling money, and inconsistent statements about the origin of the money, are insufficient to establish a nexus between the money forfeited and illegal drug activity. 548 Pa. 495, 500, 698 A.2d 576, 578 (1999); see also Collins, 8 A.3d at 388 (holding that based on Marshall, evidence of canine alert, method of bundling money, and inconsistent statements regarding origin of money or planned use for money was insufficient to establish nexus); Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 739 A.2d 152 (1999) (holding that evidence of canine alert, large amount of cash, officer's knowledge of claimant's involvement with drugs, and claimant's subsequent arrest for transporting drugs in unrelated incident was insufficient for Commonwealth to establish nexus).
Here, the trial court relied on the totality of the circumstances to establish a nexus between the seized money and the illegal activity. Specifically, the trial court relied on the following evidence, collectively, to establish the nexus: (1) Caldwell's and Shannon's past criminal histories; (2) Caldwell's involvement in a similar type of seizure in 2007; (3) the money's discrete placement in the vehicle; (4) Caldwell's and Shannon's convoluted stories about their trip and use of the rental car; and (5) the overwhelming smell of marijuana found on the money. (Trial court's Pa. R.A.P.1925(b) opinion, attached to Appellant's Brief as Appendix B at p. 9 .) The trial court considered this evidence in conjunction with the canine cash scan, the bundled money, and the inconsistent statements about the origin of the cash to determine that the Commonwealth sufficiently established a nexus between the seized cash and a violation of the Controlled Substance Act. (Id.) Under Marshall and Collins, however, we are compelled to hold that the evidence presented creates, at best, a mere suspicion of illegal drug activity.
[t]he presence of a large sum of cash coupled with alleged inconsistencies or lack of information in a ‘person's story’ is [not] enough [for the Commonwealth] to meet its burden of proof. It is not against the law to carry cash, and a citizen has no obligation to speak to the police. The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the seized cash is more likely than not related to illegal drug trafficking.
Williams argues that, because there is little or no difference between the case at bar and Collins, a similar result is in order. We agree. Based on our Supreme Court's decision in Marshall and our analysis in Collins, we feel compelled to follow the precedent set out in Marshall.
Here, the driver and passenger of the rental car were pulled over on a routine traffic stop. While both men have previous drug histories and Caldwell was involved in a similar incident in 2007, prior criminal history is not dispositive on the issue of whether money seized is related to illegal drug activity. See Collins, 8 A.3d at 388. Similarly, Williams, Caldwell, and Shannon were never charged with a crime in relation to the seized money, a probative fact in determining whether the money was indeed contraband subject to forfeiture. Fontanez, 559 Pa. at 95, 739 A.2d at 154. We may be more inclined to weigh Caldwell's prior related incident in 2007 more heavily if he had been claiming ownership of the cash, but it is Williams claiming ownership, not Caldwell. Moreover, no drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in connection with this seizure, making a nexus undoubtedly more difficult to establish.
Regarding Caldwell's and Shannon's inconsistent stories, any reliance the trial court places on such evidence is irrelevant based on established precedent. With respect to the odor of marijuana, while it is likely that the odor creates a suspicion of a connection with drug activity, it is equally likely that the bag which held that money previously contained marijuana and the money itself is void of any illegal activity. It is further possible that the money was, at one point, involved in a drug transaction and landed in the hands of an innocent person just as Justice Nigro suggested in the Marshall case. The standard in forfeiture cases is preponderance of the evidence, which is tantamount to “more likely than not.” One Thousand Two Hundred & Twenty Dollars Cash, 749 A.2d at 1016; $11,600.00 Cash, U.S. Currency, 858 A.2d 160 at 163–64. The odor of marijuana does not meet a preponderance of the evidence standard to establish a nexus because it is equally possible that the money seized was lawfully obtained. Furthermore, any remaining evidence is no more compelling than the evidence presented in Marshall and Collins.
Because the Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden of establishing a nexus between the seized property and illegal drug activity, the burden of proving lawful ownership of the property never shifted to Williams. Accordingly, it is of no consequence to this Court that Williams' testimony was inconsistent and found not to be credible by the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse.
AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2011, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, dated April 4, 2011, is hereby REVERSED.
1. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 17a, Transcript of Hearing conducted April 4, 2011.
2. We note that Trooper Conrad testified that Williams indicated that $16,000.00, not $15,000.00, was in the vehicle.
3. The Commonwealth Court's review of a forfeiture appeal is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Cmwlth. v. $6,425.00 Seized from Esquilin, 583 Pa. 544, 554, 880 A.2d 523, 529 (2005) (Esquilin ).
4. Our Supreme Court has also recognized the unreliability of canine scans for illegal drugs because they do not indicate whether all of the cash or a single bill had been exposed to narcotics. See Fontanez, 559 Pa. at 97, 739 A.2d at 155.
5. We specifically highlight how Esquilin differs from the present case. Esquilin involved a seizure from men who were actually observed engaging in drug transactions. Esquilin, 583 Pa. at 559, 880 A.2d at 531–32. Additionally, both men had drugs in their possession at the time of the seizure. Id. at 549, 880 A.2d at 525. Neither circumstance exists in this case.
6. We note that Collins provides a detailed discussion of the nature of the ion scan and its relation of casual contact with relative geographic areas. Collins, 8 A.3d at 388. More specifically, in Collins this Court determined that because ion scan results are based upon a comparison of the money tested and the casual contact levels for that specific state, an ion scan is not relevant or admissible unless it can be proven that the money has been circulated within the geographic area. Id. While the officers in the case before us performed an ion scan, the trial court correctly determined that the ion scan was irrelevant and inadmissible based on our holding in Collins. Accordingly, we need not discuss the ion scan in this appeal.

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