Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/347/475/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:54:14+00:00

Document:
The systematic exclusion of persons of Mexican descent from service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors in the Texas county in which petitioner was indicted and tried for murder, although there were a substantial number of such persons in the county fully qualified to serve, deprived petitioner, a person of Mexican descent, of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and his conviction in a state court is reversed. Pp. 347 U. S. 476-482.
(a) The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not directed solely against discrimination between whites and Negroes. Pp. 347 U. S. 477-478.
(b) When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated. P. 347 U. S. 478.
(c) The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 347 U. S. 478-479.
(d) The evidence in this case was sufficient to prove that, in the county in question, persons of Mexican descent constitute a separate class, distinct from "whites." Pp. 347 U. S. 479-480.
(e) A prima facie case of denial of the equal protection of the laws was established in this case by evidence that there were in the county a substantial number of persons of Mexican descent with the qualifications required for jury service, but that none of them had served on a jury commission, grand jury or petit jury for 25 years. Pp. 347 U. S. 480-481.
(f) The testimony of five jury commissioners that they had not discriminated against persons of Mexican descent in selecting jurors, and that their only objective had been to select those whom they thought best qualified, was not enough to overcome petitioner's prima facie case of denial of the equal protection of the laws. Pp. 347 U. S. 481-482.
(g) Petitioner had the constitutional right to be indicted and tried by juries from which all members of his class were not systematically excluded. P. 347 U. S. 482.
without discrimination. [Footnote 7] But, as this Court has held, the system is susceptible to abuse, and can be employed in a discriminatory manner. [Footnote 8] The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas statute makes no such discrimination, but the petitioner alleges that those administering the law do.
Having established the existence of a class, petitioner was then charged with the burden of proving discrimination. To do so, he relied on the pattern of proof established by Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587. In that case, proof that Negroes constituted a substantial segment of the population of the jurisdiction, that some Negroes were qualified to serve as jurors, and that none had been called for jury service over an extended period of time, was held to constitute prima facie proof of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service. This holding, sometimes called the "rule of exclusion," has been applied in other cases, [Footnote 11] and it is available in supplying proof of discrimination against any delineated class.
"for the last twenty-five years, there is no record of any person with a Mexican or Latin American name having served on a jury commission, grand jury or petit jury in Jackson County. [Footnote 13]"
"there are some male persons of Mexican or Latin American descent in Jackson County who, by virtue of being citizens, freeholders, and having all other legal prerequisites to jury service, are eligible to serve as members of a jury commission, grand jury and/or petit jury. [Footnote 14]"
the complete exclusion of negroes from jury service, the constitutional provision . . . would be but a vain and illusory requirement. [Footnote 15]"
To say that this decision revives the rejected contention that the Fourteenth Amendment requires proportional representation of all the component ethnic groups of the community on every jury [Footnote 16] ignores the facts. The petitioner did not seek proportional representation, nor did he claim a right to have persons of Mexican descent sit on the particular juries which he faced. [Footnote 17] His only claim is the right to be indicted and tried by juries from which all members of his class are not systematically excluded -- juries selected from among all qualified persons regardless of national origin or descent. To this much he is entitled by the Constitution.
See Carter v. State of Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 177 U. S. 447.
100 U.S. at 100 U. S. 308. Cf. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 179 U. S. 92.
294 U.S. at 294 U. S. 598.
See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 325 U. S. 403; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 339 U. S. 286-287.
See Akins v. Texas, supra, note 16, at 325 U. S. 403.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.