Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/315/100/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:50:56+00:00

Document:
1. An application to the Circuit Court of Appeals, under § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, for leave to adduce additional evidence before the Board is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. P. 315 U. S. 104.
evidence before the Board, averring that it had distributed all of its assets to its four stockholders as a liquidating dividend, and that two of them, who had received the Texas refinery in which the unfair labor practices were employed, had conveyed it to a newly organized Delaware corporation whose stockholders were at no time stockholders of the employer corporation, and later, in its answer, it alleged that it had very recently been dissolved pursuant to the statutes of Texas, and prayed a dismissal of the Board's petition upon that ground.
Held: under these circumstances and others disclosed by the record, that denial of the application to adduce additional evidence was not error. P. 315 U. S. 104.
Certiorari, 313 U.S. 558, to review a decree directing the enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board, and therein denying a motion for leave to adduce additional evidence.
reinstate three employees found to have been discriminatorily discharged, and to pay them backpay for the period from the time of discharge to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less earnings during such period, and to post certain notices at its Texas City refinery, where the unfair labor practices had been employed.
The petitioner has never obeyed any of the affirmative directions of the order. In June of 1939, it entered into a written stipulation with the Board that it would obey the order except as it related to backpay, and the Board stipulated, on its part, that it would accept the performance so promised as sufficient compliance with its order. But the petitioner no more regarded its own promise than it had the Board's command. It finally ceased even to answer communications from the Board, and the latter, in April of 1940, filed its petition with the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for enforcement of its order.
The petitioner then began the pleas to that court denial of which it says are errors. Nearly four months after the Board had filed its petition, the present petitioner filed an application under § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act [Footnote 2] to adduce additional evidence before the Board.
The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the Board's order and entered a decree directing that it be enforced, thus in effect denying the motion to dismiss and the application for leave to adduce additional evidence. 117 F.2d 90. We granted certiorari limited to the question of the propriety of the denial of the latter because of the general importance of the question. 313 U.S. 558.
We hold that the application for leave to adduce additional evidence pursuant to § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act was addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and that the denial of petitioner's application, under the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case, was not error.
the proffered evidence was not "material." Accordingly, we have no occasion to decide whether a Circuit Court of Appeals may, in its discretion, deny an application under § 10(e) even though it be satisfied that the additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce it in the hearing before the Board. For the same reason, we do not consider the question of the credibility of petitioner's allegations, viewed in the light of its conduct.
The petitioner's conduct does, however, give point to omissions of pertinent facts from its allegations. The record makes it certain that it would gain delay by all honorable means, and leaves it doubtful whether it has even stopped at that. The liquidation relied upon took place three days after it had entered into the stipulation of obedience. The purpose to liquidate was not communicated to the Board, nor was the Board advised of the action when taken, nor until nearly four months after the petition for enforcement was filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
stockholders in respondent have no interest, and never had any interest, directly or indirectly, in the stock ownership of the said Delaware corporation, all as set out in respondent's motion heretofore filed herein,"
if it adds anything, does not add enough to negative these possibilities, for the court was not required to be satisfied with such conclusions of the petitioner.
Granting the truth of every one of petitioner's allegations, it still is possible that the Board's order may yet be the basis -- and the indispensable basis -- of liability on the part of any of these persons, regardless of any present incapacity of petitioner to perform, or liability on its part for failure to perform, its duty of reinstatement. Of course, we do not pass on the question whether any such liability actually exists; all we hold is that there has not been a sufficient showing by the petitioner to negative the possibility which we note.
The petitioner's allegations are immaterial with respect to the backpay provision in the Board's order for like reasons, and because some liability in this respect unquestionably exists, although for a disputed period of time. And, from what we have said, it is apparent that the petitioner has not shown that there has been any change in its relations to the refinery such as to indicate any alteration of the Board's order in respect of its requirements that petitioner post notices at "its Texas City, Texas, refinery," and that it desist from unfair labor practices.
"(a) Discouraging membership in Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 227, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging its employees or by otherwise discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment;"
"(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act."
We do not consider the question whether, in the rather unusual circumstances of this case, the order should be modified as being unduly broad in this respect, see Labor Board v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426, since this question was not considered or raised in the court below or in the petition for certiorari. Alice State Bank v. Houston Pasture Co., 247 U. S. 240, 247 U. S. 242; Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U. S. 90, 281 U. S. 98; Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 172, 293 U. S. 182.
"If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the transcript."
49 Stat. 449, 454, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 160(e).
"Art. 1388. Liquidation by officers. -- Upon the dissolution of a corporation, unless a receiver is appointed by some court of competent jurisdiction, the president and directors or managers of the affairs of the corporation at the time of its dissolution shall be trustees of the creditors and stockholders of such corporation, with power to settle the affairs, collect the outstanding debts, and divide the moneys and other property among the stockholders after paying the debts due and owing by such corporation at the time of its dissolution, as far as such money and property will enable them after paying all just and reasonable expenses, and, for this purpose, they may, in the name of such corporation, sell, convey and transfer all real and personal property belonging to such company, collect all debts, compromise controversies, maintain or defend judicial proceedings, and exercise full power and authority of said company over such assets and property. Said trustees shall be severally responsible to the creditors and stockholders of such corporation to the extent of its property and effects that shall have come into their hands."
"Art. 1389. Extension of existence. -- The existence of every corporation may be continued for three years after its dissolution, from whatever cause, for the purpose of enabling those charged with the duty to settle up its affairs. In case a receiver is appointed by a court for this purpose, the existence of such corporation may be continued by the court so long as, in its discretion, it is necessary to suitably settle the affairs of such corporation."
"Art. 1390. Effect of dissolution. -- The dissolution of a corporation shall not operate to abate, nor be construed as abating, any pending suit in which such corporation is a defendant, but such suit shall continue against such corporation, and judgment shall be rendered as though the same were not dissolved."
3 Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes (Civil Statutes).
The order required that the employees be reinstated "to their former positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges."
Such proceedings may be instituted only by the Board. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261.
This is the usual form of order, and has frequently been employed in cases where this Court has sustained Board orders. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, enforcing, as modified, 4 N.L.R.B. 71, 108; Labor Board v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241, enforcing 8 N.L.R.B. 866, 877; Labor Board v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S. 453, enforcing 6 N.L.R.B. 654, 666; Labor Board v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206, enforcing 7 N.L.R.B. 237, 252; Labor Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, enforcing 12 N.L.R.B. 854, 883; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, enforcing, as modified, and remanding, 19 N.L.R.B. 547, 603.
The record does not lead me to the conclusion that petitioner has taken any improper steps to secure leave to adduce additional evidence, the matter to which the certiorari was limited by our grant. It is plain that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not act on any such ground. Neither the record on that issue nor the Government's brief or argument make any such contention. Only after evidence before the Board would it seem proper for a court to form its opinion of that question.
"2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:"
"(a) Offer to William Cornish, E.D. Richey, and Earl Gooch immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges;"
"(c) Post immediately notices in conspicuous places at its Texas City, Texas, refinery stating that the respondent will cease and desist in the manner aforesaid, and maintain said notices for a period of thirty (30) consecutive days from the date of posting;"
"In its application to adduce evidence, petitioner alleged that, by reason of its distribution of assets and discontinuation of business, it could not reinstate any employees. Thereafter, in its petition for rehearing in the court below and petition for certiorari in this Court, petitioner maintained that it could not do so unless, as it suggested, the order required it to purchase and operate another refinery or otherwise resume business. Properly construed (cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S. 112, 302 U. S. 117-118), the order contains no such requirement. Its purpose was to remedy petitioner's violations of the Act by restoring the status quo as it existed prior to the violations, but only to the extent possible under the circumstances existing at the time of compliance, assuming that the circumstances were not changed through any bad faith on petitioner's part. See Labor Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 97 F.2d 195, 196-197. That the men were to be offered reinstatement 'to their former positions' is express indication that the reinstatement provision was contingent upon continued operation of the Texas City refinery. This likewise appears to have been true of paragraph 2(c) of the order requiring the posting of notices 'at its Texas City, Texas, refinery.'"
We cannot treat this suggestion as relieving this petitioner of the threat of contempt proceedings. The statement does not consent to the amendment of the order. Bad faith may still be claimed to exist. This should be determined by the Board. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the decree below should be reversed with directions to sustain the motion for a remand unless the Board agrees to eliminate sections 2(a) and (c) of the order in line with the Board's apparent concession in its brief.

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