Source: https://www.complexip.com/quickly-correcting-anti-cybersquatting-violation-after-demand-avoids-monetary-damages-and-injunctive-relief/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:16:50+00:00

Document:
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. Eastern Shore Toyota, LLC, — F.3d —-, 2012 WL 2345117 (11th Cir.) (Available here), upheld a district court’s finding that defendant Eastern Shore had both a subjective belief and an objectively reasonable belief in the lawfulness of its actions that it did not violate the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(“ACPA”). The court found that Eastern Shore met the safe harbor provisions in the ACPA. Plaintiff Pensacola Motor did not introduce any evidence of monetary damages at the jury trial and instead relied upon, to its detriment, the statutory damages provisions in the ACPA . Since Eastern Shore turned over the accused domains within two (2) weeks after Pensacola Motors’ cease and desist letter, immediately fired the marketing director (an independent consultant), and Pensacola Motor proved no damages at trial and introduced no evidence of potential future use of the accused domains, no money damages or attorneys fees were awarded and no injunction was issued.
The facts adduced during the jury trial showed that Eastern Shore’s (“ES”) marketing consultant pitched two internet marketing strategies to ES, one defensive and the other offensive. The defensive strategy was for ES, under the consultant’s tutelage, to buy and hold desirable domain names in order to keep them out of competitors hands. As an offensive strategy, the consultant proposed the creation of a large number of mini-websites, or microsites, using a computer program that he would license to ES, a Hyundai dealer, such as owning the domain www.2009camry.com. These hundreds of microsites auto-directed the viewer to ES’ websites. ES had earlier received a cease and desist letter for the “Camry” site which redirected users to ES’ eBay website. ES turned over that Camry site. Therefore, it had some inkling of the problem before the events with Plaintiff Pensacola.
Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff Pensacola, a Toyota dealer called Bob Tyler Toyota, discovered one of Eastern Shore’s microsites: www.bobtylerprices.com which had photos copied from Bob Tyler. At the ES site, users were prompted to enter their email and phone number to complete a credit application for a financing plan. Pensacola’s cease and desist letter demanded take-down of six (6) microsites and $1,000,000 in compensation. ES took down the sites and immediately fired the marketing director. Pensacola’s lawsuit was filed a few weeks after the letter. Pensacola’s second amended complaint asserted claims for: (1) false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (2) unfair competition under the Lanham Act; (3) violation of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, § 1125(d); (4) unfair competition under Florida law; (5) violation of Florida’s trademark dilution statute, Fla. Stat. § 495.151; and (6) violation of Florida’s “Antiphising Act,” Fla. Stat. § 668.704. The Antiphising Act is discussed later herein.
The jury returned its verdict and, in answering questions on the verdict form, (i) found that ES had violated the ACPA and (ii) answered YES to the question that ES “believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that its use of the domain names was a fair use or otherwise lawful” under the ACPA.
345 U.S. 629, 632-34, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897-98 (1953).” Slip opn. P. 14. There was no proof that infringement likely to continue in the future.
“Regardless of how many statutory factors the evidence establishes, Eastern Shore cannot be liable for registering or using the Bob Tyler trademark with a bad faith intent to profit if it nonetheless ‘believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was . . . lawful.’ Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). To qualify for that safe harbor, Eastern Shore must have had both a subjective belief and an objectively reasonable belief in the lawfulness of its actions.” Slip opn. P. 30.
The Antiphising Act § 668.703 prohibited acts such as “(1) A person with an intent to engage in conduct involving the fraudulent use or possession of another person’s identifying information may not represent oneself, directly or by implication, to be another person without the authority or approval of such other person through the use of a web page or Internet domain name and use that web page, Internet domain name, or a link to that web page or domain name or another site on the Internet to induce, request, or solicit a resident of this state to provide identifying information. (2) A person with an intent to engage in conduct involving the fraudulent use or possession of identifying information may not send or cause to be sent to an electronic mail address held by a resident of this state an electronic mail message that is falsely represented as being sent by another person without the authority or approval of such other person, refers or links the recipient of the message to a web page, and directly or indirectly induces, requests, or solicits the recipient of the electronic mail message to provide identifying information.” Fla. Stat. § 668.703.
Fla. Stat. § 668.704 lists the following remedies: “(1) The following persons may bring a civil action against a person who violates this part: (a) A person engaged in the business of providing Internet access service to the public who is adversely affected by the violation. (b) A financial institution as defined in s. 655.005(1) that is adversely affected by the violation. (c) An owner of a web page, trademark, or service mark who is adversely affected by the violation. (d) The Attorney General. (2) A person bringing an action under this section may: (a) Seek injunctive relief to restrain the violator from continuing the violation. (b) Recover damages in an amount equal to the greater of: 1. Actual damages arising from the violation; or 2. The sum of $ 5,000 for each violation of the same nature. (3) The court may increase an award of actual damages in an action brought under this section to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained if the court finds that the violations have occurred with a frequency as to constitute a pattern or practice. (4) For purposes of this section, violations are of the same nature if the violations consist of the same course of conduct or action, regardless of the number of times the conduct or action occurred. (5) A plaintiff who prevails in an action filed under this section is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.” Other subsections of the Act discuss jurisdiction, venue, the statute of limitations (3 years); moneys received by the Attorney General and Department of Legal Affairs authority to adopt rules. Fla.Stat. § 668.702 lists the definitions and § 668.705 lists exemptions.

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