Source: https://www.jbwpc.com/Articles/Local-Government-article/NUTS-BOLTS-OF-LOCAL-GOVERNMENT-LAW.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:34:49+00:00

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Zoning law, like most areas of the law, is characterized by issues and rules that are peculiar to it alone. It is an area of the law defined by distinct burdens of proof, short time frames, and judicial mandates, that, if not complied with, can be fatal to your case. This paper is intended to discuss these peculiarities, so that they can be properly addressed.
2. The procedure required by the ZPL must be strictly followed, or any resulting zoning decision will be invalid.3 The ZPL requires public notice of a zoning decision and a public hearing. Local ordinances often require additional procedures.
2. A property owner who sues to challenge the failure of a local government to rezone property must file suit within thirty days of the final decision by the local government.7 The Courts have held that the 30-day clock begins to run from the time the rezoning decision is reduced to writing, which may be done by letter, by resolution or ordinance, or by minutes reflecting the outcome of the vote.8Such minutes are commonly not adopted until the next regularly-scheduled meeting.
5. Appeals to the Superior Court from local government administrative (quasi-judicial) zoning decisions are considered judicial reviews on the record. Examples are applications for variances or permits. This does not include special use permits because these are specifically defined by the Zoning Procedures Law to be legislative decisions. Writ of certiorari is an acceptable method to appeal, as is mandamus.
3. Certain types of uses are subject to protection by federal law. In such cases, the federal statute may provide an enforcement mechanism; otherwise, 42 USC § 1983 will apply.
Americans with Disabilities Act.22 A zoning ordinance that places burdens on residences of, and institutions serving, people with disabilities, will be closely scrutinized. A common example is a special use permit requirement for personal care homes.
5. Land use ordinances regulating based upon the religious nature of a use must satisfy the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and also the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.23Courts will look to whether the zoning regulation places a substantial burden on religious exercise or whether it discriminates against religious uses. If so, the Court will apply the strict scrutiny test: whether the regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.
effective.29 This involves a relatively lengthy procedure. Unless the municipality and the county agree to the zoning change proposed by the municipality, an arbitration panel is appointed by the Department of Community Affairs which conducts a hearing and renders a decision that is binding on the municipality. If the municipality is dissatisfied with the decision of the panel, it may appeal the decision to the superior court or it may abandon the annexation.
1. The practitioner must be mindful of the propriety of ex parte communications with local government decision makers. Because of the difficulty in getting an appeal and the onerous burdens placed upon challengers to local government decisions, it is of great importance to win before the local government. This raises the question of how much the practitioner can do outside of public hearings to represent the client. The general consensus among zoning attorneys is that whether or not ex parte communications are appropriate depends on whether the local government decision is legislative or administrative / quasi-judicial.
In the former case, the practitioner is essentially a lobbyist, trying to get an ordinance changed in a manner desirable to the client. In the latter case, the practitioner is contesting the applicability of the ordinance to the client; these decisions will often, but not always, be made by administrative boards rather than the governing authority. Because the latter will be reviewed in the superior court on the record, an ex parte communication essentially gives one side the opportunity to present more evidence than the other, and without the opportunity of cross-examination. This obviously has due process implications. Thus, while ex parte communications are normally considered acceptable in the context of a legislative change (such as a rezoning), they are not appropriate in the context of an administrative or quasi-judicial decision. That said, local government officials and non-attorney citizens often will not be cognizant of this distinction.
2. Supporting or opposing a legislative decision before a local government (including rezoning) on behalf of a private client is considered lobbying by statute. 31 While some would argue that such statute impermissibly interferes with the Supreme Court and Bar's authority to regulate the practice of law, nonetheless State law does require lobbyists to register with the State Ethics Commission, and lawyers have been cited and fined for appearing before local governments on rezoning matters without first registering.
1 Georgia Constitution of 1983, Art. 9, Sec. 2, Para. 4.
2 O.C.G.A. Title 36, Chapter 66; see Little v City of Lawrenceville, 272 Ga. 340, 528 S.E.2d 515 (2000).
3 Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County, 261 Ga. 153, 401 S.E.2d 527 (1991). McClure v. Davidson, 258 Ga. 706, 373 S.E.2d 317 (1988).
4 Gradous v. Board of Commissioners of Richmond County, 256 Ga. 469, 349 S.E.2d 707 (1986). Olley Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, 208 S.E.2d 801 (1974).
5 Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 219 S.E.2d 399 (1975). DeKalb County v. Dobson, 267 Ga. 624, 482 S.E.2d 239 (1997).
6DeKalb County v. Dobson, 267 Ga. 624, 482 S.E.2d 239 (1997).
7Village Centers, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 248 Ga. 177, 281 S.E.2d 522 (1981).
8Chadwick v. Gwinnett County, 257 Ga. 59, 354 S.E.2d 420 (1987).
9 Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 516 S.E.2d 785 (1999).
DeKalb County v. Bremby, 252 Ga. 510, 314 S.E.2d 900 (1984).
10 Dougherty County v. Webb, 256 Ga. 474, 350 S.E.2d 457 (1986).
Kohl v. Manning, 117 Ga.App. 398, 160 S.E.2d 666 (1968).
11 Jackson v. Spalding County, 265 Ga. 792, 462 S.E.2d 361 (1995).
Beugnot v. Coweta County, 231 Ga.App. 715, 500 S.E.2d 28 (1998).
12RCG Properties, LLC v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 260 Ga.App. 355, 579 S.E.2d 782 (2003).
13 O.S. Advertising Corp of Georgia, Inc. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 482 S.E.2d 295 (1997).
14 Cross v. Hall County, 238 Ga. 709, 235 S.E.2d, 379 (1977).
15 Lindsey Creek Area Civic Assoc. v. Columbus, 249 Ga. 488 at 490, 292 S.E.2d 61 (1982).
16 Massey v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 244, 637 S.E.2d 385 (2006).
17 Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission v. Vineville Neighborhood Assoc., 218 Ga.App. 668, 462 S.E.2d 764 (1995).
Lindsey Creek Area Civic Assoc. v. Columbus, 249 Ga. 488, 292 S.E.2d 61 (1982).
18DeKalb County v. Wapensky, 253 Ga. 47, 315 S.E.2d 873 (1984).
AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Leafmore Forest Condominium Assoc. of Owners, 235 Ga.App. 319, 509 S.E.2d 374 (1998).
19 Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 1996).
Baytree of Inverrary Realty Partners v. City of Lauderhill, 873 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1989). Cobb County v. McColister, 261 Ga. 876, 413 S.E.2d 441 (1992).
20 Bickerstaff Clay Products Co., Inc. v. Harris County, Ga., 89 F.3d 1481, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996).
21MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.2d 1412, 1215 (11th Cir. 1994).
22Pack v. Clayton County, (Not published, 1993 WL 837007)(N.D. Ga., 1993), affirmed at 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir, 1995); Open Homes Fellowship, Inc. v. Orange County, 325 F.Supp.2d 1349 (M.D. Fl., 2004); and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985).
23 42 USC § 2000cc; Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 at 1227 (11th Cir., 2004); Konikov v. Orange County, Florida, 410 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir., 2005); Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County. 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).
24 Zibtluda, LLC v. Gwinnett County, Ga. ex rel. Bd. of Com'rs of Gwinnett, 411 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir, 2005).
25 See generally Tanner Advertising Group, LLC v. Fayette County, Georgia, 451 F.3d 777 (11th Cir., 2006); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir., 2005).
25W.M.M. Properties, Inc. v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436, 339 S.E.2d 252 (1986). Banks County v. Chambers of Georgia, Inc., 264 Ga. 421, 444 S.E.2d 783 (1994).
26BBC Land & Dev. Inc v Butts County, 281 Ga. 472, 640 S.E.2d 33 (2007).
27 Corey Outdoor Advertising v. Bd. of Adjustment of Atlanta, 254 Ga. 221, 327 S.E.2d 178 (1985). Matheson v. DeKalb County, 257 Ga. 48, 354 S.E.2d 121 (1987).
28 O.C.G.A. § 36-36-110 et seq.
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