Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/221/559/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 01:49:04+00:00

Document:
The Constitution not only looks to an indestructible union of indestructible States, Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 74 U. S. 725, but to a union of equal States as well.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a legislative act of Oklahoma, providing for the removal of the capital of the State from Guthrie to Oklahoma City, are stated in the opinion.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to review the judgment of that court upholding a legislative act of the State providing for the removal of its capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City, and making an appropriation from the funds of the State for the purpose of carrying out the act by the erection of the necessary state buildings. (Act of Oklahoma, December 29, 1910) not yet published.
"The capital of said State shall temporarily be at the city of Guthrie, and shall not be changed therefrom previous to Anno Domini Nineteen Hundred and Thirteen, but said capital shall after said year be located by the electors of said State at an election to be provided for by the legislature; provided, however, that the legislature of said State, except as shall be necessary for the convenient transaction of the public business of said State at said capital, shall not appropriate any public moneys of the State for the erection of buildings for capital purposes during said period."
of Oklahoma and the Indian Territory to form a Constitution and State Government and be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and to Enable the People of New Mexico and Arizona to form a Constitution and State Government and be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States,' approved June the sixteenth, Anno Domini, Nineteen Hundred and Six."
duty of guaranteeing to "every State in this Union a republican form of government." The position of counsel for the appellants is substantially this: that the power of Congress to admit new States and to determine whether or not its fundamental law is republican in form are political powers, and, as such, uncontrollable by the courts. That Congress may, in the exercise of such power, impose terms and conditions upon the admission of the proposed new State which, if accepted, will be obligatory, although they operate to deprive the State of powers which it would otherwise possess, and therefore not admitted upon "an equal footing with the original States."
The definition of "a State" is found in the powers possessed by the original States which adopted the Constitution, a definition emphasized by the terms employed in all subsequent acts of Congress admitting new States into the Union. The first two States admitted into the Union were the States of Vermont and Kentucky, one as of March 4, 1791, and the other as of June 1, 1792. No terms or conditions were exacted from either. Each act declares that the State is admitted "as a new and entire member of the United States of America." 1 Stat.
189, 191. Emphatic and significant as is the phrase admitted as "an entire member," even stronger was the declaration upon the admission in 1796 of Tennessee, as the third new State, it being declared to be "one of the United States of America," "on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever," phraseology which has ever since been substantially followed in admission acts, concluding with the Oklahoma act, which declares that Oklahoma shall be admitted "on an equal footing with the original States."
such form is not changed to one anti-republican -- Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 88 U. S. 174, 88 U. S. 175 -- but it obviously does not confer power to admit a new State which shall be any less a State than those which compose the Union.
"that all the conditions and terms contained in said third section should be considered, deemed and taken as fundamental conditions and terms upon which the said State is incorporated into the Union."
"All Congress intended was to declare in advance to the people of the territory the fundamental principles their constitution should contain; this was every way proper under the circumstances; the instrument having been duly formed and presented, it was for the national legislature to judge whether it contained the proper principles, and to accept it if it did or reject it if it did not. Having accepted the constitution and admitted the state 'on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever,' in express terms, by the act of 1812, Congress was concluded from assuming that the instructions contained in the act of 1811 had not been complied with. No fundamental principles could be added by way of amendment, as this would have been making part of the state constitution; if Congress could make it in part, it might, in the form of amendment, make it entire. The conditions and terms referred to in the act of 1812 could only relate to the stipulations contained in the second proviso of the act of 1811, involving rights of property and navigation, and, in our opinion, were not otherwise intended. "
within the State, and that they should remain at the sole disposal of the United States, and a second, that all of the navigable waters within the State should forever remain public highways and free to the citizens of that State and of the United States, without any tax, duty or impost imposed by the State. These provisions were relied upon as a "compact" by which the United States became possessed of all such submerged lands between the shores of navigable rivers within the State.
"held the absolute right to all of their navigable waters and the soil under them for their common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution."
"forever disclaim all rights and title to the waste or unappropriated lands lying within the said territory, and that the same shall be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of the United States,"
"Full power is given to Congress 'to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States.' This authorized the passage of all laws necessary to secure the rights of the United States to the public lands, and to provide for their sale, and to protect them from taxation. "
"And all constitutional laws are binding on the people, in the new states and the old ones, whether they consent to be bound by them or not. Every constitutional act of Congress is passed by the will of the people of the United States, expressed through their representatives, on the subject matter of the enactment, and, when so passed, it becomes the supreme law of the land, and operates by its own force on the subject matter, in whatever State or Territory it may happen to be. The proposition, therefore, that such a law cannot operate upon the subject matter of its enactment without the express consent of the people of the new State, where it may happen to be, contains its own refutation, and requires no farther examination. The propositions submitted to the people of the Alabama Territory, for their acceptance or rejection, by the act of Congress authorizing them to form a constitution and state government for themselves, so far as they related to the public lands within that Territory, amounted to nothing more nor less than rules and regulations respecting the sales and disposition of public lands. The supposed compact relied on by the counsel for the plaintiffs, conferred no authority, therefore, on Congress to pass the act granting to the plaintiffs the land in controversy."
been admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original States, the constitution, laws, and compact to the contrary notwithstanding."
This deduction finds support in Permoli v. First Municipality, 3 How. 589, from which we have heretofore used an excerpt, and in Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82; Withers v. Buckley et al., 20 How. 84, 61 U. S. 93; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 107 U. S. 688; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 117 U. S. 160; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543; Sands v. River Co., 123 U. S. 288, 123 U. S. 296; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504; Bollin v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, 176 U. S. 87.
That the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States involves the control of the navigable waters of the United States over which such commerce is conducted is undeniable; but it is equally well settled that the control of the State over its internal commerce involves the right to control and regulate navigable streams within the State until Congress acts on the subject. This has been the uniform holding of this court since Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678,6 107 U. S. 83.
of the general subject by Congress, but as a result of a supposed compact, condition or restriction accepted by the State as a condition upon which it was admitted into the Union.
It may well happen that Congress should embrace in an enactment introducing a new State into the Union legislation intended as a regulation of commerce among the States, or with Indian tribes situated within the limits of such new State, or regulations touching the sole care and disposition of the public lands or reservations therein, which might be upheld as legislation within the sphere of the plain power of Congress. But, in every such case, such legislation would derive its force not from any agreement or compact with the proposed new State, nor by reason of its acceptance of such enactment as a term of admission, but solely because the power of Congress extended to the subject, and therefore would not operate to restrict the State's legislative power in respect of any matter which was not plainly within the regulating power of Congress. Williamette Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 125 U. S. 9. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra.
"In considering this act of Congress of March 1st, 1817, it is unnecessary to institute any examination or criticism as to its legitimate meaning, or operation, or binding authority, farther than to affirm that it could have no effect to restrict the new State in any of its necessary attributes as an independent sovereign government, nor to inhibit or diminish its perfect equality with the other members of the Confederacy with which it was to be associated. These conclusions follow from the very nature and objects of the Confederacy, from the language of the Constitution adopted by the States, and from the rule of interpretation pronounced by this court in the case of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. p. 44 U. S. 223."
"Whatever the limitation upon her powers as a government whilst in a territorial condition, whether from the ordinance of 1787 or the legislation of Congress, it ceased to have any operative force, except as voluntarily adopted by her, after she became a State of the Union. On her admission, she at once became entitled to and possessed of all the rights of dominion and sovereignty which belonged to the original States. She was admitted, and could be admitted, only on the same footing with them. The language of the resolution admitting her is 'on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever.' 3 Stat. 536. Equality of constitutional right and power is the condition of all the States of the Union, old and new.
Illinois, therefore, as was well observed by counsel, could afterwards exercise the same power over rivers within her limits that Delaware exercised over Black Bird Creek, and Pennsylvania over the Schuylkill River. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Permoli v. First Municipality, id., 44 U. S. 589; Strader v. Graham, 10 id. 51 U. S. 82."
States, even if it had the power to do so, and attempt to impose more onerous conditions upon her than upon them, or that, in cases arising in Nebraska, a different construction should be given to her constitution from that given to the constitutions of other States. But this court has held in many cases that, whatever be the limitations upon the power of a territorial government, they cease to have any operative force except as voluntarily adopted after such territory has become a State of the Union. Upon the admission of a State, it becomes entitled to and possesses all the rights of dominion and sovereignty which belonged to the original States, and, in the language of the act of 1867 admitting the State of Nebraska, it stands 'upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.'"
"should remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed State of Kentucky, and should be determined by the laws now existing in this (Virginia) State."
sanctioned by the Constitution, while the one here sought to be enforced is one having no sanction in that instrument.
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517, involved the validity of the grant of every sixteenth section in each township for school purposes. The grant was made by the act providing for the organization of a state government for the Territory of Wisconsin, and purported to be upon condition that the proposed State should never interfere with the primary disposal of the public lands of the United States, nor subject them to taxation. The grant was held to operate as a grant taking effect so soon as the necessary surveys were made. The conditions assented to by the State were obviously such as obtained no force from the assent of the State, since they might have been exacted as an exertion of the proper power of Congress to make rules and regulations as to the disposition of the public lands. Minnesota v. Bachelder, 1 Wall. 109, is another case which involved nothing more than an exertion by Congress of its power to regulate the disposition of the public lands.
"impair the rights of persons or property pertaining to the Indians of said territory so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty with such Indians."
within the power of a State to make, whether made with the United States for the benefit of its Indian wards or with a private corporation for the supposed advantages resulting. Certainly the case has no bearing upon a compact by which the general legislative power of the State is to be impaired with reference to a matter pertaining purely to the internal policy of the State. See Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223.
"thereupon the proposed State of Oklahoma shall be deemed admitted by Congress into the Union under and by virtue of this act, on an equal footing with the original States."
In Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 74 U. S. 725, Chief Justice Chase said in strong and memorable language that, "the Constitution, in all of its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."
"The people of the United States constitute one nation, under one government, and this government, within the scope of the powers with which it is invested, is supreme. On the other hand, the people of each State compose a State having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence. The States disunited might continue to exist. Without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States."

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