Source: https://www.thefire.org/first-amendment-library/justice/clarence-thomas/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:26:18+00:00

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This case concerns the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2680, which carves out certain exceptions to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity for torts committed by federal employees. Section 2680(c) provides that the waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims arising from the detention of property by "any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer." Petitioner contends that this clause applies only to law enforcement officers enforcing customs or excise laws, and thus does not affect the waiver of sovereign immunity for his property claim against officers of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). We conclude that the broad phrase "any other law enforcement officer" covers all law enforcement officers. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the dismissal of petitioner's claim.
About 500 students attend the Milford Central School (Milford, N.Y.), which houses grades K-12. The Child Evangelism Fellowship, a non-sectarian, Christian missionary organization, sponsors some 4,400 Good News clubs in the United States for children ages 6 to 12. The 'tender age' of the children in question is central to the Court's analysis of the case. Rev. Stephen Fournier and his wife lead the Good News Club of Milford; it has approximately 25 members. New York state allows local school boards to adopt their own regulations for community use of school property. The Milford school district's policy is stated in a handbook: (1) School facilities "may be used by district residents for holding social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment events and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community …" (2) "School premises shall not be used by any individual or organization for religious purposes." In 1996 the Good News Club of Milford, for reasons not relevant to the case, seeks a new place in which to conduct its meetings. It submits a 'District Use of Facilities Request' asking to use the school as a meeting place. An interim superintendent refuses access, finding that the Good News Club's meetings would be "the equivalent of religious worship … rather than the expression of religious views or values on a secular subject." After an attorney raises the issue that denial of access to the Good News Club while access is allowed to the Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, and the 4-H Club may violate the club's rights, school official solicit additional information about the meetings of the club, reconsider the request for facility access, and again deny access to the club. Both parties agreed that the school district created a limited public forum by issuing its community use policy for school facilities. A government-operated limited public forum is not required to and does not allow individuals to engage in all types of speech. Under Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), content-based discrimination is allowed in a limited public forum so long as the restricted speech falls outside the purpose of the limited forum. Viewpoint-based discrimination, however, is impermissible if the speech in question falls within the purpose of the limited forum. Thus, the government may restrict speech within the limited public forum if the restriction is not a viewpoint-based limitation and if the restriction is reasonable in light of the forum's purpose. The parties disagree, however, about whether club access would be a government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The clause prohibits government speech endorsing religion while private speech in support of religion is protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses. With respect to equal access to limited public forums for religious groups, the Supreme Court typically finds no violation of the Establishment Clause where there is little concern that the public would perceive an endorsement of religion by the government entity and where any benefit to religion is merely incidental. In 1997 the Good News Club files in federal district court and offers arguments related to freedom of speech, equal protection and religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court holds in summary judgment for the Milford Central School. In 2000 Hearing an appeal limited to the First Amendment issue claim, the 2nd Circuit panel (2-1) affirms the district court's dismissal of the free speech claim. The appellate court finds that the school was not discriminating between viewpoints but rather had excluded the club because the content of its meetings consisted of "religious instruction and prayer" — a permissible viewpoint-neutral reason. The Supreme Court grants the petition for cert. on October 10.
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, this Court found that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)-Congress' first attempt to protect children from exposure to pornographic material on the Internet-ran afoul of the First Amendment in its regulation of indecent transmissions and the display of patently offensive material. That conclusion was based, in part, on the crucial consideration that the CDA's breadth was wholly unprecedented. After the Court's decision in Reno, Congress attempted to address this concern in the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). Unlike the CDA, COPA applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors," 47 U. S. C. § 231(a)(I). In defining "material that is harmful to minors," COPA draws on the three-part obscenity test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, see § 231(e)(6), and thus requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material, see §231(e)(6)(A). Respondents-who post or have members that post sexually oriented material on the Web-filed a facial challenge before COPA went into effect, claiming, inter alia, that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of COPA because it concluded that the statute was unlikely to survive strict scrutiny. The Third Circuit affirmed but based its decision on a ground not relied upon by the District Court: that COPA's use of "contemporary community standards," § 231(e)(6)(A), to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.
The California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) requires clinics that primarily serve pregnant women to provide certain notices. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §123470 et seq. (West 2018). Licensed clinics must notify women that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give them a phone number to call. Unlicensed clinics must notify women that California has not licensed the clinics to provide medical services. The question in this case is whether these notice requirements violate the First Amendment.
We address in this case whether 23 U. S. C. § 409, which protects information "compiled or collected" in connection *133 with certain federal highway safety programs from being discovered or admitted in certain federal or state trials, is a valid exercise of Congress' authority under the Constitution.
A local church without a permanent location often advertised its temporary meeting locations. The church’s signs were subject to a set of provisions in the local code that differed from others because of the sign’s purpose as a temporary sign. The church was notified that it had violated the sign provisions and subsequently sued the town.
The Federal Alcohol Administration Act prohibits beer labels from displaying alcohol content. The Coors Brewing Co. claimed that it had a First Amendment right to disseminate the alcohol content of its products. Although the proffered purpose of the legislation was to prevent "strength wars," i.e., marketplace competition based on the potency of different beers, other regulation of alcoholic beverages allows brewers to advertise alcohol content and requires wine and hard liquor manufacturers to display such information. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized that commercial speech speech that concerns only commercial or economic activity is entitled to some First Amendment protection. The government therefore may regulate commercial speech only if it is false or misleading or if the restriction directly and narrowly advances a substantial state interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1978).
Montana State prison inmate Kevin Murphy writes a letter to fellow inmate Pat Tracy that urges Tracy not to plead guilty to a charge of assaulting a guard. Tracy had requested Murphy's assistance in the matter in part because Murphy, a trained inmate law clerk, had assisted Tracy with past legal issues. Murphy's letter stated in part, "It wasn't your fault and I know he provoked whatever happened! Don't plead guilty because we can get at least 100 witnesses to testify that Galle is an over zealous [sic] guard who has a personal agenda to punish and harass inmates. You tell your lawyer to get ahold [sic] of me on this. Don't take a plea bargain unless it's for no more time." Because Murphy was classified as high-security and Tracy was classified as maximum-security, Murphy could not visit Tracy in the prison. Maximum-security inmates could only be visited by an inmate law clerk classified as low-security. Defendant prison guard Robert Shaw intercepted Murphy's letter and charged him with violating three prison rules: insolence, interference with due process hearings, and conduct which disrupts the orderly operation of the prison. After a hearing officer found Murphy guilty of violating the prison rules against insolence and interference with due process hearings, Shaw sued in federal court, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. A federal trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant prison officials. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that inmates possess a First Amendment right to assist prison officials with legal matters. The prison officials appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. Prison officials do not violate inmates' First Amendment rights if the prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Inmate-to-inmate correspondence poses special security concerns for prison officials. Id.
This Court has recognized that certain courtroom practices are so inherently prejudicial that they deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-506, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). In this case, a state court held that buttons displaying the victim's image worn by the victim's family during respondent's trial did not deny respondent his right to a fair trial. We must decide whether that holding was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We hold that it was not.
This case requires us to consider whether disclosure of the home addresses of federal civil service employees by their employing agency pursuant to a request made by the employees' collective-bargaining representative under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U. S. C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion" of the employees' personal privacy within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552. Concluding that it would, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
This case requires us to decide whether two federal law enforcement agents are immune from suit for allegedly ar- resting a suspect in retaliation for his political speech, when the agents had probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a federal crime.

References: § 2680
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 § 231
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 §123470
 § 409
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 § 2254
 § 552