Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180305_0000606.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:37:24+00:00

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FindACase | Pharmarx LLC. v. 340Basics Inc.
Pharmarx LLC. v. 340Basics Inc.
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before this Court are (1) Plaintiff PharmaRx LLC's (“PharmaRx”) Motion to Remand (ECF No. 11) and (2) Defendant 340Basics Inc.'s (“340Basics”) Motion to Partially Dismiss PharmaRx's Complaint (ECF No. 5). For the reasons set forth herein, PharmaRx's Motion to Remand is GRANTED, and 340Basics' Motion to Partially Dismiss PharmaRx's Complaint is DENIED AS MOOT.
A notice of removal of a civil action must be filed by a defendant within thirty (30) days of receiving the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). However, where it is not evident from the face of the complaint that a case is removable, “a notice of removal may be filed within thirty [(30)] days after receipt by Defendants . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may be first ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
Upon the removal of an action, a plaintiff may challenge such removal by moving to remand the case back to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Grounds for remand include: “(1) lack of district court subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal process.” PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993). A motion for remand on the basis of a procedural defect in the removal must be filed within thirty (30) days of the notice of removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), whereas “a motion to remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time before final judgment, ” Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
“The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that at all stages of the litigation the case is properly before the federal court.” Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). Federal courts rigorously enforce the congressional intent to restrict federal diversity jurisdiction, and therefore removal statutes are “strictly construed against removal” and “doubts must be resolved in favor of remand.” Id. at 396-403. Additionally, when a case is removed, “all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
While the Agreement was executed after the creation of 340B Technologies, the Court finds 340Basics has not met its burden of showing jurisdiction is proper. See Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 396 (“The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that at all stages of the litigation the case is properly before the federal court.”). The Agreement inexplicably refers to “340Basics, Inc.” as a Delaware corporation located in New York, without mention of 340B Technologies, and contains 340Basics, Inc. letterhead. (ECF No. 11 Ex. 1.) In fact, the name “340B Technologies” did not appear in this litigation until 340Basics mentioned the entity in its Opposition Brief to PharmaRx's Motion. To the extent the Agreement is ambiguous as to which entity is the proper party, that ambiguity must be construed against 340Basics. Jacobson v. Sassower, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 1282 (N.Y. 1985) (“In cases of doubt or ambiguity, a contract must be construed most strongly against the party who prepared it.”).

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