Source: https://1attorneys.net/reynolds-v-florida-decided-11-13-2018/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:47:41+00:00

Document:
Statement of Justice Breyer respecting the denial of certiorari.
536 U. S. 584 (2002), which similarly held that the death penalty scheme of a different State, Arizona, violated the Constitution because it required a judge rather than a jury to find the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court has declined, however, to apply Hurst retroactively to capital defendants whose sentences became final before Ring. Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (2017). As a result, capital defendants whose sentences became final before 2002 cannot prevail on a “Hurst-is-retroactive” claim.
Many of the Florida death penalty cases in which we have denied certiorari in recent weeks involve—directly or indirectly—three important issues regarding the death penalty as it is currently administered. First, these cases highlight what I have previously described as a serious flaw in the death penalty system: the unconscionably long delays that capital defendants must endure as they await execution. Henry Sireci, the petitioner in one case we recently denied, was first sentenced to death in 1976. He has lived in prison under threat of execution for nearly 42 years. Unfortunately, Sireci is far from alone in having endured lengthy delays. The Court has recently denied petitions from at least 10 other capital defendants in Florida who have lived under a death sentence for more than 30 years, and from at least 50 other capital defendants who have lived under a death sentence for more than 20 years. I have previously written that lengthy delays—made inevitable by the Constitution’s procedural protections for defendants facing execution—deepen the cruelty of the death penalty and undermine its penological rationale. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 19); see Dunn v. Madison, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (concurring opinion) (slip op., at 2); Smith v. Ryan, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (statement respecting denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1); Sireci v. Flor-ida, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1). I remain of that view. However, because the petitioners in these cases did not squarely raise the delay issue, I do not vote to grant certiorari on that basis here.
542 U. S. 348 (2004), where we held that Ring does not apply retroactively. Although I dissented in Schriro, I am bound by the majority’s holding in that case. I therefore do not dissent on that ground here.
391 U. S. 510, 519 (1968).
472 U. S. 320, 328–329 (1985). For the reasons set out in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, post, at 3–7, I believe the Court should grant certiorari on that question in an appropriate case. That said, I would not grant certiorari on that question here. In many of these cases, the Florida Supreme Court did not fully consider that question, or the defendants may not have properly raised it. That may ultimately impede, or at least complicate, our review.
Nonetheless, the three issues raised by these cases draw into focus a more basic point I made in Schriro: A death sentence should reflect a jury’s “community-based judgment that the sentence constitutes proper retribution.” 542 U. S., at 360 (dissenting opinion). It seems to me that the jurors in at least some of these cases might not have made a “community-based judgment” that a death sentence was “proper retribution” had they known at the time of sentencing (1) that the death penalty might not be administered for another 40 years or more; (2) that other defendants who were sentenced years later would be entitled to resentencing based on a later-discovered error, but that the defendants in question would not be entitled to the same remedy for roughly the same error; or (3) that the jury’s death recommendation would be treated as if it were decisive, despite the judge’s instruction that the jury’s recommendation was merely advisory. Had jurors known about these issues at the time of sentencing, some might have hesitated before recommending a death sentence. At least a few might have recommended a life sentence instead. The result is that some defendants who have lived under threat of execution for decades might never have been sentenced to death in the first place.
The flaws in the current practice of capital punishment could often cast serious doubt on the death sentences imposed in these and other capital cases. Rather than attempting to address the flaws in piecemeal fashion, however, I remain of the view that “it would be wiser to reconsider the root cause of the problem—the constitutionality of the death penalty itself.” Madison, supra, at ___ (Breyer, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3).
Justice Thomas, concurring in denial of certiorari.
On the night of July 21, 1998, petitioner Michael Gordon Reynolds murdered nearly an entire family. While the father, Danny Ray Privett, relieved himself outside the family’s camping trailer, petitioner snuck up behind him and “viciously and deliberately battered [his] skull with a piece of concrete.” Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1157 (Fla. 2006) (Reynolds I ). Petitioner would later explain: “ ‘[W]ith my record’ ”—which included aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery—“ ‘I couldn’t afford to leave any witnesses.’ ” Id., at 1149, 1157. So petitioner entered the trailer, where he brutally beat, stabbed, and murdered Privett’s girlfriend, Robin Razor, and their 11-year-old daughter, Christina Razor. Robin “suffered multiple stab wounds along with multiple blows to the side of her face and a broken neck resulting in injuries to her spinal cord.” Id., at 1136. She desperately fought back, suffering “significant defensive wounds” and “torment wounds”—shallow slashes that occur when “the perpetrator tak[es] a depraved, measured approach to the infliction of the injury and tak[es] pleasure in his cruel activity.” Id., at 1136, 1153. Eleven-year-old Christina also resisted, suffering “blunt force trauma to her head, a stab wound to the base of her neck that pierced her heart, and another stab wound to her right shoulder that pierced her lung and lacerated her pulmonary artery.” Id., at 1136. Only petitioner knows whether Robin had to watch her daughter die, or whether Christina had to watch her mother die. “Regardless, in the close confines of that cramped camping trailer, Christina Razor, in great pain and fear, was forced to fight a losing battle for her life knowing that either her mother had already been killed and she was next or that after Reynolds killed her, he was sure to end her mother’s life.” Id., at 1154. “For a child to experience the fear, terror and emotional strain that accompanied Christina Razor as she fought for her life, knowing full well that she was fighting a losing battle, is unimaginable, heinous, atrocious and cruel.” Ibid. “Christina was found not wearing any underwear,” and petitioner’s DNA was matched to both a pubic hair and Christina’s underwear, both found near her body. Reynolds v. State, 99 So. 3d 459, 487–488, 501 (Fla. 2012). The sole surviving family member, Danielle, “was spared only because she was spending the night with a friend.” Stutzman, Judge Gives Killer Death Sentence, Orlando Sentinel, Sept. 20, 2003, p. B7, col. 1. Danielle was devastated; “she wished she’d been home that night” to “f[ight] the attacker and tr[y] to save her sister and parents” or “di[e] alongside them.” Ibid.
556 U. S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (alterations omitted) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F. 3d 924, 933 (CA4 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring in judgment)).
528 U. S. 990, 991 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). As “the Drum Major in this parade” of new precedents, Justice Breyer is not well positioned to complain about their inevitable consequences. Glossip, supra, at ___ (Scalia, J., concurring) (slip op., at 6).
Justice Breyer’s second concern is that petitioner’s jury might have declined to impose the death penalty if it had known that other capital defendants “would be entitled to resentencing,” while petitioner himself would not be resentenced. Ante, at 4. What this has to do with the original jury’s judgment as to “ ‘proper retribution,’ ” ibid., is beyond me. Petitioner murdered Danielle Privett’s entire family. Whether he deserves to be sentenced to death has nothing to do with whether a different person who engaged in different conduct might be entitled to be resentenced on procedural grounds. Moreover, if peti-tioner had been resentenced, and was again sentenced to death, I have little doubt that Justice Breyer would instead be fretting that the original jury failed to consider his belief that resentencing “sharpen[s]” “[d]eath row’s inevitable anxieties and uncertainties.” Foster, supra, at 993 (opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Justice Breyer’s third concern is that petitioner was “sentenced to death under a scheme that required the judge to make the ultimate decision to impose the death penalty, and in which the jury was repeatedly instructed that its recommended verdict would be advisory.” Ante, at 3. Once again, petitioner did not share Justice Breyer’s concern. “After thorough consultation with his attorneys and the trial court,” petitioner waived “his right to a jury’s penalty recommendation as to the appropriate sentence” and “waived the presentation of mitigating evidence before the penalty phase jury.” Reynolds I, 934 So. 2d, at 1138, 1148. When the trial court did not allow petitioner to waive the jury’s involvement, petitioner appealed, arguing that “the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it refused to honor” his waiver. Id., at 1147–1148.
Contrary to Justice Breyer’s suggestion that the jury did not feel an adequate sense of “responsibility” for its recommendation, ante, at 3, the jury was instructed that a “ ‘human life is at stake’ ” and that the trial court could reject the jury’s recommendation “ ‘only if the facts [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.’ ” 251 So. 3d 811, 813, 828 (Fla. 2018) ( per curiam). The jury was further instructed that its recommendation did not need to be unanimous. Id., at 815. Nonetheless, the jury returned not one but two unanimous death recommendations. Ibid.
Justice Breyer’s final (and actual) concern is with the “ ‘death penalty itself.’ ” Ante, at 4. As I have elsewhere explained, “it is clear that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S 35, 94 (2008) (opinion concurring in judgment); see Glossip, supra, at ___–___, and n. 1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 1–2, and n. 1). The only thing “cruel and unusual” in this case was petitioner’s brutal murder of three innocent victims.

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