Source: https://mdappblog.com/2015/05/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 20:23:12+00:00

Document:
Sublet v. State: It is what it is… or is it?
One of the more ubiquitous idiomatic phrases used in recent years has been, “It is what it is.” In three consolidated cases decided last month by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Court turned that phrase around and focused on the question, “Is it what it is?” – or, more precisely, “Is it what it says it is?” On April 23, 2015, Judge Battaglia issued the Majority’s opinion in Sublet v. State, Sept. Term 2014, No. 42; Harris v. State, Sept. Term 2014, No. 59; and Monge-Martinez v. State, Sept. Term 2014, No. 60. The cases concerned the authentication of information derived from social media, required the Court to expand on its four-year-old decision in Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343 (2011), and inquired whether three trial judges had suitably answered whether the proffered social media “was what it says it was.” As part of that inquiry, the Court of Appeals adopted a standard to be used by trial judges in resolving the authentication issue. But, as will be discussed, the standard chosen by the Court presents yet another question: what standard of appellate review should be employed in assessing a trial court’s decision on authenticity?
At long last, the Supreme Court today issued its ruling affirming the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Comptroller v. Wynne, 431 Md. 147 (2013). The Supreme Court’s opinion is here. Justice Alito wrote for the 5-to-4 majority, holding that Maryland’s income tax scheme violates the dormant commerce clause. In the kind of unusual lineup we expect in dormant commerce clause cases, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented.
The decision could cost Maryland and its localities $200 million in tax refunds. Although the taxpayers were disputing their Howard County income tax, the hardest-hit locality is Montgomery County, which has many residents who earn income in Washington, D.C. or Virginia.
For our previous coverage of Comptroller v. Wynne, click here. The filings (including some excellent briefing by Hogan Lovells in a tough case) are available here.
A century ago, pleading causes of action presented many traps for the unwary; entire cases could collapse over minor imperfections or pleading errors. Such rigid formalism ended in 1938 with enactment of the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rules 8 and 15 provide much more liberal standards for pleading and amending causes of action, even allowing some plaintiffs to amend their complaints after their trials have ended. But, as the Fourth Circuit recently reminded practitioners in Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Crystal Ridge Development, Inc., No. 13-2234, — F.3d —-, (4th Cir. April 20, 2015), Rule 15’s capacity to accommodate pleading errors has its limits.

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