Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2017/2017massappdiv96.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:48:59+00:00

Document:
Present: Coven, P.J., Singh & Crane, JJ.
Matthew T. LaMothe for the plaintiff.
Glenda H. Ganem for the defendant.
SINGH, J. Plaintiff Robert S. Almeida, D.C. ("Almeida") appeals from the dismissal of his case, brought to collect personal injury protection ("PIP") insurance benefits owed to his chiropractic patients, after the court directed a verdict in favor of defendant Encompass Insurance Company of Massachusetts ("Encompass"). [Note 1] Almeida contends that the court erroneously allowed Encompass's motion for directed verdict based on his failure to introduce into evidence the relevant insurance policy. Additionally, he claims that the judge erred in allowing Encompass's motion to exclude the patients' medical records from evidence at trial. We agree and therefore return the case for trial.
Just prior to the trial of this matter, Encompass moved in limine for exclusion of medical records proffered by Almeida, pursuant to G.L. c. 233, § 79G, on the basis that the certification required by the statute did not accompany the notice of intent to offer such records that Almeida had timely provided to Encompass. Although counsel for Almeida indicated that Almeida would certify the records that day, as he would be present to testify, the court allowed Encompass's motion and excluded the records. Counsel for Almeida therefore proceeded to trial with the testimony of Almeida, Almeida's patients, and the Encompass employee who handled Almeida's claim.
found indication of an accident, and declared the automobile to be a total loss. It paid the couple's bills from Massachusetts General Hospital, but it did not pay Almeida's bills. At the close of Almeida's case, the court directed a verdict in favor of Encompass.
1. Exclusion of medical records. As Almeida correctly argues, G.L. c. 233, § 79G does not require any certification of records to be sent to the opposing party prior to trial. Rather, the statute requires that, in order to be admissible at trial, the records must be "subscribed and sworn to under the penalties of perjury" by the physician rendering the services referenced in the records. G.L. c. 233, § 79G. Thus, "attestation by the physician . . . does not have to be included with the notice so long as it is present when the evidence is offered at trial." Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(C) note (2017), citing Knight v. Maersk Container Serv. Co., 49 Mass. App. Ct. 254 , 256 (2000). Here, Almeida's notice of intent to offer medical records pursuant to G.L. c. 233, § 79G indicated that the records were that of "Robert S. Almeida D.C.," pertaining to the care of the patients involved in the litigation. Thus, Almeida, who was a witness at trial, was in a position to certify the records, making them admissible at trial. Accordingly, the records should not have been excluded on the basis that the physician's attestation had not been sent to opposing counsel in advance. Given the nature of the case, the erroneous exclusion of medical records was prejudicial. Albright v. Boston Scientific Corp., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 213 , 224 (2016), citing DeJesus v. Yogel, 404 Mass. 44 , 48-49 (1989) (substantial rights of party adversely affected when relevant evidence is erroneously excluded that could have made material difference).
2. Allowance of motion for directed verdict. On appeal from the allowance of a motion for directed verdict, the court must evaluate whether "anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be made" in favor of the plaintiff. O'Brien v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377 , 383 (2007), quoting Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634 , 656 (1989). To establish his claim for PIP benefits, Almeida was required to establish four elements: (1) an accident occurred, (2) the patients' injuries and their related treatment by Almeida's establishment were causally related to the accident, (3) a Massachusetts automobile liability policy issued by Encompass and covering the vehicle involved in the accident was in effect on the accident date, and (4) there are unpaid amounts due to Almeida for the treatment provided. Advanced Spine Ctrs., Inc. v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 Mass. App. Div. 1 , 3, citing Provenzano v. Arbella Mut. Inc. Co., 2007 Mass. App. Div. 46 , 47.
Accordingly, the judgment for the defendant is vacated, the allowance of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict is reversed, and this case is returned to Chelsea District Court for a new trial.
[Note 1] The PIP statute, G.L. c. 90, § 34M, allows medical providers to bring suit directly against insurance carriers in order to collect insurance benefits due to patients for the purpose of paying medical bills.
[Note 2] During argument on Encompass's motion for directed verdict, Almeida's counsel stated that he had intended to offer a copy of the "Standard Massachusetts Automobile Policy, 8th Edition." The record is unclear as to whether it was actually offered and excluded or never offered at all. In any event, Almeida did not assign as error any exclusion of the policy.
[Note 3] If a motion for directed verdict presents a close question, the "recommended procedure" is to defer ruling and let the case go to the jury; if necessary, the issue may be addressed in the context of a motion notwithstanding the verdict. Cambridgeport Sav. Bank v. Boersner, 413 Mass. 432 , 438 n.9 (1992).

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