Source: https://texasdefensecounsel.com/2015/08/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 11:52:57+00:00

Document:
PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices ANDERSON and SEYMORE.
Appellant, Charles Hartland, filed suit against appellee, Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company, after the denial of an auto-insurance claim for a single-car accident. The jury found appellant did not mail the premium to renew the policy until after the policy had expired; therefore, appellant did not have insurance when the accident occurred. On appeal, appellant contends the parties formed a contract under the terms of the original renewal policy when appellee accepted his premium payment, and therefore, the policy cov-ered the accident. In addition, appellant argues appellee violated the Texas Administrative Code when it denied his claim. We affirm.
Appellant, Charles Hartland, obtained auto insurance through appellee, Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company. Policy number 37156966-1 began on November 9, 2003, at 12:01 a.m. and ended on May 9, 2004, at 12:01 a.m. Appellee sent appellant a renewal bill on April 14, and a renewal reminder on April 23, stating the renewal policy period would run from May 9 to November 9. Appellant claimed he mailed a check in the amount of the renewal premium on May 8; appellee attached a lockbox report to its counter-claim for declaratory judgment showing the postmark date was May 11. Joan Hartland, appellant’s wife, was in a single-car accident on May 9, 2004 at approximately 8:00 a.m., damaging a car covered under the initial policy.
Appellee presented evidence that it received appellant’s check on May 16, and on May 18, appellee sent appellant a revised renewal declarations page. Policy number 37156966-2 listed coverage dates from May 12, 2004, at 12:01 a.m. to November 12, 2004, at 12:00 a.m., excluding coverage for the date of the accident. Appellant requested review by appellee of the denial of the claim. On August 6, appellee again denied the claim, stating the policy was not in effect at the time of the loss. On December 29, appellant’s attorney sent a letter asking appellee to reconsider; appellee denied the claim once again.
Appellant filed an original petition, alleging breach of contract, unfair claim-settlement practice, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, damages, and attorney fees. Appellee filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, stating it owed no duty or obligation to Hartland because the policy had expired. Appellee also filed a motion for summary judgment with the same contention as the declaratory judgment. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment and the case went to trial. The jury answered “No” to the following question: “Do you find that Charles Hartland deposited his renewal policy premium payment with the post office on or before 12:01 a.m. on May 9, 2004?”Appellant then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to disregard jury findings, arguing that even if he mailed his payment after the policy period ended, appellee formed a contract based on the original terms of the renewal by accepting his payment. The trial court denied appellant’s motion and entered final judgment on the verdict.
In three issues on appeal appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because: (1) the parties formed an enforceable contract as a matter of law; and (2) appellee violated sections of the Texas Administrative Code, making any attempts to restrict appellant’s coverage void.FN1Therefore, we will construe appellant’s three issues as actually raising two issues on appeal.
FN1. Appellant raised only the Administrative Code and has not based any assertion of error by the trial court on the provisions of the Texas Insurance Code. Therefore, we do not address what, if any, impact the Insurance Code might have on the facts found in this case. See Valadez v. Avitia. 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.)(holding that, in a civil case, an appellate court has no duty, or even the right to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error).
A court may disregard a jury’s verdict and render judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) if no evidence supports the jury’s findings, or if a directed verdict would have been proper. Tiller v. McClure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 713 ( Tex.2003). To determine whether a JNOV is appropriate, we apply the standards that govern “no evidence,” i.e., legal-sufficiency review. See Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 ( Tex.2005); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 102 S.W.3d 706, 709 ( Tex.2003).
A legal-sufficiency point must be sustained: (1) when there is a complete absence of a vital fact; (2) when rules of law or evidence preclude according weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) when the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. Under the legal-sufficiency standard, we must credit evidence that supports the judgment if reasonable jurors could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. See id. at 827.If the evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we may not invade the fact-finding role of the jurors, who alone determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to give their testimony, and whether to accept or reject all or any part of that testimony. See id. at 822.Unless “there is no favorable evidence” to support the challenged finding or “if contrary evidence renders supporting evidence incompetent … or conclusively es-tablishes the opposite” of the finding, we must affirm. See id. at 810-11.
In his first issue, appellant argues that the jury’s answer to question one of the charge is immaterial because an enforceable contract exists as a matter of law. Specifically, appellant contends the parties formed a contract under the original terms of the renewal policy when appellee retained payment on the forfeited policy. Appellant raised this issue for the first time in his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Appellee characterizes this argument as an affirmative defense of waiver and asserts that appellant cannot raise this argument on appeal because it must have been pleaded or tried by consent. Assuming without deciding that appellant has properly preserved his complaint on appeal, appellant’s first issue is without merit.
If we offer to renew or continue and you or your representative do not accept, this policy will automatically terminate at the end of the current policy period. Failure to pay the required renewal or continuation premium when due shall mean that you have not accepted our offer.
The renewal notice and bill sent by appellee provided the following payment instructions to appellant: “To renew your policy, please pay at least the minimum amount due by the due date.”The jury found that appellant did not pay his premium on time. Because appellant failed to timely pay the renewal premium, the condition for acceptance of the renewal policy was not met and the policy did not begin, leaving appellant without insurance coverage when the accident occurred. See Id. at *4 (holding because insured did not timely pay renewal premium, policy was not canceled but expired under its own terms and once insured paid renewal premium insurer properly renewed policy effective on the date of the insured’s payment); Zuniga, 693 S.W.2d at 738 (holding that since the renewal payment was not made in accordance with the terms of the policy, the renewal policy never came into existence); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 503 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating offer for renewal of auto insurance could not come to fruition until premium paid); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 215 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1948, no writ) (stating no completed contract when insured did not indicate acceptance of renewal policy).
Relying heavily on the Texas Supreme Court case Bailey v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., appellant con-tends the parties formed an enforceable contract when appellee accepted appellant’s late premium payment. Bailey was a member of Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., a fraternal benefit society. Bailey v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 116 Tex. 160, 165, 286 S.W. 456, 456 (1926). As part of his membership, Bailey was issued a benefit certificate for $2,000, payable to his wife upon his death. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Bailey, 277 S.W. 782, 783 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1925), rev’d, 116 Tex. 160, 286 S.W. 456 (1926). After Bailey died, his wife made a claim for the benefit certificate. Id. at 783.The organization denied the claim, stating that Bailey was never legally reinstated after his suspension for failure to pay his May dues. Id.
First. The insurer must have knowledge of the facts constituting the forfeiture of the certificate. Second. The forfeiture must be complete and absolute. Third. There must be some unequivocal act on the part of the insurer which recognizes the continuance of the policy, or which is wholly inconsistent with the forfeiture.
Bailey, 116 Tex. at 166, 286 S.W. at 457.
When the initial policy expired, the relationship between appellant and appellee had ended according to the terms of the initial policy. In Bailey, the organization chose to reinstate Bailey as a member, giving him the right to his existing benefit certificate. In this case, there was no policy in existence. When appellant paid the renewal premium, appellee issued a new policy effective on the date of payment. Unlike Bailey, appellant did not forfeit the right to an existing policy by not paying the premium and then resurrect it when appellee accepted the premium; the policy expired and a new policy did not begin until appellant paid the premium. See Davis, 503 S.W.2d at 377 (holding no insurance coverage on day of auto accident when insured paid renewal premium one day after accident); Rogers, 215 S.W.2d at 352, (holding no insurance coverage on day of auto accident when insured paid renewal premium three days after accident).
Therefore, we overrule appellant’s first issue on appeal.
In his second issue, appellant asserts appellee violated various sections of the Texas Administrative Code in its handling of appellant’s policy. Appellant did not raise this issue until his reply to appellee’s response to his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Assuming without deciding appellant properly preserved his complaint on appeal, appellant’s second issue is also without merit.
Appellant is correct that Texas Administrative Code section 5.7005(c) provides “[p]ersonal automobile policies which are written for a period of less than one year must be renewed, at the option of the insured, for additional periods so as to accumulate a minimum of 12 months’ continuous coverage.”28 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.7005(c) (2008). However, coverage can terminate if premium payments are not made to renew the policy before the initial policy expires. See Viking County Mutual Ins., 1992 WL 211068, at *3 (con-cluding that even though policies written for less than a year must be renewed at the option of the insured, a policy terminates under its own terms if the insured does not timely pay the renewal premium); Longoria v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ) (concluding policies written for less than one year must be renewed unless premium payments are not made before expiration of initial policy). Here, appellee offered to renew appellant’s six-month policy for an additional six months; however, appellant exercised his option to not renew the policy by failing to make a timely payment to renew the policy, thus ensuring continuous coverage for a one year period of time. Therefore, because the policy expired under its own terms when appellant failed to timely remit his payment to renew his policy, appellee did not violate section 5.7005(c) of the Texas Administrative Code.
*5 Appellant also claims appellee violated section 5.7007 of the Texas Administrative Code. According to section 5.7007(a), “[a] policy must be renewed at expiration, at the option of the policyholder, unless the company has mailed written notice to the policyholder of its intention to decline renewal at least 30 days in advance of the policy expiration date.”28 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.7007(a). Appellee did not have an intention to decline renewal; in fact, appellee offered to renew the policy, at the option of appellant, by sending appellant the notice of renewal. A notice of cancellation is not required when a policy expires under its own terms. See Zuniga, 693 S.W.2d at 738. Because appellant’s policy had expired under its own terms, we hold appellee was not obligated to comply with the cancellation procedures found in section 5.7007(a) of the Texas Administrative Code.
Appellant next contends appellee violated sections 5.7011 and 5.7014 of the Texas Administrative Code. However, pursuant to section 5.7001(b), sections 5.7011 and 5.7014 apply to all automobile insurance policies except personal automobile policies. 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.7001(b). Since appellant’s policy was a personal automobile insurance policy, sections 5.7011 and 5.7014 do not apply and appellee was not required to comply with any procedures found therein.
Any company that declines to recognize or put into effect additional coverage to which an insured is entitled under the provisions of an existing policy, or that attempts to reduce or restrict coverage under the provisions of an existing policy by endorsements or by any other means, is in violation of these sections if such acts are performed without the consent of the insured, and shall be subject to the same penalties as a policy that is cancelled in violation of these sections.
28 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.7004.
Because appellant’s policy expired under its own terms, appellee did not (1) impose a restriction or reduction on his coverage; or (2) decline to recognize or put into effect additional coverage. See Zuniga, 693 S.W.2d at 738. Therefore, we hold appellee did not violate section 5.7004 and overrule appellant’s second issue on appeal.
Having overruled appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SEYMORE, J., dissenting without opinion.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Fort Worth, Texas insurance defense attorneys in Tarrant County who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
Before GARWOOD, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
it denied Kimberly-Clark its equitable share of the $325 million distribution.
growth in the surplus funds.
Clark’s policy expired on October 1, 2003.
record” (or record date) as September 30, 2003.
See, e.g., In re MetLife Demutualization 2 Litig. 495 F. Supp. 2d 310, 313 (E.D.N.Y.
removal to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
and remaining Texas Insurance Code claims.
member of Factory Mutual on the record date, breaches the Policy.
erred in concluding that Factory Mutual breached its contract.
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.
from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Turner v.
Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
controlling member of the insurer-company. See, e.g., Keystone Auto. Club Cas.
Co. v. Comm’r, 122 F.2d 886, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1941); Ohio Farmers Indem. Co. v.
Comm’r, 108 F.2d 665, 667 (6th Cir. 1940); Hutchins Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v.
other co-members about corporate governance and internal affairs.
Highlanders, 299 N.W. 467, 471 (Neb. 1941); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 429 S.E.2d 304, 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Greeff v.
not conflict. Compare Cates v. Sparkman, 11 S.W. 846, 849 (Tex. 1889) with Lynch v. John W.
conflict, this court need not undertake a choice-of-law analysis. See Railroad Mgmt. Co., L.L.C.
returned to the policy holder.
cannot be said to be a mutual insurance company.” Am. Ins. Co. of Tex. v.
providing insurance “at cost.” See, e.g., Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Germantown v.
Can., 737 F. Supp. 1058, 1062-63 (S.D. Ind. 1989); C.J. Simons & Co. v. Am.
to maintain the insurance with its legal reserve.
at which point it no longer has a competing interest over the funds.
are to be treated as a trust fund for the members. . . .
be restricted to current policyholders.
have rights at that time. Zinn,111 N.W. at 1108.
credit when their policies renew during the membership credit period.” (emphasis added).
“business judgment rule,” a point conceded by Factory Mutual.
liability to pay dividends on the declaration date to the stockholders “of record”).
as determining which shareholders have rights to a stock dividend); R. I. GEN.
stockholders of record on the declaration date. See, e.g., Cohen, 121 F.2d at 349.
the record date, was entitled to participate in the distributed surplus.
underlying mutual insurance we described above. See Mut. Ben. Liab. Ins. Co.
67 S.W. 19, 21, opinion modified on other grounds, 68 S.W. 1081 (Ky. Ct. App.
the policyholders were thereby borrowing against and depleting the company’s capital stock.
had contributed to the accumulated capital stock. Therefore, these cases are inapposite.
reasons, the order is not persuasive.
distribution from a surplus that was created, in part, by their past contributions.
based on their equitable share as calculated pursuant to the board’s formulas.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
nevertheless claims an entitlement to a share of the $325 million surplus.
share in surplus may, however, be restricted to current policyholders.”).
complain, because it had no right to any distribution of any of the surplus.
resolution of October 9, 2003.
the company’s financial success or failure.” LEE RUSS & THOMAS SEGALLA, 3 COUCH ON INS.
8006.6, 8009.1, 8010.3, and 8010.4.
8010.3, and 8010.4, as set forth in the attachment to Special Order No. 2-84.
and 8010.4 are repealed effective September 1,201 5.
The Clerk of Court is directed to make the necessary distribution.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Fort Worth, Texas civil litigation lawyers in Tarrant County who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
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All accessory structures require a building permit. This may include gazebos, outdoor fireplaces, fountains with plumbing, wind turbines, solar panels, radio towers, swimming pools, including prefabricated above-ground pools over 5,000 gallons, freestanding satellite dishes over 12 feet tall, retaining walls over 4 feet tall, etc. There are additional specific zoning requirements associated with the location, maximum height and square footage, depending on property lot size. For more information, refer to Chapter 5 Supplemental Use Standards, Article 5.301 of the Zoning Ordinance.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Fort Worth, Texas construction lawyers in Tarrant County who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
The Hearing Officer determined that Claimant was entitled to SIBs for the third quarter in spite of a job offer letter from the Employer. The Claimant took the “job offer” letter to his attorney and the attorney wrote for clarification. The Employer did not answer.
The Appeals Panel affirmed and stated that there is no prohibition against communicating with one’s employer or carrier through an attorney. They also stated that Rule 129.5 may be used as guidance in determining the bona fide nature of a job offer (Appeal 961570).
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Fort Worth, Texas workers’ compensation defense lawyers in Tarrant County who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
What information does a residential contractor in Fort Worth, Texas need to know before the plan to execute a project is begun?
Before you plan the location of your next project, you need to make sure that the location is allowed. Each residential property has an area around the perimeter of the property that is a required yard. This area is required to be open from the ground to the sky unobstructed and can be a side yard, rear yard, front yard or projected front yard. The sizes of the yards vary by the zoning classification for the property. For the correct setback for your property’s zoning classification, please refer to Chapter 4 District Regulations, Article 7 Residential Districts of the Zoning Ordinance. If you are unsure if your project’s chosen location is located in one of these required yards, please contact a zoning staff member with the City of Fort Worth at 817-392-8028.
TABLE 1-C-1 A, B, E, H, I, & M USE GROUPS NEW CONSTRUCTION OR ADDITION BUILDING PERMIT FEES NEW SQUARE FOOTAGE Permit Fee1, 2, 3 0 to 30 $76.86 ($46.11)* >30 to 400 (a) $76.86 (b) $0.955 (a) for first 30 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 400 >400 to 790 (a) $430.51 (b) $0.711 (a) for first 400 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 790 >790 to 1365 (a) $708.14 (b) $0.668 (a) for first 790 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 1365 >1365 to 5850 (a) $1092.53 (b) $0.533 (a) for first 1365 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 5850 >5850 to 18,000 (a) $3484.33 (b) $0.210 (a) for the first 5850 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 18,000 >18,000 (a) $6047.01 (b) $0.191 (a) for the first 18,000 square feet (b) for each additional square foot *New square footage associated with existing R-3 Use Group or their existing accessory U Use Groups shall be charged the fee in ( ). 1 When plan review and field inspections are performed by Third Party, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 25% (0.25). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 2 When plan review is performed by Third Party with field inspections performed by City Staff, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 70% (0.70). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 3 When plan review is performed by City Staff with field inspections performed by Third Party, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 55% (0.55). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure.
TABLE 1-C-2 F & S USE GROUPS NEW CONSTRUCTION OR ADDITION BUILDING PERMIT FEES NEW SQUARE FOOTAGE Permit Fee1, 2, 3 0 to 75 $76.86 ($46.11)* >75 to 1080 (a) $76.86 (b) $0.351 (a) for first 75 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 1080 >1080 to 1980 (a) $430.51 (b) $0.308 (a) for first 1080 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 1980 >1980 to 3365 (a) $708.14 (b) $0.277 (a) for first 1980 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 3365 >3365 to 24,675 (a) $1092.53 (b) $0.112 (a) for first 3365 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 24,675 >24,675 to 50,050 (a) $3484.33 (b) $0.100 (a) for the first 24,675 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 50,050 >50,050 (a) $6047.01 (b) $0.096 (a) for the first 50,050 square feet (b) for each additional square foot *New square footage associated with existing R-3 Use Group or their existing accessory U Use Groups shall be charged the fee in ( ). 1 When plan review and field inspections are performed by Third Party, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 25% (0.25). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 2 When plan review is performed by Third Party with field inspections performed by City Staff, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 70% (0.70). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 3 When plan review is performed by City Staff with field inspections performed by Third Party, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 55% (0.55). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure.
TABLE 1-C-3 R USE GROUPS NEW CONSTRUCTION OR ADDITION BUILDING PERMIT FEES NEW SQUARE FOOTAGE Permit Fee1, 2, 3 0 to 65 $76.86 ($46.11)* >65 to 700 (a) $76.86 (b) $0.556 (a) for first 65 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 700 >700 to 1400 (a) $430.51 (b) $0.396 (a) for first 700 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 1400 >1400 to 2700 (a) $708.14 (b) $0.295 (a) for first 1400 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 2700 >2700 to 11,800 (a) $1092.53 (b) $0.262 (a) for first 2700 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 11,800 >11,800 to 24,500 (a) $3484.33 (b) $0.201 (a) for the first 11,800 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 24,500 >24,500 (a) $6047.01 (b) $0.148 (a) for the first 24,500 square feet (b) for each additional square foot *New square footage associated with existing R-3 Use Group or their existing accessory U Use Groups shall be charged the fee in ( ). 1 When plan review and field inspections are performed by Third Party, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 25% (0.25). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 2 When plan review is performed by Third Party with field inspections performed by City Staff, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 70% (0.70). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 3 When plan review is performed by City Staff with field inspections performed by Third Party, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 55% (0.55). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure.
TABLE 1-C-4 U USE GROUP NEW CONSTRUCTION OR ADDITION BUILDING PERMIT FEES NEW SQUARE FOOTAGE Permit Fee1, 2, 3 0 to 175 $76.86 ($46.11)* >175 to 2500 (a) $76.86 (b) $0.152 (a) for first 175 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 2500 >2500 to 5200 (a) $430.51 (b) $0.102 (a) for first 2500 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 5200 >5200 to 10,200 (a) $708.14 (b) $0.076 (a) for first 5200 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 10,200 >10,200 to 46,500 (a) $1092.53 (b) $0.065 (a) for first 10,200 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 46,500 >46,500 to 96,500 (a) $3484.33 (b) $0.051 (a) for the first 46,500 square feet (b) for each additional square foot, to and including 96,500 >96,500 (a) $6047.01 (b) $0.041 (a) for the first 96,500 square feet (b) for each additional square foot *New square footage associated with existing R-3 Use Group or their existing accessory U Use Groups shall be charged the fee in ( ). 1 When plan review and field inspections are performed by Third Party, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 25% (0.25). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 2 When plan review is performed by Third Party with field inspections performed by City Staff, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 70% (0.70). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 3 When plan review is performed by City Staff with field inspections performed by Third Party, the permit fee shall be reduced by multiplying the sum by 55% (0.55). The resulting amount will be calculated to the penny with no rounding for the tenth of a penny figure. 3210.5 Fee. Along with the Consent Agreements the applicant shall pay a nonrefundable application fee as follows: Approval Fee Building Official $170.00 Development Director $200.00 City Council $500.00.
(a) If the judgment debtor shows the court that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, that the time for taking an appeal has not expired, or that a stay of execution has been granted, has been requested, or will be requested, and proves that the judgment debtor has furnished or will furnish the security for the satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in which it was rendered, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated.
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the court a ground on which enforcement of a judgment of the court of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period and ,require the same security for suspending enforcement of the judgment that is required in this state in accordance with Section 52.006.
History of CPRC §35.006: Acts 1985,69th Leg., ch. 959, §1, eff. Sept 1,1985. Amended by H.B. 4, §7.01, 78th Leg., eff. Sept. 1, 2003.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Fort Worth, Texas collections lawyers in Tarrant County who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

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