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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:58:03+00:00

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THOMAS E. CURLEY vs. THOMAS MAHAN. SAME vs. ALEXANDER STAWIECKI.
(3) The plaintiff could not recover.
that the collision occurred on its left side of the road. Held, that the questions, whether the defendant was negligent and whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, properly were submitted to the jury; and that a verdict for the plaintiff was warranted.
TWO ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs in the Central District Court of Worcester dated February 15, 1933.
Upon removal to the Superior Court, the actions were tried together before Donnelly, J. Material evidence is stated in the opinion. The judge denied a motion by the defendant in each action that a verdict be ordered in his favor. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in each action in the sum of $7,625, the verdict in the first action being recorded subject to leave reserved. At the hearing of a motion by the defendant in the first action that a verdict be ordered entered in his favor, the judge ruled that, regardless of the question of gross negligence, the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care and that he was guilty of contributory, negligence or at least was guilty of such conduct as to preclude his recovery; and allowed the motion. The plaintiff alleged exceptions in the first action, and the defendant alleged exceptions in the second action.
H. Zarrow, (M. N. Abodeely with him,) for the plaintiff.
J. Joseph MacCarthy, for the defendants.
PIERCE, J. This is a joint bill of exceptions of Thomas E. Curley, the plaintiff, in the case against the defendant Thomas Mahan, and of the defendant Alexander Stawiecki in the case of Curley against Stawiecki, consolidated by agreement of all parties in interest.
on which seat the plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident. At the place where the collision occurred the road is constructed of macadam at its intersection with a dirt road on the south known as the Wilkinsonville road and a macadam road on the north known as the Dudley road. At the close of the evidence the trial judge denied a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict in each case. Each defendant duly excepted. The cases were then submitted to the jury which returned a verdict for the plaintiff in each case. The trial judge before entry of the verdict in the Mahan case reserved leave, with the assent of the jury, to enter a verdict for the defendant. The defendant Mahan presented a motion for a verdict in accordance with leave reserved which was allowed by the judge. To the allowance of this motion the plaintiff duly excepted.
soon as the plaintiff did; and Mahan testified that he did see the automobile but not as the result of anything the plaintiff said.
Assuming a finding of the above facts and an additional finding, based on the testimony of the plaintiff, that the defendant Mahan was a careful driver except as to speed, it could have been ruled on such facts under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90,§ 17, that Mahan was prima facie guilty of negligence in that just before the accident he operated his motor cycle for a quarter of a mile up the hill faster than thirty miles an hour, and also because he drove around a curve where his view was obstructed and there were intersecting roads faster than fifteen miles an hour. As between the plaintiff and Mahan, the ruling of the judge, "that regardless of the question of gross negligence . . . the plaintiff . . . was not in the exercise of due care, and that he was guilty of contributory negligence, or at least was guilty of such conduct as to preclude his recovery," manifestly was intended to be an application of the rule of law governing similar facts laid down in Laffey v. Mullen, 275 Mass. 277, 279. More specifically, the judge evidently had in mind and framed his ruling upon the admitted, or uncontradicted, fact that the plaintiff at Southbridge had full opportunity to withdraw from the trip after he had objected to the excessive rate of speed at which the motor cycle was driven from Charlton to Southbridge. It is to be noted that the testimony of the plaintiff warranted a finding that after the motor cycle left Southbridge he objected to this excessive rate of speed almost up to the moment of the accident. In some circumstances it has been held that the failure of a guest to withdraw from a vehicle operated at an excessive rate of speed may be a bar to his action against the driver of the vehicle. Lambert v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway, 240 Mass. 495. Oppenheim v. Barkin, 262 Mass. 281. Similarly a plaintiff may be barred of action against a third person whose negligence contributed to his injury, even though the negligence of the host is not in such circumstances imputable to the guest. Shultz v. Old Colony Street Railway, 193 Mass. 309, 323. Barry v. Harding, 244 Mass. 588, 593.
In most cases, especially when the evidence is conflicting, the question, whether the plaintiff exercised due care for his safety, is for the jury. Shultz v. Old Colony Street Railway, 193 Mass. 309, 323. O'Connell v. McKeown, 270 Mass. 432. Gallup v. Lazott, 271 Mass. 406, 409. Schusterman v. Rosen, 280 Mass. 582, 587. There is nothing in the evidence to warrant a finding that the plaintiff participated in the negligence of Mahan by failing to warn him that he was driving at excessive speed in respect to the comfort and safety of the plaintiff, or in respect to the use of the road by other motor vehicles.
The evidence did not warrant a jury in finding that Mahan was guilty of gross negligence because of the admitted fact that he turned his head to the left, for a period estimated by the plaintiff as about four or five seconds, while the plaintiff called to him to "Slow down" and he answered "not to be afraid." There is nothing in the evidence or the circumstances to warrant a finding that, during the time of the above talk, Mahan's attention was diverted from the operation of the motor cycle or that the turning of his head interfered with his seeing approaching vehicles. The fact that his view of the road was not wholly withdrawn distinguishes the case at bar from Crowley v. Fisher, 284 Mass. 205, and similar cases. See McKenna v. Smith, 275 Mass. 149; and compare Meeney v. Doyle, 276 Mass. 218, Green v. Hoffarth, 277 Mass. 508, 516.
The ruling that the plaintiff had no cause of action against Mahan was right. The plaintiff knew before Southbridge was reached the manner in which Mahan was operating his motor cycle and complained to him of it. There is no evidence that Mahan agreed to diminish the speed as they should go on; he said it was not dangerous. In these circumstances the plaintiff must be held to have appreciated the risk of the excessive speed which continued after they left Southbridge and chose to take such risk. The case is governed by Laffey v. Mullen, 275 Mass. 277, 279.
Mahan as to the course of the automobile in swinging to the left and then to the right and finally turning to the left, so that after the collision the Stawiecki automobile was straddling the center line of the road, was corroborated by other witnesses, and, if their testimony were believed, would be some evidence of negligence which required that the case be submitted to the jury. Bogert v. Corcoran, 260 Mass. 206, 208. The issue of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was submitted rightly to the jury, presumably with full instructions. Regan v. Rosenmark, 272 Mass. 256, 257.

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