Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2018/6226crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 01:50:17+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Mark Merrow, Esq., Law Offices of Mark Merrow, L.L.C., 760 Saybrook Road, Middletown, CT 06457.
The respondents were represented by Lawrence G. Widem, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120.
The claimant contends that the expert witness credited by the trial commissioner offered an opinion on permanent disability which provided an evidentiary basis for commissioners decision to award the claimant a twenty-five (25) percent permanency rating to the brain. The claimant also argues that it was well within the commissioners discretion to conclude that the respondent had delayed the RME beyond a reasonable time frame and, accordingly, to refuse to allow the RME into evidence. Upon review of the evidentiary record and the law, we find the claimants position more persuasive. We therefore affirm the Findings and Orders.
At the formal hearing, the claimant testified that he began having symptoms of a stroke on February 5, 2014, and was unable to work from February 6, 2014, through February 23, 2014, because of the stroke. He was again unable to work on August 21, 2014, because of post-stroke symptoms. See March 23, 2017 Transcript, p. 37. The claimant indicated that after being totally disabled from work following the stroke, his treating physician, Isaac E. Silverman, M.D., allowed him to return to part-time work for five hours per day beginning on February 24, 2014. Id. The claimant also testified regarding his outofpocket expenses and time lost from work in order to attend medical appointments. In addition, the claimant indicated that [a]s a result of the stroke, he continues to experience mental confusion, forgetfulness, jumbled words, fatigue and weakness, loss of balance, speech difficulties, throat congestion, voice paralysis, left arm numbness, facial paralysis, and abnormal reflexes and weakness. Findings, ¶ 4.h. He has not received claimed temporary total benefits, temporary partial benefits, lost-time reimbursement, reimbursement for outofpocket expenses, or permanent partial disability benefits. Counsel for the respondent stipulated to the claimants veracity regarding the issue of lost time.
The trial commissioner also considered the opinion of Dr. Silverman, who examined the claimant on September 6, 2016, and completed a Form 42 indicating that the claimant has a twenty-to-thirty (20-to-30) percent permanent impairment of the brain. Claimants Exhibit E. At a deposition held on February 10, 2017, the doctor testified that he would be comfortable with a commissioner awarding a permanent impairment rating of twenty-five (25) percent. See Claimants Exhibit F, p. 24. The commissioner noted that the respondent had ample time to comply with the Finding and Award of May 6, 2016 but it has inexplicably failed to do so and failed to provide any reasonable excuse for having failed to comply. Findings, ¶ 8. The commissioner also noted that counsel for the claimant, who sought sanctions for undue delay, submitted an invoice documenting his hourly fees and time spent.
The Respondent shall pay the Claimant $3,116.41 for Temporary Total Disability Benefits owed.
The Respondent shall pay Temporary Partial Disability Benefits in the amount of $1,056.84.
The Respondent shall reimburse the Claimant $1,419.38 for lost time pursuant to C.G.S. Sec. 31-312.
The Respondent shall pay $4,775.00 in attorneys fees as a result of its undue delay of this claim.
In accordance with C.G.S. Sec. 31-300, the Respondent shall also pay interest on Temporary Total and Temporary Partial Disability Benefits, commencing twenty (20) days from the May 6, 2016 Finding and Award.
Orders, ¶¶ I through VI.
Prior to considering the merits of this appeal, we must consider a motion to dismiss filed by the claimant challenging the jurisdiction of this tribunal to consider this matter. He claims that the appeal, which was commenced via a petition for review dated October 17, 2017, and received by the Commission on October 18, 2017, was untimely pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 31-301 (a) and therefore did not confer jurisdiction upon the commission.8 The claimant points out the appeal documents were filed more than twenty days after the issuance of the Findings and Orders, and points to this boards decision in Gonzalez v. Premier Limousine of Hartford, 5635 CRB-4-11-3 (April 17, 2012), for the proposition that only a post-judgment motion styled as a motion to correct can toll the appeal period contemplated by the provisions of General Statutes § 31-301 (a). As such, the claimant argues that because the respondent filed a different post-judgment motion within the twenty-day period following the issuance of the Findings and Orders, the appeal period expired prior to the filing of the petition for review.
We do not find this argument meritorious. This board did not address that issue in Gonzalez, and the claimants interpretation is at odds with the plain meaning of General Statutes § 31-301 (a).9 In Gonzalez, we held that a claimant who was clearly aggrieved by the original finding could not delay filing his appeal until the postjudgment motions filed by the respondent had been addressed. We stated that [t]he claimant could have filed an appeal within twenty days of that decision or filed a post-judgment motion seeking to have the trial commissioner undo elements of the factual findings and/or alter the relief ordered. The claimant did neither. Id. See also Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 346 (2010).
In addition, we concluded that if an aggrieved claimant did not act within the statutory time period following a trial commissioners decision, he or she was barred from seeking appellate relief. In the present matter, the respondent did file timely postjudgment motions, but the claimant argues that the motions failed to toll the appeal period. The plain meaning of General Statutes § 31-301 (a) establishes that filing a motion within twenty days of the issuance of a finding serves to toll the appeal period to the Compensation Review Board until the trial commissioner acts on that motion. The statute does not articulate the specific information which must be included in such a motion. Given that the respondent in the case at bar filed post-judgment motions within the statutory twenty-day period and, once those motions were denied, filed a timely appeal to this tribunal within the statutory twenty-day period, we therefore have jurisdiction to consider this matter on the merits and accordingly deny the claimants motion to dismiss.
The standard of deference we are obliged to apply to a trial commissioners findings and legal conclusions is well-settled. The trial commissioners factual findings and conclusions must stand unless they are without evidence, contrary to law or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences. Russo v. Hartford, 4769 CRB-1-04-1 (December 15, 2004), citing Fair v. Peoples Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988). Moreover, [a]s with any discretionary action of the trial court, appellate review requires every reasonable presumption in favor of the action, and the ultimate issue for us is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did. Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 54 (2003), quoting Thalheim v. Greenwich, 256 Conn. 628, 656 (2001). This presumption, however, can be challenged by the argument that the trial commissioner did not properly apply the law or has reached a finding of fact inconsistent with the evidence presented at the formal hearing. Christensen v. H & L Plastics Co., Inc., 5171 CRB-3-06-12 (November 19, 2007).
As mentioned previously herein, the respondent contends that the trial commissioner erroneously refused to allow into evidence an RME challenging the opinion of Dr. Silverman. Our review of the record indicates that at the formal hearing on March 23, 2017, respondents counsel represented that Robert H. Berland, M.D., had conducted an RME on January 9, 2017. The claimant restated his standing objection that on October 5, 2016, Commissioner Schoolcraft had directed the respondent to initiate an RME within fifteen days and the respondent had not complied with that order. See March 23, 2017 Transcript, pp. 10-13. Respondents counsel indicated that a series of extenuating circumstances had caused the delay in initiating and completing the RME and Dr. Berland was not scheduled to be deposed until April 27, 2017. Id., 13. The trial commissioner then asked respondents counsel if he possessed any evidence which would demonstrate that the respondent had initiated an RME within fifteen days. Respondents counsel indicated that he did not have any such evidence, and the trial commissioner sustained the claimants objection to admitting the RME report.
The respondent contends that this decision was in error and deprived it of its due process rights. The respondent points to Bailey v. State, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001), for the proposition that a respondent essentially has an unlimited right to present an RME prior to the adjudication of a formal hearing. [A] commissioner must always protect the substantial rights of the parties [which] include the right of the employer ... independently to examine the claimant, to notice his deposition, and to insist on hearing his personal testimony at a formal hearing. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 604, quoting Pietraroria v. Northeast Utilities, 254 Conn. 60, 72 (2000). The respondent also challenges Commissioner Schoolcrafts decision to rely upon the Workers Compensation Commission Payor/Provider Guidelines, promulgated via Chairmans Memorandum No. 2010-01, in issuing his October 5, 2016 Order.10 Section I A. 6. c. of these guidelines directs respondents to schedule an RME within twelve calendar days of the receipt of medical reports. The respondent contends that such limitations are inconsistent with the express terms of General Statutes § 31-294f (a).
In Goulbourne, this tribunal concluded that under the circumstances of that case, the trial commissioner reasonably decided not to admit the RME and to limit the respondents to the defense they had originally advanced.
The record in this matter clearly indicates the respondent was given every opportunity in the 2006 proceedings to present medical evidence contesting the claimants medical evidence supporting compensability. Their attorney, however, represented that he would only offer such evidence to contest the disability rating due the claimant were this claim found to be jurisdictionally proper. The trial commissioner specifically approved such evidence, but as we noted, approved it solely for that purpose. The respondent then did not object to such limitations on the use of such evidence, and indeed, did not provide it to the tribunal. This fact pattern creates what amounts to the law of the case that the respondent has declined to present such evidence on the record in a seasonable manner.
It is clear that Commissioner Schoolcrafts October 5, 2016 order anticipated that the respondent would move expeditiously to obtain an RME and complete discovery in this matter. Having failed to do so by the March 23, 2017 hearing, and having failed to proffer evidence of compliance with the guidelines promulgated by this Commission, Commissioner Mlynarczyk could reasonably find that the respondent had not obtained its RME within a reasonable time frame and, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-298, bar the RME from being introduced as evidence. The respondent was afforded the opportunity to obtain an RME but failed to exercise its right in a reasonable manner. We conclude that this decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion and therefore find no error.
We now turn to the claim of error relative to the trial commissioners permanent partial disability award of twenty-five (25) percent predicated on the opinion of Dr. Silverman. The respondent, relying on our Supreme Courts analysis in Safford v. Owens Brockway, 262 Conn. 526 (2003), argues that the doctor originally opined that the claimants disability was between twenty (20) and thirty (30) percent and it was therefore error for the trial commissioner to choose a specific number within that range. However, in Aylward v. Bristol/Board of Education, 5756 CRB-6-12-5 (May 15, 2013), affd, 153 Conn. App. 913 (2014) (per curiam), this tribunal reviewed the courts analysis in Safford, and we now conclude, having reviewed our analysis in Aylward and the evidentiary basis for the permanency rating, that Safford is not on point in the present matter.
In Safford, the trial commissioner had three ratings of impairment to a scheduled body part from which to choose: Browns 12 percent rating, Glass 15 percent rating or Glass 14 percent rating applying the American Medical Association guidelines to Browns initial assessment. Id., 536. In the present case, we have a single medical witness who opined on the issue of permanency. Moreover, Dr. Silverman, at his February 10, 2017 deposition, testified that he would be comfortable with a trial commissioners decision to award a twenty-five (25) percent rating. Claimants Exhibit F, p. 24. As such, the evidentiary record contained a reference to a specific disability rating which the trial commissioner chose to adopt. In Aylward, we stated that we are not allowed to speculate on what evidence the trier of fact finds persuasive and reliable in the absence of the commissioner identifying such evidence. Id. However, in the present matter, we can clearly identify the evidence found reliable by the commissioner. We have held that it is within the discretion of the trial commissioner to accept some, but not all, of a physicians opinion. Lopez v. Lowes Home Improvement Center, 4922 CRB-6-05-3 (March 29, 2006). Given that the trial commissioner found Dr. Silvermans twenty-five (25) percent rating reliable, we are unable, as an appellate panel, to intercede in this determination.
The respondents claims of error in this case essentially challenge the trial commissioners discretionary rulings. Having determined that the evidentiary record provided a reasonable basis for the trial commissioners conclusions regarding the permanent partial disability award and his refusal to accept the RME into evidence, we must affirm the Findings and Orders.

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