Source: http://webjcli.org/article/view/446/610
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:36:09+00:00

Document:
Cite as: Savage, A. " Whistleblowing in the Police Service: developments and challenges", (2016) 22(1) EJoCLI.
This article addresses the significance of recent attempts to enhance protections available to police whistleblowers. It considers the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 and its compliance with article 10 European Convention of Human Rights following amendments introduced by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. The article reviews the current developments to support whistleblowers in the police service who might raise concerns before drawing on evidence of whistleblowing policies from a number of forces across the UK to illustrate the wide and inconsistent variances in approach. The article concludes by identifying suggestions which are of relevance to organisations across the public sector.
Whilst the term "whistleblowing" lacks a uniformly accepted definition, Near and Miceli provide the definition widely cited in the relevant academic literature. The Act requires the "disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to persons or organisations who effect action."  Acts of whistleblowing can support individual and audience enhancement. As Mansbach suggests, similar to the exercise of Parrhesia in Ancient Greece,  whistleblowers engage in fearless speech, aware of the risks but willing to forgo them for the benefit of wider society . Whereas a number of the aforementioned recent examples show evidence of wider external disclosures, in general, research suggests that whistleblowers are likely to attempt to raise concerns internally.  External disclosures can provide an indicator that there is a lack of trust in the organisation that they will protect the whistleblower or that they will rectify the situation complained of.  It is of paramount importance, that whistleblowing mechanisms not only offer protection to the whistleblower but also assurances that the concern will be dealt with effectively.  Acts of whistleblowing in the police service can present particular challenges.  Research has identified that hierarchical organisations can dissuade workers from raising concerns,  and of course it must be recognised that police officers in the United Kingdom work within a command structure.
This article will first discuss the legal protections available to police whistleblowers and also the legal barriers to the raising of concerns. Second, it will consider the HMIC report and College of Policing Code of Ethics to determine what needs to be done to strengthen internal whistleblowing procedures. Third, in recognising the benefits of internal whistleblowing against the challenges of external unauthorised disclosures to the media, the article will provide an analysis of whistleblowing policies obtained from 39 territorial police forces in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. It will consider similarities and differences in approaches alongside existing sources of good practice. Finally, the article will suggest a number of reforms.
Whilst Strasbourg is yet to determine a case involving a police whistleblower,  jurisprudence from cases involving public servants suggests that where there is evidence of wrongdoing, the court will most likely favour the need to protect them, particularly where the applicant did not have alternative means to raise the concern. These cases indicate that Strasbourg will not only want to only determine whether alternatives to unauthorised disclosures exist but whether those alternatives were effective. This is highly significant. The United Kingdom does have a law to protect whistleblowers, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, however it does not require organisations to introduce policies or procedures for whistleblowers to follow, or meet a set of minimum baselines standards. The result of this is a considerable variance in the experiences of whistleblowers and the way in which public organisations and national regulators handle any information obtained. This article will later seek to provide examples of these variances in the whistleblowing policies and procedures available to police officers across the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA) provides employment protection for individuals who raise concerns. The Act allows individuals to make a claim to an employment tribunal where they have suffered detrimental treatment or have been dismissed as a result of raising their concerns. Workers do not need a qualifying period of employment meaning that they could raise a concern on their first day of employment and still obtain protection. Unlike 'ordinary' unfair dismissal claims, damages are uncapped and workers may also seek reinstatement. In order to obtain protection, workers must first raise a 'qualifying disclosure' defined in s.43B of the Act. The worker must have a 'reasonable belief' that their concern is in the public interest and that it fits within one of the following categories of protected information: (i) a criminal offence, (ii) a failure to comply with any legal obligation, (iii) a miscarriage of justice, (iv) danger to the health and safety of any individual, (v) damage to the environment, (vi) or the deliberate concealment of information tending to show any of the matters listed above. Although I recognise that this is a slight deviation - is it worth making the point that the protection afforded in the tribunal is now subject to the payment of tribunal fees - this may act as further barrier to obtaining protection.
The overarching 'public interest' requirement was inserted following amendments made by the Employment and Regulatory Reform Act 2014. The aim was to rectify the lacuna as occurred in the case of Parkins v Sodhexo whereby individuals could use the law to claim that their private employment concern amounted to 'a failure to comply with any legal obligation.'  Whilst an early indication from the Employment Appeals Tribunal would appear to suggest that the tribunal will take a liberal view of the test, provided that a claimant has the 'subjective belief' that their concern is in the public interest, it is suggested that the reform still significantly narrows the scope for protection. This is because a claimant must first meet the subjective belief test and then the objective test that their concern fits within one of the disclosure categories. The resulting effect is that s.43B in its current form is potentially incompatible with art.10 ECHR. Strasbourg was particularly careful in the Guja case not to narrowly define the 'public interest,' in fact all cases before and after the judgment allow for determination in the widest possible terms.
Whilst it is acknowledged that s.2 Human Rights Act 1998 does not bind tribunals to follow Strasbourg decisions, it is submitted that s.43B in its current form has the potential to be incompatible with art.10. With regard to s.3 Human Rights Act, rigid drafting of s.43B PIDA could also not be rectified by the skilful insertion of words by a tribunal judge and therefore a declaration of incompatibility applying s.4 would be required to place the matter in the hands of Parliament to determine whether the section needs substantial re-drafting. As Lewis has argued, claimants could still seek determination of their claim using 'ordinary' unfair dismissal.  However, as Ashton opines, the experiences of claimants seeking to use unfair dismissal prior to PIDA coming into force indicate that it is difficult to obtain a successful outcome.  The compatibility of PIDA with the Convention will be most open to challenge where the claimant has not obtained a qualifying period of employment and cannot therefore bring a claim using the ordinary unfair dismissal route.
Provided that a claimant can meet the above threshold, it is suggested that PIDA is advantageous in comparison with laws which require claimants to exhaust internal procedures before raising their concerns outside. PIDA does this by operating a "stepped" or "tiered" disclosure regime. At the lowest 'step,' section 43C offers protection for concerns raised internally to their employer, line manager or someone designated by the employer's policy to receive concerns. The Act actively encourages internal concern reporting by making it the easiest way to obtain protection, which as confirmed by the case law can include disclosures where the worker was later proved to be wrong, provided they had the reasonable belief in the making of the disclosure.
The second 'step,' s.43F allows for protection if a concern is raised to a prescribed person. There are a number of national regulators prescribed for the purposes of receiving concerns, as well as local regulators prescribed for receiving concerns regarding health and safety and food safety.  In order to receive protection under s.43F, claimants must ensure that their concern meets the 'class or description' of the regulator that they intend to go to. If a worker approaches the wrong regulator, the case of Dudin v Salisbury District Council suggests that they could lose protection.  Research by Hyde and Savage has identified that where organisations are prescribed for the purposes of receiving concerns they have chosen to adopt their own procedures and protocols rather than establish a set of agreed protocols across the regulatory landscape.  This means that one whistleblower can experience a very different response when approaching one regulator with a concern on a particular subject to another. The effective handling of whistleblowing concerns is highly relevant for the protection of whistleblowers. Where regulators deal with whistleblower concerns using the same protocols or procedures as they would with complaints from members of the public, there is an increased likelihood that their identity could be inadvertently revealed to the wrongdoer due to the existence of identifying information or the level of care taken in the investigatory process. Members of Parliament were added to the list in 2014, this is only in respect of matters which could be raised to other prescribed persons.  Although this is a potentially welcome enhancement to democracy, it presents its own challenges. Members of Parliament do not have to undergo any form of training to handle concerns and there is the potential for the matter complained of to become ammunition for use on the political battleground, with the potential to further enflame a situation between the whistleblower and his or her employer. In addition to the potential problems outlined above, Hyde and Savage have also identified a number of persons who perform a regulatory function who are not prescribed for the purposes of PIDA. The Surveillance Camera Commissioner and Crimestoppers are two relevant examples. Where the recipients are not prescribed workers would need to meet comparatively more stringent requirements contained within s.43G or s.43H.
(ii) in accordance with s.43F"
Even if the relevant conditions are met above there is a further requirement provided by s.43G (e). In all circumstances of the case it must be reasonable for the employee to make the disclosure. This is determined by a series of considerations prescribed in s.43G (3) to which the employment tribunal must consider. These include: the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made, the seriousness of the relevant failure, whether the relevant failure is continuing or is likely to occur in the future, and whether the disclosure is made in reach of a duty of confidentiality to any other person. Additionally if the employee has reported the concern to his employer or a regulator the tribunal will have regard to any action which was taken by the employer or might have reasonably been expected to be taken as a result of reporting the concern. Section 43G (2) (C) places the emphasis on employers and regulators to handle concerns effectively despite there being no minimum standards for the handling of concerns by either the employer or the prescribed persons. As a consequence of the drafting of s.43G and the current lack of base-line standards for the handling of concerns by employers and those prescribed, claimants can receive very different responses depending on where they raise their concern. Moreover, a whistleblower may make a wider disclosure because they believe that the regulator or employer is failing to take the concern seriously where the recipient has actually failed to communicate or reassure the individual. The whistleblower would then be open to challenge on the basis that their belief was not reasonable in all of the circumstances.
(e) in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable for him to make the disclosure.
(2) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1)(e) whether it is reasonable for the worker to make the disclosure, regard shall be had, in particular, to the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made."
The Act does not define 'exceptionally serious,' instead this is left to the employment tribunal to make a determination based on the available evidence. The section offers flexibility but also potential uncertainty. Tribunals are required to first assess s.43B followed by s.43F. Following the amendment to s.43B this would require tribunals to first make a subjective assessment that the claimant has the reasonable belief that their concern is in the public interest, then followed by an objective assessment that the concern fits within one of the prescribed disclosure categories. In determining whether the concern is 'exceptionally serious' under section 43F the tribunal will then need to make an objective assessment. It is submitted that s.43B and s.43F are inconsistent when read in conjunction with each other. i.e. the tribunal can be satisfied that the claimant held the reasonable belief that the concern was in the public interest but must then separately determine whether the concern was exceptionally serious. This approach is in marked contrast to how Strasbourg would conduct the proportionality analysis by weighing up the public interest value of the information concerned, as noted above.
While PIDA can protect 'wider' disclosures' it cannot protect workers who commit a criminal offence in making the disclosure. No immunity is provided from prosecution and the worker will lose the right to obtain the employment law protection offered by the Act. Police officers are 'Crown Servants' for the purposes of the Official Secrets Act 1989. The Act contains a section relating to crime and special investigation powers.  The Act does not contain an express public interest defence and the implied defence of duress of circumstances has been subsequently narrowed after its application to official secrets cases was originally considered in the Shayler case.  It also does not allow for determination of the public interest benefit of disclosures.  However, despite these limitations, the Act has been determined Convention compliant.  In addition, the common law offence of Misconduct in Public Office can also be used to arrest and prosecute police officers who make unauthorised disclosures.  The offence can effectively criminalise the unauthorised disclosure of information which would not otherwise meet the categories of disclosure contained within the Official Secrets Act 1989.
3. Recent Developments - a recognised need for reform.
In July 2014, the College of Policing introduced a Code of Ethics applicable to all forces in England and Wales. Part 10 of the Code concerns the 'challenging and reporting of improper conduct.' In acknowledging the organisational hierarchy, the Code states that officers 'must never ignore unethical or unprofessional behaviour by a policing colleague, irrespective of the person's rank, grade or role.'  The Code includes a positive obligation to question the conduct of colleagues and to challenge or report action if necessary.  Paragraph 10.4 is particularly significant, it states that the 'policing profession will protect whistleblowers according to the law.' As the aforementioned discussion highlighted the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 does not place any express obligations on organisations to act in a certain way. The policing profession are under no obligation to protect whistleblowers, except that the failure to do so could mean that a worker is able to bring an employment tribunal claim for detriment and or dismissal. Inclusion of this sentence must be seen as a positive step in the right direction. Unfortunately the code is silent on wider disclosures to the media or public, however paragraph 10.5 does state that "Nothing in this standard prevents the proper disclosure of information to a relevant authority in accordance with the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998." PIDA extends much further than 'relevant authorities' to include any potential recipient provided that the evidential criteria are met.  In order to be consistent with the stepped disclosure regime in PIDA it would have been helpful for the code of ethics to clarify the position on when it may be appropriate for disclosures to be made to the media or wider public. This is especially important when considered in conjunction with paragraph 7.1 of the Code of Ethics which states that officers and staff "must not… disclose information, on or off duty, to unauthorised recipients." Clearly PIDA would protect such disclosures provided that the unauthorised disclosure has not convened the criminal law.
Whilst it is acknowledged that the substance of a whistleblowing concern will differ on a case by case basis, the Home Office guidance provides welcome clarity when read in conjunction with the College of Policing Code of Ethics.
The most significant addition to the guidance is contained in paragraph 2.31 which identified that an officer who 'knowingly takes action as a reprisal' against a police officer or member of staff who has raised whistleblowing concerns, or 'their family members or close associates' should be considered to have breached the standards of professional behaviour. This considerably strengthens the protection of whistleblowers. By including the protection against reprisals much earlier in the process, i.e. before a whistleblower needs to take a claim to an employment tribunal, it empowers the police force in receipt of the public interest concern to act when PIDA would not otherwise require them to do so. It limits the need for a whistleblower to become a claimant and for the police force to end up as a respondent. Given that it can take over 37 weeks for a PIDA claim to be disposed of by an employment tribunal,  early resolution of any reprisal complaint without the need to involve an employment tribunal provides the opportunity for the employment relationship to be restored long before it is allowed to break down beyond repair. In turn, other officers and staff contemplating raising their concerns are more likely to do so because of the positive experiences of others.
In addition to the aforementioned advancements in practice, the Home Office has issued an annual data requirement which came into force in April 2015. This means that police forces will be required to collect data regarding the number of conduct matters recorded internally and their outcomes.  The publication of the number of conduct matters recorded can provide an indicator as to how concerns are being handled, provided that the concerns are accurately recorded. Research by the author has highlighted that there is a distinct variance in how Civil Service departments track and monitor whistleblowing concerns.  Many concerns raised to line managers are not recorded, however it is important that records are kept of these approaches to provide evidence which may be required to first safeguard against disciplinary action or detrimental treatment prompted by the concern and second, if necessary for use in allegations of reprisals. Whilst it is too early to provide an assessment of how the annual data requirement is working across the police service it is suggested that the accurate recording of concerns will be key to its success. The data recording should therefore be subject to annual audit and review by HMIC.
Whilst the law can provide a mechanism for individuals to seek damages and potential reinstatement, it cannot be used to place obligations on organisations to behave in a certain way. This, in conjunction with the lengthy period of time that it takes to obtain a resolution before an employment tribunal weakens the standard of protection available to UK whistleblowers. The provision of soft-law arrangements backed by a Code of Ethics with statutory authority arguably places police whistleblowers in a stronger position than ever before. It provides a workable example which should be considered by other public sector organisations such as the Civil Service. The Civil Service for example has a Civil Service Code which has statutory authority and which refers to the raising of concerns, however this could be strengthened further by offering immunity from disciplinary action for the raising of whistleblowing concerns and protection against reprisals. The Civil Service also do not report on the number of whistleblowing concerns annually and this would further enhance the available procedures. The following section proceeds to provide an analysis of current police force-level whistleblowing policies.
The purpose of this section is not to measure performance of individual policies or police forces. Whilst a scoring method has been adopted by organisations in the past to measure the content of Civil Service whistleblowing policies, the author has chosen not to adopt a similar method in this instance.  The analysis does not purport to be a comprehensive study, instead it is aimed at illustrating the extent to which the lack of central co-ordination has resulted in a variation of approaches across police forces. A conclusion which can also be drawn when considering experiences regarding other areas of the public sector.  Where possible, the author has sought to identify and report upon evidence of good practice. Whistleblowing policies are likely to be one of the first places a prospective whistleblower may look to for instruction in considering whether or not to raise a concern. It is therefore important to ensure that the policies are accessible, providing clear advice as to the legal protections available, the avenues to raise concerns and assurances that the whistleblower will be supported and the concern will be taken seriously.
"Please disclose your whistleblowing policy (also generally known as a 'speak up' or 'raising concerns' policy)."
All 45 police forces in the UK were contacted and 39 policies were obtained as a result.  The author sought to adopt a methodology previously used by the author and a colleague to conduct research of the handling of whistleblowing concerns by persons prescribed for the purposes of s.43F Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. Public authorities are required to comply with the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 when formulating responses to freedom of information requests. This will therefore mean that identifying data is not disclosed in responses thus negating any risk of harm to individuals. Once information has been released as a result of a request it becomes public data. The data may therefore be published on the police force's website. Where the identity of individuals has been disclosed, whether published in policy documents or in the response itself, the author has chosen not to report or reveal these identities. The following sections of this piece will proceed to identify the findings.
It is not clear whether this use of terminology also impacts on whether or not concerns are being accepted by the police forces concerned. The requirement adds an unnecessary layer of procedural complexity. Workers do not need to be aware of the existence of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 to receive protection, nor do they need to follow any prescribed procedures such as identifying that they are raising a PIDA concern. In fact, PIDA specifically avoids procedural complexity by providing a relatively flexible 'stepped disclosure regime.' The Act will only need to be engaged if the worker suffers a detriment or dismissal, not at the start before a concern has been raised. Further to this, awareness of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 has been generally considered to be relatively low and it is therefore suggested that this unhelpful requirement could dissuade police officers and staff from coming forward.
As part of the available good practice, a clear and accessible description of the law is required, partly to assure whistleblowers that they can be protected if they raise concerns but also to identify the potential consequences of the routes available to disclosure. Whilst the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 is procedurally flexible, the evidential requirements, particularly those concerning wider and exceptionally serious disclosures are complex. This should not mean that a basic overview of the law provided in a whistleblowing policy should be overly complex. As identified earlier, inaccessible policies can dissuade workers from raising concerns.
As identified above, the term 'exceptionally serious' only relates to s.43H. Disclosures to regulatory bodies who are prescribed for the purposes of s.43F need only meet the requirements of s.43F and therefore do not have to be 'exceptionally serious.' Section 43G can also be used to obtain protection to regulators and other bodies not prescribed, again the terms 'exceptionally serious' are not used in s.43G. The Devon and Cornwall policy also appears to be out of step with the Public Interest Disclosure Act. It requires workers to raise any health and safety concerns with their line manager first as part of their 'duty of care.'  All protected disclosures under s.43C carry equal weight and are not subject to any form pre-condition. Workers need not follow any internal procedures to obtain protection under the law.
It is suggested that it is appropriate for all force whistleblowing policies to acknowledge that workers can obtain protection for making wider public disclosures in certain circumstances. Whilst it may be preferable for organisations to not identify that such protection exists, it is important that forces explain that this option is available in order to be consistent with PIDA. This replaces ambiguity around the subject of disclosures to the media with the opportunity for forces to clarify the legal position, to encourage whistleblowers to raise concerns internally and acknowledging potential risks associated with unauthorised disclosures.
Despite the HMIC report identifying that there were staff concerns with regard to confidentiality, there were some good examples of policies where assurances were given. For example, the West Mercia Police policy identified that "confidentiality when requested will be given the highest priority."  This may indicate that there are issues with the handling of concerns or scope for improvements to the culture rather than an urgent need to change the policies in this area. The assurances did, however, vary both in language and scope and it is therefore suggested that standardised language be applied to all forces' policies.
There were many examples of the Police force's commitment to whistleblowing. Greater Manchester Police makes it clear that it "does not tolerate cultural pressures within the police service which actively discourage individuals from reporting malpractice of any kind."  Gwent Police instructs workers that: "Any Police Officer or Police Staff Member of Gwent Police who makes a report in the belief that it is done so "in the public interest" will be told that they are "doing the right thing."  The Police Service of Northern Ireland identified the value of whistleblowing to the organisation: "…staff members are often best placed to identify deficiencies and problems before any damage is done, so the importance of their role as the 'eyes and ears' of PSNI cannot be overstated."  The Wiltshire Police Policy Statement identified that "the act of reporting wrongdoing should be seen as an act of loyalty rather than an act of disloyalty." The Avon and Somerset Police policy identifies that reports may be recognised by a letter of appreciation, a private ceremony with a senior member of staff or a formal commendation in public or in private.  The Avon and Somerset policy provides an exemplar, identifying that whistleblowing can be accepted as a positive act by both the organisation and the community.
The aforementioned snapshot of various police whistleblowing policies indicates that there is a considerable degree of variation in the way force whistleblowing policies have been drafted. This variation is, in part due to the flexibility of the whistleblowing law because organisations have not been required to implement statutory procedures for whistleblowers to follow in raising concerns. This flexibility is good from the point of view of whistleblowers seeking to obtain 'post detriment' protection before the employment tribunals but has resulted in considerable differences in the delivery of policies and procedures due to the lack of central co-ordination across the public sector. Some of the policies reviewed contained confusing or inaccurate descriptions of the legal protections available. It is suggested that a clear and plain English approach should be preferred. Many of the policies were comprehensive, comprising of up to 18 pages of instruction with information for recipients handling concerns etc.  One should consider whether it would be preferable to have separate policies for whistleblowers and recipients/handlers of concerns. The 'recipients' policy could still be made available to police officers and staff without the need for a single lengthy document. The clearer and more accessible the policy is, the greater the likelihood that officers and staff will want to use it.
It is hoped that the variations and suggested deficiencies outlined above will be rectified when the national guidance is implemented. It is of considerable importance that police officers and staff who raise concerns encounter a consistent approach to whistleblowing which is not dependant on the force that they work for. It is also important that appropriate police service-wide terminology is used. If forces do not adopt the term 'whistleblowing' it is important the the national guidance recognises that whistleblowing as protected by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 goes much further than conduct or corruption matters, extending to breaches of health and safety, harm to the environment and other concerns which may be encapsulated by a 'breach of a legal obligation'.
In addition to the proposed national guidance on whistleblowing, it is suggested that additional guidance is needed from the Home Office, or College of Policing, specifically aimed at police officers and staff to explain simply and clearly how the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 offers protection and how it interrelates with the College of Policing Code of Practice. The guidance should make clear that, whilst more suited to 'last resort' disclosures media disclosures are possible under the legislation.
Recent efforts by the Home Office and the College of Policing should be seen as a very positive improvement to the protection of police officers and police staff who raise concerns. It is submitted however that the efforts are indicative of the need for widespread reforms across the public sector, in particular to better co-ordinate how whistleblowing is dealt with in public organisations. The provision of immunity from disciplinary action for those who raise concerns and disciplinary action for those who mistreat whistleblowers is a significant improvement and should be considered by other public organisations such as the Civil Service, Health and Education sectors. Whilst ever there appears to be little appetite for reform of PIDA, the scope to provide pre- and post-detriment protection which is handled by a worker's organisation will reduce the need to bring lengthy and increasingly uncertain employment tribunal claims on the part of these former employees.
 See for example: R v Twitchell  All ER (D) 1161 whereby allegations of previous police misconduct which had led to the quashing of previous convictions against others were used to successfully challenge the safety of the conviction of the appellant in the instant case.
 See generally, Andrew Goldsmith, Police reform and the problem of trust  Theoretical Criminology 9 5, 443.
 Paul Peachy, Metropolitan Police whistle-blower quits days before misconduct hearing, The Independent, 24/03/14, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/metropolitan-police-whistleblower-quits-days-before-misconduct-hearing-9213007.html (accessed 01/08/15).
 Rob Evans, Undercover whistleblower Peter Francis gives evidence to official inquiry, The Guardian, 17/01/14, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/undercover-with-paul-lewis-and-rob-evans/2014/jan/17/undercover-police-and-policing-police-and-crime-commissioners (accessed 01/08/15).
 Jonathon Brown, Greater Manchester Police faces corruption storm after whistleblower goes to IPCC, forcing deputy head of Hillsborough investigation to step down , The Telegraph, 18/03/15, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/greater-manchester-police-faces-corruption-storm-after-whistleblower-goes-to-ipcc-forcing-deputy-head-of-hillsborough-investigation-to-step-down-9198079.html (accessed 01/08/15).
 Nigel Morris and Helen Carter, Child abuse whistleblowers should have immunity from arrest, says Theresa May, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/child-abuse-whistleblowers-should-have-immunity-from-arrest-says-theresa-may-10114881.html (accessed 13/08/15).
 Janet Near and Marcia Miceli, Organizational dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing (1985) 4 Journal of Business Ethics 1, 4.
 Abraham Mansbach, Whistleblowing as Fearless Speech: The Radical Democratic Effects of Late Modern Parrhesia, in Whistleblowing and Democratic Values, David Lewis and Wim Vandekerchove (eds.) 13: http://whistleblowers.dk/ArkivPDF/whistleblowing_and_democratic_values_3rd_jan%281%29.pdf (accessed 09/07/15).
 See for example: Public Concern at Work, Where's Whistleblowing Now? 10 years of legal protection for whistleblowers, 2010, 10: http://www.pcaw.org.uk/files/PIDA_10year_Final_PDF.pdf (accessed 01/11/15).
 Ashley Savage, Leaks, Whistleblowing and the Public Interest: The law on unauthorised disclosures (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham) (forthcoming), Chapter 1.
 Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde, The response to whistleblowing by regulators: a practical perspective  Legal Studies 35 3, 408.
 Petter Gottshalck and Stefan Holgersson, Whistle-blowing in the Police (2011) 12 5 Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 397, Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing and the Police (2005) 1 3 Rutgers University Journal of Law and Urban Policy, 74.
 Rodney Smith, Whistleblowing and Hierarchical Bureaucracy: Re-Thinking the Relationship (2013) 2 3 E-Journal of Comparative Labour Studies, 4.
 Guja v Moldova (2008) Application No. 14277/04, Bucur and Toma v Romania (2013) Application No. 40238/02, Heinisch v Germany (2011) Application No. 28274/08.
 However, note that all of the aforementioned cases involved public servants in other public organisations, such as, an operative in the intelligence services, Bucur and Toma v Romania (2013) Application No. 40238/02.
 Parkins v Sodhexo  UKEAT 1239_00_2206, see in particular at .
 Lucy Vickers, Freedom of Speech and Employment (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 43.
 Section 5, Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Ireland) http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2014/en.act.2014.0014.pdf (accessed 01/01/15).
 Section 8, Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act 2005 (Canada) http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-31.9/page-3.html#h-7 (accessed 01/01/15).
 David Lewis, Is the Public Interest Test for Workplace Whistleblowing in Society's Interest? International Journal of Law and Management  57 2, 152.
 Jeanette Ashton, 15 years of whistleblowing protection under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998: are we still shooting the messenger? Industrial Law Journal  44(1), 29-52.
 For example, the Health and Safety Executive and the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
 Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) (Amendment) Order 2014.
 Section 4 Official Secrets Act 1989 does not provide a test for harm. Instead it requires one of a number the listed acts to take place resulting from the disclosure. The commission of an offence, facilitating an escape from legal custody, or any act prejudicial to the safekeeping of persons in custody, impeding the prevention or detection of offences, or the apprehension or prosecution of suspects, any information obtained by the interception of any communication (in the exercise of a warrant).
 The defence of duress of circumstances was effectively arrowed following the decision in R v Hasan  UKHL 22.
 This is particularly true of s.4 whereby disclosures need only concern one of the listed acts.
 R v Shayler  UKHL 11.
 See for example: 'Plebgate': Police officer held over inquiry, BBC News, February 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21299860 (accessed 01/11/15).
 College of Policing Code of Ethics, para 10.1.
 College of Policing Code of Ethics, para 10.2.
 Section 43G and s.43H Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.
 Rt Hon Theresa May MP, Hansard, HC Debs, 22 July 2014, Column 1266.
 The author would like to thank the College of Policing for confirming this.
 HMIC, Integrity Matters: An inspection of arrangements to ensure integrity and to provide the capability to tackle corruption in policing http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/police-integrity-and-corruption-2015.pdf , 98 (accessed 15/07/15).
 Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service, FOI Response to the Author, Received 08/15/15.
 Home Office Impact Assessment, Police Whistleblowing: Changes to Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 and Home Office guidance on police officer misconduct, HO0175, March 2015: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/412012/response__police_disciplinary_system_police_whistleblowing_impact_asessment.pdf (accessed 01/08/15).
 Ashley Savage, Leaks, Whistleblowing and the Public Interest: The law on unauthorised disclosures (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham) (forthcoming).
 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Whistleblowing Framework: Call for Evidence, Government Response: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323399/bis-14-914-whistleblowing-framework-call-for-evidence-government-response.pdf (accessed 01/11/15).
 The considerable variance in the layout and content of the policies would likely render the scoring of force whistleblowing policies inaccurate and thus potentially misleading. Instead, the author has chosen to adopt an 'examples' based approach; an approach used previously in co-authored articles with Richard Hyde, Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde Using freedom of information requests to facilitate research International Journal of Social Research Methodology (2014) 17 3, 303, Richard Hyde and Ashley Savage , Local Authority Handling of Freedom of Information Requests: Lessons from a research project,  19 2 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, http://ojs.qub.ac.uk/index.php/webjcli/article/view/240/315 (accessed 01/11/15).
 A considerable degree of variance can be found in the different policies adopted by Civil Service departments and local authorities. For analysis on Civil Service departments, see Savage, Above, n 13, Chapter 5 and Savage and Hyde, Above, n 31.
 West Midlands Police and Leicestershire Police both identified that they do not have a policy but do have a confidential reporting hotline.
 Public Concern at Work, Whistleblowing in Whitehall, 2006: http://www.pcaw.org.uk/files/whistleblowing_whitehall.pdf (accessed 02/11/15).
 Government Accountability Project, International Best Practices for Whistleblowing, 2013: http://whistleblower.org/sites/default/files/Best_Practices_Document_for_website_revised_April_12_2013.pdf (accessed 12/08/15).
 National Audit Office, Assessment Criteria for Whistleblowing Policies, 2014, 6: http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Assessment-criteria-for-whistleblowing-policies.pdf (accessed 08/08/15).
 See generally: Ashley Savage, Leaks, Whistleblowing and the Public Interest: The law on unauthorised disclosures (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham) (forthcoming).
Assessment Criteria for Whistleblowing Policies, Above, n 60, 6.
 British Standards Institution, Code of Practice on Whistleblowing, PAS 2008:1998, http://shop.bsigroup.com/forms/PASs/PAS-1998/ (accessed 08/08/2015).
 Derbyshire Constabulary, Professional Standards Policy, Ref: 7.06/045, 7.
 Metropolitan Police, Reporting of Wrongdoing - Standard Operating Procedure, version 3.1, 8.
 Devon and Cornwall Police, Making Protected Disclosures (Whistle blowing), D111.
 Gloucestershire Constabulary, Fraud, Corruption, the Reporting of Unethical Behaviour and the Internal Reporting of Wrongdoing (Whistleblowing), 5.
 West Mercia Police, Professional Standards Reporting Policy, Force Policy No. 110.
 Above , n 68, 7.
 It is not clear from the document provided as to whether the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) is designated under the policy to receive concerns. If this were the case then s.43(C) (2) would apply.
 Above , n 69, 7.
 Above , n 67, 2.
 Above , n 63, 3.7.
 Above , n 65, 25.
 West Mercia Police, Professional Standards Reporting Policy, Force Policy No. 110, 2.
 Avon and Somerset Police, Professional Standards Reporting & Whistleblowing, 52QP-1187-09, 12.
 Northamptonshire Police, Confidential Reporting (Whistleblowing), Ref No. 13/12, 3.
 Lincolnshire Police, Professional Standards Reporting (whistleblowing), PD 48(9), 5.
 Above , n 79, 2.
 Lancashire Police, Confidential Reporting Policy, D51115, 10.
 See further, Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde, above, n 30.
 Greater Manchester Police, Supporting staff who make professional standards reports, form 1011.
 Gwent Police, Professional Standards Reporting Procedure, 3.
 Police Service of Northern Ireland, Reporting Wrongdoing within the PSNI, SP 2/15, 3.
 Above , n 78, 31.1.
 West Yorkshire Police, Confidential reporting - Doing the right thing, 8.
 Essex Police, Professional Standards Policy, Number: C 3000. The document identifies that there are no other related policies.
 Cheshire Constabulary, Professional Standards Reporting, Procedure Reference Number: 06/08.
 The West Yorkshire Police policy was 18 pages long, many other policies comprised of approximate average of 11 pages.

References: art.10
 art.10
 Application No. 14277
 Application No. 40238
 Application No. 28274
 Application No. 40238
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