Source: https://www.piercemandell.com/pierce-and-mandell-pc-blog?TagID=356956
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:01:19+00:00

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Petitions to Partition, often brought in the Land or Probate Courts, allow the division of land owned by two or more individuals. The right to partition is absolute, and does not require the consent of other co-owners. For an excellent overview of general partition principles and practice, see Jeff Angley’s primer entitled "Partition of Land".
The process of partition becomes complex when the land to be divided consists of multiple parcels. While courts strive to balance the rights and equities of the parties in partition proceedings, Schore v. Johnson, Land Court Misc. Case No. 29096, July 14, 2008 (Piper, J.), quoting Gonzalez v. Pierce-Williams, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 785, 787 (2007), and Moat v. Ducharme, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 751 (1990), in cases where multiple parcels are involved generally “division in kind” becomes the favored method of partition, i.e. awarding parcels of equal value to each party. However, a court may also order sale of all of the parcels and equitable division of the proceeds when it determines that the land cannot be divided “advantageously.” G.L. c. 241, § 31. Delta Materials Corp. v. Bagdon, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 333 (1992) and Buell v. Rubin, Land Court Misc. Case No. 310497, November 9, 2005 (Long, J.).
The primary method of partition is by division of the land itself by mete and bounds among the tenants in common. Until St. 1870, c. 257, and St. 1871, c. 111, § 1, later Pub. Sts. (1882) c. 178, § 65, a sale for the purpose of partition could not be ordered. Ramsey v. Humphrey, 162 Mass. 385, 386. Clough v. Cromwell, 250 Mass. 324, 330, 331. The existing statute intimates that sale may be ordered only of land "which cannot be divided advantageously." G. L. c. 241, § 31. See also § 6.
In this case the advantageousness of the division was in part a question of market values, and from this point of view we are of opinion that the judge was warranted in considering the de facto condition of the premises.
The considerations which determine whether land can be divided advantageously no doubt have reference mainly to the physical conditions of the land to be divided, but the advantage or disadvantage generally must be pecuniary. Citing Vesper v. Farnsworth, 40 Wis. 357, 361, 362.
If a division by partition of the different parcels would cause great damage and loss to the owners, as the judge has found, we cannot say that he was not amply justified in ordering a sale of all of the lands, and a division of the proceeds in proper proportions.
Also instructive is the ruling Buckley v. Lombard, a Land Court case involving a partition petition for a small lot in Wellfleet, where the respondent urged division in kind to enable her to retain a right to access beach property. Citing Delta Materials Corp. and Clough v. Cromwell, Judge Scheier noted that G.L. c. 241, § 31 instructs the court to direct its inquiry “mainly to the physical conditions of the land to be divided, but the advantage or disadvantage must be pecuniary.” Id. at 9 citing Clough v. Cromwell at 332-33. The court next evaluated G.L. c. 241, § 31 in conjunction with § 14, which requires determination regarding whether division in kind could be accomplished without “great inconvenience,” and subsequently rejected the respondent’s “personal and subjective view of the value of locus” as “not the type of retained value that the partition statute contemplates.” Id.
As Buckley, Clough and Heald make clear, paramount in the Court’s analysis as to whether it can divide multiple parcels is the central determination of whether one party or another will suffer a loss of value or money as a result of a division. If such case, courts may conclude that the property cannot be “advantageously divided” and a sale of all parcels, and equitable distribution of the proceeds, is likely to follow.
Also critical are the provisions of G.L. c. 241, § 14 which provide that “[I]f all the land cannot be divided without such inconvenience, the whole or any part thereof may be set off to any one or more of the parties, with his or her consent, upon payment by him or them to any one or more of the others of such amounts of money as the Commissioners award to make the partition just and equal.” The statute envisions a partition resolution whereby willing owners agree to a division in kind that, although inconvenient, is acceptable. In cases where a division in kind will result in a loss of value because the parcels sold collectively are worth more than the sum of their parts, such “disadvantage” or “inconvenience” will often prohibit division unless the parties consent.
The concept of owelty in partition jurisprudence is ancient, and the principle that a party may not be forced to pay sums of money in order to establish equity in a partition proceeding has endured. In Hodges v. Pingree, 76 Mass. 14 (1857), the Supreme Judicial Court held that in partition, if the premises cannot be divided without damage to the owners, “the whole estate may be set off to any one of the parties who will accept it by paying such sums of money by way of owelty as may be awarded by the commissioners.” Id. at 15. Today, the concept of consent to owelty remains explicit in G.L. c. 241, § 14 and is often a critical component of any division of multiple, diverse parcels.
When multiple parcels are involved, partition proceedings can become complex, time consuming and costly. Experienced legal advice is essential to any party contemplating or involved in partition. Pierce & Mandell partner Michael C. Fee is a member of the firm’s real estate and litigation practice groups and represents clients in all forms of real estate litigation, including petitions to partition.
In partition proceedings, the court may order the commissioners to sell and convey the whole or any part of the land which cannot be divided advantageously, upon such terms and conditions and with such securities for the proceeds of the sale as the court may order, and to distribute the proceeds so as to make the partition just and equal.
If a part of the land cannot be divided without great inconvenience to the owners, or is of greater value than the share of any party, or if all the land cannot be divided without such inconvenience, the whole or any part thereof may be set off to any one or more of the parties, with his or their consent, upon payment by him or them to any one or more of the others of such amounts of money as the commissioners award to make the partition just and equal.
The Supreme Court of the United States has denied the petition for certiorari filed by Oath Holdings, Inc., successor to Yahoo!, Inc. Oath Holdings had requested that the Supreme Court review the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc. In Ajemian, Pierce & Mandell lawyers Robert L. Kirby, Jr. and Thomas E. Kenney successfully argued, in a case of first impression, that the federal Stored Communications Act did not prohibit Yahoo! from disclosing the contents of a decedent’s email account to the personal representatives of his estate.
As a result of the Supreme Court’s denial of the petition for certiorari, the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in favor of Pierce & Mandell’s clients stands, and the matter will be remanded to the Norfolk Probate and Family Court for disposition.
For further information on the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in the Ajemian case, click here.
The Appeals Court’s recent decision in Cedar-Fieldstone Marketplace, LP v. T.S. Fitness, Inc., 17-P-791, 2018 Mass. App. LEXIS 30, serves as a stark reminder to commercial tenants and their counsel of potential guarantor liabilities that live on even after settlement of an underlying lease debt.
[T]he liability of [guarantor] hereunder shall in no way be affected, modified or diminished by reason of . . . any consent, release [,] indulgence or other action, inaction or omission under or in respect of the [l]ease, or . . . any dealings or transactions or matter or thing occurring between [the l]andlord and [the t]enant.
When the tenant defaulted under the lease the landlord brought a summary process action to recover the premises and money damages. The summary process action was resolved by the parties entering into an agreement for judgment, which the tenant president/guarantor signed in his corporate capacity. Thereafter, the landlord brought a separate action against the president, in his capacity as guarantor, to recover amounts left unsatisfied by the tenant. A superior court judge granted summary judgment for the landlord. The guarantor appealed and the Appeals Court affirmed. On appeal, the guarantor argued that once the tenant no longer was liable under the lease, he automatically was relieved of his guaranty obligations as a matter of law. He based that contention on the “black letter legal principle that a guarantor’s obligations are coextensive with those of the principal obligor.” The Appeals Court was unpersuaded.
The Appeals Court first addressed cases standing for the broad principle that “the liability of the guarantor cannot exceed the liability of the debtor.” 275 Washington St. Corp. v. Hudson River Intl., LLC, 465 Mass. 16, 30 (2013). However, on these specific facts, the Appeals Court found that such proposition establishes only that “a guarantor’s own liability is bounded by the scope of the underlying liability that he has guaranteed,” or, stated another way, the guarantor’s liability under the guaranty could not exceed the tenant’s payment obligations that arose under the terms of the lease.
We consider it self-evident that parties negotiating the terms of a guaranty would be free to agree that a subsequent release of a principal obligor’s underlying debt would result in a discharge of the guarantor’s own obligations. But we see nothing in the case law or elsewhere that requires such a term as a matter of law.” Put differently, we see no legal bar to a guarantor’s agreeing – as part of the negotiated terms of a guaranty – that his obligation to fund the underlying debt would survive a settlement of that debt between the principal obligor and the recipient of the guaranty. Rather, what the parties to a guaranty agree to in this regard is simply a matter of contractual intent. After all, “[a] guaranty is a contract ‘like all other contracts.’” Federal Financial Co. v. Savage, 431 Mass. 834, 817 (2000), quoting from Merchants Natl. Bank v. Stone, 296 Mass. 243, 250 (1936). Accordingly, “[t]he liability of a guarantor is to be ascertained by which the obligation is expressed, construed according to the usual rules of interpretation.” Agricultural Natl. Bank of Pittsfield v. Brennan, 295 Mass. 325, 327 (1936).
The ruling may come as a surprise to some, and offers a cautionary tale for tenants, guarantors, and those who draft and negotiate their documents. First, in many instances, the boiler plate terms of a personal guaranty are barely negotiated. Lawyers often assume that when a landlord requires a guaranty as a condition of entering into a lease there can be little discussion about terms. If the tenant defaults, the guarantor is liable. End of story. Careful attention should be paid, however, to the type of broad and all-encompassing guaranty language that the Appeals Court found so compelling in Cedar-Fieldstone. Guarantor’s counsel should at least attempt to carve out a limitation such that if an agreement of compromise is struck between landlord and tenant, the guarantor’s liability may be extinguished as well.
Ultimately, however, such general language was insufficient to overcome the clear, unambiguous, and all-encompassing provisions of the guaranty. Thus, both the trial court and Appeals Court correctly construed the agreement for judgment as a final resolution of disputes between the landlord and tenant, but not between the landlord and the guarantor.
Drafters and litigators beware: at least when a personal guaranty is involved, sometimes a final settlement agreement can be anything but the end of the story.
Michael Fee is a shareholder at Pierce and Mandell, P.C. and former chairman of both the Boston and Massachusetts Bar Association’s Real Estate Sections. The firm frequently represents both landlords and tenants in commercial and residential lease negotiations and litigation matters.

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