Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/369/369mass501.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:16:56+00:00

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SANDRA MARLOW & others vs. CITY OF NEW BEDFORD & others.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on March 5, 1974.
The suit was heard by Donahue, J.
Martin A. Lipman for the plaintiffs.
Richard J. Moore, Assistant City Solicitor (Francis V. Matera with him) for the city of New Bedford.
Leo S. McNamara, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of Public Works.
law resolving both issues in favor of the defendants and ordered entry of judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The case is before us on allowance of the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review. We affirm.
1. The factual context. We summarize the relevant facts, drawn from the judge's findings, the stipulation of parties, and other aspects of the record.
the effective dates of Sections 61 and 62 are staggered, [Note 7] Section 62 may not be applicable to some projects governed by Section 61. If a project commenced prior to July 1, 1973, Section 62 is inapplicable and no EIR is required. Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority, supra at 762. Similarly, Section 62 is inapplicable and no EIR is required where damage to the environment which may be expected to result from a particular project is "insignificant." G. L. c. 30, Section 61.
3. Findings and rulings of the trial judge; contentions of the plaintiffs. There were two distinct, alternative grounds for the trial judge's order for entry of judgment for the defendants and implicit ruling that no EIR was required for the Project: (1) The judge ruled that, "in view of the environmental advantage," i.e., improved sewage treatment, to be derived from the Project, any environmental harm from the Project "must be deemed `insignificant.' " (2) After a review of the relevant part of the Project's chronology, the judge concluded that "[a]ll that remained to be accomplished after July 1, 1973, was to put the plans and specifications out for bid by private contractors." Therefore, the judge ruled that the Project had "commenced" prior to July 1, 1973.
The plaintiffs challenge both grounds for the judgment below. They contend that the cutting of shade trees which beautify and cool County Street and the widening and straightening of County Street's roadway so as to produce a higher speed traffic artery threaten significant environmental harm which must be considered in an EIR. They argue that the Legislature intended that balancing of environmental harm against environmental advantage should occur in the EIR and that such balancing by a trial judge, reviewing an administrative determination that no EIR is required because impending environmental harm is insignificant, subverts the statutory procedure to have such balancing performed in the context of interagency review. Further, the plaintiffs maintain that the Project had not commenced on July 1, 1973, and that an EIR would still have been "practicable" on that date. They emphasize that, as of July 1, 1973, the contract with A. R. Belli, Inc., for construction had not been signed and actual construction had not begun.
plaintiffs' arguments respecting the significance of the environmental harm threatened.
4. Commencement of the project. Our review of the findings, rulings and judgment of the trial judge, entered August 15, 1974, is governed by the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Mass. R. Civ. P. 1A, 365 Mass. 731 (1974). In nonjury cases, such as the instant one, the rules provide that "[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), 365 Mass. 816 (1974). "A finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). In addition, this court must examine the legal standard applied to the facts found in order to assure that the ultimate findings and conclusions below were consistent with statutory norms. See Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 366 Mass. 755 , 768-770, 773 (1975).
The plaintiffs do not challenge the judge's findings of subsidiary facts. [Note 10] Rather, they challenge the ultimate finding, based on these findings of subsidiary facts and the applicable law, that the Project had commenced before July 1, 1973. We cannot say that this ultimate finding is either clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the relevant legal standards.
1973. [Note 12] We reject the suggestion that such a commitment must be one between a public agency and a construction contractor for actual construction work on a project and that the only committing contract here was executed on November 13, 1973, with A. R. Belli, Inc.
The EOTC regulations, relied on by both the plaintiffs and the defendants, cumulatively support the decision below. As of July 1, 1973, New Bedford had obtained a commitment of funds for the Project, had awarded an engineering contract, and had received the final engineering plans for the Project. The DPW had completed and filed an environmental assessment pursuant to G. L. c. 30, Section 61, prior to that date. EOTC Reg. 13.3(1). No major decisions respecting the Project remained to be made; all had been made in the finding and engineering design phases. EOTC Reg. 13.3(3). There was evidence at trial that DPW scrutiny of the engineering plans and subsequent approval were designed only to assure that the plans were complete. As of July 1, 1973, over nine per cent ($77,151.30) of the total estimated cost of the Project ($838,147) had already been expended on the engineering plans and design. EOTC Reg. 13.3(2).
until July 26, 1973. (Id. at 766.) Although some construction work had been performed in the Project area, an official public notice of the Massachusetts Port Authority, dated after that work had been completed, expressly disclaimed any final approval of proposed airport improvements and requested testimony from the public for use in the decision-making process. Id. at 765. By contrast, in the instant case, the final drawings and specifications were completed at substantial cost and submitted by the engineers prior to July 1, 1973, and the decision to widen and straighten the roadway long antedated the effective dates of MEPA and G. L. c. 30, Section 62.
The plaintiffs' reliance on Federal cases and Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality decided under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. Section 4321 (1970) et seq., is misplaced. Unlike G. L. c. 30, Section 62, the provisions of NEPA relative to preparation of environmental impact statements, 42 U.S.C. Section 4332(c) (1970), contain no reference to or focus on the time a project commences. The Federal courts which decided the cases relied on here have interpreted NEPA to require an environmental statement even for projects which were ongoing at the time NEPA became effective provided certain standards of feasibility were met. See Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 889-891 (1st Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164, 1176-1178 (6th Cir. 1972); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1330-1332 (4th Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on Transp., 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
[Note 1] Pursuant to St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 62, the substance of G. L. c. 214, Section 10A, is now in G. L. c. 214, Section 7A.
[Note 2] In the complaint, the city of New Bedford, the New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, the Massachusetts Department of Public Works, Bristol County, and A. R. Belli, Inc., were named as defendants.
[Note 3] According to the stipulation, some of the trees have already been cut down.
[Note 4] There was also testimony from a landscape architect as to the aesthetic significance of the trees and the current layout of the street.
1. September 23, 1969. By this date, New Bedford had requested and received a commitment of funds from the Commonwealth for construction on County Street. Presumably, although the record is not helpful on this point, some Federal commitment regarding the sewage disposal plant conditioned on construction of storm drains had been obtained prior to, or was obtained shortly after, this date.
2. December 10, 1971. New Bedford contracted with Tibbetts Engineering Corp. for engineering services related to the design and layout of the Project.
3. March 8, 1973, and April 12, 1973. The New Bedford city council held an open hearing on widening of intersections which necessitated a taking of land.
4. May 15, 1973. DPW filed an environmental assessment of the Project.
5. June 18, 1973. Completed engineering plans were forwarded to New Bedford and DPW. Work on the plans by Tibbetts Engineering Corp. cost $77,151.30. The cost of the total Project, as planned, will be in excess of $838,147.
6. July 1, 1973. General Laws c. 30, Section 62, become effective. The judge found that the Project had commenced prior to July 1.
7. July 16, 1973. Highway engineer for the Commonwealth notified the New Bedford commissioner of public works by letter that he had received and approved the plans for the Project.
8. October 20, 1973. New Bedford invited bids on the Project.
9. November 13, 1973. New Bedford executed a contract with the defendant A. R. Belli, Inc., to do the County Street work.
10. March 5, 1974. A. R. Belli, Inc., began work on the Project by cutting down some of the trees on County Street.
[Note 6] For a fuller discussion of the statutory scheme and applicable regulations, see Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 366 Mass. 755 , 760-762 (1975).
[Note 7] Section 61 became effective on December 31, 1972, but Section 62 did not become effective until July 1, 1973. St. 1972, c. 781, Section 3.
[Note 8] Regulations to Create a Uniform System for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Reports (EOEA Regs.), Reg. 13.
[Note 9] "Regulations Pursuant to Chapter 30, Section 62 of the Massachusetts General Laws for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Reports . . . ." (EOTC Regs.) Section 13.3.
[Note 10] By implication, they challenge his ruling that "[a]ll that remained to be accomplished after July 1, 1973, was to put the plans and specifications out for bid by private contractors." In their brief, the plaintiffs emphasize that the plans for the Project were not approved by the DPW until after July 1, 1973. As will be noted in the text below, we accord no great significance to this later approval.
[Note 11] For consideration of the phrase "has undertaken a continuous program of action or construction," which we have omitted from the quotation above, see Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 366 Mass. 755 , 763 (1975).
[Note 12] The hearings as to the takings of land for the widening of intersections in the Project area held in 1973 affected private land already used for sidewalks by New Bedford and, in any event, would have been unlikely to alter any major Project decision. Compare the hearings in Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 366 Mass. 755 (1975), infra.

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