Source: http://masslegalresources.com/clayman-et-al-v-mclaughlin-et-al-lawyers-weekly-no-12-125-17
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:29:45+00:00

Document:
DEBORAH A. CLAYMAN, individually and as trustee, and RICHARD E.
JOHN T. McLAUGHLIN, et al.
facts as alleged in the SAC, including the documents attached or referenced in the SAC.
marriage, Deborah and Richard entered into a Prenuptial Agreement dated October 13, 2005.
defendant law firm, Berluti McLaughlin & Kutchin, LLP.
shall be entitled to receive the Revere residence outright and free of encumbrances.
by their first names to avoid confusion.
taken place with respect to this Agreement.” Id. at III, C.
except for willful default or bad faith, in retaining, selling or otherwise dealing with such interest.
as a co-trustee of Deborah’s Trust.” Revocable Trust, § 9.1.
Will is, pursuant to the terms of the Revocable Trust, put into a subtrust called the Family Trust.
The beneficiary of the Family Trust is Kate Clayman, Richard’s daughter by a previous marriage.
the principal of Deborah’s Trust.
Trust in a manner to qualify for and be maintained as a Q-Tip Trust.
McLaughlin, as executor, cause the estate to reimburse her for the fees that she incurred.
indemnify is a breach of fiduciary duty.
that describes the transfers of property interests he intended to execute to fund Deborah’s Trust.
trustee of Deborah’s Trust on November 25, 2014.
and the Closely-Held Interests became clients of McLaughlin and his law firm. SAC ¶ 93.
real estate investments though a management company called 5C, Inc. It is alleged that 5C, Inc.
of any ability to affect what income would or could be distributed.
was less than $ 25,000 annually.
aiding and abetting the tort of interference with contract.
duties to Deborah’s Trust arising from being trustee of Richard’s Revocable Trust.
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). At the pleading stage, Mass. R. Civ. P.
the statute of limitations.” Epstein v. Seigel, 396 Mass. 278, 279 (1985).
faith. All of these allegations remain to be proven.
fiduciary duty to the trust and its beneficiary.
to the allegations of the SAC, then so should the firm on the basis of potential vicarious liability.
allegations as true at this stage of the case.
statute of limitations.” Epstein v. Seigel, 396 Mass. 278, 279 (1985).
dismiss whether the letter is a “final account”7 or whether it “fully disclosed” the matter.
not objecting to the July 31, 2014 letter within sixty days, as required by the Revocable Trust.
and cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss.
after Richard’s death. As a result, Deborah’s claim for reimbursement of attorney’s fees is barred.
receipts and disbursements, including the amount of the trustee’s compensation.
SAC will be addressed in the next section.
fund fully [Deborah’s Trust] with the sum of two million dollars.” SAC ¶ 173.
not deny that he operated the Closely-Held Interests for capital growth, not income production.
gain.” Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 434 (1989).
means or both. Mere interference with a contract is not actionable. See G.S. Enterprises, Inc. v.
interest. Thus, there can be no improper means or motive. Pembroke Country Club, Inc. v.
actor’s own interest is not improper conduct).
in complaint of improper means, while conclusory, were sufficient to resist a motion to dismiss).
circumstances, and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” G. S. Enterprises, Inc., 410 Mass.
at 273. This kind of evaluation of the facts cannot be done on a motion to dismiss.
For the reasons stated, Steven’s motion to dismiss counts II and III must be denied.
Massachusetts, 463 Mass. 50, 64 (2012) for the elements of an aiding and abetting claim.
dismiss Count IV must be denied.
distributed to Deborah’s Trust and the Family Trust. For two of the entities, 5C, Inc. and C.C.
business entities to Deborah’s Trust.
business entities and other indispensable parties must remain as parties.
vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of Steven. That is enough to satify the Rule 12 standard.
Count II will not be dismissed.
for her benefit during Deborah’s lifetime.
he has no right of possession at the time . . . .’” Grand Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Brauer, 57 Mass. App.
Ct. 407, 412 (2003), quoting from Abington Natl. Bank v. Ashwood Homes, Inc., 19 Mass. App.
deed”). Finally, funds held in an escrow account may be the subject of a conversion claim.
Count V adequately pleads a claim for conversion.
business entities, the motion of the Family Trust must be denied.
transfer of ownership of the Revere residence. Otherwise, the motion to dismiss is denied.
Trust and the business entities are DENIED.

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