Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/fpmd/chapter6/section6
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:11:40+00:00

Document:
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure identifies two types of experts: trial experts (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)) and consultant experts, those employed but not expected to testify (id. 26(a)(4)(D)). Trial experts are discussed below. Consultant experts are not discussed further here.
Daubert noted that its required reliability inquiry should be "a flexible one."23 Although Daubert emphasized that "[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate,"24 General Electric Company v. Joiner insisted that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct,"25 thereby expanding the trial court's authority to exclude proposed testimony as unreliable.
6.6.F. Will Expert Testimony Assist the Trier of Fact?
The burden of establishing the admissibility of expert testimony rests with its proponent.44 An opposing party can challenge the admissibility of all or part of proposed expert testimony before trial through a motion in limine or through voir dire when the expert is tendered at trial. The volume of reported cases suggests that many, if not most, objections now arise pretrial in motions in limine. Accordingly, the proponent should anticipate and prepare from the outset to overcome a motion in limine, beginning with the preparation of the expert's report.
In limine motions generally follow an expert's deposition. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) permits the expert's deposition but only after the report is provided.45 A trial court has discretion to grant a motion in limine without first conducting an evidentiary hearing if the expert's report fails to establish one of the elements required for admissibility. Although courts frequently hold evidentiary hearings to resolve in limine motions, often referred to as Daubert hearings, the determination of whether to conduct a Daubert hearing is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court can grant or exclude an expert's testimony without first conducting a Daubert hearing.46 As with all evidentiary objections, Daubert objections to the admissibility of an expert's testimony can be waived by failing to timely raise them in the trial court.
1. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. For an example of how an expert might be used in an IDEA case, see G.S. v. Cranbury Township Board of Education, 450 F. App'x 197, 200 (3d Cir. 2011).
2. See, e.g., Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014) (behavioral expert); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (2013) (property experts); PPL Corporation v. C.I.R., 133 S. Ct. 1897, 1903 (2013) (tax expert); Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (damages expert in class action context).
3. Similarly, preparation for cross-examination requires thorough familiarity with the subject matter and relevant literature, especially anything the expert has written. Review previous testimony and reports by the expert. Consider impeachment by using scientific treatises. See W.E. Shipley, Use of Medical or Other Scientific Treatises in Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses, 60 A.L.R.2d 77 (2011).
4. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. Id. at 589 n.7.
6. The Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011) is a useful guide to many of these issues.
7. Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
8. See generally, Fed. R. Evid. 702 Committee Notes on Rules -- 2000 Amendment.
9. Conroy v. Vilsack, 707 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2013).
10. General Electric Company v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) ("abuse of discretion" standard); 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702-02 – (2013). However, as in other areas of the law, if the district court applied the incorrect legal standard, then the review is de novo. United States v. Garcia, 635 F.3d 472, 476 (10th Cir. 2011).
11. See, e.g., Quiet Technology DC-8 Incorporated v. Hurel-Dubois UK Limited, 326 F.3d 1333, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 2003) (expert who had worked in field for nearly twenty years, had worked with experts in field, and had extensive on-the-job training was qualified; and distinguishing between reliability and qualifications); see also In re Flashcom Incorporated, 503 B.R. 99, 124 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (Rule 702 "contemplates a broad conception of expert qualifications.").
12. 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.04[a].
13. Levin v. Dalva Brothers, Inc., 459 F.3d 68, 78–79 (1st Cir. 2006).
14. See Jahn v. Equine Services, PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 393 n.8 (6th Cir. 2000), (citing McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Company, 61 F.3d 1038, 1045 (2d Cir. 1995)). See also Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Harris v. Gourley, No. 1:10-CV-99 (M.D. Ga. March 27, 2013).
15. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
16. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
17. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
20. Id.; 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.05[c].
21. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
22. See United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Using the Daubert factors as a point of departure, the district court is free to fashion an approach more precisely tailored to an evaluation of the particular evidentiary submission before it."). For a recent application, see Peoples State Bank v. Stifel, Nicolaus and Company, 2013 WL 1024917 (S.D. Ind. March 14, 2013).
23. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
25. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
27. See, e.g., Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 399 (2d Cir. 2005) (abuse of discretion to admit expert testimony of "misperception hypothesis" as explanation for variance between police officer perception and physical evidence in excessive force wrongful shooting claim); Burleson v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2004) (expert witness properly excluded in Eighth Amendment claim that defendants exposed plaintiffs to hazardous conditions as prison welder causing him to develop radiation-induced cancer; no reliable methodology supported expert's claim of harmful exposure level); McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff's expert witness properly excluded in claim by inmate that 4-hour delay in treating spinal epidural abscess caused or worsened resulting paralysis since studies only explored effects of 48-hour or longer delays; expert's causation conclusion was therefore unreliable assertion). See also Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corporation of America, 403 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding inadmissible affidavit submitted by defense expert physician in support of summary judgment attesting to quality care offered by defendant physician; affidavit offered no factual foundation for its conclusion).
28. See Smith v. Ford Motor Company, 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert's analysis and the correctness of the expert's conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact ...."). The proponent of the expert testimony need not demonstrate that the testimony is correct—only that the expert is qualified and that his testimony is based on reliable methodology. "[I]t is not the role of the district court to make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence." Quiet Technology DC-8, 326 F.3d at 1341. "[A] district court's gatekeeper role under Daubert 'is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.'" Id. (quoting Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 666 (11th Cir. 2001)). See also Fed. R. Evid. 702 Committee Notes on Rules -- 2000 Amendments ("The emphasis in the amendment on 'sufficient facts or data' is not intended to authorize a trial court to exclude an expert's testimony on the ground that the court believes one version of the facts and not the other.").
29. Fed. R. Evid. 702 Committee Notes on Rules -- 2000 Amendments (quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)).
30. Compare Brown v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 705 F.3d 531, 535–38 (5th Cir. 2013) (expert failed to articulate reliable methodology), with In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, 907 F. Supp. 2d 637, 645 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (expert testimony admissible because, inter alia, it is directly relevant to central questions of trial).
31. See Jahn, 233 F.3d at 390 ("In order to be admissible on the issue of causation, an expert's testimony need not eliminate all other possible causes of the injury."). Compare Orthoflex Incorporated v. ThermoTek Incorporated, 986 F. Supp. 2d 776 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (expert failure to rule out alternative causes of product failures did not render his opinions regarding device's defective design unreliable), with Casey v. Geek Squad® Subsidiary Best Buy Stores Limited Partnership, 823 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343–46 (D. Md. 2011) (expert's opinions were unreliable; opinions not based on sufficient facts or data, without any testing; expert failed to rule out alternative hypotheses).
32. Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 721 (4th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n expert is entitled to rely on factual underpinnings—including those based on hearsay—that are 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.'" (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 703)). See also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 439–40 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (although expert may rely upon inadmissible hearsay, expert must form own opinions by applying experience and reliable methodology to inadmissible materials; admitting testimony because experts brought to bear expertise and sources used were reasonably relied upon by experts in field). But see Fed. R. Evid. 703 ("Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.").
33. Johnson v. Samsung Electronics America Incorporated, 377 F.R.D. 161, 165–66 (E.D. La. 2011) (admitting testimony, relying in part on Fed. R. Evid. 702 Committee Notes on Rules -- 2000 Amendment).
34. Baldwin Graphic Systems, Incorporated v. Siebert, Incorporated, No. 03 C 7713 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2005) ("Rule 702 does not prohibit consultation, ban the acquisition of knowledge from other sources, or disqualify any witness who consults with or learns from others.").
35. Fed. R. Evid. 615(3).
36. See, e.g., Malek v. Federal Insurance Company, 994 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1993).
37. 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.03.
38. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.03[a]). For a recent example, see Worley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2013 WL 6478425 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2013).
39. "Each courtroom comes equipped with a 'legal expert,' called a judge, and it is his or her province alone to instruct the jury on the relevant legal standards." Burkart v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 112 F.3d 1207, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reversing Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 judgment for deaf plaintff based on erroneous admission of expert testimony respecting requirements governing police encounters with deaf individuals). See also Roundy's Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board, 674 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony on legalities of property law); Lakeside Feeders Incorporated v. Producers Livestock Marketing Association, 666 F.3d 1099, 1111 (8th cir. 2012) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony as legal conclusion that did not assist trier of fact).
40. Daubert, 504 U.S. at 595. For a recent example of exclusion under Rule 403, see J.T. Colby and Company v. Apple Incorporated, No. 11 Civ. 4060 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013).
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
42. See, e.g., Moore v. International Paint L.L.C., 547 F. App'x 513 (5th Cir. 2013) (excluding expert report, inter alia, because it did not meet Rule 702 standards).
43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10.
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
46. Broussard v. Maples, 535 F. App'x 825, 827–28 (11th Cir. 2013) (district court not required to hold hearing). See also Estate of Barabin v. Asten Johnson Incorporated, 740 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 2014) (hearings are commonly used but not required).

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