Source: http://isthatlegal.ca/index.php?name=490-case-law
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:21:17+00:00

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The claim will only be struck where it is “plain and obvious” that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 959; R v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 45, at paras. 17-19; Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 479 (CanLII), 111 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 22; and Trillium Power Wind Corporation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 683 (CanLII), 117 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 30. While the court must accept as true the material facts as pleaded, this obligation does not extend to bald conclusory statements of fact unsupported by material facts.
The tort of misfeasance in a public office is founded on the fundamental rule of law principle that those who hold public office and exercise public functions are subject to the law and must not abuse their powers to the detriment of the ordinary citizen. As Lord Steyn put it in Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England (No. 3),  2 W.L.R. 1220, at 1230 “The rationale of the tort is that in a legal system based on the rule of law executive or administrative power ‘may be exercised only for the public good’ and not for ulterior and improper purposes”. The “underlying purpose” of the tort of misfeasance in a public office “is to protect each citizen's reasonable expectation that a public officer will not intentionally injure a member of the public through deliberate and unlawful conduct in the exercise of public functions”: Odhavji, 2003 SCC 69 (CanLII), [2003 SCC 69,  3 S.C.R. 263] supra at para. 30.
 To pass scrutiny under r. 21.01(1)(b), a pleading of misfeasance in public office must allege facts capable of establishing the ingredients of the tort, in addition to the usual tort requirements of causation and damages. The ingredients are: (1) the defendant must be a public official; (2) the claim must arise from the exercise of power as a public official; and (3) the public official “must have acted with malice or bad faith” so as to satisfy the mental element: Freeman-Maloy, at para. 11.
 Another way of framing the test is that the plaintiff must show: first, the public official was engaged in unlawful conduct in the exercise of his or her public functions; and, second, the public official was aware that the conduct in question was unlawful and was likely to injure the plaintiff: Trillium Power Wind Corporation, at paras. 38-39, drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, at paras. 28, 30 and 32; see also, Pikangikum First Nation v. Nault, 2012 ONCA 705 (CanLII), 298 O.A.C. 14, at para. 54, leave to appeal refused,  S.C.C.A. No. 10; St. Elizabeth Home Society v. Hamilton (City), 2010 ONCA 280 (CanLII), 319 D.L.R. (4th) 74, at para. 20; Granite Power Corporation v. Ontario (2004), 2004 CanLII 44786 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 194 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused,  S.C.C.A. No. 409, at paras. 37-39.
 In order to establish a duty of care in negligence, three elements are necessary: (1) The harm complained of must have been reasonably foreseeable; (2) There must have been sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant that it would be fair and just to impose a duty of care; and (3) There must be no residual policy reasons for declining to impose such a duty: Williams v. Toronto (City), 2016 ONCA 666 (CanLII), 402 D.L.R. (4th) 678; Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 537; Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2001 SCC 80 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 562; Childs v. Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 643; Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., 2007 SCC 38 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 83; see also Anns v. Merton London Borough Council,  A.C. 728 (H.L.); and Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, 1984 CanLII 21 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 2.

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