Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Lindsey_v._Lessee_of_Miller
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 23:38:42+00:00

Document:
This was an ejectment in the circuit court of Ohio, instituted by the defendants in error for the recovery of a tract of land situated in the Virginia military district in the state of Ohio. The title of the plaintiff's lessor was derived from a patent issued by the United States, dated the 1st day of December 1824, for the premises in controversy; of which the defendants were in possession.
On the trial, the defendants offered in evidence the copy of a survey, bearing date the 5th of January 1788, recorded on the 7th of April in the same year. The entry and survey, which comprehended the land in dispute, were in the name of Richard C. Anderson, and the latter purported to be made for four hundred and fifty-four acres of land, part of a military warrant, No. 2481, on the Ohio river, on the north-west side, &c.
The defendants then read in evidence the act of congress of the 3d of March 1807, authorizing patents for land located and surveyed by certain Virginia revolution warrants, and the act, amending the same, passed in March 1823. They also offered in evidence the deposition of James Taylor, to prove that the defendants had been in possession of the premises for upwards of thirty years, which deposition was admitted by the court.
The plaintiff then offered evidence to prove that the warrant, on which the defendants' survey was predicated, was issued by the state of Virginia on the 12th of February in the year 1784, for services performed in the Virginia state line, and not in the continental establishment. The defendants objected to this evidence, but the court overruled the objection, and permitted the same to go to the jury. The defendants, by their counsel, then moved the court to instruct the jury that, if they believed that the survey under which the defendants claim was founded on the warrant so admitted in evidence by the court, it did not render the survey void; but that the survey and possession, under the acts of congress referred to, constituted a sufficient title to protect the defendants in their possession. The court refused to give the instruction, and directed the jury, that, if they believed the survey of the defendants was founded on the warrant offered in evidence by the plaintiff, then that the survey was void; and that the survey and entry, together with the possession of the defendants, were no legal bar, under the acts of congress aforesaid, to the plaintiff's right of recovery. They further requested the court to instruct the jury, that, if they believed the defendants had the uninterrupted possession of the premises for more than twenty-one years since the commencement of the act of limitations in the state of Ohio, and before the commencement of this suit, that then the defendants had a title by possession; unless the plaintiffs came within some one of the exceptions of the statute. The court refused to give such instructions.
They further requested the court to instruct the jury, that, if they believed the defendants were innocent purchasers without notice of the warrant offered in evidence by the plaintiff, that the defendants were entitled to a verdict. The court refused to give such instructions.
To these proceedings of the court the defendants excepted; and a verdict and judgment having been rendered for the plaintiff, they prosecuted this writ of error.
The case was argued by Mr Ewing and Mr Corwin, for the plaintiffs in error; and by Mr Leonard and Mr Doddridge, for the defendant.
The only question argued before the court was that which had reference to the validity of the title derived by the plaintiffs in error, the defendants below, under the entry and survey in the name of Richard C. Anderson. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error abandoned the point made in the circuit court, that they were entitled to the benefits of the statute of limitations.
For the plaintiffs in error it was argued, that the plaintiffs' title was protected by the act of congress of March 3, 1807. That act was made to protect possessions against entries under certain descriptions of warrants; to prevent and entry or location on tracts for which patents had issued, or surveys had been made. It was admitted that there must have been a survey by some person, acting in an official capacity. The party claiming must show a colour of title; and that has been shown by the entry and survey in this case. There is no distinction under the law between surveys which were void and voidable. These terms are of very indefinite import, and the application of the act cannot turn upon them.
The cases of Anderson's lessee v. Clarke, 1 Peters, 636, and of Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 7 Wheat. 212, sustain the principles claimed by the plaintiffs in error. When in 1807 congress passed the law, they must be presumed to have legislated on the then existing state of things. It was then well known that there were lands held under claims drawn under surveys made for services in the Virginia state line. It must be presumed the act was intended to apply to those cases. The equities of both classes of claimants were the same; both were meritorious; and the powers of congress extended to both. In 1823, congress passed a law in precise accordance with the act of 1807, after the decision of the court in Hoofnagle v. Anderson, in 1822, relating to Virginia state warrants. There is nothing appearing on the face of the survey, under which the plaintiffs in error held the land, showing that their title below was derived under a warrant for services in the state line: nor is it open to inquiry whether the surveyor was legally authorized to make the survey.
The plaintiffs in error held as bona fide purchasers under Anderson's title: they are purchasers without notice.
The case of Miller and others v. Kerr and others, 7 Wheat. 1, and the cases cited for the defendant in error have no application to this case. The law of 1807 was not in the view of the court in the decision of these cases.
The limitation upon claims intended to be brought within the act of 1807, extends in terms to such a warrant as the plaintiffs'. The meaning of the terms 'patent' and 'survey,' is decided tin the case of Hoofnagle v. Anderson; and in that case, the survey was under a state line warrant.
Mr Leonard and Mr Doddridge, for the defendant in error, contended that the act of congress upon which the plaintiffs rely, was intended to protect informal or imperfect entries or surveys under continental warrants, and not such as were absolutely void; such as surveys made under state line warrants. The surveys made on the ground, were to be protected when made under proper warrants.
This construction is established in the cases reported in Hard. Reports, 348, 358, 359.
The force of this decision, as applicable to this case, is in no respect impugned by the case of Hoofnagle v. Anderson, susequently decided, and reported in 7 Wheat. 212. In this latter case the party was protected by his patent, which was issued before the making of his adversary's entry. In Miller's case, the party claiming under a warrant, in the state line, did not hold an operative patent. He held the elder entry and survey. The other party, having the senior patent, held the legal title. Consequently the party stood upon his entry and survey, which was open to examination. In this case, the plaintiffs in error, having no legal grant, stand also upon their entry and survey: and upon the doctrine of Miller's case, these confer no title whatever.
In the Lessee of Anderson v. Clarke and Ellison, 1 Peters, 628, it was considered what description of survey protected land from entry under the law of March 2, 1807. The question presented in that case was, whether an entry and survey upon a warrant previously satisfied, was protected. The general principle was not decided; the court being of opinion that the particular circumstances and relations of the parties connected with the entries operated to protect them.
No doctrine is better settled than that a survey without an entry is void; none, than that an entry without a warrant to authorise it, is void. If the act of March 2, 1807, can be made to protect this survey, it protects that which before the passage of the law, was absolutely void-as much so as an entry made without reference to any warrant. The object of the law was to protect bona fide entries and surveys, made upon warrants capable of appropriating the land, but defective in some of the requisites specified in the law. This was a prudent and parental object. But it ought never to be construed as protecting that which originated in positive wrong, and unauthorised encroachment upon the rights of others.
Whatever might have been the original rights and equities of the two classes of claimants, and however true it may be, as suggested by the chief justice, in Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 'that the rights of the state officers were not sufficiently respected when the legislature omitted to insert them, as well as their brethren of the continental line, in the reservation for military warrants;' it is certain that that omission limited and concluded their rights. An entry specifying that it was made upon a warrant in the state line, and a survey and patent containing the same specification, would be mere nullities; because all were contrary to law, and unauthorised upon the face of them. It is only where prima facie every thing is legal, that the grant appropriates the land: until the grant issues to shut up all inquiry into intermediate proceedings, the validity of both entry and survey depends upon the warrant. If that confer no authority, the entry and survey originate no right. Surely the act of March 2, 1807, was intended to protect existing rights, and not to be made the foundation of new ones. Yet such must be its operation if it protect the survey in question.
Cited also, Swann's Collection of Ohio Land Laws, 121; 5 Cranch, 234; 7 Wheat. 212; 9 Wheat. 480.

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