Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40395:g-r-no-140344-august-18,-2000-solomon-rabor-v-people-of-the-phil&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:54:04+00:00

Document:
SOLOMON RABOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Through this petition for review on certiorari, Solomon Rabor (petitioner) seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision, dated 11 March 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11542 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Davao City finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the Resolution, dated 7 September 1999, of the appellate court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
INCISED WOUND, POSTERIOR TEMPORAL AREA (L) 1.5 CM. LONG, 2-3 MM. DEEP.
INCISED WOUND SUPRASCAPULAR AREA (L) 12 CM. LONG, 5-6 CM. DEEP.
INCISED WOUND, BACK OF THE NECK 10-11 CM. LONG, 4-5 MM. DEEP.
INCISED WOUND (L) LUMBAR REGION 6 CM. LONG, 4-5 MM. DEEP.
INCISED WOUND (R) LUMBAR AREA 8 CM. LONG, 3 MM. DEEP.
INCISED WOUND, POSTEROLATERAL ASPECT (L) ELBOW, 6 CM. LONG, 3-4 CM. DEEP WITH CHIP FRACTURE OF LATERAL EPICONDYLE OF THE HUMEROS (L).
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of cause independent of his will of said accused, that is because of the timely and able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said Hikaru Miyake.
Petitioner fled when he lost possession of the bolo. As a result of the attack, Miyake sustained injuries on the different parts of his body. Miyake’s security guard arrived to give assistance to his employer. The security guard saw petitioner flee towards the direction of his house. Miyake was immediately brought to the Brokenshire Hospital where he was confined for ten (10) days.
Miyake further testified that petitioner and his wife used to perform services to his (Miyake’s) family. Petitioner was hired to bring the Miyake children to their school while petitioner’s wife gave them piano lessons. This cordial relationship between Miyake and petitioner, however, abruptly ended when their respective wives quarreled with each other over a sum of money which Mrs. Miyake loaned to petitioner’s wife. Since then, petitioner became hostile towards the Miyakes.
B.	WHETHER OR NOT THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY.
C.	WHETHER OR NOT THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE APPLICATION OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION IN THE INSTANT CASE IS A FINDING GROUNDED ON SPECULATION, SURMISES, CONJECTURES, AND IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN.
D.	WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IN DISREGARDING THE ALIBI OF THE PETITIONER HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT.
The first three issues shall be discussed jointly as they are interrelated. They all pertain to petitioner’s contention that he was wrongly convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. Petitioner maintains that the wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal; hence, the crime committed was merely attempted not frustrated. Further, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not allegedly sufficiently proven in this case. Petitioner thus is of the view that the crime should be homicide and not murder.
There is merit, however, to petitioner’s assertion that the trial court and the CA erroneously appreciated evident premeditation in the commission of the offense. In holding that petitioner committed the offense with evident premeditation, the trial court considered his act prior to the hacking incident of shouting at Miyake, "I want to fight and I will kill you." According to the trial court, this showed that petitioner had long planned to kill Miyake.
On the other hand, the CA merely made a cursory statement that "in qualifying the crime as frustrated murder the trial court considered the circumstance of evident premeditation and not treachery" 12 without elaborating on the bases for the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
None of these requisites can be inferred from the facts of this case. For one, the records do not show the time when petitioner resolved to commit the crime. The date and, if possible, the time when the offender determined to commit the crime is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the third requisite is computed from date and time. 14 Absent this first requisite, evident premeditation was thus incorrectly appreciated in this case.
Evident premeditation having been wrongly appreciated in this case and there being no other qualifying circumstance established during the trial, the Court now holds that the crime committed in this case is frustrated homicide.
Q	Alright, you said you smell something wrong so you went out from the gasoline drum and clean your body?
A	I felt something wrong I heard some sound so I turn over and at that time Mr. Rabor was almost 1-1/2 meters from me and suddenly attacked me.
Q	You said when he attacked you, you saw him to be Solomon Rabor?
Q	Were you investigated by any police officer in connection with this case?
A	Yes, sir. I think August 19 in the morning I was investigated by two policemen.
Q	And what did you tell these police officers?
A	I explained to the police officers about the hacking incident.
Q	If the accused Solomon Rabor alias Boy is in Court can you identify him?
Q	Will you kindly look around the courtroom if he is around?
A	He is Mr. Rabor. (The witness pointing to Mr. Solomon Rabor and when the accused was asked he answered that he is Solomon Rabor).
Q	You said you told the police officer of what happened to you did you tell them who hacked you?
In fine, the guilt of petitioner for the crime of frustrated homicide had been sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty imposed on him shall be modified accordingly. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide. Under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Frustrated homicide is thus punishable by prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be meted out on petitioner should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, and the maximum should be taken from the medium period of prision mayor (Article 64, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code) the range of which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime of frustrated homicide, petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision, dated 11 March 1997, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is found guilty of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and sentenced to a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
2.	TSN, Testimony of Hikaru Miyake, 12 July 1983, pp. 15-23.
3.	TSN, Testimony of Solomon Rabor, 20 February 1986, pp. 2-5.
4.	TSN, Testimony of Vicente Panes, 16 June 1986, pp. 2-5.
5.	TSN, Testimony of Emma Rabor, 6 December 1986, pp. 2-3.
6.	Decision, Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Davao City, Criminal Case No. 7022, p. 16; Records, p. 172.
10.	Note 6, at 8; Records, p. 164. Emphasis ours.
11.	Article 6, Revised Penal Code.
12.	Note 7, at 43.
13.	People v. Espina, G.R No. 123102, 29 February 2000, p. 11; People v. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643, 644 (1999); People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495, 513 (1999).
14.	REYES, REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK ONE 385 (13th ed., 1993).
15.	People v. Fuentesuela, 73 Phil. 553, 554 (1942).
16.	People v. Bermudez, 309 SCRA 124, 135 (1999); People v. Alshaika, 261 SCRA 637 (1996); People v. Balamban, 264 SCRA 619 (1996).
17.	Note 2, at 19.
19.	People v. De los Santos, 295 SCRA 583, 604 (1998); People v. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574 (1996).
20.	Note 7, at 79.
21.	People v. Martinez, 205 SCRA 666, 674-675 (1992); People v. Araja, 105 SCRA 133 (1992).

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