Source: https://horowlaw.com/employment-law/intro-to-the-minnesota-veterans-preference/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:45:57+00:00

Document:
The following is an outline of a presentation that I gave to the Hennepin County Bar Association, Labor and Employment Law Section, on November 13, 2018.
vi. 317 Minnesota veterans homeless in 2014 (down 47% from 2010) (https://mn.gov/mdva/resources/homelessnessandprevention/).
Enacted to benefit Civil War veterans in state, county, city or town employment; in subsequent years extended to veterans of other conflicts and to current members of U.S. Army and Navy reserves.
vii. 2016 –probationary employees now exempted; 30 day notice (formerly 60); expansion of right to attorney’s fee for veterans; three-person panel replaced with single arbitrator.
g. Preference in State/County Contracts (Minn. Stat. § 161.321).
i. “Political subdivision” denotes an entity with authority to cause taxes to be levied, including watershed districts. Dahle v. Red Lake Watershed Dist., 354 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. App. 1984). Under that definition, not the University of Minnesota. Winberg.
ii. State employees included for employment security provision; different rules governing preference in hiring.
i. Full-time / part-time – YES. Statute makes no distinction; preference presumed to apply fully to part-time employees.
2. Right to pre-removal hearing vests “After any initial hiring probationary period expires” Minn. Stat. § 197.46(a).
2. Employer met burden of proving seasonal park maintenance workers were “temporary,” where new application was required every season, even though significant numbers of employees rehired from year to year and some were given job without the need to fill out new application. Christopherson v. City of Albert Lea, OAH No. 12-3100-14431-2 (Sept. 2001).
f. Surviving spouse or spouse of disabled veteran unable to work.
iii. PRACTICE POINT FOR EMPLOYERS: Ask on all applications for jobs subject to VPA whether applicant qualifies and wishes to claim veteran’s preference; define “veteran” (i.e. includes the surviving spouse of an honorably discharged veteran and spouse of disabled veteran); or cite to statute or other source where applicant can determine VPA qualification.
ii. Chief Deputy exclusion can apply to counties with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants. Gramke v. Cass County, 453 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1990).
h. Partially Excluded – Teachers. Minn. Stat. § 197.455, subd. 5a and Minn. Stat. § 197.46.
2. No protection against suit under Title VII, ADA or ADEA.
iii. NOTE – employer prohibited from asking about veteran status in private sector, if intent is to discriminate (Minn. Stat. § 181.535).
4. Should be based on objective criteria.
5. PRACTICE POINT FOR EMPLOYERS: be sure to have an up-to-date position description to aid in this process.
a. Usable just once after having secured position.
1. Statute doesn’t say, but assume 15 points (deceased = disabled).
iv. Veteran may disclaim credit. Minn. Stat. § 197.455, subd. 9.
iii. Balfanz did not get the job; ALJ and VA Comr’r. sided with Balfanz, saying city should have afforded Balfanz his VPA credit. City must start over with hiring process.
iii. When preference points not to be awarded / considered.
v. Veteran receives preference when “ties” in scoring with non-veteran.
vi. BUT a preference is not a guarantee of employment. Bentzen v. Hennepin County, OAH 4-3100-21648-2, 4-3100- 21444-2 (Feb. 2011).
2. 100 point test may be used simply to determine who gets interviewed.
3. PRACTICE POINT FOR EMPLOYERS: criteria for interviews should be put in writing.
4. Any number of points may be awarded to other categories of employees (based on residency, protected class status), even if doing so effectively wipes out veteran’s preference.
Case study – Jacob Bonniwell v. City of St. Paul, OAH No. 67-3100-23003 (Dec. 2013) (“expanded certification;” set number of applicants selected after credits are added to passing scores based on numerical cut off; then separately a number of “protected class” members is selected for interview, based on their scores, effectively removing from consideration white able-bodied veteran applicants; practical effect is to create two lists; argument was not addressed by ALJ in published opinion; real harm – lower scoring minorities after Bonniwell’s points were awared were afforded interviews).
e. Rejection; explanation for reasons in writing.
ii. Minn. Stat. § 43A.11 (state employees).
i. Affirmative action plans / Expanded certification – Bonniwell debate.
2. Each recently separated veteran who meets minimum qualifications for a vacant position and has claimed veterans or disabled veterans preference must be considered for the position. The top five recently separated veterans must be granted an interview for the position by the hiring authority.
c. Spouses of deceased/disabled veterans likewise covered.
b. What is a removal?
iii. Demotion. Leininger v. City of Bloomington, 299 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1980). Defined as a change in job duties which lowers a veteran’s rank, grade or position. Ammend v. County of Isanti, 486 N.W.2d 3 (Minn. App. 1992).
c. What isn’t a removal?
5. Higbee v. St. Louis County, OAH No. 4-3100-12604-2 (May 2000) (reduction from full-time to part-time status, made in good faith, is not “good cause” to resign requiring employer to provide notice of right to hearing).
v. “Voluntary demotion” of employee who goes on indefinite medical leave and is re-employed to lower level position; lost employee status upon taking leave and so was not “removed.” Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 503 N.W.2d 780) (Minn. 1983).
v. PRACTICE POINT FOR EMPLOYERS: In drafting a notice of intent to discharge based on misconduct, consider an incompetence charge citing lack of moral fitness based on the demonstrated misconduct; “moral fitness” for the job is subjective and the review panel may be more deferential to employer’s determination of moral/ethical qualifications for the job.
1. Did the Veteran have reasonable notice of the rules and policies allegedly violated?
2. Are the rules and policies uniformly administered?
3. Was the Veteran given reasonable notice of the consequences of continued violations?
4. Was the Veteran given reasonable opportunity to correct the alleged violation?
5. Is there substantial and convincing evidence in the record to support the charges?
1. Did the employee have foreknowledge of possible consequences of misconduct?
2. Was the rule was reasonably related to proper business goals and reasonable employee expectations?
3. Were efforts to discover whether the misconduct occurred reasonable?
4. Was a fair and objective investigation conducted?
5. Was the discipline was based on a sufficient level of evidence?
6. Were the rules and penalties were applied in an even-handed manner?
7. Were the penalties consistent with the offense and the employee’s past work history?
“It is universally accepted in labor law that progressive discipline is an aspirational, not mandatory, principle. In concept, progressive discipline is intended to be corrective, not punitive. However, employers are allowed to analyze an employee’s violations from a holistic viewpoint. Single policy violations may, indeed, be minor and only warrant a lower level discipline. Nevertheless, when there are, as in this case, serial individual violations, their sum can warrant dismissal.” Willmar Municipal Utilities v. Folkedahl, BMS 18VP0742 (June 2018).
i. Must provide employee notice of intent to discharge, basis for its action (incompetence versus misconduct) and right to request a hearing within 30 days.
3. Failure to provide notice extends employee’s time in which to request hearing within limitations period (6 years); extends right to pay (and claim for back-pay) as well.
4. Employee has no right to actually work during the 30 days; can be treated by employer as a paid leave of absence.
5. PRACTICE POINT FOR EMPLOYEES: right to pay through final adjudication can provide leverage for settlement.
2. Request must contain veteran’s selection of hearing body (civil service board/commission, merit authority, if applicable, or arbitrator); if veteran fails to make this election, the employer gets to choose.
3. NOTE: notice provision doesn’t require informing vet that he/she has the right to choose. Statutory oversight?
g. Who Conducts Hearing? Minn. Stat. § 197.46.
iii. “Depends” if a hearing is ordered following employer denial and employee petition.
2. If following writ of mandamus by trial court, an arbitrator from strike-off list or civil service commission (as is applicable).
iv. Standard is preponderance of the evidence. Employer must show it acted reasonably through “substantial evidence.” Matter of LaFond, 390 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. App. 1986).
i. Discovery in removal action: no express right under VPA.
1. Argument against – meant to be expedited proceeding; employee on payroll until it’s concluded.
2. Argument for – basic fairness, avoid trial by ambush.
3. Arbitrators and Commissions (per their rules for hearing) typically permit at least basic discovery – exchange of exhibits and identification of witnesses before hearing.
4. Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act (“MUAA”)?? – maybe (governs “agreements to arbitrate,” implying contractual basis rather than statutory mandate). Allows for discovery in arbitrator’s discretion, depositions in lieu of live testimony, subpoenas to compel attendance of non-cooperative witnesses. Minn. Stat. § 572B.17.
5. PRACTICE POINT FOR EMPLOYEES: Request Personnel File as per Minn. Stat. § 181.961 and make a request for documents under the Minnesota Data Practices Act, including information concerning similar incidents/infractions involving other employees and discipline imposed as a result; employee remains on pay.
iii. Summary Disposition – similar to Summary Judgment in District Court litigation; can be based on stipulated facts where pure issue of law exists.
iv. Expert witnesses sometimes appropriate, e.g. where medical condition of employee or quality / quantity of work is at issue; increases expense.
iii. Commissioner of Veterans Affairs under Minn. Stat. § 197.481, subd. 3 has subpoena powers as well.
iv. PRACTICE POINT FOR EMPLOYEES: Be mindful of the fact that most employee-side witnesses will be current employees, so a subpoena may be necessary (or desired by a co-worker who wishes not to seem aligned with a maligned employee). Don’t assume a witness (often forced to use his or her own paid time off) will appear voluntarily.
m. “Extenuating circumstances” – employee’s second bite at the apple.
b. Compare with Wagner v. Minneapolis Public Schools, Special School Dist. No. 1, 569 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 1997) (reversing commission’s finding of extenuating circumstances finding where “alleged similar acts were in fact so dissimilar as to provide no useful comparison”).
9. Corrective action taken, e.g. treatment for substance abuse where addiction gave rise to act of misconduct. Lanerd v. Dep’t of Corrections, BMS No. 12-VP-0358 (Jan. 2012).
Find and cite applicable law, e.g. Minneapolis Civil Service Rules, which discuss appropriate penalties for misconduct versus incompetence.
i. At the close of evidence, summations / closing arguments are typically presented.
iii. Proposed findings commonly requested.
2. Previously per court decision 60 days for Cities of the First Class (100,000 residents or more) under Civil Service Appeal statute (Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 2), and by implication a variety of other, shorter deadlines for other Cities depending on size. Eldredge v. City of St. Paul [I argued this case unsuccessfully to the Minnesota Supreme Court; Justice Page in dissent agreed with me].
3. “Evolving community standards” – cases should be evaluated based on the standards of the day, so prior precedents don’t necessarily dictate outcomes. Laux (affirming commission’s modification of discipline from termination to 90-day suspension, for police officer fired after sexual assault conviction).
iii. Awkwardly worded, but appears to apply to situations in which the panel/arbitrator either reverses dismissal or imposes a lesser punishment than dismissal.
b. Strategic decision, but statute now allows for recovery of attorney fees whereas CBA may not.
b. Petition the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs (Minn. Stat. § 197.481).
c. Applies to lay-offs, where vet believes it is done in bad faith to avoid VPA provisions.
f. Burden of proof on employee to show violation. Anderson v. City of Dayton, OAH No. 3-3100-15361-2 (July 2003) (citing Minn. R. 1400.7300, subp. 5).
Exception for department head and other exemptions; treated as affirmative defenses with BOF on proponent (employer).
ii. Panel or Civil Service Commission if case arises from employee-filed petition for Writ of Mandamus (on “remand”).
e. Value of fringe benefits employee would have earned but for violation. Young v. City of Duluth, 410 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. App. 1987).
i. Hunting and fishing preferences. Minn. Stat. § 97A.465 (among other things, resident military personnel on leave or discharged within 24 months can fish or hunt without a state-issued license and have a preference in hunting lottery, except regarding moose, elk and prairie chickens).

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