Source: https://casebook.icrc.org/print/21051
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:36:04+00:00

Document:
USA, Guantánamo, End of “Active Hostilities” in Afghanistan?
Home > USA, Guantánamo, End of “Active Hostilities” in Afghanistan?
INTRODUCTORY TEXT: Two individuals detained by the US at Guantánamo Bay Detention Center challenged the legality of continued detention on the basis that “active hostilities” in Afghanistan had ended. The Courts in both cases ruled against them, finding that “active hostilities” in Afghanistan had not come to an end. This case is particularly conducive to a discussion on the temporal scope of armed conflict and its impact on detention.
Case prepared by Julie Black, esq., LL.M. student at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, under the supervision of Professor Marco Sassòli and Ms. Yvette Issar, research assistant, both at the University of Geneva.
 Petitioner Haji Hamdullah has been detained as a prisoner of war by the United States since his capture in 2003. Mr. Hamdullah argues that active hostilities in Afghanistan have ceased and that the United States is therefore obligated under the Third Geneva Convention to release him immediately. Respondents counter that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force [AUMF] continues to authorize Mr. Hamdullah’s detention because the United States remains engaged in active hostilities in Afghanistan.
 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion to Grant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus […] [F]or the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s Motion shall be denied.
 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”). […] In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme Court ruled that “Congress’s “grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’” in the AUMF “include[s] the authority to detain (prisoners of war) [sic; this term does not appear in the Supreme Court decision quoted] for the duration of the relevant conflict.” […]; see also Aamer v. Obama […] (“[T]his court has repeatedly held that under the [AUMF], individuals may be detained at Guantanamo so long as they are determined to have been part of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, and so long as hostilities are ongoing.”).
 While entitled to some deference, the President's position is not dispositive. Our Court of Appeals has stated that, under separation of powers principles, “[t]he determination of when hostilities have ceased is a political decision, and we defer to the Executive's opinion on that matter, at least in the absence of an authoritative congressional declaration purporting to terminate the war.” […] But, the Hamdi plurality recognized that deference to the Executive must have limits. […] (“history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present [an immediate threat to national security]”).
 The crux of the Parties' disagreement is whether detention is authorized for the duration of “active combat” or “active hostilities.” Compare Hamdi[…] (“If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of 'necessary and appropriate force' ...”) with Hamdi […] (“It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.”); see also Third Geneva Convention, Art. 118 (prisoners of war must be released “after the cessation of active hostilities”).
 Petitioner also looks to Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that application of the Fourth Geneva Convention “shall cease on the close of military operations.” […] The phrase “close of military operations” was understood to mean “the final end of all fighting between all those concerned.” [Footnote 3 - The main purpose of this statement was to clarify that if more than two nations are involved in a conflict, the Fourth Convention only ceases to apply after the fighting stops between all parties, not just some of the parties. Fourth Convention Commentary at 62.] […] The Court agrees with Petitioner that “cessation of active hostilities” is distinct from “close of military operations,” and that active hostilities can cease prior to the close of military operations.
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the appropriate standard is cessation of active hostilities and that active hostilities can continue after combat operations have ceased. But, cessation of active hostilities is not so demanding a standard that it requires total peace, signed peace agreements, or an end to all fighting.
 Next, the Court looks to whether active hostilities have, in fact, ceased. Petitioner relies heavily on the Bilateral Security Agreement and the President's speeches regarding the end of the combat mission and war in Afghanistan in support of his argument that active hostilities have ceased.
 Petitioner cites to speeches by the President, including his 2015 State of the Union Address and his May 2014 Statement on Afghanistan, but notably, none of these statements discuss the end of “active hostilities.” […]The end of the combat mission is not synonymous with the end of active hostilities. […]Indeed, the President has expressly stated that active hostilities continue. […] [The Court cites President Obama] (“The United States currently remains in an armed conflict against al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and associated forces, and active hostilities against those groups remain ongoing”).
 Petitioners point to greatly reduced troop numbers in Afghanistan as evidence of cessation of active hostilities. Respondents counter that the continued presence of nearly 10,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan is actually evidence of ongoing active hostilities. […] While troop numbers alone are not sufficient to determine whether active hostilities persist[…] a United States presence of nearly 10,000 troops certainly supports the conclusion that ongoing active hostilities exist.
 “The Geneva Conventions require release and repatriation only at the 'cessation of active hostilities.' ” […] As this Court has noted, “The Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have repeatedly held that detention under the AUMF is lawful for the duration of active hostilities.” […] While what constitutes “active hostilities” has never been clearly defined, Respondents have provided convincing examples of ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan. Given this evidence, combined with the deference accorded the Executive's determination of when hostilities have ceased, the Court concludes that active hostilities continue in Afghanistan. Mr. Hamdullah's continued detention, therefore, is both authorized under the AUMF and does not violate the Third Geneva Convention.
 Petitioner Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi (“Al-Alwi” or “petitioner”) challenges his continued detention at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he has been held since January 2002. Although this Court, […] and our Court of Appeals, […] previously determined that Al-Alwi could lawfully be detained as an enemy combatant under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), […] Al-Alwi now argues that the relevant conflict in Afghanistan that justified his detention has now ended, thereby extinguishing the United States’ authority to detain him any longer.
 Al–Alwi filed his second and current petition for a writ of habeas corpus in May 2015. […] In his petition, Al–Alwi does not challenge the Court's prior determination that he is an enemy combatant. […] Instead, he alleges that the relevant conflict in Afghanistan that originally justified his detention has concluded and his detention is no longer authorized by the AUMF (and violates the Geneva Convention and the Convention Against Torture). […] In the alternative, Al–Alwi argues that his detention has gone on for so long that it can no longer be reconciled with traditional law of war principles, and he must therefore be released whether or not the conflict is still ongoing. […] For the following reasons, I disagree as to both positions.
[T]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
[…] The AUMF gives the President authority to detain enemy combatants—i.e., individuals who were “part of” or provided support to al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. […] This Court has already determined that Al–Alwi is an enemy combatant who can be lawfully detained under the AUMF. […] As a result, the issue presented by this petition is not whether the government had the initial authority to detain him, but whether that authority has lapsed in the fifteen years since.
 In 2004, a plurality of the Supreme Court observed in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that it was a “clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.” […] Informed by the principles of the law of war, the Court held that the AUMF's grant of authority to use “necessary and appropriate force” included within it the “authority to detain (combatants) [sic; this term does not appear in the Supreme Court decision quoted] for the duration of the relevant conflict.” […] In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (“NDAA”), Congress explicitly clarified that the AUMF gives the President authority to detain combatants “under the law of war without trial until the end of hostilities ....” […] Thus, the Court must determine whether “active hostilities” have ceased, such that Al–Alwi's detention is no longer permitted.
 However, when viewed in their proper context, these statements cannot reasonably be construed as a presidential declaration that active hostilities have ended in Afghanistan. Instead, President Obama's statements reflect a transition from Operation Enduring Freedom, which was the military's active combat mission, to Operation Freedom's Sentinel, a support and counterterrorism operation that nonetheless entails active hostilities in Afghanistan. […] Although the President announced a change in the military's focus going forward, he made clear that the United States would continue to engage in active counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. In fact, in the December 28, 2014 remarks referred to in Al–Alwi's petition, President Obama explicitly clarified that the United States would maintain a military presence in Afghanistan to “train, advise, and assist Afghan forces and to conduct counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda.” […] As such, his comments cannot be construed as a definitive declaration that active hostilities have concluded, particularly when juxtaposed with the other numerous statements from the executive branch expressly stating that active hostilities persist in Afghanistan.
 With respect to the legislative branch, Congress passed the AUMF in 2001, which gave the President the authority to use “necessary and appropriate force” in Afghanistan, which remains in effect today. […] Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Congress passed the NDAA in 2012, which affirmed the President's authority “to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the [AUMF].” […] Both indicate that Congress believes that active hostilities are ongoing and has certainly not passed an “authoritative congressional declaration purporting to terminate the war.” […] As a result, his detention under the AUMF remains lawful. [Footnote 3 reads: Al–Alwi also argues that his continued detention is prohibited by the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 1, 13 […] Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions […] art. 75 (3) […]. Specifically, he argues that the conflict in Afghanistan has ended, requiring his release under the Geneva Convention, and asserts that his continued and indefinite detention has gone on for so long that it constitutes torture, violating the Convention Against Torture. […] As an initial matter, these arguments seem exceedingly likely to fail on the merits—active hostilities remain ongoing in Afghanistan, and the mere length of his detention cannot be characterized as torture. More importantly, Al–Alwi has no judicially enforceable rights under the Geneva Conventions or the Convention Against Torture, whether he invokes them directly or indirectly, and his claims under them must therefore be rejected. […]].
[W]e agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress' grant of authority for the use of “necessary and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan.
[…] Al–Alwi argues that the “scenario Justice O'Connor describes has come to pass” and that the unusual nature and length of the conflict in Afghanistan have caused conventional understandings of the law of war to unravel completely. […] Therefore, the Court should order his release whether or not the conflict in Afghanistan continues. I disagree.
 Simply put, this case does not present a situation in which petitioner's detention would be inconsistent with the “clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities” or the rationale underlying that principle. […] After all, 8,400 United States service members are currently stationed in Afghanistan and engage in the use of force, against al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated forces, consistent with the laws of war and in a context similar to that presented to the Supreme Court in Hamdi. To say the least, the duration of a conflict does not somehow excuse it from longstanding law of war principles.
 Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus […].
d. What evidence did the courts consider when determining whether the conflict had ended? What evidence did the courts find most persuasive? How does this analysis compare with your analysis in (c)?
e. In your opinion, had the conflict ended in either case? Why or why not? Which evidence did you find most persuasive?
a. What was the status, under IHL, of Haji Hamdullah, in your opinion? Is there any additional information you would need to determine his status? What was the U.S. Government’s determination of his status? What rules of IHL governed whether or not he could be detained, on what grounds, and according to what procedures? (GC I-IV, Common Art. 3 ; GC III, Arts. 4 , 5 ; GC IV, Art. 4 ; CIHL, Rule 99 .
4. (Document A, para. , --; Document B, para. ) In your opinion, is the AUMF consistent with IHL? Why/Why not?
a. Must a State repatriate POWs when its participation in an IAC ends even if the conflict goes on?
b. Did the participation of the United States in hostilities in Afghanistan ended at the end of 2014?
c. May a State continue to hold prisoners of war if it terminates its participation in hostilities, but continues to support a party to the conflict?
9. (Document A, paras. , -, in particular para. ) What is the essence of Haji Hamdullah’s argument concerning the legality of his detention? Please enumerate the specific elements of his argument. Does the Court agree with his assessment? Why/Why not? What does the Court conclude?
10. (Document B, paras. , -) What is the essence of Al-Alwi’s argument concerning the legality of his detention? Please enumerate the specific elements of his argument. Does the Court agree with his assessment? Why/Why not? What does the Court conclude?
11. (Document B, paras -) Al-Alwi makes two alternative arguments concerning the legality of his prolonged detention.

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