Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/inverse-condemnation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:49:58+00:00

Document:
In Bowman v. California Coastal Commission, opinion on rehearing published October 23, 2014, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 6, reversed a judgment denying a property owner's petition for writ of mandate challenging a requirement that a property owner dedicate a coastal easement as a condition of repairing its property. When the owner's predecessor in interest purchased an unoccupied property in San Luis Obispo. He applied to the county for a coastal development permit to allow him to fix the property up for habitation. After the predecessor passed away and a successor trust took over the property, the CDP was granted, conditioned upon dedicating a lateral easement along the shorefront portion of the property. The rationale was that occupation of the property would increase the intensity of the use. The period for the owner to challenge the condition passed without the owner appealing the condition. The county code actually exempted the work to be done from the need for a CDP. No work was done under that CDP. Nine months later, the owner applied for another CDP to conduct further remodeling and repair, and for removal of the easement condition. The county approved the CDP. Public interest groups appealed the easement condition's removal to the California Coastal Commission. The Commission ruled that the easement condition was permanent and binding. The trial court declined to issue a writ of mandate reversing the ruling.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion. The easement condition was an unconstitutional exaction and a taking, because there was no rough proportionality between the condition and work on a private residence a mile from the coast. While normally a party's failure to timely seek a writ of mandamus will collaterally estop the party from later challenging a quasi-judicial administrative decision, there is an equitable component to collateral estoppel. Here, under the circumstances, it would be inequitable to apply the doctrine to uphold an easement requirement that never should have been imposed.
In Koontz v. St. John's River Water Management District, published June 25, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the requirements set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825 and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 for goverment demands for property from landowners or developers seeking a development permit -- that there be a nexus between the demand and the proposed development's impact, and that the demand be "roughly proportional" to the impact -- apply not only to demands imposed in connection with granting a permit, but also to decisions denying a permit on the ground that the permit seeker refused to comply with the demand. In both cases, the majority held, the doctrine barring unconstitutional conditions on exercising a constitutional right forbids coercively withholding benefits from those who exercise their rights. Denying a permit because of improper conditions works a taking of the developer's property interests. The majority further held that the Nollan/Dolan requirements apply whether the government seeks an actual easement on the permit-seeker's property, or money to offset the impact of the development. The court declined to rule on the merits of this case, and remanded it to state court. Four justices dissented.
In Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda, published May 9, 2013, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 3, upheld a trial court's ruling that the county defendant was liable for a temporary regulatory taking of a business project. The plaintiff bought property zoned for an alternative conditional use for storage of recreational vehicles and boats. The county approved a conditional use permit for the property approving that use. The CUP had to be implemented within three years or terminate. The plaintiff bought the property eight months into the CUP's term. The county assured plaintiff that the property could be developed as a storage facility. A few months later, the county's voters enacted a growth control initiative that prohibited development of a storage facility on the property, but specified it applied to developments that had not received all necessary discretionary county and other approvals and permits before the effective date of the ordinance. After the measure became effective, the plaintiff continued developing the property. The county did not issue ministerial permits as the CUP neared its end, and then did not renew the CUP, based on the ordinance. When the plaintiff sued, the trial court issued a writ of mandate requiring that the county provide the ministerial permits, holding that by its language the ordinance did not apply to the project because the plaintiff had obtained a discretionary permit (the CUP) before the ordinance went into effect. The plaintiff completed its project. The court then tried the plaintiff's regulatory taking claim. The court concluded under the Penn Central takings test that the county's application of the ordinance was a temporary regulatory taking, and awarded the plaintiff damages for lost profits and increased construction costs due to the 30-month delay in construction.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions. It concluded that the county's appeal of the writ of mandate was moot, because the county did not apply for a stay of the writ and the project had been completed. It held that the ordinance could only be interpreted to permit the property's development because the CUP had issued before the ordinance's effective date. It held that Penn Central's temporary regulatory takings test (based on interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations) rather than the California Supreme Court's ruling in Landgate v. California Coastal Comm., which holds that development delays caused by reasonable errors by local government in interpreting the law are not temporary takings. The court questioned whether Landgate was still good law, in light of post-Landgate changes in takings law from the U.S. Supreme Court. It also concluded that Landgate did not apply, because it upheld the trial court's determination that the county's interpretation of the ordinance was not a reasonable error.
The appellate court also upheld the fee award to the plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 1036. It rejected the county's argument that the court should have segregated the fees expended on the unsuccessful civil rights claim from those expended proving inverse condemnation. It concluded that the trial court had impliedly found that the work on the civil rights claim was also necessary to the inverse claim.

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