Source: http://www.legalthree.com/law-school-outlines/education-law-outline/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:45:29+00:00

Document:
Did the District offer on the IEP constitute FAPE?
Has LEA complied with procedures?
Is IEP reasonably calculated to achieve educational benefit?
Follow procedural requirements – notice of changes to the child’s plan, parents can bring complaint, etc.
There’s NO Constitutional right to an education, if it’s provided – it must be without regard to race, religion, disability, etc.
Educational benefits of regular ed.
Law requires appropriate education, w/some educational benefit, measurable & meaningful. (Does not require school district to maximize benefit).
Need personalized services with enough support to benefit to meet FAPE.
SC limited this ruling to the facts of this case, did not establish any ONE test for benefits of all children, there is no substantive standard with so many unique children, must look to procedural requirements & whether IEP was reasonably calculated to achieve success.
Did the State comply with the statutory procedures?
Was the individualized program developed through such procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefit.
Be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Is this an essential requirement for the activity/program?
Is the child otherwise qualified (somehow make if so that he is deemed to make it)?
If yes to the previous then, if reasonable accommodations would enable him to meet requirement?
Amended the ADA and included a conforming amendment to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that affects the meaning of disability in Section 504.
Disability determinations must now be made without considering mitigating measures.
Summary: The court found an academically gifted student with emotional and behavioral problems not eligible for special education under IDEA and analogous state law. It ruled that the IEP offering placement at local high school and counseling provided a reasonable accommodation under section 504.
While a federal funds recipient must offer reasonable accommodations to individuals with disabilities to ensure meaningful access to its federally funded program, 504 does not mandate substantial changes to its program. We have also held that in evaluating the accommodation offered by a D, courts should be mindful of the need to strike a balance between the rights of the student and his parents and the legitimate financial and administrative concerns of the School District.
Seattle School District, No 1 v B.S.
Here, the court said “it is appropriate for courts to determine if a child classified as non-disabled is receiving adequate accommodations in the general classroom – and thus is not entitled to special education services – using the [Rowley] benefit standard.” Grades and teacher assessments are important in determining whether a child with a discrepancy is “reaping some educational benefit in the general classroom”.
While the circumstances in this case arose before the IDEA 2004 amendments (and also involved specific California law), many school districts are still implementing a modified discrepancy formula as part of a “strengths and weaknesses” model.
Whether, as a result, the student needs special education services.
Hood v. Encinitas involves the third prong of this determination and supports looking at a student’s classroom performance (whether the student is benefitting without special education), rather than just looking at standardized test scores, to determine whether special education services are needed.
Is the rule an essential requirement?
If it is, can we make reasonable accommodations?
Accommodations are not reasonable if they impose undue financial and administrative burdens or if they require a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.
504 Holding: Other than waiving the age limit, no manner, method, or means is available which would permit Pottgen to satisfy the age limit. Consequently, no reasonable accommodations exist.
Qualified under ADA?: First determine whether the age limit is an essential eligibility requirement by reviewing the importance of the requirement to the interscholastic baseball program. If this requirement is essential, we then determine whether Pottgen meets this requirement with or without modifications. It is at this later stage that the ADA requires an individualized inquiry.
Dissent: In my view, the courts are obligated by statute to look at Ps as individuals before they decide whether someone can meet the essential requirements of an eligibility rule like the one before us in the present case. Such an individualized inquiry, I believe, shows that the age requirement, as applied to Pottgen, is not essential to the goals of MSHSAA.
The age requirement could be modified for this individual player without doing violence to the admittedly salutary purposes underlying the age rule. But instead of looking at the rule’s operation in the individual case of Pottgen, both the Activities Association and this Court simply recite the rule’s generally justifications (which are not in dispute) and mechanically apply it across the board.
Once a prima facie violation of section 504 has been established, the D must present evidence to rebut the inference of illegality.
With respect to other services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of such services (here, it was the parents who had the right to participate). Excluded solely b/c of their handicap?
The DOE has determined that, under section 504, schools are required to afford handicapped parents of non-handicapped school children the same opportunity to participate in school activities as that afforded non-handicapped parents.
As “otherwise qualified handicapped individuals,” the Rothschilds are entitled to “meaningful access to” the activities that the school offers parents.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires some degree of positive effort to expand the availability of federally funded programs to handicapped persons otherwise qualified to benefit from them.
This seems a “reasonable accommodation,” which permits the Rothschilds to be involved in their children’s education while preserving the responsible administration of the School District.
Requires that all students be proficient in reading/language arts and math by 2014.
What is RTI (response to intervention)?
15% of IDEIA funding can be used to develop and implement early intervention services.
These funds can be applied in the first tier of an RTI program.
Caution: Children already identified as special needs students may not receive services funded by this 15%.
Summary: agreed with the Third Circuit; the court applied “meaningful benefit” test.
OVERVIEW: The district court found no IDEA violations and reversed the reimbursement ordered by the ALJ. Plaintiffs argued that it erred by (1) allowing and relying upon the board’s additional evidence; (2) failing to take judicial notice of federal court filings challenging the credibility of a board experts; (3) reversing those aspects of the ALJ’s decision that found violations of the IDEA and granted reimbursement and (4) awarding costs.
On the first issue, the court gave great latitude to district courts and found no prohibition against the district court allowing even a large amount of additional evidence if it would add something to the administrative record or assist the district court in deciding the issues before it.
On the second issue, plaintiffs were essentially attempting to get the district court to take judicial notice of a witness’s lack of credibility, a fact very much in dispute, and there was no abuse of discretion in the refusal to take judicial notice.
On the third issue, because the school system deprived plaintiffs of a meaningful opportunity to participate, the predetermination the court found amounted to denial of a free appropriate public education.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the district court’s decisions on the additional evidence and judicial notice issues. It reversed the district court’s determinations regarding procedural and substantive violations of the IDEA, as well as reimbursement relating to those violations. Because plaintiffs were now the prevailing parties, the issue of costs was moot. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Court concluded that under the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, a school district must provide a student with “meaningful benefit” in order to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA.
Court stated that the “some educational benefit” standard prescribes a very low standard.
OVERVIEW: The court agreed with appellants that the school district failed to meet its procedural obligation under IDEA to evaluate the student to determine whether he was autistic. The court held that the school district failed to meet its obligation to evaluate the student in all areas of suspected disability as required under 20 U.S.C.S. § 1414(b) because it referred the student’s parents to a center for an autism evaluation rather than arranging for an evaluation after being apprised of a physician’s autism diagnosis. The court, however, rejected appellants’ contention that the district court erred in deciding that the school district did not violate the student’s substantive rights under IDEA when it denied him extended school year (ESY) services. While the district court enunciated the regression/recoupment test in a shorthand fashion, it made the determination that the student was not entitled to ESY services by appropriately using the Montana Office of Public Instruction factors. Further, it was reasonable for the hearing officer to rely on the testimony of the school district’s witnesses because they had observed the student’s school performance.
OUTCOME: The court vacated the order insofar as it found that the school district was not liable for violating procedural rights under IDEA, and it remanded with instructions to calculate the costs incurred by the parents for providing alternative educational services during one school year and the associated legal fees. The court affirmed the decision that the school district did not violate substantive rights in denying ESY services.
District court in the 9th Circuit applied “meaningful benefit” test.
Question: what supplementary aids and related services will the student need to succeed?
Question: are there accommodations or modification necessary for success in the placement?
Statutory provisions do not explicitly require parental participation in site selection. Educational placement, as used in the IDEA, means educational program – not the particular institution where that program is implemented.
To accept the parents’ view of “parental input” would grant parents a veto power over IEP teams’ site selection decisions. Congress could have included that power in IDEA; it did not do so. The right to provide meaningful input is simply not the right to dictate an outcome and obviously cannot be measured by such.
State agencies are afforded much discretion in determining which school a student is to attend. The regulations, not the statute, provide only that the child be educated as close as possible to the child’s home. However, this is merely one of many factors for the district to take into account in determining the student’s proper placement. It must be emphasized that the proximity preference or factor is not a presumption that a disabled student attend his neighborhood school.
The school violated the IDEA’s procedural mandates in its development of the student’s IEP, and thereby denied student a FAPE, by not including a representative from CID (the private school) or student’s parents at the June 8 IEP.
Under the regulation, before it can hold an IEP meeting without a child’s parents, the district must document phone calls, correspondence, and visits to the parents demonstrating attempts to reach a mutually agreed upon place and time for the meeting.
The IDEA imposes upon the district the duty to conduct a meaningful meeting with the appropriate parties. We have made it clear that those individuals, like student’s parents, who have first-hand knowledge of the child’s needs and who are most concerned about the child must be involved in the IEP creation process. After the fact parental involvement is not enough. Nor does the district’s inclusion of the parents in certain parts of the process excuse the district’s failure to include the parents in the IEP meeting; involvement in the “creation process” requires the district to include the parents unless they affirmatively refused to attend.
We engage in a two-part test to determine whether the district afforded student a FAPE.
First, we must determine whether the school complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA.
Second, we must determine whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures was reasonable calculated to confer educational benefit upon student.
The school’s violation of the IDEA’s procedural mandates resulted in lost educational opportunity for student.
Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. However, procedural inadequacies that result in the loss of educational opportunity, or seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process, clearly resulted in a denial of a FAPE.
Because we conclude that the school’s procedural violations of the IDEA resulted in a loss of educational opportunity for student, it is unnecessary for us to address the second prong of FAPE analysis. On the basis of the first prong of the FAP two-part inquiry, which is a procedural analysis, we conclude that the school denied student a FAPE.
The District had overstated the cost of putting Rachel in regular education – that the cost would not be so great that it weighed against placing her in a regular classroom with support services, including a special education consultant and a part-time aide.
The Board may grant the waiver when failure to do so would hinder compliance with federal mandate for a free appropriate education for children with disabilities.
The dispute in this case concerns what is the least restrictive environment for Student. For the 2007-2008 school year, District offered to place Student in the mild to moderate special day class for students in kindergarten through second grade at Liberty.
District asserts this is the least restrictive environment because it will afford greater educational benefit than in a regular education class.
Student takes the position that the least restrictive environment was the regular education first grade class taught and located at his local neighborhood school at Salt Creek.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rachel H., the benefits, effects, and costs of placement must be balanced to determine the least restrictive environment.
When a student with a disability is placed in a regular education classroom, the student is expected to achieve at a level commensurate with his or her ability and IEP requirements, with the assistance of appropriate special education and related services. The student is not necessarily expected to keep pace with the non-disabled students in the class or to achieve all the regular education requirements in order to be placed in the next grade level. Rather, the student with a disability is expected to move on to the next grade level upon achieving success in the classroom, as measured against his or her own IEP.
In balancing the factors above, the evidence showed that Student would likely derive the same benefit from attending the regular education first grade class as attending the SDC.
However, even if Student could receive more academic benefit from the smaller group settings and the more intense attention from the adults in the K-2 SDC, the balance tips in favor of the regular education setting when considering the non-academic benefits and the lack of adverse impact on the classroom teacher and other students. There is little doubt Student would receive more substantial non-academic benefit from the regular education setting than the K-2 SDC in view of the benefits of such inclusion. Typically developing peers would provide language and social skill models for Student throughout the entire school day. Moreover, the benefits received would be in a critical area of need for Student due to his expressive and receptive language deficits. Student’s ability and willingness to imitate others, coupled with his positive social skills, are good predictors he would benefit from such placement.
The academic and non-academic benefits that Student gains from his regular education classroom meet the educational benefit standard established by the Supreme Court. In view of Congress’s stated preference for educating children with disabilities in regular classrooms with their peers, the Liberty K-2 SDC for mild to moderate disabilities offered by District is not the least restrictive environment in which to educate Student.
Section 504 applies to preschoolers both within public preschools and private preschools which receive any type of federal financial assistance.
In California that is the Department of Developmental Services, providing services through Regional Centers for the Developmentally Disabled.
Anyone can refer an infant or toddler for Early Intervention services, including parents, doctors, social workers, neighbors, foster parents, daycare providers and preschool teachers.
IFSP services are for the child and the family.
The law allows for a broad range of Early Intervention services, based upon the need of the child. Examples include group programs, home programs, parent supports and training, and related services (Speech, OT, PT, ABA).
Contrast with IEPs, which do not include medically necessary services.
Contrast with Part B: There is no right to a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) under Part C, for Infants and Toddlers.
No right to “free” services.
Statements of the specific services required by the child to meet the expected outcomes, including the frequency, intensity, method, and location.
When a child is 2 years 6 months old the IFSP team must conduct an IFSP review.
This is a good time for the team to begin discussing the transition process. Since the law does not require any “transition steps” at this stage it is up to the parents, caseworker, or service provider to initiate this conversation.
When a child is 2 years 9 months old the IFSP team must conduct a Transition Meeting.
A School District representative must be invited, but their participation is not mandatory.
Summary: The Court ruled that the exception to covered related services for medical services does not reach the service of clean, intermittent catheterization (CIC) for a child who cannot urinate normally (so school must provide for service since it doesn’t have to be done by a doctor).
Is it a supportive service required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education?
Is it excluded from this definition as a medical service serviing purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation?
First, to be entitled to related services, a child must be handicapped so as to require special education. In the absence of a handicap that requires special education, the needs for what otherwise might qualify as a related service does not create an obligation under the Act.
Third, the regulations state that school nursing services must be provided only if they can be performed by a nurse or other qualified person, not if they must be performed by a physician. It bears mentioning that here not even the services of a nurse are required; a layperson with minimal training is qualified to provided CIC.
Cedar Rapids Community School District v Garret F.
Summary: This case established that extensive services to enable a child with quadriplegia who uses a ventilator are related services that must be provided under the federal special education law. Rather than excluded medical services.
While more extensive, the in-school services Garret needs are no more “medical” than was the care sought in Tatro.
District also tries to apply an undue burden test, based on 504, but SC doesn’t even address Section 504 since they resolve that District must provide services based on IDEA.
The District may have legitimate financial concerns, but our role in this dispute is to interpret existing law. Defining “related services” in a manner that accommodates the cost concerns Congress may have had, is altogether different from using cost itself as the definition. Given that 140(a)(17) does not employ cost in its definition of related services or excluded medical services, accepting the District’s cost-based standard as the sole test for determining the scope of the provision would require us to engage in judicial lawmaking without any guidance from Congress. It would also create some tension with the purposes of the IDEA. The statute may not require public schools to maximize the potential of disable students commensurate with the opportunities provided to other children, and the potential financial burdens imposed on participating State may be relevant to arriving at a sensible construction of the IDEA. But Congress intended “to open the door of public education” to all qualified children and “required participating States to educate handicapped children with non-handicapped children whenever possible.
Held: The SC ruled that in due process hearings assessing the appropriateness of an IEP, the burden of persuasion falls on the party seeking relief. In the typical case, that will be the parent.
Because IDEA is silent on the allocation of the burden of persuasion, this Court begins with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the burden regarding the essential aspects of their claims. Absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, the Court will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief.
Petitioners’ arguments for departing from the ordinary default rule are rejected. Petitioners’ assertion that putting the burden of persuasion on school districts will help ensure that children receive a free appropriate public education is unavailing. Assigning the burden to schools might encourage them to put more resources into preparing IEPs and presenting their evidence, but IDEA is silent about whether marginal dollars should be allocated to litigation and administrative expenditures or to educational services. There is reason to believe that a great deal is already spent on IDEA administration, and Congress has repeatedly amended the Act to reduce its administrative and litigation-related costs. The Act also does not support petitioners’ conclusion, in effect, that every IEP should be assumed to be invalid until the school district demonstrates that it is not.
Petitioners’ most plausible argument–that ordinary fairness requires that a litigant not have the burden of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary, United States v. New York –fails because IDEA gives parents a number of procedural protections that ensure that they are not left without a realistic chance to access evidence or without an expert to match the government.
Held: The SC determined that the federal special education law permitted courts, and by implication, hearing officers, to provide retrospective relief in the form of tuition reimbursement.
The grant of authority to a reviewing court under § 1415(e)(2) includes the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. The ordinary meaning of the language in § 1415(e)(2) directing the court to “grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate” confers broad discretion on the court. To deny such reimbursement would mean that the child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the parents’ right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards of the Act would be less than complete.
A parental violation of § 1415(e)(3) by changing the “then current educational placement” of their child during the pendency of proceedings to review a challenged proposed IEP does not constitute a waiver of the parents’ right to reimbursement for expenses of the private placement. Otherwise, the parents would be forced to leave the child in what may turn out to be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for reimbursement. But if the courts ultimately determine that the proposed IEP was appropriate, the parents would be barred from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in which their child’s placement violated § 1415(e)(3).
Reasoning: The ability to award attorneys’ fees does not include the ability to award experts’ fees. “Costs,” the Court wrote, is a term of art that generally does not include either type of fees. To add attorney’s fees to costs is exceptional under American law, which is why it was written into the statute. That change of the court’s power does not affect its power over experts’ fees.
Federal Law: IEE means an evaluation conducted by a qualified examiner who is not employed by the school district.
CA Law: Referenced as independent educational assessment (“IEA”).
Bottom line: “Independent” means not an employee of the school district, SELPA, or a consultant to the District.
Address unanswered questions, following the District’s assessment.
Where the assessment requires an observation, an IEE may provide valuable information concerning the effectiveness of the educational program and implementation of the IEP.
Must be in disagreement with an assessment conducted by the district.
When districts fail to assess in all areas related to the suspected disability.
When school districts conduct flawed assessments.
Must be the same as that used by the school district.
A district must provide information about the agency criteria for IEEs upon a parent’s request for an IEE.
Prohibiting an IEE evaluator’s association with private schools; history of acting as an expert witness against public schools.
Requiring an evaluator to have recent experience in public schools.
A district may not restrict a parent from selecting an evaluator not on the district’s published list of approved assessors, unless the list is exhaustive.
A district may establish reasonable cost criteria.
A district must provide advance funding for an IEE if, without the funding, a parent’s right to an IEE is effectively denied.
Parents are not required to utilize their private insurance to fund an IEE.
If an out-of-district location is necessary for the assessment and justified by unique circumstances, a district must fund required travel expenses.
Limit of one IEE for each evaluation conducted by the district.
Parents are not required to give notice or express disagreement with the district’s evaluation prior to obtaining an IEE.
Parents need not explain their reasons for disagreement.
Parents are not required to identify specific areas of disagreement with the district’s evaluation (and it is usually advisable not to do so).
A district has two choices: either initiate a hearing to show that its assessment is appropriate or provide the IEE at public expense.
Three months, according to a Northern CA federal court.
74 days, CA 2007 administrative hearing decision.
Four weeks, CA 2001 administrative hearing decision.
District responds to IEE request by proposing an assessment plan.
District entirely ignores your request.
District requests a hearing to establish the appropriateness of its assessment.
District resists allowing the independent evaluator to conduct a classroom observation.
Was the conduct caused by, or had a direct and substantial relationship to disability?
What conduct can be expected?
Questions: was the conduct the direct result of the LEA’s failure to implement the IEP?
What if school should have recognized the issue in the IEP and it was not included?
Half day in school could be FAPE b/c some educational benefit is all that’s required.
Reasoning: The “stay-put” provision prohibits state or local school authorities from unilaterally excluding disabled children from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct growing out of their disabilities during the pendency of all review proceedings. Section 1415(e)(3) is unequivocal in its mandate that “the child shall remain in the then current educational placement,” and demonstrates a congressional intent to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed students, from school. This Court will not rewrite the statute to infer a “dangerousness” exception on the basis of obviousness or congressional inadvertence, since, in drafting the statute, Congress devoted close attention to Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, thereby establishing that the omission of an emergency exception for dangerous students was intentional.
However, Congress did not leave school administrators powerless to deal with such students, since implementing regulations allow the use of normal, nonplacement-changing procedures, including temporary suspensions for up to 10 schooldays for students posing an immediate threat to others’ safety, while the Act allows for interim placements where parents and school officials are able to agree, and authorizes officials to file a § 1415(e)(2) suit for “appropriate” injunctive relief where such an agreement cannot be reached. In such a suit, § 1415(e)(3) effectively creates a presumption in favor of the child’s current educational placement which school officials can rebut only by showing that maintaining the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or to others.
Question: Is the IEP team required to hold a manifestation determination each time that a student is removed for more than 10 consecutive days or each time that the public agency determines that a series of removals constitutes a change in placement?
Answer: Yes. 34 CFR § 300.530(e) requires that “within 10 school days of any decision to change the placement of a child with a disability because of a violation of a code of student conduct” the LEA, the parent, and relevant members of the child’s IEP Team must conduct a manifestation determination (emphasis added). Under 34 CFR § 300.536, a change of placement occurs if the removal is for more than 10 consecutive school days, or if the public agency determines, on a case-by-case basis, that a pattern of removals constitutes a change of placement because the series of removals total more than 10 school days in a school year; the child’s behavior is substantially similar to the behavior that resulted in the previous removals; and because of such additional factors as the length of each removal, the total amount of time the child has been removed, and the proximity of the removals to one another.
Question: does a school need to conduct a manifestation determination when there is a violation under 34 CFR 300.530(g), which refers to a removal for weapons, drugs, or serious bodily injury?
Yes. Within 10 school days of any decision to change the placement of a child with a disability because of a violation of a code of student conduct, the LEA, the parent, and relevant members of the child’s IEP Team conduct the manifestation determination. 34 CFR § 300.530(e).
However, when the removal is for weapons, drugs, or serious bodily injury under § 300.530(g), the child may remain in an IAES (i.e., doesn’t get to be in school during that time), as determined by the child’s IEP Team, for not more than 45 school days, regardless of whether the violation was a manifestation of his or her disability.
Answer: If a child engages in behavior that violates the code of student conduct prior to a determination of his or her eligibility for special education and related services and the public agency is deemed to have knowledge of the child’s disability, the child is entitled to all of the IDEA protections afforded to a child with a disability, unless a specific exception applies. In general, once the student is properly referred for an evaluation under Part B of the IDEA, the public agency would be deemed to have knowledge that the child is a child with a disability for purposes of the IDEA’s disciplinary provisions. However, under 34 CFR § 300.534(c), the LEA is considered not to have knowledge that a child is a child with a disability if the parent has not allowed the evaluation of the child under Part B of the IDEA, the parent has refused services, or if the child is evaluated and determined not to be a child with a disability under Part B of the IDEA. In these instances, the child would be subject to the same disciplinary measures applicable to children without disabilities.
A description of other factors that are relevant to the agency’s proposal or refusal.
Held: Here, the court elaborated on Burlington’s approval of tuition reimbursement as a remedy, and further held that the absence of the private school from the state list of approved placements did not rule out reimbursement relief.
Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case.
Section 140(a)(18)(A) requires that the education be “provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction.” Similarly, 1401(a)(18)(D) requires schools to provide an IEP, which must be designed by a representative of the local education agency, and must be established, revised, and reviewed by the agency, 1414(a)(5). These requirements do not make sense in the context of a parental placement. In this case, as in all Burlignton reimbursement cases, the parents’ rejection of the school district’s proposed IEP is the very reason for the parents’ decision to put their child in a private school. In such cases, where the private placement has necessarily been made over the school district’s objection, the private school education will not be under public supervision and direction. Accordingly to read the 1401(a)(18) requirements as applying to parental placements would effectively eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington.
Moreover, IDEA was intended to ensure that children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free. To read the provisions of 140(a)(18) to bar reimbursement in the circumstances of this case would defeat this statutory purpose.
Public educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing parents for the private education of a disabled child can do one of two things: give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State’s choice. This is IDEA’s mandate, and school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.
The DC was free to fashion appropriate relief for Draper regardless of the options offered in the discussion of the administrative law judge. The Act requires appropriate relief, and the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be appropriate in light of the purpose of the Act. Equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief, and the court enjoys broad discretion in so doing. This Circuit has held compensatory education appropriate relief where responsible authorities have failed to provide a handicapped student with an appropriate education as required by the Act.
IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights, which are not limited to procedural and reimbursement-related matters but encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their child.
These various provisions accord parents independent, enforceable rights. Parents have enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert those rights in federal court at the adjudication stage.
Respondent argues that parental involvement is contemplated only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests, but this view is foreclosed by the Act’s provisions. The grammatical structure of IDEA’s purpose of protecting “the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children,” § 1400(d)(1)(B), would make no sense unless “rights” refers to the parents’ rights as well as the child’s. Even if this Court were inclined to ignore the Act’s plain text and adopt respondent’s countertextual reading, the Court disagrees that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not novel for parents to have a recognized legal interest in their child’s education and upbringing.
The Act’s provisions also contradict the variation on respondent’s argument that parents can be “parties aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer’s findings and decision relating to certain procedures and reimbursements, but not “parties aggrieved” with regard to any challenge not implicating those limited concerns. The IEP proceedings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child’s educational program. The Act also allows expansive challenge by parents of “any matter” related to the proceedings and requires that administrative resolution be based on whether the child “received a free appropriate public education,” § 1415(f)(3)(E), with judicial review to follow. The text and structure of IDEA create in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by the process but also in the substantive decision to be made. Incongruous results would follow, moreover, were the Court to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to certain nonsubstantive matters. It is difficult to disentangle the Act’s procedural and reimbursement-related rights from its substantive ones, and attempting to do so would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any express guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might differentiate between these matters. This bifurcated regime would also leave some parents without any legal remedy.
Respondent misplaces its reliance on Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, when it contends that because IDEA was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, it must provide clear notice before it can be interpreted to provide independent rights to parents. Arlington held that IDEA had not furnished clear notice before requiring States to reimburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions. However, this case does not invoke Arlington’s rule, for the determination that IDEA gives parents independent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on States that they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Increased costs borne by States defending against suits brought by nonlawyers do not suffice to invoke Spending Clause concerns, particularly in light of provisions in IDEA that empower courts to award attorney’s fees to prevailing educational agencies if a parent files an action for an “improper purpose,” § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III).
The Sixth Circuit erred in dismissing the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Because parents enjoy rights under IDEA, they are entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. In light of this holding, the Court need not reach petitioners’ argument concerning whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.
This reading of 1412(a)(10(C) is necessary to avoid the conclusion that Congress abrogated sub silent our decision in Burlington and Carter. In those cases, we construed 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and a child’s private school placement is appropriate, without regard to the child’s prior receipt of services. It would take more than Congress’ failure to comment on the category of cases in which a child has not previously received special education services for us to conclude that the Amendments substantially superseded our decision and in large part replaced 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Absent a clearly expressed congressional intention, repeals by implication are not favored. We accordingly adopt the reading of 1412(a)(10(C) that is consistent with those decisions.
When a court or hearing officer concludes that a district failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement was suitable, it must consider all relevant factors, including the notice provided by the parents and the school’s opportunities for evaluating the child, in determining whether reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child’s private education is warranted.
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