Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_35_issue_3?pg=47
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:58:22+00:00

Document:
115 See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12–13; Walczak v. Fla. Union Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 128–29 (2d Cir. 1998); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 236 (2009); R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (“This framework is known as the Burlington/Carter test.”); see also Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 369 (2d Cir. 2006) (referring to the first two prongs of the test only), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007). Section 1415(b)(2)(6)(A)( iii) provides that, after consideration of “a preponderance of the evidence” a court “shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(6)(A)( iii) (2012).
116 Carter, 510 U.S at 14.
118 Some people interpret the Court’s reference to the decisions below in regard to the significant academic progress made by the child at issue as indicating an ‘appropriateness’ standard differing from the de minimis standard established in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982).
119 Case law reflects what parents need not prove. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364. To wit—parents do not need to show that their placement meets IDEA standards for a FAPE, they do not need to show that the private school meets state standards or requirements, and unilateral selections are not subject to the same mainstreaming mandate as public schools. Id. at 364. All parents need to show is that the unilateral placement provides “educational instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child” that enable the child to benefit from instruction. Id. at 365 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188–89). In C.L., influential factors in the finding that the unilateral placement was appropriate included consideration of the Eagle Hill program, including such factors as class size, close oversight, as well as the child’s progress as demonstrated by his increased enthusiasm for school, his increased confidence, and improvement in expressing himself and working independently. Id. at 834. The S.R.O.’s decision in C.L. accepting Scarsdale’s argument that the child had progressed in the public school illustrates that the determination of whether a child gains “appropriate” educational benefit offered by a public school program can be dangerously subjective. Id. F.3d at 834–35.
120 See Carter, 510 U.S. at 13–14.
121 Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 400 (6th Cir. 1998).
122 C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011).
123 In Board of Education Murphysboro v. Illinois State Board of Education, the court noted that the restrictiveness of the unilateral placement was irrelevant, since the placement offered by the public school district was inappropriate and no other appropriate public placements were made available. Bd. of Educ. Murphysboro v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, faced with only one option, its restrictiveness was a non-issue. Id. at 1168. The court explicitly stated “the mainstreaming requirement was developed in response to school districts which were reluctant to integrate mentally-impaired children and their non-disabled peers. It was not developed to promote integration with non-disabled peers at the expense of other IDEA educational requirements and is applicable only if the IEP meets IDEA minimums.” Id. at 1168.
124 Warren G. v. Cumberland Cnty. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999); Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 2007).

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