Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/361/416/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:22:30+00:00

Document:
In 1953, petitioner and one Seijas were indicted for conspiring from 1942 to 1953 to attempt to evade income taxes of Seijas and his wife for the years 1942 through 1945. Petitioner contended that the conspiracy was consummated in 1946, when the return for 1945 was filed, and that prosecution was barred by the 6-year statute of limitations, and he requested and obtained instructions that the jury must acquit him unless it found that there was a subsidiary conspiracy, continuing to within 6 years of the indictment, to conceal the first conspiracy. He was convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that a subsidiary conspiracy cannot extend the statute of limitations which had run against the main conspiracy, and it ordered the case remanded with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal. On rehearing, however, it decided that petitioner might have been tried on the theory that the original conspiracy continued until 1952, and it ordered the case remanded for a new trial.
Held: this did not subject petitioner to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 361 U. S. 417-426.
(a) The theory on which the case was tried and upon which an instruction should have been given was that there was a continuing conspiracy from 1942 to 1953 to evade income taxes by concealing income, and that this objective was not consummated in 1946 when the 1945 return was filed. Pp. 361 U. S. 422-424.
(b) The fact that the Court of Appeals had originally ordered entry of a judgment of acquittal did not deprive it of the power to amend that direction on rehearing and order a new trial, in the exercise of its power under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to "require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." P. 361 U. S. 424.
(c) Petitioner's conviction having been set aside on his appeal, he was not subjected to double jeopardy by the action of the Court of Appeals in ordering a new trial, on rehearing, after having previously directed entry of a judgment of acquittal. Sapir v. United States, 348 U. S. 373, distinguished. Pp. 361 U. S. 425-426.
261 F.2d 181, 264 F.2d 955, affirmed.
"certain of the overt acts listed in the indictment and charged to have occurred in 1948, 1951, and 1952, involving false statements, could well have been in furtherance of and during a conspiracy having as its objective not the concealment of the conspirators' conspiracy, but tax evasion."
261 F.2d 181, 183. It modified its original order for an acquittal and entered one directing a new trial. Petitioner then contended that, having once ordered his acquittal, the Court of Appeals, by directing a new trial, violated the command of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Petitioner's motion for rehearing was denied. 264 F.2d 955. We granted certiorari. 359 U.S. 982. We affirm the order directing a new trial.
case remanded "with directions to enter judgment for the appellant" Forman.
true income tax liability of Amador A. Seijas.'"
"that certain of the overt acts listed in the indictment and charged to have occurred in 1948, 1951, and 1952, involving false statements, could well have been in furtherance of and during a conspiracy having for its objective not the concealment of the conspirators' conspiracy, but tax evasion."
The Government now says that, through "inadvertence," it allowed the case to be submitted to the jury on the "impermissible theory" condemned in our Grunewald opinion, 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 399-406, and that the trial judge was led into error by the request of the petitioner for an instruction on the "subsidiary conspiracy" theory, which error was compounded by the failure of the Government to object thereto. This resulted, it maintains, in a Grunewald instruction's being saddled onto a correct charge. In view of this complication, it concludes that the jury might well have based its conviction on either theory, and a new trial was therefore appropriate, and would not place petitioner in double jeopardy.
the theory that the central object of the conspiracy was not merely to obtain the "no prosecution" rulings, but rather to immunize the taxpayers completely from prosecution for tax evasion. The evidence supported such a theory. We said, however, that, since this theory was not adequately submitted to the jury, the case should be remanded for a new trial, rather than affirmed.
step in the process of evasion. The concealment of the "holdout" income must continue if the evasion is to succeed. It must continue until action thereon is barred and the evasion permanently effected. In this regard, the indictment alleged that the conspiracy to attempt such evasion actually did continue until 1953, when Seijas revealed the "holdout" income for the first time. It therefore appears that the "subsidiary conspiracy" theory covered by petitioner's requested charge had no place in the case, and should not have been given. There was no such conspiracy alleged or proven. In view of the possible confusion resulting, it was entirely appropriate for a new trial to be ordered. Petitioner's raising this ground on appeal, rather than specifically asserting it in his motion for new trial, had no effect on the power of the Court of Appeals to correct the error.
Petitioner insists, however, that the fatal difference between the Grunewald charge and the one here is that here, the "alternative theory" was not submitted to the jury. Even if we agreed with this point, we do not believe that it would be relevant to our conclusion. The indictment was based on one continuing conspiracy to evade Seijas' tax. The evidence supported it and, if the petitioner had not injected the infected language into the charge, this clearly would have been the theory submitted to the jury. Its inclusion did make the charge ambiguous, and the Court of Appeals, having power to direct "such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances," believed a new trial "appropriate," 28 U.S.C. § 2106, and so ordered. Petitioner concedes that this would have been appropriate if such action had been taken by the Court of Appeals upon original submission; but he says that, once having ordered the entry of an acquittal judgment, it lost power to amend that direction on rehearing and order a new trial. This would subject him, he says, to double jeopardy. We think not.
"assigning a number of alleged errors on appeal, including denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal . . . , 'there is no double jeopardy upon a new trial.'"
Even though petitioner be right in his claim that he did not request a new trial with respect to the portion of the charge dealing with the statute of limitations, still his plea of double jeopardy must fail. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, the Court of Appeals has full power to go beyond the particular relief sought. See Ball and other cases, supra. Nor does Sapir v. United States, 348 U. S. 373 (1955), require a different conclusion, as petitioner claims. The Court of Appeals there, holding the evidence insufficient to convict, had first reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment, and later, on the Government's motion, had remanded instead for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. This Court held that the original order directing the indictment to be dismissed was the correct one, and refused to pass on questions presented by the order directing a new trial.
as in Sapir, this is incorrect. Here, there was no lack of evidence in the record. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, "The jury was simply not properly instructed." 264 F.2d at 956. On the other hand, the order to dismiss in Sapir was based on the insufficiency of the evidence, which could be cured only by the introduction of new evidence, which the Government assured the court was available. Moreover, Sapir made no motion for a new trial in the District Court, while, here, petitioner filed such a motion. That was a decisive factor in Sapir's case. See concurring opinion, 348 U.S. at 348 U. S. 374. Furthermore, the power of the Court of Appeals to revise its original judgment and order the new trial on rehearing was not questioned in Sapir.
"operates to suspend the finality of the . . . court's judgment, pending the court's further determination whether the judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights of the parties."
317 U.S. at 317 U. S. 266. To hold otherwise would deprive the Government of the right to file a petition for certiorari here in criminal cases decided favorably to the defendant in the Court of Appeals, for such a petition might be attacked as a prohibited appeal by the Government on a motion for a new trial. It would be tantamount to a verdict of acquittal at the hands of the jury, not subject to review by motion for rehearing, appeal, or certiorari in this Court. We cannot subscribe to such a theory.
Seijas pleaded guilty and testified for the Government.
"(b) Failure to Collect and Pay Over Tax, or Attempt to Defeat or Evade Tax. -- Any person required under this chapter to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this chapter, who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, and any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
"SEC. 1001. STATEMENTS OR ENTRIES GENERALLY. Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
Although petitioner contends that the petition for rehearing was in fact a motion for a new trial, this is not true. The purpose of a petition for rehearing is to point out error in the original judgment. Here, the Government pointed out that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong theory (the Grunewald theory, instead of the continuing conspiracy theory).
"direct evidence . . . to show . . . an express original agreement among the conspirators to continue to act in concert in order to cover up, for their own self-protection, traces of the crime after its commission."
353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 404. (Emphasis supplied.) This statement, however, had reference to a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal, not to a continuing one. In Grunewald. we were not required to decide whether a conviction under a proper charge could be supported where the only evidence during the period within the statute of limitations was independent acts of concealment, since more was present there. See 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 409, n. 23. Nor is that necessary here, since the Court of Appeals' determination that the evidence of record could sustain a conviction under a correct instruction was based upon evidence in addition to independent acts of concealment. See 259 F.2d at 132-134 and 261 F.2d at 183. We cannot say that this determination was erroneous.
1. As I read the record, I believe the case is fairly to be viewed as having been submitted to the jury only on the subsidiary conspiracy theory. For although there are passages in the trial court's charge which can be said to have proceeded on a continuing conspiracy theory, these passages, taking the charge as a whole, are, in my view, too ambiguous to justify our saying that the jury must have understood that it could also consider the case on that basis.
"No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission. therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection."
constitute a cross-appeal. It did not, and could not, seek a result more favorable to itself than that reached by the trial court; rather, it simply opposed the relief for which petitioner contended.
3. I think the record sustains petitioner's contention that he did not, either in the trial court or in the Court of Appeals, request a new trial with respect to the portion of the charge dealing with the statute of limitations. * He is subject to retrial solely because he appealed his conviction and because, in the circumstances disclosed by this record, such relief was just and appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. The Ball, Green, and Bryan cases, cited in the Court's opinion, ante, p. 361 U. S. 425, establish that the right of an appellate court to order a new trial does not turn on the relief requested by the defendant, and the Sapir case does not suggest such a distinction.
4. Since the Court of Appeals held only that the case might have been tried on a continuing conspiracy theory, I express no opinion on the permissible duration of a conspiracy to violate § 145 (b) or on the sufficiency of the evidence adduced to prove its continuation. Those questions should be resolved in further proceedings.
* It appears that, while petitioner's post-trial memorandum assigned the sufficiency of the evidence in routine fashion as one of the grounds for a new trial, he relied in the trial court entirely on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and in the Court of Appeals on that ground plus erroneous admission of evidence and certain errors in the charge not here relevant.
I join the Court's opinion, but desire to add a word. MR. JUSTICE CLARK's clear, full, and accurate statement of the facts demonstrates errors by nearly everyone having to do with the case in the lower courts except the Government; yet it lost the case on appeal.
Petitioner, though not charged by the indictment with a "subsidiary conspiracy," nevertheless asked, and induced the court to give in his very words, a charge to the jury saying that, unless they found a "subsidiary conspiracy," they should acquit him. There being neither charge in the indictment nor evidence in the record of "subsidiary conspiracy," the requested and obtained charge to the jury amounted to a virtual direction to acquit. And if the jury, in obedience to that charge, had acquitted, its verdict would, of course, have ended the case. Therefore, petitioner, by requesting and inducing the court to give this erroneous charge, got much more than he was entitled to under the law. Yet he claimed in the Court of Appeals that this very charge, because unsupported by evidence, was erroneous, and required an outright reversal. The Court of Appeals, though finding adequate evidence to support the indictment, first took that view. It seems plain to me that petitioner, having asked and obtained an erroneous but far more favorable charge than he was entitled to, certainly invited the error, benefited by it, and surely may not be heard to attack it as prejudicial to him, especially when, as seems quite plain, it was prejudicial only to the Government. I realize there is no profit in decrying a spent transaction, but I cannot resist observing the obvious -- namely, that, in these circumstances, the law required affirmance of the judgment.
"Perhaps, we were in error in not objecting to the charge requested by the accused, and given by the court to the jury, on 'subsidiary conspiracy,' but we should at least have an opportunity to retry the case."
of this, urging that the court's original opinion "acquitted" him, and that to try him again would violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy. That contention, it seems to me, is totally devoid of merit. The Court of Appeals rendered but one judgment in the case, and it was one remanding for a new trial. Petitioner, instead of complaining that he was given only a new trial, should be thankful that his conviction was not affirmed.

References: § 2106
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 § 2106
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 § 2106
 § 145