Source: https://www.gwwlaw.com/cases/in-re-marriage-of-davis/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:46:26+00:00

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Do you need to be living in separate residences to be considered ‘separated’ from your spouse under the California Family Code?
The California Supreme Court, in a recent case printed below, held that “living separate and apart” in the California Family Code is defined as spouses living in separate residences and at least one of them has the subjective intent to end the marital relationship.
Prior History: Superior Court of Alameda County, No. RF08428441, Elizabeth Hendrickson, Commissioner, Judge. Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, No. .
HOLDINGS: -Spouses were not living separate and apart under Fam. Code, § 771, subd. (a), when they continued to live in the same residence, whether or not their conduct otherwise demonstrated their intent to end the marital relationship; -Because living in separate residences was an indispensable threshold requirement for earnings and accumulations to be characterized as separate property, all of the property acquired by the spouses while they lived in the same residence was community property in accordance with Fam. Code, § 760, and the lower courts erred in finding that separation occurred on the date when the spouses began to manage their finances separately, which was earlier than the date when one spouse actually moved out of the marital home.
HN1 Fam. Code, § 760, provides that all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is community property except as otherwise provided by statute.
HN2 Although the date of separation is normally a factual issue to be reviewed for substantial evidence, where resolution of the opposing contentions depends on statutory construction, this is a question of law to which a de novo standard of review applies.
HN3 With all questions of statutory construction, the court’s objective is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. This principle is especially important in construing a statute within the community property scheme because the system itself is a creature of statute.
HN4 A court begins with the plain language of a statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. If, however, the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.
HN5 See Fam. Code, § 771, subd. (a).
HN6 The phrase ″living separate and apart″ is a term of art. As such, it has been defined as spouses residing in different places and having no intention of resuming marital relations, and as spouses living away from each other, along with at least one spouse’s intent to dissolve the marriage. These definitions contemplate both a physical separation of residence and an accompanying intent to end the marital relationship. They incorporate an ordinary and common linguistic understanding of the word ″apart,″ used as an adverb, as being at a distance in place, position, or time, or away from, and the word ″separate″ as denoting being kept apart, spaced apart or scattered. Indeed, both legal usage of the phrase ″living separate and apart″ and colloquial understanding of what it means for someone to live separate and apart from someone else do not include persons living together in the same home. Ordinary usage of the language itself contemplates the parties’ occupation of separate residences. Therefore, the statute on its face appears to have a commonly understood, plain meaning.
HN7 Cases are not authority for propositions not considered.
HN8 The cases addressing the date of separation are consistent with a view that both separate residences and demonstrated intent are necessary.
HN9 Parties may live apart and yet not be separated. However, the reverse is not also true. Living apart physically is an indispensable threshold requirement to separation, whether or not it is sufficient, by itself, to establish separation.
HN10 Legislative inaction after a judicial decision does not necessarily imply legislative approval.
HN11 The Legislature intended the statutory phrase ″living separate and apart″ to require both separate residences and accompanying demonstrated intent to end the marital relationship. Consistent with the history of Fam. Code, § 771, subd. (a), and the developed standard articulated by the case law, ″living separate and apart″ refers to a situation in which spouses are living in separate residences and at least one of them has the subjective intent to end the marital relationship, which intent is objectively evidenced by words or conduct reflecting that there is a complete and final break in the marriage relationship.
HN12 A literal construction may be rejected where it would result in absurd consequences the Legislature could not have intended.
In dissolution of marriage proceedings, the trial court found the date of separation to be the date when the spouses began to manage their finances separately, while still living in the same residence. (Superior Court of Alameda County, No. RF08428441, Elizabeth Hendrickson, Commissioner.) The Court of Appeal, First Dist., Div. One, No. A136858, affirmed.
Statutes § 21 > Construction > Legislative Intent > Community Property Statutes.
With all questions of statutory construction, the court’s objective is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. This principle is especially important in construing a statute within the community property scheme because the system itself is a creature of statute.
Statutes § 30 > Construction > Language > Plain Meaning Rule > Most Reliable Indicator of Intent.
A court begins with the plain [*847] language of a statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. If, however, the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.
Dissolution of Marriage; Separation § 48 > Community Property > Determining Separation Date > Separate Residences.
The phrase “living separate and apart” is a term of art. As such, it has been defined as spouses residing in different places and having no intention of resuming marital relations, and as spouses living away from each other, along with at least one spouse’s intent to dissolve the marriage. These definitions contemplate both a physical separation of residence and an accompanying intent to end the marital relationship. They incorporate an ordinary and common linguistic understanding of the word “apart,” used as an adverb, as being at a distance in place, position, or time, or away from, and the word “separate” as denoting being kept apart, spaced apart or scattered. Indeed, both legal usage of the phrase “living separate and apart” and colloquial understanding of what it means for someone to live separate and apart from someone else do not include persons living together in the same home. Ordinary usage of the language itself contemplates the parties’ occupation of separate residences. Therefore, the statute on its face appears to have a commonly understood, plain meaning.
Courts § 38 > Decisions and Orders > Doctrine of Stare Decisis > Identity of Law and Fact > Propositions Not Considered.
Cases are not authority for propositions not considered.
The cases addressing the date of separation are consistent with a view that both separate residences and demonstrated intent are necessary.
Parties may live apart and yet not be separated. However, the reverse is not also true. Living apart physically is an indispensable threshold requirement to separation, whether or not it is sufficient, by itself, to establish separation.
Legislative inaction after a judicial decision does not necessarily imply legislative approval.
The Legislature intended the statutory phrase “living separate and apart” to require both separate residences and accompanying demonstrated intent to end the marital relationship. Consistent with the history of Fam. Code, § 771, subd. (a), and the developed standard articulated by the case law, “living separate and apart” refers to a situation in which spouses are living in separate residences and at least one of them has the subjective intent to end the marital relationship, which intent is objectively evidenced by words or conduct reflecting that there is a complete and final break in the marriage relationship.
A literal construction may be rejected where it would result in absurd consequences the Legislature could not have intended.
Living in separate residences is an indispensable threshold requirement for a finding that spouses are living separate and apart for purposes of Fam. Code, § 771, subd. (a). This interpretation of the statutory language aligns with the common understanding of the words, the statutory history of the provision, and legitimate public policy concerns. Because the Court of Appeal rejected such a requirement as a matter of statutory construction, it erred as a matter of law.
Counsel: Law Office of Stephanie J. Finelli and Stephanie J. Finelli for Appellant.
Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy C. Lascher; Ivie, McNeill & Wyatt and Lilia E. Duchrow for Respondent.
Judges: Opinion by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., with Werdegar, Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, and Kruger, JJ., concurring. Concurring opinion by Liu, J., with Werdegar, J., concurring.
[***836] [**402] CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.—In a marital dissolution proceeding, a court determines the division of property between the spouses by first characterizing the parties’ property as community property or separate property. (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1399 [171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 324 P.3d 274].) HN1 Family Code section 760 provides that all [***837] property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is community property “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” One such statute is Family Code section 771, subdivision (a) (section 771(a)), which provides that “[t]he earnings and accumulations of a spouse … , while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse.” In this case we consider whether a couple may be “living separate and apart,” for purposes of section 771(a), when they live together in the same home. We conclude the answer is no. The statute requires the spouses to be living in separate residences in order for their earnings and accumulations to be their separate property. Because the Court of Appeal concluded otherwise, we reverse its judgment.
Keith Xavier Davis (husband) and Sheryl Jones Davis (wife) were married on June 12, 1993. They have two children, a daughter born in August 1995 and a son born in November 1999. Wife filed for dissolution on December 30, 2008.
At trial on the issue of the date of their separation, wife described the couple’s marriage as turbulent. She testified that they stopped being sexually intimate after their son was conceived in 1999. They never went on a “date” after their son was born. The parties disagreed as to when they stopped sharing a bedroom in their marital home.
Husband testified wife moved to another bedroom in 2001; wife testified this happened in 2004. Their trial testimony indicates that they both attended the children’s activities, but traveled to the locations by separate cars. Wife did her own and the children’s laundry. Husband did his laundry. Both parties prepared meals, but wife would not prepare something different for husband if he was dissatisfied with the meal she made for herself and the children. The parties took some family vacations together, but also [**403] took separate vacations. In deposition testimony, wife claimed that by 2004 they were “living entirely separate lives.” They spoke about divorce, but stayed together for the sake of the children.
The parties maintained a joint bank account from the beginning of their marriage, which wife managed. In 2001, however, husband started his own business and at some point opened a separate bank account. In 2003, wife reactivated a separate bank account of her own to manage her business funds [*850] and pay for her personal expenses. Husband contributed $ 3,200 a month to the parties’ joint account from his separate account for the payment of household expenses. But both parties were unhappy with each other’s contributions to the joint account. In January 2006, husband became employed by Clorox, substantially increasing his earnings. Wife was frustrated when he did not increase his financial support to the household.
On June 1, 2006, after the end of their son’s school year, wife announced to husband that she was “through” with the marriage. According to her, the “last component” of their marriage was their finances. On June 1, 2006, wife presented husband with a financial ledger that itemized their joint household expenses and their individual expenses. She did this because she wanted the parties to contribute equally to running the home and funding the children’s expenses, while being solely responsible for their own respective personal expenses. Wife removed husband from her American Express credit account and returned several of husband’s credit cards to him. She believed at this point that they were acting simply as roommates. In July 2006, wife began working full-time, substantially [***838] increasing her earnings. Husband left his job with Clorox in September 2006.
The parties continued to live in the marital home after June 1, 2006. Wife continued to keep her personal belongings there. She continued to receive mail and telephone calls there. She continued to cook meals at the home when she was in town, although she often traveled for her work. She did not change the address on her driver’s license. In August 2006, the parties took a family vacation to Hawaii with their children. However, they subsequently took no out-of-state vacations with one another. They continued to celebrate special occasions, such as birthdays and holidays, together as a family as they had previously done. They both continued to use their joint bank account.
When wife filed the petition for dissolution of the marriage on December 30, 2008, she listed the date of their separation as June 1, 2006. In his initial response to wife’s petition, husband listed the date of separation as January 2, 2009 (a few days after wife’s filing of the petition). Wife did not move out of the marital home until July 2011. Husband subsequently filed an amended response listing the date of separation as July 1, 2011.
After trial of the issue, the court found the date of separation to be June 1, 2006. The Court of Appeal affirmed. In relevant part, it disagreed with the majority decision in In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152 [126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148] (Norviel), which held that physically living apart is “an indispensable threshold requirement” for separation under section 771(a). (Norviel, supra, at p. 1162.) We granted review to resolve the apparent conflict in interpretation of the statute.
Husband contends that spouses cannot be “living separate and apart” for purposes of section 771(a) when they continue to share a residence. He urges such a bright-line rule in order to provide clear guidance to judges and a measure of predictability to attorneys and litigants. Wife contends that no particular fact, including place of residence, is determinative. Instead, wife argues that a court should consider the totality of the circumstances and decide the date of separation based on conduct by either or both of the spouses evidencing a complete and final intent to part ways with no plan of resuming the marital relationship, even if at that time they are still living in the same residence. According to wife, husband’s proposed bright-line rule is unworkable and would lead [**404] to harsh results. Husband claims the same thing about wife’s proposed rule.
[**405] Indeed, both legal usage of the phrase “living separate and apart” and colloquial understanding of what it means for someone to live “separate” and “apart” from someone else do not include persons living [***840]together in the same home. Ordinary usage of the language itself contemplates the parties’ occupation of separate residences. Therefore, the statute on its face appears to have a commonly understood, plain meaning.
Nevertheless, we recognize that the phrase as used in section 771(a) is not without at least some ambiguity. The phrase “living separate and apart” could less likely, but still plausibly, be read to mean that the spouses are in effect “living separate lives” with the requisite intent to end the marital relationship. (See Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict., supra, at p. 2069, col. 3 [defining the adjective “separate” as “not shared with another,” “existing by itself: autonomous, independent” or “distinct, different”].) Such an interpretation would not require separate residences for purposes of section 771(a). Instead, it would focus a court’s attention on the spouses’ independence or autonomy from each other in their daily living. Under this understanding of the statutory phrase, physical separation would, as wife contends, be simply one of many factors to consider in determining the date of a couple’s separation.
To consider whether the Legislature intended the language of section 771(a) to encompass this less likely, but still possible secondary meaning, we turn to extrinsic aids—the statute’s long history, its prior judicial construction, and the Legislature’s use of the phrase elsewhere in the Family Code—to consider what light they may shed on the Legislature’s intent. We find evidence there bolstering the ordinary and common meaning of the language as requiring separate residences along with demonstrated intent to finally end the marital relationship before a spouse’s earnings and accumulations are considered that spouse’s separate property.
The 1870 Act did not contain a definition of the phrase “living separate and apart” used in section 2. (Stats. 1870, ch. 161, § 2, p. 226.) However, the Legislature’s understanding that the phrase connoted a threshold requirement [*854] of separate residences may be discerned from an additional section of the statute. Section 4 of the 1870 Act provided a procedure for a wife who was “living separate and apart” from her husband to sell her real property without joining with her husband. To do so, the wife was required to record a verified and acknowledged declaration “containing a description of such real estate, the name of her husband, her own place of residence, and [stating] that she is a married woman, living separate and apart from her husband.” (1870 Act, Stats. 1870, ch. 161, § 4, p. 226, italics added.) The statutory requirement that the wife state in a declaration “her own” place of residence that is “separate and apart from her husband” strongly suggests that the 1870 Act was directed at a situation where the spouses had physically separated and the wife in fact had “her own” residence. It is some indication that the 1870 Legislature had in mind what we have described as the common meaning of the language when it first adopted it.
When read as a whole and in this context, it seems evident that the 1870 Act was intended to afford married women some additional protection from the rigors of the law generally denying them control over their earnings and separate property. Under the authority of the 1870 Act, a wife whose husband was not physically living with her could undertake to support herself in her “own” residence. Unlike other married women, she could retain her earnings and accumulations as her separate property to maintain her separate residence. She was given the right to control and dispose of her separate property. She could sue and be sued without the joinder of her husband. Nothing in the 1870 [**407] Act indicates a different intent—to characterize a wife’s earnings and accumulations as her separate property while she was still physically living with her husband in the marital home so long as she and her husband were sufficiently leading “separate lives.” To the contrary, the 1870 Act should be understood as a limited exception to the general rule of that time that the husband had full management and control over the marital and separate assets for the duration of the marriage. It appears the Legislature was concerned only with the special and limited circumstance of a wife who was living physically separate from her husband. Such a wife was likely to be incurring separate expenses associated with her separate residence and could [*856] be anticipated to need the authority to separately maintain, control and manage such property. In such a situation, the 1870 Legislature determined an exception to the normal community property characterization of earnings and accumulations acquired during marriage and husband’s control was appropriate.
When the Legislature adopted the Civil Code in 1872, it enacted a version of section 2 of the 1870 Act as Civil Code section 169 (former section 169). As enacted in 1872, former section 169 provided that “[t]he earnings and accumulations of the wife … , while she is living separate from her husband, are the separate property of the wife.” Again, nothing suggests that the 1872 Legislature contemplated that anything other than separate residences would qualify as “living separate,” i.e., that it intended the language to be construed differently from its common and ordinary meaning. In fact, the Legislature enacted at the same time section 5 of the Civil Code, which states that “[t]he provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing statutes or the common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments.” Because former section 169 was substantially the same as section 2 of the 1870 Act, Civil Code section 5 directs that it be interpreted as continuing in effect the former law.
Moreover, it might reasonably be suggested that the lack of a statutory definition of the phrase is some indication itself that the Legislature intended the ordinary meaning to apply. Otherwise, the Legislature would likely have provided a specialized definition of the term. It did not.
[***843] And indeed, with respect to the language now found in section 771(a), from the earliest cases on, the issue presented regarding the interpretation of the statute was not whether separate places of residence were a prerequisite for application of the law, but rather whether separate residences sufficed. That question was answered in the negative.
On the other hand, a husband and wife were living separate and apart within the meaning of former section 169 where the husband left his wife, lived in a separate town, and determined during his absence that he would never resume marital relations with his wife, while his wife and children continued to live in the marital home, where the wife kept boarders and did [*857] other work to support herself and the children. (Loring v. Stuart(1889) 79 Cal. 200, 201–202 [21 P. 651]; see Tagus Ranch Co. v. First Nat. Bk. (1935) 7 Cal. App. 2d 457 [46 P.2d 809] [money borrowed by wife who had been deserted by her husband constituted her separate property under former § 169].) These facts illustrate the apparent purpose of the statute: to provide for an estranged wife, whose husband was not physically living with her, a means of maintaining herself in her separate place of residence by allowing her earnings and accumulations to be her separate property.
Without questioning whether separate residences was a necessary predicate, courts struggled to articulate a uniform standard for determining the date of separation in [**408] circumstances where the parties had moved into separate homes.
Subsequent legislative developments suggest no intent to change the meaning of the phrase “living separate and apart.” In 1969, the Legislature repealed the family law portions of the Civil Code and replaced them with the Family Law Act. (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, §§ 3, 6, 8, pp. 3313–3314.) Relevant to our discussion, former section 169 [***844] was repealed and Civil Code section 5118 (former section 5118) was adopted. (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, pp. 3314, 3340.) Like its predecessor, former section 5118 provided that “[t]he earnings and accumulations of the wife …, while she is living separate from her husband, are the separate property of the wife.” (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, pp. 3314, 3340.) As before, no specialized definition of the [*858] language was provided, and by enacting language identical to former section 169, the 1969 Legislature once again expressed its intent to continue in effect the former law. (Civ. Code, § 5.) Therefore, as it did originally, the statute continued to address the situation in which a wife was living estranged in a separate residence from her husband.
We pause at this point to observe that by this time the Legislature had also used the phrase “living separate and apart” elsewhere in the Civil Code. Civil Code former section 34.6 specified certain circumstances under which “a minor 15 years of age or older who [was] living separate and apart” from his or her parents or legal guardian, “whether with or without the consent of a parent or guardian and regardless of the duration of such separate residence,” could consent to his or her own medical or dental care. (Civ. Code, former § 34.6, italics added, as added by Stats. 1968, ch. 371, § 1, p. 788.) Former section 34.6 was repealed in 1992 (Stats. 1992, ch. 163, § 2, p. 724), but its substance was restated in Family Code section 6922, where it continues to use the phrase “living separate and apart” to mean the minor occupies a separate residence. (Fam. Code, § 6922, subd. (a)(2); see Family Code, 22 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1992) com. foll. § 6922, p. 545 [“Section 6922 restates former Civil Code Section 34.6 without substantive change.”].) This statute further supports our view that the Legislature likely intends the common meaning of the language when it uses this statutory phrase.
break in the marital relationship” (von der Nuell, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 736, italics omitted), and indicating that “[a]ll factors … are to be considered” in deciding the “ultimate question” of “whether either or both of the parties perceived the rift in their relationship as final” (Hardin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 452, 453, italics omitted)—must be understood in the context of their facts, which reflect that in each case the parties had moved into separate places of residence. These cases do not address, and therefore are not authority for a conclusion that “living separate and apart” was intended by the Legislature, originally or subsequently, to require, as wife argues, only demonstrated conduct reflecting a subjective intent to part ways with no plan of resuming the marital relationship, which might, but need not necessarily, [*862] include physical separation. (In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388 [53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 916 P.2d 476] [“ ‘It is axiomatic that HN7cases are not authority for propositions not considered.’ ”].) HN8 CA(5) (5) They are consistent with a view that both separate residences and demonstrated intent are necessary.
also interesting to observe that the Legislature has had more than a decade to amend section 771(a) in response to the Norviel majority’s recognition of a threshold requirement of physically separate places of residence and has failed to do so.
Wife contends that a bright-line rule, such as we articulate, will be overly simplistic, will [**413] lead to unjust, harsh results, and is, essentially, against current public policy considerations. She suggests that “[a] typical spouse in California, for example, may face further financial difficulties simply by being required to move out of the marital residence as a prerequisite to establishing the date of separation rather than intentionally and meaningfully living as roommates at the same residence, while taking the necessary steps to untangle any outstanding financial, legal and social ties incident to that spouse’s decision to terminate the marriage.” She points out that there may be spouses who need to reside in the same residence as “roommates” because of foreclosure, job loss, or other economic factors. She suggests that others may wish to share the same residence in order to coparent their children. Finally, she speculates concerning the difficulty a spouse may encounter in obtaining a move-away order.
& Sletten, Inc., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1119.) Here we find original legislative intent to use the language in its common and ordinary sense as requiring separate places of residence before the earnings and accumulations [***850] of a wife during marriage could be characterized as the wife’s separate property. We understand the original legislative purpose of the statute to be the protection of and provision for a wife who was estranged and living physically separate from her husband. Thus, the statutory phrase “living separate and apart” required that the spouses be living in separate residences. We find no evidence of any subsequent change in the legislative intent to apply the commonly understood [*865] meaning of that language or change of legislative purpose in protecting a vulnerable spouse, which alters the meaning of this statutory phrase. Admittedly, the statute, as so construed, may work hardship in some specific situations, but we cannot say it is absurd. (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506 [154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 634, 297 P.3d 870] HN12 [a literal construction may be rejected where it would result in absurd consequences the Legislature could not have intended].) Very much to the contrary; a bright-line rule, as husband points out, promotes fairness by providing a measure of predictability to the parties and their attorneys, as well as clear guidance to judges. It reduces the potential for manipulation of a more elastic standard by the higher earner in situations of significant disparity of spousal income. It provides separate property classification of earnings and accumulations where the need is greatest because each spouse is maintaining his or her own separate place of residence. It retains the presumption of community property for earnings and accumulations acquired during marriage during a period of time likely to be prior to the institution of court proceedings and any court order of support, thereby protecting the lower earning spouse.
p. 1162) for a finding that spouses are “living separate and apart” for purposes of section 771(a). This interpretation of the statutory language aligns with the common understanding of the words, the statutory history of the provision, and legitimate public policy concerns. Because the Court of Appeal rejected such a requirement as a matter of statutory construction, it erred as a matter of law.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with our opinion.
[**414] Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Corrigan, J., Liu, J., Cuéllar, J., and Kruger, J., concurred.
LIU, J., Concurring.—I agree with today’s opinion that the phrase “living separate and apart” in Family Code section 771, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 771(a)) “refers to a situation in which spouses are living in separate residences and at least one of them has the subjective intent to end the marital relationship, which intent is objectively evidenced by words or conduct reflecting that there is a complete and final break in the marriage relationship.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 864.) [***851] I also agree that it remains open “whether there could be circumstances that would support a finding that the spouses were ‘living separate and apart,’ i.e., that they had established separate residences with the requisite objectively evidenced intent, even though they continued to literally share one roof.” (Id., at p. 864, fn. 7.) I write separately to note that in addressing that question, courts should understand the purpose of section 771(a) in light of relevant changes in historical context that have occurred since 1870 when the Legislature enacted the original version of the statute.
The 1870 Act may be understood as a legislative response to cases like Lawrence v. Spear (1861) 17 Cal. 421. There a wife deserted by her husband engaged in a furniture business and sold furniture to the defendant. The husband sued the defendant to void the sale on the ground that he never consented to it. The court upheld the sale based on the legal fiction that the husband, having abandoned the wife, impliedly consented to her disposition of property for her own support. (Id. at pp. 423–424.) This fiction was necessary because the wife had no control over community property and no way to accumulate or control her own separate property, even though she was living separate and apart from her husband. Moreover, divorce did not appear to be a widely accessible option. (See Stevenson & Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces (Spring 2007) 21 J. Econ. Persp. 27, 29, figure 1 (Stevenson & Wolfers) [showing very low rate of divorce in [*868] the United States between 1860 and 1900].) The 1870 Act provided a narrow exception to the male-dominated property regime in order to protect a wife in such circumstances.
Thus, by 1971, an estranged wife living separate and apart from her husband had no need for a special statutory dispensation to [**416] earn and control separate property in order to provide for her own sustenance. She already controlled the portion of the community comprised of her own earnings, and she was soon to have equal control of all community property. Thus, the gender-neutral version of the statute enacted in 1971 no longer served the same protective purpose of the gender-specific 1870 Act. The modern statute is best understood to have a different purpose: Instead of addressing a nonexistent need to free one spouse from the other’s exclusive control of [*869] community property, the statute—consistent with contemporary norms of gender equality—evenhandedly recognizes the separateness of each spouse’s earnings and accumulations in situations where the spouses have effectively though not formally ended their marriage. In short, the statute recognizes a separation before divorce that effectively ends the community.
Today’s opinion ascribes to the Legislature a continuing purpose of “protecting a vulnerable spouse” in construing the phrase “living separate and apart” to have the same meaning today as it did in 1870. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 865.) But whereas a narrow construction of the phrase now “protect[s] the lower earning spouse” by “reduc[ing] the potential for manipulation of a more elastic standard by the higher earner” (ibid.), a narrow construction served no similar protective purpose in 1870. To the contrary, the Legislature in 1870 understood “living separate and apart” narrowly to mean separate addresses because it sought to create “a limitedexception to the general rule of that time that the husband had full management and control over the marital and separate assets for the duration of the marriage.” (Id. at p. 867, italics added.) A broader understanding of “living separate and apart”—one that enabled an estranged wife to earn and control separate property without living at a separate address from her husband—would have been more protective of the vulnerable spouse in 1870. Yet it also would have meant greater property rights for married women at the expense of the male-controlled property regime, and there is no indication that the Legislature in 1870 had any interest in fundamentally changing that regime. The 1870 statute was protective because it created an exception to the male-dominated property regime, not because the exception it created was a narrow one.
By 1971, the Legislature had revised the archaic laws granting husbands exclusive control of marital assets, and the original motivation for construing “living separate and apart” narrowly had become obsolete. Now the gender-neutral statute, premised on the legal equality of husband and wife, simply recognizes the separateness of each spouse’s earnings and accumulations at the point when the spouses have effectively but not formally ended the marriage, i.e., when the spouses are “living separate and apart.” Construing this phrase as it appears [***854] in the modern statute, I agree that its most natural meaning (maj. opn., ante, at p. 852) as well as practical considerations of clarity and administrability (id. at p. 864) suggest that whether spouses are “living separate and apart” turns not solely on the subjective intent of at least one spouse, but also on an objective manifestation of that intent by some form of physical separation. However, countervailing considerations of family economics and parenting (id. at p. 864) suggest that the physical separation need not assume the precise form that the Legislature in 1870 envisioned, namely, separate addresses.
In considering whether spouses living under the same roof are “living separate and apart” for purposes of section 771(a), we are not bound by the 1870 Legislature’s narrow understanding of that term. Rather, in light of the current purpose of section 771(a), the question is whether the spouses, in addition to their intent to separate, have demonstrated “unambiguous, objectively ascertainable conduct amounting to a physical separation under the same roof.” (In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1164 [126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148].) In order to qualify as “living separate and apart,” the spouses must have a living arrangement that clearly and objectively signals a complete and final termination of the marital relationship. Neither the Legislature nor this court has foreclosed [**417] the possibility that such a living arrangement may occur within a single dwelling.
4 The reviewing court in Manfer, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 925, found Hardin’s articulation of the standard for determining the date of separation to be the most helpful. In Manfer, the husband moved out of the marital home and the wife decided that their stormy marriage was finally over, but the parties agreed to hide their circumstances from family and friends until after the year-end holidays. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court “erroneously applied an ‘outsider’s viewpoint’ standard to defer the date of separation to [a date] after the parties had revealed to the world their hitherto secret that the marriage was over.” (Id., at p. 927.) The Manfer court stated that “[t]he date-of-separation test does not ask what the public thinks, but whether at least one of the parties intended to end the marriage and whether there was objective conduct ‘bespeak[ing] the finality of the marital relationship.’ ” (Id., at p. 928.) Once again, as in all the other cases discussed previously, the facts in Manfer involved the separation of residences.
5 The Norviel majority noted In re Marriage of Johnson (1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 148 [184 Cal. Rptr. 444] was the only case husband proffered as authority for his position that parties may live together and still be considered separated. (Norviel, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) In Johnson, supra, at page 155, the husband contested the trial court’s finding of the date of separation, but the reviewing court concluded, in a single paragraph with little discussion, that the trial court’s determination was based upon substantial evidence. The Norviel majority was not convinced that Johnson was contrary to the conclusion that it reached, given Johnson’s sparse recitation of the relevant facts. (Norviel, supra, at p. 1162.) We agree. But to the extent that it can be argued that the Johnson court determined that living separate lives was sufficient for purposes of former section 5118 (Johnson, supra, at p. 155), it is contrary to the evidence of legislative intent that we have discussed.
6 The Court of Appeal in the present case found the dissenting opinion in Norviel to be compelling and wife reiterates the position here.
7 Under the facts presented by this case, we have no occasion to consider, and expressly reserve the question, whether there could be circumstances that would support a finding that the spouses were “living separate and apart,” i.e., that they had established separate residences with the requisite objectively evidenced intent, even though they continued to literally share one roof.

References: § 771
 § 760
 § 760
 § 771
 § 771
 § 21
 § 30
 § 48
 § 38
 § 771
 § 771
 § 2
 § 4
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 § 169
 § 8
 § 8
 § 5
 § 34
 § 1
 § 2
 § 6922
 § 6922
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