Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/hudec-v-super-ct-34377
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:41:14+00:00

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Home > Opinions > Hudec v. Super. Ct.
All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
right to refuse to testify, a right constitutionally guaranteed criminal defendants.
limine motion to preclude his compelled testimony as a witness for the People.
commitment extension hearing under section 1026.5.
directed at confinement for treatment rather than punishment. (See People v.
respondent with the right not to testify at the hearing, and the People on People v.
decisions and the pertinent statutes‘ historical development.
p. 310.) We relied on the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Specht v.
to commission of sexual offenses as to present a serious threat of harm to others.
right to appointed counsel, and trial is by jury unless waived. (§ 1026.5, subd.
Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1022 (1979–1980 Reg.
statute, the respondent would have ―full jury trial criminal rights.‖ (Assem. Off.
but only a subset of the constitutional rights enjoyed by criminal defendants.
predisposition to commit sexual offenses and would not result in a penal sanction.
respondent did not have the right to be tried by a jury unless personally waived.
federal and state constitutions in criminal proceedings‖]; accord, Joshua D. v.
for recommitment under the Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) law.
rights under Welfare and Institutions Code former section 6316.2, subdivision (e).
incrimination privilege enjoyed by a criminal defendant.‖ (Lopez, supra, at p.
guilt, and do not result in punishment.‖ (Lopez, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p.
commitment had no constitutional right to refuse to testify. (Lopez, supra, at p.
afforded respondents no right to refuse to testify.
of those rights is the right to refuse to testify in the prosecution‘s case-in-chief.
statute incorporates into a commitment extension hearing is not surprising.
July 3, 1979, p. 2).
those constitutional rights specifically mandated for MDSO‘s by judicial decision.
the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings.‖ (§ 1026.5, subd.
would result in absurd consequences the Legislature could not have intended.
People v. Superior Court (Williams), supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 477, People v.
Cal.App.4th 963, to this extent.
a contradictory set of procedures by its grant of rights in section 1026.5(b)(7).
testify does not result in absurd consequences.
right not to testify to hearings under section 1026.5.
Public Defender, and Christopher D. McGibbons, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
A person found not guilty of a felony by reason of insanity may be committed to a state hospital for a period no longer than the maximum prison sentence for his or her offense or offenses (California Penal Code § 1026.5, subd. (a)). The commitment may be extended if, because of the mental disorder, the person “represents a substantial danger” to others (Id., subd. (b)(1)). In the trial for that issue, “[t]he person shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings. (Id., subd. (b)(7)).
Charles Hudec, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was found not guilty by reason of insanity of killing his father in 1981 and was committed to a state hospital for a period reflecting the maximum term for voluntary manslaughter. In March 2012, the district attorney filed a petition to extend Hudec’s commitment under section 1026.5.
The trial court denied Hudec’s in limine motion to preclude his compelled testimony as a witness for the People. On his petition for writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, stayed the trial and, after oral argument, issued the writ, directing the superior court not to compel his testimony. The Supreme Court granted the People’s petition for review.
Whether an individual facing extended commitment under section 1026.5 has the right to refuse to take the witness stand at his or her commitment extension hearing.
An individual facing extended commitment under section 1026.5 has a statutory right not to testify as his or her commitment extension hearing. The plain language of the statute affords such individuals “the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings.” The right not to testify is one of those rights.
Under both the U.S. and California Constitutions, a person has the right to refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions put to him or her in any proceeding; in addition, the defendant in a criminal proceeding enjoys the right to refuse to testify at all. The question in this case is whether, in light of the fact that Court of Appeal have held commitment extension hearings under section 1026.5 to be essentially civil, rather than criminal, in nature, the latter right applies in such a hearing. The defendant did not challenge this characterization, but argued that his right to not testify was statutorily granted by section 1026.5, rather than being a constitutional guarantee.
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve conflicting decisions by the appellate courts in People v. Haynie (2005) 116 Cal. App. 4th 1224 and People v. Lopez (2006) 137 Cal. App. 4th 1099. The appellate court in Haynie held that a commitment extension respondent has the right not to testify at the hearing. In comparison, the appellate court in Lopez expressly disagreed with Haynie and held that the respondent had no right to refuse to testify.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court looked to the plain language of section 1026.5 which provides that “[t]he person shall be entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal proceedings.” The Supreme Court concluded that this language incorporated the right to not testify. The Court rejected the People’s argument that such a right was not granted by the statute because it has no “relevant relationship” to a commitment hearing. The Court further rejected the People’s argument that such a conclusion would yield absurd results (“No nonstatutory procedures need be contrived to implement this right, and its recognition will not tend to prevent a section 1026.5 proceeding from going forward…. Recognizing that NGI commitment extension respondents may refuse to testify will deprive the prosecution in some cases of desired evidence, but it will not as a general matter preclude section 1026.5 extensions. Interpreting section 1026.5(b)(7) to include the right not to testify does not result in absurd consequences.”).
SCOCAL, Hudec v. Super. Ct. , S213003 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/hudec-v-super-ct-34377) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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