Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180330_0000773.SNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:46:20+00:00

Document:
The City and Detective Breslin (together, the “Moving Defendants”) move under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Tammaro's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising from the NYPD's retention and destruction of property seized in connection with Tammaro's arrest. The Moving Defendants also seek to dismiss Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims stemming from abuse Tammaro allegedly suffered at the hands of Rikers Island corrections officers and other inmates while incarcerated. For the reasons that follow, the Moving Defendants' motion is granted as to the property claims against Detective Breslin and the NYPD property clerks, and denied as to (1) the property claims against the City to the extent that they arise out of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment prisoner abuse claims.
The relevant facts are gleaned from the Complaint and Tammaro's opposition papers, which are presumed true for purposes of this motion. See Ceara v. Deacon, 68 F.Supp.3d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining that on a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, a court may consider materials outside the pleadings “to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint, ” including “documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers” (quotation marks omitted)).
The standards governing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are well-settled. To avoid dismissal, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim “has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In resolving a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept a plaintiff's allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 219 (2d Cir. 2015). However, this “tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation mark omitted).
Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, courts liberally construe the complaint, which, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This maxim applies with particular force when “the pro se plaintiff alleges that [his] civil rights have been violated.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Thus, this Court affords Tamarro “special solicitude” by interpreting his complaint “to raise the strongest claims that it suggests.” Hardaway v. Hartford Public Works Dep't, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).
This Court construes the Complaint to assert Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising from the failure to release and subsequent destruction of Tammaro's property by Detective Breslin, the NYPD property clerks, and the City of New York (the “Property Claims”), and Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising from his treatment by Rikers Island corrections officers while incarcerated (the “Prison Abuse Claims”). Because Tammaro asserts claims against government officials, this Court also considers whether any of the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Where, as here, Moving Defendants raise qualified immunity in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the facts supporting qualified immunity must appear on the face of the complaint. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 435-36 (2d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, courts have noted judicial reluctance “to find that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at the initial stages of the pleadings.” Soto v. City of New York, 2015 WL 3422155, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015) (quotation mark and citation omitted).
The qualified immunity doctrine protects public officials “from claims for money damages arising from the performance of their duties.” Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2017). Qualified immunity “attaches when an official's conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the shield applies “unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Whether a right is “clearly established” depends on “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). While there need not be a case directly on point for a right to be “clearly established, ” existing precedent “must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White, 137 S.Ct. at 551 (quotation marks omitted); Dudek v. Nassau Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 991 F.Supp.2d 402, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that this determination “principally relies on ‘whether or not the law was governed by controlling precedent of this Circuit'”).
As an initial matter, this Court addresses Tammaro's opposition to various documents submitted by Moving Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss. Because a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges only the ‘legal feasibility' of a complaint, ” and takes “no account of its basis in evidence, a court adjudicating such a motion may review only a narrow universe of materials.” Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 558-59 (2d Cir. 2016). Accordingly, a court may generally only consider the “facts stated on the face of the complaint, . . . documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and . . . matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Concord Assocs., L.P. v. Entm't Props. Trust, 817 F.3d 46, 51 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). However, “[e]ven where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint ‘relies heavily upon its terms and effect, ' which renders the document ‘integral' to the complaint.” Chambers v. Time Warner, 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002).

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