Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/03/21/cue-richardson-v-nicholson-no-03-2100-sympathetic-reading-to-veterans-earlier-filings/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:25:23+00:00

Document:
I also write to contrast Andrews with two situations not present here, and to which the CUE analysis in Andrews is not applicable.
First, the CUE aspect of Andrews is inapplicable to cases in which an RO decision or certain subsequent procedural rights were never provided with regard to a claim for VA benefits or the pleadings of a claimant for VA benefits. In such cases, the entire claim for benefits and all aspects of that claim remain open – in an unadjudicated status – and the claim can be pursued in a non-CUE context. See Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995) (allowing claimant pursuing claim to reopen to assert that his original claim was never final because no Statement of the Case (SOC) had been provided); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (allowing claimant pursuing an increased rating claim to assert that his claim was never final because the Secretary failed to mail him a copy of the Board decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 7104(e)); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 662, 666 (1992) (allowing claimant pursuing an increased rating claim to assert that he was entitled to an earlier effective date because no SOC had been provided); Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992) (finding claim in non-final status when the Secretary failed to mail a claimant a copy of the Board decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 7104(e)(3)); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1340 (2002) (citing favorably Tablazon, Hauck, Kuo, and Ashley, all supra, and finding a non-final claim occurs when “the time for appealing either an RO or a Board decision did not run where the [Secretary] failed to provide the veteran with information or material critical to the appellate process”); Woznick v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 198, 201-02 (2005) (directing the Secretary to issue an SOC as to the appellant’s claim).
Regarding Andrews, the Bingham Court stated that “VA’s failure [in Andrews] to consider all aspects of a claim does not render its decision non-final but instead ‘is properly challenged through a CUE motion.'” Bingham, 421 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1281).
the August 1944 RO decision on the basis of CUE, the Board misinterpreted and misapplied the rule of law articulated in Roberson, which has since been further explained in Szemraj and Moody.
Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6-10. He argues that under Roberson, Szemraj, and Moody, VA has a duty to fully and sympathetically read the pleadings and evidence submitted in support of his prior claim before adjudicating his request for revision on the basis of CUE. Id. at 9. He states that it is apparent that the Board did not apply the principles articulated in Roberson before denying his request for revision on the basis of CUE. Id. at 6-7.
VA must read all pro se submissions sympathetically, including submissions in claims underlying a request for revision on the basis of CUE, to “‘determine all potential claims raised by the evidence, applying all relevant laws and regulations.'” Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 394, 405 (2005) (quoting Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1373); see also Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that “‘Roberson requires, with respect to all pro se pleadings, that the VA give a sympathetic reading to the veteran’s filings'” (quoting Szemraj, 357 F.3d at 1373)).
Thus, a claimant may assert that VA failed to adjudicate a reasonably raised claim in the context of a request for revision of a prior decision on the basis of CUE.[ 7Whether or not CUE is the exclusive way to raise such a matter is an issue we need not address in order to decide the matter before us.]7 See Bingham, Andrews, Moody, and Roberson, all supra. When presented with such a request, VA must make two threshold factual determinations. First, VA must apply the holding in Roberson and give a full and sympathetic reading to the pro se claimant’s prior submissions to determine whether such a claim was reasonably raised. If it is determined that a claim was reasonably raised, VA must then determine whether such a claim is pending or whether it was adjudicated as part of a final decision.[ 8A claim that has not been finally adjudicated is necessarily pending. See 38 C.F.R. 3.160(c) (2005) (defining “pending claim” as a claim “which has not been finally adjudicated”).]8 If such a reasonably raised claim remains pending, then there is no decision on that claim to revise on the basis of CUE; however, the claim must be adjudicated. See Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1384-85 (determining that the appellant’s earlier submissions raised a TDIU claim as a matter of law and remanding the matter for a determination of entitlement to TDIU). If VA determines that the claim was adjudicated, then the claimant may collaterally attack the resulting decision on the basis of CUE. However, it is not for this Court to decide in the first instance whether such a claim ever existed or, if so, whether such a claim was ever adjudicated. See Moody, 360 F.3d at 1310.
In this case, although the Board determined that there “is no pending claim for service connection for psychoneurosis” based on Mr. Richardson’s statement in his 1944 application in conjunction with the “May 1944 hospital summary that diagnosed simple adult maladjustment,” the Board reached this conclusion without first applying Roberson and giving a “full and sympathetic reading” to Mr. Richardson’s 1944 submissions. R. at 10-11; see Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1384 (quoting Hodge, 155 F.3d at 1362).
After Szemraj, there is no question that the Board’s holding (based on our then-extant jurisprudence) that Roberson applies only in TDIU claims was incorrect. Because the Board failed to apply Roberson prior to addressing whether Mr. Richardson reasonably raised a claim for psychoneurosis in 1944, this matter must be remanded to the Board to make the requisite factual findings. See 38 U.S.C. 7104(a); Gutierrez v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. 1, 10 (2004) (finding that remand is the appropriate remedy where Board has failed to apply law correctly).
first should give a full and sympathetic reading of the appellant’s 1944 application to determine whether there is a pending, unadjudicated claim for psychoneurosis. If, after applying Roberson, it is determined that Mr. Richardson did not reasonably raise a claim for psychoneurosis in his 1944 application, or that such a claim was adjudicated, either as a separate and distinct claim or as part of the August 1944 RO decision, then the Board should adjudicate the request for revision on the basis of CUE. If the Board determines that the 1944 application reasonably raises a claim for psychoneurosis and that such a claim was not adjudicated, then the claim remains pending and must be referred to the RO for a determination of Mr. Richardson’s entitlement to service connection for psychoneurosis based on the 1944 application because a claim on which there has been no final decision cannot be addressed in a request for revision on the basis of CUE.[ 10The matter would have to be remanded to the RO (if not already remanded by the Board) for an initial decision on the claim. See Godfrey v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 398, 408 (1995) (holding “that the Board did not err in referring the matter to the RO because the Board did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the veteran’s claim of entitlement to benefits under section 1110 . . . and lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of that claim”).]10 See Norris, 12 Vet.App. at 422 (noting the pendency of an unadjudicated TDIU claim before the RO because the RO failed to adjudicate a claim for TDIU as part of an informal claim for an increased rating); see also Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1385 (remanding the matter of eligibility for TDIU after determining that a TDIU claim was reasonably raised by the veteran’s submissions).
Thomas E. Sullivan, all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief for the appellee.
Before KASOLD, MOORMAN, and SCHOELEN, Judges.
SCHOELEN, Judge, filed the opinion of the Court. KASOLD, Judge, and MOORMAN, Judge, filed concurring opinions.
counsel, appeals a September 5, 2003, Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) decision denying his requests for revision of August 1944 and May 1946 VA regional office (RO) decisions on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE). Record (R.) at 1-18. This appeal is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 7252(a) and 7266. For the following reasons, we will vacate the Board’s determination that there was no CUE in the August 1944 RO decision and remand that matter, and we will affirm the Board’s determination that there was no CUE in the May 1946 RO decision.
September 1935 and from September 1942 to July 1944. R. at 220, 261. Service medical records indicate treatment for various conditions. For example, he was seen by a doctor in July 1943 for weakness and fainting attacks and was diagnosed with carotid sinus syndrome.[ 1Carotid sinus syndrome is a “stimulation of a hyperactive carotid sinus, causing a marked fall in blood pressure due to vasodilation, cardiac slowing, or both.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1749 (27th ed. 2000) [( hereinafter Stedman’s]) 1 7 4 9 . The carotid sinus is located at the level of the C4 vertebra in the neck. See id. at 137 .]1 R. at 57-59. Additional service medical records indicate a diagnosis of sinusitis and carotid sinus syndrome. R. at 122. In January 1944, after spending five weeks in rehabilitation for his symptoms, Mr. Richardson was diagnosed with mild neurocirculatory asthenia.[ 2 Neurocirculatory asthenia is “a type of anxiety neurosis formerly encountered often among military personnel during times of war, in which cardiorespiratory symptoms, such as palpitation, rapid pulse, and precordial pain, were prominent.” Stedman’s 158.]2 R. at 96.
l]oss of consciousness and postural tone caused by diminished cerebral blood flow.” Stedman’s 1745.]6 following pressure on the right side, and a history of dizziness and fainting.” R. at 186.
affected until he is unable to concentrate for any period of time.
suffered from an inability to concentrate, dizziness, chills, and fever.
and increased his disability rating for carotid sinus syndrome to 50%. R.
at 254. His rating for migraine was reduced to 0%. Id.
made to his 0% rating for migraine. Id.
jurisdiction to consider CUE issues and remanded the matter to the RO.
found no CUE in the August 1944 and May 1946 RO decisions. R. at 1-18.
to the RO and it is not presently before the Court. Id.
the outcome” of the prior decision. Id. at 313-14, 320; see Bustos v.
supported by an adequate “statement of reasons or bases.” 38 U.S.C.
7261(a)(3)(A), 7104(d)(1); see Eddy v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 52, 57 (1996).
reasonably raised a claim for psychoneurosis in 1944. R. at 11.
The Board stated that the requirement under the holding of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in Roberson v.
by a contention that the disability causes unemployability. R. at 10.
1384; see R. at 10.
by the evidence, applying all relevant laws and regulations.'” Beverly v.
Szemraj, 357 F.3d at 1373)).
in Roberson, which has since been further explained in Szemraj and Moody.
Roberson before denying his request for revision on the basis of CUE. Id.
the Board’s factfinding. Id. at 13.
RO decision, there can be no CUE).
May and Norris, both supra.
disorder that, if recognized, would support an earlier effective date.
jurisdiction to make that determination.
and Cook v. Principi, 353 F.3d 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
factual determinations. First, VA must apply the holding in Roberson and give a full and sympathetic reading to the pro se claimant’s prior submissions to determine whether such a claim was reasonably raised. If it is determined that a claim was reasonably raised, VA must then determine whether such a claim is pending or whether it was adjudicated as part of a final decision.[ 8A claim that has not been finally adjudicated is necessarily pending. See 38 C.F.R. 3.160(c) (2005) (defining “pending claim” as a claim “which has not been finally adjudicated”).]8 If such a reasonably raised claim remains pending, then there is no decision on that claim to revise on the basis of CUE; however, the claim must be adjudicated. See Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1384-85 (determining that the appellant’s earlier submissions raised a TDIU claim as a matter of law and remanding the matter for a determination of entitlement to TDIU). If VA determines that the claim was adjudicated, then the claimant may collaterally attack the resulting decision on the basis of CUE.
claim was ever adjudicated. See Moody, 360 F.3d at 1310.
In this case, although the Board determined that there “is no pending claim for service connection for psychoneurosis” based on Mr. Richardson’s statement in his 1944 application in conjunction with the ” May 1944 hospital summary that diagnosed simple adult maladjustment,” the Board reached this conclusion without first applying Roberson and giving a ” full and sympathetic reading” to Mr. Richardson’s 1944 submissions. R. at 10-11; see Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1384 (quoting Hodge, 155 F.3d at 1362).
factual findings. See 38 U.S.C. 7104(a); Gutierrez v. Principi, 19 Vet.
Board has failed to apply law correctly).
remains pending and must be referred to the RO for a determination of Mr.
raised by the veteran’s submissions).
1945 Schedule for Rating Disabilities, 1).
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” standard.
to adjust Mr. Richardson’s rating in 1946 is reviewed de novo.
The Board found that the RO had the authority to modify Mr.
the better or worse may not be accurately appreciated or described.
. 4.13 (2005) (codified version of Paragraph 13).
for a finding of CUE in a Board decision). Even assuming that Mr.
disability ratings, based on Paragraphs 1 and 13, is correct.
. 7104(a) by failing to consider all applicable provisions of law.
argues are “‘potentially applicable'” provisions of law. Appellant’s Br.
separately as are all other disabling conditions, if any.”). Mr.
Fanning were not laws extant at the time of the May 1946 decision.
CUE. See Damrel, 6 Vet.App. at 245-46; Russell, 3 Vet.App. at 313-14.
the time. R. at 254; see R. at 252.
record in May 1946, and do not establish CUE in the May 1946 RO decision.
corrects” an earlier error is not CUE); cf. 38 C.F.R. 20.1403(d)(1).
KASOLD, Judge, concurring: I concur in the Court’s holding that Mr.
majority’s discussion as to how the Board or RO should proceed on remand.
I believe a finding on remand that the 1944 RO failed to construe Mr.
with the manifestly changed outcome being the processing of the claim.
instead properly corrected through a CUE motion[.]”); see also Bingham v.
Vet.App. 407, 409 (2004) (noting that Federal Circuit in Norton v.
and noting Mr. Nelson had not argued CUE).
decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 7104(e)); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App.
information or material critical to the appellate process”); Woznick v.
issue an SOC as to the appellant’s claim).
or hospitalization reports. See 38 C.F.R. 3.157(b)(1) (2005); Norris v.
been processed because the pleadings were not sympathetically read).
specific claim being filed by claimant. See Allin v. Brown, 10 Vet.App.
corresponds to date of hospital report); Servello v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App.
identify the report as a claim or to identify the benefits sought).
In the instant case, the RO rendered a decision with regard to Mr.
through a CUE motion[.]” Andrews, supra.
state of the law following Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir.
in which to raise the issue of an unadjudicated pending claim.
possibility that a claim for TDIU was still pending and unadjudicated.
. Id. at 1279-80; see Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
is key to this conclusion.
decision as to a claim before a revision based on CUE will lie. See May v.
the initial RO decision on the appellant’s claim for service connection.
supra, because, in my view, it perceived no conflict with Norris, supra.
The Federal Circuit further reinforced this conclusion in Bingham v.
but instead ‘is properly challenged through a CUE motion.'” Id.
or Board that expressly adjudicates only one of the claimed disabilities.

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