Source: https://www.thesessionslawfirm.com/dui-drugs-lawyer
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:37:02+00:00

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Georgia DUI less safe charges are one of the most confusing charges to defendants and, unfortunately, many lawyers. The confusion surrounding Georgia DUI less safe charges arises primarily from the belief that in a DUI case there must be a chemical of blood, breath, or urine to establish that the suspect is under the influence alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs.
To sustain a conviction of DUI-less safe, it is not sufficient to show merely that Head was driving after having ingested, at some point in time, alprazolam and cocaine. Rather, the state must prove that Head “was a less safe driver as a result of being under the influence of [these drugs].” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Ricks v. State, 255 Ga.App. 188, 190, 564 S.E.2d 793 (2002). See also State v. Ellison, 271 Ga.App. 898, 902(3)(b), 611 S.E.2d 129 (2005) (“Mere presence of [drugs] is not the issue…. [T]he [s]tate must prove that the defendant had impaired driving ability as a result of [the drugs].”) (Punctuation and footnote omitted); Bowen v. State, 235 Ga.App. 900, 901–902, 510 S.E.2d 873 (1999). Cf. State v. Rish, 295 Ga.App. 815, 816, 673 S.E.2d 259 (2009) ( “If the evidence shows only that a driver is intoxicated and does not show that his consumption of alcohol [or drugs] has impaired his ability to drive, there is no probable cause to arrest for DUI-less safe.”).
Georgia DUI less safe charges are among the difficult concepts for defendants to grasp. If you have questions regarding your Georgia DUI case, please contact our office.
Many lawyers handling DUI drugs cases really don't have experience with the evidence that must be prepared to challenge in these cases. Many aspects of the DUI drugs case, particularly the quasi-“scientific” field sobriety tests, are different than the field sobriety tests you may see in an alcohol-related DUI case.
There is no per se blood or urine test limit for a DUI based upon prescribed medications or marijuana. Many prosecutors and state toxicologists will attempt to argue that the suggested therapeutic ranges create per se DUI limit for prescription drugs. Anticipate this argument and testimony at trial.
There is no validation study for the use of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test in DUI drugs cases. There is no case in Georgia approving of the use of HGN evidence under the Harper standard in Georgia.
A Harper challenge should made as to the admissibility of lack of convergence, romberg, and pupil size evidence in DUI drugs cases.
DUI drugs cases are generally much more defensible (winnable) than DUI alcohol cases. There are numerous reasons why that is the truth, but it is just important that you recognize that there are some very good reasons to challenge these cases. In this post, I am going to discuss some of the reasons why I really like defending these cases.
There are commonly mistakes in the charging instruments in DUI drugs cases. In Georgia, there are distinct differences in the DUI drugs less safe statute and the DUI drugs per se statute. Look for the inclusion of “metabolites and derivatives” in a DUI less charge. This presents a great basis for a demurrer to the language of the accusation/indictment.
It is not uncommon for people to be charged with driving under the influence of prescription drugs in Georgia. DUI charges based upon the alleged consumption of prescription drugs have been steadily increasing. However, there remains a great deal of confusion about how blood test results should be interpreted. Most criminal defense attorneys have no idea how to decipher blood test results showing the presence of prescribed medications. This post is intended to provide you with some guidance in using the Winek Chart for determining therapeutic drug levels in DUI drugs cases. The Georgia Bureau of Investigations Division of Forensic Sciences reports drug levels in mg/L (milligrams per liter), but Winek's chart is reported in micrograms per milliliter. You do not need to know much about the measurements, but you do need to know that there is a difference in the unit of measurement. Do not be caught off guard with this difference.
HOW DO YOU CONVERT MILLIGRAMS PER LITER TO MICROGRAMS PER MILLILITER, SO THAT WE CAN DETERMINE WHETHER A CLIENT'S BLOOD LEVELS ARE WITHIN THERAPEUTIC RANGES?
1. First, obtain your client's blood test levels from the GBI.
2. Review Winek's chart to determine the applicable therapeutic/”normal” blood levels for your client.
How do you fight a DUI drugs case in Georgia?
Below are two examples of motions to exclude DRE evaluations that I typically file in Georgia DUI drugs cases. The first example is much more extensive than the second. Below the second motion is a link to a Maryland order excluding DRE evaluation under the Daubert standard. Remember that in Georgia, our Harper standard should be greater than the Daubert/Frye standard our courts apply in civil cases.
The subject is instructed that when told to begin, the subject should tilt their head back slightly and close their eyes.
With their head titled back and eyes closed, the subject is instructed to estimate the passage of 30 seconds.
The subject is instructed to bring their head forward, open their eyes, and say “Stop” when they believe that 30 seconds has elapsed.
When the subject opens their eyes, ask them how much time they thought elapsed.
The determination of whether a scientific principle or technique is admissible in criminal case in Georgia is governed by the rule stated in Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525-26, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982). The Harper rule requires that the Court in a criminal case determine “whether a given scientific principle or technique is a phenomenon that may be verified with such certainty that it is competent evidence in a court of law….” Id. at 525. Otherwise stated, the Court must determine whether the scientific principle or technique “has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty” or “‘rests upon the laws of nature.'” Id. (citations omitted). “[E]vidence based on a scientific principle or technique is admissible only if the science underlying the evidence is a phenomenon that may be verified with such certainty that it is competent evidence in a court of law.” Parker v. State, 307 Ga.App. 61, 704 S.E.2d 438 (2010).
The trial court may make this determination from evidence presented to it at trial by the parties; in this regard expert testimony may be of value. Or the trial court may base its determination on exhibits, treatises or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions. The significant point is that the trial court makes this determination based on the evidence available to him rather than by simply calculating the consensus in the scientific community. Once a procedure has been recognized in a substantial number of courts, a trial judge may judicially notice, without receiving evidence, that the procedure has been established with verifiable certainty, or that it rests upon the laws of nature.
Id. at 525-26. “[O]nce a procedure has been utilized for a significant period of time, and expert testimony has been received thereon in case after case, the trial court does not have to keep reinventing the wheel; a once novel technology can and does become commonplace.” Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 34, 476 S.E.2d 803, 807 (1996).
Certain evaluations commonly employed in DUI investigations, such as the “ABCs,” the “Walk-and-Turn Test,” and the “One-Leg Stand Test,” have been recognized as “physical dexterity exercises that common sense, common experience, and the ‘laws of natures” share are performed less well after drinking alcohol.” Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 34, 476 S.E.2d 803, 807 (1996). Accordingly, “[t]he screening of these gross motor skills is hardly the type of ‘scientific principle or technique' to which Harper referred, and this Court will not hold these physical manifestations of impairment, which could be as obvious to the layperson as to the expert, to such a standard of admissibility.” Id.
Hawkins, 476 S.E.2d at 807-808.
When a given type of scientific evidence or technique has been recognized as meeting the Harper foundation, the scope of the opinions which may be rendered based upon the scientific evidence or technique must still be scrutinized to determine compliance with Harper. Hawkinsauthorized use of the HGN test as a basis for an opinion regarding “impairment” by alcohol. However, Hawkins does not authorize use of the HGN test as a basis for an opinion as to a specific numerical blood-alcohol concentration. Bravo v. State, 304 Ga. App. 243, 696 S.E.2d 79 (2010)(expert testimony regarding use of the HGN to determine a specific blood-alcohol concentration was insufficient to meet the Harper standard for admissibility).
There is no authority for judicial notice that the “Romberg Test” satisfies the Harperstandard. No Georgia court has addressed whether the “Modified Romberg Balance Test” has satisfied the Harper standard of reaching a scientific stage of verifiable certainty. There are Georgia cases in which a “Romberg test” was admitted as evidence and considered by trial courts, but there is no case in which an objection to the admissibility of “Romberg” evidence was preserved for consideration on appeal. The Romberg test is not which has repeatedly presented to the Court of this state and supported by expert testimony accepted.
Respectfully Submitted, this ___ day of ____________, ———-.
On _________________, ——– of the —————- requested that the Defendant perform a field sobriety test. The test is referred to as the “Romberg” evaluation. Trooper —- stated that he observed that the Defendant improperly estimated 23 seconds to be 30 seconds, and the Defendant allegedly exhibited eyelid tremors, body tremors, reddening of the conjuctiva, and raised tastebuds.
The Defendant challenges the admissibility of the “Romberg” evaluation, eyelid tremors, body tremors, reddening of the conjuctiva, and raised tastebuds as being indicative of the Defendant driving under the influence of drugs to the extent that he was a less safe driver. These evaluations and observations constitute scientific evidence and as such should not be received into evidence without the proper foundation. See Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519 (1982).
Scientific evidence is evidence based upon principals of science and “shrouded in the mystery of professional skill or knowledge.” See, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Saul, 189 Ga. 1, 9 (1939). Such evidence is “beyond the ken of the average [person].” See, Williams v. State, 254 Ga. 508, 510 (1985). The evaluations and observations described above constitute scientific evidence. The average person would not understand that alleged problems estimating the passage of time, eyelid tremors, body tremors, reddening of the conjuctiva, and raised tastebuds or other such alleged symptoms would be indicative of someone under the influence of drugs. These are not commonsense evaluations and observations.
—————'s alleged evaluations and observations are similar to the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test that police officers often administer in DUI cases. “The HGN is a test manifesting in an involuntary rapid and then slow jerk of the eye.” Manley v. State, 206 Ga. App. 281 (1992). That evaluation is a “scientific procedure.” State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga. App. 316, 319 (1996). On the other hand, field sobriety evaluations that “demonstrate a suspect's dexterity and ability to follow directions do not constitute scientific evidence.” Id. at 318. For evaluations such as the One Leg Stand test, which was not used in Defendant's case, an average person can have an understanding that such evaluations would generally be performed less skillfully by a person who was under the influence of an intoxicant. This, however, is not the true for evaluations and observations such as HGN, the Rhomberg Evaluation, tremors, and eye symptoms about which the officer reported in Defendant's case. There is not a commonsense conclusion accessible to the average person that these observations are indicative of someone who is under the influence of an intoxicant. These are not “behavioral observations.” Rather, the evaluations and observations in question are medical observations that require knowledge of the health sciences, medicine, or perhaps toxicology to fully comprehend. See Id. at 319. It is simply not commonsense that a person who is under the influence of an intoxicant, be it marijuana or anything else, would have trouble estimating the passage of thirty seconds, would have tremors, raised taste buds, or other eye symptoms.
Because the evaluation and observations constitute scientific evidence, the State must establish the foundation required by Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519 (1982), before the Court can admit the evidence. Harper requires that the court make the determination that the evidence “has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty… [and that the] procedure rests upon the laws of nature.” Id. at 525. The court makes such a determination from “the evidence available to [it];” this may include expert testimony, exhibits, treatises, or the rationale of cases from other jurisdictions. Id. at 25-26. Once the evidence is “recognized in a substantial number of courts” the court may take judicial notice that the scientific evidence has reached a stage of verifiable certainty, the way that a court may admit the results of the HGN evaluation. See Harper, 249 Ga. at 525.
The Appellate Courts of this State have not considered the evaluation and observations at-issue in this case in the way that the courts have considered the HGN evaluation. Unless the State establishes the foundation required by Harper, the evaluations, the observations, and any conclusions drawn from them should not be admitted against the defendant.
Defendant instead contests the science and the validity of using these evaluations and observations to form the basis of an opinion that the Defendant was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of his arrest. Because the officer's investigative technique constituted the gathering of scientific evidence that has not been recognized by a substantial number of courts and has not been utilized for a significant period of time with expert testimony being offered in case after case, the trial court is not authorized to admit the evidence without the proper foundation. See, Izer v. State, 236 Ga. App. 282 (1999).
The Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an order that the “Romberg” evaluation, eyelid tremors, body tremors, reddening of the conjuctiva, and raised tastebuds, in the context of being indicia of a person who is under the influence of drugs to the extent that the person is less safe to drive, are scientific evidence. As such, the Court should require the State to meet the foundation required under Harper before the Court can receive the evidence in question.
Head v. State, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2010 WL 963658, A09A2039 (Ga. App. March 18, 2010).
After a stipulated bench trial based upon the transcript of a hearing held upon his demurrer, Head was convicted of DUI of any drug to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(2) and driving with a controlled substance in his blood, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6). His DUI drugs per se conviction merged into his DUI-less safe conviction. In his appeal, Head contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI-less safe conviction, and that OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6) violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals reversed his DUI less safe conviction finding that the evidence was insufficient to support this conviction. However, the Court rejected Head's constitutional challenge to OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6). Because Head's OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6) conviction was merged into his DUI-less safe conviction for sentencing purposes, the case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing so that Head on the DUI drug per se charge.
Head's vehicle collided with the side of a charter bus as the bus attempted to make a left hand turn across Head's lane of traffic. The bus driver was issued a traffic citation in connection with this accident and the officer working the accident found the bus driver to be “at fault.” The investigating officer, however, smelled an odor of alcohol on Head as Head was being treated by EMS personnel. The officer noted that Head had a clear line of sight and what appeared to be time to avoid the accident, yet he saw no evidence that Head attempted to stop prior to the collision and had made only a last moment attempt to swerve. The officer also learned that Head had been at a social function immediately prior to the accident.
Based upon this information, the officer believed Head to be intoxicated, and he read Head his implied consent rights and obtained Head's consent to submit to a state administered blood test. Head admitted at that time that he had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. The officer thus issued Head a citation for driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe, pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1).
The resulting lab report was negative for alcohol, but indicated the presence of alprazolam and benzoylecogonine, a cocaine metabolite. Consequently, Head was accused of DUI-less safe, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(2), and driving with any amount, including the metabolites and derivatives, of a controlled substance present in his blood, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6).
Head's DUI less safe conviction was reversed based on insufficiency of the evidence. The evidence showed that Head had ingested alprazolam and cocaine. The Court of Appeals stated once again that merely showing ingestion of drugs in insufficient to sustain a DUI less safeconviction, and the state must prove that Head “was a less safe driver as a result of being under the influence of [these drugs].” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Ricks v. State, 255 Ga.App. 188, 190 (564 S.E.2d 793) (2002). See also State v. Ellison, 271 Ga.App. 898, 902(3)(b), 611 S.E.2d 129 (2005); Bowen v. State, 235 Ga.App. 900, 901-902 (510 S.E.2d 873) (1999).
The state presented evidence that Head had alprazolam and a cocaine metabolite in his blood, and further presented the officer's opinion testimony that Head should have been able to avoid the collision, although the bus driver-not Head-was cited with the traffic infraction. No evidence was submitted to the trial court which explained the significance of the alprazolam and cocaine metabolite present in Head's blood, i.e., whether the quantity of the drugs was considered sizeable; whether the quantities indicated recent or merely past usage of the drugs; or what effect the level of drugs found in Head's blood would have on the average person, specifically whether those drugs would cause any physical and/or mental impairment. Significantly, Head elicited expert testimony that the presence of benzoylecgonine in one's blood “is not indicative of any impairment because it is the after-effect” of cocaine. There was evidence presented that cocaine metabolites can be detected in a urine sample for up to 48 hours after the ingestion of cocaine.
It follows that, since the record is completely devoid of any evidence tending to show that Head was a less safe driver as a result of being under the influence of alprozalam and cocaine, we must reverse his conviction on this count. See generally Ricks, 255 Ga.App. at 190; Bowen, 235 Ga.App. at 901-902; Webb v. State, 223 Ga.App. 9, 10-11 (476 S.E.2d 781) (1996). Compare Morris v. State,210 Ga.App. 617, 618(1) (436 S.E.2d 785) (1993). Cf. Camarata v. State, 188 Ga.App. 41, 43(2) (371 S.E.2d 885) (1988).
With regard to his conviction for violating of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6), Head argued that the trial court erred in denying his demurrer raising a constitution challenged to OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6). Head argued that O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(6) violates the equal protection provision in that it arbitrarily distinguishes between those who are legally entitled to use cocaine and those who are not. See, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(b). Head presented evidence that eye drops containing cocaine hydrochloride, a solution form of cocaine otherwise used illicitly, may lawfully be used by opthamologists conducting certain types of surgical and diagnostic procedures. In finding that the O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(6) did not violation the equal protection clause the Court of Appeals relied on Keenum v. State, 248 Ga.App. 474, 475(2) (546 S.E.2d 288) (2001).
Before you entrust your future to a lawyer, make sure that your lawyer is experienced in defending Georgia DUI less safe drugs cases.

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