Source: http://webjcli.org/article/view/610/791
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:33:00+00:00

Document:
Under the SSM, the ECB is vested with a number of important supervisory tasks in the banking sector of the Eurozone. Here it directly supervises the largest (most significant) banking groups which currently amount to 118.  The about 3,000 remaining banks are supervised by the national authorities, with the ECB keeping the oversight.  The licensing (grant/withdrawal) and the change of ownership is decided upon by the ECB with regard to all Eurozone banks, however.  But also here the ECB avails itself of the support of national supervisors.
The potential of a strong cooperation between EU bodies and national authorities has long been tried out in the field of competition law.  Also in other fields of EU administrative law and policy (such as environment and energy) it has become more and more intense,  and has gone hand in hand with a further agencification of the EU. Within the SSM, many supervisory tasks are regularly performed by the national supervisors, but may be assumed by the ECB. Additionally, the ECB may issue regulations, guidelines, general or individual instructions to the national supervisors as regards the exercise of their supervisory responsibilities. These manifold possibilities of an EU actor to influence the action of national administrations are unprecedented in the history of EU-MS cooperation.
Under the SSM, the Supervisory Board provides draft decisions which are then presented to the ECB’s main decision-making organ, the Governing Council. The draft is adopted already where the Governing Council does not object. This procedure resembles the reverse majority voting (RMV) in the Council known, inter alia, from the ‘Six-Pack,’ and strongly relativises the Governing Council’s decision-making role in the ECB as laid down in primary law. In exchange, it manifests the strong de facto power, even the decisional superiority of the Board.
In the following, these three legal aspects regarding the functioning and the limits of the SSM – cooperation, delegation, and RMV in the Governing Council – shall be addressed. An exhaustive account of the functioning and the limits of the SSM is not intended with this paper.
In conclusion, we can say that the co-existence of the ECB and other EU bodies competent in the field of banking supervision, such as the EBA, caters for a high level of horizontal cooperation. Intra-SSM cooperation between the ECB and the national authorities – that is to say vertical cooperation – in both its intensity and its complexity exemplifies well how far the European Verwaltungsverbund has developed in certain policy fields. This cooperation between the main EU actor in charge, the ECB, and the competent national authorities allows for different degrees of involvement of the latter. This involvement is necessary, not least because the ECB as an institution prior to the establishment of the SSM has had no experience in the micro-prudential supervision of banks.  At the same time, the ECB under the SSM is, beyond doubt, designed to take the lead which in the law is expressed in a rather hierarchical relationship between the ECB and the national supervisors – a relationship which would, for lack of an according Treaty base, not be possible between eg a European agency and its national counterparts.
Having discussed the issue of cooperation, we shall now address constitutional limits to the delegation of powers to the ECB on the basis of Article 127 para 6 TFEU. The Meroni criteria  on delegation of powers, which in the past decades have gained momentum in particular in the agency debate,  are a first point of reference when it comes to defining more closely these constitutional limits. These criteria, in essence, prohibit a delegation of ‘discretionary power, implying a wide margin of discretion which may, according to the use which is made of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy.’  That Meroni constitutes a limit to delegations more generally – beyond the case at issue back then, a transferal of powers from the High Authority of the ECSC to private bodies that is – had soon become clear.  That it is applicable also to European agencies had, for a long time, been assumed, but was confirmed, implicitly, by the Court of Justice only in 2014 in the so-called ESMA case.  The question now is whether Meroni is relevant also in the given case, for the delegation of supervisory powers to the ECB that is.  From an organisational point of view, it is to be noted that it is the ECB which is vested with supervisory competences by the SSM-Regulation, not the Supervisory Board.  Hence it is an institution of the EU according to Article 13 para 1 TEU which is granted powers, and not a mere EU body or a non-EU body.  Even if the Governing Council delegated the competence to adopt certain (internal) decisions to the Supervisory Board – the legality of which needs to be assessed case by case  –, its decisions would be decisions of the ECB. An institution in principle and in accordance with the Treaties disposes of wide discretionary powers. It may therefore – again: in principle – also be vested with new powers entailing a wide discretion, which is why the part of the Meroni doctrine prohibiting the delegation of such powers ratione personae, as it were, does not apply here.
Another issue is the Union’s institutional balance which in the Meroni case was still referred to as the ‘balance of powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure of the Community.’  In its judgement the Court invoked this threshold, for the first time,  as an argument against the delegation of powers entailing a wide discretion.  This institutional balance may not only be distorted by an empowerment of newly established bodies by means of secondary law, but also by the empowerment of an institution. However, the fact that it is an institution of the EU (according to the Treaties disposing of wide discretionary powers) which is vested with new powers significantly reduces the risk of and therefore increases the threshold for a distortion of the institutional balance.  Nevertheless, it is possible for an act of secondary law transferring powers on an institution to distort the institutional balance – namely where it goes beyond the wide discretion provided in the Treaties for this institution or where the kind of powers at issue is reserved for another institution (eg the ECJ as highest authority in matters of EU law). Since the institutional balance was implied to the Treaty, any Treaty provision may shape this balance. The Court did not defend an ideal institutional balance, but the institutional balance laid down in primary law.  In our case it is the Treaty itself which provides for the possibility of a transferal of supervisory powers on the ECB.  The actual delegation of powers is subject to an act of secondary law – the SSM-Regulation –, but it is expressis verbis provided for in primary law, namely in Article 127 para 6 TFEU.  Therefore a conferral of powers to the ECB in accordance with Article 127 para 6 TFEU cannot distort the EU’s institutional balance.
In order to answer this question we shall now pay closer attention to the legal basis of the SSM-Regulation, Article 127 para 6 TFEU. It allows for the delegation of ‘specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.’  The reasons for this sketchy and ‘restrictive’  drafting lies in the fact that back in the early 90s, during the negotiations on what had become the Treaty of Maastricht, the MS were disagreeing on which role the ECB ought to play in the field of financial market supervision.  In particular Germany and Belgium – and, later, Austria – have favoured a distinction between financial market supervision and monetary policy aimed at price stability. Other MS, among others France and Italy, have traditionally entrusted their respective national central bank with both tasks  and would have been open to do so also in case of the (future) ECB. As a result of these opposing views, the MS postponed the decision whether or not the ECB should be entrusted with tasks of financial market supervision and delegated it to the Council.  Against the background of the dissent between the MS, it does not come as a surprise that the compromise eventually found, today’s Article 127 para 6 TFEU, was not drawn up in precise terms. It is in particular the term ‘specific’ which requires some consideration. The meaning of ‘specific’ in everyday language – which, in case of doubt, is the understanding to be applied to legal provisions  – is ‘not general’, ‘precise’, ‘single/selected.’  While the understanding as ‘precise’ – precise tasks – does not seem helpful here,  a translation as ‘single/selected’ – as opposed to ‘all tasks’ – suggests itself in the given context. This goes hand in hand with the first synonym of ‘specific’: It is not the general (supervisory) tasks which may be transferred, but single/selected tasks only. Where exactly to draw this line may be subject to different (reasonable) opinions. To argue that supervisory tasks are single/selected as long as at least one task is exercised by the national authorities, however, would disqualify itself as a merely quantitative approach. Taking, on the contrary, a qualitative stance, the following can be said: While the far-reaching powers of the ECB under the SSM cannot be listed here in full, mention should be made of its power to authorise all credit institutions in the participating MS, and to withdraw authorisations respectively, and of its power to assess the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in credit institutions.  With regard to the other supervisory tasks listed in Article 4 of the SSM-Regulation, in principle the ECB is in charge of the significant credit institutions, whereas the national supervisory authorities are in charge of all other credit institutions. The ‘significance’ of a credit institution  is determined in a complex calculation taking into account, in particular, its size, its importance for the economy of the EU or any participating MS and the significance of its cross-border activities.  The ECB has a comprehensive competence to give instructions to the national supervisory authorities, even where a task falls principally within the responsibility of the latter.  The tasks not mentioned in Article 4 of the SSM-Regulation, in particular the fight against money laundering, combatting terrorist financing and consumer protection, remain entirely with the national supervisory authorities – even where they respect significant credit institutions.  Whether or not these powers to directly supervise credit institutions and to monitor the national authorities’ supervision respectively – altogether certainly ‘big teeth’  – amount to only ‘specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions’ (emphases added) is contested. Some scholars argue that the amount of tasks/powers the ECB is vested with under the SSM – in addition to those macroprudential supervisory tasks it exercises within the ESRB  – goes beyond the limits set in Article 127 para 6 TFEU.  Authoritatively this may only be decided upon by the Court of Justice.
On the assumption that Article 127 para 6 TFEU is infringed, the question alluded to above arises: whether the institutional balance is tilted. In this context it is first to be noted that the ECB is empowered at the cost of the national authorities’ competences (not: of other institutions), hence an institutional imbalance may be caused only by the increase of the ECB’s competences (not: by the decrease of other institutions’ competences). The SSM does not question the broad institutional setting envisaged by primary law, that is to say: the various lead roles assigned to the institutions. In particular, the Commission is not skipped. The ECB is not empowered instead of the Commission. Rather it is, due to Article 127 para 6 TFEU, the only institution which may possibly be vested with the competences at issue.  Article 127 para 6 TFEU may be violated by the SSM, but the EU’s institutional balance remains intact.
The criticism uttered in these contexts in principle may be invoked also here.  Article 10 para 2 of the Statute of the ESCB/ECB lays down the voting procedure to be applied in the Governing Council. Its subpara 4 says: ‘Save as otherwise provided for in this Statute, the Governing Council shall act by a simple majority of the members having a voting right.’ The Statute does not provide otherwise for supervisory decisions – dating from October 2012, apart from a brief reference to Article 127 para 6 TFEU, it does not even mention the ECB’s supervisory powers.  Therefore it is clear that the decisions to be taken by the Governing Council under the SSM-Regulation require a simple majority according to the Statute, primary law that is.  Although the wording leaves open this question (argumentum ‘shall act’), it is reasonable to assume that this provision only refers to positive decisions, not to negative decisions (objections), the latter still being a rare exception in EU institutions’ decision-making. The deviation laid down in the SSM-Regulation, an act of secondary law, constitutes an infringement of the lex citata in the Statute. The explicit statement of the Statute also rules out a ‘tacit’ modification of its understanding, occurring as a result of the other examples of RMV in EU law, as such a reading clearly is contra legem. In this context, we may recall the fundamental finding of the Court: ‘[T]he rules regarding the manner in which the Community institutions arrive at their decisions are laid down in the Treaty and are not at the disposal … of the institutions.’  The Court’s case law on lessened requirements for the adoption of mere implementing acts of the EU’s executive cannot be invoked here  per analogiam . In this case a Council implementing act was at issue, and the Treaties have made explicit provision of implementing powers of the Council ever since the Single European Act.  What is more, in this case the delegation of implementing powers from the Council to the Council was at issue, not the vesting by the Council of the ECB with new EU powers (ie up to then powers of the national supervisors) was at issue. Article 10 para 2 of the Statute lays down a very detailed and complex voting system. It is clear that the Masters of the Treaties did not foresee this system to be amended by secondary law  and it is also not to be assumed that they forgot about the case of – then: future – supervisory decisions of the ECB when drafting the Statute. As a comment of principle, we may add that dropping a positive majority requirement in favour of a mere qualified minority requirement (that is: no objecting majority) by no means is a minor procedural adaptation, but constitutes a veritable paradigm shift.
The dominance of Meroni in the discussion about European agencies cannot be transferred to the case of banking supervision by the ECB.  As an institution of the EU it may, unlike European agencies, be vested with competences entailing a wide discretion, and hence the weights to be put on the ECB may be much heavier than in the case of agencies, without thereby tilting the institutional balance of the EU. The restrictive wording of Article 127 para 6 TFEU, however, does set limits to the empowerment of the ECB.
The RMV applied under the SSM is a clear breach of the Statute of the ESCB/ECB, primary law that is. That this breach may lead to efficiency gains cannot do away with its unlawfulness. Neither can the separation of monetary policy from banking supervision within the ECB, which is improved by this decision-making procedure, justify the deviation from the Statute. While this separation is a requirement imposed by primary law, there are other – and lawful – means to meet it.
 The European Banking Supervisory Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority.
 Reg 1092/2010 and Council Reg 1096/2010.
 cf Paul Weismann, ‘Banking crisis and banks in crisis: from state aid to bank resolution’ (2016) 37 European Competition Law Review 384, in particular 387.
 cf Dirk Schoenmaker and Nicolas Véron, ‘Introduction and executive summary’, in D. Schoenmaker and N. Véron (eds), European banking supervision: the first eighteen months (Bruegel Blueprint Series, 2016) 43.
 Art 2 para 2 lit f and Art 4 para 2 (i) of Reg 1093/2010 (hereinafter: ‘EBA-Reg’); cf Christos V. Gortsos, ‘The Role of the European Banking Authority (EBA) After the Establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)’, in M. Andenas and G. Deipenbrock (eds), Regulating and Supervising European Financial Markets. More Risks than Achievements (Springer, 2016) 286 f.
 Art 7 of Reg 1024/2013 (hereinafter: ‘SSM-Reg’). This Regulation was unanimously adopted by all MS, as required by Art 127 para 6 TFEU (in combination with Art 139 para 2 TFEU e contrario); cf Schoenmaker and Véron, n 4 above, 1.
 Art 44 para 1 and Art 45 para 1 subpara 3 of the EBA-Reg as amended by Reg 1022/2013.
 Art 26 para 1 of the SSM-Reg.
 These DGs are called Microprudential Supervision I-IV https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/organisation/whoiswho/organigram/html/index.en.html accessed 4 April 2018; for the allocation of tasks to these DGs see Schoenmaker and Véron, n 4 above, 10.
 For alternative governance concepts brought forward in the discussion cf Gianni Lo Schiavo, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism: Building the New Top-Down Cooperative Supervisory Governance in Europe’, in F. Fabbrini, E. Hirsch Ballin and H. Somsen (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015) 121.
 ECB, List of supervised entities (1 January 2018) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.list_of_supervised_entities_201802.en.pdf accessed 4 April 2018.
 For the euro area’s most heterogeneous banking system cf Schoenmaker and Véron, n 4 above, 11-21.
 Art 6 para 4 of the SSM-Reg.
 cf Madalina Busuioc and Martijn Groenleer, ‘The Theory and Practice of EU Agency Autonomy and Accountability: Early Day Expectations, Today’s Realities and Future Perspectives’, in M. Everson, C. Monda and E. Vos (eds), European Agencies in between Institutions and Member States (Wolters Kluwer, 2014) 179; Walter Frenz, ‘Verwaltungskooperation mit der Union im Lichte von Art. 197 AEUV und des Lissabon-Urteils’ (2010) 2 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 66 f; see also Council Regulation 1/2003, in particular its Arts 12-16 and 22.
 Cf Edoardo Chiti, 'An Important Part of the EU’s Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies' (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1395, 1431 and 1435.
 For the unclear legal foundations of EEC public administration in the Treaty of Rome cf Robert Schütze, ‘From Rome to Lisbon: “Executive Federalism” in the (New) European Union’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1385, 1393-1397.
 cf Léontin-Jean Constantinesco, Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Das institutionelle Recht (Nomos, 1977) 292-294 with numerous examples.
 cf Art 89 TEEC (Rome); cf also Heike Schweitzer and Kiran K. Patel, ‘EU Competition Law in Historical Context’, in K. Patel and H. Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 207; for the functioning of the network more recently cf Meike Eekhoff, Die Verbundaufsicht. Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Aufsichtsverfahren und -mechanismen außerhalb des Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens (Mohr Siebeck, 2006) 33-42.
 cf C-429/07 Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst v X BV, ECLI:EU:C:2009:359, paras 20 f.
 cf Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe and Alexander H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2011) 262 f.
 Ellen Vos, ‘European Agencies and the Composite EU Executive’, in M. Everson, C. Monda and E. Vos (eds), European Agencies in between Institutions and Member States (Wolters Kluwer, 2014) 33.
 cf Thomas Groß, ‘Die Kooperation zwischen europäischen Agenturen und nationalen Behörden’ (2005) 1 Europarecht 54, 58 ff.
 cf Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2012) 166 f; Herwig C.H. Hofmann, ‘Composite decision making procedures in EU administrative law’, in H. Hofmann and A. Türk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law. Towards an Integrated Administration (Edward Elgar, 2009) 143-146 with further references and 166; Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, ‘Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network Approach’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 542, 543. For the more specific term ‘network agency’ cf Andreas Orator, ‘Die unionale “Netzwerkagentur” als Paradefall europäischer Verwaltungskooperation’, in K. Gotthard et al (eds), Kooperation und Koordination als Rechtsentwicklungstrends (Jan Sramek Verlag, 2014) 128-132, with further references.
 Art 2 of Reg 1093-1095/2010; critical as regards the cooperation between national and EU bodies within the ESFS: Mona P. Ladler, ‘Das Netzwerk der europäischen Finanzaufsicht: Alte Probleme im neuen Kleide?’, in K. Gotthard et al (eds), Kooperation und Koordination als Rechtsentwicklungstrends (Jan Sramek Verlag, 2014) 120.
 Art 3 of the SSM-Reg; cf also ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2016 (March 2017), in particular 42-46.
 Art 2 para 4 of the ESA-Reg.
 Art 3-5 of ECB Reg 468/2014 (SSM Framework Reg). For the cooperation of national competent authorities with regard to the supervision of a less significant credit institution see Art 7 leg cit. Cf also the Colleges of Supervisors established in accordance with Dir 2013/36/EU, in which the ECB may participate, as well; cf ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2016 (March 2017), in particular 52, 59, 76.
 ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2015 (March 2016) 30.
 cf Schoenmaker and Véron, n 4 above, 10; for the much better functioning of these supervisory teams as compared to their predecessors cf ibid 22 f; cf also https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/approach/jst/html/index.en.html accessed 4 April 2018.
 Art 20 f of ECB Reg 468/2014 (SSM Framework Reg). Pointing at the ‘joint generation and exchange of information’ as the ‘backbone of cooperation within integrated administration’: Hofmann, n 23 above, 137.
 cf Dieter H. Scheuing, ‘Europarechtliche Impulse für innovative Ansätze im deutschen Verwaltungsrecht’, in W. Hoffmann-Riem and E. Schmidt-Aßmann (eds), Innovation und Flexibilität des Verwaltungshandelns (Nomos, 1994) 332 f with examples.
 For this widely-used and related terms see Wolfgang Weiß, Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund. Grundfragen, Kennzeichen, Herausforderungen (Duncker & Humblot, 2010) 17-19; cf also, for example, Wolfgang Kahl, ‘Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund: Strukturen – Typen – Phänomene’ (2011) 3 Der Staat 353, 354-357 and 360; Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Einleitung: Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund und die Rolle des Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts’, in E. Schmidt-Aßmann and B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund (Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 1.
 cf, each with further references, Constantinesco, n 17 above, 299; Scheuing, n 31 above, 334-336; Eekhoff, n 18 above, 130-139; Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold, ‘Gemeinsame Europäische Verwaltung: die Strukturfonds der EG’, in E. Schmidt-Aßmann and B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund. Formen und Verfahren der Verwaltungszusammenarbeit in der EU (Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 46.
 cf eg Kahl, n 32 above, 366.
 cf, for example, the following contributions to E. Schmidt-Aßmann and B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund. Formen und Verfahren der Verwaltungszusammenarbeit in der EU (Mohr Siebeck, 2005): Julia Sommer, ‘Informationskooperation am Beispiel des europäischen Umweltrechts,’ Daniel Riedel, ‘Die Europäische Agentur für Flugsicherheit im System der Gemeinschaftsagenturen’; see also Martin Pawlik, Das REACH-System und die Meroni-Doktrin. Ein imperfekter Quantensprung im Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund (Nomos, 2013) 29 f.
 Deirdre Curtin and Renaud Dehousse, ‘European Union agencies: tipping the balance?’ in M. Busuioc, M. Groenleer and J. Trondal, The agency phenomenon in the European Union. Emergence, institutionalisation and everday decision-making (Manchester University Press, 2012) 195.
 cf Andreas Orator, ‘Die unionsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Eingriffsbefugnissen der ESMA im Bereich von Leerverkäufen’ (2013) 22 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 851, 855 with references to the relevant case law of the Court.
 In light of the exceptional crisis situation required for this power to take effect (Art 18 para 2 of the ESA-Regulations), it will, if at all, most probably be applied very rarely.
 Cf Niamh Moloney, ‘European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1609, 1665; critical with a view to the institutional balance: Benedikt Wolfers and Thomas Voland, ‘Level the Playing Field: The New Supervision of Credit Institutions by the European Central Bank’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1463, 1493.
 For the instructions given by the ECB to national central banks within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) cf Eekhoff, n 18 above, 136-138; with regard to the ESCB as a role model for EU network organisations cf Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European integration. The ambiguities and pitfalls of integration by stealth (Oxford University Press, 2005) 100 f.
 Art 6 para 6 of the SSM-Reg; cf also Eilís Ferran and Valia S.G. Babis, ‘The European Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 255, 260 f.
 Art 6 para 5 lit b of the SSM-Reg; cf also Dan Awrey, ‘Law, Financial Instability, and the Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation’, in A. Anand (ed), Systemic Risk, Institutional Design, and the Regulation of Financial Markets (Oxford University Press, 2016) 83.
 Art 9 para 1 subpara 3 of the SSM-Reg; Art 22 of ECB Reg 468/2014 (SSM Framework Reg).
 For the means of legal protection available in ‘composite decision making procedures’ (Hofmann) under the SSM cf Jörn A. Kämmerer, ‘Rechtsschutz in der Bankenunion (SSM, SRM)’ (2016) 1 Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht 1; Laura Wissink, Ton Duijkersloot and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Shifts in Competences between Member States and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and their Consequences for Judicial Protection’ (2014) 10 Utrecht Law Review 92.
 Cf Speech by Ignazio Angeloni at the XXXI. Convegno ‘Adolfo Beria di Argentine’ (22 September 2017) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2017/html/ssm.sp170922_1.en.html accessed 4 April 2018.
 Cf Jens Dammann, ‘The Banking Union: Flawed by Design’ (2014) 45 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1057, 1089 f; Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The single supervisory mechanism or “SSM”, part one of the Banking Union’ (2014) 255 National Bank of Belgium Working Paper Research 1, 41; cf also Jakub Gren, ‘The Politics of Delegation in European Banking Union: Building the ECB supervisory oversight capacity’ (2017) 13 Journal of Contemporary European Research 1109, applying the principal-agent model to the SSM.
 Pointing at the differences between the SSM and the traditional Verwaltungsverbund: Kämmerer, n 45 above, 2 with further references.
 Art 76 para 3 of ECB Reg 468/2014 (SSM Framework Reg).
 For the procedure in more detail see Art 73-79 of ECB Reg 468/2014 (SSM Framework Reg).
 For the (possible) coordination with the national resolution authority see Art 80 para 2 of ECB Reg 468/2014 (SSM Framework Reg).
 While having to consider the reasons contained in the proposal, the ECB shall not follow it where EU law does not provide for a withdrawal. For the procedure in more detail see Art 80-84 of ECB Reg 468/2014 (SSM Framework Reg). For the special case that the withdrawal of the authorisation would prejudice the resolution procedure see Art 14 para 6 of the SSM-Reg; see also Art 84 of ECB Reg 468/2014 (SSM Framework Reg).
 ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2015 (March 2016) 42; see also Annual Report on supervisory activities 2016 (March 2017) 29.
 Cf also Ferran and Babis, n 42 above, 264 f.
 The criteria laid down in the cases 9, 10/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority, ECLI:EU:C:1958:7; recently reconsidered comprehensively in case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.
 See, as one of many examples and with further references, Merijn Chamon, EU Agencies. Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration (Oxford University Press, 2016) 175 ff.
 Cases 9, 10/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority, ECLI:EU:C:1958:7, 152. There are numerous contributions on the Meroni criteria and their respective meaning; cf eg Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’ (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 273; for a monographic approximation cf Pawlik, n 35 above, in particular 127 ff; for the delegation of discretionary powers to EU bodies heed the more recent case law, such as case C-98/09 P Ralf Schräder v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), ECLI:EU:C:2010:196, para 77, or case C-287/13 P Bilbaína de Alquitranes, SA and Others v European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), ECLI:EU:C:2014:599, para 19.
 See, with regard to the Commission’s more general approach towards delegation which had, for a long time, been rather reluctant, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘Die Errichtung des Europäischen Fonds für währungspolitische Zusammenarbeit’ (1973) 8 Europarecht 193, 198; Stefan Griller and Andreas Orator, ‘Everything under control? The “way forward” for European agencies in the footsteps of the Meroni doctrine’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 3, 17 f.
 cf case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, in particular para 53; for the development of the doctrine since the late 50s cf Griller and Orator, n 58 above, 15-25. Pointing at the arguments against the applicability of Meroni in the agency-context: Pawlik, n 35 above, 158-160; arguing against an ‘exaggeration’ of the implications of the Meroni doctrine: Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit, ‘The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform’ (2004) 1 Jean Monnet Working Paper 14 f http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/04/040101.pdf accessed 4 April 2018; Madalina Busuioc, ‘Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 599, 601: doubting the compliance with Meroni (even) of earlier agencies such as the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market or the European Medicines Agency.
 Pointing at the similarities between the ‘supervisory department within the ECB’ and European agencies, and hence doubtful as regards the non-applicability of Meroni: Wolfers and Voland, n 40 above, 1491 f.
 cf Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The European Banking Union, a first analysis’ (2012) Financial Law Institute Working Paper Series 9.
 This makes it clear that also the Romano case (98/80 Giuseppe Romano and Institut National d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité , ECLI:EU:C:1981:104) does not apply here, which, besides – at least with regard to its delegation criteria –, appears to have been declared irrelevant in view of the institutional changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon: case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union , ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 65; cf also Dammann, n 47 above, 1075 f.
 cf case C-301/02 P Carmine Salvatore Tralli and ECB, ECLI:EU:C:2005:306, paras 41 f; cf also Wymeersch, n 61 above, 12. The Rules of Procedure of the ECB, of the Governing Council and of the Supervisory Board, respectively, do not explicitly provide for such a possibility. For Board-internal delegation of power (and its limits) see Art 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank; cf also Schoenmaker and Véron, n 4 above, 35.
 For this terminological change cf Katja Michel, Institutionelles Gleichgewicht und EU-Agenturen. Eine Analyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der European Banking Authority (Duncker & Humblot, 2015) 74.
 cf Majone, n 41 above, 89; cf now Art 13 para 2 (first sentence) TEU.
 Cases 9, 10/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority, ECLI:EU:C:1958:7, 152.
 cf Michel, n 64 above, 71 f with further references. With regard to the ECB cf, for example, case T-79/13 Alessandro Accorinti v ECB, ECLI:EU:T:2015:756, para 68.
 cf Reinhard Priebe, Entscheidungsbefugnisse vertragsfremder Einrichtungen im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Nomos, 1979) 78 (footnote 39); cf also case C-11/00 Commission v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, para 174.
 For the irrelevance of Meroni in such a case cf Hofmann, Rowe and Türk, n 20 above, 587.
 cf Eddy Wymeersch, ‘Banking Union; Aspects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism compared’ (2015) 290 ECGI Working Paper in Law 4; Martin Selmayr, ‘Art. 282 AEUV’, in H. von der Groeben, J. Schwarze and A. Hatje (eds), Europäisches Unionsrecht (Nomos, 7th edn, 2015) para 114.
 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Hart Publishing, 2014) 288.
 It ought to be stressed here that entrusting the ECB with banking supervisory powers requires a clear legal basis, as the Commission is the regular administrative authority of the EU (see Art 17 para 1 TEU) on the one hand, and as it puts at risk the independence of the ECB’s monetary policy, on the other hand.
 cf Philipp Lindermuth, ‘Demokratische Legitimation des Agenturhandelns. Delegationsgrenzen in der Unionsverwaltung’, in K. Gotthard et al (eds), Kooperation und Koordination als Rechtsentwicklungstrends (Jan Sramek Verlag, 2014) 161-164 with further references. The discussion about introducing an explicit Treaty base for the establishment of European agencies has been going on prior to the adoption of the Nice Treaty. The then President of the Commission Romano Prodi fervently opposed this idea, because he feared a fragmentation of power at the cost of the Commission: ‘Let us have no illusions: there is a real danger that this will create conflicting centres of power’; Romano Prodi, Speech/00/352 (Plenary Session of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 3 October 2000).
 Stressing the fact that – according to the terminology currently used in EU banking law – credit institutions do not belong to the group of financial institutions: Christos V. Gortsos, ‘The “Single Supervisory Mechanism”: A Major Building Block towards a European Banking Union (The Full Europeanisation of the “Bank Safety Net”)’ (2013) 8 ECEFIL Working Paper Series 18 (fn 47).
 Rosa M. Lastra and Jean-Victor Louis, ‘European Economic and Monetary Union: History, Trends, and Prospects’ (2013) Yearbook of European Law 1, 149.
 Note that the Commission (as referred to by the legislator in Recital 85 of the SSM-Reg) has expressed its discontent with Art 127 para 6 for a number of reasons.
 cf Martin Selmayr, ‘Art. 127 AEUV’, in H. von der Groeben, J. Schwarze and A. Hatje (eds), Europäisches Unionsrecht (Nomos, 7th edn, 2015) paras 42.
 The exclusion of supervision of insurance undertakings in Art 127 para 6 TFEU was insisted on by Germany; for the ‘anachronism’ this exception poses see Lastra and Louis, n 75 above, 83.
 cf Karl Larenz and Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (Springer, 3rd edn, 1995) 143.
 cf Paul Weismann, ‘Die Bankenunion. Entwicklung, System und ausgewählte Rechtsfragen’, in J. Breitenlechner et al (eds), Sicherung von Stabilität und Nachhaltigkeit durch Recht (Jan Sramek Verlag, 2015) 124 with further references.
 ‘Precisely defined tasks’ would make more sense, but this is not what the provision says. Moreover, the precise drafting of tasks and of legislation more generally is an overall quest of the rule of law. It cannot be assumed that the MS intended to highlight this quest when drafting Art 127 para 6 TFEU.
 See Art 4 para 1 lit a and c in combination with Art 6 para 4 of the SSM-Reg; see also its Art 15. For further tasks and powers of the ECB under the SSM see Art 4 f and Chapter III of the SSM-Reg.
 The supervision also extends to financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies.
 See Art 6 para 4 of the SSM-Reg. The ECB shall be in charge of the three most significant credit institutions in each participating MS, irrespective of whether they meet the thresholds just mentioned.
 See Art 6 para 3 of the SSM-Reg.
 See Recitals 28 f of the SSM-Reg.
 Harlow and Rawlings, n 71 above, 290.
 See in particular Council Reg 1096/2010 which is also based on Art 127 para 6 TFEU and in which, by the way, no separation between supervisory and monetary policy tasks is provided for; critically with regard to the delegation of macroprudential powers to the ECB on the basis of this Treaty provision: Kern Alexander , ‘The European Central Bank and Banking Supervision: The Regulatory Limits of the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2016) 3 European Company and Financial Law Review 467, 480 f.
 Cf Concetta Brescia Morra, ‘From the Single Supervisory Mechanism to the Banking Union. The Role of the ECB and the EBA’ (2014) 2 LUISS Academy Working Paper 5, with further references; Kerstin Peters, ‘Die geplante europäische Bankenunion – eine kritische Würdigung’ (2014) 9 Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht 396, 399 and 401; Reiner Schmidt, ‘Wirtschafts- und Währungspolitik’, in R. Schmidt and F. Wollenschläger (eds), Kompendium Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht (Springer, 2016) para 71; Wolfers and Voland, n 39 above, 1485 f; doubtful: Ulrich Häde, ‘Art. 127 AEUV’, in C. Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV. Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta (CH Beck, 5th edn, 2016) para 56; Reinhard Klaushofer, ‘Bankenaufsicht durch die EZB – ein primärrechtlicher Grenzgang’ (2014) 22 Journal für Rechtspolitik 102, 105; Giorgio Monti and Christy Ann Petit, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism: legal fragilities and possible solutions’ (2016) 16 ADEMU Working Paper Series 1, 2 f; differently: Moloney, n 40 above, 1659; Selmayr, n 77 above, paras 54 f.
 Vesting the EBA with comparable powers would have been in conflict with the Meroni criteria; cf Harlow and Rawlings, n 72 above, 289.
 For the decision-making procedure in the context of the ECB’s macroprudential tasks see Art 13h leg cit. For the possibilities of participating MS whose currency is not the euro see, in particular, Art 7 paras 7 f and Art 26 para 8 of the SSM-Reg.
 For a graphic representation of the procedure see ECB, Guide to banking supervision (2014) 15 https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmguidebankingsupervision201411.en.pdf accessed 4 April 2018. In the terminology of Sunstein, the draft of the Supervisory Board constitutes a ‘default rule.’ Where the Governing Council does not take an express decision – ie an objection – the draft becomes a decision. Hence the question posed to the Governing Council is rather ‘Do you want to object to this quasi-decision?’ than ‘Do you want this draft to become a decision?’. For the relevance the wording of the choice has for its outcome cf Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Empirically Informed Regulation’ (2011) 78 University of Chicago Law Review 1349, 1350 f.
 Cf Wymeersch, n 47 above, 53.
 Art 7 of the TSCG; critically: Rainer Palmstorfer, ‘The Reverse Majority Voting under the “Six Pack”: A Bad Turn for the Union?’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 186, 191-193; differently: Andreas J. Kumin, ‘“Reverse Majority Voting” – Auf dem Weg zur Herrschaft der Exekutive über die Legislative?’, (2013) 68 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht / Journal of Public Law 441, in particular 449 f. For these and other examples of RMV – such as the WTO dispute settlement – and a critical account thereof see Wim Van Aken and Lionel Artige, ‘Reverse Majority Voting in Comparative Perspective: Implications for Fiscal Governance in the EU’, in B. de Witte, A. Héritier and A. Trechsel (eds), The Euro Crisis and the State of European Democracy (European University Institute, 2013) 129.
 Art 25 para 2 of the Statute of the ESCB/ECB.
 Case C-303/94 European Parliament v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:1996:238, para 23 with further references.
 Art 10 of the Single European Act introduced the rule-exception clause in favour of the Commission in Art 145 TEEC (see now Art 291 para 2 TFEU), but also before that the Council had served as a delegatee of implementing powers; see now case C-521/15 Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2017:982, para 43.
 Art 129 paras 3 f TFEU e contrario.
 Wymeersch, n 47 above, 53.
 This separation is required because otherwise a conflict of objectives is – in the long run – unavoidable: The primary objective of the ECB within monetary policy is to maintain price stability (Art 127 para 1 TFEU), whereas the primary objective of the ECB under the SSM-Reg is ‘to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system’ (Recital 65).
 cf Palmstorfer, n 94 above, 203, refusing the ‘efficiency argument’ in the context of RMV under the ‘Six-Pack’; cf also Weismann, n 38 above, 188 f. In view of the fact that this constellation increases the powers of one body at the cost of the powers of another body of the very same institution, it cannot possibly infringe the EU’s institutional balance which addresses the inter-institutional (not: the intra-institutional) balance of powers.
 For one of these means, the so-called Chinese walls between monetary policy and banking supervision within the ECB see Christos V. Gortsos, ‘The two main pillars of the European Banking Union: the legal framework in a “nutshell”’, in J.-H. Binder and C.V. Gortsos (eds), The European Banking Union. A Compendium (CH Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2016) 25.
 Most of these ‘authorisations’ did not concern authorisations within the meaning of Art 14 of the SSM-Reg, ie licensing decisions, but so-called ‘suitability assessments’ of (proposed) members of the management bodies of significant credit institutions.
 cf ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2016 (March 2017) 37 and 53; ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2017 (March 2018) 12 and 83 f.
 cf Schoenmaker and Véron, n 4 above, 35.
 On the number of procedures and procedural efficiency gains cf ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2016 (March 2017) 35-37.
 cf ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2015 (March 2016) 50 f.
 ECB, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2016 (March 2017) 54.
 Cooperation is literally understood here as the working together of different (administrative) actors. Cooperation is not necessarily heterarchical, but may also take place between a principal actor and subordinate bodies; for a different understanding cf Alberto J. Gil Ibañez, The Administrative Supervision and Enforcement of EC Law: Powers, Procedures and Limits (Hart Publishing, 1999) 282.
 For the SRM: Art 7 and 28-31 of Reg 806/2014; with regard to the arrogation of powers by the SRB see in particular Art 7 para 4 leg cit; cf also Karl-Philipp Wojcik and Jan Ceyssens, ‘Der Einheitliche EU-Bankenabwicklungsmechanismus: Vollendung der Bankenunion, Schutz des Steuerzahlers’ (2014) 23 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 893, 896. These similarities shall not conceal the substantial differences between the two regimes which exist as well, and regard, for example, the strong involvement of EU institutions (Council, Commission, ECB) or the SRB’s legal personality (as opposed to the Supervisory Board).
 The Meroni criteria, vague as they are and somewhat defused by the ESMA judgement, have retained some relevance. In case of the SRB, for example, the legislator tried to do justice to Meroni, in particular by involving the Commission, the Council and the ECB in its operations under the SRM; cf also the reference to this doctrine in the Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund; COM(2017) 827 final, 6 and 13.

References: Art 2
 Art 4
 V. 
 Art 7
 Art 127
 Art 139
e contrario
 Art 44
 Art 45
 Art 26
 Art 6
 Art. 197
 Art 89
 Art 2
 Art 3
 Art 2
 Art 3
 Art 7
 Art 20
 Art 6
 Art 6
 Art 9
 Art 22
 Art 76
 Art 73
 Art 80
 Art 80
 Art 14
 Art 84
 Art 8
 Art 13
 Art 17
 V. 
 Art 127
 Art 127
 Art 127
 Art 4
 Art 6
 Art 15
 Art 4
 Art 6
 Art 6
 Art 127
 Art 13
 Art 7
 Art 26
 Art 7
 Art 25
 Art 10
 Art 145
 Art 291
 Art 129
e contrario
 V. 
 Art 14
 Art 7
 Art 7