Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/individualized-assessment/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:38:18+00:00

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Roller coasters and the ADA: It’s baaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaack!
In a previous blog entry, I discussed the issue of accessibility to amusement park rides. Well, it is back in the news again. This time from the District Court of New Jersey in an unpublished decision dated December 31, 2014, entitled Masci v. Six Flags Theme Park, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178666 (D. NJ December 31, 2014). As is my usual practice, the blog entry is divided into categories: facts; court’s reasoning; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
By the way, I want to thank Richard Hunt for explaining to me how I might use a picture in a blog entry. I did it!!!!!!!!
The plaintiff, then 14, attempted to ride a certain ride at Six Flags great adventure only to find out that he no longer fit the ridership requirements for the ride. Further, he found out that he was no longer permitted to ride on any of the rides at the park except for two of them due to new ridership requirements at Six Flags, which for the vast majority of the rides, required a person to have at least one fully formed arm and one fully formed leg. The changes to the ridership requirements were the result of what arose out of an accident occurring at another amusement park where a passenger missing both legs fell out of the roller coaster and died when the person was lifted out of his seat and the safety restraints at an amusement park outside of Buffalo, New York. As a result of that accident, Six Flags parks started to receive service bulletins from the manufacturers of certain rides, which include the manufacturer’s determination of what ridership restrictions were warranted to make the ride safe for all customers. The manufacturer of the nitro roller coaster, Superman ultimate flight roller coaster, the bizarro roller coaster, the Batman the ride roller coaster, and the Green Lantern roller coaster changed the ridership restrictions so as to allow a rider was one amputated foot or two amputated feet to ride providing they had the ability to hold on with two functioning hands and to allow a rider with one missing arm or hand to ride providing the rider had the ability to hold on with one functioning hand and brace himself or herself with two functioning legs. Six Flags then instituted an audit of ridership requirements on its rides and assembled an executive committee to review the ridership requirements currently in place at the various parks. The committee reviewed manufacturer guidelines, manufacturer service bulletins, engineering reports from the engineering team, standards developed by the American Society for testing and materials F24 committee on amusement rides and devices, and collective knowledge of the committee members. They also looked to manufacture requirement for similar rides in any amusement park and consulted with their engineering team to decide if the ridership requirements being proposed by the executive committee were appropriate from an engineering perspective. As a result of the audit, the executive committee changed ridership requirements for all the rides except for the flat nonrotating rides so that: 1) for rides which the manufacturer had recent service bulletins, the restrictions listed by that manufacturer would be the restrictions for the amusement park ride; and 2) for rides where the manufacturer was no longer in business or had not otherwise issued current guidelines, a rider had to possess at least one fully formed and functioning leg absent a prosthetic device and at least one fully formed and functioning arm absent a prosthetic device. They also changed the ridership requirements to further restrict the use of prosthetic devices on its rides due to the risk of a prosthetic device falling off during the ride. With respect to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had two full legs but was missing the upper sections of both feet. He wore lower limb prosthetic devices but could ambulate independently indoors and outdoors and could do some modest running and jumping activities. He was also missing his right arm above the elbow and had a short left forearm with four digits in the thumb. He did have some pinch ability with his left hand when he brought the fingers against his forearm for pinching or hooking objects but had relatively little mobility with his thumb. He also utilized a right arm prosthetic device. Six Flags defended on two different grounds. First, New Jersey law required them to follow and implement ridership restrictions mandated by ride manufacturers. Second, in the alternative, the ridership requirements were necessary for the safe operation of the rides and therefore, did not violate the ADA or the New Jersey Law against discrimination. Everybody moved for summary judgment and the court denied all motions.
1. Proof of ridership requirements mandated by the manufacturer, whom are the experts for the ride, can be relied upon by Six Flags as proof of a legitimate safety requirement under the ADA. The court, relying on the California case mentioned in the blog entry referenced above, felt that it was only logical that the ride manufacturers are in the best position to determine what ridership requirements are warranted and necessary to make the ride safe for all guests.
When you think about it, this is the same concept that I discussed in my blog entry talking about using negligence per se as a way to increase accessibility. However, in this case, the manufacturer’s ride restrictions are being used as the safety standard rather than the ADAAG.
2. The court specifically quoting from the California decision said that: defendants should not be required to second-guess the manufacturer’s safety requirements; if plaintiff believed the restrictions are overprotective he or she is free to initiate an action against the manufacturer; and that New Jersey law requires Six Flags to implement the ridership safety requirements of the manufacturer.
With respect to this particular reasoning, I get the idea that a court would not want to require an amusement park operator to second-guess the manufacturer’s safety requirements. I also get how the court could say that state law required amusement park operator to implement manufacturers safety restrictions on the amusement park rides. What I find a bit harder to deal with is the assertion that the manufacturer could be sued directly for violating the ADA if it was felt that the safety restrictions somehow violated the ADA. The reason I am struggling with this concept is that the ADA is an accessibility statute not a product accessibility statute (see this article of mine for example).
3. With respect to the rides that did not have specific manufacturer’s restriction, Six Flags failed to meet its burden that those ridership requirements were legitimate safety requirement per the ADA. In particular, they failed to provide any evidence supporting why those ridership requirements were established. The ridership requirements that were established had not been shown to be necessary for the safe operation of each ride. Further, the ridership requirements failed to establish what actual risks the safety requirements were based on.
4. A blanket approach to ridership requirements of rides with varying levels of risk creates the implication that those requirements were based upon mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities rather than actual risk, all of which violate the ADA (citing to the Texas case discussed in a comment to the blog entry mentioned above).
5. The burden is on the amusement park operator to establish that its ridership requirements are for legitimate safety reasons rather than based upon the plaintiff being a person with a disability.
6. Even assuming that Six Flags ridership requirements were appropriate under the ADA, it simply wasn’t clear if the plaintiff nevertheless qualified for the rides under those ridership requirements. In particular, it wasn’t clear whether the plaintiff had a functioning arm to qualify for the vast majority of the rides since the medical report submitted by the defendant only described the plaintiff’s ability to pinch and did not mention the extent to which the plaintiff could grip with his left hand.
7. The ADA requires that an individualized assessment must be made concerning whether a guest actually meets the safety requirements of a ride. In other words, Six Flags should have an employee on hand who could determine or otherwise assess if a guest meets the ridership requirements for the ride in question. That is, if you are going to create eligibility criteria, it logically follows that it includes the right to ask if an individual meets the criteria. The record was unclear whether the plaintiff was tested to see if he met the safety requirements of the various rides. Rather, it seems that the plaintiff was prevented from being on the ride based on the appearance of a disability rather than on his actual failure to meet the ridership requirements.
I get what the court is saying here too. However, it is interesting that with respect to the employee that Six Flags should use to make the assessment whether a person with a disability is qualified to go on the ride, the language the court uses is, “assumedly the ride operator.” If you have been to an amusement park, you know the ride operators are generally teenagers and certainly not people qualified to assess a person’s medical condition so as to determine whether they could safely be on a particular ride. It seems to me that you would almost need a medical professional, such as a doctor, to make that assessment. Then, what if the Doctor gets it wrong? Would the doctor and/or the amusement park, under apparent authority, somehow find a way to be protected from liability in that event?
8. If Six Flags did discriminate against the plaintiff based upon his appearance of disability, rather than any legitimate safety concerns, the safety defenses wind up being irrelevant.
1. If you are an amusement park operator, this case and the California case allow you to rely on the manufacturer’s restrictions for the ride.
2. If you do not have manufacturer restrictions for the ride, an individual analysis of the person with a disability must be performed to see if that person could ride the ride safely. The problem here is just what employee is going to have the ability to determine that. It is hard to believe that it could be a teenager with no medical training.
3. Regardless of whether manufacturer’s restrictions exist, each ride is going to need essential eligibility requirements. Those requirements need to be based upon legitimate safety concerns. The system that Six Flags set up to figure that out simply wasn’t good enough. This decision requires an amusement park operators to first figure out the very nature of the particular ride. Then, have scientific experts and medical experts get together to figure out just what physical capabilities a person needs to be able to safely perform the ride. It probably wouldn’t hurt to have a statistical person as well to number crunch the probabilities based upon the various physical characteristics that the experts come up with.
4. I still don’t understand how the manufacturer can be sued for their product being inaccessible as the manufacturer would not be an employer, governmental entity, or a place of public accommodation with respect to riding the ride.
5. Amusement park operators need to remember that the burden is on them with respect to establishing that the ridership requirements are for legitimate safety reasons.
6. If states have not already done so, look for each one to put in place a law saying that amusement park operators must comply with manufacturer recommendations with respect to ridership requirements.
7. If you are plaintiff, this case gives you the ability to allege both actual disability and regarded as having a disability.
Alabama and South Carolina are the only States segregating inmates that are HIV-positive. In the Alabama situation, the ACLU brought suit saying that such a practice violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. In a 153 page opinion, Judge Myron Thompson of the northern district of Alabama agreed. There are very few opinion that run 153 pages. Even fewer that run so long but yet every page is worth reading. Such is the case with this one. With respect to this opinion, what I am going to do is break this down into three different categories. First, I will discuss the practices Alabama engaged in with respect to both men and women that are HIV-positive in their prison system. Second, I will discuss the court’s reasoning. Finally, I will mention several important policy considerations brought up by the court as well.
Basically, Alabama has a system with respect to HIV-positive inmates that involves categorical non-individualized determinations resulting in automatic placement and exclusions. The specific practices of the Alabama Department of Corrections varied a little bit depending on whether the inmate was female or male. Regardless of the gender, both systems involved categorical non-individualized determinations resulting in automatic placement and exclusions.
With respect to men, the Alabama Department of Corrections was challenged on the following practices: 1) all HIV-positive men in the prison system are sent to limestone, a facility in northern Alabama. They are sent there regardless of their individual needs and custody factors; 2) HIV-positive men have limited program opportunities when compared to men that are not HIV-positive; 3) HIV-positive men are segregated into dormitories at the limestone facility; 4) within those dormitories HIV-positive men are segregated further utilizing the building’s architectural layout; 5) HIV-positive men were excluded from other dorms at limestone regardless of whether they had any individual factors that would otherwise place them in those dorms except for being HIV-positive; 6) HIV-positive men because they were segregated into certain dormitories were excluded from critical aspects of the substance abuse program; and 7) HIV-positive men must wear white armbands regardless of which dormitory they were in (that is, HIV-positive men were segregated into two different dormitories. However, regardless of which dormitory they were in, all HIV-positive men must wear white armbands).
With respect to women: 1) all HIV-positive women inmates are housed Tutwiller; 2) women who test HIV-positive at first are put in isolation until the confirmation test comes in to confirm the initial tests; 3) HIV-positive women inmates are segregated into one dorm at Tutwiller; 4) HIV-positive women are automatically sent to isolation cells if mentally ill regardless of their actual mental health needs.
With respect to both men and women HIV-positive inmates, Alabama Department of Corrections excludes all such inmates from the food service program and their participation in work release entirely depends on viral loads and not upon the inmate’s treatment needs or functional abilities.
The court had several issues before it. First, it had a couple of preliminary issues before it, standing and whether the case was moot because Alabama represented to the court that they were going to change their practices. With respect to standing, the court held that the plaintiff did have standing because they were a person with a disability (HIV-positive- see ADAAA; see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)). Second, the court said that the issue was not moot because the nature of the evidence was such that the court believed it quite possible that the challenged conduct could recur.
With respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the court reasoned as follows. First, as mentioned above, the plaintiffs clearly have a disability, being HIV-positive.
Second, the title II regulations mandate integration (see 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) and the court cited to Olmstead v. L.C. By Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), as well.
Third, since prison is the program, the plaintiffs were otherwise qualified. That is, the plaintiffs were capable of satisfying the essential eligibility requirements of the program with or without reasonable accommodation.
Fourth, the court goes into great detail about the medical evidence that is currently known with respect to a person that is HIV-positive and concludes that the treatment of HIV-positive people has evolved to the point where it simply cannot be said that such a person would be a direct threat automatically when integrated into the general prison population. With respect to direct threat, the court looked to the factors in School Board of Nassau County Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987). Those factors demand an individualized assessment, which does not occur in the Alabama prison system for inmates that are HIV-positive. In addition to the scientific evidence being what it is, the court said that the medical evidence is overwhelming that the risk of HIV transmission imprisons is minimal across the system and therefore, no direct threat could be said to exist, at least not automatically.
Sixth, Alabama could not defend on the grounds that to redo the present programming would be a fundamental alteration as many of the systems already exist to ensure that HIV-positive inmates are integrated into the general community after an individualized determination. That is, Alabama Department of Corrections already has individual data on HIV-positive inmates with respect to viral loads, behavior, and medical needs.
Seventh, Alabama tried to argue that there would be an undue burden to change the system. Undue burden generally refers to financial costs. The court said that any undue burden was not going to apply here because the costs were not going to be unreasonable and conceivably could even decline with the integration of HIV-positive inmates into the general population.
Ninth, the court discussed in some detail how the fundamental alteration defense was not going to fly here. First, the court noted that not every HIV-positive inmate needs an HIV specialist all the time. Second, much of the need for specialized care could be solved through the use of telemedicine and the costs for installing such systems would not be an undue burden. Third, HIV-positive inmate could travel to other facilities as needed. Fourth, medical staff can be trained to do basic HIV-positive care and resources exist to do that at minimal costs (there were several entities offering to help train the prison staff at minimal or no costs). Finally, since the basic purpose of a prison medical system is to provide medical care to prisoners, none of the accommodations suggested by the court involved eliminating the essential aspect of the relevant activity, and therefore, no fundamental alteration exists.
Tenth, since women can’t transmit HIV through sexual contact, any direct threat defense with respect to women was far less than men, which the data revealed that for men was virtually nonexistent.
Eleventh, the prohibition of participating in food service jobs, “are obviously irrational” and contravene science (the court was appalled, to say it mildly, at some of the representations regarding staff members with respect to how HIV-positive inmates were perceived. The court said that prejudice is no defense).
Twelfth, the white armbands policy violated the broad prohibition on discrimination and the Alabama Department of Corrections justifications for the policy were not credible, were pretextual, and served no legitimate purpose. In particular, the policy meant forced disclosure of HIV-positive status and was also profoundly stigmatizing.
Policy also underlies this decision as well. Some of those points include: 1) integration may actually reduce high-risk behavior and no evidence existed that it would increase. The idea being that if HIV-positive inmates were integrated into the general population, members of the general population may actually restrict themselves from high risk behavior for fear of becoming infected; 2) segregation has devastating psychological effects. The court referred to segregation as an, “effective tool for humiliating and isolating prisoners living with the disease;” 3) Alabama Department of Corrections policies have not changed with the times and with how treatment of HIV-positive people have evolved; 4) other Southern states-Georgia, Mississippi, and Florida- have all successfully integrated HIV populations. In fact, at trial, there was testimony from people in those state that had led the integration efforts; 5) no evidence existed that non-adherence to medication would increase with respect to integrating HIV-positive inmates into the general population; 6) segregation may worsen treatment outcome since another facility may be a better option depending upon the inmates individual needs; 7) dismantling segregation will not add significant costs to the Alabama Department of Corrections and may save money in a variety of ways. For example, there would be no need to maintain extra beds in an institutional setting as is currently done if HIV-positive prisoners were integrated into the general population; 8) forced disclosure of HIV-positive status is simply wrong.
Some thoughts: First, it is a bit surprising to me that no equal protection claim was brought. The language that the court uses such as “no legitimate purpose,” “obviously irrational,” “irrational disability discrimination,” as well as a reading of the opinion in general leads to the conclusion that the court if presented with an equal protection claim would have found, even if the prisoners were in a rational basis class, that their equal protection rights were violated. Perhaps, the reason equal protection was not alleged what to avoid a sovereign immunity discussion, which as we have talked about in other blog entries, can get quite complicated (as part of the litigation of this case, sovereign immunity did come up, but discussing sovereign immunity in the context of injunctive relief is quite a bit different than discussing it in the context of suing a sovereign for damages). Second, with respect to the white arm bands, I really thought that I was going to see a reference to the Holocaust and to where Nazi Germany made Jews wear stars on their coats. Perhaps, the judge did not feel it necessary to bring in such a comment considering how thorough the opinion was. That said, it did not surprise me to see the ACLU reference precisely this in the aftermath of this decision. Finally, I could not help but be struck at the parallels of this decision to Brown v. Board of Education with its discussion of the psychological impact of segregation and its emphasis on other information, in this case medical science, to reach a conclusion.
The above link involves the AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania filing a suit in Philadelphia in December arguing that a boarding school discriminated against an HIV-positive teenager who applied to a school that served low-income families. The school is a residential boarding school. The teenager appeared to meet the initial minimum qualification for admission. After the school learned the teenager was HIV-positive it discontinued processing the application, which led to the lawsuit. The school claims that their denial is justified because the teenager poses a direct threat. However, the AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania says that the school failed to make an individualized assessment as to whether the teenager was a direct threat.
The first question is whether the school is subject to the Americans With Disabilities Act at all. Clearly, it is as places of education are places of public accommodation under title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act.
In dealing with this case, what kind of things will the court need to be thinking about? First, they are going to have to think about the concept of direct threat. Direct threat comes from the Supreme Court case of School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). That case considered whether a teacher with tuberculosis was a direct threat to the kids she taught. The Supreme Court said that whether a person is a direct threat depends upon: the nature of the risk; the duration of the risk; the severity of the risk; and the probability the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm. Id. at 288. In Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal 536 U.S. 73 (2002) the Supreme Court extended this concept to being a direct threat to self. In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court noted that where a direct threat defense is claimed, you have to meet a fairly compelling standard. Id. at 85-86. That is, the direct threat defense must be based upon a reasonable medical judgment relying on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence. Id. at 86. Furthermore, the assessment of direct threat must be based upon an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job ( Chevron was an employment case). Id. The Department of Justice is responsible for enforcing title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act and their regulation is very similar to what is described here. In particular, in determining direct threat, one must look to the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk. The direct threat assessment must be based upon reasonable judgment relying on current medical knowledge from the best available objective evidence and must be based on an individualized assessment. 28 C.F.R. 36.208.
It is very hard to say how this case is going to work out. On the one hand, you have to be sympathetic to the school’s concerns. For example, the school would be prohibited by HIV confidentiality laws from disclosing the teenager’s disability to others. On the other hand, in the United States, there are people with HIV who don’t even know they have it and the school is probably not screening all of its students for HIV. Also, a person with HIV even prior to the ADAAA, and certainly now, is a person with a disability. Finally, what is very curious about the facts described in the link above is the allegations that an individualized assessment was not made. While Chevron was an employment case, there is no reason to believe that even in the title III context an individualized assessment would not be required, certainly the Department of Justice, no doubt basing its view on the Supreme Court decisions mentioned above, believes so.
Therefore, what can we expect going forward. It wouldn’t be surprising if an individualized assessment was ordered in light of the Supreme Court decisions and the Department of Justice regulations. Even so, once that assessment is ordered, assuming it is, the party could well be in the same exact place that they are now with the plaintiff alleging discrimination and the school alleging direct threat that cannot be mitigated with reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures of the school. This case bears closely following in the future.

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