Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_38_issue_2?pg=27
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:13:47+00:00

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Education is inherently a function of the individual states.57 Each state legislature sets its own due process for discipline, unlike due process hearings regarding special education, which are set by federal legislation.58 Because the Supreme Court has not specified due process requirements for long-term suspensions or expulsions beyond the “some kind of hearing” language in Goss, states vary widely with how charges involving long-term suspension and expulsion are adjudicated.59 This Section presents an overview of some trends state legislatures have taken in addressing the question of who should constitute a student’s disciplinary tribunal or hearing officer, a choice that indicates the state’s own interpretation of the level of impartiality due to students facing long-term discipline.
53 Harris et al. v. Atlanta Independent School System, ACLU (Dec. 18, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/cases/harris-et-al-v-atlanta-independent-school-system?redirect=racial-justice/harris-et-al-v-atlanta-independent-school-system.
54 Evidence for lesser accountability requirements for alternative schools is their lack of requirement to meet or report Adequate Yearly Progress under No Child Left Behind legislation. See Deborah Gordon Klehr, Addressing the Unintended Consequences of No Child Left Behind and Zero Tolerance: Better Strategies for Safe Schools and Successful Students, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 585, 595-96 (2010) (noting that relaxed accountability measures make it “hard for the public to decipher the educational achievements of students in alternative education programs”).
55 Jennings v. Wentzville R-IV Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1118, 1124 (8th Cir. 2005).
56 See Christle, supra note 45; Losen & Martinez, supra note 36; U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 37; Best, supra note 34.
57 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (Education is a state’s most important function); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in our nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.”).
58 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.500 et seq. (2006) (mandating due process procedures for special education hearings).
59 Goss, 419 U.S. at 579; 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2018).
60 At this juncture it may be helpful to point out that where an individual is present during a disciplinary tribunal who is not a member of the tribunal, the question becomes one of ex parte communications. In other words, what if any ex parte communications should thick impartiality protections afford? This issue arises frequently with differing treatment by the lower courts. Compare Newsome, 842 F.2d at 926 (presence of principal and superintendent at closed, post-hearing deliberations of disciplinary panel did not violate due process) with Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp.

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