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"Patent Office refuses to issue a patent . . . or if such a patent so issued is subsequently held invalid . . . , Lear at its option shall have the right forthwith to terminate the specific license so affected or to terminate this entire Agreement. . . ."
completely anticipated by the prior art. The California Supreme Court held that the 1955 agreement was still in effect, that Lear did not have the right thereunder to terminate its royalty obligations in 1959, and that the doctrine of estoppel barred Lear from questioning the patent. Noting Lear's claim that it had developed the Michigan gyros independently, the court considered "whether what is being built by Lear [in Michigan] springs entirely from the prior art," found that Lear had, in fact, utilized the patent throughout the period in question, and reinstated the jury's verdict.
1. Since the California Supreme Court's construction of the 1955 licensing agreement is solely a matter of state law, the only issue open here is raised by the court's reliance on the doctrine of estoppel to bar Lear from contesting the validity of the patent. Pp. 395 U. S. 661-662.
2. In the accommodation of (1) the common law of contracts, and (2) the federal law of patents requiring that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid patent, the technical requirements of contract doctrine must yield to the demands of the public interest in the typical situation involving the negotiation of a license after a patent has issued. The holding of Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U. S. 827, 339 U. S. 836, that licensee estoppel was "the general rule," is overruled. Pp. 395 U. S. 668-671.
3. Overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could be required to continue to pay royalties while challenging patent validity in the courts, and, in this case, Lear must be permitted to avoid payment of all royalties accruing after the issuance of the patent if Lear can prove that the patent is invalid. Pp. 395 U. S. 671-674.
4. Respondent's claim to contractual royalties accruing before the issuance of the patent, which raises the question of whether, and to what extent, the States may protect the owners of unpatented inventions who are willing to disclose their ideas only upon the payment of royalties, is remanded for specific consideration by the California courts. Pp. 395 U. S. 674-675.
5. It is inappropriate at this time to pass upon Lear's contention that the patent is invalid, as Lear must address its arguments attacking the validity of the underlying patent to the California courts in the first instance. Pp. 395 U. S. 675-676.
67 Cal.2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, vacated and remanded.
In January of 1952, John Adkins, an inventor and mechanical engineer, was hired by Lear, Incorporated, for the purpose of solving a vexing problem the company had encountered in its efforts to develop a gyroscope which would meet the increasingly demanding requirements of the aviation industry. The gyroscope is an essential component of the navigational system in all aircraft, enabling the pilot to learn the direction and attitude of his airplane. With the development of the faster airplanes of the 1950's, more accurate gyroscopes were needed, and the gyro industry consequently was casting about for new techniques which would satisfy this need in an economical fashion. Shortly after Adkins was hired, he developed a method of construction at the company's California facilities which improved gyroscope accuracy at a low cost. Lear almost immediately incorporated Adkins' improvements into its production process to its substantial advantage.
by the Patent Office, none of Adkins' improvements were sufficiently novel to warrant the award of a monopoly under the standards delineated in the governing federal statutes. Moreover, the company has sought to prove that Adkins obtained his patent by means of a fraud on the Patent Office. In response, the inventor has argued that, since Lear had entered into a licensing agreement with Adkins, it was obliged to pay the agreed royalties regardless of the validity of the underlying patent.
"one of the oldest doctrines in the field of patent law establishes that, so long as a licensee is operating under a license agreement, he is estopped to deny the validity of his licensor's patent in a suit for royalties under the agreement. The theory underlying this doctrine is that a licensee should not be permitted to enjoy the benefit afforded by the agreement while simultaneously urging that the patent which forms the basis of the agreement is void."
67 Cal.2d 882, 891, 435 P.2d 321, 325-326 (1967).
Almost 20 years ago, in its last consideration of the doctrine, this Court also invoked an estoppel to deny a licensee the right to prove that his licensor was demanding royalties for the use of an idea which was, in reality, a part of the public domain. Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U. S. 827, 339 U. S. 836 (1950). We granted certiorari in the present case, 391 U.S. 912, to reconsider the validity of the Hazeltine rule in the light of our recent decisions emphasizing the strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection. Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U. S. 234 (1964).
At the very beginning of the parties' relationship, Lear and Adkins entered into a rudimentary one-page agreement which provided that, although "[a]ll new ideas, discoveries, inventions, etc., related to . . . vertical gyros become the property of Mr. John S. Adkins," the inventor promised to grant Lear a license as to all ideas he might develop "on a mutually satisfactory royalty basis." [Footnote 1] As soon as Adkins' labors yielded tangible results, it quickly became apparent to the inventor that further steps should be taken to place his rights to his ideas on a firmer basis. On February 4, 1954, Adkins filed an application with the Patent Office in an effort to gain federal protection for his improvements. At about the same time, he entered into a lengthy period of negotiations with Lear in an effort to conclude a licensing agreement which would clearly establish the amount of royalties that would be paid.
"the U.S. Patent Office refuses to issue a patent on the substantial claims [contained in Adkins' original patent application], or if such a patent so issued is subsequently held invalid, then in any of such events Lear at its option shall have the right forthwith to terminate the specific license so affected or to terminate this entire Agreement. . . ."
The progress of Adkins' effort to obtain a patent followed the typical pattern. In his initial application, the inventor made the ambitious claim that his entire method of constructing gyroscopes was sufficiently novel to merit protection. The Patent Office, however, rejected this initial claim, as well as two subsequent amendments, which progressively narrowed the scope of the invention sought to be protected. Finally, Adkins narrowed his claim drastically to assert only that the design of the apparatus used to achieve gyroscope accuracy was novel. [Footnote 7] In response, the Office issued its 1960 patent, granting a 17-year monopoly on this more modest claim.
California plant (the California gyros) for two more years until they too were terminated on April 8, 1959.
Neither side was satisfied with this split decision, and both appealed to the California District Court of Appeal, which adopted a quite different approach. The court held that Lear was within its contractual rights in terminating its royalty obligations entirely in 1959, and that, if Adkins desired to recover damages after that date, he was "relegated to an action for infringement" in the federal courts. 52 Cal.Rptr. 795, 806. So far as pre-1959 royalties were concerned, the court held that the contract required the company to pay royalties on both the California and Michigan gyros regardless of the validity of the inventor's patent. 52 Cal.Rptr. at 809.
Once again both sides appealed, this time to the California Supreme Court, which took yet another approach to the problem presented. The court rejected the District Court of Appeal's conclusion that the 1955 license gave Lear the right to terminate its royalty obligations in 1959. Since the 1955 agreement was still in effect, the court concluded, relying on the language we have already quoted, that the doctrine of estoppel barred Lear from questioning the propriety of the Patent Office's grant. 67 Cal.2d at 907, 435 P.2d at 336. The court's adherence to estoppel, however, was not without qualification. After noting Lear's claim that it had developed its Michigan gyros independently, the court tested this contention by considering "whether what is being built by Lear [in Michigan] springs entirely" (emphasis supplied) from the prior art. 67 Cal.2d at 913, 435 P.2d at 340. Applying this test, it found that Lear had, in fact, "utilized the apparatus patented by Adkins throughout the period in question," 67 Cal.2d at 915, 435 P.2d at 341, and reinstated the jury's $888,000 verdict on this branch of the case.
should be in the present case and in the future, it is, then, desirable to consider the role it has played in the past.
While the roots of the doctrine have often been celebrated in tradition, we have found only one 19th century case in this Court that invoked estoppel in a considered manner. And that case was decided before the Sherman Act made it clear that the grant of monopoly power to a patent owner constituted a limited exception to the general federal policy favoring free competition. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 18 How. 289 (1856). [Footnote 11] Curiously, a second decision often cited as supporting the estoppel doctrine points clearly in the opposite direction. St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling, 140 U. S. 184 (1891), did not even question the right of the lower courts to admit the licensee's evidence showing that the patented device was not novel. A unanimous Court merely held that, where there was conflicting evidence as to an invention's novelty, it would not reverse the decision of the lower court upholding the patent's validity.
In the very next year, this Court found the doctrine of patent estoppel so inequitable that it refused to grant an injunction to enforce a licensee's promise never to contest the validity of the underlying patent.
important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly. . . ."
Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U. S. 224,2 144 U. S. 34 (1892).
Although this Court invoked an estoppel in 1905 without citing or considering Pope's powerful argument, United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U. S. 310, the doctrine was not to be applied again in this Court until it was revived in Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., supra, which declared, without prolonged analysis, that licensee estoppel was "the general rule." 339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 836. In so holding, the majority ignored the teachings of a series of decisions this Court had rendered during the 45 years since Harvey had been decided. During this period, each time a patentee sought to rely upon his estoppel privilege before this Court, the majority created a new exception to permit judicial scrutiny into the validity of the Patent Office's grant. Long before Hazeltine was decided, the estoppel doctrine had been so eroded that it could no longer be considered the "general rule," but was only to be invoked in an ever-narrowing set of circumstances.
that it was improper both to "sell and keep the same thing," Faulks v. Kamp, 3 F. 898, 902 (1880). Nevertheless, Formica imposed a limitation upon estoppel which was radically inconsistent with the premises upon which the "general rule" is based. The Court held that, while an assignor may not directly attack the validity of a patent by reference to the prior state of the art, he could introduce such evidence to narrow the claims made in the patent. "The distinction may be a nice one, but seems to be workable." 266 U.S. at 266 U. S. 351. Workable or not, the result proved to be an anomaly: if a patent had some novelty, Formica permitted the old owner to defend an infringement action by showing that the invention's novel aspects did not extend to the inclusion of the old owner's products; on the other hand, if a patent had no novelty at all, the old owner could not defend successfully, since he would be obliged to launch the direct attack on the patent that Formica seemed to forbid. The incongruity of this position compelled at least one court of appeals to carry the reasoning of the Formica exception to its logical conclusion. In 1940, the Seventh Circuit held that a licensee could introduce evidence of the prior art to show that the licensor's claims were not novel at all, and thus successfully defend an action for royalties. Casco Products Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Manufacturing Co., 116 F.2d 119.
the property of all. Chief Justice Stone, for the Court, did not go beyond the precise question presented by a manufacturer who asserted that he was simply copying an expired patent. Nevertheless it was impossible to limit the Scott doctrine to such a narrow compass. If patent policy forbids estoppel when the old owner attempts to show that he did no more than copy an expired patent, why should not the old owner also be permitted to show that the invention lacked novelty because it could be found in a technical journal or because it was obvious to one knowledgeable in the art? As Justice Frankfurter's dissent indicated, id. at 326 U. S. 258-264, there were no satisfactory answers to these questions. The Scott exception had undermined the very basis of the "general rule."
"If a doctrine that was vital law for more than ninety years will be found to have now been deprived of life, we ought at least to give it decent public burial."
329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 416.
The uncertain status of licensee estoppel in the case law is a product of judicial efforts to accommodate the competing demands of the common law of contracts and the federal law of patents. On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has made. [Footnote 14] On the other hand, federal law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid patent. Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co., supra; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., supra. When faced with this basic conflict in policy, both this Court and courts throughout the land have naturally sought to develop an intermediate position which somehow would remain responsive to the radically different concerns of the two different worlds of contract and patent. The result has been a failure. Rather than creative compromise, there has been a chaos of conflicting case law, proceeding on inconsistent premises. Before renewing the search for an acceptable middle ground, we must reconsider on their own merits the arguments which may properly be advanced on both sides of the estoppel question.
faith requires that courts should permit him to recover royalties despite his licensee's attempts to show that the patent is invalid. Compare Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172 (1965).
Even in the more typical cases, not involving conscious wrongdoing, the licensor's equities are far from compelling. A patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office. Moreover, the legal conclusion is predicated on factors as to which reasonable men can differ widely. Yet the Patent Office is often obliged to reach its decision in an ex parte proceeding, without the aid of the arguments which could be advanced by parties interested in proving patent invalidity. Consequently, it does not seem to us to be unfair to require a patentee to defend the Patent Office's judgment when his licensee places the question in issue, especially since the licensor's case is buttressed by the presumption of validity which attaches to his patent. Thus, although licensee estoppel may be consistent with the letter of contractual doctrine, we cannot say that it is compelled by the spirit of contract law, which seeks to balance the claims of promisor and promisee in accord with the requirements of good faith.
involving the negotiation of a license after a patent has issued.
We are satisfied that Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., supra, itself the product of a clouded history, should no longer be regarded as sound law with respect to its "estoppel" holding, and that holding is now overruled.
The case before us, however, presents a far more complicated estoppel problem than the one which arises in the most common licensing context. The problem arises out of the fact that Lear obtained its license in 1955, more than four years before Adkins received his 1960 patent. Indeed, from the very outset of the relationship, Lear obtained special access to Adkins' ideas in return for its promise to pay satisfactory compensation.
Adkins takes an extreme position on this question. The inventor does not merely argue that, since Lear obtained privileged access to his ideas before 1960, the company should be required to pay royalties accruing before 1960 regardless of the validity of the patent which ultimately issued. He also argues that, since Lear obtained special benefits before 1960, it should also pay royalties during the entire patent period (1960-1977), without regard to the validity of the Patent Office's grant. We cannot accept so broad an argument.
licensor, we cannot say that there is enough of a difference to justify such a substantial impairment of overriding federal policy.
Nor can we accept a second argument which may be advanced to support Adkins' claim to at least a portion of his post-patent royalties, regardless of the validity of the Patent Office grant. The terms of the 1955 agreement provide that royalties are to be paid until such time as the "patent . . . is held invalid," § 6, and the fact remains that the question of patent validity has not been finally determined in this case. Thus, it may be suggested that, although Lear must be allowed to raise the question of patent validity in the present lawsuit, it must also be required to comply with its contract and continue to pay royalties until its claim is finally vindicated in the courts.
The parties' contract, however, is no more controlling on this issue than is the State's doctrine of estoppel, which is also rooted in contract principles. The decisive question is whether overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could be required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are challenging patent validity in the courts.
with regard to royalties accruing during the 17-year patent period. Our decision today will, of course, require the state courts to reconsider the theoretical basis of their decisions enforcing the contractual rights of inventors, and it is impossible to predict the extent to which this reevaluation may revolutionize the law of any particular State in this regard. Consequently, we have concluded, after much consideration, that, even though an important question of federal law underlies this phase of the controversy, we should not now attempt to define in even a limited way the extent, if any, to which the States may properly act to enforce the contractual rights of inventors of unpatented secret ideas. Given the difficulty and importance of this task, it should be undertaken only after the state courts have, after fully focused inquiry, determined the extent to which they will respect the contractual rights of such inventors in the future. Indeed, on remand, the California courts may well reconcile the competing demands of patent and contract law in a way which would not warrant further review in this Court.
We also find it inappropriate to pass at this time upon Lear's contention that Adkins' patent is invalid.
this test, the court upheld the jury's verdict of $888,000 on the Michigan gyros, finding that "Lear utilized the apparatus patented by Adkins throughout the period in question." 67 Cal.2d at 915, 435 P.2d at 341. In reaching this conclusion, however, the court did express its belief that Adkins' invention made a "significant step forward" in the art of gyroscopy. 67 Cal.2d at 915, 435 P.2d at 341.
It is far from clear that the court, in making this last statement, intended to hold that Adkins' ideas satisfied the demanding standard of invention explicated in our decision in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1 (1966). Surely such a holding was not required by the court's analysis, which was concerned only with the question whether Lear had benefited from Adkins' ideas in any degree. In this context, we believe that Lear must be required to address its arguments attacking the validity of the underlying patent to the California courts in the first instance.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Lear argues that this original agreement was not submitted in evidence at trial, and so should not be considered a part of the record on appeal. The California Supreme Court, however, treated the agreement as an important part of the record before it, 67 Cal.2d at 906, 435 P.2d at 335, and so we are free to refer to it.
37 CFR § 1.111 (1967).
37 CFR § 1.106 (1967).
37 CFR § 1.112 (1967).
37 CFR § 1.113 (1967).
A. Seidel, What the General Practitioner Should Know About Patent Law and Practice 61 (A.L.I.1956).
Adkins actually amended his application a third time before he made the amendment which gained the approval of the Patent Office. This third amendment was superseded by the successful amendment, however, before the Patent Office considered it.
For purposes of the present lawsuit, the parties stipulated that the jury would award only those damages accruing before May 31, 1963.
Adkins also filed a second cause of action which contended that Lear had wrongfully appropriated a valuable trade secret, and so was liable regardless of the validity of the inventor's contractual and quasi-contractual theories. The trial court, however, required Adkins to choose between his contract and tort claims. Since the California Supreme Court completely vindicated the inventor's right to contractual royalties, it was not obliged to consider the propriety of this aspect of the trial judge's decision. Consequently, the tort claim is not before us at this time.
Adkins claims that we have no jurisdiction to decide the federal question presented because the company did not adequately preserve it in its argument before the State Supreme Court. We do not agree. While it is true that Lear did not ask the Supreme Court to repudiate estoppel entirely, it did seek to persuade the court to carve out an exception to the estoppel principle which was so sweeping as to undermine the doctrine's vitality completely. The company argued, on the basis of federal as well as state cases, that a licensee may escape the impact of estoppel simply by announcing that it has repudiated the licensing agreement, regardless of the contract's terms. See, e.g., Respondent's and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief in Cases Nos. 28624 and 30089, at 110-111.
"Lear relies on authorities holding that a licensee may terminate a license agreement upon notice to his licensor even though, prior to termination, there has been no adjudication of invalidity of the patent which is the subject of the agreement, and that thereafter the licensee may challenge the validity of the patent. (See, e.g., Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co. of Cal. (1929) 98 Cal.App. 769, 778-779). This rule has no application if the agreement sets forth the particular circumstances under which termination must occur. As stated above, such provisions must be complied with in order to effect a valid cancellation."
67 Cal.2d at 899-900 n. 15, 435 P.2d at 331, n. 15.
We clearly have jurisdiction to consider whether this decision is wrong. In doing so, we have the duty to consider the broader implications of Lear's contention, and vindicate, if appropriate, its claim to relief on somewhat different grounds than it chose to advance below, especially when the California court recognized, in language we have already quoted, supra at 395 U. S. 656, that matters of basic principle are at stake.
There are two other early cases which enforced patent licenses without a thorough consideration of the estoppel issues that were presented. In Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 11 Wall. 488 (1871), the Court held that a licensee was obliged to overcome a "very strong presumption" of patent validity in order to avoid his royalty obligations, without indicating how much more compelling a showing was required than was considered necessary in an ordinary infringement action. In Dale Tile Manufacturing Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U. S. 46 (1888), this Court affirmed the decision of the New York state courts invoking the doctrine of licensee estoppel, on the ground that the estoppel question presented was one which involved only state law.
Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., 329 U. S. 394 (1947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 329 U. S. 402 (1947).
In addition to the works cited in the text, a detailed explication of the development of estoppel doctrine may be found in Cooper, Estoppel to Challenge Patent Validity: The Case of Private Good Faith vs. Public Policy, 18 W.Res.L.Rev. 1122 (1967), and in Kramer, Estoppel To Deny Validity -- A Slender Reed, 23 N.Y.U.Intra.L.Rev. 237 (1968).
See 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 127 (163); Treece, Licensee Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases, 53 Iowa L.Rev. 525, 52530 (1967).
37 CFR §§ 1.11, 1.13 (1967).
Of course, the value of this second benefit may depend upon whether the licensee has obtained exclusive or nonexclusive rights to the use of the patent. Even in the case of nonexclusive licenses, however, competition is limited to the extent that the royalty charged by the patentee serves as a barrier to entry.
"Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner."
"Pending patent applications are preserved in secrecy . . . unless it shall be necessary to the proper conduct of business before the Office"
to divulge their contents. 37 CFR § 1.14(a) (1967). The parties do not contend that Adkins' patent application was publicized by the Office during the period it was under consideration.
See Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1432 (1967); Note, The Stiffel Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw.U.L.Rev. 956 (1968); Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Preemption -- the Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J.Pat.Off.Soc. 713 (1967); Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 80 (1964).
Adkins suggests that any decision repudiating licensee estoppel as the general rule should not be retroactively applied to contracts concluded before such a decision is announced. Given the extent to which the estoppel principle had been eroded by our prior decisions, we believe it clear that the patent owner -- even before this decision -- could not confidently rely upon the continuing vitality of the doctrine. Nor can we perceive that our decision today is likely to undermine any existing legitimate business relationships. Moreover, the public's interest in the elimination of specious patents would be significantly prejudiced if the retroactive effect of today's decision were limited in any way.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
in conflict with what this Court held to be the law in Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U. S. 234 (1964). Brother HARLAN concurred in the result in those cases, saying -- contrary to what the Court held -- "I see no reason why the State may not impose reasonable restrictions on the future copying' itself." Compco, supra, at 376 U. S. 239. Consequently the Court is today joining in the kind of qualification that only MR. JUSTICE HARLAN was willing to make at the time of our Stiffel and Compco decisions.
I still entertain the belief I expressed for the Court in Stiffel and Compco that no State has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed to be a new invention except when a patent has been obtained from the Patent Office under the exacting standards of the patent laws. One who makes a discovery may, of course, keep it secret if he wishes, but private arrangements under which self-styled "inventors" do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather disclose them in return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws, which tightly regulate the kind of inventions that may be protected and the manner in which they may be protected. The national policy expressed in the patent laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private agreements among individuals, with or without the approval of the State.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part.
Although Adkins disputes it, we have jurisdiction to consider whether a patent licensee is estopped to challenge the validity of the patent. The California Supreme Court ruled that he is, and therefore would not entertain attacks on Adkins' patent as a defense to his suit for royalties. Lear seeks review of that holding here. In my view, not only is the issue properly here, but the Court has correctly decided it.
Although we have jurisdiction to review this state court judgment and to determine the licensee estoppel issue, it does not necessarily follow that we may or should deal with two other federal questions which come into focus once the licensee is free to challenge the patent. The first is whether the patent is valid. The second, which arises only if the patent is invalidated, is whether federal law forbids the collection of royalties which might otherwise be collectible under a contract rooted in state law. Although the Court does not deal with the first issue, it does purport to decide the second, at least in part. However, as either a jurisdictional or a policy matter, neither of these issues is properly before us in this case.
decision on questions unnecessary to its disposition of the case. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 U. S. 206, 303 U. S. 212-213 (1938).
event Adkins' patent was invalidated, and without the California Supreme Court's "final judgment" on this issue, I doubt our jurisdiction to decide the issue. But even if jurisdiction exists, the Court should follow its characteristic practice and refuse to issue pronouncements on questions not urged or decided in the state courts.
"[I]t is only in exceptional cases, and then only in cases coming from the federal courts, that [the Court] considers questions urged by a petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the courts below. . . . [D]ue regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts requires us to decline to consider and decide questions affecting the validity of state statutes not urged or considered there."
Id. at 309 U. S. 434.
"In reviewing the judgment of a state court, this Court will not pass upon any federal question not shown by the record to have been raised in the state court or considered there, whether it be one arising under a different or the same clause in the Constitution with respect to which other questions are properly presented."
The result is the same when a party has attempted to raise an issue in the state court, but has not done so in proper or timely fashion. "Questions first presented to the highest State court on a petition for rehearing come too late for consideration here. . . ." Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 326 U. S. 128 (1945).
"Since the State Supreme Court did not pass on the question now urged, and since it does not appear to have been properly presented to that court for decision, we are without jurisdiction to consider it in the first instance here."
CIO v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 472, 325 U. S. 477 (1945). And no different conclusion obtains when the federal question, although not yet presented to or decided by the state court, will probably or even certainly arise during further proceedings held in that court. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 466-467 (1958); Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U. S. 386, 377 U. S. 394-395 (1964).
Wholly aside from jurisdictional considerations or those relating to our relationships with state courts, there is the matter of our own Rule 23(1)(c), which states that "[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the court." See Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 321 U. S. 259 (1944). None of the questions presented by Lear's petition for certiorari comes even close to the issue to which the Court now addresses itself -- an issue which will arise only if Lear can and does challenge the patent, if the patent is declared invalid, if Adkins nevertheless seeks to enforce the agreement, and if Lear interposes a defense based on federal law.
This seems a poor case for waiving our Rules. In the first place, the question of validity has not been reached by the California Supreme Court, and, when it is, the patent may withstand attack. In that event, there will be no necessity to consider the impact of patent law on the enforceability of a contract grounded in state law. Second, even if the patent is declared invalid, the state court, after the parties have addressed themselves to the issues, may accommodate federal and state law in a matter which would not prompt review here. Third, the parties themselves have neither briefed nor seriously argued the question in this Court, and we do not have the benefit of their views on what is surely a difficult question. The Court itself has flushed the issue, which it now deals with on a piecemeal basis. [Footnote 2/2] Like the question of patent validity, I would leave the consequences of invalidity to the state court in the first instance.
"Lear concedes that it would be estopped to contest the validity of any patent issued to Adkins on the claims of his application described in the license agreement so long as it continued to operate under that agreement."
52 Cal.Rptr. 795, 805. See also Lear's Opening Brief in the District Court of Appeal 109.
The Court's opinion flatly proscribes recovery by Adkins of "all royalties accruing after Adkins' 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent invalidity." Ante at 395 U. S. 674. But recovery of pre-1960 royalties is left open by the Court, apparently because pre-issuance and post-issuance royalties do not stand on the same footing under federal law. Such a distinction may be valid, and pre-1960 royalties recoverable; but if so, what of post-1960 royalties which are attributable to the headstart Lear obtained over the rest of the industry as a result of pre-issuance disclosure of Adkins' idea? Today's bar to collection of post-1960 royalties would seem to be inflexible, and yet those royalties arguably are recoverable to the extent they represent payment for the pre-1960 disclosure of Adkins' idea; to that extent, they seem indistinguishable from pre-1960 royalties, at least for purposes of federal patent law. Cf. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U. S. 29, 379 U. S. 31 (1964). See also id. at 379 U. S. 34-39 (dissenting opinion). This possibility and others serve to indicate the wisdom of refraining from any pronouncement now, and particularly from any rigid line-drawing, in advance of consideration by the courts below and by the parties.

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