Source: http://ukscblog.com/oneill-2-v-majestys-advocate-scotland-2013-uksc-36/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:46:27+00:00

Document:
The case concerned the scope of the right to a fair trial under ECHR, art 6, specifically the right to a trial within a ‘reasonable time’ under art 6(1) and the right to an independent and impartial tribunal, also under art 6(1).
The two appellants, Lauchlan and O’Neill, were charged with the murder of Allison McGarrigle on the 5 April 2005. Allison McGarrigle disappeared in 1997. Mrs McGarrigle had a son named Robert, who at the time of her disappearance was subject to a residential supervision requirement. It required him to live with his father during the week, but he was permitted to visit his mother on Saturdays. On Saturday 14 June 1997 Robert did not return to his father’s address after visiting his mother. Instead he and his mother went to Largs, where they met the appellants and went to live with them at a property in Largs. On or about 20 June 1997 a drinking session took place where the appellants, Mrs McGarrigle and Robert were present. Mrs McGarrigle subsequently disappeared. On 16 February 1998 she was reported to the police as a missing person and by September 1998 a murder enquiry was being conducted into her disappearance. On 17 June 1998 the appellants were convicted of a number of sexual offences, including offences against Robert McGarrigle, and in August 1998 were sentenced to 6 years and 8 years imprisonment respectively. On 17 September 1998 the appellants were released into the custody of the police for questioning on the basis that they were suspected of having committed a conspiracy to murder. Both appellants were asked if they had murdered Mrs McGarrigle. The interviews were unproductive and the appellants were not arrested or charged as a result of them, but instead returned to prison to serve the remainder of their sentences. They were released on license in 2003 and 2003.
On 22 April 2004 the appellants were arrested in Spain in connection with the apparent abduction of a fourteen year old boy. On 5 April 2005 they were charged with the murder of Allison McGarrigle and with concealing and disposing of her body in an attempt to pervert the course of justice. The appellants were tried in 2010 in two trials, one for a variety of sexual offences and one for the murder of Mrs. McGarrigle. Both trials were heard before the same judge, Lord Pentland, but with different juries. The trial for the sexual offences charges took place between 26 April and 12 May 2010. The judge reserved sentencing for the sexual offences until after the trial for murder was complete. At the time of informing the appellants of this, the judge referred to their records and made comments to them that they were ‘evil, determined, manipulative and predatory paedophiles of the worst sort’. The murder trial commenced on 17 May 2010 and they were convicted on 10 June 2010.
The case focused on two main contentions by the appellants. They argued that for the purposes of a trial taking place within a ‘reasonable time’ as per art 6 (1) the starting point should be the 17 September 1998. The appellants also argueed that comments of Lord Pentland at the end of the sexual offences trial gave rise to concerns as to the right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal also under art 6 (1).
Therefore the date when the reasonable time began was 5 April 2005, and not 17 September 1998 when the appellants were detained and interviewed.
This test has reconciled the common law test of bias and the requirement under art 6 of an independent and impartial tribunal. Applying this test the Court found that in making his remarks Lord Pentland was addressing the appellants in the performance of his judicial function, and the fair-minded and informed observer would appreciate that he was a professional judge who had taken the judicial oath and had years of relevant training and experience, and would hear and understand the context in which the remarks were made. It would only be if the judge expressed outspoken opinions about the appellants’ character that were entirely gratuitous and plainly outside the scope of the proper performance of his duties in conducting the trial, that the fair minded observer would doubt the professional judge’s ability to perform those duties with an objective judicial mind.
The Court therefore found no basis that the judge was apparently biased.
The findings with regard to bias were to be expected. Of course, any reference to the fictional ‘fair minded observer’ is open the same pitfalls as references to the infamous ‘reasonable man’, however given the context it seems unlikely that the Court would have made a finding of bias. The situation of two trials in a short period of time presided over by the same judge was unusual, but the Court was clearly heavily influenced by the lack of complaint from the appellants at the time of the trials.
The findings regarding the expectation of a trial in a ‘reasonable time’ are more interesting. It is worth placing the judgment in O’Neill within the wider context of the debate over the content of fair trial rights. The scope of art 6 rights have proved a problematic issue for the European Court of Human Rights in its jurisprudence, and a considerable body of case law has been required to clarify and define the terms ‘charge’ and ‘criminal’ under art 6 (see Engel v. Netherlands (1979) 1 EHRR 647; Ozturk v. Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 40; Benham v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 293; Clingham v. Kensington and Chelsea LBC; R (McCann) v. Manchester Crown Court  1 AC 787). In many ways the approach of Lord Hope in O’Neill provides an interesting contrast to the approach of the ECtHR. The ECtHR has tended to adopt the ‘autonomous meanings’ approach with regard to art 6, assuming that certain terms within the Convention have an independent empirical meaning. A focus of rigidly defined meanings for Convention terms such as ‘criminal’ has been problematic and led to some controversial case law (for example Ozturk v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 409). In contrast to this approach, rather than focusing on finding an autonomous definition for the concept of ‘charge’, the Supreme Court instead focused on the protections flowing from the finding that an individual had been ‘charged’ and the purpose of such protections. The result is that ‘charge’ can have a different meaning in different contexts, but the focus is on the overall purpose of the protections under art 6 rather than essentialist definitions.
O’Neill also illustrates the complex interaction between the various parts of art 6. The very concept of what makes a trial ‘fair’ in accordance with art 6 remains a subject of both academic and jurisprudential debate. Is ‘fairness’ a holistic concept, or does art 6 simply provide a ‘checklist’ of fair trial rights? The judgment in O’Neill did not address such wide-ranging questions of fairness, but by suggesting that the reasonable time requirement has little to do with questions of fairness, and instead only serves to preserve peace of mind on the part of the defendant suggests that, with regard to art. 6, fairness is not everything. Overall, the decision in O’Neill largely affirms existing case law but does provide some further clarification on the complex nature of art 6 rights.
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