Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/de-supreme-court/1741723.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:22:20+00:00

Document:
Andrea Harrison, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. State of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. Mary Ann McLane Detweiler, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant. Karen V. Sullivan, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
In November 2014, Harrison filed a motion to suppress the evidence collected during the search of the vehicle. A hearing was held on the motion, and at its conclusion, the trial court denied the motion from the bench. The trial court held that on the facts as Corporal Huston reasonably believed them to be, he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle's registered owner was in fact driving since Harrison matched the owner's description. Harrison was subsequently convicted of all charges except Endangering the Welfare of a Child.6 This appeal followed.
Harrison contends that Corporal Huston did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that she was driving on a suspended license, and the traffic stop therefore violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In other words, she claims that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was stopped for merely matching the description of the vehicle's registered owner.
Harrison's claim has no merit. Corporal Huston testified that when he ran the vehicle's registration number, he learned that the owner's license was suspended. He also learned that the owner was an approximately forty-year old, white woman. As he continued following the vehicle, he determined that the driver met that description. The fact that the driver turned out to be Harrison and not the owner is irrelevant because that fact was not known to Corporal Huston at the time he initiated the stop. It is clear from the record that Corporal Huston had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Harrison was the vehicle's registered owner and driving on a suspended license. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse his discretion or commit legal error when it denied Harrison's motion to suppress.
For these reasons, the Superior Court's judgment of conviction is affirmed.
1. Appellant's Op. Br., Ex. A.
2. 21 Del. C. § 2756(a).
3. 16 Del. C. § 4764(a).
4. 16 Del. C. § 4763(c).
5. 11 Del. C. § 1102(a)(1).
6. For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the State nolle prosequi this charge at the end of trial.
7. Lopez–Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Del.2008).
8. Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370, 374 (Del.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

References: v. 
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 § 2756
 § 4764
 § 4763
 § 1102
 v. 
 v.