Source: http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=20130308212507920
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 23:14:19+00:00

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Neither party has demanded a jury in this case, so all remaining issues, including Motorola’s breach of contract, should be tried to the bench. The Federal Rules require that any party seeking a jury make a timely demand, in writing and filed with the Court—and the failure to do so constitutes waiver. Motorola had two weeks from the filing of its Answer in June 2011 to make a jury demand, and it has never done so. Motorola noted in multiple status reports prior to its Answer that it was still considering a jury demand in this case, but decided not to make one. Motorola made a jury demand—explicitly limited to its H.264 patent infringement claims—in the consolidated patent case, in a pleading filed on the same day as its Answer in this case. Motorola was well aware of its jury right in the contract case, and deliberately waived it. The fact that Microsoft’s breach of contract action, in which neither party demanded a trial by jury, has been consolidated with Motorola’s patent case, in which Motorola demanded a jury trial only as to patent issues, does not cure Motorola’s jury trial waiver in the contract action. Motorola apparently would now prefer that this case be tried to a jury rather than the bench, but the Rules do not provide that option. Because Motorola has waived any jury right in this case, the liability phase of Microsoft’s breach of contract case, like the RAND determination phase, should be a bench trial.
Of course, this is Microsoft, so that's only part of the story. Motorola, it turns out, has asked for a jury trial, and this motion is asking the judge to rule that it's too late because of various federal rules whereby one must dot one's I's and cross one's T's by a certain deadline.
I’ve always conducted myself in a fair, balanced, and proper way. If somebody had asked me for an extension under the circumstances noted, I would feel perfectly comfortable saying fine, no problem, because I know that there will come a time, probably in the same lawsuit, where I might have to request the same thing, and what goes around comes around. You can win on the merits and you don’t have to win playing games with deadlines and things like that. So I’ve always conducted myself that way. I think that has made a difference in my career. In the course of practicing law you come across a lot of people either as clients or as adversaries or as simply colleagues, and people quickly learn who you are and what kind of a character you have and what kind of a person you are. And when luck comes you’re way it’s awfully nice to be recognized as a decent, upfront guy.
With that in mind, now take a look at the arguments Microsoft raises to try to rob Motorola of a jury trial. This litigation began as two cases. Microsoft started it by filing a breach of contract case in Seattle, this very one, #1823 [PDF], alleging that Motorola was breaching its contractual FRAND obligations by asking for too much for its patents. Then Motorola filed a defensive patent infringement action in Wisconsin, asking for a jury trial, and Microsoft answered with counterclaims that pretty much matched its breach of contract claims in Seattle. Then the two cases got consolidated. It's actually a bit more complicated, but that's the important part.
It wasn't Motorola that wanted to consolidate in Seattle. It filed in Wisconsin after Microsoft filed in Seattle, so it was hoping against hope not to end up with everything being decided there. Nobody wants to go against Microsoft in its own backyard, I think we may assume. And watching this case unfold, I think you can see why. You can read the judge's history of how it all happened in this order, #66 [PDF], which issued on May 31, 2011. In it, the judge notes that when Microsoft filed its answer to Motorola's patent infringement claims, it filed more or less the same breach of contract issues as in its own contract case, and that's why the judge in Wisconsin pushed them together into one case. And there they are.
Somewhere in that process of consolidation, Microsoft seems to think it has caught Motorola having dropped a stitch with respect to asking for a jury trial. Motorola wants a jury trial, and Microsoft doesn't and Microsoft thinks it's found a way to say it's too late to ask for it now.
The right to a jury trial “depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action.” Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970). As Motorola’s pleadings confirm, the “issues” tried in the breach trial would not overlap with Motorola’s 343 Patent Case. Even in answering Microsoft’s counterclaims in the 343 Patent Case, Motorola did not make a general jury demand, but requested a jury only on “claims arising under the Patent Laws of the United States”—explicitly leaving out Microsoft’s defenses sounding in contract. (Dkt. No. 67 at 2.) And Motorola concedes that Microsoft’s breach of contract claim is not one “arising under the Patent Laws,” having appealed the Court’s preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit (see Dkt. No. 303), and not the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit “in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents”); see also Gunn v. Minton, _ U.S._, _ S. Ct._, 2013 U.S. Lexis 1612, at *19 (Feb. 20, 2013) (noting the “exclusive appellate jurisdiction” vested in the Federal Circuit over “actual patent cases”).
So that's one key place where Microsoft pins Motorola to the rules, it hopes. But here's docket #67 [PDF], Motorola's answer, defenses and counterclaims to Microsoft's counterclaims in the case originally filed in Wisconsin as 3:10-CV-699. What do you see on page 1? Look right under the title.
Me too. It says "Jury Demand."
4.	Motorola admits that Microsoft has alleged its Counterclaims under the patent laws of the United States, 35 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, denies, however, committing any infringement or other tortious or unlawful act, admits that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1338(a), and denies the remaining allegations of Paragraph 4.
Those Microsoft counterclaims were, Motorola writes, alleged, it said then, under the patent laws of the United States, so that provides some context for the boiler plate language. And again, the breach of contract claims in both the Wisconsin and Washington State litigations, later consolidated, were the same claims. The judge says so in the #66 order, on page 3.
Also, Microsoft's counterclaims included one assertion that Motorola's standards-essential patents were not essential. On page 4 of its answer [PDF], you can see Microsoft saying that. How could that aspect of the case not arise out of the patent laws, even if the rest didn't, in that it's about whether or not the patents claimed to be infringed were in fact essential, valid? There's a lot of overlap, in other words, between the patent and the contract claims. That's why they are being handled together.
3 Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b).
So the judge can do that for Motorola if he wants to. Not that he's shown much interest in doing much for Motorola, which is likely why it very much would like a jury.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 and 39, Plaintiff Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) respectfully brings this motion to confirm that the breach of contract issues in the above- captioned case will be tried to the Court.
party seeking a jury make a timely demand, in writing and filed with the Court—and the failure to do so constitutes waiver. Motorola had two weeks from the filing of its Answer in June 2011 to make a jury demand, and it has never done so. Motorola noted in multiple status reports prior to its Answer that it was still considering a jury demand in this case, but decided not to make one. Motorola made a jury demand—explicitly limited to its H.264 patent infringement claims—in the consolidated patent case, in a pleading filed on the same day as its Answer in this case. Motorola was well aware of its jury right in the contract case, and deliberately waived it. The fact that Microsoft’s breach of contract action, in which neither party demanded a trial by jury, has been consolidated with Motorola’s patent case, in which Motorola demanded a jury trial only as to patent issues, does not cure Motorola’s jury trial waiver in the contract action. Motorola apparently would now prefer that this case be tried to a jury rather than the bench, but the Rules do not provide that option. Because Motorola has waived any jury right in this case, the liability phase of Microsoft’s breach of contract case, like the RAND determination phase, should be a bench trial.
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint. See Tarrer v. Pierce County, No. C10- 5670-BHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 47225, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2011).
“A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d). The right to a jury trial is waived by the failure to timely assert the right. See Wall v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 718 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1983) (where “jury demands were made almost a year after the last pleadings were filed, [party] failed to make a timely demand for a jury trial” under Rule 38(b)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39 states that “the court may, on motion, order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury might have been demanded.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b). A district court’s discretion to grant Rule 39 motions “is narrow . . . and does not permit a court to grant relief when the failure to make a timely demand results from an oversight or inadvertence.” Pacific Fisheries Corp. v. H.I.H. Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556–57 (9th Cir. 1983). “An untimely request for a jury trial must be denied unless some cause beyond mere inadvertence is shown.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Newport Yacht Club v. City of Bellevue, No. C09– 0589–MJP, 2012 WL 254013, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2012); Meeco Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Imperial Mfg. Group, No. C03-3061-JLR, 2005 WL 1459685, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 20, 2005) (noting near-uniform rejection of Rule 39(b) relief within the Ninth Circuit).
A. Motorola Waived Its Right to a Jury Trial in the Breach of Contract Case.
jury determination of the breach issues in the upcoming trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), (d); Wall, 718 F.2d at 909.
Motorola was keenly aware of its jury trial right as to the breach issues, but waived it nonetheless. The parties filed two joint status reports in this case in February 2011, and in each instance Motorola explicitly “reserve[d] its right to request a jury pursuant to Rule 38(b).” (Dkt. Nos. 44, 50 at ¶ 12.) Thereafter, Motorola decided not to exercise this right. In its simultaneously-filed answers to Microsoft’s breach of contract complaint and Microsoft’s counterclaims in the 343 Patent Case, Motorola explicitly requested a jury trial on the patent issues in the 343 Patent Case, but made no jury demand in Microsoft’s breach of contract case. (Compare Dkt. No. 68 with Dkt. No. 67.) Motorola made no written demand for a jury in the 14 days that followed the filing of its answer.
Motorola’s oral statement at the July 2012 hearing that it had “decided not to waive the jury trial on the breach of the duty of good faith issue” (7/9/2012 Hearing Tr. at 5:6–8) cannot cure its waiver. First, the statement on its face is not a jury demand. Motorola did not “demand a jury trial,” it only indicated a hope that the right it once had to make such a demand remained open—that is, it stated only that it had “decided not to waive” its right (presuming, erroneously, that it had not already done so), but not that it was actually attempting to exercise that right. Second, Rule 38 requires “serving the other parties with a written demand” for a jury trial and “filing the demand in accordance with Rule 5(d).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Motorola has done neither at any point in this case, even to this day. Third, Motorola’s declaration of potential interest in a jury in July 2012, even if it were treated as a demand, would have been far too late to be a timely demand -- the Rule required that Motorola make this election more than a year earlier. Wall, 718 F.2d at 909 (where “jury demands were made almost a year after the last pleadings were filed, [party] failed to make a timely demand for a jury trial”).
Even if Motorola were to move for a jury trial on the breach issues now, relief under Rule 39 would be inappropriate under Ninth Circuit law. Motorola’s initial reservation of a decision on the jury issue, followed by its jury demand as to the patent issues in the 343 Patent Case, and the absence of such a demand in its simultaneously-filed Answer in this case, reflects an intentional, strategic decision: Motorola apparently wanted a jury in the only portion of the two cases in which it was positioned as a plaintiff. Motorola’s failure to make a timely demand would not be excused even if, rather than reflecting a strategic decision, it had resulted from oversight or inadvertence. See Pacific Fisheries, 239 F.3d at 1003. The narrow grounds on which courts within the Ninth Circuit have granted Rule 39 relief confirm that Motorola’s decision to change its trial strategy mid-case provides no basis to permit a jury trial.3 Cf. Ruiz v. Rodriguez, 206 F.R.D. 501, 504-05 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (granting relief under Rule 39 where “plaintiff timely filed the jury demand and submitted it to a process server,” but “the process server apparently failed to serve the demand”); Jones v. Pan Amer. World Airways, Inc., No. C88-2033-DLJ, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13728, at *21-22 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 1990) (granting relief under Rule 39 where a party’s “failure to file a timely demand arose from the breakdown of his communications with his attorney,” who was “preparing to withdraw from the case” at the critical time).
Further, Motorola was aware that Microsoft disputed any jury right in this case at least by August 6, 2012, when Microsoft presented its waiver argument in its Opposition to Motorola’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: “Microsoft believes that any jury right as to the breach issues has been waived, because Motorola failed to timely seek a jury.” (Dkt. No. 374 at 3 n. 3.) If it was a surprise to Motorola in August 2012 that the parties did not agree on this jury trial issue, Motorola could have at least attempted a jury demand then (although it still would have been untimely under Pacific Fisheries). Instead, Motorola continued to wait; any demand made now would be even more untimely.
Finally, even if the high bar for exercise of Rule 39 discretion could be met, the Court should decline to exercise that discretion. A large portion of the record generated in the November 2012 RAND bench trial will be relevant to the bifurcated breach phase of this case. The Court heard extensive testimony concerning the purposes of standard-setting organizations; the rationale for RAND commitments; industry concerns about hold-up and patent stacking; principles of RAND valuation; the relationship between the H.264 and 802.11 standards and Microsoft’s products; the relationship between Motorola’s H.264 and 802.11 patents and Microsoft’s products; and Motorola’s licensing history of its standard-essential patents, including its patent suits against standards-implementers. A jury trial for the breach phase of the case would require extensive, unnecessary, and inefficient duplication of that testimony from the RAND trial, at a significant cost of judicial resources. In contrast, a bench trial will permit the parties and the Court to cite and efficiently reference the entirety of the RAND trial record, and the proceedings can immediately focus on the issues remaining in the case.
B.	The Breach Trial Presents No Issues on Which Motorola Has a Jury Right.
pleadings confirm, the “issues” tried in the breach trial would not overlap with Motorola’s 343 Patent Case. Even in answering Microsoft’s counterclaims in the 343 Patent Case, Motorola did not make a general jury demand, but requested a jury only on “claims arising under the Patent Laws of the United States”—explicitly leaving out Microsoft’s defenses sounding in contract. (Dkt. No. 67 at 2.) And Motorola concedes that Microsoft’s breach of contract claim is not one “arising under the Patent Laws,” having appealed the Court’s preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit (see Dkt. No. 303), and not the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit “in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents”); see also Gunn v. Minton, _ U.S._, _ S. Ct._, 2013 U.S. Lexis 1612, at *19 (Feb. 20, 2013) (noting the “exclusive appellate jurisdiction” vested in the Federal Circuit over “actual patent cases”).
The issues in Microsoft’s breach of contract claim and Motorola’s patent claims are factually distinct, as reflected both in Motorola’s circumscribed jury demand and in its decision to appeal the breach of contract preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. The Court recognized as much in its consolidation order. (See Dkt. No. 66 at 10–11.) While Motorola would have been entitled to a jury determination of damages in the 343 Patent Case (if that case were not mooted by the forthcoming RAND license, and if Motorola were to establish infringement of any remaining valid claims of its asserted H.264 patents), having acceded to the Court’s determination of RAND in the bench trial, nothing would remain for a jury to decide on damages. The remaining issue for the breach trial—whether Motorola breached the duty of good faith inherent in its RAND commitment—could have no impact on the 343 Patent case.
C. Consolidation Does Not Grant Motorola Any Jury Rights.
ordering a separate trial [in a consolidated case], the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.”); 9A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2391 (3d ed.) (“Federal Rule 42(b) may not be used in a way that defeats any right of one or both of the parties to a jury trial on a particular issue.”), consolidation does not transfer Motorola’s patent jury demand to the contract case. As the Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496–97 (1933), “consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another.” Further, at the time the Court consolidated the cases, Motorola had not yet answered Microsoft’s complaint in this case, meaning it still had the right to demand a jury. But when Motorola answered the complaint and 343 Patent Case counterclaims two weeks later, it explicitly elected a jury as to the patent claims in the 343 Patent Case, and not as to any issue in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, Microsoft respectfully requests that the Court enter an order confirming that the upcoming breach of contract trial will be a bench trial.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2013.
By _s/ Arthur W. Harrigan, Jr.
1 All references to docket entries are for Microsoft’s breach of contract case, No. 2:10-cv-01823-JLR, unless otherwise specified.
2 Motorola’s other Western District of Wisconsin case alleged infringement of 802.11 standard-essential patents, and was stayed pending resolution of Motorola’s ITC action against Microsoft on those patents.
3 Even if Motorola believed—erroneously and inconsistently with its narrow jury demand on patent issues alone in the 343 Patent Case—that the parties’ jury demands in the 343 Patent Case would carry over to this case by virtue of consolidation or because of an overlap in jury-triable issues, see Section III.B, III.C, infra, that mistake of law would provide no basis for relief under Rule 39(b). See Pacific Fisheries, 239 F.3d at 1003 (“[A]n untimely jury demand due to legal mistake does not broaden the district court's narrow discretion to grant the demand.”). Further, while Microsoft’s original answer and counterclaims the 343 Patent Case—prior to transfer from the Western District of Wisconsin—repeated Motorola’s jury demand (as to “all issues triable by jury in this action”), Microsoft’s counterclaim concerning breach of contract was alleged in the alternative, “subject to resolution” of Microsoft’s motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer the patent case to Seattle. (Dkt No. 37, 343 Patent Case at ¶ 21.) Once Microsoft’s motion was granted, Microsoft’s breach counterclaim dropped out of the 343 Patent Case. Cf. Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1213 (D. Or. 2012) (where a party prevailed on a first claim, a second claim “plead as an alternative to the First” was moot); Constellation Power Source, Inc. v. Select Energy, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 187, 219 (D. Conn. 2006) (same); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Doctors Co., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1152 (D. Haw. 2003) (same).

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