Source: https://www.bcpersonalinjurylawblog.com/blog-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:15:45+00:00

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This is an appeal from a summary trial judgment that found the City of Salmon Arm (“City”) liable in negligence for injuries suffered when Cindy Lee Binette tripped over the metal base of a broken traffic sign that was protruding from the sidewalk.
 In my view, the judge correctly approached the issue as being whether the City breached its standard of care by failing to follow its standard practice in circumstances that it knew or ought to have known created an immediate hazard in a particular area. This is not a question about the general policy of replacing signs of different types. As such, this case does not have implications for that general policy and does not alter it in the ways the City contended on appeal. Rather, the appeal turns on whether the trial judge was entitled to make certain critical findings of fact sufficient to trigger the City’s standard practice in responding to an immediate hazard. I will address that question first.
 Based on the judge’s findings, the City knew of the potential hazard, knew why it could not be dealt with immediately, and knew the vicinity of the potential hazard. The judge concluded that making no effort to prioritize dealing with identifying the location of the hazard as soon as it would reasonably be possible to do so, that is, when the snow in that area had disappeared, was a breach of its standard practice and the standard of care. Those conclusions were open to him on the evidence.
 The judge did not, nor do I intend to, comment on exactly what was required of the City in these circumstances. That decision rests with the City. The issue here is not the sufficiency of the actions taken but the lack of action. The City did not make best efforts, regardless of what those efforts would or could have been. The City needed to address the hazard as soon as reasonably possible. The judge concluded, based on the lack of any snow banks in the photos, that the area had been snow free for some time and that if best efforts had been used the hazard would have been identified and dealt with.
 Counsel for the defendants opposed the application for an adjournment, and observed that the trial had already been adjourned once from the first date set, November 16, 2015, to allow for Ms. Bolin’s medical treatment. In opposing an adjournment, the defendants emphasized the trial preparation already completed, said they were ready for trial, and stated that a delay would entail further discoveries and a further independent medical examination so as to make available for trial evidence of the plaintiffs current situation.
 In this case not only did the judge not hear out counsel for the defendants on the matter of costs, he then gave no reason for departing from the approach applied in those cases which I consider illustrate the approach usually brought to bear in such circumstances. While the judge had discretion to take a different path than is commonly taken, I consider that some explanation, however brief, then should have been given so as to allow this court to review the order.
a) The appropriate test for causation is the “but for” test, except in rare circumstances unrelated to this appeal: Clements.
b) Courts must take a common-sense approach to “but for” causation rather than requiring certain or scientific proof of causation: Snell at 328; Clements at para. 9.
c) The burden of proof remains with the plaintiff: Snell at 330. However, as in other fact-finding contexts, a court may infer “but for” causation based on an assessment of all the evidence if the defendant fails to introduce sufficient evidence contrary to the plaintiff’s theory of causation: Clements at paras. 10–11.
d) In determining whether the defendant has introduced sufficient evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s theory of causation, the trier of fact may consider the relative positions of the parties to adduce evidence on causation: Benhaim at para. 54. In other words, evidence should be “weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced and in the power of the other to have contradicted”: Blatch v. Archer (1774), 98 E.R. 969 at 970, cited in Clements at para. 11, Benhaim at para. 48.
e) Even if the defendant’s negligence created causal uncertainty and the plaintiff has adduced some evidence in support of its theory of causation, the trial judge is not obliged to draw an inference of causation against the defendant: Benhaim at para. 42.
f) The trial judge’s decision to infer or not infer causation is a finding of fact and attracts deference on appeal: Benhaim at paras. 36, 42.
 The plaintiff insurer claims sums totalling $73,421.88, plus punitive damages, for what it describes as a “straightforward case of insurance fraud”.
 For all of the reasons just outlined I conclude that the plaintiff has failed to meet its burden, on a balance of probabilities, of showing Ms. Mehat was not the driver of the van when it collided with the Sharma house on June 10, 2008. It follows that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the representations of the defendants were false.
 It is well known that there are inherent difficulties in assessing awards for hypothetical future events. It is often described as “gazing into a crystal ball” or “an estimate based on prophesies,” and the task is even more difficult when dealing with a young person who have not established a career path: Shapiro v. Dailey, 2012 BCCA 128 at para. 40.
 Ms. Pearson was 21 years old when she was injured. She was pursuing a university degree, and had taken time off from her studies to earn an income so that she could continue with her studies.
 I find that she would have obtained a bachelor’s degree, although she may have changed the direction of the course of her studies to focus on her strengths rather than her relative weaknesses in mathematics. Given her personality, her work history, particularly as relayed by Ms. Kingston, Ms. Pearson was exceptional and highly motivated. Ms. Cameron agreed that Ms. Kingston’s description of Ms. Pearson in the workplace is a description of someone with a high degree of emotional intelligence. The components of emotional intelligence include self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation or a passion for work that goes beyond status or money, and the necessary social skills to manage relationships and build networks.
 Ms. Pearson was only 21 at the time of the accident. However, she possessed the attributes to be exceptional at whatever she pursued. The average full-time full-year earnings for a BC female with a bachelor’s degree, excluding law, for all ages, in 2017 dollars, is $66,927, based on the 2011 National Household Survey. The earnings of those in the 70th, 80th and 90th percentile, is $81,274, $90,360, and $104,096, respectively.
 Assuming that Ms. Pearson earned an average of $15,000 over her expected lifetime, and based on the economic multiplier, her lifetime with injury earnings is $299,175. Had the accident not occurred her earnings would have ranged from approximately $1,036,000 (economic multiplier) based on the average earnings, to approximately $1,800,000.
 I conclude that Ms. Pearson has established that there is a real and substantial possibility that she would earn more than the average female with a bachelor’s degree, she would have worked in sports marketing or a similar field, and she would have worked full time, except for limited time off for parental leave.
 I find that an appropriate assessment for loss of earning capacity on a capital asset approach is $1,250,000.
 Ms. Pearson seeks an award of cost of future care of $401,868.50, which includes the cost of the medical treatment that the medical experts recommend based on their assessments of her. The purpose of a cost of future care award is to sustain or improve the physical and mental health of the injured person based on what the medical evidence is reasonably necessary: Gignac v. Rozylo, 2012 BCCA 351.
 There is general agreement among the medical witnesses that Ms. Pearson needs treatment, although the names of the treatment may differ slightly. However, a multi-disciplinary intervention, physical rehabilitation and pain management program, or multidisciplinary chronic pain management program is necessary. This includes physiotherapy, occupational therapy to establish an initial rehabilitation plan, physical therapy, active rehabilitation with a kinesiologist, psychological counselling or therapy, and cognitive behavioural therapy or psychotherapy. She also requires prescription medication for anti-depressants, Botox treatments, and intramuscular stimulation (IMS) or myofascial trigger point injections, and after Ms. Pearson has plateaued following her rehabilitation plan, a vocational or career consultant, and life-long access to a gym.
 Ms. Pearson testified that she is willing to travel to Vancouver for the recommended medical treatment that she needs (assuming of course, that the treatment is not available in Squamish) and as set out in Ms. Craig’s cost of care report. Despite her anxiety with being on the Sea-To-Sky Highway, I believe that she will obtain the treatment she requires, despite the problems she has had in the past.
 Ms. Pearson has found IMS helpful for reducing pain, and Botox helpful for her headaches.
 Ms. Pearson is entitled to damages of $401,868.50 for cost of future care.
Court dismisses plaintiff's claim finding accident "never happened"
 The plaintiff, Rekha Chaube, seeks damages for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle collision that the defendants say never happened.
 The plaintiff said that as the taxi was backing out of its parking space, it collided with another vehicle that had apparently just entered the parking lot. However, the defendant driver testified that he saw the other vehicle and stopped in time to avoid a collision. The other vehicle and its driver remain unidentified.
 In a case where the conflicting testimony of the parties cannot be weighed against any other testimony, there is simply no basis on which I could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be more reliable than the defendant driver’s. That means that, on the critical question of whether a collision occurred, the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proof.
 Counsel for the plaintiff argued that, even if there was no collision, the defendant driver’s own evidence shows that he was negligent and that a sudden stop was capable of causing the plaintiff’s soft tissue injuries.
 The theory of a sudden, hard stop without a collision does not accord with anyone’s evidence. The plaintiff was adamant that there was a collision that she both felt and heard. The defendant driver agreed that his stop was “quick” and was necessary to avoid a collision, but did not agree that he had to “slam on the brakes”. He said he had travelled only a very short distance at a very slow speed.
 I repeat that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant driver did not meet the applicable standard of care. I find that she has failed to satisfy that burden of proof and her action must be dismissed with costs.
 Defence counsel seeks to have the jury instructed by the Court with respect to drawing an adverse inference as a result of the plaintiff not calling Ms. Feng Jian Zhang as his witness. Ms. Zhang is the sister-in-law of the plaintiff’s wife.
 The plaintiff’s wife testified that she and Ms. Zhang were close and that in 2014, when she was residing in New Westminster, she would see Ms. Zhang “very many times”. Ms. Zhang would also have seen the plaintiff although less often.
 There is also in evidence surveillance video which a reasonable juror may view as showing that the plaintiff does not suffer from a mental injury and he did not seem to have physical limitations.
 In my view, in the context of the claimed mental injury and the video surveillance, Ms. Zhang’s evidence would be “superior” to that of the plaintiff or of his wife who have a direct or indirect financial self-interest in the outcome of the litigation. It would also be superior to that of Mr. Qiu who only saw the plaintiff on three occasions. Ms. Zhang would have observed the plaintiff on many occasions and may have been able to testify as to whether the plaintiff, as he was shown in the video surveillance, was exceptional, typical, or otherwise.
 In the circumstances, I am satisfied that a reasonable juror could draw the inference sought. I will instruct the jury with respect to the possibility of drawing an adverse inference.
 The plaintiff is unlike the insurer who was on the defence side of the case. The insurer is a serial litigant that has institutional knowledge about the risks of trial and the legal and evidentiary issues that are common in these kinds of cases.
 In my view, it is unreasonable to expect a plaintiff suffering from this kind of medical condition to be able to make a reasoned, confident decision about an offer to settle in a high-stress situation on the eve of trial in the limited time of one day. The fact she earlier made a counter-offer within a day proves only that with her lawyer’s help she had the ability to react to earlier offers, but does not prove that she had time to react reasonably to the Offer made on June 2. In short, the earlier exchange of offers does not prove that she had reasonable time to consider the Offer made on June 2.
 This case was dealing with a plaintiff who had a serious claim with long-term repercussions for her. When receiving a settlement offer, she would need the necessary time appropriate to someone with her injuries in order to reflect on what might be in her best interests. To penalize her by depriving her of costs or awarding costs to the defendants for not making a split-second decision about something so important to her future would, in my view, be unfair.
 While the possibility of an unfavourable costs award should encourage settlements, the offer to settle rule is not intended to be a tool to impose high stakes last-minute pressure on an injured litigant.
 The accident occurred in 2012, four years before trial. There was plenty of time for the defendants to make a reasonable offer in a way that would allow the plaintiff enough time to reflect on it and seriously consider it objectively.
 I conclude that the plaintiff’s decision not to accept a ticking time bomb of a settlement offer delivered on the Thursday before the start of trial and open for one day only was not unreasonable.
cultural bias “needs to be considered in not only assessing this evidence, but also awarding compensation to the plaintiff for his injuries and the consequences of these Accidents”.
 This portion of the plaintiff’s written submission then considers in some detail authorities that have reviewed this issue in a criminal law context such as R. v. Williams, 1998 CanLII 782 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 1128, and R. v. Gladue 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 688, amongst others.
 In oral submissions, Mr. Jacobs’ counsel retreated significantly from the breadth of this submission. His argument appeared to finally rest with the proposition that if the plaintiff’s cultural background could be causally related to a specific head of damage then the court should take that into account in assessing those particular damages.
 At no point did I understand the defendants’ position to be what was implied in the plaintiff’s submission, that because he was of indigenous heritage the Court should conclude that as part of his original position he was susceptible to a life of alcoholism or other forms of abuse which would likely affect his income earning capacity or things of the like.
 Rather, the defendants properly conceded, in my view, that if the plaintiff’s cultural background did impact upon a specific head of damages, as it related to him, then the Court could take that into account.
 As I will describe below, the plaintiff’s indigenous background is specifically addressed by Ms. Chisolm in her cost of future care report in relation to one of the items she recommends for Mr. Jacobs being a case worker.
 Apart from that I do not consider the “cultural bias” argument to be appropriate in the assessment of damages in this case.
 I accept all three witnesses who testified that Heliport Road can be referred to as a driveway which turns to gravel just shortly after the entrance and the fact that there is no street sign makes it completely dissimilar from a typical intersection.
 I find the defendant was driving without due care and attention and without reasonable consideration for others on the highway, in breach of s. 144 of the Motor Vehicle Act, considering that the motorcycles were there to be seen.
 Section 165(2)(a) of the Motor Vehicle Act as well obliges the defendant to bring his vehicle to the centre line, separating his lane of traffic from oncoming traffic before commencing his left turn. Instead, the defendant testified that his vehicle was in the centre of the lane before he commenced his turn, and indeed the plaintiff and Mr. Martinello gave evidence that it was near to the right shoulder of the lane.
 I find that the defendant did not activate his turn signal and failed to, otherwise, indicate his intention to turn left. Instead, he was manoeuvring to the right before beginning with a left turn. He also failed to perform a shoulder check. He failed to pay due care and attention to check the traffic behind him, instead, assuming he was alone on the road. The defendant failed to properly check his mirrors, if at all. Those motorcycles were there to be seen for quite a way as they travelled before the accident.
 As a consequence of his own negligence, the defendant was unaware of the presence of the two motorcyclists behind him and he failed to clearly indicate his intention to turn. I find that the defendant was in the best position to see the plaintiff intending to pass his vehicle but by not having adequately checked his mirrors or performed shoulder check, he failed to notice the motorcyclists: see Bathgate at para. 87.
 I agree that this is a close case, but in my view the chambers judge made a decision that was open to him on the record before him. I can see no reviewable error and would not give effect to this ground of appeal.
 On the second issue, the case management judge concluded that the issues would require a prolonged examination of documents and a scientific examination within the meaning of the sub-rule, but rejected the argument that the examination of these documents and expert reports could not be made conveniently with a jury.
 On this appeal, the appellant has not identified an error of principle in the decision of the case management judge. Her main argument is that the judge gave no weight, or no sufficient weight, to factors relevant to the application to strike. These factors may be summarized as the length of trial, the number of expert witnesses, the number of medical fact witnesses, the liability dispute and the complexity of the expert evidence, particularly in relation to the appellant’s medical condition.
 In my view, the case management judge in the case at bar considered the factors that were relevant to the disposition of this application and did not take into account any irrelevant factors. He did not make an error of principle but rather came to a decision that was open to him. I can see no reviewable error in his judgment. I would dismiss this appeal.
 The defence argues that the failure by the plaintiff to introduce engineering evidence of the collision is “telling” and that an inference should be drawn against Mr. Truax. I agree that the absence of engineering evidence is telling - there is no need to call such expert evidence when common sense prevails.
 THE COURT: The defendants in this medical malpractice trial have brought an application asking that I discharge the jury and, under R. 12-6(12), continue the trial by judge alone.
 The basis for this application is the closing address made by counsel for the plaintiff at the conclusion of this four-week trial. The defendants say the cumulative effect of the numerous alleged improper submissions cannot be rectified by cautions to the jury. They submit any attempts to rectify the transgressions will only magnify them in the minds of the jury members and enhance their prejudicial effect. Moreover, they say instructions to the jury to disregard submissions of counsel for the plaintiff could also prejudice the plaintiff in the eyes of the jury.
 Counsel for the plaintiff, not surprisingly, vigorously opposes this application. It is the plaintiff who sought a jury trial in this case, and her right to do so cannot be negated except in the most extraordinary of circumstances. Plaintiff’s counsel says this is not one of them. He correctly notes that there is a very heavy burden on the defendants in this case to convince the court that the jury ought to be discharged.
 Plaintiff’s counsel first of all revealed to the jury the terms of the arrangement between the plaintiff and the BCAS that resulted in them being released from the lawsuit. He told the jury that the paramedics were allowed out of the action “without paying a dime to the plaintiff” because in his opinion there was no case against the paramedics. He submitted further that blaming the paramedics was a “red herring,” part of the “fog” created in the case, clearly meaning “fog” created by the defendants. He submitted further that he, as counsel, was not in the business of suing people when there is no case against them.
 Plaintiff’s counsel went on to tell the jury that the “but for” test for causation was also known as the “so what” test, apparently attempting to downplay the test the plaintiff must meet as a matter of law. He also denigrated the expert evidence on causation, quoting Bob Dylan’s line “You don’t need to be a weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing.” He did not explain to the jury how that could be so, given that they have no expertise in neurology or emergency medicine.
 Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly told the jury to cut through the fog, implying that much of the evidence called by the defendants was an attempt to obscure the truth. He appealed to the jury to decide the case on the basis of their sense of justice. He stated that people have a “sense of smell and of taste,” and that similarly the jury had a sense of justice such that they would remedy the wrong done to the plaintiff by the defendant.
 Plaintiff’s counsel expressed his personal opinion that the plaintiff’s family were decent, honest people whom the jury must believe were telling the truth. He also expressed his opinion this was an honourable family who did not want the plaintiff to be a victim of negligence and did not want to bring a lawsuit against the defendants, hence, the decision to release the paramedics from the lawsuit without any compensation because there was no merit in the allegations against them.
 I have no doubt that plaintiff’s counsel was doing all he could to advance the plaintiff’s case, a tragic one, before the jury. Nevertheless, his advocacy in closing crossed the permissible line in too many respects to rectify.
 I have very reluctantly concluded that I have no alternative but to discharge the jury, despite the fact that they have heard four weeks of evidence in this trial.
 ...counsel for the defence determined to have a vocational rehabilitation assessment done and scheduled an appointment for March 24, 2017, before Dr. Colleen Quee Newell, a vocational rehabilitation consultant. Plaintiff's counsel took objection to the plaintiff's attendance at that appointment and indicated in any event that the plaintiff was going to be away at the time of that appointment.
 It appears that another appointment has now been arranged but with a different expert, a Dr. Dennis Magrega, who is an expert in vocational psychology, and his assistant Kim Eyrl. That appointment is scheduled for April 5, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. at the offices of IMA Solutions in Vancouver.
 Now, here we do not know specifically what issues Dr. Axler dealt with during the examination. We know what he was asked to do. We do not have a report. There is nothing in the material to suggest to me that there is some issue which has arisen since the time that referral was made which could not have been dealt with at the time of that examination.
 It is difficult in circumstances where a report of an expert with an overlapping expertise has not been produced to make a determination as to whether that subsequent examination is required for the purpose of levelling the playing field or addressing some issue which could not have been raised at the time of the original examination. The onus is on the defendant to establish those issues. I am not satisfied on this application that the defendant has done so.
 Voluntary attendance at a medical examination does not constitute a first examination under the Rule: Teichroab v. Poyner, 2008 BCSC 1130 at para. 24 [Teichroab].
 In contrast, the express mention of Rule 7-6 in the correspondence between counsel lends support for the plaintiff’s argument that the IME by Dr. Russell must be considered a Rule 7-6 examination.
 In my view, the wording of the Rule and the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the “further examination” contemplated by Rule 30(2) means an examination in addition to one ordered under Rule 30(1). To the extent that is so, there can be no question but that the examination ordered by the master was a first examination for purposes of the Rule. The examination carried out by Dr. Laidlow was not ordered under Rule 30(1).
 In the present case the examination by Dr. Russell was not ordered by the Court, there was no express agreement or reference to the examination taking place as if there were an order from the Court, and there was no mention of the examination constituting a first examination under Rule 7-6. The absence of that type of language distinguishes this case from Stene v. Echols, 2015 BCSC 1063 [Stene] and Stocker v. Osei-Appiah, 2015 BCSC 2312, both cited by the plaintiff. The mere mention of the Rule in the correspondence was, in my view, not enough.
 Accordingly, I conclude that the application for a neuropsychological examination of the plaintiff by Dr. Lysak was a first examination under the Rule.
 ...the Court must answer the narrow question of whether it is strictly necessary, in order to support a finding of legally compensable mental injury, for a claimant to adduce expert evidence or other proof of a recognized psychiatric illness.
 ... Canadian negligence law recognizes that a duty exists at common law to take reasonable care to avoid causing foreseeable mental injury, and that this cause of action protects a right to be free from negligent interference with one’s mental health. That right is grounded in the simple truth that a person’s mental health — like a person’s physical integrity or property, injury to which is also compensable in negligence law — is an essential means by which that person chooses to live life and pursue goals (A. Ripstein, Private Wrongs (2016), at pp. 87 and 252-53). And, where mental injury is negligently inflicted, a person’s autonomy to make those choices is undeniably impaired, sometimes to an even greater degree than the impairment which follows a serious physical injury (Bourhill v. Young,  A.C. 92 (H.L.), at p. 103; Toronto Railway, at p. 276). To put the point more starkly, “[t]he loss of our mental health is a more fundamental violation of our sense of self than the loss of a finger” (Stevens, at p. 55).
 The defendants’ counsel submits that Mr. Ackermann should be assigned at least 25% fault because of his failure to wear a seatbelt.
 On the question of what role wearing his seatbelt could have played in preventing Mr. Ackermann’s injuries, the defendants’ counsel submits that, despite the subjective impressions of the occupants, this was not such an extreme collision that wearing it would have been rendered useless. It was a side-swipe rather than head on collision; there was no major intrusion into the cabin area, and none where Mr. Ackermann was sitting; the occupants were able to leave the truck themselves; and Mr. Ackermann’s other injuries were minor and healed soon after.
 ...Where I conclude that the defendants fall short is my ability to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that his wrist injury would not have occurred, or not been as severe. We do not know, because Mr. Ackermann could not describe it, where in the course of the accident his wrist was injured. We know, because it was Ms. Martens’ evidence and the basis of her injury claim, that some part of his body struck her shoulder, but no specific probable mechanism of injury to him emerges. And balanced against the theory that it occurred due to his ejection from his position is his evidence that he bent down and covered his head before impact, which adds a reasonable possibility that his wrist was injured when he was still in a position to which a seatbelt would have confined him. I think a resolution of this question to the required standard would have required some evidence of the post-accident dynamics of a person in Mr. Ackermann’s location and bodily position, with and without the seatbelt, and an attempt to link his wrist injury with his likely route of travel to his resting position.
 On the current evidence I conclude that the defendants have not met their burden and I am therefore unable to attribute fault to Mr. Ackermann for his injuries to any degree.

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