Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/278/278mass309.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:15:22+00:00

Document:
HELEN L. ELDRIDGE vs. JOSEPH I. ELDRIDGE.
(2) Divorce Rule 4 of the Probate Court, respecting the filing of a statement, verified by affidavit, of objections to an absolute decree of divorce to prevent its entry, was not applicable.
order of the court," of a certain sum per week "toward her support and the support and maintenance of their minor child," comes to an end upon the entry of a decree dismissing the libel if no further order is made as to such payments, even though the libellant appeals from such final decree.
LIBEL for divorce, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Middlesex on November 15, 1928.
Pleadings and proceedings in the Probate Court before, Harris, J., are described in the opinion.
W. A. Graustein, attorney in fact, for the libellant.
R. Clayton, (L. A. Pike with him,) for the libellee.
CROSBY, J. This is a libel for divorce, filed on November 15, 1928, in the Probate Court for the county of Middlesex, alleging adultery and cruel and abusive treatment. The case comes before us on appeals by the libellant from certain decrees.
the ground that condonation had not been set up as an affirmative defence by the answer to the charge of cruel and abusive treatment, although it had been pleaded as a defence to the charge of adultery. The judge further found that evidence was introduced at the original trial which would have warranted a finding of condonation. From the decree nisi the libellee, on September 19, 1929) filed an appeal to this court.
plained of, which occurred from December, 1927, until in September of the following year. The libellant on April 14, 1931, filed an appeal from the decree dismissing the libel, and on the same day filed a request for a report of material facts found by the judge. The judge filed the report on July 8, 1931, referring in the main to his decision filed on the tenth of the previous April. On July 13 the libellant filed a motion that the decree dismissing the libel be vacated for want of jurisdiction. This motion was denied on November 13 and the libellant appealed.
finding was justified that the libellant had condoned any acts of cruelty on the part of the libellee. In the absence of a report of the evidence the findings must stand. Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 45. Holsworth v. Holsworth, 252 Mass. 133. Webster v. Webster, 264 Mass. 551. There was no error in the decree dismissing the libel.
Divorce Rule 4 of the Probate Court provides in part that "At any time before the expiration of six months from the granting of a decree of divorce nisi, the libellee, or any other party interested, may file in the office of the register a statement of objections to an absolute decree, which shall set forth specifically the facts on which it is founded, and be verified by affidavit." It is the contention of the libellant that as the libellee failed to file any objections under the rule the decree nisi became absolute under G. L. c. 208, s. 21. It is sufficient to say that the rule is not applicable to the facts in the case at bar. Independently of the rule, a decree for divorce may be revoked or denied if against public policy or for any reason adequate in law. Goss v. Donnell, 263 Mass. 521. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 271 Mass. 386, 389.
alimony during the pendency of the libel." The order for the payment by the libellee to the libellant was "toward her support and the support and maintenance of their minor child," and was to continue "Pending the final determination of the matter of the within libel, or until the further order of the court." Although a final decree was entered in the Probate Court an appeal was taken from that decree. The allowance of alimony pendente lite is described by the terminology. This allowance continues during the pendency of the libel in the Probate Court unless modified or revoked. If no appeal from the decree dismissing the libel had been entered in that court, it is plain that the order for the payment of temporary alimony would have terminated. Although the order entered in the Probate Court was to continue "Pending the final determination of the matter of the within libel, or until the further order of the court," this order is to be construed as limiting such payment until the case is at an end in the Probate Court by the entry of the decree in that court. A decree for permanent alimony cannot properly be made under G. L. c. 208, s. 34, before a decree nisi in favor of the libellant is entered. As no new order was made relating to alimony by the Probate Court in the decree dismissing the libel or thereafter, the order for temporary alimony came to an end. A decree for divorce is not suspended nor are the proceedings stayed by the appeal unless the court so orders. G. L. c. 215, s. 23, and s. 24 as amended by St. 1926, c. 214. See Smith v. Smith, 184 Mass. 394, 397. If the libellant desired to obtain further alimony after the entry of the decree dismissing the libel she should have applied to the Probate Court therefor. Although no formal decree was entered dismissing the petition for contempt, the ruling that the entry of the decree dismissing the libel vacated and annulled the order for the payment of alimony notwithstanding the appeal therefrom amounted to a denial of the petition. The ruling may be considered, in substance, as a decree to that effect from which the libellant appealed.
the judge of probate. The libellant's requests for rulings were properly dealt with. It results that all the interlocutory decrees are affirmed. The decree dismissing the libel also must be affirmed.

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