Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/24/890.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:22:57+00:00

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Miller, Glassman & Browning, Jerome M. Jackson and Stephen D. Miller for Petitioner.
Robert E. Cartwright, Edward I. Pollock, Leroy Hersh, Stephen I. Zetterberg, Robert G. Beloud, Arne Werchick, William P. Camusi, Ralph Drayton and Leonard Sacks as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Wise & Nelson and Duane H. Timmons for Real Party in Interest.
We consider whether punitive damages (Civ. Code, § 3294) are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver. As will appear, we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of "malice" under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences. [24 Cal. 3d 893] Accordingly, we will issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reinstate that portion of the complaint which sought recovery of punitive damages.
Petitioner Taylor is the plaintiff in a civil action against defendant and real party Stille (and others) for damages arising from an automobile accident. Because the matter is presented to us following the sustaining of defendant's demurrer as to the prayer for punitive damages, the issues are framed by the allegations of the complaint which we now examine. In pertinent part, the complaint alleged that the car driven by Stille collided with plaintiff's car, causing plaintiff serious injuries; that Stille is, and for a substantial period of time had been, an alcoholic "well aware of the serious nature of his alcoholism" and of his "tendency, habit, history, practice, proclivity, or inclination to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol"; and that Stille was also aware of the dangerousness of his driving while intoxicated.
The complaint further alleged that Stille had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol; that he had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions; that at the time of the accident herein, Stille had recently completed a period of probation which followed a drunk driving conviction; that one of his probation conditions was that he refrain from driving for at least six hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage; and that at the time of the accident in question he was presently facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge.
In addition, the complaint averred that notwithstanding his alcoholism, Stille accepted employment which required him both to call on various commercial establishments where alcoholic beverages were sold, and to deliver or transport such beverages in his car. Finally, it is alleged that at the time the accident occurred, Stille was transporting alcoholic beverages, "was simultaneously driving ... while consuming an alcoholic beverage," and was "under the influence of intoxicants."
Based upon the foregoing allegations, plaintiff asserted in his complaint that Stille "acted with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff['s] safety. ..." In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiff sought $100,000 in punitive damages. Stille demurred to the complaint, contending that punitive damages could not be assessed against a negligent, intoxicated driver, at least in the absence of allegations to the effect that the driver actually intended to cause an accident or injury. The trial court [24 Cal. 3d 894] sustained the demurrer to the complaint insofar as it sought recovery of punitive damages, and plaintiff thereupon filed the present mandate proceeding.
 Although we rarely grant extraordinary relief at the pleading stage of a lawsuit, mandamus will lie when it appears that the trial court has deprived a party of an opportunity to plead his cause of action or defense, and when extraordinary relief may prevent a needless and expensive trial and reversal. (Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 144, 148 [145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669]; Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal. 3d 841, 851 [92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 479 P.2d 379].) Such a combination of circumstances is herein presented and, accordingly, we examine the propriety of the trial court's ruling in the light of applicable statutory and decisional law.
Plaintiff seeks to distinguish Gombos by stressing the additional allegations in the present complaint which include defendant's history of alcoholism, his prior arrests and convictions for drunk driving, his prior accident attributable to his intoxication, and his acceptance of employment involving the transportation of alcoholic beverages. Certainly, the foregoing allegations may reasonably be said to confirm defendant's awareness of his inability to operate a motor vehicle safely while intoxicated. Yet the essence of the Gombos and present complaints remains the same: Defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby. This is the essential gravamen of the complaint, and while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.
We note that when Gombos was decided it was unclear whether, as a general principle, an award of punitive damages could be based upon a finding of defendant's conscious disregard of the safety of others. In the evolution of this area of tort law during the ensuing 20 years it has now become generally accepted that such a finding is sufficient. Examining the pleadings before us, we have no difficulty concluding that they contain sufficient allegations upon which it may reasonably be concluded that defendant consciously disregarded the safety of others. There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who [24 Cal. 3d 897] is intoxicated. (See Coulter v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 152-154.) One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.
The allowance of punitive damages in such cases may well be appropriate because of another reason, namely, to deter similar future conduct, the "incalculable cost" of which is well documented. (E.g., Coulter, supra, p. 154.) Section 3294 expressly provides that punitive damages may be recovered "for the sake of example." The applicable principle was well expressed in a recent Oregon case upholding an award of punitive damages against a drunken driver, "the fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver is the cause of so many of the more serious automobile accidents is strong evidence in itself to support the need for all possible means of deterring persons from driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure to awards of punitive damages in the event of accidents." (Harrell v. Ames (1973) 265 Ore. 183 [508 P.2d 211, 214-215, 65 A.L.R.3d 649, italics added.) According to a recent annotation, the Harrell case represents the view of a substantial majority of those courts of other states which have considered the matter. (See Annot. (1975) 65 A.L.R.3d 656, §§ 3-4, at pp. 661-666.) We think it also represents the better reasoned view.
An even more recent official confirmation of the severity of the problem has appeared, under date of February 21, 1979. The Comptroller General of the United States in his Report to the Congress, entitled "The Drinking-Driver Problem -- What Can Be Done About It?" further documents the continuing tragic cost of drinking and driving.
It is crystal clear to us that courts in the formulation of rules on damage assessment and in weighing the deterrent function must recognize the severe threat to the public safety which is posed by the intoxicated driver. The lesson is self-evident and widely understood. Drunken drivers are extremely dangerous people.
It is argued that an alcoholic such as Stille lacks sufficient volition to control his behavior and, accordingly, that he should be excused and not penalized for his involuntary conduct. However, the question of volitional control or wilfulness is a question of fact to be determined at trial. Plaintiff's allegation that Stille is an "alcoholic," without further definition, is not conclusive on the volitional issue, for the term may well have been intended by plaintiff merely to describe one who knowingly drinks to excess.
Defendant's final contention is that many instances of simple negligent conduct not involving consumption of alcoholic beverages could also be alleged to involve a conscious disregard of the safety of others. For example, one who wilfully disobeys traffic signals or speed limit laws arguably possesses such a state of mind and culpability. That case is not before us and we express no opinion on it, holding only that one who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, "such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton." (Prosser, supra, § 2, at pp. 9-10.) Although the circumstances in a particular case may disclose similar wilful or wanton behavior in other forms, ordinarily, [24 Cal. 3d 900] routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.
In any event, we do not now consider whether other factual variations upon the theme herein presented would also be sufficient to withstand a demurrer. We conclude that the complaint in the present case stated a cause of action for punitive damages. To the extent that Gombos v. Ashe, supra, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, is inconsistent with the views herein expressed, it is disapproved.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to overrule defendant Stille's demurrer.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
Malice has been held to be present where a person acted with knowledge that harm to others was substantially certain or at least highly [24 Cal. 3d 901] probable. (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922 [114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 523 P.2d 662]; Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1977) 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 609 [136 Cal. Rptr. 787].) However, to take this idea and expand it to include a circumstance where injury to others is not certain is unwise. Persons who drive while under the influence often lack a conscious appreciation of the high risk of harm they may present to others. In contrast, in the products liability area, a person who widely markets a dangerous drug without the proper warnings is aware that injury will probably result from his acts or omissions. (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 32.) The decision to drive after having taken a few drinks ordinarily does not rise to a comparable level of conscious indifference to the safety of others.
In this particular case the defendant is charged with repeatedly driving while intoxicated after his own experience has made him completely aware of the possible consequences of his act. Therefore, in this particular case it may be possible for a jury to conclude that "the second time was no accident."
On this limited basis, I join the majority in holding that a question of fact exists for the jury as to whether this particular defendant acted maliciously with a conscious indifference to the fact that others would probably be harmed by his actions. To go any further would surely open a Pandora's Box of punitive damages.
I share the majority's dismay at the carnage on our highways. And if today's decision would significantly reduce the number of accidents involving drunk drivers, the majority might be justified in changing the law relating to punitive damage. However, today's decision clearly will not reduce the number of drunk drivers on our highways. We should therefore adhere to the traditional rule -- enunciated in Strauss v. Buckley (1937) 20 Cal. App. 2d 7 [65 P.2d 1352], and reiterated by Justice Peters in his careful and scholarly opinion in Gombos v. Ashe (1958) 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526-530 [322 P.2d 933] -- that driving while intoxicated does not establish the malice essential to an award of punitive damages.
The reasons for hesitancy in awarding punitive damages are obvious. First, the plaintiff is fully compensated for injury by compensatory damages. An additional award or fine from the defendant may constitute unjust enrichment. Unlike fines paid into the public treasury for public use, we may assume fines paid to private persons will not be similarly used.
Second, civil law is concerned with vindicating rights and compensating persons for harm suffered when those rights are invaded. Criminal law is concerned with punishing wrongdoers. In our tripartite system of government, the Legislature prescribes punishment for criminal conduct. (People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 514, 519, fn. 3 [156 Cal. Rptr. 450, 596 P.2d 328]; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 910, 917 [112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073]; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 410, 414 [105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921].) Ordinarily, the Legislature specifies the range of criminal punishment, and it is for trial judges or administrative specialists to determine the appropriate punishment within that range.
In addition, the trier of fact assessing deterrence should be advised whether the compensatory award will come out of the defendant's pocket -- thereby reducing his assets -- or whether it will be paid by a liability insurer. But "Section 1155 of the Evidence Code provides that evidence of insurance is inadmissible to prove negligence or wrongdoing. The obvious purpose of the provision is to prevent the prejudicial use of evidence of liability insurance in an action against an insured. [Citation.]" (Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 880, 891 [153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 329].) It is apparent that to permit punitive damages in accident cases will distract the trier of fact from its liability function, interfering with sound policies governing trial procedures.
In addition, if application of punitive award depends upon a fortuitous rather than an intended consequence of wrongful conduct, potential wrongdoers will not be deterred. They will simply assume the unintended consequence will not occur. This consideration has particular relevance to the instant case because the majority seek to deter drunk driving by enhancing penalty only when an accident occurs. Drunk drivers not [24 Cal. 3d 904] involved in accidents -- comprising the vast majority -- are not subject to the penalty. In an analogous situation, where it was urged that robbery would be deterred by applying the felony-murder rule to cases where the victim shot and killed one of the robbers, this court rejected today's majority reasoning. "An additional penalty for a homicide committed by the victim would deter robbery haphazardly at best. To 'prevent stealing, [the law] would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot.' (Holmes, The Common Law, p. 58.)" (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781 [44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130].) Similarly, if their mark is deterrence, the majority might consider Holmes' suggestion, applying the enhanced penalty to one drunk driver in every thousand chosen by lot. It is apparent that punitive damage awards will not have a significant deterrent effect in numerous situations.
Fifth, the prevalence of liability insurance in our society, requires that any evaluation of punitive damage in accident cases, especially in the context of deterrence, must consider the insurance factor.
This rule was recently followed in City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36-39 [151 Cal. Rptr. 494], the court concluding that malice imports wilfulness within the meaning of Insurance Code section 533, precluding insurance coverage. Although the case involved insurance company liability for punitive award only, the court relied on the code section which makes no distinction between compensatory and punitive award, and thus the decision encompasses compensatory damages. We denied a hearing on 28 February 1979.
Sixth, creation of the new punitive award appears contrary to the solicitude for injured wrongdoers reflected by the recent adoption of comparative fault. (Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 804 [119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393].) A plaintiff guilty of wilful misconduct may not recover any damages against a negligent defendant (Sissle v. Stefenoni (1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 633, 636 [152 Cal. Rptr. 56]; Paula v. Gagnon (1978) 81 Cal. App. 3d 680, 685-686 [146 Cal. Rptr. 702]; Kindt v. Kauffman (1976) 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 853-858 [129 Cal. Rptr. 603] [overruled on other grounds Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 389, 401, fn. 8, 404, fn. 10 (143 Cal.Rptr. 13)]). Because malice imports wilfulness, intoxicated drivers will be barred from any recovery against negligent defendants.
Civil Code section 3294 provides: "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." Plaintiff does not claim that a punitive award may be sustained on the basis of oppression or fraud; the sole ground urged is malice.
In the second situation, punitive damages have been awarded on a theory of conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights where although injury to the plaintiff was uncertain, it was probable that the outrageous conduct would result in injury to someone either by maintaining a condition that would ultimately cause harm to someone (Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. (1977) 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 607-609 [136 Cal.Rptr. 787]) or by widely distributing a known dangerous product (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 32; Toole v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc. (1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 713-715 [60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 29 A.L.R.3d 988]). When injury to another is the certain result of the defendant's conduct, or when injury to unidentified persons is the probable result of defendant's conduct, a defendant may be found to have intended the resulting injury.
While the majority purport to recognize that alcohol causes impairment of judgment and degeneration of driving skills (ante, pp. 897-898), they fail to give effect to that fact. It is rare that a person commences drinking alcohol with the intent to drive or to injure someone after becoming drunk. Rather, he typically sets out to drink without becoming intoxicated, and because alcohol distorts judgment, he overrates his capacity, and misjudges his driving ability after drinking too much. Such conduct hardly establishes the evil motive requisite to a finding of malice.
Although articulating a test based on probability of injury, it is apparent that the majority are not willing to apply the test. The test quickly becomes one of awareness of substantial possibility -- not probability -- of injury to others. In essence the test is negligence. The "real basis of negligence is not carelessness, but behavior which should be recognized as involving unreasonable danger to others." (Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 31, p. 145.) The difference between the majority test of conscious disregard of safety and the "real basis of negligence" is that under the majority test what should be recognized has been recognized -- engaging in conduct known to involve an unreasonable risk of harm is conscious disregard of safety. This is a negligence standard, not a standard for determining malice and evil motive.
It is clear that today's decision represents a radical departure from prior authority in this state. fn. 6 The majority have singled out accidents involving drunk drivers and are unwilling to apply the same principle to other cases of accidental injury. It is apparent that the only possible justification for permitting awards of punitive damages against drunk drivers is that it will substantially deter drunk driving, suggesting the problem is so great we should ignore as a matter of public policy the ordinary principles applicable to punitive awards.
The additional increment of deterrence created by today's decision permitting punitive awards will be marginal at best. When the punitive sanction is applicable only to unintended and unanticipated consequences of the wrongful conduct, its deterrent effect is diluted. It is further diluted when the imposition of sanction is not certain but is solely discretionary with a jury. Moreover, potential drunk drivers will probably not learn of the new punitive sanction. Because no significant deterrence is created by today's decision, allowance of punitive awards merely permits the jury to transfer funds from the defendant and his family for the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff and his family.
The concurring opinion, like the majority, gives a twisted definition to malice, one that does not fit the statutory definition and does not meet any commonly accepted definition of the term. To pretend that the basis of the award is malice can only cause confusion.
I share the common frustration in society's inability to eliminate or reduce the incidence of drunk driving. But I cannot join the majority's experiment, which is contrary to settled principles of law, unjust and will ultimately prove ineffective.
FN 1. Insurance Code section 533 provides: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others."
Civil Code section 1668 provides: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or wilful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law."
However, a number of reasons militate against change. If drunken drivers may obtain insurance protection for losses caused by conduct warranting punitive awards the deterrent effects of both the compensatory and punitive liability is further diluted. Insurance premiums will predictably adjust to cover the risk of the punitive award, the net result of punitive allowance being that society punishes itself for the unjust enrichment of few plaintiffs. If the award cannot be covered by insurance, there is danger that many persons who use alcohol will decide that insurance is pointless, refusing to insure at all.
In any event, speculation that California will depart from its traditional rule is unreasonable in view of the recent decision in City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., supra, 88 Cal. App. 3d 31 and our denial of a hearing.
FN 5. Establishing the test the majority rely upon G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22 -- a case where injury would be probable -- widespread distribution of a known dangerous product.
FN 6. It is suggested that in other jurisdictions punitive damages may be awarded for drunk driving. (See Annot. (1975) 65 A.L.R.3d 656, §§ 3-4, at pp. 661-666.) Justice Peters, considering cases from most of the jurisdictions set forth in the annotation as imposing liability, pointed out that those jurisdictions do not have a statutory requirement of malice. (Gombos v. Ashe, supra, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 530.) Moreover, when we add those jurisdictions that do not permit punitive damages in any case (see fn. 1) to those which have denied such damages for drunk driving, there is no majority rule.

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