Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/27/875.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:47:19+00:00

Document:
RUSSELL ALLEN NORDYKE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. MARY V. KING et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Richard Winnie, County Counsel; Richards, Watson & Gershon, Sayre Weaver, Paul Gutierrez Baeza and T. Peter Pierce for Defendants and Appellants.
Louise H. Renne, City Attorney, Joanne Hoeper, Chief Trial Attorney, Owen J. Clements, Chief of Special Litigation, Ellen M. Forman and D. Cameron Baker, Deputy City Attorneys for the City and County of San Francisco as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Teresa Highsmith, Assistant City Attorney, for the City of Alameda as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Law Office of Robert Zweben and Robert Zweben for the City of Albany as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Manuela Albuquerque, City Attorney, and Matthew J. Orebic, Deputy City Attorney, for the City of Berkeley as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Michael Biddle, City Attorney, for the City of Emeryville as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Charles Dickerson, City Attorney, for the City of Inglewood as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Charles Williams, City Attorney, for the City of Lafayette as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Tom Curry, City Attorney, for the City of Livermore as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Daniel S. Murphy, Principal Deputy City Attorney, for the City of Long Beach as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
James K. Hahn, City Attorney, and Carmel Sella, Assistant City Attorney, for the City of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Jayne W. Williams and John A. Russo, City Attorneys, Randolph W. Hall, Assistant City Attorney, J. Patrick Tang, Barbara J. Parker, Doryanna M. Moreno and Kandis A. Westmore, Deputy City Attorneys, for the City of Oakland as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Lombardi, Loper & Conant and George S. Peyton, Jr., for the City of Piedmont as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Michael H. Roush, City Attorney, for the City of Pleasanton as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellant.
Daniel J. McHugh, City Attorney, for the City of Redlands as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Samuel L. Jackson, City Attorney, and William P. Carnazzo, Chief Assistant City Attorney, for the City of Sacramento as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Robert Lazone, City Attorney, for the City of San Carlos as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
George Rios, City Attorney, for the City of San Jose as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Roy Abrahms, City Attorney, for the City of San Mateo as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Marsha Jones Mourtrie, City Attorney, for the City of Santa Monica as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Rene A. Chouteau, City Attorney, for the City of Santa Rosa as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Michel Jenkins, City Attorney, for the City of West Hollywood as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, Larry Hafetz and Judy W. Whitehurst, Deputy County Counsel, for the County of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Patrick Faulkner, County Counsel, and John F. Govi, Assistant County Counsel, for the County of Marin as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Thomas F. Casey, County Counsel, and Brenda B. Carlson, Deputy County Counsel, for the County of San Mateo as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Ann Miller Ravel, County Counsel, and Debra L. Cauble, Assistant County Counsel, for the County of Santa Clara as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Steven M. Woodside, County Counsel, for the County of Sonoma as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Barrie Becker and Juliet Leftwich for Legal Community Against Violence as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
David Durant for Youth Alive! as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Jones & Mayer and Martin J. Mayer for California Police Chiefs Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Munger, Tolles & Olson and Jeffrey L. Bleich for the Los Angeles County Bar Association, Beverly Hills Bar Association and Bar Association of San Francisco as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Donald Kilmer and Donald E. J. Kilmer, Jr., for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Trutanich ·Michel, C. D. Michel; Benenson & Kates, Don B. Kates; and Bruce Colodny for California Rifle and Pistol Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Mark Barnes & Associates, Mark Barnes; Law Offices of Jeff Caufield and Jeff Caufield for National Association of Arms Shows, Madison Society, Second Amendment Foundation, Bruce Colodny and Jess Guy as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
We granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for certification pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 29.5 to address the following question: Does state law regulating the possession of firearms and gun shows preempt a municipal ordinance prohibiting gun possession on county property? We conclude that the municipal ordinance in question, insofar as it concerns gun shows, is not preempted. Other aspects of the ordinance may be partially preempted, but we need not address these aspects in this case.
Plaintiffs Russell Nordyke and Sallie Nordyke (doing business as TS Trade Shows) (the Nordykes) have been promoting gun shows at the Alameda County Fairgrounds (Fairgrounds) since 1991. The Fairgrounds are located on unincorporated county land in the City of Pleasanton and are managed by an independent nonprofit corporation, the Alameda County Fair Association (Fair Association), under an operating agreement with Alameda County. The exhibitors at the show include sellers of antique (pre-1898) firearms, modern firearms, ammunition, Old West memorabilia, and outdoor clothing. In addition, the show hosts educational workshops, issue groups, and political organizations. The remaining plaintiffs are exhibitors and patrons of the show.
Alameda County passed in August 1999 and amended in September 1999 an ordinance (Ordinance) making it a misdemeanor to "bring onto or [27 Cal. 4th 881] possess on County property a firearm, loaded or unloaded, or ammunition for a firearm . . . ." (Alameda County, Gen. Ord. Code, ch. 9.12, § 9.12.120, subd. B.) The Ordinance recited as justification the epidemic of gunshot fatalities or injuries in the county ¾ in the first five years of the 1990s, 879 homicides were committed using firearms and 1,647 additional victims were hospitalized with gunshot injuries. The Ordinance also recited a July 4, 1998, shooting incident on the Fairgrounds resulting in several gunshot wounds and other injuries.
The Ordinance was subject to certain limitations and exceptions. County property did not include any " 'local public building' " as defined in Penal Code section 171b, subdivision c. (Alameda County Gen. Ord. Code, ch. 9.12, § 9.12.120, subd. C.) It exempted from the prohibition various classes of persons, including peace officers, various types of security guards, persons holding valid firearm's licenses pursuant to Penal Code section 12050, and authorized participants "in a motion picture, television, video, dance, or theatrical production or event" under certain circumstances. (Alameda County Gen. Ord. Code, ch. 9.12, § 9.12.120, subd. F.) The Ordinance would have, as one of its chief consequences, the effect of forbidding the presence of firearms at gun shows, such as the Nordykes', thereby making such shows impractical.
To prevent the Ordinance's enforcement, the Nordykes brought suit against Alameda County in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The Nordykes applied for a temporary restraining order, claiming that the ordinance was preempted by state gun regulations and that it violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. The district court judge treated the application as one for a preliminary injunction and denied it, finding that the Nordykes had failed to demonstrate probable success on the merits.
The Nordykes then filed an interlocutory appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which subsequently certified to us the above question. We granted certification for reasons similar to those stated in the companion case also decided today, Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 853 (Great Western).
The Nordykes point out that the Ordinance is more restrictive than state statutes inasmuch as the latter provide more exceptions to the general prohibition on possession of firearms. For example, under Penal Code section 831.4, a security officer appointed by a sheriff or police chief for the protection of government property may be authorized to carry a firearm. There is no exception in the Ordinance for such security officers. There is also no exception for animal control officers, who may be authorized by their employing agency to use firearms (id., § 830.9), or for officers authorized to transport prisoners, who may carry firearms under certain circumstances (id., § 831.6), or for retired federal law enforcement officers (id., § 12027, subd. (i)).
In sum, whether or not the Ordinance is partially preempted, Alameda County has the authority to prohibit the operation of gun shows held on its property, and, at least to that extent, may ban possession of guns on its property.
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and Chin, J., concurred.
The majority concedes that state law might partially preempt the county ordinance at issue here, but it concludes that the ordinance is enforceable against plaintiffs, because plaintiffs seek only to promote a gun show. The majority, in effect, reasons that, because the county could prohibit gun shows on county property, the county is free to enforce the totally different prohibition at issue here--so long as it does so against a gun show promoter.
The flaw in this logic becomes apparent when we consider a hypothetical involving the constitutional protection of free speech. Suppose the county enacted an ordinance prohibiting any and all speech favoring residential rent control--in other words, a content-based restriction of political speech that would clearly violate First Amendment principles. A billboard company seeks to display billboard advertisements promoting rent control and challenges the ordinance on First Amendment grounds. In those circumstances, I [27 Cal. 4th 886] doubt the majority would hold that, because the county is free to regulate billboard advertising (see City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U.S. 789, 806-807; Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego (1981) 453 U.S. 490, 507-512; City and County of San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor Advertising (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 643, 658-661), it can enforce its unconstitutional restriction of speech against the billboard company. Rather, the majority would likely hold that the ordinance exceeds the county's regulatory authority under the state and federal Constitutions. Put another way, the question before us is not whether the county might be able to enact some hypothetical ordinance prohibiting what plaintiffs want to do. The question is whether the ordinance the county actually enacted exceeds the county's authority, which it does.
Significantly, this case is not one in which we are asked to enforce an independent provision in an ordinance after severing a preempted provision. (See, e.g., Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 277, 292.) Rather, the provision that the majority enforces--the prohibition against possessing firearms on county property--is the same provision that conflicts with state law. Nor is this a case where the ordinance is ambiguous and might be construed narrowly so as to avoid preemption problems. (See, e.g., In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 205, 220, fn. 18.) No one could reasonably construe a general prohibition against firearm possession to refer only to gun shows, and no one reading the ordinance without the benefit of a law degree and a careful study of our decisions would guess that the ordinance merely refers to gun shows.
In short, we consider here a local restriction on firearm possession that directly conflicts with state law. The majority seeks to avoid the obvious preemption problem by the expedient of rewriting the ordinance to prohibit gun shows instead of gun possession. Alameda County might have enacted an ordinance prohibiting gun shows, but it did not, and the ordinance it did enact exceeds its regulatory authority.
The majority attempts to make the issue quite small, involving a restriction applicable only to county property (maj. opn., ante, at p. 884); the litigants, on the other hand, insist the stakes are large. It does not matter whether the issue is large or small, though, if the government exceeds its authority. As Judge Kozinski has noted, the small and superficially benign acts of a democratic government can erode personal freedom just as surely, and to the same end, as the large and malignant acts of a tyrant or dictator: "Liberty--the freedom from unwanted intrusion by government--is as [27 Cal. 4th 887] easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress . . . ." (U.S. v. $124,570 U.S. Currency (1989) 873 F.2d 1240, 1246.) Because the ordinance conflicts with state law and because I believe the structural constraints on government authority are equally as important as the substantive ones, I dissent.
FN 2. As noted, the Ordinance specifically exempts from its purview all " 'local public buildings,' " as defined in Penal Code section 171b, subdivision (c). (Alameda County Gen. Ord. Code, ch. 9.12, § 9.12.120, subd. C.) The meaning of this exemption, which is debated by the parties, is not included in the certified question and we express no opinion on this matter.

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