Source: https://www.texasappellatewatch.com/news/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:40:55+00:00

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This blog is for information purposes only. It is not intended to provide legal advice. For client reasons, we might not cover or comment on certain cases.
In its weekly orders (7/24/15), the Texas Supreme Court issued three per curiam opinions and granted no petitions for review. Click here to read the order list and access the opinions.
No. 14-0548, City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi -- This is a boundary dispute between two cities, where Ingleside's jurisdiction encompasses land on the shore side of the Corpus Christi Bay shoreline, while Corpus Christi's jurisdiction includes land extending from the shoreline into the bay. The dispute is about control over wharves, piers, docks, and other objects affixed to Ingleside's shoreline and projecting into the bay. The court of appeals held that the courts have no jurisdiction, because selecting the boundary between political subdivisions is a purely political decision. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the issue requires the court to interpret relevant boundary ordinances, not select the appropriate boundary line.
No. 14-0629, Kay Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp. -- This is an equitable bill of review to set aside a no-answer default judgment. The petitioners argued that they were not properly served with citation or with notice of the default judgment. They also had to admit, however, that they had failed to update their registered address with the Texas Secretary of State. The plaintiff in the underlying suit put the petitioners' old address on the certificate of last known address, even though the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the petitioners' new address. The Supreme Court held that there was a fact issue, because there was some evidence that the failure to receive notice of the default judgment resulted solely from the plaintiff's failure to properly certify the petitioners' "last known mailing address," and not from any negligence or fault on the petitioners' part.
No. 14-0667, In re Woodfill -- Houston residents filed a petition to have the city council repeal the city's equal-rights ordinance or put the repeal request before the voters in a referendum. Even though the city secretary certified the petition as sufficient, the city council refused to repeal the ordinance or schedule a referendum. The Supreme Court held that, after the city secretary certified the petition, the city council had a ministerial duty to either repeal the ordinance or schedule a repeal referendum.
I was privileged to represent Toyota in a case that broke new ground on mandamus law. In re Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding). In that case, the Supreme Court held that appellate courts can, in a mandamus proceeding, review the merits of an order granting a motion for new trial after a jury verdict.
I was also recently privileged to give a presentation at the State Bar Advanced Personal Injury Law Course on this subject. Click here if you would like to read my CLE paper, which discusses issues and cases that have arisen out of the Toyota ruling.
I will repeat this presentation at the Advanced Personal Injury Law Course on July 31 in San Antonio and on September 11 in Houston. I would be happy to try to answer your questions about this topic if you would like to call me (214-969-1678) or send an email(scott.stolley@tklaw.com).
In its weekly orders for 6/12/15, the Texas Supreme Court issued ten opinions and granted review in four cases. In a post linked here, Rich Phillips summarized four of the opinions and the four grants. In this post, I will summarize the other six opinions. Click here to read the order list and access all of the opinions.
No. 11-0481, Atkins N. Am., Inc. v. CCE, Inc. -- A road contractor sued the design engineer for extra costs the contractor incurred due to allegedly faulty design plans. The contractor lost on summary judgment as to three causes of action, on the ground that the economic-loss rule barred the claims. But in its summary-judgment motion, the engineering firm did not argue the economic-loss rule as to a negligent-misrepresentation claim. The Supreme Court ruled that whether the economic-loss rule barred the negligent-misrepresentation claim would be best addressed by the trial court on remand.
No. 13-0303, Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr -- In this inverse-condemnation case, over 400 plaintiffs blame Harris County and the flood control district for approving new development without mitigating resulting runoff and drainage issues, causing their homes to flood. The defendants asked the Supreme Court to find that their plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted. The Supreme Court declined, finding fact issues on whether: (1) the government entities knew that unmitigated development would lead to flooding; (2) they approved development without appropriately mitigating it; and (3) this caused the flooding.
No. 13-0709, Valdez v. Hollenbeck -- Over ten years after an estate had been closed -- and more than three years after learning that the estate had been significantly undervalued -- the heirs sought statutory and equitable bills of review to reopen the estate and sue the administrator. The probate court denied the statutory bill of review, but granted the equitable bill of review. The Supreme Court held that the equitable bill of review was untimely. Even if tolling applied, the tolling effect would have ended more than two years before the bill-of-review proceeding was filed.
No. 14-0216, Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P. -- An employee of a workers' compensation nonsubscriber was injured while remedying a dangerous condition on the employer's premises. On the employee's premises-liability claim, the Supreme Court ruled that generally, an employer does not have a duty to warn or protect employees from dangerous premises conditions that are open and obvious or are known to the employee. Two exceptions to this general rule may apply in premises-liability cases -- those involving third-party criminal activity or a necessary use of the premises. The employee also sued for the employer's failure to provide reasonably safe equipment necessary to perform the job. Since this "instrumentality" claim is based on nonfeasance, the absence of contemporaneous negligence does not bar the claim.
No. 14-0272, SeaBright Ins. Co. v. Lopez -- In this worker's compensation death case, an employee was killed while driving a company vehicle on his daily 40-mile commute from a motel to a remote job site. The job site was some 450 miles from the employee's home, and the employer required the employee to stay near the job site. The employee was paid a per diem for lodging and had a company credit card to pay for gas. The Supreme Court held that the employee was killed in the course and scope of employment.
In its weekly orders for 6/5/15, the Texas Supreme Court issued no new opinions and granted no petitions for review. Click here to read the order list.
Look for the Court to decide a number of cases this summer, since the Court has about 20 argued cases still pending. It is likely that many of the remaining cases will be split decisions, as those kinds of cases tend to take longer for the opinions to be written.
A new feature in TAMES (Texas Appeals Management and E-Filing System) automatically adds hyperlinks to case and statute citations in briefs filed electronically in Texas state appellate courts. Within 10 minutes after the clerk adds the brief to the court's server, the process will automatically run, identify the citations, and add hyperlinks. The process will run only on documents that are uploaded as "briefs" in PDF format that are text-searchable. This is similar to a process that the Fifth Circuit has been using.
I spoke to Blake Hawthorne (the clerk of the Supreme Court) about this new feature. He confirmed that it is already active on the courts' internal TAMES system. The process recognizes pin (jump) cites and will link directly to the cited page. Also, it can process both short citations (i.e., "999 S.W.3d at 2") and "Id." citations. Blake did say that an issue could arise with "id." citations in footnotes, because the system does not distinguish between body text and footnote text. It will just scan back up the page for the first recognizable citation and assume that the "id." points to that citation.
There is also a key caveat for citing unpublished opinions. Apparently, the functionality used to create these links is not accessible on Lexis, so the links will be to Westlaw only. Therefore, for unpublished cases, it would probably be a good idea to convert any Lexis citations to Westlaw citations (or at least include the parallel Westlaw citation) so that they will be properly linked.
Finally, this feature works only on the courts' internal systems. So, the automatic hyperlinks will not appear in the version of the brief that is posted to the court's on-line docket. They will be available only to the judges and court staff.
Last week on Twitter, Blake posted a link to a training video about this and some other new features in TAMES. If you'd like to see what the hyperlinks look like and some additional details about the process, you can watch the video here.
In its weekly orders, the Texas Supreme Court issued one opinion and granted no cases for review. Click here to read the order list.
The one opinion is in No. 13-0552, Shell Oil Co. v. Writt. While Shell was a target of a DOJ investigation under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Shell agreed to undertake an internal investigation and give the report to the DOJ. As a result of the investigation, Shell fired its employee Writt, who then sued Shell for allegedly defamatory statements in the report. The Supreme Court held that Shell had an absolute privilege, because Shell was a target of a proposed judicial proceeding.
As I reported on Friday, the Texas Supreme Court issued 12 opinions on May 8, 2015. In this post, I will summarize six of the opinions, while Rich will do a separate post about the other six.
No. 12-0255, Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC -- This case involves tortious interference with a venture to develop a gas field. The Supreme Court first held that there is some evidence to support the jury's finding that Phillips tortiously interfered. The Court next found no evidence to support two different fair-market valuations offered by Carlton, because they were too speculative concerning the amount of gas that could be produced. But the Court found that a market value could be extrapolated based on Phillips's agreement to pay $8.5 million for a 10% interest in the venture. Finally, applying Nevada law, the Court found that two of Phillips's entities had alter-ego liability.
No. 13-0042, Genie Indus., Inc. v. Matak -- This is a product-liability case involving an aerial lift that tipped over, killing the occupant. The lift was fully extended to its 40-foot height, and a worker on the ground, in violation of product warnings, raised two of the stabilizing outriggers in an effort to move the lift while it was still extended. The Court found weak evidence, but more than a scintilla, of a safer alternative design. But the Court then held that there was no evidence that the lift was unreasonably dangerous.
No. 13-0080, RSUI Indemnity Co. v. The Lynd Co. -- This case involves an excess policy providing first-party property coverage for multiple properties on a schedule. At issue was the interpretation of the alternative damages limits set forth in an endorsement entitled "Scheduled Limit of Liability." When a hurricane damaged 15 properties, the insurer measured the loss by applying the different damages limits property-by-property in a way that resulted in the lowest aggregate covered loss. The insured argued that the insurer could not pick and choose as to each property, but had to apply one damages limit to the aggregate loss. The Court held that each party offered a reasonable interpretation, making the endorsement ambiguous, and thereby requiring that it be read in the insured's favor.
No. 14-0175, In re Longview Energy Co. -- The court of appeals had ruled that the defendants could post a joint supersedeas bond in the statutorily capped amount of $25 million (rather than each defendant posting a capped bond of $25 million). The Supreme Court ruled that it did not have to reach this issue, because the Court characterized the monetary award as disgorgement, which is not "compensatory damages" and thus does not have to be superseded. The Court also ruled that, because of the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the defendants to produce ongoing post-judgment discovery about the operation of the oil-and-gas properties at issue.
No. 14-0095, Ventling v. Johnson -- This case involves determining the accrual date for post-judgment interest when there are serial trial court judgments resulting from serial appeals. The Court held that the prevailing party was entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of the trial court judgment that was reversed and remanded for entry of the judgment that the trial court should have entered. The Court applied the rule that post-judgment interest runs from the judgment date on which the trial court had a sufficient record to render an accurate judgment. The Court also ruled that the prevailing party was entitled to conditional appellate attorney's fees for pursuing her appeal (as opposed to the usual situation involving appellate fees for defending an appeal). Finally, the Court held that post-judgment interest on appellate attorney's fees begins to run on the date of the appropriate appellate court's judgment.
No. 14-0214, Andrews County v. Sierra Club -- Under the anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff can defeat the defendant's dismissal motion by establishing by "clear and specific evidence" a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question. In the recent case In re Lipsky, the Court explained that "clear and specific evidence" does not impose a heightened evidentiary burden or preclude the use of circumstantial evidence. The Court remanded this case for reconsideration in light of the Lipsky standard.
In its orders this week, the Texas Supreme Court issued 12 opinions and did not grant review in any cases. Due to the volume of opinions, we will issue later posts to summarize them.
In the meantime, click here to access the order list and the opinions.
In its weekly orders (click here), the Texas Supreme Court issued one opinion and granted two cases for review.
The opinion is in No. 13-0439, Ross v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital. In this case, a hospital visitor slipped on a wet lobby floor. The hospital argued that this is a healthcare liability claim that requires the plaintiff to file an expert report under the Texas Medical Liability Act. The Court disagreed and held that the case does not fall under that Act. In the process, the Court set out seven nonexclusive factors for distinguishing between cases that fall under the Act and cases that do not.
One of the granted cases is No. 14-0006, Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez. This is a retaliatory-discharge case. The principal issue is whether there is legally sufficient evidence of discrimination or retaliation.
The other granted case is No. 14-0574, J&D Towing, LLC v. American Alternative Ins. Corp. This insurance-coverage case involves a tow truck that was destroyed. The principal issue is whether the insured can recover loss-of-use damages for the lost profits suffered before the truck was replaced.
As I reported last Friday, the Texas Supreme Court issued 13 opinions on 4/24/15. Click here to read the order list and access the opinions. I will report on seven of the opinions in this post, while Rich Phillips has done a separate post about the other six.
No. 12-0946, In re Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC -- The plaintiff is a Texas resident appointed to be the next friend of some minor children whose parents were killed in a vehicle accident in Mexico. Because the parents and the children lived in Mexico, Bridgestone filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The next friend argued the Texas-resident exception, which says that the court may not dismiss if the plaintiff is a Texas resident. The Supreme Court held that the next friend's Texas status did not trigger the Texas-resident exception. The Court then applied the forum non conveniens analysis and held that the case should have been dismissed.
No. 13-0593, Texas Student Housing Auth. v. Brazos Cnty. Appraisal Dist. -- Created by a municipality, the Texas Student Housing Authority is a nonprofit organization that owns some student housing near Texas A&M University. During the summer, the Authority uses the facility to house non-college students attending summer programs and camps at A&M. The Court held that this summer use of the facility did not forfeit the Authority's property-tax exemption under the Education Code.
No. 13-0711, JAW The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co. -- The plaintiff owned an apartment complex that was damaged by flooding and high winds during a hurricane. The apartment complex's property-insurance policy covered wind losses but not flood losses. The policy also contained an anti-concurrent-causation clause, which essentially excluded any loss that was caused in any part by an excluded peril. Because the wind and flooding combined to cause the damage, the anti-concurrent-causation clause excluded the entire loss.
No. 13-0750, Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson -- The issue is whether the plaintiff lacks standing because it assigned its claims to its lender under a forbearance agreement. The plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss included an addendum that the plaintiff relied on to argue that it does have standing. The Court held that the court of appeals erred by not considering the addendum when deciding the standing issue.
No. 13-0966, San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas -- The plaintiff complains that her employment was terminated in retaliation for her complaints about a male employee who had invited some female employees to lunch. The Court held that the plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that the lunch invitations were unlawful sexual harassment, so her complaints were not a "protected activity." This meant that the water system's sovereign immunity was not waived, so the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
No. 13-1014, Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller -- The plaintiff sued a pharmacy that compounded a drug ordered by the plaintiff's doctor. The Court held that the pharmacy was covered under the Medical Liability Act, which required the plaintiff to submit an expert report. The Court further ruled that the plaintiff could not recast her claim as a products-liability or breach-of-warranty claim to avoid the expert-report requirement.
No. 14-0353, Van Ness v. ETMC First Physicians -- The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiffs' expert report in this medical-malpractice case was not conclusory, but was a good-faith effort to comply with the Medical Liability Act. The Court found that the court of appeals did not fully credit the expert's factual statements and opinions.

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