Source: http://linksandlaw.com/decisions-112.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:48:38+00:00

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Plaintiff British Telecommunications ("BT") asserts that Defendant Prodigy Communications Corp. ("Prodigy"), through its business activities as an Internet Service Provider ("ISP"), directly infringes claims 3, 5, 6, and 7 (the "Asserted Claims") of U.S. Patent No. 4,873,662 (the "Sargent Patent" or "�662 Patent"). BT also alleges that Prodigy induces and contributes to infringement by Prodigy subscribers who infringe the Sargent patent by accessing the Internet through the Prodigy service.
The Court has already construed the claims of the patent in its Markman Opinion. British Telecommunications PLC v. Prodigy Communications Corp., 189 F. Supp. 2d 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Markman Op."). Prodigy now moves for summary judgment of non-infringement under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, I find that as a matter of law, no jury could find that Prodigy infringes the Sargent patent, nor that Prodigy contributes to infringement of the Sargent patent, nor actively induces others to infringe that patent. I therefore grant Prodigy�s motion for summary judgment.
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no "genuine issue of material fact" and the undisputed facts warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). In addressing a motion for summary judgment, "the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought and must draw all reasonable inferences in [its] favor." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Whether any disputed issue of fact exists is for the Court to determine. Balderman v. United States Veterans Admin., 870 F. 2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1989). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The party opposing summary judgment "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F. 3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). Moreover, not every disputed factual issue is material in light of the substantive law that governs the case. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
As a general rule, infringement is a question of fact. SRI Int�l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985). However, summary judgment is appropriate if the court, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the patentee, concludes that no reasonable jury could find infringement. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n. 8 (1997).
Determining whether a device infringes another�s patent is a two step process. First, the Court construes the claims to determine their scope and meaning. The Court did this in its Markman Opinion dated March 13, 2002. British Telecommunications PLC, 189 F. Supp. 2d 101. The next step is to compare the allegedly infringing device against the claims as construed to determine whether the device embodies every limitation of the claims. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
A device literally infringes a patent, when it "embodies every limitation of the asserted claims." IMS Tech, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991). "Literal infringement of a claim exists when each of the claim limitations �reads on,� or in other words is found in, the accused device." Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., No. 01-1238, 2002 WL 1765989 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2002) (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d.3 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Amhil Enters. Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
Even if a device does not literally infringe a patent, it may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents applies when there are insubstantial differences between the claimed invention and the accused product. If an allegedly infringing device performs substantially the same function as the patented invention, in substantially the same way, to yield substantially the same result, it may infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 21; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods., Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The doctrine of equivalents focuses on the "role played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim." Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40.
Whether infringement is established literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, every element, or its substantial equivalent, set forth in claim must be found in the product in question. See Penwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987). No structural or functional limitation in the claim may be ignored. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 25. The Supreme Court recently clarified the law regarding the doctrine of equivalents in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). In Festo, the patentee held a patent on a magnetically coupled, rodless cylinder used in machinery. Id. at 1835. As often occurs, the patentee amended the claims of the patent during the prosecution. Id. The amended claims stated that the invention contained a pair of sealing rings, each with a lip on one side to prevent impurities from getting onto the piston assembly. The amendment also added that the outer shell of the device would be made of a magnetizable material. Id.
SMC began making a similar device that differed from Festo�s patent in two ways: it had one sealing ring with a two-way lip instead of two sealing rings with a one-way lip, and the outer shell of SMC�s device was made of a non-magnetizable material. Festo claimed that SMC infringed its patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
SMC asserted that prosecution history estoppel prevented Festo from claiming that equivalents infringed its patent, because the additional recitations in the amendment narrowed the claim to embrace only devices that included those elements. Prosecution history estoppel requires that patent claims be interpreted in light of the proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office leading to the issuance of a patent, and precludes the patentee from claiming any interpretations of its patent that were "cancelled or rejected" during the course of the prosecution of the patent. Id. at 1838. If a patentee chooses to amend his claims in light of a patent examiner�s rejection, then the patented invention does not encompass the original claim that was rejected by the examiner. Id. (citing Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 120 U.S. 222, 228 (1880); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1577-78 (Fed..4 Cir. 1997)).
Festo argued that prosecution history estoppel applied only when narrowing amendments were made for substantial reasons relating to patentability � for example, when the applicant made the amendment to avoid prior art, but not when an amendment was made for the sake of form. Id. at 1839. In a controversial decision, the Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that any narrowing amendments made during the patent prosecution foreclosed the patentee from arguing that equivalents infringed elements of their patent, even if the amendment was not made for patentability reasons. Id. at 1835.
The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that narrowing amendments made during the prosecution process did not automatically prevent the patentee from claiming equivalents. However, it ruled that narrowing amendments create a rebuttable presumption that they were made in order to obtain the patent. The patentee may then overcome this presumption, but only by demonstrating that the amendments were made for some reason. If he succeeds in rebutting the presumption, there is no bar to his invoking the doctrine of equivalents; if he fails, the doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied to that claim.
The Court noted that Warner-Jenkinson struck the appropriate balance between flexibility and certainty when it placed on the patentee the burden of proving that the amendment was not made for the purposes of patentability. If the patentee cannot provide this explanation, the court will presume that the amendment was for a substantial reason related to patentability, and prosecution history will preclude any reliance on equivalents for the amended element. Id. at 1841-42. So strong is the presumption that, "[W]hen the court is unable to determine the purpose underlying a narrowing amendment � and hence a rationale for limiting the estoppel to the surrender of particular equivalents � the court should presume that the patentee surrendered all subject matter between the broader and the narrower language." Id. at 1842.
Under 35 U.S.C. � 271(c), one who sells a component of a patented invention or a component used in a patented process is liable for infringement as a contributor if: (1) the component is a material part of the patented invention, (2) the seller knows the component is specifically made or adapted for use in an infringement of the patented invention, and (3) the component is not a staple article of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use. Knowledge that one�s activity causes infringement is necessary to establish contributory infringement. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Absent proof of direct infringement, there can be no contributory infringement or inducement of infringement. Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unltd., Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
BT argues that Prodigy infringes the Sargent patent through its business activities as an Internet Service Provider. BT contends that Prodigy�s web servers provide access to information in a manner that literally infringes the Sargent patent.
BT also alleges that the Internet infringes the Sargent patent and that Prodigy facilitates infringement by its subscribers by providing them with access to the Internet. BT contends that Prodigy contributorily infringes or actively induces the infringement of the Sargent patent by providing the necessary software and encouraging its subscribers to access pages of information from Web servers maintained by third parties. Therefore, BT argues, even if Prodigy�s servers do not infringe the Sargent patent as a matter of law, summary judgment should be denied because Prodigy infringes the �662 patent by making and using infringing remote terminals.
� "http" is the access method. This identifies the communications service. These include hypertext transfer protocol ("http"), file transfer protocol ("ftp"), gopher, mail, etc.
4.) Prodigy provides its customers with a series of products and services containing everything necessary to access the Web.
1. Each Web server on the Internet is a "central computer" as defined in the Sargent patent because each Web server has its own centralized data store.
2. HTML files qualify as "blocks of information" either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
3. Each URL address is a "complete address" within the meaning of the Court�s construction of the term, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. BT makes other arguments 2 but it is not necessary to reach them because its failure to raise any disputed issue of fact as to these points means that Prodigy is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. The Internet Has No "Central Computer"
The cornerstone of this argument is BT�s assertion that a central computer is not limited to a single computer as a matter of law. To support its position, BT quotes a statement I made in TM Patents, L.P. v. Int�l Business Machines Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) while construing the claim term "a multi-unit memory system:" Of course, the fact that the patent claims �a� system does not mean that IBM or some other party would escape liability for infringement by constructing two or three or even more such multi-unit memory systems and somehow linking them together or causing them to operate together.
Id. at 380. The flaw in BT�s cornerstone argument is obvious. Not only was I not construing the Sargent patent in TM, I was not even construing the term "central computer" when I wrote those words. I was construing the word "system."3 A system is not the same thing as a computer, and I never said that it was. A computer, according to the dictionary, is "a device that receives, processes and presents data," Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms 342 (Sybil P. Parker ed., McGraw Hill 3d ed. 1984), while a system is "a combination of several pieces of equipment integrated to perform a specific function" or "a group of related structures." Id. at 1600. Thus, the word "system" fairly implies multiple devices connected together. The Sargent patent does indeed cover a system, one that includes a central computer as one of its elements. BT conflates the system with the computer. But I made it clear in the Markman opinion (as the Sargent patent claims make clear) that the computer is but one component of the system. The patent claims as construed clearly provide that the central computer is one device, in one location. (Markman Op. at 10-11.) Just as a circle has but one center, hub-and-spoke networks have only a single hub. There may be other circles with other centers, just as there may be other hub-and-spoke networks with other central computers or hubs. But each system (network) of the type claimed in the Sargent patent can have only one central computer. Therefore, viewing the Internet as a system (as BT asks me to do), it does not literally infringe the Sargent patent, because it contains no such central computer.
BT does not dispute that this is the case. It responds, however, that its argument is not that the Internet has a centralized data store, but that each Web server (or central computer, as BT would call it) has its own centralized data store because it has a main storage device for storing HTML files. (Wah Decl. at �� 31-33; Wah Report � 176.) However, the claims of the �662 patent state that the centralized data store contains all of the blocks of information accessible by the remote terminals. (Markman Op. at 14.) BT does not dispute that there is no centralized data store for the Internet that contains all of the data remote users might care to access.
The Internet is a network of computers intertwined with each other in order to allow users around the world to exchange information. The whole purpose of the Internet is for the sources of information to be in many places rather than centralized. Any user can retrieve information that is stored on a Web server in any physical location, as long as that server is connected to the Web. For example, a Prodigy user does not have to rely on Prodigy to gather information from multiple sources and put it on its own server in order for a Prodigy customer to have access to the information. Rather, when Prodigy users connect to the Internet through Prodigy�s system, users can access blocks of information located on remote systems, e.g. a computer in Alaska, rather than Prodigy�s own computers in New York. This "network of networks" or "system of systems" allows users access to information from a variety of sources, in any location. BT cites the general rule that addition to an accused apparatus of one or more features than the claim requires does not preclude a finding of infringement. But what BT characterizes as "additions" are fundamental differences in the nature of the claim elements. As it did during the Markman hearing, BT would have me exclude the word "central" from the construction of "central computer." The Court expressly rejected BT�s interpretation by ruling that the Sargent patent claims a central computer that is a single computer with a centralized database. Because the Internet is not a computer network consisting of a centralized computer that stores all of the data accessible by remote terminals, Web servers on the Internet cannot literally infringe the �662 patent.
BT may not rely on the doctrine of equivalents to withstand Prodigy's motion for summary judgment. The doctrine of equivalents requires insubstantial differences between the patented invention and the accused product, as determined on an element-by-element basis. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29-30. Whether the differences are insubstantial can be determined by the function-way-result test, which requires that the claimed and accused elements "perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." Id. at 40; Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). In this case, the Internet fails the function-way-result test, because a central computer containing all of the data accessible by a remote terminal user operates in substantially different ways from the Internet.
patent. Consequently, the Internet does not infringe the Sargent patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Prodigy is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
While the phrase "located at predesignated sites such as consumer stores" appears only in the preamble of Claim 1, this language appears both in the preamble and body of Claim 25. Hence, the applicants specifically included this language in the claim not once, but twice. By virtue of its inclusion in the body of Claim 25, the phrase limits Claim 25. 289 F.3d at 810-11; see also Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that preamble term limited claim because the term was used in the specification as well as in all of the claims).
The term "central computer" appears both in the preamble and the body of claim 5 of the Sargent patent. Indeed, "central computer" appears three times in the body of claim 5. Since claims 6 and 7 depend upon claim 5, these claims are also limited by anything that limits claim 5. Indeed, the Court�s Markman opinion makes clear that the terminals claimed 5, 6, and 7 must be used in a system that includes a "central computer," as defined in claim 3. (Markman Op. at 30.) Furthermore, the Sargent applicant repeatedly distinguished the prior art during the prosecution of claims 5-7 by pointing to the claimed novelty of the two-part block of information and the manner in which such blocks were stored and accessed from the central computer�s main store. (Applicant�s Appeal Br. dated Jan. 5, 1987.) Thus, unless a Prodigy user�s PC is used in a system in which a central computer exists � or at a minimum is specially adapted for use in such a system � there can be no infringement of the Sargent patent. BT�s argument that the phrase "central computer" does not limit claims 5, 6, and 7 is thus without merit.
During the Markman phase, the Court expressly rejected BTs contention that the terms "co-stored" and "contiguous " in the Sargent patent are synonomous. (Markman Op. at 15-16.) While I did not include the word "segregated" into the explanation of "blocks of information" that I would have given to the jury, I did this because I had already included the word "separable" into the definition and did not want to confuse the jury by including a second word that, to me, meant the same thing. The word "segregated" was omitted from the definition of "blocks of information" because it appeared to me to be duplicative of the term "separable," not to remove from the claim the fact that the sub-portions are not intermingled. Alternatively, BT�s expert, Dr. Wah, states that it is possible to create HTML files so that "they have a top portion containing only information for display and a bottom portion containing only information not for display but including the complete assigned address for another HTML file stored on the same server." (Decl. of Benjamin Wah at � 22.) He illustrated his argument in two ways. Neither is persuasive.
First, Doctor Wah created web sites that he alleged were infringing and placed them on Prodigy's system.4 BT cannot claim that Prodigy infringes its patent, or induces others to infringe its patent, if it must invent the infringing device itself. "A device does not infringe simply because it is possible to alter it in a way that would satisfy all the limitations of a patent claim." High Tech Medical Instrumentation v. New Images Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that a camera that was "rigidly coupled to its housing" did not infringe a device that claimed a rotating camera, since the screws on the accused infringing camera would have to be loosened in order for it to rotate like the patented device). An example of this well-established rule of patent law is found in Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Linvatec Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 396, 396-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In that case, the plaintiff held a patent on a small plastic suture used to repair tears in the menisci of the knee. The accused infringer marketed a suture that was similar to the patented device but was made of a flexible material and had a hole running through the interior of the suture. The court found that the claims of the patent described a device that was rigid. The applicant distinguished his suture from prior art because the other suture was made of a flexible material that could not "by itself be pushed into a body tissue without the use of a needle." Id.
Dr. Wah further testified that, in order to create a "block of information" containing at least two complete addresses from HTML, one would have to link conceptually two distinct, bracketed "sub-blocks." Even after performing this conceptual reconfiguration of the HTML file, all of the HTML paragraphs containing URLs would have to be somehow connected in order for them to be configured as described in the Sargent patent. This is a far cry from the "neatly segregated block" the applicant discussed during the prosecution of the Sargent patent. (Applicant's Appeal Br. dated Jan. 5, 1987 at 12-13.) Consequently, I find, as a matter of law, that the HTML file that Dr. Wah presents as evidence of an infringing "block of information" according to the Sargent patent does not literally infringe the claims of the Sargent patent. BT is correct that there is no requirement that its expert analyze every available web page that it claims qualifies as a block of information. However, in order to raise a disputed issue of material fact, BT must identify at least one web page other than one it invented for the purposes of this lawsuit. It has not done so. Other than BT's general assertion that blocks of information as defined in the Sargent patent exist on the Internet, BT has not presented any other evidence of an infringing Web page, on Prodigy's system or anywhere else on the Internet. Since the one example that Dr. Wah identified as an infringing Web page (other than the ones he created) does not literally infringe the Sargent patent, BT's expert's conclusory statement that there are infringing HTML files on the Internet does not raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
BT cannot rely on the doctrine of equivalents to withstand Prodigy's motion for summary judgment.
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel prevents a patent owner from relying upon the doctrine of equivalents when the patent applicant relinquishes coverage of subject matter during the prosecution of the patent, either by amendment or argument. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Maylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Southwall Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A patentee cannot invoke the doctrine of equivalents to "embrace a structure that was specifically excluded from the claims." Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., Inc., 16 F.3d 394, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1994). During the prosecution of the Sargent patent, a new limitation was added to the phrase "blocks of information" in order to distinguish the Sargent patent from the Quinn,5 Fedida,6 and Cramer 7 references.8 To distinguish the Quinn reference, for example, the Applicant cited to several of its narrowed claim limitations: For example, there is absolutely no suggestion anywhere in Quinn that blocks of stored data should include a first portion containing information for display and a second portion containing information not for display but including the complete address for each of plural other blocks of information. Nor does Quinn teach . . . manual entry of keyed digital data of less extent than any one complete address but nevertheless uniquely indicative of one of the complete addresses contained in the second portion of the block of information (which contains the first portion then being displayed). (Jan. 26, 1983 Amendment at 9-10.) Because BT relied on narrowing amendments to overcome prior art, equivalents are unavailable with respect to these claim limitations. Warner Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33. Thus, BT is barred from asserting that Prodigy�s Internet service meets the above claim elements under the doctrine of equivalents.
BT argues in its Opposition Brief that the phrase "blocks of information" does not limit claims 5, 6, and 7. "Blocks of information" applies to the patent for the same reasons that "central computer" applies. "Blocks of information" is not merely a term that appears in the preamble of the Sargent patent to describe the purpose of the patent. This phrase appears in the body of the Sargent claims as well, and recites structural limitations of the patent. "Blocks of information" appears five times in the preamble and five times in the body of claims. Since claims 6 and 7 depend upon claim 5, these claims are also limited by anything that limits claim 5. Furthermore, the Sargent applicant repeatedly distinguished the prior art during the prosecution of claims 5-7 by pointing to the claimed novelty of the two-part block of information and the manner in which such blocks were stored and accessed from the central computer�s main store. (Applicant�s Appeal Br. dated Jan. 5, 1987.) Thus, unless a Prodigy user�s PC is used in a system in which blocks of information are downloaded � or at a minimum is specially adapted for use in such a system � there can be no infringement of the Sargent patent. BT�s argument that the phrase "blocks of information" does not limit claims 5, 6, and 7 is therefore without merit.
As explained in the Markman opinion, a complete address is not a virtual address. (Id. at 19-20.) Virtual addresses are not complete addresses because they require reference to other information. "A complete address is . . . more than simply the address by which the central computer is able to retrieve a block of information. The complete address calls up the block of information directly, without reference to another address." (Id. at 20.) Prodigy argues that a URL is not a complete address under the meaning of the Sargent patent because a URL does not convey the location of information on a particular computer. Instead, a URL requires additional information in order to pull up a web page from a server. When a browser accesses any content page on the World Wide Web, the browser first obtains the IP address of the server where the content resides before it can access the information. The browser makes a request to DNS to get the IP address of the web server which hosts the desired content. The user�s PC will access an external DNS server, or, if available, DNS information in cache.
This multi-step method is used for two reasons. First, numerical IP addresses are not as easy to remember as URLs with alphabetic names. (Clark Decl. at � 13.) Second, this system avoids having to change a URL every time the physical location of a web page is changed. (Clark Decl. at � 14.) For example, a user seeking to access a Prodigy web page would type www.prodigy.net to reach Prodigy, whether Prodigy�s servers are housed in New York or in Alaska.
An example of how the computer must access additional information is demonstrated by an extremely frustrating experience that Internet users commonly experience. If the DNS system is unavailable, the user cannot access the desired information. This is because the URL is not a complete address. Rather, it points to other information that must be accessed in order to pull up the requested Web page.
3. The actual path must be referred to other information in the form of a lookup table on the operating system�s file system to determine a physical address for the requested information.
Q. What if I typed an address and it was displayed on the screen and a runner looked at the screen, went through a phone book, and determined the physical address; would that be other information?
Q. You are saying any other information, in your opinion, is possible, as long as it is not virtual addressing?.
Dr. Wah is right about this, and unfortunately for BT, the term "complete address" as used in the Sargent patent means that the address really is complete, in that it does not require reference to additional information in order to retrieve the requested information. BT's interpretation would eliminate the word "complete" from the patented claim language, something this Court cannot allow. Thus, as a matter of law, a URL or even a subset of a URL is not a "complete address" as defined by the Sargent patent.
a. Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents is Barred with Respect to the Complete Address element because the Applicant Made Unmistakable Assertions to Avoid Prior Art.
During the prosecution of the Sargent patent, the applicant replaced the original claims with claims 19-22, 11 narrowing the literal scope of the claims. Because the applicant relied on narrowing amendments to overcome the prior art, equivalents are unavailable with respect to these claim limitations. Warner Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33. Thus, BT is barred from asserting that Prodigy�s Internet Service meets the complete address element under the doctrine of equivalents.
We find no indication, however, that the "Request Order" [taught by Tsuda] includes the complete addresses of the next block of information which is to be retrieved and utilized for display purposes as claimed. At most it would appear to us from a review of the [prior art] that the data included in the request order [taught by Tsuda] would be used by the computer (1) for determining such an address. (Appeals Decision dated May 9, 1983 at 4.) The Applicant made these arguments in order to distinguish the complete address from the virtual address and branching programs used in prior art. Consequently, BT is precluded from asserting that a virtual address infringes under the doctrine of equivalents because here, too, it made narrowing amendments during prosecution that limited the scope of the term "complete address."
b. Even if Prosecution History Estoppel did not Prevent BT from Claiming that Equivalents Infringed the Sargent Patent, Prodigy Would Still Be Entitled to Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law. URLs function in substantially different ways from complete addresses. URLs identify a computer and page by name, instead of by address. Indeed, a URL is the antithesis of a complete address, because it cannot call up a Web page without accessing additional information. In other words, a URL is incomplete. Since an incomplete address is the antithesis of a complete address, there can be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Because the Internet itself does not infringe the Sargent patent, Prodigy can not be liable for contributory infringement or active inducement for providing its users with access to the Internet. I therefore need not address BT's arguments concerning contributory infringement and active inducement in any detail.
BT�s argument that Prodigy�s Web servers directly infringe the Sargent patent also fails, because Web pages stored on Prodigy�s web servers do not contain "blocks of information" or "complete addresses" as claimed in the Sargent patent. Therefore, Prodigy�s System does not infringe the �662 patent as a matter of law, and I need not address Prodigy�s other non-infringement arguments.
In contrast to what BT would have us believe, there are no disputed issues of material fact in this case. Instead, the two sides reach vastly different conclusions based on the same set of facts. I find that, as a matter of law, no jury could find that Prodigy infringes the Sargent patent, whether directly or contributorily, either as part of the Internet or on its Web server viewed separate and apart from the Internet. Prodigy�s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted. The Clerk is directed to close the file. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
2 BT also argues that in PCs, the first and second portions of blocks of information are separated and stored in separate memories (or the separation and storage of HTML files is substantially similar to the separation and storage of blocks of information); a computer mouse is a keypad means and it provides for manual entry of keyed digital data; and a URL is not intended for display (or the URLs in the second portion of an HTML file are substantially similar to the second portion of a block of information).
3 Moreover, I was doing so in the context of a patent that is not even remotely like the Sargent patent. The quote is taken from the Court�s construction of the �342 patent. That patent is for a computer system that is able to detect and correct errors in data stored in the computer. The system uses an error correction code with the capacity not just to detect errors in data but to correct them as well, and spare disk drives to back up the corrected data, so that there are always two copies in the system.
5 The Quinn reference, U.S. Pat. No. 3,688,276, is a computer controlled vending and reservation system. In Quinn, a central computer controls remote vending machine terminals, and the computer acts as a memory storage for keeping inventory and accounts.
6 The Fedida �Viewdata� paper describes BT�s Viewdata system.
7 The Cramer reference, U.S. Pat. No. 4,065,810 describes a data transfer system allowing a terminal to use a modem to access data stored in a memory store.
8 Claim 19, which became issued claim 1 after subsequent amendments, introduced the limitation that the blocks of information contain the complete address for each of plural other blocks of information in the second portion of the block. This claim also introduced the "further memory means" limitation and the use of keyed digital data to select the next complete address.
9 The Court did not need additional briefing from BT on this issue because Warner-Jenkinson remained the law, even before the Supreme Court re-affirmed its principles in Festo. See Festo, 122 S. Ct. 1831.
10 This may require reference to many DNS servers.
11 These claims became claims 1-4 of the issued patent.

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 v. 
 v. 
 v.