Source: http://www.kubitzlaw.com/contributory-negligence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:15:43+00:00

Document:
Assume that Mr. Plaintiff is a passenger who gets injured while travelling with an impaired driver. How would you begin to assess the Plaintiff’s contributory negligence? We recently worked on a case that required us to think through that very question.
1(1)　When by fault of 2 or more persons damage or loss is caused to one or more of them, the liability to make good the damage or loss is in proportion to the degree in which each person was at fault but if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally.
2(1)　When damage or loss has been caused by the fault of 2 or more persons, the court shall determine the degree in which each person was at fault.
2.) We then considered how a Plaintiff’s contributory negligence would succeed as a defence. To preserve the integrity of the legal process in pursuing fairness and justice for our client, we not only had to build our case, but think through how the defendant would tear down our client’s case as both the plaintiff & defendant’s arguments need to be given serious attention.
1. The nature of the duty owed by the tortfeasor to the injured person: Aynsley v. Toronto General Hospital (1967),  1 O.R. 425 (Ont. H.C.), at 444-45, aff’d(1971),  S.C.R. 435 (S.C.C.); Teno v. Arnold,  2 S.C.R. 287 (S.C.C.).
2. The number of acts of fault or negligence committed by a person at fault: Bruce (County) v. McIntyre,  2 D.L.R. 799 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d  S.C.R. 251 (S.C.C.).
3. The timing of the various negligent acts. For example, the party who first commits a negligent act will usually be more at fault than the party whose negligence comes as a result of the initial fault: Aynsley, supra.
4. The nature of the conduct held to amount to fault. For example, indifference to the results of the conduct may be more blameworthy: Chamberland v. Fleming (1984), 12 D.L.R. (4th) 688 (Alta. Q.B.) (where the driver of a motor boat sped by a canoe causing it to tip, and the canoeist to drown). Similarly, a deliberate departure from safety rules may be more blameworthy than an imperfect reaction to a crisis: see John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 8th ed. (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1992) at 273-74.
5. The extent to which the conduct breaches statutory requirements. For example, in a motor vehicle collision, the driver of the vehicle with the right of way may be less blameworthy: Crothers v. Northern Taxi Ltd. (1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 87 (Man. C.A.), at 100; see also Clyke v. Blenkhorn (1958), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 293 (N.S. S.C.), at 304.
35　Fault may vary from extremely careless conduct, by which a party shows a reckless indifference or disregard for the safety of persons or property, to a momentary or minor lapse of care in conduct which, nevertheless, carries with it the risk of foreseeable harm. Degrees of contributory negligence are assessed accordingly: Alberta Wheat Pool v. Northwest Pile Driving Ltd. (2000), 80 B.C.L.R. (3d) 153 (B.C. C.A.) at 165-66; see also Giuliani v. Saville (1999), 133 B.C.A.C. 164 (B.C. C.A.) at 167.
a) Whether the plaintiff actively contributed by way of encouragement to the defendant’s situation.
b) The extent to which the plaintiff participated in the drinking activities of the defendant.
c) The plaintiff’s knowledge of how much alcohol the defendant had consumed.
d) Whether the plaintiff encouraged the defendant to undertake the drive.
e) The symptoms exhibited by the driver to put the plaintiff on guard.
f) The freedom of action of the plaintiff.
g) The plaintiff’s knowledge of the driving habits and reputation of the defendant.
h) When it was that the plaintiff discovered that the defendant was in such a condition so that he could not safely operate a motor vehicle.
“(a)　There is no suggestion that [Gosling] actively encouraged [Roper] to drink while at the bar. She knew he was drinking and sat with him for almost one hour. For the rest of the evening she was socializing with friends and not in [Roper’s] company.
(b)　She did inquire about the Defendant’s ability to drive his car before leaving the bar location.
(c)　She said there was no indication of impairment on the part of [Roper], such as staggering, slurring of speech prior to leaving the bar before the accident.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that the Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.
The Plaintiff suffered a serious brain injury as a result of a collision and brought an action against the driver, owner of the vehicle and tavern where he and the driver became intoxicated.
The Defendant driver and owner admitted 100% responsibility for the collision, but the jury was tasked with quantifying the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. At trial, the jury apportioned 17.5% responsibility to the Plaintiff for failing to take reasonable precautions for his own safety and 18% for failing to wear his seatbelt—thereby attributing 35.5% of the damages to the plaintiff’s contributory negligence (para 3).
Failing to put on a seatbelt.
b.) Reality that the plaintiff’s ability to lookout for himself was compromised in part by the tavern over-serving him.
Although the plaintiff must bear the majority of the responsibility for his contributory negligence (60%), the tavern was assigned a significant percentage (40%) (para 13).
The deceased was a passenger (para 170) in a Chrysler 300 that was involved in a street race with a Cadillac that had gone awry. The deceased was unable to extricate himself from the Chrylser 300 when it caught fire, and his body was found partially seated on the right front passenger’s seat area with his feet trapped between the right front passenger’s door and the ground (para 4).
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the deceased passenger’s contributory negligence should be set at 25% (para 181). The Court found the driver of the Chrysler 300 65% liable and the driver of the Cadillac 10% liable (para 196).
The Plaintiff did not use a seatbelt which was functional and available to him—had he been wearing the seatbelt, he probably would not have been ejected from the car and his head injury would probably not have occurred.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not err in his apportionment of fault and upheld the trial judge’s finding of 45% contributory negligence to the Plaintiff.
The plaintiff passenger suffered injuries whilst riding in a vehicle with the impaired Defendant driver.
Accordingly, the Court found the Plaintiff 35% contributorily negligent. Although there were allegations that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent arising from her failure to wear a seatbelt, this issue was to be decided at a later time, failing agreement of the parties (para 5).
Although the Court found that the Plaintiff was not properly wearing his seatbelt (para 117), the Court also concluded that there was no medical or engineering evidence that the Plaintiff’s injuries would have been prevented or lessened if the shoulder portion of the seatbelt had been worn (para 121.
Accordingly, the Court found the Plaintiff 30% contributorily negligent.
The Plaintiff became a quadriplegic as a result of a collision whereby the Court found the Plaintiff 30% contributorily negligent, the Defendant driver 40% liable, and Tavern #1 and Tavern #2 each 15% liable (para 440).
3.) A Commercial host should bear a relatively substantial portion as well, although in this case, the substantial fault was shared by 2 commercial hosts.
4.) By drinking until he was seriously intoxicated, the Plaintiff did not, in his own interests, take reasonable care of himself and contributed to this lack of care to the injury he eventually suffered (para 438).
Thurs, the Court concluded that the standard of care required of the Plaintiff was not to enter the Defendant’s vehicle (para 131).
3.) The Defendant drove too fast, at night, down a narrow, winding mountain road.
However, the defendants only argued for a 25% degree of blameworthiness upon the Plaintiff and the Court agreed with the 25% apportionment.
In this case, the Court opined that there was a considerable degree of blameworthiness between the Plaintiff and Defendant (para 30). The Court ultimately found that the Defendant’s blameworthiness exceeded that of the Plaintiff’s and apportioned 60% liability to the Defendant, and 40% to the Plaintiff (para 30).
The Plaintiff was rendered a paraplegic when the truck in which he was a passenger collided with another vehicle. The collision was found to be wholly the fault of the defendant driver of the truck.
In our present case, we suggested that Michell pre-dated the Contributory negligence tests that have been applied in subsequent case law such as Heller v. Martens, given that such a result in the Michell case does not account for the heightened blameworthiness of the Defendant and would not serve the objectives of tort law, namely, compensating the injured and deterring the tortfeasor (see Heller, para 26-27).
The lawyers at Kubitz & Company are honored to represent Plaintiffs. We do not act for insurance companies. We thrive on pursuing a robust analysis of our cases and thinking through the merits and pitfalls of the claims that come through our office. Call us at 403-250-7100 for a consultation with one of our lawyers if you have been injured in a collision and are thinking of, or are unsure of whether you ought to pursue a claim or not.
[*END NOTE]: This was discussed by J. Veit in the Robinson v. Williams Estate QB decision (2005 ABQB 659) where she writes, “With respect, I am of the view that the Gosling decision — which is a causation analysis — has, in effect, been over-ruled by the subsequent appeal decision in Heller v. Martens [2002CarswellAlta 657 (Alta. C.A.)] which has established comparative blameworthiness as the approach that supercedes the causation approach in Alberta. In coming to this conclusion, I note that although the Gosling and Heller panels were different, in the subsequent decision of Chae v. Min, Paperny J.A., who was part of the panel on Gosling, adopted Heller as the law in Alberta. Alternatively, even if Heller does not over-rule Gosling, because Heller is the last word on the subject of contributory negligence from our Court of Appeal, the rules of stare decisis require a trial judge to follow Heller. (para 14).

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