Source: http://md.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180305_0000346.DMD.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:14:22+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff Juanita Gaines (“Plaintiff” or “Gaines”) brings this action against John W. Anderson (“Defendant” or “Anderson”), in his official capacity as Sheriff of Baltimore City, alleging that he retaliated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e et seq. Anderson asserts that res judicata bars this action because this Court dismissed with prejudice Gaines' prior Title VII claims against various defendants including Anderson. See Gaines v. Martin, No. JKB-12-1126, 2014 WL 1622316 (D. Md. Apr. 23, 2014) (“Gaines I”). Anderson further asserts that this Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13) because even if amended, res judicata bars her suit. The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is DENIED and Plaintiff's Motion to file a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED.
On January 13, 2012, Gaines received a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC related to her First Charge, indicating that the EEOC was unable to conclude that there was reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred. (Id. at ¶ 42.) On April 12, 2012, Gaines filed suit in this Court against the State of Maryland, Anderson, and three other individual defendants, alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment (“Gaines I”). (Id.; Gaines v. Martin, No. JKB-12-1126, 2014 WL 1622316 (D. Md. Apr. 23, 2014)). The complaint alleged conduct going back to 2008 when the Plaintiff was working as a Deputy Sheriff in the Special Operations Unit. Gaines, 2014 WL 1622316 at *1. On September 15, 2008, she was involved in the execution of a search warrant where a fellow deputy sheriff was shot in the face. Id. at *1. Although an investigation into the incident concluded that the deputy was shot by the subject of the warrant, Gaines developed reason to believe that he had been shot by a fellow deputy. Id. The complaint then asserted that her supervisors intended to remove her from the Special Operations Unit because of her contention that the deputy had been shot by a fellow deputy. Id. at *2. From these facts, Plaintiff brought, among other claims, a claim for retaliation under Title VII, asserting she was retaliated against “for among other things complaining about adverse personnel and disciplinary actions, complaining to the Inspector General and filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.” Id. at *5.
Ultimately, the conduct that Plaintiff opposed was not discrimination under Title VII. Rather, the picture that emerges from Plaintiff's own pleadings is that she was discriminated against for arguing that Deputy Lane was shot by a fellow Deputy and contradicting the Sheriff Department's conclusion that Deputy Lane was shot by a suspect.
A plaintiff may amend his or her complaint once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served, or within twenty-one days of service of a responsive pleading or motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). While Rule 15(a) requires that leave “shall be freely given when justice so requires, ” id., a district court may deny leave to amend “when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, the moving party has acted in bad faith, or the amendment would be futile.” Equal Rights Center v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010). “Whether an amendment is prejudicial will often be determined by the nature of the amendment and its timing.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006). An amendment is futile “when the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.” Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986).

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