Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/appellate/063wnapp/063WnApp0516.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:28:12+00:00

Document:
ELVIA GARCIA, Appellant, v. REBECCA L. WILSON, ET AL, Respondents.
 Judgment – Summary Judgment – Review – Role of Appellate Court. When reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court.
 Judgment – Collateral Estoppel – Elements – In General. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to bar the relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue presented is identical to an issue previously litigated; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the previous litigation; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party, or was in privity with a party, to the previous litigation; and (4) application of the doctrine will not result in an injustice.
 Judgment – Collateral Estoppel – Burden of Proof. A party asserting the doctrine of collateral estoppel has the burden of proving all of its elements.
 Judgment – Collateral Estoppel – Elements – Nonparty – Factors. The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied against a nonparty to previous litigation that involved a party with a substantial identity of interest with the nonparty. In determining whether application of the doctrine would unjustly deprive the nonparty of the right to be heard in court, a court will consider: (1) whether the nonparty in some way participated in the former adjudication, as a witness for example; (2) whether the issue was fully and fairly litigated in the previous litigation; (3) whether the evidence and testimony would be identical to that presented at the previous litigation; and (4) whether the separation of the actions was the product of some manipulation or tactical maneuvering, such as if the nonparty without a valid reason declined the opportunity to intervene in the previous litigation.
Nature of Action: A passenger injured in an automobile collision sought damages for personal injuries from the driver of the vehicle in which she was a passenger and the driver of the other vehicle. An earlier action by the driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger resulted in a judgment for the driver of the other vehicle.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 89-2-23243-0, Patricia H. Aitken, J., on May 23, 1990, granted a summary judgment in favor of the driver of the other vehicle.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the claim against the driver of the other vehicle was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court affirms the judgment.
Harrison H. deMers and deMers & Associates, Inc., P.S., for appellant.
Janet L. Tucker, for respondents.
FORREST, J. – Elvia Garcia (Garcia) appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her claim for personal injuries against Rebecca and Craig Wilson (the Wilsons) on the basis of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Garcia was injured while a passenger in Teodoro Macias's (Macias) vehicle when it collided with the Wilsons' vehicle, driven by Rebecca Wilson. The accident occurred on December 29, 1988.
On March 19, 1989, Macias filed suit against the Wilsons for property damage to his vehicle. Macias alleged that Ms. Wilson "negligently and tortiously failed to yield the right of way at a stop sign and drove into the path of the plaintiff's vehicle". Garcia was a witness at the trial and was living with Macias at the time of trial.
The trial court entered judgment for the defendants, stating, "I am persuaded that in this case, it was the plaintiff who was traveling at excess speeds and it was the plaintiff who was driving without his lights on." The court indicated that it relied heavily on the testimony of Mr. Wicklander, an eyewitness, who testified that he saw Ms. Wilson stop twice before entering the intersection, and that he did not see any headlights from Macias's vehicle.
On November 6, 1989, 4 months after the Macias trial, Garcia filed suit against both Macias and the Wilsons, praying for compensation for her medical bills, which totaled $1,800, pain and suffering, and loss of wages. Garcia's complaint alleged that Ms. Wilson "failed to stop at a stop sign controlling traffic in the direction in which she was traveling and failed to yield the right-of-way to the vehicle driven by . . . Macias".
«1» We note that Garcia's claim against Macias remains intact.
«2» Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
«3» McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 303, 738 P.2d 254 (1987).
«4» McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 303.
«5» This is the difference between collateral estoppel and res judicata. Res judicata is applicable when the same claim is brought in a subsequent action. Collateral estoppel is applicable when the claim is different but some of the same issues are presented. See 15 L. Orland & K. Tegland, Wash. Prac., Trial Practice § 359, at 6-17 (4th ed. 1986). See also Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 665, 674 P.2d 165 (1983).
Both Macias's and Garcia's complaints allege that Ms. Wilson was negligent in entering the intersection.
«6» Federal Way District Court cause 890397 (filed Mar. 19, 1989).
«8» We also note that the type of damages sought is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether the issue as to the basis of liability is identical. Thus, the fact that Garcia's action is for personal injuries rather than property damage has no bearing.
«9» 37 Wn. App. 791, 683 P.2d 241, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1021 (1984).
«10» 38 Wn.2d 299, 312-13, 229 P.2d 523 (1951).
«11» See also Robinson v. Hamed, 62 Wn. App. 92, 813 P.2d 171 (1991) (holding a union member to be collaterally estopped by the ruling in an arbitration proceeding in which the union, not the member, was the party).
«12» See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice § 4457, at 494-502 (1981) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). See also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908, 46 L. Ed. 2d 137, 96 S. Ct. 210 (1975).
«13» Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1499-1500 (1974).
«14» Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876, 877 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009, 19 L. Ed. 2d 606, 88 S. Ct. 571 (1967); Hackler v. Hackler, 37 Wn. App. 791, 795, 683 P.2d 241, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1021 (1984); Wright & Miller, at 498; Note, Collateral Estoppel, at 1500.
«15» Note, Collateral Estoppel, at 1500.
«16» Cauefield, 378 F.2d at 878.
«17» Bacon, 38 Wn.2d at 313; Hackler, 37 Wn. App. at 795; Wright & Miller, at 498-99.
«18» See Cauefield, 378 F.2d at 879, stating, "absolutely nothing would be gained were appellants permitted to pursue their action in the federal courts."
Finally, Garcia began seeing a doctor the day after Macias filed his complaint, leaving no other conclusion but that she was interested in the results of the trial and could have intervened in Macias's action. Indeed, she filed her own suit 8 months after Macias filed his and just 4 months after the Macias v. Wilson trial.
In any given case there may be good reasons why a party may choose not to intervene in an action even though the right to intervene exists. Examples of such considerations include that the party's injuries are not stabilized, that association with the other plaintiff may be prejudicial, that there are differences in trial strategy, that different witnesses are to be called, or that the party wants an independent attorney of her own choosing. Facts such as these, presented to the trial court, might make it unfair to apply collateral estoppel. However, at summary judgment Garcia took the position that as a matter of law collateral estoppel could not be applied to her since she had been a witness, not a party, in the first action. Hackler holds to the contrary. Garcia failed to demonstrate to the trial court any prejudice that would have resulted from a decision to intervene. The decision appears purely tactical. If Macias had won, Garcia would have gained a tactical advantage in pursuing her own claim; since Macias lost she must accept the consequences. On appeal it is suggested that her injuries were not ready to be submitted to the trier of fact. A doctor's affidavit to that fact at summary judgment might well have resulted in a different determination. The argument comes too late on appeal.
«19» See PUD 1 v. Tombari Family Ltd. Partnership, 117 Wn.2d 803, 819 P.2d 369 (1991) (holding that the party asserting that application of collateral estoppel would be unjust has the burden of showing injustice).
«20» Hackler's virtual representation doctrine is clearly limited to collateral estoppel. In order for an action to be barred by res judicata there must be identity of persons and parties. The trial court erred in ruling that Garcia's action was barred by res judicata.
COLEMAN and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.

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