Source: https://nevada.lexroll.com/abel-v-lowry-68-nev-284-1951/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 23:07:26+00:00

Document:
JAMES F. ABEL, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALBERT A. ABEL, ALSO KNOWN AS A.A. ABEL, DECEASED, APPELLANT, v. ALBERT M. LOWRY, RESPONDENT.
No. 3656Supreme Court of Nevada.
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; A.J. Maestretti, J.
Gordon W. Rice, of Reno, for Appellant.
Ernest S. Brown, of Reno, for Respondent.
1. Did the district court sitting in probate have jurisdiction to vacate a prior order approving a compromise agreement entered into between the administrator and a third party claiming ownership of certain notes and mortgages?
2. If it had such jurisdiction, what effect did such vacating order have upon the status of the compromise agreement?
the first and second party as to the ownership of the above items of property; and whereas they have agreed that the bonds and the interest thereon as aforesaid are the property of the estate of A.A. Abel, deceased, and the notes, mortgages and trust deeds aforesaid are the property of Albert M. Lowry,” it was agreed that the administrator should petition the court to confirm the agreement and that both parties would use their best efforts to secure such order of confirmation, and “that upon receiving a certified copy of said order of court” the administrator would receive the $7,000 bonds and interest and would release Lowry from all claims or demands of the estate growing out of any of the notes, mortgages or deeds of trust.
tendered back to Lowry, who refused to accept them and insisted that he would stand upon the agreement and the court’s approval thereof. The motion was further supported by the affidavit of the administrator to the effect that the approval order was made solely because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; that the affiant and his attorney both thought that the notes had created a joint tenancy, etc.; that copies of correspondence attached to the affidavit showed the attorney’s advice that they were so held; that it was not until after the order approving the agreement that the local attorney for absent heirs advised that in his opinion the instruments created a tenancy in common; that this was later confirmed in an opinion given by Reno counsel in reliance upon the case of Newitt v. Dawe, 61 Nev. 472, 133 P.2d 918, 144 A.L.R. 1462; that the notes and mortgages were worth $30,000 and the estate was entitled to one half thereof; that the administrator would never have signed the agreement and would never have petitioned the court to approve the same, and verily believes that the court would not have approved the same had the administrator or his attorneys known in fact that said notes, mortgages and trust deeds were held as tenants in common, and that the heirs of the intestate were entitled to one half of the value thereof; that the $7,000 government and municipal bonds were likewise wrongfully taken from the safe-deposit box of the decedent after the appointment of the administrator; that the agreement and the approving order were therefore “grossly and manifestly unjust, unfair and inequitable in that by virtue thereof” the heirs were deprived of approximately $15,000.
The notes referred to were ten in number and in varying amounts. Each was payable to “A.A. Abel or A.M. Lowry.” Each was secured by mortgage or deed of trust. The mortgages ran to “A.A. Abel or A.M. Lowry” as mortgagees. The deeds of trust named “A.A. Abel or A.M. Lowry” as beneficiaries.
agreement and after the local attorney for absent heirs had called the administrator’s attention to the case of Newitt v. Dawe, 61 Nev. 472, 133 P.2d 918, 144 A.L.R. 1462, in which this court on February 11, 1943, had decided that notes so payable created a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy, the administrator consulted independent counsel in Reno who advised definitely that Newitt v. Dawe was controlling and that the notes, mortgages and deeds of trust here in question created an ownership in common and not a joint tenancy and that under their terms the estate was the owner of a half interest therein. Counsel for the administrator agreed that this advice was correct and that he would attempt to secure an order vacating the order approving the settlement agreement and setting aside such agreement. All of the correspondence was introduced in evidence and appellant’s brief insists in many places that the basis for the settlement agreement and the court’s approval thereof was the belief of appellant and his attorney and the court that the instruments had created a joint tenancy and that they had never seen the instruments themselves until after the order approving the settlement agreement.
Respondent’s attorney insisted throughout the hearing of the motion to vacate the order approving the agreement and to set aside the agreement, that the probate court was without jurisdiction. The court’s formal order of June 28, 1948, ordered that its former order of November 13, 1947, approving the agreement “be and the same is hereby set aside, annulled and held for naught, and the parties are restored to the same position and status as though said order had never been made or entered herein.” It did not grant the motion to set aside the agreement itself.
without due process of law.” The court’s reason for overruling the objection is not stated. It was apparently satisfied at the time that the vacating order was within the probate court’s jurisdiction and that, being so, was not subject to collateral attack in the administrator’s subsequent action to recover the notes and mortgages. See Wiggin v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 398, 9 P. 646; Dockery v. Central Arizona L. P. Co., 45 Ariz. 434, 45 P.2d 656. However that may be, we are in accord with the theory of the trial court’s rulings up to the point that the court with one final stroke destroyed the result of those rulings and restored the compromise agreement to full, legal status, force and effect.
It is earnestly contended by respondent that the judgment must be affirmed for the reason that the probate court was without jurisdiction to make its vacating order of July 9, 1948, (1) because the order of November 13, 1947, approving the compromise agreement, was res judicata, subject only to reversal on appeal; (2) because respondent’s rights had become vested through the carrying out of the compromise agreement thus approved, and that the vacating order purported to affect these rights, in a probate proceeding, to which he was not privy; (3) because, even though the vacating order purported only to set aside the approval order and not to set aside the compromise agreement itself, its effect (if valid) was to leave the compromise agreement without court approval and thus without legal status, and therefore to destroy the rights vested under it; (4) that, in so acting, the probate court attempted to exercise powers vested only in a court of general equity jurisdiction.
46 Ariz. 401, 52 P.2d 479; 1 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, 2d Ed., p. 176, n. 1.
We see no distinction in principle between the vacating orders in the foregoing cases and the vacating order here in question.
The jurisdiction being established, it is clear that under the facts presented to the probate court, it was not guilty of any abuse of discretion in vacating the order approving the compromise agreement. The vacating of the approval order left the compromise agreement without support. Without such approval, it had no legal effect. In Lucich v. Medin, 3 Nev. 93, 109, this court, by Mr. Chief Justice BEATTY, recognized the right to compromise a suit against the estate with the approval of the probate court, and added: “But the executor, without the advice of the court, had no right to make such a compromise.” Section 203 of the Probate Act, there under consideration, empowering the court to authorize a compromise, is in all material respects the same as our present sec. 9882.198 N.C.L., 1931-1941 Supp.
a claim against the estate, 85 A.L.R. 199, 202, states that such compromise may be made in Nevada “only under the advice of the probate court.” With this conclusion we are in accord.
Our conclusions eliminate the defendant’s second affirmative defense setting up the compromise agreement. The only remaining issue, raised by the general denial, is the issue of the ownership of the notes, mortgages and deeds of trust, as to which issue Newitt v. Dawe is controlling. An undivided one-half interest therein is vested in the estate of the intestate. The present appeal does not submit to us any question for determination concerning the ownership of the $7,000 government and municipal bonds.
Respondent relies upon certain statements made by the court in Lucich v. Medin, 3 Nev. 93, indicating the right of the court to correct its own errors but not to reopen the proof as to accounts allowed, except where the account showed error on its face and if the mistake or error is only to be shown by going anew into the proof, this should be held as res adjudicata and not liable to be opened to new testimony. This statement must be considered in connection with the facts of that case, which are very different from the one at bar. Even if applicable, we should be inclined to hold that the order approving the so-called compromise agreement shows mistake and error on its face. It is true that the agreement recites that there was a dispute, but the agreement shows on its face that there was no dispute. It describes $30,000 worth of notes and mortgages in which, under the law of this state, the A.A. Abel estate owned a half interest, and then proceeds to give that half interest to respondent. The consideration for this sacrifice or waiver of $15,000 was the respondent’s possible claim to an interest in, or to a part of, or possibly to the entire ownership of the $7,000 bonds.
The voluminous briefs of counsel discuss many other propositions of law, but in view of our conclusions we do not feel called upon to discuss them. The judgment of the district court is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff as administrator establishing his undivided one-half interest in the notes, mortgages and deeds of trust in question. Appellant will be allowed his costs, which will not however include any part of 438 folios of district court briefs included in but which have no proper place in the bill of exceptions.
EATHER and MERRILL, JJ., concur.
 Nothing in the record indicates the nature of any contract with or instructions to the bank with reference to the safe-deposit box. During the oral argument, in answer to a question by one of the justices, it was stated that neither party made any point of the nature of such contract, but that as a matter of fact both keys to the box were found among the personal effects of the decedent.
 Respondent seeks to distinguish this case because of the court’s reference to the fact that in any event the executrix had for good cause rescinded the original agreement to sell, and that even without an order vacating the former confirmation of the sale, the purchaser was shown to have no interest in the property. This circumstance was simply recited as an additional ground for dismissing the writ of certiorari, the court having previously stated that the only question presented for review related to the jurisdiction of the probate court to enter the vacating order.

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