Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/88757974/Deutsche-Bank-v-Gabriel
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:38:20+00:00

Document:
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, trustee, [FN1] vs. Faustin GABRIEL & others. [FN2] No. 11-P-415.
statute, [FN13] and Deutsche Bank was entitled to rely on a certified copy of the deed to support its motion for summary judgment. b. Adequacy of affidavit of sale. The defendants also challenge the adequacy of the affidavit of sale submitted by the bank in support of its motion for summary judgment. They contend that the affidavit did not satisfy G.L. c. 244, 15, as appearing in St.1994, c. 341, 1, which provides: "The person selling, or the attorney duly authorized by a writing or the legal guardian or conservator of such person, shall, after the sale, cause a copy of the notice and his affidavit, fully and particularly stating his acts, or the acts of his principal or ward, to be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district where the land lies, with a note or reference thereto on the margin of the record of the mortgage deed, if it is recorded in the same registry. If the affidavit shows that the requirements of the power of sale and of the statute have in all respects been complied with, the affidavit or a certified copy of the record thereof, shall be admitted as evidence that the power of sale was duly executed." A model statutory form of an affidavit of sale under a power of sale in a mortgage is found at Form 12 of the Appendix to G.L. c. 183. [FN14] The statutory form "shall be sufficient," even if it is altered to suit the particular circumstances (in other words, if the blanks in the form are filled in as appropriate). G.L. c. 183, 8. Although the statutory form affidavit appears in c. 183, rather than in c. 244, we see no reason to conclude that an affidavit of sale that conforms to the model form contained in c. 183 would not also satisfy the requirements of G.L. c. 244, 15. Indeed, a logical and harmonious construction of the statutory scheme would lead one naturally to conclude that an affidavit of sale that satisfies one chapter would satisfy the other. See Canton v. Commissioner of the Mass. Hy. Dept., 455 Mass. 783, 791-792 (2010), and cases cited (applicable rules of statutory construction require courts to "construe statutes that relate to the same subject matter as a harmonious whole and avoid absurd results"). Here, the summary judgment record included an affidavit by attorney Francis J. Nolan that largely tracked the language of the statutory form affidavit. [FN15] It omitted no material information from the statutory form, and its only additions were those pertinent to the specific facts of the foreclosure sale of the property at issue in this case. A comparison of the text of the model form (note 14, supra ) with that of Attorney Nolan's affidavit (note 15, supra ) shows the limited differences between the two. Indeed, the defendants point to no specific or significant difference between Attorney Nolan's affidavit and the statutory form. Attorney Nolan's affidavit was, therefore, as a matter of law "sufficient" under G.L. c. 183, 8, and accordingly also satisfied the requirements of G.L. c. 244, 15.
defenses are available where the premises have never been leased or rented, as is the case here. [FN19] Instead, it stands for the proposition that a person who is entitled to assert defenses under G.L. c. 239, 8A, does not lose that entitlement by later becoming a tenant at sufferance. [FN20] Here, as we noted above, there was no allegation that the defendants ever rented or leased the premises.
Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, the Housing Court judgment of summary process for the plaintiff is affirmed. So ordered. FN1. Of the HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-HE1.
FN2. Kathy Gabriel, Faustina K. Gabriel, Raul Gabriel, Marian Gabriel, Quinton Gabriel, Venita Gabriel, and Ignatious Gabriel. Because the defendants share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names.
FN3. They have never rented or leased the premises, and they have never occupied the premises as tenants.
FN4. Defendants Faustin and Venita owned the property from 1981 to 2006. They transferred it to Quinton in 2006.
FN5. The defendants do not challenge the Housing Court's determination that Deutsche Bank served notices to vacate approximately six months later on all the defendants except for Ignatious. And they do not contest the Housing Court's determination that the failure to serve Ignatious was irrelevant vis--vis the codefendants, and not material with respect to Ignatious because he derives his right to occupy the premises through Quinton and is therefore not entitled to a separate notice to vacate.
FN6. Although nothing turns on it, we note that this is the second summary process action brought by Deutsche Bank relating to this property and also the second summary judgment motion.
FN7. We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. "The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).
FN8. We acknowledge the amicus brief of City Life/Vida Urbana and Oliver Hendricks.
FN9. The Samuels rule was cited, commented on, or relied on in Stockwell v. Silloway, 105 Mass. 517, 519 (1870); Brown v. Brown, 108 Mass. 386, 391-392 (1871); Gragg v. Learned, 109 Mass. 167, 168 (1872); Chamberlin v. Huguenot Mfg. Co., 118 Mass. 532, 536 (1875); Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass. 53, 57 (1878); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 142 Mass. 71, 74 (1886); O'Neil v. Webster, 150 Mass. 572, 573 (1890); New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Benedict, 169 Mass. 262, 266 (1897).
FN10. Samuels was cited by the Supreme Judicial Court for a different, and unrelated, proposition as recently as 2003. See Lawrence v. Concord, 439 Mass. 416, 421 (2003).
FN11. The Samuels rule was relied upon by the Appellate Division in Federal Natl. Mort. Assoc. v. Saric, 2010 Mass.App. Div. 177 (2010).
FN12. If a subsequent statute does not conflict with prior common law, then the common law continues to control. Trombley v. Stevens-Duryea Co., 206 Mass. 516, 519 (1910).
FN13. Although no issue has been raised regarding the authenticity of the certified copy of the deed, we note that the authenticity of certified copies of public records is governed by Mass.R.Civ.P. 44, 365 Mass. 807 (1974).
FN14. Form 12 provides as follows: "[To be filled in] named in the foregoing deed, make oath and say that the principal [to be filled in] interest [to be filled in] obligation [to be filled in] mentioned in the mortgage above referred to was not paid or tendered or performed when due or prior to the sale, and that I published on the [to be filled in] day of [to be filled in] 19[to be filled in], in the [to be filled in], a newspaper published or by its title page purporting to be published in [to be filled in] aforesaid and having a circulation therein, a notice of which the following is a true copy: "(Insert advertisement.) "Pursuant to said notice at the time and place therein appointed, I sold the mortgaged premises at [to be filled in] public action by [to be filled in], an auctioneer, to [to be filled in], above named, for [to be filled in] dollars, bid by him, being the highest bid made therefor at said auction. "Sworn to by the said [to be filled in] 19 [to be filled in], before me."
mentioned in the mortgage above referred to were not paid or tendered or performed when due or prior to the sale, and that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. caused to be published on February 13, 2009, February 20, 2009 and February 27, 2009 in the Boston Herald, a newspaper having a general circulation in Dorchester (Boston), a notice of which the following is a true copy. (See attached Exhibit A [copy of the newspaper notice] ). "I also complied with Chapter 244, Section 14 of the Massachusetts General Laws, as amended, by mailing the required notices certified mail, return receipt requested. "Pursuant to said notice at the time and place therein appointed the auction was postponed by public proclamation to April 7, 2009 at 12:00 p.m. upon the mortgaged premises, at which time and place Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. sold the mortgaged premises at public auction by Charles F. Cawley, a duly licensed auctioneer, to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. for TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($235,000.00) DOLLARS bid by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., being the highest bid made therefore at said auction. Said bid was then assigned by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-HE1, as evidenced by assignment of bid to be recorded herewith as Exhibit 'B'. [signature by Attorney Nolan] " * For signatory authority, please see the Limited Power of Attorney recorded with the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds at Book 43361, Page 106." The notary's attestation, signature, and seal followed.
FN16. Deciding as we do, we need not (and do not) reach the defendants' claim that the affidavit of Tyler N. Smith, an "REO Supervisor" of Premiere Asset Services, "a servicer" authorized to act for Deutsche Bank with regard to the property, was defective in that it does not state that it was made on personal knowledge or disclose the basis of Smith's knowledge. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(e), 365 Mass. 824 (1974) (affidavits supporting summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein"). Smith's affidavit contained nothing of import that was not contained in the certified records and the Nolan affidavit. No aspect of our decision rests on the contents of the Smith affidavit.
situation to be incorporated by reference by another set of rules (in this instance, the Uniform Summary Process Rules)." 1988 Reporter's Notes to Mass.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(7), 46 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. at 1100 (West 2006). The Uniform Summary Process Rules do not set out a procedure for moving to strike portions of pleadings and, accordingly, we look to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.
FN18. We note that neither party briefed the appropriate standard of review, nor did their briefs below address the issue.
FN19. We here reach the same conclusion reached by the Housing Court judge in his extremely thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum and decision.
Plaintiff's brief for federal court opposing defendant's motion to dismiss a diversity action under Rule 12(b)(6).
Corporate Corruption Within Macy's Inc.

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