Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/858-f-2d-1310-596550230
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:16:19+00:00

Document:
Docket Nº: 87-2566 to 87-2568 and 88-1040.
Party Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Eugene SLAY, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Leroy TYUS, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James CULLEN, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Eugene SLAY, Leroy Tyus, and James Cullen, Appellees.
Eugene SLAY, Leroy Tyus, and James Cullen, Appellees.
Nos. 87-2566 to 87-2568 and 88-1040.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 30, 1988.
Jim J. Shoemake, St. Louis., Mo., Thomas M. Utterback, Washington, Mo., and Barry Short, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
James E. Crowe, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLE, [*] District Judge.
Eugene Slay, Leroy Tyus, and James Cullen were convicted in June 1987 of violating the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1341 and 1343, in connection with their roles in seeking the award of a cable television franchise from the City of St. Louis. The jury had been instructed that a scheme to deprive the citizens of St. Louis of their intangible right to good government could constitute "a scheme or artifice to defraud" within the meaning of the mail and wire fraud statutes. Three weeks after the jury returned its verdict, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the theory that the mail fraud statute protects the intangible right of the citizenry to good government, and read the statute as "limited in scope to the protection of property rights." McNally v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 2881, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987).
In response to the defendants' post-trial motions following McNally, the District Court 1 set aside the jury's verdicts against Slay, Tyus, and Cullen "due to the fundamental instructional error in this case." United States v. Slay, 673 F.Supp. 336, 351 (E.D.Mo.1987). The Court concluded that "[t]he error in the instructions ... [permitted] the jury to convict defendants for conduct not criminalized by ... the mail and wire fraud statutes...." Id. at 347. After striking all references to the "intangible rights" theory from the indictment against the defendants, the Court found that the indictment still charged an offense, and so denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment. Instead, the District Court ordered a new trial for the defendants on the charges in the indictment which continued to state an offense after McNally. Id. at 353.
Both the defendants and the government appeal this order. The defendants argue that the District Court struck such a substantial portion of the original indictment that the remaining language no longer expresses the grand jury's intention. The defendants urge that a new trial on the pared-down indictment would therefore violate their Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on an indictment of a grand jury. We hold that our Court does not have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal, and so we dismiss the defendants' appeal, without prejudice to their right to raise this contention in a later appeal if they are convicted at the new trial. In its cross-appeal, the government argues that the guilty verdicts should not have been set aside, because the jury must have found a scheme to defraud the City of property rights. The government concludes that the defendants' convictions remain valid, and that the erroneous instruction was harmless error. We disagree, and we affirm the District Court's order granting a new trial.
Indictment p 11. The original indictment thus charged the defendants with devising a scheme which would deprive the citizens and elected officials of St. Louis of both their intangible rights to good government and full disclosure and property in the form of a cable television franchise.

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