Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/99-3035/99-3035a-2011-03-24.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 17:51:25+00:00

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 2000 › USA v. Mitchell, Dennis L.
Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R.
Fisher and Sharon A. Sprague, Assistant United States Attorneys were on the brief. Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.
Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellant Dennis L. Mitchell appeals from an order of the district court denying his motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. s 2255. After deciding some previously unsettled procedural issues concern- ing certificates of appealability ("COA") necessary to appeal the denial of s 2255 motions, we grant a COA as to appel- lant's claim for per se ineffective assistance of counsel. We deny his claim on the merits and affirm the order of the district court.
In 1993, Mitchell and a co-defendant were convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Mitchell was sen- tenced to 324 months of incarceration. We affirmed the convictions, but vacated Mitchell's sentence for consideration of a downward adjustment for his role in the offense. See United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1995). On remand, the district court resentenced Mitchell to 151 months, and we affirmed in an unpublished order. See United States v. Mitchell, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (table).
The district court denied the motion. Mitchell filed a notice of appeal without first seeking a certificate of appeala- bility as required by 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). We appointed counsel for Mitchell, and directed the parties, while not otherwise limited, to address the following ques- tions: (1) whether a COA may be issued by this court in the first instance or instead must initially be sought from the district court; and (2) whether appellant has "made a sub- stantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" re- quired for the grant of a COA.
(1) In a ... 28 U.S.C. s 2255 proceeding, the applicant cannot take an appeal unless a circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of appealability un- der 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c). If an applicant files a notice of appeal, the district judge who rendered the judgment __________ 1 Mitchell also claims that his equal protection rights were violat- ed because federal statutes punish crack cocaine crime more severe- ly than cocaine powder crimes. This same argument was squarely rejected in United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and in Mitchell's direct appeal. See Mitchell, 49 F.3d at 781 n.5. Mitchell's citation of events which occurred after the governing statutes were enacted adds nothing.
must either issue a certificate of appealability or state why a certificate should not issue. The district clerk must send the certificate or statement to the court of appeals with the notice of appeal and the file of the district-court proceedings. If the district judge has de- nied the certificate, the applicant may request a circuit judge to issue the certificate. (2) A request addressed to the court of appeals may be considered by a circuit judge or judges, as the court prescribes. If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice of appeal constitutes a request addressed to the judges of the court of appeals. As a threshold matter, 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1) does not clearly state that district court judges are empowered to issue COAs--it simply says "circuit justice or judge." However, Rule 22(b) contemplates that "judge" means district judge, and all the circuits addressing the issue have held that district court judges have the power to issue COAs. We join these circuits. See Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1573-83 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (containing a detailed discussion of the issue), overruled in part on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); see also Grant- Chase v. Commissioner, New Hampshire Dep't of Correc- tions, 145 F.3d 431, 435 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 941 (1998); Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1015-17 (2d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 472-74 (3d Cir. 1997); Else v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 82, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1073 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Riddick, 104 F.3d 1239, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d 1363 (10th Cir. 1997).
instance on whether a COA should be issued, as other courts have held. See, e.g., Lozada, 107 F.3d at 1016-17; Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1997). We agree. The language of the Rule prescribes that upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the district court "must" decide the COA issue and the district court clerk "must" provide appropriate documentation to the court of appeals. The Rule continues on to state that upon denial by the district court, a request may be made of a circuit judge. We therefore hold that Rule 22(b) requires initial application in the district court for a COA before the court of appeals acts on a COA request.
Rule 22(b)(2) provides that when an appellant fails to file an express request for a COA with the court of appeals, the notice of appeal constitutes such a request to the judges of the court of appeals. Normally, we will examine such re- quests after the district court has ruled, see Edwards v. United States, 114 F.3d 1083, 1084 (11th Cir. 1997), and we will generally transfer COA requests to the district court when the district court has not ruled. However, any defect in procedure occasioned by the appellant's failure to make appli- cation in this case is not jurisdictional, given the language of 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1), and Rule 22(b)(2). Therefore, in view of the late stage in the proceedings at which we came to confront the question, we will proceed to consider whether to grant the COA ourselves. Insofar as the failure of the appellant to make application to the district court creates any obstacle, we note that under Federal Rule of Appellate Proce- dure 2, we have the authority to "suspend any provision of" the Rules of Appellate Procedure, including Rule 22(b)(1) except in limited instances not here relevant. We therefore exercise that authority and proceed.
the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that Barefoot standard applies to COA requests). Under this standard, we grant Mitchell's COA request on his claim of per se ineffective assistance of counsel.
invokes the rule that prejudice can be presumed "if a defen- dant can show that 'a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of [the attorney's] representation....' " Bruce, 89 F.3d at 893 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980)). Claiming that Robertson was suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia during Mitchell's trial, appellant argues that Robertson had a conflict of inter- est because he was preoccupied with his own disciplinary proceedings and fear of sanctions and wanted to keep his status concealed, so he did not expend extra funds reimbursa- ble under the Criminal Justice Act as appointed counsel to seek out Ms. Allen.
The district court did not resolve the issue of Robertson's bar status. The court noted that Robertson was in fact admitted to practice before the district court during the relevant period, but accepted the proposition that this admis- sion may have been under questionable circumstances. The district court thus assumed for the sake of argument that Robertson was suspended. In any event, the suspension was not in any way related to Robertson's conduct in representing Mitchell.
__________ evidence in the form of a taped conversation between two of the co- conspirators casts serious doubt on Mitchell's theory.
cause the attorney will be concerned about drawing attention to himself and encouraging an inquiry into his background."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1107 (1999). We could as easily say that far from having a conflict of interest, Robertson had "an incentive to do his best" to avoid a later ineffective assistance claim and the exposure of his status. United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 226-27 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Vance v. Lehman, 64 F.3d 119, 126 (3d Cir. 1995). We conclude that Mitchell's ineffectiveness claim on these grounds does not rise to the level of a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
Mitchell's second argument in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim has slightly more promise. Based on a different line of precedent, he contends that Robertson's suspension calls for a finding of per se ineffectiveness. In Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), where an ex- convict posed as an attorney, we held that the requirements of the Sixth Amendment "are not satisfied when the accused is 'represented' by a layman masquerading as a qualified attorney." Id. at 212. Mitchell candidly admits that other courts have rejected a per se ineffectiveness rule for attor- neys who have been licensed to practice law and later subject- ed to discipline such as suspension, but claims that Harrison could support such a rule in an issue of "first impression" in this circuit. In his view, a generous reading could extend Harrison and hold that a suspended attorney is not a "quali- fied attorney" because he is not currently "admitted to the practice of the law, no matter how intelligent or well educated he may be." Id.
Counsel, 19 A.L.R. 5th 351 (1994). However, a few jurists appear to have thought otherwise. See In re Johnson, 822 P.2d 1317, 1323-24 (Cal. 1992) (applying California Constitu- tion); Ohio v. Newcombe, 577 N.E.2d 125, 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Mouzin, 785 F.2d at 703-04 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). To more clearly define the contours of the issue in this circuit, we grant a COA on Harrison's claim of per se ineffective assistance of counsel.
We decline appellant's invitation to extend the per se ineffectiveness rule beyond cases in which a defendant is represented by a person never properly admitted to any bar. See, e.g., Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 886-90 (2d Cir. 1990). In fact, we earlier intimated such a limitation in United States v. Butler, 504 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There, appellant's trial counsel had not been admitted to the local bar, and we stated that "[s]tanding alone, the mere fact of a trial attorney's nonmembership in the local bar is not necessarily sufficient to find that the right to effective counsel was breached." Id. at 223. Instead, we found counsel inef- fective in Butler only because in addition to the lack of bar membership, there were numerous instances of attorney er- ror at trial. See id. at 224.
Neither suspension nor disbarment invites a per se rule that continued representation in an ongoing trial is con- stitutionally ineffective. Admission to the bar allows us to assume that counsel has the training, knowledge, and ability to represent a client who has chosen him. Contin- ued licensure normally gives a reliable signal to the public that the licensee is what he purports to a be--an attorney qualified to advise and represent a client. Id. at 698.
Other circuits addressing the issue have reached similar results. Instead of extending a per se rule to cover various states of attorney licensure, courts have considered the facts of the cases to determine if counsel was ineffective. See Waterhouse, 848 F.2d at 383; Vance, 64 F.3d at 122-26; Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1479-80 (4th Cir. 1985); Maria-Martinez, 143 F.3d at 916-19; Reese, 926 F.2d at 669- 70; United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 599-601 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 568-69 (10th Cir. 1992). Therefore, although appellant's per se ineffective assistance claim survives the hurdle of the certificate of appealability, it merits no relief.
__________ 3 A detailed discussion of the facts surrounding Professor Robert- son's disciplinary difficulties is recounted in United States v. Myles, 10 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 1998).

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