Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/19/899.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:36:15+00:00

Document:
Baird B. McKnight, County Counsel, Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, John F. Downey and Stephen F. Boutin for Petitioners.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, N. Eugene Hill, Assistant Attorney General, Edmund E. White, John J. Klee, Jr., John Fourt, Byron B. Chell and Thomas E. Warriner, Deputy Attorneys General, David F. Chavkin, J. Kendrick Kresse, Andrea J. Saltzman, David J. Rapport and Ralph S. Abascal for Real Parties in Interest.
Petitioners Leonard Ross, Joe Crivello, Larry Dean, Ole Olsen and Russell Papenhausen, members of the Plumas County Board of Supervisors, seek review of a judgment of the Sacramento County Superior Court finding them guilty of contempt for wilfully violating a court order requiring the payment of retroactive welfare benefits. The supervisors challenge the judgment of contempt on a number of grounds, claiming (1) that, as nonparties to the original court action, they were not bound by the earlier order; (2) that the contempt proceedings were improperly instituted because the complaining parties failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy prior to seeking the contempt sanction; and (3) that the judgment is invalid because the record does not affirmatively reflect that the trial court applied the appropriate burden of proof in finding them guilty of contempt. As we explain, we have determined that none of the contentions is meritorious, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.
This contempt proceeding arises in the aftermath of this court's decisions in California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 237 [113 Cal. Rptr. 154, 520 P.2d 970] and Cooper v. Swoap (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 856 [115 Cal. Rptr. 1, 524 P.2d 97], invalidating several state administrative welfare regulations as incompatible with the governing statutory provisions. Several months after the rendition of the Brian and Cooper decisions, plaintiffs Laura Cooper, Hazel Wilks, and Ottilia Lott filed an amended complaint in the Sacramento County Superior Court which consolidated in a single class action the claims presented in both cases; because a new state official, Mario Obledo, had been appointed as Secretary of the Health and Welfare Agency in the interim, the suit was [19 Cal. 3d 903] reentitled Cooper v. Obledo. fn. 1 The amended complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including the payment of benefits improperly withheld in the past pursuant to the regulations invalidated in Brian and Cooper.
On July 28, 1975, the superior court entered judgment in the Cooper v. Obledo action, granting plaintiffs the relief sought in their amended complaint. With respect to the payment of retroactive welfare benefits, the injunctive order issued by the court provided: "The defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees will restore to plaintiffs and the class they represent the AFDC benefits unlawfully withheld pursuant to [the regulations invalidated in Brian and Cooper] through the following procedure: [¶] "a. ... County welfare departments will redetermine AFDC eligibility and make restitution of grant amounts unlawfully withheld ... [¶] d. Within 60 days after entry of this Judgment, or as soon thereafter as administratively possible, the Department of Benefit Payments will notify all county welfare departments of the terms of this judgment and the rights of claimants, and will instruct the counties to aid and assist claimants in obtaining restitution as appropriate including reviewing every case record ... to determine if the AFDC grant was improperly reduced by application of [the invalid regulations]."
Pursuant to this judgment, on September 18, 1975, the Department of Benefit Payments sent an "all-county letter" to each county welfare director, ordering the counties to compute and pay the retroactive welfare grants as mandated in the court order; the department attached a copy of the judgment in Cooper v. Obledo to the letter. Mona Green, the Plumas County Welfare Director, received this letter shortly thereafter and, at the November 11, 1975, meeting of the Plumas County Board of Supervisors, she informed the board of the contents and effect of the letter and the court judgment. The board immediately instructed Green not to make the retroactive payments and adopted a motion, resolving "that Plumas County not comply with the court order, as this would be an unanticipated expense for which no county funds are available."
The Director of Benefit Payments, real party in interest Marion Woods, fn. 2 immediately advised the board of supervisors by telegram that [19 Cal. 3d 904] if the board did not rescind its action of November 11, he would seek a contempt order. fn. 3 The telegram was read at a meeting of the board on November 18, 1975, but the board refused to alter its position and voted to notify the director "... that the Plumas County Board of Supervisors does not intend to rescind its decision not to comply with the court order."
Thereafter, on December 3, 1975, real parties in interest Woods, Cooper, Wilks and Lott filed a motion in the Sacramento Superior Court urging that petitioners be held in contempt for wilfully violating the Cooper v. Obledo order; an affidavit of Director Woods accompanied the motion. At the hearing on the contempt motion held on January 22 and 23, 1976, real parties in interest adduced evidence establishing the above facts. In addition, real parties in interest presented the testimony of Ann Patton, the Plumas County Auditor-Controller, who stated that as of the date of the contempt hearing "around $100,000" remained in the county's "contingency appropriation" for the current fiscal year; Mona Green, the county welfare director, estimated the cost to Plumas County of the retroactive welfare payments mandated by the Cooper v. Obledo order at between $10,000 and $20,000. Petitioners did not challenge the accuracy of these officials' testimony.
2. [1a] In administering the payment of welfare benefits, the Plumas County Board of Supervisors acts as an agent of the California Department of Health and Welfare and consequently the supervisors were bound by the injunction rendered in Cooper v. Obledo.
Petitioners initially contend that the judgment of contempt is invalid because they were not bound by the injunctive order which the trial court found they had wilfully disobeyed. Petitioners emphasize that neither Plumas County nor they, as individuals, were named defendants in the Cooper v. Obledo action, and that they received no notice and were afforded no opportunity to defend that action. Under these circumstances, petitioners urge that they were denied due process by being held in contempt for violating the injunctive order issued in that case.
In the instant case, of course, the injunctive order in the Cooper v. Obledo action was directed at "agents" of the defendants, and the judgment contemplated that individual counties would be bound by the order. As we have seen, the judgment specifically provided that "defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees will restore to plaintiffs and the class they represent the AFDC benefit unlawfully withheld," and the procedure for repayment established by the judgment explicitly stipulated that "[c]ounty welfare departments will redetermine AFDC eligibility and make restitution of grant amounts unlawfully withheld" pursuant to the invalid regulations.
Petitioners attempt to avoid this extensive array of authority by asserting that the county is only a "special agent," rather than a "general agent," of the state welfare agency, and is consequently not bound by an injunctive order issued against the state agency. This argument is flawed on two levels. First, absolutely nothing in either the statutory provisions or the prior authorities supports the petitioners' classification of counties as special agents. Civil Code section 2297 provides that "[a]n agent for a particular act or transaction is called a special agent [and] [a]ll others are general agents," (italics added), and section 3 of the Restatement Second of Agency explains that "(1) A general agent is an agent authorized to conduct a series of transactions involving a continuity of service. (2) A special agent is an agent authorized to conduct a single transaction or a series of transactions not involving continuity of service." (Italics added.)  Inasmuch as county boards of supervisors bear an on-going statutory responsibility for the local administration of welfare benefits, such boards of supervisors are clearly general agents of the state welfare agency with respect to such administrative duties.
3. The contempt proceeding was not barred by a failure to exhaust an available administrative remedy.
 Petitioners secondly contend that even if they were bound by the injunctive order issued in Cooper v. Obledo, the trial court nonetheless erred in entertaining the contempt proceeding because the real parties in interest had assertedly failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy prior to seeking the contempt order. Petitioners present no authority which supports their contention that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies to contempt proceedings, and we have serious doubts that the availability of an alternative remedy would necessarily deprive a court of the authority to punish wilful violation of its own orders through the contempt sanction. Even if we were to assume, however, that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine might be applicable in contempt proceedings under some circumstances, petitioners' invocation of the doctrine in the instant case is misguided for several reasons.
The initial defect in petitioners' argument is simply that, at the time of the institution of the present contempt proceeding, the county's refusal to pay retroactive welfare benefits did not fall within the ambit of section 10605. Section 10605, by its terms, applies only to a county's failure to comply "with any provisions of this code or any regulation," and although numerous court decisions have articulated the general rule that welfare benefits which have been unlawfully withheld must be repaid retroactively (see, e.g., Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L.A. (1945) 27 Cal. 2d 81, 85-86 [162 P.2d 630]; Leach v. Swoap (1973) 35 Cal. App. 3d 685, 689-692 [110 Cal. Rptr. 62]; Mooney v. Pickett (1972) 26 Cal. App. 3d 431, 435-436 [102 Cal.Rptr. 708]), at the time of the instant contempt proceeding, this principle was not embodied in any statutory provision or [19 Cal. 3d 912] administrative regulation. fn. 9 Consequently, section 10605 did not provide an "available" remedy to which the director could have resorted.
Moreover, the remedy provided by section 10605 is, in any event, available only to the Director of Benefit Payments and not to individual aggrieved welfare recipients. Inasmuch as the contempt proceeding in this case was pursued by the individual Cooper v. Obledo plaintiffs as well as by the director it is clear that the proceeding was not barred by the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.
The case of Diaz v. Quitoriano (1969) 268 Cal. App. 2d 807 [74 Cal. Rptr. 358] is directly on point. In Diaz, welfare recipients brought an action against Sutter County, claiming that the county had refused to comply with some aspects of the AFDC program mandated by state and federal law; the county argued the action should be dismissed because the recipients had failed to exhaust the administrative remedy embodied in section 10605. The Diaz court rejected the contention, explaining that section 10605 "is not an 'administrative remedy' within the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. '.... Our courts have repeatedly held that the mere possession by some official body of a continuing supervisory or investigatory power does not itself suffice to afford an "administrative remedy" unless the statute or regulation under which that power is exercised establishes clearly defined machinery for the submission, evaluation and resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties.' ... (Rosenfield v. Malcolm (1967) 65 Cal. 2d 559, 566 [55 Cal. Rptr. 505, 421 P.2d 697].)" (Italics added in Diaz.) (268 Cal.App.2d at pp. 812-813.) Section 10605 provides no such machinery for the submission or resolution of complaints by individually aggrieved parties.
Accordingly, we conclude that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine did not constitute a bar to the instant contempt proceedings.
 Finally, petitioners contend that the challenged order is invalid because the record does not affirmatively reflect that the trial court applied the correct standard of burden of proof in finding petitioners guilty of contempt. As we explain, we have concluded that this argument, like the prior two contentions, is unsound.
For almost a century, our court has repeatedly emphasized that in California all contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and that, as a consequence, "an accused on trial for contempt must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Bridges v. Superior Court (1939) 14 Cal. 2d 464, 485 [94 P.2d 983], revd. on other grounds, 314 U.S. 252 [86 L. Ed. 192, 62 S. Ct. 190, 159 A.L.R. 1346]; see, e.g., In re Buckley (1886) 69 Cal. 1, 3 [10 P. 69]; Hotaling v. Superior Court (1923) 191 Cal. 501, 505 [217 P. 73, 29 A.L.R. 127].) We reiterated this principle recently in In re Coleman (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 568, 572 [116 Cal. Rptr. 381, 526 P.2d 533], explaining that "[b]ecause of the penalties imposed, a proceeding to punish an accused for contempt is criminal in nature, and guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt." All parties to this action agree that the trial court was obliged to utilize the reasonable doubt standard in the instant case.
Petitioners point out that the record in this case does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court applied the reasonable doubt standard in reaching his conclusion, and they contend that the absence of such an affirmative showing fatally flaws the judgment of contempt. Petitioners' argument, in essence, is that in the absence of an explicit statement by the trial court indicating that he was applying the reasonable doubt standard, error must be presumed.
After reaching this conclusion, we did reverse the juvenile court order at issue because the record did not affirmatively reflect that the court had applied the reasonable doubt standard in adjudicating the supplemental petition. In arriving at that disposition, however, we specifically relied [19 Cal. 3d 915] upon the fact that the initial judicial decision articulating the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard in section 777 proceedings had been rendered "long after the hearing in issue [in Arthur N.] was conducted" (16 Cal.3d at p. 240); under those circumstances, of course, there was a substantial danger that the trial court in Arthur N. had not accorded the juvenile the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.
Indeed, as the real parties in interest suggest, a review of the entire record in this case demonstrates quite clearly that the petitioners never seriously contested the facts underlying the finding of contempt. fn. 14 Petitioners conceded that they had received notice of the court order in Cooper v. Obledo and had knowingly voted to defy the order; petitioners did not challenge the testimony of the county officials which established beyond question that the county had the financial ability to comply with the order. fn. 15 On this record, the trial court could reach no other conclusion but that petitioners were guilty of the contempt.
Richardson, J., Sullivan, J., and Devine, J., concurred.
"I am compelled to make an embarrassing inquiry. How do my learned colleagues propose to enforce their order? [¶] Naturally it is to be hoped that all good citizens will accept a final judicial determination of their rights and duties. But let us assume arguendo that the Glendale City Councilmen are intransigent, that they steadfastly refuse to vote to repeal [the offending ordinance] and to adopt another salary ordinance in its stead. Are my colleagues prepared to cite the entire legislative body for contempt of their order?"
The foregoing is no longer mere rhetoric; it now assumes monumental pragmatic proportions. The majority respond to my query about violating the separation of powers in the affirmative: they are indeed prepared to send an entire legislative body to jail for noncompliance with a judicial order. Yesterday, in Glendale, it was a city council. Today it is a county board of supervisors. Tomorrow the state Legislature?
In Glendale the city council had a moral obligation to comply with an agreement made with representatives of municipal employees. Here the supervisors, out of respect for the judicial process upon which our form of government depends, have an equally clear moral obligation to comply with the directives of California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 237 [113 Cal. Rptr. 154, 520 P.2d 970], and Cooper v. Swoap (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 856 [115 Cal. Rptr. 1, 524 P.2d 97]. I do not condone their refusal to do so.
However misguided the actions of the Plumas County board may be and however the supervisors' intransigence contributes to immobilizing orderly governmental processes, such persuasive moral imperatives do not invest the judiciary with the power to breach the wall of separation of powers. We simply cannot direct a legislative body to adopt a statute or [19 Cal. 3d 918] ordinance, whether it relates to employees' salaries, payments of welfare benefits, or any other subject requiring a vote of the body. After being selected by the electorate, every councilman, every supervisor, and every state legislator has an inviolate right to cast an "aye" or "nay" vote upon any subject before his body, and he must be able to do so conscientiously, without apprehensively glancing up at the Damoclean sword of a potential court citation for contempt. The legislators' responsibility is to their constituency, not to the judiciary.
I find nothing in the circumstances of this proceeding to justify carving out an exception to the venerable doctrine of separation of powers, such as, e.g., when the very ability of the judiciary to function is at stake (see State ex rel. Edwards v. Murray (1976) 48 Ohio St.2d 303 [2 Ohio Ops.3d 446, 358 N.E.2d 577]). Quite the contrary, the posture of the case cries out for invocation of judicial abstention.
It is true, as the majority state, that the trial court judgment in Cooper v. Obledo, the underlying action, directed the named defendants therein and their agents to restore welfare benefits improperly withheld. The significant issue, however, is whether the supervisors, not a party to the action, automatically become agents of Obledo and other state defendants for the purposes of this litigation. In an attempt to bridge the gap the majority cite numerous Welfare and Institutions Code sections, including those relating to state supervision of aid (§ 10603), providing for administration of state welfare laws by county boards of supervisors (§ 10800), and establishment of county welfare directors who shall abide by lawful state directives (§ 10802). None of those sections, assuming they could do so, declare that county supervisors -- as distinguished from the county as an entity and county administrators as ministerial officers -- become agents of a state bureau head. Indeed, it is utterly incongruous to suggest that elected public officials of one governmental entity can, by some ipse dixit, be declared agents of an appointed administrative officer of an entirely distinct branch of government, and thus be responsible for compliance with court orders made not to them but to their purported principal.
Authorities cited by the majority are not apposite, and the quotations are loose generalities taken out of context. San Francisco v. Collins (1932) 216 Cal. 187 [13 P.2d 912], involved the right of county supervisors [19 Cal. 3d 919] in the depths of the Great Depression to propose a bond issue for relief of the indigent sick and dependent poor. To indicate that the subject of providing relief was not entirely preempted by the state, the court declared that in issuing bonds for such purposes the county was acting as an agent of the state. County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 276 [106 P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141], involved the power of the county to release liens upon the property of recipients of aid. Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 669 [94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231], involved the failure of an appointive county public health director to comply with a statute. In no case cited by the majority has an elected official of a county been held to be an agent of an appointed state bureaucrat.
Admittedly there would be chaos if state welfare programs, such as those involved in Brian and Cooper, could be ignored or emasculated by the perversity of individual county administrators. The Legislature anticipated this untoward possibility in the adoption of Welfare and Institutions Code section 10605 (see ante, pp. 910-911, fn. 8 of majority opn. for the full text). The section provides for notice to the county director who is remiss, and for a hearing. Thereafter if the county continues its failure to comply with state laws and regulations, the state has three options: first, to withhold state and federal funds from the county; second, to assume direct responsibility for county administration -- virtually to place the county in receivership; third, to bring appropriate court action. The court action, it should be noted, is authorized if the state considers a county director to be failing, not the board of supervisors.
Chief Justice John Marshall said of the Constitution in his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders (1827) 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 351 [6 L. Ed. 606, 653]: [19 Cal. 3d 920] it contains "the language of restraint, not of coercion." We should speak in the same muted tones of forbearance.
I would annul the order of contempt.
Clark, J., and Brown (G. A.), J., concurred.
FN 1. The amended complaint named Obledo and Jerry Prod, Director of Benefit Payments, as defendants.
FN 3. The telegram read in full: "The policy of this administration is to carry out court orders even when we do not agree with them. Based on this policy, unless you act before 5 p.m., Thursday, November 20, 1975, to rescind action taken last week not to impliment [sic] order in Cooper decision, I intend to seek an order holding you in contempt of court. Please advise your intention."
FN 4. As the record reflects, the trial court stated from the bench: "The court believes that there is enough evidence here to justify finding that the defendants are guilty of contempt .... I believe that the evidence showed, number one, that the defendants had been noticed of the judgment; number two, they wilfully refused to comply with the judgment; and number three, that funds were available and are available in the general fund with which to comply. So we have the three ingredients, actual notice, wilfull refusal to abide by the judgment and ability to comply. ... So, I find that the defendants -- the individual defendants who are members of the Board of Supervisors of Plumas County are in contempt and guilty of contempt." A minute order, reflecting these findings, was entered; the record does not disclose any request by petitioners for additional findings.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the court's order does recite "sufficient facts, with sufficient particularity, to show that ... contempt has been committed." (Kroneberger v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal. App. 2d 206, 209 [16 Cal. Rptr. 339]; see generally 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Enforcement of Judgment, § 169, p. 3530.) Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion at oral argument, the record leaves no doubt that petitioners were at all times aware that the contempt proceeding related solely to their failure to comply with the portion of the Cooper v. Obledo order requiring retroactive welfare payments.
FN 5. Section 10800 provides in full: "Subject to the provisions of Section 11050 and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 12000) of Part 3, the administration of public social services in each of the several counties of the state is hereby declared to be a county function and responsibility and therefore rests upon the boards of supervisors in the respective counties pursuant to the applicable laws, and in the case of public social services for which federal or state funds are provided, subject to the regulations of the department.
"For the purpose of providing for and carrying out this function and responsibility, the board of supervisors of each county, or other agency as may be otherwise provided by county charter, shall establish a county department, unless otherwise provided by the county charter. Except as provided herein, the county department shall be the county agency for the administration of public social services and for the promotion of public understanding of the public social services provided under this code and the problems with which they deal."
Moreover, in light of the dissent's argument, it bears emphasis that a county's duty to pay welfare benefits derives ultimately from statutes enacted by the state Legislature, and not from judicial initiative. In this context, any "political solution" that the county seeks must be obtained by petitioning the Legislature to revise existing state statutes, rather than by disobedience of the governing law.
FN 7. Although petitioners did not raise the argument before the superior court, they now briefly maintain that the Cooper v. Obledo case was, in part, incorrectly decided; petitioners contend that the portion of the judgment implementing this court's unanimous decision in Brian is erroneous under the subsequent United States Supreme Court decision in Burns v. Alcala (1975) 420 U.S. 575 [43 L. Ed. 2d 469, 95 S. Ct. 1180]. This contention is clearly unsound on several grounds. First, even if the Cooper v. Obledo decision was based on an error of substantive law, such error constitutes no defense to a contempt conviction so long as the court had jurisdiction to issue the order. (See In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 148 [65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273]; Signal Oil etc. Co. v. Ashland Oil etc. Co. (1958) 49 Cal. 2d 764, 778 [322 P.2d 1]; Brady v. Superior Court (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 69 [19 Cal. Rptr. 242].) Petitioners demonstrate no such lack of jurisdiction within the meaning of the governing authorities. Moreover, our Brian decision was explicitly based on our interpretation of California's statutory welfare scheme (see 11 Cal.3d at pp. 240-241), and thus is not affected by the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of federal legislation in Burns.
FN 8. Section 10605 provides in full: "If the director considers a county director to be failing, in a substantial manner, to comply with any provision of this code or any regulation, pertaining to the administration of aid, the director shall put the county director on written notice to that effect, and shall give a copy of the notice to the board of supervisors.
"If within 60 days the county director fails to give reasonable assurance that he is complying and will continue to comply with the laws and regulations, the director shall order the county to appear at a hearing, before the director, with the State Benefits and Services Advisory Board, to show cause why the director should not take action to secure compliance. The county shall be given at least 30 days' notice of such hearing. The director shall consider the case on the record established at the hearing, and the advice of the State Benefits and Services Advisory Board, and, within 30 days, shall render proposed findings and a proposed decision on the issues. The proposed findings and decision shall be submitted to the county, and the county shall have an opportunity to appear within 10 days at such time and place as may be fixed by the director, for the purpose of presenting oral arguments respecting the proposed findings and decision. Thereupon the director shall make his final findings and decision.
"(c) Bring an action in mandamus or such other action in court as may be appropriate to compel compliance. Any such action shall be entitled to a preference in setting a date for a hearing.
"Nothing in this section shall be construed as relieving the board of supervisors of the responsibility to provide funds necessary for the continued aid required by law.
"Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as preventing a county from seeking judicial review of action taken by the secretary pursuant to this section under Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or except in cases arising under Sections 10962 and 10963, from seeking injunctive relief when deemed appropriate."
FN 10. Petitioners, relying on broad statements in some earlier cases to the effect that "no intendments or presumptions can be indulged in aid" of a judgment of contempt (e.g., Hotaling v. Superior Court, supra, 191 Cal. 501, 506; but cf. Rosin v. Superior Court (1960) 181 Cal. App. 2d 486, 490-492 [5 Cal.Rptr. 421]), suggest that the presumption that official duty was regularly performed is inapplicable to contempt proceedings. Petitioners, however, have failed to identify a single case in which a contempt order was reversed because the trial court failed to state on the record that it was applying the reasonable doubt standard. In In re Ciraolo (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 389, 393 [74 Cal. Rptr. 865, 450 P.2d 241], by contrast, we stated with respect to the requirements of an order finding an individual guilty of direct contempt that "[a]ll that is required is that an order be made reciting the facts constituting the contempt, adjudging the person guilty and prescribing the punishment. [Citations.]"
FN 11. On several occasions, the court specifically noted that "this is not a civil case; this is a quasi criminal [matter]."
FN 12. The affidavit filed by petitioners' attorney states in relevant part: "Judge Shreck concluded by stating that he was going to apply the civil standard of proof, a preponderance of the evidence, to the contempt proceeding."
FN 13. The three affidavits filed by the attorneys of the real parties in interest state in relevant part: (1) "Judge Shreck stated that on the basis of the exhibits and testimony received in evidence, he was prepared to find the petitioners guilty of contempt under either the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' or the 'preponderance of evidence' burden of proof rule of evidence." (2) "[Petitioners' counsel] then stated that he was concerned that the record failed to reflect what standard of proof was employed by the Court in reaching its decision. ... Judge Shreck cut [petitioners' counsel] short, stating that on one seriously contended that the supervisors were not in contempt and that the evidence presented at the hearing clearly established beyond a reasonable doubt all the necessary elements." (3) "[Petitioners' counsel] expressed his concern that the decision of the Court failed to include the legal standard employed by the Court in weighing the evidence, and that this would be necessary on appeal. ... Judge Shreck then responded that the evidence presented at the hearing clearly established beyond a reasonable doubt that the supervisors were in contempt. He further stated that he was presumed to know the law."
"Whereas, the economic condition of Plumas County is very depressed, and Whereas, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the taxpayers of Plumas County to support various Federal and State mandated programs by paying taxes out of their meager incomes, and Whereas, it is likewise increasingly difficult to adjust tax rates due to restrictions in the amounts that may be taxed which have been placed on counties such as Plumas by the State of California and Whereas, one of the largest State and Federal mandated programs from a tax standpoint is the social services operations of the Plumas County Welfare Department, and Whereas, it appears to this Board of Supervisors that the only way to present a workable budget is to eliminate the County's financial participation in said social services programs, Now, therefore, be it resolved, that effective July 1, 1975, Plumas County will no longer participate financially with the State and Federal Government in any social services programs mandated by the State or Federal Government."
FN 15. In the instant case public officials testified that sufficient funds were present in the county's budget to cover the cost of retroactive welfare payments mandated in Cooper v. Obledo, and on the basis of such testimony the court had little difficulty in finding that the county possessed the ability to comply with the court order. The strong showing made in the instant case, however, is by no means a prerequisite to a finding of contempt. In City of Vernon v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal. 2d 509, and City of Culver City v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal. 2d 535, our court upheld findings of contempt in cases in which city council members had simply failed to take reasonable steps to raise money needed to comply with a court order.

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