Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/151/586/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:02:59+00:00

Document:
It is unnecessary to decide whether under the civil law as in force in New Mexico in 1868, a written instrument was not necessary for the transfer of real estate (about which quaere), as if such a provision had previously existed, it had been supplanted at that time by territorial enactments. Under the most liberal construction of the civil law, a transfer of title to real estate could not be effected without identification of the land, delimitation of the boundaries, and delivery of possession, all of which were wanting in this case.
Certain loose parol statements and certain hearsay evidence are held to be inadmissible in this action of ejectment either to fix the boundaries of the defendant's deed or to show the character and extent of his alleged adverse possession.
When the defendant in an action of ejectment sets up title under adverse possession, it is competent for him to show that it was generally known in the neighborhood that he was in possession of the disputed premises, and was generally regarded as their owner.
claims covers a large estate, as a whole, excepting from the grant such tracts, "parts of said estate," warranted not to exceed a stated number of acres, "which the parties of the first part have heretofore sold and conveyed," the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the land in suit does not come within the exception.
The New Mexico statute of limitations as to real actions, Comp.Laws New Mexico, 1884, § 1881, operates when the period of limitation has expired, if set up and maintained by the defendant in an action of ejectment, to extinguish the right of the plaintiff, and to vest a complete title in the defendant.
This was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff in error in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of New Mexico to recover of the defendant the possession of a large tract of land within what is known as the Beaubien and Miranda or Maxwell land grant.
The declaration was in the ordinary form of a declaration in ejectment, averring the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the entire Maxwell grant and the unlawful entry of the defendant into that portion thereof situate in the County of Colfax.
"All the land in the valley or drainage of the Vermejo River, in the County of Colfax, Territory of New Mexico, within the following boundaries: commencing at the dam on said river at the upper end of John B. Dawson's farm; thence running to a high point of rocks on the north side of the Vermejo canyon; thence following along the top of the divide west of Rail Canyon to the head of Saltpeter Canyon; thence down along the top of the divide east of Saltpeter Canyon to a point on a line with John B. Dawson's rock fence; thence following the line of said rock fence across the Vermejo to the top of the divide between the Vermejo and Van Bremmer Canyon; thence following the top of said divide to the head of Coal Canyon, and thence along the top of the divide east of Coal Canyon to a point on said divide nearest the place of beginning; thence to the place of beginning."
that the plaintiff's right to sue for the same accrued more than ten years prior thereto.
"Excepting from the operation of this conveyance such tracts of land, part of the said estate, hereby warranted not to exceed in the aggregate fifteen thousand acres, which the parties of the first part have heretofore sold and conveyed by deeds duly recorded on or prior to the 25th day of January, one thousand eight hundred and seventy,"
and all the subsequent deeds under which the plaintiff claimed contained the same exception, though not exactly in the same words.
that after Maxwell put them into possession, they divided up the entire tract which he undertook to sell them, each one taking exclusive possession of his particular part. There seems to have been what the witness termed "a kind of a bond for a deed," to which Maxwell and Curits were parties, but it was not produced, and testimony of its contents was ruled out.
to the right of a ridge, near a wash, which tree is marked with a letter 'L;' thence running up said river on the south side to the place of beginning; containing about _____ acres, more or less."
This deed he claimed to have received by mail some time in 1869, and admitted to have shown to one Morley, who, in 1871, came to his house, under orders from the president of the plaintiff company, to survey the land. He appears to have entered upon the land the year before the deed was given, to have made numerous improvements, such as houses, orchards, and fences, and to have put the land under cultivation by means of irrigating ditches. All these improvements, except some cattle fences, were put upon the land described in the deed. Upon redirect examination, he stated that when he first came on the Vermejo, in the early part of 1868 or 1869, passing through, Curtis and Maulding told him that they had a contract with Maxwell for a piece of land there, beginning at the dam and running down the river to the lower end of what was known as the "O'Donnell Farm," with all the drainage, with the water that flowed from between this dam and the lower end of the O'Donnell farm. That they asked him (defendant) if he wanted some of it.
"I studied a good while, and said, 'If you will let me have the upper part,' which they agreed to do. . . . The contract which they had was for a block of land. . . . Curtis and Maulding told me that they had this whole drainage belonging to this block of land, and this was my part, and I talked with them often about it, and I talked with others."
He further testified that when Maxwell pointed out to him the boundaries of the land, they were down at a stage station, some four miles away, though they could see the prominent points of the tract from where they were, and that this was six months before he received his deed.
The case was tried by a jury, and a general verdict of not guilty returned, upon which final judgment was entered. The case was then carried to the supreme court of the territory, by which the judgment of the district court was affirmed. Plaintiff thereupon sued out a writ of error from this Court.
The controversy in this case relates to a tract of land within what is known as the "Maxwell Land Grant," to a portion of which, about 1,000 acres, described in the deed from Maxwell and wife to Dawson, it is admitted the defendant has a good title, Defendant, however, claims title to about 20,000 acres lying outside of the boundaries of the tract admitted to belong to him, which is the property in dispute. The case is before us upon certain errors assigned to the admission of testimony, and to the charge of the court.
(1) The third assignment of error is taken to the admission of the testimony of Dawson as to the parol statements of Maulding and Curtis touching their contract for the purchase of the land, which included that in controversy. The court below held that there was no error in the admission of this testimony, because, under the civil law, land could be conveyed by parol, accompanied by delivery of possession, and that it was immaterial whether the statements of Maulding and Curtis were properly admitted or not, because Dawson had testified that he had conversations with Maxwell, the party from whom they claimed to have purchased, and that Maxwell pointed out the boundaries of the land he would receive under his agreement with Maulding, Miller, and Curtis, who were then in possession, and so recognized by Maxwell under his sale to them.
"There has never been a time since the adoption of the Fuero Juzgo [a Visigothic code of the seventh century] in which lands could be conveyed, under Spanish or Mexican law, without an instrument in writing, unless it was, perhaps, in the case of an executed contract, where corporeal possession was delivered at the very time of the sale by actual entry upon the premises, and the doing of certain acts analogous to the livery of seisin at common law."
The question was again fully considered in the case of Hayes v. Bona, 7 Cal.
"that there is some doubt whether this law was in force in California. From what we can learn, it was a fiscal law, and extended over all the states and territories of Mexico. That it fell somewhat into disuse there is no doubt; but so far as we are informed, contracts for the sale of land, by the custom of the country, were required to be in writing, and although all the forms prescribed were not strictly followed, still it was necessary that the instrument should contain the names of the parties, the things sold, the date of the transfer, and the price paid. . . . We have always been willing to extend the greatest liberty to contracts executed before the acquisition of California by the United States, and to uphold them, if possible, where there were any equities existing. But to go further and extend the rule to verbal contracts for the sale of land or conveyances like the present, would open the door to stupendous frauds, and unsettle every title in the state."
See also Stafford v. Lick, 10 Cal. 12; Merle v. Mathews, 26 Cal. 455.
"the sale is not considered complete, when it is stipulated at the time of making it that it shall be reduced to writing, until that stipulation is complied with."
It is also said, in the useful and exhaustive work of Mr. Hall upon Mexican Law, page 489, that there was no statute of frauds in Spain or Mexico, and that a verbal sale of real estate was valid. He also speaks of the public writing (escritura publica) stated by earlier authors to be essential to the sale of real estate, as being a mere fiscal law, created for the purpose of collecting the alcabala, or tax on sales, and that the law did not declare that sales made otherwise should be null and void.
"Sales of real estate, or contracts in relation thereto, made in the territory ceded by Mexico to the United States, and subsequent to the concession, could not possibly have been affected by such a fiscal law. There was no law in force in the United States authorizing the collection of an alcabala, and no officer had power to collect such an impost. Such a fiscal law could not have been carried into execution in said territory."
"the sale of an immovable, whose value does not exceed $500, may be made by private instrument, which has to be signed by the vendor and the vendee before two known witnesses."
By art. 3059, this instrument was to be executed in duplicate, one for the vendor and one for the vendee, and, if the value of the immovable exceeds $500, the sale shall be reduced to a public writing.
In a subsequent chapter, a system of public registration is provided, somewhat similar to our own. These provisions are also carried into the Civil Code of December 14, 1883.
It is unnecessary, however, for the purpose of this case, to express an opinion whether, under the civil law, a transfer of land was valid without a written instrument, since we are of the opinion that the civil law in this particular had been supplanted by territorial enactments.
While no statute of frauds appears to have been adopted in New Mexico as early as 1868, the Compiled Laws of 1865, art. 19, c. 44 required all conveyances of real estate to be subscribed by the person transferring his title or interest (sec. 4) and to be acknowledged and certified by a public officer (sec. 5). Although there is nothing in this chapter saying in so many words that no transfer can be made without an instrument in writing, the careful provisions made for the execution and acknowledgment of conveyances of real estate indicate very clearly that written instruments were considered essential.
but hearsay of the loosest description. Taking Dawson's own version of it, all it amounted to was that Maulding and Curtis told him they had a contract with Maxwell for the purchase of this property, and that he might take a part of it. Neither the property which they purchased nor that which they allowed Dawson to take appears to have been identified in any way beyond the general statement that it included the drainage of the Vermejo River between certain points. If this testimony as to the contract between Miller, Maulding, and Curtis on the one part, and Maxwell, on the other, was entitled to any weight whatever, we think the court should have admitted the deeds from Maxwell and wife to Miller and Maulding and to Joel W. Curtis, showing the lands actually conveyed to them, as having a tendency to contradict, or at least to qualify, their general statements. These deeds appear to have been ruled out upon the ground that defendant could not be bound by recitals in deeds between other parties; but as both the grantors and grantees in these deeds were the parties from whom Dawson himself claimed title, it was competent to show definitely what land was conveyed by Maxwell to Miller, Maulding, and Curtis, from whom Dawson claimed title. Nor was this error cured by the admission of counsel as to the contents of these deeds, since the deeds themselves were excluded, and the admission was simply for the purpose of enabling the appellate court to pass upon their relevancy in reviewing the action of the trial court in excluding them.
under his agreement with Maulding, Miller, and Curtis, and that some of the permanent objects on the land in question were visible from the spot where they stood. There was no attempt in this conversation to identify the land, to fix the boundaries, or to deliver possession. All he said in this connection was that "the boundaries were what you read in that description there," meaning thereby his plea. There was nothing in the nature of a livery of seisin, which the Supreme Court of California pronounced to be essential to an oral transfer of lands under the civil law. No weight whatever should be given to testimony of this description in connection with the transfer of lands. It is incredible that any man should have paid $3,700 for such an indefinite purchase of real estate. A more probable explanation of the transaction was given by Dawson upon his cross-examination, when he produced a deed from Maxwell and wife, bearing date June 7, 1869, in which, to himself, for the consideration of $3,700, Maxwell conveyed to him the property admitted in this suit to belong to him.
drainage of the Vermejo River between the dam and the stone fence.
While defendant may have gained a title by adverse possession for ten years, it is difficult to believe that when he went into possession he claimed anything more than the tract covered by the deed from Maxwell, though, having command of the water for a certain distance, he may have treated this as giving him the control of the grazing privileges over a much larger extent of territory.
Under no theory of the case, however, were the loose talks which the defendant had with Miller, Maulding, and Curtis, or with Maxwell, admissible either to fix the boundaries of the deed or to throw light upon the character and extent of his alleged adverse possession. They were calculated to prejudice the plaintiff's case and to leave an impression upon the jury that defendant's claim of adverse possession was justified by a contract with Maulding, Miller, and Curtis of which there was no legal evidence. The admission of such testimony would create a most dangerous precedent and open up possibilities of fraud that might operate to the unsettlement of great numbers of titles.
defendant had a title other than that arising from adverse possession.
(2) There was no error in admitting testimony to the effect that the land claimed by Dawson was generally reputed to belong to him. Claiming, as he did, by open, notorious, and adverse possession of these lands for a period sufficient under the statutes of New Mexico to give him a good title, it was competent to prove that it was generally understood in the neighborhood not only that he pastured his cattle upon these lands, but that he did so under a claim of ownership, and that his claim and the character of his possession were such that he was generally reputed to be the owner. While this testimony would be irrelevant in support of a paper title, it had an important bearing upon the notoriety of his possession. Sparrow v. Hovey, 44 Mich. 64. It may be that, as the tract upon which Dawson lived was admitted to be his property and the question was one of boundaries or extent of ownership, the testimony may not have been of much value, but we cannot say it was inadmissible. It was a question for the jury to say not only whether his adverse possession, but whether this repute of ownership, extended beyond the property included in his deed from Maxwell.
(3) Plaintiff has no just reason to complain of the instruction of the court that the documents introduced by it were sufficient to vest in it the title to the land in controversy, unless they found from the evidence that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the land in controversy, or some portion thereof, was not the whole or part of the 15,000 acres of land excepted in the conveyances under which plaintiff claimed title, or in the further instruction that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that it had the legal title to, and the right of possession of, all the lands in controversy, and unless they found from the evidence that the lands in controversy were included in, and not excepted from, the deeds of conveyance under which plaintiff claimed title, plaintiff could not recover.
"part of the said estate, hereby warranted not to exceed in the aggregate 15,000 acres, which the parties of the first part have heretofore sold and conveyed,"
etc., and the question was whether the plaintiff was bound to show that the lands claimed by him in this suit had not theretofore been conveyed, or whether the burden was upon the defendant to show that they had been so conveyed. Ordinarily the burden of proof is upon the party claiming the affirmative of the issue. There are, however, certain exceptions to this general rule. Bearing in mind that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show its title to the identical land claimed by the defendant, it is manifest that, as the plaintiff did not take title to 15,000 acres of the Maxwell land grant by reason of the fact that its grantors had already conveyed this amount of land, it was incumbent upon it to show that the land it sued to recover had not been previously conveyed, and hence that it had taken title to it under its deeds.
"This is not always the rule of pleading; it is sometimes a rule of evidence only. It goes no further in any case than to require the party relying upon the exception to present the facts in such form as the case may require, and this may or may not be by special pleadings. . . . Whether special pleadings are necessary must be determined by other considerations and by the general rules of pleading."
Guthrie v. Lewis, 1 T. B. Mon. 142, in which a similar ruling was made.
These cases are precisely in point, and show that the court was guilty of no error prejudicial to the plaintiff.
Defendant, however, claims that as the plaintiff made no effort to prove himself without the exception, the judgment of the court ought, irrespective of every other consideration, to be affirmed. It is true that the court may have erred in not granting the motion of the defendant made at the close of the plaintiff's case to direct a verdict for him upon that ground, as there does not seem to have been any testimony offered by the plaintiff, in making his original case, to show that the land in controversy was not within the exception, but the defendant is in no condition now to take advantage of it, as the instruction actually given was given upon the request of the defendant himself. While the plaintiff has no right to complain of this instruction, it does not necessarily follow that defendant is entitled to an affirmance of the judgment because the charge of the court was not sufficiently favorable to him in that particular, when such charge was made upon his own request. In putting in its rebutting testimony, plaintiff did put in evidence the deeds of Maxwell and wife to Maulding and Curtis, but they were not offered for the purpose of proving itself without the exception, but for the purpose of contradicting the testimony of defendant as to his conversations with Maulding and Curtis, and it is too late for it now to claim that they were offered for the purpose of proving itself without the exception.
"no person, or persons, nor their children, or heirs, shall have, sue, or maintain any action or suit either in law or in equity for any land . . . but within ten years next after his, her, or their right to commence . . . such suit shall have . . . accrued, and that all suits . . . shall be had and sued within ten years next after the title or cause of action or suits accrued or fallen, and at no time after the ten years shall have passed."
Under similar statutes, it has been held by this Court that the lapse of time not only bars the remedy, but extinguishes the right and vests a complete title in the adverse holder. See 67 U. S. Warren, 2 Black 599; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268, 72 U. S. 289; Probst v. Presbyterian Church, 129 U. S. 182. In the last case, this Court held, construing the statute of New Mexico here in question, that the defendant was entitled to an instruction that an uninterrupted occupancy of land by a person who in fact has no title thereto for a period of ten years adversely to the true owner operates to extinguish the title of the true owner thereto and vest the title of the property absolutely in the occupier.
Reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
"III. In admitting the testimony of J. B. Dawson as to oral statements of Maulding and Curtis touching their contract for purchase of a tract of land as follows, to-wit:"
" They told me that they had a contract for a piece of land there, beginning at this dam that has been described, running down to the river to the lower end of what is known as the O'Donnell farm, with all the drainage of the water that flowed from between this dam and the lower end of the O'Donnell farm. They asked me if I wanted some of it. I studied a good while and said, 'If you will let me have the upper part,' which they agreed to."
" Curtis and Maulding told me that this whole drainage belonged to this block of land, and this was my part, and I talked with them often about it, and I talked with others. I talked with Maxwell, and Maxwell and myself were frontiersmen at this time when I talked with them at the stage station, and he observed that I did not get as much land."
"Also in admitting the testimony of other parties touching Dawson's ownership of and claim to the land in question, to-wit:"
" Q. Have you ever heard the people other than Dawson residing in that vicinity speak of this land as belonging to anyone?"
" Q. state the names of the persons that they always spoke of it as belonging to."
" A. They have always spoken of it as belonging to Mr. John Dawson."
" Q. How long have you heard the people in that vicinity speak of it in that way?"
" A. Since I have been in the country."
" Q. While you were in the Vermejo for that year or two, did you have any conversation with the people residing in that neighborhood as to who owned this tract of land that I read you the description of?"
" A. Yes, sir. "
" Q. Was that tract of land spoken of as belonging to anyone?"
" Q. As belonging to whom?"
" A. Mr. Dawson's, and also of Miller, Maulding, and Curtis."
" Q. Have you heard them speak of Miller and Maulding's land, too?"
" Q. Where were they with reference to this tract of land I read you the description of?"
" A. They were further down the creek."
" Q. Did you ever hear the people there speak of Dawson's south boundary line, as to where it was?"
" Q. What was it, according to their statements? "
" A. They said it was above Lacey's ranch, adjoining Dawson's land. At that time it belonged to De Graftenreid. "
" Q. During the time you were there, did you hear the people residing in that vicinity talk about Dawson's south boundary line?"
" Q. What did they speak of as his south boundary line?"
" A. They said he was going to fence in his portion of the land from this stone fence, when it was found he was going to continue the stone fence to the high point to the divide."
" A. He claimed from the dam on the Vermejo above his house to a rock fence below his house, and all drainages from either side."
" Q. Was that land ever spoken of as the land of anyone?"
" A. John B. Dawson."
" Q. Have you ever heard the people in that neighborhood other than Dawson speak of anyone as being the owner of this tract of land? "
" Q. Of whom did they speak as the owner of the land?"
" A. As Mr. Dawson's."
" Q. Did you ever hear any neighbors around there speak of this tract of land as the property of anyone?"
" A. Yes, sir; I have heard a great many speak of it."
" Q. They spoke of it as whose property?"
" A. John B. Dawson's."
" Q. Did you ever hear any of these people speak of this land as belonging to anyone?"
" A. Yes , sir."
" Q. They have spoken of it as belonging to whom?"
" A. To Mr. Dawson."
" A. I told them that my father claimed all the drainage of the Vermejo River that was above his lower line, and the heads of the canyons -- all the drainage above his lower line that come in on the property of the Horseshoe property, including his own place."
" A. It was the upper tract of this purchase or the upper part of this purchase that Maxwell made to us on the Vermejo River."
" A. I talked with my neighbors and we spoke of his upper tract. We often talked about this piece of land and Dawson owning this piece of land with its drainage."
" Q. While this defendant was in possession of this land in 1868, did Maxwell have actual knowledge of that possession?"
" Q.Did you have any conversation with anyone in that neighborhood as to who claimed to own this tract of land?"
" A. Yes, sir; I have heard several say who owned it."
" Q. Who did they speak of as owning it?"
" A. They said Mr. Dawson was the owner of it."
" Q. Do you know whether Maxwell knew that Dawson was in possession of this tract of land?"
" A. He knew that he was."
" Q. What land did these people claim to have possession of at that time?"
" A. They claimed to have possession of the land from the dam that now belongs to me down the river to a place known as the O'Donnell farm, to the lower end of the O'Donnell farm, with all the drainage and lands the water would flow in between these points to the Vermejo River."
" Q. Did Maxwell know that you were in possession of that tract of land?"
" Q. What was to be the extent of that southern line?"
" A. There was an extension from the east end, across Lacey Canyon, across Saltpeter Canyon to the top of the divide of Saltpeter Canyon and the waters flowing to the east, and the other end, an extension from the rock fence across Lacey Canyon to the top of the divide between Lacey Canyon and the Van Bremmer Canyon."
" Q. Do you know why that line was established there at all?"
" A. To divide my property from the next property below."

References: § 1881
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 art. 3059
 art. 19
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