Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/personal-injury-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:36:23+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Trujillo v. Regional Transportation Dist. on Thursday, December 28, 2018.
In this governmental immunity case, the key issue is whether a certain walkway is a “sidewalk” as described in section 24-10- 103(6), C.R.S. 2018, which would exempt the Regional Transportation District from the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act’s immunity provisions. Under that statute, sidewalk is defined as “that portion of a public roadway between the curb lines or the lateral lines of the traveled portion and the adjacent property lines which is constructed, designed, maintained, and intended for the use of pedestrians.” § 24-10-103(6). Thus, the court must determine whether the road adjacent to the walkway is a “public roadway.” A division of the court of appeals concludes that a road qualifies as a “public roadway” as that term is used in section 24-10-103(6) where, even though private vehicles are not permitted to drive thereon, its purpose is for transporting the general public via public buses.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Hernandez v. City & County of Denver on Thursday, October 18, 2018.
Negligence—Willful and Wanton Conduct—Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Public Employee—Waiver of Sovereign Immunity—Jail Operation.
Hernandez sustained injuries while a pretrial detainee at the Denver Detention Center. She sued six of the jail’s employees, including Deputy Sheriff Dodson, alleging, as relevant to this appeal, willful and wanton conduct. Following an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993), and pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), the district court found that Dodson and another defendant had not engaged in willful and wanton conduct and therefore enjoyed immunity from suit on those allegations.
On appeal, Hernandez alleged that the district court erred in finding Dodson was entitled to immunity. The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act provides that a public employee may not assert immunity in an action for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail, regardless of whether the employee engaged in willful and wanton conduct. Because the allegations of willful and wanton conduct here do not raise an issue of sovereign immunity, the district court erred in dismissing them before trial via Rule 12(b)(1) and a Trinity hearing.
The order was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Amparan v. Lake Powell Car Rental Companies on February 13, 2018.
Edmundo and Kimberly L. Amparan appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Lake Powell Car Rental Companies on the Amparans’ claims for negligent entrustment and loss of consortium. The claims arose from a vehicle accident involving a motorcycle operated by Mr. Amparan and a Ford Mustang rented by Lake Powell to Denizcan Karadeniz and operated by Mevlut Berkay Demir. Because the Amparans failed to come forward with evidence from which the jury could find an essential element of their claim for negligent entrustment, the appeals court affirmed.
On July 14, 2014, a group of Turkish nationals, including Mr. Karadeniz, visited Lake Powell to rent two vehicles. Mr. Karadeniz produced a valid Turkish driver’s license and a valid credit card. Mert Tacir, another member of the group, produced a valid Turkish driver’s license. The owner and operator of Lake Powell, Paul Williams, asked the remaining individuals in the group if they possessed valid driver’s licenses. Mr. Demir responded that he possessed a valid driver’s license. At the time of the rental, all three individuals were 21 years old. Although Mr. Williams recognized that Mr. Karadeniz and Mr. Tacir were under the age of 25, he nonetheless agreed to rent to rent a Dodge Caravan and a Ford Mustang to Mr. Karadeniz and to permit Mr. Tacir as an additional authorized driver for the Ford Mustang. None of the other members of the group, including Mr. Demir, completed an “Additional Driver Application/Agreement.” However, Mr. Demir testified that he understood Mr. Williams’ inquiry into whether he possessed a driver’s license as a signaling that he had Lake Powell’s implicit permission to operate the vehicles. Because a reasonable jury could adopt Mr. Demir’s understanding, the Tenth Circuit proceeded under the assumption that Lake Powell implicitly entrusted the rental vehicles to Mr. Demir. Evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Mr. Williams’ decision to rent two vehicles to an individual under the age of 25 and to permit an additional driver under the age of 25 violates internal policies propagated by Lake Powell’s licensor, Avis Rent A Car Systems, LLC.
During the course of the rental, Mr. Demir operated the Ford Mustang. Mr. Demir, unfamiliar with the traffic rules governing left turns at intersections, turned left on a solid green light without yielding to oncoming traffic. Mr. Amparan, traveling in the oncoming direction, unsuccessfully attempted to swerve to avoid hitting the turning vehicle operated by Mr. Demir and the two vehicles collided. As a result of the collision, Mr. Amparan alleges he suffered multiple broken bones, a punctured lung, and various other injuries.
The Amparans filed complaint in New Mexico state court, naming Mr. Demir, Mr. Karadeniz, and Avis as defendants. Avis removed the action to federal court, where, after an initial round of discovery, the district court granted the Amparans leave to amend their complaint to add Lake Powell as a defendant. The amended complaint raised claims against Lake Powell for negligent entrustment, loss of consortium, and negligent supervision and training. Lake Powell moved for summary judgment, arguing, in part, that even if it implicitly entrusted the Mustang to Mr. Demir, it neither knew nor should have known that Mr. Demir was likely to operate the vehicle in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. In response to Lake Powell’s motion for summary judgment, the Amparans filed a notice of testifying expert on both the risk posed by young drivers and standards of care in the car rental industry. The Amparans also contested Lake Powell’s motion for summary judgment, arguing in part that Lake Powell’s violation of internal policies regarding renting to, or approving as additional drivers, individuals under age 25 constituted sufficient evidence to permit the finding that Lake Powell knew or should have known that Mr. Demir was likely to operate the Ford Mustang in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
The district court indicated it would not consider factual assertions in the Amparans’ response to summary judgment that did not comply with District of New Mexico Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A). The district court denied Lake Powell’s motion to strike as moot. The district court deemed the motions to strike moot based on its conclusion that the Amparans’ evidence regarding Lake Powell’s alleged violation of internal policies was insufficient, on its own, to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Lake Powell knew or should have known that Mr. Demir was likely to operate the Mustang in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. The district court concluded that the disputes of fact with respect to whether Lake Powell entrusted the Mustang to Mr. Demir and whether Lake Powell violated any internal policies were not material because resolution of the disputes in favor of the Amparans did not alter the summary judgment decision.
On appeal, the Amparans argued that the district court failed to perform a proper analysis, in that a New Mexico court would view evidence of a violation of internal policies, which are also allegedly industry standards, sufficient to advance a claim for negligent entrustment. Alternatively, the Amparans urged the Tenth Circuit to address the merits of Lake Powell’s motions to strike. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Lake Powell on the Amparans’ claims for negligent entrustment and loss of consortium.
In an effort to overcome the extensive body of case law supporting the conclusion that the New Mexico Supreme Court would reject the proposition that evidence of a car rental company’s violation of internal policies is sufficient to establish the third element of a claim for negligent entrustment even where the entrustee possesses a valid driver’s license, the Amparans argued that their expert witness would testify on car rental industry standards regarding rentals to individuals under age 25. But the fact that evidence of a violation of an internal policy is probative on the question of negligence does not establish that the evidence is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of negligence. It cannot be said that the driver’s young age, on its own, makes it likely that the driver will cause an accident, will operate the vehicle in an incompetent manner, or will operate the vehicle in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. For, if such were true, no individual in New Mexico could grant a person under the age of 25 permission to drive a vehicle without facing liability for negligent entrustment based solely on the entrustee’s youthful age.
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the New Mexico Supreme Court would conclude that evidence of a car rental company’s violation of internal policies on the minimum age of renters and drivers is, on its own, insufficient to establish the third element of a claim for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. Thus, the Amparans failed to advance sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of negligent entrustment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Lake Powell on the Amparans’ claims for negligent entrustment and loss of consortium.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Forfar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. on Thursday, August 23, 2018.
Insurance—Collateral Source Rule—Medicare Benefits—Premises Liability.
Forfar, a Medicare beneficiary, slipped and fell at a Wal-Mart store. He filed a premises liability case. Before trial, Wal-Mart moved to exclude evidence of Forfar’s medical expenses owed under agreements he had with his medical providers. Forfar moved in limine to exclude evidence that he had received Medicare benefits. The trial court ruled that Wal-Mart could not present evidence to the jury as to the amount of the Medicare limits and that Forfar could not present evidence of private contracts between himself and any third-party medical providers. Forfar was allowed to present evidence of the reasonable value of medical services, for which he sought $72,636. After trial, Wal-Mart moved to reduce the damages under C.R.S. § 13-21-111.6, arguing that the economic damages awarded for medical expenses should be reduced to Medicare accepted rates. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Medicare benefits fall within the contract exception to the collateral source rule in C.R.S. § 13-21-111.6. The judgment entered on a jury verdict included $44,000 in economic damages for the reasonable value of medical services that Forfar had received.
On appeal, Wal-Mart contended that the trial court should have reduced the damages, arguing that the amounts paid by Medicare are dispositive of the necessary and reasonable value of medical services provided to Forfar. Pre-verdict, the collateral source rule, C.R.S. § 10-1-135(10)(a), bars evidence of collateral source benefits, and the correct measure of damages is the reasonable value of medical services. A benefit is not excluded from the definition of a collateral source simply because it comes from a government program. The trial court properly held Medicare benefits to be a collateral source inadmissible as evidence based on C.R.S. § 10-1-135(10)(a).
Wal-Mart also challenged the trial court’s holding that Medicare benefits fall within the contract exception to the collateral source rule. Post-verdict, the trial court is required to reduce a plaintiff’s verdict by the amount the plaintiff “has been or will be wholly or partially indemnified or compensated for his loss by any other person, corporation, insurance company or fund.” The exception to this prohibits trial courts from reducing a plaintiff’s verdict by the amount of indemnification or compensation that the plaintiff has received from “a benefit paid as a result of a contract entered into and paid for by or on behalf of the plaintiff.” Medicare benefits fall within the contract exception to the collateral source rule of C.R.S. § 13-21-111.6. The trial court properly applied the contract exception to Medicare benefits.
Wal-Mart further contended that the trial court violated the Supremacy Clause by failing to apply the Medicaid statutes and regulations over the collateral source rule, asserting that no person may be liable for payment of amounts billed in excess of Medicare approved charges. The Medicare statutes Wal-Mart relies on do not preempt Colorado law holding it liable for the reasonable value of Forfar’s medical services.
The court of appeals declined to award Forfar attorney fees because the issues presented by Wal-Mart were novel and supported by some out-of-state authority.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Lopez v. City of Grand Junction on Thursday, July 12, 2018.
Negligence—Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Waiver—Independent Contractor—Maintenance Work.
The underground maintenance of a public traffic light in Grand Junction breached a natural gas line. Gas from the ruptured line leaked into the surrounding ground and a sewer main and migrated to a house, resulting in an explosion. Lopez, Pierson, and Gimmeson (plaintiffs) brought negligence claims against the City of Grand Junction (City) for their resultant personal injuries and property damage. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges, among other things, that the City breached its duty of care to safely maintain its utility, electric, and sewer lines. As pertinent here, the complaint alleged that the City contracted with Apeiron Utility Construction (Apeiron) to upgrade utility lines that powered a traffic light; during this maintenance project Apeiron ruptured a gas line; and the leaking gas resulted in the house explosion. The complaint further alleged that Apeiron’s conduct should be imputed to the City. The City moved to dismiss these negligence claims for lack of jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), asserting governmental immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The court granted the motion.
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erroneously concluded that Apeiron’s conduct in maintaining the traffic light was not attributable to the City for purposes of waiving the City’s immunity under C.R.S. § 24-10-106(1)(f). For purposes of the immunity waiver in C.R.S. § 24-10-106(1)(f), a public entity maintains a public facility even if it hires an independent contractor to perform the maintenance. Here, plaintiffs met their burden to establish a waiver of immunity as to their negligence claims against the City.
Plaintiffs next asserted that the district court erred when it dismissed their negligence claim against the City as to its operation and maintenance of its sewer main. Plaintiffs asserted that the City’s failure to keep the main free of invasive roots was a failure to maintain that waived liability under the CGIA. Based on the record, plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to prove a waiver.
The dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claim against the City as to its operation and maintenance of its sewer main was affirmed. The dismissal of the negligence claims against the City for Apeiron’s maintenance work on the traffic light was reversed and the case was remanded.

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