Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99287/rogers-vs-missouri-pac-r-co
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 13:00:32+00:00

Document:
Respondent Missouri Pac. R. Co.
Held: The evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding for petitioner, and the judgment is reversed. Pp. 352 U. S. 501 -511.
1. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the test of a jury case is whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the employee's injury. Pp. 352 U. S. 505 -509.
2. Cognizant of the duty to effectuate the intention of the Congress to secure the right to a jury determination in cases under the Act, this Court is vigilant to exercise its power of review in any case where it appears that the litigants have been improperly deprived of that determination. P. 352 U. S. 509 .
3. The fact that Congress has not substituted a scheme of workmen's compensation cannot relieve this Court of its obligation to effectuate the existing Act by granting certiorari to correct improper administration of the Act and to prevent its erosion by narrow and niggardly construction. P. 352 U. S. 509 .
4. When this Court has granted certiorari in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case, the litigants are entitled to the same measure of review on the merits as in every other case. P. 352 U. S. 509 .
5. In actions under the Act, Congress has vested the power of decision exclusively in the jury in all but the infrequent cases where fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ whether fault of the employer played any part in the employee's injury. Pp. 352 U. S. 504 -505, 352 U. S. 509 -510.
6. Special and important reasons for the grant of certiorari in these cases exist when lower federal and state courts persistently deprive litigants of their right to a jury determination. P. 352 U. S. 510 .
We think that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding for the petitioner. The testimony that the burning off of weeds and vegetation was ordinarily done with flame throwers from cars on the tracks and not, as here, by a workman on foot using a crude hand torch, when that evidence is considered with the uncontradicted testimony that the petitioner was where he was on this narrow path atop the dirt "dump" in furtherance of explicit orders to watch for hotboxes, supplied ample support for a jury finding that respondent's negligence played a part in the petitioner's injury. These were probative facts from which the jury could find that respondent was or should have been aware of conditions which created a likelihood that petitioner, in performing the duties required of him, would suffer just such an injury as he did. [ Footnote 4 ] Common experience teaches both that a passing train will fan the flames of a fire and that a person suddenly enveloped in flames and smoke will instinctively react by retreating from the danger and, in the process, pay scant heed to other dangers which may imperil him. In this view, it was an irrelevant consideration whether the immediate reason for his slipping off the culvert was the presence of gravel negligently allowed by respondent to remain on the surface or was some cause not identified from the evidence.
the petitioner was the sole cause of his mishap. [ Footnote 9 ] We must take it that the verdict was obedient to the trial judge's charge, and that the jury found that such was not the case, but that petitioner's injury resulted at least in part from the respondent's negligence.
with reason a verdict in his favor, unless the judge can say that the jury may exclude the idea that his injury was due to causes with which the defendant was not connected, or, stated another way, unless his proofs are so strong that the jury, on grounds of probability, may exclude a conclusion favorable to the defendant. That is not the governing principle defining the proof which requires a submission to the jury in these cases. The Missouri court's opinion implies its view that this is the governing standard by saying that the proofs must show that "the injury would not have occurred but for the negligence" of his employer, and that "[t]he test of whether there is causal connection is that, absent the negligent act, the injury would not have occurred." [ Footnote 10 ] That is language of proximate causation which makes a jury question dependent upon whether the jury may find that the defendant's negligence was the sole, efficient, producing cause of injury.
defenses and, for practical purposes, the inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more than the single question whether negligence of the employer played any part, however small, in the injury or death which is the subject of the suit. [ Footnote 16 ] The burden of the employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to pay damages arises, when there is proof, even though entirely circumstantial, [ Footnote 17 ] from which the jury may with reason make that inference.
action, has required this Court to review a number of cases. [ Footnote 24 ] In a relatively large percentage of the cases reviewed, the Court has found that lower courts have not given proper scope to this integral part of the congressional scheme. We reach the same conclusion in this case. [ Footnote 25 ] The decisions of this Court after the 1939 amendments teach that the Congress vested the power of decision in these actions exclusively in the jury in all but the infrequent cases [ Footnote 26 ] where fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ whether fault of the employer played any part in the employee's injury. Special and important reasons for the grant of certiorari in these cases are certainly present when lower federal and state courts persistently deprive litigants of their right to a jury determination.
Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459 .
Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U. S. 477 .
Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. R. Co., 321 U. S. 29 , 321 U. S. 35 .
Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520 .
Proof of violation of certain safety appliance statutes, without more, proves negligence and also eliminates contributory negligence as a consideration for any purpose. Note 11 supra. The only issue then remaining is causation. Carter v. Atlanta & St. A.B. R. Co., 338 U. S. 430 ; Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U. S. 477 .
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163 , 337 U. S. 174 .
(Emphasis added.) 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. § 51; Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520 , 335 U. S. 523 -524.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54 .
Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence. The Robert Edwards, 6 Wheat. 187, 19 U. S. 190 .
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492 .
Tipton v Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 298 U. S. 141 ; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473 .
Jacob v. New York City, 315 U. S. 752 .
We adopt the reasoning in this regard of Part I of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's opinion concurring in No. 46 and dissenting in this case and in Nos. 42 and 59. Post, p. 352 U. S. 559 .
See Appendix to opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 , 336 U. S. 71 ; Note, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 1441.
This Court found that a jury question was presented, and reversed in the following cases: Schulz v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 350 U. S. 523 ; Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 344 U. S. 407 ; Carter v. Atlanta & St. A.B. R. Co., 338 U. S. 430 ; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 ; Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 333 U. S. 821 ; Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459 ; Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U. S. 477 ; Ellis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 329 U. S. 649 ; Jesionowski v. Boston & M. R. Co., 329 U. S. 452 ; Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645 ; Keeton v. Thompson, 326 U.S. 689; Blair v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 323 U. S. 600 ; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 323 U. S. 574 ; Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. R. Co., 321 U. S. 29 ; Bailey v. Central Vt. R. Co., 319 U. S. 350 ; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54 ; Seago v. New York Cent. R. Co., 315 U.S. 781; Jenkins v. Kurn, 313 U. S. 256 .
The Court found that no question for the jury was presented, and affirmed in the following cases: Moore v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 340 U. S. 573 ; Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 335 U. S. 329 ; Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U. S. 476 .

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