Source: https://www.insidethefca.com/fca-deeper-dive-fca-retaliation-claims/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 01:59:20+00:00

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The employee engaged in protected activity.
The employer knew that the employee was engaged in protected activity.
As a result of the above, the employee was discriminated against.
In interpreting this language, many courts have adopted the so-called “distinct possibility” standard, holding that “an employee engages in protected activity when litigation is a distinct possibility, when the conduct reasonably could lead to a viable FCA action, or when . . . litigation is a reasonable possibility.” Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Const., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 866 (4th Cir. 1999) Since the “distinct possibility” standard was adopted, § 3730(h) has been amended on two occasions. The current definition of “protected activity,” enacted in 2010, covers employee conduct “in furtherance of an action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1).
Courts have continued to consider the type of conduct that constitutes “protected activity” under the post-2010 FCA’s anti-retaliation provisions at various procedural junctures.
For example, in Carlson v. DynCorp International LLC, 2016 WL 4434415 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2016), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an FCA complaint for failure to state a claim under the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision. In so doing, the Fourth Circuit “assume[d], without deciding” that the relator’s proposed standard for applying § 3730(h)’s second prong was correct, e., “efforts to stop 1 or more violations” constitute protected activity where those efforts are “motivated by an objectively reasonable belief that the employee’s employer is violating, or soon will violate, the FCA.”In other words, to determine whether a plaintiff has adequately pleaded “protected activity” under the second prong of § 3730(h), the Fourth Circuit asks whether the relator has “allege[d] facts sufficient to show that he believed [his employer] was violating the FCA, that his belief was reasonable, that he took action based on that belief, and that his actions were designed to ‘stop 1 or more violations of’ the FCA[.]” With respect to the sufficiency of the relator’s allegations, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly dismissed the second amended complaint on the ground that the relator “failed to show that his belief that [the defendant employer] was violating the FCA was objectively reasonable.” Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit deemed the allegations contained in the second amended complaint “entirely speculative[,]” largely due to the relator’s failure “to plausibly allege facts sufficient to show he reasonably believed that” the defendant employer committed a fraud against the government.
The Seventh Circuit likewise affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer and related entities in U.S. ex rel. Uhlig v. Fluor Corporation, 839 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2016). With respect to the relator’s allegations, the Seventh Circuit found no false statements were made under the FCA, because the relator failed to demonstrate that the defendant employer breached its contract with the government.
In contrast, in U.S. ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educational, Inc., 840 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 2016), the Eighth Circuit found that sufficient factual issues precluded a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer. The plaintiffs had alleged that Heritage College fraudulently induced the Department of Education “to provide funds by falsely promising to keep accurate student records.” The Eighth Circuit found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Heritage with respect to the plaintiffs’ FCA claim on the ground that the plaintiffs raised material issues of fact regarding “how Heritage understood its obligations and whether it intended to comply with the” program participation agreement with the DOE.
For more information about FCA Compliance, please contact the authors listed above and visit Bass, Berry & Sims’ Healthcare Fraud practice page.

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