Source: https://www.marylandcriminalattorneyblog.com/maryland_criminal_attorney_mar_1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 13:05:29+00:00

Document:
If the attorney believes that a Constitutional violation has occurred he will file a motion to suppress the evidence and follow up that motion with a memorandum of law to support it. The first questions an aggressive criminal attorney will ask are questions such as: I am currently representing a client who had a large amount of narcotics seized from his apartment pursuant to a warrant that I believe was both stale (that is the events making up the probable cause happened too long ago to support the warrant) and lacked a nexus to his apartment where the police recovered the cocaine.
Here is the brief that I am filing with the court.
A. There was no probable cause established in the affidavit for issuance of the search warrant to search the Defendant’s residence.
The Fourth Amendment requires that no search warrant shall issue without probable cause. Probable cause means a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). This Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the District Court of Maryland’s decision to issue the warrant. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984). While this Court should pay “great deference” to findings of probable cause, it does not mean that warrants should be upheld when based on objectively unreasonable grounds for believing the warrant is valid. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 236. Moreover, it is important to remember that to pass constitutional muster, there must be sufficient nexus between the criminal conduct, the items to be seized and the place to be searched. United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988).
In determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, the crucial element is not whether the target of the search is suspected of a crime, but whether it is reasonable to believe that the items to be seized will be found in the place to be searched. United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582 (4th Cir. 1993); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 & n.6, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1976-77 & n.6; 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). In Lalor, the Fourth Circuit found that the affidavit was devoid of any basis from with the magistrate could infer that there was evidence of drug activity at Lalor’s residence. The Court noted that the affidavit did not describe circumstances which indicated that such evidence was likely to be stored at Lalor’s residence nor did it explain the geographic relationship between Lalor’s residence and the area where drug sales occurred. The Court emphasized “residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence.” Id. at 1583.
The same result should be reached in this case. The affidavit does not describe circumstances which indicate that narcotics were likely to be stored at the Defendant’s residence. There was no explanation of the geographic relationship between the Defendant’s residence and where drug sales occurred. Further, the Defendant was not seen carrying narcotics into his residence nor was further surveillance conducted. As the Court noted in United States v. Thomas, 300 U.S. App. D.C. 380 (D.C. Cir. 1993), “observations of illegal activity occurring away from the suspect’s residence, can support a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant for the residence, if there is reasonable basis to infer from the nature of the illegal activity observed that relevant evidence will be found in the residence.” As the Court of Appeals noted in Holmes v. State, 368 Md. 506 (2002) “the mere observation, documentation, or suspicion of a defendant’s participation in criminal activity will not necessarily suffice, by itself, to establish probable cause that inculpatory evidence will be found in the home.” In this case, although there was observation of the Defendant’s participation of criminal activity outside the home, that does not justify the search and seizure of the Defendant’s residence.
B. If there was probable cause at the time of the controlled buy, it was stale by the time of the search of the residence.
The ultimate criterion in determining the degree of evaporation of probable cause, however, is not case law but reason. The likelihood that the evidence sought is still in place is a function not simply of watch and calendar but of variables that do not punch a clock: the character of the crime (chance encounter in the night or regenerating conspiracy?), of the criminal (nomadic or entrenched?), of the thing to be seized (perishable and easily transferable or of enduring utility to its holder?), of the place to be searched (mere criminal forum of convenience or secure operational base?), etc. The observation of a half-smoked marijuana cigarette in an ashtray at a cocktail party may well be stale the day after the cleaning lady has been in; the observation of the burial of a corpse in a cellar may well not be stale three decades later. The hare and the tortoise do not disappear at the same rate of speed.
significant, so as not to vitiate the warrant.” Peterson at 318; See also, Lee v.
the warrant must be suppressed.
C. The good faith exception cannot save the first search of the property.
first, when the warrant is based on an affidavit containing “knowing or reckless falsity”; second, when the magistrate has simply acted as a “rubber stamp” for the police; third, when the affidavit does not “provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause”; and finally, when the warrant is so “facially deficient” that an officer could not reasonably rely on it.
United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Leon, Supra, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3420. The good faith exception cannot save this unconstitutional search. The issuing judge certainly abandoned any detached or neutral role by authorizing a warrant based upon an application bereft of probable cause.
In addition, it is evident that probable cause was stale and the warrant was so facially deficient an officer could not reasonably rely on it. In Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652 (2006), the Court of Appeals recently addressed the good faith argument as it applied to stale probable cause. The defendant in that case moved to suppress drugs seized from his residence. The defendant argued that the issuing judge lacked a substantial basis to issue the warrant because probable cause, based upon the date of a trash seizure, was stale. The affidavit indicated that the trash seizure occurred one year and one day prior to the application of the warrant. The Court of Appeals noted probable cause was clearly stale and rejected the good faith argument articulated by the State. The Court of Appeals determined that the affidavit outlined the trash seizure, eleven months earlier, and did not describe a continuing criminal enterprise ongoing at the time of the application. Id. at 682. In addition, the Court stated, “we do not conclude that a reasonable well-trained police officer executing a warrant would believe that the warrant authorized the search because the lack of probable cause was apparent on the face of the affidavit” when the evidence does not indicate continuing criminal activity.” Id. at 683.
The same result should be reached in this case. There was not a sufficient nexus between the criminal activity and the place to be searched. Further, probable cause was stale. As the Court of Appeals concluded in Greenstreet, a reasonable well-trained police officer would not have believed the warrant authorized the search because the lack of probable cause was apparent. Therefore, good faith cannot save this unconstitutional search.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant this Motion to Suppress.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v.