Source: http://www.jacobtcremer.com/2012/09/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:40:40+00:00

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Property Rights at Stake This Week: Should Property Rights Depend on the Importance of the Public Interest?
The case could have implications beyond the narrow question of Army Corps-directed water discharges. Those keen for the Supreme Court to become more active in the property rights area, like Jonathan Adler, a law professor at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, certainly hope so. "We don't see many property rights cases," he said. "The language of the opinion will really matter."
Others are wary of the Supreme Court expanding the definition of what constitutes a taking. John Echeverria, a professor at Vermont Law School, is concerned that any kind of ruling in favor of Arkansas could have "enormous implications" for local governments.
Although the federal government is the defendant in the case before the court, local governments are far more likely to be on the receiving end of such claims if the Supreme Court endorses the practice, Echeverria wrote in a brief in support of the Army Corps filed by the International Municipal Lawyers Association and other local government groups.
In an interview, Echeverria said property rights advocates would be keen for a broad ruling on "temporary takings" that could prompt challenges to such activities as government inspections of property. "This is one front of a multifaceted debate over property rights," he added. "The property rights advocates see it as an opportunity to expand the doctrine."
Professor Echeverria is well known for having never seen a property rights claim that amounted to a taking. He supported the State of Florida before the U.S. Supreme Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). In that case, I worked for counsel of record in representing the property owners after the Florida Supreme Court rewrote its waterfront property law.
The facts of this relatively unique case have the potential to obscure the particular threats to local governments posed by the arguments of Petitioner and its amici curiae for extending physical takings octrine to temporary occupations or invasions. In a variety of contexts, for a variety of important public purposes, government officials intentionally or inadvertently cause temporary or occasional physical invasions of private property. Exposing local taxpayers to potential financial liability under the Takings Clause for all such incidental injuries to property would impose significant new financial burdens on already straitened local governments as well as impede important government functions. In other words, in the context of temporary invasions or occupations, as much as with regulatory restrictions, “government hardly could go on” if it could be held liable under the Takings Clause every time it acted. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
Of most immediate concern, Petitioner’s proposed takings theory would seriously undermine the ability of local governments to address a host of local water management issues. Managing the flow of storm water, sewage and other forms of water is one of the most important and difficult functions of local government.
Professor Echeverria seems to miss the point of constitutional protection of property rights entirely. As is always the case in property rights disputes, there are many competing interests at stake here. The interests of farmers and others that the Army Corps was working towards when it flooded the Commission's property are certainly important, as were the more general interests of the public in being protected from flooding. That makes this case all the more compelling: property rights must be respected, no matter how compelling the public interest is. Any other rule cheapens the freedoms we've worked so diligently for in this country.
The 2d DCA recently held that a local government's longstanding interpretation of its land development code cannot trump the code's unambiguous language. In Longboat Key v. Islandside Prop. Owners Coal., LLC, - So. 3d -, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2058 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), the Town approved a $400 million redevelopment plan for the Longboat Key Club. Several community organizations asked the circuit court to review the Town's decision. The circuit court found that the Town violated multiple provisions of its land development code in approving the redevelopment plan. Consequently, it struck down the Town's ordinance approving the plan.
The Town argues that the Code is ambiguous, thus requiring the circuit court to defer to the Town's reasonable interpretation. See Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So.2d 844, 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that an agency's interpretation is afforded deference by the court unless the plain language of the ordinance runs contrary to the agency's interpretation). In support of this argument, the Town cites its longstanding tradition allowing similar nonresidential developments. Vanderbilt Shores Condominium Association v. Collier County, 891 So.2d 583, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), blunts that attack. Tradition cannot displace the plain meaning of a local code.
The Town's longstanding interpretation of its Code cannot tie the circuit court's hands. To allow such a result would countenance a shifting-sands approach to Code construction that would deny meaningful judicial review of local quasi-judicial decisions. The meaning of a code would remain in flux. Such an approach does not promote consistency in the application of law. As the wording of its laws binds a legislature, the Town is bound by the wording of its Code. This mounts a bulwark against the Town's unfettered exercise of power. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Brevard Cnty. v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474 (Fla.1993) (noting that local governments and agencies must strictly adhere to town development plans and zoning codes); City of Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 10 So.2d 307, 309 (1942) (discussing the limited scope of authority under which municipal ordinances are valid); Ocean's Edge Dev. Corp. v. Town of Juno Beach, 430 So.2d 472, 474–75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (determining that courts cannot amend local ordinances “as the town would have liked it to read” by ignoring the language of the code “in favor of after-the-fact expert testimony as to legislative intent to fill in the cracks” because property owners and residents have every right to depend on the wording of the code.) As the circuit court noted, the Town is free to amend the Code. See Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (“[T]he City is bound by the express terms of its own ordinance.... If the City desires a different meaning for its ordinance in the future, it may amend, modify, or change the same by legislative process.”).
The 2d DCA's message is clear: local governments must follow their own rules in their land development codes. If they do not like them, they can legislatively amend the rules. They cannot, however, simply interpret clear rules unreasonably. If the rules are unclear (or become unclear when a new situation arises), then local governments can interpret their rules to address the uncertainty.
Next week, on October 3d, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear an important case for property rights: Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, No. 11-597 (cert. granted Apr. 2, 2012). Property owners should be concerned about this case because it could affect their investment decisions, especially investments related to natural resources. If the decision below stands, landowners will oftentimes be uncertain of whether they deserve compensation when the government floods their property.
In this case, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which reviews takings claims against the federal government, held that the flooding of private land cannot be a taking. The only exception is where the government intends for the flooding to be a permanently recur on the property. The Federal Circuit held that courts should not look at the damages caused by the flooding or the time it lasted, but rather on the character of the policy behind the intrusion. The Federal Circuit then held that each flooding instance was merely a temporary policy not subject to review. Consequently, the Commission could not recover for the timber that the federal government killed by flooding.
The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (“the Commission”) is an agency that works to regulate and preserve Wildlife Management Areas in Arkansas. One of the areas that the Commission manages (the “Management Area”) is a bottomland hardwood forest in the Upper Mississippi Alluvial Valley, home to diverse wildlife and hardwood timber species. The Black River runs through the Management Area. One way that the Commission regulates the Management Area is by harvesting timber in the area and then planting new trees. The Commission also controls the flooding of multiple reservoirs in the Management Area to improve the habitat for migratory waterfowl.
On March 18, 2005, the Commission filed a lawsuit in the Court of Federal Claims against the United States claiming that from 1993 through 2000, the United States effectuated a taking of the Commission’s property and failed to provide compensation. The Commission argued that during those years, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”), deviated from the Corps’ 1953 water control plan for the Clear Water Dam, which regulates the flow of the Black River. The Commission claims that the deviations caused increased flooding in the Management Area, which devastated the timber in the region. The Corps deviated from the 1953 water control plan to help farmers near the Management Area.
In December 2008, the Court of Federal Claims conducted a hearing concerning the Commission’s lawsuit. At the hearing, the United States argued that the flooding in the Management Area was temporary and therefore did not constitute a taking. The Court of Federal Claims rejected the United States’ argument and awarded the Commission $5.5 million for the damage resulting from the flooding and $176,428.34 to regenerate the Management Area. The United States appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Court of Appeals”), arguing that a taking had not occurred and the Commission cross-appealed, requesting more funds for regeneration. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the United States and then denied the Commission’s petition for a rehearing. On April 2, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the Commission certiorari to consider whether flooding has to be permanent to constitute a taking under theTakings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On August 16, 2012, the Commission rejected a $13 million settlement offer from the United States because the United States refused to agree that the Corps would not increase the flooding in the Management Area again.
One interesting aspect of this case is that it has not pitted environmental interests against property rights, as is often the case. Jonathan Adler has gone so far as to call it "A Takings Claim Even Environmentalists Could Love." For more in-depth reading, here are the briefs in the case. You might also check out Robert Thomas's excellent blog, where Robert has discussed the case in depth along with the amicus brief that he filed supporting the property owner.
I'll prove updates in the coming weeks once reports from oral argument at the Supreme Court come in.
Though the economy has slowed, growth pressures continue, while the local food and small farms movements gather steam. Planners are working to understand and address these issues. But agriculture is different. From agricultural enclaves under growth management law, to the Right to Farm Act, to the numerous preemptions against regulation by local government, Florida law and policymakers treat agriculture differently. After discussing the laws that planners should be aware of, the panelists with discuss the challenges, pitfalls, and opportunities that agriculture presents. Special emphasis will be placed on agriculture at the rural-urban fringe.
Robert Halman is the Collier County University Extension Director and Agricultural Agent with 26 years of extension experience providing timely, relevant programming for small farm operators and agribusiness enterprises. His focus is on sustainable agricultural enterprises, farm agrosecurity, emergency preparedness, and thriving communities. The agricultural program involves one-on-one consultations, farm visits, topical programming and facilitating community civic engagements. Robert has a B.S. in Dairy Science, a M.Ag. in Dairy Science, a M.S. in Food and Agricultural Science.
Phil Leary is a City Commissioner in Palatka. Previously, Phil served as the Planning Director for Clay and Putnam Counties and as Director of Government & Community Affairs for the Florida Farm Bureau Federation, the largest general farm membership organization in the state of Florida. While there, he represented Farm Bureau policy positions on local government land use, growth management, and environmental regulation. Phil continues his work on these issues at his government consulting firm. Phil received a B.S. in Agriculture from UF and completed post graduate work in Public Administration, Policy, and Planning at UNF.
Pat Steed is the Executive Director of the Central Florida Regional Planning Council. She has served as Planning Director for Polk County and the City of Lakeland, the MPO Coordinator, and as a Project Director for a national consulting firm. Pat has served on statewide committees, including DCA’s Rural Land Stewardship Advisory Committee. Currently, Pat is managing the Heartland 2060 visioning effort and development of a Regional Plan for Sustainable Development, which covers over half of Florida’s productive agricultural land. These efforts recognize the importance of viable agri-business for economic sustainability, including alternative crops and biofuels.
Joseph Gocsik received his Bachelor of Science in Natural Resources from The Ohio State University in 1996. In 1997 Joseph was hired as the Timber Forester for the 150,000 acre Withlacoochee State Forest where he was able to learn the “hands on” history of management practices in Florida and was introduced to the majority of habitats that currently exist. After serving the public for 2 ½ years Joseph chose to join a private forestry consulting firm in 2000 and served as a senior consulting forester and eventual division manager until January of 2008. In February of 2008 Joseph created Forest Environmental Solutions, LLC “FES” in hopes of better serving client needs, while providing them the best management services possible.
Jake Cremer is a fifth generation owner of timberlands in Florida, and he grew up working in his family’s timber operations. He served the Department of Community Affairs as a Gubernatorial Fellow and has received FAPA’s Outstanding Student Planner Award. Currently, he represents landowners in interactions with government at Bricklemyer Smolker & Bolves in Tampa. He assisted in the defense of property rights before the U.S. Supreme Court in the controversial Stop the Beach Renourishment case. Jake received a BA in Economics & Business from Rhodes College. He holds a JD and MSP in urban and regional planning with a certificate in real estate development from FSU.
Last month, I reviewed the arguments being made in the Koontz case, which the U.S. Supreme Court is considering whether to review. In that case, a landowner sued after being denied a permit when he refused to fund improvements miles away from his property on land owned by the agency issuing the permit. The Florida Supreme Court declined to recognize an exaction, holding that U.S. Supreme Court precedent on exactions only applies to real property where a permit was actually issued and the exaction imposed.
The petitioner has filed a brief in reply to last month's opposition brief from the St. Johns River Water Management District. In its opposition brief, the District had argued that the U.S. Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the petitioner did not initially allege a federal takings claim, and that even if it did, there was no important question of federal law to be answered.
The Opposition, however, insists that this Court does not have jurisdiction over a state court’s determination of federal constitutional law because the complaint alleged only a violation of the state constitution. The District is wrong. For the purpose of establishing this Court’s jurisdiction, it is irrelevant when a federal claim was raised in the proceedings below so long as the state court of last resort did, in fact, rule on the federal question. It is enough that the state court “reached and decided” the federal constitutional questions.
The Florida Supreme Court adopted two per se rules of federal takings law that significantly limit the protections guaranteed by Nollan and Dolan. First, the court concluded that, as a matter of law, the nexus and proportionality tests will never apply to an excessive exaction of money or any other non-real property. And second, the court held that Nollan and Dolan will not apply where the government denies a permit application because the landowner refuses to accede to an excessive exaction. Each of these rulings raises “an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.” In addition, the Florida court’s resolution of these questions conflicts with decisions of this Court, and conflicts with decisions from other state courts of last resort and federal courts of appeals.
The U.S. Supreme Court docket shows that the Court will decide whether the hear this case during its September 24th conference.
The State of Oregon and the industry group of petitioners have filed their merits briefs in the forest roads case that the U.S. Supreme Court will hear this term. As readers of this blog will know, the U.S. Supreme Court consolidated two petitions for certiorari into one case because they were based on the same Ninth Circuit ruling. Since then, it's clear the petitioners have been hard at work, since both present much clearer questions to the Court. The briefs are posted below.
Whether the Ninth Circuit should have deferred to EPA’s long-standing position that channeled runoff from forest roads does not require a permit, and erred when it mandated that EPA regulate such runoff as industrial stormwater subject to NPDES.
(1) Congress authorized citizens dissatisfied with the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules implementing the Clean Water Act’s permitting program to seek judicial review of those rules in the courts of appeal. Congress further specified that those rules could not be challenged in any civil or criminal enforcement proceeding. Did the Ninth Circuit err when it held that a citizen may bypass the exclusive method of seeking judicial review of a permitting rule, and challenge the validity of the rule in a citizen suit to enforce the Clean Water Act against regulated parties?
(2) In the Clean Water Act, Congress required permits for stormwater discharges “associated with industrial activity,” and delegated to EPA the responsibility to determine what activities qualified as “industrial” for purposes of requiring permits for those activities. EPA determined, after public comment and rulemaking, that stormwater from forest roads and other specified forestry activities is non-industrial stormwater that does not require a permit. Did the Ninth Circuit err when it held that stormwater from forest roads is industrial stormwater under the Clean Water Act and EPA’s rules, contrary to EPA’s consistent interpretation of its own rules?
The theme behind both opening merits briefs is clear: the Ninth Circuit allowed an environmental organization to make an end run around around the Clean Water Act's when the Ninth Circuit struck down EPA's longstanding Silvicultural Rule. The Clean Water Act separates the rule development process from the citizen lawsuit enforcement process, and the Ninth Circuit conflated the two processes. Consequently, the petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit should have barred the belated challenge, or at the least have deferred to EPA's consistent interpretation of the Act and its rules.
Will the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) recently announced proposed rule regarding forest roads impact the Supreme Court’s review of the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit? The simple answer is no.
EPA has proposed to clarify its regulations defining “stormwater discharges associated with industrial activity” by revising its reference to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 24 to exclude logging. SIC codes were developed in the 1930’s as a uniform way to collect statistics. For reasons never explained, the Department of Labor many years ago included logging in SIC 24 with various solid wood manufacturing classifications, rather than in SIC 08 with the forestry classifications. The proposed rule does not remove the language excluding logging from the industrial activity definition which EPA put in its original 1990 stormwater regulations but which the Ninth Circuit ignored when it ruled that logging is an industrial activity.
If this rule were to become final, logging, and “immediate access roads” referred to as logging roads, would not be subject to the mandatory NPDES permit requirement under Phase 1 of the stormwater program for discharges associated with industrial activity. However, this would not change two facts. First, under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, logging roads would have been classified as part of an industrial activity for the past 22 years and would have required NPDES permits during this period. Second, these logging roads, as well as all other forest roads formerly defined as nonpoint sources by the Silvicultural Rule, remain point sources under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Finally, the Supreme Court must decide whether the plaintiffs in the case filed the lawsuit at a time and in a court authorized by the Clean Water Act. Thus, the essential issues to the case would remain active before the Supreme Court.
In the short therm, uncertainty remains for forest landowners. These developments indicate, however, that clarity lies ahead.

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