Source: https://incometaxact.ca/de-jure-versus-de-facto-directors-corporations/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:05:23+00:00

Document:
The Appellant was assessed under the directors’ liability provisions of the Income Tax Act (Section 227.1) and Excise Tax Act (Section 323) to be liable for a corporation’s tax debts.
The Appellant argued that he never consented to be a director and never held himself out to be a director of the corporation, or in the alternative exercised due diligence, and therefore not liable for the corporation’s debts.
For the purpose of the directors’ liability provisions under the ITA and the ETA a “director” is either a de jure or a de facto director: Mosier v. R.,  G.S.T.C. 124.
A de jure director is a person who has been appointed as a director under the appropriate corporate statute. Therefore one must look to the governing corporate statute under which the corporation was created or continued.
The public registry of directors only creates a rebuttable presumption that a person so listed is de jure director. This presumption may be overcome using evidence to the contrary, including evidence that the person never consented to be a director.
A person who was not aware they were a director and never consented to be a director is not a de jure director: Lau v. R.,  G.S.T.C. 1; Hay v. Canada, 2004 TCC 51.
In this case, the person did not know he was a director and did not consent to act as a director. Also, the corporate process required to appoint a director was not followed, and no resolution was passed.
A de facto director may be either (I) a person who is ostensibly duly elected but lacks some qualification under the relevant corporate statute, or (ii) a person who simply assumed the role of director without any pretense of legal qualification.
The FCA in Wheeliker v. R.,  2 C.T.C. 395, held that de facto directors may be liable even without a valid appointment. But, de facto director findings are limited to persons who hold themselves out as directors: Scavuzzo v. R.,  G.S.T.C. 199.
Where a person “did not believe he is a director and never thought he had any authority to advise, influence, or control the management or director of the company”, that person should not be considered a de facto director: Perricelli v. R., 2002 G.T.C. 244. Also, steps including “steps taken to satisfy the requirements of the Excise Tax Act such as the preparation of invoices, meeting with the auditor, hiring a lawyer and signing cheques were not in themselves acts of a director”: Hay v. Canada, 2004 TCC 51. The role the person plays cannot be limited or inconsistent with that of a director: Mikloski v. R., 2004 TCC 253.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.