Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50603:gr-124915-2008&amp;catid=1502&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:35:58+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 124915 - RIZAL SECURITY & PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. v. HON. DIRECTOR ALEX E. MARAAN, ET AL.
RIZAL SECURITY & PROTECTIVE SERVICES INC., and/or RUFINO S. ANTONIO, JR., Petitioners, v. HON. DIRECTOR ALEX E. MARAAN, Regional Sheriff of DOLE, Cordillera Administrative Region, and RICO GOMEZ, ROLANDO TUPAS, DETECIO VICENTE, EDWIN TUPAS, ROBERTO RUIZ, RONNIE LEABRES, DENNIS LEABRES, and SANDY FIGER, Respondents.
The Petition brought before this Court is a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with petitioners praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining from execution the Order1 dated 24 January 1996 issued by public respondent Alex E. Maraan, then Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Director for the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), in CAR00-9507-CI-25.
Petitioner Rizal Security and Protective Service, Inc. (Rizal Security) is a corporation organized under Philippine laws and is doing business as a security agency. Petitioner Rufino S. Antonio, Jr. (Antonio) is the president of the aforesaid corporation. On the other hand, private respondents were formerly employed by petitioner Rizal Security as security guards detailed at Rainbow End Village in Baguio City.
Hearings were scheduled by the DOLE-CAR to give petitioners the opportunity to present their side.
In the meantime, two significant events apparently took place.
And second, a notice of Termination of Services dated 25 July 1995 was sent by Dominador N. Valmonte, Jr., Resident Manager of Rainbow End Village to petitioner Antonio, President of co-petitioner Rizal Security.4 Through the said Notice, Rainbow End Village informed petitioner Rizal Security of the termination of their Security Services also effective 1 September 1995.
In a hearing conducted on 23 October 1995 before the DOLE-CAR Regional Office, petitioner Rizal Security submitted a Manifestation and Motion assailing the jurisdiction of the DOLE-CAR Regional Office over the case. Petitioner Rizal Security alleged that the DOLE-CAR Regional Office had lost its jurisdiction to try the case considering there was no longer any employer-employee relationship between petitioner Rizal Security and private respondents when the latter ceased to be employees of petitioner Rizal Security due to their resignation effective 1 September 1995.
This office further holds Mr. Dominador Valmonte, Resident Manager of Rainbow End Village, to be jointly and severally liable pursuant to Articles 107 and 109 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
WHEREAS, a copy of said Order was received by respondent on February 1, 1996.
WHEREAS, the period for appeal has already expired without respondent having perfected an appeal from said decision.
WHEREAS, the Order has now become final and executory but respondent has not yet effected the necessary payments of the Monetary Awards due the employee/s concerned.
Petitioners are now asking for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin public respondents from executing the Order of 24 January 1996 and from enforcing the Writ of Execution. Petitioners pray that this Court order that the case be endorsed, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, from the DOLE-CAR Regional Office to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and that judgment be rendered annulling and setting aside the 24 January 1996 Order and quashing the 12 March 1996 Writ of Execution.
I. THE HONORABLE DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 24, 1996 WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND IN NOT ENDORSING THE CASE TO THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FOR HEARING.
II. THE HONORABLE DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF EXECUTION AGAINST PETITIONERS PREMATURELY AND CONTRARY TO LAW OR WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
III. GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 24, 1996 IS VALID, THE HONORABLE DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER RUFINO ANTONIO AS LIABLE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE MONETARY CLAIMS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
The Petition was initially dismissed by this Court on 24 July 1996 for failure to comply strictly with the Rules of Court in not submitting a certified true copy of the questioned Writ of Execution dated 12 March 1996. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration and compliance with the foregoing requirement, this Court resolved to grant the reconsideration, thus reinstating the Petition.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this Petition is whether public respondent DOLE-CAR Regional Director Maraan acted without jurisdiction in issuing the Order dated 24 January 1996.
Resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law. And there is grave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. x x x.
After a careful scrutiny of petitioners' arguments, this Court sustains the jurisdiction of public respondent DOLE-CAR Director Maraan over CAR00-9507-CI-25 and, thus, finds that the writ of certiorari does not lie herein.
Section 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists. ' Where employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. Accordingly, if on the face of the complaint, it can be ascertained that employer-employee relationship no longer exists, the case, whether or not accompanied by an allegation of illegal dismissal, shall immediately be endorsed by the Regional Director to the appropriate Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
It follows, petitioners contend, that where the employer-employee relationship no longer exists by the fact of its severance, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. Petitioners claim that the supervening event of private respondents' voluntarily resigning from petitioners' employ in the course of the proceedings in CAR00-9507-CI-25 automatically ousted public respondent DOLE-CAR Director Maraan of his jurisdiction to continue to hear and determine said case. Petitioners insist that public respondent DOLE-CAR Director Maraan should have desisted from further handling the case and should have instead indorsed it to the appropriate regional branch of the NLRC for further hearing, since the jurisdiction over the same belongs to the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners' reliance on Rule II, Section 3 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices is inappropriate.
While it is true that the quoted provision states that where employee-employer relations have been severed, complaints or claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters; however, such is not the case in the present Petition. To emphasize, at the time private respondents instituted CAR00-9507-CI-25 by filing a complaint with the DOLE-CAR Regional Office, they were still employees of petitioners.
Private respondents Gomez and Tupas filed the Complaint on 19 May 1995 before the DOLE-CAR Regional Office, seeking a routine inspection to be conducted on petitioner Rizal Security relative to underpayment in wages and nonpayment of other benefits under the Labor Code. At the time of filing of the Complaint on said date, the employer-employee relationship between private respondents and petitioner Rizal Security had not yet been severed. As alleged by petitioner Rizal Security itself, deemed as an admission on its part, the employer-employee relations between petitioner Rizal Security and private respondents were terminated on 1 September 1995, or more than three months after the institution of CAR00-9507-CI-25 before the DOLE Regional Office.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.
Secondary to the issue of jurisdiction is the issue of whether or not public respondent DOLE-CAR Director Maraan acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Execution dated 12 March 1996.
Petitioners insist that the issuance of the said Writ of Execution was unlawful and premature, without legal basis or due process of law, and implemented against a person not a party litigant.
Petitioners maintain that since the DOLE-CAR Regional Office never furnished petitioners' counsel a copy of the 24 January 1996 Order, then the said Order never became final with respect to them, and cannot be the subject of a Writ of Execution.
Rule II, Section 4 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices provides that notices and copies of orders shall be served on the parties or their duly authorized representatives at their last known office or home addresses or, if they are represented by counsel, through the latter.
This procedure on service of Orders and Decisions as provided under the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices is in line with the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent.
No such number #5 at Sto. Nino St.
However, the foregoing is obviously not the notice contemplated under the Labor Code. The inspection report is undeniably a distinct and separate document from the Order dated 24 January 1996. More than merely re-stating the findings on the inspection report, the Order of 24 January 1996 ruled on the Manifestation and Motion of the petitioners assailing the jurisdiction of the DOLE-CAR Regional Office by refusing to dismiss and retaining jurisdiction over CAR00-9507-CI-25.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases and not defeat justice.23 While the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, it was never intended to forge a bastion for a violation of due process. And although it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
The essence of due process is to provide an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Rule III, Section 17 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices provides that an aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of the Order of the Regional Office within seven calendar days from receipt by him of a copy of said Order. The judgment becomes "final and executory" when the reglementary period to appeal lapses, and no appeal is perfected within such period. In this case, petitioners never had the opportunity to contest the Order of 24 January 1996 considering that they never received a notice of the issuance thereof nor were they provided with a copy of the same.
Without receipt by the petitioners of the notice and copy of the Order dated 24 January 1996, the same has not yet become final and executory and the Writ of Execution issued pursuant thereto on 12 March 1996 was premature and without legal basis. This renders the Writ of Execution fatally defective and, thus, null.
Finally, the Court declines from addressing at this point the question of petitioner Antonio's solidary liability with co-petitioner Rizal Security for the payment of the monetary awards granted to the private respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the instant Petition and ISSUES a Writ of Certiorari to quash the Writ of Execution dated 12 March 1996 for being issued prematurely. The Department of Labor and Employment Cordillera Administrative Region is further DIRECTED to proceed with CAR00-9507-CI-25 with DISPATCH. No costs.
8 San Miguel Foods, Inc. Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Hon. Laguesma, 331 Phil. 356, 376 (1996).
10 380 Phil. 660, 667 (2000).
11 G.R. No. 123782, 16 September 1997, 279 SCRA 218, 227.
12 323 Phil. 589, 593 (1996).
13 Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, 15 September 2006, 502 SCRA 172, 178.
14 Tolosa v. National Labor Relations Commission, 449 Phil. 271, 280 (2003).
15 Guiang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169372, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 568, 584-585; Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, G.R. No. 38204, 24 September 1991, 201 SCRA 632, 637.
16 Bernarte, v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 643, 660 (1996), citing the following:; People v. Paderna, 130 Phil. 317, 323 (1968); Firemans's Fund Insurance Co. v. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinos, 126 Phil. 246, 250-251 (1967); Insurance Co. of North America v. U.S. Lines Co., 123 Phil. 1138, 1140 (1966); Rizal Surety and Ins. Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., 123 Phil. 788, 790 (1966); Tuvera v. de Guzman, 121 Phil. 706, 709 (1965); Lumpay v. Moscoso, 105 Phil. 968, 972 (1959); Detective and Protective Bureau, Inc. v. Guevarra, 101 Phil. 1234 (1957); Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 93 Phil. 747, 752 (1953); Alejandro v. Francisco, 70 Phil. 749 (1940); People v. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715, 717 (1933); Vda. De Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, 4 (1929).
17 A recognized exception to this rule is when the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate upon actions pending before its enactment. Where such retroactive effect is not provided for, statutes altering the jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already pending prior to their enactment.
22 Rule II, Section 12 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices.
23 Casolita, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 251, 260 (1997), citing Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 780, 784 (1996).
24 Laguna CATV Network, Inc. v. Maraan (DOLE), 440 Phil. 734 (2002).

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