Source: https://browardlandlord.wordpress.com/tag/foreclosure/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 09:24:23+00:00

Document:
Liens recorded after the judgment of foreclosure and before the sale are foreclosed if the lienor does not intervene in the action within 30 days” after the recording of the notice of lis pendens.
On November 26, 2007 a bank recorded a lis pendens on certain property as part of a foreclosure lawsuit against a homeowner. On September 22, 2008, the bank obtained a final judgment of foreclosure. On September 27, 2012, the foreclosure sale was conducted with the Bank as the successful bidder. It later sold the property to Ober.
From July 13, 2009 through October 27, 2011, Town of Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, recorded seven liens on the subject property related to various code violations occurring after the entry of the final judgment.
Ober filed suit to quiet title, attempting to strike the liens against his property. The Town’s counterclaim sought to foreclose the liens. The trial court granted the Town’s motion, denied Ober’s motion, and entered a final judgment of foreclosure on the seven liens recorded prior to the judicial sale, as well as on three liens imposed after the sale of the property. Ober does not argue that those three post-judicial sale liens were discharged, and on remand the trial court may enter judgment on them.
The 4th Discrict Court of Appeals reversed holding: [T]he recording of a notice of lis pendens ․ constitutes a bar to the enforcement against the property described in the notice of all interests and liens unrecorded at the time of recording the notice unless the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien intervenes in such proceedings within 30 days after the recording of the notice. If the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien does not intervene in the proceedings and if such proceedings are prosecuted to a judicial sale of the property described in the notice, the property shall be forever discharged from all such unrecorded interests and liens.
A proper reading of section 48.23(1)(d) is, as the Florida Land Title Association suggests, that “when a foreclosure action is prosecuted to a judicial sale, that sale discharges all liens, whether recorded before the final judgment or after, if the lienor does not intervene in the action within 30 days” after the recording of the notice of lis pendens.
Subsequent foreclosure action filed more than five years later by subsequent mortgage holder is barred by statute of limitations.
A previous mortgage holder filed a suit against the borrowers on December 5, 2007, alleging that the borrowers had defaulted on their mortgage on January 1, 2007 and electing to accelerate payment of the balance. The complaint specifically declared the full amount payable under the note and mortgage to be due. However, the action was dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution in 2009. On June 19, 2013, the assignee of the mortgage and note, filed a new suit to foreclose the mortgage.
The court ruled that the filing of the prior lawsuit in 2007 triggered the running of the statute of limitations with respect to the entire balance of the mortgage and note. See Central Home Trust Co. v. Lippincott, 392 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (“Examples of acceleration are a creditor’s sending written notice to the debtor, making an oral demand, and alleging acceleration in a pleading filed in a suit on the debt.”) (emphasis added); Locke v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 509 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that the mortgagee had not enforced the optional acceleration clause in the mortgage until it filed its foreclosure complaint); Jaidon v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 136 So. 517 (Fla. 1931) (“[T]he mere filing of suit to enforce the mortgage by foreclosure may sufficiently show his election to exercise his option to accelerate.”). Furthermore, the dismissal without prejudice of the prior lawsuit did not toll the limitations period. See Barrentine v. Vulcan Materials Co., 216 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968); see also Hamilton v. Largo Paint and Decorating, Inc., 335 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (“It appears settled in Florida that when an action is dismissed for lack of prosecution the time during which it is pending does not toll a statute of limitations and cannot be deducted from the total elapsed time in computing such statute.”). Because the prior mortgagee exercised its right to accelerate the entire balance due under the note and mortgage when it filed its complaint on December 5, 2007, the five-year statute of limitations period began to run on that date and subsequently lapsed on December 5, 2012.
The prior acceleration of the mortgage by the predecessor in interest is operative against an assignee. See, e.g., Spencer v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 97 So. 3d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D2068a]; Cadle Co. v. Rhoades, 978 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D871a]. Singleton v. Greymar Assoc., 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly S481a], is inapposite and concerns only the application of res judicata in an action to collect discrete payments under an installment contract. Singleton is not only distinguishable from the facts of the instant case, it is wholly irrelevant to the issue of the statute of limitations raised by the borrowers.
The MEEKS were tenants of a property that was foreclosed. A Certificate of Title was issued on December 17, 2013 to RYAN HENSON #10 LAND TRUST which filed a Motion for Writ of Possession on December 20, 2013. MEEKS, filed an Emergency Motion to Quash the Writ of Possession on January 3, 2014.
The Court issued a Final Order Quashing Writ of Possession on January 28, 2014 holding that MEEKS were bona fide tenants in possession and must be given a ninety (90) notice to vacate the property pursuant to the PTFA. Thereafter, Tenants, MEEKS, filed a Motion to Determine Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees seeking attorney’s fees pursuant to §83.48, Florida Statutes.
The Court ruled that the Emergency Motion to Quash was not based upon enforcement of any provisions of the rental agreement. The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act only allows for recovery of attorney’s fees by the prevailing party in a civil action brought to “enforce the provisions of the rental agreement or this part” [ Section 83.48, Florida Statutes] .
The Emergency Motion to Quash was based solely upon the PTFA. The court ruled that the PTFA does not provide for any award of attorney’s fees. The tenant’s motion for attorney’s fees was denied.
Attorneys Title Fund Services LLC reports in the May 2014 issue of “The Fund Concept” that there is a spate of forged deeds on REO properties. These are foreclosed bank owned properties that have been sitting vacant for months or even years. The scheme is that the fraudster will forge a deed from the bank to himself. Then the fraudster will contract to sell the property at a bargain price.
Minimum documentary stamps on the fraudsters deed. Florida taxes deeds at $0.70 per $100 of sales price. This tax is printed on the deed with the recording information. If the tax paid is $0.70, then the sales price was $100 or less. In a real REO sale by a bank full documentary stamps would be paid.
The deed does not show the scrivener (person who prepared the deed) in the top left corner, or shows the grantee is the scrivener. A bank would never have the buyer prepare the deed.
The seller has no documentation of his purchase other than the recorded deed. i.e. no owner’s title insurance policy, no settlement statement, etc.
You are dealing with a middleman other than the record title holder.
Borrower bankruptcy filed after the expiration of the redemption period acts neither to stay the issuance of the certificate of title, nor writ of possession.
In a residential foreclosure, a third party purchased the property at auction. On July 11, 2013, the Clerk of Court issued a Certificate of Sale. On September 26, 2013 Defendants filed bankruptcy. On October 8, 2013, the clerk issued a Certificate of Title. On January 6, 2014, the Court, issued a writ of possession. Thereafter, Defendants filed to reverse the sale and stay the writ.
The court noted that the redemption period set forth in § 45.0315, Fla. Stat., is “the later of the filing of a certificate of sale . . . or the time specified in judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure . . . .” See, e.g., Matter of Sarasota Land Co v. Barnett Bank of Sarasota, NA., 36 B.R. 563, 566 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that because the debtor/mortgagor failed to exercise his right of redemption within the statutory period, his interest in the property was permanently foreclosed and the issuance of the Certificate of Title was proper); In re Trust No. 101B, 77 B.R. 973, 975 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (reaching the same conclusion as Sarasota Land and holding that the purchaser at the judicial sale “is now entitled to receive a Certificate of Title pursuant to Florida law without the need for further proceedings.”). In this case, the foreclosure judgment is silent on the issue and the Certificate of Sale was filed months prior to the bankruptcy filing. Therefore, as defendants redemption period had expired, they had no remaining interest in the property, and the bankruptcy could act neither to reverse the sale or stay the writ of possession.

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