Source: http://legal.gerryarmstrong.ca/tag/opinion/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:07:58+00:00

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professional Law Corporation.Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Raymond Cardenas, Judge. Affirmed.
William T. Drescher, attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants, Religious Technology Center; Eric M. Lieberman et al., attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants, Church of Scientology International.
Lewis, D’Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard; David B. Parker, Jayesh Patel, Matthew D. Berger, Joseph A. Yanny, attorneys for Defendants and Respondents Joseph A Yanny, et al.
2 Also named as defendants were several associates who had worked for Yanny during the relevant time, including Richard Wynne, Lisa Wilske, Mary Grieco, and Karen McRae, counsel to an individual, Vicki Aznaran.
conversion. Scientology charged, among other things, that Yanny was orchestrating a number of lawsuits against them. Yanny cross-complained for the legal fees owed him. After a 41-day trial (3 months) the jury awarded Yanny $154,000 damages as attorney fees owed. After hearing the equitable claims the trial court denied injunctive relief. Scientology appeals the adverse judgments.
and there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the jury award to Yanny. Finally it is urged the trial court erred in refusing to enjoin Yanny from “continuing to aid litigation adversaries in substantially related matters” to his previous employment as attorney for Scientology.
California, County of Los Angeles, case No. BC033035.
4 This preliminary injunction was based upon the sworn testimony of two persons who were later, upon trial, found not worthy of belief.
October through December 1987 for legal services and expenses. He also asserted causes of action for breach of contract (first cause of action), for account stated (second cause of action), for work, labor and services (third cause of action), and for book account (fourth cause of action). In addition, Yanny alleged a cause of action for quantum merit for $10,500,000, on the ground that plaintiffs had purportedly been unjustly enriched by this sum. The reasonable value of the cross-claimants’ services were sought (fifth cause of action). Finally, Yanny claimed that plaintiff exploited him in breach of their covenant of good faith and fair dealing (sixth cause of action). Yanny’s plaintiff cross-complaint sought both compensatory and punitive damages.
We accept the trial court summary of the evidence relevant to the injunctive issues. These findings are supported by substantial evidence.
assist Yanny in any way. As provided in Case Law and the Evidence Code, such conduct by plaintiffs, acting through their agents, partially waived the attorney-client privilege which existed and allowed Yanny to act to protect his interest with respect to his legal reputation and his right to receive payment for legal services rendered in 1987-1988, and to establish his right to the $150,000.00 retainer. At the outset, therefore, plaintiffs waived their right that Yanny not breach the duty of confidentiality or loyalty with respect to matters and confidences that were relevant to the legal dispute between the parties. There was no waiver with respect to confidences unrelated to the dispute.
5 A dispassionate reading of the Dorothy Peti’s testimony points directly to the falsity of Scientology’s claims of Yanny “revealing” any “secrets” of Scientology. There is a strong suspicion that Peti was a “plant,” a spy on behalf of Scientology. She reported directly to the Scientology attorneys.
The court found that Yanny’s assistance in this regard including transporting the Aznarans to other attorneys’ offices did not constitute a breach of duties owed plaintiffs. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Yanny rendered legal assistance to any prospective attorneys.
relief. A dispassionate reading of the reporter’s transcript cited by Scientology leads to these conclusions: (1) There was no evidence presented of Yanny entering into any representation of any person, any prospective adversary to Scientology; (2) There is a total lack of evidence that Yanny breached any particular or general fiduciary duties of confidentiality and loyalty owed to his former client.
See also In re Marriage of Zimmerman (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 556, 561-562; In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 667, 671; Higdon v. Superior Court, 227 Cal.App.3d 1667, 1671.
None of these cases are in point. There is no evidence whatsoever that Yanny represents any former client with an interest adversed to those of Scientology. This rule therefore has no application here. The evidence is without contradiction, Yanny determined after examination and consideration not to represent any prospective client in a suit against Scientology. Nor is there any evidence of any threat to represent anyone in an unspecified future litigation against Scientology.
Scientology was required to prove its claim factually before either injunction or damage relief could be awarded. In these critical requirements Scientology has abjectly failed.
Professions Code 6100). It belabors the obvious to state that this court cannot regulate the practice of law in any federal court.
Scientology has yet to tender such a case. The judge’s decision is in complete conformity with binding California authorities. It could not enjoin Yanny and associates from the practice of law.
The trial court’s negation of any right or authority to disqualify counsel as to and future representation was correct law yet the rule has no application here. No representation of an adverse party has been shown or threatened.
Twenty-two of the Scientology objections listed in the “appendix” were specifically overruled by the trial court.7 More significantly, twenty-seven of those instances cited in Scientology’s “appendix” took place during the examination of Yanny, when he was on the stand. He had been specifically excluded by the trial court from participating in side bar conferences. Yanny had no way of knowing the substance of the trial court’s decision at side-bar during his examination and the limits it might have imposed on his testimony.
2199-2201, 2993. These examples were taken from Scientology’s “appendix” of purported misconduct.
When objections were sustained, during the over one-and-a-half month jury trial, the trial court followed, when necessary, with an admonition that sought to clarify that matters being discussed were allegations, rather than facts.
“Approximately 40 to 60 percent of the $2,300,000 represented fraudulent billing [by Yanny].
“There are basically two parts to this case, the betraying of client confidences, the aiding, counseling and assisting of adversaries. That’s one side. And the other, the fraudulent billing.
“MR. SAYERS: Your Honor, I’m going to object to this is argument and I’d ask that the jury be instructed to disregard these comments.
Counsel’s statements of evidence to be offered should be presented in good faith. Many of Cooley’s statements were totally unsupported by evidence produced at trial. Scientology witnesses gratuitously volunteered unsupported statements of Yanny’s marital infidelities.
“Q. Do you recall what Mr. Yanny said with respect to Ms. Aznaran’s relationship to that retainer?
“A. He said he owed everything to Vicki Aznaran, and that if it weren’t for Scientology ethics he would like to sleep with her.
“MR. SAYERS: Objection. Move to strike. That’s irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
“THE COURT: Overruled. Motion to strike denied.
[SCIENTOLOGY ATTORNEY]: This is a further example.
“MR. DRESCHER: Your Honor, I’d object to Mr. Yanny’s gratuitous remark and ask that it be stricken.
“THE COURT: Overruled. The jury is asked to disregard any comment made by the lawyer.
“Good morning. [¶] Mr. Van Sickle’s final argument was based, I think, upon a technique more appropriate to a propaganda ministry than to a courtroom. His strategy obviously was to equate things that, in fact, are irrelevant to each other, and then to lump the entire story into a great big generality which he gave his own theological spin by repeating to you over and over again.
“So what. So What. Big deal. Word games. “So what that Yanny ripped plaintiffs off for thousands upon thousands of dollars. Nobody’s perfect.
“So what that neither of the defendants’ only two witnesses, Yanny and Vicki Aznaran, could get their story straight, even when they spent the night together before one of them testified.
“So what that the fictitious documents that Yanny claims support his position never even existed.
“So what that Yanny dreamed up a nonexistent agreement, one-page agreement written by a dead man which Mr. Van Sickle now wants you to ignore.
“So what that Yanny claims to have cut the deal for the $150,000 retainer at a meeting that never happened in a restaurant Vicki Aznaran never visited with people who were never there.
“The so what is that a witness, and particularly a lawyer, who is supposed to honor and serve the judicial process, has a sacred duty not to give false testimony and not to procure false testimony from that witness stand, and to treat his clients with honesty and fairness and not to take advantage of their trust in him by defrauding them.
“As part of his effort to reduce Yanny’s enormous wrongdoing to a so what or big deal status, Mr. Van Sickle characterizes specific items that have been proven as part of the overall fraud, which even by his calculations come to $50,000, that’s pocket change, and nickels and dimes not worthy of your consideration.
evidence of the overall fraud that Yanny had in his heart and it defines what Yanny is, and serves as one of the many building blocks on which we ask you to base the overall case of fraud, treachery and deceit.
“According to Mr. Van Sickle, all of the witnesses against Yanny are blind and cannot see the elephant. Jacobs is blind, Grabowski is blind, Todd Serota’s blind, Warren McShane, Paul Schroer, Doreen Hackett, Eva Raber, Tom Vallier, Marty Rathbun and Dorothy Peti, all blind. None of them can see the elephants, according to Mr. Van Sickle. They feel the tail and think it’s a rope and want to hang Yanny with it.
Neither the judge nor the jury accepted these statements as fact as demonstrated by the jury verdict in favor of Yanny and the court’s decision denying injunctive relief to Scientology.
issues of purported misconduct cited by Scientology, was Yanny’s reference to the Wollersheim verdict. This verdict was in evidence, having been introduced by Scientology itself as Exhibit 61. This is invited error or waiver.
(Gunch v. Fieg (1913) 164 Cal. 429, 3) Finally, regardless of whether the trial court overruled or sustained the objections, over seventy instances of purported misconduct cited by Scientology are based on objections where there is no certification of the grounds for objecting whether as to the form or the substance of the question. These various examples cited by Scientology, do not meet the standard to constitute lawyer misconduct. There is no basis for reversal shown in this record.
Scientology next contends the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to willful suppression of evidence is reversible error. Two issues are raised. Was the refusal erroneous, and if error, prejudicial?
“If weaker or less satisfactory evidence is offered by a party when it was within his power to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust.
A litigant is entitled to instructions on every theory advanced by him which finds support in the evidence. (Phillips v. G. L. Truman Excavation Co. (1961) 55 cal.2d 801, 806; Daniels v. City of County of San Francisco (1953) 40 Cal.2d 614, 623.) But the precise instruction requested is not required in every instance. The instruction actually given had not only covered Scientology’s theory of willful suppression but also covered other theories favorable to Scientology. Scientology’s theory was adequately covered by the instruction given. (See Williams v. Carl Karcher Enterprises Inc. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 479, 487.) If it be assumed that the broader instruction given was not sufficient yet no prejudice is shown. The evidence was in conflict as to what was contained in the non produced documents. The jury chose to believe Yanny’s witnesses. There was no evidence of Yanny’s willful suppression of any documents.
Scientology contends that the jury verdict on the cross-complaint is not supported by substantial evidence.
hired by RTC president Vicki Aznaran. He was retained at a non-refundable $150,000 retainer. The contract was admitted. The Scientology’s witness McShane admits the final bill submitted by Yanny was unpaid. The services rendered by Yanny were complex and extensive in nature. It was only after Yanny expressed his disagreement with certain Scientology practices and policies did Scientology question any bills submitted. There is more than substantial evidence to support the jury verdict and the trial court’s denial of injunctive relief. Each must be affirmed.
This is a case that warrants the imposition of sanctions upon Scientology under Code of Civil Procedure section 907 as well as upon Scientology’s attorney William T. Drescher and Eric M. Lieberman. Respondents Mary Grieco and Richard Wynne have been sued without cause, put to the expense of a three month trial and to this lengthy appeal.
On this appeal Scientology does not even mention Mary Grieco. Richard Wynne is mentioned only once in a footnote in an unrelated matter.
58 Cal.App.3d 439, 444.) The prime issue in this trial was credibility. Scientology witnesses totally failed to establish the requisite facts necessary to judgments in their favor. The evidence of the “fair game policy” and its application was relevant. Scientology failed to adequately designate the record on appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, § 5.1). Scientology does not give this court the necessary record in order to determine their contentions of error in the jury verdict. This neglect prevents this court to reach the merits of the issues raised. Neither Scientology nor its lawyers offer any justification for the prosecution of this appeal against Mary A. Greco or Richard Wynne. There is no legal or factual basis to find any error in the judgments in favor of these individuals.
Scientology at long last concedes (as is apparent from the face of the record) that the trial was “hotly contested.” The record and the jury verdict and court decision reflect a rejection of the unsupported slanderous statements and legal deficiencies of Scientology’s positions taken.
Scientology and counsel have failed to respond to or refute misleading arguments made on this appeal. (See fns. 7 and 8, supra.) The same issues and arguments presented on this appeal were made–unsuccessfully–before Division Three of this court in case No. B068216 (see fn. 3, supra). Scientology and counsel have urged on this appellate court law having no relevancy whatsoever. This case does not involve a lawyer representation of a client against a former client after termination of that attorney client relationship. Further, the law relevant to a “breach of loyalty” absent facts to show a disclosure of confidence has no application whatsoever. Three times Scientology and its lawyers have pushed these inapposite legal arguments without success. The high point in evidence offered was rejected by the trial court as not worthy of belief. This was an appeal on unproved–rejected as false–facts. This appeal and its delays and total lack of merit must be viewed in conjunction with the other groundless similar lawsuit pursued against Yanny. Such evidence leads to the conclusion that this proceeding was a device for destroying Yanny and any lawyers who chose to work with him. This appeal is the “Fair Game” of Scientology infamy at work.
This appeal has been delayed unreasonably due to Scientology’s failure to perform requisite acts to perfect an appeal. There were violations of numerous rules of court. The notice of appeal was filed April 23, 1991 and designation of the reporters record made on May 9, 1991. It was not until September of 1992 that Scientology paid the estimated costs of completing the reporters transcript. Failure to do so for over one year caused this court to make its own motion to dismiss. Numerous other delaying tactics appear in this record.
Review of the record and briefs filed including specific declarations as to time spent and applicable hourly rates, I conclude the amount of attorneys fees reasonably incurred in defense of this appeal by Yanny, Greco and Wynne, is the sum of $63,387.50 plus costs involved of $14,441.60 or a total of $77,829.10.
The handling of this case has imposed a lengthy and arduous burden upon the court. Numerous briefs, procedural motions precedes the oral argument in this case. I place the fault for imposing this burden on the legal system upon Scientology and counsel. This was a time-consuming, costly and frivolous appeal. The taxpayers of the state have been harmed by a wasteful diversion of their appellate court limited resources. The appropriate measure of sanctions should compensate the State of California for its processing, reviewing and deciding this frivolous appeal.
an appeal in this Second District of the Court of Appeal (see Young v. Rosenthal, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 136-137), but I am also painfully aware that that is not an average case. I conclude the cost incurred by the State of California due to this frivolous appeal is the sum of $25,000. Appellant Religious Technology Center, a California non-profit religious corporation; Church of Scientology International, a California non-profit religious corporation; and Church of Scientology of California, A California non-profit religious corporation and their attorneys William T. Drescher and Eric M. Lieberman are jointly and severally liable to Joseph A. Yanny and Mary A. Greco and Richard Wynne for the total sum of $77,829.10. Appellants and named attorneys should be directed to pay the further sum, as a joint and several obligation, of $25,000 to the clerk of the court as a further sanction.
The judgment is affirmed in all respects. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.
*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Accordingly, we are unwilling to impose monetary sanctions on appeal either in favor of the court or of respondents.
As a result of our decision on this issue, the disposition of this case does not include any direction to appellants or their attorneys to pay respondents the monetary sanctions on appeal discussed in our colleague’s opinion or to pay monetary sanctions to the State of California. However, we do deem it appropriate to require appellants to pay respondents’ costs on appeal. Thus, the disposition of this appeal is as set forth in the paragraph below.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GERALD ARMSTRONG, Defendant and Respondent.
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, Eric M. Lieberman, Bowles & Moxon, Timothy Bowles, Kendrick L. Moxon and Michael Lee Hertzberg for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Gerald Armstrong, in pro. per., Toby L. Plevin, Paul Morantz and Michael L. Walton for Defendant and Respondent.
Lawrence Wollersheim as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
In consolidated appeals, the Church of Scientology of California (the Church) and Mary Sue Hubbard (hereafter collectively plaintiffs) appeal from an order after appealable judgment unsealing the file in Church of Scientology of California v. Gerald Armstrong (No. B038975), and from the judgment entered in the case (No. B025920). We vacate the order and affirm the judgment.
In the underlying action, the Church sued Armstrong, a former Church worker, alleging he converted to his own use confidential archive materials and disseminated the same to unauthorized persons, thereby breaching his fiduciary duty to the Church, which sought return of the documents, injunctive relief against further dissemination of the information contained therein, imposition of a constructive trust over the property and any profits Armstrong might realize from his use of the materials, as well as damages. Mary Sue Hubbard (Hubbard), wife of Church founder L. Ron Hubbard, intervened in the action, alleging causes of action for conversion, invasion of privacy, possession of personal property [sic], and declaratory and injunctive relief. Armstrong cross-complained, seeking damages for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contract.
believed the Church threatened harm to him and his wife, and that he could prevent such harm by taking and keeping the documents.Following those determinations the court made and entered an order, entitled “Judgment,” on August 10, 1984,1 ordering and adjudging that plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint and complaint-in-intervention, and that defendant Armstrong have and recover his costs and disbursements. Plaintiffs filed notice of appeal from that order.
Armstrong’s cross-action was then settled and dismissed, the subject documents were ordered returned to the Church, and the record was sealed by Judge Breckenridge pursuant to stipulation of the parties. The dismissal of Armstrong’s cross-action was a final determination of the rights of the parties, and constituted a final judgment, permitting appellate review of the court’s interlocutory order captioned “judgment” filed August 10, 1984.
Breckenridge having retired, Corydon’s motion was heard by Judge Geernaert, who made an order dated November 9, 1988, which he clarified by another order dated November 30, 1988, which opened the record not only to Corydon but also to the general public, thus vacating the earlier order made by Judge Breckenridge.On December 19, 1988, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal from those orders made after appealable judgment. That appeal, No. B038975, is the other of the current consolidated appeals.
On December 22, 1988, Division Four of this court issued an order staying Judge Geernaert’s orders (1) unsealing the record and (2) denying a motion for reconsideration of the unsealing order, to the extent those orders unsealed the record as to the general public and permitted review by any person other than Corydon and his counsel of record. On December 29, 1988, Division Four modified this stay order by adding to it a protective order prohibiting Corydon and his counsel from disseminating copies of or disclosing the content of any documents found in the file to the public or any third party, except to the extent necessary to litigate the actions to which Corydon and the Church were parties. Corydon and his counsel were also required to make good faith efforts in Corydon’s litigation to submit under seal any documents they found in the file of this case.
On this appeal, Corydon argues in favor of the trial court’s order unsealing the record, as he wishes to be free of the protective orders contained in the modified stay order issued by Division Four.
Armstrong’s taking of the documents is undisputed. The evidence relating to his claim of justification, which was found credible by the trial court,3 established that Armstrong was a dedicated member of the Church for a period of 12 years. For 10 of those years, he was a member of the Sea Organization, an elite group of Scientologists working directly under Church founder L. Ron Hubbard. In 1979, Armstrong became a part of L. Ron Hubbard’s “Household Unit” at Gilman Hot Springs, California.
property at Gilman Hot Springs. In a two-week period, approximately one million pages were shredded pursuant to this order.In the course of the inspection of documents for potential shredding, Armstrong reviewed a box containing Hubbard’s early personal letters, diaries, and other writings, which Armstrong preserved.
Hubbard selected one Omar Garrison to write his biography. Armstrong became Garrison’s research assistant, copying documents and delivering the copies to him, traveling with him, arranging interviews for him, and generally consulting with him about the project. Armstrong also conducted a genealogical study of Hubbard’s family, and organized the materials he had gathered into bound volumes for Garrison’s use, retaining a copy for the Church archives. The number of documents obtained by Armstrong ultimately reached 500,000 to 600,000. Within a week after commencing the biography project, Armstrong and Garrison began to note discrepancies between the information set forth in the documents and representations previously made concerning Hubbard. Then Armstrong was summoned to Gilman Hot Springs, where he was ordered to undergo a “security check” consisting of interrogation while connected to a crude lie-detector called an E-meter, to determine what materials he had delivered to Garrison and to meet charges that he was speaking out against Hubbard.
In November 1981, Armstrong wrote a report urging the importance of ensuring the accuracy of all materials published concerning L. Ron Hubbard, and relating examples of factual inaccuracies in previous publications. In December 1981, Armstrong and his wife left the Church, surreptitiously moving their possessions from the Church premises because they knew that persons attempting to leave were locked up, subjected to security checks, and forced to sign promissory notes to the Church, confessions of “black-mailable” material obtained from their personal files, and incriminating documents, and they were afraid that they would be forced to do the same. Before leaving, Armstrong and his wife copied a number of documents which he delivered to Garrison for his work on the Hubbard biography. After leaving, Armstrong cooperated with his successor, assisting him in locating documents and other items.
Commencing in February 1982, the international Church of Scientology issued a series of “suppressive person declares” in effect labelling Armstrong an enemy of the Church and charging that he had taken an unauthorized leave, was spreading destructive rumors about senior Church officials, and secretly planned to leave the Church. These “declares” subjected Armstrong to the “Fair Game Doctrine” of the Church, which permits a suppressive person to be “tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed … [or] deprived of property or injured by any means by any Scientologist….”At around the same time, the Church confiscated photographs of Hubbard and others that Armstrong had arranged to sell to one Virgil Wilhite. When Armstrong met with Church members and demanded the return of the photographs, he was ordered from the Church property and told to get an attorney. Thereafter, he received a letter from Church counsel threatening him with a lawsuit. In early May 1982, he became aware of private investigators watching his house and following him.
These events caused Armstrong to fear that his life and that of his wife were in danger, and that he would be made the target of costly and harassing lawsuits. The author, Garrison, feared that his home would be burglarized by Church personnel seeking to retrieve the documents in his possession.
Following commencement of the instant action, Armstrong was pushed or shoved by one of the Church’s investigators. In a later incident his elbow was struck by an investigator’s vehicle; still later, the same investigator pulled in front of Armstrong on a freeway and slammed on his brakes. This investigator’s vehicle also crossed a lane line as if to push Armstrong off the road. Plaintiffs’ position is that the investigators were hired solely for the purpose of regaining the documents taken by Armstrong.
Trial of the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention was by the court sitting without a jury. On August 10, 1984, the court made its order, captioned “Judgment,” ordering that plaintiff Church and plaintiff in intervention Hubbard, take nothing by their complaint and complaint-in-intervention and that defendant Armstrong have and recover from each of them his costs and disbursements.
parties’ agreement to the procedure and by the lower court’s sealing of its records.” The quoted language appears at page 786 of the decision, and refers to the court’s initial response to requests to seal received in connection with the petition, opposition, and amici curiae requests. Later, after receiving “rebuttal briefs, rebuttal declarations, reply to amici, declarations in reply to amici, and supplemental declarations,” (Champion v. Superior Court, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d at p. 786) resulting in a file containing “some sealed documents, some public documents, and many documents not yet designated as sealed or public,” (ibid.) most of which blended together discussions of confidential and public materials, as well as requests to seal all of the documents without any explanation of why any of the documents deserved such treatment (ibid.), the court stated, at page 787, “it is apparent that we acted precipitously in granting the earliest, unsupported, requests to seal documents lodged or filed in this matter.” While the court did ultimately grant the application to seal the entire file, it did so because of the confusion and undue complication and delay that would be caused by return of the documents for segregation into public and confidential portions. (Id. at pp. 789-790.)In our case, plaintiffs have not formally requested sealing of the record on appeal. They argue, in seeking reversal of Judge Geernaert’s order vacating the sealing order made in the trial court, that their pursuit of an action brought primarily for the purpose of protecting their respective privacy interests in the documents converted by Armstrong should not cause disclosure of the very information they sought to protect, through references in the record to such information. The argument is not limited to any particular portion or portions of the voluminous record of the trial court proceedings. Should plaintiffs move to seal the record on appeal, we would require a much more particularized showing.
court appropriately adopted the Restatement approach respecting conditional privilege. (See 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 278, p. 360; Gilmore v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 416, 421 [281 Cal.Rptr. 343].)In its statement of decision the court found Armstrong delivered the documents in question to his attorney “… because he believed that his life, physical and mental well-being, as well as that of his wife, were threatened because the organization was aware of what he knew about the life of L. Ron Hubbard, the secret machinations and financial activities of the Church, and his dedication to the truth. He believed that the only way he could defend himself, physically as well as from harassing lawsuits, was to take from Omar Garrison those materials which would support and corroborate everything that he had been saying within the Church about L. Ron Hubbard and the Church, or refute the allegations made against him in the April 22 Suppressive Person Declare. He believed that the only way he could be sure that the documents would remain secure for his future use was to send them to his attorneys, and that to protect himself, he had to go public so as to minimize the risk that L. Ron Hubbard, the Church, or any of their agents would do him physical harm.” The court’s findings were substantially supported by the evidence adduced at trial.
(6) Armstrong’s defense was predicated on his claim that he reasonably believed the Church intended to cause him harm, and that he could prevent the apprehended harm only by taking the documents, even though the taking resulted in harm to the Church.
Plaintiffs complain of the trial court’s admission of documentary and testimonial evidence concerning the history of Armstrong’s relationship with the Church, and certain practices of the Church in relation to its members, as well as its former members and/or critics. The record is replete with statements of the court’s recognition of the limited purpose for which the complained of statements were properly admitted, i.e, to prove Armstrong’s state of mind when he converted the Church’s documents. These statements are referenced in Armstrong’s briefs, and acknowledged by plaintiffs.Plaintiffs complain that certain testimony of defense witnesses was irrelevant, as there was no showing that Armstrong was aware of the facts to which the witnesses testified. The testimony in question was largely corroborative of Armstrong’s testimony with respect to Church practices affecting his state of mind, and was relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of his belief that the Church intended to cause him harm.
Klein, P.J., and Hinz, J., concurred.
Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 17, 1991.
1. The “judgment” of August 10, 1984, is not included in the present record on appeal. However, it is included in the petition of plaintiffs and appellants for review by our Supreme Court of our decision (No. B005912) in this case, filed December 18, 1986.
2. We later granted the motion of appellant Church to deem the record on appeal in No. B005912 to be the record on appeal in No. B025920, which is one of the current consolidated appeals; we also take judicial notice of the entire record in No. B005912. Consequently the reporters’ transcript, the appendices of the parties on appeal, and the parties’ briefs in No. B005912 are part of the record on appeal in No. B025920. The parties have also filed briefs in No. B025928.
3. Plaintiffs’ contention that certain testimony was impeached by testimony given in other proceedings subsequent to the judgment herein is, of course, not cognizable on this appeal.
4. Plaintiffs do not challenge Corydon’s access to the record, stating in their brief: “Corydon’s access must continue to be limited by the conditions imposed thus far by this court’s Modified Temporary Stay Order…. He sought access only for use in private litigation against the Church; this court’s order, which permits him to use the information he obtains only in said litigations and only after making a good faith effort to have it introduced under seal, is appropriately tailored to meet his asserted need without unnecessarily invading appellants’ privacy.” Pursuant to the stay order issued by Division Four, Corydon has had the desired access since December 22, 1988, and the issue is moot as to him. He now seeks in this court more than he sought by his motion in the trial court.
5. Armstrong, who did not participate in the hearing on the motion below, has filed a brief claiming the record should be unsealed because the Church has failed to comply with the terms of its settlement agreement with him. His declarations to the latter effect are not properly before us on this appeal, as they were not considered by the trial court. We therefore consider neither the meaning of the portions of the settlement agreement to which he refers nor the question whether the Church has complied therewith.We are also in receipt of an amicus curiae brief of Lawrence Wollersheim, who urges unsealing of the record based on reasons of public policy. Wollersheim’s argument is directed primarily to the documentary exhibits lodged in the underlying case. Those documents have been returned to the Church in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement.
6. No purpose would be served by our engaging in an exhaustive discussion of each of the points asserted by plaintiffs.For example, plaintiffs misconstrue the decision in Dietemann v. Time, Inc. (9th Cir.1971) 449 F.2d 245. The Dietemann court stated: “Privilege concepts developed in defamation cases and to some extent in privacy actions in which publication is an essential component are not relevant in determining liability for intrusive conduct antedating publication.” (Id. at pp. 249-250.) The question in that case was whether the defendant, whose employees gained entrance to plaintiff’s home by subterfuge and there photographed him and recorded his conversation without his consent, was insulated from liability by the First Amendment because its employees did these acts for the purpose of gathering material for a magazine story which was thereafter published. The case has nothing to do with the justification asserted herein. Pearson v. Dodd (D.C. Cir.1969) 410 F.2d 701 [133 App.D.C. 279], is similarly inapposite.
Discussing the privilege of an agent set forth in section 418 of the Restatement Second of Agency, plaintiffs point to the last sentence of comment b, which reads: “So, too, if the agent acquires things in violation of his duty of loyalty, he is subject to liability for a failure to use them for the benefit of the principal.” This language has reference to the initial sentence of the comment: “If the conflict of interests is created through a breach of duty by the agent, the agent is subject to liability if he does not prefer his principal’s interests.” In the present case, the conflict was created by the plaintiffs, who threatened Armstrong with harm.
Referring to comment b to section 396 of the Restatement Second of Agency, which has to do with the use of customer lists in unfair competition, plaintiffs urge that even if Armstrong was privileged to verbally report to others information he gained in his capacity as an agent of the Church, he would not be privileged under any circumstances to retain or disseminate Church documents. They also urge, based on cases which are inapposite to that at bench, that the justification defense applies only in emergency situations requiring immediate action to avert danger, or where the agent believes that the principal’s documents are the fruits or instrumentalities of crime or fraud. The court found, on substantial evidence, that Armstrong was under a reasonable apprehension of danger when he delivered the documents to his attorney. More was not required.

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 § 278
 v. 
 v. 
 v.