Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/summary-judgment/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:42:55+00:00

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I promised Jon Hyman of the Ohio Employer’s Law Blog that I would hold down the fort with respect to blogging while he and his family jetted off to Italy for vacation. So, here goes. Today’s case, Reed v. Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital, comes out of the Seventh Circuit, and was decided on February 8, 2019. It is notable in a couple of respects. First, of late, the Seventh Circuit has not been kind to persons with disabilities at all. Second, the case goes into quite a bit of detail discussing the religious exemption to title III of the ADA, which simply doesn’t get a lot of litigation associated with it usually. Finally, it also discusses affirmative defenses and what happens if they are not laid out when they are supposed to be laid out. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories, and they are: 1) Facts; 2) court’s reasoning discussing affirmative defenses generally; 3) court’s reasoning finding District Court abused its discretion by allowing religious exemption defense; 4) court’s reasoning reversing summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claims and failure to accommodate claims; and 5) takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to concentrate on any or all of the categories.
Plaintiff alleged that the hospital failed to accommodate her disability by deliberately withholding from her a device needed for her to speak and discriminated against her by putting her in the seclusion room to punish her. Defendant responded with answers to both the complaint and the amended complaint that at no time raised the religious exemption. In granting summary judgment for the defendant, the District Court held that the hospital did not have to comply with title III of the ADA because of the religious exemption in 42 U.S.C. §12187. It also dismissed plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim finding that the discrimination alleged was not premised solely on her disability.
The religious exemption in title III is an affirmative defense because it assumes the plaintiff can prove everything in order to establish her claim, but still loses because of the affirmative defense.
It makes perfect sense for a defendant claiming the title III religious exemption to bear the burden of pleading and proof with respect to its religious control. After all, the facts are ordinarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant.
A defendant’s failure to plead an affirmative defense can result in either a waiver of the defense if the defendant has relinquished it knowingly and intelligently, or it can result in a forfeiture of the defense if the defendant failed to preserve the defense by not pleading it.
The purpose of the pleading requirement for an affirmative defense is to avoid surprise and undue prejudice to the plaintiff by providing for notice and the opportunity to demonstrate why the defense should not prevail.
A defendant remains obligated to act in a timely fashion when it comes to affirmative defenses. Once the availability of an affirmative defense is reasonably apparent, the defendant has the obligation to alert the parties and the court of his intent to pursue that defense. A defendant cannot be permitted to lie behind a log and ambush a plaintiff with an unexpected defense. In that situation, the appropriate thing for a defendant to do is to promptly seek the court’s leave to amend the answer. Failure to do that, risks a finding the defense has been waived.
Many efficiencies are lost when claims or defenses are left out pleadings and a party then attempts to assert them at later stages.
It is the same set of problems that occur when plaintiffs try to raise new theories or claims for the first time when opposing summary judgment. The concerns about unfair surprise and prejudice with non-pleaded affirmative defenses are similar. That is, late assertions of affirmative defenses, including the title III religious exemption defense, make litigation more costly and difficult. It also makes it unfairly difficult for plaintiff to pursue her claims.
The title III religious exemption is based on facts in the defendant’s control and clearly falls within the category of affirmative defenses that must be pleaded.
The fact that a witness possibly alluded to a religious exemption defense being possible, doesn’t mean that the plaintiff was on fair notice that the religious exemption defense was in play. The statement made by the witness is not comparable to a lawyer’s statement that the party intends to assert a defense. The statements by the witness in her deposition did not put the plaintiff on fair notice that the hospital would be asserting the religious exemption and that the plaintiff was going to have to spend the time and money to conduct extensive discovery on whether the hospital can satisfy the ADA’s religious exemption.
The fact that plaintiff knew when she filed the suit that the hospital was at least nominally associated with the Catholic faith is of no help to defendant either. Nominal association tells a plaintiff nothing about the availability of the religious exemption because the statutory test is the control exercised by the religious organization. After all, all kinds of entities have names associated with religions but are not subject to religious control.
With respect to the facts of this case, it turns out that the hospital had two lines of control (Catholic and non-sectarian).
The hospital offered no excuse or explanation for failing to plead the defense in its answers or for raising the defense so late.
Absent a credible excuse for the delay, the hospital’s late invocation of the defense looks like a straight ambush of the plaintiff when it was too late for the plaintiff to put together a comprehensive rebuttal.
The religious exemption defense ordinarily depends on facts within the knowledge and control of the defendant.
The defendant did not deploy this defense until after discovery had closed. That means both parties had already invested a good deal of time and money in the case on the legitimate expectation they knew what the issues were.
Allowing a last-minute defense introduces new factual and legal issues after discovery has closed, adds to the cost of litigation, and allows the party that was at least negligent in failing to plead the defense to take unfair advantage of the opposing party.
The District Court’s rationale for allowing the defense to be used so late doesn’t hold up. Here, a few relevant facts to the affirmative defense came up briefly in one deposition, but that cannot be reasonably treated as fair notice that the hospital would actually assert the defense thereby causing the plaintiff to have to spend time and money needed to meet that defense. Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to rely on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c) requiring affirmative defenses to be pleaded in answers.
It was not the plaintiff’s obligation to raise the defense.
If Rule 8(c) is not to become meaningless, attempts to invoke defenses at the 11th hour, without excuse and without adequate notice to the plaintiff, cannot be tolerated.
The prejudice to the plaintiff from the delayed assertion of the defense is especially problematic here because the relevant law and the facts are not clear.
The ADA does not define what it means to be a religious organization or to be controlled by a religious organization. Further, no federal appellate court has yet analyzed this religious exemption.
With respect to the District Courts analyzing the religious exemption, the issue is very complex on a factual and legal level. What the courts have done is look at the Department of Justice interpretation of its rules in 28 C.F.R. part 36 to try and figure things out. That interpretation says the religious exemption test is a factual one. That is, the focus is on whether the church or other religious organization controls the operations of the school or of the service. That test also focuses on whether the church or religious organization operates the place of public accommodation and not upon the individuals receiving the services of that public accommodation.
Here, the religious exemption defense means assessing a whole bunch of facts that are very much in dispute and need to be explored in some depth. Before summary judgment briefing, the plaintiff had no notice that she needed to prepare to meet that defense.
Where a defendant offers no credible excuse for delay, the normal rule is forfeiture of non-pleaded defenses.
Any reopening of discovery would impose additional delay on the plaintiff, and there are no mitigating factors favoring anything other than treating the defense as forfeited.
Making out a prima facie case for violation of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act involves showing: 1) the plaintiff is a handicapped individual; 2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified for participation in the program; 3) the program receives federal financial assistance; and 4) the plaintiff must have been denied the benefits of the program solely because of his or her handicap.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are very close to each other in their substance, but the Rehabilitation Act prohibit discrimination only if it is solely by reason of a person’s disability. Whereas, the ADA permits mixed motive claims.
While the Rehabilitation Act does not contain an explicit accommodation requirement, the United States Supreme Court has found a duty to accommodate in the statute generally.
A review of the facts shows that a jury could find that nothing the plaintiff conceded happened would have justifiably led to the hospital taking her to the seclusion room. That is, the material facts leading to the plaintiff being placed in seclusion are very much in dispute. So much so, that a reasonable jury could find that the hospital intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff solely on the basis of her disability.
The court also reversed the summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim finding that the hospital had not argued that the decisions it made were done in the exercise of professional judgment to treat plaintiff’s mental illness.
Religious exemption is an affirmative defense. Make sure you plead it in the answer. Failure to do so will likely result in forfeiture of the defense.
Remains to be seen whether the hospital might pursue a malpractice action against its attorneys. After all, it’s possible had the religious exemption defense have been alleged in its answer, the hospital would have gotten a get out of jail free card. Also, the court actually uses the term “negligence,” when discussing the failure to plead an affirmative defense.
If during the course of discovery, it becomes clear to the defense that the religious exemption is in play, be sure to seek leave from the court to amend your answer.
It is entirely possible that a defendant may be aware of the religious exemption defense but for a variety of reasons elects not to pursue it.
Religious exemption affirmative defense claims are very complex factually and legally. The legal complexity may be about to get a whole lot worse with the expected decision from the United States Supreme Court in Kisor (oral argument on that case will take place next week, but the result- getting rid of Auer deference-, is a foregone conclusion, though I could be wrong).
For the religious exemption to apply, nominal association with the religious entity is not going to work.
The religious exemption focuses on the control exercised by the religious organization and not upon the people receiving the services.
The court uses the term “handicapped,” which is a term very much out-of-favor and has been for some time. The better language to use is a person with a disability. 29 U.S.C. §794 (§504 of the Rehabilitation Act), does use the term disability.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledges that causation is different between Rehabilitation Act cases and ADA cases. That causation is different between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is something readers of this blog have known for a long time, see here, but it is significant that a Court of Appeals is saying as much.
Prevailing on a religious exemption affirmative defense at the summary judgment stage is going to be very difficult after this case.
In case you are wondering why your place of worship (it is a real problem in the Jewish faith from what I have read), is not accessible to a person with a disability, this blog entry gives you your answer.
As I have mentioned before, I am not afraid to blog on cases discussed by fellow bloggers. Recently, Richard Hunt, whose blog appears on my blog roll, discussed a whole bunch of cases. Many of those cases I have put in my to blog pipeline, and two of which are the subject of today’s blog. Both cases involve website accessibility. One involves a credit union and the other involves General Nutrition Corporation. The cases are Jones v. Lanier Federal Credit Union, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171060 (N.D. GA, September 26, 2018), and Gomez v. General Nutrition Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49655 (S.D. Fla. 2018), also here. Gomez is a published decision. With respect to Jones, in the interest of full disclosure, local counsel on the case was James Radford and his firm Radford and Keebaugh, from Decatur Georgia. I know James and his partner, Regan Keebaugh, and refer many cases to them. I am not sure whether Jones will be published. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: Jones facts; Jones court’s reasoning; Jones takeaways; Gomez facts; Gomez court’s reasoning; and Gomez takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
The facts are straightforward. Plaintiff uses a screen reader, and the defendant operates a website providing information about its location, services and amenities. When plaintiff tried to access the website, he found empty or missing form labels, empty links containing no text, and redundant links thereby denying him the full use and enjoyment of the credit union’s facilities and services. Plaintiff sought an injunction as well as attorney’s fees.
Membership in the credit union is not a prerequisite for standing.
Plaintiff suffered a concrete injury when he attempted to access the website but was unable to fully and effectively utilize it.
Plaintiff adequately pled a threat of future discrimination by defendant when he alleged an intent to return to the website, whereupon he will face barriers to access because he is visually-impaired.
The injury plaintiff seeks to address is not the inability to access defendant’s services. Rather, it is the inability to access defendant’s website. So, an order by the court requiring defendant to remove the barriers facing the plaintiff when attempting to use defendant’s website would address that injury.
Defendant’s physical locations are public accommodations.
Regardless of whether the theory is that a website can be considered a public accommodation without a connection to a physical place or whether a sufficient nexus must exist, plaintiff’s case goes forward either way.
A nexus exists because: 1) the website provides goods and services such as information concerning the locations it operates and information and descriptions of its amenities and services, privileges, advantages and accommodations; 2) the website allows user to find locations for them to visit; and 3) plaintiff alleged he was deterred from visiting the physical locations that plaintiff has as a result of using the website.
With respect to a nexus, the website is heavily integrated with and in many ways operates as a gateway to defendant’s physical store locations, and plaintiff cannot fully and equally enjoy those goods and services offered by the defendant because of the website’s inaccessibility.
With respect to the due process argument under the void for vagueness doctrine since no regulation for website accessibility exist or are forthcoming, the court found that the ADA is not so unclear as to be unconstitutionally vague even without the benefit of DOJ regulations. Further, plaintiff is not seeking an injunction imposing WCAG 2.0, rather plaintiff seeks to require defendant’s compliance with the ADA without dictating how the defendant has to comply with the statute. Accordingly, the requested relief does not violate due process.
In a footnote, the court notes that being a tester does not preclude standing under the ADA.
In another footnote, the court questioned whether the nexus test is the proper test for figuring out website accessibility.
As Richard Hunt has discussed numerous times in his blog, some courts are buying that you can’t get to first base in a website accessibility case unless there is some probability that you could actually take advantage of that particular place of public accommodation. This court was having none of it.
In a footnote, this court makes clear that while it believes a gateway exists sufficient to find standing, it prefers the approach that a website may be considered a public accommodation without a connection to a physical place.
The court was also having none of the argument that the lack of DOJ regulations violates due process. The critical factor is that the defendant has flexibility with respect to ADA compliance, but that the ADA must be complied with.
Just because plaintiff is a tester, doesn’t affect standing one way or the other.
When I first started dealing with website accessibility issues, I was of the opinion that flexibility for defendants is great, and that regulations only take away that flexibility. However, for the reasons that Richard has mentioned in his blog on more than one occasion, I have come around to the position that DOJ regulations if gone through the proper rulemaking process whereby all views are considered would bring needed sensibility to the area. Without such regulations, it is completely up to each court to figure out what meaningful accessibility is and that is going to vary from judge to judge and plaintiff to plaintiff.
Gomez is legally blind and uses screen reading software to access the Internet. The summer of 2017, plaintiff visited the website of the General Nutrition Company. That website allows customers to purchase General Nutrition Company’s goods and services as well as view any promotions and deals offered at that time. It also provides a store locator. When Gomez visited the website, he could not access many of its features, such as adding items to its online shopping cart, accessing the store locator, or reading the deals and promotions. The inaccessibility was due to the mislabeling of the online content so that his screen reader did not work properly. While the website did not include a statement regarding defendant’s commitment to ADA compliance, in its terms and conditions, it did provide a phone number for customers to call if they needed additional assistance. As recently as June 2018, defendant’s expert using automated accessibility tests AChecker and WAVE found zero errors and no known problems with the website. However, plaintiff’s expert found errors that could prevent a user from selecting a product and completing a purchase. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to exclude the testimony and opinions of defendant’s expert.
When it comes to injunctive relief, plaintiff must show a sufficient likelihood that he will be injured by such conduct in the future. Plaintiff has done that because he faces barriers to access the website and thereby suffered a concrete injury. Further, if the problems are not addressed, he will suffer that same injury in the future.
Plaintiff’s status as an ADA tester has nothing to do with his standing.
As we have discussed previously here, in the 11th Circuit, title III covers both tangible and intangible barriers, and that whatever goods and services the public accommodation offers as part of its place of public accommodation, the public accommodation cannot discriminate against people on the basis of disability, even if those goods and services are intangible.
Courts in the 11th Circuit have found that websites are subject to the ADA if a nexus between the website and the physical premises of a public accommodation can be established.
Few courts have defined nexus precisely. As we have discussed previously here and here for example, where a website is heavily integrated with physical store locations and operate as a gateway to the physical store location, courts have found that the website is a service of the public accommodation and covered by the ADA. That is, the ADA prohibits a retailer’s website from impeding a person with a disability’s full use and enjoyment of the brick-and-mortar store.
Just providing information may not be enough to establish a nexus. However, citing to various cases, the ability to pre-order or purchase products probably does create a sufficient nexus between the website and the physical store.
Looking at the various decisions as a whole, a number of factors exist for determining whether a website has a sufficient nexus to the physical stores. Those factors are: 1) whether the website provides a service of the public accommodation like the ability to purchase or preorder products; 2) whether the alleged barrier to access prevents the full use and enjoyment of services of the public accommodation; 3) whether the website provides more than just information about the store; 4) whether the website impedes access to the physical location; and 5) whether the website facilitates the use of the physical stores.
In this situation, GNC’s website is a service facilitating the use of the physical store, and therefore, it is a place of public accommodation. More specifically, the ability to purchase products remotely is a service of the physical stores. Further, by providing information about promotions and deals in addition to information about store information, the website operates as a gateway to physical stores.
Defendant’s expert lacked specialized knowledge or experience on website accessibility. Further, his professional training and experience is in e-commerce, which is only tangentially related to web accessibility. Defendant’s expert does not know the success criteria of the accessibility checking software relied on by the defendant. Further, defendant’s expert does not usually run those tests personally himself.
Defendant’s expert not only based his opinion upon reliable principles or methods but also on the input he had received from people over 20+ years of just interaction. That kind of interaction cannot be tested or peer-reviewed, has no known rate of error, and defendant put forth no evidence that such a technique is accepted in the relevant scientific community.
While testimony on website accessibility would be helpful to deciding the case, defendant’s expert lack of experience in web accessibility and the unreliability of his opinions outweigh any potential helpfulness.
Plaintiff’s expert tested the website and found that it had 77% and 64% compliance on success levels AA and A and that such errors could prevent a user from selecting a product and completing the purchase.
While the court can grant summary judgment to plaintiff as to liability, it cannot grant summary judgment as to the remedy for two reasons. First, plaintiff has provided no support that WCAG 2 .0 is an appropriate remedy. Second, even if that was the appropriate remedy, the record is silent as to which success level is most appropriate.
In a footnote, the court noted that the defendant has been hauled into court regarding website accessibility before. That case settled. As part of that settlement, the defendant agreed to take commercially reasonable steps to improve accessibility for individuals using screen readers. Further, that agreement stated that the defendant may use WCAG 2.0 level AA or other applicable authority as a reference for making such improvements.
In another footnote, the court noted that plaintiff’s expert may very well be qualified to talk on matters within his expertise, such as the costs to implement accessibility measures but that does not help with regard to ADA compliance.
In yet another footnote, the court found highly persuasive the number of cases adopting WCAG 2.0 success level AA as the appropriate standard to measure accessibility.
Plaintiff prevailed on summary judgment, which is not a frequent occurrence at all.
When it comes to website accessibility, there are three things a business needs to be concerned about. In particular, the website needs to be meaningfully accessible to persons with disabilities using screen readers, voice dictation technology, and to the Deaf/hard of hearing, if audio is involved.
This case is the first one I am aware of that has reviewed the case law to figure out just what factors the courts consider when determining whether a nexus exists. Lawyers may find this analysis very helpful in the future. As discussed in the opinion, these factors are individual and not in combination. That is, you get a nexus if any of the factors are met.
One wonders how this particular judge, Marcia Cooke of the Southern District of Florida, would have dealt with Jones because of her reference that just providing information may not be enough to establish a nexus.
Liability and a remedy are not the same thing.
As Richard Hunt has mentioned previously in his blog entries, relying on widely available Internet checking tools for accessibility may not be enough. The key is whether the individual with the disability has meaningful access.
The court acknowledged that expert testimony on website accessibility if the expert was properly qualified could be very helpful.
If you are looking for signals, the footnotes mentioned in the Gomez takeaways section above, are definitely important reading.
The Winn-Dixie decision that will come down from the 11th Circuit will definitely impact both of the cases we discussed today.

References: v. 
 §12187
 §504
 §794
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