Source: https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/double-jeopardy-%C2%ADunraveling-a-gordian-knot/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:20:15+00:00

Document:
A motley few are frustrated, flummoxed, or even flabbergasted when faced with a double jeopardy issue. To some, such an issue is nothing less than a Gordian knot of criminal law. Were we suspended in legend, such a problem would best be dealt with by cleaving it with Alexander the Great’s sword. Indeed, even in our world, such action may be preferred by those facing recurring double jeopardy issues.
“One bite of the apple” is the general rule: Once a person has been acquitted or convicted of a specific crime, he cannot be tried a second time for that offense. A significant but rarely encountered exception to the ban on repeated prosecutions for the same offense exists for different sovereigns, e.g., state A and state B or state and federal systems.10 The federal government and some states, however, have imposed restrictions on seeking further prosecutions on the same facts where one conviction has already been pursued by another jurisdiction.
• No violation when Offense 1 has elements A, B, C, and D and Offense 2 has elements A, B, C, and E.
• Violation when Offense 1 has elements A, B, C, and D and Offense 2 has elements A, B, and C.
A twist to the one-bite rule?
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that where a person is convicted of an offense but later a greater offense results from the same underlying act, double jeopardy will not prevent conviction of the greater offense. In Diaz, the defendant was convicted of assault and battery. A month later, the victim died from the injuries sustained. The defendant was charged and convicted of homicide. The High Court held that “the plea of former jeopardy disclosed no obstacle to the prosecution for homicide.”16 Does this case survive the Blockburger test? It hasn’t been expressly overruled and at least a brace of similar factual scenarios have come up in Texas over the last couple of years. You may want to keep Diaz handy.
When a defendant is subjected to multiple punishments, the remedy is to affirm the most serious offense and vacate the other convictions.26 Sometimes, the offenses may provide similar consequences or, even, the greater punishment attaches to the lesser crime. Fortunately, the most serious offense can be the more heinous conviction or the offense carrying the more severe punishment.
Ex parte Masonheimer is an extension of Ex parte Lewis. As the dissent observed, Masonheimer involved a prosecutor who intended to “win at any price” before a first jury, not one who intended to “get rid of this jury” so that he would have a better chance to win before a second one.29 An anomaly or aberration driven by the particular facts of the case, we may hope, but it remains out there.
Just like knots, double jeopardy issues can be easy to unravel, but some are more are difficult. For the more tangled problems, we may still dream of the stroke of a sword to cut through the interlacing threads, but the marlinspike teasing out the ropes better preserves the integrity of the law and is a tad more subtle—even more lawyerly. Just avoid a bloody finger.
1 The small marlinspikes available on some penknives must have caused many a painful and even bloody jab to fingers. The things seem designed for nothing better than slipping from the work at hand to deeply penetrate the softest, most sensitive areas of skin. Swords may be safer!
2 I tender this article with some trepidation. I have attempted to map out the basic tests but the caselaw is not always consistent or clear—the less so at the intermediate court level. There is no substitute for your own research.
3 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
4 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793 (1969).
5 Tex. Const., Art. 1, §14. Even in the context of mistrials, the Court of Criminal Appeals has ostensibly reverted to a parallel construction of the two provisions. See Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), overruling Bauder v. State, 921 S.W2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); but see Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (three judges dissenting) (fudging the sharp boundary delineated in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)).
6 David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 193 (2005), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol14/iss1/8. Maybe something of the sort existed in a more primitive form at the time of Alexander the Great too.
7 This claim, however, has more restrictive relief than other claims that may be raised for the first time on appeal such as jurisdiction, sufficiency of the evidence, and jury charge issues.
8 Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App 2000) (any violation not clearly apparent on the face of the record because more than one manner and means presented); Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
9 See, e.g., Teeter v. State, No. PD-1169-09, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1206 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2010) (holding that convictions on the same facts for capital murder and the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault violated double jeopardy). Of course, double jeopardy claims may also be redressed in habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d at 880.
10 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985). Similarly, with tribal and federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 453 U.S. 313 (1978).
11 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Not Blockbuster as it has been called in all seriousness—but possibly inadvertently—on more than one occasion in open court. The Blockburger test was reaffirmed in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 505 (1990).
12 See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 299, 304 (1977); Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d at 883.
13 See, e.g., Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (op. on reh’g) (failing to yield while turning is not a lesser-included offense of intoxication assault).
14 Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (explaining and rejecting “strict statutory” and “cognate evidence” tests).
15 Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d at 273.
16 Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1911).
17 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).
18 Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
19 Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
20 Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d at 883.
21 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); Compare Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d. at 883 (forbidden multiple prosecutions obtaining multiple punishments) with Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (permitted single prosecution obtaining multiple punishments).
22 Ex parte Ervin, 991 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (convictions for manslaughter and intoxication manslaughter for same offense offend the Double Jeopardy Clause.).
23 Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
24 Id. at 629-30 (deciding that the act of exposure in an indecency with a child by exposure—a circumstances of conduct—offense constitutes a single unit of prosecution despite the number of victims per incident).
26 Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 303, 337 (Tex. Crim. App.2006); Landers v. State, 957 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
27 Ex parte Lewis, 223 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
28 Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
29 Id. at 514-15 (Cochran, J., dissenting).

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