Source: https://thompsononeillaw.typepad.com/tov_blog/employment_decisions/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:29:41+00:00

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Jordan Porter was hurt while driving a truck owned by Losey's Lawn & Landscape business. A tire blew, causing the accident and injuries while Porter was using a Losey's dump truck to transport stone. Porter wasn't a regular employee of Losey's and apparently wasn't "on the clock" when this event occurred. He argued that as a result, he was entitled to collect PIP benefits from Losey's auto insurer and was not limited to workers compensation benefits (partial pay and medical).
State Farm argued that Porter was an "employee" because a recent Michigan Supreme Court case had held that anyone who does not maintain a separate business, does not render a service to the public, and is not an "employer," is limited to the collection of workers comp benefits if injured in the trade or business of another. Judges Kirsten Kelly, Cavanagh and Saad ruled that Porter was limited to comp benefits, and could not recover for his full damages, despite the fact that he was not actually "employed" by Losey's and that he operated his own power-washing business.
In Great Lakes Eye Inst, P.C. v. Krebs, the Court of Appeals interpreted a non-compete and liquidated damages clause after the sole shareholder accepted an assignment of the "assets" of the corporation and transferred them to another corporation. The Court ruled that the unauthorized assignment of the non-compete agreement, contrary to its express language, relieved the employee of any obligations under the contract, and that the contract was perhaps no an asset that could be assigned, in any event.
When William Baird suffered catastrophic injuries in a truck rollover, he was forced to sue Safeco and Travelers Insurance Company to secure payment of more than $1.4 million dollars in medical payments plus lost wages. The no fault insurer of the vehicle and the workers compensation insurer of Baird's employer both owed these benefits, but each claimed the other was higher in priority or solely responsible.
Eventually, Travelers, the comp insurer, lost this fight and was ordered to pay the medical and wages, and also the attorneys' fees incurred by Safeco. This month, the Court upheld that decision with the sole exception of interest earned on the attorneys fees.
In Primary Insurance Agency Group, LLC v. Neville Nofar, et al., the plaintiff sued a competitor arguing that it stole customers by hiring a former employee to identify Albanian-American potential customers. The employee testified that she found the potential customers (only about 20 of the 200 customers the Plaintiff had lost) using the white pages to identify Albanian surnames. Given the lack of contradictory evidence, the Court concluded that summary disposition of the plaintiff's claim was appropriate, since there was nothing improper about using the phone book--a public domain--to identify potential customers.
The Personal Representative of Melody Grimmer sued several doctors and their corporations, including one hospital, after Ms. Grimmer died immediately after a cardiac catheterization. The family argued that the doctor who diagnosed her ultimately-fatal hematoma and the doctors who refused to respond to the diagnosis were all negligent. The family couldn't get service on the diagnosing doctor, however, and apparently concluded that the subsequent treaters should be dismissed. When those treaters sought summary disposition, the family's attorney indicated that she would not object to their dismissal or attend the hearing seeking dismissal.
At the hearing, the attorneys--who had not sought dismissal of the un-served, diagnosing doctor's employer-- verbally asked the Court to also dismiss that defendant with prejudice. The Court agreed to do so, even though no one had moved for a summary dismissal of the allegedly negligent doctor's employer, and no one had alerted the family's attorney that such a dismissal would be sought.
The family appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial judge had abused its discretion. The Court noted that a claim could be pursued against the hospital "principal" even without suing the agent-physician, so the failure to achieve service of process on the doctor-agent was irrelevant. The panel noted that dismissing the claim where no motion had been filed was both a denial of "basic due process" (not to mention the pertinent Court Rule) and a violation of good faith by the defense attorneys who requested it at the hearing.
Eric Moore put a nail through his foot during a roofing project. Years later, he is still significantly disabled by the injury. He was being paid $100.00 to finish a roofing project for Nolff's Construction. The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission reviewed the case and concluded that Moore was an "employee" of Nolff at the time he was hurt, and thus entitled to the statutory benefits of workers compensation insurance (limited wages and medical).
The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that since Moore had actually employed some other men as roofers on another project, he could not meet the statutory definition of an "employee" at the time of his injury. Therefore, he was not entitled to recover workers compensation benefits from Nolff's insurer, Travelers Indemnity.
It used to be that if it looked like a duck and quacked like a duck, the courts would recognize a duck: today, our courts grant broader and broader discretion to employers to avoid the statutory worker protections that were put in place 50-100 years ago. If this case had been decided before the modern Republican anti-worker, anti-middle class agenda had gained traction, there would have been no dispute that Moore was an employee entitled to the modest benefits of workers compensation. Today, that pro-insurer, pro-corporate agenda puts every laborer at risk of a life-destroying economically catastrophic work injury and passes none of the risk to employers who seek to avoid risk-sharing responsibility.
Court holds that bar is not responsible for its bouncers because they are "independent contractors."
Allen Oumedian sued the "Stout Irish Bar" after he was allegedly injured by the bar bouncers. The Court held that the Bar was not responsible for the actions of the bouncers, because they did not qualify as "employees." To his credit, Judge Michael Kelly dissented from the decision--despite his shared Irish heritage--pointing out that the bouncers were agents of the bar which retained elements of control over the bouncers performance of their bar-imposed duties. Judge Kelly's opinion pointed out that the agency-responsibility of the Bar was properly a factual question to be decided by jurors and not a matter to be decided on motion for summary disposition.
Sharon Bear sued Kenneth Prather, Walter Briggs Connolly and Connolly's firm, after she was cheated by Lee S. Ruhl. Bear had previously sued Golden Mortgage, arguing that Ruhl's fraudulent schemes were enabled by Golden Mortgage, however, the Court granted summary disposition of her claim after it concluded that she hadn't presented adequate evidence of Golden's involvement in Ruhl's fraud to hold Golden Mortgage accountable. She then sued her attorneys for malpractice. That claim was also summarily dismissed. She appealed.
The Court of Appeals last month upheld the dismissal of the malpractice claim. It ruled that the evidence offered by her original attorneys after her fraud claim was dismissed--which evidence wasn't considered by the Court in the Golden case because it wasn't filed timely--would not have changed the outcome of the original summary disposition.
On this basis, the Court concluded that even if the attorneys' work was deficient in terms of what should have been placed before the original reviewing court, even taking that information into account, her evidence didn't adequately establish that Golden Mortgage was fully aware of Ruhl's fraud--and therefore the original case was a "loser." If the case was a loser, her attorneys' malpractice didn't cause her any damages.
Gregory Fayz suffered from narcolepsy and sleep apnea. He was involved in four car accidents that resulted from drowsiness and slow reation time. He had worked since 1990 for a group of related companies as an "independent contractor" providing cleaning services. He adapted to his illness by relying on others to drive him to and from cleaning locations. In August of 2008, he was ordered by one of his owner-contractors to immediately return and finish a cleaning job at Willow Run Airport and then run an errand to deliver equipment to another location. When he complained of tiredness, he was allegedly told to follow instructions or be fired.
Fayz left for Willow Run but fell asleep en route and was badly hurt in a car accident on the way. He sued the employing contractor, arguing that the "drive or quit" instruction violated a duty of reasonable care, given Fayz's disability. In an all-too-familiar Judge Henry Saad move, the Court gratuitously threw into its opinion the fact that Fayz had been incarcerated at some time between 2001 and 2003, before ruling that the employing contractor owed him no duty to accommodate his illness.
The Court based its decision on the Judges' conclusion that Fayz's accident was not "foreseeable." Despite his nearly 18 years of service, there was no "special relationship" that would make the owner's demand unreasonable. The Court affirmed the trial judge's summary disposition of the lawsuit.
Angela Ware sued Bronson Methodist Hospital after her ex-husband's girlfriend used her employee access to view, copy and disclose the content of her confidential medical records. Ware was involved in a custody dispute with her ex-husband and argued that a breach of privacy occured when Patricia Wark [not a typo], her ex's girlfriend and an ICU nurse at Bronson, accessed her records for use in the custody dispute. Ware argued that Bronson's privacy policies were inadequate, in that they allowed an employee not involved in her care to access her records. She also argued that the Hospital should be liable for the misconduct of its employee.
The Hospital sought summary disposition of Ware's vicarious responsibility claim, arguing that it should not be responsible for an employee's violation of the law where that violation was not in the course of duty and not committed to further the Hospital's interests. The trial judge rejected this argument, but two of the three judges on the high court panel disagreed and granted summary disposition. The Hospital also sought summary disposition of Ware's privacy claims related to Bronson's access rules and procedures, arguing that a claim of this nature must be pursued as a medical malpractice action. The Court of Appeals agreed in part and ruled that since Ware did not follow the difficult procedural rules established for Michigan malpractice cases, some of her allegations were barred by the statute of limitations. The Court did leave open one narrow channel of recourse for Ware. It held that the failure to monitor and enforce its own rules regarding privacy does not sound in medical malpractice, and therefore, if Ware can prove that this failure caused her injury, she is entitled to a trial on that sole issue.
The dissenting judge rejected the idea that allowing a non-treating nurse to examine the victim's medical records raises an issue of professional judgment. She noted that by definition, no standards of medical care dictate the privacy rights of patients with respect to non-treating professionals and employees. This is a technical, legal, administrative issue that the majority improperly confounds with issues of professional medical judgment. The dissenting judge provides a detailed analysis of the historical medical privilege and explains why failing to protect private information from access by non-treating individuals should not be tolerated--let alone protected as a matter of "medical judgment."
When Joseph Derry was hurt while working for a landscaping service, he attempted to sue the owner of the truck and the owner's insurer. He maintained that as an "independent contractor" he was not limited to workers compensation for his injuries, but instead could collect both No Fault PIP benefits, and legal damages arising from the owner's negligence. The owner had purchased a general commercial liability policy, a no fault policy and a workers compensation policy from Auto Owners. The insurer argued that Derry should be limited to collecting the minimal benefits payable under workers compensation law, even though Derry was not an employee of the company, All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc.
It is common for employers to demand that their labor pool be designated "independent contractors," as this designation prevents the employees from claiming federal and state worker protections. The Company avoids mandatory worker protections and regulations. The Republican majority of Michigan's Supreme Court has evidenced a sympathy for this employer posture and interpreted the law in a fashion that encourages employers to skirt the normal employee protections.
It is less common for an insurer to attempt to reverse this process in order to reap savings in an individual case. Nevertheless, that is what happened in Derry's case, as Auto Owners sued to designate Derry an "employee" entitled to collect only minimial medical and partial wage loss benefits. Despite the existence of a contract between the laborer and his employer that designated Derry an "independent contractor" receiving a 1099 and no wage deductions, Auto Owners persuaded the lower court to limit his legal rights to those of an employee. He appealed and the Supreme Court, ever protective of employers' long-term rights, reversed.
The Court held that the Court of Appeals special panel that decided the case had erred in concluding that "all three of the statutory criteria must be met before an individual is divested of 'employee' status:" the individual must not maintain a separate business, must not render service directly to the public, and must not be an employer subject to the workers compensation disability act. The cynical among us would suggest that this decision was yet another example of "corporations and insurers win; ordinary people lose." Regardless of theory, logic or precedent.
In any event, the case had implications for future rulings and this week the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court went too far in protecting an employee's status as an "employee." The Court held that if an individual meets any of the three statutory criteria (Derry did a little lawn work on his own, independent of the truck owner), the individual is an independent contractor, regardless of the economic reality of his "employment" status. So employers remain free to skirt the rules governing the employment relationship and to "deem" employees to be "independent contractors."
Good news for Derry in a rare loss for a Michigan insurance company. Bad news for the next hundred employees who are deemed ineligible for legal protections we formerly provided to employees.
The Court of Appeals published one of the least transparent and most obtuse opinions it has published in years, this week, tossing a wrongful death case against Detroit Edison. The case was brought by Rosalie M. Bagby, whose husband was electrocuted on a job site during his apprenticeship. Bagby maintained that her husband died because the company knowingly exposed him to electrocution by a bus that was energized with 40,000 volts. She presented expert testimony that the site was not propertly guarded, that the apprentice was not properly trained or supervised, that he didn't receive the proper equipment, and that it was entirely foreseeable that electrocution would result from the employer's failure to act reasonably.
Employers are normally not liable for injuring their employees, if the injury results from "mere" negligence. A "trade off" for granting workers compensation to any employee injured on the job was to grant employers immunity unless they committed intentional wrongdoing. Republican tort "reforms" resulted in the re-writing of the intentional acts exclusion a number of years ago to make the exclusion more narrow. Today, it is not enough to demonstrate a statistical certainty that someone will be hurt by an employer's deliberate course of action: one must either show actual evidence of intent to injure or "supervisory knowledge that an injury would follow from an employer's deliberate act."
If that seems like some form of hair-splitting and a discussion of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, the opinion in Bagby v. Detroit Edison is a stellar example of how foggy language can obfuscate justice. Authored by militant insurance-oriented judges, the opinion never actually explains what happened to the young apprentice. Nor does it put the several acknowledged deficiencies in Edison's conduct into context. Incredibly, it uses the young man's "many opportunities to exercise his own discretion" to obstruct a claim against the at-fault employer because a responsible employer is off the hook if the dead employee "had the chance to exercise individual volition." We don't know what, if anything, the young man might have done wrong, but because he was not chained to an oar, his employer cannot be responsible.
We know that Edison failed to erect orange barrier rope around the hazardous area; we know that supervisors visited the site and by Edison's own investigation, "should have noticed" that barrier rope was missing. There was evidence that the job supervisor did not conduct a mandatory pre-job briefing and apparently evidence to support that the apprentice and others lacked proper training. The judges admitted that the rope should have encompassed the location where the apprentice placed his ladder to begin changing leads, however, they go on to speculate that he might have ignored the rope, even if it had been present.
Witnesses apparently anticipated a death and verbalized warnings, however, the judges concluded that "knowledge that the bus was energized at 40,000 volts and that contact or close proximity would be dangerous, does not constitute actual knowledge that an injury would be certain to occur." This was deemed merely knowledge of a "general risk" that doesn't establish liability.
In Smith v. Aegon Companies Pension Plan, a group of aggrieved Kentucky employees sued their pension plan after it severely reduced their retirement. The plan argued that the employees could only sue in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, based on a restrictive 2007 venue selection clause it unilateally added to the plan articles. The employees argued that such a venue selection clause was unenforceable as it unduly restricted the beneficiiaries access to enforce the fiduciary obligations of the plan administrator.
The lower court agreed and allowed the employees to sue in Kentucky. A two-judge majority of the Sixth Circuit reversed, summarily dismissing the suit. Judge Clay dissented, citing a wealth of federal law upholding the employees' right to challenge the management of their plan in a reasonably convenient location. He noted that the cited location was arbitrary and bore no relationship to the parties' prior dealings. He also pointed out the illogic of the majority's holding, since it relied upon a case upholding mandatory arbitration, without recognizing that a federal statute compelled recognizing arbitration---and that no court has ever mandated arbitration in a distant venue.
The Worden Insurance Agency secured workers compensation insurance for Jack Fritz's company through Hastings Mutual. One problem: Fritz's company operated in several states and the Hastings Policy applied only to injuries suffered in Michigan. Thus, when Jennifer Stephens' husband died after a fall, Fritz had no insurance coverage to provide workers compensation benesfits to the widow and children.
Since Fritz had applied for coverage that operated outside the State of Michigan, and since David Shamaly, Worden's agent, had represented that Hastings' coverage would apply to injuries outside the state, Fritz and Stepehens ultimately pursued a claim against the insurance agent for negligence. The Agency argued that the shorter statute of limitations for professional malpractice should apply, rendering the claim void. It also argued that Shamaly operated outside its rules if he confirmed out-state coverage and therefore it should not be accountable for Shamaly's error.
The Court was forced to determine, for the first time, what statute of limitations should apply to insurance agents and when the cause of action actually accrued. It ruled that since an insurance agent requires very little education or qualification, by law, it was not a "profession" by Michigan's malpractice standards. Therefore, a suit against an insurance agent is in the nature of an ordinary negligence claim, not a malpractice claim.
The Court also held that the statute of limitations for insurance agent negligence begins to run when the presumed insurer denies the underlying claim. It rejected Worden's argument that the claim accrues when the policy is purchased and the negligence occurred, since at that point, in most cases, no damage has been suffered and no one is aware of the deficiency. The Court also rejected delaying accrual until coverage litigation is resolved.
With regard to Shamaly's claim that Worden cannot be responsible for an assurance of coverage because it has a policy forbidding employees to make assurances, the Court noted that Shamaly's actions--whether allowed by the employer or not--were within the scope of his employment. Therefore his employer is accountable for his negligence, if any.
Auto Owners fought and won a garnishment action brought by James Decker after he was hurt. Decker was working for Bell Site Services when he was hurt, however, after the accident, Auto Owners sued Trux R Us, its own insured, seeking a Declaratory Judgment that it owed no duty to defend claims by Decker. Auto Owners did not join Decker in the lawsuit or notify him of the lawsuit until after it had entered a default judgment against Trux R Us for failing to appear timely. When Trux R Us attempted to set aside the default, Auto Owners objected and the Court refused Trux's request. Trux's appeal of that decision was also rejected.
In the interim, Decker secured an injury settlement with Trux R Us that would be payable out of his Auto Owners coverage, if Auto Owners owed coverage. He then attempted a garnishment action against Auto Owners to determine the coverage issue. Auto Owners argued that Decker was bound by the earlier judgment it achieved against Trux R Us, that Decker could not sue Trux R Us because it was his "employer" and immune from any action other than workers compensation claims, and that in any event, Decker was stuck with Auto Owners' interpretation of events because he didn't seek garnishment discovery within 14 days of Auto Owners' rejection of the garnishment inquiry.
Two judges of the Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's decision that Decker will never get his "day in court" to prove that he was owed insurance coverage for his injuries. Without addressing the fact that Decker was never informed of Auto Owner's Declaratory Judgment action--even though it was directed at liability to him--or that the insured did not place the actual issue before the court or protect Decker's interests, the Court held that Decker was bound to accept Auto Owners' interpretation of the law because he didn't object within two weeks of receipt of its garnishment response.
There was a time when Michigan residents were assured due process and a day in court. There was a time in Michigan when insurers couldn't use their superior resources and familiarity with the law to abuse consumers, insureds and injury victims. There was a time when people with legitimate issues were assured an actual opportunity to place their position before a fair-minded, neutral decision-maker. That time is gone. One judge of the Court of Appeals dissented, pointing out that the majority were invalidating one entire sub-part of the pertinent Court Rule.
Linda Enders sued Lynn Borg and others after she was hurt in a car accident caused by Borg while driving drunk. Right after the wreck, Borg admitted she was drinking and claimed that she was leaving a meeting related to the Community Foundation of St. Clair. Enders joined the Foundation in her injury lawsuit, arguing that it was vicariously liable for Borg's drunken driving, since Borg was leaving a Foundation work obligation.
Borg then changed her story and argued that she was drinking socially with a male companion. The Foundation provided evidence that it had no relationship with Borg's companion, conducted no scheduled activities on the night in question, and generally denied that Borg was drinking in her role with the Foundation. The Judge then granted summary disposition to the Foundation. Enders appealed, arguing that Borg's original lies to the police created a question of fact regarding the purpose of her activities--creating an issue if credibility for the jury to decide.
The Court of Appeals rejected Enders' appeal. It held that the lies Borg told immediately after the incident were not sufficient to create a "genuine issue of material fact." Instead, the Court held that the self-serving testimony of the Foundation was sufficient to allow for summary disposition--even withouth "weighing the facts" and giving the non-moving party the benefit of the doubt.
In Michigan's current corporate/insurer-dominated jurisprudential climate, it is deemed more important to make decisions in favor of Defendants fast, than it is to assure we get the decisions right.
Dennis Cole was beaten in the basement of the Bada Bing Club and Atlantis Lounge. He was beaten by the manager and three other men. He attempted to sue the bar owner, arguing that the owner should be responsible for the criminal activities of the bar's manager.
Although the owner was described as the "boss" and the "general" and reportedly attended weekly Sunday meetings, he and the manager denied that the owner was involved with the daily activities of the bar and argued that he should not be vicariously responsible for beating the Plaintiff. The Court ruled that summary disposition should be granted to the owner under the "control test" rather than the "economic reality" test, and that Cole hadn't established even a question of fact with regard to whether the bar owner exercised control over the operation of the bar.
Michigan Head & Spine Institute was forced to sue the Auto Club, Great West Casualty, and Great American Insurnace Company to collect payment for medical services it provided to a self-employed trucker. The Auto Club was the trucker's individual, personal vehicle insurer, while the other insurers provided coverage for the truck and trailer he was operating at the time of his injury. They were titled to his trucking company and its lessor. The trial judge had ordered the Auto Club to re-imburse the other insurers for all benefits they had paid, pursuant to a subrogation clause in the trucker's coverage which obligated any workers compensation or "similar" insurer to re-pay benfits.
The Court of Appeals rejected the judge's reasoning and overturned summary disposition. It noted at the outset that Michigan's comprehensive No Fault auto liability insurance scheme is not a law that can be deemed "similar" to workers compensation. It further noted that under the No Fault scheme, when there are multiple potential coverages for a self-employed worker, the coverage on the work-related vehicle should always be the primary payor of benfits.
Two of the Michigan Court of Appeals' most conservative judges joined in a rare decision certifying a class action. The action was brought by a man who argued that he was being denied equal fair treatment by the Department of Corrections. Judges Henry Saad and Kirsten F. Kelly ruled in Nowacki v. Department of Corrections that the Plaintiff could bring a class action arguing that the Department's BFOQs governing women's prisons were too limited and denied men equal opportunity for employment and overtime. Nowacki argued that the BFOQs were defined too broadly and limited too many jobs and duties to women.
Under the Americans wiith Disabilities Act, employer medical examinations and disability inquiries are closely regulated and in many situations prohibited. The Dura Auto Sys. Company required employees to submit to third-party drug testing limited only to screening for "prescription drugs that warn against 'operating machinery.' " An employee, Bates, sued arguing that Dura was violating the ADA through this mandatory testing.
The District Court Judge agreed and ruled that Dura violated the ADA as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals majority, with one dissenter, over-ruled the District Court and sent the case back after Dura appealed. The majority concluded that if Dura's explanation of the testing held up, and it could prove that its third-party testing did not result in disclosure of ADA-confidential facts to the employer, its' testing program may pass constiutional muster. Dura will need to persuade a jury that the test design and implementation are not likely to reveal to Dura protected employee information.
Timothy Carl sued Muskegon County and Katherine Jawor, a CMH-contracted physician, after Jawor allegedly performed a negligent assessment and denied Carl treatment while incarcerated. Carl had been arrested for vulnerable adult abuse, while employed as an in-home healthcare provider, after he urinated on one patient and attempted to dispense liquid soap on another. Needless to say, Carl's behavior was consistent with his previous history of mental illness: CMH employees who interviewed him in jail described him as "floridly psychotic," suicidal, and requiring treatment, in part because his current medications were "ineffective." They judged him to be "paranoid" and in need of "intensive psychiatric treatment."
Dr. Jawor was consulted and concluded that Carl did not require institutionalized psychotic care, as he did not represent a danger to himself or others. On that basis, he remained in jail without intensive treatment. He later sued the jail and Jawor, arguing that through state action he had been denied needed medical care in violation of the U.S. Constitution and federal statute 42 USC, section 1983.
The trial judge ruled that Dr. Jawor was not a "state actor" in performing the mental health assessment that denied him in-patient psychiatric care and left him in jail. The Court of Appeals reversed. It pointed to longstanding precedent holding that a state may not avoid its legal obligations by delegating them to private actors. Since the state owed Carl a duty to provided adequate medical care while jailed, it could not evade its responsibility by suggesting that Jawor acted in a private capacity when she assisted the County in evaluating Carl's needs. She was clearly a "state actor" under the law, and therefore the case was remanded for a determination of whether Carl's civil rights were violated.
This week the Court of Appeals reversed its prior decision in Copeland v. MidMichigan Regional Medical Center, and upheld the summary disposition of the neurosurgeon's defamation claim against the hospital that took away his surgical privileges. In what appears to be a story of unmitigated tragedy for a young doctor, Brian Copeland contracted Hepatitis C during his residency and was forced to take a leave of absence from Mid Michigan Hospital's staff during the spring of 2010. When he returned to perform 2 of 5 scheduled surgeries, the Hospital claimed that it received an anonymous report that his behavior suggested a substance abuse problem, and his privileges were summarily withdrawn pending completion of counseling at the Professional Renewal Center in Lawrence, Kansas, even though the hospital's Medical Executive Committee could not substantiate any substance abuse issue.
Robert W. Bright was hired to provide criminal defense counsel to indigent persons accused of crime in Gallia County, Ohio. He earned about $60,000.00 per year as a public defender, handling difficult felony cases, as many as 70 at any given time. Judge David Dean Evans was the sole Court of Common Pleas Judge for the County. As a public defender, Bright appeared in an action on behalf of a young man who had indicated a willingness to plead guilty to a reduced charge.
At the time of the plea-taking, however, the indigent defendant learned that he would go straight to prison without any opportunity to wrap up his home affairs and hesitated to enter the voluntary plea. Literally "mere seconds" later, the defendant indicated a willingness to accept the plea, but the Judge refused to allow it. Even though the prosecutor was willing to allow the [seconds-] late plea, the Judge rejected it on the ground that the plea agreement now violated his personal "drop dead date" for guilty pleas.
Bright filed a motion to compel the judge to accept the plea. In his motion, he described the judge's actions and "arbitrary and unreasonable" rule as unconscionable and an abuse of discretion. In response, the Judge filed a grievance against Bright with the Ohio bar association and removed him from the 70 felony cases in Evans' court. The Criminal Defense Corporation of the County then fired Bright. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Bright's appropriately zealous defense of his client did not warrant Evans' actions and that Judge Evans "failed to meet the minimum expectations for members of the judiciary." His conduct was "worthy of censure" and "high-handed" and "caused [the young attorney] great hardship."
Nevertheless, when Bright sued Evans and his employer for violating his right of free speech and due process, the Court held that he had no recourse against either of the Defendants. The Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court's dismissal of Bright's case, finding that the judge enjoyed absolute immunity from liability claims and his employing corporation could not be sued for violating Bright's constitutional and civil rights. It is bad enough that this young lawyer's appropriate efforts on behalf of a client have been punished with unemployment; imagine yourself needing a public defender in Evans' court today. Do you think the next Public Defender will jeopardize his or her employment by exercising the [ethically-demanded] zealous representation of your rights? This is the kind of story one expects to read about Chinese or Russian or Middle Eastern courts.
Naum Thomai attempted to sue his employer, MIBA Hydramechanica Corporation, after his arm was traumatically shredded at the elbow and required amputation. Thomai operated a "grooving machine" and claimed that despite oil leaks and lack of guarding, his employer made minor adjustments in its operation and then increased his production quota, per shift, from 300 units to 600 units. According to Thomai, he informed management that he could not operate the machine, in its present condition, at the demanded rate, without incurring injury. His complaints fell on deaf ears until his arm was shredded.
The trial judge allowed a few months of discovery and then entered an order at the employer's request, severely limiting the discovery Thomai's attorneys could conduct. They were precleded from taking pictures of the machine, denied the right to depose witnesses and their records-investigation was severely curtailed. The employer then sought summary disposition, citing the lack of evidence that Thomai could produce to support his claim of virtually intentional injury, and the Court granted his motion.
Jay Brown sought to collect workers compensation after he was injured at work in a paving accident. After compromising his workers compensation claim, he sued his employer, Ajax Paving Industries, it's insurer, and several other entitites, claiming a corrupt conspiracy to deny injured workers compensation. Brown argued that the employer and its insurer consistently presented false testimony at compensation hearings in an effort to reduce payouts and discourage comp claims.
While Brown's claim was pending, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals undercut his legal argument. It reversed course and held that the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [RICO] could not be invoked to fight against a conspiracy to deny workers their work comp rights. It ruled that RICO protects only "injuries to business or property," and that personal injury-type rights, or statutory employee compensation 'benefit' rights are not "property."
How is it that "businesses" and "property" are protected against fraud and corrupt practices, but statutory rights of workers are not? Must be that employees' rights are just "too small to protect," as many businesses are "too big to fail...or punish." And, oh, by the way, which one gives more money to politicians and judges for election?
In Devon Scott Bailey v. Steven Gerome Schaaf, et al., a panel of the Court of Appeals issued yet another decision after remand from the Michigan Supreme Court. Bailey sued his landlord and its security agents after the complex received warning that Defendant Schaaf was stalking the premises with a gun and failed to act. Bailey was shot and suffered serious injuries and sued the gunman, the landlord and the security people and agency who were on duty at the time.
The Court analyzed its instructions from the Supreme Court that limited the liability exposure of the defendants, and applied recent precedent to the facts. It concluded that while Bailey couldn't sue the security agency or employees, because under Michigan Supreme Court logic, they owed no duty to Bailey, he could sue the owner of the apartment complex. In essence, since the apartment complex's agents were aware of the threatened imminent criminal threat and failed to act, the apartment had violated its common law duty to respond. Even though Bailey cannot sue the security people, the apartment complex may be able to sue them for breach of contract--the only duty they owed to anyone involved.
Jennifer Paul "allegedly" suffered a shoulder injury at work. Her employer sent her to the Glendale Neurological Associates for an IME. She then attempted to subpoena her records, including x-rays, form Glendale, but the doctors refused to produce them. She filed a lawsuit to obtain them, citing the Medical Records Access Act and the Consumer Protection Act. The trial judge ruled that she couldn't obtain her own x-rays because the IME doctor wasn't "treating or diagnosing" her.
She appealed and two of the Republican judges on the Court of Appeals Judges Christopher Murray and Mark Boonstra, issued a troubling opinion upholding the doctors' right to refuse the injured worker access to the studies of her own body, despite the access-to-records act, because they didn't examine her for purposes of treatment or diagnosis. At that same time, they upheld the lower court's decision that the Consumer Protection Act didn't apply because the doctors' actions were "not 'trade or commerce."
To her everlasting credit, Judge Servitto issued a blistering dissent rejecting the majority's arguement that they could perform diagnositic tests on Paul, for purposes of "diagnosis," without coming under the rules allowing access to medical records. She noted the broad definitions adopted by the legislature in defining "patient", "health care" and "medical records" under the various applicable statutes, including the Michigan Public Health Code.
After multiple appeals, Douglas Latham has only one more appeal between his 2004 injury and justice. This week, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the appeal arguments of the Barton Malow, Co., after a jury awarded Latham 55% of his total damages against Barton Malow for failing in its duty as a general contractor to instill sufficient fall safety procedures in a common work area. If the Republican-and insurance-dominated Michigan Supreme Court doesn't throw out Latham's verdict, he will finally receive the compensation he was granted for two serious leg injuries.
Latham fell from the mezzanine at the Oakview School project in Lake Orion. Barton Malow argued that it was only the "construction manager" and did not owe the duties of a "general contractor." This argument was in defiance of longstanding Michigan law that holds accountable for common area work safety the entity that has supervisory control and responsibility. Since Barton Malow had that "supervisory and coordinating authority," it could not ignore the concomitant safety responsibilities.
In Marwani v. Chalmers Service Station, Inc., the Michigan Court of Appeals recently upheld the summary dismissal of Marwani's premises liabilty claim against the owner of a closed gas station. The dismissal was a sanction for what the court described as "overwhelming evidence of plaintiff's numerous, willful misrepresentations...[and] egregious behavior...[which were]...not the product of misunderstanding, inadvertence, or negligent failure to investigate."
Apparently, Marwani fell into the oil change pit on the property after asking if he could apply for work and being told to wait inside. He initially filed a claim for workers compensation benefits and answered Interrogatories suggesting that he understood he had been hired and was sent into the building to retrieve salt for the building manager. At his deposition he admitted that he had not been hired by the defendant. His initial claim was deemed frivolous and his injury claim was dismissed as a sanction. The entire claim smacks of a poor understanding of the law by Marwani or his attorney. The standards for determining "employment" are straightforward and easily discernable; and if Marwani was an employee, his sole remedy would be workers compensation--making a civil premises liabilty action untenable and frivolous.

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