Source: https://www.lockelord.com/professionals/m/mead-jeffrey-brian
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:51:15+00:00

Document:
Jeff Mead represents a broad range of clients, at every stage of commercial litigation and arbitration, in state and federal courts, at the trial and appellate levels, on behalf of plaintiffs and defendants, and in complex cases involving a wide variety of subject matters, allegations, defenses, counter-claims, and damages.
Super Lawyers magazine named him a Texas Rising Star in 2015, 2016, and 2017.
Thompson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 775 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2014): The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment entered by the federal district court for our client Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“DBNTC”). In particular, the Fifth Circuit held: DBNTC’s removal from state court was proper and timely; the federal district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the dispute; the federal district court properly vacated the state court’s improperly entered default judgment against DBNTC; dismissal of DBNTC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on limitations grounds was proper; and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment could not apply to the limitations period of a claim alleging failure to make required disclosures.
Reyes v. North Texas Tollway Authority (N.D. Tex.): Jeff was part of a team of Locke Lord attorneys who helped secure summary judgment, which was affirmed on appeal, for the North Texas Tollway Authority (“NTTA”). The suit involved claims brought by a putative class of tollroad users who alleged the administrative fees imposed on the third set of invoices sent to the users were unconstitutionally excessive. The plaintiffs sued NTTA and numerous NTTA officials (board members, officers, and staff) in their individual and official capacities, and sought millions of dollars in damages for alleged violations of: the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation under Article 1, Sections 17 and 19 of the Texas Constitution; the right to equal treatment and protection under Article 1, Section 2 of the Texas Constitution; and the prohibition of excessive fines under Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution. In a series of rulings, the federal district court dismissed all claims against all defendants, and entered a judgment for NTTA. See Reyes v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., 830 F. Supp. 2d 194 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (agreeing with NTTA’s interpretation of the pertinent statute to permit a single administrative fee for each unpaid toll, dismissing all claims other than the federal due process claim, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief, and dismissing all the individual defendants); Reyes v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., No. 3:10-CV-0868-G, 2014 WL 2616841 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2014) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim); Reyes v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., 186 F. Supp. 3d. 621 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granting NTTA’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding in no uncertain terms that “[t]he fee passes rational basis review.” Reyes v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., No. 16-10767, 2017 WL 2772577 (5th Cir. June 27, 2017).
Applied Food Scis., Inc. v. New Star 21, Inc., No. 6:07-CV-00359-WSS, 2009 WL 9120113 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2009): The federal district court granted motions to dismiss filed by California-based clients New Star 21, Inc. and Piacere International, Inc. The motions argued that forcing the clients to litigate IP-related allegations in Texas violated their due process rights, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court agreed, holding that the clients had too few contacts with Texas to be amenable to suit in Texas, meaning the court lacked general personal jurisdiction. The court also held that the clients’ Internet presence was insufficient to create specific personal jurisdiction in Texas. The court dismissed the complaint against the clients.
City of Wylie v. Luevano, No. 4:13-CV-00414, 2014 WL 935332 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2014): The City of Wylie sought a state-court order compelling the repair, demolition, or removal of what it characterized as “nuisance” improvements on a tract of real property, and sought real damages, recovery of costs associated with the repair / removal work, and a civil penalty of $1,000 per day. The City named the homeowners in the suit, but also named our clients Wells Fargo (a former lienholder) and Freddie Mac (the then-current lienholder). Our clients removed the action to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss. The federal district court, in adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to dismiss the case, held that the plain language of Texas Local Government Code § 54.018(b)(2)—the statute relied on by the City—does not provide a cause of action against former or current lienholders. The district court also held that statute could not apply to our clients because they were not “the owner or the owner’s representative with control over the premises.” The City appealed the district court’s order, and the parties settled the matter while the appeal was pending.
Brimmer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:13-CV-342, 2013 WL 1842287 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2013): The plaintiff (a former homeowner) sued our client Wells Fargo (the homeowner’s loan servicer) in state court under Section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code. The plaintiff sought to determine the fair market value of real property he previously owned, and that Wells Fargo sold at foreclosure sale for a price that plaintiff said was too low. The plaintiff alleged he was owed nearly $100,000 as an offset to the deficiency he still owed Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo had not filed a deficiency suit to recover the deficiency, but had reported the deficiency to the pertinent credit bureaus. Wells Fargo removed the suit to federal district court and sought dismissal. After denying the plaintiff’s motion to remand, the court examined Section 51.003. The court held that the plain language of the statute required a deficiency suit to be initiated before the offset provision in Section 51.003(c) could be asserted. The court also held that the mere reporting of credit information about a person is not an “act” to collect a discharged debt within the meaning of Section 51.003. The court thus held that the plaintiff’s case was not ripe, held there was no subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissed the case.

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