Source: https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=1139104
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:41:01+00:00

Document:
722 shall give the better right as between those using water for the same purpose; but that in event of insufficiency of the supply, domestic pur- poses shall have first preference, and agricultural purposes shall have preference over manufacturing.58 However, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that this section does not entitle one desiring to use water for domestic purposes to take the water from a prior appropriator for some other purpose, without just compensation.59 The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized the right of the City of Denver to appropriate water not only for immediate use but for the needs result- ing from a normal increase in population within a reasonable time in the future, and to lease the use of water pending its need by the city;60 and the city is protected by statute against the vesting of rights under such leasing that would defeat the city's right to make eventual use of the water.61 The method of acquiring appropriative rights to the use of waters of natural streams in Colorado is a logical result of the constitutional prohibition against denying the right to make such appropriations. The intending appropriator does not apply to a State agency for a permit to appropriate water, subject to refusal if statutory conditions require or authorize denial of the application, as is the case in many of the Western States. In Colorado, one who proposes to appropriate unappropriated water of a stream commences the construction or en- largement of the necessary diversion or storage works, and within 60 days thereafter he files a claim therefor with the State Engineer. If the facts are adequately presented, the State Engineer accepts the claim for filing, after which reproductions are made and filed in the appro- priate county records.62 The foregoing is the statutory procedure for initiating an appropriation; but the requirements for filing maps and statements have been so construed by the supreme court as to restrict their purpose and effect to matters of evidence.63 That is to say, it 68 Colo. Const., art. XVI, § 6. w Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co., 23 Colo. 233, 236-237, 48 Pac. 532 (1896); Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426-427, 94 Pac. 339 (1908). And see Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 72-75, 26 Pac. 313 (1891). 60 Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 203-208, 96 Pac. (2d) 836 (1939). 61 Colo. Stats. Ann. 1935, ch. 193, § 398 (Laws 1931, ch. 172). This statute provides that if a city with population of 200,000 or more leases water not needed for immediate use, no rights shall become vested to a continued leasing or to a continuance of conditions concerning return water from irrigation so as to defeat the right of the city to terminate the leases or to change the place of use. 62 Colo. Stats. Ann. 1935, ch. 90, §§ 27 to 33. 63 De Haas v. Benesch, 116 Colo. 344, 351-352, 181 Pac. (2d) 453 (1947); Schulter v. Burlington Ditch, Res. & Land Co., 117 Colo. 284, 289, 188 Pac. (2d) 253 (1947); Archuleta v. Boulder & Weld County Ditch Co., 118 Colo. 43, 52, 53, 192 Pac. (2d) 891 (1948).

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