Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/244/111/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:09:28+00:00

Document:
Acting under the enrollment provisions of the Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, and the Creek Agreement of March 1, 1901, the Dawes Commission was a quasi-judicial tribunal, and enrollments made by it and approved by the Secretary of the Interior are presumptively correct, and, unless impeached by very clear evidence of fraud, mistake, or arbitrary action, they are conclusive.
Whether or not a person alleged to be a member of the Creek Nation was living on April 1, 1899, is one of the questions going to the right of such person or his heirs to have his name enrolled under § 28 of Agreement of March 1, 1901, which the Dawes Commission was competent to decide; it is not a jurisdictional question, and an incorrect determination of it does not necessarily render the enrollment void. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, distinguished.
In enrolling members of the Creek Tribe in 1901, the Dawes Commission was authorized to presume that a person enrolled as a member of the tribe on the tribal rolls of 1895 was living on April 1, 1899, in the absence of proof of his death before that day or of circumstances indicating that he had died before the Commission acted.
The evidence in the case examined, and found wanting in proof of such arbitrary action on the part of the Dawes Commission as would establish a mistake of law or fact warranting the impeachment of its action in enrolling the Indian in whose name the allotment in question was made and patented.
An attempt of the Secretary of the Interior to set aside the enrollment and allotment of a deceased Creek Indian by striking his name from the rolls without notice to his heirs is ultra vires and void.
When a Creek citizen dies after April 1, 1899, and an allotment is afterwards made, and deeds issued, in his name, the title is vested in his heirs by § 28 of the Agreement of March 1, 1901. Skelton v. Dill, 235 U. S. 206-208.
Under the Creek Agreement of March 1, 1901, § 3, it was permissible for the Dawes Commission to enroll tribal citizens and make them allotments when they failed to make selections for themselves.
information that he was living on that date and entitled to be enrolled.
"said enrollment, allotment, and patent cannot be cancelled, nor can the issue of fact upon which the Commission placed the name of Barney Thlocco upon the approved Creek Roll be tried again, and these defendants say that this Court is without authority of law to reopen or retry the question of fact sought to be put in issue by the United States."
for the purpose of attacking the allotment certificate and deeds to Thlocco, to retry the question of fact as to whether he was living April 1, 1899.
The government, in the brief filed in its behalf, reduces the questions necessary to decide the merits of this appeal to two: first, should the evidence offered by the government to show that Thlocco died prior to April 1, 1899, have been admitted? Second, should the judgment of the district court be reversed because the enrollment of Thlocco and the allotment to him were made arbitrarily and without evidence as to whether he was living or dead on April 1, 1899?
the council of the nations, and the descendants of those appearing on such rolls,"
This agreement was ratified by the Creek Council May 25, 1901, 32 Stat.1971.
The legislation which we have outlined indicates the purpose of Congress to make provision for the partition of the lands belonging to the Creek Nation among the members of the tribe, and to that end it authorized the Dawes Commission to make investigation and determine the names of such as were entitled to be on the rolls of citizenship and to participate in the division of the tribal lands. This purpose, indicated in the Curtis Act of 1898, was emphasized by the so-called Creek Agreement of 1901, subsequently ratified by the tribe. In that act, the Commission was authorized to investigate the subject, and its action, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, was declared to be final. There was thus constituted a quasi-judicial tribunal whose judgments within the limits of its jurisdiction were only subject to attack for fraud or such mistake of law or fact as would justify the holding that its judgments were voidable. Congress, by this legislation, evidenced an intention to put an end to controversy by providing a tribunal before which those interested could be heard and the rolls authoritatively made up of those who were entitled to participate in the partition of the tribal lands. It was to the interest of all concerned that the beneficiaries of this division should be ascertained. To this end, the Commission was established and endowed with authority to hear and determine the matter.
had to pass with the best information which it could obtain.
When the Commission proceeded in good faith to determine the matter and to act upon information before it, not arbitrarily, but according to its best judgment, we think it was the intention of the act that the matter, upon the approval of the Secretary, should be finally concluded, and the rights of the parties forever settled, subject to such attacks as could successfully be made upon judgments of this character for fraud or mistake.
We cannot agree that the case is within the principles decided in Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, and kindred cases, in which it has been held that, in the absence of a subject matter of jurisdiction, an adjudication that there was such is not conclusive, and that a judgment based upon action without its proper subject being in existence is void. In Scott v. McNeal, it was held that a probate court had no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of a living person and to sell property in administration proceedings after finding that he was in fact dead. In that case, it was held that a sale of the property of a living person by order of the probate court, without notice to him, necessarily deprived him of due process of law by selling his property without notice and by order of a court which had no jurisdiction over him in any manner. The notice in such cases to his next of kin, the court held, was not notice to him, and to make an order undertaking to deprive such person of his property would be to take it by a judgment to which the living person was not a party or privy, and it was held that jurisdiction did not arise from the mere finding of the court that the person whose property was thus taken was in fact deceased. In the present case, the government had jurisdiction over these lands. It had the authority to partition them among the members of the tribe. Shulthis v. McDougal, 170 F. 529, 534; McDougal v. McKay, 237 U. S. 372, 237 U. S. 383.
For this purpose, it determined to divide the lands among those living on April 1, 1899, and constituted a tribunal to investigate the question of membership and consequent right to share in the division. We think the decision of such tribunal, when not impeached for fraud or mistake, conclusive of the question of membership in the tribe, when followed, as was the case here, by the action of the Interior Department confirming the allotment and ordering the patents conveying the lands, which were in fact issued. If decisions of this character may be subject to annulment in the manner in which the government seeks to attack and set aside this one, many titles supposed to be secure would be devested many years after patents issued, upon showing that the decision was a mistaken one. The rule is that such decisions are presumably based upon proper showing, and that they must stand until overcome by full and convincing proof sufficient, within the recognized principles of equity jurisdiction in cases of this character, to invalidate them. Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 121 U. S. 379-381; Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307.
that Thlocco was one of those who were unaccounted for at that time, and the witness could not say whether his name was taken from the old census roll or whether someone appeared and asked for his enrollment; that, after Thlocco's name was listed, there was some investigation upon the question as to whether or not he was living or dead on April 1, 1899, but the Commission would have to be satisfied or have information of some kind that he was living on that date; that the Commission knew that Thlocco was dead in 1901, and it apparently was satisfied that he was living on April 1, 1899; that they would ask town kings and town warriors when they came in and anybody else if they knew this or that about the applicants; that, because of a discrepancy between the ages of Thlocco on the census cards, they must have had some information other than the old census card; that the invariable custom and practice was never to fill out one of the cards until they had some information from some source with reference to the question as to whether the applicant was living or whether he had died prior to April 1, 1899; that the Commission never arbitrarily listed any name; that no name was listed solely because it was on the Roll of 1895, but some particular individual evidence was required outside of that roll; that, before the new rolls were sent to Washington, the clerks and the chairman of the Commission would get together and go over every one of them.
and death proof; that the Commission did not arbitrarily enroll any Creek citizen without evidence, and that, in every single case, if the applicant did not appear, someone who was regarded as reliable appeared for him and gave evidence until the Commissioner was satisfied that he belonged on the roll; that, whenever any question was raised by the Creek Nation or its attorney with reference to the right to enrollment, or for any reason as to whether the applicant was living or dead, there was generally testimony taken in those cases; that, with reference to those people whose names up to March, 1901, had not been accounted for, there were lists of these made and sent to the various town kings, and various inquiries were made that way and report came back; that sometimes the party addressed came in and gave verbal testimony, and if it seemed clear to the Commission it was probably not reduced to writing; that, if there was any question with reference to the matter, it probably was reduced to writing; that the Commission had to be satisfied from the records; that the Commission never passed upon a card until it was completed; that the information may have been picked up piecemeal over a year or two, but the Commission was satisfied that the party was entitled to enrollment, and the records were made up for the purpose of the information of the Commission, and to show such information as was necessary to enable the Commission to reach a decision.
was living or dead on April 1, 1899, before the rolls were recommended to the Secretary of the Interior.
The acting chairman of the Dawes Commission testified that they did not, to his knowledge, ever enroll any man without taking some evidence, information, or eliciting knowledge from some source other than the tribal rolls that he was entitled to be enrolled, and it was never permitted to be done; that the purpose was to find out whether a man was entitled to enrollment, and one of the factors in that determination was whether he died prior or subsequent to April 1, 1899; that he always ascertained that fact before he enrolled the applicant, and always satisfied his mind on that subject by evidence outside of the roll; that every name sent in to the Department of the Interior as a name to be enrolled and which had been enrolled as a member of the Creek Tribe had been investigated by some member of the Commission at some place, and by evidence outside of the rolls, and a determination had been reached that that person was entitled to enrollment; that he undoubtedly satisfied himself from an examination of Thlocco's card whether Thlocco was living on April 1, 1899; that, in securing information, the Commission had the assistance of the best men in the tribes as well as its own field parties; that, when he would take the card, he would have the card and the clerk would have the schedule, and he went over it several times with the clerks, and would find out from the clerk all the information the clerk had with reference to that card several times.
its capital, some days before that date for the purpose of considering and acting upon the agreement, and that there was great activity sometime before the ratification upon the part of the Dawes Commission and its officers and clerks to complete the enrollment of the tribe, and it is shown that Thlocco's enrollment card was made out at Okmulgee on the 24th day of May, 1901 -- the last day before the ratification of the agreement. It is also true that, in the testimony as adduced in this record, there was, as naturally would be the case, a lack of recollection as to the details which attended the enrollment of Thlocco. But there is evidence, to which we have already alluded, showing the practice of the Commission to make inquiries and investigations and to ascertain the facts as to the persons enrolled, and that no person was enrolled without information that was deemed satisfactory at that time. The Commission had before it the tribal rolls of 1890 and 1895. The latter roll was made out some six years before the action of the Commission, and, in the absence of proof of Thlocco's death or some circumstances to give rise to the conclusion that he was not still living, the Commission might well indulge the presumption that he was still alive. Fidelity Mut. Life Assn. v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 185 U. S. 316.
which is essential to the impeachment of the action of the Commission. This action was brought fourteen years after the enrollment of Thlocco, and the allotment to him, based on such enrollment, should not be disturbed except for good and sufficient reasons.
U.S. 95, the Secretary of the Interior, in striking names from the roll of Cherokee citizens, acted after notice and opportunity to be heard.
"if any such citizen has died since that time [April 1, 1899] or may hereafter die before receiving his allotment of lands and distributive share of all the funds of the tribe, the lands and money to which he would be entitled, if living, shall descend to his heirs according to the laws of descent and distribution of the Creek Nation, and be allotted and distributed to them accordingly."
The effect of this provision is to vest title in the heirs by operation of law. Skelton v. Dill, 235 U. S. 206, 235 U. S. 207-208.
"all lands of the said tribe, except as herein provided, shall be allotted among the citizens of the tribe by said Commission so as to give each an equal share of the whole in value, as nearly as may be, in manner following: there shall be allotted to each citizen one hundred and sixty acres of land -- boundaries to conform to the government survey -- which may be selected by him so as to include improvements which belong to him."
While citizens were thus permitted to make their selections for the purpose of retaining improvements, it seems clear that, in case any citizen failed to avail himself of this right, it was permissible for the Commission to make the allotment.
the validity of the Commission's action, and thus to invalidate the title subsequently conveyed by the patent to Thlocco with the approval of the Interior Department.

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