Source: https://www.tmtlawwatch.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:20:41+00:00

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TCPA Watch | Business, legal and policy developments under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
Business, legal and policy developments under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
The Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) has adopted new rules (set forth in its Second Report and Order) to establish a single, nationwide database with information provided by phone companies that will allow callers to determine whether a number has been permanently disconnected and is therefore eligible for reassignment. The FCC also voted to provide a safe harbor from liability for any calls to reassigned numbers caused by database error. The database will be administered by a private company to be determined through a competitive bidding process. The FCC also voted to provide a safe harbor from liability for any calls to reassigned numbers caused by database error. The database will be administered by a private company to be determined through a competitive bidding process.
The reassigned-number database will provide callers with more certainty in ensuring that their records correctly reflect the current subscriber to a particular number. Similar to the databases used to determine if phone numbers have been assigned to cellular subscribers, the new database should greatly ease compliance with the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
A district court in Illinois recently dismissed a lawsuit against Yahoo!, Inc. (“Yahoo”) alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), reversing its previous decision denying summary judgment. In Johnson v. Yahoo! Inc., Case No. 14-cv-2028 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2018), the court granted Yahoo’s motion for reconsideration based on recent interpretations of the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) under the TCPA, particularly the decision in ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (previously discussed here). In its ruling, the district court rejected prior Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) pronouncements and adopted a narrow interpretation of ATDS, holding that only a system that actually dials randomly or sequentially generated numbers can be an ATDS.
Rachel Johnson sued Yahoo in 2014, alleging that Yahoo’s “PC2SMS” texting service was an ATDS and it had used that service to text her in violation of the TCPA. Yahoo’s PC2SMS service caused a text message to be sent to Johnson by pulling her number from a database of stored numbers, an address book, and then automatically sending that number a text message. In an earlier order, the court denied Yahoo’s motion for summary judgment because of disputes over whether PC2SMS was an ATDS under the FCC‘s interpretation of the TCPA. See Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 14 CV 2028, 2014 WL 7005102, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2014). Yahoo asked for reconsideration and for entry of summary judgment based on the holding in ACA Int’l.
In ACA Int’l, the court set aside the FCC’s explanation of what devices qualify as an ATDS. See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 695. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that including a device that “can call from a database of telephone numbers generated elsewhere” within the scope of the definition of an ATDS would be incompatible with a definition of ATDS requiring the device to generate random or sequential numbers to be dialed. Id. at 701–03. The FCC’s lack of clarity about the qualifying functions of an ATDS, in addition to its unreasonably expansive understanding of “capacity,” led the court to “set aside the Commission’s treatment of those matters.” Id. at 703.
The district court in Johnson v. Yahoo! explained that it had previously denied summary judgment to Yahoo because it was bound by the FCC’s definition of an ATDS. However, because ACA Int’l changed the premise upon which the earlier ruling was based, the court concluded that reconsideration was appropriate.
Under the TCPA, the term ATDS is defined as equipment which has the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers, using a random or sequential number generator” and “to dial such numbers”. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). Yahoo’s PC2SMS system did not have the capacity to generate random or sequential numbers to be dialed — it dialed numbers from a stored list. In its order granting reconsideration, the court explained that a device that stores or produces numbers without the use of a random or sequential number generator is not an ATDS. Accordingly, Yahoo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This decision is noteworthy in that it specifically holds that as a result of ACA Int’l, courts are not bound by prior FCC orders from 2003, 2008, and 2012 interpreting what sort of devices qualify as ATDS; a conclusion that has been reached by other courts in recent decisions, including Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2018) (previously discussed here).
Furthermore, the Johnson v. Yahoo! court noted, even if the FCC orders concerning the scope of the term ATDS were not vacated by ACA Int’l, district courts nevertheless may not be bound by FCC’s orders, depending on the outcome in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., No. 17-1705, 2018 WL 3127423, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2018) (previously discussed here), in which the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether the Hobbs Act requires the district court to accept the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA. The Supreme Court decision, which is anticipated next year, is expected to resolve this question and clarify the weight of the FCC’s orders for future TCPA cases.
Sen. John Thune (R-SD), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, and Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA), a member of the Committee and author of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), recently introduced S. 3655, the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (the TRACED Act), to prevent illegal robocall scams. In brief, the bill would extend the statute of limitations for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to pursue robocall scammers and others who intentionally violate the law, impose additional penalties on such violators, require call authentication and blocking technologies, and establish an interagency working group to explore further ways to prosecute robocallers who intentionally violate the law.
direct the FCC to adopt a rule to help protect subscribers from receiving unwanted calls or text messages from a caller using an unauthenticated number.
First, it is bipartisan bill, and could garner support not only in the Senate, but also in the soon-to-be Democratic-controlled House. In addition, both the telecom industry and consumer groups issued positive statements on the bill after its introduction.
Second, we expect Sens. Thune and Markey to re-introduce the bill next Congress and we understand that House Energy & Commerce Committee members have expressed interest in the legislation as well. Sens. Thune and Markey are well-positioned to help pass the bill. Sen. Thune was just elected the Senate Majority Whip for the next Congress, and although he has to give up his chairmanship of the full Commerce Committee because of Senate Republican term-limit rules, he could decide to chair the Committee’s Communications Subcommittee. Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS), the current Communications Subcommittee Chairman, who also cosponsored the bill, is likely to be the next chairman of the full committee. Further, Sen. Markey could play an influential role not only in the Senate, but also with his former House colleagues on the Energy & Commerce Committee.
Finally, scam robocalls and illegal ID spoofing are clearly a serious problem, and the FCC and Congress support multiple solutions to help combat them. In the case of the TRACED Act, Sen. Markey said it “will provide every person with a phone much-needed relief” and will do so using “a simple formula: call authentication, blocking, and enforcement.” As Sen. Thune noted, it also is intended to go after really bad actors and not legitimate businesses. For this reason, it could help legitimate businesses and help clear the way for future legislation providing badly-needed TCPA reforms. Yet, as we noted last spring after the Senate hearing leading to the introduction of the bill, there is risk that legitimate businesses could be adversely affected by the bill and that attempts could be made, especially in the Democratic-controlled House, to amend it to expand rather than reform the TCPA. So, again, businesses should keep a close eye on the legislation.
On November 13, 2018 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) case in which the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s holding that an unsolicited fax sent by a health information provider offering a free e-book must have a commercial goal to be considered an advertisement under the TCPA. This case presents important questions as to the scope of judicial deference to the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) rules under the Hobbs Act, which limits the ability of TCPA litigants to challenge FCC rules in private civil litigation.
In February of this year, the Fourth Circuit held that faxes that offer goods and services, even if the goods and services are free, are “advertisements” under the TCPA, and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the suit. See Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. v. PDR Network, LLC, 883 F.3d 459, 469 (4th Cir. 2018). In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit took issue with the district court treatment of a 2006 Rule promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission the FCC interpreting certain provisions of the TCPA. Pursuant to its statutory authority to “prescribe regulations to implement the requirements” of the TCPA, see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2), the FCC promulgated a rule providing that “facsimile messages that promote goods or services even at no cost . . . are unsolicited advertisements under the TCPA’s definition.” See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991; Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,967, 25,973 (May 3, 2006) (the “2006 Order”). In the district court, plaintiff Carlton & Harris argued that the fax it received was an unsolicited advertisement as defined in the 2006 Order because it promoted a good at no cost. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. v. PDR Network, LLC, No. 3:15-14887, 2016 WL 5799301, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 2016). The district court declined to defer to the 2006 Order, holding that the Hobbs Act did not compel the court to defer to “the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous statute.” Id. The district court further held that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, PDR Network’s fax was still not an advertisement because the rule requires an advertisement to have a “commercial aim,” and no such aim existed. Id. Accordingly, it granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that the jurisdictional command of the Hobbs Act requires a district court to apply FCC interpretations of the TCPA. See Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, 883 F.3d at 469. The district court therefore erred by engaging in Chevron analysis and “declin[ing] to defer” to the FCC rule and issuing a ruling “at odds with the plaining meaning” of the 2006 Order’s text. Id. at 462. Thereafter, PDR Network appealed to the Supreme Court asserting that the Fourth Circuit opinion created a circuit split with the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, all of which require a “commercial” nexus for faxes promoting free goods or services to be considered “advertisements” under the TCPA.
PDR Network’s petition for a writ of certiorari asks the Supreme Court to resolve the Circuit split regarding whether the Hobbs Act prevents courts from engaging in a typical Chevron analysis of FCC Orders interpreting the TCPA and requires automatic deference to the agency’s order where there has been no challenge to the validity of the order. It also asks the Court to resolve whether the FCC’s 2006 Order creates a per se rule that faxes that “promote goods and services even at no costs” are “advertisements” under the TCPA or whether courts can require a commercial nexus to a firms’ business in order for such a fax to fall within the definition of “advertisement.” In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court said it is limiting the certiorari to the question of whether the Hobbs Act required the lower court to accept the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently adopted an expansive definition of the term “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). In Marks v. Crunch San Diego LLC, the panel held that, in light of ACA Int’l, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s landmark decision interpreting certain provisions within the TCPA (previously discussed here) and based on the panel’s own review of the TCPA, the statutory definition of an ATDS includes devices that store telephone numbers to be called, whether or not the device has the ability to generate numbers randomly or sequentially. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit splits from a number of other decisions holding that an essential element of an ATDS is the capacity to generate random or sequential numbers.
The TCPA defines ATDS as “equipment which has the capacity–(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” In ACA Int’l, in brief, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)’s interpretation of two key questions raised by the statutory definition of an ATDS, namely “(i) when does a device have the ‘capacity’ to perform the two enumerated functions; and (ii) what precisely are those functions?” In so doing, the D.C. Circuit created uncertainty as to what features or attributes of a dialing system would bring it within the scope of the ATDS definition.
Plaintiff Jordan Marks filed suit against Crunch San Diego LLC (“Crunch”) after he joined the gym and received three text messages over a period of eleven months. Crunch utilized a system called Textmunication. In this system, phone numbers are captured and stored in one of three ways: an operator of the system can manually enter a phone number into the system; a current or potential customer may respond to a marketing campaign with a text; or a customer may provide a phone number by filling out a consent form on a Textmunication client’s website. A client of Textmunication can then design a marketing campaign and Textmunication will automatically send the desired messages to the stored phone numbers at a time scheduled by the client. When Crunch wants to send a text through Textmunication, a Crunch employee logs into the system, selects the recipient phone numbers, generates the content of the message, and selects the date and time for the message to be sent. The messages are then automatically sent at the appointed time.
Prior to the decision in ACA Int’l, the district court held that Textmunication was not an ATDS because it lacked the present or potential capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator” and granted summary judgment for Crunch. Marks appealed the decision, and following his appeal, ACA Int’l was decided. The Ninth Circuit then reversed, holding that a system could be an ATDS if it has the capacity to store a list of numbers and call those numbers automatically, even if the system does not have the ability to generate random or sequential lists of numbers. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit first reviewed the statutory definition of ATDS as set forth by Congress in 1991 and determined that the provision is ambiguous, and, accordingly, that it was appropriate to look to the context and structure of the statutory scheme. The Ninth Circuit found that Congress intended to regulate devices that make automatic calls, including those devices that make automatic calls from lists of recipients, rather than utilizing a random or sequential number generator. The Ninth Circuit rejected Crunch’s argument that because the system was not fully automatic, it did not qualify as an ATDS, holding that Congress had been clear that it was targeting equipment that could engage in automatic dialing rather than equipment that operated without any human oversight or contact. The Ninth Circuit remanded the matter back to the district court for further proceedings.
In Gonzalez v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, the Court concluded that a predictive dialer that lacks the capacity to generate random or sequential telephone numbers and dial them, but it does include a predictive dialer that has the “present ability” to do so.
In Washington v. Six Continents Hotels, Inc., the Court agreed that ACA Int’l set aside not only the FCC’s 2015 ruling but also the FCC’s historic treatment of which devices qualify as an ATDS. 16-3719, 2018 WL 4092024, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018) The Court then determined that the complaint adequately alleged the use of an ATDS by claiming that the defendant “acquired Plaintiff’s number, stored it in a database connected to its telephonic or computer system . . . [the system] . . . has the capacity to generate random numbers . . . has the capacity to generate sequential numbers . . . [and] has the capacity to store and dial the random or sequential numbers it generates just like it stored and dialed Plaintiff’s number.” Id.
In Heard v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, the Court held that a system that could and did store customer information for at least 24 hours and did not have the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator fell within the definition of ATDS. 16-694, 2018 WL 4028116, at *5-6 & n.2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2018).
In King v. Time Warner Cable Inc., the Second Circuit determined that qualification as an ATDS was limited to those devices that were “capable at the time of use” of performing the functions of an autodialer, absent any modifications to the device’s hardware or software. 849 F.3d 473, 476–77 (2d Cir. 2018).
In Dominguez ex rel Himself v. Yahoo, Inc., the Court held that, absent any evidence that the device had the capacity to generate random or sequential telephone numbers and dial those numbers, the plaintiff failed to show that the text messaging system was an ATDS in light of ACA Int’l. 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2018).
Given the split among courts on how to interpret ATDS, uncertainty will continue to prevail until there is additional clarification, either from the Supreme Court or the FCC. The FCC has requested further comment from the public regarding the interpretation of the TCPA in light of this decision.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina recently rejected a First Amendment challenge to a portion of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). In American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al. v. Sessions, et al., Case No. 5:16-cv-00252-D (E.D.N.C.), a bi-partisan coalition of political groups sued the federal government. The coalition asserted that the TCPA’s prohibition on making auto-dialed calls or texts to cell phones without the requisite consent (the “cell phone ban”) imposes a content-based restriction on speech that does not pass strict scrutiny and is unconstitutionally under-inclusive. (The plaintiffs’ complaint was previously discussed here.) The government defended the TCPA’s constitutionality.

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