Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/86/86mass321.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:43:35+00:00

Document:
Present: Bigelow, C.J., Dewey, Metcalf, Merrick, & Chapman, JJ.
One who has been appointed under the laws of another state to be the guardian of a child whose legal domicil is in that state, has no absolute right to the custody of the person of his ward in this commonwealth; but his office of guardian will be considered by the court as an important element in determining to whom the custody of the child shall be granted.
The appointment in this commonwealth of a guardian over a child whose legal domicil is in another state, and who has a guardian appointed under the laws of that state, does not deprive this court of the power, in its discretion, to decree the custody of the child to the foreign guardian.
respondent, who is the child's aunt, brought him to this commonwealth in 1856, with the consent of the petitioner; and, in June 1858, she was appointed as his guardian, without the knowledge of the petitioner, by the judge of probate of Berkshire county, where she resided. The present writ was brought by the petitioner for the purpose of asserting his right to the custody of the person of the child.
At the hearing before the chief justice, the respondent contended that the guardianship in Illinois could have no such effect or operation in this commonwealth as to entitle the petitioner to claim, on the facts stated, the right to the custody of the person of the child; and that if under other circumstances the petitioner could have such right, it was defeated by the appointment of the respondent as guardian in this commonwealth, by virtue of which she had the right to the custody of the person of the child; and these questions were reserved for the determination of the whole court.
The case was argued in September 1861.
M. Wilcox, for the petitioner.
J. Branning, for the respondent.
and preserving to every state the exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory, and avoiding the confusion and conflict of rights and remedies which would ensue from attempting to give extra-territorial effect to the varying laws of different countries. Statuta suo cluduntur territorio, nec ultra terrilorium disponunt. Every nation has an exclusive right to regulate persons and property within its jurisdiction according to its own laws, and the principles of public policy on which its own government is founded. It results from these principles, that persons exercising offices and trusts with which they are clothed by virtue of the laws of a particular state or country cannot undertake to transfer their power or capacity to act, so as to control persons or property situated beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the government or sovereignty from which their authority is derived. An administrator appointed under the laws of a foreign state cannot act as such in this commonwealth. Nor, for like reasons, can a guardian appointed by virtue of the statutes of another state exercise any authority here over the person or property of his ward. His rights and powers are strictly local, and circumscribed by the jurisdiction of tbe government which clothed him with the office. Story Confl. Laws, § 499. Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 153. Kraft v. Wickey, 4 Gill & Johns. 322. Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 C1.& Fin. 42, 113, 145. So far, therefore, as the claim of the petitioner to the custody of the child in the present case rests on a supposed rightful authority to control his person in this commonwealth, by virtue of his appointment as guardian in the State of Illinois, it is not supported either on principle or authority. He cannot assert his tutorial power, de jure, in our courts or within our territory.
the laws of another state as an important element in determining with whom the custody of the child is to continue. It wonld not do to say that a foreign guardian has no claim to the care or control of the person of his ward in this commonwealth. If such were the rule, a child domiciled out of the state, who was sent hither for purposes of education, or came within the state by stealth, or was brought here by force or fraud, might be emancipated from the control of his rightful guardian, duly appointed in the place of his domicil, and thus escape or be taken out of all legitimate care and custody. But in such cases the foreign guardian would not be regarded here as a stranger or intruder. His appointment in another state as guardian of an infant, with powers and duties similar to those which are by our laws vested in guardians over the persons of their wards, would entitle him to ask that the comity of friendly states having similar laws and usages should be so far recognized and exerted as to surrender to him the infant, so that he might be again restored to his full rights and powers over him, by removing him to the place of his domicil. And if it should appear that such surrender and restoration would not debar the infant from any personal rights or privileges to which he might be entitled under our laws, and would be conducive to his welfare and promote his interests, it would be the duty of the court to award to the foreign guardian the custody of the person. This is the doctrine substantially stated by Lord Langdale in Johnstone v. Beattie, ubi supra, and confirmed in a subsequent judgment in the' case of Stuart v. Moore, in the House of Lords, as reported in 4 Law Times, (N. S.) 382.
remained an infant, or prevent his being removed from the Commonwealth by the guardian appointed in the place of his domicil, if the interests and welfare of the ward rendered such removal expedient or necessary. No doubt, so long as the child continues within this jurisdiction, the guardian appointed in the courts of this state would have the exclusive right to the custody of his person. But the decree of the probate court does not deprive this court of the power to adjudicate and determine the question of the proper custody of the child as between a domestic guardian and one appointed in the place of the domicil of the infant. The jurisdiction of this court to decide, on habeas corpus or other proper process, concerning the care and custody of infants, is paramount, and cannot be taken away by any decree of an inferior tribunal. Commonwealth v. Briggs, 16 Pick. 203 . The result is, that neither of the parties to the present proceeding can assert or maintain an absolute right to the permanent care and custody of the infant who is now before the court. But it is for this court to determine, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, having regard to the welfare and permanent good of the child as a predominant consideration, to whose custody he shall be committed. The case must therefore stand for future disposition.

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