Source: http://www.torttalk.com/2017/03/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:32:15+00:00

Document:
In his recent decision in the case of Estate of Marsh v. Lizza, No. 2016-CV-2812 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 1, 2017 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrance R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Plaintiff’s attempt to substitute another party in a reissued Writ of Summons without the consent of the opposing parties or the court.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff commenced this wrongful death and survival action against her sister alleging negligent conduct which allegedly caused their mother’s death on July 28, 2013.
The initial Writ of Summons and the three (3) ensuing reissued Writs of Summons identified the mother’s estate as the named Plaintiff. Without securing the Defendant’s consent or seeking leave of court, the Plaintiff changed the identity of the named Plaintiff sua sponte on the fourth reissued Writ by substituting himself individually for his mother’s estate.
The Defendant-sister filed Preliminary Objections asserting that a party cannot substitute a different party as the Plaintiff under Pa. R.C.P. 1033 without first obtaining the consent of all parties or leave of court. The Plaintiff’s sister sought to strike the amended Writ of Summons that was served upon her as well as the Complaint that was subsequently filed.
In reply, the Plaintiff contended that the acceptance and filing of the amended Writ of Summons by the Lackawanna County Clerk of Judicial Records constituted approval by the court under Rule 1033. The Plaintiff also asserted that the Complaint could substitute a new Plaintiff without the Defendant’s consent or leave of court since the two (2) year statute of limitation period had not yet expired due to the operation of the “discovery rule” which allegedly extended that limitation.
Judge Nealon rejected the Plaintiff’s contention and sustained the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections. In so ruling, the court noted that the Clerk of Judicial Records serves a purely ministerial, administrative role with respect to civil filings and lack the authority to evaluate the merits of a litigant’s pleadings or to decline to accept and process a party’s filing. Since the Clerk of Judicial Records did not possess or exercise any judicial powers, the court found that the Clerk did not have any authority under any statute or rule of court to grant leave of court to amend the pleadings under Rule 1033 in order to substitute a different named Plaintiff.
Judge Nealon also ruled that, inasmuch as the two (2) year statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death and survival actions under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §5524(2) may not be extended by the discovery rule, the Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed after the two (2) year statute of limitations had expired such that the Plaintiff was not at liberty to substitute a new party in that pleading absent the consent of all parties or leave of court.
Accordingly, the court ruled that the amended Writ of Summons and the Complaint filed in this case were both nullities for substituting a different party and, therefore, the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections seeking to strike those pleadings was sustained.
Anyone wishing to read this Opinion by Judge Nealon may click this LINK.
UPDATE: Judge Nealon's decision was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on February 3, 2018 in a Non-Precedential Decision that can be viewed HERE.
A plaintiff's personal injury case can go off the rails when the plaintiff's medical experts offer opinions that conflict with one another. This may typically arise where one expert for the plaintiff opines that a particular injury was caused by the subject accident and yet another expert questions whether the injury is indeed related.
Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702, titled "Testimony by Expert Witnesses," it is provided, that "a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion" if the expert's specialized knowledge is beyond that of a layperson and such knowledge will assist the jury to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.
Generally speaking, the admissibility of expert opinion is a matter left largely within the broad discretion of the trial court, as in Bolus v. United Penn Bank, 525 A.2d 1215, 1225 (Pa.Super. 1987).
Where a plaintiff's experts conflict with one another, the plaintiff is likely to be faced with a defense motion in limine seeking to preclude each expert's opinion on the basis that allowing such evidence would only serve to confuse, and not educate, the jury.
Notably, in the separate scenario where the defense produces conflicting expert reports in a civil litigation matter, the defense may still be permitted to proceed with the expert testimony as the defense does not bear the burden of proof at trial. The remedy for the plaintiff in this regard is to point out to the jury the conflicting nature of the opinions of the defense experts in an effort to discredit the defense.
Under what has become known as the Mudano rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mudano v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit, 289 Pa. 51, 60, 137 A. 104, 107 (1927), has held that the testimony of a plaintiff's medical experts must be reasonably consistent with one another such that, with respect to the plaintiff's experts, "there must be no absolute contradiction in their essential conclusions." The court further stated that a plaintiff has a "duty to furnish consistent, and not inconsistent, advice—otherwise the jury would be confused rather than instructed."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the Mudano rule in case of Brannan v. Lankenau Hospital, 417 A.2d 196 (Pa. 1980). In Brannan, the court cited Mudano for the proposition "that a plaintiff's case will fail when the testimony of his two expert witnesses is so contradictory that the jury is left with no guidance on the issue, see also Menarde v. Philadelphia Transportation, 103 A.2d 681 (Pa. 1954) (The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applies Mudano rule to the plaintiff's expert reports); see also Halper v. Jewish Family and Children Services of Great of Philadelphia, 963 A.2d 1282, 1287 (Pa. 2009) (The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applies the Mudano rule to the plaintiff's expert reports).
Even if a plaintiff attempts to supplement his discovery responses to only identify one of the two conflicting as the only expert the plaintiff will call at trial, the Mudano rule will be implicated when the defense cross-examines the plaintiff's expert with respect to the separate, contradictory opinion of the plaintiff's other expert.
In such a case, the jury would still be faced with conflicting opinions by two experts from the plaintiff's side of the matter, i.e., the very situation that the Mudano rule holds will cause the plaintiff's case to fail. The defense argument will be that the plaintiff should not be allowed to put the court, the parties, the attorneys and the jurors through the time and expense of the trial by simply choosing to identify one expert and ignoring the contradictory opinions of his or her other expert. Such evidentiary gamesmanship should not be countenanced by the courts where the purpose of a civil trial is get to the truth of the claims and defenses asserted.
The courts of Pennsylvania have rejected attempts by plaintiffs to have the Mudano rule applied to defense experts that conflict with one another. The courts have reasoned that the rule should not apply to the defense case because the defense does not bear the burden of proof at trial.
Plaintiffs may cite to the case of Smith v. German, 253 A.2d 107 (Pa. 1959), in support of an argument that the defense must produce consistent evidence in an effort to disprove causation between an accident and a plaintiff's alleged injuries.
However such an argument has been rejected by more recent Pennsylvania appellate court decisions. In Kennedy v. Sell, 816 A.2d 1153, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2003), the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that its "research indicates that Smith has never been cited in subsequent cases for the proposition that in all cases where a defendant challenges the causation element of a plaintiff's case, that he must produce independent evidence of his own. In fact, we can find no case citing to Smith that applies the case to the defendant. In large part, Smith, as it may apply to a defendant, appears to be an anomaly limited to the facts of that case."
Rather, in personal injury matters, the defense has no burden of proof on the issue of causation and, therefore, the Mudano is inapplicable to the defense evidence. As emphasized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Kennedy case, when there is some evidence of other causes of a plaintiff's alleged injuries, the burden of proving these other causes does not shift to the defense. To the contrary, as confirmed by the Kennedy court, absent special circumstances, a defendant carries no burden of proof in a civil litigation matter.
Stated otherwise, "a defendant may choose to present no evidence and may simply argue that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof. A jury may find for the defendant in such a situation." The Kennedy court also pointed out that the Smith decision "does not require a defendant ... to present independent medical testimony specifically linking the alleged injuries to another cause."
Moreover, it has otherwise generally been held as a principle of Pennsylvania law that an opinion offered by the party, i.e., the defendant, not having the burden of proof need not be as precise as an opinion offered by the party with the burden of proof, as in Neal v. Lu, 530 A.2d 103, 109-110 (Pa. Super. 1987).
It has generally been held by the courts of Pennsylvania that the effect of a conflict between the testimony of different experts called by a party is in reality a question of the sufficiency of the evidence.
In the case of conflicting expert opinions presented by a defendant not having the burden of proof, the courts will allow the issue to proceed to the jury for the jury's consideration as to what weight to be applied to such contradictory evidence.
However, conflicting expert opinions on the plaintiff's side of the case will often prove fatal. Such evidence fails to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof, renders the plaintiff's case speculative and, if the case were allowed to proceed to verdict, would cause the jury to engage in impermissible guesswork on the important issues presented in the case.
In the case of The Hartford Ins. Grp. v. Kamara, No. 976 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Feb. 10, 2017 Olson, Solano, Fitzgerald, JJ.)(Op. by Olson, J.), the court ruled that a a workers' compensation carrier could pursue claim against third-party tortfeasors by asserting the claim on behalf of the injured employee to establish the tortfeasors' liability to the injured employee, as opposed to bringing a subrogation claim.
The court rejected the argument by the defendants that the Complaint should have been dismissed because appellant was attempting to assert subrogation directly against third-party tortfeasors in violation of the Workers' Compensation Act which provided that a right of action against tortfeasors remained in the injured employee such that an employer's/insurer's right of subrogation had to be achieved through an action brought in the name of the injured employee or joined by the injured employee.
The Superior Court held that the worker’s compensation carrier properly brought the action on behalf of the injured employee to establish the tortfeasors' liability to her. The Court reasoned that the Workers' Compensation Act did not require an injured employee to be party to a suit for an employer or insurer to be able to assert its subrogation rights, but merely required the suit to be brought on behalf of or in the name of the injured employee.
Anyone wishing to review this Opinion online may click HERE.
Source: “Digests of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 28, 2017).
A lot of attorneys glaze over the "Question Presented" section of a brief and, in doing so, miss an opportunity for the court to read their client's argument as set forth in a concise and forceful format that foreshadows the conclusion desired.
It is a waste to simply state in the "Question Presented" that the motion at issue should be granted or denied.
Always begin your "Question Presented" with a phrasing that suggests your position should carry the day. For example, for the movant, the "Question Presented" should be positively phrased as, "Whether the motion of the defendant, John Smith, to compel should be granted where..." and vice versa for the non-moving party.
Then, as concisely as possible, include in the "Question Presented" the pertinent facts of your case as applied to the rule of law in a manner that favors your position.
In the end, the "Question Presented" should be a detailed statement of your legal position in a question format that suggestively asks whether your position should be accepted by the court.
Also, take the language in your "Question Presented" and mirror it in the Conclusion section of your brief as very similar, but not identical, restatement of your ­client's position. In other words, copy your Question Presented into your Conclusion section but change it from a question to a statement in favor of your position and polish it off with a specific statement of the relief requested.

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