Source: https://louisvilledivorce.typepad.com/info/relocation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:43:10+00:00

Document:
A custody determination is separate from parenting time. A modification of parenting time, even one that changes the child's primary residence, does not alter joint custody. Two affidavits are not required for a motion to change primary residence. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting mother from relocating the children and granting father primary residence of the children.
Father appeals order granting Mother leave to relocate with Child to Washington State, contending such an Order is not in Child’s best interests.
After marrying in Texas in May 2009, Couple moved to Kentucky and had their only Child there. Both Mother and Father have substance abuse issues and bipolar disorder. Multiple EPO’s were taken out, 2 with Dad as Petitioner and 1 with Mom as Petitioner. In May 2011, Father’s time-sharing with Child was terminated due to positive drug test, but it was re-established in September 2011. In November 2011, they divorced and Mother was granted sole custody of Child. FC ordered a time-sharing evaluation from social worker and the report was incorporated with FC’s order allowing Mother to relocate with Child.
Father argued that social worker’s opinions must be limited because they cannot be related to psychological analysis or credibility of the witnesses and that she acted only as a conduit for the introduction of hearsay testimony. CA held first that the social worker was qualified to give the testimony she did, but that, more importantly, her opinion was only a fraction of the evidence relied upon by FC in granting the relocation request. FC relied upon the testimony of family and friends that, among other things, Mother has no connections to Fayette County; that during their time together, Mother and Father moved repeatedly and there was no real connection to Fayette County for Father either; that neither party has an income; and that both parties have ongoing mental and emotional health issues. CA also held that these facts demonstrated it was in Child’s best interests to relocate with Mother.
Mother appealed from FC’s denial of her motion to relocate with the parties’ three minor children.
Divorce proceedings were initiated in June, 2004. In December, 2004 FC entered an order that the parties would share joint legal custody of their children. A bifurcated divorce decree entered in August, 2005 dissolved the marriage but reserved all other issues, including custody, with all temporary orders to remain in effect pending resolution. An agreed order entered March 21, 2007 stated that the parties would have joint legal custody, with mother the primary residential custodian.
On November 1, 2007 mother filed a motion to relocate to Virginia with the children. Father’s counsel stated his objection at the hearing on November 13, 2007. The court set a hearing date for February 7, 2008 and appointed a guardian ad litem.
Father filed a motion on January 30, 2008 for review of parenting time which was set to be heard the same date as the hearing on relocation. The GAL filed her report on February 4, 2008 stating that she did not believe the relocation was in the best interest of the children. On February 6, 2008 mother filed a motion for court to summarily grant her relocation because father had not complied with Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003) and KRS 403.340 and 403.350. This was also set to be heard on February 7, 2008.
On February 7, 2008, father filed a motion for a change of custody with two affidavits. At the hearing, the judge requested briefs on the legal issues and gave mother an opportunity to file a response to father’s motion for change of custody.
Each party filed a memorandum and on June 2, 2008, the court held an unrecorded hearing in chambers. On August 11, 2008, the judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of law that father had submitted sufficient evidence of emotional harm to the children, requiring a full evidentiary hearing under KRS 403.340(2).
On October 23, 2008, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008) which specifically addressed relocation issues and changing motion procedures previously mandated by Fenwick.
Before the hearing on October 31, 2008 father filed a motion to plead in the alternative for modification of visitation/timesharing to name him the residential parent, citing Pennington. The FC decided Pennington applied and that the best interests of the child standard applied to motions for relocation. On November 13, 2008, mother filed a motion for sole custody with no affidavits.
On January 6, 2009, the FC heard the remainder of the evidence and granted father’s oral motion to deny mother’s change of custody motion. Both parties filed position statements at the request of the court.
On March 30, 2009, FC issued an order denying mother’s motion to relocate and reserved all issues for future rulings.
Mother filed an appeal of the March 30 decision which was dismissed as premature because of unresolved reserved issues. The FC then entered an amended opinion and order on December 22, 2009, denying all other motions, maintaining the status quo, making no custody changes and stating the order was final and appealable. Mother appealed from the March 30, 2009 and December 22, 2008 orders.
CA did not find the three month period an unreasonable time in which to file father’s motion and cited Fowler v. Sowders, 151 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. App. 2004) which held that allegations of serious physical or emotional endangerment to a child were not required to support a motion for a change of custody.
The CA found no error in failing to follow Fenwick’s procedural mandates because Fenwick is not applicable to this case.
Mother further argued that FC retroactively applied Pennington and erred by the retroactive application of new law to substantive rights. CA disagreed distinguishing between statutes and regulations and Pennington, a judicial decision. In cases involving new judicial precedent, the CA said “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” Commonwealth v. Alexander, 5 S.W.3d 104, 106 (Ky. 1999). Pennington did not affect mother’s substantive rights; it merely clarified statutory procedure for challenging a motion for relocation. Furthermore, no decision or event had occurred to which Pennington could have been applied retroactively. CA found that FC did not err in determining that Pennington was applicable.
Mother argued that the FC did not find give appropriate weight to GAL’s report. CA did not find that FC clearly erred when it found relocation was not in the best interest of the children.
TC awarded primary physical custody of Child to Dad. Mom claimed that TC's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and that TC improperly considered her relocations as a factor in its decision.
The parties were married thirteen years when Mom filed for divorce in May 2004 and Dad moved to the next town a month later. A dissolution decree was entered on June 8, 2005 but custody, visitation, and child support were reserved. A few months after the parties filed for divorce but before entry of the decree parties entered an agreed order on child support Custody and parenting time was never formalized, but the parties shared almost equal time but Mom functioned as the primary residential parent. Both parties adhered to the informal custody agreement until April 2005, when Mom removed Child from school and relocated to Iowa without notifying Dad or TC. Dad filed an emergency motion for temporary custody shortly thereafter, at which time the parties were awarded temporary joint custody. The order provided for nearly equal time sharing and reasonable telephonic communication between the parties and Child. On June 28, 2005, TC awarded joint custody with primary physical custody to Dad, concluding that Mom's unilateral decision to remove Child from school and relocate to Iowa without notifying Dad disregarded the child's best interests. CA affirmed TC, holding that TC was in the best position to make a custody determination and the decision was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.
Mom argued that it was unreasonable and unfair in light of the evidence for TC to name Dad primary residential custodian when she functioned as Child's primary caregiver throughout her life. Additionally, she argued that it was erroneous for TC to conclude the relocation to Iowa was not motivated by a desire to improve living conditions. Though Mom attempts to characterize TC’s determinations as two distinct errors, CA found that the bottom line is that the finding regarding her relocation to Iowa was simply part of the consideration in determining that it was in Child’s best interest for Dad to be her primary residential custodian.
As TC in this case properly noted, its custody ruling was not entered in response to a motion to modify a permanent order of custody; rather, it was actually the custody determination. As such, TC properly considered the standard required by KRS 403.270, the custody determination statute, which states that custody shall be determined in accordance with the best interests of the child giving each parent equal consideration . The statutory guidelines of KRS 403.270 do not include a definition of the best interests of the child standard; however, KRS 403.270(2) requires TC to consider all relevant factors and provides a list of non-exclusive, demonstrative factors to be considered in custodial determinations. Citing Fenwick as authority, Mom argued that as the primary caregiver in Child's life up until the final custody decree, she was entitled to relocate with her child and that Dad was required to show that the move seriously endangered the child, and that the harm from change of custody to him would be outweighed by the good. However, SC in Fenwick did not consider that relocation had been raised prior to entry of the final custody decree, and thus applied KRS 403.340, the modification of custody statute. In so doing, SC erred because it did not distinguish between a temporary custody order and a custody decree. The effect of relocation by a parent with the child on custody and visitation must be viewed in light of whether relocation occurs pre- or post-decree.
order; such decisions are "pendente lite," "interlocutory," or "non-final." The trial judge's "final" decision about custody is the custody decree. Finality in this context is different than in most others, however, as the decision, while immediately appealable, is subject to modification at a later time under KRS 403.340.
I	n making the final custody decree, TC must apply KRS 403.270, which has a best interests standard. Consequently, most of the discussion in Fenwick about the standard to be applied to modification of custody must be disregarded in this case, as must any rule that appears to give a preference on relocation to a primary residential parent. Here, TC correctly applied the best interests standard, and while Mom obviously disagrees with its findings, this Court cannot depart from them unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous or TC abused its discretion in applying the law.
Though TC stated the relocation of Mom was a substantial factor in the custodial determination, the record also indicates that TC placed significant weight on Child's strong relationship with her father, frequent interaction with the father's extended family, and adjustment within the community. Mom's unilateral decision to disregard these substantial components of Child's life supports the conclusion that it is in Child's best interests that the Dad function as primary residential custodian.
Although Mom did relocate with the child, this case is not about the typical relocation questions of whether the relocation warrants a change of custody or of timesharing. Since this was the actual custody determination, TC had a clear directive to make its decision based on the best interests standard set forth in KRS 403.270. After reviewing the record, it is clear TC's decision was supported by substantial evidence. While some of the evidence conflicted with TC's conclusions, and a different trial court or a reviewing appellate court might disagree with TC, the standard on appellate review requires a great deal of deference both to its findings of fact and discretionary decisions. CA affirmed .
Frances v. Frances involves relocation issues arising prior to the entry of a final custody decree. These were also the facts in Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003). The Kentucky Supreme Court now recognizes that the effect of relocation must be viewed in light of whether it occurs pre- or post-decree. In making a final custody decree, the trial court must apply a best interest standard and there is no rule giving a preference on relocation to a primary residential parent.
The party seeking modification of custody or visitation/timesharing is the party who has the burden of bringing the motion before the court. A residential parent who wishes only to change the visitation/timesharing due to his relocating with the child may bring the motion to modify visitation/timesharing under KRS 403.320. If that parent believes that the relocation will make a joint custody arrangement unworkable, then the motion should be made for a change of custody from joint to sole under KRS 403.340.
Likewise, when one parent indicates an interest in relocating with the child, the parent opposed need not wait, but could file his own motion. A parent who has equal or nearly equal visitation/timesharing and who wants to prevent a child’s relocation with the other parent, but does not want to change custody from joint to sole, could bring a motion for a change of visitation/timesharing under KRS 403.320. This could result in a designation of that parent as primary residential parent if the child is not allowed to relocate because it is not in his best interest to do so. If that same parent wants to change custody from joint to sole custody to him, he must being the motion for a change of custody and proceed under KRS 403.340.
Both parents may need to bring motions if their wishes differ. For example, if the residential mother makes a motion to modify visitation/timesharing to allow her to relocate with the child, the father may need to make a motion for modification of visitation/timesharing to name him as the residential parent, which would prevent relocation of the child. Or, the father could make a motion to be named sole custodian, and if he could meet his statutory burden, there would be a change of custody which would also defeat the relocation. If neither party wishes to change the nature of the custody, and the court determines that it is in the best interest of the child to relocate with the mother, the father’s visitation/timesharing would be modified to an accommodation as reasonable as possible given the distance of the relocation and the means of the parties.
To the extent this Court’s prior decision in Fenwick and its progeny is inconsistent with this Opinion, it is overruled.
It appears we could sing “Ding Dong Fenwick’s Dead!” but both Opinions talk about overruling Fenwick to the extent it is inconsistent. It will take some digging to determine what part of Fenwick is still alive. Nonetheless, it is a case we no longer have to worry about.
Justice Noble was joined by Justices Abramson, Schroder, and Scott. Justices Cunningham and Venters agree with most of the majority Opinion, but dissent because the trial court gave insufficient analysis to the effect of relocation on the child, a deficiency in large part due to the Court’s failure to provide guidance to trial judges. Factors a trial court should consider include: (1) the age of the child; (2) the purpose of the move; (3) the distance of the move; (4) the worthiness of the move for the child when balanced with any negative effects; (5) the improvement of the child’s standard of living; (6) the physical hardship of travel for the child on visitation with the non-custodial parent; (7) the presence or absence of extended family for the child at the new location versus the existing location; (8) the motivation of the non-custodial parent for objecting to the move (i.e., is it genuine concern for the child or simply a way of punishing the former spouse?); (9) whether the non-custodial parent has turned down career advancement opportunities by not moving away in order to stay close to the child; (10) the possibility and plausibility of the non-custodial parent following the child; and (11) the number of times the custodial parent has moved.
Justice Venters' separate dissent espoused the belief that the court should have adopted or promoted a requirement that joint custodians discuss a proposed relocation in advance.
It's a rare day when one can agree with both majority opinions and both dissenting opinions. Our high court tackled the thorny issue of relocation very well.
Full digests of both cases to follow.
Frances v. Frances, but the real discussion of the law is in Pennington v. Marcum. Digest to follow.
Pennington v. Marcum, decided today by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Congratulations to Martha Rosenberg! I dreaded reading Justice Cunningham’s dissent, only to find him cite the “prestigious” AAML and our model relocation act as guidelines that could have given courts greater guidance than best interests. A good day! We will post more on the case shortly and thereafter post a full digest.
HB383 was filed today with posting waived. It should be online tomorrow and we'll link to it when available. It will be heard in the house judiciary committee in Frankfort on Wednesday, January 30, 2008. It mirrors with few exceptions the AAML Model Relocation Act, available here.
Update: HB383 is online here.
"Child Custody. Issues in this marriage dissolution proceeding relate to the trial court's award of primary physical custody of the child to the father, and the effect of the mother's relocation out-of-state on the determination of the child's best interest."
"Child Custody. Issues relate to the denial of a motion to modify a custody agreement based upon the residential custodian's relocation out of state with the child."
Here's the link where the oral arguments will be online.
Last month we reported here on a "not to be published" relocation case in which the Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review. Now there is another. While we still fret about whether to digest "not to be published' decisions, it certainly seems worthwhile to do so for those which are being entertained on discretionary review.
Whether the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous or the trial judge abused his discretion in a child custody dispute. The Court held no, the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence and he did not abuse his discretion.
One child was born during the marriage of the parties. The wife filed for divorce, and the parties entered an agreed order regarding child support obligations and custody schedule. After learning that the wife had removed the child from school and moved to Iowa, with her boyfriend, the husband filed an emergency motion for temporary custody. After a hearing was held, the trial court granted primary physical custody to the husband. The wife filed a motion to amend, alter, or vacate the judgment, which was denied. The wife appealed.
Under CR 52.01, the trial court’s findings of fact cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous or the trial judge abused his discretion. KRS 403.270 requires that the best interests of the child standard for determining custody. The record demonstrates that the lower court fully considered the best interests of the child. The wife separated the child from everything that was familiar and stable in her life, especially the on-going and consistent relationship with her father. While the wife offered excuses for her abrupt departure, she failed to use any of the readily available resources in Kentucky to protect women from threatening and potentially harmful situations with a disgruntled former spouse. The trial court was in the best position to determine what is best for the child. Accordingly, the Court found no abuse of discretion.
It is difficult enough to keep track of the "to be published" decisions. Yet here is the digest of this "not to be published" decision as the Kentucky Supreme Court has accepted discretionary review.
1.	Whether lower court erred by disregarding the findings of the Domestic Relations Commissioner and by making a decision contrary to the DRC’s recommendations without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court held no, the court did not err.
2.	Whether the lower court erred in failing to consider the best interests of the child standard. The Court held no, the lower court did not err.
In January 2001 the parties agreed to share joint custody of their one child, with the mother having physical custody. In 2002 the mother married and moved to West Virginia, but the father continued his weekly visits. In July 2004 the mother moved to Virginia, six hours away from the father’s home. The father then filed a motion to modify custody, seeking physical custody of the child.
The Domestic Relations Commissioner held a full hearing and recommended that the father have physical custody. The mother filed exceptions to the DRC’s recommendations. The circuit court considered the recommendations and heard oral arguments, and then sustained the mother’s exceptions and restored physical custody to her. The father appealed.
First, CR 53.06(2) does not mandate a full evidentiary hearing by the circuit court, it only requires an opportunity for oral argument. Therefore, the court properly reviewed the DRC’s report and considered arguments of counsel.
Second, KRS 403.340 (3) outlines the factors that the court must consider prior to modifying custody. Said statute also refers to the best interests of the child analysis set out in KRS 403.270 (2). The circuit court noted in its order that the child flourished in her new setting in Virginia. The court also noted that it would not deprive the mother of custody just because she moved farther away from the father. The Court found that there was substantial evidence to support a finding in favor of the mother.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court’s order.
Ben Stevens at The South Carolina Family Law Blog, posts a nice online link for a useful resource in move away cases.
One of the (many) issues that the Court considers in such cases is the quality of the schools in each location.
Fortunately, it is now easier than ever to find out necessary information about educational institutions located far away, thanks to Yahoo Real Estate. This free service allows you to research both public and private schools in any state by city name or even by zip code.
The information provided includes contact information, enrollment, student to teacher ratio, and location on an interactive map. There are also reports available on the school's test scores, students, and teachers. This resource can prove extremely helpful as a starting point when a child's education is at issue, and I urge you to check it out.
Editor's note: This case is now final, and we will update post with SW3d cite when available.
Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to modify the custody decree regarding one parent’s wish to relocate with the children. The Court held no, the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
1)	Whether a parent, who spends more time with child than the other parent, can claim the status of primary residential parent for purposes of determining the standard to apply to a motion to relocate. The Court held no, the parent cannot claim such status.
2)	What standard is to be applied to motions to relocate, if the motion is filed less than two years since the original custody agreement. The Court held that the parent wanting to relocate must show that the present environment endangered the child’s physical and emotional well-being.
The Circuit Court ordered that the motion for modification of custody did not meet the requirements for the court to hold a hearing under KRS 403.340, and denied the motion. Brockman appealed.
COMMENT: The Court of Appeals is almost begging the Kentucky legislature to address relocation. We have promoted consideration of the AAML's model relocation act here.

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