Source: https://casetext.com/case/al-el-corp-v-rapaport
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:34:50+00:00

Document:
Edward F. Keenan and Francis J. Sypher for landlord.
Samuel Goldberg for tenants and undertenants.
This is a summary proceeding to dispossess a statutory tenant from business space, brought under subdivision 5 of section 1410 of the Civil Practice Act and paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of section 8 of the Business Rent Law of the State of New York (L. 1945, ch. 314, as amd.). The landlord contends that the leased space is being and has been continuously used and occupied for illegal purposes and for illegal manufacturing in contravention of (1) section 270 Lab. of the Labor Law and, (2) in contravention of the certificate of occupancy, and accordingly, of section C26-185.0 of the Administrative Code of City of New York.
There is no record of any violation on the premises by the department of housing and buildings, or by any department of the city or State. The tenants for upwards of seven years have done manufacturing of clothing on the demised premises. They are at present statutory tenants, the leases having expired on January 31, 1948.
It is true that the lease provides in paragraph 2 that "the tenant shall use and occupy demised premises for the sale of ready-to-wear and for no other purpose." However, the evidence shows that the landlord had knowledge and notice that the tenants have continuously used the premises for manufacturing. It permitted the installation of machines, about seven years ago, together with the necessary electrical work and gas company connections. The landlord's representatives and agents as well as the superintendent of the building have visited and inspected the premises and saw manufacturing being done there during this seven-year period. Several other tenants in the building have been continuously and are now engaged in manufacturing.
The landlord contends that there can be no waiver or estoppel where the premises are being unlawfully used for manufacturing (even though no violation has been placed on the premises by any city or State department) and relies upon 2 West 32 St. Corp. v. Levine ( supra); Kennedy v. Nelson (70 N.Y.S.2d 211); Revon Realty Corp. v. Fixler (66 N.Y.S.2d 30); Bakter v. Mimmo ( 196 Misc. 245), and Fifth Ave. Equities v. Kriesberg (80 N.Y.S.2d 455). In the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice EDER in 2 West 32 St. Corp. v. Levine ( supra), he pointed out that the Appellate Division, in Sol Apfel, Inc., v. Kocher ( supra), held that the waiver by the landlord, insofar as the use of the premises for manufacturing was concerned, was an effective and binding waiver.
On the question of waiver, it appears that the last case is Parisi v. Nagler (N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1952, p. 1766, col. 3), wherein the Appellate Term, First Department, unanimously affirmed a final order for the tenant, dismissing the landlord's petition on the merits. It is to be specially noted that in that case the department of housing and buildings did place a violation on the premises for being used for manufacturing purposes and the landlord did give notice to the tenant demanding that he cure the violation.
It is conceded that the manufacturing of clothing as such is not unlawful. Can a landlord, who shuts his eyes to the fact that the tenant has continuously engaged in manufacturing for seven years, suddenly wake up and come into court, claiming "clean hands" and ask the court to evict a tenant, without showing that he faces any imminent threat or prosecution by any public authority and, in fact, does not show that there is even a violation by any city or State department? Assuming a violation had been filed, the tenant would be no greater a culprit than the landlord, and, as between the two, equitable principles and justice would appear to favor the tenant on the facts in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, this court finds a final order in favor of the tenant, dismissing the landlord's petition on the merits.

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