Source: http://www.annalsofhealthlaw.com/annalsofhealthlaw/vol__24_issue_1?pg=125
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:25:19+00:00

Document:
of § 1983.243 This difference affects § 1983 cases, but not the Supremacy Clause cause of action, because federal regulations can still preempt state laws.244 The second key difference is the structure of the Marketplaces. The structure of the Marketplaces themselves vary from part of a federal agency, to federal-state hybrids, to organizations on the boundary between the state and the private sector, making the analysis of whether a Marketplace official is acting “under color of state law” for the purposes of § 1983 significantly more complicated.245 These two differences create new hurdles for individuals seeking to enforce due process rights against the Marketplaces.
243. See supra Section III. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 155 (2013).
244. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884-86 (2000); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986)) (The Supremacy Clause cause of action is still available to enforce regulations). Courts of appeals have unanimously held that Gonzaga limitations are inapplicable to a preemption claim. Bobroff, supra note 152, at 73.
245. See infra Section IV. C.
246. Compare 42 U.S. C. A. § 1396a(a)(3) with 42 U.S. C. A. § 18081(f).
247. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289–90 (2002).
248. 42 U.S. C. A. § 1396a(a)(3).
249. Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2012); Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 772 (6th Cir. 2003).
250. Shakhnes, 689 F.3d at 251.

References: § 1983
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