Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/361/363/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:44:38+00:00

Document:
Held: since the injunction has long since expired by its own terms, the cause has become moot. Pp. 361 U. S. 364-371.
(a) Because the injunction has long since "expired by its own terms," there remains for this Court no actual matter in controversy essential to a decision of this case. Harris v. Battle, 348 U.S. 803. Pp. 361 U. S. 367-369.
(b) Life is not given to this appeal by the fact that the statute contains provisions which impose (1) monetary penalties upon labor unions which continue a strike after seizure, and (2) loss of seniority for employees participating in such a strike; since the Supreme Court of Missouri found that those separable provisions of the Act were not involved in this case, it carefully refrained from passing on their validity, and they are not properly before this Court in this case. Pp. 361 U. S. 369-371.
317 S.W.2d 309, judgment vacated and cause remanded.
In the state courts and in this Court, the appellants have contended that the Missouri law conflicts with federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, and that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of doubt as to whether the controversy was moot, we postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits. 359 U.S. 982.
"rules and regulations . . . governing the internal management and organization of the company, and its duties and responsibilities, shall remain in force and effect throughout the term of operation by the State of Missouri. "
After the seizure, the appellants continued the strike in violation of the statute, [Footnote 3] and the State of Missouri filed suit for an injunction against them in the Circuit Court of St. Louis. [Footnote 4] At the end of a three-day hearing, the trial court entered an order enjoining the appellants from continuing the strike, and, in an amendment to the decree, declared the entire King-Thompson Act constitutional and valid. On July 14, 1956, the day after the injunction issued, the strike was terminated. On August 10, 1956, the appellants and Laclede signed a new labor agreement, and, on October 31, 1956, the Governor ended the seizure.
"Section 295.180, relating to the power of seizure, and subparagraphs (1) and (6) of Section 295.200 RSMo, V.A.M.S., making unlawful a strike or concerted refusal to work after seizure and giving the state courts power to enforce the provisions of the Act by injunction or other means. [Footnote 5]"
sections which we have considered are severable from, and may stand independently of, the remainder of the Act. Although the defendants argue strenuously to the contrary, no case is made in this record for determination of the constitutionality of section 295.090, pertaining to a written labor agreement of a minimum duration, and section 295.200, subparagraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5, relating to monetary penalties and loss of seniority. We therefore refrain from expressing any opinion with reference thereto."
"is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it."
In finding that the controversy was moot, the Court necessarily rejected all these contentions. 348 U.S. 803. Upon the authority of that decision, the same contentions must be rejected in the present case. See also Barker Co. v. Painters Union, 281 U. S. 462; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U. S. 360.
However, as the appellants point out, the decision in Harris v. Battle is not completely dispositive here, because, unlike the Virginia statute, the King-Thompson Act contains provisions which impose: (1) monetary penalties upon labor unions which continue a strike after seizure, [Footnote 11] and (2) loss of seniority for employees participating in such a strike. [Footnote 12] The Missouri court found that these separable provisions of the Act were not involved in the present case, and it carefully refrained from passing on their validity. [Footnote 13] The court noted that liability for monetary penalties had been asserted in a separate lawsuit, 317 S.W.2d at 314, and the parties have informed us that the action is still pending in the state courts.
We cannot agree that the pendency of that litigation gives life to the present appeal. When that claim is litigated, it will be subject to review, but it is not for us now to anticipate its outcome.
"'Constitutional questions are not to be dealt with abstractly.' . . . They will not be anticipated, but will be dealt with only as they are appropriately raised upon a record before us. . . . Nor will we assume in advance that a State will so construe its law as to bring it into conflict with the federal Constitution or an act of Congress."
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740, at 315 U. S. 746.
"'there still exists a controversy, undetermined and unsettled,' involving the right of the State to enforce the statute against a corporation engaged in interstate commerce."
193 U.S. at 193 U. S. 51. What the Court said in rejecting that argument and dismissing the appeal as moot is entirely relevant here.
"[T]hat suit is not before us. We have not now jurisdiction of it or its issues. Our power only extends over, and is limited by, the conditions of the case now before us."
193 U.S. at 193 U. S. 52. See Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U. S. 528.
"would be wholly ineffectual for want of a subject matter on which it could operate. An affirmance would ostensibly require something to be done which had already taken place. A reversal would ostensibly avoid an event which had already passed beyond recall. One would be as vain as the other. To adjudicate a cause which no longer exists is a proceeding which this Court uniformly has declined to entertain."
Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U. S. 216, 261 U. S. 217-218.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is vacated, and the cause is remanded for such proceedings as by that court may be deemed appropriate.
The King-Thompson Act is Chapter 295 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1949. The section of the statute which authorizes seizure by the Governor on behalf of the State is Mo.Rev.Stat. 1949, § 295.180.
All employees represented by the appellants, approximately 2,200, participated in the strike; approximately 300 supervisors and others not in the bargaining units represented by the appellants remained at work.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, employee, or representative as defined in this chapter to call, incite, support, or participate in any strike or concerted refusal to work for any utility or for the state after any plant, equipment or facility has been taken over by the state under this chapter as means of enforcing any demands against the utility or against the state."
See notes 1 3 and 4 supra.
The court did reaffirm an earlier decision (State ex rel. State Board of Mediation v. Pigg, 362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75) upholding the constitutionality of provisions of the King-Thompson Act relating to the State Board of Mediation and public hearing panels, "[t]o the extent that those sections are a necessary predicate for the additional sections . . . with which we are now concerned. . . ."
See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 141 U. S. 696; California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651; American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U. S. 49; United States v. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U. S. 466; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U. S. 360; United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U. S. 113; Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U. S. 216; Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U. S. 528; Barker Co. v. Painters Union, 281 U. S. 462.
See jurisdictional statement in Harris v. Battle, No. 111, O.T. 1954, pp.12-13.
"Any labor organization or labor union which violates paragraph l of this section shall forfeit and pay to the state of Missouri for the use of the public school fund of the state the sum of ten thousand dollars for each day any work stoppage resulting from any strike which it has called, incited, or supported, continues, to be recovered by civil action in the name of the state and against the labor organization or labor union in its commonly used name."
"It shall be unlawful for any public utility to employ any person or employee who has violated paragraph 1 of this section except that such person or employee may be employed only as a new employee."
See pp. 361 U. S. 366-367, supra. Since neither the statutory penalties nor possible loss of seniority turns on the validity of the injunction, this case is quite unlike Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 383, where the very judgment in controversy imposed financial liability. Nor did this case involve a "perpetual" injunction. See Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 416, n., at 340 U. S. 417-418.
The appellee asserts, and the appellants do not deny, that the statute imposes no penalty for violation of the seniority provisions.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting.
after the strike had ended. It was moot then if it is moot now. But the state court treated it as a live controversy, and so should we. Otherwise, the appellant unions and their members stand constantly under threats of penalties and continuing injunctions under the state statute the Missouri Supreme Court held validly applied in this case.
The wrongfulness in holding the case moot is emphasized by our belief that the state court was plainly without any jurisdiction over this controversy unless the Court wants to overrule Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 383, and adopt the views of the three dissenters in that case. We would follow that holding, and reverse this case on the merits.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 295
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.