Source: https://law-journals-books.vlex.com/vid/punish-s-inconsistent-counts-468260254
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:52:02+00:00

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It is a recognized goal of criminal law that a convicted defendant’s punishment be proportionate to the crime committed.1Ohio’s multiple counts statute, section 2941.25 of the Ohio Revised Code, represents the General Assembly’s attempt to ensure that Ohio’s criminal justice system honors that goal of proportionality. Unfortunately, the Ohio Supreme Court’s case law interpreting that statute has varied widely, leaving both practitioners and judges to wade through the morass that is Ohio’s multiple counts jurisprudence. It is unlikely that the even the court’s laudable but unsatisfying recent effort2to turn this morass into a wonderland of legal clarity will be successful.
Copyright © 2008, Richard R. Parsons.
∗ Capital University Law School, J.D. 2007. B.A., Carleton College. In fond memory of Professor Max Kravitz. I feel exceedingly fortunate that to have had the opportunity to benefit from his tutelage and even more fortunate to have had the opportunity to simply know him. I would also like to thank Paula Brown for her useful comments on this Article in Max’s absence.
1See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.11(B) (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that the sentence imposed should be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct”); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006) (stating that the sentence should “provide just punishment for the offense”).
2State v. Cabrales, 886 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio 2008).
3See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (LexisNexis 2006). The section reads, in part: “No person, who is the parent . . . of a child under eighteen years of age . . . shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.” Id.
4See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04(B) (LexisNexis 2006). The section reads, in part: “No person shall cause the death of another . . . as a proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor of any degree . . . .” Id.
Therefore, the state must prove every element of the child endangering offense to establish guilt for involuntary manslaughter. Thus, if convicted of both charges, the defendant is being punished twice for the child endangering charge, even if he is only being punished once for causing his son’s death.
The multiple counts statute, however, mandates that a defendant cannot be convicted of more than one “allied offense.” Unfortunately, exactly what constitutes an allied offense under Ohio law is anything but clear.8Indeed, over the last three decades, the Ohio Supreme Court’s multiple counts jurisprudence might even be described as schizophrenic.
5OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25(A) (LexisNexis 2006). Nowhere does the multiple counts statute prohibit a jury from finding a defendant guilty of multiple “allied offenses.” Id. Instead, the statute prohibits multiple convictions for such offenses. Id.
In addition, the sentence the defendant receives is irrelevant to the multiple counts inquiry. Thus, even if a defendant receives concurrent sentences for two “allied offense” convictions, he will have been twice convicted for the same conduct in violation of the statute. Id.
6OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25(A) (LexisNexis 2006).
7See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04(B) (LexisNexis 2006).
8See infra Sections II & IV.
9397 N.E.2d 1345 (Ohio 1979).
12Id. at 1348; see also State v. Donald, 386 N.E.2d 1341 (Ohio 1979).
child endangering and involuntary manslaughter charges because, as applied to the facts of his case, the child endangering charge was a necessary element of the involuntary manslaughter charge. That is, the prosecution would have to prove all of the elements of child endangering to prove the involuntary manslaughter charge.
13See, e.g., State v. Bickerstaff, 461 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 1984); State v. Richey, 595 N.E.2d 915 (Ohio 1992).
14Bickerstaff, 461 N.E.2d at 896.
15OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2903.04(B) (LexisNexis 2006).
16OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(E)(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2006).
17See, e.g., City of Newark v. Vazirani, 549 N.E.2d 520 (Ohio 1990), overruled by State v. Rance, 710 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1999).
18See Rance, 710 N.E.2d at 704 (citing numerous cases to demonstrate the disharmony among the appellate courts).
19See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 453 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ohio 1983), rev’d, 467 U.S. 493 (1984).
20See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 405 N.E.2d 247 (Ohio 1980).
Recognizing that Rance had led to “inconsistent, unreasonable, and, at times, absurd results,” the Ohio Supreme Court recently handed down the decision in State v. Cabrales25to attempt to rectify confusion left behind in Rance’s wake.26While Cabrales, might have clarified one problem caused by Rance,27the opinion nevertheless continues to adhere to the Rance test, thereby failing to properly effectuate the legislative intent behind the enactment of section 2945.21. Therefore, further refinement of Ohio’s multiple counts jurisprudence remains necessary.

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