Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/366/36/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:18:20+00:00

Document:
Under California law, the State Supreme Court may admit to the practice of law any applicant whose qualifications have been certified to it by the California Committee of Bar Examiners. In hearings by that Committee on his application for admission to the Bar, petitioner refused to answer any questions pertaining to his membership in the Communist Party, not on the ground of possible self-incrimination, but on the ground that such inquiries were beyond the purview of the Committee's authority and infringed rights of free thought, association and expression assured him under the State and Federal Constitutions. The Committee declined to certify him as qualified for admission to the Bar on the ground that his refusals to answer had obstructed a full investigation into his qualifications. The State Supreme Court denied him admission to practice.
Held: Denial of petitioner's application for admission to the Bar on this ground did not violate his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 366 U. S. 37-56.
(a) The State's refusal to admit petitioner to practice on the ground that his refusal to answer the Committee's questions had thwarted a full investigation into his qualifications was not inconsistent with this Court's decision in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252. Pp. 366 U. S. 40-44.
(b) The Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbitrary state action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses to answer questions having a substantial relevance to his qualifications, and California's application of such a rule in this instance cannot be said to have been arbitrary or discriminatory. Pp. 366 U. S. 44-49.
(c) Petitioner was not privileged to refuse to answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party on the ground that they impinged upon rights of free speech and association protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, distinguished. Pp. 366 U. S. 49-56.
52 Cal.2d 769, 344 P.2d 777, affirmed.
"the burden of proving that he is possessed of good moral character, of removing any and all reasonable suspicion of moral unfitness, and that he is entitled to the high regard and confidence of the public."
Id., Div. 3, c. 4, Rule X, § 101. Any applicant denied certification may have the Committee's action reviewed by the State Supreme Court. Id., § 6066.
In 1953, petitioner, having successfully passed the California bar examinations, applied for certification for bar membership. The Committee, after interrogating Konigsberg and receiving considerable evidence as to his qualifications, declined to certify him on the ground that he had failed to meet the burden of proving his eligibility under the two statutory requirements relating to good moral character and nonadvocacy of violent overthrow. That determination centered largely around Konigsberg's repeated refusals to answer Committee questions as to his present or past membership in the Communist Party. [Footnote 1] The California Supreme Court denied review without opinion. See 52 Cal.2d 769, 770, 344 P.2d 777, 778.
to the State Supreme Court "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Id. 353 U. S. 274.
344 P.2d 777. We again brought the case here. 362 U.S. 910.
Petitioner's contentions in this Court in support of reversal of the California Supreme Court's order are reducible to three propositions: (1) the State's action was inconsistent with this Court's decision in the earlier Konigsberg case; (2) assuming the Committee's inquiries into Konigsberg's possible Communist Party membership were permissible, it was unconstitutionally arbitrary for the State to deny him admission because of his refusals to answer, and (3) in any event, Konigsberg was constitutionally justified in refusing to answer these questions.
to questions on his application form, or from Committee interrogation of the applicant himself. This interrogation may well be of decisive importance, for, as all familiar with bar admission proceedings know, exclusion of unworthy candidates frequently depends upon the thoroughness of the Committee's questioning, revealing as it may infirmities in an otherwise satisfactory showing on his part. This is especially so where a bar committee, as is not infrequently the case, has no means of conducting an independent investigation of its own into an applicant's qualifications. If, at the conclusion of the proceedings, the evidence of good character and that of bad character are found in even balance, the State may refuse admission to the applicant, just as in an ordinary suit a plaintiff may fail in his case because he has not met his burden of proof.
these two standards for admission. The Court did not consider, but reserved for later decision, all questions as to the permissibility of the State treating Konigsberg's refusal to answer as a ground for exclusion, not because it was evidence from which substantive conclusions might be drawn, but because the refusal had thwarted a full investigation into his qualifications. See 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 259-262. The State now asserts that ground for exclusion, an issue that is not foreclosed by anything in this Court's earlier opinion which decided a quite different question.
Comm'n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134; Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U. S. 146.
considered for the purposes of the proceeding to be answered in a way unfavorable to the refusing party, or even that such refusal may result in "dismissing the action or proceeding" of the party asking affirmative relief.
The state procedural rule involved here is a less broad one, for all that California has in effect said is that, in cases where, on matters material to an applicant's qualifications, there are gaps in the evidence presented by him which the agency charged with certification considers should be filled in the appropriate exercise of its responsibilities, an applicant will not be admitted to practice unless and until he cooperates with the agency's efforts to fill those gaps. The fact that this rule finds its source in the supervisory powers of the California Supreme Court over admissions to the bar, rather than in legislation, is not constitutionally significant. Nashville, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362. Nor, in the absence of a showing of arbitrary or discriminatory application in a particular case, is it a matter of federal concern whether such a rule requires the rejection of all applicants refusing to answer material questions, or only in instances where the examining committee deems that a refusal has materially obstructed its investigation. Compare Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399, with Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U. S. 1.
inferences as to petitioner's character qualifications, 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 266-274. That was not to say, however, that these factors, singly or together, could not be regarded as leaving the investigatory record in sufficient uncertainty as constitutionally to permit application of the procedural rule which the State has now invoked, provided that Konigsberg had been first given due warning of the consequences of his continuing refusal to respond to the Committee's questions. Cf. 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 261.
It is no answer to say that petitioner has made out a prima facie case of qualifications, for this is precisely the posture of a proceeding in which the Committee's right to examine and cross-examine becomes significant. Assuming, as we do for the moment, that there is no privilege here to refuse to answer, petitioner could no more insist that his prima facie case makes improper further questioning of him than he could insist that such circumstance made improper the introduction of other forms of rebutting evidence.
the party were, to your knowledge, and questions of that type. You see, by failing to answer the initial question, there certainly is no basis and no opportunity for us to investigate with respect to the other matters to which the initial question might very well be considered preliminary."
"Mr. Mosk, you realize that, if Mr. Konigsberg had answered the question that he refused to answer, an entirely new area of investigation might be opened up, and this Committee might be able to ascertain from Mr. Konigsberg that perhaps he is now and for many years past has been an active member of the Communist Party, and from finding out who his associates were in that enterprise we might discover that he does advocate the overthrow of this government by force and violence. I am not saying that he would do that, but it is a possibility, and we don't have to take any witness' testimony as precluding us from trying to discover if he is telling the truth. That is the point."
"As a result of our twofold purpose [to investigate and reach determinations], particularly our function of investigation, we believe it will be necessary for you, Mr. Konigsberg, to answer our material questions or our investigation will be obstructed. We would not then, as a result, be able to certify you for admission."
"Mr. Konigsberg, I think you will recall that I initially advised you a failure to answer our material questions would obstruct our investigation and result in our failure to certify you. With this in mind do you wish to answer any of the questions which you heretofore up to now have refused to answer?"
of Mr. Konigsberg to answer the question as to whether or not he is now a member of the Communist Party is an obstruction of the function of this Committee, not a frustration if that word has been used. I think it would be an obstruction. There are phases of his moral character that we haven't been able to investigate simply because we have been stopped at this point, and I, for one, could not certify to the Supreme Court that he was a proper person to be admitted to practice law in this State until he answers the question about his Communist affiliation."
The record thus leaves no room for doubt on the score of "warning," and petitioner does not indeed contend to the contrary.
the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 161; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622. It is in the latter class of cases that this Court has always placed rules compelling disclosure of prior association as an incident of the informed exercise of a valid governmental function. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 361 U. S. 524. Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 354 U. S. 198; NAACP v. Alabama, supra; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 360 U. S. 126-127; Bates v. Little Rock, supra; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431. With more particular reference to the present context of a state decision as to character qualifications, it is difficult indeed to imagine a view of the constitutional protections of speech and association which would automatically, and without consideration of the extent of the deterrence of speech and association and of the importance of the state function, exclude all reference to prior speech or association on such issues as character, purpose, credibility, or intent. On the basis of these considerations, we now judge petitioner's contentions in the present case.
would indeed be difficult to argue that a belief, firm enough to be carried over into advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form of the State or Federal Government is an unimportant consideration in determining the fitness of applicants for membership in a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this country's legal and political institutions. Cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716. Nor is the state interest in this respect insubstantially related to the right which California claims to inquire about Communist Party membership. This Court has long since recognized the legitimacy of a statutory finding that membership in the Communist Party is not unrelated to the danger of use for such illegal ends of powers given for limited purposes. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382; see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 360 U. S. 128-129; cf. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431.
As regards the questioning of public employees relative to Communist Party membership, it has already been held that the interest in not subjecting speech and association to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure is outweighed by the State's interest in ascertaining the fitness of the employee for the post he holds, and hence that such questioning does not infringe constitutional protections. Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U. S. 399; Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716. With respect to this same question of Communist Party membership, we regard the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented.
NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 357 U. S. 462, for bar committee interrogations such as this are conducted in private. See Rule 58, Section X, Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Illinois; cf. Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, Rule 8; Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U. S. 287, 360 U. S. 291-292. Nor is there the possibility that the State may be afforded the opportunity for imposing undetectable arbitrary consequences upon protected association, see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 364 U. S. 486, for a bar applicant's exclusion by reason of Communist Party membership is subject to judicial review, including ultimate review by this Court, should it appear that such exclusion has rested on substantive or procedural factors that do not comport with the Federal Constitution. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252; Schware v. Board of Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U. S. 232; cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. In these circumstances, it is difficult indeed to perceive any solid basis for a claim of unconstitutional intrusion into rights assured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
penalized. The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens. This is especially to be feared when the complexity of the proofs and the generality of the standards applied, cf. Dennis v. United States, supra, provide but shifting sands on which the litigant must maintain his position. How can a claimant whose declaration is rejected possibly sustain the burden of proving the negative of these complex factual elements? In practical operation, therefore, this procedural device must necessarily produce a result which the State could not command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free."
"In these cases . . . , there was no attempt directly to control speech, but rather to protect, from an evil shown to be grave, some interest clearly within the sphere of governmental concern. . . . Each case concerned a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which they could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the public safety. The principal aim of those statutes was not to penalize political beliefs, but to deny positions to persons supposed to be dangerous because the position might be misused to the detriment of the public. "
But there are also additional factors making the rationale of Speiser inapplicable to the case before us. There is no unequivocal indication that California in this proceeding has placed upon petitioner the burden of proof of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow, as distinguished from its other requirement of "good moral character." [Footnote 12] All it has presently required is an applicant's cooperation with the Committee's search for evidence of forbidden advocacy. Petitioner has been denied admission to the California bar for obstructing the Committee in the performance of its necessary functions of examination and cross-examination, a ruling which indeed presupposes that the burden of producing substantial evidence on the issue of advocacy was not upon petitioner, but upon the Committee. Requiring a defendant in a civil proceeding to testify or to submit to discovery has never been thought to shift the burden of proof to him. Moreover, when this Court has allowed a State to comment upon a criminal defendant's failure to testify, it has been careful to note that this does not result in placing upon him the burden of proving his innocence. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 332 U. S. 58.
the Speiser case between penalizing statutes and those merely denying access to positions where unfitness may lead to the abuse of state-given powers or privileges. The issue is not now before us.
Thus, as matters now stand, there is nothing involved here which is contrary to the reasoning of Speiser, for, despite compelled testimony, the prospective bar applicant need not "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" (357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 526) for fear of mistaken judgment or fact finding declaring unlawful speech which is, in fact, protected by the Constitution. This is so as to the ultimate burden of persuasion for, notwithstanding his duty to testify, the loss resulting from a failure of proof may, for all we now know, still fall upon the State. It is likewise so as to the initial burden of production, for there is no indication in the proceeding on rehearing of petitioner's application that the Bar Committee expected petitioner to "sustain the burden of proving the negative" (357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 526) of those complex factual elements which amount to forbidden advocacy of violent overthrow. To the contrary, it is clear that the Committee had assumed the burden of proving the affirmative of those elements, but was prevented from attempting to discharge that burden by petitioner's refusal to answer relevant questions.
Konigsberg rested his refusals not on any claim of privilege against self-incrimination, but on the ground that such inquiries were beyond the purview of the Committee's authority, and infringed rights of free thought, association, and expression assured him under the State and Federal Constitutions. He affirmatively asserted, however, his disbelief in violent overthrow of government.
"(1) That the questions put to the applicant by the Committee concerning past or present membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party are material to a proper and complete investigation of his qualifications for admission to practice law in the State of California."
"(2) That the refusal of applicant to answer said questions has obstructed a proper and complete investigation of applicant's qualifications for admission to practice law in the State of California."
". . . The committee action now before us contains no findings or conclusion that petitioner had failed to establish either his good moral character or his abstention from advocacy of overthrow of the government."
"Here, it is the refusal to answer material questions which is the basis for denial of certification. . . ."
". . . [T]o admit applicants who refuse to answer the committee's questions upon these subjects would nullify the concededly valid legislative direction to the committee. Such a rule would effectively stifle committee inquiry upon issues legislatively declared to be relevant to that issue."
Id. at 772, 774, 344 P.2d at 779, 780.
Justice Traynor dissented on the ground that the California Supreme Court, not being required by statute to exclude bar applicants on the sole ground of their refusal to answer questions concerning possible advocacy of the overthrow of government, should not adopt such an exclusionary rule, at least where the Committee of Bar Examiners has not come forward with some evidence of advocacy. He declined to reach constitutional issues. Justice Peters dissented on federal constitutional grounds and in the belief that this Court's decision in the first Konigsberg case required immediate admission of the applicant. Chief Justice Gibson did not participate in the decision.
All of the 50 States, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, prescribe qualifications of moral character as preconditions for admission to the practice of law. See West Publishing Co., Rules for Admission to the Bar (35th ed.1957); Survey of the Legal Profession, Bar Examinations and Requirements for Admission to the Bar (1952); Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 Fordham L.Rev. 305 (1951); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301 (1959).
The burden of demonstrating good moral character is regularly placed upon the bar applicant. Ex parte Montgomery, 249 Ala. 378, 31 So.2d 85; In re Stephenson, 243 Ala. 342, 10 So.2d 1; Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 319 P.2d 991; Ark.Stat.Ann., 1947, §§ 25-101, 25-103; Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697; O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 A. 777; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 147, 67 A. 497; Del.Sup.Ct.Rule 31(1)(A)(a), (2)(A)(a); Coleman v. Watts, 81 So.2d 650 (Fla.) (burden of proof on applicant; prima facie showing shifts burden of going forward to Examiners); Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S.E.2d 15; In re Latimer, 11 Ill.2d 327, 143 N.E.2d 20 (semble); Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 193 Ind. 472, 141 N.E. 58; In re Meredith, 272 S.W.2d 456 (Ky.); In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (semble); Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N.E.2d 12; Application of Smith, 220 Minn.197, 19 N.W.2d 324 (semble); On Application for Attorney's License, 21 N.J.L. 345; Application of Cassidy, 268 App.Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202, aff'd, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41; Application of Farmer, 191 N.C. 235, 131 S.E. 661; In re Weinstein, 150 Ore. 1, 42 P.2d 744; State ex rel. Board v. Poyntz, 152 Ore. 592, 52 P.2d 1141 (burden of proof on applicant; prima facie showing shifts burden of going forward to Examiners); In the Matter of Eary, 134 W.Va. 204, 58 S.E.2d 64 (semble).
For reasons given later (pp. 366 U. S. 55-56, infra), we need not decide whether California's burden of proof rule could constitutionally be applied, as it was by the Committee after the first Konigsberg proceedings, to the requirement of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow.
The Court assumed, but did not discuss, the constitutionality of California's burden of proof rule as applied to the "nonadvocacy of forcible overthrow" requirement of the California statute.
Moreover, even if there could be debate as to whether this Court's prior decision prevented new hearings on matters that had already transpired at the time of the first state hearings, there can be no doubt that such decision did not prevent California from investigating petitioner's actions during the period subsequent to the first hearing. Therefore, we would in any case be presented with the question of the constitutionality of the State's refusing to admit petitioner to the practice of law because of his declining to answer whether he has been a member of the Communist Party since the termination of the first set of hearings.
The transcript of the original hearing before the Committee has been made part of the record before us in the present case.
There is no basis for any intimation that the California Supreme Court fashioned a special procedural rule for the purposes of this particular case. The California Bar Committee has in the past declined to certify applicants who refused to answer pertinent questions. See Farley (Secretary, Committee of Bar Examiners), Character Investigation of Applicants for Admission, 29 Cal.State Bar Journal, 454, 457, 466 (1954). No more does the State's action bear any of the hallmarks of a bill of attainder or of an ex post facto regulation, See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, especially in light of the fact that petitioner was explicitly warned in advance of the consequences of his refusal to answer. Likewise, there is no room for attributing to the Committee a surreptitious purpose to exclude Konigsberg by the device of putting to him questions which it was known in advance he would not answer, and then justifying exclusion on the premise of his refusal to respond. So far as this record shows, Konigsberg was excluded only because his refusal to answer had impeded the investigation of the Committee, a ground of rejection which it is still within his power to remove.
"[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth."
Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 233 U. S. 610. In this connection, also compare the equally unqualified command of the Second Amendment: "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." And see United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174.
Indeed, we cannot tell whether California did so even in the earlier proceeding, since the California Supreme Court's denial of review of the Committee's original rejection of Konigsberg was without opinion, and, for all we know, may have rested alone on petitioner's failure to meet his state burden of proof as to "good moral character."
so, we held that there was "no evidence in the record" which could rationally justify such a conclusion. [Footnote 2/1] Upon remand, the Supreme Court of California referred the matter back to the Committee of State Bar Examiners for further hearings, at which time Konigsberg presented even more evidence of his good character. The Committee produced no evidence whatever which tended in the slightest degree to reflect upon the good character and patriotism which we had already held Konigsberg to have established. The case is therefore now before us with the prior adjudication that Konigsberg possesses the requisite good character and patriotism for admission to the Bar unimpaired.
the California decisions, or even in the Rules of the Bar Committee, which has been called to our attention that suggests that failure to answer a Bar Examiner's inquiry is, ipso facto, a basis for excluding an applicant from the Bar, irrespective of how overwhelming is his showing of good character or loyalty or how flimsy are the suspicions of the Bar Examiners. [Footnote 2/3]"
enough for me to vote to reverse the judgment. There are other reasons, however.
The majority avoids the otherwise unavoidable necessity of reversing the judgment below on that ground by simply refusing to look beyond the reason given by the Committee to justify Konigsberg's rejection. In this way, the majority reaches the question as to whether the Committee can constitutionally reject Konigsberg for refusing to answer questions growing out of his conjectured past membership in the Communist Party even though it could not constitutionally reject him if he did answer those questions and his answers happened to be affirmative. The majority then goes on to hold that the Committee, by virtue of its power to reject applicants who advocate the violent overthrow of the Government, can reject applicants who refuse to answer questions in any way related to that fact, even though the applicant has sworn under oath that he does not advocate violent overthrow of the Government and even though, as the majority concedes, questions as to the political associations of an applicant subject "speech and association to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure." I cannot agree with that holding.
and present danger test" was urged as consistent with this view in that it protected speech in all cases except those in which danger was so imminent that there was no time for rational discussion. [Footnote 2/15] The "balancing test," on the other hand, rests upon the notion that some ideas are so dangerous that Government need not restrict itself to contrary arguments as a means of opposing them even where there is ample time to do so. Thus, here, where there is not a semblance of a "clear and present danger," and where there is more than ample time in which to combat by discussion any idea which may be involved, the majority permits the State of California to adopt measures calculated to suppress the advocacy of views about governmental affairs.
"In each case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. [Footnote 2/17]"
After the "clear and present danger test" was diluted and weakened by being recast in terms of this "balancing" formula, there seems to me to be much room to doubt that Justices Holmes and Brandeis would even have recognized their test. And the reliance upon that weakened "test" by the majority here, without even so much as an attempt to find either a "clear" or a "present" danger, is only another persuasive reason for rejecting all such "tests" and enforcing the First Amendment according to its terms.
to think, speak or publish exists in the people that cannot be taken away if the Government finds it sufficiently imperative or expedient to do so. Thus, the "balancing test" turns our "Government of the people, by the people and for the people" into a government over the people.
I cannot believe that this Court would adhere to the "balancing test" to the limit of its logic. Since that "test" denies that any speech, publication or petition has an "absolute" right to protection under the First Amendment, strict adherence to it would necessarily mean that there would be only a conditional right, not a complete right, for any American to express his views to his neighbors -- or for his neighbors to hear those views. In other words, not even a candidate for public office, high or low, would have an "absolute" right to speak in behalf of his candidacy, no newspaper would have an "absolute" right to print its opinion on public governmental affairs, and the American people would have no "absolute" right to hear such discussions. All of these rights would be dependent upon the accuracy of the scales upon which this Court weighs the respective interests of the Government and the people. It therefore seems to me that the Court's "absolute" statement that there are no "absolutes" under the First Amendment must be an exaggeration of its own views.
of action by the State of California designed to control the content of speech. As such, it is a "direct," and not an "incidental," abridgment of speech. Indeed, if the characterization "incidental" were appropriate here, it would be difficult to imagine what would constitute a "direct" abridgment of speech. The use of the "balancing test" under these circumstances thus permits California directly to abridge speech in explicit contradiction to the plain mandate of the First Amendment.
"having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change."
this case is not, as the majority's statement of the State's interest would seem to indicate, whether a person who advocates the overthrow of existing government by force must be admitted to the practice of law. All we really have on the State's side of the scales is its desire to know whether Konigsberg was ever a member of the Communist Party.
The real lack of value of that information to the State is, to my mind, clearly shown by the fact that the State has not even attempted to make membership in the Communist Party a ground for disqualification from the Bar. Indeed, if the State's only real interest was, as the majority maintains, in having good men for its Bar, how could it have rejected Konigsberg, who, undeniably and as this Court has already held, has provided overwhelming evidence of his good character? Our former decision, which I still regard as resting on what is basically just good common sense, was that a man does not have to tell all about his previous beliefs and associations in order to establish his good character and loyalty.
that questions asked an applicant and answers given by him in the highly emotional area of communism would not rapidly leak out to the great injury of an applicant -- regardless of what the facts of his particular case may happen to be. As to the second ground given, the Court fails to take into account the fact that judicial review widens the publicity of the questions and answers and thus tends further to undercut its first ground. At the same time, such review, as is demonstrated by this and the companion case decided today, [Footnote 2/34] provides small hope that an applicant will be afforded relief against stubborn efforts to destroy him arbitrarily by innuendoes that will subject him to lasting suspicions. But even if I thought the Court was correct in its beliefs that the interrogation of a Bar applicant would be kept confidential and that judicial review is adequate to prevent arbitrary exclusions from the Bar, I could not accept its conclusion that the First Amendment rights involved in this case are "minimal."
association with any organization that advocates anything at all somebody might possibly be against, including groups whose activities are constitutionally protected under even the most restricted notion of the First Amendment. [Footnote 2/35] And, in the currently prevailing atmosphere in this country, I can think of few organizations active in favor of civil liberties that are not highly controversial. [Footnote 2/36] In addition, it seems equally clear that anyone who had already associated himself with an organization active in favor of civil liberties before he developed an interest in the law would, after this case, be discouraged from spending the large amounts of time and money necessary to obtain a legal education in the hope that he could practice law in California.
test" for the application of such a test is necessarily tied to the emphasis particular judges give to competing societal values. Judges, like everyone else, vary tremendously in their choice of values. This is perfectly natural and, indeed, unavoidable. But it is neither natural nor unavoidable in this country for the fundamental rights of the people to be dependent upon the different emphasis different judges put upon different values at different times. For those rights, particularly the First Amendment rights involved here, were unequivocally set out by the Founders in our Bill of Rights in the very plainest of language, and they should not be diluted by "tests" that obliterate them whenever particular judges think values they most highly cherish outweigh the values most highly cherished by the Founders.
"the oaths required in those cases performed a very different function from the declaration in issue here. In the earlier cases, it appears that the loyalty oath, once signed, became conclusive evidence of the facts attested so far as the right to office was concerned. If the person took the oath, he retained his position. The oath was not part of a device to shift to the officeholder the burden of proving his right to retain his position. [Footnote 2/40]"
But that is precisely what is happening here. For, even though Konigsberg has taken an oath that he does not advocate the violent overthrow of the Government, the Committee has persisted in the view that he has not as yet demonstrated his right to admission to the Bar. If that does not amount to the sort of shifting of the burden of proof that is proscribed by Speiser, I do not know what would.
not advocate the violent overthrow of the Government. There is one difference between the two cases, for here Konigsberg agreed to take the oath required, and he refused to answer only when the State insisted upon more. Surely he cannot be penalized for his greater willingness to cooperate with the State.
The majority also suggests that the Speiser case may be distinguishable because it involved merely the power of the State to impose a penalty, by way of a heavier tax burden, upon a person who refused to take an oath, while this case involves the power of the State to determine the qualifications a person must have to be admitted to the Bar -- a position of importance to the public. This distinction seems to me to be little more than a play on words. Speiser had the burden of proving that he did not advocate the overthrow of the Government, and, upon his refusal to satisfy this burden, he was forced to pay additional taxes as a penalty. Konigsberg has the burden of proving that he does not advocate the violent overthrow of the Government, and, upon his supposed failure to meet this burden, he is being denied an opportunity to practice the profession for which he has expended much time and money to prepare himself. So far as I am concerned, the consequences to Konigsberg, whether considered from a financial standpoint, a social standpoint, or any other standpoint I can think of, constitute a more serious "penalty" than that imposed upon Speiser.
"If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. [Footnote 2/42]"
being the period since the beginning of the "cold war" shortly after the close of World War II, in which there has been a widespread fear of an imagined overwhelming persuasiveness in Communist arguments. The most commonly offered justification for the liberty-stifling measures that have characterized this latter period is that the Communists do not themselves believe in the freedoms of speech, press and assembly, so they should not be allowed to take advantage of the freedoms our Constitution provides. But, as illustrated by this and many other cases, the effect of repressive laws and inquisitions of this kind cannot be, and is not, limited to Communists. [Footnote 2/43] Moreover, the fact that Communists practice repression of these freedoms is, in my judgment, the last reason in the world that we should do so. We do not have to imitate the Communists in order to survive. Our Bill of Rights placed our survival upon a firmer ground -- that of freedom, not repression.
of overthrowing this Government by force. No witness could be found throughout the long years of this inquisition who could say, or even who would say, that Konigsberg has ever raised his voice or his hand against his country. He is, therefore, but another victim of the prevailing fashion of destroying men for the views it is suspected they might entertain.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252, 353 U. S. 273. That decision was reached on the basis of a record containing a large quantity of evidence favorable to Konigsberg and some scanty evidence arguably adverse to him.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal.2d 769, 344 P.2d 777. Mr. Justice Traynor and Mr. Justice Peters dissented in separate opinions.
353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 260-261.
"Are then these acts of the legislature, which affect only particular persons and their particular privileges, laws of the land? Let this question be answered by the text of Blackstone:"
"And first, it (i.e. law) is a rule: not a transient sudden order from a superior, to, or concerning, a particular person; but something permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore, a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather a sentence than a law."
"Lord Coke is equally decisive and emphatic. Citing and commenting on the celebrated 29th chap. of Magna Charta, he says,"
"no man shall be disseized, &c. unless it be by the lawful judgment, that is, verdict of equals, or by the law of the land, that is, (to speak it once for all) by the due course and process of law."
(Emphasis as in source.) Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 580-581 [argument of counsel omitted from electronic version].
71 U. S. 4 Wall. 277.
71 U. S. 4 Wall. 333.
The suspicions of the Committee doubtless relate to the period around 1941, for the Committee had heard testimony from an ex-Communist that Konigsberg had attended meetings of a Communist Party unit during that period. The unreliability of that testimony was discussed in the Court's opinion when the case was here before. See 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 266-268.
Under the circumstances of this case, it seems clear to me that the action of the State of California in rejecting Konigsberg is also contrary to our decision in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U. S. 232. In that case, every member of this Court who participated in the decision expressed serious doubts with regard to the probative value of evidence as to a Bar applicant's membership in the Communist Party 15 years previous to our consideration of the case. Id. at 353 U. S. 246 (concurring opinion) 353 U. S. 251. I cannot believe that such evidence becomes more probative when, as here, it would, if obtained, have been five years older.
See, e.g., my dissenting opinions in Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431, 365 U. S. 441 446; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399, 365 U. S. 422-423; Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U. S. 388, 364 U. S. 392-393; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 360 U. S. 140-144; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 339 U. S. 445-453.
James Madison, for example, indicated clearly that he did not understand the Bill of Rights to permit any encroachments upon the freedoms it was designed to protect.
See, e.g., Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 310 U. S. 593; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 319 U. S. 108; Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 319 U. S. 639; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313 321.
"If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."
"Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly."
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 250 U. S. 630-631 (dissenting opinion); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 268 U. S. 672-673 (dissenting opinion); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 274 U. S. 378-379 (concurring opinion).
See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 314 U. S. 260-263.
83 F.2d 201, 212; 341 U. S. 494, 341 U. S. 510.
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 354 U. S. 514 (dissenting opinion). See also Labor Board v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469; Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490.
See, e.g., Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean? 20 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 461, 464.
"[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
The Court opinion here apparently treats the Beauharnais case as having decided that the Federal Government has power, despite the First Amendment, to pass so-called "group libel" laws. This, I think, is wholly unjustified. The Beauharnais opinion was written on the assumption that the protection afforded the freedoms of speech and petition against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment amounted to something less than the protection afforded these freedoms against congressional action by the First Amendment. Thus, as pointed out in my dissent in that case, the majority in Beauharnais never even mentioned the First Amendment, but upheld the state "group libel" law on the ground that it did not violate "civilized canons of decency,' reasonableness, etc." See 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. 268-269. See also the dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson at 343 U. S. 287-305.
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476.
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568.
"The founders of our federal government were too close to oppressions and persecutions of the unorthodox, the unpopular, and the less influential to trust even elected representatives with unlimited powers of control over the individual. From their distrust were derived the first ten amendments, designed as a whole to 'limit and qualify the powers of Government,' to define 'cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode,' and to protect unpopular minorities from oppressive majorities. 1 Annals 437. The first of the ten amendments erected a Constitutional shelter for the people's liberties of religion, speech, press, and assembly. This amendment reflects the faith that a good society is not static, but advancing, and that the fullest possible interchange of ideas and beliefs is essential to attainment of this goal. The proponents of the First Amendment, committed to this faith, were determined that every American should possess an unrestrained freedom to express his views, however odious they might be to vested interests whose power they might challenge."
Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 322 U. S. 501 (dissenting opinion).
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 308 U. S. 161.
339 U. S. 339 U.S. 382, especially at 339 U. S. 398-400.
341 U. S. 341 U.S. 494, especially at 341 U. S. 508-509.
See also the discussion of these street regulation cases in my dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 360 U. S. 141-142.
The majority places some stress upon the fact that the Committee did not have independent investigatory resources with which to seek further evidence. In view of the complete reliance upon this decision to justify the use of an identical procedure in In re Anastaplo, decided today, post, p. 366 U. S. 82, where the bar admission committee not only had investigatory resources, but also utilized them to the fullest, this fact must be of little "weight" in the constitutional "balance."
In this regard, the situation is identical to that invalidated as unconstitutional by our decision in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479. Indeed, the absence of such a requirement was there stressed as an important part of the ground upon which that decision rested. Id. at 364 U. S. 486.
In re Anastaplo, supra. See also the discussion in my dissenting opinion in that case, especially at pp. 366 U. S. 108-112.
The situation here is thus identical to that in Speiser v. Randall, where the Court expressly recognized the danger to protected associations. See 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 526.
Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 364 U. S. 486, n. 7, where we took note of testimony that efforts were being made to remove from a school system all teachers who supported such organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union, the Urban League, the American Association of University Professors, and the Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools.
357 U. S. 357 U.S. 513.
Section 32 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code. This section was set out in full in the majority opinion in Speiser. 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 516-517, n. 2.
357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 526.
Id. at 357 U. S. 528. The cases so distinguished were Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56, and American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382.
This line has already been considerably lengthened during this very Term of Court. See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U. S. 388; Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431.
"Centuries of experience testify that laws aimed at one political or religious group, however rational these laws may be in their beginnings, generate hatreds and prejudices which rapidly spread beyond control. Too often it is fear which inspires such passions, and nothing is more reckless or contagious. In the resulting hysteria, popular indignation tars with the same brush all those who have ever been associated with any member of the group under attack or who hold a view which, though supported by reversed Americans as essential to democracy, has been adopted by that group for its own purposes."
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 339 U. S. 448-449 (dissenting opinion).
"a question as to present or past membership in [the Communist Party] is relevant to the issue of possible criminal advocacy, and hence to [Konigsberg's] qualifications."
". . . when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's general taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition."
"Whatever its relevancy [the question as to past or present Party membership] in a particular context, . . . it is an extraordinary variant of the usual inquiry into crime, for the attendant burden of proof upon any one under question poses the immediate threat of prior restraint upon the free speech of all applicants. The possibility of inquiry into their speech, the heavy burden upon them to establish its innocence, and the evil repercussions of inquiry despite innocence, would constrain them to speak their minds so noncommittally that no one could ever mistake their innocuous words for advocacy. This grave danger to freedom of speech could be averted without loss to legitimate investigation by shifting the burden to the examiners. Confronted with a prima facie case, an applicant would then be obliged to rebut it."
Id., p. 776, 344 P.2d p. 782.
The Court admits the complete absence of any such predicate by the Committee for its questions. The Court attempts to distinguish the situations in order to escape the controlling authority of Speiser. The speciousness of its reasoning is exposed in MR. JUSTICE BLACK's dissent. I would reverse.

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