Source: https://www.bna.com/garcia-google-implications-n17179889476/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:46:15+00:00

Document:
Partner Anthony Dreyer is a commercial litigator concentrating on intellectual property and sports litigation matters; Jordan Feirman and Katelyn Andrews are associates in the Intellectual Property and Technology Group. All authors are located in Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom's New York office.
On Feb. 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted an actress's request for a preliminary injunction requiring Google, Inc. to take down from YouTube.com an anti-Islamic film in which she appeared. The 2-1 opinion in Garcia v. Google, Inc., No. 12-57302, 2014 BL 51739, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d 1799 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2014), authored by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, has rapidly garnered a great deal of attention, insofar as it sharply deviates from Ninth Circuit precedent, and appears to have been “reverse engineered” to reach a desired result--albeit for the noble purpose of attempting to protect the plaintiff against the threats and harassment that she claims to have suffered since the film appeared online.
Of particular note--and the primary focus of this article--is the court's novel recognition of an independent copyright interest that actors and actresses have in their own performances, separate and apart from the copyrights in the underlying script or the film itself. Although the precedential value of the opinion remains to be seen, this facet of the case is of particular importance to content creators and providers because the court's sweeping language could be seized upon by many individual performers seeking to expand their control over the use of not only their own performances in collaborative works, but also the collaborative works themselves.
Plaintiff Cindy Lee Garcia alleged that she was cast by a film writer and producer (also defendants in the action, but who did not answer the complaint and were not the subject of the preliminary injunction motion at issue) to perform a minor role in an Arabian adventure film entitled “Desert Warrior.” Garcia was given the four pages of the script in which her character was to appear, and was paid $500 for three-and-a-half days of filming. However, Garcia's performance--much to her surprise--was modified and ultimately used in an approximately five-second clip in an anti-Islamic film entitled “Innocence of Muslims,” which was broadcast via YouTube. The film spurred protests, including the issuance of a fatwa by an Egyptian cleric calling for the killing of everyone involved in the film. After purportedly receiving death threats, Garcia requested that Google take down the film from YouTube pursuant to the takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Google refused.
In a lengthy dissent, Circuit Judge N. Randy Smith asserted that the majority erred in granting the preliminary injunction requiring Google to remove the film from YouTube.
The majority's expansive conception of copyright law as providing rights to an actor in their individual performances--independent from the script, direction or fixation of that performance in a filmed scene--is not only a divergence from copyright law jurisprudence, but also could have extremely wide-reaching implications for the media and entertainment industry. If any performer who participates in the creation of a copyrightable work, no matter how minor their role may be, can obtain an independent copyright in their individual performance solely by virtue of contributing some modicum of creativity and originality to their craft, virtually all television shows or films would by default consist of work owned by dozens, if not hundreds, of putative copyright owners of discrete portions of those shows or films.
Complex works could become infinitely divisible into small, competing copyright interests. Just as an actor could seek to protect their own performance in a movie, an individual violin player could seek to protect their own playing when their orchestra performs a musical work; an individual model could seek to protect their posture during a photo shoot; a dancer could seek to protect their own movements in a choreographical work; an individual builder could protect their own bricklaying in an architectural work (although one would hope for safety's sake that they would not exercise much creativity beyond the engineer's specifications). These are, of course, somewhat extreme examples. Nevertheless, this exercise in reductio ad absurdum reflects the troubling implications of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning.
Needless to say, such a construct would be incredibly cumbersome (if not absurd), and ignores the practical realities of creating collaborative works, particularly in entertainment media. The Ninth Circuit seems to recognize this but believes that the notion of a “broadly construed” implied license to use an actor's performance largely solves the issue, even in the absence of an express license. Yet this answer is not particularly satisfying. First, the implied license construct invites opportunistic litigation; notwithstanding Judge Kozinski's warning against actors “leverag[ing] their individual contributions into de facto authorial control over the film,” courts will no doubt be faced with myriad performers flooding the courts with claims that the way that their particular performances were manipulated by filmmakers and other content creators was outside the scope of their implied license. Second, the majority's approach to determining whether a performance is outside the scope of an implied license amounts to little more than “I know it when I see it;” asking simply whether “the film differs so radically from” an actor's expectations is not a particularly meaningful guide for future jurisprudence.
Ultimately, it is difficult to tell what precedential value this case will have. There may well be en banc review and/or a petition for certiorari.19 Even without reversal, the extraordinary factual circumstances of the case and the centrality of a person's health and safety (truly unusual for a copyright case) may render the opinion a compelling candidate for sui generis treatment both within and without the Ninth Circuit. But the language and reasoning of the majority opinion has for the moment created a significant risk for content creators--including, for example, television and film production companies and studios--that may not always pay attention to copyright issues related to individual performers in their works.
• Enter into written contracts with all performers, no matter how minor the role or creative contribution may be.
• Contracts with performers should include language expressly providing the content owner with the right to use a performance--including derivative works of that performance (e.g., outtakes, still photographs, etc.)--for any and all purposes.
• Relatedly, contracts should provide that performers expressly disclaim any “moral rights” that may subsist in their creative performances throughout the world, and that content creators may exercise complete creative control over how to utilize that performance.
• Contracts should also note that the final creative work may vary substantially from scripts, treatments, or other underlying works on which the final product is based.
The majority in Garcia sought to achieve what it viewed as the morally “right result,” but copyright law was an ill-suited vehicle to achieve that goal. In reverse engineering its decision to attempt to protect the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit majority did not pay proper attention to how its reasoning would so sharply diverge from fundamental copyright principles and established jurisprudence. Upsetting a copyright framework that has adapted to decades of common practices in the entertainment industry will lead to a great deal of confusion--and inevitably increased litigation.
1 Garcia also brought claims for fraud, unfair business practices, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These state law claims, however, were not the basis for her preliminary injunction motion.
2 CV12-08315-MWF (VBKx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012), at 3.
4 109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1801.
5 Id. at 1801 n.4.
14 Id. at 1807 (citing 17 U.S.C. §101).
15 Id. (quoting AalMuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1661 (9th Cir. 2000)).
16 Id. (quoting Comty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989)).
18 Id. at 1810-11. Judge Smith further asserts that the majority should have afforded the district court greater deference with respect to irreparable harm. Id. at 1811.
19 On Feb. 28, the Ninth Circuit refused to grant Google's motion for an emergency stay, but modified the Order to state that it did not preclude the posting or display of any version of the film that did not include Garcia's performance. No. 12-57302 (9th Cir.), Dkt. 45. On March 6, Ninth Circuit Judge Sidney R. Thomas requested a vote to rehear en banc the denial of the stay of the Order, independent of any petitions for rehearing that Google may request. Id. Dkt. 46. That request was denied March 14 (Id. Dkt. 64), but on March 12 Google filed its own petition for en banc review. Id. Dkt. 57.
20 See 17 U.S.C. §203. Under the Copyright Act, assignments of copyright can be terminated by authors 35 years after the assignment.

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