Source: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/923/prisoners-rights
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:52:20+00:00

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In U.S. jurisprudence, the First Amendment rights of prisoners are sharply curtailed. When analyzing prisoner speech claims, the Supreme Court has displayed considerable reluctance to second-guess prison administrators.
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union (1977), the Court upheld direct restrictions on efforts by prison inmates to form and operate a union — including a ban on soliciting other inmates to join the union, meetings among union members, and delivery of bulk mailings to inmates concerning the union from outside sources.
And whether there is a ready alternative to the regulation that fully accommodates the asserted right at a minimal cost to valid penological interests.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has maintained its commitment to the deferential Turner test when deciding prisoner speech cases. In Shaw v. Murphy (2001), the Court held that restrictions on prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence should be analyzed under the Turner standard even if they inhibit a prisoner’s ability to provide legal assistance to a fellow inmate.
Applying the Turner test, federal courts have rejected a wide variety of speech clause challenges directed at prison regulations. They have sustained, for example, restrictions on prisoner access to typewriters and word processors, to telephones, and to subscription magazines and newspapers.
And when the government interferes with a prisoner’s “legal” mail (correspondence between a prisoner and his attorney).
When it comes to a prisoner’s nonlegal mail, the courts draw a distinction between incoming and outgoing mail. Since the prison’s internal security can be seriously compromised by objects or communications entering the prison from the outside world, the deferential Turner test governs all restrictions on incoming mail. But the same elevated security concerns do not exist for a prisoner’s outgoing mail.
And the restriction must be no greater than necessary for the protection of that interest.
Does the heightened scrutiny of the Martinez test apply to all restrictions on outgoing prisoner correspondence? Apparently not. Although the Supreme Court has not answered this question, it appears that Martinez only applies to governmental censorship of outgoing prisoner correspondence. The deferential Turner test should be used to analyze all other regulations that affect nonlegal outgoing prisoner mail.
With regard to legal mail, the Court applies heightened scrutiny to the speech claims of prisoners. Federal courts have expressed “heightened concern” for protecting the privacy and the unimpeded flow of all correspondence between a prisoner and his attorney. Prisoners have a well-established First Amendment right to be present whenever prison officials open their legal mail — and the officials may open it only to check for contraband, not to read it. Any effort by prison officials to read, withhold, restrict, or censor a prisoner’s legal mail must be subjected to heightened scrutiny.
Turning from the speech clause to the other guarantees of the First Amendment, we find that Turner again provides the presumptive standard for claims advanced by prisoners. Overton v. Bazzetta (2003) established that Turner governs prisoner claims that invoke the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of association. The Court’s latest prisoner free expression decision, Beard v. Banks (2006), also upheld restrictive prison policies, rejected inmate First Amendment claims, and showed broad deference to prison officials.
But heightened scrutiny is available to free exercise claimants who invoke the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). In enacting RLUIPA and the earlier Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Congress intended to depart from the Turner reasonableness standard, which the Supreme Court had established for prisoner free exercise claims in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987).
RLUIPA provides that the government shall not impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that the imposition of the burden on that person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.
This appears to be a strict scrutiny test, but in Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005) the Supreme Court cautioned that courts must apply the test with “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security, and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” The Court specifically noted that “[l]awmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions.” The Court held that prison security is a compelling state interest, and it stressed that a prison is free to resist requests for religious accommodations that either impose unjustified burdens on other prisoners or jeopardize the effective functioning of the prison.
Finally, lawyers who bring First Amendment claims on behalf of prisoners must pay careful attention to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions … by a prisoner … until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Courts entertaining First Amendment challenges to prison regulations have held that such a lawsuit must be dismissed (without prejudice) if the prisoner fails to plead that he has exhausted all available administrative remedies.
Collins, William C. “Bumps in the Road to the Courthouse: The Supreme Court and the Prison Litigation Reform Act.” Pace Law Review 24 (2004):651–674.
O’Neill, Kevin Francis. “Muzzling Death Row Inmates: Applying the First Amendment to Regulations That Restrict a Condemned Prisoner’s Last Words.” Arizona State Law Journal 33 (2001): 1159–1218.
Schlanger, Margo. “Inmate Litigation.” Harvard Law Review 116 (2003): 1555–1706.
Waguespack, Kenneth. “Note, Shaw v. Murphy: Restricting Prisoners’ First Amendment Rights.” Southern University Law Review 29 (2001):113–127.
Hager, Eli. "Does the First Amendment End At the Prison Gate?" The Marshall Project, Oct. 25, 2016.
"Your First Amendment Right to Freedom of Speech and Association." Jailhouse Lawyer's Handbook. 5th ed. New York: Center for Constitutional Rights and the National Lawyers' Guild, 2010.

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