Source: http://www.floridalawyerdefenseteam.com/publicRelations-DuelingDoctors.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:58:08+00:00

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Florida’s evidentiary rules grant broad discretion to a trial judge when certifying a medical expert in a given field. Variation in admissibility is seen between criminal and civil courts, and even from personal injury to medical malpractice trials. Recent legislative changes and case rulings in the Florida Supreme Court demonstrate a shift toward a greater exclusion among specialty practitioners, but variation still exists.
Unless the medical procedure is common or routine practice, an expert not specialized in the same area of practice lacks the foundation to voice an opinion.10 It is not enough to be a medical doctor; one must "to the satisfaction of the court, possess sufficient training, experience, and knowledge as a result of practice or teaching in the specialty of the defendant or practice or teaching in a related field of medicine, so as to be able to provide such expert testimony as to the prevailing professional standard of care in a given field of medicine. Such training, experience, or knowledge must be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine" within a statutory period before the incident giving rise to the claim.11 The expert must be "conversant" with the relevant science within the particular specialty.12 In personal injury and criminal litigation, the qualifying standard is F.S. §90.702.
c. A clinical research program that is affiliated with an accredited health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the same or similar specialty.
Reviewing the case precedents for permissible expert testimony from other states further defines and clarifies what constitutes a qualified professional opinion. Utah, Michigan, Colorado, and Texas have each adopted a version of Rule 702 that is nearly identical to the comparable Florida rule.
Michigan prohibits testimony unless the party offering testimony is board certified in the same specialty as the party the opinion is offered against.17 Witness qualification requires evaluation of educational and professional training, specialty, and time engaged in clinical practice.18 Thus, it would likely be insufficient for a trained physician to simply read a textbook or take a weekend course.
What Problems Are on the Horizon?
Unanswered questions remain: If different areas of expertise overlap, will a court prohibit the number of similar experts that can testify in a case for one side? Meaning, will a judge now convinced that neuropsychology is a similar enough discipline to psychology, deny a litigant’s second expert permission to testify at trial, because of redundancy?38 In the battle to win a jury by tipping the scales of the quantity of medical expert opinion in a party’s favor, will courts limit a litigant to one expert who overlaps two fields of study? Conversely, will multiple expert witnesses be permitted to testify because restrictions require a different expert to render an opinion in an area not wholly alien to a particular expert witness?
Interestingly, the move toward a nationalized legal standard of care and expertise may be reduced to what is minimally acceptable within a small community, as specific local context may be dramatically different from standards applied elsewhere. That would be a particularly elevated standard in areas demographically served by a disproportionately high number of exceptionally qualified physicians. It is no longer enough to be a "like professional," a witness must now be a "like expert." Mere knowledge or familiarity is not enough to testify on a specialty science. One must have exquisite and particular understanding and experience in the field at issue and its direct factual application to a matter before the court.
Evidentiary rules are written with sufficient flexibility to leave the door open for courts to exercise discretion. Without a clear demarcation between qualified expertise and specialization, however, trial courts remain the ultimate arbiters of when testimony is offered by a sufficiently similar expert, so as not to prejudice a party or mislead a juror. It is not an imaginative stretch to recognize that the outcome of any litigation requiring medical evidence hinges on the admission or exclusion of an expert in a Frye hearing.
1Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 843 (Fla. 2001).
3Ga. Soc. of Plastic Surgeons, Inc. v. Anderson, 363 S.E. 2d 140 (Ga. 1987).
4Catron v. Bohn, 580 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1991).
6Meyer v. Caruso, 730 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1999).
7Horowitz v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977).
8Vazquez v. Ceballos, 36 Va. Cir. 181, 182 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1995).
9Lake v. Clark, 533 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988); see also Catron, 580 So. 2d at 817.
10Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943 (Utah 1994) (Utah shares a very similar rule of evidence on the admission of scientific testimony as Florida).
11Id. at 798-799; see also Cross v. Lakeview Center, 529 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1988).
12Foster v. Thornton, 160 So. 490 (Fla. 1934).
15Clair v. Glades County Board of Commissioners, 635 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1994).
17Tate v. Detroit Receiving Hospital, 242 N.W. 2d 346 (Mich. App. 2002).
19Connelly v. Kortz, 689 P.2d 728 (Colo. App. Div. 3 1984).
20Dikeou, 881 P.2d at 948.
21Reed v. Granbury Hospital Corp., 2003 WL 22026543*4 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2003).
27Anderson, 363 S.E.2d at 710.
29Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 2003) (citing Executive Car & Truck Leasing, Inc. v. DeSerio, 468 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985)).
30Broward County School Board v. Cruz, 761 So. 2d 388, 395 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000).
31Grenitz, 858 So. 2d at 1002.
32Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 2003).
36Id. at 1002 (citing Fla. Stat. §490.003(4).
38Fla. Stat. §90.612; Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).
Robert C. Buschel graduated from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center in 1995 and is a founding partner in the Ft. Lauderdale law firm of Buschel Carter Schwartzreich & Yates. He practices in both the civil and criminal defense arenas.
Sean Gelb holds Florida licenses to practice both medicine and law. His medical training and experiences include surgery, critical care, burns, and plastic and reconstructive surgery. Dr. Gelb graduated from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center in May of 2003, and is associated with the Ft. Lauderdale law firm of Buschel Carter Schwartzreich & Yates, practicing civil and criminal litigation.
This column is submitted on behalf of the Trial Lawyers Section, Thomas D. Masterson, chair, and Thomas P. Barber, editor.

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