Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/73/371/557233/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:33:38+00:00

Document:
Rodolfo Trujillo appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a) (1). We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Trujillo contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.2 Assuming that the delay of slightly over a year from the date of his indictment (which in Trujillo's case occurred before his arrest) to trial is "presumptively prejudicial," see Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992), the remaining factors that we consider under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), do not weigh in his favor. While he asserted his right to a speedy trial by moving to dismiss on the ground of pre-indictment delay, the delay is not extraordinary, being just over a year, and Trujillo was responsible for most of it. Most importantly, as Trujillo has not shown that the government acted in bad faith or negligently, he must--but has failed to--make a particularized showing of prejudice as Doggett requires. The generalized allegation that his defense was impaired does not suffice.
For much the same reason, Trujillo's argument that the 21 month delay between the alleged crime and the date of indictment violates Due Process cannot succeed. A defendant must show actual prejudice, United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986); Trujillo has failed to do so. " [T]he proof must be definite and not speculative, and the defendant must demonstrate how the loss of a witness and/or evidence is prejudicial to his case." United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986). Trujillo suggests that he was unable to locate witnesses, but he has not demonstrated that loss of the expected testimony was actually prejudicial. United States v. Horowitz, 756 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985). Accordingly, there is no due process violation.
Even if reference in the grand jury proceedings to seizure of 424 kilograms of cocaine from someone other than Trujillo, an uncharged crime involving 244 kilograms of cocaine, and a profile stop in which $35,000.00 was found on Trujillo were improper, the error is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986). Guam v. Muna, 999 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1993). At most, the grand jury might have been misled about whether there was probable cause to indict, and Trujillo's subsequent conviction renders any such error harmless.
Trujillo contends that the failure of Special Agent Fong to make contemporaneous notes of interactions between Trujillo and an informant ran afoul of the government's obligations under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). However, Fong did make a report later, and that report was disclosed before trial. He was cross-examined about both the report and his delay in making it. We can't see how this could amount to a discovery violation, or how the fact that notes about Trujillo's payments to the informant to get out of jail were not contemporaneously recorded could have made any difference to the outcome of Trujillo's trial on drug trafficking charges. If there was error, it was surely harmless. United States v. Lehman, 792 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986); United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1471 (9th Cir. 1988).

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