Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/346/556/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:44:01+00:00

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Eight individuals who owned undivided interests aggregating 85% in a ship which was certificated under the maritime laws of the United States instituted a proceeding in a California state court at San Diego, the home port of the vessel, for sale of the vessel and partition of the proceeds pursuant to a California statute. The defendant was an individual who owned a 15% interest in the vessel, and personal service was had upon him by summons. The state court's decision that it had jurisdiction was upheld by the State Supreme Court, which declined to issue a writ of prohibition.
1. Under the federal admiralty power, United States District Courts have jurisdiction to order vessels sold for partition. Pp. 346 U. S. 557-560.
2. The jurisdiction of the federal courts was not exclusive, and the California court was "competent" to give this partition remedy, and had jurisdiction of the cause of action. Pp. 346 U. S. 560-561.
(a) The federal admiralty jurisdiction is "exclusive" only as to those maritime causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem, and the proceedings in this partition case were not in rem in the admiralty sense. Pp. 346 U. S. 560-561.
(b) The state court in this proceeding acts only upon the interests of the parties over whom it has jurisdiction in personam, and it does not affect the interests of others in the world at large, as it would if this were a proceeding to enforce a lien. P. 346 U. S. 561.
3. The California court's taking of jurisdiction of this partition suit at the instance of the majority shipowners does not run counter to any established rule of admiralty, nor do the circumstances justify the establishment of a national judicial rule controlling partition of ships. Pp. 346 U. S. 561-564.
4. The State Supreme Court's refusal to issue a writ of prohibition was a final judgment reviewable here under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. P. 557, n 1.
40 Cal.2d 65, 251 P.2d 1, affirmed.
This case for sale of a vessel and partition of the proceeds pursuant to a California statute began in the Superior Court of San Diego, the home port of the vessel. The plaintiffs were eight individuals, including Edward, Anthony, and Joseph Madruga. The defendant was Manuel Madruga, on whom personal service was had by summons. The defendant owned a 15% interest, and the eight plaintiffs owned undivided interests aggregating 85%, in a ship certificated under the maritime laws of the United States. The defendant 15% owner challenged the jurisdiction of the San Diego court on the ground that only the United States district court sitting in admiralty could take jurisdiction to consider such a case. The San Diego court decided it had jurisdiction, and was upheld by the State Supreme Court, which declined to issue a writ of prohibition. [Footnote 1] 40 Cal.2d 65, 251 P.2d 1. Certiorari was granted to consider the state court's jurisdiction. 345 U.S. 963.
Steamer Eclipse, 135 U. S. 599, 135 U. S. 608. [Footnote 11] We think, however, that the power of admiralty, as Congress and the courts have developed it over the years, is broad enough for United States district courts to order vessels sold for partition. This brings us to the contention that this federal admiralty power is exclusive.
not a ship or some other instrument of navigation. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303, 237 U. S. 306-309. Aside from its inability to provide a remedy in rem for a maritime cause of action, this Court has said that a state, "having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit" so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the"substantive maritime law." Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 264 U. S. 124.
The proceedings in this California partition case were not in rem in the admiralty sense. The plaintiffs' quarrel was with their co-owner, not with the ship. Manuel Madruga, not the ship, was made defendant. Thus, the state court in this proceeding acts only upon the interests of the parties over whom it has jurisdiction in personam, and it does not affect the interests of others in the world at large, as it would if this were a proceeding in rem to enforce a lien. The California court is "competent" to give this partition remedy, and it therefore has jurisdiction of the cause of action.
registration after their judicial sale. [Footnote 14] But Congress has never seen fit to bar states from making such sales, or to adopt a national partition rule. [Footnote 15] Nor has any such rule been established by decisions of this Court. And, as pointed out above, decisions of lower federal courts and of state courts show varying ideas as to what kind of partition rule should be adopted, if any. We do not think the circumstances call on us to add to congressional regulation by attempting establishment of a national judicial rule controlling partition of ships. See Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 302 U. S. 9-14. Cf. 53 U. S. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299.
of such a national rule has produced few difficulties over the years, it appears to us that it would be better to let well enough alone.
MR. JUSTICE REED concurs in the judgment of the Court.
The State Supreme Court's judgment finally disposing of the writ of prohibition is a final judgment reviewable here under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
"The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in cases of part owners, having unequal interests and shares, is not and never has been applied to direct a sale upon any dispute between them as to the trade and navigation of a ship engaged in maritime voyages properly so called. The majority of the owners have a right to employ the ship in such voyages as they may please; giving a stipulation to the dissenting owners for the safe return of the ship if the latter, upon a proper libel filed in the admiralty, require it. And the minority of the owners may employ the ship in the like manner if the majority decline to employ her at all. So the law is laid down in Lord Tenterden's excellent Treatise on Shipping. Abbot on Ship. part 1, chap. 3, sec. 4 to sec. 7. If, therefore, this were a vessel engaged in maritime navigation, the libel for a sale could not be maintained."
Some have thought that Mr. Justice Story here rejected the idea of admiralty jurisdiction to sell ships for partition. But, however that may be, he made it clear in his book on partnership that he believed admiralty courts did have such jurisdiction. Story, Partnership (1st ed. 1841), § 439, n. 1.
E.g., The Seneca, Fed.Cas.No.12,670 (1829); The Emma B., 140 F. 771 (1906). Compare discussion in Davis v. The Seneca, Fed.Cas.No.3,650 (1828), rev'd, The Seneca, supra.
E.g., Lewis v. Kinney, Fed.Cas.No.8,325 (1879); The Red Wing, 10 F.2d 389 (1925); see Coyne v. Caples, 8 F. 638, 639-640 (1881); Fischer v. Carey, 173 Cal. 185, 189-192, 159 P. 577, 578-579 (1916).
Tunno v. The Betsina, Fed.Cas.No.14,236.
E.g., Andrews v. Betts, 8 Hun. (N.Y.) 322 (1876); Francis v. Lavine, 26 La.Ann. 311 (1874).
Swain v. Knapp, 32 Minn. 429, 21 N.W. 414 (1884); Reynolds v. Nielson, 116 Wis. 483, 93 N.W. 455 (1903).
E.g., Fischer v. Carey, 173 Cal. 185, 159 P. 577 (1916); Cline v. Price, 39 Wash.2d 816, 239 P.2d 322 (1951).
Citations to cases with these varied holdings are collected in Note 302, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333; 90 Am.St.Rep. 378-380 and in L.R.A.1917A, 1114-1116.
In England, Kings Bench prohibited Admiralty's exercise of partition jurisdiction in Ouston v. Hebden, 1 Wils.K.B. 101, 95 Eng.Rep. 515 (1745). However, jurisdiction, which extended even to minority share owners, was later given to admiralty by statute. The Admiralty Court Act, 1861, 24 Vic. c. 10, § 8.
For applications of this decision, see, e.g., The Guayaquil, 29 F.Supp. 578 (1939); Hirsch v. The San Pablo, 81 F.Supp. 292 (1948).
The 1948 and 1949 revisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1333, amended the above clause. It now reads: " . . . saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." We take it that this change in no way narrowed the jurisdiction of the state courts under the original 1789 Act.
Title 46 U.S.C. 46 U.S.C. In particular, see: § 11, limiting United States ship registration to ships owned by United States citizens or United States corporations having only citizens as officers (from Act of Dec. 31, 1792, c. 1, § 2, 1 Stat. 288); § 25, prescribing a form for registration which requires detailed information as to the ship's description, its builders, and the identity and proportion of ownership of all its owners (from Act of Dec. 31, 1792, c. 1, § 9, 1 Stat. 291); § 39, requiring new registration upon any sale or alteration of a ship (from Act of Dec. 31, 1792, c. 1, § 14, 1 Stat. 294); § 808, placing restrictions on the sale to aliens of vessels owned by a United States citizen or corporation (from Act of Sept. 7, 1916, c. 451, § 9, 39 Stat. 730, as amended by Act of July 15, 1918, c. 152, § 3, 40 Stat. 900); § 921, providing that no sale, conveyance or mortgage of a vessel of the United States shall be valid against one other than the grantor or mortgagor, his heirs or persons with notice, until recorded (from Act of June 5, 1920, c. 250, § 30, 41 Stat. 1000).
46 U.S.C. § 34 provides for registration of vessels sold under process of law where the former owner retains the ship's registration, upon the new owner's meeting the legal requirements for registry (from Act of Mar. 2, 1797, c. 7, 1 Stat. 498).
It is noteworthy that Congress has explicitly placed partition actions under federal jurisdiction only where the United States is a tenant, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1347, 2409. Partition of real estate belonging to Oklahoma Indians has been made subject to state laws, 25 U.S.C. § 355.
"The rule of the civil, as of the common, law, that no one should be compelled to hold property in common with another grew out of a purpose to prevent strife and disagreement. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 648. And additional reasons are found in the more modern policy of facilitating the transmission of titles, and in the inconvenience of joint holding."
Caldwell v. Snyder, 178 Pa. 420, 422, 35 A. 996.
". . . [P]artition is a right much favored, upon the ground that it not only secures peace, but promotes industry and enterprise; that each should have his own."
Cannon v. Lomax, 29 S.C. 369, 371, 7 S.E. 529, 530.
For one reason or another, eight co-owners having eighty-five percent interest in a vessel wished to terminate the enterprise, but found the present petitioner, owner of the remaining fifteen percent, opposed to sale. Accordingly, they asked a California State court for judicial sale of the vessel and appropriate distribution of the proceeds among all the owners. This is the only claim the plaintiffs made. There was no claim to enforce a personal right against the petitioner, no claim of any sort for which the levy on the ship as security was sought for some personal obligation owing from the petitioner. The jurisdiction of the State court was invoked exclusively for the sale of vessel.
Vessel Liberty, Official No. 256332, or if the action had in fact been so entitled, it would inescapably be deemed an action in rem? To make the existence of State power depend on such tenuous formalities is to make questions of jurisdiction in matters maritime, as between federal and State courts, turn on distinctions much too frail.
"the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in admiralty is full and complete touching the matter of sale under the circumstances here indicated, that is to say, where dissentient owners are at strife over the use to be made of the ship, for it must, from the nature of admiralty jurisdiction, be a fundamental part of that jurisdiction to exercise control over the rem -- the ship itself."
U.S.C. § 1333. [Footnote 2/2] The Reviser's notes completely refute this view. And, since this Court does not adopt the construction given § 1333 by the California Supreme Court, the argument against it need not be elaborated.
Once it is established that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that the remedy here sought in a State court has "all the essential features of an admiralty proceeding in rem," The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 71 U. S. 571, the disposition of this case is clearly controlled by decisions of this Court. They were thus summarized in an opinion for the Court by Mr. Justice Brandeis, than whom no member of this Court gave wider scope to concurrent State jurisdiction in maritime matters: "A state may not provide a remedy in rem for any cause of action within the admiralty jurisdiction." Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 264 U. S. 124.
From the admiralty clause of the Constitution this Court has drawn probably greater substantive lawmaking powers than it exercises in any other area of the law. See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158. Broad as are the implications of this clause, it does not authorize this Court to decide as a matter of policy, wholly untrammeled by the historic roots of admiralty, what relief may be sought exclusively in the federal admiralty courts and what may be concurrently given by the State courts. It is significant that the need for a body of maritime law, applicable throughout the nation and not left to the diversity of the several States, was the one basis for the creation of a system of inferior federal courts, authorized by the Constitution, which was recognized by every shade of opinion at the Philadelphia Convention.
Were Congress to authorize the States to exercise jurisdiction for the partition of vessels, we would, of course, have a very different question than the one now before us, the more so because one may assume that such a statute would differentiate between small craft plying within a limited area and ocean-going vessels. This Court cannot, on its own initiative, make such differentiations, regarding the power of State courts, as between small vessels and large. Whatever power may be exercised by Congress in ceding national maritime jurisdiction to the States, it is not for this Court to allow State courts to have concurrent jurisdiction in rem solely because the "establishment of a national partition rule is not of major importance to the shipping world."
Fischer v. Carey was recently followed in Cline v. Price, 39 Wash.2d 816, 239 P.2d 322 (1951).
The original "saving clause" read: "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." 28 U.S.C. § 1333. It now reads: "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."

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 § 1333
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 § 648
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