Source: https://arizona.lexroll.com/abounader-v-industrial-commission-12-ariz-app-535-1970/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:12:42+00:00

Document:
Thomas L. ABOUNADER, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Northeast Construction Company of West Virginia, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier.
No. 1 CA-IC 265.Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, Department B.
August 10, 1970. Rehearing Denied October 13, 1970. Review Denied December 8, 1970.
Proceeding for certiorari to review lawfulness of award of Industrial Commission, Claim No. BC 45125. The Court of Appeals, Eubank, P.J., held that the workman on seeking rehearing on award ordered pursuant to formal hearing had the burden to raise his contention that he had been denied opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to make written application to the Commission to compel attendance of such witnesses, and by failure to sustain such burden, he waived his right to cross-examine witness employees of his employer.
Gorey Ely by Stephen S. Gorey, Phoenix, for petitioner.
Donald L. Cross, Chief Counsel, Phoenix, for respondent, Industrial Commission of Arizona.
Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel, by A.B. Parsons, Phoenix, for respondent, State Compensation Fund.
The sole question raised for review is whether or not the Industrial Commission provided the petitioner with the opportunity to cross-examine two of respondent-employer’s employee witnesses. A review of the record shows that they did and we affirm the award.
that the petitioner was not on an assignment for the employer when he was injured in an automobile accident while returning to his home.
“My purpose at this time is to ask if you wish the opportunity of cross-examing (sic) Mr. Shepherd and Mr. Dunlap. If you do want the opportunity of so doing, a serious problem again presents itself, in that their attendance at a Phoenix hearing would be no more likely at this time than it was before. Assuming that you do want to cross-examine them and assuming further that inasmuch as they reside in Gallup, New Mexico, it would not be possible for them to come to Phoenix, the only other alternative would be to once again schedule a hearing in Gallup or Windowrock for said purpose. If this is the only feasable (sic) means of accomplishing an opportunity for cross-examination, the question arises of whether your client is financially able to have you represent him in one of those cities. I trust he is not since you were not present at the 11-10-66 hearing. In that event, upon receipt from you of an appropriate request, I would present the matter to the Commission in an effort to obtain authorization for the payment by the Commission of your travel expenses incurred in connection therewith.
Counsel did not reply to this letter. On January 11, 1967, the Referee sent a follow-up letter to petitioner’s counsel requesting that he reply to his December 8th letter of the prior year. Counsel for the petitioner did not reply to this letter either. Over one month later, the Referee advised the Commission of these facts and suggested that the matter be submitted to it for its decision. The recommendation was approved and on March 10, 1967, the Commission entered its findings and award denying petitioner compensation on the basis that he had failed to sustain his burden of proof that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
On April 20, 1967, the petitioner filed a timely petition for rehearing. This petition contained a Commission Rule 38 statement of grounds which did not include therein the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine the two witnesses who testified at Window Rock. Thereafter, a stipulated hearing date was set on November 7, 1967 at Phoenix. The hearing was held but the record shows that the petitioner failed to make a written application to the Commission under its Rule 35 for it to issue subpoenas to compel the appearance of the two witnesses for the purpose of cross-examination.
Following the hearing, on March 15, 1968, the Referee filed his report recommending that the Commission affirm its prior award of March 10, 1967, denying petitioner compensation. No objection was filed by petitioner and the award affirming its March 10 award was made by the Commission on April 15, 1968. This award contained the 20-day clause. Petitioner filed a timely “Notice of Protest of Award” and “Protest of Decision”, which was treated by the Commission as a Rule 37 motion for rehearing, and which was denied by Commission order on June 4, 1968. Petitioner then applied to this court for a writ of certiorari to review the lawfulness of the June 4th order and the April 15th award, as authorized by A.R.S. § 12-120.21, subsec. A(2) (1964), which was granted.
(1968) cited as authority by all parties. However, this case does not turn on that precise question. The immediate question is whether or not the petitioner was under any obligation to request the opportunity to cross-examine the two witnesses at the second formal hearing held on November 7, 1967. We are of the opinion that he was and his failure to do so precludes him now from relying upon the issue he advances in this case. Two cases primarily lead us to this conclusion: the first is Russell v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ariz. 548, 456 P.2d 918 (1969), and the second is Davis v. Industrial Commission, supra. The Russell case is important in restating the relationship between successive hearings. First, citing Martin v. Industrial Commission, 88 Ariz. 14, 352 P.2d 352 (1960), the court affirmed the Commission’s power to make an award without a hearing, so long as a full and impartial hearing is granted to a dissatisfied party upon his filing a timely protest; Second, citing Wammack v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ariz. 321, 320 P.2d 950 (1958) the court confirmed that the granting of the first motion to rehear the award had the effect of setting aside or vacating the award and that when the rehearing of the cause was on its merits the subsequent award supersedes the former award; Third, the court reaffirmed that the burden of proof at the rehearing is on the petitioner to establish a compensable disability within the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; and Fourth, that where a timely protest or petition for rehearing was not filed then the award becomes res judicata.
In Davis the petitioner apparently was of the opinion that the magic words “opportunity to cross-examine” freed him from his burden of proof at the rehearing of a formal award. The holding by the Supreme Court quoted above, we believe, puts this view to rest. In the case at bar, as in Davis, the petitioner had the burden to raise the cross-examination issue, under Commission Rule 38, supra, and to make a written application to the Commission under its Rule 35, supra, to compel the attendance of the witnesses he desired to cross-examine in order to preserve his claimed error. By his failure to do so, as in Davis, he waived his right to cross-examine the two witness employees of the respondent-employer.
We have reviewed the claimant’s file, and in addition to the foregoing, we agree with the Commission that the petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
HAIRE and JACOBSON, JJ., concur.
“38. Grounds for Rehearing Must Be Set Forth: — Such application must be verified on oath, and must set forth specifically and in detail the grounds on which the applicant therefor considers such award or decision to be unjust or unlawful and every issue to be considered by the Commission.
(a) If the grounds upon which such rehearing is requested are that the evidence does not justify the findings or that the findings do not support the decision or award, the application for rehearing shall state specifically wherein the findings are not supported by evidence, or wherein the decision or award is not justified by the findings.
(b) Every ground or complaint, or defense, to such award or decision not so specified in such petition shall be deemed fully and finally waived.

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