Source: http://sundaysplits.com/category/con-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:21:09+00:00

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Sitting or Standing … Injury in Fact after a Data Breach?
A battle wages on between creative hackers and information security professionals, each struggling to outpace the other. Likely, most of us already have had personal or medical information leaked in one of several massive data breaches in recent years, possibly even today with the news coming out that five million Lord and Taylor and Saks Fifth Avenue customers had their information stolen. Until you are hit with identify theft, medical insurance fraud, or some other abuse of your data, your options are only to lock down credit reports and purchase identity theft insurance, then sit back and hope your personal information is not misused.
In the meantime, you are upset, you are worried, but so far it does not seem like the hackers have used your data. For the sake of this article, we will call you an “Unharmed Victim.” Do you have standing to sue?
In Fero v. Excellus Health Plan (W.D.N.Y. 2018), hackers gained access to the Excellus’ computer network and the personal identity information (PII) of more than 10.5 million individuals; however, as far as the plaintiffs knew, the hackers had not yet used or misused their stolen data.
The Fero case highlights a wide split among the Circuit courts. In Fero, a district court found standing for Unharmed Victims of a data breach to sue, relying on the rationale of a recent unpublished Second Circuit case, Whalen v. Michaels Stores (2017). The Fero court cited to similar holdings in several other Circuits which found plaintiffs had standing based on an increased identity theft risk, including Galaria v. Nationwide (6th Cir. 2016), Remijas v Neiman Marcus (7th Cir. 2015), and Attias v. Carefirst (D.C. Cir. 2017).
On the other hand, the Third, Fourth and Eighth circuits in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. (3rd Cir. 2011), Beck v. McDonald (4th Cir. 2016) and In re: SuperValu Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation. (8th Cir. 2017), all declined to find standing in data breach cases wherein hackers had not yet used or misused plaintiffs’ stolen data.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing by demonstrating three elements: 1) an injury in fact; 2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant; and 3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Further to the first element of Lujan, in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff must allege an injury that is “concrete, particularized, actual or imminent…” and emphasized that a future injury must be “certainly impending,” rather than simply speculative.
In certain circuits, Unharmed Victims’ ability to establish standing by pleading an injury in fact is significantly more challenging than in other circuits.
The Fero court cites the Sixth, Seventh and D.C. Circuit in finding standing on the basis that an increased identity theft risk is sufficient to state an injury in fact.
On the other side of the split, the Third, Fourth and Eighth circuits have declined to grant standing to plaintiffs whose stolen data was not yet used or misused, saying the mere risk of identity theft is too speculative to constitute an injury, and therefore insufficient to constitute injury in fact. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit argued against standing because as more and more time passed after the breach, with the plaintiffs still unable to produce evidence of their PII or PHI being misused, the threat of injury became more and more speculative.
On February 16, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to review an appeal of the D.C. Circuit’s decision to deny standing in Attias v. CareFirst.
Without Supreme Court guidance, the Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. circuits have now seemingly emerged as the clear forums of choice for data breach class actions. Conversely, defendant companies will logically seek to consolidate data breach class actions in the Third, Fourth and Eighth Circuits. There are other Circuits not mentioned in the Fero case that may widen the split on this issue.
Do the due process restrictions on shackling criminal defendants apply equally to jury and non-jury proceedings?
Due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments restricts the use of physical restraints on criminal defendants during a criminal trial. Because shackles are inherently prejudicial, the Supreme Court instructed in Deck v. Morrison (2005) that defendants should only be shackled during trial as a last resort. Shackles interfere with a jury’s ability to make accurate determinations about both guilt and sentencing because they imply to a jury that the defendant is dangerous, and may cause a jury to infer negative attributes about the defendant’s character.
The Court established a rule in Deck that physical restraints that are visible to a jury may only be used after a trial court determination that they are justified by an essential state interest, based on particular concerns in a specific defendant’s trial. For example, a trial court may find that a particular defendant poses such severe security risks that shackling is necessary to protect the occupants of the courtroom. Judges may not impose blanket rules about the use of restraints, and the inquiry must be specific to concerns about the particular defendant. The Deck rule applies to both guilt-determination proceedings and to sentencing proceedings.
The presumption of a defendant’s innocence until proven guilty. Visible restraints erode the fairness of the criminal proceeding by implying that the defendant is dangerous and tipping the scale in favor of guilt.
The defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. Shackles interfere with a defendant’s ability to move freely to communicate with her attorney. Defendants physically struggle to write when they are restricted by shackles, which limits their ability to effectively communicate with counsel during criminal proceedings.
The dignity and decorum of the courtroom is necessary to support confidence that the legal system pursues justice as it handles the potential deprivation of liberty. Courtroom dignity requires that defendants are treated respectfully.
The Court only addressed jury proceedings in Deck. The Deck holding left lower courts to determine whether a defendant’s due process rights require the same justification for shackles in proceedings without juries.
The Second Circuit does not require a specific evaluation of the need for restraints in non-jury proceedings. Because juror prejudice is the primary concern for limiting the use of restraints in the courtroom, the Second Circuit examined in United States v. Zuber (1997) whether a concern of prejudice is present when judges rather than juries do the sentencing.
We traditionally assume that judges, unlike juries, are not prejudiced by impermissible factors, …, and we make no exception here. We presume that where, as here, the court defers without further inquiry to the recommendation of the Marshals Service that a defendant be restrained at sentencing, the court will not permit the presence of the restraints to affect its sentencing decision.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Lafond (2015) that the Deck rule against restraints only limits the use of restraints at proceedings with juries.
The Ninth Circuit arrived at a different conclusion in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez (2017). The court extended the Deck rule to non-jury proceedings and clarified that it applies in pretrial, trial, and sentencing proceedings. The Ninth Circuit now requires that, before shackling a criminal defendant in both jury and non-jury proceedings, courts must decide if the security concerns with the particular defendant outweigh the infringement on the defendant’s due process right.
Continuing with the rationale for the Deck rule, the court applied the principle of presuming a defendant’s innocence until proven guilty.
The principle [that defendants are innocent until proven guilty] isn’t limited to juries or trial proceedings. It includes the perception of any person who may walk into a public courtroom, as well as those of the jury, the judge and court personnel. A presumptively innocent defendant has the right to be treated with respect and dignity in a public courtroom, not like a bear on a chain.
Courtrooms are palaces of justice, imbued with a majesty that reflects the gravity of proceedings designed to deprive a person of liberty or even life. A member of the public who wanders into a criminal courtroom must immediately perceive that it is a place where justice is administered with due regard to individuals whom the law presumes to be innocent. That perception cannot prevail if defendants are marched in like convicts on a chain gang. Both the defendant and the public have the right to a dignified, inspiring and open court process. Thus, innocent defendants may not be shackled at any point in the courtroom unless there is an individualized showing of need.
The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari for Sanchez-Gomez, but declined to take up the issue of whether due process prohibits the use of restraints in non-jury proceedings. The circuit split and conflicting rationales present a need for clarity on this important constitutional issue.
Prayer in the United States has been contentious ever since it was forbidden in schools. Although over half of Americans say they pray daily, the Supreme Court, in Engel v. Vitale, ruled that public school students cannot be required to begin their day with a nonsectarian prayer . Across the nation, numerous local, county, and state officials take their opening time allotted to them to pray. These prayers are often sectarian in nature.
The argument around prayer in these public institutions stems from the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution which states, “Congress Shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” Circuit courts are split on how to interpret the clause as it relates to the often sectarian prayers that open meetings. The split boils down to whether lawmakers are able to lead prayer in a sectarian manner.
The Split: Does a lawmaker’s sectarian prayer violate the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution?
The Fourth Circuit ruled that it does. In Rowan v. Lund County, a county in North Carolina had rotating prayer which the elected officials would lead in a clearly sectarian manner. No one other than the elected officials were permitted to offer the prayer. The court ruled that the practice caused the government to be aligned with Christianity with the risk that minority faith citizens would see it as a message of exclusion. They reasoned that although Town of Greece allowed for sectarian prayer from guests and volunteers, the “intimate government involvement” identified the government more strongly with that particular religion because the legislators were the only eligible people to deliver the prayer.
Additionally, the court looked at the audience of the prayers. While Town of Greece found that the intended target of the prayers were the legislators, the Fourth Circuit found that these prayers were intended for the audience and sought audience involvement rather than target specifically the legislators.
Because the audience was targeted and compelled to participate in the prayer, and because the prayers aligned the government with Christianity, the Fourth Circuit ruled that prayers given by lawmakers violated the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution.
The Sixth Circuit took a different approach. In Bormuth v. County of Jackson, a county in Michigan held monthly meetings which were opened by the Commissioners with prayer. A member of the community did not follow Christianity, the religion of all Commissioners, and felt isolated and the Board of Commissioners would prejudice against him because of his beliefs. He voiced his concerns to the Board and was met with expressions of disgust and disagreement, confirming his fear. He filed suit later against the County for violating the Establishment Clause.
Much like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, looked at Town of Greece concerning whether the Commissioners’ prayer practice fell within the tradition of legislative prayer. Looking at the history of legislative prayer, the court rebuked the Fourth Circuit for not engaging the entire legislative prayer history as they had. They found that it was so commonplace that it has been “uninterrupted and continues in modern time.” They say that to strike down a prayer based on the deliverer is an absurd result because one prayer delivered by a minister would be permitted while the same prayer delivered by a lawmaker would be stricken down. To this end, the court holds that the prayers were well within the tradition of legislative prayer.
Next, the court looked to see if the content of the prayer was incompatible with the Establishment Clause. While disparaging and distinguishing the Fourth Circuit’s decision that the content of the prayer was against non-Christians as similar to those in Town of Greece, the court does not agree that one comment that was Christian in nature was enough to disparage nonbelievers. The court also considered that anyone may be elected to the board and lead a prayer in any way that they so choose once elected, adding to their argument that the content and make-up of the Board is irrelevant.
Although the court was unable to determine which coercion standard to apply from Town of Greece, they held that the prayers were not unconstitutionally coercive under either standard, so they did not need to resolve the issue.
Because the prayers were not coercive, not too-Christian in content, not affected by the Board’s composition, and not outside the scope of historic practices, the Sixth Circuit held that the County of Jackson did not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
Prayer is a regular part of many town, county, and state meetings. These decisions will ultimately affect how those processes change depending on which jurisdiction the polity may find itself. To that end and due to the current Supreme Court’s enthusiasm with religious freedom cases, the Supreme Court is likely to grant cert. to these cases and settle whether the sectarian prayers are constitutional.

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