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Timestamp: 2019-04-20 07:09:39+00:00

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3. in any event, to refrain from indicating in respect of the Italian Republic the provisional measures specified in the Yugoslav request, or any other provisional measure."
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of June, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Italian Republic, respectively.
Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, Judges Shi, Koroma and Vereshchetin, and Judge ad hoc Gaja append declarations to the Order of the Court.
Judge ad hoc KRECA appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the Court.
I make this declaration having regard to the human tragedy and the acute suffering caused throughout Yugoslavia by the present conflict.
The Court has observed that its decision in no way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case under Article IX of the Genocide Convention or any questions relating to the admissibility of the Application or relating to the merits themselves and leaves unaffected the right of the Parties to submit arguments in respect of these questions.
The Court is thus seised of this case and continues to be so seised of it until the hearing. It is not a case where for manifest lack of jurisdiction it can be dismissed in limine, as was the case with the Applications against the United States and Spain. This aspect is expressly recognized in para-graph 2 of the operative part of the Order wherein it is decided that the Court reserves subsequent procedure for further decision.
Quite apart from the question of the issue of provisional measures, I therefore consider it appropriate for the Court to issue an appeal to both Parties to the effect that they should act in accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law including humanitarian law, and do nothing to aggravate or extend the conflict.
This is in my view the appropriate course to be followed when a dispute involving the use of force, loss of human life and a vast amount of suffering awaits determination on the merits.
I am fortified in believing this to be the appropriate course by the observations made by the Court relating to its profound concern with the human tragedy and loss of life involved and by its reference to its own responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and security under the Char-ter and the Statute of the Court.
Such an appeal in my view would be well within the Court's functions and responsibilities under the Charter and the Statute as well as under its inherent jurisdiction as more fully explained by me in my dissenting opinion in Yugoslavia v. Belgium.
Such an appeal would in my view have more value than the mere reference to these matters in the text of the Order.
It is for these reasons that I felt compelled to vote against the operative paragraph 39 (1) of the present Order.
In other words, and as stated in the commentary on the Article, the time [p 499] of the Commission of this breach is not limited to the moment at which the act begins, but extends over the whole period during which the act takes place and continues contrary to the requirements of the international obligation. Therefore, the Court's finding that Yugoslavia had not established the existence of a specific dispute, distinct from the preceding one, which arose after 25 April 1999 does not appear to me tenable in law.
For the foregoing reasons, I cannot concur with the inaction of the Court in this matter, although I concede that in some of the cases insti-[p 501]tuted by the Applicant the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, at this stage of the proceedings, is open to doubt, and in relation to Spain and the United States is non-existent.
While I agree with the Court's Order on all points, I feel that some further explanation should be given for the decision not to remove this case from the List.
Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court states that a case should not be entered on the General List when the applicant State only relies on the possibility of forum prorogatum until the defendant State consents to the jurisdiction of the Court for the case. Should a case of this type nevertheless have been entered on the List, Article 38, paragraph 5, implies that it should be struck off. The same should apply when the applicant State relies on a jurisdictional basis that is manifestly inexistent. This has been done by the Court � rightly in my opinion � in the parallel Orders given in the cases Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) and ( Yugoslavia v. United States of America).
I come now to the situation in which the Applicant invokes a jurisdictional clause in a treaty, but has not shown that a reasonable connection exists between the dispute submitted to the Court and the treaty including the clause. This case seems to me analogous to the ones I have con-sidered above only if no such connection could be established at subsequent stages of the proceedings. When on the contrary a reasonable connection may conceivably appear in the future, it would be too drastic a solution to remove the case from the List. The applicant State should therefore be given an opportunity to develop its position in a memorial � whether or not its arguments are meritorious.
As a matter of judicial policy, this way of proceeding seems preferable because it allows the Court to establish the truth of any allegation of a wrongful act as serious as genocide.
A starting point for this solution is that, as the majority of the Court held in the Judgment on the preliminary objections in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 616, para. 32), the Genocide Convention imposes on States parties to it the obligation not to commit genocide. It appears to me clear that were State organs involved in genocide, the State would grossly infringe its obligation to prevent genocide as set out in Article I of the Convention.
1. I entirely support the decision of the Court in dismissing the requests for the indication of provisional measures submitted on 29 April 1999 by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against ten respondent States � Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
While favouring subparagraph (2) of the operative paragraph in which the Court ordered that the case be removed from the General List of the Court in the cases of Spain and the United States, I voted against subparagraph (2) of the operative paragraph in the other eight cases in which the Court ordered that it [r]eserves the subsequent procedure for further decision" because I believe that those eight cases should also be removed from the General List of the Court.
"the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can [p 505] not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations"
5. The Applications of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refer to the acts of the ten respondent States by which the Federal Republic of Yugo-[p506]slavia alleges that they have violated certain obligations as listed in the section of each Application entitled "Subject of the Dispute". The acts which are listed in the section of each Application entitled "Claim" may have occurred, but the fact alone that a State allegedly committed these acts or actions as described in the section "Facts upon Which the Claim is Based" cannot constitute the existence of a "legal dispute" between two States within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
12. The making of a declaration is a unilateral act, which, far from being in the nature of a concession, is in fact to the State's advantage, in that it confers a right of action against States in a similar position. However, as the making of the declaration functions in the same way as an [p 509] offer to conclude an agreement and depends on reciprocity, the practical effectiveness of the system depends on the number of States which are willing to participate in it and on the relative breadth of the obligations which they are prepared to accept thereunder. The acceptance is commonly hedged with reservations and exclusions.
14. All of these facts indicate that some States accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court out of their good will but on the understanding that other States have the same good intentions. If this good faith is lack-[p 510]ing, the system of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court cannot work in the manner in which the drafters of the Statute intended.
17. As late as the second round of oral hearings, which took place on 12 May 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supplemented its Applications against Belgium and the Netherlands by invoking as additional grounds of jurisdiction of the Court, respectively, Article 4 of the 1930 Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration [p 511] between Yugoslavia and Belgium, and Article 4 of the 1931 Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation between Yugoslavia and the Netherlands. Irrespective of the question of whether these instru-ments still remain valid in the present-day relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the two respondent States, and whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is entitled to invoke them as a basis of jurisdiction at such a late stage, I have to say that in my view the reliance on these instruments by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is totally unfounded.
"[disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpret-[p 512]tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention . . . shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute".
To be sure, the Contracting Parties to the Convention defined genocide as 'a crime under international law' (Art. I). The Convention binds the Contracting Parties to punish persons responsible for those acts, whoever they may be, and is thus directed to the punishment of persons committing genocide and genocidal acts (Art. IV). The Contracting Parties undertake 'to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention' (Art. V).
As persons committing genocide or genocidal acts may possibly be 'constitutionally responsible rulers [or] public officials' (Art. IV), [p 514] the Convention contains a specific provision which allows '[a]ny Contracting Party [to] call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of [those acts]' (Art. VIII) and contemplates the establishment of an international penal tribunal (Art. VI).
Genocide is defined as 'a crime under international law which [the Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and punish' (Art. I). Even if this general clause (which was subjected to criticism at the Sixth Committee in 1948 when it was felt by some delegates that it should have been placed in the preamble, but not in the main text) is to be interpreted as meaning specifically that the Contracting Parties are obliged 'to prevent and to punish' genocide and genocidal acts, these legal obligations are borne in a general manner erga omnes by the Contracting Parties in their relations with all the other Contracting Parties to the Convention � or, even, with the international community as a whole � but are not obligations in relation to any specific and particular signatory Contracting Party.
The construction of Article IX of the Genocide Convention is very uncertain as it incorporates specific references to '[disputes .. . relating to . . . fulfilment of the Convention' and to 'disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or [genocidal acts]' � ref-[p 515]erences which can hardly be understood in any meaningful sense as a compromissory clause.
When this draft was taken up by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in its Third Session in October 1948, the addition of the two aforementioned references was proposed (Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Sixth Committee, Annexes, p. 28: A/C6/258) without, in my view, the drafters having a clear picture of the new type of convention to be adopted. While some delegates understood that 'fulfilment' would not be different from 'application', a proposal to delete 'fulfilment' from the additions was rejected by 27 votes to 10, with 8 abstentions. However, another deletion of the words 'including [disputes] relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or [genocidal acts]' was also rejected but only by 19 votes to 17, with 9 abstentions (Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Sixth Committee, SR. 104, p. 447). The travaux pr�paratoires of the Convention seem to confirm that there was some measure of confusion among the drafters, reflecting in particular the unique nature of their task in the prevailing spirit of the times.
Provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party may be indicated by the Court 11 if it considers that the circumstances so require" (Statute, Art. 41, emphasis added). It thus falls within the discretion of the Court to grant provisional measures upon the request of the applicant State.
Where the Court finds that there is a prima facie basis of jurisdiction, this does not, of course, necessarily lead it to determine that it eventually has jurisdiction in the case. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case and the [p 518] Interhandel case, the Court, after granting provisional measures, ulti-mately found that it had no jurisdiction to be seised of these cases.
29. In conclusion I would like to express my sincere hope that the present situation in the territory of Yugoslavia, in the settlement of which the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the [p 519] United Nations has no role to play, will be resolved peacefully and in a way that satisfies all humanitarian aspects raised by this case.
1. Notwithstanding my agreement with the operative part of the Order, I consider it necessary to make the following observations.
"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute."
"the obligation contained in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide not to impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group ..." (Application of Yugoslavia, p. 12).
Furthermore, during the public hearings Yugoslavia stated "in the circumstances the intensive bombing of Yugoslav populated areas constitutes a breach of Article II of the Genocide Convention" (CR 99/25, p. 12, Brownlie).
4. The Respondent considers that it has not violated the Genocide Convention, because no genocide crimes have been committed during or as a result of the military intervention of the NATO countries in Yugoslavia.
and that, by reason of the rejection by Yugoslavia of the complaints formulated against it by Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'there is a legal dispute' between them (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 100, para. 22)" (Application of the Convention on [p 521] the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 614-615, para. 29).
6. Consequently, taking into account the allegations of the Parties in these incidental proceedings, there appears to exist, prima facie, a "legal dispute" between them regarding the interpretation and application of the Genocide Convention. For this reason, Article IX of the Genocide Convention is applicable and, in my opinion, the Court has prima facie jurisdiction to entertain the request for provisional measures presented by Yugoslavia.
7. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is the only prima facie basis for jurisdiction of the Court in the present case. Therefore the only provisional measures that it can indicate are those aiming to guarantee the rights of the Applicant under the Genocide Convention.
8. Yugoslavia is requesting the Court to indicate that the Respondent "shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and shall refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (CR 99/14, p. 63, Etinski). However, the threat or use of force against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. Consequently the provisional measures requested by Yugoslavia do not aim to guarantee its rights under the Genocide Convention, i.e., the right not to suffer acts which may be qualified as genocide crimes by the Convention. Therefore, in my opinion, the measures requested by Yugoslavia shall not be indicated.
"(a) to equalize the situation when the Bench already includes a Member of the Court having the nationality of one of the parties; and (b) to create a nominal equality between two litigating States when there is no Member of the Court having the nationality of either party" (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, Vol. Ill, pp. 1124-1125).
In the present case, the question of "the same conclusion" as the relevant criterion for the existence of "the same interest" of the respondent States is, in my opinion, unquestionable. The same conclusion was, in a way, inevitable in the present case in view of the identical Application which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has submitted against ten NATO member States, and was formally consecrated by the outcome of the proceedings before the Court held on 10, 11 and 12 May 1999, in which all the respondent States came to the identical conclusion resting on the foundation of practically identical argumentation which differed only in the fashion and style of presentation.
Hence, the inevitable conclusion follows, it appears to me, that all the respondent States are in concreto parties in the same interest.
The Statute, accordingly, refers to the right of "any other party", namely, a party other than the party which has a judge of its nationality, in the singular. But, it would be erroneous to draw the conclusion from the above that "any other party", other than the party which has a judge of its nationality, cannot, under certain circumstances, choose several judges ad hoc. Such an interpretation would clearly be in sharp contradiction with ratio legis of the institution of judge ad hoc, which, in this particular case, consists of the function "to equalize the situation when the Bench already includes a Member of the Court having the nationality of one of the parties" (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, Vol. Ill, pp. 1124-1125). The singular used in Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute with reference to the institution of judges ad hoc is, consequently, but individualization of the general, inherent right to equalization in the composition of the Bench in the relations between litigating parties, one of which has a judge of its nationality on the Bench, while the other has not. The practical meaning of this principle applied in casum would imply the right of the Applicant to choose as many judges ad hoc to sit on the Bench as is necessary to equalize the position of the Applicant and that of those respondent States which have judges of their nationality on the Bench and which share the same interest. In concreto, the inherent right to equalization in the composition of the Bench, as an expression of fundamental rule of equality of parties, means that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should have the right to choose five judges ad hoc, since even five out of ten respondent States (the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands) have their national judges sitting on the Bench.
Regarding the notion of equalization which concerns the relation between the party entitled to choose its judge ad hoc and the parties which have their national judges on the Bench, the fact is that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as can be seen from the Order, did not raise any objections to the circumstance that as many as five respondent States [p 525] have judges of their nationality on the Bench. However, this circumstance surely cannot be looked upon as something making the question irrelevant, or, even as the tacit consent of the Federal Republic of Yugo-slavia to such an outright departure from the letter and spirit of Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
The Court has, namely, the obligation to take account ex officio of the question of such a fundamental importance, which directly derives from, and vice versa, may directly and substantially affect, the equality of the parties. The Court is the guardian of legality for the parties to the case, for which presumptio juris et de jure alone is valid � to know the law (jura novit curia). As pointed out by Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume and Ranjeva in their joint declaration in the Lockerbie case: "that is for the Court � not the parties � to take the necessary decision" (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), I.C.J. Reports 1998. p. 36, para. 11).
The respondent States having no judge of their nationality on the Bench have chosen, in the usual procedure, their judges ad hoc (Belgium, Canada, Italy and Spain). Only Portugal has not designated its judge ad hoc. The Applicant successively raised objections to the appointment of the respondent States' judges ad hoc invoking Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the Court. The responses of the Court with respect to this question invariably contained the standard phrase "that the Court . . . found that the choice of a judge ad hoc by the Respondent is justified in the present phase of the case".
The meanings of equalization as a ratio legis institution of judges ad hoc, in the case concerning the Applicant and respondent States which [p 526] are parties in the same interest, and which do not have a judge ad hoc of their nationality on the Bench, have been dealt with in the practice of the Court, in a clear and unambiguous manner.
If, on the other hand, among the Members of the Court there is a judge having the nationality of even one of those parties, then no judge ad hoc will be appointed (Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, P.C.I.J., Series C, No. 17-11, p. 8; Customs Regime between Germany and Austria, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 41, p. 88).
This perfectly coherent jurisprudence of the Court applied to this particular case means that none of the respondent States were entitled to appoint a judge ad hoc.
5. Humanitarian concern, as a basis for the indication of provisional measures, has assumed primary importance in the more recent practice of the Court.
In this regard the cases concerning LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America) are characteristic.
"The importance and sanctity of an individual human life are well established in international law. As recognized by Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, every human being has the inherent right to life and this right shall be protected [p 527] by law." (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 12, para. 8).
The following day, the Court already unanimously indicated provisional measures because it found that in question was "a matter of the greatest urgency" (ibid., p. 15, para. 26), which makes it incumbent upon the Court to activate the mechanism of provisional measures in accordance with Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court in order: "to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings" (ibid., p. 16, para. 29).
Almost identical provisional measures were indicated by the Court in the dispute between Paraguay and the United States of America which had arisen on the basis of the Application submitted by Paraguay on 3 April 1998. On the same day, Paraguay also submitted an "urgent request for the indication of provisional measures in order to protect its rights" (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America). Order of 9 April 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 251, para. 6). As early as 9 April 1998 the Court unanimously indicated provisional measures so as to: "ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings" (ibid., p. 258, para. 41).
It is evident that humanitarian concern represented an aspect which brought about unanimity in the Court's deliberations. This is clearly shown not only by the letter and spirit of both Orders in the above-mentioned cases, but also by the respective declarations and the separate opinion appended to those Orders. In the process, humanitarian considerations seem to have been sufficiently forceful to put aside obstacles standing in the way of the indication of provisional measures. In this respect, the reasoning of the Court's senior judge, Judge Oda, and that of its President, Judge Schwebel, are indicative.
In paragraph 7 of his declaration appended to the Order of 3 March 1999 in the case concerning LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judge Oda convincingly put forward a series of reasons of a conceptual nature which explained why he "formed the view that, given the fundamental nature of provisional measures, those measures should not have been indicated upon Germany's request". But, Judge Oda goes on to "reiterate and emphasize" that he "voted in favour of the Order solely for humanitarian reasons" (I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 20).
The Court, for its part, indicated provisional measures, as President Schwebel put it, "on the basis only of Germany's Application".
"incidents . . . which not merely are likely to extend or aggravate the dispute but comprise a resort to force which is irreconcilable with the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes" (Frontier Dispute, Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9, para. 19).
"the facts that have given rise to the requests of both Parties for the indication of provisional measures expose the persons and property in the disputed area, as well as the interests of both States within that area, to serious risk of irreparable damage" (ibid., p. 10, para. 21).
It can be said that in the cases referred to above, in particular those in [p 529] which individuals were directly affected, the Court formed a high standard of humanitarian concern in the proceedings for the indication of interim measures, a standard which commanded sufficient inherent strength to brush aside also some relevant, both procedural and material, rules governing the institution of provisional measures. Thus, humanitarian considerations, independently from the norms of international law regulating human rights and liberties, have, in a way, gained autonomous legal significance; they have transcended the moral and philanthropic sphere, and entered the sphere of law.
6. In the case at hand, it seems that "humanitarian concern" has lost the acquired autonomous legal position. This fact needs to be stressed in view of the special circumstances of this case.
That these are not empty words is testified to by destroyed bridges, power plants without which there is no electricity, water supply and production [p 530] of foodstuffs essential for life; destroyed roads and residential blocks and family homes; hospitals without electricity and water and, above all, human beings who are exposed to bombing raids and who, as is rightly stressed in the Application in the LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America) case, have the "inherent right to life" (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6), whose importance and sanctity are well established in international law. In the inferno of violence, they are but "collateral damage".
� secundo, the arsenal used in the attacks on Yugoslavia contains also weapons whose effects have no limitations either in space or in time. In the oral proceedings before the Court, the Agent of the United States explicitly stressed that depleted uranium is in standard use of the United States Army (CR 99/24, p. 21).
"Once inhaled, fine uranium particles can lodge in the lung alveolar and reside there for the remainder of one's life. The dose due to uranium inhalation is cumulative. A percentage of inhaled particulates may be coughed up, then swallowed and ingested. Smoking is an additional factor that needs to be taken into account. Since smoking destroys the cilia, particles caught in a smoker's bronchial passages cannot be expelled. Gofman estimates that smoking increases the radiation risk by a factor of 10. Uranium emits an alpha particle, similar to a helium nucleus, with two electrons removed. Though this type of radiation is not very penetrating, it causes tremendous tissue damage when internalized. When inhaled, uranium increases the probability of lung cancer. When ingested, uranium concentrates in the bone. Within the bone, it increases the probability of bone cancer, or, in the bone marrow, leukemia. Uranium also resides in soft tissue, including the gonads, increasing the probability of genetic health effects, including birth defects and spontaneous abortions. The relationship between uranium ingested and the resultant radiation doses to the bone marrow and specific organs . . . are listed in numerous references.
"Je l�nger der Krieg in Jugoslawien dauert, desto gr�sser wird die Gefahr von lang-fristigen Sch�digungen der Umwelt. Diese drohen sich �ber die Landesgrenzen hinaus auszubreiten und k�nnen m�glicherweise nicht mehr vollst�ndig beseitigt werden. Zu dieser Einsch�tzung kommt das Umweltbundesamt (UBA) in einem internen Papier, das sich mit den �kologischen Auswirkungen des Krieges in Jugoslawien befasst und f�r die Vorbereitung des Treffens europ�ischer Umweltminister Anfang Mai in Weimar erstellt wurde. Katastrophen 'wie Seveso und Sandoz' sind nach Ansicht des Amtes 'ein durchaus wahrscheinliches Schadensszenario'.
Die Gefahr einer 'tiefgreifenden Zerst�rung wesentlicher Bestandteile von Trink-wasserversorgungssystemen' sei f�r mittlere und grosse St�dte sowie Ballungsgebiete am gr�ssten. Schon geringe Mengen von Substanzen der petrochemischen Industrie k�nnten 'grosse Grundwasservorr�te unbrauchbar machen'.
Die Verbrennungsprodukte seien 'zum Teil hoch toxisch und kanzerogen'. Je nach klimatischen Bedingungen k�nne es 'zu einer grossfl�chigen Verteilung dieser Stoffe' kommen, 'die eine vollst�ndige Beseitigung nahezu unm�glich macht' . . .
"The longer the war in Yugoslavia lasts, the greater the risk of long-term damage to the environment. Such damage threatens to extend beyond national frontiers, and it may no longer be possible fully to make it good. The Federal Environmental Agency [Umwelt-bundesamt (UBA)] comes to this conclusion in an internal paper examining the ecological consequences of the war in Yugoslavia, prepared for the meeting of European Environment Ministers at the beginning of May in Weimar. Catastrophes 'like Seveso and Sandoz' are, in the opinion of the Agency, 'a perfectly probable damage scenario'.
The danger of 'extensive destruction of essential components of drinking-water supply networks' is biggest with regard to middle-sized and large cities and conurbations. Even small amounts of substances from the petrochemical industry can render 'extensive groundwater reserves unusable'.
The substances produced by the fires are described as 'in part highly toxic and carcinogenic'. Depending on climatic conditions, 'widespread diffusion of these substances' could occur, 'which would render full cleansing almost impossible'.
Therefore, it is my profound conviction, that the Court is, in concreto, confronted with an uncontestable case of "extreme urgency" and "irreparable harm", which perfectly coincides, and significantly transcends the [p 533] substance of humanitarian standards which the Court has accepted in previous cases.
7. I must admit that I find entirely inexplicable the Court's reluctance to enter into serious consideration of indicating provisional measures in a situation such as this crying out with the need to make an attempt, regardless of possible practical effects, to at least alleviate, if not elimi-nate, an undeniable humanitarian catastrophe. I do not have in mind provisional measures in concrete terms as proposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but provisional measures in general: be they provisional measures proprio motu, different from those proposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, simply, an appeal by the President of the Court, as was issued on so many occasions in the past, in less difficult situations, on the basis of the spirit of Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court.
or, in paragraph 37 of the Order, that the Parties: "should take care not to aggravate or extend the dispute", and it is obvious that both the above pronouncements of the Court have been designed within the model of general, independent provisional measures.
"whereas the threat or use of force against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide Convention; and whereas, in the opinion of the Court, it does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application 'indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision quoted above' (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 26)" (Order, para. 27).
The intent is, without doubt, the subjective element of the being of the [p 534] crime of genocide as, indeed, of any other crime. But, this question is not and cannot, by its nature, be the object of decision-making in the incidental proceedings of the indication of provisional measures.
In this respect, a reliable proof should be sought in the dispute which, by its salient features, is essentially identical to the dispute under consideration � the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
"Whereas the Court is not called upon, for the purpose of its decision on the present request for the indication of provisional measures, now to establish the existence of breaches of the Genocide Convention" (ibid., para. 46).
9. Fundamental questions arise regarding the position of the Court on this particular matter.
(b) is the use of force conducive to genocide and, if the answer is in the affirmative, what is it then, in the legal sense?
It is incontrovertible that the use of force per se et definitione does not constitute an act of genocide. It is a matter that needs no particular proving. However, it could not be inferred from this that the use of force is unrelated and cannot have any relationship with the commission of the crime of genocide. Such a conclusion would be contrary to elementary logic.
Any of these acts can be committed also by the use of force. The use of force is, consequently, one of the possible means of committing acts of genocide. And, it should be pointed out, one of the most efficient means, due to the immanent characteristics of armed force.
Extensive use of armed force, in particular if it is used against objects and means constituting conditions of normal life, can be conducive to "inflicting on the group conditions of life" bringing about "its physical destruction".
Of course, it can be argued that such acts are in the function of degrading the military capacity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But such an explanation can hardly be regarded as a serious argument. For, the spiral of such a line of thinking may easily come to a point when, having in mind that military power is after all comprised of people, even mass killing of civilians can be claimed to constitute some sort of a precautionary measure that should prevent the maintenance or, in case of mobilization, the increase of military power of the State.
In the incidental proceedings the Court cannot and should not concern itself with the definitive qualification of the intent to impose upon the group conditions in which the survival of the group is threatened. Having in mind the purpose of provisional measures, it can be said that at this stage of the proceedings it is sufficient to establish that, in the conditions of intensive bombing, there is an objective risk of bringing about conditions in which the survival of the group is threatened.
The Court took just such a position in the Order of 8 April 1993 on the indication of provisional measures in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case.
"Whereas the Court, in the context of the present proceedings on a request for provisional measures, has in accordance with Article 41 of the Statute to consider the circumstances drawn to its attention as requiring the indication of provisional measures, but cannot make definitive findings of fact or of imputability, and the right of each Party to dispute the facts alleged against it, to challenge the attribution to it of responsibility for those facts, and to submit arguments in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the Court's decision" (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 22).
The question of "intent" is a highly complicated one. Although the intent is a subjective matter, a psychological category, in contemporary criminal legislation it is established also on the basis of objective circumstances. Inferences of intent to commit an act are widely incorporated in legal systems. Exempli causa, permissive inferences as opposed to a mandatory presumption in the jurisprudence of the United States of America may be drawn even in a criminal case.
In any event, there appears to be a clear dispute between the Parties regarding "intent" as the constitutive element of the crime of genocide.
The Applicant asserts that "intent" can be presumed and, on the other hand, the Respondent maintains that "intent", as an element of the crime of genocide, should be clearly established as dolus specialis. Such a confrontation of views of the Parties concerned leads to a dispute related to "the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention", including disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention.
Of the utmost importance is the fact that, in the incidental proceedings, the Court cannot and should not concern itself with the definitive qualification of the intent to impose upon the group conditions in which the survival of the group is threatened. Having in mind the purpose of pro-visional measures, it can be said that at this stage of the proceedings it is sufficient to establish that, in the conditions of intensive bombing, there is an objective risk of bring about conditions in which the survival of the group is threatened.
The phrasing of the statement seems to me unacceptable for a number of reasons. First, the formulation introduces dual humanitarian concern. The Court is, it is stated, "deeply concerned", while at the same time the Court states "the loss of life". So, it turns out that in the case of "all parts of Yugoslavia" the Court technically states "the loss of life" as a fact which does not cause "deep concern". Furthermore, the wording of the formulation may also be construed as meaning that Kosovo is not a part of Yugoslavia. Namely, after emphasizing the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, the Court uses the phrase "in all parts of Yugoslavia". Having in mind the factual and legal state of affairs, the appropriate wording would be "in all other parts of Yugoslavia". Also, particular reference to "Kosovo" and "all parts of Yugoslavia", in the present circumstances, has not only no legal, but has no factual basis either. Yugoslavia, as a whole, is the object of attack. Human suffering and loss of life are, unfortunately, a fact, generally applicable to the country as a whole; so, the Court, even if it had at its disposal the accurate data on the number of [p 538] victims and the scale of suffering of the people of Yugoslavia, it would still have no moral right to discriminate between them. Further, the qualification that "human tragedy and the enormous suffering in Kosovo . . . form the background of the present dispute" not only is political, by its nature, but has, or may have, an overtone of justification of the armed attack on Yugoslavia. Suffice it to recall the fact that the respondent State refers to its armed action as humanitarian intervention.
It is up to the Court to establish, at a later stage of the proceedings, the real legal state of affairs, namely, the relevant facts. At the present stage, the question of the underlying reasons for the armed attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the object of political allegations. While the Respondent argues that what is involved is a humanitarian intervention provoked by the "human tragedy and the enormous suffering", the Applicant finds that sedes materiae the underlying reasons are to be sought elsewhere � in the support to the terrorist organization in Kosovo and in the political aim of secession of Kosovo and Metohija from Yugoslavia.
12. The formulation of paragraph 38 of the Order leaves the impression that the Court is elegantly attempting to drop the ball in the Security Council's court. Essentially, it is superfluous because, as it stands now, it only paraphrases a basic fact that "the Security Council has special responsibilities under Chapter VII of the Charter". It can be interpreted, it is true, also as an appeal to the United Nations organ, specifically entrusted with the duty and designed to take measures in case of threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; but, in that case the Court would need to stress also another basic fact � that a legal dispute should be referred to the International Court of Justice on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter.
13. The Court, by using the term "Kosovo" instead of the official name of "Kosovo and Metohija", continued to follow the practice of the political organs of the United Nations, which, by the way, was also strictly followed by the respondent States.
It is hard to find a justifiable reason for such a practice. Except of course if we assume political opportuneness and involved practical, political interests to be a justified reason for this practice. This is eloquently shown also by the practice of the designation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After the succession of the former Yugoslav federal units, the organs of the United Nations, and the respondent States themselves, [p 539] have used the term Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). However, since 22 November 1995, the Security Council uses in its resolutions 1021 and 1022 the term "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" instead of the former "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" without any express decision and in a legally unchanged situation in relation to the one in which it, like other organs of the United Nations, employed the term "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)". The fact that this change in the practice of the Security Council appeared on the day following the initialling of the Peace Agreement in Dayton gives a strong basis for the conclusion that the concrete practice is not based on objective, legal criteria but rather on political criteria.
(b) it ignores the official name of Serbia's southern province, a name embodied both in the constitutional and legal acts of Serbia and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, it runs contrary to the established practice in appropriate international organizations. Exempli causa, the official designation of the southern Serbian province "Kosovo and Metohija" has been used in the Agreement concluded by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (International Legal Materials, 1999, Vol. 38, p. 24).
14. A certain confusion is also created by the term "humanitarian law" referred to in paragraphs 18 and 36 of the Order. The reasons for the confusion are dual: on the one hand, the Court has not shown great consistency in using this term. In the Genocide case the Court qualified the Genocide Convention as a part of humanitarian law, although it is obvious that, by its nature, the Genocide Convention falls within the field of international criminal law (see dissenting opinion of Judge Kreca, in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime oj Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 774-775, para. 108).
On the other hand, it seems that in this Order the term "humanitarian law" has been used with a different meaning, more appropriate to the generally accepted terminology. The relevant passage in the Order should be mentioned precisely because of the wording of its paragraphs 18 and 36. The singling out of humanitarian law from the rules of international [p 540] law which the Parties are bound to respect may imply low-key and timid overtones of vindication or at least of diminishment of the legal implications of the armed attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Humanitarian law, in its legal, original meaning implies the rules of jus in bello. If, by stressing the need to respect the rules of humanitarian law, which I do not doubt, the Court was guided by humanitarian considerations, then it should have stressed expressis verbis also the fundamental importance of the rule contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which constitutes a dividing line between non-legal, primitive international society and an organized, de jure, international community.

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