Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/6/6massappct73.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:30:34+00:00

Document:
COMMONWEALTH vs. RUSSELL G. LABBE.
Present: HALE, C.J., ARMSTRONG, & BROWN, JJ.
INDICTMENT found and returned in the Superior Court on April 29, 1975.
Joseph F. Flynn, for the defendant.
Philip A. Rollins, District Attorney (Gary A. Nickerson, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth.
ARMSTRONG, J. The defendant was charged with the murder of his fifteen month old stepson, and a jury found him guilty of the lesser charge of manslaughter. He appeals that conviction under G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33G.
bruising and discoloration all over his body and head. On July 19 Jason was treated for a broken arm, estimated to be a week or so old. The break was attributed to a fall, but was of a type which the treating physician said was more likely to have been caused by a sharp blow. In August the family stayed with a friend of the mother, who observed bruises and discoloration all over Jason's body and discussed the matter with the mother. During that stay the friend saw the defendant dropping the child roughly, apparently in anger, and he repeatedly expressed hostility towards Jason and complained of the aggravation to which he was put because of Jason. In late August Jason was taken to the emergency room with a cut tongue. The doctor also noted an unexplained contusion on his face and neck. On September 25 Jason was taken to the emergency room with a sore arm, variously attributed by the defendant and Jason's mother to a yank by his four year old sister or to a fall. On September 26 Jason was again taken to the emergency room, this time with a bleeding, lacerated lip. He also had bruises (which had not been noted the previous day) on his forehead, ear, chin, and abdomen. The defendant, who had been alone with Jason when he injured his lip, stated that it had been caused by a fall in his playpen. The attending physician asked a visiting nurses association to visit the home and look into the cause of Jason's frequent injuries.
fatal liver injuries was estimated to be when the defendant was alone with Jason. Dr. Bigelow, who performed the autopsy, testified that in his opinion the injuries were the result of "battered child syndrome," which he defined as "a young infant or child [being] subjected to repeated episodes of trauma, violence by an older person which, after sufficient length of time, leads to severe medical injury and often ultimate death."
The defendant argues that the judge erred in refusing to allow his motion for a directed verdict, first, because there was no direct evidence of the defendant's having struck Jason either on October 29 or previously, and, second, because the evidence was equally consistent with other causes of the fatal injury to the liver on October 29, such as a fall from a height against a sharp object or accidental injury during the defendant's own attempts to revive Jason after he was discovered not breathing. Neither point has merit. The law does not require that a crime be proved only by the testimony of one who witnessed it; circumstantial evidence must necessarily suffice in many cases. Commonwealth v. Montecalvo, 367 Mass. 46, 54-55 (1975). Nor must the evidence preclude the possibility of any other explanation. Commonwealth v. Lussier, 364 Mass. 414, 420 (1973). The case relied on by the defendant, Commonwealth v. Curtis, 318 Mass. 584 (1945), is not in point. There, it was held that the evidence established nothing more than opportunity. Here there was evidence that the defendant had been alone with Jason during much of the period of time when, according to medical testimony, the fatal injuries must have been inflicted. There was further evidence that he had been disposed to violence towards Jason from the day he moved into the house.
The evidence of Jason's frequent injuries prior to October 29 was admissible to show that someone in a custodial relation to Jason bore him ill will. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 157 Mass. 233, 239-240 (1892). Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503, 510-511, cert. denied, 304 U.S.
565 (1938). Commonwealth v. Cutler, 356 Mass. 245, 247-249 (1969). Contrast Commonwealth v. Welcome, 348 Mass. 68, 70-71 (1964). No limiting instructions were requested. See Commonwealth v. Bartolini, supra; Commonwealth v. Rawlins, 352 Mass. 293, 297 (1967). The earliest of the prior injuries cannot be said as matter of law to have been too remote in time to have a rational bearing on the defendant's state of mind on the day of the fatal injury. Commonwealth v. Holmes, supra at 240.
The trial judge permitted the district attorney to introduce in evidence, as part of the Commonwealth's case in chief, the defendant's testimony at an inquest into Jason's death which was held pursuant to G. L. c. 38, Section 8, as in effect prior to St. 1975, c. 490, Section 1. The transcript was not introduced as an exhibit; rather, the district attorney read the questions and an assistant district attorney read the answers. Compare Williams v. Meachum, 382 F. Supp. 521, 524-525 (D. Mass. 1974). No question was or is raised as to the accuracy of the transcript or demeanor of those doing the reading.
492-493 (1968), and Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 499-501 (1977), and also 507-513 (dissenting opinion of Liacos, J.). The principle of those cases seems to us to have no application to the introduction in evidence of the defendant's own prior testimony. In this situation, the principal concern must be the voluntariness of the defendant's earlier testimony. Leach & Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence 230-231 (4th ed. 1967). No viable question of voluntariness arises in this case, the defendant having been represented by trial counsel at the inquest and having been apprised of his right against self-incrimination.
context of the interspousal privilege (the Martin case involved an exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege by a witness called for the prosecution). In the DiPietro case, the judge's ruling permitting the Commonwealth to call the defendant's spouse was sustained on two bases, neither of which is applicable here: first, the judge was not required to accept the assertion of defense counsel that the spouse would exercise her privilege, particularly because the privilege was personal to the witness, not the defendant; and second, the Commonwealth had to show the unavailability of the spouse's testimony in order to lay a foundation for the admissibility of her prior testimony, and the jury were entitled to know "why [the Commonwealth] was introducing the transcript of [the spouse's] prior testimony when she was in fact present in court." (The DiPietro case at 390.) Nothing in the DiPietro case seems to us to justify the Commonwealth's contention that the interspousal privilege is governed by a different rule from that stated in the Martin case. Whether it is the interspousal privilege or the privilege against self-incrimination which is claimed, if it is clear that a witness for the prosecution will, if called, exercise a privilege not to testify, the witness should not be called or, alternatively, the questions which will cause the privilege to be exercised should not be put in the presence of the jury.
concluding that the prosecution made "a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege" (Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 186 ; Commonwealth v. Martino, 361 Mass. 720, 722 ), and this is not a case in which "insistent or extended [questioning] . . . suggest[ed] particularized states of fact from which the jury might the more easily draw harmful inferences." Commonwealth v. Martin, 372 Mass. at 421. In light of all these circumstances, coupled with the judge's forceful cautionary instructions, we conclude that, if there was error, it was not such as to require reversal.
The defendant's contention that he should have been permitted to sit with his family during the trial, rather than alone in the defendant's dock, obviously raises a matter in which the trial judge was called upon to exercise his sound discretion. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 501 (1972); Commonwealth v. MacDonald (No. 2), 368 Mass. 403, 409 (1975); Commonwealth v. Magnasco, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 144, 148 (1976). There is no showing of any abuse of that discretion.
The reference in the Commonwealth's opening to psychiatric testimony which was never adduced was so vague and general that it cannot reasonably be contended that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.
We have considered the other assignments argued by the defendant and find them to be without merit.
BROWN, J. (concurring). I fully concur in the opinion of the court affirming the verdict of manslaughter. I note, however, that, most regrettably, none of the doctors or other persons involved in treating Jason on his several visits to the hospital emergency rooms between January and September, 1974, reported the possibility of abuse to the Department of Public Welfare as required by G. L.
c. 119, Section 51A. [Note Concur-1] Such a report could possibly have saved Jason's life.
A cause of action may lie in tort on behalf of a battered child against persons named in the statute for failure to report a probable case of child abuse, where subsequently there is further injury to the child. See Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 319 n.8 (1978). In addition, an attending physician may be subject to personal liability for the consequences of any negligent failure to recognize the battered child syndrome. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 408-412 (1976).
[Note 1] It has been discussed in Commonwealth v. Cutler, 356 Mass. 245, 247, 248 (1969), and Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 316-318 (1978).
[Note 2] It is unnecessary to deal with questions presented by a definition of "battered child syndrome" adopted by another witness and mentioned by the district attorney in closing argument. The definition included the thought that the battery was usually performed by a parent or stepparent. No objection or motion to strike was made by the defendant on either occasion.
[Note 3] An exception is that portion of the inquest testimony which was in response to questions by the inquest judge. The trial judge offered to exclude that portion, but the defendant declined the offer.
[Note Concur-1] The attending physician on September 26, 1974, did ask the visiting nurses association to visit the home and look into the cause of Jason's frequent injuries.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.