Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1299785.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 05:12:19+00:00

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Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.
Charles Ivan JONES et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
Charles Ivan Jones and Shirley L. Jones, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Michael L. Whitcomb and Glenn C. Moret, Monterey, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiffs Charles Ivan Jones and Shirley L. Jones appeal summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company. Plaintiffs, whose home is adjacent to Union Pacific's railroad tracks in Yermo, filed a nuisance action against Union Pacific for allegedly causing needless train noise and engine fumes. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication of plaintiffs' action. The trial court granted Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment on the grounds plaintiffs' action is federally preempted by the Surface Transportation Board (STB), Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), federal Noise Control Act (NCA), and Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), and is barred by Civil Code section 3482 and the federal Constitution's Commerce Clause.
We conclude that triable issues of material fact exist as to whether plaintiffs' action is federally preempted. Triable issues also exist as to whether plaintiffs' action is barred by Civil Code section 3482 and the Commerce Clause. If Union Pacific's alleged conduct was not in furtherance of necessary railroad operations or committed for safety reasons, state court is a proper forum for plaintiffs' action.
Plaintiffs own a home adjacent to Union Pacific railroad tracks, near Union Pacific's Yermo railroad terminal facility.3 The Yermo facility consists of a train yard area and railroad tracks. In September 1996, the STB approved the merger between Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Transportation Company. The merger resulted in train congestion problems.
In June 1997, Union Pacific began parking idling train engines in front of plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs began experiencing frequent loud train noise throughout the day and night, which included horn blowing in front of their home, and noisy idling train engines parked in front of their home for hours, and even days at a time.
Plaintiffs and Elmer Bricker, who were the only residents in the area in question, began complaining about the train noise and engine fumes to Union Pacific and various governmental agencies. Eventually, Union Pacific agreed to issue a general order prohibiting parking unattended train engines in front of plaintiffs and Bricker's homes for more than one hour. Union Pacific issued the order on February 10, 1998. Union Pacific employees ignored the order for the most part, and the train noise and idling train engines parked in front of plaintiffs' home continued.
On June 12, 1998, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint against Union Pacific for monetary damages. Plaintiffs later filed an amended verified complaint (complaint) containing the following causes of action: nuisance, nuisance per se, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs alleged that Union Pacific employees parked idling trains in front of their home for lengthy periods of time and blew train horns in front of their house for no reason other than to harass them. Plaintiffs further alleged that they suffered depression, anger, frustration, and other emotional and physical ailments as a result of the loud train noise and the engine fumes.
Union Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, which plaintiffs opposed. In support of plaintiffs' opposition, they provided their own declarations and Bricker's declaration, stating that the train noise in question appeared to serve no legitimate purpose, and worsened after plaintiffs and Bricker began complaining. Plaintiffs' declarations further stated that Union Pacific employees were verbally abusive.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that the STB had exclusive jurisdiction under the ICCTA.
Plaintiffs argue that their state claims are not economic regulations, but rather involve “ ‘essential local police power required to protect the health and safety of citizens․' ” (City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, supra, 154 F.3d at p. 1029.) Union Pacific asserts that the increased noise, fumes, engine idling, and other irritating activity, was due to increased train congestion resulting from the merger of Union Pacific and Southern Pacific. According to Union Pacific, in order to reduce the congestion arising from the merger, the STB authorized Union Pacific to take a wide variety of severe measures, which encompassed the conduct in question. Union Pacific argues that the regulatory actions taken in furtherance of reducing congestion caused by the merger conflict with plaintiffs' state action. Hence, plaintiffs' action is preempted by federal regulation of railroads under 49 United States Code section 10501 of the ICCTA.
Union Pacific relies on City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, supra, 154 F.3d at p. 1028, which concerned the reopening of a railroad line. The Auburn federal district court upheld the STB's finding that compliance with state and local environmental regulations was not required because the regulations were preempted by 49 United States Code section 10501, part of the ICCTA. (City of Auburn, supra, at p. 1031.) But Auburn is distinguishable. In Auburn, application of state environmental regulations potentially could have interfered with, or even prevented, the reopening of a railroad line. Here, Union Pacific's conduct, according to plaintiffs, served no purpose and was committed solely to harass plaintiffs because they complained about unnecessary train noise and fumes.
State and local regulation of Union Pacific's trains is permissible if it does not interfere with Union Pacific's interstate rail operations. If the tooting of train horns and idling of train engines for long periods of time in front of plaintiffs' house was necessary to reduce congestion and operate Union Pacific's railroad business safely and efficiently, then plaintiffs' claim is federally preempted. But if Union Pacific's activity in question did not further rail operations or was committed solely to harass plaintiffs, then plaintiffs' action is not federally preempted.
We thus must determine whether plaintiffs provided evidence that the horn blowing and idling of train engines in front of plaintiffs' home was not safety related or in furtherance of Union Pacific's operations. Evidence as to whether the conduct in question furthered Union Pacific's economic interests is relevant to that determination.
When discussing the matter with Union Pacific employees, Charles Jones was told that if Union Pacific engines were going to be parked for longer than two hours, the engines were to be shut off because it would save the company millions of dollars per year in fuel conservation costs. This general policy was also reflected in correspondence to Bricker from the California Environmental Protection Agency.
Bricker notes in his declaration that after he and the plaintiffs complained to Union Pacific and the air quality district in 1998, Union Pacific issued an order that Union Pacific park their running engines a quarter mile away from Bricker's and plaintiffs' homes. But, for the most part, Union Pacific employees ignored the order.5 Union Pacific's senior terminal manager, Jeffrey Miller, provided deposition testimony confirming the issuance of the order and noncompliance.
This evidence cited in plaintiffs' summary judgment opposition is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Union Pacific's activities were committed solely to harass plaintiffs, and were not safety related or in furtherance of Union Pacific's railroad operations. There, thus, is a triable issue as to whether plaintiffs' state tort claims fall within the purview of state police powers or are federally preempted under the ICCTA by 49 United States Code section 10501.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that their claims were preempted by the federal Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 United States Code section 4901, et seq. The NCA provides maximum noise levels for rail cars engaged in interstate commerce. (42 U.S.C. § 4916, et seq.) Federal rail car noise regulations enforced under the NCA are found at 40 Code of Federal Regulations section 201, et seq.
The Rushing court concluded a triable issue of fact existed based on the plaintiffs' lay opinion that the railroad's expert's opinion regarding compliance was based on sound measurements which did not reflect the true sound level plaintiffs typically heard.
Here, Union Pacific has failed to address the issue of whether the noise, which is the subject of plaintiffs' lawsuit, violated federal noise regulations. If the train noise violated either federal noise regulations or state-equivalent regulations, plaintiffs' claim is not subject to federal preemption. Under the NCA, the state is not precluded from enforcing noise violations so long as enforcement is based on federal standards or identical state standards or the activity is not subject to NCA regulation. (42 U.S.C., § 4916.) We thus conclude the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that plaintiffs' action was barred by the NCA. Union Pacific failed to meet its burden of proof that it had complied with federal noise regulations or that the subject activity was subject to NCA regulation.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding plaintiffs' action barred under the FRSA. Plaintiffs argue that their action is based on activity that is not encompassed by the FRSA. Plaintiffs' complaint is based on train noise caused by idling engines, unnecessary horn blowing, and Union Pacific employee harassment, which included verbal abuse. Union Pacific argues that plaintiffs' action is barred because the FRSA preempts all state claims and laws on the subject of railroad safety and operations.
The FRSA of 1970, codified at 45 United States Code section 421 et seq., was repealed in 1994, and recodified at 49 United States Code section 20101 et seq. The newly codified 1994 act is referred to as the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act (FRSAA). For purposes of this case, the provisions of the FRSAA relevant to this case are essentially the same as those contained in the repealed 1970 act.
Under the FRSA, the federal Department of Transportation issued a train safety regulation, 49 Code of Federal Regulations section 229.129, which requires, for safety purposes, that trains be equipped with audible warning devices, such as horns or whistles, and that such devices have a specified minimum decibel level.7 (Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra, 185 F.3d at p. 515.) The provision does not cover the topic of when or how often such devices shall be sounded.
Rushing is directly on point. Based on its rationale for concluding federal preemption inapplicable under the FRSA, we conclude here that the trial court erred in finding federal preemption as a matter of law since there is evidence that Union Pacific's horn blowing did not serve any safety purpose and was done solely to harass plaintiffs and their neighbor.
As to plaintiffs' complaints of idling engine noise, pollution, and Union Pacific employee harassment, these are clearly not subject to FRSAA regulation since they do not serve any safety purpose.
In addition to finding that plaintiffs' action was federally preempted, the trial court also found that plaintiffs' action was barred by the federal Constitution's Commerce Clause. Union Pacific argues that plaintiffs' lawsuit violates article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution because it creates an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl.3).
Plaintiffs argue their claims do not violate the Commerce Clause because they do not place an undue burden on interstate commerce and do not raise a conflict between state and federal regulations. Furthermore, plaintiffs note that they are not seeking injunctive relief. They are merely seeking monetary damages for their injuries.
Here, state court adjudication of plaintiffs' claims and judgment entered against Union Pacific, in the event plaintiffs prevail, will not result in an undue burden on interstate commerce. Plaintiffs' action seeks monetary compensation for Union Pacific activities which allegedly served no purpose other than to harass plaintiffs. Union Pacific, no doubt, is concerned that allowing plaintiffs to sue Union Pacific in state court for nuisance and emotional distress claims will set a harmful precedent, which could potentially subject Union Pacific to many other law suits of a similar nature.
But if, in fact, Union Pacific's employees have been needlessly blowing train horns and whistles and idling train engines in front of property owners' homes for hours on end, at all hours of the day and night, for no legitimate purpose, then such reprehensible conduct is not protected by the Commerce Clause. Deterring such conduct by requiring Union Pacific to compensate property owners for consequential harm would not unduly burden interstate commerce since such activity serves no legitimate purpose. Accordingly, we conclude compensation for such conduct may be sought and recovered in state court.
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground their action is barred by Civil Code section 3482. Union Pacific argues that, since federal regulations authorize Union Pacific's conduct in question, plaintiffs are precluded from prevailing on their nuisance claim under Civil Code section 3482.
As discussed in the foregoing sections of this opinion, the activity in question, and manner in which it was committed, is not authorized by, or subject to, federal regulation. At least a triable issue of fact exists in this regard.
The cases relied upon by Union Pacific 8 are distinguishable in that they involve nuisance complaints arising directly from public works construction authorized pursuant to statute, whereas the instant case involves allegedly unnecessary activity, serving no legitimate purpose, and/or activity allegedly committed for the sole purpose of harassing plaintiffs. Here, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on Civil Code section 3482 because the activity in question is not expressly authorized by statute.
To support a claim of nuisance per se, plaintiffs must point to a statutory provision that declares Union Pacific's alleged conduct a nuisance. (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518.) The provisions cited in plaintiffs' nuisance per se cause of action do not satisfy this critical requirement. Summary adjudication as to plaintiffs' nuisance cause of action is proper.
Summary judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to grant Union Pacific's alternative motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiffs' nuisance per se cause of action, and to deny Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment and alternative motion for summary adjudication in all other respects. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs on appeal.
1. Plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit (Jones v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (Super. Ct. San Bernardino County, 1999, No. BCV04545) on August 5, 1999, after plaintiffs filed notice of this appeal. Plaintiffs' second lawsuit has not been consolidated with this action and, hence, is not considered in this appeal. On January 19, 2000, plaintiffs filed notice of appeal of judgment entered in their second lawsuit (No. E026430). Plaintiffs' second complaint asserts identical theories of recovery, with the exception that plaintiffs allege additional incidents of train noise harassment occurring between August 6, 1998, and July 21, 1999. The second complaint also differs from the complaint which is the subject of this appeal in that, in addition to seeking monetary relief, it requests injunctive relief.
2. The plaintiffs' unopposed request for judicial notice, filed on October 12, 1999, is granted as to items 1 (STB Finance Docket No. 33611) and 3 (United States District Court for the Central District of California, minute order dated November 9, 1998, in Union Pacific Railroad Company v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., case no. CV-98-6892), and denied as to items 2 (Article in Who's Who and What Does It Do?, regarding the STB), 4 (Findings of the Cal. Scientific Review Panel on The Report on Diesel Exhaust), and 5 (Cal. Air Resources Bd., Res. No. 98-35, dated August 27, 1998). Plaintiffs' unopposed request for judicial notice of (1) STB Finance Docket No. 33466, (2) STB Finance Docket No. 33420, and (3) plaintiffs second complaint filed against Union Pacific on August 5, 1999 (case no BCV04545), is granted. Union Pacific's unopposed request for judicial notice of STB Finance Docket No. 32760 and STB service order no. 1518, filed on December 2, 1999, is granted.
3. Mr. Jones purchased the home in July 1991.
RICHLI, Acting P.J., and WARD, J., concur.

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