Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:44:10+00:00

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abandonment of the route, and therefore still exercised exclusive jurisdiction over it, the court dismissed the action, and the State Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioners then sought a certificate of abandonment from the ICC, but the Commission granted a petition to permit the railroad to discontinue rail service and transfer the right-of-way to the city of Burlington for interim trail use under § 8(d). The Federal Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioners' contentions that § 8(d) is unconstitutional on its face because it takes private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment and because it is not a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power.
"authority to . . . make payments . . . under this Act shall be effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts"
renders their takings challenge to the ICC's order premature, there is no need to determine whether a taking occurred. Pp. 494 U. S. 11-17.
2. The Amendments are a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power. The stated congressional purposes -- (1) to encourage the development of additional recreational trails on an interim basis and (2) to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service -- are valid objectives to which the Amendments are reasonably adapted. Even if petitioners were correct that the rail banking purpose is a sham concealing a true purpose of preventing reversion of rights-of-way to property owners after abandonment, the Amendments would still be valid because they are reasonably adapted to the goal of encouraging the development of additional trails. There is no requirement that a law serve more than one legitimate purpose. Moreover, this Court is not free under the applicable rational basis standard of review to hold the Amendments invalid simply because the rail banking purpose might be advanced more completely by measures more Draconian than § 8(d) -- such as a program of mandatory conversions or a prohibition of all abandonments. The long history of congressional attempts to address the problem of rail abandonments provides sufficient reason to defer to the legislative judgment that § 8(d) is an appropriate answer. Furthermore, in light of that history, Congress was entitled to make the judgment that every line is a potentially valuable national asset meriting preservation even if no future rail use for it is currently foreseeable, so that the fact that the ICC must certify that public convenience and necessity permit abandonment before granting an interim trail use permit does not indicate that the statute fails to promote its purpose of preserving rail corridors. Pp. 494 U. S. 17-19.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p. 494 U. S. 20.
The question presented is the constitutionality of a federal "rails-to-trails" statute, under which unused railroad rights-of-way are converted into recreational trails notwithstanding whatever reversionary property interests may exist under state law. Petitioners contend that the statute violates both the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8. We find it unnecessary to evaluate the merits of the taking claim because we hold that, even if the rails-to-trails statute gives rise to a taking, compensation is available to petitioners under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1) (1982 ed.), and the requirements of the Fifth Amendment are satisfied. We also hold that the statute is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
to trails. Section 809(a) of the 4-R Act required the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a report on alternative uses for abandoned railroad rights-of-way. Section 809(b) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to encourage conversion of abandoned rights-of-way to recreational and conservational uses through financial, educational, and technical assistance to local, state, and federal agencies. See note following 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (1982 ed.). Section 809(c) authorized the ICC to delay the disposition of rail property for up to 180 days after the effective date of an order permitting abandonment, unless the property had first been offered for sale on reasonable terms for public purposes, including recreational use. See 49 U.S.C. § 10906.
"ha[d] not been successful in establishing a process through which railroad rights-of-way which are not immediately necessary for active service can be utilized for trail purposes."
"shall not be treated, for any purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes."
"The key finding of this amendment is that interim use of a railroad right-of-way for trail use, when the route itself remains intact for future railroad purposes, shall not constitute an abandonment of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. This finding alone should eliminate many of the problems with this program. The concept of attempting to establish trails only after the formal abandonment of a railroad right-of-way is self-defeating; once a right-of-way is abandoned for railroad purposes there may be nothing left for trail use. This amendment would ensure that potential interim trail use will be considered prior to abandonment."
See S.Rep. at 9 (same). The primary issue in this case is whether Congress has violated the Fifth Amendment by precluding reversion of state property interests.
Petitioners claim a reversionary interest in a railroad right-of-way adjacent to their land in Vermont. In 1962, the State of Vermont acquired the Rutland-Canadian Railway Company's interest in the right-of-way and then leased the right-of-way to Vermont Railway, Inc. Vermont Railway stopped using the route more than a decade ago, and has since removed all railroad equipment, including switches, bridges, and track, from the portion of the right-of-way claimed by petitioners. In 1981, petitioners brought a quiet-title action in the Superior Court of Chittenden County, alleging that the easement had been abandoned and was thus extinguished, and that the right-of-way had reverted to them by operation of state property law. In August, 1983, the Superior Court dismissed the action, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the ICC had not authorized abandonment of the route, and therefore still exercised exclusive jurisdiction over it. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510, 496 A.2d 151 (1985).
"[i]nevitably, interim trail use will conflict with the reversionary rights of adjacent landowners, but that is the very purpose of the Trails Act."
State of Vermont and Vermont Railway, Inc. -- Discontinuance of Service Exemption in Chittenden County, 3 I.C.C.2d 903, 908.
Petitioners sought review of the ICC's order in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that § 8(d) of the Trails Act is unconstitutional on its face because it takes private property without just compensation and because it is not a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. 853 F.2d 145 (1988). It reasoned that the ICC has "plenary and exclusive authority" over abandonments, id. at 151, and that federal law must be considered in determining the property right held by petitioners.
"For as long as it determines that the land will serve a 'railroad purpose,' the ICC retains jurisdiction over railroad rights-of-way; it does not matter whether that purpose is immediate or in the future."
Ibid. Because the court believed that no reversionary interest could vest until the ICC determined that abandonment was appropriate, the court concluded that the Trails Act did not result in a taking. Next, the court found that the Trails Act was reasonably adapted to two legitimate congressional purposes under the commerce Clause: "preserving rail corridors for future railroad use" and "permitting public recreational use of trails." Id. at 150. The Court of Appeals therefore dismissed petitioners' Commerce Clause challenge. We granted certiorari. 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
"not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."
See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 473 U. S. 194 (1985). All that is required is the existence of a "reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation'" at the time of the taking. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 419 U. S. 124-125 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 135 U. S. 659 (1890)).
"If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process 'yield[s] just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim against the Government' for the taking."
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 195-195 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 467 U. S. 1013, 467 U. S. 1018, n. 21 (1984)).
"taking claims against the Federal Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act."
in the United States Claims Court for any claim against the Federal Government to recover damages founded on the Constitution, a statute, a regulation, or an express or implied-in-fact contract. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982 ed.); see also § 1346(a)(2) (Little Tucker Act, which creates concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts for such claims not exceeding $10,000 in amount).
"If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the [Claims Court] to hear and determine."
United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 328 U. S. 267 (1946).
"whether Congress has in the [statute] withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction to the [Claims Court] to hear a suit involving the [statute] 'founded . . . upon the Constitution.'"
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 126 (emphasis in original). Under this standard, we conclude that the Amendments did not withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. Congress did not exhibit the type of "unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy," Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 1019, that is necessary to preclude a Tucker Act claim. See Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 685 F.Supp. 1108, 1120-1121 (E.D.Mo.1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 316, 324-325 (CA8 1989).
97 Stat. 42, note following 16 U.S.C. § 1249. Petitioners contend that this section limits the ICC's authority for conversions to those not requiring the expenditure of any funds and to those others for which funds had been appropriated in advance. Thus, any conversion that could result in Claims Court litigation was not authorized by Congress, since payment for such an acquisition would not have been approved by Congress in advance. Petitioners insist that such unauthorized government actions cannot create Tucker Act liability, citing Hooe v. United States, 218 U. S. 322, 218 U. S. 335 (1910), and Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 127, n. 16.
We need not decide what types of official authorization, if any, are necessary to create federal liability under the Fifth Amendment, because we find that rail-to-trail conversions giving rise to just compensation claims are clearly authorized by § 8(d). That section speaks in capacious terms of trail "interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way" (emphasis added) and does not support petitioners' proposed distinction between conversions that might result in a taking and those that do not. Although Congress did not explicitly promise to pay for any takings, we have always assumed that the Tucker Act is an "implie[d] promis[e]" to pay just compensation which individual laws need not reiterate. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 309 U. S. 21 (1940). Petitioners' argument that specific congressional authorization is required for those conversions that might result in takings is a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the established method for determining whether Tucker Act relief is available for claims arising out of takings pursuant to a federal statute. We reaffirm that a Tucker Act remedy exists unless there are unambiguous indications to the contrary.
under the Tucker Act, as evidenced by § 101's opening clause -- "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act" (emphasis added) -- which refers to the 1983 Amendments. The section means simply that payments made pursuant to the Amendments, such as funding for scenic trails, markers, and similar purposes, see Amendments § 209(5)(c), 97 Stat. 49 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1249(c)(2)) (authorizing appropriations for the development and administration of certain National Scenic and National Historic Trails), are effective only "in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts," a concept that mirrors Art. 1, § 9, of the Constitution ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law"). Payments for takings claims are not affected by this language, because such claims "arise" under the Fifth Amendment, see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 315-316. Payments for takings would be made "under" the Tucker Act, not the Trails Act, and would be drawn from the Judgment Fund, which is a separate appropriated account, see 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982 ed.). Section 101 does not manifest the type of clear and unmistakable congressional intent necessary to withdraw Tucker Act coverage.
"Congress in [the statute] did not address the liability of the Government to pay just compensation should a taking occur. Congress' failure specifically to mention or provide for recourse against the Government may reflect a congressional belief that use of data by [the Government] in the ways authorized by [the statute] effects no Fifth Amendment taking or it may reflect Congress' assumption that the general grant of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act would provide the necessary remedy for any taking that may occur. In any event, the failure cannot be construed to reflect an unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy."
In sum, petitioners' failure to make use of the available Tucker Act remedy renders their taking challenge to the ICC's order premature. We need not decide whether a taking occurred in this case.
Petitioners also contend that the Amendments to the Trails Act are not a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, because the true purpose of § 8(d) is to prevent reversion of railroad rights-of-way to property owners after abandonment and to create recreational trails, rather than to preserve rail corridors for future railroad use. We evaluate this claim under the traditional rationality standard of review: we must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce "if there is any rational basis for such a finding," Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 452 U. S. 276 (1981), and we must ensure only that the means selected by Congress are "reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.'" Ibid. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 379 U. S. 262 (1964)); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 452 U. S. 323-324 (1981). The Amendments clearly pass muster.
"to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use."
H.Rep. at 8; S.Rep. at 9, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, p. 119; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). These are valid congressional objectives to which the Amendments are reasonably adapted.
"In every Trails Act case, we will already have found that the public convenience and necessity permit abandonment (or that regulatory approval is not required under 49 U.S.C. 10505)."
54 Fed.Reg. 8012, n. 3 (1989). Thus, trail conversion is permitted only after the Commission determines that rail service will not be not needed in the foreseeable future. This, according to petitioners, reveals that the rail banking rationale is a sham. If Congress really wished to address the problem of shrinking trackage, it would not have left conversions to voluntary agreements between railroads and State and local agencies or private groups. Rather, petitioners suggest, Congress would have created a mandatory program administered directly by the ICC.
because more Draconian measures -- such as a program of mandatory conversions or a prohibition of all abandonments -- might advance more completely the rail banking purpose. The process of legislating often involves tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect solutions, and our ability to imagine ways of redesigning the statute to advance one of Congress' ends does not render it irrational. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 449 U. S. 469 (1981). The history of congressional attempts to address the problem of rail abandonments, see supra at 918-919, provides sufficient reason to defer to the legislative judgment that § 8(d) is an appropriate answer. Here, as in Hodel, "Congress considered the effectiveness of existing,legislation and concluded that additional measures were necessary." 452 U.S. at 452 U. S. 283.
Petitioners' argument that § 8(d) does not serve the rail banking purpose, moreover, is not well taken. That the ICC must certify that public convenience and necessity permit abandonment before granting a CITU or NITU does not indicate that the statute fails to promote its purpose of preserving rail corridors. Congress did not distinguish between short-term and long-term rail banking, nor did it require that the Commission develop a specific contingency plan for reactivation of a line before permitting conversion. To the contrary, Congress apparently believed that every line is a potentially valuable national asset that merits preservation even if no future rail use for it is currently foreseeable. Given the long tradition of congressional regulation of railroad abandonments, see, e.g., Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926), that is a judgment that Congress is entitled to make.
See authorities cited in Comment, Rails to Trails: Converting America's Abandoned Railroads Into Nature Trails, 22 Akron L.Rev. 645, 645 (1989); see also 102 ICC Ann.Rep. 44-45 (1988); 101 ICC Ann.Rep. 37-38 (1987).
There Is an important distinction in the Interstate Commerce Act between "abandonment" of a rail line and "discontinuance" of service. See 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (1982 ed.). Once a carrier "abandons" a rail line pursuant to authority granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the line is no longer part of the national transportation system, and although the Commission is empowered to impose conditions on abandonments, see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 10905(f)(4); 10906 (1982 ed.), as a general proposition ICC jurisdiction terminates. See Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 467 U. S. 622, 467 U. S. 633-634 (1984); 54 Fed.Reg. 8011-8012 (1989). In contrast, "discontinuance" authority allows a railroad to cease operating a line for an indefinite period while preserving the rail corridor for possible reactivation of service in the future.
Under implementing regulations promulgated by the ICC, a railroad may apply to the ICC for either a Certificate of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (CITU) or, in a proceeding involving the exemption of a route from ICC regulation, a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU). See Rail Abandonments -- Use of Rights-of-Way as Trails, 2 I.C.C.2d 591, 628 (1986); 49 CFR § 1152.29 (1988). A CITU or NITU provides a 180-day period during which the railroad may discontinue service, cancel tariffs, and salvage track and other equipment, and also negotiate a voluntary agreement for interim trail use with a qualified trail operator. If agreement is reached, interim trail use is thereby authorized. If not, the CITU or NITU automatically converts into an effective certificate or notice of abandonment. Because the ICC had not yet promulgated its final regulations implementing section 8(d) at the time of its decision in the instant case, the Commission did not issue a CITU or NITU.
State of Vermont and Vermont Railway, Inc. -- Discontinuance of Service Exemption in Chittenden County, Docket No. AB-265 (Sub-No. IX) (Feb. 4, 1986).
See H.R.Rep. at 2, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, p. 113 (noting that the Committee "eliminated most of the items which could require future Federal expenditures"); S.Rep. at 3 (same), H.R.Rep. at 11, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, p. 122 (reporting required funding for the bill to be "insignificant"); 129 Cong.Rec. 5219 (1983) (remarks of floor manager Rep. Seiberling) ("[T]he committee recommended a revised text which eliminated most of the items which would require future Federal expenditures. . . . Additional recommendations reflect continuing efforts to encourage the expansion of trail recreation opportunities across the Nation at a low cost").
We note that the ICC has construed § 8(d) as not providing federal power to condemn railroad rights-of-way for interim trail use. See Rail Abandonments, 2 I.C.C.2d at 596-598; see also National Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 271 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 4, n. 4, 6-9, 850 F.2d 694, 697, n. 4, 699-702 (1988); Connecticut Trust for Historic Preservation v. ICC, 841 F.2d 479, 482-483 (CA2 1988); Washington State Dept. of Game v. ICC, 829 F.2d 877, 879-882 (CA9 1987).
Some state courts have held that trail use does not constitute abandonment of a right-of-way for public travel so as to trigger reversionary rights. See State by Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 545-548 (Minn.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983); Reiger v. Penn Central Corp., No. 85-CA-11 (Ct.App. Greene County, Ohio, May 21, 1985).
"the Federal Government has acquired too much land from landowners using condemnation procedures that in essence shortchanged the property rights of the landowners,"
129 Cong.Rec. 1607 (1983), means that Tucker Act relief is unavailable. We disagree. The Senator spoke in the context of praising the statute for "encourag[ing] cooperation" rather than resorting automatically to condemnation. Ibid. As administered by the ICC, the conversion process begins when a railroad voluntarily seeks a CITU or NITU; it then negotiates with a qualified trail operator to establish interim trail use. The ICC does not set up trails on its own, and has interpreted § 8(d) to exclude the type of condemnation power vested in the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture by 16 U.S.C. § 1246(g). See n 8, supra. This limitation on ICC condemnation authority is not relevant to the question whether compensation under the Tucker Act is available for takings resulting from the conversions that do occur, and it certainly is not an unambiguous sign that Congress meant to withdraw Tucker Act relief.
Petitioners assert that the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) actions prevent them from enjoying property rights secured by Vermont law, and thereby have effected a compensable taking. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that, no matter what Vermont law might provide, the ICC's actions forestalled petitioners from possessing the asserted reversionary interest, and thus that no takings claim could arise. Today the Court affirms the Second Circuit's judgment on quite different grounds. I join the Court's opinion, but write separately to express my view that state law determines what property interest petitioners possess, and that traditional takings doctrine will determine whether the Government must compensate petitioners for the burden imposed on any property interest they possess.
"we are mindful of the basic axiom that '[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.'"
Vermont acquired from the Rutland Railway Corporation and, correspondingly, whether petitioners possess the property interest that they claim has been taken. See Brief for Petitioners 15, and n. 14; Brief for Respondents State of Vermont et al. 22-25; Reply Brief for Petitioners 2-4. Similar reference to state law has guided other courts seeking to determine whether a railway right of way lapsed upon the conversion to trail use. Compare State by Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 545-548 (Minn.) (trail use within original interest, thus reversionary rights have not matured), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983), with Lawson v. State, 107 Wash.2d 444, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (change in use would give effect to reversionary interests); McKinley v. Waterloo R. Co., 368 N.W.2d 131, 133-136 (Iowa 1985) (lack of railway use triggered period leading to reversion); Schnabel v. County of DuPage, 101 Ill.App.3d 553, 57 Ill.Dec. 121, 428 N.E.2d 671 (1981) (easement lapsed). Determining what interest petitioners would have enjoyed under Vermont law, in the absence of the ICC's recent actions, will establish whether petitioners possess the predicate property interest that must underlie any takings claim. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 1001-1004. We do not attempt to resolve that issue.
"brings [the Commission's] regulatory mission to an end." Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 467 U. S. 622, 467 U. S. 633 (1984). As the Vermont Supreme Court recognized, state courts cannot enforce or give effect to asserted reversionary interests when enforcement would interfere with the Commission's administration of the Interstate Commerce Act. See Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510, 496 A.2d 151 (1985). These results are simply routine and well established consequences of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
v. Monsanto Co., supra, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 1012 ("If Congress can `preempt' state property law in the manner advocated by EPA, then the Taking Clause has lost all vitality. [A] sovereign, `by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation. . . . This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent'"), quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, supra, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 164.
approach were adopted, discussion of the availability of the Tucker Act remedy would be unnecessary. Even the federal respondent acknowledges that the existence of a taking will rest upon the nature of the state-created property interest that petitioners would have enjoyed absent the federal action and upon the extent that the federal action burdened that interest. See Brief for Federal Respondents 23-24.
"has occurred . . . where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises."
that has been burdened. As today's decision indicates, petitioners and persons similarly situated will have ample opportunity to make that showing.

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