Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=22591:g-r-no-l-33146-may-31,-1977-commissioner-of-customs,-et-al-v-pedro-c-navarro,-et-al&amp;catid=1094&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:41:57+00:00

Document:
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Petitioners, v. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II (Pasig, Rizal), and JUANITO S. FLORES, doing business under the name and style of JS. F. ENTERPRISES and ASIATIC INCORPORATED, represented by EUGENIO VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T . Limcaoco, Solicitor Jaime M . Lantin and Special Attorney Vicente M. Asuncion for Petitioner.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for Private Respondent.
2.	The petition did not ignore the due process aspect which appeared to have bothered respondent Judge. It was pointed out that in ordering the sale at public auction of the fruits in question, considering their perishable character, petitioners acted in accordance with section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Insofar as pertinent, it reads: "When seizure shall be made of property which, in the opinion of the Collector, is liable to perish or be wasted or to depreciate greatly in value by keeping, or which cannot be kept without great disproportionate expense, whether such property consists of live animals or of any article, the appraiser shall so certify in his appraisal, then the Collector may proceed to advertise and sell the same at auction, upon notice as he shall deem to be reasonable." 36 There was a literal adherence to the procedure above set forth. The proper advertisement to sell the perishable goods at auction was made. That was the notice required by the statute. Private respondents as the importers could not have been unaware that such step was contemplated. The law expects them to have that requisite degree of interest in what was happening. There is nothing unreasonable in such an assumption. It would be futile to assert therefore that there was a denial of due process unless the above section is considered null precisely on that ground. No attempt was made by private respondents to impugn its validity. Perhaps it is because of the realization that it would be futile. There is nothing arbitrary or unfair, the earmarks of a denial of due process, for the Collector to order the sale at public auction upon notice as he shall deem to be reasonable of a commodity in their nature perishable. That is the only way to safeguard during the pendency of a seizure and forfeiture proceeding the rights of both the government and even the persons responsible for the importation. That way, if the illegality of the importation is not shown and forfeiture is not ordered, the proceeds could be turned over to the importer. If it were otherwise, he would be deprived of property that is his, and that would be a denial of due process. What negates any assertion of such an infringement of a constitutional right is the admitted and undeniable fact that the importation in question is banned by the applicable Central Bank circulars. Petitioners therefore had no choice except to proceed in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Customs and Tariff Code.
3.	The petition likewise took pains to point out that the reliance by respondent Judge on Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala 37 was misplaced. In that 1970 decision, this Court, recognizing that the judiciary in the Philippines is vested with both legal and equitable powers, did not deem it proper to set aside an injunction issued by the lower court addressed to the customs authorities to stop the sale at public auction of imported fruits. There was thus a semblance of similarity. A closer examination would reveal that the analogy is more apparent than real. The case could be easily distinguished. All that is necessary is to refer to the opinion of former Chief Justice Makalintal in the Alikpala decision: "The warrants of seizure were issued in view of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 294 and 295, promulgated on March 10 and 20, 1970, respectively, which provide that ’no-dollar imports not covered by Circular No. 247 shall not be issued any release certificates and shall be referred to the Central Bank for official transmittal to the Bureau of Customs for appropriate seizure proceedings.’ Evidently, in the opinion of the Collector of Customs himself, even in the light of those circulars there exists no legal impediment to the release of the subject importations under bond, otherwise he would not have agreed thereto, although he changed his requirement from surety bond to cash. In any case, as pointed out by private respondents, the said importations had been ordered before Central Bank Circulars 294 and 295 were promulgated, and since the orders were made in accordance with previous practice there could be no bad faith or intent to violate those circulars." 38 Unfortunately, in this case respondent Judge missed those significant distinctions. The importation in question was clearly violative of the above Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295. Also petitioner Collector of Customs in this case was, in accordance with law, definitely opposed to the release of the importation in question. He could not have authorized it without being held liable for violating the Tariff and Customs Code and the applicable doctrines of this Court previously cited. It may be said further on this point that the Alikpala decision is the only one of its kind and has not since been followed. As a matter of fact, the previously cited Señeres decision did set aside a preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge and did chide in vigorous and vehement language the assumption of jurisdiction by the lower court when respect for the controlling doctrines ought to have cautioned him against the issuance of a preliminary injunction. In the even later case of Pacis v. Geronimo, 39 a writ of preliminary injunction likewise issued by the respondent Judge in a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding was annulled by this Court, again on the precise ground of manifest lack of jurisdiction. The petition therefore did not exaggerate matters when it emphasized that respondent Judge, in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction sought to be nullified, acted in a manner contrary to and in violation of the law, assuming jurisdiction over a matter beyond his competence.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of respondent Judge of January 4, 1971 nullified and set aside. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of February 15, 1971 against the enforcement of the above order is made permanent. Respondent Judge, or whoever is acting in his place and in his stead, is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 14178 of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled Juanito S. Flores, doing business under the name and style of J.S.F. Enterprises and Asiatic Incorporated v. the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs. Costs against private respondents.
Muñoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
1.	The petition was prepared and filed by the then Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, now a member of this Court, assisted by the then Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco, now a Judge of the Court of First Instance, and Solicitor Jaime M. Lantin, likewise now a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
2.	Annex F of Petition.
3.	Sections 2301, 2303 and 2530 of Republic Act No. 1937 (1957).
4.	Manifestation dated February 27, 1971, 1.
8.	Ibid, 1046. This case arose prior to the effectivity of the Customs and Tariff Code, Republic Act No. 1937 as amended (1957).
9.	108 Phil. 1 (1960).
10.	113 Phil. 333 (1961).
11.	114 Phil. 589 (1962).
12.	114 Phil. 702 (1962).
13.	114 Phil. 953 (1962).
14.	L-19564, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 493.
15.	L-20489, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 331.
16.	L-22259, January 19, 1966, 16 SCRA 1.
17.	L-20803, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 133.
18.	L-22989, May 14, 1966, 17 SCRA 11.
19.	L-22511, May 16, 1966, 17 SCRA 36.
20.	L-22990, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 61.
21.	L-21376, August 29, 1966, 17 SCRA 1001.
22.	L-22526, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 907.
25.	L-25181, January 11, 1967, 19 SCRA 10.
27.	Ibid, 96. Cf. De Joya v. Lantin, L-24037, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 893; Cadiz v. Secretary of National Defense, L-25150, Sept. 30, 1968, 25 SCRA 419.
28.	L-29043, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381.
30.	Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 907; De Joya v. Lantin, L-24037, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 893; Romualdez v. Arca, L-20516, Nov. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 856; Diosamito v. Balanque, L-30734, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 836; and De Joya v. David, L-23504, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1493. Ibid, 386-387.
31.	Ibid, 388. Papa v. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968, is reported in 22 SCRA 857.
32.	L-28235, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 327.
33.	L-24237, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 189.
34.	L-32921-40, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 533.
36.	Section 2607 of Republic Act No. 1937 (1957).
37.	L-32542, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 208.
39.	L-24068, April 23, 1974, 56 SCRA 583.

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