Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52276:gr-178300-2009&catid=1516&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:33:44+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO, Accused-Appellants.
For review is the Decision,1 dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution,2 dated 18 October 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 affirming with modifications the Decision,3 dated 26 February 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 finding herein accused-appellants Domingo Reyes y Paje (Reyes), Alvin Arnaldo y Avena (Arnaldo) and Joselito Flores y Victorio (Flores) guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and imposing upon each of them the capital punishment of death.
That on or about 11:00 p.m. on July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban, Federico Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes y Acejo, who are still at large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such amount as may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court.
During their arraignment,5 appellants, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge. Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids). The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants, the instant case was elevated to us for automatic review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,40 we remanded the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision but this was denied. Hence, appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.
Anent the first assigned error, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San.
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their respective testimonies were consistent with one another. They were steadfast in recounting their ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony with the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against appellants.
Appellants, nonetheless, maintain that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San could not have identified their kidnappers, because (1) the incident occurred in the darkness of the night; (2) they were blindfolded then; and (3) the heads of the kidnappers were covered by T-shirts.
Appellants, however, insist that the testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San that they were able to recognize the kidnappers - - because although the kidnappers' heads were covered with T-shirts, their faces were nevertheless exposed or uncovered - - are incredible. Appellants argue that it is against human nature and experience that kidnappers would cover only their heads and not their faces in concealing their identities.
Appellants dispute the plausibility of Enrico Cebuhano's claim that he was able to identify the assailants because they took off their masks. Persons who wear masks would not take them off so casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so would thereby reveal their identities. x x x.
The above arguments are untenable. In his testimony, Enrico Cebuhano clearly stated that the men who entered his home removed their masks when he was brought downstairs. Why they did so was known only to them. It is possible that they thought that there was no one in the vicinity who could identify them, or that they wanted Enrico to see who they were so as to intimidate him. It is also possible that they felt secure because there were 14 of them who were all armed. In any event, what is important is that the trial court found Enrico Cebuhano's testimony to be both credible and believable, and that he was able to positively identify appellants herein, because the men who entered his home removed their masks, x x x.
Appellants put in issue the failure of Robert and Yao San to immediately report the incident and identify appellants to authorities despite their common claim that they recognized appellants, as the latter used to work in the poultry farm.
Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in kidnapping the Yao family.
As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray63 approached and poked their guns at Yao San, and thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then took the driver's seat and drove the van, while each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions64 how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual acts of appellants and their cohorts demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Appellants, however, challenge the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial confessions.
Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based solely on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. He maintains, however, that said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants' constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of their own choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his co-appellants; and that Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be utilized against him.
Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who, according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations.
The Pasubali76 of appellants Arnaldo and Flores's written extra-judicial confessions clearly shows that before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had informed them that the interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereafter, the PAOCTF agents explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain silent, and that anything they would say may be used against them in a court of law. They were also told that they were entitled to a counsel of their own choice, and that they would be provided with one if they had none. When asked if they had a lawyer of their own, appellant Arnaldo replied that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. Rous. Thereafter, when asked if they understood their said rights, they replied in the affirmative. The appraisal of their constitutional rights was done in the presence of their respective lawyers and in the Tagalog dialect, the language spoken and understood by them. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores and their respective counsels, Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, also signed and thumbmarked the extra-judicial confessions. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous attested to the veracity of the afore-cited facts in their respective court testimonies.77 Indeed, the appraisal of appellants' constitutional rights was not merely perfunctory, because it appeared certain that appellants had understood and, in fact, exercised their fundamental rights after being informed thereof.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. Nor is there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. The indelible fact is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a lackey of the lawmen.
Further, as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.88 While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel - or where the preferred lawyer is not available - is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsel's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.89 Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning, appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.
They did not submit any medical report showing that their bodies were subjected to violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against the persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective confessions despite several opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred that they informed their family members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment, but the latter did not report such allegations to proper authorities. On the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and Flores declared in their respective confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn statements, and that they were not promised or given any award in consideration of the same. Records also bear out that they were physically examined by doctors before they made their confessions.92 Their physical examination reports certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted during their examination.93 In People v. Pia,94 we held that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim.
It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS' extrajudicial confessions were independently made without collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.
Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant Reyes participated in their kidnapping of the Yao family. These statements are, therefore, admissible as corroborative and circumstantial evidence to prove appellant Reyes' guilt.
Nevertheless, even without the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability of appellant Reyes. As earlier found, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao positively identified appellant Reyes as one of their kidnappers. They specifically testified that during the incident, appellant Reyes (1) approached and pointed a gun at Yao San and dragged the latter inside the van; and (2) accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. The RTC, Court of Appeals and this Court found such testimonies credible.
Appellants argue that their alibis cast reasonable doubt on their alleged guilt. Appellant Reyes avers that he could not have been one of those who kidnapped the Yao family on the night of 16 July 1999 at around 11:00 p.m., because he was sleeping with his family in their residence during such time and date. Likewise, appellant Flores asseverates that he could not have been present at the crime scene on such date and time, as he was already sleeping in his sister's house at Antipolo City. For his part, appellant Arnaldo asserts that he is a victim of a police frame-up. He alleges that he was an asset of the PAOCTF, but was later utilized as a drug pusher by the said agency. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of a shabu sale to the PAOCTF officers, he was beaten up and included as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family.
It should be observed that the family residence/house of appellant Reyes where he claimed to have slept when the incident occurred is located within Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.101 This is the same barangay where the Yao family's poultry farm is situated. Appellant Reyes, in fact, admitted that the poultry farm is near his residence.102 There is a huge possibility that appellant Reyes slept for a while, woke up before 11:00 p.m., and thereafter proceeded to the Yao family's poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family. The same is true with appellant Flores. Wilfredo, appellant Flores' nephew, testified that he and appellant went to bed and slept together in the house of appellant's sister in Antipolo City at about 8:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999.103 It is greatly possible that Wifredo did not notice when appellant Flores woke up later at 9:00 p.m. and immediately proceeded to the Yao family's poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family, arriving therein at about 11:00 p.m. It is a fact that a person coming from Antipolo City may reach San Jose del Monte, Bulacan in two hours via a motor vehicle, considering that there was no more heavy traffic at that late evening. Obviously, appellants Reyes and Flores failed to prove convincingly that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene during the incident.
Appellant Flores submitted two pictures which, according to him, show that he worked as a construction worker from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999 while staying in his sister's house at Antipolo City. These pictures, however, do not clearly and convincingly support such claim, because (1) the pictures were undated; (2) the shots were taken from a far distance; and (3) the face of the man in the pictures which appellant Flores claims as his is blurred, unrecognizable and almost hidden, as such person is wearing a cap and is in a position where only the right and back portions of his head and body are visible.
Appellant Arnaldo also failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of frame-up. Aside from his self-serving testimony that he was a former PAOCTF agent and that he was beaten and included as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family by the PAOCTF agents because he failed to remit to the PAOCTF officers the proceeds of his sale of shabu, he did not present convincing proof to support said allegations. He submitted the calling card of Colonel Mancao, which appears to have been signed by the latter at the back portion, but there is nothing on it which indicates or verifies that appellant Arnaldo was indeed a former PAOCTF agent. He also submitted a prayer book containing his handwritten narration of torture he allegedly experienced at the hands of the PAOCTF agents, but this does not conclusively show that he was beaten by the PAOCTF agents. As we earlier found, appellant Arnaldo did not produce any medical records/certificates or file any complaint against the PAOCTF agents to bolster his claim of maltreatment.
We shall now determine the propriety of appellants' conviction for the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the corresponding penalties imposed.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed with the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.106 All of the foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are private individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking control of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family was taken against their will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females.
Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of the two qualifying circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the motive of the kidnappers is to extort ransom for the release of the kidnap victims, although none of the circumstances mentioned under paragraph four of the elements of kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would release him from captivity.107 Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment.108 It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of exacting ransom;109 and (2) the kidnap victims were killed or died as a consequence of the kidnapping or was raped, or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. Both of these qualifying circumstances are alleged in the information and proven during trial.
As testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts demanded the amount of P5 million for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim and Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City, to hand over the ransom money to appellants and their cohorts, but the latter did not show up. It was also apparent that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were killed or died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and their cohorts called up and told him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond who were still under their custody, because they heard the radio report that the incident was already known to the police. True to their threats, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were later found dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their respective death certificates show that they died of asphyxia by strangulation.
Withal, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. In accordance with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the penalty that should be meted out to the appellants is reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted accordingly in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole on each of the appellants.
The Court of Appeals was also correct in ordering appellants to jointly and severally pay civil indemnity and exemplary damages to the Yao family. Nonetheless, their corresponding amounts should be modified. In People v. Quiachon,110 we explained that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 was still proper, as the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As earlier stated, both the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the double killing or death of two of the kidnap victims were alleged in the information and proven during trial. Thus, for the twin deaths of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond, their heirs (Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew and Charlene) are entitled to a total amount of P150,000.00 as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.111 In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be recovered when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying.112 Since both the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the killing or death of two of the kidnap victims (Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond) while in captivity were alleged in the information and proven during trial, and in order to deter others from committing the same despicable acts, the award of exemplary damages is proper. The total amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages should be modified. In several cases,113 we awarded an amount of P100,000.00 to each of the kidnap victims. As in this case, the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages should be awarded each to Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea. This makes the total amount of exemplary damages add up to P700,000.00.
The appellate court aptly held that the award of moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury. Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. There is no doubt that each member of the Yao family suffered physical and/or psychological trauma because of the ordeal, especially because two of the family members were ruthlessly killed during their captivity. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,114 Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea should each receive the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages. Per computation, the total amount of moral damages is P700,000.00 and not P500,000.00 as fixed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double homicide since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during the kidnapping. The word "double" should be deleted therein. Regardless of the number of killings or deaths that occurred as a consequence of the kidnapping, the appropriate denomination of the crime should be the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18 October 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the total amount of civil indemnity is P150,000.00; (2) the total amount of exemplary damages is P700,000.00; (3) the total amount of moral damages is P700,000.00; and (4) the appropriate denomination of the crime committed by appellants is the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
* Per Special Order No. 568, dated 12 February 2009, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, designating Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio to replace Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, who is on official leave under the Court's Wellness Program.
** Associate Justice Renato C. Corona was designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 24 September 2007.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo concurring; rollo, pp. 3-34.
2 CA rollo, p. 445.
5 Id. at 72-78 & 94-96.
6 TSN, 26 October 1999, pp. 3-14; TSN, 11 August 2000, pp. 3-7; TSN, 21 September 2000, pp. 2 - 8.
7 TSN, 26 October 1999, pp. 16-17; TSN, 11 August 2000, p. 7.
10 TSN, 26 October 1999, pp. 16-23; TSN, 7 December 1999, pp. 2-5; TSN, 11 August 2000, pp. 8 - 9.
11 TSN, 7 December 1999, pp. 4-7.
12 Id. at 7-8; TSN, 11 August 2000, pp. 10-12.
14 Id; TSN, 11 August 2000, pp. 12-14.
15 TSN, 7 December 1999, pp. 8-9; TSN, 11 August 2000, pp. 14-15; Records, p. 35.
17 Id. at 5, 8, 12, & 24-28.
18 Id. at 13-14 & 33, 35, & 38.
19 Id. at 46-48, 63-64 & 302-306.
31 TSN, 7 June 2001, pp. 3-21.
32 TSN, 10 July 2001, pp. 3-6.
33 Id. at 10-16; TSN, 21 August 2001, pp. 3-14.
34 TSN, 6 March 2001, pp. 3-10.
35 TSN, 24 May 2001, pp. 2-9.
36 Records, Volume VI, Index of Exhibits.
39 CA rollo, p. 61.
40 G.R. NOS. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
42 CA rollo, pp. 85-132, 148-164 & 198-219.
43 Id. at 94-95, 150-151 & 200-201.
44 People v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 182192, 29 October 2008.
45 TSN, 26 October 1999, pp. 14 & 22.
46 TSN, 11 August 2001, pp. 6, 9, 10, 18 & 19.
48 TSN, 7 December 1999, p. 51; TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 11; TSN, 19 September 2000, p. 3.
49 TSN, 19 September 2000, p. 3.
50 TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 8; TSN, 21 September 2000, p. 14.
51 TSN, 14 January 2000, p. 38.
52 TSN, 7 December 1999, p. 26; TSN, 14 January 2000, p. 32; TSN, 19 September 2000, p. 19.
53 TSN, 26 October 1999, p. 14; TSN, 19 September 2000, p. 5; TSN 21 September 2000, p. 10.
54 TSN, 19 September 2000, p. 14; TSN 21 September 2000, p. 7.
55 357 Phil. 924, 933-934 (1998).
56 People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 642, 658.
57 People v. Ubaldo, 396 Phil. 509, 520 (2000).
58 TSN, 26 September 2000, p. 14.
59 People v. Fajardo, Jr., G.R. No. 173022, 23 January 2007, 512 SCRA 360, 373.
60 People v. Dadles, 343 Phil. 916, 924 (1997).
61 People v. Dorico, 153 Phil. 458, 475 (1973).
62 People v. Geronimo, 153 Phil. 1, 10 (1973).
65 People v. Fabro, 342 Phil. 708, 721 (1997).
67 People v. Base, 385 Phil. 803, 815 (2000).
69 People v. Sayaboc, 464 Phil. 824, 839 (2004).
70 People v. Agustin, 310 Phil. 594, 612 (1995).
71 People v. Olermo, 454 Phil. 147, 165 (2003).
72 Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, 27 June 1988, 162 SCRA 642, 653.
73 People v. Deniega, G.R. No. 103499, 29 December 1995, 251 SCRA 626, 637.
74 People v. Velarde, 434 Phil. 102, 119 (2002).
75 People v. Base, supra note 67.
77 TSN, 25 September 2001 and 27 September 2001.
78 TSN, 27 September 2001, pp. 5-9.
80 TSN, 25 September 2001, pp. 2-14.
82 People v. Velarde, supra note 74.
83 TSN, 27 September 2001, p. 5.
85 TSN, 25 September 2001, pp. 4-5.
87 Supra note 65 at 726.
88 People v. Mojello, 468 Phil. 944, 954 (2004).
89 People v. Base, supra note 67.
90 People v. Bagnate, G.R. NOS. 133685-86, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 633, 651.
91 People v. Fabro, supra note 65.
94 229 Phil. 577, 582 (1986).
95 People v. Bagnate, supra note 90.
96 Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 400 Phil. 1175, 1206 (2000).
97 G.R. No. 88451, 5 September 1991, 201 SCRA 364, 377.
98 230 Phil. 560, 574 (1986).
99 People v. Guevarra, supra note 44.
100 People v. Montesa, G.R. No. 181899, 27 November 2008.
101 TSN, 6 March 2001, p. 3.
103 TSN, 22 May 2001, p. 6.
104 People v. Guevarra, supra note 44; People v. Larranaga, G.R. NOS. 138874-75, 21 July 2005, 463 SCRA 652, 662; People v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 158203, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 719, 736; People v. Datingginoo, G.R. No. 95539, 14 June 1993, 223 SCRA 331, 335.
105 People v. Fajardo, Jr., supra note 59.
106 People v. Jatulan, G.R. No. 171653, 24 April 2007, 522 SCRA 174, 183.
110 G.R. No. 170236, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 719.
111 New Civil Code, Article 2229.
112 New Civil Code, Article 2223.
113 People v. Garalde, G.R. No. 173055, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 327, 355; People v. Martinez, 469 Phil. 558, 578 (2004); People v. Bisda, 454 Phil. 194, 239 (2003).
114 People v. Garalde, id.; People v. Borromeo, 380 Phil. 523, 531 (2000); People v. Reyes, 329 Phil. 1043, 1049 (1996).

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