Source: https://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/content/3-application-forfeiture-rule
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:33:05+00:00

Document:
3.1 The forfeiture rule applies to a person who unlawfully kills someone and stands to benefit as a result of their relationship with the victim.
3.4 Most unlawful killings in Victoria are carried out by someone known to the victim. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 90 victims of homicide were recorded in Victoria in 2012. Of these, two out of three were killed by someone they knew.
3.5 Table 1 shows the relationship between homicide victims and offenders in Victoria during 2011 and 2012, which are the last two years for which figures are available.
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Recorded Crime—Victims, Australia, 2012, Cat No 4510.0.
3.7 The forfeiture rule is most likely to have applied where the victim was a family member.
Source: Victoria Police,Crime Statistics 2012/13, 12.
3.10 Of the 178 offences recorded in 2012–13, 40 were attempted, conspiracy or incitement offences.
3.11 A broad range of acts can cause the unlawful killing of another. As the forfeiture rule is applied inflexibly, a premeditated murder carried out with the intention of obtaining a financial benefit and a suicide pact in which one of the parties survived would both attract the application of the forfeiture rule.
3.12 This section describes the range of acts to which the rule applies, or may apply.
3.13 The application of the forfeiture rule to murder is a well-established rule of public policy.6 Murder is the most serious of homicides and the maximum penalty in Victoria is life imprisonment.7 The killer has intentionally or recklessly and without lawful justification killed someone or has inflicted serious injury and their victim dies as a result.
The community’s abhorrence of this offence is clear. The Commission does not propose to open debate about whether the rule as it applies to convicted murderers should be modified in any way.
3.16 As discussed in Chapter 2, at common law, the forfeiture rule applies to manslaughter offences, at least where the offence was intentionally committed.12 In the United Kingdom, the forfeiture rule does not apply in manslaughter cases resulting from an involuntary, inadvertent or negligent act, which can include motor manslaughter, inadvertent or involuntary manslaughter or negligent manslaughter.
3.17 The position in Victoria is not as clear. Justice Gillard expressed the view in Estate of Soukup that, while the court was not required to decide whether the forfeiture rule should apply to an inadvertent or involuntary act, the English approach would be appropriate in the circumstances.13 However, in the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales the application of the rule in these circumstances may not need to be decided as, even if there is doubt, the court can use its discretion to modify the effect of the rule.
3.19 Other negligent, reckless or dangerous acts or omissions might result in alternative criminal charges such as culpable driving;20 dangerous driving causing death;21 or failure to control a dangerous dog.22 Generally, deaths resulting from such acts or omissions are unintended.
3.20 Some common law jurisdictions apply the rule rigidly in these circumstances. In New South Wales, there are indications that the court is prepared to apply the forfeiture rule even where the relevant act of homicide was inadvertent. In Straede v Eastwood,23 Mr Straede, who had pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death, applied to have the effect of the rule modified.His wife had been killed in a car accident when he was at the wheel and he had been sentenced to two years imprisonment. The question of whether or not the rule applied in his case was not in issue. Justice Palmer agreed to modify the effect of the rule, noting that there had been no suggestion that Mrs Straede’s death was premeditated or that Mr Straede sought to profit from it.24 However, due to the discretion under the NSW Act, the court did not need to consider whether the rule might not apply in the circumstances of the case once an application to modify the effect of the rule had been made.
3.21 Generally in the United States the slayer rule does not apply if the killing was reckless, accidental, or negligent.25 However, both Kentucky and the District of Columbia preclude killers from inheriting from their victims when their negligent wrongful conduct results in homicide.26 Also, there have been court decisions in Canada27 and South Africa28 that have held that the forfeiture rule will apply to someone who has negligently and unintentionally caused the death of another. In Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board v Young29 a woman caused the death of her husband in a motor vehicle accident after drinking at dinner to celebrate their wedding anniversary. Her husband had a terminal illness and she did not intend to cause him harm but the court held that the forfeiture rule applied to both intentional and non-intentional killings.
3.23 While suicide is no longer a criminal offence,32 it is an offence in Victoria to incite another to commit suicide33 or to aid or abet another in the commission of a suicide.34 The consent of the victim is not a valid defence to assisting a suicide and the forfeiture rule will preclude the person who has assisted in the suicide from inheriting.
3.24 However, criminal penalties are often very different from those imposed for other offences that result in an unlawful killing. For example, in both R v Hood35 and R v Maxwell36 the court imposed wholly suspended sentences on offenders found guilty of assisting a suicide. In R v Hood, the deceased had expressed a wish to commit suicide to avoid ‘becoming a vegetable’ as a result of inoperable brain tumours; however, an autopsy revealed that the deceased had not had a brain tumour. The deceased, Mr Colley, had told multiple people he was going to commit suicide in order to die with dignity and organised a farewell party. Mr Hood was the deceased’s former partner who had continued to reside with him. He assisted Mr Colley to commit suicide by purchasing the drugs that he used to kill himself and remaining with him until he died.
In R v Maxwell, Mr Maxwell had assisted his wife to commit suicide to relieve her suffering as a result of terminal cancer. The forfeiture rule would apply to prevent people in these circumstances from inheriting despite the minimal criminal culpability.
3.25 Assisting a suicide is a separate offence in New Zealand as well. In its review of the forfeiture rule, the New Zealand Law Commission considered that this offence does not warrant a bar to inheritance. The nature of an assisted suicide—in that it is the deceased’s choice to die—provides a clear distinction from murder.37 Often, those who assist a suicide are close to the deceased and motivated by compassion to end their suffering.
3.28 Suicide pacts often occur in circumstances of great distress for the parties involved. In DPP v Rolfe,45 an 81-year-old man was convicted of manslaughter by suicide following an attempted joint suicide with his wife. His wife was going to be placed in an aged care home and they had wanted to avoid being separated. Both the husband and wife were found unconscious after attempting to gas themselves but only one of them was able to be saved. Mr Rolfe was later found to have been suffering severe psychiatric distress and depression at the time and received a non-custodial sentence.
3.29 The court in sentencing Mr Rolfe accepted that the proper function of sentencing was to deter people from the unlawful taking of life. The court also found that the principle of general deterrence was modified by Mr Rolfe’s psychiatric condition of major depression.
3.30 As the forfeiture rule applies to suicide pacts, persons such as Mr Rolfe would be unable to inherit. They could lose the home they may have jointly owned with the other member of the suicide pact and, depending on their relationship with other heirs, they might forfeit other assets.
3.31 The NZ Act excludes suicide pacts from the operation of the codified rule.46 In the United Kingdom, the effect of the rule was modified in Dunbar v Plant.47 In that case, the trial judge held that the defendant, who had a suicide pact with her fiancé, had illegally aided and abetted his suicide and that the forfeiture rule therefore applied to preclude her from succeeding to his interests and entitlements. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that at common law the rule remained absolute and inflexible. However, the Court exercised its statutory discretion under the UK Act to modify the effect of the forfeiture rule and allow the survivor to inherit.
(a) Which types of killing should be excluded from the operation of the rule?
(b) On what basis should they be excluded?
3.33 Just as there is a broad range of unlawful killings, so there is also wide variation between unlawful killers in terms of their motivations, intentions and circumstances.
3.34 An act or omission causing the death of another can be accompanied by an intent to kill or to cause bodily harm on the part of the killer or by a reckless disregard of the consequences. A killer may also have murderous intent but there may be mitigating circumstances such as diminished responsibility or they may be motivated by compassion to end the suffering of the deceased through a mercy killing.
3.35 There may be a need to take variables of this type into account when applying the forfeiture rule.
3.36 A killer’s moral culpability means the degree of blameworthiness that can be attributed to their actions in committing the unlawful killing.
3.39 The level of moral culpability of the killer is a significant issue in applying the slayer rule in the United States, where most jurisdictions do not apply the rule unless the killing is intentional.
3.45 Where courts have a statutory power to modify the effect of the rule, they have done so in family violence cases. In the English case of Re K Deceased a woman accidentally killed the husband who assaulted her. The forfeiture rule was found to apply because she was guilty of a deliberate threat of violence and the death, although unintended, was the consequence of her conduct.59 The court then exercised its statutory discretion to modify the effect of the rule.
to be suffering from diminished responsibility rather than mental impairment, the forfeiture rule was applied.
3.50 The effect of the forfeiture rule has been modified by courts under the NSW Act in cases of diminished responsibility. For example, in R v R,67an application was successfully made on behalf of a 13-year-old boy who had killed his mother and sister and had diminished responsibility as a result of the physical, sexual and emotional abuse of his father.
His application was supported by his half-brother and grandmother.
3.51 In Leneghan-Britton v Taylor,68 the effect of the rule was modified where the killer had diminished responsibility due to an inability to cope with responsibilities as a carer for her grandmother but the killing was neither premeditated nor motivated by profit.
The court considered a range of factors of questionable relevance, including a lack of profit motive, which might exist in many murder cases, and the deceased’s impending death from cancer.
3.53 Another crime in which the unlawful killer can experience some diminution of responsibility is infanticide. Infanticide is an alternative verdict for murder in Victoria and occurs when a woman causes the death of her child within two years of giving birth in circumstances that would otherwise constitute murder.71 In order to be guilty of the offence of infanticide the killer must be disturbed because of a failure to recover from the effect of giving birth or must suffer a disorder consequent to giving birth.72 The forfeiture rule would apply to preclude women who have committed infanticide from inheriting any property held on trust for the deceased infant.
3.55 However, if, as the New Zealand Law Commission suggests, infanticide is analogous to a killing in which there is an acquittal on the ground of mental impairment, then other types of unlawful killings involving a diminution in the killer’s responsibility may also be analogous to this crime. There may therefore be a broader range of circumstances in which an unlawful killing might occur that are equally worthy of exception from the operation of the forfeiture rule.
3.56 Minors are subject to the forfeiture rule, and so those who kill cannot inherit from their victims.75 However, minors are not regarded as having the same level of criminal responsibility or culpability as adult offenders in the criminal justice system.
3.58 The application of the forfeiture rule to minors could be regarded as inconsistent with these principles and policies, particularly in the younger age range of minors.
3.59 In R v R,79 the court modified the effect of the forfeiture rule on the basis of the diminished responsibility of the killer. However, the case involved a 13-year-old boy who killed his mother and sister while in a state of diminished responsibility resulting from physical, sexual and emotional abuse by his father. The ability of the minor R to process and deal with his situation is likely to have been affected by his age. Children in these circumstances could not ordinarily be held to have the same level of responsibility as an adult. Any application of the forfeiture rule to a child such as R might deprive the child of an inheritance that could be used to provide them with the assistance and care they require to develop and overcome the cumulative effects of the harm they may have suffered.
3.60 Minors are nevertheless still held responsible for their crimes and many minors who commit unlawful killings are aware that what they are doing is wrong. A minor could kill with the objective of obtaining a financial benefit if the forfeiture rule did not apply to all minors who commit unlawful killings.
3.61 Not all unlawful killings result from an act of violence or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Some, such as assisted suicides or mercy killings, are motivated by compassion and love for the victim and to relieve their suffering. The application of the forfeiture rule in these cases can sometimes produce harsh results.
3.66 A range of other factors might be considered relevant to the question of whether an unlawful killer should be able to inherit from their victim. These might include the forgiveness of the deceased; the impact of the loss of inheritance on the killer; or whether the killer was found to be criminally responsible.
3.70 The loss of property entitlements may have a particularly negative impact on certain unlawful killers. In Jans v Public Trustee,95the court decided to modify the effect of the forfeiture rule under the NSW Act. The court took into account the fact that the killer, who was deemed to have diminished responsibility at the time of the killing, would have nowhere to live if he were disinherited. The application was supported by family members.
3.71 The forfeiture rule may be applied to a person who has been acquitted in criminal proceedings, or has not been prosecuted at all, if it is proved to the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the person unlawfully killed the deceased.96 Proceedings on the right of someone to inherit or take the benefit of property entitlements in circumstances where the forfeiture rule would apply are not about punishing a killer for their crime but about enforcing a rule of public policy that a person should not benefit from their crime. These proceedings will therefore not violate the rule against double jeopardy, which prevents an accused from being retried for the same crime without compelling new evidence.
3.74 The application of the forfeiture rule to a person who has been acquitted may be contrasted with the exception for persons found not guilty by reason of mental impairment. If the reason for that exception is that the person is not criminally responsible for a killing, then that reasoning could also extend to persons acquitted of an offence.
3.75 In some circumstances it is possible that an unlawful killer can obtain a benefit by inheriting from the heir of their victim. For example, in a recent American case the wife of a man who killed a will-maker inherited from the estate of the victim despite suggestions that she had prior knowledge of the crime.100 In the much criticised case of Ex parte Steenkamp and Steenkamp101 in South Africa, a couple left a will benefitting their daughter and her children. They were subsequently killed by their son-in-law, and later one of their grandchildren who had received a benefit under the will died in infancy. The court held that the killer was eligible to inherit from his child.
(a) Should the courts be able to consider moral culpability?
(b) What other factors should be taken into account?
3.81 Exempting persons found not guilty of an unlawful killing by reason of their mental impairment ensures that they will not be held accountable for actions for which they are not responsible.
3.82 However, this exception may be inconsistent with the absolute and inflexible nature of the forfeiture rule in other circumstances in which the killer is not criminally responsible or where the killing was unintentional.109 Where the rule is applied strictly, the courts do not examine the motive of the killer and instead rely on the fact of the killing to apply the forfeiture rule.
3.83 It could be seen as anomalous that a person who is found not guilty in a criminal trial may have the rule applied against them, unless they were not guilty because of mental impairment.110 On the other hand, a person who has been acquitted on the criminal standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—may nevertheless be found in civil proceedings on the balance of probabilities to have committed the homicide. If so, the forfeiture rule should prevent any benefits flowing to the killer as a result. A person who is acquitted because of mental impairment has committed the homicide but, based on the M’Naghten rules discussed below, has been determined to have been not responsible.
3.84 In a 2010 study on persons found not guilty by reason of mental impairment, almost half (42.5 per cent) of the offences committed by the 146 participants were committed against an immediate family member, with 16.5 per cent of the victims being a person’s spouse or partner.111 Under the current law, the forfeiture rule would not preclude any of them from inheriting.
3.85 An analysis of the socio-demographic, psychiatric and criminological characteristics of the 146 participants of the study suggests the typical person found not guilty by reason of mental impairment is unemployed, unskilled and has not completed secondary schooling.112 Many people with mental impairment will be likely to have ongoing care needs. If the forfeiture rule were to be applied to them, they may be more likely to require state support to meet these needs.
3.88 The CMIA seeks to achieve a therapeutic aim by promoting an increased understanding and tolerance of mental illness that can give rise to a mental impairment.117 Exempting persons found not guilty of an unlawful killing from the forfeiture rule is consistent with this aim.
3.89 However, mental impairment is difficult to demonstrate and applies only to a specific class of offenders. The CMIA has adopted the common law test for establishing the defence of mental impairment, known as the M’Naghten Rules. In order to establish the defence it must be proven that at the time of committing the causative act they were labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as to not know the nature and quality of the act they were doing, or if they did know, then they must not have known that the act was wrong.118 Therefore, where an unlawful killer is conscious that an act is one they should not be doing, then despite any mental condition they might be suffering, they will be held criminally responsible and will be subject to the application of the forfeiture rule.
3.90 For example, in Clift v Clift,119an intellectually disabled woman suffering from a depressive illness and delusions murdered her aunt and then killed herself. Medical evidence showed that she knew what she was doing, and knew that it was wrong, even though her mental condition was such that she was unable to refrain from killing her aunt, and the forfeiture rule applied.
3.91 In addition to being difficult to demonstrate, a finding of not guilty by reason of mental impairment has serious consequences and is not treated lightly by the courts. The supervision process under the CMIA can be onerous and last for a significant period. The length of a supervision order is always indefinite and can last the rest of a person’s life.
It involves continual assessment and review of the person’s progress under the order.
(a) In what circumstances should the exception not apply?
(b) Should the court have a discretion to apply the rule in the circumstances of the case?
1 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 9AF, 9AG.
2 Estate of Soukup (1997) 97 A Crim R 103.
4 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Recorded Crime—Victims, Australia, 2012, Cat No 4510.0.
the offence occurred or when it was reported to police.
7 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 3.
9 R v Sypott  VSC 327 (5 September 2003).
10 The Queen v Nguyen  VSC 46 (12 February 2013); R v Jie Hua Yu  VSC 207 (1 June 2001).
11 The Queen v Blackwell  VSC 499 (13 September 2013).
12 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; Estate of Soukup (1997) 97 A Crim, R 103.
13 Estate of Soukup (1997) 97 A Crim R 103, 115.
14 Sara M Gregory, ‘Paved with Good “Intentions”: The Latent Ambiguities in New Jersey’s Slayer Statute’ (2010) 62 Rutgers Law Review 821, 835; In re Seipel 329 NE 2d 419 (Ill App Ct, 1975); Henry v Toney 50 So 2d 921 (Miss, 1951).
15 UPC § 2-803(b) (2010).
16 In re Estates of Swansons 187 P 3d 631, 638 (Mont, 2008).
17 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (2003) § 8.4 cmt (f).
18 UPC § 2-803 cmt (2010).
19 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) § 45 reporter’s note (b).
20 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 318.
23 Straede v Eastwood  NSWSC 280 (2 April 2003).
25 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (2003) § 8.4 cmt (f), citing Commercial Union Insurance Co. v Pelchat 727 A 2d 676 (RI, 1999).
26 Ky Rev Stat Ann §§ 381.280, 507.050 (LexisNexis 2013); Turner v Travelers Insurance Co 487 A 2d 614 (DC, 1985)—involuntary manslaughter was sufficient for the killer to be disinherited.
27 Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board v Young (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 78.
28 Casey NO v The Master & others 1992 (4) SA 505(N).
29 (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 78.
30 Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 (NZ) s 4(1).
31 Law Commission (New Zealand), Succession Law: Homicidal Heirs, Report No 38 (1997), 5.
32 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 6A.
35  VSC 123 (12 April 2002).
36  VSC 278 (24 July 2003).
37 Law Commission (New Zealand), above n 31, 6.
38 Jeffrey G Sherman, ‘Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit’ (1993) 61 University of Cincinnati Law Review 803, 863.
39 Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 (NZ) ss 3, 4(1). The codified rule prevents a person who commits homicide from benefiting from the victim’s death. The definition of ‘homicide’ for the purposes of the Act excludes an assisted suicide.
41 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 6B(2)(a).
44 Dunbar v Plant  4 All ER 289.
45  VSC 528 (28 November 2008).
46 Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 (NZ), ss 3, 4(1). The codified rule prevents a person who commits homicide from benefiting from the victim’s death. The definition of ‘homicide’ for the purposes of the Act excludes ‘a killing of a person by another in pursuance of a suicide pact’.
47  4 All ER 289.
48 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 323.
49 Forfeiture Act 1982 (UK) s 1(2); Forfeiture Act 1991 (ACT) s 2; Forfeiture Act 1995 (NSW) s 3.
50 H Zimmermann and J J Hockley, ‘A Forfeiture Act for Western Australia?’ (2009) 17 Australian Property Law Journal 35, 59.
51 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 25 October1995, 2257 (Jeffrey Shaw, Attorney-General).
52 Re K Deceased  Ch 25; Re K  Ch 180.
53 Jans v Public Trustee  NSWSC 628.
54 Re K Deceased  Ch 25; Re K  Ch 180.
55 Women’s Legal Service (Tas), Submission No 1 to Tasmania Law Reform Institute, The Forfeiture Rule, 2004, 1.
56 R v Tran  VSC 220 (24 June 2005).
57 R v Uttley  VSC 79 (16 March 2009).
58 R v Gazdovic  VSC 588 (20 December 2002).
59 Re K Deceased  Ch 25; Re K  Ch 180.
60 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 25 October1995, 2257 (Jeffrey Shaw, Attorney-General). New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 20 November 1995, 3481 (John Hannaford, Meredith Burgmann).
61 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 October 1991, 4109 (Terry Connolly, Attorney-General).
62 Law Commission (New Zealand), above n 31, 8.
63 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 23A.
65 Re Giles  Ch 544; Jones v Roberts  2 FLR 422; Dalton v Latham  EWHC 796 (Ch); Troja v Troja (1994) 33 NSWLR 269.
66 (1964) 82 WN (NSW) 298.
67 NSWSC 2143 (14 November 1997).
68 (1998) 100 A Crim R 565.
69 Andrew Hemming ‘Killing the Goose and Keeping the Golden Nest Egg’ (2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology Law & Justice Journal 342, 356.
70 Nicola Peart, ‘Reforming the forfeiture rule: Comparing New Zealand, England and Australia’ (2002) 31 Common Law World Review 1, 27.
71 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 6.
73 Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 (NZ) s 4(1).
74 Law Commission (New Zealand), above n 31, 10.
75 See Re Fitter; Public Trustee v Fitter  NSWSC 1188.
76 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 10(1).
79 NSWSC 2143 (14 November 1997).
82 R v Klinkermann  VSC 65.
83 Wis Stat § 854.14(6)(b) (2013); Anne-Marie Rhodes, ‘Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discretion’ (2007) 33 Ohio Northern University Law Review 975, 981.
84 Anne-Marie Rhodes, ‘Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discretion’ (2007) 33 Ohio Northern University Law Review 975, 981.
85 Law Commission (New Zealand), above n 31, 7.
86 New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 May 2007, 8988 (Lynne Pillay), 8990 (Kate Wilkinson).
87 G E Dal Pont and K F Mackie, Law of Succession (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013) 172.
88 Andrew Simester, ‘Unworthy But Forgiven Heirs’ (1990) 10 Estates & Trust Journal 217, 220; Lundy v Lundy (1895) 24 SCR 650.
89 (1895) 24 SCR 650.
92 Code Civil (Civil Code) (France) arts 726, 728; La CC art 943 (2013); Anne-Marie Rhodes, above n 83, 980.
93 Code Civil (Civil Code) (France) arts 726, 728.
94 Law Commission (New Zealand), above n 31, 10.
96 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691.
97 Tasmania Law Reform Institute, The Forfeiture Rule, Report No 6 (2004) 21.
98 Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) s 32(1).
99 Ibid ss 4, 5.
101 1952 (1) SA 744.
102 Or Rev Stat § 112.465(2) (2012); Carla Spivack, ‘Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance’ (2011) 90 Oregon Law Review 247, 274.
103 In the Estate of Hall  P 1; Re Houghton  2 Ch 173; Re Plaister; Perpetual Trustee Company v Crawshaw (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 547.
104 Confiscation Act 1997 ss 4, 32(1); Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) generally.
105 Forfeiture Act 1995 (NSW) s 11(1).
106 (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 547.
107 Ibid; Perpetual Trustee Company v Crawshaw (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 547, 549.
108 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper No 17 (2013), 10–11.
109 Chris Triggs, ‘Against Policy: Homicide and Succession to Property’ (2005) 68 Saskatchewan Law Review 117, 126.
111 Janet Ruffles, The Management of Forensic Patients in Victoria: The More Things Change, The More They Remain the Same (PhD Thesis, Monash University, 2010) 122.
113 Re Pitts  1 Ch 546.
114 See Clift v Clift (1964) [1964–5] NSWR 1896.
115 Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) s 20.
116 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 108, 10–11.
117 Re LN (No 2)  VSC 159R (19 April 2000).
118 R v M’Naghten (1843) 8 ER 718.
119 (1964) 82 WN (NSW) 298.
120 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 108, 49.
121 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 September 2005, 18042 (Graham West).
122 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 18 October 2005, 18648–9 (Arthur Chesterfield-Evans).
123 Legislation Review Committee, Parliament of New South Wales, Legislation Review Digest, No 11 of 2005, 10 October 2005, 14­.
125 Guler v NSW Trustee and Guardian  NSWSC 1369.
126 Re Pitts  1 Ch 546; Re Plaister; Perpetual Trustee Company v Crawshaw  NSWStRp 18; (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 547; Dhingra v Dhingra 2012 ONCA 261.
127 Laurel Sevier, ‘Kooky Collects: How the Conflict between Law and Psychiatry Grants Inheritance Rights to California’s Mentally Ill Slayers’ (2007) 47 Santa Clara Law Review 379, 380, 395; e.g. Estate of Ladd 153 Cal Rptr 888 (Ct App, 1979); Ford v Ford 512 A 2d 389, 399 (Md, 1986). However, the Surrogate’s Court of New York has held that a mother who killed her children and was found not guilty by reason of mental disease was barred from inheriting the money that the children’s estates received as a result of a wrongful death claim: In re Demesyeux 978 NYS 2d 608 (NY Sur Ct, 2013).
128 Sara M Gregory, ‘Paved with Good “Intentions”: The Latent Ambiguities in New Jersey’s Slayer Statute’ (2010) 62 Rutgers Law Review 821, 840.
129 Congleton v Sansom 664 So 2d 276 (Fla Dist Ct App, 1995); Goldsmith v Pearce 75 NW 2d 810 (Mich, 1956); Garner v Phillips 47 SE 2d 845 (NC, 1948).
130 Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2105.19(A) (LexisNexis 2013).
132 Burns Ind Code Ann § 29-1-2-12.1(a) (2013).
133 Ibid § 29-1-2-12.1(b) (2013). They will be a constructive trustee of the property for the benefit of those who would be legally entitled to the property if the slayer had predeceased the victim: ibid § 29-1-2-12.1(c) (2013).
134 Ibid § 29-1-2-12.1(b) (2013).

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