Source: https://www.specialedlaw.com/database/special-education-appeals-bsea-02-1798/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:29:45+00:00

Document:
The parties to this proceeding are Georgetown Public Schools (hereafter, GBS), the Beverly Public Schools (hereafter, BPS), the Salem Public Schools (hereafter SPS), and the Massachusetts Department of Education (hereafter, DOE).
The official record of the hearing consists of three documents submitted by GPS and marked as exhibits 1 through 3 (hereafter, Exhibit GPS-1, etc.); fifteen documents submitted by BPS and marked as exhibits A through O (hereafter, Exhibit BPS-A, etc.);1 a single document (affidavit of Mother with five attachments) submitted by SPS and marked as Exhibit SPS-1; two documents submitted by DOE and marked as exhibits 1 and 2 (hereafter, DOE-1, etc.); a Stipulation of Parties filed as a joint exhibit of all four parties (hereafter, Stipulation) and approximately two hours of recorded oral closing argument on April 2, 2002. The parties had previously submitted written arguments.
Does the Georgetown Public Schools, the Beverly Public Schools, and/or the Salem Public Schools have programmatic and/or fiscal responsibility for Student’s special education and related services for the time period of September 7, 1999 through the present?
On or about July 13, 2000, Nicholas LaMela, the Massachusetts Department of Social Services (hereafter, DSS) social worker assigned to Student’s case, filed a SPED 766-7 form seeking a DOE determination of school district responsibility for Student’s special education placement. Stipulation, par. 12.
In a letter dated June 13, 2001 from Marcia Mittnacht (DOE State Director for Special Education) to Attorney Paul Cormier, DOE assigned programmatic and fiscal responsibility for Student solely to Georgetown (hereafter, Determination Finding). Stipulation, par. 14; Stipulation Attachment # 2.
By letter dated July 24, 2001, Georgetown requested that the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (hereafter, BSEA) review DOE’s assignment of responsibility. Stipulation, par. 16.
1. DOE’s determination letter of June 13, 2002 that GPS is solely programmatically and fiscally responsible for Student’s educational placement was erroneous in that it did not take into account the fact that Student is in custody of DSS.
2. Pursuant to 603 CMR 28.02(16) and 28.03(4)(b), the school district where Student’s father (hereafter, Father) and Student’s mother (hereafter, Mother) lived are jointly programmatically and fiscally responsible for his educational placement. Thus GPS, as the school district where Father lives, would share programmatic and fiscal responsibility with the school district where Mother lives.
For purposes of this appeal, I therefore take DOE’s position to be DOE’s Determination Finding dated June 13, 2001 (Stipulation Attachment # 2) as amended by DOE attorney’s letter dated February 4, 2002 (Exhibits DOE-1 and GPS-2).
Stipulations of the Parties .
1. Student (d.o.b. 9-23-85) is an individual with disability as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and M.G.L. ch. 71B.
2. On or about November 1,1993, Student’s parents signed a stipulation in Probate and Family Court. The parents stipulated that, with regard to Student, they would have joint legal custody, Student’s father would have physical custody, and Student’s mother would have reasonable visitation rights.
3. On or about January 28, 1997, Student’s parents entered into a Voluntary Placement Agreement with the Department of Social Services (“DSS”) with regard to the Student.
4. On or about January 28, 1997, DSS arranged and paid for Student to live at The Lakeside School (“Lakeside”). Prior to this date, Student had been attending Lakeside as a day student pursuant to an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) written by the Georgetown Public Schools (“Georgetown”). The Lakeside School is a private school approved to provide services to publicly-funded students.
5. On or about August 13, 1997, Probate and Family Court Judge Edward J. Rockett issued the attached judgment of divorce nisi relative to Student’s parents.
6. In May 1998, Georgetown wrote an IEP for the period May 1998 to May 1999 that proposed Student’s continued placement as a day student at Lakeside, with DSS continuing to fund the residential portion of his placement there.
7. On or about March 17, 1999, the DSS social worker assigned to Student’s case signed an affidavit that attested to the fact that DSS was requesting custody of the Student.
8. On or about April 16, 1999, DSS filed a motion in Probate and Family Court seeking temporary custody of the Student.
9. In May 1999, Georgetown wrote an IEP for the period May 1999 to May 2000 that proposed Student’s continued placement as a day student at Lakeside, with DSS continuing to fund the residential portion of his placement there.
10. On or about July 14,1999, Probate and Family Court Judge Mary McCauley Manzi ordered that DSS was responsible for the care and custody of Student.
11. Beginning on or about September 7, 1999 and continuing to date, DSS has arranged and paid for Student to live at the Hillcrest Educational Centers, Inc./High Point School, where Student receives his special education services. The Hillcrest Educational Centers, Inc./High Point School is a private school approved to provide services to publicly-funded students.
12. On or about July 13, 2000, Nicholas LaMela, the DSS social worker assigned to the Student’s case, filed a SPED 766-7 form seeking a determination from the Massachusetts Department of Education (“DOE”) of school district responsibility for Student’s placement.
13. On or about May 4, 2001, the Hillcrest Educational Centers, Inc./High Point School sent DOE’s LEA assignment office information regarding Student and his parents.
14. On or about June 13, 2001, DOE issued the attached determination finding that Georgetown is solely programmatically and fiscally responsible for Student’s special education program.
15. On or about June 27, 2001, Georgetown received a copy of DOE’s June 13, 2001 determination.
16. On or about July 24,2001, Georgetown requested that the Bureau of Special Education Appeals review the June 13, 2001 determination.
17. Student’s father has lived in Georgetown, Massachusetts at all relevant times.
1. January 28, 1997 to July 15, 1997 – 20 Larch Rd., Georgetown, MA.
2. July 15, 1997 to November 19, 1997 – 6 Elliot Place, Peabody , MA.
3. November 19, 1997 to April 2, 1998 – 26 Purchase St., Danvers, MA.
4. April 2, 1998 to May 6, 1998 – 14 Jordan St., Beverly, MA.
5. May 6, 1998 to July 14, 1999 – 12 Nelson Ave., Beverly, MA.
6. July 14, 1999 to November 13, 2000 – 20 Liberty Hill Ave., Salem, MA.
7. November 14,2000 to present – 3 Northend Ave., Salem, MA.
19. Student has lived in residential facilities at all relevant times.
· Judgment of Divorce Nisi relative to Student’s parents, issued Probate and Family Court Judge Edward J. Rockett on August 13, 1997 (referenced hereafter as Stipulation Attachment # 1). The Judgment provides, in part, that DSS shall retain custody of Student.
· Determination Finding issued by DOE and dated June 13, 2001, assigning programmatic and fiscal responsible for Student’s special education program solely to Georgetown (referenced hereafter as Stipulation Attachment # 2).
1. During all times relevant to this dispute (September 7, 1999 through the present), Student was under the care and custody of DSS.
2. During all times relevant to this dispute (September 7, 1999 through the present), neither Father nor Mother had either legal custody or physical custody of Student.
3. In July 1999, Student moved from Beverly to Salem. She has continued to live in Salem through the present.
4. DSS has paid for and is continuing to pay for the residential portion of Student’s current special education program.
· Mother’s revised affidavit dated March 27, 2002 provides that on or about November 2, 1993, Mother moved out of the marital residence (28 Linden Circle, Georgetown) and moved into her uncle’s home (20 Larch Road, Georgetown). She explains that although she no longer sleeps at her uncle’s home in Georgetown, it is the address used on her license, she is registered to vote and has voted in Georgetown, she receives mail there, and she considers herself a Georgetown resident. Exhibits SPS-1, par. 6; and BPS-D, par. 6.
In July 1999, Mother moved from Beverly (12 Nelson Road) to Salem (20 Liberty Hill Avenue). On or about November 2000, she moved to a different location within Salem (3 Northend Avenue) where she continues to live. Exhibit SPS-1, par. 10.
· Father’s affidavit dated March 27, 2002 provides that Student has not visited with Father at Father’s address in Georgetown since Student began living at the Hillcrest Educational Centers, Inc./High Point School. Exhibit GPS-3.
· Team meetings were held by Georgetown on April 16, 1999 and May 3, 1999. Father (but not Mother) attended these meetings. Exhibit BPS-H. On May 4, 1999, GPS sent the IEP to Father only. Exhibit BPS-I.
Student is an individual with a disability, falling within the purview of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)3 and the state special education statute.4 Neither his status nor his entitlement is in dispute.
The issue presented is which school district(s) have programmatic and/or fiscal responsibility for Student’s special education and related services for the time period of September 7, 1999 through the present.
I note at the outset, that the location of a residential educational placement does not constitute the Student’s residence for purposes of determining school district responsibility in the present dispute.5 None of the parties argues otherwise.
A. DOE Regulatory Standards .
It is not disputed that during the time period in question, Student has required an out of district placement, that he has been placed in an approved residential placement and that he has been within the care or custody of DSS. A straightforward reading of the above-described regulatory framework therefore leads to the conclusion that programmatic and fiscal responsibility for Student’s educational placement should be shared equally by the city or town where Father has lived and the city or town where Mother has lived. This is the position of GPS and DOE.
BPS and SPS disagree. They take the position that, at least with respect to the particular facts of the present dispute, the above-referenced regulatory standards are unlawful and should not be implemented.
B. Argument of BPS and SPS based on Walker Home for Children Decision .
BPS’s and SPS’s argument, essentially, is that Mother (as well as the school districts where she has lived) have not had such contact or connection with Student that could justify their being found responsible for Student’s special education and related services.
BPS and SPS note that neither of their school districts has been involved in planning or paying for the education of Student, Student has not visited Mother in Beverly or Salem, much less lived there. BPS and SPS also note that Father was the last parent to have physical custody of Student before Student came under the care and custody of DSS. The facts in evidence are not inconsistent.
On or about November 1, 1993, Student’s parents signed a stipulation in Probate and Family Court. The parents stipulated that, with regard to Student, they would have joint legal custody, Student’s father would have physical custody, and Student’s mother would have reasonable visitation rights. Stipulation, par. 2.
In May 1999, Georgetown wrote an IEP for the period May 1999 to May 2000 that proposed Student’s continued placement as a day student at Lakeside, with DSS continuing to fund the residential portion of his placement there. Stipulation, par. 9.
Team meetings were held by Georgetown on April 16, 1999 and May 3, 1999. Father (but not Mother) attended these meetings. Exhibit BPS-H. On May 4, 1999, GPS sent the IEP to Father only. Exhibit BPS-I.
Mother has not had physical or legal custody during times relevant to this dispute. Stipulation, par. 10; Oral Stipulation 2.
In Walker , the parents were divorced and living in separate school districts. The mother who lived in Milford had physical custody of her two children. The children attended residential school in neither mother’s nor father’s school district. The children visited their father where he lived (Franklin), but the children did not live there.
The Court explained that the residence of a minor child generally is the same as the parent with physical custody, and determined that the children’s residence was that of their mother. The court further concluded that DOE “exceeded its authority when it assigned responsibility to Franklin for the costs of the special education of two boys, who do not reside there.”11 Mother’s school district (Milford) was therefore solely responsible for the children’s special education.
BPS and SPS argue that the Walker decision, as applied to the facts of the present dispute, requires the following findings: (i) school district responsibility follows the child’s residence, (ii) the Mother’s lack of any involvement with Student (as well as the lack of involvement by BPS and SPS) require that Mother’s living in Beverly and Salem not be determinative of the child’s residence, (iii) the child’s residence is that of Father who had physical custody, and (iv) pursuant to MGL c. 71B, DOE therefore may only assign school district responsibility in the present controversy on the basis of Father’s residence in Georgetown and DOE has no authority to assign school district responsibility on the basis of Mother’s living in Beverly or Salem.
C. Student within the Custody of the Department of Social Services (DSS) .
On or about July 14, 1999, Probate and Family Court Judge Mary McCauley Manzi ordered that DSS was responsible for the care and custody of Student. Stipulation, par. 10. At the Hearing, the parties agreed that during all times relevant to this dispute (September 7, 1999 through the present), Student has been under the care and custody of DSS and that neither Father nor Mother has had either legal custody or physical custody of Student. Oral Stipulations 1 and 2.
For the reasons explained below, I find that these facts result in the Walker decision not being dispositive of the present dispute.
In the present dispute, DSS has had care and custody of the child, and neither parent has had physical custody during the time period in question. The present dispute therefore involves determination of a child’s residence where the usual rule for determining the child’s residence (based on the residence of the parent who has physical custody) no longer applies.
The fundamental principle encapsulated within the DOE regulations relevant to this dispute is that whenever a child is within DSS custody, the school districts of the two parents must jointly share responsibility without regard to a parent’s custody status.16 Through its regulations, DOE has determined that the fact of DSS care and custody of a child changes the usual manner of determining the child’s residence.
Implicit within the DOE regulatory standard is a policy determination that it is best simply to allocate responsibility jointly between the parents’ two school districts when DSS has custody and parents are living apart. I can identify nothing within Walker or special education law that is inconsistent with a determination of Student’s residence (and therefore school district responsibility) in this manner when DSS has custody.
I find that the DOE regulations provide reasonable standards for determining school district responsibility when parents are separated and the child is within DSS custody. I further find that these regulatory standards are consistent with MGL c. 71B and its underlying purpose.
The reasonableness of the DOE regulatory standards is underscored by a review of possible alternative rules that DOE might have established for the assignment of school district responsibility when a child is under the care and custody of DSS, keeping in mind that school district responsibility must follow a determination of the child’s residence.
A second alternative rule that might be used by DOE, and the one urged by BPS and SPS, is to assign school district responsibility on the basis of which parent last had physical custody of the child. Because school district responsibility must follow the child’s residence, this proposed rule would essentially have DOE assign responsibility on the basis of the child’s previous residence (when the parent actually had physical custody).
The difficulty of this position is that there is nothing that BPS or SPS can point to within the state education statute or within case law which supports the proposition that a child’s residence should be determined solely on the basis of his or previous residence. To the contrary, state education law is clear that school district responsibility is assigned on the basis of where someone is presently living. For example, the so called “move-in” law (discussed below in part E of this Decision) explains how school district responsibility shifts on the basis of a parent’s move from one school district to another. Similarly, the school attendance law (discussed below in part D of this Decision) assigns school district responsibility on the basis of the city or town where a parent is presently living. Moreover, even if one were to assume the appropriateness of assigning responsibility on the basis of a parent’s previous physical custody of Student, such a rule would likely become more and more suspect over the passage of time.
D. Legal Residence or Physical Presence .
I disagree with this interpretation of the DOE regulatory standards for the following reasons.
Similarly, the special education “move-in” law (discussed below in part E of this Decision) adjusts fiscal responsibility of a city or town for a student’s special education if the parent “moves to a different school district.” Pursuant to this statute, fiscal responsibility depends on the place where a parent is actually living.
In addition, I note that the Massachusetts school attendance law (for all students) provides that a child has the right to attend the public schools in the city or town where he or she “ actually resides ”.26 This law allows no latitude for an argument that legal residence, as compared to actual residence, should control school district responsibility.
These statutory provisions support the conclusion that the DOE regulations may appropriately condition school district responsibility upon the place where a parent is living, rather than legal residence.
DOE regulatory standards, applicable when a child is within DSS care and custody, provide for responsibility to be assigned to the “district(s) where the parent(s) are living or were last known to be living without regard to the parent’s custody status.”27 For the above-stated reasons, I conclude that the use of the word “living” should be interpreted consistent with its plain meaning – that is, where someone is actually living (physical presence).
E. Application of the “Move-in” Law .
Massachusetts’ so-called “move-in” law (MGL c. 71B, s. 5) provides, in relevant part, that if a parent moves from one school district to another on or after July 1 of any fiscal year, the former school district bears fiscal responsibility for a residential placement for the remainder of that fiscal year. This law therefore provides an exception to the general principles described above, which assign responsibility on the basis of the city or town where parents currently are living.
GPS has initiated the instant proceeding for the purposes of appealing assignment of responsibility from September 7, 1999 through the present. The importance of this date is that beginning on or about September 7, 1999 and continuing through the present, DSS has arranged and paid for Student to live at the Hillcrest Educational Centers, Inc./High Point School, where Student receives his special education services. The Hillcrest Educational Centers, Inc./High Point School is a private residential school approved to provide services to publicly-funded students. Stipulation, pars. 11 and 19.
There is no dispute that Father has lived in Georgetown at all relevant times. Stipulation, par. 17. From September 7, 1999 through the present, Mother has been living in Salem. Stipulation, par. 18; Exhibits SPS-1, par. 10 and BPS-D, par. 10 (Mother’s revised affidavit); Oral Stipulation 3.
However, Mother moved to Salem from Beverly in July 1999. Stipulation, par. 18; Exhibit SPS-1, par. 10 (Mother’s revised affidavit); Oral Stipulation 3. Because Mother moved on or after July 1, Beverly (rather than Salem) bears fiscal responsibility pursuant to the “move-in” law during the fiscal year July 1, 1999 through June 30, 2000.
For these reasons, I find that application of the “move-in” law to the above-discussed DOE regulatory standards leads to the following results: (i) from September 7, 1999 through June 30, 2000, Georgetown and Beverly had joint fiscal responsibility for Student’s special education and related services; (ii) from September 7, 1999 through June 30, 2000, Georgetown and Salem had joint programmatic responsibility for Student’s special education and related services; and (iii) from July 1, 2000 through the present, Georgetown and Salem have joint fiscal and programmatic responsibility for Student’s special education and related services.
DOE’s Determination Finding dated June 13, 2001 (Stipulation Attachment # 2) as amended by DOE attorney’s letter dated February 4, 2002 (Exhibits DOE-1 and GPS-2) is AFFIRMED.
From September 7, 1999 through June 30, 2000, Georgetown and Beverly had joint fiscal responsibility for Student’s special education and related services.
From September 7, 1999 through June 30, 2000, Georgetown and Salem had joint programmatic responsibility for Student’s special education and related services.
From July 1, 2000 through the present, Georgetown and Salem have joint fiscal and programmatic responsibility for Student’s special education and related services.
A party contending that a decision of the BSEA is not being implemented may file a complaint with the Department, whose responsibility it shall be to investigate such complaint. 603 CMR s. 28.00, par. 407.0.
BPS initially submitted, as Exhibit D, an affidavit of Mother dated March 20, 2002. At the Hearing, Beverly substituted, for this affidavit, Mother’s revised affidavit dated March 27, 2002 which was also submitted by Salem as its only exhibit.
In light of the extensive stipulations agreed to by all parties and the limited dates during which responsibility for Student is at issue, only a relatively small part of the additional evidence is referenced within this Decision.
Walker Home for Children v. Franklin , 416 Mass. 291, 296 n. 8 (1993) (“municipality is not relieved of its responsibility for a special needs student because that student participates in a special education program in a residential setting elsewhere”); 603 CMR 28.02(20).
416 Mass. 291, 621 NE2d 376 (1993).
Id . at 296-297 (citations omitted).
Id. at 295 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
Id . at 296 (citations omitted).
Id . (internal quotations and citations omitted).
603 CMR 28.02(16) and 28.03(4)(b).
Massachusetts Hospital Association v. Department of Medical Security , 412 Mass. 340, 345 (1992); Emerson Hospital v. Rate Setting Commission , 408 Mass. 785, 788 (1990); Massachusetts Medical Society v. Commissioner of Insurance , 402 Mass. 44, 62 (1988).
Massachusetts Hospital Association v. Department of Medical Security , 412 Mass. 340, 346 (1992).
See footnote 5 and accompanying text of this Decision.
Martinez v. Bynum , 461 U.S. 321, 330 (1983); Catlin ex re. Catlin v. Sobel , 24 IDELR 767, 771 (2 nd Cir. 1996); Rummel v. Peters , 314 Mass. 504, 51 N.E.2d 57, 62 (1943); Tuelle v. Flint , 283 Mass. 106, 186 N.E.2d 222, 223 (1933).
BPS and SPS have presented factual evidence that in certain respects supports their argument that Mother’s legal residence has continued to be Georgetown. Exhibit SPS-1. However, for purposes of this Decision, I need not (and therefore decline to) determine Mother’s place of legal residence.
MGL c. 71B, s. 3, par. 1.
Doe v. Anrig , 1986-87 EHLR DEC 558:278, No. 81-1731-T (U.S. Dist. Ct., D.Mass. January 15, 1987). See also In Re: Andrew M ., BSEA # 96-3249, 2 MSER 133 (MA SEA July 5, 1996) (to read domicile into the federal statute would be inconsistent with statute’s plain meaning); In Re: Wakefield Public Schools , BSEA # 94-0744 (MA SEA October 15, 1993) (distinguishing actual residency from legal residency or domicile).
MGL c. 76, s. 5 (emphasis supplied).
603 CMR 28.02 (16) (emphasis supplied).
Application of previous DOE regulations (which were in effect until September 2000) would lead to the same result. See 603 CMR 202.1(c) (children who are at a private residential school are the responsibility of the city or town where mother or father lives) and 603 CMR 202.1(g) (when child’s mother and father live in two different school districts, the two school districts are jointly responsible). At the Hearing, all of the parties agreed that although these earlier regulations use different language than the current regulations, the analysis and arguments are the same.
School Committee of Stoneham v. Robert Antonnucci , Superior Court CA No. 92-5899, nn. 18 and 19 and accompanying text (April 26, 1996).

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