Source: http://www.minesafety.com/2015/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:39:04+00:00

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In the trial of former Massey-head Donald Blankenship, Ken Ward of Coal Tattoo is pointing out that Blankenship’s defense team claims there is no such thing as a citation-free inspection.
One of the jewels of the former Safe-Pro President, Frank Adkins, was that Frank used to keep lists of mines with citation-free inspections on his web site. It was an enlightening blog to show the positive side of the mining industry. He would point to the dedication and hard work of the companies and their exquisite safety records to show that, in fact, a mine can have a citation-free inspection if the miners are properly trained and management cares.
I could continue. The list is long.
However, the point is MSHA inspectors are in underground coal mines all of the time with no violations cited. It is a disservice to the mining industry to argue otherwise.
The numbers are in: From Oct. 1, 2010 – Sept. 30, 2015, 701 miners have some degree of black lung disease according to mandatory Part 50 reports from MSHA.
While it’s a hodge podge of triggering events that compelled the operators to report these cases under Part 50, it nonetheless represents a death sentence for each miner positively diagnosed. But it’s not all of the cases. NIOSH reports that only about 33% of the miners eligible to participate in the black lung screening program do so. Without a doubt, there are more cases out there.
Of the 701 miners, 12% had 15 years or less mining experience. Keep in mind that the 701 miners don’t count those Upper Big Branch miners — 17 of whom were diagnosed with black lung disease in their autopsies. Any miners diagnosed before Oct. 1, 2010 aren’t in the five year window.
In 1969, the Coal Mine Act called for the elimination of the disease. In the year 2000, black lung was at an all-time low.
There are various theories. Mining more coal faster leading to more respirable dust. Higher quartz levels. But we ask, does it matter?
Here are some of the findings to begin the conversation on the terrible numbers of black lung disease.
Thanks to the Charleston Gazette for obtaining a partial transcript of Judge Irene Berger’s Oct. 6th ruling, in part, stating that MSHA citations issued to the UBB mine can be admitted as evidence at the trial of Donald Blankenship.
Blankenship’s attorneys had argued that the hundreds of citations were hearsay, but the judge said, “the citations are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted in them or, in other words, to prove violations of safety standards but are being offered as evidence of the defendant’s knowledge, intent, and/or willfulness as well as notice. That being the case, the documents are not hearsay and are admissible in my opinion given the allegations in the counts of the indictment. I further anticipate, if the documents are offered, giving the jury a limiting instruction that they cannot consider those citations for the truth of what’s contained in them but they can be considered for the fact that they were issued and, thus, can be used by them in their consideration of notice and the defendant’s knowledge, intent, and/or willfulness.
Judge Barger also ruled that the 2005 “Running Coal” memo that Blankenship wrote, can be submitted during the trial.
However, Judge Berger said she would not allow the guilty pleas of former UBB employees to be admitted as evidence, since that may cause confusion among the jurors.
CHARLESTON, W.Va. – Pursuant to the Court’s directive in the case of United States v. Blankenship, all government exhibits admitted into evidence and published to the jury will be made available to the press and the public no later than 9:00 a.m., the day after admission and publication of the exhibits. The exhibits will be posted to a link on the website of United States Attorney Booth Goodwin. Click here.
Today the court heard from Tracy Stumbo as the first government witness.
MSHA won a Pattern of Violations “victory” from the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission that has upheld a POV notice and MSHA’s POV theory in a case involving Brody Mining Co.
The outcome means that MSHA inspectors can begin issuing, once again, 104(e) withdrawal orders to Brody. FMSHRC ALJ William Moran’s decison, now overturned, mean that the previous 104(e) withdrawal orders had been converted to 104(a) citations, and they are to be converted back to 104(e) orders.
Key in this decision: the commissioners cite the Legislative History in finding that an operator does not need a certain number of S&S violations to establish a pattern.
The case stems from October 24, 2013, when Brody received a letter that it was being placed on a “pattern of violations” for 54 citations or orders for repeat hazards of methane or ventilation violations, emergency preparedness or emergency escape hazards, roof and ribs hazards and inadequate examinations.
Although it had previously submitted a corrective action plan to MSHA after a March 2013, POV warning notice, it still had an accident rate 205% above the national average.
MSHA’s DRS showed that between 2012 and 2015, the mine reported 14 roof falls, 12 of which caused injuries to miners, including ruptured vertebrae in a miner’s neck, a broken pelvis in another miner, and several miners with broken bones. The mine was the site of a May 12, 2014, double-fatality that killed Eric Legg, 48, and Gary Hensley, 46. The fatalities happened when the operator was pulling pillars and a coal out-burst occurred. Similar to the Crandall Canyon disaster of 2007, there had been a “precusor burst” on May 9, 2014, that was not reported to MSHA. Records also show that 10 Brody miners have been diagnosed with black lung disease, caused by over exposure to coal dust.
At the time the POV notice was issued to the mine on Oct. 15, 2013, MSHA record showed that in the previous 15 month period before the POV notice, Brody had received 114 citations and orders for violations under §75.400 for accumulations of combustible materials; 104 citations and orders under §75.370(a)(1) for ventilation violations; 76 citations and orders for violations of permissible electric face equipment under §75.503; 56 citations and orders under §75.517 for insulation protection of trolley wires and cables. At that time, the mine had a violations-per-inspection-day (VPID) rate of 1.82 compared to the national average of .77.
The owner of the mine, Patriot Coal, is selling assets as part of a bankruptcy reorganization.
It is unknown at this time how the decision will impact the Brody mine.
The U.S. Attorney is arguing in the Blankenship case today that MSHA inspectors are not law enforcement personnel, and that MSHA records are not of the confrontational nature of records like that of a police force.
“We need to change how we do business.” So goes the memo of a former Massey official and former MSHA inspector written to Massey executives, including Don Blankenship on the problems at Masssey Energy’s coal mines.
“Many in Massey do not take MSHA seriously,” according to a memo of Stephanie Ojeda to Massey CEO Don Blankenship, Chris Adkins, Shane Harvey and Stan Suboleski, who once sat on the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. Ojeda was quoting from notes of former MSHA inspector Bill Ross who left MSHA and went to work for Massey.
“Massey lacks knowledge at the foreman level. Our foremen often don’t even know the part of the law that they have violated,” the former inspector wrote in the notes quoted by Ojeda.
“The attitude at many Massey operations is “if you can get the footage, we can pay the fines,” said Ross, according to the memo.
The memo was submitted in court documents in the criminal trial of Don Blankenship. Ross talked to many Massey employees, “and their biggest complaint is lack of manpower…. the people in production at Massey are multi-taskers. They are given 4 or 5 jobs to do, but they are never given the time to do any of them well. Most say that if they had the opportunity, they would leave because of the long hours and because they are given more to do than they can reasonably get done. The biggest complaint of the foreman is that they are continually forced to operate with skeleton crews. In addition to being a boss and an examiner, they are forced to also act as a worker. If they need nine men, they are given five and are still expected to produce big footage. Massey suffers from the Big Four violations: ventilation, clean up, roof control and electrical.
And about those UBB miners whose autopsies showed that 17 of the 29 miners had black lung disease — including 25 year old Jason Atkins?
“Massey is plainly cheating on dust sampling at some of its operations. It ranks in the top 10 in the submission of low-weight-gain dust samples, and this has gotten MSHA’s attention in Arlington,” according to the memo.
“One MSHA employee Bill spoke with mentioned that it’s only a matter of time before MSHA begins special investigations and possible criminal investigations related to Massey’s dust sampling,” Ojeda wrote to the Massey officials.
“Bill was so concerned about the problems in Massey that he had written them down, but wasn’t sure who to talk to about them. He wants Massey to do well. He is happy to be able to tell someone about the problems that he sees.
He believes that the company presidents or mine superintendents can change things. However, he feels that people at the mines don’t believe that Don Blankenship or Chris Adkins really are serous about following the law.
Admission of the citations in lieu of the MSHA inspector’s testimony violates the rules of evidence for a criminal trial, according to the court filing (See UBB Attic; Doc_399). However, it appears that if the citations and orders are admitted, then the MSHA inspectors must testify about each citation and order, according to the defense attorneys.
What isn’t clear is if the non-prosecution agreement that U.S. Attorney Booth Goodwin reached with Alpha Natural Resources Dec. 6, 2011, may come back to haunt the U.S. government in their goal of prosecuting the former Massey Energy CEO for alleged conspiracy and Mine Act charges.
The agreement stated that the MSHA citations and orders “may not be considered an adjudication on the merits of any citation or order…. it is the parties’ intent that this correspondence may not be referenced or introduced as evidence,” which included all of the citations and orders issued at the UBB mine.
Further, MSHA and the U.S. Attorney agreed that it would not consider the settlement, or the payment in full of the citations and orders, an admission of a violation by any legacy Massey company… any of their affiliates, or any individual of any laws, including local, state or federal statutes (See UBB Attic; “Alpha_Settlement_Agreement”).
It’s not the first time that MSHA evidence was excluded from a trial. In 1996, evidence of fatalities from the Pyro mine explosion in which 10 miners were killed was held to be inadmissible at the criminal trial of four mine officials charged with criminal violations of the Mine Act arising from the explosion. “[E]vidence that there were fatalities and the number of fatalities is not relevant to any issue in [the] case.” The government, the parties, the attorneys, and the witnesses were prohibited from making any reference to the fact that fatalities occurred in the explosion. However, the fact that the explosion occurred is relevant because “an explosion is one of the dangers targeted by many of the mandatory health and safety standards the defendants are alleged to have violated.” The “probative value” of evidence of the explosion is not outweighed by the danger of “unfair prejudice” to the defendants.” The government was permitted to refer to the fact that an explosion occurred “with resulting injuries to miners.” U.S. v. David Steele, No. 4:93-CR-10-M (D.C. W.Ky. Jan. 11, 1996), 3 MSHN 42 (Jan. 26, 1996).

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