Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=84190:59613&amp;catid=1594&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:02:23+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI, Respondent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 31, 2008 and June 18, 2008, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision3 dated October 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in LRC Case No. 04-3340.
In its Decision dated March 31, 2008, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, rejecting petitioner’s contention that respondent failed to overcome the burden of proving her possession of the subject lots in its entirety, the area being too big for respondent’s family to cultivate themselves, and that even if they did, such can hardly suffice as possession, being a mere casual cultivation. The CA also rejected petitioner’s averment that the tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership for they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property. According to the appellate court, the fact that respondent and her family cultivated the subject lands, erected their conjugal home, and paid real property taxes thereon, cannot be construed as a mere casual cultivation but an intention of permanently settling down therein.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly taken into account, will justify a different conclusion. First, petitioner posits that respondent did not present any evidence to show that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of public domain. In its Reply,12 petitioner, citing our ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,13 criticizes the probative value of the certifications submitted by respondent from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, that no public land application/land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title as well as the letter from the Provincial Engineer that the province has no projects which will be affected by the registration. In said case, this Court held that a certification from the CENRO is insufficient to prove the alienability and disposability of lands.
Second, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence proving her claim of possession and occupation over the entire portion of the subject properties. Contrary to the findings of the courts below, respondent’s planting of fruit-bearing trees, at best, constituted a mere casual cultivation of portions of the land which can hardly become sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. Other than planting trees and constructing their home, respondent failed to provide any other proof of acts of dominion over the subject land such as enclosing the property or constructing other improvements thereon considering the vastness of the same. In addition, petitioner points out that apart from a single tax declaration, there is nothing in the records which evince respondent’s religious payment of real property taxes.
While it is true that this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, and not of fact, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, when the findings of fact are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or when the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, this Court may revisit the evidence in order to arrive at a decision in conformity with the law and evidence at hand.14 In the instant case, the evidence on record do not support the findings made by the courts below on the alienable and disposable character of the lands in question.
To support her contention that the lands subject of her application is alienable and disposable, respondent submitted certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title.
Respondent’s reliance on the CENRO certifications is misplaced.
Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence, that the land sought to be registered has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The records of this case merely bear certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO certifications, however, do not even make any pronouncement as to the alienable character of the lands in question for they merely recognize the absence of any pending land patent application, administrative title, or government project being conducted thereon. But even granting that they expressly declare that the subject lands form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, these certifications remain insufficient for purposes of granting respondent’s application for registration. As constantly held by this Court, it is not enough for the CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Unfortunately for respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration in order to show the alienable character of the lands subject herein.
In similar regard, the evidence on record likewise fail to establish that respondent, by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the properties under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The testimonies of respondent and her close friend, Remigio Leyble, insofar as they allege possession of the subject properties since 1944, fail to convince. The tax declaration submitted by respondent dates back only to the year 1947.22 In fact, as the records reveal, said tax declaration is the oldest piece of documentary evidence submitted in support of the application. Hence, at best, the same can only prove possession since 1947. Other than the bare allegations of respondent and her witness, as well as the 1947 tax declaration, respondent did not present any other proof to substantiate her claim of possession beginning in 1944. Neither did she provide any explanation as to why, if she has truly been occupying the properties as early as 1994, it was only in 1947 that she sought to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 and June 18, 2008, respectively, of the Court Appeals which affirmed the Decision dated October 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. 04-3340 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration of title filed by respondent Emeteria G. Lualhati over Lots 1 and 2 consisting of an area of 169,297 and 79,488 square meters, respectively, situated in C-5 C-6 Pasong Palanas, Sitio Sapinit, San Juan, Antipolo, Rizal, is DENIED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of the Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring; Annex “A” to Petition, rollo, pp. 30-38.
3 Penned by Judge Francisco A. Querubin, id. at 57-62.
5 Id. at 31-32; 59-60.
7 Id. at 33 and 60.
8 Id. at 34 and 60.
9 Id. at 34 and 61.
13 578 Phil. 441 (2008).
14Raquel-Santos v. Court of Appeals, 609 Phil. 630, 655 (2009); Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, 558 Phil. 235, 256-257 (2007).
15Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 619, citing Mistica v. Republic, 615 Phil. 468, 476 (2009), citing In Re: Application for Land Registration of Title, Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation v. Republic, 573 Phil. 241, 251 (2008).
16Republic v. Medida, G.R. No. 195097, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 317, 325-326, citing Republic v. Dela Paz, supra, at 621-622.
18Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, id. at 451-453. (Emphasis ours).
19Republic v. Sese, G.R. No. 185092, June 4, 2014; Republic v. Remman Enterprises, G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014; Republic v. Aboitiz, G.R. No. 174626, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 388; People v. Capco de Tensuan, G.R. No. 171136, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 367; Republic v. Jaralve, G.R. No. 175177, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 495; Republic v. Medida, supra note 16; Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 92; Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172102, July 2, 2010, 662 SCRA 730; Republic v. Dela Paz, supra note 14; Republic v. Roche, 638 Phil. 112 (2010).
21Gaerlan v. Republic, G.R. No. 192717, March 12, 2014, citing Republic v. Medida, supra note 15, at 328.
23Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 299, 308-309, citing Republic v. Carrasco, 539 Phil. 205, 216 (2006) and Republic of the Phils. v. Alconaba, 471 Phil. 607, 620 (2004).
24 Id. at 309-310, citing Arbias v. Republic, 587 Phil. 361, 374 (2008).
25 G.R. No. 182913, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 411.
26Republic v. Bacas, et. al., supra, at 437.
27Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013, 704 SCRA 561, 585.
28 Republic v. Medida, supra note 16, at 331.

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