Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/327/546/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:50:28+00:00

Document:
Tennessee Valley Authority built a power dam creating a large reservoir, thus flooding a highway which afforded the only reasonable means of access to a large area of mountainous land constituting part of the watershed and lying between the reservoir and a national park. A new road could have been built at a cost disproportionate to its value to the public. After lengthy consideration of all public and private interests, it was agreed between the national, state, and county authorities that the best solution of the problem was for TVA to acquire all land in the isolated area and add it to the national park, making satisfactory financial adjustments with all interests, public and private, and reserving all rights required to carry out the TVA program. TVA adopted a resolution that it deemed the acquisition of the land necessary to carry out the purposes of the TVA Act. All landowners in the area sold their property voluntarily, except the six respondents here. They contested condemnation proceedings on the ground that the taking was beyond the authority conferred by §§ 4 and 25 of the TVA Act to condemn all property that TVA "deems necessary for carrying out the purposes" of the Act, which places broad responsibilities on TVA relating to navigability, flood control, reforestation, marginal lands, and agricultural and industrial development of the whole Tennessee Valley, and specifically admonishes it to cooperate with other governmental agencies, federal, state, and local, in relation to the problem of "readjustment of the population displaced by the construction of dams, the acquisition of reservoir areas, the protection of watersheds," etc.
1. The condemnation is sustained, since it was for a public purpose authorized by the Act and TVA proceeded in complete accord with the congressional policy embodied in the Act. P. 327 U. S. 552.
2. The common law rule requiring a strict construction of powers to condemn is not applicable here, because of the specific provision of § 31 that the Act shall be "liberally construed" to carry out its broad purposes. P. 327 U. S. 551.
3. In construing the Act, a court should not break one inseparable transaction into separate units, but should view the entire transaction as a single integrated effort on the part of TVA to perform its functions. Pp. 327 U. S. 552-553.
4. It is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for public use, and the agency authorized to do the taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority. P. 327 U. S. 551.
5. The provisions of the Act show a clear congressional purpose to grant TVA all power needed to acquire by purchase or condemnation lands which it deems necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Act. P. 327 U. S. 554.
6. Neither the fact that TVA wanted to prevent a waste of public funds nor that it intended to cooperate with the National Park Service detracted from its power to condemn. P. 327 U. S. 554.
The United States instituted proceedings under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act to condemn certain land. The District Court dismissed the petition. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 150 F.2d 613. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U.S. 714. Reversed, p. 327 U. S. 555.
The United States, on behalf of the Tennessee Valley Authority, filed petitions in the District Court to condemn six tracts of land located in North Carolina and owned by the several respondents. It asserted that the power to condemn the land in question was conferred upon the Authority by the provisions of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act as amended. 4 8 Stat. 58 as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd. The District Court held that the Act did not authorize condemnations under the facts shown by the evidence, and dismissed the petitions. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 150 F.2d 613. Since the grant of power to condemn needed properties is an essential part of the Act, we granted certiorari, 326 U.S. 714.
The following basic facts form the background of this proceeding: Congress, in 1942, in order to meet pressing power needs for war production empowered the Authority to construct Fontana Dam, on the Little Tennessee River in North Carolina. H.Rep. 1470; 77th Cong. 1st Sess. 25. The dam is one of the world's largest, and creates a reservoir twenty-nine miles long. Between this reservoir and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park lie forty-four thousand acres of mountainous land, including the tracts which the government wants to condemn here. When Congress authorized construction of the dam, two hundred and sixteen families occupied this area. Their only convenient means of ingress and egress, except for foot trails, was North Carolina Highway No. 288, a road approximately fifty miles in length. When the dam was built, the reservoir flooded most of the highway, rendering it useless for travel. As a result, the area remained practically isolated.
of the individuals affected. The United States' interest was that of the TVA and the National Park Service. The TVA had a dual interest. First, the isolated area, while not actually submerged by the reservoir, was a part of the watershed. Left in private hands, it could be used to frustrate some of the objectives of TVA legislation. Second, the fact that the dam had caused the highway to be flooded created a serious problem for the inhabitants and landowners in the area who had been damaged by the project. It was the statutory duty of the TVA to attempt to bring about proper adjustments in order to alleviate resulting hardship and inconvenience. At the same time, the TVA was not supposed to waste the money of the United States. The United States' interest in the land through the National Park Service was due to the fact that this particular area had been included in the Great Smoky Mountains Park project. Had this land been actually owned by the United States for park purposes, it would have been easier to subject it to servitudes in the interest of the TVA development. North Carolina was interested in the land because it was its duty to continue to hold and maintain a highway so long as its citizens continued to live within the area. Swain County had a similar interest. It had issued bonds to finance building the highway. Part of the bond issue was still outstanding.
and quality needed. T his meant that type of road could only be built if North Carolina would bear the additional expense. Since the highway carried no through traffic and serviced so few people, the state was not willing to pay for the added cost, and all parties agreed that such an expenditure would be wasteful and unjustifiable. The War Production Board presented further obstacles. It was of the opinion that the road was not sufficiently essential to warrant use of the materials and manpower its construction would require. For these and other reasons, North Carolina objected to the TVA's settling the controversy by a mere payment of damages to it for injury to the road and by the payment of damages to individual owners for destroying their access to the area. The State contended that this would leave the area in private hands with no adequate roads to serve the people, and would impose unwise, if not impossible, burdens on the State and County in connection with providing schools, police protection, health services, and other necessary facilities.
state, the county, the TVA, and the National Park Service. The cost to the United States was several hundred thousand dollars less than the cost of rebuilding the old road. And all the landowners in the area, except these six respondents, who refused to sell, have received full compensation for their property.
"liberally construed to carry out the purposes of Congress to provide . . . for the national defense, improve navigation, control destructive floods, and promote interstate commerce and the general welfare."
In the face of this declaration, the District Court erred in following the asserted common law rule.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, without expressly relying on a compelling rule of construction that would give the restrictive scope to the TVA Act given it by the district court, also interpreted the statute narrowly. It first analyzed the facts by segregating the total problem into distinct parts, and thus came to the conclusion that TVA's purpose in condemning the land in question was only one to reduce its liability arising from the destruction of the highway. The Court held that use of the lands for that purpose is a "private," and not a "public, use" or, at best, a "public use" not authorized by the statute. We are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
"It is well established that, in considering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases of expropriation of private property, the question what is a public use is a judicial one."
"No case is recalled where this court has condemned, as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a taking upheld by the state court as a taking for public uses in conformity with its laws."
And see Madisonville Traction Co. v. Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 196 U. S. 257, 196 U. S. 260-261. But, whatever may be the scope of the judicial power to determine what is a "public use" in Fourteenth Amendment controversies, this Court has said that, when Congress has spoken on this subject "[i]ts decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility." Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 269 U. S. 66. Any departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields. See Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, 327 U. S. 102; New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572. We hold that the TVA took the tracts here involved for a public purpose if, as we think is the case, Congress authorized the Authority to acquire, hold, and use the lands to carry out the purposes of the TVA Act.
"readjustment of the population displaced by the construction of dams, the acquisition of reservoir areas, the protection of watersheds, the acquisitions of rights of way, and other necessary acquisitions of land, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act."
"development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and of such adjoining territory as may be related to or materially affected by the development consequent to this Act . . . all for the general purpose of fostering an orderly and proper physical, economic, and social development of said areas."
"for the acquisition by condemnation of any lands, easements, or rights of way which, in the opinion of the Corporation, are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."
arises, individuals may be required to relinquish ownership of property so long as they are given that just compensation which the Constitution requires. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 200 U. S. 531. Such compensation can be awarded these respondents by the District Court.
* Together with No. 529, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Burns et al.; No. 530, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Lollis et al.; No. 531, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Bradshaw et al.; No. 532, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Rust et al; and No. 533, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hyatt et al., on certiorari to the same court, argued and decided on the same dates.
I agree that the TVA has authority to condemn the tracts of land which the Authority seeks to acquire by these proceedings.
by the contract arrangements of July 30, 1943, with Swain County and North Carolina. With the Authority's power to turn over its lands to the National Park we are not here concerned. Under the contract, the public rights in Highway No. 288 were acquired by the Authority, and it agreed to acquire the lands here in controversy. The acquisition of the whole area was a factor in these arrangements, and the condemnation of these smaller tracts is a part of the transaction.
I do not join in the opinion of the Court because of certain language, ante, pp. 327 U. S. 551-554, which implies to me that there is no judicial review of the Authority's determination that acquisition of these isolated pieces of private property is within the purposes of the TVA Act. The Court seems to accept the Authority's argument that a good faith determination by it that property is necessary for the purposes of the Act bars judicial review as to whether the proposed use will be within the statutory limits. This argument of lack of judicial power properly was rejected by the Circuit Court of Appeals, although, as explained above, I think that court erroneously held that the TVA Act did not authorize these condemnations. 150 F.2d 613, 616. It is my opinion that the TVA is a creature of its statute, and bound by the terms of that statute, and that its every act may be tested judicially, by any party with standing to do so, to determine whether it moves within the authority granted to it by Congress. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94; Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 327 U. S. 369.
the agency and the citizen. The former cases go no further than this. United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668, 160 U. S. 680; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U. S. 700, 262 U. S. 709; Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 269 U. S. 66; Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 281 U. S. 446.
Once it is admitted or judicially determined that a proposed condemnation is for a public purpose and within the statutory authority, a political or judicially nonreviewable question may emerge, to-wit, the necessity or expediency of the condemnation of the particular property. These are the cases that led the TVA, erroneously, in my view, to assert the action of its Board could "not be set aside by a court." Adirondack R. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 335, 176 U. S. 349; Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 251 U. S. 58; Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 262 U. S. 678; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U. S. 700, 262 U. S. 708.
the doctrine that whether a taking is for a public purpose is not a question beyond judicial competence.

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