Source: https://familylaw.typepad.com/virginiafamilylawappeals/alimony_spousal_support/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:56:40+00:00

Document:
Pendente lite support can't be changed retroactively, but needn't be maintained to keep up innocent spouse's unaffordable "lifestyle"
The law is settled that support payments vest as they accrue and may not be modified retroactively. See Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 839, 140 S.E.2d 663, 666 (1965); Smith v. Smith, 4 Va. App. 148, 152, 354 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1987).
The Court cites several cases in which pendente lite support that had been paid could not be ordered reimbursed, even if the divorce case was dismissed and the marriage found to be void, and apparently is satisfied that they likewise protect accrued but unpaid payments.
The wife also appealed, claiming that when the trial court awarded permanent alimony that was far lower than the pendente lite figure, it mismeasured income, failed to consider tax consequences, and improperly considered the property division that the wife received in the divorce, and that as the blameless party, she should keep the "upper middle class lifestyle" she had during the marriage. Affirming, the Court notes the trial court's finding that the couple had lived beyond their means, its proper consideration of the husband's ability to pay, its consideration of expert testimony on how tax payment patterns reduced cash flow and made incomes smaller than they appeared. The statutes not only make property division an explicit factor to consider when awarding alimony, but also encourage and facilitate that by having courts divide property and debt before determining support, it says. The consideration of property division in this support determination was unusually clear, because the monetary award was broken down into monthly payments, and the trial court considered those when measuring both parties' incomes.
The Court of Appeals upholds a reduction in alimony for a 66-year-old anesthesiologist who reduced his brutal work hours and planned to fully retire, and who testified that that was consistent with other anesthesiologists his age, in Gadpaille v. Gadpaille, unpublished 7/10/2018.
The trial court in that case also dealt with marital home sales proceeds that were supposed to be offset against a retirement account division and other sums under the PSA, but which ended up being "a deficiency", apparently a negative number, after accounting for repair costs, fire damage, and reduced insurance coverage. The appeals court finds that the trial court did not rewrite the PSA, but rather, correctly "considered the totality of the parties’ agreement as expressed" in the PSA and in a later consent order, and applied that agreement to the unforeseen circumstances.
The Court of Appeals upholds an award of alimony despite the recipient's adultery, on grounds of "manifest injustice" consideringthe parties' "relative economic circumstances" respective degrees of fault in the breakdown of the marriage, in Pattillo v. Pattillo, unpublished 5/29/2018. Just as in Barnes v. Barnes, 16 Va. App. 98, 428 S.E.2d 294 (1993), "fault" for this purpose includes everything leading to the breakdown of the marriage, not just conduct that would be grounds for divorce. It can even include "a gradual breakdown in the marital relationship".
When asked to overrule the long-standing Barnes holding, the Court replies that "Even if we wished to do so, we could not," because of "the doctrine of interpanel accord," meaning that a "decision of one panel . . . ‘cannot be overruled except by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc or by the Virginia Supreme Court." It cites Startin v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 26, 39 n.3, 690 S.E.2d 310, 316 n.3 (2010) (en banc).
Husband testified that his lack of communication skills, work schedule and exhaustion contributed to the demise of the marriage. And the [c]ourt does so find. Therefore, even though Wife committed adultery in the years immediately prior to the parties’ separation, the [c]ourt finds that the marriage was irretrievably lost due to gradual dissolution caused by mutual inattention and fault from both parties.
The appeals court did not award fees to either party.
The Court of Appeals upholds a refusal to impute income to a 62-year-old retiree who had earned about $150,000 until four years earlier, and is "an active volunteer," in Collins v. Leeds, published, 5/29/18. Husband, a Navy retiree, had worked for Accenture and then as a civilian for the Navy, voluntarily retired from the government at 58, and not looked for employment after that. But the appellant had not offered any other evidence of current earning capacity. "wWife presented no evidence of employment positions currently available to husband or the income he could make in those positions based on his present circumstances." At the time of the trial, "his security clearances had expired, he had not worked in approximately four years, and he was approaching the age when many individuals retire."
The Court points out that the income used for imputation in Stubblebine (1996) had been just five months before the trial, and that it had reversed an imputation based on income just over one year before trial in Harber v. Harber (unpublished 2008). It also says that the Stubblebine imputation was upheld not because of the payor's vigorous unpaid work, which showed only his "physical and mental capacity to be gainfully employed," but because of his recent actual earnings.
Wife also appealed the trial court's alleged failure to consider $311,000 in recent fruitless legal expenses that affected her ability to make ends meet. She had sued a physical therapist for injuring her, and lost at every level, spending about $110,000. She still owed expert witnesses $20,500. She had spent $87,000 unsuccessfully suing her divorce lawyer for malpractice. The other $100K+ was spent in abortive litigation about marital assets several years after the divorce. Wife had translated these expenses into $6,000 per month on her income-expense sheet, but the trial court disregarded them because they were past, not current, expenses.
Wife argues that the trial court was required to consider her “financial resources” pursuant to Code § 20-107.1(E)(1), and her financial resources were “depleted by the hundreds of thousands of dollars in recent litigation costs.” She further argues that, because husband did not produce an expert witness to testify that the lawsuits she filed were frivolous or that the expenses she incurred were unreasonable, the legal expenses should have been included by the trial court as part of her total monthly expenses.
As the party seeking a modification of the spousal support or, as in this case, additional spousal support following the termination of the initial support period, wife bore the burden of showing, “in addition to a material change in circumstances, that the change ‘warrants a modification of support.’” Driscoll v. Hunter, 59 Va. App. 22, 33, 716 S.E.2d 477, 482 (2011) ... Since wife bore the burden of proving the legitimacy and need for these expenses and of their impact on her - 12 - current financial need, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expenses incurred in these legal proceedings, which wife repeatedly – and unsuccessfully – chose to pursue.
Fees: "Because wife’s appeal is so lacking in merit, we grant husband’s request for a reasonable amount of appellate attorney’s fees."
The Court also reverses a valuation that did not subtract the amount of debt secured by the asset. An account had a lien against it for an equity line of credit in the husband's name. The trial court valued the account at its full value, not counting the lien, and divided it equally, then left the debt entirely to the husband. That sounds wrong, but what makes it absolutely wrong under the ED Statute?
However, "On remand, the court should once again apply the subsection (E) factors to determine the distribution of the account." So the trial court might do something on remand that arrives at the same result.
Husband had two accounts created during the marriage, which he and bank employees testified were funded solely from a pre-marriage account that contained 100% pre-marriage funds. But there were three years during the marriage, about 15 years ago, for which no statements from that old were available. Thus he failed to meet his burden of proof that the new account, created during the marriage, was separate property. The trial court had the discretion not to believe husband's testimony that no marital funds had been added to the old account, so its classification of the accounts as marital is upheld.
But the husband was able to show that what was already in the account at the time of marriage was sufficient to account for what was put into the new accounts. That doesn't matter: "The mere fact that the husband was able to prove that he had pre-1999 earnings and bonuses in an amount sufficient to fund account #0410, the amount he claims to have traced, was insufficient to meet his burden of proof."
Husband was a retired professional athlete and was receiving disability pension payments under a retirement plan. But there was no evidence that the payments were analogous to a "pain and suffering" personal injury award: they replaced wages and regular retirement benefits, and so they were marital. The timing of husband's employment should have made them hybrid, so it is possible, though not spelled out, that the trial court found the disability portion of already-received payments to be entirely marital because they were considered "wage replacement", not "deferred compensation."
Divorce court cannot order transfer of any solely-titled property; must consider but needn't discuss every ED factor; can't award what counsel conceded wasn't sought.
The court may direct payment of a percentage of the marital share of any pension, profit-sharing or deferred compensation plan or retirement benefits, whether vested or nonvested, which constitutes marital property and whether payable in a lump sum or over a period of time. The court may order direct payment of such percentage of the marital share by direct assignment to a party from the employer trustee, plan administrator or other holder of the benefits. However, the court shall only direct that payment be made as such benefits are payable.
But the Court cites Broom v. Broom, 15 Va. App. 497, 505, 425 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1992) as "holding that an IRA is not a pension, profit-sharing or deferred compensation within the meaning of Code § 20-107.3(G)(1)".
Unequal division of marital property: The Court says it was not error for the trial court to say it had considered all the §20-107.3(E) factors, but only to discuss some of them in its ruling.
Although the trial court must consider all factors set out in Code § 20-107.3(E), it “need not quantify or elaborate exactly what weight was given to each of the factors” as long as its findings are “based upon credible evidence.” Taylor v. Taylor, 5 Va. App. 436, 444, 364 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1988); see also, e.g., Judd v. Judd, 53 Va. App. 578, 592-93, 673 S.E.2d 913, 919 (2009). “Virginia law does not establish a presumption of equal distribution of marital assets. It is within the discretion of the court to make an equal division or to make a substantially disparate division of assets as the factors outlined in Code § 20-107.3(E) require.” Matthews v. Matthews, 26 Va. App. 638, 645, 496 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1998). “A circuit court, therefore, need not start off at the 50-yard line and then look to the discretionary factors of Code § 20-107.3(E) to move the ball marker up or down the sidelines.” Robbins v. Robbins, 48 Va. App. 466, 480, 632 S.E.2d 615, 622 (2006).
It was also appropriate to consider, and give great weight to, bad behavior that did not have any effect on the marital property. It was enough that "husband’s cruelty to wife caused the dissolution of the marriage and obviously detracted from the overall marital partnership."
But in the apportionment of debts, the trial court erred when it chose not to give the husband a $9,000 credit for his payment of marital debt, which the wife's closing argument had said was "fair" and "should" be done. It had also been on her ED forms. This specific limitation on what she was asking for was not negated by her original Complaint's general request for “all rights and remedies afforded by Section 20-107.3 of the Virginia Code” and “such other and further relief as the nature of this case may require.” A court cannot award a party more than she asked for, the Court says.
For this it cites Rosedale v. Rosedale, (Va. Ct. App. unpub. July 22, 2008), where a wife asked for 50% of an asset at trial but was awarded more of it; Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 245, 361 S.E.2d 364, 368 (1987) on "not seeking spousal support"; Carter v. Lambert, 246 Va. 309, 435 S.E.2d 403 (1993), and Johnson v. Buzzard Island Shooting Club, Inc., 232 Va. 32, 36, 348 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1986).
Waste was a significant issue in the trial, but was not appealed.
On spousal support, it was error to make no decision, thus leaving a juvenile court order, when the wife had not asked the divorce court to award alimony but the husband's pleadings had asked it to deny or limit alimony. This is discussed in more detail in our posting about the later "Ozfidan II" appeal opinion, after remand.
The Court of Appeals upholds enforcement of written agreement for alimony that did not specify a beginning date in Moy v. Moy, unpublished 3/27/18. The agreement said that the agreement, as a whole, became effective on the date that was filled in at the top as the date of the agreement, Sept. 2. The parties actually signed it on Sept. 5 and Sept. 8, and the trial court said that it would be reasonable to interpret the obligation to pay $3,500 a month as beginning on Oct. 2. Upheld in a two-page opinion.

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