Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ga-court-of-appeals/1559821.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 01:20:18+00:00

Document:
Robert S. Lanier, Jr., for Serna. Richard Ashley Mallard, Daphne Helena Jarriel, for the State.
Following a jury trial, Juan Antonio Serna appeals from his conviction of sexual battery,1 possession of dangerous drugs,2 and furnishing alcohol to a person under 21 years of age .3 Serna challenges the dangerous drug count only, contending that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed the crime as alleged in the indictment, (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on fatal variance, and (3) the evidence did not suffice to show intent. For the following reasons, we affirm.
So viewed, the evidence showed that a group of college students and friends gathered in an apartment for a birthday celebration. The group drank alcohol and socialized over the course of the evening, and Serna, a professor at the college who knew several of the students, also attended. At one point, Serna offered to provide the students with a high quality tequila, and he left to retrieve the tequila. By the time he returned to the apartment, most of the attendees had left, but K. M., one of Serna's former students and teaching assistants, remained in the apartment. Serna and K.M. drank a shot of tequila together, and Serna offered K.M. a small bottle containing a substance he asked K.M. to sniff, which rendered K.M. “very dizzy.. very heavy and just kind of stuck where [he] was .” Serna then proceeded to sexually touch K.M. without K. M.'s consent. Serna soon left the apartment, and K.M. called campus security after he recovered from the effect of the sedative administered by Serna.
Serna was arrested, and police found in his residence a bottle labeled “Amsterdam Poppers” matching K. M.'s description of the sedative. Serna was charged with several crimes based on the assault, and a jury found him guilty of sexual battery, possession of dangerous drugs, and furnishing alcohol to a minor. After Serna's motion for new trial was denied, he filed this appeal.
1. Serna contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he committed the dangerous drug violation as alleged in the indictment. Serna does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the finding that he unlawfully possessed a dangerous drug; instead, he argues that the offense was not proven as alleged. Thus, Serna essentially contends that there was a fatal variance between the proof and the indictment.
2. Serna also contends that the trial court erred by leaving for the jury the question of whether any variance between the indictment and proof at trial was fatal. To the extent the trial court relied on the jury to determine whether the variance was fatal, we agree, but we find the error to be harmless in light of our holding in Division 1.
3. Finally, Serna contends that the evidence was insufficient to show his intent to possess a dangerous drug because he was unaware that the chemical compound in the “Amsterdam Poppers” bottle was classified as a dangerous drug under OCGA § 16-13-71. We disagree.
OCGA § 16-13-72 provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person ․ to ․ possess in this state any dangerous drug,” except under certain medical and pharmacological circumstances not present in this case. The term “dangerous drug” is defined to include alkyl nitrite, which was the compound Serna possessed.14 Serna argues that because he was unaware of the precise chemical compound in the bottle and of its “dangerous drug” status in the Criminal Code, he lacked the requisite criminal intent to be guilty of possessing the dangerous drug.
4. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
5. (Punctuation omitted.) McKay v. State, 234 Ga.App. 556, 556-557(1) (507 S.E.2d 484) (1998).
6. (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Cooper v. State, 286 Ga. 66, 68(2) (685 S.E.2d 285) (2009).
7. We note that Serna did not file a general demurrer to the indictment in the trial court; therefore, in this direct appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial, we do not consider the argument that the indictment failed to allege the commission of any crime.When an indictment is absolutely void in that it fails to charge the accused with any act made a crime by the law and, upon the trial, no demurrer to the indictment is interposed and the accused is convicted under the indictment and judgment is entered on the verdict, the accused's proper remedy is a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas corpus. A motion for [directed verdict or] new trial is not the proper method to attack the sufficiency of an indictment and does not provide a basis for this Court to review the indictment.(Punctuation and citations omitted.) McKay, 234 Ga.App. at 559(2).
8. See OCGA § 16-13-71(b) (21.1).
9. 142 Ga.App. 795 (237 S.E.2d 202) (1977).
10. See id. at 796(2).
12. Compare Smith v. State, 202 Ga.App. 664, 665 (415 S.E.2d 481) (1992) (reversing conviction of offense not charged in indictment).
13. See Hardin, 142 Ga.App. at 796(2). See also Murray v. State, 157 Ga.App. 596, 598-599(4) (278 S.E.2d 2) (1981) (finding no fatal variance despite a discrepancy in the name of the chemical compound).
14. See OCGA § 16-13-71(b) (21.1).
16. Wilson v. State, 57 Ga.App. 839, 841 (197 SE 48) (1938). See Mincey v. State, 303 Ga.App. 257, 257-258 (692 S.E.2d 809) (2010).
17. (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Riley v. State, 292 Ga.App. 202, 205(2) (663 S.E.2d 835) (2008).
18. Cf. In the Interest of T. S., 211 Ga.App. 46, 47(2) (438 S.E.2d 159) (1993) (affirming finding of delinquency for inhaling fumes of substance defined as “model glue,” when juvenile inhaled spray paint fumes containing acetone). See also Duvall v. State, 305 Ga.App. 545, 546(1) (699 S.E.2d 761) (2010), cert. granted, Duvall v. State, ---Ga. ---- (Case No. S10C2079, granted Feb. 7, 2011).
ELLINGTON, C.J., and ANDREWS, J., concur.

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