Source: http://citizenfactory.com/en/bills/41-1/C-16/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:17:59+00:00

Document:
This bill was tabled by Peter MacKay on Oct. 8, 2011.
Bill C-15 has appeared in various forms. First of all, Bills C-7 and C-45 died on the order paper because of prorogation in 2007 and the election in 2008.
In July 2008, Bill C-60 came into force. It was intended to simplify the structure of the court martial system and establish a method for choosing the type of court martial that would mesh better with the civilian system. After that, in 2009, the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs studied Bill C-60 and made nine recommendations containing amendments to be made to the National Defence Act.
Then, Bill C-41 was introduced in 2010. It responded to the 2003 Lamer report and the Senate committee report I just mentioned. It contained provisions on military justice, including sentencing reform.
The issue of military judges was addressed in Bill C-16 and therefore was not covered in Bill C-15. Bill C-15 also addressed military committees, summary trials, court martial panels and the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, and contained a certain number of provisions related to the grievance and military police complaints processes.
That is why, in addition to the four failed attempts we have had to amend this legislation, there have also been Bill C-60 and Bill C-16. That means six pieces of legislation for this House, over four parliaments, without a full, thorough-going modernization, update, taking place yet.
Could I ask the hon. member to return to the issue at hand today? Why is it that he is speaking, after all our consideration in committee of this issue, in favour of a reprised amendment, essentially, that goes against the testimony of the Provost Marshal of the Canadian Forces on March 2, when he said that the safeguards in place are robust, and goes against the testimony of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, who says that this provision is required to potentially save lives on the battlefield, using the example of a live fire exercise?
I would invite all hon. members, if they are ever asking themselves about the relevance of this debate and the relevance of this bill, to have a look at the National Defence Act. It is a weighty document in both languages, which is mostly devoted to the military justice system.
Roughly 180 pages out of 230 pages of this document are devoted to the military justice system because of the special need of our Canadian armed forces at home and abroad to maintain discipline and to maintain operational effectiveness while ensuring that justice is done both when they are training on their bases at home in peacetime and also amid the uncertainties and exigencies of the combat they have been involved from time to time throughout their history.
This is an important bill. I find it surprising that the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands would raise amendments at this stage on a very specific part of the bill regarding the role of the Provost Marshal, which is going to be enshrined under this legislation much more clearly in law than ever before, but without mentioning the requirement for operational effectiveness, mission success. That is why we have a military justice system that is separate from the civilian system.
We make a special request of the Canadian armed forces soldiers, sailors and aircrew when they go on missions and when they are at home preparing for such missions. We ask them to live under a justice system that will meet the special requirements of those dangerous situations in which they find themselves from time to time.
The failure to refer to these urgent operational requirements is very revealing in the presentation from the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands. It shows that she has not understood why we have a military justice system and she has not understood the balance that has been struck throughout this legislation, not just in Bill C-15 but in all bills that have established our excellent military justice system over decades.
She has not followed the testimony of witnesses, across the board, in committee and outside of committee, indeed, because most of those best qualified to pronounce on this issue agree with the balance that has been struck in this legislation. The two witnesses the member mentions are in fact the only two I can remember having commented at all positively on the kind of proposal she is making.
It is also extraordinary that the member would introduce these amendments at this very late stage in debate of this bill. We have had dozens of speeches. We have had days and weeks of testimony in committee. This is the fourth Parliament to be considering these amendments.
We are here in the 41st Parliament. There was a similar bill before the 40th Parliament, the 39th Parliament and the 38th Parliament. The recommendations we are trying to enact, at long last, are more than a decade old. They actually came forward in the 36th Parliament.
How many people were here during the 36th Parliament? Was anyone here? There were a very few. Certainly the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands was not here, and neither was I.
I also have a sense of déja vu in that I think some of us were standing in this House a full year ago, on budget day, discussing military justice. It was Bill C-16, an urgent portion of this bill that was taken out of the bill because we were not moving quickly enough on the bill. Here we are again today, going around in circles.
Bill C-15 proposes to put into legislation the appointment, duties and functions of the Provost Marshal as recommended by the Lamer report. He suggested the National Defence Act be amended to define the role of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal and to set out a framework concerning the relationship between the CFPM, the military police and the chain of command.
The motions before the House today call upon the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to issue instructions or guidelines in writing in respect of a particular investigation, provide the rationale for issuing the instructions and make sure they are made public.
(3) The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff may issue instructions or guidelines in writing in respect of a particular investigation.
I hear the member for St. John's East telling us that we should simply buy into a mention of an accountability framework with a specific date, 1998, in the legislation. We do not mention administrative documents in legislation passed by this House. We do not do that. That is not good legislative practice, in this place or in the other place. What we are trying to do is take the content of that accountability framework, which I agree is important, and turn it into legislative terms, which is what this bill would do.
The intent of proposed subsection 18.5(3) is to recognize the unique circumstances of the military police, who often operate in zones of armed conflict. I will mention that again: zones of armed conflict. I would like to hear the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands, in her subsequent interventions, if there are any, inform this House as to how she proposes to deal with those circumstances.
Military police may be going to investigate a situation, here or there on the battlefield, but they do not have knowledge of the operational next steps of the mission. They do not know if there is going to be direct fire called in at that location. They do not know if there is going to be a live fire training exercise at that location. They do not know if there is going to be an air strike at that location. That is what this provision in the bill, as unamended, seeks to allow the VCDS to inform the Provost Marshal of, and absolutely the Provost Marshal could make public the rationale. That is the default position. That is what is expected of the Provost Marshal. That is what the Provost Marshal would be empowered to do under the bill as unamended.
However, in those rare cases when, for reasons of operational secrecy, the protection of Canadian lives or, if there is personal information involved in the investigation, privacy, the Provost Marshal may not make the instructions fully public or may not make them public at all.
In other words, the intent of proposed section 18.5 is to strengthen the independence of the military police, as the default position is that the instructions must be made public, and it is unnecessary to refer to an administrative document. The VCDS would be responsible and accountable for the instructions he or she gives. While the fact of the issuance of the direction and its contents should be public, the rationale may be classified or engage issues of operational security.
...there's the very important transparency provision set out at proposed sections 18.4 and 18.5, which says that the default position is that the instruction must be made public. It gives the discretion ultimately to whether or not to release that, having regard to the impact on a particular investigation, to the provost marshal.
Therefore the Provost Marshal has the hammer if he or she is concerned about this, and it is transparent.
We heard the Provost Marshal and the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in committee expressing the view that this would be the right way to strike a balance. They were comfortable with this, that their independent ability to conduct investigations on the military police side would be protected.
On our side, there really is not more information or more insight provided on this issue, either by the amendments presented today or by what we have heard in this House so far. I remind the members of the House that there have been three attempts previous to Bill C-15, four if we count this bill, to amend this legislation to bring our military justice system up to date.
We in committee considered a wide range of amendments. We are grateful to all members of the committee for the full discussion we had. There are two amendments coming forward to this place, one of which is urgently required because it would reduce the likelihood that members of the Canadian Forces would be carrying into civilian life a criminal record for offences committed under the military justice system that do not justify a criminal record. We need to enact that change quickly. It has been close to a decade that we have been trying to do this, and we have failed so far. We are not serving the Canadian Forces well as long as we fail to pass this legislation, and we would like to move through report stage and third reading as quickly as possible.
I would like to begin by specifying that the law—chapter 22 of the Statutes of Canada, 2011—talks about that provision. That provision was used again because there was uncertainty over whether Bill C-15 and Bill C-16 should be introduced at the same time.
To answer your question more specifically, I would say that, in proposed subsection 165.21(4), two circumstances are set out—the judge's request, or the attainment of the age of 60 years. Subsection 165.21(5) talks about how to deal with resignations. The legislation overlaps simply to cover both possibilities.
I don't think we need to play politics with this. We can have legitimate arguments here. A similar thing happened with the passage of Bill C-60 in about a month. That was before I was here, in 2006 or 2007.
We are here as politicians for the good of the country. We may have differences about what we're doing now, but in a time of emergency or special circumstance, as we saw with the concerns about the legitimacy of the military justice system because of the rulings under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, actions are taken. My view is that is exactly what would happen in the circumstance we're talking about, if this country were at war.
Let me open, Mr. Chair, by noting that I have already provided the clerk of the committee with five copies of a bilingual book, which I recently authored, on Canadian military justice. It is entitled Introduction to Military Justice: An Overview of the Military Penal Justice System and Its Evolution in Canada. I will make reference to the contents of this book as a complement to my remarks today.
I have followed, with much interest, the discussions that have taken place within this committee on Bill C-15. While I acknowledge some of the improvements the bill contains and proposals that have been made for changes to the bill, I have to deplore the lack of a wall-to-wall review of the National Defence Act, which, in my considered opinion, leads to a short-sighted, if not distorted, view of the Canadian penal military justice system.
Hence, my first point is that there is a need for a fundamental wall-to-wall review of the National Defence Act, a review that has to be conducted outside the control of the Department of National Defence so that Parliament can be provided with a legislative proposal that addresses not only the wishes of the military leadership but also, first and foremost, the expectations of our civil society, who demand that our soldiers who serve in uniform be afforded rights equal to those provided in the civilian penal system in Canada and other militaries abroad. This is currently not the case.
In the short period of time I have, I can only give you an overview of some of these problems. In fact, both from a constitutional and a practical perspective, I would like to draw your attention to the shortcomings of this piecemeal approach taken so far by the military to the reform of the military justice system. I shall provide a few examples that will help you understand what I mean by its structural shortcomings and that will highlight the resistance of the Canadian military to real substantive changes that would actually strengthen the military justice system in Canada.
Let me begin with the prolonged struggle to bring about the constitutionality of the courts martial, as an example. In 1990, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada—I'll refer to it as the CMAC—found the standing court martial unconstitutional. In 1992, while it recognized the constitutionality of separate military tribunals, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Généreux case, ruled that the general court martial also was unconstitutional. Since nothing whatsoever was done to amend the National Defence Act to remedy this, it should come as no surprise when six years later, in 1998, in the Lauzon case, a unanimous Court Martial Appeal Court concluded that the standing court martial was unconstitutional.
After the Lauzon case, the case law with respect to the independence of courts in general continued to evolve. Military judges' security of tenure became, along with administrative independence and financial security, a component of judicial independence. However, it seems this jurisprudential evolution never reached the Canadian military, because nothing was done to review the status of the courts martial on the issue of security of tenure, so in 2007, in a unanimous and powerful obiter dictum in Dunphy, the Court Martial Appeal Court made a certain number of observations on the issue of renewable terms for military judges. This reconsideration took place in the case of Leblanc, a decision handed down on June 2, 2011. This led to the passage of Bill C-16 last year.
In retrospect, it is interesting to observe that despite the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada with respect to the independence of provincial judges, in spite of the excellent obiter dictum of Justice Hugessen of the CMAC in Dunphy, and despite decisions handed down by courts martial holding renewable terms for military judges to be unconstitutional, the military prosecutor strenuously objected to the making of a declaration of unconstitutionality requested by the appellant in the Leblanc case. Instead, speaking for the crown, he argued that the security of tenure of military judges, if desirable, was not constitutionally required.
Meanwhile, not to be forgotten is that military judges enjoyed unparalleled powers and dealt with crimes of a most serious nature. Consider this: they were, for instance, the only judges in Canada who, operating under renewable terms, could until 1998 sentence an offender to death.
They were also the only judges not having security of tenure who were called upon to try the most serious offences in our criminal law or to preside at general courts martial.
Also, they have tried offences including murder and manslaughter committed outside Canada. Examples include the Deneault case in 1994, for murder committed in Germany; the Brown case in 1995, for manslaughter and torture in Somalia; and recently the Semrau case, for second-degree murder and attempted murder in Afghanistan.
To sum up, as a result of legislative inaction and military resistance to changes required by the charter, it took nearly 20 years of legal challenges in a civilian appellate court to achieve—although not completely, as we shall see—the judicial independence of the courts martial and their incumbents.
Let me give you another example. Contrary to the Criminal Code, the National Defence Act gave the right to choose the mode of trial to the prosecution rather than to the accused. In 2008, in the case of Trépanier, the CMAC found the provision unconstitutional. Again, notwithstanding a Supreme Court of Canada decision to the effect that the choice of the mode of trial is a tactical advantage that belongs to the accused as part of his right to full answer and defence under the charter and the CMAC's serious concern expressed about the constitutionality of the provision in the Nystrom case in 2005, some three years before Trépanier, the military prosecution again showed no willingness to confer to a soldier facing criminal proceedings this advantage granted to him by the charter. It bitterly fought the Trépanier case, and the court had to intervene to ensure that a military accused's rights were equal to those under the civilian penal system.
With this background information, allow me to bring to your attention concerns l have about some of the provisions of Bill C-15 in respect of either their constitutionality or the unwarranted unequal treatment they afford to a member of the armed forces charged with a service offence based on the Criminal Code.
Let me start with the summary trial. I won't repeat here what has been said by the two previous speakers. I endorse their submissions and their fears. I think the system is unconstitutional, and it is still in place only because there's no means of contesting it other than a declaratory relief in the Federal Court, at the expense of the soldier, with two layers of subsequent appeals.
It has been mentioned that the British have changed the system. I won't repeat the fact that there's a right to counsel and so on, but as a general rule, imprisonment or service detention cannot be imposed when the offender is not legally represented in the court of appeal in a summary trial or in a court martial. There can be no imprisonment or detention unless he's represented by counsel.
Mr. Drapeau has alluded to the fact that changes have taken place in Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, France, Belgium, Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, and despite the fact that the requirements of independence, impartiality, fairness, and justice are the same in Canada as they are in England—and if anything, they are more compelling here, because in Canada they are entrenched in the Constitution—our soldiers in uniform are still denied fair treatment at a summary trial. I'll be pleased to answer questions on that.
I can see how under Bill C-15 the provost marshal is appointed by the Chief of the Defence Staff and removed from office by the CDS. However, for example, if you look sections 56 and 58 of the Quebec Police Act, you will see that the director general of the Quebec Police Force is appointed not by the Minister of Public Security, who is responsible for the police, but by the government. The director is removed by the government only pursuant to a recommendation of the Minister of Public Security after an inquiry.
This process provides not only an actual and better guarantee of independence to the incumbent but also increases in the general public and in the individuals subjected to the police powers a perception of real independence, as well as their confidence in the administration of justice.
I will address the second question first, if I may, Mr. Chair, on the concept of civilianizing military justice. We have heard that out in the public as a suggestion perhaps to improve the military justice system. I fundamentally disagree with such a proposition. I think it's critical to have those judges. We are talking about the military judges who actually sit at courts martial. We're not talking about the judges who sit on appeal at the court martial appeal court who are civilian judges. I fully support and always have supported the concept of having civilian judges on the appeal review, because those are matters of law and they will have a broader perspective from across Canada and in their Federal Court roles. But internally, I think it is vital to have people who sit in judgment of our men and women in uniform on either mundane or very serious charges, as we saw recently with Captain Semrau, or the courts martial involving Major Watts and others that are in the press these days.
To me at a very fundamental level it's common sense that you want somebody who obviously knows the law, is very practised in the rules of evidence and criminal law and discipline. But again it's that point: discipline. That's what separates the military justice system from the civilian system. It's discipline that requires the troops to pay attention so that when they are in times of crisis, in firefights in the middle of Afghanistan, they are going to respond to orders without questioning them. It's that habit of obedience that discipline really goes to form.
You have to have, in my opinion, clearly someone who fully understands that, who has actually been brought up in that culture, if you will, of understanding what discipline really means, and the context in which our men and women in uniform actually conduct their activities. It's one thing for us to sit sometimes in the relative comfort of offices here in Ottawa, and another to actually be out there and understand what it's like on the front lines.
I think it would be very dangerous, in my respectful opinion, to have that part of the courts martial system civilianized. I think we would lose not only the experience of those judges, but the understanding of the concept of discipline.
In regard to the part-time judges that you mentioned, what we're really referring to is the ability to have what we call a surge capability in times of heightened activity when we may need more military judges at courts martial. Right now the way the scheme is proposed, we would have to appoint them as military judges. As you know, with Bill C-15 and Bill C-16, they would have tenure until the age of 60. We may have a surge of activity; let's say we were in a major conflict again and we needed more judges to sit on courts martial and then after that surge we're left with perhaps a pool of 15 to 20 military judges of which a lot of them functionally we don't need. This gives us the ability to surge when we need to, to have part-time military judges, reserve judges, who could then not be required once that surge element is over.
Regarding the interaction, overall I can say with a great amount of confidence that Parliament and Canadians as a whole should be very proud of all of the government's legal advisers. We do some tough work, a lot of times in anonymity. We're not asking to be put in the headlights, that's for sure, but there's a lot of hard work done in the trenches, literally. We work closely with the Department of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Privy Council legal advisers.
Having said that, as I said, in response to Mr. Harris's question earlier, reasonable people can agree reasonably to disagree over interpretations. It doesn't mean one is wrong or one is better than the other; it simply means there is a different perspective.
What we bring to the table, not to put it too lightly, is 100 years of critical experience of military operations and understanding of how they're done not only at the strategic level, but right down to the tactical level as well.
I'll get right to the point because I only have a short period of time. We support many things in the bill, but we have some concerns. You mentioned the Charter of Rights and Freedoms a number of times during your presentation, and the necessity for public confidence in the administration of military justice and indeed legislation. We've had a number of occasions, of course, where changes had to be made to the military justice system because of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Indeed, we agreed on swift passage of one of those, a companion bill to this, Bill C-16, in a matter of three weeks back in the fall of 2011 for that very reason.
But public confidence was somewhat shaken recently when it was revealed by a senior justice department lawyer that the vetting of bills by the justice department, which is required by law for charter compliance, is in fact being done with a degree of confidence of I think 5%. In other words, the statement made by the senior Justice lawyer was that if there was a 5% chance that it could comply with the charter or if there was any argument that could be made, it didn't matter, the justice department would not flag this to Parliament for consideration.
Can you tell me, Mr. Minister, in regard to this particular iteration of the bill and the confidence level that you have, as you've expressed here today, is it the 5% confidence level that the justice department seems to be using as a standard, or is there some other level?
A year and a half ago, that was the case for me. Since arriving here, I have had the opportunity to meet many members of the armed forces and I have become aware of the issues that are important to them. I have also asked the veterans in my riding many questions, and they have kindly and patiently answered them.
Bill C-15 is about military justice and it is a truly interesting subject. I will summarize the bill in order to provide some context. Bill C-15 is the Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts. True to form, the Conservative government gave it an optimistic short title—Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act. Coming up with such upbeat titles is a new trend. I would not put it past the Conservatives to introduce a bill to diminish the rights of aboriginal peoples and name it “encouraging the legal and economic autonomy of first nations”. The cheerful words are a bit much.
Bill C-15 addresses some very clear problems and, in a way, proposes some clear solutions. This bill originated in 1998 when the Liberals were in power. During the 1990s, it was determined that the National Defence Act absolutely had to be modernized and achieve a better balance. It was significantly amended in 1998, after the release of three different reports that questioned its effectiveness. The Liberals introduced Bill C-25, which contained clause 96 stating that, every five years after the bill is assented to, there would be an independent review of the amendments made to the National Defence Act to see whether they were effective and whether any adjustments were needed.
This brings us to 2003, when the Lamer report came out with its 88 recommendations. Everyone agreed that the Lamer report was an effective tool and that it clearly indicated the steps to follow to improve and modernize our National Defence Act.
When the Conservatives came to power in 2006, they inherited the Lamer report and its recommendations. The Conservative government was aware that it had to continue reforming the National Defence Act. Under the Conservatives there were all kinds of disappointing twists and turns. In the first two minority, and rather unstable, Conservative governments, the two attempts to pass legislation to comply with the Lamer report recommendations died on the order paper.
In 2008, there was a turn of events. On April 24, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, in R. v. Trépanier, declared unconstitutional the provisions in the National Defence Act enabling the director of military prosecutions to choose the type of court martial for a given accused. This essentially meant that, from then on, in certain cases, accused persons had the right to choose the type of court martial to be convened.
The Conservatives had to react to this event as quickly as possible. Their legislative attempt failed in the wrangling of minority governments, and suddenly there was a court case that they needed to respond to. Their response was Bill C-60, which made minor changes to the military justice system. The Lamer report definitely remained the foundation for future legislation, but it also led to a report from the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs entitled, “Equal Justice”. That report, commissioned by the Minister of National Defence, was agreed to in principle by the government when it tabled the report.
At this time, we have an abundance of studies and information to guide the whole legislative process of amending the National Defence Act. However, the tone has already been set. It will never be applied as a whole, but rather in bits and pieces. That is not necessarily a bad thing. We cannot change everything at once, unless the government decides to throw an omnibus bill at us concerning the National Defence Act, but I think the staff at the Prime Minister's Office, based on the two huge tomes that we have seen in recent months, are burned out. You see, the first victims of these paving stone expeditions are the legislative and political staff in the Prime Minister's Office.
Significant progress was made in 2010. Bill C-41, which was the direct forerunner of Bill C-15, was introduced in the House on June 16, 2010. It made it through the entire legislative process, was debated and discussed, and several of the NDP's proposed amendments were included. Unfortunately, Bill C-41 died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved during the last federal election.
Not long after a new Parliament was formed, in June 2011, there was yet another twist. The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, in R. v. Leblanc, declared unconstitutional the provisions regarding the appointment of judges and the length of their terms.
The Conservatives wanted to fix the problem as quickly as possible, so in came Bill C-16, which was introduced and assented to in the fall of 2011. At the same time, at the very beginning of the 41st Parliament, the Minister of National Defence appointed the hon. Patrick LeSage, retired Chief Justice of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, to conduct the second independent review of Bill C-25, passed in 1998. His report was recently tabled on June 8, 2012. And that is where we are now.
This topic has been debated in Parliament for 13 years. We have the Lamer report and we have the report from the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, all of whose recommendations the Conservative government accepted. Now we have Bill C-15. So what is the problem?
As I said, Bill C-15 in itself is relatively well done and addresses specific urgent problems. Except there was a bit of a sleight of hand. All of the recommendations that the NDP had managed to get accepted for Bill C-41 magically disappeared.
We were not kidding around when we proposed amendments during the previous Parliament. We were being serious. They were discussed in detail and they were accepted. The NDP wants to see these amendments in Bill C-15 as well.
If I may, I would like to quickly describe the purpose of those amendments.
First, there is one very important thing: we believe that Bill C-15 fails to properly address the problem of reforming the summary trial system.
A summary trial takes place when a member of the Canadian Forces is guilty of a lack of discipline in a strictly military setting. That person will be judged by his or her commanding officer on site, without a transcript, in order to maintain military discipline. That is fine in and of itself. Members of the military are subject to rigorous discipline in the course of their duties, but since they are only human, they may make mistakes and commit minor offences. Unfortunately, right now, these minor offences lead to a civilian criminal record.
The NDP does not believe that this type of purely military insubordination should result in a criminal record. I am somewhat disturbed that soldiers who bravely put themselves in harm's way for my safety and who are under an unusual amount of pressure must, when they return to civilian life, carry a criminal record that could prevent them from travelling or getting a bank loan all because of a simple matter of insubordination.
In February 2011, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association said that military officers who impose sentences during a summary trial often want to make a show of discipline for the unit and discourage future offences, not impose on the accused the consequences that go along with having a criminal record in the civilian world.
We are talking here about really minor offences, and in the last Parliament, the NDP sold the committee on expanding the list of so-called minor offences from 5 to 27. We want this amendment to be put back into Bill C-15. If it is not, we will not support the bill.
This is not a conspiracy. The countries with which we have everything in common have already done so. It is a fairly powerful list: Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland.
If they have done this, I do not understand why Canada would not.
The second point pertains to the reform of the military grievances system. Right now, the grievance board does not allow external reviews. However, the grievance board should be an independent, external civilian body. Right now, only retired members of the Canadian Forces are on the board. I am not saying that they are not doing the job properly, but the system is not working. A change must be made.
Do we have to wait for another Court Martial Appeal Court ruling for things to be done right?
We suggest that at least 60% of the members of the grievance board be civilians. This amendment was agreed to in the last Parliament, but is not included in Bill C-15. We are right about this, and we want this amendment to be included.
Once again, for these reasons we will not be supporting this bill.
The third amendment that is missing from Bill C-15 concerns the Military Police Complaints Commission. It is a minor point, but the NDP believes that much more should be done to strengthen this commission.
It should be granted more powers by means of a legislative provision and it should be able to legitimately conduct investigations and report to Parliament. It is for the good of the military. We want this amendment included as well.
In the end, it is quite gratifying to be part of this long process that began in the late 1990s under the Chrétien government.
I am quite aware that such important statutes as the National Defence Act cannot be amended by only three or four pieces of legislation. Change will inevitably take many years. The work is well under way. The Conservative government has dealt with this matter rather appropriately, which is quite rare. However, as always, the NDP must be vigilant in order to put the finishing touches to the bill. The Conservatives want to act too quickly, and they have not got all the details right.
If the valuable and important amendments that we won acceptance for in the last Parliament are not restored, the NDP will unfortunately vote against the bill.
I have to say at the outset that I appreciate the optimism of the speaker before me, but frankly, my experience since the Conservative government gained majority control has been that the hard work done in committee seems to be for naught. I hope the government will take heed. However, I would think it is an indication that, since the government chose not to include the consensus amendments, it is going to be an uphill battle to get them back in. However, we look forward to being surprised.
Canadians would be shocked to discover that under the current law, and even with the passage of Bill C-15, many who have bravely served our country, supporting the democratic processes, due process and rule of law for this nation and others, may obtain a criminal record through a system that lacks the due process that is available in civilian criminal courts to other Canadians.
Bill C-15 is the most recent of more than half a dozen tabled iterations, which the government let die. From that standpoint, what is the rush? We should spend time in committee, and if the amendments were previously valid, then let us discuss if they are still valid.
The changes that were previously brought forward and that we continue to call for were put forward not just by opposition members but by Justice LeSage; a former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada; Professor Michel Drapeau, from the University of Ottawa; a noted author and military lawyer; members of the armed forces; and many legal experts and defence counsel for military members.
While some of the needed reforms are included in Bill C-15—and we have been clear about that—regrettably, many of the most important ones are not.
In 2003, retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio Lamer provided a report outlining 88 recommendations to reform the system of military justice and bring it into the 21st century. He was retained to undertake a review of the court martial procedures under the National Defence Act and he did issue a report, again, with 88 recommendations relating to military justice, the Military Police Complaints Commission, the grievance procedures and the provost marshal.
As one of my colleagues has stated, Bill C-15 is a step in the right direction, yet no rationale has been provided by the government as to why, at this point in time with this iteration, it has now thrown out the majority of the agreed amendments.
Retired Colonel Michel Drapeau, noted legal expert and author on military justice, has commented that the National Defence Act “requires more than tweaks and tinkering to bring it into the 21st century”.
However, this is what we have before us today. Yes, there are some amendments and, yes, they are worthwhile, but it is still tweaking and tinkering rather than bringing forward a bill that is appropriate for this century.
In this century, is it not time that the military courts and grievance procedures were amended to instill independence of the decision makers, judicial independence, trial by peers and penalties on par with those in the civilian courts for other Canadians?
I wish to echo the sentiments of the member for Windsor—Tecumseh, who clearly presented his rationale for opposing Bill C-15. As he stated in the House: “...I am never going to vote for a bill that would treat our military personnel unfairly”.
That is the stance of all my colleagues in the official opposition.
The member stated that the second reason he was voting against the bill was that, despite the efforts of the committee members in the last Parliament to agree on amendments, the experience under this majority government has been continually, where we seek all-party consensus, that the PMO overrides and rejects that consensus.
Many in the House have noted the many iterations prior to this bill. We had the Lamer report in 2003, outlining significant, thoughtful changes to bring military tribunals into this century. In 2006, we had Bill C-7, which died on the order paper. In March 2008, we had Bill C-45, which died on the order paper. In 2008, we had Bill C-16 on court martials. That was given royal assent. We had a little tinkering and it was good that one change was made, but it did not do overall reforms as had been recommended by Justice Lamer. There was a Senate report on equal justice for court martials in May 2009. Again in 2010, we had Bill C-41. The government tabled one amendment, but it died on the order paper. Then we had Bill C-16 in 2011. It passed narrow provisions to improve the appointment and tenure of military judges, but again it was just a tinkering at the edges. In March 2011, the Minister of National Defence commissioned yet another review by Justice LeSage.
It is time for a full, all-encompassing reform of the military justice regime. It is not merely the opposition saying this; it has been senior judges, military law experts and representatives of the military. It has been said over and over again. It has been agreed to by all party members of the committee.
Despite the six iterations since 2003, including this one, little concrete action has been taken to expedite a more just and equitable trial process for military accused. As my colleagues have reiterated to questions from the other side of the House, we do agree that Bill C-15 does provide a number of measures, including greater flexibility in sentencing, more sentencing options including absolute discharge, restitution and intermittent sentences. These are good measures. It modifies the composition of court martial panels and changes the power of delegation of the Chief of the Defence Staff for grievance procedures. Good on the Conservatives for agreeing to make some of those changes.
Unfortunately, the bill falls short in key issues: in reforming summary trials, in reforming the grievance system and in strengthening the Military Complaints Commission. Only 28 of Mr. Justice Lamer's 88 recommendations to improve military justice, the Military Complaints Commission, the grievance procedures and the provost marshal have been addressed.
Many amendments tabled by the New Democrats and put forward by the armed forces and passed at committee have been excluded from Bill C-15—for example, the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff in grievance processes; changes to the composition of grievance committees and, as my colleague previously mentioned, to include 60% civilians on panel reviews; or to ensure that the persons convicted at summary trial are not unfairly subjected to a criminal record, particularly when we are dealing with minor offences.
Some of the critical reforms we brought forward previously and that have not been included provide the reasons that we cannot support the bill, including the reforms to the summary trial system; reforms to the grievance system; and strengthening the Military Police Complaints Commission. Again, these are matters that were tabled at committee and agreed to, but they are not found in Bill C-15.
Reforms to the summary trial system would include removing the criminal record for an expanded list of minor offences. In other words, there are a good number of offences where a young member of the military could be given a criminal record, where it is deemed inappropriate and would not happen in the civil system. Again, there is no right of appeal, no transcript, no access to counsel and often the judge is the accused's commanding officer.
As I mentioned, major reforms to the grievance system include reconstituting the panels with civilian members and strengthening the Military Police Complaints Commission to provide oversight.
In closing, it is a question of justice and equity for our dedicated military.
Unfortunately, as the bill stands now, I will not be speaking in favour at second reading. Despite still agreeing that the bill does represent a step in the right direction, this version omits key recommendations from the mandatory review process and it also omits recommendations that had already been accepted by all parties in the previous Parliament during debate on its predecessor, Bill C-41.
Certainly both sides of the House recognize the importance of the major reforms to our military justice system that took place in 1998. One of those important progressive provisions was the requirement that there be a mandatory five-year review of the impact of those changes in our military justice system.
The first review was completed by the very distinguished former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Lamer, in September 2003. His conclusion was that our military justice system was generally working well, but it was not without room for improvement. Therefore, he then submitted 88 recommendations for improvements to that justice system.
Since that time, by most counts, only about 28 of those recommendations have been dealt with, either in legislation or in administrative changes. That still leaves 60 recommendations outstanding.
Mr. Justice Lamer made recommendations in three main areas. The first of those was action to increase the protection for the independence of military judges. The second area was for actions to improve the current grievance process. The third area was actions to address efficiencies in the overall military justice framework.
Tonight I want to talk largely about how well Bill C-15 does in terms of implementing those outstanding recommendations made by Mr. Justice Lamer. When we look at Bill C-15, what we find is a very mixed record.
The recommendations in the first area of independence of military justice were dealt with last fall with all party support. They were separated out into Bill C-16, due to the deadline Parliament had been given by a decision of the Military Court Martial Appeal Court in the case of Regina v. Leblanc, and that deadline was met with royal assent last November.
I mention this specifically because it demonstrates that with goodwill on both sides of the House, we can get reforms that are needed through the House of Commons in a timely fashion. What I see missing in this draft of the bill is that goodwill to respect opinions on all sides of the House.
The second area that Mr. Justice Lamer made recommendations in was the area of improvements to the current grievance system. Lamer judged the current process unsatisfactory, largely due to its failure to deal with grievances in a timely manner and then the resulting backlog of grievances that came about as a result of that untimely dealing with problems.
His conclusion was that the basic principles of the grievance system were sound, but that its operation was not sound. At the time of his report, there were over 800 grievances outstanding and he pointed out the fact that grievances were often stuck at the office of the Chief of Defence Staff for more than two years.
Lamer suggested a 12 month limit be placed on grievances, that they would have to be dealt with within that time period. However, he also suggested some ways that deadline could be met, but it required several things to happen.
If the Chief of Defence Staff were able to delegate responsibility for some grievances to subordinate officers, that would speed up the process. That provision is in Bill C-15 and has been in all the previous bills.
The other two things are not actually legislative action and unfortunately they have not taken place.
The second of his recommendation on grievances was that adequate resources needed to be made available so that grievances could proceed in a timely fashion. The main reason for the delay was not enough people and not enough resources to deal with those grievances.
His third recommendation was providing additional training to those members of the Canadian Forces who were actually dealing with grievances, so they became more skilled in getting resolution of the grievances at a low level and were able to therefore move on to deal with more serious grievances.
As I said, only the first of these is in the bill. The other two would be very difficult to manage now, in view of the large cuts to the DND budget this year. They require more resources for the grievance system and they require more resources for training. I have my doubts about whether those would be available, given the large cuts in this year's budget.
The other reform not included in this bill to do with grievances was one which was adopted as an NDP amendment to Bill C-41, the previous version of this bill. That was an amendment to add critical balance to the representation on grievance committees. Therefore, I am at a loss as to why the government would not have included this amendment, which was already accepted in the previous Parliament, and which would go a long way to helping restore credibility to the grievance committee system by having a good representation of difference kinds of members of the Canadian Forces on those committees.
In his third area of recommendations we probably have the most important recommendations for redressing the balance within the military justice framework as a whole. In talking about these, Justice Lamer set out four principles to guide that system. I want to take a moment to talk about those principles because I think it is important to keep them in mind as we are talking about this bill.
The first of those, and I shall quote Mr. Lamer, was to recognize that “maintaining discipline by the chain of command is essential to a competent and reliable military organization”.
What he is pointing out there is that discipline depends on a well-functioning grievance and justice system. Therefore, it is not a challenge to that system to have a good grievance system; it is a support to that discipline system. It is not a challenge to have a good justice system; it is a support to discipline within the military.
...need to have a system that will properly operate under those special conditions that our men and women are placed in, often abroad, under conditions from peacekeeping to peace-making, in what is often a hostile environment, and indeed sometimes outright war.
Mr. Justice Lamer did not say there should not be a system for summary convictions or expedited justice. He recognized that sometimes these things are necessary. However, he also recognized that we can do these things within the framework of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and within a system that is just and fair to all the members of the Canadian Forces.
The third point or principle underlying these reforms to the framework that he mentioned was that those “who risk their lives for our country deserve a military justice system that protects their rights in accordance with our Charter” of Rights and Freedoms.
What he is saying there is that, like all other Canadian systems, but in particular because members of the Canadian Forces risk their lives in the service of their country, they deserve the protection of the rights that are in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms because that is what we are asking them to defend as members of the Canadian Forces.
His fourth principle said that it was necessary to recognize that any doubts about the military justice system and any lack of confidence in the military justice system would have negative impacts not just on discipline but also on morale within the Canadian Forces. Therefore, it becomes very important to deal with concerns about injustice in a timely fashion in order that the esprit de corps and the sense of common purpose can be maintained in the Canadian Forces.
By laying out those four principles, what he was saying is that the context that the military justice operates in makes it particularly important that we operate a model system.
Bill C-15 does make progress in two areas. I am prepared to acknowledge that.
One is in placing limits on the power of arrest without warrant under the existing sections 155 and 156 of the National Defence Act. Two court cases had already brought these wide powers of arrest without warrant into question, and Bill C-15 addresses this problem by incorporating Mr. Justice Lamer's recommendations.
The second area in which it makes progress is in providing for more flexible sentencing. Again, as recommended by Lamer, this would bring military justice in line with civilian justice in Canada by adding new sentencing options, including absolute discharges, intermittent sentences and restitution orders.
Those are two areas of progress I am prepared to acknowledge. Unfortunately, some of the most significant recommendations from Mr. Justice Lamer's report are missing from Bill C-15. That is why I am unable to support the bill at second reading.
One in particular I would like to highlight from Mr. Lamer's report deals with section 129 of the National Defence Act. That section establishes a general prohibition against conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. That is something no one could disagree with, given the context the military operates in. Unfortunately, as Mr. Justice Lamer noted, there is a lack of clarity in that section as to what the requisite elements of an offence are under this section or, in common language, what it is one has to do to violate this section is not clear. We might ask why Justice Lamer would focus on such a technical matter involving a single section of the defence act.
What he pointed out was that in the last year before his report, 44% of all charges in the military justice system were under this single section, where exactly what one has to do to be in contravention is unclear, and that this section also generated a large proportion of the appeals in the military justice system. This is what I would call a very major problem in terms of acceptance of the justice system, in terms of discipline and in terms of morale, and resulting from this lack of clarity it is not dealt with in Bill C-15, and it is a major omission.
It is so major, in fact, that it raises the general question of why most of the other 60 recommendations have not been included in Bill C-15. What was the standard by which the government sorted through and decided some of these deserve to stay and some of them have to go?
The second major omission that many of my colleagues have spoken about is the failure to reform the summary trial system. Again, the summary trial system, according to Mr. Lamer, in normal times accounts for about 96% of all cases in the military justice system. The major concern we have noted here is the possibility of summary trial convictions leading to criminal records, something that has a great impact on the future prospects of those convicted, both their prospects within the military and their prospects should they choose to leave the Canadian Forces. Again, in its last incarnation as Bill C-41, NDP amendments were adopted to expand the number of offences considered minor from 5 to 27, and this would reduce significantly the number of convictions that could result in a criminal record.
A further failure of Bill C-15 is its failure to address the need to strengthen the role of the Military Police Complaints Commission so that it can act as an effective oversight body with full investigative powers and the unfettered right to report to Parliament.
There is one other concern that Lamer had, which is perhaps not surprising, but is not addressed in this bill. He did acknowledge that all the solutions are not legislative in nature. This concern was the general under-resourcing of the military justice system. Lamer pointed in particular to the under-resourcing of the defence counsel services, where the number of defence lawyers in the Canadian military was equal to the number of judges and that number was four. So not having enough people to provide defence counsel contributed to these lengthy delays in the actual justice system in getting cases through the court.
A further particular concern with resourcing came about at CFB Esquimalt in my riding. That is the cuts that have been made to alternative dispute resolution programs. These cuts that have been made in this budget would result in the phasing out of the alternative dispute resolution program at CFB Esquimalt by March 2014.
Now why am I talking about this as part of Bill C-15? I would say we have had a proven success rate in reducing the number of grievances and the number of behaviours that result in discipline by having an effective alternative dispute resolution program operating on the base. We can look at the number of cases that were dealt with in alternative dispute resolution and we can look at the number of grievances and see that the number of grievances has gone down. We can look at the number of cases dealt with in alternative dispute resolution and see that the number of discipline cases has gone down. Why on earth would the government want to cut the funding to alternative dispute resolution at the base? What the Conservatives say is that there is no explicit mandate for alternative dispute resolution services anywhere in the National Defence Act.
However, as I said, it flies in the face of the proven results of the alternative dispute resolution program in having a significant impact on reducing recourse to formal grievance procedures and in reducing the incidence of behaviours that would result in formal discipline proceedings. It is a great shame to see this program being phased out at the base.
I conclude my remarks about this bill by saying, once again, that I believe Bill C-16 last fall demonstrated the ability of all parties to co-operate to get important reforms adopted quickly in the House of Commons. Once again, I am perplexed as to why this bill ignores previously agreed upon amendments and ignores key recommendations from Mr. Justice Lamer. For that reason, I cannot support this bill at second reading.
Let me restate the importance of improvements to our military justice system. As I said, it is extremely important to one of those fundamental principles, and that is maintaining discipline in a chain of command.
It is extremely important to maintaining morale within the Canadian Forces, but it is also a right of those who serve. Therefore, we owe nothing less to the members of the Canadian Forces than to give them the same rights and the same protections, albeit in a special context, that are given to all other Canadians.
Members of the Canadian Forces are held to a high standard of discipline. They are asked to risk their lives, and therefore our judicial system should reflect those sacrifices they make on behalf of all of us. Those who risk their lives for our country should not be denied their charter rights when facing things like summary trials.
Other countries have recognized this issue and have changed their summary trial process. I heard my colleagues previously listing countries like Australia, Britain and Ireland. It is time for Canada to catch up in this area.
Ensuring that our military justice system ranks as a model system and a system of which all Canadians, both members of the Canadian Forces and the public at large, can justifiably be proud of should be the goal of Bill C-15. Once again, I have to question the government's motives in putting forward a bill that rejects those previously agreed upon compromises that help us accomplish that goal.
My final remarks go back to the important innovation we had in 1998, a five-year review. We had that review from Mr. Justice Lamer. We had a more recent review completed. We know what needs to be done here in the military justice system, and it is left now to us to find a way to come together in Parliament to get that done. We on this side of the House have said we will not support the bill at second reading. We would urge the government to take another run at this, one that recognizes the things that had already been agreed upon.
I want to go back to talk a bit more about the grievance system. It would be an easy thing for the Chief of the Defence Staff to adopt a 12-month limit for dealing with grievances, if we had that provision that allowed him to delegate some of that responsibility to his subordinates. It would not be so easy for him to do so in the context of cutbacks to the DND budget for this year. Therefore, those adequate resources for dealing with grievances will not be available, I am certain, and adequate resources for training those who deal with grievance procedures will not be available, likely, because of these large budget cutbacks.
I wonder where the consistency is in the government's commitment to the military and the commitment to improving the military justice system, when it is proceeding with such large cutbacks on an annual basis. I just cannot square that circle. Once again, if they are concerned about efficiency, I would go back to programs like the alternative dispute resolution program at CFB Esquimalt in my riding and ask why that program, instead of being cut, is not being piloted at all the bases across the country as a way of trying to get the problem solved at the lowest level without resorting to the formal processes that take so long and consume so many resources and without leaving Canadian Forces members so unhappy that they often engage in behaviours that provoke discipline and then invoke the military justice system.
We have some good alternatives here. We have some good ideas. We know where we need to go in reforming the military justice system. Again, I just cannot understand the lack of goodwill of the government in introducing Bill C-15 in this form when we have had so much experience in previous Parliaments and we know what it takes to get all of us on to the same page and improving the military justice system for the benefit of all the members who serve in the Canadian Forces.
I had the honour of being elected as the member of Parliament for the riding of Saint-Jean in Quebec. I realize that I have never had the opportunity to talk about this riding, which has many ties to national defence.
First, I will say that it is because of the military installation at the base, for example, with which all Canadian soldiers are familiar due to an important part of their basic training that takes place and also the Royal Military College in Saint-Jean, from which most of our senior military personnel graduated. Second, Saint-Jean is also an important centre for the defence industry, including Rheinmetall, Cadex and Mil-Quip, which contribute significantly to the regional economy.
Finally, for historical reasons, this year we will commemorate the bicentennial of the War of 1812, part of which took place in Lacolle, in the riding. In November 1812, a very small group of 200 Canadian regulars were able to hold off more than 1,200 American soldiers and were eventually able to chase them back into the United States. We are fortunate that the wooden blockhouse, which is called the Lacolle Mill, which protected the Canadian soldiers is still standing and is one of the most significant and interesting historical buildings in Canada. If members or people listening are in the region this summer, this building is absolutely a must see.
On a more personal note, I worked in the military exactly 20 years ago, from 1992 to 1993. I did mandatory military service in the French army. As a signaller in the signals company of the 4e Régiment d'hélicoptères de commandement et de manoeuvre of the French army's Force d'action rapide, I was directly confronted with the reality of military discipline and with the consequences that arise if anyone disobeys the kind of rules we are debating today regarding Bill C-15.
I can say that I feel privileged, compared to the majority of members who have had a chance to examine this bill, either to debate it in the House or to study it more carefully in committee. I and my colleague from Abitibi—Témiscamingue, who is also a member of the Standing Committee on National Defence, have worked in the military.
Let us get back to Bill C-15. This bill is substantive in terms of both quantity and quality. It has 90 pages and addresses complex legal notions.
This is actually the fourth time this bill has been introduced. The third time it was introduced, as Bill C-41, it was referred to the Standing Committee on National Defence, which studied the bill during eight sessions lasting over two hours each, the last of which took place not long ago on March 23, 2011.
It is important to point out that, in addition to the 16-plus hours of formal meetings during which witnesses were called and questioned by members of the Standing Committee on National Defence, hundreds of hours of work were devoted to finding reasonable solutions to real problems. Now that is all being thrown in the trash.
During the 40th Parliament, Bill C-41 included specific clauses about the independence of military judges. This is now the 41st Parliament, and given the urgency of the matter, the government decided to remove those provisions to create a new bill, Bill C-16, which the members of the Standing Committee on National Defence studied last fall and the NDP supported at all stages.
Clearly, Bill C-15 is not an omnibus bill, like the ones introduced in 2011 and 2012, but it nevertheless amends several parts of the National Defence Act. First of all, it amends part III of the act, which serves as the Code of Service Discipline. There is also part IV, which has to do with complaints concerning the military police, and finally, there is an addition regarding the position of the Canadian Forces provost marshal.
Discipline is fundamental to military efficiency...permitting commanders to control the use of violence so that the right amount and type of force can be applied in exactly the right circumstances, the right time and the right place. At the personal level, discipline ensures that...the soldier can and will carry out orders even if his natural instinct for self-preservation and fear tells him otherwise.
As a non-commissioned soldier myself once, I was trained to understand that military justice is inexorably different from civilian justice because it must fulfill two additional requirements: discipline and swiftness.
I can say that people who wear a uniform are subjected to pressure that does not exist in the civilian world, if only because of the existence of a chain of command that must be obeyed—obviously, as long as those commands are lawful. During my military training, in fact, I remember learning about the particular problem posed by illegal commands. Even so, experience shows that when an individual is subjected to this particular pressure, he can be motivated to commit acts that he would never commit in civilian life.
Next, I would like to speak a little about the procedural aspect of the question we are addressing today. Our role as parliamentarians is to study bills in detail, however complex they may be. Our responsibility as elected representatives, however, is also to summarize our work and explain to Canadians how their government is conducting itself in a specific case. When we provide Canadians with those explanations, they do not understand why their government, the same government that sets itself up artificially as a good manager of the money that Canadians have earned with the sweat of their brow, could be trashing the hours of work that have been put into improving this same bill on three occasions. Instead of starting from the last version of this bill, the government is using its position of power and starting over from zero. That is what Canadians do not understand.
The saddest thing is that the last version of Bill C-41 was the product of discussion, dialogue and consensus. Unfortunately, we get the feeling that this government does not understand the word “consensus”, and that is what is sad.
I would like to start by talking about points that the NDP believes are a step in the right direction. I will then address the points where we disagree, or rather where we think improvements should be made.
In general, we support all the measures that are designed to create greater uniformity between the military and civilian justice systems.
A typical example is the question of the jurisdiction of the court. Sometimes, offences, or crimes, are committed in a military precinct. In that case, the military court will have jurisdiction, although the crime is in no way connected with the operational side of the job performed by a member of the military. Instead, the case should go before a civilian court, so the accused has the benefit of all the civilian protections guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
What are the points on which we think the government can do a better job in its reforms? There are three main points. There are the summary trial system, the Canadian Forces Grievance Board and the MPCC, which is the Military Police Complaints Commission.
Let us first talk about the summary trial aspect. This is a very important one, because, as we have heard in various speeches, 80% of military offences are dealt with by summary trial. The concern raised by my colleague from St. John's East in his work in committee is that, contrary to what happens in the civilian justice system, the proceedings in summary trials do not protect the rights of the accused adequately. He also introduced amendments to address this point.
As he pointed out, one of the general principles of natural justice lies in procedural fairness, and one of the things this means is the right to be tried by an impartial person. It will be agreed that in a summary trial, when a person is tried by their superiors, that is not the case.
Another interesting case and one which we should take as an example is the case of countries whose legal system comes from the common law, but that have had to change their legislation to achieve that well-known procedural fairness. The reason for it is that the European Court of Justice has ruled that military summary trials violated the European Convention on Human Rights. This is the case in the United Kingdom, a country that had to amend its legislation.
As was mentioned earlier, if Commonwealth countries, such as Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, have been able to make these legislative amendments, why should Canada still not be able to do so?
To end on this point, I would say that we cannot discuss summary trials without looking into the issue of criminal records. I will take a few minutes to speak about this particular issue.
One of our main concerns is that military personnel should not be treated less fairly than civilians are and that the treatment a soldier receives should not have unfair repercussions in his civilian life. Why? Because after a certain period, our military return to civilian life once again.
What we are concerned about is the direct link that currently exists between a summary trial in the military environment and the risk of a criminal record under the Criminal Records Act in the civilian world. It was mentioned earlier that a criminal record is becoming even more important in everyday life, not only in crossing a border, the case that first comes to mind, but also in looking for work. It is a good thing in itself, on condition that the process that led to the criminal record has been as rigorous and as fair in the military context as the equivalent in the civilian context.
One of the solutions to this issue could have been to provide that anyone found guilty in a military context during a summary trial may not have a criminal record in the civilian environment. Unfortunately, the solution was not accepted.
Let us take the example of being under the influence of a drug and behaving in a manner that is likely to discredit Her Majesty's service. This is a punishable offence in the military, while in civilian life, it is not even an offence.
We could look at the example of someone claiming to have an illness that they do not actually have. This can be punishable by life imprisonment in exceptional operational circumstances, for example, if it put the lives of other soldiers at risk. However, in the civilian world, this is not even punishable as a criminal offence.
These are practical examples that would result in a criminal record for a criminal act committed in the military world, but that would not have a consequence in the civilian world.
The second item that should be improved in this bill is the Canadian Forces Grievance Board.
At present, this board consists exclusively of retired members of the Canadian Forces. We would like to have more civilians on this board.
Initially, we even supported having only civilians on the board. My colleague from St. John's East introduced an amendment in that regard. During discussions in the previous Parliament, members of the committee had found a compromise solution whereby at least 60% of the members of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board would be civilians. That amendment was adopted by the committee. We wonder why the Conservatives deleted this particular provision from Bill C-15.
Another issue that was debated in detail during the meetings of the Standing Committee on National Defence was the Chief of the Defence Staff's authority to make financial decisions.
This has been a problem for many years and Justice Lamer asked that it be rectified in 2003. That was almost 10 years ago. This issue has been raised on a regular basis not only by the Canadian Forces ombudsman, but also by the chair of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board.
For the sake of clarity, I will try to explain what is meant by that. What we find unfair is that National Defence's Chief of Defence Staff does not have the authority to render a decision. He only has the authority to issue a notice that the applicant must use to try to get paid by National Defence. That is what we want to correct because we find it to be unfair.
Next, we would like the Military Police Complaints Commission, the MPCC, to become a real oversight body. I noticed that we have not talked very much about the MPCC during the various debates because we were focused on the summary trials, which are the most important aspect. However, I would like to provide a bit of historical background. The MPCC was established by the Parliament of Canada in the wake of the Somalia inquiry because MPs felt the need to strengthen civilian control over how the army operates.
We think that this reform is not ambitious enough and does not go far enough.
I would like to come back to the question that the hon. member for Edmonton Centre asked the hon. member for Abitibi—Témiscamingue as to why summary trials are not constitutional at this time.
If an individual is to be subject to penal consequences such as imprisonment...then he or she should be entitled to the highest procedural protection known to our law.
That was the ruling made by the Supreme Court. I do not know whether the hon. member for Edmonton Centre will have the opportunity to say more about this, but that is indeed why we are against summary trials.
In closing, I would like to say that, for all the reasons I have mentioned, the NDP will not be supporting Bill C-15 at second reading, not because we are opposed to most of the provisions in the bill, but because we cannot condone the government's strategy of deliberately ignoring the recommendations that had been made by parliamentarians during the previous sessions.
We are asking the government to amend its bill, in order to take into account the hundreds of hours of work done in the Standing Committee on National Defence during previous parliaments.
I have the honour to inform you that the Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General of Canada, signified royal assent by written declaration to the bills listed in the Schedule to this letter on the 29th day of November, 2011, at 4:15 p.m.
The schedule indicates the bills assented to on Tuesday, November 29, 2011, were Bill C-22, An Act to give effect to the Agreement between the Crees of Eeyou Istchee and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada concerning the Eeyou Marine Region, Chapter 20; Bill S-3, A third Act to harmonize federal law with the civil law of Quebec and to amend certain Acts in order to ensure that each language version takes into account the common law and the civil law, Chapter 21; and Bill C-16, An Act to amend the National Defence Act (military judges), Chapter 22.
Before we resume debate, I have the honour to inform the House that a message has been received from the Senate informing this House that the Senate has passed Bill C-16, An Act to amend the National Defence Act (military judges).
Well, let us go with another one. Just last week, or earlier this week, we agreed to go through all stages of Bill C-16, which deals with the judiciary within the military. Again, that was in part an initiative that came from us, at the request of the government initially.
There in fact progress has been made. To finish, the question really is, how rapidly do we run important bills through the House? It is way too fast.
That, notwithstanding any standing order or usual practices of this House, Bill C-16, An Act to amend the National Defence Act (military judges), be deemed concurred in at report stage and deemed read a third time and passed.
In accordance with its order of reference on Friday, November 4, the committee has considered Bill C-16, An Act to amend the National Defence Act (military judges), and agreed on Tuesday, November 15, to report it without amendment.
It is often pointed out to me that the way the wording has been done in French versus English in Bill C-15 is also quite deliberate. It's consistent with what we see in Bill C-16.
We have simply noticed, Colonel Gibson, that in the very brief Bill C-16, which only has two clauses, in proposed subsection 165.21(4), in the French translation.... Reading the English, it says, “A military judge may resign”. On the French side, it says, “Il peut démissionner”. In other words, the language “Le juge militaire” is left out for some reason. We will come back to this, no doubt, in the clause-by-clause, but would your professional view be that this is an oversight of translation?
There is a provision for a reserve for our military judges panel under Bill C-15. Of course, that is not part of the very narrowly focused provisions in Bill C-16 currently before the committee.
Honourable members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to briefly address you regarding Bill C-16, Security of Tenure of Military Judges Act.
I am pleased to be with you this morning as you begin your examination of this bill, which, as members will be aware, is a companion bill to the more comprehensive Bill C-15, which is currently at the debate stage of second reading.
Bill C-16 is specifically aimed at expeditiously and effectively responding to the recent judgment of the Court Martial Appeal Court in the case of R. v. LeBlanc regarding the constitutionality of the appointment and tenure of military judges.
Currently under section 165.21 of the National Defence Act, military judges must be officers and barristers or advocates of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province before they may be appointed by the Governor in Council. That section further provides that a military judge holds office during good behaviour for a term of five years; is removable for cause by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of an inquiry committee; and is eligible to be selected for renewal for a second or subsequent term on the recommendation of a renewal committee.
On June 2, 2011, the Court Martial Appeal Court delivered its judgment in the case of R. v. LeBlanc. In its decision the court determined that those portions of section 165.21 regarding the appointment and tenure of military judges do not sufficiently respect judicial independence as required by paragraph 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court specifically declared that subsections 165.21(2), 165.21(3), and 165.21(4) of the National Defence Act were constitutionally invalid and inoperative. However, it suspended the declaration of invalidity for a period of six months to allow Parliament to enact remedial legislation. The court's declaration, absent of such an enactment, will be effective on December 2, 2011.
This decision is consistent with the recommendations of the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer, the late former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, who submitted an independent review of the National Defence Act in 2003. Former Chief Justice Lamer found that while these current provisions were not unconstitutional, military judges should be awarded security of tenure until retirement, subject only to removal for cause on the recommendation of an inquiry committee.
Bill C-16 responds directly to the recommendations in the Lamer report and to the decision in R. v. LeBlanc. The proposed amendments will enhance security of tenure for military judges by providing that they serve until the retirement age of 60 years unless removed for cause on the recommendation of an inquiry committee or if the military judge resigns.
As mentioned earlier, Bill C-15, Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act, introduced at the same time as this bill, addresses the same security of tenure issues and proposes broader systemic changes. Coordinating amendments have been added to Bill C-15 to ensure that in the event both bills enter into force, it will be the provisions of Bill C-15 that take effect. Those provisions in this regard are identical to this bill.
I would be pleased to assist the committee by answering any questions you may have regarding Bill C-16.
As a witness this morning, for the first hour, we have Colonel Michael Gibson, Deputy Judge Advocate General--Military Justice.
Colonel, if you would please make your opening comments and give us background on the bill, we'd appreciate that.
As well, in his report there were many things in the recommendations the government could do without legislation, including increasing resources to the military justice system which apparently the government has failed to do in that intervening time period.
Why have there been these omissions of recommendations from the bill and why has the government not acted on those recommendations which do not require legislation?
I want to pay particular tribute to the three members I mentioned earlier. The member for St. John's East made a couple of remarks about the LeBlanc case which probably, if they were heard by members of the Canadian Forces, would have them regretting that he chose to pursue his legal career not in the Judge Advocate General's office but in civilian life. He clearly understands the importance of the system, the importance of a strong defence, the importance of independent judges and professionals at every level of the military justice system.
I thank the member for his clarity on the issues. I also thank his party and the Liberal Party for their constructive contribution to advancing these bills.
I rise now in support of Bill C-15 , the strengthening military justice in the defence of Canada bill, which concerns an important aspect of national defence, that of military justice in the broad sense.
Maintaining the integrity of the military justice system is the responsibility of government and should concern all Canadians. The military justice system is an essential tool to maintain the discipline, morale and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.
Without such a system, our men and women in uniform would not be able to focus on their number one priority which is to protect the interests of Canada and Canadians.
For that reason, the government, the Supreme Court of Canada and even the Constitution recognized the importance of maintaining a robust military justice system.
This government also recognizes, as did Chief Justice Lamer in his 2003 report, that there is room for improvement. The principles and procedures of military courts martial and summary trials must remain consistent with Canadian values and the evolution of Canadian criminal law. After all, a legal system can only remain strong if it evolves alongside the society it serves. Otherwise, an outdated system could risk undermining not only the legitimacy of military law, but also the health and vitality of the forces themselves.
This government has tried three times since 2006 to introduce the necessary legislation to do so, but each bill has failed to progress as a result of the unpredictable nature of a minority Parliament. I do not think it is worth going into the details again of those stories from previous Parliaments.
In 1998, when the National Defence Act was last updated, an independent review of the act every five years was made mandatory. In the first review, in 2003—the member for Richmond—Arthabaska was right to mention that it was some time ago—Chief Justice Lamer made several important recommendations about how to improve the act.
These recommendations focused on the administration of military justice, the role of the Canadian Forces provost marshal, the head of the military police, and the system by which grievances of Canadian Forces members were addressed. All of these recommendations were studied in detail, both inside and outside the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence. A wide range of stakeholders--civilian, military, government, non-government--were consulted and, as a result, this government brought forward legislation on two separate occasions to update the National Defence Act. Members know them well. They were Bill C-7 in 2006 and Bill C-45 in 2008, both of which, as we are aware, died on the order paper.
Then in 2008, the ruling of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada in the case of Regina v. Trépanier forced the government to introduce legislation on an urgent basis. In response, the government rapidly introduced a targeted bill, Bill C-60, to rectify this problem. Thanks to many hon. members still present, this legislation was passed by Parliament.
In 2010, the government once again tried to update the National Defence Act, this time by following up on recommendations from the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs as well as the latest recommendations from Chief Justice Lamer.
That bill, Bill C-41, was introduced during the final session of the 40th Parliament and was both studied and reported on by the Senate committee.
Some of the amendments that were submitted by the Bloc and discussed in committee were included in Bill C-41.
However, that bill died with the dissolution of Parliament in March. Since that time, we have had the Court Martial Appeal Court ruling, already discussed today, which assessed the process by which military judges were appointed, currently on a five-year basis, and we started to deal with that issue with Bill C-16. However, that bill does not address other important amendments included in Bill C-15, a bill that aims to reinforce military justice by bringing the National Defence Act up to date. This is an act that is evergreen, that requires constant updating, as many pieces of legislation do, on which the institutions of our country depend.
We have given careful consideration to the recommendations and proposed amendments put forward by members of the House, when Bill C-41 was studied in committee.
Bill C-15 would address various problems regarding military justice through a series of important amendments to the National Defence Act.
First, it would strengthen the administration of military justice by allowing for the appointment of part-time military judges to serve in times of large-scale operations and other search periods, thereby providing flexibility in the courts martial system. We hope this is not a provision that will be needed soon or often, but it needs to be there and it is a former chief justice of our country's Supreme Court who endorses that view.
In addition, it would lower the minimum rank requirement for the senior member of a court martial panel from colonel to lieutenant colonel in most cases and reduce the minimum rank of serving panel members on courts martial of non-commissioned members from warrant officer to sergeant. This fight simply widens the pool of those eligible to serve on these panels.
It would also allow for one more non-commissioned officer to serve on the panel when the accused is a non-commissioned member, as well as allow for increased participation of non-commissioned officers, without undermining the requirement for leadership and experience in the maintenance of discipline. It is the experience of non-commissioned members, as well as officers, on which this system depends.
This bill would clearly define the objectives, intent and principles of sentencing in the military justice system.
By articulating the purposes of military justice, we would be giving increased clarity and transparency to all those engaged in its delivery. This is perhaps the most exciting and compelling aspect of this bill. The National Defence Act had not previously articulated the purposes of military justice. They are implicit and known but now they would be explicit and this would provide Parliament's guidance to the military judges, officers and Court Martial Appeal Court justices presiding over courts martial, summary trials and appeals, just as Parliament has already done for the civilian criminal justice system in the Criminal Code. Of course, this guidance would expressly recognize the crucial elements unique to the military system necessary for it to fulfill its vital function.
The bill would also introduce a broader range of sentencing options to help ensure that the punishments handed down by courts martial or summary trials are appropriate, both in terms of being appropriate to the offence committed as well as being broadly comparable to the range and type of sentences available within the civilian criminal justice system. Criminal justice evolves. Military justice must reflect the best of the evolution of the civilian criminal system.
Bill C-15 would also improve how victims are treated by the military justice system. The bill includes the option of presenting victim impact statements before courts martial and would give military judges the authority to order restitution.
Victim impact statements are very important to the whole justice system, something that is recognized on the civilian side but which now needs to be enacted on the military side for us to continue to be as proud of and confident in that system as we have been to date.
The bill would set an additional limitation period for holding summary trials, requiring that charges be laid within six months of an alleged offence being committed, to accompany the existing requirement that the summary trial be held within one year of the alleged offence. And, Bill C-15 would legally empower the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada to suspend sentences handed down by courts martial where deemed appropriate.
In addition to resolving issues related to the administration of military justice, Bill C-15 would strengthen the military police system by officially establishing the position, duties and responsibilities of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, who is the military police chief, and by speeding up the military police complaint process and making it more fair.
The provost marshal, just to be clear, is not yet recognized officially in the National Defence Act. Mr. Justice Lamer recommended that he or she be so, and the position would be so under Bill C-15 when it is enacted.
With respect to addressing grievances in the Canadian Forces, Bill C-15 would permit the Chief of the Defence Staff to better delegate his power as the system's final grievance authority, thereby helping to resolve grievances more swiftly and efficiently in the interests of better administration and morale.
The bill would also formally change the name of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board, at its own request, to the military grievances external review committee to reflect the actual status of that committee. This would better reflect its independence and increase the confidence of Canadian Forces members in its impartiality.
Finally, this bill would improve the existing statutory requirement for a periodic independent review of selected provisions of the National Defence Act. It would clearly establish that requirement in the act itself, setting out both the scope of review and the mandate of review period which would be adjusted from five to seven years to ensure the quality and effectiveness of each independent review.
In conclusion, the government recognizes that the changes proposed in this bill are extensive and, in some cases, complex. However, it should be noted that, in most cases, the need for these changes has been recognized for years and most of the proposed changes have already been addressed and analyzed in committee.
Our men and women in uniform are counting on us. This government acknowledges that regular attention and review is necessary to ensure the continued relevance and effectiveness of any legal system, military or civilian, and through Bill C-15, we will ensure that this is the case for military justice in the years to come.
Canadians depend on their government to build and maintain a justice system that reflects our national values and respects the rule of law. This government has been given a strong mandate from Canadians to do that. The House has a mandate to act in this area as well. I therefore call on the House to support this important effort by moving this bill forward as quickly as possible.
It may seem to some of us in the House that the measures in the bill are distant or obscure. Not all of us have had direct contact with the military justice system, but we all understand that the roughly 100,000 Canadian men and women in uniform, regular force, reserve force, depend on these measures for their morale, for their discipline, for the framework of justice, action and order in which they operate in Canada, and which they take with them abroad when they are deployed as they have been so often in the history of this country.
We have a responsibility to them, eight years after the Lamer report, to move forward with these important measures. The measures in Bill C-15 go well beyond those provided for in Bill C-16, and will indeed supersede that of the bill we dealt with earlier today if that bill passes into law earlier.
We hope that we have the support of all members of the House in moving through an expeditious debate on the bill, efficient consideration at committee, and early implementation and enactment of the bill into law.

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