Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103231/united-states-vs-orito
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 13:00:15+00:00

Document:
Appellee was charged with knowingly transporting obscene material by common carrier in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462. The District Court granted his motion to dismiss, holding the statute unconstitutionally overbroad for failing to distinguish between public and nonpublic transportation. Appellee relies on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 .
Held: Congress has the power to prevent obscene material, which is not protected by the First Amendment, from entering the stream of commerce. The zone of privacy that Stanley protected does not extend beyond the home. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, ante p. 413 U. S. 123 ; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, p. 413 U. S. 49 . This case is remanded to the District Court for reconsideration of the sufficiency of the indictment in light of Miller v. California, ante, p. 413 U. S. 15 ; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, supra, and this opinion. Pp. 413 U. S. 141 -145.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 413 U. S. 145 . BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEWART and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 147 .
Although the District Court held the statute void on its face for overbreadth, it is not clear whether the statute was held to be overbroad because it covered transportation intended solely for the private use of the transporter, or because, regardless of the intended use of the material, the statute extended to "private carriage" or "nonpublic" transportation which, in itself, involved no risk of exposure to children or unwilling adults. The United States brought this direct appeal under former 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964 ed.) now amended, Pub.L. 91644, § 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890. See United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169 , 343 U. S. 171 (1952).
within the privacy and confines of the home, but may be prohibited in public. The Court has consistently rejected constitutional protection for obscene material outside the home. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, ante at 413 U. S. 126 -129; Miller v. California, ante at 413 U. S. 23 ; United States v. Reidel, supra, at 402 U. S. 354 -356 (opinion of WHITE, J.); id. at 402 U. S. 357 -360 (Harlan, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 484 -485 (1957).
could cause. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante at 413 U. S. 57 -63. See also United States v. Alpers, 338 U. S. 680 , 338 U. S. 681 -685 (1950); Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 , 267 U. S. 436 -437 (1925); Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325 , 239 U. S. 329 -330 (1915).
"The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 ; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506 , 300 U. S. 513 and cases cited."
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 , 312 U. S. 115 (1941).
As this case came to us on the District Court's summary dismissal of the indictment, no determination of the obscenity of the material involved has been made. Today, for the first time since Roth v. United States, supra, we have arrived at standards accepted by a majority of this Court for distinguishing obscene material, unprotected by the First Amendment, from protected free speech. See Miller v. California, ante at 413 U. S. 23 -25; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, ante at 413 U. S. 130 n. 7. The decision of the District Court is therefore vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration of the sufficiency of the indictment in light of Miller v. California, supra; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels, supra; and this opinion.
"These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us. He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases -- the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. "
The Solicitor General indicates that the tariffs of most, if not all, common carriers include a right of inspection. Resorting to common carriers, like entering a place of public accommodation, does not involve the privacies associated with the home. See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363 , 402 U. S. 376 (1971) (opinion of WHITE, J.); United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351 , 402 U. S. 359 -360 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 , 367 U. S. 551 -552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655, 657 (CA9 1970); United States v. Melvin, 419 F.2d 136, 139 (CA4 1969).
"Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other States from the State of origin. In doing this, it is merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field of interstate commerce. . . . In the Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 , it was held that Congress might pass a law punishing the transmission of lottery tickets from one State to another, in order to prevent the carriage of those tickets to be sold in other States and thus demoralize, through a spread of the gambling habit, individuals who were likely to purchase. . . . In Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 and Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 , the so-called White Slave Traffic Act, which was construed to punish any person engaged in enticing a woman from one State to another for immoral ends, whether for commercial purposes or otherwise, was valid because it was intended to prevent the use of interstate commerce to facilitate prostitution or concubinage, and other forms of immorality. . . . In Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325 , it was held that Congress had power to prohibit the importation of pictorial representations of prize fights designed for public exhibition, because of the demoralizing effect of such exhibitions in the State of destination."
Books v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 , 267 U. S. 436 -437 (1925).
Id. at 394 U. S. 565 .
the Federal Government's power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face. See my dissent in Miller v. California, ante, p. 413 U. S. 47 . I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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