Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/madam-justice-maisonville
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:55:07+00:00

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Adding to this site’s archives of judicial commentary on the boundaries of opening statements, reasons for judgement were released earlier this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that comments addressing the Plaintiff by his first name and further discussing his wife’s miscarriage crossed the line.
His wife is pregnant during this period of time. She’d like a little bit more support. He’s not able to give that to her. In July, Michael was supposed to do a number of things in anticipation of having some friends over, July of 2012, and at that point his wife was pregnant with her third child. He didn’t get around to doing it. Out of frustration, she did it herself. She did all the work he was supposed to do that day in addition to getting the house ready for a party that they were having. They were having some friends over. She started bleeding and two weeks later she has a miscarriage. Now, whether or not or what caused the miscarriage is not the point here. The point is that she blamed Michael for that, so you can see that’s an obvious point of tension.
 I find that in the circumstances of the comments as they were made yesterday, it would be impossible to dispel the chain of reasoning that the accident ultimately led to the miscarriage. To make a further comment would underscore that, and, as noted in the above cases, it would be impossible to effect a correction without drawing attention to the problem and refer to what is not going to be led in evidence.
 I do not find that this is the same as the circumstances in the cases Zhong v. Ao and Holman v. Martin, which were not jury trials. I do not find that the remarks are appropriate for an opening, and rather that they are inappropriate and inflammatory and appear designed to have evoked sympathy, and that it would be impossible to craft an instruction to the jury that would be able to dispel that possible sympathy to the jury. As noted, as well, that there were similar objections to references to the position of the defendant respecting liability which cause concern.
 The remarks in relation to the miscarriage were sufficient to cause this court grave concerns such that I am going to direct that the jury be discharged. While I find that those remarks are questionable, I am not going to comment on them in these reasons as it is not necessary for me to do so. I do note that the reference to the plaintiff by his first name is considered inappropriate and has been considered so by both the Ontario courts and by the Court of Appeal.
 In all of the circumstances, I order that the jury in this matter be discharged.
 I note that, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12, that counsel for the defendant submits that the matter can proceed judge alone. In the circumstances, I am going to order that the matter carry on as a judge alone trial.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for “mostly resolved” soft tissue injuries.
 I find in the present case that Mr. Vela has met the burden of proof with respect to injuries he sustained to his neck, upper back and trapezius area, and those to his left hand as well as the headaches that he suffered initially. I find that, with some exceptions, the pain had largely resolved within 15 months, with continuing improvement to where the plaintiff felt he was functioning at 75 per cent to 80 per cent by June 2011. He has now only occasional flare-ups. I consequently find the injuries to be more severe than submitted by defence counsel but far less severe than submitted by the plaintiff. I find the soft tissue injuries sustained by the plaintiff to be more akin to those sustained by a plaintiff in Hussainyar v. Miller, 2012 BCSC 405 where Allan J. awarded $27,000 in non-pecuniary damages where the injuries had largely resolved within one year but continued in part to trial, some 27 months after the accident. (See also Robinson v. Anderson,2009 BCSC 1450 $25,000 no permanent or long-term injury or pain Hsu v. Williams, 2011 BCSC 1412 $30,000 award before deduction for failure to mitigate.) An important principle is to be fair and reasonable to both parties (See Miller v. Lawlor, 2012 BCSC 387 para. 109 considering Andrews v. Grand v. Toy Alberta Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 229; Jackson v. Lai, 2007 BCSC 1023, para.134 and Kuskis). In all the circumstances, I award $27,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
In the latest judicial demonstration that the so-called Low Velocity Impact Defence is not the law, reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding damages following a motor vehicle collision.
 The damage to the vehicle was described by the assessing adjuster, with respect to the bumper, as a plastic face all warped, and a gross total damage of $927.31 was found including all taxes. Total labour costs were estimated to be $607.20.
 From the pictures that were put in evidence on the summary trial, the vehicle appeared to have sustained only minor damage, but again that does not mean that the plaintiff did not suffer genuine injuries, nor is it the case that with soft tissue injuries there is always a physical presentation that can be seen or felt. The pain remains real to the victim of the accident, and his credibility is not an issue on this application.
 In all of the circumstances, I find while the plaintiff’s injuries had largely resolved within one year and nine months, he has some ongoing complaints of pain, coupled with his inability to perform certain activities as a consequence of his fear of causing flare-ups to his lower back such as carrying heavy objects.
 Taking evidence as a whole, I find that the plaintiff has, on a balance of probability, proved he was injured from this accident for one year and nine months and that he presently has some minor complaints on occasion relating to his lower back and neck, but that these are not preventing the plaintiff from enjoying his pre-accident state of health and activity level.
For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts addressing ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact Policy.
Reasons for judgement were released earlier this month assessing damages for a knee injury caused in a 2007 collision.
In the recent case (Dulay v. Lachance) the Plaintiff was injured in a broadside collision. Fault for the crash was admitted by the offending motorist. The Plaintiff suffered from chronic knee pain and dysfunction following the crash. The trial focused largely on whether the collision was responsible for this.
Investigation following the collision revealed that the Plaintiff had pre-existing arthritis in his knee. As is often the case, this condition was asymptomatic prior to the crash.
 Dr. McLeod had described the contusion to the right medial femoral condyle and medial tibial plateau (very simply put – the area where the femur meets the lower leg bones) as mild, but as noted he separated this injury from the triggering of the arthritis as clarified in his second report. I accept his evidence on this point and find that his attribution of “mild” to the injury did not mean to incorporate the onset of symptoms of osteoarthritis.
 Dr. McLeod stated: “It is impossible to predict whether or not this right knee would have become symptomatic should this accident not have occurred.” I accept his evidence on that issue.
 The plaintiff asserts that his injuries arose from the accident. While it is true that he had osteoarthritis before the accident, the plaintiff’s position is that his condition was rendered symptomatic as a consequence of the accident.
It is also my opinion that, but for the motor vehicle accident in question, he would likely have remained pain free and symptom free (as far as the right knee is concerned) for many years to come, on balance of probability.
 I find Griffin J.’s reasoning apt here in Mr. Dulay’s case where he is nearing retirement and has lost the ability to function in a way that has altered how he lives.
Stoicism of the plaintiff should not reduce the award.
 In all the circumstances of the case I award the plaintiff $75,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
Further to my previous posts on this topic, if a lawyer accepts an ICBC offer without clear client instructions a binding settlement could be created leaving the remedy of a separate claim against the lawyer in negligence. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with this area of the law.
In last week’s case (Ng v. Schell) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 motor vehicle collision. She retained a lawyer who allegedly entered into a settlement agreement for $95,000 plus taxable costs and disbursements. The client apparently did not give instructions to accept such an offer.
4. there was an issue to be tried as to whether there was such a limitation, misapprehension, fraud or collusion in relation to the settlement.
17 Solicitors, of course, are agents of their clients in accordance with the terms of their retainers; and when retained to conduct litigation have the authority to compromise and settle an action brought for a client.
 It is settled law that a solicitor has authority to enter into settlement agreements as agent for the client in such circumstances and that if there is any restriction on that authority, notice must be given to the other side of such a want of authority. Otherwise, in the absence of the other side being aware the authority was limited or restricted, the opposing side is entitled to rely upon the authority to settle. The only exceptions, accordingly, in a situation where there appears to be authority to settle are the above exceptions from Hawitt.
As a practical matter these types of disputes can be avoided if settlement instructions are provided in writing, or, better yet, by clearly communicating in the course of negotiations that binding settlement will be made subject to clients confirming instructions evidenced by a signed full and final release.
Rule 6-1 deals with amendments to BC Supreme Court pleadings. Unless the opposing parties consent, once a trial date is set pleadings can only be amended with permission from the Court. Authorities under the former Rules of Court established a very low threshold for obtaining a Court’s permission. The first case I’m aware of dealing with this issue under the New Rules was released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that the law remains unchanged.
 The rationale for allowing amendments is to enable the real issues to be determined. The practice followed in civil matters when amendments are sought fulfills the fundamental objective of the Civil Rules which is to ensure the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on the merits”. (See also McLachlin and Taylor, in British Columbia Practice, 2d ed. looseleaf (Butterworths, 1991) pages 24-1 to 24-2-10, and the decision of this Court in Chavez v. Sundance Cruises Corp. (1993), 15 C.P.C. (3d) 305, 309-10).

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