Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/425/391/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:13:04+00:00

Document:
In each of these cases taxpayers, who were under investigation for possible civil or criminal liability under the federal income tax laws, after having obtained from their respective accountants certain documents relating to the accountants' preparation of their tax returns, transferred the documents to their respective attorneys to assist the taxpayers in connection with the investigations. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service served summonses on the attorneys directing them to produce the documents, but the attorneys refused to comply. The Government then brought enforcement actions, and, in each case, the District Court ordered the summons enforced. In No. 74-18 the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the taxpayers had never acquired a possessory interest in the documents and that the documents were not immune from production in the attorney's hands. But in No. 74-611, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, by virtue of the Fifth Amendment, the documents would have been privileged from production pursuant to a summons directed to the taxpayer if he had retained possession, and that, in light of the attorney-client relationship, the taxpayer retained such privilege after transferring the documents to his attorney.
compel him to be a "witness" against himself, and the fact that the attorneys are agents of the taxpayers does not change this result. Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322. Pp. 425 U. S. 396-398.
(b) These cases do not present a situation where constructive possession of the documents in question is so clear or relinquishment of possession so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion upon the taxpayer substantially intact, since the documents sought were obtainable without personal compulsion upon the taxpayers. Couch, supra. P. 425 U. S. 398.
(c) The taxpayers, by transferring the documents to their attorneys, did not lose any Fifth Amendment privilege they ever had not to be compelled to testify against themselves and not to be compelled themselves to produce private papers in their possession, and this personal privilege was in no way decreased by the transfer. Pp. 425 U. S. 398-399.
(d) Even though the taxpayers, after transferring the documents to their attorneys, may have had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the documents, the Fifth Amendment does not protect private information obtained without compelling self-incriminating testimony. Pp. 425 U. S. 399-401.
2. Although the attorney-client privilege applies to documents in the hands of an attorney which would have been privileged in the hands of the client by reason of the Fifth Amendment, the taxpayer-clients in these cases would not be protected by that Amendment from producing the documents in question, because production of such documents involves no incriminating testimony, and therefore the documents in the hands of the taxpayers' attorneys were not immune from production. Pp. 425 U. S. 402-414.
(a) The Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence, but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating. P. 425 U. S. 408.
(b) Here, however incriminating the contents of the accountants' workpapers might be, the act of producing them -- the only thing that the taxpayers are compelled to do -- would not, itself, involve testimonial self-incrimination, and implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the papers does not rise to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 425 U. S. 409-414.
No. 74-18, 500 F.2d 683, affirmed; No. 74-611, 499 F.2d 444, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., post, p. 425 U. S. 414, and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 425 U. S. 430, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
In these two cases, we are called upon to decide whether a summons directing an attorney to produce documents delivered to him by his client in connection with the attorney-client relationship is enforceable over claims that the documents were constitutionally immune from summons in the hands of the client and retained that immunity in the hands of the attorney.
with an investigation of possible civil or criminal liability under the federal income tax laws. Shortly after the interviews -- one day later in No. 74-611 and a week or two later in No. 74-18 -- the taxpayers obtained from their respective accountants certain documents relating to the preparation by the accountants of their tax returns. Shortly after obtaining the documents -- later the same day in No. 74-611 and a few weeks later in No. 74-18 -- the taxpayers transferred the documents to their lawyers -- respondent Kasmir and petitioner Fisher, respectively -- each of whom was retained to assist the taxpayer in connection with the investigation. Upon learning of the whereabouts of the documents, the Internal Revenue Service served summonses on the attorneys directing them to produce documents listed therein. In No. 74-611, the documents were described as "the following records of Tannebaum Bindler & Lewis [the accounting firm]."
"1. Accountant's work papers pertaining to Dr. E. J. Mason's books and records of 1969, 1970 and 1971. [Footnote 2]"
"2. Retained copies of E. J. Mason's income tax returns for 1969, 1970 and 1971."
In No. 74-18, the documents demanded were analyses by the accountant of the taxpayers' income and expenses which had been copied by the accountant from the taxpayers' canceled checks and deposit receipts. [Footnote 3] In No.
74-611, a summons was also served on the accountant directing him to appear and testify concerning the documents to be produced by the lawyer. In each case, the lawyer declined to comply with the summons directing production of the documents, and enforcement actions were commenced by the Government under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a). In No. 74-611, the attorney raised in defense of the enforcement action the taxpayer's accountant-client privilege, his attorney-client privilege, and his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. In No. 74-18, the attorney claimed that enforcement would involve compulsory self-incrimination of the taxpayers in violation of their Fifth Amendment privilege, would involve a seizure of the papers without necessary compliance with the Fourth Amendment, and would violate the taxpayers' right to communicate in confidence with their attorney. In No. 74-18 the taxpayers intervened and made similar claims.
"a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the materials he placed in his attorney's custody, that he retained constructive possession of the evidence, and thus . . . retained Fifth Amendment protection. [Footnote 4]"
Id. at 453. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict created. 420 U.S. 906 (1975). Because, in our view, the documents were not privileged either in the hands of the lawyers or of their clients, we affirm the judgment of the Third Circuit in No. 74-18 and reverse the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in No. 74-611.
All of the parties in these cases and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have concurred in the proposition that, if the Fifth Amendment would have excused a taxpayer from turning over the accountant's papers had he possessed them, the attorney to whom they are delivered for the purpose of obtaining legal advice should also be immune from subpoena. Although we agree with this proposition for the reasons set forth in 425 U. S. infra we are convinced that, under our decision in Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 (1973), it is not the taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege that would excuse the attorney from production.
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
The taxpayer's privilege under this Amendment is not violated by enforcement of the summonses involved in these cases because enforcement against a taxpayer's lawyer would not "compel" the taxpayer to do anything -- and certainly would not compel him to be a "witness" against himself. The Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of "physical or moral compulsion" exerted on the person asserting the privilege, Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7, 247 U. S. 15 (1918); Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457, 228 U. S. 458 (1913); Couch v. United States, supra at 409 U. S. 328, 409 U. S. 336. See also Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 218 U. S. 252-253 (1910); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 765 (1966); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 256 U. S. 476 (1921); California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 416 U. S. 55 (1974). In Couch v. United States, supra, we recently ruled that the Fifth Amendment rights of a taxpayer were not violated by the enforcement of a documentary summons directed to her accountant and requiring production of the taxpayer's own records in the possession of the accountant. We did so on the ground that, in such a case, "the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused is lacking." 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 329.
"was never intended to permit [a person] to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person. . . . [T]he Amendment is limited to a person who shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
(Emphasis in original.) "It is extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense of justice." Couch v. United States, supra at 409 U. S. 328. Agent or no, the lawyer is not the taxpayer. The taxpayer is the "accused," and nothing is being extorted from him.
Nor is this one of those situations, which Couch suggested might exist, where constructive possession is so clear or relinquishment of possession so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion upon the taxpayer substantially intact. 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 333. In this respect, we see no difference between the delivery to the attorneys in these cases and delivery to the accountant in the Couch case. As was true in Couch, the documents sought were obtainable without personal compulsion on the accused.
reason of the transfer of the documents to the attorneys, those papers may be subpoenaed without compulsion on the taxpayer. The protection of the Fifth Amendment is therefore not available. "A party is privileged from producing evidence, but not from its production." Johnson v. United States, supra at 228 U. S. 458.
The proposition that the Fifth Amendment protects private information obtained without compelling self-incriminating testimony is contrary to the clear statements of this Court that, under appropriate safeguards private incriminating statements of an accused may be overheard and used in evidence if they are not compelled at the time they were uttered, Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 354 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 385 U. S. 329-330 (1966); and Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 388 U. S. 57 (1967); cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 385 U. S. 304 (1966); and that disclosure of private information may be compelled if immunity removes the risk of incrimination. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). If the Fifth Amendment protected generally against the obtaining of private information from a man's mouth or pen or house, its protections would presumably not be lifted by probable cause and a warrant or by immunity. The privacy invasion is not mitigated by immunity; and the Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's, are not removed by showing reasonableness. The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment. They struck a balance so that, when the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue. They did not seek in still another Amendment -- the Fifth -- to achieve a general protection of privacy, but to deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination.
We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy -- a word not mentioned in its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to the view that the Fifth Amendment protects against "compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information." United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 422 U. S. 233 n. 7 (1975).
to obtain more informed legal advice. Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74, 227 U. S. 79-80 (1913); 8 Wigmore § 2307, and cases there cited; McCormick § 90, p. 185; Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (CA5 1953); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Reed, 208 Ala. 457, 94 So. 910 (1922); Andrews v. Mississippi R. Co., 14 Ind. 169, 98 N.E. 49 (1860); Palatini v. Sarian, 15 N.J.Super. 34, 83 A.2d 24 (1951); Pearson v. Yoder, 39 Okla. 105, 134 P. 421 (1913); State ex rel Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash.2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). The purpose of the privilege requires no broader rule. Pre-existing documents obtainable from the client are not appreciably easier to obtain from the attorney after transfer to him. Thus, even absent the attorney-client privilege, clients will not be discouraged from disclosing the documents to the attorney, and their ability to obtain informed legal advice will remain unfettered. It is otherwise if the documents are not obtainable by subpoena duces tecum or summons while in the exclusive possession of the client, for the client will then be reluctant to transfer possession to the lawyer unless the documents are also privileged in the latter's hands. Where the transfer is made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the purposes of the attorney-client privilege would be defeated unless the privilege is applicable.
"It follows, then, that, when the client himself would be privileged from production of the document, either as a party at common law . . . or as exempt from self-incrimination, the attorney having possession of the document is not bound to produce."
in No. 74-18 and respondents in No 74-611, and was conceded by the Government in its brief and at oral argument. Where the transfer to the attorney is for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, we agree with it.
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."
Id. at 116 U. S. 634-635. Admitting the partnership invoice into evidence had violated both the Fifth and Fourth Amendments.
"[t]here is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized. . . ."
Gouled v. United States, supra at 255 U. S. 309. Private papers taken from the taxpayer, like other "mere evidence," could not be used against the accused over his Fourth and Fifth Amendment objections.
inconsistent with Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 (1966); and Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), approving the seizure under appropriate circumstances of conversations of a person suspected of crime. See also Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927).
It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence, but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating. We have, accordingly, declined to extend the protection of the privilege to the giving of blood samples, Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 763-764 (1966); [Footnote 10] to the giving of handwriting exemplars, Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 388 U. S. 265-267 (1967); voice exemplars, United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 388 U. S. 222-223 (1967); or the donning of a blouse worn by the perpetrator, Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910). Furthermore, despite Boyd, neither a partnership nor the individual partners are shielded from compelled production of partnership records on self-incrimination grounds. Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974). It would appear that, under that case, the precise claim sustained in Boyd would now be rejected for reasons not there considered.
(1944); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 587-588; Schmerber, supra at 384 U. S. 763-764; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 330; Bellis v. United States, supra at 417 U. S. 87. To the extent, however, that the rule against compelling production of private papers rested on the proposition that seizures of or subpoenas for "mere evidence," including documents, violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore also transgressed the Fifth, Gouled v. United States, supra, the foundations for the rule have been washed away. In consequence, the prohibition against forcing the production of private papers has long been a rule searching for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment against compelling a person to give "testimony" that incriminates him. Accordingly, we turn to the question of what, if any, incriminating testimony within the Fifth Amendment's protection, is compelled by a documentary summons.
testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers or of anyone else. [Footnote 11] The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to produce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else.
contents of the accountant's workpapers might be, the act of producing them -- the only thing which the taxpayer is compelled to do -- would not itself involve testimonial self-incrimination.
It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the papers rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The papers belong to the accountant, were prepared by him, and are the kind usually prepared by an accountant working on the tax returns of his client. Surely the Government is in no way relying on the "truthtelling" of the taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to the documents. 8 Wigmore § 2264, p. 380. The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion, and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he, in fact, has the papers. Under these circumstances, by enforcement of the summons, "no constitutional rights are touched. The question is not of testimony, but of surrender." In re Harris, 221 U. S. 274, 221 U. S. 279 (1911).
hands of their possessor. E.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911); Dreier v. United States, 221 U. S. 394 (191 (1); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944); Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974); In re Harris, supra. The existence and possession or control of the subpoenaed documents being no more in issue here than in the above cases, the summons is equally enforceable.
Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his "private papers," see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 634-635. We do hold that compliance with a summons directing the taxpayer to produce the accountant's documents involved in these cases would involve no incriminating testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
* Together with No. 7611, United States et al. v. Kasmir et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In No. 74-18, the taxpayers are husband and wife who filed a joint return. In No. 74-611, the taxpayer filed an individual return.
The "books and records" concerned the taxpayer's large medical practice.
The husband taxpayers checks and deposit receipts related to his textile waste business. The wife's related to her women's wear shop.
The respondents in No. 74-611 did not, in terms, rely on the attorney-client privilege or the Fourth Amendment before the Court of Appeals.
There is a line of cases in which the Court stated that the Fifth Amendment was offended by the use in evidence of documents or property seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 255 U. S. 306 (1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S. 33-34 (1925); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 285 U. S. 466-467 (1932); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 367 U. S. 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). But the Court purported to find elements of compulsion in such situations.
"In either case, he is the unwilling source of the evidence, and the Fifth Amendment forbids that he shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case."
Gouled v. United States, supra at 255 U. S. 306. In any event, the predicate for those cases, lacking here, was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 256 U. S. 475-476 (1921).
In Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 (1973), on which taxpayers rely for their claim that the Fifth Amendment protects their "legitimate expectation of privacy," the Court differentiated between the things protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
"We hold today that no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can prevail where, as in this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the accused."
Id. at 409 U. S. 336.
The taxpayers and their attorneys have not raised arguments of a Fourth Amendment nature before this Court, and could not be successful if they had. The summonses are narrowly drawn and seek only documents of unquestionable relevance to the tax investigation. Special problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a personal diary, United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 897 (CA2 1969) (Friendly, J.), are not involved here.
Federal Rule Evid. 501, effective January 2, 1975, provides that with respect to privileges the United States district court "shall be governed by the principles of the common law . . . interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience." Thus, whether or not Rule 501 applies to this case, the attorney-client privilege issue is governed by the principles and authorities discussed and cited infra. Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 26.
In No. 74 -611, the taxpayer did not intervene, and his rights have been asserted only through his lawyer. The parties disagree on the question whether an attorney may claim the Fifth Amendment privilege of his client. We need not resolve this question. The only privilege of the taxpayer involved here is the attorney-client privilege, and it is universally accepted that the attorney-client privilege may be raised by the attorney, C. McCormick, Evidence § 92, p. 193, § 94, p. 197 (2d ed.1972) (hereinafter McCormick); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (CA2 1967); Boschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (CA8 1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (CA2 1962); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (CA8), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812 (CA9 1942).
Citing to Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 302-303, reserved the question "whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure."
"Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds."
384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 765.
The fact that the documents may have been written by the person asserting the privilege is insufficient to trigger the privilege, Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 221 U. S. 378 (1911). And, unless the Government has compelled the subpoenaed person to write the document, cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968), the fact that it was written by him is not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue. Conversations may be seized and introduced in evidence under proper safeguards, Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 (1966); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d at 897 n. 9, if not compelled. In the case of a documentary subpoena the only thing compelled is the act of producing the document and the compelled act is the same as the one performed when a chattel or document not authored by the producer is demanded. McCormick § 128, p. 269.
The "implicit authentication" rationale appears to be the prevailing justification for the Fifth Amendment's application to documentary subpoenas. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 763-764 ("the privilege reaches . . . the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616"); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 344, 346 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (the person complying with the subpoena "implicitly testifies that the evidence he brings forth is, in fact, the evidence demanded"); United States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267, 270 (CA2 1975) (Friendly, J.) ("[a] subpoena demanding that an accused produce his own records is . . . the equivalent of requiring him to take the stand and admit their genuineness"), cert. pending, Nos. 75407, 75-700; 8 Wigmore § 2264, p. 380 (the testimonial component involved in compliance with an order for production of documents or chattels "is the witness' assurance, compelled as an incident of the process, that the articles produced are the ones demanded"); McCormick § 126, p. 268 ("[t]his rule [applying the Fifth Amendment privilege to documentary subpoenas] is defended on the theory that one who produces documents (or other matter) described in the subpoena duces tecum represents, by his production, that the documents produced are, in fact, the documents described in the subpoena"); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 27, 150 N.E. 585, 590 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("A defendant is protected from producing his documents in response to a subpoena duces tecum, for his production of them in court would be his voucher of their genuineness.' There would then be `testimonial compulsion'").
In seeking the accountant's "retained copies" of correspondence with the taxpayer in No. 74-611, we assume that the summons sought only "copies" of original letters sent from the accountant to the taxpayer -- the truth of the contents of which could be testified to only by the accountant.
In these cases, compliance with the subpoena is required even though the books have been kept by the person subpoenaed and his producing them would itself be sufficient authentication to permit their introduction against him.
"[w]hether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'private papers.'"
Ante at 425 U. S. 414. This implication that the privilege might not protect against compelled production of tax records that are his "private papers" is so contrary to settled constitutional jurisprudence that this and other like implications throughout the opinion [Footnote 2/1] prompt me to conjecture that, once again the Court is laying the groundwork for future decisions that will tell us that the question here formally reserved was actually answered against the availability of the privilege. Semble, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507 (1976). It is therefore appropriate to recall that history and this Court have construed the constitutional privilege to safeguard against governmental intrusions of personal privacy to compel either self-incriminating oral statements or the production of self-incriminating evidence recorded in one's private books and papers. Although, as phrased in the Fifth Amendment -- "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" -- the privilege makes no express reference, as does the Fourth Amendment, to "papers, and effects," private papers have long been held to have the protection of the privilege, designed as it is "to maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy." Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 322 U. S. 490 (1944).
"our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.'"
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 378 U. S. 55 (1964). "It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." Couch v. United States, supra at 409 U. S. 327. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 382 U. S. 416 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 384 U. S. 460 (1966).
"The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 381 U. S. 484 (1965). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 350 n. 5 (1967).
"[w]ithin the limits imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves privacy interests,"
"Court has always construed provisions of the Constitution having regard to the principles upon which it was established. The direct operation or literal meaning of the words used do not measure the purpose or scope of its provisions. . . ."
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 285 U. S. 467 (1932).
"It has been repeatedly decided that [the Fifth Amendment] should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by [it], by imperceptible practice of courts or by well intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers."
That the privilege does not protect against the production of private information where there is no compulsion, or where immunity is granted, or where there is no threat of incrimination in nowise supports the Court's argument demeaning the privilege's protection of privacy. The unavailability of the privilege in those cases only evidences that, as is the case with the First and Fourth Amendments, the protection of privacy afforded by the privilege is not absolute. The critical question then is the definition of the scope of privacy that is sheltered by the privilege.
"The right was originally a 'right of silence' . . . only in the sense that legal process could not force incriminating statements from the defendant's own lips. Beginning in the early eighteenth century, the English courts widened that right to include protection against the necessity of producing books and documents that might tend to incriminate the accused. . . . Lord Mansfield summed up the law by declaring that the defendant, in a criminal case, could not be compelled to produce any incriminating documentary evidence 'though he should hold it in his hands in Court.'"
"that the privilege protects an accused . . . from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. . . ."
own testimony or personal records." United States v. White, supra at 322 U. S. 701 (emphasis supplied).
that papers are not "testimonial," and thus producible because they contain no declarations. And while it may be that the unavailability of the privilege depends on a showing that "the preparation of all of the papers sought in these cases was wholly voluntary," ibid., again it does not follow that the protection is necessarily unavailable if the papers were prepared voluntarily, for it is the compelled production of testimonial evidence, not just the compelled creation of such evidence, against which the privilege protects.
"[t]he taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to produce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else."
Ante at 425 U. S. 410 (emphasis supplied). For it is not enough that the production of a writing, or books and papers, is compelled. Unless those materials are such as to come within the zone of privacy recognized by the Amendment, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does not protect against their production.
"[T]hey are of a character which subjects them to the scrutiny demanded. . . . This was clearly implied in the Boyd case, where the fact that the papers involved were the private papers of the claimant was constantly emphasized. Thus, in the case of public records and official documents, made or kept in the administration of public office, the fact of actual possession or of lawful custody would not justify the officer in resisting inspection, even though the record was made by himself and would supply the evidence of his criminal dereliction."
Id. at 221 U. S. 380 (emphasis in original).
Couch v. United States expressly held that the Fifth Amendment protected against the compelled production of testimonial evidence only if the individual resisting production had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the evidence. 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 336. Couch relied on Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S.
7 (1918), where the Court permitted the use against the defendant of documentary evidence belonging to him because "there was a voluntary exposition of the articles," rather than "an invasion of the defendant's privacy." Id. at 247 U. S. 14. Under Couch, therefore, one criterion is whether or not the information sought to be produced has been disclosed to, or was within the knowledge of, a third party. 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 332-333. That is to say, one relevant consideration is the degree to which the paper holder has sought to keep private the contents of the papers he desires not to produce.
"It has long been established . . . that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony. . . . The privilege applies to the business records of the sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents containing more intimate information about the individual's private life."
"decisions holding the privilege inapplicable to the records of a collective entity also reflect . . . the protection of an individual's right to a 'private enclave where he may lead a private life.' . . . Protection of individual privacy was the major theme running through the Court's decision in Boyd,. . . and it was on this basis that the Court in Wilson distinguished the corporate records involved in that case from the private papers at issue in Boyd."
A precise cataloguing of private papers within the ambit of the privacy protected by the privilege is probably impossible. Some papers, however, do lend themselves to classification. See generally Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considerations, 6 Loyola (LA) L.Rev. 274, 300-303 (1973). Production of documentary materials created or authenticated by a State or the Federal Government, such as automobile registrations or property deeds, would seem ordinarily to fall outside the protection of the privilege. They hardly reflect an extension of the person.
not the more intimate aspects of one's life. Where the privilege would have protected one's mental notes of his business affairs in a less complicated day and age, it would seem that that protection should not fall away because the complexities of another time compel one to keep business records. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nonbusiness economic records in the possession of an individual, such as canceled checks or tax records, would also seem to be protected. They may provide clear insights into a person's total lifestyle. They are, however, like business records and the papers involved in these cases, frequently, though not always, disclosed to other parties; and disclosure, in proper cases, may foreclose reliance upon the privilege. Personal letters constitute an integral aspect of a person's private enclave. And while letters, being necessarily interpersonal, are not wholly private, their peculiarly private nature and the generally narrow extent of their disclosure would seem to render them within the scope of the privilege. Papers in the nature of a personal diary are a fortiori protected under the privilege.
the appellant himself wrote, or signed, the [documents], neither conditioned nor enlarged his privilege. Where one's private documents would tend to incriminate him, the privilege exists although they were actually written by another person. [Footnote 2/8]"
Thus, although "[t]he fact that the documents may have been written by the person asserting the privilege is insufficient to trigger the privilege," ante at 425 U. S. 410 n. 11, and "the fact that it was written by him is not controlling . . . ," ibid., this is not to say that the privilege is available only as to documents written by him. For the reasons I have stated at the outset, however, I do not believe that the evidence involved in these cases falls within the scope of privacy protected by the Fifth Amendment.
I also question the Court's treatment of the question whether the act of producing evidence is "testimonial." I agree that the act of production implicitly admits the existence of the evidence requested and possession or control of that evidence by the party producing it. It also implicitly authenticates the evidence as that identified in the order to compel. I disagree, however, that implicit admission of the existence and possession or control of the papers in this case is not "testimonial" merely because the Government could readily have otherwise proved existence and possession or control in these cases.
I know of no Fifth Amendment principle which makes the testimonial nature of evidence and, therefore, one's protection against incriminating himself, turn on the strength of the Government's case against him.
For example, the Court's notation that "[s]pecial problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a diary . . . are not involved here," ante at 425 U. S. 401 n. 7, is only made in the context of discussion of the Fourth Amendment, and thus may readily imply that even a subpoena of a personal diary containing forthright confessions of crime may not be resisted on grounds of the privilege.
"The privilege against self-incrimination is a specific provision of which it is peculiarly true that a page of history is worth a volume of logic.'" Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 350 U. S. 438 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.). "The previous history of the light, both in England and America, proves that it was not bound by rigid definition." L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 428 (1968).
"Some tests seemingly directed to obtain 'physical evidence,' for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment. Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the privilege 'is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.' . . ."
"The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted."
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 267 U. S. 108-109 (1925). But, "the common law rule invoked shall be one not rejected by our ancestors as unsuited to their civil or political conditions." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 249 (1936). Without a doubt, the common law privilege against self-incrimination in England extended to protection against the production of incriminating personal papers prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Roe v. Harvey, 98 Eng.Rep. 302, 305 (K.B. 1769); King v. Heydon, 96 Eng.Rep. 195 (K.B. 1762); King v. Purnell, 95 Eng.Rep. 595, 597 (K.B. 1748); King v. Cornelius, 93 Eng.Rep. 1133, 1134 (K.B. 1744); Queen v. Mead, 92 Eng Rep. 119 (K.B. 1703); King v. Worsenham, 91 Eng.Rep. 1370 (K.B. 1701). The significance of this English development on the construction of our Constitution is not in any way diminished by this country's experience with the privilege prior to the Constitution's adoption. See Levy, supra, n. 2, at 368-404.
"And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom."
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 631-632.
"a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure -- and an unreasonable search and seizure -- within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,"
"the rule against compelling production of private papers rested on the proposition that seizures of or subpoenas for 'mere evidence,' including documents, violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore also transgressed the Fifth."
Ante at 425 U. S. 409. The relation of the Fourth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment violation in United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925); and Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921), was merely that the illegal searches and seizures in those cases were held to establish the element of compulsion essential to a Fifth Amendment violation. See ante at 425 U. S. 399-400, n. 5. Even if the Fourth Amendment violations were now held not to establish the element of Fifth Amendment compulsion, it, of course, would not follow that the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled production of incriminating private papers is lost.
"The items of clothing involved in this case are not 'testimonial' or 'communicative' in nature, and their introduction therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. . . . This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure."
387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 302-303. That observation was plainly addressed not to application of the Fourth Amendment, but to application of the Fifth.
Contrary to the Court's intimations, ante at 425 U. S. 407-408, neither Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 (1966); nor Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), all involving the Fourth Amendment, lends support to an argument that the Fifth Amendment would not protect the seizure of the private papers of a person suspected of crime. Fifth Amendment challenges to the seizure and use of private papers were not involved in those cases.
The grudging scope the Court today gives the privilege against self-incrimination is made evident by its observation that, "[i]n the case of a documentary subpoena, the only thing compelled is the act of producing the document. . . ." Ante at 425 U. S. 410 n. 11. Obviously disclosure or production of testimonial evidence is also compelled, and the heart of the protection of the privilege is in its safeguarding against compelled disclosure or production of that evidence.
With respect to a partnership invoice, it thus seems fair to say, as the Court does, ante at 425 U. S. 408, "that, under [Bellis], the precise claim sustained in Boyd would now be rejected for reasons not there considered." Bellis, however, took care to point out: "We do not believe the Court in Boyd can be said to have decided the issue presented today," 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 95 n. 2, thereby leaving unaltered Boyd's more general or "imprecise" holding protecting against the compelled production of private papers.
Similarly, United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225 (1975), held that the Fifth Amendment did not bar production of a defense investigator's summaries of interviews with witnesses. The Court carefully noted, however, that there was no indication that the summaries contained any information conveyed by the defendant to the investigator. Id. at 422 U. S. 234.
"assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or officers, and they are bound by its obligations."
United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 322 U. S. 699 (1944).
"In view of the inescapable fact that an artificial entity can only act to produce its records through its individual officers or agents, recognition of the individual's claim of privilege with respect to the financial records of the organization would substantially undermine the unchallenged rule that the organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth Amendment privilege, and largely frustrate legitimate governmental regulation of such organizations."
"[t]he custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a subpoena duces tecum is itself a representation that the documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena."
The Court in Curcio, however, apparently did not note any self-incrimination problem because of the undertaking by the custodian with respect to the documents. (One charged with failure to comply with an order to produce, however, may not thereafter be compelled to testify as to the existence or his control of the documents. See Curcio v. United States, supra.) In the present cases, of course, the taxpayers are not representatives of any artificial entity, and have not undertaken any obligation with respect to that entity or its documents. They have stipulated, however, that the documents involved here exist, and are those described in the subpoenas, thereby obviating any problem as to self-incrimination in these cases resulting from the act of production itself.
forms, been discussed by commentators for some time; nonetheless, as I noted a few years ago, the theory "has an odd sound to it." Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 409 U. S. 348 (1973) (dissenting). The Fifth Amendment basis for resisting production of a document pursuant to subpoena, the Court tells us today, lies not in the document's contents, as we previously have suggested, but in the tacit verification inherent in the act of production itself that the document exists, is in the possession of the producer, and is the one sought by the subpoena.
This technical and somewhat esoteric focus on the testimonial elements of production, rather than on the content of the evidence the investigator seeks, is, as MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN demonstrates, contrary to the history and traditions of the privilege against self-incrimination both in this country and in England, where the privilege originated. A long line of precedents in this Court, whose rationales, if not holdings, are overturned by the Court today, support the notion that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's . . . private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime" compels him to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 630 (1886). See also Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85, 417 U. S. 87 (1974); Couch v. United States, supra at 409 U. S. 330; Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 763-764 (1966); Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 328 U. S. 587-588 (1946); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 322 U. S. 698-699 (1944); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478, 226 U. S. 489 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 221 U. S. 377 (1911).
are certain documents no person ought to be compelled to produce at the Government's request. While I welcome the Court's attempt to provide a rationale for this longstanding rule, it is incumbent upon the Court, I believe, to fashion its theory so as to protect those documents that have always stood at the core of the Court's concern. Thus, I would have preferred it had the Court found some room in its theory for recognition of the import of the contents of the documents themselves. See Couch v. United States, supra at 409 U. S. 350 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, I am hopeful that the Court's new theory, properly understood and applied, will provide substantially the same protection as our prior focus on the contents of the documents. The Court recognizes, as others have argued, that the act of production can verify the authenticity of the documents produced. See, e.g., United States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267 (CA2 1975), cert. pending, Nos. 75-407, 75-700. But the promise of the Court's theory lies in its innovative discernment that production may also verify the documents' very existence and present possession by the producer. This expanded recognition of the kinds of testimony inherent in production not only rationalizes the cases, but seems to me to afford almost complete protection against compulsory production of our most private papers.
Thus, the Court's rationale provides a persuasive basis for distinguishing between the corporate document cases and those involving the papers of private citizens. Since the existence of corporate record books is seldom in doubt, the verification of their existence, inherent in their production, may fairly be termed not testimonial at all. On the other hand, there is little reason to assume the present existence and possession of most private papers, and certainly not those MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN places at the top of his list of documents that the privilege should protect. See ante at 425 U. S. 426-427 (concurring in judgment).
Indeed, there would appear to be a precise inverse relationship between the private nature of the document and the permissibility of assuming its existence. Therefore, under the Court's theory, the admission through production that one's diary, letters, prior tax returns, personally maintained financial records, or canceled checks exist would ordinarily provide substantial testimony. The incriminating nature of such an admission is clear, for, while it may not be criminal to keep a diary, or write letters or checks, the admission that one does and that those documents are still available may quickly -- or simultaneously -- lead to incriminating evidence. If there is a "real danger" of such a result, that is enough under our cases to make such testimony subject to the claim of privilege. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367 (1951); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). Thus, in practice, the Court's approach should still focus upon the private nature of the papers subpoenaed and protect those about which Boyd and its progeny were most concerned.
immunity grant must extend to the testimony that the document is presently in existence. Such a grant will effectively shield the contents of the document, for the contents are a direct fruit of the immunized testimony -- that the document exists -- and cannot usually be obtained without reliance on that testimony. [Footnote 3/2] Accordingly, the Court's theory offers substantially the same protection against procurement of documents under grant of immunity that our prior cases afford.
The Court's theory would appear to apply to real evidence as well.
Similarly, the Court's theory affords protection to one who possesses documents that he cannot authenticate. If authentication were the only relevant testimony inherent in the act of production, such a person would be forced to relinquish his documents, for he provides no authentication testimony of relevance by producing them in response to a subpoena. See United States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267 (CA2 1975), cert. pending, Nos. 75-407, 7700. Under the Court's theory, however, if the existence of these documents were in question, the custodian would still be able to assert a claim of privilege against their production.

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