Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2017/2017massappdiv38.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:49:40+00:00

Document:
Steven M. Guard and Francis X. Hubbard for the plaintiffs.
Jonathan C. Young for the defendant.
FINNERTY, J. On February 22, 2012, the parties entered into a written agreement under which the plaintiffs-appellees, Daniel DelPrete and Christine DelPrete ("DelPretes"), would purchase commercial real estate located in the town of Rockland from the defendant-appellant, Chad Realty Associates, LLC ("Chad Realty"). The DelPretes gave a deposit of $40,000 toward the purchase to be held by the broker for Chad Realty.
"BUYER shall have an initial permitting period of ninety (90) days from the date of the execution of this Agreement in order to obtain all necessary permits for its intended use. If at the end of said ninety (90) days the BUYER has been unable to obtain any and all necessary permits, then the SELLER shall grant a thirty (30) day extension to complete said permitting process but only if the BUYER has filed for said permits and the permits have yet to be issued because of activity or inactivity by persons beyond the control of the BUYER."
The agreement further provided that if the buyers were to unable to obtain their permits timely, [Note 2] they could terminate the purchase agreement so long as notice was received by the seller within the ninety days. Failure of the buyers to fulfill their obligations under the agreement would result in default and forfeiture of their deposit as liquidated damages.
anticipated special permit. The letter emphasized, though, that the deposit was now the property of Chad Realty.
The DelPretes' application for a special permit was submitted to the town zoning enforcement officer on May 18, 2012 and, following his necessary approval and sign-off, was filed with the town clerk on May 24, 2012. It was ultimately denied by the town on July 10, 2012.
The trial judge found that the DelPretes were not in default and ordered return of the deposit, and also found for the DelPretes on Chad Realty's counterclaim for breach of contract seeking a declaration that the DelPretes had forfeited their deposit.
Chad Realty timely appealed, contending that the court's finding was erroneous; that the court erred in failing to enter judgment for it under Mass. R. Civ. P., Rule 50(a); [Note 3] and that the court failed to comply with Rule 52(c) where Chad Realty had submitted a timely request for findings of fact and rulings of law.
were contrary to the evidence and clearly erroneous. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' only when, 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mks., Inc., 424 Mass. 501 , 509 (1997), quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). "It is the appellant's burden to show that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous." Id. "[W]e do not 'review questions of fact found by the judge, where such findings are supported "on any reasonable view of the evidence, including all rational inferences of which it was susceptible."' T.L. Edwards, Inc. v. Fields, 371 Mass. 895 , 896 (1976), quoting Bowers v. Hathaway, 337 Mass. 88 , 89 (1958)." Id. at 510. "Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Id., quoting Anderson v. Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-574 (1985).
We do not have the benefit of the trial transcript, but the record before us would support the finding that the DelPretes had applied for the special permit by submitting it to the zoning enforcement officer within the time provided under the agreement, thus triggering the contingency, and that Chad Realty had agreed to an extension at the June 10, 2012 zoning board meeting. The issue of waiver of the "time is of the essence" provision of the agreement by Chad Realty's conduct in continuing to deal with the DelPretes regarding the transaction was not addressed by Chad Realty in its brief and was not specifically addressed in the trial court's decision. As with the finding of no default, we do not have the benefit of the trial testimony to address that issue, but nothing in the record that is before us would lead us to conclude that finding such a waiver was clearly erroneous. The trial judge is in the best position to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. at 509-510.
We hold, therefore, that Chad Realty has not met its burden of showing that the trial judge's findings were clearly erroneous. The appeal is dismissed.
[Note 2] In order to use the property as they intended for a nursery/garden center or to seek approval for a change in a preexisting nonconforming use, the DelPretes needed zoning board approval of a special permit.
[Note 3] Mass. R Civ. P., Rule 50, allows a party in a case tried to a jury to move for a directed verdict at the close of an opponent's case and at the close of all the evidence. As this case was tried to a judge, Rule 50 does not apply, and Chad Realty presumably intended its motion as one for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P., Rule 41(b)(2).
[Note 4] Despite the fact that the trial judge's June 5, 2015 findings were filed after the 10-day period provided for in Mass. R. Civ. P., Rule 52(d), they do not amend the court's June 6, 2014 findings or alter the judgment, and the findings set forth in the June 6, 2014 filing are adequate for purposes of our appellate review. See Nessralla v. Peck, 403 Mass. 757 (1989), in which the Court held that a former Superior Court judge's filing of findings, which occurred after he was no longer a Superior Court judge, was valid where it merely memorialized draft findings that had been made while he was still on the Superior Court bench.

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