Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2014/2014massappdiv12.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:11:34+00:00

Document:
Present: Greco, P.J., Singh & Pierce, JJ.
No brief filed for the plaintiff.
Alan J. Ross, Pro Se.
waived trial, the court entered judgment in favor of ANJ. We reverse.
At the outset of trial, ANJ contended that the defendants response to ANJs request for admissions entitled it to a directed finding in its favor. The court directed a finding in favor of ANJ as to liability, concluding that the only issue contested by the defendant was the amount of the debt. The parties proceeded to trial as to damages. After denying the defendants motion for directed finding, the court found that the defendant owed Chase $6,213.78 and that Chases right to collect had been assigned to ANJ, entitling it to recovery.
trial conference or at a designated time prior to trial. Id.
533 (2005), quoting Reynolds Aluminum Bldg. Prods. Co., supra at 260. See 8B C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller, & R.L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2252, at 323 (3d ed. 2010) (Wright and Miller) (with regard to Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, technical considerations will not be allowed to prevail to the detriment of substantial justice).
414 (2002) (purpose of Rule 36 is to narrow issues for trial by identifying those issues and facts as to which proof will be necessary).
-1247. Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether the responding party quoted certain language from the Rule, but rather whether he intentionally disregarded the obligations imposed by Rule 36(a). Id., quoting Asea, Inc., supra at 1247.
responding to interrogatory; it is normally limited to obtaining information from persons or entities over which it has actual control).
-619 (stating that imposition of the severe sanction of a binding admission will be imposed only when the answering party has . . . intentionally disregarded his good faith discovery obligations).
To deem the defendants stated lack of knowledge as to any assignment from Chase to ANJ as an admission for failure to indicate reasonable inquiry would be unwarranted and too severe a sanction, id. at 619, particularly where the defendant actually made reasonable inquiry by requesting the information in discovery. Indeed, the admission allowed ANJ to make out its prima facie case, when it otherwise may not have been able to do so. See Wright & Miller, supra at § 2261, at 365-366 (stating that caution should be exercised in compelling a party to admit something believed true where there is a reasonable ground for concluding that the party seeking the admission will fail to establish the point at trial). Under the circumstances, ANJs motion for directed finding should have been denied.
-611 & n.19 (2012). See also Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(A) (2013). Documents meeting these requirements are presumed reliable because they are routinely made by those charged with the responsibility of making accurate entries and are relied on in the course of doing business. Beal Bank, SSB v. Eurich, 444 Mass. 813 , 815 (2005), citing Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 385 Mass. 402 , 406 (1982).
None of the three exhibits offered by ANJ met these requirements. The first exhibit was an affidavit of the Director of Operations for Turtle Creek Assets, Ltd. and the second was an affidavit of an officer of Chase Bankcard Services, Inc. The substance of each affidavit makes clear that it was not prepared in the ordinary course of business, but rather for the specific purpose of the litigation. Indeed, each affidavit postdates the initiation of litigation and recites the chain of the debt transfer, based on the affiants review of records, as if it were meant to substitute for testimony of a keeper of records. The affidavits were in no sense business records as contemplated by the hearsay exception.
-407. Then, and only then, are there the necessary indicia of reliability. Id. at 407. For records that are transferred from one business to another, reliability must be established by showing that the records were integrated into the latters business records and were subsequently relied on by that business. See Beal Bank, SSB, supra at 818 (records of banks servicing agent admissible as business records of bank where servicing agent had business duty to report information accurately and bank routinely accessed and relied on records).
Here, the witness authenticating the credit card statements introduced himself as the keeper of the records of ANJ without any other description of his role or responsibilities within the company or even a description of the business of ANJ. Nor did he indicate from whom ANJ received the statements. Under the circumstances, ANJ failed to establish the reliability of the credit card statements as a necessary foundation to allow them into evidence under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. The defendants motion for directed finding should have been allowed.
[Note 1] For trial purposes, admissions are generally read into the record. See J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 36.9, at 524 (2d ed. 2006). Here, no admissions were read into the record prior to arguments on ANJs motion for directed finding. Instead, counsel for ANJ offered a document for inclusion into the record, referencing admissions of the defendant. No admissions were marked or endorsed or appear in the docket. Thus, it is unclear what documents the judge had before her when ruling on the motion. In any event, only the defendants actual response to request for admissions is controlling. See S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v. Board of Appeals of Concord, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 477 , 479 (1980) (to obtain benefit of admission at trial, party who relies on it must introduce it into record).
[Note 2] Although this argument was raised in ANJs written submission, it was not made orally in open court. Styled as it was, as Admissions of the Defendant, followed by a series of affirmative statements, the document tended to obscure its true nature, which was an advocacy piece, arguing that the defendants responses should be deemed admitted. There was no discussion at the hearing of the reasonable inquiry issue at all, suggesting that neither the defendant nor the court were alerted to it.
[Note 3] Reliance on cases interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 is appropriate as the Massachusetts Rule track[s] the Federal Rule. See Reporters Notes to Mass. R. Civ. P. 36. See also Reynolds Aluminum Bldg. Prods. Co., supra at 259 n.7 (Massachusetts has adopted Fed. R. Civ. P. 36); Massachusetts Highway Dept v. Smith, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 614 , 618 (2001) (stating that our rule is patterned after Rule 36 of the Federal Rules).

References: § 2252
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