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indicated in the text here, these excerpts omit significant portions of the .... Examples of such de facto interjurisdictional regulatory problems include the regulation of air .... gridlock, posing obstacles to novel approaches to interjurisdictional regulatory ... In this ironic respect, the New Federalism simply does what New Deal.
This chapter contribution is excerpted from: FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN: SEEKING CHECKS AND BALANCE IN THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL GRAY AREA 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007). These excerpts are used with permission of the Maryland Law Review. While not indicated in the text here, these excerpts omit significant portions of the original article at the end of Parts I and II, after the third paragraph of Part II, and at the end of Part III, where this chapter concludes. Section numbers and note numbers have been changed from the original article to reflect their current arrangement in this chapter. See the original article for the complete discussion. Erin Ryan retains the right to use any and all parts of this work in the future without further permission from Ashgate Publishing. ∗ Associate Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary; J.D., 2001, Harvard Law School; M.A., 1994, Wesleyan University; A.B., 1991, Harvard-Radcliffe College. I am deeply indebted to Bill Van Alstyne, Richard Lazarus, Erwin Chemerinsky, Vicki Jackson, Neal Devins, Michael Stein, Tony Arnold, David Barron, John Vile, and Laura Heymann for their insightful comments, and as well to Ned Ryan, Eric Kades, Dave Douglas, Michele Gillman, Nancy Combs, Rich Hynes, Eric Chason, and Linda Malone for their guidance during my early phases of research. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the expert research assistance of Jessica Deering, Syed Masood, Janet McCrae, Katy Mikols, Catherine Rylyk, Tara St. Angelo, Matthew Whipple, and especially Tal Kedem, and the hard work of the Maryland Law Review editors who helped prepare it for publication.
what is truly national and what is truly local.”2 And yet, even conceding the value of the federalism principles thereby implied, we have yet to seriously reckon with the question that hangs after the rhetorical satiety dissipates: What about everything in between?
‘appropriate legislation’ under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment”), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) exceeded Congress’ authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); (3) the extent of Congress’ ability to command state executive branch and legislative activity, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress may not compel state and local law enforcement to implement a federal regulatory program); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment forbids Congress from “commandeering” state legislative action under a federal regulatory program); but see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (finding that a federal law regulating state action did not commandeer state legislative and administrative process); and (4) the extent of state sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (limiting Congress’ power to authorize suits against state governments in state courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (limiting Congress’ power to authorize suits against state governments in federal courts). For further discussion, see Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, pt. III.A., at 539-54 (2007) [hereinafter Tug of War]. 2.Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (emphasis added).
that characterized the failed response to Hurricane Katrina. This Article argues that American federalism can ably weather this storm, but it will require that we (1) recognize the interjurisdictional zone that so complicates the project; (2) better understand the tensions between underlying federalism values there exacerbated; and (3) articulate an administrable means of mediating between them so as to best realize the ultimate objectives of our constitutional design. This the New Federalism fails to do, as have preceding interpretive movements that espoused similar ideals until they too were overcome by competing federalism concerns for which their theories could not account. In this most recent round, the Court’s reasoning has proceeded from a model of statefederal relations based on a severe construction of dual sovereignty, the constitutional principle by which regulatory authority is allocated between the independently-functioning federal and state governments.
separationist model, state and federal governments are idealized as operating in mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction, without overlap. Regulatory matters are styled as properly local or national concerns, state and federal authority is segregated accordingly, and the Tenth Amendment polices the supposed brightline boundary between them.
3.MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).
decisionmaking, the New Federalism’s ideals seek to impact decisionmaking at both levels, and have been embraced by decisionmakers at both levels. See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 539-54. 5.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 522-39 (discussing the role of federalism considerations in the federal response to Hurricane Katrina). 6.See id,. at 522-39. Interestingly, the public castigation that the federal government received for its failed Katrina response suggests that the New Federalism has not changed the way that large sectors of the public think about the respective roles of state and federal government. 7.The strict-separation ideal extrapolated from the New Federalism decisions exceeds their doctrinal impact at present, and we continue to operate from within a predominantly cooperative federalism system. See id., at 637-42. Nevertheless, it has already infiltrated the regulatory mindset of policymakers. See id., at 522-39. As such, the strict-separationist trajectory of New Federalism warrants scrutiny now, before its culmination further complicates our ongoing navigation of good governance.
8.See, e.g., id, at 577-80. 9.In recognition that not every public quandary ranks among the “regulatory problems” with which we are here concerned, I note that for the purposes of this piece, “regulatory problems” are those associated with the classic targets anticipated by administrative law—such as market failures, negative externalities, and other collective action problems reasonably susceptible to efficient resolution by government activity. See id., at 567-96. 10.An example of this type of de jure interjurisdictional regulatory problem is the regulation of stormwater pollution. See id.., at 572-80. 11.Examples of such de facto interjurisdictional regulatory problems include the regulation of air pollution and domestic efforts to combat terrorist attacks from abroad. See id. at 580-84.
12.Establishing precise boundaries around the category of interjurisdictional regulatory problems invites disagreement, ranging from dispute over whether a given problem truly implicates both local and national concern to dispute over whether the given problem is truly amenable to a regulatory solution. I leave such legitimate arguments aside for the purpose of this piece, which introduces an interjurisdictional conceptual framework to the federalism discourse through a sample of problems that meet the criteria in a relatively uncontroversial manner.
environmental and land use problems, natural disaster management issues, public health crises, and counterterrorism and national security matters. See id., at 567-96. 13.See id. , at 596-629.
14.See id. , at 620-28. 15.See id. ,at 629-43.
the Supreme Court adopted a model of federalism that exalted the problemsolving value at the expense of the check-and-balance value to approve pragmatic New Deal legislative programs that expanded federal jurisdiction into traditionally local arenas. Cooperative federalism, the predominant model of federalism since World War II, recovers some of the balance through a partnership-based approach to regulation in areas of interjurisdictional overlap, allowing state and federal governments to take responsibility for interlocking components of a collaborative regulatory program.
cooperative federalism is, at best, undertheorized (and at worst, more coercive than collaborative), the New Federalism reestablishes the supremacy of the checkand-balance value over all others in an effort to bolster the line between state and federal authority against pressures (some perhaps political, others genuinely interjurisdictional) that would blur the boundary. Demanding attention from both a national and local actor, interjurisdictional problems do blur that boundary, pitting concerns about tyranny and needs for pragmatism against one another.
17.For example, the innovative state-federal partnership created by the Clean Water Act’s Phase II Stormwater Rule, though negotiated with the participation of the states over a ten-year period, was challenged fiercely (though unsuccessfully) on Tenth Amendment grounds. See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 843–45 (9th Cir. 2003); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,724, 68,743 (Dec. 8, 1999); see also Tug of War, supra note 1,, at 577-80. 18.For example, federalism-related concerns may have frustrated a more efficient regulatory response during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 522-39.
Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 287 (2004) (reviewing the “vast body of primary historical materials . . . that support a spectrum of constitutional meaning” and the accordingly futile project of constraining judicial interpretation with originalist principles); see also Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032–33 (1977); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in REPRESENTATIONS 13 (1990). Although none dispute the proper recourse to amendment for correcting clearly defective textual provisions, they argue that some degree of interpretive lawmaking is a necessary part of the judicial function in applying vague constitutional commands to new controversies. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra, at 68–72 (discussing the problem of choosing the correct “level of abstraction” at which constitutional clauses should be construed).
deliberate interpretive space in the model of dual sovereignty implied by the Constitution, most directly in the text of the Tenth Amendment. 20.E.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004) (endorsing regulatory approach to many environmental problems). 21.E.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO (rev. ed. 1978).
22.For example, Edward Rubin has observed that [f]ederalism is indeed worth discussing; it is a basic, truly fundamental question of political organization. Fortunately, the United States has not needed to confront this question, as a matter of practical politics, for nearly a century. That is what makes it so much fun to talk about. Like a healthy person talking about medical care, a congenitally thin person talking about dieting, or a rich person talking about money problems, we can lavish exuberant attention on the subject without any sense of urgency or danger. . . . [T]here is also an intrinsic pleasure in talking about how much one has of something that one does not need, and that other people desperately require.
Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (1997). 23.See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213–23 (1998) (arguing in favor of American federalism’s continued vitality despite cogent criticism of the New Federalism approach in the Tenth Amendment context); cf. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 951 (1994) (conceding, despite skepticism, that the states serve beneficial roles as mechanisms of decentralization and that American federalism might retain value for reasons of historical and cultural identity).
Comment [e1]: Just a note that the formatting appears to change here, from double spacing to 1-1/2 line spacing. I’m sure this will get fixed in the next editing phase, but thought I’d point it out.
interjurisdictional gray area, I proceed from the assumption that good government should address those market failures, negative externalities, and other collective action problems that individuals are ill-equipped to resolve on their own and that so threaten public welfare as to warrant a regulatory response24 despite the libertarian-highlighted risks that inherently attend the exercise of governmental authority.25 As we face interjurisdictional problems that meet these criteria, we deserve a model of federalism that anticipates the competition between federalism values that will arise in the interjurisdictional gray area so invisible to New Federalism.
Basil S. Markesinis eds., 2006) (“Every federalism responds to a unique history, and thus every federalism is different from every other.”). For example, the European Union, Canada, India, and Switzerland are all federalism-based polities whose federations exhibit unique characteristics. The American dual sovereignty principle is well illustrated in Collector v. Day, in which the Supreme Court stated that [t]he general government, and the States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. The former in its appropriate sphere is supreme; but the States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the language of the tenth amendment, “reserved,” are as independent of the general government as that government within its sphere is independent of the States. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870). 27.U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 28.U.S. CONST. amend. X. 29.See supra note 19.
30.E.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 31.U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Supremacy Clause,32 suggests that at least some of this authority may be wielded exclusively at the federal level, preempting contrary state law. However, neither the Tenth Amendment nor the Supremacy Clause nor any other provision in the Constitution decisively resolves whether there may also be regulatory spaces in which both the states and the federal government may operate (if they have not been withdrawn from either’s commission by express constitutional limitation or purposeful preemption). Drawing the conclusion that such overlapping regulatory space exists requires an interpretive leap, but so does the extrapolation of wholly mutually exclusive spheres of authority.33 Either conclusion demands application of some exogenous theory about what American federalism means, or what, in essence, federalism is for. That we have relied on one theory or another to resolve the matter (in ways that may eventually come to seem obvious if only by virtue of their repetition) does not negate the role of federalism theory in getting us to that point.
32.U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). The Supremacy Clause tells us that federal law is “supreme,” but from there to field preemption nevertheless requires an interpretive leap. 33.See Tug of War, supra note 1, text accompanying notes 153-59; see also Jackson, supra note 23, at 2191 (noting that the Constitution’s assumption that states would continue to exist “does not tell us whether states can be required to help carry out federal law”).
34.See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. . . .
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 35.See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry”). 36.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 596-629. 37.See id.,, at 596-643.
or not, among different models of federalism that then inform our lawmaking and adjudication.38 In the United States, political discourse has tended more and more to treat the ideals of the diffusion of sovereign power and the pragmatic concerns of problemsolving as a federalism thesis and antithesis—principles in opposition to one another, rather than complementary elements of the overall federalism project. Regardless, a federalism model that subordinates pragmatic concerns to the maintenance of formalist boundaries between the reservoirs of state and federal power is clearly a legitimate political choice.
38.One might fairly ask, “[w]ho is the ‘we’ of whom you speak?” James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 442 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 442–43 (“In place of the constituted ‘we,’ that it is the achievement of our past to have given us, we are offered an unconstituted ‘we,’ or a ‘we’ constituted on the pages of law journals.”). As aforementioned, this Article argues that American federalism, as set forth in the text and structure of the Constitution, invites interpretive choices by judges, legislators, and policymakers. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The subject thus warrants consideration by all participants in the legal community, though it is ultimately the job of the Supreme Court to provide definitive interpretive guidance to the rest (as the Article recommends). 39.See generally David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with Federalism: If It’s Not Just a Battle Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2006) (discussing how different Supreme Court justices have implicitly invoked different models of federalism in justifying their analyses).
40.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 629-43. 41.See id., at 522-39. (discussing the relationship between federal restraint during the Katrina aftermath and New Federalism ideals); infra note 92 (detailing public disapproval of federal restraint during the relief effort).
42.Equally shameful were the lingering dynamics of racial unfairness apparent in these images of abject poverty. See, e.g., Representative John Lewis, “This is a National Disgrace”, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 52 (“It’s so glaring that the great majority of people crying out for help are poor, they’re black. There’s a whole segment of society that’s being left behind.”). 43.See, e.g., Joe Whitley et al., Homeland Security After Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go from Here?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3 (2006) (describing the failures of state and federal coordination during the Katrina response). 44.For a compilation of documents collected by congressional investigators, including a conference call transcript between state and federal authorities before Katrina struck New Orleans, see Eric Lipton, Key Documents Regarding the Government Response to Katrina, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/national/nationalspecial/10katrina-docs.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
45.U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE P LAN 6 (2004) [hereinafter NRP]. For an excellent review of the federal statutory framework dictating federal involvement in disaster response, see DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 24–56 (2006). 46.NRP, supra note 45, at 8, 15. 47.In particular, former FEMA Director Michael Brown did not fare well in media accounts of his performance. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Effectiveness Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A23 (characterizing Brown’s performance as “ludicrous”); see also Evan Thomas et al., How Bush Blew It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 30, 38 (questioning Brown’s credentials for appointment as head of FEMA).
48.See NRP, supra note 45, at 9. 49.The New York Times described the crippling effect on the National Guard: The morning Hurricane Katrina thundered ashore, Louisiana National Guard commanders thought they were prepared to save their state. But when 15-foot floodwaters swept into their headquarters, cut their communications and disabled their high-water trucks, they had their hands full just saving themselves. For a crucial 24 hours after landfall on Aug. 29, Guard officers said, they were preoccupied with protecting their nerve center from the waves topping the windows at Jackson Barracks and rescuing soldiers who could not swim. The next morning, they had to evacuate their entire headquarters force of 375 guardsmen by boat and helicopter to the Superdome. It was an inauspicious start to the National Guard’s hurricane response, which fell so short that it has set off a national debate about whether in the future the Pentagon should take charge immediately after catastrophes. Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, When Storm Hit, National Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A1. 50.WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 42 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf. According to the White House’s own report: An important limiting factor of the Federal response . . . is that the Federal response is predicated on an incident being handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. A base assumption to this approach is that, even in cases where State and local governments are overwhelmed, they would maintain the necessary incident command structure to direct Federal assets to where they are most needed. In the case of Katrina, the local government had been destroyed and the State government was incapacitated, and thus the Federal government had to take on the additional roles of performing incident command and other functions it would normally rely upon the State and local governments to provide.
how are resources managed—and we must create an expedited, transparent, and effective contracting and contract oversight process. Id. 55.42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5205 (2000). 56.Whitley et al., supra note 43, at 4–6. 57.Id. at 4. 58. Id.
59. Id. 60. Id. 61.Id. at 7. 62. Id. 63.Id. at 4.
64. Id. 65. Id. 66. Id. 67.John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006) [hereinafter Warner Act]; see also Michael Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The President Can Deploy Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major American City from a Devastating Natural Catastrophe 1–2 (U. of Md. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-37), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946207 (arguing that the new law neither adds to nor subtracts from the President’s existing powers but merely clarifies them after uncertainty suggested during the Katrina emergency).
68.Whitley et al., supra note 43, at 3. 69.Evan Thomas et al., The Lost City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 41, 48. 70.Lipton et al., Political Issues, supra note 53, at A1. 71.Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 53, at §1; see id. (reporting that “interviews with dozens of officials” supported this contention).
72.See Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 48–49 (“Beginning early in the week, Justice Department lawyers presented arguments for federalizing the Guard, but Defense Department lawyers fretted about untrained 19-year-olds trying to enforce local laws . . . .”). 73.Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 40. 74. Id. 75.See id. The troops of each state’s National Guard report to their Governor unless they are “federalized” by Presidential order in accordance with the terms of the Stafford Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5191–5192 (2000) (authorizing the President to declare disaster emergencies and direct federal government response). 76.Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 40.
77. Id. 78. Id. 79. Id. 80. Id. 81.John M. Broder, Guard Units’ New Mission: From Combat to Flood Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at A13. 82.See Karen Tumulty et al., 4 Places Where the System Broke Down: The Governor, TIME, Sept. 19, 2005, § 2, at 34. Time reported: Further tangling the post-Katrina disaster effort was a struggle for power. On the Friday after the hurricane, as the Governor met with Bush aboard Air Force One on the tarmac of the New Orleans airport, the President broached a sensitive question: Would Blanco relinquish control of local law enforcement and the 13,268 National Guard troops from 29 states that fall under her command? . . . [S]he thought the request had a political motive. It would allow Washington to come in and claim credit for a relief operation that was finally beginning to show progress. Blanco asked for 24 hours to consider it, but as she was meeting at midnight that Friday night with advisers, [Chief of Staff Andrew] Card called and told her to look for a fax. It was a letter and memorandum of understanding under which she would turn over control of her troops. Blanco refused to sign it.
Id.; see also Katrina Aftermath, Louisiana: Don’t Want You on My Dance Card, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, THE HOTLINE, Sept. 8, 2005, at 7 (discussing Governor Blanco’s rejection of the White House proposal for federal control of troops in Louisiana). 83.It remains unclear why Blanco did not, given that the state resources at her disposal had proved insufficient to manage the relief effort independently. Viewed most generously, it may be that she was reluctant to turn control over to a federal government that had so far shown nothing but incompetence in its own handling of the disaster. Viewed less generously, her decision to refuse federal aid in the face of state incapacity tyrannically exacerbated the suffering of her own citizens by contributing to the delay. If she refused to relinquish control on federalism grounds while being unable to provide the needed resources independently, then her view of federalism warrants just as much criticism as that of the federal government. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing Michael Brown’s testimony on the role of federalism considerations during the response effort). 84.Under both the Stafford Act and the NRP, the President may federalize emergency response at the request of a state’s governor. See supra notes 46 & 75 and accompanying text. 85.Greenberger, supra note 67, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
federalism quandary: what does the Constitution tell us about when the United States exercises “preeminent responsibility and authority”? Although John Yoo is convinced that the text authorizes at least some measure of federal disaster response without a gubernatorial request, the question is unsettled.
uncertainty makes President Bush’s decision not to invoke his potential authority, especially in the face of such hideous human suffering and public pressure to act,91 all the more significant.
actions of this Administration, regardless of the consequences to our Constitution or civil liberties.”). 95.For example, Scott L. Silliman, Executive Director of Duke University School of Law’s Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, believes that delays were caused not by the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act, which generally precludes the use of federal troops for domestic security concerns, but by confusion over the lines of authority between President Bush and Governor Blanco: “I think the problem was you had two heads of state . . . each having the authority, but one waiting for the other to act.” Anne Plummer, Loosening Restrictions on the Military Enforcing Civil Law Unwise, Say Critics, CONG. Q. WKLY., Sept. 24, 2005, at 2550 (internal quotation marks omitted). 96.See id. Silliman’s interpretation, of course, suggests another possible explanation for the administration’s reluctance to intervene despite an arguable legal basis for doing so: the desire to pass the hot potato and avoid responsibility for an intractable situation. See Tug of War, supra note 1,at 588-91. 97.E.g., Lewis, supra note 42, at 52.
98.Shane & Shanker, supra note 49, at A1. 99.See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 100.Katrina’s Official Death Toll Tops 1,000, CNN.COM, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/21/katrina.impact. 101.Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 53, at A1 (quoting official reports of thirty-four deaths: ten at the Superdome and twenty-four at the convention center).
102.Id. Food and water supplies stashed at the planned emergency shelter of the Superdome ran out within the first few days after Katrina made landfall. Id. After the Superdome had filled beyond all capacity, an additional 15,000 refugees were directed to the convention center, where there were no food or water supplies. Id.; see also John Riley & Craig Gordon, Katrina—What Went Wrong, NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 2005, at A4 (describing the deplorable conditions in the convention center). 103.Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 53, at A1 (citing Chief Lonnie C. Swain, an assistant police superintendent who oversaw ninety police officers on patrol at the Superdome). 104.See id. (quoting Captain Jeffrey Winn, head of the convention center’s police SWAT team: “The only way I can describe it is as a completely lawless situation.”). 105.Shane & Shanker, supra note 49, at A1.
106.Barbara Kantrowitz & Karen Breslau, Some Are Found, All Are Lost, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 51. Young children were often separated from parents during chaotic boat rescues and bus evacuations. Id. at 52. 107.See Lester R. Brown, Global Warming Forcing U.S. Coastal Population to Move Inland, EARTH POL’Y INST., Aug. 16, 2006, http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2006/Update57.htm (explaining that Hurricane Katrina forced one million people to move inland from the afflicted coastal cities); see also Eric Lipton, Storm and Crisis: Hurricane Evacuees Face Eviction Threats at Both Their Old Homes and New, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A20 (discussing the large influx of displaced Katrina victims to Texas). For a graphical depiction of Katrina refugee displacement, see Kantrowitz & Breslau, supra note 106, at 53. Refugees have fled to forty-nine different states and the District of Columbia. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Gulf Coast Update: Hurricane Relief, Recovery, and Rebuilding Continues (Mar. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Gulf Coast Fact Sheet], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060308-8.html (noting the federal aid flowing to local education agencies in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia for displaced school children). 108.Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 107. This is more than “double the combined total of Individuals and Households Assistance Program (IHP) dollars provided for six major U.S. natural disasters occurring since 1992.” Id.
109.See, e.g., Oscar Corral, Stranded Pets Facing Starvation, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 5, 2005, at A13 (noting that many pets were abandoned because their owners could not bring them on evacuation buses); Norma Mendoza, Task Force Members Describe Devastation in New Orleans, EDWARDSVILLE INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 11, 2005, at 1, 3 (“Another sad sight was the dogs that were everywhere, strays and abandoned pets that rescue workers wouldn’t allow people to bring with them. Some died, trapped in the houses where they were left. Others were starving and the officers had nothing to give them.”). 110.See, e.g., Photo Gallery: Pets, Hurricane Katrina’s Other Victims, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC.COM, Sept. 8, 2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0908_050908_katrina_pets.html (illustrating the anguish of animals abandoned in Katrina’s wrath); cf. Karlyn Barker & NiaMalika Henderson, Plight of Stranded Animals Worsening Daily, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at B4 (estimating that thousands of animals abandoned by their owners after Katrina were in peril). 111.See Pam Radtke Russell, Gulf Platform Damage Still Being Assessed, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV., Mar. 23, 2006 (on file with author) (explaining that the damage to oil and gas platforms from Katrina was the worst ever seen in the Gulf of Mexico, and that the harm caused by rigs was equally noteworthy). 112.Mike Taibbi, Oil Coats Homes, Water After Katrina, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9972220.
113.Robert J. Samuelson, Hitting the Economy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 54. 114.See Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 34–35 (listing environmental hazards affecting public health). 115.Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 107. As high as this figure seems, it nevertheless falls short of the $150 billion of federal aid that experts had predicted would be necessary for recovery efforts. Nina J. Easton, Katrina Aid Falls Short of Promises, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 2005, at A1. 116.See Press Release, FEMA, By the Numbers: FEMA Recovery Update in Louisiana (Mar. 24, 2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=24505 (allocating $165 million to disaster unemployment assistance). 117.See id. (allocating $700 million in loans to local governments in need of assistance). 118.FEMA has already dispersed checks in the amount of $3.5 billion for rental assistance and home restoration. Id. 119.Over $1.9 billion has already been set aside for such public assistance undertakings. Id. 120.Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 107.
have long learned to fear. River and wetland management choices along the Mississippi Delta exacerbated the flooding that proved the worst of New Orleans’ battles,124 and Americans are right to ask for better long-term planning from the local, state, and federal authorities responsible for these activities.125 Still, it was the bungled humanitarian relief effort—the disorganized response that stranded the sick and injured, separated young children from their parents, and left the most vulnerable members of society struggling to survive amidst prolonged Lord of the Flies conditions126—that triggered public outrage.
4. Coda: Which Federalism? Given the proven ability of the United States to respond quickly and effectively in the face of natural disaster (for example, our immediate and ambitious relief effort in response to the South Asian tsunami just nine months earlier127), what could possibly account for this spectacular failure of governance?
2006, at 47, 56 (recounting the same episode); Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 44–45 (comparing the images of helpless families and children begging for food and water to third-world conditions in Mogadishu or Port-au-Prince). 127.See Brigadier General John Allen, Principal Director of Asia and Pacific Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Update—U.S. Government Relief Efforts in Asia,” Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 3, 2005), available at http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050103-wh-presstranscript.shtml (“Within minutes of our notification of this disaster, we began military planning to assist in the U.S. Governmental response to this crisis . . . . Within hours, U.S. forces began to move to the affected area.”); BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GOING THE DISTANCE: THE U.S. TSUNAMI RELIEF EFFORT 2005, at 1 (2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/tsunami/tsunami.pdf (reporting that, at the height of the relief effort, “more than 15,000 U.S. military personnel were involved in providing relief support in the affected region. Twenty-five ships and 94 aircraft were participating in the effort. The U.S. military had delivered about 2.2 million pounds of relief supplies to affected nations . . . .”); see also Ralph A. Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, South Asian Tsunami: U.S. Military Provides ‘Logistical Backbone’ for Relief Operation, EJOURNAL USA: FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA (Nov.
Brown’s statement is important for three reasons. First, he correctly articulates a central problem of federalism: structural constraints are only meaningful if they are followed in difficult times as well as easy times. For Brown, allowing the federal government to cross federalism’s proverbial line in the sand to satisfy a short-term desire would undermine the very principles of constitutional government.
another Defense Department unique capability: command, control, communications, and coordination. These attributes, critical in wartime, proved equally critical in ensuring an effective, coordinated response.”). 128.See Brown Statement, supra note 52, at 3.
Comment [e2]: Here is where I would like to insert the additional three paragraphs about interjurisdictional regulatory problems (to alleviate the confusing gap left by the omission of thirty pages between here and the preceding paragraph). I am appending the additional text at the end of the chapter, so that inserting it here does not make all following footnotes appear changed (for having been numerically displaced). I have adjusted all supra and infra references within the new footnotes to be self contained (so that they do not refer back to missing parts of the full-length article), and my scan of the other footnotes in the piece suggests that nothing else needs to be changed in light of the numerical displacement of the footnotes that follow.
multiple levels of government. Especially in hindsight, it is hard to imagine a serious argument that preparation and response should have proceeded at an exclusively national or local level. Nevertheless, in accordance with the strictseparationist model, the White House viewed the Katrina response as a properly state regulatory affair, declining to take more aggressive federal initiative because it viewed avoiding interference with (let alone commandeering) state resources as its highest obligation.133 Yet nothing could have proved this view more tragically simplistic than our actual experience in the aftermath of the hurricane. Katrina was clearly a local problem, demanding the protection of public health and safety and the maintenance of domestic law and order that lie at the heart of traditional state function.134 State regulatory concern was implicated in the dispatch of first responders with localized expertise, the provision of humanitarian aid for intrastate evacuees, and the protection and salvage of state infrastructure and private property.
floodwalls failed even though the storm waters did not rise above the level that the walls were designed to hold.
133.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 527-32. 134.See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 313 (2006) (noting that the “state cannot surrender, abdicate, or abridge its police power”). 135.Rip Watson, New Orleans Port Opens to Relief Ships After Katrina, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000082&sid=adNXIjdn4Z8Q.
136.Thanks to the convenient proximity of rich carbon-based fuels in the Gulf of Mexico to the Port of New Orleans, this region is perhaps the most important energy hub in the continental United States, supplying nearly twenty percent of domestic demand for oil and natural gas. Robert Viguerie, Coastal Erosion: Crisis in Louisiana’s Wetlands, 51 LA. B.J. 85, 86 (2003). 137.Stemming the Tide: The Mississippi River Delta and the Davis Pond Freshwater Diversion Project, LACOAST.GOV, http://www.lacoast.gov/programs/DavisPond/stemming-the-tide.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007). 138.Jad Mouawad & Vikas Bajaj, Gulf Oil Operations Remain in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at C1. 139.See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 140.See Schwartz, supra note 125 (recounting reports that the Army Corps conceded that the levee designs were flawed). 141.U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
threatening health and safety into the foreseeable future,146 there is no quick end to the crisis in sight. In other words, everyone had a stake—but as we now well know, the bifurcated disaster response itself proved disastrous. As the stories of failure after failure in the relief effort unfolded, culpability fell on city, state, and federal agencies alike. The City of New Orleans probably should have considered how the 100,000 New Orleans residents without motor vehicles would be able to heed Mayor Nagin’s evacuation command. The State of Louisiana probably should have considered the wisdom of moving the National Guard headquarters that would coordinate hurricane response to higher ground before the storm. The federal government apparently failed to heed National Weather Service warnings about the scope of the storm and failed to deploy FEMA resources appropriately before the storm.
aggravated by a natural disaster that turned the physical and social landscape of New Orleans into an ideal terrain for criminals.”).
146.See EPA, Response to 2005 Hurricanes: Frequent Questions, http://www.epa.gov/katrina/faqs.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (providing a forum to address a host of continuing health and safety related issues for the residents of the New Orleans area). 147.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 527-32. 148.See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 149.That said, the anticommandeering rule of New York and Printz may well have discouraged the White House from “federalizing” the Louisiana National Guard without gubernatorial consent. 150.See Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1203-05 (2003) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court’s narrow federalism perspective threatens to impermissibly impinge on proper federal legislative power).
151.Brown Statement, supra note 52, at 3. 152.Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 40.
trajectory of the Supreme Court’s recent federalism rulings,153 and thus hesitated to invoke potential Stafford Act authority to intrude upon the state’s primary role as provider of intrastate relief and law enforcement services.
interjurisdictional nature of the Katrina emergency demonstrates how a problem shaped beyond the comprehension of the strict-separationist model can cause the entire system to crash. Indeed, interjurisdictional problems spawn circumstances that exacerbate the inherent tension between underlying federalism values, with which the New Federalism is ill-equipped to handle. Although symptoms of this mismatch were evident in foundering regulatory responses to less mediagenic interjurisdictional problems preceding Katrina (e.g., the disposal of low-level radioactive waste and the management of respiratory disease in Los Angeles), the Katrina debacle brought home to the nation a clear message: a legal framework built around a theory that does not track the real-world targets of regulatory response is unstable and unsustainable. It also suggested an alternative, at least in the Katrina response, that most Americans collectively imagined was possible.
153.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 554-63 (discussing the distinct spheres of state and federal power in the New Federalism).
governments to respond, and the relative risks to dual sovereignty checks and balances of crossing into the interjurisdictional gray area. The state and local governments would have made a similar evaluation, to the extent of their capacity. Most Americans apparently believed that the federal interest in saving the lives and relieving the human suffering of its own citizens far overwhelmed the risks to inter-sovereign diplomacy, but in any event, a conclusion would have been reached more efficiently and decisively if freed from the paralysis provoked by the New Federalism approach.154 This paralysis reflects perhaps the most serious trap of binary thinking promoted by the New Federalism, which is its essential suggestion that we must choose between either federalism or interjurisdictional problem-solving. Either we are faithful to the constitutional ideal of dual sovereignty, or we can effectively grapple with the collective action problems that we ask regulation to help us control. New Federalism frames this as the choice by positing the check and balance value as synonymous with federalism in general. But as important as they are, checks and balances are only one of the principles of good government that undergird American federalism.
accountability, localism, problem-solving—all in tension with one another. The interpretive model of federalism that we choose determines how we mediate this tension, and New Federalism’s solution is to privilege checks and balances over all others.
154.See supra note 92 and accompanying text (reviewing public disapproval of the federal response).
jurisprudential standard for interpreting Tenth Amendment claims within a model of Balanced Federalism dual sovereignty that affords both checks and balances. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 644-65 (2007). 155. For example, this is arguably the case with regard to the problem of stormwater pollution, which stems both from land uses regulated by municipal governments and water uses regulated by the federal government. See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 576-580. 156. In other words, in this type of interjurisdictional regulatory problem, though the national government could theoretically preempt local involvement as a legal matter, the regulatory target so implicates an area of local concern or expertise that to do so would obstruct, rather than facilitate, meaningful resolution of the problem (as regarding such national security matters as the National Response Plan). 157. E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (finding that federal courts hearing state law claims under diversity jurisdiction are to apply the substantive laws of those states and not federal common law). 158. E.g., Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 66–67 (2006) (examining the federal government’s use of state law “to help effectuate its burgeoning criminal justice authority” while simultaneously “infus[ing] federal law with the normative judgments of the respective states”).
159. E.g., Gerald F. Hess, The Trail Smelter, the Columbia River, and the Extraterritorial Application of CERCLA, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2005) (discussing the arbitration decisions in the 1930s and early 1940s between Canada and the U.S. regarding the Trail Smelter, a facility near the border of British Columbia that pumped sulphur dioxide into Washington State). 160. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317–19 (1981) (finding that an interstate sewage discharge claim should be resolved under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, rather than by federal common law). 161. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–52 (1829) (acknowledging overlapping state and federal concern in upholding the legality of a state-authorized dam through a waterway subject to the federal navigational servitude).
a preexisting state law requiring that their identities be disclosed). The court observed that “while the State possesses sovereign authority over the operation of its jails, it may not operate them, in respect of INS detainees, in any way that derogates the federal government's exclusive and expressed interest in regulating aliens.” Id.
pandemic). 177. By contrast, some have argued that the federal government should devolve more of such regulatory responsibility to the states. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 135 (2005) (“Because most environmental problems are local or regional in nature, there is a strong case that most . . . environmental problems should be addressed at the state and local level.” (footnote omitted)). Despite these arguments, however, few propose the abolition of the federal Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, which fulfill a classic centralized regulatory role of preventing negative externalities and remedying collective action problems.
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