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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 12:55:37+00:00

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THE NEW YORK State Legislature amended CPLR >214(6) effective Sept. 4, 1996 to repeal the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh,1 that the statute of limitations to be applied in actions for professional malpractice (other than medical, dental or podiatric) is not solely the three-year negligence limitation, but can also be the expanded six year contract limitation.
As with most new statutes, two questions that are of immediate concern are whether or not the statute is retroactive and, if it is not, then how is the statute to be applied prospectively. This prospective application is especially important when a statute of limitations is shortened since there will be an issue of whether or not the application will result in an abrogation of a vested right of a party.
The question of retroactivity appears to have been answered with a resounding no;4 however, the more important question is how the statute is to be applied to cases filed after Sept. 4, 1996. Does the six-year statute of limitations apply to cases that accrued before the date the statute was enacted, but were filed after? Will the three-year statute of limitations apply?
Or will the court fashion some sort of reasonable time frame in which to file a professional malpractice claim that was viable on Sept. 3, 1996, but extinguished on Sept. 4, 1996?
This article will discuss those cases dealing with professional malpractice claims filed after CPLR 214(6) was enacted and for which the application of the new three year statute of limitations would have immediately extinguished otherwise viable claims.
Since the courts have essentially put to rest the question of whether the statute will be applied retroactively to cases pending as of the effective date of the statute, the remaining question concerning CPLR 214(6) is what happens to claims filed after September 4, 1996, but which had accrued before that date.
Specifically, what happens to cases where the professional malpractice occurred more than three years but less than six years before Sept. 4, 1996?
If the statute had not been amended, the six-year statute would have applied to these cases. However, once the statute was amended, these cases became immediately time-barred.
The courts that have dealt with this issue all agree that the immediate extinguishment of these claims is unconstitutional and that a party should be afforded 'some reasonable opportunity and period following enactment within which to pursue a claim.5 The question then becomes what is a 'reasonable time to commence an action that would have been timely before the amendment of the statute of limitations.
The initial Appellate Division to decide this issue was the First Department in Coastal Broadway Associates v. Rafael.
The Fourth Department in Shirley v. Danziger7 decided that the institution of a legal malpractice claim within 20 days after the effective date of the amendment was a reasonable time, but, as in Coastal Broadway, there is no detailed treatment of the reasoning behind the decision.
For a discussion of the issues involved in the prospective application of 214(6), it is necessary to examine three lower court decisions.
Davis v. Isaacson, Robustelli,8 a lower court case decided on Nov. 12, 1997, (two months before Coastal Broadway Associates) deals with a claim that was commenced five months after the effective date of the statute. Davis, another legal malpractice action, involved a claim that accrued in November 1991, and, accordingly, under the Santulli case, the statute of limitations would have expired in November 1997. The claim was filed on Jan. 29, 1997, approximately five months after the effective date of the statute, but within the Santulli time period.
Under the new three-year period, the action would be barred and the court had to determine whether or not to allow the malpractice claim to stand.
The lower court stated that while it was up to the Legislature to determine what a 'reasonable time would be, the Legislature, in this case, abrogated this responsibility and it was up to the court to determine what a reasonable time would be.
Accordingly, Davis not only found that five months was a reasonable time in which to bring a lawsuit that was viable before the enactment of the statute, but further opined that the claim was governed by the six-year statute of limitations; in effect, there was no prospective application of 214(6). Although that precise question was not before the court, this reasoning would mean that the plaintiffs would have been able to bring suit until November 1997, 13 months after the statute had been amended.
Is then a 13-month period a 'reasonable time to bring a claim after a shortened statute of limitations has been enacted? Not according to a later lower court case of Kelly v. Cesarano, Haque & Kahn, P.C. That lower court case was decided by Judge David Goldstein on July 24, 1998 and came to the exact opposite conclusion of the court in Davis.
In Kelly, Judge Goldstein noted that the plaintiff's claims accrued on April 14, 1994 and were viable as of Sept. 4, 1996. Accordingly, the plaintiff had until April 14, 1997 under the three-year statute of limitations. However, suit was not filed until Oct. 29, 1997, 13 months after the new statute was passed.
The court noted that the amendment did not have retroactive application to cases filed before Sept. 4, 1996, but that it would apply in 'someway to cases filed after Sept. 4, 1996.
Kelly appears to hold that while the shortened statute of limitations will not apply to cases which were filed before the effective date of the statute, claims accruing before but filed after the effective date of the statute, will not get the total benefit of the Santulli six-year statute of limitations but must be filed within a 'reasonable time. Thirteen months is not a reasonable time.
The same reasoning was applied by the Federal Court in Panegeon v. Alliance Navigation Lines, Inc.,16 a situation where the malpractice accrued as early as Oct. 18, 1993, but, in any event, no later than Dec. 31, 1993. However, plaintiffs filed their complaint in March 1997, six months after the statute was enacted.
The court found that the malpractice claims before it were subject to a three year statute of limitations and therefore the statute expired no later than Dec. 31, 1996. As noted above, the claim was not filed until March 1997.
Finally, in the Federal Court case of Middle Market Financial Corporation v. D'Oranzio,19 Judge Shirley Wohl Kram held that a legal malpractice action commenced 56 days after the statute was instituted timely.
Accordingly, what appears to be the trend is that for all claims filed after Sept. 4, 1996, the three-year statute of limitations will apply. However, the courts will consider how much time elapsed between the effective date of the statute and the filing of the summons and complaint to determine whether or not the plaintiff had a reasonable time to file the summons and complaint. Apparently, this will have to be done on a case by case basis as what constitutes a reasonable time is sui generis.
The Panegeon case strictly construed the statute and what constitutes a reasonable time. Kelly refrained from defining what a reasonable time would be, but found that thirteen months was unreasonable. Coastal Broadway decided that five and one-half months was reasonable. Davis held that five months was reasonable, but, in dicta, can be interpreted to mean that the six-year Santulli statute of limitations applies to claims accruing before the statute was amended. Shirley held that 20 days was reasonable and Middle Market found 56 days to also be appropriate.
As these cases have illustrated, courts will be divided as to what constitutes a reasonable time. Certainly, any claim that accrued before Sept. 4, 1996 but filed only recently would probably be untimely. It also appears clear that such claims filed within six months after the new amendment would be timely, except, perhaps, in federal court. It is those cases that fall between these two boundaries that will be the subject of future litigation.
For plaintiffs, their strong suit is the Davis case which can be read as holding that the six-year statute of limitations still applies to cases accruing before Sept. 4, 1996.
This will avoid another inequity, that is, a case that accrued on September 3, 1996 would be governed by a six-year statute of limitations, while a case that accrued the next day would be subject to a three-year limitation.
Defendants, on the other hand, should argue that the statute is effective immediately and applies to all cases filed after Sept. 4, 1996 and that, at most, a reasonable period of time to commence a suit is up to six months.
(3) New York Civil Practice Law and Rules >241(6) (McKinney's 1997).
1997); Mason Tenders District Council Pension Fund v. Messera, 958 F.Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
(S.D.N.Y.); Romeo v. Schmidt, 244 A.D.2d 861, 668 N.Y.S.2d 113 (4th Dept. 1997); Ruffolo v.
Legal Services, 671 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dept. 1998); Martin v. Canale, 676 N.Y.S.2d 349 (3rd Dept.
a pending claim, the court, in essence, gave the statute retroactive effect.
Greco & Fogelgamren, P.C., 175 Misc.2d 40, 667, N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1997); Kelly v.
Cesarano, Haque & Khan, P.C., 678 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1998); Shirley v.
1998 WL 397867 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
(6) Coastal, supra, note 20, 246 A.D.2d at 445, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
(7) Shirley v. Danziger, supra.
(8) Davis, supra, note 20.
(9) 175 Misc.2d at 43-44, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
(10) 175 Misc.2d at 44, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
(11) 175 Misc.2d at 45, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
(12) 175 Misc.2d at 45, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
(13) 175 Misc.2d at 46, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
(14) 175 Misc.2d at 46, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
(15) Kelly, supra, 678 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
(16) Panegeon, supra, note 20 1997 WL 473385, at 3.
(19) Middle Market Financial Corporation, supra.
Commentaries for 1997. CPLR 214(a) McKinney's, Book 7B Cumulative Pocket Part, pp. 133-4.

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