Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/162/420.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 17:07:30+00:00

Document:
This case is here upon a writ of error sued out of the district court of the United States for the Southern district of California, wherein the plaintiff in error was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced for violation of section 3893, Rev. St., as amended by Act. Cong. Sept. 26, 1888, c. 1039, 2 (25 Stat. 496). The indictment contained two counts, each of which alleged that in the year 1893, at the city of Los Angeles, county of Los Angeles, the plaintiff in error 'did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully deposit, and cause to be deposited, in the United States post office, at the said city of Los Angeles, county and district aforesaid, for delivery, a certain obscene, lewd, and lascivious letter addressed to 'Mrs. Susan Budlong, box 661, Los Angeles, Cal."; and that the said letter was then and there unmailable matter, by reason of the indecent character of its contents. The two counts [162 U.S. 420, 421] differed merely in that they described two different letters, alleged to have been dated, respectively, November 1 and November 3, 1893, and to have been respectively deposited in the said post office November 2 and November 3, 1893.
The defendant demurred to the indictment on the ground that the facts stated therein did not constitute an offense against the laws of the United States. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant then pleaded not guilty. [162 U.S. 420, 422] The evidence adduced at the trial tended to prove that one M. H. Flint, a United States post-office inspector, having seen in the Los Angeles Herald a certain advertis ment bearing the address, 'Spero, box 60, this office,' mailed to that address a letter referring to the subject of the advertisement, signed 'Susan H. Budlong, P. O. box 661, Los Angeles, Cal.,' and received in answer thereto, through the post office at Los Angeles, a letter signed 'Spero,' being the letter described in the first count of the indictment; that Flint then sent another letter, signed as above, and, having received an answer thereto signed 'Spero,' wrote a third time, and afterwards received out of the said post office a letter signed 'A. D. A., 313 N. Broadway,' being the letter described in the second count of the indictment. All the letters so received by Flint were inclosed in plain sealed envelopes, neither of which bore any writing save the address. Evidence was also introduced tending to connect the defendant with the mailing of the letters.
At the close of all the testimony, the defendant requested the court to give the jury certain instructions, which request was refused Other instructions were given instead, which do not appear in the record. To the court's refusal to give the instructions proposed by the defendant, and to the giving of other instructions, the defendant excepted. [162 U.S. 420, 423] J. Marion Brooks and M. D. Brainard, for plaintiff in error.
Error is attributed to the court below in permitting the witness Flint to testify in the case, for the reason that he was an officer of the United States, and that correspondence was carried on, through the mails, for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence from the defendant upon which to base the prosecution. A similar contention was disposed of by this court in the case of Grimm v. U. S., 156 U.S. 604 , 15 Sup. Ct. 470, where it was said: 'It does not appear that it was the purpose of the post- office inspector to induce or solicit the commission of a crime, but it was to ascertain whether the defendant was engaged in an unlawful business. The mere facts that the letters were written under an assumed name, and that the writer was a government official (a 'detective,' he may be called ), do not of themselves constitute a defense to the crime actually committed. The official, suspecting that the defendant was engaged in a business offensive to good morals, sought information directly from him; and the defendant, responding thereto, violated a law of the United States by using the mails to convey such information, and he cannot plead in defense that he would not have violated the law if inquiry had not been made of him by the government official.' Goode v. U. S., 159 U.S. 663 , 16 Sup. Ct. 136, though under a different statute, is to the like effect.
Owing, perhaps, to the doubt thus suggested, it was held in several of the lower courts that the word 'letter,' thus introduced into the statute, must, in the light of the other words used, be deemed to be some sort of a publication, and not merely private sealed letters. U. S. v. Wilson, 58 Fed. 768; U. S. v. Warner, 59 Fed. 355; and U. S. v. Jarvis, Id. 357. The contrary view is taken in U. S. v. Andrews, 58 Fed. 861 (the present case); in U. S. v. Nathan, 61 Fed. 936; and in U. S. v. Ling, Id. 1001.
However, any doubt there may have been as to the proper meaning to be given to the word has been removed by the case above cited, of Grimm v. U. S., where mailing a private sealed letter, in an envelope on which nothing appeared but the name and address, but containing obscene matter, was held to be an offense within the statute.
It is likewise argued that, because of the provision of the law that 'nothing in this act shall authorize any person to open any letter or sealed matter of the first class not addressed to himself' (25 Stat. 496), the act of the inspector in opening the letters addressed to 'Susan H. Budlong' was itself an offense against the law, which would vitiate the evidence thus produced against the defendant. The inspector, however, testified that he and Susan H. Budlong were the same person, or, in other words, that the address was fictitious.
Complaint is made because the court failed to give defendant's requests for instructions; but the instructions actually given by the court are not disclosed by the record, and we may presume that such instructions covered the defendant's requests so far as they stated the law correctly. This we are [162 U.S. 420, 425] the more ready to do in the present case as no specific exceptions were taken to the action of the court in refusing or in giving instructions. Reagan v. Aiken, 138 U.S. 109 , 11 Sup. Ct. 283.

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