Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/254/189/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 03:58:25+00:00

Document:
1. In a case properly here on a constitutional question under Jud.Code § 238, the court retains its jurisdiction to decide other questions presented, after the constitutional question has been settled in another case. P. 254 U. S. 191.
in violation of the Anti-Narcotic Act by issuing a prescription, the clause as to issuing the prescription, being intimately involved in the description of the offense, cannot be treated as surplusage, but it is not repugnant to the charge of selling, since, under the act, one person may take a principal part in a prohibited sale of morphine belonging to another by issuing a prescription for it, in view of Crim.Code, § 332, making whoever aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures the commission of an offense as principal. P. 254 U. S. 192.
3. Subdivision (a) of § 2 of the Anti-Narcotic Act, in allowing the dispensing or distribution of narcotic drugs "to a patient" by a registered physician "in the course of his professional practice only," confines the immunity strictly within the appropriate bounds of a physician's professional practice, not permitting sales to dealers or distributions intended to satisfy the appetites or cravings of persons addicted to the use of such drugs. P. 254 U. S. 194.
4. In a criminal prosecution in the district court in Pennsylvania, the defendant's wife is not competent to testify for her husband, either generally or by contradicting testimony that certain matters transpired in her presence. P. 254 U. S. 195.
been overruled (253 F. 213), he brought the case here by direct writ of error under § 238 Judicial Code upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the act. Afterwards, this question was set at rest by our decision in United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, sustaining the act, but our jurisdiction continues for the purpose of disposing of other questions raised in the record. Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216; Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239.
These questions relate to the sufficiency of the indictment, the adequacy of the evidence to warrant a conviction, the admissibility of certain evidence offered by defendant and rejected by the trial court, and the instructions given and refused to be given to the jury.
"was not then and there a patient of the said Jin Fuey Moy, and the said morphine sulphate was dispensed and distributed by the said Jin Fuey Moy not in the course of his professional practice only, contrary to the form of the act of Congress,"
"Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission is a principal."
Taking this together with the clauses quoted from § 2 of the Anti-Narcotic Act, it is easy to see, and the evidence in this case demonstrates, that one may take a principal part in a prohibited sale of an opium derivative belonging to another person by unlawfully issuing a prescription to the would-be purchaser. Hence, there is no necessary repugnance between prescribing and selling, and the indictment must be sustained.
"they were taking too big a chance, and I must go back to the Chinaman and tell him what he told me, and he would understand -- the Chinaman would understand."
Witness returned the two prescriptions to defendant, told him what the manager had said, and defendant retained those prescriptions and issued to the witness a new one for 16 drams in place of them, with which the witness returned to the drugstore and procured the specified quantity of the drug.
In each case where defendant was found guilty, the evidence fully warranted the jury in finding that he aided, abetted, and procured a sale of morphine sulphate without written order upon a blank form issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and that he did this by means of a prescription issued not to a patient and not in the course of his professional practice, contrary to the prohibition of § 2 of the act. Manifestly the phrases "to a patient" and "in the course of his professional practice only" are intended to confine the immunity of a registered physician, in dispensing the narcotic drugs mentioned in the act, strictly within the appropriate bounds of a physician's professional practice, and not to extend it to include a sale to a dealer or a distribution intended to cater to the appetite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use of the drug. A "prescription" issued for either of the latter purposes protects neither the physician who issues it nor the dealer who knowingly accepts and fills it. Webb v. United States, 249 U. S. 96.
Errors assigned to the instructions given and refused to be given by the trial judge to the jury are disposed of by what we have said.
But a single point remains -- hardly requiring mention -- the refusal to permit defendant's wife to testify in his behalf. It is conceded that she was not a competent witness for all purposes, a wife's evidence not having been admissible at the time of the first Judiciary Act, and the relaxation of the rule in this regard by § 858, Rev.Stats., being confined to civil actions. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 144 U. S. 299-302; Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79, 219 U. S. 91. But, it is said, the general rule does not apply to exclude the wife's evidence in the present case, because she was offered not "in behalf of her husband" -- that is, not to prove his innocence, but simply to contradict the testimony of particular witnesses for the government who had testified to certain matters as having transpired in her presence. The distinction is without substance. The rule that excludes a wife from testifying for her husband is based upon her interest in the event, and applies irrespective of the kind of testimony she might give.
"Sec. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the aforesaid drugs except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. . . . Nothing contained in this section shall apply --"
"(a) To the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this act in the course of his professional practice only: Provided, that such physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon shall keep a record of all such drugs dispensed or distributed, showing the amount dispensed or distributed, the date, and the name and address of the patient to whom such drugs are dispensed or distributed, except such as may be dispensed or distributed to a patient upon whom such physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon shall personally attend; . . ."
"(b) To the sale, dispensing, or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs by a dealer to a consumer under and in pursuance of a written prescription issued by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this act. . . ."

References: § 238
 § 332
 § 2
 § 238
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 § 2
 § 2
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 § 858
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