Source: https://www.uclpractitioner.com/class_actions_certification/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:37:37+00:00

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Posts categorized "Class actions - certification"
Earlier this year, in Schermer v. Tatum, 245 Cal.App.4th 912 (Mar. 18, 2016), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) affirmed the trial court's order sustaining the defendants' demurrer to the class allegations without leave to amend. The action alleged UCL and other violations in connection with various aspects of defendants' operation of eighteen separate mobilehome parks.
In a fact-heavy discussion, the Court of Appeal determined that common questions did not predominate. Id. at 922-30.
In Schmidt v. California Highway Patrol, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Aug. 1, 2016), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Six) affirmed an order granting class certification (slip op. at 8-9), as well as the ensuing judgment (id. at 10-11) and attorneys' fees award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (id. at 11-12).
The opinion (briefly) discusses the elements of class certification, mainly ascertainability, numerosity and typicality. A class consisting of "the vast majority" of 187 persons was sufficiently numerous; the class members' identities need not be proven at the certification stage; and "[t]ypicality refers to the nature of the claim of the class representative, not the specific facts from which the claim arose. (Seastrom v. Neways, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502.)" Slip op. at 9.
New Ninth Circuit class certification opinion: Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc.
In June, the Ninth Circuit handed down a wonderful new class certification opinion, Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jun. 8, 2016).
[T]he complaint contains a “common contention” that easily “is capable of classwide resolution”: it is one type of injury allegedly inflicted by one actor in violation of one legal norm against a relatively small number of class members who all generally performed the same work. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. The district court permissibly concluded that Vaquero had pleaded a common injury capable of class-wide resolution.
Our precedent is well settled on this point. In Yokoyama, we held that “damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification.” 594 F.3d at 1094. That is, the “amount of damages is invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action treatment.” Id. (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975)). We have repeatedly confirmed the Yokoyama holding that the need for individualized findings as to the amount of damages does not defeat class certification. See Leyva, 716 F.3d at 514 (holding that “the presence of individualized damages cannot, by itself, defeat class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)”); Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Leyva was the “controlling case,” and that individual damages calculations did not defeat class certification), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2835 (2015). Indeed, “Yokoyama remains the law of this court, even after Comcast.” Pulaski & Middleman, 802 F.3d at 988.
The opinion also considers the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, handed down in March, in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036 (2016). In Tyson Foods, the Supreme Court "declined to establish" a "'broad rule against the use in class actions of what the parties call representative evidence.'" Vaquero, slip op. at 10 (quoting Tyson Foods, 136 S.Ct. at 1046). Instead, the Supreme Court "held that class certification was appropriate even though class members might have to prove liability and damages individually." Id. (citing Tyson Foods, 136 S.Ct. at 1046) (emphasis in original). The opinion goes on to cite claim forms and special master proceedings as examples of management tools that would not preclude assertion of individual defenses, and to note that Tyson Foods permits use of representative sampling in a proper case. Id. at 11-12.
Congratulations to my friends Michael Rubin, Kevin Barnes, Gregg Lander, and Michael Singer on this great result.
You know, after Dukes, and again after Comcast, I was very concerned that those opinions would be misconstrued in the lower courts and employed as tools to deny class certification far more often than we had previously seen. These fears were unfounded, at least within the Ninth Circuit.
In Alberts v. Aurora Behavioral Health Care, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Oct. 16, 2015), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division One) reversed an order denying class certification of meal period and rest break claims.
Slip op. at 18-19 (footnote omitted).
The opinion also addresses the use of expert statistical evidence at the class certification stage. Id. at 22-26.
The Ninth Circuit has issued quite a few new class certification opinions recently. In a third recent opinion, Alcantar v. Hobart Service, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2015), the Court reversed in part an order denying class certification in a wage and hour action. The action alleged that the defendant violated the Labor Code and the UCL by not compensating employees for "the time they spent commuting in [the employer]’s service vehicles from their homes to their job sites and from those job sites back home." Slip op. at 4.
Among other things, the Court held that the district court erred by requiring, as a prerequisite to certification, proof that the defendant maintained a "uniform policy requiring technicians to commute in the service vehicles." Id. at 12. Whether such a policy exists is a merits question, and the district court improperly reached it at the certification stage. Id. at 12-13 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1191, 1197 (2013)).
The opinion upheld the trial court's order denying class certification of related meal period and rest break claims. Citing no authority other than Rule 23, the opinion states that the denial was within the district court's discretion "because questions as to why service technicians missed their meal and rest breaks, whether because of their employer’s failure to provide them or their own choice to forgo them, would predominate over questions common to the class." Slip op. at 13-14. This conclusion, unfortunately, is wholly inconsistent with the legal standard articulated by the California Supreme Court for meal periods in Brinker. For citations to opinions that correctly apply Brinker, see this link.
In the next section of the opinion, the Court applied the Morillion "control" test in holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in the defendant's favor on the commute time claim. Slip op. at 14-18. One justice dissented from this portion of the opinion. Id. at 22-31. In the final section, the Court held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in defendant's favor on the derivative PAGA claim because the PAGA notice letter was inadequate. Id. at 19-22.
In Bobbitt v. Milberg LLP, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2015), the Ninth Circuit reversed an order denying class certification of legal malpractice claims against several law firms and attorneys. The panel held that Arizona law governed the claims, and that the district court erred in holding that different states' laws applied depending on each class member's domicile. Slip op. at 8-12.
New class certification opinion: Mies v. Sephora U.S.A., Inc.
In Mies v. Sephora U.S.A., Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Feb. 2, 2015; pub. ord. Feb. 26, 2015), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division One) affirmed an order denying class certification in an employee misclassification case.
This is not a case like Williams v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1358, 1369–1370 or Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996, in which the class disputes (which were not misclassification disputes) centered on whether application of a uniform policy (no compensation for time before arrival at first worksite; no compensation for at home “computer sync time”) was lawful. If unlawful, some class members would be damaged and some might not be, but the employer would face liability as to each. Here, the question is not the legality of Sephora’s operational procedures. Instead, the parties dispute the evidentiary value of the policies—Mies claims they demonstrate total uniformity in the tasks Specialists perform and the manner in which they perform them. Sephora disagrees, and points to the varied declarations of Sephora employees, evidence the trial court credited. Thus, unlike in Williams and Jones, the policies here are just a piece of a far more complicated puzzle and do not, in light of the trial court’s factual determinations, provide a means of readily determining liability issues for the entire proposed class. The same rationale distinguishes Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726, in which the issue was whether a policy regarding meal and rest breaks was unlawful on its face as to all class members.
Id. at 20-21 (footnote omitted).
Last week, on February 18, 2015, the Supreme Court depublished the Court of Appeal's opinion in In re Walgreen Co. Overtime Cases, 231 Cal.App.4th 437 (2014). The opinion is no longer citable as a precedent.
In Walgreen, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division One) affirmed the trial court's order denying class certification of meal period claims. In so doing, the Court discussed the substantive meal period standards adopted in Brinker, but did so in a manner that the Supreme Court apparently considered inconsistent with its Brinker opinion. Depublication requests were filed by both CELA and CAOC.
This development is just as important as the Supreme Court's orders, in late 2012 and early 2013, depublishing three other post-Brinker opinions. Those orders are discussed in these blog posts.
New post-Brinker class certification opinion: Gerard v. Orange Coast Mem. Med. Ctr.
In Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center, ___ Cal. App.4th ___ (Feb. 10, 2015), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) reversed the trial court's order granting the defendant's preemptive motion to deny class certification.
Such motions are discussed here, as well as in my article, “A Tool for Mischief: Preemptive Defense Motions Under BCBG Overtime Cases to Reject Class Certification,” CAOC Forum, January/February 2009 (with Kevin K. Green) (CAOC members-only link).
[Plaintiffs] argue the court improperly denied class certification for several reasons. Among other things they cite as an abuse of discretion the court’s community interest analysis based on its erroneous “legal assumption that ‘liability is not established by an illegal policy.’” Plaintiffs contend that assumption is contrary to the holding of Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 1033, and Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 232. We conclude this argument has merit.
As we have explained above, plaintiffs have shown their invalid second meal period policy and waiver theory is potentially viable, and plaintiffs have proffered substantial evidence hospital violated the governing law by failing to provide second meal periods or premium pay in lieu thereof on shifts longer than 12 hours as required. The court’s contrary conclusions rest on improper criteria and assumptions that are erroneous as a matter of law. Consequently, we conclude the court abused its discretion by denying [plaintiffs] class certification on the grounds plaintiffs failed to show they have any claim. We express no opinion on the other stated grounds for denial of class certification but instead direct the court to consider them further on remand.
Id. at 20-21. Another reason for reversing the order would be that the trial court improperly reached and resolved a substantive merits question at the class certification stage, which Brinker held should be avoided unless such issues are "enmeshed" with the elements of certification, or unless resolution of such issues is "essential" or "necessary" to the certification decision. See Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1023, 1025. As a general matter, plaintiffs are not required to prove that a challenged policy is in fact unlawful in order to obtain class certification.
Last week, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for review in Dynamex Operations West v. Superior Court, No. S222732. In that case, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Seven) vacated, in part, the trial court's order denying the defendant's motion to decertify certain wage and hour claims. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal.App.4th 718 (2014), review granted.
In answering this question, the Supreme Court may well have an opportunity to expand on its three most recent class certification opinions, namely, Brinker, Duran, and Ayala. It's hard to predict how far the Court might delve into class certification issues when it ultimately decides this case, which could be two or three years from now.
This litigation has already resulted in one published opinion on class certification issues. In Lee v. Dynamex, Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 1325 (2008), the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying class certification. My post on that opinion is here.
Many thanks to the blog reader who wrote to advise me of the grant of review.
Almost a year ago, I put together a list of twelve post-Brinker class certification opinions of note in wage and hour cases. One of the opinions was Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings, 221 Cal.App.4th 1148 (2013), in which the Supreme Court granted review in early 2014.
In the original Martinez opinion, filed in December 2013, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Seven) reversed the trial court's order denying class certification in an employee misclassification case. Here is my blog post on the opinion.
In July 2014, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider the matter in light of Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn., 59 Cal.4th 1 (2014).
In November 2014, the Court of Appeal handed down a new opinion, in which it once again reversed the order denying class certification. Martinez v. Joe's Crab Shack Holdings, 231 Cal.App.4th 362 (2014). The opinion discusses both Duran and Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal.4th 522 (2014), decided in late June 2014.
A petition for rehearing was denied in early December 2014, and a petition for review was filed in late December 2014. Here's the link to the Supreme Court's docket (No. S223373). The deadline to grant or deny review will fall in late February 2015 (absent any extensions of time). UPDATE: On February 11, 2015, the petition for review was denied.
In related news, in September 2014, the Supreme Court declined to review the Court of Appeal's opinion in Hall v. Rite Aid Corp., 226 Cal.App.4th 278 (2014), a thirteenth post-Brinker opinion of note. In Hall, the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) reversed the trial court's order decertifying the class in a suitable seating case.
At some point, I intend to update my list of post-Brinker opinions to include both of these developments.
New class certification opinion: Cochran v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc.
In Cochran v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Aug. 12, 2014), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Two) reversed an order denying class certification of a claim for violation of Labor Code section 2802, which relates to reimbursment of expenses.
The opinion is short but interesting, and discusses Duran.
Speaking of which, I'm collecting orders of California Superior Court judges construing Duran. If you have copies of any, please forward. I will post links to the collection once I have a few more. Right now, I only have two, but there must be more out there. Thanks in advance.
In Stockwell v. City and County of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2014), the district court denied class certification of plaintiffs' age discrimination claim under FEHA, holding that the plaintiffs had not established the existence of a common question under Rule 23(a).
We conclude that the district court erred in denying class certification because of its legal error of evaluating merits questions, rather than focusing on whether the questions presented, whether meritorious or not, were common to the members of the putative class. By doing so, the district court made an error of law and relied on improper factors, thereby abusing its discretion.
Here, the officers have identified a single, well-enunciated, uniform policy that, allegedly, generated all the disparate impact of which they complain: the SFPD's decision to make investigative assignments using the Q–50 List instead of the Q–35 List. Each member of the putative class was on the Q–35 List. Each suffered the effects of its elimination, whatever those were.
The officers produced a statistical study purportedly showing a disparate impact. The district court, and the City, critiqued that study as inadequate for—among other reasons—failing to conduct a regression analysis to take account of alternative explanations, unrelated to age, for any statistical imbalance. But whatever the failings of the class's statistical analysis, they affect every class member's claims uniformly, just as the materiality issue in Amgen affected every class member uniformly. Each member of the putative class suffered the effects of eliminating the Q–35 List. If those effects amount to a disparate impact on account of age, it will be so for all class members or for none; their claims rise and fall together.
Id. at 1114-15 (footnote omitted). The panel remanded with directions to the district court to assess whether the other requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied.
This class action was brought by newspaper carriers who were classified as independent contractors rather than employees. The trial court denied class certification, and the Court of Appeal reversed as to most of the claims. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 210 Cal.App.4th 77 (2012), review granted.
It originally appeared that the Supreme Court was interested in the class certification issues presented in the case, but the oral argument reportedly focused entirely on the substantive question of whether the workers were properly classified. It will be interesting to see the opinion this morning.
Yesterday, the California Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion, Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association, ___ Cal.4th ___ (May 29, 2014). The ruling is a victory for the Duran plaintiffs, who now have their putative class action back, along with an opportunity to re-try their case on remand, and clear guidance on how to successfully litigate their case going forward.
For class action plaintiffs generally, the ruling is also a victory. Try as they might, defense-side interests failed to achieve their goal of eliminating the class action as a procedural device in misclassification cases involving an exemption defense.
To the contrary, in Duran, the Supreme Court confirmed principles critical to preserving the class action procedure as a tool for courts to use when they need to efficiently adjudicate the claims of large groups of plaintiffs against a single defendant.
For example, under Duran, "[s]tatistical sampling may provide an appropriate means of proving liability and damages" in class action litigation. Slip op. at 2 (emphasis added). The Court provided ten pages of guidance on how to develop and use this type of evidence. See id. at 40-49.
As previously held in both Sav-on and Brinker, class certification may be granted even if the case presents individualized issues in addition to the common ones. The pertinent question is whether the individualized issues can be effectively managed. Slip op. at 22-25. Statistical sampling is one of many available management tools that the trial court may allow the parties to use. See id. at 27.
The opinion clarifies that a defendant's affirmative defenses should be considered at the class certification stage, and that the trial management plan must allow the defendant to present them—which, the Court held, the plan adopted by the trial court in Duran did not. Slip op. at 29-35. However, the defendant may not dictate to the trial court how the defenses are presented.
U.S. Bank argued that it had a due process right to adjudicate its exemption defense by calling every class member to the stand. As a result, the bank claimed, there could be no class action because the individualized evidence it wanted to present would swamp the common evidence. The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning in Duran.
Instead, the Court held that defendants do "not have an unfettered right to present individualized evidence in support of a defense," let alone "a due process right to litigate an affirmative defense as to each individual class member." Id. at 30, 35. The defendant's "opportunity to present proof of affirmative defenses" must adhere to "whatever method the court and parties fashion" for their trial. Id. at 50. The defendant must be allowed to present its defenses (an issue that was undisputed in Duran), but there is a give and take. If the plaintiff proposes to use statistical proof, the trial court must adopt a trial management plan that accommodates the defenses, but on the flip side, the defendant cannot defeat certification by insisting on presentng its evidence in a manner contrary to the plan.
There is a lot more to be said about the Duran opinion, and much more I am sure will be written about it in the coming weeks. Bryan Schwartz has a post on the opinion here and Scott Leviant has one here. I think Duran is likely to be spun initially as a defense victory, but time will tell a different story, as happened after Brinker. The flaws in the underlying litigation in Duran were unique to that case, and they are unlikely to reappear in other litigation. In the Court's words, the case was "an exceedingly rare beast." Slip op. at 1. Although the Duran judgment stands reversed, the broader legal principles announced in the opinion reinforce the bedrock on which the class action procedure stands in California.
On a personal side note, my blogging has been sparse this past month due to the press of other business, including two summary judgment oppositions and a class cert. reply. I am also in the process of relocating my office to another building in San Francisco, and I will have a blog post with my new address after we've moved. Finally, my service provider TypePad has been the target of a series of DDoS attacks in recent weeks. These attacks have taken down the TypePad website and all TypePad blogs, including mine, temporarily. If you visit and the site is down, that is probably the reason. It will be back soon.
The Supreme Court has just announced that tomorrow morning (Thursday, May 29, 2014), it will be handing down its opinion in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association, no. S200923.
A thirteenth post-Brinker class certification opinion: Hall v. Rite Aid Corp.
In Hall v. Rite Aid Corp., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (May 2, 2014; pub. ord. May 16, 2014), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) reversed the trial court's order decertifying the class in an action involving the Wage Orders' suitable seating requirement.
Other than to note that this case is thirteenth in the list of notable post-Brinker class certification decisions, I will say no more. You must go over and read Scott Leviant's post from last Friday on the opinion.

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