Source: http://www.bevanbrittan.com/insights/articles/2017/authorityupdate20170127/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:49:48+00:00

Document:
Norfolk CC v Information Commissioner (Allowed: Freedom of Information Act 2000)  UKFTT 2016/0161 (GRC) (FTT GRC): the Council appealed against the IC's Decision Notice requiring it to disclose information requested by a journalist about to the Council’s system of regular risk assessment of schools and its assignment of each school to one of three categories. The Council refused the information request, relying on s.33(1) and s.36(2)(b)(i) & (ii) FOIA 2000. The IC ruled that the balance of public interest favoured disclosure.
The Tribunal held, allowing the appeal, that the balance of public interest favoured maintaining the exemption from disclosure under s.36 (2)(b)(i) & (ii). The public interest in transparency about the Council’s running of schools had to be balanced against evidence from those directly involved in the system of a significant risk that it would fail to operate as effectively and thus achieve its goal of improving school performance were the risk category data to be published. On the basis of the Head Teachers’ evidence, there was a significant risk that schools would cease to provide voluntarily the range of data currently provided were the categorisation of the school to become public and such a risk posed a grave threat to the continuation of the current system. Whilst the risk of misinterpretation of information by others was in most cases insufficient to favour maintaining these exemptions, it would not be reasonable to expect the Council or each school to contextualise a rating based on a subjective judgement by others of data taken in seven snapshots over a year for 400 schools. Such an exercise would involve significant resources and thus very probably lead to a scaling back of the system currently in operation.
Hackney LBC v Williams  EWCA Civ 26 (CA): the Council appealed against the High Court's decision that it had failed to comply with its statutory duty under the Children Act 1989 and were liable to pay damages for breach of Art.8 ECHR. W's eight children were removed into police protection for 72 hours under s.46 of the Children Act 1989. W were arrested on suspicion of assault and bailed on condition that they would not have unsupervised contact with their children. The Council placed the children in foster care and obtained the parents' signature to an agreement under s.20 of the Children Act 1989 authorising the Council's continued accommodation of the children away from their parents. W were not told of their right to take the children home at the end of the 72 hour police protection period, nor that their children could have been accommodated with family or friends. W obtained legal advice and withdrew consent to the children being accommodated by the Council. The Council concluded that the children were not at a continuing risk of harm from W, but refused to return the children due to the bail condition. The bail condition was eventually varied two months later and the children returned home. The judge allowed an extension of the time limit for bringing the claim, as W had been attempting to obtain redress through the local government complaints system and the LGO. He concluded that retention of the children after the initial 72 hour period of police protection was unlawful and, in assessing damages, he took the view that there were facts that made the non-consensual separation of the children from their parents more distressing than would normally be expected.
R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Rev 1)  UKSC 5 (Sup Ct): this case concerned the steps which were required as a matter of UK domestic law before the process of leaving the European Union could be initiated and in particular, whether a formal notice of withdrawal under Art.50 TEU could lawfully be given by ministers without prior legislation passed in both Houses of Parliament and assented to by HM the Queen. The Divisional Court declared that the Secretary of State did not have power to give Notice, without Parliament’s prior authority.
The case also raised devolution issues requiring the court to consider whether the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (NIA), and associated agreements, required primary legislation, and the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly and/or the people of Northern Ireland, before a Notice could be served. Under each of the devolution settlements, the devolved legislatures had responsibilities to comply with EU law, and under the Sewel Convention, the UK Parliament will not normally exercise its right to legislate with regard to devolved matters without the agreement of the devolved legislature.
The Supreme Court held, dismissing the Secretary of State’s appeal by a majority of 8 to 3, that an Act of Parliament was required to authorise ministers to give Notice of the decision of the UK to withdraw from the EU. The Supreme Court considered that the terms of the European Communities Act 1972, which gave effect to the UK’s membership of the EU, were inconsistent with the exercise by ministers of any power to withdraw from the EU Treaties without authorisation by a prior Act of Parliament.
The 2016 referendum was of great political significance. However, its legal significance was determined by what Parliament included in the statute authorising it, and that statute simply provided for the referendum to be held without specifying the consequences. The change in the law required to implement the referendum’s outcome must be made in the only way permitted by the UK constitution, namely by legislation. The Government accepted that the resolution of the House of Commons on 7 December 2016 calling on ministers to give notice under Article 50 by 31 March 2017 was a political act which did not affect the issues arising in the appeals.
DBEIS: Building our industrial strategy: this Green Paper sets out the Government's vision for a modern industrial strategy and some early actions that it has committed to take. It identifies 10 pillars to drive forward the Government's industrial strategy across the entire economy. It is seeking comments about the skills, research, infrastructure and the other things needed to get right to drive long term growth in productivity. Pillar 10 "Creating the right institutions to bring together sectors and places" includes commitments: to work with local government to review how to bring more business expertise into local governance, and improve links between councils and the private sector, such as creating a modern “Alderman” type of role within local government; further devolution deals for the largest cities; the LGA to work with new Mayoral Combined Authorities to build up administrative capacity; and to work with Local Enterprise Partnerships to review their role in delivering local growth. The closing date for responses is 17 April 2017.
Williams v Surrey Heath BC  EWCA Civ 23 (CA): W was employed by the Council as a revenue control officer. The Council introduced a new pay structure in 1999 as part of a job evaluation scheme. W's job was found to have been over-valued and it was categorised as a lower grade, grade 8, in the pay structure. The Council therefore created a "personal grade" for her which reflected as closely as possible, and was no less favourable than, her current pay and she was placed in grade 9.37. She could move up that grade until she reached at least the maximum which she could have attained in her former position but could then rise no further. She reached that highest point, 9.38, in 2000. In 2004 salary levels for higher grade posts were increased following a regarding exercise and salaries for posts at 9.38 were increased but W's salary did not increase. W retired in 2005 and her pension was calculated by reference to her 40 years' service and her final salary. W contended that her ongoing pension payments were under-calculated as a consequence of the wrong final salary being adopted in the relevant calculations – she argued that her contractual right was to be paid whatever salary was allocated to 9.38 so when that sum was increased following the 2004 restructuring, she was entitled to it in the same way as any other employee on that grade. She submitted that by refusing to pay the increase to her, the Council was in substance placing her on a completely new grade which was not found on the Council's salary scales at all. She sought a declaration as to what her final salary ought to have been, and also claimed damages for breach of various contractual rights including loss of pay and pension. The issue was whether she had a contractual right to be paid whatever salary was attached to grade 9.38 in all circumstances.
Government Equalities Office: Mandatory gender pay gap reporting – Public sector: sets out the Government's response to the August 2016 consultation on mandatory gender pay gap reporting for public sector employers.
Hackney LBC v Haque  EWCA Civ 4 (CA): this case considered issues about the impact of the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) on a local housing authority's discharge of its duties under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 (HA 1996). It concerned the relationship between the PSED and the authority's duty under s.193 HA 1996 to "secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant" where the authority was satisfied that an applicant was "homeless, eligible for assistance and has a priority need, and are not satisfied that he became homeless intentionally".
The Council accepted that H was vulnerable by reason of physical disability and mental ill health, and therefore in priority need, and offered him a single room on the third floor of a hostel. H complained that the room was unsuitable by reason of particular aspects of his physical and mental condition, and sought a review. The judge quashed the reviewing officer's decision, ruling that he had not demonstrated that he had complied with the PSED when conducting his review. The Council appealed, arguing that the judge had misinterpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Hotak v Southwark LBC  AC 811 by assuming that it would be necessary for the reviewing officer expressly to spell out his decision-making by reference to each of the requirements in the PSED, which the reviewing officer did not do.
R (Kensington and Chelsea RLBC) v Ealing LBC  EWHC 24 (Admin) (Admin Ct): this case considered upon which housing authority the housing duty under the Housing Act 1996 fell where there had been a cessation of housing duty by one authority and a new application made to another housing authority.

References: EWCA 
 Art.8
 UKSC 
 Art.50
 EWCA 
 EWCA