Source: http://masudco.com/en/english-internet/29-the-current-risk-to-employers-the-liability-to-a-business-when-an-employee-uses-internet-communications-for-threatening-or-offensive-purposes
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:05:20+00:00

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What happens when you have a rogue or even out of control employee that uses an office computer to send or even post threats of great bodily harm or uses an office computer to generate other highly offensive communications? Can an employer who ends up being sured for such conduct assert a defense of immunity under the provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230. This particular federal law defense of immunity actually does preempt inconsistent state law that might otherwise impose liability in certain circumstances. The Act immunizes “provider[s] . . . of an interactive computer service” (the employer) where “another information content provider” (the employee) has initiated the offending activity.
While the facts considered recently by a California Court of Appeal in Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790 are unquestionably extreme and will not likely be encountered in garden-variety employment situations, the CDA immunity defense could well apply in more benign or commonplace circumstances as a result of the court's ruling in this particular case.
The employer terminated the employee. The victims of the employee’s threats sued the employee and the employer for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision or retention. The plaintiffs in the lawsuit claimed the employer was aware that the employee was using its computer system to threaten them. The further argued that the employe took no action to prevent the co-defendent employee from continuing to make threats over the Internet.
Some may consider this particular scenario far fetched. The case was presented as one of first impression in Delfino v. Agilent. The California appellate court determined that an employer could in fact assert the immunity defense under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230.
In asking the court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ case, the employer filed a motion for summary judgment, in which it asserted that the employer was a “provider . . . of an interactive computer service”, and therefore entitled to complete immunity under the CDA. Section 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” The statute also preempts inconsistent state law that would impose liability, saying: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Section 230(e)(3), italics added.
Considering the second element of the test, (whether the cause of action treated the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information), the court found that plaintiffs, in alleging that the employer was liable for the employee’s cyber threats, sought to treat the employer “as a publisher or speaker” of those messages. (§ 230(c)(1).) Id.
In its decision, the court also noted that, even if plaintiffs’ claims had not been barred under section 230(c)(1), granting summary judgment to the employer was nonetheless proper. The court reached this conclusion because plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case on their claims against the employer. Id. at 808. In this regard, the court specifically held that there was no indication that the employer ratified in any manner the employee’s conduct, and that the employer could not be liable under theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 810-12. In addition, there was not even any evidence that the employer was even aware of the employee's conduct. Id. at 815.
The court noted that imposing derivative liability on the employer for an employee’s actions need not be founded on respondeat superior. Such liability can also be based upon the doctrine of ratification as discussed in Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 852). In that case, the court observed that an employee’s actions may be ratified after the fact by the employer’s voluntary election to adopt the employee’s conduct. This is done, in essence, by treating the conduct as that of the employer's own. Id. at 810.
In considering what evidence can support the ratification theory, the Delfino court cited the California Civil Code § 2339. The court, in citing that provision, determined that an employer’s failure to discharge an employee after knowledge of his or her wrongful acts may be used as evidence that can support ratification of that employee’s conduct.

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