Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/70/752/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:26:48+00:00

Document:
1. Though the general rule in cases of appeal undoubtedly is that the transcript of the record must be filed and the case docketed at the term next succeeding the appeal, yet the rule necessarily has exceptions, and where the appellant, without fault on his part, is prevented from seasonably obtaining the transcript by the fraud of the other party or by the ill founded order of the court below or by the contumacy of its clerk, the rule will not apply.
if the suit be an appeal in a land case from the California District in which the United States is a party, it may apply to the district attorney for a transcript, the latter as well as the clerk having power under an Act of Congress of March 3, 1861, in such cases of appeal, to transcribe and certify the record to this Court.
3. In proceedings under the Act of March 3, 1851, for the settlement of private land claims in California, where the claimant produces neither a concession nor a grant and does not prove that he ever had possession of the land described in his petition, the claim is rightly disallowed.
4. Where a decree was obtained by fraud, still if in form correct, it is sufficient as against the appellee to sustain the appeal, correct the error, and dispose of the case.
This was an appeal by the United States from a decree of the district court for Southern California under the Act of March 3, 1851, to settle private land claims in California reversing a decision of the Board of Land Commissioners and confirming to one Vincente Gomez a claim for a tract or rancho called the Panoche Grande.
So far as the title involved in the claim of Gomez was concerned, the case could embrace nothing, of course, but the question whether title was shown or not -- whether the claim was well founded or the reverse of it.
had been the counsel of Gomez, one Ord, having become the representative at law of the United States as the district attorney for that part of California, entered into a bargain with Gomez to allow a reversal by the district court of the decree of the board and a consequent confirmation of the claim on condition of receiving himself a portion of the land, which afterwards he did receive. By such an abuse and betrayal of his official trust, as the reporter understood the case, the decree above mentioned was obtained. So far as Gomez was concerned, therefore, whatever title he had derived no validity from the decree.
The allegation was, however, that the land was now owned by McGarrahan, who purchased it in December, 1857, after a decree of confirmation was pronounced by the court, who having had no suspicion that there was anything fraudulent in the judicial proceedings by which the title was confirmed, was not affected by Ord's fraudulent act, and who stood in the position of an innocent purchaser without notice.
Representing this person and desiring to get the case dismissed from the court, as the first step in establishing his title, Messrs. Cushing and Stone, in his behalf, set up that this Court had no jurisdiction of the case. Urging with what force they could on the evidence, McGarrahan's title as a bona fide purchaser for value of a title regular on its face, they set up further, pressing it strongly, that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
1st. Because the appeal was not taken within five years from the date of the decree.
2d. Because there was no citation.
3d. Because the appeal was not entered at the term of this Court next succeeding the appeal.
4th. Because the pretended appeal, by virtue of which this entry was made, lost all its legal effect, by reason of the subsequent proceedings, in the district court, on the part of the United States District Attorney.
5th. Because the decree appealed from was not a final decree.
with by the reader. Its particulars are complicated and dull, perhaps, as well. The history has been once told in the reports of two years since. [Footnote 1] But not to refer the reader for half the case to a volume which he may not have at hand, the reporter must request him to tolerate a repetition and read it again.
"And it appearing that, on the 5th June, 1857, the lands had been confirmed by the court to the said claimant, and it having been omitted to sign and enter a decree therefor at the date last aforesaid, it is ordered that the same be done now for then."
"It appearing that heretofore, to-wit, on the 5th June, 1857 &c., the claim in this case had been confirmed by the court, but that it had been omitted by the court to sign the decree of confirmation at the time the same was made. It is therefore further ordered by the court that the same be signed now as then."
"That all proceedings heretofore had in the cause be set aside, and the cause be put on the calendar, and set for trial de novo, according to law."
But behold a new incident! Mr. Justice Ogier died. Another judge sat in his seat, and he, thinking that, after the lapse of a year, no power had rested with his deceased brother to alter or modify a decree except to correct some clerical error, "with great reluctance," on the 4th August, 1862, vacated the order of March 21, made by his predecessor.
The case thus stood a decree entered on the 7th of January, 1858 (or possibly on the 5th of February following), as of the 5th of June, 1857.
At the same term, on the 25th August, 1862, on motion in open court -- no citation having been issued -- an appeal was allowed the United States "from the decision and decree of this Court confirming the claim of the claimant herein," and on the 6th October following, the district attorney, reciting that the claimant was "desirous of moving the court to set aside the order for appeal," agreed by entry made on the minutes that all proceedings should be stayed till the next term, "so as to give the claimant an opportunity to make such motion." On 1st December, 1862, a motion to vacate the appeal was made and heard, and on the 4th the order for appeal was vacated; the grounds of the order being that the decree having been entered nunc pro tunc, took effect as from June 5, 1857, and not from 7 January, 1858, thus, of course, making more than five years to the 25th August, 1862, when the appeal was allowed.
give it to him. Not getting it at the promised time, he asked for it again on the 2d of December; the clerk now informed the counsel "that he had changed his mind on the subject, and would not prepare or deliver a transcript in said cause." Mr. Goold "offered to pay said clerk his customary fees for a transcript of said record, but said clerk persisted in his refusal to prepare one."
"That the district attorney of the United States of any district in California may transcribe and certify to the Supreme Court of the United States the records of the District Court of his proper district in all land cases wherein the United States is a party, upon which appeals have been or may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and records so certified by such district attorney under his hand and filed in the Supreme Court of the United States shall be taken as true and valid transcripts to the same intent and purpose as if certified by the clerk of the proper district."
conducting litigations at the expense of the United States, wherein the final result was matter of entire indifference so far as the interest of the government was concerned."
The attorney-general, Mr. Bates, in person now interposed. He wrote to the judge, and by letter sent to Mr. Goold, at San Francisco, directed him to obtain a copy, calling on the district attorney of the United States at San Francisco for any needed "aid." Provision was again made for the clerk's fees. Telegrams were sent across the continent. But it was in vain. Neither request, entreaty, demand, nor offered fees besides, procured the record.
"that the foregoing one hundred and seven pages are a full, true, and correct copy of all the proceedings, entries, and files in the district court for the Southern District of California, except the transcript from the late board &c., in the case of United States v. Gomez, No. 393, for the claim called Panoche Grande."
On this record, the case came here, and was docketed in February, 1864.
1. Because the five years within which an appeal can be taken had expired before the appeal was claimed and allowed.
2. Because the entry of the appeal was made without authority and had been set aside.
3. Because there was no citation.
4. Because the appeal was not seasonably prosecuted.
5. Because the transcript of the record was incomplete.
1st. That the decree dated from 7 January, 1858, and not from the prior date of June 5, 1857.
3d. That a citation was unnecessary.
5th. That the transcript certified by the district attorney was sufficient.
"In view of the whole case our conclusion is that the motion to dismiss the appeal must be overruled. Effect of the motion if granted would be to leave the decree below in full force and unreversed, which is a result that at present we are not prepared to sanction. When the cause comes up upon its merits, we shall desire to hear the counsel on the question whether there is any valid decree in the case, and if not as to what will be the proper directions to be given in the cause. Those questions are not involved in the motion to dismiss."
1. Whether under the circumstances of this case the appeal, if a final decree, and legally taken and allowed, had been ineffective for want of seasonable prosecution, the general rule being confessedly that the transcript must be filed here and the case docketed at the term next succeeding the appeal.
2. If the appeal had not become ineffective, how did the claim stand upon merits.
3. Whether, if the decree was invalid and void, it had such vitality as that this Court would sustain an appeal upon it, and reform and correct it.
Claim of the appellee, as described in his petition to the land commissioners, was for a tract of land situated in California called Panoche Grande, of the extent of four square leagues, and he alleged that the tract was granted to him, in the year 1844, by Governor Manuel Micheltorena. Unable to exhibit his title papers, as required by the act of Congress upon the subject, he relied upon parol proof to show their existence, loss, and contents. Commissioners rejected the claim, and the claimant appealed to the district court, where the claim for the whole tract was confirmed. Final decree, as amended, was entered on the fifth day of February, 1858, and on the twenty-fifth day of August, 1862, the appeal of the United States was allowed.
jurisdiction of the cause, and contends that the appeal should be dismissed. Principal difficulty in the case grows out of certain proceedings in the cause, which have taken place since it first made its appearance in this Court. Docket entries for the December Term 1858, show that the case was first presented here at that term by the claimant, as an appeal not prosecuted, and that it was, on the production of the record, on his motion, dismissed in conformity to the rules of court for the want of prosecution. Mandate of the court dismissing the appeal was, on the eighteenth day of March following, delivered to the assignee of the claimant.
motion filed by their special counsel for a rehearing was still pending in the district court. Decision of the court, therefore, was that the appeal was not before the court when the cause was docketed and dismissed.
4. Coming to the present term of the Court, the docket entries show that the motion under consideration was filed by the claimant on the ninth day of February last. He moved the Court to strike out certain matters printed in the record, and requested the Court to determine the fourth cause assigned in the motion of the preceding term for the dismissal of the cause, which, as he alleges, was not noticed, considered, or decided, when the motion was overruled and denied. Both branches of the motion were subsequently argued by counsel, and on the twenty-sixth day of February last, the motion was overruled; but THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in announcing the result, remarked that the question of jurisdiction would be open when the cause should be argued upon the merits.
counsel have reargued all the questions of jurisdiction presented for decision in the original motion to dismiss.
5. Three of those questions, to-wit, the first, third, and fifth, were carefully examined and decided by this Court during the same term in which the motion was filed, and it is only necessary to refer to that decision as the final determination of the court. [Footnote 5] Special mention was not made of the second question presented in the motion, because what was said by the Court, in disposing of the first question, rendered any further remarks upon that subject unnecessary. Express statement of the opinion is that the appeal to this Court was allowed on the day therein specified. But the suggestion is that the Court did not decide the fourth question presented for decision, and the suggestion, so far as it applies to the opinion of the Court, is certainly well founded.
Fourth objection to the jurisdiction of the Court was that the appeal, even if legally taken and allowed, became null and void for the want of seasonable prosecution. General rule, as established by repeated decisions, undoubtedly is that the transcript must be filed here, and the case docketed at the term next succeeding the appeal, in order to give this Court jurisdiction. [Footnote 6] Argument upon that subject is unnecessary, as the rule has been reaffirmed at this term in an opinion delivered by THE CHIEF JUSTICE. [Footnote 7] Unless the case therefore falls within some exception to the general rule of practice, as derived from the act of Congress allowing appeals, the motion of the claimant must prevail.
of the Court, or by the contumacy of the clerk, the rule does not apply, provided it appears that the appellant was guilty of no laches or want of diligence in his efforts to prosecute the appeal. [Footnote 8] Order allowing the appeal in this case was entered on the twenty-fifth day of August, 1862, but on the sixth day of October following, a stipulation was entered in the minutes, that the transcript should be withheld until the next term of that court, in order to give the claimant an opportunity to move the court to set aside the order of appeal. Such a motion was accordingly made by the claimant on the first day of the succeeding December; and on the fourth day of the same month the court directed that the order allowing the appeal should be vacated and set aside. Reason for vacating the appeal as assigned was that the five years had expired before it was allowed, which is directly contrary to the decision of this Court, and consequently must be considered as overruled. [Footnote 9] Although the decision of the Court was erroneous, still the proceedings under the motion had the effect to prevent the appellants, in the meantime, from obtaining a copy of the transcript.
attorney from making out and certifying the transcript of the record, upon the ground that the order allowing the appeal was entered without authority of law, and that the appeal had been properly revoked and set aside. Result was that the judge refused to grant the injunction, but he reiterated his opinion that no appeal was pending, and remarked that the procuring copies for the United States in such a case was a fraud upon the government and was not to be tolerated.
8. Mandamus unquestionably is the proper remedy where the appeal is refused, and it is an appropriate remedy to compel the production of the transcript. Strong doubts are entertained, however, whether it would have been an adequate remedy in this case, because it is more than probable that, if the motion had been made, the affidavits showing the refusal of the clerk to furnish a copy, would have been met by counter affidavits, showing that the appeal had been vacated; and in that state of the case it would have been difficult for the court to have decided what was right and proper between the parties, without the opportunity of inspecting the record.
Grant, however, that the appellants might have had an adequate remedy in a motion to this Court for a mandamus, still it is clear that they had a right, under the circumstances of this case, to invoke the benefit of the special provision in the act of Congress referred to as a cumulative means of securing their rights. Application was accordingly made to the district attorney, and he, without delay, made the certificate exhibited in the record. Conclusion therefore is that the case, in either point of view, is regularly before the Court, and all the motions to dismiss are overruled.
claimant to the governor, and there is appended to it the usual informe, but there is no concession or grant, nor is there any satisfactory evidence that any title of any kind was ever issued by the governor to the claimant. He states in his petition to the land commissioners that he obtained the map in the record from the proper officers of the department, but the alleged fact is not satisfactorily proved. Four witnesses were examined by the claimant before the land commissioners, but only one of the number pretended that he had ever seen the grant, and his statements are quite too indefinite to be received as satisfactory proof.
Instead of proving possession under the grant, it is satisfactorily shown that he never occupied it at all, and it is doubtful if he ever saw the premises during the Mexican rule. Land commissioners rejected the claim, but before it came up for hearing in the district court, his attorney had been appointed district attorney of the United States, and the proofs show that he conveyed two leagues of the land to the district attorney. Circumstances of the confirmation of the claim in the district court are fully stated in the opinion of this Court given when the mandate was revoked and recalled. [Footnote 12] Comment upon those circumstances is unnecessary, except to say that the confirmation was fraudulently obtained.
Although the decree was fraudulently obtained, still, inasmuch as it is correct in form, it is sufficient to sustain the appeal for the purpose of correcting the error. Party who procured it cannot be allowed to object to its validity as a means of perpetuating the fraud, especially as he did not appeal from the decree.
United States v Gomez, 1 Wall. 690.
12 Stat. at Large 320.
United States v. Gomez, 23 How. 326.
United States v. Gomez, 1 Wall. 698 [argument of counsel -- omitted].
Steamer Virginia v. West, 19 How. 182.
Castro v. United States, supra, 70 U. S. 46.
United States v. Booth, 21 How. 512.
United States v. Gomez, 1 Wall. 699.
United States v. Gomez, 23 How. 339.

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