Source: https://www.patentlitigation.ch/category/order/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:00:49+00:00

Document:
The notified party conducting the proceedings in place of the notifying party acts as representative of the notifying party.
This order clarifies some important aspects of third party notice and third party action. The general principles are set out in Art. 78 CPC: A party may notify a third party of the dispute if, in the event of being unsuccessful, he or she might take recourse against or be subject to recourse by a third party. The notified third party may also give notice of the dispute.
proceed in place of the notifying principal party, with the consent of the latter.
Now, what is the standing of the notified party in case of lit. b, above?
The FPC follows the practice of the High Court of Zurich (Obergericht; PP140001-O/U) and the Commercial Court of Bern (Handelsgericht; HG 15 12) in that there is no room for an arbitrary change of parties (gewillkürter Parteiwechsel) — even though the mere wording of Art. 79(2) CPC might suggest it. The order holds that this would be too much of an intervention into the procedural rights of the counterparty, and there is no indication whatsoever that the legislator indeed had intended it to be this way.
Thus, the approach now also taken by the FPC effectively (only) relieves the notifying party of the burden of litigation, but clarifies that the legal effects of the judgment continue to apply to him. The notified party is therefore involved as such in the proceedings without the defendants 1 and 2 being released from the proceedings. The notified party only acts as the representative of defendants 1 and 2.
Accordingly, as is customary in the case of arbitrary representation, judicial correspondence will only be served to the notified party. Defendants 1 and 2 must have the actions and declarations of the notified party counted as their own.
In sum, Art. 79(2) CPC is anything but a comfortable ejection seat to easily get out of the danger zone.
Note that Hepp Wenger Ryffel is involved in this matter on behalf of the defendant.
The plaintiffs requested ex parte interim injunctive relief, i.e. without hearing the defendant beforehand. In principle, this is possible in cases of special urgency; Art. 265 CPC. It goes without saying that a plaintiff should act quickly in a case of special urgency. But how quickly does one need to take action so that it is not considered (too) late? The present decision provides further guidance in this respect.
In cases of alleged urgency, the court examines whether the request has not obviously been delayed or could reasonably have been and should have been filed earlier. If this is the case, it is no longer justified to not hear the defendant beforehand. If a plaintiff waits considerably longer after a triggering event than the time limit that is typically set for the defendant to respond in summary proceedings, the case can hardly be assumed to be particularly urgent.
[B]eim Fall der zeitlichen Dringlichkeit ist weiter zu prüfen, ob das Gesuch nicht offensichtlich hinausgezögert worden ist respektive vernünftigerweise früher hätte gestellt werden können und müssen, mithin das Weglassen der Anhörung der Gegenseite nicht mehr gerechtfertigt ist. Die relevante Zeitskala bemisst sich dabei unter anderem an der Zeit, die typischerweise der Gegenseite zur Stellungnahme eingeräumt wird. Wartet die Gesuchstellerin ohne erkennbare Gründe mit der Einreichung des superprovisorischen Gesuchs nach einem auslösenden Ereignis deutlich länger zu, als der Gegenseite in einem Massnahmeverfahren zur Stellungnahme eingeräumt wird, kann schwerlich von besonderer Dringlichkeit im Sinne von Art. 265 ZPO ausgegangen werden, die ein Weglassen der Anhörung der Gegenseite rechtfertigt.
Plaintiffs argued that the defendant had already ample opportunity in prior / parallel proceedings to provide comments. Accordingly, new arguments were not to be reckoned with. The decision holds that this has nothing to do with the alleged urgency, and that there may well be new arguments since parallel proceedings are pending elsewhere.
Further, plaintiffs argued that the expected delay in co-pending nullity proceedings caused urgency of the present request for injunctive relief. However, the decision holds that the course of the parallel nullity proceedings is not out of the ordinary, and plaintiffs could have lodged a claim for infringement in main proceedings since more than a year ago – but did not do so.
Note that the request for ex parte interim measures had been filed more than one month after the parties had been informed about availability of hearing dates in parallel nullity proceedings no earlier than end of August 2018, and the plaintiff indicated one of these dates as ‘suitable and preferred’ (‘geeignet und bevorzugt’). Only later, plaintiffs requested an earlier hearing date – which could not be arranged anymore.
Moreover, the present request was filed more than two months after receipt of the opinion of the judge-rapporteur. If this was considered as the triggering event (in view of a changed opinion of the judge-rapporteur), the request could and should have been filed much earlier.
Finally, plaintiffs noted that previous summary proceedings took about six months to conclude. A similar duration in the present proceedings would result in a decision only after the hearing date in parallel nullity proceedings. The decision holds that this, again, has nothing to do with the required urgency.
The request for ex parte interim injunctive relief was thus dismissed, and inter partes summary proceedings are now ongoing.
A previous version of this post mentioned Bruno MEYER as an assisting patent attorney on behalf of the defendant. I have been informed that this is wrong; he is actually engaged on behalf of the plaintiff. This has been corrected hereinbelow.
This procedural order is almost a blueprint of a published order in the case O2012_039; see this Blog here. Again, an alleged infringer argued for nullity as a plea in defense with his answer to the suit. Prior to the preparatory hearing, the plaintiff had been ordered and actually provided a reply only with respect to the alleged nullity, for the time being. So far so good.
But the defendant filed a factual rejoinder concerning the (in)validity of the patent in suit. This evidently frustrated the court’s intention to have one(!) reply of each party on file pertaining to the questions of infringement and nullity. Consequently, the FPC decided to not take the defendant’s submission on file at all, for the time being. The defendant may re-file the same after the preparatory hearing, with his rejoinder.
Die Prozessleitung ist Sache des Gerichts (Art. 124 Abs. 1 ZPO). Wenn die Beklagten hier nun ungefragt mit einer faktischen Duplik zur Bestandesfrage reagieren, wird das Bestreben des Gerichts, die Waffengleichheit der Parteien zu wahren, unterlaufen. Das ist zu unterbinden. Entsprechend ist die Eingabe der Beklagten (samt Beilagen) aus dem Recht zu weisen. Es steht den Beklagten frei, das Vorgebrachte (nach der Instruktionsverhandlung) im Rahmen der dann einzuholenden Duplik erneut vorzutragen.
The background of this case is a cooperation with an unhappy ending, at least concerning the resulting IP. The plaintiff (A) and one of the defendants (B) had signed a confidentiality agreement on 12 July 2015 for the purpose of a joint development. Two employees of A had then worked on this project and exchanged their respective results by Email. These results were then shared with B in working meetings later on, and a specific solution was sent to B by Email on 10 September 2015. B then filed a Swiss patent application on its own on 25 November 2015. That would be enough to blow most cooperations, but it even got worse: B informed A on 11 October 2016 that the patent application had been assigned to D. And on 29 November 2016, A was informed that the patent application had been assigned to C.
A was not amused and requested that a register ban be ordered ex parte to avoid withdrawal / abandonment and to suspend further prosecution; and that B, C and D be ordered to abstain from any actions towards this end. These requests were indeed granted inasmuch as the Swiss patent application is concerned. On the contrary, the request was held inadmissible with respect to related applications unspecifically referred to in the requests. Likewise, a request for a register ban at the EPO was held inadmissible; this has to be effected in accordance with Art. 61 and R. 14 EPC.
Who actually has invented the disputed technology?
How has the plaintiff obtained the right to be granted a patent for this technology?
How has the defendant / patent applicant been informed about this technology?
How is the technology reflected in the patent application at stake?
The decision holds that these criteria have been met by prima facie evidence: The plaintiff (1.) had identified the inventors; (2.) how he obtained the right to be granted a patent (i.e. by virtue of Art. 332 CO as employer); (3.) how this information had been conveyed to B (see timeline above); and (4.) how this is reflected in the patent application under dispute: Apparently, Fig. 1 of the patent application reflects all the essential elements which also corresponds to the wording of claim 1.
The multiple assignments underlined the risk of a not easily reparable harm for the plaintiff. On the contrary, the defendants are not substantially harmed by the ex parte order. As to the urgency of the matter, the decision holds that the plaintiff had acted with sufficient diligence on 18 January 2017 after having been notified of the (second) assignment on 29 November 2016, i.e. seven weeks ago. Summary proceedings can still be concluded earlier than potential main proceedings which typically take one year.
On the other hand, the diligence required for the ex parte order is less clear to me. The FPC held in an earlier case that seven weeks (what a coincidence!) were too long for a plaintiff to wait — rather, one should act ‘within one or two weeks in any event’; see this Blog here. The devil may be in the (yet unknown) detail.
As to the technology concerned, the bone of contention is a latch for a watch band with a folding clasp which can carry a biometric insert.
The Swiss patent application at stake has been filed only less than 18 months ago (25 November 2015); it is not yet published. We will learn more on or shortly after 25 May 2017.
The hearing scheduled for March 29, 2017 will provide further insight, and the Swiss patent application will be published end of May 2017. Stay tuned!
The hearing scheduled for March 29, 2017 has just been canceled.
The patent application at stake has been published today. It’s CH 711 847 A2, see Swissreg. Registered applicant expectedly is Oréade Manufacture de boîtes SA.
The matter has apparently been settled by compromise; see Matthias Vanoni’s comment in the comments section below.
This decision provides very early insight into a litigation with an apparently rather complex setup. The plaintiff had initiated main proceedings on January 11, 2017, inter alia alleging co-ownership of two patent families currently held by the defendant. Only two days later, the plaintiff requested ex parte interim measures, i.e. that the defendant be ordered to preserve the status quo of the patent families in suit (with respect to ownership, licenses, etc.), and that a ban be noted in the Swiss patent register to prevent any changes to the Swiss part of the already granted European patent.
Allegedly, an employee of the Swiss plaintiff has largely contributed to the subject invention(s), in a joint development together with the CEO of the defendant (a company domiciled in Sweden). Two patent families are at stake, with an already granted European patent in the first family. EPO prosecution is still pending in the second family, while patents have already been granted in the U.S., Japan and Russia.
First, the President holds that the FPC only has territorial jurisdiction for the Swiss part of the European patent at stake; Art. 1(2) IPRA, Art. 31 LugC, Art. 10 lit. b IPRA. Note that the patentee / defendant is domiciled in Sweden! The request has thus not been considered at all as far as it concerned foreign patent rights.
What remains is the Swiss part of the already granted European patent. Swiss law is applicable in this respect; Art. 110(1) IPRA. In general terms, the requested injunction and the order to a register authority would be possible in accordance with Art. 262 lit. a and c CPC. However, the President held that the plaintiff failed to show the three necessary elements, i.e.
how the subject-matter claimed by the defendant actually corresponds to this invention.
The plaintiff apparently did not discuss how the contribution of its employee is reflected in the claims; see item iii, above. Co-ownership was thus held to be not established for this reason alone.
Moreover, the President notes that the plaintiff failed to show an actual risk that any of the acts to be prohibited might materialize. The request also failed for this reason.
The routine exercise: Who are the parties?
As to the first patent family, “WO 222” likely is WO 2011/042058 A1 and the European patent “EP 333” with 37 claims likely is EP 2 485 864 B1 (opposed by Trumpf Werkzeugmaschinen GmbH + Co. KG); see EPO Register and Swissreg for further details.
The second patent family is based on “WO 555” — which likely is WO 2012/136262 A1. This family has granted patents in Japan (JP 5828953 B2), Russia (RU 2 594 921 C2) and the U.S. (US 9,469,338 B2); examination of EP 2 694 241 A1 is still pending; see EPO Register.
The sole inventor of both patent families is Magnus Norberg Ohlsson, CEO of Tomologic AB, a company domiciled in Sweden.
[…] newly developed cluster technology from the Swedish company Tomologic. The patented technology […].
The former product page is currently offline (checked on Feb 2, 2017).
The patentee / plaintiff requested interim injunctive relief to be ordered without hearing the defendant beforehand, in view of special urgency. The FPC did not do so. In principle, the President could decide in the capacity of a judge sitting alone in summary proceedings (Art. 23(1) lit. b PatCA). But the present matter requires the assessment of patentability of the patent in suit; both parties are engaged in co-pending nullity proceedings at the FPC. In such cases, i.e. where the understanding of a technical matter is of particular significance, decisions must be made in a panel of three; see Art. 23(3) PatCA. It takes some time to staff the panel of judges from the pool of non-permanent judges who have to do a thorough check for conflicts. It would be unbalanced to not hear the defendant meanwhile since this will not delay the decision as such. The defendant has thus been ordered to file a response within only seven days. This short time was held appropriate since both parties are well acquainted with the subject-matter at stake from the co-pending nullity proceedings.
On the procedural side, there are two further aspects to note. First, the plaintiff had drafted its submission in English language, with reference to an agreement between the parties in this respect in co-pending nullity proceedings. The President held that this does not necessarily imply consent to the use of English language in the present proceedings — but provisionally and in the absence of an immediate information of the defendant to the contrary, consent will be assumed. Second, the President notes that a hearing on short notice might be necessary. A date will be fixed by way of precaution, as soon as the panel of judges is staffed.
Well, shame on me, I haven’t seen the wood for the trees: The procedural decision in the matter O2016_003 (reported here) obviously relates to the suit filed by Illumina and Verinata Health against Genoma; see this Blog here.
“EP 000” is EP 0 994 963 B2. Opposition/appeal proceedings have been concluded with decision T 0146/07; see EPO Register for details.
“EP 111” is EP 1 981 995 B1. The hearing before the OD is scheduled for 18 November 2016; see EPO Register for details.
“EP 333” is EP 2 514 842 B1 which has only been granted on 24 February 2016; see EPO Register for details.
Entities A and B (in a joinder of parties) have sued C for patent infringement. Four European patents are at stake (EP 000, EP 111, EP 222 and EP 333). A and B are exclusive licensees of the patents: Entity A is licensee of EP 000, EP 222 and EP 333; B is licensee of EP 111. The case has been separated in view of the different status of proceedings at the EPO (don’t be misled by the german term ‘Rechtsstand’ used in the decision; the formal status of all the patents is obviously granted): Opposition proceedings at the EPO have already been concluded for one of the patents (EP 000). For two other patents (EP 111 and EP 222), oral proceedings are scheduled for September and June 2016, respectively. The last patent in suit has only been granted in February 2016 and it is thus still open for opposition (EP 333).
The suit based on EP 222 and EP 333 (plaintiff A) will be separately continued under case ID O2016_005.
Another issue at stake is the choice of the language to be used by the parties. The plaintiffs used the English language and have submitted a letter allegedly confirming the agreement of the defendant with the use of the English language. However, the letter was apparently not issued by the defendant itself but a parent company. This letter was thus not considered as a consent of the defendant in accordance with Art. 36(3) PatCA; such consent is still outstanding.
As mentioned earlier on this Blog here, pre-emptive briefs are quite frequently used if one fears to be faced with a request for interim measures without hearing the defendant. The present decision for the first time clarifies what is allowable to be submitted as an addendum to a pre-emptive brief that is already on file. The President held that it is well admissible to bring proper and improper novae according to Art. 229 CPC to the attention of the FPC by way of an addendum. But that’s it. Beware: If the addendum covers more than proper or improper novae according to Art. 229 CPC, it will not be taken into consideration at all.
Nicht zulässig ist es hingegen, eine Schutzschrift mit weiteren Eingaben einfach nachzubessern, ohne dass zulässige Noven vorlägen. […] Dafür, dass sich die Richterin oder der Richter mit beliebigen Eingaben befasst, in denen irgendwelche Sachverhalte und Argumente portionenweise und womöglich widersprüchlich vorgebracht werden, ist kein Raum.
It is not admissible to simply overhaul a pre-emptive brief by means of subsequent filings, in the absence of admissible novae. […] It cannot be that the judge has to assess any old submissions in which facts and arguments are brought forward little by little and maybe even inconsistent.
In addition, the President held that an addendum which pertains to per se admissible facts is expected to fulfil the same criteria as a regular writ. That means that evidence which is readily available in support of the alleged facts is to be put on file. In particular, it is not sufficient to only refer to the URL of a website. Since websites are known to change over time, a screenshot of the website is to be put on file.

References: Art. 78
 Art. 79
 Art. 79
 Art. 265
 Art. 265
 Art. 61
 Art. 332
 Art. 1
 Art. 31
 Art. 10
 Art. 110
 Art. 262
 Art. 23
 Art. 36
 Art. 229
 Art. 229