Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82606:gr-185922-2014&catid=1579&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:05:54+00:00

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G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014 - HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, v. JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS, Respondents.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, v. JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS, Respondents.
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 April 2008 Decision1 and 7 January 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86497 dismissing petitioners’ complaint for annulment of the Deed of Donation for failure to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he had seven children named Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo Favis, Consolacion Favis-Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, and Nelly Favis-Villafuerte. When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children, named Ma. Theresa Joana D. Favis, Ma. Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Ma. Thea D. Favis.
3. One-half (1/2) of the house located in Brgy. VI, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur[,] containing an area of 2,257 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north by Lot 1208; on the east by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on the West by Lot 1211-B, 1212 and 1215.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ contention when it ruled that the prohibited compromise is that which is entered between the decedent while alive and compulsory heirs. In the instant case, the appellate court observed that while the present action is between members of the same family it does not involve a testator and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court pointed out that the subject properties cannot be considered as "future legitime" but are in fact, legitime, as the instant complaint was filed after the death of the decedent.
5. Assuming arguendo that petitioners cannot be construed as complying substantially with Article 151 of the Family Code, still, the same should be considered as a non-issue considering that private respondents are in estoppel.
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. − Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia ; res judicata ; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-matter of the action remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages, cognizable by the court below.
To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,17 allowed an amendment which " merely corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action, because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action." We there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista,18 that an amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x. (Italics supplied).
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the respondents were concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss but on the respondents’ insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the subject properties. Nor could it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial Order specifically limited the issues to the validity of the deed and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Respondents not only confined their arguments within the pre-trial order; after losing their case, their appeal was based on the proposition that it was error for the trial court to have relied on the ground of vitiated consent on the part of Dr. Favis.
x x x To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the action for annulment, the mental state/condition of the donor Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. at the time of its execution must be taken into account. Factors such as his age, health and environment among others should be considered. As testified to by Dr. Mercedes Favis, corroborated by Dr. Edgardo Alday and Dra. Ofelia Adapon, who were all presented as expert witnesses, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had long been suffering from Hiatal Hernia and Parkinson’s disease and had been taking medications for years. That a person with Parkinson’s disease for a long time may not have a good functioning brain because in the later stage of the disease, 1/3 of death develop from this kind of disease, and or dementia. With respect to Hiatal Hernia, this is a state wherein organs in the abdominal cavity would go up to the chest cavity, thereby occupying the space for the lungs causing the lungs to be compromised. Once the lungs are affected, there is less oxygenation to the brain. The Hernia would cause the heart not to pump enough oxygen to the brain and the effect would be chronic, meaning, longer lack of oxygenation to the brain will make a person not in full control of his faculties. Dr. Alday further testified that during his stay with the house of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (1992-1994), he noticed that the latter when he goes up and down the stairs will stop after few seconds, and he called this pulmonary cripple–a very advanced stage wherein the lungs not only one lung, but both lungs are compromised. That at the time he operated on the deceased, the left and right lung were functioning but the left lung is practically not even five (5%) percent functioning since it was occupied by abdominal organ. x x x.
The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed.
The issue of the validity of donation was fully litigated and discussed by the trial court. Indeed, the trial court's findings were placed at issue before the Court of Appeals but the appellate court chose to confine its review to the procedural aspect. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, even if it dealt only with procedure, is deemed to have covered all issues including the correctness of the factual findings of the trial court. Moreover, remanding the case to the Court of Appeals would only constitute unwarranted delay in the final disposition of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 is AFFIRMED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia- Salvador and Apolinario D. Bruselas Jr. concurring. Rollo, pp. 87-102.
10 P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS Management and Development Corp., G.R. No. 166462, 24 October 2012, 684 SCRA 453, 464-465.
13 Gumabon v. Larin, supra note 11 at 230.
19 Peregrina v. Hon. Panis, 218 Phil. 90, 92 (1984).
20 Agbayani v. Hon. Belen, 230 Phil. 39, 42 (1986) citing Catorce v. Court of Appeals, 214 Phil. 181 (1984).
21 Verzosa v. Verzosa, supra note 16 at 88.

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