Source: https://www.ptab.us/2013/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:54:13+00:00

Document:
"[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification." In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007), quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
In a proper case, the disclosure of a genus may anticipate a species within that genus even if the species is not recited. See In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 682 (CCPA 1962); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
And, we recently reiterated that “‘[l]itigation misconduct and unprofessional behavior may suffice, by themselves, to make a case exceptional under § 285.’” Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd., 726 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
See In re Gardiner, 171 F.2d 313, 315-16 (CCPA 1948) (“the patentability of apparatus claims must be shown in the structure claimed and not merely upon a use, function, or result thereof”). See also In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming rejection of appellant’s claim directed to a dispensing top for dispensing popcorn based on factual finding that the prior art structure would be capable of dispensing popcorn).
“Having established that this knowledge was in the art, the [E]xaminer could then properly rely . . . on a conclusion of obviousness ‘from common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference.’” In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390 (CCPA 1969). It is the Appellants’ burden to traverse the Examiner’s notice. “We did not mean to imply . . . that a bald challenge, with nothing more, would be all that was needed. . . .We feel it to be perfectly consistent with the principles governing procedural due process to require that a challenge to judicial notice by the board contain adequate information or argument so that on its face it creates a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances justifying the judicial notice.” In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971). That has not been done here by the bald assertion that “the Examiner has erred in taking Official Notice without any substantial evidence” (App. Br. 15).
Citing In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994), Appellant argues that the principle of non-functional descriptive material (i.e., printed matter) is not applicable to the present case because, in the present application, “whatever can be considered printed matter is generated and processed by a computer.” App. Br. 13-14. However, Lowry does not, as Appellant suggests, stand for the proposition that the “printed matter” cases have no application in situations involving computer systems and data stored on a memory. In the Lowry case, the Federal Circuit determined that Lowry’s data structures, a plurality of attribute data objects (ADOs), were not analogous to printed matter because they perform a function and “provide increased efficiency in computer operations.” Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1580, 1584. In determining that the data structures were not analogous to printed matter, the court noted that “Lowry’s ADOs do not represent merely underlying data in a database.” Id. at 1583; see also id. (“Indeed, Lowry does not seek to patent the Attributive data model in the abstract. Nor does he seek to patent the content of information resident in a database. Rather, Lowry's data structures impose a physical organization on the data.”). In the claims before us, the recited rendering of each of the characters “in a uniform representative of a different manual labor trade” is merely the display of underlying graphics data stored in a memory. This uniform data does not functionally affect the operation of the memory or the processor. As noted by the Examiner, the graphics that “decorate the characters” are “purely cosmetic” and do not change the underlying fighting game at all. Ans. 14. Stated differently, this graphics data is “useful and intelligible only to the human mind,” and thus cannot impart patentability to Appellant’s claimed gaming method. Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1583 (quoting In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (CCPA 1969)); see also King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (confirming that the rationale underlying the printed matter cases extends to method claims as well).
While it might be possible to install software and/or hardware that would allow Hanawa’s controller to perform the functions of controlling movement, tracking location and determining the path for each of a plurality of test vessels as required in claim 1 and 13, the “capable of” test requires that the prior art structure be capable of performing the function without further programming. Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). When the functional language is associated with programming or some other structure required to perform the function, that programming or structure must be present in order to meet the claim limitation. Id. While in some circumstances generic structural disclosures may be sufficient to meet the requirements of a “controller,” see Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2010)), that is not the case here.

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