Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2d/55/553.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:16:07+00:00

Document:
DAVID ERLICH, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE BEVERLY HILLS JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
Joseph W. Fairfield and Ethelyn F. Black for Petitioner.
Petitioner was charged in the Municipal Court of Beverly Hills with a violation of section 383b of the Penal Code. He is seeking a writ of prohibition to prohibit that court from any further proceedings against him on that charge. The charging part of the complaint alleges that defendant "did willfully and unlawfully and with intent to defraud sell to the Beverly Hilton Hotel chicken breasts which were not kosher and not prepared under and from a product or products sanctioned by the Orthodox Hebrew Religious requirements, having falsely represented the same chickens to be kosher and to have been prepared under and from a product or products sanctioned by the Orthodox Hebrew Religious requirements in violation of Section 383b, Penal Code."
Counsel for petitioner asserts however that in adopting the definition of "kosher" in section 383b, which did not appear in any of the New York statutes, and particularly by defining "kosher" "to mean a strict compliance with every Jewish law and custom pertaining and relating to the killing of the animal or fowl from which the meat is taken or extracted," our Legislature has introduced an element of uncertainty which was not present in the New York laws.
 Statutes are to be so construed, if their language permits, as to render them valid and constitutional rather than invalid and unconstitutional. (County of Los Angeles v. Legg, 5 Cal. 2d 349, 353 [55 P.2d 206]; 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 115, p. 624.)  This statute, having been patterned on a similar New York statute, should be given, insofar as the language is the same, the same construction as that given to the New York statutes by the courts of New York. (Holmes v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 426, 430 [110 P.2d 428]; Canfield v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 13 Cal. 2d 1, 14-15 [87 P.2d 830]; Union Oil Associates v. Johnson, 2 Cal. 2d 727, 734-735 [43 P.2d 291, 98 A.L.R. 1499].) The New York court in People v. Atlas, supra, 170 N.Y.S. 834, in the passage which we have quoted construed the words "as having been prepared under and of a product or products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements" as themselves being a definition of the word "kosher," or a parallel way of expressing the same idea.  The proper construction to be given to this statute is to be found by construing it as a whole and harmonizing its various parts. (Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 616, 621 [241 P.2d 525]; People v. Moroney, 24 Cal. 2d 638, 642 [150 P.2d 888].)  Applying these rules to the construction of this section, it is reasonable to conclude that the reference to "every Jewish law and custom," etc. must be construed to include only such Jewish laws and customs as are generally recognized as among "the [55 Cal. 2d 559] orthodox Hebrew religious requirements" which must be followed in preparation of kosher meat and meat products. Exactly the same result would be reached if we accept counsel's argument that the second paragraph of section 383b is void for uncertainty.  The first paragraph of section 383b is complete in itself and may be enforced without reliance upon the definition in the second paragraph, and under the doctrine of severability the claimed unconstitutionality of the second would not affect the enforceability of the first paragraph. (In re Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488 [122 P.2d 22]; People v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 2d 280 [89 P.2d 388].) Under either approach the statute is satisfied by compliance with "the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements," and is no more onerous than the New York statute upon which it is patterned.
As pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Hygrade, supra, "the statutes require a specific intent to defraud."  The same specifity in describing the prohibited act is not required where the violation of the statute is made to depend upon the existence of a specific wrongful intent.  "A statute will likewise be upheld, despite the fact that the acts it prohibits are defined in vague terms, if it requires an adequately defined specific intent." (People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 414 [317 P.2d 974]; see Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101-102 [71 S. Ct. 576, 95 L. Ed. 774]; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 [67 S. Ct. 1538, 91 L. Ed. 1877]; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 [65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495]; Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28 [61 S. Ct. 429, 85 L. Ed. 488].)  Unless the People prove that the representation that the chicken breasts here involved were kosher was not only false, but was also made with the specific intent to defraud, petitioner cannot be convicted.
The alternative writ is discharged and a peremptory writ denied.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., and White, J., concurred.

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