Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19811211-943381
Timestamp: 2017-01-20 02:20:40+00:00

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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9433/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1981-12-11;9433.81 Analyses : (Art. 5-1) LIBERTE PHYSIQUE, (Art. 5-1) VOIES LEGALES, (Art. 5-1-e) ALIENE, (Art. 5-2) INFORMATION DANS LE PLUS COURT DELAI, (Art. 5-4) INTRODUIRE UN RECOURSParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : PAYS-BASTexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9433/8 1 X . v/THE NETHERLANDS X . c/PAYS-BA S DECISION of l l December 1981 on the admissibility of the applicatio n
DÃCISION du 11 dÃ©cembre 1981 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention : a) Is observance of the principle "ne bis in idem"guaranteed by this provision? (Question not pursued). b) Reasonable time : Determination of the moment when the individual is affected by criminal proceedings against him in the case where ce rtain investigations took place long before the opening of the criminal proceedings. strictly called.
Artlcle 6, paragraphe 1, de la Conventlon : a) Le respect du principe "ne bis in idem " est-il garanti par cette disposition ? (Question non rÃ©solue) . b) DÃ©lai raisonnable : DÃ©termination du moment oÃ¹ la situation de l'intÃ©ressÃ© a Ã©tÃ© affectÃ©e par les poursuites pÃ©nales engagÃ©es contre lui, dans le cas oÃ¹ certaines enquÃªtes avaient eu lieu longtemps avant l'ouveKure de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale proprement dite.
(francais : voir p . 238) Summary of the rclevant facts The applicant, of Dutch nationality, was accused in 1948 of having entered the German police or army during the Second World War, subsidiarlty of having rendered assistance to the ennemy in Poland, of having administered the belongings of lewish a rt leaders in Krakau and of having benefitted from various facilities offered to him by the ennemy . In April 1 949 the Extraordinary
Court of Amsterdam convicted the applicant and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment on the first subsidia ry charge, acquitting him for lack of evidence on the other charges . The sentence was reduced to 8 months on appeal to the Cou rt of Cassation . In 1950 and 1952 the Polish Oovernment requested the applicant's extradition on charges concerning the murder of civilians in Urycz and the pillage ofJewish belongings in Lwow and Krakau . The Netherlands authorities refused extradition, particularly on the ground of the ne bis in idem principle. In 1952 the Netherlands Minister of Justice apparently decided to provide the applicant with a definitive "discharge of criminal proceedings" . At the end of 1976 the applicant was arrested in Switzerland and handed over to the Netherlands authorities. In March 1977 he was charged with crimes against humanity and in particular of having participated in the 1941 massacres in Podhorodce and Urycz (Poland) . In December the Regional Court of Amsterdam convicted the applicant for the Podhorodce massacres acquitting him of the Urycz massacres. It sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. In May 1978 the Netherlands Supreme Courtfound that the principle of ne bis in idem did not apply to the conviction but referred the case back to the Regional Court of The Hague . defence rights having been prejudiced by that court's refusal to hear certain witnesses . Coruidering that the 1952 declaration by the Minister of Justice ended proceedings, The Hague Court declared the charges inadmissible and ordered the applicant's release . The public protecutor appealed and the Supreme Court quashed this decision in May 1979 and referred the case back to the Regional Court of Rotterdam . This Court decided to release the applicant in view of his advanced age and to suspend proceedings in view of his mental state . This decision, which was given in September 1979, was quashed by the Supreme Court in February 1980. In July, the Regional Cou rt of Rotterdam convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment, having found him guilty of the events in Prodhorodce . In January 1981 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal.
THE LAW (Extract ) The applicant has first complained that he was prosecuted in 1971 and convicted and sentenced in 1981 for acts for which he had been acquitted by the Netherlands courts in 1949 . He considers this to be in breach of the principle of "ne bis in idem" .
Even assunining that a violation of this principle could under specific circumstances interfere with the right to "fair trial" enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention (cf. in this respect decision on the admissibility of Application No . 4212/69, Collection of Decisions 35, p . 151, 154), the Commission observes that the indictment of 29 September 1948 related to the charges of (a) voluntarily joining the enemy's forces, (b) rendering assistance to the enemy and (c) misappropriation by intimidation . He had been acquitted in 1949 of charges (a) and (c) and convicted on charge (b) . It was thus established in court, it is true, that the applicant had not joined the German army . The indictment issued in 1977, consisted of various elements, of which only one was the relationship between the applicant and the German army . However, it is clear from the wording and history of Article 27 (a) of the Decree Extraordinary Law that the degree of association with the enem}%s army required by that provision is of a broader scope so as to include also occasional services . An acquittal of the former charge does not therefore constitute an obstacle to a prosecution and subsequent conviction on the basis of the latter charge . The most essential component of the indictment in 1977 was the applicant's participation in the mass execution in Prodhorodce . It emerges from the tile that the proceedings brought against the applicant in 1949 had no bearing whatsoever on these events . In the absence of such an essential relationship between the previous tried facts and the present charge . the Commission is of the opinion that the "ne bis in idem" rule could not apply in the present case . It is true that the refusal by the Netherlands authorities to comply with two subsequent extradition requests from Poland in 1950 and 1952 had been motivated by the principle of "ne bis in idem" . The reason given by the Netherlands' authorities for doing so was that the extradition was requested tor acts which the applicant was alleged to have committed in his capacity as "an officer of the Security Police" and therefore concerned a point that had been decided in the Netherlands by a court . Whatever the merits of the above decision may be, the mere fad that on one aspect of the indictment-the degree of the applicant's association with the German army-an irrevocable stand had been taken by the Netherlands courts does not render inadmissible the present criminal proceedings which, as has been stated above, relate to a different set of facts from those tried in 1949 . It follows that on this assumption, this part of the application is in any event ntanifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
The applicant has further complained in this context that the criminal charges against him have not been determined within a reasonable time contrary to Article 6(1) of the Convention . He submits, in particular, that in October 1952 the Minister of Justice gave an undertaking that he would not be prosecuted and that this raised in him the expectation, steadily and gradually increasing as time went by, that no criminal charges would be brought against him . Article 6(1) of the Convention guarantees to everyone charged with a criminal offence that the charges against him should be determined within a reasonable time . In order to assess whether this provision has been complied with, the Commission must in the first place determine the beginning and the end of the period which is to be taken into consideration . The Commission recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has held that the period which has to be taken into consideration "begins with the day on which a person is charged . . . as this word is understood within the nteaning of the Convention (Neumeister Case, Series A, Judgment of 27 June 1968, p . 41) . The Commission itself has established the principle that "the relevant stage is that at which the situation of the person concerned has been substantially affected as a result of the suspicion against him (cf. Report of the Commission in Application No . 4517/70, Huber v . Austria, Decision and Reports 2, p . II) . The Commission observes in the present case that the indictment of the present criminal proceedings is dated . . . March 1977 . However, he had already been arrested in Switzerland on . . . December 1976 . The applicant maintains that he was under a criminal charge as from 1950 when enquiries were made in relation to a first extradition request from Poland . It is true that in the early fifties a great deal of evidence continued to be transmitted to the Netherlands from abroad concerning the applicant's role in the area and period concerned and that the applicant was aware of this, in particular as he was heard in relation to the two Polish extradition requests . These events cannot, however, be considered to form part of the criminal proceedings which followed the indictment of 1977 . The Commission therefore finds that the applicant began to be substantially affected by the criminal proceedings at issue in the present cases as from . . . December 1976 . The Commission further recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has held that Article 6 is, in criminal matters . "designed to avoid tha t
a person charged should remain too long in a state of unce rt ainty about his fate" (SttigmÃ¼ller Case, Judgment of 10 November 1969, Series A, p . 40) . The Commission has itself held, in re lation to the termination of the period under Article 6( 1), that "the same general principle as that governing the beginning of the pe riod should apply to the ending of that period in the sense that the period lasts until the situation of the person concerned has ceased to be affected as a result of the charges levelled against him" (cf. Huber v . Aust ria, Decisions and Repo rts 2, p . 21) . In a more recent application the Commission decided that the decision to discontinue criminal enquiries and the communication of this decision to the applicant implied that from that moment on the applicant ceased to be affected as a result of the suspicion against him, and that he was no longe rtainties which Article 6 seeks to limit . rsufeingomthc Similarly, in the present case, however much the applicant may have been suffering from the unce rt ainty about p rospects of future cri minal proceedings, he ceased to be affected by this when, as the applicant has maintained all through the proceedings, the Minister of Justice informed him in 1952 of his decision that he would not be prosecuted . He was thus in any event not subject to any "criminal charge" for the purpose of Article 6 between the date on which he took cognisance of the above decision and the date on which he was informed of the present accusation . It follows that the sole pe ri od to be conside red for the purposes of Article 6 (1) is the period that elapsed since December 1976 until January 1981, when the Supreme Cou rt delivere d its last judgment in this case . In considering that question, the Commission has taken into account all the circumstances of the case, the complexity of the case as a whole, the manner in which it has been handled by the national authorities and cou rt s, and the applicant's own conduct (cf . Huber v . Austria, Decisions and Report s 2, p . 22) . The Commission observes that it follows from the very nature of the charge that the investigations required consideration of a substantial quantity of evidence from diffe rent sources . Fu rthermo re , there is nothing in the file to sugggest that the manner in which the national authorities conducted the proceedings was unreasonable . Investigating the cri mes more than 30 years after their commission was extre mely difficult . The investigations re quired the examination of a large number of witnesses sca ttered all over the world, whose whereabouts could only be asce rt ained with great difficulty, or not at all . It is in this respect also re levant that the Regional Court in Rott erdam in September 1979 decided to suspend cri minal proceedings in view of the applicant's mental state of health and that criminal proceedings were resumed in February 1980, when the Supreme Court quashed that decision . The Commission fu rt her notes that in the framework of the va rious nullity proceeding s
before the Supreme Court the applicant, although represented by counsel, personally formulated numerous grievances which, either in view of their factual nature or repetitive character or tardiness, could not be regarded as grounds on which the Supreme Court was called upon to give a decision, but necessarily delayed its fmdings . Proceedings were furthermore complicated by the numerous objections levelled by the appliccant and his counsel against procedural and interlocutory decisions taken in the course of the proceedings . In view of the above, the Commission does not consider that the delay from December 1976 until January 1981 was exceptionally long and that it has exceeded a reasonable time for the purposes of Article 6 (1) . The facts of the case, as submitted to the Commission, do not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of this provision .
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits pertinent s De nationalitÃ© nÃ©erlandaise, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© accusÃ© en 1948 d'@tre eritrÃ© durant la seconde guene mondiale dans des services de la police de l'armÃ©e allemande, subsidiairement d'avoir prÃ©tÃ© assistance Ã l'ennemi en Pologne, d'avoir administrÃ© les biens de marchands juifs d'objet d'art Ã¢ Cracovie et d'avor utilisÃ© Ã son avantage diverses facilitÃ©s
concÃ©dÃ©es par
l'emiemi . En avril 1949, la cour extraordinaire d'Amsterdam le condamna Ã¢ un an de prison pour la premiÃ¨re accusation subsidiaire et l'acquitta faute de preuves pour le surplus . La peine fut rÃ©duite Ã huit mois aprÃ¨s pourvoi en cassation .
En 1950 et 1952, le Gouvernement polonais demanda aux Pays-Bas l'extradition du requÃ©rant Ã la Pologne pour y rÃ©pondre d'accusations de nieurtres de civils Ã Urycz et de pillage de biens juifs Ã Lwow et Ã¢ Cracovie . Les autoritÃ©s nÃ©erlandaises refusÃ¨rent l'extradition en se fondant notamment sur le principe . ne bis in idem Â» . En 1952, le Ministre de la Justice des Pays-Bas aurait dÃ©clarÃ© Ã l'intention du requÃ©rant que les poursuites qui avaient Ã©tÃ© engagÃ©es contre lui Ã©taient dÃ©finitivement abandonnÃ©es . A la fin de 1976, le requÃ©rant fut arrÃ©tÃ© en Suisse et remis aux autoritÃ©s nÃ©erlandaises . En mars 1977, il fut accusÃ© de crimes contre l'humanitÃ© en avant notamment participÃ© Ã des massacres en 1941 Ã Podhorodce et Ã Urycz (Pologne) . En dÃ©cembre, le tribunal rÃ©gional d'Amsterdam reconnut le requÃ©rant coupable quant aux massacres de Podhorodce et l'acquitta quant Ã ceux
d'Urvcz ; elle prononÃ§a une peine de 15 ans de prison . En mai 1978, la Cour SuprÃªme des Pays-Bas estima le principe + ne bis in idem . inapplicable Ã cette condamnation mais renvova la cause au tribunal de La Haye, au motif qu'il y arait eu atteinte aux droits de la dÃ©fense par le refus d'entendre certains tÃ©moins . Estimant que la dÃ©claration faite par le Ministre de la Justice en 1952 avait mis fin aux poursuites, le tribunal de La Haye dÃ©clara l'accusation irrecevable et prononÃ§a la libÃ©ration du requÃ©rant . Sur pourvoi du parquet, la Cour SuprÃªme annula ce jugement en mai 1979 et renvoya l'affaire au tribunal de Rotterdam . Ce tribunal dÃ©cida de mettre le requÃ©rant en libertÃ© vu son grand Ã¢ge et de snspendre la procÃ©dure vu son Ã©tat mental . Cette dÃ©cision, rendue en septembre 1979, fut annulÃ©e par la Cour SuprBme en fÃ©vrier 1980.
En juillet 1980, le tribunal condamna le requÃ©rant Ã 10 ans d'emprisonnement aprÃ¨s l'avoir reconnu coupable quant aux Ã©vÃ©nements de Podhorodce . En janvier 1981, la Cour SuprÃªme rejeta un pourvoi en cassation du requÃ©rant .
(TRADUCTION) EN DROIT (Extrait ) Le requÃ©rant se plaint en premier lieu d'avoir Ã©tÃ© poursuivi en 1971 et condamnÃ© en 1981 pour des actes dont il avait Ã©tÃ© acquittÃ© par les tribunaux nÃ©erlandais en 1949 . II estinie que c'est lÃ une violation du principe Â«ne bis in idem . . A supposer mÃªme qu'une violation de cette rÃ¨gle puisse, dans certaines circonstances, porter atteinte au droit Ã .un procÃ¨s Ã©quitableâ¢ consacrÃ© Ã l'article 6 de la Convention (ef . Ã cet Ã©gard la dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte nÂ° 4212/69, Recueil de DÃ©cisions 35, p . 151, 154), la Commission relÃ¨ve que l'acte d'accusation dressÃ© le 29 septembre 1948 comportait les chefs suivants : a . Engagement dans les forces ennemies, b . Assistance Ã l'ennemi, e t c . Appropriation illicite de biens par intimidation . Le requÃ©rant fut acquittÃ© en 1949 des chefs a et c . mais reconnu coupable de b . Il est donc exact qu'il a Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli par un tribunal qu'il n'avait pas ralliÃ© l'armÃ©e allemande . L'acte d'accusation dressÃ© en 1977 comportait cependant divers Ã©lÃ©ments, dont un seul concemait les rapports entre le requÃ©rant et l'armÃ©e allemande . Toutefois, il ressort clairement du libellÃ© et de la gÃ©nÃ¨se de l'article 27 (a) d u
DÃ©cret-Loi extraordinaire que l'idÃ©e de collaboration avec l'ennemi telle que l'entend cette disposition est d'une portÃ©e plus large puisqu'elle inclut Ã©galement des services occasionnels . Un acquittement sur l'ancien chef d'accusation ne constituait donc pas un obstacle Ã poursuites et condamnation ultÃ©rieures sur la base du nouveau chef d'accusation . L'Ã©lÃ©ment essentiel de l'acte d'accusation de 1977 Ã©tait la participation du requÃ©rant au massacre de Podhorodce . Or, il ressort du dossier que les poursuites intentÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant en 1949 n'avaient aucun rapport avec ces Ã©vÃ©nements . En l'absence d'un lien aussi essentiel entre les faits prÃ©cÃ©demment jugÃ©s et la prÃ©sente accusation, la Commission est d'avis que la rÃ¨gle .ne bis in idem . ne saurait s'appliquer en l'espÃ¨ce . Il est exact que le refus des autoritÃ©s nÃ©erlandaises de donner suite en 1950 et 1952 Ã deux demandes d'extradition prÃ©sentÃ©es par la Pologne a Ã©tÃ© motivÃ© par le principe .ne bis in idemâ¢ . La raison donnÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s nÃ©erlandaises Ã©tait que l'extradition Ã©tait demandÃ©e pour des actes que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait censÃ© avoir commis en sa qualitÃ© d' .agent de la police de sÃ»retÃ© â¢ et concernait donc une question dÃ©jÃ tranchÃ©e par un tribunal nÃ©erlandais . Quel que soit le bien-fondÃ© de cette dÃ©cision de refus, le simple fait que, sur l'un des aspects de l'acte d'accusation - le degrÃ© de collaboration du requÃ©rant avec 1'armÃ©e allemande - une position irrÃ©vocable a Ã©tÃ© prise par les tribunaux nÃ©erlandais, ne fait pas obstacle Ã la prÃ©sente procÃ©dure pÃ©nale qui, comme il a Ã©tÃ© dit, concerne un ensemble de faits diffÃ©rents de ceux jugÃ©s en 1949 . Il en dÃ©coule que cette partie de la requÃ©te est, quoi qu'il en soit, manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en deuxiÃ¨me lieu et dans ce contexte que, contrairement Ã l'article 6, paragraphe l, de la Convention, il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable sur les accusations pÃ©nales le concernant . Il soutient notamment qu'en octobre 1952, le Ministre de la Justice a pris l'engagement que le requÃ©rant ne serait pas poursuivi, ce qui, progressivement et rÃ©guliÃ¨rement au fil des ans, a fait naitre chez le requÃ©rant l'idÃ©e qu'aucune accusation pÃ©nale ne serait portÃ©e contre lui . L'article 6 . paragraphe 1, de la Convention garantit Ã toute personne qu'il sera dÃ©cidÃ© du bien-fondÃ© des accusations pÃ©nales portÃ©es contre elle dans un dÃ©lai raisonnablÃ© . Pour apprÃ©cier si cette disposition a Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©e, la Commission doit tout d'abord fixer le dÃ©but et la fin de la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration .
La Commission rappelle que la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a dÃ©clarÃ© que la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration .commence nÃ©cessairement le jour oÃ¹ une personne se trouve accusÃ©e . . . ., ce terme Ã©tant compris au sens de la Convention (Affaire Neumeister, SÃ©rie A . arrÃªt du 27 juin 1968, p . 41 . par . 18) . La Commission a elle-mÃªme Ã©tabli le principe que .ce moment est celui oÃ¹ les soupÃ§ons dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã©tait l'objet ont eu des rÃ©percussions importantes sur sa situation Â» (cf . rapport de la Commission sur la requÃªte nÂ° 4517/70, Huber c/Autriche, D .R . 2, p . 39, par . 67) . La Commission relÃ¨ve qu'en l'espÃ¨ce, dans la prÃ©sente procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, l'inculpation date du . . . mars 1977 . Cependant, l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© arrÃªtÃ© en Suisse le . . . dÃ©cembre 1976. Le requÃ©rant soutient qu'il faisait l'objet d'une accusation pÃ©nale dÃ¨s 1950, au moment des enquÃªtes faites en liaison avec la premiÃ¨re demande d'extradition prÃ©sentÃ©e par la Pologne . Il est exact qu'au dÃ©but des annÃ©es 50 quantitÃ© de tÃ©moignages continuaient Ã arriver de l'Ã©tranger aux autoritÃ©s nÃ©erlandaises sur le rÃ´le jouÃ© par le requÃ©rant dans cette rÃ©gion Ã cette Ã©poque et que l'intÃ©ressÃ© en avait connaissance puisqu'il avait Ã©tÃ© entendu au sujet des deux demandes d'extradition prÃ©sentÃ©es par la Pologne . Ces Ã©vÃ©nements ne sauraient toutefois Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme faisant partie de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale qui a suivi l'inculpation de 1977 . La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que le requÃ©rant a commencÃ© Ã Ãªtre sensiblement affectÃ© par la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale ici incriminÃ©e Ã partir du . . . dÃ©cembre 1976. La Commission rappelle en outre que la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a dÃ©clarÃ© qu'en matiÃ¨re rÃ©pressive, l'article 6 . vise Ã Ã©viter qu'une personne inculpÃ©e ne demeure trop longtemps dans l'incertitude de son sort . (Affaire St6gmÃ¼ller, arrÃªt du 10 novembre 1969, sÃ©rie A, p . 40) . La Commission elle-mÃªme a dÃ©clarÃ©, quant Ã la fin de la pÃ©riode prÃ©vue Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, que Â« Ie principe gÃ©nÃ©ral applicable Ã la dÃ©termination du dÃ©but de la pÃ©riode vaut Ã©galement pour la fin de celle-ci, en ce sens que la pÃ©riode en question dure jusqu'Ã ce que la situation de l'intÃ©ressÃ© cesse d'Ãªtre affectÃ©e par le fait qu'il se trouve sous le coup d'accusations pendantes contre lui . (cf . Huber c/Autriche, D .R . 2, p . 40) . A propos d'une requÃªte plus rÃ©cente, la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© qu'une dÃ©cision de non-lieu et sa communication au requÃ©rant supposaient qu'Ã partir de ce moment-lÃ le requÃ©rant cessait d'Ãªtre affectÃ© par les soupÃ§ons le concernant et qu'il ne souffrait plus de l'incertitude que l'article 6 cherche Ã limiter dans le temps . De mÃªme, en l'espÃ¨ce, si le requÃ©rant a souffert de l'incertitude oÃ¹ il se trouvait quant Ã l'issue de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale future, il a cessÃ© d'en Ãªtre affectÃ© lorsque, comme il l'a affirmÃ© tout au long de la procÃ©dure, le Ministr e
de la Justice l'informa en 1952 de sa dÃ©cision de renoncer aux poursuites . Il n'Ã©tait donc pas soumis Ã une - accusation pÃ©nale - au sens de l'article 6 entre le moment oÃ¹ il a pris connaissance de la dÃ©cision prÃ©citÃ©e et celui oÃ¹ il a Ã©tÃ© informÃ© de la prÃ©sente accusation . Il s'ensuit que la seule pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration aux fins de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, est celle qui s'est Ã©coulÃ©e entre dÃ©cembre 1976 et janvier 1981, date du dernier arrÃªt rendu en l'espÃ¨ce par la Cour SuprÃªme . Dans l'examen du prÃ©sent grief, la Commission tiendra compte des circonstances et de la complexitÃ© de l'affaire dans son ensemble, de la maniÃ¨re dont elle a Ã©tÃ© traitÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s et les tribunaux nationaux et de la conduite du requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme (cf . Huber c/Autriche, D .R . 2, p . 41) . La Commission relÃ¨ve qu'en raison de la nature mÃªme de l'accusation, l'instruction a dÃ» porter sur une foule de tÃ©moignages provenant de sources diverses . En outre, aucun Ã©lÃ©ment du dossier ne permet de penser que la maniÃ¨re dont les autoritÃ©s nationales ont menÃ© l'affaire a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©raisonnable . Il Ã©tait extrÃªmement difficile d'enquÃªter sur des crimes remontant Ã plus de trente ans et l'instruction obligeait Ã examiner le tÃ©moignage d'un grand nombre de personnes dispersÃ©es dans le monde entier et dont il Ã©tait difficile voire impossible de vÃ©rifier les donnÃ©es personnelles . Il importe aussi de noter que le tribunal rÃ©gional de Rotterdam a dÃ©cidÃ© en septembre 1979 de suspendre la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale compte tenu de l'Ã©tat mental du requÃ©rant et que la procÃ©dure fut reprise en fÃ©vrier 1980, lorsque la Cour SuprÃªme a cassÃ© cette dÃ©cision . La Commission relÃ¨ve en outre que, dans le cadre des divers pourvois en cassation formÃ©s devant la Cour SuprÃªme, le requÃ©rant, tout en Ã©tant reprÃ©sentÃ© par son avocat, a personnellement prÃ©sentÃ© de nombreux moyens qui, en raison de leur cÃ ractÃ¨re factuel, rÃ©pÃ©titif ou tardif, ne pouvaient Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme de ceux auxquels la Cour SuprÃªme peut avoir Ã©gard mais qui retardaient nÃ©cessairement les dÃ©cisions . En outre, la procÃ©dure s'est trouvÃ©e compliquÃ©e par les multiples objections formulÃ©es par le requÃ©rant et son avocat contre les dÃ©cisions de procÃ©dure et interlocutoires prises en cours d'instance . Ceci Ã©tant, la Commission n'estime pas que la pÃ©riode allant de dÃ©cembre 1976 Ã janvier 1981 soit exceptionnellement longue et ait dÃ©passÃ© le dÃ©lai raisonnable prÃ©vu Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s Ã la Commission, ne permettent donc de discerner aucune apparence de violation de cette disposition .
-242-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 11/12/1981Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

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