Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/456/228/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:12:18+00:00

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A section (§ 309.515, subd. 1(b)) of Minnesota's charitable solicitations Act provides that only those religious organizations that receive more than half of their total contributions from members or affiliated organizations are exempt from the registration and reporting requirements of the Act. The individual appellees, claiming to be followers of the tenets of appellee Unification Church (later joined as a plaintiff) brought suit in Federal District Court seeking a declaration that the statute, on its face and as applied to them, violated, inter alia, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and also seeking injunctive relief. After obtaining a preliminary injunction, appellees moved for summary judgment. Upon finding that the "overbreadth" doctrine gave appellees standing to challenge the statute, the Magistrate to whom the action had been transferred held that the application of the statute to religious organizations violated the Establishment Clause, and therefore recommended declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. The District Court, accepting this recommendation, entered summary judgment for appellees. The Court of Appeals affirmed on both the standing issue and on the merits. But the court, disagreeing with the District Court's conclusion that appellees and others should enjoy the religious organization exemption from the Act merely by claiming to be such organizations, held that proof of religious organization status was required in order to gain the exemption, and left the question of appellees' status "open . . . for further development." Accordingly, the court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded for entry of a modified injunction and further proceedings.
the parties is not rendered any less concrete by the fact that appellants, in the course of this litigation, have changed their position to contend that the Unification Church is not a religious organization within the meaning of the Act, and that therefore it would not be entitled to an exemption under § 309.515, subd. 1(b) even if the fifty percent rule were declared unconstitutional. This is so because the threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule to appellees amounts to a distinct and palpable injury to them, in that it disables them from soliciting contributions in Minnesota unless they comply with the registration and reporting requirements of the Act. Moreover, there is a causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. The fact that appellees have not yet shown an entitlement to a permanent injunction barring the State from subjecting them to the Act's registration and reporting requirements does not detract from the palpability of the particular and discrete injury caused to appellees. Pp. 456 U. S. 238-244.
2. Section 309.515, subd. 1(b), in setting up precisely the sort of official denominational preference forbidden by the First Amendment, violates the Establishment Clause. Pp. 456 U. S. 244-255.
(a) Since the challenged statute grants denominational preferences, it must be treated as suspect, and strict scrutiny must be applied in adjudging its constitutionality. Pp. 456 U. S. 244-246.
(b) Assuming, arguendo, that appellants' asserted interest in preventing fraudulent solicitations is a "compelling" interest, appellants have nevertheless failed to demonstrate that § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule is "closely fitted" to that interest. Appellants' argument to the contrary is based on three premises: (1) that members of a religious organization can and will exercise supervision and control over the solicitation activities of the organization when membership contributions exceed fifty percent; (2) that membership control, assuming its existence, is an adequate safeguard against abusive solicitations of the public; and (3) that the need for public disclosure rises in proportion with the percentage of nonmember contributions. There is no substantial support in the record for any of these premises. Pp. 456 U. S. 246-251.
(c) Where the principal effect of § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule is to impose the Act's registration and reporting requirements on some religious organizations but not on others, the "risk of politicizing religion" inhering in the statute is obvious. Pp. 456 U. S. 251-255.
which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 456 U. S. 258. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 456 U. S. 264.
charitable organizations, and is designed to protect the contributing public and charitable beneficiaries against fraudulent practices in the solicitation of contributions for purportedly charitable purposes. A charitable organization subject to the Act must register with the Minnesota Department of Commerce before it may solicit contributions within the State. § 309.52. With certain specified exceptions, all charitable organizations registering under § 309.52 must file an extensive annual report with the Department, detailing, inter alia, their total receipts and income from all sources, their costs of management, fundraising, and public education, and their transfers of property or funds out of the State, along with a description of the recipients and purposes of those transfers. § 309.53. The Department is authorized by the Act to deny or withdraw the registration of any charitable organization if the Department finds that it would be in "the public interest" to do so and if the organization is found to have engaged in fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest practices. § 309.532, subd. 1 (Supp.1982). Further, a charitable organization is deemed ineligible to maintain its registration under the Act if it expends or agrees to expend an "unreasonable amount" for management, general, and fundraising costs, with those costs being presumed unreasonable if they exceed thirty percent of the organization's total income and revenue. § 309.555, subd. 1a (Supp.1982).
temporary and permanent injunctive relief. Appellee Unification Church was later joined as a plaintiff by stipulation of the parties, and the action was transferred to a United States Magistrate.
After obtaining a preliminary injunction, [Footnote 6] appellees moved for summary judgment. Appellees' evidentiary support for this motion included a "declaration" of appellee Haft, which described in some detail the origin, "religious principles," and practices of the Unification Church. App. A-7 - A-14. The declaration stated that among the activities emphasized by the Church were "door-to-door and public-place proselytizing and solicitation of funds to support the Church," id. at A, and that the application of the Act to the Church through § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule would deny its members their "religious freedom," id. at A-14. Appellees also argued that, by discriminating among religious organizations, § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule violated the Establishment Clause.
religious literature, by arguing that, unlike the activities of the petitioners in Murdock, appellees' solicitations bore no substantial relationship to any religious expression, and that they were therefore outside the protection of the First Amendment. [Footnote 7] Appellants also contended that the Act did not violate the Establishment Clause. Finally, appellants argued that appellees were not entitled to challenge the Act until they had demonstrated that the Unification Church was a religion and that its fundraising activities were a religious practice.
637 F.2d at 564-565. On the merits, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's holding that the "inexplicable religious classification" embodied in the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), violated the Establishment Clause. [Footnote 10] Id. at 565-570. Applying the Minnesota rule of severability, the Court of Appeals also held that § 309.515, subd. 1(b), as a whole should not be stricken from the Act, but rather that the fifty percent rule should be stricken from § 309.515, subd. 1(b). Id. at 570. But the court disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that appellees and others should enjoy the religious organization exemption from the Act merely by claiming to be such organizations: the court held that proof of religious organization status was required in order to gain the exemption, and left the question of appellees' status "open . . . for further development." Id. at 570-571. The Court of Appeals accordingly vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the action for entry of a modified injunction and for further appropriate proceedings. Id. at 571. [Footnote 11] We noted probable jurisdiction. 452 U.S. 904 (1981).
Appellants argue that appellees are not entitled to be heard on their Establishment Clause claims. Their rationale for this argument has shifted, however, as this litigation has progressed. Appellants' position in the courts below was that the Unification Church was not a religion, and, more importantly, that appellees' solicitations were not connected with any religious purpose. From these premises, appellants concluded that appellees were not entitled to raise their Establishment Clause claims until they had demonstrated that their activities were within the protection of that Clause. The courts below rejected this conclusion, instead applying the overbreadth doctrine in order to allow appellees to raise their Establishment Clause claims. In this Court, appellants have taken an entirely new tack. They now argue that the Unification Church is not a "religious organization" within the meaning of Minnesota's charitable solicitations Act, and that the Church therefore would not be entitled to an exemption under § 309.515, subd. 1(b), even if the fifty percent rule were declared unconstitutional. From this new premise, appellants conclude that the courts below erred in invalidating § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule without first requiring appellees to demonstrate that they would have been able to maintain their exempt status but for that rule, and thus that its adoption had caused them injury in fact. We have considered both of appellants' rationales, and hold that neither of them has merit.
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.'"
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 438 U. S. 72 (1978), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 204 (1962). This requirement of a "personal stake" must consist of "a distinct and palpable injury . . .' to the plaintiff," Duke Power Co., supra at 438 U. S. 72, quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 501 (1975), and "a `fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct," Duke Power Co., supra at 438 U. S. 72, quoting Arlinton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 429 U. S. 261 (1977). Application of these constitutional standards to the record before us and the factual findings of the District Court convince us that the Art. III requirements for standing are plainly met by appellees.
stated rationale for the application of the Act to appellees was that § 309.515, subd. 1(b), did apply to the Unification Church. [Footnote 13] But § 309.515, subd. 1(b), by its terms, applies only to religious organizations. It follows, therefore, that an essential premise of the State's attempt to require the Unification Church to register under the Act by virtue of the fifty percent rule in § 309.515, subd. 1(b), is that the Church is a religious organization. It is logically untenable for the State to take the position that the Church is not such an organization, because that position destroys an essential premise of the exercise of statutory authority at issue in this suit.
that the Church is not a religious organization. And it remains entirely clear that, if we were to uphold the constitutionality of the fifty percent rule, the State would, without more, insist upon the Church's registration. In this Court, the State has changed its position, and purports to find independent bases for denying the Church an exemption from the Act. Considering the development of this case in the courts below, and recognizing the premise inherent in the State's attempt to apply the fifty percent rule to appellees, we do not think that the State's change of position renders the controversy between these parties any less concrete. The fact that appellants chose to apply § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule as the sole statutory authority requiring the Church to register under the Act compels the conclusion that, at least for purposes of this suit challenging that State application, the Church is indeed a religious organization within the meaning of the Act.
With respect to the question of injury in fact, we again take as the starting point of our analysis the fact that the State attempted to use § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule in order to compel the Unification Church to register and report under the Act. That attempted use of the fifty percent rule as the State's instrument of compulsion necessarily gives appellees standing to challenge the constitutional validity of the rule. The threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule to the Church surely amounts to a distinct and palpable injury to appellees: it disables them from soliciting contributions in the State of Minnesota unless the Church complies with registration and reporting requirements that are hardly de minimis. [Footnote 14] Just as surely, there is a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct -- here, between the claimed disabling and the threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule.
Of course, the Church cannot be assured of a continued religious organization exemption even in the absence of the fifty percent rule. See n 30, infra. Appellees have not yet shown an entitlement to the entirety of the broad injunctive relief that they sought in the District Court -- namely, a permanent injunction barring the State from subjecting the Church to the registration and reporting requirements of the Act. But that fact by no means detracts from the palpability of the particular and discrete injury caused to appellees by the State's threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 429 U. S. 261-262. The Church may indeed be compelled, ultimately, to register under the Act on some ground other than the fifty percent rule, and while this fact does affect the nature of the relief that can properly be granted to appellees on the present record, it does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear the present case. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 429 U. S. 287 (1977). In sum, contrary to appellants' suggestion, appellees have clearly demonstrated injury in fact.
rise to the present suit, a discrete injury of which appellees now complain will indeed be completely redressed by a favorable decision of this Court.
"[A] considerable burden is on the state in questioning a claim of a religious nature. Strict or narrow construction of a statutory exemption for religious organizations is not favored. Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir.1957, Burger, J.)."
"Security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. [Footnote 22]"
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 336 U. S. 112 (1949) (concurring opinion).
"The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion. . . . The State may not adopt programs or practices . . . which 'aid or oppose' any religion. . . . This prohibition is absolute."
"[t]he fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government . . . effect no favoritism among sects . . . and that it work deterrence of no religious belief."
Abington School District, supra, at 374 U. S. 305. In short, when we are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.
that rule must be invalidated unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest, cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 454 U. S. 269-270 (1981), and unless it is closely fitted to further that interest, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 319 U. S. 116-117 (1943). With that standard of review in mind, we turn to an examination of the governmental interest asserted by appellants.
Appellants assert, and we acknowledge, that the State of Minnesota has a significant interest in protecting its citizens from abusive practices in the solicitation of funds for charity, and that this interest retains importance when the solicitation is conducted by a religious organization. We thus agree with the Court of Appeals, 637 F.2d at 567, that the Act, "viewed as a whole, has a valid secular purpose," and we will therefore assume, arguendo, that the Act generally is addressed to a sufficiently "compelling" governmental interest. But our inquiry must focus more narrowly, upon the distinctions drawn by § 309.515, subd. 1(b), itself. Appellants must demonstrate that the challenged fifty percent rule is closely fitted to further the interest that it assertedly serves.
"Where the safeguards of membership funding do not exist, the need for public disclosure is obvious. . . ."
". . . As public contributions increase as a percentage of total contributions, the need for public disclosure increases. . . . The particular point at which public disclosure should be required . . . is a determination for the legislature. In this case, the Act's 'majority' distinction is a compelling point, since it is at this point that the organization becomes predominantly public-funded."
can and will exercise supervision and control over the organization's solicitation activities when membership contributions exceed fifty percent; that membership control, assuming its existence, is an adequate safeguard against abusive solicitations of the public by the organization; and that the need for public disclosure rises in proportion with the percentage of nonmember contributions. Acceptance of all three of these premises is necessary to appellants' conclusion, but we find no substantial support for any of them in the record.
by § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule in fact control their organizations. Indeed, the legislative history of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), indicates precisely to the contrary. [Footnote 25] In short, the first premise of appellants' argument has no merit.
fail to justify the fifty percent rule: appellants offer no reason why the members of religious organizations exempted under § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule should have any greater incentive to protect nonmembers than the members of nonexempted religious organizations have. Thus we also reject appellants' second premise as without merit.
Finally, we find appellants' third premise -- that the need for public disclosure rises in proportion with the percentage of nonmember contributions -- also without merit. The flaw in appellants' reasoning here may be illustrated by the following example. Church A raises $10 million, 20 percent from nonmembers. Church B raises $50,000, 60 percent from nonmembers. Appellants would argue that, although the public contributed $2 million to Church A and only $30,000 to Church B, there is less need for public disclosure with respect to Church A than with respect to Church B. We disagree; the need for public disclosure more plausibly rises in proportion with the absolute amount, rather than with the percentage, of nonmember contributions. [Footnote 27] The State of Minnesota has itself adopted this view elsewhere in § 309.515: with qualifications not relevant here, charitable organizations that receive annual nonmember contributions of less than $10,000 are exempted from the registration and reporting requirements of the Act. § 309.515, subd. 1(a).
We accordingly conclude that appellants have failed to demonstrate that the fifty percent rule in § 309.515, subd. 1(b), is "closely fitted" to further a "compelling governmental interest."
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), we announced three "tests" that a statute must pass in order to avoid the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 392 U. S. 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 397 U. S. 674 (1970)]."
Id. at 403 U. S. 612-613.
against. . . . [G]overnment participation in certain programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of administration and planning, may escalate to the point of inviting undue fragmentation."
397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 695.
The Minnesota statute challenged here is illustrative of this danger. By their "very nature," the distinctions drawn by § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule "engender a risk of politicizing religion" -- a risk, indeed, that has already been substantially realized.
"[t]he benefit conferred [by exemption] constitutes a substantial advantage; the burden of compliance with the Act is certainly not de minimis."
"A religious society or organization which solicits from its religious affiliates who are qualified under this subdivision and who are represented in a body or convention that elects and controls the governing board of the religious society or organization is exempt from the requirements of . . . Sections 309.52 and 309.53."
"an attempt to deal with the religious organizations which are soliciting on the street and soliciting by direct mail, but who are not substantial religious institutions in . . . our state."
"what you're trying to get at here is the people that are running around airports and running around streets and soliciting people and you're trying to remove them from the exemption that normally applies to religious organizations."
had mixed feelings about the proposed provision, stated, "I'm not sure why we're so hot to regulate the Moonies anyway." Id. at 16.
"This kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction . . . of churches."
The Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ." It is applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 303 (1940).
"[S]ections 309.50 to 309.61 shall not apply to any group or association serving a bona fide religious purpose when the solicitation is connected with such a religious purpose, nor shall such sections apply when the solicitation for such a purpose is conducted for the benefit of such a group or association. . . ."
"[S]ections 309.52 and 309.53 shall not apply to . . . :"
"Subdivision 1. . . . [S]ections 309.52 and 309.53 shall not apply to . . . :"
"(b) A religious society or organization which received more than half of the contributions it received in the accounting year last ended (1) from persons who are members of the organization; or (2) from a parent organization or affiliated organization; or (3) from a combination of the sources listed in clauses (1) and (2). A religious society or organization which solicits from its religious affiliates who are qualified under this subdivision and who are represented in a body or convention is exempt from the requirements of sections 309.52 and 309.53. The term 'member' shall not include those persons who are granted a membership upon making a contribution as a result of a solicitation."
"discussed the application of the amendments expanding the scope of the charities law to religious organizations, explained the registration procedure, enclosed the proper forms, and sought [appellees'] compliance with the law."
"During the recent Minnesota legislative session, a bill was passed which changes the registration and reporting requirements for charitable organizations which solicit funds in Minnesota. One significant change was in the religious exemption which previously exempted from registering and reporting any organization serving a bona fide religious purpose."
"Minn.Stat. § 309.515, as found in chapter 601 of the 1978 Session Laws, provides that the religious exemption now applies to religious groups or societies which receive more than half of its contributions in the accounting year last ended from persons who are members of the organization or from a parent organization or affiliated organization. In other terms, a religious organization which solicits more than half its funds from non-members must register and report according to the provisions of the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Law."
"From the nature of your solicitation, it appears that Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity must complete a Charitable Organization Registration Statement and submit it to the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The Charitable Organization Registration Statement must be accompanied with a financial statement for the fiscal year last ended."
"I am enclosing the proper forms and an information sheet for your use. Please be advised that the proper forms must be on file with the Department of Commerce by September 30, 1978, or we will consider taking legal action to ensure your compliance."
Affidavit of Susan E. Fortney, supra, Exhibit A.
"application of the statutes to itinerant missionaries whose Churches are not established in Minnesota, but not to Churches with substantial local membership, constitutes an unequal application of the law."
App. A-5. The focus of this allegation was plainly the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b).
Appellants responded to appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction with a motion to dismiss. App. to Juris.Statement A-38. They disputed appellees' claims on the merits, and also challenged appellees' standing to raise their Establishment Clause claims, arguing that the Unification Church was not a religion within the meaning of that Clause. Id. at A-44 - A-45. The Magistrate made findings of fact that the Unification Church was a California nonprofit religious corporation, and that it had been granted tax exempt religious organization status by the United States Internal Revenue Service and the State of Minnesota. Id. at A-37. These findings were later incorporated into the Magistrate's report and recommendation on the motion for summary judgment. Id. at A-21. He declined, however, to rule on the issue of the religious status of the Church. Id. at A-47.
Appellants asserted that the central issue in the case was "whether [appellees'] fund raising practices constitute expression of religious beliefs within the protection of the First Amendment." Defendants' Objections to Report and Recommendations of Magistrate Robert Renner in No. Civ. 7853 (DC Minn.), p. 2. Appellants argued that appellees' fundraising activities were not a form of religious expression; they provided evidentiary support for this argument in the form of numerous affidavits of persons claiming to be former members of the Unification Church, who asserted that they had been encouraged to engage in fundraising practices that were both fraudulent and unrelated to any religious purpose.
"in that it inhibit[ed] religious organizations which receive[d] more than half of their contributions from nonmembers, and thereby enhance[d] religious organizations which receive[d] less than half from non-members."
"1. The Minnesota Charitable Solicitations Act, Minn.Stat. § 309.50 et seq., is unconstitutional as applied to religious organizations and members thereof;"
"2. The Act is constitutional as applied to nonreligious organizations and members thereof;"
"3. Sections 309.534, subd. 1(a), and 309.581 of the Act is [sic] unconstitutional as applied to persons claiming to be religious organizations or members thereof;"
"4. The constitutionality of the application of section 309.532 [relating to denial, suspension, and revocation of licenses issued under the Act] to [appellees] and others whose claims to a religious exemption are challenged by the State is a nonjusticiable issue;"
"5. [Appellant Larson] is permanently enjoined from enforcing the Act as to any and all religious organizations;"
"6. [Appellant Larson] is permanently enjoined from utilizing sections 309.534, subd. 1(a), and 309.581 to enforce the Act as against [appellees] and other persons claiming to be religious organizations or members thereof."
Id. at A-18 - A-19.
The Court of Appeals supported this conclusion on grounds broader than those of the District Court. Whereas the District Court had found § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule to violate only the second of the Lemon tests, the Court of Appeals found the rule to violate the first of those tests as well. 637 F.2d at 567-568. The first Lemon test provides that "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose." 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 612.
"[W]e agree with the district court's holding that [appellees] have standing to challenge the classification made in the exemption section of the Act, as it pertains to religious organizations; we agree with the court's invalidation of the classification made in that section; we agree that the exemption section should apply to all religious organizations, subject to possible legislative revision; we disagree with the conclusion that no part of the Act may be applied to religious organizations, but leave open questions of construction and validity for further development, including the application of the Act to charitable organizations; and we disagree with the conclusion that [appellees] and others claiming the religious exemption should automatically enjoy such exemption, but leave open the question of [appellees'] status for further development."
JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent suggests,post at 456 U. S. 265-266, and n. 2, that our interpretation of the State's grounds for application of the Act to appellees is erroneous. But the letter quoted in n 4, supra, speaks for itself, and we reject the novel suggestion that the contents of such a notification of official enforcement action may be ignored by this Court depending upon the state official who signs the notice.
The Department's attempt to apply the Act to appellees by means of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), was consistent with the expectation, evident in the legislative history of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), that that provision's fifty percent rule would be applied to the Unification Church in order to deny it continued exemption from the requirements of the Act. See infra at 456 U. S. 253-255.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent suggests,post, at 456 U. S. 264, that "the Act applies to appellees not by virtue of the fifty percent rule,' but by virtue of § 309.52." This suggestion misses the point. Section 309.52 announces the Act's general registration requirement for charitable organizations. In 1978, the State sought to compel the Church to register and report under the Act, relying upon § 309.515, subd. 1(b). The State might have chosen to rely upon some other provision, e.g., § 309.515, subd. 1(a)(1), which exempts charitable organizations receiving less than $10,000 annually from the public. Instead the State chose to rely upon § 309.515, subd. 1(b). Thus, if the Act applies to appellees, it of course does so by the combined effect of § 309.52 and § 309.515, subd. 1(b). In this attenuated sense, the Act does apply to appellees "by virtue of § 309.52." But nevertheless the State sought to impose the requirements of the Act upon appellees by only one means out of the several available to it, and that means was § 309.515, subd. 1(b).
See supra at 456 U. S. 230-231; n. 29, infra.
Appellants contended below that appellees were not entitled to raise their Establishment Clause claims until they had demonstrated that their activities were within the protection of that Clause. The courts below applied the overbreadth doctrine to reject this contention, and appellants argue that those courts erred in doing so. We have no need to address these matters. Appellees have made a sufficiently strong demonstration that the Church is a religion to overcome any prudential standing obstacles to consideration of their Establishment Clause claim.
See S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America: A History 67-453 (1970); L. Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom 71-90 (rev. ed.1967).
B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 265 (1967).
"You tell your [colonial] governor that the Parliament of England have no right to tax the Americans . . . because they are not the representatives of America; and will you dare to tax the Baptists for a religion they deny? Are you gentlemen their representatives before GOD, to answer for their souls and consciences any more than the representatives of England are the representatives of America? . . . [I]f it be just in the General Court to take away my sacred and spiritual rights and liberties of conscience and my property with it, then it is surely right and just in the British Parliament to take away by power and force my civil rights and property without my consent; this reasoning, gentlemen, I think is plain."
See Pfeffer, supra, at 104-119.
The Federalist No. 51, p. 326 (H. Lodge ed.1908).
"churches which are new and lacking in a constituency, or which, as a matter of policy, may favor public solicitation over general reliance on financial support from members,"
on the other hand. 637 F.2d at 566. This fundamental difference between § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and the statutes involved in the "disparate impact" cases cited by appellants renders those cases wholly inapplicable here.
Appellants also argue that reversal of the Court of Appeals is required by Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971). In that case, we rejected an Establishment Clause attack upon § 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (1964 ed., Supp. V), which afforded "conscientious objector" status to any person who, "by reason of religious training and belief," was "conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 441. Gillette is readily distinguishable from the present case. Section 6(j) "focused on individual conscientious belief, not on sectarian affiliation." Id. at 401 U. S. 454. Under § 6(j), conscientious objector status was available on an equal basis to both the Quaker and the Roman Catholic, despite the distinction drawn by the latter's church between "just" and "unjust" wars, see St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Second Part, Part II, Question 40, Arts. 1, 4; St. Augustine, City of God, Book XIX, Ch. 7. As we noted in Gillette, the "critical weakness of petitioners' establishment claim" arose "from the fact that § 6(j), on its face, simply [did] not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation." 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 450. In contrast, the statute challenged in the case before us focuses precisely and solely upon religious organizations.
In support of their assumption of such supervision, appellants cite Minn.Stat. § 317.28(2) (1969), which allows any member of a domestic nonprofit corporation to "inspect all books and records for any proper purpose at any reasonable time." But this provision applies only to domestic nonprofit corporations; appellants have made no showing that religious organizations incorporated in other States operate under an analogous constraint. Further, in Minnesota, even domestic religious organizations need not be organized as nonprofit corporations -- they may also choose to organize under Minn.Stat., ch. 315, governing "Religious Associations," which has no provision analogous to § 317.28(2). Moreover, even as to the religious organizations to which it applies, § 317.28(2) obviously does not ensure that any member of a religious organization will actually take advantage of the supervision permitted by that provision. And finally, since § 317.28(2) applies irrespective of the percentage of membership contributions, it cannot provide any justification at all for the fifty percent rule in § 309.515, subd. 1(b). In sum, appellants' assumption of membership supervision is purely conjectural.
An early draft of that provision allowed an exemption from the Act only for a religious organization that solicited "substantially more than half of the contributions it received . . . from persons who have a right to vote as a member of the organization." Minn.H. 1246, 1977-1978 Sess., § 4 (read Apr. 6, 1977). The italicized language was later amended to read, "who are members." Attachment to Minutes of Meeting of Commerce and Economic Development Committee, Jan. 24, 1978. Since § 309.515, subd. 1(b), as enacted deliberately omits membership voting rights as a requirement for a religious organization's exemption, it clearly permits religious organizations that are not subject to control by their membership to be exempted from the Act. Of course, even if § 309.515, subd. 1(b), exempted only those religious organizations with membership voting rights, the provision obviously would not ensure that the membership actually exercised its voting rights so as to control the organization in any effective manner.
This thesis is evident in the Act's treatment of nonreligious organizations that might solicit within the State: with exceptions not relevant here, such organizations are exempted from the registration and reporting requirements of the Act only if their solicitations of the public are de minimis, § 309.515, subds. 1(a)(1), (f), or if they are subject to independent state regulation, § 309.515, subd. 1(c).
We do not suggest, however, that an exemption provision based upon the absolute amount of nonmember contributions would necessarily satisfy the standard set by the Establishment Clause for laws granting denominational preferences.
Allen involved a state law requiring local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven through twelve, including those in parochial schools. 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 238. Walz examined a state law granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship. 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 666. And in Lemon itself, the challenged state laws provided aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools. 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 606.
The registration statement required by § 309.52 calls for the provision of a substantial amount of information, much of which penetrates deeply into the internal affairs of the registering organization. The organization must disclose the "[g]eneral purposes for which contributions . . . will be used," the "[b]oard, group or individual having final discretion as to the distribution and use of contributions received," and "[s]uch other information as the department may . . . require" -- and these are only three of sixteen enumerated items of information required by the registration statement. The annual report required by § 309.53 is even more burdensome and intrusive. It must disclose "[t]otal receipts and total income from all sources," the cost of "management," "fund raising," and "public education," and a list of "[f]unds or properties transferred out of state, with explanation as to recipient and purpose," to name only a few. Further, a religious organization that must register under the Act may have its registration withdrawn at any time if the Department or the Attorney General concludes that the religious organization is spending "an unreasonable amount" for management, general, and fund-raising costs. § 309.555.
In so holding, we by no means suggest that the State of Minnesota must in all events allow appellees to remain exempt from the provisions of the charitable solicitations Act. We agree with the Court of Appeals that appellees and others claiming the benefits of the religious organization exemption should not automatically enjoy those benefits. 637 F.2d at 571. Rather, in order to receive them, appellees may be required by the State to prove that the Unification Church is a religious organization within the meaning of the Act. Nothing in our opinion suggests that appellants could not attempt to compel the Unification Church to register under the Act as a charitable organization not entitled to the religious organization exemption, and put the Church to the proof of its bona fides as a religious organization. Further, nothing in our opinion disables the State from denying exemption from the Act, or from refusing registration and licensing under the Act, to persons or organizations proved to have engaged in frauds upon the public. See § 309.515, subd. 3. We simply hold that, because the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), violates the Establishment Clause, appellees cannot be compelled to register and report under the Act on the strength of that provision.
"invalidation of the fifty percent rule will have absolutely no effect on the Association's obligation to register and report as a charitable organization under the Act."
substituted a simple method of imposing registration and reporting requirements for a more burdensome and less certain method of accomplishing that result. I therefore agree with the Court's conclusion that the appellees have standing to challenge the 50-percent rule in this case.
U.S. 549, 331 U. S. 568. Moreover, a resolution of the question that has been fully considered by the District Court and by the Court of Appeals and that has been fully briefed and argued in this Court is surely consistent with the orderly administration of justice.
The Church has been incorporated in California as a religious corporation, and has been treated as a religious organization for tax purposes by the Federal Government and by the State of Minnesota. App. to Juris.Statement A-37. The Church was treated as a religious organization by the State prior to the enactment of the 50-percent rule in 1978. According to the Magistrate, the appellees "have submitted substantial, although not uncontroverted, evidence of the religious nature of the Unification Church and of their solicitations." Id. at A-23; see id. at A 7.
See Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 373, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (1957) (Burger, J.) ("To construe exemptions so strictly that unorthodox or minority forms of worship would be denied the exemption benefits granted to those conforming to the majority beliefs might well raise constitutional issues").
See generally Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 331 U. S. 568-574; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 346-348 (Brandeis, J., concurring). I have no reservations about the wisdom or importance of this policy. See, e.g., California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U. S. 90, 454 U. S. 94 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U. S. 105; University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 438 U. S. 411-412 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
Even if we were to conclude that the constitutional standards for resolving the statutory issue were perfectly clear, there is nevertheless an important interest in avoiding litigation of issues relating to church doctrine. See United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 455 U. S. 263, n. 2 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490.
Even if the District Court should find that the Church is not a religious organization, I believe that it is fair to assume that the Church would challenge that conclusion in this Court. I recognize that it is also possible that ultimately we may be required to confront both constitutional problems, but that possibility is present whether we dismiss the appeal pending resolution of the Church's status or we decide now the validity of the 50-percent rule.
to whether or not it was the principal or primary effect of the limitation. In any event, the Magistrate recommended, and the District Court agreed, that the exemption from registration be extended to all religious organizations.
"expressly separates two classes of religious organizations and makes the separation for no valid secular purpose that has been suggested by defendants. Inexplicable disparate treatment will not generally be attributed to accident; it seems much more likely that, at some stage of the legislative process, special solicitude for particular religious organizations affected the choice of statutory language. The resulting discrimination is constitutionally invidious."
Id. at 568. The Court of Appeals went on to say that, if it were necessary to apply the second part of the Lemon test, the provision would also fail to survive that examination, because it advantaged some organizations and disadvantaged others.
In this Court, the case is given still another treatment. The Lemon v. Kurtzman tests are put aside because they are applicable only to laws affording uniform benefit to all religions, not to provisions that discriminate among religions. Rather, in cases of denominational preference, the Court says that "our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality." Ante at 456 U. S. 246. The Court then invalidates the challenged limitation.
It does so by first declaring that the 50-percent rule makes explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations. The State's submission that the 50-percent limitation is a law based on secular criteria which happens not to have an identical effect on all religious organizations is rejected. The Court then holds that the challenged rule is not closely fitted to serve any compelling state interest, and rejects each of the reasons submitted by the State to demonstrate that the distinction between contributions solicited from members and from nonmembers is a sensible one. Among others, the Court rejects the proposition that membership control is an adequate safeguard against deceptive solicitations of the public. The ultimate conclusion is that the exemption provision violates the Establishment Clause.
new standard involves factual issues or even mixed questions of law and fact that have not been addressed by the District Court, the Court should not itself purport to make these factual determinations. It should remand to the District Court.
Second, apparently realizing its lack of competence to judge the purposes of the Minnesota Legislature other than by the words it used, the Court disposes in a footnote of the State's claim that the 50-percent rule is a neutral, secular criterion that has disparate impact among religious organizations. The limitation, it is said, "is not simply a facially neutral statute," but one that makes "explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations." Ante at 456 U. S. 247, n. 23. The rule itself, however, names no churches or denominations that are entitled to or denied the exemption. It neither qualifies nor disqualifies a church based on the kind or variety of its religious belief. Some religions will qualify and some will not, but this depends on the source of their contributions, not on their brand of religion.
but also not so well-established, organizations. The Court appears to concede that the Minnesota law at issue does not constitute an establishment of religion merely because it has a disparate impact. An intentional preference must be expressed. To find that intention on the face of the provision at issue here seems to me to be patently wrong.
Fourth, and finally, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and the District Court that the exemption must be extended to all religious organizations. The Court of Appeals noted that the exemption provision, so construed, could be said to prefer religious organizations over nonreligious organizations, and hence amount to an establishment of religion. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did not further address the question, and the Court says nothing of it now. Arguably, however, there is a more evident secular reason for exempting religious organizations who rely on their members to a great extent than there is to exempt all religious organizations, including those who raise all or nearly all of their funds from the public.
The Magistrate also recommended, and the District Court agreed, that all of the registration provisions applicable to religious organizations be enjoined as prior restraints offensive to the First Amendment. App. to Juris.Statement A-33. The Court of Appeals did not agree in this respect.
This observation would appear to call into question the exemption of charitable organizations raising all of their funds from their members: since members cannot be relied upon to control their organization's fundraising activities so as to prevent fraud, why should those organizations be entitled to an exemption when others are not?
Ibid. (citations omitted). Such fundamental principles notwithstanding, the Court today delivers what is, at best, an advisory constitutional pronouncement. The advisory character of the pronouncement is all but conceded by the Court itself when it acknowledges, in the closing footnote of its opinion, that appellees must still "prove that the Unification Church is a religious organization within the meaning of the Act" before they can avail themselves of the Court's extension of the exemption contained in the Minnesota statute. Because I find the Court's standing analysis wholly unconvincing, I respectfully dissent.
456 U. S. 515, subd. 1(b), of the Minnesota Charitable Solicitations Act (Act) because they have "plainly met" the case-or-controversy requirements of Art. III. Ante at 456 U. S. 239. This conclusion is wrong. Its error can best be demonstrated by first reviewing three factual aspects of the case which are either misstated or disregarded in the Court's opinion.
"From the nature of your solicitation, it appears that [the Association] must complete a Charitable Organization Registration Statement and submit it to the Minnesota Department of Commerce."
"[t]he [Association] has failed to file a registration statement and financial information with the Minnesota Department of Commerce, resulting in a violation of Minn.Stat. § 309.52."
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 441 U. S. 99 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 438 U. S. 72 (1978). I do not disagree with the Court's conclusion that the threatened application of the Act to appellees constitutes injury in fact.
"there is a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct -- here, between the claimed disabling and the threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule."
Ante at 456 U. S. 241.
As was demonstrated above, the statute and the State require the Association to register because it is a "charitable organization" under § 309.52, not because of the fifty percent requirement contained in the exemption for religious organizations. Indeed, at this point in the litigation, the fifty percent rule is entirely inapplicable to appellees, because they have not shown that the Association is a "religious organization." Therefore, any injury to appellees resulting from the registration and reporting requirements is caused by § 309.52, not, as the Court concludes, by "the . . . threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule." Ante at 456 U. S. 242. Having failed to establish that the fifty percent rule is causally connected to their injury, appellees at this point lack standing to challenge it.
"[W]hen a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue the relevant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Absent such a showing, exercise of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous, and thus inconsistent with the Art. III limitation."
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 426 U. S. 38.
"We agree with the Court of Appeals that appellees and others claiming the benefits of the religious organization exemption should not automatically enjoy those benefits. Rather, in order to receive them, appellees may be required by the State to prove that the Unification Church is a religious organization within the meaning of the Act."
Ante at 456 U. S. 255, n. 30 (citation omitted). [Footnote 4/7] If the appellees fail in this proof -- a distinct possibility given the State's "heavy testimonial barrage against [the Association's] claim that it is a religion," App. to Juris.Statement A-46 -- this Court will have rendered a purely advisory opinion. In so doing, it will have struck down a state statute at the behest of a party without standing, contrary to the undeviating teaching of the cases previously cited. Those cases, I believe, require remand for a determination of whether the Association is a "religious organization" as that term is used in the Minnesota statute.
There can be no doubt about the impropriety of the Court's action this day.
Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 323 U. S. 105 (1944). Nowhere does this doctrine have more force than in cases such as this one, where the defect is a possible lack of Art. III jurisdiction due to want of standing on the part of the party which seeks the adjudication.
"'Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of [legislative Acts] unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.'"
Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 250 U. S. 279 (1919), quoted in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The existence of injury in fact does not, alone, suffice to establish such an interest.
"The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. III requirement. A federal court cannot ignore this requirement without overstepping its assigned role in our system of adjudicating only actual cases and controversies."
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 39.
In sum, the Court errs when it finds that appellees have standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 309.515, subd. 1(b). Although injured, to be sure, appellees have not demonstrated that their injury was caused by the fifty percent rule or will be redressed by its invalidation. This is not to say that appellees can never prove causation or redressability, only that they have not done so at this point. The case should be remanded to permit such proof. Until such time as the requirements of Art. III clearly have been satisfied, this Court should refrain from rendering significant constitutional decisions.
The examples of this error by the Court are numerous. The Court speaks of the Act "as applied to [appellees] through § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule," ante at 456 U. S. 233 (emphasis added), "the application of the Act to the Church through § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule," ante at 456 U. S. 234 (emphasis added), the State's attempt to enforce the Act against the appellees "in express and exclusive reliance upon the newly enacted fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b)," ante at 456 U. S. 239, and the State's "attemp[t] to use § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule in order to compel the Unification Church to register and report under the Act," ante at 456 U. S. 241. In addition, the Court holds that, because the fifty percent rule is unconstitutional, the "appellees cannot be compelled to register and report under the Act on the strength of that provision," ante at 456 U. S. 255 (emphasis added).
The Court errs when it concludes that the basis for the State's enforcement action was the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b). See ante at 456 U. S. 232, 456 U. S. 241. The Court bases this conclusion on a letter to the Association from Legal Assistant Fortney which referred to the fifty percent rule while informing the Association of its obligation to register under the Act. See ante at 456 U. S. 232-233, n. 4. The Court apparently concludes from this letter that it was the fifty percent rule which motivated the State to seek registration from the Association. Certainly the imprecise implications of a letter from a Legal Assistant in the Attorney General's Office do not establish the motive behind the State's enforcement action. More importantly, the reason for the State's action was expressly alleged in the enforcement complaint: the Association is a charitable organization soliciting funds in Minnesota. See Exhibit F to Fortney Affidavit. Even if the State had been motivated by the narrowing of the religious organization exemption, however, that would not alter the legal basis for enforcement of the statute against appellees or the analysis of appellees' standing before this Court.
It is not surprising that the Court's opinion never once mentions this enforcement complaint. That the complaint is pending in the Minnesota District Court, and that it relies entirely upon the Association's status as a "charitable organization" within the meaning of § 309.52, altogether refute the Court's assertion that the fifty percent "rule was the sole basis for the State's attempt to compel registration," and the consequent conclusion that invalidation of the rule will mean that "the Church cannot be required to register and report under the Act." Ante at 456 U. S. 242. As has already been demonstrated, invalidation of the fifty percent rule will have absolutely no effect on the Association's obligation to register and report as a charitable organization under the Act. See supra at 456 U. S. 265-266. Indeed, the Court's decision today will not even require the State to amend its complaint before proceeding with its enforcement action.
"'bare assertion . . . , without the production of any evidence . . . , is simply not sufficient to sustain [an] assertion that [the Unification Church] is a religious organization.'"
637 F.2d 562, 570 (CA8 1981) (quoting United States v. Berg, 636 F.2d 203, 205 (CA8 1980)).
"a declaration that § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule is unconstitutional would put the State to the task of demonstrating that the Unification Church is not a religious organization within the meaning of the Act."
Ante at 456 U. S. 243 (emphasis added). This conclusion directly conflicts with the Minnesota statute, which requires registration and reporting under the Act if the State demonstrates that an organization is "charitable" within the meaning of § 309.52. See supra at 456 U. S. 265-266. It then becomes incumbent on the organization to show that it qualifies for one of the Act's several exemptions -- in this case, to show that it is a "religious organization" within the meaning of § 309.515, subd. 1(b). The Court cannot change this state regulatory scheme by judicial fiat, and does so only in a transparent attempt to manufacture redressability where none exists. See infra at 456 U. S. 269-271.
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464, 454 U. S. 472 (1981); Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U. S. 151, 454 U. S. 161 (1981); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 441 U. S. 100 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. at 438 U. S. 74, 75, n. 20; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 429 U. S. 262 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 504, 507-508 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 410 U. S. 618(1973).
"[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury."
Ante at 456 U. S. 244, n. 15 (emphasis in original). True though this statement may be, appellees have failed to demonstrate that a favorable decision in this Court will relieve any injury. The Court's decision does not alter the statutory requirement that the Association register under the Act, and expands an exemption from which appellees can benefit only when they prove that the Association is a "religious organization" within the meaning of the Act.
"Of course, the Church cannot be assured of a continued religious organization exemption even in the absence of the fifty percent rule. . . . But that fact by no means detracts from the palpability of [appellees' injury.]"
Ante at 456 U. S. 242 (citation omitted).
I agree that the uncertainty as to whether this decision will benefit appellees does not detract from the "palpability" of their injury. As shown in the text, however, it detracts totally from their ability to demonstrate the essential Art. III requirements of causation and redressability.
John R. Larson, et al.

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