Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/326/446/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:22:53+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 326 › Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Duquesne Warehouse Co.
Where a warehouse company wholly owned by a railroad company loads and unloads goods shipped on the railroad, it performs services "in connection with the transportation of . . . property by railroad;" it is an "employer" within the meaning of § l(a) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 and § l(a) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act of 1938, and its employees are entitled to the benefits of those Acts, even though the services are rendered to, and paid for by, the shippers. P. 326 U. S. 453.
148 F.2d 473, reversed; 149 F.2d 507, affirmed.
the Railroad Retirement Board holding that respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of § 1(a) of the Railroad Retirement Act.
No. 103. Certiorari, 325 U.S. 848, to review reversal of a judgment setting aside a decision of the Railroad Retirement Board holding that petitioner is an "employer" within the meaning of § 1(a) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.
The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 307, 45 U.S.C. § 228a et seq., established a system of annuity, pension, and death benefits for employees of designated classes of employers. The Railroad Retirement Board adjudicates claims of eligible employees for the various types of benefits created by the Act. § 10(b). The eligibility of an employee for such benefits is based on service to those included in the Act's definition of "employer." § 1(a).
The question arose whether the Duquesne Warehouse Co. was such an "employer." The Board, after a hearing, found in No. 95 that it was. Duquesne, pursuant to the provisions of § 11 of the Act, brought suit in a district court to compel the Board to set aside its order. [Footnote 1] That court rendered judgment for Duquesne. 56 F.Supp. 87. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 148 F.2d 473.
The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1094, 45 U.S.C. § 351 et seq., established a system of unemployment insurance for employees of designated classes of employers. The Railroad Retirement Board adjudicates claims of eligible employees for unemployment insurance payments. § 5(b). The eligibility of an employee for such payments is based on service to those included in the Act's definition of "employer." § 1(a). The question arose whether Duquesne was such an "employer." The Board, after a hearing, found in No. 103 that it was. The findings were identical to those which the Board made in No. 95, and were based on the same record. Duquesne, pursuant to § 5(f), brought suit in the district court for the District of Columbia to set aside that order. That court gave judgment for Duquesne. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. 149 F.2d 507. Since the definition of "employer" under both Acts was the same, there was presented a conflict in decisions which led us to grant the petitions for writs of certiorari.
therewith, and which operates any equipment or facility or performs any service . . . in connection with the transportation of passengers or property by railroad, or the receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage, or handling of property transported by railroad. . . ."
Duquesne meets the requirements of the first part of the definition, for it is a corporation, all of whose stock is owned by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a carrier by railroad. The question is whether Duquesne "performs any service" (1) "in connection with the transportation of . . . property by railroad" or (2) "in connection with . . . the receipt, delivery . . . , storage, or handling of property transported by railroad."
transit privileges in 1936; about 12.5 percent in 1937; about 12.5 percent in 1938. During the period of operation at Erie, all the space at that point was used for such freight.
We do not find it necessary to resolve that controversy. At the very least, the phrases in question embrace activities which form a part of transportation service within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act. Duquesne regularly performs service of that character. It is therefore an "employer" within the meaning of the present Acts.
We have noted the loading and unloading services rendered by Duquesne. The duty of unloading carload freight ordinarily rests with the shipper or consignee. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kittaning Co., 253 U. S. 319, 253 U. S. 323. But it is a transportation service within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193, 295 U. S. 200; Barringer & Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 1, 319 U. S. 6. Its cost may be included in the line-haul tariffs, or separately fixed or allowed as an additional charge. Adams v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397, 286 U. S. 410-415; Loading and Unloading Carload Freight, 101 I.C.C. 394; Berg Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Reading Co., 142 I.C.C. 161, 163-164; Livestock Loaded and Unloaded at Chicago, 213 I.C.C. 330, 336, 337. See Haberman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 234 I.C.C. 167, dealing with less than carload lots.
"when those companies are engaged in the business of transporting passengers or property for the railroad, or other service that is a part of railway transportation. [Footnote 12]"
In other words, if a service is involved which the railroad could perform as a part of its transportation service, it is within the present Acts. It then makes no difference that it is performed by a carrier affiliate, rather than by the carrier itself. We think it plain that the definitions in question include, at the very least, those activities which would be transportation services when performed by a railroad, but which it chooses to have performed by its affiliate.
may be given a broader scope. It is sufficient for the disposition of these cases that the loading and unloading services performed by Duquesne are services performed "in connection with the transportation of . . . property by railroad."
* Together with No. 103, Duquesne Warehouse Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, and its president, G. M. Harrison, were allowed to intervene as defendants in No. 95. The Brotherhood intervened in No. 103.
Incoming shipments are consigned to the owner care of Duquesne, the route being designated "Penn R R-For Stge in Transit." Outgoing shipments are consigned to the owner; they have a transit record number, and are marked "accorded transit privilege at East Liberty, a." That is, sugar in carload lots transported by the Pennsylvania to consignees at East Liberty may be delivered there to the consignees at the local rates. When it is subsequently shipped out via the same road, it is entitled to be charged the through rate from the first point of shipment to the ultimate destination.
Between August, 1937, and May, 1938, the Board found that Duquesne is now, and has been at least since August 28, 1935, an employer within the meaning of the Acts.
Duquesne also has "salvage freight" agreements with the Pennsylvania under which the Pennsylvania turns over to it, for sale or other disposition, "over" and damages freight which has been refused or unclaimed by the owner. For this service, Duquesne retains 10 percent of the gross plus certain costs, and remits the balance to the Pennsylvania.
"any company which is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by or under common control with any carrier by railroad and which operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service (other than trucking service) in connection with the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, or icing, storage, and handling of property transported by railroad. . . ."
Hearings, S. Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 10-11, 145. At the latter point, he testified, "I am inclined to believe that, for the present, it would be well not to go beyond carriers and their subsidiaries engaged in transportation." And see Hearings, H. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. 7650, 73rd Cong., 2d Session., pp. 17, 18.
"all services in connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit, ventilation, refrigeration, or icing, storage, and handling of property transported."
See Hearings, H. Committee on Interstate an Foreign Commerce, on H.R. 6956, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 10-11, 82.
"when those companies are engaged in the business of transporting passengers or property for the railroad, or other service that is a part of railway transportation."
And see Hearings, S. Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2395, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11.
"the coverage is extended expressly to railroad labor organizations, railroad associations, traffic associations, and is made more clearly applicable to subsidiaries of railroad companies such as refrigerator storage and other facilities. In other words, it covers a greater number of employees, not only those directly in the railroad business, but those associated with it, and, in that regard, it is more liberal than the present act."
"In addition to trucking service, it is intended to exclude employees of a contractor who may, for example, be occasionally employed by a 'carrier' to repair a depot or build a bridge. Contractors, other than those which perform casual service, would not be excluded, irrespective of whether control be legal or de facto. De facto control may be exercised not only by direct ownership of stock, but by means of agreements, licenses, and other devices which insure that the operation of the company is conducted in the interests of the carrier."
"By these changes, there are brought within the scope of the act substantially all those organizations which are intimately related to the transportation of passengers or property by railroad in the United States."
It is also pointed out that various railroad associations are included in the Acts, and that their express inclusion was to make clear what had been previously implied. Id. pp. 6-7. It is therefore argued that, since some of those associations are not engaged in railroad transportation, Congress did not intend the coverage of the Acts to be restricted to organizations engaged in transportation either in the ordinary sense or in the sense in which the Interstate Commerce Act uses the term.

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