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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TERRY D. JOHNSON (SC 14801) Supreme Court of Connecticut. Argued October 26, 1999-- officially released May 2, 2000 Richard Emanuel, with whom were Kent Drager, senior assistant public defender, and, on the brief, Joseph G. Bruckmann, public defender, for the appellant (defendant). Lori Welch-Rubin, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant) on the proportionality review. Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Mark S. Solak, state's attorney, Susan C. Marks, supervisory assistant state's attorney, Michael E. O'Hare, assistant state's attorney, Toni M. Smith- Rosario, deputy assistant state's attorney, and Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state). Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state) on the proportionality review.
FN1. General Statutes s 53a-54a provides in relevant part: "Murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime...." General Statutes s 53a-54c provides: "Felony murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in any prosecution under this section, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (2) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any dangerous instrument; and (3) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon or instrument; and (4) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury." Because murder and felony murder are contained in separate statutes; General Statutes ss 53a-54a and 53a-54c; the two crimes could have been charged in separate counts of the information. The information in the present case, however, charged the defendant with murder and felony murder in a single count.
FN2. General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) s 53a-54b provides in relevant part: "Capital felony. A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of any of the following: (1) Murder of a member of the division of state police within the department of public safety or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the division of criminal justice, a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, an official of the department of correction authorized by the commissioner of correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility, or any fireman ... while such victim was acting within the scope of his duties...." Unless otherwise indicated, references hereinafter to s 53a-54b are to the 1991 revision.
FN3. General Statutes s 53a-101 (a) provides: "A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and: (1) He is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or (2) in the course of committing the offense, he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone."
larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and ... (2) the value of the property or service exceeds one thousand dollars...."
FN5. General Statutes s 53a-212 provides: "(a) A person is guilty of stealing a firearm when, with intent to deprive another of his firearm or to appropriate the same to himself or a third party, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds a firearm, as defined in subdivision (19) of section 53a-3. "(b) Stealing a firearm is a class D felony."
decision in Godinez as establishing that "any criminal defendant who has been found competent to stand trial, ipso facto, is competent to waive the right to counsel as a matter of federal constitutional law." Id., 824. Furthermore, we explained that although states may require a higher degree of competency than the standard outlined in Dusky v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. 403, "[w]hatever standard is employed ... must be applied equally at the various stages of a trial to pass constitutional muster." State v. Day, supra, 824. Additionally, prior to Godinez, in Myers v. Manson, 192 Conn. 383, 389- 90, 472 A.2d 759 (1984), this court rejected a defendant's claim that a higher competency standard applied to his guilty plea than to the determination of his ability to stand trial. In Myers, the court concluded that the trial court's canvass of the defendant prior to accepting his guilty plea demonstrated the defendant's competency. Id., 389-91. The court explained that "[i]mplicit in the scrutiny of the plea at the trial level and on appeal is an inquiry into whether the defendant was competent to plead.... Hence, the trial court's acceptance of the plea after a thorough inquiry ... implies that the [defendant] was competent to enter that plea." (Citations omitted.) Id., 390; see also State v. Watson, supra, 198 Conn. 604. In the present case, the canvass of the defendant amply supports the trial court's finding that the defendant was competent to plead guilty. [FN26] See State v. Wolff, supra, 237 Conn. 665-66 (defendant's responses during canvass supported finding of competency to waive right to counsel); State v. Watson, supra, 198 Conn. 606-607 (trial court's canvass supported finding of competency to plead guilty); Myers v. Manson, supra, 192 Conn. 390-91 (canvass supported habeas court's conclusion that defendant was competent). Throughout the canvass the defendant demonstrated his clear understanding of the charges against him and the implications of his guilty plea. [FN27] The defendant provided appropriate and coherent responses to the court's questions and indicated that he had consulted with defense counsel regarding the various aspects of his guilty plea. [FN28] See State v. Janice, 20 Conn.App. 212, 214, 565 A.2d 553, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 811, 568 A.2d 795 (1989) ( "intelligent and articulate dialogue" with judge demonstrated defendant's competency). Furthermore, the defendant paused repeatedly during the lengthy canvass to consult with counsel before answering specific questions. Thus, the record of the canvass establishes that the defendant comprehended the proceedings and was able to consult with and assist counsel in the presentation of his case. Accordingly, the defendant was competent to plead guilty. Applying the Godinez principles to the present case, the same measure of competency applied at the time that the trial court denied the defendant's first motion for a competency evaluation as to his guilty plea entered immediately thereafter. Thus, the trial court's extensive canvass of the defendant, prior to accepting his guilty plea, necessarily included a determination that the defendant was competent. See State v. Vane, 322 A.2d 58, 61 (Me.1974) (explaining that finding that plea is voluntary and intelligent after extensive canvass "subsumes and definitively determines that the plea was made by a competent defendant"). Because the same competency standard applied to both determinations and because the canvass occurred immediately after defense counsel raised the issue of competency, implicit in the trial court's conclusion that the defendant was competent to plead guilty is its finding that the defendant was also competent to stand trial. C The defendant also argues that the trial court's denial of his two subsequent motions for a competency examination and its failure to order a competency examination sua sponte when defense counsel raised the issue on a fourth occasion deprived him of due process because he was incompetent to stand trial. We conclude that the defendant was competent to stand trial on those later occasions. As explained previously, the defendant was competent when he pleaded guilty. Less than three months passed between the defendant's guilty plea and his second motion for a competency evaluation. Defense counsel based the later motions for a competency examination on changes in the defendant's demeanor, an increase in medication and his refusal to attend court proceedings. Although defense counsel's concerns are an important indicator of a defendant's incompetency, we do not find that the factors cited by defense counsel here established the defendant's incompetency. Again, the fact that the defendant received medication was not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish incompetency. Additionally, defense counsel never specifically indicated that the medication interfered with the defendant's ability to comprehend the proceedings. Furthermore, the trial court expressly noted that from its observations the defendant appeared competent. Nothing transpired between December 10, 1992, and March 3, 1993, that required the trial court to order a competency examination. Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion on March 4, 1993, when it denied defense counsel's third motion for a competency evaluation. On that occasion, defense counsel reiterated their concerns regarding the defendant's medications and indicated that the defendant again had refused to attend court proceedings. The record shows that the defendant's refusal to come to court stemmed from his anger with defense counsel's alleged failure to keep a promise rather than from the defendant's incompetency. The defendant's dissatisfaction with defense counsel does not indicate his incompetency. See State v. Johnson, 22 Conn.App. 477, 489, 578 A.2d 1085, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 817, 580 A.2d 63 (1990) (defendant's "obstreperous, uncooperative or belligerent behavior" including refusal to return to court and hostility toward attorney did not necessarily indicate defendant's incompetency); Commonwealth v. Logan, 519 Pa. 607, 623-24, 549 A.2d 531 (1988) (refusal to cooperate with defense strategy and display of childish behavior at trial does not necessarily constitute incompetence). Although defense counsel stated that the defendant's medications may have caused his refusal to cooperate with counsel, the record demonstrates that the medications did not interfere with his ability to consult with defense counsel or to assist in his defense. See United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1349 n.70 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976) (mere uncooperativeness with defense counsel does not prove inability to communicate and, therefore, does not prove incompetency). "[The defendant] had the ability to cooperate but did not want to do so." State v. Johnson, supra, 489; see also Commonwealth v. Logan, supra, 624 (" 'issue is the defendant's ability to cooperate and not whether he is actually cooperating' "). Finally, the record reveals that the defendant was competent when defense counsel raised the competency issue for the fourth and final time on March 9, 1993. On that occasion, defense counsel simply mentioned the issue of competency in the context of a discussion regarding a change of psychiatrists and the release of medical records. Defense counsel did not make a motion, pursuant to s 54-56d, for a competency evaluation. The trial court did not respond to defense counsel's comments and defense counsel did not raise the issue thereafter. Again, defense counsel made no specific reference as to why he felt that the defendant was incompetent and, therefore, unable to assist counsel.
D Because we conclude that in accepting the defendant's guilty plea, the trial court implicitly found him competent, and because our own review of the record demonstrates that this finding was not an abuse of discretion, the trial court's failure to provide a competency evaluation did not deprive the defendant of due process under the state or federal constitutions. Accordingly, we conclude that the impropriety of the trial court's failure to order a competency evaluation was harmless. II We next address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly accepted his plea of guilty in violation of the federal and state due process clauses [FN29] and his rights to ensure an informed and voluntary plea pursuant to Practice Book ss 39-19 and 39-20. [FN30] The defendant argues on appeal that his guilty plea violated due process because it was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary. [FN31] Additionally, the defendant claims that the trial court failed to comply substantially with the procedures for acceptance of a guilty plea contained in ss 39-19 and 39-20. [FN32] The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of these claims. On December 10, 1992, the defendant appeared before the trial court and pleaded guilty to the first three counts of the amended information. [FN33] After the defendant entered his guilty plea and the state recited the factual basis for the charges, the trial court canvassed the defendant regarding his plea. The trial court questioned the defendant extensively regarding each charge, the potential penalties for each charge, the factual basis for the plea and whether the defendant understood the constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty. Thereafter, the trial court accepted the defendant's guilty plea finding that it was made knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily and with a full understanding of the crimes, penalties and consequences of the guilty plea. The trial court also found that the plea was made with adequate assistance of counsel and that a factual basis for the plea existed. A First, we review the defendant's assertion that he did not understand the law in relation to the facts and, therefore, his plea of guilty was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary, because: (1) the charging document was complex and confusing; (2) the trial court failed to advise him of an essential element of the capital felony count; (3) he was confused about the sentencing consequences of his guilty plea; and (4) he did not understand that his guilty plea waived all nonjurisdictional defects. We reject these claims. Before addressing the defendant's claims, we review the well established standards for valid guilty pleas. It is axiomatic that "[u]nless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable. State v. Childree, 189 Conn. 114, 119, 454 A.2d 1274 (1983); see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969); State v. Lopez, 197 Conn. 337, 341, 497 A.2d 390 (1985). When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives important fundamental constitutional rights, including the privilege against self- incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront his accusers.... These considerations demand the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences. Boykin v. Alabama, [395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) ]. State v. Childree, supra, 120. "We, therefore, require the trial court affirmatively to clarify on the record that the defendant's guilty plea was made intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Childree, supra, 189 Conn. 120. In order to make a knowing and voluntary choice, the defendant must possess an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, including all relevant information concerning the sentence. State v. Collins, 176 Conn. 7, 9, 404 A.2d 871 (1978).... A determination as to whether a plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails an examination of all of the relevant circumstances. State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287, 542 A.2d 299 (1988)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 310, 699 A.2d 921 (1997); see generally State v. Domian, 235 Conn. 679, 686-87, 668 A.2d 1333 (1996); State v. Nelson, 221 Conn. 635, 639-40, 605 A.2d 1381 (1992); State v. Badgett, 220 Conn. 6, 11-13, 595 A.2d 851 (1991). 1 The defendant first claims that due to the complex and confusing nature of the information he did not understand the law in relation to the facts of the case. [FN34] In particular, the defendant cites the inclusion, in count one, of both intentional murder pursuant to s 53a-54a and felony murder pursuant to s 53a-54c. Although the defendant concedes that the two charges are "legally reconcilable" and that we previously have approved joinder of the two charges; see, e.g., State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 560, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985); State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 708, 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S.Ct. 2898, 115 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1991); he advances no reason for overruling these decisions, nor do we find one. Additionally, the defendant provides no basis for his assertion that the charge contributed to his confusion. Therefore, he has failed to demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violations deprived him of a fair trial. State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). The defendant also argues that count two was confusing and, therefore, jeopardized his understanding of the law in relation to the facts. Count two of the amended information charged the defendant with capital felony [FN35] predicated on both burglary and felony murder. The defendant contends that felony murder may not constitute the underlying offense for a capital felony charge because only intentional murders may serve as the predicate offense for such a charge. [FN36] Therefore, the defendant argues, count two contained capital felony charges based on murder, a death eligible charge, and felony murder, a charge that is not death eligible, and he did not fully comprehend this distinction. The defendant correctly concludes that felony murder may not serve as a predicate offense for a capital felony charge under s 53a-54b. State v. Harrell, 238 Conn. 828, 831-39, 681 A.2d 944 (1996). The inclusion, however, of the capital felony charge based on felony murder did not render the defendant's plea unknowing, involuntary or unintelligent. Despite the fact that the capital felony charge predicated on felony murder was invalid, the defendant nonetheless pleaded guilty to an additional capital felony charge predicated on murder pursuant to s 53a-54a. Thus, by pleading guilty to a second capital felony charge the defendant faced either life imprisonment without the possibility of release or the death penalty regardless of the validity of his plea to the felony murder based capital felony. Accordingly, the exclusion of the felony murder based capital felony charge would not have affected the defendant's decision to plead guilty because he faced the same penalty regardless of the inclusion of that charge. Additionally, the canvass reveals that the defendant clearly understood the potential penalties for a capital felony conviction.
When the trial court asked him whether he knew about the penalties for the capital felony charge, the defendant correctly responded that the penalties were either life imprisonment without the possibility of release or the death penalty. [FN37] Therefore, the record of the guilty plea canvass supports the conclusion that the defendant's guilty plea passed constitutional muster. 2 The defendant also alleges that he did not understand the law of the crimes charged in relation to the facts of his case because the trial court did not read to him that portion of the capital felony statute containing the requirement that the victim was "acting within the scope of his duties...." General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) s 53a-54b (1). The defendant argues that the scope of duty element was critical to his understanding of the capital felony charge and that it is not appropriate, in these circumstances, to presume that defense counsel provided an adequate explanation of the charge. We disagree. We begin by reiterating that "the [defendant's] plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); see also Paulsen v. Manson, 203 Conn. 484, 490, 525 A.2d 1315 (1987); State v. Eason, 192 Conn. 37, 43-44, 470 A.2d 688 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds, Paulsen v. Manson, supra, 491. However, "[w]e recognize that Henderson ... falls short of announcing a per se rule that notice of the true nature of a charge always requires a description of every element of the offense.... The trial court's failure to explicate an element renders the plea invalid only where the omitted element is a critical one ... and only where it is not appropriate to presume that defense counsel has explained the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit." (Citations omitted.) State v. Childree, supra, 189 Conn. 123; see also Oppel v. Lopes, 200 Conn. 553, 558, 512 A.2d 888 (1986). We acknowledge that the trial court did not recite the specific portion of s 53a-54b (1) pertaining to the scope of duty requirement. [FN38] Nonetheless, on the basis of our review of the record and the transcripts, we conclude that the defendant was informed sufficiently of the pertinent element of the capital felony offense. Additionally, under the circumstances of the present case, it was appropriate for the trial court to presume that defense counsel explained each element of the capital offense charge to the defendant. Our careful review of the record reveals that the defendant acquired knowledge of the scope of duty element from sources other than the trial court's explanation of the charge. First, the information expressly contained the scope of duty element. [FN39] See Oppel v. Lopes, supra, 200 Conn. 558 (finding it significant that indictment specifically contained element omitted from trial court's recitation of pertinent statute). Second, after the defendant entered his guilty plea, the clerk of the court read each count of the information aloud and asked the defendant how he pleaded. With reference to the capital felony charge in count two, the clerk specifically stated on two occasions that the defendant caused the death of the victim while the victim "was acting within the scope of his duties." Third, throughout its summation of the facts at the plea proceeding, the state referred to the fact that the victim was in his police cruiser, on patrol and on duty at the time of murder. See State v. Eason, supra, 192 Conn. 44 (defendant on notice of elements of offense where state's factual basis included all elements of offense). Furthermore, during the canvass the defendant repeatedly stated that defense counsel had explained s 53a-54b (1) to him. The trial court specifically asked the defendant whether defense counsel had "read [the capital felony] statute to you or have you read the statute prior to your guilty plea?" The defendant responded, "I have reviewed that with my attorneys and I stand by my plea of guilty as to that point." Thereafter, when the trial court asked the defendant whether defense counsel had read him the penalty portion of s 53a- 54b, he responded that "[m]y attorneys have read me all the statutes." (Emphasis added.) See Bowers v. Warden, 19 Conn.App. 440, 443, 562 A.2d 588, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 817, 565 A.2d 534 (1989) (trial court may rely on defendant's responses during plea canvass in deciding he was informed adequately of elements of charged offenses). Moreover, later in the canvass, the defendant indicated that he had reviewed his plea with defense counsel for at least one entire day. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the defendant had been adequately apprised of the scope of duty element in s 53a-54b (1). 3 The defendant also briefly argues that he was confused about the potential sentencing consequences of his guilty plea. The defendant cites his erroneous responses to several of the trial court's questions regarding the penalties for particular charges. [FN40] We conclude that the defendant was informed adequately of the potential sentencing possibilities and, therefore, that his plea was knowingly made. At several points during the canvass, the defendant corrected himself after initially providing an inaccurate answer regarding the sentencing possibilities. Additionally, the trial court corrected the errors in the defendant's responses, thus informing him of the correct penalties. Furthermore, the defendant expressly stated that defense counsel had read to him the portions of the statutes pertaining to penalties and had informed him of the potential penalties, including the death penalty, that he faced as a result of his guilty plea. See id., 444 (finding that defendant was aware of potential penalties through defense counsel's and trial court's explanations). Thus, the defendant knew the potential penalties and his guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently made. 4 Finally, the defendant claims that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary because he did not clearly understand that a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects. Specifically, the defendant asserts that although the trial court provided defense counsel with an opportunity to explain the waiver rule to the defendant during the canvass, the record does not establish exactly what defense counsel instructed on this issue. Therefore, the defendant claims, it is unclear whether he understood the waiver rule. We reject this claim. It is well established that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects. See State v. Reddick, 224 Conn. 445, 451, 619 A.2d 453 (1993); State v. Suggs, 194 Conn. 223, 227, 478 A.2d 1008 (1984); Cajigas v. Warden, 179 Conn. 78, 81, 425 A.2d 571 (1979). "It is [however] not necessary for the trial court to canvass the defendant to determine that [he] understands that [his] plea of guilty or nolo contendere operates as a waiver of any challenge to pretrial proceedings." State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369, 383-84, 521 A.2d 547 (1987).
the s 53a-46a (h)(4) factor. The state theorizes that Bagshaw's last utterance, namely, "Oh, my God," and his last act of activating his cruiser's lights, prove that he was suffering mental pain and anguish from the first moment of gunfire until he lost consciousness. Although Bagshaw's last words certainly evoke great sympathy, such words do not demonstrate extreme psychological pain above and beyond that necessarily accompanying any killing that is not absolutely instantaneous. Moreover, the ability to activate the lights merely demonstrates that the trooper was conscious. Even if these combined factors show an awareness of his situation, we cannot conclude that "the mere apprehension of death, immediately before [or after] the fatal wounds are inflicted, amounts to serious psychological abuse prior to death." Phillips v. State, 250 Ga. 336, 341, 297 S.E.2d 217 (1982). In Phillips, the defendant approached his estranged wife at her place of employment. When she saw that he was carrying a rifle, "she screamed 'Oh, no!' before [the defendant] fired [five] times in rapid succession"; she was hit by four of the shots, and "lived at least [five] minutes from the onset of the injuries." Id., 339-40. The court rejected the state's claim that, because the victim had "suffered pain and anticipated the prospect of death, she suffered serious physical and psychological abuse before death." Id., 340; see also Clark v. State, 609 So.2d 513, 514 (Fla.1992) (where "fatal shot came almost immediately after the initial shot to the chest," and "there [was] no indication that the crime was committed in such a manner as to cause unnecessary and prolonged suffering to the victim," insufficient proof that victim was aware of impending death so as to satisfy aggravating factor); Shere v. State, supra, 579 So.2d 96 ("there was no prolonged apprehension of death," and no "prolonged suffering," where, without warning, victim's hunting companions fired "a rapid succession of gunshots at [the victim] from close range with two weapons"). We conclude that there is no evidence that the defendant in the present case inflicted mental suffering upon Bagshaw "beyond that ordinarily suffered by anyone who is shot to death." State v. Stanley, supra, 312 S.E.2d 398. Finally, the state claims that the homicide was especially heinous because it was senseless, [FN68] the victim was helpless and the defendant later expressed satisfaction in his accomplishment. These factors do no more than prove the defendant's intent to kill, something he had already admitted as part of his guilty plea. We have carefully considered all of the evidence supporting the jury's determination that the aggravating factors defined by s 53a-46a (h)(4) were proven. We are constrained to conclude, however, that the evidence was insufficient to meet the state's burden of proof. V The defendant also claims that the trial court deprived him of a fair determination of probable cause in violation of article first, s 8, of the constitution of Connecticut, and General Statutes s 54-46a. He further contends that he was deprived of the right to due process of law, the right of confrontation and the right to the assistance of counsel in violation of the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the United States, and article first, ss 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the trial court deprived him of a fair determination of probable cause because: (1) Judge Potter improperly presided over the probable cause hearing after issuing the defendant's arrest warrant; and (2) the trial court refused to sever the defendant's probable cause hearing from that of his brother, Duane Johnson. The following additional facts are pertinent to this claim. The defendant's probable cause hearing commenced on September 23, 1991, before Judge Potter, the same judge who had issued the defendant's arrest warrant. The defendant did not raise the issue of Judge Potter's disqualification. The probable cause hearing was held jointly with that of the defendant's brother, Duane, who was also charged with capital felony. [FN69] On or about June 6, 1991, Duane had given the police an eight page statement detailing the events of June 5, 1991, and identifying the defendant as the shooter. Duane's statement was summarized in one paragraph of the affidavit that had been offered in support of the arrest warrant application for the defendant. Before the probable cause hearing had commenced, anticipating that the state would introduce Duane's statement, the defendant moved to sever their two cases. Based on State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 557 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824, 110 S.Ct. 84, 107 L.Ed.2d 50 (1989), the state argued that severance was not necessary and that it intended to ask the court to consider Duane's statement against him only, and not against the defendant. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. At the hearing, the state offered Duane's statement, and over the defendant's objection, the court admitted the statement only as to Duane. The court made a similar ruling with regard to another exhibit--a one page document containing additional information obtained from Duane on June 6, 1991. In concluding that the state had established probable cause to hold the defendant for felony murder and capital felony, the court specifically addressed the issue of Duane's statement. "The court reiterates its earlier statement regarding the admission of the statements of ... Duane Johnson. The court has not considered any portion of these statements as they may apply to the defendant, Terry Johnson, in its decision [of] whether probable cause exists as to the aforesaid three charges against him--murder and felony murder in the first count and capital felony in the second count." On December 10, 1992, the defendant pleaded guilty to the crimes of murder in violation of ss 53a-54b (1), 53a-54a (a) and (c), and 53a-54c, and burglary in the first degree in violation of s 53a-101 (a)(1) and (2). The state claims that because the defendant's claims are nonjurisdictional in nature, he waived his right to raise them when he pleaded guilty. We agree. It is well established that an unconditional plea of guilty, made intelligently and voluntarily, operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). In general, the only allowable challenges after a plea are those relating either to the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea or the exercise of the trial court's jurisdiction. Id.; State v. Niblack, 220 Conn. 270, 276-77, 596 A.2d 407 (1991). In this case, the defendant's challenges to the finding of probable cause were waived, because neither of these claims is relevant to the validity of his pleas, nor do they challenge the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. VI The vile nature of the crime committed by the defendant in this case cannot be overstated, either from the standpoint of Bagshaw's family, friends and colleagues or from the perspective of the community at large. When a peace officer is murdered in the course of his or her duties, the community rightly demands that the perpetrator of that atrocious deed be dealt with in the most severe terms permitted by law. It therefore is understandable that our statutory scheme defines the murder of a police officer as a capital felony, which carries, at a minimum, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
That same statutory scheme, however, authorizes a sentence of death only when the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt one of the statutorily defined aggravating circumstances, which, in this case, was alleged to be that the murder was committed in an especially cruel, heinous and depraved manner. As judges, it is our sworn responsibility to apply the law in an objective, reasoned and dispassionate manner. We bear this responsibility equally in all cases, whoever the parties and however unpopular the result. Thus, we are obligated to determine whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant in fact caused the victim extreme pain and torture above and beyond that necessary to cause his death. In this case, there was not sufficient evidence to support those facts. Therefore, the discharge of our judicial duty in this case compels the conclusion that, under our law, the sentence of death imposed on the defendant cannot stand. The judgment is reversed with respect to the imposition of the sentence of death and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction, pursuant to s 53a-46a (g), to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects. In this opinion BORDEN, PALMER and CALLAHAN, Js., concurred.
FN6. General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) s 53a-46a provides in relevant part: "Hearing on imposition of death penalty. Aggravating and mitigating factors. (a) A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section. "(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of ... a capital felony, the judge ... who presided at the trial ... shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, including any mitigating factor set forth in subsection (g), and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (h).... Such hearing shall be conducted (1) before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection (b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause or, (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state. "(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (h) shall he governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The burden of establishing any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) shall be on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant. "(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the jury ... shall first determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise constitute a basis for a sentence less than death. "(e) The jury ... shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor. "(f) If the jury ... finds that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist and that no mitigating factor exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the jury ... finds that none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exists or that one or more mitigating factors exist, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. "(g) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury ... finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e), that any mitigating factor exists. The mitigating factors to be considered concerning the defendant shall include, but are not limited to, the following: That at the time of the offense (1) he was under the age of eighteen or (2) his mental capacity was significantly impaired or his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution or (3) he was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution or (4) he was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but his participation in such offense was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution or (5) he could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course of commission of the offense of which he was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person. "(h) If no mitigating factor is present, the court shall impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury ... finds by a special verdict as provided in subsection (e) that ... (4) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner...." The legislature repealed s 53a-46a and replaced it with a new death penalty statute, effective October 1, 1995, pursuant to Public Acts 1995, No. 95-19, s 1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references hereinafter to our death penalty statute are to the 1991 revision of s 53a-46a, the revision in effect at the time of the commission of the offenses here.
all matters brought before it according to law, and may carry into execution all its judgments and decrees and institute rules of practice and procedure as to matters before it. "(b) The following matters shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court: (1) Any matter brought pursuant to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under section 2 of article sixteen of the amendments to the Constitution; (2) an appeal in any matter where the Superior Court declares invalid a state statute or a provision of the state Constitution; (3) an appeal in any criminal action involving a conviction for a capital felony, class A felony, or other felony, including any persistent offender status, for which the maximum sentence which may be imposed exceeds twenty years; (4) review of a sentence of death pursuant to section 53a-46b; (5) any election or primary dispute brought to the Supreme Court pursuant to section 9-323 or section 9-325; (6) an appeal of any reprimand or censure of a probate judge, pursuant to section 45a-65; (7) any matter regarding judicial removal or suspension pursuant to section 51-51j; (8) an appeal of any decision of the Judicial Review Council pursuant to section 51-51r; (9) any matter brought to the Supreme Court pursuant to section 52-265a; (10) writs of error, pursuant to section 52- 272; and (11) any other matter as provided by law. "(c) The Supreme Court may transfer to itself a cause in the Appellate Court. Except for any matter brought pursuant to its original jurisdiction under section 2 of article sixteen of the amendments to the Constitution, the Supreme Court may transfer a cause or class of causes from itself, including any cause or class of causes pending on July 1, 1983, to the Appellate Court. The court to which a cause is transferred has jurisdiction." General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) s 53a-46b provides: "Review of death sentence. (a) Any sentence of death imposed in accordance with the provisions of section 53a-46a shall be reviewed by the supreme court pursuant to its rules. In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the supreme court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate said sentence and remand for imposition of a sentence in accordance with subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a. "(b) The supreme court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that: (1) The sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; (2) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in subsection (h) of section 53a- 46a; or (3) the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant. "(c) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal and if taken, the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall then render its decision on the legal errors claimed and the validity of the sentence." Unless otherwise indicated, references hereinafter to s 53a-46b are to the 1991 revision.
FN8. The issues that we do not need to decide are essentially as follows: (1) Did the special verdict form on mitigating factors and the trial court's instructions allow the jury to return a verdict finding that the defendant failed to prove the existence of a mitigating factor without unanimously rejecting each mitigating factor claimed by the defense? (2) Did the trial court properly instruct the jury regarding the s 53a- 46a (h)(4) aggravating factor? (3) Did the trial court properly admit evidence relating to the underlying burglary and the defendant's background and history? (4) Did the trial court properly deny the defendant's motion to suppress certain statements made by the defendant to a correction officer? (5) Did the trial court improperly allow the state to include within its allegation of capital felony the alternative allegation that this crime was committed by the felony murder of a police officer, in addition to the predicate felony of intentional murder? (6) Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that it could find the existence of an aggravating factor based upon a theory that was neither argued by the state nor supported by the evidence? (7) Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on its role as sentencer? (8) Did the trial court properly decline to instruct the jury that it could find the existence of a mitigating factor if it determined that death was not the appropriate sentence? (9) Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that it could consider the defendant's guilty plea as a mitigating factor if it determined that the plea was motivated by "rehabilitation or sorrow"? (10) Did the trial court's instructions adequately distinguish between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors? (11) Did the trial court's instructions properly require the defendant to prove not only the factual basis of his claimed nonstatutory mitigating factors, but also that they were mitigating in nature? (12) Did the trial court properly decline to provide the jury with a special verdict form that required the jury to indicate, for each claimed nonstatutory mitigating factor, first, whether any of the jurors found the factual basis of the factor and, second, whether those jurors who found the factor to be proven factually also found the factor to be mitigating in nature? (13) Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on the meaning of the alternative sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release? (14) Did the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the nonstatutory mitigating factors adequately explain the meaning and importance of the "any other," or catchall, mitigating factor? (15) Did the trial court properly decline to instruct the jury to consider the cumulative impact of all the mitigating evidence presented before rendering a verdict on mitigation? (16) Did the trial court properly decline to instruct the jury that it could consider mercy itself as a mitigating factor? (17) Did the trial court properly limit the defendant's cross-examination of the state's rebuttal witnesses? (18) Was sufficient evidence presented to establish the existence of a mitigating factor? (19) Did the trial court properly deny the defendant's motion for a change of venue in the absence of an evidentiary hearing? (20) Did the trial court properly deny the defendant's motion for a new penalty phase hearing without holding an evidentiary hearing or otherwise investigating the defendant's claims, based on posttrial statements of two jurors? (21) Pursuant to this court's mandatory death sentence review under s 53a- 46b, should the defendant's death sentence be affirmed where he claims that the sentence was the product of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors? (22) Is Connecticut's death penalty statute unconstitutional?
FN9. General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) s 54-56d provides in relevant part: "Competency to stand trial. (a) Competency required. Definition. A defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while he is not competent. For the purposes of this section, a defendant is not competent if he is unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense. "(b) Presumption of competency. A defendant is presumed to be competent. The burden of proving that the defendant is not competent by clear and convincing evidence and the burden of going forward with the evidence are on the party raising the issue. The burden of going forward with the evidence shall be on the state if the court raises the issue. The court may call its own witnesses and conduct its own inquiry. "(c) Request for examination. If at any time during a criminal proceeding it appears that the defendant is not competent, counsel for the defendant or for the state, or the court, on its own motion, may request an examination to determine the defendant's competency. "(d) Examination of defendant. Report. If the court finds that the request for an examination is justified and that, in accordance with procedures established by the judges of the superior court, there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crime for which he is charged, the court shall order an examination of the defendant as to his competency. The court either may appoint one or more physicians specializing in psychiatry to examine the defendant or it may order the commissioner of mental health to conduct the examination either by a clinical team consisting of a physician specializing in psychiatry, a clinical psychologist and a psychiatric social worker, or by one or more physicians specializing in psychiatry. If the commissioner of mental health is ordered to conduct the examination, he shall select the members of the clinical team or the physician or physicians. If the examiners determine that the defendant is not competent, they shall then determine whether there is substantial probability that the defendant, if provided with a course of treatment, will regain competency within the maximum period of any placement order under this section. The court may authorize a physician specializing in psychiatry, a clinical psychologist or a psychiatric social worker selected by the defendant to observe the examination. Counsel for the defendant may observe the examination. The examination shall be completed within fifteen days from the date it was ordered. The examiner or examiners shall prepare and sign, without notarization, a written report and file it with the court within ten days of the completion of the examination. On receipt of the written report, the clerk of the court shall cause copies to be delivered immediately to the state's attorney and to counsel for the defendant. "(e) Hearing. The court shall hold a hearing as to the competency of the defendant no later than ten days after it receives the written report. Any evidence regarding the defendant's competency, including the written report, may be introduced at the hearing by either the defendant or the state. If the written report is introduced, at least one of the examiners must be present to testify as to the determinations in the report, unless his presence is waived by the defendant and the state. Any member of the clinical team shall be considered competent to testify as to the team's determinations. A defendant and his counsel may waive the court hearing only if the examiners, in the written report, determine without qualification that the defendant is competent. "(f) Court finding of competency or incompetency. If the court, after the hearing, finds that the defendant is competent, it shall continue with the criminal proceedings. If it finds that the defendant is not competent, it shall also find whether there is substantial probability that the defendant, if provided with a course of treatment, will regain competency within the maximum period of any placement order permitted under this section...." Unless otherwise indicated references hereinafter to s 54-56d are to the 1991 revision.
FN10. Specifically, the defendant claims a violation of his due process rights under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, ss 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut. The fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation...." Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law...." Article first, s 8, of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by article seventeen of the amendments, provides in relevant part: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law...." Article first, s 9, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law." The defendant has not provided an independent analysis of his state constitutional claims. Accordingly, we do not address those claims. See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 429 n.4, 736 A.2d 857 (1999).
FN11. General Statutes s 54-82(b) provides: "If the accused is charged with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for life and elects to be tried by the court, the court shall be composed of three judges to be designated by the Chief Court Administrator, or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly."
FN12. The defendant pleaded guilty to counts one through three of the amended information. Count one charged the defendant with murder in violation of s 53a-54a, and felony murder in violation of s 53a-54c. Count two charged him with capital felony in violation of ss 53a-54b (1), 53a-54a (a) and (c), and 53a-54c. Count three charged him with burglary in the first degree in violation of s 53a-101 (a)(1) and (2).
"(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered; "(2) The mandatory minimum sentence, if any; "(3) The fact that the statute for the particular offense does not permit the sentence to be suspended; "(4) The maximum possible sentence on the charge, including, if there are several charges, the maximum sentence possible from consecutive sentences and including, when applicable, the fact that a different or additional punishment may be authorized by reason of a previous conviction; and "(5) The fact that he or she has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and the fact that he or she has the right to be tried by a jury or a judge and that at that trial the defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him or her, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself or herself." Practice Book s 39-20, formerly s 712, provides: "--Ensuring That the Plea is Voluntary "The judicial authority shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first determining, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, that the plea is voluntary and is not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The judicial authority shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the prosecuting authority and the defendant or his or her counsel." See footnotes 37, 41 and 47 of this opinion for a recitation of the relevant portions of the plea canvass.
FN14. The defendant notes in his brief that the trial court previously asked only about "drugs and alcohol," but not medications. We do not find this difference to be dispositive. See footnote 27 of this opinion.
FN15. Defense counsel stated: "And we intend, either today or tomorrow, to move the court for a competency evaluation. We have had personal communication with the attending psychiatrist ... concerning medications administered to the defendant.... And at this point we are reporting to the court that we do have a concern that we believe is legitimate and well founded as to the competence of [the defendant] to proceed with this trial at the present time. We would report to the court that his refusal to partake of the proceedings today was a heretofore unexpected event and one which had not happened previously.... [W]e are aware that another psychiatrist increased [the defendant's] medications over the weekend.... [My cocounsel] and I have both noted a change in our client's demeanor in the courtroom over the last I would say five days, Your Honor. And we don't believe we should comment on that any further because of our concern for the attorney/client privilege--but we do report to the court that we have noted a change in demeanor, Your Honor. We feel that given the seriousness and importance of this proceeding ... that a motion to evaluate [the defendant's] legal competence should be granted, Your Honor, for the grounds presented. That is that we have a good faith belief that something--some change has occurred in him which at this point could be affecting his legal competence."
FN16. The trial court stated: "[T]he court is still guided by the requirements of s 54-56d with particular reference to [subsection (b) ], which is that [the defendant's] competency is presumed and the one asking for such examination must show by clear and convincing evidence the need for such examination." Additionally, the court explained that "to respond to [defense counsel's] comments that there has been no observation by the court to warrant the court, on its own motion, to have [the defendant] examined for competency ... that the court is still going to require clear and convincing evidence before it does."
FN17. Defense counsel informed the court that the defendant's physicians in prison had changed his medications, and that at least one physician had recommended a review of those medications. Additionally, defense counsel explained that the defendant was upset because he had not been seen by a physician and had not been served lunch that day as defense counsel had assured him he would. Defense counsel stated: "In our opinion ... his mood has changed dramatically. Yesterday, although there was some difficulty, today he has refused to come up completely. His refusal to cooperate with his attorneys ... may be due to his medication. I think that he may ... be unable to assist because of medication. We have found dramatic change in him over the last four or five days, but most importantly since Monday when [a prison physician] did report that over the weekend that [the defendant's] medication level was almost double.... We find ... that under s 54-56d the defendant must be ... able to understand the proceedings against him and assist counsel in his defense. He is no longer able to assist counsel in his defense, Your Honor. On that basis, I would request that examination under s 54-56d...."
FN18. The trial court stated that "[b]y virtue of what I indicated yesterday, I noted from time to time the presence of the defendant in the courtroom and I have indicated on the record yesterday my reluctance to order a s 54-56d without some knowledge of his being incompetent. I have not observed him being less than competent. Without further evidence I would not order a competency exam. I will, however, [accede] to the fact that the defendant is upset with you and perhaps this can be righted by having the proceedings delayed until Tuesday after the promised examination by [a prison physician]."
FN19. Defense counsel stated: "[W]e continue to be concerned about the competency of our own client. We have learned ... that as a result of the mittimus issued in this court, all medication ... was halted on Thursday. No medication, again, was given until last night. And it's my understanding that the ... treating psychiatrist was exceedingly upset that the medication was stopped. He had not seen [the defendant]. He didn't discontinue his medication. It was stopped by the jail somehow, in the dispensary, based upon the mittimus. Obviously, Your Honor, in giving that order--that's not what the mittimus said. It said that the psychiatrist should look at--should evaluate. There was no evaluation. Totally different medication of much stronger prescription should be given--had been given I should say. And there has been some discussion by the treating psychiatrist ... that even the medication given is not sufficient and it would require medication that is not possible to prescribe at that facility."
granted a subsequent request, we should invalidate his sentence of death because, although he had already pleaded guilty, the penalty was imposed while the defendant was not competent.
FN21. The constitutional principle prohibiting the criminal trial of incompetent defendants has deep roots in the common law. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356-58, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (discussing common-law prohibition); see also note, "Competence to Plead Guilty: A New Standard," 1974 Duke L.J. 149, 151-52.
FN22. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that other states' statutes, containing protections similar to those found in s 54-56d, jealously guard the right of an incompetent defendant not to stand trial. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (Missouri "jealously guards" this right); Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. 385 ("Illinois jealously guards this right").
FN23. Our review of whether the trial court properly interpreted s 54-56d is plenary. See Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995).
FN24. We note that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard cited by the trial court here no longer applies to a moving party's burden of proving incompetency to stand trial. Although the clear and convincing standard existed in the 1991 revision of s 54-56d in effect at the time of the relevant proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has since held that standard unconstitutional. The court, in Cooper v. Oklahoma, supra, 517 U.S. 369, ruled that requiring a defendant to prove incompetency by clear and convincing evidence impermissibly burdened the defendant's due process rights. Accordingly, in 1996, the Connecticut General Assembly replaced the clear and convincing standard with the preponderance of the evidence standard currently contained in s 54-56d. See Public Acts 1996, No. 96-215. In commenting upon Senate Bill No. 295, which changed the language in s 54-56d, Senator Thomas F. Upson explained that the recent decision in Cooper necessitated the change from a standard of clear and convincing evidence to that of a preponderance of the evidence. Senator Upson also noted that, at that time, Connecticut was one of only four states with the clear and convincing standard. 39 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1996 Sess., pp. 3047-50.
FN25. Prior to the decision in Godinez, courts disagreed about whether certain aspects of the criminal proceeding required higher levels of competency. See State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 825 n.8, 661 A.2d 539 (1995); Myers v. Manson, 192 Conn. 383, 390-91, 472 A.2d 759 (1984). In particular, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that a guilty plea required a higher degree of competency than that required for a defendant to stand trial. See Chavez v. United States, 641 F.2d 1253, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1981); Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir.1973).
FN26. Unlike the first part of this claim addressed to the trial court's interpretation of s 54-56d; see part I A of this opinion; we review the trial court's determination of competency to plead guilty under an abuse of discretion standard. Essentially, we examine the relevant record to determine whether the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant was competent to plead guilty. In doing so, we give deference to the trial court's findings of fact because the trial court has the benefit of firsthand review of the defendant's demeanor and responses during the canvass. See State v. Wolff, supra, 237 Conn. 665 (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying competency hearing); State v. DesLaurier, supra, 230 Conn. 586 (reviewing denial of competency hearing under abuse of discretion standard).
FN27. The defendant claims on appeal that his uncertainty regarding the penalty for intentional murder versus the penalty for felony murder and his lack of knowledge that a guilty plea constituted a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects, demonstrated his incompetence. We recognize that these are difficult and complex legal concepts. The defendant, however, simply expressed the confusion that any layperson experiences in attempting to understand fully these issues. The trial court's careful review of these topics with the defendant, combined with the fact that the defendant was represented by counsel, effectively eliminated any legitimate concern. The defendant also points to the fact that he was taking medication as evidence of his incompetency. The fact that he was receiving medication did not automatically render him incompetent. See State v. Gonzalez, supra, 205 Conn. 688 (antipsychotic drugs did not render defendant incompetent); State v. DeAngelis, 200 Conn. 224, 230, 511 A.2d 310 (1986) (medication does not render defendant incompetent). Indeed, we have found that even mental illness or the use of illegal drugs does not invariably render a defendant incompetent. See State v. DeAngelis, supra, 230 (defendant may be mentally ill yet competent to stand trial); State v. Lloyd, 199 Conn. 359, 363, 507 A.2d 992 (1986) (allegations of cocaine use did not entitle defendant to competency hearing). Additionally, we note that in the present case the state, not defense counsel, asked the court to inquire about the defendant's medications.
FN28. See footnotes 37, 41 and 47 of this opinion for examples of the defendant's dialogue with the trial court during his guilty plea canvass.
FN29. Specifically, the defendant claims a violation of his due process rights under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, ss 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut. The defendant has not provided an independent analysis of his state constitutional claims. Accordingly, we do not address those claims. See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 429 n.4, 736 A.2d 857 (1999).
FN30. See footnote 13 of this opinion for the text of ss 39-19 and 39-20.
on an unpreserved constitutional claim if all of the following four conditions are met: "(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt." Even if we were to assume that the first two conditions have been satisfied, as we conclude herein, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated.
FN32. Because the defendant's claims do not merely challenge the court's failure to comply "literally" with the rules of practice, but, rather, assert a lack of substantive compliance with the constitutionally based norms set forth in those sections, he seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and the doctrine of plain error as set forth in Practice Book s 60-5, formerly s 4061. Section 60-5 provides: "Review by the Court; Plain Error; Preservation of Claims "The court may reverse or modify the decision of the trial court if it determines that the factual findings are clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record, or that the decision is otherwise erroneous in law. "The court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court. "In jury trials, where there is a motion, argument, or offer of proof or evidence in the absence of the jury, whether during trial or before, pertaining to an issue that later arises in the presence of the jury, and counsel has fully complied with the requirements for preserving any objection or exception to the judge's adverse ruling thereon in the absence of the jury, the matter shall be deemed to be distinctly raised at the trial for purposes of this rule without a further objection or exception provided that the grounds for such objection or exception, and the ruling thereon as previously articulated, remain the same. "If the court deems it necessary to the proper disposition of the cause, it may remand the case for a further articulation of the basis of the trial court's factual findings or decision. "It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review as provided in Section 61-10." Once again, as we conclude herein, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violations existed or that the trial court's "decision [was] otherwise erroneous in law." Practice Book s 60-5.
FN33. See footnote 12 of this opinion.
FN34. The defendant asserts, in a footnote in his brief, that his incompetency also contributed to his confusion regarding the charges contained in the information. Because we previously have determined that the defendant was competent to stand trial and enter a plea; see part I B of this opinion; we reject this claim.
FN35. Count two charged the defendant with capital felony in violation of ss 53a-54b (1), 53a-54a (a) and (c), and 53a-54c.
FN36. The defendant also raised this issue at trial during his probable cause hearing.
FN37. The following colloquy between the trial court and the defendant took place during the plea canvass: "The Court: And as to the second count of capital felony, the statute to which you've pleaded guilty to in the second count, is as follows: 'A person is guilty of capital felony who is convicted of any of the following: Murder of a member of the division of state police within the department of public safety.' Did your attorneys read that statute to you or have you read that statute prior to your guilty plea? "The Defendant: I have reviewed that with my attorneys and I stand by my plea of guilty as to that point. "The Court: And do you know what the penalty for a violation of that statute is? "The Defendant: Life imprisonment. Life imprisonment. "The Court: And there is an alternative. "The Defendant: Ah'm--and/or the death penalty. "The Court: And the death penalty. And do you recall discussing with your attorneys that if you are found guilty of this statute the only possible penalty is life imprisonment without possibility of release, unless the death penalty is imposed? "The Defendant: I've reviewed that with my attorneys and I stand by my plea of guilty as to that point. "The Court: Well, I asked you the specific question. Were you read that portion as to the penalty? "The Defendant: Yes. My attorneys have read me all the statutes. "The Court: And you understand that those are the only penalties that you can be given concerning a violation of that statute of capital felony? Either life imprisonment without possibility of release or death. "The Defendant: My attorneys have informed me. "The Court: And that was prior to your plea of guilty to that statute? "The Defendant: I believe so. Yes, sir. "The Court: Aren't you sure? "The Defendant: Well, it's been a long--it's been--I've seen them on countless occasions and I can't recall which-- "The Court: It was prior to today? "The Defendant: Prior to today. Yes, sir. "The Court: It was prior to your plea of guilty to this offense? "The Defendant: Yes, sir."
member of the division of state police within the department of public safety.' " See footnote 37 of this opinion.
FN40. Specifically, the defendant refers to his erroneous responses regarding the penalties for murder versus the penalties for felony murder. See footnote 27 of this opinion.
FN41. The following colloquy took place regarding the waiver rule: "The Court: You recognize that your plea waives--or forgoes any nonjurisdictional defects in your prosecution? "The Defendant: No, sir. I do not understand that. "The Court: Do you want to consult your attorney about it. "The Defendant: I reviewed that with my ... "[Raymond Canning, Defense Counsel]: We simply haven't discussed that issue at all with our client.... "The Court: Could you then explain to [the defendant] now what nonjurisdictional defects might be? "Mr. Canning: If I can have a few minutes I will certainly do so, Your Honor.... "The Court: You may. Right now. I'll wait for you."
FN42. After the pause in the proceedings, the following colloquy occurred: "The Court: You recognize your plea waives or forgoes all nonjurisdictional defects in the prosecution? "The Defendant: My lawyers have explained things to me and I really don't have a clue but they assure me that those things are not ... a problem.... "The Court: They're not your problem? In other words, they felt that it was their problem? ... "The Defendant: They explained it. I really--I don't understand it but they assure me that-- "The Court: That it wouldn't be a problem? "The Defendant:--it isn't going to be a problem. A problem at all."
FN43. See footnote 13 of this opinion for the text of ss 39-19 and 39-20.
FN44. The defendant pleaded guilty to first degree burglary in violation of s 53a-101 (a)(1) and (2). General Statutes s 53a-101 (c) provides: "Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court."
FN45. We note that the present situation differs dramatically from cases wherein the trial court failed to inform the defendant of the maximum potential sentence. See State v. James, 197 Conn. 358, 497 A.2d 402 (1985); State v. Bowden, 53 Conn.App. 243, 729 A.2d 795 (1999). The record of the plea canvass here unmistakably demonstrates that the defendant was aware of the maximum penalty to which his plea exposed him.
FN46. The defendant acknowledges in his brief that "it is not certain" that knowledge of the five year mandatory minimum sentence for burglary would have made any difference in his decision to plead guilty.
FN47. The defendant refers specifically to the following discussion: "The Court: Was any force used upon you to make you plead guilty to these counts? "The Defendant: No, sir. "The Court: Was any threat used? Threat of force? "The Defendant: No, sir. "The Court: And were any promises made as to--well, this morning you heard [Mark S. Solak, state's attorney] indicate, when you pleaded guilty to the first three counts, that he wasn't going to proceed on the rest of the counts, which amounted to larceny counts. Other than that were any other promises made--as to the sentence to be imposed, or dropping any other charges? "The Defendant: He promised that. "The Court: Pardon? "The Defendant: Mr. Solak promised that. "The Court: Well he promised, apparently-- "The Defendant: To drop the-- "The Court:--to drop the larceny charges. Were there any other charges that he indicated he would drop or any sentence he would recommend? "The Defendant: Not that I know of.
"The Court: So you can't think of any promises as to anybody recommending sentence or dropping any other charges? "The Defendant: My attorneys haven't told me of any. "The Court: You have no reason to believe then there are such promises. "The Defendant: Not to my knowledge."
FN48. The defendant claims a violation of his rights under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, s 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. The defendant also claims that the trial court violated Practice Book ss 39-19 et seq. and 44-3. Practice Book s 44-3, formerly s 961, provides: "--Waiver of Right to Counsel "A defendant shall be permitted to waive the right to counsel and shall be permitted to represent himself or herself at any stage of the proceedings, either prior to or following the appointment of counsel. A waiver will be accepted only after the judicial authority makes a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant: "(1) Has been clearly advised of the right to the assistance of counsel, including the right to the assignment of counsel when so entitled; "(2) Possesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent oneself; "(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case; and "(4) Has been made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation." See footnote 13 of this opinion for the text of ss 39-19 and 39-20; see also footnotes 51 and 52 of this opinion.
FN49. The trial court imposed a twenty year sentence for the burglary count to run concurrently with the sentence to be imposed for the capital felony count.
FN50. By the time the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court already had sentenced him on the burglary count. He nevertheless maintains that the claims addressed in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea apply to the burglary sentence as well as the capital felony sentence. Although "[a] defendant may not withdraw his or her plea after the conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was imposed"; Practice Book s 39-26, formerly s 720; see footnote 52 of this opinion; and although he already had been sentenced on the burglary count, the sentencing proceeding itself had not yet concluded.
FN51. Practice Book s 39-27, formerly s 721, provides: "--Grounds for Allowing Plea Withdrawal "The grounds for allowing the defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty after acceptance are as follows: "(1) The plea was accepted without substantial compliance with Section 39-19; "(2) The plea was involuntary, or it was entered without knowledge of the nature of the charge or without knowledge that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; "(3) The sentence exceeds that specified in a plea agreement which had been previously accepted, or in a plea agreement on which the judicial authority had deferred its decision to accept or reject the agreement at the time the plea of guilty was entered; "(4) The plea resulted from the denial of effective assistance of counsel; "(5) There was no factual basis for the plea; or "(6) The plea either was not entered by a person authorized to act for a corporate defendant or was not subsequently ratified by a corporate defendant."
FN52. Practice Book s 39-26, formerly s 720, provides: "Withdrawal of Plea; When Allowed "A defendant may withdraw his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right until the plea has been accepted. After acceptance, the judicial authority shall allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea upon proof of one of the grounds in Section 39-27. A defendant may not withdraw his or her plea after the conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was imposed."
FN53. We note that the defendant did not specifically request an evidentiary hearing when he made his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Despite his failure to request an evidentiary hearing, we review the defendant's claim. See State v. Safford, 22 Conn.App. 531, 534, 578 A.2d 152, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 823, 581 A.2d 1057 (1990) (motion to withdraw guilty plea and briefing of issue preserved claim despite failure to request hearing); see also State v. Watson, supra, 198 Conn. 612-13 (defendant's claim reviewed despite failure to request evidentiary hearing at any time); State v. Peterson, 51 Conn.App. 645, 648-49, 725 A.2d 333 (1999) (defendant's claim reviewed despite failure to request hearing at time of motion).
FN54. Federal Hydra-Shok hollow point bullets are designed to mushroom and expand on impact, thereby breaking the copper jacket into pieces. Testimony indicated that "that is the bullet that you would use if you wanted to kill something."
FN55. Although on appeal the defendant has raised the propriety of the admissibility of this evidence, for purposes of deciding the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of an aggravating factor; see part IV of this opinion; we presume it was properly admitted. We nevertheless conclude that the evidence was insufficient to establish the presence of an aggravating factor.
FN56. Qualifying as a sharpshooter meant that out of forty shots at a range of 300 meters, the defendant hit a target thirty-two to thirty-six times. Qualifying as an expert meant that he hit a target thirty-six out of forty times at ranges from fifty to 300 meters.
FN57. Notwithstanding the cases from Alabama cited by the state and Chief Justice McDonald's dissent; see, e.g., Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70 (Ala.Crim.App.1995); execution-style killings evincing a calculated design to kill, even when perpetrated to avoid later identification, do not, without more, satisfy the s 53a-46a (h)(4) requirements. Noticeably absent from Alabama's "heinous, atrocious or cruel" calculus is a concern about whether the victim suffered extreme physical or psychological pain or torture or whether such suffering was the defendant's conscious objective.
FN58. Although the defendant's trial preceded our decision in Ross, the trial court here instructed the jury as follows: "The commission of the crime must have the nature of being committed without pity or conscience and must include the intentional infliction of extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. So the defendant must intend to cause extreme pain or torture to the victim above and beyond that necessary to cause the death in order to have the element of an aggravating factor as noticed in this case."
FN59. Therefore, unlike the cases from Arizona cited by the state; State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 896 P.2d 830 (1995); State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 859 P.2d 169 (1993); State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 823 P.2d 22 (1991); in Connecticut, the state must prove more than that the victim's pain was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's acts.
FN60. It is therefore evident that s 53a-46a (h)(4) has been interpreted narrowly, indeed far more so than similar provisions from either Mississippi or Illinois, two states relied upon by the state and Chief Justice McDonald's dissent. The broad interpretation of the state's "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating factor by the Mississippi Supreme Court was noted in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 760-61, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Similarly, the Illinois statute has been interpreted liberally to allow premeditation to be a part of the "wanton cruelty" calculus. See People v. Johnson, 154 Ill.2d 356, 368, 609 N.E.2d 294 (1993); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399, 446, 548 N.E.2d 1003 (1989).
FN61. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. s 13-703(F)(10) (1989) ("[t]he murdered individual was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew or should have known, that the victim was a peace officer"); Fla. Stat. c. 921.141(5)(j) (1999) ("[t]he victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his or her official duties"); Ga.Code Ann. s 17-10-30(b)(8) (1997) ("[t]he offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties"); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. s 905.4(A)(2) (West 1997) ("[t]he victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in his lawful duties"); Mo. Ann. Stat. s 565.032(2)(8) (West 1999) ("[t]he murder in the first degree was committed against any peace officer, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duty").
FN62. Because eligibility for the death sentence depends upon the state's ability to prove the existence of an aggravating factor, it is that very factor that plays the constitutional role of distinguishing between those who may be sentenced to death and those who may not be and, as such, it must be objectively understandable. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 233-36, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362-64, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); State v. Breton, supra, 212 Conn. 263-64. Therefore, to the extent that the state claims that there is no eighth amendment justification for a restrictive interpretation of the statutory language constitutionally required in a one-tiered state, or that the term "heinous and cruel" demands a stricter interpretation when it is an element of the murder as opposed to the aggravant, we disagree.
FN63. To the extent that the state claims that the s 53a-46a (h)(4) factor can be satisfied in a case in which death has been inflicted by a gunshot wound, it misinterprets the defendant's argument. Indeed, the defendant does not suggest otherwise. Rather, the defendant contends that there must be something more about the killing to distinguish it from "the norm of [intentional] murders." Lewis v. State, 398 So.2d 432, 438 (Fla.1981).
FN64. To prove that the defendant had intended to inflict pain and suffering above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing, the state noted the following factors. The defendant was enraged that Bagshaw interrupted his elaborate burglary scheme. Having been alerted by his brother Duane Johnson that the trooper making his rounds might return to the store, the defendant chose to stay to complete the theft rather than escape. The defendant continued to shoot at Bagshaw even after the trooper cried out. The defendant also chose a bullet with great destructive power and the defendant failed to render assistance to Bagshaw, instead leaving him to die. In addition, the defendant hated police and lacked remorse for the killing. The defendant fired seventeen shots, although he could have killed Bagshaw "instantly." Because we determine that the state failed to prove the defendant's conduct did in fact inflict extreme physical or psychological pain or torture on Bagshaw above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing, we need not decide whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to inflict such extreme pain and torture.
defendant got out of the car, walked over to the victim and, standing directly in front of her, shot her three more times: in the chest, in the ear and, bending over the prostrate victim, point blank in the face. This last shot finally killed the victim. As much as three minutes may have passed between the time the defendant first wounded the victim and when he shot her for the last time.... Finally, the bullets used by the defendant were specially designed to generate a high velocity and, as a result, had greater destructive capacity than ordinary bullets. At least two of the bullets were designed with hollow points, which caused them to expand upon impact and cause greater damage than ordinary bullets." Id., 486-87.
FN66. These cases, like the present case, are markedly different from State v. Chaney, 141 Ariz. 295, 312, 686 P.2d 1265 (1984), the case upon which Chief Justice McDonald's dissent is anchored. In Chaney, "[a]t least one shot from behind was from such short range that powder burns were left on his body. After the attack, the victim, who was a doctor, was conscious for approximately 30 minutes. He was slowly bleeding to death, and he knew it. He told the medics, 'I'm dying, I'm dying.' His left arm was almost severed by a bullet, it hung to the body by a muscle; the victim looked at what remained of his arm. Before help arrived, he could hear the radio transmissions and the fact that no one was sure where he was for several minutes. It [was] not necessary to speculate about the victim's mental anguish; he helplessly and uselessly begged and waited for help." Id.
FN67. The state simply argued that "the actual piece of shrapnel that went up into his arm ... caused pain in addition to the pain of the bullet...."
FN68. In this regard, the state claims that the defendant was familiar with the premises and the surrounding area, that his brother Duane Johnson warned him the first time the trooper drove by and that he could have left before Bagshaw returned. According to the state, the combination of these factors demonstrates that the killing was senseless.
FN69. Duane Johnson was convicted of felony murder in violation of s 53a-54c, capital felony in violation of s 53a-54b, burglary in the first degree in violation of ss 53a-101 (a) and 53a-8, larceny in the third degree in violation of ss 53a-119, 53a-124 (a)(2) and 53a-8, and twenty counts of stealing a firearm in violation of ss 53a-212 and 53a-8. On appeal, we vacated Duane Johnson's conviction on the capital felony count but affirmed his conviction on all of the remaining counts. See State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 706, 699 A.2d 57 (1997).

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