Source: http://mo.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180323_0000543.EMO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:11:19+00:00

Document:
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,  Acting Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.
This is an action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner denying the application of Melody Bordeaux (“Plaintiff”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. Plaintiff has filed a brief in support of the Complaint (Doc. 17), and Defendant has filed a brief in support of the Answer (Doc. 21). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Doc. 8).
Plaintiff filed her applications for DIB and SSI on February 7, 2008 (Tr. 136-43). Plaintiff was initially denied on May 6, 2008, and she filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 73-79, 86-90). After a hearing, by decision dated November 9, 2009, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 12-26). On April 11, 2011, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-4). Plaintiff appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Honorable Fredrick R. Buckles reversed and remanded Plaintiff's case to the Commissioner on November 14, 2012 (Tr. 765-99). Accordingly, the Appeals Counsel remanded the case to an ALJ for further proceedings consistent with the Court's order (Tr. Tr. 802-03). After a second hearing, in a decision dated July 3, 2014, a different ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 677-96). On November 28, 2016, the Appeals Counsel denied Plaintiff's request for review of the July 2014 decision (Tr. 671-76). As such, the ALJ's July 3, 2014 decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 13, 2007, the amended alleged onset date (Tr. 683). The ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe impairments of mild lumbar disc disease, very mild cervical disc disease, supraventricular tachycardia, diabetes, mild peripheral neuropathy and obesity, but that no impairment or combination of impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 683-84).
After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following limitations (Tr. 684). She is able to occasionally climb ramps and stairs but should never climb ropes, ladders or scaffolds (Id.). She is able to occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and bend (Id.). She is able to frequently balance (Id.). She should avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights and hazardous machinery (Id.). The ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing her past relevant work as a recruiter (Tr. 688). Thus, the ALJ concluded that a finding of “not disabled” was appropriate (Tr. 690). Plaintiff appeals, arguing a lack of substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision.
Under the Social Security Act, the Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1529. “If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled.” Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, the claimant first cannot be engaged in “substantial gainful activity” to qualify for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c). The Social Security Act defines “severe impairment” as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. . . .” Id. “‘The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on [his or] her ability to work.'” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caviness v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2001), citing Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996)).

References: § 405
 § 636
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