Source: https://openjurist.org/23/f1d/279
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:17:12+00:00

Document:
UBU'ED STATES 11. SAN .JAOINTO TIN 00.
these facts, and he, together with the respondent, prays the instruotions of the court. The question in this matter is whether communications made to a counselor in the course of his professional employment by perSOilS other than the client or his agent are privileged. I find no sufficient authority for the proposition that they are so privileged. The rule 'extends only to communications made by or on behalf of the client. OroBby v. Berger, 11 Paige, 377, and cases cited; Steph. Dig. Ev. art. 115; Best, Ev. p. 567, § 58!. Two cases are cited by thQ complainant in support of his view. Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Mylne & K. 98, decided by Lord BROUGHAM in 1833, "does indeed appear," to use the words of Chancellor IN ALWORTH, "to extend the privilege further than the previous cases would warrant, and beyond the principle upon which the privilege is founded." That case appears to me, however, to be contrary to the current of decision and opinion, both before and since it was decided· . The case of Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330, also cited by complainant, does not appear to me to have any bearing on this qnestion. An order will therefore be made requiring the witness to WUlwer the interrogatories.
The evidence to sllstain charges of fraud against a number of government of. ficers must I)e conclusive. Evidence held insufficient.
The courts cannot review mere errors in location of Mexican proper officers.
When the United States enters a court as a litigant, It waives its exemption from legal proceedings and stands upon the same footing with private individuals, and if, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, it be inequitable to grant the relief prayed against a citizen, such relief will be refused.
Although, on grounds of public policy, no statute of limitations runs against the United 8tiLtes, and no lRches in bringing a suit can be imputed to them, yet the facility with which the truth could originally have been shown by them, if different from the finding made, the changed condition of the parties and the property from lapse of time, the difficulty from this cause of meeting objections which might, perhaps, at the time have been readily explained, and the acquisition of interests by third parties upon faith of decree, - are elements which will be considered by the court in determining whether it \)e equitlloble JAIDrmed. See 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850.
to grant the relief prayed. All the attending circumstances of each Case will be weighed, that no wrong be done to the citizen, though the government be the suitor against him.
As, under the circumstances of this case, it would be inequitable to vacate the patent, and impossible to place the parties in statu quo, the patent should not be annulled.
After a great lapse of time strangers pUrCll!lsing stock in a corporation without actual notice of frauds committed before the creation of the corporation, and to which the corporation, as such, was no party, affecting title to lands held by the corporation, ought to be entitled to rely on the dec!'lJes of the United States tribunals affirming such titles.
UNITED STATES V. SAN JACINTO TIN 00.
UNITED STA.TES V. SAN JACmTO TIN 00.
plausible argument can be honestly made in support of either side of the proposition. An erroneous location is certainly not so obvious as to necessarily stamp it as a fraud. The petition filed in February, 1846, asks a grant of land "within the limits of the known rancho of San Jacinto, whose general desino is in the office of the secretary of the governor, and shows in its total extension to be coterminous with the ranchos of J urupa and San Bernardino towards the north, Temecula on the south, Huapa on the west, and San Gorgonio on the east." The sub-prefect reports the land as being "the remainder which has been left untitled of the tract of San Jacinto Viejo and Nuevo, and which is coterminous with the lands expressed in the petition, and is shown by the desino, which I have before me." And the governor, upon said report, gra'nts the "surplus land in San Jacinto Viejo and Nuevo as shown in the general desino, which appears in the foregoing." And in the final grant it is stated to be "that which results as a surplus in the ranchos San Jacinto Viejo and Nuevo, as shown by the general desino of both ranchos, which appears in the expediente." ThE:: language of the decree of confirmation in the United States district court, which is controlling, is: "The lands hereby confirmed are the 'sobrante,' or surplus, remaining within the boundaries of the tract of land c(llled 'San Jacinto,' as the same is represented and described in the map of B'aid tract contained in the expediente of Miguel Pedrorena, filed in this case and referred to in the grant, over and above certain lands granted to Jose Antonio Estudillo, and certain other lands granted to Miguel Pedrorena, within the aforesaid bonndaries, [that is, the boundaries of the whole tract called' San J acinto,'J to the extent of eleven square leagues of land; and if the said sobrante, or surplus, within the said boundaries, should be less than eleven square leagues, then confirmation is hereby made to such less quantity." There was no juridical possession given of the grant, as the country passed to the United States before the performance of this act. The external boundaries were therefore left indefinite, and to 'be determined by the boundaries of the surrounding "coterminous"
UNITED STATES lI. SAN lAOINTO TIN 00.
certained must be taken as the limit of the lands out of wllich these three ranchos must be satisfied; and that this dotted line thus located on the ground must govern, notwithstanding the express statement in the expediente that these boundaries are to be "coterminous," and notwithstanding the fact that they are shown on the "general desino" to be "coterminous." By this construction and mode of location, the sobrante grant is located outside the dotted lines and of the exterior bounds of the grant. The surveyor general adopted the view that the exterior boundaries of the grant were "coterminous" with the surrounding grants, and located the sobrante grant on that theory, within those boundaries. Under the practice, the grantee was entitled to select the location in a compact form anywhere within the exterior boundaries where it would not conflict with any prior grant, and in this case there is no other valid or confirmed prior grant with which the location conflicts.. Although, under the decisions of the supreme court of the United States cited, we are not called .upon to determine this question, we are by no meanR satisfied that the surveyor general was not entirely COll'ect in the view he took of the case. Thut is the view which would naturally and at first sight strike an ordinarily intelligent person, familiar with these Mexican grants, upon reading the expediente and decree of the court, and comparing them by the eye with the desino. Even a considerable portion, perhaps one-half, of the old San Jacinto rancho, as now in fact patented, is located outside the dotted lines on the dcsino drawn, as is claimed it should be, by complainants. But if the location in accordance with the view of the surveyor general be erroneous, the error certainly is not so obvious or palpable as to create a presumption of fraud or of a wjllfully unauthorized location, and however erroneous, in the absence of actual conspiracy or fraud on the part of the officials taking part in the location and approval, it is conclusive in this case. They were the officers or tribunals appointed by law to determine the location, and that determination, under the decisions already cited, is final and conclusive. The location was contested step by step till the issue of the patent, as will be seen by the communication of the commissioner of the general land-office addressed to the secretary of the interior, a copy of which is annexed to and made part of the answer. The survey was ordered by Surveyor General Beale on April 1, 1864, but in consequence of exceptions and appeals it was not finally completed and approved till December 10, 1866, after Mr. Upson succeeded to the office of surveyor general. In August, 1866, Abel Stearns filed in the surveyor general's office objections to the survey, and in his affidavit he sets up the same charges as to the interest of Hancock and Conway, and their unlawful and alleged fraudulent connection with the survey, as are now alleged in this bill as constituting the fraud and conspiracy upon which the patent should be set aside, and the questions arising upon these charges were necessarily examined and decided by the surveyor general.
UmTBD STATJlSl'.SAN l:UJINTO TIN 00.
UNITED STATES t1. SAN JAOINTO TIN CO.
1m1TED STATBS fl. SAN JACINTO TIN 00.
UNITED STA.TES V. SAN JACINTO TIN 00.
which justifies them in suing such parties to enforce their rigllts, or they are legally or equitably bound to some third party, lawfully deriving title under the United States, to maintain the title in the courts for the benefit of such parties; or else they have no such interest as to justify litigation, or are not legally or equitably bound to litigate the title for the benefit of such other parties. It seems to us, therefore, that if the United States have such title or interests as justifies litigation, or if they are legally or equitably bound to maintain the title for the benefit of parties deriving title under them, then the United States ought to pay the expenses, and take the control and responsibility of the suits, and not require an indemnity· for costs from private parties, and tnrn the litigation over to them. If, on the other hand, they have no such interest in the subject-matter of litigation, and are under no obligation to protect parties deriving title under them, then the United States ought not, upon indemnity against costs, or otherwise, to allow the use of their name, thereby lending dignity to the suit, to one set of private partie!'!, who, in consequence of lapse of time, want of equity, or for other reasons, have no rights upon which a suit can be maintained in their own names to harass with protracted, tedious, and expensive litigation, another class of citizens claiming title under the same government. And the fact of requiring indemnity for costs, and of turning over the whole matter of litigation to the indemnifying parties, seems to us to be a strong indi. cation that the government has grave doubts as to its having an interest in the controversy, or of its being under any obligation to litigate for the benefit of others, sufficient to justify their taking control or paying the costs of the litigation. In view of the long struggle to "settle" private land titles under Mexican grants in California, and in the interest of the stability of land titles and of the public peace, i+' is to be earnestly hoped that in future this privilege of using the name of the United States for the accomplishment of private ends will be more sparingly granted, and only granted npon the most urgent occasion, if such occasion there can be. It appears to us that leave to use the name of the government for purposes of litigation should not be granted upon the representation of private parties, confessedly not verified or supported by any substantial evidence produced by them. The bill must be dismissed; and it is so ordered. We regret our inability to impose costs upon the real prosecutors of this suit.
Laches as defense in suits by United States. See U. S. v. Southern Colorado Coal do'! Town Co. 18 FED. REP. 273, and U. S. v. Beebee, 17 FED. REP 36. Suits against state and state officers. See Parsons v. Marye, ante, U3, and Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Allen, 17 FED. REP.I7I, and note, 188-197.-[ED.
(District Oourt, D. lYew Jersey.
CARRmRS OF GOODS BY WATER-BILL OF LADING - EXCEPTIONS THE SEA-DAMAGE TO CARGO-BURDEN OF PItOOF.
Where a bill of lading', containing an exemption from liability for damages caused by perils of the sea, acknowledg'es the receipt of goods" in good order and condition," and such goods are damaged by sea water, it is incumbent on the carrier to prove that the loss was occasioned by perils of the sea. Evidence held insuffiCIent to show that the damage was caused by perils of the sea.
A provision in a bill of lading that" the ship-owner is not to be liable for any damage to the goods >Il< 'il' 'It' in IIny case for more than the invoice or d,,elared value of the goods, whichever shall be the least," is reasonable, and will be enforced in cas,e of the goods; following Hart v. R. 00.7 FED. HEP. 630; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151; and The 18 liED. REP. 459.

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