Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/474/159/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:26:20+00:00

Document:
Held: Respondent's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by him to Colson after indictment and at the meeting of the two to plan defense strategy for the upcoming trial. Pp. 474 U. S. 168-180.
participation in a trial; to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself. Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. Pp. 474 U. S. 168-170.
(b) Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must honor it. At the very least, the prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel. Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315; Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201; United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264. 474 U. S. 170-174.
(c) The State misreads Massiah, supra, and Henry, supra, in contending that the decisive fact in those cases was that the police set up the confrontation between the accused and a police agent at which incriminating statements were elicited, and that, thus, respondent's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated here because, he rather than Colson, initiated the recorded conversations. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" between him and the State. Knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity. Pp. 474 U. S. 174-176.
(d) In this case, the State clearly violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right when it arranged to record conversations between respondent and its undercover informant, Colson. When the police requested that Colson wear a body wire transmitter to the meeting with respondent, the police knew that respondent would make statements that he had a constitutional right not to make to their agent prior to consulting with counsel. By concealing the fact that Colson was an agent of the State, the police denied respondent the opportunity to consult with counsel, and thus denied him the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Pp. 474 U. S. 176-177.
evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right. Evidence obtained that is relevant to crimes as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached may be admissible at a trial on those charges. Pp. 474 U. S. 178-180.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL,BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and REHNQUIST JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 474 U. S. 181.
Colson also discussed with Keating and Kelley the anonymous threats he had received and Moulton's inchoate plan to kill Gary Elwell. Keating requested, and Colson consented, to have a recording device placed on Colson's telephone. Colson was instructed to turn the recording device on whenever he received a telephone call, but to turn it off immediately unless it was a threat from the anonymous caller or a call from Moulton.
living in New Hampshire, said that he was planning to visit Belfast around Christmas.
The second telephone conversation, on December 2, was prompted by Moulton's receipt of copies of statements of three of the State's witnesses, including Elwell; Colson had not yet received copies of the statements. Most of their talk (on Moulton's side particularly) was about the statements of Elwell and Elwell's brother, which accused Moulton and Colson of being guilty of the pending charges and which Moulton complained were an attempt to frame him and Colson. After reading Colson a statement by Elwell that he had received a threatening phone call, Moulton commented "[t]his is a big joke, man." [Footnote 3] When Colson jokingly suggested that they flee to Acapulco, Moulton vehemently rejected the suggestion, stating: "No, I'm gonna stay here and I'm gonna fight it, man. I'm gonna fight it, man. I ain't gonna get framed for nothing." Colson assented to this, and suggested, "we'll have to get together sometime. . . ." Moulton reminded Colson that he would be visiting at Christmas, and the conversation ended without Moulton's having said anything that incriminated him.
The third telephone conversation, which took place on December 14, was similar to the second one. Most of the conversation concerned the pending charges, but Moulton said nothing inculpatory, and continued to insist that he and Colson were being framed. Moulton asked Colson to set aside an entire day so that the two of them could meet and plan their defense. They agreed to meet on Sunday, December 26.
realized that Colson was cooperating with the police, and to record any further conversation concerning threats to witnesses. Keating also testified that he was aware that Moulton and Colson were meeting to discuss the charges for which Moulton was already under indictment. Colson was instructed "not to attempt to question Perley Moulton, just be himself in his conversation. . . ."
events. Apologizing for his poor memory, he repeatedly asked Moulton to remind him about the details of what had happened, and this technique caused Moulton to make numerous incriminating statements. [Footnote 5] Nor were all of Colson's memory lapses related to events that required discussion to fabricate convincing alibis. Colson also "reminisced" about events surrounding the various thefts, and this technique too elicited additional incriminating statements from Moulton. For example, Colson asked Moulton how many locks they had drilled to steal a truck, a fact obviously not relevant to developing an alibi. Similarly, Colson questioned Moulton about whether it was the Mustang or the pickup truck that did not have a heater. Later, Colson jokingly drew forth admissions from Moulton concerning the dumping of a stolen truck into a pond after it had been scavenged for parts, and the dumping of a load of potatoes from another stolen truck onto the road. Each of these statements was later admitted into evidence against Moulton at trial.
receiving, to protect Mr. Colson, and to gather information concerning defendant Moulton's plans to kill Gary Elwell."
Meanwhile, after Colson's role as an informant had been revealed to Moulton, the State had the pending indictments dismissed and obtained seven new indictments against Moulton. These indictments realleged the pending charges and charged Moulton in addition with burglary, arson, and three more thefts. Moulton pleaded guilty to the charges contained in two of these indictments, and the trial court dismissed two more for improper venue. Moulton waived his right to a jury and proceeded to trial on the remaining three indictments, which covered the subjects of the original indictments and charged him with burglary, arson, and theft. At the trial, the State did not offer into evidence anything from the recorded telephone conversations, but did offer portions of the tapes of the December 26 meeting, principally those involving direct discussion of the thefts for which Moulton was originally indicted. The State did not offer the portion of the meeting during which Moulton and Colson discussed the possibility of killing witnesses, and offered only one portion of the discussion about developing false testimony. At the conclusion of the trial, the court dismissed one more count of theft for improper venue and found Moulton not guilty of the arson charge. The court found Moulton guilty, however, of burglary and theft in connection with the Ford pickup truck, the Chevrolet dump truck, and the Ford automotive parts.
"[r]eference to the State's legitimate motive may be relevant to, but cannot wholly refute, the alleged infringement of Moulton's right to counsel."
"When the police recommended the use of the body wire to Colson they intentionally created a situation that they knew, or should have known, was likely to result in Moulton's making incriminating statements during his meeting with Colson. The police's valid purpose in investigating threats against witnesses does not immunize the recordings of Moulton's incriminating statements from constitutional attack. Those statements may be admissible in the investigation or prosecution of charges for which, at the time the recordings were made, adversary proceedings had not yet commenced. But as to the charges for which Moulton's right to counsel had already attached, his incriminating statements should have been ruled inadmissible at trial, given the circumstances in which they were acquired."
Id. at 161. We granted the State's petition for certiorari. 469 U.S. 1206. We affirm.
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every stage of the proceedings against him."
at 287 U. S. 68-69 (quoted in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 372 U. S. 344-345 (1963)).
"[w]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. . . ."
"'the government has committed itself to prosecute, and . . . the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.'"
Goveia, supra, at 467 U. S. 189 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, supra, at 406 U. S. 689).
"what use is a defendant's right to effective counsel at every stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting trial, he can be questioned in the absence of counsel until he confesses?"
Id. at 360 U. S. 326.
"[Massiah] was denied the basic protections of [the right to the assistance of counsel] when there was used against him at trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel."
Id. at 377 U. S. 206.
"confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make [an individual] particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents,"
"[b]y intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
Id. at 447 U. S. 274.
"irrelevant that, in Massiah, the agent had to arrange the meeting between Massiah and his codefendant, while here the agents were fortunate enough to have an undercover informant already in close proximity to the accused."
447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 272, n. 10.
"We do not question that, in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial."
Id. at 377 U. S. 207 (emphasis omitted).
however, the Government's investigative powers are limited by the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance invites abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated investigations and risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Massiah. On the other hand, to exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities. Consequently, incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to the assistance of counsel. [Footnote 16] Because we hold that the Maine police knowingly circumvented Moulton's right to have counsel present at a confrontation between Moulton and a police agent, the fact that the police had additional reasons for recording Moulton's meeting with Colson is irrelevant. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine is affirmed.
Indeed, in pursuing an anonymous tip received earlier that day that the stolen truck could be found at Belfast Dodge, one of the officers had conducted a consent search of the main building of the dealership facility.
Seven months after the conclusion of Moulton's trial, Colson pleaded guilty to two counts of theft. The prosecutor recommended that Colson be sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment, all but 15 days to be suspended, and placed on probation for 2 years. Colson also agreed to make restitution up to $2,000 during the probationary period. The trial court accepted this recommendation and sentenced Colson accordingly.
Colson testified that he never told Moulton about the threatening calls that he had received.
"[Moulton:] You know I thought of a way to eliminate them. Remember we were talking about it before?"
"[Colson:] Yes, you thought of a way?"
"[Moulton:] Yeah, but . . . I don't think we ought to go for it."
"[Colson:] Is it, is it fairly foolproof?"
"[Moulton:] I like it. I think its just for the. . . ."
"[Colson:] Well let me [hear it]."
Moulton explained that he had considered using air rifles to shoot poisoned darts and the conversation then turned to joking about a magazine that instructed readers how to build bombs to kill large numbers of people. Exh. S-4, Tr. of Dec. 26 Meeting 18-19.
"I want you to help me with some dates. One date I cannot remember Caps [Moulton's nickname], just can't remember, I know it was in December, what night did we break into Lothrop Ford? What date?"
"[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that, in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court . . . cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."
Id. at 372 U. S. 344.
"[T]he lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen. If, in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual's effective representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this lawyer."
Id. at 430 U. S. 415 (STEVENS, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
The parties have taken pains to assure us that Massiah's friend Colson and Moulton's friend Colson are unrelated.
"'during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . . that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation [are] vitally important, the defendants [are] as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial itself.'"
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 205 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 57 (1932)).
It is not clear whether the informant asked to meet with Massiah or vice versa. Both the opinion for the Second Circuit and the dissent state only that, on the instructions of a Government agent, Colson invited Massiah into his car to discuss their case; neither opinion establishes who requested the meeting in the first place. See United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (1962); id. at 72 (Hays, J., dissenting). It is quite plausible that Massiah asked to see Colson, who then proposed meeting in his car. In fact, there is nothing in the record in Massiah to support even the assertion of the Court of Appeals that Colson, rather than Massiah, suggested meeting in Colson's car, although the inference is logical enough. See App. to Brief for United States in Massiah v. United States, O.T. 1963, No.199, pp. 125a-175a (testimony of Agent Murphy).
In his amicus brief for the United States in this case, the Solicitor General suggests that Beatty did not survive Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), which, he contends, modified Massiah to require affirmative interrogation by the Government. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 12. That argument, however, was expressly rejected when the Solicitor General made it in Henry. See 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 271 ("While affirmative interrogation, absent waiver, would certainly satisfy Massiah, we are not persuaded, as the Government contends, that Brewer v. Williams . . . modified Massiah's deliberately elicited' test"). Cf. also Brief for United States in United States v. Henry, O.T. 1979, No. 121, p 2, n. 12.
Direct proof of the State's knowledge will seldom be available to the accused. However, as Henry makes clear, proof that the State "must have known" that its agent was likely to obtain incriminating statements from the accused in the absence of counsel suffices to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. See 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 271.
"frequently pressed Moulton for details of various thefts, and, in so doing, elicited much incriminating information that the State later used at trial."
481 A.2d at 161. Thus, as in Henry, supra, at 447 U. S. 271, n. 9, we need not reach the situation where the "listening post" cannot or does not participate in active conversation and prompt particular replies.
The State argues that it took steps to prevent Colson from inducing Moulton to make incriminating admissions by instructing Colson to "be himself," "act normal," and "not interrogate" Moulton. Tr. of Hearing on Motion to Suppress 42, 51, 56. In Henry, we rejected this same argument, although the likelihood that the accused would talk about the pending charges to a cellmate was less than here, where the accused invited his codefendant to discuss the upcoming trial, and although the instructions to the agent were far more explicit. See 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 268, 447 U. S. 271. More importantly, under the circumstances of this case, the instructions given to Colson were necessarily inadequate. The Sixth Amendment protects the right of the accused not to be confronted by an agent of the State regarding matters as to which the right to counsel has attached without counsel's being present. This right was violated as soon as the State's agent engaged Moulton in conversation about the charges pending against him. Because these charges were the only subject to be discussed at Colson's December 26 meeting with Moulton, a Sixth Amendment violation was inevitable once Colson agreed to this meeting with Moulton. In any event, we reject the State's suggestion that these instructions were designed to protect Moulton's constitutional rights. The instructions were obviously motivated by the police's concern that Colson, who had never before served as an undercover agent, might behave unnaturally or ask too many questions, thereby tipping Moulton off to the fact that Colson was cooperating with the police. Thus, rather than explain to Colson that actively questioning Moulton might taint any evidence obtained, the police simply told Colson to "be himself," and to "act normal." Tr. of Hearing on Motion to Suppress 42, 51, 56. In addition, the instructions were not limited to questions concerning the pending charges, the only matters as to which active questioning might create problems. On the contrary, according to Chief Keating, Colson was instructed that he could engage Moulton in a conversation, but should not try to draw him out on "elimination of witnesses or anything." Id. at 51.
"had the flavor of a post hoc rationalization of conduct that, at its inception, in fact had as a primary purpose the obtaining of evidence for use at trial on the pending charges."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23-24. So saying, he asks us to distinguish from that justification the justification that law enforcement officials are investigating "separate" crimes. In Massiah, however, the Government's assertion was that it needed to continue its investigation in order to discover the identities of Massiah's intended buyer and of others who were importing narcotics, as well as to find additional evidence of Massiah's crimes. Brief for United States in Massiah v. United States, O.T. 1963, No.199, pp. 26-27. The Court in Massiah was thus faced with the very same argument made by the Solicitor General in this case. Even were the Solicitor General's characterization of the issue posed in Massiah correct, however, we would not draw the distinction he asks us to make. The likelihood of post hoc rationalizing is the same whether police claim to be investigating other examples of the same crime or some allegedly "separate" crime. We take what we feel is a more realistic view of police investigations, and instead accept that dual purposes may exist whenever police have more than one reason to investigate someone.
Incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, and with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins as to Parts I and III, dissenting.
Today the Court holds that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the use at trial of postindictment statements made to a government informant, even where those statements were recorded as part of a good faith investigation of entirely separate crimes. Nothing whatever in the Constitution or our prior opinions supports this bizarre result, which creates a new "right" only for those possibly habitual offenders who persist in criminal activity even while under indictment for other crimes. I dissent, and would reverse.
"for legitimate purposes not related to the gathering of evidence concerning the crime for which [respondent] had been indicted --i.e., in order to gather information concerning the anonymous threats that Mr. Colson had been receiving, to protect Mr. Colson, and to gather information concerning [respondent's] plans to kill Gary Elwell."
The Maine Supreme Court, in a careful opinion, found "ample evidence" to support this factual finding.
"[t]o allow the admission of evidence obtained from an accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance . . . risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Massiah."
Ante at 474 U. S. 180. With all deference, I am bound to state that this conclusion turns the Sixth Amendment on its head by first positing a constitutional violation and then asking whether "alternative, legitimate reasons" for the police surveillance are sufficient to justify that constitutional violation.
was able to obtain additional indictments against respondent for burglary, arson, and three more thefts. The Court's opinion notes that respondent pleaded guilty to several of the additional indictments secured as a result of pursuing Colson's leads. Ante at 474 U. S. 167.
"speaks only to the situation where, in the absence of retained counsel, statements are deliberately elicited from a defendant in connection with a crime for which he has already been indicted."
party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter.'"
(Emphasis added.) Our reference in Henry to this rule illustrates that we have framed the Sixth Amendment issue in terms of whether the State deliberately circumvented counsel with regard to the "subject of representation." But where, as here, the incriminating statements are gathered for "an alternative, legitimate reason," ante at 474 U. S. 180, wholly apart from the pending charges, no such deliberate circumvention exists. The Court's opinion seems to rest on the notion that the evidence here is excludable because "the State must have known' that its agent was likely to obtain incriminating statements from the accused," ante at 474 U. S. 176, n. 12, with respect to the crimes for which he was already indicted. But the inquiry mandated by our holdings is whether the State recorded the statements not merely in spite of, but because of that consequence. Cf. Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598 (1985). If the State is not seeking to elicit information with respect to the crime for which the defendant is already indicted, it cannot rationally be said that the State has "planned an impermissible interference with the right to the assistance of counsel." Henry, supra, at 447 U. S. 275. This case is a particularly inappropriate one for invoking the right to counsel. The right to counsel recognized in Massiah was designed to preserve the integrity of the trial. See 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 204. Here respondent was under investigation because of his plans to obstruct justice by killing an essential witness. There is no right to consult an attorney for advice on committing crimes. See United States v. Merritts, 527 F.2d 713, 716 (CA7 1975). Indeed, any attorney who undertook to offer such advice would undoubtedly be subject to sanction. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for example, states "a lawyer shall not . . . [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." Thus, there is no warrant for vindicating respondent's right to consult counsel.
"The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told."
Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1, 289 U. S. 15 (1933). I would let the truth be told in this case rather than exclude evidence that was the product of this police investigation into activities designed to thwart the judicial process.
"so long as investigating officers show no bad faith and do not institute the investigation of the separate offense as a pretext for avoiding the dictates of Massiah."
United States v. Darwin, 757 F.2d 1193, 1199 (CA11 1985). Here, the careful actions of Chief Keating and Detective Kelley steered well clear of these prohibitions.
"Even before [Brewer v.] Williams, [430 U.S. 387 (1977),] it was generally accepted that the right to counsel did not bar contact with the defendant concerning other offenses, particularly if the offenses were clearly unrelated and it did not appear the charge was simply a pretext to gain custody in order to facilitate the investigation. The more recent cases recognize that [Massiah and its progeny do] not confer upon charged defendants immunity from investigation concerning other crimes. This is especially true when the offense under investigation is a new or ongoing one, such as illegal efforts to thwart the forthcoming prosecution."
1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.4, p. 470 (1984) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Rather than expand Massiah beyond boundaries currently recognized, I would take note of the observation that "Massiah certainly is the decision in which Sixth Amendment protections have been extended to their outermost point." Henry, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 282 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). I would not expand them more and well beyond the limits of precedent and logic.
Even if I were prepared to join the Court in this enlargement of the protections of the Sixth Amendment, I would have serious doubts about also extending the reach of the exclusionary rule to cover this case.
remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation, and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests."
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 422 U. S. 539 (1975). Here the trial court found that the State obtained statements from respondent "for legitimate purposes not related to the gathering of evidence concerning the crime for which [respondent] had been indicted." Since the State was not trying to build its theft case against respondent in obtaining the evidence, excluding the evidence from the theft trial will not affect police behavior at all. The exclusion of evidence "cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, supra, at 468 U. S. 919. Indeed, as noted above, it is impossible to identify any police "misconduct" to deter in this case. In fact, if anything, actions by the police of the type at issue here should be encouraged. The diligent investigation of the police in this case may have saved the lives of several potential witnesses, and certainly led to the prosecution and conviction of respondent for additional serious crimes. It seems, then, that the Sixth Amendment claims at issue here "closely parallel claims under the Fourth Amendment," Brewer, supra, at 430 U. S. 414 (POWELL, J., concurring), where we have found the exclusionary rule to be inapplicable by weighing the costs and benefits of its applications. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, supra (exclusionary rule inapplicable where officers rely in good faith on defective search warrant issued by neutral magistrate); Stone v. Powell, supra (where full opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment issues has been afforded, such issues may not be raised in a state habeas petition). If anything, the argument for admission of the evidence here is even stronger because "[t]his is not a case where . . . the constable . . . blundered.'" United States v. Henry, supra, at 447 U. S. 274-275 (quoting People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)). Because the Court today significantly and unjustifiably departs from our prior holdings, I respectfully dissent.
"[Moulton:] The parts I bought. I never denied that. I did buy those. . . ."
"[Colson:] The [M]ustang . . . same here."
"[Moulton:] And the [M]ustang, we bought that?"
"[Moulton:] Ok. It's just a coincidence that ah, they happened to be . . . [h]ot or whatever. . . . You've got a bill of sale for the Mustang. I got a bill of sale for parts. So, you know, what the hell? What can they say?"
Exh. S-3, Tr. of Dec. 14 Conversation 4-5.
"[Moulton:] You know, I thought of a way to eliminate them. Remember we were talking about it before?"
"[Moulton:] Yeah, but, ah, I don't think we ought to go for it. . . ."
"[Colson:] Well, let me [hear it]."
"[Moulton:] Well you know those air guns. . . . They make little darts for those little feather-back darts that you can put in there --you've seen 'em. Those little darts, those little things about that long. I [was] thinking just hollow the tip out like a needle and just put . . . little . . . holes on the side, and you fill it with a lethal injection and the shooting impact would shoot all the stuff out of it into . . . the individuals body [and] poison [th]em. There would be no noise."
"[Colson:] Jesus. . . ."
"[Moulton:] That's the only thing that runs through my brain . . . you have a puncture wound, probably take about 20 or 30 minutes to kick off, yeah, and the other problem is the poison, where . . . are you going to get some poison? Small bottles."
"[Colson:] What was that stuff you told me about once?"
"[Moulton:] Calcium chlorine . . . , yeah, something like that, just a small drop will make you look like you have a heart attack and . . . you'd never, never, find it unless you were looking . . . exactly for that drug. . . . Stops your heart."
Exh. S-4, Tr. of Dec. 26 Meeting 18-20. Moulton then discussed an alternative scheme for doing away with witnesses, based on making explosives pursuant to directions contained in a magazine that one of his "best friends" was sending. Moulton described him as having belonged to "a motorcycle gang," and also suggested ominously that he had "[p]robably snuffed one or two people." Id. at 21.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 377 U. S. 207 (1964) (first emphasis added). The reference to the "circumstances here disclosed" must be to the fact that the Government, far from pursuing a good faith investigation of different crimes, had "instructed the informant to engage [Massiah] in conversation relating to the crimes [for which he had already been indicted]." United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 447 U. S. 276 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring); Brief for Petitioner in Massiah v. United States, O.T. 1963 No.199 p. 4.
See United States v. DeWolf, 696 F.2d 1, 3 (CA1 1982); Grieco v. Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 717-718 (CA1 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Cassesso v. Meachum, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1015 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Carter v. United States, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); United States v. Merritts, 527 F.2d 713, 716 (CA7 1975); United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 968-969 (CA9 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977); United States v. Darwin, 757 F.2d 1193, 1200 (CA11 1985); Crawford v. State, 377 So.2d 145, 156 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 377 So.2d 159 (Ala. 1979), vacated and remanded, 448 U.S. 904 (1980); Deskins v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 520, 526 (Ky.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Hall v. State, 47 Md.App. 590, 596, 425 A.2d 227, 231 (1981), aff'd, 292 Md. 683, 441 A.2d 708 (1982); People v. Mealer, 57 N.Y.2d 214, 218, 441 N.E.2d 1080, 1082 (1982); People v. Costello, 101 App.Div.2d 244, 247, 476 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (1984); Hummel v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 252, 257, 247 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979). Cf. United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 243 (CA7 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); United States v. Boffa, 89 F.R.D. 523 (Del. 1981). But see Mealer v. Jones, 741 F.2d 1451, 1455 (CA2 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1006 (1985); State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 202, 639 P.2d 1020, 1028 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).

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