Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=84264:60024&amp;catid=1594&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:41:18+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLIE SORIN Y TAGAYLO, Accused-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLIE SORIN Y TAGAYLO, Accused-Appellant.
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Charlie Sorin y Tagaylo (Sorin) assailing the Decision2 dated February 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00953-MIN, which affirmed in toto the Judgment3 promulgated on August 3, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 2005-694, finding Sorin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II4 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
That on or about 8:20 in the evening of November 2, 2005 at Amoros, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused , without authority of the law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell two (2) sachets containing white crystalline substance positive to [sic] the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU), a dangerous drug, with a combined weight of 0.12 gram to a poseur-buyer for Four Hundred Pesos (PHP400.00) in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165.
Aggrieved, Sorin appealed21 his conviction before the CA.
It agreed with the RTC's finding that a valid buy-bust operation, resulting in the seizure of two (2) sachets containing shabu, had occurred, and that, notwithstanding the police officers' lapses in complying with the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, or the seized drug itself, were nevertheless preserved. Finally, the CA opined that Sorin failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties enjoyed by the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation.24 Thus, Sorin's conviction was sustained.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Sorin's conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. X X X.
As to its procedural mechanics, Section 21,32 Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or the accused's or the person's representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sorin due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus warranting his acquittal.
Atty. Alvyn R. Lopena (Atty. Lopena): It was also in the course of that investigation by [SPO1 Mugot] that the markings on the exhibit were made, right?
PO2 Dador: After the investigation. Sir.
It was only [SPOl Mugot] who made the markings of those two (2) sachets ofshabu?
Because after the investigation you already left to the office [sic]?
[PO2 Dadorl, you have no personal knowledge as to the markings made by fSPOl Mugotl because you were not there when the markings were made?
In other words [PO2 Dador], from the time you turned over the two (2) sachets of shabu, of alleged shabu that you confiscated from the possession of [Sorin] and those four (4) P100.00 bills to fSPOl Mugotl, you have no idea anymore as to the where about [sic], as to the custody of those pieces of evidence, thereafter?
Atty. Lopena: [PO2 Dador], you said that you turned over the two (2) sachets of shabu that you confiscated from the possession of [Sorin] [to SPOl Mugot], before you turned over [the sachets of shabu], did you place any identifying markings on the sachet?
PO2 Dador: I did not place any [markings], Sir.
Pros. Azis: You also mentioned about the [sic] 2 sachets of shabu which [PO2 Dador] handed to you. Are these the same 2 sachets of shabu which [PO2 Dador] handed to you?
SPO1 Mugot: Yes, Ma'am, but I placed that in a transparent plastic cellophane with marking Exhibit "A".
Q: Are you referring to this transparent plastic cellophane?
Q: Were you the one who made the marking on this transparent plastic cellophane?
Atty. Lopena: So you placed the marking on the sachets itself?
How the apprehending team could have omitted such a basic and vital procedure in the initial handling of the seized drugs truly baffles and alarms us. We point out that succeeding handlers of the specimen would use the markings as reference. If at the first or earliest reasonably available opportunity, the apprehending team did not mark the seized items, then there was nothing to identify it later on as it passed from hand to hand. Due to the procedural lapse in the first link of the chain of custody, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence.
In this case, SPO1 Mugot admitted that he did not mark the plastic sachets which contained the seized drugs, but instead placed the marking on the "transparent plastic cellophane" wherein he placed the seized sachets. To the Court's mind, the act of marking only the cellophane and not the individual plastic sachets renders the corpus delicti highly susceptible to tampering, switching, planting, and contamination of the evidence - the very acts which the requirement of marking seeks to prevent. As the cellophane passed hands, it can now no longer be determined with certainty that its contents have remained intact, especially considering the dearth of testimony from SPO1 Mugot that the cellophane was tightly sealed or, at the very least, secured.
With these lapses unveiled from the foregoing testimonies, the Court is unconvinced that the chain of custody rule had been substantially complied with. Not only did the apprehending officer who had initial custody over the seized drugs, i.e., PO2 Dador, fail to mark the same or even witness its alleged marking, but also the officer to which the marking of the seized items was attributed to, i.e., SPO1 Mugot, himself disclaimed that he had done such marking and admitted that he only marked a transparent plastic cellophane container, and not the individual sachets PO2 Dador had turned-over to him containing the seized drugs themselves. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.46 The lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly militates against a finding of guilt,47 as in this case. Therefore, as reasonable doubt persists on the identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, the latter's acquittal should come as a matter of course.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00953-MIN is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Charlie Sorin y Tagaylo is ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
1 See Notice of Appeal dated March 14, 2014. Rollo, pp. 17-18.
2 Id. at 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Oscar V. Badelles concurring.
3 Dated July 8, 2011. CA rollo, pp. 33-47. Penned by Presiding Judge Arthur L. Abundiente.
5 Records, pp. 2-3. See also rollo, p. 4 and CA rollo, p. 33.
SEC. 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. - A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section II of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
7 Erroneously dated as "November 5, 2002" in some parts of the records.
8 "Paciano" or "Taciano" in some parts of the records.
11 Id. at 6. See also CA rollo, pp. 38-39.
15 Rollo, pp. 6-7. See also CA rollo, pp. 40-41.
16 CA rollo, pp. 42-43.
19 See id. at 44-46.
24 See id. at 8-15.
26 See People v. Almodiel, G.R. No. 200951, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 306 316.
28 See id. at 323-324.
29 See G.R. No. 203434, July 23, 2014.
30 600 Phil. 819, 836 (2009).
31People v. Viterbo, supra note 34; citations omitted.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.
33 See IRR ofRA 9165, Section 21.
35People v. Viterbo, supra note 33, citing People v. Martinez, 652 Phil. 347, 372 (2010).
36 See Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), May 20, 2007 pp 18-19.
36 TSN, July 15,2007, pp. 20-27.
37 TSN, May 20, 2007, 49-51.
39 See TSN, July 15, 2007, pp. 10-14.
40 See id. at 16-17.
42 TSN July 31, 2007, p. 6.
43People v. Salonga, G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 536, 545, citing People v. Coreche, 612 Phil. 1238, 1245 (2009).
44 See G.R. No. 184758, April 21, 2014.
46 See People v. Viterbo, supra note 34, citing People v. Almorfe, 631 Phil. 51, 60 (2010).
47Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576, 593 (2008).

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