Source: https://eulaw.typepad.com/eulawblog/citizenship/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:17:11+00:00

Document:
The Court of Justice has handed down an intriguing judgment in Case C-137/09 Marc Michel Josemans v. Burgemeester van Maastricht about the right to restrict the access of non-residents to places called "coffee shops" which sell dope legally in the Netherlands. The Court held it is possible to restrict entry to such places to residents and ban non-residents from them in order to combat drug tourism and what it calls the accompanying public nuisance.
Here's the story. In principle, the Netherlands bans the possession of and dealing in all manner of narcotic drugs. Yet, it has a policy of tolerance with regard to cannabis and in particular allows the establishment of coffee-shops. Don't be mistaken, you don't go to such coffee shops to sip a latte because their main activities are the sale and consumption of weed. Local authorities may authorize such establishments in compliance with certain criteria. In a number of coffee-shops, non-alcoholic beverages and food are also sold.
Maastricht is a pleasant town on the banks of the Meuse close to the German and Belgian borders. To try to prevent drug tourism the Municipal Council of Maastricht banned any coffee-shop owner from admitting to his establishment persons who do not have their actual place of residence in the Netherlands. So, if you lived over the border, you could not go and smoke up in a Maastricht coffee shop with your Dutch friends.
The plaintiff in the main case, Mr Josemans, runs the ‘Easy Going’ coffee-shop in Maastricht. He was denounced for allowing foreign residents to his coffee shop and so the local Mayor closed his place down. Mr Josemans challenged that decision, claiming the Municipal ban on foreign residents constitutes unjustified unequal treatment of citizens of the European Union and that, more specifically, people who are not resident in the Netherlands are denied the possibility of buying non-alcoholic beverages and food in coffee-shops, which is contrary to European Union law. The case reached the Dutch Council of State, which then referred a number of questions to the Court of Justice.
The first question referred to the Court of Justice was what provisions of EU law applied to the sale of cannabis and what provisions applied to the sale of non-alcoholic beverages.
The Court held that narcotic drugs which are not distributed through channels which are strictly controlled by the competent authorities to be used for medical and scientific purposes are, because of their very nature, subject to a prohibition on importation and offering for sale in all the member States (Case 221/81 Wolf  ECR 3681, paragraph 10; Case 240/81 Einberger  ECR 3699, paragraph 10; Case 294/82 Einberger  ECR 1177, paragraph 15; Case 269/86 Mol  ECR 3627, paragraphs 15 and 18; Case 289/86 Vereniging Happy Family Rustenburgerstraat  ECR 3655 paragraphs 17 and 20 and Case C-158/98 Coffeeshop‘Siberië’  ECR I-3971 paragraph 14). As narcotic drugs which are not distributed through such strictly controlled channels are prohibited from being released into the economic and commercial channels of the EU, a coffee-shop proprietor cannot rely on the freedoms of movement or the principle of non-discrimination, in so far as concerns the marketing of cannabis, to object to municipal rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings.
As for the marketing of non-alcoholic drinks is concerned, the Court held that it appears to constitute a catering activity characterized by an array of features and acts in which services predominate as opposed to the supply of the product itself (Case C-491/03 Hermann  ECR I-2025, paragraph 27). Consequently, the free movement of goods aspect is entirely secondary to that of the freedom to provide services. As a result the Court examined the rules at issue in the main proceedings only in the light of the freedom to provide services (Case C-275/92 Schindler  ECR I‑1039, paragraph 22; Case C-71/02 Karner  ECR I-3025, paragraph 46; Case C-36/02 Omega  ECR I-9609, paragraph 26; Case C‑452/04 Fidium Finanz  ECR I-9521, paragraph 34; and Case C‑233/09 Dijkman and Dijkman-Laveleije  ECR I-0000, paragraph 33).
The Court also held Article 12 EC (now Article 18 TFEU), which lays down a general prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality, does not apply in this case as it applies independently only to situations governed by EU law for which the EC Treaty lays down no specific rules of non-discrimination and the principle of non-discrimination has been implemented, in the area of the freedom to provide services, by Article 49 EC (now Article 56 TFEU) (Case 305/87 Commission v Greece  ECR 1461, paragraphs 12 and 13; Case C-443/06 Hollmann  ECR I-8491, paragraph 28; and Case C‑269/07 Commission v Germany  ECR I-7811, paragraph 98). Similarly, Article 18 EC (now Article 21 TFEU), which lays down generally the right for every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the member States, finds specific expression in the provisions guaranteeing the freedom to provide services (Case C-92/01 Stylianakis  ECR I-1291, paragraph 18; Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz  ECR I-6849, paragraph 34; and Case C-56/09 Zanotti  ECR I-0000, paragraph 24). As citizens of the EU who do not reside in the Netherlands and wish to go into coffee-shops in the municipality of Maastricht to consume lawful goods there are to be regarded as ‘persons for whom’ services ‘are intended’ within the meaning of Article 49 EC, it is not necessary for the Court to rule on the interpretation of Article 18 EC.
The Court had then to deal with the second question posed by the referring national court, whether the rules on the freedom to provide services precluded the restriction of selling non-alcoholic beverages to non residents and whether such a restriction was justified on grounds of public policy.
The Court affirmed is consistent case law according to which the principle of equal treatment, of which Article 49 EC embodies a specific instance, prohibits not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result (Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy  ECR 4035, paragraph 8; Case C-388/01 Commission v Italy  ECR I-721, paragraph 13; Case C‑28/04 Tod’s and Tod’s France  ECR I-5781, paragraph 19; and Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria  ECR I-5969, paragraph 41). Article 49 EC also precluded a measure which distinguished residents from non-residents, because it is liable to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other member States, since non-residents are in the majority of cases foreigners (Case C-224/97 Ciola  ECR I‑2517, paragraph 14; Case C‑388/01 Commission v Italy, paragraph 14; Case C‑103/08 Gottwald  ECR I-9117, paragraph 28; and Case C-73/08 Bressol and Others  ECR I-0000, paragraph 45 - see our post about that case here).
The Court went on to examine the tricky issue whether such a restriction may be justified.
It held that the discriminatory rule was justified.
The Court accepted the finding of fact that the rules at issue in the main proceedings intend to put an end to the public nuisance caused by the large number of tourists wanting to purchase or consume cannabis in the coffee-shops in the municipality of Maastricht. According to the information provided by the Mayor of Maastricht at the hearing, the 14 coffee-shops in the municipality attract around 10 000 visitors per day and a little more than 3.9 million visitors per year, 70% of which are not resident in the Netherlands.
The Court also found that given the commitments entered into by the EU and its member Sates, there is no doubt that the objectives of combatting drug tourism constitute a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by EU law, even under a fundamental freedom such as the freedom to provide services. It also found that a prohibition on admitting non-residents to coffee-shops, such as that which is the subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings, constitutes a measure capable of substantially limiting drug tourism and, consequently, of reducing the problems it causes.
But there was the precedent of Joined Cases 115/81 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille  ECR 1665, concerning the right of residence or establishment of prostitutes. In that case, the Belgian authorities had adopted measures which were more repressive towards prostitutes from other member States working in Belgium than they had taken against the local ladies. The Court had held in that case that a member State cannot validly rely on grounds of public policy with regard to the behavior of a non-national inasmuch as it does not adopt repressive measures or other genuine and effective measures with respect to the same conduct on the part of its own nationals. The Court distinguished that case by pointing out that under international law and European Union law, a prohibition in all the Member States on marketing narcotic drugs, with the exception of strictly controlled trade for use for medical and scientific purposes. By contrast, prostitution, the behavior referred to in Adoui and Cornuaille, aside from trafficking in human beings, is tolerated or regulated in a number of member States (Case C-268/99 Jany and Others  ECR I‑8615, paragraph 57). It cannot be held to be inconsistent for a member State to adopt appropriate measures to deal with a large influx of residents from other member States who wish to benefit from the marketing – tolerated in that member State – of products which are, by their very nature, prohibited in all member States from being offered for sale.
As regards the scope of rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the Court held that they apply only to establishments the main activity of which is the marketing of cannabis. They do not preclude a person who is not resident in the Netherlands from going into other catering establishments in Maastricht to consume non-alcoholic beverages and food. According to the Netherlands Government, there are more than 500 such places.
Finally, the Court accepted as a fact that other less restrictive measures such as a restriction on the number of coffee-shops or their opening hours, the implementation of a card system which allows customers access to them or even a reduction in the amount of cannabis per person which may be bought had proved insufficient and ineffective in the light of the objective pursued.
Is this the beginning of a trend of allowing member States to introduce measures discriminating against foreigners? Let us hope it is confined to reefers.
In the meantime, there is some confusion as to whether the "Easy Going" is actually shut down or not.
The Court of Justice has handed down an important and interesting judgment on the right of a member State to restrict the number of students coming from other member States. In its judgment in Case C-73/08 Nicolas Bressol and others v. Gouvernement de la Communauté française the Court held that a member State could restrict the number of students from other member States enrolling in certain medical and paramedical courses if such a restriction was justified in order to protect public health. In so doing the Court seems to back-track a bit on its previous case law on the free movement of students.
Here's the story. Belgium has an odd system which divides responsibility within the state for education between the "Flemish community" and the "French community". The French community, which provided well regarded higher education courses attractive to students from France, saw a significant increase in the number of students from other member States, in particular France, enrolling in its institutions of higher education, in particular in nine medical or paramedical courses. The French Community considered that too many students from France were attending classes in Belgium and adopted the decree of June 16 2006. That decree obliged universities and schools of higher education to limit the number of students not considered as resident in Belgium who may register for the first time in one of the over-subscribed nine medical or paramedical courses. The decree limits the total number of non-resident students, for each university and for each course, to 30 % of all enrollments in the preceding academic year. Once that percentage has been reached, the non-resident students are selected, with a view to their registration, by drawing lots.
A group of students sought annulment of the decree in the Belgian Constitutional Court. That Court referred a number of question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the decree with EU law.
The Belgian court asked first whether EU law precludes legislation of a Member State which restricts the number of non-resident students who may enroll for the first time in medical and paramedical courses at higher education establishments, where that member State faces an influx of students from a neighboring member State and where the result of that situation is that too few students resident in the first member State graduate from those courses.
The Court of Justice held that Articles 18 and 21 TFEU preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which limits the number of non-resident students who may enroll for the first time in medical and paramedical courses at higher education establishments, unless - and this is the important bit - the referring court, having assessed all the relevant evidence submitted by the competent authorities, finds that that legislation is justified in the light of the objective of protection of public health.
The Court began by recalling that EU law allows the member States the power to organize their education systems and of vocational training – pursuant to Articles 165(1) and 166(1) TFEU – as they please But they must, when exercising that power, comply with EU law, in particular the provisions on the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the member States (Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz  ECR I‑6849, paragraph 70, and Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher  ECR I‑9161, paragraph 24). Thus the states are free to opt for an education system based on free access – without restriction on the number of students who may register – or for a system based on controlled access in which the students are selected. However, where they opt for one of those systems or for a combination of them, the rules of the chosen system must comply with European Union law and, in particular, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality.
The Court then continued by recalling the applicable provisions of the Treaty. Article 21(1) TFEU provides that every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect. Also, the Court’s case-law makes clear that every citizen of the Union may rely on Article 18 TFEU, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality, in all situations falling within the scope of EU law, those situations including the exercise of the freedom conferred by Article 21 TFEU to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello  ECR I‑11613, paragraph 24; Case C‑209/03 Bidar  ECR I‑2119, paragraphs 32 and 33; and Case C‑158/07 Förster  ECR I‑8507, paragraphs 36 and 37). Clearly, the prohibition of discrimination also covers situations concerning the conditions of access to vocational training, and that both higher education and university education constitute vocational training (Case C‑147/03 Commission v Austria  ECR I-5969, paragraphs 32 and 33).
Consequently, the students in question in the main proceedings may rely on the right, enshrined in Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, to move and reside freely within the territory of a Member State, such as the Kingdom of Belgium, without being subject to direct or indirect discrimination on ground of their nationality.
Did the Belgian decree discriminate against the non Belgian residents ?
The Court confirmed that the non resident students were in fact discriminated against. The Court recalled that unless objectively justified and proportionate to the aim pursued, a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect nationals of other member States more than nationals of the host State and there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage (Case C-195/98 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund  ECR I-10497, paragraph 40). In the cases in the main proceedings, the decree of June 16 2006 provides that unrestricted access to the medical and paramedical courses covered by that decree is available only to resident students, that is those who satisfy both the requirement that their principal residence be in Belgium. The students who do not satisfy those conditions, by contrast, enjoy only restricted access to those institutions, since the total number of those students is in principle limited, for each university institution and for each course, to 30% of all enrollments in the preceding academic year. Once that percentage has been reached, the non-resident students are selected, with a view to their registration, by drawing lots.
But was the discrimination justified?
The Court recalled that to be justified, the measure concerned must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the legitimate objective it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (Case C-527/06 Renneberg  ECR I‑7735, paragraph 81, and Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others  ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).
The Court found that the discriminatory measure was not justified by the need to reduce an excessive burden on the educational system. It also found that the justification advanced relating to the homogeneity of the system was in this case the same as that relating to the need to preserve the quality of the health system provided in the French Community. The Belgian government submitted that it was impossible to increase the total number of students taking the courses concerned and that the non resident are likely to return to their home states thus causing a shortage of qualified practitioners in Belgium.
The Court held that hat a difference in treatment based indirectly on nationality may be justified by the objective of maintaining a balanced high-quality medical service open to all, in so far as it contributes to achieving a high level of protection of health (Case C-169/07 Hartlauer  ECR I-0000, paragraph 47). It stated as a matter of principle that it is for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, to determine whether and to what extent such legislation satisfies those conditions (Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn  ECR 2743, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Schönheit and Becker  ECR I‑12575, paragraph 82).
In order to assist the referring court, the Court of Justice noted that it cannot be ruled out that a reduction in the quality of training of future health professionals may ultimately impair the quality of care provided in the territory concerned, since the quality of the medical or paramedical service within a given area depends on the competence of the health professionals who carry out their activity there. It also cannot be ruled out that a limitation of the total number of students in the courses concerned – in particular with a view to ensuring the quality of training – may reduce, proportionately, the number of graduates prepared in the future to ensure the availability of the service in the territory concerned, which could then have an effect on the level of public health protection. A shortage of health professionals would cause serious problems for the protection of public health and that the prevention of that risk requires that a sufficient number of graduates establish themselves in that territory in order to carry out there one of the medical or paramedical occupations covered by the decree at issue in the main proceedings.
Consequently, the Court of Justice leaves it open to the national court to find that the discrimination can be justified relatively easily in this case and uphold the decree in question. In doing so, the Court seems more liberal than in its previous case law, presumably because the university courses lead to qualifications for health professionals.
One final and interesting point. The Court of Justice considered the preliminary reference in the light of primary, Treaty law. But it did also consider whether Directive 2004/38 of April 29 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory applied.
- fourth, Directive 2004/38 applies ratione temporis to the cases in the main proceedings. The member States were obliged, first, to implement that directive before April30 2006. Second, the decree at issue in the main proceedings was adopted after that date, on 16 June 2006. In addition, it is common ground that the students in question in the main proceedings applied for enrollment in the institutions of higher education concerned for the academic year 2006/07, and that their enrollment was refused on the basis of that decree. Their request must therefore have been refused after April 30 2006.
However, as the Court was not in possession of all the facts which would enable it to hold that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings also falls within Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38, it held that it is for the referring Belgian court to assess whether that provision actually applies in the cases in the main proceedings.
The Court of Justice has handed down an interesting and important judgment on the loss of citizenship and its relationship to EU law.
In its judgment in Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, the Court held that EU law, and in particular to Article 17 EC, allows a member State to withdraw from a citizen of the Union the nationality of that State acquired by naturalisation when that nationality was obtained by deception, on condition that the decision to withdraw observes the principle of proportionality.
The facts are a bit weird. Dr Rottmann was an Austrian originally, by birth. He moved to Munich in Germany in 1995 but just before then he was under investigation in Graz, Austria, because he was suspected of having committed a serious fraud. In 1997 the Austrian authorities issued a national warrant for his arrest. Dr Rottmann applied for German nationality in February 1998. During the naturalisation procedure he omitted to mention the proceedings against him in Austria. He became a naturalized German citizen in February 1999.
The naturalization in Germany of Dr Rottmann had the effect, in accordance with Austrian law, of causing him to lose his Austrian nationality. In August 1999 the city of Munich was informed by the Austrian that they had issued a warrant for Dr Rottmann’s arrest. In September 1999 the Austrian public prosecutor’s office informed the German authorities, inter alia, that Dr Rottmann had already been questioned as an accused person before the an Austrian court in July 1995.
In the light of those circumstances, the German authorities withdrew the naturalization with retroactive effect in July 2000, on the grounds that Dr Rottmann had not disclosed the fact that he was the subject of judicial investigation in Austria and that he had, in consequence, obtained German nationality by deception. He then challenged the decision to withdraw his naturalization before a German court which referred the issue of whether such a withdrawal of nationally was compatible with EU law.
The Court of Justice answered that in principle a member State can withdraw its nationality from an EU citizen if that nationality had been obtained by deception.
The first and biggest problem faced by the Court was whether the withdrawal of naturalization concerned EU law in any way or whether it was a purely internal, domestic issue. Interestingly, the Court held that the fact that Dr Rottmann had exercised his right of free movement by moving from Austria to Germany was not enough to constitute a cross-border element capable of connecting the withdrawal of naturalization with EU law.
Thus, the Court had to find another more serious connecting factor with EU law.
What it found as a connecting factor was the grave consequence in EU law of losing one’s nationality. It held that it is clear that the situation of a citizen of the Union who is faced with a decision withdrawing his naturalization, adopted by the authorities of one member State, and placing him, after he has lost the nationality of another member State that he originally possessed, in a position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 17 EC and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of EU law.
The Court recalled the important principle that it is for each member State, having due regard to EU law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality (Case C-369/90 Micheletti and Others, paragraph 10; Case C‑179/98 Mesbah  ECR I‑7955, paragraph 29; and Case C‑200/02 Zhu and Chen  ECR I‑9925, paragraph 37).
It recalled also that Declaration No 2 on nationality of a member State, annexed by the States to the final act of the EU Treaty, and the decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council at Edinburgh on December 11 and 12 1992, were intended to clarify the definition of the ambit ratione personae of the provisions of EU law referring to the concept of national, have to be taken into consideration as being instruments for the interpretation of the EC Treaty, especially for the purpose of determining the ambit ratione personae of that Treaty.
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized, the fact that a matter falls within the competence of the member States does not alter the fact that, in situations covered by EU law, the national rules concerned must have due regard to the latter (Case C‑274/96 Bickel and Franz  ECR I‑7637, paragraph 17 (as regards national provisions in the sphere of criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure); Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello  ECR I‑11613, paragraph 25 (as regards national rules governing a person’s name); Case C‑403/03 Schempp  ECR I‑6421, paragraph 19 (as regards national rules relating to direct taxation); Case C‑145/04 Spain v United Kingdom  ECR I‑7917, paragraph 78 (as regards national rules determining the persons entitled to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament)).
But why must member States have due regard to EU law ? Because of the importance of EU citizenship. The Court stressed that citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the member States (Case C‑184/99 Grzelczyk  ECR I‑6193, paragraph 31; Case C‑413/99 Baumbast  ECR I‑7091, paragraph 82). Article 17(2) EC attaches to that status the rights and duties laid down by the Treaty, including the right to rely on Article 12 EC in all situations falling within the scope ratione materiae of EU law (Case C‑85/96 Martínez Sala  ECR I‑2691, paragraph 62, and Case C‑403/03 Schempp, paragraph 17). Thus, the member States must, when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality, have due regard to EU law (Micheletti and Others, paragraph 10; Mesbah, paragraph 29; Case C‑192/99 Kaur  ECR I‑1237, paragraph 19; and Zhu and Chen, paragraph 37).
In those circumstances, it is for the Court of Justice to rule on the questions referred by the national court which concern the conditions in which a citizen of the Union may, because he loses his nationality, lose his status of citizen of the Union and thereby be deprived of the rights attaching to that status.
As to the second issue, which concerned the substance of the case, the Court held that in principle a member State may withdraw its nationality from a person who obtained it through deception and in particular can withdraw it even if that person does not recover his nationality of origin.
Nevertheless, the Court stated that it was for the national court to examine the proportionality of the decision to withdraw the nationality acquired as a consequence of deception.
How could this have happened ? We're kind of embarrassed..... Here's a major case dealing with the free movement of persons in which the Court of Justice overruled itself and handed down a judgment that's very "citizen friendly". And we did not blog about it !
The case is C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the judgment was handed down on July 25th 2008.
Here's the story (of the case, not how we managed to overlook it). The case came to the Court of Justice on a reference from the Irish High Court. There were four cases before the Irish court concerning a non-EU member State national who arrived in Ireland and applied for asylum. In each case the application was refused. While resident in Ireland the four asylum seekers married citizens of the Union who did not have Irish nationality but who were resident in Ireland. None of the marriages was a marriage of convenience. After the marriage, each of the non-EU spouses (the asylum seekers) applied for a residence permit as the spouse of a EU citizen. The applications were refused by the Minister for Justice on the ground that the spouse did not satisfy the condition of prior lawful residence in another Member State.
The reason why the residence permits were refused is the following. Directive 2004/38 - which we have commented on before here and here - provides that all citizens have the right to move and reside in the territory of another member State as workers or students or if they have comprehensive sickness insurance and sufficient funds not to become a burden on the social assistance system. The family members of a citizen of the EU have the right to move and reside in the Member States with that citizen. They can enter a member State if they have an entry visa or residence card issued by a member State.
The Irish legislation implementing Directive 2004/38 in Ireland provides that a citizen of an EU country who is a family member of an EU citizen may reside with or join that citizen in Ireland only if he is already lawfully resident in another member State. And that was not the case for the applicants in Case C-127/08.
Consequently, the Irish High Court asked the Court of Justice whether the condition of prior lawful residence in another Member State is compatible with the terms of Directive 2004/38.
The Court of Justice held - to the surprise of many - that the condition of prior lawful residence was not compatible with Directive 2004/38. It held that the application of the directive is not conditional on family members having previously resided in a member State. The directive applies to all EU citizens who move to or reside in a member State other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members who accompany them or join them in that Member State. The definition of family members in the directive does not distinguish according to whether or not they have already resided lawfully in another member State.
The Court examines its previous case law and expressly overrules its judgment in Case C-109/01 Akrich (which it had previously tried to confine to its facts in Case C-1/05 Yungying Jia). In Case C-109/01 Akrich the Court had upheld the condition of prior lawful residence in another EU state.
It is really quite rare for the Court of Justice to overrule itself.
Has the Court of Justice halted the inexorable march of rights under the banner of "citizenship" ? Perhaps not. But the recent judgment in Case C-158/07 Jacqueline Förster v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep does give the member States some latitude to treat citizens of other member States differently from their own.
Here's the story. Jacqueline Förster, a young German woman, went to the Netherlands and enrolled for training as a primary school teacher in 2000. She got a job to help support herself while she studied. She also got a grant from the competent Dutch authority, the IB-Groep, from September 2000. That authority took the view that Ms Förster was a ‘worker’ and, consequently, should be treated in the same way as a student of Dutch nationality as regards maintenance grants. Later, when it checked up, the IB-Groep discovered that Ms Förster had not been gainfully employed between July 2003 and December 2003. As she could no longer be considered to be a worker, the IB-Groep annulled the decision giving her a grant that was paid between July and December 2003 and asked her to repay the amounts paid during that time.
Ms Förster challenged that decision and claimed that she was already sufficiently integrated into Dutch society during the period at issue to be able to claim a maintenance grant as a student under EC law. She relied on the judgment in Case C-209/03 Bidar in which the Court of Justice held that the existence of a certain degree of integration may be deemed established by a finding that a student has resided in the host member State for a certain length of time. But, following that judgment the IB-Groep adopted a policy rule which provided that a student from the EU must have been lawfully resident in the Netherlands for an uninterrupted period of at least five years before claiming a maintenance grant.
The competent Dutch court, wondering whether Ms Förster should be treated like a Dutch national, then referred questions to the Court to ask under what conditions a student from another member State may be entitled to a grant and whether the residence requirement of 5 years is compatible with EC law.
The Court of Justice replied that such a 5 year requirement was indeed compatible.
In the first place, the Court held that Ms. Förster did not come within the ambit of Regulation 1251/70 that entitles a worker who has ceased her employment activity to remain permanently in the territory of a member State after having worked there as an employed person and to continue to be entitled to equality of treatment with nationals, subject to certain conditions: Ms Förster did not, as a matter of fact, meet those conditions.
Then, the Court held that that a residence requirement of 5 years, such as that laid down by the Dutch authorities, does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of ensuring that students from other member States are to a certain degree integrated into the society of the host member State, as required by the judgment in Case C-209/03 Bidar. The Court found that the residence requirement was applied on the basis of clear criteria known in advance (see Case C-138/02 Collins). Consequently, the Court held a student who is a national of one member State and travels to another member State to study there can rely on the first paragraph of Article 12 EC in order to obtain a grant where she has resided for a certain period in the host member State. But Article 12 EC does not preclude the application to nationals of other member States of a requirement of five years’ prior residence even when such a requirement is not imposed on nationals.
Some time ago, in 2006, we noted a strange case, C-96/04Standesamt Stadt Niebüll in which the Court of Justice declined jurisdiction to respond to a preliminary question referred by a national court exercising an administrative rather than a judicial function.
That case came back to the Court of Justice as Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul. This time there was no doubt that the court referring the question was exercising a judicial function as it clearly had to adjudicate a dispute. Consequently, the Court dealt with the substance of the case which concerned the relationship between the form of surname of a person and the law of the nationality of that person.
The facts are as follows. The case concerns the family name of a German child of German parents. According to German law, a person’s name falls to be decided by the law of the State of his or her nationality. Also, German law does not allow a child to have a double-barrelled name made of a his father's and mother's surnames. But, the child was born in Denmark and was registered there with just the double-barrelled name not allowed in Germany, but allowed in Denmark. The Registrar’s Office (Standesamt) in Germany refused to recognize the double-barrelled surname as it had been given in a manner contrary to German private international law (according to the law of the nationality of the child). To cut a long story short, the Registrar's office referred the matter to the Amtsgericht (Local Court). But then the Local Court wondered whether EC law requires that the name that is valid under Danish law must be recognized by German law and referred the matter to the Court of Justice in Case C-96/04Standesamt Stadt Niebüll. As the Court of Justice declined jurisdiction at that time, the German Local Court refused to register the child's double-barrelled name. The parents then appealed to the Amtsgericht Flensburg which held that it could not order the Standesamt Niebüll to register a surname which is not allowed under German law, but had doubts as to whether it is compatible with EC law for a citizen of the Union to be required to bear a different surname in different member States.
The Court of Justice held that, in the circumstances of this case, it was contrary to EC law to require a person to have different surnames in different member States. The Court held that Article 18 EC precludes the authorities of a member State, in applying its national law, from refusing to recognise a child’s surname, as determined and registered in another member State in which the child – who, like his parents, has only the nationality of the first Member State – was born and has been resident since birth.
The Court first stated that there was a connecting factor with EC law. It stated that while the rules governing a person’s surname are matters coming within the competence of the member States, the latter must, when exercizing that competence, comply with EC law. The situation of the child in this case falls within the scope of EC law because he is a national of one member State and is lawfully resident in the territory of another member State. The Court finds that having to use a surname, in the member State of which the person concerned is a national, that is different from that conferred and registered in the member State of birth and residence is liable to hamper the exercise of the right, established in Article 18 EC, to move and reside freely within the territory of the member States. The Court gave quite a long list of examples of how having different names in different states is likely to cause trouble. Thus, the Court recalled its caselaw according to which national legislation of a member State that places certain of its nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on every citizen of the Union (see Case C-406/04 De Cuyper, paragraph 39, and Case C-499/06 Nerkowska, paragraph 32).
The German government tried to justify their refusal to register a double-barrelled name on two grounds.
First, the German, and indeed other governments, stated that they considered nationality as the sole connecting factor for the determination of surnames, and that such a connecting factor constitutes an objective criterion which makes it possible to determine a person’s surname with certainty and continuity, to ensure that siblings have the same surname and to preserve relationships between members of an extended family. That seems a pretty strong justification. But the Court rejected it. It held that none of the grounds put forward in support of the connecting factor of nationality for determination of a person’s surname, however legitimate those grounds may be in themselves, warrants having such importance attached to it as to justify, in circumstances of this case, a refusal by the authorities of a member State to recognize the surname of a child as already determined and registered in another member State in which that child was born and has been resident since birth.
The Court was clearly not impressed with nationality as a connecting factor. It went on to the effect that in so far as the connecting factor of nationality seeks to ensure that a person’s surname may be determined with continuity and stability, in circumstances of this case, that connecting factor will result in an outcome contrary to that sought: Every time the child crosses the border between Denmark and Germany, he will bear a different name.
The second justification advanced by the German government seems, to a non German, quite frankly hilarious. That government stated that double-barrelled names should not be allowed for reasons of convenience because it must be possible to limit the length of surnames! When one wonders just how mind-bogglingly polysyllabic many nouns are in the German language, one just has to laugh incredulously at such a justification. Well, the Court was unimpressed too and held tartly that administrative convenience was no excuse for maintaining an obstacle to free movement.
UPDATE: Our friends over at the Conflict of Laws blog - a blog we cannot recommend too highly - have an excellent write-up here.
The Court of Justice handed down an important judgment in Case C-164/07 James Wood v. Fonds de garantie des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d'autres infractions stating that EU law prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality which results in citizens of other member States who live and work in France being excluded from receiving compensation from a French state fund intended to help victims of crimes.
The sad story is as follows. James Wood, an Englishman, lived, worked and paid taxes in France for more than 20 years. He had three children with his partner, a French national. Their three children were also French nationals. Tragically, their eldest daughter died in a road traffic accident in Australia.
France has a statutory Guarantee Fund to compensate the victims of terrorism and other crimes. The Wood family brought a claim before the Compensation Board which administered the Guarantee Fund for an assessment of the non-material damage suffered by the family. The Guarantee Fund agreed to award a sum in compensation for the loss of the eldest child but excluded the father of the deceased on the grounds that if the crime is committed outside France, the claimant must have French nationality, which Mr Wood did not. Mr Wood challenged that decision before a French court which then referred a question to the Court of Justice on the compatibility of the French legislation with EC law.
The Court of Justice held that EC law precludes legislation of a member State which excludes nationals of other member States who live and work in its territory from the grant of compensation intended to make good losses resulting from offences against the person where the crime in question was not committed in the territory of that State, on the sole ground that they do not have the nationality of that State.
The Court recalled that Mr Wood, a British national, has exercised his right to freedom of movement for workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC or freedom of establishment within the meaning of Article 43 EC by living and working in France for more than 20 years. Therefore, Mr Wood’s situation falls within the scope of application of the EC Treaty and he may rely on his right not to suffer discrimination by reason of his nationality.
It also recalled its settled case-law that the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way. Such treatment may be justified only if it is based on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and is proportionate to the objective being legitimately pursued (see Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello, paragraph 31).
The Court found that as regards the loss of his daughter and the resulting damage, Mr Wood is in a comparable situation to that of his partner, Mrs Arraitz, the mother of the poor girl. Thus, under the national provision at issue in the main proceedings, the only aspect of their position regarding their right to compensation which differs is their nationality. Only Mrs Arraitz, received compensation because of her French nationality while Mr Woods did not.
The Court concluded that this difference in treatment, based expressly and solely on the nationality of Mr Wood, constitutes direct discrimination, prohibited by Article 12 EC. The French Government itself admitted that in a case such as this there are no reasons capable of justifying such difference in treatment.
Note too that the Court of Justice dealt with the reference in just over a year.
If there is one interesting development in the case law of the Court of Justice, it is that which concerns citizenship. Take this case, for example, or that one.
The Commission publishes a report every so often on "Citizenship of the Union" and the fifth one was made public recently. You can find it here as COM(2008) 85 final.
The report covers the period May 1st 2004 to June 30th 2007 and contains a very valuable and interesting summary of developments - legislative, administrative and judicial - in all areas affecting citizenship at the EC level.
That Report itself is succinct. Earnest researchers should refer to the accompanying Commission document SEC(2008) 197 is much more detailed and provides what seems like a comprehensive series of references. What is particularly interesting is the table on pages 9 and 10 on migration and population figures per member State. Did you know, for example that 2.1% of the United Kingdom's population was made up of citizens from other member States and 3.6% of it from non-member States ?
The Court of Justice has handed down a judgment in Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan an Bucher that is so exciting that we can barely contain ourselves. It really does reward reading and so we should just suggest you go and read it for yourselves.
Here's a bit of an introduction to whet your appetite for it. The Court held that a national law that makes the award of education and training grants for studies in another member State subject to the condition that those studies should be a continuation of studies pursued for at least one year in the member State awarding the grant is liable to deter citizens of the Union from making use of their freedom of movement and is thus contrary to Articles 17 EC and 18 EC.
Ms Morgan, a German national, moved to Great Britain where she worked for a year as an au pair before starting her university studies in England, for which she applied to the German authorities for a grant. Her application was rejected because, under German legislation, the grant was subject to the condition that the course of study should constitute a continuation of education or training pursued for at least one year in a German establishment.
Ms Bucher, also German, lived in Bonn until she decided to move to Düren, a German town close to the Dutch border, and pursue a course of study in Heerlen, in the Netherlands. She applied to the authorities in Düren for a grant. She was refused because she was not ‘permanently’ resident near a border as required by the German legislation.
The Court of Justice held that while member States remain competent to establish a system of grants for the pursuit of education, they must ensure that if students pursue their education in another member State, they must ensure that the detailed rules for the award of those grants do not create an unjustified restriction on freedom of movement. In the present case, German legislation imposed a two fold obligation on the receipt of a grant for study abroad : First, the applicant for a grant must have attended an education or training course for at least one year in Germany and second, the applicant must continue only that same education or training in another member State. The Court held that on account of the personal inconvenience, additional costs and possible delays which it entails, the German legislation is liable to discourage citizens of the Union from leaving Germany in order to pursue studies in another member State. It therefore constitutes a restriction on freedom of movement for citizens of the Union.
The Court recalled that recalled that national legislation of a member State which places certain of its nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another ember State constitutes a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on every citizen of the Union (see Case C‑406/04 De Cuyper, paragraph 39; Case C-192/05 Tas Hagen and Tas, paragraph 31; and Case C-76/05 Schwarzand Gootjes-Schwarz, paragraph 93). The opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement for citizens of the Union cannot be fully effective if a national of a member State can be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles placed in the way of his stay in another Member State by legislation of his State of origin penalizing the mere fact that he has used those opportunities (see, to that effect, Case C‑224/98 D’Hoop, paragraph 31; Case C‑224/02 Pusa, paragraph 19; and Schwarz and Gootjes‑Schwarz, paragraph 89).
Interestingly, the Court added that that consideration is particularly important in the field of education in view of the aims pursued by Article 3(1)(q) EC and the second indent of Article 149(2) EC, namely, inter alia, encouraging mobility of students and teachers (see D’Hoop, paragraph 32, and Case C-147/03 Commission v. Austria, paragraph 44).
There's a lot, really a lot that can be written about this judgment. It shows for one thing how real, effective and far reaching is the concept of a single European market for education.
The Court of Justice handed down a neat judgment on citizenship and Article 18 EC. It held in Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas that Article 18(1) EC precludes legislation of a member State under which it refuses to grant to one of its nationals a benefit for civilian war victims solely on the ground that, at the time at which the application was submitted, the person concerned was resident, not in the territory of that member State, but in the territory of another member State.
The story is as follows. Mrs Tas-Hagen was born in 1943 in what was at the time the Dutch East Indies. She moved to the Netherlands in 1954. In 1961 she acquired Netherlands nationality. In 1987, after having become incapable of working and thereby forced to terminate her professional career, she took up residence in Spain. In 1999, while resident in Spain, Mrs Tas-Hagen applied for the grant of a war pension. This application was based on health problems resulting from her experiences in the Dutch East Indies during the Japanese occupation and during the Bersiap period following that occupation. Her application was denied on the ground that the relevant Dutch legislation required the applicant for the war pension to be actually resident in the Netherlands and she was not because she was resident in Spain at the time.
As for Mr Tas, he was born in the Dutch East Indies in 1931. In 1947 he took up residence in the Netherlands. From 1951 to 1971 he held Indonesian nationality. He regained Netherlands nationality in 1971. In 1983 he ceased to be employed as an official of the Hague municipal council, and he was declared wholly incapable of work on grounds of mental health. In 1987 Mr Tas took up residence in Spain. He too applied for a war pension in 1999 and was also turned down on the ground that he was resident in Spain, not the Netherlands, at the time of the application.
They both challenged the refusal before the Dutch courts on the ground that the condition of residence in the Netherlands at the time of the applications is contrary to the Treaty provisions on citizenship of the Union. The Dutch court then referred the matter to the Court of Justice.
The Court had first to determine whether the facts of the case came within the scope of EC law. The Court held that they did. It stated that a benefit such as that in issue in the main proceedings, which is intended to compensate civilian war victims for physical or mental damage which they have suffered, falls within the competence of the member States. But, member States must exercise that competence in accordance with Community law, in particular with the Treaty provisions giving every citizen of the Union the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the member States. The Court pointed out that while citizenship of the Union, established by Article 17 EC, is not intended to extend the material scope of the Treaty to internal situations which have no link with Community law (Joined Cases C‑64/96 and C‑65/96 Uecker and Jacquet, paragraph 23, and Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello, paragraph 26), the situation of Ms Tas-Hagen and Mr Tas is covered by the right of free movement and residence of citizens of the European Union. Clearly, Ms Tas-Hagen and Mr Tas, in taking up residence in Spain, were exercising the right granted by Article 18(1) EC to every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of a Member State other than that of which he is a national.
Then the Court considered whether the residence requirement laid down in Dutch law was contrary to EC law. The Court held that it was contrary to EC law. The Court recalled that the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement cannot be fully effective if a national of a member State can be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles raised to his residence in the host Member State by legislation of his State of origin penalizing the fact that he has used them (Case C‑224/02 Pusa, paragraph 19). It held that national legislation which places at a disadvantage certain of the nationals of the Member State concerned simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on every citizen of the Union (Case C‑406/04 De Cuyper, paragraph 39).
- and is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions (De Cuyper, paragraph 40).
As to the first condition (the existence of objective considerations of public interest) it is apparent the limitation in the Dutch legislation, by means of the condition of residence, of the number of persons likely to be eligible for the benefits introduced by that legislation results from the Netherlands legislature’s wish to limit the obligation of solidarity with civilian war victims to those who had links with the population of the Netherlands during and after the war. The condition of residence is therefore an expression of the extent to which such victims are connected to Netherlands society. The Court conceded that this aim of solidarity may constitute an objective consideration of public interest.
But that left the second condition, the one relating to proportionality. The Court had a problem with that one. The Court held that a condition of residence such as that in issue in the main proceedings cannot be characterised as an appropriate means by which to attain the objective sought. It found that a criterion requiring residence cannot be considered a satisfactory indicator of the degree of connection of applicants to the member State granting the benefit when it is liable, as is the case with the criterion in issue in the main proceedings, to lead to different results for persons resident abroad whose degree of integration into the society of the member State granting the benefit is in all respects comparable. The setting of a residence criterion such as that used in the main proceedings, based solely on the date on which the application for the benefit is submitted, is not a satisfactory indicator of the degree of attachment of the applicant to the society which is thereby demonstrating its solidarity with him. It follows that this condition of residence fails to comply with the principle of proportionality.
Consequently, the Court held the Dutch residence requirement was contrary to Article 18(1) EC.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.