Source: http://bf.ahcuah.com/ohio/matz.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:44:06+00:00

Document:
1. The driver of a motor vehicle, who, after nightfall, without his fault, is forced, by an oncoming automobile, to the side of the highway and into an unlighted parked truck, with which otherwise he would not have collided, cannot be said as a matter of law to be guilty of violating the "assured clear distance" provision of section 12603, General Code. Paragraph 3 of the syllabus in Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.(2d) 427, approved and followed.
Instructive discussions may be found in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947, and Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294.
It is the general rule that, in order to confer the power to make rules and regulations upon a commission, the Legislature must establish the policy of the law by adopting standards as has been heretofore stated with reference to conferring official discretion. The discretion conferred must not be "unconfined and vagrant" and must be "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing." Mr. Justice Cardozo in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra.
If such general rule-making power could be conferred indiscriminately, the Legislature could meet, create commissions, pass on to them the duties of legislation, and then adjourn sine die. Without restrictions on the commission's power, rules and regulations of whatever kind could be adopted by it without notice and changed overnight. The result would be that statutory law would lose its significance and legal rights would be grounded in great measure upon the readily alterable rules and regulations of boards and commissions. Thus the constitutional right of referendum would be denied, government would be given over to the despotic rule of administrative authorities, and bureaucracy would run wild. A pertinent discussion of this, phase of the problem may be found in Goodlove v. Logan, 217 Iowa, 98, 251 N.W. 39.
Exceptions to this rule have been made from time to time and reasons therefor often exist. In Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604, there is an interesting and instructive discussion of the problem. There are many instances where it is impossible or impracticable to lay down criteria or standards without destroying the flexibility necessary to enable the administrative officers to carry out the legislative will; especially may such a contingency arrise when the discretion conferred relates to police regulations. In such cases it has been held unnecessary to declare the policy of the law by establishing definite restrictions. See Section III, paragraph a, of the annotation in 92 A.L.R. 410, in which the cases are collected. Exceptions of this character should be made with discrimination and foresight, and only in cases where absolutely necessary to accomplish the legislative objective.
The beginnings of bureaucracy in this state trace back to its early history. In France v. State, 57 Ohio St. 1, at page 18, 47 N.E. 1041, 1043, Williams, J., states in the opinion: "But in numerous instances, from an early period in the history of the state, the legislature has invested various boards, bodies, and officers with the power, and charged them with the duty, of ascertaining facts, and hearing and deciding questions, when deemed necessary or expedient in order to carry into execution laws enacted to accomplish some public need or purpose, or deemed for the public good."
Not only the provisions of law, but the rules and regulations of the commission authorized by statute, whicw are designed for the safety of the traveling public, should be rigidly enforced by the commission." Midwestern Motor Transit, Inc., v. Public Util. Comm., supra.
"The provisions of law as well as the regulations of the commission designed for the safety of the traveling public should be enforced by the commission. It is well that motor transportation companies understand that compliance with such laws and regulations will be required and enforced." Minerva-Canton Transit Co. v. Public Util. Comm., supra.
"In our opinion the Public Utilities Commission, upon reaching a conclusion from evidence adduced before it upon hearing that the holder of a certificate issued by it violates the rules prescribed by the comission for the purpose of safeguarding the traveling public, and that he continues such violation for such a protracted period as to indicate neglect, is fully authorized to revoke the certificate of convenience and necessity theretofore issued by it." Solt v. Public Util. Comm., supra.
In Sylvania Busses, Inc., v. City of Toledo, 118 Ohio St. 187, 160 N.E. 674, section 614-86, General Code, was held valid and constitutional, but the contention that parts of it were invalid as constituting a delegation of legislative power to the commission was not made or considered.
Rules and regulations of administrative boards never have the full effect of law but have legal effect only in the sense that they have enforceability, for legislation can be enacted only by the General Assembly. Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N.Y. 346, 150 N.E. 139. Yet without rule-making power many of the boards and commissions would be impotent and could not achieve the ends for which they were created. Motor transportation companies are utilities operating on the public highways for commercial profit, and regulation is imperative if highway safety is to be attained. The Legislature is not alwavs in session and so cannot, acting by itself. promptly meet the everchanging problems arising out of the regulation of service, the control of equipment, and the promotion of safety. Recent years have shown how quickly unforeseen dangers on the highways may arise through upheaval by frost and washout by rain and flood. Shifting conditions require new methods in dealing with service, equipment, and safety problems. It may well be assumed that the legislative intent in providing that the required license is to be granted subject to such conditions (which include proper rules and regulations whether adopted before or after the certificate of public convenience and necessity is obtained) as the commission may impose was to enable the commission through such regulatory power to avert new perils and meet emergencies; but it is essential to the validity of such rules and regulations that they be reasonable and neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor in conflict with the law.	The necessities are such that the instant case comes within the exception, and the power conferred on the Public Utilities Commission is administrative and not legislative. Standards restricting the commission and restricting its action are impracticable under the circumstances.
A searching investigation has failed to reveal very many authorities bearing on the precise question presented. State v. Dixon, 335 Mo. 478, 73 S.W.(2d) 385, supports the conclusions reached by this court.
In a number of other cases the conferring of similar regulatory power his been upheld but in all of them there were some restrictions or limitations. Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.(2d) 691, 87 A.L.R. 534; Hamann v. Lawrence, 354 Ill. 197, 188 N.E. 333; Snyder v. State, 206 Ind. 202, 188 N.E. 777; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct. 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167; In re Hinkelman, 183 Cal. 392, 191 P. 682, 11 A.L.R. 1222; State v. Wetzel, 208 Wis. 603, 243 N.W. 768, 86 A.L.R. 274.
In Goodlove v. Logan, 217 Iowa, 98, 251 N.W. 39, it was held that such action constituted a delegation of legislative power; but the regulation of the commission in that case applied to the public generally and to all vehicles on the highway, and the alleged violator was operating his own passenger automobile on a public road in the usual way and not for hire. It is therefore distinguishable from the instant case.
It does not follow that a violation of the regulation constitutes negligence per se. Assuredly, a violation after the regulation has become effective and notice of its adoption has been given to the motor transportation company warrants revocation of the license or prosecution for a misdemeanor under section 614-100, General Code, as heretofore indicated; that section, however, is not a measure enacted for the public safety, but to secure the observance of orders, rules, and regulations of the commission and of certain statutes and therefore a violation of section 614-100 does not constitute negligence per se under the doctrine pronounced in Schell v. Du Bois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, L.R.A.1917A, 710. The regulation as to fusees or flares was, however, admissible in evidence as bearing on the question of negligence in the sense of want of ordinary care. The trial court, therefore, would have been warranted in submitting that question to the jury, but committed prejudicial error in charging the doctrine of negligence per se. Schumer v. Caplin, supra.

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