Source: https://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/interference/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 13:57:02+00:00

Document:
In Dickinson v. St. Cloud Hospital, No. 07-3346 ADM/RLE (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2008), the court addressed the interaction of the FMLA with attendance policies based on absenteeism percentage rates. In that case, the Hospital had separate policies for FMLA and non-FMLA absences. For non-FMLA absences, an employee could be subject to discipline for exceeding a 4% absenteeism rate. The absenteeism rate was calculated by dividing the number of hours an employee is absent by the scheduled hours of the employee. FMLA absences are not factored into the absenteeism rate.
Dickinson was terminated for having a non-FMLA absenteeism rate of 7.12% for the period November 6, 2005 to March 25, 2006. Prior to that, Dickinson had used FMLA leave for problems with her kidneys. She had also been subjected to several levels of progressive discipline for exceeding the 4% absenteeism rates during various periods over the last several years.
Dickinson sued, alleging that the Hospital interfered with her FMLA rights by the manner in which it calculated her non-FMLA absenteeism rate. Specifically, Dickinson argued that FMLA leave must be included in the denominator of the absenteeism calculation because failing to do so causes the negative effect of increasing her absenteeism rate. The Hospital argued that it did not interfere with her rights because it treats FMLA leave neutrally by excluding it from both the numerator and the denominator.
As a ".9" employee, Dickinson was scheduled to work 1,872 hours per year. To remain below the 4% absenteeism rate required by [the Hospital], she could only miss 74.88 hours of work a year (74.88/1872 = 4%). Applying the method by which [the Hospital] calculates the absenteeism rate means that if Dickinson takes 100 hours of FMLA leave as well as 74.88 hours of non-FMLA leave, her absenteeism rate rises above 4% (74.88/1772 = 4.22%).
The court concluded that, under the Hospital's policy, employees who elect to take FMLA leave may be allowed fewer non-FMLA absences. As such, the policy uses the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor, which is prohibited by the Act.
Comment: Employers with attendance policies based on non-FMLA leave absenteeism percentages need to ensure that FMLA leave usage is completely factored out of the calculation. WARNING: THIS MAY REQUIRE MATH SKILLS.
The court went on to find that the Hospital could still prevail if it could show that it would have terminated Dickinson even if she had not exercised FMLA rights. To do so, the Hospital, the court opined, would need to demonstrate the Dickinson 's absenteeism rate would be above 4% over the time period used to determine the rate even with FMLA leave factored into the denominator. The court ultimately found material facts in dispute on the issue and denied employer's motion for summary judgment.
In Wojan v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc.,No. 07-11544, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69576 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2008), the employee took 12 weeks of FMLA leave from her medical sales position incident to the birth of a child. Because she took 12 weeks of FMLA leave, she did not meet her sales goals for the year. The company did not adjust her sales quota to account for her leave. Under company policy, sales goals are not adjusted for any employee for any reason, including FMLA leave. Alcon placed Wojan on a performance improvement plan because she did not meet her sales goals. She was eventually terminated. Prior to this incident, Wojan had consistently achieved high performance ratings.
In denying the employer summary judgment, the court found that Alcon used Wojan's FMLA leave as a negative factor in her evaluation. The court opined that Alcon's policy is "in direct contravention of FMLA provisions which prohibit the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions." The court reasoned that Alcon may have interfered with Wojan's FMLA rights by adversely evaluating her, in part, based on time she was absent on FMLA leave. That adverse evaluation led to her placement on a PIP, which led to her termination.
Comment: The decision appears problematic. While the FMLA prohibits an employer from using FMLA leave as a negative factor against an employee, it also provides that an employee has no greater right to employment benefits for having exercised FMLA rights. The court's decision, in my opinion, provides greater employment rights to employees who have exercised FMLA rights than if they had not taken FMLA leave. Like it or not, the employer's policy does not recognize the use of leave of any kind as an exception to the requirement that the employee meet their annual sales quota. The court's decision effectively carves out an exception to that general rule that benefits employee's who have used FMLA leave over those who used another form of leave, or no leave at all.
This is not a case where the employee was denied a perfect attendance bonus because of their use of FMLA leave. The current DOL regulations (29 CFR 825.215) distinguish bonuses based on meeting performance goals from those based on the absence of certain events, such as safety and perfect attendance bonuses. The distinction is predicted on the DOL's view that performance goals require activity on the part of the employee independent of FMLA leave, whereas the latter did not require any effort on the part of the employee. Because achieving perfect attendance or no accidents required no effort on the part of the employee, the DOL believed that the denial of the bonus was more directly tied to the use of FMLA leave. Wojan clearly involved performance by the employee to meet the annual sales quota.
It should be noted that the DOL has proposed to do away with the current distinction as confusing and illogical. The DOL proposal questions its own previous asumption that achieving perfect attendance or no accidents requires no effort on the part of the employee.
An employer that discourages an employee from taking FMLA leave may be liable for interfering with an employee's FMLA rights even though the employer ultimately grants all FMLA leave requested.
The issue was recently addressed in Jennings v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:06-cv-0877-SEB-TAB, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 62761 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2008). For purposes of summary judgment, the court accepted that Ford managers had discouraged employees by denying overtime to any employee who took time off during the week, including time off for FMLA leave.
(1) he was eligible for the FMLA's protections, (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.
Ford argued that it should be awarded summary judgment because Jennings could not establish the fifth element: that he was denied FMLA benefits. The court distinguished Burnett because the fifth element was not at issue in the case. Instead, the court followed the lead of the Sixth Circuit in Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 384 F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir. 2004), and modified the fifth element to read: the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits or interfered with FMLA rights to which the employee was entitled. Applying that standard, the court found sufficient evidence in the record to deny summary judgment to Ford.
Comment: The decision preserves the prohibition on discouraging employees from exercising FMLA rights in 825.220(b). The decision allows employees (with sufficient supporting facts) to take FMLA interference claims past summary judgment in situations where the employer's efforts to discourage FMLA usage were either successful (denied FMLA benefits) or unsuccessful (granted FMLA benefits, but discouraged in the process). Given the time and legal expenses involved, a case that gets past summary judgment becomes significantly more expensive for the employer to defend.
Nothing in the statute forbids an employer to adopt reasonable, nonburdensome measures to prevent fraud.
The court reasoned that that an employee might "forge a letter from a doctor, or embellish it before forwarding it to the employer."
Comment: To perfect the right to leave, the employee requesting leave bears the responsibility to ensure that an employer receives a medical certification, if one is requested. The FMLA does not, however, address the method of delivery of a medical certification from the health care provider to the employer.
The FMLA permits an employer to require an employer to comply with the employer's usual and customary procedural requirements for requesting leave. 29 CFR 825.302(d). According to the Seventh Circuit, those permissible procedural requirements include the requirement that a supporting medical certification be directly submitted to the employer by the health care provider.
Direct submission of medical information from a health care provider to an employer gives rise to HIPPA issues. Generally, HIPPA prohibits disclosure of medical information to an employer absent patient authorization. However, an employee who exercised their HIPPA right and refused to authorize direct disclosure of medical information as required by employer policy would almost certainly loose FMLA protections. The employee may also be subject to disciplinary action for violating such an employer policy.
Employers concerned with fraud may want to consider implementing a reasonable policy requiring that any medical certification be submitted directly by the health care provider.
An employee may have an interference claim as a result of being forced to take FMLA leave where the reason for the leave is not covered by the FMLA.
In Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 05-4197, 2007 Fed. App. 0402 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2007), the employee alleged that DOW violated her rights by forcing her to take 3 days of FMLA leave when she did not need to do so. Wysong did not believe that her neck pain constituted a "serious health condition" within the coverage of the FMLA.
The Sixth Circuit recognized an involuntary-leave claim as a type of interference claim. To state a viable interference claim, an employee must show both that she was not suffering from a "serious health condition" that precluded her from working during the time the employer forced her to take FMLA leave, and that the employee sought FMLA leave at a later date, and such leave was not available because the employee was wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in the past. Critically, an involuntary-leave claim ripens only when FMLA leave is exhausted and, as a result, a request for FMLA-qualifying leave is subsequently denied.
Comment: The decision illustrates two important points. First, the FMLA permits an employer to force an employee to exhaust FMLA leave. Second, an employer that forces an employee to exhaust FMLA leave over an employee's objection runs the risk of having that decision challenged in a subsequent suit, at least where the employer denies FMLA leave or disciplines an employee for a subsequent FMLA-covered absence on the grounds that the employee has exhausted their 12-week FMLA leave entitlement and protections.
Employers must exercise great care to ensure that leave counted against an employee's 12-week FMLA leave entitlement is, in fact, covered by the FMLA. It is just as illegal to prematurely exhaust an employee's FMLA leave balance for leave that is not covered by the FMLA as it is to deny FMLA leave to an employee where the reason for leave is covered by the FMLA. To avoid expensive litigation and substantial monetary liability, employers must make the effort to determine that the reason for leave is covered by the FMLA in every instance. The alternative is to simply give up, grant all leave, and never issue discipline for attendance. Your call.
In Wilde v. City of Lincoln, No. 4:05CV3293, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Neb. March 27, 2007), the employee alleged that the City interfered with his FMLA rights by counseling him for using sick leave in excess of what was permitted by the collective bargaining agreement. Wilde argued that because he used the sick leave in conjunction with FMLA the counseling discouraged him from using FMLA which interfered with his FMLA rights. The Court disagreed.
The Court held that, even assuming that he used sick leave to care for family members with serious health condition, the City did not interfere with his FMLA rights by counseling him. Wilde's sick leave requests periodically exceeded the amount of leave available to him under collective bargaining agreement. He was, however, never denied sick leave. The City, the Court concluded, had the right to counsel Wilde to avid using sick leave at a rate exceeding that permitted under his union agreement.
Comment: An employee may use paid leave in conjunction with FMLA leave. An employer may, however, continue to enforce existing company policies regarding the use of paid leave. If an employer would counsel an employee for exceeding the amount of sick leave they have available in the absence of FMLA leave, the employer may counsel an employee who takes sick leave in conjunction with FMLA leave for exceeding the amount of sick leave available. The use of FMLA leave does not insulate the employee from the normal rules governing paid leave. On the other hand, employers must be careful to not treat employees who take FMLA disparately compared to employees who have not taken FMLA leave. For example, if the employer has never counseled an employee for exceeding the amount of sick leave available but counsels an employee who took FMLA, the employer may violate the anti-discrimination provisions of the FMLA.
An employer's failure to provide the forms required by the company to request FMLA leave for several months despite repeated requests by the employee interfered with the employee's FMLA rights by discouraging the employee from taking FMLA leave, even though the employee was allowed to take leave while she waited for the forms and was ultimately granted FMLA leave.

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