Source: https://canons.sog.unc.edu/perspective-on-the-separation-of-powers-case/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:57:02+00:00

Document:
This entry was posted on March 31st, 2015 and is filed under General Local Government (Miscellaneous), Miscellaneous.
Earlier this month a panel of three superior court judges held that the General Assembly’s appointment of a majority of members to the new Oil and Gas, Mining and Coal Ash commissions violates the state constitutional provision on separation of powers. The decision, which is subject to direct appeal to the state supreme court, is the most recent litigation in a 30+ years’ tug-of-war between the governor and legislature over administrative agencies. Some perspective on that conflict, and a brief look at how the courts’ view of separation of powers has evolved in recent years, may be useful in thinking about what comes next.
The modern era of separation of powers litigation in North Carolina began in the early 1980s, most often involving disputes between the governor and legislature. Several developments in the 1970s and earlier gave rise to these conflicts.
First, North Carolina was evolving into a two-party state, in 1972 electing Jim Holshouser the first Republican governor since Reconstruction. The General Assembly, on the other hand, remained solidly Democratic for another couple of decades. Conflict was inevitable.
A third factor in the increasing conflict between the executive and legislative branches was the change taking place in the General Assembly. Stirred partly by a 1971 national report listing North Carolina third from the bottom in effective legislatures, the General Assembly began beefing up its own operation and reducing its dependence on the executive. The legislature, which had not hired its first full-time employee until 1969, created its own fiscal research division in 1971. Soon lawyers were employed to do general research and advise committees. In 1979 the legislature started its in-house bill drafting office rather than relying on the Attorney General. Equally significant, in 1973-74, with the oil crisis playing havoc with the state budget, and a Republican in the governor’s office, the legislature began meeting annually rather than every other year. Thus, just as the governor was becoming a stronger office the legislature, too, was moving toward a more assertive institution with greater interest in the day to day operation of state government.
Finally, state government increasingly turned to administrative agencies to do its work, making separation of powers issues almost unavoidable. The typical administrative agency just does not fit neatly into the classic categorization of three branches of government. Such agencies often blend all three functions — a commission will be empowered to adopt rules (legislative), to issue permits and investigate violations (executive), and hear and decide disputes about violations (judicial). When an agency has a mix of legislative, executive and judicial functions it is harder to say how much control each branch ought to be able to exert over it.
State senator I. Beverly Lake, Jr., (at the time a Democrat but later a Republican and later still chief justice) sued over the constitutionality of the Advisory Budget Commission (ABC), a powerful body — notwithstanding the misleading “advisory” in its title —responsible for preparing and overseeing the state budget. The ABC had eight legislators among its twelve members. Lake later withdrew his lawsuit.
The General Assembly created a Rules Review Committee to examine and potentially suspend rules adopted by administrative agencies that exceeded their authority.
A legislative committee took over the state employees’ health plan despite an opinion from Attorney General Rufus Edmisten that the move was unconstitutional.
The new Joint Legislative Commission on Government Operations, created in the mid-1970s, required the governor to seek approval before transferring more than ten percent from any agency line item appropriation.
The disagreements between the governor and legislature came to a head in 1982 in the state supreme court’s decision in State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 NC 591 (1982). Environmental issues were near the top of the political agenda at that time, and the legislature in 1979 had decided that legislators should occupy four of the thirteen seats on the Environmental Management Commission, two senators and two representatives. Jimmy Wallace, an NC State faculty member, environmentalist and mayor of Chapel Hill, sued, claiming a violation of separation of powers. The supreme court agreed. The court examined the duties of the commission, decided they were clearly executive or administrative in character — drafting regulations, issuing permits, investigating violations, etc. — and held that the legislative branch could not exercise control over the implementation of its acts by appointing legislators to the commission.
The fallout from Wallace v. Bone was considerable. The General Assembly removed legislators from 32 boards and commissions, including the Environmental Management Commission, the Board of Transportation, the Wildlife Resources Commission, and the Social Services Commission. At the same time, though, legislators found other ways to keep a hand on those agencies, such as taking from the Social Services Commission and giving to the legislature itself the authority to set eligibility standards and rates or fees for services.
Five boards, including the Advisory Budget Commission, retained their legislator members but were made advisory. That is, the Advisory Budget Commission actually became advisory. Again, however, the General Assembly found ways to continue its involvement, such as giving itself rather than the governor and ABC the authority to set salaries for various offices including the secretary of revenue, chair of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission and commissioner of motor vehicles.
The legislature removed legislator members from another 25 boards and commissions but retained its authority to appoint non-legislators. Attorney General Edmisten had opined that legislative appointment of non-legislators was still allowed under Wallace v. Bone, that the problem was appointment of legislators themselves. This view appeared to be upheld by the court of appeals in North Carolina State Bar v. Frazier, 62 NC App 172 (1983), when a lawyer being disciplined by the State Bar said the disciplinary committee violated separation of powers because some members were appointed by the General Assembly. The court of appeals, echoing the earlier AG’s opinion, only touched on the issue briefly but said the appointment of non-legislators by the legislature did not raise separation of powers issues.
Now to the three-judge panel’s decision in McCrory v. Berger. In holding that the General Assembly’s appointment of non-legislators to a majority of seats on the three commissions is unconstitutional the panel relied on and quoted extensively from Wallace v. Bone. The panel’s written opinion does not mention the court of appeals’ Frazier opinion which seemed to say it was okay for legislators to appoint commission members so long as they were not legislators. The panel, rather, stuck closely to the analysis of Wallace v. Bone. That is, the panel examined the responsibilities of the three commissions, decided that they all were similar to the Environmental Management Commission when it was litigated in 1982, and that they all clearly were to perform executive functions. The panel concluded, therefore, that the General Assembly cannot encroach on the executive branch by controlling a majority of the members. The panel’s opinion does not discuss the difference between appointing legislators and appointing non-legislators or whether it might be okay to appoint some members provided they are not a majority.
The three-judge panel’s reliance on Wallace v. Bone harkens back to a time when the courts took a more rigid approach to separation of powers. Today the judiciary — including the North Carolina supreme court — tends toward a more lenient standard. The supreme court’s analysis in Wallace v. Bone in 1982 was simple and straightforward. Are the duties of the commission executive or legislative in nature? If the duties are executive or administrative, the legislature may not appoint legislators, to do so would be attempting to control the execution of the law, even if legislators were a minority of members. End of discussion.
The analysis might not be the same today. When Wallace v. Bone was being decided, and since then, other courts generally have followed a more flexible, Madisonian view of separation of powers. Most prominent is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425 (1977), the final fight between Richard Nixon and Congress over the Watergate tapes. When Nixon resigned he made a deal with the General Services Administration (GSA) allowing him to control access to his White House recordings. Congress was not happy with that agreement and decided that the GSA should take custody and have control of all recordings though Nixon could still assert executive privilege. Nixon sued, claiming the congressional directive violated separation of powers.
Recognition of the more flexible approach to separation of powers was stated even more explicitly in Bacon v. Lee, 353 NC 696 (2001). There the court said it was guided by Nixon v. Administrator of General Services in resolving separation of powers issues. The question was not whether a function belonged to one branch of government but whether one branch’s action interferes to the extent of preventing the other branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned function — and, if so, whether the action by the intervening branch is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within its own constitutional sphere of authority.
There are about a dozen other state supreme court decisions on separation of powers since the Alamance County case and none speaks directly to the difference between the Wallace v. Bone analysis and the more flexible approach taken in Alamance County and Bacon v. Lee. Still, there is reason to think that when the court gets McCrory v. Berger it may not adopt quite the same approach as the three-judge panel.
The appeal of McCrory v. Berger will offer the supreme court an opportunity to revisit Wallace v. Bone and more generally revisit the method by which it decides separation of powers cases. None of us knows, of course, how the supreme court will decide the case, but we have some idea as to the possibilities.
The simplest decision to write would be one saying the three-judge panel got it wrong, the General Assembly’s appointment of non-legislators does not present the same threat as the appointment of its own members, regardless of the nature of the commission — therefore, the trial court is reversed, the commissions may continue as enacted by the legislature.
If, however, the supreme court were inclined to uphold the three-judge panel it could be expected to explain why the appointment of non-legislators presents the same harm as the appointment of legislators. And it could be expected to explain in more detail — consistent with the changing view of separation of powers — why the appointment of non-legislators to these particular commissions creates a problem. What is it about the Oil and Gas, Mining and Coal Ash commissions that bars the General Assembly from choosing members? Through such an explanation the court could provide guidance for the many other boards and commissions which presently have legislative appointees. Is the central flaw that the General Assembly appointed a majority of members? If so, how many is acceptable? Is it critical that the commission has functions that overlap with an executive department? May the legislature still appoint members to boards and commissions that seem more remote from gubernatorial power, like the UNC Board of Governors?
Even if the supreme court upholds the decision of the three-judge panel the General Assembly will not lose its ability to influence administrative agencies. One option of particular value might be confirmation of the governor’s appointees. In the 1985 decision in State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, discussed briefly above, the supreme court considered Article III, Section 5(8) of the state constitution which says that the governor’s appointments are subject to the “advice and consent” of the Senate for “all officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.” Governor Martin wanted the court to say that provision applied only to constitutional offices. The court instead read it more broadly, holding in effect that the legislature can require any appointment to be subject to confirmation unless the constitution says otherwise. Should the legislature be denied the authority to appoint members of boards and commissions by a final decision in McCrory v. Berger, it would not be surprising to see many more gubernatorial appointments subject to confirmation — just as the General Assembly found various means to keep a grip on administrative agencies after Wallace v. Bone.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.