Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/293605559/Omnibus-Order-on-Cross-Motions-for-Summary-Judgment-July-12-2012
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:19:26+00:00

Document:
this Order, Plaintiffs Motion is granted and Defendants Motion is granted in part.
(codified at Fla. Stats. 790.338, 381.026, 456.072, 395.1055).
The bill created Fla. Stat.
action under Fla. Stats. 456.072, 395.1055.
final agency actions are subject to judicial review.
Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge them. (See Compl. 58-62).
statistics on physicians practices or patients experiences on this issue.
and discrimination by health care providers against patients based on their ownership of firearms.
fact they are exercising the constitutional right to possess (i.e., keep) firearms. (Id. at 4-5).
Act as mainly an anti-discrimination and harassment bill.
790.338 is a run-of-the-mill anti-discrimination law . . . . (Defs Resp. to Pls. Mot. for Summ. J.
check-ups, in which they ask about a variety of health and safety risks, including access to firearms.
about risks, including firearms, during other types of patient visits. (See, e.g., Schaechter Decl.
Decl 12; Fox-Levine Decl. 16).
anticipatory guidance on the prevention of injuries. (Cosgrove Decl. 10; Raspa Decl. 7-8).
bicycle helmets, automotive safety, and firearms safety. (Cosgrove Decl. 14; Raspa Decl. 9).
and smoke detectors, and firearms safety. (Himmelstein Decl. 8).
summary judgment on the Acts constitutionality.
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The parties do not dispute the facts in this case; the sole issue before me is an issue of law.
therefore proceed to resolve this case on its merits through summary judgment.
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
of; and (iii) redressability, i.e., it must be likely that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Id.
that Plaintiffs do not establish an injury-in-fact with respect to every provision of 790.338.
contend that they are currently engaging in self-censorship to avoid potential disciplinary action.
about firearm safety. (See, e.g., Schaechter Decl. 17; Schechtman 15; Fox-Levine Decl. 1011; Goodman Decl. 10). As I found in my Preliminary Injunction Order, this injury is actual. Cf.
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
threat of specific future harm, i.e., disciplinary action.
therefore infer that the State intends to enforce the rule.
1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009).
serious, and plausible and desire to engage in conduct that arguably would violate the [law].
continue to engage in self-censorship.
enactment, it is unlikely that the State would simply decline to enforce the law.
penalties such as letters of concern, reprimands, suspensions and revocations. . . .
any licensee for violating such charge.
practitioner may face if she violates the law, not to the interpretation of what constitutes a violation.
v. U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1149 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
1278-79 (The informal opinion of the Bars general counsel does not establish the Bars policy.
Act is ripe for adjudication.
protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class.
subject or viewpointthe exercise of the right to own and possess a gun.
it, but its happening, and thats why I support this bill.).
No. 11-210, slip op. at 4 (Kennedy, J., opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, contentbased statutes that ban or burden constitutionally protected speech are subject to strict scrutiny.
Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005).
aspect of fairness, privacy, etc., addressed by the law at issue is highly significant.
U.S. at 382; accord Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
Owners Privacy Act at the preliminary-injunction stage.
matters of preventive medicine should be accorded similar protections.
his or her membership in a class now protected from discrimination and harassment. (Defs. Resp.
to Mot. for Summ. J. 1; Defs. Second Am. Mot for Summ. J. 13).
a non-smoker so that she will not take up that habit.
No. 11-210, slip op. at 1-2 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (applying intermediate scrutiny).
to hold, and to carry weapons, including firearms. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
law; therefore, I do not find that it is a legitimate or compelling interest for it.
receipt of medical care arising from discrimination or harassment based on firearm ownership.
compelling interest in protecting its citizens from some types of discrimination or harassment.
speech. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
that individuals are suffering harassment and discrimination on the basis of firearm ownership.
harassed by pharmaceutical marketers can sustain a broad content-based rule like 4631(d).).
discrimination or harassment on the basis of firearm ownership or possession.
relationship if a patient refuses to answer questions regarding firearm ownership.
ineffective or remote support for the governments purpose).
although it may be a legitimate one.
provision that allows a patient to simply refuse to answer any questions about firearm ownership.
patient. Physicians must be able to speak frankly and openly to patients.); see also Sorrell, 131 S.
proper practice of preventive medicine, thereby preventing patients from receiving truthful, nonmisleading information. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 638. This it cannot do. Cf. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
reject any school of medical thought.).
anti-discrimination, and anti-harassment provisions cannot stand.
regulating the medical profession outweighs practitioners free speech rights.
slip op. at 11 (Kennedy, J., opinion).
I also find that the inquiry restriction, record-keeping, anti-discrimination, and antiharassment provisions do not consist of the least restrictive means to accomplish the States ends.
practitioner must respect a patients right to privacy.
federal laws further protect the confidentiality of patients medical records. See, e.g., Health Ins.
anti-discrimination, and anti-harassment provisions do not pass constitutional muster.
not define what constitutes relevant to the patients medical care or safety, or the safety of others.
because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
that to read the relevance standard in that way would render that clause meaningless or superfluous.
Cf. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-49.
effect on speech, and, by extension, on the effectiveness of the practice of preventive medicine.
whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
statute regulates the content of speech. Id. I find that these provisions are void for vagueness.
practitioners on notice of what kind of conduct is prohibited.
refrain from unnecessarily harassing a patient about firearm ownership during an examination.
reason, it is void for vagueness.
remains after the invalid provisions are stricken.
subsection (4), which provides that a patient may decline to disclose such information.
Plaintiffs have not provided any substantive argument in opposition to allowing these provisions to remain.
applying the severability rule to strike the invalid portion and to preserve the rest of the enactment.
I do not find, however, that a judicial nip and tuck can preserve these clauses. See Jones v.
provide any standards for practitioners to follow. They would simply be too vague and overbroad.
Further, a provision complete in itself does not remain after the invalid portions are stricken.
shall constitute grounds for which disciplinary actions specified under 456.072(2) may be taken.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers at Miami, Florida, this 29th day of June 2012.

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