Source: http://www.kmbllaw.com/more-on-those-great-new-categorical-approach-cases/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:45:15+00:00

Document:
United States v. Garcia-Jimenez, 807 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2015), provides a nice summary of the sources to look to in establishing the federal generic definition of a crime for purposes of the categorical approach.
Garcia-Jimenez and United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2015), also nicely illustrate the sort of investigation and research you need to engage in to apply the categorical approach, including both examination of the universe of state statutes and researching case law on how they’ve been interpreted and applied.
Dixon also reaffirms and provides a nice practical explanation of Rendon’s holding that an alternative is an “element” for purposes of divisibility under Descamps only if there has to be jury unanimity about the element.
I ended last week’s post about the opinions in United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Garcia-Jimenez, 807 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2015), by noting that they also clarify, illustrate, and reaffirm some general principles about the categorical approach and what we have to do in investigating and developing potential categorical approach challenges. They do this in a number of ways.
To begin, Garcia-Jimenez summarizes “a number of sources” courts should survey “to establish the federal generic definition of a crime” – “including state statutes, the Model Penal Code, federal law, and criminal law treatises.” Id., 807 F.3d at 1084. The opinion goes on to state that “[m]ost often, ‘[t]he generic definition of an offense “roughly corresponds to the definitions of the offense in a majority of the States’ criminal codes.”’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 2014), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990)). It further cautions that “the Model Penal Code, while a helpful tool in the categorical analysis, does not dictate the federal generic definition of a crime.” Id., 807 F.3d at 1086. Garcia-Jimenez then bases its ultimate holding on “[t]he weight of authority – approximately two-thirds of the states, the common law, federal law, and at least one treatise, as compared to the Model Penal Code and one-third of the states.” Id. at 1087.
We acknowledge that the facts underlying the vast majority of convictions under CPC § 211 [the California robbery statute] likely meet the [ACCA definition of “violent felony”]. However, Taylor’s categorical approach is an “elements-based inquiry,” not an “evidence-based one.” Descamps [v. United States], 133 S. Ct. [2276,] 2287 [(2013)]. Because Anderson [the California Supreme Court case] shows that one can realistically violate CPC § 211 in a manner that is not covered by the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony,” a violation of CPC § 211 is not categorically a “violent felony” under the ACCA.
Dixon, 805 F.3d at 1197-98.
The disjunctively worded phrases in the statute and jury instructions are alternative means, not alternative elements. To return a guilty verdict on a CPC § 211 charge, a jury must find that the elements are satisfied, but jurors need not agree on the disjunctively worded alternatives. For example, jurors must agree that element (3) [the “person or immediate presence” element] is met – but the jury can return a guilty verdict even if some jurors believe the defendant took property from the victim’s person and other jurors believe the defendant took the property from the victim’s immediate presence. Similarly, for element (5) [the “force or fear” element], a jury can return a guilty verdict even if some jurors believe the defendant used force and other jurors believe the defendant used fear.
Dixon, 805 F.3d at 1198.
Keep in mind a caveat about Dixon – and the other Rendon progeny – however. The approach of Rendon and its progeny is now before the Supreme Court in Mathis v. United States, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2016 WL 207258 (Jan. 19, 2016). The lower court in Mathis disagreed with Rendon and enhanced a split in the circuits that the Supreme Court has now decided to resolve – hopefully in our favor.
In any event, subject to whatever the Supreme Court decides in Mathis, remember the principles articulated and illustrated in Garcia-Jimenez and Dixon when you consider a prior conviction under the categorical approach. It’s surprising what you can come up with.
← A Couple of Great New Categorical Approach Cases.

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