Source: https://www.complexip.com/1944-2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:32:21+00:00

Document:
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in a case involving patent infringement, trademark infringement, and violations of an unfair trade practices act, ruled that an award of attorneys fees under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285, and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), should be analyzed in an identical manner in accordance with the Supreme Court case of Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014)(“an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position … or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated …, considering the totality of the circumstances”). Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., Case No. 2016-1115 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2017) (Available Here).
Romag Fasteners (“Romag”) owns the ’126 patent for magnetic snap fasteners, which it sells under its registered trademark, ROMAG. Romag sued Fossil and various retailers for, inter alia, patent infringement, trademark infringement, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”). ROMAG magnetic snaps are used on handbags manufactured and distributed by Fossil. In 2010, a batch of Fossil handbags appeared to contain counterfeit ROMAG magnetic snaps, which led Romag to sue Fossil. The district court granted fees under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285, and the CUTPA but not under the federal trademark act, the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Romag appealed the award.
Under the Patent Act and the Lanham Act, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). In Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court held that under 35 U.S.C. § 285, “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position … or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated …, considering the totality of the circumstances.” 134 S. Ct. at 1756.
Applying the Octane standard, the district court found that Romag was entitled to attorney’s fees under § 285 of the Patent Act because Fossil did not “withdraw [anticipation and obviousness] defenses with prejudice until after trial,” and because Fossil’s “patent invalidity defense of indefiniteness bordered on frivolous.” The district court also found that Fossil’s non-infringement position (as opposed to its invalidity position) was not “so frivolous or groundless as to justify an award of fees.” Finally, the district court declined to consider Romag’s conduct as part of the totality of circumstances because it had already penalized Romag for the timing of Romag’s infringement suit and Romag’s misconduct during an earlier TRO injunction proceeding.
The Federal Circuit noted that since Octane was decided, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all held that the Octane “Court was sending a clear message that it was defining ‘exceptional’ not just for the fee provision in the Patent Act, but for the fee provision in the Lanham Act as well.” The Federal Circuit held that in determining a fee award, the trial courts should apply the same standard to both patent and trademark litigation.
In response to Romag’s patent infringement allegation, Fossil also presented the invalidity defense of indefiniteness, arguing that the ’126 patent’s claim term “rotatable” was indefinite because the patent does not specify the “degree of force necessary to rotate.” Fossil presented expert witness testimony on this point at the Markman claim construction hearing, which was not adopted by the district court. The Federal Circuit stated that a failed patent does not so frivolous as to support a fee award.
non-infringement defense, where it asserted that the batch of magnetic snaps at issue were in fact genuine ROMAG snaps. This defense, coupled with some supporting evidence, was also not frivolous.
As for the bad litigation behavior of the parties, the Federal Circuit cited Power Mosfet Technologies, LLC v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2004), which affirmed a district court’s denial of § 285 fees “because all of the parties had conducted themselves without the decorum required when practicing before a federal court . . . and credited each of the parties with some share of the bad behavior.” Id. at 1415.

References: § 285
 § 1117
 v. 
 v. 
 § 285
 § 1117
 § 285
 § 1117
 § 285
 § 285
 v. 
 § 285