Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=A147507&s=CA&d=121636
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:46:23+00:00

Document:
dismissed his state claims under California claim preclusion principles.
completing the CDCR’s background investigation questionnaire.
the CDCR informed Guerrero he was no longer eligible to become a correctional officer.
appealed to the SPB, to no avail.
process clauses of article I, section 7 of the California Constitution.
ineligible to be a correctional officer.
monetary relief, he was left with only the equitable remedy of backpay.
applicants by using question 75 to target formerly undocumented immigrants like himself.
parallel state and federal proceedings were virtual mirror images.
set far enough out on the calendar to trail the entry of judgment in the Federal Action.
p. 35 (Guerrero Fees Order), vacated and remanded, Guerrero II, supra, 701 Fed.Appx.
We review a dismissal on grounds of res judicata de novo as an issue of law.
SPB and the individual defendants, leaving the CDCR as the sole respondent.
the prior suit. (Id. § 19.) This case involves the merger aspect of claim preclusion.
substantial time and expense associated with repetitive litigation. (Taylor, supra, 553 U.S.
analysis.” Do we apply California law or federal law?
Co. (1941) 313 U.S. 487, 496.
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision (1957) 105 U. Pa.
which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.”).
2 Cal.3d 752, 761; see also Younger v. Jensen (1980) 26 Cal.3d 397, 411; Levy v.
1163; Butcher v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1452; Merry v.
in a case that did not involve the preclusive effect of a federal judgment.
7 Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 585, footnote 3.
or whether it might apply.
action despite the consent decree. (Id. at p. 1558.) The same analysis applies here.
common law endeavors to develop a uniform rule of preclusion”]; see also Wong v.
Brown v. Osier (Maine 1993) 628 A.2d 125, 127. Cf. Paramount Pictures Corporation v.
federal common law governs its preclusive effect.
reassert his claim in a competent court.’ ”).
apply here under either federal or California law.
on 11th Amendment grounds, just as here.” This, too, was error.
jurisdiction of the courts.’ Rest.2d Judgments, § 26(1)(c)”); Burgos v. Hopkins (2d Cir.
arises from the same factual circumstances as the initial action”); see also United States v.
Tohono O’odham Nation (2011) 563 U.S. 307, 328–329 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).
§ 26(1)(c)); see also Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 327, 344.
Restatement), section 62 and the Fifth Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement (Tent.
declined to exercise its discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.
face claims for damages in a separate action in state court.
Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277, 286 (same).
with “limitations on . . . [its] subject matter jurisdiction . . . or restrictions on [its] authority.” Section 26(1)(c). Upon consideration of sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Second Restatement, when read together—and notably the cross-referencing within these interrelated sections in the comment language accompanying them—it is apparent that the drafters took care to ensure that the general claim-splitting rule, in section 24, as illustrated in application, in section 25, dovetails with the jurisdictional competency exception, in section 26(1)(c), and that, as shown by comment e, section 25, this newly recognized exception limits the preclusive effect of federal judgments in state court.
Although the subtle interrelationship of these provisions is just as evident in the Fifth Tentative Draft as it is in the Second Restatement as published, Mattson fails to take it into account.

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