Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/286/286mass602.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 19:08:07+00:00

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CHARLES P. POTIER & another vs. A. W. PERRY, INC.
(5) The damages awarded for interruption of business were for injury to the orderly conduct of business and not for profits lost and properly were awarded.
At the hearing of the suit above described, the judge had before him in evidence the kind of business and the character of the stock in trade, and the plaintiff testified and described his conduct of the business. Held, that, although the evidence as to the amount of damages resulting from interruption of the lessee's business was scanty, the finding was warranted.
(3) The decree must be reversed, and a new decree ordered recognizing the defendant's right to insist upon his counterclaim.
The word "transaction" in Rule 32 of the Superior Court (1932) should not be construed narrowly or technically, but should be construed in a sense to effectuate the settlement in one proceeding of controversies so closely connected as appropriately to be combined in one trial in order to prevent duplication of testimony, to avoid unnecessary expense to the parties and to the public, and to expedite the adjudication of suits. Per RUGG, C.J.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on December 13, 1932, and afterwards amended.
The suit was heard by Weed, J., the evidence being reported. Material evidence and facts found by him and a final decree entered by his order are described in the opinion. The defendant appealed.
R. Donovan, (V. H. Willard with him,) for the defendant.
R. H. Cooper, (J. Charles with him,) for the plaintiffs.
urged that the suit be retained for assessment of their damages caused by the detention of their merchandise by the defendant. After summarizing briefly the conflicting evidence, the judge found upon all the evidence "that the defendant wrongfully withheld said property from the plaintiffs from the time when it took possession of the demised premises until the plaintiffs were permitted to take away said property in January, 1933, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to damages therefor to the amount of interest for said period on the value thereof, to wit, the sum of $8.12, and in addition thereto the sum of $90 for damages for the interruption of their business." The judge also found, if material, the amounts owed by the plaintiffs to the defendant for rent and electricity under the lease at the time it was terminated, but ruled as matter of law that this alleged counterclaim did not arise out of the same transaction as did the subject matter of the suit, and that the defendant could not enforce it in this suit.
A final decree was entered adjudging that the defendant wrongfully withheld from the plaintiffs their goods so that they could not be replevied, and that the defendant owes the plaintiffs for damages suffered by them by reason of such withholding the sum of $98.12, and ordering payment thereof with interest together with costs in a specified sum. The appeal of the defendant brings the case here with full report of the evidence.
in its own custody for a considerable time. It is plain that by this conduct the plaintiffs were prevented from carrying on their business and the custody of their property was taken away from them. The defendant is liable in damages for the consequences of such illegal conduct. Interruption of business and deprivation of possession of their property are elements of damage for which the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. C. W. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated Railway, 199 Mass. 220, 235-238.
The circumstance that after the lapse of several weeks their goods were returned to the plaintiffs does not affect their right to damages, although entitled to weight in mitigation of damages. The plaintiffs did not seek the difference in market value at the time the goods were converted by the defendant and when they were returned. That is a rule frequently applied. Jackson v. Innes, 231 Mass. 558, 560. They did not try this case on that theory. That is not the only rule of damages. See C. W. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated Railway, 199 Mass. 220, at pages 235-238, where the subject is discussed at large. Interest on the value of the property detained was a proper element for consideration in the conditions here disclosed. It is allowed not as interest but as a part of the plaintiffs' damages. Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co. 141 Mass. 126. Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 402. Cochran v. Boston, 211 Mass. 171, 172. H. D. Foss & Co. Inc. v. Whidden, 254 Mass. 146, 152. Royal Paper Box Co. v. Munro & Church Co. 284 Mass. 446, 451.
Interruption of business caused by the unlawful detention of the stock of the plaintiffs used in conducting retail or wholesale trade is a factor rightly to be considered in assessing damages in a case like the present. This is an attempt to recover for injury to the orderly conduct of business and not for profits lost. Antokol v. Barber, 248 Mass. 393, 396. Whitcomb v. Reed-Prentice Co. 262 Mass. 348, 360.
altogether stable in its nature. But the interruption of business caused by the wrongful act of the defendant was proved by definite and clear evidence. The kind of business, the character of the stock in trade, the plaintiffs in person and their description of their conduct of the business were all before the trial judge. This evidence was somewhat scanty, but was enough in all the circumstances to afford basis for estimating such damages as here were awarded. The use of knowledge of practical affairs and judicial sense would enable a decision to be made in accord with justice. On this point the case falls within the authority of numerous decisions. Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co. 200 Mass. 1, 8. Cross v. Sharaffa, 281 Mass. 329, 331-332. Parker v. Levin, 285 Mass. 125, 129. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. 282 U. S. 555, 563-566.
ture," they arose "out of such transaction," that is, "the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit." The subject matter of the present suit was equitable replevin of the plaintiffs' stock of merchandise, of the possession of which they were unlawfully deprived by the defendant. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, s. 3 (1). After the merchandise had been returned to the plaintiffs by the defendant, the suit was rightly retained for the assessment of damages. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Holt, 185 Mass. 97, 101. Byrne v. Gendreau, 279 Mass. 77, 80. But that did not change the nature of the proceeding. It remained a suit in equity. It can be ended only by a final decree. The word "transaction" is doubtless one of somewhat broad import. A great variety of definitions may be found collected in 63 C. J. pages 769 et seq. It is not necessary to traverse that field. In the rule of court in question it should not be construed narrowly or technically, but should be construed in a sense to effectuate the settlement in one proceeding of controversies so closely connected as appropriately to be combined in one trial in order to prevent duplication of testimony, to avoid unnecessary expense to the parties and to the public, and to expedite the adjudication of suits. It has been said that in "a general sense, a transaction is where both causes of action proceed from the same wrong." Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Lehigh Valley Railroad, 94 N. J. L. 236, 239. In Konick v. Champneys, 108 Wash. 35, it was held that an action by a grocer for assault while attempting to deliver goods to his customer in an apartment house owned by the defendant, committed upon him by the defendant, could not be joined with an action for an injunction against the same defendant to prevent him from wrongfully refusing to allow the grocer to enter the same apartment house to make delivery of goods sold by him to tenants because, although constituting different causes of action, they did not "arise out of the same transaction" and therefore could not be joined under the governing statute. On the same ground actions for breach of warranty in the sale of a gun and for negligence in manufacturing the same gun were held improperly joined in Reed v.
Livermore, 101 App. Div. (N. Y.) 254. The implications of our own decisions are to the same effect. Mackintosh v. Chambers, 285 Mass. 594, 597, and cases cited. Canning v. Shippee, 246 Mass. 338. See Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, 321. Rule 32 of the Superior Court (1932) recognizes and preserves the principle of equity practice that a cross bill can properly bring into a case only controversies pertinent to the transactions stated in the bill. Martin v. Murphy, 216 Mass. 466.
It is clear that the counterclaim of the defendant for rent and the sale of electric light does not arise out of equitable replevin or out of damages flowing from the unlawful detention of a stock of merchandise and the consequent interruption of business in which it was used. They are transactions utterly different in character. Even though neither transaction might have come into existence if the lease had never been made, these diverse causes of action cannot properly be held to arise out of the transaction which is the subject of the suit of the plaintiffs.
We are of opinion, however, that this point is not open to the plaintiffs. It is provided by Rule 26 of the Superior Court (1932) that, while in general the plaintiff may not file any reply to an answer, if "a counterclaim is included in the answer in equity, a party against whom such . . . counterclaim is asserted shall reply within ten days after receipt of the copy of such . . . counterclaim sent to him under Rule 21." It does not appear in the record before us that any such copy was sent to the plaintiffs and no reply appears to have been filed by them. The report of the evidence shows that evidence was introduced at the trial without objection or exception by the plaintiffs, showing the amount due from them to the defendant for rent and electric light. This constituted a waiver by the plaintiffs of objection to the counterclaim of the defendant based on the ground of want of equity. Baker v. Langley, 247 Mass. 127, 132. Martin v. Murphy, 216 Mass. 466, 468. Pothier v. Doucette, 276 Mass. 326, 332. Adams V. Silverman, 280 Mass. 23, 28. Carleton & Hovey Co. v. Burns, 285 Mass. 479.
The trial judge ruled as matter of law that the counterclaim could not be enforced because not arising out of the same transaction as that set forth in the bill. He did not exercise his discretion under the fifth paragraph of Rule 32 of the Superior Court (1932) by striking out the counterclaim because it could not be conveniently determined. In truth he determined the counterclaim.
The result is that the decree must be reversed. A new decree may be entered establishing the amounts due the plaintiffs from the defendant as already found, with correction as to interest, and containing a new paragraph establishing the amount due from the plaintiffs to the defendant for rent and electric light and ordering execution to issue in favor of the defendant for the balance due, without costs to either party. The details may be settled in the Superior Court.

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