Source: https://abkveteranslaw.com/blog?offset=1517435400482
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:47:05+00:00

Document:
He appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. The Court framed the issues as (1) whether the rating criteria adequately contemplated the function effects of his hearing loss such that extraschedular referral was not required and (2) whether the availability of a higher schedularrating is relevant to the extraschedular analysis.
If the Board determines that the symptoms or their severity are not contemplated by the rating schedule, the second step requires the Board to determine whether the exceptional disability picture exhibits “other related factors,” such as “marked interference with employment or frequent periods of hospitalization.” In this case, the Board determined that extraschedular referral was not warranted because it found the rating criteria reasonably describe Mr. King’s disability and provide for “higher ratings for more severe symptoms.” It was this second rationale that caught the Court’s attention.
HELD: When the only hearing loss problem alleged by a claimant is “difficulty understanding conversations,” referral for extraschedular consideration is not warranted since that complaint is type of symptom and functional effect that is contemplated and compensated by VA’s rating schedule.
SUMMARY: Jose Rossy served in the U.S. Army from 1949 to 1952. More than 50 years later, he applied for and was granted service connection for bilateral hearing loss, rated 0%. His appeal for a compensable rating was stayed at the Court, pending the outcome of Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet.App. 366 (2017).
Because Mr. Rossy’s complaints were “within the type of symptoms and functional effects contemplated and compensated by VA’s schedular rating criteria,” the Court affirmed the Board’s denial of referral for extraschedular consideration.
The Court also concluded that extraschedular referral was not warranted based on the combined effects of Mr. Rossy’s various service-connected conditions because this issue was not reasonably raised by the record or the appellant.
HELD: Petition to compel Secretary to act is dismissed as moot when Secretary finally acts on veteran's allegations of fiduciary's misuse of his benefits.
SUMMARY: More than a decade prior to this petition, veteran Joe Browder alleged that his VA-appointed fiduciary had embezzled a portion of his benefits. VA refused to investigate and Mr. Browder attempted to appeal to the Board. When VA took no action on his appeal, Mr. Browder petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to act.
The Court formed a panel to consider “whether a decision by the Secretary not to formally investigate a misuse allegation may be appealed to the Board and eventually to the Court.” The Court noted that Congress created a statute defining misuse by a fiduciary, 38 U.S.C. § 6106. Yet, the Secretary never issued regulations addressing misuse or explaining how VA is to respond to veterans’ complaints. Instead, VA has created “policy” to respond to misuse allegations.
After the panel was formed, the Secretary informed the Court that the fiduciary hub involved in Mr. Browder’s case “had reversed course,” conducted a formal investigation, and issued a report, along with notice of his right to appeal that decision. Because Mr. Browder had now received a decision that he could appeal to the Board, the Court dismissed the petition as moot.
SUMMARY: In 1980, during his active duty service, veteran John Frost was involved in a train accident, injuring his shoulder and leg. In 1982, following his separation from service, he got into a fight with a store proprietor and was shot in his neck. In 1985, he was awarded non-service-connected pension for left extremity paralysis due to the 1982 gunshot wound (GSW).
In 2001, he filed a claim for service connection for PTSD related to the 1980 train accident. He reported that after the train accident, he received two Article 15 punishments for fighting, occasionally became violent, and that his wife filed for divorce shortly after his separation from service. A VA examiner diagnosed PTSD and noted recurring memories of the 1980 train accident. The Regional Office granted service connection for PTSD.
A few years later, he filed a claim for the residuals of the 1982 GSW as secondary to his now service-connected PTSD. The RO denied the claim and he appealed, asserting that his PTSD caused him to become involved in the fight that resulted in the GSW. The Board denied the claim, finding that he was first shown to have PTSD in 2002, twenty years after the 1982 incident.
On appeal to the CAVC, the Court examined the regulation governing service connection on a secondary basis, 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, and held: “Nothing in the text of the regulation specifies or indicates that the primary condition must be service connected, or even diagnosed, at the time the secondary condition is incurred.” Because there is no reference in § 3.310 to a temporal requirement, the Court rejected VA’s argument that Mr. Frost’s claim was barred as a matter of law.
The Court recognized the “basic logic” that there must be a primary service-connected condition in order to establish secondary service connection, but clarified that “at the time that any decisionestablishing entitlement to secondary service connection is rendered, there must be a primary service-connected condition.” The Court concluded that “for a veteran to receive secondary service connection on a causation basis under § 3.310(a), the primary disability need not be service connected, or even diagnosed, at the time the secondary condition is incurred.” The Court remanded the claim to the Board to determine whether a VA examination is necessary to determine whether the GSW residuals are proximately due to or the result of his service-connected PTSD.
SUMMARY: Thomas Lyles sought an increased rating for residuals of his service-connected left knee disability, which was rated 30% under DC 5257 for instability. After ten years of appeals, he was finally granted an additional 30% rating under DC 5261, based on limited extension. He appealed to the Court, which remanded for the Board to address whether he was entitled to an additional separate rating under DC 5258 (dislocated semilunar cartilage) or 5259 (removed and symptomatic semilunar cartilage).
The Board obtained a new VA joints examination in which the examiner noted objective evidence of pain, tenderness, and crepitus, but concluded that he could not offer an opinion as to whether pain, weakness, fatigability, etc., resulted in additional functional loss because there was “no objective evidence” to support such loss. The Board denied an additional rating, finding that his additional symptoms were “already ‘encompassed’ by his current evaluations under DCs 5257 and 5261.” The Board determined that Mr. Lyles was not entitled to a higher rating under DeLucabecause there was “no clinical evidence” of further impairment and the VA examiners “‘could not say without resort to mere speculation what such impairment would be.’” The Board concluded that an additional rating would violate the rule against pyramiding, and denied the claim.
On appeal to the Court, Mr. Lyles argued that the plain language DCs 5257 and 5261 shows that they only cover instability and limited extension, and do not include not all the manifestations of his left knee disability – popping, locking, grinding, pain, and swelling. He acknowledged that VA mayconsider these symptoms under DC 5261, pursuant to DeLuca, but that those manifestations had not been compensated in his case. The Secretary argued that his left knee symptoms had already been considered under DC 5261 and could not be rated again under DC 5258 or 5259.
The issue before the Court was whether “evaluation of a knee disability under DC 5257 or 5261 preclude, as a matter of law, separate evaluation of a meniscal disability of the same knee under DC 5258 or 5259.” The Court held that it does not.
DC 5257 covers “recurrent subluxation or lateral instability” and DC 5261 covers limitation of leg extension. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a. DC 5258 provides a 20% rating for “cartilage, semilunar, dislocated, with frequent episodes of ‘locking,’ pain, and effusion into the joint.” DC 5259 provides a 10% rating for “cartilage, semilunar, removal of, symptomatic.” Id.
The Court found that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a “does not expressly prohibit separate evaluation under DC 5257 or 5261 and a meniscal DC,” Lyles, 29 Vet.App, at 114(citing Esteban v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 259, 261 (1994) (examining separate ratings under scar DCs) and Yonek v. Shinseki, 722 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (regarding separate ratings under musculoskeletal DCs)). The Court noted that VA’s rating schedule “is replete with rules that prohibit separate evaluations of other disabilities,” such as 38 C.F.R. § 4.96 (prohibiting separate ratings of specific respiratory conditions), § 4.113 (regarding rating digestive conditions), § 4.115 (prohibiting separate ratings for heart conditions and nephritis). Id. The Secretary’s demonstrated ability to “craft regulations that expressly forbid” separate ratings strongly suggests that the absence of such language in § 4.71a “must be read as a deliberate decision to permit separate evaluation.” Id. at 115.
The Court briefly explored the regulatory history of § 4.71a, and held that the language of the regulation, its history, and the surrounding regulations “unambiguously reflect that evaluation of a knee disability under DC 5257 or 5261 does not preclude, as a matter of law, separate evaluation of a meniscal disability of that same knee under DC 5258 or 5259,” and vice versa.
As to whether Mr. Lyles’ symptoms have already been compensated, the Court found that DC 5257 “compensates veterans only for knee impairment resulting in recurrent subluxation and lateral instability,” and thus reversed the Board’s determination that this DC also compensated him for pain and swelling.
Because DC 5261 is based on limitation of motion, the Court discussed the relevant regulations pertaining to rating musculoskeletal conditions based on limitation of motion – 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45, and 4.59. These regulations provide for higher ratings where there is evidence of (1) functional loss due to pain and other factors, (2) reduction of normal movement, or (3) an “actually painful, unstable, or malaligned” joint. *13 (citing Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 32, 36-37 (2011); DeLuca, 8 Vet.App. 205-07; Southall-Norman v. McDonald, 28 Vet.App. 346, 352 (2016); and Petitti v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 415, 425 (2015)). Lyles, 29 Vet.App. at 117-18.
The Court stated that the purpose of the rating schedule “is to ensure that a claimant is properly compensated, but not overcompensated, for the actual level of impairment.” Id. at 118. Mr. Lyles conceded, and the Court agreed, that each of his additional symptoms couldbe compensated under DC 5261 – by assigning a higher rating pursuant to DeLucaand §§ 4.40, 4.45, and 4.59. The Court found, however, that the Board’s discussion of §§ 4.40 and 4.45 demonstrates that these symptoms have not been compensated in Mr. Lyles’ case. The Court based this determination on the Board’s “failure to address whether swelling, popping, locking, or grinding caused additional functional limitation” that would result in a higher rating under DC 5261 and DeLuca, and the Board’s improper reliance on medical opinions in which the examiners refused to offer the requested opinions regarding additional functional limitation during flare-ups. Lyles, 29 Vet.App. at 419-20 (citing Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 26, 36 (2017)).
The Court remanded for the Board to determine whether a separate evaluation is warranted under DC 5258 or 5259.
Advocacy Note: Lylesdemonstrates how VA’s own regulations – 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45, 4.59 – require adjudicators to assess additional functional loss based on limited motion or painful motion. The Court has repeatedly admonished VA for not complying with its own regulations when rating musculoskeletal conditions, and the cases cited in Lyles reflect this history.
SUMMARY: Robert Gray is a Blue Water Navy veteran who challenged VA’s exclusion of Da Nang Harbor from its definition of “inland waterways” for purposes of presumptive service connection for conditions related to herbicide (Agent Orange) exposure. The Veterans Court concluded that VA’s definition was “both inconsistent with the regulatory purpose and irrational,” and remanded for VA to “reevaluate its definition of ‘inland waterway’ to be consistent with [38 C.F.R.] § 3.307(a)(6)(iii),” the regulation governing the presumption of herbicide exposure.
Mr. Gray challenged the amendment to VA’s policy under 38 U.S.C. § 502, which governs judicial review of rules and regulations. This statute limits the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to agency actions that are subject to two provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act – 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) and § 553. The question in this appeal is whether the revision to the M21-1 falls under § 552(a)(1). The Federal Circuit held that it did not.
This provision covers agency actions that are published in the Federal Register and are “substantive rules of general applicability as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency.” In other words – notice-and-comment rulemaking. The Federal Circuit stated that there are three factors to consider in assessing “whether an agency action constitutes substantive rulemaking … (1) the [a]gency’s own characteristics of the action; (2) whether the action was published in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations; and (3) whether the action has binding effects on private parties or on the agency.” (quoting Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
The Court found that Mr. Gray – and his fellow Blue Water Navy Veterans – still had other options to pursue. First, if they are “adversely affected by a M21-1” provision, they can challenge that provision on direct appeal. Second, they can petition VA for rulemaking. (Mr. Gray pointed out that both options were currently pending.) The Court recognized that it would likely take years for “individual adjudications or petitions for rulemaking” to run their course. Unfortunately, the sad reality of this situation does not change the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.
In a partial dissent, Judge Dyk argued that DAV was wrongly decided and that it unnecessarily narrows the Court’s jurisdiction. In Judge Dyk’s view, the “relevant question for jurisdictional purposes … is whether the Manual revisions here are properly characterized as ‘statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability.” If so, the Federal Circuit would have jurisdiction to review the challenge. The problem with DAV (and, now, the majority opinion in this case), is that it essentially enables VA to evade judicial review by simply not publishing the revision in the Federal Register.
ABK will present on "Environmental Challenges: Burn Pits."
HELD: Notice of Appeal that is timely placed in a personal mailbox, but not picked up by the mail carrier prior to the expiration of the 120-day deadline, is not an “extraordinary circumstance” beyond one’s control that warrants equitable tolling.
SUMMARY: Mr. James sought to appeal a January 28, 2016 Board decision. On the last day to file his Notice of Appeal, he placed the NOA in his personal mailbox, raised the flag to alert his mail carrier to pick up the mail, and left town for the weekend. When he returned, the flag had been lowered, but the NOA had not been picked up. He mailed the NOA four days after the 120-day deadline.
The Court rejected his NOA as untimely and found that the circumstances of his case did not warrant equitable tolling. Mr. James argued that the “errantly lowered flag on his residential mailbox constitutes an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control” and that the diligence required here should be the same type of diligence required in cases where the veteran files his NOA on time, but in the wrong place.
HELD: To warrant equitable tolling of the 30-day deadline to file an EAJA application, a claimant must demonstrate that physical or mental illness, individually or in combination, rendered “one incapable of handling one’s own affairs or rational thought and decisionmaking,” and thus “directly or indirectly” prevented the timely filing of the EAJA application.
Regarding the attorney’s privacy concerns, the Court stated that she could ask the Court to lock the record. The Court added that it “had not required anything more of counsel than it requires of a veteran seeking equitable tolling of a deadline” – and dismissed the application as untimely.
In this case, Judge Greenberg had granted equitable tolling in a single-judge order – but two other judges disagreed and called the decision to panel. At that time, there were six active judges on the Court. Judge Greenberg argued that “sending a matter for precedential panel disposition constituted ‘business of the Court’ that should have required a 4 vote majority” – and that “[s]ubjecting an individual Judge’s equitable tolling discretion to panel review is inconsistent with the IOP itself” and with the basic tenets of equity jurisprudence. He concluded that “[a] process that allows for a single Judge’s veteran-friendly decision to be overturned merely because two other Judges disagreed goes against the intent of Congress in creating our Court, which was to ‘place a thumb on the scale in the veteran’s favor in the course of administrative and judicial review of VA decisions.’” (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440 (2011)).
HELD: A child of a deceased veteran is eligible for substitution only if he/she meets VA’s definition of “child” at the time of the veteran’s death – not just during the pendency of the veteran’s claim.
SUMMARY: The veteran was granted service connection for PTSD in 2007, effective 2003. He appealed for an earlier the effective date all the way up to the Federal Circuit. In February 2016, the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s decision and remanded the matter for the Court to consider a 1992 effective date. In May 2016, the CAVC remanded the issue to the Board.
In August 2016, the veteran’s attorney notified the Court that the veteran had died in April 2016 and requested substitution of his three adult children. The attorney acknowledged that the “children” were now adults – but argued that the Court should allow them to be substituted because this appeal involves the effective date of PTSD for the period from 1992 to 2003, and the veteran’s children were minors for all or part of this time period.
The Court disagreed – and held that in order to be substituted “an individual must satisfy the requirements of the statutory framework for these benefits when the veteran dies as opposed to at some point during the pendency of the veteran’s claim.” VA defines an eligible “child” as one who is unmarried and under 18 or “became permanently incapable of self-support” prior to age 18 or who is under age 23 and a full-time student. 38 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A). The Court held: “A child of a deceased veteran is therefore eligible for substitution only if he or she satisfies the definition of 38 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) ‘upon the death’ of the veteran.” Because none of the adult children met VA’s definition of eligible “child” at the time of the veteran’s death, the Court denied the motion to substitute.
HELD: When assigning a single disability rating for co-existing respiratory conditions, 38 C.F.R. § 4.96(a) allows VA to (1) determine which disability is predominant and then (2) evaluate the overall severity of the multiple conditions under the diagnostic criteria for the predominant disability. The fact that the non-predominant disability may cause symptoms that are not listed in the diagnostic criteria for the predominant disability does not automatically warrant a higher rating.
SUMMARY: Mr. Urban is service connected for obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) and asthma, evaluated as 60% disabling under the Diagnostic Code (DC) for asthma since that DC results in a higher rating than the DC for OSA. He appealed for a higher rating, arguing that although he was entitled to a 60% rating under the DC for asthma, he should be rated 100% because his OSA required the use of a CPAP machine and caused him to be tired during the day – two factors that are not part of the 60% rating.
The Board denied the higher rating based on 38 C.F.R. § 4.96(a), which precludes separate evaluations for certain listed respiratory conditions, including asthma and OSA.
On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Urban argued that the specific criteria for the higher evaluation listed in the predominant disability’s DC need not be met – and that symptoms in the non-predominant disability can warrant a higher rating. The Secretary argued that a higher rating is warranted only when the criteria listed in the DC for the predominant disability are met. Mr. Urban also argued that the Board erred when it denied referral for extraschedular consideration under 38 C.F.R. § 3.321 “because the availability of a higher scheduler evaluation does not prevent extraschedular referral.” The Secretary conceded that the Board may have erred in suggesting that referral was not warranted because of the availability of a higher rating, but argued that the error was harmless because the Board’s overall extraschedular assessment was adequate.
The Court found that the language in § 4.96(a) was ambiguous and thus deferred to the Secretary’s “reasonable” interpretation of the phrase “with elevation to the next higher evaluation” to refer to the “next higher evaluation level of the predominant disability DC.” To attain the higher rating, “the criteria listed in that evaluation level are key to assessing the severity of the overall disability from both respiratory conditions.” The Court found that this interpretation allows VA “to assess the overall symptoms of the coexisting respiratory conditions against the criteria listed in the predominant disability’s DC.” The Court found the interpretation to be consistent with the plain language of the regulation, as well as with its purpose within VA’s regulatory scheme (“to avoid duplicate compensation payments for the same symptoms,” i.e., “pyramiding”).
HELD: VA adjudicators may rely on a medical examiner’s opinion as to whether a condition is a medically unexplained multi-symptom illness (MUCMI). However, these decisions are not precedential and do not prevent other veterans from establishing entitlement to service connection for the same condition as a MUCMI under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317.
SUMMARY: Prezell Goodman served in the U.S. Army from 1972 to 1992, including service in Southwest Asia during the Persian Gulf War. His service medical records were negative for rheumatoid arthritis and he did not report joint pain at separation. In 2007, he was treated for hand stiffness and knee pain, which he said began in service. Shortly after this treatment, he filed a claim for service connection for rheumatoid arthritis. The RO and the Board denied the claim.
He appealed to the Veterans Court, and the parties entered into a Joint Motion to Remand the appeal for the Board to consider whether Mr. Goodman was entitled to presumptive service connection for rheumatoid arthritis as a MUCMI under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317. The parties agreed that the question of whether Mr. Goodman’s rheumatoid arthritis was a MUCMI is a medical determination.
The Board obtained a medical opinion by a VA hospital’s Director of Rheumatology, who concluded that it was less likely that Mr. Goodman’s rheumatoid arthritis was a MUCMI under § 3.317 because “it has at least partially explained and widely accepted concepts in regards to etiology and pathogenesis that are well documented and established in the literature.” The examiner added that it was less likely that his rheumatoid arthritis was related to any in-service exposure event because he had no symptoms in service and it was diagnosed 15 years after his discharge. The Board relied on this opinion to deny the claim.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. The Court first noted that 38 U.S.C. § 1117 provides Persian Gulf War veterans with presumptive service connection for a “qualifying chronic disability” that “cannot be attributed to any known clinical diagnosis.” The statute defines “qualifying chronic disability” as one that results from “[a]n undiagnosed illness” or “[a MUCMI] . . . that is defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms.” 38 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2). The implementing regulation, § 3.317, contains a similar definition of “qualifying chronic disability”: “[T]he term [MUCMI] means a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology, that Is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs . . . . Chronic multisymptom illnesses of partially understood etiology and pathophysiology, such as diabetes and multiple sclerosis, will not be considered medically unexplained.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii).
Under 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1), VA may assist a veteran in acquiring housing or equipment that is made necessary by the veteran’s disability. A veteran is eligible for this benefit if he/she is “entitled to compensation . . . for a permanent and total service-connected disability” that results in the “loss, or loss of use, of both lower extremities such as to preclude locomotion without the aid of braces, crutches, canes, or a wheelchair.” 38 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2)(B)(i).
The RO denied Mr. Jensen’s claim and he appealed to the Board. He stated that he needed a cane or crutches to ambulate and that “without the assistance of prosthetic devices and daily aqua-therapy,” he would “no longer have the use of both lower extremities.” After several VA examinations and a Board remand, the RO granted service connection for several related conditions, but continued to deny the SAH grant. The Board affirmed the denial.
On appeal, the Court considered whether Mr. Jensen’s disabilities resulted in the “loss of use” of both lower extremities that would establish entitlement to SAH. Neither the statute nor the relevant regulation – 38 C.F.R. § 3.809(b)(1) – define “loss of use,” but the Secretary urged the Court to adopt the definition of this phrase from the regulation dealing with special monthly compensation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(a)(2)(i).
Having rejected the Secretary’s proposed interpretation, the Court turned to the dictionary to define “loss of use” and “such as.” The Court held that “a loss of use exists if a veteran has suffered a deprivation in his ability to use his lower extremity so severe that he is precluded from perambulating without one of the required assistive devices.” The Court further held that “locomotion is precluded even if a veteran is capable on occasion of moving about unaided.” Applying this definition to the facts of this case, the Court concluded that Mr. Jensen met the requirements for SAH and reversed the Board’s denial.
Jensen v. Shulkin, specially adapted housing, SAH, 38 U.S.C. § 2101, "loss of use"
HELD: When newly received service records do not “remedy the defects” of a prior claim, those records are not “‘relevant’ for purposes of § 3.156(c)” and thus will not warrant an earlier effective date.
SUMMARY: Mr. Kisor was a Vietnam combat veteran. In 1982, he filed a claim for service connection for PTSD. His Vet Center therapist submitted a letter with a diagnosis of PTSD. However, a 1983 VA (C&P) psychiatrist diagnosed a personality disorder. The RO denied the claim due to the lack of a PTSD diagnosis. Mr. Kisor did not appeal this decision and it became final.
In 2006, he filed a request to reopen his previously denied claim. He subsequently submitted a psychiatric evaluation showing a diagnosis of PTSD. He also submitted service records showing his combat history. The RO obtained an opinion from a VA examiner who confirmed the diagnosis of PTSD. The RO then made a Formal Finding of Information Required to Document the Claimed Stressor and verified his combat service. The RO granted service connection for PTSD, rated 50%, effective June 5, 2006, the date it received his request to reopen. The grant was based on the PTSD diagnosis and the Formal Finding of Information.
Mr. Kisor appealed for a higher rating and an earlier effective date. The RO granted a higher rating, but denied an earlier effective date.
Mr. Kisor appealed to the Board, arguing that there was clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the 1983 RO decision. The Board rejected his arguments, but identified an alternative argument for an earlier effective date – via 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c), which requires the VA to reconsider a veteran’s claim when relevant service department records are newly associated with the veteran’s claims file, whether or not they are ‘new and material’ under § 3.156(a).” (quoting Blubaugh v. McDonald, 773 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). The Board considered whether the new evidence warranted reconsideration of his claim such that he would be entitled to a 1982 effective date. The Board determined that the new records were not “relevant” for purposes of § 3.156(c) because the 1983 decision denied service connection due to a lack of a PTSD diagnosis – and there was no dispute as to his combat status or in-service stressor.
Mr. Kisor appealed to the CAVC, arguing that the Board failed to apply § 3.156(c). The Court rejected this argument, noting that the newly submitted service records did not contain a diagnosis of PTSD – and that the lack of such diagnosis was the basis for the 1983 denial. The Court found no error in the Board’s application of § 3.156(c).
The Federal Circuit first determined that the term “relevant” in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) was ambiguous, and found that the Board’s interpretation was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with VA’s regulatory framework.” The Court found that the newly submitted service records were “superfluous” and determined that since they “did not remedy the defect of his 1982 claim and contained facts that were never in question,” there was no error in the Board’s conclusion that they were not “relevant” for purposes of § 3.156(c)(1).
In response to Mr. Kisor’s argument that the Veterans Court construed § 3.156(c)(1) too narrowly, the Federal Circuit held that their interpretation did not require “that relevant records must relate to the basis of a prior denial,” but rather that “on the facts and record of this case, Mr. Kisor’s later-submitted materials were not relevant to [the] determination of his claim.” The Court thus affirmed the CAVC’s decision.

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