Source: https://criminallawyeralexandriavirginia.wordpress.com/tag/alexandria-virginia-dui-attorneys/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:23:33+00:00

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Defendant appealed his conviction by the Circuit Court of driving under the influence (DUI), second or subsequent offense, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 for which Penalties were imposed. Following defendant’s appeal de novo to that court under Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-136, the circuit court amended to DUI second offense the warrant on which he was convicted of DUI first offense in a district court.
In Virginia, when misdemeanor charges are initiated by warrant and a defendant is convicted of those charges in district court, he may appeal to the circuit court for a trial de novo. A trial on the same charges in the circuit court does not violate double jeopardy principles, subject only to the limitation that conviction in the district court for an offense lesser included in the one charged constitutes an acquittal of the greater offense, permitting trial de novo in the circuit court only for the lesser-included offense.
Defendant was arrested for DUI first offense, and prior to trial, he was again arrested and charged with DUI second offense. Prior to a trial de novo in the circuit court for the first arrest, the district court convicted defendant of the lesser-included offense of DUI first offense for the second charge. On review, the court reversed his conviction for DUI second offense based on double jeopardy.
An exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause may exist where a state is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.
A police officer stopped defendant for speeding. He noticed that defendant had a strong odor of alcohol and red, watery eyes. The officer asked defendant to take field sobriety tests. Defendant failed the tests. The officer arrested her under the charges of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). He read her the implied consent form, but defendant refused to take a breath test. She argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction The court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in finding defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266(ii) prohibits driving while such person is under the influence of alcohol. That degree of intoxication, or being “under the influence of alcohol,” is established when any person has consumed enough alcoholic beverages to so affect his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or behavior, as to be apparent to observation.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of misdemeanor driving under influence (DUI) under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266, and speeding under Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-875. The Circuit Court of Southampton County (Virginia) sentenced defendant to 30 days in jail, suspended, fined him $ 250, suspended his license for 12 months, and ordered him to pay a $ 50 fee for the Trauma Center Fund for the driving while intoxicated conviction. Defendant appealed.
An estimate of the speed at which an automobile was moving at a given time is generally viewed as a matter of common observation rather than expert opinion, and it is accordingly well settled that any person of ordinary experience, ability, and intelligence having the means or opportunity of observation, whether an expert or nonexpert, and without proof of further qualification may express an opinion as to how fast an automobile which came under his observation was going at a particular time. Speed of an automobile is not a matter of exclusive knowledge or skill, but anyone with a knowledge of time and distance is a competent witness to give an estimate; the opportunity and extent of observation goes to the weight of the testimony.
The Circuit Court convicted defendant of driving while having the status of an habitual offender. Defendant appealed. Defendant contended the trial judge rendered impermissible, inconsistent verdicts by convicting him of a felony after acquitting him of violating Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266, which was an element of the felony offense. The State responded that the record established the judge did not reject the evidence of driving under the influence and that he gave an explanation, which established that the verdicts were not truly inconsistent. The court of appeals agreed with the State.
Where the trial judge on the record explains an apparent inconsistency in the verdicts, and where the explanation shows that the trial court’s action was proper and that there was no unfairness, inconsistent verdicts would be sustained.
Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor hit-and-run pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-894, and driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the attorney to cross-examine a witness, who was a passenger in the car, about the witness’s two prior DUI convictions. The court held the trial court erroneously refused to allow cross-examination. Evidence that the witness would receive a harsher sentence because of the other convictions was probative of the witness’s bias in testifying defendant was behind the wheel at the time of the accident.
A witness’ testimony is the “improper” evidence the court evaluates, to determine its effect, if any, on the verdict. In performing such analysis, the court evaluates the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony on material points, the extent of cross-examination of the witness otherwise permitted and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.
A conviction for hit-and-run pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-894 requires proof of knowledge. The driver must be aware that harm has been done; it must be present in his mind that there has been an injury to person or property, and then, with that in his mind, he must deliberately go away without making himself known.
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of driving under the influence (DUI)and aggravated involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-266 and 18.2-36.1(B), respectively under virginia laws. He appealed.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-268.3 provides that if an arrestee for driving under the influence (DUI) refuses repeatedly to submit to blood or breath testing after being advised of the possible consequences of such refusal, no blood or breath samples shall be taken, and if charged with unreasonably refusing to submit to such testing, the arrestee may introduce evidence to try to establish that his refusal was reasonable.
Since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation.
A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the state will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration.
An officer saw defendant’s car being operated erratically and transmitted that sighting to another city’s officer who arrested defendant for DUI when he was outside his car filling it with gas. The warrantless arrest for DUI was unlawful under § 19.2-81 since the offense, a misdemeanor, was not committed in the arresting officer’s presence. The arrest was supported by probable cause and so it was not unconstitutional. Thus, the exclusionary rule for an unconstitutional arrest did not apply, and the court affirmed the DUI conviction. The remedy for § 19.2-81 violation was not suppression of the arrest itself, at least absent prejudice to defendant. However, defendant was improperly charged with Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-268, refusing to submit to a breath or blood test, since he was not legally under arrest for DUI, since his arrest was in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81.
Where a defendant’s arrest for driving under the influence is unlawful, as in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81, because the misdemeanor offense is not committed in the arresting officer’s presence, when he is read his implied consent rights under the implied consent statute, his refusal does not constitute a violation of that statute, which requires that a defendant have been lawfully arrested to be subject to the statute’s mandate.
Where a defendant is arrested for a misdemeanor committed outside an arresting officer’s presence, his warrantless arrest is unlawful, and as a consequence, the result of a Breathalyzer test is inadmissible.

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