Source: https://www.drug2go.com/2012/10/trafficking-prescription-drugs-evidence.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:11:02+00:00

Document:
Criminal Defense Attorney / Lawyer notes a recent court decision involving trafficking and possession of drugs and a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(g), motion to suppress the narcotics seized and charges made under Florida Statutes 893.13. The prescription drug bottle with a unreadable label was the subject of a Search and seizure. The drugs were found in a Vehicle. The drug cops saw the defendant park his car in high-crime area. The suspect got out of his car, cash in hand; handed cash to a guy who walked out of officers' sight. Suspect returned with a large prescription bottle, handed bottle to defendant; who drove away.
It is a principle too well-settled to require citation to authority that such an arrest -- conducted, as this one was, in the absence of warrant -- must be justified by nothing less than probable cause. The classic and oft-cited definition provides that “[p]robable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-6 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). In the taxonomy of standards of proof, probable cause is lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339 (1813) (Marshall, C. J.), but higher than mere articulable reasonable suspicion, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Only if Mr. Lopez's arrest was justified by probable cause are its fruits admissible at trial.
The topos of the “high crime area” in present-day police testimony is, in at least one sense, perfectly understandable. No self-respecting policeman can be expected to begin his testimony by remarking that, “I was patrolling in a crime-free area” or “Our squad was detailed to set up surveillance in an area where no crimes had been reported.” Sending the greatest number of police officers to the areas with the greatest number of serious crimes is precisely what we want our police departments to be doing. But when every officer testifies in every case that his search or seizure was justified, at least in part, because it took place in a “high crime area,” then every search or seizure is justified, at least in part. In Orwell's Animal Farm, all pigs were equal but some were more equal than others; so, too, if all areas in which policework is done are “high crime areas,” then some of those areas must be “higher crime” -- and therefore some “lower crime” -- than others. Comparatives and superlatives lose their force when applied to anything and everything. And the use of a particular locution in every, or nearly every, case in which policemen testify detracts from the force and probative value of that locution in any given case. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1171 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1973).
Det. Washington's observations gave rise to that “articulable reasonable suspicion” that justify the police in conducting an investigatory stop. See § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (codifying and modifying the doctrine ofTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). This Terry doctrine is as fully applicable to the drivers of cars as it is to pedestrians. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1981); State v. Dilyerd, 467 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1985). The officers in the case at bar were entitled to stop Mr. Lopez's car and make further inquiries; indeed they would have been recreant in their duty had they failed to do so. Their authority was limited to “temporarily detain[ing] [Mr. Lopez] for the purpose of ascertaining [his] identity . . . and the circumstances surrounding [his] presence abroad which led the officer[s] to believe that [he] had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.” § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. If, during the course of that investigatory stop, the officers had observed contraband in plain view, they would have been entitled to seize it. If, during the course of that investigatory stop, the officers had solicited and obtained Mr. Lopez's consent to search his car, or his person, they would have been entitled to do so. If, during the course of that investigatory stop, the officers had developed probable cause, then -- and only then -- would they have been entitled to make an arrest. § 901.151(4), Fla. Stat. Where, as here, there was no contraband in plain view, there was no consent to search, and there was no probable cause, the seizure of Mr. Lopez's person and the search of his car were unsupportable as a matter of law. The fruits of such a search must be suppressed.
The evidence was suppressed by the Judge.

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