Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/107wn2d/107wn2d0662.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:51:03+00:00

Document:
J. Boyle, et al, Respondents.
 Waters - Tidelands - State Ownership - Constitutional Provisions. The state ownership of tidelands asserted in Const. art. 17, 1 is the sovereignty and dominion aspect of ownership that is separate and distinct from the title aspect of ownership. The sovereignty and dominion aspect of tideland ownership is held by the State in trust for the public and cannot be conveyed or given away except where such conveyance promotes the interest of the public or does not substantially impair the public interest in the remaining tidelands.
 Waters - Tidelands - State Ownership - Use for Private Docks - Validity. RCW 79.90.105, which permits owners of residential property abutting state-owned tidelands to install and maintain private recreational docks on the tidelands without payment to the State, does not violate the state sovereignty and dominion over all tidelands asserted in Const. art. 17, 1, the Const. art. 8, 5 prohibition against lending of state credit, or the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
 Statutes - Validity - Presumption - Burden of Proof. A statute is presumed to be constitutional and the burden of proof is on a party challenging the statute.
 Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - Classifications - Rational Relationship - In General. Legislative classifications not involving a suspect class nor a fundamental right are valid if there is a rational basis for distinguishing between those within and without the class.
NAMES OF CONCURRING OR DISSENTING JUDGES: Dore, J., dissents by separate opinion; Goodloe, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
NATURE OF ACTION: Individuals and an organization concerned with public use of tidelands sought extraordinary relief against state officers, challenging the validity of legislation permitting private recreational docks on state tidelands without charge.
Supreme Court: Holding that the legislation did not violate the public trust doctrine, and did not give away state credit or deny equal protection, the court DENIES the petition.
COUNSEL: PETER T. JENKINS, for petitioners.
KENNETH O. EIKENBERRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, NIXON HANDY, SENIOR ASSISTANT, and ANN C. ESSKO, ASSISTANT, for respondents.
«1» Const. art. 4, 4; RAP 16.2.
«2» SEE TACOMA v. O'BRIEN, 85 Wn.2d 266, 268, 534 P.2d 114 (1975).
Having now considered the parties' briefs and oral argument on the merits, we decline to hold the statute unconstitutional. Issuance of the writ will be denied.
«3» Agreed Statement of Facts, paras. 5-10 (paragraph numbering deleted).
purposes and the area is not subject to prior rights.
governing construction, size, and length of the dock.
"Prior to the effective date of RCW 79.90.105, approximately 370 residential owners of private land abutting public aquatic lands were paying the State approximately $35,000 in annual rental for private recreational docks on public aquatic lands, outside of harbor areas, pursuant to the then statutorily authorized leasing program. This amount includeS all monies received by the Department of Natural Resources as lease application fees pursuant to RCW 79.01.088, RCW 79.90.100 and RCW 79.01.720. The administrative cost to the Department of Natural Resources of maintaining its leasing program for private recreational docks on public aquatic lands, outside of harbor areas, prior to the effective date of RCW 79.90.105 amounted to a substantial portion of the lease revenues.
"Since the effective date of RCW 79.90.105, the Department of Natural Resources has terminated the leasing program for private recreational docks on public aquatic lands, outside of harbor areas, and has not issued new leases or collected lease application fees or annual rental. The $35,000 in annual rental previously collected does not necessarily reflect the amount of annual rental that the State would have charged in succeeding years had RCW 79.90.105 never been enacted, which amount may have been more or less.
"Petitioner Caminiti has interests affected by the amount of revenue that the State generates each year from public resources.
"Petitioner Caminiti and the members of petitioner Committee for Public Shorelines RightS have recreational interests that are affected by their ability to acquire access to and use public aquatic lands and waters. These include, but are not limited to, their ability to fish, swim, navigate, water ski, beachcomb, procure shellfish, sunbathe, observe natural and undisturbed wildlife, play on open beaches, and enjoy seclusion. These interests are impacted to some extent by the presence, location, and private use of private recreational docks on these public aquatic lands and waters.
"The elimination of lease fees may be a factor considered by some upland owners in deciding whether to build a private recreational dock on abutting public aquatic lands, although it is not known to what extent this factor would actually influence such decisions."
There is one principal issue.
«4» In addition to referring to state-owned shorelands and tidelands, RCW 79.90.105 also deals with "RELATED BEDS of navigable waters, other than harbor areas . . ." (Italics ours.) Bedlands are those lands lying beyond the line of navigability of rivers and lakes and those lands beyond the low tide mark of tidal waters. RCW 79.90.050. Bedlands in tidal waters may present unique problems, particularly with respect to federal regulation of navigable waters. However, the parties have chosen to argue this case primarily with respect to tidelands and shorelands which, as a practical matter, are those principally involved. As a consequence, bedlands will not be separately dealt with herein other than to point out by this note that what we hold concerning tidelands and shorelands generally applies to bedlands as well.
to install and maintain private recreational docks on such lands free of charge, violate article 17, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution or the "public trust doctrine"?
The short answer to the question posed by this issue is "no". Upon admission into the Union, the State of Washington was vested with title in, and dominion over, its tidelands and shorelands. Since statehood, the Legislature has had the power to sell and convey title to state tidelands and shorelands. Prior to 1971, when the Legislature by statute changed its policy, the State had sold separately 60 percent of its tidelands and 30 percent of its shorelands. The Legislature has never had the authority, however, to sell or otherwise abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over such tidelands and shorelands. By enacting the statute at issue in this case (RCW 79.90.105), the Legislature has seen fit to grant only a revocable license allowing owners of land abutting state-owned tidelands and shorelands to build recreational docks thereon subject to state regulation and control. The Legislature did not thereby surrender state sovereignty or dominion over these tidelands and shorelands, but through the Department of Natural Resources and local subdivisions of state government continues to exercise control over them.
«5» ROBINSON v. SILVER LK. RY. & LUMBER CO., 153 Wash. 261, 274, 279 P. 1109 (1929).
«6» BRACE & HERGERT MILL CO. v. STATE, 49 Wash. 326, 331, 95 P. 278 (1908).
«7» HILL v. NEWELL, 86 Wash. 227, 231, 149 P. 951 (1915); GRAYS HARBOR BOOM CO. v. LOWNSDALE, 54 Wash. 83, 89, 102 P. 1041, 104 P. 267 (1909); SEQUIM BAY CANNING CO. v. BUGGE, 49 Wash. 127, 131-32, 94 P. 922 (1908); EISENBACH v. HATFIELD, 2 Wash. 236, 240-43, 26 P. 539 (1891).
by the constitution to the United States.
of the common law in this respect.
control the waters for the purposes of navigation; . . .
From the foregoing it is clear that the State's ownership of tidelands and shorelands is not limited to the ordinary incidents of legal title, but is comprised of two distinct aspects.
«9» EISENBACH, at 244-45; SEQUIM BAY, at 131. SEE PORT OF SEATTLE v. OREGON & W. R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63, 65 L. Ed. 500, 41 S. Ct. 237 (1921); SHIVELY v. BOWLBY, 152 U.S. 1, 12-13, 38 L. Ed. 331, 14 S. Ct. 548 (1894). SEE ALSO ORION CORP. v. STATE, 103 Wn.2d 441, 464, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985) (Utter, J., concurring).
«10» SEE 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 8.109 (1952); R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, PROPERTY 8.1 (1984); 1 A. Reeves, REAL PROPERTY 235 (1909).
«12» T. Cooper, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 1 (2d ed. 1841).
«13» 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (1968).
«14» SEE SHIVELY, at 11-14; ILLINOIS CENT. R.R. v. ILLINOIS, 146 U.S. 387, 456-59, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 13 S. Ct. 110 (1892).
«15» SEE HILL, at 231; GRAYS HARBOR BOOM CO., at 90- 91; SEQUIM BAY, at 130-31; NEW WHATCOM v. FAIRHAVEN LAND CO., 24 Wash. 493, 499-503, 64 P. 735 (1901); EISENBACH, at 240-41.
«16» SHIVELY, at 13; HILL, at 231.
to the right of navigation and the use of public waters.
«17» ILLINOIS CENTRAL, at 453.
«18» SEE ILLINOIS CENTRAL, at 453; HILL, at 231.
«19» SEE Johnson & Cooney, HARBOR LINES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON NAVIGABLE WATERS, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 275, 285-87 (1979).
«20» ILLINOIS CENTRAL, at 453.
Accordingly, we must inquire as to: (1) whether the State, by the questioned legislation, has given up its right of control over the jus publicum and (2) if so, whether by so doing the State (a) has promoted the interests of the public in the jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially impaired it.
«21» SEE DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY v. BALLARD ELKS LODGE 827, 84 Wn.2d 551, 557, 527 P.2d 1121 (1974) (quoting this policy with approval).
«23» Brief of Petitioners, at 39.
as argued by petitioners, but to the contrary, any such construction is subject to substantial regulation and control.
[2-4] Turning next to the above stated test for violations of the "public trust doctrine", and applying that test to the questioned statute (RCW 79.90.105), we observe as follows.
«24» Reply Brief of Petitioner, at 24.
«25» Until 1971, Washington had a liberal policy favoring the sale of tidelands and shorelands. This resulted in approximately 60 percent of the tidelands and 30 percent of the shorelands acquired at statehood being transferred to private ownership. K. Conte, THE DISPOSITION OF TIDELANDS AND SHORELANDS, WASHINGTON STATE POLICY 1889-1982, at x (Nov. 1982) (Master's Thesis, The Evergreen State College). The State presently owns approximately 1,300 miles of tidelands and the amount of shorelines has not been determined. WAC 332-30-100. RCW 79.94.150, which became operative August 9, 1971, now prohibits all such sales except for limited sales of certain second-class shorelands of navigable lakes. SEE RCW 79.94.210.
«26» SEE Const. art. 15; RCW 79.90.020. According to figures computed by the Department of Natural Resources, there are approximately 6,700 acres of constitutionally established harbor areas in the state (see WAC 332-30-100). SEE GENERALLY Johnson & Cooney, HARBOR LINES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON NAVIGABLE WATERS, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 275 (1979).
«31» EISENBACH v. HATFIELD, 2 Wash. 236, 249-53, 26 P. 539 (1891).
«32» U.S. Const. art. 1, 8.
The statute under review expresses a part of that policy; it is a practical recognition that one of the many beneficial uses of public tidelands and shorelands abutting private homes is the placement of private docks on such lands so homeowners and their guests may obtain recreational access to navigable waters. No expression of public policy has been directed to our attention which would encourage water uses originating on public docks, as they do, while at the same time discouraging any private investment in docks to help promote the use of public waters.
Recreational docks existed on public tidelands and shorelands before enactment of the statute, and still do; the principal difference being that under current statutory policy there is no obligation to pay rental or lease fees. As discussed above, the public ownership of such lands also remains unchanged; and state and local governments continue to regulate the construction of docks thereon, as does the federal government in some situations.
" RCW 79.90.105 was passed to rectify an unfair situation.
«35» Brief of Respondents, at 67.
«36» SEE GENERALLY K. Conte, THE DISPOSITION OF TIDELANDS AND SHORELANDS, WASHINGTON STATE POLICY 1889-1982 (Nov. 1982) (Master's Thesis, The Evergreen State College).
and the record herein, it is unnecessary for us to opine either as to the accuracy of this explanation or its merits. Suffice to say, based on the law set forth herein, the Legislature was the appropriate forum in which to do battle on that issue, and the Legislature's decision to enact the statute in question was an entirely appropriate one for it to make.
The enactment of RCW 79.90.105 by the Legislature did not violate either the "public trust doctrine" or article 17, section 1 of our state constitution relating to state tidelands and shorelands. We also observe that the legislation enacted here is a far cry from that confronting the United States Supreme Court in the leading "public trust doctrine" case of ILLINOIS CENT. R.R. v. ILLINOIS, 146 U.S. 387, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 13 S. Ct. 110 (1892). In that case, the Illinois Legislature had not only sold all of the land under one of the world's largest harbors (the Harbor of Chicago) to a private railroad company, but had also surrendered all right to control the harbor. There it was held that by so doing the Illinois Legislature had abdicated state sovereignty and dominion over the jus publicum; here, the Washington Legislature has not abdicated state sovereignty or dominion over the jus publicum.
The remaining issues may be more succinctly dealt with.
aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation.
«37» SEE PUBLIC EMPL. RELATIONS COMM'N v. KENNEWICK, 99 Wn.2d 832, 836, 664 P.2d 1240 (1983); IN RE MARRIAGE OF JOHNSON, 96 Wn.2d 255, 258, 634 P.2d 877 (1981).
«38» SEE STATE EX REL. GRAHAM v. OLYMPIA, 80 Wn.2d 672, 676, 497 P.2d 924 (1972).
«39» SEE LOUTHAN v. KING CY., 94 Wn.2d 422, 428, 617 P.2d 977 (1980). SEE GENERALLY Spitzer, AN ANALYTICAL VIEW OF RECENT "LENDING OF CREDIT" DECISIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 195, 195-99 (1985).
«40» SEE JOHNSON, at 264-68.
Petitioners have not sustained their heavy burden of proof on this issue.
«41» EQUITABLE SHIPYARDS v. STATE, 93 Wn.2d 465, 476, 611 P.2d 396 (1980).
«42» MACIAS v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUS., 100 Wn.2d 263, 273, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983). SEE 2 Rotunda, Nowak & Young, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 18.38, at 680 (1986).
There is no such impact here. In any event, as discussed herein, there is nothing in the statute or its application which restricts the public's right to walk over, or otherwise appropriately use, state tidelands and shorelands. There is no interference with petitioner's right to travel.
«43» MYRICK v. PIERCE CY. COMM'RS, 102 Wn.2d 698, 701, 677 P.2d 140, 687 P.2d 1152 (1984).
«44» SEE EQUITABLE SHIPYARDS, at 478.
The petitioners not having prevailed herein, we do not address the various bases on which they claim attorneys' fees.
The writ petitioned for is denied.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Pearson, C.J., Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Callow, and Durham, JJ., and Schumacher, J. Pro Tem., concur.
DISSENTING OPINION: I believe that RCW 79.90.105 violates Const. art. 8, 5, which prohibits the State from lending credit or giving gifts to private parties. The grant of free use of state tidelands and waterways to private parties to maintain private recreational docks confers no benefit to the State, and constitutes an impermissible gift. I would hold RCW 79.90.105 is therefore unconstitutional, and I would grant the petitioners' writ of mandamus compelling the State not to enforce the statute.
This section has been interpreted to mean that the State cannot either lend credit or give a gift of state funds to a private individual. SEE, E.G., ADAMS v. UW, 106 Wn.2d 312, 722 P.2d 74 (1986); STATE HWY. COMM'N v. PACIFIC NORTHWEST BELL TEL. CO., 59 Wn.2d 216, 367 P.2d 605 (1961).
Recently in ADAMS v. UW, SUPRA, we held that the key factor in constitutional gift analysis is consideration. Clearly, by allowing private individuals to use the land to build docks, the State has transferred a valuable property right. SEE, E.G., NEW WHATCOM v. FAIRHAVEN LAND CO., 24 Wash. 493, 64 P. 735 (1901). The State has not received anything valuable in return, which makes this transfer an impermissible gift.
The respondents contend the State does receive consideration in that the private dock statute promotes a public interest. Namely, new jobs in constructing docks and new access to navigable waters for some private citizens result from RCW 79.90.105. I believe these contentions are unreasoned, unpersuasive, and cannot be the basis of an unconstitutional grant of the people's property, which has up to now been safeguarded and protected by our judicial system.
A statute conferring benefit to private interests is constitutional only in cases in which the benefit is incidental to a public purpose served by the statute. PUBLIC EMPL. RELATIONS COMM'N v. KENNEWICK, 99 Wn.2d 832, 664 P.2d 1240 (1983). The benefit to the public in this case is nonexistent; the only benefits arising from this statute go to private individuals. Furthermore, even if a remotely speculative benefit accrues to dock builders, a statute enacted for a public purpose will be held invalid if the property is given to a private person for which the public neither expects nor receives consideration. ACKERLEY COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SEATTLE, 92 Wn.2d 905, 918, 602 P.2d 1177 (1979), CERT. DENIED, 449 U.S. 804 (1980).
I dissent to the majority's decision. There is no public benefit arising from RCW 79.90.105. It is not disputed that the effect of the statute is to give away, for free, valuable state property. This gift is prohibited by Const. art. 8, 5, and I would issue a writ of mandamus preventing state officials from implementing a blatantly unconstitutional statute.
POST-OPINION INFORMATION: Reconsideration denied July 29, 1987.

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