Source: http://www.techlawjournal.com/alert/2002/08/15.asp
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:38:16+00:00

Document:
TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 492, August 15, 2002.
August 15, 2002, 9:00 AM ET, Alert No. 492.
8/14. The U.S. Court of Appeals (8thCir) issued its opinion [11 pages in PDF] in Missouri Municipal League v. FCC, vacating an FCC order denying a request that it preempt a Missouri statute that prohibits political subdivisions of the state from offering telecommunications services. It held that the term "any entity" in 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) includes political subdivisions of states. This ruling creates a conflict between the District of Columbia Circuit and the 8th Circuit.
Various municipalities and municipal organizations filed a petition with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) asking that it preempt this statute for being in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
The FCC denied the request to preempt by Memorandum Opinion and Order [18 pages in PDF] released on January 12, 2001. (This is CC Docket No. 98-122.) The FCC wrote that "We do not preempt the enforcement of HB 620 to the extent that it limits the ability of municipalities or municipally owned utilities, acting as political subdivisions of the state of Missouri, from providing telecommunications services or facilities. As we found in the Texas Preemption Order, the term ``any entity´´ in section 253(a) of the Act was not intended to include political subdivisions of the state, but rather appears to prohibit restrictions on market entry that apply to independent entities subject to state regulation."
The Appeals Court concluded "that because municipalities fall within the ordinary definition of the term ``entity,´´ and because Congress gave that term expansive scope by using the modifier "any," individual municipalities are encompassed within the term ``any entity´´ as used in § 253(a)."
8/14. The U.S. Court of Appeals (6thCir) issued its opinion in New Par v. City of Saginaw, affirming a District Court order compelling a local zoning board to grant New Par a variance to allow it to construct a cell tower, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 332.
Statute. 47 U.S.C. § 332 provides, at § 332(c)(7)(A) that "Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities." § 332(c)(7)(B) then provides limitations to this general rule. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) prevents state and local governments from unreasonably discriminating among providers, and from prohibiting the provision of service. However, this case involves the "in writing" and "substantial evidence" requirements of § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which provides that "Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record."
The Appeals Court adopted a definition of "in writing". It wrote that "We hold that for a decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof denying a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities to be ``in writing´´ for the purposes of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), it must (1) be separate from the written record; (2) describe the reasons for the denial; and (3) contain a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record that supports those reasons." The Appeals Court added that "Board's order denying New Par's variance request was separate from the written record, but it did not contain any explanation of the reasons for the denial."

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