Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/375/217/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:18:53+00:00

Document:
Under § 106 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added in 1961, a Federal Court of Appeals has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to review an administrative determination of the Attorney General denying a suspension of deportation sought by an alien under § 244(a)(5). Pp. 375 U. S. 217-232.
308 F. 2d 779 reversed and remanded.
Involved in this case is the single question of whether the Federal Courts of Appeals have the initial, exclusive jurisdiction, under § 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, to review discretionary determinations of the Attorney General, relating to the suspension of deportation, under § 244(a)(5) of the Act.
§ 106(a), [Footnote 3] we granted certiorari, limited to the question whether Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review final administrative orders with respect to discretionary relief sought during deportation proceedings. 371 U.S. 947.
federal court. The only question presented for decision involves the scope of judicial review by the Courts of Appeals of administrative determinations made during the course of deportation proceedings. Specifically, we must decide a rather narrow question of statutory construction -- whether a refusal by the Attorney General to grant a suspension of deportation is one of those "final orders of deportation" of which direct review by Courts of Appeals is authorized under § 106(a) of the Act. Both parties have contended that it is. While the question is not free of difficulty, as evidenced by the division in the court below and the conflict among the various Courts of Appeals on the matter, we have concluded that the court below erred in holding that it was not.
"apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation heretofore or hereafter made against aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 242(b) of this Act or comparable provisions of any prior Act. . . ."
Section 242 provides a detailed administrative procedure for determining whether an alien should be deported. Sections 243 and 244 relate to certain situations in which the Attorney General may suspend deportation in his discretion. In its decision below, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 106(a) applies only to orders required by statute to be made in a § 242(b) hearing, i.e., findings of deportability.
Both petitioner and the Government have urged that the decision below should be reversed, and that the statutory language should be so construed as to include both an adjudication of deportability and an order denying suspension of deportation. Based on the historical background of the Immigration and Nationality Act, [Footnote 6] the manifest purpose of Congress in enacting § 106(a), the context of the statutory language when viewed against the prevailing administrative practices and procedures, and pertinent legislative history of § 106(a), we are led to the conclusion that the interpretation argued for by petitioner and the Government is the correct one.
for suspension of deportation in a single proceeding conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Thus, the administrative discretion to grant a suspension of deportation has historically been consistently exercised as an integral part of the proceedings which have led to the issuance of a final deportation order, and discretionary relief, if sought, must be requested prior to or during the deportation hearing. The hearings on deportability and on an application for discretionary relief have, as a matter of traditional uniform practice, been held in one proceeding before the same special inquiry officer, resulting in one final order of deportation. Significantly, when suspension is granted, no deportation order is rendered at all, even if the alien is in fact found to be deportable.
"the 6 months' period on the question of finality of an order applies to the final administrative adjudication of the applications for suspension of deportation, just as it would apply to any other issue brought up in deportation proceedings."
With the dissenters below, we feel that the court's speculation that few congressmen were present at the time of this exchange was unwarranted, and probably immaterial.
"has been disturbed in recent years to observe the growing frequency of judicial actions being instituted by undesirable aliens whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but which are brought solely for the purpose of preventing or delaying indefinitely their deportation from this country."
"Other aliens, mostly subversives, gangsters, immoral [persons], or narcotic peddlers, manage to protract their stay here indefinitely only because their ill-gotten gains permit them to procure the services of astute attorneys who know how to skillfully exploit the judicial process. Without any reflection upon the courts, it is undoubtedly now the fact that such tactics can prevent enforcement of the deportation provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act by repetitive appeals to the busy and overworked courts with frivolous claims of impropriety in the deportation proceedings."
evidence of a specific congressional intent to give Courts of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review denials of discretionary relief in deportation proceedings is contained in the legislative history. Case histories of abuse of the existing judicial review process, as summarized in the various Committee reports, include references to litigation arising out of discretionary determinations. And a reference chart reproduced in the Committee reports shows the denial of discretionary relief as being antecedent to and a constituent part of the "final order of deportation." Although deportability and whether to grant a suspension are determined in the same hearing, the decision below means that an alien may appeal only the deportability finding to a Court of Appeals, and must initially seek review of a denial of suspension in a District Court. A short analysis of the reasoning of the court below demonstrates that its conclusion is inconsistent with this manifest purpose of Congress.
In substance, we feel that the Court of Appeals was wrong in limiting the phrase "final orders of deportation"
in § 106(a) to adjudications of deportability. The finding of the court below that the phrase was a "term of art" with a well understood meaning, merely because it was used several times in §§ 242 and 244 when plainly referring only to rulings on deportability, cannot be substantiated. Section 106(a) was, of course, not enacted contemporaneously with §§ 242 and 244, and it is solely concerned with the rather different problem of judicial review. And the language of § 242(b) indicates that Congress plainly distinguished determinations of deportability from orders of deportation. We regard this as of especial relevance, since § 106(a), in describing the "final orders of deportation" intended to be encompassed thereunder, specifically refers to administrative proceedings conducted under § 242(b).
the intent of Congress. The inclusion in one of the "exceptions" to the principal provision of § 106(a) of a proviso which primarily could apply only to determinations of deportability does not necessarily indicate that the principal provision of the section was also intended to be thus limited. Since the adjudication of deportability is certainly the principal ingredient, and an indispensable one, of the ultimate result of the proceeding -- a final order of deportation -- it would not be unusual for Congress to include in an overall enactment relating to judicial review of all final orders of deportation a specific provision pertinent to the primary constituent of such an order.
Courts of Appeals. [Footnote 16] Furthermore, we do not regard it "in the last degree unlikely" that Congress intended a court of three judges to initially review discretionary determinations denying suspension of deportation. Much of the litigation in deportation cases with respect to the setting aside of an administrative determination on the ground of arbitrariness involves disputed eligibility questions and matters of statutory construction. Additionally, the concern of the court below does not comport with the declared purpose of § 106(a) to eliminate the District Court stage of the judicial review process in an effort to prevent dilatory tactics. And the suggestion of the court below that it is "incredible" that Congress meant to burden the Courts of Appeals with review of all orders denying discretionary relief in deportation cases is unconvincing.
We believe that the controlling intention of Congress in enacting § 106(a) was to prevent delays in the deportation process by vesting in the Courts of Appeals sole jurisdiction to review "all final orders of deportation." It seems apparent that, because of the consistent practice under the administrative regulations since 1940 of adjudicating deportability and passing on applications for discretionary relief in the same proceeding, the final administrative action that Congress was thinking of in using the phrase "final orders of deportation" included denials of suspension of deportation. To so construe § 106(a) does not constitute an expansion of "the words used by Congress beyond their well understood meaning." Bifurcation of judicial review of deportation proceedings is not only inconvenient; it is clearly undesirable and not the necessary result from a fair interpretation of the pertinent statutory language. Therefore, this matter can and should be passed upon by the Courts of Appeals, resulting in a judicial review procedure that would be both fair to the petitioner and expeditious for the Government. The decision below is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
The granting of voluntary departure relief does not result in the alien's not being subject to an outstanding final order of deportation. In this case, the order granting voluntary departure was combined with a contingent deportation order, which directed that petitioner be deported if he failed to depart within the prescribed time and was to become effective automatically if petitioner did not depart the country by the date fixed by the District Director.
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 106, as added by § 5(a) of Public Law 87-301, approved September 26, 1961, 75 Stat. 651, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1962) § 1105a.
Compare Fong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 308 F.2d 191 (C.A.9th Cir. 1962), Blagaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (C.A.7th Cir. 1962), and Roumeliotis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 304 F.2d 453 (C.A.7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 921, with Holz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 309 F.2d 452 (C.A.9th Cir. 1962), Zupicich v. Esperdy, 207 F.Supp. 574 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1962), and the decision below.
On October 24, 1962, subsequent to the decision below and while the case was pending before this Court on petition for certiorari, Congress enacted Public Law 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247, effective the same date. This enactment provides, in relevant part, for the amendment of § 244 of the Act, the source of the Attorney General's power to suspend the deportation of eligible classes of aliens, by the addition of a new subsection, which states: "(f) No provision of this section shall be applicable to an alien who (1) entered the United States as a crewman. . . ." Although petitioner concededly entered the United States as a crewman, and the Government has indicated that, when the merits of this case are reached, it will argue that petitioner is now absolutely ineligible for the relief sought, because of the 1962 amendment to § 244, we agree with the parties that the enactment of this amendment did not necessarily have the effect of rendering moot the jurisdictional issue involved in this litigation. The applicability of this provision to one in petitioner's situation is an arguable matter, and, since it is not undisputed, but remains debatable, whether the relief sought by petitioner could still be granted, we have determined it not improper to consider and decide the threshold question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
Hobbs Act, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1042, vesting the Courts of Appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders of certain designated federal agencies.
On the history of the recent congressional enactments relating to deportation, see Comment, 71 Yale L.J. 760 (1962).
Regarding the extent of the Attorney General's discretion in suspension of deportation cases, see, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 351 U. S. 354, 351 U. S. 357-358 (1956).
Representative Walter was the chairman of a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee responsible for immigration and nationality matters, author and chief sponsor of the measure under consideration, and a respected congressional leader in the whole area of immigration law. Representative Lindsay was thoroughly familiar with the problems in this area and the role of discretionary determinations denying suspension in the deportation process, as a result of having represented the Government, three years earlier, in Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345 (1956). Representative Moore was a co-sponsor of the bill under discussion and a member of the House Judiciary Committee out of which the bill containing § 106(a) was reported.
H.R.Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1961).
"Most important, by eliminating review in the district courts, the bill would obviate one of the primary causes of delay in the final determination of all questions which may arise in a deportation proceeding."
According to the General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Service's policy and practice is to stay deportation sua sponte when a petition to obtain judicial review of determinations made during the administrative proceedings is not "patently frivolous." See Comment, 111 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 1226, 1230 (1963). Consequently, temporary restraining orders issued by District Courts would usually be unnecessary to prevent deportation, and whether District Courts grant restraining orders rarely or frequently is rather irrelevant. And the assumption of the court below that, since the Attorney General can moot the proceedings in the District Courts (unless a restraining order is issued) by deporting the alien pendente lite, ultimate deportation would be expedited by permitting bifurcated judicial review seems unwarranted. Also, an assumption that the practice of District Courts is merely to issue restraining orders pending final disposition in a Court of Appeals of all of the questions presented for judicial review in a deportation case appears unjustified. See, e.g., Zupicich v. Esperdy, 207 F.Supp. 574 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1962).
Deportability is conceded in about 80% of the cases. See Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, § 5.7a at 541 (1962). Even so, the bifurcation problem remains in that type of case which prompted the enactment of § 106(a), where judicial review of both an adjudication of deportability and a denial of discretionary relief is sought.
Because of the effect of our holding here, it is, of course, unnecessary to consider the Government's contention that, where deportability is actually adjudicated, a Court of Appeals has "pendent jurisdiction" to review a denial of discretionary relief in the same proceeding.
In the instant case, the special inquiry officer not only found that petitioner failed to meet the eligibility requirements for suspension of deportation, since no hardship would result from his deportation, but further indicated that, even had the hardship requirement been met, relief would have been denied as a discretionary matter. Since a special inquiry officer cannot exercise his discretion to suspend deportation until he finds the alien statutorily eligible for suspension, a finding of eligibility and an exercise of (or refusal to exercise) discretion may properly be considered as distinct and separate matters. And since the finding of eligibility involves questions of fact and law, paragraph (4) of § 106(a) might be read to require that this finding be based on substantial evidence in the record. See Comment, 111 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 1226, 1229 (1963). However, we need not pass on this question here. And, of course, denial of suspension of deportation as a discretionary matter is reviewable only for arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, and thus could hardly be within the procedural and evidentiary requisites of paragraph (4).
When § 106(a) was enacted, the withholding of deportation under § 243(h) was a matter determined by an official other than the special inquiry officer conducting the deportation hearing, on a later occasion, under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, and the designation of the country of deportation was not made until after the issuance of the warrant of deportation. Under revised and currently effective regulations, both the designation of the country of deportation and the decision on any § 243(h) request for relief which the alien might wish to make are effected in the deportation proceedings and reflected in the final order of deportation. While presumably denials of § 243(h) relief were not covered by § 106(a) at the time of its enactment, it does not seem incongruous to assume that such orders, because of the change in administrative regulations making such decisions an integral part of the deportation proceedings conducted by a special inquiry officer, are now within the reach of § 106(a)'s judicial review provisions. Such a result simply means that, while the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals is limited now, as when § 106(a) was enacted, to the review of "all final orders of deportation," a change in the administrative regulations relating to the processing and determination of applications for § 243(h) relief had the incidental effect of expanding the decisional content of such orders. Clearly, changes in administrative procedures may affect the scope and content of various types of agency orders, and thus the subject matter embraced in a judicial proceeding to review such orders.
Compare, however, 308 F.2d at 785, n. 6, where the court below referred to the "inarticulate premise that all deportation suits are appealed . . ." from District Courts to Courts of Appeals.
The court below manifested its concern that, if it were to find that it had jurisdiction in this case, the door would then be opened to the obtaining of review of a refusal to reopen a deportation proceeding in the Courts of Appeals. 308 F.2d at 785. And the Government has argued in its brief that, although the question is a close one, an order refusing to reopen a deportation proceeding should be regarded as within the provisions of § 106(a) with respect to judicial review in the Courts of Appeals, though occurring subsequent to the issuance of a final deportation order. Brief for respondent, pp. 51-54. Compare Giova v. Rosenberg, 308 F.2d 347 (C.A.9th Cir. 1962), petition for cert. pending, No. 15, Misc., October Term, 1963. Cf. Dentico v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 303 F.2d 137 (C.A.2d Cir, 1962), holding that Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review denials of motions to reopen deportation proceedings, where review of a final order of deportation is sought at the same time.
Compare the provisions of § 106(c) purporting to restrict the availability of habeas corpus relief in deportation cases. But see the provisions of § 106(a)(9) with respect to the availability of habeas corpus relief to aliens held in custody pursuant to a deportation order.
Believing that a jurisdictional statute of this kind should be circumspectly construed, cf. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153, 369 U. S. 156-157, and recognizing the force of the considerations which concerned the majority of the Court of Appeals, 308 F.2d 779, I am nevertheless satisfied that the legislative history of § 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act leaves no room for a conclusion other than that which this Court has reached.

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