Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/99-3113/99-3113a-2011-03-24.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:15:54+00:00

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 2000 › USA v. Ginyard, Harry A.
Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for the appellant. A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, was on brief. David A. Howard, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.
Amul R. Thapar, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.
does not constitute "plain error" on this record. Additionally, as both parties agree, the district court's restriction on Gin- yard's computer and telephone use in prison is beyond its authority and we therefore vacate that portion of the sen- tence.
Between 1991 and 1997, Ginyard made contact with various women through internet chat rooms, electronic mail and the telephone. Using several aliases, Ginyard initiated what he falsely represented as "committed relationship[s]" and lied about his background, employment and income. Govern- ment's Memorandum Statement of Facts 2 (May 10, 1999). At one point Ginyard was engaged to marry at least two different women and was involved in "serious romantic rela- tionship[s]" with others. Status Call Tr. 5/12/99 at 21. Gin- yard took control of each woman's finances for his own financial benefit and forced at least one woman into bankrupt- cy. Following Ginyard's arrest, the FBI searched Ginyard's computer files and discovered approximately 35 visual images which he had received through an internet chat program depicting a female under the age of 18 years engaged in sexually explicit conduct. On December 8, 1998 Ginyard was indicted on seven counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1343 and eight counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1341. On May 7, 1999 the government filed a superseding information charging Ginyard with receipt of materials depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit con- duct in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 2252(a)(2).
States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) the desire to spare Ginyard's victims the adverse consequences from trial.1 At the plea hearing held on May 12, 1999 the district court informed both parties that it was not "prepared to accept any plea agreement that binds [it] to a sentence of eighteen months." Id. at 5. Nevertheless, the district court provision- ally accepted the plea agreement pending receipt of the presentence report as allowed under Rule 11(e)(2).
DEFENSE: Your Honor, Mr. Ginyard is prepared to take a twenty-four month plea, or sentence I should say, and we can see no need to have another hearing. We are prepared to go forward at this time. COURT: And does the government agree to that as well? PROSECUTOR: Yes, Your Honor. COURT: Mr. Howard, I think under the Rules of Crimi- nal Procedure your client has the right to speak, al- though given the agreements I am not sure that anything __________ 1 According to section 6B1.2(c) of the Guidelines (Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreements (Policy Statement)) the district court "may accept the [Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea] agreement if the court is satisfied ... that ... the agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons."
can change. But just to make sure that the Rules are completely complied with, if he wishes to speak I do believe that he has the right under the Federal Rules. DEFENSE: We decline, Your Honor. COURT: The sentence in this case will be a sentence of twenty-four months in custody. DEFENSE: Should he come forward, Your Honor? .... COURT: Yes, he should. I am sorry. Twenty-four months in custody. There will be a period of supervised release of three years. There will be a special assess- ment of $200. There will be restitution, and this is, I believe, under the plea agreement as well, of $63,464.88, and the probation department will have to work out the details of the restitution. Id. at 36-37. The court also continued the pretrial order which prohibited Ginyard from using computers and allowed him, while imprisoned, telephone contact with family mem- bers and counsel only. In addition, the court prohibited Ginyard during supervised release from having contact with any of his victims or entering an internet chatroom and allowed him to use a computer only for professional real estate purposes. Ginyard made no objection below to any aspect of his sentence. He now appeals the supervised release component of his sentence, claiming that it is aliunde the plea agreement, as well as the computer and telephone restrictions during imprisonment.
below that district court "breached" plea agreement); see also United States v. Watley, 987 F.2d 841, 847 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (plain error review of district court's unobjected to failure to inform defendant of supervised release prior to accepting plea agreement). A sentencing error is plain "where it is obvious under settled law and would result in grave prejudice or a miscarriage of justice if not corrected on appeal." United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted).
Ginyard entered into the plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C), which provides that the government "agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate dis- position of the case."2 The plea agreement "is binding on the court once it is accepted by the court." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C).
__________ 2 Rule 11(e)(1)(C) was amended effective December 1, 1999 while this appeal was pending. We quote from and apply the rule as amended since our holding would be the same under either version. See Langraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 & n.29 (1994).
3 The district court correctly indicated that its participation in arriving at an acceptable sentence under the plea agreement was "an uncomfortable conversation" in light of Rule 11(e)(1). Sentenc- ing Tr. 8/3/99 at 35.
the parties were tendering a plea that specified only a 24- month term of incarceration, the district court's imposition of a term of supervised release would have been error.4 Super- vised release is punishment, see United States v. Gilchrist, 130 F.3d 1131, 1133 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 1997)), and therefore part of the "sentence" within the meaning of Rule 11(e)(1)(C). See Unit- ed States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("sentence" in statute authorizing imposition of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. s 3583(a), includes both imprisonment and supervised release). Rule 11(e)(1)(C) also makes clear that the agreed-to sentence constitutes the "disposition" of the case, precluding the imposition of additional punishment. Thus, if supervised release is not specified as part of the sentence in a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, it cannot be imposed.
Here, however, the district court's acceptance of the 24- month term was ambiguous. On the one hand, the district court could have understood the parties to have agreed to a guideline sentence that included the normally-attendant term of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. s 5D1.1(a). Under this interpretation of the court's acceptance, it did not breach the plea agreement.
__________ 4 The government's failure to include both the supervised release and the special assessment components, see U.S.S.G. s 5E1.3 & Application Note 2A; 18 U.S.C. s 3013, in the plea agreement, which it acknowledged at oral argument is standard procedure, is troubling and may have led the district court astray in the first instance.
the parties' agreement, Ginyard invited the error when he solicited the district court's opinion on an acceptable sentence and then negotiated, through counsel, the restrictions of supervised release. See Sentencing Tr. 8/3/99 at 34-35 (DE- FENSE: "I don't know if the court feels comfortable giving us some guidance as to what sentence it would be comfortable with, but otherwise I guess it would be--it would come down to sort of a bidding process where we come back and say twenty months, or twenty-two, something of that nature. So if the court could provide some guidance."); id. at 43 (DE- FENSE: "And if the court were maybe to restrict [Gin- yard's] use of the internet to matters related to real estate during that period [supervised release], then that may be a reasonable middle ground."). If a defendant invites error by the district court, he is "barred from complaining about it on appeal." United States v. Harrison, 103 F.3d 986, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1997); cf. United States v. Wiggins, 530 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1976). More important, Ginyard failed to object to the district court's imposition of supervised release, and, assuming the district court erred in doing so, it did not plainly err.
Finally, both parties agree that the district court lacked statutory authority to restrict Ginyard's computer and tele- phone use during confinement. See Appellee's Br. 21-22 & n.11; Reply Br. 11 n.5; United States v. Sotelo, 94 F.3d 1037, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[B]ecause there is no federal law authorizing an incarceration-communication restriction as part of a sentence ordered by a district court ..., the district court lacked the authority to impose the restriction."). Ac- cordingly, we vacate the portion of the sentence imposing restrictions on Ginyard's telephone and computer use in prison. In all other respects, Ginyard's sentence is affirmed.
While I agree that the district court did not plainly err in imposing supervised release, I do not believe that the error was invited. See In re Sealed Case, 108 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Appellant may have acquiesced in what he now claims is error, but he did not invite it.") (citing United States v. Harrison, 103 F.3d 986, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). After the district court rejected the plea agreement, Ginyard did seek its input in the plea discussions. In response, the district court reluctantly, but nevertheless erroneously,1 declared that it "could in good conscience live with a [sentence] of twenty- four months." Sentencing Tr. 8/3/99 at 35. This error (which was invited), however, did not extend to the district court's separate imposition of supervised release after Ginyard agreed to the 24-month term of imprisonment. See id. at 36. Once the district court imposed supervised release, Ginyard did not object but, again, his conduct more resembled acqui- escence than invitation.
Whether the district court erred at all depends, in my opinion, not on the ambiguous nature of the district court's acceptance of the plea agreement as my colleagues believe, see Per Curiam Op. 6-7, but on the wording of Rule 11(e)(1)(C). While I agree that our holding is "the same under either version," id. at 6 n.2, that is so only because our review is for plain error. But I do not agree that the amended version has not effected a change that could, de- pending on the language of the plea agreement, change the results on appeal.
Under the unamended version of Rule 11(e)(1)(C) the gov- ernment may agree "that a specific sentence is the appropri- ate disposition of the case." This is the version under which Ginyard was sentenced and, as we have recognized, see United States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1991), because supervised release is part of the sentence, the district court's acceptance of Ginyard's plea agreement (as amended) bound the court to its terms. See United States v.
__________ 1 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) ("The court shall not participate in any discussions between the parties concerning any such plea agreement.").
Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1363-64 (D.C. Cir. 1982). I there- fore agree with my colleagues that, "assuming the district court erred ..., it did not plainly err," Per Curiam Op. 8, and I therefore join in affirming the district court.
But Rule 11(e)(1)(C) now allows the parties to agree in- stead that a "particular provision of the Sentencing Guide- lines ... is or is not applicable to the case."2 With respect to this language, the advisory committee notes state, "the gov- ernment and defense ... actually agree[ ] on what amounts to an appropriate sentence or ... agree[ ] to one of the specified components." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) advisory committee's note (1999) (emphasis added). If the plea agreement fails to address a specific provision of the Guidelines, particularly a mandatory one, the district court's acceptance of a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement would not, in my view, prohibit it from imposing the unaddressed "component" of the sentence.
__________ 2 Rule 11(e)(1)(C) as amended also allows the government to "agree that a specific ... sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case" (amended language emphasized). "Range" refers, in my opinion, only to the term of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. s 1B1.1(g) (Application Instruction to "determine the guideline range ... that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category") & (h) (Application Instruction to deter- mine "[f]or the particular guideline range, ... the sentencing requirements and options related to ... supervision conditions"); U.S.S.G. s 5A, Application Note 1 ("The intersection of the Offense Level and Criminal history Category displays the Guideline Range in months of imprisonment.") (emphases added). A supervised release departure, however, is governed by section 5D1.1, Applica- tion Note 1.
3 Application Note 1 includes four other bases on which to decline to impose supervised release, none of which is applicable here.
__________ 4 The Atkins and Perkins holdings involved departures from the Guidelines "range," that is, the applicable imprisonment period. See supra n.2.
5 Interestingly, Ginyard did not challenge the district court's failure to advise him of the mandatory supervised release term before accepting his plea. According to the record, the court failed to mention both supervised release and the mandatory $100 assess- ment per felony conviction before the court's conditional acceptance at the May 12 plea hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) ("Before accepting a plea ..., the court must address the defendant person- ally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands ... that the court is required to consid- er any applicable sentencing guidelines but may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances."); see also United States v. Watley, 987 F.2d 841, 847 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The government concedes that the district court entirely overlooked one Rule 11(c) specification [before accepting guilty plea]: that the court did not inform Watley of the supervised release term he might receive."). Had the two conditions been set out in the plea agreement, see Per Curiam Op. at 7 n.4, the court a might well have recited them to Ginyard before conditionally accepting his guilty plea.

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