Source: http://www.onelbriefs.com/outlines/civpro/full_outline.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:43:21+00:00

Document:
Query involved in finding whether power is sufficient is narrowed to whether the relation of the target to the forum state constitutes minimum contacts and does not consider the P's or the public's interests.
Forum does not need to be the ideal forum just not unreasonable. Very flexible and liberal test.
Facts - OR attorney sued CA Neff. Published notice in OR newspaper. Neff didn't show, attorney got default judgment. After trial, court attached some of Neff's land in OR and gave it to Neff.
Notes - Attorney did not have jurisdiction over Neff. This method of personal jurisdiction was too rigid.
Facts - Harris, from NC, owed Balk, from NC, $180. Balk owed Epstein, from MD, $300. Epstein sued Harris when they were both in MD for the amount Harris owed Balk, $180. Epstein won judgment in MD, and Harris paid Epstein $180. Later, Balk sued Harris for the $180 owed to him.
Rule - The situs of a person's debt is not stationery but follows him wherever he goes. States must give "full faith and credit" to judgments made against its residents when those residents are in another state.
SCOTUS saw that with the nationalization of our economy and advances in transportation technology, jurisdiction needed to be expanded through other cases. Problems were also present in cases of jurisdiction with corporations. Where do they exist? The next few cases expanded the bounds of personal jurisdiction.
Does the defendant come within the terms of the applicable long-arm statute?
Does the defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the assertion of jurisdiction would not violate the Due Process Clause?
Has the defendant "purposely availed" itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the state's laws?
Does the lawsuit arise out of or related to the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum or, if it does not, are the defendant's forum contacts so extensive that no such relationship is necessary?
Would the exercise of jurisdiction be unfair and unreasonable, taking into account the interests of the defendant, the forum state, the plaintiff, and other states that may have an interest in the matter?
Some states have tailored/specific-act long-arm statutes.
Facts - Int'l Shoe was a DE based corporation with a main office in St. Louis, MO. It had no offices, made no contracts for sale, and did not keep any warehouses of goods in WA. They did have several salesmen employees who lived and sold merchandise for the company in WA. The state of WA sued Shoe in WA court for unpaid contributions to the state's unemployment fund. Notice was served to a salesman for the company in WA and via registered mail to the corporation's headquarters in MO.
Rule - If a party has "minimum contacts" in a state, that corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of that state as long as it does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice".
Facts - MI Rudzewicz applied for a franchise from FL based BK. Franchise was in MI. Rudzewicz failed to make payments, so BK tried to negotiation with Rudzewicz through its FL office. After negotiations failed, BK terminated the franchise. BK sued in FL.
Rule - Alone, signing a contract with a party in the forum state is not sufficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement for that forum state. However, if the contract in that state is an intermediate step to tie up prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, the party may be seen as having purposefully established minimum contacts in that forum state, especially when the consequences arise proximately from the activities allowed by the contract.
Notes - FL had no jurisdiction over the DE trust since trust had not purposely availed itself to the privilege of acting in that state. FL was probably the most judicially efficient place to litigate, but that does not matter. The contact with FL was unilateral.
Facts - IL Chalek sold software to NY Klein. When Klein found the software unsatisfactory, he returned it and put a stop payment on the check. Chalek sued for payment in IL court.
Rule - Entering into a passive contract with an entity in a state does not subject someone to personal jurisdiction in that state.
Notes - This may have been a case worried about the public policy involved with mail order/internet purchasing.
Facts - PA Hanson set up trust in DE and made changes to it in FL cutting sisters out of some money. Sisters sued DE trust in FL court.
Rule - There be some act by which the defendant "purposely avails" itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, in order for the minimum contacts requirement for jurisdiction to be met. A forum state can only gain jurisdiction over an out of state corporation if that corporation has "minimal contacts" with that forum state.
Facts - Robinsons purchased an Audi from D (Seaway Volks) in NY. Following year, Robinsons moved to AZ, passing through OK where they were in an accident. Car caught on fire. Robinsons sued auto manufacturer, importer, regional distributor, and retail dealer in OK. Regional distributor (World-wide Volks) and retail dealer (Seaway Volks) are the parties in this case about jurisdiction.
Rule - Jurisdiction may be exercised if a party delivers its products into the "stream of commerce" with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state.
No jurisdiction over WW VW in OK. The forseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into a forum state, otherwise every chattel a company sold would be its agent for service of process. It is that the Ds conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Thus, minimum contacts was the issue here, not fair play and substantial justice.
Facts - CA Zurcher lost control of motorcycle and collided with a tractor. He was badly hurt and his wife was killed. Zurcher sued Korean Cheng Shin Rubber who implicated Japanese Asahi. Asahi sold tire valve assemblies to Cheng Shin. Zurcher sued Asahi in CA court.
Rule - The mere awareness on the part of a foreign D that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the US would reach the forum state in the stream of commerce does not constitute "minimum contacts" in that state.
Rule - A forum state can exercise in personam jurisdiction over a party whose conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate (forseeability) being haled into court there. Jurisdiction may be exercised if a party delivers its products into the "stream of commerce" with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state.
Facts - FL Calder's magazine wrote an article about CA Jones. Magazine's largest circulation was in CA. Jones claimed the article was libelous and sued in CA court.
Rule - A can exercise jurisdiction over a D based on the "effects test" - a state has power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party who causes effects in a state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from these effects.
Notes - The Calder effects test will allow personal jurisdiction over a party whose conduct was expressly aimed at the forum state, knowing that the harmful effects would be felt primarily there, and that the defendants would "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there". The action was directed at CA, and the Ds knew it would cause an effect there.
Rule 4(d)(1)- unless D waives service in a timely manner, "the court may impose on the D…the expenses later incurred in making service.
Discovery - the process of compelled exchange of information between parties to a law suit.
Under the federal discovery rules (FRCP 26-37), parties may use six devices to obtain information about the case from other parties and nonparty witnesses .
The FRCP requires require the parties to respond to requests made through the Rules.
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the [claim or defense of any party] (used to say subject matter involved in the pending action), including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
This rule is pretty broad and can even be widened to the previous parameter if a party is able to demonstrate a need.
Information is discoverable even if it isn't admissible at trial.
Since the standard for discovery relevance is tied to the claims and defenses in the case, the parties' pleadings play a crucial role in setting the scope of discovery.
By raising issues in the pleadings, the parties open themselves up to discovery on issues which otherwise might not be discoverable.
Under the Rule, discovery extends to relevant information "unless otherwise limited by order of the court."
Or if the burden of production outweighs the likely value of the information, in light of various practical realities about the case, etc.
The relevance limit is vague, so much is left to negotiation between counsel for the parties.
If parties cannot agree on the information to be produced, the party making the discovery request may move to compel production of the information on the ground that they are entitled to it under the Rule.
Also, the party resisting production can move for a protective order under Rule 26(c), barring production of the disputed information.
"Privilege" refers to information that is protected from disclosure under the rules of evidence.
The decision to recognize a privilege represents a policy judgment that maintaining the confidentiality of certain communications is so important that society is willing to sacrifice the evidentiary value of those communications to preserve that confidentiality.
Some examples are the attorney-client privilege, privilege against self-incrimination, psychotherapist privilege, and doctor-patient privilege.
The existence of privilege does not protect factual information simply because it was communicated in a privileged conversation.
From Upjohn, "The privilege only protects from disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicate with the attorney/therapist."
In other words, just because I confess a murder to my therapist doesn't mean I can refuse to answer questions about it because of privilege.
Rule 26(b)(5) requires parties who object to production of information based on privilege to provide enough detail about the protected material to allow the requesting party to evaluate the privilege objection.
If the applicability of the privilege is challenged, the court can decide whether it is privileged based on the information required under 26(b)(5). In doubtful cases, the court can review documents in camera to determine if privilege applies.
In Hickman v. Taylor, SCOTUS held that "attorney work product" should be protected from disclosure, at least absent a showing of a particular need for the information, and inability to obtain it through other means.
The Court was concerned that discovery of trial preparation materials would interfere with lawyers' ability to develop their case strategy in private, and lead lawyers to build their cases through opposing counsel's efforts rather than their own.
Is the material a "document or tangible thing"?
Was it "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial"?
Was it prepared "by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative"?
If the answer to all three is yes, the material enjoys presumptive protection under Rule 26(b)(3). Go on to STEP #2.
Does the requesting party have a substantial need for the material in preparing its case?
Is it unable to obtain equivalent information by other means?
If the answer to both is yes, it will have to be produced despite presumptive work product protection unless the answer in STEP #3 is yes.
Would the material reveal the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of counsel?
If the answer is yes, it will be protected from discovery in almost all cases.
Although outside of the jurisdiction of Rule 26(b)(3), most intangible work product enjoys protection under the standards established in Hickman.
"Opinion work product" (the mental impressions of counsel) are usually protected from disclosure in almost all cases.
A computation of damages claimed, making available for inspection and copying the documents and other materials on which the computation is based.
Any insurance agreement under which an insurer may be liable to satisfy all or part of a judgment in the action.
The parties are required to meet and confer about these disclosures and other discovery issues and file a written report with the court outlining their plans for discovery (Rule 26(f)). Until this meeting, the parties are barred from taking discovery by other means.
Rule 26(e)(1) says, "A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals its disclosures under 26(a)(1) if the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing."
Penalties for non-disclosure include possible exclusion of the evidence or other sanctions.
Interrogatories are questions sent by one party to the case to be answered by another (they cannot be used to obtain info from nonparties).
Since they are answered by counsel for the other side, they should be written precisely in order to get a precise answer. They are useful for obtaining factual information like names of witnesses, itemizations of damages, dates of events, and locations of known documents.
Contention interrogatories asked for opinion and application of law to fact.
Rule 33(d) allows for these, but the court can allow a party to delay in answering them until discovery is complete.
"Specify each act upon which the P relies in support of her contention that the D breached the contract."
An interrogatory to a corporate party can be more effective than a deposition since it requires them to "furnish such information as is available to the party."
Parties are allowed to object to interrogatories if they feel the answer is not in the scope of discovery or protected from disclosure.
Rule 34 allows parties to request production of documents from other parties that are relevant to claims and defenses in the case. The request must describe the documents sought with "reasonable particularity."
It provides the other party with wide access to both relevant and irrelevant files.
Allowing access to the files waives the producing party's right to object to production of documents that are protected from discovery.
A deposition is the examination of a witness under oath and is the most effect means of previewing the detailed testimony of witnesses.
Parties do not usually depose their own witnesses or cross-examine witnesses as to not reveal their line of reasoning.
Parties may depose their own witnesses and use that testimony at trial if they will be unavailable for trial (Rule 32(a)(3)(B)).
Citizen of one state can sue a citizen of another state in federal court, even if the claim arises under state law, if the claim is for more than 75K.
P sued RR for breach of contract because a federal statute prohibited the RR from renewing their passes for free travel.
In their answer, D did rely on the federal statute for their defense.
SCOTUS dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A case only "arises under" federal law if the P relies on federal law as the source of their right to relief.
From Mottley, the court is required to consider not what the P has pleaded but what P needed to plead to state their cause of action.
This is to prevent manipulation by Ps; if Ps could make a federal case out of a state law claim by including unnecessary references to federal law in their complaints, arising-under jurisdiction could be created by simply including peripheral or even irrelevant references to federal issues in the complaint.
By asking not what is in the complaint, but what has to be, the court can limit the opportunity to manipulate the federal courts' jurisdiction.
In Mottley, their claim was a breach of contract claim and did not "arise under" federal law, as interpreted by 28 USC 1331.
A federal law must include a private right of action (either implicit or explicit) in order for a party to bring suit in federal court.
Is P part of class for whose special benefit the Act was created?
Ask "would a private cause of action further the legislative scheme?"
Is this something that courts would be good at?
How specific are the guidelines?
Was it traditionally part of state law?
It is very rare to find an implicit private right of action.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that federal courts may hear cases "arising under" federal law.
28 USC 1331 uses the same language conveying arising under jurisdiction to the federal district courts.
In spite of this, SCOTUS has interpreted the phrase "arising under federal law" in 28 USC 1331 to focus solely on the P's complaint while the language of Article III is interpreted more broadly.
In Osborn v. Bank of the US, SCOTUS held that Article III granted jurisdiction over all cases where a question of federal statutory or constitutional law "forms an ingredient" of a case (applies to defenses and counterclaims that arise under federal law).
Congress could do away with the Mottley rule by amending 28 USC 1331 if they wanted to.
With arising under cases, it is always necessary to analyze the constitutional scope of jurisdiction and Congress' grant of that jurisdiction separately. Congress can add as many limits (or broaden up to the limits of the Constitution) onto 28 USC 1331 as they want.
Just because a claim can be filed in federal court (Mottley test passed, etc) does not mean that it has to be. State courts can adjudicate these claims.
The jurisdiction of the federal and state courts over most types of federal law cases is said to be "concurrent" (the courts of both systems can entertain these cases).
Cases arising under federal law in state court if the D doesn't remove them to federal court.
Cases where P sues in state court for state claims and D relies on federal law as defense.
Cases where P sues in state court and D asserts a counterclaim arising under federal law.
Supplemental Jurisdiction allows claims that could not have entered federal court on their own to be heard by a federal court if they are part of a case over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction.
Ex: B sues S in federal court (b/c of diversity) for $250k in injuries after a car accident, S's counterclaim against B for $500 in damages to her car falls within the court's supplemental jurisdiction b/c it is factually related to B's claim, even though S would not be able to file the $500 suit in federal court on its own (because of amt in controversy requirement).
Supplemental Jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. §1367, a 1990 statute. Before 1990, Supp. Jurisdiction was governed by common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
Does the federal court have the constitutional power to hear the state law claim?
Separate claims that one would expect to be tried in one judicial proceeding- commonsense approach.
If power exists, should the court in its discretion assert pendent jurisdiction?
SCOTUS held that if the federal court has a basis for subject matter jurisdiction over one of the P's claims, it may hear other claims that arise out of the same "nucleus of operative fact."
The reasoning was that the Framers must have understood that cases involve multiple claims, and that they must have contemplated that the federal court would hear the entire dispute, as long as there was a "federal hook" from which to append the other, jurisdictionally insufficient claims.
SCOTUS explained that federal courts can't hear claims just because they are within the constitutional scope of Article III as explained by Gibbs; Congress must authorize them to hear the claims as well, by statute. Even if allowed to do so, federal courts cannot resolve all claims in the case unless a federal statute authorizes the federal court to hear the related claims.
The Court ruled that unless Congress had expressly authorized jurisdiction over the pendent parties, the lack of such an authorization was fatal.
This was different from Aldinger v. Howard and Kroger, which required that there be evidence that Congress had rejected the pendent party jurisdiction in order for jurisdiction to be invalid.
Essentially, Finley was the death knell for pendent party jurisdiction, because if there were a statute that expressly allowed for jurisdiction then there would be no need to invoke the doctrine, and without such a statute the doctrine could not be employed.
The Finley court invited Congress to do something about it. Congress responded with §1367.
Congress reacted by enacting 28 USC 1367(a) which broadly authorizes federal courts to exercise "supplemental jurisdiction"
§1367(a)- incorporates Gibbs limits on claims over which there is no independent basis of jurisdiction to those that are part of the same constitutional case or controversy as the jurisdiction-conferring claim.
Most courts use the "common nucleus of operative fact" principle.
Some give §1367(a) a broader reading, allowing sup jurisdiction over claims that have only a "loose factual connection" to the jurisdiction-conferring claim.
If a claim satisfies the Gibbs test, it satisfies the statute and vice versa.
§1367(a) expressly allows the addition of new parties.
Although the statute recognizes the importance of congressional intent, it no longer allows a court to infer or imply congressional intent to negate. A court must find that Congress has "expressly provided otherwise by federal statute."
§1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction where a district court's jurisdiction is "founded solely on §1332," the diversity statute.
This was an attempt to codify Kroger ruling.
The purpose for this exception to 1367(a) is to prevent parties from evading the Strawbridge complete diversity rule.
1367(b) does not apply when the extra parties are brought in by the D.
§1367(c) sets out four grounds on which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Sharp split among federal circuits on these questions. Most courts say it preserves the full range of discretion recognized in Gibbs, while others take the position that the statute strictly cabins a court's discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction.
§1367(d) says that if a federal court refuses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the statute of limitations is tolled for the period during which the federal suit was pending and for at least 30 days after the dismissal.
SOL is tolled only if the state law claim in question in fact fell within the courts §1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction.
Ex: In Barry Aviation v. Land O'Lakes, the Court said that §1367(d) does not apply to P's claims that Ds breached the parties' contract, because these claims are not part of the same case or controversy as federal constitutional claims.
SCOTUS also held that §1367(d) does not apply to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting States, because the 11th amendment bars a federal court from hearing claims against a state w/o the state's consent.
(FALLBACK PROVISION) A judicial district in which any D is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
If Ds reside in different districts but all within the same state, venue is proper in any district in which one D resides in that state.
Subsection (3) is a fallback provision that is only available in unusual circumstances when there is no district anywhere in the US where venue would be proper under (1) or (2).
"Except as otherwise provided by law" means that 1391 will apply unless there is a special venue statute for the type of claim the P brings. For example, tort claims against the US must be brought in the district where the P resides or where the act or omission complained of occurred.
Venue is proper under (2) for any district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place, even if substantial events also took place in other districts. We don't have to choose which events are most substantial.
28 USC 1391(b) governs venue in federal suits not based on diversity jurisdiction. 1391(a) and 1391(b) are the same except for subsection (3), which states that venue is proper where any D "may be found." Again, subsection (3) only applies if (1) and (2) cannot.
1391(a) and 1391(b) apply equally with individuals and corporations. Thus, the only outstanding issue is residence.
D corporations shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.
In a state with more than one judicial district and in which a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction the time an action is commenced, the corporation is deemed to reside in any district in that state where its contacts with that district would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if it were a separate state. If there is no such district, the corporation is deemed to reside in the district where is has the most significant contacts.
Most courts hold that a corporation is subject to general in personam jurisdiction in both the state of its principal place of business and the state of its incorporation. Corporations can be residents of multiple states. Thus, venue is proper in these locations.
However, be careful in multi-district states; personal jurisdiction over a D is state-wide while venue is only district-wide.
SCOTUS held that a federal district court could dismiss for forum non conveniens on the grounds that even though it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, practical factors suggest that it should be litigated somewhere else.
The federal transfer-of-venue statute, 28 USC 1404(a), was enacted as a response to Gilbert.
A judge may transfer a case filed in their court to the more appropriate federal district instead of dismissing for forum non conveniens.
The standard for transfer is broad ("for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice"), but the factors of Gulf Oil govern transfer decisions as well.
From Hoffman, a case can only be transferred under 1404(a) to a district where it could have been filed originally (personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue).
If a federal statute, constitutional provision, or treaty applies, it will provide the governing law.
Otherwise, federal courts should apply relevant state law.
The RDA refers only to state statutes, not to the common law decisions of state courts.
In cases where no federal statute or state statute applies, courts do not have to rely on state common law decisions; they can look to the common law of any state or even treatises for authority.
Federal courts in diversity cases could reach their own decisions about the proper rule in common law cases, even if those conclusions contradicted the governing case law of the state in which they sat.
An out-of-state party to a state action has a distinct advantage.
If out-of-state law favored the out-of-state party, they could sue in that state court. The in-state defendant can't remove in diversity cases (1441(b)), so they are stuck in that state court.
If federal courts applied a more favorable rule, the out-of-state party could sue in federal court. There is no right to remove from federal to state court.
Thus, the out-of-state party has a choice of different rules since it has a choice of two different court systems.
SCOTUS held that Swift's interpretation of the RDA let to an unconstitutional assumption of power by the federal courts since they were making state law through these diversity cases.
The RDA must be interpreted to require federal courts to apply not only the state statutes, but also the common law of the state in a diversity case.
In federal question cases, if a state claim is brought in through supplemental jurisdiction, the federal court must still apply state law to that claim even though federal law will apply to the federal claim.
How should a federal court apply state law if there are conflicting state court decisions about the issue at hand?
SCOTUS ruled that district courts should use the "supreme court predictive" approach; federal judges should try to predict what the high state court would say.
A federal judge should very rarely make the prediction that a state supreme court case would be overruled.
How should a federal court proceed if there is no precedent at all on the issue?
In the same vein, the court should try to predict what state appellate courts would say.
As an aside, if the issue were to come up after the diversity ruling, the state court is not bound to follow the federal judge's decision; the state court may take it into account in his decision, but he is not bound to follow it.
Which state's law should a federal court use in diversity cases?
Every state has choice-of-law rules to deal with this problem. From Klaxon, federal diversity courts should use the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.
Thus, a NY federal court should apply whatever state substantive law the New York state court would apply to the case.
This reasoning was based on the fact that Erie mandated that the case should come out the same way in federal court as it would in the state court of the state where the federal court sat.
This could create forum-shopping since a party could choose the federal court in a state with a choice-of-law provision that would benefit them. The Klaxon court recognized this risk but shrugged it off as inevitable.
The choice of state or federal court in a diversity case should not affect the outcome of the case.
Thus, if federal practice differs from state practice, the court should determine whether the case would come out differently if it applied its own rule. If it would, a federal diversity court should use the state rule instead.
York mandated deference to state law even in areas where there was constitutional authority to make a separate federal rule.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause, provide constitutional authority for federal courts to apply their own rules on matters of procedure, like the method of service of process. York, however, required deference to state law even in matters of litigation procedure under the outcome-determinative test.
Where the federal court could, constitutionally, apply its own rule, and is making a discretionary policy decision whether to apply state law to ensure uniform outcomes, the court may balance that uniformity policy against other policies.
Other policies might outweigh the uniformity policy posited by Erie and York.
In cases leading up to Byrd, diversity courts had applied state rules even in matters having to do with procedure in conducting the litigation under the outcome-determinative test, but they have constitutional authority to follow a separate federal practice.
The York policy of uniform outcomes must be considered along with other policies, which might sometimes outweigh the uniformity policy.
For example, the division of functions between judge and jury in federal cases, under the influence of the 7th Amendment, was an important consideration supporting the use of federal procedure in federal court in diversity cases.
Since the state law was not "bound up with rights and obligations of the parties" (in which case the federal could would have to defer to it), the Court could consider "affirmative countervailing considerations."
Byrd did not overrule York, it merely said that balancing was necessary in matters relating to procedure.
Only if important federal policies would be compromised by following state rules might the federal court choose to follow a federal procedural rule in the face of a contrary state rule.
Court recognized two different tracks.
York dealt with judicial practice of applying laches; Byrd dealt with the judicial practice of having the jury decide all factual issues. There was no Federal Rule involved.
Of course, in pure substantive matters or those bound up in substantive rights, state law must apply.
For grey areas, Hanna prescribed a more focused version of the York outcome-determinative test to decide between state law and federal judicial practices which are not a part of the FRCP.
The court should consider whether applying the federal approach rather than the state rule would lead to (1) forum shopping and (2) "inequitable administration of the laws" (significantly different litigation opportunities for diversity litigants than for those who must proceed in state court).
The Court said that the question of equitable administration should be viewed prospectively. In other words, would the litigant before filing suit have greater litigation opportunities in federal court if that court followed its own practice instead of state law?
In the instant case, the Court said that if the service rule in question were a judicial practice and not a part of the FRCP, state law would not have to be used since the federal approach would only require the P to serve process in a slightly different manner, a difference too slight to affect her choice of forum or provide unfair advantages to diverse Ps over non-diverse Ps.
This analysis was dicta, however, because the issue in Hanna dealt directly with a FRCP Rule.
The Federal Rules were adopted by SCOTUS, under authority delegated to it by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act (28 USC 2072).
The REA requires that the Rules created by the Court be "arguably procedural" and not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right."
For conflicts involving a Federal Rule, the question is whether the Court had the power to adopt the Rule. It must be broadly procedural (under Sibbach) and must not alter substantive rights.
If it meets this two-part test, the Rule is valid and will apply, even if it leads to a different outcome from what the P would obtain in state court.
So, if the conflict involves a federal judicial practice, the "modified outcome determinative test" of Hanna I applies, If it involves a conflict between state law and a FRCP Rule, the question under Hanna II is whether the Court had the power to write the rule (i.e. procedural and not alter substantive rights).
State practice provided that the P must file suit within the limitations period and serve process in the action on the D within 60 days to avoid being barred. Under FRCP Rule 3, an action is "commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
If Rule 3 provides that filing the complaint satisfies the limitations period, an action might be barred under state law but timely under the Federal Rule.
The Court avoided this problem by holding that FRCP Rule 3 did not directly address the issue of meeting the limitations period and does not affect state statutes of limitations.
Thus, since there was no "direct collision" between the state rule and FRCP Rule 3, Hanna I analysis through the "modified outcome-determinative test" applies.
It seems likely that if there is a logical limiting construction that avoids a direct conflict, the court will lean towards that construction (and Hanna I analysis).
The court must assume that the facts alleged in the complaint are true.
Given this assumption of truthfulness, do the facts in the complaint set forth a claim for which the court could grant the P some kind of remedy?
In most cases, the P's complain will meet this minimum test.
The purpose of a summary judgment motion is to dispose of a case where the opposing side feels that the party will not be able to prove all of the elements of the complaint.
The movant must challenge the non-movant's case and supports the motion with admissible evidence to show that there is "no genuine issue of material fact."
The non-movant must respond by demonstrating that there is a "genuine issue of material fact," or the motion will be granted.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in the rule, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of their pleading; they must respond with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
The purpose of a directed verdict motion is to ask the trial judge to take the case away from the jury, on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict for the P.
Motion should be granted where there is "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis" for the jury to find for the party opposing the motion.
Judge should not decide whether D's evidence is stronger than P's, only whether a jury could rationally find for the P on the evidence before it.
Judge must assume that the jury will construe the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and not weight the credibility of witnesses.
If certain testimony would support two inferences, one that supports recovery and one that does not, the judge should assume the jury will make the inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
However, judge should consider the "uncontradicted, unimpeached evidence" for the movant.
This does not disrupt the Seventh Amendment since it only guarantees a jury decision where there is a legitimate dispute in the evidence, where a meaningful dispute exists about whether the facts the P must establish are true.
If there is a such a conflict in the evidence, so that reasonable jurors could find for either party, the jury should resolve the conflict by "finding the facts."
If the P has no evidence, or clearly insufficient evidence, to establish a required element of the claim, courts have held that the jury has no legitimate role to play, because its constitutional role as the finder of facts is not required.
"Burden of Production" - P bears the burden to convince the judge that their evidence is strong enough on each element of their claim to support a rational verdict in their favor.
If the judge concludes that the P has met the burden of production on each element of their claim, JMOL will be denied, case go to the jury.
Reviewing JMOL before verdict on appeal - If a JMOL before verdict is overturned, the case must be remanded for a new trial. Thus, trial courts are more wary of granting them because of the possibility for waste.
The standard for granting the motion after verdict is the same as the motion made before the case goes to the jury--that the evidence is too weak to support a rational verdict for the P.
Reviewing JMOL after verdict on appeal--if the appellate court finds that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding for the P, can just overrule the trial judge's JMOL decision and enter the judgment based upon the jury's decision.
Motion must be made within 10 days of the jury's verdict for the P.
Thus, a lawyer cannot use new reasoning for a Rule 50(b) motion not used in his 50(a) motion.
Reconsidering the jury's verdict violates the Seventh Amendment unless the judge reserved the right to do so on a motion made before the case went to the jury.
Rules 50(a) and 50(b) do not apply in judge-tried cases.
A procedural rule was ignored or broken at trial (evidence admitted when it shouldn't have been).
This is better than having the case appealed and sent back for a new trial.
The court will not ordinarily grant a new trial for trial mistakes unless an objection was made at the time and the judge made the mistaken ruling.
An improper jury instruction was given.
The judge has the authority to protect against improper jury behavior based on sympathy for the P or other improper grounds.
Can only be given if the jury's verdict is "against the great weight of the evidence," "represents a miscarriage of justice," or the jury has reached a result which is "seriously erroneous."
The judge may consider the credibility of the evidence; unlike JMOL motions where judge is asking whether the jury could find for the P if they believe the evidence, judges in new trial motions must ask whether the jury was seriously wrong in choosing to believe that evidence.
Much more intrusive on the role of jury as fact finder.
Under Rule 23(a), there are four prerequisites for class action treatment.
Numerosity- Class must be sufficiently numerous that "joinder of all members is impracticable."
"Common nucleus of operative fact"
Core issues to justify it.
Typicality- in terms of claims and defensive of representative parties.
Adequacy of Representativeness of lawyers and class representative.
Named class members have to be representative of the class.
Rule 23(b)(1)(a) for cases creating a risk of inconsistent adjudications that would create "incompatible standards of conduct" for the party opposing the class.
Rule 23(b)(2) when D has acted or refused to act in a way generally applicable to the class, so that "final injunctive relief" (or declaratory relief) is appropriate.
Most common for "damage" class actions.
The common questions of law or fact "predominate" over individual issues.
The class action approach is "superior" to other approaches.
Ex: Plane crash- all different injuries, very personalized, each person can get their own lawyer.
The "manageability" of the class action.

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