Source: http://crimapp.com/index_files/category-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:10:24+00:00

Document:
After a two delay because of Hurricane Sandy, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Chaidez v United States, No. 11-820. In Chaidez, the Court will decide whether its 2010 ruling in Padilla v Kentucky, __ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) is retroactive. Padilla stated that counsel has a duty to inform a non-citizen client about deportation consequences of the plea. SCOTUS blog has a nice summary of the case.Update: Here is a link to the oral argument transcript. Here is a link to the audio transcript. I’ve read the transcript on this one and it is going to be close.
There is an old lawyer’s joke that the “two things you never want to see how they are made are law and sausages.” The joke applies mostly to legislation (rather than litigation) where there is horse trading to get legislation through and get opponents to back down. HB5804 is the prime example. Most parties (prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts) agree that our current system is “broke,” but can’t agree on the fix or who is going to pay for the fix.
HB5804 is designed to increase the quality of representation, but has had to yield to various needs. Just as the bill was on the verging of passing, the Michigan Attorney General’s Office attempted to derail the bill. They argued that because most ineffective assistance of counsel challenges fail, there is no problem. The Sixth Amendment Center has a nice piece on the bill, the Attorney General’s 11th hour efforts to derail this bipartisan effort and what is wrong with their position.
Today, the Michigan Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in People v Trakhtenberg, Supreme Court No. 143386. While this in many ways in a garden variety ineffective assistance of counsel challenge -- Ms. Frankel alleges that the defense counsel was ineffective in variety of ways. She is arguing that Mr. Trakhtenberg’s attorney failed to properly investigate the case or impeach a witness a witness (Liliya Tetarly) with evidence of bias.
The interesting question in this appeal is whether losing the civil suit somehow precludes Mr. Trakhtenberg from pursuing his criminal ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Ms. Frankel is trying to overturn fairly established law in this regard. Here is link to her brief. Here is a link to the prosecutor’s brief.
In this year of partisan bickering, it is rare to see both party’s agree to anything. A rarely-seen majority of Michigan House Representatives from both sides of the aisle introduced sweeping reform legislation on August 15, 2012, to transform the state’s broken and underfunded indigent defense system. This bill focuses on trial level representation. (Juvenileand appellate representation are not part of it). HB 5804 was co-sponsored by 38 Republicans and 37 Democrats. State Representative Tom McMillin (R – District 45) which tracks the Governor’s recommendation. For more information, click here.
On Wednesday March 21, 2012, the United States Supreme Court released the decision in Lafler v Cooper, finding that habeas relief was warranted due to ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining stage of the proceedings. Lafler was argued by SADO Assistant Defender Valerie Newman on October 31, 2011, with Assistant Defender Jacqueline McCann serving as second chair. The decisions in Lafler, and the related case of Missouri v Frye, are being hailed as "the single greatest revolution in the criminal justice process since provided indigents the right to counsel" - a quote from coverage in the New York Times. Additional materials and full coverage of events can be found on Scotusblog's website.
While SADO rightly turns to the New York Times for their praise, I think a better source of the importance of the ruling is to read what our enemies have to say. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation’s whose mission statement says that their goal is provide reduced rights for criminal defendants. Their blog utterly blasts the ruling and it is authored by no less than their lead counsel Kent Scheidegger.
Today’s New York Times contains an interesting article concerning the deplorable state of court-appointed counsel in New York State and the lawsuit brought by people challenging the court appointed counsel system. Kimberly Hurell-Harring was represented by court appointed counsel in Washington County, New York.
She was charged with smuggling a small amount of marijuana into a prison for her husband (an inmate at the facility). The court appointed counsel was a local favorite and the low ball bidder on the public defender contract. Counsel had multiple reprimands, suffered from depression, and was in trouble with the bar on other matters of neglect. He pled his client guilty to a non-existent felony. Tipped off about the case, the New York Civil Liberties Union sent an observer into the courthouse and watched. They reported that the attorney had virtually no contact with his client who rushed the case through. Ms. Hurell-Harring is the lead plaintiff in a civil suit challenging whether New York is providing adequate counsel to its indigent defendants and challenging the decision to leave the appointed counsel system in the hands of various counties. Except for the name of the suit, this could be Michigan. A similar suit is pending in the Michigan Courts and is currently on appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Except for the names of the parties, the facts are virtually the same. The ruling in this case could have a dramatic effect on Michigan law.
On January 12, the Court issued its decision in Smith v. Spisak, No. 08-724. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion, which seven other Justices joined in full; Justice Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court held that Ohio’s denial of Spisak’s underlying criminal appeal was reasonable. In the habeas corpus action, Spisak argued that (1) the jury instructions used at his trial unconstitutionally required the jury to consider mitigating factors only if the existence of each factor was unanimously found; and (2) his attorney was constitutionally ineffective, particularly during his closing argument – was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. As previously noted on this blog, the Supreme Court has taken a number of Michigan habeas corpus cases involving AEDPA deference including Berghuis v Smith (to be argued in two days). Many have wondered whether the Supreme Court has taken these cases to sending a warning to the Sixth Circuit Court about the probing level of its rulings. Justice Breyer’s authorship of the Court’s opinion is a tad disconcerting. Stay Tuned.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations requires the United States to inform a foreign national of his/her right to consular access (to talk to his home country’s embassy or consulate) upon arrest. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, April 24, 1962, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. In Sanchez-Lllamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 336 (2006), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a violation of Article 36 did not require suppression of evidence. See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1355, 170 L.Ed.2d (2008). Despite repeated orders from the International Court of Justice, Texas executed two suspects earlier this year where the evidence was clear that the convictions were based on confessions obtained in violation of the suspects rights to diplomatic access. Based on Sanchez-Llamas and these developments, many member of the bar (including this one) believed that this issue was not going to prevail in any domestic court.
The adoption of the Vienna Convention by the international community was “the single most important event in the entire history of the consular institution.” LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 26 (2d ed. 1991). When the United States ratified the treaty in 1969, it became the “supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Foreign nationals who are detained within the United States find themselves in a very vulnerable position. Separated from their families and far from their homelands, they suddenly find themselves swept into a foreign legal system. Language barriers, cultural barriers, lack of resources, isolation and unfamiliarity with local law create “an aura of chaos” around the foreign detainees, which can lead them to make serious legal missteps. Linda A. Malone, From Breard to Atkins to Malvo: Legal Incompetency and Human Rights Norms on the Fringes of the Death Penalty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 363, 392-93 (2004). In these situations, the consulate can serve as a “cultural bridge” between the foreign detainee and the legal machinery of the receiving state. William J. Aceves, Murphy v. Netherland, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 87, 89-90 (1998).
Of course, we assume that lawyers here are equipped to deal with language barriers; we also assume they are familiar with the law. Sometimes, however, the assistance of an attorney cannot entirely replace the unique assistance that can be provided by the consulate. The consulate can provide not only an explanation of the receiving state’s legal system but an explanation of how that system differs from the sending state’s system. See Linda Jane Springrose, Note, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 185, 195 (1999). This assistance can be invaluable because cultural misunderstandings can lead a detainee to make serious legal mistakes, particularly where a detainee’s cultural background informs the way he interacts with law enforcement officials and judges.
Thus far, the Court’s opinion matches the position articulated by dissents and the International Court of Justice. Now here is where the decision gets interesting. The Court stated that Sanchez-Llamas stated that the Government was required to provide a remedy for a violation and the remedy was to internalize this violation into our domestic law. While violation of a Vienna Convention Claim would not be a self-standing violation of the Constitution or federal law requiring suppression of a confession, it could be a Fifth Amendment or a Sixth Amendment violation.
W]e must address the Government’s argument that Sanchez-Llamas forecloses foreign nationals from bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on Article 36 violations. A close reading of Sanchez-Llamas suggests otherwise. While the Court rejected the argument that the treaty itself required suppression as a remedy, the Court stressed that there were other means of “vindicating Vienna Convention rights.” Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350, 126 S. Ct. 2669. Specifically, the Court stated that a defendant could raise an Article 36 violation as a part of a broader constitutional challenge, such as a challenge to the voluntariness of a statement under the Fifth Amendment. Id., 126 S. Ct. 2669; see also United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 886 (8th Cir. 2002). More importantly, the Court suggested that the Sixth Amendment could also serve as a vehicle for vindicating Article 36 rights. In a telling passage, the Court noted that an attorney’s failure to raise an Article 36 violation would not be “cause” for overriding a state’s procedural default rules, unless “the attorney’s overall representation falls below what is required by the Sixth Amendment.” Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 357 & n.6, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (emphasis added).
Osagiede is a testament to the value of persistence. Mr. Osagiede prevailed on an argument that most lawyers would have rejected.
Last week, I reported on the Sixth Circuit decision in VanHook v Anderson recognizing that post-Strickland decisions from the United States Supreme Court have tightened the duty of investigation required by defense counsel. Today the South Carolina Supreme Court reached essentially the same position in Council v State.
The Sixth Circuit reversed a habeas petitioner’s murder conviction where he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated at trial and on appeal because of his state attorney’s actual conflict of interest. Boykin v Webb, Sixth Circuit No. 06-5775.
In VanHook v. Anderson the Sixth Circuit recently granted a habeas corpus in a capital case where the evidence was that counsel did minimal investigation regarding the Defendant’s mental health. Since the Court’s 1984 ruling in Strickland v Washington, the United States Supreme Court has applied a two part test for determining whether counsel was ineffective: (a) whether there was a breach of counsel’s duty to the defendant; and, (b) “but for” that error, the defendant stood a reasonable chance for acquittal. While the analysis has not technically changed, many commentators have pointed out that later high court decisions have placed greater emphasis on Strickland’s language about the need for basic investigation. See, e.g. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (incorporating the American Bar Association Guidelines For the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases as the professional standard of performance), and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (same). Judge Merritt’s opinion in VanHook does a wonderful job at discussing this point and is a must read for any appellate practitioner. Hopefully, the decision survives en banc review. Mr. VanHook has previously won panel decisions on other grounds only to have defeat snatched from the jaws of victory by the en banc court.

References: v. 
 art. 36
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.