Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/454/950/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:50:28+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 454 › MICHAEL v. U.S.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 1981.
The District Court in this criminal case sustained petitioner's motion to suppress on the ground that the evidence in question was obtained by Drug Enforcement Administration agents with the aid of an electronic tracking device or "beeper" which was installed on the exterior of petitioner's rented van and for which no warrant was obtained.
legal drug manufacture outweighs the slight infringement of any expectation of privacy.
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 153, 311 (1964); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 734, n. 2, 1010, n. 2 (1947); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 685, n. 3, 1459, n. 3 (1949).
This is such a case. The law of the Fifth Circuit is now settled. The announced rule will influence, if not determine, the disposition of this case. More importantly, granting certiorari will enable us to resolve the clear conflicts in the Circuits over the use of beepers. This case presents the very set of facts necessary to decide whether warrantless installation of such devices is permissible and, if so, whether reasonable suspicion is adequate justification. Here DEA agents did not have probable cause to support warrantless installation. The panel opinion stated that "only reasonable suspicion existed-at the time the beeper was installed-to believe that the defendant was connected with the criminal activity of another suspect (for whom probable cause did exist)." 622 F.2d 744, 745 (1980) (footnote omitted). The en banc court agreed, but found such a level of suspicion to be adequate. 645 F.2d 252 ( 1981).
Failure to exercise our jurisdiction at this time will not resolve this recurring issue or enhanced the factual record. I would grant the petition.
[Footnote *] When Justice REHNQUIST, acting in his capacity of Circuit Justice, denied a motion for a stay in a case from the Ninth Circuit raising this issue, he observed that "in all probability this Court may eventually feel bound to decide whether Government agencies must have probable cause to install tracking devices on motor vehicles" because "the question is an important and recurring one." Thus Justice REHNQUIST thought that the Court would grant certiorari if "such an action would appear to offer the strong likelihood of deciding an issue on which a square conflict exists." Miroyan v. United States, 439 U.S. 1338, 1342-1343, 20-21 (1978). With this case the square conflict has emerged.
Other Circuits have reserved the issue because judicial authorization, consent, or exigent circumstances justified the installation. E. G., United States v. Chavez, 603 F.2d 143, 145-146 (CA10 1979); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (CA8 1979).

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