Source: http://intermediatescrutiny.com/2016/01/theories-of-discrimination-in-the-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:45:41+00:00

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The theories of discrimination are important because they allow courts to evaluate discrimination in a legal context. To be able to measure the existence and extent of discrimination it is necessary to have a theory (concept, or model) of how such discrimination might occur and what its effects might be. In a legal sense, discrimination can be broken down into either disparate treatment or disparate impact.1Looking through legal treatises and the Internet it is difficult to find good working definitions of the theories of discrimination. No matter if the context is employment, racial profiling, or in death penalty proceedings these theories can be applied and help to understand how a claim of discrimination can be made.
Disparate treatment is intentional treatment2that occurs when an unlawful action is the motivating factor.3 The Supreme Court has “consistently used conventional disparate treatment theory, in which proof of intent to discriminate is required, to review. . . decisions that were based on the exercise of personal judgment or the application of inherently subjective criteria.”4 A simplified way to describe disparate treatment is to equate it with intentional treatment. There is a little more to it, but hopefully it will be flushed out.
When using comparative evidence in a disparate treatment context, using the correct comparators are essential in establishing that individuals or class members are similarly situated. Almost by definition, one sub-set of discrimination is: the practice of unfairly treating a person or group differently.15 The problem courts deal with is how close a match does a comparator have to be.
Even though the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination based on race, there are limitations on how discrimination can be analyzed. “[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional Solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”48 Thus, in the death penalty context when asserting a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, more than just disparate impact needs to be asserted. “Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”49 The Equal Protection Clause is supplemented by the language of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act expressly permitting the use of disparate impact claims in employment discrimination contexts.50 There is no statutory equivalent of Title VII for claims of equal protection in death penalty proceedings allowing for a pure claim of disparate impact.
A facially neutral policy can be applied so as to “invidiously discriminate,” against a race or a class of people, would trigger the Equal Protections Clause.51 However, it appears that when a facially neutral policy is applied to invidiously discriminate, there is an intent to discriminate which would not make it a pure claim of disparate impact then, but also that of disparate treatment. Disparate treatment is a claim that can be asserted under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Thus, Washington v. Davis precludes a mere showing of disparate impact when a claim of due process or equal protection is made. Since claims of discrimination typically involve the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause, then more than just disparate impact must be proved.
15-V Evaluating Employment Decisions, EEOC Compl. Man., at *1 (BNA).
To describe ‘intentional discrimination’ several synonyms are used by the United States Supreme Court: invidious discrimination, discriminatory intent, and discriminatory purpose. All of these terms used by the Supreme Court of the United States all refer to the state of mind of the actor. Even though all of these terms will surface throughout this paper, they will reference to the intent.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988).
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279, 288 (1997).
Disparate treatment is intentional treatment that occurs when an unlawful action is the motivating factor. 15-V Evaluating Employment Decisions, EEOC Compl. Man., at *1 (BNA).
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
Disproportionate impact is not enough to prove a claim of discrimination by itself. See Disparate Treatment discussion infra.
Section 604 Theories of Discrimination, 604.3 Proof of Disparate Treatment, EEOC Compl. Man., at *1-8 (BNA).
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 749 (2011).
Coleman v. Donahue, 667 F.3d 835, 848 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 852 (quoting Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2008).
Statistical evidence can be relevant in proving an individual case of disparate treatment because it is evidence of the presence of a discriminatory motive, but does not prove causation.[note]Section 604 Theories of Discrimination, 604.3 Proof of Disparate Treatment, EEOC Compl. Man., at *5 (BNA); see Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (stating “[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important role in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 604 Theories of Discrimination, 604.3 Proof of Disparate Treatment, EEOC Compl. Man., at *5 (BNA).
Section 604 Theories of Discrimination, 604.3 Proof of Disparate Treatment, EEOC Compl. Man., at *6 (BNA).
Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Orange Cnty., Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1105 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Section 604 Theories of Discrimination, 604.3 Proof of Disparate Treatment, EEOC Compl. Man., at *6 (BNA).
Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating “circumstantial evidence alone can support a finding of political discrimination”).
Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999).
Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989) (stating “a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence”).
“Perhaps on average circumstantial evidence requires a longer chain of inferences, but if each link is solid, the evidence may be compelling-may be more compelling than eyewitness testimony, which depends for its accuracy on the accuracy of the eyewitness’s recollection as well as on his honesty.” Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages Illinois, Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2006).
Doe v. United Postal Serv., 317 F.3d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Id. (quoting Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003)).
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).
Shaping Employment Discrimination Law – The Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1971) (stating “EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, issued August 24, 1966, provide: The Commission accordingly interprets ‘professionally developed ability test’ to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to measure the applicant’s ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or organization claiming expertise in test preparation does not, without more, justify its use within the meaning of Title VII.’”).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
Section 604 Theories of Discrimination, 604.7 Adverse Impact, EEOC Compl. Man., at *1 (BNA).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
The Statistics of Discrimination Using Statistical Evidence in Discrimination Cases, Part 1. Introduction to Statistics and Discrimination, Chapter 2. Statistics: An Introduction, § 2:5. The problem of causation, at 1 (West 2012).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2344, (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating “only intentional discrimination may violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”).
E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (employment discrimination).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976).
Id. at 239 (original emphasis included).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
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