Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=17-6046&s=OK&d=109516
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:35:32+00:00

Document:
being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). He unsuccessfully pursued a direct appeal and relief under 28 U.S.C.
COA on Mr. Robinson’s remaining claims.
has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” Id.
that any of these convictions failed to qualify as “violent felony” under the ACCA.
States v. Robinson, 304 F. App’x 746, 754 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
guilty to the charge in 1973.
544 F. App’x 798, 801 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
§ 2255 motion relying on Johnson.
not rely on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
issue in his § 2255 motion. Mr. Robinson does not challenge that decision on appeal.
States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (8th Cir. 2017) (analyzing Ark. Code Ann.
appropriate analysis. See United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir.
2009) (recognizing that this court has the authority to expand a COA).
intent to commit a crime.” 495 U.S. at 599. That is known as “generic” burglary.
(1987) under Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256-57, and Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S.
254, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013).
of generic burglary in order to convict the defendant.” Id.
“occupiable structure” was defined to include vehicles, see id. § 5-39-101(1) (1987).
Aplt. Supp. Opening Br. at 7-8.
necessarily admitted to or was convicted of the elements of generic burglary.
identified the structures burglarized as an office and two residences).
attempted burglary qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause. Id. at 209.
as a burglary under the elements or enumerated-offenses clauses. See id. at 197.
clause in sentencing Mr. Robinson.
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
circuit’s precedent, this conclusion is not reasonably debatable. See United States v.
see also United States v. Brown, No. 16-6373, 2017 WL 3772654, at *3 (10th Cir.
progeny, we deny a COA on this issue.
criminal and therefore he was sentenced beyond the statutory maximum.
Mr. Robinson cannot pursue any claim based on new law except one under Johnson.
claim, we deny a COA on that issue.
reopening violated his right to due process and subjected him to double jeopardy.
because he failed to show good cause why he did not raise the claim on direct appeal.
See Robinson, 401 F. App’x at 335, 336.
conviction. A COA is denied as to all other claims.
was not part of “the relevant background legal environment” at the time of Mr.
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
extended their burglary definitions to include “entries into boats and cars.” Id.
court may not follow it.
Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 26 (emphasis added).
v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 771 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled by United States v.
Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc))).
Silva, 608 F.3d 663; United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir.
301 F. App’x 790 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); United States v. Roberts, 250 F.
App’x 843 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); United States v. Tenderholt, 149 F.
515 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
good law now—and, more to the point, was not good law at the time of Mr.
order and judgment in this case.

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