Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/79/204/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:25:38+00:00

Document:
1. Although taxes levied, as on property, by a state upon vessels owned by its citizens and based on a valuation of the same, are not prohibited by the federal Constitution, yet taxes cannot be imposed on them by the state "at so much per ton of the registered tonnage." Such taxes are within the prohibition of the Constitution, that "no state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage."
2. Nor is the case varied by the fact that the vessels were not only owned by citizens of the state, but exclusively engaged in trade between places within the state.
at the port where such vessels are registered, if practicable; otherwise at any other port or landing within the state where such vessel may be."
The tax collector was directed by the act to demand, in each year, of the person in charge of the vessel, if the taxes lead been paid. If a receipt for the same was not produced, he was to immediately assess the same according to tonnage, and if such tax was not paid on demand, he was to seize the boat, &c., and, after notice, proceed and sell the same for payment of the tax, &c., and pay the surplus into the county treasury for the use of the owner. If the vessel could not be seized, the collector was to make the amount of the tax out of the real and personal estate of the owner, &c.
Under this act, one Lott, tax collector of the State of Alabama, demanded of Cox, the owner of the Dorrance, a steamer of 321 tons, and valued at $5,000, and of several other steamers, certain stems as taxes; and under an act of 1867, identical in language with the one of 1866, just quoted, demanded from the Trade Company of Mobile certain sums on like vessels owned by them; the tax in all the cases being proportioned to the registered tonnage of the vessel.
The steamboats, the subject of the tax, were owned exclusively by citizens of the State of Alabama, and were engaged in the navigation of the Alabama, Bigbee, and Mobile Rivers, carrying freight and passengers between Mobile and other points of said rivers, altogether within the limits of that state. These waters were navigable from the sea for vessels of "ten and more tons burden," and it was not denied that there were ports of delivery on them above the highest points to which these boats plied. The owners of the boats were not assessed for any other tax on them than the one here claimed. The boats were enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade. Though running, therefore, between points altogether within the limits of the State of Alabama, the boats were, as it seemed, [Footnote 1] of that sort on which Congress lays a tonnage duty.
Cox, under compulsion and protest, paid the tax demanded of him, and then brought assumpsit in one of the inferior state courts of Alabama, to get back the money. The Trade Company refused to pay, and filed a bill in a like court, to enjoin the collector from proceeding to collect. The ground of resistance to the tax in each case was this, that being laid in proportion to the tonnage of the vessel, the tax was laid in a form and manner which the state was prohibited by the already quoted section of the Constitution from adopting. The right of the state to lay a tax on vessels according to their value and as property was not denied, but on the contrary, conceded. [Footnote 2] Judgment being given in each case against the validity of the tax, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which decided that it was lawful. To review that judgment the case was now here.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the judgment of the Court, giving an opinion in each of the cases.
Assumpsit for money had and received is an appropriate remedy to recover back moneys illegally exacted by a collector as taxes in all jurisdictions where no other remedy is given, unless the tax was voluntarily paid or sonic statutory conditions are annexed to the exercise of the right to sue, which were unknown at common law.
"be assessed and collected at the port where such vessels are registered, if practicable, otherwise at any other port or landing within the state where such vessel may be. [Footnote 4]"
Annexed to the agreed statement exhibited in the record is a schedule of the taxes imposed and collected, in which are also given the names of the respective steamboats, their tonnage and their value, and the proportion assessed by the county as well as that imposed by the state. Committed as the assessments were to the same person to collect, it is immaterial whether the taxes were assessed for the state or for the county, as the collector demanded the whole amount of the plaintiffs, and they paid the same under protest, the sums specified as county taxes including also a charge made by the collector for fees in collecting the money.
Separately stated, the taxes were as follows: on the steamboat C. W. Dorrance, 321 tons burden, valued at five thousand dollars, taxed, state tax $321, county tax $322.25; Flirt, tonnage 214 tons, valued at two thousand five hundred dollars, taxed, state tax $214, county tax $215.25; Cherokee, tonnage 310 tons, valued at fifteen thousand five hundred dollars, taxed, state tax $310, county tax $311.25; Coquette, tonnage 245 tons, valued at four thousand dollars, taxed, state tax $245, county tax $246.25; St. Charles, tonnage 331 tons, valued at fifteen thousand dollars, taxed, state tax $331, county tax $332.25; showing that the county tax as well as the state tax is one dollar per ton of the registered tonnage of the steamboats, exclusive of the fees charged by the collector.
Demand of the taxes having been made by the collector, the plaintiffs protested that the same were illegal, but they ultimately paid the same to prevent the collector from seizing the steamboats and selling the same in case they refused to pay the amount. They paid the sum of two thousand eight hundred and forty-eight dollars and twenty-five cents as the amount of the taxes, fees, and expenses demanded by the defendant, and brought an action of assumpsit against the collector in the circuit court of the state for Mobile County to recover back the amount upon the ground that the sum was illegally exacted. Judgment was rendered in that court for the plaintiffs, the court deciding that the facts disclosed in the agreed statement showed that the taxes were illegal as having been levied in violation of the federal Constitution. Appeal was taken by the defendant to the supreme court of the state, where the parties were again heard, but the supreme court of the state, differing in opinion from the circuit court where the suit was commenced, rendered judgment for the defendant, whereupon the plaintiffs sued out a writ of error and removed the record into this Court for reexamination.
were in direct contravention of the prohibition of the Constitution that "No state shall, without the consent of Congress, levy any duty of tonnage," and the proposition of the plaintiffs was and still is that the act of the legislature of the state directs in express terms that such taxes shall be levied on all steamboats, vessels, and other watercrafts plying in the navigable waters of the state.
"All navigable waters within the said state shall forever remain public highways, free to the citizens of the said state and of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor imposed by the said state. [Footnote 7]"
Such a concession, however, does not advance the argument much for the defendant, as it is not only equally true but absolutely certain that no state can, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, and the question still remains to be determined whether the taxes in this case were or were not levied as duties of tonnage, as it is clear, if they were, that the judgment of the state court must be reversed.
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the states attempted to regulate commerce, and they also levied duties on imports and exports and duties of tonnage, and it was the embarrassments growing out of such regulations and conflicting obligations which mainly led to the abandonment of the Confederation and to the more perfect union under the present Constitution.
Authority is also conferred upon Congress to lay and collect taxes, but this grant does not supersede the power of the states to tax for the support of their own governments, nor is the exercise of that power by the states, unless it extends to objects prohibited by the Constitution, an exercise of any portion of the power that is granted to the United States.
Whether the act of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises was a branch of the taxing power or of the power to regulate commerce was directly under consideration in the case last cited, and it was conclusively settled that the exercise of such a power must be classed with the power to levy taxes. Had the Constitution, therefore, contained no prohibition, it is quite clear that it would have been competent for the states to levy duties on imports, exports, or tonnage, as they bad done under the Confederation.
Evidently the word "license," as used in that act, as the Court said in that case, means permission or authority, and it is equally clear that a license to do any particular thing is a permission or authority to do that thing, and if granted by a person having power to grant it, that it transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize.
Steamboats, as well as sailing ships and vessels, are required to be enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and the record shows that all the steamboats taxed in this case had conformed to all the regulations of Congress in that regard, that they were duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade and were engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight within the limits of the state upon waters navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more toils burden.
Tonnage duties, to a greater or less extent, have been imposed by Congress ever since the federal government was organized under the Constitution to the present time. They have usually been exacted when the ship or vessel entered the port, and have been collected in a manner not substantially different from that prescribed in the act of the state legislature under consideration. Undisputed authority exists in Congress to impose such duties, and it is not pretended that any consent has ever been given by Congress to the state to exercise any such power.
"as a way or mode to determine and ascertain the tax to be assessed on the steamboats, and to furnish a rule or rate to govern the assessors in the performance of their duties."
tendency to strengthen the argument for the defendant, as the suggestion concedes what is obvious from the schedule, that the taxes are levied without any regard to the value of the steamboats. But the proposition involved in the suggestion cannot be admitted, as by the very terms of the act the tax is levied on the steamboats wholly irrespective of the value of the vessels as property, and solely and exclusively on the basis of their cubical contents as ascertained by the rules of admeasurement and computation prescribed by the act of Congress.
not as property, that they are required to contribute to the revenues of the state.
Speaking of the same prohibition, THE CHIEF JUSTICE said in that case that those words in their most obvious and general sense describe a duty proportioned to the tonnage of the vessel -- a certain rate oil each ton -- which is exactly what is directed by the provision in the tax act before the Court, but he added that it seems plain, if the Constitution be taken in that restricted sense, it would not fully accomplish the intent of the framers, as the prohibition upon the states against levying duties on imports or exports would be ineffectual if it did not also extend to duties on the ships which serve as the vehicles of conveyance, which was doubtless intended by the prohibition of any duty of tonnage.
"It was not only a pro rata tax which was prohibited, but any duty on the ship, whether a fixed sum upon its whole tonnage or a sum to be ascertained by comparing the amount of tonnage with the rate of duty."
"the levy of the tax in question is expressly prohibited, as the schedule shows that it is exactly proportioned to the registered tonnage of the steamboats plying in the navigable waters of the state."
such laws where Congress has not legislated, but it is clear that such laws bear no relation to the act in question, as the act under consideration is emphatically an act to raise revenue to replenish the treasury of the state, and for no other purpose, and does not contemplate any beneficial service for the steamboats or other vessels subjected to taxation.
Attempt was made in the case of Alexander v. Railroad to show that the form of levying the tax was simply a mode of assessing the vessels as property, but the argument did not prevail, nor can it in this case, as the amount of the tax is measured by the tonnage of the steamboats, and not by their value as property.
Reference is made to the case of the Towboat Company v. Bordelon [Footnote 26] as asserting the opposite rule, but the Court is of a different opinion, as the tax in that case was levied not upon the boat, but upon the capital of the company owning the boat, and the court, in delivering their opinion, said the capital of the company is property, and the constitution of the state requires an equal and uniform tax to be imposed upon it with the other property of the state for the support of government.
For these reasons, the Court is of opinion that the state law levying the taxes in this case is unconstitutional and void, that the judgment of the state court is erroneous and that it must be reversed, and having come to that conclusion, the Court does not find it necessary to determine the other question.
. IN THE SECOND CASE.
Much discussion of the questions involved in this record will not be required, as they are substantially the same as those presented in the preceding case, which have already been fully considered and definitely decided.
Submitted, as the case was, in the court below, on a demurrer to the bill of complaint and on the answer of the respondent, it will be necessary to refer to the pleadings to ascertain the nature of the controversy, by which it appears that the complainants are a corporation created by the Legislature of the State of Alabama, having their place of business at Mobile in that state; that they were the owners of twelve steamboats, as alleged in the bill of complaint filed by them on the twelfth of October, 1867, in the Chancery Court for that county, and that the respondent is the collector of taxes for that county and a resident of the city of Mobile.
1. That the tax is a duty of tonnage, levied in violation of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, and in support of that allegation they allege that all the steamboats, at the time the taxes were levied, were, and that they still are., duly enrolled and regularly licensed to engage in the coasting trade under and in pursuance of the revenue laws of the United States, and that all the duties imposed upon the steamboats by the laws of the United States have been paid and discharged.
the personal property held by the complainants. He also demurred to the bill of complaint, insisting that nothing alleged and charged therein was sufficient to require a further answer. Prior to the filing of the answer, the chancellor granted a temporary injunction, and the cause having been subsequently submitted to the court on bill and answer, the chancellor entered a decree making the injunction perpetual, and the respondent appealed to the supreme court of the state, where the injunction was dissolved and the bill of complaint was dismissed. Dissatisfied with that decree, the complainants sued out a writ of error and removed the cause into this Court.
Different remedies are accorded to a complaining party in different jurisdictions for grievances such as the one set forth in the bill of complaint before the Court. Usually preventive remedies are discountenanced as embarrassing to the just operations of the government, and the party taxed is required to pay the tax and seek redress in an action of assumpsit against the collector for money had and received. Decided cases may also be referred to where it is held that trespass will he against the assessor if it appear that the whole tax was levied without authority, as in that state of the case it is held that the assessor had no jurisdiction of the subject matter. Preventive remedies, however, are accorded in some of the states, and in cases brought here by writ of error under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, if no objection was taken in the court below to the form of the remedy employed, and none is taken in this Court, it may safely be assumed that the proceeding adopted was regarded in the court below as an appropriate remedy for the alleged grievance. Doubts upon that subject cannot be entertained in this case, as the record shows that both courts heard and determined the case upon the merits, and all parties conceded throughout the litigation that the complainants were entitled to the relief prayed in the bill of complaint, if the taxes were illegal, and the law levying the same was unconstitutional and void.
Concede all that and still the Court is of the opinion that the tax in this case is a duty of tonnage, and that the law imposing it is plainly unconstitutional and void. Taxes, as the law provides, must be assessed by the assessor in each county on and from the following subjects and at the following rates, to-wit: "On all steamboats &c. plying in the navigable waters of the state at the rate of one dollar per ton of the registered tonnage thereof," which must be assessed and collected at the port where such steamboats are registered, &c. [Footnote 30] Copied as the provision is from the enactment of the previous year, it is obvious that it must receive the same construction, and as the tax is one dollar per ton, it is too plain for argument that the amount of the tax depends upon the carrying capacity of the steamboat, and not upon her value as property, as the experience of everyone shows that a small steamer, new and well built, may be of much greater value than a large one badly built or in need of extensive repairs. Separate lists are made for the county and school taxes, but the two combined amount exactly to one dollar per ton, as in the levy for the state tax, and the Court is of the opinion that the case falls within the same rule as the case just decided.
carry, as estimated and ascertained by the official admeasurement and computation prescribed by the public authority. Regulations upon the subject are enacted by Parliament in the parent country and by Congress in this country, as appears by several acts of Congress. [Footnote 31] Tonnage, says a writer of experience, has long been an official term intended originally to express the burden that a ship would carry, in order that the various dues and customs which are levied upon shipping might be levied according to the size of the vessel, or rather in proportion to her capability of carrying burden. Hence the term, as applied to a ship, has become almost synonymous with that of size. [Footnote 32] Apply that interpretation to the word tonnage as used in the tax act under consideration, and it is as clear as anything can be in legislation that the tax imposed by that provision is a tonnage tax, or duty of tonnage, as the phrase is in the Constitution.
State authority to tax ships and vessels, it is supposed by the respondent, extends to all cases where the ship or vessel is not employed in foreign commerce or in commerce between ports or places in different states. He concedes that the states cannot levy a duty of tonnage on ships or vessels if the ship or vessel is employed in foreign commerce or in commerce "among the states," but he denies that the prohibition extends to ships or vessels employed in commerce between ports and places in the same state, and that is the leading error in the opinion of the supreme court of the state. Founded upon that mistake, the proposition is that all taxes are taxes on property, although levied on ships and vessels duly enrolled and licensed, if the ship or vessel is not employed in foreign commerce or in commerce among the states.
Such a rule as that assumed by the respondent would incorporate into the Constitution an exception which it does not contain. Had the prohibition in terms applied only to ships and vessels employed in foreign commerce or in commerce among the states, his construction would be right, but courts of justice cannot add any new provision to the fundamental law, and if not, it seems clear to a demonstration that the construction assumed by the respondent is erroneous.
Judgment reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity to the opinion of the Court.
See Act of July 18th, 1866, § 28, 14 Stat. at Large 185.
"that all navigable waters within the said state shall forever remain public highways, free to the citizens of said state, and of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor, imposed by the said state."
This ground not being passed upon by this Court, need not be adverted to further.
<|10 Pet. 160|>Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 160; <|13 Pet. 267|>Bend v. Hoyt, 13 Pet. 267.
1 Stat. at Large 77.
13 id. 70; ib., 444.
Alexander v. Railroad, 3 Strobhart 598.
<|8 How. 82|>Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 82; Howell v. Maryland, 3 Gill 14.
<|7 How. 402|>Passenger Cases, 7 How. 402; <|17 How. 598|>Hays v. The Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 598.
<|9 Wheat. 202|>Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 202; <|22 How. 238|>Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 238; <|22 How. 245|>Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 245; Perry v. Torrence, 8 Ohio 524.
<|7 How. 447|>Passenger Cases, 7 How. 447, <|7 How. 481|>481.
<|9 Wheat. 193|>Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 193.
1 Stat. at Large 287; ib., 305; 3 Kent (11th ed.) 203.
<|9 Wheat. 212|>Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 212.
<|12 Wheat. 445|>Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 445; <|11 Pet. 134|>New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 134; People v. Brooks, 4 Denio 476; Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cowen 743.
Sess.Acts 1866, pp. 7, 31.
<|6 Wall. 34|>Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 34.
Lott v. Morgan, 41 Ala. 250.
People v. Saratoga & Rensselaer Railroad Company, 15 Wend. 131; Steamboat Company v. Livingston, 3 Cowen 743.
<|12 How. 314|>Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 314.
State v. Charleston, 4 Rich., S.C. 286; Benedict v. Vanderbilt, 1 Robt. N.Y. 200.
Sess. Acts 1867, p. 645; Revised Code 1867, p. 169, art. ii, § 434, p. 11.
<|8 How. 82|>Nathan v Louisiana, 8 How. 82; <|4 Wheat. 429|>McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 429; <|6 Wall. 604|>Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 604; <|12 Wheat. 448|>Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 448; <|2 Pet. 467|>Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 467.
1 Stat. at Large 305; 13 id. 444.
Homan's Com. & Nav., Tonnage.
1 Stat. at Large 205; ib., 287.

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 28
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 434
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.