Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/abbadessa-v-puglisi-101-conn-1-1924/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:24:53+00:00

Document:
CARMELO ABBADESSA vs. GUISEPPE PUGLISI ET ALS.
Supreme Court of Connecticut Third Judicial District, Bridgeport, April Term, 1924.
WHEELER, C.J., BEACH, CURTIS, HAINES and MALTBIE, Js.
An unrecorded conditional bill of sale of electric light fixtures installed by the petitioner in the vendee’s apartment building held valid as against the vendee’s receivers, since such fixtures were “household furniture” within the meaning of § 4744 of the General Statutes. No right to a mechanic’s lien for the price of the fixtures existed under § 5217 of the General Statutes, because the claim was not one for “materials furnished or services rendered in the construction of the building.” (One judge dissenting.) The doctrine of election of remedies, as inherited from the common law, has been relaxed under modern procedure so that consistency of claim is only required of a litigant in choosing between such existing and available remedies as he is legally entitled to pursue; and a mistaken attempt on his part to enforce a remedy to which he has no legal right does not of itself preclude him from thereafter seeking a proper, though inconsistent, remedy. Held that plaintiff was entitled to maintain a petition to reclaim the electric light fixtures on the theory that he had retained title thereto under the conditional bill of sale, although he had previously proceeded on the theory that title had passed to the vendee by attempting to assert a mechanic’s lien, to which he had no legal right.
Puglisi, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where one of the defendants, Frank Caplan, filed a reclamation petition for certain electric light fixtures which he had sold to the defendant Puglisi upon condition that the title thereto should not pass until they had been fully paid for, and which had been installed in the building in question; this petition was referred to James E. Wheeler, Esq., a committee who heard the parties, reported the facts and recommended that the petition be denied, and from a judgment of the court (Keeler, J.), accepting the report and disallowing the claim, the petitioner appealed. Error, judgment set aside and cause remanded.
The committee found that the fixtures scheduled were furnished and installed by the petitioner upon a written order dated January, 1921, providing that the title to the articles enumerated should remain in the petitioner until fully paid for; that the price agreed on was $1,900, of which about $600 had been paid; that the writing was not recorded; and that a balance of $1,355.25 was due the petitioner from the defendant Puglisi. The committee also found that on April 24th, 1921, the petitioner filed and recorded a mechanic’s lien on the land and building in question for $1,355.25; that all of the articles furnished and installed were “household furniture” within the purview of § 4744, and that the reclamation petition was filed June 24th, 1921. The committee further found that the petitioner by filing his mechanic’s lien waived his right to reclaim, and recommended that the petition for reclamation be denied.
A remonstrance against the acceptance of the committee s report was demurred to, demurrer sustained and remonstrance overruled (Keeler, J.), and judgment rendered disallowing the petitioner’s claim and denying the petition for reclamation.
Petitioner appeals for the reason that the court erred in holding that the petitioner by executing and filing a mechanic’s lien waived his claim for payment by the receivers and his right of reclamation under the conditional sale.
Jacob Caplan, for the appellant (defendant Frank Caplan).
Edwin S. Pickett, for the appellees (defendant receivers of Puglisi).
action in which it cannot be entertained does not constitute an estoppel against the pursuit of the same right in an appropriate proceeding.” Ash Sheep Co.
v. Robinson Co., in 5 Amer. Eng. Ann. Cas. 962 (128 Iowa 72, 102 N.W. 814); 2 Words and Phrases (2d Series), Election of Remedies, 235; 20 Corpus Juris, pp. 21-25, and § 24 on pp. 33, 34, and 9 R.C.L. p. 962.
intent might, if acted on by others entitled to guide their course by his announced intention, ripen into an estoppel in pais; but there is no finding here that the vendee or the receivers changed their position because of the petitioner’s futile notice of intent to claim a mechanic’s lien. The most that can be said is that the petitioner’s present claim is inconsistent with his original claim, because the attempt to reclaim assumes that title is still in the petitioner, while the attempt to assert a mechanic’s lien assumed that title had already passed to the vendee. We think the cases cited and referred to clearly show that, in these days at least, consistency of claim is not required of a litigant except in choosing between two existing and available remedies, and that the petitioner has not lost his right of reclamation by making an inconsistent claim in the attempted assertion of a right which he did not possess.
it would seem illogical to hold that the petitioner had lost his right to assert title in himself, merely because he had at one time made an inconsistent claim or admission in the mistaken pursuit of a nonexistent remedy.
In view of the general relaxation of the common law requirement of consistency in pleading, the Supreme Court of the United States has wisely observed that “at best this doctrine of election of remedies is a harsh, and now largely obsolete rule, the scope of which should not be extended, as it must be in order to reach the case at bar.” Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207, 213, 38 Sup.Ct. 450.
There is error, the judgment is set aside, and the cause remanded with direction to overrule the demurrer to the petitioner’s remonstrance against the acceptance of the report of the committee.
In this opinion WHEELER, C.J., CURTIS and HAINES, JS., concurred.
v. Beach, 62 Conn. 25, 38, 25 A. 446, of the issue then before the court: “This is not a question of remedy, but of right.” Upon such a situation, the doctrine of election of remedies has no bearing, but the solution lies along the lines of waiver. I do not think, however, that this would lead to any other result than that reached by the majority of the court, for I incline to believe that a waiver is not irrevocable unless supported by a consideration or accepted or acted upon by the adverse party.

References: § 4744
 § 5217
 § 4744

v. 
 § 24
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