Source: https://www.marylanddivorcelawyerblog.com/category/recent-court-decisions/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 15:13:35+00:00

Document:
The anonymity features of social networking sites may present an obstacle to litigants seeking to authenticate messages posted on them. See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357, 370-71 (2009). That is the issue we encounter here: whether the State adequately established the author of the cyber message in question. Despite the pervasive popularity of social networking sites and their potential as treasure troves of valuable evidence, Maryland appellate courts have not yet addressed the issue of authenticating anonymous or pseudonymous documents printed from social media Web sites. Notably, neither the Maryland Rules of Evidence nor the Maryland Rules of Procedure specifically address the authentication of such evidence. Perhaps this is because courts that have generally considered the issue of authentication of electronic communications have concluded that they may be authenticated under existing evidentiary rules governing authentication by circumstantial evidence. We see no reason why social media profiles may not be circumstantially authenticated in the same manner as other forms of electronic communication – by their content and context. The inherent nature of social networking Web sites encourages members who choose to use pseudonyms to identify themselves by posting profile pictures or descriptions of their physical appearances, personal background information, and lifestyles. This type of individualization may lend itself to authentication of a particular profile page as having been created by the person depicted in it.
In this particular criminal case, the Defendant was disputing that a MySpace page should be used as evidence because one could not prove that it was the person’s page it purported to be.
Third party visitation cases have become increasing difficult cases to establish ordered child access. The standard has been and remains that in order for grandparents or other third parties to be awarded visitation with a grandchild/child they must show either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances. For more information regarding third party visitation see our August 11, 2009 blog post. Maryland’s second highest court recently filed an opinion in the case of Brandenburg v. LaBarre on June 2, 2010, which held that in order to prove exceptional circumstances in a third party visitation case, third parties must show that without visitation there will be significant harm to the children. I am of the opinion that prior to this decision, exceptional circumstances could be proven without proving actual/significant harm to the children.
This visitation case was originally heard in 2008 in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The LaBarres, the children’s grandparents, filed a Complaint for Visitation after they had a falling out with their son and daughter-in-law, the Brandeburg’s. The Brandenburgs have four young children and until February 2008 the LaBarres cared for the children often and spent a great amount of time with the children. After hearing testimony from both sides, including the LaBarre’s testimony that exceptional circumstances existed because the children had previously spent so much time with them, the Judge granted the LaBarres one overnight visit a month and one week in the summer with the children. The Judge noted that the LaBarres had shown no evidence that the children had been harmed by lack of contact with them, but that it was unreasonable for them to have to do so given they had no contact with the children for some time. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the Judge’s decision stating that the test for exceptional circumstances is whether or not the children are suffering significant harm because they are not allowed contact with the third party seeking visitation. In this case, because the parents were fit, they have the right to decide who can visit their children unless these exceptional circumstances are proven.
The Maryland Court of Appeal issued an opinion in Curtis O. Rosemann v. Salsbury, Clements, Bekman, Marder & Adkins, LLC on January 13, 2010 stating that funds received as a part of a settlement in personal injury case are exempt from being executed for a judgment of child support arrearages. Mr. Rosemann, the father and primary custodial parent of two minor children sought to garnish funds received from his ex-wife in a personal injury lawsuit after she failed to pay her child support. Mr. Rosemann’s battle began in 2001 when he obtained two judgments in the Circuit Court for Howard County against his ex-wife for child support arrearages totaling over $33,000.00. Ms. Rosemann and her attorneys were awarded $30,000.00 from America West Airlines in a personal injury lawsuit after being injured while on an America West flight. After learning of this settlement, Mr. Rosemann attempted to garnish the account that held Ms. Rosemann’s share of the settlement.
The Circuit Court found, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that the funds were exempt from execution on judgment in accordance with Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 11-504(b)(2), which states the following: (b) The following items are exempt from execution on a judgment: (2) Money payable in the event of sickness, accident, injury, or death of any person, including compensation for loss of future earnings. This exemption includes but is not limited to money payable on account of judgments, arbitrations, compromises, insurance, benefits, compensation, and relief. Disability income benefits are not exempt if the judgment is for necessities contracted for after the disability is incurred.
Maryland’s second highest court filed an opinion in the case of Guzman Cruz v. Clemencia Silva on November 25, 2009, which held that a spouse can be awarded alimony absent a divorce. The idea of alimony disconnected from a divorce, although a strange scenario for most to imagine, has long been a reality in Maryland. For more information regarding alimony see our October 2, 2009 and October 13, 2009 blog posts.
The Cruz’s came to the Circuit Court for Princes George’s County on January 9, 2008, both seeking a divorce but did not prove legally sufficient grounds for the divorce. However, the Judge awarded custody of the two minor children to Clemencia, ordered Guzman to pay her $764.00 per month in child support, and $1,500.00 per month in alimony. Guzman appealed to the Court of Special Appeals contending that the trial court erred in awarding alimony to Clemencia without granting a divorce and without properly determining the type and amount of alimony. The Court stated that Maryland has long recognized that the common law obligation of alimony was the obligation of husband to provide support to wife (or wife to husband). This is evidenced by Maryland Code, Family Law Section 11-101(a)(1), which provides that a court may award alimony not only in a decree of divorce, but also in a bill of complaint for alimony. The Court of Special Appeals held that while a spouse can be awarded alimony absent a divorce, that in this case the award was an error as a spouse still has to prove a case that would entitle him or her to alimony.
On June 3, 2009, in the case of Barrett v. Ayres, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that Sharon Barrett did not need to show a material change in circumstances in order to modify the current set visitation schedule between her daughter and her daughter’s paternal grandparents, Bryan and Helen Ayres. Sharon Barrett had agreed to a visitation schedule between her daughter and the Ayres after her husband was seriously injured in a car accident in 2004. However, the relationship had become strained and Sharon believed that it was no longer in her daughter’s best interest to visit with her grandparents. The Court stated a parent’s decision that their child’s visitation with a third party should be modified is a material change in and of itself. The burden then shifts to the third party to establish that the parent is unfit or other exceptional circumstances exist. In this case the grandparents now have the burden to prove the parents are unfit or exceptional circumstances exist.
While not seemingly an issue in the Barrett case, some factors used to assess fitness include parental characteristics such as age, stability, and the capacity and interest of a parent to provide for the emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child. If the Court finds a parent to be fit, the next issue is whether such exceptional circumstances exist to determine what is in the minor child’s best interest in terms of visitation and/or custody. In cases of both custody and visitation there can be any number of factors used to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist. Historically, the Court often makes findings as to (1) nature and strength of ties between child and third party; (2) intense and genuine desire of third party to have custody/visitation of the child; (3) stability and certainty of child’s future; and (4) emotional effect of changing custody. If the Court finds exceptional circumstances exist, then the Court will determine what is in the minor child’s best interest.
In custody matters, Maryland Courts presume that a child’s best interests are better served in the care and custody of his or her natural parents rather than a third party. The third party threshold showing is necessary because parents have a fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children, which includes with whom the children spend their time, i.e. with whom they have visitation. Barrett is a landmark decision in Maryland as it expands the 2007 decision in Koshko v. Haining to apply to not only initial determinations of third party custody or visitation, but also to modifications of it.

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