Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82445:56317&catid=1575&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:45:00+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013 - FE ABELLA Y PERPETUA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FE ABELLA Y PERPETUA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
thus performing all the acts of exe[cu]tion which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able intervention of the medical attendance rendered to the said victim.
During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and trial thus proceeded.
The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno;10 (b) Amelita Abella11 (Amelita), Benigno’s wife; (c) Alejandro Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with whom the petitioner had a quarrel; and (d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13 (Dr. Ardiente), a surgeon from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered medical assistance to Benigno after the latter was hacked by the petitioner.
The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro and a certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.
The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner;22 (b) Fernando Fernandez23 (Fernando), a friend of the petitioner; and (c) Urbano Cabag24 (Urbano).
The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he and his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is rendered finding [petitioner] Fe Abella GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as defined and penalized by Article 249 in relation to Article 50 and Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, [petitioner] Fe Abella is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1) day to Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum; to indemnify offended-party complainant Benigno Abella the sum of Ten Thousand ([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the medical expenses incurred; to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential damages and to pay the costs.
The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as weak. No disinterested witnesses were presented to corroborate the petitioner’s claim that he was nowhere at the scene of the hacking incident on September 6, 1998. Fernando and Urbano’s testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies. The RTC accorded more credence to the averments of the prosecution witnesses, who, without any ill motives to testify against the petitioner, positively, categorically and consistently pointed at the latter as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, medical records show that Benigno sustained a wound in his neck and his scar was visible when he testified during the trial.
The RTC awarded P10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical expenses he incurred despite the prosecution’s failure to offer receipts as evidence. The petitioner was likewise ordered to pay P100,000.00 as consequential damages, but the RTC did not explicitly lay down the basis for the award.
The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily anchored on the claim that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on Benigno’s neck. The petitioner argued that the hacking was merely accidental especially since he had no motive whatsoever which could have impelled him to hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one wound negates intent to kill.
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The [petitioner] attacked [Benigno] with deadly weapons, two scythes. [The petitioner’s] blow was directed to the neck of Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter had no means, and no time, to defend himself.
In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed to appreciate relevant facts, which if considered, would justify either his acquittal or the downgrading of his conviction to less serious physical injuries. The petitioner points out that after the single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after Alejandro and Dionisio leaving Benigno behind. Had there been an intent to kill on his part, the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that time, he had two scythes in his hands. Further, the CA erred in finding that the hacking blow was sudden and unexpected, providing Benigno with no opportunity to defend himself. Benigno saw the petitioner arriving with weapons on hand. Benigno could not have been unaware of the danger facing him, but he knew that the petitioner had no intent to hurt him. Benigno thus approached the petitioner, but in the process, the former was accidentally hit with the latter’s scythe.
Further, as per Dr. Ardiente’s testimony, no complications resulted from Benigno’s hacking wound in the neck and incised wound in the hand. Such being the case, death could not have resulted. The neck wound was not “so extensive because it [did] not involve [a] big blood vessel on its vital structure” while the incised wound in the hand, which only required cleansing and suturing, merely left a slight scarring.40 Besides, Benigno was only confined for seventeen (17) days at the hospital and the injuries he sustained were in the nature of less serious ones.
In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the dismissal of the instant petition. The OSG stresses that the petitioner raises factual issues, which call for a re-calibration of evidence, hence, outside the ambit of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the petitioner’s argument that the development of infections or complications on the wounds is a necessary factor to determine the crime committed is specious. The petitioner’s intent to kill Benigno can be clearly inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the extent of injuries inflicted and the circumstances of the aggression. Benigno could have died had there been no timely medical assistance rendered to him.
If it were the petitioner’s wish to merely get Benigno out of the way to be able to chase Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick, fist blow, push, or the use of a less lethal weapon directed against a non-vital part of the body would have been sufficient. However, the petitioner hacked Benigno’s neck with an unsterile scythe, leaving behind a big, open and gaping wound.
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact.
In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the findings of the courts a quo that the petitioner had a homicidal intent when he hacked Benigno’s neck with a scythe and that the wounds the latter sustained could have caused his death had there been no prompt medical intervention. These questions are patently factual in nature requiring no less than a re-calibration of the contending parties’ evidence.
It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua admits of exceptions, among which is, “when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to notice certain relevant facts that would otherwise justify a different conclusion x x x.”44 However, the factual backdrop and circumstances surrounding the instant petition do not add up to qualify the case as falling within the exceptions.
still, the instant petition is susceptible to denial.
The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to attack, much less kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr.47 to argue that homicidal intent is absent in a case where the accused shot the victim only once when there was an opportunity to do otherwise. The petitioner belabors his claim that had he intended to kill Benigno, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death, and not leave right after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.
In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the body. The attending physician certified that the injury would require medical attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged from the hospital the following day.
In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-cm long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that “it is possible to have complications [resulting from these] injuries because the wounds [were] extensive and [they were] big and [they were open wounds], so there is a possibility of infection[s] [resulting from these] kind[s] of wounds, and the instrument used [was] not [a] sterile instrument contaminated with other thing[s].”48 No complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days from September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of a scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.
This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by reason of a timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will.
All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC’s conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 74-82.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Abraham B. Borreta and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang, concurring; id. at 112-116.
4 Issued by Judge Downey C. Valdevilla, id. at 31-43.
7 Original Records, p. 1-2.
10 TSN, February 20, 2003, pp. 2-20.
11 TSN, January 23, 2003, pp. 2-21.
13 TSN, May 12, 2003, pp. 3-12.
14 TSN, January 23, 2003, pp. 9, 17.
19 TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 7; see also Medical Certificate and Clinical Cover Sheet, Original Records, pp. 69-70.
20 Original Records, p. 70; TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 9.
21 TSN, May 12, 2003, pp. 9-11.
22 TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 1-26.
23 TSN, January 22, 2004, pp. 1-32.
24 TSN, October 27, 2004, pp. 1-27.
25 TSN, January 22, 2004, p. 13.
26 TSN, October 27, 2004, pp. 5-6.
27 CA rollo, pp. 31-43.
35 Id., citing Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 704, 719 (2004).
38 G. R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 504.
41 CA rollo, pp. 129-150.
42 G. R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013.
44Rollo, p. 20, citing Fuentes v. CA, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997).
45People v. Badriago, G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 820, 832, citing SPO1 Nerpio v. People, 555 Phil. 87, 94 (2007); People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 671, 695.
46Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 266, 275-276, citing People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351 (2001); Rivera v. People, 515 Phil. 824, 832 (2006).
48 TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 9.
50Esqueda v. People, id; Serrano v. People, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 322, 341.
51People of the Philippines v. Rodel Lanuza y Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 188562, August 17, 2011; People of the Philippines v. Jesus Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436.
52Esqueda v. People, supra note 49, at 513.
53 Please see People of the Philippines v. Jonathan “Uto” Veloso y Rama, G.R. No. 188849, February 13, 2013.

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