Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2015/02/19/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:19:05+00:00

Document:
The Future of Law (Part Six): What’s Trending?
Trend Analysis is the practice of collecting information and attempting to spot a pattern, or trend, in the information. In some fields of study, the term “trend analysis” has more formally defined meanings.
In project management trend analysis is a mathematical technique that uses historical results to predict future outcome. This is achieved by tracking variances in cost and schedule performance. In this context, it is a project management quality control tool.
In statistics, trend analysis often refers to techniques for extracting an underlying pattern of behaviour in a time series which would otherwise be partly or nearly completely hidden by noise. A simple description of these techniques is trend estimation, which can be undertaken within a formal regression analysis.
Today, trend analysis often refers to the science of studying changes in social patterns, including fashion, technology and consumer behavior.
The point is, someone cares about all of this. And if that someone cares enough to jump into a trend, and enough other people do the same, then we’ll all need to care, because the trend just moved from outliers to early adopters to mainstream. At that point, we’re all going along for the ride, like it or not.
In the coming installments of this series, we’ll continue to look at changes in “social patterns, including fashion, technology and consumer behavior” (well, not fashion) that are affecting the law, and make predictions about them. Think of these not as possible outcomes, but as energies. Some will accelerate in size, speed, and impact — those we’ll need to reckon with. Others will fade away — like all that momentary coolness on Facebook and Twitter. Along the way, some of us might want to dive in and see if we can shape some of these trends the way we’d like.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Barnes v. United States on Wednesday, January 21, 2015.
Larry Barnes was indicted in Oklahoma federal court for two crimes related to possession and distribution of methamphetamine. He was convicted and sentenced to two concurrent 66-month sentences. Barnes appealed. While his appeal was pending, the government acquired evidence that testimony of an ATF agent, a Tulsa police officer, and a confidential informant had been fabricated, and asked the court to vacate Barnes’ conviction and immediately release him from prison. The court granted that motion on July 2, 2009.
Seeking redress, Barnes filed administrative tort claims with the BATF on May 20, 2010. Receiving no response from the BATF, Barnes filed a civil lawsuit in Oklahoma state court on May 13, 2011, which the government removed to federal court. On September 23, 2011, the BATF filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that since the FTCA vests exclusive jurisdiction over federal tort claims in the federal district court, and removal jurisdiction requires a colorable state court claim, and plaintiffs had no jurisdiction in state court, the federal court therefore lacked jurisdiction as well. On October 25, 2011, while its motion to dismiss was pending, the BATF notified Barnes via certified mail of its formal denial of the administrative claims. The letter specifically advised that any appeal must be filed within six months of the date of mailing of the letter, or by April 25, 2011.
On March 23, 2012, the federal district court granted the BATF’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed the case without prejudice. On August 22, 2012, Barnes filed a second lawsuit in federal district court. The BATF again moved to dismiss, this time for lack of jurisdiction under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) due to the lawsuit being time-barred. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and Barnes appealed.
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), and found the two sections acted like “book-ends” for the time limit to file an FTCA claim. Barnes argued that his second lawsuit was timely because he was filing under § 2675(a)’s “deemed denial” provision, but the Tenth Circuit found that the BATF’s October 25, 2011 letter explicitly triggered § 2401(b)’s six-month limitations period. The Tenth Circuit found that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the time-bar.
The Tenth Circuit also analyzed Supreme Court precedent in Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), regarding jurisdictional bars and equitable estoppel. After a lengthy analysis, the Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by previous circuit precedent to apply a jurisdictional bar to FTCA claims. Even analyzing Barnes’ claims under equitable estoppel principles, though, the Tenth Circuit still found no relief for Barnes, because he could not show “affirmative misconduct” by the BATF.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court correctly dismissed the claims, but incorrectly did so with prejudice. Claims subject to a jurisdictional bar are properly dismissed without prejudice. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court but remanded for correction of the dismissal as without prejudice.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Cruz on Monday, December 22, 2014.
Raul Cruz was convicted by a jury of knowingly and intentionally possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Cruz subsequently filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence uncovered during the search of his residence pursuant to an unsigned search warrant. The district court denied relief on this assertion, and Cruz appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found, upon examination of the record, that the affidavit and warrant had been presented to a New Mexico district judge on March 26th, 2010. The judge signed the signature lines on the affidavit but neglected to sign the warrant at that time. Officers executed the warrant on March 29, 2010, and found methamphetamine, horse steroids, cash, and false identification. Officers found no evidence of drug use in the home or by Cruz. Cruz admitted to possession of the drugs but not intent to distribute. Approximately a month later, the judge signed the warrant, dated it March 26, 2010, and wrote “Nunc Pro Tunc on this April 23, 2010″ below the date line.
Cruz asserted that his counsel should have moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his residence, as well as his subsequent statements to police about the fruits of the search, because the unsigned warrant was not “issued” by a judge. Cruz claims that such motion would have been meritorious and would ultimately have led either to dismissal of the charges against him or his acquittal at trial. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding instead that nothing in the text of the Fourth Amendment conditions the validity of a warrant on its being signed. The First Circuit recently dealt with surprisingly similar facts and rejected the defendant’s argument, concluding that nothing in the Fourth Amendment required the judge who made the probable cause determination to also sign the warrant. The Tenth Circuit exhaustingly examined the meaning of the term “issue” under the Fourth Amendment, and found no reason to impose conditions on a validity of a warrant that were not set forth by the Fourth Amendment itself. The Tenth Circuit therefore concluded that there was no support for an inference that Cruz’s counsel’s motion to suppress would have been meritorious, and found no deficient performance of his counsel.
On Wednesday, February 18, 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and four unpublished opinions.

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