Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/294/405/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 23:04:43+00:00

Document:
1. A statute, valid when enacted, may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. P. 294 U. S. 414.
2. The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably. P. 294 U. S. 415.
3. The power in a State to require a railroad company to bear expenses of separating the grades of the railway and a new highway at crossing is not absolute, but is subject to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it does not exist in the particular case if, upon the facts of that case, the exaction would be unreasonable or arbitrary. P. 294 U. S. 413.
4. In resisting an imposition upon it, under a state statute, of one-half the cost of an underpass to separate the grades of its main line and a proposed new highway, the railway company adduced, among other facts, that the highway was designed for high-speed through motor traffic across the State, as part of the national system of Federal-aid highways largely planned, financed, and supervised by the Federal Government; that it had no local significance; that, from the local standpoint, there was no need of grade separation; that the underpass was prescribed not upon consideration of local safety needs, but in conformity to general plans of the federal and state highway engineers as being a proper engineering feature in the construction of a nationwide system of highways for high-speed motor vehicle transportation; that the highway would be the greater source of danger; that, far from being a feeder of railway traffic, it would add to the motor competition from which the railway had already suffered severely, and that the tax burden upon the railway was already excessive as compared with that upon the owners of motor vehicles who would use the highway as it competitors.
(1) That the State Supreme Court erred in not considering whether the facts showed that the imposition was arbitrary and unreasonable. Pp. 294 U. S. 415, 294 U. S. 428.
(2) This question should be determined in the first instance by the state court. P. 294 U. S. 433.
(3) The state court should also decide whether findings of facts were adequately supported by evidence. Id.
5. When the scope of the police power is in question, the special knowledge of local conditions possessed by the state tribunals may be of great weight. Id.
167 Tenn. 470, 71 S.W.2d 678, reversed.
Appeal from a judgment in a suit of the railway company brought for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of an order, and an underlying statute, requiring it to pay one-half of the expense of obviating a grade crossing.
This suit, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act of Tennessee, [Footnote 1] was brought, on November 21, 1931, in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Part 1, by the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway against the State Highway Commissioner and the Attorney General. The purpose of the suit is to secure a determination of the constitutionality of an order entered by the Commission and, as so applied, of Chapter 132 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1921, upon which the order rests. [Footnote 2] The statute authorizes the Commission, whenever a state highway crosses a railroad, to require the separation of grades if, in its discretion, "the elimination of any such grade crossing is necessary for the protection of persons traveling on any such highway or any such railroad," and, without conferring upon the Commission any discretion as to the proportion of the cost to be borne by the railroad, requires the latter to pay, in every case, one-half of the total cost of the separation of grades. The order requires the railway to construct an underpass so as to separate grades where a proposed state highway will cross its main line within the limits of the little town of Lexington, and to bear one-half the cost thereof.
The railway does not question the power of the state to build the proposed highway; nor its power to require the separation of grades; nor the appropriateness of the plan adopted for such separation; nor the reasonableness of the cost, $17,400. It does not deny that, if the proposed highway is built, safety of travel thereon and on the railroad will be promoted by separation of grades. It concedes that, in Tennessee, as elsewhere, the rule has long been settled that, ordinarily, the state may, under its police power, impose upon a railroad the whole cost of eliminating a grade crossing, or such part thereof, as it deems appropriate. [Footnote 3] The claim of unconstitutionality rests wholly upon the special facts here shown. The main contention is that to impose upon the railway, under these circumstances, one-half of the cost is action so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive it of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
of the bill were denied, much evidence was introduced. That contained in the printed record in this Court occupies, with exhibits, 492 pages. The trial court found that, with one exception, [Footnote 4] the evidence fully supported every averment of fact in the bill. It held that the order and the statute as applied, is so far as they require the railway to pay one-half the cost of the underpass, are arbitrary and unreasonable, and that they are void. The decree enjoined the Commissioner from attempting to enforce payment by the railway; ordered that the entire cost of the project (except for contributions by the federal government) be borne by the state highway Commission, and directed the defendants to pay the costs of the cause. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the state reversed that decree, ordered the bill dismissed, and allowed an appeal to this Court. Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Baker, 167 Tenn. 470, 71 S.W.2d 678, 680. Consideration of the jurisdiction thereof was ordered postponed to the hearing on the merits.
"could consider changed mental attitudes to determine the constitutionality or enforceability of a statute." A rule to the contrary is settled by the decisions of this Court. A statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid as to another. [Footnote 5] A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. [Footnote 6] The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably. [Footnote 7] To this limitation, attention was specifically called in cases which have applied most broadly the power to impose upon railroads the cost of separation of grades. Cincinnati, I. & W. Ry. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336, 218 U. S. 344; Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430, 232 U. S. 441; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Omaha, 235 U. S. 121, 235 U. S. 127; Erie R. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U. S. 394, 254 U. S. 409-410; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U. S. 24, 278 U. S. 34-35. Compare Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U. S. 241, 250 U. S. 244; Southern Ry. Co. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 290 U. S. 196.
"that this underpass is a part of a statewide and nationwide plan to foster commerce by motor vehicle on the public highways, the result of which is to afford competition with railroads, and that the decision to build this underpass, its location and construction, was not in any proper sense an exercise of the police power, but rather, as set forth in the bill of complaint, pursuant to a general plan of internal improvement fostered by the Congress of the United States in conjunction with the several States to make a nationwide system of superhighways in the interest of interstate commerce by motor vehicle, much of which is in active competition with the railroads themselves; . . . that, in the interest of commerce by motor vehicles on the public highways, this was a proper engineering project, properly conceived, located, designed and constructed;"
"that this underpass did not involve an exercise of the police power any more than many other features of this project, such as elimination of curves, grades, widening the pavement, et cetera. "
"The Secretary of Agriculture and the State highway department of each State shall agree upon the roads to be constructed therein and the character and method of construction. [Footnote 19]"
"be divided into two classes, one of which shall be known as primary or interstate highways, . . . and the other which shall connect or correlate therewith and be known as secondary or intercounty highways. [Footnote 20]"
of traffic interruptions incident to crossing at grade are now of far greater importance to the highway users than it is to the railroad crossed. For the rail operations are few, those of motor vehicles very numerous.
5. The underpass required is for a new and additional highway over which state highway No. 20 is being rerouted, which will be a part of a federal aid route between Nashville and Memphis, the best route between those two cities, and which will connect at these termini with highways extending into other states. This highway was planned by the State Highway Department, acting in conjunction with the Bureau of Public Roads of the federal government. It is part of the secondary or intercounty system, but, because of the expected traffic, the district engineer of the Bureau of Roads, in recommending its approval, characterized it as a route of primary importance. The underpass was prescribed not upon consideration of local safety needs, but in conformity to general plans of the federal and state highway engineers, as being a proper engineering feature in the construction of a nationwide system of highways for high-speed motor vehicle transportation, and because it is the policy of the federal authorities to make the avoidance of grade crossings a condition of a grant in aid of construction. The requirement of the underpass, and the payment by the railway under the 1921 Tennessee Act of one-half the cost of separating the grades, are results of the federal aid legislation. Final payment of federal aid on this project was conditioned upon commencement of the construction of this underpass.
6. The new highway, paralleling lines of the railway and intended for rapid moving motor vehicles, will, through competition for both freight and passenger traffic, seriously decrease rail traffic and deplete the railway's revenue and net earnings. Practically all vehicles moving upon it will directly or indirectly compete for traffic with the railway. [Footnote 34] Busses will operate over the new highway in regular scheduled movements in the same way as passenger trains. Trucks, some of them 70 feet in length and many weighing with load as much as 50,000 pounds, operated by common carriers, by contract carrier, and by private concerns, will compete for the most profitable classes of freight. The competition, besides reducing the volume of traffic, will compel reduction of rates.
classes of carload traffic, similar decreases were experienced by rail carriers. In 1921, the railroads brought into Nashville 5,689 cars of livestock; being 69.79% of the total. In 1930, they brought in only 641 cars, being 21.24% of the total. That the decrease in the railway's traffic was due mainly to increased motor competition following the construction of the new highways appears from the fact that the decrease began while general business was active, and that, even in the years of economic depression, the railway's freight traffic was practically constant in the relatively few regions where its rail lines were not paralleled by hard surfaced highways, and that traffic increased when highways paralleling its lines were temporarily closed for reconstruction. The reduction in traffic and depletion in revenues has been particularly severe during the three years preceding 1933.
the particular convenience rests upon it. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 196; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U. S. 71. These were the authorities relied upon by this Court in Chicago, St.P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Holmberg, 282 U. S. 162, 282 U. S. 167, where it held that to require a railroad to provide, at its own expense, an underpass not primarily as a safety measure, but for private convenience, was a denial of due process.
"In the light of modern motor vehicular traffic, anything which slows up that traffic is an inconvenience. In other words, eliminating a grade crossing, as in the case at bar, facilitates the speed of motor vehicular traffic, in accordance with public demands."
taxed may receive no benefit, and indeed, suffer serious detriment; St. Louis & Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U. S. 157, 277 U. S. 159; Memphis & Charleston Ry. Co. v. Pace, 282 U. S. 241, 282 U. S. 246; so-called assessments for public improvements laid upon particular property owners are ordinarily constitutional only if based on benefits received by them. Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage District, 239 U. S. 478; Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 6, 256 U. S. 658.
"to promote the safety of persons traveling the highways at grade crossings as well as to promote the safety of persons traveling the railroads at such crossings by eliminating dangerous grade crossings,"
"Admitting the insistence of complainant that the primary object of highway construction and the object of Federal contribution to highways is to invite and stimulate interstate traffic or travel upon the highways, it does not follow that the State roads are not primarily designed to serve the people of the State."
that the statute and order complained of are arbitrary and unreasonable. That determination should, in the first instance, be made by the Supreme Court of the state. Compare Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 260 U. S. 447; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 264 U. S. 548-549; Twist v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 274 U. S. 684, 274 U. S. 692; Grant v. A. B. Leach & Co., 280 U. S. 351, 280 U. S. 363. [Footnote 41] Moreover, since that court held the facts relied upon to be without legal significance, it did not inquire whether the findings were adequately supported by the evidence introduced in the trial court. The correctness of some of the findings is controverted by the state. Other facts of importance bearing upon the issue may possibly be deducible from the evidence, or be within the judicial knowledge of that court. When the scope of the police power is in question, the special knowledge of local conditions possessed by the state tribunals may be of great weight. Compare Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 214 U. S. 105-106; Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 216 U. S. 365.
validity of the order made thereunder. Compare Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 172 U. S. 290-294; Schneider Granite Co. v. Gast Realty & Inv. Co., 245 U. S. 288; Thomas v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 261 U. S. 481; Road Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 274 U. S. 188; Rowley v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 293 U. S. 102, 293 U. S. 112.
Nor is it necessary to consider the contentions of the railway that the state action here challenged, taken in conjunction with the burdens of taxation and systems of regulation to which the railroads and their competitors are subject, amounts to a denial of equal protection of the laws, and that it discriminates against, and imposes a burden upon, interstate commerce.
MR. JUSTICE STONE and MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO are of the opinion that there is nothing in the evidence or special facts relied on by the appellant to sustain a finding of arbitrary action by the State of Tennessee or its official representatives; that, on the contrary, the separation of grades is conceded to be necessary to give protection to travelers against perils created by the railroad; that a decision correct in result may not properly be reversed because the reasoning of the opinion is inadequate or erroneous, and that, upon the facts stated in the record as well as upon any others within the range of judicial notice the appellant has failed to sustain the burden of establishing a violation of its constitutional immunities, and the decree should be affirmed.
Pub. Acts of Tennessee,1923, c. 29.
Public Acts of Tennessee, 1921, c. 132, entitled "An Act to provide for the elimination of grade crossings on State Highways;" amended 1923, c. 35; 1925, c. 88.
See Dyer County v. Railroad, 87 Tenn. 712, 11 S.W. 943; Harriman v. Southern Ry. Co., 111 Tenn. 538, 82 S.W. 213; Chattanooga v. Southern Ry. Co., 128 Tenn. 399, 161 S.W. 1000; Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Drainage District, 149 Tenn. 490, 491, 261 S.W. 975. Exertion of the power was sustained by this Court in the following cases: New York & New England R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556; Cincinnati, I. & W. Ry. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336; Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Omaha, 235 U. S. 121; Erie R. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U. S. 394; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U. S. 24. Compare Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561; Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Clouth, 242 U. S. 375; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Oklahoma, 271 U. S. 303; Missouri ex rel. Wabash Railway Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 273 U. S. 126; Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. Co. v. White, 278 U. S. 456; New Orleans Public Service Co. v. New Orleans, 281 U. S. 682.
"The court finds from the evidence that there are no facts to sustain this averment, and that, in the interest of commerce by motor vehicle on the public highways, this was a proper engineering project, properly conceived, located, designed, and constructed."
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 233 U. S. 325; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 114 U. S. 295, 114 U. S. 330. Compare Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 257 U. S. 289; Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co., 249 U. S. 63, 249 U. S. 71; Chicago, T.H. & S.E. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 242 U. S. 283.
Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U. S. 765, 282 U. S. 772; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 264 U. S. 547; Perring v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 232 U. S. 487. Compare Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249.
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116; Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U. S. 182; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223; Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684; see too McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 211 U. S. 547; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 152 U. S. 137-138.
It was largely in anticipation of federal aid legislation that the State Highway Commission of Tennessee was created in 1915. Report of the Commissioner, Tenn. Dep't of Highways and Public Works (1926), p. 14; Public Acts Tenn.1915, c. 100, §§ 8, 9.
Report of Chief of (Federal) Bureau of Public Roads for the year ending June 30, 1922, pp. 1, 5. See also Report for year ending June 30, 1923, p. 3.
"Bill to provide that . . . the Secretary of Agriculture on behalf of the United States, shall, in certain cases, aid the States in the construction, improvement, and maintenance of roads which may be used in the transportation of interstate commerce, military supplies or postal matter."
June 16, 1916, Sen.Doc. No. 474, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. See too House Rep. No. 26, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) p. 4; Sen.Rep. No. 134, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), p. 1. Compare Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I.C.C. 263, 366 (1932).
Reports of Chief of Bureau of Public Roads (1931) pp. 2-7; (1932) pp. 1-3; (1933) pp. 1-4; (1934) pp. 1-5.
Act July 11, 1916, c. 241, §§ 3, 6, 39 Stat. 355; Act Feb. 28, 1919, c. 69, § 6, 40 Stat. 1201; Act Nov. 9, 1921, c. 119, §§ 11, 20, 42 Stat. 212; Act June 19, 1922, c. 227, § 4, 42 Stat. 660; Act Feb. 12, 1925, c. 219, § 1, 43 Stat. 889; Act June 22, 1926, c. 648, § 1, 44 Stat. 760; Act May 26, 1928, c. 755, § 1, 45 Stat. 750; Act April 4, 1930, c. 105, §§ 1, 2, 46 Stat. 141; Act June 18, 1934, c. 586, § 4, 48 Stat. 993.
The research was instituted by the Department of Agriculture, October 3, 1893, and has been pursued continuously since. See Report of the Special Agent and Engineer for Road Inquiry for 1896, p. 145; Reports of the Director of Office of Road Inquiries from 1897-1904; Reports of Director of Office of Public Roads, 1905-1918; Reports of Chief of Bureau of Public Roads, 1918-1934.
"for the purpose of providing for emergency construction . . . with a view to increasing employment and carrying out the policy declared in the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931."
"the President is authorized to make grants to the highway departments of the several States in an amount not less than $400,000,000, to be expended by such departments in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Highway Act."
"No deductions shall hereafter be made on account of prior advances and/or loans to the States for the construction of roads under the requirements of the Federal Aid Highway Act or on account of amounts paid under the provisions of Title I of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 for furnishing relief and work relief to needy and distressed people."
See Reports of Chief of Bureau of Public Roads (1931) pp. 34, 55; (1932) pp. 2, 29; (1933) pp. 2, 31.
Estimated cost of federal aid roads under construction in Tennessee on June 30, 1933, totaled $4,645,392, of which $2,321,975 was to be defrayed with federal aid money, and $2, 166,751 with federal emergency construction funds. Id., p. 14, Table 15. See too Report of State Highway Commissioner of Tennessee for biennium ending June 30, 1934, pp. 206, 207, Table No. 29, showing disbursements on federal aid projects, July 1, 1932, to June 30, 1933, totaling $5,473,229, and receipts from United States government on those projects of $4,018,219.
Act November 9, 1921, c. 119, § 6, 42 Stat. 212. On June 30, 1934, the total mileage of the designated federal aid highway system in Tennessee was 3,982, of which 1,925.1 had been improved with federal aid. Report of Chief Bureau of Public Roads, September 1, 1934, p. 18. The mileage of the official state highway system, including the federal aid system, is 7,247.3. Report of State Highway Commissioner of Tennessee, January 5, 1935, p. 102, Table No. 1.
Act November 9, 1921, c. 119, § 3, 42 Stat. 212.
Act November 9, 1921, c. 119, § 18, 42 Stat. 212.
"Grade crossings occurring in the Federal aid highway system shall be classified for priority of improvement by agreement between the state highway departments and the Bureau of Public Roads."
See too Report of Chief of Bureau of Public Roads (1924), p. 7.
Compare Act June 19, 1922, c. 227, § 4, par. 3, 42 Stat. 660; Opinion of Solicitor of Bureau of Public Roads, July 24, 1922.
In Tennessee, prior to 1925, the maximum permissive speed on public highways was 20 miles an hour. Public Acts of Tennessee, 1905, c. 173. By Pub. Acts 1925, c. 132, the maximum was increased to 30 miles. By Act of 1931, c. 82, all restrictions on speed were eliminated. The speed of motor vehicles is now often more than 75 miles. Compare note (1933) 46 Harv.L.Rev. 838.
Prior to 1931, vehicles approaching railroad grade crossings were ordinarily required to come to a full stop at some point not less than 10 nor more than 50 feet from the railroad tracks. Public Acts of Tennessee, 1917, c. 36. By Act of 1931, c. 82, vehicles are not required to slow up or stop on approaching railroad grade crossings unless there is a positive signal of the immediate approach of a train or cut of cars, or when the state highway department designates a particular crossing as dangerous. Neither the existing nor the proposed crossing at Lexington has been so designated. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66; Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 98.
"On all roads, and especially the important routes included in the Federal aid system, solution of the problems raised by the increased traffic is not provided merely by building of higher types of surfaces. A general widening of the surfaces is also required, and, in view of the greater speeds now customary and legally permissible, the easing and super-elevation of curves, the cutting away of banks which obscure vision, and other improvements in detail which contribute to safety. The elimination of dangerous grade crossings is an expensive but urgently required improvement, and, on densely traveled roads, it is already desirable to separate the grades of intersecting highways."
See too Fisher, Connecticut's Regulation of Grade Crossing Elimination, Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics (1931) 367, 385.
Accidents caused by motor vehicles running into trains amounted in 1928 to 22% of the total of grade crossing accidents; in 1929, to 24%; in 1930, to 26.5%; in 1931, to 28.6%; in 1932, to 30.6%, and in 1933, to 31.3%. Interstate Commerce Commission Accident Bulletins, Nos. 97-102, Table 78. Of the fatalities in automobile accidents in the United States during 1934, 3.3% resulted from collision with railroad trains; of the persons injured, only one-half of 1% (.5%) were injured in such collisions. See pamphlet entitled "Thou Shalt Not Kill," p. 5, issued by the Travelers' Insurance Co., February, 1935.
Report of the Commissioner, Tenn. Dept. of Highways and Public Works (1926) p. 13. In 1915, there were 19,668 automobiles in Tennessee; in 1930, 368,259.
The old Highway No. 20, from Perryville, on the Tennessee River, to Lexington is a winding gravel road which passes through several towns and crosses the railway eight times at grade. The new route is a comparatively straight paved road crossing the river a short distance above Perryville, avoiding some of the towns served by the old road, and crossing the railway only at the Lexington underpass.
On February 16, 1933, while this suit was still in progress in the trial court, the new Route No. 20, between Perryville and Lexington, was opened to traffic, although a part of the Highway No. 100, connecting Route 20 with Nashville, was not yet paved. A witness for the railroad testified that traffic counts, taken on May 2 and 3, 1933, at the old Clifton Street crossing and at the new underpass, which is on the outskirts of the town, indicated that the underpass was then diverting only 20% of the traffic from the grade crossing.
"When the Nashville to Linden connection is completed and the balance of this route to Jackson paved, it is expected that a large percentage of the traffic now using State Route No. 1, between Nashville and Jackson, will be diverted to this route, and it is confidently expected that several thousand vehicles will be using the route in the near future."
The railway introduced in evidence traffic counts on Route 1 showing the weekday foreign traffic amounting to 13% and 23% of the total motor vehicle traffic, and truck and bus traffic amounting to 16% and 19% of the total.
The principal taxes paid by motor vehicle owners in Tennessee are the registration fees and gasoline taxes, the proceeds of which are used mainly for highway purposes. See Reports of State Highway Commissioner (1932) pp. 27, 32-33, 241, 285; (1934) pp. 22, 23, 199, 221. Besides these, the state levies a mileage tax upon commercial vehicles. Mileage taxes collected from intrastate operators go into the general state funds; those collected from interstate operators, into the highway fund. In 1932, it was testified, this tax yielded a gross revenue of approximately $100,000, and a net revenue of $40,000 for the general fund, and $18,000 for the highway fund. The ad valorem taxes paid by common carrier motor vehicles are negligible. In 44 of the richest counties, they aggregated, in 1928, $1,371.97; in 1929, $1,714.01; in 1930, $1,185.04.
Early cases establishing the rule that the entire cost of a grade separation may be imposed upon the railroad perhaps reflect the attitude that "the business of railways is specially dangerous," Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150, and that "crossing highways and running locomotives, were they not authorized by law, would be nuisances." Mr. Justice Strong, dissenting in Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 97 U. S. 679. Compare Woodruff v. Catlin, 54 Conn. 277, 295, 6 A. 849.
By some state courts, a different rule has been applied, particularly as to the original cost of the crossing. Toledo, A.A. & N.M. R. Co. v. Detroit, L. & N. R.. Co., 62 Mich. 564, 573, 29 N.W. 500; see State ex rel. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 140 Wis. 145, 160, 161, 121 N.W. 919.
In Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U. S. 24, the crossing was over a state highway, which had originally been an "ancient county road, laid out in 1811." In Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430, the canal and footpath to be crossed were part of a park development.
In the following cases, among others, decided since the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1921, orders of state Commissions directing railroads to pay the whole, or part, of the cost of grade separation on modern state highways -- in several instances, federal aid highways -- were unsuccessfully challenged as unconstitutional under the particular circumstances, but in none of them, so far as appears, was the charge of arbitrariness supported on a record embodying facts similar to those presented above. Chicago, N.S. & M. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 354 Ill. 58, 188 N.E. 177 (1933); Gulf, C. & S.F. R. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 151 La. 635, 92 So. 143 (1922); New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 164 Miss. 343, 144 So. 558 (1932); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 315 Mo. 1108, 287 S.W. 617 (1926); State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm'n, 297 S.W. 47; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm'n, 62 S.W.2d 1090; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm'n, 68 S.W.2d 691; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm'n, 70 S.W.2d 52, 55, 57, 61; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm'n, 72 S.W.2d 101; North Dakota State Highway Comm'n v. Great Northern Ry., 51 N.D. 680, 200 N.W. 796; Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 187 Wis. 364, 204 N.W. 606.
See too McCandless v. Furlaud, 293 U. S. 67; Missouri ex rel. Wabash Railway Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 273 U. S. 126, 273 U. S. 131; Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U. S. 164, 275 U. S. 169-172; Hammond v. Farina Bus Line, 275 U. S. 173, 275 U. S. 174-175; United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, 272 U. S. 553; Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U. S. 321, 266 U. S. 327; Brown v. Fletcher, 237 U. S. 583, 237 U. S. 586-588; Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo, 236 U. S. 635, 236 U. S. 656-657.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 6
 § 4
 § 1
 § 1
 § 1
 § 4
 § 6
 § 3
 § 18
 § 4
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.