Source: http://hansellaw.com/jones-v-state-excessive-force.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:50:04+00:00

Document:
STATE OF MARYLAND, et al.
connection with the Fourth Amendment limitations on in-home execution of arrest warrants.
remaining claims the parties raised in that court.
a claim of negligent training or supervision of police officers?
prove a claim of negligent training?
number, and as a result of that call went to Petitioner’s apartment.
my warrant. My supervisor has my warrant. I said, where is your supervisor?
And by then somebody was tapping at my patio door.
tapping on the door. When I turned back, Falby hit me.
before putting his foot through the door opening.
pulled out his baton and shattered the glass patio door in order to enter the apartment.
began to struggle against the two men in an attempt to escape the apartment.
sprayed Petitioner and struck her on the forearm with a baton.
change into those clothes in the parking lot, in full view of her neighbors.
because the charges appeared on her annual criminal background check.
directly and proximately causing injury to Petitioner.
Court denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
she could not tell that the man, who was wearing dark clothing, was a police officer.
phone camera to take digital photographs of Petitioner’s head.
there’s a difference between a search and arrest warrant; isn’t that right?
[Deputy Falby]: Arrest warrant, as well, allows me that.
arrest is in the house?
[Deputy Falby]: Believing that he is in the house.
[Petitioner’s Counsel]: Even without believing he’s in the house?
warrant is the address that I’m at, correct.
going to enter have to be the home of the actual arrestee?
we normally go to that’s on the warrant.
[Petitioner’s Counsel]: And that’s what you’ve been trained to do, right?
[Petitioner’s Counsel]: Go to the address on the warrant?
[Deputy Falby]: We’re assuming that’s where he lives.
only go to the house of the arrestee?
[Deputy Falby]: Well, the address on the warrant, sir.
[Petitioner’s Counsel]: Just the warrant?
broaching it with your leg?
[Deputy Falby]: Right. We don’t let the door close once it’s opened, correct.
doorway during an arrest was for officer safety reasons.
when the officers reasonably believe the suspect is within the residence.
belief ultimately proves to be wrong.
4 Petitioner cross-appealed the Circuit Court’s reduction of the damages award.
Petitioner’s cross-appeal. Petitioner has not pursued that issue here.
Circuit Court reduced the total award to $200,000, pursuant to the Maryland Tort Claims Act.
arguments as were pressed in the motions for judgment. The court denied the motion.
similar to the facts of [Petitioner’s] case.” Id. at 667, 14 A.3d at 1240 (citing Ford v. Balt.
declined to decide the issue, reasoning that, “[e]ven if [the State] had such a duty, . . . Ms.
the standard of care in connection with the training of Deputies Falby and Henderson. Id.
Henderson on the constitutional rules respecting in-home execution of arrest warrants.
Id. at 181, 854 A.2d at 1237-38 (quoting Evans, 284 Md. at 166-67, 395 A.2d at 483).
negligent in training Deputies Falby and Henderson to violate Fourth Amendment law.
specific claim of negligent training.
A. Applicability of the public duty doctrine?
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
(2004) (quoting Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 583, 831 A.2d 18, 26 (2003)).
Horridge, 382 Md. at 183, 854 A.2d at 1239 (quoting Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank, 307 Md.
527, 534, 515 A.2d 756, 759 (1986)).
those individuals.” Muthukumarana, 370 Md. at 486-87, 805 A.2d at 395.
could have been charged with driving while intoxicated. Id. at 619-20, 510 A.2d at 1079.
pedestrian. Id., 510 A.2d at 1079. This Court affirmed. Id. at 635, 510 A.2d at 1087.
duty. Such discretion is no discretion at all.
frivolous [—] would raise the spectre of civil liability for failure to respond.
of a policeman would give rise to a potential lawsuit.
protect plaintiffs from an attack by one plaintiff’s murderous boyfriend).
State owes no duty in tort to a person wrongfully detained by an expired or invalid warrant.
Bobo, we merely concluded that the plaintiff, in his pleadings, “fail[ed] to employ any . . .
does our opinion mention, much less discuss, the public duty issue raised here.
(quoting Ashburn, 306 Md. at 631, 510 A.2d at 1085).
done so, and we find the reasoning of those courts persuasive.
Strickland v. Univ. of N.C. at Wilmington, 712 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), cert.
the effects of such a force.” Id.
police powers.”) (citation omitted); District of Columbia v. Evans, 644 A.2d 1008, 1017 n.
8 (D.C. 1994) (“In this case, the harm . . . was caused directly by the officers at the scene.
infliction of harm by one “lay” person to another.
not foreclose liability on that claim.
(quoting Fink v. Steele, 166 Md. 354, 361, 171 A. 49, 52 (1934)).
breach was a lawyer’s failure to inform his client that he was terminating representation).
expert testimony is unnecessary to calibrate the exact standard of care owed by the defendant.
express an opinion on a question of law.”).
C. Sufficiency of the evidence of a breach?
whether the State breached its duty to Petitioner. This dispute divides into two sub-issues.
governs entry of a home to execute an arrest warrant of a person suspected of being inside.
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.
magistrate, and not that of the police officer.
party’s home.8 Id. at 215.
applicable Fourth Amendment principles. We agree with Petitioner.
permit but a single inference as relates to the appellate issue presented. See Scapa, 418 Md.
at 503, 16 A.3d at 163.
with the Fourth Amendment’s dictates concerning in-home execution of arrest warrants.
Petitioner directs us to the following testimony.
to enter [with an arrest warrant] have to be the home of the actual arrestee?
normally go to that’s on the warrant.
[Petitioner’s Counsel]: Even if it’s not the address where the actual arrestee is?
Deputy Henderson, like Deputy Falby, testified that he had been trained by the State.
when you have an arrest warrant?
judgment and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
breach was the proximate cause of Petitioner’s damages. We reject this contention.
result” of the improper training. Id. at 246, 973 A.2d at 788.

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