Source: https://www.thomaslaw.com/blog/author/olivia-filbrandt/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:23:56+00:00

Document:
In reviewing whether the City of Sacramento complied with a peremptory writ of mandate issued by the Sacramento Superior Court (East Sacramento Partnership for a Livable City v. City of Sacramento (2016) 5Cal.App.5th 281 (ESPLC I)), the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that the City had explained and provided substantial evidence supporting both its traffic threshold and its conclusion that the traffic impact was less than significant. (East Sacramento Partnership for a Livable City v. City of Sacramento (2018) Cal.App. Case No. C085551.) In ESPLC I, the Court faulted the City’s use of a General Plan threshold because, the Court concluded, the threshold was not supported by substantial evidence.
Real Parties in Interest, Encore McKinley Village, LLC, proposed a 328-unit residential development (Project), which is now 80% built out. As pertinent here, the Project EIR recognized that the Project potentially impacted four intersections in the core and, utilizing the level of service (LOS) standard from the City’s General Plan, concluded that there would be no significant impacts to traffic. The City of Sacramento (City) reviewed the Project application, certified the Project EIR, and approved the Project. East Sacramento Partnership for a Livable City (ESPLC) filed suit.
The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate, finding the EIR sufficient. ESPLC appealed. In ESPLC I, the Court of Appeal held that the EIR was sufficient except for its reliance on the General Plan LOS standards without explanation. Specifically, the City was in error in relying on the LOS standards as an automatic determinant that traffic effects at the four intersections in the core were not significant. In doing so, the City failed to provide substantial evidence to support the finding of no significant traffic impact. “The fact that a particular environmental effect meets a particular threshold cannot be used as an automatic determinant that the effect was or was not significant.” Accordingly, the Court remanded the case.
The trial court then entered judgement in favor of ESPLC and issued a preemptory writ of mandate to rescind and set aside the EIR’s certification until the City brought the transportation and circulation sections of the EIR into compliance with CEQA. The City recirculated and certified a revised EIR. The trial court found the revised EIR was sufficient and discharged the writ. ESPLC appealed the order discharging the writ.
ESPLC alleged that the City failed to provide substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the Project’s impacts on traffic at the four intersections in the core are insignificant. ESPLC claimed that it was insufficient to merely provide evidence and an explanation to support the choice of threshold of significance for traffic impacts. ESPLC contended that the City was instead required to prepare a new traffic study to support its determination. The City responded that, among other things, the appeal should be dismissed as untimely.
Here, the Appellate Court held that ESPLC I only asked that the City provide an explanation and substantial evidence for the City’s determination to use the flexible LOS standards. The Court then found that it was to review for abuse of discretion because compliance with a writ is, for all practical purposes, an attempt to comply with CEQA.
The Court found the revised EIR provided substantial evidence supporting the City’s determination that there would be no significant traffic impacts at the challenged intersections in the core. The revised EIR provided an explanation of how the flexible LOS policy promotes infill development and achieves environmental benefits by reducing vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and greenhouse gas emissions. Further, the revised EIR explained that vehicle delay is not a physical impact on the environment and is preferable to roadway expansion as the latter increases VMT. These conclusions were supported by staff opinions, legislation, studies of flexible LOS, evidence of VMT in the area, and comments from Regional Transit, the Air District, and Sacramento Area Council of Governments.
ESPLC contended that the revised EIR should have studied and quantified the alleged reductions in VMT and greenhouse gas emissions in the Project area. The Court held that it was only required that the City provide “sufficient information and analysis to enable the public to discern the analytic route the agency traveled from evidence to action.” Because the City provided sufficient explanation and substantial evidence to support its selection of the threshold of significance for the traffic impacts, the Court affirmed the judgment.
The Court further established that the appeal was not untimely. A post judgment order, like that issued by the trial court discharging the writ, extends the time for filing a notice of appeal. Relying on City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 964, the Court held that an order relating to the enforcement of a judgment is appealable. Thus, the discharge order, finding the return to the writ adequate, was an appealable post judgement order and subject to reconsideration. As such, the appeal was timely.
As a final point, the Court granted the City’s motion to strike ESPLC’s argument that the City admitted the traffic impacts were significant as defined by the 2030 General Plan because it could have been raised earlier and ESPLC failed to show why the issue was raised for the first time in their reply brief. The Court further noted that adoption of a 2035 General Plan mooted arguments based on the 2030 General Plan.
The Court affirmed the trial court’s discharge of the writ of mandate.
Note: This case is currently unpublished. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, the deadline to request publication is 20 days from filing –Wednesday, January 16, 2019.
In Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 2018 Cal.LEXIS 9831, the California Supreme Court held that, where the description of an environmental impact “lacks analysis or omits the magnitude of the [significant] impact,” the reviewing court applies the de novo standard of review. The substantial evidence standard of review is reserved for wholly factual questions; where a question presented is both legal and factual, the issue shall be reviewed de novo. The Court also found that a substitution clause in a mitigation measure did not constitute deferred mitigation, a mitigation measure that only partially reduced a significant impact did not violate CEQA, and mitigation measures involving HVAC installation and tree selection were adequately enforceable.
The proposed project includes a specific plan and specific plan update covering 942-acres that together contemplate the construction of about 2,500 single and multifamily homes, commercial and recreation areas, and dedicated open space (Project) into a master-planned “pedestrian friendly” community near the unincorporated area of Friant in northern Fresno County (County). The County adopted Project alternative 3 (Northeast Development Configuration, the “environmentally superior alternative”), certified the EIR, and approved the Project. At the same time, the County adopted a mitigation monitoring program, which noted compliance would be enforced through subsequent conditions on future discretionary actions, including use permits and tentative subdivision maps.
The Sierra Club, Revive San Joaquin, and League of Women Voters of Fresno filed suit alleging that the project approval violated CEQA. The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate and noted that “it may not exercise its independent judgement on the evidence, but must determine only whether the act or decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Sierra Club timely appealed the decision pertinent to the air quality impacts and certain mitigation measures.
In May 2014, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the EIR was inadequate because it failed to include an analysis that “correlated the [P]roject’s emissions of air pollutants to its impact on human health,” only provided air quality impact mitigation measures that were “vague, unenforceable, and lack[ed] specific performance criteria,” and failed to support the claim that the mitigation measures would “substantially” reduce the Project’s significant air quality impacts. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court judgement on those grounds only and directed the preparation of a revised EIR. Real Party, Friant Ranch LP, appealed the Appellate Court decision.
The Supreme Court granted review on the issues of the air quality impact findings and conclusions in the EIR as well as the adequacy of certain mitigation measures.
The Court held that an EIR must (1) include “sufficient detail” to enable readers to understand and to “consider meaningfully” the issues that the proposed project raises, and, (2) make a “reasonable effort to substantively connect” the Project’s significant air quality impacts to likely health consequences.
Further, the Court held a lead agency has not impermissibly deferred mitigation measures where it leaves open the possibility of employing measures consistent with evolving technology nor are such measures impermissibly vague where it can be demonstrated in “good faith” that the measures will be at least partially effective.
The Court contrasted these with factual issues like the decision to use a particular methodology and reject another.
Similar to the facts in Laurel Heights I, the Court found that, while the EIR’s conclusion as to the impact may have been correct, the analysis and discussion of the significant impact was deficient as an EIR must “reasonably describe the nature and magnitude of the adverse effect.” The core purpose of an EIR is to inform the public and decision-making body, regardless of the conclusion drawn. In certifying the EIR, the County failed to disclose the analytic route that it took in making its decision relating to the Project’s significant air quality impact. This was a CEQA procedural issue as the Court determined it resulted in noncompliance with CEQA’s information disclosure provisions. Thus, the Court held, de novo review was proper.
The Court found that briefs from the County, the Real Party, and amici curiae clarifying the connection between air emissions information in the EIR and health impacts information in the EIR were “irrelevant.” Relying on Vineyard, the Court held that the question is not whether the Project’s impacts can be clearly explained, but whether they were at the time that the Project was approved. The County’s plan to require Health Risk Assessments as part of future development projects approved within the specific plan area was also irrelevant where the issue was the sufficiency of the EIR’s discussion of the Project’s significant air quality impacts, not the sufficiency of future studies.
Turning to the Project’s mitigation measures, the Court found that the EIR was incorrect to claim a mitigation measure would “substantially reduce air quality impacts” without factual support.
The Court also held that Project mitigation measures relating to HVAC systems and tree-planting were not impermissibly vague. The first identified the anticipated cost for a HVAC catalyst that was considered feasible and detailed the HVAC brand or equivalent that could be installed. The latter required tree varieties be planted that would shade 25% within 20 years of planting, which “provide[d] sufficient guidance for selecting appropriate shade trees.” Contrary to the Appellate Court’s holding, it was of no issue that the burden of enforcement of mitigation measures was on the County as the EIR and Specific Plan was not impermissibly vague on the means of enforcement.
Finally, the Court held that a lead agency does not violate CEQA for approving a project though the environmental impacts are not reduced to less than significant levels. CEQA is satisfied where a project’s mitigation measures only partially reduced significant impacts “as long as the public is able to identify any adverse health impacts clearly, and the EIR’s discussion of those impacts includes relevant specifics about the environmental changes attributable to the project.” In such a situation, unmitigated effects must be outweighed by the project’s benefits—whether economic, social, technological, or other, as documented in a statement of overriding considerations.
“[A] sufficient discussion of significant impacts requires not merely a determination of whether an impact is significant, but some effort to explain the nature and magnitude of the impact.” The determination whether an EIR achieves its informational purpose by providing such details is subject to de novo review.
In Alliance of Concerned Citizens Organized for Responsible Development v. City of San Juan Bautista, (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 424, the Sixth District Court of Appeal held that the “substance and effect” of a decision labeled by the trial court as a preemptory writ of mandate nonetheless constituted a final judgment.
The City of San Juan Bautista (City) approved a gas station, convenience store, and fast food restaurant (Project) and related permits with a mitigated negative declaration (MND). Alliance of Concerned Citizens Organized for Responsible Development (ACCORD) filed suit.
ACCORD alleged that the City violated CEQA by not preparing an EIR for the Project. ACCORD also alleged that the Project conflicted with the City’s General Plan and that, in approving the Project, the City violated state planning and zoning laws, its own zoning code, and its municipal code.
In March 2016, the trial court issued a “Preemptory Writ of Mandate of Interlocutory Remand for Reconsideration of Potential Noise Impacts,” which directed the City to take specific action and then file a return to the preemptory writ no later than October 10, 2016. ACCORD did not appeal that decision. The City filed a return to the writ within the timeframe provided, and then a supplemental return advising the Court of the City’s compliance with the Writ. In December 2016, the trial court issued a subsequent decision finding that the City had complied with the terms of the preemptory writ. ACCORD timely appealed this decision alleging that the City was required to prepare an EIR because there was substantial evidence of a fair argument that the Project would have noise and traffic impacts and the Project violated the City’s municipal code governing formula retail businesses.
The Court found that the March 2016 decree described specific instructions for the City to follow and the means for the City to comply with the Writ. It was inconsequential that additional proceedings were required as “a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a preemptory writ of mandate” and the scope of these proceedings was limited to whether the City complied with the decree. The trial court’s subjective intent was also inconsequential to the effect of the Court’s decision. It did not matter that the trial court titled the March 2016 decree an interlocutory remand and declared “nothing herein shall be construed as a final judgment,” the effect of the decree disposed of all issues raised by the petition thus, it was a final judgment.
The final judgment rule provides that an appeal may only be taken from the final judgment in an entire action; piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action are oppressive and costly. Here, the Court established that, in finding a final judgment, a court does not focus on the decision title or intent of the deciding court in issuing the decision but the “substance and effect” of the decision. Where the decision concludes matters between the parties, it is a final judgment for the purposes of an appeal.
ACCORD alleged that the March 2016 decision was an interlocutory remand and therefore unappealable, as discussed in Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Board (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499. In Voices, the California Supreme Court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 does not impose an absolute bar on interlocutory remands in administrative mandamus actions. In a concurring opinion, Justice Werdegar, joined by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye, recognized the limited scope of the court’s decision and indicated that an interlocutory remand is not proper in a CEQA action. The California Supreme Court has not since decided the propriety of an interlocutory remand in a CEQA action. Here, the Court did not answer whether the Voices holding applied to CEQA actions pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21168.9 as “in substance and effect the March 2016 decision was a final judgment.” As such, the December 2016 decision was a post-judgment order.
Considering the above, the Court found the scope of its review limited to the December 2016 post-judgment order. The City’s response to the preemptory writ was adequate where it satisfied the conditions of the preemptory writ and timely filed a return on the preemptory writ.
The Court affirmed the trial court’s December 2016 holding.
Where a court’s decision disposes all issues raised by the petition, it is a final judgment from which an appeal must be filed within 60 days.
An appeal from a post-judgment decision limits the appellate court’s scope of review to only those issues addressed in the post-judgment decision, not the original judgment.
Thomas Law Group is honored to accept the High 5 Award at the Rise Up Sacramento event on January 8, 2019 at the Golden 1 Center’s Assembly Lounge. This award, granted on behalf of First 5 Sacramento and Sacramento County Supervisor Phil Serna, recognizes a business that incorporates family-friendly policies into the workplace. Hope to see you there!
The Rise Up Sacramento Event is put on by First 5 Sacramento. The group invests in critical programs for children and families in the Sacramento region. This event will celebrate the group’s 20th year of spearheading this work.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.