Source: https://www.specialedlaw.com/database/student-framingham-public-schools-bsea-11-1276/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:42:14+00:00

Document:
This Corrected Ruling is identical to the Ruling on the School’s Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment that was issued on January 11, 2011, with the exception of correction of three typographical or scrivener’s errors noted by the Parent in her Motion for Clarification dated February 14, 2011 . This Corrected Ruling should be substituted for the original document.
On November 1, 2010, Student’s parent (Parent) filed a hearing request with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA), in which she sought an order from the BSEA directing the Framingham Public Schools (Framingham or School) to reimburse Parent for the cost of a private occupational therapy (OT) evaluation conducted on or about June 29, 2010. Parent claimed that she had obtained the private evaluation in response to Framingham’s persistent failure or refusal to conduct its own OT evaluation within prescribed time lines, and failure to meet the Student’s OT needs.
The School filed its Response to the Hearing Request on November 10, 2010, in which it asserted that Mother was not entitled to a publicly-funded OT evaluation because more than 16 months had elapsed since the School’s most recent OT evaluation of Student. Further, the School stated that it agreed to conduct its own OT re-evaluation, after which Parent would be entitled to request an independent OT evaluation, but Parent unilaterally obtained the private evaluation without waiting for the School’s evaluation to be done.
On November 17, 2010,1 the District filed this Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment , stating that as a matter of law, Parent was not entitled to reimbursement. Parent filed an Opposition on December 8, 2010. An informal telephonic motion session was conducted on December 15, 2010, during which the parties discussed and clarified their respective positions. On December 16, 2010, the School filed additional correspondence explaining its position on a legal question posed by the Hearing Officer during the conference call.
The following factual summary is based on the documents accompanying the Hearing Request, Response, Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, and Opposition.2 These facts are not in dispute.
Student is an eligible child with disabilities. The Framingham Public Schools is Student’s Local Educational Agency (LEA) responsible for ensuring that Student receives a free, appropriate public education (FAPE). Student currently is a nine-year-old fourth grader attending a public elementary school in Framingham.
There is no dispute that Student is a very bright, capable child who excels in the regular education classroom. Historically, the only service provided by Student’s IEPs has been pull-out speech/language therapy to address difficulties with articulation, together with some related accommodations. (SM-3) Student also has some weaknesses in his handwriting skills, which will be discussed more fully, below.
In June 2010, Framingham issued an IEP for the 2010-2011 school year (fourth grade), which addressed articulation issues. (SM-6) On July 22, 2010, Parent partially rejected this IEP on the grounds that it omitted services and/or strategies to address weak handwriting skills, as well as related MCAS accommodations. Parent also requested reimbursement for a private (OT) evaluation that she had obtained in June 2010. The following chronology summarizes the remaining pertinent facts.
10. The Team convened on May 20, 2010. The occupational therapist, Ms. Plugis, did not attend the TEAM meeting, despite Parent’s prior request. Parent and the classroom teacher received the OT screening report immediately before attending the meeting. At the meeting, the classroom teacher mentioned that Student did not fill in the bubbles on MCAS answer sheets in a way that could be machine scored..
At issue here is whether, as a matter of law, Parent was not entitled to an independent OT evaluation at public expense where (1) the last School evaluation had taken place more than sixteen months prior to the request; (2) the School had conducted an OT “screening” within the 16-month window, but did not consider that “screening” to be an evaluation; (3) the School did not request a BSEA hearing within five (5) school days of declining to fund an outside evaluation.
The School has moved for dismissal or summary judgment in this case. For reasons of efficiency, I will analyze this matter within the framework for summary judgment, which will effectively resolve the issues raised by both requests. In so doing, I examine all of the parties’ written submissions, including the Hearing Request , Response , Motion , Opposition , and documents attached to these submissions. For reasons discussed below, the School’s Motion is DENIED.
Summary judgment is available at the BSEA if “there is no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law…” 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h). As with motions to dismiss, in determining whether to grant summary judgment, BSEA hearing officers are guided by Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 US 242, 248-252 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of producing evidence that there is no dispute of material fact. Once the moving party has done so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish specific facts showing that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 US 317, 322 (1986). As with motions to dismiss, the parties’ case is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case, the Parent. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby at 252. See also, Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment in Zelda v. Bridgewater-Raynham Public Schools and Bristol County Agricultural Schools , BSEA No. 06-0256 (Byrne, 2006); In Re Westwood Public Schools , BSEA No. 10-1162 (Figueroa, 2010 ), In Re: Mike v. Boston Public Schools , BSEA No. 10-2417 (Oliver, 2010).
Here, I find that the material facts are not in dispute, and the sole issue is whether the School is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The Massachusetts special education statute, G.L. c. 71B, Sec. 3, explicitly defines the term “without unnecessary delay” for Massachusetts, stating “[u]pon completion of said [school-based] evaluation, the child’s parents may obtain an [IEE] at school committee expense…provided that the school committee may initiate within five school working days of the request, a hearing with the [BSEA] to show that its evaluation is appropriate…” (Emphasis supplied) Since the Massachusetts standard provides more protection to the Parent than the federal IDEA, that state standard must be applied. Town of Burlington v. Mass. Dept. o f Education , 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1 st Cir. 1984).
The corresponding state regulation provides that if a parent requests an IEE “in an area not assessed by the school district,” the district must either agree to pay for the IEE or “within five school days, proceed to the [BSEA] to show that its evaluation was comprehensive and appropriate.” 603 CMR 28.04(5)(d). Read in isolation, this state regulation appears to restrict the “five-day rule” to situations where a parent is requesting assessment in a new area, that the school has not evaluated. The state statutory language cited above makes clear, however, that this time limit applies to all cases where the school opposes funding an IEE, and the regulation should be applied accordingly.
Finally, in Massachusetts, school districts must fully or partially fund IEEs for income-eligible families, according to the sliding scale established by state statute and regulations, upon receipt of pertinent financial information from the parents.5 According to the legal opinion cited to in the preceding paragraph, school districts must provide information about this option within the Notice of Procedural Safeguards that it distributes to parents. To comply with the five-day rule in cases where the sliding scale may apply, a district may either receive income information from parents within the five-day period and determine eligibility during that time, or request a BSEA hearing within the five days, and then withdraw the request if the parent demonstrates eligibility for full or partial funding of the IEE (assuming, of course, that a parent in this situation is satisfied with partial funding). The district is not excused from compliance with the five-day rule, however. Id.
In the instant case, in March of 2010, Parent requested the School to have its occupational therapist assess Student’s handwriting and related skills. The School conducted a “screening” which stated that Student “had no disability in this area,” and needed neither further evaluation nor OT services. Mother disagreed with this conclusion, and requested an IEE.
Since Parent clearly disagreed with the School’s conclusion, and requested an IEE, the School had five school days to (1) decide to fund the IEE, or (2) request a hearing at the BSEA. At such a hearing, the School would have to defend its “screening” as fulfilling the requirement for a comprehensive and appropriate evaluation. The School did neither, however. Further, the School did not offer to conduct its own evaluation until after Parent had notified the Director of Special Education of her intention to arrange for the IEE and seek reimbursement, and did not actually conduct this evaluation until the start of the following school year.
The School has correctly stated the general rule that a school-based evaluation is a pre-requisite to a publicly-funded IEE. That rule is inapplicable here, however. In this case, Parent did not refuse to consent to a school-based evaluation. On the contrary, it was Parent who asked the school to evaluate Student in the manner that the School deemed appropriate, and the School refused to either conduct what it considered to be an evaluation or to designate its “screening” as an evaluation. The law does not allow the School to sidestep its obligations in this manner.
Finally, as noted in the Facts , above, in May 2010, Parent provided Framingham with income information that suggested potential eligibility for the sliding fee scale program. There is no information in the parties’ documents indicating the School’s response, if any. If the School had followed up with Parent on this subject, as required by statute and regulation, the entire matter might have been resolved prior to hearing.
For the reasons stated above, the School is not entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law, and the Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
The School filed the Motion by fax on November 15, and the accompanying exhibits were received by mail on November 17, 2010.
Mother attached 39 exhibits to her Hearing Request, which will be designated Exhibits P-1 through P-39. The School attached 12 exhibits to its Response (SR-1 through SR-12) and 17 to its Motion (SM-1 through SM-17 ).
20 USC Sec. 1415(b)(1) and (d)(2)(A); 34 CFR Sec. 300.502, G.L. c. 71B, Sec. 3, 603 CMR 28.04(5).
GL c. 71B, Sec. 3, 603 CMR 28.04(5)(c).
This is a reasonable inference based on the undisputed facts.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.