Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/104/625/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 03:51:23+00:00

Document:
1. The construction given by the supreme court of a state to a statute of limitations of the state will be followed by this court in a case decided the other way in the circuit court before the decision of the state court.
2. The erroneous sustaining of a demurrer to a replication to one of several defenses in the answer requires the reversal of a final judgment for the defendant which is not clearly shown by the record to have proceeded upon other grounds.
on or after the 1st of January, 1873, when she first learned that the defendant disputed the validity of the certificate, denied that any transfer had been made to her upon its books, and refused to recognize her as a stockholder; that after the issue of the certificate to her, the defendant fraudulently permitted and procured Robert B. Moores to make on its books transfers of all the stock owned by him or standing in his name to Dorsey, its president, for its benefit, and refused, and still refuses, to recognize the plaintiff as owner of the stock or to recognize the validity of the certificate; that the facts that no transfer had been made to the plaintiff on the books of the bank at the time of the issue and delivery of the certificate to her, that the certificate was not authorized by the bank or recognized by its as valid, and that the stock standing in the name of Robert B. Moores had been transferred on the books to its president, was fraudulently concealed by the defendant, through its cashier, Robert B. Moores, and she was aware of no circumstances calling for inquiry on her part until after the 1st of January, 1873; that, by reason of the fraudulent conduct and acts aforesaid of the defendant, the certificate was invalid and worthless in her hands, and she had lost the sum of $9,100 paid by her therefor; and that the defendant had been requested by the plaintiff to repay or reimburse that sum to her, or to recognize the validity of the certificate, and had refused so to do.
to take up the same; 3d, averring that the paper purporting to be a certificate of stock was executed and delivered by Robert to the plaintiff, in violation of his duty and without the knowledge or consent of Dorsey or any other officer of the defendant; that according to the defendant's rules and usages, no one could procure a certificate of stock without the contemporaneous surrender of a certificate for an equal amount for cancellation, and that before the 15th of July, 1867, all the shares previously held by Robert had been transferred by him, and on the books of the bank, to other persons.
The plaintiff replied, alleging, as to the first ground of defense, first that at and before the 15th of July, 1867, and ever since, she was a married woman, and second that the cause of action did accrue within four years, and, as to the second ground of defense, denying the agreement and payment therein alleged, and demurred to the third ground of defense. And the defendant demurred to both the replies for the reason that they did not constitute good replies to the first ground of defense.
The court ordered that the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's first reply to the first ground of defense be sustained, to which the plaintiff excepted; ordered that the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's second reply to the first ground of defense be overruled, to which the defendant excepted; ordered that the plaintiff's demurrer to the third ground of defense be sustained, to which the defendant also excepted; and gave the parties leave to plead within thirty days, which did not appear to have been availed of.
which was well known to the plaintiff, and denying generally all allegations of fraud or negligence contained in the petition. And it was ordered by the court that "the default herein" (of which there was no previous mention in the record) be set aside, and the plaintiff have leave to reply; and she did reply, joining issue on the denials and denying the allegations of the amended answer.
"submitted the case to the court upon the issue joined. On consideration whereof the court find the issues to be in favor of the defendant, to which finding the plaintiff by her attorneys excepts."
The bill of exceptions presented by the plaintiff, and allowed by the judge presiding at the trial, stated that the case was submitted to the court upon all the evidence (which was in writing and annexed to the bill), and "thereupon the court found for the defendant, to which the plaintiff excepted."
"If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter, except for a penalty or forfeiture, be, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of twenty-one years, a married woman, insane or imprisoned, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within the respective times limited by this chapter, after such disability shall be removed"
Sec. 28. 2 Rev.Stat. of Ohio (Swan & Critchfield's ed.) 947, 949, 953. The section last cited has been amended by the Act of April 15, 1870, sec. 1, by providing that in actions concerning her separate property she may sue and be sued alone, and shall in no case be required to promote or defend by her next friend. 67 Ohio Laws 111.
The principal embarrassment in this case arises from the difficulty of ascertaining from the prolix and obscure record what was actually decided in the court below.
The decision of that court sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's first reply to the first ground of defense was based upon the position that the exception in the statute of limitations of Ohio in favor of a married woman was repealed by the statute of 1870, by which it was enacted that a married woman might sue alone in actions concerning her separate property. That decision was in accordance with an opinion of the majority of the Superior Court of Cincinnati in Ong v. Sumner, 1 Cincinnati Superior Court 424, which appears to have been the only decision upon the question in the courts of Ohio at the time of the trial of the present case in the circuit court. But in Lawrence Railroad v. Cobb, 35 Ohio St. 94, the Supreme Court of Ohio has since adjudged that even if the statute of 1870 withdrew the protection of coverture (a point which it did not decide), yet the action of a married woman was not barred until four years after the passage of this statute, and the construction thus given to the statute by the highest court of the state should be followed by this Court. Tioga Railroad v. Blossburg & Corning Railroad, 20 Wall. 137; Kibbe v. Ditto, 93 U. S. 674; Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, 100 U. S. 47.
below in favor of the defendant must be reversed unless it clearly appears that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the error. Deery v. Cray, 5 Wall. 795; Knox County Bank v. Lloyd, 18 Ohio St. 353.
To the first ground of defense stated in the answer -- namely that the cause of action did not accrue within four years -- the plaintiff had made two replies: the first in the nature of confession and avoidance, that she was a married woman; the second in the nature of a traverse, that the action did accrue within four years. This allegation of fact in the second reply cannot affect the issue of law raised by the defendant's demurrer to the first reply. After that demurrer had been sustained, the case, as was assumed and contended by the learned counsel for the defendant at the argument, presented three issues: first, whether the cause of action accrued within four years. Second, whether there had been a payment, as alleged in the second ground of offense. Third, upon the third ground of defense, which included a general denial of all the material allegations in the petition.
A verdict of a jury, or, where a trial by jury is waived, a finding by the court, upon any one of these issues would be sufficient to sustain a general finding for the defendant, and would render the other issues of fact immaterial. The bill of exceptions merely states generally that "the court found for the defendant," and the statement in the record that under a submission "upon the issue joined" the court found "the issues" to be in favor of the defendant, is too ambiguous to enlarge the effect of the general finding as stated in the bill of exceptions.
solely upon that ground of defense, without touching the second and third grounds.

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