Source: http://freeassembly.net/foaa-online/suspension-dissolution-associations/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:53:25+00:00

Document:
Suspension and the involuntary dissolution of an association are among the severest restrictions on freedom of association. Such measure must always comply with the requirements of Article 22(2) of the Covenant. Given the severity of these measures, they may only be used when there is a clear and imminent threat to for example national security of public Note that the legitimate aims which may be protected are exhaustively enumerated in article 22 of the ICCPR: national security, public safety, public order, protection of public health or morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. in accordance with the interpretations of international human rights law. It must be strictly proportional to the legitimate aim pursued and used only when softer measures would be insufficient. UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para 75.
Suspension or dissolution of an association by the government may only be applied where there is a clear and imminent danger resulting in a flagrant violation of national law, in compliance with international human rights law and as a matter of last resort.
Taking into account the severe consequences of the dissolution of “Viasna” for the exercise of the author’s and his co-authors’ right to freedom of association, as well as the unlawfulness of the operation of unregistered associations in Belarus, the Committee concludes that the dissolution of the association is disproportionate.  Belyatsky v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1296/2004, Views of 24 July 2007, para. 7.5; see also Korneenko v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1274/2004, Views of 31 October2006, para.7.7.
A restriction shall always be narrowly construed and applied and shall never completely extinguish the right nor encroach on its essence. In particular, any prohibition or dissolution of an association shall always be a measure of last resort, such as when an association has engaged in conduct that creates an imminent threat of violence or other grave violation of the law, and shall never be used to address minor infractions. OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association, 2015, para. 35.
Also, the ECtHR has underscored the extreme and severe nature of an involuntary dissolution when finding this form of interference to be disproportionate. Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Judgment of 8 October 2009, para. 82; United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 30 January 1998, paras. 46, 54, 61.
Suspension or involuntarily dissolution of associations should be sanctioned by an impartial and independent court in case of a clear and imminent danger resulting in a flagrant violation of domestic laws, in compliance with international human rights law. UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, paras. 77, 100.
Suspension may only be taken following court order, and dissolution only following a full judicial procedure and the exhaustion of all available appeal mechanisms. Such judgments shall be made publicly available and shall be determined on the basis of clear legal criteria in accordance with international human rights law.
The European Court confirmed that once dissolved – or refused registration – the association maintains its right to bring a claim before the ECtHR. Sindicatul “Pastorul cel bun” v. Romania, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 July, 2013, para. 70. In the case United Communist Party and Others v Turkey, the ECtHR held that “[t]he right guaranteed by Article 11 would be largely theoretical and illusory if it were limited to the founding of an association, since the national authorities could immediately disband the association without having to comply with the Convention.” United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 20 January 1998, para. 33.
The ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association follows the same logic and holds that because of the extreme nature of the measure, suspension or involuntary dissolution must always be subject to judicial review and the association’s rights to defense must be fully guaranteed. ILO, Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, Fifth (revised) edition, para. 699 (2006).
Failing to comply with administrative obligations enshrined in national law is not a sufficient ground for dissolution. The UN Rapporteur specifically clarified that should an association fail to meet its reporting obligations, such a violation should not lead to involuntary dissolution, closure of association or prosecution of its members. Instead, the association should be given an opportunity to rectify the situation.  UN Human Rights Council, Second Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39, April 24 2013, para 38(e).
The Human Rights Committee has examined several cases where the State improperly dissolved or suspended an association. In a string of cases arising in Belarus, it has found violations of the right to freedom of association where the State arbitrarily used its laws on association to dissolve or suspend organizations.
“In the present case, the court order dissolving ‘Civil Initiatives’ is based on two types of perceived violations of the State party’s domestic law: (1) improper use of equipment, received through foreign grants, for the production of propaganda materials and the conduct of propaganda activities; and (2) deficiencies in the association’s documentation. These two groups of legal requirements constitute de facto restrictions and must be assessed in the light of the consequences which arise for the author and ‘Civil Initiatives’.
On the first point, the Committee notes that the author and the State party disagree on whether ‘Civil Initiatives’ indeed used its equipment for the stated purposes. It considers that even if ‘Civil Initiatives’ used such equipment, the State party has not advanced any argument as to why it would be necessary, for purposes of Article 22, paragraph 2, to prohibit its use ‘for the preparation of gatherings, meetings, street processions, demonstrations, pickets, strikes, production and the dissemination of propaganda materials, as well as the organization of seminars and other forms of propaganda activities’.
On the second point, the Committee notes that the parties disagree over the interpretation of domestic law and the State party’s failure to advance arguments as to which of the three deficiencies in the association’s documentation triggers the application of the restrictions spelled out in Article 22, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Even if ‘Civil Initiatives’’ documentation did not fully comply with the requirements of domestic law, the reaction of the State party’s authorities in dissolving the association was disproportionate.” Viktor Korneenko et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1274/2004, Views of 31 October 2006, paras. 7.2-7.4.
, the applicants’ NGO had been dissolved for failing to comply with national law regarding the use of foreign funds, equipment purchased with foreign funds and for apparent flaws in its official documents. The Human Rights Committee found the State Party had violated the applicants’ rights to freedom of association because it failed to show (1) that the restrictions on the use of foreign funds were necessary to any legitimate State interest, or (2) that the dissolution of an organization was proportionate to any technical failings in its attempts to comply with Belarussian law [click for full case explanation].
In Belyatsky v Belarus, the Human Rights Committee found that Belarus violated the applicants’ rights to freedom association where it dissolved an NGO, Viasna, for its monitoring of Belarus’ 2001 national elections. Viasna raised questions about the legitimacy of the elections. It was dissolved by court order soon after for violating the laws on elections by sending monitors to election committee meetings and polling stations, and for violating the law governing public associations by paying third party observers in addition to relying on “members” of the association. Aleksander Belyatsky et al. v Belarus, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1296/2004, Views of 7 August 2007, para. 7.5. The Human Rights Committee held that Belarus had again failed to show that the dissolution of the organization was in pursuit of a legitimate aim or was necessary or proportionate to any such State interest. Instead, the HRC took the opportunity to remind the State Party that “the existence and operation of associations, including those which peacefully promote ideas not necessarily favorably received by the government or the majority of the population, is a cornerstone of a democratic society” Aleksander Belyatsky et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1296/2004, Views of 7 August 2007, para. 7.3.
The mere existence of reasonable and objective justifications for limiting the right to freedom of association is not sufficient. The State party must further demonstrate that the prohibition of an association is necessary to avert a real and not only hypothetical danger to national security or democratic order, and that less intrusive measures would be insufficient to achieve the same purpose.
In the present case, the court order which dissolved “Viasna” is based on perceived violations of the State party’s electoral laws carried out during the association’s monitoring of the 2001 Presidential elections. This de facto restriction on the freedom of association must be assessed in the light of the consequences which arise for the author, the co-authors and the association.
The Committee notes that the author and the State party disagree over the interpretation of article 57, paragraph 2, of the Civil Procedure Code, and its compatibility with the lex specialis governing the legal regime applicable to public associations in Belarus. It considers that even if “Viasna’s” perceived violations of electoral laws were to fall in the category of the ‘repeated commission of gross breaches of the law’, the State party has not advanced a plausible argument as to whether the grounds on which “Viasna” was dissolved were compatible with any of the criteria listed in Article 22, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. As stated by the [Belarus] Supreme Court, the violations of electoral laws consisted of “Viasna’s” non-compliance with the established procedure of sending its observers to the meetings of the electoral commission and to the polling stations; and offering to pay third persons, not being members of “Viasna”, for their services as observers. Aleksander Belyatsky et al. v. Belarus, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, UN Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1296/2004, Views of 24 July 2007, para. 7.3-7.5.
the order to dissolve the association on the ground of the alleged breaches of the domestic legal requirements on internal management of NGOs was not justified by compelling reasons and was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Judgment of 8 October 2009, para. 82.
The Venice Commission’s opinion on Belarus similarly clarified that penalizing actions connected with the organization or management of an association on the sole ground that the association has not been registered does not meet the three-prong test for restricting the right to freedom of association. Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility with Universal Human Rights Standards of Article 193-1 of the Criminal Code on the Rights of Non-Registered Associations of The Republic of Belarus, 18 October 2011, para. 113.
In Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, the State also advanced criminal allegations to dissolve the association. These allegations were however not substantiated by evidence, nor by any criminal charges against the leadership of the association. The ECtHR found that unproven allegations of unlawful activities were not a legitimate basis for dissolution of the association. Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Judgment of 8 October 2009, para. 84-91.
Measures of suspension or dissolution may be proportionate in extreme cases, such as when an association incites violence or advocates for the destruction of democracy.
The protection of associational objectives which promote ideas not favorable to the government is guaranteed under international law (see Association Section 8). The ECtHR has emphasized on several occasions that an association, including a political party, is not excluded from the protection afforded by the Convention simply because its activities are regarded by the national authorities as undermining the constitutional structures of the State. United Communist Party and Others v Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 30 January 1998. In Refah Partisi v. Turkey, the ECtHR clarified however, that a political party inciting to violence or aiming at destroying the democratic order cannot claim protection under the Convention: See Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 13 February 2003, para. 98-100.
It necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite to violence or put forward a policy which fails to respect democracy or which is aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay claim to the Convention’s protection against penalties imposed on those grounds See Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v. Turkey, ECtHR, 2003, para. 98; see also Yazar and others v Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 April 2002, para. 49.
The State is also entitled to take preventive measures to protect democracy vis-à-vis such non-party entities if a sufficiently imminent prejudice to the rights of others threatens to undermine the fundamental values on the basis of which a democratic society exists and functions. […] the State is entitled to act preventively if it is established that such a movement has started to take concrete steps in public life to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the Convention and democracy. Vona v Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 July 2013, para. 57.
It is important to note that the specific facts of this case – especially the paramilitary nature of some of the activities, the history of the country and the intimidating effects on a vulnerable ethnic group – seem to have played an important role in the conclusion by the ECtHR. The Court accepted in this case that the threat posed could only be effectively eliminated by removing the movement’s organizational backing. Vona v Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 July 2013, paras. 71-72.
In Eusko Abertizale Ekintza – Accion Nacionalista Vasca v Spain, the European Court accepted the legitimacy of the dissolution of the party taking into account the linkages, albeit not formal, but practical, including financial, between the party and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), declared a terrorist organization in Spain. Eusko Abertzale Ekintza – Accion Nacionalista Vasca v. Spain, ECtHR, Judgment of January 15, 2013, para 73. Available in French.
In a remarkable case, Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, the ECtHR found that the dissolution of a football supporters’ club in France did not amount to a violation of the right to freedom of association. Even though, in this case, the local courts had not established any negligence on the part of the applicant associations for very violent acts (resulting in deaths), they established that their involvement in the events had led to public disorder by certain supporters acting as members of the association. Again, it is important to consider the case in its specific context of a long period of very violent outbreaks in football stadiums for which a number of other government measures had not yielded effects. In this particular situation, the ECtHR accepted the legitimacy of the “pressing social need” to impose drastic restrictions on groups of supporters, thereby infringing the very essence of freedom of association, in order to prevent and eliminate the risk of public disorder. Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 October 2016, para. 83. The rule is available only in French. A summary is available in English. When considering the necessity of the measure, the Court also took the nature of the organization into account, namely the promotion of a football club. The Court found such association to be less vital to a democratic society. Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 October 2016, para. 84.
Even in cases where State authorities take the measure of dissolution because they find the association is inciting violence, a strict proportionality test must be applied.
81. In this particular case it is obvious that the dissolution of the UFD/EN had the main objective of preventing the party leaders from continuing to be responsible for actions for declarations or for the adoption of positions which, according to the Mauritanian government, caused public disorder and seriously threatened the credit, social cohesion and public order in the country.
82. Nonetheless, and without wanting to pre-empt the judgment of the Mauritanian authorities, it appears to the African Commission that the said authorities had a whole gamut of sanctions which they could have used without having to resort to the dissolution of this party. It would appear in fact that if the respondent state wished to end the verbal ‘drifting’ of the UFD/EN party and to avoid the repetition by this same party of its behaviour prohibited by the law, the respondent state could have used a large number of measures enabling it, since the first escapade of this political party, to contain this ‘grave threat to public order’. Interights and Others v Mauritania, AComHPR, June 2004, paras. 81-82.
It may be argued that a number of measures amount to a de facto dissolution.
The Special Rapporteur has argued in an amicus brief that hasty approvals by government authorities of a new composition of an association’s board – while knowing that it was contested by the governing board and against a background of earlier threats by authorities not to renew the association’s registration – had the effect of an involuntary dissolution of the association. UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association Maina Kiai, Amicus Curiae before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the case of Laurent Munyandilikirwa versus Rwanda, January 2015, para. 43.
Similarly it can be argued that the impact of withdrawing the legal personality of an association may be so severe that it amounts to a de facto dissolution. Without legal personality, associations often cannot transact or engage resources (human and financial) in the name of the association, which are key to carrying out the purposes for which they are formed (see Association Section 7). For a specific application of this argument see UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association Maina Kiai, Amicus curiae before the Constitutional Court of Bolivia, April 2015, paras. 34, 42, 49.

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