Source: http://blog.federaldefendersny.org/category/statutory-interpretation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:56:48+00:00

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Today the Second Circuit issued an opinion holding that a non-U.S. citizen, employed by a foreign company, could not be prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). See United States v. Hoskins, No. 16-1010 (2d Cir. 2018) (Katzmann, Pooler, Lynch). The opinion is a statutory interpretation tour de force. Of course, the case does not necessarily present a factual scenario that attorneys will often encounter while representing indigent defendants. However, Judge Pooler’s analysis and methodology provide an excellent template for for those arguing for limitations on the scope of conspiracy liability in other contexts. The opinion is available here.
In a short and interesting opinion, available here, the Second Circuit held today that (1) a defendant did not waive her right to appeal a restitution order on the ground that it covered conduct outside the statute of limitations period, and (2) that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (embezzlement of government property) are not continuing offenses, rendering the defendant liable for funds embezzled outside the limitations period. See United States v. Green, No. 16-3044 (2d Cir. 2018) (Cabranes, Carney, Goldberg (Ct. Intl. Trade )) (appeal from W.D.N.Y.). The second of these holdings, concerning the scope of § 641, creates a circuit split.
In Marinello v. United States, the Supreme Court narrowly construed the obstruction provision in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), known as the Omnibus Clause. That provision criminalizes “corruptly or by force or threats of force . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code].” Justice Breyer wrote the opinion, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Thomas dissented, joined by Alito.
One major decision out of the Second Circuit today, United States v. Rowland (Docket 15-985). It’s a good read for those interested in statutory construction and interpretation. A brief overview of the facts: The defendant, John Rowland was once governor of Connecticut. After being released from federal custody following a 2004 conviction for corruption and a kickback scandal, Rowland attempted to get back in the political game by offering his consulting services to Connecticut politicians running for federal office. When the politicians, wanting his advice, but not an association with him, raised their concerns about the optics, Rowland suggested that their respective companies and non-profits hire him as a consultant. As the government alleged, though, in reality he would offer advice to their campaigns.
Odell Connolly was born in Panama on April 21, 1968. His mother was a local, but his father was a United States citizen. They were not married. The father had been drafted into the United States Army in 1966 and was on active duty in the Panama Canal Zone until eighteen days before Connolly was born. After that, he was transferred to the Ready Reserves; he performed no further duty or services for the army, and received no pay or other form of government compensation. Although the army had the right to recall him to active duty, it never did so, and he was discharged in 1972.
In 2002 and 2003, the government believed that Frederic Bourke was involved in a scheme to bribe senior government officials in Azerbaijan in connection with the privatization of that nation’s state-run oil company. During the investigation, the government made treaty requests for assistance to Switzerland and the Netherlands. And, months later, on July 21, 2003, it applied for an order under 18 U.S.C. § 3292 tolling the statute of limitations based on those requests. By this time, however, more than five years had elapsed since some of Bourke’s offenses had been completed.

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