Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1551104.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:11:14+00:00

Document:
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gregory DIAZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Lyn A. Woodward, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. DeNicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Lawrence M. Daniels, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Victoria B. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
We granted review in this case to decide whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits law enforcement officers, approximately 90 minutes after lawfully arresting a suspect and transporting him to a detention facility, to conduct a warrantless search of the text message folder of a cell phone they take from his person after the arrest. We hold that, under the United States Supreme Court's binding precedent, such a search is valid as being incident to a lawful custodial arrest. We affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.
About 2:50 p.m. on April 25, 2007, Senior Deputy Sheriff Victor Fazio of the Ventura County Sheriff's Department witnessed defendant Gregory Diaz participating in a police informant's controlled purchase of Ecstasy. Defendant drove the Ecstasy's seller to the location of the sale, which then took place in the backseat of the car defendant was driving. Immediately after the sale, Fazio, who had listened in on the transaction through a wireless transmitter the informant was wearing, stopped the car defendant was driving and arrested defendant for being a coconspirator in the sale of drugs. Six tabs of Ecstasy were seized in connection with the arrest, and a small amount of marijuana was found in defendant's pocket. Defendant had a cell phone on his person.
Fazio transported defendant to a sheriff's station, where a detective seized the cell phone from defendant's person and gave it to Fazio. Fazio put it with the other evidence and, at 4:18 p.m., interviewed defendant. Defendant denied having knowledge of the drug transaction. After the interview, about 4:23 p.m., Fazio looked at the cell phone's text message folder and discovered a message that said “6 4 80.” 1 Based on his training and experience, Fazio interpreted the message to mean “[s]ix pills of Ecstasy for $80.” Within minutes of discovering the message (and less than 30 minutes after the cell phone's discovery), Fazio showed the message to defendant. Defendant then admitted participating in the sale of Ecstasy.
Defendant was charged with selling a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). He pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the fruits of the cell phone search-the text message and the statements he made when confronted with it-arguing that the warrantless search of the cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, explaining: “The defendant was under arrest for a felony charge involving the sale of drugs. His property was seized from him. Evidence was seized from him. [¶] ․ [I]ncident to the arrest[,] search of his person and everything that that turned up is really fair game in terms of being evidence of a crime or instrumentality of a crime or whatever the theory might be. And under these circumstances I don't believe there's authority that a warrant was required.” Defendant then withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to transportation of a controlled substance. The trial court accepted the plea, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed defendant on probation for three years.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that under governing high court precedent, because the cell phone “was immediately associated with [defendant's] person at the time of his arrest,” it was “properly subjected to a delayed warrantless search.” We granted defendant's petition for review.
The relevant high court decisions do not support the view that whether police must get a warrant before searching an item they have properly seized from an arrestee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest depends on the item's character, including its capacity for storing personal information. As noted above, Chadwick explains that a delayed warrantless search “of the person” (Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 16, fn. 10, 97 S.Ct. 2476)-which includes property “immediately associated with the person” at the time of arrest (id. at p. 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476), but excludes property that is only “within an arrestee's immediate control” (id. at p. 16, fn. 10, 97 S.Ct. 2476)-is valid because of “reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest.” (Ibid.) Robinson states that if a custodial arrest is lawful, then a “full” search of the arrestee's person “requires no additional justification.” (Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 235, 94 S.Ct. 467.) Edwards states that “once the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even though a substantial period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent administrative processing, on the one hand, and the taking of the property for use as evidence, on the other.” (Edwards, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 807, 94 S.Ct. 1234.) Nothing in these decisions even hints that whether a warrant is necessary for a search of an item properly seized from an arrestee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest depends in any way on the character of the seized item.
Moreover, in analogous contexts, the high court has expressly rejected the view that the validity of a warrantless search depends on the character of the searched item. In United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (Ross ), the court held that police who have probable cause to believe a lawfully stopped car contains contraband may conduct a warrantless search of any compartment or container in the car that may conceal the object of the search. As relevant here, the court stated that whether a particular container may be searched without a warrant does not depend on the character of the container, explaining: “[A] constitutional distinction between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ containers would be improper. Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other, the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction.” (Id. at p. 822, 102 S.Ct. 2157, fn. omitted.) “The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted.” 8 (Ross, at p. 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157.) In New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (Belton ), the court held that police making a lawful custodial arrest of a car's occupant “may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,” “examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.” (Id. at p. 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, italics added.) As relevant here, the court rejected the proposition that whether a particular container may be searched without a warrant depends on the extent of the arrestee's reasonable expectation of privacy in that container, explaining: “[A]ny container[ ] ․ [in] the passenger compartment ․ may ․ be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.” 9 (Belton, at pp. 460-461, 101 S.Ct. 2860, italics added.) Under Ross, Belton, and the other high court decisions discussed above, there is no legal basis for holding that the scope of a permissible warrantless search of an arrestee's person, including items immediately associated with the arrestee's person, depends on the nature or character of those items.
Regarding the particular focus of defendant and the dissent on the alleged storage capacity of cell phones, for several reasons, the argument is unpersuasive. First, the record contains no evidence regarding the storage capacity of cell phones in general or of defendant's cell phone in particular. Second, neither defendant nor the dissent persuasively explains why the sheer quantity of personal information should be determinative. Even “small spatial container[s]” (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, at p. 120, 244 P.3d at p.514) that hold less information than cell phones may contain highly personal, intimate and private information, such as photographs, letters, or diaries.10 If, as the high court held in Ross, “a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf [has] an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case” (Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 822, 102 S.Ct. 2157), then travelers who carry sophisticated cell phones have no greater right to conceal personal information from official inspection than travelers who carry such information in “small spatial container[s].” 11 (Dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, at p. 120, 244 P.3d at p. 514) And if, as the high court held in Belton, differing expectations of privacy based on whether a container is open or closed are irrelevant to the validity of a warrantless search incident to arrest (Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at p. 461, 101 S.Ct. 2860), then differing expectations of privacy based on the amount of information a particular item contains should also be irrelevant. Regarding the quantitative analysis of defendant and the dissent, the salient point of the high court's decisions is that a “lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have” in property immediately associated with his or her person at the time of arrest (ibid., italics added), even if there is no reason to believe the property contains weapons or evidence (Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 235, 94 S.Ct. 467). Third, even were it true that the amount of personal information some cell phones can store “dwarfs that which can be carried on the person in a spatial container” (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, at p. 123, 244 P.3d at p. 516)-and, again, the record contains no evidence on this question-defendant and the dissent fail to explain why this circumstance would justify exempting all cell phones, including those with limited storage capacity, from the rule of Robinson, Edwards, and Chadwick.12 A warrantless search, incident to a lawful arrest, of a cell phone with limited storage capacity does not become constitutionally unreasonable simply because other cell phones may have a significantly greater storage capacity.
The majority holds that the police may, without obtaining a warrant, view or listen to information electronically stored on a mobile phone that a suspect was carrying when lawfully arrested. The dissent disagrees. I explain why I join the majority rather than the dissent.
When carried in clothing (rather than inside luggage or a similar container), a mobile phone is personal property that is “immediately associated with the person of the arrestee” (Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476). Accordingly, under controlling high court decisions, police may, without obtaining a warrant, inspect a mobile phone carried by a suspect at the time of arrest, by viewing or listening to its electronically stored data, including text messages, even when a substantial time has elapsed since the arrest.
The dissent asserts that in light of the vast data storage capacity of “smart phones” and similar devices, the privacy interests that the federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment was intended to protect would be better served by a rule that did not allow police “to rummage at leisure through the wealth of personal and business information that can be carried on a mobile phone or handheld computer merely because the device was taken from an arrestee's person.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 126, 244 P.3d at p. 518.) The dissent also asserts that the three high court decisions I have mentioned are not binding here because they “were not made with mobile phones, smartphones and handheld computers-none of which existed at the time-in mind.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 124, 244 P.3d at p. 517.) In my view, however, the recent emergence of this new technology does not diminish or reduce in scope the binding force of high court precedents.
Under the compulsion of directly applicable United States Supreme Court precedent, I join the majority in affirming the Court of Appeal's judgment.
The potential intrusion on informational privacy involved in a police search of a person's mobile phone, smartphone or handheld computer is unique among searches of an arrestee's person and effects. A contemporary smartphone 19 can hold hundreds or thousands of messages, photographs, videos, maps, contacts, financial records, memoranda and other documents, as well as records of the user's telephone calls and Web browsing.20 Never before has it been possible to carry so much personal or business information in one's pocket or purse. The potential impairment to privacy if arrestees' mobile phones and handheld computers are treated like clothing or cigarette packages, fully searchable without probable cause or a warrant, is correspondingly great.
Although the record does not disclose the type of mobile phone defendant possessed, I discuss smartphones as well as other mobile phones for two reasons. First, the rule adopted by the majority-that an electronic device carried on the person is for Fourth Amendment purposes indistinguishable from an individual's clothing or a small spatial container-is broad enough to encompass all types of handheld electronic data devices, including smartphones such as iPhones and BlackBerry devices, as well as other types of handheld computers. While I disagree with the majority's holding on the validity of the search here, I agree that the permissibility of a search incident to arrest should not depend on the features or technical specifications of the mobile device, which could be difficult to determine at the time of arrest.21 Second, smartphones make up a growing share of the United States mobile phone market and are likely to be pervasive in the near future. (See Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, supra, 56 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 29 [“It does not take a crystal ball to predict that such devices will be ubiquitous in the United States within a few years.”].) 22 The question of when and how they may be searched is therefore an important one.
Weapons, of course, may be hidden in an arrestee's clothing or in a physical container on the person. But there is apparently no “app” that will turn an iPhone or any other mobile phone into an effective weapon for use against an arresting officer (and if there were, officers would presumably seek to disarm the phone rather than search its data files). Clearly, any justification for the warrantless search of a mobile phone must come from the possibility that the arrestee might, during the arrest, destroy evidence stored on the phone.
Recently, addressing the search of an arrestee's vehicle, the high court rejected the fictional approach to justification of a search incident to arrest, holding instead “that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” (Arizona v. Gant, supra, --- U.S. at p. ---- [129 S.Ct. at p. 1719, 173 L.Ed.2d at p. 496].) Just as the court in Gant adopted a narrow reading of New York v. Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, so, too, some courts and commentators have suggested a narrow reading of Edwards, in which delayed searches incident to arrest would be per se valid only as to the arrestee's actual person or clothing (which cannot easily be separated from the person at the time of arrest). (See United States v. Schleis (8th Cir.1978) 582 F.2d 1166, 1171 [disapproving station house search of arrestee's locked briefcase]; Butterfoss, As Time Goes By: The Elimination of Contemporaneity and Brevity as Factors in Search and Seizure Cases, supra, 21 Harv.C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. at p. 626 [noting possibility of reading Edwards as dependent on impossibility of taking arrestee's clothes until replacement clothes were available at the jail].) Indeed, the defendant in Edwards had objected, and the court of appeals had reversed his conviction, only on grounds that the delayed warrantless seizure of his clothing violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Edwards, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 802, 94 S.Ct. 1234, italics added.) No issue was presented as to the delayed warrantless seizure or search of a container carried by an arrestee.
Edwards nonetheless spoke broadly, and Chadwick suggests items beyond clothing may be subject to delayed warrantless search if they are “immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” (Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476; see also id. at p. 16, fn. 10, 97 S.Ct. 2476 [describing Robinson (which involved search of a small container), as well as Edwards, as a search “of the person”].) The majority thus reasonably reads existing high court authority as permitting delayed warrantless searches of containers immediately associated with an arrestee's person.
The question is whether the information stored on electronic devices such as mobile phones, as at issue here, may be examined without a warrant under the same rationale. For two reasons, I would hold it may not.
First, as suggested earlier, the amount and type of personal and business information that can be stored on a mobile phone, smartphone or handheld computer, and would become subject to delayed warrantless search under the majority holding, dwarfs that which can be carried on the person in a spatial container.25 As one federal district court observed in suppressing the fruits of a mobile phone search, modern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of private information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also contain address books, calendars, voice and text messages, email, video and pictures. Individuals can store highly personal information on their cell phones, and can record their most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email and text, voice and instant messages. (United States v. Park (N.D.Cal., May 23, 2007, No. CR 05-375 SI) 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 40596, *21-*22, fn. omitted.) Smartphones, as we have seen, have even greater information storage capacities.
The warrantless search of an arrestee's person thus rests on a relatively simple, intuitively correct idea: the police, having lawful custody of the individual, necessarily have the authority to search the arrestee's body and seize anything of importance they find there. Having been lawfully arrested, with his or her person under the custody and control of the police, the individual can no longer claim in full the personal privacy he or she ordinarily enjoys. It does not follow, however, that the police also have “ ‘dominion (Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 232 [94 S.Ct. 467] ) over the entirety of stored messages, photographs, videos, memoranda and other records an arrestee may be carrying on a mobile phone or smartphone. An individual lawfully arrested and taken into police custody necessarily loses much of his or her bodily privacy, but does not necessarily suffer a reduction in the informational privacy that protects the arrestees records. That an arrestees interest in his or her own privacy’ ” (Edwards, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 809, 94 S.Ct. 1234) is severely reduced does not imply a corresponding reduction in privacy of personal and business data. Even when they happen to be stored on a device carried on the person, these records are clearly distinct from the person of the arrestee.
Because the data stored on a mobile phone or other electronic device is easily distinguished from the arrestee's actual person, and in light of the extraordinary potential for invasion of informational privacy involved in searching data stored on such devices, I would hold mobile phones, smartphones and handheld computers are not ordinarily subject to delayed, warrantless search incident to arrest. In the terms provided by the existing United States Supreme Court authority, search of the information stored on an arrestee's mobile phone or similar device should be treated as the search of an item “within an arrestee's immediate control” rather than a search “of the person.” (Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 16, fn. 10, 97 S.Ct. 2476.) Once an arrestee's mobile phone or similar device is securely “under the exclusive dominion of police authority” (id. at p. 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476), the arrest itself no longer serves to authorize a warrantless search of its stored data.
The majority's holding, however, goes much further, apparently allowing police carte blanche, with no showing of exigency, to rummage at leisure through the wealth of personal and business information that can be carried on a mobile phone or handheld computer merely because the device was taken from an arrestee's person. The majority thus sanctions a highly intrusive and unjustified type of search, one meeting neither the warrant requirement nor the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As a commentator has noted, “[i]f courts adopted this rule, it would subject anyone who is the subject of a custodial arrest, even for a traffic violation, to a preapproved foray into a virtual warehouse of their most intimate communications and photographs without probable cause.” (Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, supra, 50 Santa Clara L.Rev. at p. 211.) United States Supreme Court authority does not compel this overly permissive rule, and I cannot agree to its adoption.
1. Fazio had to manipulate the phone and go to several different screens to access the text message folder. He did not recall whether the cell phone was on when he picked it up to look through it.
3. The People do not contest that defendant had a protected expectation of privacy in the contents of his text message folder. For purposes of this opinion, we therefore assume defendant had such an expectation, and do not consider the issue.
4. Defendant does not question the legality of either his arrest or his phone's warrantless seizure. He challenges only the validity of the warrantless search of the phone's text message folder.
5. The approximately 90-minute delay between defendant's arrest and the search of his cell phone was substantially similar to the 90-minute delay the high court held to be too remote in Chadwick.
11. Were the rule otherwise, those carrying small spatial containers, which are legally subject to seizure and search if found upon the person at the time of arrest, would find little solace in discovering that their intimate secrets would have been protected if only they had used a device that could hold more personal information.
15. The high court did discuss containers in the decisions we have cited as involving “analogous contexts.” (Ante, at pp. 112-114, 244 P.3d at p. 507-508.) In this respect, our analysis is consistent with the weight of authority. (State v. Boyd (2010) 295 Conn. 707, 992 A.2d 1071, 1089, fn. 17 [“A number of courts have analogized cell phones to closed containers and concluded that a search of their contents is, therefore, valid under the automobile exception or the exception for a search incident to arrest.”].) Moreover, contrary to the dissent's analysis, nothing in these analogous decisions purports to limit the rule of Robinson, Edwards, and Chadwick to property that classifies as a container.
17. Only a few published decisions exist regarding the validity of a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to a lawful custodial arrest. Most are in accord with our conclusion. (See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, supra, 552 F.3d at p. 412 [citing Edwards in holding that “once [the defendant's] cell phone was held for evidence, other officers and investigators were entitled to conduct a further review of its contents ․ without seeking a warrant”]; United States v. Finley (5th Cir.2007) 477 F.3d 250, 260, fn. 7 [arrestee's cell phone “does not fit into [Chadwick's ] category of ‘property not immediately associated with [his] person’ because it was on his person at the time of his arrest”]; United States v. Wurie (D.Mass.2009) 612 F.Supp.2d 104, 110 [upholding delayed search of cell phone, finding “no principled basis for distinguishing a warrantless search of a cell phone from the search of other types of personal containers found on a defendant's person that” have been upheld under Edwards ].)In a closely divided (four to three) opinion, the Supreme Court of Ohio held otherwise, reasoning that “because a person has a high expectation of privacy in a cell phone's contents,” police, after seizing a cell phone from an arrestee's person, “must ․ obtain a warrant before intruding into the phone's contents.” (State v. Smith (2009) 124 Ohio St.3d 163, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955.) The Ohio court's focus on the extent of the arrestee's expectation of privacy is, as previously explained, inconsistent with the high court's decisions.
18. The separately concurring justice correctly observes that we must follow directly applicable decisions from the United States Supreme Court even if we think them due for reexamination. (Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp. (1989) 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526.) But where high court precedent is not on all fours with the case at bar, we also must remember that the language of Supreme Court decisions is to “be read in the light of the facts of the case under discussion” and that “[g]eneral expressions transposed to other facts are often misleading.” (Armour & Co. v. Wantock (1944) 323 U.S. 126, 133, 65 S.Ct. 165, 89 L.Ed. 118.) Indeed, the Supreme Court recently emphasized that stare decisis should not be used “to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice․ in a case that is so easily distinguished from the decisions that arguably compel it.” (Arizona v. Gant (2009) --- U.S. ----, ---- [129 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 173 L.Ed.2d 485, 499].)The facts of the present case, as I will explain, differ in important respects from those that gave rise to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Robinson, Edwards and Chadwick. These precedents, therefore, provide no basis for evading this court's independent responsibility to determine the constitutionality of the search at issue. While we of course have no authority to overrule them, we may and should refrain from applying their language blindly to new and fundamentally different factual circumstances.
20. Apple's iPhone 4, HTC's Droid Incredible, and the BlackBerry Torch all can store up to 32 gigabytes of data, which could include thousands of images or other digital files. (See ; ; and [all as of Jan. 3, 2011].) On the capabilities of smartphones generally, see Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment (2008) 56 UCLA L.Rev. 27, 29-30.
21. But see Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence (2010) 50 Santa Clara L.Rev. 183, 222 (proposing to distinguish smartphones from “older generation cellular phones” by presence of a touch screen or full keyboard, and to impose stricter limits on searches of smartphones).
23. Defendant did not challenge the seizure of his phone, only the search of the data stored on it. Nor do I contend the police needed a warrant or probable cause to take defendant's phone from him and secure it. Once secured, the phone could have been searched later if a warrant, founded on probable cause, issued for the search.
25. The majority observes that substantial private information can be carried in the nondigital forms of letters and diaries. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 113-114, 244 P.3d at pp. 508-509.) Implicit in the majority's argument is the assumption that police may not only take a letter or diary from an arrestee and inventory it, but may, without a warrant, read through all of its contents. Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has so held.
26. The Belton court stated: “ ‘Container’ here denotes any object capable of holding another object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.” (New York v. Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at pp. 460-461, fn. 4, 101 S.Ct. 2860.) As Belton clearly spoke only of objects physically containing other objects, the majority's reliance on that case for the proposition that any “container,” whatever the extent of the arrestee's expectation of privacy in it, may be searched incident to arrest (maj. opn., ante, at p. 112-113, 244 P.3d at pp. 507-508) is misplaced when it comes to mobile phones and other electronic communication and data storage devices. Still less on point is United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, which did not even involve a search incident to arrest. That the high court in Ross declined to distinguish among probable cause searches of paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates carried in automobiles (id. at p. 822, 102 S.Ct. 2157) hardly requires that an arrestees mobile phone, smartphone or handheld computer be treated the same as clothing or a crumpled cigarette package.
WE CONCUR: KENNARD, Acting C.J., BAXTER, CORRIGAN and GEORGE, * JJ.

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