Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/339/33/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:45:57+00:00

Document:
1. Administrative hearings in proceedings for the deportation of aliens must conform to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Pp. 339 U. S. 35-53.
2. The history of this Act discloses that it is remedial legislation which should be construed, so far as its text permits, to give effect to its remedial purposes where the evils it was aimed at appear. Pp. 339 U. S. 36-41.
3. One of the fundamental purposes of the Act was to ameliorate the evils resulting from the practice of commingling in one person the duties of prosecutor and judge. Pp. 339 U. S. 41-45, 339 U. S. 46.
Held: this was contrary to the purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act to ameliorate the evils resulting from a combination of the prosecuting and adjudicating functions in administrative proceedings. Pp. 339 U. S. 45-48.
Service, although the Immigration Act contains no express requirement for hearings in deportation proceedings. Pp. 339 U. S. 48-51 .
(a) The limitation of § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act to hearings "required by statute" does not exempt hearings held by compulsion, but only those which administrative agencies may hold by regulation, rule, custom, or special dispensation. P. 339 U. S. 50.
(b) They do not exempt hearings the requirement for which has been read into a statute by this Court in order to save the statute from constitutional invalidity. Pp. 339 U. S. 50-51.
6. The exception in § 7(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act of proceedings before "officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute" does not exempt deportation hearings held before immigrant inspectors. Pp. 339 U. S. 51-53.
(a) Nothing in the Immigration Act specifically provides that immigrant inspectors shall conduct deportation hearings or be designated to do so. Pp. 339 U. S. 51-52.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the District Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., does not apply to deportation hearings. 80 F.Supp. 235. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 84 U.S.App.D.C. 419, 174 F.2d 158. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U.S. 812. Reversed, p. 339 U. S. 53.
departments of the executive Government and to recommend improvements, including the suggestion of any needed legislation. [Footnote 9]"
measures, [Footnote 15] but, before the gathering storm of national emergency and war, consideration of the problem was put aside. Though bills on the subject reappeared in 1944, [Footnote 16] they did not attract much attention.
Of the several administrative evils sought to be cured or minimized, only two are particularly relevant to issues before us today. One purpose was to introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose customs had departed widely from each other. [Footnote 21] We pursue this no further than to note that any exception we may find to its applicability would tend to defeat this purpose.
". . . We recommend that the presiding inspectors be relieved of their present duties of presenting the case against aliens, and be confirmed [sic] entirely to the duties customary for a judge. This, of course, would require the assignment of another officer to perform the task of a prosecuting attorney. The appropriate officer for this purpose would seem to be the investigating inspector who, having prepared the case against the alien, is already thoroughly familiar with it. . . . "
This brings us to contentions both parties have advanced based on the pendency in Congress of bills to exempt this agency from the Act. Following an adverse decision, [Footnote 26] the Department asked Congress for exempting legislation, [Footnote 27] which appropriate committees of both Houses reported favorably, but in different form and substance. [Footnote 28] Congress adjourned without further action. The Government argues that Congress knows that the Immigration Service has construed the Act as not applying to deportation proceedings, and that it "has taken no action indicating disagreement with that interpretation;" that therefore it "is at least arguable that Congress was prepared to specifically confirm the administrative construction by clarifying legislation." We do not think we can draw that inference from uncompleted steps in the legislative process. Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 309 U. S. 119-120.
Both parties invoke many citations to legislative history as to the meaning given to these key words by the framers, advocates, or opponents of the Administrative Procedure Act. Because § 5 in the original bill applied to hearings required "by law," [Footnote 31] because it was suggested by the Attorney General that it should be changed to "required by statute or Constitution," [Footnote 32] and because it finally emerged "required by statute," the Government argues that the section is intended to apply only when explicit statutory words granting a right to adjudication can be pointed out. Petitioner, on the other hand, cites references which would indicate that the limitation to statutory hearing was merely to avoid creating by inference a new right to hearings where no right existed otherwise. We do not know. The legislative history is more conflicting than the text is ambiguous.
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 189 U. S. 101.
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 189 U. S. 100-101; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 253 U. S. 459, 253 U. S. 464; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 326 U. S. 160 (concurring opinion).

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