Source: http://rongolini.com/medmal.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:17:31+00:00

Document:
To whom is the duty of care owed?
When does the duty of care end?
Who is the proper defendant?
Why not sue a tortfeasor?
Why pay damages for death?
How do medmal and tort claims differ?
Does the competent patient have a right to resist treatment?
poor physician policing, resulting in nonphysicians doing the policing.
In Massachusetts, 87-90% of cases that went to the jury result in verdicts favoring providers, with the national average over 50%. When a provider makes a promise of a specific result, the plaintiff may sue for breach of contract. Where no such specific promise is made, the plaintiff may sue in negligence for failure to use reasonable care.
The duty of care arises from the physician-patient relationship (implied contract); the provider agrees to use his or her skills, ability and best judgment. Although there is no duty to rescue, once started, there is a duty to use reasonable care.
In Massachusetts, there is an absolute right to a jury trial, except on GL c. 93A issues. Massachusetts does not allow jury nullification.
The standard of care is judicially set, with the judge announcing to the jury what the standard is. Expert witnesses define what the average qualified physician would have done by giving opinions as to whether there was compliance with that duty of care. Noncompliance, the failure to perform according to the standard, is malpractice.
Strict locality standard: where the provider is held to exercise the standard of care of the average health care provider in that locality. This rule was a problem for plaintiffs because physicians were not willing to testify against one other, the so-called "plurality of silence."
Similar location standard: where the provider is held to exercise the standard of care of the average health care provider in a similar locality, e.g. similar size, geographic location and distance from a major medical center. This is the plurality/majority rule and Restatement rule. With this, it is easier to obtain an expert.
National standard: where the general provider is held to exercise the degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into account the advances in the profession. Alternatively, the specialist provider is held to exercise the degree of care and skill of the average member of the profession practicing the specialty, taking into account the advances in the profession. The national standard is not limited by geography or similarity, and an expert can be taken from anywhere in the country as long as that expert knows the standard of care. With the advent of national certification examinations, it began to be recognized that providers who take the same national exam should also be set to the same national standard. This Brune standard is employed in the majority of the US and is the Massachusetts standard.
Respectable minority standard: the provider is not found negligent if a respectable minority use it. Although this allows for the expansion and development of new ideas, it does, however, pose a problem in determining how many constitute a minority, what exactly is "respectable," and who determines it.
it is a contract based jurisdiction?
is there strict or narrow privity?
Is there a Special relationship?
where to cut off liability?
Under common law, a contractual relationship developed with a promise, usually implied.
Where there is no promise and a provider's treatment brings about adverse results causing a patient to sue that provider for negligence, the duty arises from an implied contractual relationship.
All duties are dependent on privity of contract, i.e., privity between the provider and the patient; there is no duty to a third person because the duty arises only from a relationship.
Foreseeability extends privity to what is reasonably foreseeable by looking to the time of the tort and whether the potential plaintiff was known.
Tarasoff v. Regents (murder by psychiatric patient) finds no privity, but a duty is owed to a foreseeable victim.
Shepard v. Redford (contagious meningitis, not treated) finds no privity between the doctor and the son, but the court found a "special relationship" between the woman and the physician hospital which could establish that the hospital owed a duty of reasonable care to the woman's son.
In Chatman v. Millis a divorced man sought the services of a psychologist to determine whether her son's father might be sexually abusing him. After examination, the psychologist concluded that there was the likelihood of such an abuse and provided a report to that effect which was eventually used in court. The boy's father sued for negligent diagnosis by the psychologist whose defense was based on the lack of a physician-patient relationship and thus no duty to the father or subsequent cause of action.
In Bradshaw v. Daniel a patient was brought to the ER with symptoms of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever and died a day later. The physician who communicated with the patient's wife never warned her that she also might be at risk because of the circumstances under which her husband contracted the disease. Even though not communicable, the both may have been exposed at the same time. She came down with same symptoms and died; the subsequent suit in her behalf alleged that the physician failed to warn her that she might also be at risk. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the physician-patient relationship with the husband was adequate to impose an affirmative duty of care to warn persons in his immediate family about the risks concerning this illness.
Many cases require reasonable notice to end the doctor-patient relationship.
A provider who simply refuses to treat a patient is considered to effect pure abandonment; the provider will be liable for any injury.
For non-payment of medical bills, a provider who gives a patient reasonable notice or refers the patient to another provider is sufficient to terminate the relationshipprovided the patient is not put into a worse condition or induced to forego treatment.
There is no duty to rescue. Once treatment is undertaken, however, the provider must comply with the applicable standard of care. The provider must pass the patient over to someone competent, leave reasonable notice of the termination of the relationship, or be released by the patient. The patient cannot be left in a worse situation.
The Massachusetts Good Samaritan law, GL c. 112 §12B, indicates that if a licensed physician renders treatment in an emergency that physician will not be held liable unless there is a showing of gross negligence.
Always: the tortfeasor, i.e. the negligent actor. Plaintiffs usually sue many providers because it is easier to join defendants procedurally when commencing an action than it is to join them later, because joinder will require leave of the court and notice to the defendants.
Exception: a Massachusetts state employee who is negligent in the course of employment and injures a party cannot be sued for negligence in accordance with the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff can sue the government employer with damages limited to $100,000 per plaintiff; notice is required. If the employee acts intentionally, that employee will be personally liable. Furthermore, no action can be brought when the actor is a federal employee.
In Kelley v. Rossi there is an attempt to pin liability on a private hospital under the agency doctrine. The Massachusetts court looks at control as the main, determinative factor. Any summary judgment under FRCivPro 56 would be solely on the basis of facts. Here, it is who has control of Rossi.
For example, in Sparger v. Worley Hospital, the nurse could always be sued. In Massachusetts, if the facility is a non-profit hospital, there is a $20,000 award limit; this is a common law carry-over rooted in the state's sovereign immunity that charities cannot be sued; thus the doctor is targeted. Private hospitals do not have such a cap.
respondeat superior, vicarious liability; the master is responsible for the tort of the servant. Hospital employees are so subject. Doctors are either independent contractors or have staff privileges at a hospital(s).
"borrowed servant" while working for a "new" party; if negligent, the new party can be sued, not the first employer. This arises in cases where a staff doctor uses a nurse who is the employee of the hospital. The key to determining liability is determining who has control over the nurse, i.e., the means and manner in which a person does the job. Control is an issue of fact, not law.
corporate negligence: a corporation cannot practice medicine and thus cannot be sued; this doctrine is weakening with HMOs. Corporate negligence imposes liability on a hospital for negligently hiring, selecting and giving staff privileges. If the corporation fails to choose reasonably it is thus liable for the intentional or negligent torts of its employees. Usually a hospital is not liable for negligence of a doctor with staff privileges because the hospital does not have control.
enterprise liability: if the negligent act occurs during an activity performed for the benefit of the enterprise (e.g., hospital), the enterprise will be liable. A hospital cannot escape liability if an individual or agency performs a function inherent to the hospital, e.g. a hospital has a duty to maintain an ER and cannot effectively delegate that function to another; it remains responsible.
agency: an agent who acts through apparent authority will hold the principal liable on the theory that the principal permitted the apparency to continue. When an agent is released then so is the principal with respondeat superior. Settling with one defendant, however, does not mean that action cannot proceed with another defendant as long as there is not full recovery for the damages.
joint tortfeasors and joint and several liability: once one party pays a portion of the damages, then that party can bring action against another for contribution, as long as the damages cannot be apportioned. If damages can be apportioned then each party can be singled out for payment according to its relative portion. Mary Carter agreements are not enforceable; these agreements arise when there are multiple defendants and where the plaintiff makes a side agreement with some of the defendants.
"captain of the ship" in which the doctor has full control of everybody. Massachusetts in Guell v. Tenny (accurate sponge count) does not recognize this doctrine and applies a straight agency concept.
HMOs control the cost of medical treatment by tweaking the financial and credentialing relationship between the HMO and the provider. This control, shown to reach even to the treatment of the patient, may result in adverse results for patients. Sloan v. Metropolitan has to do with an HMO as an insurance enterprise. The HMO doctor who malpractices can be sued, of course; the HMO itself can also be sued under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The patient as a premium payor as well as the doctor who is an employee of the HMO both have a contract relationship.
If an HMO issues an order to withhold treatment from a patient, the complying doctor does not malpractice in the usual sense since he is following orders. The liability of an HMO is challenged by either suing the actor or suing the HMO itself. The patient in this case, however, cannot sue the HMO. Here, a resulting problem is the denial of benefits, since an HMO is an insurance company with premiums paid by the insured-patient. Generally an ERISA provision pre-empts organizations from suits entirely. There is a question of whether the patient may sue the individual doctor for abandonment or breach of contract.
HMOs exist under the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Under state law, therefore, any of these organizations characterized under ERISA are pre-empted from being sued. Suits can only be brought in federal court. ERISA has prevented claims for denial of coverage, and also does not cover negligence actions.
breach of contract suits will be enforced if there clear and convincing proof that the promise was made and that the breach caused the damage; this is a higher standard than preponderance of the evidence. It is unlikely that a physician will promise a specific result. Claims for breach of a specific promise of an end result are few because (1) physicians are careful about making such promises, and (2) lawyers know it is a heightened burden of proof.
right to privacy statute in Massachusetts, GL c. §214 1B, concerns unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with privacy. This usually occurs in defamation cases where an employee's medical report travels through the chain of command. The court will balance the plaintiff's privacy rights with the interests of the company. The company will not be liable as long as it is not reckless.
legal reasons, such as the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act for state or municipal employees; the Federal Tort Claims Act for federal employees. Only the government is sued, not the employee.
More than one provider can be involved in the negligence. In Gilson v. Mitchell, it is assumed that a catheter is broken off in the patient; it is never found. With multiple providers, viz., tortfeasors, the question is who is responsible and what can be done?
apportionment of liability: if injuries are apportioned to the individual defendants, then there can be apportionment. If there is no reasonable basis to apportion, i.e. if the result is indivisible and difficult to apportion, the jury is not asked to apportion. Joint and several liability then applies. For example, if there is a situation of two single acts of negligence and two acts of injury, the party must convince the judge to have damages apportioned by the jury. Joint tortfeasor acts exist in all states.
joint and several liability: any one tortfeasor can be liable for the whole, single, indivisible and unapportioned injury. There is the right to collect the whole judgment from one actor, who can subsequently collect a proportional share from the others. All are treated the same in regards to the whole, but are equally divided regarding the subsequent contribution of each.
negligence: if there is pure (or absolute) negligence, then damages rest on a certain percentage of responsibility (e.g. defendant 70% and plaintiff 30%); the plaintiff will recover no matter how much the plaintiff is negligent. Rhode Island is a pure negligence state. With comparative negligence, the party found over 51% contributorily negligent will be barred from recovery; a percentage below is pro-rated. Massachusetts uses a modified comparative negligence standard. Contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery and very rarely used; it occurs at the same time as the negligence of the defendant. In medical malpractice, it consists of the failure to inform or failure to follow a regimen. Avoidable consequences are those that happen afterwards (failure to mitigate damages after the event).
Mary Carter agreement: as illustrated in Lum v. Stennett, a plaintiff settles with party C (of A, B, and C, multiple defendants) for a certain amount; if the jury returns less than expected, then A and B make up the difference. This gives the plaintiff a guarantee and gives A and B limited exposure. It avoids a run-away jury. When a party settles before the verdict, that party is eliminated and not subject to joint contract law. This is illegal in Nevada as against the public policy which views A and B as ganged up against C.
in contract or tort: damages in contract (e.g. abandonment) differ from those in tort. Clevenger v. Haling presents a situation of surgical sterilization, yet the woman gives birth. The claim is, if the contract were performed there would be no baby. Was there an outright promise of specific results or merely a doctor's reassurance. In Sullivan v. O'Connor, plastic surgery was performed on an entertainer's nose to enhance looks, resulting rather in a bulbous nose. In Massachusetts, one cannot sue for failure to deliver an express promise; the burden of proof is usually the preponderance of the evidence. To win here, the plaintiff must present "clear proof," a higher standard of proof. Sullivan contains a very strong dissent.
In Forlano v. Hughes, a myelogram was performed in connection with severe headaches, but dye entered the patient's brain. Plaintiff sued Dr Frieburg and Lahey Clinic for breach of contract, because another surgeon performed the procedure. No malpractice was found in the procedure, and the measure of damages was the same as if the contract was not performed (or performed by Dr Frieburg).
In Bratt v. IBM, a company doctor malpracticed and the question was whether the plaintiff could sue the company for invasion of privacy. The Massachusetts privacy statute, GL 214 §1B, codifies a person's right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy. But the physician here enjoys no testimonial privilege and can be made to testify to everything.
"Loss of a chance"doctrine: In Boody v. US, plaintiff dies after a a tumor on her lung, which defendant failed to diagnose, metastasized and spread to her brain. There was expert testimony that had the tumor been diagnosed in its early stage, there was a 51% change that she would have lived for 5 years; after metastasis there was a very slight change she would survive. The court here adopted what has become the majority rule that loss-of-a-chance means loss of an "appreciable" chance which depends on the circumstances of the case. 51% chance was considered "appreciable." A figure must be placed on the life, and then a percentage applied. Herskovits v. Group Health held that evidence of a reduction in the chance of survival from 39% to 25% was sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of proximate cause. In Cooper v. Sisters of Charity the court held that the burden on the plaintiff was to establish that the negligence of the defendant probably caused the death, thus requiring more than 50% probability of survival but for the negligence. After a court finds that the loss-of-a-chance of survival is a compensable injury, the next inquiry concerns how to value that chance.
In Glicklich v. Spievack, had defendant #1 not misdiagnosed, plaintiff would have had a 50% chance of survival for 5 years. Defendant #2 also misdiagnosed at the time when there would have been possible survival of 2 years. Same with defendant #3. It is not true that without malpractice she would have lived, i.e. she lost a chance. But for the negligence she would have been given time and therefore hope, such as it was. Extended life has intrinsic value; advances in medicine and science have reduced the level of pure speculation so that statistics have more conclusive value.
With the paucity of evidence in the ordinary tort case, there is not enough evidence for rational apportionment. Thus joint and several liability and the joint tortfeasor statute are used. The tactic is to sue D1 and let D1 sue D2, D3, etc for contribution.
Experts can now provide each tortfeasor's percentage of liability as part of the whole picture. Reconstructionists give opinion as to liability and also to who is at fault.
In tort cases, the usual elements of duty, breach, causation and damages are to be applied; proximate causation must be shown. It must be shown that more probably than not the negligence caused the injury.
In medmal cases, an expert is asked what a provider did (improper technique, etc) and whether that malpractice to a reasonable degree of medical certainty caused the damage.
In Willey v. Ketterer, the plaintiff had cerebral palsy; there could have been a predisposition for this in the family. The defendant had no expert but only theory. There was no scientific evidence that seizures are related to the plaintiff's condition of palsy. Thus there can be no allusion to material not in evidence and no personal opinion.
Alfonso v. Lund explores whether severed fingers could be successfully attached. Conjecture is juxtaposed to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, i.e. court jargon v. physicians' jargon (as witnesses).
In Harrington v. Cohen a halo is negligently applied by D1 to minor patient's head in preparation for a spinal corrective procedure; D2 then attached the halo but as a result of D1's action, an infection developed in patient's brain tissue causing injury. D2 was not negligent. At issue was whether without the malpractice of D1 there would not be the need for D2 and the consequential damages. The court held that the chance of infection was still the same as if D1 was successful.
Harlow v. Chin considers whether there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause. Evidence supported a conclusion that the physician was negligent in not warning fall victim to return in two or three days if pain did not subside. The return of the patient within that period, instead of 18-day period that actually elapsed, would have prevented patient from becoming a quadriplegic. This Massachusetts case also invokes the $20,000 limit of liability for not-for-profit corporations.
Ferrara v. Galluchio presents a situation where D1 administered an excessive x-ray dosage. D2 was subsequently not negligent but did alert the patient of the possibility of developing cancer. On the issue of whether D1 was responsible for patient's cancerophobia, the court found for the patient. Foreseeability entered the analysis. The dissent found the decision had gone too far.
1. Wrongful conception/pregnancy (normal child results).
C.S. v. Neilson illustrates a claim for "wrongful pregnancy" resulting in the birth of a normal, healthy child as result of unsuccessful sterilization procedure performed by the physician.
Liability results from (a) negligently performed sterilization; (b) negligent advice as to the risk of conception; (c) breach of guarantee (in contract action) because a procedure or technique is performed properly, but is accompanied by a guarantee.
Damages may include: (a) OB/GYN costs; (b) pain and suffering attending birth; (c) cost of sterilization procedure; (d) emotional toll of being pregnant.
States are split on the cost of rearing the child. Some look at the reasons for sterilization, e.g., economic, genetic, emotional, therapeutic; all play a part in determining damages.
Under the benefits rule in Massachusetts, the court will award costs of rearing a child after offsetting this by the benefits derived from that child. The problem which arises is that costs can be calculated mathematically, but determining the benefits from the child are difficult to calculate.
Burke v. Rivo held that parents of a normal, healthy child born after a physician unsuccessfully performed a sterilization procedure on the mother could recover the cost of raising child to adulthood.
The minority Massachusetts view (O'Connor, J.) is no recognition of damages other than child bearing damages, because it would involve an intolerable inquiry. The majority limited damages rule allows payment only for child bearing, not child rearing.
Liability results because the parties intended pregnancy, but because there was negligence in some health service before pregnancy and related to it, e.g. pre-natal testing, genetic or preconception counseling. Massachusetts recognizes a cause of action for wrongful birth, Viccaro v. Milunsky, where parents of minor child afflicted with a genetic defect allege that negligent preconception genetic counseling by geneticist induced the parents to conceive and give birth to a child. Here the reasoning is, because the provider is negligent with proper testing and fails to inform the parties that the child will be born with defects, the parties may have aborted. Siemieniec v. Lutheran held that parents had cause of action for extraordinary medical expenses and other expenses involved in caring for a hemophiliac child during his minority.
The damages for the severely handicapped child: (1) special medical expenses; and (2) special education. The court will not give child rearing expenses, but will give special expenses.
This suit is brought by the child who is the product of the wrongful birth, alleging that had the provider not been negligent in testing and counseling, "I" (the child) would not have been born. Siemieniec v. Lutheran held that a child had no cause of action on his own behalf for extraordinary medical expenses s/he expected to incur during her/his majority.
Damages are derived from the fact that the child is impaired for life. Because impaired life must be weighed against no life, most courts find this to be an intolerable inquiry. Some courts have allowed expenses until the age of majority.
Massachusetts has a conditional privilege whereby a physician employed by a corporation may divulge to that employer the results of employee's examination. The information conveyed to the doctor by the patient is confidential, but there is here no statutory or common law privilege. A doctor who refuses to testify in a judicial proceeding will be held in contempt.
By statute, Massachusetts has created a testimonial privilege in a psychotherapist-patient situation and it applies only to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists. This privilege does not apply to child custody cases or cases where the party has put his/her mental health at issue. The privilege must be invoked; it is not automatic. Other states allow a suit for breach of a confidential relationship.
damages (extent, future and amount of disability) are witness reliant.
Admission can only be used against a party defendant; only a party opponent may make an admission. A statement against self interest is admissible and may prove a case without an expert.
In Lipman v. Lustig the plaintiff placed defendant's statement into evidence. Only a party can make an admission. In John Hopkins v. Genda part of a needle remained in the patient because of a "wrong angle" used during the procedure. That wrong angle is not an admission of medical negligence; not every adverse result is due to negligence in the practice of medicine.
2. call the defendant as a witness.
Not applicable in criminal cases. Jurisdictions are separated on what can be asked of the defendant. Percipient testimony is acceptable, e.g., "what happened?" Jurisdictions also differ on what is the standard of care in this situation. Massachusetts allows a witness to be called and asked his/her opinion and asked what the standard of care is, whether it has been violated and is this the proximate cause. In Massachusetts the plaintiff may ask anything of the defendant as long as it is relevant; it may also lead the witness upon examination, e.g. "isn't it true...?" In McDermott v. Manhattan it was held that the plaintiff could call the defendant-physician to the stand, question his factual knowledge and as an expert establish the generally accepted medical practice in a community.
A person cannot be summoned to give an expert opinion involuntarily nor can a person with no connection to the event be forced to testify. The courts usually acknowledge the expert's right to testify in cases they so choose; they cannot be summoned just because they are experts. As a rare exception in a narrow specialty where very few persons are knowledgeable, expert witnesses can be summoned (and must be paid) to testify for the defendant. Oftentimes witnesses are hired even if not needed, just to bottle them up.
Most literature is not generally admissible into evidence to prove the truth of what it contains because it constitutes hearsay. By exception, learned treatises are admissible into evidence through direct examination of an expert witness in tort/malpractice cases against physicians and hospitals. This is often as a direct response to any conspiracy of silence. Notice to the other party is required in Massachusetts, Reddington v. Clayman. Published statements of fact or opinion, GL c. 233 79C, are admissible in actions of contract or tort in malpractice. GL c. 233 79B allows in anything printed for people in the field and widely accepted. The methodology to prove the authenticity and authority of the treatise is to get the defendant to say that the book is authoritative.
4. Under FRCP 36, a request for admissions is used to prove facts that are difficult to prove. If there is no response then the facts are deemed admitted. If the defendant denies the facts and the plaintiff subsequently proves those denials, plaintiff is entitled to recover costs for proving those facts.
Case law often revolves around whether through reasonable inference the ordinary juror knows of the duty and skill required of the average qualified physician. An inference is never necessary; it is permissible. Causation must still be proved through an expert. In Lipman v. Lustig, a dentist's reamer fell into the patient's throat; the dentist's duty, obviously, is not to drop this, and the ordinary juror knows here. Contrast this with Ward v. Levy, where a patient was bleeding after leaving the dentist. The ordinary juror does not have the knowledge to know whether the dentist breached his duty. In Toy v. Mackintosh the plaintiff swallowed a tooth after extraction causing her coughing and shoulder pain. The jury here was not bound to believe the expert evidence coming from the defendant's witnesses that the tooth had nothing to do with the plaintiff's condition afterwards. Normally, an expert is not needed in cases of obvious causation which are within the knowledge of the average juror, but ascertaining the extent of damage may require one where the situation is vague, e.g., when patient has a terminal condition (cancer) and then is a victim of malpractice The minority holds there is no liability because the patient will die anyway.
Res ipsa loquitur generally is not broadly accepted in medmal cases. It is an instrumentality under the control of the defendant which produces injury which would not have occurred if the actor(s) in control used proper care. It shifts the burden of proof. The British case, Byrne v. Boadle, Court of Exchequer 1863, in which a barrel of flour is thrown from a second floor and injures a passerby deals with the control of instrumentality where there are multiple possible actors. Medmal cases, however, seek to attach fault with specificity. Winning a case is first to establish that a defendant was in control of the instrumentality and then shift the burden to have the defendant prove that it did not have control. By contrast, Horner v. Northern Pacific found that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applicable.
A protective order is a way of preventing a lay witness from testifying. Plaintiff is not entitled to the opinion of the witness, only percipient testimony. Thus an expert witness cannot be summoned to testify if not paid. The attorney may not cover the cost of an expert witness for a client who cannot afford to do so.
GL c. 233 79G, in any proceeding in any court, an itemized bill or any report related to the medical treatment is admissible into evidence, including the opinion of the physicians as to the diagnosis and proximate causation.
Quality assurance reports are admissible (business records exception).
Peer reviews are not discoverable on policy grounds, but not on evidentiary grounds.
Physician's reports prepared for litigation may be protected under the work product rule/exception.
A general verdict is to find for either the plaintiff or defendant. With a special verdict, the jury is asked separate questions regarding the different elements of negligence for each defendant.
Damages found in medmal cases are fundamentally the same as in any contract or tort action, e.g., loss of earnings, disfigurement, pain and suffering, out-of-pocket medical expenses, limiting disability, consequential (consortium, companionship, moral support).
In Massachusetts: there is also an entitlement to all future damages; the plaintiff cannot specify the amount of damages (ad damnum) sought, however the cover sheet of court papers for the case must show how much the case is worth. When the case is over, it is unclear whether anything can be said to the jury. A per diem argument is prohibited in Massachusetts, i.e., explain and relive the every day life of the plaintiff demonstrating what the injury caused, the help needed and "what's that worth per day?" or "do the math!" or "what's it worth not to have this every day?"
The usual counts in a fundamental medmal case are (1) negligence; (2) breach (failure to produced a promised result); (3) negligent failure to obtain informed consent of the plaintiff (actually part of negligence); failure to obtain informed consent is actionable; (4) products liability, e.g., strict liability because an instrument broke in a patient (sue surgeon, manufacturer, distributor).
Charitable immunity in Massachusetts: if a claim is brought against a charitable entity, the common law concept applies as embodied in GL c. 231 §85k. If engaged in a "charity," there is either total or limited immunity. "Charity" generally includes (1) those enterprises that are truly charitable in the narrow sense of the term, i.e., give their services for nothing; (2) any not-for-profit enterprise (as distinguished for for-profit). Distinguish types by looking to where the "bottom line" goes: to shareholders in a for-profit and back into the corporation (stockholders) in a not-for-profit. The status of a corporation can be ascertained from the Secretary of State, not-for-profit under GL c. 180 and for-profit under GL c. 156.
Total immunity means plaintiff cannot sue and collect because of absolute immunity. Limited means plaintiff can, but there is an upper limit of $20,000 to what can be collected. Under the so-called New York Rule, Bing v. Thunig, a charitable entity was immune as to its charitable activities, but was not immune as to its administrative activities.
There is a movement throughout the country to increase the upper limit. (1) Formerly under common law in cases of irreparable harm, charitable institutions would be put out of business; (2) Also, donations might be affected and lowered if earmarked for legal expenses and awards; (3) charitable gifts are often in the form of trusts (inter vivos or testamentary); the settlor expects the purpose of the trust to be observed, not payment to claimants and lawyers. Today, insurance protects small institutions, but these in turn are being absorbed by larger ones.
sovereign immunity: at common law one could not sue the sovereign and therefore the government and government agents, only the actors.
Under the Massachusetts Torts Claim Act one cannot sue the employee, but can sue an institution up to a limit of $100,000. Here the employer has become completely immunized, a complete reversal of common law by the legislature. Under the equivalent federal act, one can sue the federal government, not the employee. The old rule applies if it is a military rule hospital, e.g., VA Hospitals; the policy reasons immunizing military personnel include the consideration that such doctors must also respond to military orders in providing medical care. Lilly v. Fieldstone held that a civilian consultant called upon to perform emergency surgery at a US Army hospital was an independent contractor, rather than an "employee of the government" as required to allow substitution.
contributory negligence: it is the defendant's burden to prove contributory negligence; if plaintiff was found to be in any way contributory, that plaintiff receives nothing. Case law exemplifies this: smoker and kidney transplant; canceling appointment at HMO; failure to take medication; failure to take therapy regimens.
With comparative negligence, the burdens are the same. With pure negligence, just do the numbers, e.g. defendant's negligence at 70% v. plaintiff's negligence at 30%. In Massachusetts, with limited comparative negligence, there can be some recovery as long as the plaintiff is under 51%. If over 50%, plaintiff gets nothing.
workers' compensation law: this was established because under common law and employee could not sue a fellow employee and thus by extension the employer. The right of suit by the employee in the course of employment has been replaced with a schedule of benefits paid (but not pain and suffering), wages, bill payment. In Forlano v. Hughes an employee is injured and sent to the corporation nurse who malpractices.
The dual capacity concept here arises which says that a person should be able to sue a provider who is a co-worker, (e.g., hospital employee is injured on the job and is taken to the ER where he is injured by the physician) because medical service was not given in the capacity of co-worker, but instead as a medical service provider. Some hospitals are open to the public and thus the doctrine should apply to all those who are part of "the public." Seems to exist in only 2 or 3 states.
Good Samaritan laws: a licensed provider who provides services without expectation of payment and in good faith is not held liable for any negligence unless it is gross negligence. Massachusetts has enacted this under GL c. 112 §12B. No physician or health care provider is liable for actions taken in good faith, GL c. 111c §13, GL c. 111c §14. California has a similar statutory good faith element. Vermont requires a doctor to lend aid in an emergency, and in return can be sued only for gross negligence. The Massachusetts immunization statute, GL c. 112 §12c, insulates physicians and nurses in situations where there may be, for example, a bad batch of serum, improper sterilization and the like which cause widespread problems. This statute has been interpreted by the SJC.
Statute of Limitations: this is the most common affirmative defense in civil litigation; the statute begins to run when the tort occurs. A regular tort case in Massachusetts has 3 years within which to file. A child has 3 years after reaching majority to commence an action. A minority of cases see at the time of the occurrence that the patient does not know of the negligence. The US Supreme Court has labeled this blameless ignorance; a person should not have the statute run against that person while not aware, e.g. a sponge left inside a patient first shows up later after the statute of limitations. In some states the clock starts to run when the patient knows something is wrong and probably why something is wrong; this is a conservative approach. Knowing that it is malpractice ("should have known") is the more liberal approach. Massachusetts tends to follow the more liberal rule of "should have known."
The Statute of Repose, GL c. 231 §60d, suits brought on any claim by minors against a provider must be commenced within 3 years, except if the minor is under age 6 in which case the minor has until his/her 9th birthday to commence the action, but in no event shall it be commenced more than 7 years after the act/tort. This statute is meant to be a limitation on the discovery rule. Hardy v. VerMuelen claims the statute of repose is unconstitutional, but the majority opinion is that the statute is constitutional.
The Discovery Rule states that the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the happening of an event which puts the plaintiff on notice, i.e., when the plaintiff knows or should have known. In Franklin v. Albert an x-ray showed an abnormality which the physician missed when he discharged the patient as being normal. Plaintiff brought suit 4 years later when Hodgkin's and a severe malignancy were disclosed. The court reasoned that the plaintiff should not be faulted for blameless ignorance especially of the problem is inherently unknowable. A cause of action for medical malpractice does not "accrue" under the statute of limitations until the patient learns, or reasonably should have learned, that s/he has been harmed as result of physician's conduct.
Both Palermo v. Brennan and Lindsay v. Romano turn on whether a patient knew or should have known that she was harmed by psychiatrist's and surgeon's professional treatment.
Some states limit the discovery rule to foreign objects in the body. In Massachusetts, one must show blameless ignorance and the element of "knew or should have known."
Mattocks v. Bell presents a situation where a two year old child was being treated by a medical student for a lacerated tongue. During the procedure the child bit down on the student's finger and would not release it. After several unsuccessful attempts to free his finger, the student struck the child on the cheek. In a resulting action for the intentional tort of battery, the court held that the amount of force by the student was proper under the circumstances, thus negating any medical liability.
In Perna v. Pirozzi a patient brought suit in intentional tort because she had consented to an operation to be performed by one surgeon and it was afterwards performed by another. There was inadequate consent.
The extension doctrine: courts allow a physician to use his/her reasonable judgment in expanding the scope of an operation; traditionally, physicians may not expand the scope of a patient's consent. Thus, if an unforeseen problem arises while performing one procedure and additional treatment is required, but the patient is unable to give consent, then the doctor may expand the scope of the original consent in order to deal with the problem. Once a patient consents to treatment, there is still a question as to the context of the consent.
Kennedy v. Parrott during an appendectomy procedure, the surgeon also removed a cyst he discovered. The suit was for assault and battery because he intentionally excised the cyst without the patient's consent. Two views emerge here. Conservative: liability exists because there was no permission and no emergency, thus an unconsented to touching. The surgeon should have noted the cyst, made a record and later discussed it with the patient who later makes the decision. Liberal: the surgeon's intervention was acceptable, although unconsented to as long as he was not negligent, thus basing this approach on the consent that a reasonable patient would have provided.
The informed consent doctrine: certain information about the medical procedure, its risks and benefits, its costs and side effects, must be made available to the patient before consent is given. To be effective, the patient's consent must have been an "informed consent," i.e., one that is given after the patient has received a fair and reasonable explanation of the contemplated treatment or procedure. In 1914, Cardozo noted that a person is to determine what is to be done to and with his body. The doctor has the obligation to obtain the patient's informed consent by imparting sufficient information. In Massachusetts, this is embodied and articulated in Harnish v. Childrens Hospital Medical Center where a health provider's failure to divulge in a reasonable manner sufficient information to enable the patient to make an informed judgment as to whether to consent to the medical procedure is medical malpractice/misconduct.
The patient is to be told all reasonable information that is material to the patient. In Canterbury v. Spence the court defined materiality. "A risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what a physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy."
The standard applied by the majority of jurisdictions to determine whether a physician provided the patient with enough information when seeking consent has traditionally been the professional standard of materiality which a reasonable medical practitioner would perceive and make under the same or similar circumstances as relevant to the patient. The lay standard of materiality presents that information which the average reasonable patient wants to know. States are equally split on these two standards, and once the patient is informed then the jury decides what the average doctor would have thought was important to the patient.
In Canterbury v. Spence, the court found that the professional standard violated the patient's right of self-determination and held that in order for the patient to give informed consent, s/he must have all the "material" information regarding "the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated." The patient owns the right to determine what is to be done to or with his or her body (Cardozo). Massachusetts under Harnish applies the lay standard thus dispensing with the need for an expert witness.
The test is an objective test: in order for the plaintiff to prevail in Massachusetts, s/he must establish that s/he would not have consented to the procedure had s/he been given sufficient information and that a reasonable person would likewise have refused.
Precourt v. Frederick presents a suit brought because the doctor did not disclose the risk to the patient of developing aseptic necrosis after taking a steroid drugwhich information was material to the patient's decision. Liacos, J., drew the distinction between (1) the severity of risk, where an expert is not needed, and (2) the likelihood of risk, where a lay person has no such knowledge (and usually measured in a "range of chance"). In practice, a lack of informed consent count is usually dropped from the complaint before trial, and the case is tried on negligent failure; the trial usually focuses on whether or not the doctor informed the patient of the risks. In giving testimony, the doctor usually informs of his habit in this regard, e.g., "I don't recall, but what I usually do/say is..."
therapeutic privilege, where the physician under certain limited circumstances may have the right to withhold information that is pertinent to the informed decision-making because the physician believes that disclosure would be harmful to the patient. The standard for invoking this privilege is the "reasonable practitioner" standard. Therapeutic privilege was also asserted in Canterbury as appropriate only in such cases where it appears that risk disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the patient as to become infeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view. The court also noted that even when the privilege is invoked, the physician must still provide the patient with information that is relevant and not harmful to the patient. It is not a blanket privilege.
A perception developed that a crisis existed in the field of medical malpractice in Massachusetts (and the US) and that medmal cases were driving up the cost of medical liability insurance to such a point that insurance carriers were unwilling to write and doctors were fleeing jurisdictions where premiums were driven up. Out of fear that all companies would leave the state, Massachusetts established a state insurance administration. Most of the crisis was unreal. Insurance was high but affordable; doctors were not fleeing. Medmal cases were not increasing any more than any other type of case.
Mechanisms were established in many states to control the "crisis," e.g., threshold screening devices to control entry into court, hence the Massachusetts Medical Tribunal. A lawyer (1) has to certify (certificate of merit) that a case has merit (injury, negligence) to eliminate and discourage specious suits; (2) before suing a health provider, must give intention of notice of intent to file the suit. This encourages settlement, and trials neither "make money" nor are cost efficient to the attorney.
Before a medical malpractice case can proceed to court in Massachusetts under GL 231 §60B, it must be brought before a three person panel held in Superior Court consisting of a superior court judge, an attorney and a health care provider from the same discipline as the defendant. The provider must not reside or practice in the same county as the defendant. If the suit is against a hospital, the "provider" is to be a hospital administrator. The panel reviews the plaintiff's offer of proof and determines whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability. The panel must be convinced by a directed verdict standard for the case to get to trial. The plaintiff has the burden of proof and evidence and rests; the defendant can then make a motion for directed verdict, meaning that even if all the evidence is true, the plaintiff cannot win the case.
if the tribunal determines the case raises a question of liability, it can proceed to trial.
if not, the case can proceed only proceed with a $6,000 bond posted with the court by the client; if the case is lost, this amount is applied towards defendant's costs.
if the tribunal is thought to be mistaken, its finding may be appealed to the Appeals Court. If no bond is posted and the appeal from the tribunal's decision is successful, the case can go ahead as if without a bond. If the tribunal's finding is upheld on appeal, everything is over.
proof of negligence, usually in the form of proving causation by an expert through a letter stating: (a) the expert's credentials, (b) treatment below the applicable standard of care; (c) maltreatment caused the injury.
"In the often chaotic setting of an emergency room, physicians and medical staff frequently must make split-second, life-saving decisions. Emergency medical personnel may not have the time necessary to obtain the consent of a family member when a patient is incapable of consenting without jeopardizing the well-being of the patient. But a competent patient's refusal to consent to medical treatment cannot be overridden whenever the patient faces a life-threatening situation."
This is the flip side of informed consent, and the SJC has decided that if a patient is conscious and competent, informed consent must be obtained before subjecting the patient to treatment, even if this decision is stupid and life-threatening. Lack of capacity, for example, would be encountered with an unconscious patient (whose spouse or next of kin gives permission).
The test is whether the patient has the capacity to understand. In Massachusetts for adults this is the capacity to understand the issue, situation, advice given, pros and cons; it is a minimal test. For minors the decision rests with the parents, guardian or next of kin. Negligently failing to obtain this consent from the patient before subjecting the patient to treatment is battery.
Time is a significant factor in an emergency; the court can appoint a guardian to expedite and facilitate matters over the body or a conservator to take charge of the property or manage the affairs of an incompetent person.
Where parents, guardian or next of kin in Massachusetts are refusing life-saving help, and the situation is life-threatening, and the patient is incompetent, the court can apply the doctrine of substituted judgment; it takes the evidence and makes a decision by putting itself in the shoes of the incompetent person and asking if that person were competent, would that person refuse treatment.
A peer review statute usually generally looks to the self-government of doctors in a licensed hospital or clinical setting. A health provider's efforts in a case or series of cases will be reviewed by a group of peerswith like background and trainingwhich then decides if the provider in question should be assisted, disciplined, prevented, etc. because there is a claim of sub-standard treatment. A plaintiff in a case, of course, attempts to get the results of peer review through discovery.
Massachusetts statute GL 111 §203 reflects this process by specifying provisions for reporting conduct in a licensed hospital by a health care provider that indicates incompetency to committee and hospital officials. The SJC has decided that such a peer review report is confidential, not discoverable and not subject to subpoena in a judicial proceeding.
Incident reports, however, are produced by hospitals to record any adverse event. The SJC has determined that these are generally discoverable from the hospital, unless such reports are filed with the peer review committee or sent to an attorney to be under the claim of lawyer-client privilege.
Hospitals have an interest in self-policing, and allowing reports of this kind to be used later against a hospital may not further the rationale to produce such reports in the first place in the interest of self-improvement.
Pharmaceutical companies manufacture drugs for distribution to the health care industry and produce a so-called "package insert" to notify and warn potential users of dosage, side effects, adverse reactions, etc. This medical information is collected in the ubiquitous Physicians Desk Reference (PDR). Tresemer v. Barke (Dalkon Shield) states that the duty of the manufacturer to adequately warn is discharged by its warning of possible and actual dangers to the physicians, as "it would be virtually impossible for a manufacturer to comply with the duty of direct warning, as there is no sure way to reach the patient." For example, if a physician prescribes a certain drug and the patient subsequently develops hypertension, an expert witness can be called in to testify to the presence or lack of such side effects. A learned treatise can also be used, the package insert, to clarify an interaction with other drugs; this however, is an evidentiary issue and as hearsay, is an out of court statement. Although a vehicle is needed to use it as evidence, most courts disallow proving negligence through a package insert.
What if the company does not adequately warn the patient who suffers an adverse event from a drug prescribed by a physician? Once a physician is adequately informed by the manufacturer of the actual and possible dangers of a product, the physician acts as a learned intermediary between the patient and the ... manufacturer, thus breaking the chain of liability." An action for failure to warn the patient may be maintained against the physician under Tresemer (and adopted by most states) due to the continuing confidential relationship between the physician and patient and the fact that the danger arose from that relationship.
Another legislative tool to respond to the number of malpractice cases is the establishment of limits on damages awarded by the courts such as $100,000 for government, $500,000 for pain and suffering and $20,000 for non-profits ( in Massachusetts). Under GL 231 §60F, medmal suits which go to a jury must answer special questions asked, such as to the amount of medical bills incurred in the past, in the future, past loss of earnings, likely loss of future earnings, specific amount for pain and suffering up to the date of trial and after. If an award is more than $500,000, the jury must explain its reasoning on a form provided; and if future damages are awarded, the jury must indicate a specific estimate of how far into the future.
collateral source [of income] rule: a plaintiff who is able to protect him/herself from possible loss by carrying insurance or receiving compensation from other "collateral" sources, has no obligation to reduce the obligation of a wrongdoer by the amount received from a collateral source. Plaintiff cannot get a second payment from, for example, an insurance company; the award is deducted.
abandonment of care: the standard is one of reasonableness and an action for abandonment will not lie when sufficient grounds for termination exist along with reasonable efforts on the part of the physician to find alternative care for the patient.
apportionable damages: damages which can be fairly and proportionately divided and distributed among two or more tortfeasors, as opposed to unapportioned.
average qualified physician: a standard against which physicians are measured.
Belinkoff test: the skill of the average member of the profession practicing the specialty, taking into account the advances in the profession and medical facilities available, Brune v. Belinkoff.
benefits rule: in Massachusetts, the award of the costs of rearing a child as offset by the benefits provided by that child.
blameless ignorance: the plaintiff should not be faulted where the problem is inherently unknowable.
borrowed servant doctrine: This arises in cases where a staff doctor uses and controls an employee of the hospital, e.g. nurse. If the borrowed servant is negligent while working for and controlled by a "new" party, the new party can be sued, not the first employer.
"but for" doctrine: a defendant who starts a chain of reaction is responsible for all foreseeable injuries.
"captain of the ship" doctrine: the doctor has full control of everybody.
charitable immunity: In Massachusetts, GL 231 §85K, any not for profit corporation defendant if found liable is only responsible for $20,000.00.
collateral source [of income] rule: a plaintiff who is able to protect him/herself from possible loss by carrying insurance or receiving compensation from other "collateral" sources, has no obligation to reduce the obligation of a wrongdoer by the amount received from a collateral source.
comparative negligence: a doctrine that compares the relative degree of fault attributed to a defendant and a plaintiff in a negligence suit. It states that a plaintiff may recover damages from a defendant in a negligence suit even though the plaintiff may be guilty of some negligence itself, provided that the negligence of the defendant was greater. The damages awarded the plaintiff will be diminished in proportion to the degree of negligence attributed to him/her.
conspiracy of silence: the reticence usually exhibited by one physician to determine whether a colleague is liable for not meeting the required standard of care in a strict locality setting.
contributory negligence: lack of ordinary care for one's safety on the part of an injured plaintiff, which, when added to the negligence of another, contributes to the cause of an injury. It is an affirmative defense to a negligence charge, but has often been replaced by the doctrine of comparative negligence.
directed verdict: a jury verdict ordered by the court. In civil cases, a party may receive a directed verdict if the opposite side does not present a prima facie case or a necessary defense.
discovery Rule: statute of limitation does not begin to run until the happening of an event which puts the plaintiff on notice, i.e., when the plaintiff knows or should have known.
dual capacity doctrine: a person should be able to sue a negligent provider who is a co-worker in a facility or institution because medical service was not given in the capacity of co-worker, but medical service provider.
ERISA: Employment Retirement Income Security Act; federal.
extension doctrine: the court allows a physician to use his/her reasonable judgment in expanding the scope of an operation.
for-profit corporation: money goes to stock holders.
Good Samaritan law: in Massachusetts under GL c. 112 §12B, a licensed provider who provider services in good faith and without expecting payment is not held liable for any negligence unless it is gross negligence.
incident report: produced by hospitals to record any adverse event; discoverable.
informed consent: certain information about the medical procedure, its risks and benefits, its costs and side effects, must be made available to the patient before consent is given.
intolerable inquiry: when impaired life must be weighed against no life, most courts find this to be an intolerable inquiry.
joint and several liability: any one tortfeasor can be liable for the whole, single, indivisible and unapportioned injury.
joint tortfeasor: two or more persons whose negligent conduct, in concert or individually, united to injure a third person and who are therefore jointly and severally liable for the injury.
lay standard of materiality presents that information which the average reasonable patient wants to know in order to make an informed consent.
learned intermediary doctrine: a physician, once adequately informed by the manufacturer of the actual and possible dangers of a product, acts as a learned intermediary between the patient and the ... manufacturer, thus breaking the chain of liability.
learned treatise rule: A statement of fact or opinion on a subject of science or art contained in a published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in the discretion of the court, and if the court finds that it is relevant and that the writer of such statement is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals and sanitaria, as evidence tending to prove said fact or as opinion evidence; provided, however, that the party intending to offer as evidence any such statement shall, not less than three days before the trial of the action, give the adverse party notice of such intention, stating the name of the writer of the statement and the title of the treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet in which it is contained. GL c. 233 §79C.
legal cause: the Restatement's term for "proximate cause."
loss of (a) chance doctrine: assuming that the defendant-physician negligently misdiagnosed the patient's condition, and that the patient would have had a certain percentage of a chance of survival even with a timely diagnosis and proper careand regardless of whether it could be said that the defendant caused the decedent's deaththe defendant-physician caused the loss of a chance, and that chance-interest should be completely redressed in its own right.
medical cause of action: requires that four elements be established (1) obligation of due care; (2) duty is violated; (3) caused by the breach; (4) compensable damages.
medical negligence: conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Restatement Second of Torts §282 (1965).
malpractice: failure to perform according to the standard; in Massachusetts, what the average qualified physician would or would not have done.
Mary Carter agreement: one in which the settling defendant possesses a financial stake in the outcome of the case and the settling defendant remains a party to the litigation.
Massachusetts medical tribunal: a three-person "review" panel held in Superior Court consisting of a superior court judge, an attorney and health care provider from the same discipline as the defendant which allows a medmal case to go to trial only if the directed verdict standard is satisfied.
national standard: where the general provider is held to exercise the degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into account the advances in the profession.
New York Rule: The doctrine, abandoned in Bing v. Thunig, which allowed the hospital an immunity for the negligence of its hospital employees acting within scope of employment The hospital is liable to a patient for injuries sustained through negligence of employees.
not-for-profit corporation: money goes back into the corporation.
peer review report: a report indicating incompetency or lack thereof, issued by peer group of like background and training, occasioned by a health care provider's specific conduct in a licensed hospital in a case or series of cases.
percipient testimony: plaintiff is not entitled to the opinion of the witness, only percipient (what is perceived) testimony. Thus an expert witness cannot be summoned to testify if not paid.
physician: The words "physician" and "dentist" shall not include any person who is not licensed to practice as such under the laws of the jurisdiction within which such services were rendered, but shall include chiropodists, chiropractors, optometrists, osteopaths, physical therapists, podiatrists, psychologists and other medical personnel licensed to practice under the laws of the jurisdiction within which such services were rendered, GL c. 233 §79G.
professional standard of materiality: what a reasonable medical practitioner would perceive and make under the same or similar circumstances as relevant information for the patient to make an informed consent.
qualified privilege: in those cases where a patient seeks the services of a physician for reasons other than medical treatment, the confidentiality of their relationship is qualified (e.g. worker's compensation examination results).
reasonable degree of medical certainty: the opinion sought from a provider.
res ipsa loquitur doctrine: tort doctrine which creates a permissible inference of negligence unless the defendant can prove otherwise when (a) the defendant had exclusive control of the thing producing injury and (b) the injury would not normally occur without negligence, e.g., a baby exhibits clear dog bite marks and the defendant owns the only dog in the neighborhood.
respectable minority: one of the standards against which physicians are measured.
similar locality standard: where the provider is held to exercise the standard of care of the average health care provider in a similar locality, e.g. similar size, geographic location and distance from a major medical center.
standard of conduct: what the "reasonable practitioner" would do in like circumstances" and requires that the physician exercise that degree of skill and care that would be expected of the average qualified practitioner practicing under like circumstances.
standard of proof: for medical malpractice is preponderance of the evidence; for child custody it is clear and convincing. There is also a category called "clear proof" in Sullivan.
statutory mandated reporting: the statutory requirement that a physician report otherwise confidential information such as child abuse, gunshot wounds, and contagious diseases. This is a conditional privilege and disclosure is limited to to the information required to carry out the intent of the reporting requirements.
strict locality standard: where the provider is held to exercise the standard of care of the average health care provider in that locality.
substituted judgment; a doctrine whereby the court takes the evidence and makes a decision by putting itself in the shoes of the incompetent person and asking if that person were competent, would that person refuse treatment.
termination of patient care: if a physician-patient relationship has already been initiated, proper notice of termination is necessary, along with whatever measures are reasonably necessary to secure treatment with another physician.
testimonial privilege: in Massachusetts there are common law privileges of lawyer-client and husband-wife as well as statutory psychotherapist-patient and clergy-penitent privileges. Note, however, a physician has no testimonial privilege in Massachusetts and can be made to testify in a judicial proceeding to confidential information. The doctor, of course, has an ethical duty (AMA Ethical Rules) in this regard and may be sued civilly.
therapeutic privilege: wherein the medical profession declares that there are instances when it would not be necessary to tell patients of the risks.
thin skull doctrine: take the plaintiff as you see him.
verdict, general: find for either plaintiff or defendant.
verdict, special: jury is asked different separate questions as to the different elements of negligence for each defendant.
wrongful birth (child has defects): but for the physician's negligence, a wanted child was born (with defects, handicaps).
wrongful life (suit by child): but for the physician's negligence, an unwanted child would not have existed.
wrongful pregnancy (normal child results): but for the physician's negligence, an unwanted child is conceived (failed birth control methods).

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