Source: https://www.jus.uio.no/ior/english/people/aca/szilardg/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 18:14:11+00:00

Document:
Szilárd Gáspár Szilágyi is a Postdoctoral Fellow at PluriCourts. He holds a PhD from Aarhus University (Denmark, 2015) and a two-year LLM in International Law from Maastricht University (Netherlands, 2011, top 3% of students). He has previously been a Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam (Centre for EU Law and Governance, 2015-2016), a Lecturer at the Hague University of Applied Sciences (EU External Relations Law and EU Criminal Law, 2015), a visiting researcher at TMC Asser Institute (The Hague, 2014), a Grotius Visiting Researcher at University of Michigan Law School (2013-2014) and an intern at the EU Commission (2011-2012). During his studies he also spent time at Bucerius Law School (Hamburg, 2010), Stellenbosch University (South Africa, 2011), Utrecht University (Netherlands, 2007-2008) and holds an LLB from Babeș-Bolyai University (Romania, 2005-2009, first class honours).
His research interests include EU Investment Law and Policy, International Economic Law, EU External Relations Law and the EU's Common Commercial Policy.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2018). It is Not Just About Investor-State Arbitration. A Look at Case C 284/16, Achmea BV’. European Papers. ISSN 2499-8249. 3(1), s 357- 373 . doi: 10.15166/2499-8249/220 Full text in Research Archive.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2018). Quo Vadis EU investment law and policy? the shaky path towards the international promotion of EU rules. European Foreign Affairs Review. ISSN 1384-6299. 23(2), s 167- 186 Full text in Research Archive.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd & Usynin, Maxim (2018). The Rising Trend of Including Investment Chapters into PTAs. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. ISSN 0167-6768. 48, s 267- 304 Full text in Research Archive.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). Binding Committee Interpretations under the EU’s new FTIAs. European Investment Law and Arbitration Review. ISSN 2468-7413. 2, s 90 Full text in Research Archive.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). Transparency, Investment Protection and the Role of the European Parliament. European Investment Law and Arbitration Review. ISSN 2468-7413. 2, s 371- 411 Full text in Research Archive.
This article critically assesses the feasibility of the recently proposed Investment Court System (ICS) under the envisaged Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), from the perspective of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It is argued that an ex ante assessment of the ICS by the CJEU would likely result in several incompatibilities between the ICS and EU law, since insufficient safeguards exist guaranteeing that the ICS will not interfere with EU fundamental rights and the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction to deliver binding interpretations of EU law. Moreover, it is not yet certain whether an incompatibility exists with Article 344 TFEU or with substantive EU values. Furthermore, no preliminary reference mechanism is envisaged with a binding ruling of the CJEU and even if such a system were included, it is uncertain whether the ICS could refer a question to the CJEU.
This case-note provides a critical overview of Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 ppu, Aranyosi and Căldăraru. The cjeu tries to reconcile the principles of mutual trust and recognition with the protection of the fundamental rights of the requested person. Instead of introducing a new ground of refusal for a European Arrest Warrant based on the breach of fundamental rights, the cjeu opted for a ground of postponement. Furthermore, it brings its two-tier ‘systemic deficiencies’ test closer to the standards used by the ECtHR and encourages dialogue between the issuing and executing judicial authorities. Nevertheless, the scope of application of the new ground of postponement is not entirely clear and it is not yet sure what happens after the executing judicial authority postpones its decision due to evidence of a real risk that the requested person will be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in the issuing Member State.
The current article provides a critical overview of the CJEU’s role as the main ‘architect’ of the relationship between the EU legal order and the international legal order. The activities of the CJEU are assessed in light of four parameters: the protection of fundamental rights, the protection of the internal division of competences within the EU, issues of primacy and review of legality when international agreements are present, and the relationship between the CJEU and other international tribunals. It is argued that the CJEU in the last decade is increasingly acting in a fashion similar to federal constitutional courts that seek to protect the ‘federal’ level legal order from the intrusions of the international legal order and those of the sub-federal level. In its quest to protect the autonomy of the EU legal order and its own exclusive jurisdiction in a multilevel, pluralistic legal system, the CJEU might have caused more harm than good, affecting legal certainty, and the dialogue between it and the international legal order or international tribunals.
This article looks at a less discussed topic in European legal scholarship: the horizontal direct effect of EU international agreements and the Court of Justice’s apparent reluctance to expressly confirm it. It is argued that the direct effect of EU international agreements has been confirmed in proceedings involving private individuals/professionals against the private regulatory bodies of a profession or a State-owned and controlled entity. However, direct effect has not yet been expressly confirmed in cases involving veritable horizontal relationships, between private parties of equal positions and with equal functions. Whilst, the choice for this reluctance was understandable three decades ago, the time feels right to expressly acknowledge it and keep up with international trends.
The rules on invoking EU norms before the Court of Justice and Member State courts are at the core of EU constitutional law. International agreements binding on the EU form an integral part of EU law and have primacy over inconsistent secondary EU legislation. Moreover, they also have primacy over inconsistent Member State law.This article aims to investigate, whether such primacy is capable of having effects independent of direct effect or it needs to be triggered by some form of ‘direct effect’ of the international agreement.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2015). The Relationship between EU law and International Agreements. Restricting the Fediol and Nakajima Exceptions in Vereniging Milieudefensie. Common market law review. ISSN 0165-0750. 52(4), s 1059- 1077 Full text in Research Archive.
Inspired by the questions US courts and American scholarship ask when confronted with the domestic enforcement of international agreements, this article looks at the methods of interpretation and tests used by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its “direct effect” analysis of international agreements, which are binding on the European Union, as well as the issue of “rights” and its role in the “direct effect” analysis. It is argued that the current case law is split when it comes to the methods of interpretation and tests used in the “direct effect” analysis. Moreover, the CJEU’s case law is not clear on whether a primary right or the right to seek a remedy needs to be conferred by international agreements, or whether a right should be conferred at all.
Article 344 TFEU forbids Member States to pursue any other means of dispute settlement, when issues regarding the application and interpretation of theTreaties are concerned.The Court of Justice extended this principle to include disputes arising under international agreements, where the subject matter falls under European Union (EU) competence. At the same time, the number of international agreements to which direct effect is not granted is slowly rising. Consequently, the question arises whether Member States still have proper access to justice under these international regimes vis-à-vis other Member States or the EU, given that: first, they cannot pursue litigation under the agreements’ dispute resolution system if the foreign body risks interpreting the agreement, which also forms part of EU law; second, they cannot rely on these agreements before the Court.This article argues that a rethinking of the direct effect doctrine of international agreements is necessary. Member States should not be equated with individuals, when invoking international agreements before the Court to challenge the validity of EU acts.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2013). What Constitutes ‘Failure to Notify’ National Measures. European Public Law. ISSN 1354-3725. 19(2), s 281- 294 Full text in Research Archive.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2018). Brexit. Maybe not such bad news for intra-EU investment awards after Achmea?.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2018). Building a Multilateral Investment Court: Should Domestic Courts be Co-opted as ‘Investment Courts’?.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2018). The CJEU Strikes Again in Achmea. Is this the end of investor-State arbitration under intra-EU BITs?’.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2018). The EU’s Investment Law and Policy, and a Future Multilateral Investment Court.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd & Letourneau-Tremblay, Laura (2018). Who are the Dissenting Arbitrators in International Investment Treaty Arbitration?.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd & Márton, Péter (2018). Creeping Intergovernmentalism in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy: The Curious Case of Investment Protection.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd & Márton, Péter (2018). Foreign Investment Policy in the Post-Lisbon CCP: An Institutionalist Perspective.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). A Follow-up to the EU Commission’s Decision to ‘Split’ Trade and Investment Protection.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). Opinion 2/15: Maybe it is Time for the EU to Conclude Separate Trade and Investment Agreements.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). Quo Vadis European Investment Law and Policy? The Shaky Path Towards the International Promotion of EU Norm.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). Should Domestic Courts be Co-opted as International Courts?.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). The EU’s Investment Court System and a Multilateral Investment Court.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). The Effects of Opinion 2/15 on Member State BITs with Third Countries.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2017). Transparency, Investment Protection and the Role of the European Parliament.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd & Lenk, Hannes (2017). Case C-600/14, Germany v Council. More Clarity over ‘Facultative Mixity’?.
Kádár, Hanga; Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd & Kádár, Hanga (2017, 08. april). Külföldi karrier csak önerőből (A Self-made Foreign Career). [Tidsskrift]. Romania.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2016). A Standing Investment Tribunal: The Commission Trying to Please the ‘Cabbage’ and the ‘Goat’, but what about the Court?.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2016). Binding Committee Interpretations under the EU’s New FTIAs.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2016). ISDS in EU FTIAs. Yes, No, Maybe? A Domestic Enforcement Perspective.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2016). Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant..
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2016). LEGITIMATE POLICY OBJECTIVES’ UNDER THE EU’S NEW TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2016). TRANSPARENCY, INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2016). The Investment Court System Under TTIP from the Perspective of the CJEU.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2015). EU International Agreements through a US lens.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2015). Mutual Trust before the Court of Justice – a view from CJEU Judge Sacha Prechal.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2014). Alternatives to the Direct Effect of International Agreements in the EU and the US.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Szilárd (2013). The Primacy and Direct Effect of EU International Agreements.

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