Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/36435
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:03:59+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,VS. JOSE CHUA Y VALENCIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
This is an appeal from the Decision dated March 25, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12 in Criminal Case No. 90-83644 convicting Jose Chua y Valencia of the crime of Murder.
That on or about December 15, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities, and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one PEPITO LOPEZ Y SANTOS, by then and there stabbing and shooting the latter several times, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the crime of Murder, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant was further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
Appellant asserts that the appellant had no participation whatsoever in the death of the victim Pepito Lopez; that he was only armed with a knife, whereas the victim's death was caused by two gunshot wounds as testified to by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Florante Baltazar; that it was one of the onlookers who shot the victim; that the testimony of Fernando Sanchez was "fabricated to establish a scenario that [appellant] conspired with the two other assailants and thus convict [appellant] of the crime of murder."
Appellant points out that Fernando referred to the two other assailants as appellant's "henchmen"; however, appellant could not afford to hire henchmen on his income as a jeepney driver. He also insists that Fernando Sanchez could not have ascertained who the companions of appellants were because at the time of the incident, there was "already a commotion in the market and many people were milling around watching the fight between his uncle [the victim] and [appellant]." Finally, appellant argues that Fernando was ten (10) feet away from the scene and could not have been an eyewitness to the crime.
Appellant's contentions have no merit.
Between the bare denial of the accused and the positive identification and straightforward testimony of the witness Fernando Sanchez, a young boy, this Court is inclined to believe the prosecution's evidence. What is more is that the witness for the defense admitted that he saw the accused carrying a bladed weapon while standing two (2) meters away from the victim immediately after the incident happened. He further said that the victim and the accused were the only people who quarelled (sic). All these give rise to the conclusion that the accused perpetrated the crime resulting in the death of the victim. There is unanimity in the evidence pointing to the accused as the perpetrator of the offense as against his denial.
The rule is that the positive and categorical assertions of witnesses generally prevail over bare denials. We consider appellant's defense of denial of any participation in the crime viz-a-viz the testimonies of the other witnesses. Prosecution witness Fernando Sanchez positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The defense's own witness Jaime Camacho, barangay chairman of Barangay 1, Zone 1, District 1 of the City of Manila testified seeing appellant wielding a 30-cm. long bladed weapon about two (2) meters from the fallen victim.
Significantly, appellant admitted being armed with a knife at the time of the incident, although he asserted that he was not of the habit of carrying a deadly weapon.
Furthermore, the testimonies of the witnesses are supported by the physical evidence showing that the victim sustained a stab wound, which is borne out by the findings of the medico-legal officer. And, while it may be so that it was the two gunshot wounds sustained by the victim which were fatal, the medico-legal officer was of the opinion that the stab wound damaged the victim's internal organs and could have caused the victim's death.
On appellant's attempt to dispute the prosecution's theory that he (appellant) conspired with his "henchmen" to kill the victim, asserting that he "could not afford to hire two henchmen." He was "only a jeepney driver whose income was not even enough for his family."
A reading of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that the word "henchman" was used loosely to mean "alalay." In Tagalog, "alalay" means "helpful friend or companion," thus not necessarily a subordinate. The transcript materially reveals that the witness was aided by an "English-Tagalog Interpreter," in answering the questions propounded to him by counsel.
And how about the two persons whom you said earlier that they were the companions of Jose Chua, when was the first time you saw these person(s)?
I had seen them previously.
Now, how do you know, how did you know that these two persons who shot and clubbed your uncle Pepito are the companions of Jose Chua?
Where did you see them before?
Now, at the time when your uncle and Jose Chua were gearing to a fight, do you know what the two companions of Chua were doing?
You said that the accused Jose Chua stabbed your uncle while he was lying down. Do you know how many stabs were made on him?
Do you know where your uncle was hit by the four stabs?
Where, will you demonstrate on your body, Fernando?
(Witness pointing to his head.) When Jose Chua was about to stab my uncle, my uncle parried it with his thorax (witness pointing to his left and right forearm)."
How about the other stabbed (sic) wounds?
Witness pointing to his left leg.
You mentioned earlier that aside from Jose Chua, he has two companions, isn't it?
Do you know what did these two companions do to your uncle, if any?
And what did these two companions do?
While Jose Chua was stabbing my uncle, one of the two companions suddenly shot my uncle.
How about the other one, what did he do, if he did anything?
And the other one clubbed him.
Now, Fernando, do you know what came first, the stabbing by Jose Chua of your uncle or the shooting by the other companion of Jose Chua and the clubbing of the other companion of Jose Chua?
The stabbing came first, then the shooting and then the clubbing, sir.
Do you know also Fernando, how the intervals of the stabbing, the shooting and the clubbing?
They were successively inflicted, sir.
The foregoing testimony establishes conspiracy-- that the acts of appellant and his two companions collectively and individually demonstrates the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. Each malefactor did his part in the crime, which part, though apparently independent, was in fact connected and in cooperation with each other, indicating a closeness of their personal association and concurrence of sentiments. The rule is then that the liability of the conspirators is collective, and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others.
The corollary rule is that where a conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the malefactors rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
Appellant finally contends that, granting arguendo "that the facts are true, [appellant] cannot be convicted of the crime of Murder as the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation." Appellant asserts that there can be no evident premeditation because appellant did not even know the victim before the shooting incident. Further, he contends that there was no treachery, as it was the victim who started the aggression and provoked the fight and he (the victim) should have been forewarned of a possible reprisal.
We find no treachery. There is treachery "when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." No evidence was presented to show that the appellant and his companions deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to ensure the killing of Pepito Lopez, without the victim having the opportunity to defend himself.
Furthermore, prior to the killing, appellant and the victim Pepito Lopez were circling each other and were in a fighting stance, or in the words of witness Fernando Sanchez, "naggigirian." The victim thus could be said to have had forewarning and anticipation of the aggression from appellant and his companions, allowing him a chance to defend himself. While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard.
The situation that the victim, at the time of the assault, was prostrate on the ground, after having accidentally slipped, is of no moment when considering the presence of treachery. Suddenness of attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of treachery, so long as the decision to kill was made at that instant and the victim's helpless position was accidental.
The prosecution also did not prove the presence of the elements of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be present: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The premeditation to kill must be plain and notorious; it must be sufficiently proven by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill. In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove a circumstance to qualify the killing to Murder, appellant may only be convicted of Homicide.
We however consider the aggravating circumstance of recidivism against appellant. While as a rule, it is necessary to allege recidivism in the information and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused, such circumstance may be considered if the accused does not object to the presentation of evidence of the fact of recidivism.
The prosecution presented in evidence the record from the Bureau of Corrections, Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, Palawan stating that appellant was incarcerated at that facility, having been convicted of Murder in Criminal Case No. CC-VI-71-70 and imposed the penalty of six years and one day, as minimum, to twelve years and one day, as maximum. On June 12, 1971, the President of the Philippines commuted the sentence to three years, as minimum, to six years, as maximum. Appellant was released on parole on September 13, 1972. Appellant did not object to the presentation of this evidence and even admitted that the same.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. The existence of the aggravating circumstance of recidivism calls for the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the next lower penalty to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or prision mayor. Accordingly, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and (1) one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The trial court also awarded the heirs of the victim the following: "indemnity x x x in the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages for the death of the deceased; P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages."
No evidence whatsoever was presented to support the award of actual damages. The rule is that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We likewise delete the award of moral damages, absent factual basis. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary, it is essential that the claimant should satisfactorily provide factual basis for the alleged moral injury.
The award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
We also order appellant to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, this being without need of further proof other than the fact that appellant committed the crime.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12 in Criminal Case No. 90-83644 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Accused-appellant Jose Chua is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim Pepito Lopez the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), On Official leave.
 RTC Decision, pp. 2-7; Records, pp. 148-153.
 Appellant's Brief, p. 8; Rollo, p. 45.
 Id., at 10 & 47.
 Id., at 9 & 46.
 Id., at 7 & 153.
 People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713 (1997) citing People v. Cayanan, 315 Phil. 23 (1995).
 TSN, February 25, 1991 p. 5.
 TSN, November 19, 1990, pp. 4 and 6.
 TAGALOG-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, LEI JAMES ENGLISH, 1986 ed.
 TSN, December 10, 1990 p. 2.
 TSN, December 19, 1990, p. 3.
 People v. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 (1997).
 People v. Layno, 264 SCRA 558 (1996) citing People v. Miranday, 312 Phil. 709 (1995).
 People v. Rostata, Jr., 218 SCRA 657 (1993).
 People v. Salison, 253 SCRA 758 (1996); People v. Yabut, 226 SCRA 715 (1993).
 Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code of Philippines.
 TSN, December 10, 1990, p. 2.
 People v. Demonteverde G.R. No. 124978, May 19, 1998 citing People v. Compendio, 258 SCRA 254 (1996); People v. Hubilla, 252 SCRA 471 (1996).
 People v. Demonteverde, supra, citing People v. Macalino, 177 SCRA 185 (1989) and People v. Ruiz, 110 SCRA 155 (1981).
 People v. Andesa, 55 SCRA 245 (1974) citing People v. Macalisang, 130 Phil. 728 (19 ).
 People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 111149, September 5, 1997; People v. Quinao, 269 SCRA 495 (1997).
 People v. Caisip, G.R. No. 119757, May 21, 1998, citing People v. Palomar, G.R. No. 108183-85, August 21, 1997.
 People v. Martinada, 194 SCRA 36 (1991).
 TSN, February 25, 1991 p. 7.
 People v. Fabrigas, Jr., 261 SCRA 436 (1996) citing People v. Wenceslao, 212 SCRA 56 (1992); People v. Rosario, 246 SCRA 658 (1995).
 People v. Santos. G.R. No. 117873, December 22, 1997, citing Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99301, March 13, 1997; People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997; People v. Zamora, G.R. No. 101829, August 21, 1997; People v. Sol, G.R. No. 118504, May 7, 1997; People v. Villamor, G.R. No. 111313-14, January 16, 1998.
 Art. 2230, Civil Code of the Philippines; People v. Bergante, G.R. Nos 120369-70, February 27, 1998; People v. Esguerra, 256 SCRA 659 (1996); People v. Manero, Jr. 218 SCRA 85 (1993).
 People v. Tulop, et al., G.R. No. 124829, April 21, 1998; People v. Caballes, G.R. No. 102723-24, June 19, 1997.

References: Art. 2230
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