Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/4th/94/325.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:50:00+00:00

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INTEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KOUROSH KENNETH HAMIDI, Defendant and Appellant.
Philip H. Weber for Defendant and Appellant.
Ann Brick for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California; Christopher A. Hansen for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York; and Deborah Pierce for Electronic Frontier Foundation, Amici Curiae for Defendant and Appellant.
After Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi was fired by Intel Corporation, he began to air grievances about the company. Hamidi repeatedly flooded Intel's e-mail system. When its security department was unable to block or otherwise end Hamidi's mass e-mails, Intel filed this action. The trial court issued a permanent injunction stopping the campaign, on a theory of trespass to chattels.
On appeal Hamidi, supported by Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), urges trespass to chattels was not proven and, even if it was, the injunction violates free speech principles which require the elements of the tort be tempered in cases involving speech. We shall affirm.
Intel filed a brief complaint, alleging it maintains an internal, proprietary, e-mail system for use of its employees; the e-mail addresses are confidential; defendant Hamidi and FACE-Intel (Former and Current Employees of Intel, a defaulting party which did not appeal) obtained Intel's e-mail address list and on several occasions sent e-mail to up to 29,000 employees; on March 17, 1998, Intel sent a letter demanding Hamidi stop, but he refused. The complaint sought remedies based on theories of nuisance and trespass to chattels.
Intel moved for summary judgment and submitted a set of undisputed facts which Hamidi did not dispute. They establish: Hamidi is the FACE-Intel webmaster and spokesperson. He sent e-mails to between 8,000 and 35,000 Intel employees on six specific occasions. He ignored Intel's request to stop [94 Cal. App. 4th 329] and took steps to evade its security measures. Intel's employees "spend significant amounts of time attempting to block and remove HAMIDI's e-mail from the INTEL computer systems," which are governed by policies which "limit use of the e-mail system to company business."
Hamidi filed a declaration in opposition to summary judgment, explaining "FACE-INTEL was formed to provide a medium for INTEL employees to air their grievances and concerns over employment conditions at INTEL. FACE-INTEL provides an extremely important forum for employees within an international corporation to communicate via a web page on the Internet and via electronic mail, on common labor issues, that, due to geographical and other limitations, would not otherwise be possible." His six mass e-mailings "did not originate on INTEL property, nor were they sent to INTEL property. The electronic mails were sent over the internet to an internet server. [¶] With each of the electronic mailings [he] informed each recipient that [he] would remove them from the mailing list upon request. [He] only received 450 requests[.]"
Intel dropped its nuisance theory and claim for damages, and the trial court granted summary judgment. It issued an injunction that "defendants, their agents, servants, assigns, employees, officers, directors, and all those acting in concert for or with defendants are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from sending unsolicited e-mail to addresses on INTEL's computer systems." Hamidi timely appealed.
Trespass to chattels is somewhat arcane and suffers from desuetude. "The chief importance of the theory today, according to Prosser, is that there may [94 Cal. App. 4th 330] be recovery for interferences with the possession of personal property that are not sufficiently important to be classed as conversion, i.e., as a 'little brother of conversion.'" (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988, 1999 Supp.) Torts, § 627A, p. 390; see id., § 610, pp. 707-708.) However, the tort has reemerged as an important rule of cyberspace.
The Restatement also provides "The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. In order that an actor who interferes with another's chattel may be liable, his conduct must affect some other and more important interest of the possessor. Therefore, one who intentionally intermeddles with another's chattel is subject to liability only if his intermeddling [94 Cal. App. 4th 331] is harmful to the possessor's materially valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some other legally protected interest [is harmed.] Sufficient legal protection of the possessor's interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession against even harmless interference. [¶] Illustration: [¶] 2. A, a child, climbs upon the back of B's large dog and pulls its ears. No harm is done to the dog, or to any other legally protected interest of B. A is not liable to B." (§ 218, com. e, pp. 421-422; see Glidden v. Szybiak (1949) 95 N.H. 318, 320 [63 A.2d 233, 235].) This caveat speaks of "nominal damages." [3a] Intel does not seek damages, even nominal damages, to compensate for Hamidi's conduct; Intel wants to prevent him from repeating his conduct. In this case, the nature of the remedy sought colors the analysis.
As indicated, some confusion in the cases and treatises disappears when the nature of the remedy is considered. We accept that "The plaintiff, in order to recover more than nominal damages, must prove the value of the property taken, or that he has sustained some special damage." (1 Waterman, Trespass (1875) Remedy for Wrongful Taking of Property, § 596, p. 617; see Lay v. Bayless (1867) 44 Tenn. 246, 247; Warner v. Capps (1881) 37 Ark. 32.) Intel seeks no damages.
[3c] Amicus ACLU seeks to distinguish CompuServe on the ground the conduct "placed 'a tremendous burden' on CompuServe's equipment thus depriving CompuServe of the full use of its equipment." Elsewhere in its brief, ACLU states Hamidi did not send "a large number of e-mails. All in all, he sent a total of only six e-mails over a period spanning close to two years." Similarly, Amicus EFF states: "Assuming the veracity of Intel's allegations, on six occasions over a nearly two-year period, many Intel employees simply had one additional e-mail from Mr. Hamidi sitting in their in boxes when they came to work in the morning. [94 Cal. App. 4th 334] This hardly constitutes physical disruption to Intel's computer system." Amici discount disruption to Intel's business system, inasmuch as the thousands of employees had to confront, read, and delete the messages even if only to tell Hamidi to send them no more, as several hundred did.
EFF states if such loss of productivity "is the applicable standard [of harm], then every personal e-mail that an employee reads at work could constitute a trespass." The answer is, where the employer has told the sender the entry is unwanted and the sender persists, the employer's petition for redress is proper. Strangely, EFF, purporting to laud the "freedom" of the Internet, emphasizes Intel allows its employees reasonable personal use of Intel's equipment for sending and receiving personal e-mail. Such tolerance by employers would vanish if they had no way to limit such personal usage of company equipment.
CompuServe relied in part on Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (Thrifty-Tel). Thrifty-Tel held the unauthorized use of telephone access numbers, which "overburdened the system, denying some subscribers access," (p. 1564) was sufficient to support liability for actual monetary damages. The case did not state or imply that such an extreme effect was required to establish the tort. Thrifty-Tel noted: "At early common law, trespass required a physical touching of another's chattel or entry onto another's land. The modern rule recognizes an indirect touching or entry; e.g., dust particles from a cement plant that migrate onto another's real and personal property may give rise to trespass. [Citing, inter alia, Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co. (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 229 (Wilson).] But the requirement of a tangible trespass has been relaxed almost to the point of being discarded. Thus, some courts have held that microscopic particles [citation] or smoke [citation] may give rise to trespass. And the California Supreme Court has intimated migrating intangibles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a trespass, provided they do not simply impede an owner's use or enjoyment of property, but cause damage. [Citing Wilson.] In our view, the electronic signals generated by the Bezenek boys' activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action." (46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1566, fn. 6.) We agree.
Amicus EFF suggests Thrifty-Tel, supra, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 is based on the view "physical damages or physical disruption, even if temporary," "gives the 'electronic signal' a sufficiently tangible quality to support a cause of action for trespass," and Intel has not shown Hamidi's e-mails caused physical disruption. This is not so for two reasons. First, the footnote just quoted makes it plain that the electronic signal is "sufficiently tangible [94 Cal. App. 4th 335] to support a trespass cause of action." The tangibility of the contact is not dependent on the harm caused. Second, Hamidi's e-mails caused disruption to Intel's workers, who were drawn away from their jobs to deal with the messages. If EFF is saying Hamidi can flood Intel's system to the penultimate extent before causing a computer crash, we disagree.
Quite recently, a California federal court reached a similar conclusion in eBay Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2000) 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071: "Even if, as BE argues, its searches use only a small amount of eBay's computer system capacity, BE has nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own purposes. The law recognizes no such right to use another's personal property."
At oral argument counsel referred to Business and Professions Code section 17538.4, which prohibits entities from barraging a person or company with unwanted commercial e-mails. The statute shows the Legislature recognizes the distraction and harm caused by unwanted electronic communications. Nothing in the statute suggests any intent to eliminate the application of common law remedies, such as trespass to chattels, to electronic communications, nor to limit common law remedies to cases of commercial speech.
We conclude the summary judgment moving papers demonstrated Intel's entitlement to an injunction based on a theory of trespass to chattels.
[7a] Hamidi and Amici insist the injunction runs afoul of the First Amendment. In like manner as the First Amendment trumps a state's power to make and enforce defamation torts (e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan [94 Cal. App. 4th 337] (1964) 376 U.S. 254 [11 L. Ed. 2d 686] (Sullivan)) they urge it governs a state's power to enjoin e-mails. This lawsuit does not implicate federal constitutional rights, for lack of state action.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (1991) 501 U.S. 663 [115 L. Ed. 2d 586], cited by Hamidi, involved a newspaper's breach of promise to a source; liability was not precluded by the First Amendment. The case did not address trespass.
Recent cases involving unwanted commercial e-mail support our view. In Cyber Promotions v. American Online, Inc. (E.D. Pa. 1996) 948 F. Supp. 436 (Cyber Promotions), the court found no state action when an online company obtained an injunction to prevent another company from sending commercial e-mail to its members. The court rejected the e-mail sender's position that "'the Court's participation with the litigant in issuing or enforcing an order which impinges on another's First Amendment rights'" amounted to state action. (Id. at pp. 444-445.) CompuServe, which upheld an injunction against a company sending unsolicited e-mails, held squarely: "the mere judicial enforcement of neutral trespass laws by the private owner of property does not alone render it a state actor." (CompuServe, supra, 962 F.Supp. at p. 1026, cited on this point with approval Golden Gateway Center [94 Cal. App. 4th 340] v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 1034 & fn. 14 (plu. opn.) ["judicial enforcement of injunctive relief does not, by itself, constitute state action] (Golden Gateway).) We agree.
At oral argument counsel asserted the California Supreme Court has held any judicial tort relief implicating expressive rights constitutes state action, relying on the following passage in Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 1092 at page 1114: "While judicial sanctioning of tort recovery constitutes state action sufficient to invoke the same constitutional protections applicable to statutes and other legislative actions [citing Sullivan], religious groups are not immune from all tort liability." That case involved claims by former cult members alleging that a religious group defrauded and falsely imprisoned them. The point of the passage just quoted was to emphasize that not all activities by religious groups are insulated from tort liability. Counsel's interpretation of the passage is tenable only if the language is divorced from its context.
For lack of state action the federal constitution is not implicated herein. Intel has the right to exclude others from speaking on its property. Intel is not required to exercise its right in a "content-neutral" fashion. Content discrimination is part of a private property-owner's bundle of rights. Intel does not welcome Hamidi.
The California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Robins holding. In Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal. 4th 1013, a majority concluded a large residential apartment complex could prevent its tenants from distributing leaflets within the complex. The plurality opinion of three justices would import the "state action" limitation into lawsuits based on the California Constitution's analog to the First Amendment. Three justices disagreed with this view and the Chief Justice declined to resolve the point. For our purposes we need not enter into that debate. Instead, we distill from Golden Gateway a holding which reaffirms the test employed in Robins. According to the plurality, "the actions of a private property owner constitute state action for purposes of California's free speech clause only if the property is freely and openly accessible to the public." (26 Cal.4th at p. 1033.) Because the plurality concluded the complex was not freely and openly accessible to the public, it found no state action. The Chief Justice's opinion proceeds directly to the question whether the complex was "freely open" to the public and concluded it was not. (Id. at p. 1036) We perceive no semantic difference between "freely open" and "freely and openly accessible" to the public. Therefore actions to halt expressive activity on one's private property do not contravene the California Constitution unless the property is freely open to the public.
Private e-mail servers differ from the Internet; they are not traditional public forums. (Cyber Promotions, supra, 948 F.Supp at p. 446.) Nor is a private company which chooses to use e-mail made a public forum.
Although Intel is a large company, it is not like a Pruneyard Shopping Center, in that it is not a place where the public gathers to engage in expressive activity such as gathering signatures to petition the government, nor is its e-mail system so used. The Intel e-mail system is private property used for business purposes. Intel's system is not transformed into a public forum merely because it permits some personal use by employees. (See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Assn. (1983) 460 U.S. 37, 47 [74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 806] [limited access to outside organizations does not transform school mailbox system into a public forum].) Intel invites the public to use its e-mail system for and only for business purposes.
There is no liability for releasing an electronic communication that does not actually damage or hinder the operation of the computer system to which it is sent.
A former employee of Intel Corporation, Hamidi, sent six emails through the company system to 35,000 current Intel employees that criticized the company's employment practices. No harm was caused to the company's internal system or its functioning, although the emails led to discussions among employees and managers. Intel brought a claim for trespass to chattels, based on Hamidi's use of the internal email system. The trial court granted summary judgment to Intel.
Trespass to chattels does not arise when there is no interference with the use or possession of the chattel, in this case the computer system. Since there was no damage or functional impairment caused by Hamidi's use of the computer system, the damages element of the claim could not be satisfied. The alleged type of damages, which was a loss of productivity caused by employees reading and discussing the messages as well as Intel's attempts to block them, did not harm the company's interest in its computers.
Actual damages must be shown even in situations when a plaintiff seeks only an injunction rather than damages. Distractions based on the content rather than the frequency of the emails do not suggest any impairment of the computer system. An intentional tort like trespass to chattels should not cover conduct that is offensive only because of the speech that it contains. Moreover, computers are personal property rather than real property, so they would not be an appropriate basis for this type of claim.
This situation is similar to making undesired calls to a cell phone, which clearly does not give rise to tort liability.
The overall functionality of the computer system was undermined because of the extra effort required in reviewing and deleting the emails. The former employee had no right to use the company's property to express his own message. An injunction would be appropriate even if the harm arose solely from the content of the emails.
Hamidis' speech should not be protected because it did not occur in a public forum. The situation was similar to someone entering a private office mailroom where he did not have the right to enter and using the mail cart to put unwanted mail on 35,000 employee desks.
The emails did not undermine the productivity of the company, since they were only a brief distraction to the current employees, nor did they affect the functioning of the email system. This meant that the company could not satisfy the damages element of a tort claim.

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