Source: http://wakeforestlawreview.com/tag/murder/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 01:02:44+00:00

Document:
Today, in the criminal case of United States v. Beyle, a published opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of two Somali pirates for various charges relating to piracy, including the murder of four Americans off the coast of Somalia.
On appeal, Abukar Osman Beyle, defendant, contended that the court lacked jurisdiction over the charges related to murder and firearm use because the murder occurred in Somalia’s territorial waters, not on the high seas. Shani Nurani Shiekh Abrar, the other defendant, claimed that his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses material to his defense were violated because he was unable to access certain witnesses important to his duress defense.
In February of 2011, a group of Somali pirates, which defendants were a part of, armed with automatic weapons and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher captured a Yemeni fishing boat. Both Beyle and Abrar were listed on the ledger for dividing the spoils among the pirates. The pirates attacked a ship with four Americans aboard that was part of an international yacht rally. Abrar was the first to board the American ship, and once on board he subdued the Americans and cut the communication lines. When the pirates gained control of the ship, it was approximately 950 miles off of the Somali coast. The pirates let four Yemeni fishermen they had captured with the Yemeni boat leave on the Yemeni boat, while the pirates stayed on the American boat. The pirates took the Americans hostage and tried to secure a ransom using their connections on land in Somalia. The U.S. Navy was alerted to this and moved to intercept the vessel before it could reach Somali waters. The Navy engaged with the pirates for several days in an attempt to get them to surrender, but the pirates refused, threatening to kill the hostages. The pirates started to fire guns and rockets at a Navy vessel that was attempting to block the boat from reaching Somali waters. The Navy did not return fire. A group of pirates, including Beyle and Abrar, opened fire on the four Americans, killing them all. At this time, the vessel was between thirty and forty nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. Navy SEALs then boarded the vessel, and the pirates surrendered after four pirates were killed. The FBI questioned the pirates and Abrar claimed that he was kidnapped and forced to be the pirates’ mechanic, with his role later changing to guard. Abrar claimed that the only reason he did not leave with the Yemeni fishermen was because he was afraid of being arrested in Yemen. Abrar admitted to pointing a gun at the hostages, but denied taking part in the shooting.
All of the pirates were taken to the United States and charged with a variety of crimes related to the piracy and hostage taking, including murder. All but three of the pirates, pled guilty and were sentenced to life in prison. Beyle, Abrar, and another pirate decided to take the case to trial. Beyle filed a motion to dismiss any counts relating to the murders because he claimed the murders took place in Somali territorial waters, outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Abrar filed a motion to dismiss the case against him because he could not reach witnesses, including the Yemeni fishermen, that would provide evidence that he acted under duress, which could act as a defense to all the charges except murder. The district court denied both motions. The U.S. sought the death penalty for all three defendants at trial. The trial lasted over a month, and ultimately the jury voted to convict all three defendants to life in prison. The jury heard instructions on Abrar’s duress defense, but decided that duress was not applicable. Beyle and Abrar appealed.
The Constitution gives the federal government the power to punish piracy and felonies committed on the high seas. In statute, Congress had defined the high seas as including any waters outside the jurisdiction of any nation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the United States has recognized but not ratified and Somalia has ratified, recognizes that a nation’s sovereignty covers only territorial sea, which is twelve nautical miles off the coast. However, UNCLOS also recognizes exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which UNCLOS treats as quasi-territorial for economic rights. These EEZs extend to 200 miles off the coast of a nation. UNCLOS does not define waters as high seas until outside of these EEZs.
Beyle argued that because UNCLOS does not consider the high seas to start until 200 miles of the coast of nation, the court below did not have jurisdiction because the murders occurred within forty miles of the Somali coast. The Fourth Circuit disagreed because EEZs allocated economic rights, not other rights. The actual authority to punish criminal violations only extended to twelve nautical miles off the coast of Somalia according to UNCLOS. Therefore, EEZs were outside of a nation’s sovereignty, making them “high seas” according to U.S. law, regardless of what UNCLOS defines as high seas. In the alternative, Beyle argued that Somalia had passed a resolution in 1972 extending its jurisdiction to 200 miles from the coast. The Fourth Circuit was unsure of the validity of this resolution, and found that Somalia’s subsequent adoption of UNCLOS superseded any such resolution. Because the murder occurred outside of twelve nautical miles off of the Somali coast, the Fourth Circuit found that the murders occurred on the high seas and were thus subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
The Fifth Amendment provides due process protections when the government seeks to deprive someone of life, liberty, or property. The Sixth Amendment grants the right to a process to obtain witnesses for criminal defendants. The Sixth Amendment is violated if a defendant is arbitrarily deprived of relevant and material testimony that is vital to his defense. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are closely related and the right to call witnesses to defend oneself is essential to due process.
Abrar claimed that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he did not have access to overseas witnesses that would have testified to his character and would have aided in his duress defense. The Fourth Circuit disagreed because the Sixth Amendment did not grant a defendant the right to any and all witnesses, only a compulsory process to obtain witnesses. This process was still limited by practicality, and the court did not have jurisdiction over the witnesses Abrar wanted to call. Additionally, outside concerns such as the security of Somalia made it very impracticable to locate and subpoena these witnesses. The Fourth Circuit also expressed concerns that some of Abrar’s witnesses might be fictional based on investigations into those witnesses that were made. The Fourth Circuit also did not think that the evidence that those witnesses would have put on would have been material because none of them actually witnessed Abrar’s abduction by pirates. Additionally, there were better witnesses such as the pirates Abrar claimed abducted him that the U.S. already had in custody that could testify to Abrar’s abduction. However, Abrar refused to call these witnesses because they would have contradicted his story. The district court even offered Abrar the opportunity to give testimony limited to his abduction but he refused. The Fourth Circuit also saw ample evidence on the record that Abrar was a willing participant. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Abrar’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the court had jurisdiction over the actions of the defendants and that Abrar’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.
Today, in the criminal case United States v. Bran, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of Virginia, upholding both the conviction of Jose Armando Bran for conspiracy to commit murder and the district court’s interpretation of federal sentencing guidelines under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j).
Bran raised the following two issues on appeal: (1) the jury verdict was insufficient to convict on conspiracy to commit murder under § 924(j); and (2) the trial court erred in imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence for the conviction under § 924(j).
At trial, the government argued that Bran was the leader of Richmond Sailors Set, a violent sect of the MS-13 gang. The evidence established that in July 2011, Bran ordered two prospective members, Jeremy Soto and Luis Cabello, to kill Hernandez-Gonzalez as part of their initiation. Bran provided Soto and Cabello with a firearm to commit the murder and also ordered a current member, Michael Arevalo, to ensure that the murder was carried out.
Based on the order, Soto and Cabello carried out the murder, shooting Arevalo four times and leaving him to die by the James River. While Bran provided Soto and Cabello with a murder weapon, the firearm proved faulty. Instead, Soto and Cabello used Arevalo’s firearm to carry out the murder.
Bran was charged and convicted of three felonies for his role in the murder: (1) conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering; (2) murder in aid of racketeering; and (3) use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing death to another. He was sentenced to 120 months for Count 1, mandatory life for Count 2, and life for Count 3. The trial judge ordered the life sentence for Count 3 to run consecutively with the other parts of the sentence.
The jury was given several instructions with regards to Count 3 under § 924(j). The jury was asked to fill out a three-part special interrogatory if they found Bran guilty. The interrogatory asked whether Bran aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or caused another to: (1) use a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; (2) carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and/or (3) cause a firearm to be discharged during and in relation to a crime of violence. Even though the jury found him guilty of Count 3, the jury failed to find the second and third parts of the interrogatory beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bran argued that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to support his conviction under § 924(j). While an appellate court reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo, a court need only find that there was enough substantial evidence at trial for a reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty of the charge.
In order to convict a defendant under § 924(j), the government must prove “(1) the use of a firearm to cause the death of a person and (2) the commission of a § 924(c) violation.” § 924(c) “prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . .” Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides that a person “is punishable as a principal” if the person (a) “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of a criminal offense; or (b) “willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another” would be a criminal offense.” Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2, Bran was charged as the principal for both the § 924(c) and § 924(j) violations.
The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court did not err in convicting Bran under § 924(j). The evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to find that Bran aided and abetted the murder of Hernandez-Gonzalez through the use of a firearm. While Bran ostensibly claimed that the evidence did not support the conviction, the bulk of his argument focused on the juries failure to find all three of the special interrogatories. However, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the jury found Bran guilty on the general verdict form and found that he “caused a firearm to be discharged.” The “caused” language should be interpreted broadly to encompass “use of a firearm” under 924(j). Therefore, the conviction was affirmed.
Bran argued that the trial court erred in applying a mandatory consecutive sentence for the § 924(j) conviction. Bran argued that sentencing under § 924(j) should be left up to the discretion of the judge. This issue was reviewed de novo.
According to the majority, the relation between § 924(c) and § 924(j) requires that the latter be interpreted to require mandatory consecutive sentencing. Because § 924(j) is separated out from § 924(c), Congress must have intended for § 924(j) to be given the effect of enhancing the sentence imposed by conviction under § 924(c). To interpret the statute otherwise would lead to the conclusion that a person with a § 924(c) conviction which resulted in murder could face a more lenient sentencing scheme than if the murder never occurred. The majority also emphasized that of the five circuits to have been presented with this issue, four have held that § 924(j) requires mandatory consecutive sentencing. For these reasons, the majority affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The dissent disagreed with the majority primarily on two points. First, the dissent argued that § 924(j) is discrete from § 924(c). Thus, the express statutory mandate of § 924(c) should not be applied to § 924(j). Second, Congress enacted § 924(j) so that prosecutors could “extend the death penalty to second-degree murders.” The power to impose the death penalty does not result in a more lenient sentencing scheme. For these reasons, § 924(j) should not be interpreted as requiring mandatory consecutive sentencing.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial court’s conviction of Bran under § 924(j) and the trial court’s interpretation of § 924(j) as requiring mandatory consecutive sentencing.

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