Source: http://fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/vol1/1fsm053_074.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:05:54+00:00

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This action was filed on September 28, 1981 by plaintiff, a seaman, alleging that he was wrongfully discharged from his duties with the Trust Territory Maritime Service System. The Trust Territory Government has moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, contending that actions against the Trust Territory Government are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Trust Territory High Court by virtue of 6 T.T.C. Section 251.
The court concludes that it is required to exercise jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in this litigation. For the reasons discussed here the Trust Territory Government's motion is denied.
Lonno's legal claims here are grounded upon the Seaman's Protection Act, 19 T.T.C. Sections 201-32; and the Trust Territory Bill of Rights, 1 T.T.C. Section 4. He also generally claims violations of unspecified provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement under which the United States serves as administering authority for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 2 and of the Charter of the United Nations. 3 Based upon these legal claims, he contends that this Court has jurisdiction over the litigation as an admiralty or maritime case under Article XI, Section 6(a) of the Federated States of Micronesia Constitution, and as a case arising under national law, or as a dispute between a citizen of a state and a foreign state, citizen, or subject, under Article XI, Section 6(b) of the constitution.
Micronesia may say, 6 T.T.C. Section 251 precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction over it. That statutory provision authorizes certain types of civil actions against the Trust Territory Government 4 but specifies that the Trial Division of the High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." The Trust Territory Government contends that this language means precisely what it says and that this court is barred from exercising jurisdiction in any civil action against the Trust Territory Government.
The defendant's straightforward argument has immense appeal and would in most circumstances be dispositive of this case. The pertinent statutory language is plain and unambiguous and the court would normally accept the argument without further thought or discussion.
so simple as the defendant maintains. Indeed, the legal effect of 6 T.T.C. Section 251 has been dramatically affected by subsequent events.
First, the development, adoption and implementation of the Constitution and constitutional governments of the Federated States of Micronesia demand our attention. Considerably after enacting 6 T.T.C. Section 251, the Congress of Micronesia authorized a constitutional convention looking toward self-government by the peoples of Micronesia. Delegates from throughout the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands convened on Saipan in 1975 and approved the document which is now the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia. Thereafter, a constitutional referendum was held, on July 12, 1978, throughout all parts of the Trust Territory except the Northern Mariana Islands. Peoples of each of the four states of the present Federated States of Micronesia approved the constitution by majority vote.
In a subsequent portion of this opinion, this court concludes that Article XI, Section 6 of the constitution provides jurisdiction over the litigation here. If defendant's argument that 6 T.T.C. Section 251 retains its former meaning were accepted, this statute would therefore be in serious conflict with the Constitution, which in turn would presumably lead to the conclusion that the statute has been repealed by the Constitution. See FSM Const. art. XV, § 1.
Delegation of Authority. Until the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and subject to the limitations contained in this Order and in existing-treaties, laws, and regulations of the United States generally applicable in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, executive, legislative, and judicial functions of the Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands are, except as otherwise provided herein, hereby delegated to the three political subdivisions of the Trust Territory known as the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.
Micronesia by delegating the judicial functions of the Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to the Federated States of Micronesia. Thus, the previous exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court under 6 T.T.C. Section 251 was effectively delegated to the Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia, in so far as the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia authorizes such jurisdiction. That delegation became effective on May 5, 1981, when this court was certified pursuant to Section 5 of the Secretarial Order.
a. Pending Cases. The present Community and District Courts and Trial and Appellate Divisions of the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands shall continue to function and operate in accordance with the present procedural and jurisdictional provisions of the Trust Territory law until the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau have established functioning Courts pursuant to the terms of their respective constitutions. The determination that such functioning courts exist shall be made in writing by the Chief Justice of the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands upon written request of the chief judicial officer of the respective jurisdictions. A denial of the request may be appealed to the Secretary.
Once such a determination has been made for a jurisdiction, all cases, except for suits against the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Government or the High Commissioner, currently pending but not in active trial before the Community Courts, the District Courts, and the Trial Division of the High Court shall be transferred to the functioning courts of such jurisdiction, provided that the legal rights of the parties in any case in controversy pending before a Community Court, a District Court, or the Trial or Appellate Division of the High Court shall in no way be impaired by this Order.
Determination as to whether a case is in "active trial" shall be made by the Judge before whom such case is pending.
This language does not support defendant's argument. The subsection contemplates continued High Court activity pursuant to the "present procedural and jurisdictional provisions of Trust Territory law" only until new functioning courts are established by the constitutional governments and recognizes that the jurisdictional provisions of Trust Territory law will necessarily be revised when those courts have been established.
Defendant insists that the first sentence of the second paragraph of the Subsection 5(a) places all suits against the Trust Territory Government or the High Commissioner outside this court's jurisdiction. That sentence pertains only to transfer of cases pending before the Trust Territory Courts at the time when a new court is determined to be functioning. It has no application to this case, which was initially filed with this court, well after May 5, 1981.
from Associate Solicitor William H. Satterfield of the Solicitor's Office of the United States Department of the Interior to Interior's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Territorial and International Affairs. 8 This memorandum states that George Milner, former Deputy Director of Interior's former Office of Territorial Affairs and the person who drafted the phrase has said that his intent was that the phrase, "except for suits against the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or the High Commissioner" was "not to be affected by the rest of the paragraph." From this the Satterfield memo concludes that the phrase was inserted "to retain in the High Court jurisdiction to hear not only all cases involving the Trust Territory or the High Commissioner then pending but also all similar cases filed later until the Trusteeship Agreement is terminated." (Memo's emphasis). Plaintiff has countered the Satterfield memorandum with an April 20, 1979 memorandum prepared by Mr. George R. Milner himself for then Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus.
in a most extraordinary grammatical exercise. The critical phrase, "except for suits against the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or the High Commissioner," appears in Section 5(a) of the Order in a sentence discussing the "transfer" of cases pending" before Trust Territory courts. As the Satterfield memo itself confesses, to find that the phrase somehow affects this case originally filed in this court, we would have to agree that this phrase "was not to be affected by the rest of the paragraph in which it appears. We can not impute to the Secretary such maladroit use of the English language. The Satterfield memo conflicts with the language of Secretarial Order 3039 and must be rejected.
Judicial functions will be transferred to courts of the new jurisdiction created pursuant to their respective constitutions when such courts are established and functioning. Provision is made for the continued adjudication in the existing. High Court of cases that are in active trial when the new courts are established and ultimately, for appeals from the highest court of the new governments upon writ of certiorari. These provisions have been reviewed and approved by the Solicitor.
The purpose of this Order is to provide the maximum permissible amount of self-government..., consistent with the responsibilities of the Secretary under Executive Order 11021 for the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall, Islands and Palau, pursuant to their respective constitutions when framed adopted, and ratified, pending termination of the 1947 Trusteeship Agreement under which the United States of America undertook to act as Administering Authority for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
The ... judicial authority provided for in ... this order may be exercised.., through such...persons under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Interior, as the Secretary may designate and shall be exercised in such a manner as the Secretary, or any person or persons acting under the authority of the Secretary, may direct or authorize.
the Trusteeship Agreement plainly is appropriate, perhaps even essential, for compliance with the Trusteeship Agreement.
l. foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of that Trust Territory toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned; and to this end shall give to the inhabitants of the trust territory a progressively increasing share in the administrative services in the territory; shall develop their participation in government; and give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the territory; and shall take other appropriate measures toward those ends.
Trusteeship Agreement, Article 6, Section 1, 1 T.T.C. 12 and 13 (1980 ed.).
jurisdiction by the courts of the constitutional government.
Recent precedent within the Trust Territory is also instructive in assessing the current import of 6 T.T.C. Section 251. In Sablan Construction Co. v. Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 526 F. Supp. 135 (D. N. Mar. I. App. Div. 1981), a taxpayer seeking refund of allegedly overpaid taxes sued the Trust Territory Government in the United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands. The Trust Territory Government contended, as it has here, that it could not be sued in that court because 6 T.T.C. Section 251 places exclusive jurisdiction of law suits against the Trust Territory Government in the Trust Territory High Court. Both the Trial Division and the Appellate Division of the District Court disagreed.
jurisdiction. These made no mention of 6 T.T.C. Section 251 or of lawsuits against the Trust Territory Government nor indeed of the Trust Territory High Court, but the court held that they nevertheless worked an amendment of 6 T.T.C. Section 251.
As a creation of delegated power emanating from the [Secretary of Interior], the High Court's jurisdiction was exclusive in the [Federated States of Micronesia] only until the [Secretary of Interior] provided other-wise. The [Secretary of Interior] did exactly that when [he promulgated Secretarial Order 3039].
Trusteeship principles likewise call for similarity between the self-government accorded the peoples of the Northern Mariana Islands by the United States, and that granted other parts of the Trust Territory. If the administering authority were to permit those peoples selecting a closer and more dependent relationship with the administering authority a higher degree of autonomy than those seeking other relationships the dual standard could suggest an effort to discourage self-government and independence of the peoples within the Trust Territory. We should not lightly find disparities which could hint of Trusteeship Agreement violation.
We conclude then that the former exclusive jurisdiction of the Trust Territory High Court over lawsuits against the Trust Territory Government has been delegated to the constitutional governments covered by Secretarial Order 3039. Within the Federated States of Micronesia, the allocation of this former exclusive High Court jurisdiction between the Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia and the various state courts will be determined on the basis of jurisdictional provisions within the Constitution and laws of the Federated States of Micronesiaand its respective states. In the meantime, until the state courts are established, the High Court itself retains that portion of its exclusive jurisdiction formerly held under 6 T.T.C. Section 251 which does not fall within the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia.
Having determined that the former exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court over lawsuits against the Trust Territory Government hag been delegated to this Court, but only in so far at this Court has jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the Federated States of Micronesia, we now consider the various constitutional and statutory grounds suggested by plaintiff as authorizing our jurisdiction over this litigation.
or maritime matters within the meaning ofArticle XI, Section 6(a) of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia. We find no guidance in the journals of the Constitutional Convention assisting us in determining the scope of our admiralty jurisdiction. We therefore look to other sources to determine the meaning of this provision.
Constitution, the reasonable expectation of the framers would be that the words in the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia would have substantially the effect those same words had been given in the United States Constitution as of the times that the convention was acting, or when the' ratifying vote occurred.
of the Federated States of Micronesia, containing the same words, to yield that result also.
Secondly, decisions of the courts of the Trust Territory may be a useful source of guidance. The framers of the constitution were working against the background of legal concepts recognized and applied by the Trust Territory High Court and may have been guided by those interpretations in selecting or rejecting certain provisions.
In Lakemba v. Milne, 4 T.T.R. 44 (Tr. Div. Marshalls 1968), appeal dismissed, 4 T.T.R. 488 (1969), the High Court exercised jurisdiction over claims of seamen that the owner of the vessel upon which they had served had breached their seamen contracts. The statutory language under which the High Court acted granted jurisdiction over "admiralty and maritime matters." This path too leads to our acceptance of jurisdiction in this case.
Third, there may be international legal concepts which guide our interpretation. The concept of admiralty, for example, is related uniquely to the law of nations. It consists of rules in large part intended to govern the conduct of various nations in their shipping and commercial activities.
Finally, we may look to the law of other specific nations, especially other nations of the Pacific community, to determine whether approaches employed there may prove useful.
The Trust Territory Government has suggested no basis for disputing that this lawsuit falls within the court's constitutional jurisdiction over admiralty or maritime cases and none has made itself apparent to this court. Consequently, we find that this court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over this litigation as an admiralty or maritime case within the meaning of Article XI, Section 6(a) of the constitution.
National Law Jurisdiction - Lonno asserts rights here under the Seamen's Protection Act, 19 T.T.C. Sections 201-32. While this legislation was originally enacted for the entire Trust Territory by the Congress of Micronesia, it relates to matters that now fall within the legislative powers of the national government, FSM Const. art. IX, § 2, and has therefore become a national law of the Federated States of Micronesia. Id. art. XV. That being so, a claim asserting rights under the Act falls within the jurisdiction of this court under Article XI, Section 6(b) of the constitution as a case arising under national law.
Foreign Citizenship - Plaintiff contends that, in addition to the two grounds of jurisdiction already found here, we are also free to find jurisdiction under Article XI, Section 6(b). The plaintiff, a citizen of a state, urges this court to hold that the Trust Territory Government is a "foreign state citizen or subject." Id.
Except perhaps in some metaphysical sense beyond the range of constitutional interpretation, the Trust Territory Government cannot be viewed as a state or entity "foreign"
to the Federated States of Micronesia. See Neimes v. Maeda Construction Co., 1 FSM Intrm. 47(Truk 1982) (Benson, J.). Although it is being displaced by the new constitutional government, the Trust Territory Government retains critical governmental functions throughout the Trust Territory. The High Commissioner continues to play a major role in the budget, auditing and accounting, and grant-in-aid programs, Secretarial Order 3039, Section 3, and retains power to suspend legislation enacted by the President. Id. § 4. As already stated, Section 5(b) of Secretarial Order 3039 authorizes the Appellate Division of the High Court to entertain appeals from the courts of last resorts of the constitutional government. Thus the Trust Territory Government has the power to overrule and set aside decisions and actions of the heads of each of the three branches of the constitutional government of the Federated States of Micronesia. These awesome powers are calculated to allow the Trust Territory Government to control or override virtually every action of any constitutional government within the Trust Territory. Retention of these powers, the very essence of government, suggests that the Trust Territory Government even today remains, not a foreign state, but an integral part of the national government here.
which the "national government" is a party within the meaning of Article XI, Section 6(a) of the constitution. We conclude, however, that under the present state of affairs, the Trust Territory Government cannot be considered a foreign state, citizen or subject thereof within the meaning of Article XI, Section 6(b) of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
The court has jurisdiction of this litigation as a case within our admiralty or maritime jurisdiction and as a case arising under national law. Therefore, defendant's motion to-dismiss is denied.
So ordered this 28th day of January, 1982.

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