Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_34_issue_2?pg=25
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:30:06+00:00

Document:
Solitary confinement is not per se a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 198 Successful Eighth Amendment claims against the use of solitary confinement with adults have often focused on the specific conditions to which an individual is subjected and not the fact of solitary confinement. 199 Some courts have found that excessive isolation of juvenile delinquents is in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 200 Courts are permitted to consider the increased impact of isolation on youth in determining the severity of the deprivation, 201 but there is no separate cruel and unusual punishment standard applicable to juvenile delinquents.
191 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
192 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
193 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
195 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
196 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
197 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (concluding “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes ‘unncessary and wanton infliction of pain’… proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”).
198 Ford v. Bd. of Managers of N.J. State Prisons, 407 F.2d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 1969).
199 See, e.g., McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334-37 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that isolation is not per se unconstitutional, but in determining that this particular instance of isolation violated the plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment, the court considered factors such as hygiene, exercise, the availability of visitation, and the existence of a rehabilitation program).
200 See Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (holding that use of isolation for longer than twenty-four hours or for reasons other than protecting oneself or others from an immediate physical threat constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Pena v. N. Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N. Y. 1976) (explaining that because youth have the right to treatment, use of isolation is cruel and unusual punishment when it is punitive rather than therapeutic); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 174 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (finding that isolation of juveniles without “any legislative or administrative limitation on the duration and intensity of the confinement” was cruel and unusual punishment); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 456 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff’d, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that use of isolation cottages for extended periods of time with minimal contact with treatment staff and no academic services was cruel and unusual); Inmates of Boys’ Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1359, 1366-67 (D.R.I. 1972) (finding that systematic isolation in rooms with nothing but a toilet and a mattress was cruel and unusual punishment when youth were provided with no more than one and a half hours of education a day and no exercise); Lollis v. N. Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 476-77, 482-83 (S.D.N. Y. 1970) (holding that isolation of a fourteen-year-old in a small room without a mattress during the day, books, or any other recreation for two weeks was cruel and unusual punishment).
201 See, e.g., Lollis, 322 F. Supp at 480 (examining the affidavits submitted by seven experts that unanimously condemned the use of extended isolation on children because it was “cruel and inhuman” and “counterproductive to the development of the child” in determining whether the use of isolation was in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

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