Source: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/collages/15826
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:29:45+00:00

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agent, officer, or employee of any company or corporation violating the provisions of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not less than $50, or imprisoned in the county jail not less than thirty days.
a free agent, in all respects competent, and at liberty to choose what was best from the standpoint of his own interests. Of course, if plaintiff in error, acting as the representative of the railway company, was otherwise within his legal rights in insisting that Hedges should elect whether to remain in the employ of the company or to retain his membership in the union, that insistence is not rendered unlawful by the fact that the choice involved a pecuniary sacrifice to Hedges. Silliman v. United States, 101 U. S. 465, 470, 471, 25 L. ed. 987-989; Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 576, 8 N. W. 511; Emery v. Lowell, 127 Mass. 138, 141; Custin v. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 314, 320, 30 N. W. 515. And if the right that plaintiff in error exercised is founded upon a constitutional basis, it cannot be impaired by merely applying to its exercise the term 'coercion.' We have to deal, therefore, with a statute that, as construed and applied, makes it a criminal offense, punishable with fine or imprisonment, for an employer or his agent to merely prescribe, as a condition upon which one may secure certain employment or remain in such employment (the employment being terminable at will), that the employee shall enter into an agreement not to become or remain a member of any labor organization while so employed; the employee being subject to no incapacity or disability, but, on the contrary, free to exercise a voluntary choice.
based upon another clause, which related to discharging an employee because of his membership in such an organization; and the decision, naturally, was confined to the case actually presented for decision. In the present case, the Kansas supreme court sought to distinguish the Adair decision upon this ground. The distinction, if any there be, has not previously been recognized as substantial, so far as we have been able to find. The opinion in the Adair Case, while carefully restricting the decision to the precise matter involved, cited (208 U. S. on page 175), as the first in order of a number of decisions supporting the conclusion of the court, a case (People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 282, 113 Am. St. Rep. 902, 77 N. E. 1073, 7 Ann. Cas. 188) in which the statute denounced as unconstitutional was in substance the counterpart of the one with which we are now dealing.
employ one holding membership in a labor union, and has reason to suppose that the man may prefer membership in the union to the given employment without it—we ask, can the legislature oblige the employer in such case to refrain from dealing frankly at the outset? And is not the employer entitled to insist upon equal frankness in return? Approaching the matter from a somewhat different standpoint, is the employee's right to be free to join a labor union any more sacred, or more securely founded upon the Constitution, than his right to work for whom he will, or to be idle if he will? And does not the ordinary contract of employment include an insistence by the employer that the employee shall agree, as a condition of the employment, that he will not be idle and will not work for whom he pleases, but will serve his present employer, and him only, so long as the relation between them shall continue? Can the right of making contracts be enjoyed at all, except by parties coming together in an agreement that requires each party to forego, during the time and for the purpose covered by the agreement, any inconsistent exercise of his constitutional rights?
which, in its judgment, is consistent with both the words and spirit of the Constitution, and is sustained as well by sound reason.' We are now asked, in effect, to overrule it; and in view of the importance of the issue we have reexamined the question from the standpoint of both reason and authority. As a result, we are constrained to reaffirm the doctrine there applied. Neither the doctrine nor this application of it is novel; we will endeavor to restate some of the grounds upon which it rests. The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property—partaking of the nature of each—is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money.
purpose which would be a proper object for the exercise of that power. 'Its true character cannot be changed by its collocation,' as Mr. Justice Grier said in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 458, 12 L. ed. 775. It is equally clear, we think, that to punish an employer or his agent for simply proposing certain terms of employment, under circumstances devoid of coercion, duress, or undue influence, has no reasonable relation to a declared purpose of repressing coercion, duress, and undue influence. Nor can a state, by designating as 'coercion' conduct which is not such in truth, render criminal any normal and essentially innocent exercise of personal liberty or of property rights; for to permit this would deprive the 14th Amendment of its effective force in this regard. We, of course, do not intend to attribute to the legislature or the courts of Kansas any improper purposes or any want of candor; but only to emphasize the distinction between the form of the statute and its effect as applied to the present case.
welfare. If they were, a different question would be presented.
inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of their exercise, and then invoking the police power in order to remove the inequalities, without other object in view. The police power is broad, and not easily defined, but it cannot be given the wide scope that is here asserted for it, without in effect nullifying the constitutional guaranty.
so far as may be incidentally necessary for the accomplishment of some other and paramount object, and one that concerns the public welfare. The mere restriction of liberty or of property rights cannot of itself be denominated 'public welfare,' and treated as a legitimate object of the police power; for such restriction is the very thing that is inhibited by the Amendment.
labor organization—a voluntary association of working men—has the inherent and constitutional right to deny membership to any man who will not agree that during such membership he will not accept or retain employment in company with nonunion men? Or that a union man has the constitutional right to decline proffered employment unless the employer will agree not to employ any nonunion man? (In all cases we refer, of course, to agreements made voluntarily, and without coencion or duress as between the parties. And we have no reference to questions of monopoly, or interference with the rights of third parties or the general public. There involve other considerations, respecting which we intend to intimate no opinion. See Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 37 L.R.A. 802, 57 Am. St. Rep. 496, 46 N. E. 297; Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 213, 214, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292, 111 Am. St. Rep. 730, 76 N. E. 5, 5 Ann. Cas. 280; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 51 L.R.A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. 1011; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 899, 108 Am. St. Rep. 499, 74 N. E. 603, 3 Ann. Cas. 738; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 738, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 254, 118 Am. St. Rep. 727, 65 Atl. 165, 169, 9 Ann. Cas. 698, 702). And can there be one rule of liberty for the labor organization and its members, and a different and more restrictive rule for employers? We think not; and since the relation of employer and employee is a voluntary relation, as clearly as is that between the members of a labor organization, the employer has the same inherent right to prescribe the terms upon which he will consent to the relationship, and to have them fairly understood and expressed in advance.
employer be foreclosed by legislation from exercising the same freedom of choice that is the right of the employee.
sustaining legislation of this character, excepting that which is now under review. The single previous instance in which any court has upheld such a statute is Davis v. State (1893) 30 Ohio L. J. 342, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 894, where the court of common pleas of Hamilton county sustained an act of April 14, 1892 (89 Ohio Laws, 269), which declared that any person who coerced or attempted to coerce employees by discharging or threatening to discharge them because of their connection with any lawful labor organization should be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction fined or imprisoned. We are unable to find that this decision was ever directly reviewed; but in State v. Bateman (1900) 10 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 68, 7 Ohio N. P. 487, its authority was repudiated upon the ground that it had been in effect overruled by subsequent decisions of the state supreme court, and the same statute was held unconstitutional.
Constitution.1 The court held it unconstitutional, saying: 'The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as completely within the protection of the Constitution as the right to hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one will. One of the ways of obtaining property is by contract. The right, therefore, to contract cannot be infringed by the legislature without violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Every citizen is protected in his right to work where and for whom he will. He may select not only his employer, but also his associates. He is at liberty to refuse to continue to serve one who has in his employ a person, or an association of persons, objectionable to him. In this respect the rights of the employer and employee are equal. Any act of the legislature that would undertake to imposs on an employer the obligation of keeping in his service one whom, for any reason, he should not desire, would be a denial of his constitutional right to make and terminate contracts and to acquire and hold property. Equally so would be an act the provisions of which should be intended to require one to remain in the service of one whom he should not desire to serve. . . . The business conducted by the defendant was its property, and in the exercise of this ownership it is protected by the Constitution. It could abandon or discontinue its operation at pleasure. It had the right, beyond the possibility of legislative interference, to make any contract with reference thereto not in violation of law.
act of 1897, upon grounds sufficiently indicated and answered by what we have already said.
upon able and learned reasoning that has a much wider reach. In People v. Marcus (1906) 185 N. Y. 257, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 282, 113 Am. St. Rep. 902, 77 N. E. 1073, 7 Ann. Cas. 118, the statute dealt with (N. Y. Laws 1887, chap. 688), as we have already said, was in substance identical with the Kansas act. These decisions antedated Adair v. United States. They proceed upon broad and fundamental reasoning, the same in substance that was adopted by this court in the Adair Case, and they are cited with approval in the opinion (208 U. S. 175). A like result was reached in State ex rel. Smith v. Daniels (1912) 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584, with respect to an act that, like the Kansas statute, forbade an employer to require an employee or person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to make an agreement that the employee would not become or remain a member or a labor organization. This was held invalid upon the authority of the Adair Case. And see Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500, 513.
only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397, 42 L. ed. 780, 792, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 570, 55 L. ed. 328, 339, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259. If that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it seems to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins. Whether in the long run it is wise for the workingmen to enact legislation of this sort is not my concern, but I am strongly of opinion that there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it, and that Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 436, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764, and Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 L. ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133, should be overruled. I have stated my grounds in those cases and think it unnecessary to add others that I think exist. See further, Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 108, 35 L.R.A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 44 N. E. 1077; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505, 51 L.R.A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. 1011. I still entertain the opinions expressed by me in Massachusetts.
of the constitutional protection afforded under the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The right of contract, it is said, is part of the liberty of the citizen, and to abridge it, as is done in this case, is declared to be beyond the legislative authority of the state.
great mass of legislation has been enacted which has for its purpose the promotion of the health, safety, and welfare of the public, is of the utmost importance. This power was not surrendered by the states when the Federal Constitution was adopted, nor taken from them when the 14th Amendment was ratified and became a part of the fundamental law of the Union. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357.
purpose the protection of the exercise of a legal right, by preventing an employer from depriving the employee of it as a condition of obtaining employment. I see no reason why a state may not, if it chooses, protect this right, as well as other legal rights.
good faith and because of conditions which they deem proper and sufficient to warrant the action taken. Speaking for this court in Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L. ed. 264, 265, Chief Justice Chase summed up the doctrine in a sentence when he said: 'We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature; we can only examine into its power under the Constitution.' In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed. 257, that eminent author says: 'They [the courts] must assume that legislative discretion has been properly exercised. If evidence was required, it must be supposed that it was before the legislature when the act was passed; and if any special finding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act, it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held equivalent to such finding.' 'The rule is general with reference to the enactments of all legislative bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferable from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and existing legislation. The motives of the legislators, considered as the purposes they had in view, will always be presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the natural and reasonable effect of their enactments. Their motives, considered as the moral inducements for their votes, will vary with the different members of the legislative body. The diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile.' Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 710, 28 L. ed. 1145, 1147, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730. 'We must assume that the legislature acts according to its judgment for the best interests of the state. A wrong intent cannot be imputed to it.' Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471, 480, 46 L. ed. 283, 287, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176.
order and security of society. It imposes a penalty for 'coercing or influencing or making demands upon or requirements of employees, servants, laborers, and persons seeking employment.' It was in the light of this avowed purpose that the act was interpreted by the supreme court of Kansas, the ultimate authority upon the meaning of the terms of the law. Of course, if the act is necessarily arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional, mere declarations of good intent cannot save it, but it must be presumed to have been passed by the legislative branch of the state government in good faith, and for the purpose of reaching the desired end. The legislature may have believed, acting upon conditions known to it, that the public welfare would be promoted by the enactment of a statute which should prevent the compulsory exaction of written agreements to forego the acknowledged legal right here involved, as a condition of employment in one's trade or occupation.
hibit a particular stipulation in an agreement because it is deemed to be opposed in its operation to the security and well being of the community, it may prohibit it in any agreement, whether the employment is for a term or at will. It may prohibit the attempt in any way to bind one to the objectionable undertaking.
court to be tried by a jury of eleven men. In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exercise his right to remove his suit to a Federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in each recurring case. In these aspects any citizen may, no doubt, waive the rights to which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.' Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 451, 22 L. ed. 365, 368.
subsequent time, the prohibited act is done. What is in fact accomplished, is that the one engaging to work, who may wish to preserve an independent right of action, as a condition of employment, is coerced to the signing of such an agreement against his will, perhaps impelled by the necessities of his situation. The state, within constitutional limitations, is the judge of its own policy and may execute it in the exercise of the legislative authority. This statute reaches not only the employed, but, as well, one seeking employment. The latter may never wish to join a labor union. By signing such agreements as are here involved he is deprived of the right of free choice as to his future conduct, and must choose between employment and the right to act in the future as the exigencies of his situation may demand. It is such contracts, having such effect, that this statute and similar ones seek to prohibit and punish as against the policy of the state.
lative power reaches such a case. It would be difficult to select any subject more intimately related to good order and the security of the community than that under consideration—whether one takes the view that labor organizations are advantageous or the reverse. It is certainly as much a matter for legislative consideration and action as contracts in restraint of trade.
It is urged that a labor organization—a voluntary association of working men—has the constitutional right to deny membership to any man who will not agree that during such membership he will not accept or retain employment in company with nonunion men. And it is asserted that there cannot be one rule of liberty for the labor organization and its members and a different and more restrictive rule for employers.
to abridge the right of employers of labor in the exercise of free choice as to what organizations they will form for the promotion of their common interests, or denying to them free right of action in such matters.
But it is said that in this case all that was done in effect was to discharge an employee for a cause deemed sufficient to the employer,—a right inherent in the personal liberty of the employer protected by the Constitution. This argument loses sight of the real purpose and effect of this and kindred statutes. The penalty imposed is not for the discharge, but for the attempt to coerce an unwilling employee to agree to forego the exercise of the legal right involved as a condition of employment. It is the requirement of such agreements which the state declares to be against public policy.
1 Constitution of the state of Kansas.
2 Statutes like the Kansas statute have been passed in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Porto Rico, and Wisconsin. Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 148, volumes 1 and 2; Labor Laws of the United States.
Original Item: "Coppage v. Kansas"

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