Source: https://lalegalethics.org/louisiana-rules-of-professional-conduct/article-1-client-lawyer-relationship/rule-1-6-confidentiality-of-information/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:11:06+00:00

Document:
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.
(7) to detect and resolve conflicts on interest between lawyers in different firms, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.
The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted this rule on January 20, 2004, and it became effective on March 1, 2004. In 2015, the court amended the rule to permit disclosures to screen conflicts, and to require the exercise of reasonable care to prevent unauthorized disclosures.
This rule is identical to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 (2003), except for the following: The Louisiana rule does not contain ABA Model Rule paragraph (b)(7) (which allows disclosures “to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s change of employment or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client”).
In 2002, the ABA substantially expanded the grounds for permissive disclosure under Model Rule 1.6. While strongly reaffirming the legal profession’s commitment to the core value of confidentiality, the ABA recognized the importance of preserving human life and the integrity of the lawyer’s role within the legal system through permitting more disclosures of otherwise confidential information. See ABA Ethics 2000 Comm’n Revision Notes to Model Rule 1.6 (2002).
In 2015, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a new paragraph, Louisiana Rule 1.6(b)(7), permitting a lawyer to disclose confidential information to the extent the lawyer “reasonably believes necessary”: “(7) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest between lawyers in different firms, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.” In adopting this amendment, the court made the Louisiana rule similar to the corresponding ABA Model Rule. The ABA adopted similar language because sometimes a lawyer may need to disclose potential conflicts when the lawyer is considering associating with a new firm, or when law firms are considering a merger. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(c), cmt. 13. In reality, Louisiana lawyers changing or joining firms have long made these disclosures without this express authorization.
In 2015, the court adopted a new paragraph, denominated as Rule 1.6(c), that provides as follows: “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.” This is a default rule; a client may demand that a lawyer exercise more—or permit a lawyer to exercise less—than ordinary “reasonable care” of the client’s information. In adopting this amendment, the court made the Louisiana rule identical to the corresponding ABA Model Rule.
The ABA expanded the exception for client crimes threatening imminent death or substantial bodily harm in part, to make the Model Rule consistent with Section 66 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. The Model Rule replaces “imminent” with “reasonably certain,” to include a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such injury at a later date, as in some instances involving toxic torts. See ABA Model Rule 1.6, cmt. 6.
In August 2003, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3), provisions it had previously rejected. These provisions permit a lawyer to reveal client confidences to prevent the client from committing a serious crime or fraud that the lawyer unwittingly assisted. The ABA believed that the use of the lawyer’s services for such improper ends constitutes a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship. Moreover, the ABA believed that the client’s entitlement to the protection of the Rule must be balanced against the prevention of the injury that would otherwise be suffered and the interest of the lawyer in being able to prevent the misuse of the lawyer’s services.
In 2002, the ABA adopted paragraph (b)(4) to permit a lawyer to reveal confidential information to secure legal advice regarding his own obligations. In most instances, the ABA presumed disclosing information to secure such advice is impliedly authorized. Nevertheless, in order to clarify that such disclosures are proper even when not impliedly authorized, the ABA revised Model Rule 1.6 to make such disclosures explicitly permissible. See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6(b).
Prior to 2002, the Model Rules did not address whether a lawyer is permitted or required to disclose information when such disclosure is required by other law or a court order. For this reason, the ABA added paragraph (b)(6) to explicitly permit, but not to require, disclosure in order for a lawyer to comply with law or court orders. See id.
The sensitivity and importance of the information disclosed.
The likelihood of disclosure if more protective measures are not employed.
The cost and difficulty of employing additional safeguards.
See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6, cmt. 18.
To comply with the obligations imposed by this rule, a lawyer who digitally stores and communicates confidential information generally need not implement über-security measures like encryption or multi-factor authentication. Nor is a lawyer prohibited from using means of communication when the lawyer has a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as when using a public Wi-Fi network for confidential email.
 Paragraph (b)(7) recognizes that lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is considering an association with another firm, two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the purchase of a law practice. See Rule 1.17, Comment . Under these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limited information, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new relationship have occurred. Any such disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved in a matter, a brief summary of the general issues involved, and information about whether the matter has terminated. Even this limited information, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that might arise from the possible new relationship. Moreover, the disclosure of any information is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client (e.g., the fact that a corporate client is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced; that a person has consulted a lawyer about the possibility of divorce before the person’s intentions are known to the person’s spouse; or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge). Under those circumstances, paragraph (a) prohibits disclosure unless the client or former client gives informed consent. A lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the lawyer’s firm may also govern a lawyer’s conduct when exploring an association with another firm and is beyond the scope of these Rules.
A lawyer’s duty of confidentiality is significantly broader than many lawyers understand. Because this rule prohibits a lawyer from revealing “information relating to representation of a client,” it is not limited merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client. See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 cmt. 5. Thus, this rule prohibits disclosure of confidential information from any source, including from third parties and from documents prepared by third parties. When in doubt, however, the lawyer should seek client consent to disclose the information in question.
A lawyer must preserve the confidences of prospective clients, current clients, and former clients. “This obligation continues even after termination of the attorney-client relationship. This duty of confidentiality is broader than the evidentiary attorney-client privilege and applies not only to matters communicated to the attorney in confidence by the client, but to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.” State v. Tensley, 955 So. 2d 227, 242 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2007).
A lawyer has no duty to keep confidential matters concerning a client that are not related to the representation of the client. Specifically, Rule 1.6 does not disqualify a lawyer from being a witness; and under the rule a lawyer may reveal information unrelated to the representation of a client. Bernard v. Lott, 610 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the lawyer was not barred by Rule 1.6 from testifying on matters not related to the representation of the client; namely, the client’s consumption of alcohol and drugs and the client’s ability to attend parties and date).
A lawyer’s duty of confidentiality attaches even prior to the formal commencement of a lawyer-client relationship. Therefore, a lawyer must maintain the confidentiality of information learned during the initial consultation with a prospective client. See La. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 (2004) (addressing duties owed to prospective clients); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 cmt. c (2000); Id. at § 15(1)(a) and cmt. c; see ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990).
Whether it is reasonable for a lawyer to conduct confidential communications using unencrypted email, cordless phones, cellular phones, or wireless messaging is often a source of concern. To address these concerns, on May 22, 2017, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a new formal opinion on Securing Communication of Protected Client Information. See ABA Formal Op. 477R (May 22, 2017). In so doing, the committee updated a 1999 opinion on the topic because “the role and risks of technology in the practice of law have evolved” overtime.
The regulatory framework governing a lawyer’s use of electronic technology for communication is built on reasonableness. A lawyer must be competent by exercising the knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation “reasonably necessary” for the representation. See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.1. Further, a lawyer must use “reasonable efforts” to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of client information. See id. r. 1.6(c). To comply with these standards, a lawyer must keep “abreast of knowledge of the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” See id. r. 1.1. cmt. 8.
See id. r. 1.6 cmt. 18. Given these indeterminate standards, what’s a lawyer to do? The opinion offers this advice.
First, a lawyer needs to understand the nature of the threats to security. If the information in question is at high risk for cyber intrusion (such as information relating to trade secrets, mergers, and the like), then “greater effort is warranted” to protect the information.
Second a lawyer needs to understand how electronic communications are created, where the data is stored, and what “avenues exist to access the information.” Only then can the lawyer evaluate each device and access point for vulnerabilities.
Fifth, a lawyer should mark sensitive communications as “privileged and confidential.” Such a “clear and conspicuous” label could trigger an inadvertent recipient’s obligations under Model Rule 4.4(b) to “promptly notify” the sender of the error.
Sixth, a lawyer should “establish policies and procedures, and periodically train employees, subordinates and others assisting in the delivery of legal services, in the use of reasonably secure methods of electronic communications with clients.” A lawyer should also assure that vendors retained by the lawyer protect client information.
In conclusion, the opinion advises that a lawyer should get informed consent from the lawyer’s client “as to how to appropriately and safely use technology in their communication.” But even without such informed consent, unencrypted email and ordinary cloud-storage facilities (such as Dropbox) are almost always fine. “Special security precautions” are necessary only when “required by an agreement with the client or by law, or when the nature of the information requires higher degree of security.” Which is to say, über-security measures needn’t be used often. But, ordinary digital hygiene is required. And unfortunately, practices that are “ordinary” to those with basic technological competence- things like using complex passwords, enabling two-factor authentication, and regularly updating software- are sometimes not ordinarily used by ordinary lawyers. There in lies the true risk to client data integrity and confidentiality.
The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct expressly permit disclosure only of generally-known information relating to former clients. Compare La. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6(a) (2004) with ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.9(c)(1) (permitting disclosure of information relating to a former client “when the information has become generally known”). Nevertheless, a lawyer arguably should be permitted to disclose information relating to current clients that has become generally known to the public. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (2000) (stating that confidential client information does not include “information that is generally known”). Note, however, that merely because information has become known to one or more third persons does not mean that it has become “generally known” to the public. Id. at cmt. d. When information has become “generally known,” is often difficult to discern. For example, the recordation of a document in the public records may waive any claim that the recorded information remains confidential, although as a practical matter few people peruse mortgage and conveyance records. See In re Sellers, 669 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (La. 1996).
This rule permits a lawyer to disclose confidential information when such disclosure is required by other rules or laws. For example, a lawyer may disclose otherwise confidential information that is responsive to lawful discovery requests and subpoenas. Likewise, a lawyer must disclose confidential information when necessary to avoid assisting the client in a crime or fraud or to remedy past client perjury. See La. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.3(a) (2004). Finally, a lawyer must disclose confidential information when required by law or court order. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 63 (2000). For example, a prosecutor must disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant irrespective that such information may otherwise be confidential. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the failure to disclose evidence material to guilt violated the Due Process Clause). A lawyer compelled to disclose confidential information should take reasonably appropriate steps to assert in good faith that the requested information is protected. Moreover, the lawyer should limit the scope of disclosure to that which is required. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 63 (2000).
Under general mandate (agency) principles, a lawyer owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the client. As a fiduciary, a lawyer may not personally profit from the use of confidential information in a manner that is detrimental to the client. See, e.g., La. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.8(b) (2004); Defcon, Inc. v. Webb, 687 So. 2d 639, 643 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997) (outlining the elements of a claim against a fiduciary for misappropriation of confidential information); Woodward v. Steed, 680 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1996); see also Neal v. Daniels, 47 So. 2d 44, 45 (La. 1950) (agent may not “speculate for his gain in the subject-matter of his employment”); see generally Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60(2) (2000) (“A lawyer who uses confidential information of a client for the lawyer’s pecuniary gain other than in the practice of law must account to the client for any profits made.”); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 (stating that an agent must not use confidential information “on his own account”).
Whether a lawyer may personally profit from the use of confidential information when it does not harm a client is less clear. Under Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(b), a lawyer is prohibited only from using confidential information “to the disadvantage of the client.” See La. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.8(b) (2004). But under Louisiana mandate law, a mandatary must account to his or her principal for all profits or advantages obtained in the course of the mandate. See La. Civ. Code art. 3004; id. at art. 3005 cmt. b (“In the absence of contrary agreement, the mandatary is not entitled to apply to his own use the money or other property of the principal.”); Noe v. Roussel, 310 So. 2d 806, 818-19 (La. 1975); Neal, 47 So.2d at 44; Foreman v. Pelican Stores, 21 So. 2d 64 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1944); see also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60(2) (2000) (requiring a lawyer to account to client for profits made through the use of confidential information). How a Louisiana court would resolve this issue is uncertain.
Rule 1.6 obviously is not enforceable against a nonlawyer. However, a lawyer may be subject to discipline for disclosures of confidential information by a nonlawyer with whom the lawyer works. Therefore, a lawyer must take reasonable measures to ensure that support personnel protect confidential information. Reasonable measures may include devising policies and practices concerning confidential information, communicating these policies and practices to those with whom the lawyer works, and then enforcing these directives. Whether a lawyer’s efforts in this regard are reasonable turns on such factors as “the duties of the agent or other person, the extent to which disclosure would adversely affect the client, the extent of prior training and experience of the person, the existence of other assurances such as adequate supervision by senior employees, and the customs and reputation of independent contractors.” Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60 cmt. d (2000).
Rule 1.6 does not establish an evidentiary privilege against disclosure of confidential information; rather, it establishes a broader ethical duty that is enforced primarily through the lawyer disciplinary system. Thus, a lawyer cannot use this rule as a basis for refusing to divulge confidential information when the lawyer otherwise would be compelled to do so by law or court order. See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 cmt. 3. Articles 506 through 509 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence address the “lawyer-client” evidentiary privilege. See La. Code Evid. arts. 506-509; see also MCGovern v. Moore, No. 5:13-CV-1353, 2013 WL 5781315 (W.D. La. Oct. 25, 2013) (holding that, where attorney-client privilege does not apply, professional duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 cannot be used to suppress evidence).
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client confidences: disbarment, when the lawyer reveals confidential information with the intent to benefit himself or another, and the disclosure causes injury or potential injury to the client; suspension, when the lawyer knowingly reveals confidential information, and the disclosure causes injury or potential injury to the client; reprimand, when the lawyer negligently reveals confidential information and the disclosure causes injury or potential injury to the client; and, admonition, when the lawyer negligently reveals confidential information, and the disclosure causes little or no actual or potential injury to the client. See ABA Stds. for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions stds. 4.21-4.24 (1992).
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