Source: http://www.jstlegal.com/2012/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:05:59+00:00

Document:
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia on September 10, 2012, KARLEN v. RELIANCE EQUITIES, LLC., Case No. S12A1056, the court held that it could not review arguments that the special master had erred in its rejection of a quiet title claim. The court found that the plaintiff advancing the claim had failed to provide a transcript of the proceedings before the special master. Without a transcript, there was no way for the court to consider the claims that the special master report should have been overturned by the trial court.
Wills made near the end of life can be subject to a challenge in probate where a person that would otherwise have been an heir under the law is excluded by the will. One of the forms of such a challenge is based on allegations that persons who have been elevated to the status as beneficiaries under a will exercised undue influence over the testator. Upon a showing of undue influence, a will can be invalidated. The result is that the testator would then be deemed to have died without a will, or with a prior will in place. If the testator dies without a will, then the laws of intestate succession would determine the heirs to estate and not the will. Accordingly, the theory of undue influence is a means by which an heir at law, excluded from a will, can invalidate the will and assume his place as a beneficiary.
In the Georgia Supreme Court opinion in Davidson v. Hines, Appeal Case No. S12A0405 (July 2, 2012), the Court recently upheld a decision of a Georgia trial court that submitted the issue of undue influence to a jury to decide as the finder of fact. The Court made various findings in the opinion indicating that the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of the will were sufficient to meet the criteria for a jury finding of undue influence.
In the opinion in Haralson County v. Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc., Appeal No. S12A0200, the Georgia Supreme Court issued a ruling upholding a land owner's rights to continue a nonconforming use of a junkyard in a residential zoning district because the prior owner had started the junkyard before Harlason County adopted the zoning ordinance prohibiting it.
The Court held that the property owner was entitled to the business license following an appeal of a denial of the license to the Board of Zoning Appeals, that the plaintiff had not abandoned the nonconforming use and possessed "grandfather rights," and that the proper procedure for taking the case to court was in the form of a writ of mandamus, and not an appeal or writ of certiorari.
In an opinion issued on July 2, 2012, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed an instance in which a would be property owner built a house on the wrong lot. The Court also addressed the issues that arose when a holder of a tax deed and quitclaim deed to the lot sought to quiet title the lot.
The opinion indicated that even where a person has not established adverse possession to a property for the statutorily required period of 20 years, that person may still have a claim to title if the value of the improvements he made exceeds the value of the property and other due rents, and if the legal title holder does not elect to pay for the improvements. The case in which this opinion was addressed was Small v. Irving, Slip Op., Appeal No. S12A0182 (Ga. Sup. Ct., July 2, 2012).
Teague & Chambless, LLLP is representing homeowners against an association in a lawsuit and companion case. The main case is styled and known as John Rymer, et al. v. Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners Association, Case No. 10CV-0415 (Superior Court, Forsyth County, Georgia). The case involves the Rymer's claims for damages due to flooding of their home. The Rymers contend their damages are connected to failures of under ground pipes and a detention area in the Polo Subdivision. The corrugated metal pipes in the subdivision were installed twenty five years ago, and are failing due to rust and age.
On July 3, 2012, the Superior Court of Forsyth County entered an order enforcing Section 4.2.2 of a Post Development Storm Water Code, which is a part of the county's development codes. (Order of July 3, 2012.) The relevant code section provides that in Forsyth County subdivisions that have homeowner associations, associations are responsible for maintenance and repairs to components of the storm water system that service the subdivision's residents.
Partners in a business owe a fiduciary duty of utmost good faith to one another. This duty is stated in a Georgia statute and is not discretionary to the partners. O.C.G.A. Section 23-2-58.
One partner cannot dissolve a partnership in order to take the business and partnership investments. He is required to act in a manner for the good of his partner as well as for the good of the partnership itself. Jordan v. Moses, Case No. S11G1772 (May 7, 2012, Ga. Supreme Court).
In a recent case involving a dispute over a property line, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated a consent judgment entered by the court. The supreme court found that getting permits from the Georgia Department of Natural Resources was a condition of the agreement. Allen v. Sea Gardens Seafood, Inc., Case No. S111912 (March 19, 2012). The trial court's decision to delete this condition as part of the settlement negated the settlement agreement because the supreme court found the parties had agreed on the allegedly unfulfilled condition.
In East Georgia Land Development Co. v. Newton County, Georgia, Case No. S12A0114 (March 19, 2012, Ga. Supreme Ct.), the Georgia Supreme Court reiterated that formalities are required for the adoption of zoning ordinances under the Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. Section 36-66-1, et seq. The case held that there was an issue regarding whether the county had a valid zoning ordinance due to an alleged failure to attach a copy of the zoning ordinance to the minutes of the meeting of the board of commissioners. The case also found that there was an issue regarding whether the county had valid zoning maps.
Sometimes a legal description to land in a deed does not match up with what is shown on a recorded plat. When this happens, the deed description prevails. In Washington v. Brown, the Georgia Supreme Court issued an opinion rejecting a claim of title to land based on a referenced plat on the grounds the land in the plat did not match the legal description in the deed. Washington v. Brown, Case No. S11A1551 (Fe. 6, 2012). The court cited the 1956 case in Johnson v. Willingham, 212 Ga. 310, 311 (1), in reaching this conclusion. The court held the legal description trumped the plat reference.
The Washington case also rejected a claim of adverse possession under the shortened period for color of title. The court held the plat reference was not sufficient to invoke color of title thereby requiring a showing of adverse possession for the longer, 20 year period. The squatter had failed to show continuity of possession for 20 years and had to rely on the 7 year argument requiring color of title.
The most interesting part of the Washington decision was the result of the case. The suit was between two landowners in a quiet title action. The party losing the plat argument in the supreme court had prevailed before the special master and before the superior court -- on the appeal from the special master. Because the special master in the proceedings below had previously ruled against the appellant's claim of title, the result of the court's opinion appears to be that both parties to the land dispute lost their claim to the disputed land!
That written easement constitutes a contract, and express easements are construed by applying the rules of contract construction. Municipal Elec. Auth. of Ga. v. Gold–Arrow Farms, 276 Ga.App. 862, 866(1), 625 S.E.2d 57 (2005). “Generally, this [easement] presents a question of law for the court, unless the language presents an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by the rules of construction.” Id. In construing a contract, if the terms are clear and unambiguous, the court looks to the contract alone—the easement itself—to determine the parties' intent. Parris Properties v. Nichols, 305 Ga.App. 734, 738(1)(a), 700 S.E.2d 848 (2010).
Richardson v. Georgia Power Co., 308 Ga. App. 341, 343, 708 S.E.2d 10, 12 (2011), reconsideration denied (Mar. 10, 2011).
In an opinion on February 6, 2012, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a condemning authority is not required to compensate a landowner for a right of first refusal of a tract of land adjacent to the tract subject to condemnation under the Taking Clause of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, Art. 1., Section 3, Paragraph 1. Robinson v. Gwinnett County, Case No. S11A1533 (Feb. 6, 2012). The right of first refusal of the adjacent tract had value and was part of the bundle of rights held, but the Court decided that the county was not required to compensate the landowners for the value of the option upon condemning the land to which the option was attached.
In the opinion in Cardinale v. City of Atlanta issued February 6, 2012, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed a set of facts raising the issue whether the Open Meetings Act required a municipality to make a record of the names of members voting for and against a proposal in a poll at a retreat. The Court's opinion stated that when members of a city council get together and float a proposal informally among the group to ascertain support for a resolution, the names of the members voting for and against the proposal must be made a public record. Cardinale v. City of Atlanta, Case No. S11G1047 (Ga., Feb. 6, 2012).

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