Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/70/196/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:20:14+00:00

Document:
1. A bidder at a judicial sale at public auction, whose bid has not been accepted, the sale being adjourned for sufficient cause and finally discontinued, cannot insist, even though he have been the highest and best bidder, on leave to pay the amount of his bid and have a confirmation of the sale to him.
2. The marshal or other officer who makes a sale of real property under a decree of foreclosure, possesses the power, for good cause shown, in the exercise of a sound discretion and in subordination to the superior control of the court over the whole matter of the sale, to adjourn the sale from time to time.
3. In a case where the decree was that the sale should be made unless the mortgagors should previously pay the mortgage debt, a few short adjournments for the purpose of enabling the mortgagors to make an arrangement to pay it are adjournments for sufficient cause, although such adjournments have been made by direction of the complainant's solicitor. And if, prior to the day to which the sale stands adjourned, the mortgagors come in and pay the complainants the amount of the decree &c., the sale may properly be discontinued altogether.
public auction, under the direction of the marshal, unless the mortgagors, previously to such sole, should pay to the complainants the sum of $254,175 -- the amount of the decree. The marshal accordingly offered the premises for sale on the 6th of June, 1862, but no bids being received, he adjourned it "by direction of the complainant's solicitor," to the 19th of the same month, at the same hour and place. At the time and place of adjournment he put up the premises again, and one Blossom bid $250,000 for them, this being the highest and best bid received at that time. Fearing that the property would be sacrificed if the sale should be completed, the agent of the stockholders applied to the solicitors of the complainants, requesting that the sale might be postponed for a short time to enable the respondents to make some arrangements to pay the amount of the decree without a sale of the property. The solicitors gave such directions, and the marshal again adjourned the sale, the adjournment being to the 21st June -- two days -- and the marshal giving notice that at the expiration of this time the sale would be opened at the same hour and place, and with the bid of $250,000 already made by Blossom. During these two days, the mortgagors made arrangements to pay the mortgage, but had not been able by the 21st to have the money actually in hand. The sale, after being opened and after Blossom had increased his bid to the full amount of the mortgage debt -- but no other bids being received -- was again adjourned by direction of the complainant's solicitor, this adjournment being to the 1st October, 1862, and being also the second adjournment made by direction of the solicitor aforesaid, after the bid of $250,000 had been made. On this 1st October the sale was again opened, and by the same direction further adjourned till the 15th January, 1863, this being, of course, the third adjournment made by the same direction, and after Blossom's bid. Previous to this 15th January, however, the company had paid the amount of the decree, and the marshal, by order of the complainant's solicitor, discontinued the sale altogether.
court below -- sworn to and stating that "he made both bids in good faith, and has been ever since and now is ready to comply with his said bid, and hereby offers to bring that amount into court" -- applied to have the sale confirmed to him on his bid as increased to the full amount of the decree of foreclosure and sale, but the court denied the petition, and he appealed here.
It having been lately decided in this Court, on a motion to dismiss his appeal, that he was entitled to be heard here, [Footnote 1] his case now came on upon its merits.
Respondents mortgaged their railroad to certain trustees as a security for moneys loaned and advances of various kinds and to defray the current expenses of operating the railroad and of keeping the same in repair. Suit was brought by the trustees and certain creditors, named in the bill of complaint, to foreclose the mortgage for a breach of the conditions, and the cause proceeded to a decree of foreclosure and of sale. Substance of the decree was that the mortgaged premises should be sold at public auction under the direction of the marshal of the district unless the mortgagors should pay to the complainants, previous to the sale, the sum of two hundred and fifty-four thousand one hundred and seventy-five dollars, with interest from the date of the decree. Pursuant to that decree, the marshal, on the 6th day of June, 1862, offered the mortgaged premises for sale, but as no bids were received, he adjourned the sale, under the instructions of the solicitors of the complainants, to the 19th day of the same month, at the same hour and place.
bid received at that time. Fearing that the stock would be sacrificed if the sale should be completed, the agent of the stockholders made application to the solicitors of the complainants requesting that the sale might be postponed for a short time to enable the respondents to make some arrangements to pay the mortgage debt without a sale of the property. Yielding to that suggestion, the solicitors gave such directions, and the marshal accordingly adjourned the sale for the period of two days, giving notice at the time that the sale at the expiration of that period would be again opened at the same hour and place, and that the bid of the appellant would be regarded as pending.
Such an arrangement having been negotiated during those two days, a further adjournment became necessary to enable the parties to carry it into effect; but when the sale was opened for that purpose, the appellant was present and increased his bid to the full amount of the mortgage debt, including interest, costs, and expenses of sale. No other bids having been made, the sale was adjourned, as directed, to the 1st day of October, and afterwards to the 15th day of January following, but before the day to which the last adjournment was made the respondents paid the amount of the decree to the complainants, and the sale was discontinued.
Record also shows that the appellant applied to the court by petition on the 9th day of October, 1862, to have the sale confirmed to him on his bid as increased to the full amount of the decree of foreclosure and sale, but the court denied the prayer of the petition, and from that order the petitioner appealed to this Court.
deny that any sale was ever made, and insist that the bid of the appellant was a mere offer of purchase, which he might withdraw at any time before the bid was accepted or the property was struck off to him, and an entry to that effect was made by the marshal.
2. Sales of mortgaged premises under a decree of foreclosure and sale are usually made in the federal courts by the marshal of the district where the decree was entered or by the master appointed by the court, as directed in the decree. Such sales must be made by the person designated in the decree, or under his immediate direction and supervision, but he may employ an auctioneer to conduct the sale if it be made in his presence. Express directions of the decree in this case were that the mortgaged premises should be sold at public auction unless the respondents, as mortgagors, should, previously to such sale, pay to the complainants the amount of the mortgage debt, as specified in the decree.
be held answerable to the other for not selling the goods unless that other by accepting the offer has bound himself to purchase.
6. Subject to those qualifications and perhaps some others which need not be noticed, the question of sale or no sale, when it arises under a state of facts such as are exhibited in this record, may be fully tested by substantially the same rules as those which apply in cases of sales under common law process or in other cases of sales at public auction. Tested by those rules, it is clear to a demonstration that there was no sale of the mortgaged premises in this case, because the property was never struck off to the appellant, nor was his bid, by act or word or in any manner, ever accepted by the seller, and the record shows that, at the hearing in the court below, nothing of the kind was pretended by the appellant. Instead of setting up that pretense, his complaint was that the marshal erred in refusing to accept his bid, which, if possible, is less defensible upon the facts and circumstances of the case than the theory of the sale and purchase.
7. Officers appointed under such decrees and directed to make such sales have the power to accomplish the object, but they are usually invested with a reasonable discretion as to the manner of its exercise, which they are not at liberty to overlook or disregard. Acting under the decree, they have duties to perform to the complainant, to the vendor and purchaser, and to the court, and they are bound to exercise their best judgment in the performance of all those duties. Such an officer, in acting under such a decree, if directed to sell the property, should adopt all necessary and proper means to fulfill the directions; but he should at the same time never lose sight of the fact that unless he is restricted by the terms of the decree, the time and manner of effecting the sale are in the first instance vested in his sound discretion. Usual practice undoubtedly is that the officer in selling the property acts under the advice of the solicitor of the complainant, but it cannot be admitted that his advice is, under all circumstances, obligatory upon the officer.
in making the sale are to a certain extent primarily vested in the officer designated in the decree. Unreasonable directions of the solicitor are not obligatory and should not be followed, as if the solicitor should direct the property to be struck off at great sacrifice when but a single bidder attended the sale. Under such circumstances, the officer might well refuse to do as he was directed, and he might be justified in postponing the sale to a future day to prevent the sacrifice of the property. Every such officer has a right to exercise a reasonable discretion to adjourn such a sale, and all that can be required of him is that he should have proper qualifications, use due diligence in ascertaining the circumstances, and act in good faith and with an honest intention to perform his duty.
General rule is that a sheriff is not bound to obey the directions of the attorney of the creditor to make an unreasonable sale of the property of the debtor if he sees that the time selected or other attending circumstances will be likely to produce great sacrifice of the property; but he may in such a case, if he thinks proper, postpone the sale, especially if it appears that the creditor will not sustain any considerable injury by the delay; and no reason is perceived why the same rule may not be safely applied in judicial sales made under the decretal order of a court of chancery.
sanctioned in numerous cases, [Footnote 13] and was expressly laid down by the chancellor in the case of Kelley v. Israel, [Footnote 14] which is one of the latest cases upon the subject.
But the record shows in this case that the bid of the appellant was never accepted and that the adjournments were made by the direction of the solicitors of the complainants to enable the respondents to pay the mortgage debt and save the mortgaged property from sacrifice. Negotiations to that effect were opened between the parties to the suit on the day the first bid of the appellant was made, and they were completed within two days, so that all concerned knew, or might have known, that a sale had become unnecessary. Subsequent postponement took place to enable the respondents to carry the arrangements into effect. They paid the debt and the complainants executed a discharge for the same. Justice has been done, and all are satisfied except the appellant, and he has no just ground of complaint.
Blossom v. Railroad Co., 1 Wall. 655.
Addison on Contracts (ed. 1857) 23-154.
Addison on Contracts (ed. 1857) 26.
1 Sugden on Vendors and Purchasers 25.
Rutlidge v. Grant, 4 Bingham 653; Cook v. Oxley, 3 Term 654; Adams v. Linsdell, 1 Barnewall & Alderson 681; Story on Sales § 461.
Dalby v. Pullen, 1 Russel & Mylne 296.
Collier v. Whipple, 13 Wendell 229.
Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason 420.
Tinkham v. Purdy, 5 Johnson 345; McDonald v. Neilson, 2 id. 190; Keightly v. Birch, 3 Campbell 321; Leader v. Denney, 1 Bosanquet & Puller 359.

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