Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/200/164/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:29:19+00:00

Document:
The provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution do not apply to proceedings in the state courts.
A state cannot be deemed guilty of violating its obligations under the Constitution of the United States because of a decision, even if erroneous, of its highest court, if acting within its jurisdiction.
While the words "due process of law," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, protect fundamental rights, the Amendment was not intended to interfere with the power of the state to protect the lives, liberty, and property of its citizens, nor with the power of adjudication of its courts in administering the process provided by the law of the state.
In discharging a juror in a murder trial before he was sworn, for cause sufficient to the court, and after questioning him in absence of accused and counsel but with the consent of his counsel, and substituting another juror equally competent, held, that the accused was not denied due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is the law of Kentucky that occasional absence of the accused from the trial from which no injury results to his substantial rights is not reversible error.
The Criminal Code of Kentucky, § 281, provides that decisions of the trial court upon challenges shall not be subject to exception, and as the highest court of the state in deciding that, even though the action of the trial court in regard to the juror had been error it could not reverse under § 281, followed the construction of that section established by prior cases, it did not make a discriminating application of the section against the accused, and he was not therefore deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiff in error seeks to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Kentucky affirming a conviction and sentence of murder against him. He was indicted, with others, for killing one William Goebel. The grounds of review by this Court are based upon certain rulings of the trial court which, plaintiff in error contends, were repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
about the said killing, this affiant expressing and urging the opinion that there had been a conspiracy to murder Goebel, among those who were charged with his murder, and Mr. Alexander expressing and urging the opinion that there had not been a conspiracy at all to murder him. These arguments and conversations occurred at different times and places in Woodford County during the time that has elapsed since the murder of Mr. Goebel, were frequent, and much earnest interest and feeling was expressed by both this affiant and Mr. Alexander therein."
"This affiant further says that, on yesterday afternoon, late, after Mr. Alexander had been accepted as a juror to try the case, and after this affiant had been excused, after those accepted as jurors had been charged and admonished by the court, immediately after adjournment for supper, and as the jury was being conducted by the sheriff away from the courthouse, affiant by accident met the jury as they were passing out through the courthouse yard, when, in passing, Mr. Alexander said to this affiant: 'Hello, Ben, I am glad they cut you off this jury, as I did not want to serve on this jury with you.'"
"Affiant, Ben Hackett, says the foregoing statements are true."
now, excused as a juror in this case, and he is now ordered to be discharged, and the court, being thus advised, overruled defendant's objection, and discharged and excused said Alexander, and defendant, by counsel, excepts."
"Thereupon defendant moved the court to discharge the entire panel remaining, which was objected to by the attorney for the commonwealth, and the court being advised, sustained said objection, and refused to discharge said entire panel, to which ruling defendant, by counsel, excepts."
By these rulings, it is contended that plaintiff in error was deprived of due process of law. Error is assigned under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.
Plaintiff in error cannot avail himself of the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, for reasons we have so often expressed that it would be the extreme of superfluity to repeat them. It is enough to say that those amendments do not apply to proceedings in the state courts. The invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment is attempted to be justified on two grounds: (1) that the trial court, in discharging Alexander, acted beyond its power, and that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in holding that, by reason of § 281 of the Criminal Code of the state, it cannot reverse on account of such error, deprives plaintiff in error of his liberty without due process of law; (2) by the common law, which has been adopted by Kentucky, and by the Constitution and statutes of the state, an accused has not only the right to be present, but must be present during the whole of the trial. "His presence is not only an inalienable right, but a jurisdictional fact, and cannot be waived."
He seems to make an issue with the Court of Appeals of the state upon the law of the state, and to contend that the court erred in the interpretation and application of that law. This contention encounters the ruling in In re Converse, 137 U.S.
"state cannot be deemed guilty of a violation of its obligations under the Constitution of the United States because of a decision, even if erroneous, of its highest court, while acting within its jurisdiction."
"to interfere with the power of the state to protect the lives, liberty, and property of its citizens, nor with the exercise of that power in the adjudications of the courts of a state in administering the process provided by the law of the state."
116 U. S. 642. The right to challenge is the right to reject, not to select, a juror. If, from those who remain an impartial jury is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused is maintained."
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172.
In passing on the action of the trial court in examining Alexander in the absence of plaintiff in error, the Court of Appeals said that the court had been compelled to relax the rule prescribed by the statute that "the defendant must be present and shall remain in custody during trial," and cited Hite v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. 308; Meece v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 586. In the first case, absence from the courtroom by the accused for a few minutes at a time on account of sickness, the trial continuing in his absence, it was held did not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.
"While we recognize the fact that the accused, when on trial for a criminal offense, should be present during the entire trial, and that no evidence should be heard or instructions given or amended without his presence either before or after the submission of the cause to the jury, still this Court is only authorized to reverse in cases where the substantial rights of the accused have been prejudiced in the court below, and in order to ascertain whether errors have been committed to the prejudice of the accused, the facts as well as the law of the case should be considered. While one charged with a criminal offense has the constitutional right to be tried by a jury, the right of appeal from the verdict and judgment against him does not exist except by reason of the legislation of the state on the subject, and when permitting an appeal, the lawmaking power has the right to determine for what cause a reversal may be had."
"It has also been held by this Court that a trial for felony begins when the jury is sworn. Willis v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 68. At the time the examination of Alexander took place, and when he was discharged, the jury had not only not been sworn, but it had not been completed."
"There are many rights, some of them guaranteed by the Constitution, which one charged with crime may not waive, and should not be permitted by the courts to waive, such as the right of trial by jury, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and yet others, the assertion of which may unexpectedly become necessary for his protection during the progress of the trial. But we are unwilling to say that one charged with felony, and being in court, as was the appellant, with counsel at hand ready and competent to advise him of his rights, may not, in advance of the swearing of the jury, and before he is placed in jeopardy, consent to a private examination by the court of a juror against whom complaint has been made, for the purpose of ascertaining whether he was qualified to retain his place as one of the jury to try the case. Nor do we think it is affirmatively shown by the record in this case that any injury resulted to the substantial rights of the appellant by Alexander's dismissal from the jury."
It is manifest, therefore, that it is the law of Kentucky that occasional absence of the accused from the trial, from which no injury results to his substantial rights, is not reversible error. And we think, in applying that rule to the case at bar, plaintiff in error was not deprived of due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
114 Ky. 237, where § 281 was construed the same way. The court, in its construction of § 281, followed the construction established by prior cases, and did not make a discriminating application of that section against plaintiff in error. He was therefore not deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
The record does not, in my judgment, show an absence of the due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as that amendment has been interpreted by this Court. For that reason, without approving all that is said in the opinion of the Court, I concur in the judgment of affirmance.

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