Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_34_issue_1?pg=123
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:14:01+00:00

Document:
275 See Swenson, supra note 98, at 1152-54 (finding that elected supreme court justices were somewhat more likely to strike-down school funding systems). It should be noted, however, that Swenson’s article found that, because even appointed justices often face retention elections, the relationship between the method of judicial appointment in a state supreme court and the justices’ likelihood of striking-down a state finance system is not entirely clear. Id.
276 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to appoint “judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,” which includes judges in lower federal courts); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting federal judges lifetime tenure); ILL. CONST. art. VI., § 10, 12(a); see also GA. CONST., art. VI, § 7, ¶ 1 (providing for the election of Georgia state supreme court judges); MINN. CONST., art. VI, § 7 (providing for the election of Minnesota state supreme court judges); TEX. CONST., art. V, § 2(c) (providing for the election of Texas state supreme court judges); WASH. CONST., art. IV, § 3 (providing for the election of Washington state supreme court judges); WIS. CONST., art. VII, § 4 (providing for the election of Wisconsin state supreme court judges).
277 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
278 The Edgar suit was brought by roughly thirty-seven districts (and additional individuals), and in Lewis E. the local district was a defendant. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Ill. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Ill. 1999). In contrast, the body of plaintiffs in Rose initially included a coalition of sixty-six districts, and was later joined by districts from five additional counties. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S. W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989).
279 See Orfield, supra note 255, at 120-25 (noting the positive influence Rose and its surrounding reform advocacy efforts had on Kentucky’s legislature).
280 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1180; Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 801-02; Rose, 790 S. W.2d at 190.
281 See, e.g., Litigation—Kentucky, supra note 271 (noting that the Kentucky legislature was ultimately responsible for fashioning school funding reforms with minimal guidance from the Kentucky Supreme Court).
282 See supra Part III-C (noting that legislative reform following judicial invalidation of a school funding system can often take several years).
283 See generally Hunter, supra note 272, at 499-516 (discussing reform in Kentucky following Rose); Orfield, supra note 255, at 120- 25 (arguing that advocacy efforts helped spur the Kentucky state legislature to enact meaningful reform following Rose).
284 See supra Part III-B (noting that there was bipartisan support for the failed 1992 amendment to Article X); CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11 (discussing how both urban and downstate school districts have a strong interest in education funding reform, suggesting that both Chicago-area Democrats and downstate Republicans should be able to reach consensus on the issue).
285 In 2011, approximately 73.1% of Illinois’ public school children were served by foundation level districts, 21.9% of students attended alternate formula districts, and just 5.0% of students attended flat grant districts. GENERAL STATE AID, supra note 83; see also CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 6 (providing a similar breakdown of how many students attend each type of district).

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