Source: http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2009/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:53:51+00:00

Document:
Dear readers, at the end of this year a final post with a miscellany of issues. First, the Court's site offers a range of new features to make its case law more easily accessible. An important innovation is the translation of key judgments in over ten languages (to be found through HUDOC) More information on this can be found here. That same page also contains a host of links to online translated collections of case-law in many more languages by non-ECHR sites. Another great innovation is that it is now finally possible to search on HUDOC for judgments by the Grand Chamber, ordinary chambers and committees. Finally, a list of keywords to search HUDOC more effectively is upcoming. And for another way of keeping updated, several RSS feeds have been added here. All of this will hopefully help the often mentioned implementation of the ECHR at the national level.
Secondly, under the new Procedure of Protocol 14-Bis, the first judgments have been adopted by three-judge committees. This should pave the way for a more efficient handling of cases. Whereas until now, such committees could only declare cases inadmissible, they can now also issue judgments on the merits in cases dealing with issues on which there is well-estalbished case-law. In the first place, one can think here of repetitive judgments. the first of these judgments, Kressin v. Germany (Appl.no. 21061/06) and Jesse v. Germany (Appl.no. 10053/08) will be published online today and deal, not surprisingly perhaps, with complaints on the excessive length of judicial proceedings. The entry into force of that other Protocol, 14, might be very near, as the Council of Europe reports that the Russian Duma has agreed to resume the procedure for Protocol 14 ratification. See also the report of Julien Frisch, over at Watching Europe.
In its admissibility decision in the Al-Saadoon case the ECtHR held that the United Kingdom had jurisdiction over the applicants, who had been arrested by British forces and kept in a British-run military prison in Iraq. Just before the respective mandate of the Security Council expired on 31 December 2008, the applicants were transferred to Iraqi custody at Iraqi request and thereby exposed to the risk of an unfair trial followed by capital punishment. The authors trace back the ECtHR's case law concerning the extraterritorial application of the Convention and establish patterns how the ECtHR and the UK Courts did cope in the past with international law norms potentially competing with the Convention.
Finally, for a case that could qualify as one of the funniest of the year, as a kind of Christmas treat from Strasbourg, I can recommend the admissibility decision in Friend and Countryside Alliance and others (Appl.nos 16072/06 and 27809/08) of last week. In this decision, the Court dismissed the complaints of a group of hunters and others about the British ban on hunting with hounds (on foxes and other animals). The Court held in this decision that a person's hunting grounds do not fall within the concept of home nor can the huntng community be seen as an ethnic community. The Court was not of the view that (para. 44) "that hunting amounts to a particular lifestyle which is so inextricably linked to the identity of those who practise it that to impose a ban on hunting would be to jeopardise the very essence of their identity."
I wish all of you a very good holiday season and an excellent 2010, with hopefully an improved human rights situation in Europe and around the world!
The upcoming conference in Interlaken next year on the reform of the supervision of the ECHR is already yielding a range of preparatory documents. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe has published a memorandum in which he gives his views. He points amongst others to the need to strengthen national supervision of human rights and specifically national monitoring by e.g. national human rights institutions. Not surprisingly the Commissioner also calls for more staff for his own office in order to make his own contribution to the ECHR supervisory system. In the past few years, the budget of the Council of Europe's institutions (apart from the Court) has indeed stagnated. Now that both attention and emphasis are being put more heavily on implementation of the Court's judgments, the enabling environment - as I would call it - of the Convention indeed needs reinforcement.
In the longer term, there lies the possibility that the Court might one day develop to have some degree of power to choose from amongst the applications it receives those that would receive judicial determination. The time is not yet ripe, however, to make specific proposals to this end.
(iv) at least in the short-term, until other solutions can be implemented, a rotating pool of judges taken from the existing bench.
The CDDH also calls upon the Court itself to be clear and coherent and "to take full accoonut of its subsidiary role" - is that a plea to revive a strong margin of appreciation application and in general to leave more to the state parties? One might question whether this way of handing responsibility back to national authorities will automatically strengthen human rights protection. In that sense, supervising human rights is not the same as raising children by giving them increased responsibilities. Caution is called for here.
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, has also drafted his contribution (dated 18 December) to Interlaken, which will soon be online on the Council of Europe's website.
Finally, on the NGO front, action is also being undertaken to make sure that the reforms will truly happen and more specifically will really strengthen the system of supervision. As I reported last week, there is a joint NGO statement. The drafting NGOs of this document are now calling for other NGOs, in as many ECHR state parties as possible, to endorse this document to make civil society's voice resound in the hills around Interlaken. NGOs who want to endorse the document or who have further questions about it, can contact the main drafters at Europeigoteam at amnesty.org .
* Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights Affecting Criminal Law/Criminal Procedure, by Richard Lang.
The entire issue can be accessed electronically here.
For further information you can contact Giuseppe Martinico (martinico at sssup.it). The programme in pdf-format can be found here.
The system for the protection of human rights in Europe is under scrutiny. States are examining the European Court of Human Rights. At a Conference in February 2010 they will take decisions which could bring welcome reform to relieve the Court’s backlog of cases. Conversely, the decisions taken could undermine a body that has provided redress for the victims of human rights violations in Europe for 50 years.
People in Europe (future applicants to the Court) have an interest at least equal to that of the states in ensuring the long-term effectiveness of the Court. States should therefore inform the public about the debates and consult civil society in the lead-up to the Conference and throughout the reform process which follows it.
47 states in Europe have agreed to be bound by the European Convention on Human Rights. States’ respect for the Convention rights of some 800 million people is monitored primarily by the European Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg. The Court makes binding judgments in cases where individuals claim that their Convention rights have been violated and that the state has not granted redress. The implementation of the Court’s judgments is supervised by the Committee of Ministers, representing all 47 Council of Europe states.
number of applications to the Court would be significantly reduced. The Court faces difficult challenges in light of its resources, as a result of the enormous number of individual applications being lodged (nearly 50,000 application forms in 2008), coupled with the backlog of cases pending before it (more than 110,000).
The European Court of Human Rights must be a strong Court, accessible to individuals claiming violations of their Convention rights when they have had no effective redress domestically. It should be a Court which will give a reasoned decision on whether a case is admissible, or a reasoned judgment on the merits of a case, without undue delay. The Court should be given the resources by states to function properly, and not at the expense of other Council of Europe human rights mechanisms.
States must take concerted action to ensure greater respect for human rights and must provide effective domestic remedies when rights are violated. Better implementation of the Convention at national level would mean greater respect for human rights throughout Europe and would reduce the need for individuals to apply to the Court for redress. Fewer cases would be sent to the Court if states implemented the Court’s judgments by providing effective remedy and reparation and by taking steps aimed at ensuring the violation is not repeated, and if states implemented not only judgments against them, but also standards developed in all relevant judgments against other states. There would also be fewer cases brought about issues on which the Court has already clarified how the Convention should be applied (half of the Court’s judgments in the past 50 years are on “repetitive” cases).
· solutions to the problems faced by the Court, including the varied reasons for inadmissible applications, are devised on the basis of informed analysis, transparent evaluation of both the root of the problems and recent and future reforms.
implement and ensure the implementation of the Court’s judgments and to adequately resource the European Court of Human Rights and the Department of Execution of Judgments. We note the recent Opinion by the Committee of Ministers’ Steering Committee for Human Rights, the reflections of the Court’s President and earlier proposals by the Group of Wise Persons and Lord Woolf.
· that would lessen the powers of the Committee of Ministers and the Department of Execution of Judgments to supervise the implementation of Court judgments.
· to simplify the procedures for amending Convention provisions relating to the Court’s operating rules and procedures.
Last week, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe urged the Russian Federation to adopt reforms to fully implement the pilot judgment in the case of Burdov (No. 2) v. Russia, on which I have reported earlier here. Although the Committee commends Russia for its constructive approach in addressing the issue of failed enforcement of domestic court judgments - the subject-matter of the Burdov case - it also criticizes Russia for failing to implement reforms before the deadline set by the Court (4 November 2009). For the full press release, click here. The interim resolution itself can be found here.
The importance of the beliefs that the applicant derives from belonging to the Roma community – a community which has its own values that are well established and deeply rooted in Spanish society. The Court observes, in the present case, that when the applicant got married in 1971 according to Roma rites and traditions, it was not possible in Spain, except by making a prior declaration of apostasy, to be married otherwise than in accordance with the canon-law rites of the Catholic Church. The Court takes the view that the applicant could not have been required, without infringing her right to religious freedom, to marry legally, that is to say under canon law, in 1971, when she expressed her consent to marry according to Roma rites.
The reference to an emerging consensus is taken from the 2001 Chapman judgment, but the Court omits - and I think this is remarkable - the consideration which followed in the Chapman case (para. 94): "However, the Court is not persuaded that the consensus is sufficiently concrete for it to derive any guidance as to the conduct or standards which Contracting States consider desirable in any particular situation. The framework convention, for example, sets out general principles and goals but the signatory States were unable to agree on means of implementation." By contrast, in Munoz Diaz the Court appearantly takes the position that such consensus on minority rights as reflected in the Framework Convention is sufficiently clear to derive guidance from. It notes (para. 64) that "under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the States Parties to the Convention are required to take due account of the specific conditions of persons belonging to national minorities." This seems a stronger position than in Chapman in which the Court held that belonging to a minority (para. 96) "may have an incidence on the manner" on the way in which laws are implemented. Should we conclude that the Court is prepared to take more account of the culture of well-estabblished minorities? After all, it emphasizes in Munoz Díaz that the Roma have a culture that is "well established and deeply rooted in Spanish society." It may be too early too say, but Munoz-Díaz may become the first in a line of cases.
One judge, Myjer, dissented, and it is very worthwhile to read his dissent which does not go so much into the question of specific Roma culture, but more into questions of deviation from earlier case-law on marriage and into whether the Court's line of reasoning was necessary in the first place.
* G. Sumner, 'We'll sometimes have Strasbourg: privileged status of community law before the European Court of Human Rights', Irish student law review, vol. 16(2008) pp. 127-170.
*E. Yilmaz, 'Domestic implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights at the national level: Turkey', Ankara bar review, vol. 1, no. 2(2008) pp. 85-91.
* P. Langford, 'Extradition and fundamental rights: the perspective of the European Court of Human Rights', International journal of human rights, vol. 13, no. 4 (2009) pp. 512-529.
* L. Hart, 'Individual adoption by non-heterosexuals and the order of family life in the European Court of Human Rights', Journal of law and society, vol. 36, no. 4 (2009), pp. 536-557.
* T. Lock, 'The ECJ and the ECtHR: the future relationship between the two European courts', Law and practice of international courts and tribunals, vol. 8, no. 3 (2009) pp. 375-398.
* N. Bamforth, 'Prohibited grounds of discrimination under EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights: problems of contrast and overlap, Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies, vol. 9 (2006/07) pp. 1-42.
* F. Tulkens, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and church-state relations: pluralism vs. pluralism', Cardozo law review, vol. 30, no. 6 (2008/09) pp. 2575-2592.
* K. Boyle, 'The European Experience: The European Convention on Human Rights, Victoria University of Wellington law review, vol. 40, no. 1 (2009) pp. 167-176.
Coming to terms with its past is a challenge for many societies. The role of a former Hungarian Prime minister, Pál Teleki, in anti-Jewish policies before and during WW II, is at the core of a judgment by the Court this week: Karsai v. Hungary (Appl.no. 5380/07). The applicant is a historian who participated in a public debate on Teleki's role, in relation to a cotnroversy on the possiblity of raising a statue for Teleki a few years ago. In a weekly newspaper, Karsai wrote on the ill-informed apology of Teleki by a number of people, which he labelled as 'careful Jew-bashing'. One of the persons he reffered to was an amateur historian, B.T., who subsequently sued him for defamation. Karsai was ordered to pay the legal costs of the ensuing proceedings and to arrange the publication of a rectification.
Taking his case to Strasbourg, Karsai claimed that this obligation violted his freedom of expression and that the sanction itself affected his credibility as a historian. The Court agreed, holding unanimously that Article 10 ECHR had been violated. Most of the Court's reasoning is very familiar: it considered the debate of utmost public interest (leading to a higher protection for Karsai's expressions). In addition, it held that B.T. had exposed himself to criticism by also openly participating in the public debate on the issue of Teleki. In this case Karsai's criticism had been indirect, but in the Court's view even harsh criticism would have been protected by Article 10 ECHR.
One element is of note for those who follow every step of the Court's freedom of expression case law. The Court has always distinguished between statements of fact - which are susceptible to proof - and to value-judgments which are not. In this case the domestic Courts had labelled Karsai's writings as factual statements, but the European Court disagreed. In order to do so it had to step away even further from what originally seemed to be intended as a clear typology, but which has become a bit blurred over the years. In this case, the Court introduced the term "value-laden" statements of fact, which seems to be somewhere in the grey zone between the two extremes. Does this mean that the Court has now truly chosen for a kind of gliding scale, in which the less factual a statement is, the less proof is needed? If so, then domestic courts might have a hard time in applying this approach consistently and convincingly in new cases coming before them.
Finally, having studied history myself, I was happy to read that the Court now explicitly held the following (para. 36): "the measure imposed on the applicant, namely, the duty to retract in a matter which affects his professional credibility as a historian, is capable of producing a chilling effect."
The fiftieth anniversary of the European Court of Human Rights this year is an occasion for both celebration and apprehension. From a timid beginning the Court has grown into a full-time institution successfully dealing with thousands of cases each year. Its case law is generally perceived to be among the most developed and extensive of all international human rights institutions and most of its judgments are routinely implemented by the state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, for over a decade dark clouds have been gathering over Strasbourg. The number of applications has been rising so sharply – partly due to the accession of a large number of new state parties to the ECHR – that the very work and survival of the Court seems to be at risk. It is precisely because of these high numbers that the Court has started to deal creatively with large-scale violations of human rights by way of so-called pilot judgments. This article will assess this new phenomenon which holds the promise of being the most creative tool the Court has developed in its first fifty years of its existence. First, it will look at what pilot judgments are and in which cases the Court has applied the pilot methodology. Secondly, the main reasons for setting up the pilot judgment procedure will be considered. Finally, this article will analyse the challenges the pilot judgment procedure faces, such as its legal basis and the position of applicants in comparable cases.
Mr Pourgourides called upon members of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, representing both the ruling party and the opposition, to act together to adopt all the necessary measures to speed up criminal and civil proceedings. The rapporteur also invited Italian parliamentarians to establish within the Parliament a committee to monitor the implementation of European Court judgments, and was assured that they would do so. During the visit, Mr Pourgourides also met the Prosecutor General and judges of the Supreme Court, as well as a number of other officials, to discuss problems with the implementation of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments.
This is the third in a series of visits by the same rapporteur aimed at mobilising parliamentary support in states where delays or other difficulties in implementing judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have arisen. The rapporteur has previously undertaken similar visits to Bulgaria and Ukraine, and will later travel to Greece, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation and Turkey.
Such a dialogue, provided adequate follow-up is given to it, is essential in strengthening the enabling environment for the European Convention on which I wrote here last week. A post on Mr Pourgourides' earlier report on the general issue of failing implementation of judgments can be found here.
The current relationship between the two European courts has been discussed in some great detail while the future of that relationship has been widely neglected. This is somewhat surprising as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and with it of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as the EU's succession to the ECHR are probably going to take place before too long. The article first examines Article 52(3) of the Charter, which prescribes that the ECHR be the minimum standard of human rights in the EU. It is argued that Article 52 (3) does not entail a reference to the ECtHR's case law so that the ECJ will not be bound by that case law. After an accession of the EU to the ECHR, it is likely that both courts will assert that they have exclusive jurisdiction over the ECHR in inter-state cases, which creates a jurisdictional conflict for which a solution must be found. In addition, the article explores whether after an accession, the Bosphorus case law will have a future and whether the dictum found in Opinion 1/91 will be applicable, according to which the ECJ is bound by the decisions of courts created by an international agreement to which the EC is a party.
In several cases, comparative law exercises have been given excessive weight, which has given rise to conflicting interpretations in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This use of the comparative law method by the Court has been widely criticised. The critical voices have generally argued in terms of what is prohibited by the principle of the rule of law, which the Court itself is also bound to take into account, namely the arbitrary use of power. In the light of these criticisms, it is a challenging task to examine whether and to what extent the comparative law method complies with the principle of the rule of law, which is the aim of this paper. An analysis of several ECtHR cases demonstrates that in many respects the comparative exercises of the Court indeed do not comply with the requirements set by the formal conception of the rule of law. The application of the comparative law method is neither consistent nor sufficiently transparent. In addition to exploring the problematic aspects of the application of the comparative law method, the paper also formulates some recommendations in order to bring this method into accordance with the principle of the rule of law.
One main concern was the strengthening of the Court's independence and its ability to deal in a more flexible way with the challenges of the present and the future. This increased independence could come about by giving the Court a budget detached from the one of the Council of Europe (at present every increase in the Court's budget goes at the detriment of other very essential human rights tasks of the Council of Europe) and by a more transparent selection of the candidates for appointment as judges on the national level. There are currently huge differences between states in this respect. As to flexibility, a statute (easier to change than the Convention itself, but with more status than the Court's own rules of procedure) was seen as a good prospect as long as it would not be used to weaken the acquis of the current Court, such as the binding nature of interim measures. Reforms should not be used as a pretext to turn back the tide. In any event, the Court should not again become a hostage of protracted ratification processes of reform protocols to the Convention (as happened with Protocol 14).
Secondly, it was considered important to significantly strengthen the enabling environment of the Court's work. This relates specifically to the implementation of the Court's judgments. The Committee of Ministers, which formally supervises such implementation, currently has a very dedicated but also very small staff of a few dozen people who have to deal with the supervision. The backlog of cases so known to Court watchers is now also a problem in the implementation phase. Increased NGO input during this phase would be helpful to get information on implementation in national cases to the Committee. Other main actors who could solidify this enabling environment are national human rights institutions and NGOs which could focus on monitoring state compliance with ECHR judgments - especially in cases of large-scale or systemic problems - and the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights who could pay structural and specific attention to the implementation of the Court's judgments in his discussions and reports concerning specific countries. To do this effectively, it is essential that the Court is as clear as possible in its judgments on what the Convention requires from states, as it increasingly does through pilot judgments. Put succinctly, the network aorund the Corut should be strengthened.
I might add that at the other end of the horizon, where cases come to the Court, it is essential to increase expertise on how the Convention system works both among the general public but specifically among practising lawyers. ECHR as a standard part of legal education would be helpful, but also practical dissemination of information on admissiblity criteria and other matters within the state parties themselves. In that respect, an interesting pilot project (not to be confused with pilot judgments) is being undertaken in Poland - the Warsaw Pilot Project - where a lawyer has been appointed within the Council of Europe's Information Office to inform potential applicants about admissibility criteria and more generally about the ECHR. Such undertakings, either performed by a specially appointed lawyer or by national human rights institutions, might help to avoid part of the deluge of cases streaming to Strasbourg.
A short note on follow-up: the Swiss government, host of the Interlaken conference, will organise a consultation with NGOs in Strasbourg on 4 December. For those NGOs who want to get engaged on the national level to lobby their own governments, you can contact Jill Heine of Amnesty International for more information (jheine at amnesty.org). The Norwegian government (on 7 December) as well as the Parliamentary Assembly will both also organise conferences in the run-up to Interlaken.
Let us hope for a strong outcome of the Interlaken process, for the benefit over the over 800 million Europeans whom the Convention should effectively protect!
Today the Court issued its judgment in the case of Kaboulov v. Ukraine (Appl. no. 41015/04) which in effect imposes a moratorium on extraditions to Kazakhstan on all ECHR state parties, unless credible assurances of safety would be offered by Kazakhstan. The applicant is a Kazakh national suspected of murder. In 2003 the applicant was arrested in Ukraine on the basis of an international arrest warrant. He applied to the European Court to prevent his extradition, amongst others complaining that he would face the risk of ill-treatment during detention and capital punishment.
Basing itself on reports of the Amnesty International, a UN rapporteur, the International Helsinki Federation, and the US State Department, the Court concluded that extradition would not violate the right to life, since there had been a moratorium on enforcement of the death penalty and that death sentences had been commuted to life imprisonment. By contrast, since there was uncontested information that torture and ill-treatment were regular occurences in Kazakh prisons as well as generally very poor prison conditions. Since this was a general situation, it did not matter that the applicant could not prove that he was personally and specifically in danger, since (para. 112) "it appears that any criminal suspect held in custody runs a serious risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, sometimes without any aim or particular purpose. Thus, the Court accepts the applicant’s contention that the mere fact of being detained as a criminal suspect, as in the instant case, provides sufficient grounds to fear a serious risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention." Extradition would thus violate article 3 ECHR.
One may note that the Court last year ruled more or less on the same issues, but then in respect to Turkmenistan. See my earlier post here. It seems that large parts of Central Asia are turning into no-go areas. If these countries ever want to have suspects extradited to them from any ECHR state party, they will have to get their act together and improve both their combat against torture and the conditions of their detention facilities. If this would indeed happen in the future, this would be an interesting de facto extraterritorial effect of Convention norms. The only possible alternative is credible assurances by Kazakhstan that the individual in question would not face the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3, but these assurances would have to be very credible in order for the Court to accept that they sufficiently countered the generally existing situation.
Discusses aspects of the procedure and practice of the European Court of Human Rights and looks at what the Court may be able to offer to legal and human rights communities across the world. Examines: (1) the importance of patience and persistence in the process of establishing human rights procedural norms; (2) the Court's flexible approach, highlighting its treatment of cases involving racial violence and discrimination against the Roma; (3) the importance of managing expectations and forward planning to meet increased demand in applications; (4) issues of transparency and accessibility; and (4) the execution of judgments.
Discusses the role of religion in the sentencing process of criminal trials. Contends that religious interests have significance in sentencing and that European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence can negatively impact on the freedom to sentence religious defendants. Considers: (1) the manifestation of religion as a factor leading to a reduced sentence; and (2) situations where a defendant's offending is a manifestation of religion and whose faith is sufficiently strong to resist rehabilitation. Considers how to balance the weight to be given to religious concerns in sentencing by national courts.
* Achilles C. Emilianides, Do Minimum Age Requirements Violate the Right to Stand for Election under the European Convention on Human Rights?
Argues that the imposition of minimum age requirements for persons seeking to stand for elections breaches the rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Protocol 1 art.3. Discusses: (1) the active and passive aspects of the right to stand for election; (2) the specific right to free elections; (3) whether minimum age requirements breach Protocol 1 art.3, either on its own or in conjunction with art.14; (4) the need to establish that there is no reasonable and objective justification for the differing treatment regarding minimum age requirements; and (5) the scope of the "legislature " under Protocol 1 art.3.
Yesterday, the Court re-elected Jean-Paul Costa as its president for a period of three years. On the same day the British judge Bratza was re-elected as one of the two vice-presidents of the Court, also for three years (the other vice-president is Christos Rozakis). Finally, the Belgian judge Francoise Tulkens was re-elected as president of the Second Section of the Court. All elections were conducted by secret ballot. The re-affirmation of some of the Court's key positions comes at a crucial time. With the upcoming conference at Interlaken and with the expiry of the terms of a number of judges in 2010 (unless Russia ratifies Protocol 14, which would extend some of he terms), experience within the Court is something to be cherished.
The full composition of the current Court can be found here.
1. The Committee of Ministers has examined Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1809 (2007) on “Member states’ duty to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights”. It has brought the recommendation to the attention of member states and forwarded it to its Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH). The CDDH has given an opinion, appended to this reply, with which the Committee fully concurs.
2. It points out that in its interim reply adopted at the 1009th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (24 October 2007), it had congratulated the Parliamentary Assembly on the work accomplished in the preparation and adoption of Resolution 1571 (2007) and Recommendation 1809 (2007) on “Member states’ duty to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights”.
3. As stated in the recommendation itself, the Committee of Ministers has, on numerous occasions, stressed the importance of member states’ obligation to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights. For example, in its Resolution ResDH(2006)45, the Committee of Ministers, emphasising that respect of this obligation was of fundamental importance for the proper and effective functioning of the Convention system, deplored the fact that violations of this obligation had nevertheless continued to be found in recent judgments of the Court. In this resolution, the Committee of Ministers called on contracting states to ensure that all measures had been taken so that the relevant authorities complied with requests for assistance from the Court under Article 38 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) and to ensure that authorities effectively seized with such requests complied strictly with them.
4. The Committee of Ministers notes that questions relating to unlawful acts from which applicants to the Court, or people close to these applicants, had suffered, have been discussed on several occasions by the Ministers’ Deputies.
5. In view of the fundamental importance of member states’ duty to co-operate with the Court, the Committee of Ministers informs the Parliamentary Assembly that, in accordance with the opinion of the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), it is intending to draw up a draft resolution addressing the concerns expressed by the Assembly in its Resolution 1571 (2007) and its Recommendation 1809 (2007), in particular with regard to the protection of applicants, their lawyers and members of their family, the investigations to be carried out and the measures to be taken.
1. The Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) concurs entirely with the Assembly that whilst states generally co-operate well with the Court, it is a matter of grave concern that isolated cases persist of interference with applicants, their families and their lawyers and other representatives.
2. The CDDH agrees fully with the Assembly’s conclusion that “the right of individuals to apply to the Court is a central element of the human rights protection mechanism in Europe and must be protected from interference at all levels.” It strongly supports the philosophy running through the Assembly’s report and adopted texts and shares the Ministers’ Deputies’ conclusion that the issues raised are of great importance for the effectiveness of the European system of human rights protection.
3. All States Parties to the Convention have undertaken not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right (Article 34 of the Convention). Furthermore, the Court’s case law has now clearly established that all States Parties are obliged to comply with an order of interim measures made under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and that non-compliance may imply a violation of Article 34.
4. In particular, the CDDH would underline the Assembly’s recommendations to member states made in paragraphs 17.2 and 17.3 of Resolution 1571 (2007). These duties to protect and to investigate reflect states’ basic positive obligations that are an essential characteristic of the Convention system as a whole.
5. As regards the question posed by the Ministers’ Deputies concerning the advisability of drawing up a recommendation to member states along the lines proposed by the Assembly, the CDDH is of the opinion that such a course of action would not be appropriate at present. It suggests that the Deputies, by means of a resolution, echo the worries expressed by the Assembly in particular in paragraphs 17.2 and 17.3 of the aforementioned resolution. Finally, it considers that the issue of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, including the question of its status, should be examined in detail in the context of future work on a Statute for the Court.
"As from next month, the 27-member EU will be in a position to become more democratic, more transparent and more effective. First and foremost, however, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will afford the EU an opportunity to strengthen the principle of legal certainty by acceding to the ECHR of the Council of Europe, so that the actions and decisions of EU institutions will be subjected to the same external scrutiny as those of the member states.
Although there is now broad support for this accession, it is important that the declarations of intent swiftly be matched by deeds. As our Assembly recently pointed out, accession will convey a strong message of a clear commitment to the protection of human rights not only within the boundaries of the European Union but also Europe-wide, in keeping with the community of values shared by the Council of Europe and the European Union.
From now on, the preparations for accession must be top of the agenda in discussions between the two organisations."
However, the other end of the equation should not be forgotten: it is Protocol 14 to the ECHR which provides for EU accession. As readers of this blog will know, this Protocol still awaits its last ratification by the Russian Federation. Would the prospect of making the EU more accountable for human rights violations be a reason for the Russian Duma to look more postively at Protocol 14? In any event, Protocol 14-Bis, which was meant to increase the speed of reforms of the Court does not contain the EU accession provision from Protocol 14. No help can thus be expected from that side. EU and ECHR - never the twain shall meet?
This essay, which will in due course appear in M Andenas and S Vogenhauer (Eds), A Matter of Style? The Form of Judgments in the United Kingdom and Abroad: Essays in Honour of Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Hart Publishing, forthcoming, examines the structure of judgments in the European Court of Human Rights, and offers some reflections on the extent to which the form of judgments contributes to the aims of the Convention system.
At the same publisher, a guide for practioners and others interested in bringing cases to the European Court of Human Rights has just been published by my colleague Yves Haeck - in Dutch: Procederen voor het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, an impressive and very complete roadmap to Strasbourg.
55. La présence du crucifix peut aisément être interprétée par des élèves de tous âges comme un signe religieux et ils se sentiront éduqués dans un environnement scolaire marqué par une religion donnée. Ce qui peut être encourageant pour certains élèves religieux, peut être perturbant émotionnellement pour des élèves d'autres religions ou ceux qui ne professent aucune religion. Ce risque est particulièrement présent chez les élèves appartenant à des minorités religieuses. La liberté négative n'est pas limitée à l'absence de services religieux ou d'enseignement religieux. Elle s'étend aux pratiques et aux symboles exprimant, en particulier ou en général, une croyance, une religion ou l'athéisme. Ce droit négatif mérite une protection particulière si c'est l'Etat qui exprime une croyance et si la personne est placée dans une situation dont elle ne peut se dégager ou seulement en consentant des efforts et un sacrifice disproportionnés.
56. L'exposition d'un ou plusieurs symboles religieux ne peut se justifier ni par la demande d'autres parents qui souhaitent une éducation religieuse conforme à leurs convictions, ni, comme le Gouvernement le soutient, par la nécessité d'un compromis nécessaire avec les partis politiques d'inspiration chrétienne. Le respect des convictions de parents en matière d'éducation doit prendre en compte le respect des convictions des autres parents. L'Etat est tenu à la neutralité confessionnelle dans le cadre de l'éducation publique obligatoire où la présence aux cours est requise sans considération de religion et qui doit chercher à inculquer aux élèves une pensée critique.
La Cour ne voit pas comment l'exposition, dans des salles de classe des écoles publiques, d'un symbole qu'il est raisonnable d'associer au catholicisme (la religion majoritaire en Italie) pourrait servir le pluralisme éducatif qui est essentiel à la préservation d'une « société démocratique » telle que la conçoit la Convention, pluralisme qui a été reconnu par la Cour constitutionnelle en droit interne.
One may note, that the Court thinks this applies in general in the exercise of public functions by the state and particularly (but not solely) in classrooms.
Italy has already indicated that it wants the Grand Chamber of the Court to have a look at the case. Even if the judgment was unanimous - which would decrease chances for reconsideration - this could happen since it is an issue which can be considered of major importance in many ECHR state parties. In addition, a bit more clarity would be welcome on the extent to which this judgment should be explained as a complete and aboslute ban on religious symbols in public schools (as the reasoning of the judgment seems to argue towards that conclusion) or simply that the obligation for public schools to display such symbols is contrary to the Convention (as the final part of the judgment seems to indicate as one of the key reasons for concluding that the Convention was violated). The judgment seems to lean towards the first of these two explanations. Some pragmatism might be called for here and this will certainly not be the end of the discussion of this issue.
For coverage in the European press, see the article in yesterday's Guardian newspaper here and in Le Monde here. Both newpapers report that the Italian government has classified the Court's ruling as ideologically motivated. The judgment has provoked strong reactions amongst Italians themselves as well, with a on online petition being signed by tens of thousands of people within a day. This is the report from the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, in which - one may note - the nationality of all the judges in the Chamber are mentioned (sic!).
On Monday 9 November, the Athens Bar Association will organise a seminar entitled '1959-2009: 50 years since the creation of the European Court of Human Rights'. Speakers at this event include the Court's president Jean-Paul Costa, President of the ECtHR, the Greek judge in Strasbourg (and one of the Court's vice-presidents) Christos Rozakis, and the head of the Greek section in the registry of the Court, Marialena Tsirli. Also speaking: Dimitrios Paxinos, the President of the Athens Bar Association, the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of our Greece, and the Minister of Justice. The event starts at 17h30 at Odos Aiolou 82-84 in Athens. Later this month a special issue of the Greek law journal Nomiko Vima will be published on the same theme.
* P. Rowe, 'Non-international armed conflict and the European Court of Human Rights: Chechnya from 1999', New Zealand Yearbook of International Law (available at heinonline) vol. 4 (2007) pp. 205-228.
* A. Garay, 'Association les Témoins de Jéhovah v France: the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on religious activities and taxation issues', Religion and Human Rights, vol. 3, no. 2 (2008), pp. 185-190.

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