Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/301/402/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 05:42:14+00:00

Document:
1. Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring carriers to desist from spotting cars on industrial plant tracks as part of the service rendered under interstate line-haul rates and from granting allowances out of the line-haul rates to industries doing such spotting held adequately supported by the Commission's findings in each case that the interchange tracks of the respective industries are reasonably convenient points for the receipt and delivery of interstate shipments, and that the industry performs no service beyond those points of interchange for which the carrier is compensated under its interstate line-haul rates. P. 301 U. S. 406.
These findings are an adjudication by the Commission that the spotting service within the plants is not transportation service which the carriers are bound to render in respect of receipt and delivery of freight.
2. The Commission is not foreclosed by its earlier decisions from investigating the varied practice of making allowances for plant switching and from making proper orders to regulate the practice and prevent performance of a service not within the carriers' transportation obligation. P. 301 U. S. 407.
spotting within the plants is not included in the service for which the line-haul rates were fixed, there is power in the Commission to enjoin the performance of that additional service or the making an allowance to the industry which perform it. P. 301 U. S. 408.
4. The Commission's findings are sustained by the evidence. P. 301 U. S. 409.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court, of three judges, setting aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning the spotting of cars. The case was a consolidation of several cases, each brought by a different industrial corporation, which were tried together and disposed of by one decree.
which required certain carriers to cease and desist from spotting cars on industrial plant tracks as part of the service rendered under interstate line-haul rates and from granting allowances out of the line-haul rates to industries doing such spotting. The appellees are five industrial concerns affected by the orders. They contend that the spotting service in question is "transportation" within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act; that the performance of the service, or the payment of an allowance to an industry which itself performs it, is sanctioned by custom and practice and by previous adjudications of the Commission, and that line-haul rates were fixed in contemplation of the rendition of such service. They further charge the orders are void because not supported by the Commission's findings or the evidence.
"When a carrier is prevented at its ordinary operating convenience from reaching points of loading or unloading within a plant, without interruption or interference by the desires of an industry or the disabilities of its plant, such as the manner in which the industrial operations are conducted, the arrangement or condition of its tracks, weighing service, or similar circumstances, . . . the service beyond the point of interruption or interference is in excess of that performed in simple switching or team-track delivery."
were consolidated for hearing, and were disposed of upon a single record in one opinion. Separate decrees were entered in the respective causes granting the requested relief. The appellants took a single appeal from all the decrees. We hold the Commission's orders were lawful, and should not have been set aside.
"The term 'transportation' . . . shall include . . . all services in connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit . . . of property transported. [Footnote 7]"
an industry for the performance of spotting service on its plant track system, or for an allowance from the carrier for itself performing the service, the Commission, in the view that like service was performed or an allowance paid for it at other similar plants, has ordered the removal of discrimination as between shippers. On the other hand, in some cases, the Commission has held that the service demanded was not a service of transportation, and has refused to order the carrier to perform it. [Footnote 11] But, whatever may have been decided in the past, it is evident that the growth of the practice of making allowances for plant switching, and the lack of uniformity in the practice of the carriers with respect to this service, properly called for an investigation of the entire situation and the promulgation of appropriate orders to regulate the practice and prevent performance of a service not within the carrier's transportation obligation. The investigation and the consequent orders of the Commission were not foreclosed by its earlier decisions. The Commission is clearly empowered to determine what is embraced within the service of transportation, and what lies outside that service. [Footnote 12] Since the Commission finds that the carriers' service of transportation is complete upon delivery to the industries' interchange tracks, and that spotting within the plants is not included in the service for which the line-haul rates were fixed, there is power to enjoin the performance of that additional service or the making of an allowance to the industry which performs it.
Third. What has been said makes it unnecessary further to discuss the question of the adequacy of the Commission's findings. If supported, they are sufficient to sustain the orders made.
It is conceded that the line-haul rate covers delivery. Such rates are usually made to or from an area, sometimes designated a "switching district" or "switching limits." Within that area, the carrier holds itself out as agreeing to deliver freight in its freight depot or at team tracks or on sidings or spur-tracks owned by an industry. The practice has come to be uniform that, in delivering a car on a team track, the carrier will spot the car at a point where merchandise of the class contained in the car is usually and most conveniently unloaded; thus, there are particular team tracks or points where fruit and vegetables, furniture, etc., etc., are constantly loaded and unloaded, and cars are spotted accordingly. In the analogous situation where an industry's warehouses or other facilities are located at given points on a spur or side-track, the carrier holds itself out to spot the car at the point where it is needed for loading or unloading, as a warehouse door, a scrap pile, etc.
on plant tracks as part of the delivery service which the carrier holds itself out as agreeing to perform without a charge additional to the line-haul rate. The record fails to establish any such custom. Carriers in official territory have, for perhaps thirty years, made allowances to certain industries for doing spotting within their plants. No uniform rule as to when such an allowance would be made has been adopted, although there have been efforts to agree upon a rule. Apparently the plants most favored have been steel plants, and some carriers have refused to extend the system of allowances to other than steel plants. It appears from the record that the making of allowances has not been governed by any principle, and the case fall into three general classes: (1) where the plant does its own spotting, and receives an allowance; (2) where the railroad does plant spotting; (3) where the industry does its own spotting, and receives no allowance.
No allowances have been granted in New England territory, in the Southeast, or in the extreme Southwest. The practice of granting allowances has spread, to some extent, from official territory across the Mississippi and to the Northwest, but here again there is no uniform rule about the matter. There is no custom or practice which has the force of a rule of law that the line-haul rate includes plant spotting service.
The testimony of operating officials of the carriers and transportation officers of industries was not entirely consistent. Some took the position that it is the obligation of a carrier to spot a car on plant tracks if the spotting involves but a single uninterrupted movement which can be made at the carrier's convenience. Many took a broader view, and indicated that, in consideration of the large amount of traffic emanating from and terminating at a given plant, the spotting of cars, in cooperation with the needs of the plant, would not involve a burden greater than the delivery of similar cars on team tracks.
There was much opinion evidence to the effect that the cost of spotting a car on plant tracks is no greater than that of placing a car on team tracks. There was, however, opinion evidence to the contrary, and facts were developed with respect to the amount of engine time involved in some of the operations under examination from which it may fairly be deduced that the industry switching involved greater expense than team track switching.
The Commission properly held that each case must be decided upon the circumstances disclosed. It accordingly examined the evidence respecting the operations at the plant of each of the appellees and made its findings with respect to each upon the evidence in the record. We find it unnecessary to detail that evidence, since it is summarized in the Commission's reports. It is sufficient now to say that, in every case, the Commission found, upon sufficient evidence, that the cars were, in the first instance, placed upon lead tracks, interchange tracks, or sidings, and subsequently spotted from these tracks; in each instance, the spotting service involved one or more operations in addition to the placing of the car on interchange tracks, such as moving it to plant scales for weighing, or some additional burden, such as conformance to the convenience of the plant, supply of special motive power required by the plant's layout or trackage or some other element which called for excessive service greater than that involved in team track spotting or spotting on an ordinary industrial siding or spur. We are unable to say that the findings in respect of the individual plants lacked support in the evidence. We are therefore bound to accept them, and to hold the orders lawful.
The decrees will be reversed, and the causes remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
complete upon delivery to the industries' interchange tracks is not supported by the circumstantial facts found or by the evidence, that the orders here involved are based upon a misconstruction of the Act, and that the decrees of the district court should be affirmed.
The reports and orders affecting the appellees are the following: American Sheet & Tin Plate Company Terminal Allowance, 209 I.C.C. 719; Allegheny Steel Company Terminal Allowance, 209 I.C.C. 273; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company Terminal Allowance, 209 I.C.C. 467; Weirton Steel Company Terminal Allowance, 209 I.C.C. 445; West Leechburg Steel Company Terminal Allowance, 210 I.C.C. 213; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company Terminal Allowance, 210 I.C.C. 527.
49 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3(1), 15(1).
Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(3).
Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 18 I.C.C. 310; Car spotting Charges, 34 I.C.C. 609; National Malleable Castings Co. v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R. Co., 51 I.C.C. 537, and many others.
General Electric Case, 14 I.C.C. 237; Crane Iron Works Case, 17 I.C.C. 514. Compare New York C. & H. R. Co. v. General Electric Co., 219 N.Y. 227, 114 N.E. 115.
Los Angeles Switching Case, 234 U. S. 294, 234 U. S. 311; Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 501, 283 U. S. 508.

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