Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/361/363.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 01:17:44+00:00

Document:
Proceeding under a Missouri statute, the Governor of Missouri found that the public interest, health and welfare were jeopardized by an existing strike against a public utility in the State and issued executive orders taking possession of the company and directing that it continue operations. Pursuant to the statute, a state court enjoined continuation of the strike. The strike was then terminated; a new labor agreement was entered into between the unions and the company; and the Governor ended the seizure. On appeal from the injunction decree, the Supreme Court of Missouri noted that the injunction had "expired by its own terms"; but it proceeded to sustain the constitutionality of those sections of the statute authorizing the seizure, forbidding continuation of a strike after seizure, and authorizing the state courts to enjoin violations of the Act. On appeal to this Court, held: Since the injunction has long since expired by its own terms, the cause has become moot. Pp. 364-371.
(a) Because the injunction has long since "expired by its own terms" there remains for this Court no actual matter in controversy essential to a decision of this case. Harris v. Battle, 348 U.S. 803 . Pp. 367-369.
(b) Life is not given to this appeal by the fact that the statute contains provisions which impose (1) monetary penalties upon labor unions which continue a strike after seizure, and (2) loss of seniority for employees participating in such a strike; since the Supreme Court of Missouri found that those separable provisions of the Act were not involved in this case, it carefully refrained from passing on their validity, and they are not properly before this Court in this case. Pp. 369-371.
317 S. W. 2d 309, judgment vacated and cause remanded.
Robert R. Welborn, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was John M. Dalton, Attorney General of Missouri.
I. J. Gromfine, Bernard Cushman, Herman Sternstein and Justus R. Moll filed a brief for the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employes of America, AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae, in support of appellants.
Briefs of amici curiae in support of appellee were filed by Richmond C. Coburn for the Chamber of Commerce of Metropolitan St. Louis; Myron K. Ellison for the Missouri State Chamber of Commerce et al.; Irvin Fane, Harry L. Browne and Howard F. Sachs for the Kansas City Power & Light Co.; and James M. Douglas and Edmonstone F. Thompson for the Laclede Gas Co.
In the state courts and in this Court the appellants have contended that the Missouri law conflicts with federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, and that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of doubt as to whether the controversy was moot, we postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits. 359 U.S. 982 .
After the seizure the appellants continued the strike in violation of the statute, 3 and the State of Missouri filed suit for an injunction against them in the Circuit Court of St. Louis. 4 At the end of a three-day hearing the trial court entered an order enjoining the appellants from continuing the strike, and in an amendment to the decree declared the entire King-Thompson Act constitutional and valid. On July 14, 1956, the day after the injunction issued, the strike was terminated. On August 10, 1956, the appellants and Laclede signed a new labor agreement, and on October 31, 1956, the Governor ended the seizure.
In Harris v. Battle, 348 U.S. 803 , these principles were given concrete application in a context so parallel as explicitly to control disposition of the primary issue here. That case originated as an action to enjoin the enforcement of a Virginia statute, markedly similar to the King-Thompson Act, under which the Governor had ordered that "possession" be taken of a transit company whose employees were on strike. Although the labor dispute was subsequently settled and the seizure terminated, the trial court nevertheless proceeded to decide the merits of the case, holding that the seizure was constitutional. Harris v. Battle, 32 L. R. R. M. 83. The Virginia Supreme Court refused an appeal. Harris v. Battle, 195 Va. lxxxviii. In this Court it was urged that the controversy was not moot because of the continuing threat of state seizure in future labor disputes. 8 It was argued that the State's abandonment of alleged unconstitutional activity after its objective had been accomplished should not be permitted to forestall decision as to the validity of the statute under which the State had purported to act. 9 It was contended that the situation was akin to cases like Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 514 -516. 10 [361 U.S. 363, 369] In finding that the controversy was moot, the Court necessarily rejected all these contentions. 348 U.S. 803 . Upon the authority of that decision the same contentions must be rejected in the present case. See also Barker Co. v. Painters Union, 281 U.S. 462 ; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360 .
We cannot agree that the pendency of that litigation gives life to the present appeal. When that claim is litigated it will be subject to review, but it is not for us now to anticipate its outcome. "`Constitutional questions are not to be dealt with abstractly'. . . . They will not be anticipated but will be dealt with only as they are appropriately raised upon a record before us. . . . Nor will we assume in advance that a State will so construe its law as to bring it into conflict with the federal Constitution or an act of Congress." Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.S. 740 , at 746.
The guiding principle is well illustrated in American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U.S. 49 . There the Kansas Supreme Court had ousted the appellant from doing business in the State until it complied with provisions of the local law governing foreign corporations. Pending appeal the appellant satisfied the judgment by complying with the requirements of the statute. But meanwhile the State had brought another action against the appellant to void contracts it had made prior to the date of its compliance. Because of this pending litigation the appellant argued that "there still exists a controversy, undetermined and unsettled,' involving the right of the State to enforce the statute against a corporation engaged in interstate commerce." 193 U.S., at 51 . What the Court said in rejecting that argument and dismissing the appeal as moot is entirely relevant here. "[T]hat suit is not before us. We have not now jurisdiction of it or its issues. Our power only extends over and is limited by the conditions of the case now before us." 193 U.S., at 52 . See Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528 .
The decision we are asked to review upheld only the validity of an injunction, an injunction that expired by its own terms more than three years ago. Any judgment of ours at this late date "would be wholly ineffectual for want of a subject matter on which it could operate. An affirmance would ostensibly require something to be done which had already taken place. A reversal would ostensibly avoid an event which had already passed beyond recall. One would be as vain as the other. To adjudicate a cause which no longer exists is a proceeding which this Court uniformly has declined to entertain." Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216, 217 -218.
[ Footnote 1 ] The King-Thompson Act is Chapter 295 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1949. The section of the statute which authorizes seizure by the Governor on behalf of the State is Mo. Rev. Stat., 1949, 295.180.
[ Footnote 2 ] All employees represented by the appellants, approximately 2,200, participated in the strike; approximately 300 supervisors and others not in the bargaining units represented by the appellants remained at work.
[ Footnote 3 ] Missouri Rev. Stat., 1949, 295.200, par. 1, provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, employee, or representative as defined in this chapter to call, incite, support or participate in any strike or concerted refusal to work for any utility or for the state after any plant, equipment or facility has been taken over by the state under this chapter, as means of enforcing any demands against the utility or against the state."
[ Footnote 4 ] Missouri Rev. Stat., 1949, 295.200, par. 6, provides: "The courts of this state shall have power to enforce by injunction or other legal or equitable remedies any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation prescribed by the governor hereunder."
[ Footnote 6 ] The court did reaffirm an earlier decision (State ex rel. State Board of Mediation v. Pigg, 362 Mo. 798, 244 S. W. 2d 75) upholding the constitutionality of provisions of the King-Thompson Act relating to the State Board of Mediation and public hearing panels, "[t]o the extent that those sections are a necessary predicate for the additional sections . . . with which we are now concerned . . . ." 317 S. W. 2d, at 315.
[ Footnote 7 ] See, e. g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 141 U.S. 696 ; California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U.S. 308 ; Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 ; American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U.S. 49 ; United States v. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U.S. 466 ; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360 ; United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 ; Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 ; Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528 ; Barker Co. v. Painters Union, 281 U.S. 462 .
[ Footnote 8 ] See jurisdictional statement in Harris v. Battle, No. 111, O. T. 1954, pp. 12-13.
[ Footnote 11 ] Missouri Rev. Stat., 1949, 295.200, par. 3, provides: "Any labor organization or labor union which violates paragraph 1 of this section shall forfeit and pay to the state of Missouri for the use of the public school fund of the state, the sum of ten thousand dollars for each day any work stoppage resulting from any strike which it has called, incited, or supported, continues, to be recovered by civil action in the name of the state and against the labor organization or labor union in its commonly used name."
[ Footnote 12 ] Missouri Rev. Stat., 1949, 295.200, par. 2, provides: "It shall be unlawful for any public utility to employ any person or employee who has violated paragraph 1 of this section except that such person or employee may be employed only as a new employee."
[ Footnote 13 ] See pp. 366-367, supra. Since neither the statutory penalties nor possible loss of seniority turns on the validity of the injunction, this case is quite unlike Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 , where the very judgment in controversy imposed financial liability. Nor did this case involve a "perpetual" injunction. See Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 416 , n., at 417-418.
[ Footnote 14 ] See note 12, supra.
[ Footnote 15 ] The appellee asserts and the appellants do not deny that the statute imposes no penalty for violation of the seniority provisions.
We think this controversy is not moot. As the Court's opinion points out, the appellant unions may still be held liable for monetary penalties and their members may lose seniority because of the strike the Missouri Supreme Court held illegal under state law. Its holding was made long [361 U.S. 363, 372] after the strike had ended. It was moot then if it is moot now. But the state court treated it as a live controversy, and so should we. Otherwise, the appellant unions and their members stand constantly under threats of penalties and continuing injunctions under the state statute the Missouri Supreme Court held validly applied in this case.

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