Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/454/1110/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:52:35+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 454 › KIMBLE v. MCDUFFY, INC.
These two clauses are separated by a semicolon: The lower federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions concerning the effect of that semicolon.
Petitioner was employed as an oil driller by respondent D. J. McDuffy, Inc., from December 1972 until April 1973. In March 1973, McDuffy joined the Industrial Foundation of the South (IFS). IFS is a nonprofit corporation, the purpose of which is to provide information to its members concerning workers' compensation claims and personal injury lawsuits in state and federal courts filed by employees or prospective employees of the employer/members. Apparently, the employer/members believe that they can reduce their employers' insurance and workers' compensation costs by obtaining this information, which may indicate whether a particular employee is likely to be an insurance or compensation risk.
the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. 623 F.2d 1060 (1980). It held that under the first clause of 1985(2)-that part of the statute applicable to interference with federal, as opposed to state, court proceedings-there is no requirement of discriminatory animus and that the scope of the term " attended" includes the filing of a complaint in federal court. A petition for rehearing en banc was granted and a severely divided Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. CA 5, 648 F.2d 340 (1981).
By a vote of 11 to 10,3 the court held that the language of the statute is not as important as its history. Thus, the fact that the phrase "equal protection of the laws" is included in the second, but not the first, part of 1985(2) is not as relevant to the proper interpretation of the statute as is the fact that all of 1985(2) is derived from the Ku Klux Act of 1871. Relying in part on this Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88d 338 (1971), the majority held that an action under 1985(2) must allege a racial or class-based animus. The dissent argued both that Griffin was inapplicable because it dealt only with 1985(3) and that the intent of the Ku Klux Act of 1871 was broader than the majority suggested : "A major concern was restoration of civil authority and preservation of orderly government, including federal court ability to proceed without improper interference." 648 F.2d, at 350. In their view, the second clause of 1985(2) included the equal protection language because Congress was concerned about the constitutional source of its power to create federal jurisdiction over state torts or crimes. Because Congress had no similar concern over its authority to protect federal-court proceedings, there was no reason for a similar limitation on the first part of the statute.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agrees with the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in this case: "the racial or class-based discrimination rationale expressed by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-102 [, 1797-1798 (1971) ], applies equally to [ 1985(2) ]." Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 271 (1976).
Footnote 1 Besides McDuffy, the defendants included IFS and all its members.
Footnote 2 The District Court certified a class only with respect to the claim for injunctive relief.
Footnote 3 Judge Clark concurred in the majority's decision, but stated that it was not necessary to reach this issue.
"It does not make a reason given for a conclusion in a case obiter dictum that it is only one of two reasons given for the same conclusion . . . . we can not hold that the use of the section in the opinion is not to be regarded as authority except by directly reversing the decision in that case on that point." Richmond Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 340, 196 (1928).
See also Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 623, 754 (1948); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486, 623 (1924); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Mason City & Fort Dodge R. Co., 199 U.S. 160, 166, 20 (1905). In any case, the intended scope of the term "attending" can only be determined by reviewing the same legislative history as is involved in resolving the question of whether an action under 1985(2) must allege class-based discrimination. Because these two questions are so related, I would grant review of petitioner's second question as well: Whether the term "attending" includes the filing of a claim in federal court. I would not, however, grant review of petitioner's third question: Whether offshore workers constitute a "discrete class" for equal protection purposes.

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