Source: http://blog.transportbusinesslaw.com/tag/federal-railroad-administration/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:58:21+00:00

Document:
RAILROADS (TANK CAR TRANSLOADING AFTER HEATING) / U.S. Federal Railroad Administration issues guidance in parts: (1) “Safety precautions and recommended guidance for persons responsible for unloading or transloading hazardous materials from rail tank cars, specifically those persons heating a rail tank car to prepare its hazardous material contents for unloading or transloading”; and (2) “Reminds such persons of current regulatory requirements addressing this type of operation”.
Safety Advisory Guidance. July 12, 2013.
(1) An incident February 18, 1999 in which a 20,000-gallon rail tank car was propelled by an explosion 750 feet over multi-story storage tanks at the Essroc Logansport cement plant near Clymer, Indiana due to a sudden and catastrophic rupture of the tank car.
(2) An incident September 13, 2002 in which “a 24,000-gallon-capacity rail tank car containing about 6,500 gallons of hazardous waste catastrophically ruptured at a transfer station at the BASF Corporation chemical facility in Freeport, Texas” – and “the force of the explosion propelled a 300-pound rail tank car dome housing about1/3mile away from the rail tank car”, and “about 660 gallons of the hazardous material oleum” were released.
“This guidance provides safety precautions and recommended guidance for persons responsible for unloading or transloading1 hazardous materials from rail tank cars, specifically those persons heating a rail tank car to prepare its hazardous material contents for unloading or transloading. Further, this guidance reminds such persons of current regulatory requirements addressing this type of operation. PHMSA is issuing this guidance in coordination with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in consultation with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
“Several Federal agencies share responsibility for the safety regulations of rail tank car unloading or transloading operations involving hazardous material—DOT (PHMSA and FRA), OSHA, and EPA. PHMSA, in coordination with OSHA and EPA, and in consultation with FRA, is issuing this safety advisory guidance to offer guidance on heating of a rail tank car to prepare solidified or viscous hazardous material products contained in the rail tank car for unloading or transloading. Based on existing regulatory requirements, we have assembled and coordinated the following guidance to raise awareness of those requirements and the risks associated with heating rail tank cars. This guidance does not include all of the aspects applicable to the safe heating of rail tanks cars; rather, it focuses on the issues raised in the NTSB recommendations as a result of its investigations into the two incidents cited above.
Training of all entities involved in the unloading or transloading process.
“These procedures should be maintained in a location where they are immediately available to employees responsible for the heating, unloading or transloading operation. These procedures should clearly define employees’ roles and responsibilities for the heating of a rail tank car, as well as the roles and responsibilities of contractor personnel that are employed at a facility to conduct the operations for heating of a rail tank car.
“Monitoring. The facility operator should be knowledgeable of the chemical properties of all of the materials involved in the heating process, including the reactivity of those materials, and ensure that the heating process (i.e., pressure, temperature, and heating rate) applied to the rail tank car, and the pressure and temperature inside the rail tank car should be monitored to ensure that it does not result in over-pressurization of the rail tank car.
Monitoring should be conducted at the necessary frequency as heating continues until the material reaches its recommended parameters (e.g., viscosity and temperature) for safe unloading or transloading. Certain chemicals, such as a material that can undergo rapid exothermic decomposition, may require more frequent or even continuous monitoring during heating. Monitoring of the tank pressure and the temperature of the hazardous material includes measures to ensure that the heating rate does not result in over pressurization of the rail tank car.
As an additional aspect of monitoring, the facility operator may, when practical and safe, and the physical state of the material allows, sample the material that is in the rail tank car to verify the material and its chemical and physical properties. The rail tank car contents should be monitored at multiple times as heating continues until the material is determined to be at its recommended parameters (e.g., viscosity and temperature) for safe unloading or transloading.
“Designated Employee. The facility operator should designate an employee responsible for monitoring the heating process. Prior to the onset of operation, the designated employee should be made thoroughly knowledgeable of the nature and properties of the material contained in the rail tank car and procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency. In the event of an emergency, the designated employee should have the ability and authority to take responsive action.
RAILROAD (EMPLOYEE DEPRESSION, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, ETC.) / U.S. Federal Railroad Administration issues this proposed rule in accordance with a statutory mandate that the Secretary of Transportation require certain major railroads to develop, and submit to the Secretary for approval, critical incident stress plans that provide for appropriate support services to be offered to their employees who are affected by a “critical incident” as defined by the Secretary who are directly involved in, who witness, or who respond to, such a “critical incident”.
June 28, 2013. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
“Although FRA has never regulated critical incident stress plans, many railroads have had some form of critical incident stress plan in place for many years. This rulemaking responds to the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-432, Div. A) (RSIA) mandate that the Secretary of Transportation establish regulations to define ‘critical incident’ and to require certain railroads to develop and implement critical incident stress plans.
RAILROAD (CAR HANDLING PROCEDURES) The Federal Railroad Administration issues a safety advisory relating “to make recommendations to railroads regarding the adoption of car-handling procedures during flat switching operations at certain locations and to re-emphasize the importance of following procedures when going between rolling equipment due to the hazards involved. FRA previously made related recommendations to railroads and their employees regarding going between rolling equipment in Safety Advisory 2011-02”.
Note well: Under 49 C.F.R. § 219.99(a)(2) “kicking” cars refers to “the common railroad switching practice of shoving or pushing rolling equipment and then uncoupling the equipment and allowing it to roll free”.
May 3, 2013. Notice of Safety Advisory.
March 5, 2013, Final Rule.
“In 1985, FRA implemented a post-accident toxicological testing (post-accident testing) program to test railroad employees who had been involved in serious train accidents for alcohol and certain controlled substances (marijuana, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), and selected opiates, amphetamines, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines). This final rule adds certain non-controlled substances with potentially impairing side effects to its standard post-accident testing panel. The non-controlled substances include tramadol and sedating antihistamines. This final rule makes clear that FRA intends to keep the post-accident test results for these non-controlled substances confidential while it continues to obtain and analyze data on the extent to which prescription and over-the-counter (OTC) drug use by railroad employees potentially affects rail safety.
“In 1985, to further its accident investigation program, FRA began conducting alcohol and drug tests on railroad employees who had been involved in serious train accidents that met its specified criteria for post-accident testing (see 49 CFR 219.201). Since the program’s inception, FRA has routinely conducted post-accident tests for alcohol and for certain drugs classified by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as controlled substances because of their potential for abuse or addiction. See the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Substances Act of 1970 (CSA, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.). As noted in the NPRM, FRA has historically conducted post-accident tests for alcohol and marijuana, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), and certain opiates, amphetamines, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines. The purpose of these tests is to determine if alcohol misuse or drug abuse played a role in the occurrence or severity of an accident.
“On May 17, 2012, FRA proposed to add routine post-accident tests for certain non-controlled substances with potentially impairing side effects (77 FR 29307). As discussed in the NPRM, studies have shown a significant increase in the daily use of prescription drugs, OTC drugs, vitamins, and herbal and dietary supplements by both railroad workers and the general population. Although most prescription drugs and all OTC drugs are non-controlled substances, many commonly used ones, such as antihistamines and muscle relaxants (e.g., tramadol), carry warning labels against driving or moving heavy machinery because of their potential sedating effects. Furthermore, even prescription and OTC drugs that do not carry such warnings can have unintended side effects when taken in combination with other drugs, when not used in accordance with directions, or when a user has an unusual reaction.
“In the NPRM, FRA discussed testing for two non-controlled substances: (1) Tramadol, which is available only by prescription, and (2) sedating antihistamines, which are available at both prescription and OTC dosages. FRA asked for comment on how the agency should handle test results for these first non-controlled substances to be tested for routinely in its post-accident testing program. In the NPRM, FRA proposed to continue its research testing related to sedating antihistamines and keep the test results confidential and not report to the relevant railroad or employee any sedating antihistamine post-accident test results. In the NPRM, FRA noted that although tramadol is a non-controlled substance, it is a prescription-only semi-synthetic opioid that can cause dizziness, and sought comment on how it should handle tramadol post-accident test results. FRA specifically requested comment as to whether the agency should release post-accident test results for tramadol as it does for other opioids that are controlled substances.
Case Study: On Tuesday February 19, 2013 a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit materially strengthened the whistle-blower protections of railroad employees contained in the Federal Rail Safety Act by the construction it placed on some of its key provisions to protect against retaliation for reporting injuries. .
Free copy of opinion available here.
This is significant not only for railroad employees who believe they face retaliation for having reported a safety problem, but for employees in other sectors like maritime, aviation and motor carrier who are protected by federal statutory counterparts to the Federal Rail Safety Act.
“It is necessary for us to interpret the FRSA burden- shifting scheme. Statutory analysis begins with the plain language of the statute, “the language employed by Congress.” Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)) (internal quotations omitted). This Court must give effect to the intent of Congress by giving these words their “ordinary meaning.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Considering the plain meaning of the statute, FRSA burden- shifting is much more protective of plaintiff-employees than the McDonnell Douglas framework. The plaintiff-employee need only show that his protected activity was a “contributing factor” in the retaliatory discharge or discrimination, not the sole or even predominant cause. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii). In other words, “a contributing factor is any factor, which alone or in combination with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.” Ameristar Airways, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 650 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen, 514 F.3d at 476 n.3 (internal quotation omitted).
“The words “a contributing factor” . . . mean any factor which, alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision. This test is specifically intended to overrule existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove that his protected conduct was a “significant”, “motivating”, “substantial”, or “predominant” factor in a personnel action in order to overturn that action.
Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting 135 Cong. Rec. 5033 (1989) (Explanatory Statement on S. 20)) (emphasis added by Federal Circuit). Furthermore, an employee “need not demonstrate the existence of a retaliatory motive on the part of the employee taking the alleged prohibited personnel action in order to establish that his disclosure was a contributing factor to the personnel action.” Marano, 2 F.3d at 1141 (emphasis in original); see also Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A prima facie case does not require that the employee conclusively demonstrate the employer’s retaliatory motive.”).
This case significantly clarifies the Federal Rail Safety Act as amended in 2007 with protections for whistle-blowers.
As I noted in a post a few weeks ago (here), the law displays considerable ambivalence about whistle-blower / anti-retaliation protections. [plug] Such protection as is offered by statute in the various transport modes and also outside the transport sector is often hedged in with short statute of limitations filing time limits, limited and conditional access to federal court, and considerable legal credence given to employer explanations of what they call as “disciplinary” action for claimed complainant rule violations.
From the standpoint of legal doctrine this case moves the needle toward complainant’s rights and requires more of the employer who would wish to strike down the complainant’s claim.
Whatever one thinks is the proper policy toward whistle-blowers – in transport or elsewhere – this case makes matters considerably easier for the employee-complainant and harder for the employer who seeks to explain why it took action against the employee in question.
This holding and related opinion amount to a strong move in the employee-complainant’s direction. Railroad employees and railroad management should each take note, as Charles Cahill has underscored in his summary. A summary of a case that he argued himself to the 3rd Circuit.
CASE STUDY #1 / In the relatively low-key format of its report on a specific accident, the NTSB made recommendations to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and Federal Railroad Administration that could be surprisingly consequential in the current legal context.
Hat tip to the Scopelitis Transportation Blog this past week.
First, the FMCSA is, controversially, pursuing its safety program called “CSA 2010”. Its Safety Measurement System – alongside SafeStat – has called into question the standards by which motor carriers and those who hire them will be judged on both compliance grounds and in vicarious liability litigation. See past comments abut CSA 2010 in this blog here and here.
Into this fraught situation for motor carriers and brokers the NTSB in its report on a truck-tractor hauling two empty trailers and an Amtrak train in Nevada killing the truck driver, train conductor, and four passengers – and injuring 15 passengers and a crew member. Its recommendations begin at Page 64 of “National Transportation Safety Board. 2012. Report available here: “Highway–Railroad Grade Crossing Collision, US Highway 95, Miriam, Nevada, June 24, 2011. Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-12/03”.
 “Create a mechanism to gather and record commercial driving-related employment history information about all drivers who have a commercial driver’s license, and make this information available to all prospective motor carrier employers. (H-12-54).
 “Using the mechanism developed in Safety Recommendation H-12-54, require motor carriers to conduct and document investigations into the employment records of prospective drivers for the 10 years that precede the application date. (H-12-55).
 “Require motor carriers to retrieve records from the Commercial Driver’s License Information System and the National Driver Register for all driver applicants so that they can obtain a complete driving and license history of prospective drivers. (H-12-56).
Second, even a casual reading of this blog picks up on the frequency and volume of tort litigation relating to collisions at railroad grade crossings (see posts here, here, here, here, here, and here). Also, recently the Federal Railroad Administration proposed a rule to require railroads to inventory all railroad / highway crossings over which they operate (see post here).
 “Work with the Federal Highway Administration to develop a model grade crossing action plan that can be used as a resource document by all states. At a minimum, such a document should incorporate information from US Department of Transportation publications, industry studies, and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, as well as the best practices and lessons learned at the conclusion of the 5-year grade crossing action plans developed in response to 49 Code of Federal Regulations 234.11, “State Highway–Rail Grade Crossing Action Plans.” (R-12-42).
RAILROAD / Administrative Rule – / Federal Railroad Administration clarifies but does not alter its December 11, 2012 proposal on implementing the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 to require that “certain passenger and freight railroads install positive train control (PTC) systems”. Key here: Responses the FRA makes to Association of American Railroads petition.
In a petition for rulemaking dated April 22, 2012 the Association of American Railroads (AAR) proposed – regarding a future FRA rule about Positive Train Control systems – “expanding the de minimis exception and other amend[ing] the rules concerning the “limited operations” exception, en route failure of trains operating with PTC systems, and the discontinuance of signal systems once PTC systems are installed”.

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