Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100576/lopez-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:51:21+00:00

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1. On the record in this case, entrapment was not shown as a matter of law; and, if there was any error in the trial court's instructions on this subject, it was not reversible error. Pp. 373 U. S. 434 -437.
2. Both the Agent's testimony pertaining to his conversation with petitioner and the wire recording of that conversation were properly admitted in evidence. Pp. 373 U. S. 437 -440.
simply because his apparent willingness to accept a bribe was not real. Pp. 373 U. S. 437 -438.
(b) The secret making of the wire recording of the conversation did not violate petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 373 U. S. 438 -439.
(c) This Court should not, in the exercise of its supervisory powers, prevent the introduction of the recording in evidence, since there was no manifestly improper conduct by federal officials. P. 373 U. S. 440 .
"Lopez: Yes, and Uncle Sam is bigger than you and I are, and we pay a lot of taxes, and if we can benefit something by it individually, let's keep it that way, and, believe me, anything that transpires between you and I, not even my wife or my accountant or anybody is aware of it. So I want you to feel that way about it. [ Footnote 2 ]"
The first of the four counts in the ensuing indictment charged that, at the meeting of October 21, Lopez gave Davis the $420 with intent to induce Davis, among other things, "to refrain from making an examination of the books and records relating to sales and receipts" at the Inn from 1959-1961. [ Footnote 3 ] The remaining three counts related to the meeting of October 24, and charged three separate acts of attempted bribery, each for the purpose of influencing Davis to aid in concealing sales, receipts, and any cabaret tax due for the years 1959-1961. The acts were the giving of $200 to Davis (Count 2), the promise of an additional $200 the following month (Count 3), and the promise of a free weekend for Davis and his family (Count 4).
Although defense counsel had briefly adverted to the possibility of "entrapment" in his summation to the jury, he did not request judgment of acquittal on that ground. Nor did he request any instruction on the point, or offer at the trial any evidence particularly aimed at such a defense . Nevertheless, the trial judge did charge on entrapment. [ Footnote 4 ] Petitioner made no objection to this instruction, or to any other aspect of the charge.
Following per curiam affirmance of the conviction by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 305 F.2d 825, we granted certiorari, 371 U.S. 859, to consider the two questions stated at the outset of this opinion. Supra, pp. 373 U. S. 428 -429.
The defense of entrapment, its meaning, purpose, and application, are problems that have sharply divided this Court on past occasions. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 ; Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369 ; Masciale v. United States, 356 U. S. 386 . Whether, in the absence of a conclusive showing, the defense is for the court or the jury, and whether the controlling standard looks only to the conduct of the Government, or also takes into account the predisposition of the defendant, are among the issues that have been mooted. We need not, however, concern ourselves with any of these questions here, for, under any approach, petitioner's belated claim of entrapment is insubstantial, and the record fails to show any prejudice that would warrant reversal on this score.
In the case before us, we think that such a showing has not been made. It is undisputed that, at the meeting of October 21, petitioner made an unsolicited offer of $420 to Agent Davis. The references to the October 21 offer in the recorded conversation scarcely leave room for doubt that this offer was made for the same general purpose as the bribes offered at the October 24 meeting: to obtain Davis' assistance in concealing any cabaret tax liability for past and present periods. [ Footnote 5 ] As to the meeting of October 24, the recording shows that petitioner's improper overtures began almost at the outset of the discussion, when he stated: "Deduct anything you think you should, and I'll be happy to . . . because you may prevent something coming up in the office." This and similar statements preceded Davis' computations, [ Footnote 6 ] and his comment, "I don't want to get greedy,"
We need not be long detained by the belated claim that Davis should not have been permitted to testify about the conversation of October 24. Davis was not guilty of an unlawful invasion of petitioner's office simply because his apparent willingness to accept a bribe was not real. Compare Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 . He was in the office with petitioner's consent, and, while there, he did not violate the privacy of the office by seizing something surreptitiously without petitioner's knowledge. Compare Gouled v. United States, supra. The only evidence obtained consisted of statements made by Lopez to Davis, statements which Lopez knew full well could be used against him by Davis if he wished. We decline to hold that, whenever an offer of a bribe is made in private and the offeree does not intend to accept, that offer is a constitutionally protected communication.
Stripped to its essentials, petitioner's argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment. For no other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the agent could testify to from memory. [ Footnote 11 ] We think the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording.
The function of a criminal trial is to seek out and determine the truth or falsity of the charges brought against the defendant. Proper fulfillment of this function requires that, constitutional limitations aside, all relevant, competent evidence be admissible unless the manner in which it has been obtained -- for example, by violating some statute or rule of procedure -- compels the formulation of a rule excluding its introduction in a federal court. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 ; Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 .
Petitioner does not claim that the issue of entrapment should always be decided by the court and never submitted to the jury, and we are not now presented with that question. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369 ; Masciale v. United States, 356 U. S. 386 .
I concur in the result achieved by the Court, but feel compelled to state my views separately. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, the majority opinion may be interpreted as reaffirming sub silentio the result in On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 . Since I agree with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN that On Lee was wrongly decided, and should not be revitalized, but base my views on grounds different from those stated in the dissent, I have chosen to concur specially. Although the dissent assumes that this case and On Lee are in all respects the same, to me, they are quite dissimilar, constitutionally and from the viewpoint of what this Court should permit under its supervisory powers over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.
It is no answer to say that the defense can call an informer such as Chin Poy as a hostile witness. The prosecution may have an interest in concealing his identity or whereabouts. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 . He may be so undependable and disreputable that no defense counsel would risk putting him on the stand. Moreover, as a defense witness, he would be open to impeachment by the Government, his late employer. The tactical possibilities of this situation would be apparent to a prosecutor bent on obtaining conviction. Through use of a recorder or transmitter, he may place in the case-in-chief evidence of statements supporting conviction which is not open to impeachment. And, if not required to call the informer, he may place on the defense the onus of finding and calling a disreputable witness who, if called, may be impeached on all collateral issues favoring the defense. The effect on law enforcement practices need hardly be stated: the more disreputable the informer employed by the Government, the less likely the accused will be able to establish any questionable law enforcement methods used to convict him.
pattern of presentation of evidence in the criminal trial, a shift that may be used to conceal substantial factual and legal issues concerning the rights of the accused and the administration of criminal justice. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Cf. On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 , 343 U. S. 758 (Black, J., dissenting).
The facts in On Lee may also have involved a right to counsel issue. The New York of Court Appeals has recently ruled that, after a person has been arraigned, any statement obtained outside the presence of his counsel and without advice as to his rights is inadmissible at trial, since the petitioner is entitled to the presence of counsel at every stage in the proceedings after arraignment. People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 182 N.E.2d 103; cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ; Spano v. New York, supra, p. 360 U. S. 324 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). The statement in Meyer was made to a police officer voluntarily and without solicitation while Meyer was on bail awaiting submission of his case to the grand jury. Presumably, any agent of the prosecutor would be circumscribed by this rule, whether he be a "special employee" like Chin Poy or a patrolman on the beat.
Where the similar defense of entrapment has been involved, cross-examination of the government informer has invariably been critical to the defense. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369 , 356 U. S. 371 -375. Had the Government been able to limit its case in Sherman to recordings of the final meetings between the informer and the petitioner wherein the illegal sales were consummated, the record would never have revealed the long series of meetings inducing the petitioner to make these sales. The officers in charge were apparently unaware they had ever taken place. 356 U.S. at 356 U. S. 374 -375.
"In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, see Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 , 308 U. S. 341 -342, this Court has, from the very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions. . . . [collecting authority.] And, in formulating such rules of evidence for federal criminal trials, the Court has been guided by considerations of justice not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance."
See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 , 335 U. S. 414 -416 (dissenting opinion); Rule 26, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In McNabb itself, the purpose of the exclusionary rule adopted was to eliminate all incentive to engage in law enforcement practices universally condemned -- use of the "third degree" to obtain confession immediately after arrest.
The other half of the Government's argument is that Lopez surrendered his right of privacy when he communicated his "secret thoughts" to Agent Davis. The assumption, manifestly untenable, is that the Fourth Amendment is only designed to protect secrecy. If a person commits his secret thoughts to paper, that is no license for the police to seize the paper; if a person communicates his secret thoughts verbally to another, that is no license for the police to record the words. Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 . On Lee certainly rested on no such theory of waiver. The right of privacy would mean little if it were limited to a person's solitary thoughts, and so fostered secretiveness. It must embrace a concept of the liberty of one's communications, and historically it has.
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others . . . , and, even if he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them. "
And if this principle is granted, I see no reasoned basis for reaching different results depending upon whether the conversation is with a private person, with a federal undercover agent ( On Lee ), or with an avowed federal agent, as here.
embodies a more encompassing principle. It is, in light of the Entick decision, that government ought not to have the untrammeled right to extract evidence from people. Thus viewed, the Fourth Amendment is complementary to the Fifth. Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 , 322 U. S. 489 -490. The informing principle of both Amendments is nothing less than a comprehensive right of personal liberty in the face of governmental intrusion.
116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 630 .
The Court in Boyd set its face against a narrowly literal conception of "search and seizure," instead reading the Fourth and Fifth Amendments together as creating a broad right to inviolate personalty. Boyd itself was not a search and seizure case in the conventional sense, but involved an order to compel production of documents in the nature of a subpoena duces tecum. And Boyd had been preceded by Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 , 96 U. S. 735 , in which the Court had clearly intimated that a statute permitting government officials to open letters in the mail would violate the Fourth Amendment. See also Hoover v. McChesney, 81 F. 472 (Cir.Ct.D.Ky. 1897).
The authority of the Boyd decision has never been impeached. Its basic principle, that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments interact to create a comprehensive right of privacy, of individual freedom, has been repeatedly approved in the decisions of this Court. [ Footnote 3/7 ] Thus, we have held that the gist of the Fourth Amendment is "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 , 338 U. S. 27 ; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 , 342 U. S. 119 ; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
359 U. S. 360 , 359 U. S. 362 . Only two Terms ago, in reaffirming that the Fourth Amendment's "right to privacy" is a "basic constitutional right," Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , 367 U. S. 656 , we remarked the "intimate relation" between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 367 U. S. 657 . So also, the Court's insistence that the Fourth Amendment is to be liberally construed, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 , 273 U. S. 32 ; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 , 285 U. S. 464 ; Grau v. United States, 287 U. S. 124 , that searches for and seizures of mere evidence, as opposed to the fruits or instrumentalities of crime, are impermissible under any circumstances, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, supra, at 285 U. S. 464 -466; Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 , 331 U. S. 154 ; Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217 , 362 U. S. 237 -238, and that the Fourth Amendment is violated whether the search or seizure is accomplished by force, by subterfuge, Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 , 255 U. S. 306 ; see, e.g., Gatewood v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 209 F.2d 789; Fraternal Order of Eagles v. United States, 57 F.2d 93; United States v. General Pharmacal Co., 205 F.Supp. 692; United States v. Bush, 172 F.Supp. 818; United States v. Reckis, 119 F.Supp. 687; United States v. Mitchneck, 2 F.Supp. 225; but see United States v. Bush, 283 F.2d 51, reversing 172 F.Supp. 818, by an invalid subpoena, see, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 , 201 U. S. 76 ; Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 ; Brown v. United States, 276 U. S. 134 , or otherwise, see e.g., Wakkuri v. United States, 67 F.2d 844, is confirmation that the purpose of the Amendment is to protect individual liberty in the broadest sense from governmental intrusion. And see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 , 367 U. S. 549 -552 (dissenting opinion).
Court's holding, which is fully pertinent here, [ Footnote 3/8 ] rested on the propositions that there had been no search, because no trespass had been committed against the petitioners, and no seizure, because no physical evidence had been obtained, thus making the Fourth Amendment inapplicable; and that evidence was not inadmissible in federal criminal trials merely because obtained by federal officers by methods violative of state law or otherwise unethical.
(3) The Court's illiberal approach in Olmstead was a deviant in the law of the Fourth Amendment, and not a harbinger of decisional revolution. The Court has not only continued to reiterate its adherence to the principles of the Boyd decision, see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, supra, but to require that subpoenas duces tecum comply with the Fourth Amendment, see United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707 , 321 U. S. 727 -728; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 ; McPhaul v. United States, 364 U. S. 372 , 364 U. S. 382 -383 -- a requirement patently inconsistent with a grudging, narrow conception of "searches and seizures."
obtained, unless its admission is specifically made illegal by federal statute or by the Constitution, the decision is manifestly inconsistent with what has come to be regarded as the scope of the supervisory power over federal law enforcement. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 ; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 ; Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 ; Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 ; Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 Harv.L.Rev. 481, 537 (1946). We are empowered to fashion rules of evidence for federal criminal trials in conformity with "the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience." Rule 26, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Even if electronic surveillance as here involved does not violate the letter of the Fourth Amendment, which I do not concede, it violates its spirit, and we ought to devise an appropriate prophylactic rule. The Court's suggestion that the supervisory power may never be invoked to create an exclusionary rule of evidence unless there has been a violation of a specific federal law or rule of procedure is, to me, a gratuitous attempt to cripple that power. And I do not see how it can be reconciled with our mandate to fashion rules conformable to evolving common law principles.
§ 605, being directed to the specific practice sanctioned by Olmstead, wiretapping, does not, of its own force, forbid the admission in evidence of the fruits of other techniques of electronic surveillance. But a congressional enactment is a source of judicial policy, as well as a specific mandate to be enforced, and the same "broad considerations of morality and public wellbeing," Nardone at 308 U. S. 340 , which make wiretap evidence inadmissible in the federal courts equally justify a court-made rule excluding the fruits of such devices as the Minifon. It is anomalous that the federal courts, while enforcing the right to privacy with respect to telephone communications, recognize no such right with respect to communications wholly within the sanctuaries of home and office.
If we want to understand why the Court, in Olmstead, Goldman, and On Lee, carved such seemingly anomalous exceptions to the general principles which have guided the Court in enforcing the Fourth Amendment, we must consider two factors not often articulated in the decisions. The first is the pervasive fear that, if electronic surveillance were deemed to be within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, a useful technique of law enforcement would be wholly destroyed, because an electronic "search" could never be reasonable within the meaning of the Amendment. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 40, 187 (1961). For one thing, electronic surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate, so that compliance with the requirement of particularity in the Fourth Amendment would be difficult; for another, words, which are the objects of an electronic seizure, are ordinarily mere evidence, and not the fruits or instrumentalities of crime, and so they are impermissible objects of lawful searches under any circumstances, see p. 373 U. S. 456 -457, supra; finally, the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect.
risk changes crucially. There is no security from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk, and so not even a residuum of true privacy. See pp. 373 U. S. 449 -451, supra. [ Footnote 3/12 ]"
Furthermore, the fact that the police traditionally engage in some rather disreputable practices of law enforcement is no argument for their extension. Eavesdropping was indictable at common law, [ Footnote 3/13 ] and most of us would still agree that it is an unsavory practice. The limitations of human hearing, however, diminish its potentiality for harm. Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdropping. They make it more penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient, and police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.
of States have been impelled to enact regulatory legislation. [ Footnote 3/18 ] (5) The legitimate law enforcement need for such techniques is not clear, [ Footnote 3/19 ] and it surely has not been established that a stiff warrant requirement for electronic surveillance would destroy effective law enforcement.
historically, the search and seizure power was used to suppress freedom of speech and of the press, see Lasson, supra, at 33, 37-50; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717 , 367 U. S. 724 -729; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 , 359 U. S. 376 (dissenting opinion), and that today also, the liberties of the person are indivisible.
Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 , 331 U. S. 159 (dissenting opinion).
Of course, the Warrant Clause not only outlaws general warrants, but also establishes the root principle of judicial superintendence of searches and seizures. See p. 373 U. S. 464 , infra.
E.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 , 168 U. S. 543 -544; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 , 201 U. S. 71 ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 , 255 U. S. 306 ; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 , 269 U. S. 33 -34; McGuire v. United States, 273 U. S. 95 , 273 U. S. 99 ; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 , 285 U. S. 467 ; Feldman v. United States, supra, at 322 U. S. 489 -490; Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 , 328 U. S. 587 ; Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624 , 328 U. S. 628 .
The Court's liberal construction of the Fourth is paralleled by its similarly liberal construction of the Fifth. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 , 142 U. S. 562 .
277 U.S. at 277 U. S. 465 .
Id. at 277 U. S. 466 .
The disingenuous artificiality of this analysis is surely plain. Although, arguably, face-to-face conversations in home or office are more intimately a part of the right to privacy than are telephonic conversations, see pp. 373 U. S. 452 -453, supra, any attempt to draw a constitutional distinction would ignore the plain realities of modern life, in which the telephone has assumed an indispensable role in free human communication.
In Irvine v. California, supra, though the conduct of the police was held to violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the fruits were deemed admissible under the rule of Wolf v. Colorado, supra, overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, supra. It might be noted that the holdings in Irvine and Silverman, insofar as they brought verbal fruits within the Fourth Amendment, were implicit in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 , 251 U. S. 392 , where it was held that all fruits of an unconstitutional search must be excluded from the federal courts, so as not to "reduce the Fourth Amendment to a form of words." Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 ; Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 73 App.D.C. 85, 115 F.2d 690.
"In the instant case ( On Lee ), . . . Lee's overhearing of petitioner's statements was accomplished through Chin Poy's surreptitious introduction, within petitioner's laundry, of Lee's concealed radio transmitter, which, without petitioner's knowledge or consent, there picked up petitioner's conversation and transmitted it to Lee outside the premises. The presence of the transmitter, for this purpose, was the presence of Lee's ear. . . . In this case, the words were picked up without warrant or consent within the constitutionally inviolate 'house' of a person entitled to protection there against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ."
On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 , 343 U. S. 766 -767 (Burton, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 , 316 U. S. 140 , n. 6 (Murphy, J., dissenting); cf. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), § 2184b(3), at 59; Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 Col.L.Rev. 165, 200-208 (1952).
This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment must necessarily embrace every situation involving electronic recording aids to law enforcement. For example, a distinction might be drawn between surveillance of home or office, on the one hand, and surveillance of public places, streets, and so forth, on the other hand. Compare McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 , with Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 .
" Eaves-droppers, or such as listen under walls or windows or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are a common nuisance, and presentable at the court-leet, or are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and finding sureties for their good behaviour."

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