Source: https://classactionblawg.com/tag/fraud-on-the-market/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 23:18:53+00:00

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Basically the Same Story after Halliburton II?
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision earlier today in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (Halliburton II), its most highly-anticipated class-action-related decision of the October 2013 term. Those who were hoping for a sea-change in securities class action jurisprudence were left disappointed, as the Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, declined to overrule its 25-year-old decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Rather than abolish the framework established in Basic, which provides a means for securities fraud plaintiffs to satisfy the elements of class certification through a class-wide presumption of reliance on material misrepresentations, the Court instead held that a defendant can rebut the presumption by demonstrating, at the class certification stage, that the alleged misrepresentations did not actually have any impact on the stock price. In doing so, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision barring the defendant from offering evidence of non-impact on stock price at the class certification stage.
[P]rice impact differs from materiality in a crucial respect. Given that the other Basic prerequisites must still be proved at the class certification stage, the common issue of materiality can be left to the merits stage without risking the certification of classes in which individual issues will end up overwhelming common ones. And because materiality is a discrete issue that can be resolved in isolation from the other prerequisites, it can be wholly confined to the merits stage.
Price impact is different. The fact that a misrepresentation “was reflected in the market price at the time of [the]transaction”—that it had price impact—is “Basic’s fundamental premise.” Halliburton I, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). It thus has everything to do with the issue of predominance at the class certification stage. That is why, if reliance is to be shown through the Basic presumption,the publicity and market efficiency prerequisites must be proved before class certification. Without proof of those prerequisites, the fraud-on-the-market theory underlying the presumption completely collapses, rendering class certification inappropriate.
Halliburton II, slip op., at 21-22. In other words, a merits question that is indisputedly common to the class should not be considered prior to class certification, but a merits question that also bears on whether the issues to be resolved at trial are truly common or individualized in the first place must be considered as part of the class certification decision.
Individual Standing in Class Actions offers an important and interesting approach to the question of standing, one of the most important themes relating to the development of Brazilian class actions.
The first part the book summarizes research on foreign law, inquiring into the state of the art of collective protection throughout Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico), in the United States and Canada, in the European Union (Germany, France, England and Italy) and in Australia. Part two offers a comparative analysis of these jurisdictions’ various approaches to standing.
Part three organizes the main objections to representational standing and argues for laws recognizing the standing of individuals to sue in a representative capacity, demonstrating the reasons for its relevance, and the important role to be played by lawyers in class actions.
Finally, the book addresses the question of the participation of the individual from various perspectives, seeking to offer a systematic framework for the standing discussion and proposals for the improvement of collective protection in Brazil.
The result is a work that contributes to the development and strengthening of collective action law in Brazilian and brings a new perspective of modernization and improvement of tools for access to justice and the effectiveness of the process.
Pochmann da Silva’s book is available at http://www.editoragz.com.br/produto.asp?prodId=199.
A deeply entrenched principle in the law of fraud and negligent misrepresentation provides that damages can be recovered only upon a showing of reliance. To prevail, plaintiffs must not only establish the mere falsity of a statement, but also show that they had acted upon the statement and sustained injury as a consequence.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this principle, this paper argues that the reliance requirement ought to be abandoned. Harm can be caused by a misrepresentation without reliance, and recovery for such loss should not be barred. When a firm misrepresents an attribute of a product, its price in equilibrium typically rises. The inflated price is an injury caused to all consumers, relying and non-relying alike. A rule restricting recovery to only relying consumers results in inadequate deterrence of the firm, which in turn spurs a host of inefficient effects: it may distort allocative efficiency; encourage investments by firms in the production of fraud; induce investments by consumers in self-protection efforts and in detrimental reliance investments; and prompt competing firms to invest excessively in signaling. Furthermore, it undermines deterrence by erecting a substantial barrier to private enforcement through class actions.
While the discussion focuses on consumer markets, it applies more broadly to other markets and other market structures. We explicitly discuss its extension to security markets, in which the requirement has been famously revoked. While the analysis supports existing policy in the domain of primary security markets, it does not do so in the context of secondary markets.
Are Securities Fraud Class Actions Basically a Thing of the Past?
The Supreme Court granted certiorari earlier this week in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 13-317, a second trip to the high Court for the same case. At issue is whether the Court should overrule holding of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, which recognized the “fraud-on-the-market” theory of class wide reliance in securities fraud cases. The Court foreshadowed its willingness to consider this issue last term when it decided Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (2012). Both Amgen and the Court’s earlier decision in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) were victories for plaintiffs, with the Court holding in both cases that plaintiffs were not required to prove questions on the merits as a prerequisite to class certification. However, in Amgen, Justice Alito’s concurrence as well as dissenting opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas (joined by Justice Kennedy) all raised questions about the continued viability of the Basic decision.
At the risk of oversimplification, the “fraud-on-the market” theory is that a material misrepresentation made in connection with the sale of a publicly traded security can have an effect on the entire market, so that investors may be harmed (or benefitted) by the misrepresentation even if they did not directly rely on it, because enough investors in the market did rely on it to the point where the price was affected. A decision by the Court that this presumption is no longer viable could seriously limit or eliminate securities fraud class actions, because without the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption, a required element of a securities fraud claim, reliance, becomes an individualized question of fact. As a result, Halliburton becomes the first case on the Court’s 2013-14 docket that has a potential for a truly significant impact on class actions.
Judge Krieger opened by observing that none of the cases this term have been a surprise from the standpoint of what a trial court judge would have expected given existing law. Amgen was predictable because the question of materiality in a securities fraud case is unquestionably a common issue, so it is not surprising that it is a question for trial, not a prerequisite for class certification. Standard Fire can be viewed as a straightforward application of agency law: a plaintiff cannot bind a class of people that he or she doesn’t yet represent. Comcast exemplifies the importance of examining the plaintiffs’ theory of liability and the relationship to the theory of loss. Damages are not the same as loss. The theory by which the plaintiff establishes loss determines the measure of damages.
When asked to identify any trends that she has been seeing in class actions recently, Judge Krieger identified issue certification as a key trend. She has been seeing more situations where the factual issues may be individualized but there are common legal issues that can be resolved classwide. She noted that she has been inclined to grant partial certification limited to the common legal issue(s) in that situation.
From the plaintiffs’ perspective, Katz agreed that the outcome of Standard Fire was not surprising, and he went as far as to say that the outcome was correct, noting that plaintiffs’ attorneys shouldn’t be afraid of the federal courts. Although the holding of Amgen was favorable to plaintiffs, Katz noted an issue that should be of great concern to plaintiffs, and that is the commentary from the conservative wing of the court suggesting that they might be willing to revisit the fraud-on-the-market presumption adopted in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. Katz sees the potential of a 4-4 split on that issue, with Chief Justice Roberts being the deciding vote. He predicts market studies being commissioned by both sides over the coming years to demonstrate or disprove the continued efficiency of the markets.
Comcast, Katz noted, caused a collective sigh of relief in the plaintiffs’ bar because it does not go as far as many would have feared by requiring Daubert hearings at the class certification phase. He noted that one positive impact for plaintiffs arising from the “death of Eisen” (the rejection in decisions like Wal-Mart and Comcast of the idea that merits questions were off-limits at the class certification phase) is that it gives plaintiffs’ counsel an opportunity to obtain merits discovery much earlier in a case than was allowed previously. On the other hand, Katz expressed fear about the possibility that the Court is trying to raise the bar for plaintiffs with a subtle change in the language about what common proof is necessary on the issue of damages. Where earlier decisions required that damages be “susceptible to classwide proof,” the Comcast majority phrased the standard as requiring the plaintiff to “prove classwide damages.” Katz predicts that defendants will argue that this means damages must be uniform, as opposed to simply being susceptible to formulaic calculation. He noted, however, that the few lower courts that have interpreted Comcast so far have rejected a broad application of the decision.
Fitzpatrick combined philosophical commentary about the evolution of class actions with some practical tips for defense lawyers. Standard Fire, he argued, is proof that judicial hellholes still exist. He pointed to Amgen as an example of the dangers of accepting conventional wisdom, pointing out that the outcome in that case might well have been different if the defendants had stipulated to the existence of an efficient market.
Comcast, Fitzpatrick said, provides an opportunity for defendants to prevail at the class certification stage by discrediting a plaintiffs’ expert. Focus not just on the opinions themselves, he suggested, but also on 1) the existence of bias; 2) the expert’s credentials, and 3) flaws in the methodology. Scour the country for transcripts about the plaintiffs’ experts. Look at misstatements and exaggerations in the expert’s CV. Make sure you find and read all of their prior statements in books, media, and transcripts. Just as important, Fitzpatrick reminded defense practitioners, is the make sure to prepare your own experts for class certification.
The Supreme Court has issued its opinion in one of the most highly anticipated class action-related cases on the docket this term. The result in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085, slip op. (U.S., Feb. 27, 2013) is not surprising given the content and tone of the questioning at oral argument. In an 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ginsberg, the Court held that the plaintiff in a securities fraud case based on a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance does not have to prove materiality of the fraudulent statement or omission at the class certification stage. Because materiality is a common question capable of resolution simultaneously for the entire class, the majority reasoned, it does not have to be proven at the class certification stage. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy dissented.
Amgen is an important decision in the securities fraud context because it addresses the lingering question of whether any special prerequisites exist in certifying a securities fraud class action that aren’t required in certifying other types of class actions. Like the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011), Amgen will probably have an impact beyond the securities fraud context. In the context of class certification decisions more broadly, the opinion will be almost certainly be cited as clarifying the distinction between issues impacting the elements of class certification, which must be resolved at the class certification phase, and merits issues, which can wait until trial to be resolved.
Forbes columnist Daniel Fisher has authored an excellent preview of the three class-action-related cases set to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court this term. The article, entitled Class-Action Lawyers Face Triple Threat At Supreme Court, previews the issues in each of the three cases and summarizes what’s at stake for class action lawyers. The article points out that although the three decisions have potential to spell disaster for class action plaintiffs given the conservative majority in the Supreme Court, two of the three class-action-related decisions last term came out in favor of the plaintiffs. I highly recommend this article, as well as Fisher’s work more generally.

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