Source: https://www.calbizlit.com/cal_biz_lit/civil_procedure_and_discovery/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:51:25+00:00

Document:
Except as provided in subdivision (b), or by any court order, including a case management order, a deposition examination of the witness by all counsel, other than the witness’ counsel of record, shall be limited to seven hours of total testimony. The court shall allow additional time, beyond any limits imposed by this section, if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination.
﻿﻿﻿This is somewhat different than Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30(d)(1), which limits depositions to one day of seven hours and on its face includes questionning by the deponent's attorney. AB 1875 has a seven hour limit, but does not limit the examination to a single day. Furthermore, AB 1875 has specific exceptions.
The first exception recognizes agreements by the parties, which will be enforced. Other exceptions to the limit include expert witness depositions, depositions of corporate representatives (referred to in California as "persons most qualified"), plaintiffs (and all witnesses) in employment cases and "second served" depositions, taken by parties served in a case after one or more initial depositions were completed.
. . . unless a licensed physician attests in a declaration served on the parties that the deponent suffers from an illness or condition that raises substantial medical doubt of survival of the deponent beyond six months, in which case the deposition examination of the witness by all counsel, other than the witness’ counsel of record, shall be limited to two days of no more than seven hours of total testimony each day, or 14 hours of total testimony.
When the Consumer Attorneys of California – the organized Plaintiff tort bar – was lobbying for this bill, some of the examples of abusive, overly-long depositions they cited were from asbestos plaintiff depositions and from employment depositions. But the bill that ultimately passed both houses and was signed by the Governor allows unlimited depositions in employment cases and limits asbestos plaintiff depositions only when the plaintiff is dying.
The new law takes effect on January 13, 2013. CBL will be most interested to see the extent to which the parties reach stipulations in appropriate cases and also the extent to which Superior Court judges are willing to make case-by-case accommodations. As California Court resources have become scarcer and scarcer, getting timely relief through discovery motions has become increasingly difficult.
It's been more than two years since the Cal Supremes agreed to hear the case of Coito v. Superior Court of Stanislaus County (March 4, 2010) (F057690) and decide this question: "Is the statement of a witness that is taken in writing or otherwise recorded verbatim by an attorney or the attorney's representative entitled to the protection of the California work product privilege?"
The case is now set for hearing at the California Supreme Court in San Francisco on Thursday, May 31 at 9:00 a.m.
As CBL has posted here and here, Courts of Appeal are divided on this question, meaning the trial courts have so far been able to rule either way. Cal Supremes hearings are often like press-conferences for the outcome, so we may well know how this is going to come out right after the hearing. CBL will keep you posted.
Happy New Year. Now Put Away That Computer!
Comes the new year, and lots of law firms, pundits, reporters and bloggers like to write about the new laws coming into effect the first of the year. And CBL may get around to that. But here's our favorite: Last August, as reported by the SF Chronicle, the California legislature passed, and Governor Brown signed, AB 141, designed to prevent jurors from blogging, tweeting, or facebook posting about their jury service in progress or from conducting internet research.
The new additions to California's Code of Civil Procedure and Penal Code provide that the court's admonition must include a clear explanation "that the prohibition on research, dissemination of information, and conversation applies to all forms of electronic and wireless communication." The bailiff or court attendant in charge of the jury is required to enforce the ban (how? by taking away electronic devices? I doubt that.) And willful violation is contempt of court, which is a misdemeanor.
So, happy new year. Now, put down the device. Put down the device.
Here are a couple of updates on cases CBL has reported on over the last few months.
First, under the category "Court of Appeals Pokes SCOTUS in Eye," binding arbitation division, CBL reported on July 14 about Brown v. Ralph's Grocery Stores (July 12, 2011) ___Cal.App.4th ___ (2nd Dist., B222689) wherein the Court of Appeals used some extremely convoluted reasoning to try to get around the US Supremes' disapproval of Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148. The Brown court essentially tossed a binding arbitration provision with a class action waiver in an employment action brought under California's Private Attorney General Act. The employer has petitioned the Cal Supremes for a hearing. They have until November 21 to grant or deny a hearing (if they grant themselves a 30-day extension). The Cal Supremes' case number is S195850.
Second, under the category "Who just took my $15 million verdict away?" ancient precedent division, CBL reported in March on Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital (now an unciteable case) where the Court of Appeal relied on some very old authority to hold that release of one defendant in a multi-defendant lawsuit could result in the release of all defendants. The Court of Appeal begged the Cal Supremes to take the case up. The Cal Supremes have obliged and granted a hearing, and the first brief on the merits is due September 7. The Cal Supremes' case number for this one is S192768.
Stay tuned. CBL will keep you up to date.
Can Foreign Corporations Be Compelled To Appear For Deposition in California?
Warning, warning: long post ahead with a whole bunch of confusing citations to California discovery statutes. But this one is pretty important for non-California corporations ensnared in litigation in the golden state. So please bear with us, even if the post sometimes reads like a tax code analysis.
All you in-house counsel and defense counsel, consider this scenario: Say your company is headquartered in Michigan. A plaintiff sues your company in California Superior Court. His lawyers then notice the depositions of your president, vice president, chief engineer and assistant design engineer, locating them conveniently in the attorney’s offices in . . . . Los Angeles. Well, conveniently for him anyway, but not so much for the witnesses, since they all live in Michigan. Can the trial court order those corporate employees to get on the airplane from Michigan and go to Los Angeles for deposition?
Code of Civil Procedure section 1989 says “[a] witness . . . is not obliged to attend as a witness before any court, judge, justice or any other officer, unless the witness is a resident within the state at the time of service.” Section 1878 defines a “witness” as “a person whose declaration under oath is received as evidence for any purpose, whether such declaration be made on oral examination, or by deposition or affidavit.” And under section 2025.230, depositions must be taken in front of officers -- court reporters. So section 1989 applies to depositions.
Unless the court orders otherwise under Section 2025.260, the deposition of a natural person, whether or not a party to the action, shall be taken at a place that is, at the option of the party giving notice of the deposition, either within 75 miles of the deponent's residence, or within the county where the action is pending and within 150 miles of the deponent's residence.
And section 2025.260 allows the trial court to make exceptions to 2025.250 after going through a balancing analysis. But, said the court of appeal, the statute doesn’t allow exceptions to section 1989, so maybe the deposition can be more than 150 miles from the deponent’s residence, but you still can’t make him fly here from Japan. Or, presumably, Michigan.
This means we have conflicting rulings on this subject. As regular readers know, when there are conflicting decisions from two courts of appeal on a question of law, every court in the State is free to follow either of them. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court Of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450.
This all begs two interesting questions. First, will this ruling be taken to the State Supremes, and will they agree to hear it? A conflict in Court of Appeal decisions is one of the main reasons the State Supremes accept review. We’ll be watching and will let you know.
If the deponent named is not a natural person, the deposition notice shall describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event, the deponent shall designate and produce at the deposition those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent.
The deposition of an organization that is a party to the action shall be taken at a place that is, at the option of the party giving notice of the deposition, either within 75 miles of the organization's principal executive or business office in California, or within the county where the action is pending and within 150 miles of that office.
If the organization has not designated a principal executive or business office, then section 2025.250(d) allows its deposition to be taken either within the county where the deposition is pending or within 75 miles of any of its executive or business offices.
We express no opinion, however, as to whether our analysis or the conclusions we have reached in this opinion would or should extend or apply to a court order made pursuant to section 2025.230 which provides for the circumstance where “ the deponent named is not a natural person . . . .
Now that’s a pretty curious thing for the Court to say, since section 2025.230 doesn’t provide for any court order, and neither do sections 2025.250(b) and (d). In other words, a court can go through a balancing test under 2025.260 to decide if an individual deponent has to appear for a deposition farther from his residence than section 2025.250(a) would otherwise require, so long as he is a California resident as required by section 1989. But when it comes to corporate depositions, there are no exceptions to sections 2025.250(b) and (c).
We now know that section 1989 means that no witness can be compelled by a California court to appear for deposition unless the witness is a resident of this state.
A corporation is a person under Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (1886) 118 U. S. 394.
Where is the corporation a resident? Well, under federal diversity jurisprudence, it is a resident of the state where its corporate nerve center is located and the state where it is incorporated. Hertz v. Friend (2010) 130 S.Ct. 1181. This may or may not apply, but a corporation is certainly not a resident of every state where it does business; logically, a corporation resides where its executive offices, headquarters, etc. are located.
The fact that California courts may have personal jurisdiction over a corporation does not mean that the corporation is a resident of California, anymore than the State’s jurisdiction over a non-resident individual makes that individual a State resident.
Therefore, under Toyota Motor Corporation v. Superior Court, it should not be possible to compel a foreign corporation to appear for its deposition in California any more than it is possible to compel its management employees to appear here.
Of course, somebody will likely have to take this to at least the Court of Appeal, and possibly the State Supreme Court, in order to prove CBL is right. Any companies out there interested?
admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). On the other hand, the rule in California is that an expert is somebody who went to college and has a briefcase; (b) In California state court, a verdict requires nine out of twelve jurors, while in Federal Court, the verdict must be unanimous, including on damages (although we typically only get six to eight jurors); (c) in Federal Court, pretrial orders require highly structured discovery and early disclosure of expert information, while in State Court, experts are disclosed and deposed in a mad scramble right before trial; (d) in Federal Court, a defendant can actually get summary judgment granted once in awhile in a meritless case, while in California Superior Courts, the summary judgment law is somewhat akin to the tax code and the culture is to deny; and (e) while there really are plenty of good California State judges, in Federal Court the odds increase that you'll get a judge who is willing to rule and who believes in making both sides follow the law.
So here's a chronic problem. 28 U.S.C.§ 1448 says that removal to Federal Court must occur within thirty days "after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based. . . ."
Consider this scenario: Plaintiff files a product liability case in California Superior Court and sues five defendants. The first defendant sends the summons and complaint to its insurer, who sends the case to defense counsel, who doesn't think about removal jurisdicition. Counsel for Defendant 1 lets the thirty days go by, after which Plaintiff serves Defendants 2 through 5. Assuming 2 through 5 can get Defendant 1's consent, can they remove within 30 days of when they were served? There is a disagreement in the Federal Courts. Compare: Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1986) (thirty days starts running as to everybody with service on first defendant) and Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 1999) (each defendant gets 30 days from when it was served).
thirty days to remove after being brought into the case.
Destfino v. Reiswig, ___ F.3d ___ , 2011 WL 182241 (9th.Cir. 2011). So in these parts, every defendant in a removeable case gets thirty days.
The New Expedited Trials: A Big Difference, Or A Non-Event?
Not long ago, the California legislature enacted, and the outgoing Governator signed, new legislation allowing for "expedited jury trials." If the parties stipulated to it, they would get a one day jury trial, with an hour to pick a jury and three hours for each side to put on a case. There'd be no appeal and not much in the way of post-trial motions. This mechanism was presumably designed for small cases. But the parties can stipulate to use the process for any case of any size. The parties can also make a high-low deal (something they are free to do now, for that matter) with a floor for the planitiff and a ceiling for the defendant.
Clearly the idea here is to provide a meaningful forum for the trial of cases that are too small for a traditional jury trial to make any economic sense.
Will this make any difference? I have my doubts, at least for garden variety tort cases. Why would a defendant, no matter what size the case, be willing to shortcut the jury trial process if the plaintiff won't voluntarily limit the exposure? And why would the plaintiff want to voluntarily take the high end out of the case, even if the liklihood of a high end outcome is pretty remote?
As things stand, California has a process for handling small cases: non-binding judicial arbitration. I get appointed as an arbitrator on these cases (which typically involve the fascinating fact patter of one vehicle running into another) 5 or 6 times a year. Hearings typically take about an hour, and I send out a ruling (which is not effective unless both sides accept it) the same day.
One of two things happens when I get appointed an arbitrator: the case settles before the arbitration, so my getting appointed and scheduling the case for hearing has the same effect as an approaching trial date usually has. Or the plaintiff attorney just wants to get through the process so he or she can reject the award, get a trial scheduled, and find out how much money the defendant is really willing to pay. So half the time, scheuling a hearing causes the case to settle without further proceedings. The other half, it's just a bump in the road to settlement. I'm not at all sure how a one-day jury trial changes things for the good.
Also, I'm a little skeptical about the one day trial with an hour of jury selection and 6 hours of testimony (not to mention instructing the jury, closing argument, opening statement, deliberation, etc.). The typical trial day in most of our urban courts runs from 9:00 a.m. to noon and 1:30 to 4:30 with two fifteen minute breaks. That's five and a half hours. But plenty of courts have shorter trial days than that, and in some of the small rural counties where the judges both try cases and manage calendars, three to four per day hours isn't unusual. So in those courts, the one day trial becomes a full two days or more. Back in the good old days, when we had a municipal court for small cases, 2 - 3 day regular jury trials weren't all that unusual.
Still, it will be interesting to see if insurers and soft-tissue personal injury plaintiffs take advantage of the new system. Even more interesting will be if litigants with larger cases but not many issues sometimes give it a try. My guess in both cases is no.
By the way, in the spirit of simplifying the jury trial process in these "expedite" cases, the State Judicial Counsel is adopting some rules that will apply. The document setting out these rules, and the reasons for them, is here. A mere seventy pages long.
One of the more complex questions of California tort law, with one of the more counter-intuitive answers, can best be posed this way: If plaintiff sues ten defendants in tort, nine of them settle and the plaintiff gets a verdict against the tenth, what credit, or set-off, does that tenth defendant get for the settlements?
My partner Barbara Adams blogs on toxics issues from time to time at Toxics Defense. She has a multi-part series going right now on this and related questions. She does an excellent job of bringing clarity to the otherwise imponderable legal morass of credits and set-offs. The first two installments are here and here. Recommended!

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