Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Doe_v._Governeur%27s_Heirs_Robertson
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:35:53+00:00

Document:
Certificate of Division from the Circuit Court of Kentucky.
2. That if Robertus S. Brantz died, leaving his son as alien, and having no relations who were citizens of the United States, or of any of the States, then, upon his death without heirs, the title, if it had passed out of the Commonwealth by the patent, was immediately vested in the Commonwealth; and if the grant to Duncan Rose, from the Commonwealth of Virginia, includes the land in controversy, then the act of Kentucky, granting the land to N. and I. Governeur, cannot, under the articles of the compact between Virginia and Kentucky, overreach the grant to Duncan Rose from the Commonwealth of Virginia; and they ought to find for the defendants.
5. That if they find that the grant to Duncan Rose, given in evidence, includes the land held thereunder by the defendants, then the grant of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, in the act given in evidence by the plaintiff, is the junior and inferior claim of title, and the jury ought to find for the defendants.
The Judges of the Circuit Court being divided in opinion upon the instructions moved, the division was certified to this Court.
Mr. Sampson, for the plaintiff, argued, (1.) That it had been conclusively settled by a uniform series of decisions in this Court, that an alien can take, and hold, real property, either by grant or devise, until office found. [a] The grantee of the State takes by purchase as much as a private grantee. [b] In Craig v. Radford, [c] the alienage of a grantee from the State was presented distinctly as a positive bar to his taking, but the Court determined the grant to be good, and the decision of that point was inevitably involved in the determination of the cause. And there was no reason, either of policy or law, for making a distinction between a public and a private grant. The title of the government being devested by the grant, which is matter of record, it could not be revested again but by an inquest of office, by which alone the fact of alienage can be determined. Every person resident in the country is presumed to be a citizen until the contrary is shown by a judicial proceeding. [d] The government, having once invested its grantee with a title, cannot deprive him of it but in due course of law; and the inquest of office is the appropriate process, where the title to lands is in controversy. But, it might be contended, that the grant of the State to an alien is absolutely void, and not voidable merely; and a passage in Vin. Abr. might, perhaps, be relied on for that purpose. But this would be found to be a mere insulated dictum, unsupported by any other authority, or by any adjudged case. In Page's case, [e] it was 'resolved, that in the case of an alien,' &c. 'the inheritance, or freehold of the land, is not vested in the king till office found under the great seal; for that is an office of intitling.' The grants of the king are not void, unless the defect for which they are sought to be avoided appear on the face of the grant. So, here, the fact of alienage not appearing in the grant to B., is sufficient to show that it was not void. If it were contended that an alien could not take, because he could not hold, the answer would be, that he shall take and hold, until it shall appear, in the manner the law requires, that he cannot hold. The subsequent naturalization of R. S. Brantz had a retrospective effect, and confirmed and rendered valid his title, which was before subject to be defeated by an inquest of office. [f] So, also, the act of 1796 would have had the effect of confirming his title, even if he had never been naturalized. But his naturalization in Maryland was sufficient to give him all the privileges of a citizen in Kentucky, and, among others, that of holding lands, under the articles of confederation before the establishment of the present constitution. And, even supposing his title as an alien to be defective at common law, that defect was completely cured by the statute of Virginia of 1779, c. 13. s. 3. which provides, that 'All persons, as well foreigners as others, shall have a right to assign or transfer warrants, or certificates of survey for lands; and any foreigner purchasing lands, may locate and have the same surveyed, and after returning the certificate of survey to the land office, shall be allowed the term of eighteen months, either to become a citizen, or to transfer his right in such certificate of survey to some citizen of this, or any other of the United States of America.' and it is not for him to say that he misinformed the government, and having surveyed not vacant, but lands already appropriated, had thereby entitled himself to be considered a purchaser without notice. [h] There is a difference, in this respect, between grants by the government, and mere private conveyances. [i] The grantee having failed to comply with the condition of the grant, the State could not be bound by it, or estopped by it from again asserting dominion over the lands, and re-granting them to another. The grantee takes an immediate title, or none at all. [j] Even a grant made expressly to commence in futuro would be void. [k] make him a denizen, so that he may take. [m] A grant from a private citizen to an alien takes effect by act of the parties; a grant from the government takes effect by act of law. An alien may take by purchase from an individual, because it is for the benefit of the government that he should be allowed to take, in order that the title may pass to the government by escheat. But if the same effect were allowed to a grant from the government to an alien, it would be for the mere vain purpose of devesting the title of the government, and vesting it in a party incapable of holding it, in order to revest the very same title, by means of an inquest of office. Such a proceeding would be contrary to all the analogies of the law. An alien cannot take by act of law. An alien cannot, therefore, take as heir, or tenant in dower, or by the curtesy. [n] The reason why an alien cannot take in this manner is, because the law does nothing in vain; and it will not, therefore, confer by grant an estate on the alien which he cannot hold, for the nugatory purpose of taking it back again by an inquest of office. This is the reason assigned by Lord Chief Baron Hale, and by Mr. Chancellor Kent. [o] The incapacity of aliens to take, is founded on reasons of national or civil polity, rather than on principlcs strictly feudal. [p] restrained and disabled from granting to an alien; he was incapable of receiving it; the grant was not made in the order and manner required by law. The title of the public demesne lands in England is vested in the crown; the king has, by the constitution, the sole power of granting them. But the king cannot, by his grant to an alien, render him capable of taking. In Virginia the title was in the people, or Commonwealth; not in the Governor, Register, or other public officer. They could only grant the land in pursuance of the express provisions of law. which shall be located on land within the said District, on or before the first day of September, 1791.' So that the stipulations of the compact of 1789, secure all vested as well as contingent claims and titles to land, and provide for their determination by the then existing laws of Virginia. By the laws of that State then in force, the title of Brantz (supposing him to have had any) was cast upon the Commonwealth, by his death without heirs capable of taking by descent.s The interest of Rose under his patent became valid and secure by the third article of the compact, and, under the fifth article, it could not be interfered with by any grant from the State of Kentucky. [t] Every political society or government is bound by the ties of justice and morality, and to the observance of good faith in its contracts with individuals. The grant of 1785 to Rose, was a contract between the State of Virginia and the grantee. [u] If a private individual sells land without title, and subsequently acquires a title, it enures to the benefit of his grantee. [v] A vendor, purchasing in an outstanding title, cannot use it against his vendee. The same rules which are just and equitable as between individuals, are binding on governments. The legal maxim, that the king, or the commonwealth, can do no wrong, implies the highest degree of moral excellence in the collective body of society, and those who represent it. Every prerogative being created for the benefit of the citizen, none of the powers of the government can be exerted to his prejudice. [w] Hence the maxims, that the prerogative of the king is no warrant to do wrong; the king is estopped, and by his prerogative can do no wrong. [x] Virginia, therefore, could not violate the obligation of her contract with Rose, by using the interest of Brantz when it lapsed in 1797, by his death, without heirs capable of inheriting. A legislative act of Virginia, (had she retained her sovereignty over the territory of Kentucky,) passed in 1799, to grant the land to Governeur, without regard to the vested interest of Rose, and those claiming under his grant, would have been a law impairing the obligation of contracts within the prohibition in the constitution of the United States. Such a law, made by Kentucky, is equally prohibited by her treaty with Virginia. But the acts of 1796 and 1799, (which, being in pari materia, are to be construed together,) do not constitute such a law. The former act confirms the title of Brantz, with the proviso, 'that nothing in the said act should affect the right or title of any other person or persons.' The subsequent act transfers the estate to Governeur, as Brantz held it, subject to the proviso. It was not necessary, in the act of 1799, to repeat the proviso in that of 1796. It was sufficient to do what the act does, transfer the estate, after the death of Brantz, to Governeur, 'as if the said Brantz had done (it) in his lifetime.' This construction makes the acts consistent with good faith, with the compact with Virginia, and with the eternal principles of justice. that it passed a vested interest capable of being transmitted from one to another by deed or will; that such interests of the junior patentee are treated as legal, and not mere equitable interests, and still less as non-entities, a number of cases from the local decisions were cited. [z] patent until 1788, and it is not, therefore, of this that the Court speak, when they say that he took the estate 'during the war,' and was not devested by any act of Virginia before the treaty of 1794, by which his title was confirmed. But the Court meant to refer to the act of Virginia of 1779, (passed during the war,) by which the legislature declared, that the surveys under the proclamation of 1763 were valid. All the other cases cited to show that an alien can take by grant, and hold, until office found, are cases of grants, or devises, from private individuals to an alien. The distinction between such conveyances and grants from the crown, is to be found in all the authorities, from the year books down to the latest elementary writers.
^a Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch's Rep. 603. Craig v. Radford, 3 Wheat. Rep. 594. Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. Rep. 563. Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. Rep. 453.
^b Co. Litt. 18 b.
^c 3 Wheat. Rep. 594.
^d 1 Bac. Abr. Alien. C. 133.
^e 5 Co. Rep. 52.
^f 2 Bl. Comm. 250. 1 Johns. Cas. 399.
^h 5 Cranch's Rep. 253.
^i Legat's case, 10 Co. Rep. 113. Alton Wood's case, 1 Co. Rep. 51.
^j Noy's Max. 10. 4 Co. Rep. 61. Plowd. 432. 10 Co. Rep. 62.
^k Berwick's case, 5 Co. Rep. 94.
^m 2 Bl. Comm. 351. Tucker's ed. 344.
^n Calvin's case, 7 Co. Rep. 25. Co. Litt. 2 b. 3. a. 31. a. Plowd. 229. 2 Bl. Comm. 252. Tucker's ed. 249. Hunter v. Fairfax, 7 Cranch's Rep. 619. Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. Rep. 460.
^o Collingwood v. Pace, 1 Ventr. Rep. 417. Mooers v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. Rep. 365.
^p 1 Bl. Comm. 392. 2 Bl. Comm. 258. 2 Bl. Comm. 278.
^t Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. Rep. 1. 1 Marsh. Kentuck. Rep. 199. 3 Marsh. Rep. 219. 1 Monr. Kentuck. Rep. 60. Littel. Rep. 364.
^u Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch's Rep. 87.
^v Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. Rep. 222.
^w Magdalen College case, 11 Co. Rep. 72.
^x Plowd. Rep. 246-248, 249.
^z 1 Marsh. Kentuck. Rep. 525. 3 Bibb's Rep. 535. 4 Bibb's Rep. 225. 1 Monr. Rep. 48. 189. 138.
As to the case of Elmendorf v. Carmichael, ^1 which had been cited as determining the questions in this cause, it could have no weight as authority in this Court, because it did not decide the point as to the construction of the compact of 1789; a subject peculiarly of federal jurisdiction, which was involved in several other cases, all of which would be brought before this Court for revision. The opinions, therefore, of the State Judges, in that case, could be entitled to no more respect than the judgments of any tribunal, State or national, which this Court might be called on to revise on error.

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