Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50179:gr-175783-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:51:00+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS, Accused-Appellant.
For Review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas," affirming the Decision2 dated 14 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,3 as amended.
The prosecution's version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who testified that in the morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, a confidential information that a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 4116 would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellant's waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant to get down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the driver's seat, the contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately brought to the police station.
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.
Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment. According to him, he used to work as a caretaker of "Curacha," a beer house/videoke bar located along Circumferential Road, Marville II Subdivision and owned by a certain Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he reported for work at six o'clock in the evening. Later that night, unidentified men walked up to him. One of these men asked him regarding the ownership of the car parked outside the bar. He allegedly accompanied the men outside so he could confirm the identity of the owner of the car that the men were inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green colored Isuzu Gemini car which according to him was driven by his employer, Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified men, the latter purportedly pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men allegedly asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened to include him in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A few hours passed and he was then brought to the police headquarters where he was asked regarding his address and the name of his employer. After two days, he was allegedly forced to admit that he was in fact the owner of the Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered from said vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged with violations of Republic Act No. 6425 for illegal possession of shabu and Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his direct examination, appellant reiterated that he should not have been the one charged with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was driving the Gemini car.
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.
A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.
The witness is pointing to a male person inside the courtroom when confronted give his name as Bernardo Tuazon.
A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.
A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.
A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone, sir.
A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.
A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the telephone that the car is a Gemini bearing plate number PFC 411 who will deliver at said place.
A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir.
A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.
A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked vehicle and proceeded to the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.
A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in Antipolo City.
A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate number PFC 411, sir.
A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.
A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.
A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.
A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as police officers, sir.
A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station, sir.
A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on his waist.
A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.
A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent document for his gun.
A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
A: He said that the gun is not his.
A: I ordered him to get down from the car.
A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the driver's seat.
A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it contained shabu, sir.
A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the evidence, sir.
A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the case.
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellant's waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more strengthened the police's suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the driver's seat plastic sachets containing white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
Appellant also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the Constitutional requirement that "(n)o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."37 Again, we disagree.
In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of the Constitution. The decision contained a summary of the facts of the case as presented by the prosecution and by the defense. It likewise contained an explanation as to why it found appellant guilty as charged. Admittedly, the decision is brief but to our mind, it sufficiently informed appellant as regards the bases for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that the trial court disregarded his defense of bare denial in favor of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties enjoyed by police officers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 dated 31 July 2006, finding appellant Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-12.
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Felix S. Caballes. Records, pp. 84-89.
3 Also known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
6 In the Joint Affidavit of PO3 Glenon Bueno and PO1 Manuel Padlan as well as the picture of the Gemini car marked as Exhibits "B," "B-1," and "B-2," the plate number of the car was identified as PMZ 411; id.
8 Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.
10 CA rollo, p. 22.
18 CA rollo, p. 32.
24 People v. Baygar, 376 Phil. 466, 473 (1999).
25 People v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 24 (2004).
26 TSN, 14 February 2000, pp. 3-7.
27 People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, 29 September 2004, 439 SCRA 350, 381, cited in People v. Torres, G.R. No. 170837, 12 September 2006, 501 SCRA 591, 609.
28 People v. Vargas, 327 Phil. 387, 397 (1996).
29 People v. Gonzales, 417 Phil. 342, 353 (2001).
30 People v. Hivela, 373 Phil. 600, 605 (1999).
31 People v. Gonzales, supra note 29 at 357.
32 G.R. No. 88017, 21 January 1991, 193 SCRA 122, 128-129.
33 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 279 (2002).
35 People v. Bagista, G.R. No. 86218, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 63, 69.
37 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 14.
38 Yao v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 86, 105 (2000).
39 Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, 11 February 1992, 206 SCRA 127, 132.

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