Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/213/339/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 16:08:31+00:00

Document:
Under § 3198, Rev.Stat. of Arizona of 1887, the common law doctrine of riparian rights does not now obtain in that territory, and, as held by the supreme court of the territory, the doctrine of appropriation was recognized and to some extent in force prior to and since 1833 in the State of Sonora, now a part of that territory.
Confirmation of an estate doe not enlarge it, and where the original Mexican title did not carry riparian rights, the mere confirmation thereof by the United States doe not give such rights to the confirmee.
The Legislative Act of Arizona, Howell's Code of 1864, c. 61, § 7, adopting the common law of England was merely the adoption of a general system of law in place of the Spanish Mexican general system which was simultaneously repealed, and the regulation of and rights to water were by the same act made subject to the natural and physical condition of the territory and the necessities of its people, and this Court sustains the supreme court of the territory in its interpretations of the qualification imposed on the general adoption of the common law in respect to the use of water.
The right to use water is not confined under the customary law of Arizona to the riparian proprietors. Where the riparian proprietor is entitled under a general statute to have the damages to his land taken for withdrawal of water by appropriators assessed, the decree below will not be disturbed because no provision was made for compensation, it appearing in this case that the objection was technical, and the point was not discussed below.
The facts are stated in the. opinion.
it in its natural flow. The defendants threaten and intend to build a dam, as alleged, in place of one built in 1903, but washed out, and to build and rebuild a ditch through land of the plaintiff to another ditch already established, and to divert the water through the same to land of theirs on the north. They set up no title, except that they have been the first to appropriate the water. The plaintiff claims as riparian owner, and argues that, as such, it has a right that cannot to taken from it by simple appropriation. The territorial court of first instance and the supreme court dismissed the bill (89 P. 504), and the plaintiff appealed to this Court.
It is not denied that what is called the common law doctrine of riparian water rights does not obtain in Arizona at the present day, Rev.Stats.Arizona 1887, § 3198, but the plaintiff contends that it had acquired such rights before that statutory declaration, and that it cannot be deprived of them now. So far as the claim is rested on the original grant and the Mexican law, it may be disposed of in a few words, without going into all the questions that would have to be answered before an opposite conclusion could be reached.
"Whatever may have been the general law throughout the Republic of Mexico on the subject of water, it is reasonably certain that, in the State of Sonora, the doctrine of appropriation, as now recognized, was to some extent in force by custom. In this territory, irrigation was practiced in the Santa Cruz valley prior to the cession, and it is well known the right of appropriation without regard to the riparian character of the lands was there in force probably from the time when the Spaniards first settled in the valley. Our statutes, as well as those of New Mexico, seem to have had their origin in the Mexican law as modified by custom."
This is the statement of the territorial court, and we know nothing to control it. It is not met by arguments as to the general character of Mexican law, or by inference from the situation and nature of the grant. The same doctrine seems to be implied by the Howell Code, c. 55, § 25, which we shall refer to again.
The plaintiff draws another argument from the effect of the United States patent. It contends that the patent not only confirms the Mexican title, but releases that of the United States, Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478, 70 U. S. 491, and that, by the grant from the United States, it gained rights as a riparian proprietor that could not be displaced by a subsequent attempt to appropriate the water. Sturr v. Beck, 133 U. S. 541. But, while it is true that in Beard v. Federy, supra, Mr. Justice Field calls such a patent a quitclaim, we think it rather should be described as a confirmation in a strict sense.
"Confirmation is the approbation or assent to an estate already created, which, as far as is in the confirmer's power, makes it good and valid; so that the confirmation doth not regularly create an estate; but yet such words may be mingled in the confirmation, as may create and enlarge an estate; but that is by the force of such words that are foreign to the business of confirmation."
Gilbert, Tenures, 75. It is not to be understood that, when the United States executes a document on the footing of an earlier grant by a former sovereign, it intends or purports to enlarge the grant. The statute under which the Mexican title was decided to be good speaks of confirmation throughout, and, in the most pertinent passage, directing a patent to be issued, says that it shall be issued "to the confirmee." Act of March 3, 1891, c. 539, § 10, 26 Stat. 854, 859. It would be possible, perhaps, to argue to the contrary from provisions in §§ 8 and 13, that the confirmation shall only work a release of title by the United States, but we are satisfied that the true intent of the statute and the reason of the thing are as we have said.
United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 174 U. S. 704-706; Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U. S. 545, 188 U. S. 553. So it is unnecessary to consider how far, if at all, the defendants represent an appropriation of the water before the patent was granted. For that reason, we have not set forth the details found by the court below as to the dams, ditches, and use of water, going back to 1877.
"The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or the Bill of Rights or laws of this territory, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this territory."
We assume that this section, however it may affect the case at bar, was within the power of the legislature to enact. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 174 U. S. 702-703. Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U. S. 545, 188 U. S. 553. Act of June 17, 1902, c. 1093, § 8. 32 Stat. 390. But we agree with the territorial court that, construed with the rest of the Code, it is far from meaning that patentees of a ranch on the San Pedro are to have the same rights as owners of an estate on the Thames.
Statutes of 1887, which, in terms, enacted or declared that "the common law doctrine of riparian water rights" should not obtain. But we are not left to rely upon reasonable implications and argument, for other parts of the original Code are express upon the point. Therefore we need not consider whether, in any event, the statute could be supposed to confer property rights not previously possessed and not subject to legislative change. Compare Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 191 U. S. 387, and Damon v. Hawaii, 194 U. S. 154, 194 U. S. 160.
"all the inhabitants of this territory who own or possess arable and irrigable lands shall have the right to construct public or private acequias, and obtain the necessary water for the same from any convenient river, creek, or stream of running water,"
"the regulations of acequias which have been worked according to the laws and customs of Sonora and the usages of the people of Arizona shall remain as they were made and used up to this day,"
the qualifications imposed upon it, were correct. They simply follow what has been understood to be the law for many years. Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371.
The right to use water is not confined to riparian proprietors. Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U. S. 545, 188 U. S. 556; Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449, 450; Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496. Such a limitation would substitute accident for a rule based upon economic considerations, and an effort, adequate or not, to get the greatest use from all available land. Whether there are any limits of distance is a question not arising in this case.
A final objection urged is that the plaintiff's land is taken without compensation. It would seem that this is merely technical in this case. There does not appear to have been any discussion of the point below, and it is probable that the water is the only thing that has substantial value or really is cared for. But the plaintiff is authorized to have his damages assessed if he desires by c. 55, § 4 (now Rev.Stat. § 3202), as we have mentioned. We think that it would be unjust to disturb the decree on this ground, although in other circumstances the objection might be grave.

References: § 3198
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 § 3202