Source: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/CanterLawRw/2011/17.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:43:53+00:00

Document:
PA Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand 3rd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at 959.
2	McInnes v Onslow Fane  3 All ER 211.
For general comment on the use of private tools and procedures in the English Administrative Law tradition, see, for example, I Harden and N Lewis The Noble Lie, The British Constitution and the rule of law (Hutchinson, London, 1986).
4	Nagle v Fielden  1 All ER 689.
5	Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs  2 Ch 149 (CA).
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 1991), at V, Foreword.
The speeches in Ridge v Baldwin10 show that an administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say.
Seeing he had been elected to this office by a democratic process, he had, I think, a legitimate expectation that he would be approved by the district committee, unless there were good reasons against him. If they had something against him, they ought to tell him and to give him the chance of answering it before turning him down.
Legitimate expectation is therefore significant in that it provides that an interest less than a legal right may warrant the protection of the rules of natural justice. Where a legitimate expectation can be shown, a decision- maker may not act to defeat that benefit without the requirements of procedural fairness being met.12 As McHugh J explains in Haocher, before Lord Denning’s statements in Schmidt and Breen, the common law rules of natural justice only protected a persons existing rights and interests, implying a right to be heard before a statutory power only where a matter arose which might prejudice those rights and interests.13 The introduction of the concept of legitimate expectation under public law extended the range of protection given, so that prospective, as well as existing, rights, interests, privileges and benefits could come within the domain of natural justice. But with such an extension came the obvious need to develop principles of application to prevent a snowball of unfounded claims. Thus a complex set of rules has been developed by the courts to govern when such an expectation will arise.
7 New Zealand Association for Migration and Investments Inc v A-G  NZAR 45 at 52.
The concept of legitimate expectation is commonly found in countries whose public law systems follow the United Kingdom common law model, and in selected other cases, such as in German Public law.
9 Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch 149.
10 Ridge v Baldwin  UKHL 2 (1964) AC 40.
11 Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175 at 191.
13 Ibid, per McHugh J at 679-680.
14 Vea v Minister of Immigration  NZAR 171 (HC).
15 Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, above, n 11, per Mc Hugh J at 681.
17 Lawson v Housing New Zealand  2 NZLR 474 at 488.
641; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex p Ruddock  2 All ER 518 (QB).
19 NZ Maori Council v Attorney-General  1 NZLR 513;  1 AC 466 (PC); Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service  AC 374.
299;  2 All ER 589;  2 WLR 1262.
21 Chen v Minister of Immigration  NZAR 261 (CA).
22 Hughes v Dept of Health and Social Security  AC 776,  2 WLR 866, HL.
23 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu  2 AC 629; 2 All ER 346 (PC); NZ Maori Council v Attorney-General  1 NZLR 513;  1 AC 466 (PC).
25 Joseph, above, n 1, at 965.
26 The Power Co Ltd v Gore District Council, above, n 23, at 548.
also mean that a contract that fetters powers will be upheld if to strike it down would be unfair or contrary to some legitimate expectation, or would amount to an abuse of discretion.27 One key factor that is considered in balancing these considerations is the nature of the expectation and the number of people affected. Where a policy induces an expectation of a substantive outcome affecting a small and specific group of people, this will be more likely to be sufficient to ground some reliance.28 By contrast, where the expectation is vague, and is not made to any person or specific group in particular, this will be less likely to require substantive compliance. In New Zealand Association for Migration and Investments Inc v Attorney-General,29 for example, the fact a policy “applied to a large number of individuals where no specific promises have been made, nor settled practice adopted” meant that while it had the potential for unfairness in some cases, it was not sufficient to ground a binding legitimate expectation.
Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Preston  UKHL 5;  1 AC 835;  2 All ER 327.
28 R v North and East Devon Health Authority; Ex p Coughlan  QB 213.
30 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu  2 AC 629; 2 All ER 346 (PC).
31 University of Auckland v Tertiary Education Commission  2 NZLR 668 (HC).
32 Lawson v Housing New Zealand  2 NZLR 474.
33 Te Heu Heu v A-G  1 NZLR 98.
34 Ng Siu Tung v Director of Immigration (2002) 1 HKLRD 561.
35 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh  HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273; R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment; Ex Parte Begbie  EWCA Civ 2100;  1 WLR 1115; R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council  EWCA Civ 607;  1 WLR 237.
36 Joseph, above, n 1, at 965.
37 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment; Ex P Begbie  EWCA Civ 2100;  1 WLR 1115; R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council  EWCA Civ 607;  1 WLR 237.
38 Te Heu Heu v AG  1 NZLR 98.
... it is important that the courts do not quickly find a willingness to talk has given rise to a Legitimate expectation when all it has done is demonstrated an openness of process and a willingness to be receptive to ideas.
39 NZ Assn for Migration and Investments v A-G  NZAR 45 at 61-64 (HC).
40 Hughes v Dept of Health and Social Security  AC 776 at 788 (HL).
41 McInnes v Onslow Fane, above, n 2, at 218.
42 Ridge v Baldwin  UKHL 2;  2 All ER 66 at 114.
43 White v New Zealand Stock Exchange & Anor  NZAR 297.
44 De Smith, Woolf & Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995) [8-027].
a possibility in the future. In broad terms, legitimate means reasonable,45 and therefore imports a requirement that the expectation is one that is sufficiently strongly grounded so as to sustain a requirement that it would at least be closely considered before action is taken which overrides it. Generally it will be difficult to establish that a decision maker has a sufficiently proximate relationship with an applicant, particularly as proving a legitimate expectation requires showing not only that the applicants expected some benefit, but that they were reasonably entitled to do so.46 Flowing out of this distinction is the implicit principle that an application, compared to a licence, generally provides a mere hope of achieving the substantive outcome desired, and “a hope is not an expectation in public law terms”.47 While this classification will often be an accurate one in terms of the ability of the party to successfully sustain an argument of a legitimate expectation the issue of causation must be examined further. In a great number of cases where the distinction is said to preclude the existence of an enforceable expectation, the failure is simply attributable to the threshold requirements imposed by the normal principles, and is entirely unrelated to the particular nature of the action.
The addition of the category implies the need for a substance over form approach. Without this the requirements of natural justice could be defeated by simply transferring the claim into one involving an application, like by considering matters of discipline only upon reapplication after expiry, and not at the time they arise. So while classification as either an application or a cancellation may provide a useful starting point for the courts, ultimately it must subordinate the particular facts of each case.
45 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu  2 AC 629; 2 All ER 346 (PC).
46 University of Auckland v Tertiary Education Commission  2 NZLR 668 (HC).
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs  HCA 22; (1989) 169 CLR 648.
48 McInness, above, n 2.
Metropolitan Borough Council; Ex parte Hook  1 WLR 1052.
“Expectation cases”, for example, although in form involving not forfeiture but a mere application that fails, nonetheless involved a legitimate expectation of confirmation or renewal of the applied for item which raised the question of “what had happened to make the applicant unsuitable for the membership or licence for which he was previously thought suitable.”51 As a result, the fact an applicant may have a “mere hope”, and not an expectation may simply denote that that person has fallen short of meeting the legal rigours required to meet that threshold, and not that there is a blanket classification which prohibits a particular form of action from ever sustaining a finding of legitimate expectation. The case on the facts was an example, involving an applicant who had made five consecutive prior applications for the license in question and had all of them declined. As a result there was no factual basis on which such an expectation could be considered reasonable, a finding that is clearly consistent with the orthodox principles applying to all cases of legitimate expectation.
Association considered well founded. Because the appellants licence was due to expire within a few months, and it was clear no association in New Zealand would employ him in the intervening period, the council decided to take no action and simply allow his licence to lapse, with the intention of avoiding the difficulties associated with terminating an existing benefit. A letter was sent telling him that the complaints had been received, but that the council had decided to take no action. Upon expiry of the initial licence, the appellant applied for a new licence but was rejected on the basis of those previous incidents. He then made a number of subsequent applications, all of which were unsuccessful. The appellant then sought judicial review of the decisions on the basis that when the council refused to grant him a licence they acted unfairly by failing to indicate to him, before reaching a decision as to the granting of the licence, that they intended to take into account the views which had been arrived at when the initial complaints were received.
51 McInnes v Onslow-Fane  3 All ER 211 (CA).
52 Stininato v Auckland Boxing Association  1 NZLR 1.
53 Ibid per Cooke J (as he then was) at 24.
of trade and a breach of natural justice. In substance that is what the appellant alleges happened here. In my opinion, proof of such allegations would give the court jurisdiction to grant a declaration; and in some cases an injunction would be appropriate.
Whilst categorization may assist in some circumstances, and lawyers delight in the precision said to arise from such an exercise- the obligation to afford procedural fairness, in the sense of a right to be heard, is a general one. It depends upon the nature of the power exercised, the interests of the person affected and any perceived or actual detriment, whether a person has been led to believe that a hearing will occur, and there may be other general aspects of “fair play in action”.
One simple alternative would be for the distinction to create a starting presumption which was ultimately subject to the same evidential burdens applied to all other cases of legitimate expectation. For while the licence/ application distinction is founded on reason, the utility that it provides is largely subsumed within the larger question of whether on all the facts of a particular case the relevant factors in establishing a legitimate expectation have been met. The fact an argument of expectation involves an application would simply become another factor in the decision, and not the decision itself, or as some have put it, it would be a starting point but not the finish line.55 To do so would in some respects recognize the criticisms made of the doctrine of legitimate expectation as a whole- that it is overly complex and adds little to established existing principle.56 Megarry’s “expectation” classification, for example, which recognizes the existence of applications that “in form”57 raise the same sort of expectations of a license case, provides an example of how a more flexible approach to classification could be applied.
There can be no doubt that it is permissible to exclude anyone for any reason or no reason from membership of a social club just as anyone (unless he has a statutory right of entry) may be excluded from one’s home. Once however, a man is elected to a club, he acquires contractual rights and cannot be expelled save in accordance with its rules and processes which do not offend against natural justice.
54 White v NZ Stock Exchange  NZAR 297 at 309.
55 Halsbury’s Laws Of England, Administrative Law- Volume 1(1) (2001 Reissue, Judicial Control, Procedural Fairness, Natural Justice in General: 96. Application and Scope Of The Duty To Act Fairly.
Daganyasi v Minister of Immigration  2 NZLR 130 at 141 per Cooke J (CA).
57 McInnes, above, n 2 at 218.
58 Nagle v Fielden  1 All ER 689 per Salmon LJ at 698-699.
However even in that situation, the existence of an existing relationship was not necessarily determinative, with exceptions being made where a private body held a monopolistic or ‘closed shop’ style control over an area of significant importance to the lives of citizens.59 So not only is the distinction not an absolute, it is also a specific private law concept, with no general application to government bodies whose amenability to review does not rest upon a purported contractual basis.
... concern for the development of administrative law as an effective and realistic branch of justice must imply that the discretionary remedies should not be granted lightly. After all, progress is not synonymous with giving judgement for the plaintiffs.
The need to proceed with caution has been reflected in the approach taken by the New Zealand courts in dealing with arguments of legitimate expectation made with regards to an application for benefit, and show that even if an application were able to sustain a legitimate expectation, proving that on the facts would be very difficult.
59 Ibid, affirmed in White v NZ Stock Exchange & Anor  NZAR 297.
60 See the detailed examination of the New Zealand cases later in this paper.
61 Stininato v Auckland Boxing Association Inc  1 NZLR 1 (CA) at 29.
63 Attorney-General v E  3 NZLR 257.
648; NZ Assn for Migration and Investments v A-G  NZAR 45 (HC); Lalli v Attorney- General (Minister of Immigration)  NZAR 720; Ng Siu Tung v Director of Immigration  HKCFA 7; (2002) 5 HKCFAR 1 and Vea v Minister of Immigration:  NZAR 171 (HC).
Subject to compliance with the statute and other legal obligations, substantial weight will normally be accorded by the Courts to government perceptions of the national interest inherent in the setting of immigration policy and its necessary review from time to time.
Notwithstanding this contextual difficulty, the applicants in the case argued that an Immigration Service Operations Manual created a presumption that temporary Immigration permits would be issued to refugee claimants. In the High Court, Fisher J considered the breadth of discretion expressed in the governing Immigration Act 1987, the provisions of the Manual, a United Nations convention referred to by the Act, evidence from an Immigration service official that temporary permits are normally granted to refugee status claimants, and s 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. He concluded that the combination of these factors meant that there was intended to be a strong, although rebuttable, presumption in favour of granting temporary permits which he saw as providing a basis for a legitimate expectation. While the judge himself stated that the decision was prepared “under some urgency”,67 it is relevant to note that at no point did he consider the fact this was an application for a desired benefit as impacting upon the legitimacy of the argued expectation.
... we are unable to read into (the section of the manual) or the practice adopted anything more than a recognition that in the general run of cases claimants are likely to be granted temporary permits and that if a permit is granted it will normally be a visitor permit. That is a considerable distance from imposing a fetter on the clear statutory discretion, particularly one of the seriously inhibiting kind propounded.
Unfortunately, the Court made few statements as to the nature of doctrine in general, simply stating that: “with respect, we do not see this as a case of legitimate expectation’.69 No comment at all was made about the impact of the expectation arising from a new application for benefit as opposed to some change to an established course of affairs. As a result, Attorney-General v E appears to provide only a reminder of the clear and unambiguous representation necessary for a successful argument of legitimate expectation,70 and cannot be treated as an authoritative determination of the fact that people applying for a substantive benefit cannot hold a legitimate expectation that benefit will be received.
65 Ashby v Minister of Immigration  1 NZLR 222, 230-231 per Richardson J.
67 Attorney-General v E  NZAR 354 at 363.
70 Ng Siu Tung v Director of Immigration (2002) 1 HKLRD 561.
... little doubt that the Immigration Service Circular, and statements made both orally and in written form to the applicant on the basis of the circular, could be characterised as representations that the Immigration Service would act in a certain way or take a certain view of Mr Vea’s application.
71 Vea v Minister of Immigration  NZAR 171 (HC).
72 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu  UKPC 2;  2 All ER 346 at 351.
73 Vea v Minister of Immigration  NZAR 171 at 180.
75 NZ Association for Migration and Investments Inc v Attorney General  NZAR 45 (HC).
It is clear that the approach adopted by the Court in legitimate expectation cases involving policy changes will be very much fact dependent. The response will depend on a range of factors including the degree of specificity of the promise; the significance of the consequences to the individual or class concerned if the promise is not kept or the prior practice not followed; whether the decision maker has given proper consideration to the position of the affected parties; what provision, if any, has been made to accommodate those affected by way of transitional provisions, whether by the creation of exceptions from the application of the new policy or by compensation or otherwise; and the nature and strength of any countervailing public interest factors justifying the course proposed.
The unfairness of the case was regrettable, but applied to a large number of individuals to whom no specific promise had been made or settled practise established, and as such was not enough to make the change invalid. Again it is important to note that the fact this was an application for benefit, as opposed to an expectation arising in a different manner, was not considered relevant. Instead the case was simply determined according to the ordinary principles of when an expectation would arise in the traditional sense, and fell short upon that standard.
79 White v New Zealand Stock Exchange & Anor  NZAR 297.
80 Nagle v Feilden  1 All ER 689 at 698-699.
82 White v New Zealand Stock Exchange  NZAR 297 at 309.
obligation of fairness was a general one, a blanket rule that one particular form of claim, like an application, would not succeed could not be made. Thus while the facts of this particular case were not considered to sustain such an expectation, the judge considered that there would certainly be cases in which it would, the obvious example being the established exception of applications which pertained to a person’s ability to work.83 Again this approach is consistent with the suggestion that where the distinction arises, it should be treated as a relevant but not determinative factor.
A certificate of character is required from the Council of a District Law Society. Lists of candidates for admission are notified to the profession. If an objection alleging some wrongdoing on the part of the candidate was forthcoming, fairness would require that he be told of this, so that at least it could be answered. A formal oral “hearing” may not be required, but an opportunity to respond is.
In that case, the seriousness of the application would make it reasonable to expect that the principles of procedural fairness would be applied, and thus the presumptions arising from the fact the case involved a “mere application” for an unattained benefit would be overcome by the ability to nonetheless prove the expectation was a reasonable one in accordance with orthodox principles.
865, 874, per Lord Russell of Killowen].
83 De Smith, Woolf & Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edition (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995) [8-022] to [8-026].
Courts were willing to make an exception had the particular facts imported the need.
In R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett, the English Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion with regards to an application for a passport by an English citizen living in Spain. Despite there being outstanding warrants for the arrest of the man in the United Kingdom, this being the reason his application was denied, the Court held that the requirements of fairness still imported the need for him to be given reasons for being declined so as to allow him the opportunity to respond, should exceptional circumstances that justified an exception from the standard policy exist. The potential for a legitimate expectation to arise in application cases is not limited to those which involve personal reputation. In R v Huntingdon District Council, ex p Cowan,89 a commercial applicant for an entertainers licence was held to be entitled to be told of all information on which the decision was to be founded and given an opportunity to make representations orally or in writing by virtue of the overall scheme of the statute. Again “that truism”90 of administrative law, that the requirements of fairness will hinge upon the particular circumstances of the case, will again prevail over any definitive classification.
87 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fayed  EWCA Civ 946;  1 All ER 228.
88 Ibid per Lord Woolf MR at 237-238.
89 R v Huntingdon District Council, ex p Cowan  1 All ER 58,  1 WLR 501.
90 Stininato v Auckland Boxing Association (Inc) and Others  1 NZLR 1 per Cooke J at 29.
In Australia, the licence/application distinction has generally been considered of little significance in cases of legitimate expectation, being used in only the traditional sense of determining the amenability of clubs and domestic organizations to review. In Haocher, the High Court of Australia recognized the distinction between a mere hope and a bona fide expectation, but at least in the context of the review of a statutory body, treated the concept as simply a reflection of the high onus involved in establishing a legitimate expectation in the administrative law sense.91 On the facts, they concluded that a resident who applied for review of a deportation order did have a legitimate expectation that the findings of the appeal authority would not be overturned without a hearing being given. A series of other cases have reflected the principle that the primary problem with sustaining an argument of legitimate expectation on an application for benefit is simply the need to meet the threshold required, and not the existence of a principled base that precludes such a finding as a general rule.
In McDade v State Rail Authority,92 for example, guidelines for determining promotions in a fair and unbiased hearing were held to generate a legitimate expectation of a person applying for promotion that the procedure will be followed, although that case could be explained at least in part on the traditional ‘right to work’ exemption. This exemption may also stretch to pensions or other government benefits: in Courtney v Peters, 93 an applicant seeking to establish eligibility for the grant of a pension was held to have an interest affected so as to imply procedural fairness. In Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd v FCT,94 taxpayers making an application to the Commissioner of Taxation were held to have a legitimate expectation that the material they provided in support of that application would not be communicated to anyone outside that office without them first being consulted, and thus being given the opportunity to consider the impact that action may have upon their applications. That same year the Queensland courts in Re Murphy and Minister for Minerals and Energy95 considered it at least arguable that applicants for assignments of mining leases held a legitimate expectation that further material would be sought from the applicant if it was necessary in order to grant that application.
91 Haocher  HCA 22; (1990) 169 CLR 648 (HCA) per McHugh J at 682.
92 McDade v State Rail Authority (1985) 4 NSWLR 383 at 391-5.
93 Courtney v Peters  FCA 526; (1990) 27 FCR 404; 22 ALD 557; 98 ALR 645 at 652.
95 Re Murphy and Minister for Minerals and Energy (1995) 2 QAR 94 at 98.
96 The argument that legitimate expectation is overly complex and does not materially add to the abuse of power and substantive unfairness grounds of review is noted by Joseph, (above, n 1) for example, at 966, and led the English Court of Appeal in R v North and East Devon Health Authority; Ex p Coughlan  QB 213 at 645-646 to couch a simpler test of whether reneging on a promise was ‘so unfair [as to] amount to an abuse of power’.

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