Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/administrative-procedures-act/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:07:26+00:00

Document:
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in State of Wyoming v. Zinke on Thursday, September 21, 2017.
In this case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is asked to decide whether the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) acted beyond its statutory authority when it created a regulation that governed hydraulic fracturing (fracking) on lands owned by the United States.
As fracking has become more common, public concern has increased about whether fracking is contributing to contamination of underground water sources. The BLM responded by preparing a regulation that attempted to modernize the existing federal regulations governing fracking on lands owned by the United States by increasing disclosure of the chemicals used in fracking, updating the standards for wellbore construction and testing, and addressing management of water used in the fracking process.
The finalized, published fracking regulation attempted to regulate fracking in four ways: by (1) imposing new well construction and testing requirements; (2) imposing new flowback storage requirements; (3) imposing new chemical disclosure requirements; and (4) generally increasing BLM’s oversight of fracking.
Shortly before the fracking regulation was to take effect, the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA) and the Western Energy Alliance (WEA) filed a petition for review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), opposing the new regulation. North Dakota, Utah, and the Ute Indian Tribe also intervened.
The petition for review asserted that the fracking regulation violated two provisions of the APA in two ways: (1) the regulation was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; and (2) it was in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.
The district court concluded that no statute authorized the BLM to regulate fracking. The district court reasoned that states may regulate underground injections of any substance, not the federal government. According to the district court, only the states could regulate fracking.
While the parties supporting the regulation brought an appeal, the BLM asked this court to hold these appeals in abeyance, explaining that President Trump’s Executive Order required the Department of the Interior to review its regulations, including the fracking regulation, for consistency with the policies and priorities of the new administration. Another Executive Order directed the Secretary of the Interior, as soon as practicable, to publish for notice and comment proposed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding the fracking regulation at issue. The Secretary of the Interior then stated that the BLM would rescind the regulation in full.
The issue addressed in this appeal is whether the BLM has the authority to regulate fracking on lands owned or held in trust by the United States and thereby to promulgate the fracking regulation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the case was not ripe for review, as there was no hardship to the parties. The only harm suffered will be the continued operation of oil and gas development on federal lands, which represents no departure from the status quo since 2015. Further, the BLM will be able to proceed with its proposed rule rescinding the fracking regulation, and would face more uncertainty if these appeals were to remain under advisement. The appeal was held to be unripe and unfit for judicial review.
The Circuit dismissed the appeals, finding that the subject matter is unripe and the record is notably undeveloped or the future is particularly uncertain.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals DISMISSED the appeals as prudentially unripe, VACATED the district court’s judgment invalidating the fracking regulation, and REMANDED with instructions to dismiss the underlying action without prejudice.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in WildEarth Guardians v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service on Friday, April 17, 2015.
WildEarth Guardians, Rocky Mountain Wild, and the Town of Superior (Appellants) challenged the authority of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) to construct a parkway through the former Rocky Flats nuclear facility. Rocky Flats was formerly used to manufacture nuclear weapons, and since 1989 the Department of Energy (DOE) has been tasked with a cleanup effort to remediate the land. Under the Rocky Flats Act, Congress designated authority to the DOE to manage the central area of the Flats, which was contaminated by plutonium and other hazardous materials, and transferred the remainder of the land to the FWS to become a National Wildlife Refuge. The Rocky Flats Act further provided the DOE would transfer the remainder of the land to the FWS as soon as the cleanup was complete, and set aside a large parcel of land at the Flats’ border to be used for transportation improvements (specifically, the parkway).
The DOE transferred the remaining land to the FWS in 2007, and the FWS began considering applications for the transportation project jointly with the DOE. Prior to final approval of the land exchange and construction project, the FWS issued two opinions regarding the potential consequences to the Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse, a threatened species with a critical habitat in the corridor. The FWS also issued an environmental assessment pursuant to its duties under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Appellants sued in district court, arguing the FWS violated the Rocky Flats Act, the NEPA, and the Endangered Species Act. The district court rejected all three claims, and Appellants timely appealed.
The Tenth Circuit considered the appeal under the Administrative Procedures Act, evaluating only whether the FWS’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. The Tenth Circuit first addressed Appellants’ argument that the FWS lacked authority to convey the land under the Rocky Flats Act. Applying the Chevron test, the Tenth Circuit found that Congress did not directly discuss whether the FWS could convey the corridor, but by effectuating the intent of Congress and taking the statutory language in context, the Tenth Circuit determined that it was reasonable to assume Congress intended the FWS to convey the corridor for transportation purposes if it had not already been conveyed by DOE. The FWS further asserted it had authority to convey the land under the Refuge Act and Fish and Wildlife Act, and the Tenth Circuit agreed. The Tenth Circuit rejected Appellants’ argument that a catch-all clause in the Rocky Flats Act was meant only to refer to the transportation conveyance, finding that the conveyance was discussed in detail in other parts of the Act, and “Congress knew how to write ‘transportation improvements'” but did not do so in the catch-all clause.
The Tenth Circuit turned next to Appellants’ arguments that the FWS violated NEPA, specifically with respect to contaminated soils, air pollution, and the protected mouse. Appellants argued the FWS erred by issuing an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact instead of the more formal and detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Addressing the soil contaminants, particularly plutonium, the FWS relied on a 2006 EPA certification that the soil conditions were acceptable for unlimited use and unlimited exposure. Although Appellants argued the construction workers would be at greater risk for plutonium exposure, the FWS asserted that a 2011 letter from the EPA sufficiently addressed the risk faced by construction workers. The Tenth Circuit found no impropriety in the FWS’s reliance on the certification and letter and found no NEPA violation regarding the contaminated soils. The Tenth Circuit similarly dismissed Appellants’ contention of a NEPA violation regarding air pollution. Appellants argued the FWS failed to consider 2008 air quality standards when contemplating the transportation improvement. However, the FWS’s action occurred in 2006, and the Tenth Circuit found it unreasonable to expect the FWS to comply with an act that was not yet in existence. Finally, as to the protected mouse, the Tenth Circuit found support for the FWS action because the FWS considered the mouse habitat and found it would not be significantly affected by the transportation improvement. The Tenth Circuit noted the FWS appropriately issued an incidental take statement regarding the mouse.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of Appellants’ claims. Appellants had requested leave to file a supplemental appendix, which the Tenth Circuit denied, and it also denied the FWS’s request to file supplemental rebuttal appendix documents as moot.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Kobach v. United States Election Assistance Commission on Friday, November 7, 2014.
The secretaries of state from Arizona and Kansas, Ken Bennett and Kris Kobach, respectively, sought to have the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) add language requiring documentary proof of citizenship to each state’s instructions on the federal voter registration form. The EAC concluded the additional language was unnecessary and denied their requests. Kobach and Bennett filed suit in federal district court challenging the denial, and the district court held the EAC had a nondiscretionary duty to grant their requests.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s reasoning, holding that the district court’s decision is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) (ITCA). Justice Thomas’ dissent in ITCA endorsed the theory brought to the Tenth Circuit by Arizona and Kansas in this appeal, thus clearly explaining what the law does not provide. The EAC had valid authority to subdelegate decision-making authority to its Executive Director relating to the contents of the federal form. Under the unique circumstances of this case, an appeal from the Executive Director’s decision denying the requests to modify the federal form was impracticable, and consequently the decision qualifies as a final agency action, which was procedurally valid. The National Voter Registration Act’s requirements do not impose a ministerial duty on the EAC to approve state requests to change the form.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate its order mandating EAC modifications to the federal form.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Jiron on Tuesday, August 5, 2014.
Biodiversity sued the U.S. Forest Service in two separate cases involving Forest Service actions in the Black Hills National Forest. In the first case, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, Biodiversity claimed the Forest Service failed to comply with various statutes and regulations. The district court denied Biodiversity’s petition for review. In the second case, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Biodiversity argued the Forest Service had violated a settlement agreement and moved for relief. The district court dismissed Biodiversity’s motion. Biodiversity appealed both rulings and the cases were consolidated for appellate review.
In 1976, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) took effect, and the Forest Service created a plan under which it managed the Black Hills National Forest. In 1992, the Forest Service decided to revise the plan, and in 1997 it issued its revised forest plan. Biodiversity challenged the 1997 plan in an administrative proceeding, and its appeal was decided by the Chief of the Forest Service in 1999. The Chief determined that although most of the plan complied with the NFMA and the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), there were some shortcomings, which the Chief described specifically in his ruling.
Before the Chief issued his 1999 ruling, the Forest Service began implementing its 1997 forest plan. Biodiversity administratively challenged some aspects of the plan, and eventually Biodiversity and the Forest Service entered into a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement included Phase I and Phase II plans for implementation, and the Colorado federal district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. Phase I was implemented in 2001, and the Forest Service incorporated some of the Chief’s recommendations from the 1999 ruling. From 2001 through 2005, the Forest Service conducted a more detailed analysis of the Black Hills National Forest in preparation for the Phase II amendment. Also during this time, several wildfires ravaged the forest, and a mountain pine beetle infestation spread from 5,200 acres to 100,000 acres. As a result, the Phase II amendment was adjusted to address fire and insect issues.
The Forest Service considered six alternatives to implement the 1997 plan, and ultimately chose the sixth alternative even though some species would be adversely affected because the sixth plan would reduce wildfire risks and reduce the pine beetle infestation. In October 2005, the Forest Service began implementing Alternative 6 as the Phase II amendment. In 2006, Biodiversity challenged the Phase II amendment, but the Chief upheld it. In separate administrative cases, Biodiversity also challenged nine specific projects implemented as part of the Phase II amendment. The Chief denied all nine challenges, upholding the last in January 2011.
Biodiversity filed suit in Wyoming federal district court in October 2011, petitioning for agency review under the Administrative Procedures Act. In November 2012, the Wyoming court upheld the Forest Service’s action, and it denied a motion for reconsideration in April 2013. Biodiversity timely appealed.
Meanwhile, the Beaver Park litigation initiated by Biodiversity in 1999 lay dormant. After its defeat in Wyoming, Biodiversity attempted in May 2013 to reopen the Colorado case. The district court denied its motion, determining that laches barred enforcement of Biodiversity’s rights under the settlement agreement. Biodiversity timely appealed this ruling also, and the appeals were consolidated for Tenth Circuit review.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed Biodiversity’s challenges as final agency actions under the Administrative Procedures Act. Both parties agreed that each of Biodiversity’s plaintiffs established Article III standing. Biodiversity pursued review under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), arguing that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious. Biodiversity asserted violations of the NFMA and the NEPA.
The Tenth Circuit conducted a detailed analysis of each implicated section of the NFMA and NEPA. Where sections were ambiguous, the Tenth Circuit deferred to the Forest Service’s interpretation unless that interpretation was manifestly unreasonable. Regarding the population data requirement, the Tenth Circuit found that the regulation was ambiguous, and although Biodiversity raised a competing interpretation, deference was due to the Forest Service because its resolution of the ambiguity was reasonable. Regarding the Forest Service’s species viability analyses generally, Biodiversity argued that the Phase II amendment failed to ensure species viability for the Northern Goshawk, snag-dependent species, and sensitive plants. The Forest Service examined these particular species and adopted a different approach than that proposed by Biodiversity. Biodiversity failed to explain why its analysis was preferential to the Forest Service’s, however, so the Tenth Circuit deferred to the Forest Service’s scientific analyses.
Biodiversity argued the Phase II amendment failed to provide heightened protections for Research Natural Areas (RNAs) and Botanical Areas. Specifically, it alleged the Forest Service allowed livestock to graze on RNAs without specific management plans in place. However, there are no timelines for implementation of RNA management plans, and the Forest Service developed a plan as part of the 2005 Phase II implementation. Biodiversity failed to show that the Forest Service’s delay was unreasonable. As for the Botanical Areas, the Forest Service addressed these in its 1997 plan. Although Biodiversity argued the Forest Service failed to adequately monitor the well-being of the Botanical Areas, the Tenth Circuit’s APA review is narrow and examines only if the Forest Service had a rational explanation, which the Tenth Circuit found it did.
Biodiversity argued that the Forest Service failed to conduct a proper suitability and capability analysis for livestock grazing. The Tenth Circuit found no reason to conclude the Forest Service’s analysis was unreasonable, erroneous, or inconsistent with the regulation.
Biodiversity also argued that the Forest Service violated NEPA because it failed to consider no grazing alternatives in its Phase II amendment, it failed to take a “hard look” at how the amendment would affect sedimentation in Black Hills waterways, and it failed to take a “hard look” at historical grazing practices before authorizing grazing. The Tenth Circuit found no error in the Forest Service’s actions, finding instead that the Forest Service considered two no grazing alternatives, it contemplated sedimentation using Biodiversity’s proposed resources, and the Forest Service considered past grazing practices in determining that Alternative 6 was the best way to implement Phase II.
Turning to the Colorado claim, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the doctrine of laches barred Biodiversity’s assertion of the breach of settlement agreement claims. Biodiversity waited 6 1/2 years to file its suit alleging breach of the agreement, and that delay was unreasonable. The district court ruled the delay prejudiced the Forest Service, and the Tenth Circuit found no reason to disturb those findings.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Wyoming court’s denial of Biodiversity’s petition to review under the APA and affirmed the Colorado court’s dismissal of Biodiversity’s action to enforce the settlement agreement.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 706