Source: http://casaly.com/articles/02_just_for_the_record.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 17:57:18+00:00

Document:
Just for the record, you should know that . . .
[No] mortgage, bargaine, sale or gruant hereafter to be made of any houses, lands, rents or other hereditaments, shall bee of force against any other person except the grauntor and his heirs, unless the same be recorded as is hereafter expressed [in the publik Record] . . . . And if any such grauntor, being required by the grauntee to make an acknowledgement of any graunt by him made, shall refuse to do so, it shall be in the power of any magistrate to send for the party so refusing and cimmit him to prison without baile or mayneprize, until he shall acknowledge the same . . . .
For the history buff, that's the earliest recording statute, which was passed in Massachusetts in 1640. The text appears in R. Powell & P. Rohan, 3 The Law of Property, Matthew Bender (1992), 904. Except for the fact that the word "gruant" in the second line is obviously a misprint (as the root word throughout the rest of the section is "graunt"), there are no typos in the statute, but you'll have to get beyond the Chaucer-like spelling if you expect to (or even want to) understand the Colonial jargon.
Why would you want to understand this ancient statute anyhow (other than the fact that it might be good cocktail party talk, depending on your audience)? Understanding the machinations of the recording law as it has developed over the years answers many questions concerning priorities between competing interests, conflicting chains of title, out-of-order recordings and even questions as to whether parties with no ownership at all can convey a good title. As we'll see there are some real surprises in store as to what happens when the recording statute is applied in particular cases.
The Colonial enactment is for the most part entertaining, but today's recording laws and cases that swirl around its provisions find their geneses in it. It is interesting and informative to follow the progeny of this old law and watch how the legislature has changed it and how the courts have reformed it. Before we begin our journey, however, let's see what the present recording law (G.L.c. 183, §4) provides.
A conveyance of an estate in fee simple, fee tail or for life, or a lease for more than seven years from the making thereof, or an assignment of rents or profits from an estate or lease, shall not be valid as against any person, except the grantor or lessor, his heirs and devisees and persons having actual notice of it, unless it, or an office copy as provided in section thirteen of chapter thirty-six, or, with respect to such a lease or an assignment of rents or profits, a notice of lease or a notice of assignment of rents or profits, as hereinafter defined, is recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district in which the land to which it relates lies.
The present-day statute is not dissimilar from the Colonial law (although it is easier to read!), but there is one very big difference: the statute introduces as an exception to its protection the requirement that the grantee not have "actual notice" with regard to deeds previously given by the grantor. This concept is absent from the Colonial law. In this respect, the Colonial law was a "race" statute, while the present-day law is a "notice" statute. The transformation between the two types of statutes was not initially championed by the legislature. The General Court engrafted the change in 1836 legislation, but the notice concept was first introduced judicially many years before, in such cases as Farnsworth v. Child, 43 Mass. 637 (1808). In Farnsworth the court had ruled that although the statute was silent on the point as to the status of one who was aware of an unrecorded deed, it would be unjust to permit such a person to prevail over a "good faith" purchaser who had no such knowledge. It is for this reason that it has been said that "[T]he additional words 'and persons having actual notice thereof' incorporated in the [statute] did not change the law, but merely put in statutory form what already had been declared by judicial exposition." This concept of notice becomes pivotal in many issues concerning the recording system, and is so pervasive that it even affects registered land. For example, in Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646 (1944), where the owner of registered land had taken title with knowledge of the existence of a lease affecting the property but recorded on the unregistered side, the court said that the owner was subject to the lease even though it did not appear on the certificate of title. "[T]he foregoing historical background compel[s] the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to give certificate holders such as the plaintiffs an indefeasible title as against interests of which they had actual knowledge."
In addition to persons having "actual notice" of an unrecorded instrument, there are two other categories of persons who are bound by such instruments. They are, under the provisions of the statute, "the grantor or lessor [and] his heirs and devisees." The first category, the grantor or lessor, is pretty obvious. The second category, heirs and devisees, is very important. Heirs and devisees are bound by an unrecorded instrument, whether or not they have notice of it. This means that if the grantor gives a deed, whether it's recorded or not before his death, the heirs and devisees, who otherwise would have succeeded to the title, will nonetheless be bound by the deed and title to the property will not vest in them. But if the heirs and devisees are bound by the unrecorded deed, and therefore don't have title upon the grantor's death, what happens if they deed out after the grantor's death and before that previously-given deed appears of record? Does their grantee get a good title even though the heirs or devisees don't have one to transfer? The answer is "yes," and revolves around the recording statute itself, and is explained in Earle v. Fiske, 103 Mass. 491 (1896). In Earle the facts were that Nancy Fiske gave a deed of locus to Mary Fiske in 1864, but the deed was not recorded at that time. Nancy died in 1865. In 1866 Benjamin Fiske, Nancy's sole heir, deeded the property to Nicholas Earle, and it was only the next year, in 1867, that the deed from Nancy to Mary was recorded. Nicholas claimed the title as his under the deed from Benjamin. Mary, however, insisted that she was the rightful owner.
We do not, under the circumstances, incline to yield to the authority of [the Connecticut and Kentucky] cases in the construction of a local statute of this Commonwealth. It appears to us that the plain meaning of our system of registration is, that a purchaser of land has a right to rely upon the information furnished him by the registry of deeds, and in the absence of notice to the contrary he is justified in taking that information as true, and acting upon it accordingly. It is impossible to see why the unrecorded deed of Nancy A. Fiske should have any greater weight or force after her decease than it had immediately after it was first delivered. * * * Upon that assumption, [Benjamin's] deed would take precedence over the unrecorded deed of his mother, in exactly the same manner as a deed from his mother in her lifetime would have done over any unrecorded or unknown previous deed from herself.
The court acknowledged that "[i]t may not be very logical" to say that after a title has been conveyed out it is still capable of being conveyed again as though the first conveyance had not occurred, but the result was dictated not on logic, but on fairness, and was based on giving integrity to the recording system.
One important point that should be noted about the recording statute is that it does not protect "the grantor . . ., his heirs and devisees and persons having actual notice of" the conveyance. This listing includes three separate groups. We've seen that in the Earle decision an heir or devisee, though bound by the deed of the ancestor, can nevertheless give a good title to a third party who qualifies as a bona fide purchaser without notice. The axiom to this rule is that if the grantor dies before his or her deed is recorded the heirs and devisees, though they are able to pass a good title before such recording, cannot do so after such recording. In Earle the heirs gave a deed to a purchaser before their ancestor's deed was recorded. Though the heirs did not have any title to give, the purchaser's title prevailed. On the other hand, if the ancestor's deed had appeared of record after the ancestor's death but before the heirs had deeded out, the ancestor's deed would have prevailed and a later deed by the heirs to the purchaser would have failed. At that point the ability of the heirs or devisees to give a good title would terminate. The heirs, being bound by the deed according to the statute, cannot complain about this result. So, it becomes important when "running the title out" after the ancestor's death to continue running the ancestor and the heirs until a conveyance is found. Though it "looks like" the heirs or devisees have title upon the ancestor's death, this may only be an illusion.
The record of an instrument erroneously indexed is still constructive notice to the public. The index ordinarily is no part of the record, and a mistake made in it by the clerk does not invalidate the notice afforded by a record otherwise in proper form.
An improperly acknowledged instrument or one that contains no acknowledgment at all, is deemed not to be effectively recorded. Such an instrument is effective to convey title - just like an unrecorded instrument would do - but its record is a nullity, and thus the protection afforded by the recording statute does not exist. Pidge v. Tyler, 4 Mass. 541 (1808).
Public policy forbids that the act of taking and certifying the acknowledgment should be performed by a person financially or beneficially interested in the transaction. Such disqualification naturally includes the signer of the instrument, his grantee, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary or assignee, a member of the partnership in whose favor the instrument is drawn, and, except where the disability has been removed by statute, stockholder[s] of a corporation which is a party to [the] conveyance. (Citations omitted).
Under G.L.c. 184, §24 an instrument that has been on record for more than ten years is "cured" of the effects of a defective acknowledgment.
Let's continue our review of the history and application by the courts of the recording statute. In Part I we started off with the Chaucer-like 1640 enactment of the Colonial recording law and ended up two pages later noting that many problems that would arise by reason of a defective recording would be cured by a statute passed more than three hundred years thereafter. A lot went on during those three centuries and some of the case law and statutory enactments were discussed in Part I. But there are still more things to explore about the recording law, and some of them may surprise you.
A conveyance of an estate in fee simple, fee tail or for life, or a lease for more than seven years from the making thereof, or an assignment of rents or profits from an estate or lease, shall not be valid as against any person, except the grantor or lessor, his heirs and devisees and persons having actual notice of it, unless it, or an office copy as provided in section thirteen of chapter thirty six, or, with respect to such a lease or an assignment of rents or profits, a notice of lease or a notice of assignment of rents or profits, as hereinafter defined, is recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district in which the land to which it relates lies.
References in the deeds in the petitioner's chain to title to Casey and his predecessors as adjoining owners on the south would not require a finding that the grantees had actual notice of a deed which encroached upon the land being acquired by them.
This does not mean that confusing or ambiguous references in deeds to abutters who "don't line up" can be ignored; obviously, those references can be to prior-recorded instruments that were "missed" in the examination of title. But what the court is saying here is that such references will not themselves reach the level of "actual notice" of off-record instruments. The court is also saying that such references will not impose upon the grantee an obligation to make further inquires.
The McCarthy decision should be distinguished from that in Hughes v. Williams, 218 Mass. 448, 105 N.E. 1056. In Hughes, just like in McCarthy, the dispute arose in connection with a registration proceeding. The petitioner (Hughes) claimed his title under a sheriff's sale, which was based upon an execution, which in turn had grown out of an attachment in an action brought by Duckrey against Jones. Jones had acquired the title of record from Williams. However, upon his acquisition Jones immediately reconveyed the title back to Williams by deed that was not recorded. Williams retained occupation of the property. The attachment was recorded against Jones while he was in record title, and the deed from Jones to William did not appear of record until just before Hughes purchased it at the sheriff's sale. Hughes claimed superior title under the record that had shown Jones as the owner at the time of the attachment; but Williams asserted that his title was paramount because Duckrey knew of the deed back to him when the attachment was recorded and that with the recording of the deed from Jones to Williams occurring before Hughes took title at the sheriff's sale, Hughes too knew of the conveyance.
Hughes' knowledge would become relevant only if Duckrey at the time of the attachment had knowledge of the unrecorded deed from Jones to Williams. Noting that attaching creditors hold their title in the same fashion as purchasers, the court said, "If [Duckrey] did not have actual notice of the unrecorded deed at the date of the attachment . . . the petitioner even if chargeable with notice at the sale, would succeed to Duckrey's title by force of the levy."
There was evidence that the petitioner knew of the existence of the deed to Williams before the sheriff sale because his counsel had told him about it as a result of a search of the record. In quoting from George v. Kent, 7 Allen 16, the court said, "Intelligent information of a fact, either verbally or in writing, and coming from a source which a party ought to give heed to, is generally considered as evidence of [actual notice] . . . ." But the real question was whether Duckrey knew of the deed to Williams at the time he attached the property in Jones' name. The court noted there was evidence to show this to be the fact, but various erroneous jury instructions required the issue to be retried. The point of Hughes, however, is that the type of notice involved in that case, namely knowledge of the existence of a deed, is much different than the type of surmise that occurred in McCarthy. Knowledge of the existence of a deed or other instrument is to be distinguished from recitations in deeds with no actual notice of an unrecorded underlying document to support them.
Both McCarthy and Hughes involved the question of actual knowledge and the effect it would have on pending registration proceedings. Cases like Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646, 55 N.E.2d 945 involve notice questions with respect to land that has already been registered. In Killam, the court held that a purchaser of registered land who had actual notice of a lease for more that seven years was subject to it even though it did not appear on the certificate of title. Under the decision in Killam it would seem that if one discovers a deed on the "wrong" (recorded) side at the registry of deeds that describes the registered land at issue that it too would be actual notice of the existence of the conveyance and would result in the purchaser of the registered land taking title subject to those outstanding rights.
The court held that E had good title.
Deed #2, though given after Deed #1 is recorded prior to it. That's the key here. E, when starting his title will find Deed #2 in his search and will go no further. And since D's title is indefeasible (he has no knowledge of Deed #1), the court held that E stepped into his shoes when he purchased from D, even though he knew of Deed #1 (not from record examination, but from his own knowledge).
The Trull decision was questioned by Chief Justice Shaw in Flynt v. Arnold, 2 Met. 619, and appears never to have been cited since, so its continued authority is unknown.
Actual notice of a competing instrument will defeat an otherwise good title of record. It is a substitute for the constructive notice that a recording would have provided.
But what if an instrument is actually on record? Will it always impart constructive notice to those dealing with the title? In George v. Wood, 9 Allen 80, after a mortgage had been recorded, a portion of the mortgaged premises was conveyed by the mortgagor and the mortgagee thereafter, without knowledge of the deed, gave a partial release to another portion of the mortgaged property. In connection with a dispute as to whether the partial release would in some way under the theory of marshaling of assets impair the security upon the land that was conveyed and upon which the mortgage remained outstanding, the court stated that, "We are not aware of any adjudged case in which the record of a deed has been held to be constructive notice to any persons other than subsequent purchasers, or those claiming title under the same grantor." In other words, the mortgagee was not bound by the notice that the recording statute imparted with respect to the latter-recorded deed and, since he did not have actual notice or knowledge of the deed, he was not bound by it.
Similarly, in Strong v. Stoneham Cooperative Bank, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 828, where a first mortgagee entered into agreements with the borrower modifying the mortgage and increasing the interest rate, the court said that the amended mortgage would not be adversely affected by the then existing subordinate second mortgages that it was unaware of. "We need not decide whether [the agreements] were valid against nonconsenting junior encumbrancers of whom the bank had actual or constructive notice (compare Guleserian v. Fields, 351 Mass. 238, 241 242 ) since there was no evidence that the bank had such notice. While it appears that the junior mortgages were recorded before the amendatory agreements had been made, the recording of those mortgages was not constructive notice of their existence to the mortgagee under the first mortgages. See George v. Wood, 9 Allen 80, 83 84 (1864); Dixon v. Smith, 181 Mass. 218, 221 (1902); Clarke v. Cowan, 206 Mass. 252, 255 (1910). Cf. Hardy v. Beverly Sav. Bank, 175 Mass. 112, 113 114 (1900)."
The decisions in George and Stone don't mean that one should go and amend mortgages or make loan disbursements under security instruments without doing title rundowns, but they do tell us how the courts have interpreted the constructive notice provisions of the statute.
One final note. There are some situations where the record title will not protect a party relying upon it. For example, with one exception (noted below), the recording statute does not apply to one dealing with the record holder of a mortgage. The mortgagee may have transferred the note or given an unrecorded assignment, and in those instances, though the record title shows the mortgagee as the holder, this is not the case and the off-record instruments will bind a purchaser. See Lamson & Co., Inc. v. Abrams, 305 Mass. 238, 25 N.E.2d 374. "The security (mortgage) follows the debt" is the controlling rule here, regardless of the record status of the mortgage. The exception to this rule is found in G.L.c. 183, §54 which provides that, "The recordation of a duly executed and acknowledged deed of release or written acknowledgment of payment or satisfaction as provided herein shall be conclusive evidence that the mortgage has been discharged notwithstanding the fact that the party signing such instrument may have assigned the note or other evidence of debt to another party, unless such assignment had been duly recorded prior to the instrument discharging the mortgage." This statute, which applies exclusively to discharges, is the only statute I am aware of that makes a "cut out" to the common law rule announced in the Lamson decision.
When any owner of land the title to which is not registered, or of any interest in such land, signs and instrument in writing conveying or purporting to convey his land or interest, or in any manner affecting or purporting to affect his title thereto, and the instrument, whether or not entitled to record, is recorded, and indexed, in the registry of deeds for the district wherein such land is situated, and a period of ten years elapses after the instrument is accepted for record, and the instrument or the record thereof because of defect, irregularity or omission fails to comply in any respect with any requirement of law relating to seals, corporate or individual, to the validity of acknowledgment, to certificate of acknowledgment, witnesses, attestation, proof of execution, or time of execution, to recitals of consideration, residence, address, or date, to the authority of a person signing for a corporation who purports to be the president or treasurer or a principal officer of the corporation, such instrument and the record thereof shall notwithstanding any or all of such defects, irregularities and omissions, be effective for all purposes to the same extent as though the instrument and the record thereof had originally not been subject to the defect, irregularity or omission, unless within said period of ten years a proceeding is commenced on account of the defect, irregularity or omission, and notice thereof is duly recorded in said registry of deeds and indexed and noted on the margin thereof under the name of the signer of the instrument and, in the event of such proceeding, unless relief is thereby in due course granted.
This is a handy little statute with which to become familiar. It can save a lot of title headaches when you run into one or more of these problems in your back chain of title that would otherwise call into question the effectiveness of the recording of an instrument that made it to record even though it perhaps should not have because of one of these "defects, irregularities or omissions."

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