Source: http://www.iuspublicum-thomas-schmitz.uni-goettingen.de/Lehre/Jurisprudence-on-integration-2.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:12:45+00:00

Document:
Updated 2009; partly updated and enlarged 2015. With contributions from Thomas Schmitz, Giulia Rossolillo, Giorgos Christonakis, Julia Laffranque, Piotr Czarny, Harald Christian Scheu and Ola Zetterquist.
This overview presents the jurisprudence of constitutional courts and other courts with constitutional jurisdiction. The selection concentrates on the better known decisions (in particular of the Italian Corte costituzionale, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the French Conseil constitutionnel) and on the highly topical Lisbon judgements (of the Conseil constitutionnel, the Czech Ústavní soud, the Latvian Satversmes tiesa, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Hungarian Alkotmánybíróság and the Polish Trybunał Konstytucyjny). However, presentations of less known judgements, in particular from the new member states, are also incorporated.
Note that the constitutional courts of the member states do not have any jurisdiction on questions of European Union law. According to art. 19(1) EU Treaty (formerly: 220 EC Treaty), this jurisdiction is reserved to the European Court of Justice. The jurisdiction of the constitutional courts is limited to questions of constitutional law concerning the participation of their state in the process of European integration. For example, regarding the question of Union law, a finding of a national constitutional court that in a given case the European Union has acted ultra vires, would be nothing else than a simple expression of opinion.
- because they are no acts of German "public power"
● EC Treaty represents "in a sense the constitution of this Community"
- measures taken by supranational institutions no acts of German "public power"
● The Bundesverfassungsgericht will control if the legal acts of the Union comply with the limits of its competences.
- this passage caused a flood of literature on the possible organisation of the "relationship of cooperation"
● the principle of equal elections does not exclude the current unequal allocation of seats in the European Parliament to the member states (based on ponderation) because it corresponds to the character of the EU as a "Staatenverbund"
- disguised correction of the statements in the Maastricht judgment while pretending continuity; the notion of "relationship of cooperation" ["Kooperationsverhältnis"] is not applied any more!
- The Bundesverfassungsgericht requires a thorough comparison of the national and European protection of human rights following the example of its Solange II decision. The appellant or submitting court has to demonstrate that the imperative standards are generally not guaranteed any more in the EU.
- When establishing mechanisms of considerable financial importance which can lead to incalculable burdens, the Bundestag must ensure that later on, mandatory approval by the Bundestag is always obtained again. It is prohibited from establishing permanent mechanisms under the law of international treaties which result in an assumption of liability for other states' decisions.
- Every larger scale aid to other member states provided by the Federation in a spirit of solidarity and involving public expenditure must be specifically approved by the Bundestag. Sufficient parliamentary influence must also be ensured with regard to the manner in which the funds that are made available are dealt with.
- The legislature’s assessment that otherwise the European Parliament’s ability to function would be impaired cannot rely on a sufficient factual basis and does not adequately take account of the European Parliament’s specific working conditions and its functions.
● the transfer of competences for measures relating to visas, asylum and the free movement of persons jeopardises "conditions essentielles d'exercice de la souveraineté nationale"
- first relativization of the position in the decision "économie numérique"
- second relativization of the position in the decision "économie numérique"
- "49. ... Neither the Chancellor of Justice Act nor the Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act give the Chancellor of Justice the competence to request that the Supreme Court declare an Act unconstitutional on the ground that it is in conflict with the European Union law. There are different possibilities for bringing national law in conformity with the European Union law, and neither the Constitution nor the European Union law provide for the existence of constitutional review proceedings for this purpose. The European Union law has indeed supremacy over Estonian law, but taking into account the case-law of the European Court of Justice, this means the supremacy upon application. The supremacy of application means that the national act which is in conflict with the European Union law should be set aside in a concrete dispute ... Pursuant to Article 226 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Commission, if it considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, including not bringing national law into conformity with the European Union law, may bring the matter before the Court of Justice. This does not mean that such abstract review procedure over national law should exist on the national level. ..."
- "50. The legislator is competent to decide whether it wants to regulate the procedure for declaring invalid Estonian legislation which is in conflict with the European Union law, just as the legislator is free to choose whether it will or will not give the Chancellor of Justice the right to review the conformity of national legislation with the European Union law."
● see also dissenting opinion of the JUDGE LAFFRANQUE: The Chancellor of Justice essentially contested the conformity of the Political Parties Act to the Constitution (the substance of which had been renewed by the Amendment Act), and the Riigikohus en banc should have answered this question in the framework of constitutional review, using the help of EU law for interpretation purposes and even asking the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, if necessary.
- "14. ... Thus, the Constitution ... must be read together with the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Amendment Act, applying only the part of the Constitution that is not amended by the CAA. ... 16. ... only that part of the Constitution is applicable, which is in conformity with the European Union law or which regulates the relationships that are not regulated by the European Union law. The effect of those provisions of the Constitution that are not compatible with the European Union law and thus inapplicable, is suspended. This means that within the spheres, which are within the exclusive competence of the European Union or where there is a shared competence with the European Union, the European Union law shall apply in the case of a conflict between Estonian legislation, including the Constitution, with the European Union law."
● see also the dissenting opinions of the JUSTICES KERGANDBERG and KÕVE who criticise that the Riigikohus did not specify the limits of the primacy of EU law over the Estonian Constitution and did not interpret the fundamental principles of the Constitution which are stated in the protective clause (§ 1) of the Constitution Amendment Act. JUSTICE KÕVE is of the opinion that the principle of primacy of EU law has been "overestimated".
● principle of interpreting the Constitution in a manner "sympathetic to European law"
● The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, as a source of legal interpretation, is important for the interpretation and application of Lithuanian law.
● As a result of the Czech Republic's accession to the European Union, a transfer of powers of national organs to the organs of the European Community was effected. This delegation is conditional and may persist only so long as these powers are exercised in a manner that is compatible with the preservation of the foundations of state sovereignty of the Czech Republic, and in a manner which does not threaten the very essence of a state governed in a broad, substantive sense by the rule of law ["materieller Rechtsstaat"].
● Direct applicability in national law and applicational precedence of Community law follows from Community law doctrine itself, as it has emerged from the case-law of the ECJ.
● Art. 10a of the Constitution operates in both directions: It forms the normative basis for the transfer of powers to the Community and simultaneously opens up the national legal order to the operation of Community law, including rules relating to its effects within the legal order.
● Domestic legal enactments, including the constitution, should be interpreted in conformity with the principles of European integration and the cooperation between Community and member state organs(Euro-conforming interpretation / interpretation in the light of European law).
● If the national methodology for the interpretation of constitutional law does not enable a relevant norm to be interpreted in harmony with European Law, it is solely within the Constituent Assembly's prerogative to amend the Constitution.
● When interpreting art. 36 of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod), which guarantees the right to assert one's rights before an independent and impartial court, the Cconstitutional Court (Ústavní soud) has to take into account the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, which has already adjudicated on the interpretation of the procedural standards determined in a EC directive.
● The transfer of powers of bodies of the Czech Republic to an international organisation under art. 10a of the Constitution cannot go so far as to violate the very essence of the republic as a sovereign and democratic state governed by the rule of law. Apart from that, it is solely a question of politics.
● If, on the basis of a transfer of powers, the "competence of competences" were transfered to an international organisation, i.e. if it could change its powers at will, and independently of its member states, this would violate the essence of the republic as a sovereign and democratic state in the sense of art. 1 of the Constitution.
● The modern concept of sovereignty assumes that state sovereignty is not an aim in and of itself, but is a means for fulfilling the fundamental values of the constitution.
● For the preventive review of whether an international treaty is consistent with the constitutional order, the appropriate point of reference is the constitutional order as a whole, not only its material core.
● The purpose of the constitutional review of an international treaty is to preventively eliminate inconsistencies between treaty obligations and the constitutional order before the treaty becomes binding. These inconsistencies must be alleged without undue delay. It is contrary to the international public law principle of good faith to disproportionately draw out the definitive decision to accept or not accept the treaty obligation.
● Under the Czech Constitution, the President of the Republic is obliged to ratify without undue delay an international treaty that was negotiated by the government and the ratification of which has been approved by the democratically elected Parliament. Only a proceeding before the Constitutional Court postpones the moment of ratification until the time of the decision of the Constitutional Court.
● It is not possible for the Constitutional Court to determine in advance authoritatively a catalogue of non-transferrable powers of the organs of the Czech Republic. These limits should be left primarily to the constitutional legislator to specify.
● After joining the European Union the Republic of Latvia has to honour all the liabilities following from the membership.
● A possible accession of the European Union to the ECHR would not be incompatible with the Satversme.
● Although the dissemination of information on the European integration should be seen as good administration, deficits in the information process do not violate art. 2 of the Statsversme [which reserves the sovereign power to the people of Latvia].
● The right to initiate the procedure under art. 68(4) Satversmes [the referendum], is an exclusive right of (one-half of) the members of the Saeima.
● The Saeima, when deciding on the ratification of an international treaty which modifies the conditions of membership in the European Union, must vet the treaty (and therefore have access to preliminary assessments on the possible implications, made available to its members). The Saeima must also assess which procedure shall be applied for the adoption of the law.
Swedish courts have a distinct low profile in EU matters. The constitutional law of the EU membership is predominantly elaborated by the Riksdag (the parliament). The debate in Sweden is primarily concerned with the position of the Riksdag and not with fundamental rights protection.
● The transfer of competencies to the EU may not violate "the principles of the form of government".
● The protection of fundamental rights in the EU must be equivalent to the level afforded by the ECHR and the Swedish Instrument of Government.
● In case of conflict between the Swedish constitution and EU law there is no issue of supremacy but rather of whether the EU has a properly transferred competence to adopt the norm in question. Should that not be the case, the norm is not valid in Sweden.
● The "principles of the form of government" also include the fundamental principles of the two constitutional laws the Freedom of the Press Act (Tryckfrihetsförordningen) and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen), which are instrumental to securing the free formation of opinion in Sweden. The basic principles of these two laws are the public nature of official documents, the freedom to communicate information for the purpose of publication, the ban on censorship, the protection of sources and the special system of liability.
● The Constitutional Treaty weakened the role of the Swedish Riksdag but not enough to violate the constitution.
● The protection of fundamental rights was adequate and even streng-thened by the Constitutional Treaty.
 See also the materials from the Riga Symposiums " Verfassungsrechtsprechung zwischen Souveränität und Integration" / "Konstitucionālo tiesu prakse. Ceļā no suverenitātes uz integrāciju", University of Latvia, 2007 - 2009.
 This has already been recognized in the "Solange I" decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) from 1974 (BVerfGE 37, 271, p. 278 and 282).
 Compiled by Giulia Rossolillo, University of Pavia.
 Oppenheimer (ed..), The Relationship between European Community law and National Law: The Cases, vol. 1, 1994, vol. 2, 2003.
[4a] BVerfGE 22, 293 = Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, official reports), quoted by indicating the volume and the page number, here: 22nd volume, beginning of the quoted decision at page 293.
 Casebook Hummer/Vedder, Europarecht in Fällen, 4th edition 2005.
 Confirmed in BVerfGE 58, 1 (Eurocontrol) and BVerfGE 37, 271, 277 (Solange I).
 Confirmed in BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange II).
 See also the different statement in BVerfGE 89, 155, 175 (Maastricht judgement).
 See also, as a preparing step for this decision, BVerfGE 52, 187 ("maybe.,..") from 1979.
 See on this aspect also the Czech Ústavní soud in its first Lisbon judgement.
 See also, as a preparing step for this decision, BVerfGE 68, 1, 98 f. (Pershing missiles) from 1984: Substantial modifications of the integration program and its execution, as laid down in the founding treaty, are not any more covered by the ratifying legislative act. See also the Lisbon judgement.
 This idea has been given up de facto in the decision BVerfGE 102, 147 (banana market organisation).
 Explicit divergence from the previous statement in BVerfGE 58, 1, 27 (Eurocontrol).
 An English translation of excerpts of the judgement has been published by Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, 8th edition 2007, p. 662 ff. There are some inaccuracies in the translation. However, with regard to the terminology used by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, this was unavoidable.
 See now the regulation in art. 23(4-6) BL (and implementing law).
 See also the judgements of the Polish Trybunał Konstytucyjny and the Czech Ústavní soud.
[16a] Note: The English translation of the judgement uses the term "obvious transgressions of the boundaries" that is not precisely correct. "Obvious" means "offensichtlich", but the German term "ersichtlich" serves to indicate a degree of certainty, which is considerably lower.
[16b] See, however, the correction and conretisation in BVerfG, 06.07.2010, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Honeywell).
[16c] See for another attitude the second Lisbon judgement of the Czech Ústavní soud.
 See on this aspect also the Czech Ústavní soud in its second Lisbon judgement.
[17a] See also the criticism of the Justice Landau in his dissenting opinion, no. 94 (102 ff.).
[17b] Denied by Justice Landau in his dissenting opinion, no. 94 (105 ff.).
[17c] Note that the same applies to the three per cent barrier clause, which had been introduced after this decision, see BVerfGE 135, 259 (with dissenting opinion of the Juctice Müller, BVerfGE 135, 299).
[17d] Presentation following the decision of 2014 on the merits. The essential considerations have been developed already in the thorough "summary review" in the decision of 2012 on the applications for the issue of a temporary injunction.
[17e] Note that the ECJ has not followed this reasoning in its OMT Judgement of 16.06.2015 (ECJ, case 2/14, Gauweiler and others). After its preliminary ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court has not yet taken its final decision in the case.
 See in this context art. 54 of the French Constitution.
 See also the much stricter view of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGE 83, 37), concerning art. 20(2) phrase 1 and art. 28(1) phrase 2 BL: "People" means only the people of the state; therefore any right of foreigners to vote and to stand as a candidate at local elections is unconstitutional, even if it does not have any impact on national institutions or policies. See now, however, the new regulation in art. 28(1) phrase 3 BL.
[19a] Confirmed in Conseil constitutionnel, 12.05.2010, 2010-605 DC (conerning online betting and gambling).
 Compiled by Giorgos Christonakis, Athens.
 Concerning the incompatibility of this position with European Union law, see footnote 26. In contrast, the lower ordinary and administrative courts have pronounced themselves frequently and in various case configurations in favour of the primacy of Community law over constitutional law.
 See also Österreichischer Verfassungsgerichtshof, cases G2/97 (Slg. 15215), G24/01 a.o. (Slg. 16293) and G121/03 a.o., concerning the constitutional review of unapplicable statutes and ordinances.
 Compiled by Julia Laffranque, University of Tartu.
 Compiled by Piotr Czarny. University of Cracow.
 See on this aspect also the judgements of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Czech Ústavní soud.
 In some member states (Greece, Spain, Poland, Lithuania), the Courts have denied the primacy of European Union law over the national constitution. Thereby, they are challenging a core element of the European legal order. The European Court of Justice has elaborated the primacy of Union law over national constitutional law already in 1970 in the decision Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (case 11/70). The member states have accepted it (in principle) on the occasion of all later reforms and enlargements of the Union. It is a central component of the acquis communautaire, which all member states that acceeded later have explicitly accepted.
 Note that these remarks of the Trybunał Konstytucyjny rest upon a misunderstanding of the term "supranational organisation"; see for the terminology Schmitz, Integration in der Supranationalen Union, 2001, p. 70 ff., 164 ff. (chapters 1 and 2).
 Note that Lithuania has regulated important aspects of the relation between national law and EU law in the Constitutional Act on Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union of July 13, 2004. According to section 2, EU law shall be a constituent part of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania. It shall be applied directly and, in the event of collision of legal norms, have primacy over Lithuanian law. The wording of section 2 does not address the problem of primacy over the Lithuanian Constitution.
 Concerning the incompatibility of this position with European Union law, see footnote 26.
 Compiled by Harald Christian Scheu, Charles University in Prague.
 See on this aspect also the judgements of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Polish Trybunał Konstytucyjny.
 Se also the Maastricht judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
 See for another attitude the Lisbon judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
 See on this aspect also the Lisbon judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
 Compiled by Jānis Pleps, School of Business Administration Turība, doctorand at the University of Latvia. Translated from Latvian to German by Līga Ziediņa. See also the original Latvian compilation with detailed literal quotations from the judgements (p. 13 ff.) and a summary of the presentation at the the Riga Symposium 2009.
 Cf. no. 7 of the judgement.
 Cf. no. 24.2 ("...Eiropas Savienības tiesības ir kļuvušas par neatņemamu Latvijas tiesību sastāvdaļu"). This understanding reflects the strictly monistic perspective of Latvian constitutional law. Note that in most member states, following a dualistic approach, EU law is understood and applied as a separate law, coming from outside the national legal order.
 See no. 10.4 of the judgement.
 See no. 11.2 and 11.3. of the judgement.
 See no. 15 of the judgement.
 See no. 16.2 of the judgement.
 See no. 16.3 of the judgement.
 See no. 17 of the judgement.
 See no. 17. of the judgement.
 See no. 18.3 f. of the judgement.
 See no. 18.8 of the judgement.
 See no. 18.10 of the judgement.
 See no. 19 of the judgement.
 See no. 20 of the judgement.
 Compiled by Ola Zetterquist, University of Gothenburg.

References: art. 19
 Art. 10
 art. 36
 art. 10
 art. 1
 art. 2
 art. 68
 art. 23
 art. 54
 art. 20
 art. 28
 art. 28