Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_us_rule100
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:06:48+00:00

Document:
The US Field Manual (1956) restates common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Articles 102 and 108 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, §§ 11, 178 and 184.
With respect to occupied territories, the manual uses the same wording as Articles 5, 66 and 71 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, §§ 248, 436 and § 441.
The manual provides that “wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a protected person of the rights of a fair and regular trial” is a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 502.
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states that the 1949 Geneva Convention III “provides specific safeguards and guarantees of fair judicial proceedings”.
The Pamphlet specifies that “deliberate deprivation of fair trial rights to any protected persons” is an act involving individual criminal responsibility.
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 15-3(c)(11).
The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) provides: “A prisoner of war must be tried by the same courts as try members of the armed forces of the detaining power, and must be given the same procedural rights as members of that state’s armed forces”.
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Judge Advocate General, US Department of the Air Force, 25 July 1980, § 4-2(c).
The Handbook adds: “Even terrorists … and illegal partisans have the right to be tried”.
With respect to war crimes trials, the Handbook states that “these trials must meet certain minimum standards of fairness and due process, now set out in detail in the 1949 Geneva Conventions” and that the “failure to accord captured personnel the right to a fair trial is itself a serious violation of the law of armed conflict”.
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Judge Advocate General, US Department of the Air Force, 25 July 1980, §§ 8–3(a) and(b).
The US Soldier’s Manual (1984) prohibits sentencing protected persons without a proper trial.
United States, Your Conduct in Combat under the Law of War, Publication No. FM 27-2, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, November 1984, pp. 5 and 20.
The US Naval Handbook (1995) provides that “the following acts are representative war crimes … denial of a fair trial” for prisoners of war and civilian inhabitants of an occupied territory.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 6.2.5(2) and (3).
2. Offenses against civilian inhabitants of occupied territory, including … denial of fair trial for offenses.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 6.2.6.3.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 11.3.1.1.
d. Passing sentences … without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 11.2(d).
… Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, as construed and applied by U.S. law, establishes minimum standards for the humane treatment of all persons detained by the United States, coalition, and allied forces. Common Article 3 prohibits at any time and in any place: “… the passing of sentences … without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples … ”.
DODD 2310.01E [Department of Defense Directive, The Department of Defense Detainee Program] requires that all DOD [Department of Defense] personnel and contractors will apply, without regard to a detainee’s legal status, at a minimum, the standards articulated in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010) provides that “procedural and evidentiary rules that … extend to the accused all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples as required by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949”.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Preamble, § 2, p. I-1.
Under the US War Crimes Act (1996), as amended in 2006, violations of common Article 3 and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are war crimes.
United States, War Crimes Act, 1996, as amended in 2006, Section 2441(c).
United States, Executive Order 13492, Closure of Guantánamo Detention Facilities, 2009, Sections 4(a) and 7.
In the Sawada case before the US Military Commission at Shanghai in 1946, the accused was charged with “knowingly, unlawfully and wilfully” denying the status of prisoner of war to eight members of the US forces who were “tried and sentenced by a Japanese Military Tribunal in violation of the laws of war”. The Military Commission considered that “false and fraudulent charges” and “false and fraudulent evidence” contributed to the criminal character of the trial.
United States, Military Commission at Shanghai, Sawada case, Judgment, 15 April 1946.
In the Isayama case in 1946, the US Military Commission at Shanghai tried Lieutenant-General Harukei Isayama and other members of the Japanese Military Tribunal on charges that members of the Japanese Military Tribunal did “permit, authorize and direct an illegal, unfair, unwarranted and false trial [of prisoners of war] … upon false and fraudulent evidence and without affording said prisoners of war a fair hearing”. The Commission found that the accused had falsified the records of interrogation of 14 US airmen, that the US airmen were not afforded the opportunity to obtain evidence or to call witnesses on their own behalf, that they were not permitted to be represented by legal counsel and that they were executed in violation of international law. The Commission found Lieutenant-General Isayama and the seven other accused guilty of all counts alleged.
United States, Military Commission at Shanghai, Isayama case, Judgment, 25 July 1946.
The trials of the accused … did not approach a semblance of fair trial or justice. The accused … were arrested and secretly transported to Germany and other countries for trial. They were held incommunicado. In many instances they were denied the right to introduce evidence, to be confronted by witnesses against them, or to present witnesses on their own behalf. They were tried secretly and denied the right of counsel of their own choice, and occasionally denied the aid of any counsel. No indictment was served in many instances and the accused learned only a few moments before the trial of the nature of the alleged crime for which he was to be tried. The entire proceedings from the beginning to end were secret and no public record was allowed to be made of them.
The Tribunal concluded that the trial was “unfair”.
5. The defense characterization of the effect of the MCA [Military Commissions Act (2006)] on Mr. Khadr as “legislative punishment” is not supported by case law; nor by any logical interpretation of the historical reasons for the Bill of Attainder Clause.
a. The cases cited by the defense for the propositions which it asserts do not support characterization of a trial by military commission as punishment.
b. Insofar as the defense claims are based upon those portions of the MCA which regulate the access to civilian courts for purposes of habeas corpus, those portions are independent of those sections establishing the jurisdiction of and procedures for military commissions.
c. Insofar as the defense claims are based on procedures established by the MCA which differ from procedures in federal courts and military courts-martial, such variations. are not grounds for determining that punishment has been legislated before a trial. The commission notes that the Uniform Code of Military Justice has not been held to be a Bill of Attainder, even though certain provisions of military practice appear to be at variance with Constitutional requirements – compare place of trial under the Uniform Code with the 6th Amendment’s venue rule and Clause 2 of Section III.
6. Nothing in the MCA directs that any person or any subset of persons be punished without a trial. Nothing in the trial procedures established by the MCA can be properly viewed as “punishment,” as that term is used in the cases cited by the defense.
United States, Guantánamo Military Commission, Khadr case, Ruling, 20 February 2008, §§ 5–6.
We support the principle that … no sentence be passed and penalty executed except pursuant to conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure.
United States, Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, US Department of State, Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, American Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 2, 1987, pp. 427–428.
The basic core of [the 1977 Additional] Protocol II is, of course, reflected in common article 3 of the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions and therefore is, and should be a part of generally accepted customary law. This specifically includes its prohibitions on … punishment without due process.
United States, Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, US Department of State, Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, American Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 2, 1987, pp. 430–431.
These men will be held in a high-security facility at Guantanamo. The International Committee of the Red Cross is being advised of their detention, and will have the opportunity to meet with them. Those charged with crimes will be given access to attorneys who will help them prepare their defense – and they will be presumed innocent. While at Guantanamo, they will have access to the same food, clothing, medical care, and opportunities for worship as other detainees. They will be questioned subject to the new U.S. Army Field Manual, which the Department of Defense is issuing today. And they will continue to be treated with the humanity that they denied others.
United States, Report by the President of the United States, 2010 National Security Strategy, The White House, Washington DC, 26 May 2010, p. 36.
The US Field Manual (1956) reproduces Article 84 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 160.
Requisites of military commission jurisdiction.
(1) Jurisdiction of military commissions generally. A military commission shall have jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by the M.C.A. [Military Commissions Act of 2006] or the law of war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001.
(2) Lawful enemy combatants. Military commissions under the M.C.A. shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatants.
The accused must be a person subject to military commission jurisdiction; and The offense must be subject to military commission jurisdiction.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part II, Rule 201 (b), pp. II-12 and II-13.
(a) In general. The military commissions may try any person when authorized to do so under the M.C.A.
(b) Determination of unlawful enemy combatant status by Combatant Status Review Tribunal or other competent tribunal dispositive. A finding, whether before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for trial by a military commission under the M.C.A. The determination by the tribunal shall apply for purposes of military commission jurisdiction without regard to any pending petitions for review or other appeals.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part II, Rule 202(a) and (b), p. II-13.
(a) In general. Except as provided in section (e) of this rule, a military judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which that military judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(1) Where the military judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part II, Rule 902(a) and (b)(1), p. II-80.
… Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, as construed and applied by U.S. law, establishes minimum standards for the humane treatment of all persons detained by the United States, coalition, and allied forces. Common Article 3 prohibits at any time and in any place: “… the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”.
(d) the passing of sentences … without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.
(5) The offense must be subject to military commission jurisdiction.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 201(b), p. II-14.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 202, p. II-15.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 902(a) and (b)(1), p. II-86.
(a) PURPOSE.—This chapter establishes procedures governing the use of military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other offenses triable by military commission.
(f) STATUS OF COMMISSIONS UNDER COMMON ARTICLE 3.— A military commission established under this chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary “judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
(g) GENEVA CONVENTIONS NOT ESTABLISHING SOURCE OF RIGHTS.—No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.
United States, Military Dictatorship, 2007, Article 2(1). Spain, Law on the Victims of the Civil War and the Dictatorship Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2602, § 948b(a), (f) and (g).
(a) JURISDICTION.—A military commission under this chapter shall have jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by this chapter or the law of war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001.
(b) LAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANTS.—Military commissions under this chapter shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy combat ants. Lawful enemy combatants who violate the law of war are subject to chapter 47 of this title. Courts-martial established under that chapter shall have jurisdiction to try a lawful enemy combatant for any offense made punishable under this chapter.
(c) DETERMINATION OF UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT STATUS DISPOSITIVE.—A finding, whether before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for trial by military commission under this chapter.
(d) PUNISHMENTS.—A military commission under this chapter may, under such limitations as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by this chapter, including the penalty of death when authorized under this chapter or the law of war.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2603, § 948d.
[T]there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories. Article 3, often referred to as Common Article 3 because, like Article 2, it appears in all four Geneva Conventions, provides that in a “conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,” certain provisions protecting “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by … detention.” Id., at 3318. One such provision prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that Common Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being “‘international in scope,’” does not qualify as a “‘conflict not of an international character.’” 415 F.3d at 41. That reasoning is erroneous. The term “conflict not of an international character” is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations. So much is demonstrated by the “fundamental logic [of] the Convention’s provisions on its application.” Id., at 44 (Williams, J., concurring). Common Article 2 provides that “the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” 6 U.S.T., at 3318 (Art. 2, P 1). High Contracting Parties (signatories) also must abide by all terms of the Conventions vis-a-vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a nonsignatory “Power,” and must so abide vis-a-vis the nonsignatory if “the latter accepts and applies” those terms. Ibid. (Art. 2, P 3). Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory “Power” who are involved in a conflict “in the territory of” a signatory. The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not). In context, then, the phrase “not of an international character” bears its literal meaning. See, e.g., J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 6, 296 (J. Burns & H. Hart eds. 1970) (using the term “international law” as a “new though not inexpressive appellation” meaning “betwixt nation and nation”; defining “international” to include “mutual transactions between sovereigns as such”); Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, p 1351 (1987) (“[A] non-international armed conflict is distinct from an international armed conflict because of the legal status of the entities opposing each other”).
Although the official commentaries accompanying Common Article 3 indicate that an important purpose of the provision was to furnish minimal protection to rebels involved in one kind of “conflict not of an international character,” i.e., a civil war, see GCIII [1949 Geneva Convention III] Commentary 36–37, the commentaries also make clear “that the scope of the Article must be as wide as possible,” id., at 36. In fact, limiting language that would have rendered Common Article 3 applicable “especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion,” was omitted from the final version of the Article, which coupled broader scope of application with a narrower range of rights than did earlier proposed iterations. See GCIII Commentary 42–43.
Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and, as indicated above, requires that Hamdan be tried by a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” 6 U.S.T., at 3320 (Art. 3, P 1(d)). While the term “regularly constituted court” is not specifically defined in either Common Article 3 or its accompanying commentary, other sources disclose its core meaning. The commentary accompanying a provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention, for example, defines “‘regularly constituted’” tribunals to include “ordinary military courts” and “definitely exclud[e] all special tribunals.” GCIV [1949 Geneva Convention IV] Commentary 340 (defining the term “properly constituted” in Article 66, which the commentary treats as identical to “regularly constituted”); see also Yamashita, 327 U.S., at 44, 66 S. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 499 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (describing military commission as a court “specially constituted for a particular trial”). And one of the Red Cross’ own treatises defines “regularly constituted court” as used in Common Article 3 to mean “established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country.” Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, 1 Customary International Humanitarian Law 355 (2005); see also GCIV Commentary 340 (observing that “ordinary military courts” will “be set up in accordance with the recognized principles governing the administration of justice”).
United States, Supreme Court, Hamdan case, Judgment, Part VI D, 29 June 2006.
Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen born on 19 September 1986, had been captured in Afghanistan in July 2002 and detained at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, since October 2002. In September 2007, the Khadr case (US Court of Military Commission Review) resulted from an appeal by the Government after the military judge presiding over Khadr’s military commission trial had dismissed all charges against him without prejudice – a ruling based upon the judge’s determination that the military commission lacked personal jurisdiction over Khadr. The basis for that ruling had been the Appellant’s failure to properly determine Khadr’s status as an “alien unlawful enemy combatant” before his Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT). The judge ruled that this was an indispensable prerequisite to the military commission’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act 2006 (MCA), further stating that “the military commission is not the proper authority, under the provisions of the MCA, to determine that Mr. Khadr is an unlawful enemy combatant in order to establish initial jurisdiction for this commission to try Mr. Khadr”.
[T]he 2002 White House memorandum [“Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees”, signed by President G.W. Bush, 7 February 2002] concluded that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions “does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees.” Id. at ¶ 2c. The Supreme Court subsequently determined that legal conclusion was erroneous. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2795–96, 165 L. Ed. 2d 776–78. Congress, clearly aware of the Hamdan decision when it drafted the M.C.A., appears to have embraced the minimal safeguards guaranteed by Common Article 3 requiring that even “unlawful enemy combatants” be tried by a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” See § 948b(f), M.C.A. (quoting Common Article 3 – “A military commission established under this chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’ for purposes of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions”); see also Art. III, GPW III, ¶ 1(d). No serious legal authority would contest the notion that one of the most indispensable and important judicial guarantees among civilized nations honoring a tradition of due process and fundamental fairness is the right to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in regard to allegations which might result in criminal sanctions. The M.C.A. did not exist until October 2006. Mr. Khadr could not have known at the time of his C.S.R.T. in 2004 that a determination of “enemy combatant” status pursuant to declarations contained in the 2002 White House memorandum, or definitions contained in the 2004 Wolfowitz memorandum [Deputy Secretary for Defense, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, “Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal”, 7 July 2004], could dispositively qualify him two years after the fact for potential criminal liability before a military commission as an “unlawful enemy combatant”.
United States, Court of Military Commission Review, Khadr case, Judgment, 24 September 2007.
Country reports on human rights practices issued by the US Department of State in 1983 and 1996 stress that the right to be tried by a trained, impartial and independent judge may not be suspended, even during an emergency situation.
United States, Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 1983, Nicaragua, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 637; Country reports on human rights practices for 1996, Cambodia, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 611.
In 1987, the deputy legal adviser of the US Department of State affirmed: “We support the principle that … no sentence be passed and penalty executed except pursuant to conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court”.
In March 2010, in a speech given at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, the US State Department’s legal adviser stated: “As the President noted in his National Archives speech, lawfully constituted military commissions are also appropriate venues for trying persons for violations of the laws of war”.
The manual also contains the provisions of Articles 71 and 123 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV.
Arraignment shall be conducted in a military commission session and shall consist of reading the charges and specifications to the accused and calling on the accused to plead. The accused may waive the reading.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 904, p. II-88.
(1) The nature of the offense to which the plea is offered and the maximum possible penalty provided by law.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 910 (c)(1), p. II-101.
“(2) that they are true in fact to the best of the signer’s knowledge and belief.
“(b) NOTICE TO ACCUSED.—Upon the swearing of the charges and specifications in accordance with subsection (a), the accused shall be informed of the charges against him as soon as practicable.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2602, 2606, 2607, §§ 948b(a) and 948q.
“(A) Classified information shall be protected and is privileged from disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to the national security. The rule in the preceding sentence applies to all stages of the proceedings of military commissions under this chapter.
(ii) disclosure of the information would be detrimental to the national security.
“(C) A person who may claim the privilege referred to in subparagraph (A) may authorize a representative, witness, or trial counsel to claim the privilege and make the finding described in subparagraph (B) on behalf of such person. The authority of the representative, witness, or trial counsel to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(iii) the substitution of a statement of relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.
“(B) PROTECTION OF SOURCES, METHODS, OR ACTIVITIES.—The military judge, upon motion of trial counsel, shall permit trial counsel to introduce otherwise admissible evidence before the military commission, while protecting from disclosure the sources, methods, or activities by which the United States acquired the evidence if the military judge finds that (i) the sources, methods, or activities by which the United States acquired the evidence are classified, and (ii) the evidence is reliable. The military judge may require trial counsel to present to the military commission and the defense, to the extent practicable and consistent with national security, an unclassified summary of the sources, methods, or activities by which the United States acquired the evidence.
“(C) ASSERTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY PRIVILEGE AT TRIAL.—During the examination of any witness, trial counsel may object to any question, line of inquiry, or motion to admit evidence that would require the disclosure of classified information. Following such an objection, the military judge shall take suitable action to safeguard such classified information. Such action may include the review of trial counsel’s claim of privilege by the military judge in camera and on an ex parte basis, and the delay of proceedings to permit trial counsel to consult with the department or agency concerned as to whether the national security privilege should be asserted.
“(3) CONSIDERATION OF PRIVILEGE AND RELATED MATERIALS.—A claim of privilege under this subsection, and any materials submitted in support thereof, shall, upon request of the Government, be considered by the military judge in camera and shall not be disclosed to the accused.
“(4) ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of Defense may prescribe additional regulations, consistent with this subsection, for the use and protection of classified information during proceedings of military commissions under this chapter. A report on any regulations so prescribed, or modified, shall be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than 60 days before the date on which such regulations or modifications, as the case may be, go into effect.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2612–2613, § 949d(f).
“(b) NOTICE TO ACCUSED.—Upon the swearing of the charges and specifications … the accused shall be informed of the charges and specifications against the accused as soon as practicable.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 948q(b).
“The trial counsel assigned to a case before a military commission under this chapter shall cause to be served upon the accused and military defense counsel a copy of the charges upon which trial is to be had in English and, if appropriate, in another language that the accused understands, sufficiently in advance of trial to prepare a defense.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 948s.
The US Field Manual (1956) reproduces Articles 96, 99 and 105 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, §§ 172, 175 and 181.
The manual also restates Articles 71 and 72 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, concerning situations of occupation, and Article 123 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, regarding disciplinary punishment.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, §§ 441, 442 and 330.
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) provides: “In no event may [a prisoner of war] be tried … under procedure which fails to accord the rights of defense set forth in Article 105 [of the 1949 Geneva Convention III].” It adds that Article 105 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III “gives [the accused] the right to counsel of his choice” and that the prisoner of war’s “counsel will have the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense”.
The manual also states: “Among other rights, accused persons are assured the right to … obtain defense counsel”.
The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) states that prisoners must “be allowed the help of a lawyer”.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 11.7.1.
Counsel in a military commission. Military trial and defense counsel shall be detailed to military commissions by the Chief Prosecutor and Chief Defense Counsel, respectively. Assistant trial and associate or assistant defense counsel may also be detailed. Civilian trial counsel may be detailed by the Chief Prosecutor, with the approval of the convening authority and, if such counsel are employed by another government agency, with the approval of the head of that agency. Should an accused, pursuant to his request, be deemed competent to represent himself, detailed defense counsel shall serve as standby counsel.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part II, Rule 501(b), p. II-19.
Prisoners of war prosecuted for war crimes committed prior to capture, or for serious offenses committed after capture, are entitled to be tried by the courts that try the captor’s own forces and are to be accorded the same procedural rights. At a minimum, these rights must include the assistance of lawyer counsel.
(b) Counsel in a Military Commission. Military trial and defense counsel shall be detailed to military commissions by the Chief Prosecutor and Chief Defense Counsel, respectively. Assistant trial and associate or assistant defense counsel may also be detailed. Civilian trial counsel may be detailed by the Chief Prosecutor, with the approval of the convening authority and, if such counsel are employed by another government agency, with the approval of the head of that agency. Should an accused, pursuant to his request, be deemed competent to represent himself, detailed defense counsel shall serve as standby counsel.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 501(b), p. II-22.
(b) Capital Offenses. In any case in which the trial counsel makes a recommendation to the convening authority pursuant to R.M.C. 307(d) that a charge be referred to a capital military commission, or in which the convening authority refers a charge to a capital military commission, the accused has the right to be represented in accordance with section (a) above, and by at least one additional counsel who is learned in applicable law relating to capital cases.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 506(a) and (b), p. II-32.
(2) If the accused is not represented by counsel, that the accused has the right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 910(c)(2), pp. II-101 and II-102.
“(a) PROCEDURES AND RULES OF EVIDENCE.—Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including elements and modes of proof, for cases triable by military commission under this chapter may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General. Such procedures shall, so far as the Secretary considers practicable or consistent with military or intelligence activities, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence in trial by general courts-martial. Such procedures and rules of evidence may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
“(A) The accused shall be permitted to present evidence in his defense, to cross-examine the witnesses who testify against him, and to examine and respond to evidence admitted against him on the issue of guilt or innocence and for sentencing, as provided for by this chapter.
“(B) The accused shall be present at all sessions of the military commission (other than those for deliberations or voting), except when excluded under section 949d of this title.
“(C) The accused shall receive the assistance of counsel as provided for by section 948k.
“(D) The accused shall be permitted to represent himself, as provided for by paragraph (3).
“(A) Evidence shall be admissible if the military judge determines that the evidence would have probative value to a reasonable person.
“(B) Evidence shall not be excluded from trial by military commission on the grounds that the evidence was not seized pursuant to a search warrant or other authorization.
“(C) A statement of the accused that is otherwise admissible shall not be excluded from trial by military commission on grounds of alleged coercion or compulsory self-incrimination so long as the evidence complies with the provisions of section 948r of this title.
(ii) the military judge instructs the members that they may consider any issue as to authentication or identification of evidence in determining the weight, if any, to be given to the evidence.
“(E)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general courts-martial may be admitted in a trial by military commission if the proponent of the evidence makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet the evidence, the intention of the proponent to offer the evidence, and the particulars of the evidence (including information on the general circumstances under which the evidence was obtained). The disclosure of evidence under the preceding sentence is subject to the requirements and limitations applicable to the disclosure of classified information in section 949j(c) of this title.
(ii) Hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general courts-martial shall not be admitted in a trial by military commission if the party opposing the admission of the evidence demonstrates that the evidence is unreliable or lacking in probative value.
(ii) by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
“(3)(A) The accused in a military commission under this chapter who exercises the right to self-representation under paragraph (1)(D) shall conform his deportment and the conduct of the defense to the rules of evidence, procedure, and decorum applicable to trials by military commission.
“(B) Failure of the accused to conform to the rules described in subparagraph (A) may result in a partial or total revocation by the military judge of the right of self-representation under paragraph (1)(D). In such case, the detailed defense counsel of the accused or an appropriately authorized civilian counsel shall perform the functions necessary for the defense.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2602, 2608 and 2609, §§ 948b(a) and-949a(a) and (b).
“(1) The accused shall be represented in his defense before a military commission under this chapter as provided in this subsection.
“(2) The accused shall be represented by military counsel detailed under section 948k of this title.
“(E) has signed a written agreement to comply with all applicable regulations or instructions for counsel, including any rules of court for conduct during the proceedings.
“(4) Civilian defense counsel shall protect any classified information received during the course of representation of the accused in accordance with all applicable law governing the protection of classified information and may not divulge such information to any person not authorized to receive it.
“(5) If the accused is represented by civilian counsel, detailed military counsel shall act as associate counsel.
“(6) The accused is not entitled to be represented by more than one military counsel. However, the person authorized under regulations prescribed under section 948k of this title to detail counsel, in that person’s sole discretion, may detail additional military counsel to represent the accused.
“(7) Defense counsel may cross-examine each witness for the prosecution who testifies before a military commission under this chapter.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2610-2611, §§ 948b(a) and 948q.
Every accused shall have a qualified military defense counsel detailed to the accused at government expense during every stage of the proceedings. Should the military judge approve the request of an accused to represent himself, detailed military defense counsel shall serve as standby counsel. Should the accused retain civilian counsel, a military defense counsel shall remain detailed to the accused.
Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b) and R.M.C. 502(d)(1), the accused may retain the services of a civilian attorney of the accused’s own choosing and at no expense to the United States Government.
United States, Regulation for Trial by Military Commissions, 27 April 2007, § 9-1, p. 36 and § 9-5.a.1, p. 40.
“(C)(i) When none of the charges preferred against the accused are capital, to be represented before a military commission by civilian counsel if provided at no expense to the Government, and by either the defense counsel detailed or the military counsel of the accused’s own selection, if reasonably available.
(ii) When any of the charges preferred against the accused are capital, to be represented before a military commission in accordance with clause (i) and, to the greatest extent practicable, by at least one additional counsel who is learned in applicable law relating to capital cases and who, if necessary, may be a civilian and compensated in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 949a(b)(2)(A) and (C).
“(b) DEFENSE COUNSEL.—(1) The accused shall be represented in the accused’s defense before a military commission under this chapter as provided in this subsection.
“(2) The accused may be represented by military counsel detailed under section 948k of this title or by military counsel of the accused’s own selection, if reasonably available.
“(4) If the accused is represented by civilian counsel, military counsel shall act as associate counsel.
“(5) The accused is not entitled to be represented by more than one military counsel. However, the person authorized under regulations prescribed under section 948k of this title to detail counsel, in such person’s sole discretion, may detail additional military counsel to represent the accused.
“(6) Defense counsel may cross-examine each witness for the prosecution who testifies before a military commission under this chapter.
“(7) Civilian defense counsel shall protect any classified information received during the course of representation of the accused in accordance with all applicable law governing the protection of classified information, and may not divulge such information to any person not authorized to receive it.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 949c(b).
“(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) Defense counsel in a military commission under this chapter shall have a reasonable opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence as provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The opportunity to obtain witnesses and evidence shall be comparable to the opportunity available to a criminal defendant in a court of the United States under article III of the Constitution.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 949j(a)(1).
This Court has set aside convictions based upon confessions extorted from ignorant persons … who have been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel, or who have been taken at night to lonely and isolated places for questioning. Any one of these grounds would be sufficient cause for reversal.
United States, Supreme Court, Ward case, Judgment, 1 June 1942.
Country reports on human rights practices issued by the US Department of State have often noted that defendants must be given an opportunity to present their defence. More specifically, in 1986, the Department of State expressed concern that several indicted political prisoners in Ethiopia had been denied the right to present a defence, to call witnesses or to search for further evidence.
United States, Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 1986, Ethiopia, United States Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 144; see also Country reports on human rights practices for 1993, Nicaragua, United States Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 637; Country reports on human rights practices for 1996, Cambodia, United States Government Printing Office, 1997, p. 611.
[U]nder the laws and customs of war, detained enemy combatants have no right of access to counsel or the courts to challenge their detention. Should a detainee be charged with a criminal offense, he would have the right to counsel and applicable fundamental procedural safeguards.
As the President noted in his National Archives speech, lawfully constituted military commissions are also appropriate venues for trying persons for violations of the laws of war. In 2009, with significant input from this Administration, the Military Commissions Act was amended, with important changes to address the defects in the previous Military Commissions Act of 2006 … . The 2009 legislative reforms … require the government to disclose more potentially exculpatory information, restrict hearsay evidence … .
The US Field Manual (1956) reproduces Article 103 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III and Article 71 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, §§ 179 and 441.
“(b) AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS UNDER THIS CHAPTER.—The President is authorized to establish military commissions under this chapter for offenses triable by military commission as provided in this chapter.
“(c) CONSTRUCTION OF PROVISIONS.—The procedures for military commissions set forth in this chapter are based upon the procedures for trial by general courts-martial under chapter 47 of this title (the Uniform Code of Military Justice). Chapter 47 of this title does not, by its terms, apply to trial by military commission except as specifically provided in this chapter. The judicial construction and application of that chapter are not binding on military commissions established under this chapter.
“(A) Section 810 (article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), relating to speedy trial, including any rule of courts-martial relating to speedy trial.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2602, § 948b(a)–(d)(A).
The manual also uses the same wording as Articles 72 and 123 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, §§ 442 and 330.
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) provides that Article 105 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III “gives [the prisoner of war] the right to … the services of a competent interpreter”.
The Pamphlet also states: “Among other rights, accused persons are assured the right to … obtain an interpreter”.
The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) states that prisoners must be allowed “the help of … an interpreter” in case of trial.
The US Naval Handbook (1995) states: “At a minimum, [procedural] rights must include the assistance of … an interpreter”.
Interpreters. The convening authority may detail or employ for the military commission interpreters who shall interpret for the commission and as necessary, for the trial counsel, defense counsel, and the accused.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part II, Rule 501(d), p. II-19.
Prisoners of war prosecuted for war crimes committed prior to capture, or for serious offenses committed after capture, are entitled to be tried by the courts that try the captor’s own forces and are to be accorded the same procedural rights. At a minimum, these rights must include the assistance of … an interpreter.
(d) Interpreters. The convening authority may detail or employ for the military commission interpreters.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 501(d), p. II-22.
(e) Interpreters, reporters, escorts, bailiffs, clerks, and guards.
(A) Interpreters. Interpreters shall interpret for the commission and as necessary, for the trial counsel and defense counsel and for the accused.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 502(e)(3)(A), p. II-28.
In each case before a military commission and in each instance of the taking of a deposition, the convening authority or the officer directing such proceeding shall appoint, when necessary, an interpreter for the commission or officer taking the deposition.
United States, Regulation for Trial by Military Commissions, 27 April 2007, § 7-3.a, p. 30.
“(b) INTERPRETERS.—Under such regulations as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, the convening authority of a military commission under this chapter may detail to or employ for the military commission interpreters who shall interpret for the military commission, and, as necessary, for trial counsel and defense counsel for the military commission, and for the accused.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 948l(b).
(a) General rule. No person shall be required to testify against himself at a proceeding of a military commission under these rules. The privileges against self-incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 31, to the extent that either may be invoked in proceedings before military commissions, are applicable only to evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. The privilege most beneficial to the individual asserting the privilege shall be applied.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part III, Rule 301(a), p. III-5.
(1) A statement obtained by use of torture shall not be admitted into evidence against any party or witness, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.
(2) A statement alleged to be the product of coercion may only be admitted as provided in section (c) below.
(3) A statement produced by torture or otherwise not admissible under section (c) may not be received in evidence against an accused who made the statement if the accused makes a timely motion to suppress or an objection to the evidence under this rule.
(c) Statements allegedly produced by coercion. When the degree of coercion inherent in the production of a statement offered by either party is disputed, such statement may only be admitted in accordance with this section.
(1) As to statements obtained before December 30, 2005, the military judge may admit the statement only if the military judge finds that (A) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value; and (B) the interests of justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
(2) As to statements obtained on or after December 30, 2005, the military judge may admit the statement only if the military judge finds that (A) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value; (B) the interests of justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence; and (C) the interrogation methods used to obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part III, Rule 304(a) and (c), pp. III-8 and III-9.
(d) Ensuring that the plea is voluntary. The military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the accused personally, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 910(c)(3) and (d), pp. II-101 and II-102.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 301(a), p. III-5.
(1) Exclusion of Statements Obtained by Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment. No statement, obtained by the use of torture, or by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment … whether or not under color of law, shall be admissible in a trial by military commission, except against a person accused of torture or such treatment as evidence that the statement was made.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 304(a)(1), p. III-7.
“(B) Sections 831(a), (b), and (d) (articles 31(a), (b), and (d) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), relating to compulsory self-incrimination.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2602, § 948b(a)–(d)(B).
“(a) IN GENERAL.—No person shall be required to testify against himself at a proceeding of a military commission under this chapter.
“(b) EXCLUSION OF STATEMENTS OBTAINED BY TORTURE.—A statement obtained by use of torture shall not be admissible in a military commission under this chapter, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.
“(2) the interests of justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
“(3) the interrogation methods used to obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment prohibited by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2607, § 948r.
“(a) EXCLUSION OF STATEMENTS OBTAINED BY TORTURE OR CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT.—No statement obtained by the use of torture or by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment … whether or not under color of law, shall be admissible in a military commission under this chapter, except against a person accused of torture or such treatment as evidence that the statement was made.
“(b) SELF-INCRIMINATION PROHIBITED.—No person shall be required to testify against himself or herself at a proceeding of a military commission under this chapter.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 948r(a)–(b).
This Court has set aside convictions based upon confessions extorted from ignorant persons who have been subjected to persistent and protracted questioning, or who have been threatened with mob violence, or who have been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel, or who have been taken at night to lonely or isolated places for questioning. Any one of these grounds would be sufficient cause for reversal … The use of a confession obtained under such circumstances is a denial of due process.
The first of these specific grounds involves the CSRT’s reliance on statements allegedly obtained through torture or otherwise alleged to have been provided by some detainees involuntarily. The Supreme Court has long held that due process prohibits the government’s use of involuntary statements obtained through torture or other mistreatment.
United States, District Court for the District of Columbia, In re Guantanamo Detainee cases, Judgment, 31 January 2005.
4. To the extent the motion raises issues of coercion after [the accused] arrived in Guantanamo, these are resolved against the accused. While [the accused] was exposed to a variety of coercive influences over the past seven years, some of these were rationally related to good order and discipline in the camp, some were imposed as a result of his own misconduct as disciplinary measures, and others were likely imposed to encourage his cooperation with camp rules and procedures generally. … The Commission is convinced, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no coercive techniques influenced the making of any of the accused’s statements in Kandahar or Guantanamo Bay.
United States, Guantánamo Military Commission, Hamdan case, Ruling, 20 July 2008, p. 15.
[The accused] is a citizen of Yemen, and has been determined to be an alien unlawful enemy combatant. The determination was made after a public, two-day, adversarial hearing at which he was represented by counsel, called his own witnesses and cross-examined the government’s witnesses. The decision was made by a military judge, who considered not only the M.C.A’s [Military Commissions Act of 2006] statutory definition of unlawful enemy combatant, but considered and evaluated his claims under the Geneva Convention in an Article 5 status hearing, held over Government objection. This factor weighs against extraterritoriality.
The apprehension occurred in Afghanistan, and the sites of his detention have been in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. The Supreme Court has held that Guantanamo Bay is under the de jure sovereignty of Cuba, and the de facto control of the United States. As the Court indicated in Boumediene [553 US 723 (2008)], “detainees here are similarly situated to the Eisentrager [339 US 763 (1950] petitioners in that the sites of their apprehension and detention are technically outside the sovereign territory of the United States. As noted earlier, this is a factor that weighs against finding that they have rights under the [Constitution].” Boumediene, at 38.
The alternative remedy Congress has provided for application in military commissions is significantly less protective of the accused than the 5th Amendment. But the same can be said of the  Geneva Conventions themselves: the protections of Common Article 3 (for those not entitled to Prisoner of War Status), are minimal compared to the exhaustive and extensive protections and rights accorded to Prisoners of War in Articles 12 through 125 of the Third Geneva Convention. The right afforded defendants before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is a right “not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.” … These standards are comparable to the protection afforded by Congress before a military commission.
This factor weighs against application of the Amendment.
Congress has an express delegation of Constitutional authority to “define and punish” offenses against the law of nations. This power must include power to establish tribunals, modes of proof and other standards and procedures that satisfy the minimal standards established for Unlawful combatants in Common Article 3. In this specialized area where Congress must weigh national interests with our obligations under the law of nations, the Commission can not readily conclude that a decision Congress has made under this special mantle of authority must be overturned “to prevent injustice.” The right Congress has provided to unlawful combatants in the Military Commissions Act satisfies the minimal standard of a “fair and regular” trial required by Common Article 3 and is consistent with that provided in two other international tribunals. There is no requirement for the Fifth Amendment to apply to prevent injustice.
. Would application of the 5th Amendment be “impractical or anomalous”?
The Commission has already determined that there are practical obstacles to, and national interests opposing, the provision of Constitutional rights to unlawful combatants. What of anomaly? Applying the 5th Amendment to unlawful enemy combatants, arguably engaged in unlawful combat against coalition forces, possibly associated with international terrorist organizations that chose civilians and civilian objects as their targets, would be anomalous. Because the accused’s status deprives him of the protections accorded to Prisoners of War, giving him the protections accorded to criminal defendants in United States courts would be anomalous.
In providing the limited alternative right it chose, Congress has determined that unlawful combatants are entitled to the minimum protections of Common Article 3 in this regard. Given the longstanding practice of encouraging compliance with the law of war by according enhanced protections to those who do comply, it would be anomalous to provide Constitutional protections to unlawful combatants when their only connection or association with the United States is that they are being held here for having unlawfully opposed us on the field of battle. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14, § 218, 25 I.L.M. 1023, cited at Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 776 n. 63 (2007).
In summary, the commission finds that (1) the accused has been found to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a full, fair, open and adversarial hearing; (2) that the site of his apprehension and detention, in the Court’s own words “is a factor that weighs against a finding that he has rights under the [Constitution]”; (3) there are substantial practical arguments against applying the 5th Amendment “with full force and effect” in Guantanamo Bay; (4) that the alternative remedy Congress has provided, is considerably less protective than the 5th Amendment but is consistent with the minimal protections guaranteed to unlawful combatants under Common Article 3; (5) that there is no necessity for the 5th Amendment to prevent injustice, and (6) that application of the 5th Amendment in Guantánamo Bay would be anomalous in some respects. The preponderance of these factors analyzed weigh against application of the 5th Amendment in Guantánamo Bay. The Supreme Court has expressly disclaimed extraterritorial application of the 5th Amendment as recently as 1990: “The claim that extraterritorial aliens are entitled to rights under the 5th Amendment has been emphatically rejected.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, at 268–269 (1990).
Conclusion: The 5th Amendment of the Constitution does not apply to protect [the accused].
United States, Guantánamo Military Commission, Hamdan case, Ruling, 20 July 2008, pp. 11–14.

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