Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/896-f-3d-979-748593957
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:21:11+00:00

Document:
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges, and Susan Illston,[*] District Judge.
(not deferring); see also Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Atty Gen. of the United States, 884 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2018) (deferring); Martinez v. U.S. Atty Gen., 413 Fed.Appx. 163 (11th Cir. 2011) (deferring).
We join the Second Circuit in deferring to the BIAs reasonable interpretation. We further hold that California Penal Code § 273a(a) is categorically a crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment, as interpreted by the BIA. Finally, we hold that the BIAs interpretation applies retroactively to Martinez-Cedillos conviction. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings on the grounds that Martinez-Cedillos conviction under California Penal Code § 273a(a) was a crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). An Immigration Judge ("IJ") entered a final order of removal, which Martinez-Cedillo appealed to the BIA, arguing that (1) California Penal Code § 273a(a) is not a crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and (2) he should be allowed to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
The BIA affirmed in part and remanded in part. The BIA held that California Penal Code § 273a(a) was categorically a crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment under its prior interpretation of that phrase in two precedential opinions: Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008), and Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010). Nevertheless, the BIA remanded for the IJ to consider Martinez-Cedillos eligibility for cancellation of removal.
Martinez-Cedillo now petitions our court for review, arguing that (1) the BIAs interpretation of a crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment to encompass criminally negligent acts that do not result in actual injury to a child is unreasonable; (2) California Penal Code § 273a(a) is not categorically a crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment even under the BIAs interpretation; (3) the BIAs interpretation should not apply retroactively to his 2008 conviction; and (4) denial of his motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion.
We first review the history of the BIAs interpretation of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and then address each of Martinez-Cedillos arguments in turn.
to § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) in Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (BIA 1999). At issue in that case was 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(a), which makes "sexual abuse of a minor" an "aggravated felony" for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The BIA held that Texass offense of indecency with a child was "sexual abuse of a minor" and thus an aggravated felony under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), even though the Texas statute did not require physical contact with a child. The BIA reasoned that the term "sexual abuse of a minor," like the term "child abuse" in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), could refer to conduct that did not involve physical contact: We note that in including child abuse as a ground of removal in section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act, Congress likewise did not refer to a particular statutory definition, although in the same section it did designate a statutory definition for the term "crime of domestic violence." By its common usage, "child abuse" encompasses actions or inactions that also do not require physical contact. See [Child Abuse, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) ] (defining child abuse as "(a)ny form of cruelty to a childs physical, moral or mental well-being").
Id. at 996. Rodriguezs passing reference to child abuse was dictum and did not purport to offer a precedential interpretation of what constitutes a crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

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