Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19830715-931581
Timestamp: 2017-07-23 21:04:09+00:00

Document:
J. c. AUTRICHE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche J. c. AUTRICHE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partielllement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9315/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-07-15;9315.81 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVILParties : Demandeurs : J.Défendeurs : AUTRICHETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9315/8 1 J . v/AUSTRI A J . c/AUTRICH E DECISION of 15 July 1983 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 15 juillet 1983 sur la recevabilitc de la requ@t e
Article 6, paragraphe I and 3 (c ) , of the Conventlon : Although rrot guaranteeing a right of appea/, these provisions . in principle . applV to existing appeal procedures . without, however, going as far as to require a full, second hearing.
Persona( attendance at an appeal is only one etentent to be considered . along with others . in evaluating the fairness of the proceediugs as a whole. Case before the Supreme Court of Austria, seized oJ an appeal against sentence . where the persoual attendance of the accused was uot required .
Article 6 paragraphee 1 et 3, lltl . cl, de la Convention : Bien que ne garantissant aucun droit d'interjeter appel, ces dispositious s'appliquent eu principe Ã la procÃ©dure d'appel, sans exiger pour autant que celle-ci Ã©quivale Ã un second procÃ¨s complet . La comparution personnetle en appel n'est qu'un Ã©lÃ©ment Ã prendre en considÃ©ration avec d'autres pour juger de FÃ©quitÃ© du procÃ¨s. Cas oÃ¹, devarrt la Cour suprÃ©me d'Autriche . saisie d'ua appel portam sur la peine, la comparution persoturette de FaccusÃ© n'Ã©tait pas exigÃ©e .
((ran (,ais : voir p. 99)
Summary of the relevant facb
Having beerr convicted at frrst instance and sentenced to five years ' imprisonment f)r fraud . the applicant lodged a plea of ruullity and an appeal against sentence with the Supreme Coun .
Ajter rejectiug the plea oJ rndlity on the basis of the case-ft/e, the Court ordered a heariug ojthe appeal, but refused permission for the applicant, who was imprisoned. to attend . The latuer informed the Court that he had dismissed his lanyer for incompetence . However the Court . finding that the applicarrt's contplaints against the lawyer were not re%varrt to the appeal, wetu ahead and held the hearing with the lawyer presertt . but not the applicant . The appeal was disntissed and the sentence upheld.
The applicant [further] complains that he was not permitted to be present before the Supreme Court at its hearing of his appeal on 13 November 1980, when his appeal was rejected . The Commission's case-law has established that Article 6 (3) (c) and Article 6(1) of the Convention do not expressly guarantee the right to be present during the hearing of an appeal, but that the right to be present must be considered with the other rights of the defence in lhe context of an evaluation of the fairness of the proceedings as a whole (cf . Applications Nos . 1169/61, Yearbook 6, p . 520 ; 2635/65, Coll . 28, p . 43, 49 ; 7138/75, D .R . 9, p . 50 and 8289/79, D .R . 18, p. 160) .
Furthermore the Commission has also recognised that although Article 6 of the Convention does not guarantee an appeal in criminal proceedings, where the opportunity to seek appeal is provided under domestic law, the guarantees of Article 6 continue to apply to the proceedings on appeal, since once an appeal is sought, the subsequent applications form part of the whole proceedings which "determine" the criminal charge at issue . In the present case the applicant applied to be present in person for his appeal, a request which was specifically refused by the Supreme Court on 6 November 1980 on the grounds that his presence did not appear from the case tile to be necessary and that any arguments which he wished to make could adequately be presented by his lawyer . The Commission considers that in order to examine the fairness of these appeal proceedings in the context of the proceedings as a whole it must consider the powers of the Supreme Court and the scope of its hearing, including the question whether it was a full rehearing, and secondly, in the light ot the first question, how the applicant's actual interests were presented and protected .
As tar as the powers of the Supreme Court on appeal are concerned, in accordance with Article 294 (2) of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure : "Where an appeal is lodged solely by the accused, the appeal court may uot impose a more severe sentence on the accused than that imposed by the court of tirst instance . " Furtherniore the present appeal concerned the applicant's sentence, his appeal of nullity having been decided on 9 October 1980 . The Supreme Court had therefore to examine the decision of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court and its reasons for iniposing the sentence of tive years against which the applicant's appeal was made . In so doing it was bound by the conviction established by the court of first instance, but able to evaluate the weight to be given to mitigating and aggravating circumstances in deciding upon the appeal against sentence with the result that it could . if appropriate reduce, but not increase the applicant's sentence . Against this background the Commission ntust therefore consider whether the hearing of the appticant's appeal was 'fair' within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention despite his absence from the hearing . Furthermore the Commission notes that the applicant applied to dismiss his legal aid counsel for alleged incompetence and requested the appointment of alternative counsel for the appeal . The Supreme Court refused this application since the alleged iucompetence related to other aspects of the proceedings and had no connection with the appeal in question . The applicant's appeal against sentence was therefore presented to the Supreme Court bv his counsel, in the presence ot' counsel for the public prosecutor . The Supreme Court also had before it the decision of the trial court and was able to consider the factors which the power court had weighed iu reaching the applicant's sentence . It noted the reliance placed in the appeal on the partial restitution of the proceeds of the otTences, but it was unable to take account of the applicant's state of health since that was a question of the service of sentence rather than its legal justification . The Commission recalls that the applicant was present at his trial at tirst instance and that its case-law interpreting Article 6 of the Convention has established that this provision cannot be construed as requiring in all cases of appeal a secottd full hearing unless the powers of the appeal court and the issues before it make this necessary in order to guarantee the fairness of the proceedings as a whole . However the Supreme Court had expressly considered whether the scope of the proposed appeal required the applicant's personal presence, but had concluded that this was not necessary . Furthermore the reasons given for the Supreme Court's rejection of the applicant's appeal were objective conclusions which were derived from an examination of the case file ,
including the size of the sums involved in the fraud and the small amounts which had been recovered from the applicant, and which did not involve the direct assessnient of the applicant'spersonality . The Comniission concludes from the foregoing that there is nothing t o suggest that the applicant's right to a fair determination of the criminal charge against him was prejudiced by his absence-from the proceedings before the Supreme Court or that, in the light of the Court's powers and its conduct of the case, his presence was necessary for the fair and proper adminsitration ot justice . It follows that this aspect of the applicant's complaint is manifestl y ill-tounded within the meaning of Article 27 ( 2) of the Convention .
RÃ©aumÃ© des falts pert inente
CondamnÃ© en prenriÃ¨re instance Ã cinq ans d'emprisomtentent pou r escroquerie, le requÃ©rant a recouru en appel et en cassation devant la Cour suprÃªnre, l'appel ue portant que sur la ntesttre de la peine. Le pourvoi en cassation ayant Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ© srtr piÃ¨ces, !a Cour ordonna une audience consacrÃ©e Ã l'appel mais rejusa au requÃ©rart-qui Ã©tait dÃ©tenu l'autortsation d Ã¿ comparaÃ®tre en personne. Ce dernier irrJortna la Cour qu'il arait congÃ©diÃ© son avocat pour iuconrpÃ©tence ; mais la Cour, constatant que les grieJs du requÃ©raÃ©rt envers son avocat Ã©taient Ã©trangers Ã la procÃ©dure d'appel, passa outre et tint audience ea prÃ©sence de l'arocat mais hors celle du requÃ©rant . L'appe! Jut rejetÃ© et la peine canftrmÃ©e .
(TRADUCTlO M EN DROIT (Extrait ) . . . . . . ... ... ... Le requÃ©rant se plaint [en outre] de n'avoir pas Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã comparaÃ®tr e en personne Ã l'audience concernant son appel devant la Cour suprÃªme le . 13 novenibre 1980, lequel fut rejetÃ© . ' La jurisprudence de la Commission a Ã©tabli que l'article 6, paragraphe 3(c) , et l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention ne garantissent pas expressÃ©ment Ã l'accusÃ© le droit de comparaitre personnellement Ã l'audience d'appel mais que pareille comparution doit Ãªtre prise en considÃ©ration Ã c8tÃ© des autres droit s
de la dÃ©fense pour apprÃ©cier l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure dans son ensemble (cf . requÃªtes NÂ° 1169/61, Ann . 6, p . 520 ; NÂ° 2635/65, Rec . 28, pp .43 .49 ; NÂ° 7138/75, D .R . 9, p . 50 et NÂ° 8289/78, D .R . 18, p . 160) . Par ailleurs, la Commission a reconnu qu'alors mÃªme que l'article 6 de la Convention ne garantit pas un droit d'appel en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale, lorsque le droit interne prÃ©voit la facultÃ© de faire, appel, les garanties de l'article 6 continuent Ã s'appliquer Ã la procÃ©dure d'appel car une fois l'appel interjetÃ©, les deniandes subsÃ©quentes font partie de l'ensemble de la procÃ©dure qui .dÃ©cide du bien fondÃ© . de l'accusation pÃ©nale en jeu .
En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© Ã comparaitre personnellement Ã l'audience d'appel, ce que la Cour suprÃªme lui a expressÃ©ment refusÃ© le 6 novembre 1980 aux motifs qu'un examen du dossier ne faisait pas apparaitre sa prÃ©sence comme nÃ©cessaire et qu'il pouvait faire prÃ©senter par son avocat de maniÃ¨re satisfaisante l'argumentation qu'il dÃ©sirait exposer . La Commission estime qu'atin d'examiner l'Ã©quitÃ© de cette procÃ©dure d'appel dans le contexte de la procÃ©dure dans son ensemble elle doit en premier lieu envisager les pouvoirs de la Cour suprÃªme et la portÃ©e de l'audience, notamment la question de savoir s'il s'agissait de rejuger la totalitÃ© de l'affaire, et ensuite, suivant la rÃ©ponse Ã cette premiÃ¨re question, voir comment les intÃ©rÃªts du requÃ©rant ont effectiventent Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s et protÃ©gÃ©s . En ce qui concerne les pouvoirs de la Cour suprÃªme en matiÃ¨re d'appel, l'article 214, paragraphe 2, du Code autrichien de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale stipule : â¢Lorsqu'un appel n'est interjetÃ© que par l'accusÃ©, la cour d'appel ne peut pas inYliger Ã l'accusÃ© une peine plus lourde que celle imposÃ©e par le tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance . . De plus, le prÃ©sent appel ne concernait que la peine intligÃ©e au requÃ©rant, le pourvoi en cassation ayant dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ© le 9 octobre 1980. La Cour suprÃªme devait dÃ¨s lors examiner la dÃ©cision du tribunal pÃ©nal rÃ©gional de Vienne et les motifs pour lesquels avait Ã©tÃ© infligÃ©e une peine de cinq ans . objet de l'appel du requÃ©rant . Ce faisant, la cour Ã©tait liÃ©e par la condamnation prononcÃ©e par le tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance, mais pouvait, en statuant sur l'appel interjetÃ© contre la peine, apprÃ©cier le poids Ã accorder aux circonstances attÃ©nuantes et aggravantes et aboutir, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, Ã diminuer - mais non Ã augntenter - la peine infligÃ©e au requÃ©rant . C'est dans ce contexte que la Commission doit examiner si, malgrÃ© l'absence de l'accusÃ© Ã l'audience . l'appel du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© â¢Ã©quitablement . entendu, au sens de l'article 6 de la Convention . La Commission relÃ¨ve en outre que le requÃ©rant avait demandÃ© le renvoi de son avocat pour incompÃ©tence et la noniination d'un autre avocat en appel . La Cour suprÃªme a rejetÃ© cette demande car l'allÃ©gation d'incompÃ©tence concernait d'autres aspects de la procÃ©dure, qui n'Ã©taient pas liÃ©s Ã l'appel .
L'appel Ã la Cour suprÃªme a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©fendu par l'avocat en prÃ©sence du reprÃ©sentant du parquet . La cour avait Ã©galement connaissance de la dÃ©cision de la juridiction de jugement et pouvait dÃ¨s lors examiner les Ã©lÃ©ments pesÃ©s par cetue juridiction pour prononcer la peine . La cour prit note de ce que l'accent avait Ã©tÃ© mis en appel sur la restitution partielle du produit des infractions, mais n'a pas pu tenir compte de l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant, puisque c'Ã©tait lÃ une quesiion concernant l'exÃ©cution de la peine et non sa justification en droit . La Commission rappelle d'une part que le requÃ©rant a comparu personuellement Ã son procÃ¨s en premiÃ¨re instance et, d'autre part, que sa jurisprudence a Ã©tabli que l'article 6 de la Convention ne saurait s'interprÃ©ter comme exigeant dans tous les cas d'appel un deuxiÃ¨me rÃ©examen complet de l'affaire saut si les pouvoirs de la cour d'appel et les questions dont elle est saisie obligeut Ã ce rÃ©examen pour garantir l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure dans son eusemble . Cependant, la Cour suprÃªme a expressÃ©ment examinÃ© si la portÃ©e de l'appel interjetÃ© exigeait la comparution personnelle du requÃ©rant et estimÃ© que tel n'Ã©tait pas le cas . De plus, les raisons donnÃ©es par la Cour SuprÃªme pour rejeter l'appel du requÃ©rant Ã©taient des conclusions objectives tirÃ©es d'un examen du dossier, notamment de l'importance des montants en jeu dans l'escroquerie et de la modicitÃ© des sommes restituÃ©es par l'intÃ©ressÃ©, conclusions qui n'obligeaient pas Ã une apprÃ©ciation directe de la personnalitÃ© du requÃ©rant . Dans ces conditions, la Commission estime que rien n'autorise Ã penser qÃ»e le droit du requÃ©rant Ã faire dÃ©cider Ã©quitablement de l'accusation pÃ©nale le concernant ait Ã©tÃ© compromis par l'absence de l'intÃ©ressÃ© au procÃ¨s devant la Cour suprÃ©me ou que, compte tenu des pouvoirs de la cour et de la maniÃ¨re dont celle-ci a conduit l'affaire, la comparution du requÃ©rant ait Ã©tÃ© nÃ©cessaire Ã la bonne administration de la justice . Il eu dÃ©coule que le grief du requÃ©rant est, sur ce point, manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention .
- 101 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 15/07/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 214
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27