Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/print/v2_cou_us_rule156
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 03:44:30+00:00

Document:
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 499; see also Operational Law Handbook (1993), p. Q-183.
and a list of “Other Types of War Crimes” which it describes as being “representative of violations of the law of war (“war crimes)”.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 504.
The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) emphasizes the importance of criminal intent as an element of any war crime.
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 15-2(c).
War crimes are defined as those acts which violate the law of armed conflict, that is, the rules established by customary and conventional international law regulating the conduct of warfare, and which have been generally recognized as war crimes. Acts constituting war crimes may be committed by the armed forces of a belligerent or by individuals belonging to the civilian population.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989) § 6.2.5.
The Handbook then provides a list of acts which it characterizes as “representative war crimes”.
While there is not an exhaustive list of war crimes, they consist of serious and intentional violations of the law of armed conflict, which are generally recognized as war crimes and may be committed during periods of international or noninternational armed conflict. Acts constituting war crimes may be committed by combatants, noncombatants, or civilians. ….
acts committed against persons or property protected by the Conventions; willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
The Handbook then provides a list of acts which, “if committed intentionally, are examples of war crimes that could be considered grave breaches”.
4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians.
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d)) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character.
United States, War Crimes Act, 1996, 18 United States Code Sec. 2441, as amended by Military Commissions Act, 2006, 17 October 2006, § 2441 (c)(3).
Acts adjudged criminal when done by an officer of the government are criminal also when done by a private individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not in quality. The offender in either case is charged with personal wrong and punishment falls on the offender in propria persona. The application of international law to individuals is not a novelty.
United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Flick case, Judgment of 22 December 1947; see also Military Commission in Wiesbaden, Klein case (The Hadamar Trial), Judgment, 8–15 October 1945, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Krupp case, Judgment, 17 December 1947–30 June 1948, and Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Krauch case (The I.G. Farben Trial), Judgment, 14 August 1947–29 July 1948.
“War crimes” refers to criminal actions taken against the soldiers or civilians of another country rather than against the defendant’s fellow citizens. This limitation on the meaning of “war crimes” is reflected in the [1945 IMT Charter (Nuremberg)] annexed to the Agreement for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal.
United States, District Court, Central District, California, Handel case, Judgment, 31 January 1985.
It is understood that the “laws and customs of war” referred to in Article 3 [of the 1993 ICTY Statute which aims at the prosecution of “violations of the laws and customs of war”] include all obligations under humanitarian law agreements in force in the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time the acts were committed, including common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Additional Protocols to these Conventions.
United States, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.3217, 25 May 1993, p. 15.
According to the Report on US Practice, the United States considers any violation of the law of war a war crime, provided the accused had the requisite criminal intent at the time of his or her participation in the violation. The report adds that conspiracy to violate the laws of war, inciting violations and aiding and abetting violations of the laws of war are also punishable as war crimes.
Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 6.6.
Section 2441 of Title 18 [US Code Section 2441 - War Crimes] criminalizes the commission of war crimes by U.S. nationals and members of the U.S. Armed Forces. It criminalizes such conduct whether it occurs inside or outside the United States, including conduct within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. See id. §2441(a). Subsection (c) of section 2441 defines “war crimes” as (1) grave breaches of any of the Geneva Conventions; (2) conduct prohibited by certain provisions of the Hague Convention IV, Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.18, 1907, Stat. 2277; or (3) conduct that constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. We have previously concluded that this statute does not apply to conduct toward the members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. See Treaties and Laws Memorandum at 8–9. We reached this conclusion because we found al Qaeda to be a non governmental terrorist organization whose members are not legally entitled to the protections of GPW [1949 Geneva Convention III]. Since its members cannot be considered to be POWs [prisoners of war] under the Convention, conduct toward members of al Qaeda could not constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(I). We further found that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions covers either traditional wars between state parties to the convention or non-international civil wars, but not an international conflict with a non-governmental terrorist organization. As a result, conduct toward members of al Qaeda could not constitute a violation of common Article 3, see Treaties and Law Memorandum at 9, and thus could not violate Section 2441 (c)(3).
Thus, section 2441 is inapplicable to conduct toward members of the Taliban or al Qaeda. We further note that the Treaties and Law Memorandum is the Justice Department’s binding interpretation of the War Crimes Act, and it will preclude any prosecution under it for conduct toward members of the Taliban and al Qaeda. See Letter for William H. Taft, Legal Adviser, Department of State, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel (Jan. 14, 2002).
The Rome Statute makes torture a crime subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction in only two contexts. Under article 7 of the Rome Statute, torture may fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction as a crime against humanity if it is committed as “part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against any civilian population.” Here, however, the interrogation of al Qaeda or Taliban operatives is part of an international armed conflict against a terrorist organization; not an attack on a civilian population. Indeed, our conflict with al Qaeda does not directly involve any distinct civilian population. Rather, al Qaeda solely constitutes a group of illegal belligerents who are dispersed around the world into cells, rather than being associated with the civilian population of a nation-state. Under article 8 of the Rome Statute, torture can fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction as a war crime. To constitute a war crime, torture must be committed against “persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Conventions,” Rome Statute, art. 8. As we have explained, neither members of the al Qaeda terrorist network nor Taliban soldiers are entitled to the legal status of prisoners of war under the GPW. See Treaties and Laws Memorandum at 8 (Jan. 22, 2Q02); see also United States v. Lindh, 212 F.2d 541, 556-57 (E.D. Va. 2002). Interrogation of al Qaeda or Taliban members therefore cannot constitute a war crime because article 8 of the Rome Statute applies only to those protected by the Geneva Conventions.
Some may ask: Why are you acknowledging this [CIA] program now? There are two reasons why I’m making these limited disclosures today. First, we have largely completed our questioning of the men – and to start the process for bringing them to trial, we must bring them into the open. Second, the Supreme Court’s recent decision Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006)] has impaired our ability to prosecute terrorists through military commissions, and has put in question the future of the CIA program. In its ruling on military commissions, the Court determined that a provision of the Geneva Conventions known as “Common Article Three” applies to our war with al Qaeda. This article includes provisions that prohibit “outrages upon personal dignity” and “humiliating and degrading treatment.” The problem is that these and other provisions of Common Article Three are vague and undefined, and each could be interpreted in different ways by American or foreign judges. And some believe our military and intelligence personnel involved in capturing and questioning terrorists could now be at risk of prosecution under the War Crimes Act – simply for doing their jobs in a thorough and professional way.

References: § 499
 § 504
 § 15
 § 6
 § 2441
 §2441
 § 2441
 art. 8
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