Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/375/162/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:01:51+00:00

Document:
Respondent was convicted in a Federal District Court of an offense punishable under 18 U.S.C. §113(a) by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. The Trial Judge issued an oral order under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) committing respondent to the custody of the Attorney General pending receipt of a report from the Bureau of Prisons. His order provided that, after the report was received, respondent's commitment, deemed to be for 20 years, would "be subject to modification in accordance with" § 4208(b). After the report was received, the Trial Court entered an order fixing the period of imprisonment at 5 years and providing that the Board of Parole might decide when respondent should be eligible for parole. Neither respondent nor his counsel was present when this order as entered, and respondent subsequently moved to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Held: The first order under § 4208(b) was a preliminary commitment postponing action as to the final sentence; the later order fixing the sentence at 5 years was an "imposition of sentence," within the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43; and the District Court erred in fixing final sentence in the absence of respondent and his counsel. Pp. 375 U. S. 162-166.
convenience, the defendant were not permitted to invoke it when the sentence that counts is pronounced. [Footnote 4] We hold that it was error to impose this sentence in the absence of respondent and his counsel.
"If the court desires more detailed information as a basis for determining the sentence to be imposed, the court may commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General, which commitment shall be deemed to be for the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by law, for a study as described in subsection (c) hereof. The results of such study, together with any recommendations which the Director of the Bureau of Prisons believes would be helpful in determining the disposition of the case, shall be furnished to the court within three months unless the court grants time, not to exceed an additional three months, for further study. After receiving such reports and recommendations, the court may, in its discretion: (1) Place the prisoner on probation as authorized by section 3651 of this title, or (2) affirm the sentence of imprisonment originally imposed, or reduce the sentence of imprisonment, and commit the offender under any applicable provision of law. The term of the sentence shall run from date of original commitment under this section."
371 U.S. 966; 373 U.S. 902.
It is true that the House Committee on the Judiciary, in reporting favorably on a proposed section identical to § 4208(b), indicated that it saw no necessity for a defendant's being present when final action on his sentence was taken. H.R.Rep. No. 1946, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10. This section failed of passage in the House, but an identical one was added by the Senate and adopted without discussion of the point in the Senate committee and conference reports. See S.Rep. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R.Rep. No. 2579, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.. No language supporting this position appeared in the Senate bill or in the Act itself. We are not inclined to expand the language of the section, and thereby make necessary a constitutional decision, by reading the silence of the Act as depriving a defendant of a right to urge upon the court reasons for leniency at the time when the judge at last has the relevant materials for decision before him.
I agree with the result reached in this case, but not with all of the reasoning of my Brother BLACK's opinion. More particularly, disagreeing as I do with the rationale of the Corey decision, post, p. 375 U. S. 169, I draw no support from it for the conclusion here reached.
however, clear that the statute does not contemplate that the district judge will have deliberated and decided upon an appropriate sentence at the time of the original commitment. As the first words of § 4208(b) make plain, the procedures outlined therein are called into play "if the court desires more detailed information as a basis for determining the sentence to be imposed. . . ." Although the statute refers later to "the sentence of imprisonment originally imposed," this is quite plainly intended merely to permit the district judge to impose as a final sentence the "maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by law" under which the defendant is "deemed to be" committed. The Corey case well illustrates the absurdity of any other conclusion; there, the defendant was originally deemed to be committed for a term of 375 years on a conviction of making false claims against the Government. See post, p. 375 U. S. 171.
in the deferment of the actual sentence. Even if he has spoken earlier, a defendant has no assurance that, when the time comes for final sentence, the district judge will remember the defendant's words in his absence and give them due weight. Moreover, only at the final sentencing can the defendant respond to a definitive decision of the judge.
Whether or not the Constitution would permit any other procedure it is not now necessary to decide. Congress not having spoken clearly to the contrary, [Footnote 2/2] I concur in the judgment of the Court.
"If the court desires more detailed information as a basis for determining the sentence to be imposed, the court may commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General, which commitment shall be deemed to be for the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by law, for a study as described in subsection (c) hereof. The results of such study, together with any recommendations which the Director of the Bureau of Prisons believes would be helpful in determining the disposition of the case, shall be furnished to the court within three months unless the court grants time, not to exceed an additional three months, for further study. After receiving such reports and recommendations, the court may in its discretion: (1) Place the prisoner on probation as authorized by section 3651 of this title, or (2) affirm the sentence of imprisonment originally imposed, or reduce the sentence of imprisonment, and commit the offender under any applicable provision of law. The term of the sentence shall run from date of original commitment under this section."
A bill now pending in Congress provides that the defendant's presence is not required at final sentencing, but the defendant may be present in the discretion of the court. S.1956, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
Neither the legislative history set out in the opinion of the majority, ante, p. 375 U. S. 166, note 4, nor the pending proposal seems to me sufficient indication of congressional intent to require disregard of the important right involved in this case, particularly in light of the possible constitutional issues which would be raised.

References: §113
 § 4208
 § 4208
 § 2255
 § 4208
 § 4208
 § 4208