Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83036:57026&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:18:12+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 183202, June 02, 2014 - ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision2 dated March 17, 2008 and resolution3 dated June 2, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29268. These assailed rulings affirmed with modification the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, dated January 27, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 93-129891, finding petitioner Alberto Almojuela y Villanueva (Almojuela) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are (sic) still unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Ricardo Quejong y Bello by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon twice, hitting him on the left side of his back, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
During arraignment, Almojuela entered a plea of “not guilty”. Pre-trial conference was conducted then trial on the merits followed.8 Two different versions of the facts surrounding the victim Ricardo Quejong’s (Quejong) death surfaced.
At around 8:00 in the evening, Masula, Quejong, Jose Buenhijo Paz (Paz), along with some others, were on their way home from a party when they encountered Almojuela, who was having a drinking spree with his friends in front of his house.
In its decision dated January 27, 2005, the RTC found Almojuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum. It also ordered him to pay the following indemnities to the heirs of Quejong: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P832,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; P35,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses.
The RTC gave great weight to Masula’s testimony. Although Masula did not actually see Almojuela use a knife on Quejong, strong evidence still existed to support his conviction.
Only three persons were actually involved in the fight – Almojuela, Quejong and Paz. Since only Almojuela was armed with a knife and in fact he wounded Paz in his right arm, it was reasonable to conclude that he also stabbed Quejong.16 The RTC noted that Paz could not have stabbed Quejong as he himself was wounded.
In his Rule 45 petition before us, Almojuela imputes error on the CA for finding that the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argues that only questions of law may be reviewed in a Rule 45 petition, and that the findings of fact by the trial court, if affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court.
We find it clear, based on the records and the evidence adduced by both parties, that no direct evidence points to Almojuela as the one who stabbed Quejong in the night of November 21, 1993.
Almojuela hid when policemen came to his home to investigate.
The nine circumstances, individually, are not sufficient to support Almojuela’s conviction. But taken together, they constitute an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that Almojuela is guilty of the crime of homicide.
First, Almojuela was the one who provoked Paz and his group to a fight. His unlawful aggression was the starting cause of the events which led to Quejong’s death.
Second, Masula categorically testified that only Almojuela was armed with a knife during the fight. In fact, he hit Paz in his right arm, forcing the latter to retreat.
Third, only three persons actually were involved in the fight: Almojuela, Paz and Quejong. Paz was wounded, forcing him to retreat. This fact renders it improbable that Paz was the one who stabbed Quejong. Thus, Almojuela alone was the perpetrator.
Fourth, although Masula admitted that he did not actually see Almojuela stab Quejong, he testified that he saw blood on Quejong’s back during his fight with Almojuela.
Fifth, after Quejong and his group scurried away from the scene, his friend noticed that he had stab wounds in his back. Almojuela did not present any evidence that Quejong figured in any other fight with another person after the fight with Almojuela. In fact, Quejong was immediately rushed to the hospital.
These proven circumstances lead to the reasonable conclusion that Almojuela stabbed Quejong during their fight, causing the latter’s subsequent death.
there is lack of provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.29 This mitigating circumstance is inapplicable in the present case because the unlawful aggression did not start from the victim Quejong but from Almojuela. The prosecution proved that it was Almojuela who first challenged Paz and his group to a fight. Almojuela came prepared to fight and was in fact armed with a bladed weapon.
Moreover, the third element is also absent since there is no lack of sufficient provocation on Almojuela’s part as shown by his confrontational stance right from the start.
Under these facts, all the elements of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender are present in this case.
We also delete the award of litigation expenses for lack of actual proof. We additionally impose a 6% interest on all the monetary awards for damages to be reckoned from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
10 TSN, March 17, 1994, pp. 4-7.
13 TSN, August 12, 2000, pp. 4-5.
23People v. Vda. de Quijano, G.R. No. 102045, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 66, 73.
25 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 4.
26 G.R. No. 157221, 548 Phil. 436 (2007).
27 Id. at 460-461, citing People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, 438 Phil. 716 (2002).
28People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 133737, 443 Phil. 67, 89 (2003), citing People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 138929, 418 Phil. 740 (2001).
29People v. Dolorido, G.R. No. 191721, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 496, 503.
30De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506, 515.
32Licyayo v. People, G.R. No. 169425, 571 Phil. 310, 329 (2008).
33People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 222, 231.
34Bautista v. Castillo Mercado, G.R. No. 174405, 585 Phil. 389, 398 (2008).
35People v. Estrada, supra note 33.
36 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, series of 2013, effective July 1, 2013; Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.