Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/73/117/557434/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:01:07+00:00

Document:
Jerold S. Solovy, Richard P. Steinken, Daniel W. Smith (argued), Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for petitioner-appellant.
Grant C. Johnson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Steven Pray O'Connor, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Office of U.S. Atty., Madison, WI, for respondent-appellee.
James Knight brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 contesting the revocation of his probation. Knight did not file a direct appeal and concedes that he cannot show cause for and prejudice from this failure. Accordingly, we review only for jurisdiction. Kelly v. United States, 29 F.3d 1107, 1113 (7th Cir. 1994). Knight asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction in two regards: (1) to exercise its probationary power when Knight was under the control of the United States Parole Commission; and (2) to revoke his probation based on pre-probation conduct that occurred while Knight was on parole. Knight argues that under Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 79, 76 S. Ct. 171, 100 L. Ed. 62 (1955), and United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 48 S. Ct. 146, 72 L. Ed. 309 (1928), the district court, by revoking his probation while he was on parole and for conduct occurring during Knight's parole term, violated the relevant statutes and the separation of powers by improperly extending the judicial function of sentencing to invade the executive functions of clemency and parole.
Knight's argument raises two separate questions: (1) whether the district court may exercise probationary power while a convict is on parole; and (2) whether the district court may revoke probation for pre-probation conduct occurring while the convict is on parole. These are difficult questions (the former question being one of first impression in this circuit) that require us to balance the goals of probation against the desire to maintain an orderly governmental structure. After a good deal of deliberation, we hold that the Probation Act empowers the district court to revoke probation while a convict is on parole and to consider all relevant conduct, including conduct that occurs while the convict is under executive branch control.
Because parole and probation emanate from different branches of government, the responsibility for the terms, conditions and supervision of each lies with different agencies. The judiciary manages probation, while authority over parole is wielded under the Constitution by the executive branch. Cf. Duehay v. Thompson, 223 F. 305, 307 (9th Cir. 1915) (finding parole tantamount to a commutation). The Parole Commission supervises the paroled convict, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-18, repealed Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2027 (repeal effective Nov. 1, 1987 for offenses committed after that date), and may at any time, upon notice and hearing, change the conditions of the parole, revoke it or even terminate it entirely. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4209(d) (1) (modification), 4211(a) (termination), 4213 (revocation). The conduct of probationers, on the other hand, is monitored by judicially-appointed probation officers within the Probation Department. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3653-55. Probation may similarly be amended, revoked or terminated by the sentencing court at the recommendation of the Probation Department or on the motion of the government. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565(a) (revocation, modification), 3564(c) (termination).
On the other hand, in Williams, the Sixth Circuit held that a court may revoke probation for pre-probation conduct that occurred while the convict was under the control of the executive branch. In that case the convict, Williams, committed several new crimes while on parole. His criminal acts, however, were not brought to the district court's attention until Williams had "successfully" completed his parole period and had begun to serve the consecutive five-year period of probation to which he had been originally sentenced. One month into the probationary period, Williams was indicted for the new crimes. Williams pleaded guilty to the new crimes, and the district court subsequently revoked his probation, finding that "Williams had violated the conditions of his probation by virtue of his pre-probation offenses." 15 F.3d at 1357.
The Sixth Circuit considered whether allowing a court to revoke probation for pre-probation conduct would unduly interfere with executive administration of a convict's sentence. 15 F.3d at 1360-64. The court concluded that such authority did not conflict with the "separation of powers" principle. We find its reasoning persuasive, although we are troubled by the direct conflict that apparently occurred in Knight's case. Here, unlike in Williams, the parole board was aware of the violative conduct, chose to act on the conduct and chose to allow Knight to remain on parole. On the other hand, in Williams, we assume that the parole board was unaware of the conduct that occurred while Williams was on parole. What seems disturbing in our case, is the action of the parole board in forwarding the information about Knight's conduct to the Office of Probation. The parole board made an agreement with Knight: extracting a guilty plea and a promise not to contest liability in any future proceeding in exchange for allowing Knight to remain on parole. How this can be squared with bringing the matter before the district court apparently with the expectation that the court might put Knight back in prison after his parole has expired is not easy to understand. However, we do not believe that the parole board somehow lured Knight with the promise of his continued freedom into pleading guilty while secretly knowing all along that the district court on receipt of Knight's file might revoke his probation. We may assume, as Knight has not argued to the contrary, that Knight knew that the district court would be informed of his conduct, and that revocation of his probation would therefore be a possibility. The contingency that a probationary sentence would be converted into a custodial sentence is inherent in the very notion of probation. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 53 S. Ct. 154, 77 L. Ed. 266 (1932). More relevantly, we do not understand Knight to be charging a due process violation. We are concerned here only with the question of jurisdiction.
It is certainly possible for the parole and probation authorities to work together and this would seem to be highly desirable. In any event, the jurisdiction of the court to revoke probation for pre-probation conduct cannot be said to "conflict" with the authority of the agents of the executive branch to revoke parole and/or inform the judiciary of violative conduct. See Williams, 15 F.3d at 1364. Nor can we say that the district court may not revoke probation at the time that the defendant is in prison or on parole (and therefore under executive control) since it would make little sense for the court to first stay its hand and then take action later after the probationary term began. If we accepted Knight's argument that such a denial of authority is required, we would provide incarcerated defendants with a grace period in which their activity, no matter how heinous, could not affect their probationary release into society. It is unlikely that Congress, which authorized probation, intended to deprive the original sentencing court of its continuing authority over the probationary sentence.
We believe that our reading of the jurisdictional grant of Sec. 3651 and Sec. 3653 is consistent with the interpretation of the sentencing court's authority prescribed in Affronti. The Supreme Court held, in Affronti, that a district court does not have jurisdiction under Sec. 3651 to "suspend the uncommenced terms of a cumulative sentence after the prisoner has been imprisoned and entered upon the execution of a prior term." 350 U.S. at 83, 76 S. Ct. at 173. The Court reasoned that such authority would interfere with the executive branch's power over parole and clemency. If the judiciary could grant an incarcerated prisoner relief from his prison term by converting the custodial sentence into a probational sentence, the judiciary could effectively grant clemency. Id. " [I]n view of the existence of provisions for parole and executive clemency, it would seem unlikely that Congress would have intended to make the probation provisions applicable during the same period of time." 350 U.S. at 81, 76 S. Ct. at 172.
That the district court may revoke a convict's future probation based on an admitted parole violation while the convict is in executive branch custody, does not impinge upon the parole board's clemency-like powers. To hold otherwise, would unnecessarily tie the hands of the district court and create an indefensible loop-hole, whereby a convict considered by the court to be unsuitable for public release would be entitled to probation merely because of the timing of his violative conduct. It is possible, of course, that the government may fail to obtain a parole revocation and may subsequently press for revocation of probation (as was apparently the case here). Although this may lead to questionable results in the exercise of discretion, there is nothing so contradictory as to deny the court jurisdiction. Nor is the double jeopardy clause implicated. See United States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that the protections of the double jeopardy clause are not triggered by a parole revocation proceeding); United States v. Whitney, 649 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (declining to extend the double jeopardy clause to probation revocation proceedings).
The Supreme Court said in Affronti, that "within the Congressional intent, the probation statute should not be 'appl [ied] in such a way as to unnecessarily overlap the parole and executive-clemency provisions of the law' and should be interpreted in such a way as 'to avoid interference with the parole and clemency powers vested in the Executive Branch.' " Wright, 744 F.2d at 1129 (quoting Affronti, 350 U.S. at 83, 76 S. Ct. at 173-74). Our interpretation of the Probation Act is cautious and, we believe, avoids unnecessary overlap. That "multiple authorities" may "impose multiple sanctions is 'simply another manifestation of a central fact underlying modern federal criminal procedure: the power to determine the length and conditions of an individual criminal's punishment is dispersed between the judicial and executive branches.' " United States v. Camarata, 828 F.2d 974, 978 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S. Ct. 1036, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1988) (quoting Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 246 (3rd Cir. 1984)). Here, the parole board chose not to return Knight to jail. The judiciary's different decision with respect to the very same conduct is not a conflicting determination. Notwithstanding the fact that both may result in incarceration, probation and parole revocation proceedings involve different considerations, not to mention different periods of time. Accordingly, it is not inconsistent for the parole board to find a person suited to parole, whom the court believes not to be ready for a more lengthy period of probation.
Both Veatch, [792 F.2d 48 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933, 107 S. Ct. 407, 93 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1986) ] and Wright, relying on Affronti, suggest that the district court can only modify probation when the defendant has not begun to serve a period of incarceration. Veatch, 792 F.2d at 50; Wright, 744 F.2d at 1131. Although we have some doubt as to the correctness of this holding, we need not decide this question because the defendant did not raise the issue on appeal.
827 F.2d at 88 n. 5.

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