Source: https://lonang.com/library/reference/story-commentaries-us-constitution/sto-321/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:22:54+00:00

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§ 1164. A similar exclusive power was given to congress by the confederation.1 That such a power ought to exist in the national government, no one will deny, who believes, that it ought to have any powers whatsoever, either for offence or defence, for the common good, or for the common protection. It is, therefore, wholly superfluous to reason out the propriety of granting the power.2 It is self-evident, unless the national government is to be a mere mockery and shadow. The power could not be left without extreme mischief, if not absolute ruin, to the separate authority of the several states; for then it would be at the option of any one to involve the whole in the calamities and burthens of warfare.3 In the general government it is safe, because there it can be declared only by the majority of the states.
§ 1165. The only practical question upon this subject would seem to be, to what department of the national government it would be most wise and safe to confide this high prerogative, emphatically called the last resort of sovereigns, ultima ratio regum. In Great Britain it is the exclusive prerogative of the crown;4 and in other countries, it is usually, if not universally confided to the executive department. It might by the constitution have been confided to the executive, or to the senate, or to both conjointly.
§ 1174. The power to raise armies is an indispensable incident to the power to declare war; and the latter would be literally brutum fulmen without the former, a means of mischief without a power of defence.18 Under the confederation congress possessed no power whatsoever to raise armies; but only “to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each state for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such state;” which requisitions were to be binding; and thereupon the legislature of each state were to appoint the regimental officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the United States.19 The experience of the whole country, during the revolutionary war, established, to the satisfaction of every statesman, the utter inadequacy and impropriety of this system of requisition. It was equally at war with economy, efficiency, and safety.20 It gave birth to a competition between the states, which created a kind of auction of men. In order to furnish the quotas required of them, they outbid each other, till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. On this account many persons procrastinated their enlistment, or enlisted only for short periods. Hence, there were but slow and scanty levies of men in the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense; and continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline, and subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence also arose those oppressive expedients for raising men, which were occasionally practised, and which nothing, but the enthusiasm of liberty, could have induced the people to endure.21 The burthen was also very unequally distributed. The states near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance were exceedingly remiss in their exertions. In short, the army was frequently composed of three bodies of men; first, raw recruits; secondly, persons, who were just about completing their term of service; and thirdly, of persons, who had served out half their term, and were quietly waiting for its determination. Under such circumstances, the wonder is not, that its military operations were tardy, irregular, and often unsuccessful; but, that it was ever able to make head-way at all against an enemy, possessing a fine establishment, well appointed, well armed, well clothed, and well paid.22 The appointment, too, by the states, of all regimental officers, had a tendency to destroy all harmony and subordination, so necessary to the success of military life.
§ 1176. The clause, as originally reported, was “to raise armies;” and subsequently it was, upon the report of a committee, amended, so as to stand in its present form; and as amended it seems to have encountered no opposition in the convention.24 It was, however, afterwards assailed in the state conventions, and before the people, with incredible zeal and pertinacity, as dangerous to liberty, and subversive of the state governments. Objections were made against the general and indefinite power to raise armies, not limiting the number of troops; and to the maintenance of them in peace, as well as in war.
§ 1178. To these suggestions it was replied, with equal force and truth, that to be of any value, the power must be unlimited. It is impossible to foresee, or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the national means necessary to satisfy them. The power must be co-extensive with all possible combinations of circumstances, and under the direction of the councils entrusted with the common defence. To deny this would be to deny the means, and yet require the end. These must, therefore, be unlimited in every matter essential to its efficacy, that is, in the formation, direction, and support of the national forces.27 This was not doubted under the confederation; though the mode adopted to carry it into effect was utterly inadequate and illusory.28 There could be no real danger from the exercise of the power. It was not here, as in England, where the executive possessed the power to raise armies at pleasure; which power, so far as respected standing armies in time of peace, it became necessary to provide by the bill of rights, in 1688, should not be exercised without the consent of parliament.29 Here the power is exclusively confined to the legislative body, to the representatives of the states, and of the people of the states. And to suppose it will not be safe in their hands, is to suppose, that no powers of government, adapted to national exigencies, can ever be safe in any political body.31 Besides, the power is limited by the necessity (as will be seen) of biennial appropriations.31 The objection, too, is the more strange, because there are but two constitutions of the thirteen states, which attempt in any manner to limit the power; and these are rather cautions for times of peace, than prohibitions.32 The confederation itself contains no prohibition or limitation of the power.33 Indeed, in regard to times of war, it seems utterly preposterous to impose any limitations upon the power; since it is obvious, that emergencies may arise, which would require the most various, and independent exercises of it. The country would otherwise be in danger of losing both its liberty and its sovereignty, from its dread of investing the public councils with the power of defending it. It would be more willing to submit to foreign conquest, than to domestic rule.
§ 1182. The danger of an undue exercise of the power is purely imaginary. It can never be exerted, but by the representatives of the people of the states; and it must be safe there, or there can be no safety at all in any republican form of government.44 Our notions, indeed, of the dangers of standing armies in time of peace, are derived in a great measure from the principles and examples of our English ancestors. In England, the king possessed the power of raising armies in the time of peace according to his own good pleasure. And this prerogative was justly esteemed dangerous to the public liberties. Upon the revolution of 1688, parliament wisely insisted upon a bill of rights, which should furnish an adequate security for the future. But how was this done? Not by prohibiting standing armies altogether in time of peace; but (as has been already seen) by prohibiting them without the consent of parliament.45 This is the very proposition contained in the constitution; for congress can alone raise armies; and may put them down, whenever they choose.
§ 1186. In some of the state conventions an amendment was proposed, requiring, that no standing army, or regular forces be kept up in time of peace, except for the necessary protection and defence of forts, arsenals, and dockyards, without the consent of two thirds of both houses of congress.51 But it was silently suffered to die away with the jealousies of the day. The practical course of the government on this head has allayed all fears of the people, and fully justified the opinions of the friends of the constitution. It is remarkable, that scarcely any power of the national government was at the time more strongly assailed by appeals to popular prejudices, or vindicated with more full and masculine discussion. The Federalist gave it a most elaborate discussion, as one of the critical points of the constitution.52 In the present times the subject attracts no notice, and would scarcely furnish a topic, even for popular declamation. Ever since the constitution was put into operation, congress have restrained their appropriations to the current year; and thus practically shown the visionary nature of these objections.
§ 1191. Although these considerations were decisive with the people at large in favour of the power, from its palpable necessity and importance to all the great interests of the country, it is within the memory of all of us, that the same objections for a long time prevailed with a leading party in the country,62 and nurtured a policy, which was utterly at variance with our duties, as well as our honour. It was not until during the late war with Great Britain, when our little navy, by a gallantry and brilliancy of achievement almost without parallel, had literally fought itself into favour, that the nation at large began to awake from its lethargy on this subject, and to insist upon a policy, which should at once make us respected and formidable abroad, and secure protection and honour at home.63 It has been proudly said by a learned commentator on the laws of England, that the royal navy of England hath ever been its greatest defence and ornament. It is its ancient and natural strength; the floating bulwark of the island; an army, from which, however strong and powerful, no danger can be apprehended to liberty.64 Every American citizen ought to cherish the same sentiment, as applicable to the navy of his own country.
§ 1192. The next power of congress is “to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.” This is a natural incident to the preceding powers to make war, to raise armies, and to provide and maintain a navy. Its propriety, therefore, scarcely could be, and never has been denied, and need not now be insisted on. The clause was not in the original draft of the constitution; but was added without objection by way of amendment.65 It was without question borrowed from a corresponding clause in the articles of confederation,66 where it was with more propriety given, because there was a prohibition of all implied powers. In Great Britain, the king, in his capacity of generalissimo of the whole kingdom, has the sole power of regulating fleets and armies.67 But parliament has repeatedly interposed; and the regulation of both is now in a considerable measure provided for by acts of parliament.68 The whole power is far more safe in the hands of congress, than of the executive; since otherwise the most summary and severe punishments might be inflicted at the mere will of the executive.
1. Art. 9; The Federalist, No. 41.
2. See The Federalist, No. 23, 41.
3. 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 271.
4. 1 Black. Comm. 257, 258.
5. Mr. Hamilton’s Plan, Journal of Convention, p. 131.
a. 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 271, 272, 374.
7. 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 269 to 272; Rawle on the Const. ch. 9, p. 109.
8. Journal of Convention, 221,258, 259, 327, 328.
10. The Federalist, No. 64. See also Rawle on the Const. ch. 9, p. 110; North Amer; Rev. Oct. 1827, p. 263.
11. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch’s R. 1, 28; Bas v. Tingey, 4 Dall. 37.
12. Act of 1812, ch. 102.
13. Rawle on the Const. ch. 9, p. 109; Sergeant on Const. ch. 28, [ch. 30;] Bas v. Tingey, 4 Dall. R. 37.
14. See Mr. Madison’s Letter to Mr. Cabell., 18th Sept. 1828.
15. 1 Black. Comm. 258, 259.
16. 1 Black: Comm. 258, 259; Bynkershoek on War, ch. 24, p. 182, by Duponceau; Valin Traite des Prises, p. 223, 321; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 271; 4 Elliot’s Deb. 251.
17. Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch’s R. 1.
18. 4 Elliot’s Deb. 220, 221.
19. Art. 9; Art. 7.
20. 1 American Museum, 270, 273, 283; 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, App. note 1.
21. The Federalist, No. 22, 23.  The difficulties connected with this subject will appear still more striking in a practical view from the letters of General Washington, and other public documents at the period. See 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, ch. 3, p. 125, 126; ch. 5, p. 212 to 220; ch. 6, p. 238 to 248. See 6 Journals of Congress in 1780 passim. Circular Letter of Congress, in May, 1779; 5 Jour. of Cong. 224 to 231.
22. The Federalist, No. 22, 23.
23. The Federalist, No. 23; 2 Elliot’s Debates, 92, 91.
24. Journal of Convention, 221, 327, 328.
25. 2 Elliot’s Debates, 285, 286, 307, 308, 430.
26. 2 Elliot’s Debates, 307, 308, 430.
27. The Federalist, No. 23; 2 Elliot’s Debates, 92, 93, 438.
28. 2 Elliot’s Debates, 438.
29. 1 Black. Comm. 262, 413.
30. The Federalist, No. 23, 26.
31. The Federalist, No. 24, 25.
32. The Federalist, No. 24, and note; Id. No. 26.
33. The Federalist, No. 24; 2 Elliot’s Debates, 438.
34. The Federalist, No. 24, 25; 2 Elliot’s Debates, 292, 293.
35. The Federalist, No. 24; 2 Elliot’s Debates, 292, 293.
36. The Federalist, No. 24, 41.
38. The Federalist, No. 25; 2 Elliot’s Debates, 92, 93.
39. The Federalist, No. 25, 41.
41. The Federalist, No. 41; 3 Elliot’s Debates, 305.
42. The Federalist, No. 28, 26.
43. 2 Elliot’s Debates, 92, 93.
44. 3 The Federalist, No. 98, 26, 98.
45. The Federalist, No. 26; 1 Black. Comm. 413.
46. The Federalist, No. 41; 2 Elliot’s Debates, 93, 308, 309.
47. The Federalist, No. 26, 41.
48. The Federalist, No. 26.
49. 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm, App. 272; 1 Black. Comm. 414, 415.
50. The Federalist, No. 41.
51. 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 271, 272, 379.  An attempt was also made in the convention, to insert a clause, limiting the number of the army in time of peace to a  number; but it was negatived. Journal of Convention, p. 262.
52. The Federalist, No. 24 to 29.
53. Act of 28th of May, 1798, ch. 64; Act of 22d of June, 1798, ch. 74; Act of 2d of March, 1799, ch. 187.
54. 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 273, 274, 329, 330. See also Virginia Report and Resolutions, 9th of January, 1800, p. 53 to 56.
55. See Act of 8th of Feb. 1812, ch. 22; Act of 6th of July, 1812, ch. 538; Act of 24th of Feb. 1814, ch. 75; Act of 30th of March, 1814, ch. 96; Act of 27th of Jan. 1815, ch. 178. See also Act of 24th of Feb. 1807, ch. 70.
56. The Federalist, No. 29.
58. Journ. of Convention, 221, 262.
59. 2 Elliot’s Deb. 224, 319, 320.
60. 2 Elliot’s Deb. 319, 320.
61. The Federalist, No. 11, 24, 41. See also 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 272.
62. See 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, ch. 7, p. 523 to 531.
63. Lest it should be supposed, that these remarks are not well founded, the following passage is extracted from the celebrated Report and Resolutions of the Virginia legislature, of 7th and 11th Jan. 1800, which formed the text-book of many political opinions for a long period. “With respect to the navy, it may be proper to remind you, that whatever may be the proposed object of its establishment, or whatever the prospect of temporary advantages resulting therefrom, it is demonstrated. by the experience of all nations, who have adventured far into naval policy, that such prospect is ultimately delusive; and that a navy has ever in practice been known more as an instrument of power, a source of expense, and an occasion of collisions and wars with other nations, than as an instrument of defence, of economy, or of protection to commerce. Nor is there any nation, in the judgment of the general assembly, to whose circumstances this remark is more applicable, than to the United States.” p. 57, 58. And the senators and representatives were instructed and requested by one of the resolutions “to prevent any augmentation of the navy, and to promote any proposition for reducing it, as circumstances will permit, within the narrowest limits compatible with the protection of the sea-coasts, ports, and harbours of the United States.” p. 59.
64. 1 Black. Comm. 418.
65. Journal of Convention, p. 221, 262.
67. 1 Black. Comm. 262, 421.
68. 1 Black. Comm. 413, 414, 415, 420, 421.
69. See United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheaton’s R. 336, 390. The Schr. Exchange, 7 Cranch’s R. 116.

References: § 1165

§ 1174

§ 1176

§ 1178

§ 1182

§ 1186

§ 1191

§ 1192
 Art. 9
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 Art. 9
 Art. 7
 v.