Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/365/525.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 05:10:44+00:00

Document:
In his petition for habeas corpus, filed in a State Supreme Court, petitioner alleged that, after he had finished serving his terms for two separate felonies of which he had been convicted and after he had been released, he was arrested by state authorities, taken to another county, and there brought to trial two days after his arrest on a charge of being a "second offender" in violation of a state statute. He further alleged that he told the trial court that he had already retained counsel for his own defense, that his counsel was on the way and was due to arrive on the day of the trial, and that he asked that his trial be postponed until his counsel arrived; but that the court denied a continuance and proceeded to convict him on the record of his two previous convictions and his admission that he had been guilty of those offenses, and he was sentenced to imprisonment. The State Supreme Court dismissed his petition without a hearing. Held: The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 526-533.
(a) Petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to prove his claim that he had been deprived of due process by the refusal of the trial judge to grant his motion for a continuance in order that he might have the assistance of the counsel he had retained in the proceedings against him. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 . Pp. 527-531.
(b) If the trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion for a continuance, that error was not harmless under the facts of this case. Pp. 531-533.
Claude Pepper, acting under appointment by the Court, 363 U.S. 824 , argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
"Your petitioner would show this Honorable Court that at the time of his arrest he was living in Valusia County, DeLand Florida, that he was arrested without a warrant, that he was arrested on strength of a pick up order from Sheriff Office, Bartow, Polk County, Florida, that the arresting officer, a deputy sheriff of Volusia County did not know why he was arresting your petitioner and did not have a warrant to make a legal arrest, further that your petitioner was taken against his will across five (5) county lines. The said county lines being Volusia, Seminole, Orange, Osceala, into Polk County all of State of Florida, without his knowing why he was arrested or the arresting officer knowing why or what charge he was making arrest for; Your petitioner, was taken across the afore said counties by the arresting officer, a deputy sheriff of Volusia County, Florida.
"Your petitioner contends that once he was in the clutches of the Criminal Court of Record in and for Polk County Florida; he was a convicted person before he was ever tried.
"The trial court then proceeded to read off two (2) convictions from your petitioners record and then asked, You are guilty of these two convictions, are you not? Petitioner saying yes your Honor, but the court, I find, you guilty of being a `second offender' and sentence you Stephen Franklin Reynolds to ten (10) years in State Prison . . . ."
In Chandler v. Fretag, 9 we made it emphatically clear that a person proceeded against as a multiple offender has a constitutional right to the assistance of his own counsel in that proceeding. Under the facts of this case, as alleged in the petition filed before the Florida Supreme Court, the decision in Chandler is squarely in point and controlling. Under those facts, the statement of this Court in Powell v. Alabama, 10 which provided the basis of our holding in Chandler, 11 is wholly applicable: "If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be [365 U.S. 525, 531] doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense."
We of course express no opinion as to how this question of statutory construction should eventually be decided by the Florida courts. But its mere existence dramatically illustrates that even in the most routine-appearing proceedings the assistance of able counsel may be of [365 U.S. 525, 533] inestimable value. Plainly, such assistance might have been of great value to petitioner here. The allegations of his petition for habeas corpus indicated, if true, that he had been denied the assistance of counsel he had retained. He is entitled to a hearing to establish the truth of those allegations. The case must therefore be and is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
[ Footnote 1 ] "A person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, or under the laws of any other state, government or country, of a crime which, if committed within this state would be a felony, commits any felony within this state is punishable upon conviction of such second offense as follows: If the subsequent felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then such person must be sentenced to imprisonment for a term no less than the longest term nor more than twice the longest term prescribed upon a first conviction. . . ." Fla. Stat., 1957, 775.09.
[ Footnote 2 ] The theory used by the State in its proceedings against petitioner, as disclosed by the quoted recitals of the information and judgment, seems to be completely at variance with that upon which multiple-offender [365 U.S. 525, 527] proceedings are normally based. For normally the punishment provided for in a multiple-offender statute is viewed as increased punishment for the last offense in the sequence. Here, on the other hand, the theory seems to have been that petitioner, by virtue of his convictions for two previous offenses, has committed a third and entirely separate offense - to quote the judgment, "the offense of Second Offender." Because of the disposition we make of this case on other grounds, however, we need not reach the questions posed as to the constitutionality of confinement based upon such a theory. In any event, prior opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida indicate that there might be room for considerable doubt whether 775.09 authorizes confinement on such a theory. See Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380; Washington v. Mayo, 91 So.2d 621.
[ Footnote 3 ] The Supreme Court of Florida issued no opinion, the case being disposed of with the following order: "The above-named petitioner has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to be issued to the respondent in the above entitled cause, and upon consideration thereof, it is ordered that said petition be and the same is hereby denied."
[ Footnote 4 ] 363 U.S. 801 .
[ Footnote 5 ] Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633, 634 ; Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 273 .
[ Footnote 7 ] The problem presented by these questions is rather dramatically stated by petitioner himself in his petition for habeas corpus: "In the instant case how can your petitioner know when in his life he is no longer subject to have his liberty translated to imprisonment, even after expiration of the present sentence, can he again be imprisoned without committing another crime as in the instant case?? Surely this Honorable Court will not condone this practice . . . ."
[ Footnote 8 ] As in Chandler v. Fretag, n. 9, infra, the petitioner here also alleged a denial of due process in that he was not given pretrial notice of the charge against him. But as in Chandler, we find it unnecessary to pass upon this contention. See 348 U.S. 3, 5 -6, n. 4.
[ Footnote 9 ] 348 U.S. 3 .
[ Footnote 10 ] 287 U.S. 45, 69 .
[ Footnote 11 ] 348 U.S., at 9 -10.
[ Footnote 12 ] It is significant that in Chandler we did not require any showing that the defendant there would have derived any particular benefit from the assistance of counsel.
[ Footnote 13 ] The proof of prior convictions in a second-offender proceeding may raise difficult evidentiary problems. See, e. g., Shargaa v. State, 102 So.2d 809. Moreover, it can be presumed that if an accused second offender were able to make a successful collateral attack upon his first conviction, 775.09 would not be applied. Cf. Fields v. State, 85 So.2d 609.
[ Footnote 14 ] Milan v. State, 102 So.2d 595, 596.
[ Footnote 15 ] See n. 6, supra.

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