Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19791003-823378
Timestamp: 2017-04-27 03:56:46+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8233/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1979-10-03;8233.78 Analyses : (Art. 5-1) ARRESTATION OU DETENTION REGULIERE, (Art. 5-1) LIBERTE PHYSIQUE, (Art. 5-1) VOIES LEGALES, (Art. 5-1-e) ALIENE, (Art. 5-4) INTRODUIRE UN RECOURS, (Art. 5-4) ORDONNER LA LIBERATION, (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVILParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 8233/78 X v/the UNITED KINGDO M X . c/ROYAUME-UN I
DECISION of 3 October 1979 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 3 octobre 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 5, paragraph 3 of the Convention : The obligation, assumed by States parties under the terms of Article 5, paragraph 3, to judge a person within a reasonable time ceases as soon as this person is released paragraph I of the Convention : Reasonable time in criminal matters . .Article6, a) The end of the period to take into consideration may be not only a verdict of conviction or acquittal, but also a decision terminating the proceedings in another way. bl Examination of the question whether adjourning a judgment of certain counts pending the judgment of other counts is in conformity with the proper administration of justice . Artic%27, paragraph 1 .b of the Convention : When a complaint concerns the length of proceedings (Art . 6, para . 1), the time which has elapsed since the examination of a first application does, in itself, constitute a new fact.
Artic%5, peregraphe 3 de le Convention : L'obligation assumÃ©e par les Etats aux termes de l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de faire juger une personne dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable prend fin dÃ©s que cette personne est mise en libertÃ© . Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : DÃ©lai raisonnable, en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale .
a) La fin de la pÃ©riode 9 prendre en considÃ©ration peut Ã©tre non seulement un jugement de condamnation ou d'acquittement mais aussi une dÃ©ctsion mettant fin Ã la procÃ©dure d'une autre maniÃ¨re . b) Examen du point de savoir s'il Ã©tait conforme Ã une bonne administration de la justice d'ajourner le jugement sur certains chefs d'accusation en attendant un jugement sur d'autres chefs .
Article 27, paragraphe 1, fitt. b), de la Convention : Corsque le grief porte sur la durÃ©e d'une procedure (art . 6. par. 7), le temps passA depuis l'examen d'une premiÃ¨re requÃªte constitue, en lui-mÃªme, un fait nouveau .
THE FACTS (franFais : voir p . 136) The facts of the case may be summarised as follow s
1 . The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1933, and residing in C . He is a consultant by profession and is represented by Messrs Osborne Â§ Co ., Solicitors in Bristol . i . The applicant's previous application 2 . The applicant has previously lodged an Application No . 7345/76 which was declared inadmissible by the Commission on 5 July 1977 after having been communicated to the United Kingdom Government for written observations on the admissibility . The facts of that application can be summarised as follows : 3 . On 29 July 1974, the applicant was arrested by members of the G . Constabulary . He was charged with two alleged offences of being involved in the management of a company contrary to Section 187 (1) of the Companies Act 1948 and, furthermore, of two offences of obtaining credit whilst being an undischarged bankrupt contrary to Section 155 of the Bankruptcy Act 1974 . The applicant had been adjudged bankrupt on 23 January 1979 . (These charges will hereinafter alternatively be called the bankruptcy charges or the F . charges . ) 4 . On 19 August 1974 the applicant was committed to trial at the G . Crown Court . The prosecution was undertaken by the Department of Trade and Industry . The applicant submitted that the prosecution case was clearly incomplete at the time of his committal to the Crown Court and additional evidence was subsequently sent to his lawyers . By January 1975 the whole prosecution evidence was in the hands of his lawyers . In their observations on the admissibility the Government disagreed with the submission that the prosecution was incomplete in August 1974 . 5 . The applicant stated that he himself also spent a great deal of time and effort to prepare his defence . However, in December 1974 he suffered a heart attack and was admitted to the intensive care ward of the C . Hospital where he remained for some time . He later suffered another cardiac incident and was returned to hospital . By reason of his health he was unable to undertake any work on his case between December 1974 and March 1975 . He had, however, passed all the information to his solicitors and instructed them to interview witnesses and collect the evidence on his behalf .
6 . Because of the applicant's illness, the case against him was adjourned from time to time . The applicant submitted that the Prosecution were not anxious for the trial to start in March 1975 as they were still not ready notwithstanding the fact that they had been preparing the case for some three years and had interviewed approximately one hundred people . 7 . In April 1975 the applicant visited his solicitors but found that they had done virtually no work at all on the case and that they had not carried out the instructions given to them . The trial had been fixed for hearing on 12 May 1975 . Being disappointed with his lawyers the applicant consulted a new solicitor at the end of April 1975 . The solicitor was prepared to accept the case but indicated that it was quite impossible to prepare properly a case of such complexity and magnitude within three weeks . 8 . On 5 May 1975 the applicant applied for an adjournment of the proceedings . The Prosecution opposed the application on the ground that the fault for the delay was entirely the applicant's . An adjournment was granted for seven days and the trial was to start on 19 May 1975 . The applicant had requested an adjourment of three months . 9 . This decision was unacceptable to the applicant who applied to the G Crown Court on 8 May for a new adjournment . On the express basis that no further application for adjournment would be entertained by the Court a judge granted an adjournment for the matter to 15 September 1975 . According to the applicant the judge "indicated that he accepted that justice could not be done, and could not be seen to be done, by the case commencing in some eleven days' timÃ©' . Having seen the affidavits the Prosecution also accepted that the delay was not occasioned by the applicant's fault or neglect . 10 . According to the applicant he and his lawyers "worked hard" to prepare the case for the trial that was to take place in September . The solicitors inter alia interviewed witnesses all over the country and collated thousands of exhibits . By mid-August the defence was substantially ready to proceed to trial . 11 . Since February 1974 the applicant was aware that a company called the A . Company Ltd was being investigated by officers of the Department of Trade and Industry and that it was possible that charges would be brought against various people including himself . The applicant had been employed by the company for a certain period . Towards the end of August 1975 the Prosecution had become aware that the Director of Public Prosecutions had the intention to apply for a warrant in the early part of September 1975 in connection with certain charges against the applicant of a more serious nature arising out of th e - 124 -
A . Company Ltd 1"the A . charges"1 . Accordingly, the Prosecution informed the defence that it proposed to apply to the G . Crown Court on 15 September 1975 for the case to be adjourned sine die . On 15 September 1975, counsel for the Prosecution applied to the judge at G . Crown Court for an adjournment sine die . Counsel said that if the applicant were convicted of the more serious offences with which he was then about to be charged by the Director of Public Prosecutions (i .e . the A . charges) he would be asked if he was prepared to have the bankruptcy charges taken into consideration . Counsel tor the Prosecution also indicated that if the applicant were acquitted on the A . charges, the Prosecution intended to continue with the bankruptcy charges ; and if G . Crown Court was not prepared to grant the requested adjournment sine die, then the Prosecution was ready to have the bankruptcy charges listed for trial imfnediately . The defence was totally opposed to this application . They informed the judge that there were approximately ten new charges against the applicant and that he was one of three persons who were charged with some series of offences . It was further argued that these new offences could not possibly be heard at the same time as the bankruptcv offences, "as they were totally different in nature, time and in virtually every way" . The counsellor also indicated that, having regard to the complexity and weight of the nÃ©w charges, it was extremely unlikely that they could be brought to trial within twelve months, particularly as the committal proceedings were not expected to be concluded until February or March 1976 . It was consequently ve ry likely that the new charges would not be finally disposed of until the latter part of 1976 . If the applicant then would be acquitted, the four bankruptcy charges would have to be examined separately and he would face a trial in the middle of 1977 . On 15 September 1975 the judge ordered the bankruptcy charges to be adjourned sine .die. 12 . On 16 September 1975 the applicant requested the Attorney General to intervene in the proceedings by means of a nol%prosequi . The entry of such a fiat would conclusively prevent the proceedings from being heard . By letter dated 6 October 1975 the Attorney General informed the applicant that the entry of a nolle prosequi would not be appropriate in the present case . He also stated, however, that he fully appreciated the need for speedy action and that he, to that end, would keep the case under review . 13 . On 17 September 1975, the A . charges were made against the applicant . In June 1976 he was then committed for trial in the A . case, the charges consisting of one count of fraudulent trading contrary to Section 332 131 of the Companies Act 1948, four counts of theft contrary to Section 1 of the Theft Act 1968, one count of being concerned in the management of the A .
Co Lytd whilst being an undischarged bankrupt contrary to Section 187 of the Companies Act 1948, and one count of conspiracy to steal .
On 31 January 1977 the trial on the A . counts was fixed for 25 April 1977 at B . Crown Court, the venue having been changed from G . 14 . On 27 September 1976 the so-called R . charges were preferred against the applicant and in December of that year he was committed for trial in this case which consisted of seven counts of obtaining money by deceit contrary to Section 15 of the Theft Act 1968, one count of conspiring to obtain by deception, five counts of theft, one count of being concerned in the management of R . Ltd whilst being an undischarged bankrupt, and one count of being concerned in the management of F . and Co (lnternational) whilst being an undischarged bankrupt in the period from 19 September 1973 to 10 June 1975 . On 31 January 1977, the trial on the R . counts was adjourned generally . 15 . The applicant's main complaint was that, by reason of the decision to adjourn the hearing of the bankruptcy charges sine die, they would not be determined within a reasonable time as guaranteed by Article 6 .1 of the Conventio n 16 . In its decision on the admissibility of 5 July 1977 the Commission left open the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies and examined the case under Article 6 .1 of the Convention . It considered inter alia that the period to be taken into consideration for the purpose of Article 6 .1 must run from 29 July 1974, the date on which the first bankruptcy charges were brought against the applicant . In the view of the Commission, there appeared to be a clear connection between the charges preferred against the applicant on 29 July 1974 and the A . and R . charges, at least as far as they all inter alia involved alleged offences of the applicant, committed in the management of different companies whilst being an undischarged bankrupt . The various groups of charges must therefore not be considered separately but regarded as a related set of procedures . In the opinion of the Commission it was consequently both understandable and reasonable that the first bancruptcy case, which was in any case initially delayed by the solicitors of the applicant, was allowed to be suspended sine die pending the outcome of the hearings in the A . and R . cases . The Commission noted, moreover, that the applicant had the possibility of having the four bankruptcy charges taken into consideration if convicted of the more serious charges . In the light of these considerations the Commission concluded that, although nearly three years had elapsed since the laying of the first four bankruptcy charges without any determination of them having yet been made in a judgment convicting or acquitting the accused, there was no appearance of any violation of Article 6 .1 by reason either of
the adjournment of the four bankruptcy charges or by any other irregularities on the part of the judicial authorities in their handling of the applicant's case . The application was consequently declared inadmissible . II . The applicant's present application 17 . The applicant now submits that, although his new application concerns the same subject matter as his first application, it deals with new facts and developments which have occurred after the first case was dealt with . The difference arises in his view in particular from the fact that certain matters put forward in the United Kingdom Government's observations on the admissibility of the first application have not been carried out as promised . The new facts as they appear from the applicant's submissions may be summarised as follows :
18 . On 25 April 1977 the trial in the A . case commenced at B . Crown Court . The trial lasted until 27 July 1977 when the applicant was found guilty of four counts and sentenced to four years' imprisonment . A Criminal Bankruptcy Order was also made against him . However, at the end of the trial on the A . charges, the applicant was not asked by the Prosecution as to whether he desired to have the bankruptcy charges taken into consideration . In this context the applicant recalls that, in their submissions on the admissibility of his first application, the United Kingdom Government stated that the Director of Public Prosecutions intended to ask the applicant, at the end of the A . trial, if he was prepared to have the bankruptcy charges taken into consideration . The applicant considers that the statement thus made by the respondent Government is indicative of their intention to mislead the Commission, as he was never so asked by the Prosecution . 19 . On 26 July 1978 the applicant's appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal in London in regard to the judgment in the A . case was heard . The applicant was represented by leading and junior counsel . The Court of Appeal decided that there had been material irregularities in the trial and it quashed the conviction on three of the four charges . However, the Court applied the proviso in relation to the management charge and the conviction and sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment stood . The Court also set aside the Bankruptcy Order . The applicant was released from imprisonment the following week . He states that he will challenge the validity of the application of the proviso by the Court of Appeal . 20 . On 24 October 1977 there was a hearing in respect of the R . charges . The bankruptcy charges had not at that time been joined in the indictment with the R . charges and were not before the Court . However, on that same day, without any notice to the applicant's lawyers, counsel for the Prosecutio n
brought up the F . charges and the applicant was again arraigned on those charges to which he pleaded "not guilty" . The Prosecution immediately made an application for these charges to lie on the file and not to be proceeded with without the Leave of the Court or the Court of Appeal . Counsel for the Prosecution also indicated that they had no intention of proceeding with these charges . The applicant alleged that they were thereby again denying him his right to a fair trial as this had been done in September 1975 when that case was adjourned sine die. 20bis . On 19 December 1977 the applicant appeared before a Judge of B . Crown Court and applied for his plea ot guilty to the R . charges to be wlthdrawn and a plea of "not guilty" to be substituted . He submitted that his earlier plea of guilty had been of a technical nature only . 21 . The applicant further submits that, on 3 May 1978, he was interviewed by two examiners coming respectively from the Department of trade and Industry and the Department of the Official Receiver . The purpose was, he says, to obtain from him information on his business activities, employment and so forth . The applicant's lawyer and a prison officer were present at the interview . During this interview one of the examiners asked the applicant as to whether he would co-operate with the Official Receiver if they dropped the original bankruptcy charges . However, the applicant declined to have any negotiations on this "unlawful offer", which he considered to be an attempt to pervert the course of justice . He instructed his solicitors to report the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions . 22 . On 15 May 1978 the applicant applied to the judge at B . Crown Court for an Order that he be awarded costs in respect of the F . charges, the application being made under the provisions of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1973 . However, counsel for the Department of Trade and Industry opposed the applicant for costs stating that the said charges were still "live" although they would not be proceeded with by the Crown without proper notice being given to the applicant . Having heard both parties the judge dismissed the application for costs and said that an application was not appropriate despite the provision under Section 12 (5) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1973 which stipulates that "where a person committed for trial is not ultimately tried, the Crown Court shall have the same power to order payment of costs under this Act as it the accused had been tried and acquitted" . On 13 October 1978 the applicant next applied to B . Crown Court for a 23 directive by the judge that either the original F . charges should be heard or that the judge should direct that a verdict of "not guilty" be entered to these charges . In addition he applied for an Order that a "not guiltÃ¿' verdict be entered in relation to the two theft charges in the A . case which had been ordered to lie on the file .
Byconsent of the Prosecution the judge ruled that a"not guilty' verdict be entered in regard to the A . charges . Such verdicts were formally given on 18 October 1978 . With respect to the F . charges the judge stated that he could not make an Order as it could be that the applicant in his pending trial on the R . charges would make capital out of his acquittal . According to the applicant, however, the judge stated i .a . that he was entitled to a determination but that the question was when . It is submitted that he also stated that the practicability of the situation was that it was unlikely that the charges would ever be proceeded with but that he was not prepared to order that a verdict of "not guilty" be entered .
Complaints 24 . The applicant submits that he has throughout insisted that he wished to exercise his basic right under Article 6 .1 of the Convention with a view to having the original bankruptcy charges determined within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal . These charges which were originally brought against him in July 1974 relate to events that took place in 1971 and 1972 . He states .that he has full and final answer to these charges which would prove his innocence . Had the bankruptcy charges been heard, it would also have been much more difficult, if not impossible, for the Prosecution to pursue the subsequent charges relating to the A . and R . cases . The applicant avers, furthermore, that the Order sought and obtained by the Prosecution on 24 October 1977 indicates that, since about mid-1975, they neither had, not have, any intention to have these charges dealt with in a fair trial . This denial of justice is, in the applicant's submission a gross violation of his human right under Article 6 .1 of the Convention . The applicant further regards the offer made by the examiner from the Department of the Official Receiver as anâ¢attempt to pervert the course of justice . It would also show that the Department of Trade and Industry, which originally preferred the bankruptcy charges are now prepared to try and use them as a negotiating pawn to avoid embarrassment to themselves . The applicant says that it is causing him great anxiety with detriment to his health and family life to have the bankruptcy charges hanging over his head for so long a time . He invokes Article,5 .3 and Article 6 .1 of the Convention and reserves the right to introduce further complaints at a later stage in respect of the trials in the A . and R . cases .
THE LA W 52 . The applicant has complained that the bankruptcy charges preferred against him on 29 July 1974 will not be determined within a reasonable tim e - 129 -
by a tribunal as understood by Article 6 .1 of the Convention . He has also alleged a violation of Article 5 .3 of the Convention .
Artic%27.1 .b of the Convention 53 . The Commission recalls in the first place that the applicant has lodged a previous application, No . 7345/76 concerning the same issue . That application was rejected by the Commission on 5 July 1977 as being manifestly illfounded under Article 6 .1 of the Conventio n 54 . The first question to be considered is therefore whether the present application "is substantially the same as a matter which already has been examined" by the Commission within the meaning of Article 27 .1 .b . However, in the light of the new information submitted by the applicant the Commission is satisfied that this is not the case . Of particular and even decisive importance in this respect is the length of the period during which the applicant has had the F . charges hanging over his head . As noted below, the period to be considered under Article 6 .1 of the Convention in this case now amounts to four years and eight months as compared with three years when the Commission gave its decision on the admissibility of the applicant's first application . In the view of the Commission the time aspect constitutes in itself the relevant new information in the sense of Article 27 .1 .b, and it does not therefore find it necessary in this context to go into applicant's allegation that he was not given the opportunity of having these bankruptcy charges raken into consideration at the end of his trial in the A . Case . 55 . For these reasons the Commission considers that the present application cannot be rejected under Article 27 .1 .b as being substantially the same as Application No . 7345/76 .
Article 5.3 of the Conventio n 56 The applicant has alleged that there is a total disregard of Article 5 .3 in his case by reason of the continued refusal by the Prosecution to have the bankruptcy chages determined .3 of the Convention provides as follow s .Article5 "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 .c of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial . Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial . " 57 . The respondent Government have submitted in their observations on the admissibility that, since the applicant has not been held in custody at any time on the original bankruptcy charges, this complaint is manifestly illfounded . In reply to this the applicant has submitted that he was arrested o n
the said charges on 29 July 1974 and held until bailed at C . Police Station on the same day . He avers that this part of his application is therefore admissible . The Commission observes that the information given by the applicant with respect to his arrest was in fact confirmed by the submission by the Government of a copy of a letter dated 3 April 1979 from the G . Constabulary to the solicitor of the Department of Trade which acted as prosecuting authority in regard to this indictment . 58 . The Commission notes that Article 5 of the Convention is concerned only with the rights of detained persons . Consequently, if a person is provisionally released, Article 5 ceases to apply . It would therefore appear clear that in such circumstances there would thenceforth be no obligation for the State Party concerned to bring the person to trial within a reasonable time as stated by Article 5 .3 of the Convention .However, the criminal proceedings would of course continue to be subject to the provisions of Article 6 .1 . 59 . In view of the fact that the applicant was arrested and freed on bail on the same day, namely on 29 July 1974 and, considering furthermore that he has never since been held in custody on the charges, the Commission is of the opinion that his complaint under Article 5 .3 is clearly inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention . Article 6.1 of the Conventio n 60 . The applicant has submitted in the next place that he wishes to exercise his basic right under Article 6 .1 of the Convention with a view to having the F charges determined within a reasonable time . He avers that the Order obtained by the Prosecution on 24 October 1977 indicates that, since about mid-1975, they neither had, nor have, any intention to have these charges dealt with in a fair trial . In the applicant's opinion this denial of justice amounts to a gross violation of his human rights under Article 6 .1 of the Convention . Article 6 .1 provides that :"In the determination . . . of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal" . 61 . Referring to the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the applicant's first application, No . 7345/76, the respondent Government submit, on the other hand, that it remains understandable and reasonable that the bankruptcy charges have not been prosecuted whilst the A . and R . trials were in progress .
62 . The Commission recalls that the precise aim of Article 6 .1 "in criminal matters is to ensure that accused persons do not have to lie under a charg e
for too long and that the charge is determined" Icf Eur . Court H .R ., Wemhoff Case, Judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A, p . 26, para . 18) . In other words . Article 6 .1 is "designed to avoid that a person charged should remain for too long in a state of uncertainty about his fate" (Eur . Court H .R ., St6gmiiller Case, Judgment of 10 November 1969, Series A . p . 40) . The questions arising in the present case are consequently, in the first 63 place, whether the applicant can be considered to have an absolute right to have the F . charges determined by a verdict of guilty or not guilty and, in the second place, whether there is any indication that the applicant's right to have these charges determined "within a reasonable time" has been violated . 64 . The Commission points out that, according to the opinion expressed by the European Court of Human Rights in the Neumeister Case, the period covered by Article 6 .1 "begins with the day on which a person is charged . . . as this word is understood within the meaning of the Convention" (Judgment of 27 June 1968 . Series A, p . 41) . For the purposes of identifying the particular moment in time when the applicant before the Commission can be said to have been charged in the context of Article 6 .1 of the Convention, the Commission has also found it necessary to adopt a flexible attitude to the effect that "the relevant sage is that at which the situation of the person concerned has been substantially affected as a result of the suspicion against him" Icf . Eur . Court ., Series B, Neumeister Case, p . 811 . In its decision on the admissibility of the applicant's aforementioned application, the Commission found that the period to be taken into consideration must run from 29 July 1974, the date on which the four bankruptcy charges were brought against the applicant . The Commission finds that the same date has to be accepted as the starting point for the period to be examilied in the present case, there being no new facts that would justify the choice of a different date as the beginning of the relevant period . 65 . As to the termination of the period under Article 6 .1, the Commission has previously held that "the same general principle as that governing the beginning of the period should apply to the ending of that period in the sense that the period lasts until the situation of the person concerned has ceased to be affected as a result of the charges levelled against him" IHuber v . Austria, Decisions and Reports 2, p . 11 at p . 21) . This is normally the case when criminal charges are determined by an acquittal or a conviction -whether on first instance or on appeal-by a court which pronounces upon the merits of the charge, and the Commission refers in this regard to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and to its own case-law (cf . e .g . the Wemhoff, Neumeister and Ringeisen Cases and Huber v . Austria, loc . cit .) . However, the same result could be achieved wtiere the criminal proceedings against the applicant are terminated otherwise, e .g . by their discontinuance (cf Huber v . Austria, loc . cit .) .
66 . With respect to the present case, the Prosecution undertook on 29 March 1979 not to seek a trial in respect of the three counts which remained on the F . indictment on the condition that they remained on the file after a plea of autrefois convict had been entered in regard to the second count . The applicant appears to be of the view, however, that, irrespective of the intention of the Prosecution to proceed or not to proceed with a trial on these charges, he has an absolute right under Article 6 .1 to have the remaining charges on this indictment terminated by a finding of guilty or not guilty . 67 . However, the Commission has earlier accepted that Article 6 .1 does not provide an accused person with a right of access to the courts in order that a criminal charge against him may be heard at a tim@ of his choice (cf . Application No . 8046/77 v . United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of 8 March 1979) . It is moreover the view of the Commission that Article 6 .1 of the Convention cannot be so construed as to bar the Prosecution from formally discontinuing criminal proceedings or from simply dropping charges . This is in fact a daily practice in member states . It is in cases where the Prosecution has the intention of proceeding to a trial on an indictment that they are under an obligation to do so within a reasonable time . This is the very purpose of Article 6 .1 . 68 The Commission is of the opinion that, insofar as the present case is concerned, the undertaking made by the Prosecution on 29 March 1979 not to try the applicant on the three remaining charges on the F . indictment must be considered as being tantamount to saying that these charges have been effectively dropped . Consequently, the applicant thereby also ceased to be affected by the charges on the said indictment . Thus, as from that date, there are in fact no longer any charges against the applicant which require a determination within the meaning of Article 6 .1 of the Convention . In support of this conclusion the Commission recalls that it was conIronted with a similar issue in Application No . 3034/67, R . and A . IFletcher v . the United Kingdom . Collection of Decisions 25, p . 76) . The applicants complained before the Commission that they were not tried within a reasonable time on a count of arson which was left on the file at the conclusion of their trial in which they had been found guilty of murder . In its decision the Commission stated that it was satisfied that is was established practice in English law that a second indictment left on the file was not proceeded with so long as the charge of murder remains undisturbed . The Commission considered that there was in fact no criminal charge against the applicants which required to be determined and that there was thus no violation of Article 6 .1 of the Convention .
It may be wondered whether in the present casethe Prosecution had not decided at an earlier date already to abstain from proceeding to trial o n - 133 -
the F . indictment . However, the Commission finds that this cannot be clearly estbalished on the facts as they have been presented by the parties . In the light of the aforementioned considerations the Commission concludes that the period to be considered in the present case under Article 6 .1 runs from 29 July 1974 until 29 March 1979, this periodbeing altogether four years and eight months long . 69 . It remains to be considered whether this period has exceeded the limits of a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 .1 of the Convention . 70 . In approaching this question the Commission has in the first place had regard to its decision on the admissibility of the applicant's first application, No . 7345/76 . It was stated therein, inter alia, that in the circumstances of the case of 5 July 1977, and although nearly three years had elapsed since the bringing of the bankruptcy charges against the applicant, there was no appearance of a violation of Article 6 .1 of the Convention . The question now arises whether there is any indication that a period of four years and eight months might possibly exceed what can be considered as reasonable for the purposes of Article 6 .1 . 71 . It is recalled that the original four bankruptcy charges were adjourned sine die on 15 September 1975, the reason being that the Prosecution wanted first to proceed with more serious charges . On 17 September 1975 and 27 September 1976 the A . and R . charges were respectively preferred against the applicant . The trial in the A . case started on 25 April 1977 and lasted until 27 July 1977 . The appeal was heard on 26 July 1978 . As regards the R . case, the trial began on 30 October 1978 although it was discontinued in order to be recommenced on 6 November 1978 . The trial lasted until 16 February 1979 and the appeal is still pending . In the former case the applicant was convicted in first instance on four counts although the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on three counts since there had been material irregularities in the trial . In the R . case the applicant was found guilty of seven out of thirteen charges in the court of first instance . 72 . The Commission must therefore again determine, in the circumstances of the present case, whether or not it was in keeping with good administration of justice to suspend the bankruptcy charges against the applicant pending the proceedings before the courts on the other charges against hi m 73 . As stated by the Commission in its decision on the admissibility of Application No . 7345/76, there appears in the first place to be a clear connection between the charges preterred against the applicant on 29 July 1974 and those levelled against him on 17 September 1975, and 27 September 1976, at least insofar as they all inter alia involved alleged offences of the applicant, committed in the management of different companies whilst being an undischarged bankrupt . In the view of the Commission it was consequently bot h
understandable and reasonable that the first bankruptcy case was allowed to be suspended sine die pending the outcome of hearings in the A . and R . cases . The Commission noted, moreover, that the applicant had the possibility of having the four bankruptcy charges taken into consideration in case of his being convicted of the more serious charges . It is true that it was not until 24 October 1977 that the applicant was given the opportunity of having the F . charges taken into consideration in connection with the proceedings in the R . case . However, he pleaded not guilty and, following an application of the Prosecution, the Court ordered that the said charges lie on the file . In the Commission's view this particular aspect of the case, although relevant, is not of any conclusive importance for the determination of the issue arising under Article 6 .1 in the present case . It considers, on the other hand, that for the reasons already given in the earlier case, and referred to in the preceding paragraph, it remains understandable and reasonable that the apparently less serious charges on the F . indictment were not proceeded with whilst the A . and R . cases were still pending . The period during which the F . charges were allowed to stagnate may seem to be long . However, this delay to a large extent appears to be due to the complexity and seriousness of the A . and R . cases . In those latter cases the trial proceedings, in the courts of first instance alone, lasted for three months and three-and-a -half months respectively . In all particular circumstances of the present case the Commission is satisfied that, although the F . charges were left in suspense for four years and eight months, there is no appearance that this period exceeded the limits for what can be considered as "reasonable" in the sense of Article 6 .1 of the Convention . 74 . It follows that the remainder of this application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBL E
1 TRA DUCTIOM EN FAI T Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme sui t 1 . Le requÃ©rant, ressortissant britannique nÃ© en 1933, rÃ©side Ã C . oÃ¹ il exerce le mÃ©tier d'expert-conseil . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par MM . Osborne, Clarke & Cie, solicitors Ã Bristol . 1 . La prÃ©cÃ©dente requÃªte du requÃ©ran t 2 . Le requÃ©rant avait prÃ©cÃ©demment introduit une requÃªte portant le NÂ° 7345/76, que la Commission a dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable le 5 juillet 1977 aprÃ©s l'avoir communiquÃ©e au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni-pour recueillir ses observations Ã©crites sur la recevabilitÃ© de l'affaire . Les faits de cette premiÃ©re requÃªte peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : 3 . Le 29 juillet 1974, le requÃ©rant fut arrÃ©tÃ© par desagents de la police de G . Il fut accusÃ© de deux infractions pour avoir participÃ© Ã la gestion d'une sociÃ©tÃ© violant l'article 187, paragraphe 1 de la loi de,1948 sur les sociÃ©tÃ©s (Companies Act) et, en outre, de deux infractionspour avoir obtenu un crÃ©dit alors qu'il Ã©tait en Ã©tat de faillite et non rÃ©habilitÃ© ; ceci contrairement Ã l'article 155 de la loi de 1974 sur la faillite (Bankruptcy Act) . Le requÃ©rant avait en effet Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© en faillite le 23 janvier 1970 : :ICes chefs d'accusation seront dÃ©nommÃ©s ci-aprÃ©s Â« les accusations de faillite Â» ou Â« les accusations F Â» . . .I . 4 . Le 19 aoÃ¹t 1974, le requÃ©rant fut traduit devant la a Crown Court Â» de G ., l'accusation Ã©tant soutenue par le MinistÃ©re du commÃ©rbe et de l'industrie . Le requÃ©rant fit valoir que le dossier de l'accusation Ã©tait manifestement incomplet au moment oÃ¹ il fut traduit devant la Crown Court etque des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve complÃ©mentaires furent ultÃ©rieurement envoyÃ©s Ã ses avocats . Avant janvier 1975, l'ensemble des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve Ã charge se trouvaient entre les mains de ses avocats . Dans- .ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte, le Gouvernement a contestÃ© que le .dossier de l'accusation n'Ã©tait pas complet en aoÃ»t 1974 . 5 . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clare avoir personnellementconsacrÃ© beaucoup de temps et d'efforts Ã prÃ©parer sa dÃ©fense . Mais en.dÃ©cembre 1974, il eut une crise cardiaque et fut admis au Service de soins intensifs de .l'hOpital de C ., oÃ¹ il resta quelque temps . Par la suite, un autre incident cardiaque le ramena Ã l'hÃ´pital . Vu son Ã©tat de santÃ©, il ne fut pas en mesure de s'occuper de son dossier entre dÃ©cembre 1974 et mars 1975 . II avait -toutefois .communiquÃ© tous renseignements nÃ©cessaires Ã ses solicitors et -les .avaitchargÃ©s d'interroger des tÃ©moins et de rassembler les Ã©lÃ©mentsde preuve 8 .,sa dÃ©charge . 6 . En raison de la maladie du requÃ©rant, l'affairefutajournÃ©e Ã plusieurs reprises . Le requÃ©rant a prÃ©tendu que le parquet n'Ã©tait nullement dÃ©sireu x
d'entamer le procÃ©s en mars 1975 car il n'Ã©tait pas encore prÃªt, bien qu'ayant prÃ©parÃ© l'affaire depuis trois ans dÃ©jA et interrogÃ© une centaine de personnes . 7 . En avril 1975, le requÃ©rant rendit visite Ã ses solicitors en constata qu'ils n'avaient pratiquement rien fait sur l'affaire et n'avaient pas exÃ©cutÃ© ses instructions . Le procÃ©s Ã©tait fixÃ© au 12 mai 1975 . DÃ©Ã§u de ses solicitors, le requÃ©rant consulta un nouveau solicitor Ã la fin d'avril 1975 . Celui-ci Ã©tait disposÃ© Ã accepter le dossier mais indiqua qu'il lui Ã©tait tout Ã fait impossible de prÃ©parer convenablement en trois semaines une affaire aussi vaste et complexe . 8 . Le 5 mai 1975, le requÃ©rant sollicita le renvoi de l'affaire . Le parquet s'y opposa au motif que le retard Ã©tait entiÃ©rement imputable au requÃ©rant . Le procÃ¨s fut ajournÃ© Ã sept jours et devait donc commencer le 19 mai 1975 . Le requÃ©rant avait sollicitÃ© un ajournement de trois mois . Ne pouvant accepter la dÃ©cision du tribunal, le requÃ©rant, demanda l e .9
8 mai Ã la Crown Court de G . un nouvel ajournement . Le juge ajourna l'affaire au 15 septembre 1975, en spÃ©cifiant expressÃ©ment que la Cour n'accueillerait aucune nouvelle demande d'ajournement . Selon le requÃ©rant, le juge Â« indiqua qu'il reconnaissait que justice ne saurait Ptre faite et ne saurait passer pour faite si le procÃ©s s'ouvrait d'ici onze jours Â» . Au vu d'attestations certifiÃ©es, le parquet reconnut, lui aussi, que le retard n'Ã©tait pas imputable Ã la faute ou Ã la nÃ©gligence du requÃ©rant . 10 . Selon le requÃ©rant, ses solicitors et lui Â« travaillÃ©rent dur Â» Ã prÃ©parer l'affaire pour le procÃ©s qui devait avoir lieu en septembre . Les solicitors notamment interrogÃ©rent des tÃ©moins dans tout le pays et rassemblÃ©rent des milliers de piÃ©ces . A la mi-aoÃ»t, la dÃ©fense Ã©tait pratiquement prÃªte au procÃ©s . 11 . Depuis fÃ©vrier 1974, le requÃ©rant savait qu'une sociÃ©tÃ© appelÃ©e la SociÃ©tÃ© A . Ltd Ã©tait l'objet d'une enquÃªte de la part d'agents du MinistÃ©re du commerce et de l'industrie et qu'il Ã©tait possible que des accusations soient portÃ©es contre diverses personnes dont lui-mÃªme . Le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ©, pendant un certain temps, employÃ© par cette sociÃ©tÃ© . Vers la fin d'aoÃ»t 1975, l'accusation apprit que le Chef du parquet (Director of Public Prosecutions) avait l'intention de solliciter, au dÃ©but de septembre 1975, la dÃ©livrance d'un mandat d'arrÃªt en raison d'accusations de caractÃ¨re plus grave portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant Ã propos de la sociÃ©tÃ© A . Ltd 1Â« Les accusations A . Â») . En consÃ©quence, l'accusation informa la dÃ©fense qu'elle se proposait de demander Ã la Crown Court, le 15 septembre 1975, d'ajourner l'affaire sine die .
Le 15 septembre 1975, l'avocat de l'accusation sollicita de la Crown Court de G . un ajournement sine die . Il indiqua que si le requÃ©rant Ã©tait condamnÃ© du chef des dÃ©lits plus graves dont il Ã©tait sur le point d'Ãªtr e - 137-
accusÃ© par le chef du parquet Ic'est-Ã -dire les accusations A . . .1, on lui demanderait s'il serait disposÃ© Ã voir prises en considÃ©ration les accusations de faillite . L'avocat de l'accusation indiqua Ã©galement que si le requÃ©rant Ã©tait acquittÃ© sur le chef des accusations A . . ., l'accusation poursuivrait les accusations de faillite ; enfin, que si la Crown Court de G . n'Ã©tait pas disposÃ©e Ã accorder l'ajournement sine die comme il le lui demandait, l'accusation Ã©tait prÃªte Ã faire inscrire immÃ©diatement au rÃ´le les accusations de faillite . La dÃ©fense Ã©tait totalement opposÃ©e Ã cette requÃªte . Elle informa le juge qu'une dizaine d'accusations nouvelles Ã©taient portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant qui se trouvait parmi trois personnes inculpÃ©es de plusieurs sÃ©ries d'infractions . Elle fit valoir en outre que ces nouvelles accusations ne pourraient pas Ãªtre entendues en mÃ©me temps que celles concernant la faillite Â« Ã©tant donnÃ© qu'elles Ã©taient totalement diffÃ©rentes de par leur nature, l'Ã©poque et pratiquement tout Â» . L'avocat indiqua Ã©galement que, vu la complexitÃ© et la gravitÃ© des nouvelles accusations, il Ã©tait hautement improbable qu'elles puissent Ã¨tre jugÃ©es dans les douze mois Ã venir, d'autant que la procÃ©dure de mise en accusation ne serait pas terminÃ©e avant fÃ©vrier ou mars 1976 . II Ã©tait par consÃ©quent trÃ©s probable qu'il ne serait pas statuÃ© sur les nouvelles accusations avant la fin de 1976 . Si le requÃ©rant Ã©tait acquittÃ©, les quatre accusations de faillite seraieni examinÃ©es sÃ©parÃ©ment et l'intÃ©ressÃ© serait traduit en justice au milieu de 1977
Le 15 septembre 1975, le juge ordonna l'ajournement sine die du procÃ©s concernant les accusations de faillite . 12 . Le 16 septembre 1975, le requÃ©rant sollicita l'Attorney General d'intervenir dans la procÃ©dure par une dÃ©cision de non-poursuite Inolle prosequi) . Une telle dÃ©cision empÃ¨cherait dÃ©finitivement que le procÃ©s ait lieu . Par lettre du 6 octobre 1975, l'Attorney General informa le requÃ©rant qu'une dÃ©cision de non-poursuite n'Ã©tait pas indiquÃ©e en l'espÃ¨ce . Il dÃ©clara toutefois reconnaitre pleinement la nÃ©cessitÃ© de diligenter l'affaire et qu'9 cet effet, il ne perdrait pas l'affaire de vue . 13 . Le 17 septembre 1975, la StÃ© A . . . porta plainte contre le requÃ©rant . En juin 1976, celui-ci fut alors mis en accusation dans l'affaire A . . ., les accusations portant sur un chef de commerce frauduleux (infraction Ã l'article 332, paragraphe 3 de la loi de 1948 sur les sociÃ©tÃ©sl, quatre chefs de vols (infraction Ã l'article premier de la loi de 1968 sur le vol), un chef de participation Ã la gestion de la SociÃ©tÃ© A . Ltd alors qu'il Ã©tait failli non rÃ©habilitÃ© (infraction Ã l'article 187 de la loi de 1948 sur les sociÃ©tÃ©s) et un chef d'association de malfaiteurs en vue de commettre des vols .
Le 31 janvier 1977, le procÃ©s concernant les accusations A . fut fixÃ© au 25 avril 1977 devant la Crown Court de B ., l'affaire ayant Ã© tÃ© retirÃ©e Ã celle de G . - 138 -
14 . Le 27 septembre 1976, les accusations nommÃ©es Â« accusations R . Â» furent portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant qui, en dÃ©cembre de la mÃªme annÃ©e, fut traduit en jugement dans cette affaire, comportant sept chefs d'accusation : celui de s'Ãªtre procurÃ© de l'argent par tromperie (infraction Ã l'article 15 de la loi de 1968 sur le vol), celui d'avoir conspirÃ© pour se procurer de l'argent par tromperie, cinq chefs de vol, une autre pour avoir participÃ© Ã la gestion de la sociÃ©tÃ© R . Ltd alors qu'il Ã©tait failli non rÃ©habilitÃ© et enfin l'accusation d'avoir participÃ© Ã la gestion de la sociÃ©tÃ© F . (International) alors qu'il Ã©tait failli non rÃ©habilitÃ©, entre le 19 septembre 1973 et le 19 juin 1976 . Le 31 janvier 1977, le procÃ©s sur les accusations R . fut ajournÃ© . 15 . Le grief essentiel du requÃ©rant Ã©tait, qu'Ã cause de l'ajournement sine die du procÃ©s sur les accusations de faillite, il ne serait pas statuÃ© sur ces accusations dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, comme le prescrit l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . 16 . Dans sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte, en date du 5 juillet 1977, la Commission n'a pas tranchÃ© la question de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et a examinÃ© l'affaire sous l'angle de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Elle considÃ©ra notamment que la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration aux fins de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, courait Ã partir du 29 juillet 1974, date Ã laquelle les premiÃ¨res accusations de faillite avaient Ã©tÃ© portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant . De l'avis de la Commission, il existait un lien Ã©vident entre les accusations portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant le 29 juillet 1974 et les accusations A . et R ., du moins pour autant qu'elles concernaient toutes les infractions que le requÃ©rant aurait commises en participant Ã la gestion de diffÃ©rentes sociÃ©tÃ©s alors qu'il Ã©tait failli non rÃ©habilitÃ© . Il ne fallait donc pas considÃ©rer les diffÃ©rents groupes d'accusations sÃ©parÃ©ment mais plutÃ´t comme un ensemble de procÃ©dures connexes . De l'avis de la Commission, il Ã©tait donc Ã la fois comprÃ©hensible et raisonnable que la premiÃ©re affaire de faillite, qui d'ailleurs avait Ã©tÃ© initialement retardÃ©e du fait des solicitors du requÃ©rant, ait Ã©tÃ© suspendue sine die en attendant l'issue des procÃ¨s A . et R . La Commission relevait en outre que le requÃ©rant avait la possibilitÃ© de faire prendre en considÃ©ration les quatre accusations de faillite s'il Ã©tait condamnÃ© sur les accusations plus graves . Dans ces circonstances, la Commission en conclut que, malgrÃ© les trois ans Ã©coulÃ©s depuis le dÃ©p6t des autre premiÃ©res accusations de faillite sans qu'il ait Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© par un jugement d'acquittement ou de condamnation, il ne semblait pas y avoir eu violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, en raison de l'ajournement des quatre accusations de faillite ou de quelque autre irrÃ©gularitÃ© commise par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires dans leur examen de l'affaire . La requÃªte a donc Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable .
II . La prÃ©sente requdt e 17 . Le requÃ©rant fait valoir Ã prÃ©sent que si sa nouvelle requÃªte porte sur la mÃ©me affaire que la premiÃ©re, elle traite cependant de faits et de dÃ©velÃ´ppements nouveaux survenus aprÃ©s l'examen de la premiÃ©re requÃªte . La diffÃ©rence provient Ã son avis du fait que certains Ã©vÃ©nements annoncÃ©s par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni dans ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la premiÃ¨re requÃªte n'ont pas eu lieu comme promis . Les faits nouveaux, tels qu'ils ressortent des observations du requÃ©rant , peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : 18 . Le 25 avril 1977 s'ouvrit devant la Crown Court de B . le procÃ©s dans l'affaire A ., qui se termina le 27 juillet 1977 . Le requÃ©rant succomba sur quatre chefs d'accusation et fut condamnÃ© Ã quatre ans de prison . Une ordonnance pÃ©nale de faillite fut Ã©galement prononcÃ©e contre lui . Toutefois, Ã l'issue du procÃ¨s A ., le parquet ne demanda pas au requÃ©rant s'il dÃ©sirait que les accusations de faillite soient alors prises en considÃ©ration . Le requÃ©rant rappelle Ã cet Ã©gard, que dans ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la premiÃ¨re requÃªte, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni avait dÃ©clarÃ© que le chef du parquet se proposait de demander au requÃ©rant, Ã l'issue du procÃ©s A ., s'il serait disposÃ© Ã voir les accusations de faillite prises en considÃ©ration . Le requÃ©rant estime que la dÃ©claration ainsi faite par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur montre qu'il avait l'intention d'induire la Commission en erreur puisque le parquet ne lui a jamais posÃ© la question . 19 . Le 26 juillet 1978, eut lieu le procÃ¨s sur l'appel interjetÃ© par le parquet devant la chambre criminelle de la Cour d'appel de Londres dans l'affaire A . Le requÃ©rant y Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© par un avocat principal et un avocat adjoint . La Cour d'appel admit que des irrÃ©gularitÃ©s matÃ©rielles avaient eu lieu lors du procÃ©s et cassa la condamnation sur trois des quatre chefs d'accusation . Toutefois, la Cour appliqua la clause spÃ©ciale' en ce qui concerne l'accusalion de gestion de sociÃ©tÃ© par un failli et maintint la condamnation et une peine de 18 mois de prison . La Cour annula Ã©galement l'ordonnance de faillite . Le requÃ©rant fut libÃ©rÃ© la semaine suivante . Il dÃ©clare qu'il a l'intention de contester la validitÃ© de l'application de la clause spÃ©ciale par la Cour d'appel . 20 . Le 24 octobre 1977 eut lieu le procÃ©s concernant l'affaire R . Les accusations relatives Ã la faillite n'avaient pas alors Ã©tÃ© jointes, dans l'acte d'accusation, aux accusations R ., de sorte que la Cour n'en Ã©tait pas saisie . Toutefois, le mÃªme jour et sans que les avocats du requÃ©rant en aient Ã©tÃ© avisÃ©s, l'avocat de l'accusation fit valoir les accusations F . et le requÃ©rant se - II s'agit d'une ciause permettant Ã la iuridiction d'apoel de maintenir la condamnation nonobstant une irrÃ©gularitÃ© formelle en premiÃ©re instance . si l'ensemble des circonstances montre que rintÃ©ressÃ© a nÃ©anmoins bÃ©nÃ©llciÃ© d'un orocÃ©s Aqutlable (Note du traducteur )
trouva Ã nouveau traduit sur ces chefs d'accusation, pour lesquels il plaida Â« non coupable Â» . L'accusation demanda immÃ©diatement que ces accusations soient Â« laissÃ©es au dossier Â» et qu'il ne soit pas procÃ©dÃ© sur elles sans l'autorisation du tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance ou de la Cour d'appel . L'avocat de l'accusation fit savoir qu'il n'avait pas l'intention de poursuivre ces accusations . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue qu'il s'est trouvÃ©, de ce fait, privÃ© de son droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable, comme cela s'Ã©tait dÃ©jÃ produit en septembre 1975 lorsque l'affaire fut ajournÃ©e sine die . 20 bis . Le 19 dÃ©cembre 1977, le requÃ©rant comparut devant un juge de la Crown Court de B . et demanda que sa dÃ©claration de plaider coupable dans l'affaire R . soit dÃ©clarÃ©e nulle et non avenue et remplacÃ©e par une dÃ©claration de plaider non coupable . Il expliqua que sa premiÃ¨re dÃ©claration avait Ã©tÃ© faite pour des raisons purement techniques . 21 . Le requÃ©rant expose en outre que, le 3 mai 1978, il fut entendu par deux enquÃªteurs venant l'un du MinistÃ©re du Commerce et de l'Industrie, l'autre de l'Office des faillites . Selon le requÃ©rant, cet entretien avait pour but d'obtenir de lui des renseignements sur ses affaires, ses activitÃ©s, etc . . . Le solicitor du requÃ©rant et un gardien de la prison y assistaient . L'un des enquÃªteurs lui demanda alors s'il accepterait de coopÃ©rer avec l'Office des faillites si celui-ci retirait ses accusations de banqueroute . Le requÃ©rant refusa de discuter de ce qu'il considÃ©rait comme des avances contraires Ã la loi et une tentative de fausser le cours de la justice et il pria ses solicitors de rapporter ces faits au Chef du parquet . 22 . Le 15 mai 1978, le requÃ©rant, se fondant sur la loi de 1973 relative aux frais de justice en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale ICosts in Criminal Cases Act), demanda Ã un juge de la Crown Court de B . de rendre une ordonnance lui allouant le paiement de ses dÃ©pens dans l'affaire F . L'avocat du MinistÃ¨re du Commerce et de l'Industrie s'y opposa en arguant du fait que ces accusations n'avaient pas Ã©tÃ© abandonnÃ©es, quand bien mÃ©me la Couronne n'avait pas l'intention de les faire valoir, au moins sans que le requÃ©rant en ait Ã©tÃ© prÃ©alablement avisÃ© . AprÃ©s avoir entendu les deux parties, le juge rejeta la demande d'allocation des dÃ©pens, en indiquant qu'une telle demande n'Ã©tait pas fondÃ©e malgrÃ© l'article 12, paragraphe 5 de la loi de 1973, qui stipule que Â« lorsqu'une personne mise en accusation n'est finalement pas jugÃ©e, la Crown Court pourra aux termes de cette loi, ordonner le paiement des dÃ©pens comme si l'accusÃ© avait Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© et acquittÃ© rr . 23 . Le 13 octobre 1978, le requÃ©rant demanda Ã la Crown Court de B . d'ordonner ou que le tribunal n'entende pas les accusations initiales dans l'affaire F . ou qu'un verdict d'acquittement soit prononcÃ© Ã leur propos . En outre, il sollicita une dÃ©cision d'acquittement Ã propos des deux accusations de vol dans l'affaire A . que le tribunal avait ordonnÃ© de Â« laisser au dossier Â» . - 141 -
Avec l'accord du parquet, le juge ordonna qu'un verdict d'acquittement soit inscrit quant aux accusations A . Ce verdict fui officiellement rendu le 18 octobre 1978 . Quant aux accusations F ., le juge dÃ©clara ne pas pouvoir prendre de dÃ©cision Ã©tant donnÃ© que, dans son procÃ©s pendant dans l'affaire R ., le requÃ©rant pourrait tirer parti d'un acquittement Ã©ventuel . Selon le requÃ©rant toutefois, le juge dÃ©clara notamment que l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait droit Ã ce que l'affaire soit tranchÃ©e mais il s'agissait de savoir Ã quel moment . II aurait Ã©galement dÃ©clarÃ© que, vu la situation, il Ã©tait peu probable qu'il soit jamais procÃ©dÃ© sur ces accusations mais que lui-mÃªme n'Ã©tait toutefois pas disposÃ© Ã ordonner l'inscription d'un verdict d'acquittemen t
GRIEFS 24 . Le requÃ©rant fait valoir que, tout au long de l'affaire, il a insistÃ© sur son dÃ©sir d'exercer le droit fondamental que lui reconnaÃ®t l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention pour qu'il soit tranchÃ©, dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable et par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impanial, sur les premiÃ©res accusations de faillite portÃ©es contre lui . Ces accusations datent de juillet 1974, mais concernent des Ã©vÃ©nements survenus en 1971 et 1972 . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clare pouvoir y rÃ©pondre de maniÃ¨re totale et dÃ©finitive de faÃ§on Ã prouver son innocence . Il estime mÃ¨me que s'il avait Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© sur les accusations de faillite, il aurait Ã©tÃ© beaucoup plus difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible, au parquet de lancer ultÃ©rieurement des accusations concernant les affaires A . et R . Le requÃ©rant affirme au surplus que la dÃ©cision sollicitÃ©e et obtenue par le parquet le 24 octobre 1977 indique que, depuis la mi-1975 environ, il n'avait ni n'avait eu l'intention de faire statuer sur ces accusations lors d'un procÃ©s Ã©quitable Ce dÃ©ni de justice constitue, soutient le requÃ©rant, une violation grossiÃ©re du droit que lui reconnaÃ®t l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant considÃ©re en outre que l'offre faite par l'enquÃªteur de l'Office des faillites comme une tentative d'entraver le cours de la justice . Elle montrerait Ã©galement que le MinistÃ©re du Commerce et de l'Industrie, qui fut 9 l'origine des accusations de faillite, est maintenant disposÃ© Ã tenter de les utiliser comme un Ã©lÃ©ment de nÃ©gociation pour s'Ã©viter des embarras . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clare que la menace de ces accusations de faillite suspendue depuis si longtemps au-dessus de sa tÃªte lui cause une grande angoisse, nuisible Ã sa santÃ© et Ã sa vie familiale . Il invoque les articles 5, paragraphe 3, et 6 de la Convention et se rÃ©serve le droit de formuler ultÃ©rieurement de nouveaux griefs Ã propos des procÃ©s dans les affaires A . et R .
EN DROI T 52 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'il ne sera pas statuÃ© sur les accusations de faillite portÃ©es contre lui le 29 juillet 1974 dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable et par un tribunal comme le prescrit l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . II allÃ©gue Ã©galement une violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention .
Article 27, paragraphe 1 (b) de la Conventio n 53 . La Commission rappelle tout d'abord que le requÃ©rant avait dÃ©jÃ , sur le mr'me sujet, introduit une prÃ©cÃ©dente requÃªte, enregistrÃ©e sous le numÃ©ro 7345/76 . Le 5 juillet 1977, la Commission a rejetÃ© cette requÃªte comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e au regard de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . 54 . La premiÃ¨re question Ã examiner est donc celle de savoir si la prÃ©sente requÃªte Â« est essentiellement la mÃªme qu'une requÃ©te prÃ©cÃ©demment examinÃ©e par la Commission Â», au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 1 (b) . Toutefois, au vu des faits nouveaux prÃ©sentÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, la Commission estime que tel n'est pas le cas . L'Ã©lÃ©ment particuliÃ¨rement dÃ©cisif Ã cet Ã©gard est la durÃ©e de la pÃ©riode pendant laquelle la menace des accusations F . a pesÃ© sur le requÃ©rant . Comme on le remarquera ci-aprÃ©s, la pÃ©riode Ã examiner en l'espÃ©ce au titre de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention atteint Ã prÃ©sent 4 ans et 8 mois et non plus 3 ans, comme lorsque la Commission a rendu sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la premiÃ©re requÃªte . Selon la Commission, le facteur temps constitue en lui-mÃªme un fait nouveau, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 1(b ) , et il ne lui apparaÃ®t donc pas nÃ©cessaire B cet Ã©gard d'approfondir l'allÃ©gation du requÃ©rant selon laquelle il n'aurait pas eu l'occasion de faire examiner ses accusations de faillite Ã l'issue de son procÃ©s dans l'affaire A . 55 . Par ces motifs, la Commission estime que la prÃ©sente requÃ©te ne saurait Ãªtre rejetÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 1(b ) , comme Ã©tant essentiellement la mÃªme que la requÃªte NÂ° 7545/76 .
Article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Conventio . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend qu'il y a eu enn56 l'espÃ©ce mÃ©connaissance totale de l'article 5, paragraphe 3, en raison du refus persistant du parquet de faire trancher les accusations de faillite . L'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention stipule : Â« Toute personne arrÃ©tÃ©e ou dÃ©tenue, dans les conditions prÃ©vues au paragraphe 1(c) du prÃ©sent article doit Ãªtre aussitÃ´t traduite devant un juge ou un autre magistrat habilitÃ© par la loi Ã exercer des fonctions judiciai(es et a le droit d'Ãªtre jugÃ©e dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, ou libÃ©rÃ©e pendant la procÃ©dure . La mise en libertÃ© peut Ã©tre subordonnÃ©e Ã une garantie assurant la comparution de l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã l'audience . Â»
57 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a fait valoir dans ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© que ce grief est manifestement mal fondÃ©, puisque le requÃ©rant n'a jamais Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu Ã la suite des premiÃ¨res accusations de faillite . Le requÃ©rant rÃ©pond qu'il a bel et bien Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© de ce chef le 29 juillet 1974 et gardÃ© au commissariat de C . jusqu'Ã© sa libÃ©ration sous caution le mÃªme jour . Il affirme que cette partie de la requÃªte est donc recevable . La Commission fait observer que les informations fournies par le requÃ©rant quant Ã son arrestation se trouvent confirmÃ©es par la production par le Gouvernement d'une copie de la lettre du 3 avril 1979 adressÃ©e par la police de G . au solicitor du MinistÃ©re du Commerce, qui Ã©tait l'autoritÃ© de poursuite dans cette affaire . 58 . La Commission relÃ©ve que l'article 5 de la Convention ne concernant que les droits des dÃ©tenus, cette disposition cesse de s'appliquer aprÃ©s que l'intÃ©ressÃ© a Ã©tÃ© provisoirement mis en libertÃ© . Il apparaÃ®t donc clairement qu'en de telles circonstances l'Etat en cause ne serait pas tenu de traduire l'intÃ©ressÃ© en jugement dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable aux termes de l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . NÃ©anmoins, les poursuites pÃ©nales continueraient bien sÃ»r Ã relever de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . 59 . Comme le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arr@tÃ© et libÃ©rÃ© sous caution le mÃªme jour, le 29 juillet 1974, et qu'en outre il n'a jamais depuis lors Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu du chef des accusations F ., la Commission est d'avis que le grief qu'il tire de l'article 5, paragraphe 3, est clairement irrecevable, comme Ã©tant manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention .
Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Conventio n 60 . Le requÃ©rant fait valoir ensuite qu'il souhaite exercer le droit fondamental que lui garantit l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention pour qu'il soit statuÃ© sur les accusations F . dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . Il affirme que la dÃ©cision obtenue par le parquet le 24 octobre 1977 indique que depuis la mi-1975 environ il n'a ni n'avait eu l'intention de faire examiner ces accusations dans un procÃ©s Ã©quitable . Le requÃ©rant estime que ce dÃ©ni de justice Ã©quivaut Ã une violation grossiÃ¨re des droits de l'homme que lui garantit l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . L'article 6, paragraphe 1, stipule que Â« toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial, . . . qui dÃ©cidera . . . du bienfondÃ© de toute accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle Â» . 61 . Evoquant la dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la premiÃ©re requÃªte dÃ©posÃ©e par le requÃ©rant sous le NÂ° 7345/76, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur aftirme en revanche qu'il est comprÃ©hensible et raisonnable qu'il n'ait pas Ã©tÃ© donnÃ© suite aux accusations de faillite alors que les procÃ©s A . et R . Ã©taient en cours . -144-
62 . La Commission rappelle que l'a rt icle 6, paragraphe1, a plus prÃ©cisÃ©ment pour objet Â« en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale, d'obtenir que .les accusÃ©s ne demeurent pas pendant un temps trop long sous le coup d'une accusation et qu'il soit dÃ©cidÃ© de son bien-fondÃ© Â» (cf . Cour eur . DH, affaire Wemhoff, arrÃªt du 27 juin 1968, sÃ©rie A, p . 26, paragraphe 18) . Autrement dit, l'a rt icle 6, paragraphe 1, Â« vise Ã Ã©viter qu'une personne incÃ»lpÃ©e ne demeure trop longtemps dans l'ince rt itude de son so rt Â» . ICour eur . DH, affaire St6gmÃ¼ller, arrÃªt du 10 novembre 1969, SÃ©rie A, p . 40) . . 63 . Les questions qui se posent en l'espÃ©ce sont donc~ ' premiÃ©rement de savoir si l'on peut considÃ©rer que le requÃ©rant a le droit absolu de faire statuer sur les accusations F . par un verdict de culpabilitÃ© ou d'acquittement et deuxiÃ¨mement si quelque indice montre que le droit du requÃ©rant de faire statuer sur ces accusations Â« dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable Â» a Ã©tÃ© violÃ© . 64 . La Commission souligne que, selon l'avis exprimÃ©par la Cour eur . des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Neumeister, la pÃ©ridde visÃ©e par l'a rt icle 6, paragraphe 1, Â« commence le jour oÃ¹ une personne se trouve accusÃ©e . . . ce terme Ã© tant compris au sens de la Convention .Â» (arrÃªt du 27 juin 1968, sÃ©rie A, p . 41) . Aux fins de dÃ©terminer le momentâ¢prÃ©cis dans .le temps oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme ayant Ã© tÃ© accusÃ©, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, la Commission a Ã©galement jugÃ© nÃ©cessaire d'adopter une attitude de souplesse en indiquant que Â«ce moment est celui oÃ¹ les soupÃ§ons dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã©tait l'objet ont eu des rÃ©percussions impo rtantes sur sa situation Â» . (cf . Cour eur . DH, sÃ©rie B, affaire Neumeister, p . 81) . Dans sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la premiÃ©re'requ@te du prÃ©sent requÃ©rant, la Commission a estimÃ© que la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration commenÃ§ait Ã courir Ã partir du 29 juillet 1974, date Ã laquelle les quatre accusations de faillite ont Ã©tÃ© portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant . La Commission estime que c'est la mÃªme date qu'il faut considÃ©rer comme point de dÃ©pa rt de la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration en l'espÃ©ce, Ã©tant donnÃ© qu'aucun tait nouveau ne justifierait Ã cet Ã©gard le choix d'une date diffÃ©rente . 65. Quant au moment oÃ¹ la pÃ©riode prend fin au regard de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, la Commission a prÃ©cÃ©demment dÃ©clarÃ© que Â« le principe gÃ©nÃ©ral applicable Ã la dÃ©termination du dÃ©but de la pÃ©riode vaut Ã©galement pour la fin de celle-ci, en ce sens que la pÃ©riode en question dure jusqu'Ã© ce que la situation de l'intÃ©ressÃ© cesse d'Ãªtre affectÃ©e par le fait qu'il se trouve sous le coup d'accusations pendantes contre lui Â» . (Huber c/Autriche, DÃ©cisions et rapports 2, p . 30 Ã p . 40) . C'est normalement le cas lorsqu'il est statuÃ© sur les accusations pÃ©nales par un acquittement ou par une condamnation - en premiÃ©re instance ou en appel - par un tribunal qui se prononce sur le bien-fondÃ© de l'accusation . La Commission se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã cet Ã©gard d'une pa rt aux arrÃ©ts rendus par la Cour des Droits de l'Homme et ,
d'autre part, Ã sa propre jurisprudence Icf . par ex . les affaires Wemhoff, Neumeister et Ringeisen et Huber c/Autriche, op . cit .) . Toutefois, le mÃªme rÃ©sultat peut Ãªtre atteint lorsque les procÃ©dures pÃ©nales intentÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant se sont terminÃ©es autrement, par exemple par leur abandon (cf . Huber c/Autriche, op . cit .l . 66 . Dans la prÃ©sente affaire, le parquet a dÃ©cidÃ©, le 29 mars 1979, de ne pas traduire l'intÃ©ressÃ© en justice sur les trois chefs restant sur l'acte d'accusation dans l'affaire F ., Ã la condition toutefois que ces accusations demeurent au dossier et aprÃ©s que la mention de condamnation antÃ©rieure (autrefois convictl ait Ã©tÃ© portÃ©e au regard du deuxiÃ©me chef d'accusation . Le requÃ©rant semble estimer toutefois qu'indÃ©pendamment de l'intention du parquet de poursuivre ou de ne pas poursuivre jusqu'Ã un procÃ©s sur ces accusations, il jouit, en vertu de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, du droit absolu Ã ce qu'il soit mis fin, par un verdict de culpabilitÃ© ou d'acquittement, aux accusation figurant dans l'acte d'accusation . 67 . Toutefois, la Commission a antÃ©rieurement reconnu que l'article 6, paragraphe 1, ne donne pas Ã l'accusÃ© un droit d'accÃ¨s aux tribunaux pour qu'il soit statuÃ© au moment de son choix sur une accusation pÃ©nale portÃ©e contre lui (cf . requÃªte NÂ° 8046/77 X c/Royaume-Uni, dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© du 8 mars 1979) . La Commission estime en outre que l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention ne saurait Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ© comme interdisant au parquet de mettre fin formellement aux poursuites pÃ©nales ou d'abandonner purement et simplement des accusations . C'est lÃ en rÃ©alitÃ© pratique courante dans les Etats membres . C'est lorsque le ministÃ©re public a l'intention de poursuivre l'accusation devant un tribunal qu'il est tenu de le faire dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . Tel est le but de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . 68 . La Commission est d'avis qu'en ce qui concerne la prÃ©sente affaire, la dÃ©cision du parquet prise le 29 mars 1979 de ne pas traduire le requÃ©rant en justice sur les trois chefs d'accusation restant dans l'affaire F doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme Ã©quivalant Ã un abandon effectif de ces accusations . En consÃ©quence, le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement cessÃ© d'Ãªtre affectÃ© par les accusations en question . Aussi bien, Ã partir de cette date, il n'existe plus, en rÃ©alitÃ©, d'accusations portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant qui exigent une dÃ©cision, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . A l'appui de cette conclusion, la Commission rappelle qu'el e a eu Ã trancher un problÃ©me analogue dans la requÃªte NÂ° 3034/67 R . et A . Fletcher c/Royaume-Uni, Recueil de dÃ©cisions 25, p . 76) . Les requÃ©rants se plaignaient Ã la Commission de n'avoir pas Ã©tÃ© jugÃ©s dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable du chef d'incendie volontaire, qui fut laissÃ© au dossier Ã l'issue du procÃ¨s oÃ¹ ils avaient Ã©tÃ© reconnus coupables de meurtre . Dans sa dÃ©cision, la Commission dÃ©clara qu'il ne faisait pour elle aucun doute que c'Ã©tait une pratique Ã©tablie en droit anglais qu'une deuxiÃ©me accusation laissÃ©e au dossier ne serait pa s
poursuivie tant que subsisterait l'accusation de meurire . La Commission a estimÃ© qu'il n'existait donc plus contre les requÃ©rants aucune accusation pÃ©nale exigeant une dÃ©cision et qu'il n'y avait donc pas violation de'l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . / En l'espÃ©ce, on peut se demander si le parquet n'avait pas dÃ©cidÃ©, auparavant dÃ©jA, de renoncer de traduire le requÃ©rant en justice dans l'affaire F . La Commission estime toutefois que cela ne ressort pas clairement des faits tels qu'ils lui ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties . A la lumiÃ©re des considÃ©rations qui prÃ©cÃ©dent, la Commission estim e que la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration en l'espÃ©ce, au regard de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, s'Ã©tend du 29 juillet 1974 au 29 mars 1979, soit au total sur 4 ans et 8 mois . 69 . II reste Ã examiner si cette pÃ©riode a dÃ©passÃ© les limites du dÃ©lai raisonnable au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . 70 . En examinant la question, la Commission se rÃ©fÃ©re tout d'abord Ã sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la premiÃ©re requÃªte introduite par le requÃ©rant sous le NÂ° 7345/76 . Elle y dÃ©clarait notamment que, dans la situation qui prÃ©valait au 5 juillet 1977 et bien que prÃ©s de 3 ans se fussent Ã©coulÃ©s depuis que les accusations de faillite avaient Ã©tÃ© portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant, il n'y avait pas apparence de violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . La question se pose donc maintenant de savoir si quelque Ã©lÃ©ment montre que la pÃ©riode de 4 ans 8 mois pourrait avoir dÃ©passÃ© ce que l'on peut estimer comme raisonnable, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . 71 . La Commission rappelle que l'examen des quatre premiÃ©res accusations de faillite a Ã©tÃ© ajournÃ©e sine die le 15 septembre 1975 au motif que le parquet dÃ©sirait d'abord poursuivre le requÃ©rant sur des accusations plus graves . Le 17 septembre 1975 et le 27 septembre 1976, respectivement, les accusations A . et R . ont Ã©tÃ© portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant . Le procÃ©s dans l'affaire A . a dÃ©butÃ© le 25 avril 1977 et s'est terminÃ© le 27 juillet 1977 . Le procÃ¨s en appel a eu lieu le 26 juillet 1978 . Quant Ã l'affaire R ., le procÃ¨s a commencÃ© le 30 octobre 1978 puis a Ã©tÃ© interrompu, pour reprendre le 6 novembre 1978 . II a durÃ© jusqu'au 16 fÃ©vrier 1979 et l'appel est toujours pendant . Dans le premier cas, le requÃ©rant a succombÃ© sur les quatre chefs en premiÃ©re instance, mais la Cour d'appel a cassÃ© la condamnation sur trois des chefs d'accusation, en raison d'irrÃ©gularitÃ©s matÃ©rielles constatÃ©es dans le procÃ©s . Dans l'affaire R ., le requÃ©rant a, en premiÃ©re instance, succombÃ© sur sept des treize chefs d'accusation . â¢-
72 . La Commission doit donc Ã nouveau dÃ©cider si, dans les circonstances de l'espÃ©ce, il Ã©tait ou non conforme Ã une bonne administration de la justice de suspendre les accusations de faillite portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant en attendant l'issue judiciaire des autres accusations . - 147-
73 . Comme l'a dÃ©clarÃ© la Commission dans sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 7345/76, il semble tout d'abord y avoir un lien manifeste entre les accusations portÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant le 29 juillet 1974 et celles dont il a Ã©tÃ© l'objet le 27 septembre 1975 et le 27 septembre 1976, dans la mesure tout au moins oÃ¹ elles concernent toutes les allÃ©gations d'infractions que le requÃ©rant aurait commises dans la gestion de diffÃ©rentes sociÃ©tÃ©s, alors qu'il Ã©tait un failli non rÃ©habilitÃ© . La Commission estime qu'il Ã©tait en consÃ©quence Ã la fois comprÃ©hensible et raisonnable d'autoriser la suspension sine die de la premiÃ©re affaire de faillite en attendant l'issue de la procÃ©dure dans les affaires A . et R . La Commission relÃ©ve en outre que le requÃ©rant avait la possibilitÃ© de faire prendre en considÃ©ration les quatre accusation de faillitÃ© au cas oÃ¹ il serait reconnu coupable d'infractions plus graves . Il est exact que c'est seulement le 24 octobre 1977 que le requÃ©rant a eu l'occasion de faire prendre en considÃ©ration les accusations F ., en liaison avec la procÃ©dure dans l'affaire R . Toutefois, il a plaidÃ© non coupable et, sur demande du parquet, le tribunal a ordonnÃ© que ces accusations soient laissÃ©es au dossier . De l'avis de la Commission, cet aspect particulier de l'affaire est certes pertinent mais n'a pas une importance dÃ©cisive pour trancher en l'espÃ©ce la question qui se pose sur le terrain de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Elle estime en revanche que, pour les raisons dÃ©jÃ indiquÃ©es dans la prÃ©cÃ©dente affaire et rappelÃ©es au paragraphe prÃ©cÃ©dent, il est comprÃ©hensible et raisonnable qu'il n'ait pas Ã©tÃ© procÃ©dÃ© sur les accusations apparemment moins graves figurant dans l'acte d'accusation F . tant que les affaires A . et R . Ã©taient pendantes . La pÃ©riode pendant laquelle les accusations F . sont restÃ©es en sommeil peut paraPtre longue, mais ce dÃ©lai est pour beaucoup imputable Ã la complexitÃ© et Ã la gravitÃ© des affaires A . et R . Dans ces deux derniÃ©res affaires, la procÃ©dure en premiÃ¨re instance a durÃ© Ã elle seule respectivement trois mois et trois mois et demi . Vu l'ensemble des circonstances du cas d'espÃ©ce, la Commission estime que, malgrÃ© la suspension des accusations F . pendant 4 ans et 8 mois, il n'apparaÃ®t pas que cette pÃ©riode ait dÃ©passÃ© les limites de ce que l'on peut considÃ©rer comme Â« raisonnable Â», au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . 74 . II s'ensuit que le surplus de la requÃªte est, lui aussi, manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DECLARELA REOUETEIRRECEVABLE .
- 148 _Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 03/10/1979Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 5
 l'article 187
 l'article 155
 l'article 332
 l'article 187
 l'article 15
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 12
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 5
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
 l'article 27
 l'article 5
 L'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 6
 l'article 5
 l'article 27
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 L'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27