Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/96/221.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:12:27+00:00

Document:
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MAURICIO MONTANO et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Michael W. McIsaac and Michael J. Udovic, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendants and Appellants.
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Norman H. Sokolow and Roy C. Preminger, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendants Mauricio Montano and Joe Montez appeal from judgments and sentences imposed after they were each found guilty by the court of "attempted murder, in violation of section 664/187, Penal Code," as charged in count II of the information. Count II specified that on January 22, 1978, defendants "did willfully, and unlawfully and feloniously and with malice aforethought attempt to murder Jimmy Moreno, a human being." Count III of the information, based on the same incident, charged defendants with "assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder, in violation of Section 217, Penal Code." Both defendants were found not guilty of count III. fn. 1 Various armed, use of firearms, and great bodily injury allegations were either left undetermined or found to be untrue, except an armed allegation against defendant Montez; he was found to have been armed when the attempted murder was committed.
Defendant Montez was sentenced to prison for a term of seven years, comprising the middle term of six years provided in Penal Code section 664 at the time the offense was committed when "the crime attempted [was] one in which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death," plus one year because he was armed. Defendant Montano was sentenced to a total of five years, comprising the lower term for the attempted murder without any enhancements.
Meanwhile, defendants dropped Delgadillo off at the white Volkswagen where he rejoined the two women and left the area.
Moreno's injuries required his hospitalization for five months and left him paralyzed without sensation below the middle of his chest.
Both defendants and codefendant Delgadillo relied upon an alibi as their defense. They acknowledged their membership in Geraghty, which they characterized as a social club, and acknowledged that they all were "good friends."
Defendant Montano contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of attempted murder, (2) the sentence imposed upon him pursuant to Penal Code sections 664 and 187 constitutes unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment, and (3) his conviction should have been for assault with intent to commit murder.
Defendant Montez contends only that his crime, if any, was assault with intent to commit murder in violation of Penal Code section 217 and that he should be sentenced pursuant to that section.
The People controvert the contentions of both defendants.
Substantial evidence supports the conviction of defendant Montano of assault with intent to commit murder, a form of attempted murder. Both defendants, if guilty of any attempted murder, were guilty of this form of attempted murder, to wit, assault with intent to commit murder. Such being the case, their offense was punishable pursuant to Penal Code section 217, only.
 Montano challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to find him guilty of attempted murder or assault with intent to commit murder. He [96 Cal. App. 3d 226] concedes in his brief that substantial evidence supports a finding that he "knowingly aided or encouraged a battery on Moreno" and that he "expected some kind of injuries to result to Moreno." He contends, however, that he is not chargeable with the codefendant's "intent to kill which was unknown to appellant."
The real question before this court is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that Montano aided and abetted the attempt to murder Moreno. We are satisfied that there is. People v. Butts (1965) 236 Cal. App. 2d 817 [46 Cal. Rptr. 362], upon which Montano places great reliance, as "[t]he most similar case," involved different circumstances. The fighting in which both Butts and a codefendant were involved was simply common, drunken brawling. It was in that context that the court said (id, at p. 837): "The evidence shows Butts' awareness of participation in a fist fight, not a knife fight." The court recognized, however, that under other circumstances where "death was a 'reasonable and natural consequence'" (id, at p. 836), an aider and abettor to an assault may be guilty of murder and said (ibid): "It is not necessary that the primary actor expressly communicate his unlawful purpose, if that purpose is apparent from the circumstances and the secondary actor nevertheless assists in its accomplishment. (People v. Grischott, 107 Cal. App. 2d 631, 634 [237 P.2d 712].) An unarmed aider and abettor may be responsible in the same degree as the actual perpetrator. (People v. Perkins, 37 Cal. 2d 62, 64 [230 P.2d 353].)"
More nearly in point is People v. Martinez, supra, 239 Cal. App. 2d 161, where the court upheld a murder conviction on the basis that death was "'not an unreasonable result to be expected'" (id, at p. 178) from participation in a punitive response to a gang attack upon defendant's friend the week previous.
Inasmuch as the court found that the murder of Moreno which was attempted was first degree, for which the maximum punishment at that time was life imprisonment or death (Pen. Code, § 190), the term pursuant to section 664 was five, six or seven years, whereas the term specifically provided in Penal Code section 217 was at that time two, three or four years. Therefore, the specific punishment provided for by section 217 was substantially less than that prescribed by the combination of the general provision of Penal Code section 664 and the punishment specified in Penal Code section 190. A similar relationship between the [96 Cal. App. 3d 229] punishments provided pursuant to these sections has existed for some time and it has been the subject of judicial scrutiny in several decided cases.
"It was proper, under the facts of the case and under the pleadings, for the trial court to have found the defendant guilty of both the crimes of attempted murder and assault with intent to commit murder. Because the crimes were committed in the same course of criminal conduct, the defendant may be punished for the crime carrying the greater penalty but not for both such crimes. (People v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 2d 574, 586 [21 Cal. Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007].) The trial court, however, suspended the execution of the sentence pronounced for the crime of assault with intent to commit murder. This suspension of the sentence has avoided the double penalty proscribed by section 654 of the Penal Code. (In re Wright, 65 Cal. 2d 650, 655-656 [56 Cal. Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d 998], fn. 4; People v. Niles, 227 Cal. App. 2d 749, 755-756 [39 Cal. Rptr. 11]; People v. Cooper, 256 Cal. App. 2d 500, 502 [54 Cal. Rptr. 282].)"
People v. Johnson (1978) 81 Cal. App. 3d 380 [146 Cal. Rptr. 476], in a comparable fact situation, reached a contrary result. As in Meriweather, the defendant had been charged with and convicted both of attempted murder and of assault with intent to commit murder, but the trial court sentenced him for the term prescribed by law on each count, with the terms to run concurrently. Johnson pointed out that inasmuch as attempted murder is necessarily included within the offense of assault with intent to commit murder, he could not be found guilty of both. The court agreed, stating in this respect (id, at p. 387): "Where one offense is necessarily included in another, both double conviction (People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 597-598 [184 P.2d 512]) and double punishment are prohibited (People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175 [217 P.2d 1]; People v. Wilson, 50 Cal. App. 3d 811 [123 Cal.Rptr. 663]). An assault with intent to commit a crime necessarily embraces an attempt to commit said crime (People v. Rupp, 41 Cal. 2d 371, 382 [260 P.2d 1])."
The Johnson court thus reached the contrary conclusion to that reached in Meriweather and left in effect the lesser punishment of the including offense of assault with intent to commit murder, rather than the greater punishment of the necessarily included offense of attempted murder, on the ground that conviction of the including offense precludes conviction of the included offense. Insofar as Johnson points out Meriweather's failure to consider the prohibition against double conviction, it is a useful contribution to the solution of our problem. The basis, however, upon which it imposed the lesser punishment is not applicable in this case because defendants here were not convicted of the including offense of assault with intent to commit murder. Consequently, conviction of attempted murder is not precluded on that basis.
[2b] The conclusion is thus inescapable that assault with intent to commit murder is a form of attempted murder which is specifically punishable under Penal Code section 217. It, therefore, is not an attempt to commit a crime "where no provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempt," governed by Penal Code section 664.
There remain numerous other crimes for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death, the attempt to commit which may be punishable pursuant to section 664. For example, Penal Code section 37 imposes the punishment of death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole for treason; Penal Code section 209 provides for life imprisonment as punishment for kidnaping for ransom; and Penal Code section 128 imposes death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole for procuring the execution of an innocent person by perjury or by subornation of perjury. Also, attempted murders not involving assaults (see examples, supra) appear to be governed by Penal Code section 664. We express no opinion, however, as to the validity of the greater punishment imposed by section 664 for these attempts. Some of them, at least, where the attempt is thwarted before reaching the point of a direct assault, appear to involve less culpability than attempts which progress to the point of an assault with intent to commit murder. (See, e.g., People v. Parrish, supra, 87 Cal. App. 2d 853.) Any denial of equal protection or imposition of cruel and unusual punishment involved in such cases does not, however, give rise to a constitutional violation as against these defendants who are susceptible only to the lesser punishment. The disparity in this respect might, however, well be corrected by the Legislature with a uniform punishment for all attempted homicides of the same degree established.
The defendants must, therefore, both be resentenced by the trial court. In sentencing defendants pursuant to Penal Code section 217, the court [96 Cal. App. 3d 233] will be free to depart from the earlier choice of the lower and middle terms made for defendants Montano and Montez, respectively, under Penal Code section 664, subdivision 1, for an attempt at an offense punishable by life imprisonment, when choosing the term under section 217 which applies to all assaults with intent to commit murder of any degree.
The judgments of conviction of attempted murder of both defendants are affirmed. The case is remanded, however, for resentencing in accordance with the views above expressed.
Cobey, J., and Allport, J., concurred.
FN 1. Other counts either were dismissed or resulted in acquittal and are not pertinent to the issues raised on this appeal.
FN 3. See People v. Burden (1977) 72 Cal. App. 3d 603, 614-621 [140 Cal. Rptr. 282], where a defendant's failure to perform the legal duty of providing food for his helpless child was held to justify his conviction of second degree murder.
FN 4. See People v. Parrish (1948) 87 Cal. App. 2d 853, 856 [197 P.2d 804], where defendant was apprehended outside his intended victim's home where he had gone with a gun in preparation for killing her, before he had any opportunity to confront the victim.

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