Source: http://elawreview.org/articles/volume-48/resisting-deregulation-progressive-states-can-limit-impact-epas-deregulatory-efforts/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:22:18+00:00

Document:
It goes without saying, of course, that Congress could relax, or perhaps even eliminate, our federal environmental standards if it so chose. But this Essay deals with a different and more imminent threat: that of a United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that, in the current Administration, seems hell-bent on implementing an aggressive deregulatory agenda. At the 2018 Ronald Reagan Dinner, the Conservative Political Action Conference’s annual showcase, then-Administrator Scott Pruitt referred to EPA as an agency that has been “weaponized against certain sectors of the economy.” In response to that perception, in his relatively short time in office, Administrator Pruitt demonstrated his inclination to disarm the agency in significant ways. In July of 2018, the New York Times documented seventy-six environmental regulations that the Trump Administration had overturned or was in the process of rolling back. EPA was either solely or jointly responsible for at least twenty-three of them. In the following month, EPA issued a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” heralding its intent to water down fuel economy standards for new cars and light duty trucks. By all accounts, Acting Administrator Wheeler will pursue a similar agenda.
Thus far, the Trump-era EPA seems to have concentrated its efforts on withdrawing or narrowing initiatives that EPA advanced during the last two years of the Obama Administration. These include, for example, the “Clean Power Plan,” addressing climate change under the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA and the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ joint “Clean Water Rule” (sometimes known as the “WOTUS Rule,” for “waters of the United States”), which redefined the scope of the “navigable waters” protected under the CWA, and EPA’s recent effluent limitation guidelines for toxic discharges from steam electric power plants. This focus on recently-promulgated regulations makes sense, of course, given that in these contexts regulated entities faced significant capital costs, as opposed to just ongoing implementation measures.
More recently, however, EPA has begun to take action on initiatives designed to reduce compliance costs, even in situations in which regulated entities have already invested in the necessary equipment to meet the pre-existing standards. In January of 2018, for example, EPA withdrew the “once in, always in” policy under the CAA’s National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) program. Under EPA’s new interpretation, major emitters of toxic pollutants will now be able to use the very equipment they were required to install under that program—referred to as the “maximum achievable control technology” (MACT)—to avoid the very standards the equipment was designed to achieve and—if a given source has been complying—has been achieving. In effect, they will be able to use this equipment at less than full capacity, so long as their emissions stay below the threshold levels that required them to install that equipment in the first place.
This Essay will begin with a brief discussion of how antibacksliding requirements may limit EPA’s ability to relax regulatory requirements under both the CWA and the CAA. Next, I will provide a very basic overview of the most pertinent principles of “cooperative federalism,” as they apply in the pollution-control context. And that accomplished, I will then move to the major point of this piece: how states can blunt the force of any impending deregulatory efforts by maintaining their existing programs, if they so choose. In this regard, I will argue that in most contexts the states not only will be able to preserve their favored regulatory requirements, but that—if they do so—the relevant requirements will remain enforceable as a matter of federal law. As a practical matter, this would typically be through citizen suits, as, at least during the Trump Administration, EPA is probably quite unlikely to enforce state standards that are stricter than required as a matter of federal law.
Of course, some states no doubt will be eager to relax their standards accordingly. Other states, however, may resist any impending deregulatory thrust. It is noteworthy, for example, that New York has been leading a coalition of ten states in challenging the Trump Administration’s new rule seeking to put the Obama Administration’s 2015 WOTUS rule on ice until 2020. Similarly, Massachusetts led a coalition of twelve states in successfully challenging EPA’s refusal to even make a finding whether greenhouse gases posed an “endangerment” within the meaning of § 202 of the CAA.
The key operative principle of this Essay is that, as will be discussed further below, under the “cooperative federalism” framework embodied in most of our pollution control laws, the states are free in most contexts to establish or maintain standards that are either stricter or broader in scope than the relevant federal requirements. As such, those states that do not embrace the Trump Administration’s deregulatory agenda can effectively stymie that agenda within their borders. If the ten states that challenged the stay of the WOTUS rule were to band together to even passively resist any deregulatory efforts—by simply refusing to make any corresponding changes—they will be able to limit the damage in states that bear a disproportionate number of both our citizenry and our economic activity. Moreover, this form of resistance may serve to discourage EPA from pursuing these relaxations, if—as some theorize—regulated entities may sometimes value uniformity more than laxity. This latter prospect may especially be so, of course, if regulated entities perceive that the relevant relaxations may be short-lived.
As mentioned above, many states likely will be inclined to relax their pollution standards to track whatever deregulatory measures EPA may implement. Sadly, for the most part they will be able to do so. Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s preliminary expectation, there is no flat ban in any of our major pollution control statutes precluding either EPA from relaxing any of its regulatory requirements or the states from following suit.
Thus, if EPA were now to weaken any of its nationally-applicable effluent limitation guidelines, the states would be free to follow suit. This would involve a two-step process. First, the given state would have to submit its proposed program revision to EPA, incorporating the new, relaxed requirement as a matter of state law. And second, it would then need to revise the relevant permits for individual dischargers, incorporating the new treatment standards. The limit on any permissible backsliding would be that, on a case-by-case basis, the relevant discharges could not cause or contribute to the violation of any water quality standard.
In section 172(e), Congress specified that if EPA revises a NAAQS and makes it less stringent, EPA must promulgate regulations applicable to areas that have not yet attained the original NAAQS to require controls that are no less stringent than the controls that applied to areas designated nonattainment prior to such relaxation. We believe that, if Congress intended areas to remain subject to the same level of control where a NAAQS was relaxed, they also intended that such controls not be weakened where the NAAQS is made more stringent.
The D.C. Circuit deferred to this interpretation in South Coast Air Quality Management District v. EPA (South Coast), noting that “[c]onsidered as a whole, the Act reflects Congress’s intent that air quality should be improved until safe and never allowed to retreat thereafter.” The court further determined the new source review program constitutes a “control” within the meaning of § 172(e).
For our purposes, the most important implication of § 172(e), as understood through the lens of South Coast, is that whenever EPA revises an air quality standard, in whatever direction, all sources that were previously subject to new source review in the relevant area must remain subject to the same new source review requirements that applied to them before the relevant revision. This would mean, for example, that if the Trump EPA were to relax a primary standard, the major sources in what are currently nonattainment areas must continue to achieve the same “lowest achievable emission rate” requirements specified in their pre-existing new source review permits, even if an affected area is in attainment with the new standard.
Conceptually, the beauty of an overarching antibacksliding dynamic would be that it would ensure that our pollution-control requirements would move in only one direction, toward continued improvement. Or at worst, that they would at least stand still. In a perfect world these dynamics would hold, at least absent statutory change, regardless of the deregulatory tendencies of an EPA administrator or any of the relevant states. Unfortunately, though, only § 172(e) of the CAA appears to provide any real constraints, and even there it may only come into play if EPA revises an air quality standard. At the very least, though, perhaps these dynamics will dissuade EPA from attempting to relax any existing standards.
The Clean Water Act anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government . . . . To effectuate this partnership, the CWA authorizes [EPA] to issue pollution discharge permits, but provides that a State may administer its own permit system if it complies with detailed statutory and regulatory requirements.
In addition to being able to impose requirements that are at least as strict as the pertinent federal standards, the states must also establish certain enforcement authorities as a precondition to authorization. In this context, however, full equivalence is not required. Again, using the CWA as an example, under that statute states must have the authority to impose civil penalties in the amount of up to $5,000 per day for any and all violations.
The vast majority of states have taken up the invitation to administer the relevant federal programs. Under the CWA, for example, forty-seven of the fifty states are authorized to administer most elements of the NPDES program.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has recognized these dynamics on multiple occasions. In the CWA context, for example, the Supreme Court noted in EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board (EPA v. California) that “[Section 510] provides that the States may set more restrictive standards, limitations, and requirements than those imposed under [the CWA].” Likewise, in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, the Court noted that “§ 510 allows States to adopt more demanding pollution-control standards than those established under the Act.” Addressing the parallel provision of the CAA, the Court in Union Electric Co. v. EPA determined that “Section 116 of the Clean Air Act . . . provides that the States may adopt emission standards stricter than the national standards.” Finally, under RCRA, in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court agreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court that the relevant state restriction, which had no basis under RCRA, was not preempted by RCRA.
Thus, it is well-established that, except where otherwise specifically provided, the states can maintain existing requirements—or even strengthen or expand them—even in the face of any deregulatory measures the Trump EPA may undertake. Moreover, the states will remain fully capable of enforcing their regulatory programs as a matter of state law. As mentioned, they have long been required, as a precondition to becoming authorized, to have these enforcement powers.
The more interesting question is whether, in situations in which the states retain their existing requirements in the face of EPA’s deregulatory efforts, the retained requirements would remain federally enforceable either by EPA or, more significantly, by the public under the relevant citizen-suit provisions.
This is an important question for two reasons. First, it would expand the number of potential enforcers significantly, and thus the likely number of enforcement actions. And second, perhaps even more significantly, it would dramatically increase the potentially applicable sanctions. As previously mentioned, in order to become authorized, states only have to have the ability to impose fines of up to $5,000 per day for each violation under the CWA, or up to $10,000 per day under the CAA and RCRA. In the federal context, by contrast, citizens (or EPA) can seek much larger fines. The relevant citizen suit provisions incorporate the penalty dynamics that are available to EPA when it is authorized to seek civil penalties in court. EPA periodically adjusts these amounts pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990. As it currently stands, the potentially applicable daily fines on a per violation basis are $52,414 under the CWA, $95,284 under the CAA, and $71,264 under RCRA.
IV. Will the Old Limits Remain Federally Enforceable?
In general, the citizen-suit provisions in the relevant statutes—like EPA’s enforcement provisions—contain a laundry list of the categories of requirements that citizens may enforce. Most pertinently, though, all of the relevant citizen suit authorities allow citizens (like EPA) to enforce permit conditions, without qualification, including in situations in which—as is most often the case—the states are the relevant permit-issuers. Also significantly, § 7002 of RCRA allows citizens to enforce all relevant “regulations,” and § 304 of the CAA allows them to enforce a whole host of state implementation plan (SIP) requirements even beyond those implemented through permits under the statute’s new source review programs.
Taken together, these provisions encompass virtually every requirement that a state may have established to fulfill its obligation as an authorized state under the relevant programs. No one seriously doubts that these permit conditions, regulations, and SIP requirements are enforceable through citizen suits to the extent that they are necessary to meet the requirements of federal law. The question is whether these state-generated requirements suddenly become unenforceable through citizen suits if EPA takes a deregulatory action, making—for example—an extant state-generated NPDES permit condition no longer essential to ensuring that the permit meets the minimum federal requirements.
While this situation has not often arisen, and thus has not given rise to a body of well-established law, my view is that these permit or SIP conditions—or even, under RCRA, the applicable state regulations—would remain fully enforceable as a matter of federal law. This would remain true until and unless the relevant state modifies them to make them consistent with EPA’s newly-relaxed regulatory dynamics; if the state does not choose to do so—immediately or otherwise—nothing in either the relevant statutes, regulations, or case law suggests that the requirements at issue would suddenly lose their status as federally-enforceable requirements. As will be discussed below, in the context of permit requirements, it may be that a given regulated entity could petition for a permit modification. Even there, however, it is not clear that the permittee would be entitled to such a modification as a matter of law. But the more important principle is that the relevant permit condition should remain federally-enforceable unless and until it is modified.
This interpretation finds support both in the relevant statutes and the case law. First and foremost, as mentioned, the relevant citizen-suit provisions are unqualified in providing citizens with the right to enforce the relevant permit conditions, SIP requirements, and regulations. There is simply no hint in the text of these provisions that this authorization is limited to those conditions, requirements, or regulations that are—or, in our context, remain—essential to ensuring consistency with the minimum federal requirements. Reading such a requirement into these provisions would also be in tension with the judicial review provisions in the relevant statutes, which contemplate, for example, that challenges to EPA’s approval of any SIP requirements “may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate Circuit.” Allowing the district courts in citizen-enforcement actions to examine the ongoing appropriateness of SIP conditions would appear to contravene this provision.
would not only require the Administrator to expend considerable time and energy determining whether a state plan was precisely tailored to meet the federal standards, but would simultaneously require States desiring stricter controls to enact and enforce two sets of emission standards, one federally improved plan and one stricter state plan.
Thus, the Court held that states may implement more stringent state requirements through a federally-approved SIP. As recognized by the Court, this in turn renders the relevant requirements enforceable as a matter of federal law.
While not as directly on point, the Supreme Court’s opinion in EPA v. California is also supportive. In that case, the Court dealt with the question whether, as then drafted, the CWA’s federal facilities provision, § 313, subjected federal entities to the need to obtain permits under § 402 of the Act. The Court interpreted the term “requirement,” as then used in § 313, to refer only to the CWA’s substantive standards and schedules, not its permitting requirements.
The reference in [§] 505(f)(6) to requirements applicable by reason of [§] 313 is to be read as making clear that all dischargers (including federal dischargers) may be sued to enforce permit conditions, whether those conditions arise from standards and limitations promulgated by the Administrator or from stricter standards established by the State.
Thus, the Court clearly contemplated that, in the NPDES context, citizens can enforce even more stringent conditions imposed by the States.
It should be noted that some of EPA’s regulations muddy these statutory waters a bit. In particular, EPA’s regulations under both the CWA and RCRA draw a distinction between state-generated requirements that are “more stringent” than the relevant federal requirements, versus those with “a greater scope of coverage” than the relevant federal programs. The general thrust of these regulations is that while more stringent requirements are federally enforceable, those that are “broader in scope” are not. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied in part on this dichotomy in holding that if a particular state-issued permit condition meant what the plaintiffs argued it meant, it would be broader in scope than contemplated under the federal program, and therefore unenforceable in a citizen suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a criminal case under RCRA, also acknowledged this dichotomy, but—as one basis for its holding—agreed with EPA that the relevant regulation should be viewed as being “more stringent,” not “broader in scope,” because it merely imposed additional requirements on those who already were subject to regulation under the federal program.
It is debatable whether these regulations should ever be able to undercut the plain text under the relevant statutes indicating what citizens (and EPA) may enforce. In our context, however, this question is likely to be an academic one in the vast majority of circumstances. If EPA is “only” relaxing requirements, rather than eliminating them, the remaining state regulation would likely qualify as “more stringent,” rather than broader in scope.
The point of this Essay is that, while our pollution control laws do not—outside of the nonattainment new source review context—significantly limit EPA’s ability to relax its extant regulatory requirements, their cooperative federalism dynamics are capable of saving the day, at least in the states that are willing take a stand against significant deregulation. It is absolutely clear that any such states can preserve their existing schemes as a matter of state law. Moreover, the better argument is that any of the relevant requirements would remain federally enforceable so long as they are embodied in forms (e.g., permit conditions or SIP provisions) that are referenced in the relevant citizen suit provisions. Further, as previously mentioned, if enough states indicate their intent not to embrace any deregulatory efforts, their collective force may dissuade EPA from going forward with at least some of the relevant changes.
Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.
[Under the CAA, even] areas that attained were not allowed to remove controls. At most, an attaining area was allowed to shift controls from active enforcement to the contingency plan that would be automatically triggerd should air quality again deteriorate. CAA § 175A, 42 U.S.C. § 7505a. And EPA was to enforce a high threshold for removing controls from a [state implementation plan]—no mandatory controls could be removed and nothing could be done that would hinder an area’s ability to achieve prescribed annual incremental emissions reductions. CAA § 110(l), 42 U.S.C. 7410(l).

References: § 202
 v. 
 § 172
 § 172
 § 172
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 7002
 § 304
 v. 
 § 313
 § 402
 § 313
 § 175
 § 7505
 § 110