Source: http://www.acoel.org/2016/05/default.aspx
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:49:34+00:00

Document:
The court criticized the Service for mischaracterizing scientific consensus as “substantial disagreement,” and for employing an inappropriately high standard of absolute certainty. The court suspected the Service’s sudden loss of confidence in its listing decision resulted not from scientific diligence but, instead, from “immense political pressure” exerted by a handful of western states.
Although the decision is replete with references to wolverine denning statistics, sophisticated snow cover assessments based on satellite imagery, and emerging climate models, the court made clear that the Service changed its decision based on policy considerations, not science. That the wolverine depends on persistent snow cover to reproduce, and “relies on snow for its existence at the most fundamental level,” the court said, was not disputed. That climate change is occurring, and will in the future result in reduced snowpack and loss of denning habitat, within the wolverine’s U.S. range also was not disputed. The western states, however, questioned how reliably the Service could predict either the pace or the foreseeable impacts of climate effects far into the future. The states, and many senior staff within the Service, also questioned whether the ESA is an appropriate or workable tool to address the large-scale effects of climate change on North American ecosystems.
If the Service reinstates its prior listing decision, the wolverine will join the polar bear, ringed and bearded seals, and other species listed because they rely on snow and ice “for existence at the most fundamental level.” The policy challenges at the core of the Service’s listing decision, however, remain unresolved. Species affected by climate change are not limited to those dependent on snow and ice. If climate trends continue, the list of species affected will grow and grow. The ESA can do nothing to reverse or decelerate those impacts. The Service cannot build an ark to save every species ultimately displaced or threatened. Any realistic hope for slowing the loss of biodiversity in the U.S. must depend, therefore, on comprehensive and lasting reforms to address the underlying causes of climate change, and not the predicted effects of climate change at the species level.
Until recently I thought state water quality agencies with oversight from EPA were in charge of setting water quality standards, establishing mixing zones and similar activities. However, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) has recently served notice that they are the new water quality sheriffs in the Northwest.
It is well known that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is a comprehensive statute designed to protect and recover species that are listed as threatened or endangered by the USFWS and the NMFS (collectively referred to as "Services"). One of the key provisions in the ESA is 16 USC § 1636 (or Section 7) which requires federal agencies to utilize their authority to conserve endangered species and "consult" with the Services whenever any discretionary action by the acting federal agency has the potential to negatively affect listed species. Many no doubt recall the decision in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), in which the Court determined that Section 7 required the acting federal agency to halt construction of an almost completed major federal dam in Tennessee (Tellico Dam) because it would undisputedly eradicate the listed species ("snail darter" or perch), destroy its critical habitat and therefore completion of the dam would clearly violate Section 7.
What constitutes "jeopardy" and destruction of critical habitat under the ESA has come a long way since TVA v. Hill. The ESA gets a lot of play in the Northwest principally because there are large tracts of undeveloped federal land, human population is relatively sparse and pristine waters combine to provide habitat for many listed aquatic species such as various species of salmon. In one of the latest iterations of what constitutes "jeopardy" the Services recently determined in lengthy biological opinions that EPA's approval (some twenty years ago) of Idaho's Water Quality Standards for certain toxic metals would jeopardize the continued existence of listed species and destroy or adversely modify critical habitat.
There is a question whether EPA approval of state water quality standards pursuant to § 303 of the CWA is the type of discretionary action that even triggers ESA consultation. See National Association of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (Section 7 consultation not required when EPA authorizes state to take over the NPDES permit program under § 402 of the CWA). Assuming consultation is required, certainly there had been a lengthy delay in EPA and the Services completing consultation on Idaho Water Quality Standards (over twenty years). This delay gave rise to a lawsuit brought by regional environmental groups to force completion of the consultation. See Northwest Environmental Advocates v. The National Marine Fisheries Service, USDC Idaho, Case No. 1:13-cv-00263-EJL.
But, how can a water quality criteria jeopardize the existence of an endangered species? Water quality standards under the CWA are goals set by each state for state surface waters. NPDES Permits must meet state water quality standards and if a waterbody is not meeting standards then states must adopt pollution control plans (known as "TMDLs") to bring a waterbody into compliance also subject to EPA approval. Adoption of criteria itself cannot jeopardize endangered species or for that matter save a species.
If one has the fortitude to power through the Services lengthy biological opinions, which were not subject to public comment, there is no finding that state standards at or below the current criteria are actually harming any fish in the thousands of miles of streams and rivers affected by the opinions. Rather the Services take exception to the somewhat esoteric process by which EPA develops national recommended water quality criteria (which most states ultimately follow). The Services found EPA should have relied on different laboratory studies in developing and approving criteria. Many of the laboratory studies the Services relied upon do not even involve listed species.
The Services then suggested that EPA must adopt replacement criteria (or force the state to do so) over the next few years via reasonable and prudent alternatives (or RPAs) to avoid the alleged jeopardy. An RPA are measures "suggested" by the Services under Section 7 to the action agency (EPA) to avoid jeopardy which are within the discretion of the action agency and are economically and technically feasible. In the meantime the Services suggested as an interim measure how EPA should regulate point source dischargers into waters containing listed species by meeting certain prescribed mixing zones.
While the Services’ jeopardy determinations on Idaho's standards are a far cry from jeopardy to the snail darter caused by the construction to the Tellico Dam many years ago, the Services’ findings may go unchallenged. It is likely EPA will follow the RPA's (or force the state to do so) for fear of another lawsuit that EPA is violating its obligations under Section 7. Likely the only remedy to question the Services’ jeopardy determinations may be a judicial challenge to the Biological Opinions. However in such a challenge a court would be forced to evaluate the "science" behind the Services’ jeopardy determinations which is an area the courts generally will defer to the expertise of the agency. One would think that EPA or state water quality agencies would be the experts on setting water quality standards and establishing mixing zones, but the Services will no doubt claim they are now the experts. Sometimes it is difficult to figure out who is in charge.
As divisive as Congress is, Members miraculously seem to agree that our chemical management law, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), needs modernizing. On May 6, the key Members of the Senate announced that they had reached agreement on draft TSCA reform legislation; the House is expected also to act soon, perhaps before Memorial Day. This means that TSCA, our chemical control law enacted almost 40 years ago, could be significantly modernized this year -- a goal that has proven to be uniquely elusive. Many believe that TSCA’s greatest failing, and the deficit that most undermined the public’s confidence in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ability to assure chemical safety, is EPA’s limited authority under TSCA to regulate “existing” chemical substances believed to pose risks. Pending TSCA reform legislation that is supported by an unusually broad group of stakeholders would strengthen EPA’s authority and address this failing. Consensus on the contentious issue of preemption has proven especially challenging as many states are aggressively enacting chemical-specific measures, have been for years, and do not wish to cede authority to EPA. Now that the Senate has reached agreement, the hope is the House can also agree quickly as time is running out. TSCA reform is urgently needed. Congress has never been this close to making it happen, and while we are not there yet, Congress seems poised uncharacteristically to make the right choice. Tobacco products will still not be subject to TSCA jurisdiction, but celebrations will be in order if this elusive milestone is finally reached.
The American College of Environmental Lawyers is pleased to announce its first collaboration with the American Law Institute Continuing Legal Education Group (ALI CLE). On June 28, 2016, from 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm EDT, the College and ALI CLE will be presenting an MCLE-accredited telephone seminar: The Clean Power Plan: Issues and Challenges.
The seminar panel will feature ACOEL Fellows Mike Gerrard (Columbia Law School/Sabin Center for Climate Change Law), Pam Giblin (Baker Botts) and Bob Martineau (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation).
The College has provided the planning, faculty and content of the program; ALI CLE is providing the administrative end, including production and CLE accreditation for the 1.5 hour program. (CLE credits range from 1 to 2 depending on state; most are 1.5.) The planning chairs are ACOEL Fellows Ted Garrett (Covington & Burling LLP) and me (Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis LLP).
The seminar topic is an outgrowth of the August 2015 announcement by President Obama and EPA of promulgation of the final Clean Power Plan regulations, the subsequent challenges to the Plan pending before the D.C Circuit Court of Appeals (scheduled for June but now pushed back to September before the full D.C. panel), and the U.S. Supreme Court’s stay of the regulations pending judicial review on whether EPA exceeded its authority under the Clean Air Act.
We hope that you will register for this timely and informative seminar.
Thanks much to Mike Gerrard, Pam Giblin and Bob Martineau for agreeing to participate, and to Ted Garrett for his involvement in planning the phone seminar.
The Global Warming Solutions Act Requires MassDEP to Promulgate Declining Annual GHG Emissions Limits for Multiple Sources: Yikes!
"To promulgate regulations that address multiple sources or categories of sources of greenhouse gas emissions, impose a limit on emissions that may be released, limit the aggregate emissions released from each group of regulated sources or categories of sources, set emissions limits for each year, and set limits that decline on an annual basis."
The SJC gets the final word, so I won’t spend much time explaining why the SJC got it wrong, though I will note that to suggest that the legislature’s use of the phrase “desired level” of GHG emissions unambiguously requires MassDEP to establish hard targets was at best overenthusiastic.
The bigger question at this point is what the decision means. First, it’s clear that MassDEP must establish hard declining emissions limits for more than one, but less than all, categories of GHG emitting sources.
Second, MassDEP must promulgate regulations that limit total emissions – not emission rates.
Third, the regulations must truly control Massachusetts sources. The SJC specifically found that RGGI doesn’t satisfy the GWSA requirement, in part because Massachusetts sources can purchase allowances from out of state facilities.
But where does this leave MassDEP? In a deep hole, for sure. Unless it wants to ditch RGGI, it can’t regulate power generation, because the type of program that the SJC said is required would simply be incompatible with RGGI.
How about mobile sources? They are the largest growing source of GHG emissions. Unfortunately, we come back to the SJC’s injunction that MassDEP must regulate total emissions, not emission rates. You tell me how MassDEP is going to issue regulations setting a cap on mobile source emissions.
The only obvious candidates I see are buildings and industrial sources other than power generation.
I don’t envy MassDEP – and the nature of the task only emphasizes the extent of the SJC’s overreach here – but I said I wouldn’t get into that.
Three companion decisions in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S. et. al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00056, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, provide insight on the CERCLA statute of limitations, potential pitfalls in pleading CERCLA claims, and the defense of sovereign immunity by an Indian Pueblo in the context of CERCLA and contract claims. The case remains pending.
In the 1940s, when the war was over, the federal government was in the market for uranium concentrate for bombs, and it encouraged private entities to mine and mill uranium for sale to the government at prices set by the government. Much of the country’s uranium reserves were in the Grants Uranium Belt in western New Mexico, an area that includes the Laguna Pueblo.
Uranium was discovered on Laguna Pueblo lands in 1952, and Anaconda Copper Mining Company entered into mining leases with Laguna, which were approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, acting pursuant to its trust responsibility to the Pueblo. Much uranium was mined there from the Jackpile Paguate mine beginning in 1952, and operations continued until 1982. In 1986, the Pueblo and Anaconda’s successor, Atlantic Richfield Co. (“ARCO”), entered into an agreement to terminate the leases and perform remediation. ARCO agreed to pay the Pueblo to perform remediation, and the Pueblo agreed to assume all liability and release ARCO regarding it. The Department of the Interior approved the agreement and, following the preparation of an EIS, BLM and BIA issued a ROD that established requirements for the remediation. ARCO paid $43.6 million to the Pueblo to perform the remediation and release ARCO.
All defendants were involved in varying degrees with the remediation. BIA had responsibility to determine the extent of remediation required and approve key remediation decisions according to a cooperative agreement with the Pueblo. But BIA and the Pueblo saw in ARCO’s $43.6 million payment an economic development opportunity. The Pueblo formed Laguna Construction Company (“LCC”) to conduct the remediation, and BIA ceded certain oversight to the relatively inexperienced LCC as well. Work on the initial remediation ended in 1985. Beginning in 2007 the Pueblo, and then EPA, investigated the adequacy of mine reclamation at the mine site and found problems. In 2012 EPA proposed listing on the NPL, and in 2014 it asserted that ARCO should fund the RI/FS, but EPA has brought no litigation.
ARCO claims that the remediation was mishandled and brought CERCLA claims against the United States, the Pueblo and LCC, seeking cost recovery, contribution, and declaratory relief. The United States moved to dismiss. In detailed decision by Senior United States District Judge, James A. Parker, all of ARCO’s claims against the United States were dismissed. In companion decisions, some claims against the Pueblo and LCC were dismissed and some survived motions to dismiss. Dismissals were based in part on the CERCLA statute of limitations, the court’s determination that the ARCO pleadings were deficient and sovereign immunity.
ARCO sought to recover two categories of response costs: (1) the $43.6 million it paid to the Pueblo in 1986 in exchange for the Pueblo’s agreeing to be responsible for the remediation and to release ARCO from all responsibility for it; and (2) the significant costs ARCO incurred in responding to EPA’s more recent efforts to shift responsibility to ARCO. The Court dismissed ARCO’s claims for cost recovery and contribution for the 1986 settlement payment as time barred. The Court dismissed ARCO’s claim to recover the costs in responding to EPA and associated investigation as inadequately pled to establish that the expenditure constitutes “necessary costs of response.” Claims for contribution under 113(f)(1) (referenced by the court as “post judgment contribution claim”) were dismissed as premature because ARCO had not been sued. Finally, the claims against the United States for declaratory judgement were dismissed; the court ruled that ARCO cannot bring a claim for declaratory relief because it has failed to establish a valid underlying contribution or cost recovery claim.
Claims against the Pueblo and LCC are somewhat more complicated as a result of sovereign immunity defenses they raised. The court considered the sovereign immunity defense asserted by both Laguna Pueblo and LLC, its federally-chartered Tribal Corporation. The Court concluded that both the Pueblo and LCC are entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a bar to ARCO’s CERCLA claims because the language of existing waivers of sovereign immunity was not unequivocal enough to cover CERCLA claims. The Court therefore dismissed those CERCLA claims. However, the court found that the Pueblo and LCC waived sovereign immunity with regard to ARCO’s breach of contract claims. The source of this waiver for the Pueblo is in the 1986 Agreement to Terminate Leases. The court found that this agreement served to waive sovereign immunity from claims brought under that contract. Regarding LCC, the source of the waiver of sovereign immunity for breach of contract claims was in the Articles of Merger associated with the merger of LCC from a New Mexico corporation to a federal LCC formed under 25 USC §477, which may assert sovereign immunity. A motion for reconsideration by LCC is pending.
Although the facts of Atlantic Richfield are unique, its lessons are broader. First, in pleading a CERCLA claim for cost recovery, care should be taken to allege in some detail facts which support all elements of the claim, including facts showing that necessary response costs within CERCLA were incurred. Second, without adequate waiver of sovereign immunity, the settlement and payment in exchange for a release and commitment by a tribe or tribal corporation to assume full responsibility for clean-up may leave the door open for CERCLA liability in the future without recourse through CERCLA-based contribution and cost recovery claims. Finally, although the court’s decision confirmed that the defense of sovereign immunity applies to CERCLA contribution and cost recovery claims brought by private parties against sovereign Indian tribes and their federally chartered corporations, the court’s analysis confirms that under the right circumstances, a tribe may waive its sovereign immunity protections.
On April 20, 2016, the U.S. Senate passed S.2012, the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015, by a vote of 85-12. If enacted, S.2012 would be the first comprehensive energy legislation since the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. This bipartisan bill is intended to expand domestic energy systems, facilitate investment into critical infrastructure and improve the performance of federal agencies while protecting the environment.
S.2012 contains two notable provisions that would impact domestic oil and natural gas production and infrastructure development. First, the Act would designate the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) as the lead agency responsible for coordinating all applicable federal authorizations and National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) review for proposed natural gas projects and facilities. According to the Act, once FERC determines that an application for a project or facility is complete, all required federal authorizations must be issued within the timeframe specified by FERC, which “should” not exceed 90 days. The provision would likely speed the federal approval of interstate pipeline and liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) projects.
Second, the Act creates a Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) pilot program that would allow operators to lease and develop certain mineral interests owned by the federal government without a federal drilling permit. Specifically, the pilot program would include 2,000 spacing units in which the federal government owns 25% or less of the mineral interests and none of the surface estate. BLM would be authorized to waive the requirement that operators obtain a federal drilling permit for the spacing units if BLM determines that the mineral interests are adequately protected by the lease terms or other laws and regulations. The proposed pilot program may lead to permanent programs that ease the restrictions on exploration and production activities affecting mineral interests in which the federal government owns only a minority share.
The White House has previously threatened to veto legislation aimed at speeding the federal authorizations necessary to construct LNG facilities and pipelines. However, no such veto statement has been issued with respect to S.2012. This legislation may not face opposition from the White House because it was developed after numerous listening sessions were held with stakeholders across the country and after weeks of negotiations by many senators seeking common ground for modernizing energy policy. Senator Murkowski (R-Alaska), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, stated that she expects a formal conference with the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee to merge the Senate and House bills, but no timeline for a meeting has been established.
The Tata Mundra “Ultra-Mega” coal-fired power plant on the coast of India north of Mumbai is a behemoth by any measure. Capable of producing over 4,000 megawatts of electricity from five huge boilers, it can consume over 12 million tons of coal per year and requires millions of gallons of seawater a day for its once-through cooling system. Indeed, the plant is so large it requires its own coal port, its own water intake channel (nearly 150 meters wide) and its own outfall that discharges warm water equal to almost half the mean flow of the Potomac River.
For generations, the area where the plant is now located supported a system of small fishing villages where fishing families move from inland locations to the coast for several months each year following the monsoon to catch and dry fish which they sell to traders. This income has supplemented income from agriculture and provided the villages and families with a subsistence living.
The arrival of the Tata Mundra Plant changed all that: construction disrupted access to fishing locations; dredging altered the natural systems and the fish disappeared as water salinity and temperature changed; fresh water supplies dwindled as the plant’s water use led to increased saltwater intrusions into groundwater; and a way of life that had sustained families and villages disappeared.
The Tata Mundra Plant would not have been built without financing from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) based in Washington. The IFC is an organization of member states and part of the World Bank Group. To its credit, the IFC recognized the environmental risks of the project from the outset noting that it had the potential to have “significant adverse social and/or environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or unprecedented.” And, consistent with its lending policies, it put in place as part of its loan agreement social and environmental performance standards and requirements to mitigate these impacts.
It all looked good on paper. But then the plant was built and the IFC looked the other way. We know this because individual villagers who depended on the resources the Tata Mundra Plant destroyed complained through a local fishing union and village government to the IFC’s ombudsman office. That office issued a scathing report criticizing the IFC for its multiple failures to ensure implementation of the protective measures in its loan agreement. The IFC shrugged; the ombudsman’s office has no enforcement powers.
Frustrated with their inability to achieve any meaningful accountability through the IFC, a handful of individual fishers and villagers, a local fishing union, and a village governmental entity filed a complaint against the IFC in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Budha Ismail Jam et al v. IFC, No 15-cv-00612 (JDB), in April of 2015. The IFC moved to dismiss the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds. The IFC is covered by the International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”), which Congress passed in 1945, and is entitled to the “same immunity” in U.S. courts as foreign nations. While the immunity enjoyed by foreign nations has changed significantly since 1945, the IFC asserted that its had not -- and remained near-absolute.
The District Court concluded, in light of longstanding D.C. Circuit precedent dealing with immunity from wage garnishment proceedings for an employee of one of the IFC’s sister international organizations, the Inter-American Development Bank, that it was bound to dismiss the complaint against the IFC on sovereign immunity grounds. Budha Ismail Jam et al v. IFC, No 15-cv-00612 (JDB), Memorandum Opinion (Mar. 24, 2016 D.D.C.).
This outcome raises serious questions about the accountability of international lending organizations like the IFC that finance potentially environmentally destructive project around the world while professing to follow the most stringent lending practices for protecting people and the environment. If we are “all in this together,” a serious failure of accountability on the other side of the world is not something we can just shrug off as someone else’s problem. We live in a global commons – industrial projects built anywhere can affect us all. The most obvious example is the effects on the climate from the dramatic expansion of fossil fuel-based power generation around the world, much of it built with international financial support, often originating in the U.S.
Nor is the law of sovereign immunity as clear or unfavorable to the plaintiffs as the District Court’s decision suggests. First, since 1945, sovereign immunity for foreign states has developed a well-recognized exception for commercial activities, activities that do not enjoy immunity. IFC lending decisions – on which the IFC makes a profit – are nothing if not commercial activity. Second, and maybe more significantly, sticking with an out-dated, circa-1945 version of sovereign immunity actually undermines the credibility of the IFC itself. For the IFC to continue enjoying the financial support of its member states, its commitment to responsible lending must be real and reliable, not illusory. If it continues to finance projects without real environmental accountability, its members may become inclined to withdraw their support because they will not want it lending to their neighbors: environmental harms don’t recognize geo-political boundaries and irresponsible financing for a polluting facility in one country may well harm another.
Because the facts of Budha Ismail Jam et al v. IFC are so stark, because accountability in international finance for major industrial projects is increasingly important both here and abroad in a world facing rapid climate change and its effects, and because the plaintiffs are appealing the District Court’s order of dismissal, this is a case worth watching. It could be the first whisper of a new breeze in accountability for the environmental effects of international lending decisions -- or the last sigh from beneath a suffocating blanket of sovereign immunity.
You do not have to be a football fan to be aware of the legal battles between NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell and the star quarterback, and perpetual winner, Tom Brady arising out of Brady’s use of deflated footballs at a playoff game. Brady won the round in district court where the judge focused on the merits of the factual case. Goodell recently won on appeal where the court of appeals focused on the fact that the NFL Players Association bargained away the right to challenge Goodell’s decisions on the merits. On appeal, it did not matter whether Brady did anything wrong. All that mattered was that Goodell thought Brady did something wrong.
In recent dealings with EPA on its model Administrative Order on Consent (“AOC”) for Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies (“RI/FS”), it seems EPA wants PRPs to make the same mistake the Players Association made: let EPA be judge and jury over any dispute that arises under the AOC. The most troubling language in the model is that EPA’s final decision on the dispute “becomes part of the Order.” While the vast majority of EPA folk I have met are more reasonable than Roger Goodell, RI/FS projects can involve millions of dollars, which sets the table for expensive disputes.
What is a Brady fan to do? First, the model should be changed to allow pre-enforcement review, as pointed out in a recent ACOEL post by Mark Schneider. Second, if the AOC process is otherwise desirable, there are ways to minimize the effect of the model language on at least one category of dispute: work expansion disputes, often the most serious and expensive variety of disputes. A very specific Scope of Work attached to the AOC would minimize the risk of work expansion by EPA through dispute resolution. If a dispute arises that could expand the work, do not invoke dispute resolution. Take the position that the AOC does not apply to EPA’s demand because the demand is beyond the scope of the AOC. If EPA enforces the AOC on this point you can defend without EPA’s position becoming part of the AOC beforehand. Thus, you avoid Brady’s fate—having a good argument and nowhere to go.

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