Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/462/393/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:48:05+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 462 › NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt.
National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management Corp.
Acting on unfair labor practice charges filed by an employee of respondent, petitioner National Labor Relations Board found that respondent had discharged the employee, a bus driver, for his union activities, in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board applied its rule that the General Counsel has the burden of persuading the Board by a preponderance of the evidence that an antiunion animus contributed to the employer's decision to discharge the employee, and the employer can avoid the conclusion that it violated the Act by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee would have been fired for permissible reasons even if he had not been involved in protected union activities. The Board concluded that respondent failed to carry its burden of persuading the Board that the employee's discharge would have taken place, even if he had not been engaged in protected union activities, because of his practice of leaving his keys in the bus and taking unauthorized breaks. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board's order, based on its view that it was error to place the burden on the employer, and that the General Counsel carried the burden of proving not only that a forbidden motivation contributed to the discharge but also that the discharge would not have taken place independently of the employee's protected conduct.
1. The burden of proof placed on the employer under the Board's rule is consistent with §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), as well as with § 10(c) of the Act, which provides that the Board must find an unfair labor practice by a "preponderance of the testimony." The Board's construction of the statute, which is not mandated by the Act, extends to the employer what the Board considers to be an affirmative defense, but does not change or add to the elements of the unfair labor practice that the General Counsel has the burden of proving under § 10(c). This is a permissible construction, and the Board's allocation of the burden of proof is reasonable. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274. Pp. 462 U. S. 397-404.
activities. Such finding was supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. 462 U. S. 404-405.
the next four days, Santillo discussed with his fellow drivers the possibility of joining the Teamsters and distributed authorization cards. On the night of March 23, George Patterson, who supervised Santillo and the other drivers, told one of the drivers that he had heard of Santillo's activities. Patterson referred to Santillo as two-faced, and promised to get even with him.
Later that evening, Patterson talked to Ed West, who was also a busdriver for respondent. Patterson asked, "What's with Sam and the Union?" Patterson said that he took Santillo's actions personally, recounted several favors he had done for Santillo, and added that he would remember Santillo's activities when Santillo again asked for a favor. On Monday, March 26, Santillo was discharged. Patterson told Santillo that he was being fired for leaving his keys in the bus and taking unauthorized breaks.
ALJ also found that the taking of coffee breaks during working hours was normal practice, and that respondent tolerated the practice unless the breaks interfered with the driver's performance of his duties. In any event, said the ALJ, respondent had never taken any adverse personnel action against an employee because of such behavior. While acknowledging that Santillo had engaged in some unsatisfactory conduct, the ALJ was not persuaded that Santillo would have been fired had it not been for his union activities.
The Board affirmed, adopting with some clarification the ALJ's findings and conclusions and expressly applying its Wright Line decision. It stated that respondent had failed to carry its burden of persuading the Board that the discharge would have taken place had Santillo not engaged in activity protected by the Act. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, relying on its previous decision rejecting the Board's Wright Line test, NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1981), refused to enforce the Board's order and remanded for consideration of whether the General Counsel had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Santillo would not have been fired had it not been for his union activities. 674 F.2d 130 (1982). We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982), because of conflicts on the issue among the Courts of Appeals. [Footnote 3] We now reverse.
§ 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), or by discrimination in hire or tenure "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization," NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
"Where the employer has discharged an employee for two or more reasons, and one of them is union affiliation or activity, the Board has found a violation [of 8(a)(3)]."
"whether or not the [employer] may have had some other motive . . . and without regard to whether or not the [employer's] asserted motive was lawful."
unfair labor practice, the General Counsel need show by a preponderance of the evidence only that a discharge is in any way motivated by a desire to frustrate union activity -- was plainly rational and acceptable. The Board has adhered to that construction of the Act since that time.
Line decision in 1980 was an attempt to restate its analysis in a way more acceptable to the Courts of Appeals. The Board held that the General Counsel of course had the burden of proving that the employee's conduct protected by § 7 was a substantial or a motivating factor in the discharge. [Footnote 5] Even if this was the case, and the employer failed to rebut it, the employer could avoid being held in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge rested on the employee's unprotected conduct, as well and that the employee would have lost his job in any event. It thus became clear, if it was not clear before, that proof that the discharge would have occurred in any event and for valid reasons amounted to an affirmative defense on which the employer carried the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. "The shifting burden merely requires the employer to make out what is actually an affirmative defense. . . ." Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088, n. 11; see also id. at 1084, n. 5.
motivation contributed to the discharge, but also that the discharge would not have taken place independently of the protected conduct of the employee. The Court of Appeals was quite correct, and the Board does not disagree, that, throughout the proceedings, the General Counsel carries the burden of proving the elements of an unfair labor practice. Section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), expressly directs that violations may be adjudicated only "upon the preponderance of the testimony" taken by the Board. The Board's rules also state that "[t]he Board's attorney has the burden of pro[ving] violations of Section 8." 29 CFR § 101.10(b) (1982). We are quite sure, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that § 10(c) forbids placing the burden on the employer to prove that, absent the improper motivation, he would have acted in the same manner for wholly legitimate reasons.
be required by the Act, is at least permissible under it . . . ," and, in these circumstances, its position is entitled to deference. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 420 U. S. 266-267 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 373 U. S. 236 (1963).
The Board's allocation of the burden of proof is clearly reasonable in this context, for the reason stated in NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872 (CA2), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576 (1938), a case on which the Board relied when it began taking the position that the burden of persuasion could be shifted. E.g., Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting, 16 N.L.R.B. at 801. The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity, but by his own wrongdoing.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the Board's orders, which rested on the Board's Wright Line decision.
"If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter. . . . If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause."
The Board's Wright Line decision has been rejected by the Second and Third Circuits, see NLRB v. New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284 (CA2 1983), cert. pending, No. 82-1705; Behring International, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83 (CA3 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-438, as well as by the First. Several Circuits have expressly approved the Wright Line test. See NLRB v. Senftner Volkswagen Corp., 681 F.2d 557, 560 (CA8 1982); NLRB v. Nevis Industries, Inc., 647 F.2d 905, 909 (CA9 1981); Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460 (CA7 1981).
The Board argues that its approach to mixed-motive cases was known to Congress and ratified by the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 61 Stat. 136, which reenacted §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) almost without material change. We need not pass on this submission, since we find nothing in the legislative history of the LMRA that calls into question the decisions of the Board relevant to the issue before us now. The issue after, as well as before, the passage of the LMRA is whether the Board's construction of 8(a) is sufficiently rational to be acceptable in the courts. We do note that nowhere in the legislative history is reference made to any of the mixed-motive cases decided by the Board or by the courts, see, e.g., NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.) ("[S]ince the refusal [to negotiate] was at least one cause of the strike, and was a tort . . . , it rested upon the tortfeasor to disentangle the consequences for which it was chargeable from those from which it was immune"), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576 (1938); NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167, 176 (CA3), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 605 (1939); Borden Mills, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. at 474-475 (dicta); Davis Precision Machine Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 529, 537 (1945); Wright-Hibbard Industrial Electric Truck Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 897, 908, n. 15 (1946); Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 69 N.L.R.B. at 454, n.21.
The Board has not purported to shift the burden of persuasion on the question of whether the employer fired Santillo at least in part because he engaged in protected activities. The General Counsel satisfied his burden in this respect, and no one disputes it. Thus, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), is inapposite. In that case, which involved a claim of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), the question was who had "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. . . ." 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 253. The Court discussed only the situation in which the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the "true" motives behind the decision. It thus addressed the pretext case.
The language of the NLRA requiring that the Board act on a preponderance of the testimony taken was added by the LMRA, 61 Stat. 136, in 1947. A closely related provision directed that no order of the Board reinstate or compensate any employee who was fired for cause. Section 10(c) places the burden on the General Counsel only to prove the unfair labor practice, not to disprove an affirmative defense. Furthermore, it is clear from the legislative history of the LMRA that the drafters of § 10(c) were not thinking of the mixed-motive case. Their discussions reflected the assumption that discharges were either "for cause" or punishment for protected activity. Read fairly, the legislative history does not indicate whether, in mixed-motive cases, the employer or the General Counsel has the burden of proof on the issue of what would have happened if the employer had not been influenced by his unlawful motives; on that point, the legislative history is silent.
"A third change forbids the Board to reinstate an individual unless the weight of the evidence shows that the individual was not suspended or discharged for cause. In the past, the Board, admitting that an employee was guilty of gross misconduct, nevertheless frequently reinstated him, 'inferring' that, because he was a member or an official of a union, this, not his misconduct, was the reason for his discharge."
H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1947) (emphasis added). The proviso was thus a reaction to the Board's readiness to infer antiunion animus from the fact that the discharged person was active in the union, and thus has little to do with the situation in which the Board has soundly concluded that the employer had an antiunion animus and that such feelings played a role in a worker's discharge.
"In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast."
The Rule merely defines the term "presumption." It in no way restricts the authority of a court or an agency to change the customary burdens of persuasion in a manner that otherwise would be permissible. Indeed, were respondent correct, we could not have assigned to the defendant the burden of persuasion on one issue in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977).
Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), provides that the proponent of an order has the burden of proof. Since the General Counsel is the proponent of the order, asserts respondent, the General Counsel must bear the burden of proof. Section 7(c), however, determines only the burden of going forward, not the burden of persuasion. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 43, 49, 58-60, 548 F.2d 998, 1004, 1013-1015 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. EPA, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).

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