Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52965:gr-162104-2009&catid=1522&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:43:33+00:00

Document:
R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, represented by its owner/President RIZALINA LAMZON, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO PANTE, Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the Decision dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76170, and its Resolution dated February 5, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan City, Branch 35, dated January 26, 2002, holding petitioner liable to respondent for damages for physical injuries sustained by respondent due to a vehicular accident.
Petitioner R Transport Corporation, represented by its owner and president, Rizalina Lamzon,3 is a common carrier engaged in operating a bus line transporting passengers to Gapan, Nueva Ecija from Cubao, Quezon City and back.
On March 14, 1995, respondent filed a Complaint13 for damages against petitioner with the RTC of Gapan City, Branch 35 (trial court) for the injuries he sustained as a result of the vehicular accident.
In its Answer,14 petitioner put up the defense that it had always exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, and that the accident was a force majeurefor which it should not be held liable.
At the pre-trial on October 4, 1995, petitioner was declared in default,15 which was reconsidered by the trial court on December 12, 199516 upon finding that petitioner had earlier filed a Motion to Transfer Date of Hearing. Trial was first set on February 26, 1996, and from then on trial was postponed several times on motion of petitioner.
The trial court held that the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers govern this case. Article 1756 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733 and 1755." The trial court ruled that since petitioner failed to dispute said presumption despite the many opportunities given to it, such presumption of negligence stands.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION PROMULGATED ON OCTOBER 7, 2003, THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONER'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH DIVISION FURTHER GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN CITY, BRANCH 35, PARTICULARLY IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT WITHOUT PRESENTING ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The main issue is whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages.
The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for damages.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733 and 1755."
Next, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in denying its motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's Decision dated October 7, 2003.
Moreover, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court, which awarded actual damages in the amount of P22,870.00 based on the statement of account issued by the Baliuag District Hospital and not based on an official receipt. Petitioner argues that the statement of account is not the best evidence.
As cited by the Court of Appeals in its Decision, Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals36 awarded actual damages for hospitalization expenses that was evidenced by a statement of account issued by the Makati Medical Center. Hence, the statement of account is admissible evidence of hospital expenses incurred by respondent.
The Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of moral damages, citing Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals,38 which awarded moral damages to paying passengers, who suffered physical injuries on board a bus that figured in an accident. Spouses Ong held that a person is entitled to the integrity of his body and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. Thus, the usual practice is to award moral damages for physical injuries sustained. In Spouses Ong, the Court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to a passenger who was deemed to have suffered mental anguish and anxiety because her right arm could not function in a normal manner. Another passenger, who suffered injuries on his left chest, right knee, right arm and left eye, was awarded moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the mental anxiety and anguish he suffered from the accident.
In this case, respondent sustained a "laceration frontal area, with fracture of the right humerus" due to the vehicular accident. He underwent an operation for the fracture of the bone extending from the shoulder to the elbow of his right arm. After a few years of rest, he had to undergo a second operation. Respondent, therefore, suffered physical pain, mental anguish and anxiety as a result of the vehicular accident. Hence, the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is proper.
Petitioner likewise contends that the award of exemplary damages is improper, because it did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Further, the Court affirms the award of attorney's fees to respondent's counsel. The Court notes that respondent filed his Complaint for damages on March 14, 1995 as pauper-litigant. The award of legal fees by the trial court to respondent's counsel was a contingent fee of 25 percent of the total amount of damages, which shall constitute a lien on the total amount awarded. The said award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Twenty-five percent of the total damages is equivalent to P34,778.15. The award of legal fees is commensurate to the effort of respondent's counsel, who attended to the case in the trial court for seven years, and who finally helped secure redress for the injury sustained by respondent after 14 years.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the medical certificate presented in evidence is without probative value since respondent failed to present as witness Dr. Virginia Cabling to affirm the content of said medical certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76170, dated October 7, 2003, and its Resolution dated February 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner R Transport Corporation is ordered to pay respondent Eduardo Pante P39,112.60 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount shall constitute a lien as contingent fee of respondent's counsel.
2 As culled from the Decision of the Court of Appeals, the transcript of stenographic notes and the records of the case.
3 Also referred to as Rosalina Lamson in the RTC Decision and as Rosalina Lanson in the CA Decision.
4 Exhibit "A," records, p. 37.
5 Exhibit "B," records, p. 114.
7 Exhibit "E," records, p. 119.
8 TSN, October 4, 1990, p. 7.
9 Id. at 7; TSN, October 24, 1995, pp. 6-7.
10 Exhibit "D,"records, p. 118; TSN, October 4, 1995, pp. 11-12.
11 TSN, October 4, 1995, pp. 7-8.
12 Exhibits "F-1"to "F-5," records, pp. 241-243.
13 Docketed as Civil Case No. 1460.
23 CA rollo, p. 284.
28 Civil Code, Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
29 Civil Code, Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
31 See Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 153 (2000); Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 762 (1996).
33 G.R. No. 109979, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 541.
34 Id., citing Gutierrez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 126298, March 25, 1997, 270 SCRA 413.
36 378 Phil. 991 (1999).
(10) Acts of actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
38 361 Phil. 338 (1999).
39 Prudencio v. Alliance Transport System, G.R. No. L-33836, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 440.
40 SCC Chemicals Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 514 (2001).

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