Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/296/296mass394.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:39:41+00:00

Document:
AUSTIN D. MACRAE & others vs. SELECTMEN OF CONCORD & others.
It appearing that at least ten of sixteen petitioners in a taxpayers' petition under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, s. 53, acted in good faith, it was immaterial that many of them were unfamiliar with the exact nature of the proceeding.
A taxpayers' petition under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, s. 53, to enjoin a municipality from engaging in a certain retail business was not barred by laches although four years had elapsed since the retail business was established.
Municipal corporations in Massachusetts can exercise only those powers and perform only those duties which are expressly conferred by statute or necessarily implied either from those expressly conferred or from undoubted municipal rights or privileges. Per RUGG, C.J.
A municipal corporation has no power to establish and operate a municipal electric plant except by statute.
Statutes conferring powers upon municipalities, especially statutes enabling them to enter into commercial activities, have always been given a strict construction.
The provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 164, s. 34-69, did not authorize a municipal corporation having a municipal electric plant to conduct the business of selling household electrical appliances at retail or to do free installation and repair work in connection therewith for consumers using power and light from its plant.
PETITION by taxpayers under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, s. 53, filed in the Superior Court on May 22, 1935.
Upon confirmation of a master's report, a final decree dismissing the petition was entered by order of Morton, J. The petitioners appealed.
R. E. Goodwin, (F. B. Wallis & R. M. Nichols with him,) for the petitioners.
H. R. Bygrave, for the respondents.
RUGG, C.J. This is a petition by citizens of Concord under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, s. 53, against the selectmen, the members of the municipal light board, the treasurer, and the manager of the municipal light plant, to enjoin them, as officers of the town of Concord, from conducting the business of selling at retail various kinds of household electrical appliances and from doing free installation and repair work for consumers using power and light supplied by the municipal light plant.
ployed, who also had other duties in connection with keeping accounts. The larger appliances were sold on liberal terms and the municipal light plant did the installation work free of charge. Directions were given that no sales of any appliances be made except to residents of Concord. This order has not been closely observed where a customer pays cash, but in general has been well observed as to the larger appliances, although there have been some infractions. The result of the merchandising and jobbing operations for the years 1931 to 1934 was a substantial loss in each year, although for the first five months of 1935 a small profit was shown. The municipal light plant as a whole has made a profit in each of the last five years. During the last three years the average monthly consumption per customer has increased due to the use of appliances in homes.
A preliminary question is raised as to the standing of the petitioners. They were sixteen in number. All were taxable inhabitants of Concord. Although many of them apparently were unfamiliar with the exact nature of this proceeding, we are of opinion that at least ten of them acted in good faith as petitioners. They have not been guilty of laches. There is no lack of sufficient parties as petitioners. The case at bar is distinguishable from Conners v. Lowell, 246 Mass. 279.
ipalities in this Commonwealth. Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass. 592. Spaulding v. Peabody, 153 Mass. 129. Whiting v. Mayor of Holyoke, 272 Mass. 116, 118, 119. The development of electricity by a municipality for light, heat and power for general use is a function which under the Constitution can be conferred by an appropriate statute. It is a public use. Barnes v. Peck, 283 Mass. 618, 629. Citizens' Gas Light Co. v. Wakefield, 161 Mass. 432, 439. In this Commonwealth statutes as to powers conferred upon cities and towns have always been given a strict construction. Spaulding v. Peabody, 153 Mass. 129, 135. Attorney General v. Lowell, 246 Mass. 312, 320. See Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 598; 182 Mass. 605. This principle applies with special force to statutes enabling municipalities to enter into commercial activity. It was said in Donohue v. Newburyport, 211 Mass. 561, 567: "where cities and towns are authorized to enter the field of business enterprises, like the manufacture of gas and electricity, they do it not under the laws relating to private corporations . . . but under" special statutory provisions.
connection in this section naturally is confined to processes of manufacture and distribution. It does not extend to the establishment of a mercantile business for trading in the household furniture not permanently used by the municipality, which in the progress of the science of electricity may be utilized by householders in consuming electricity. It is apparent from s. 41 that the "appliances" to which reference has been made relate to those necessary to distribute electricity. The statute in s. 56 contains detailed provisions as to the duties of a manager of municipal lighting, but no reference is made to merchandising of chattels at retail. No officer or employee is designated to have charge of the kind and quantity of inventory or stock in trade to be carried, the prices to be charged, the determination of matters of credit, and other questions inherent and highly important in the conduct of a retail business. There is no reference in s. 57, touching income and expenses, which can by fair interpretation be held to govern retail sales and installation of apparatus in homes. Provision is made in s. 58A to protect the municipality against credit losses incurred in the sale of electricity. No provision is made for losses resulting from sales of appliances on credit. This in connection with other terms of the statute carries the implication that dealing in appliances in retail trade by the municipality was not contemplated by those who framed the statute.
The sale at retail of electrical appliances and the installation of electrical fittings are a separate business from the supply of electrical energy. There is no inherent and necessary connection between the two.
interpreted and do not permit such extension of interpretation.
For these reasons and on the authorities already reviewed, we are of opinion that the conduct of the business of selling electrical appliances as shown by this record is beyond the power conferred upon the town by the statute. Keen v. Waycross, 101 Ga. 588. Attorney General v. Leicester Corp.  2 Ch. 359, 373. Attorney General v. County of London Electric Supply Co. Ltd.  Ch. 542, 557. There are authorities to the contrary in other jurisdictions. Andrews v. South Haven, 187 Mich. 294. Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243; affirmed 275 U. S. 504. Mayfield v. Phipps, 203 Ky. 532. Milligan v. Miles City, 51 Mont. 374. Hamler v. Jacksonville, 97 Fla. 807, 812. Those decisions need not be reviewed. They are founded upon theories as to the business functions of municipal corporations diverse from those established in this Commonwealth by the decisions already cited.
The interpretation given to the governing provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 164 renders it unnecessary to discuss other questions argued. The decree dismissing the petition must be reversed. Upon the facts set forth in the master's report the petitioners are entitled to a decree in their favor.

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