Source: https://latinlawyer.com/chapter/1177366/representing-individual-executives-in-latin-america
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:12:30+00:00

Document:
Representing individuals who are being investigated by US regulators is a significant and complicated task, which becomes more complicated when these individuals are Latin American nationals living abroad. This chapter will discuss circumstances under which these nationals could come under US investigation, and key concerns that lawyers should consider when representing Latin American nationals in US regulatory or criminal investigations. As discussed below, US regulators may commence an investigation under various circumstances that can expose Latin American nationals not only to those investigations, but also to the related criminal or civil exposure.
First, we will discuss the potential for US law to apply to individuals located outside of the United States. Second, we will discuss the ability of US law enforcement to pursue actions against foreign nationals and individuals located outside of the United States. Third, we will cover the length of time the US government has to pursue an action against an individual located outside of the United States and ways in which US regulators can lengthen these limitations periods. Fourth, we will examine the risks of extradition to the United States, which vary based on location and offence. Fifth, we will examine the contours of the attorney–­client privilege and how it may impact an individual's defence. Sixth, we will discuss the law relating to an individual's right to indemnification for legal costs associated with investigations, an important issue in light of the significant cost of effective representation in the United States. Finally, we will examine how these factors may influence an individual's decision whether to cooperate with US regulators' investigations.
It is well settled that US federal law is presumed to apply only within the United States, unless Congress clearly provides otherwise.2 Congress has clearly stated that some laws provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction, meaning that US regulators can prosecute conduct that occurs outside the US borders. Latin American individuals operating abroad, and counsel representing them, should be aware of these laws and whether their conduct is subject to the extraterritorial reach of US law. Several of such laws are discussed briefly in turn.
Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), US antitrust law applies to anticompetitive activities outside the US when the foreign conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on US domestic commerce or import trade; and the effect gives rise to a claim under the Sherman Act.5 In these instances, the FTAIA gives the US Department of Justice (DOJ) the power to prosecute antitrust violations.
Certain offences related to the obstruction of justice expressly provide for extra­territorial application. These include witness tampering6 and retaliation against a witness.7 Obstruction of justice in the context of a government or regulatory investigation most commonly occurs when a witness takes action to impede or hinder a government investigation. For example, in United States v. Norris, 753 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 2010), the court affirmed the conviction of a national of the United Kingdom for conduct that took place wholly outside of the United States, including his or her efforts to influence the testimony of several witnesses in a US grand jury investigation.
The Federal Money Laundering Statutes8 impose criminal penalties for various money laundering offences. Both statutes provide the DOJ with extraterritorial jurisdiction: Section 1956 applies to 'foreign persons' who commit offences involving transactions, property or institutions with certain specified connections to the United States, and Section 1957 imposes criminal liability on 'United States person[s]' who engage in prohibited transactions 'outside of the United States'.
US regulatory and criminal investigations are routinely global in nature, which, in many instances, requires US regulators to seek documents or testimony from outside of the United States. Accordingly, it is important to be aware that US regulators attempting to collect documents and testimony from abroad are subject to certain constraints that are not present when collecting evidence in the United States. For instance, 28 U.S.C. Section 1783 authorises US courts to issue subpoenas to a US national or resident located in a foreign country to appear or to produce evidence. However, courts have held that Section 1783's subpoena power does not extend to foreign citizens or nationals present outside the United States.9 Despite Section 1783's limitation, US regulators still have certain methods of gathering evidence from foreign citizens and nationals residing abroad.
DOJ's methods of obtaining evidence from abroad can be grouped into formal and informal means. Formal requests include: letters rogatory, treaty requests and requests pursuant to executive agreements. A letter rogatory is a request from a judge in the United States to the judiciary of a foreign country requesting the performance of an act that, if done without the sanction of the foreign court, would constitute a violation of that country's sovereignty.10 Most treaty requests are made pursuant to a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT). An MLAT defines the mutual obligation between participating countries to provide assistance, the scope of assistance, and the contents of the request.11 Informal requests use ad hoc methods to secure assistance, often more quickly and flexibly than by formal means, but the evidence obtained may not always conform to the Federal Rules of Evidence or otherwise be admissible in a US proceeding.12 Executive agreements, are international agreements that are placed into force without the advice and consent of the Senate. Such agreements may provide alternative channels for obtaining evidence from abroad.
If a witness who ordinarily is not subject to a subpoena because he or she is located abroad voluntarily travels to the United States, US prosecutors may serve him or her with a subpoena and compel him or her to testify.14 Depending on the circumstances of the case, the witness may be served with the subpoena at the time and place he or she enters the United States, or at a later date if the DOJ becomes aware of the witness's presence in the United States.
The statute of limitations applicable to most federal criminal offences and conspiracies is five years from the date that the offence is committed.37 It is important to keep in mind that, under certain circumstances, the applicable statute of limitations may be tolled (i.e., suspended), while the individual is outside of the United States.
First, the government may request that the individual enter into a tolling agreement, extending the statute of limitations in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Depending on relevant factors, including the individual's status as a witness, subject or target of the investigation and their risk of extradition, it might make sense to enter into a tolling agreement for a number of reasons, such as to obtain more time to convince prosecutors not to file charges, or to provide the foreign national with immunity or cooperation credit.
Whether an individual in Latin America is at risk of extradition to the United States depends on the terms of the extradition treaty, if one exists, between the country in which they are located and the United States. The United States has entered into bilateral agreements with 20 Latin American countries regarding extradition.43 Counsel should consult the relevant treaty provisions for specific guidance.
Many extradition treaties contain dual criminality provisions, which tend to have the effect of limiting the circumstances under which foreign nationals may be extradited to the United States. Under such provisions, a person is extraditable only for offences punishable under the laws of both countries.44 Therefore, if the conduct that DOJ seeks to prosecute in the United States is not a criminal offence in the country where the individual is located that country is unlikely to extradite him or her to the United States for prosecution.
The United States' wide-ranging extradition treaties presents significant exposure for individuals subject to criminal prosecution in the United States even if they are not present in a Latin American country. The United States has extradition treaties with over 100 countries around the world. For example, all European Union member countries,50 except Croatia, have bilateral extradition treaties in force with the United States.51 An individual's risk of international travel, therefore, varies depending on the existence and terms of the treaty between the destination country and the United States. In one example, a defendant charged with FCPA violations in Mexico and Panama was arrested in the Netherlands while on personal travel and extradited to the United States.52 In another example, the DOJ charged five Venezuelan government officials with violations of the FCPA as part of its ongoing investigation into Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA).53 According to the indictment, the five officials were engaged in money laundering and bribery to secure contracts for PDVSA, the state-owned petroleum corporation. Four of the five defendants were arrested in Spain. One has already been extradited to the United States; the other three await extradition.54 An additional risk associated with international travel includes the possibility that a flight could be unexpectedly re-routed to a country with an extradition treaty with the United States. Of course, citizens from countries protecting its nationals from extradition cannot invoke this protection abroad.
Issues regarding the attorney–client and attorney work product privilege belonging to a company often arise in the representation of individuals where the individual's defence may require disclosure of privilege materials or assertion of the advice of counsel defence. In general, a US company will have custody of any privileged materials that may be relevant to an individual's defence, as well as have the right to decide whether to waive privilege over those materials.
It is often possible to obtain access to privileged information that the individual was party to or aware of pursuant to a joint defence or common interest agreement with the company, but the ability to disclose privileged information to the government in connection with a defence is much more difficult.
There are three scenarios in which otherwise privileged communications may be disclosed in a US government investigation regardless of the company's preference: the advice of counsel defence, the crime-fraud exception and the self-defence doctrine.
Absent one of these three situations, an individual must convince the company to waive privilege with respect to relevant information. This, however, can be risky for the company because selective or limited waiver of the attorney–client privilege has been generally rejected, and is generally disfavoured with respect to attorney work product unless there is a confidentiality agreement.58 Another significant complication that arises in the representation of Latin American foreign nationals is that the law relating to the attorney–client privilege in his or her respective country may not exist or may not be as strong as that in the United States. Under these circumstances, counsel may be able to freely use information or communications that would otherwise be privileged in the United States.
Adequate legal representation in a US government investigation is costly. Thus, whether an individual is entitled to, or can obtain, indemnification of legal expenses from his or her employer is a crucial consideration in any defence. The law in Delaware – where most large United States companies are headquartered and which is similar to the corporate law of many other states – may provide a backstop of coverage if the company is a subsidiary of a Delaware corporation. So too may a company's by-laws. For comprehensive protection, however, individuals should seek an indemnification agreement and make sure the company has a thorough insurance policy that will cover expenses relating to defending against a United States government investigation. At the outset of an investigation, the individual should establish whether he or she is entitled to indemnification by law or by agreement. If he or she is not already entitled to indemnification, he or she should seek indemnification from his or her employer on the grounds that it is in the company's best interest that the individual have access to the best representation possible. A company's agreement to indemnify an individual, however, may be subject to laws that prohibit a company from indemnifying employees for, among other things, wilful or bad-faith misconduct or fraud.
Delaware law also permits companies and individuals to enter into indemnification agreements, which are controlling as long as they do not conflict with a mandatory statutory provision.61 Thus, it is advisable to have an indemnification agreement that defines key terms, lays out indemnity procedure and provides quality insurance.
Because indemnification may not always be available, executives should also make sure that the company has a broad insurance policy that would cover their legal fees and expenses in the event of an investigation. Insurance policies usually cover formal claims – relating to civil, criminal and administrative matters – but should also cover informal proceedings. Without these protections, the policy provisions may not trigger until it is too late, if at all.
The extraterritorial reach of the relevant law, the ability of a United States court to exercise jurisdiction, the statute of limitations, the risk of extradition, the indemnification of legal costs, access to and the ability to disclose privileged information are all key factors that should influence an individual's decision to cooperate with a government investigation in the United States and the extent of that cooperation. Individuals should also consider whether immunity may be available in exchange for information they can provide.
Other key considerations include whether an individual's employment will be jeopardised by the failure to cooperate and whether cooperation is necessary to maintain goodwill in the industry generally. For example, an older individual, close to retirement, that faces little risk of extradition and has no need to travel may choose not to cooperate because the potential of an indictment or other enforcement action is unlikely to have a material effect on his or her quality of life.
Cooperation may take many forms. On one end of the spectrum, of course, is the decision not to cooperate by refusing to provide information to the government and an employer conducting an internal investigation. On the other end of the spectrum is the decision to come to the United States to provide information and testimony either on a voluntary basis or pursuant to a subpoena. There are, of course, numerous options in between, such as allowing your attorney to provide information via an attorney proffer, submitting to a voluntary interview via telephone or videoconference. If an individual is considering coming the United States to sit for an interview in a criminal investigation, it is generally advisable to ask for a safe passage letter that provides assurance that the individual will not be arrested or served with process during the trip and that the prosecutor will not share information about the trip with other government bodies. In sum, there are numerous important considerations when mounting a defence to a United States investigation of an individual in Latin America that lawyers and their clients should carefully consider.
001 Mauricio A España, Hector Gonzalez and Andrew J Levander are partners, and Mariel Bronen, Emlyn Mandel and Yando Peralta are associates at Dechert LLP.
2 Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
3 See 15 U.S.C §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (1977).
4 See US Dept. of Justice and SEC, A Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at 10-12 (2012).
5 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957.
9 See Aristocrat Leisure Ltd v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co Americas, 262 F.R.D. 293, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (In any event, courts faced with similar circumstances have found that foreign nationals living abroad are not subject to subpoena service outside the United States); U.S. v. Taveras, No. 04-CR-156 (JBW), 2006 WL 1875339, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. 5 July 2006). ([T]he federal district court's power of subpoena does not extend to non-citizens beyond the nation's borders); United States v. Korolkov, 870 F. Supp. 60, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). (The government is unable to compel the attendance of any of these witnesses at trial at New York (under § 1783 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). As there [sic] are not citizens of the United States and do not reside here, they are not amenable to United States subpoenas); United States v. Serhan, No. 14-20685, 2015 WL 4886578, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 17 Aug 2015) (holding § 1783 does not allow the government, in a criminal proceeding, to subpoena a non-resident, non-national living outside the United States).
10 See US Attorney's Resource Manual, Criminal Resource Manual, CRM 1-499, CRM 275.
12 id. at CRM 266-285.
13 See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
14 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 15; 18 U.S.C. § 3503.
15 US Attorney's Resource Manual, Criminal Resource Manual, CRM 1-499, CRM 285.
16 United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1988) (approving the use of depositions taken pursuant to letter rogatory where defendants were not present at French deposition, defence counsel were not permitted to be present while the witness testified, and the presiding magistrate conducted the examination, asking questions counsel submitted in writing).
17 7 U.S.C. § 9(5).
18 Id. at § 9(7).
19 28 U.S.C. § 1783.
20 See SEC Division of Enforcement, Office of Chief Counsel, Enforcement Manual at 17 (28 November 2017).
21 Under Rule 8 of the SEC's Rules Relating to Investigations (17 C.F.R. § 203.8), service of subpoenas issued in formal investigative proceedings shall be effected in the manner prescribed by Rule 232(c) of the SEC's Rules of Practice (17 C.F.R. § 201.232(c)). Rule 232(c), in turn, states that service shall be made pursuant to the provisions of Rule 150(b) through (d) of the SEC's Rules of Practice (17 C.F.R. §§ 201.150(b) through (d)).
22 470 F.Supp. 1307 (D.D.C.1978).
23 SEC v. Zanganeh, 470 F.Supp. 1307 (D.D.C.1978).
25 See SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945); Ludlow Corp v. DeSmedt, 249 F.Supp. 496, 500–01 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. FMC v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974, 87 S.Ct. 513, 17 L.Ed.2d 437 (1966) (broadly construing the agency's power to require the production of documents located outside the country, but it was careful to acknowledge 'that the service of the subpoena [was] made within the territorial limits of the United States').
26 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir. 1996).
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); SEC v. Sharef, 924 F. Supp. 2d 539, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
28 Sharef, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 252, 546.
29 U.S. Dept. of Justice and SEC, 'A Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act' at 10–12 (2012). In courts outside of the Second Circuit, a foreign individual may also be subject to jurisdiction if he or she aids, abets or conspires with an issuer or US person or entity, regardless of whether the foreign individual takes any action in the United States. See United States v. Hoskins, No. 16-cr-1010 (2d Cir, 24 Aug 2018).
30 See Sharef, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 547; In re Royal Ahold N.V. Securities & ERISA Litigation, 351 F.Supp.2d 334, 351–52 (D.Md.2004) (United States courts frequently have asserted personal jurisdiction over [foreign] individual defendants who sign or, as control persons, approve the filing or dissemination of, particular forms required by the SEC that they knew or should have known would be relied on by US investors).
31 In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp. 3d 731, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
34 Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56.
36 Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 262-64. See also Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413 (10th Cir. 1996) (determining that a former president of Bahamian companies had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to support the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction enforcing administrative subpoena duces tecum issued by SEC, based on his trading activities on behalf of the companies directed toward United States and relating to matters underlying the SEC investigation).
37 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley–Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 155 (1987) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3282 establishes a five-year limitations period for non-capital federal offences); US v. Grimm, 738 F. 3d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the statute of limitations applicable to conspiracies is five years from the date that the offence is committed); 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offence, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offence shall have been committed.).
38 18 U.S.C. § 3292(b).
39 United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 541 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing several counts of an indictment on the grounds that it was returned outside of the limitations period); but see United States v. Bischel, 61 F.3d 1429, 1434 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Neill, 940 F. Supp. 332, 336-337 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated in part on other grounds, 952 F.Supp. 831 (D.D.C.1996).
40 United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 1998); Donnell v. United States, 229 F.2d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 149–151 (2d Cir. 2006).
41 In jurisdictions where 'mere absence' from the jurisdiction is enough to satisfy § 3290, courts must, nevertheless, examine the defendant's intent in cases where the defendant did not physically leave the relevant jurisdiction. In Matter of Extradition of Liuksila, 133 F. Supp. 3d 249, 257 (D.D.C. 2016).
42 See United States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 1070, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 1994); Florez, 447 F.3d at 153.
43 See Extradition Treaty, Dom. Rep.-U.S., 12 Jan 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1215 (Dominican Republic); Extradition Treaty, Chile-U.S., 5 June 2013, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1214 (Chile); Extradition Treaty, Peru-U.S., 26 July 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 03-825 (Peru); Extradition Treaty, Para.-U.S., 9 Nov 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12,995 (Paraguay); Treaty on Extradition, Arg.-U.S., 10 June 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 12,866 (Argentina); Treaty on Extradition, Bol.-U.S., 27 June 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 96-1121 (Bolivia); Extradition Treaty, Costa Rica-U.S., 4 Dec 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-17 (1982) (Costa Rica); Extradition Treaty, Colom.-U.S., Sept. 14, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 97-8 (1979) (Colombia); Extradition Treaty, With Appendix, Mex.-U.S., 4 May 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9,656 (Mexico); Treaty on Extradition and Cooperation in Penal Matters. Uru.-U.S., 6 Apr 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 10,850 (Uruguay); Treaty of Extradition, Braz.-U.S., 13 Jan 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 5,691 (Brazil); Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Extradition, Braz.-U.S., 18 June 1962, T.I.A.S. No. 5,691 (Brazil); Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Guat.-U.S., 27 Feb 1903, T.S. No. 425 (Guatemala); Supplementary Extradition Convention, Guat.-U.S., 20 Feb 1940, T.S. No. 963 (Guatemala); Extradition Treaty, Ecuador-U.S., 28 June 1872, T.S. No. 79 (Ecuador); Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Ecuador-U.S., Sept. 22, 1939, T.S. No. 972 (Ecuador); Treaty for the Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Hond.-U.S., 15 Jan 1909, T.S. No. 569 (Honduras); Supplementary Extradition Convention, Hond.-U.S., 21 Feb 1927, T.S. No. 761 (Honduras); 'Treaty Providing for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Cuba-U.S., 6 Apr 1904, T.S. No. 440 (Cuba); Additional Extradition Treaty, Cuba-U.S., 14 Jan 1926, T.S. No. 737 (Cuba)' Treaty of Extradition, and Additional Article, U.S.-Venez., Jan. 19 and 21, 1922, T.S. No. 675 (Venezuela); Treaty of Extradition, El Sal.-U.S., 18 Apr 1911, T.S. No. 560 (El Salvador); Treaty on Extradition, Nicar.-U.S., 1 Mar 1905, T.S. No. 462 (Nicaragua); Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Haiti-U.S., 9 Aug 1904, T.S. No. 447 (Haiti); Treaty Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, Pan.-U.S., 25 May 1904, T.S. No. 445 (Panama).
44 e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Arg.-U.S., at art. 2.
45 e.g., Extradition Treaty, Dom. Rep.-U.S., at art. 3.
46 e.g., Extradition Treaty, Chile-U.S., at art. 2.
47 e.g., Extradition Treaty, Colom.-U.S., Sept. 14, 1979, at Appendix.
48 See Extradition Treaty, With Appendix, Mex.-U.S., at art. 9.
49 See Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 5 (Braz.).
50 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. EU Member Countries, Europa.eu available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/index_en.htm (11 April 2015).
51 Treaties in Force, U.S. Dept. of State, available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282222.pdf(1 January 2018).
52 See Dep't of Justice, 'Former Chief Executive Officer of Lufthansa Subsidiary BizJet Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges', Justice.gov, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-chief-executive-officer-lufthansa-subsidiary-bizjet-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery.
53 See Dep't of Justice, 'Five Former Venezuelan Government Officials Charged in Money Laundering Scheme Involving Foreign Bribery', Justice.gov, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-former-venezuelan-government-officials-charged-money-laundering-scheme-involving-forei-0.
55 See Moskowitz v. Lopp, 28 F.R.D. 624, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (permitting individual officers to raise the advice-of-counsel defense without the consent of the corporation and observing that —'[a]lthough in theory the privilege belongs to the corporation, fairness dictates that it be waived where a corporate officer asserts the reliance on counsel defense.' (citations omitted)).
57 See S.E.C. v. Forma, 117 F.R.D. 516, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognising that the self-defence doctrine permits an attorney to disclose attorney–client communications in order to defend himself against accusations of wrongful conduct and finding that attorney appropriately gave testimony in SEC investigation that waived the attorney–client privilege).
58 See In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir.1993); Permian Corp v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1217-18, 1219-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
59 8 Del. C. § 145(a)-(b).
62 See 734 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
63 See id. at 1322.

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