Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/394/576/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:07:14+00:00

Document:
1. Appellant has met the burden of showing that the federal question of constitutionality of the "words" part of the statute was adequately raised in the state courts, by appellant's motion to dismiss in the trial court and his briefs in the appellate courts. Pp. 394 U. S. 581-585.
2. The application of § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, to appellant was violative of rights of free expression assured against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it permitted him to be punished merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the American flag. Pp. 394 U. S. 581, 394 U. S. 585-594.
(a) Appellant's conviction must be set aside if it could have been based solely upon his words, or upon both his words and his act, and if a conviction on such a basis would be unconstitutional. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (131); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). Pp. 394 U. S. 585-588.
(b) The record here is insufficient to eliminate the possibility that appellant's words were the sole basis of his conviction or that he was convicted for both his words and his deed. Pp. 394 U. S. 588-590.
(c) Appellant's conviction under § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, for speaking she did could not be constitutionally justified on the basis that the words he uttered (1) constituted incitement to others to commit unlawful acts; (2) were so inflammatory as to provoke violent retaliation by others; (3) were (apart from the content of the ideas they conveyed) likely to shock passers-by; or (4), in the light of Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), constituted failure by the appellant to manifest the respect which every citizen must show the flag. Pp. 394 U. S. 590-593.
"publicly [to] mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or act [any flag of the United States]." [Footnote 1] He was given a suspended sentence. We must decide whether, in light of all the circumstances, that conviction denied to him rights of free expression protected by the First Amendment and assured against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 376 U. S. 269, 376 U. S. 271, 376 U. S. 271-277 (1964).
appellant, he heard appellant say, "We don't need no damn flag," and that, when he asked appellant whether he had burned the flag, appellant replied: "Yes; that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that happen to Meredith, we don't need an American flag." Appellant admitted making the latter response, but he denied that he said anything else, and asserted that he always had remained on the corner with the flag.
"the crime of Malicious Mischief in that [he] did willfully and unlawfully defile, cast contempt upon and burn an American Flag, in violation of 1425-16-D of the Penal Law, under the following circumstances: . . . [he] did willfully and unlawfully set fire to an American Flag and shout, 'If they did that to Meredith, We don't need an American Flag.'"
punish one who publicly destroys or damages an American flag as a means of protest, because such an act constitutes expression protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. We deem it unnecessary to consider the latter two arguments, for we hold that § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, was unconstitutionally applied in appellant's case because it permitted him to be punished merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the American flag. In taking this course, we resist the pulls to decide the constitutional issues involved in this case on a broader basis than the record before us imperatively requires.
appellant's conviction. If the question was not so presented, then we have no power to consider it. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257(2), 1257(3); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 326 U. S. 206-207 (1945). Moreover, this Court has stated that, when, as here, the highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary. See, e.g., Bailey v. Anderson, supra; Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. McGuire, 196 U. S. 128, 196 U. S. 131-133 (1905).
"Before we plead to this case, I would like to make a motion to dismiss the information upon the ground it does not state facts to constitute a crime on the following grounds: the defendant was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, to-wit, freedom of speech. The allegation simply says that the defendant did willfully and unlawfully set fire to an American flag, and did say: 'If they did that to Meredith we don't need an American flag.' Under the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States and under the New York State constitution on freedom of speech, they provide for protest in many forms, whether it be by burning a flag, demonstration or picketing. This is a form of demonstration and protest. "
The issue whether a federal question was sufficiently and properly raised in the state courts is itself ultimately a federal question, as to which this Court is not bound by the decision of the state courts. [Footnote 5] However, it is not entirely clear whether, in such cases, the scope of our review is limited to determining whether the state court has "bypassed the federal right under forms of local procedure" or whether we should decide the matter "de novo for ourselves." Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U. S. 458, 349 U. S. 463 (1955). In either event, we think appellant has met the burden of showing that the issue of the constitutionality of the "words" part of 1425, subd. 16, par. d, was adequately raised in the state trial court. The motion quoted above explicitly referred to appellant's words. Appellant's counsel termed appellant's overall activity a "demonstration" or "protest," terms which encompass words as well as conduct. Indeed, if appellant's intention was to protest alleged governmental inaction in connection with the shooting of James Meredith, his words were an essential element, for, without them, no one would have known the object of his protest.
"There are various ways in which the validity of a state statute may be drawn in question on the ground that it is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. No particular form of words or phrases is essential, but only that the claim of invalidity and the ground therefor be brought to the attention of the state court with fair precision and in due time. And if the record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear intendment that this was done, the claim is to be regarded as having been adequately presented."
his raising of the issue in the two appellate courts. [Footnote 7] We therefore conclude that the question is properly before us.
be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause. . . . It follows that . . . the conviction cannot be upheld."
Id. at 283 U. S. 367-368.
"To say that a general verdict of guilty should be upheld though we cannot know that it did not rest on the invalid constitutional ground . . . would be to countenance a procedure which would cause a serious impairment of constitutional rights."
Id. at 317 U. S. 292. The rule was again applied in Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 325 U. S. 36, n. 45 (1945); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 337 U. S. 5-6 (1949), and Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 354 U. S. 311 (1957).
unconstitutional -- a matter to which we shall turn in a moment.
"The motion for the fiat in contempt was filed and the fiat itself was issued on account of both invitations. The order adjudging Thomas in contempt was in general terms, finding that he had violated the restraining order, without distinction between the solicitations set forth in the petition and proved as violations. The sentence was a single penalty. In this state of the record, it must be taken that the order followed the prayer of the motion and the fiat's recital, and that the penalty was imposed on account of both invitations. The judgment therefore must be affirmed as to both or as to neither. Cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 317 U. S. 292; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 283 U. S. 368."
We take the rationale of Thomas to be that, when a single-count indictment or information charges the commission of a crime by virtue of the defendant's having done both a constitutionally protected act and one which may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict ensues without elucidation, there is an unacceptable danger that the trier of fact will have regarded the two acts as "intertwined" and have rested the conviction on both together. See 323 U.S. at 323 U. S. 528-529, 323 U. S. 540-541. There is no comparable hazard when the indictment or information is in several counts and the conviction is explicitly declared to rest on findings of guilt on certain of those counts, [Footnote 9] for, in such instances, there is positive evidence that the trier of fact considered each count on its own merits, and separately from the others.
f they did that to Meredith, We don't need an American Flag.'" Section 1425, subd. 16, par. d, the statute which appellant was charged with violating, made it a crime not only publicly to mutilate a flag, but also "publicly [to] defy . . . or cast contempt upon [any American flag] by words."
action in burning the flag than upon his words, a police officer did testify to the utterance of the words. The State never announced that it was relying exclusively upon the burning. The trial judge never indicated during the trial that he regarded appellant's words as relating solely to intent. The judge found appellant guilty immediately after the end of the trial, and he delivered no oral or written opinion.
furthered by punishing appellant for his words: (1) an interest in deterring appellant from vocally inciting others to commit unlawful acts; (2) an interest in preventing appellant from uttering words so inflammatory that they would provoke others to retaliate physically against him, thereby causing a breach of the peace; (3) an interest in protecting the sensibilities of passers-by who might be shocked by appellant's words about the American flag, and (4) an interest in assuring that appellant, regardless of the impact of his words upon others, showed proper respect for our national emblem.
In the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that any of these interests may constitutionally justify appellant's conviction under § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, for speaking as he did. We begin with the interest in preventing incitement. Appellant's words, taken alone, did not urge anyone to do anything unlawful. They amounted only to somewhat excited public advocacy of the idea that the United States should abandon, at least temporarily, one of its national symbols. It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from imposing criminal punishment for public advocacy of peaceful change in our institutions. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (I), 379 U. S. 536, 379 U. S. 546-552 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 372 U. S. 237-238 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 337 U. S. 4-5 (1949); cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 354 U. S. 318-319 (1957). Even assuming that appellant's words might be found incitive when considered together with his simultaneous burning of the flag, § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, does not purport to punish only those defiant or contemptuous words which amount to incitement, and there is no evidence that the state courts regarded the statute as so limited. Hence, a conviction for words could not be upheld on this basis. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, supra; Terminiello v. Chicago, supra.
Nor could such a conviction be justified on the second ground mentioned above: the possible tendency of appellant's words to provoke violent retaliation. Though it is conceivable that some listeners might have been moved to retaliate upon hearing appellant's disrespectful words, we cannot say that appellant's remarks were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that small class of "fighting words" which are "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 315 U. S. 574 (1942). And even if appellant's words might be found within that category, § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, is not narrowly drawn to punish only words of that character, and there is no indication that it was so interpreted by the state courts. Hence, this case is again distinguishable from Chaplinsky, supra, in which the Court emphasized that the statute was "carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression. . . ." Id. at 315 U. S. 574. See also Terminiello v. Chicago, supra.
Again, such a conviction could not be sustained on the ground that appellant's words were likely to shock passers-by. Except perhaps for appellant's incidental use of the word "damn," upon which no emphasis was placed at trial, [Footnote 11] any shock effect of appellant's speech must be attributed to the content of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (I), supra; Edwards v. South Carolina, supra; Terminiello v. Chicago, supra; cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). And even if such a conviction might be upheld on the ground of "shock," there is again no indication that the state courts regarded the statute as limited to that purpose.
"The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure, but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. . . . [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."
Id. at 319 U. S. 641-642. (Footnote omitted.) We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed "freedom to be intellectually . . . diverse or even contrary," and the "right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order," encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous.
Since appellant could not constitutionally be punished under 1425, subd. 16, par. d, for his speech, and since we have found that he may have been so punished, his conviction cannot be permitted to stand. In so holding, we reiterate that we have no occasion to pass upon the validity of this conviction insofar as it was sustained by the state courts on the basis that Street could be punished for his burning of the flag, even though the burning was an act of protest. Nor do we perceive any basis for our Brother WHITE's fears that our decision today may be taken to require reversal whenever a defendant is convicted for burning a flag in protest, following a trial at which his words have been introduced to prove some element of that offense. Assuming that such a conviction would otherwise pass constitutional muster, a matter about which we express no view, nothing in this opinion would render the conviction impermissible merely because an element of the crime was proved by the defendant's words, rather than in some other way. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 391 U. S. 369-370, 391 U. S. 376-377 (1968).
We add that disrespect for our flag is to be deplored no less in these vexed times than in calmer periods of our history. Cf. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907). Nevertheless, we are unable to sustain a conviction that may have rested on a form of expression, however distasteful, which the Constitution tolerates and protects.
Only last Term, this Court held, in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 390 U. S. 633, n. 2 (1968), that the case of a New York appellant was not moot even though the time for revocation of his suspended sentence had expired, because it was possible that his license to operate a luncheonette might be withdrawn in consequence of his conviction. Here there is an actual, rather than merely a potential, threat that appellant will be deprived of his employment, albeit only temporarily. This Court also held last Term, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 392 U. S. 50-58 (1968), that the case of a New York appellant who had fully served his misdemeanor sentence was not moot, because he apparently could not have brought his case to this Court before completion of his sentence and because the conviction could be used for impeachment and sentencing purposes in future criminal proceedings. Appellant Street similarly was unable, despite diligent prosecution of his appeals, to bring his case here within a year of his sentencing. He is subject to all of the collateral penalties to which Sibron was liable. Hence, both Ginsberg and Sibron dictate that this case is not moot.
See, e.g., Parker v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 571, 333 U. S. 574 (1948); Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 177 U. S. 447 (1900); R. Robertson & F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 63 at 112 n. 1 (R. Tolfson & P. Kurland ed.1951), and other cases there cited.
We find unpersuasive the State's argument that appellant's omission to raise the question of the constitutionality of the "words" provision is shown by his failure at any stage to invoke the exclusionary rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), with respect to the admission of his words into evidence. For the State concedes that appellant's words were probative at least with respect to his unlawful intent in burning the flag, see Brief for Appellee 45-46, and appellant therefore would have had reason to invoke Miranda even had he believed the "words" part of the statute to be irrelevant.
See, e.g., Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140 (1891); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 (1946); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 (1959).
The State also contends that appellant's words could not have been a ground of conviction because they obviously were not spoken "publicly," as required by § 1425, subd. 16, par. d. However, although appellant testified that he spoke solely to a police officer, the officer himself gave evidence from which the trial judge might have concluded that appellant's remarks were made either to or within hearing of a small crowd. See supra at 394 U. S. 578-579. Moreover, the sworn information recited that appellant "shout[ed]" his words on a city street, thereby apparently satisfying the statutory requirement that the words be said "publicly."
"We are called upon to decide whether the deliberate act of burning an American flag in public as a 'protest' may be punished as a crime. [Footnote 2/1]"
"May New York State constitutionally impose penal sanctions upon an individual charged with destroying or damaging an American flag in an attempt to dramatize his concern with social conditions existing in the country? [Footnote 2/2]"
"May the State of New York constitutionally impose penal sanctions upon one who is charged with publicly and deliberately desecrating an American flag as a means of dramatizing his dissatisfaction with social conditions existing within our Country? [Footnote 2/3]"
peripheral Stromberg ground, holding that it is impossible to determine the basis for appellant's conviction. In my opinion a reading of the short trial record leaves no doubt that appellant was convicted solely for burning the American flag.
"Sidney Street did commit the crime of Malicious Mischief in that the defendant did willfully and unlawfully defile, cast contempt upon and burn an American Flag, in violation of 1425-16-D of the Penal Law, under the following circumstances: on the aforesaid date, place and time, the defendant did willfully and unlawfully set fire to an American Flag and shout, 'If they did that to Meredith, We don't need an American Flag.'"
state facts to constitute a crime on the following grounds: the defendant was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, to-wit, freedom of speech. The allegation simply says that the defendant did willfully and unlawfully set fire to an American flag and did say: 'If they did that to Meredith we don't need an American flag.' Under the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States and under the New York State constitution on freedom of speech they provide for protest in many forms, whether it be by burning a flag, demonstration or picketing. This is a form of demonstration and protest."
"Court: You say burning the flag is a form of demonstration?"
"Mr. Goldstick: Also, there is a Federal statute which provides for burning the flag. I refer Your Honor -- "
"Court, interposing: So does Section 1425 provide for the lawful disposition of a flag,"
"Mr. Goldstick, continuing: I refer Your Honor to page 6 of my brief, referring to the United States Code that a flag, when it is in such a condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display, should be destroyed in a dignified way, preferably by burning."
"Now, under the supremacy clause, if there is any conflict with any statute the Federal statute takes precedence; if a State law is in conflict with a Federal law the Federal law takes precedence. The Federal law provides you may burn an American flag; therefore, New York State is without power to make a complaint and convict a man for the burning of an American flag. "
"Court: Motions denied. The question here would be whether he burned it because it was in such poor condition that it should be burned, or if it was an illegal demonstration."
whether he was responsible for the burning of the flag; appellant replied that he was and that: "If they let that happen to Meredith, we don't need an American flag." The officer's testimony concluded with a description of the number of people in the vicinity and the extinguishing of the fire. During cross-examination of the officer, defense counsel asked not one question concerning what, if anything, appellant said.
would impinge upon First Amendment freedoms. Since the jury charge was disjunctive, i.e., Miss Stromberg could be convicted if the jury found that she conducted the ceremony for any of the three statutorily prohibited goals, it was possible that her conviction rested totally upon an act entitled to constitutional protection. Presumably, given the jury's general verdict, it could have convicted Miss Stromberg for raising a red flag solely as a symbol of opposition to organized government, but not as either an invitation to anarchistic action or an aid to propaganda of a seditious character.
My analysis is confirmed by an examination of the other cases upon which the Court relies. Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942), presents a factual pattern identical to Stromberg. Williams, a resident of North Carolina, obtained a Nevada divorce and then remarried in Nevada. Upon his return to North Carolina, Williams was convicted of bigamous cohabitation. The jury was charged that it could convict Williams if it found either that he procured the divorce based upon substituted service or that he went to Nevada not to establish a bona fide residence, but rather to obtain a divorce through a fraud upon the Nevada courts. Holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required North Carolina to respect Williams' Nevada divorce even though acquired by substituted service, the Court reversed Williams' conviction, since it was possible that the jury found the divorce was not procured by fraud, yet convicted Williams. Under this state of facts, the conviction could have been based upon the acquisition of a divorce North Carolina was constitutionally compelled to honor.
for organizing even if it found that he was not guilty of advocacy, the conviction was reversed.
"the record precludes the inference that appellant's conviction might have been based solely on his words, we are still bound to reverse if the conviction could have been based upon both his words and his act."
the occasion and of all that was said or done. . . . How one might 'laud unionism,' as the State and the State Supreme Court concede Thomas was free to do, yet in these circumstances not imply an invitation, is hard to conceive. This is the nub of the case, which the State fails to meet because it cannot do so."
Id. at 323 U. S. 534-535. Having so held, it was unnecessary for the Court to determine if an individual solicitation could have been enjoined. The union organizer therefore was entitled to relief without regard to whether his conviction was based upon the general or the individual solicitation.
protest and those who must enforce the law are entitled to know the scope of constitutional protection. The Court's explicit reservation of the constitutionality of flag-burning prohibitions encourages others to test in the streets the power of our States and National Government to impose criminal sanctions upon those who would desecrate the flag.
"Mr. Goldstick [appellant's counsel]: Before we plead to this case, I would like to make a motion to dismiss the information upon the ground it does not state facts to constitute a crime on the following grounds: the defendant was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, to-wit, freedom of speech. The allegation simply says that the defendant did willfully and unlawfully set fire to an American flag and did say: 'If they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag.' Under the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and under the New York State constitution on freedom of speech, they provide for protest in many forms, whether it be by burning a flag, demonstration or picketing. This is a form of demonstration and protest. "
"Now, under the supremacy clause, if there is any conflict with any statute the Federal statute takes precedence; if a State law is in conflict with a Federal law the Federal law takes precedence. The Federal law provides you may burn an American flag; therefore, New York State is without power to make a complaint and convict a man for the burning of an American flag."
"Mr. Goldstick: Under the supremacy --"
"Mr. Goldstick: I plead the defendant not guilty and take exception to Your Honor's rulings."
"Court: Proceed, You may sit down, counselor. Now, we have two cases, One is Disorderly Conduct and one is Malicious Mischief."
"Mr. Goldstick: I see nothing in the information regarding a charge of Disorderly Conduct. "
"Court: We have two charges before me!"
"Show the complaints to counsel!"
"Mr. Bonomo [the prosecutor]: We have two separate complaints! (Handing papers to Mr. Goldstick.)"
"Mr. Goldstick: I plead not guilty to the Disorderly Conduct charge, too, Your Honor."
"Court: Are you ready for trial in each case?"
"Court: Do you stipulate that the two cases will be tried together and the facts adduced in one will be applied to the other wherever necessary, and there will be separate findings on the facts and the law and separate judgments may be rendered?"
"Mr. Goldstick: I so stipulate."
"Mr. Goldstick: Before I cross-examine, I move to dismiss both charges upon the ground the People failed to make out a prima facie case."
"Court: Are you going to cross-examine?"
"Mr. Goldstick: Yes, but I am making a motion before cross-examination!"
"Mr. Goldstick: No further questions."
"Mr. Bonomo: People's case, in each case!"
upon the ground the People failed to prove a prima facie case."
"Court: Motion denied as to each case."
"Q. Did the officer speak to you or did you speak to him?"
"A. He spoke to me."
"Q. What did he say?"
"A. He asked me if I set fire to the flag. I said yes."
"A. I said: 'If they do what they had [sic] to Meredith, we don't need this flag.'"
"Q. While you were burning this flag, did anybody say anything to you other than this police officer?"
"A. I noticed no unusual crowd."
"Q. Where is that corner?"
"A. St. James and Lafayette."
"Q. Were you on the curb or in the street?"
"A. I was on the curb. The flag was laying on the curb."
"Q. When the police officer came up to you, were you still by the flag?"
"Q. The flag was still burning when the officer came?"
"Q. Other than saying to the police officer, 'if they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag,' did you speak to anybody else at the time?"
"Mr. Goldstick: No further questions,"
"Mr. Goldstick: The defendant rests."
"Mr. Bonomo: The People rest."
"Mr. Goldstick: I move to dismiss on all the constitutional grounds previously made, on all the grounds provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and also upon the ground the People failed to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt."
"Court: On the charge of Disorderly Conduct, the defendant is acquitted; on the charge of Malicious Mischief, the defendant is convicted."
"Mr. Goldstick: May we have next Tuesday for sentence?"
"Court: No, that is not enough time, August 9th for sentence; bail continued."
I need not consider to what extent the Thomas Court's implicit assumption that Thomas could test the constitutionality of the restraining order without first attempting to secure judicial relief is inconsistent with Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U. S. 307 (1967); see id. at 388 U. S. 336 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).
feel constrained, as the Court seems to be, to search my imagination to see if I could think of interests the State may have in suppressing this freedom of speech. I would not balance away the First Amendment mandate that speech not be abridged in any fashion whatsoever. But I accept the unanimous opinion of the New York Court of Appeals that the conviction does not and could not have rested merely on the spoken words but that it rested entirely on the fact that the defendant had publicly burned the American flag -- against the law of the State of New York.
"It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 336 U. S. 498 (1949). In my view, this quotation from the Giboney case precisely applies here. The talking that was done took place "as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute" against burning the American flag in public. I would therefore affirm this conviction.
judgment; since the conviction might logically have been for speech alone or for both words and deeds, and since, in either event, the conviction is invalid, the judgment of the New York courts must be set aside without passing upon the validity of a conviction for burning the flag. [Footnote 3/1] I reach precisely the opposite conclusion; before Street's conviction can be either reversed or affirmed, the Court must reach and decide the validity of a conviction for flag burning.
from the state courts, I would not assume that the particular words which Street spoke in this case would be deemed within the coverage of the statute. In any event, if Street was convicted for speaking, he most certainly was also convicted for flag burning. Hence, Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), and like cases to which I adhere, have no application by their own terms.
I reject also the proposition that, if Street was convicted for both burning and talking, his conviction must be reversed if the speech conviction is unconstitutional. The Court initially cites Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945), for the rule that, where two acts violative of a statute are charged, a verdict of guilty on both acts and a single sentence must be reversed if conviction for either act is invalid. This has never been the prevailing rule in this country or in this Court, either before or after Thomas v. Collins. The Court in that case cited no authority for the proposition other than Stromberg and William.s v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942), neither of which announced that rule. I am not convinced that the rule stated by the Thomas Court was necessary for reversal, but whether dictum or not the rule on which the Court relies today is at odds with many cases in this Court.
"And it is settled law in this court, and in this country generally, that, in any criminal case a general verdict and judgment on an indictment or information containing several counts cannot be reversed on error, if any one of the counts is good and warrants the judgment, because, in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary, the presumption of law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count only. Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 11 U. S. 344; Clifton v. United States, 4 How.
242, 45 U. S. 250; Snyder v. United States, 112 U. S. 216; Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604, 112 U. S. 609; 1 Bishop Crim. Pro. § 1015; Wharton Crim.Pl. & Pract. § 771."
"Since this sentence was less than the maximum punishment authorized by the statute for conviction under any one Count, the judgment below must be upheld if the conviction upon any of the Counts is sustainable."
Recognizing the aberrance of Thomas, the Court now gives that case a new and more confusing gloss. The general finding of guilt for both speaking at a meeting and for an individual solicitation was reversed, we are told, because the speech and solicitation were intertwined, making it uncertain that there was or would have been a judgment of guilty on the solicitation alone. Aside from the fact that Thomas itself said the penalty was imposed for both violations, the rationale which the Court extracts from the facts and judgment in that case hardly qualifies as a constitutional standard to be applied willy-nilly in all cases where there is a general verdict on a count charging dual violations. The Court is capable of more discriminating judgment than to insist on its newly fashioned doctrine in a case like Street's where it is so clear that there was at least a conviction for a public burning of the American flag.
The Court is obviously wrong in reversing the judgment below because it believes that Street was unconstitutionally convicted for speaking. Reversal can follow only if the Court reaches the conviction for flag burning and finds that conviction, as well as the assumed conviction for speech, to be violative of the First Amendment. [Footnote 3/3] For myself, without the benefit of the majority's thinking if it were to find flag burning protected by the First Amendment, I would sustain such a conviction. I must dissent.
The Court's theory is not that of unconstitutional overbreadth; it does not argue that New York may not convict for burning because the entire statute is unconstitutional for permitting convictions for insulting speech as well as for the act of flag burning.
E.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 328 U. S. 641-642, n. 1 (1946); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431, 297 U. S. 438 (1936); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 279 U. S. 299 (1929); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 250 U. S. 619 (1919); Ballew v. United States, 160 U. S. 187, 160 U. S. 197-203 (1895); Goode v. United States, 159 U. S. 663, 159 U. S. 669 (1895); Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584, 153 U. S. 595 (1894); Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 608 (1894). This Court has recognized the applicability of the same rule to court-martial proceedings, Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 183 U. S. 384-387 (1902); to forfeiture actions, Snyder v. United States, 112 U. S. 216, 112 U. S. 217 (1884), Clifton v. United States, 4 How. 242, 45 U. S. 250 (1846), Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 11 U. S. 344 (1813), and to civil cases under state law, Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604, 112 U. S. 609 (1884). In United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 380 U. S. 65 (1965), the Court applied the related concurrent sentence rule to a general sentence on a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several counts. See Transcript of Record 48-50, No. 13, October Term, 1964.
Arguably, under today's decision, any conviction for flag burning where the defendant's words are critical to proving intent or some other element of the crime would be invalid, since the conviction would be based in part on speech. The Court disclaims this result, but without explaining why it would not reverse a conviction for burning where words spoken at the time are necessarily used to prove a case and yet reverse burning convictions on precisely the same evidence simply because on that evidence the defendant might also have been convicted for speaking. The Court's seemingly narrow holding may be of potentially broader application, particularly in view of Thomas v. Collins as now rewritten by the Court.
If a state statute provided that it is a misdemeanor to burn one's shirt or trousers or shoes on the public thoroughfare, it could hardly be asserted that the citizen's constitutional right is violated. If the arsonist asserted that he was burning his shirt or trousers or shoes as a protest against the Government's fiscal policies, for example, it is hardly possible that his claim to First Amendment shelter would prevail against the State's claim of a right to avert danger to the public and to avoid obstruction to traffic as a result of the fire. This is because action, even if clearly for serious protest purposes, is not entitled to the pervasive protection that is given to speech alone. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 303-304 (1940). It may be subjected to reasonable regulation that appropriately takes into account the competing interests involved.
The test that is applicable in every case where conduct is restricted or prohibited is whether the regulation or prohibition is reasonable, due account being taken of the paramountcy of First Amendment values. If, as I submit, it is permissible to prohibit the burning of personal property on the public sidewalk, there is no basis for applying a different rule to flag burning. And the fact that the law is violated for purposes of protest does not immunize the violator. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968); see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
States flag for purposes of advertising. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907). Statutes prescribe how the flag may be displayed; how it may lawfully be disposed of; when, how, and for what purposes it may and may not be used. See, e.g., 4 U.S.C. § 3; 56 Stat. 377, c. 435, 36 U.S.C. §§ 172-177. A person may "own" a flag, but ownership is subject to special burdens and responsibilities. A flag may be property, in a sense; but it is property burdened with peculiar obligations and restrictions. Certainly, as Halter v. Nebraska, supra, held, these special conditions are not per se arbitrary or beyond governmental power under our Constitution.

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