Source: http://www.edcorrigan.ca/articles/the-legal-debate-in-canada-on-the-protection-of-stateless-individuals-under-the-1951-geneva-convention
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 05:43:17+00:00

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The question of stateless individuals who have claimed refugee status in Canada has been subject to a vigorous legal debate in Canada over the past number of years both at the Immigration and Refugee Board and also at the Federal Court. Generally speaking the International Community has had difficulty dealing with stateless individuals in a world governed by nation states and strict rules governing citizenship.
It is interesting to note that Palestinians, the largest group of stateless individuals, were originally excluded from the 1951 Geneva Convention. To quote Article 1(D) Exclusion Clause of the 1951 Convention dealing with "Persons already receiving United Nations protection or assistance."
1(D) This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commission for Refugees protection or assistance.
The definition of "Convention refugee" is contained in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act.
It will be noted that not all stateless persons are refugees. They must be outside the country of their former habitual residence for the reasons indicated in the definition. Where these reasons do not exist, the stateless person is not a refugee.
It would seem to be best in keeping with the intention of the drafters if in the greatest possible number of cases application of the term "country of former habitual residence" would lead to the same practical result as application of the term "country of nationality"
The Supreme Court in Ward found that it was necessary to find a fear of persecution against all countries of nationality. This principle does not, however, apply to stateless individuals in that a fear of persecution should not be required to be proved with respect to all countries of former habitual residence only for countries where the claimant has a legal right to return and has a meaningful right of protection. The key consideration is that there is legal right of return and that protection is available.
To quote Mr Justice Cullen in Maarouf "the claimant does not have to be legally able to return to a country of former habitual residence as denial of a right of return may in itself constitute an act of persecution by the state."  Accordingly the right of return was not determinative in granting refugee status.
After the Federal Court overruled Hathaway's interpretation on the requirement of returnability some members of the IRB interpreted Maarouf in a manner, which I believe, was not intended by the Federal Court. As a result, yet another, a legal dispute arose with respect to CFHR that was not explicitly dealt with in Maarouf. In particular the question was where there are more that one country of former habitual residence what CFHR was the reference country for the fear of persecution in order to determine eligibility for protection under the Geneva Convention.
This type of legal analysis where stateless individuals must prove a fear of persecution against all CFHR's was fundamentally flawed and created a legal absurdity in that it could create the legal result of returning a stateless refugee who could not prove a claim against one country of CFHR to a country where they could be returned and where they faced a genuine risk of persecution.
Thabet at the Trial Division this claimant could not qualify as a Convention refugee. To quote the CRDD Reasons for Decision.
A Consent Order and Direction issued by the Federal Court of Canada (Trial Division) is not considered a binding precedent on Immigration and Refugee Board or on other Judges at the Federal Court of Canada who have co-equal jurisdiction. A Consent Order even with Direction, and therefore, has no value as a precedent.  The Department of Justice, however, seemed to recognize that the law in Thabet was flawed and in a least three Orders from the Federal Court recognized that there was a problem with the legal reasoning in Thabet and that a refugee claim for a stateless individual should be accessed against one country of former habitual residence and not just the last CFHR.
The effect of the Thabet decision at the Federal Court Trial Division is precisely what the Convention seeks to avoid. As we saw in Kablawi where the claim failed against the last country of former habitual residence and since there was no consideration given to a second country of possible persecution. The claimant in that case was returnable to the second CFHR where he alleged a genuine fear of persecution the law as interpreted in the first Federal Court decision in Thabet placed Canada in violation of the prohibition on refoulement as set out in the Article 33 of the Geneva Convention where it is illegally to return a refugee to a country where they face persecution. This principle is adopted into law in Canada as part of our legal obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees.
It is the issue of protection that is the key consideration. Where there is nationality or defacto nationality and a legal right of return, protection is available and there is no requirement to provide international protection. Where there is a right of return, the claimant must exercise that right since as Ward states international protection is a surrogate where an individual "is unable" or "unwilling" to return to a country and the basis for this inability is a fear of persecution based on one of the five grounds set out in the Convention. Then and only then would a refugee be entitled to protection as a Convention refugee.
A parallel can be made to the applicability of the 1(E) Exclusion clause where a refugee claimant who has nationality or defacto nationality and cannot demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution against the country of nationality or defacto nationality is then excluded under the Geneva Convention.
If a refugee claimant proves that there is a genuine fear of persecution under the terms of the Convention with respect to one country of former habitual residence then they should qualify for protection as a Convention refugee. Where there is no right of return there is no effective protection. The lack of protection is the "raison d'etre" behind the Convention and where a stateless individual cannot return and where there is a genuine fear of persecution under one of the grounds enumerated in the Convention then international law steps in and the refugee qualifies for protection as a Convention Refugee. Logic dictates that if grounds exist for a genuine fear of persecution for one CFHR then the Convention applies and there is no basis in law to exclude an individual who is stateless and has a genuine fear of persecution from one (or more) CFHRs if they have no right of return and no effective protection if they fail to prove a claim against all countries of former habitual residence.
It will suffice to show that one state is guilty of persecution, but that both states are unable to protect the claimant. Likewise, where a claimant has been resident in more than one country it is not necessary to prove that there was persecution at the hands of all those countries. But it is necessary to demonstrate that one country was guilty of persecution, and that the claimant is unable or unwilling to return to any of the states where he or she formerly habitually resided. While it may appear burdensome to impose this duty upon all stateless claimants, we must, in the light of Ward, properly take into account the situations where claimants have other possible safe havens.
For a claim to succeed a stateless individual should need only prove a claim against one country of former habitual residence and other countries of habitual residence are irrelevant to the refugee claim if there is no legal right to return to the country of habitual residence and if alternate protection is absent.
The Federal Court of Appeal finally resolved the legal debate over protecting stateless persons under the Convention on refugees and the CFHR issue. The Thabet decision is a sound one and provides a mechanism to protect stateless persons who have a genuine fear of persecution and who have no alternate place of safety. This approach is in keeping with the Supreme Court ruling in Ward and gives stateless individuals who can prove a genuine fear of persecution the protection they seek and maintains Canada's obligations under International law and our humanitarian tradition of offering refuge to those who need protection.
 "Stateless Persons and Their Lack of Access to Judicial Forums," Brooklyn Journal of International Law (Vol. X1:2 1985) pp.439-457 at 439.
 P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law 161, (1979) p. 162, cited in Ibid p. 439.
 UNHCR HANDBOOK, para 141, p. 33.
 UNHCR HANDBOOK, para 142, pp. 33-34.
 James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), pp. 205-209.
 UNHCR Handbook, para 143, p.34.
 Ward v. Attorney General of Canada, (Supreme Court of Canada), (June 30, 1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) pp. 105-108.
Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law (Vol.1, the Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1966), at 162.
 Ward v. Attorney General of Canada (Supreme Court of Canada), (June 30, 1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) at 105.
 Maarouf v. Canada 23 Imm. L.R. 163.
James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at 61-63.
Guy Goodwin-Gill, "Stateless Persons and Protection under the 1951 Convention or Refugees, Beware of Academic Error!" (Unpublished Paper) Director, Legal Services, "Treatment of Stateless Refugee Claimants at CRDD," March 11, 1992.
 Maarouf v. M.E.I. 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 163 at pp. 174-175.
 Maarouf v. M.E.I. 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 163 at pp. 172.
 Abdel-Khalik v. Minister of Employment and Immigration 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 262 at para. 3.
Also see Shaat v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)  F.C.J. No. 1149 (Action No. A‑539‑92 F.C.T.D.) August 4, 1994; See also Zdanov v. Canada (M.E.I) Action No. IMM-643-93 (F.C.T.D.) July 18, 1994; Ibrahim v. Canada (Secretary of State)  F.C.J. No. 1056, (Action No. Imm-4190-93 F.C.T.D.) July 8, 1994.
 Maarouf v. M.E.I. 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 163 at p. 175.
 UNHCR Handbook on Refugees, para 104, p. 24.
 UNHCR HANDBOOK, paragraphs 104 and 105, p.24.
 Maarouf v. The Minister of Employment and Immigration 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) at 163.
 Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1995), 105 F.T.R. 49.
 CRDD Decision T94-02330 at 8-9.
 Ramadan v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, November 7, 1994 (IMM-3089-93).
 Kablawi v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (June 10, 1997), IMM-2371-96.
 Sayed v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (May 15, 1995) IMM-3398-94.
 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (28 September 1954).
 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, UNHCR, New York, August 30, 1961.
Article I(E) of the 1951 Convention, Schedule 2(1) of Immigration Act.
 Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 105 FTR 49 at 58 (TD).
 Thabel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 48 Imm. L.R.(2d) at 36.

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