Source: https://www.carterdeluca.com/news/william-valet-publishes-importing-limitations-specification-claims-proper-nyipla-report/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:53:28+00:00

Document:
Claim construction is a seemingly simple proposition that continues to challenge even the most seasoned patent practitioners, as well as the courts. After all, it is well understood that claim terms are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
But, if importing limitations into claim terms is considered to be a major breach, how can the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit justify the result reached in the unpublished, nonprecedential opinion ProFoot, Inc. v. Merck & Co., No. 2016-1216 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 26, 2016), which seemingly imports limitations from the specification into the claims? The answer to this question depends upon the specific facts of this case.
During a claim construction proceeding, the district court determined that the term “neutralizer” is “‘a device that has a housing, a protractor, and an angularly adjustable plate capable of supporting the foot.’” Based upon this claim construction alone, the parties stipulated that Merck & Co. (“Merck”) did not infringe any claims of the ’568 Patent.
The issue on appeal was whether, when viewed in the context of the specification, the district court’s construction of the claim term “neutralizer” was proper.
The present invention includes a number of components such as a foot neutralizer 10 as shown in FIG. 1. . . . Neutralizer 10 includes a housing 12, protractor 14, an angularly adjustable plate 16, crank 18 with threaded rod 19 having threads 23 that coact with threads 21 on support 22, and rod 24. . . .
FIG. 2 shows an alternate embodiment of a foot neutralizer 100. It includes a housing 102, angularly adjustable plate 104, foot rests 106 and 108, upright support bar 110, and positionable horizontal bar 112 that adjustably slides along bar 114 of support 110. Also included is protractor 116.
Although nonprecedential, ProFoot provides another important example of how the Federal Circuit is applying the holding of ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, 558 F.3d 1368, 1374-76 (Fed. Cir. 2009), where the term “spike” was held to mean “an elongated structure having a pointed tip for piercing the seal, which tip may be sharp or slightly rounded” and not to mean “an upward projection,” and similar decisions when interpreting claim terms. ProFoot thus illustrates how the specification can impact the scope of the claims (often negatively), particularly in a manner that is contrary to the practitioner’s intent.
In view of ProFoot, practitioners should not only be aware of how claim terms are defined in the specification but, also, how those claim terms are referred to throughout the specification. Therefore, it may be prudent to disclose as many possible embodiments of the invention as feasible. Further, it is also important to question whether certain com¬ponents are required for the claimed invention to properly function. Practitioners should also consider adding qualify¬ing language, such as “although generally illustrated as X, it is contemplated that X may be any suitable [component] capable of [being used in that particular situation]” or “X may be any suitable [component] capable of [being used in that particular situation] known in the art” in order to avoid hav¬ing the claims limited to only those embodiments disclosed in the specification.
The inventor can be a key player in identifying required components or any additional variants of components that may be utilized to enable the invention other than those initially described. Practitioners should thus seek to involve the inventor early and often while drafting a patent applica¬tion. By maintaining open communication with the inventor, the practitioner may be able to draft a more comprehensive patent application that, ultimately, may avoid inadvertently narrowing the claims.
ProFoot also highlights the fact that the prosecution history of parent applications may be utilized to construe the meaning of claim terms. With this in mind, practitioners should ensure that arguments made during prosecution say no more than is necessary to overcome the cited art. Prac-titioners should focus on making concise arguments that highlight the differences between the claims and the cited art, and that reference only those portions of the claims and art that are necessary.
The lessons gleaned from ProFoot also extend to litiga¬tion. Practitioners should be aware that the specification may be used to construe a claim more narrowly than it appears on its face. Therefore, if the specification provides only a few embodiments of an invention or repeatedly and consistently refers to a claim term having specific elements, the claim term may be interpreted as requiring those elements. This is important for practitioners to keep in mind when determining whether or not a claim is infringed.
If nothing else, ProFoot is yet another reminder that practitioners should be mindful of how they draft a pat¬ent application, and should keep in mind that research and planning do not start and end at receipt of the invention disclosure. It is incumbent upon practitioners to expand the scope of the claims by including as much detail as possible in the specification and by identifying as many variations of components or embodiments of the invention as possible. ProFoot highlights the pitfalls that may befall practitioners who fail to go beyond the bare minimum when drafting pat¬ent applications.
* William Valet is an associate at Carter DeLuca Farrell & Schmidt LLP. He is involved in patent preparation and prosecution in a wide range of technologies, including medical devices, computer hardware and software, and optics and opti­cal systems.
 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
 See Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“‘We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history.’”).
 Id. at 1319-20 (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
 ProFoot, Inc. v. Merck & Co., No. 2016-1216, slip op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 26, 2016) (emphasis in original) (hereafter “Profoot Slip Op.”).
 Id. at 6 (quoting Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
]10] Id. (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
 Id. (quoting the ’568 Patent, col. 5, ll. 11-13; col. 6, ll. 3-5; col. 5, ll. 14-15; col. 6, ll. 6-7).
 Id. (quoting GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
 Profoot Slip Op. at 7.
Id. (quoting the ’568 Patent, abstract) (emphasis in original).
 Id. at 8-9 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)).

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