Source: https://www.ejiltalk.org/germany-v-italy-a-view-from-the-united-states/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:13:21+00:00

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Chimène I. Keitner is Associate Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law, and Co-Chair of the ASIL International Law in Domestic Courts Interest Group. In 2010, she represented amici Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law in the U.S. Supreme Court case Samantar v. Yousuf.
U.S. lawyers are poring over the ICJ’s decision in Germany v. Italy to see what impact, if any, it might on legal proceedings in U.S. courts. My assessment is, “not much.” The immunity of foreign states is governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which generally codifies the restrictive theory of immunity, except for provisions allowing certain types of suits against designated state sponsors of terrorism (the current list includes Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria). The ICJ’s reasoning lends some support to the view that permitting suits against foreign states for their non-commercial acts absent an express waiver violates customary international law, but the court was careful to limit its holding to suits for conduct performed by one state’s armed forces during armed conflict on the territory of the forum state (¶ 78). In any event, within the U.S. legal system, Congress’s intent to hold state sponsors of terrorism liable will govern.
The ICJ’s acceptance of war crimes as acta jure imperii for the purpose of state immunity is consistent with current U.S. practice, as reflected in the Supreme Court’s decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson. Similarly, the United States has not yet recognized a jus cogens exception to state immunity, as reflected for example in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, and in the absence of a statutory jus cogens exception in the FSIA.
Because both Germany and Italy agreed that state immunity is a matter of customary international law (¶ 53), the ICJ did not dwell on the possibility that state immunity might instead be a matter of comity. The distinction between customary international law and comity remains important as a matter of U.S. interpretation and application of state immunity, however, because—contrary to the language in Germany’s memorial (¶ 66 & n.91)—the United States as a general matter does not set out to disregard international law in most circumstances.
As for the immunity of current and former foreign officials, U.S. courts are still grappling with how to identify and define the applicable standards following the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Samantar v. Yousuf, which held that the FSIA does not govern such immunity where the foreign state is not the “real party in interest.” The ICJ has said that its decision in Germany v. Italy does not speak to whether, and to what extent, immunity might apply “in criminal proceedings against an official of the State” (¶ 91); nor, presumably, does it speak to civil proceedings in which the state is not the real party in interest.
Paul Stephan has suggested in a recent blog post that the ICJ’s decision “may imply” that the extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction would also violate international law. Although this position is currently being argued strongly to the U.S. Supreme Court in the pending Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum case, I do not read the ICJ’s decision as being relevant in this context, particularly since, as I have argued elsewhere, the conduct-regulating rules being applied in Alien Tort cases come from international law. That said, many doctrines other than immunity (including, where applicable, forum non conveniens, exhaustion of local remedies, act of state, and basic requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction) recognize the importance of reconciling competing claims to exercise adjudicatory authority over disputes that implicate multiple territorial sovereigns. The ICJ was no doubt wise to restrict its analysis to the narrow question of adjudicatory jurisdiction over the activities of a foreign state’s armed forces engaged in armed conflict on the territory of the forum state (¶¶ 77-78), but this will not discourage observers from attempting to extract broader lessons.
Hopefully the ICJ decision will be read as having made merely a severely limited decision regarding conduct during war, customary law, and state responsibility in foreign fora (and even then I think it is a serious affront to trends regarding nonimmunity and accountability).
I note here that the U.S. FSIA also has provisions for nonimmunity in the case of a state (or state entity under sec. 1603(b)) violation of an international agreement (secs. 1330(a) and 1604) and a state violation of international law (customary or treaty-based) regarding improper taking of property (sec. 1605(a)(3)). One case involving assassination in violation of international law within the U.S. fit under Sec. 1605(a)(5) [Letelier], and there are cases regarding treaties concerning arbitration and Sec. 1605(a)(6). And, yes, there are cases under the old Sec. 1605(a)(7), now 1605A, concerning certain conduct in violation of customary international law and, in some cases, relevant treaties (if the foreign state is a party) such as torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or provision of material support or resources for such (complicity type liability of a state).
in any event, thanks ICJ for placing much of international law in connection with state perpetrators in serious jeopardy! But you were wrong and your decision is “not binding” outside of the parties to the case [well, I know that that is not a “realistic” point].
p.s. foreign state immunity is actually “a departure from” the recognition of the IMT at Nuremberg that no state can have a lawful authority or power to authorize violations of international criminal law (that the state could delegate to one of its nationals who would be in the dock for alleged war crimes, etc.). Immunity is more generally “a departure from” the rule of law!
Many thanks for your valuable post. Just a point of clarification: as I read para. 56 of the judgment, the Court is quite conclusive (maybe also conclusory?) on the point that immunity arises as a matter of custom, not just comity. In other words, the Court’s holding does not depend on the fact that neither Germany nor Italy disputed this. Thus, to the extent that some authors argue that immunity is purely a creature of comity the Court quite clearly disagrees with them, for whatever that’s worth.
Although, it seems that the Court did its best to confine the ratio decidendi of its judgment to the immunity of States for acts committed during armed conflicts, but for sure, there some announcements that is beyond this scope.
The Germany’agent – Mr Tomushat – during the hearings announced that their case is different from those followed before the US Courts. However, the defense and arguments put forward by Italy at some part was in common with the US practice, that at least in one case has been rejected by the ICJ (para. 88).
A general point is that the Court findings on customary international law in this case, is different from those instances that article 59 of the ICJ Statute stipulates. Such announcements, are not merely judicial views, but in fact, approving rules that was existing before and only presented for a specific case.

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