Source: https://www.tba.org/tags/appellate
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:29:58+00:00

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Tennessee Bar Association Appellate Practice Section member Richard Lynn recently wrote an article for The Nebraska Lawyer that is relevant to Tennessee lawyers as well. The article features observations by Lynn regarding oral arguments from attorneys in the court and judicial temperament, and provides useful practice tips. You can view the article here.
The Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility is seeking a motivated attorney for the position of Disciplinary Counsel – Litigation Section, Appeals. The duties and responsibilities include: investigate and conduct discovery related to complaints of attorney misconduct; prepare pleadings and appear in disciplinary hearings before hearing panels; represent the Board in appellate proceedings before special judges in trial courts and before the Tennessee Supreme Court; prepare and present continuing legal education; and other duties as assigned.
Excellent written and oral communication required. Applicants must be licensed in Tennessee and have a minimum of seven (7) years experience in the practice of law. Must have significant experience in appellate advocacy. Practice before the Tennessee Supreme Court is preferred. You can find out more about the position including how to apply by using this link.
The Tennessee Bar Association’s Appellate Practice Section held its annual boot camp this past Wednesday. Produced by Section Chair Kyle Wilson and Vice-chair Leslie Price, this year’s boot camp was focused on criminal appeals. Attendees viewed oral arguments at the Court of Criminal Appeals and enjoyed a Q&A with the presiding judges. Following court, boot camp participants moved to the Tennessee Bar Center for a networking lunch and oral advocacy panel with the attorneys who presented arguments that morning discussing briefs, argument preparation and providing practice tips. The TBA would like to thank Kyle, Leslie and the TBA Appellate Practice Section for another successful program!
1. Keep an APPEAL FILE on the counsel table in plain view.
Write the word “APPEAL FILE” in big letters on the front of a file folder. Every time the judge does something you don’t like, write it down and make a big production about opening the appeal file and put your note in the APPEAL file. After a time, folks will get the message. Seriously, you want to keep things in a handy place that may have something to do with a possible appeal.
2. Always write down the dates of all your trial court proceedings and always get the name of your court reporter.
Stick important information in your appeal file. Think about all the time you have wasted as a lawyer running around trying to remember when you had this hearing or that hearing and trying to figure out who the court reporter was for a particular proceeding. You cannot have an appeal without a transcript and you cannot have a transcript if nobody remembers the name of the court reporter.
Most modern trials have a verdict form. Attorneys should be careful to examine the jury form regarding the verdict to be certain that it is responsive to the issues while the jury is still in the box. In criminal cases, the jury form must be specific as the degree of the crime or designating the particular offense in a multiple count indictment or, for example, in theft cases, the value of the property taken. In civil cases, of course, the rules permit special verdicts which is a topic worthy of a separate presentation. Generally, see Tenn. R. Civ. P. 49.
— David Raybin is a Middle Tennessee Delegate of the executive council for the Tennessee Bar Association's Appellate Practice Section. Raybin has been named the Best Criminal Lawyer in Nashville in criminal general practice and white collar defense by Best Lawyers in America and listed among the Best Criminal Lawyers in Tennessee by the Tennessee Business magazine. Raybin holds degrees from Virginia Commonwealth University and the University of Tennessee College of Law.
A federal appellate panel last Monday overturned an order that would have required the Tennessee Valley Authority to unearth and remove a massive amount of coal ash at the Gallatin Fossil Plant, The Washington Post reports. In a 2-1 decision, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals maintained that leaks from unlined coal ash pits through groundwater into the Cumberland River are a “major environmental problem” but the Clean Water Act isn’t the “proper legal tool of correction” to address it. A district judge in 2017 ordered the coal ash to be excavated and removed, citing Clean Water Act violations regarding pollutants leaking into the Cumberland River. You can read the opinion here.
Criminal appellate attorneys should be aware of litigation currently working its way through the federal appellate system that may have substantial repercussions on how federal courts treat certain firearm offenses, violent crimes and drug offenses.
Federal law prohibits certain classes of people from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In general, violations of this ban can result in prison sentences of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), provides that, for offenders with particularly notable criminal histories, this punishment is markedly increased. Specifically, if an offender has sustained three or more earlier convictions – state or federal – for a “serious drug offense” or “violent felony,” he or she will face a minimum prison term of 15 years and a maximum of life.
Originally, the ACCA defined a “violent felony” as: any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. . . that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2014) (emphasis added). In 2015, the Supreme Court addressed the italicized portion of the ACCA — colloquially known as the “residual clause” due to its general scope — on a challenge claiming that it was unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The Court decided the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague and, consequently, unenforceable.
Accordingly, courts now consider whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under the remainder of the ACCA, i.e., whether the offense of conviction (1) has an element the use or the attempted/threatened use of force (the so-called “use of force clause”); or (2) whether the offense is otherwise specifically listed in the statute (the “enumerated offense” clause). Appellate cases (and by extension, years of custody for a federal appellant) can – and often do – turn on this complex and nuanced analysis.
Appellate advocates may be required to address in federal court whether a decades-old state conviction has “the use of force” as an element. This can present complicated questions. For example, what if a criminal statute sets out alternative elements by which a person may commit a crime, some of which contemplate the use of force, some of which do not? See Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). Assuming a defendant is convicted under such a “divisible” statute, how can an attorney show which elements relate to her client’s past conviction? See id.; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). What if a state statute criminalizes the reckless use of force – could this count as a “violent” predicate offense? See United States v. Verweibe, 874 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2017).
Alternatively, appellate attorneys should be prepared to argue whether a prior conviction constitutes one of the four remaining enumerated offenses under the ACCA. Although this seems like a straightforward task, it is anything but. Only those convictions with elements that are identical to, or narrower than, the “generic” crimes in the enumerated offense clause will qualify.
The most recent example involves Tennessee aggravated burglary, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403. Despite being a “burglary” statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that, because the elements listed in the Tennessee Code are broader than those of generic burglary, Tennessee aggravated burglary is not a “violent felony” within the meaning of the ACCA. See United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017). Conversely, a prior conviction for “burglary,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402, as a Class D felony, will qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA. United States v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2017). Put another way, the current status of federal law is: in Tennessee, aggravated burglary is not a violent felony, but Class D burglary is.
The ACCA presents some of the most rapidly changing and nuanced criminal appellate issues, and appellate attorneys must be prepared to address them thoroughly. Trial attorneys should keep abreast of them, as well, so that they may appropriately advise their clients about potential significant future consequences. One tip to help stay on top of the developing law: sign up for the 6th Circuit’s free listserv, which will push daily opinions to your e-mail inbox as soon as they are released: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions. The TBAToday newsletter also includes all published 6th Circuit opinions the day they are released.
The Armed Career Criminal Act is a substantial facet of federal criminal litigation. Despite the shifting legal landscape, one thing is certain: more guidance is coming. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Stitt, supra, and it will no doubt weigh in on these and other issues in the months to come. It’s anyone’s guess as to how profoundly the law may change, if at all, as a result. The only thing a skilled appellate advocate can do is be prepared.
— Kyle J. Wilson is the Section Chair for the TBA Appellate Practice Section.
Appellate Practice Tip: What is the Mandate?
In the case of an appeal taken to the Supreme Court, the clerk of the Supreme Court shall transmit to the clerk of the trial court the mandate of the Supreme Court with notice to the parties. Rule 42(a) requires that this be done “Eleven days after entry of the judgment unless the court orders otherwise.” Since a petition for rehearing may be filed within 10 days after the date the decision is filed, the rule further provides that the timely filing of the petition for rehearing will stay the mandate until disposition of the petition for rehearing. If the petition is denied, as it almost always is, the mandate shall issue immediately upon the filing of an order denying the motion for rehearing. When the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals, a formal mandate shall not issue unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
The clerk of the Court of Appeals and the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals have the duty to transmit to the clerk of the trial court the mandate of the Court of Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals. That mandate must be sent no later than 64 days after the entry of judgment unless the court orders otherwise. The timely filing of a petition for rehearing will stay the mandate temporarily. Rule 42 provides that the clerk of the appellate court is responsible for collecting the clerk’s fees and that the mandate should not be delayed for the taxing of costs.
Once the mandate is issued by the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court has the responsibility to promptly file it. See T.R.A.P. 43(a). If the appellate court has dismissed the appeal or affirmed the judgment of the trial court, once the mandate is filed in the trial court, the prevailing party may issue execution to enforce the judgment. T.R.A.P. 43(b).
The mandate is simply the order of the appellate court that disposes of the case in the appellate court and sends the case back to the trial court to handle the case. If the trial court is affirmed, the mandate allows the prevailing party to proceed. If the appeal is dismissed, the mandate gives the trial court the authority to conduct post-judgment proceedings, if any. It is important for appellate practitioners to understand the significance of the appellate court mandate and not to confuse it with the appellate court’s opinion, which is only a part of the mandate.
—George "Buck" Lewis is a shareholder at Baker Donelson, former TBA president and chairs the Appellate Practice Law Section.

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