Source: https://www.lawweb.in/2017/11/whether-contract-to-influence.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:17:53+00:00

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Law Web: Whether contract to influence government to secure particular order is enforceable?
Whether contract to influence government to secure particular order is enforceable?
39. As regards the Agreements entered into between the six Respondent-Societies and their agents, inter alia, for the purpose of influencing the Government and to procure the preliminary and the final notifications Under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, which they did procure and which are subject matter of challenge in these Petitions, the questions which arises for consideration is, if the agreements are hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act on the ground that they were opposed to public policy whether the impugned notifications are liable to be quashed on the grounds that they were the result of exercise of influence by the agents on the Government which submission of the Petitioners stand substantiated by the approval given for acquisition is all such cases which has made the Government itself to realise that it has totally bungled in the matter as is evident from the G.V.K. Rao Committee ..... As far as the question that the agreements in question are opposed to public policy is concerned, it is seen that the real purpose of the Agreement entered into between the Respondent-Societies and their agents was that the agent should get the preliminary and the final notifications from the Government and for that purpose huge amounts were paid or agreed to be paid. Any power conferred on the Government under a statute like the power conferred Under Section 4 and 6 of the Act has to be exercised bona fide and for the purpose for which it is conferred, therefore an agreement under which a party to the agreement is required to influence the statutory authority and to procure a decision favourable to the other party, is certainly opposed to public policy.
The contract such as the present one which is found by the City Civil Court as well as the High Court to have been entered into with the obvious purpose of influencing the authorities to procure a verdict in favour of the late Nawab was obviously a "carrier" contract. To enforce such a contract although its tendencies to injure public wealth is manifest is not only to abdicate one's public duty but to assist in the promotion of a pernicious practice of procuring decisions by influencing authorities when they should abide by the law. To strike down such contracts is not to invent a new head of public policy but to give effect to its true implications. A democratic society is founded on the Rule of law and any practice which seeks to subvert or circumvent the law strikes at its very root. When the Court discountenances such practice, it only safeguards the foundation of the society. Even assuming, therefore, that the Court finds a new head of public policy to strike down such practice, its activism is not only warranted but desired.
2. The present appeals arise out of the common impugned judgment and order dated 06.05.2004 in Writ Appeal Nos. 7543-7557 of 1996 and connected matters passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, wherein the judgment and order dated 11.07.1996, passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 8188-8201 of 1989 and other connected petitions quashing the acquisition notifications issued Under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "L.A. Act") was set aside.
The lands involved in all these acquisition proceedings are agricultural lands belonging to poor agriculturalists. On 09.01.1984, Trinity House Building Co-Operative Society (hereinafter referred to as the "Respondent-Society") was registered with the object of providing sites for building residential houses for its members. On 12.03.1985, the said society, represented by its President and Vice President entered into an agreement with M/S Srinivasa Enterprises, represented by its proprietor, Mr. S. Rangarajan. The said agreement was entered into between the parties essentially for getting the lands acquired in favour of the Respondent-Society. The relevant clauses of the agreement will be extracted in the reasoning portion of the judgment. As per the agreement, a contract of agency was created in favour of Mr. S. Rangarajan to act as a middleman between the Respondent-Society and the State Government to get the lands mentioned therein acquired in favour of the Respondent-Society.
4. It is also an undisputed fact that between 06.05.1987 and 12.06.1989, the land owners of the lands mentioned in the agreement dated 12.03.1985 have also executed power of attorney(s) in favour of Mr. S. Rangarajan. The state government of Karnataka by its order dated 23.06.1986, fixed the last date as 30.06.1984 for the registration of the societies. The Respondent-Society finds a place at Serial No. 43 in the annexure attached to the above government order.
5. By way of order dated 30.04.1987, the state government of Karnataka constituted a 'Three Men Committee' to verify the claims of land for acquisition being made by the various societies, and a State level Co-ordination Committee also was constituted by the Government to inquire into the affairs of the society before recommending their claim for acquisition.
Formation of sites and construction of houses to the members of the trinity House Building Co-Operative Society Ltd. at Avalahalli and Herohalli, Yelahanka hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore District. AND WHEREAS the Government having caused an inquiry to be made in conformity with the provisions of the said Act and being satisfied as a result of such inquiry that the acquisition of the said land is needed for the purpose.
And whereas the Government of Karnataka is satisfied after considering the report of the special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, Bangalore under Sub-section (2) of Section 5A and Section 6(1) of special Land Acquisition Act (Central Act 1 of 1894) as amended by Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1961 and Land Acquisition (Amendment Act 1984) that the said lands are needed to be acquired for the purpose specified above.
In the statement of objections it is stated that the society through the agency of M/S Srinivasa Enterprises, represented by its proprietor has made payments to the landowners. This fact shows that the facts involved in these petitions are identical with that of the case involved in the decision of HMT House Building Co-Operative Society (supra). The Supreme Court in the said decision has held that the power Under Section 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act has been exercised for extraneous consideration at the instance of the persons who have no role in the decision making process. In the said view of the matter, I hold that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court is applicable in all fours and therefore the impugned notifications are liable to be quashed. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, I hold that the Petitioners are entitled to challenge the impugned acquisition since the land acquisition proceedings is the product of colourable exercise of power at the instance of the third parties.
12. Aggrieved of the common judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the Respondent-Society filed Writ Appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court challenging the correctness of the same urging certain legal grounds. The Division Bench of the High Court held that there was no evidence on record to suggest that the "outside agency" (M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises) had influenced the acquisition proceedings. On the other hand, it is clear from the material placed on record that the case of the Respondent-Society was considered by the State Level Co-ordination Committee on 25.09.1987, and on the basis of the clearance granted by the Committee the state government granted approval to acquire the lands in question. Accordingly, the Division Bench, by way of common final impugned judgment and order dated 06.05.2004 allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned single judge and restored the acquisition proceedings. Hence, the present appeals.
14. The learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants vehemently question the correctness of the findings and reasons recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment and order. It is contended that the findings and reasons recorded on the contentious points are not only erroneous in law but also suffer from error in law. They place strong reliance on the three judge bench decision of this Court in the case of HMT House Building Cooperative Society (supra), which has been followed in the subsequent decisions of this Court in the cases of H.M.T. House Building Cooperative Society v. M. Venkataswamappa MANU/SC/0448/1995 : (1995) 3 SCC 128, Bangalore City Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Karnataka MANU/SC/0091/2012 : (2012) 3 SCC 727, B. Anjanappa and Ors. v. Vyalikaval House Building Cooperative Society Limited and Ors. MANU/SC/0142/2012 : (2012) 10 SCC 184. The learned senior Counsel further sought to distinguish the decision of this Court in the case of Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha v. Narayanamma MANU/SC/0864/2002 : (2003) 1 SCC 228, upon which strong reliance has been placed by the Division Bench of the High Court, which has been followed by this Court in the cases of Sumitramma v. State of Karnataka SLP (C) No. 10270 of 1996, decided on 04.10.1996 and Muniyappa v. State of Karnataka SLP (C) No. 14681 of 1995 decided on 04.10.1996. It is submitted that the reliance placed upon the said judgments by the Division Bench of the High Court, in the absence of a scheme framed and approved by the government as required Under Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act in favour of the Respondent-Society, is held to be violative of not only the statutory provisions of law, but also the decisions of this Court referred to supra.
19. According to us, in Section 3(f)(vi) the expression "housing" has been used along with educational and health schemes. As such the housing scheme contemplated by Section 3(f)(vi) shall be such housing scheme which shall serve the maximum number of members of the society. Such housing scheme should prove to be useful to the public. That is why the Parliament while introducing a new definition of "public purpose", said that any scheme submitted by any co-operative society relating to housing, must receive prior approval of the appropriate Government and then only the acquisition of the land for such scheme can be held to be for public purpose. If requirement of Section 3(f)(vi) is not strictly enforced, every housing co-operative society shall approach the appropriate Government for acquisition by applying Section 3(f)(vi) instead of pursuing the acquisition under Part VII of the Act which has become more rigorous and restrictive. In this background, it has to be held that the prior approval, required by Section 3(f)(vi), of the appropriate Government is not just a formality; it is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of acquisition by the appropriate Government for a housing scheme of a co-operative society.
17. It is further submitted that a perusal of the above extracted portion of the judgment would show that prior approval of the government to the Housing Scheme, as contemplated Under Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act is a condition precedent for the exercise of eminent domain power by the state government for acquisition of lands for the purpose of the housing scheme of a Co-operative society. Consequently, the existence of Housing Scheme framed by the Respondent-Society is a pre-condition for grant of approval of the same by the State Government.
20. We then enquired from Shri Bhat whether his client had submitted housing scheme for the approval of the State Government. Shri Bhat responded to the Court's query by relying upon the recommendations made by the State Level Coordination Committee for the acquisition of 179 acres, one and half guntas land. We have carefully gone through the recommendations of the State Level Coordination Committee but do not find any trace of housing scheme which was under the consideration of the Committee.
23. The judgment in Kanak Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha v. Narayanamma (supra), if read in the light of the 1st and 2nd HMT judgments and the finding recorded by us that Respondent No. 1 had not framed any housing scheme and secured its approval from the State Government, the direction given to the Deputy Commissioner to issue notification Under Section 4(1) cannot be treated as the State Government's approval of the housing scheme framed by Respondent No. 1. It is also apposite to note that in Kanak Gruha's case, this Court was not called upon to consider a case in which the State Government had come out with a specific stand that the housing society had not framed any scheme.
22. The learned senior Counsel further questions the locus standi of the Appellants in filing the first batch and second batch of appeals. It is submitted that the agreement dated 12.05.1985 entered into between the Respondent-Society and M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises stipulates the Respondent-Society to pay consideration to Mr. S. Rangarajan for getting the layout plan approved, costs of the entire lands purchased, execution of layout work etc. It is submitted that the original landowners in the instant case executed the general power of attorney in favour of Mr. S. Rangarajan to get the lands in question acquired. It is further submitted that the preliminary notification was issued Under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act dated 09.06.1988, and the final notification issued Under Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act dated 18.03.1989 were challenged by the Respondent-original landowners by way of Writ Petitions before the High Court of Karnataka, wherein the learned single judge, by way of common judgment and order dated 11.07.1996 quashed the land acquisition proceedings. It is submitted that within a few days, Mr. S. Rangarajan sold the lands in question in favour of his daughter, son and son in law, who are the Appellants in first batch of appeals. It is contended that the purported sale transactions in respect of lands covered in the acquisition notifications is illegal as the same is nothing but fraud played by the said middleman on the original land owners and the society with a mala fide intention to deprive the landowners of their constitutional rights, thereby deceiving not only the original landowners, but also the Respondent-Society. It is thus, contended that since the alleged sale of lands in favour of some of the Appellants by Mr. Rangarajan on the basis of the power of attorney executed by the landowners is void ab initio in law, they have no locus standi to challenge the legality of the impugned judgment and acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands involved in these proceedings before this Court.
23. Mr. H.N. Nagamohan Das, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent original landowners-farmers sought to justify the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. It is further submitted by the learned senior Counsel that during the pendency of the Writ Appeals before the High Court, there came to be a compromise between the farmers and the society. The compromise is immensely beneficial to farmers as for the acquisition of every acre, each one of them are entitled for allotment of one site and the society has agreed to deposit the award amount as determined by the Land Acquisition Officer. The learned senior Counsel submits that if the acquisition proceedings are not upheld, the farmers will be deprived of both the award amount as well as a site for every acre of land. In such a scenario, the only party which stands to gain is the fraudulent purchasers of the lands. Alternatively, he submits that even if the acquisition proceedings are quashed on the basis of the non compliance with Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act and decisions of this Court referred to supra and the sale transactions between Mr. S. Rangarajan and some of the Appellants are held void, then also the landowners will get justice for depriving them and their family members of livelihood for more than 28 years by preventing them from cultivating the said lands and earning their livelihood.
24. We have heard the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. Before we turn our attention to the essential questions of law that arise for our consideration in the present case, it is important to advert to a submission made on behalf of the Appellants. The learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants have also sought to contend that the Respondent-Society had no locus standi to file the Writ Appeal as it did not have any right over the said lands in the instant case. It is submitted that a right would vest in the society only once possession of the land was taken by the state government and award passed in favour of the landowners, and thus, it did not have the locus standi to challenge the quashing of the acquisition proceedings. The said submission has been sought to be rebutted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent-Society, by placing reliance on a constitution bench decision of this Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (D) by L.Rs. and Ors. MANU/SC/0144/1995 : (1995) 2 SCC 326.
6. The Second Party shall arrange to initiate land Acquisition Proceedings as per the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act under Clause 4(1), 6(1) Notifications issued in the name of the First Party.
8. The Second Party shall take necessary steps to get the said lands Acquired in the name of the First Party through the Government for the formation of residential sites and handover the possession of said lands in favour of the First Party within a period of 18 months from the date of this Agreement.
b. On production of document of Title relating to the lands forming Subject matter of this agreement And after verification by the lawyers of the society and at the time of Submission of Application for Acquisition.
WHEREAS the Schedule property has been sold by us under agreement to sell: AND we have also agreed and declared to relinquish our rights for acquiring the Schedule property in favour of the Trinity House Building Co-Operative Society Ltd., Bangalore AND WHEREAS we have received the full consideration for the said Schedule property as per Agreement under separate document and receipt.
AND WHEREAS the registration formalities or the acquisition proceedings is yet to be completed AND WHEREAS the entire consideration/compensation/award has been received by us under separate documents as said above we hereby give this Power of Attorney in favour of SRI S. RANGARAJAN, S/o Late K.S.S. Naidu, as desired by the Trinity House Building Co-Operative Society Ltd., Bangalore.
It has been considered necessary to reconstitute the THREE MEN COMMITTEE for Verification and for reporting to the revenue Department regarding the extent of lands to be acquired for each society and for relaxation of cut-off date for registration of certain societies and for enrolment of members even beyond 30.06.1984.
...it appears that the society had entered into an agreement with Estate Agents for acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act and in the process, the amount being paid to the Estate Agents towards his service charges itself is more than the costs of the land under land acquisition. This is a clear case of the Society frittering away the advances collected from the members and the site deposit collected from the members are not employed in a prudent manner.
The society had admitted 18 members without applications for membership, 3 members with incomplete applications, at least 21 members from out-side the jurisdiction of the society (all are from outside Bangalore) and 8 members without resolution of the committee..... At one stage he has also stated that many of their members are Senior Government Officers and this demolishes the contention of the Vice-president that because of their inexperience and ignorance, they have committed the mistakes. The way society is admitting members from Bombay, Mangalore, Kolar, Andaman, Secunderabad etc, makes it clear that they have absolutely no intention of following their byelaws.
When these lapses were brought to the notice of the Vice-President of the society he has explained that, in the initial stages, since they did not get the prescribed application forms printed, they had admitted a few members without applications and thereafter when they had asked the members to fill in the prescribed applications they have not filled in....Further he has stated that since there is a lot of pressure from the members of their community, they have admitted members from outside the jurisdiction (mostly outside the state) and subsequently, they made efforts to amend the Byelaws, the same has not been approved by the Department, and he has pleaded that because of the inexperience of the committee, some mistakes have been committed by the society while admitting the members and they will take steps to ensure that the same mistakes are not repeated.
We are in agreement with the finding of the High Court that the statutory notifications issued Under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act have been issued due to the role played by M/s. S.R. Constructions, Respondent No. 11. On the materials on record, High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been initiated because the State Government was satisfied about the existence of the public purpose but at the instance of agent who had collected more than a crore of rupees for getting the lands acquired by the State Government.
Dated: 14.11.85 The Revenue Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Bangalore.
Sub: Acquisition of Land in Sy.
Nos. 19/2, 26, 29 of Kadirenahalli village and Sy. No. 29/3 of Konanakunt village Bangalore South Taluk in favour of Kanaka Gruhaniramana Sahakara Sangha, Bangalore.
I am directed to convey the approval of Government to initiate acquisition proceedings by issuing 4(1) notification in respect of lands measuring 8 acres 03 guntas as recommended by the Official Committee in Sy. Nos. 19/2, 26, 29 of Kadirenehalli village and Sy. No. 29/3 of Kenanakunte village, Bangalore South Taluk in favour of Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha Bangalore.
Copy to the President, Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara No. 435 Middle School Road, V.V. Puram, Bangalore-4.
Considering the fact that State Government directed the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies of Bangalore to verify the requirement of the members of the Society and also the fact that the matter was placed before the Committee of three Members for scrutiny and thereafter the State Government has conveyed its approval for initiating the proceedings for acquisition of the land in question by letter dated 14.11.1985, it cannot be said that there is lapse in observing the procedure prescribed Under Section 3(f)(vi). Prior approval is granted after due verification and scrutiny.
20. Now the question which is to be answered is as to whether in view of the definition of "public purpose" introduced by the aforesaid amending Act 68 of 1984 in Section 3(f)(vi), is it open to the appropriate Government to acquire land for cooperative society for housing scheme without making proper enquiry about the members of the Society and without putting such housing co-operative society to term in respect of nature of construction, the area to be allotted to the members and restrictions on transfer thereof?
17. Considering the fact that the State Government directed the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies of Bangalore to verify the requirement of the members of the Society and also the fact that the matter was placed before the Committee of three members for scrutiny and thereafter the State Government has conveyed its approval for initiating the proceedings for acquisition of the land in question by Letter dated 14-11-1985, it cannot be said that there is lapse in observing the procedure prescribed Under Section 3(f)(vi). Prior approval is granted after due verification and scrutiny.
111. In majority of the cases decided by the High Court to which reference has been made hereinabove, the Petitioners were non-suited on the ground of delay and laches or participation in the award proceedings. In Muniyappa case, the judgment in 1st H.M.T. case was distinguished on the premise that a scheme had been framed and the same had been approved by the State Government and further that the Petitioner had failed to show that the approval was vitiated due to intervention of the extraneous consideration. In Sumitramma case this Court noted that in 1st H.M.T. case, no separate order was made by the Government for grant of approval whereas in Sumitramma case an order has been passed on 14-10-1985 conveying the Government's approval for the issuance of Notification dated 21-1-1986 Under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. In Kanaka Gruha case also, this Court treated the direction contained in letter dated 14-11-1985 of the Revenue Commissioner and Secretary to the Government to the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore to initiate the acquisition proceedings by issuing notification Under Section 4(1) as an approval within the meaning of Section 3(f)(vi).
112. In none of the three cases, this Court was called upon to consider whether the decision taken by the Government to sanction the acquisition of land in the backdrop of an agreement executed by the society with a third party, as had happened in 1st H.M.T. and 2nd H.M.T. cases and the present case whereby the Estate Agent agreed to ensure the acquisition of land within a specified time-frame subject to payment of huge amount of money and the fact that the agreement entered into between the society and the Government was in the nature of an agreement contemplated by Part VII of the Act.
113. While in 1st H.M.T. case the amount paid to M/s. S.R. Constructions was rupees one crore, in the present case, the Appellant had agreed to pay more than rupees five crores for facilitating issue of notifications Under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) and sanction of the layouts and plans by BDA within a period of less than one year. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the Appellant's case is squarely covered by the ratio of 1st H.M.T. and 2nd H.M.T. cases and the High Court did not commit any error by relying upon the judgment in 1st H.M.T. case for declaring that the acquisition was not for a public purpose.
33. The stand of the Respondent-Society is that the acquisition of lands by the State Government is Under Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act and that a scheme has been submitted and the same has been approved. But from a perusal of the original acquisition file of the state government, it is clear that there is no such scheme and no prior approval of the same by the State Government as required Under Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act.
34. Thus, in the light of the judgments of this Court referred to supra, and in the absence of framing of scheme by the Respondent-Society and approval of the same by the State Government as required Under Section 3 (f)(vi) of the L.A. Act, the Division Bench, holding that the letter dated 26.11.1987 referred to supra amounts to approval of the scheme, is wholly erroneous in law for the reason that neither the Three Men Committee, nor the State Level Co-ordination Committee even adverted to the said letter in their proceedings. Further, no details are forthcoming from the original file regarding the details of the scheme, and the application of mind by the state government to approve the same. In the light of the decisions of this Court, as well as the wording of Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act, we are constrained to hold that the acquisition proceedings in the instant case cannot be said to be one for 'public purpose' as defined Under Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act, especially in the light of the fact that not only was there no scheme formulated by the Respondent-Society and approved by the State Government for the said purpose before initiating the acquisition proceedings, but that the evidence on record clearly indicates that the Respondent-Society paid consideration to Mr. S. Rangarajan to act as the agent between it and the state government, to ensure that the lands of the original land owners are acquired in its favour. Upholding such an acquisition would be akin to approving to such type of agreements which are opposed to public policy and the same cannot be allowed by this Court under any circumstances, as the concept of hiring middlemen to get lands of the poor agricultural workers acquired by the state government in favour of a Cooperative Society is abhorrent and cannot be granted the sanction of law.
36. Further, the state government did not even take into consideration the finding of the G.V.K. Rao Committee report, which found that the Respondent-Society was issuing membership to persons fraudulently, including to those persons who were not even residing within the area of operation of the jurisdiction of the society. Further, the acquisition of lands of two different villages by issuing the impugned notifications by the State Government in exercise of its eminent domain power at the instance of a middleman amounts to a mala fide exercise of power by the state government. This is further made clear from the stand of the state government reflected throughout the proceedings, not just before this Court, but also before the High Court, where it remained a silent spectator to the proceedings, and neither actively defended the acquisition of lands nor opposed it. Even in the affidavit dated 03.08.2016 submitted before this Court in these proceedings, the stand of the state government is merely that it will proceed to make an award Under Section 24(1)(a) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the "New L.A. Act, 2013"), if the validity of the acquisition of the lands in question is upheld. This stand of the state government clearly goes to show the seriousness in which it has exercised its eminent domain power in such important case of acquisition of lands of poor agricultural workers in blatant violation of the provisions of the L.A. Act and law laid down by this Court.
39. The learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants submit that since no award has been passed within two years from the date of the acquisition of the lands, which got over in April 1991, thus, by virtue of Section 11A of the L.A. Act, the acquisition proceedings are lapsed. A question which was sought to be examined was whether Section 24(1)(a) of the New L.A. Act, 2013, which came into force from 01.01.2014 would save the proceedings in the instant case, even if the award has not been passed within two years from the date of the acquisition of the lands. Before we deal with the argument advanced by the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, it would be useful to advert to the relevant statutory provisions.
114. Repeal and saving.-(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under Sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.
It was contended that when the New L.A. Act, 2013 came into force, the acquisition proceedings had already lapsed by virtue of Section 11A of the L.A. Act. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act clearly lays down that the repeal of the L.A. Act does not revive anything not in force or existing at the time the repeal takes effect. It is submitted that the repeal took effect on 01.01.2014 and as on that date, the acquisition proceedings were no longer alive. Thus, Section 24(1)(a) of the New L.A. Act, 2013 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not revive the acquisition proceedings which were dead long before coming into force of the New L.A. Act, 2013.
44. As far as the sale in favour of the Appellants in the appeals arising out of SLP (c) Nos. 18090-18118 of 2004 is concerned during the pendency of the writ petitions, the same is also void ab initio in law as the same happened during the pendency of the Writ Petition before the learned single Judge of the High Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. v. Sant Singh and Ors. C.A. No. 5072 of 2016, decided on 13.05.2016 held that the sale transactions of a similar nature is void ab initio in law. Thus, the transactions of the alleged sales made during the pendency of the proceedings are wholly illegal and void ab initio in law and therefore the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law. The said sale transactions are also contrary to law which is in operation in respect of agricultural lands.
(a) The appeals filed by the so-called purchasers and some of the landowners seeking to set aside the common impugned judgment and order dated 06.05.2004 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Writ Appeal Nos. 7543-7557 of 1996 and other connected appeals are allowed to the extent as indicated below and the impugned judgment and order is hereby set aside. The common judgment and order dated 11.07.1996 passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 8188-8201 of 1989 and other connected writ petitions in quashing the acquisition notifications and proceedings are restored.

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