Source: http://www.gerryarmstrong.org/50k/legal/a7/3725.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:30:43+00:00

Document:
Marin County Superior Court Case No.
Marin County Superior Court Case No. CV 157680.
Petitioner Church of Scientology International ("CSI") hereby petitions for a writ of certiorari, or in the alternative for a writ of mandate, from an order of the Respondent Superior Court dated May 20, 2004.
court and refuses to enforce prior sentences issued by earlier judges of fine and jail for 14 previously adjudicated contempts of court.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Armstrong and CSI entered into a settlement agreement in 1986, pursuant to which Armstrong received $800,000, dismissed certain legal claims against the Church, and agreed, inter alia, to strict confidentiality, to forego any public mention of Scientology and its leadership, and to avoid voluntarily assisting in litigation against Scientology churches. The agreement provided for liquidated damages for each breach of the contract.
Beginning in approximately 1990, and continuing to this day, Armstrong repeatedly and openly breached the agreement. When CSI obtained a money judgment against him for his breaches, he avoided the judgment by declaring bankruptcy, after either spending or "giving away" the $800,000 he received in the settlement. When CSI obtained a permanent injunction against further breaches, Armstrong fled the jurisdiction and moved to Canada, from where he openly and contemptuously disobeyed the court order and publicly defamed Superior Court Judge Gary Thomas by alleging that he had either been bribed or extorted by CSI.
Armstrong triumphantly announced to the press that he now was free to ignore both the settlement agreement and the injunction, and that he intended to do so.
In making its rulings, the court below not only committed fundamental errors of law and grossly abused its discretion, it also usurped judicial power by acting in excess of its jurisdiction.
1. Petitioner, Church of Scientology International, is a not-for-profit religious corporation, recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as a church exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3). Petitioner is the plaintiff in the underlying Superior Court consolidated action entitled Church of Scientology International v. Gerald Armstrong, Marin Cty. Superior Court Nos. 152229 and 157680 (Consolidated) ("the Action"). Petitioner is also the plaintiff in the related Superior Court action entitled Church of Scientology International v. Gerald Armstrong, Marin Cty. Superior Court No. CV 021632 ("the Related Action"). On July 15, 2004 CSI filed a related appeal from the Superior Court's judgment in the Related Action.
2. The Respondent Superior Court of the State of California, County of Marin, is the Superior Court exercising judicial functions in both the Action and the Related Action.
3. Real Party in Interest, Gerald Armstrong is the defendant in the Action and the Related Action.
Plaintiff agrees never to create or publish, or attempt to publish, and/or assist another to create for publication by means of magazine, article, book or other similar form, and writing or broadcast or to assist another to create, write, film, or video tape or audio tape any show, program or movie, or to grant interviews or discuss with others, concerning their experiences with the Church of Scientology, or concerning their personal or indirectly acquired knowledge or information concerning the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard or any of the organizations, individuals and entities listed in Paragraph 1 above. Plaintiff further agrees that he will maintain strict confidentiality and silence with respect to his experiences with the Church of Scientology and any knowledge or information he many have concerning the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, or any of the organizations, individuals or entitles listed in Paragraph 1 above .... Plaintiff agrees that if the terms of this paragraph are breached by him, that CSI and the other Releases would be entitled to liquidated damages in the amount of $50,000 for each such breach.
1 The bracketed page citations are to the sequential number at the bottom of each Exhibit page.
CSI sought liquidated damages for each breach and injunctive relief to prevent any future breaches. Armstrong asserted more than forty affirmative defenses, including fraud, duress and that the liquidated damages provision was unreasonable and unenforceable. Exs. Tab 3, [Pg. Nos. 063-078], Answer of Gerry Armstrong.
1. Plaintiff and defendant freely and voluntarily entered into a Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement in December, 1986.
Accordingly, the Court finds that entry of a permanent injunction in this action is necessary in this action because pecuniary compensation could not afford the Church adequate relief, and the restraint is necessary in order to prevent a multiplicity of actions for breach of contract.
Exs. Tab 5, ¶10, [Pg. Nos. 090-091], Order of Permanent Injunction.
5. Discussing with anyone, not a member of Armstrong's immediate family or his attorney, Scientology, the Church and/or any of the Beneficiaries (including CSI)."
6. On May 2, 1996, the Order of Permanent Injunction was incorporated into a judgment against Armstrong. Exs. Tab 6, [Pg. Nos. 094-096], Judgment. Armstrong's appeal from the permanent injunction was dismissed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal on December 23, 1997. Exs. Tab 7, [Pg. No. 97], Court of Appeal Order Granting Dismissal of Appeal.
fled the jurisdiction, and on August 6, 1997, Judge Thomas issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Exs. Tab 9, [Pg. No. 101], Bench Warrant.
On December 2, 1997 CSI again moved for an order of contempt, based upon Armstrong's numerous additional, open violations of the injunction. On February 20, 1998, Judge Thomas issued a Second Order of Contempt, finding that Armstrong "willfully disobeyed the Order ...in thirteen (13) separate incidents between September 2, 1997 and November 26, 1997." Exs. Tab 10, ¶4, [Pg. No. 104], Order of Contempt.
Judge Thomas imposed a fine of $200 per incident (for a total of $2,600) and ordered Armstrong confined in the County Jail for a period of two days for each separate incident, for a total of 26 days. Id. [Pg. No. 107]. The Court issued a second bench warrant for Armstrong's arrest when he failed to surrender to serve his sentence. Exs. Tab 11, [Pg. No. 108], Bench Warrant.
This Court has no authority to make unlawful orders; which include orders against public policy, orders in flagrant unnecessary violation of Constitutional guarantees, orders which are impossible to perform, and orders which generate a great stupidity.
There are no "adequate criminal sanctions" which can be ordered to make me comply with the Injunction, because it is not lawful. What Judge Thomas did and said, since he would not logically address the defenses and issues I raised, has served only to strengthen my conviction that the Injunction he signed is unlawful, and therefore need not be complied with and cannot legally be enforced.
Id. ¶18, 19, [Pg. No. 122].
9. On July 13, 2001, Superior Court Judge Vernon F. Smith issued yet a third Order of Contempt, finding that "Armstrong repeatedly, willfully and intentionally disobeyed" the injunction over 131 additional times. Exs. Tab 13, ¶5, [Pg. No. 143], Order of Contempt. Judge Smith postponed imposing a specific punishment until "such time as Armstrong is apprehended [and] brought before this Court." Id. [Pg. No. 144].
201 breaches in his answer to the complaint, which he signed, saying that he did so "at the will of God." He further stated that he would continue to do so because, in his view, the court's injunction was "illegal, unconstitutional, greatly stupid, impossible to perform, anti-public policy, anti-American, anti-religion, diabolical, insane and clearly unenforceable," and because, by issuing the injunction, the Court "abetted ...illegal blackmail." Exs. Tab 15, [Pg. Nos. 213, 222-223], Answer of Gerry Armstrong.
11. The Related Action was assigned to Superior Court Judge Lynn Duryee and set for trial on April 9, 2004. On that same day, the first Action, in which the contempt findings and judgments previously had been issued, was reassigned to Judge Duryee.
[Pg. No. 339]. After a recess, Judge Duryee reiterated that " I am treating this now as a hearing on the sentencing that Judge Smith set." RT 46 [Pg. No. 341].
13. At the conclusion of Greene's argument, plaintiff moved for judgment on the breach of contract claim. RT 49 [Pg. No. 344). After a brief recess, the Court announced its tentative rulings. First, the Court held that Armstrong's proposed defenses to the second beach of contract action were both precluded by res judicata and, in any event, were without merit.
The court agrees with the motion for directed verdict on the defenses. That is that none of the circumstances that were described in the opening statement by Mr. Greene amount to a defense in this case. And it appears that there is no quarrel but that these 131 acts did occur. And it's quite clear from Exhibit Number 1, that the settlement agreement did provide for liquidated damages for violating the terms of the settlement agreement. And it also is quite clear from the court's judicial notice that this matter has been thoroughly litigated and that a trial is not required for a final resolution of the matter.
So I do believe that these defenses have been previously litigated, previously ruled upon, and in addition the court has listened to the opening statements of the defense. And even if those things were proven to be true, there is no ambiguity in the settlement agreement. And defendant, in accepting that money, did undertake to abide by the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement. And that particular provision was not bilateral, it was unilateral. So that even if the Church said horrible things about Mr. Armstrong, he is not justified to violate the terms of the settlement agreement, but would have other remedies under the law.
damages of $300,000 (which he never paid, having declared bankruptcy), the Court limited the liquidated damages to $500,000, which it characterized not as compensation, but as "punishment."
unconscionable to punish him beyond what the benefit was that conferred to him. He's previously been sanctioned in the sum of $300,000.
So my thought is to enter judgment for the plaintiff, on the admitted violations, of $500,000.
(emphasis added). RT 56 [Pg. No. 350].
RT 56-57 [Pg. No. 350-351].
Judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $500,000. And the time that was ordered on the contempt citations is deemed served.
RT 62 [Pg. No. 356]. Armstrong, of course, never "served" a minute of time for his contempts.
So on the order of contempt issued July 13th, 2001, the court sentences you to five days in jail and a fine of $1,000. The fine is - - the fine is concurrent with the [civil] judgment that's been rendered in this action [i.e.; the Related Action] and the jail time is deemed served by your appearance in court here today.
RT 63, [Pg. No. 357]. The Court did not explain how a fine for criminal contempt payable to the court can be "concurrent" with a civil judgment for damages payable to a party. Nor did it explain how an appearance in court is the equivalent of serving a five-day jail sentence.
After submission of differing proposed orders by counsel for CSI and Armstrong, the Court entered its own written orders on May 20, 2004, which incorporated these rulings. Exs. Tab 17, [pg. Nos. 359-360], Order re Sentences for Contempt, Exs. Tab 18; [Pg. Nos. 361-362], Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment.
17. On May 20, 2004, the Superior Court issued its final judgment in the Related Action. CSI appealed that judgment on July 15, 2004.
18. The Superior Court lacked jurisdiction either to alter the final and conclusive sentences for the First and Second Orders of Contempt, or to essentially override the sentence imposed in by the Court's own, final contempt sentence. The original orders must be enforced.
20. The Superior Court's Order undermines respect for the power and authority of the Court and its lawful orders by essentially excusing Armstrong for his repeated violations of the Court's injunction and his public defiance of the Court's authority.
21. The basis of the relief is further set forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, which is incorporated by reference into this verified Petition as though fully set forth.
23. The Superior Court's Order was dated May 20, 2004. This petition is filed within 57 days of that date.
3. Grant such other relief as may be just and proper.
I, Andrew H. Wilson, am attorney for the Petitioner in the within action. I am verifying this Petition and supporting papers rather than Petitioner because most of the facts set forth herein are particularly within my personal knowledge, rather than Petitioner's, making my verification appropriate under Code of Civil Procedure § 446. I have read the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari or, in The Alternative, A Writ of Mandamus, and the exhibits in support thereof separately filed with this Court, and know the contents thereof, which are true of my own knowledge except as to those matters which are stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 15th day of July, 2004, at Sausalito. California.
mislabeling nor a defective prayer will bar relief justified by proper allegations and proof") (citations omitted).
[W]here, in a proceeding instituted by the beneficiary of a judgment granting an injunction the disobedience of which is made to appear, the court without any ground shown therefor denies to such beneficiary the process of the court, which constitutes the only means of enforcing the judgment, such order should be annulled, since otherwise the judgment solemnly pronounced would be an idle act.
injunction, which was issued to protect its contract rights.. This interest is more than sufficient to confer standing.
Judge Duryee had no jurisdiction to alter the final and conclusive sentences for the First and Second Orders of Contempt, or to essentially override the sentence imposed in her own final contempt order. The original orders must be enforced.
constituted judicial action complete and final, and it was no longer open to the court to make any further or different order therein.") (emphasis added).
Judge Duryee also lacked authority to discharge the final sentences that had been imposed. In the First and Second Orders of Contempt, Judge Thomas found Armstrong guilty of contempt and sentenced him to fines totaling $3,600 and 28 days of confinement. In the Third Order of Contempt, Judge Duryee sentenced Armstrong to a $1,000 fine and five days of confinement. These sentences were criminal contempt sanctions, primarily designed to punish Armstrong for his repeated flouting of the protective order and his avowed intent to continue to flagrantly violate that order. Their purpose was to "vindicate the dignity [and] authority of the court." See People v. Batey, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1281, 1284, 228 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1986). In no way were these sentences conditional on Armstrong's future compliance. Even if they could somehow be so construed, Armstrong's continued pronouncements that he had disobeyed the court order and would continue to do so because, in his view, the court's injunction was "illegal, unconstitutional, greatly stupid, impossible to perform, anti-public policy, anti-American, anti-religion, diabolical, insane and clearly unenforceable," Exs. Tab 15, [Pg. Nos. 213, 222-223], unquestionably would not have satisfied any such condition.
Judge Duryee lacked the jurisdiction to discharge these sentences and should be ordered to enforce the plain terms of the final contempt judgments.
The discharge of these sentences is not properly viewed as a lawful remission, Armstrong made no motion to remit these sentences; thus, the terms of those sentences were not properly before the court.
Moreover, even if the issue were properly before the court, no grounds for remission of Armstrong's contempt sentences existed here. "In unusual cases, even though a contempt judgment is sustained, if the violation was the result of an honest mistake of law, and compliance is ultimately obtained, either the trial or appellate court may grant a remission of punishment." Witkin, 9 Cal. Proc. § 347 (4th Ed. 1997) (citing City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 2d 839, 842, 250 P.2d 241 (1952)) (emphasis added); see also County of Lake v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 815, 136 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1977) (where there are "mitigating factors," remission may be appropriate) (citing City of Vernon, 39 Cal. 2d 839, 250 P. 2d 241 (1952)). The only thing "unusual" in this case is the remarkable contempt which Armstrong has accorded the power and dignity of the Superior Court.
In stark contrast to the councilmen in City of Vernon, Armstrong has acted in manifest bad faith in pursuing his repeatedly contemptuous course of conduct. First, he voluntarily accepted $800,000 in exchange for, among other things, his agreement to be bound by all of its provisions, including Paragraph 7(D). Notwithstanding his receipt of that money, Armstrong quickly demonstrated he had no intention of abiding by the terms of that order, leading to the entry of a permanent injunction against him. Since that injunction was entered, he has repeatedly, flagrantly, and admittedly violated that order at least 201 times. Armstrong has also defiantly proclaimed his intention to continue to violate the injunction because, in his view, it was "illegal, unconstitutional, greatly stupid, impossible to perform, anti-public policy, anti-American, anti-religion, diabolical, insane and clearly unenforceable," and because, by issuing the injunction, the Court "abetted ... illegal blackmail." Given this history, not only was remission of the lawfully imposed sanctions for Armstrong's repeated contempt unwarranted, it would have been a "manifest abuse of discretion" for the court to remit Armstrong's contempt sentences under these circumstances. See City of Vernon, 39 Cal. 2d at 843, 250 P.2d 241.
different violations of the permanent injunction simply cannot satisfy Armstrong's outstanding contempt sanctions. See In re Wales, 153 Cal. App. 2d 117, 119, 315 P. 2d 433 (1957); Bailey v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 47, 53, 297 P.2d 795 (1956) ("A contempt proceeding is not a civil action, either at law or in equity, but is a separate proceeding of a criminal nature and summary character in which the court exercises but a limited jurisdiction . . . .").
297 P.2d 795 ("[I]f real parties have suffered civil damages, a civil action is the proper remedy."). Thus, the court erred in conflating the two and holding that the $500,000 compensatory damage award discharges Armstrong's responsibility to pay accumulated fines of $4,600 and serve 28 days in jail, the punishment imposed for numerous contempts.
Moreover, given that immediately prior to Armstrong's court appearance, he had willfully evaded two outstanding bench warrants since 1997, it is difficult to understand how one voluntary appearance could satisfy the five additional days of jail time to which Judge Duryee herself sentenced Armstrong.
The orders discharging Armstrong's contempt should be vacated and the original sentences reinstated.
___BY HAND DELIVERY AT COURT EX PARTE HEARING.

References: § 501
 v. 
 v. 
 § 446
 v. 
 § 347
 v. 
 v. 
 v.