Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/292/313/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:57:34+00:00

Document:
1. This Court has no jurisdiction of a suit brought by a foreign state against a state of the Union without her consent. Pp. 292 U. S. 320, 292 U. S. 330.
2 The need for such consent, though not expressed in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution, is clearly to be implied. P. 292 U. S. 321.
3. Clause 2 of § 2, Art. III, of the Constitution merely distributes the jurisdiction conferred by Clause 1, and deals with cases in which resort may be had to the original jurisdiction of this Court in the exercise of the judicial power as previously given. P. 292 U. S. 321.
4. Neither the literal sweep of the words of Clause 1, § 2, Art. III, nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment, permits the conclusion that, in all controversies of the sort described in Clause 1 and omitted from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued without her consent. P. 292 U. S. 321.
5. Behind the words of these constitutional provisions are the essential postulates that the controversies shall be found to be of a justiciable character and that the states of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the Constitution. P. 292 U. S. 322.
6. There has been such a surrender of immunity as respects suits in this Court brought by one state of the Union against another, or by the United States against a state, but not as respects (1) suits against a state brought by citizens of another state or citizens of a foreign state (expressly barred by the Eleventh Amendment), or (2) suits against a the Union by its own citizens or by federal corporations, or (3) suits against a the Union by foreign states. P. 292 U. S. 328.
7. In construing the constitutional provision with respect to suits by foreign states, consideration is given to the thought that such suits may involve questions of national concern. P. 292 U. S. 331.
bonds issued by that state. Mississippi made her return to a rule to show cause why the leave should not be granted.
"long since defaulted on the principal and interest of these bonds, the holders of which have waited for some 90 years in the hope that the state would meet its obligations and make payment;"
that the donors had been advised that there was no basis upon which they could maintain a suit against Mississippi on the bonds, but that "such a suit could only be maintained by a foreign government or one of the United States;" and that, in these circumstances, the donors were making an unconditional gift of the bonds to the Principality to be applied "to the causes of any of its charities, to the furtherance of its internal development or to the benefit of its citizens in such manner as it may select."
"forbids the State of Mississippi without the consent of Congress, to enter into any compact or agreement with the Principality of Monaco, and no compact, agreement or contract has been entered into by the state with the Principality;"
extinguished" by reason of the completion of the period of limitation of action prescribed by the statutes of Mississippi; that the plaintiff and its predecessors in title have been guilty of laches, and that the right of action, if any, is now and for a long time has been stale.
"assume, redeem, secure, or pay any indebtedness or pretended indebtedness alleged to be due by the State of Mississippi to any person, association, or corporation whatsoever, claiming the same as owners, holders, or assignees of any bond or bonds, now generally known as 'Union Bank' bonds and 'Planters Bank' bonds,"
that this provision was incorporated in the Constitution of 1890 (§ 258), and that, since its adoption, no foreign state could accept the bonds in question as a charitable donation in good faith.
In reply to these objections, the Principality asserts that she is a foreign state recognized as such by the Government of the United States; that the consent of the State of Mississippi is not necessary to give the Court jurisdiction; that the obligation of the State of Mississippi to pay her bonds is not an agreement or a compact with a foreign power within § 10, cl. 3, Article I of the Constitution; that the action is not a subterfuge to evade the Eleventh Amendment; that the cause of action is justiciable; that no statute of limitations has run against the plaintiff or its predecessors, and that neither has been guilty of laches. Upon the last-mentioned points, the Principality urges that, under the provisions of the statutes of Mississippi, holders of her bonds never had an enforceable remedy which could be said to be barred by the running of any state statute of limitations, and that the Principality will be prepared in the course of the suit to meet the defense of laches by showing the history of the efforts of the holders of the bonds to procure payment.
These contentions have been presented in oral argument as well as upon briefs. We find it necessary to deal with but one -- that is, the question whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a foreign state against a state without her consent. That question, not hitherto determined, is now definitely presented.
of the Constitution, providing that the judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit against one of the United States "by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign state," contains no reference to a suit brought by a foreign state.
The argument drawn from the lack of an express requirement of consent to be sued is inconclusive. Thus, there is no express provision that the United States may not be sued in the absence of consent. Clause 1 of § 2 of Article III extends the judicial power "to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party." Literally, this includes such controversies, whether the United States be party plaintiff or defendant. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 289 U. S. 573. But, by reason of the established doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign from suit except upon consent, the provision of Clause 1 of § 2 of Article III does not authorize the maintenance of suits against the United States. Williams v. United States, supra. Compare 19 U. S. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U. S. 411-412; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 185 U. S. 384, 185 U. S. 386; Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 204 U. S. 341-342. And while Clause 2 of § 2 of Article III gives this Court original jurisdiction in those cases in which "a State shall be Party," this Court has no jurisdiction of a suit by a state against the United States in the absence of consent. Kansas v. United States, supra. Clause 2 merely distributes the jurisdiction conferred by Clause 1, and deals with cases in which resort may be had to the original jurisdiction of this Court in the exercise of the judicial power as previously given. Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311, 251 U. S. 314.
Similarly, neither the literal sweep of the words of Clause 1 of § 2 of Article III nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment permits the conclusion that, in all controversies of the sort described in Clause 1 and omitted from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a state may be sued without her consent.
But, although a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be prosecuted against a state, without her consent, by one of her own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1; Duhne v. New Jersey, supra, p. 251 U. S. 311. The requirement of consent is necessarily implied. The state has the same immunity in case of a suit brought by a corporation created by act of Congress. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436. Yet in neither case is the suit within the express prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment. Again, the Eleventh Amendment mentions only suits "in law or equity;" it does not refer to suits in admiralty. But this Court has held that the Amendment does not "leave open a suit against a state in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether its own citizens or not." Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, 256 U. S. 498.
immunity in the plan of the convention." The Federalist, No. 81. The question is whether the plan of the Constitution involves the surrender of immunity when the suit is brought against a state, without her consent, by a foreign state.
an American state and a foreign state, without the consent of the parties. If they consent, provision is here made."
"He objects, in the next place, to its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and a foreign state. Suppose, says he, in such a suit, a foreign state is cast; will she be bound by the decision? If a foreign state brought a suit against the Commonwealth of Virginia, would she not be barred from the claim if the federal judiciary thought it unjust? The previous consent of the parties is necessary, and, as the federal judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce."
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind, and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union. Unless therefore there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of state sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us that there is no color to pretend that the state governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.
The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against states for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident it could not be done without waging war against the contracting state, and to ascribe to the federal courts by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting right of the state governments, a power which would involve such a consequence would be altogether forced and unwarrantable. [Footnote 4]"
"Looking back from our present standpoint at the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, we do not greatly wonder at the effect which it had upon the country. Any such power as that of authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain suits by individuals against the states had been expressly disclaimed, and even resented, by the great defenders of the constitution while it was on its trial before the American people."
"It seems to us that these views of those great advocates and defenders of the Constitution were most sensible and just, and they apply equally to the present case as to that then under discussion. The letter is appealed to now, as it was then, as a ground for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a state. The reason against it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an attempt to strain the constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of. Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a state to sue their own state in the federal courts, while the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a state from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the states? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face."
"The truth is that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States. . . . "
"The suability of a state without its consent was a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted. It was fully shown by an exhaustive examination of the old law by Mr. Justice Iredell in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, and it has been conceded in every case since where the question has in any way been presented -- even in the cases which have gone furthest in sustaining suits against the officers or agents of states."
In the case of South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, 192 U. S. 318, the Court observed that the expression in the opinion in Hans v. Louisiana of concurrence in the views announced by Mr. Justice Iredell in his dissenting opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia could not be considered as a judgment of the Court in view of the point which Hans v. Louisiana actually decided. But South Dakota v. North Carolina did not disturb the ruling in Hans v. Louisiana or the principle which that decision applied.
South Dakota v. North Carolina was a suit by one state against another state, and did not present the question of the maintenance either of a suit by individuals against a state or by a foreign state against a state. As a suit by one state against another state, it involved a distinct and essential principle of the constitutional plan which provided means for the judicial settlement of controversies between states of the Union, a principle which necessarily operates regardless of the consent of the defendant state. The reasoning of the Court in Hans v. Louisiana with respect to the general principle of sovereign immunity from suits was recently reviewed and approved in Williams v. United States, supra.
The question of that immunity, in the light of the provisions of Clause 1 of § 2 of Article III of the Constitution, is thus presented in several distinct classes of cases -- that is, in those brought against a state (a) by another state of the Union; (b) by the United States; (c) by the citizens of another state or by the citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (d) by citizens of the same state or by federal corporations, and (e) by foreign states. Each of these classes has its characteristic aspect from the standpoint of the effect upon sovereign immunity from suits, which has been produced by the constitutional scheme.
"by their own consent and delegated authority" as a necessary feature of the formation of a more perfect Union. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 720; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 176 U. S. 16-17; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 180 U. S. 240-241; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 185 U. S. 142-144; 206 U. S. 206 U.S. 46, 206 U. S. 83-85; Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565.
2. Upon a similar basis rests the jurisdiction of this Court of a suit by the United States against a state, albeit without the consent of the latter. While that jurisdiction is not conferred by the Constitution in express words, it is inherent in the constitutional plan. United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211; United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 143 U. S. 644-645; 162 U. S. 162 U.S. 1, 162 U. S. 90; United States v. Michigan, 190 U. S. 379, 190 U. S. 396; Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 258 U. S. 581; United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181, 270 U. S. 195. Without such a provision, as this Court said in United States v. Texas, supra, "the permanence of the Union might be endangered."
3. To suits against a state, without her consent, brought by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, the Eleventh Amendment erected an absolute bar. Superseding the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, supra, the Amendment established in effective operation the principle asserted by Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall in expounding the Constitution and advocating its ratification. The "entire judicial power granted by the Constitution" does not embrace authority to entertain such suits in the absence of the state's consent. Ex parte New York, No. 1, supra, p. 256 U. S. 497; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 290 U. S. 25-26.
prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Hans v. Louisiana, supra; Smith v. Reeves, supra; Duhne v. New Jersey, supra; Ex parte New York, No. 1, supra.
5. We are of the opinion that the same principle applies to suits against a state by a foreign state. The decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, is not opposed, as it rested upon the determination that the Cherokee nation was not a "foreign state" in the sense in which the term is used in the Constitution. The question now before us necessarily remained an open one. We think that Madison correctly interpreted Clause 1 of § 2 of Article III of the Constitution as making provision for jurisdiction of a suit against a state by a foreign state in the event of the state's consent, but not otherwise. In such a case, the grounds of coercive jurisdiction which are present in suits to determine controversies between states of the Union, or in suits brought by the United States against a state, are not present. The foreign state lies outside the structure of the Union. The waiver or consent on the part of a state, which inheres in the acceptance of the constitutional plan, runs to the other states who have likewise accepted that plan, and to the United States as the sovereign which the Constitution creates. We perceive no ground upon which it can be said that any waiver or consent by a the Union has run in favor of a foreign state. As to suits brought by a foreign state, we think that the states of the Union retain the same immunity that they enjoy with respect to suits by individuals whether citizens of the United States or citizens or subjects of a foreign state. The foreign state enjoys a similar sovereign immunity, and, without her consent, may not be sued by a the Union.
provision prohibiting agreements between states and foreign powers in the absence of the consent of the Congress. While, in this instance, the proposed suit does not arise a question of national concern, the constitutional provision which is said to confer jurisdiction should be construed in the light of all its applications.
See Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 36 U. S. 321; Darrington v. Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12, 54 U. S. 17; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 61 U. S. 529; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 123 U. S. 505.
"Our own government has largely availed itself of the like privilege to bring suits in the English courts in cases growing out of our late civil war. Twelve or more of such suits are enumerated in the brief of the appellees, brought within the last five years in the English law, chancery, and admiralty courts. There are numerous cases in the English reports in which suits of foreign sovereigns have been sustained, though it is held that a sovereign cannot be forced into court by suit. [Cases cited.]"
In Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 F. 341, Ann.Cas.1918E, 524, the court held that the bringing of an action by a foreign nation in a court of the United States to recover a deposit placed to its credit in a bank was not a waiver of its immunity as a sovereign from suit by other parties, and hence that the court was without jurisdiction to permit the defendant, by interpleader, to substitute as defendant another party claiming a lien on the deposit as a creditor of the plaintiff. See also Republic of Columbia v. Cauca Co., 190 U. S. 524; Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522.
For statements by Madison and Marshall in the Virginia Convention in relation to the nonsuability of states by individuals, see 3 Elliot's Debates 533, 555.
For comment upon the force of this dissent, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 134 U. S. 12, 134 U. S. 14; Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 289 U. S. 574, 289 U. S. 576-577.
See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 180 U. S. 240; New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76.

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