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36. In considering Uwinkindi’s complaint of an alleged breach of his right to choose his counsel, the Trial Chamber recalled that the Appeals Chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals have consistently recognised that individuals lacking the means to remunerate counsel do not have an absolute right to a counsel of their own choosing. […] Consistent with international human rights law and the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals, this right is necessarily subject to certain limitations where, as in the present case, free legal aid is relied upon and the interests of justice require the accused to be defended by counsel assigned to him despite his wishes.
 See Impugned Decision [Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No. MICT-12-25-R14.1, Decision on Uwinkindi’s Request for Revocation, 22 October 2015], para. 24 and references cited therein.
 See Léonidas Nshogoza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2007-91-A, Judgement, 15 March 2010, para. 35; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgement, 9 May 2007, paras. 14, 17. See The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgement, 23 November 2001 (signed on 1 June 2001), para. 61; Jean Kambanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgement, 19 October 2000, para. 33. See also Dvorski v. Croatia  ECHR 927, paras. 78, 79.
 Croissant v. Germany  ECHR 60, para. 28.
 Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14, Decision on Appeal against the Referral of Phénéas Munyarugarama’s Case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to Strike, 5 October 2012, para. 24.
 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36A-A, Judgement, 28 September 2011, para. 115; Tharcisse Renzaho v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-31-A, Judgement, 1 April 2011, para. 43. See also Kyprianou v. Cyprus  ECHR 873, para. 119.
 See The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-A, Judgement, 14 December 2015, paras. 95, 405 and references cited therein; Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgement, 9 July 2004 (“Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement”), para. 45.
 Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 45 and references cited therein.
 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, 28 February 2005, (“Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement”) para. 23. See also, e.g., Nyiramasuhuko et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1308; Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Ðorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-A, Judgement, 27 January 2014 (“Ðorđević Appeal Judgement”), para. 864.
 Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23. See also, e.g., Nyiramasuhuko et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1308; Ðorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 864; Gaspard Kanyarukiga v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-02-78-A, Judgement, 8 May 2012, para. 127; Aloys Ntabakuze v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41A-A, Judgement, 8 May 2012, para. 161.
5. Rule 142 of the Rules provides for the admission of additional evidence on appeal, and the Appeals Chamber finds that, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ICTR and the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), this provision is applicable to appeals of decisions issued pursuant Rule 14 of the Rules. According to Rule 142(A) of the Rules, a motion for the admission of additional evidence shall clearly identify with precision the specific finding of fact made by the trial chamber to which the evidence is directed. For additional evidence to be admissible under Rule 142(C) of the Rules, the applicant must demonstrate that the additional evidence was not available at trial in any form, or discoverable through the exercise of due diligence. The applicant must also show that the additional evidence is relevant to a material issue at trial and credible. Once it has been determined that the additional evidence meets these conditions, the Appeals Chamber will determine in accordance with Rule 142(C) of the Rules whether it could have been a decisive factor in reaching the Impugned Decision.
6. Where, however, the evidence was available during the revocation proceedings or could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, it may still be admissible on appeal pursuant to Rule 142(C) of the Rules if the applicant shows that the exclusion of the additional evidence would lead to a miscarriage of justice, in that, if it had been admitted at trial, it would have had an impact on the Impugned Decision.
7. In both cases, the applicant bears the burden of identifying with precision the specific finding of fact made by the trial chamber to which the additional evidence pertains, and of specifying with sufficient clarity the impact the additional evidence could or would have had upon the trial chamber’s decision. An applicant who fails to do so runs the risk that the tendered material will be rejected without detailed consideration.
 See Bernard Munyagishari v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-89-AR11bis, Decision on Bernard Munyagishari’s First and Second Motions for Admission of Additional Evidence, 25 February 2013 (“Munyagishari Decision of 25 February 2013”), para. 5; Prosecutor v. Željko Mejakić et al., Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis.1, Decision on Joint Defence Motion to Admit Additional Evidence before the Appeals Chamber pursuant to Rule 115, 16 November 2005 (“Mejakić et al. Decision of 16 November 2005”), para. 6.
 Augustin Ngirabatware v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, Decision on Ngirabatware’s Motions for Relief for Rule 73 Violations and Admission of Additional Evidence on Appeal, 21 November 2014 (“Ngirabatware Decision of 21 November 2014”), para. 24; Munyagishari Decision of 25 February 2013, para. 5.
 Ngirabatware Decision of 21 November 2014, para. 25; Munyagishari Decision of 25 February 2013, para. 5; Mejakić et al. Decision of 16 November 2005, para. 10.
 Munyagishari Decision of 25 February 2013, para. 5; Mejakić et al. Decision of 16 November 2005, para. 10. Cf. Ngirabatware Decision of 21 November 2014, para. 26.
 Cf. Ngirabatware Decision of 21 November 2014, para. 27; Munyagishari Decision of 25 February 2013, para. 6; Mejakić et al. Decision of 16 November 2005, para. 12.
 Cf. Ngirabatware Decision of 21 November 2014, para. 28 and references cited therein.
 Ngirabatware Decision of 21 November 2014, para. 28 and references cited therein.
 Tharcisse Renzaho v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-31-A, Decision on Tharcisse Renzaho’s Motions for Admission of Additional Evidence and Investigation on Appeal, 27 September 2010 (“Renzaho Decision of 27 September 2010”), para. 19 (emphasis omitted).
 Renzaho Decision of 27 September 2010, para. 19 (emphasis omitted).
72. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that the purpose of Rule 142 of the Rules is to address instances where a party is “in possession of material” that was not before the court of first instance and which is additional evidence of a fact or issue litigated at trial. As repeatedly held by the ad hoc Tribunals, a party seeking the admission of additional evidence on appeal must provide the Appeals Chamber with the evidence sought to be admitted to allow it to determine whether the evidence meets the requirements of relevance and credibility.
76. The Appeals Chamber has the authority to summon a witness, in appropriate circumstances, to testify before the Chamber so as to facilitate the effective conduct of appeal proceedings. However, Rule 142 of the Rules does not permit a party to merely request a particular person to be summoned as a witness to give evidence at the appellate stage. Where a party seeks to call a witness at the appellate stage, it needs to provide a statement or other documentation of the potential witness’s proposed evidence, which the Appeals Chamber may admit as additional evidence pursuant to Rule 142 of the Rules and on the basis of which it may determine whether calling the witness to testify on appeal is necessary.
 See, e.g., Théoneste Bagosora et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Decision on Théoneste Bagosora’s Motion for Admission of Additional Evidence, 7 February 2011 (“Bagosora et al. Decision of 7 February 2011”), para. 8; Renzaho Decision of 27 September 2010, para. 3; Emmanuel Rukundo v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR‑01‑70-A, Decision on Rukundo’s Motion for the Admission of Additional Evidence on Appeal, 4 June 2010, para. 5; The Prosecutor v. Ildephonse Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on Request to Admit Additional Evidence, 2 October 2008 (“Hategekimana Decision of 2 October 2008”), para. 5; Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion for Leave to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115, 5 May 2006 (“Nahimana et al. Decision of 5 May 2006”), para. 20; Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on the Motions of Drago Josipović, Zoran Kupreškić and Vlatko Kupreškić to Admit Additional Evidence pursuant to Rule 115 and for Judicial Notice to be Taken Pursuant to Rule 94(B), 8 May 2001 (“Kupreškić et al. Decision of 8 May 2001”), para. 5.
 See, e.g., Bagosora et al. Decision of 7 February 2011, para. 8; Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT‑98‑29/1-A, Decision on Dragomir Milošević’s Further Motion to Present Additional Evidence, 9 April 2009, para. 18; Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin Šljivančanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Decision on Mile Mrkšić’s Second Rule 115 Motion, 13 February 2009, para. 13; Hategekimana Decision of 2 October 2008, paras. 7, 8. See also Practice Direction on Requirements and Procedures for Appeals, MICT/10, 6 August 2013, para. 12(e), providing that a party applying to present additional evidence pursuant to Rule 142 of the Rules shall do so by way of a motion filed containing “an appendix with copies of the evidence the party is applying to present before the Appeals Chamber”.
 See, e.g., Bagosora et al. Decision of 7 February 2011, para. 8; Nahimana et al. Decision of 5 May 2006, para. 20. Kupreškić et al. Decision of 8 May 2001, para. 5.
 See, e.g., Bagosora et al. Decision of 7 February 2011, para. 8; Nahimana et al. Decision of 5 May 2006, para. 20; Kupreškić et al. Decision of 8 May 2001, paras. 5, 10.
 See, e.g., Bagosora et al. Decision of 7 February 2011, paras. 8, 9; Nahimana et al. Decision of 5 May 2006, para. 20. Cf. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Decision on the First and Third Rule 115 Defence Motions to Present Additional Evidence before the Appeals Chamber, 30 June 2005 (“Galić Decision of 30 June 2005”), para. 87; Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić and Vinko Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Decision on the Request for Presentation of Additional Evidence, 18 November 2003, para. 13.
 Practice Direction on Lengths of Briefs and Motions, MICT/11, 6 August 2013 (“Practice Direction”).
 Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-A, Decision on Stanišić’s Urgent Request for Extension of Word Limit, 31 October 2013 (“Stanišić and Simatović Decision of 31 October 2013”), p. 2; Georges A.N. Rutaganda v The Prosecutor, Case No. IT-96-03-R68, Decision on Motion for Leave to Exceed the Word Limit, 23 February 2010, p. 2.
Decision on Croatia's Amicus Curiae Application - 18.07.2016 PRLIĆ et al.
 Statute of the Tribunal, Arts 1, 6-7. See also Gotovina and Markač Decision of 8 February 2012 [Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Decision on Motion to Intervene and Statement of Interest by the Republic of Croatia, 8 February 2012], para. 12.
 See Decision on Motion for Access to Ex Parte Filings in Completed Cases, 10 May 2016 (“Appeals Chamber Decision of 10 May 2016”), p. 2 and references cited therein.
 See Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, 23 May 2005, para. 202 (“The doctrine [of res judicata] refers to a situation when ‘a final judgement on the merits’ issued by a competent court on a claim, demand or cause of action between parties constitutes an absolute bar to a ‘second lawsuit on the same claim’ between the same parties”). See also, e.g., Brumărescu v. Romania  ECHR 105 at para. 61, (“[o]ne of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires, inter alia, that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question”); Ryabykh v. Russia  ECHR 396 at para. 52 (“Legal certainty presupposes respect for the principle of res judicata, that is the principle of finality of judgments. This principle underlines that no party is entitled to seek a review of a final and binding judgment merely for the purpose of obtaining a rehearing and a fresh determination of the case”).
1036. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the mens rea for extermination has been defined as the intention of the perpetrator to: (i) kill on a large scale; or (ii) systematically subject a large number of people to conditions of living that would lead to their deaths. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber recalls that it has consistently held that the elements of the crime of extermination are the same as those required for murder as a crime against humanity, with the difference that extermination is killing on a large scale. As such, the Appeals Chamber considers that the mens rea for extermination to “(i) kill on a large scale” can be met by establishing the mens rea for murder as a crime against humanity – i.e. the intent to: (i) kill the victim; or (ii) wilfully cause serious bodily harm which the perpetrator should reasonably have known might lead to death – plus the additional intention to do so on a large scale.
 Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras 259-260. See Trial Judgement [Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, 27 March 2013]], vol. 1, para. 45.
 Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260. See Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 701.
 Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 261.
 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber also recalls that “[t]]he principle of individual guilt requires that an accused can only be convicted for a crime if his mens rea comprises the actus reus of the crime” (Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 66, quoting Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, para. 114). Thus, for a conviction of extermination, not only the actus reus but also the mens rea must encompass the large scale element.
1021. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the actus reus of extermination is “the act of killing on a large scale”. It is this element of “massiveness” that distinguishes the crime of extermination from the crime of murder. However, the expression “on a large scale” does not suggest a strict numerical approach with a minimum number of victims. While extermination as a crime against humanity has been found in relation to the killing of thousands, it has also been found in relation to far fewer killings.
1022. The assessment of “large scale” is made on a case‑by‑case basis, taking into account the circumstances in which the killings occurred. The Appeals Chamber has found that relevant factors include but are not limited to: (i) the time and place of the killings; (ii) the selection of the victims and the manner in which they were targeted; (iii) the type of victims; (iv) whether the killings were aimed at the collective group rather than victims in their individual capacity; and (v) the population density of the victims’ area of origin. These factors do not constitute elements of the crime of extermination as a crime against humanity, but rather are factors which a trier of facts may take into account when assessing whether or not the “large scale” element is satisfied. Moreover, separate killing incidents may be aggregated for the purpose of meeting the “large scale requirement” if the killings are considered to be part of one and the same operation. Whether killings are part of the same operation must be assessed on a case‑by‑case basis taking into account the circumstances in which they occurred. As held by the ICTR Appeals Chamber, collective consideration of distinct events committed in different locations, in different circumstances, by different perpetrators, over an extended period of time cannot satisfy the requirement of killing on a large scale.
 Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 146; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536, referring to Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 259, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 660. See Trial Judgement [Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, 27 March 2013]], vol. 1, para. 44.
 Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 146; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 536; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516. See Trial Judgement, vol. 1, para. 44.
 Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 537; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 260; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 516.
 Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 537. In the Lukić and Lukić case, the Appeals Chamber found that the killing of 59 persons was sufficiently large so as to constitute extermination (Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 543). In the Akayesu case, the ICTR Appeals Chamber upheld the finding that the killing of 16 persons constituted extermination (see Akayesu Appeal Judgement, paras 423-424; Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras 737-744).
 Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538, referring to Martić Trial Judgement, para. 63, Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 640, Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 391, Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgement, para. 57; Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 716, Nahimana et al. Trial Judgement, para. 1061. See Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 472, finding “that the scale of the killings, in light of the circumstances in which they occurred, meets the required threshold of massiveness for the purposes of extermination” (emphasis added).
 Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 538.
 Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, para. 542.
 Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgement, paras 539, 542-543.
 Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 147; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, paras 661-662; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396.
 Cf. Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 149.
 Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396.
 See supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 1022.
 See Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 147, stating that “[i]]t is not required that that the killings be on a vast scale in a concentrated location over a short period of time.” See also Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396.
 Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 147; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, para. 661; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgement, para. 396. See supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 1022.
 See Župljanin Appeal Brief [Stojan [Ž]]upljanin’s Appeal Brief, 19 August 2013 (confidential; public redacted version filed on 23 August 2013, re-filed on 21 April 2016)]], para. 228.
 The Appeals Chamber notes that in the Brđanin case, the Trial Chamber found killings occurring in separate incidents between 22 April 1992 and 18 December 1992 to collectively amount to extermination (10 victims at Manjača detention camp, 94 victims at Omarska detention camp, 20 victims at Trnopolje detention camp, 20 victims in the Sanski Most Incident, 4 victims in front of Manjača Camp, 190 victims at Room 3 Keraterm detention camp, 200 victims at Korićanske Stijene, 11 victims at Petar Kočić elementary school, 144 victims at Biljani, 45 victims at Teslić TO). It however did not convict Brđanin for extermination, and this finding was not challenged on appeal (see Brđanin Trial Judgement, paras 436-465, 467, 478-479).
32. On the issue of disqualification of Judges, Rule 15(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal (“Rules”) provides that “[a] Judge may not sit on a trial or appeal in any case in which the Judge has a personal interest or concerning which the Judge has or has had any association which might affect his or her impartiality.” In light of Article 13 of the Statute – which requires Judges to be, inter alia, impartial – Rule 15(A) of the Rules has been interpreted and applied in accordance with the principle that a Judge is not impartial if actual bias or an unacceptable appearance of bias exists. The Appeals Chamber also notes that a Judge who has not met the requirements of this Rule in a specific case has otherwise been entitled to continue to exercise the functions of a Judge of the Tribunal and sit in other cases when he fulfils the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules in those other cases. The Appeals Chamber therefore considers that determinations of actual bias or unacceptable appearance of bias under Rule 15 of the Rules should be made on a case‑by‑case basis. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that Judge Harhoff’s disqualification in the Šešelj case, which was determined pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rules, does not automatically disqualify him from other cases. Stanišić and Župljanin therefore cannot rely on a finding of apparent bias made in another case and must instead show that those actions of Judge Harhoff which allegedly demonstrate an unacceptable appearance of bias, impacted on his impartiality in their trial proceedings.
33. Additionally, as held by the Appeals Chamber, there has been no general finding or final determination on Judge Harhoff’s partiality with regard to the present case, and the factual findings in the Šešelj Decisions were limited to the particular circumstances of that case. The Appeals Chamber emphasises in this respect that, as a rule, factual findings made by one chamber are not binding upon subsequent chambers. The Appeals Chamber also does not find Stanišić and Župljanin’s argument that the Šešelj case and the current proceedings are “identical” to be persuasive. Recalling that it is the burden of the party seeking disqualification of a Judge to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias, the Appeals Chamber notes that the arguments presented in the Šešelj case, as well as the evidence considered, differ from those in this case, and that in the Šešelj case, the Letter was sent by Judge Harhoff while the case was ongoing. Thus, Stanišić and Župljanin’s reliance on the findings in the Šešelj case is insufficient to meet their burden of proof. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber considers that Stanišić takes out of context the Acting President’s Order Replacing Judge Harhoff in the Šešelj proceedings. It is clear that the relevant statement in the order, i.e. that Judge Harhoff’s disqualification was “therefore now final”, concerned the finality of the disqualification pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rules in the Šešelj proceedings and related only to that case. Similarly, Stanišić and Župljanin’s argument that a different conclusion on Judge Harhoff’s impartiality in this case would invalidate the Šešelj Decisions is without merit and is dismissed.
 See Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 179.
 Furundžija Appeal Judgement, paras 189-191; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 179-181. See Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 175 (noting that Rule 15(A) of the Rules calls for a Judge to withdraw from a particular case if he or she believes that his or her impartiality is in question).
 See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 683 (stating that the “relevant question to be determined by the Appeals Chamber is whether the reaction of the hypothetical fair-minded observer (with sufficient knowledge of the circumstances to make a reasonable judgement) would be that [the Judge]] might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the issues arising in the case” (emphasis added)). See also Delalić et al. Disqualification and Recusal Decision [Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision of the Bureau on Motion to Disqualify Judges Pursuant to Rule 15 or in the Alternative that Certain Judges Recuse Themselves, 25 October 1999]], para. 9 (“If the Judge does not fulfil the requirements referred to in Rule 15(B), he or she is disqualified from hearing that particular case, although he or she is fully entitled to continue to exercise the functions of a Judge of the Tribunal and sit in other cases”).
 See Delalić et al. Disqualification and Recusal Decision, paras 9-10. See also Prosecutor v. Chea Nuon et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Decision on Ieng Sary’s Application to Disqualify Judge Nil Nonn and Related Requests, 28 January 2011, para. 7 (“It follows that a finding of bias in a case does not by itself require the judge’s disqualification from other, unrelated cases.”).
 See Furundžija Appeal Judgement, paras 197 (“It is for the Appellant to adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy the Appeals Chamber that Judge Mumba was not impartial in his case”), 200 (“even if it were established that Judge Mumba expressly shared the goals and objectives […]] in promoting and protecting the human rights of women, that inclination, being of a general nature, is distinguishable from an inclination to implement those goals and objectives as a Judge in a particular case”).
 See Decision on Mićo Stanišić’s Motion requesting a Declaration of Mistrial and Stojan Župljanin’s Motion to Vacate Trial Judgement, 2 April 2014 (“Mistrial Decision”), para. 25.
 Decision on Mićo Stanišić’s Motion Seeking Reconsideration of Decision on Stanišić’s Motion for Declaration of Mistrial and Župljanin’s Motion to Vacate Trial Judgement, 24 July 2014, para. 15, referring to Mistrial Decision, para. 25.
 See Mistrial Decision, para. 25 (with references cited therein).
 See supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 30.
 See Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 197; supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 44.
 See e.g. Šešelj Decision on Disqualification [Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the Vice-President, 28 August 2013]], paras 2 (the Šešelj Defence argued that Judge Harhoff had a strong inclination to convict accused persons of Serbian ethnicity, and contended that contempt proceedings should be initiated), 8-14 (no consideration in the Šešelj case of the Rebuttal Material); Šešelj Reconsideration Decision [Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Reconsideration of Decision on Disqualification, Requests for Clarification, and Motion on Behalf of Stanišić and Župljanin, 7 October 2013]], paras 12‑20 (no consideration in the Šešelj case of the Media Articles, but the Special Chamber found that the Memorandum was immaterial and not probative).
 See supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 30; Šešelj Order Replacing Judge Harhoff [Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Order Assigning a Judge Pursuant to Rule 15, 31 October 2013]].
 Šešelj Order Replacing Judge Harhoff, p. 1.
45. As a preliminary matter, insofar as Župljanin argues that the reasonable apprehension of bias test should be applied with “reference to a reasonable observer properly informed from any of the ethnic groups affected by Judgements of the Tribunal”, the Appeals Chamber first observes that the references cited by Župljanin do not support his assertion. Second, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the “reasonable person must be an informed person, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, including the traditions of integrity and impartiality that form a part of the background and apprised also of the fact that impartiality is one of the duties that Judges swear to uphold”. Župljanin’s argument, suggesting a departure from this principle and asserting that the reasonable observer must come from the region, is thus dismissed.
47. Another preliminary issue concerns the Prosecution’s submission that Judge Harhoff’s numerous rulings against it in this case demonstrate a lack of bias. The Appeals Chamber observes that, although Judge Harhoff took decisions that resulted favourably for Stanišić and Župljanin, his judicial record in this case is not instructive as to whether a reasonable observer properly informed could apprehend bias. The Appeals Chamber notes, in particular, that Judge Harhoff’s judicial record does not take into account that procedural decisions have limited impact on the substantive issues to be decided in a final trial judgement.
55. The Appeals Chamber further considers that the Letter contains no language which would suggest to a reasonable observer that Judge Harhoff believed that a finding of guilt could be made without reviewing the particular evidence of a case or that he had difficulty applying the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. A reasonable observer properly informed of all the circumstances would have regard for the fact that Judges are presumed to be impartial, and that before taking up his duties, Judge Harhoff made a solemn declaration to perform his duties “honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously”. The Appeals Chamber considers that a fair‑minded and informed observer would regard this judicial oath as an important protection against the appearance of bias. Additionally, the reasonable observer would consider Judge Harhoff’s role as a Judge of the Tribunal and his professional experience. While Judge Harhoff’s views on the law as expressed in the Letter do not align with the current case law of the Tribunal, Judge Harhoff was (at the time of writing the Letter) a Judge of the Tribunal and a legal professional who was to be relied upon to bring an impartial mind to the evidence and issues before him. The Appeals Chamber considers that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a reasonable observer properly informed of these circumstances would presume that Judge Harhoff as a Judge of the Tribunal could disabuse his mind of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions.
 Župljanin Additional Appeal Brief, paras 16-17, referring to Piersack v. Belgium [Piersack v. Belgium, Application No. 8692/79, ECtHR, Judgement, 1 October 1982]], para. 30, Hoekstra v. HM Advocate [Hoekstra v. HM Advocate (No. 2) (Scottish High Court of Justiciary), 2000 J.C. 391]], paras 18, 22.
 See Župljanin Additional Appeal Brief [Stojan Župljanin’s Supplement to Appeal Brief (Ground Six), 26 June 2014]], para. 16, referring to Piersack v. Belgium, para. 30 (discussing generally the objective test but not the attributes of the reasonable observer); Hoekstra v. HM Advocate, paras 18, 22 (considering that the Judge in question could not be seen to have been impartial, especially on the part of the Dutch appellants).
 Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 181; Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 190. See Karadžić Disqualification Decision [Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-05/18-PT, Decision on Motion to Disqualify Judge Picard and Report to the Vice-President Pursuant to Rule 15(B)(ii), 22 July 2009]], para. 18 (referring to the perception of the hypothetical fair-minded observer with sufficient knowledge of the circumstances to make a reasonable judgement), fn. 55.
 See Karemera et al. Disqualification Decision [The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion for Disqualification of Judge Byron and Stay of the Proceedings, 20 February 2009]], para. 15 (considering that a comparison of decisions to detect a pattern “is troublesome” as all decisions are made on an individual basis as a result of particular request, and also that the decisions in question were decided by a three Judge panel and not by a particular Judge).
 Rule 14(A) of the Rules (emphasis added).
 See Article 13 of the Statute (Judges are required to be “persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity”); Rule 14 of the Rules (Judges are required to take an oath to exercise their powers “honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously”).
 See Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 181; Furundžija Appeal Judgement, paras 196-197.
138. The Appeals Chamber first turns to Stanišić’s submission that the Trial Chamber failed to indicate the evidence relied upon or excluded in the section of the Trial Judgement addressing Stanišić’s contribution and as such failed to provide a reasoned opinion. The Appeals Chamber notes that the section of the Trial Judgement on Stanišić’s contribution to the JCE indeed does not refer to the evidence relied upon by the Trial Chamber to support its findings. Neither does it include any cross references to its earlier findings where the Trial Chamber analysed the evidence. The Appeals Chamber, however, recalls that a trial judgement must be read as a whole. Furthermore, there is a presumption that a trial chamber has evaluated all the evidence presented to it, as long as there is no indication that the trial chamber completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence. As Stanišić acknowledges in his own submission, in the section of the Trial Judgement addressing his contribution to the JCE, the Trial Chamber summarised the evidence that it had relied on in other sections of the Trial Judgement. While the Appeals Chamber considers the Trial Chamber’s approach regrettable,  it does not, in its view, amount to a failure to provide a reasoned opinion in and of itself. The Appeals Chamber therefore dismisses Stanišić’s argument.
 See Trial Judgement [Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, 27 March 2013]], vol. 2, paras 729-765.
 Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 306, 321; Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgement, para. 67; Orić Appeal Judgement, para. 38.
 Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 306; Đorđević Appeal Judgement, fn. 2527; Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 129; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 23.
 See Stanišić Appeal Brief [Appellant’s Brief on behalf of Mićo Stanišić, 19 August 2013]], paras 46, 240.
 See supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 90.
139. In relation to Stanišić’s submission that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion as to whether and how his acts and conduct furthered the JCE, and whether his alleged contribution to the JCE was significant, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber indeed did not enter express findings in this regard. The Appeals Chamber recalls that these are legal requirements in order for joint criminal enterprise liability to be incurred and that not every type of conduct will amount to a significant enough contribution to the crime to give rise to criminal liability. A trial chamber’s determination of whether and to what extent an accused’s acts and conduct furthered the joint criminal enterprise, and whether the requisite threshold of significance is met, are therefore relevant legal findings essential to the determination of an accused’s guilt, and must be set out in a clear and articulate manner. The lack of explicit findings in this regard falls short of what is required under Article 23(2) of the Statute and Rule 98ter(C) of the Rules. Neither Stanišić nor the Appeals Chamber should be expected to engage in a speculative exercise to discern the Trial Chamber’s findings in this regard.
140. In this context, the Appeals Chamber further considers that the absence of these essential legal findings and the accompanying reasoning have necessarily hindered Stanišić’s ability to appeal his conviction, as he would have been unable to identify exactly which underlying factual findings the Trial Chamber relied upon in its ultimate conclusion that he contributed significantly to the furtherance of the JCE. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber’s failure to enter express findings as to whether and how Stanišić’s acts and conduct furthered the JCE, and whether his contribution was significant constitutes a failure to provide a reasoned opinion.
 Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1378; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, paras 215, 218, 695; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, paras 427, 430. See supra [Stanišić and Župljanin Appeal Judgement]], para. 136.
 Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 988; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 427.
 Stanišić and Simatović Appeal Judgement, para. 78; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1906; Bizimungu Appeal Judgement, paras 18-19.
 See Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 384-385; Bizimungu Appeal Judgement, paras 18-19.
 Cf. Orić Appeal Judgement, para. 56. The Trial Judgement must enable the Appeals Chamber to discharge its task pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute based on a sufficient determination as to what evidence has been accepted as proof of all elements of the mode of liability charged (Cf. Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 385). The Appeals Chamber notes that, by contrast, after analysing Župljanin’s conduct, the Trial Chamber concluded that “during the Indictment period, Stojan Župljanin significantly contributed to the common objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the territory of the planned Serbian state” (Trial Judgement, vol. 2, para. 518. See Trial Judgement, vol. 2, para. 510 (holding that Župljanin’s “omission to take adequate measures to stop the mass arrest of non-Serbs and his policemen’s involvement therein constituted at least a significant contribution to the unlawful arrests, if not a substantial one”)). The Appeals Chamber considers that the different approach taken with respect to Župljanin further highlights the Trial Chamber’s failure to enter the requisite findings with respect to Stanišić (see Bizimungu Appeal Judgement, para. 19 and fn. 52 (wherein the Appeals Chamber noted that “[b]]y contrast, the Trial Chamber did enter relevant legal findings with respect to other convictions”, specifying that the trial chamber made “legal findings on the crime of genocide in relation to Ndindiliyamana”)).
537. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a trial chamber’s failure to explicitly refer to particular evidence will not often amount to an error of law, especially where there is significant contrary evidence on the record. This is because a trial chamber cannot be presumed to have ignored a particular piece of evidence simply because it did not mention it in its judgement. Rather, it could be presumed, in the absence of particular circumstances suggesting otherwise, that a trial chamber chose not to rely on an unmentioned piece of evidence, meaning that it considered the evidence but was of the view that it was either not reliable or otherwise not worth citing in its judgement. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, this reflects a corollary of the overarching principle of deference to the discretion of a trial chamber. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that only where it is shown within the substance of a trial chamber’s reasoning that clearly relevant evidence has been disregarded, should the Appeals Chamber intervene in order to assess whether that evidence would have changed the factual basis supporting the trial chamber’s conclusion.
 Tolimir Appeal Judgement, para. 53; Perišić Appeal Judgement, para. 95, referring to Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 23, 483-484, 487, 582-583, Simba Appeal Judgement, paras 143, 152, 155.
 Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 32, referring to Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 118.
917. Župljanin’s argument that the Trial Chamber was required to find that he intended coercive acts to find that he possessed the requisite intent pursuant to the first category of joint criminal enterprise is based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law. The Trial Chamber was not required to establish that Župljanin intended the specific coercive acts by which the JCE I Crimes were to be achieved. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber was required to find that Župljanin shared with the other members of the JCE the intent to commit the JCE I Crimes and the intent to participate in a common plan aimed at their commission. Therefore, it was necessary for the Trial Chamber to find that Župljanin shared the intent for the JCE I Crimes, and especially that he intended to forcibly displace, permanently or otherwise, the victims across the relevant de facto or de jure border to another country (as in deportation) or within a relevant border (as in forcible transfer). In the view of the Appeals Chamber, it is not required that members of the JCE agreed upon a particular form through which the forcible displacement of non‑Serbs was to be effectuated or that Župljanin intended specific acts of coercion causing the displacement of individuals, so long as it is established that Župljanin intended to forcibly displace the victims.
 Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 1369. See Đorđević Appeal Judgement, para. 468; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 365. It is noted that Župljanin does not contest this standard (see Župljanin Reply Brief [Stojan [Ž]]upljanin’s Reply to Prosecution’s response Brief, 11 November 2013 (confidential; public redacted version filed on 13 November 2013)]], para. 12).
 See Trial Judgement [Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, 27 March 2013]], vol. 1, paras 61, 105. See also Stakić Appeal Judgement, paras 278, 307, 317. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber correctly recounted the mens rea required for the JCE I Crimes (see Trial Judgement, vol. 1, para. 61).

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