Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/206/1/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:36:45+00:00

Document:
While the enforcement by a a general scheme of maximum rates so unreasonably low as to be unjust and unreasonable may be confiscation, and amount to taking property without due process of law, the states have power to compel a railroad company to perform a particular and specified duty necessary for the convenience of the public even though it may entail some pecuniary loss. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 526, distinguished.
As the public power to regulate railways and the private right of ownership of such property coexist, and do not the one destroy the other, it has been settled that the right of ownership of railway property, like other property rights, finds protection in constitutional guaranties, and therefore wherever the power of regulation is exerted in such an arbitrary and unreasonable was as to cause it to be in effect not a regulation, but an infringement upon the right of ownership, such an exertion of power is void because repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 3] The result, therefore, is that the proposition relied upon is well founded if it be that the order which the court below enforced was of the arbitrary and unreasonable character asserted.
of the Coast Line. This reduces itself to the contention that, although the governmental power to regulate exists in the interest of the public, yet it does not extend to securing to the public reasonable facilities for making connection between different carriers. But the proposition destroys itself, since at one and the same time it admits the plenary power to regulate, and yet virtually denies the efficiency of that authority. That power, as we have seen, takes its origin from the quasi-public nature of the business in which the carrier is engaged, and embraces that business in its entirety, which, of course, includes the duty to require carriers to make reasonable connections with other roads so as to promote the convenience of the traveling public. In considering the facts found below as to the connection in question -- that is, the population contained in the large territory whose convenience was subserved by the connection and the admission of the railroad as to the importance of the connection -- we conclude that the order in question, considered from the point of view of the requirements of the public interest, was one coming clearly within the scope of the power to enforce just and reasonable regulations.
the unreasonableness of the order. Such, however, is not the case when the question is as to the validity of an order to do a particular act, the doing of which does not involve the question of the profitableness of the operation of the railroad as an entirety. The difference between the two cases is illustrated in St. Louis &c. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, and Minneapolis & St.Louis R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257. But even if the rule applicable to an entire rate scheme were to be here applied, as the findings made below as to the net earnings constrain us to conclude that adequate remuneration would result from the general operation of the rates in force, even allowing for any loss occasioned by the running of the extra train in question, it follows that the order would not be unreasonable, even if tested by the doctrine announced in Smyth v. Ames and kindred cases.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164; Chicago, M. & St.P. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179; Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 536; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 541; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307; Stone v. Illinois Central R. Co., 116 U. S. 347; Stone v. New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co., 116 U. S. 352; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386; Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339; Pearsall v. Great Northern. R. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 161 U. S. 665; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 161 U. S. 695; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287; Minneapolis & St.L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257; Minneapolis & St.L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 200 U. S. 584; Atlantic Coast Line v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256; Seaboard Air Line v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261.
Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, 116 U. S. 331; Chicago, M. & St.P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 134 U. S. 455; Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 143 U. S. 344; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 154 U. S. 399; St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 156 U. S. 657; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 166 U. S. 241; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 512 [argument of counsel - omitted]; Chicago, M. & St.P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 176 U. S. 172; Minneapolis & St.L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 200 U. S. 592.

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