Source: https://blog.cpradr.org/18-2/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 05:11:26+00:00

Document:
On 31 August 2018, the Arbitral Tribunal in Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany issued a decision on jurisdictional objection made by the Federal Republic of Germany (decision). The Tribunal asserted its jurisdiction, despite Germany’s argument based on the groundbreaking Slovak Republic v. Achmea decision issued earlier that year by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
The dispute between Vattenfall and Germany concerns the decision by Germany following the 2011 Fukushima disaster to phase out nuclear power by 2022.
Vattenfall initiated proceedings pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and ICSID Convention, claiming that the decision to phase out nuclear power and, thereby, shut down nuclear plants breached Germany’s obligations under the ECT.
Germany essentially claimed that Art. 26 ECT, providing for the ISDS mechanism, must be interpreted restrictively in such a manner that the ISDS is not applicable in intra-EU investor-State disputes. It further noted that the reasoning of the CJEU in Achmea extends to intra-EU investor-State disputes initiated under multilateral treaties, such as the ECT, as the risk to the consistent interpretation and application of EU law exists irrespective of the bilateral, or multilateral character of a treaty.
The ICSID Tribunal rejected the argument that Art. 26 ECT should be interpreted to exclude intra-EU investor-State arbitration. In this sense, it dismissed Germany’s claim and asserted its jurisdiction.
The ICSID Tribunal stated that while the CJEU in Achmea interpreted the ISDS clause in the underlying intra-EU BIT as conflicting with the provisions of the European Union (EU) law, it limited its considerations to ISDS clauses in intra-EU treaties of bilateral character. Thus, the CJEU did not extend its reasoning to multilateral treaties concluded between EU members and third States. The ICSID Tribunal further contended that the ECT is not an agreement concluded between EU Member States within the meaning of Achmea, but rather constitutes a mixed agreement between EU Member States, third States and the EU itself.
The ICSID Tribunal pointed out that in line with the view expressed in Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v Kingdom of Spain, the CJEU in Achmea did not address the argument in the Opinion of the Advocate General Wathelet (AG), in which the AG distinguished between ISDS clauses in BITs and ECT, further supporting the position of the ICSID Tribunal.
Having carried out an interpretation of Art. 26 ECT in accordance with Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the ICSID Tribunal concluded that in light of the context, object and purpose of the ECT, Art. 26 ECT does not exclude the possibility of intra-EU ECT arbitration.
The ICSID Tribunal further noted that the lack of the “disconnection clause” in the ECT, which aims to ensure that the provisions of a multilateral treaty apply only between particular States, confirms that the ECT creates obligations between EU Member States and does not exclude intra-EU ECT arbitration.
The decision on the Achmea issue has a number of implications for investment protection system in the EU.
In particular, the decision confirms the full effectiveness of the ECT in relations between parties that are EU Member States. This is clearly beneficial for investors engaging in the European market as the restructuring of investment will not be necessary to benefit from protection granted by the ECT. This may contribute to further development of the European energy market. Undoubtedly, the Decision, by asserting the full effectiveness and binding force of the ECT, could positively affect the cross-border cooperation in the energy industry between its Parties.
Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that while the Decision presents the perspective of an arbitral tribunal, the European Commission (EC) and the CJEU may advocate that the Achmea argument extends to MITs, which raises a threat to the ECT as well to the recognition and enforcement mechanism of ICSID arbitral awards in the EU Member States. Art. 54 of the ICSID Convention provides that each contracting state shall recognize an award rendered by an ICSID Tribunal as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award as if it were a final judgment of a court where recognition is sought. This unique recognition mechanism does not leave room for any ground on which the recognition could be refused.
Therefore, considering the possibility that the EC and, depending on whether there will be a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of Art. 26 ECT with the EU law and the role of the ICSID Convention, CJEU will not accept the reasoning of the ICSID Tribunal in Vattenfall AB and others, the national court where the recognition is sought will be faced with a rather complex and uncertain situation of conflicting treaty obligations. It must decide whether to recognize the award pursuant to Art. 54 of the ICSID Convention, or to comply with the EU law and, thereby, refuse to recognize the award.
The possibility that a national court may decide not to recognize the award rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention may undermine the effectiveness of the Convention and deprive investors of the benefit of its recognition mechanism.
Additionally, it must be noted that payment of compensation awarded by the arbitral tribunal may, as it was the case in the Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v Romania and Decision adopted by the EC, constitute illegal state aid under Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This leads to the consideration that even if the Achmea argument would not cover MITs, the enforcing court would still face a dilemma of whether to enforce the award.
In light of the above, it is interesting to note that the ICSID Tribunal explicitly stated that while it is mindful of the duty to render an enforceable award, it must perform its mandate given under the ECT and, thereby, is not as such concerned with the question of whether the award will be recognized or enforced.
The Decision of the ICSID Tribunal in Vattenfall AB and others on the jurisdictional objection made by the Federal Republic of Germany demonstrates the approach of investment treaty tribunal to the “Achmea issue” and adds to the ongoing discussion on the relationship between EU law and investment protection treaties.
While the ICSID Tribunal confirmed that the reasoning of the CJEU in Slovak Republic v. Achmea preliminary ruling does not extend to intra-EU arbitrations initiated on the basis of multilateral treaties, there is uncertainty as to the approach of the EC and, possibly, CJEU to the matter. Ultimately, it is the domestic court of a Member State before which the recognition and/or enforcement of the award will be sought that will have final say on the matter.
It is worth noting that because of the fragmentation of international investment law and lack of stare decisis principle in investment treaty arbitration, there is much uncertainty as to whether arbitral tribunals will follow the reasoning of the ICSID Tribunal in Vattenfall AB and others.
After the decision of the EC with respect to Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania, even if the EC and CJEU would share the reasoning of the ICSID Tribunal in Vattenfall AB and others regarding jurisdiction, investors may be unable to obtain compensation awarded by tribunals, as it would amount to illegal State aid.
Finally, the Achmea argument has the potential to become a popular strategy of defendants in investment arbitration proceedings to challenge the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal, or admissibility of a claim.
 Krzysztof Wierzbowski is the senior partner at Wierzbowski Eversheds Sutherland.
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018].
 13. AtGÄndG v. 31.07.2011, BGBl I S. 1704 (No. 43); Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Rhea Tamara Hoffmann, The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test in International Investment Arbitration? Background to the new dispute Vattenfall v Germany (II) (The International Institute for Sustainable Development 2012).
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par.50.
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par.51-52.
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par. 211.
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par.213.
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par.162.
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par.163-164; Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV , Opinion of AG Wathelet  par.43; see. Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Award [16 May 2018].
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par.207.
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par. 201-206.
 See. Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20; Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on State aid SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by Romania — Arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11 December 2013.
 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018] par.230-231.
Blind Justice: Can Individuals Be Bound to Arbitration Clauses They Can’t Read?
The First U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston recently declined to enforce an arbitration clause in the Container Store’s loyalty program against blind customers. The ruling followed a trend of other circuits requiring a minimum level of notice for arbitration agreements to be binding.
In the case, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Container Store, Inc., No. 16-2112, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 26122 (1st Cir. Sept. 14, 2018)(available at https://bit.ly/2xVaxUY), a unanimous circuit panel that included retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter, sitting by designation, examined whether an arbitration clause in the retailer’s loyalty program agreement was binding to blind customers.
The plaintiffs alleged that the Container Store’s sign-up process wasn’t handicap accessible. The retailer’s in-store touch screen interface required the customers to announce their private account information to clerks, creating privacy concerns. The complaint alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Acts and under the state laws where the plaintiffs joined the loyalty program, Massachusetts, California, Texas and New York.
Three of the plaintiffs signed up for the loyalty program in-store, and one registered online. The in-store customers signed up on a touch-screen device with the aid of an employee, but there was no evidence that they were notified by that they were agreeing to waive any rights to court by signing up for the program, which included an arbitration clause.
The plaintiff who signed up on her home computer said she didn’t recall being presented with the arbitration agreement.
The court held that no valid agreement to arbitrate was formed with the in-store customers because they did not receive a “minimum level of notice,” pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act that they were waiving any rights to pursue future ADA claims in court. The court held that an agreement was formed with the online customer, but that it was void as illusory under Texas state law.
The Container Store contended the suit was an attack on the validity of the entire agreement, but the appeals panel agreed with the plaintiffs that the problem was that there was no valid contract formed for arbitration.
The unanimous opinion authored by First Circuit Judge O. Rogeriee Thompson, and joined by Senior Circuit Judge Bruce M. Selya, as well as retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Souter, cited recent case law that has begun to carve out an exception where a party is not made aware that they are entering into an agreement in the first place.
In Noble v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 682 Fed. App’x. 113 (3d. Cir. 2017), the Third Circuit examined an agreement to arbitrate that was buried deep within a lengthy smartwatch operation manual. The court held that no agreement to arbitrate was formed because a customer cannot be deemed to have consented to a writing that does not even appear to be a contract.
In Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit held that a link to a service agreement on a credit-score website did not properly identify itself as an agreement containing an arbitration clause and therefore did not create a valid agreement to arbitrate.
And in Nicosia v. Amazon.com Inc., 834 F.3d 220, (2d Cir. 2016), a Second Circuit panel held that where a customer was not required to manifest assent to conditions of use containing an arbitration provision, they were not bound to those terms.
These cases, the Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind opinion noted, demonstrated that courts recognize that parties cannot be bound by an agreement to arbitrate that they are not given notice of.
But the opinion noted that parties can be bound to an agreement to arbitrate that they were not made aware of in situations where it is clear that parties are entering into a contractual relationship. The court referenced obtaining a loan, employment and being admitted into a nursing home as situations where a contractual relationship could be presumed.
Companies seeking to ensure the enforceability of their arbitration clauses should take these recent developments into account. The burden imposed by these cases are seemingly minimal: only that parties are made aware that they are entering into a contractual relationship.
In addition, as this case shows, special considerations have to be taken into account for people with disabilities.
The author is a Brooklyn Law School student who is a CPR Institute Fall 2018 Intern.
For the second year in a row, the Supreme Court is kicking off its new term with a focus on arbitration.
This year’s case, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, No. 17-340—which will be argued tomorrow, the Court’s third day of arguments in the new term—focuses on whether the Federal Arbitration Act Sec. 1 exemption language from the act’s application for certain “contracts of employment” encompasses independent contractor agreements.
The case—an appeal from Oliveira v. New Prime Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017)(available at https://bit.ly/2tEzlkr)—is potentially significant for many workers, though it isn’t attracting the attention of the 2017-2018 term’s kickoff argument, Epic Systems v. Lewis. That case, decided in May, strongly backed the use of mandatory arbitration in conjunction with waivers of class arbitration and litigation processes in workplace disputes. See CPR Speaks blog coverage at https://bit.ly/2xPvFMk; see analysis at Russ Bleemer, “While Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Strategize, the Supreme Court’s Strong Backing Likely Will Grow Mandatory Processes,” 36 Alternatives 97 (July/August 2018)(available at https://bit.ly/2QsxLJ5).
The Court is still one justice short of the longstanding nine-judge bench, as the Senate continues its fight over the nomination of D.C. Circuit Court Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh to succeed retired Justice Anthony Kennedy.
So a 4-4 outcome looms. The Court could order a rehearing after its decision to include Kavanaugh or another new justice if a party asks for it. See Court Rule 44, available at https://bit.ly/2NE6ouV.
Despite a shift to a “gig” economy for many workers, the number of independent contractors the New Prime case focuses on actually shrunk since about a decade ago, according to a report earlier this year by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, to 6.9% of total U.S. employment in 2017, from 7.4% in 2005.
But the more than 10 million workers in these arrangements often see mandatory arbitration in their work agreements, as do millions more in so-called contingent employment situations which, depending on their agreements, may be covered by whatever the Court decides in New Prime.
The Court’s FAA backing in general employment cases in Epic Systems points to a similar decision in New Prime. But groups backing individual independent contractors are drawing a contrast, and argue that these workers should be treated different and not compelled to arbitrate against the companies with which they contract.
The case is summarized at Mark Kantor, “U.S. Supreme Court Grants Cert to Decide “Who Decides” “Independent Contractor” Employment Arbitration Case,” CPR Speaks blog (available at https://bit.ly/2RpwP9E), and Ginsey Varghese, “Supreme Court Will Decide Independent Contractor Arbitration Case,” 36 Alternatives 59 (April 2018)(available at https://bit.ly/2xW5MdN).
Below are highlights of amicus views filed in the case that back the petitioner, trucking company New Prime, along with statements about the filing party’s interest in the case. The petitioners’ amicus supporters were required to file first. In a CPR Speaks post to follow shortly, we will examine the views of the respondent employees’ friend-of-the-Court supporters.
American Trucking Associations is an Arlington, Va.-based group that represents the trucking industry with members including companies and state organizations. ATA regularly represents “the common interests of the trucking industry in courts.” Many of its member companies contract with owner-operators who may enter into agreements to arbitrate disputes that arise during the course of their business relationship.
The amicus brief says that the First Circuit decision upends the expectation that the FAA will require motor carriers and their independent contractors to arbitrate any disputes that arise between them under their agreements, including in some cases the question whether a given dispute is arbitrable. Even where both sides agreed to arbitrate, “[t]his sweeping, idiosyncratic holding . . . would mean that owner-operators and carriers . . . could never expect those agreements to be enforced under the FAA. . . .” The decision undermines the federal policy favoring arbitration, to the detriment of motor carriers and independent owner-operators.
The Chamber regularly files amicus curiae briefs in business cases, and has emphasized an anti-class action stance that incorporates a strong endorsement for individual arbitration in many Supreme Court and federal appellate court cases. The Chamber notes that its members and affiliates regularly rely on arbitration agreements in their contractual relationships. The SHRM, based in Alexandria, Va., represents 300,000 human resources professionals world-wide.
The panel majority also failed to recognize that its interpretation is inconsistent with the context in which the Sec. 1 exemption was enacted—against the backdrop of other federal laws that recognize the long-established distinction between employees and independent contractors.
Cato takes an historical approach to criticizing the appellate court decision and urging reversal. At the time of the FAA’s 1925 enactment, Cato wrote, contracts of employment referred to traditional employer–employee relationships, not independent contractor arrangements. Courts embraced the same distinction in applying the common law, as did the legal dictionaries and treatises of the time. The FAA’s text is plain: only certain agreements establishing traditional employer– employee relationships are exempt from the FAA’s scope—that is, transportation workers like the seamen and railway employees the statute names.
Statutory history, including contemporaneous state laws, confirms that the FAA’s contracts-of-employment exemption is limited to traditional employer– employee relationships, and doesn’t include independent contractors.
NELF is a conservative free-market advocacy group in Boston.
It makes a statutory construction argument to restrict the FAA Sec. 1 exclusion from application for transportation workers to the enumerated seamen and railroad employees, and the phrase “any other class of workers” is narrowed by the “ejusdem generis” rule, meaning “of the same kind.” This means that undefined statutory terms should be construed consistently with their immediate context, not in isolation from that context.
This also means that statutory terms should be interpreted consistently with the statute’s overarching purpose—here, the FAA’s purpose to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms. This purpose, coupled with the traditional statutory construction rules, mandates a narrow interpretation of the exemption contained within Section 1 of the FAA.
The NELF argues that, based on the immediate context of the phrase “contracts of employment” in 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1, the FAA’s purpose, and a plausible historical explanation for the exemption, “contracts of employment,” must define an employer-employee relationship, not an independent contractor relationship.
When interpreted properly, in its immediate context, “contracts of employment” modifies “seamen” and “railway employees,” which are the two prominent classes of transportation employees in the statute, not independent contractors.
The FAA’s overarching purpose counsels in favor of enforcing, not exempting, arbitration agreements under the FAA.
CLDA is a nonprofit Washington trade association that advocates for the interests of delivery companies. New Prime is of significant interest to CLDA because of the common industry practice of using independent owner-operators to transport cargo. These independent owner-operators are crucial to the structure of many of the carriers’ businesses, as they often provide the equipment and services carriers need to meet the changing demands of their businesses. Carriers frequently rely on arbitration provisions in their contracts with owner-operators to ensure that both parties have an efficient and cost-effective means through which they can resolve their disputes.
The CLDA relies on a general argument about arbitration’s effectiveness in urging the nation’s top Court to reverse.
The First Circuit decision, which applied an overly expansive interpretation of the FAA exception, would render unenforceable the arbitration agreements used by the largest segment of the CLDA membership—small operators with one to 50 operators and annual revenue below $1 million. That would leave both the carriers and owner-operators subject to the threat of lengthy and costly litigation.
“In order to achieve these goals, the determination of ‘whether a contract qualifies as a ‘contract of employment’’ within the meaning of Section 1 of the FAA “requires a categorical approach that focuses solely on the words of the contract.” In re Swift Transportation Co. Inc., 830 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2016)(Ikuta, J., dissenting).
The author was a 2018 CPR Institute summer intern and is a student at Northeastern University School of Law. Alternatives editor Russ Bleemer assisted with research.
Epic Systems vs. #MeToo: What Now?
Panelists and audience members came together to discuss workplace dispute resolution in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Epic Systems v. Lewis decision, analyzing the impact of mandatory arbitration and class actions waivers in light of the #MeToo movement as it continues to raise awareness of the pervasive culture of sexual harassment in the workplace, and society generally.
More than 100 in-house employment counsel from Fortune 500 companies, corporate defense attorneys, counsel from the plaintiff’s bar, as well as noted academics and neutrals attended a CPR Institute mini-symposium last month on the intersection of the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis, No. 16-285 (May 21)(available at https://bit.ly/2rWzAE8) and the #MeToo movement.
The two-panel program discussed anticipated responses from state and federal legislatures and the plaintiff’s bar, the pros and cons of mandatory arbitration for employment disputes and what makes an employment disputes program successful in light of new, competing priorities from the perspective of all stakeholders.
The event started with a CPR members-only meeting of CPR’s Employment Disputes Committee members. The meeting featured an exclusive interview with Anil K. Chaddha, Lead Counsel of Labor, Employment and Benefits at General Motors, about his experience with employment ADR throughout his career.
The program was then opened up to the public where CPR Institute Chief Executive Officer and President Noah Hanft led off by noting that CPR is working to bridge the gap between the two sides of these types of contentious discussions, and provides an avenue for discourse and cooperation between plaintiff’s counsel and corporate defense to tackle common issues. [Follow CPR Events at www.cpradr.org/events-classes/upcoming, on Facebook and on Twitter].
The first panel, titled “Was Epic Systems Really Epic: Responses to Epic and the Next Battlegrounds for Mandatory Arbitration,” was moderated by Washington, D.C. based neutral Mark Kantor, who is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center and a member of CPR’s Panel of Distinguished Neutrals.
Kantor broke down the Epic Systems case and discussed both its immediate impact and far-reaching implications with panelists Christopher C. Murray, a shareholder in the Indianapolis office of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., who co-chairs the firm’s Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice Group, and Fran L. Rudich, a partner in Rye Brook, N.Y.’s Klafter Olsen & Lesser.
The panel largely agreed that, from the employer’s perspective, this holding decisively shifts the balance in favor of mandatory arbitration with class action waivers.
From the employees’ perspective, Rudich previewed the plaintiff’s bar’s anticipated response: plaintiffs’ attorneys will now make concerted efforts to bring multiple, individual cases against the same employer as a workaround to class action waivers. Rudich warned, “be careful what you wish for,” because employers that seek to avoid class matters are going to get exactly that, numerous individual employment dispute arbitrations, potentially with repetitive evidentiary and discovery requests.
The panel also discussed the burgeoning federal and state laws taking aim at mandatory arbitration, including that more states are poised to adopt California-style private attorney general (“PAGA”) laws to supersede employment class actions.
After a brief intermission, a second panel, “Epic Systems v. #MeToo: What Now? Best Practices for Workplace Disputes Program Design,” which included Sarah E. Bouchard, a Philadelphia-based partner in Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP; Lisa J. Banks, a named partner in Washington, D.C.’s Katz, Marshall & Banks LLP; Peter J. Cahill, Executive Director and Associate General Counsel at Ernst & Young LLP in New York; Diane Dann, Senior Vice President of Employment Law at Mastercard Inc. in Purchase, N.Y., and Kathleen McKenna, a partner at event host Proskauer, took the stage to focus on practical guidance for designing workplace disputes programs in the midst of the #MeToo movement.
The panelists discussed the legal, business and public relations implications for implementing employment disputes programs with mandatory arbitration in today’s climate. They debated whether carving sexual harassment claims out of mandatory arbitration – like Microsoft, Uber and Lyft have done — is workable solution.
The employer-side and employee-side counsel agreed that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017’s conditioned use of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) in sexual harassment suits may make it harder to settle these types of claims. Because the law attempts to disincentive the use of NDAs without regard to the wishes of the victim, it forces the parties to find work-arounds to the law where (as often happens) victims do not wish to have these disputes resolved publicly. The panelists explained that most victims don’t want to be Gretchen Carlson — the journalist and advocate who brought a 2016 sexual harassment complaint against the chairman of Fox News – but instead want to move on with their lives without calling attention to the situation.
Panelists seemed to agree generally that incorporating opt-in or opt-out clauses into workplace dispute resolution programs might be a useful tool for assault victims who aren’t interested in publicly calling out their attackers.
Some tips for preventing sexual harassment in the workplace that the panel discussed included thoroughly vetting new hires’ pasts; evaluating the corporate culture from the top down; training bystanders who witness harassment to report it, and serving less alcohol – and more water — at business functions.
The panelists concluded that the #MeToo movement is broader than just sexual harassment – it has challenged how women are treated in the workplace and how they are compensated.
The program was followed by a networking cocktail reception.
Hershenberg is Vice President of Programs and Public Policy at the CPR Institute. Higgins is a CPR Institute Summer 2018 intern.

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