Source: https://www.grossarchive.com/project/3598/A-CRITICAL-OVERVIEW-OF-THE-CONSENT-PROVISIONS-UNDER-THE-LAND-USE-ACT--1978..html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:14:56+00:00

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The Land Use Act as a single piece of legislation which came into force on 29th. March, 1978 has generated more controversy than any piece of legislation of its kind. The sore point of this enactment is the consent requirement provided under the Act especially Sections 21 and 22 therein.
BEFORE THE LAND USE ACT, 1978.
Chapter Two: THE LAND USE ACT, 1978.
Interpretation Act, Cap 89, LFN, 1958.
Ekpendu V. Erika(1959) 4 FSC 79.
Eyamba & Ors V. Koure(1937) WACA 186.
Nkwocha V. Governor of Anambra State(1984) 1 SC 634.
Nwokoro V. Nwosu(1990) 4 NWLR(pt.129) 679.
1 Datong, P.Z.: “The role of State Government in the Implementation of the Land Use Act in The Land Use Act Administration and Policy Implication (ed.) by Olayide Adigun, Unilag Press, 1991, P.64.
It is this importance of land to man and the society that influenced the state intrusion into property legislation in order to ensure adequate and efficient management technique for the benefits of the greatest number of the members of the society.
The Land Use Act which is the umbrella statute, under which the consent requirement is to be critically analyzed in this work, was promulgated by the Obasanjo administration in 1978 to address this importance of land to mankind, and therefore provide viable management options to land administration in Nigeria. This salient fact is borne out of the preamble to the Act. Consequently, section one of the Act vests ownership of all land within the territory of a state in the Governor of the state who will in turn administer such land for the benefit of all Nigerians.
unanimous call for their amendments to suit, in practicality, the noble intendments of the Act.
This, no doubt has evoked my interest to delve into this contentions area of the Act with a view to critically appraise this thorny issue of the consent requirement. However, I must concede that this project work is not the first on this issue. It is, in fact, a part of a continuing discourse on land management and reforms in Nigeria. But this critical appraisal may be regarded as a bold attempt on the issue, coming after the Amendment Bill might have been presented before the National Assembly. It is intended therefore, to in addition, highlight those areas of the consent requirement which seems to have been ignored by the Bill, while urging the national assembly to expeditiously save Nigerians from the stranglehold of this consent requirement of the Land Use Act.
state of land administration and the agitation for reforms. Hence, the essence of this chapter is to review the system of land tenure in Nigeria before the Act in 1978.
not only for the other groups but also society at large. Thirdly land is the focus of much wealth, power and status. Indeed, the current concern in the use of land as a vehicle for investment gain as well as a hedge against inflation under condition of economic turbulence, points to the centrality of land in present day Nigeria, and more importantly how it is managed.
In considering this topic, I shall first discus the customary land tenure, that is to say, the practice before the coming of the British Colonialists to Nigeria. This will be followed by the system operational with the colonialisation of Nigeria. The chapter will be capped with an examination of the consent requirements in the stages of land management developments afore-mentioned. It is intended that this chapter will serve as a basis for the discussion of the existing land use management policy, the land use Act of 1978 under chapter two.
man but by his creator. This is an overriding principle guiding all types of customary land tenure in Nigeria.4 Men merely have use and occupation thereof and any abuse must be remedied by propitiatory sacrifices.
Western Nigeria available at www.fao.org/ed/ltdirect/LR972/w6728t14.htm, accessed on 23-10-2009 at 23.10GMT.
community and as such, the decision of the Privy Council in Amodu Tijani V.
or family and never to the individual was widely accepted as substantially true.
4. (1921) 2 A.C. 399.
applicable to both. It is to be taken therefore, that references to the family head is applicable to the community chief, and references to principal members of a family is equally references to the various family heads that make up a village or community, and vice-versa.
7. Olawoye, C.O. (1974), Title to Land in Nigeria, Evans Brothers Ltd, London .
Although the chief or headman of the community in the exercise of his powers is sometimes described as a trustee, he is not strictly speaking a trustee in the English sense. This is because the title to the land is not vested in him, but remains vested in the community as a corporate entity. That’s not withstanding, the head or chief of the community as the community’s alter ego is the proper person to exercise the ownership rights, of the community subject to the individual rights of members9. Hence any outright alienation of land by the family without the active participation of the head is void as was established in the Ghanaian case of Agbole V. Sappor10 and adopted in the Nigerian case of Ekpendu V. Erika11. The same principle has been restated by the Supreme Court in Odekilekun V. Hassan12, where it was held that sale of communal or family land by the head of the community without the consent of the principal members of the family is voidable at the instance of the family or community. In that case, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between sales by community head in a representative capacity and one in his personal capacity. In the case of his sale for and on behalf of the community without the requisite consent of the members, the sale is voidable while a sale in his personal capacity is void, the principle being ‘nemo dat quod non habet’.
12. (1997) 12 NWLR (pt. 531) 56.
compulsorily acquired by the government and $3,000 paid as compensation.
The money was given to Rev. Effiong as the representative of the community.
14. (1924) 5 N.R.L. 50 @ 54, per Combe, C.J.
family head is void abinitio18.
16.See also Kosoko V. Kosoko (1937) 13 NLR 131 17. (1989) 6 S.C.N.J. 243.
Occupied land is that land which is under use and which basic tenet is that the occupier in free to deal with the land as he likes, subject to not causing any injury to members of the public and subject to acquisition for public purpose. Thus, he can sell, pledge or loan and enter into tenancy agreements without the consent of the Emir or ruler or any authority. Unoccupied land, on the other hand, can be sub-divided into two; land close to the emirate capital and/or other towns and those far away from the capital or town. The Emir is the main land manager. Thus one cannot occupy any land in towns or in their vicinity without first obtaining the consent of the Emir. But once allocated, the person to who it is allocated became the absolute owner. According to Yakubu20, this means that the occupier has a title against all persons and he is free to use it the way he likes but cannot alienate it to a total stranger without the consent of the Emir.
However, Land which is far away from the town is free for all persons or a ‘no man’s Land’ where any person can acquire land by clearing, cultivating, building or planting or economic tress etc, without the consent of any authority. A third variant of land category, whether occupied or unoccupied land, is the waqf or common land which an Emir can declare such land as common or public land. Mostly land gained from war, cession and treaty were excluded. They include land used for markets, praying grounds or grazing land.
In situations were such land were occupied, the occupier was given another piece of land somewhere and compensation, where required, was paid. It should be noted that Islamic Law doe not recognize holding of land for a fixed tenure, at the expiration of which rights in the land lapse. Again the Emirs had no proprietary rights to land and were, therefore, not land owners. They had rights over inhabitants as district from rights over land21.
English common Law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in relation to land law that were in force England on the 1st day of January, 190022. Some of these statutes are: the Real property Act, 1845, statute of frauds, 1877, the Wills Act, 1837, the limitations Act, 1833 and 1877, the partition Act, 1868, the conveyancing Act, 1881, the settled Land Act, 1882 and the Land Transfer Act, 1887. Accordingly, the English common Law rules relating to tenures, disposition of real property, estates, inheritance, perpetuities and a number of others became applicable in Nigeria. The same could be said of the doctrine of the equity, which included the construction of Wills, institution and settlement of Land, legal and equitable estates and interests in Land and the doctrines of notice.
22. See S.45 Interpretation Act, cap 89, repealed by Act of 1964, No 1.
In a nutshell, colonization brought about the substitution of ownership of Land with such concepts as rights, interest, possession and occupation23.
The Received English Land Law is based on the doctrines of tenure and estate24. By the doctrine of tenure, all Lands in England belong to the crown. The doctrine of estate on the other hand concedes to the individual the right of seisin or what is known in common phraseology as possession which he holds either directly or indirectly of the crown as a tenant. It is of two types; freehold and Non-freehold. The freehold estate is subdivided into fee-simple estate, life estate and fee-tail or estate-entail. The fee-simple estate is the largest possible interest in Land received into Nigerian Law, and which, theoretically in England, does not amount to absolute ownership25. It denotes inheritance by any manner of successor, - brother, wife etc, and for as long as it has successors from generation to generation26. The life estate is an estate whose duration is measured by the life of the tenant or the life of another person. It may be created by express limitation or by operation of law. It is expressly created where, for example, Land is limited in favour of X for life or where in the alternative it is limited in favour of X for the life of Y.
25. Amiko & Amidu; Op. cit, P.5.
In the first instance, the estate is measured by the life of X, and in the second place by the life of Y by way of an estate per autre vie (that is, in the life of a person other than the tenant). The fee-tail or Estate-entail is where the right of inheritance is limited to the specified descendants of the original tenant or grantee, and the estate reverts to the grantor on failure of the descendant entitled to inherit it.
Any estate whose duration is fixed or ascertainable at inception (during the grant) is called a Non-free hold estate. It does not matter that it is stated to be for a million years, once it is known or can be ascertained at the beginning, the date on which the estate will end, the estate is said to be non-freehold. In modern Land Law, the only surviving non-freehold estate is the leasehold. It now includes subleases or assignments.
As a result of the application of the received English Land Law in Nigeria, between 1900 and 1978, Nigeria had the problem of applying two types of tenure to our land system. Nigerians were allowed, however, to decide which tenure to apply during land transactions. The situation gave rise to property legislations which regulated the allocation and use of Land in Nigeria. The effects of these legislations as well as communal tenure on alienation, with particular emphasis on the requirement of consent, will form the nucleus of the next discussion.
permission as to some act or purpose, esp. given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent’.27 Under the Nigeria Land tenure, the word represents a legal necessity for the validity of an alienation of Land. It denotes the approval of a person(s) recognized by the Law to give such approval, and the absence of which may void a transaction in Land at which such approval is expected to be obtained, or at least make the transaction voidable, depending on the status of the approving authority.
authority to conclude the transaction in question30, or where a member, knowing of a proposed deal, did nothing to express his objection31. Be that as it may, the overriding principle is that alienation of Land without the requisite consent has a far-reaching legal consequences on the property, be it family’s, community’s, or otherwise.
The requirement of consent for alienation of Land either by sale, transfer, lease, mortgage or otherwise howsoever is not the peculiarity of the Land Use Act. The requirement in one form or another has featured in older laws. Also, it is not the prerogative of enacted legislations. Under the customary Law, the consents of the family head and the principal members are required for the alienation of family Land. The principle was established in Ekpendu V. Erika (supra), and adopted in a long line of decided cases. It is to the effect that alienation of family Land without the consent of the family head first had and obtained is void ab initio. But where the alienation is done without the consent of a principal member of the family, the transaction is only voidable at the instance of the member or members whose consent where not obtained.
It should be borne in mind that the objective of the customary Law is to preserve the family Land for the family. In the eyes of customary Law, Land is sacrosanct and therefore virtually inalienable. The consent requirement therefore is to serve as an encumbrance on family Land to guard against arbitrary and unrestricted alienation. But it is noteworthy the point that customary Law makes a distinction between absolute and non-absolute aleination32. Absolute alienation such as outright sale or gift is aimed at achieving a conversion from communal or family ownership to individual ownership. This requires consent. But non-absolute alienation such as a conditional lease, mortgage or pledge passes only a possessory right to the transferee, while the ownership remains with the transferor. This type of transaction, strictly speaking, would not require consent since the right passed is redeemable at any time by any member of the family. On such redemption, ownership reverts to the family33.
The old English Mortmain and charitable uses Act of 188834 requires the consent of the crown for any foreign company to acquire Land from a private citizen. It is suggested that the restriction was necessary to discourage indiscriminate acquisition of Land by foreign companies and to protect thee private citizen from unguided alienation of his valued possession.
forfeited, that can sue for forfeiture.
The Land and Native Rights Act No. 1 of 1916, modified by the Act No.
“4. The Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by this proclamation with respect to any land, shall have regard to the native laws and customs existing in the district in which such Land is situated”.
35. Section 3 & 4.
(a) To grant rights of occupancy to ‘natives’ as well as ‘non-natives’.
(c) To render null and void any attempted alienation by an occupier of his right of occupancy without the governor’s consent.
(d) To revoke the grants to occupiers for ‘good cause’ shown.
36. Elias, T.O Nigerian Land Law (4th Ed) Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1971, P. 31.
was refurbished into the Land Tenure Law of 1962 whose influence on the enactment of the Land use Act is so remarkable that it may not be an overstatement to say that the Land use Act of 1978 is a mere shadow of the Land tenure Law of 1962.
Section 5 of the Land Tenure Law of 1962 places the management, control and disposition of Land in the North under the minister for Land, who holds and administer all lands for the use and common benefit of the ‘natives’, and by section 11 of the Law, “no title to occupation and use of any such lands by a non-natives is valid without the consent of the ministers”. A ‘non-native’ by the tenor of the Law is a person whose father is not a member of any tribe indigenous to each state in Northern Nigeria.
Again, a holder of a statutory right of occupancy cannot alienate without the minister’s consent. In Solanke V Abed and Anor37, a holder of a statutory right of occupancy leased same to a tenant without the minister’s prior consent.
whole public have an interest.
was the state itself, it had power to enact positive prohibitions.
“3 (a) No alien shall acquire any interest or right in or over any land within the protectorate from a native except under an instrument which had received the approval in writing of the Governor.
(b) Any instrument, which has not received the approval of the Governor as required by the section shall be null an void.
(a) be transferred to any other alien without the approval in writing of the Governor40.
The Native Lands Acquisition Act of 1917 was later re-enacted as the Native Lands Acquisition Law of 1952 for the West and Midwestern Nigeria and the Acquisition of Land by Aliens Law, 1956 in the Eastern States. These regional enactments carried over the consent requirement restrictions of their precursor. It was argued that the restrictions were necessary to protect the then unsophisticated natives from being lured by the attraction of cash in undertaking unguided and indiscriminate alienation of their valuable heritage.
40. This provision was repealed in the 1938 amendment of the Act such that an alien can transfer his interest to another alien without the consent. This new position was established in the case of Eyamba & Ors V. Koure (1937) 3 WACA 186.
It has been canvassed that the consent clause gives the Governor the required effective supervisory control of all land in the territory. This argument, as cogent as it may seem, cannot stand erect before the prohibitive and inhibiting effect of the requirement in the realization of the well-intended objectives of the Land use Act.
when the interest of an alien was being transferred to another alien42. Under such a situation, the consent of the Governor will not be required as it will be time wasting and economically inexpedient to the alien who might be leaving the country for good.
From the totality of what I have posited so far, it is incontestable to deduce that the requirement of consent in Land transaction is as old as the society itself; though with little modifications here and there to suit the circumstances of each locality and the intentions of the authority. The next chapter will be devoted to the Land use Act, 1978 with respect to the consent requirement provisions thereof.

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