Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/firearms/hill.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:49:11+00:00

Document:
II. Whether evidence consisting solely of Dr. xxxxxxxx's annual evaluation of Ms. xxxxxxxx's poor work performance, which evaluation may have been written prior to the district court's order prohibiting retaliation against Ms. xxxxxxxx, was sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. xxxxxxxx wilfully retaliated against Ms. xxxxxxxx for her testimony in the Neal case.
III. Whether the district court should have applied the rule of lenity in this case where it was not clear whether prohibited "retaliation" in the district court's order could encompass an annual performance evaluation of Ms. xxxxxxxx by her supervisor, Dr. xxxxxxxx.
On February 27, 1996, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Appellant, Derrick Hill. Count One of the indictment charged Mr. Hill with distributing five grams or more of cocaine base on April 4, 1995, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Count Two charged that the distribution occurred within one thousand feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). (App. 6-7) (1).
On August 1, 1996, Mr. Hill entered a plea of guilty to Count One of the indictment. A Presentence Investigation Report was prepared and the court heard presentence arguments on October 10, 1996. On October 17, 1996, the Honorable Thomas P. Jackson sentenced Mr. Hill to 70 months imprisonment, to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. (App. 32-35).
On April 4, 1995, the government's "cooperating individual" ("CI") called a pager number, given to him by Shawn Burton, to arrange the purchase of an ounce of crack cocaine. Derrick Hill returned the page. (2) (6/10/96 Tr. 3). The CI and Mr. Hill discussed arrangements for the purchase. "The [CI] could hear Mr. Burton's voice in the background and defendant Hill was evidently consulting with him about the sale." (PSR 4). Mr. Hill then told the CI that it would take about an hour to get the crack. (PSR 4).
Later that day, as arranged, the CI drove to the neighborhood of 21st and M Streets, N.E., to meet Mr. Hill and purchase the crack. Mr. Hill asked the CI to wait in the car a few minutes while Mr. Hill went to a nearby apartment to look for Shawn Burton. Mr. Hill returned and informed the CI that Shawn Burton had left to pay a phone bill and would return in 20 minutes. Mr. Hill told the CI to come back at that time. (6/10/96 Tr. 3-4; PSR 4).
When the CI returned, Mr. Hill told him that they would have to drive to Benning Road to find Shawn Burton. A few minutes later, Mr. Hill informed the CI that Shawn Burton was returning and that the CI should wait. (6/10/96 Tr. 3-4; PSR 4).
The CI waited in his car. Some twenty minutes later, Shawn Burton appeared and told the CI that he (Mr. Burton) would send Mr. Hill back down. Mr. Burton stood back from the CI's car during this conversation so as to avoid being filmed by a hidden camera, which he suspected was in the car. (App. 18; PSR 5, 15). Mr. Hill then returned and told the CI that they had only 24 grams of crack, (3) which they would sell for $950. The CI handed Mr. Hill $1,000 and Mr. Hill went back to the apartment for the cocaine and change. When he returned, Mr. Hill handed the CI a bag containing $50 change and a packet of crack cocaine. (6/10/96 Tr. 4, 5; PSR 4).
On August 1, 1996, Mr. Hill pled guilty to distribution of five grams or more of cocaine. At a presentencing hearing on October 10, 1996, the district court heard arguments regarding the Presentence Investigation Report. Mr. Hill sought a two-level reduction in his offense level of 25 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) for his role as a "minor participant" in the crack sale or, in the alternative, a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 based on his minor role. His counsel argued that the facts clearly show the minor role Mr. Hill played in this sale compared to that of Shawn Burton. (App. 16-20, 26-29; see 10/10/96 Tr. 2-10; 10/17/96 Tr. 2-5, 6-8). Mr. Hill further sought a reduction in his criminal history points due the fact that there was no record showing that he was on probation at the time of this offense. Mr. Hill also requested a departure from the guidelines by substituting a period of community confinement for part of his term of imprisonment. (4) (App. 20, 21-22).
The district court found that Mr. Hill was a "broker" in this drug transaction (10/10/96 Tr. 2, 11-13; 10/17/96 Tr. 3, 6) and, based on that finding, denied the request for an offense-level reduction. The court also denied his requests for a reduction in criminal history points and for a substitution of community confinement for imprisonment. (10/10/96 Tr. 18-21). The court then sentenced Mr. Hill to seventy months, at the bottom of the guideline range. (10/17/96 Tr. 14).
The sentencing court applied the wrong legal standard when it denied an offense-level reduction for Mr. Hill's role as a "minor participant" based solely on a finding that Mr. Hill was a "broker" in the drug transaction. The "minor participant" provision of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) directs sentencing courts to grant a two-level reduction to "a participant who is less culpable than other participants." Because even a person who is more than a "broker" may be less culpable than other participants, this Court must remand in order for the district court to properly consider Mr. Hill's relative culpability.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD AND DENIED MR. HILL A TWO-LEVEL REDUCTION FOR HIS MINOR ROLE IN THE OFFENSE.
Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in determining Mr. Hill's status as a "minor participant" under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) is a legal question reviewed de novo by this Court. United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 516-17 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
The district court's finding that Mr. Hill was a "broker" is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. Kim, 23 F.3d at 517. Where the proper legal standard was used, this Court is "to give 'due deference' to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts." Id.
Here, the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it denied Mr. Hill the "minor participant" adjustment solely because the court found that he was a "broker" and "facilitated the transaction." (10/10/96 Tr. 2, 11-13; 10/17/96 Tr. 3, 6). In response to defense counsel's arguments for the adjustment, the court repeatedly commented along the lines of "I can't see him as a minor participant. He is a broker. He is clearly not a mule." (10/10/96 Tr. 2). There is nothing in the record indicating that the district court considered the relative culpabilities of Mr. Hill and Shawn Burton. (5) Instead, the court appeared to use its finding that Mr. Hill was a "broker" as a per se determination that he was not a "minor participant."
The proper inquiry for determining whether Mr. Hill was a "minor participant" is whether Mr. Hill was "less culpable" than Shawn Burton, not whether he played a particular kind of role or was essential to carrying out the offense. See Caballero, 936 F.2d at 1299-1300 (remanding where district court's statements at sentencing indicated it applied wrong legal standard and had granted minor role adjustment solely because of defendant's status as a courier); see also United States v. LaValley, 999 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1993) (remanding where district court failed to make finding on relative culpability and instead suggested that the guidelines precluded "steerers" or "facilitators" from having minor role status). Because even a person who is a "broker" may be less culpable than other participants, this case should be remanded for consideration of the minor role adjustment under the proper legal standard.
Beyond the court's application of the wrong legal standard for determining "minor participants" under § 3B1.2(b), this Court should find that the sentencing court misapplied that guideline to the facts and remand the case for resentencing with instructions to grant the two-level adjustment. In addition, this Court should instruct the district court to consider a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 for Mr. Hill's minor role. See United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1065 (3d Cir. 1990) (departure under § 5K2.0 available for mitigating role, even when adjustment under § 3B1.2 is not). The facts proffered by the government, together with the facts in the Presentence Investigation Report, demonstrate that Mr. Hill was a "minor participant" in the transaction.
The facts support the district court's finding that Mr. Hill acted as a broker for Shawn Burton only to the extent that a broker is a mere intermediary. And in his role as a broker, Mr. Hill clearly was far less culpable than Shawn Burton. Mr. Hill answered a page that Shawn Burton had set up in order to avoid direct contact with the CI. He then acted at Shawn Burton's direction during the entire course of the drug transaction. He consulted Shawn Burton while setting up the transaction with the CI. Mr. Hill delayed the transaction twice while he waited on Shawn Burton and, in fact, could not act until Burton returned. Mr. Hill then shuttled between Shawn Burton's apartment and the CI's car to finalize the details of the deal, to bring the money to Shawn Burton and to deliver the crack and change to the CI.
Had Mr. Hill been a more sophisticated "broker" in this deal, one with culpability closer to that of Shawn Burton, he would have had more control over the transaction. There is no evidence that Mr. Hill was more than a paid go-between. (10/10/96 Tr. 7). Mr. Hill had no access to the drugs other than through Shawn Burton. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Mr. Hill had any other sources for drugs. Mr. Hill was working solely for Shawn Burton, who directed all his actions.
"The application of § 3B1.2 is inherently fact-bound . . . ." Caballero, 936 F.2d at 1299; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, Background. The facts here clearly show the differences in culpability between Mr. Hill and Shawn Burton and the relatively minor culpability of Mr. Hill.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Derrick Hill respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court for resentencing with instructions either to grant an offense-level reduction for his role as a "minor participant" or to reconsider that adjustment under the proper legal standard.
1. "App." refers to the Appendix of Appellant filed with this brief. References to the transcripts of the June 10, 1996, October 10, 1996, and October 17, 1996, hearings included in the Appendix are cited as "6/10/96 Tr.," "10/10/96 Tr.," and "10/17/96 Tr.," respectively. References to the Presentence Investigation Report, filed separately with the Court under seal, are cited as "PSR."
2. It is unclear whether Hill and Burton shared a pager or whether this was Hill's pager. Hill told the probation officer that Burton gave out Hill's pager number for this transaction because Burton suspected that the CI was a government agent. (PSR 5). The government, however, proffered that Burton and Hill shared a pager. (6/10/96 Tr. 3).
3. The CI originally asked to buy an ounce of crack cocaine. An ounce equals just over 28 grams.
4. If this case is remanded for resentencing, Mr. Hill may renew these issues before the district court.
[Mr. Hill] was the broker. It isn't as if he were just a delivery boy. He put the transaction together. If you wanted to sell your house, and [the AUSA] wanted to buy it or was a potential customer, and you had a real estate broker who would work out the details of it, would you regard that real estate broker as less culpable than you if there were something illegal about the transaction?
(10/17/96 Tr. 6). This discussion contains neither consideration of this specific criminal conduct nor the fact-specific relative culpabilities of Mr. Hill and Shawn Burton.
6. It is hard to imagine conduct by a defendant that would not qualify as "essential to committing the instant offense." Even conduct that § 3B1.2 gives as an example of "minimal" conduct, e.g., courier for a single, small drug transaction, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, Commentary (n.2), would be an "essential" act in a particular transaction.
7. Because Shawn Burton was cooperating with the government in a separate case at the time, he knew how to avoid detection or conviction in this transaction.

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