Source: https://kuchlerpolk.com/category/blog/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:04:53+00:00

Document:
On May 29, 2018, one day before a National Security Council meeting on the subject of energy resiliency, a draft White House memorandum was published which outlines plans for the utilization of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”), in concert with the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), as a means of reversing what the White House describes as the rapid depletion of our nation’s critical energy infrastructure. This memorandum suggests that the Department of Energy may be able use its powers under the aforementioned Acts to stem the ongoing tide of “premature retirements” occurring among domestic coal and nuclear plants.
So what is the DPA?
Based on the War Powers Acts of WWII and initially authorized during the Korean War, the DPA authorizes the President to control and direct certain aspects of domestic industry in the interest of national defense. Facing a series of post-war labor strikes resulting from widespread industrial and economic turmoil and in the face of growing Cold War tensions, the Truman administration enacted the DPA on September 8, 1950. By design, the DPA is a temporary law requiring periodic reauthorization. The most recent reauthorization occurred on December 1, 2005, and will expire on September 30, 2019. The provisional nature of this law enabled the evolution of its terms, with amendments modifying and updating the Act’s authorities continuously.
In its original form the DPA granted to the President a number of authorities, such as the authority to demand that manufacturers give priority to defense production, to requisition materials and property, to expand government and private defense production capacity, to ration consumer goods, to fix wage and price ceilings, to force settlement of some labor disputes, to control consumer credit and regulate real estate construction credit and loans, to provide certain antitrust protections to industry, and to establish a voluntary reserve of private sector executives who would be available for emergency federal employment. Currently, only a portion of these original authorities granted by the Act remain.
This begs the question: Are we facing an emergency situation? The United States has not declared war since 1941, but that does not necessarily mean that exerting economic influence in the interest of national defense cannot still be accomplished through the use of its war powers. The constitutionality of the DPA was called into question not long after its enactment by Excel Packing Company when the company was found liable for damages under the Act, for selling meat in excess of maximum prices fixed by the regulation.
Given that the United States has been embroiled in “Extended Military Campaigns” off and on for the better part of a century, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a court would find the measures proposed in the memorandum to be justified and properly exercised under the war powers and authorities granted by the Act. Judging by various industry responses to the memorandum thus far, these measures could face some tough legal challenges.
What exactly does the memorandum propose?
The rapid rate at which coal and nuclear energy generating facilities are being retired could be creating a shortage of energy generation diversity sufficient to justify action under the DPA/FPA. The memorandum suggests that too many “fuel-secure plants” have closed prematurely and many more have recently announced retirement. The term “fuel secure” refers to facilities which maintain their power source on site, such as coal and nuclear facilities, as opposed to those utilizing natural gas, which must be piped-in. The memorandum acknowledges that currently the lost megawatts of coal/nuclear power are being replaced by new generation from natural gas and renewable energy sources, but warns that this transition comes at the expense of fuel security and resilience.
What has the industry response been?
Administrations on both sides of the aisle have relied on DPA authorities to direct energy production (During January 2001, both Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush invoked DPA powers, in conjunction with those granted in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350), to ensure that emergency supplies of electrical power and natural gas continued flowing to California utilities, deflecting threatened electrical blackouts.). However, its proposed use to safeguard, and some critics would say interfere with, the domestic energy market has sparked quite a bit of controversy.
An unlikely alliance of environmental groups and oil and gas industry interest groups have spoken out in opposition to the proposed measures. Todd Snitchler of the American Petroleum Institute has called for less government intervention in energy markets and expressed concern that the proposed use of the DPA/FPA to support “high-cost generation” (referring to coal and nuclear) could result in consumers paying more for their electricity. Amy Farrell, vice President of the American Wind Energy Association stated, “[o]rderly power plant retirements do not constitute an emergency for our electric grid”. PJM, the east coast grid operator which serves 65 million customers, published an analysis of recently announced planned deactivations of certain nuclear plants and determined that there was no immediate threat to system reliability. “There is no need for any such drastic action,” said a PJM spokesperson referring to the memorandum’s proposals.
How likely is implementation of the proposals in this memorandum?
The memorandum directs the DOE to protect the ailing coal and nuclear industries from further decline by requiring power market operators “to purchase or arrange the purchase of electric energy or electric generation capacity from a designated list of Subject Generation Facilities (SFGs) sufficient to forestall any further actions towards retirement, decommissioning, or deactivation…” The proposed use of the DPA is unique in this instance because the memorandum seems to say that at any moment an emergency could arise, and this risk is itself sufficient to invoke the DPA. The memorandum warns that “[t]he vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure to cyber, physical, and electromagnetic attacks means that adversaries could disrupt military command and control, banking and financial operations, the electrical grid, and means of communication.” It remains yet to be seen whether the looming threat of attack to critical infrastructure would be considered an “emergency” sufficient to justify use of the authorities granted by the DPA and FPA.
Further, the draft DOE directive lacks many details addressing how it would actually be implemented. For instance, the memorandum provides that systems operators would be instructed to purchase energy from a specified list of “Subject Generation Facilities.” However, statements made by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chairman Kevin McIntyre and DOE Undersecretary Mark Menezes suggest that details on who these “subject generation facilities” are, or how they will be chosen, are not only unclear, but do not yet exist. The lack of specificity about how the DOE would actually implement this plan, as well as the fact that the memorandum was a draft subject to modification, makes it difficult to assess the feasibility of utilizing the DPA to assist the struggling coal and nuclear industries.
Should the measures proposed in the May 29 draft memorandum be implemented, the oil and natural gas industries would inevitably feel the impacts. One commentator expressed concerns that a push to help one sector of energy production would inevitably cut in on the success of its competitor producers, and in this instance could introduce uncertainty and challenges into the oil and gas industry not previously present. Additionally, the proposed assistance to the coal and nuclear industry comes on the heels of newly imposed steel tariffs, a measure that has already been speculated to negatively impact the oil and gas industry, and follows ongoing discussions on modifying the North American Free Trade Agreement, which could also have an impact upon oil and gas exports.
Until an official directive is released by the White House, it is impossible to assess the legality and feasibility of the proposed use of the DPA and FPA to bolster struggling nuclear and coal facilities. However, it is safe to say that the memorandum presents a novel approach to ensuring domestic energy resilience, and should an official directive be released, this discussion will certainly be revisited, and more thoroughly. At the very least, the memorandum’s release is a reminder that a free energy market is still subject to expansive federal oversight—especially where national security is concerned.
 50 U.S.C.A. § 4501 (Formerly cited as 50 App. USCA § 2061).
 Under FPA section 202(c) during the continuance of a war in which the United States is engaged or when an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy, or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of the fuel or water for generating facilities, or other causes, the Secretary of Energy may require by order temporary connections of facilities, and generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electricity as the Secretary determines will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).
Taken from a statement by Whitehouse spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee Sanders following the memorandum’s release. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-energy-plan-would-prop-failing-coal-nuclear-plants-n879406.
 See “Addendum, Draft-5/29/18”, p. 1, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html.
 P.L. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798.
 Defense Production Act, “Declaration of Policy”, 50 U.S.C.A. § 4502.
 Else, Congressional Research Service report: The Defense Production Act: Purpose and Scope (May 14, 2009), available at www.crs.gov.
 United States v. Excel Packing Co., 210 F.2d 596, 598 (10th Cir. 1954).
 Energy analysist Katie Bays stated in an interview with Reuters online that “While we believe DOE has broad privileges to identify threats to national security, we are skeptical that (the order) entitles DOE to direct power market operators (…) to pay generators more based upon that threat… Litigation would begin almost immediately.” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electricity/trump-throws-ailing-u-s-coal-nuke-plants-a-lifeline-triggers-backlash-idUSKCN1IX51Q.
 “Gas-fired power generators are more vulnerable to cyber attacks than coal plants and nukes because gas must be delivered from remote fields via pipelines, according a draft report by the department. Coal and nuclear plants, on the other hand, keep fuel stored on site, eliminating a potential weak point that could be targeted by malicious hackers.” https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-01/trump-s-coal-nuke-push-pegged-to-security-threats-to-gas-pipes.
 Unattributed, “Bush Administration Extends Emergency Orders Requiring Electricity and Natural Gas Shippers to Continue Supplying California Utilities,” Foster Electric Report 209, January 31, 2001, p. 6. The use of these authorities was criticized by some as improper. Bart Jansen, “Gramm Raps Cold War Law,” San Antonio ExpressNews, February 10, 2001, p. 19A.
 “The White House billed the effort as a way to shore up national energy security, but the announcement triggered swift backlash from an unusual alliance of drillers, renewable energy producers and environmentalists who called it an unfair attempt to prop up non-competitive industries.” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electricity/trump-throws-ailing-u-s-coal-nuke-plants-a-lifeline-triggers-backlash-idUSKCN1IX51Q.
 Farrell called the draft plan “a misapplication of emergency powers” and said, “There’s certainly no credible justification to force American taxpayers to bailout uneconomic power plants.” https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/01/us/politics/ap-us-trump-coal-plants.html.
In 1997 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PJM as the nation’s first fully functioning independent system operator (ISO). ISOs operate, but do not own, transmission systems in order to provide open access to the grid for non-utility users. http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/pjm-history.aspx.
 Previous uses of the FPA include responses to massive blackouts caused by incidents like hurricanes Rita and Katrina, https://www.energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/other-regulatory-efforts/does-use.
 See “Addendum, Draft-5/29/18”, p. 7, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html, citing National Security Strategy of the United States of America, at 12 (Dec. 20 17), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/20 17112/NSS-Final-12-18-20 17-0905-2.pdf.
 The DPA does not provide a statutory definition of what would constitute an “emergency”, however the holding in Excel suggests that neither a declaration of war, nor recognition of any national emergency is necessary, where the Act is used to promote national defense.
 Statement of Samantha Gross, a fellow in foreign policy focused on international energy and climate at the Brookings Institution, https://www.rtoinsider.com/ferc-doe-trump-rick-perry-kevin-mcintyre-coal-nuclear-93744/.
 For a more thorough discussion of this, see: Trump’s Steel Tariff Threatens His Goal Of Oil And Natural Gas Dominance, https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2018/03/04/trumps-steel-tariff-is-bad-for-his-oil-and-natural-gas-dominance/#190380c82550.
Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana v. USA, the lawsuit brought by a group of children against the federal government seeking relief from environmental harms, has survived yet another motion to dismiss. The suit was initially filed in District Court in Eugene, Oregon, and has been elevated into the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On Wednesday, March 7, 2018, the Ninth Circuit refused to grant the United States’ writ of mandamus seeking a dismissal.
The plaintiffs in Juliana are seeking a court order which would require the government to protect the “Public Trust” by, among other measures, adopting a plan to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Plaintiffs’ claims assert that energy policies enacted by the US government and its agencies have enabled the continued “subsidization of fossil fuel extraction, development, consumption, and exportation- activities producing enormous quantities of [carbon dioxide] emissions that have substantially contributed to the increase in the atmospheric concentration of [carbon dioxide].” Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1251 (D. Or. 2016), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. June 8, 2017). These policies, plaintiffs argue, are in violation of the Constitution’s mandate that the government must provide for the “General Welfare” of its people.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit panel found the United States’ motion to be premature, holding that “mandamus relief was inappropriate where the district court had not issued a single discovery order, nor had the plaintiffs filed a single motion seeking to compel discovery. The panel also held that any merits errors were correctable through the ordinary course of litigation. The panel further held that there was no controlling Ninth Circuit authority on any of the theories asserted by plaintiffs, and this weighed strongly against a finding of clear error for mandamus purposes. Finally, the panel held that district court’s order denying a motion to dismiss on the pleadings did not present the possibility that the issue of first impression raised by the case would evade appellate review. The panel concluded that the issues that the defendants raised on mandamus were better addressed through the ordinary course of litigation.” In re United States of America, No. 17-71692, (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018).
This case is one among a number of recent “Atmospheric Trust Litigation” lawsuits, and is part of a legal movement whose proponents are attempting to hold the government responsible for reducing carbon pollution. Nature’s Trust, Wood, 2013. The decisions which have enabled Juliana to climb into federal court have, thus far, supported this proposition. Judge Aiken’s opinion in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon posited that “The sovereign’s public trust obligations prevent it from “depriving a future legislature of the natural resources necessary to provide for the well-being and survival of its citizens.” The court expanded that there exists a “natural resources trust” which operates according to basic trust principles, and imposes upon the trustee a fiduciary duty to “protect the trust property against damage or destruction.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254.
This lawsuit departs from traditional public trust suits, in that it seeks to position the federal government as trustee. There is considerable debate as to whether the state or the federal government is the holder of a duty to protect resources falling within the public trust, as well as debate as to whether the atmosphere falls within that trust. The Juliana decisions appear to suggest that such a trust duty does indeed belong to the federal government. After a lengthy discussion, wherein Justinian concepts of property, Jefferson’s Social Contract theory, and the seminal Illinois Central case are invoked, Judge Aiken states, “This action is of a different order than the typical environmental case. It alleges that defendants’ actions and inactions—whether or not they violate any specific statutory duty—have so profoundly damaged our home planet that they threaten plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to life and liberty… I can think of no reason why the public trust doctrine… would apply to the states but not to the federal government.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1259.
In light of the ever evolving legal climate surrounding energy development, as well as the growing popularity of “Atmospheric Trust Litigation”, those monitoring energy and environmental litigation matters would be wise to monitor Juliana, and be mindful of the impacts such litigation has on developments in energy legislation and regulation.
On July 27, 2017, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) proposed the first of two rules designed to replace the controversial 2015 “Clean Water Rule” (the 2015 Rule), which some argue broadened federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA). This regulation is particularly important because it determines which areas are subject to the Corps’ permitting authority under the CWA. This news comes after Louisiana state administrators asked the Trump administration to grant funding and ease the federal permitting requirements related to Louisiana’s coastal lands.
The Corps’ Clean Water Rule of 2015 purportedly sought to clarify the question of which wetlands fall under the jurisdiction of the CWA, and interpreted “waters of the United States” to include “all waters that require protection in order to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of traditional navigable waters,” without requiring a continuous surface connection. After its adoption, critics of the 2015 Rule argued that this construction significantly expanded federal jurisdiction.
Pursuant to its terms, the CWA applies to “navigable” waters, defined by Section 1362(7) of the Act as “waters of the United States.” This definition caused confusion regarding which areas are subject to the CWA regulations. Wetlands have been particularly difficult to classify under the CWA because the boundaries between navigable waterbodies and adjacent wetlands are often unclear. Enforcing agencies and the courts have struggled to determine where the navigable waters – and the jurisdiction of the CWA – ends, and where terra firma land begins.
The Corps, responsible for enforcing certain of the CWA’s permitting requirements, interpreted “waters of the United States” expansively. This resulted in a number of legal challenges from multiple parties and states, including Louisiana.
For instance, in U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the United States Supreme Court upheld the Corps’ authority to interpret the CWA as applicable to wetlands adjacent to other covered water bodies, even though the Corps had historically construed the CWA to cover only waters navigable in fact.
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (SWANCC), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Corps exceeded its authority under the CWA when it adopted a rule extending the definition of “navigable waters” to include intrastate waters used as habitat by migratory birds. That case did not involve wetlands specifically, but it discussed that the deciding factor in Riverside, supra, was the “significant nexus” between the wetlands and navigable waters at issue. While the opinion did not precisely address what constitutes a significant nexus, it did indicate that physical proximity and location are important considerations.
More recently in Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court agreed that the “significant nexus test” should be applied to determine which wetlands fall within the CWA’s jurisdiction, but failed to reach a majority holding regarding how the test is applied. According to the plurality opinion authored by late Justice Scalia, a significant nexus requires that the wetlands be adjacent to “a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters; and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the water ends and the wetland begins.” According to the opinion, the scope of the definition of “waters of the United States” was determined by a wetland’s physical proximity to covered waters, “not ecological relationship thereto.” According to Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, the significant nexus is established if the wetlands “affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters.” In Justice Kennedy’s view – if the wetlands have a substantial ecological impact on navigable waters, the significant nexus test is satisfied regardless of the wetlands’ physical proximity to the navigable waters.
In February 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order instructing the EPA and Corps to issue new regulations that reflect Judge Scalia’s majority opinion in Rapanos to narrow CWA jurisdiction and reduce the area subject to federal permitting. The rule proposed on July 27, 2017 essentially seeks to repeal the 2015 Rule and “re-codify” the prior regulations temporarily. This will essentially maintain the status quo, as the prior regulations have been applied since the Sixth Circuit enjoined the 2015 Rule. In a “second step,” the agencies intend to “conduct a substantive re-evaluation of the definition” to draft replacement regulations.
 Corps of Engineers’ regulatory definition of waters of the United States 33 C.F.R. § 328.3.
 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 FR 37054-01 (2015).
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7) (2014).
 See U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
 U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006)(internal quotations omitted).
 In Re E.P.A., 803 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 2015).
By: Mark E. Best, Esq.
Clients want, expect, and are entitled to efficient handling of their cases. The block-billing model of the past, which allowed for full-day time entries on “research” or “document review,” gave way to standard tenth-of-an-hour billing increments with verbose time entries designed to help clients determine whether they were getting their money’s worth. And even this model is now showing its age, having to compete with fixed and alternative fee agreements designed to give more certainty to future litigation costs. No matter the billing method, when the client is writing out that check, she wants to know she isn’t paying for unnecessary work.
Most defense firms create efficiencies using common methods like new technology (e.g., paperless work flow; video conferencing; electronic document review software), appropriately tiered staffing (e.g., delegation of simple tasks to clerks, paralegals and secretaries), and assessment of cases for early resolution through motion practice or settlement. At Kuchler Polk Weiner, LLC, we take efficiency efforts one step further—out of the physical office and into our collective mindset. One way we do this is by focusing on the archenemy of efficiency—the law of diminishing marginal returns (“DMR”).
This economic principle states that if one input in the production of a commodity is increased while all other inputs are held fixed, a point will eventually be reached at which additions of the input yield progressively smaller, or diminishing, increases in output. Put more simply, you can continually add more of a given resource to creation of a product but, at some point, it will become inefficient to do so. The practice of law is not immune from the law of DMR. There comes a point in every project or case when spending additional hours working on it yields an ever-decreasing return for the client—potentially even a negative return, which occurs when additional work input results only in increased costs to the client, without any benefit whatsoever. So what does this look like in the real world?
In the first three hours an attorney spends constructing a brief, she may formulate an outline, read the latest case-on-point, and identify the key supporting exhibits. That work is very productive and highly valuable to the client. In the last hour of brief preparation, however, he may read and re-read the draft, ultimately deciding only to change the word “Firstly” to “First.” Some would (rightly) argue that the last hour was quality-control work necessary to ensure top quality. From an economic perspective, however, the last hour created “diminished” value for the client relative to the first three hours. And yet, the client is charged for the last hour at full price.
What is absolutely essential to this work product, and what is not?
Have any essential parts of the work product already been created, such that I need not reinvent the wheel?
Have I reached the point in the creative process where I am merely fine-tuning?
Is the fine-tuning still creating good value for the client?
The goal of this mindfulness exercise is to create an automatic internal alarm system, pinpointing the moment when the return on investment of time begins to diminish. Once the alarm bells go off, there should be a shift in mindset to “wrapping things up” and moving on to other, more productive tasks. The benefit to the client’s bottom line does not go unnoticed and (bonus!) we tend to avoid those headaches that come from staring at the same words on the computer screen for hour after hour.
After growing tired of referencing bland maps of Louisiana’s judicial districts—none of which combined both federal and state courts—KPW Associate Joshua Dogget made his own. Feel free to download, print, and share.
What’s the jurisdictional basis? Is it a vessel? Seaman or Longshoreman? Are punitive damages available?
When are responsive pleadings due? Who is opposing counsel? Who’s the judge? Didn’t we just handle a similar case?
Sometimes it seems hard to know where to begin. But the answer is pretty simple—begin at the end. There is nothing more valuable to defense clients than a quick win, and attorneys should strive to develop a reputation for ending litigation or delivering file closure before it’s expected. With rare exception, contractual indemnity is the fastest and least expensive way to get a new maritime file off of a client’s desk. Here are steps we strive to complete on Day 1 of a new maritime case.
First, we want to identify our target—the contractor who is going to cover every dime of our client’s expense. Contracts for offshore work commonly require an employer to defend and indemnify those who are sued by its employees, so plaintiff’s employer is usually the first and best option. In Jones Act cases, the employer will always be a named defendant and the employment relationship will be clear from the allegations in the Complaint. In the event the employer is not identified in the Complaint, we pick up the phone and ask plaintiff’s counsel. Our client’s time is money, and it should not be wasted waiting for formal discovery on non-controversial matters.
Next, we get the signed documents. On the day a new file is assigned, we request copies of the relevant contracts and work orders between the client and plaintiff’s employer. Our efficiency-focused maritime clients understand our goals and provide these contracts with the new case assignment, before we even have to ask.
Master service agreements and vessel charters can be quite complex and the risk allocation, indemnity, and insurance provisions are thoroughly and carefully reviewed. We confirm that the contract language identifies the client as an indemnitee and that it contains specific language allowing the indemnitee to be indemnified for its own negligence. If our client did not contract with plaintiff’s employer, we request and examine its agreements with other named defendants in the suit. Oftentimes, contractual indemnity and defense obligations “pass through” other entities and provide coverage to our clients. By maintaining familiarity with our clients’ contract language, we can expedite the analysis.
Once we’ve confirmed that our client is owed defense and indemnity pursuant to the contract terms, we need to ensure that those terms are enforceable under applicable law. Our seasoned maritime attorneys are well-versed in choice-of-law analysis, state anti-indemnification statutes and, importantly, the exceptions thereto.
Assuming the contract terms are enforceable, we check the contract for dispute resolution and claim notification procedures. We strive to recommend next steps to our clients in every status report and, in this situation, those steps must conform to contract requirements.
Some agreements require notices to be sent to particular individuals or office addresses. Others allow the indemnitor to recover attorneys’ fees and costs if the indemnitee fails to employ alternative dispute resolution before filing a cross-claim or separate lawsuit for defense and indemnity. We avoid pitfalls by being accustomed to the terrain and our clients rest assured that we will take no action on this issue without specific authorization.
Finally, we consider our client’s internal procedures and preferences. Some companies’ legal departments require approval from their business units before a formal tender letter can be issued to a contractor. Some clients wish to issue tender letters directly, while others prefer to present them on our firm letterhead. Some clients prefer lengthy demand letters that attach the Complaint and all contract documents, along with a full legal analysis. Such letters project strength because they imply that formal legal action is a mere “cut-n-paste” away. Other clients see lengthy demand letters as giving away too much information, preferring instead simple demands merely attaching the Complaint and referencing a contract number. We seek out our clients’ individual preferences to deliver precisely what they want, when they want it.
The best practice is to send copies of the demand letter by certified mail or other trackable means to (1) the entity’s registered agent for service of process; (2) the notification addressee identified in the contract; and, (3) the entity’s counsel of record in the underlying litigation (if applicable). This increases the likelihood of a prompt response, which can save our client time and money.
Our clients may not always remember opening a new case file with multi-million dollar exposure and a litigation budget of hundreds of thousands of dollars. We only want them to remember how Kuchler Polk Weiner, LLC closed it, at little or no cost to the company, in a matter of weeks.
 Indemnification for an indemnitee’s own negligence must be “clearly and unequivocally expressed.” An indemnification of “any and all claims” standing alone is not sufficient to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence. Seal Offshore, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 736 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir.1984) (citations omitted).
 The number of potential fact patterns, legal issues, pitfalls and outcomes of this analysis are too numerous to discuss in this space, and may be the subject of future posts.

References: § 4501
 § 2061
 § 824
 § 4502
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 § 328
 § 1362
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