Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2013/06/06/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:50:41+00:00

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From time to time I am asked about the legislative process, so I teamed up with Jill and we created a handy one-pager (life at the capitol is driven by the proverbial one-pager) to walk you through how a bill becomes a law.
Bills are introduced by legislators – By rule, each legislator is permitted to introduce five bills in each legislative session. Exceptions are made (and made often) to the five bill limit.
Bills are introduced – First Reading by the House clerk. Other than reading the title to the bill nothing really happens at this juncture. This just gets the ball rolling.
The bill is assigned to a committee of reference (committee) by the Speaker of the House.
The committee meets to consider the bill after a notice is published.
The committee hears testimony from the general public and from experts. The bill can be amended by the committee.
If the committee approves the bill it goes back to the full House for consideration.
Non-partisan legislative staff prepares a “fiscal note” that details the cost to the State of Colorado.
The bill has an additional committee to review the bill for the fiscal impact to the state – this committee is the Appropriations Committee in each house.
If the Appropriations Committee agrees to the cost of the bill, that committee amends the bill with an appropriations clause and the bill moves to the floor for Second Reading.
The report of the committee is considered; including any amendments.
The bill is debated by the “committee of the whole” additional amendments can be offered and considered.
If bill passes on Second Reading it is listed on the next day’s calendar for Third and final reading in the House.
If the bill passes on Third Reading it is sent to the Senate where the process starts anew – First Reading, assigned to committee, committee review, sent to floor for consideration on Second and Third Reading.
If the bill passes the Senate without any changes the bill goes to the Governor.
If the Senate makes changes to the bill the House has the option of agreeing to the changes (concur) or rejecting the changes and asking for a conference committee to iron out the differences.
Comprised of three members from each house. The conference committee meets to reach an agreement (conference committee report) on the final form of a bill.
A majority (four or more) is required to move a bill from a conference committee back to the House and Senate.
After a conference committee report is submitted, the Senate and the House each have a final “yay” or “nay” vote on the bill.
Once the bill passes both houses, the bill becomes law when the Governor signs it.
During the session, from the day the Governor receives the bill she/he has 10-days to sign, veto, or let the become law without her or his signature.
Within the last 10-days of the session the governor has up to 30 days after the legislature adjourns to sign, veto, or let the bill become law without a signature.
The Governor must send a veto message to the legislature.
The legislature can override a veto with a two-thirds majority vote in BOTH houses.
If the Governor vetoes a bill after the legislature adjourns for the year there is not an opportunity to override that veto.
For a fun view of the life of how a bill becomes a law, please click here to check out the flow-chart developed by the wonderful nonpartisan staff of the Colorado General Assembly.
On Thursday, June 6, 2013, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued nine published opinions and 16 unpublished opinions.
Medical Lien Management, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
Ruiz v. Hope for Children, Inc.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Pahls v. Thomas on Tuesday, June 4, 2013.
President George W. Bush visited Los Ranchos, New Mexico, for a fundraiser in August 2007. The Secret Service was in charge of overall security, and Special Agent Sheehan, as the “site agent,” was tasked with designing and implementing the site security plan. Lt. Thomas of the Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Department (“BCSD”) was in charge of local law enforcement personnel for the event. Among other tasks, he was responsible for making decisions regarding the treatment of demonstrators, including where they would be permitted to stand. Sgt. Mims’s primary responsibility was security of the outer perimeter, which included the area where plaintiffs eventually stood.
For events of this type, BCSD had in place a general policy of directing demonstrators to a designated protest zone. Pursuant to their responsibilities, Lt. Thomas and Sgt. Mims decided that all demonstrators who attended the event should be directed to gather at what was named the “southern checkpoint,” which was approximately 150 yards from where the President would arrive.
As the morning progressed on the day the President was to arrive, many people, including plaintiffs, began arriving at the site to protest. Law enforcement personnel had no reason to believe the protesters posed any threat to the President or the public. Various plaintiffs were subjected to the requirement to gather at the southern perimeter.
At some point prior to President Bush’s arrival, an individual approached Special Agent Sheehan and identified himself as the owner of the property directly opposite the driveway where the President was to arrive. The landowner asked Special Agent Sheehan if he would be allowed to stand on the portion of his property that would allow him to watch the President’s motorcade as it passed. After satisfying himself that the landowner was not a security risk, Special Agent Sheehan told him that security officials would not interfere with his property rights so long as he did not interfere with the motorcade. Soon after, a small group of supporters gathered in this area, which was approximately 15 feet from where the President’s motorcade would pass.
When the President arrived, the motorcade never passed by the protesters at the southern checkpoint, and the President’s view of these protesters was obstructed by distance and a police barricade. The supporters, by contrast, were up close and easily visible to the President.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in January 2008, asserting claims pursuant to § 1983 and alleging viewpoint discrimination by various government entities and five unnamed officials. Plaintiffs claimed that they received disparate treatment vis-à-vis the Bush supporters in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After extensive discovery, they moved to amend their complaint to include, among others, Special Agent Sheehan, Lt. Thomas, and Sgt. Mims as defendants in their individual capacities. The district court granted the motion. In September 2010, Special Agent Sheehan moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified immunity. Lt. Thomas and Sgt. Mims did the same in November 2010. The district court denied summary judgment to all three officials. Each official appealed.
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by setting forth the relevant legal standards that govern its decision.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against state officials who violate constitutional or other federally protected rights. A second avenue is a Bivens action—the federal analog to a § 1983 suit—which provides a “private action for damages against federal officers” who violate certain constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Common to all § 1983 and Bivens claims is the requirement that liability be predicated on a violation traceable to a defendant-official’s own individual actions.
The Supreme Court has recognized that public officials enjoy qualified immunity in civil actions that are brought against them in their individual capacities and that arise out of the performance of their duties. A plaintiff seeking to overcome that presumption must make a two-part showing: first, that a public official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional (or, in the case of a § 1983 action, more generally, federally protected) rights; and second, that these rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
At the core of the First Amendment is the idea that “government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). In traditional public forums, such as sidewalks and streets, a content-based regulation of speech must meet strict scrutiny. A content-neutral regulation, by contrast, must meet intermediate scrutiny. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Viewpoint discrimination is a subset—and a particularly “egregious form”—of content discrimination. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). In § 1983 and Bivens actions, a claim of viewpoint discrimination in contravention of the First Amendment requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose.
In light of these principles, the Tenth Circuit held the district court improperly denied qualified immunity to Special Agent Sheehan, Lt. Thomas, and Sgt. Mims on plaintiffs’ viewpoint-discrimination claim.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s mode of analysis ran afoul of the standards that must be met if plaintiffs were to make out viable § 1983 and Bivens claims and overcome defendants’ assertions of qualified immunity. Liability under § 1983 and Bivens requires personal involvement. Plaintiffs had to have established that each defendant caused plaintiffs to be subjected to viewpoint discrimination and acted with a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose.
The first decisionmaker was Special Agent Sheehan. On the day of the President’s visit, Special Agent Sheehan’s primary responsibility was the security of the inner perimeter. The second set of decisionmakers consisted of Lt. Thomas and Sgt. Mims of BCSD. Their primary responsibility on the day in question was outer-perimeter security, including operation of the southern checkpoint.
The Court noted that neither the Secret Service’s policy nor BCSD’s policy was itself a content- or viewpoint-based restriction on speech. The rub of this case was that these two viewpoint-neutral policies came together and were implemented in such a way as to produce a viewpoint-discriminatory effect.
However, disparate impact alone is not enough to render a speech restriction content- or viewpoint-based. For a discrimination claim rooted in the First Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a government official acted with discriminatory purpose. Where, as here, the government policies are themselves viewpoint-neutral but in tandem create a disparate impact, plaintiffs must show that the policies were brought together for the purpose of discriminating against or in favor of a particular viewpoint. See Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 854 (9th Cir. 2011).
Even taking all of the district court’s factual determinations as true and granting plaintiffs all reasonable inferences in their favor, they do not demonstrate a constitutional violation—i.e., that any defendant acted, or implemented his agency’s policy, for the purpose of discriminating against plaintiffs’ anti-Bush message or in favor of the supporters’ pro-Bush message.
The most that the evidence showed with respect to Special Agent Sheehan was that he knew his actions, though consistent with Secret Service policy, would, in conjunction with the independent actions of BCSD officials, result in disparate treatment of supporters and protesters. This was legally insufficient to establish viewpoint discrimination.
Turning to Lt. Thomas, there was no evidence that he had any hand in Special Agent Sheehan’s decision to allow Bush supporters to remain on private property. The only activity that connected Lt. Thomas to that decision was his knowledge of and acquiescence in it. That, however, was plainly insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer a discriminatory purpose.
The facts with respect to Sgt. Mims were identical in all material respects to the facts with respect to Lt. Thomas. The district court predicated Sgt. Mims’s personal liability for viewpoint discrimination on the fact that he possessed responsibility for Sheehan’s policy and that he knew of and did not interfere with the pro-Bush supporters’ demonstration. But Sgt. Mims did not personally participate in Special Agent Sheehan’s decision and was not responsible for it in a supervisory capacity. His mere knowledge of and acquiescence in that decision were insufficient as a matter of law to amount to a viewpoint discriminatory purpose.
The Court therefore reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Special Agent Sheehan, Lt. Thomas and Sgt. Mims.
On Wednesday, June 5, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and eight unpublished opinions.

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