Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/266/497/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 07:26:10+00:00

Document:
1. Equity will interfere to prevent criminal proceedings under an unconstitutional statute when that is necessary to effectually protect property rights. P. 266 U. S. 500.
2. A criminal statute is not lacking in due process of law merely because the application of its prohibition may be uncertain in exceptional cases, and the more clearly so where the act defined is made criminal only when performed with a specific intent to defraud. P. 266 U. S. 501.
3. Laws of New York punishing those who sell or expose for sale meat or meat preparations falsely misrepresenting them as "Kosher," or "as having been prepared under and of a product or products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements," or who sell or expose for sale in the same place both Kosher and non-Kosher meat etc., without signs indicating that both kinds are sold and labeling the articles accordingly, do not violate the rights of dealers under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or infringe the Commerce Clause. Pp. 266 U. S. 501, 266 U. S. 503.
against the plaintiffs under Chapters 580 and 581, Laws of New York, 1922, respecting the sale of "Kosher" meat and meat preparations.
both kosher and nonkosher meat or meat products who fails to display over such meat or meat preparation so exposed a sign in block letters at least four inches in height reading 'kosher meat,' or 'nonkosher meat,' as the case may be,"
"by compelling it to be discredited in standing and reputation, and by having its merchandise wrongfully branded as 'nonkosher' in accordance with the requirements of said enactments."
"have threatened to prosecute all complaints against persons or concerns engaged as manufacturers, dealers, retailers, or otherwise in the sale of raw or prepared meat commodities, who are charged with violating the statutes;"
of the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements necessitate that even such meats as appellants sell as kosher are not kosher. The bills contain allegations tending to show the impossibility, or at least the great difficulty, of determining with certainty what is kosher according to the rabbinical law and the customs, traditions, and precedents of the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements; but appellants allege that, whenever they could possibly determine in advance whether any meat commodity in their honest belief might be called kosher, they have sold the same as kosher, but not otherwise. The bills aver that irreparable injury to appellants' business, property, goodwill, and reputation will result. It does not appear that any of the appellants has ever been prosecuted for a violation of the statutes, or has ever been specifically threatened with prosecution, the threats alleged being, in substance, simply that all violators of the statutes will be prosecuted. The district court, in each case, after a hearing upon an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, upheld the statutes, denied the injunction and dismissed the bill.
The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute, even though unconstitutional. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 264 U. S. 143; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 124 U. S. 209-211; Davis & Farnum Manufacturing Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 189 U. S. 217. But appellants seek to bring themselves within an exception to this general rule -- namely, that a court of equity will interfere to prevent criminal prosecutions under an unconstitutional statute when that is necessary to effectually protect property rights. Packard v. Banton, supra; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 263 U. S. 214. That these bills disclose such a case of threatened actual and imminent injury as to come within the exception is not beyond doubt. But, upon a liberal view of the decisions above cited and other decisions of this Court (see Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U. S. 100, and cases referred to in footnote), we accept the conclusion of the lower court, based on the decisions of this Court, that, if the statutes under review are unconstitutional, appellants are entitled to equitable relief, and pass to a consideration of the constitutional questions.
"The purpose of the statute, manifestly, is to prevent and punish fraud in the sale of meets or meat preparation, and it only operates on those who knowingly violate its provisions, for it is expressly provided that there must be both an intent to defraud and a false representation."
"And thereupon it is said that the crime thus defined by the statute contains in its definition an element of degree as to which estimates may differ, with the result that a man might find himself in prison because his honest judgment did not anticipate that of a jury of less competent men. . . ."
"But, apart from the common law as to restraint of trade thus taken up by the statute, the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly -- that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it -- some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may be incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of death."
in order to encounter their prohibitions, the hazard of prosecution which appellants fear loses whatever substantial foundation it might have in the absence of such a requirement. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 246 U. S. 348.
2. Lewis & Fox Company is a Massachusetts corporation conducting a general provision supply business, including the shipment and sale of original packages into and within the State of New York. It is this situation which forms the basis of the contention that the commerce clause is violated. It is enough to say that the statutes now assailed are not aimed at interstate commerce, do not impose a direct burden upon such commerce, make no discrimination against it, are fairly within the range of the police power of the state, bear a reasonable relation to the legitimate purpose of the enactments, and do not conflict with any congressional legislation. Under these circumstances, they are not invalid because they may incidentally effect interstate commerce. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 237 U. S. 60, 61; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 225 U. S. 524-526.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS took no part in the consideration of this case.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.