Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2015/02/17/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:54:03+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Clanton on Thursday, February 12, 2015.
Unemployment Compensation Benefits—Forgery—CRS § 8-81-101(1)(a)—Equal Protection—Restitution—Statutory Penalty.
Defendant obtained unemployment compensation benefits to which he was not entitled by using a false Social Security number and a fake military discharge form. The trial court found defendant guilty of forgery. The court sentenced defendant to eighteen months of probation and ordered him to pay $12,397.50 in restitution. That total included a 50% statutory penalty of $4,132.50, which the court believed was required by CRS § 8-81-101(4)(a)(II).
On appeal, defendant contended that he was unlawfully convicted of forgery. He argued that CRS § 8-81-101(1)(a) was the appropriate statute under which he should have been charged, because his misconduct involved making of a false statement of material fact, with intent to defraud, to obtain unemployment compensation benefits. CRS §8-81-101 does not address all criminal activity that may occur in the unemployment compensation context; rather, it addresses certain specific acts that may occur in the context of an application for benefits. Because the General Assembly did not intend to preclude prosecution for forgery where the conduct underlying the charge also arguably violates CRS § 8-81-101(1)(a), the People had the discretion to charge defendant with the more serious offense.
Defendant also contended that the forgery statute, CRS § 18-5-102, fails to provide an intelligible standard by which to differentiate the conduct proscribed from that proscribed by CRS § 8-81-101(1)(a). Therefore, charging him under the forgery statute violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The forgery statute applicable here includes elements that CRS § 8-81-101(1)(a) does not. Accordingly, the People could charge defendant with forgery without violating his right to equal protection of the laws.
Defendant further contended, the People agreed, and the Court of Appeals concurred that the district court should not have assessed the 50% penalty provided for in CRS § 8-81-101(4)(a)(II) as part of his restitution obligation. That portion of defendant’s sentence, including the statutory penalty as restitution, was vacated, and the case was remanded to the district court to correct the mittimus to reflect the proper amount of restitution.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Roper v. Carneal on Thursday, February 12, 2015.
Carneal, an El Paso County employee, was driving a county-owned snowplow when he allegedly failed to stop at a stop sign. Plaintiff, Roper, drove off the road to avoid Carneal and crashed, suffering personal injuries and damage to her car. She filed this action against Carneal and the Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County (County Board), alleging claims of negligence per se, negligence, respondeat superior, and property damage/loss of use.
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing they were immune from suit under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The CGIA generally bars tort-related claims against public entities and employees, but waives immunity for a public employee’s operation of a motor vehicle under certain circumstances. Defendants argued the snowplow was “special mobile machinery” rather than a “motor vehicle,” and therefore the motor vehicle waiver of immunity did not apply.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss based on the nature of the vehicle (a modified dump truck with seats for two but generally driven by one operator and used exclusively on county roads to remove snow and ice). Defendants filed this interlocutory appeal.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the statutory definitions of “motor vehicle” and “special mobile machinery” and concluded the snowplow in this instance was a “motor vehicle”; therefore, governmental immunity was waived. The Court noted that a “motor vehicle” under CRS §42-1-102(58) must be designed primarily for travel on the public highways and generally and commonly used to transport persons and property over the public highways. The undisputed evidence was that the snowplow was a dump truck designed to remove snow and ice from the public highways by traveling on them. The Court found that a vehicle need only transport persons or property, despite the use of “and” in the statute, because requiring transport of both persons and property would be “absurd and unreasonable.” It further held that carrying sand and salt constituted transporting property.
The Court also held that the definition of “special mobile machinery” requires a finding that the vehicle is “only incidentally operated or moved over public highways.” Because it was exclusively driven over the public highways, the snowplow did not meet this requirement. The order was affirmed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

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