Source: https://casetext.com/case/allen-v-dutchess-county-mut-ins-co
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:40:29+00:00

Document:
Allen v. Dutchess County Mut. Ins. Co.
Allenv.Dutchess County Mut. Ins. Co.
William E. Osborn, for the appellant.
Milton A. Fowler and Robert F. Wilkinson, for the respondent.
The policy provides: "No suit or action on this policy, for the recovery of any claim, shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity until after full compliance by the insured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire." The twelve months' limitation began to run from the day of the fire. ( King v. Watertown Fire Ins. Co., 47 Hun, 1; Cooper v. U.S.M.B. Assn., 132 N.Y. 334, 338; Joyce Ins. § 3190.) The cases cited contra by the learned counsel for the appellant ( Hay v. Star Fire Insurance Co., 77 N.Y. 235; Steen v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co., 89 id. 315; Mayor of New York v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 39 id. 45) are to be discriminated for the reason that the term of limitation was twelve months "next after such loss or damage shall have occurred," or "after such loss," or after the "loss or damage shall accrue." This distinction is pointed out by HAIGHT, J., in King v. Watertown Fire Ins. Co. ( supra). (See, also, Cooper v. U.S.M.B. Assn., supra.) Inasmuch as the plaintiff alleged that his buildings were burned on November 13, 1897, yet did not begin suit until January 13, 1899, the defendant pleaded, inter alia, this period of limitation. The rule is that such a plea is conclusive against the action. The plaintiff, however, insists that there was a waiver of this limitation by the defendant, and asked that this question be submitted to the jury: "Did the defendant waive the twelve months' limitation of commencing suit?" This request was refused under exception.
The plaintiff pleaded waiver only of the clause regulating the filing of the proof of loss and certain procedure thereupon. He alleged performance of "all the other conditions of said policy of insurance on his part." Under such pleading of performance the plaintiff could not prove a waiver of the limitation of the action. ( Elting v. Dayton, 63 Hun, 629, reported in full, 43 N Y St. Repr. 363; affd., 144 N.Y. 644; Oakley v. Morton, 11 id. 25; Todd v. Union Casualty Surety Co., 70 App. Div. 52; 74 N.Y. Supp. 1062.) But, conceding that the proof was admissible under the pleadings, I am of opinion that it was not sufficient to warrant the submission of the question to the jury. In Gibson Electric Co. v. Liverpool L. G. Ins. Co. ( 159 N.Y. 418) the court, per MARTIN, J., say: "Although the decisions of this court, of which we have made this brief review, seem to warrant the conclusion that an insurer, even under the provisions of a standard policy, may estop itself from claiming, or may waive, a forfeiture under its conditions by its acts and the requirements it makes of the insured after knowledge of the forfeiture, still, the circumstances and acts which are required to constitute such an estoppel or waiver seem to be quite firmly established. Thus, in the absence of an express waiver, at least, some of the elements of an estoppel must exist."
In fine, the mere facts that the adjuster of the defendant, early after the fire and "not such a great time after," discussed a possible settlement, and that thereafter, and toward the close, the plaintiff renewed these negotiations, so that they continued to a time within perhaps two months, possibly five or six weeks, of the close of the period within which a suit must be begun, is not sufficient evidence of waiver, for it must be based upon "some of the elements of an estoppel," so that the assured "must have been misled by some action of the company," to quote the words of MARTIN, J., in Gibson Electric Co. v. Liverpool L. G. Ins. Co. ( supra). The mere pendency of negotiations or the fact that occasional interviews are had in regard to the adjustment or settlement of a loss "will not of themselves operate as a waiver of the stipulation or be an equitable estoppel." (See Joyce Ins. § 3207; May Ins. [4th ed.] § 485.) The facts do not bring the case within the rule as applied by HIRSCHBERG, J., in Bowen v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. ( 82 App. Div. 458), and the cases therein cited.
The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.

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