Source: https://www.patentdocs.org/trade-secrets/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:04:31+00:00

Document:
As the saying goes, hard cases make bad law. And it certainly looked improper when Sergey Aleynikov downloaded high-frequency trading ("HFT") source code as he was leaving his job as a Goldman Sachs programmer, at least to the juries who convicted him of Federal and New York state crimes. But while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned his conviction because the law did not fit the offense, the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in the state) recently upheld his conviction on "Unlawful Use of Secret Scientific Material." To reach that conclusion, however, the Court of Appeals had to construe two statutory provisions in ways that may have unintended -- and unwanted -- consequences for New York's criminal laws.
To recap, Mr. Aleynikov left Goldman Sachs on June 5, 2009 to take a job with another trading firm where he would be writing HFT software. Before he left, first on June 1 then again on June 5 (his last day as an employee), he downloaded portions of the Goldman Sachs HFT software source code and uploaded them to a server in Germany. He later downloaded the source code to his personal computer and allegedly used it to structure HFT code modules for his new employer.
After discovering Mr. Aleynikov's actions, Goldman Sachs notified the FBI, who questioned Mr. Aleynikov about Goldman Sachs's allegations. Mr. Aleynikov cooperated with the interrogation, admitting that he had downloaded the source code, but explaining that he had innocent motives. The FBI and the U.S. Attorney did not see his actions as innocent; he was prosecuted in the Southern District of New York for violations of the Economic Espionage Act and National Stolen Property Act and found guilty under both laws. Upon appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed his conviction on both counts. Importantly, in doing so, it found that source code was "intangible property" and therefore not a "good" under the National Stolen Property Act.
Although the Second Circuit overturned Mr. Aleynikov's conviction, the FBI turned Mr. Aleynikov's computer, passport, and other materials over to the Manhattan District Attorney's Office rather than returning them to him. The Manhattan D.A. then charged Mr. Aleynikov with two counts of Unlawful Use of Secret Scientific Material (each count tied to one of the two downloading sessions) and one count of Unlawful Duplication of Computer Related Material. At trial, the jury convicted Mr. Aleynikov on the count of unlawful use related to his June 5 downloads, hung on the count of unlawful use related to his June 1 downloads, and acquitted him of unlawful duplication. But the trial court (known in New York as the Supreme Court) overturned the jury conviction, reasoning (among other things) that Mr. Aleynikov had not made a "tangible reproduction or representation" of the Goldman HFT source code and that the prosecution had not shown that he had intended to "appropriate" the use of the code, both of which were statutory requirements for the unlawful use offense.
The appellate court (the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court) reversed the trial court order, reinstating the jury conviction on the unlawful use count. Whether the source code itself was tangible or intangible property was irrelevant to the appellate court. Instead, it found that Mr. Aleynikov made a "tangible reproduction or representation" when he uploaded the source code to the German server because "when he copied it onto the server's 'physical' hard drive[,] it took up 'physical space' and was 'physically present." With regard to the term "appropriate," defined in the New York Penal Law generally for all larceny offenses, the appellate court considered the portion of the definition that indicated that "[t]o 'appropriate' property of another to oneself or a third person means (a) to exercise control over it, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it, permanently . . . ." The appellate court focused on Mr. Aleynikov's intent with regard to the copy he had made of the secret scientific material, finding that there was no evidence that he had intended to return the copy, and therefore had appropriated it.
Against this backdrop, the New York Court of Appeals accepted review to consider whether Mr. Aleynikov had made a "tangible reproduction or representation of [Goldman's HFT source code] by means of writing, photographing, drawing, mechanically or electronically reproducing or recording such secret scientific material," and whether he had intended to appropriate the use of that source code. It answered both questions in the affirmative.
The first issue the Court faced was what the term "tangible" meant in the context of the unlawful use statute. The Court reviewed the background of the statute (which arose out of concerns that the conduct in a Federal case, United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966), might not be prohibited under New York law), but then noted that the term "tangible" is not defined in the Penal Law. It noted that dictionaries could provide "useful guideposts" for determining the ordinary meaning of statutory terms; indeed, both the prosecution and Mr. Aleynikov had proposed definitions from Black's Law Dictionary for the interpretation of the word "tangible." Mr. Aleynikov had suggested that it meant "capable of being touched," the State had argued that it meant "having or possessing physical form."
The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Aleynikov's proposed definition in two steps. First, it asserted that, if construed that way, "the term does not apply to ink printed on paper any more readily than to source code, and provides no workable criterion." Second, it indicated that the question was not whether source code was tangible (and, to conform with prior cases, the Court was constrained to agree that source code is intangible), but whether a copy of that source code would be tangible when downloaded. Thus, the Court sought to distinguish between source code generally and a copy of source code taking up physical space on a hard drive or CD.
The Court's position is curious, and appears to be based on a limited computer literacy. The Court's first statement is odd, as there is no doubt that paper with printed indicia can be touched by hand. On the other hand, virtual (that is, not printed) source code is not stored in the same format as it is printed; it is saved as binary code. Therefore, it cannot be touched as compiled source code, even on a microscopic level. There is a clear distinction that, while perhaps intellectually unsatisfying, is easy to police. Second, even before it is saved, computer code takes up physical space (whether in memory or saved on media). That is, the Court of Appeals makes a distinction where there is no difference.
Notably, the Court struggles to provide any meaning to the term "tangible" in the phrase "tangible reproduction or representation." It posits the example of memorization of source code, but notes that such memorization would not fall under the statute because the reproduction or representation must be "by means of writing, photographing, drawing, mechanically or electronically reproducing or recording." It circumvents the conundrum by stating, "the word 'tangible,' as we interpret it, does not introduce redundancy; it adds a modest element to 'reproduction,' serving to emphasize that the crime consists in making a physical, not a mental, copy of secret scientific material." But that "emphasis," in light of the requirement of certain means for making the reproduction, is redundancy.
The Court then gets to the heart of its objection to Mr. Aleynikov's position, stating that "it would be absurd to suppose that the statute criminalizes photographs stored on film but not ones stored on a hard drive." But that absurd result is for the legislature to prevent through an amendment of the statute, not the Court to fix through interpretation. The unlawful use statute was adopted in 1967, long before the internet was in common use. The legislature had not yet criminalized computer crime specifically, and would not do so for almost two more decades. And even now, there is a package of legislation proposed that would remedy the absurd juxtaposition noted by the Court.
The Court of Appeals made short work of Mr. Aleynikov's second argument, that he did not intend to appropriate the relevant source code because he did not intend to deprive Goldman Sachs of the source code. In doing so, it disaggregated the definition of "appropriate": under the New York Penal Law, "[t]o 'appropriate' property of another to oneself or a third person means (a) to exercise control over it, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it, permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value or benefit, or (b) to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or a third person." The Court asserted that the definition was intended to indicate that control could be exercised (i) permanently or (ii) for so extended a period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value or benefit. From that, it surmised that exercising permanent control over another's property would be sufficient, and asserted that Mr. Aleynikov intended to exercise control over the source code permanently, since he admittedly did not intend to return the copy of source code in his possession.
The Court's resolution of the appropriation issue is ironic, as it elides the distinction between the source code and the copy of the source code it made in relation to "tangible reproduction or representation. That is, Mr. Aleynikov certainly intended to keep the copy of source code he had made, but had no intent to control Goldman Sachs's use of its own copy of the source code. But the Court did not address the inconsistency between the two interpretations.
While the Court of Appeals was clearly bothered by the prospect of Mr. Aleynikov getting off on a "technicality," it substantially expanded the unlawful use statute to do so. Of course, the language of a statute is not a technicality. But the Court interpreting the statute extremely broadly is likely to chill behavior that the legislature did not intend to criminalize. There is always tension between preventing harm to intellectual property owners and allowing employees freedom to move from job to job; the New York Court of Appeals drew the line far more to employers' liking because of the hard facts of the case. In truth, that should have been the legislature's job.
 For more details on Mr. Aleynikov’s conduct and prosecutions, please see the Patent Docs posts "Another Aleynikov Trade Secrets Case Ends with Narrower Statute" and "Aleynikov Conviction Reinstated by New York Appellate Court," as well as the Snippets article "New York v. Aleynikov: New York State's Penal Code (Like Federal Criminal Law) Does Not Cover Electronic Reproduction of Source Code."
 The Economic Espionage Act is found at 18 U.S.C. § 1832 and the National Stolen Property Act is found at 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
 United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 76-79 (2d Cir. 2012).
 See N.Y. Pen. L. § 165.07 ("A person is guilty of unlawful use of secret scientific material when, with intent to appropriate to himself or another the use of secret scientific material, and having no right to do so and no reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he makes a tangible reproduction or representation of such secret scientific material by means of writing, photographing, drawing, mechanically or electronically reproducing or recording such secret scientific material.").
 New York v. Aleynikov, 148 A.D. 3d 77 (N.Y. App. Div. [1st Dept.] 2017).
 N.Y. Pen. L. § 155.00.
 For example, after the Second Circuit reversed Mr. Aleynikov's conviction under the Economic Espionage Act, Congress moved quickly to amend the statute to cover future abuses of the same sort. Pub. L. 112-236.
Sergey Aleynikov was tried and convicted on criminal charges by both a Federal and a New York state jury; both times, his conviction was reversed. But his luck on appeal may have run out. The Appellate Division, First Department, of the New York Supreme Court (the intermediate state appellate court for Manhattan) reversed the trial court's order of dismissal after a jury conviction for unlawful use of secret scientific material.
Mr. Aleynikov was employed by Goldman Sachs writing code; on his last day of employment, he transferred parts of the source code for Goldman's high frequency trading program to a foreign website for his own future use.
He was tried originally in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and convicted of violations of the Economic Espionage Act and National Stolen Property Act. Those convictions were reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit because the source code had not itself been a product placed in interstate commerce (under the EEA) and was intangible property, not a "good" (under the NSPA).
After the Federal prosecution failed, the Manhattan District Attorney's office charged Mr. Aleynikov with two counts of unlawful use of secret scientific material and one count of unlawful duplication of computer related material. The jury convicted him of only one count of unlawful use of secret scientific material. Even that conviction was overturned by the trial judge on a post-trial motion, but the DA appealed.
A person is guilty of unlawful use of secret scientific material when, with intent to appropriate to himself or another the use of secret scientific material, and having no right to do so . . . , he makes a tangible reproduction or representation of such secret scientific material by means of writing, photographing, drawing, mechanically or electronically reproducing or recording such secret scientific material.
First, did Mr. Aleynikov have an "intent to appropriate to himself or another the use of secret scientific material," based on his transfer of the source code to the foreign website? Second, was transferred code "a tangible reproduction or representation of such secret scientific material"?
The appellate court addressed the second question first, trying to figure out what a "tangible" reproduction would be. In that context, the appellate court sought to avoid "hypertechnical or strained interpretations" of the statutory language. However, despite the statute having been enacted in 1967 (well before the advent of the internet) and the general rule that criminal statutes are construed based on the knowledge of the time of enactment, the appellate court turned to Black's Law Dictionary. From there, it understood that "tangible" meant that something would be required to have "physical form and characteristics."
The trial court found that computer code would not have physical form; the appellate court found that it would. In doing so, the appellate court found that the source code might not be tangible, but that Mr. Aleynikov made a tangible reproduction of it when he copied it onto a physical hard drive on a server where it took up physical space and was physically present. In reaching that conclusion, the court found that the statute had been drafted with "broad generalized language that fits squarely into today's digital world," despite the impossibility of visualizing saving code on a server at the time of drafting. Notably, the court rejected a conflict with the Second Circuit's decision that the source code was "intangible property" by distinguishing between the source code and the copy that Mr. Aleynikov had made. Although that appears to be a distinction without a difference, it was sufficient for the appellate court to find the relevant material fit within the scope of the statute.
Having reached that conclusion, the appellate court turned to whether Mr. Aleynikov had intended to "appropriate" the scientific material. New York's Penal Law defines "appropriate" as exercising control over property either (1) permanently or (2) "for so extended a period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value or benefit." In considering whether Mr. Aleynikov would be exercising control over the relevant code, the trial court focused on the effect on Goldman Sachs's use of the code and found that it would have had none. But the appellate court created a sharp distinction between the two subsets of control, focusing on only Mr. Aleynikov for permanent control and only Goldman Sachs for the second definition. It thus found that Mr. Aleynikov's conduct fell within the scope of the statutory offense because he had no intent to return the code. Notably, however, the definition of "appropriate" is not specific to the secret scientific material offense; the appellate court was seemingly making new law for the entirety of the New York Penal Code.
Mr. Aleynikov has already signaled that he intends to seek review in New York's highest court. There, the battle will be between narrowly construing the criminal statute to preserve its original intent and the overall integrity of the Penal Code and broadly construing it to cover clearly improper conduct. As has happened in all of Mr. Aleynikov's trials and appeals, the court will have to consider what to do when the pace of technology far outstrips the development of the criminal law.
 More details on Mr. Aleynikov’s actions and the prior cases can be found in a Summer 2015 snippets article and a July 6, 2015 Patent Docs post.
 N.Y. Pen. L. § 165.07.
After a brief markup session in which no amendments to the bill were proposed, the House Judiciary Committee reported the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 to the House floor by unanimous voice vote today. The bill passed the Senate earlier this month by a vote of 87-0 and should receive quick approval by the full House. President Obama has voiced support for the measure and should sign the bill into law in short order. The bill is remarkable not only for its bipartisan support, but also because it would create a new Federal cause of action for intellectual property owners.
During the markup session, seven representatives spoke in favor of the bill including the Chairman (Rep. Goodlatte of Virginia), the ranking minority member (Rep. Conyers of Michigan), sponsors of the House's original version of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (Rep. Collins of Georgia and Reps. Nadler and Jeffries of New York), Rep. Lofgren of California, and Rep. Johnson of Georgia. Other than Rep. Lofgren, all spoke only of the importance of the bill to American business and their appreciation for the efforts of all who helped draft and promote the bill. Rep. Lofgren, whose district covers much of San Jose and Santa Clara, expressed concern over the venue for hearings after ex parte seizures. Specifically, she was troubled that a start-up or small business might be forced to try to find counsel and prepare for a hearing across the country within a week of having had a seizure executed against it. But, remarkably, rather than proposing an amendment to address the issue, Rep. Lofgren recognized that the bill is on a fast track to the President's desk and only expressed the hope that the concern could be dealt with later (either through a later law or some other mechanism). Thus, no amendments were proposed and the bill was reported in the same form in which it passed the Senate.
The bill now goes to the House floor for debate. Since it had over 150 cosponsors in its original House form and support from the White House, however, it is unlikely that there will be much dissent or controversy. Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee took only one week to report the bill after it was passed by the Senate. Thus, it is likely we will see the President signing the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 into law this spring, creating a new Federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.
Yesterday, the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) sent a letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary expressing "strong support" for the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890), which was introduced in the Senate in July. A corresponding bill (H.R. 3326) was introduced in the House.
The Senate bill, which is sponsored by Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and which has received bipartisan support from more than a dozen co-sponsors, would amend Title 18 of the United States Code to provide Federal jurisdiction for trade secret theft. In particular, the legislation would allow the owner of a trade secret to bring a civil action in U.S. district court for misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce. The Defend Trade Secrets Act would allow trade secret owners to secure a court order providing for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of a trade secret (if the court determines, inter alia, that a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be an inadequate remedy). The bill would also require the court issuing the order to hold a seizure hearing within seven days of the issuance of the order in which the party obtaining the order would have the burden of proving that the facts supporting the order are still in effect.
Other remedies provided by the legislation for the misappropriation of a trade secret include an injunction to prevent any actual or threatened trade secret misappropriation, payment of a reasonable royalty for future use of the trade secret in exceptional circumstances that render an injunction inequitable, damages for actual loss caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret, damages for any unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret, exemplary (treble) damages when a trade secret is willfully and maliciously misappropriated, and attorney's fees for willful and malicious misappropriation of a trade secret or a bad faith claim of misappropriation. Actions under the Defend Trade Secrets Act would have to be commenced not later than five years after the date on which the misappropriation is discovered (or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered).
(1) The scope and breadth of the theft of the trade secrets of United States companies occurring outside of the United States.
(2) The extent to which theft of trade secrets occurring outside of the United States is sponsored by foreign governments, foreign instrumentalities, or foreign agents.
(3) The threat posed by theft of trade secrets occurring outside of the United States.
(4) The ability and limitations of trade secret owners to prevent the misappropriation of trade secrets outside of the United States, to enforce any judgment against foreign entities for theft of trade secrets, and to prevent imports based on theft of trade secrets overseas.
(5) A breakdown of the trade secret protections afforded United States companies by each country that is a trading partner of the United States and enforcement efforts available and undertaken in each such country, including a list identifying specific countries where trade secret theft, laws, or enforcement is a significant problem for United States companies.
(6) Instances of the Federal Government working with foreign countries to investigate, arrest, and prosecute entities and individuals involved in the theft of trade secrets outside of the United States.
(7) Specific progress made under trade agreements and treaties, including any new remedies enacted by foreign countries, to protect against theft of trade secrets of United States companies outside of the United States.
(D) provide a mechanism for United States companies to confidentially or anonymously report the theft of trade secrets occurring outside of the United States.
Following introduction of the bills, S. 1890 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee and H.R. 3326 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.
The IPO letter in support of the legislation contends that "current legal tools available to remedy trade secret theft are inefficient," and that "current federal law in this area has limitations." While commending the FBI and Department of Justice for doing a good job enforcing the Economic Espionage Act, the IPO notes that both "have limited resources and numerous priorities and are not able to pursue all trade secret thefts." The IPO points out that the Defend Trade Secrets Act would allow its members to protect their trade secrets. In addition, the IPO argues that enactment of the legislation "will place the United States in a position to promote strong trade secrets protection globally, both by creating the “gold standard” by which countries can model their trade secrets laws and by placing the United States in a better position to negotiate trade agreements and other international treaties that provide strong trade secrets protection."
In 2009, Sergey Aleynikov was a computer programmer employed by Goldman Sachs to write high-frequency trading code. He accepted an offer to join a new Chicago-based company, Teza Technologies. Before he left Goldman Sachs, however, he sent portions of Goldman's high frequency trading code to a German website for his own future use. After Goldman found out, it went to the FBI; Aleynikov was then arrested on a flight home from Chicago. With that arrest began a circuitous journey through the U.S. legal system, governed by two different sovereigns and under two different legal regimes -- neither one of which was ultimately found to cover his actions.
Aleynikov was first tried in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on charges of violating the Federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ("EEA"). At that time, the EEA's trade secret misappropriation provision established that "[w]hoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly . . . without authorization . . . downloads, uploads, . . . transmits, . . . or conveys such information" would be guilty of a criminal offense punishable with up to ten years in jail. 18 U.S.C. § 1832. The parties disputed the application of the EEA to Aleynikov's behavior, Aleynikov's intent in uploading the code to the German website, and the importance of the uploaded code. Eventually, however, the jury found Aleynikov guilty under the EEA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the EEA differently from the construction applied by the trial court. It stressed that the EEA had been adopted as a response to the Supreme Court's decision that the National Stolen Property Act (18 U.S.C. § 2314) did not apply to purely intangible property, as found in Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207 (1985). 676 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 2012). It then considered the differences in language between the economic espionage provision of the EEA (18 U.S.C. § 1831) and the trade secrets provision (18 U.S.C. § 1832). The former did not require that the information be "related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce," while the latter did. Id. at 79. Given the statutory language, the Second Circuit found that Goldman's was intended to remain confidential (and not be related to any product placed in interstate commerce). Id. at 82. It therefore overturned Aleynikov's Federal conviction.
Remarkably, the Second Circuit's decision in the Federal Aleynikov case led to a change in the statute. Although it cannot apply to the Aleynikov case (under both the Constitution's ex post facto clause and double jeopardy case law), § 1832 was amended to apply to any trade secret "that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce." Thus, in future cases, misappropriation of computer code that is intended to remain confidential, but used in relation to a service performed in interstate commerce, will be an offense under the EEA.
Rather than returning Aleynikov's computer, other evidence, and passport, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office turned it all over to the New York County (Manhattan) prosecutor's office. Ultimately, that evidence was ruled to be illegally transferred and inadmissible as evidence against Aleynikov. The prosecutor's office decided to prosecute Aleynikov nonetheless. The state court prosecution proceeded under two statutes: two counts of Unlawful Use of Secret Scientific Material (N.Y. Pen. L. 165.07) and one count of Unlawful Duplication of Computer Related Material (N.Y. Pen. L. 156.30). The former statute provides, "A person is guilty of unlawful use of secret scientific material when, with intent to appropriate to himself or another the use of secret scientific material, and having no right to do so and no reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he makes a tangible reproduction or representation of such secret scientific material by means of writing, photographing, drawing, mechanically or electronically reproducing or recording such secret scientific material." Aleynikov challenged his State indictment on numerous grounds, ranging from double jeopardy to the high-frequency trading code not being "secret scientific material" to not having made a "tangible reproduction or representation." The trial court judge rejected those arguments and allowed the case to go forward to trial.
At trial in April 2015, Aleynikov argued that he had committed no crime, based both on his own lack of culpable intent and the technical language of the relevant statutes. The jury returned with a split verdict: guilty on one count of Unlawful Use of Secret Scientific Material, hung on the other count of Unlawful Use of Secret Scientific Material, and not guilty of Unlawful Duplication of Computer Related Material.
On July 6, 2015, however, the trial court judge entered an order overturning the jury's finding of guilt on the count of Unlawful Use of Secret Scientific Material. The judge asserted that he had no doubt that Aleynikov's actions were wrongful, but also found that prosecutors "did not prove he committed this particular obscure crime." His findings were based on two deficiencies by the prosecutors: first, that they failed to prove that Aleynikov made a "tangible reproduction or representation of such secret scientific material" and, second, that they failed to prove that Aleynikov intended to take much of the value of the high-frequency trading code. Thus, the trial court found, the prosecutors had not proven all of the elements of the charged offense and Aleynikov could not be convicted.
Under these circumstances, Sergey Aleynikov may finally be free from risk of criminal jeopardy from his actions at Goldman. The Manhattan DA's office could still appeal, but it would be surprising to see an appellate court find that a virtual copy of information would constitute a "tangible reproduction," since the Supreme Court rejected that argument in Dowling. But future defendants may not be so lucky: the New York State Senate has already passed a bill that would criminalize the same sort of acts that Aleynikov undertook. Thus, Aleynikov may end up with a unique position in legal history: two vacated convictions based on the same acts and two laws changed because of those vacated jury decisions.
 The Manhattan DA’s office offered Aleynikov a plea bargain: if he pled guilty to one of the counts, they would agree to drop the other charges and seek no time beyond the one year he had already served awaiting trial on the Federal charges. Aleynikov rejected the plea deal.

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