Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Post_Master_General_of_the_United_States_v._Early
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:29:35+00:00

Document:
THIS was an action of debt, commenced in the Circuit Court for the district of Georgia, by the District Attorney of the United States for that district, in the name of the Post Master General of the United States, against the defendants, on a bond executed by them, in Juns, 1820, to the Post Master General of the United States, the condition of which, after reciting that Eleazer Early (one of the coobligors and defendants in the suit) is Post Master at Savannah, provides, that if he shall perform the duties of his office, 'and shall pay all moneys that shall come to his hands for the postages of whatever is by law chargeable with postage, to the Post Master General of the United States for the time being, deducting only the commission and allowances, made by law, for his care, trouble, and charges, in managing the said office,' &c. 'then the above obligation shall be void.' The breach assigned was, that the said E. Early did not pay to the Post Master General the moneys which came to his hands, as post master at Savannah, but that the sum of 7,736 dollars and 64 cents was still in arrear and unpaid. The defendants pleaded to the jurisdiction of the Court, that this was 'not a suit in which the United States are a party, nor is the debt declared on one contracted, authorized, or arising, under a law of the United States, and over which jurisdiction has been given to this honourable Court.' On the argument of the cause in the Court below, the opinions of the judges of the Court were opposed upon the question of jurisdiction, and it was certified to this Court for a final decision. March 9th.
The cause was argued by the Attorney General and Mr. Wheaton, for the plaintiff, and by Mr. Webster and Mr. Berrien, for the defendants.
Bunb. 225. 262. 558. 223. Parker, 37. 279. Hale, in Hargr. Law Tracts, 216. 2 Anstr. 558. Coop. Eq. Pl. 21, 22. Mitf. Pl. 22. Barton's Eq. 59.
2 East's Rep. 362. 1 Chitty's Com. Law, 801. 824. insisted, (1.) that there was no law of Congress which, in terms, required or authorized the Post Master General to take the bond on which the suit was brought. There was, indeed, no express inhibition of such a bond, but the supposed implied authority to take it was negatived by the obvious policy of the post office laws. That policy was to secure the collection of the dues to the department by requiring prompt settlements, enforced by the personal responsibility of the Post Master General, as provided in the 29th section of the act of 1810. It was not meant to rely upon this provision as constituting a ground of defence for a deputy post master sued by the Post Master General for official negligence, upon the primary obligation imposed on him by accepting the office, and not accounting for the public moneys received in his official capacity. It was only contended, that it excluded the idea of the Post Master General being authorized to take a security not expressly authorized by the law, from an agent appointed by him, removable by him, and accountable to him. This inference was supported by the new provision inserted in the 3d section of the amended post office act of 1815, expressly authorizing and requiring him to take such a bond. This was a legislative declaration, negativing the right under any preexisting statute. The question here was not, whether this might not be good as a voluntary bond at common law. Without stopping to inquire whether the United States have a system of unwritten law, to which an official bond, not authorized by any statute of Congress, can be referred for its validity, it was said that the cases cited to show that the bond might be sustained at common law, were foreign to the present inquiry. This was a question of jurisdiction, which depended upon the other question, whether this bond, (admitting it to be valid at common law,) when made the foundation of an action, presented a case arising under the laws of the United States. To make it a case arising under those laws, the bond must not only be valid, but must be authorized by statute; and the case could no more be said to arise under the laws of the United States, than that of a voluntary bond taken by the marshal, or the collector, from their deputies.
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 7 Cranch. 85. M'Intire v. Wood, 7 Cranch. 503. United States, upon the bond, or in the form of an express or implied assumpsit to recover the money, the payment of which the bond was intended to secure. Could, then, the United States be considered as parties to the suit, for the purpose of giving the Court a jurisdiction, which it would not take if they were, in fact, parties to the suit, or, (in the words of the Judiciary Act of 1789,) 'plaintiffs or petitioners?' The jurisdiction, as derived from the character of the parties, must depend, not on the question who is the substantial party in interest, but who is the formal party on the record. [k] Independent of the circumstance that the United States had no interest on the face of the bond, which would entitle them to maintain an action on it, they are inhibited from being parties to the suit, even as against the principal obligor, by the express provisions of the Post Office Act of 1810, s. 29., which directed that all such suits 'shall be commenced in the name of the Post Master General of the United States.' Even supposing, therefore, that Congress has legislated upon the unfounded assumption that the jurisdiction was already vested in the Circuit Court, or supposing that the case is a casus omissus, can the judicial power correct the mistake, or supply the defect? Even in the case of choses in action, assigned to the United States as collateral security for debts due to the government, the defect of jurisdiction was incontestible, and attended with great practical inconveniences; and yet Congress has recently refused to supply it, by authorizing suits upon such securities to be brought in the Courts of the Union. The case of Dugan v. The United States, [l] went upon the ground, that in all cases of contract with the United States, they had a right to enforce it by an action in their own names, unless a different mode of suit was prescribed by law. But if, in that case, the treasurer of the United States had been authorized and required to sue, in his official name, on all bills which should be endorsed to him for account of the government, would this Court have sustained jurisdiction of an action brought on such bills by the United States in their own name?
Osborn v. Bank of the United States. 9 Wheat. Rep. 855-857.
2. But even supposing the bond in question was authorized to be taken by the laws of the United States, jurisdiction of a suit brought upon it could only be vested in the Circuit Court by some express legislative enactment. Though the case may be included in the constitutional grant of jurisdiction, some act of Congress is necessary to enable the Courts to exercise it. [j] So far from Congress having conferred this jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts, the Post Office Act, whilst it is silent as to the Courts of the Union, expressly confers it on the State Courts. As to the Judiciary Act of 1815, s. 4. the title of that act shows the intention of Congress to limit its operation to the State Courts and to the District Courts of the United States. If it can be construed to extend to the Circuit Courts of the Union, its effect is merely to give them jurisdiction in the specified cases where 'the debt, claim, or matter in dispute, shall not amount to 100 dollars.' The words 'concurrent with the Circuit Courts,' were not intended to give jurisdiction to those Courts. Similar expressions are found in the 9th and 11th sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789, but it had never been supposed that such was their effect. It is possible that the act was passed, upon the mistaken supposition that the jurisdiction was already vested in the Circuit Court. But this could not make the law; and the Court would not construe this particular act contrary to its plain intent, however erroneous the opinion which produced it.
3. The remaining question was, whether the United States were a party to the suit. And even admitting that the proceeds would accrue to their benefit, that the money which the bond was given to secure was their money, for which assumpsit could have been maintained against the principal obligor in their name; still, as it regarded the coobligors or sureties, this was a new contract, not depending on any pre-existing debt, liability, or obligation from them to the United States. Their obligation arises exclusively from the bond, which binds them to the Post Master General alone; no action could be maintained against them by the March 15th.
^b Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. Rep. 172.
^c 2 Ld. Raym. 1459; s.c., 2 Str. 745; 2 Dall. 122; 6 Binn. 292; 12 Mass. 367; Pet. C. C. 47.
^k Osborn v. Bank of the United States. 9 Wheat. Rep. 855-857.
^l 3 Wheat. Rep. 172.
^d Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. Rep. 902.
^e 1 Wheat. Rep. 235. 5 Wheat. Rep. 277.
^h Bunb. 225. 262. 558. 223. Parker, 37. 279. Hale, in Hargr. Law Tracts, 216. 2 Anstr. 558. Coop. Eq. Pl. 21, 22. Mitf. Pl. 22. Barton's Eq. 59.
^i 2 East's Rep. 362. 1 Chitty's Com. Law, 801. 824. insisted, (1.) that there was no law of Congress which, in terms, required or authorized the Post Master General to take the bond on which the suit was brought. There was, indeed, no express inhibition of such a bond, but the supposed implied authority to take it was negatived by the obvious policy of the post office laws. That policy was to secure the collection of the dues to the department by requiring prompt settlements, enforced by the personal responsibility of the Post Master General, as provided in the 29th section of the act of 1810. It was not meant to rely upon this provision as constituting a ground of defence for a deputy post master sued by the Post Master General for official negligence, upon the primary obligation imposed on him by accepting the office, and not accounting for the public moneys received in his official capacity. It was only contended, that it excluded the idea of the Post Master General being authorized to take a security not expressly authorized by the law, from an agent appointed by him, removable by him, and accountable to him. This inference was supported by the new provision inserted in the 3d section of the amended post office act of 1815, expressly authorizing and requiring him to take such a bond. This was a legislative declaration, negativing the right under any preexisting statute. The question here was not, whether this might not be good as a voluntary bond at common law. Without stopping to inquire whether the United States have a system of unwritten law, to which an official bond, not authorized by any statute of Congress, can be referred for its validity, it was said that the cases cited to show that the bond might be sustained at common law, were foreign to the present inquiry. This was a question of jurisdiction, which depended upon the other question, whether this bond, (admitting it to be valid at common law,) when made the foundation of an action, presented a case arising under the laws of the United States. To make it a case arising under those laws, the bond must not only be valid, but must be authorized by statute; and the case could no more be said to arise under the laws of the United States, than that of a voluntary bond taken by the marshal, or the collector, from their deputies.
^j Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 7 Cranch. 85. M'Intire v. Wood, 7 Cranch. 503. United States, upon the bond, or in the form of an express or implied assumpsit to recover the money, the payment of which the bond was intended to secure. Could, then, the United States be considered as parties to the suit, for the purpose of giving the Court a jurisdiction, which it would not take if they were, in fact, parties to the suit, or, (in the words of the Judiciary Act of 1789,) 'plaintiffs or petitioners?' The jurisdiction, as derived from the character of the parties, must depend, not on the question who is the substantial party in interest, but who is the formal party on the record. ^k Independent of the circumstance that the United States had no interest on the face of the bond, which would entitle them to maintain an action on it, they are inhibited from being parties to the suit, even as against the principal obligor, by the express provisions of the Post Office Act of 1810, s. 29., which directed that all such suits 'shall be commenced in the name of the Post Master General of the United States.' Even supposing, therefore, that Congress has legislated upon the unfounded assumption that the jurisdiction was already vested in the Circuit Court, or supposing that the case is a casus omissus, can the judicial power correct the mistake, or supply the defect? Even in the case of choses in action, assigned to the United States as collateral security for debts due to the government, the defect of jurisdiction was incontestible, and attended with great practical inconveniences; and yet Congress has recently refused to supply it, by authorizing suits upon such securities to be brought in the Courts of the Union. The case of Dugan v. The United States, ^l went upon the ground, that in all cases of contract with the United States, they had a right to enforce it by an action in their own names, unless a different mode of suit was prescribed by law. But if, in that case, the treasurer of the United States had been authorized and required to sue, in his official name, on all bills which should be endorsed to him for account of the government, would this Court have sustained jurisdiction of an action brought on such bills by the United States in their own name?

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