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Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, Témoins de Jéhovah de Moscou c. Russie, 10 juin 2010 - Religions law and Jehovah's Witnesses
European Law (ECHR) >
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Témoins de Jéhovah de Moscou c. Russie, (...)
Article 9 (Liberté de religion) - Article 11 (Liberté d’association)
Published on 9 June 2013 - Modified on 10 November 2016
Dissolution d’une communauté religieuse en l’absence de motifs pertinents et suffisants : violation
Refus, dépourvu de base légale, de réenregistrer une communauté en tant qu’organisation religieuse : violation
Etat défendeur tenu de prendre des mesures en vue du réexamen de décisions portant dissolution d’une communauté religieuse et refus de la réenregistrer
En fait En décembre 1993, la communauté requérante – la branche de Moscou des Témoins de Jéhovah – obtint le statut de personne morale. En octobre 1997, la loi fédérale sur la liberté de conscience et les associations religieuses entra en vigueur. Cette loi imposait à toutes les associations religieuses dotées de la personnalité morale de mettre leurs statuts en conformité avec ses dispositions et de se faire réinscrire auprès du département de la justice. La communauté requérante demanda sa réinscription à cinq reprises, sans succès ; même après avoir obtenu en 2002 une décision de justice constatant le caractère illégal des refus qui lui avaient été opposés, elle demeura non inscrite. Dans l’intervalle, à la suite de plaintes d’une organisation non gouvernementale de même bord que l’Eglise orthodoxe russe, un procureur entama une action civile en vue de la dissolution de la communauté. La procédure s’acheva en 2004, lorsqu’un tribunal de district, estimant fondées diverses accusations relatives à des fautes, ordonna la dissolution de la communauté et interdit définitivement ses activités. Un recours formé par la communauté requérante fut rejeté.
En droit Article 9 à la lumière de l’article 11 (dissolution) : la décision de dissolution, qui a eu pour effet de retirer à la communauté requérante sa personnalité morale et de lui interdire d’exercer les droits dont elle jouissait auparavant, s’analyse en une ingérence. Celle-ci était prévue par la loi et visait le but légitime consistant à protéger la santé et les droits d’autrui. Elle n’était toutefois pas nécessaire dans une société démocratique car, en premier lieu, les juridictions internes n’ont pas avancé de motifs pertinents et suffisants pour justifier la mesure litigieuse et, en second lieu, cette mesure était disproportionnée au but légitime poursuivi.
a) Absence de motifs pertinents et suffisants – Nombre d’observations faites par le tribunal de district à l’appui de la décision de dissolution sont dénuées de fondement et ne reposent pas sur une évaluation acceptable des faits pertinents. Ainsi, aucun élément n’étaye les allégations selon lesquelles la communauté requérante ou ses membres ont usé de la contrainte, attiré des enfants dans l’organisation ou encouragé le suicide. En fait, certaines des conclusions du tribunal témoignent d’idées préconçues au sujet des Témoins de Jéhovah, idées qui ont conduit la juridiction à écarter à tort certains moyens de défense. Les autres accusations portées contre la communauté requérante – selon lesquelles elle aurait violé le droit de ses membres au respect de leur vie privée, porté atteinte aux droits parentaux de parents extérieurs à la communauté, encouragé des membres à refuser les transfusions sanguines et incité ceux-ci à ne pas remplir leurs obligations civiques – sont également rejetées par la Cour, pour les motifs exposés ci-après.
i) Respect de la vie privée, en particulier du droit de choisir son métier : de nombreuses religions fixent des principes doctrinaux en matière de comportement et, en obéissant à de tels préceptes, les fidèles manifestent leur désir de se conformer strictement aux croyances religieuses qu’ils professent. Dans leurs témoignages, les membres de la communauté ont déclaré qu’ils suivaient les dogmes et usages des Témoins de Jéhovah de leur plein gré et déterminaient personnellement leur lieu de travail, la répartition entre temps de travail et temps libre, et le temps consacré au sermon ou à d’autres activités religieuses. Les personnes ayant assumé un service religieux au centre qui abrite la communauté n’étaient pas des employés mais des bénévoles, et n’étaient donc pas soumis à la réglementation du travail. Le bénévolat, le travail à temps partiel et les activités de missionnaire ne sont pas contraires aux principes de la Convention, et la Cour ne décèle aucun besoin social impérieux qui aurait pu justifier l’ingérence litigieuse.
ii) Droits parentaux de parents extérieurs à la communauté : s’il est arrivé que des enfants issus de mariages mixtes prennent part aux activités de la communauté malgré l’objection du parent extérieur à la communauté, cela ne semble pas être dû à des agissements répréhensibles de la communauté ou de ses membres, mais avoir été approuvé et encouragé par le parent Témoin de Jéhovah. En vertu de l’article 2 du Protocole no 1, les Etats sont tenus de respecter les droits des parents d’assurer l’éducation et l’enseignement conformément à leurs convictions religieuses, et l’article 5 du Protocole no 7 établit que les époux jouissent de l’égalité de droits dans leurs relations avec leurs enfants. La législation nationale n’assujettit pas l’éducation religieuse d’un enfant à l’existence d’un accord entre les parents. Dès lors, tout désaccord entre les parents quant à la nécessité et à la portée de la participation d’un enfant à une pratique et à une éducation religieuses est un différend privé relevant du droit de la famille qui doit être résolu suivant la procédure prévue à cet effet.
iii) Transfusions sanguines : la liberté d’accepter ou de refuser un traitement médical spécifique, ou de choisir un autre type de traitement, est essentielle à la maîtrise de son propre destin et à l’autonomie personnelle. De nombreuses juridictions bien établies se sont penchées sur des affaires de Témoins de Jéhovah ayant refusé une transfusion sanguine et ont constaté que, si l’intérêt général à protéger la vie ou la santé d’un patient est assurément légitime et très puissant, cet intérêt doit céder face à l’intérêt plus puissant encore du patient à diriger le cours de sa propre vie. Le droit russe prévoit expressément le droit de refuser un traitement médical ou de demander son interruption, dès lors que le patient a reçu toutes les informations accessibles quant aux conséquences possibles d’une telle décision. Rien ne montre que la communauté requérante ait exercé des pressions inappropriées ou une influence indue sur ses membres. Lorsque le patient est un enfant, le droit interne prévoit la possibilité pour les tribunaux d’annuler la décision d’un parent de refuser un traitement. En définitive, il n’a pas été démontré qu’il existait un besoin social impérieux ni des motifs pertinents et suffisants capables de justifier une restriction au droit de l’individu à l’autonomie personnelle dans la sphère des croyances religieuses et de l’intégrité physique.
iv) Incitation alléguée à refuser les obligations civiques : l’exhortation religieuse à refuser le service militaire est pleinement conforme au droit interne, qui autorise l’objection de conscience, et aucun exemple de membres de la communauté qui auraient illégalement refusé un service civil de remplacement n’a été présenté lors du procès. Les juridictions nationales n’ont mentionné aucune disposition juridique interne imposant aux Témoins de Jéhovah de respecter les symboles de l’Etat (par opposition à une obligation de ne pas profaner) ; il n’existe pas non plus d’obligation légale de participer aux célébrations lors des fêtes nationales. Partant, il n’a pas été démontré que des membres de la communauté auraient été poussés à refuser d’accomplir des obligations civiques légalement établies.
b) Proportionnalité : avant sa dissolution en 2004, la communauté requérante existait et fonctionnait légalement à Moscou depuis plus de douze ans, sans qu’aucun de ses aînésou de ses membres individuels aient été jugés responsables d’une quelconque infraction pénale ou administrative, ou d’une faute civile. Cependant, comme d’autres organisations religieuses considérées par les autorités moscovites comme étant « non traditionnelles » [1], la communauté requérante semble avoir été soumise à un traitement différencié. La dissolution forcée et l’interdiction des activités constituent la seule sanction que les tribunaux nationaux peuvent appliquer aux organisations religieuses qui sont jugées avoir enfreint les dispositions de la loi sur la liberté de conscience et les associations religieuses, sanction qui a donc été infligée sans discernement et sans considération du degré de gravité de l’infraction en cause. Cette mesure drastique a privé des milliers de Témoins de Jéhovah à Moscow de la possibilité de rejoindre d’autres fidèles de cette communauté dans la prière et l’observance. Partant, même en supposant que des motifs impérieux justifiaient l’ingérence, celle-ci était disproportionnée au but légitime poursuivi.
Article 11 à la lumière de l’article 9 (refus de réinscription) : les motifs invoqués par les autorités internes à l’appui de leur refus de réinscrire la communauté requérante sont dénués de base légale. Les autorités ont manqué à justifier leurs décisions par des raisons suffisantes ou ont fait peser des exigences excessivement lourdes dépourvuesde fondement légal. A l’époque où l’obligation de réinscription a été instaurée, la communauté requérante existait et fonctionnait légalement à Moscou en tant que communauté religieuse indépendante depuis de nombreuses années, sans qu’il ait été constaté qu’elle ni aucun de ses membres individuels avaient enfreint une quelconque disposition légale ou réglementaire interne relative à la vie associative et aux activités religieuses. Dans ces conditions, les motifs du refus de réinscrire la communauté requérante auraient dû être particulièrement solides et impérieuses. En refusant la réinscription, les autorités n’ont pas agi de bonne foi et ont manqué à leur devoir de neutralité et d’impartialité envers la communauté requérante.
La Cour constate par ailleurs que la durée de la procédure de dissolution a été déraisonnable, et qu’il y a dès lors eu violation de l’article 6 § 1 (unanimité).
Article 41 : 20 000 EUR pour la communauté requérante et les quatre requérants individuels conjointement, pour préjudice moral. Un réexamen des décisions internes à la lumière des principes de la Convention constituerait la meilleure forme de réparation des violations constatées dans le chef de la communauté requérante.
Note d’information sur la jurisprudence de la Cour (N° 131 - 2010)
23. On 20 April 1998 [2] the prosecutor of the Northern Administrative District of Moscow filed a civil action for the applicant community to be dissolved and its activity banned. The prosecutor’s charges against the applicant community were: (i) incitement to religious discord; (ii) coercion into destroying the family; (iii) encouragement of suicide or refusal on religious grounds of medical assistance to persons in life- or health‑threatening conditions; (iv) infringement of rights and freedoms of citizens; and (v) luring teenagers and minors into the religious organisation.
29. On 4 October 2000 the five-expert composite study was completed. On 9 February 2001 the proceedings resumed and on 23 February 2001 [3] the District Court gave judgment.
30. The Golovinskiy District Court heard over forty witnesses and experts and examined religious literature and documents. It scrutinised the experts’ report and took their oral testimony. A fifteen-page report by four experts endorsed the prosecutor’s allegations, while the fifth expert dissented in a refutation of 139 pages. The court noted that he was the only expert who had ever observed “how Jehovah’s Witnesses carry out their preaching work in different countries”, while the four other experts “confirmed that they did not examine anyone belonging to the indicated group [Jehovah’s Witnesses or potential members of Jehovah’s Witnesses]”. As to the four experts’ conclusions, the court also stated:
34. On an appeal by the prosecutor, on 30 May 2001 the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment of 23 February 2001 [4] and remitted the claim for a fresh examination by a different bench. The City Court held that the District Court had not properly assessed the circumstances of the case and that it should have ordered a new expert study in order to elucidate differences between the existing expert opinions.
60. Ruling on the charge of “encouragement of suicide or the refusal of medical assistance on religious grounds”, the District Court found that under the influence of the applicant community its members had refused transfusions of blood and/or blood components even in difficult or life‑threatening circumstances. That finding was based on the following evidence: the prohibition on blood transfusion contained in the literature of the applicant community, the “No Blood” card distributed within the community for the benefit of its members, testimonies by community members who confirmed carrying such cards, the existence of the Hospital Liaison Committee with the applicant community, and stories of patients who had refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds and whose refusal had been noted in their medical records. The District Court also had regard to a letter from the Moscow Health Protection Department that listed a number of instances in which patients had refused blood transfusions for themselves and, in one case, in respect of a newborn child. Even though the medical outcome of those cases was not specified, the District Court held that the proven fact of damage to the health of at least one individual was a sufficient ground for terminating the activities of the Moscow community. It further noted the opinions of medical experts who clarified that bloodless surgery was a prospective trend in medicine but that in case of certain diseases the transfusion of blood or its components was still indispensable. Finally, in the District Court’s view, the “No Blood” card contravened the patient’s right to take medical decisions for himself by delegating that right – in the eventuality of his being unconscious – to his fellow believers.
68. The “No Blood” card referred to in the proceedings is a pre-printed foldable card that bears the words “No Blood” in capital letters on the front page and empty fields to be filled out concerning the person(s) to be contacted in case of emergency and the holder’s allergies, diseases and medicine(s). The text inside the card reads as follows:
69. Article 28 [5] guarantees freedom of religion, including the right to profess either alone or in community with others any religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, have and share religious and other beliefs and manifest them in practice.
the right to establish and maintain religious buildings and other places of worship or pilgrimage (section 16 § 1);
the right to manufacture, acquire, export, import and distribute religious literature, printed, audio and video material and other religious articles (section 17 § 1);
the right to create cross-cultural organisations, educational institutions and mass media (section 18 § 2);
the right to establish and maintain international links and contacts for pilgrimages, conferences and so on, including the right to invite foreign nationals to the Russian Federation (section 20 § 1);
the right to own buildings, plots of land, other property, financial assets and religious artefacts, including the right to have municipal and State property transferred to them free of charge for religious purposes and the immunity of such property from legal charge (section 21 §§ 1 to 5);
the right to found companies publishing religious literature or producing articles for religious services (section 17 § 2);
the right to establish licensed educational institutions for the professional training of clergy and auxiliary religious staff (section 19 § 1); and
85. In 1990 the Ontario Supreme Court in Canada upheld a decision of the lower court to hold a medical doctor liable for administering blood transfusions to an unconscious patient carrying a card stating that she was a Jehovah’s Witness and, as a matter of religious belief, rejected blood transfusions under any circumstances (Malette v. Shulman 72 O.R. 417). It held, in particular, as follows:
86. A 1992 landmark case from the United Kingdom involved an adult daughter of a Jehovah’s Witness who had been prevailed upon by her mother to refuse blood transfusions for religious reasons (In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 3 Weekly Law Reports 782 (Court of Appeal)). Lord Donaldson gave the following summary of his opinion:
87. In United States law, the doctrine of informed consent required for any kind of medical treatment has been firmly entrenched since 1914 when Justice Cardozo, on the Court of Appeals of New York, described this doctrine as follows: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body, and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault” (Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92). The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment (Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). The following summary of the relevant case-law can be found in the case of Fosmire v. Nicoleau (75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990):
88. The right of an individual to refuse blood transfusions on religious grounds and to be compensated in damages if such transfusion has been carried out against the patient’s wishes has also been upheld by courts in other jurisdictions (see, for example, Phillips v. Klerk, Case No. 19676/82; Supreme Court of South Africa [1983]; Bahamondez, Marcelo v. Medida Cautelar, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina, 6 April 1993); Sentence No. 166/1996 in case of Mr Miguel Angel, Constitutional Court of Spain, 28 October 1996; Ms A. and her heirs v. Dr B. and Institute of Medical Science, Case No. 1998 (O) Nos. 1081, 1082, 29 February 2000, Supreme Court of Japan).
xiv. the Assembly regrets the problems of the Salvation Army and Jehovah’s Witnesses in Moscow, but welcomes the decision of the Russian authorities to ensure that the problem of local discrimination and harassment of these religious communities be brought to an end; ...”
91. The applicants complained that the Russian courts’ judgments dissolving the applicant community and banning its activities had violated their rights to freedom of religion, expression and association. Article 9 provides as follows:
92. The applicants submitted that there had been no credible or reliable evidence supporting the adverse findings made by the Russian courts against the applicant community. All of the findings had been based solely on an assessment of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ literature and there had been no indication that any community members had been forced or prevailed upon to act in a specific way. The literature all emanated from the same general headquarters of Jehovah’s Witnesses and was distributed worldwide to over 200 countries – including forty-five Council of Europe member States – in 150 local languages, while maintaining the same content. However, there had not been any conviction based on that literature in Russia or in any jurisdiction with similar law. No specific “actions” of the applicant community had been discussed during the trial; on the other hand, no less than fourteen complete court days had been devoted exclusively to discussion of the Holy Scriptures and the court-ordered psycho-linguistic study contained references to no fewer than 205 scriptural questions, many of which had been read and discussed while evidence was being heard.
100. The Court further reiterates that the right to form an association is an inherent part of the right set forth in Article 11. That citizens should be able to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of association, without which that right would be deprived of any meaning. The way in which national legislation enshrines this freedom and its practical application by the authorities reveal the state of democracy in the country concerned. Certainly States have a right to satisfy themselves that an association’s aim and activities are in conformity with the rules laid down in legislation, but they must do so in a manner compatible with their obligations under the Convention and subject to review by the Convention institutions (see Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, judgment of 10 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑IV, § 40). The State’s power to protect its institutions and citizens from associations that might jeopardise them must be used sparingly, as exceptions to the rule of freedom of association are to be construed strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on that freedom. Any interference must correspond to a “pressing social need”; thus, the notion “necessary” does not have the flexibility of such expressions as “useful” or “desirable” (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, §§ 94 95, 17 February 2004, with further references).
101. The Court refers to its constant case-law to the effect that a refusal by the domestic authorities to grant legal-entity status to an association of individuals, religious or otherwise, amounts to an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of association (see Gorzelik and Others, cited above, § 52 et passim, ECHR 2004-I, and Sidiropoulos and Others, cited above, § 31 et passim). The authorities’ refusal to register a group or their decision to dissolve it have been found by the Court to affect directly both the group itself and also its presidents, founders or individual members (see Association of Citizens Radko and Paunkovski v. “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, no. 74651/01, § 53, ECHR 2009‑... (extracts); The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59491/00, § 53, 19 January 2006; Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania, no. 46626/99, § 27, 3 February 2005; and APEH Üldözötteinek Szövetsége and Others v. Hungary (dec.), no. 32367/96, 31 August 1999). Where the organisation of a religious community was at issue, a refusal to recognise it as a legal entity has also been found to constitute an interference with the right to freedom of religion under Article 9 of the Convention, as exercised by both the community itself and its individual members (see Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others, §§ 79-80, and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others, § 105, both cited above). The same approach was applicable in the situation where a previously existing association has been dissolved by a decision of the domestic authorities (see Association of Citizens Radko and Paunkovski, cited above, and Tüm Haber Sen and Çınar v. Turkey, no. 28602/95, §§ 30-32, ECHR 2006‑II, and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 50, ECHR 2003‑II).
108. The Court reiterates that the exceptions to the rights of freedom of religion and association are to be construed strictly and that only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on these rights. When the Court carries out its scrutiny, its task is not to substitute its own view for that of the relevant national authorities but rather to review the decisions they delivered in the exercise of their discretion. This does not mean that it has to confine itself to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; it must look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in the Convention and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 47, Reports 1998‑I, and Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu, cited above, § 49).
111. It further appears from the testimonies by witnesses that what was taken by the Russian courts to constitute “coercion into destroying the family” was the frustration that non-Witness family members experienced as a consequence of disagreements over the manner in which their Witness relatives decided to organise their lives in accordance with the religious precepts, and their increasing isolation resulting from having been left outside the life of the community to which their Witness relatives adhered. It is a known fact that a religious way of life requires from its followers both abidance by religious rules and self-dedication to religious work that can take up a significant portion of the believer’s time and sometimes assume such extreme forms as monasticism, which is common to many Christian denominations and, to a lesser extent, also to Buddhism and Hinduism. Nevertheless, as long as self-dedication to religious matters is the product of the believer’s independent and free decision and however unhappy his or her family members may be about that decision, the ensuing estrangement cannot be taken to mean that the religion caused the break-up in the family. Quite often, the opposite is true: it is the resistance and unwillingness of non-religious family members to accept and to respect their religious relative’s freedom to manifest and practise his or her religion that is the source of conflict. It is true that friction often exists in marriages where the spouses belong to different religious denominations or one of the spouses is a non-believer. However, this situation is common to all mixed-belief marriages and Jehovah’s Witnesses are no exception.
116. Firstly, the domestic courts considered that the following aspects of the applicant community’s life violated the constitutional right of its members to inviolability of their private life and the right to choice of occupation:
determination of the place and nature of employment;
preference for part-time work that allows time to preach;
unpaid work at the Bethel community centre in St Petersburg;
regulation of leisure activities;
ban on celebrating holidays and birthdays;
117. The Court reiterates that “private life” is a broad term encompassing the sphere of personal autonomy within which everyone can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of his or her personality and to establish and develop relationships with other persons and the outside world. It also extends further, comprising activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world (see Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 71, ECHR 2007‑IV; Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, §§ 42-50, ECHR 2004‑VIII; and Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, § 29, Series A no. 251‑B). In the light of these principles, the decisions of Jehovah’s Witnesses whether to take full-time or part-time, paid or unpaid employment, whether and how to celebrate events significant to them, including religious and personal events such as wedding anniversaries, births, housewarmings, university admissions, were matters that fell within the sphere of “private life” of community members.
137. This position is echoed in the Russian law which safeguards the patients’ freedom of choice. The Fundamentals of Russian Legislation on Health Protection explicitly provide for the patient’s right to refuse medical treatment or to request its discontinuation on condition that they have received full and accessible information about the possible consequences of that decision. Patients are not required to give reasons for the refusal. The refusal may only be overridden in three specific situations: prevention of spreading of contagious diseases, treatment of grave mental disorders and mandatory treatment of offenders (see paragraphs 81 and 83 above). Additionally, the parents’ decision to refuse treatment of a child may be reversed by means of judicial intervention (see paragraph 82 above). It follows that Russian law protects the individual’s freedom of choice in respect to their health care decisions as long as the patient is a competent adult and there is no danger to innocent third parties. These provisions had been repeatedly invoked by the applicants in the first-instance and appeal proceedings but were not mentioned or analysed in the domestic judgments. The Court notes, however, that they were prima facie applicable in the instant case because all the refusals of blood transfusions which had been described in the domestic judgments had been formulated by adult Jehovah’s Witnesses having capacity to make medical decisions for themselves. In the only case involving a minor, the hospital did not apply for judicial authorisation of a blood transfusion, although such a possibility was explicitly provided for in law (see paragraph 82 above), which indicates that authorisation was considered unnecessary for medical or other reasons.
138. Furthermore, even though the Jehovah’s Witnesses whose opposition to blood transfusions was cited in evidence were adults having legal capacity to refuse that form of treatment, the findings of the Russian courts can be understood to mean that their refusals had not been an expression of their true will but rather the product of pressure exerted on them by the applicant community. The Court accepts that, given that health and possibly life itself are at stake in such situations, the authenticity of the patient’s refusal of medical treatment is a legitimate concern. In the landmark case In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), Donaldson L.J., on the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, indicated that the refusal may have been vitiated because it resulted not from the patient’s will, but from the will of others. If the patient’s will was overborne, the refusal will not have represented a true decision (see the judgment, § 5, paragraph 86 above). Staughton L.J. added that “for an apparent refusal or consent to be less than a true consent or refusal, there must be such a degree of external influence as to persuade the patient to depart from her own wishes, to an extent that the law regards it as undue”.
158. Before the decision dissolving it was made, the applicant community of Jehovah’s Witnesses had existed and legally operated in Moscow for more than twelve years, from 1992 to 2004. During the entire period of its lawful existence the applicant community, its elders and individual members had never been found responsible for any criminal or administrative offence or a civil wrong; no such evidence was produced in the domestic dissolution proceedings or before the Court. A number of criminal investigations into the activities of the applicant community undertaken on the basis of complaints by the Salvation Committee did not produce evidence of any criminal offence either (see paragraphs 16-22 above).
194. The Court observes that the prosecutor introduced an application for dissolution of the applicant community on 20 April 1998 [6]. However, the period to be taken into consideration for the purposes of the present case began only on 5 May 1998, when the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia. The period in question ended on 16 June 2004 with the final decision of the City [7] Court. It lasted, accordingly, a total of six years and almost two months at two levels of jurisdiction, of which six years, one month and thirteen days fall within the Court’s jurisdiction.
198. As to the conduct of the authorities, the Court finds that the overall period, less the period attributable to the applicant community’s conduct, leaves the authorities accountable for approximately five and a half years. Certain delays in that period were attributable to the courts, for instance, a four-month delay between the quashing of the first judgment by the Moscow City Court on 30 May 2001 and the opening of a new trial on 25 September 2001 or a three-month adjournment of the trial between 13 February and 14 May 2003. However, the majority of the delays were caused by the proceedings being stayed pending the completion of expert studies, of which the first study took more than twenty months (from March 1999 to December 2000) to be completed. In total, the experts’ delays amounted to more than three years. The Court is not called upon to determine the reasons for the delay in preparation of the expert reports because, as it has found on many occasions, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial system in such a way that their courts can meet the obligation to decide cases within a reasonable time and because the responsibility for a delay caused by expert examinations ultimately rests with the State (see Rolgezer and Others v. Russia, no. 9941/03, § 30, 29 April 2008; Salamatina v. Russia, no. 38015/03, § 28, 1 March 2007; Kesyan v. Russia, no. 36496/02, § 57, 19 October 2006; and Capuano v. Italy, 25 June 1987, § 32, Series A no. 119). It follows that the authorities were responsible for a significant part of the delays in the proceedings.
208. The applicants pointed out that the domestic dissolution proceedings had lasted for an exceptionally long period of time – 116 court days – and that their defence had needed to secure the appearance of many experts and witnesses and be properly represented. The total costs of the Russian attorney, Mr Leontyev [8], at the hourly rate of EUR 40, travel expenses, printing and copying costs at EUR 0.15 per page, and transcription expenses at EUR 3.50 per page, amounted to EUR 65,519.75, according to the following break-down:
EUR 800 for the defence in the criminal proceedings;
EUR 19,329.45 for the first round of proceedings before the Golovinskiy District Court (37 days; 1,952 pages of transcript);
EUR 1,078.10 for the defence against the prosecutor’s appeal to the Moscow City Court;
EUR 35,142.20 for the second round of proceedings before the Golovinskiy District Court (66 days; 3,257 pages of transcript);
EUR 1,070 for the appeal proceedings before the Moscow City Court;
1. Declares admissible the applicants’ complaint concerning the dissolution of the applicant community and the banning of its activity, the complaint by the applicant community concerning the refusal of its re-registration, the complaint about discrimination on religious grounds, and the complaint by the applicant community concerning the excessive length of the dissolution proceedings, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
(i) EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable; and
[1] Voir Branche de Moscou de l’Armée du Salut c. Russie, no 72881/01, 5 octobre 2006, Note d’information no 90, et Eglise de scientologie de Moscou c. Russie, no 18147/02, 5 avril 2007, Note d’information no 96
[2] Rectified on 18 August 2010: the date was “23 April 1998”.
[3] Rectified on 18 August 2010: the date was “15 July 2001”.
[4] Rectified on 18 August 2010: the date was “15 July 2001”.
[5] Rectified on 18 August 2010: the text was “Article 29”.
[6] Rectified on 18 August 2010: the date was “23 April 1998”.
[7] Rectified on 18 August 2010: the text was “Regional”.
[8] Rectified on 18 August 2010: the text was “Leonyev”.

References: § 1
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