Source: https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2017-09-23-en
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 19:38:49+00:00

Document:
Resolved (2017.09.23.01), the Board approves the minutes of the 24 June Meeting of the ICANN Board and 29 June Executive Committee Meeting of the ICANN Board.
Whereas, the ICANN Bylaws call for the establishment of a Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC) with the role to advise the ICANN community and ICANN Board of Directors on matters relating to the operation, administration, security, and integrity of the Internet's Root Server System.
Whereas, the ICANN Bylaws call for the ICANN Board of Directors to appoint one RSSAC member from each root server operator organization, based on recommendations from the RSSAC Co-Chairs.
Whereas, the RSSAC Co-Chairs have recommended to the ICANN Board of Directors the appointments of representatives from Cogent Communications, the ICANN organization, the RIPE Network Coordination Centre, the University of Southern California—Information Sciences Institute, and the WIDE Project to the RSSAC.
Resolved (2017.09.23.02), the ICANN Board of Directors appoints Terry Manderson to the RSSAC through 31 December 2018 and Wes Hardaker, Daniel Karrenberg, Jun Murai, and Paul Vixie to the RSSAC through 31 December 2020.
In May 2013, the root server operator organizations agreed to an initial membership of representatives for the RSSAC, each nominating an individual. The ICANN Board of Directors approved the initial membership of RSSAC in July 2013 with staggered terms.
The current term for the representatives from Cogent Communications, the University of Southern California—Information Sciences Institute, the RIPE Network Coordination Centre, and the WIDE Project expires 31 December 2017. In August 2017, the ICANN organization requested to change its representative for the remainder of the current term, which expires on 31 December 2018.
The appointment of these RSSAC members is not anticipated to have any fiscal impact on the ICANN organization, though there are budgeted resources necessary for ongoing support of the RSSAC.
This resolution is an organizational administrative function for which no public comment is required. The appointment of RSSAC members is in the public interest as it contributes to the commitment of the ICANN organization to strengthen the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS.
Resolved (2017.09.23.03), as part of the exercise of its responsibilities under the IANA Naming Function Contract with ICANN, PTI has reviewed and evaluated the request to transfer the .CI country-code top-level domain to Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications/TIC de Côte d'Ivoire (ARTCI). The documentation demonstrates that the proper procedures were followed in evaluating the request.
In accordance with the IANA Naming Function Contract, PTI has evaluated a request for ccTLD transfer and is presenting its report to the Board for review. This review by the Board is intended to ensure that the proper procedures were followed.
The proposal is to approve a request to transfer the country-code top-level domain .CI and assign the role of manager to Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications/TIC de Côte d'Ivoire (ARTCI).
In the course of evaluating this transfer application, PTI consulted with the applicant and other significantly interested parties. As part of the application process, the applicant needs to describe consultations that were performed within the country concerning the ccTLD, and their applicability to their local Internet community.
PTI is not aware of any significant issues or concerns raised by the community in relation to this request.
These evaluations are responsive to the appropriate criteria and policy frameworks, such as "Domain Name System Structure and Delegation" (RFC 1591) and "GAC Principles and Guidelines for the Delegation and Administration of Country Code Top Level Domains". As part of the process, Delegation and Transfer reports are posted at http://www.iana.org/reports.
The timely approval of country-code domain name managers that meet the various public interest criteria is positive toward ICANN's overall mission, the local communities to which country- code top-level domains are designated to serve, and responsive to obligations under the IANA Naming Function Contract.
Whereas, the BGC reviewed the Expressions of Interest from candidates for the 2018 Nominating Committee ("NomCom") Chair and Chair-Elect, considered the results of a 360-degree evaluation of the 2017 NomCom leadership, and conducted interviews of candidates.
Whereas, the BGC has recommended that Zahid Jamil be appointed as the 2018 NomCom Chair and J. Damon Ashcraft be appointed as the 2018 NomCom Chair-Elect.
Resolved (2017.09.23.04), the Board hereby appoints Zahid Jamil as the 2018 Nominating Committee Chair and J. Damon Ashcraft as the 2018 Nominating Committee Chair-Elect.
ICANN's Bylaws require the Board to appoint the Nominating Committee (NomCom) Chair and NomCom Chair-Elect. See ICANN Bylaws, Article 8, Section 8.1. The Board has delegated the responsibility for recommending the NomCom Chair and Chair-Elect for Board approval to the Board Governance Committee. See BGC Charter at http://www.icann.org/en/committees/board-governance/charter.htm. The BGC posted a call for expressions of interest (EOI) on 2 June 2017 seeking EOIs by 7 July 2015 (see (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2017-06-02-en). The BGC received and reviewed several EOIs, oversaw a 360-degree evaluation of the 2017 NomCom leadership and conducted interviews with candidates before making its recommendations. The Board has considered and agrees with the BGC's recommendation for the 2018 NomCom Chair and 2018 NomCom Chair-Elect. The Board also would like to thank all who expressed interest in becoming part of the 2018 NomCom leadership.
Appointing a NomCom Chair and Chair-Elect identified through a public EOI process, including interviews of the candidates, is in the public interest as it positively affects the transparency and accountability of ICANN. Adopting the BGC's recommendation has no financial impact on ICANN that was not otherwise anticipated, and will not negatively impact the security, stability and resiliency of the domain name system.
Whereas, under the ICANN Bylaws the Organizational Review of the ccNSO was due to commence in August 2017.
Whereas the ccNSO has been subject to a continued, heavy work load, including four Specific Reviews, the implementation of the Empowered Community, the ongoing Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability.
Whereas, the Chair of the Organizational Effectiveness Committee reached out to the Chair of the Country Code Names Supporting Organization Council with the option to defer the start of the second ccNSO Review by twelve months until August 2018, to alleviate the ccNSO's heavy workload.
Whereas the ccNSO Council Chair indicated that the ccNSO supports the deferral of the second ccNSO Review.
Whereas a public comment period on the proposed deferral received support from a majority of contributors.
Resolved (2017.09.23.05), that the second Review of the Country Code Names Supporting Organization (ccNSO) shall be deferred until August 2018, as initiating the Review at this time is not feasible due to ccNSO's workload.
Resolved (2017.09.23.06), that the ccNSO is encouraged to conduct a self-review prior to the start of the second ccNSO Review in August 2018.
There is a continued pressure on community volunteer time. Currently, four Specific Reviews are underway, in addition to CCWG-Accountability Workstream 2 and various cross-community work efforts, all of which consume considerable volunteer time from the ccNSO community. Deferring the second review of the ccNSO will enable the ccNSO to conduct a preparatory self-review, adding valuable substance to the Review when it begins in August 2018. Under the Bylaws, the Board has the power to defer Organizational Reviews beyond the five-year cycle if conducting a review in that cycle is not feasible, and the various strains on the ccNSO support that feasibility concern. This action is in the public interest as it supports ICANN's component entities in devoting the proper resources to considering their accountability and ongoing purpose in the ICANN system.
The proposal under consideration is to defer the second review of the ccNSO until August 2018.
The Chair of the ccNSO Council, indicated that the ccNSO is supportive of a deferral because of competing obligations on the ccNSO's time. A public comment forum was opened on 6 April 2017. Four submissions were made, three of which were supportive of the deferral of the second ccNSO Review, citing benefits to the effectiveness of the review, use of volunteer resources, and an improved outcome, as well as deferral being an appropriate exercise of discretion provided for in the Bylaws with respect to timing.
A summary of comments can be found here [PDF, 381 KB].
Among the community submissions, conflicting interpretations transpired on the wording of the ICANN Bylaws that permit the Board to defer Organizational Reviews. The Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group cited the wording of ICANN Bylaws Article 4, Section 4—specifically use of the word "shall" in reference to review timing--as justification for its stance, along with the importance of timing for maintaining public confidence, and thus setting a "dangerous precedent" by delaying. Noting this, the ICANN Board, acting under the same Bylaws language, has previously deferred organizational reviews based on feasibility considerations, namely the At-Large Review, and reviews of the Generic Names Supporting Organization, the Root Server System Advisory Committee, and the Security and Stability Advisory Committee.
The Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group also raised the concern that a deferral would undermine the newly set up review schedule (under the new Bylaws), questioning that the benefits of a deferral would outweigh the potential risk of impinging on ICANN's accountability commitment. However, deferring the review by 12 months, and thereby allowing the ccNSO to complete some of its work will allow for more focus on the ccNSO review; adding to rather than subtracting from ICANN's accountability commitment.
In addition, community comments pointed out that the second ccNSO review had already been deferred in 2015 due to the IANA Transition, and therefore the current process is the second time it is being deferred, resulting in the second ccNSO Review starting two years late. While this is a valid point, the fact that the additional volunteer committee to support the ccNSO review appropriately is necessary, means that the Board can rely on the feasibility provision in the Bylaws to agree to an additional 12 months deferral.
The Board reviewed the ccNSO request to defer the review. The public comments submitted in response to the proposal to defer the second ccNSO review were also taken into consideration by the Board. In addition, the Board gained an overview of the ongoing community work efforts, including CCWG-Accountability Workstream 2, cross-community working groups, ccNSO working groups,1 and all Specific Reviews. Based on this overview, and the fact that Bylaws allow for a deferral of reviews 'based on feasibility' the Board made the decision to support the deferral until August 2018.
The Board considered its prerogative to defer organizational reviews based on feasibility. In this context, the Board considered the high volume of on-going ccNSO work efforts and the resulting pressure on volunteer time. The Board also relied on the precedents set by the deferral of the second GNSO review in 2013, and the delay of several Specific (then Affirmation of Commitments) Reviews and Organizational Reviews in 2015.
The OEC, in light of concerns of multiple deferrals, recommends that while deferral is still appropriate in this situation because of the feasibility issues identified, believes that in the future it will be appropriate to consider only one deferral for a review for up to a year, assuming the appropriate feasibility concerns have been raised.
Positive impacts are the reduced pressure on the ccNSO workload, including more focused participation when the review process kicks off in August 2018. Additionally, the ccNSO has offered to use the deferral productively and conduct a self-review regarding the implementation status of the outcome of the previous Review, to set the context and prepare for the second ccNSO review.
There are no fiscal impacts or ramifications on ICANN as the FY18 budget set aside for this review will be reallocated to the next fiscal year. The ccNSO community will benefit from reduced pressure on its workload.
There are no security, stability or resiliency issues relating to the DNS as the result of this action.
Whereas, the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) met during the ICANN59 meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa and issued advice to the ICANN Board in a communiqué [PDF, 469 KB] on 29 June 2017 ("Johannesburg Communiqué").
Whereas, the Johannesburg Communiqué was the subject of an exchange between the Board and the GAC on 14 August 2017 (https://gac.icann.org/transcripts/public/20170814_GAC_ICANN_Board_Call-ES.DOC [PDF, 393 KB]).
Whereas, in a 7 August 2017 letter [PDF, 976 KB], the GNSO Council provided its feedback to the Board concerning advice in the Johannesburg Communiqué relevant to generic top-level domains to inform the Board and the community of gTLD policy activities that may relate to advice provided by the GAC.
Whereas, the Board developed an iteration of the scorecard to respond to the GAC's advice in the Johannesburg Communiqué, taking into account the exchange between the Board and the GAC and the information provided by the GNSO Council.
Resolved (2017.09.23.07), the Board adopts the scorecard titled "GAC Advice – Johannesburg Communiqué: Actions and Updates (23 September 2017)" [PDF, 330 KB] in response to items of GAC advice in the Johannesburg Communiqué.
Article 12, Section 12.2(a)(ix) of the ICANN Bylaws permits the GAC to "put issues to the Board directly, either by way of comment or prior advice, or by way of specifically recommending action or new policy development or revision to existing policies." In its Johannesburg Communiqué (29 June 2017), the GAC issued advice to the Board on: protection of names and acronyms of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) in gTLDs. The ICANN Bylaws require the Board to take into account the GAC's advice on public policy matters in the formulation and adoption of the polices. If the Board decides to take an action that is not consistent with the GAC advice, it must inform the GAC and state the reasons why it decided not to follow the advice. Any GAC advice approved by a full consensus of the GAC (as defined in the Bylaws) may only be rejected by a vote of no less than 60% of the Board, and the GAC and the Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution.
At this time, the Board is taking action to address the advice from the GAC in the Johannesburg Communiqué. The Board's actions are described in the scorecard dated 23 September 2017.
The Board also notes that the GAC has included a new section in the Johannesburg Communiqué entitled "Follow-Up on Previous Advice and Other Issues". The Board thanks the GAC for this information and for its efforts in organizing the communiqué to distinguish between new advice and previous advice. The Board believes this change will contribute to additional information sharing between the Board, the ICANN Organization, and the GAC.
The adoption of the GAC advice as provided in the scorecard will have a positive impact on the community because it will assist with resolving the advice from the GAC concerning gTLDs and other matters. Additionally, the Board's action is in the public interest as it positively affects the accountability of ICANN by taking into account the concerns of governments, particulary matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues. There are no foreseen fiscal impacts associated with the adoption of this resolution. Approval of the resolution will not impact security, stability or resiliency issues relating to the DNS. This is an Organizational Administrative function that does not require public comment.
Whereas, DotMusic Limited (the Requestor) filed Reconsideration Request 17-2 (Request 17-2) challenging ICANN organization's response to the Requestor's request for documents, pursuant to ICANN's Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, relating to the Community Priority Evaluation (CPE) process review.
Whereas, the Board Governance Committee2 previously determined that Request 17-2 is sufficiently stated and sent the Request to the Ombudsman for review and consideration in accordance with Article 4, Section 4.2(j) and (k) of the ICANN Bylaws.
Whereas, the Ombudsman recused himself from this matter pursuant to Article 4, Section 4.2(l)(iii) of the Bylaws.
Whereas, the Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee (BAMC) has carefully considered the merits of Request 17-2 and all relevant materials and recommended that Request 17-2 be denied on the basis that Request 17-2 does not set forth a proper basis for reconsideration, and the Board agrees.
Whereas, even though the Requester's rebuttal to the BAMC's Recommendation on Request 17-2 was untimely, the Board has carefully considered it and concludes that the rebuttal provides no additional argument or evidence to support reconsideration.
Resolved (2017.09.23.08), the Board adopts the BAMC Recommendation on Request 17-2 [PDF, 123 KB].
The Requestor submitted a community-based application for .MUSIC, was invited to, and did, participate in CPE, but did not prevail. On 24 February 2016, the Requester sought reconsideration of the CPE determination (Request 16-5).
The ICANN Board directed the President and CEO, or his designees, to undertake a review of the process by which ICANN organization interacted with the CPE provider (CPE Process Review). The BGC later decided that the CPE Process Review should also include: (1) evaluation of the research process undertaken by the CPE panels to form their decisions; and (2) compilation of the reference materials relied upon by the CPE provider for the evaluations which are the subject of pending Reconsideration Requests concerning CPE. The BGC also placed the eight pending reconsideration requests relating to CPE on hold, including Request 16-5, pending completion of the CPE Process Review.
The full factual background is set forth in the BAMC Recommendation [PDF, 123 KB], which the Board has reviewed and considered, and which is incorporated here.
On 23 August 2017, the BAMC recommended that Request 17-2 be denied on the basis that Request 17-2 does not set forth a proper basis for reconsideration for the reasons set forth in the BAMC Recommendation [PDF, 123 KB], which are incorporated here.
On 12 September 2017, the Requestor submitted a rebuttal to the BAMC's Recommendation, which the Board has also reviewed and considered.
Whether ICANN organization complied with established ICANN policies in responding to the DIDP Request.
Whether ICANN organization was required by the DIDP or established policies to provide the Requestor with "the specific formula used to justify the nondisclosure."
Whether ICANN organization complied with its Core Values, Mission, and Commitments.
One or more actions or inactions of the Board or Staff that are taken as a result of the Board's or staff's reliance on false or inaccurate relevant information.
The Board has reviewed and thoroughly considered Request 17-2 and all relevant materials, including the BAMC Recommendation. The Board finds the analysis set forth in the BAMC Recommendation [PDF, 123 KB], which is incorporated here, to be sound.
ICANN Organization Adhered To Established Policies And Procedures In Responding To The DIDP Request.
The Reconsideration Process is Not a Mechanism for "Instructing" ICANN Staff on General Policies Where No Violation of ICANN Policies or Procedure Has Been Found.
The Requestor's Unsupported References to ICANN Commitments and Core Values Do Not Support Reconsideration of the DIDP Response.
The Requestor suggests that ICANN organization violated the following Commitments and Core Values in the DIDP Response: Article 1, Sections 1.2(a)(i), 1.2(a)(iv), 1.2(a)(vi), 1.2(b)(iv), 1.2(b)(v), 1.2(b)(vi), Article 2, Sections 2.3, 2.9, and Article 3, Section 3.2 of the ICANN Bylaws. (See Request 17-2, § 10, Pgs. 15-16.) However, as the BAMC concluded, and the Board agrees, the Requestor provides no explanation for how these Commitments and Core Values relate to the DIDP Response at issue in Request 17-2 or how ICANN organization might have violated these Commitments and Core Values. (See BAMC Recommendation [PDF, 123 KB], Pg. 26-27.) In fact, many of them, such as ICANN's Core Value of accounting for the public policy advice of governments and public authorities, have no clear relation to the DIDP Response. The Requestor has not established grounds for reconsideration through its list of Commitments and Core Values.
The Board notes that the Requestor states in passing that it has "standing and the right to assert this reconsideration request" as a result of "[f]ailure to consider evidence filed," but does not identify any evidence that it believes ICANN organization failed to consider in responding to the DIDP Request. (Request 17-2 [PDF, 960 KB], § 10, Pg. 13-14.) The Requestor similarly references "[c]onflict of interest issues," "Breach of Fundamental Fairness," and the need for "[p]redictability in the introduction of gTLDs" without explaining how those principles provide grounds for reconsideration here. As such, the BAMC found, and the Board agrees, that the Requestor's claims are unsupported.
The Rebuttal Does Not Raise Arguments or Facts That Support Reconsideration.
The Board has considered the Requestor's Rebuttal and finds that the Requestor has not provided any additional arguments or facts supporting reconsideration.
As noted above, before addressing the Requestor's rebuttal arguments, the Board notes that the Rebuttal is untimely. The Rebuttal was due within 15 days of receipt of the BAMC's Recommendation. (ICANN Bylaws, 22 July 2017, Art. 4, § 4.2(q).) The Requestor received the BAMC's Recommendation on 25 August 2017. The rebuttal was therefore due on 9 September 2017. However, the Requestor did not submit its Rebuttal until 12 September 2017, three days after the deadline. Regardless, for the below reasons, even if the Rebuttal was timely, it does not support reconsideration.
[N]otwithstanding ICANN's transparency commitment, both ICANN's By-Laws and its Publication Practices recognize that there are situations where non-public information, e.g., internal staff communications relevant to the deliberative processes of ICANN . . . may contain information that is appropriately protected against disclosure.
Third, the Requestor also suggests that ICANN "has closed off th[e] possibility [of obtaining information about the CPE Process Review] in clear contradiction of its own stated Commitments and Core Values." (Rebuttal, Pg. 5.) The Board notes that BGC and ICANN organization have provided several updates concerning the CPE Process Review, including one on 1 September 2017. (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2017-09-01-en.) Additionally, and as noted in the 1 September 2017 update, the CPE Process Review is still ongoing. When FTI completes the review, additional information will be made available to the ICANN community, including the Requestor.
Fourth, the Requestor believes that the BGC is ultimately responsible for ICANN organization's DIDP response, and states that it seeks reconsideration of the BGC's supervision of ICANN organization's response to the DIDP Request, and of the BGC's inaction, insofar as the BGC did not cause ICANN organization to disclose the requested documents. (Rebuttal [PDF, 259 KB], Pg. 6.) The Requestor is mistaken. As noted in the DIDP, ICANN organization responds to DIDP requests. Nothing in the DIDP indicates that the BGC is responsible for or otherwise oversees that process. Likewise, nothing in the BGC's Charter indicates that the BGC is responsible for oversight of the DIDP Response Process. (BGC Charter, 25 February 2012, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/charter-06-2012-02-25-en.) Rather, the DIDP states that the Reconsideration Request process is the proper mechanism for appealing denials of DIDP requests. That process was followed here.
This action is in the public interest as it is important to ensure that ICANN is accountable to the community for operating within the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and other established procedures, by having a process in place for those materially affected by an action of the ICANN Board or Staff may seek reconsideration. Taking this action has no financial impact on ICANN and will not negatively impact the security, stability and resiliency of the domain name system.
This decision is an Organizational Administrative Function not requiring public comment.
Whereas, dotgay LLC (the Requestor) filed Reconsideration Request 17-3 (Request 17-3) challenging ICANN organization's response to the Requestor's request for documents pursuant to ICANN's Documentary Information Disclosure Policy relating to the Community Priority Evaluation (CPE) process review.
Whereas, the Board Governance Committee4 previously determined that Request 17-3 is sufficiently stated and sent the Request to the Ombudsman for review and consideration in accordance with Article 4, Section 4.2(j) and (k) of the ICANN Bylaws.
Whereas, the Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee (BAMC) has carefully considered the merits of Request 17-3 and all relevant materials and recommended that Request 17-3 be denied on the basis that Request 17-3 does not set forth a proper basis for reconsideration, and the Board agrees.
Whereas, the Board has carefully considered the Requestor's rebuttal to the BAMC's Recommendation on Request 17-3 and concludes that the rebuttal provides no additional argument or evidence to support reconsideration.
Resolved (2017.09.23.09), the Board adopts the BAMC Recommendation on Request 17-3 [PDF, 111 KB].
The Requestor submitted a community-based application for .GAY, which was placed in a contention set with other .GAY applications. The Requestor was invited to, and did, participate in CPE, but did not prevail. On 22 October 2015, the Requestor sought reconsideration of the CPE report (Request 15-21). On 1 February 2016, the Board Governance Committee (BGC) denied Request 15-21.5 On 17 February 2016, the Requestor filed another reconsideration request (Request 16-3), seeking reconsideration of the BGC's determination on Request 15-21 concerning the CPE Report.
On 17 September 2016, the ICANN Board directed the President and CEO, or his designee(s), to undertake a review of the process by which ICANN organization interacted with the CPE provider (CPE Process Review). The BGC later decided that the CPE Process Review should also include: (1) evaluation of the research process undertaken by the CPE panels to form their decisions; and (2) compilation of the reference materials relied upon by the CPE provider for the evaluations which are the subject of pending Requests for Reconsideration concerning CPE. The BGC also placed the eight pending reconsideration requests relating to CPE on hold, including Request 16-3, pending completion of the CPE Process Review.
The full factual background is set forth in the BAMC Recommendation [PDF, 111 KB], which the Board has reviewed and considered, and which is incorporated here.
On 23 August 2017, the BAMC recommended that Request 17-3 be denied on the basis that Request 17-3 does not set forth a proper basis for reconsideration for the reasons set forth in the BAMC Recommendation [PDF, 111 KB], which are incorporated here.
On 8 September 2017, the Requestor submitted a rebuttal to the BAMC's Recommendation, pursuant to Article 4, Section 4.2(1) of ICANN's Bylaws, which the Board has also reviewed and considered.
The Board has reviewed and thoroughly considered Request 17-3 and all relevant materials, including the BAMC Recommendation. The Board finds the analysis set forth in the BAMC Recommendation [PDF, 111 KB], which is incorporated here, to be sound. The Board has also considered the Requestor's Rebuttal to the BAMC Recommendation. The Board finds that the Rebuttal does not raise arguments or facts that support reconsideration.
The Requestor suggests that ICANN organization violated the following Commitments and Core Values in the DIDP Response: Article 1, Sections 1.2(a), 1.2(a)(v), 1.2(a)(vi) and Article 3, Section 3.1 of the ICANN Bylaws. (See Request 17-3 [PDF, 507 KB], § 6, Pg. 5.) However, as the BAMC concluded, and the Board agrees, the Requestor provides no explanation for how these Commitments and Core Values relate to the DIDP Response at issue in Request 17-3 or how ICANN organization might have violated these Commitments and Core Values. (See BAMC Recommendation [PDF, 111 KB], Pgs. 21-22.) As such, the Requestor has not established grounds for reconsideration through its list of Commitments and Core Values.
This action is in the public interest as it is important to ensure that, in carrying out its Mission, ICANN is accountable to the community for operating within the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and other established procedures, by having a process in place by which a person or entity materially affected by an action of the ICANN Board or Staff may request reconsideration of that action or inaction by the Board. Adopting the BAMC's Recommendation has no financial impact on ICANN and will not negatively impact the security, stability and resiliency of the domain name system.
Whereas, the ICANN organization has established a need to secure vendors to implement the Information Transparency Initiative.
Whereas, upon receiving information from ICANN Organization on the identified needs and recommended solution of the Information Transparency Initiative, the Board followed a 6-step process to assist the Board in evaluating the recommended Information Transparency Initiative and approve it, and after having approved, to allow its oversight of the Information Transparency Initiative implementation.
Whereas, during its meeting on 17 August 2017, the Board Finance and Risk Committees reviewed the Information Transparency Initiative, and particularly financial and risk information, and the Board Finance Committee requested further analysis and documentation, which it received.
Whereas, the Board Finance Committee has recommended that the Board authorize the President and CEO, or his designee(s), to take all actions necessary to execute the contracts for the Information Transparency Initiative, as reflected in the reference materials to this paper, and make all necessary disbursements pursuant to those contracts.
Resolved (2017.09.23.10), the Board authorizes the President and CEO, or his designee(s), the take all necessary actions to execute the contracts for the Information Transparency Initiative, as reflected in the reference materials to this paper, and make all necessary disbursements pursuant to those contracts.
Resolved (2017.09.23.11), specific items within this resolution shall remain confidential for negotiation purposes pursuant to Article III, section 5.2 of the ICANN Bylaws until the President and CEO determines that the confidential information may be released.
Valuable ICANN information has accumulated in thousands of pieces of unstructured public content spread across 38 different public ICANN and SO/AC sites. This content continues to grow at rates of 25-30% per year. The ICANN organization currently surfaces this content through multiple, unconnected platforms with differing foundational technologies that are non-scalable, may be vulnerable, and are no longer fit for purpose.
ICANN has commitments to accountability and transparency to provide up-to-date and easy-to-find information in all six official U.N. languages, but the ICANN organization has no integrated system or process in place to efficiently create, govern, store, and manage that content.
Create an integrated ongoing operational process to govern, preserve, organize, and secure ICANN's public content.
Build a foundation of content governance through consistent multilingual tagging, a functional information architecture, and enforced workflows.
Implement this governance through a new document management system, the content foundation for ICANN ecosystem-wide governance.
Deploy new workflows and processes to ensure consistent, multilingual taxonomy for greater content findability and multifaceted search capabilities.
Surface this improved multilingual content and search to the community through a new Content Management System which will serve as the backbone for ICANN's external web properties.
Establish a future-proof and content agnostic technology landscape.
Upgrade our technical infrastructure, and thereby serve our global community better through increased findability and accessibility of multilingual content.
There are three key areas for which the Information Transparency Initiative is aimed at improving: the ICANN organization's internal and external content governance, its public content findability in all six U.N. languages, and its technical foundation for the entire ICANN ecosystem (community, Board, organization).
The ICANN organization performed a thorough analysis of the costs associated with the Information Transparency Initiative, and finds it to be a viable, cost-effective solution. Further, the Board followed a 6-step process to allow for a thorough evaluation of the Information Transparency Initiative, leveraging the expertise available among Board members related to the scope of the project. The steps include: (i) the Board defines its requirements and questions; (ii) ICANN Organization prepares answers to Board questions; (iii) a group of interested Board members signs off on the Project plan; (iv) the Board Finance Committee signs off on the Project costs and funding and the Board Risk Committee evaluates the project's risks and the Organization's plans to mitigate them; (v) the Board makes a final decision on the Information Transparency Initiative; and (vi) the group of interested Board members (or Board members tasked by the rest of the Board) will provide oversight on the implementation of the Information Transparency Initiative.
In furtherance of step (iii) above, a group of Board members, including some from the Board's Finance and Risk Committees, as well as others with interest in the topic, came together to liaise with the ICANN organization to evaluate the Information Transparency Initiative project plan. However, the Board is considering establishing a Board Technical Committee and, once formed, this Committee will be the group expected to provide oversight on the implementation of the Information Transparency Initiative as referenced in step (vi) above.
The Board reviewed the ICANN organization's recommendation to approve the Information Transparency Initiative, the Board Finance Committee's recommendations for contracting and disbursement authority relating to the Information Transparency Initiative, and the fact that the Board Risk Committee did not object to the Information Transparency Initiative.
Taking this decision at this time is in the public interest in that it will enhance and improve the public's access to, and findability of, data surfaced by the ICANN organization in support of ICANN's mission. There will be a financial impact on ICANN to implement the Information Transparency Initiative. The cost is estimated at US$6.3 million plus a 30% contingency. The FY18 project costs will be funded from FY18 budgeted operating costs, FY18 budgeted contingency and additional FY18 savings/net excess. The FY19 - FY22 operating expenses for the Information Transparency Initiative will be included in those annual budgets. This action will not have a direct impact on the security, stability, and resiliency of the domain name system.
Whereas, in 2008, the Board delegated to the Board Governance Committee (BGC) the responsibility for considering Reconsideration Requests, a responsibility that was previously delegated to a stand-alone committee of the Board.
Whereas, the BGC recommended, and the Board agreed, that the BGC's performance would be enhanced through the development of a Board committee specifically charged with oversight of ICANN accountability mechanisms, as the Board deems appropriate, with the BGC focusing on core governance activities.
Whereas, pursuant to the process set forth in the Bylaws for a Fundamental Bylaws amendment, on 22 July 2017, the Bylaws amendment redesignating the Reconsideration responsibilities from the BGC to the Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee (BAMC) came into effect.
Whereas, the Board previously specified that that the charter concerns raised during the public comments public comment process for the Fundamental Bylaws change be taken into account, as appropriate, by the BGC in developing the new BAMC charter and revising the BGC charter.
Whereas, the BGC has recommended that the Board approve the attached inaugural Charter for the BAMC [PDF, 330 KB], which aligns with the purposes of the BAMC and the amended Bylaws, and which incorporates suggestions received during the public comment period for the Fundamental Bylaws change, as appropriate.
Whereas, the BGC has recommended that the Board approve the attached revised BGC charter [PDF, 222 KB] in which the Purpose and Responsibilities sections have been amended to align with the Bylaws amendment and the BAMC charter, and which incorporates suggestions received during the public comment period for the Fundamental Bylaws change, as appropriate.
Whereas, the BGC has also recommended that Board approve revisions to the BGC charter as part of the process of standardizing certain provisions of Board Committee charters.
Whereas, the Board has further determined that a Board committee should be formed to help the ICANN Board with oversight of technical work necessary to meet ICANN's mission of ensuring the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems (the Board Technical Committee (BTC)).
Whereas, the BGC has recommended that the Board approve the inaugural charter of the Board Technical Committee [PDF, 56 KB].
Resolved (2017.09.23.12), the Board hereby adopts the Charter [PDF, 330 KB] of the Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee.
Resolved (2017.09.23.13), the Board hereby adopts the revised Charter [PDF, 222 KB] of the Board Governance Committee.
Resolved (2017.09.23.14), the Board herby adopts the Charter [PDF, 56 KB] of the Board Technical Committee.
The Board is addressing this matter to ensure committee charters are up-to-date and reflect the most current needs of the organization, in accordance with governance requirements and best practices.
Over the past several years, the Board Governance Committee's (BGC) work relating to Reconsideration Requests, which was delegated to the BGC by the Board, has increased exponentially, particularly with the New gTLD Program. As a result of the increased volume of Reconsideration Requests, the BGC was required to focus more of its time on Reconsideration Requests and less on its other governance duties. Given that the Bylaws in effect on 1 October 2016 expanded the scope of the Reconsideration process, as well as ICANN's other accountability mechanisms, it is anticipated that the volume and complexity of accountability mechanisms filed, including Reconsideration Requests, might increase and that the BGC's workload on Reconsideration Requests will not likely lessen.
As part of its responsibilities, the BGC is tasked with "periodically review[ing] the charters of the Board Committees, including its own charter and work with the members of the Board Committees to develop recommendations to the Board for any charter adjustments deemed advisable." (BGC Charter, I.A, at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/charter-06-2012-02-25-en) In this role, the BGC recommended, and the Board agreed, that to enhance its own performance and focus on core governance activities, the Reconsideration responsibilities should be moved to a new committee dedicated to oversight of ICANN's accountability mechanisms as deemed appropriate by the Board.
On 3 February 2017, the ICANN Board directed the initiation of the Fundamental Bylaws amendment process to allow for the ICANN community to consider these changes alongside the Board.
Pursuant to the process set forth in the Bylaws for a Fundamental Bylaws amendment, on 22 July 2017, the Bylaws amendment redesignating the Reconsideration responsibilities from the BGC to the Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee (BAMC) came into effect.
Accordingly, the BGC has recommended, and the Board agrees, that the Board adopt the inaugural charter of the BAMC to align with the purposes of the BAMC and the amended Bylaws.
The BGC further recommended, and the Board agrees, that the Board approve the revised BGC charter in which the Purpose and Responsibilities sections have been amended to align with the Bylaws amendment and the BAMC charter, and which incorporates the suggestions received during the public comment period for the Fundamental Bylaws change as appropriate. Additionally, the BGC has recommended, and the Board agrees, that Board approve revisions to the BGC charter as part of the process of standardizing certain provisions of Board Committee charters.
The Board previously specified that that the charter concerns raised during the public comments public comment process for the Fundamental Bylaws change be taken into account, as appropriate, by the BGC in developing the new BAMC charter and revising the BGC charter. (See Resolution 2017.05.18.06.) The Board notes that BAMC charter and revised BGC charter have incorporated the charter concerns received during the public comment period for the Fundamental Bylaws change as appropriate.
The Board has further determined that a Board committee should be formed to help the ICANN Board with oversight of technical work necessary to meet ICANN's mission of ensuring the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems (the Board Technical Committee (BTC). The BGC has recommended, and the Board agrees, that the Board adopt the inaugural charter of the BTC.
This action is in the public interest as it is important to ensure that the Board has the necessary Committees, properly tasked with responsibilities, to ensure oversight over the ICANN organization, as the Board deems appropriate. There will be no direct fiscal impact or adverse ramifications on ICANN's strategic and operating plans from the proposed changes to the charters.
Whereas, the Final Declaration in the Amazon EU S.à.r.l. (Amazon) v. ICANN Independent Review Process (IRP) was issued on 11 July 2017.
Whereas, in accordance with Article IV, section 3.21 of the applicable version on the Bylaws, the Board has considered the Final Declaration.
Resolved (2017.09.23.15), the Board accepts that the Panel declared the following: (i) Amazon is the prevailing party in the Amazon EU S.à.r.l. v. ICANN IRP; and (ii) ICANN "shall reimburse Amazon the sum of US$163,045.51."
Resolved (2017.09.23.16), the Board directs the President and CEO, or his designee(s), to take all steps necessary to reimburse Amazon in the amount of US$163,045.51 in furtherance of the Panel's Final Declaration.
Resolved (2017.09.23.17), further consideration is needed regarding the Panel's non-binding recommendation that the Board "promptly re-evaluate Amazon's applications" and "make an objective and independent judgment regarding whether there are, in fact, well-founded, merits-based public policy reasons for denying Amazon's applications."
Resolved (2017.09.23.18), the Board asks the Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee (BAMC) to review and consider the Panel's recommendation that the Board "promptly re-evaluate Amazon's applications" and "make an objective and independent judgment regarding whether there are, in fact, well-founded, merits-based public policy reasons for denying Amazon's applications," and to provide options for the Board to consider in addressing the Panel's recommendation.
After indicating in the Beijing Communiqué (April 2013) that the Amazon Applications required further GAC consideration, the GAC provided consensus advice (GAC Advice) to the ICANN Board in the Durban Communiqué (18 July 2013) that the Amazon Applications should not proceed (https://gacweb.icann.org/display/GACADV/2013-07-18-Obj-Amazon). Pursuant to the New gTLD Program, applicants have the opportunity to respond to GAC advice. Amazon provided responses to both the Beijing and Durban Communiqués, indicating in the latter that the GAC Advice "is inconsistent with international law; would have discriminatory impacts that conflict directly with ICANN's Governing Documents; and contravenes policy recommendations implemented within the AGB achieved by international consensus over many years." (Amazon Response to GAC Durban Communiqué, available at https://newgtlds.icann.org/sites/default/files/applicants/03sep13/gac-advice-response-1-1315-58086-en.pdf [PDF, 6.11 MB].) Following careful consideration of Amazon's response, ICANN commissioned an independent, third-party expert, with respect to Amazon's international law argument, "to provide an opinion on the well foundedness of various objections raised against the reservation of the new gTLD '.amazon'" (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/crocker-to-dryden-07apr14-en.pdf [PDF, 736 KB]). The conclusion of the expert supported the view that ICANN, within its processes, could either accept or reject the Amazon Applications and neither would be inconsistent with international law.
On 14 May 2014, the NGPC accepted the GAC Advice and directed ICANN not to proceed with the Amazon Applications. (Resolution 2014.05.14.NG03, available at https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-new-gtld-2014-05-14-en#2.b.) As part of its deliberations, the NGPC considered various factors including but not limited to the GAC Early Warning, Amazon's response(s) to the GAC Advice, correspondence received from various parties on the matter, and the expert analysis commissioned by ICANN. The NGPC's decision was without prejudice to the continuing efforts by Amazon and members of the GAC to pursue dialogue on the relevant issues.
On 1 March 2016, Amazon submitted a request for independent review of ICANN Board Resolution 2014.05.14.NG03 directing that the Amazon Applications should not proceed.
On 11 July 2017, the IRP Panel (Panel) issued its Final Declaration in the Amazon v. ICANN IRP (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/irp-gcc-final-declaration-24oct16-en.pdf [PDF, 2.52 MB]). The Panel's findings and recommendation are summarized below, and available in full at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/gcc-v-icann-2014-12-06-en.
The dissenting IRP panelist disagreed with the majority's reliance on the GAC's failure to give Amazon the chance to present to the GAC (as he thought that reviewing the GAC's processes was outside the scope of an IRP). He also disagreed with the majority's determination that the NGPC accepted the GAC Advice as irrebuttable, rather than just a strong presumption, as he thought the NGPC did properly analyze the GAC Advice. Notwithstanding, the dissenting panelist agreed with the final result because he thought Amazon had rebutted the strong presumption created by the GAC Advice, but the NGPC failed to provide a "well-founded" basis for its conclusion that the Amazon Applications should still not proceed.
The Board appreciates that both parties participated in good faith in the IRP, and accepts and acknowledges that a neutral third-party panel concluded that Amazon is the prevailing party, and that ICANN should reimburse Amazon for its IRP costs. The Board is therefore adopting this resolution so as to not delay the reimbursement of Amazon for its IRP costs, while the Board continues to consider the Panel's recommendation and/or additional options regarding next steps.
The Board recognizes the importance of this decision and wants to make clear that it takes the results of all ICANN accountability mechanisms very seriously, which is further evidenced by the creation of the new Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee (BAMC) and why the Panel's recommendation is being referred to the BAMC.
The Board's decision is in the public interest, taking into consideration and balancing the goals of resolving outstanding gTLD disputes, respecting ICANN's accountability mechanisms, and abiding by the policies and procedures set forth in the Applicant Guidebook, which were developed over numerous years of community efforts and input.
Taking this decision is expected to have a direct financial impact on the ICANN Organization in the amount the Panel declared ICANN should reimburse the prevailing party. Further review and analysis of the Panel's recommendation will not have any direct impact on the security, stability or resiliency of the domain name system.
1 For non-PDP ccNSO working groups, see https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups; for the PDP on 'Retirements of ccTLDs' see https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/pdp-retirement.htm.
2 Prior to 22 July 2017, the Board Governance Committee (BGC) was tasked with reviewing and considering Reconsideration Requests pursuant to Article 4, Section 4.2 of the Bylaws. See ICANN Bylaws, 1 October 2016, Art. 4, § 4.2(e), (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2016-09-30-en - article4). As such, the BGC reviewed Request 17-2 to determine if it was sufficiently stated, and it did so on 7 July 2017. On 22 July 2017, while Request 17-2 is pending, the amended Bylaws came into effect and the Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee (BAMC) is now designated to review and consider Reconsideration Requests. See ICANN Bylaws, 22 July 2017, Art. 4, § 4.2(e), available at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en/#article4. Since that time, the BAMC is responsible for reviewing reconsideration requests, including Request 17-2.
4 Prior to 22 July 2017, the Board Governance Committee (BGC) was tasked with reviewing and considering Reconsideration Requests pursuant to Article 4, Section 4.2 of the Bylaws. See ICANN Bylaws, 1 October 2016, Art. 4, § 4.2(e) (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2016-09-30-en - article4). As such, the BGC reviewed Request 17-3 to determine if it was sufficiently stated, and it did so on 19 July 2017. On 22 July 2017, while Request 17-3 is pending, amended Bylaws came into effect and the Board Accountability Mechanisms Committee (BAMC) is now designated to review and consider Reconsideration Requests. See ICANN Bylaws, 22 July 2017, Art. 4, § 4.2(e) (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en/#article4). Since that time, the BAMC is responsible for reviewing reconsideration requests, including Request 17-3.
5 Pursuant to Article IV, Section 2.3 of the Bylaws in effect at the time Request 15-21 was filed the BGC was tasked with reviewing and considering Reconsideration Requests. See ICANN Bylaws, 30 July 2014, Art. IV, § 2.3 (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#IV). Article IV, Section 2.15 provided that "[f]or all Reconsideration Requests brought regarding staff action or inaction, the BGC shall be delegated the authority by the Board of Directors to make a final determination and recommendation on the matter." Id. at Art. IV, § 2.15.

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