Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule100_sectionf
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 01:23:19+00:00

Document:
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 103, first para.
Article 71, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides that accused persons prosecuted by the occupying power “shall be brought to trial as rapidly as possible”.
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 71, second para.
Article 14(3)(c) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that everyone shall be entitled “to be tried without undue delay”.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966, Article 14(3)(c).
American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the OAS Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, also known as Pact of San José, Article 8(1).
Article 7(1)(d) of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides that every individual shall have “the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal”.
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, Article 7(1)(d).
Article 40(2)(b) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: “Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the following guarantees: … (iii) to have the matter determined without delay by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body”.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 44/25, 20 November 1989, Article 40(2)(b)(iii).
Upon assignment of a case for trial in accordance with this Statute, the Trial Chamber assigned to deal with the case shall … confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 64(2) and (3).
Article 67(1)(c) of the 1998 ICC Statute provides that the accused shall be entitled “to be tried without undue delay”.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 67(1)(c).
In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, he or she shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: … to be tried without undue delay.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the 2002 Agreement on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002, annexed to Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/246, 8 March 2002, p. 29, Article 17(4)(c).
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, attached to the Agreement between the UN and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon annexed to UN Security Council Resolution 1757 of 30 May 2007, Article 16(4)(c).
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 43/173, 9 December 1988, Principle 38.
Article 8(d) of the 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides that an individual charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind has the right “to be tried without undue delay”.
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session, 29 April–19 July 1991, UN Doc. A/46/10, 1991, Article 8(d).
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 827, 25 May 1993, as amended by Res. 1166, 13 May 1998 and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 20(1).
Article 21(4)(c) of the 1993 ICTY Statute provides that the accused shall “be tried without undue delay”.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 827, 25 May 1993, as amended by Res. 1166, 13 May 1998 and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 21(4)(c).
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 955, 8 November 1994, as amended by Res. 1165, 30 April 1998, and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 19(1).
Article 20(4)(c) of the 1994 ICTR Statute provides that the accused shall “be tried without undue delay”.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 955, 8 November 1994, as amended by Res. 1165, 30 April 1998, and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 20(4)(c).
Article 11(1)(d) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides that an individual charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind has the right “to be tried without undue delay”.
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May–26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, 1996, Article 11(1)(d).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, signed and proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of the European Union, Nice, 7 December 2000, Article 47.
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) sets out a number of procedural rules which include, inter alia, that “investigations must be conducted as rapidly as possible”.
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 1042(a).
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) sets out a number of procedural rules which include, inter alia, that “investigations must be conducted as rapidly as possible”.
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 10.54.
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) provides that in an occupied territory, accused persons “must be brought to trial as rapidly as possible”.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 12-6, § 54.
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001), in its chapter on rights and duties of occupying powers, states that accused persons “must be brought to trial as rapidly as possible”.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1232.1.
Colombia’s Instructors’ Manual (1999) provides: “Anybody who is accused has the right to … a due … trial without unjustified delay”.
Colombia, Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual de Instrucción de la Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina , Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, p. 11.
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) provides that judicial criminal proceedings in occupied territory shall not last longer than the usual delay.
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that time limits are to apply to criminal proceedings in occupied territories.
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 230.
The manual further states that in occupied territories, the accused “must be brought to trial as rapidly as possible”.
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 570.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 11.64 11 .
Note. Numerous pieces of domestic legislation provide for the right to be tried without undue delay.
See, e.g., Kenya, Constitution, 1992, Article 77(1).
Afghanistan, Criminal Procedure Code for Military Courts, 2006, Article 27.
(1) The suspect or accused shall be entitled to be brought before the Court in the shortest reasonable time period and to be tried without delay.
(2) The Court shall also be bound to conduct the proceedings without delay and to prevent any abuse of the rights of any participant in the criminal proceedings.
(3) The duration of custody must be reduced to the shortest necessary time.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Procedure Code, 2003, Article 13.
c. to be tried without delay.
Cambodia, Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, 2001, as amended in 2004, Articles 33 new and 35 new.
k) to have a public, oral, adversarial and impartial trial … without unjustified delays.
C. To be tried without undue delay.
Iraq, Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 2005, Article 19(4)(C).
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Article 103 of the Geneva Convention III and Article 71 of the Geneva Convention IV, is a punishable offence.
Peru, New Code of Criminal Procedure, 2004, Article I(1).
Every person has the right to a final judicial decision within a reasonable time in conformity with the time limits set in this Code.
Delay in issuing decisions or repeated undue delays shall be considered serious misconduct.
Peru, Code of Military and Police Justice, 2006, Article 208.
Peru, Military and Police Criminal Code, 2010, Article 154; see also Articles 252–254.
The procedure to be followed in proceedings during international armed conflicts shall be subject to the rules established for ordinary proceedings to the extent that they apply.
5. The sentence can be designated at the time when the judgment is announced or within one day thereafter.
Peru, Military and Police Criminal Code, 2010, Articles 416 and 421.
h) To have speedy and impartial trial, with legal or other appropriate assistance and preferably in the presence of his parents or legal guardian, unless such presence is considered not to be in the best interests of the juvenile taking into account his age or other peculiar circumstances.
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(h).
5° the accused shall be entitled to a speedy trial without undue delay.
5º a speedy trial without undue delay.
Rwanda, Organic Law concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other States, 2007, as amended in 2009, Article 13(5º).
(1) Whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence he shall[,] unless the charge is withdrawn, be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.
Sierra Leone, Constitution, 1991, Sections 23(1) and (10) and 29(2) and (5).
A trial before the High Court under these regulations, including a High Court at Bar, shall be held as speedily as possible and in the manner provided under any other written law for other trials before the High Courts, or the High Court at Bar, as the case may be, without a jury.
Sri Lanka, Emergency Regulations, 2005, as amended to 5 August 2008, Section 62(6).
1. The criminal justice authorities shall commence criminal proceedings immediately and conclude them without unjustified delay.
2. Where an accused is in detention, the proceedings shall be conducted as a matter of urgency.
Switzerland, Criminal Procedure Code, 2007, as amended to 2012, Article 5(1) and (2).
Venezuela’s Penal Procedure Code (2009), which is applicable to the prosecution of war crimes, states: “No one may be sentenced without a trial … carried out without undue delay”.
Venezuela, Penal Procedure Code, 2009, Article 1; see also Article 327.
Venezuela’s Penal Procedure Code (2012), which is applicable to the prosecution of war crimes, states: “No one may be sentenced without a trial … carried out without undue delay”.
Venezuela, Penal Procedure Code, 2012, Article 1; see also Articles 309–310 and Explanatory Notes pp. 3–4.
Zimbabwe, Constitution, 1979, as amended to 2009, Sections 18(9) and 26(7).
In the Ribic case before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in 2004, the accused, a Canadian national, was charged with four counts of hostage-taking contrary to section 279.1 of Canada’s Criminal Code.
Canada, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Ribic case, Reasons for Judgment and Judgment, 16 June 2004, § 1.
The fair trial interests of the accused is an object of both s. 7 and s. 11(b). Once trial delay is sufficient to require scrutiny fair trial concerns could not be adequately assessed if prejudice of any type related to the passage of time is excluded from consideration. All relevant factors must be brought together and form the basis of the ultimate decision as to breach and remedy. A fact relevant to s. 7 concerns may also be a fact for consideration under s. 11(b).
4. Prejudice to the accused.
Canada, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Ribic case, Reasons for Judgment and Judgment, 16 June 2004, §§ 15–17.
Ribic inter alia … contends that the trial judge erred by refusing to stay the prosecution on the grounds that Ribic’s rights under ss. 7 and 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms [(Charter)] … to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.
Canada, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Ribic case, Judgment, 24 November 2008, § 5, per Cronk J.A.
 Ultimately, after weighing the competing interests in detail and referring to the applicable legal principles that guide the balancing inquiry, the trial judge concluded that the seriousness of the offences in this case and “the national and international interests in bringing this case to trial” substantially outweighed the injury to the appellant’s interests in an earlier trial.
The passage of another year … brings the balance more towards a position favourable to the accused, but I do not see, now that I have heard all the evidence that the societal interests are lessened in any significant way. Indeed, it seems to me, at least in terms of Canada’s small role in endeavouring to assert the rule of law into the protection of UN personnel in such a civil conflagration, that the national and international societal interests in having this case prosecuted are every bit as weighty as they were a year ago, possibly even more so.
 The delay in this case, although considerable, was not unreasonable. As this court recently stated in R. v. Godin,  237 O.A.C. 324, at para. 46, appeal as of right to the S.C.C.,  S.C.C.A. No. 354, there will be circumstances where trial delay, even significant trial delay, will be caused by “a constellation of explicable factors”. This is such a case.
Canada, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Ribic case, Judgment, 24 November 2008, §§ 142–146, per Cronk J.A.
The fundamental right of the defendant that criminal procedures against him end within a reasonable time, is a corner stone of our legal system. The defendant’s right to a speedy procedure was also anchored in Article 71 to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.
Israel, Military Court of Appeals for Judea and Samaria, Alkam case, Judgment, 6 November 2007.
In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot accept petitioners’ submission that the absence of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would deny private respondent – or any military personnel facing charges before the General Courts Martial, for that matter – a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. What petitioners suggest is untenable. In the case at bench, the records of the case may indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain substantive rights have been or are being denied in the meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which mandates the “duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” Moreover, the absence of rules and regulations mandating a reasonable period within which the appropriate appellate military authority should act in a case subject to mandatory review is no excuse for denial of a substantive right. The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases “before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.” This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.
As admitted by counsel for respondents, there is no time frame within which to transmit the records of the case to the reviewing authority as well as time limitation within which the Chief of Staff must act on the recommendation of dismissal However, it must be stressed that the absence of a rule does not give to the Chief of Staff indefinite time within which to act at the expense of the constitutional right of a citizen to enjoy liberty and to be protected from illegal or arbitrary detention.
Respondent court, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioners to act with dispatch in dealing with the private respondent’s case. Over three years have elapsed since the respondent’s arrest. To this day, there is no indication – and it has not been alleged – that records of the case have been forwarded to the appropriate military appellate authority.
This case does not even involve complex issues of fact and law. The central issue which the appropriate military appellate authority will have to review is whether or not the General Court Martial was correct in dismissing the case on grounds of prescription under Article 38 of the Articles of War. We cannot see why the military appellate review authority should take an interminable length of time in coming up with a decision on the case. The unjustified delay in dealing with the respondent’s case is a deliberate injustice which should not be perpetrated on the private respondent a day longer.
Philippines, Supreme Court, Abadia case, Judgment, 23 September 1994.
… Article 17 of the  … ICC Statute … lays down certain criteria on the admissibility and inadmissibility of hearing situations referred to it when certain conditions are met.
In order to determine the willingness or unwillingness [of a State] to act in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: … [t]here has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with the intention to bring the concerned person to justice.
Spain, National High Court, Gaza case, Judgment, 9 June 2009, Fundamentos Jurídicos, Tercero, pp. 4–5.
… In addition, there does not seem to be malicious or unjustified procedural delays that could interfere with the legitimate expectations of the parties to a fair and founded decision on the issues submitted to a judicial decision.
Spain, National High Court, Gaza case, Judgment, 9 June 2009, Fundamentos Jurídicos, Quinto, p. 10.
The proceeding for the offences of [international organized crimes, acts against the public heritage of other States and against human rights] … will be … brief.
However, it can be compelled to conclude an investigation within a given period of time but this does not mean that it must conclude the latter through the termination of the proceedings.
This thus concerns the obligation of the Prosecution Office to terminate the preparatory phase [of the proceedings] as required by the case in view of the constitutional exigency of an expeditious justice … [However,] this does not mean that through this guarantee one can infringe upon the autonomy of this organ [and oblige it] to conclude an investigation in a given way. The Prosecution Office … will seek to terminate the preparatory phase [of the proceedings] by filing the indictment [or] requesting the termination of proceedings. … It is clear that in “the cases referring to the investigation of … war crimes” a time limit cannot be set for the termination of the preparatory phase [of the proceedings], as provided in Article 313 of the Penal Procedure Code.
Venezuela, Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Recao case, Judgment, 27 July 2004, Section V, pp. 8–11.
The President has tasked all the justice and judicial authorities to speed up the processing of the prisoners cases and to provide the grounds for a fair trial, so that the innocent and the guilty be distinguished.
In 2011, in its third periodic report to the Committee against Torture, Senegal stated: “All the necessary substantive and procedural legislative amendments have now been made to … ensure that Mr. Hissène Habré can have a just, fair and speedy trial in Senegalese courts presided over by Senegalese judges”.
Senegal, Third periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 5 October 2011, UN Doc. CAT/C/SEN/3, submitted 9 February 2011, § 269.
524. The Government is committed to reducing unnecessary delay in the criminal justice system. It is rarely in the interests of justice that a case becomes protracted. Measures introduced since 1997 have played an integral part in seeking to reduce delay wherever possible, but the Government fully recognizes the need to do more. Critically, the Government is trying to ensure that the needs of victims and witnesses are considered at all stages of the process.
United Kingdom, Sixth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/6, 18 May 2007, submitted 1 November 2006, § 524.
In 2003, in its second periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Uruguay stated that “article 74 of the Children and Adolescents Code establishes a range of guarantees of due process such as: … the principle of a reasonable duration of the proceedings”.
Concerned at the proportion of suspects and pretrial detainees detained for long periods of time in many African countries without being charged or sentenced and without access to legal advice or assistance.
In a resolution adopted in 1984 concerning the situation of martial law in Turkey, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly urged the Turkish authorities to ensure respect for the right of individuals to have their cases heard within a reasonable time.
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 822, 10 May 1984, § 17(b)(iv).
This approach is further justified by the limited object and purpose of the confirmation hearing which, as highlighted above, is to separate those cases which should go to trial from those which should not. In this regard, the Chamber’s consideration of the evidence is not undertaken for the purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the suspect. A wholesale assessment as to the admissibility of each item of evidence at this stage would unjustifiably delay the proceedings and give rise to an inappropriate pre-determination of evidentiary matters which should be properly decided in light of the whole of the evidence presented at trial. Such an approach, in the view of the Chamber, would be incompatible with the fair trial rights of the suspect guaranteed under article 67 of the [1998 ICC] Statute, and in particular, the right to be tried without undue delay under article 67(l)(c) of the Statute.
ICC, Mbarushimana case, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, § 44.
The right to be tried without undue delay is guaranteed by Article 20(4)(c) of the [1994 ICTR] Statute. The Appeals Chamber has pointed out that this right only protects the accused against undue delay, which has to be decided on a case by case basis. The following factors are relevant: (a) the length of the delay; (b) the complexity of the proceedings (the number of counts, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the quantity of evidence, the complexity of the facts and of the law); (c) the conduct of the parties; (d) the conduct of the authorities involved; and (e) the prejudice to the accused, if any.
ICTR, Bagosora case, Judgment and sentence, 18 December 2008, § 75.
38. This provision is not reflected in the International Tribunal’s Statute. However, as one of the fundamental human rights of an accused person under customary international law, it is, nonetheless, applicable, and indeed, has been acted upon by this International Tribunal.
39. In Barayagwiza, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stressed the importance of the right of the accused to invoke that provision, which in some common-law jurisdictions is called habeas corpus.
40. One of the essential features of the right of an accused person to challenge the legality of his detention is that such a challenge should be heard as promptly as possible. For that reason, the Chamber will treat this motion as the proceedings by which the accused is challenging the legality of his detention. The Chamber is in a position to do this because the challenge has been raised by the accused, and it has heard arguments on this question from all the parties, as well as the amici curiae.
ICTY, Slobodan Milošević case, Decision on Preliminary Motions, 8 November 2001, §§ 37–40.
In its judgment in the Simić case in 2003, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that the rights to a fair trial are encompassed in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and that such rights include, inter alia, “the right to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and to trial within a reasonable time or to release”.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8 (Article 9 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 30 July 1982, § 3.
27. An important aspect of the fairness of a hearing is its expeditiousness. While the issue of undue delays in criminal proceedings is explicitly addressed in paragraph 3 (c) of article 14, delays in civil proceedings that cannot be justified by the complexity of the case or the behaviour of the parties detract from the principle of a fair hearing enshrined in paragraph 1 of this provision. Where such delays are caused by a lack of resources and chronic under-funding, to the extent possible supplementary budgetary resources should be allocated for the administration of justice.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 [Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial], 23 August 2007, §§ 27 and 35.
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of the Sudan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3, 29 August 2007, § 21.
6.2 As to the claim of unreasonable pre-trial delay, the Committee observes that the relevant dates, for the purpose of determining the length of the delay in the author’s case, are the dates between the author’s arrest and trial … [T]he Committee considers that a delay of 2 years and 3 months between the author’s arrest and his trial, which has remained unexplained by the State party, constitutes a violation of the author’s right under article 9, paragraph 3, of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] to be tried within a reasonable time or to release, subject however to conditions, and equally of the author’s right under article 14, paragraph 3 (c), of the Covenant to be tried without undue delay.
6.3 As to the claim of a delay of five years and nine months between conviction and the dismissal of his appeal by the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, which has also remained unexplained by the State party, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the rights contained in article 14, paragraphs 3 (c), and 5, read together, confer a right to review of a decision at trial without delay. In Johnson v. Jamaica, the Committee considered that, barring exceptional circumstances, a delay of four years and three months was unreasonably prolonged. As a result of these considerations, the Committee finds a violation of article 14, paragraphs 3 (c), and 5, of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Evans v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views, 5 May 2003, §§ 6.2–6.3.
As to the claim of a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], in the form of the delay of three years and one month between the filing of his notice of appeal and its eventual disposition, the Committee notes the particular circumstance of this case that the author lodged his appeal immediately at the close of trial on the day that he was convicted. Noting also that the State party has not provided any explanation for the delay or presented any factors by which the delay could be attributed to the author, the Committee considers that the facts disclose a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c).
Human Rights Committee, Reece v. Jamaica, Views, 21 July 2003, § 7.5.
Regarding the author’s claims under article 14 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], the Committee takes note of the fact that [the author’s son] was, after first acquitted in 1988, ordered for retrial by a “faceless” Chamber of the Supreme Court. This alone raises issues under article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2. Taking into account that [the author’s son] was convicted after retrial in 1998, the Committee takes the view that whatever measures were taken by the Special Criminal Counter-Terrorism Chamber to guarantee [the author’s son’s] presumption of innocence, the delay of some 12 years after the original events and 10 years after the first trial resulted in a violation of the … right, under article 14, paragraph 3(c), to be tried without undue delay. In the circumstances of the case, the Committee concludes that there was a violation of article 14 of the right to a fair trial taken as a whole.
Human Rights Committee, Casafranca de Gomez v. Peru, Views, 19 September 2003, § 7.3.
As to the author’s allegations that the trial went on for too long, since the investigation began in September 1991 and the court of first instance convicted him on 1 January 1996, the Committee takes note of the State party’s arguments that the duration of the proceedings should be calculated as from the entry into force of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] and the Protocol for Lithuania on 20 February 1992. The Committee nevertheless notes that, although the investigation began before the entry into force, the proceedings continued until 1996. The Committee also takes note of the fact that the State party has not given any explanation of the reason why four years and four months elapsed between the start of the investigation and the conviction in first instance. Considering that the investigation ended, according to the information available to the Committee, following the report by the forensic medical commission and that the case was not so complex as to justify a delay of four years and four months, or three years and 2 months after the preparation of the forensic medical report, the Committee concludes that there was a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
Human Rights Committee, Filipovich v. Lithuania, Views, 19 September 2003, § 7.1.
The author claims that there were undue delays in his trial, since almost five years elapsed between the date of the incident and the hearing. The Committee notes that the circumstances of the case involved a flagrant offence, and that the evidence required little police investigation and, as the author points out, the low level of complexity of the proceedings did not justify the delay. The Committee recalls its constant jurisprudence that exceptional reasons must be shown to justify delays – in this case, five years – until trial. In the absence of any justification advanced by the State party for the delay, the Committee concludes that there has been a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c), of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
Human Rights Committee, Muñoz v. Spain, Views, 4 February 2004, § 7.1.
6.1 With regard to the authors’ claims under article 9, paragraph 3 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], the Committee notes the authors were arrested in April 1985, that their trial began on 4 January 1988, and that the authors were kept in pre-trial detention throughout this period. That their pre-trial detention lasted 34 months is uncontested. The Committee recalls that pursuant to article 9, paragraph 3, anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. What period constitutes a “reasonable time” within the meaning of article 9, paragraph 3, must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. A delay of almost three years, during which the authors were kept in custody cannot be deemed compatible with article 9, paragraph 3, in the absence of special circumstances justifying such delay. The Committee finds that, in the absence of any explanation from the State party, a delay of over 34 months in bringing the author to trial is incompatible with article 9, paragraph 3.
6.2 As to the claim of a delay of four years and ten months between conviction and dismissal of the appeal, counsel has invoked article 9, paragraph 3, but as the issues raised clearly relate to article 14, paragraph 3 (c) and 5, the Committee will examine them under that article. The Committee considers that a delay of four years and 10 months between the conclusion of the trial on 19 January 1988 and the dismissal of the authors’ appeal on 29 March 1993 is incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, in the absence of any explanation from the State party justifying the delay. The Committee accordingly concludes that there has been a violation of article 14, paragraph 5 in conjunction with paragraph 3 (c), of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Siewpersaud et. al v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views, 19 August 2004, §§ 6.1–6.2.
As to the delay between conviction and the final dismissal of the author’s appeal by the Supreme Court (29 September 1995 to 28 January 2000) in Case no. 6825/1994, which has remained unexplained by the State party, the Committee notes … that more than two years of this period, from 3 January 1998 to 28 January 2000, relate to the time after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol [to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the rights contained in article 14, paragraphs 3(c), and 5 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], read together, confer a right to review of a decision at trial without delay. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that the delay in the instant case violates the author’s right to review without delay and consequently finds a violation of article 14, paragraphs 3(c), and 5 of the Covenant.
On the merits, the Committee first notes that … three indictments were served on the author on 26 June 1996, 31 March 1997, and 30 September 1997 respectively. At the time of the final submissions made by the parties, none of these indictments had been finally adjudicated by the High Court. The indictments were thus pending for a period of several years from the entry into force of the Optional Protocol [to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. In the absence of any explanation by the State party that would justify the procedural delays and although the author has not raised such a claim in his initial communication, the Committee, consistent with its previous jurisprudence, is of the opinion that the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged, and are therefore in violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c), of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
Human Rights Committee, Kankanamge v. Sri Lanka, Views, 26 August 2004, § 9.2.
In relation to the alleged undue delays in the proceedings, the Committee notes that the Supreme Court delivered its judgment of 10 February 2003, that is over 41 months after the appeal was lodged on 3 September 1999, complemented by appeal briefs, the last of which is dated 25 May 2000. There was thus a delay of two years and eight months between the last appeal brief and the Supreme Court’s judgment. Altogether, there was a delay of six and a half years between the author’s arrest and the judgment of the Supreme Court. On the strength of the material before the Committee, these delays cannot be attributed to the author’s appeals. In the absence of any pertinent explanation from the State party, the Committee concludes that there has been a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
Human Rights Committee, Rouse v. Philippines, Views, 5 August 2005, § 7.4.
Concerning the complaint of a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], the Committee notes that although the authors were charged with a number of criminal offences on 9 March 1996, the investigation and consideration of the charges did not lead to a judgement of first instance until 16 July 2003, in other words seven years and three months after the charges had been brought. Under article 14, paragraph 3 (c), everyone has the right “to be tried without undue delay”. In the Committee’s opinion, the arguments put forward by the State party cannot justify excessive delays in judicial procedure. The Committee also considers that the State party has not demonstrated that the complexity of the case and the appeal by the authors on points of law were such as to explain that delay. It therefore finds a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (c).
Human Rights Committee, Taright et al. v. Algeria, Views, 16 May 2006, §8.5.
The Committee notes that Mr. Medjnoune is still in detention and is still awaiting trial. It notes that, according to the State party, the judicial investigation into the case was completed on 10 December 2000 and that the hearing was set for 5 May 2001 but subsequently adjourned. Today, nearly seven years after the start of the inquiry and more than five years after the first committal order, the author’s son is still in prison and is still waiting to be tried. In respect of the excessive pretrial delay, the Committee recalls that, according to its case law, “in cases involving serious charges such as homicide or murder, and where the accused is denied bail by the court, the accused must be tried in as expeditious a manner as possible”. In the case at hand, given that the son was arrested on 28 September 1999 and charged on 2 May 2000 as an accessory to murder, among other things, the Committee believes compelling reasons would have been required to justify nearly six years’ detention without trial or sentence. The State party has said that events in the region have made it impossible to try the case in the conditions of calm required for proceedings of this nature. It also informed the Committee on 28 December 2004 that the case should be scheduled for trial in the Tizi-Ouzou criminal court in the very near future. Yet nearly 18 months have passed since then without Mr. Medjnoune being brought to trial. Consequently, the Committee finds a violation of the rights under article 14, paragraph 3 (c) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
Human Rights Committee, Medjnoune v. Algeria, Views, 9 August 2006, § 8.9.
The Committee has noted the State party’s explanations concerning the delay in the trial proceedings against the author. Nevertheless, it finds that the delay was caused by the authorities and that no substantial delay can be attributable to the author. In any case, the fact that the author appealed cannot be held against him. Article 14, paragraph 3(c) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], requires that all accused shall be entitled to be tried without undue delay, and the requirement applies equally to the right of review of conviction and sentence guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 5. The Committee considers that a delay of seven years and ten months from the author’s arrest in September 1997 to the final decision of the Supreme Court dismissing his motion for reconsideration in July 2005 is incompatible with the requirements of article 14, paragraph 3(c).
Human Rights Committee, Larrañaga v. Philippines, Views, 14 September 2006, § 7.10.
As to the claim of undue delay under article 14, paragraph 1 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the right to a fair trial guaranteed by this provision includes the expeditious rendering of justice, without undue delay. The Committee recalls that the issue of delay must be assessed against the overall circumstances of the case, including an assessment of the factual and legal complexity of the case.
Human Rights Committee, E.B. v. New Zealand, Views, 21 June 2007, § 9.2.
The Committee recalls that the right to a fair hearing under article 14, paragraph 1 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], entails a number of requirements, including the condition that the procedure before the national tribunals must be conducted expeditiously. This guarantee relates to all stages of the proceedings, including the time until the final appeal judgement. Whether a delay is unreasonable must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case, taking into account, inter alia, the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties, the manner in which the case was dealt with by the administrative and judicial authorities, and any detrimental effects that the delay may have had on the legal position of the complainant.
Human Rights Committee, Lederbauer v. Austria, Views, 11 September 2007, § 8.1.
In a resolution adopted in 1992 on the right to recourse and fair trial, the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights considered that the right to fair trial included, inter alia, the following: “In the determination of charges against individuals, the individual shall be entitled in particular to: … ii) Be tried within a reasonable time”.
African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, Eleventh Session, Tunis, 2–9 March 1992, Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial, § 2(e)(ii).
Mr. Mazou has not yet had a judgment on his case brought before the Supreme Court over 2 years ago, without being given any reason for the delay … The delegation [of Cameroon] held that the case might be decided upon by the end of October 1996, but still no news of it has been forwarded to the Commission. Given that this case concerns Mr. Mazou’s ability to work in his profession, two years without any hearing or projected trial date constitutes a violation of [Article 7(1)(d) of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights].
African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, Pagnoulle v. Cameroon, Decision, 15–24 April 1997, § 19.
African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, Abubakar v. Ghana, Decision, 21–31 October 1996, § 12.
In several cases, the European Court of Human Rights found that the reasonableness of the length of time for pre-trial detention would depend upon factors relating to the circumstances of the case, including the difficulty of the investigations, the behaviour of the accused and the handling of the case by the national authorities.
European Court of Human Rights, Wemhoff case, Judgment, 27 June 1968, § 104; Matznetter v. Austria, Judgment, 10 November 1969, § 12; Stögmüller case, Judgment, 10 November 1969, § 16; König v. Germany, Judgment, 28 June 1978, § 99; Letellier v. France, Judgment, 26 June 1991, § 51; Kemmache v. France, Judgment, 27 November 1991, § 52; Tomasi v. France, Judgment, 27 August 1992, § 102; Olsson v. Sweden (No. 2), Judgment, 27 November 1992, § 99; Scopelliti v. Italy, Judgment, 23 November 1993, § 19.
In its judgment in Boddaert v. Belgium in 1992, the European Court of Human Rights stated that Article 6 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights commanded that judicial proceedings be expeditious, but it also laid down the more general principle of the proper administration of justice.
European Court of Human Rights, Boddaert v. Belgium, Judgment, 12 October 1992, § 39.
It is not possible to define this [reasonable length of time] period in abstracto, but, instead, that it shall be defined in each case … The Commission … agrees with the opinion that the referenced State party is “not bound (by the Convention) to fix a valid period for all cases, independently from the circumstances”.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 10.037 (Argentina), Resolution, 13 April 1989, Sections 11(a)(s) and 17(seventh).
In a case concerning Argentina in 1996, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted in relation to the right to a hearing within a reasonable time that a series of factors might determine the length of a trial. The relevant considerations included “the complexity of the case, the behaviour of the accused, and the diligence of the competent authorities in their conduct of the proceedings”.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 11.245 (Argentina), Report, 1 March 1996, § 111.
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 30 November–2 December 1990, Article 9(a), IRRC, No. 282, 1991, p. 334.

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