Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1645251.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:59:00+00:00

Document:
Alan Shaun ROSSBERG et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Robinson–Legal and Raymond G. Robinson for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Bryan Cave, Sean D. Muntz and Thomas E. Nanney for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiffs and appellants Alan Shaun Rossberg (Shaun) and Brenda Rossberg (Brenda; collectively Rossbergs) 1 appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint after the trial court sustained a demurrer by defendants and respondents Bank of America, N.A. (BofA) and U.S. Bank, National Association, as trustee for the certificate holders of Banc of America Funding Corporation Mortgage Pass–Through Certificates, Series 2007–C (U.S. Bank; collectively Defendants). The Rossbergs sued Defendants to prevent them from selling the Rossbergs' home at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale after the Rossbergs defaulted on two loans secured by deeds of trust. The Rossbergs alleged several causes of action against Defendants based on BofA's unperformed promises to modify the Rossbergs' loans and Defendants failure to comply with the statutory requirements for conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure.
We affirm the trial court's order sustaining Defendants' demurrer to the first amended complaint because the Rossbergs failed to adequately allege the existence of an enforceable agreement to modify their loans or that Defendants failed to comply with the statutory requirements for conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure. We also affirm the trial court's order denying leave to amend because the Rossbergs failed to specifically show how they could amend their pleading to state a cause of action. Finally, because we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing the Rossbergs' action, we dismiss as moot the Rossbergs' petition for writ of mandate to prevent Defendants from evicting them from their home during this appeal.
In February 2007, the Rossbergs borrowed more than $600,000 from BofA. They signed a promissory note (First Note) and gave BofA a deed of trust (First Deed of Trust) on their home in Irvine, California, to secure the loan. The First Deed of Trust named BofA as the beneficiary and PRLAP, Inc. as the trustee.
The Rossbergs borrowed an additional $58,000 from BofA in August 2007. Again, they signed a promissory note (Second Note) and gave BofA a deed of trust on their home (Second Deed of Trust) as security for the loan. The Second Deed of Trust named BofA as the beneficiary and PRLAP, Inc. as the trustee. The Rossbergs do not allege whether the Second Note and Second Deed of Trust were part of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
In 2007, Shaun lost his job and then suffered a debilitating illness that prevented him from looking for new work for several months. After exhausting much of their savings and available credit, the Rossbergs fell behind in their loan payments. In early 2009, they began discussions with BofA to modify their loans. These discussions dragged on for more than two and one-half years as the Rossbergs engaged in countless oral and written communications with BofA. They repeatedly sent BofA numerous tax and other financial documents to support their loan modification requests.
The Rossbergs alleged BofA employees told them on several occasions that they had been granted a loan modification. In July 2009, Esmerna, an employee in the loan modification processing department, told Brenda the Rossbergs had been granted a loan modification that would reduce their interest rate from 7.65 percent to 6.54 percent and would add $58,000 to the loan balance. In December 2010, Yazmin, another BofA loan modification employee, told Brenda the Rossbergs had been granted a loan modification that would (1) fix their variable interest rate at 7.65 percent for the term of the loan; (2) establish an impound account; and (3) require a $130,000 balloon payment at the end of the loan. Several other employees confirmed the Rossbergs had been granted these loan modifications.3 All of these employees promised the Rossbergs would receive documents to confirm and implement these loan modifications, but the Rossbergs never received those documents and BofA never implemented either loan modification. The Rossbergs did not allege what, if any payments, they made during their loan modification negotiations with BofA.
On September 22, 2009, as the Rossbergs continued their efforts to negotiate a loan modification, BofA executed a Substitution of Trustee designating Cal–Western Reconveyance Corporation (Cal–Western) as the new trustee on the First Deed of Trust. BofA did not have a notary public acknowledge the Substitution of Trustee until November 11, 2009, and it did not record the document until November 18, 2009.
Three days after BofA executed the Substitution of Trustee, and nearly two months before BofA recorded that document, Cal–Western executed a Notice of Default as “either the original trustee, the duly appointed substituted trustee, or acting as agent for the trustee or beneficiary” under the First Deed of Trust. The Notice of Default informed the Rossbergs they were nine months behind on their loan and the beneficiary had elected to start the nonjudicial foreclosure process on their property. Cal–Western recorded the Notice of Default on September 28, 2009, three days after executing it.
In June 2010, Cal–Western recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale (Notice of Sale) under the First Deed of Trust. The Notice of Sale originally set July 14, 2010, as the sale date, but the date for the sale was rescheduled several times. Attached to the Notice of Sale was a declaration executed by BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC) that stated BAC obtained an exemption from certain statutory time limits for giving notice of the sale, but the declaration does not explain BAC's relationship to the First Deed of Trust or the Rossbergs' loan.
The Rossbergs filed this action in April 2011 to block the foreclosure sale. After the trial court sustained a demurrer to the original complaint, the Rossbergs filed a first amended complaint. The first amended complaint named BofA, U.S. Bank, and Cal–Western as defendants and alleged the following causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code section 2923.5; 4 (2) violation of section 2924 et seq.; (3) fraud; (4) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; (5) breach of contract; (6) declaratory relief; and (7) quiet title.5 The numerous exhibits the Rossbergs attached to the first amended complaint included the First Deed of Trust, portions of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the Substitution of Trustee, the Notice of Default, the Notice of Sale, and the Assignment of Deed of Trust.
BofA and U.S. Bank demurred to the first amended complaint on the ground each cause of action failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against either defendant. The trial court sustained the demurrer on every cause of action without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. The Rossbergs timely appealed.
Shortly after the trial court dismissed the Rossbergs' action, Cal–Western proceeded with the nonjudicial foreclosure and conducted the public sale because the Rossbergs failed to seek a stay of enforcement regarding the trial court's judgment. U.S. Bank purchased the property at the sale for a credit bid and then filed an unlawful detainer action to obtain possession.
In September 2012, the Rossbergs filed a petition for writ of mandate to prevent “BofA” from selling the property to a third party or proceeding with the unlawful detainer action during this appeal. We issued an order (1) treating the Rossbergs' petition as a petition for writ of supersedeas; (2) consolidating the Rossbergs' appeal from the judgment and their writ petition; and (3) inviting an informal response from BofA. BofA did not file a response and no further action was taken on the petition.
In July 2013, U.S. Bank obtained a judgment of possession against the Rossbergs in the unlawful detainer action after the Rossbergs failed to appear for trial.
The Rossbergs concede the declaration section 2923.5 requires as part of a notice of default may simply track the statutory language regarding the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent's efforts to contact the borrower and the declaration need not be under penalty of perjury. (See Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208, 232–235.) The Rossbergs further concede Cal–Western's declaration in its recorded Notice of Default satisfied the statute's requirements. Nonetheless, the Rossbergs argue they stated a cause of action under section 2923.5 because the declaration in the Notice of Default is false. According to the Rossbergs, neither BofA nor any of its agents contacted them to assess their financial situation and explore options for avoiding foreclosure before Cal–Western recorded the Notice of Default.
A borrower may state a cause of action under section 2923.5 by alleging the lender did not actually contact the borrower or otherwise make the required efforts to contact the borrower despite a contrary declaration in the recorded notice of default. (Skov v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 690, 696.) The Rossbergs, however, failed to state a cause of action on this theory because they did not adequately allege BofA and its agents failed to contact them to assess their financial situation and explore options for avoiding foreclosure at least 30 days before Cal–Western recorded the Notice of Default.
2. Second Cause of Action for Violation of Section 2924 et seq.
This cause of action sought to enjoin Defendants from foreclosing on the Rossbergs' home because Defendants failed to record a proper notice of default. The Rossbergs alleged the Notice of Default was invalid because Cal–Western lacked authority to record it, and therefore the entire nonjudicial foreclosure process was void. Although the Rossbergs alleged several reasons for Cal–Western's purported lack of authority, they misconstrue the requirements for conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure and failed to allege any defect in the process that prevented Cal–Western from validly recording the Notice of Default. We therefore affirm the trial court's decision sustaining the demurrer to this cause of action.
The Rossbergs first contend Cal–Western lacked authority because it was not yet designated as trustee when it recorded the Notice of Default. According to the Rossbergs, Cal–Western did not become trustee until nearly two months after it recorded the Notice of Default when a notary acknowledged the Substitution of Trustee and Cal–Western recorded the Substitution. Section 2934a, however, expressly authorized Cal–Western to record the Notice of Default because the Substitution of Trustee was executed before Cal–Western recorded the Notice of Default even though the Substitution of Trustee was not notarized or recorded until nearly two months later.
Specifically, section 2934a states, “[a] trustee named in a recorded substitution of trustee shall be deemed to be authorized to act as the trustee under the ․ deed of trust for all purposes from the date the substitution is executed ․“ (§ 2934a, subd. (d), italics added.) That statute also provides a substituted trustee may record a notice of default before the substitution empowering the trustee to act is recorded. (§ 2934a, subd. (b); Debrunner, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 443–444.) Here, the Substitution of Trustee attached to the first amended complaint shows BofA executed it on September 22, 2009, and recorded it on November 18, 2009. Accordingly, Cal–Western was authorized to act as trustee starting on September 22, 2009, and validly recorded the Notice of Default six days later.
In a related argument, the Rossbergs contend the Substitution of Trustee must be a forgery because a notary did not acknowledge the signature on that document until nearly two months after BofA signed it. This argument assumes a notary must acknowledge a document at the time it is executed and any delay between the execution and acknowledgment renders the document invalid. That is not the law and the Rossbergs do not cite any authority to support that proposition. Nothing requires a notary to acknowledge a document at the same time it is executed, and even a lengthy delay between the execution of the document and its acknowledgment does not invalidate the document. (Wilson v. Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 599, 602 [assignment of beneficial interest in deed of trust validly transferred title despite notary acknowledging assignment nearly two years after it was executed]; Pedersen v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (E.D.Cal 2012) 900 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1083 [same].) The Rossbergs allege no other basis for their contention the Substitution of Trustee is a forgery.
The Rossbergs next contend Cal–Western lacked authority to record the Notice of Default because BofA was not the beneficiary under the First Deed of Trust when it executed the Substitution of Trustee designating Cal–Western as trustee. According to the Rossbergs, BofA transferred the First Note and First Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank in April 2007, when it entered into the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, and therefore only U.S. Bank could have validly executed the Substitution of Trustee in September 2009.10 The allegation BofA could not properly designate Cal–Western as trustee, however, does not state a claim to invalidate the Notice of Default.
Section 2924 authorizes a notice of default to be recorded by the “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents.” (§ 2924, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The Notice of Default did not state Cal–Western was acting as a substituted trustee designated by BofA. Rather, the Notice of Default stated Cal–Western “is either the original trustee, the duly appointed substituted trustee, or acting as agent for the trustee or beneficiary under [the First Deed of Trust].” (Italics added.) Accordingly, to state a claim based on Cal–Western's purported lack of authority to record the Notice of Default, the Rossbergs had to allege not only that Cal–Western was not the trustee under the First Deed of Trust, but also that Cal–Western was not the agent of the trustee or beneficiary. (Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 515–516 [when notice of default states entity recorded it “ ‘as agent for beneficiary,’ ” the debtor must allege facts showing the entity was not the beneficiary's agent to state a claim]; Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 270 [to state cause of action based on foreclosing entity's lack of authority borrower must “affirmatively” plead facts establishing lack of authority].) The Rossbergs made no such allegations. Indeed, although they alleged BofA transferred the First Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank more than two years before Cal–Western recorded the Notice of Default, the Rossbergs fail to allege U.S. Bank, as the beneficiary under the First Deed of Trust, did not authorize Cal–Western to record the Notice of Default as its agent. Accordingly, assuming Cal–Western lacked authority to act as trustee when it recorded the Notice of Default, the Rossbergs nonetheless failed to allege sufficient facts establishing Cal–Western lacked authority to record the Notice as agent for the trustee or beneficiary.
Finally, the Rossbergs contend section 2932.5 rendered the Notice of Default invalid because Cal–Western recorded the Notice before U.S. Bank recorded its beneficial interest in the First Deed of Trust. According to the Rossbergs, BofA transferred the First Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank in April 2007, and section 2932.5 required U.S. Bank to record its beneficial interest in the First Deed of Trust before anyone could initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on its behalf. Because U.S. Bank did not record the Assignment of Deed of Trust until more than a year after Cal–Western recorded the Notice of Default, the Rossbergs contend the Notice is void. The Rossbergs are mistaken because section 2932.5 does not apply to deeds of trust.
Here, the Rossbergs alleged specific BofA employees promised on multiple occasions that the Rossbergs had been granted specific modifications to their loans, but neither BofA nor U.S. Bank ever intended to modify the Rossbergs' loans. The Rossbergs allege they relied on these promises by “execut[ing] continual loan modification papers and disclos[ing] their confidential, private and personal information.” Finally, the Rossbergs allege their reliance on the promised loan modifications caused them “hundreds of thousands of dollars” in damages. These allegations fail to state a promissory fraud claim because they fail to specifically allege the harm the Rossbergs suffered and how the Rossbergs' reliance on the promised loan modifications caused them harm.
The Rossbergs did not satisfy these standards. They did not allege any specific damages they suffered as a result of their reliance on the promised loan modifications nor did they allege how their execution of loan modification papers and disclosure of confidential information caused those unspecified damages. For example, the Rossbergs did not allege BofA or U.S. Bank used the confidential information the Rossbergs disclosed for an improper purpose or in any way that injured the Rossbergs. Indeed, there are no allegations at all regarding how BofA or U.S. Bank used the confidential information the Rossbergs disclosed. The logical inference is that BofA used the information to evaluate the Rossbergs' requests for a loan modification, but there is nothing improper about that. Significantly, the Rossbergs do not allege their reliance on the promised loan modifications caused them to default on their loans or prevented them from curing their existing defaults. In short, the Rossbergs failed to allege any connection between their reliance on the promised loan modifications and any specific damages that reliance caused.
In their brief, the Rossbergs argue BofA's promised loan modifications induced them to continue making loan payments to BofA instead of obtaining a replacement loan. The Rossbergs, however, did not allege this theory of reliance in their first amended complaint and therefore we may not consider this argument in evaluating whether they have shown a viable fraud cause of action. (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 8–9, fn. 3.) Moreover, the Rossbergs fail to explain how continuing to pay on their loans caused them damages when BofA credited those payments toward the amount they undisputedly owed and allowed them to remain in their home. The Rossbergs also failed to provide facts showing they had sufficient equity in their home and sufficient income to qualify for a replacement loan. The conclusory allegation they would have obtained a replacement loan does not state a cause of action.
Next, the Rossbergs contend an exception to the particularity requirement exists when the defendant necessarily possesses full information concerning the facts supporting the alleged cause of action. Although the Rossbergs are correct that “[l]ess specificity is required when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy’ [citation]” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217), that exception does not apply to the Rossbergs' failure to specifically allege their damages and how their reliance on BofA's promises caused those damages. This exception is usually applied to the elements regarding a defendant's representations and intent, not the elements regarding the plaintiff's own damages and reliance. Here, Defendants would not necessarily possess full information regarding the Rossbergs' damages or how the Rossbergs' reliance caused those damages without the Rossbergs providing that information.
4. Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.
This cause of action alleged the Rossbergs and Defendants entered into a “partially written, partially verbal, and verbal agreement” to modify the Rossbergs' loans based on BofA's oral representations that it had granted the Rossbergs' loan modification request and the statements on BofA's Web site describing its loan modification programs. This cause of action fails as a matter of law because the Rossbergs failed to allege they entered into a signed, written agreement with BofA to modify their loans.
Here, the Rossbergs alleged the loan modification agreement they entered into with BofA modified the terms of their promissory note and deed of trust by changing the interest rate and principal balance, among other things. The statute of frauds therefore required the loan modification agreement to be in a writing signed by BofA. The Rossbergs, however, concede there is no written loan modification agreement signed by BofA. They therefore failed to allege a cause of action for breach of the purported loan modification agreement.
The Rossbergs contend their loan modification agreement with BofA was not subject to the statute of frauds because the “object of the [loan modification] agreement was to arrange a refinancing loan,” not to convey an interest in real property. This argument fails because it contradicts controlling precedent, as we explained in Secrest.
The Rossbergs also contend we should reject BofA's argument that the statute of frauds bars this cause of action because BofA never signs written agreements granting homeowner loan modifications. The Rossbergs, however, base their argument on facts not alleged on the face of their pleading. Because the Rossbergs sought to allege a contract subject to the statute of frauds, they must allege a written contract signed by BofA and their failure to do so is a legal issue properly decided on demurrer. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2013) ¶ 7:58, p. 7(I)–33 (rev. # 1 2013) citing Parker v. Solomon (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 125, 136.) Whether BofA routinely signs a written agreement when it modifies a borrower's loan is irrelevant. The statute of frauds requires a signed writing and therefore the Rossbergs must allege facts establishing the existence of a signed writing to state this cause of action.
The sixth cause of action seeks a judicial declaration that the Substitution of Trustee, the Notice of Default, and the Notice of Sale are void based on the defects discussed above concerning the first and second causes of action, and also a judicial declaration modifying the First Note, First Deed of Trust, Second Note, and Second Deed of Trust to conform to the loan modifications BofA promised the Rossbergs. The seventh cause of action seeks to quiet title against Defendants and Cal–Western “for the reasons set forth hereinabove.” The Rossbergs, however, fail to explain how the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to these causes of action or why they alleged sufficient facts to state these claims.
In their reply, the Rossbergs invoke California's liberal policy in favor of permitting amended pleadings and argue we should grant them leave to amend on any claim where they failed to adequately allege a cause of action. As explained above, however, it is not sufficient for the Rossbergs to assert “an abstract right to amend.” (Rakestraw, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 43.) Instead, they must “clearly and specifically” set forth the legal authority for the claims they contend they can allege, the elements of each of those claims, and the specific factual allegations that would establish each of those elements. (Ibid.) The Rossbergs made no attempt to meet this burden.
The judgment is affirmed. Because we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing the Rossbergs' action, we also dismiss the petition for writ of mandate as moot. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiffs and appellants Alan Shaun Rossberg and Brenda Rossberg's petition for rehearing is DENIED.
Finally, because we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing the Rossbergs' action, we dismiss as moot the Rossbergs' petition for writ of mandate to prevent Defendants from initiating eviction proceedings during this appeal.
(4) it is unclear who held the First Note and First Deed of Trust when the Notice of Default and Notice of Sale were recorded because the Pooling and Servicing Agreement transferred the First Note and First Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank in April 2007, but the Assignment of Deed of Trust purported to make that same transfer in January 2011.
The Rossbergs first contend Cal–Western lacked authority because it had not been designated as trustee when it recorded the Notice of Default.
The Notice of Default did not state BofA designated Cal–Western to act as a substituted trustee.
Consequently, the Rossbergs forfeited any claim based on BAC signing the declaration.
This cause of action alleges a fraud claim based on Defendants' promises to modify the Rossbergs' loans.
In their brief, the Rossbergs also contend they based their fraud cause of action on the fraudulent nonjudicial foreclosure documents and their false notarizations.
Moreover, as explained above, the Rossbergs failed to adequately allege the nonjudicial foreclosure documents were forged or otherwise false.
3. The Rossbergs contend they attached three letters to their pleading in which BofA approved loan modifications, but the attached letters do not support the Rossbergs' contention. Two of the letters do not contain the language the Rossbergs quote in their pleading and the third letter merely states BofA has “approved your request for assistance.” The third letter does not refer to modifying the Rossbergs' loans, let alone the specific terms of any modification; it merely asks the Rossbergs to contact BofA to discuss available options for resolving their loan delinquency.The Rossbergs also contend BofA admitted the Rossbergs received loan modifications in two letters it sent after the trial court entered judgment. Because the operative pleading contains no allegations regarding these letters and they postdate the trial court's ruling, we may not consider them in evaluating the adequacy of the Rossbergs' allegations. (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 8–9, fn. 3 (Hensler ) [in ruling on a demurrer, courts are limited to allegations appearing on the face of the pleadings and facts properly subject to judicial notice]; Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court's judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered’ ”].) To the extent we may consider these letters in deciding whether we should grant the Rossbergs leave to amend, the letters merely state BofA twice offered the Rossbergs a loan modification and the Rossbergs rejected those offers. Accordingly, the letters fail to show an agreement was ever reached on a specific loan modification.
4. All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise stated.
5. Cal–Western is not a party to this appeal.
6. The first amended complaint and the Rossbergs' opening brief include allegations and contentions suggesting BofA had a duty to grant the Rossbergs a loan modification, but their reply clarifies that the Rossbergs do not contend BofA had a duty to grant them a modification. We therefore do not address that issue.
7. The Rossbergs argue the trial court erred by failing to consider their opposition to Defendants' demurrer, considering evidence Defendants' counsel offered at the hearing on the demurrer, and requiring the Rossbergs to present evidence to overcome the demurrer. The record does not support any of these contentions. Nonetheless, they are irrelevant because we conduct a de novo review when determining the adequacy of the Rossbergs' pleading against the demurrer.
9. Defendants argue all of the Rossbergs' causes of action fail as a matter of law because the Rossbergs did not tender the full amount due and owing on the loans before bringing this action. Because we affirm the trial court's ruling on other grounds, we do not address whether a full tender was required before the Rossbergs could properly bring this action.
10. In their brief, the Rossbergs mistakenly refer to U.S. Bank as the trustee under the First Deed of Trust. The Rossbergs, however, fail to recognize the proper legal effect of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. That Agreement pooled together large numbers of mortgages to create investment instruments potential investors could purchase. Under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the beneficial interests in the mortgages (more specifically, the underlying promissory notes and deeds of trusts) were transferred to U.S. Bank, who acted as trustee and held the beneficial interests in the promissory notes and deeds of trusts for the investors. The Pooling and Servicing Agreement did not make U.S. Bank the trustee under the First Deed of Trust or any other deed of trust.
12. In their brief, the Rossbergs also contend their fraud cause of action was based on the fraudulent nonjudicial foreclosure documents and their false notarizations. The Rossbergs, however, do not allege they did anything or refrained from doing anything based on the various nonjudicial foreclosure documents such as the Notice of Default or the Notice of Sale. Moreover, as explained above, the Rossbergs failed to adequately allege the nonjudicial foreclosure documents were forged or otherwise false in any material way.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P.J. IKOLA, J.

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