Source: https://answers.uslegal.com/civil-actions/35733/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:37:33+00:00

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"Volenti Non Fit Injuria" can apply to almost any type action.
We find one Statute that mentions "Volenti Non Fit Injuria" in a footnote. See Footnote 4 in the North Carolina Statute below. This does not mean that there are not other statutes that apply to this but just don't mention the term in the statute.
We also find over 1200 State Court opinions that mention the term and it was involved in those cases. A similar issue is called the last clear chance defense where the person has a clear chance to avoid the injury or matter and failed to do so. Another is contributory negligence where the person suing for example injuries was also at fault and contributed to the injuries.
alter the course of a young adult's life are unsettling; however, as aptly noted by Chief Judge Cardozo in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173, "Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary" (id., at 482, 166 N.E. 173).
'The mere encountering of a risk, * * * does not, legally speaking, constitute assumption of risk; it is only when the risk exists in spite of the exercise of due care or when the risk results from negligence which is obvious that it is assumed by the person injured'. (Italics ours.) And see Gila Valley, G. & N. R. Co. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 34 S.Ct. 229, 58 L.Ed. 521; Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82, 149 A.L.R. 1041.
 In addition to the sports setting, the primary assumption of risk doctrine also comes into play in the category of cases often described as involving the "firefighter's rule." (See Terhell v. American Commonwealth Associates (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 434, 437 [218 Cal.Rptr. 256].) In its most classic form, the firefighter's rule involves the question whether a person who negligently has started a fire is liable for an injury sustained by a firefighter who is summoned to fight the fire; the rule provides that the person who started the fire is not liable under such circumstances. (See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 202 [142 Cal.Rptr. 152].) Although a number of theories have been cited to support this conclusion, the most persuasive explanation is that the party who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter is employed to confront. (See, e.g., Baker v. Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 710, 719-721 [181 Cal.Rptr. 311]; Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 709, 714 [211 Cal.Rptr. 668]. See generally 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 739, pp. 69-70 [discussing rule as one illustration of duty approach]; Anicet v. Gant (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991) 580 So.2d 273, 276 ["a person specifically hired to encounter and combat particular dangers is owed no independent tort duty by those who have created those dangers ...."].) Because the defendant in such a case owes no duty to protect the firefighter from such risks, the firefighter has no cause of action even if the risk created by the fire was so great that a trier of fact could find it was unreasonable for the firefighter to choose to encounter the risk. This example again demonstrates that primary assumption of risk is not the same as "reasonable implied assumption of risk."
The Court Opinions that we find that mention the term are broken down as follows. There are over 80 Court Opinions in New York that have used the term.
N.C.G.S. §§ 50-16.1A(3) and 50-16.3A(d).
The (state number) issue reads: Did the [plaintiff] [defendant] (fn1), (state name of offending spouse), commit marital misconduct during the marriage [and prior to or on the date of separation] (fn2) of the plaintiff and the defendant?
On this issue the burden of proof is on the [plaintiff] [defendant]. This means the [plaintiff] [defendant] must prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that during the marriage [and prior to or on the date of separation] of the plaintiff and the defendant, the [plaintiff] [defendant] committed marital misconduct.
Finally, as to this (state number) issue on which the [plaintiff] [defendant], (state name of offended spouse), has the burden of proof, if you find by the greater weight of the evidence, that during the marriage [and prior to or on the date of separation] of the plaintiff and the defendant, the [plaintiff] [defendant], (state name of offending spouse), committed marital misconduct, then it would be your duty to answer this issue "Yes" in favor of the [plaintiff] [defendant].
If, on the other hand, you fail to so find, then it would be your duty to answer this issue "No" in favor of the [plaintiff] [defendant].
FOOTNOTE 1. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A(d) (stating that "[i]n the claim for alimony, either spouse may request a jury trial on the issue of marital misconduct as defined in [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 50-16.1A. If a jury trial is requested, the jury will decide whether either spouse or both have established marital misconduct.").
FOOTNOTE 2. The acts set out in the instruction are included within the definition of "marital misconduct" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3) if such acts "occur[red] during the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation."
FOOTNOTE 3. regarding certain acts of marital misconduct, then N.C.P.I.-Civil 101.38 ("Evidence - Invocation by Witness of Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination") may be appropriate. See, e.g., In re Estate of Trogdon, 330 N.C. 143, 152, 409 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1991) (privilege invoked when wife questioned concerning adultery).
FOOTNOTE 4. Unlike several of the statutory acts of marital misconduct set out in the instruction, "it is not necessary to couple the allegation of [adultery] with a denial of provocation." Brooks v. Brooks, 226 N.C. 280, 285, 37 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1946). See also 6 Suzanne Reynolds, Lee's North Carolina Family Law§ 6.9 (noting that "no conduct by the complaining spouse justifies the other spouse to commit adultery or become an habitual drunkard; therefore, neither of these grounds requires the complaining spouse to allege and prove that the conduct was 'unprovoked.'") and Greene v. Greene, 15 N.C. App. 314, 316-18, 190 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1972) (noting that "'[c]onnivance in the law of divorce is the plaintiff's consent, express or implied, to the misconduct alleged as a ground for divorce.' (Citation omitted). 'Connivance, or procurement, denotes direction, influence, personal exertion, or other action with knowledge or belief that such action would produce certain results and which results are produced.' (Citation omitted). 'The basis of connivance is the maxim "volenti non fit injuria," or that one is not legally injured if he has consented to the act complained of or was willing that it should occur. It is also said that the basis of the defense of connivance is the doctrine of unclean hands.'" (citation omitted)).
FOOTNOTE 5. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3)a.
FOOTNOTE 6. Id. at § 50-16.1A(3)b. If the issue is raised, and in the absence of an applicable decision from North Carolina's appellate courts, the Civil Subcommittee of the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction Committee recommends that the date of filing be referenced as the date of "this proceeding."
FOOTNOTE 7. Id. at § 50-16.1A(3)c. For cases involving indignities, abandonment and cruelty see Earp v. Earp, 52 N.C. App. 145, 277 S.E.2d 877 (1981), Privette v. Privette, Sr., 30 N.C. App. 305, 227 S.E.2d 137 (1976), and Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).
On the issue of including lack of provocation as an element of abandonment, see n.15 infra.
FOOTNOTE 8. For an instruction on intent, see N.C.P.I.--Civil 101.46.
FOOTNOTE 9. Panhorst v. Panhorst, 277 N.C. 664, 178 S.E.2d 387 (1971); Murray v. Murray, 37 N.C. App. 406, 246 S.E.2d 52 (1978), aff'd, 296 N.C. 405, 250 S.E.2d 276 (1979), and Lin v. Lin, 108 N.C. App. 772, 776, 429 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1993).
FOOTNOTE 10. See Panhorst, 277 N.C. at 671, 178 S.E.2d at 392. Abandonment without physically leaving the home is generally referred to as "constructive abandonment." See, e.g., Walker v. Walker, 143 N.C. App. 414, 420-21, 546 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2001) (evidence that husband "drank excessively, would not come home in the evenings after work, spent many weekends at the coast without his family, and was removed from the home [pursuant to a Chapter 50B emergency protective order] due to his violent behavior towards" the wife would allow a verdict in favor of, the wife "on the issue of constructive abandonment," notwithstanding "that he could not have actually abandoned [the wife] because he was forcibly removed from the marital home pursuant to a[n] . . . emergency protective order"), and Somerset v. Somerset, 3 N.C. App. 473, 476, 165 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1969) ("We perceive no reason why [wife]'s seeking the aid of the Domestic Relations Court should detract from her cause of action. It was for the jury to determine whether [husband]'s conduct prior to the [emergency protective] order . . . would justify [the wife] in seeking the aid of the Courts and thereby constitute a constructive abandonment by him. Defendant cannot hide behind the order which his own improper conduct brought about.").
FOOTNOTE 11. Eggleston v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 668, 47 S.E.2d 243 (1948).
FOOTNOTE 12. See, generally, Ellinwood v. Ellinwood, 88 N.C. App. 119, 121-23, 362 S.E.2d 584, 586-87 (1987) (discussing neglect and constructive abandonment).
FOOTNOTE 13. See Brady v. Brady, 273 N.C. 299, 303-05, 160 S.E.2d 13, 16-18 (1968).
FOOTNOTE 14. Merely sleeping in a separate bedroom is not abandonment. See Oakley v. Oakley, 54 N.C. App. 161, 162, 282 S.E.2d 589, 590 (1981). Nor does abandonment occur when spouses separate by agreement. See Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 390, 218 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1975). "However, where the agreement to separate is induced by the misconduct of one spouse, the other can still maintain the charge of voluntary abandonment . . . . Mere acquiescence in a wrongful and inevitable separation, which the complaining spouse could not prevent after reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, does not make the separation voluntary . . . . Nor under such circumstances, is the innocent party obliged to protest, to exert physical force or other importunity to prevent the other party from leaving." Id.
FOOTNOTE 15. See 6 Suzanne Reynolds, Lee's North Carolina Family Law at § 6.8 (stating that "[a] spouse who ends marital cohabitation has not abandoned the other spouse if ending it was justified; therefore, the law imposes the requirement that a spouse not provoke the separation . . . . Procedurally, North Carolina recognizes the doctrine of provocation by requiring that the spouse alleging abandonment specifically allege and prove absence of provocation.").
FOOTNOTE 16. See Caddell v. Caddell, 236 N.C. 686, 690-91, 73 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1953).
FOOTNOTE 17. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3)d; see also n.21 (discussing lack of provocation as an element of maliciously turning out of doors).
FOOTNOTE 18. See 6 Lee's at § 6.9 (noting that "[t]he ground is self-explanatory, requiring the guilty spouse wrongfully to evict the other spouse.").
FOOTNOTE 19. See, generally, Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857 (1918) (finding that malicious turning out of doors is an instance of abandonment).
FOOTNOTE 20. See Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 452-53, 35 S.E. 414, 415 (1945) (noting that "[i]t is the public policy of the State that a husband shall provide support for himself and family. This duty . . . is an obligation imposed by law, and penal sanctions are provided for its willful neglect or abandonment.").
FOOTNOTE 21. Inclusion of lack of provocation as an element in a malicious turning out-of-doors instruction has been questioned. See 6 Lee's at § 6.9 (stating that "[a]n issue that might arise involves the requirement that the innocent spouse plead and prove absence of provocation. The law has required the complaining spouse to prove lack of provocation as a way to balance the conduct of the spouses: if the conduct of the complaining spouse justified the other spouse to leave or withdraw, then the complaining spouse is not entitled to the relief sought . . . . [I]t is unclear whether malicious turning out of doors [requires specific pleading and proof of lack of provocation]. Since the ground involves malice and extreme conduct, the balancing implicit in the element of 'without provocation' may be inappropriate. At any rate, in the North Carolina cases on malicious turning out of doors, the appellate courts rarely discuss provocation. It may be that when the conduct is egregious enough to raise malicious turning out of doors, the accused parties have lacked the temerity to suggest that the conduct of the evicted spouse excused their own." (citations omitted)).
FOOTNOTE 22. See Caddell, 236 N.C. at 690-91, 73 S.E.2d at 926.
FOOTNOTE 23. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3)e; see also n.6 supra and n.25 infra (discussing the lack of provocation as an element of cruel and barbarous treatment).
FOOTNOTE 24. See Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N.C. 307, 310, 37 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1946).
FOOTNOTE 25. See 6 Lee's at § 6.10 (explaining that "[t]o establish cruelty . . . the complaining party must show . . . the absence of provocation . . . . [T]he requirement to prove absence of provocation has become clearer as the definition of cruelty has expanded. When the law considered only physical violence as cruelty, public policy may have dispensed with the need to establish lack of provocation: surely no conduct of the complaining spouse would justify the other to inflict physical injury. As the law recognized cruelty in conduct that did not involve force, however, establishing lack of provocation became more important. A number of appellate cases in North Carolina have reiterated that cruelty requires allegation and proof that the complaining spouse did not provoke the conduct of the offending spouse." (citations omitted)).
FOOTNOTE 26. See Caddell, 236 N.C. at 690-91, 73 S.E.2d at 926.
FOOTNOTE 27. . See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3)f, Barwick v. Barwick, 228 N.C. 109, 112, 44 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1947), Traywick v. Traywick, 28 N.C. App. 291, 295, 221 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1976), Presson v. Presson, 12 N.C. App. 109, 111, 182 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1971), and n.13 supra; see also n.33 infra (discussing the issue of including lack of provocation as an element of rendering a spouse's condition intolerable and his life burdensome).
FOOTNOTE 28. See 6 Lee's at § 6.11 ("Cruelty, especially mental cruelty, is a close cousin of indignities . . . , and the development of indignities in this state parallels the development of cruelty in other states.").
FOOTNOTE 29. See id. at § 6.12A ("Indignities need not involve force or the fear of it.").
FOOTNOTE 30. See Traywick v. Traywick, 28 N.C. App. 291, 295, 221 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1976); see also Miller v. Miller, 78 N.C. 102, 106-07 (1878) ("It would be impossible . . . to decide with any precision the course of conduct which will amount to . . . 'indignities.'").
FOOTNOTE 32. See Sanders, 157 N.C. at 233, 72 S.E. at 877-78 ("The station in life, the temperament, state of health, habits and feelings of different persons are so unlike that treatment which would send the broken heart of one to the grave would make no sensible impression upon another.").
FOOTNOTE 33. See 6 Lee's at § 6.14 ("As developed in the North Carolina law of indignities, the provocation element requires the fact finder to weigh the conduct of the spouses and decide their relative responsibility. If the accused spouse is more blameworthy, then the complaining spouse has satisfied lack of provocation. The complaining spouse need not establish total absence of blame . . . . If the indignities cannot be explained away by the conduct of the complaining spouse, then the complaining spouse has not provoked the indignities." (citations omitted); id at § 6.14(A) ("In North Carolina, the law requires not only allegations of lack of provocation but sufficient specificity to enable the accused spouse to counter them." (citations omitted)); and id at § 6.14(B) ("To establish lack of provocation for indignities . . . , the complaining party need not establish that his or her conduct was perfect; only that it does not excuse the conduct of the accused spouse . . . . At least in the appellate cases, the complaining parties almost always prove absence of provocation, and when they do not, it is usually because the provoking conduct itself amount to marital misconduct . . . . [However, the] provoking conduct may not need to amount to marital misconduct. Whether the complaining party has satisfied the absence of provocation rests with the finder of fact, and often the appellate cases suggest that the complaining party has carried the burden of proving lack of provocation without offering much evidence of it." (citations omitted)).
FOOTNOTE 34. See Caddell, 236 N.C. at 690-91, 73 S.E.2d at 926.
FOOTNOTE 35. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3)g; see also Skamarak v. Skamarak, 81 N.C. App. 125, 128, 343 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1986).
FOOTNOTE 36. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3)g.
FOOTNOTE 37. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3)h; see, e.g., Best v. Best, 228 N.C. 9, 44 S.E.2d 214,(1947) (finding that the wife's allegations that the husband was a habitual drunkard stated a cause of action for alimony without divorce under North Carolina law).
Similar to the adultery, the "law apparently does not require the spouse who complains of excessive use of alcohol or drugs to establish lack of provocation." 6 Lee's at § 6.15.
FOOTNOTE 38. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(3)i; see also VanDooren v. VanDooren, 37 N.C. App. 333, 335, 246 S.E.2d 20, 22, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 258 (1978).
FOOTNOTE 39. See id. at 335, 246 S.E.2d at 22.

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