Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1010187.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 15:25:08+00:00

Document:
TOM v. San Francisco Tenants Union, Intervenor and Appellant.
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.
Jun Wai TOM et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Appellants; San Francisco Tenants Union, Intervenor and Appellant.
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Andrew W. Schwartz, and Susan Cleveland-Knowles, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendants and Appellants. Randall M. Shaw, San Francisco, Stephen L. Collier, Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc., for Intervener and Appellant. Andrew M. Zacks, James B. Kraus, Paul F. Utrecht, Barbara Herzig, Herzig & Berlese, San Francisco, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
The trial court ruled that a local San Francisco ordinance, seeking to discourage persons from acquiring private residential property using tenants in common (TIC) agreements, violated the constitutional rights of privacy and equal protection guaranteed by the California Constitution, and was preempted by the state Ellis Act, Government Code, section 7060 et seq. We affirm the judgment.
The San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed the ordinance in issue in this appeal in order to discourage the use of TIC agreements in the conversion of rental housing to owner occupied housing, by regulating and forbidding such ERO agreements. The San Francisco City (City) ordinance requires that all parties to a TIC agreement have a right of access to all units on the property, i.e., they cannot agree to occupy separate units with an exclusive right of occupancy. The ordinance does this by amending the San Francisco Subdivision Code in numerous respects, by adding language to sections 1302, 1308, 1359, 1388, 1396, and 1396.1 so as to regulate and require recordation of ERO's.
The ordinance also contains exemptions from this rule for some, but not all, relatives, exempting persons who are “related to each other as grandparents, parents, brothers, sisters, children, grandchildren, or spouses, or are registered as Domestic Partners․” The ordinance also exempts certain preexisting TIC's, established before July 15, 2001.
The effect of the ordinance is that unrelated persons who reside in multi-unit buildings subject to the ordinance would be required to share occupancy of their dwelling units with each other, or could not prevent other cotenants from entering their private living space.
Former Mayor Willie Brown initially vetoed the City ordinance, citing concerns as to its validity and wisdom, but the City board of supervisors overrode his veto.
Respondents in this appeal are homeowners, tenants, and landlords who desire to occupy or convert property using a TIC agreement, with an ERO for each of their separate units. They brought this action seeking a writ of mandate to overturn the ordinance, contending the ordinance violated their constitutional rights of privacy in their homes, violated equal protection principles, and was preempted by the state Ellis Act, Government Code sections 7060 et seq.
The lower court granted the writ of mandate, as well as the related motion for summary judgment, ruling that the ordinance was preempted by the statewide Ellis Act, and was in violation of constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection. This appeal followed.
We agree with the trial court that there is an “autonomy privacy” interest in choosing the persons with whom a person will reside, and in excluding others from one's private residence. Such was the case in City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 126-134, 164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436 (City of Santa Barbara ), where our Supreme Court held that a city could not constitutionally enforce a local ordinance that regulated the number or type of unrelated persons with whom adults chose to reside in a home.
The City further suggests that, even where the ordinance applies, any governmental invasion is “indirect and attenuated.” According to the City, the ordinance “does not require plaintiffs to own a unit without an ERO. It simply forces plaintiffs to choose between a TIC without an ERO and numerous other forms of occupancy.” The City suggests the respondents should instead acquire one of the several types of homes not affected by the ordinance, such as a single-family house; or a unit not affected by the ordinance, because the TIC was formed prior to the effective date of the ordinance; or respondents should convert their homes into condominiums.
The City also refers us to two cases to support its argument that no privacy right is implicated. We find these cases are distinguishable.
Ortiz v. Los Angeles Police Relief Assn. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1312, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 (Ortiz ), is cited by the City as being instructive of the proposition that “indirect and attenuated impacts of government regulation on family relationships do not violate constitutional privacy rights.” In Ortiz, the Second Appellate District upheld a conflict of interest rule of a private police benefits organization, which barred prison inmates or their spouses from employment as benefits administrators with access to confidential files regarding health and retirement claims of police officers. (Id. at pp. 1295-1296, 1312, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 670.) Ms. Ortiz, a benefits administrator, was given the choice of either terminating her employment or her marriage plans with the inmate. She chose to terminate the employment and sue, alleging a violation of the state Constitution's right of privacy.
While Ortiz found a privacy interest was implicated, the privacy interest was outweighed by a legitimate employer interest in officer safety-a conflict of interest rule designed to protect the safety of peace officers. (Oritz, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1312-1313, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 670.) The case under review does not involve conflicts of interest laws or anti-nepotism rules. Nor does the City claim that allowing persons to enjoy privacy rights in their homes “could jeopardize the personal safety” of others. (Id. at p. 1313, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 670.) Because the instant case involves privacy rights in homes, as opposed to employment that is subject to legitimate concerns regarding security issues, we do not view Ortiz as particularly instructive.
In analyzing the question of whether a privacy right is implicated, we find guidance in a recent decision of the Second District, Coalition Advocating Legal Housing Options v. City of Santa Monica (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 451, 458-461, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 (CALHO ). We find its analysis persuasive.
The ordinance under review in CALHO sought to regulate the types and numbers of persons who could reside in a multi-unit home on the same residential property. The question for the court was whether this local ordinance violated the constitutional right of privacy of homeowners. The Second District Court of Appeal, analyzing the issue under Hill, supra, and City of Santa Barbara, supra, found that the local ordinance unconstitutionally infringed the right of privacy in the home: “It is clear from City of Santa Barbara that the right to choose with whom to live is fundamental-not ‘so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion’ as to require no justification-and nothing in any subsequent case suggests otherwise. The suggestion that this right may be curtailed when the home is constructed with independent living facilities included is unpersuasive. The Hill threshold requirements are plainly met.” (CALHO, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 460-461, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, fn. omitted; see also College Area Renters & Landlord Assn. v. City of San Diego (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 677, 691, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 515 (CARLA ) [noting in dicta that “any laws which involve intrusion into the inhabitation of bedrooms and living rooms would likely trigger privacy concerns.”].) Guided by the rationale and logic of CALHO, supra, we conclude this threshold requirement of a privacy violation is clearly met.
As we have indicated, the City suggests this privacy invasion is not “serious.” According to the City, persons may choose whether to “consent” to or “forgo” such an invasion of their privacy, by deciding whether or not to buy a home affected by the City's TIC ordinance.
The City did not bear its burden of demonstrating a sufficiently strong countervailing interest, and in fact the City contends it had no duty under Hill to do so. We note, however, that the City does maintain in other related contexts that it had an interest in enacting the ordinance in order to preserve rental housing, by limiting the right of homeowners under the Ellis Act to go out of the business of renting, and in possibly “protecting consumers” by explicitly stating that owners of TIC's were allowed to enter each other's homes. We will consider these factors as the City's expression of countervailing interests.
First, we find it difficult to understand how violating privacy rights protects the consumers whose privacy is being violated. The City must provide a justification for the privacy violation in issue, not simply a general assertion that a law might serve some possible public goal. (See Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633; CALHO, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 460-461, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 802.) While providing more rental housing may be a laudable goal in the abstract, it is not a sufficiently strong countervailing interest for the City in these circumstances, for at least two reasons.
Second, and more critically, a governmental interest in precluding homeowners from going out of the landlord business would not justify an extreme privacy violation, such as rendering homeowners unable to determine the persons with whom they should live, or forcing them to share their homes with others who are unwelcome. (See Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633; City of Santa Barbara, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 128-134, 164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436; CALHO, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 460-461, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 802; cf. also Cwynar v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 637, 660-663, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 233.) The City has failed to advanced adequate countervailing interests, so as to justify the privacy invasion in issue.
Had the City met its burden of articulating a countervailing governmental interest, we would then proceed to the next stage of the Hill analysis: “The plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a defendant's assertion of countervailing interests by showing there are feasible and effective alternatives to defendant's conduct which have a lesser impact on privacy interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) Because the City did not bear its burden in this respect, we need not proceed to the question of whether respondents sufficiently rebutted the City's asserted countervailing interests.
The judgment is affirmed. The request for judicial notice is denied. Costs to respondents.
We concur. JONES, P.J., and GEMELLO, J.

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