Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/511/202/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:14:45+00:00

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Defendants who refuse to settle before trial are not entitled to a credit for the amount of a settlement that other defendants reach with the plaintiff. Instead, the jury's original allocation of responsibility among the parties should be applied.
After a construction accident in the Gulf of Mexico, McDermott, Inc. settled with all of the defendants except AmClyde and River Don Castings, Ltd. After finding that both of those defendants were liable, the jury set the total damages award at $2.1 million, of which 32 percent was assigned to AmClyde and 38 percent to River Don. McDermott appealed the court's allocation of a credit to the defendants based on the settlement awards that it had previously received.
Defendants that refuse to settle with the plaintiff generally are entitled to a credit for settlements between the plaintiff and other tortfeasors involved in the same incident. Two of the ways to do this involve a pro tanto credit, one of which allows for a right of contribution against a settling defendant and the other of which does not. Neither of these methods is as consistent with precedent as the proportionate responsibility method, since it allows a defendant that goes to trial to pay only its proportionate share of the judgment. This method is more likely to reduce unnecessary litigation and preserve commercial relationships by encouraging parties to settle in advance.
By contrast, the pro tanto with contribution method promotes litigation at the expense of settlement negotiations because a defendant that settles could be sued by litigating tortfeasors to contribute more damages. The pro tanto without contribution method might result in the litigating defendant being forced to pay more than its appropriate share of liability if the plaintiff settles with the defendant for less than that defendant's equitable share. It does promote settlement, but it is unnecessary to add this incentive for settlement, and it undermines judicial economy because it postpones the issue of determining liability until trial.
This result gives the victim something resembling a windfall or a double recovery because the approach does not account for the money that the victim previously received in the settlement from the other defendants.
McDERMOTT, INC. v. AMCLYDE ET AL.
When petitioner McDermott, Inc., attempted to use a crane purchased from respondent AmClyde to move an offshore oil and gas production platform, a prong of the crane's hook broke, damaging both the platform and the crane itself. The malfunction may have been caused by McDermott's negligent operation of the crane, by AmClyde's faulty design or construction, by a defect in the hook supplied by respondent River Don Castings, Ltd., or by one or more of the three companies that supplied supporting steel slings. McDermott brought suit in admiralty against respondents and the three "sling defendants," but settled with the latter for $1 million. The case then went to trial, and the jury assessed McDermott's loss at $2.1 million, allocating 32% of the damages to AmClyde, 38% to River Don, and 30% jointly to petitioner and the sling defendants. Among other things, the District Court entered judgment against AmClyde for $672,000 (32% of $2.1 million) and against River Don for $798,000 (38% of $2.1 million). Holding that the contract between McDermott and AmClyde precluded any recovery against the latter and that the trial judge had improperly denied respondents' motion to reduce the judgment against them pro tanto by the settlement amount, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment against AmClyde entirely and reduced the judgment against River Don to $470,000, which it computed by determining McDermott's full award to be $1.47 million ($2.1 million minus 30% attributed to McDermott/sling defendants), and then by deducting the $1 million settlement.
Held: The nonsettling defendants' liability should be calculated with reference to the jury's allocation of proportionate responsibility, not by giving them a credit for the dollar amount of the settlement. Pp. 207-221.
about how that credit should be determined. The American Law Institute (ALl) has identified three principal alternatives for doing so: (1) pro tanto setoff with a right of contribution against the settling defendant; (2) pro tanto setoff without contribution; and (3) the "proportionate share approach," whereby the settlement diminishes the injured party's claim against nonsettling tortfeasors by the amount of the equitable share of the obligation of the settling tortfeasor. pp. 207-211.
(b) ALl Option 3, the proportionate share approach, best answers the question presented in this case. Option 1 is clearly inferior to the other two alternatives, because it discourages settlement and leads to unnecessary ancillary litigation. As between Options 2 and 3, the proportionate share approach is more consistent with the proportionate fault approach of Reliable Transfer, supra, because a litigating defendant ordinarily pays only its proportionate share of the judgment. Conversely, Option 2, even when supplemented with hearings to determine the good faith of the settlement, is likely to lead to inequitable apportionments of liability, contrary to Reliable Transfer. Moreover, although Option 2 sometimes seems to better promote settlement than Option 3, it must ultimately be seen to have no clear advantage in that regard, since, under the proportionate share approach, factors such as the parties' desire to avoid litigation costs, to reduce uncertainty, and to maintain ongoing commercial relationships should ensure nontrial dispositions in the vast majority of cases. Similarly, Option 2 has no clear advantage with respect to judicial economy unless it is adopted without the requirement of a good-faith hearing, a course which no party or amicus advocates because of the large potential for unfairness to nonsettling defendants, who might have to pay more than their fair share of the damages. Pp.211-217.
abrogated by Reliable Transfer and is not in tension with the proportionate share approach. Pp. 218-221.
979 F.2d 1068, reversed and remanded.
Arden J. Lea argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was R. Jeffrey Bridger.
William K. Kelley argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Richard A. Olderman, and David v: Hutchinson.
Robert E. Couhig, Jr., argued the cause for respondents.
A construction accident in the Gulf of Mexico gave rise to this admiralty case. In advance of trial, petitioner, the plaintiff, settled with three of the defendants for $1 million. Respondents, however, did not settle, and the case went to trial. A jury assessed petitioner's loss at $2.1 million and allocated 32% of the damages to respondent AmClyde and 38% to respondent River Don Castings, Ltd. (River Don). The question presented is whether the liability of the non settling defendants should be calculated with reference to the jury's allocation of proportionate responsibility, or by giving the non settling defendants a credit for the dollar amount of the settlement. We hold that the proportionate approach is the correct one.
*Warren B. Daly, Jr., and George W Healy III filed a brief for the Maritime Law Association of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal.
1 "Am Clyde," formerly known as "Clyde Iron," is a division of AMCA International, Inc.
Invoking the federal court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1332 and 1333(1),3 petitioner brought suit against AmClyde and River Don and the three sling defendants. The complaint sought a recovery for both deck damages and crane damages. On the eve of trial, petitioner entered into a settlement with the sling defendants. In exchange for $1 million, petitioner agreed to dismiss with prejudice its claims against the sling defendants, to release them from all liability for either deck or crane damages, and to indemnify them against any contribution action. The trial judge later ruled that petitioner's claim for crane damages was barred by East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858 (1986).
2 The three sling defendants, sometimes also described as the "settling defendants," were International Southwest Slings, Inc.; British Ropes, Ltd.; and Hendrik Veder B. V.
3 Section 1333(1) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
4 McDermott's motive in taking upon itself responsibility for the sling defendant's fault is obscure. Perhaps it thought doing so would prevent a contribution action against the sling defendants and thus relieve McDermott of its indemnity obligation.
5 The special interrogatory treated McDermott and the sling defendants as a single entity and called for a percentage figure that covered them both. This combined treatment reflected McDermott's acceptance of responsibility for the damages caused by the sling defendants.
6 The trial judge also noted that "[tJo hold as the defendants request would result in the settling defendants, who were at the most thirty percent (30%) responsible for the accident (no separate contributory negligence, if any, finding was made as to McDermott), paying One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) while the defendants who insisted on a trial and were found to be seventy percent (70%) liable would pay Four Hundred and Seventy Thousand Dollars ($470,000.00) between them. That is unjust .... " App. to Pet. for Cert. A-52 to A-53.
$470,000." Ibid. It treated this figure as the maximum that could be recovered from the nonsettling defendants. Because it was less than River Don's liability as found by the jury (38% of $2.1 million or $798,000), it directed the entry of judgment against River Don in that amount. Ibid.
Because we have not previously considered how a settlement with less than all of the defendants in an admiralty case should affect the liability of nonsettling defendants, and because the Courts of Appeals have adopted different approaches to this important question, we granted certiorari. 509 U. S. 921 (1993).
Although Congress has enacted significant legislation in the field of admiralty law,7 none of those statutes provides us with any "policy guidance" or imposes any limit on our authority to fashion the rule that will best answer the question presented by this case. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 27 (1990). We are, nevertheless, in familiar waters because "the Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime." United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397, 409 (1975).
7 See, e. g., Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950; Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U. S. C. §§ 761-768; Public Vessels Act, 46 U. S. C. §§781-790.
negligence, we concluded that it was "unnecessarily crude and inequitable" and that "[p]otential problems of proof in some cases hardly require adherence to an archaic and unfair rule in all cases." Id., at 407. Thus the interest in certainty and simplicity served by the old rule was outweighed by the interest in fairness promoted by the proportionate fault rule.
"(1) The money paid extinguishes any claim that the injured party has against the party released and the amount of his remaining claim against the other tortfeasor is reached by crediting the amount received; but the transaction does not affect a claim for contribution by another tortfeasor who has paid more than his equitable share of the obligation." Id., at 343.
The first two alternatives involve the kind of "pro tanto" credit that respondents urge us to adopt. The difference between the two versions of the pro tanto approach is the recognition of a right of contribution against a settling defendant in the first but not the second. The third alternative, supported by petitioner, involves a credit for the settling defendants' "proportionate share" of responsibility for the total obligation. Under this approach, no suits for contribution from the settling defendants are permitted, nor are they necessary, because the nonsettling defendants pay no more than their share of the judgment.
8 The three alternatives sketched by the ALl correspond to three detailed model Acts proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1939 Act), 12 U. L. A. 57-59 (1975) (ALl Option 1); Revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955 Revised Act), id., at 63-107 (ALl Option 2); Uniform Comparative Fault Act (1977 Act), 12 U. L. A. 45-61 (1993 Supp.) (ALl Option 3). Although the three ALl options are the most plausible, a number of others are possible. So, for example, in addition to arguing for the pro tanto rule, respondents suggest that we consider a rule that allows the nonsettling defendants to elect before trial either the pro tanto or the proportionate share rule. Although respondents claim support for their proposal in Texas and New York statutes, those statutes enact regimes quite different from that proposed by respondents. Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.012(b) (Supp. 1994) (nonsettling defendant can choose pro tanto rule or reduction of damages by fixed proportion of total damages without regard to relative fault); N. Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 15-108 (McKinney 1989) (pro tanto rule or proportionate share rule, whichever favors nonsettling defendants). We are unwilling to consider a rule that has yet to be applied in any jurisdiction.
9 In this opinion, we use the phrase "proportionate share approach" to denote ALl Option 3. We have deliberately avoided use of the term "pro rata," which is often used to describe this approach, see, e. g., T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §4-15, p. 153 (1987), because that term is also used to describe an equal allocation among all defendants without regard to their relative responsibility for the loss. See In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan and IRAP Litigation, 957 F.2d 1020, 1028 (CA2 1992); Silver, Contribution Under the Securities Acts: The Pro Rata Method Revisited, 1992/1993 Ann. Survey Am. L. 273. Others have used different terms to describe the approach adopted here. Ibid. ("proportionate method"); Kornhauser & Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability, 68 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 427, 438 (1993) ("apportioned share set-off rule"); Polinsky & Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 447 (1981) ("claim reduction").
10 It might be thought that, since AmClyde is immune from damages, River Don's liability should be $1.47 million (McDermott's $2.1 million loss minus 30% of $2.1 million, the share of liability attributed to the settling defendants and McDermott). This calculation would make River Don responsible not only for its own 38% share, but also for the 32% of the damages allocated by the jury to AmClyde. This result could be seen as mandated by principles of joint and several liability and by Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256 (1979). See infra, at 220-221. Nevertheless, McDermott has not requested that River Don pay any more than its 38% share of the damages. AmClyde is immune from damages because its contract with McDermott provided that free replacement of defective parts "shall constitute fulfillment of all liabilities ... whether based upon Contract, tort, strict liability or otherwise." 979 F.2d 1068, 1075 (CA5 1993) (emphasis omitted). The best way of viewing this contractual provision is as a quasi settlement in advance of any tort claims. Viewed as such, the proportionate credit in this case properly takes into account both the 30% of liability apportioned to the settling defendants (and McDermott) and the 32% allocated to AmClyde. This leaves River Don with $798,000 or 38% of the damages.
appeals that holding. Although AmClyde spent a considerable amount replacing the defective hook, River Don does not argue that that amount should be included in the calculation of its liability.
12 Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the pro tanto rule in the context of McDermott's acceptance of responsibility for the sling damages is a difficult question. Fortunately, since we adopt the proportionate share approach, we need not answer it.
13 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4 (1955 Revised Act), Commissioners' Comment, 12 U. L. A. 99 (1975); Kornhauser & Revesz, 68 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 474; Polinsky & Shavell, 33 Stan. L. Rev., at 458-459, 462, 463. This argument assumes, in accordance with the law of most jurisdictions, that a settling defendant ordinarily has no right of contribution against other defendants. See Uniform Contribution Against Tortfeasors Act § l(d), 12 U. L. A. 63 (1975); Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 4(b), 12 U. L. A. 54 (1993 Supp.); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(2) and Comment 1, pp. 337, 339 (1977).
which it pays less than the amount a court later determines is its share of liability, the other defendant (or defendants) can sue the settling defendant for contribution. The settling defendant thereby loses the benefit of its favorable settlement. In addition, the claim for contribution burdens the courts with additional litigation. The plaintiff can mitigate the adverse effect on settlement by promising to indemnify the settling defendant against contribution, as McDermott did here. This indemnity, while removing the disincentive to settlement, adds yet another potential burden on the courts, an indemnity action between the settling defendant and plaintiff.
14 Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff sues two defendants, each equally responsible, and settles with one for $250,000. At trial, the nonsettling defendant is found liable, and plaintiff's damages are assessed at $1 million. Under the pro tanto rule, the nonsettling defendant would be liable for 75% of the damages ($750,000, which is $1 million minus $250,000). The litigating defendant is thus responsible for far more than its proportionate share of the damages. It is also possible for the pro tanto rule to result in the nonsettlor paying less than its apportioned share, if, as in this case, the settlement is greater than the amount later determined by the court to be the settlors' equitable share. For a more complex example illustrating the potential for unfairness under the pro tanto rule when the parties are not equally at fault, see Kornhauser & Revesz, 68 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 455-456 (pro tanto rule can lead to defendant responsible for 75% of damages paying only 37.5% of loss, while 25% responsible defendant pays 31.25%).
15 In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan and IRAP Litigation, 957 F.2d 1020 (CA2 1992); Miller v. Christopher, 887 F.2d 902, 906-907 (CA9 1989); Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P. 2d 159 (1985); Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4 (1955 Revised Act), 12 U. L. A. 98 (1975) (enacted as statute law in 19 States, 12 U. L. A. 81 (1993 Supp.)).
16 Tech-Bilt, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d, at 499, 698 P. 2d, at 166; Miller, 887 F. 2d, at 907; In re Masters, 957 F. 2d, at 1031; but see Noyes v. Raymond, 28 Mass. App. 186, 190, 548 N. E. 2d 196, 199 (1990) (judge in good-faith hearing should not scrutinize the settlement amount, but merely look for "collusion, fraud, dishonesty, and other wrongful conduct").
17 Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1230 (CA9 1989).
18 Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d, at 500, 698 P. 2d, at 167 ("[T]he determination of good faith can be made by the court on the basis of affidavits"); TBG Inc. v. Bendis, 811 F. Supp. 596, 605, n. 17, 608 (Kan. 1992) (no "mini trial" required; settlement amount is "best available measure of liability").
cess at trial is uncertain.19 In sum, the pro tanto approach, even when supplemented with good-faith hearings, is likely to lead to inequitable apportionments of liability, contrary to Reliable Transfer.
19 Suppose again, as in footnote 14, that plaintiff sues two equally culpable defendants for $1 million and settles with one for $250,000. At the good-faith hearing, the settling defendant persuasively demonstrates that the settlement is in good faith, because it shows that its share of liability is 50% and that plaintiff has only a 50% chance of prevailing at trial. The settlement thus reflects exactly the settling defendant's expected liability. If plaintiff prevails at trial, the nonsettling defendant will again be liable for 75% of the judgment even though its equitable share is only 50%. The only way to avoid this inequity is for the judge at the good-faith hearing to disallow any settlement for less than $500,000, that is, any settlement which takes into account the uncertainty of recovery at trial. Such a policy, however, carries a grave cost. It would make settlement extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, in most cases. As a result, every jurisdiction that conducts a good-faith inquiry into the amount of the settlement takes into account the uncertainty of recovery at trial. Miller, 887 F. 2d, at 907-908; Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d, at 499, 698 P. 2d, at 166; TBG Inc., 811 F. Supp., at 600.
60% of $75), which is more than the $60 (60% of $100) the plaintiff would expect if he went to trial against both defendants. For a more thorough discussion of settlement under the pro tanto rule, see Kornhauser & Revesz, 68 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 447-465.
21 See H. Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law § 14.6, p. 377 (1985), summarizing Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J. Law & Econ. 331, 353-360 (1980).
22 Less than 5% of cases filed in federal court end in trial. Administrative Office of United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, 186, 217 (1991) (Of 211,713 civil cases terminated between July 1, 1990, and June 30, 1991, only 11,024 involved trials). Although some of the nontrial terminations are the result of pretrial adjudications, such as summary judgments and contested motions to dismiss, the bulk of the nontrial terminations reflect settlements. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 Judicature 161, 163-164 (1986).
23 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397, 408 (1975) ("Congestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply to encourage speedy out-of-court accommodations").
24 An excellent discussion of the effect of the various rules on settlement is Kornhauser & Revesz, Settlement Under Joint and Several Liability, 68 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 427 (1993). Mter considering the effects of strategic behavior, litigation costs, and whether the probabilities of the defendants' being found liable at trial are "independent" or "correlated," they conclude that "neither rule is consistently better than the other." Id., at 492. In addition, in comparing the pro tanto and proportionate share rules, they generally assume that the pro tanto rule is implemented without goodfaith hearings. Good-faith hearings, however, "mak[e] the pro tanto setoff rule relatively less desirable from the perspective of inducing settlements than the apportioned [i. e. proportionate] share set-off rule." Id., at 476. Moreover, the pro tanto rule contains a unique disincentive to settlement in cases, like this one, in which the settlement covers more items of damage than the litigated judgment. McDermott argued that the settlement covered damage both to the crane and to the deck, whereas the judgment against River Don related only to the deck. The Court of Appeals refused to apportion the settlement between deck damages and crane damages and to credit River Don only with that portion related to deck damages. 979 F. 2d, at 1080. This refusal to apportion will greatly discourage settlement, because parties like McDermott will be unable to recover their full damages if they settle with one party.
25 By referring to the relative fault of the parties, we express no disapproval of the lower courts' use of relative "causation" to allocate damages. See 979 F. 2d, at 1081-1082.
In sum, although the arguments for the two approaches are closely matched, we are persuaded that the proportionate share approach is superior, especially in its consistency with Reliable Transfer.
26 A further cost of the pro tanto rule would be incurred in cases in which the settlement covered more items of damage than the judgment. See n. 24, supra. To avoid discouraging settlement, the judge would have to figure out what proportion of the settlement related to damages covered by the judgment and what percentage related to damages covered only by the settlement. Presumably this allocation would be done by comparing the settling defendant's liability for the damages to be covered by the judgment to those not so covered. Ascertaining the liability of a settling defendant for damages not otherwise litigated at trial would be at least as difficult as ascertaining an absent defendant's responsibility for damages already the subject of litigation.
Respondents advance two additional arguments against the proportionate share approach: that it violates the "one satisfaction rule" and that it is inconsistent with Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256 (1979).
27 Conway v. Pottsville Union Traction Co., 253 Pa. 211, 97 A. 1058 (1916); Rogers v. Cox, 66 N. J. L. 432, 50 A. 143 (1901); w. Prosser, Law of Torts § 109, pp. 1105-1111 (1941).
28W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 49, pp. 333-334 (5th ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885(1), Comment b, at 334.
29 Rose v. Associated Anesthesiologists, 501 F.2d 806, 809 (CADC 1974); Sanders v. Cole Municipal Finance, 489 N. E. 2d 117, 120 (Ind. App. 1986).
fault, and that it would be overcompensatory for McDermott to receive more than the percentage of the total loss allocated to the defendants, here $1.47 million (70% of $2.1 million).
30 See 4 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 25.22 (2d ed. 1986) (injured person can recover full damages from tortfeasor, even when he has already been made whole by insurance or other compensatory payment); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(2) (1977). The one satisfaction rule once applied to compensatory payments by nonparties as well, thus preventing or diminishing recovery in many situations in which the collateral benefits rules would now permit full judgment against the tortfeasor. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 109, pp. 1105-1107 (1941).
the amounts a trier of fact would have set. It seems to us that a plaintiff's good fortune in striking a favorable bargain with one defendant gives other defendants no claim to pay less than their proportionate share of the total loss. In fact, one of the virtues of the proportionate share rule is that, unlike the pro tanto rule, it does not make a litigating defendant's liability dependent on the amount of a settlement negotiated by others without regard to its interests.
31 Uniform Comparative Fault Act §2, Comment "Joint and Several Liability and Equitable Shares of the Obligation," 12 U. L. A. 51 (1993 Supp.).
has been a judgment against multiple defendants. It can result in one defendant's paying more than its apportioned share of liability when the plaintiff's recovery from other defendants is limited by factors beyond the plaintiff's control, such as a defendant's insolvency. When the limitations on the plaintiff's recovery arise from outside forces, joint and several liability makes the other defendants, rather than an innocent plaintiff, responsible for the shortfall. Ibid.32 Unlike the rule in Edmonds, the proportionate share rule announced in this opinion applies when there has been a settlement. In such cases, the plaintiff's recovery against the settling defendant has been limited not by outside forces, but by its own agreement to settle. There is no reason to allocate any shortfall to the other defendants, who were not parties to the settlement. Just as the other defendants are not entitled to a reduction in liability when the plaintiff negotiates a generous settlement, see supra, at 219-220, so they are not required to shoulder disproportionate liability when the plaintiff negotiates a meager one.
32 See also Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 2 (reallocation of insolvent defendant's equitable share), id., at 50.

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