Source: https://casetext.com/case/aaaaar-constr-of-orthopedic-appliances-inc-v-vill-of-brewster
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 01:07:48+00:00

Document:
A.A.A.A.A.R. CONSTRUCTION OF ORTHOPEDIC APPLIANCES, INC., doing business as A.A.A.A.A.R. Orthopedics, Inc., appellant, v. VILLAGE OF BREWSTER, et al., respondents.
Pamela Gabiger, Poughkeepsie, NY, for appellant. Henderson & Brennan, White Plains, NY (Brian C. Henderson of counsel), for respondent Village of Brewster. Pillinger Miller Tarallo, LLP (Thomas Torto, New York, NY, of counsel), for respondent Laws Construction Corp. Penino & Moynihan, LLP, White Plains, NY (Scott D. Taffet of counsel), for respondent Lumar Plumbing & Heating, Inc.
Pamela Gabiger, Poughkeepsie, NY, for appellant.
Henderson & Brennan, White Plains, NY (Brian C. Henderson of counsel), for respondent Village of Brewster.
Pillinger Miller Tarallo, LLP (Thomas Torto, New York, NY, of counsel), for respondent Laws Construction Corp.
Penino & Moynihan, LLP, White Plains, NY (Scott D. Taffet of counsel), for respondent Lumar Plumbing & Heating, Inc.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, ROBERT J. MILLER, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for injury to property, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Lubell, J.), dated June 29, 2015, as denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to supplement its bill of particulars to assert, inter alia, a theory of recovery based on violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ).
The plaintiff allegedly suffered damage to its property following a water main break on August 5, 2005. In its notice of claim, dated October 31, 2005, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Village of Brewster was negligent in allowing water to enter the plaintiff's place of business.
In 2006, the plaintiff commenced this action against the Village, and others, alleging negligence in causing the water main break and resulting damage to the plaintiff's property. In 2007, the plaintiff served a bill of particulars alleging, in relevant part, that "the [d]efendants, their agents, servants and/or employees were negligent and grossly negligent in that they dug up and excavated the ... intersection of Main Street and Oak Street in Brewster, New York in such a manner which [caused] piping and plumbing located underneath [the] intersection ... to break and become defective, resulting in large quantities of water to discharge ... into the [p]laintiff's premises and property."
Eight years later, in 2015, the plaintiff, represented by new counsel, sought leave to supplement its bill of particulars to include new allegations of wrongdoing against the defendants, including, inter alia, a theory of recovery based on violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ; hereinafter RICO).
CPLR 203[f] ; see Hustedt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jones, Little & Co., 129 A.D.3d 669, 670, 8 N.Y.S.3d 917 ).
Since the new allegations contained in the supplemental bill of particulars were time-barred or otherwise patently lacking in merit, the plaintiff's motion for leave to supplement its bill of particulars was properly denied (see Calamari v. Panos, 131 A.D.3d at 1091, 16 N.Y.S.3d 824 ; Holmes v. Town of Oyster Bay, 82 A.D.3d 1047, 1049, 919 N.Y.S.2d 207 ).

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