Source: https://casetext.com/case/adkins-v-astrue-6
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:47:00+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff, Aaron Adkins, filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, ("Commissioner"), denying Adkins's claims for supplemental security income, ("SSI"), and disability insurance benefits, ("DIB"), under the Social Security Act, as amended, ("Act"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 423 and § 1381 et seq. (West 2003 Supp. 2008). Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) (West 2003 Supp. 2008). This case is before the undersigned magistrate judge by referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). As directed by the order of referral, the undersigned now submits the following report and recommended disposition.
The court's review in this case is limited to determining if the factual findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence has been defined as "evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). "`If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is "substantial evidence."'" Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws, 368 F.2d at 642).
By decision dated February 22, 2007, the ALJ denied Adkins's claims. (R. at 13-22.) The ALJ found that Adkins met the disability insured status requirements of the Act for DIB purposes through December 31, 2006. (R. at 15.) The ALJ found that Adkins had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of September 8, 2005. (R. at 15.) The ALJ also found that the medical evidence established that Adkins had severe impairments, namely a back disorder with associated pain, borderline intellectual functioning, alcohol abuse, depressive disorder and an anxiety disorder, but he found that Adkins did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart, Appendix 1. (R. at 16-17.) The ALJ found that Adkins had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, but that he should avoid activities that required more than occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, that he should avoid even moderate exposure to hazardous machinery and heights, that he would be limited to simple, unskilled work and that he should avoid direct contact with the public. (R. at 18.) Thus, he found that Adkins was unable to perform any of his past relevant work. (R. at 21.) Based on Adkins's age, education, work history and residual functional capacity and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Adkins could perform, including those of a packager, an assembler and a food preparer. (R. at 21.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that Adkins was not under a disability under the Act and was not eligible for DIB or SSI benefits. (R. at 22.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g) (2007).
Light work involves lifting items weighing up to 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of items weighing up to 10 pounds. If an individual can perform light work, he also can perform sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b) (2007).
After the ALJ issued his decision, Adkins pursued his administrative appeals, (R. at 9), but the Appeals Council denied his request for review. (R. at 5-8.) Adkins then filed this action seeking review of the ALJ's unfavorable decision, which now stands as the Commissioner's final decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 (2007). The case is before this court on Adkins's motion for summary judgment filed March 28, 2008, and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment filed April 8, 2008.
Heavy work involves lifting items weighing up to 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carry of items weighing up to 50 pounds. If an individual can perform heavy work, he also can perform medium, light and sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(d), 416.967(d) (2007).
Sedentary work involves lifting items weighing up to 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles such as docket files, ledgers and small tools. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a) (2007).
In rendering his decision, the ALJ reviewed records from Stone Mountain Health Services; Dr. Ranjy C. Basa, M.D.; Dr. Thomas Roatsey, D.O.; Dr. Shirish Shahane, M.D., a state agency physician; Howard S. Leizer, Ph.D., a state agency psychologist; B. Wayne Lanthorn, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist; Donna Abbott, M.A., a licensed senior psychological examiner; Dr. Frank M. Johnson, M.D., a state agency physician; Louis Perrott, Ph.D., a state agency psychologist; Dr. John Marshall, M.D.; St. Mary's Hospital; and Holston Valley Hospital. Adkins's attorney also submitted medical reports from Dr. Roatsey to the Appeals Council.
Since the Appeals Council considered this evidence in reaching its decision not to grant review, (R. at 5-8), this court also should consider this evidence in determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. See Wilkins v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health Human Servs., 953 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir. 1991).
The GAF scale ranges from zero to 100 and "[c]onsider[s] psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness." DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS FOURTH EDITION, (ADSM-IV@), 32 (American Psychiatric Association 1994). A GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates "[m]oderate symptoms . . . OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. . . ." DSM-IV at 32.
The Commissioner uses a five-step process in evaluating DIB and SSI claims. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2007); see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62 (1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981). This process requires the Commissioner to consider, in order, whether the claimant: 1) is working; 2) has a severe impairment; 3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; 4) can return to his past relevant work; and 5) if not, whether he can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2007). If the Commissioner finds conclusively that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the process, review does not proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a) (2007).
Under this analysis, a claimant has the initial burden of showing that he is unable to return to his past relevant work because of his impairment. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must then establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B) (West 2003 Supp. 2008); see also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65; Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980).
By decision dated February 22, 2007, the ALJ denied Adkins's claims. (R. at 13-22.) The ALJ found that Adkins met the disability insured status requirements of the Act for DIB purposes through December 31, 2006. (R. at 15.) The ALJ found that Adkins had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of September 8, 2005. (R. at 15.) The ALJ also found that the medical evidence established that Adkins had severe impairments, namely a back disorder with associated pain, borderline intellectual functioning, alcohol abuse, depressive disorder and an anxiety disorder, but he found that Adkins did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart, Appendix 1. (R. at 16-17.) The ALJ found that Adkins had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, and further found that he should avoid activities that required more than occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, that he should avoid even moderate exposure to hazardous machinery and heights, that he would be limited to simple, unskilled work and that he should avoid direct contact with the public. (R. at 18.) Thus, he found that Adkins was unable to perform any of his past relevant work. (R. at 21.) Based on Adkins's age, education, work history and residual functional capacity and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Adkins could perform. (R. at 21.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that Adkins was not under a disability under the Act and was not eligible for DIB or SSI benefits. (R. at 22.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g) (2007).
The court's function in this case is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ's findings. This court must not weigh the evidence, as this court lacks authority to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, provided his decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456. In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, the court also must consider whether the ALJ analyzed all of the relevant evidence and whether the ALJ sufficiently explained his findings and his rationale in crediting evidence. See Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).
Thus, it is the ALJ's responsibility to weigh the evidence, including the medical evidence, in order to resolve any conflicts which might appear therein. See Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; Taylor v. Weinberger, 528 F.2d 1153, 1156 (4th Cir. 1975). Specifically, the ALJ must indicate that he has weighed all relevant evidence and must indicate the weight given to this evidence. See Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir. 1979.) While an ALJ may not reject medical evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, see King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 1980), an ALJ may, under the regulations, assign no or little weight to a medical opinion, even one from a treating source, based on the factors set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d), if he sufficiently explains his rationale and if the record supports his findings.
Adkins's first argument is that the ALJ erred by improperly determining his residual functional capacity. (Plaintiff's Brief at 5-7.) I agree. The ALJ states that he "agrees with the opinions of [Lanthorn and Abbott] . . ." and the ALJ concluded that Adkins "has borderline intellectual functioning, which would reflect a full-scale IQ score at least in the range of 71-84." (R. at 20.) However, Lanthorn and Abbott determined that Adkins's verbal IQ score was 72, his performance IQ score was 69 and his full-scale IQ score was 68, which placed him at the extremely low range of current intellectual functioning. (R. at 186.) Lanthorn and Abbott noted that Adkins's effort appeared to be marginal at times, and they stated that his potential might be higher, perhaps in the borderline range. (R. at 187.) However, Lanthorn and Abbott never made a finding that Adkins's intellectual ability was in the borderline range, but rather, they diagnosed mild mental retardation. (R. at 187.) Furthermore, Lanthorn and Abbott did not suggest that the IQ tests scores were not valid.
An ALJ may not simply disregard uncontradicted expert opinions in favor of his own opinion on a subject that he is not qualified to render. See Young v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 218, 221 (4th Cir. 1984). "In the absence of any psychiatric of psychological evidence to support his position, the ALJ simply does not possess the competency to substitute his views on the severity of plaintiff's psychiatric problems for that of a trained professional." Grimmett v. Heckler, 607 F. Supp. 502, 503 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (citing McLain, 715 F.2d at 869; Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974)). As a result, the ALJ's determination of Adkins's residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence within the record. On remand, the ALJ should make a finding based on substantial evidence as to whether Adkins's mental residual functional capacity is greater than that determined by Lanthorn and Abbott, and not merely substitute his own opinion. If the ALJ determines that Adkins's IQ scores were valid, the ALJ should then consider whether Adkins's impairments meet or equal Listing 12.05. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart, Appendix 1, § 12.05(C) (2007). I also should note that if, on remand, the ALJ finds that Adkins is disabled, then the ALJ should determine whether Adkins "would still [be found] disabled if [he] stopped using drugs or alcohol." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935 (2007).
Although a claimant's allegations about [his] pain may not be discredited solely because they are not substantiated by objective evidence of the pain itself or its severity, they need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence, including objective evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges [he] suffers. . . .
Here, the ALJ found that "[Adkins's] medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that [Adkins's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely credible." (R. at 19.) The ALJ, therefore, found that the first prong of the pain analysis was satisfied, but that the objective medical evidence of record did not support Adkins's subjective allegations regarding his symptoms.
It is well-settled that an ALJ's assessment of a claimant's credibility regarding the severity of pain is entitled to great weight when it is supported by the record, and that credibility determinations as to a claimant's testimony regarding a claimant's pain are for the ALJ to make. See Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989-90 (4th Cir. 1984). Because the ALJ had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and to determine the credibility of the claimant, the ALJ's observations concerning these questions will be given great weight. See Shively, 739 F.2d at 989-90 (citing Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.Va. 1976)). In this case, the ALJ properly relied on evidence that is found within the record, and, thus, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Adkins's pain allegations were not supported by the objective medical evidence of record.
Based on the above, I find that substantial evidence does not exist in this record to support the ALJ's finding that Adkins was not disabled, and I recommend that the court deny Adkins's motion for summary judgment, deny the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, vacate the Commissioner's decision denying an award of DIB and SSI benefits and remand this case for further consideration.
3. Substantial evidence does not exist in the record to support the Commissioner's finding that Adkins was not disabled.
The undersigned recommends that this court deny Adkins's motion for summary judgment, deny the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, vacate the Commissioner's decision denying an award of DIB and SSI benefits and remand Adkins's claims to the Commissioner for further consideration. The undersigned also recommends that the court deny Adkins's request to present oral argument based on my finding that it is not necessary in that the parties have more than adequately addressed the relevant issues in their written arguments.
Within ten days after being served with a copy [of this Report and Recommendation], any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations within 10 days could waive appellate review. At the conclusion of the 10-day period, the Clerk is directed to transmit the record in this matter to the Honorable James P. Jones, Chief United States District Judge.
The Clerk is directed to send certified copies of this Report and Recommendation to all counsel of record at this time.

References: § 423
 § 1381
 § 405
 § 636
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