Source: https://www.specialedlaw.com/database/student-v-dighton-rehoboth-public-schools-fall-river-public-schools-bsea-07-0756/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 13:52:51+00:00

Document:
On September 14, 2006, Fall River Public Schools (FR) filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dighton-Rehoboth Public Schools (DR) filed an Opposition to Fall River’s Motion to Dismiss on September 20, 2006. Parents then filed an Opposition to Fall River’s Motion to Dismiss on September 25, 2006.
1. Student is a minor whose parents are divorced and share legal custody. Under the divorce decree, “Mother is the primary care parent with whom children shall reside.” (FR Exhibit A). Until July 2004, both parents resided in FR, MA.
2. Student started the 2002-2003 school year in FR. At a Team meeting on September 30, 2002, FR found Student eligible to receive special education services due to a specific learning disability. The diagnosis and specific findings were the result of an independent evaluation obtained by Parents. FR drafted an IEP proposing Language Arts, Math, Science and Social Studies support in an inclusion program as well as one-to-one individual reading instruction daily. Parents took no action regarding the proposed program and placement in FR.
3. On or about November 2002, Parents unilaterally placed Student at the Wolf School, a private school in Providence, Rhode Island. Student remained at the Wolf School until June 2005. Between November 2002 and June 2005, Parents did not seek reimbursement from FR.
4. In July 2004, Mother moved to Dighton, MA, while Father remained a resident of Fall River.
5. In May 2005, Parents decided to place Student at the Eagle Hill School for the 2005-2006 school year. They notified DR of their decision to place Student out of district. Student began attending classes at Eagle Hill School in September 2005. Parents have again unilaterally placed Student at Eagle Hill for the 2006-2007 school year.
7. On or about February 28, 2006, Student’s Team was convened by DR to discuss Student’s placement.
8. Parents filed a Hearing Request with the BSEA in the above referenced matter on August 11, 2006.
9. Following the Resolution Meeting under the IDEA 2004, held on or about August 31, 20062 , DR requested that the Department of Education (DOE) issue an LEA assignment to address cost share responsibilities for Student between FR and DR.
Student only had visitation with his father for two days every two-week period. FR argues that the aforementioned regulations are applicable to the facts here and since it would therefore not be responsible for Student, it should be dismissed as a party in the case at bar. In making this argument, FR relies in the Decision issued on In Re: Fall River Public Schools , BSEA # 06-4240 (May 12, 2006)3 .
DR and Parents request that the BSEA decline to rule on Fall River’s Motion to Dismiss until the DOE makes an assignment of responsibility pursuant to 603 CMR 28(8). They assert that if this argument is not persuasive, then the BSEA should deny FR’s Motion to Dismiss because Parents share responsibility for Student who has lived with both Parents. According to DR and Parents, both school districts share programmatic and financial responsibility for Student under 28 CMR 28.10(2)(a)(2)4 . Furthermore, DR states that 603 CMR 28.10(3)(b) provides that the district where parents reside shall bear the fiscal and programmatic responsibility when an eligible Student whose IEP calls for services to be rendered out of district and Student lives and receives special education services in a residential program. Both DR and Parents argue that 28 CMR 28.10(8) is not applicable under the facts of this case.
DR also states that the facts in the instant case are distinguishable from those in BSEA # 06-4240, citing the court in George H. and Irene L. Walker Home for Children, Inc. v. Franklin , 416 Mass. 291, 621 N.E. 2d 376 (1993)5 , because Parents here share physical custody even if the primary residence of Student is with Mother.
Parents further argue that Eagle Hills’ status as an unapproved special education school in Massachusetts is insufficient to deny Parents reimbursement. See Florence County School District Four v. Carter , 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Board of Education of the Pawling Central School District , 43 IDELR 207 (2004). In making this argument, Parents rely on Melanie v. Concord-Carlisle Regional School District , 40 IDELR 202 (2003) and assert that in both instances Parents attempted placement in an approved program before turning to an unapproved school.
The sole issue before me is whether FR should be dismissed as a party in the case at bar. I find FR’s argument regarding Eagle Hill’s status as an unapproved school to be irrelevant to the narrow issue before me and therefore, decline to address it at this stage of the process.
In cases where complete relief cannot be granted among those who are already parties, or if the party being joined has an interest relating to the subject matter of the case and is so situated that the case cannot be disposed of in its absence. Factors considered in determination of joinder are: the risk of prejudice to the present parties in the absence of the proposed party; the range of alternatives for fashioning relief; the inadequacy of a judgment entered in the proposed party’s absence; and the existence of an alternative forum to resolve the issues.
Similarly, a party seeking to be dismissed must show that it has no interest relating to the subject matter of the case and that therefore, the case can be disposed of in its absence. See Horizon Bank and Trust Co. v. Flaherty , 309 F.Supp.2d 178 (D.Mass., 2004), (discussing the question of dismissal of the Commonwealth as an indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which the Court saw as a “pragmatic, case-specific examination of whether resolution of a case in the absence of a particular party comports with the Federal Rules’ twin goals of fairness and efficiency .”) In Horizon Bank and Trust Co. v. Flaherty , the Court reasoned that joinder of a party under Rule 19 depended on whether the party sought to be joined was first, necessary, and second, whether joinder was feasible. First and foremost to the issue of participation in a proceeding is the question of whether the person’s participation is necessary. If it is not, assuming that the person’s presence is not indispensable, then the person need not participate as a party. If the person is already a party then the same analysis must be conducted in determining whether that party can be dismissed with or without prejudice7 .
Since the controlling regulation, 603 C.M.R. 28.10(8), Assignment of School District Responsibility, falls within the purview of the DOE, and since DR requested said assignment with the DOE following the resolution session in the case at bar, I must defer a Ruling on FR’s Motion to dismiss as a party pending DOE’s assignment of school district responsibility.
Assuming that the facts presented to DOE are consistent with those presented by the Parties when filing this motion, and in light of the relevant case-law and applicable Massachusetts regulations, it would appear likely that FR will not be found to be a necessary party and that it will be dismissed.
1. The Ruling on FR’s Motion to Dismiss as a Party is DEFERRED pending DOE’s determination on LEA Assignment . DR’s and Parents’ Motions in Opposition to FR’s Motion to Dismiss are GRANTED In Part to the extent that the final ruling is deferred.
2. The Parties are ordered to submit by October 10, 2006, their availability to proceed to Hearing in mid November 2006. This assumes that DOE enters its determination by the middle of October, which will have provided DOE with over one month to issue its determination.
3. All discovery must be completed by November 2, 2006.
Since Student is in a residential placement it is reasonable to assume that he goes home on weekends, so that when school is in session he is likely to spend every other weekend with Mother and every other weekend with Father.
A letter from Jeffrey M. Sankey, Esq., attorney for Parents, dated August 8, 2006, contained in the administrative record provides the date of the Resolution Meeting. I take administrative notice of this date for the purpose of issuing this ruling.
Ruling ordering FR to assume sole fiscal responsibility for a student residing in a residential nursing home, whose divorced parents resided in two different towns, but the mother had sole physical custody and the student resided with her in Fall River immediately prior to a hospitalization after which the student entered a pediatric nursing home.
“[W]hen a student who requires an out of district placement to implement his or her IEP lives with both of his or her parents during the school year, irrespective of school vacation periods, and the parents live in two different Massachusetts school districts, the school districts where the parents reside shall be equally responsible for fulfilling the requirements of 603 CMR 28.00.” 28 CMR 28.10(2)(a)(2).
“The Court in George H. and Irene L. Walker Home for Children, Inc. v. Franklin , 416 Mass. 291, 621 N.E. 2d 376 (1993), clarified that a minor child’s domicile or residence generally is the same as that of the parent who possesses physical custody of the child.” In Re: Fall River Public Schools , BSEA # 06-4240 (Figueroa, May 12, 2006).
Parents state that they are not seeking any reimbursement from FR regarding tuition paid by them to the Wolf School.
See New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. International Broth. Of Elec. Workers , … 402 F.Supp. 1032 (D.Mass. 1975), dismissing a party with prejudice.
(b) When a student whose IEP requires an out of district placement lives and receives special education services at a special education residential school…” 603 CMR 28.10(3)(b).
MGL c. 76 §5 assures an individual’s right to attend the public school of the town where that individual resides. When addressing residency, the words residence and domicile have been interpreted to be synonymous when used in statutes involving residency requirements. Watson v. Town of Lexington 1993 WL 818774, 1 Mas L. Reptr. 261 (Mass. Super. 1993); See Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Worcester , 366 Mass. 570, 576, 321 N. E. 2d 656 (1974); Teel v. Hamilton Wenham Regional School District , 13 Mass. App. Ct. 345, 349, 433 N.E. 2d 907 (1982). A domicile has been defined as the “place where a person dwells and which is the center of [an individual’s] domestic, social and civil life”, the place where that person has his home. Dane v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Concord , 374 Mass. 152, 161-162, 371 N.E. 2d 1358 (1978); Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Worcester , 366 Mass 570 (1974). In this regard, a minor who has not been emancipated is “generally said to lack capacity to acquire such a domicile of choice.” Hershkoff, 366 Mass. at 577. When residence issues involve children, the Court in George H. and Irene L. Walker Home for Children, Inc. v. Franklin , 416 Mass. 291, 296, 621 N.E. 2d 376 (1993) clarified that a minor child’s domicile or residence generally is the same as that of the parent who possesses physical custody of the child. See also, Lydia D. et al. v. Thomas W. Payzant et al. , 17 Mass. L. Rep. 272 (2003); 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 471.

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