Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2016/10/13/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:14:32+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Golden Run Estates, LLC v. Town of Erie on Thursday, October 6, 2016.
Annexation—Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Contract Claims—Annexation Act.
Defendant Town of Erie entered into a pre-annexation agreement with Harber for his property located in unincorporated Boulder County. Harber intended his company, Golden Run Estates, to develop a mixed-use community over approximately 50 years. An annexation agreement and a detailed development plan were supposed to follow the pre-annexation agreement. Golden Run Estates and Harber sued Erie after an annexation agreement was not reached following annexation of the property. They brought two contract claims, a claim for declaratory relief, and a claim for a judicial disconnection decree. The trial court found it had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claims and entered a judgment for damages. It also ordered judicial disconnection, but concluded it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory relief claim.
The sole issue on appeal was the jury award on the two contract claims. Erie argued that the trial court erred in concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claims and in upholding the breach of contract verdict because plaintiffs did not bring their claims within the 60-day limitation period under C.R.S. § 31-12-116(2)(a)(I). The court of appeals determined that the C.R.S. § 31-12-116(2)(a)(I) limitation period is jurisdictional and its time limits cannot be tolled or waived.
Erie also raised arguments relating to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning lost opportunity costs and the property manager’s testimony. Because the court determined that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ contract claims, it did not address these contentions.
Plaintiffs argued that their contract claims did not challenge the annexation of the property but were to enforce the terms of the pre-annexation agreement, so C.R.S. 31-12-116 was inapplicable. The court found plaintiffs’ claims were actually impermissible collateral attacks on the annexation and there was no separate breach of contract claim that wasn’t an argument regarding the annexation itself. The court held that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claims and vacated that part of the judgment and the damages award. The case was remanded with directions to grant Erie’s motion for directed verdict and for a determination of the amount of attorney fees incurred by Erie in the appeal.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Berges v. County Court of Douglas County on Thursday, October 6, 2016.
The Children’s Code—Authority of District Attorneys to Prosecute Mandatory Reporters.
Plaintiffs are medical doctors, clinical social workers, and healthcare professionals charged with violating C.R.S. § 19-3-304, under which they are “mandatory reporters” required to report suspected child abuse or neglect. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the district attorney lacked authority to prosecute under C.R.S. § 19-3-206. The county court denied the motions. Plaintiffs filed a complaint under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) seeking review of the county court’s orders. The district court denied all relief and upheld the county court’s determination.
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that C.R.S. § 19-3-206 of the Children’s Code vests county attorneys with exclusive authority to prosecute mandatory reporters for criminal violations of C.R.S. § 19-3-304 because such prosecutions are “proceedings” brought under article 3 of the Children’s Code. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that C.R.S. § 19-3-206 does not preclude district attorneys from prosecuting mandatory reporters because C.R.S. § 19-3-304 does not set forth a proceeding under article 3, but simply defines an offense. Criminal prosecutions of that offense do not constitute article 3 proceedings.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Andrade v. Johnson on Thursday, October 6, 2016.
Personal Injury—Summary Judgment—Premises Liability Statute—Negligence.
Andrade slipped and fell on the damaged public sidewalk adjacent to Johnson’s house and fractured her leg. Andrade filed a complaint against Johnson asserting premises liability and common law negligence claims. The district court granted Johnson’s motion for summary judgment on both claims.
On appeal, based on concessions in her opening brief, the court of appeals determined that Andrade did not contest entry of the summary judgment on the premises liability claim. Based on the undisputed fact that Andrade fell on a public sidewalk, the court concluded as a matter of law that Johnson was not a “landowner” for purposes of the premises liability statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-115 (the Act). Because Andrade’s injury did not occur on Johnson’s property, she had no claim under the Act, and the district court did not err in entering summary judgment on this claim.
Andrade also argued that the district court erred in entering summary judgment on the negligence claim, alleging Johnson had a duty to notify the city engineer about the damaged sidewalk and became liable for Andrade’s injury as a result of her failure to notify. The court considered whether the “no duty” rule was applicable and concluded that it was not because Colorado Springs City Code § 3.4.103(D) expressly provides for civil liability under the circumstances of this case. The court held that (1) the plain language of § 3.4.103(B) unambiguously imposes a duty on owners and occupants of real property to notify the city engineer about any damage to the public sidewalk abutting or adjacent to their property, and (2) this section expressly imposes liability on such owners or occupants when their failure to notify is the proximate cause of a third party’s injury. Because disputed issues of fact remain as to whether the public sidewalk was damaged and whether Johnson’s failure to report it was a proximate cause of Andrade’s injuries, the district court erred by entering summary judgment on this claim.
The summary judgment on the premises liability claim was affirmed. The summary judgment on the negligence claim was reversed and the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
On Wednesday, October 12, 2016, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and three unpublished opinions.

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