Source: https://www.ptab.us/2011/09/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:07:56+00:00

Document:
In the Reply Brief, Appellants submit that the “new and more extensive record on the present application” makes “irrelevant” the Examiner’s determination that the claimed processes in the prior and present Appeals are “essentially equivalent.” Reply Br. 1, citing and quoting In re Herr, 377 F.2d 610, 611 (CCPA 1967) (the issue in any appeal is whether appellant is entitled to allowance of the claims “in the application and record” on appeal).
The term “a” is an indefinite article which is customarily interpreted to mean “at least one,” permitting the inclusion of additional elements which are not recited in the claim. See KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
“If the claim preamble, when read in the context of the entire claim, recites limitations of the claim, or, if the claim preamble is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim, then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the claim.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Thus, the Examiner has not established that even if the references were combined as proposed by the Examiner, the Appellants’ claimed invention would result. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
We agree with Appellants that the two-way test is the proper standard for making a determination of obviousness-type double-patenting on this record (see App. Br. 18-22; see also Ex parte Smith et al., (BPAI Nov. 17, 2008).
A flexible teachings, suggestions, or motivations (TSM) test remains the primary guarantor against a non-statutory hindsight analysis. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A]s the Supreme Court suggests, a flexible approach to the TSM test prevents hindsight and focuses on evidence before the time of invention.”).
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
A trademark simply does not function in this manner. See Ex parte Simpson, 218 USPQ 1020 (BPAI 1982).
Appellants cite PolyVision Corp. v. Smart Technologies Inc., 501 F.Supp. 2d 1042 (W.D. Mich. 2007). App. Br. 10. In that case, the District Court declined to follow Simpson, admitting that it acted to preserve the validity of patent claims at issue, in spite of the Court’s inclination to conclude that the reference to the Windows® trademark rendered the claims indefinite. Id. at 1065. The Court stated it was following “the Federal Circuit’s admonition to construe claims so as to sustain their validity, if possible.” Id. Contrary to Appellants’ argument, while the patent owner argued that the trademark was used as an adjective rather than as a noun, the court expressly rejected this argument, as do we.
To be sure, a reference used in a § 103 context must be enabling. In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 274 (CCPA 1968).
“It is necessary to consider everything appellants have said about what is prior art to determine the exact scope of their admission.” In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 571 (CCPA 1975).
[I]t is not necessary in order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness that both a structural similarity between a claimed and prior art compound . . . be shown and that there be a suggestion in or expectation from the prior art that the claimed compound . . . will have the same or a similar utility as one newly discovered by applicant.
In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1990). “A prima facie case has been established” where “[t]he art provide[s] the motivation to make the claimed compositions in the expectation that they would have similar properties.” Id. “[T]he burden (and opportunity) then falls on applicant to rebut that prima facie case.” Id. at 692.
Such rebuttal or argument can consist of a comparison of test data showing that the claimed compositions possess unexpectedly improved properties or properties that the prior art does not have. . . . There is no question that all evidence of the properties of the claimed composition and the prior art must be considered in determining the ultimate question of patentability, but it is also clear that the discovery that a claimed compound or composition possesses a property not disclosed for the prior art subject matter, does not by itself defeat a prima facie case.
Id. at 692-693 (internal citations omitted).
The preamble recites a “computer-implemented method,” the steps of the method fail to explicitly require any of the steps to be performed on a computer. As such, this recitation in the preamble is a mere nominal recitation of structure. At most, a “computer-implemented method” ties the process to any general-purpose computer. We find no evidence that the claims require the method steps to be hosted on a computer.

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