Source: http://www.pavlacklawfirm.com/blog?category=Contract+Law
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:47:10+00:00

Document:
In the last installment of the Hoosier Litigation Blog for 2018, we examine the Indiana Court of Appeals’ decision in Youell v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., which held that a lease requiring the landlord to maintain fire insurance foreclosed a claim against the tenant for losses suffered by a fire because the lease shifted the allocation of risk from the parties to the insurer.
This week we discuss the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, which weighed in on the propriety of certifying a class narrower than the definition proposed in the complaint and upon claims not specifically identified in the complaint. We also briefly look at eight other appellate decisions from the past two weeks that include: (i) holding that the misuse defense under Indiana’s Products Liability Act can be a complete defense; (ii) a party’s complete about-face can be a basis for surprise to obtain relief from a judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(1); (iii) multi-year assertion that a defendant is subject to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act and numerous delays to await a medical review panel determination can be sufficient to estop a plaintiff from arguing that the defendant is not subject to the Medical Malpractice Act; (iv) contracts attached to complaints are admissible as evidence at trial even if not specifically identified in final exhibits list; (v) a claim for unjust enrichment can be made even if the benefits are provided by a third-party; (vi) courts may commit reversible error when elevating formality over substantial justice with overly rigid application of procedure at trial; (vii) illustrating considerations in applying the doctrines of apparent authority and apparent agency; and (viii) citations to the record along with other citations count toward the word limit in federal appellate filings despite no rule specifically stating that citations are included in the word count.
This week, we discuss the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in the second appeal of Brc Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Co., which held that a supply contract for the purchase of an approximate amount for a fixed price was an enforceable contract and further analyzed how a change in legal theory from that advanced in the complaint may impact the litigation.
This week, we look to the recent Court of Appeals of Indiana decision in Tucker v. Tom Raper, Inc., which held that third-party beneficiary claims can be brought on oral contracts. Tucker is the first case in Indiana to so hold.
This week's discussion returns to interpretation of the AIA Standard Construction Contract through a rehearing on the case Allen County Public Library v. Shambaugh & Son, L.P. The post also looks at a very meaningful development in the ability to cite unpublished cases to Indiana courts.
In this week's post, we take a look at the recent Seventh Circuit case Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Kenray Associates, Inc. that held that parol evidence could be used to prove fraud in the inducement of a contract &ndash; a settlement agreement and covenant not to execute – even though the contract contained an integration clause. The decision reversed a trial court decision holding that parol evidence could only be used to show that the integration clause itself was the product of fraud.
This week we discuss the 7th Circuit decision SAMS Hotel Group, LLC v. Environs, Inc. which found that, at least between two sophisticated parties, a liability cap in a contract dispute is enforceable even without specifying its application to defendant's own negligence. The result capped the claim at $70,000 and prevented the plaintiff from seeking the full $4.2 Million in damages.
This week we discuss the major Indiana Court of Appeals decision, which found that not only is an insurance policy's limitation for bringing a suit against the insurer to less than the statutory period set forth by statute void, but that the limitation period is not then the minimal period that could have been agreed upon but rather the full statutory period for breach of contract actions.

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