Source: https://www.lawyerissue.com/category/intellectual-property/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:52:57+00:00

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The urban legend says, “If you don’t protect your trademark rights, you’ll lose them.” Like most urban legends, there is a kernel of truth lurking at the base, although the proposition is not literally and universally true.
If mark owners do not enforce their rights against third-party uses of the same or similar marks or names for goods or services, the mark owner’s rights to object to such uses and similar ones can be diminished if not extinguished. This is true particularly when the goods or services are the same as or closely related to those of the mark owner, and when the activities of the parties overlap in geographic area or other market segmentation.
But if mark owners seek to enforce their rights when either the marks or the goods and services are so significantly different that no confusion is likely, they face different risks with a similar result. These include publicizing the third-party use, being unsuccessful in attacking the use, encouraging additional uses and potentially having their rights diminished if not extinguished.
Often mark owners send a cease and desist letter to third parties who use the same or similar marks or names for goods or services. When a cease and desist letter is sent, the typical response is a return letter stating that there can be no reasonable probability of confusion (probability here equating to likelihood, rather than a possibility of confusion) because of the nature and extent of third party use of similar marks on the same and related goods and services, thus demonstrating that the relevant public is not likely to be confused by use of the accused party’s mark. The impact of this response depends on the number and nature of the third party uses that the accused party can find.
However, if mark owners seek to enforce their rights for a mark that is subject to challenge based on a registration that is subject to challenge, they likewis risks the diminishment if not the extinction of their rights. Such extinction of rights can occur based on several different arguments: that the asserted mark is generic for the goods (such as “footlong” for 12” sandwiches); that the mark is deceptive or merely descriptive and has not acquired distinctiveness; that the mark is the configuration of the goods and that the configuration is functional; or that the claim of use was defective and the evidence of use insufficient to support the claim to registration.
Given these scenarios, it looks like mark owners could be damned if they do try to enforce their rights and damned if they don’t. So, what are mark owners to do? That decision should be made by assessing the answers to the following questions and considerations, which fall into two general categories: diligence and identification of options.
It’s essential to research all the relevant information by answering these questions. Who has priority? What is the nature and extent of use of each mark? Has there been any confusion? Granted the conditions of purchase trade channels and strength of the senior mark, is there a real likelihood of confusion that is commercially meaningful or a hypothetical “if-then” concern? Is the accused company one that might be a business partner or customer? How vulnerable is the senior mark (or registration) to attack? What counterclaims might be brought against the client? Does the accused party have superior rights in another jurisdiction of interest? How important is the matter to the client? Is the business at issue profitable, justifying the expense of potential litigation? Will the mark be in use into the foreseeable future, will it be phased out in a matter of months, or is it otherwise at the end of its lifecycle?
Sending a cease and desist demand letter or filing a complaint are common remedies used to protect a mark. But there are other approaches worthy of consideration that may be more effective. These include the following: taking no action; communicating with the third-party user by having a business person to business person conversation by telephone or otherwise; or having an initial expression of concern made by in-house counsel to in-house counsel with an invitation to discuss how those concerns might be addressed. On the other extreme, if the conduct is egregious and appears to be deliberate, there is no requirement for a cease and desist letter to be sent. The first communication to the adverse party may be the service of the complaint, with or without a demand for interlocutory injunctive relief.
If, after consideration of all the options, the decision is made to send a cease and desist letter, the next step is to determine what the demand is going to be, how much support will be provided for the demand and what the tone of the demand will be.
In making these determinations it is important to remember that how the message is conveyed will impact the response, which may include a resort by the recipient to social media. This is where the Streisand effect (that is, the capacity of an attempt to shut down a communication to generate even wider distribution of the communication) may come into play. Having a demand letter to cease and desist made public on social or other media by an accused entity seeking to generate public sympathy and support against a “bully” may generate more notoriety for the mark owner’s conduct than the accused party’s mark or product ever would have received, if the dispute had not become public. What this suggests is, first, that the demand be written as if it will be read by the client’s customers, as well as the general public, and second, that if the misuse is likely to be short-lived and little noticed, a different kind of letter may be called for. In the latter instance, the letter will have a less formal and less strident tone, as it is intended to educate and persuade. It’s also important to realize that search engine optimization can address any number of issues without recourse to legal demands.
Generally, the objective should be: first, to provide a factual and legal basis for the claim, especially if the recipient is an individual or small enterprise that may not have done a comprehensive search or may not have any real understanding of trademark law; and second, to demand what is feasible and what the client is entitled to. Overblown demands and demands that cannot reasonably be met are more likely to generate resistance than to secure compliance.
More than two thirds of all patents challenged under 35 U.S.C. §101 have been invalidated since Alice Corp v. CLS Bank was decided in 2014. Is this recent trend signaling the beginning of the end of the software patent? Should software even be patentable? Will a clear test help? While both the majority and dissenting opinion in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp. agree that software is patentable, in a bizarre twist, the concurring opinion has declared that software patents are finished. Clearly some judges on the Federal Circuit have run out of patience with the multitude of software patents that were drafted prior to the Mayo/Alice cases being decided. Nonetheless, don’t expect a clear test for patent eligibility under §101 anytime soon. This article reviews the majority and dissenting opinions in Intellectual Ventures, contrasts the concurring opinion, and explains why we believe a clear test for patenting software is not needed and in fact, would set back the patent system for years.
The Federal Circuit went through both steps in the Alice framework and ruled that all three patents were invalid under §101 (affirming the District Court on two and overruling the Court on the remaining patent).
The Federal Circuit made two things clear. First, the inventive concept required to transform an abstract idea into a patent eligible concept must be in the claims. This concept was spelled out by the majority directly addressing the dissenting opinion. The dissent had argued that one claim in one patent was patentable because that claim improved the functioning of the computer and addressed problems specific to the internet. However, the majority stated that, while it was true the patent disclosed an improvement in the functioning of a computer, the improvements at issue were absent from the claims. Therefore, the Federal Circuit held the claim invalid.
Second, the majority makes clear that software is still patent eligible. The majority restated precedent noting that to be patent eligible, software must improve the functioning of the computer or solve problems specific to the technological environment. The majority even gave an example of how the virus screening claim at issue might have been patent eligible. The fact that the majority stated what they are looking for when determining software patent eligibility and provided a concrete example of how such a claim might have been patentable, makes clear that software is still patent eligible.
Initially, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp. seemed like another run-of-the-mill software patent case. Company A sues Company B for infringement of software patents. Company B argues that the asserted patents are invalid under §101. The Federal Circuit agrees and the software patents are ruled invalid. Case over, right? Not so fast. Judge Mayer, in a concurring opinion, has decided he’s had enough of software patents in general. His frustration likely built up after more than two years of purging the system of software patents that never should have been issued. Since Alice in 2014, software patents have been invalidated at the Federal Circuit level under §101 at an alarming rate of roughly 95 percent.
Judge Mayer’s central point, on its face, is difficult to dispute. If an idea (software) is not patentable and only embodiments of the idea are patentable, and the generic computer the software is running on is not patentable, then all ideas running on the generic computer should not be patentable. However, guidance from the Courts, like the majority opinion, has said software must improve the functioning of the computer or solve problems specific to the technological environment in order to be patent eligible. It’s undisputable that patents directed at conventional ideas cannot be patented by simply tying those claims to a generic computer. What we believe Judge Mayer is missing is that not all software patents are generic ideas on generic computers. In reality, a lot of software patents are behind the improvements of the electronic devices we use today. Software has a place in patent law; unfortunately, it has taken patent law several years to catch up and find that place.
Judge Mayer’s first point regards preemption, a main concern in the post-Alice world. However, instead of worrying about how a patent claim might preempt a field of invention, Judge Mayer expresses concern about preempting the First Amendment by “exacting heavy taxes on widely-used conduits for online expression.” This concern, while somewhat valid, is actually resolved by the Alice framework, which specifically addresses the potential for preemption. If, for example, an idea preempts “widely-used conduits for online expression,” it would be ineligible for patent protection under §101. Thus, Judge Mayer’s slippery slope argument involving preemption is not a valid reason to make software ineligible for patent protection.
The first sub-point also regards preemption. As noted above, preemption is accounted for under the current Alice framework. However, one sticking point for Judge Mayer is that most software patents do not include the software code behind the invention. The reason for the lack of code in the patent, however, is that the code itself is not patentable. What is patentable is what the code does. Software code itself can be protected using copyright law and has no place in patent law.
The second sub-point, that software patents provide incentives at the wrong time, exists for virtually any invention, not just software. While Judge Mayer correctly points out that a lot of software patents are filed at the “idea stage,” before the invention is finished, the same is true for most inventions. This problem has only gotten worse because of the new First to File rule under the America Invents Act. It’s true that “those who scamper to the PTO early…reap hefty financial dividends.” But, this reward is not a result of software patents; it is a result of the new filing provision of the America Invents Act. Right or wrong, first-to-file is here to stay and all inventors are incentivized to file patent applications as early as possible.
The third sub-point, that there are too many software patents, should have no bearing on whether software is patent-eligible. Clearly, most of the things we use today are operational because of software. In fact, it is very likely that you are reading this article using an electronic device that is operational because of software. It’s no surprise that the most popular area of innovation has a lot of patents. Software’s patent eligibility doesn’t hinge on the popularity of the technology it relates to.
The fourth sub-point, that software patents lack the definiteness required by patent law, is also related to preemption. Judge Mayer states that software is “akin to…literature or a piece of music, undeniably important, but too unbound” to be patent eligible. But Judge Mayer misses the point – software patents don’t patent software, they patent what software does. If software simply does something that can be accomplished without it, the Alice framework will render that ineligible for patenting, thereby preventing the preemption Judge Mayer is concerned about.
A thorough review of Judge Mayer’s analysis, combined with the fact that it was a concurring opinion, shows that the software patent is not dead. The current Alice framework directly addresses most of Judge Mayer’s concerns. Looking at the underlying reasons for Judge Mayer’s arguments suggests he is simply frustrated with the large number of bad software patents he sees on a regular basis.
We should not spend much time waiting for a clearer standard on patenting software from the Supreme Court. Many recent cases seeking such guidance have been denied certiorari. This is likely because the patent system has already learned first-hand the consequences of bright line rules. In its 2008 search to find a predictable test, the Federal Circuit declared the Machine or Transformation test as the standard for patent eligibility under §101. While the Machine or Transformation test seemed to be in line with Supreme Court precedent, it had tremendous unintended consequences. The Machine or Transformation test led to numerous patents awarded merely because a conventional abstract idea was performed on conventional computer hardware. Today, many similar patents are regularly invalidated because implementing an abstract idea on a generic computer is not patent eligible. While many suggest that the sheer number of patents being invalidated is a sign of bad things to come, or worse, that software and its effects are not patent eligible, the fact that these patents are being invalidated is actually a good sign. The heightened number of invalidated patents is an indication that a lot of ineligible patents were issued under a system that hand-cuffed both patent examiners and the courts. The patent system is purging itself of patents that slipped through the system under the Machine or Transformation test.
The Supreme Court has long “warn[ed] …. against” interpreting Section 101 “in ways that make patent eligibility depend simply on the draftsman’s art.” Trying to give a definition to the term “abstract idea” or a clear test on patent eligibility under §101 would do just that. Given the Alice framework, it’s clear that software patents will continue to be granted based on how well a patent prosecutor can define the invention so that it is not simply an “abstract idea.” A clear test with bright line rules and definitions would handcuff patent examiners and the courts for years, and once again set back the patent system.
For the purposes of §101, the want of predictability is outweighed by the need of flexibility. Patent law exists to promote the progress of science and useful arts. Scientific progress is unpredictable. An overly rigid legal system will only “impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.” Moreover, “Section 101’s vital role…is to insure that patent protection promotes, rather than impedes, scientific progress and technological innovation.” The current application of the patent eligibility standard is working; no clear test is needed.
In trying to address new technology, the Federal Circuit used an inflexible rule to interpret Section 101. Since then, the Supreme Court has made determinations under Section 101 more flexible, which has led to large-scale purging of many patents that should never have been issued. The Supreme Court would not have gone through Bilski, Mayo and Alice, if software were ineligible for patent protection. Instead, the Supreme Court appears to be trying to mold a flexible set of rules that can keep pace with innovation. Another inflexible rule would simply set the patent system back again. The software patent is alive and well. It is merely being held to the same standard as all other areas of technology.
 Two Years After Alice: A Survey of The Impact of a ‘Minor Case’ (Part 1), Bilski Blog, June 16, 2016, available at: http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html.
 Intellectual Ventures I LLC, v. Symantec Corp, 2015-1769, at 24-25 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
 Intellectual Ventures I LLC, v. Symantec Corp, 2015-1770 at 3 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, C. J., concurring).
 Ultramercial, LLC et al. v. Wild Tangent, Inc. 772 F. 3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (cert. denied).
 In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2008).
 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Is Your Company a Trademark Bully?
Depending on one’s perspective, a “trademark bully” is either simply a vigorous enforcer of its valid trademark rights who is unduly criticized for such enforcement or an overreaching behemoth trying to unfairly expand its trademark rights well beyond the reasonable boundaries of its protection. For this second category, think “Goliath” challenging the unprotected “Davids” in the market.
The “behemoth” is the most common image and was called to mind squarely when the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office solicited comments in 2010 about harassing trademark litigation tactics, and defined a trademark bully as “a trademark owner that uses its trademark rights to harass and intimidate another business beyond what the law might be reasonably interpreted to allow.” 1 No additional legislation resulted from that study, but the phrase “trademark bully” stays with us.
This article addresses ways in which trademark owners can vigorously protect their rights, determine which infringements are worth pursuing, learn how to avoid being the subject of social media shaming and consider how the playing field may change if the accused infringer obtains pro bono counsel or has insurance coverage to defend the claim. The goal of any enforcement plan is to protect the owner’s full rights at the lowest possible cost, while avoiding any negative publicity that may result from an overreaching program, which could damage the owner’s reputation or goodwill associated with its name and mark.
In general, if an owner fails to enforce its exclusive rights to use a particular name or mark in connection with specific goods or services, the value of the owner’s mark and its ability to enforce it against others may diminish over time.
In cases of owner inattention, junior users or potential infringers may begin to use the mark or something very similar in jurisdictions where the owner’s goods or services are not yet sold or offered, and are not yet known by the local purchasing public, and thereby develop a loyal following that recognizes the potential infringer’s use of the mark over the owner’s. This infringement can be very damaging to the owner’s reputation, sales and business development, as well as the bottom line. If customers seek the relevant goods and services from the potential infringer instead of from the owner, then the owner’s mark loses its value as an indication that the goods are – or should have been – sourced by the owner when the owner enters that market.
If an owner takes action early, it is likely to be more successful in stopping use by the potential infringer. The longer the owner waits, however, the more difficult it will become to reassert the owner’s senior position in the market. Similarly, the longer the two marks coexist in the same marketplace for similar goods and services – and particularly where there is no evidence of actual confusion by consumers – the weaker and more narrow the owner’s rights in the mark may be. If more infringers using the same or similar marks for the same or related goods or services enter commerce without challenge, then the field becomes “crowded” and everyone’s rights in their similar marks become very narrow, to the point where only exact matches or very close approximations would be considered infringing.
In addition, if the owner knew about the potential infringers and declined to take any action for one reason or another, the owner may have difficulty obtaining relief – such as an injunction against continued infringement. The owner also may later be found to have waived its rights to pursue the potential infringer for such infringement, or to have acquiesced to their use, or to have unreasonably delayed enforcing its rights (i.e., laches), thus making it inequitable to require the potential infringer to stop using the mark where it has become established.
As a result, trademark owners should consider implementing a watch system – which can have varying degrees of complexity – that searches the marketplace, the internet and relevant industry materials for potentially infringing use. The more effective programs will search regularly for potentially competing marks in a variety of relevant places and use search parameters designed to identify close matches, rather than limiting a search to a very narrow, exact match.
Once potentially infringing watch results are identified, the trademark owner should analyze them carefully to determine whether contact with the potential infringer is warranted and/or necessary to preserve the owner’s rights.
What are the owner’s core names and marks? At a bare minimum, these names and marks should be protected the most vigorously against potential infringement. Owners might forgo zealous enforcement efforts for marks that are anticipated to have a short life – such as for products or product lines or advertising campaigns that will have a limited run or short duration in commerce.
How closely related must the goods or services of an unauthorized user be to the owner’s goods or services? The answer to this question may depend on the number and nature of third party uses of similar marks already in place.
How did the owner learn about the unauthorized use? From a complaint by a customer about poor customer service or quality referring to the unauthorized user’s goods or services, thus demonstrating “actual confusion” and potential damage to the owner’s reputation and goodwill?
What is the owner’s end-game in the enforcement program? To litigate all potential infringements to their final conclusion? To get the unauthorized user to recognize the owner’s senior rights and obtain a license producing a revenue stream where the goods may be related but are not competitive?
With respect to each of these factors, it is critical that owners evaluate the potential likelihood of confusing customers and potential customers about the source of the goods or services distributed under the mark, the potential misunderstanding about the owner’s endorsement of, sponsorship of or affiliation with the potential infringer, and the potential for damage to the goodwill and other value of the owner’s mark if the potential infringer’s quality is not as good as the owner’s.
Whenever an owner drafts a cease and desist letter to a potential infringer, care should be taken not to unnecessarily inflame the recipient or invite re-publishing that letter on the internet for purposes of ridicule and shaming. This phenomenon is common today using social media outlets. Inflammatory language and threats of imminent lawsuits with draconian remedies are likely to increase the risk of such re-distribution, causing public relations discomfort that may take some time to correct.
Instead, owners may be better served by identifying genuine concerns they have with the potential infringer’s use and asking for corrective action in the form of discrete, reasonable requests that are feasible for the potential infringer to complete. These requests can be forceful and rigorous, but they should be constructed with a view toward maximizing the possibility of compliance and resolution. Cease and desist letters are not a required prerequisite to filing a federal lawsuit, but they can be valuable tools to negotiate an acceptable settlement before incurring significant legal costs. If the potential infringer declines to respond, follow up letters can be more strident, but it is rarely prudent to start off that way unless the owner is immune to bad publicity.
A frequently held (but not always correct) assumption is that an owner who is a “trademark bully” must have deep pockets and able to continue litigation without consideration of increasing costs. Similarly, victims of so-called bullies are generally assumed to be smaller entities, without significant resources. Thus, the theory proceeds, these trademark-bully-owners seek to extort settlements from these smaller entities in a way that expands the owner’s trademark rights unfairly.
If a potential infringer accused of trademark infringement by an owner is represented by pro bono counsel or has insurance coverage, however, the possibility of an extortive settlement may decline. When the potential infringer is not paying its legal fees for defense out of its own pockets, it may be less inclined to accept an unreasonable settlement demand just to reduce its steadily climbing legal costs.
As an owner, consider carefully the actual economic position of the potential infringer, to the extent that such information is available in the early stages of the dispute. Be aware of the public’s assumptions about the potential infringer and its role in the community, and manage public relations needs from the inception of the dispute. Do not wait for an emergency to arise before addressing public relations issues. The more the potential infringer can be cast as a “victim of a bully” the more likely the owner’s goodwill and business reputation could be harmed by bad press, including social media.
Enforcement programs are essential to any owner’s ability to manage the business’s names and marks, maintaining its exclusive right to use these names and marks in connection with specific goods and services as long as feasible. While overly aggressive and unreasonable programs may legitimately be called “bullying,” owners must take seriously their obligations to monitor and enforce the use of their marks in commerce to avoid losing or de-valuing their rights.
It’s a truism that a patent is only as valuable as the patent owner’s willingness and ability to enforce it. And therein lies the challenge faced by companies or institutions with substantial IP assets when they attempt to justify allocating resources to pursue claims.
By the time a patent exists to enforce, the company has likely already made a substantial investment to develop the asset. Protecting it through litigation will require still more money to be invested. The challenge is not only the very high price tag of that additional investment—it is also its high degree of risk, given the even more uncertain outcomes of IP litigation compared to other forms of commercial litigation. As a result, many companies, universities and other entities find themselves with untapped IP assets because of their inability to bear the additional cost and risk of protective litigation.
It gets worse. Companies that are able to overcome the hurdle of added cost and risk, and move forward with IP litigation, face a further challenge in the negative impact of litigation spending on corporate balance sheets. And although private practice lawyers tend not to think about balance sheets, GCs—and CFOs—think about them a lot, and they know that litigation impacts corporate balance sheets in ways that reduce profits and pull down earnings. Indeed, this was specifically cited by 23% of GCs surveyed as part of Burford’s 2016 Litigation Finance Survey as a reason their companies stopped pursuing a viable claim—because legal expenses were hitting the company’s bottom line. For the same reasons, many more choose not to pursue the claims at all.
To understand how negatively IP litigation impacts corporate balance sheets, one must understand how litigation is treated as an accounting matter. A pending litigation claim to enforce IP rights is a corporate asset, similar in form to any other contingent receivable. However, spending to pursue that claim, and increase its asset value, is peculiarly not added to its asset value, or “capitalized”, and instead is immediately expensed, flowing through the P&L and reducing operating profits. Indeed, a pending litigation claim—despite having legal status as an asset, or a “chose in action”—is affirmatively not an asset for accounting purposes. It is found nowhere on financial statements. Finally, when a significant litigation claim succeeds, the associated income from the claim is often not treated as operating income on the P&L. Instead, it’s put “below the line” as a non-operating or one-off item.
In practical terms, the GC responsible for generating a lot of IP litigation expense and risk is likely going to be persona non grata in the CFO’s office because no matter the ultimate value of that IP litigation to the company, the immediate hit to earnings can be significant. Obviously, companies want to maximize their profits and minimize their expenses. Being hit with expenses as a litigation matter goes forward and then not later recognizing the income from the win is a bad outcome. The situation is even worse for publicly traded companies with significant IP litigation. When investors and stock market analysts look at the balance sheet and don’t see an asset, they don’t credit it; and when they see the kind of expenses associated with high value IP litigation, they may take an overly negative view of the company’s risk factors and value.
Yet despite all of this, the situation is far from dire. Companies have new options. Litigation finance is growing rapidly in the IP space as part of a broader growth trend that saw a quadrupling of litigation finance use by leading U.S. law firms between 2013 and 2016, according to Burford’s latest research. Among the reasons for its growth in the IP space is its ability to neutralize the negative impact of IP litigation on corporate balance sheets and to shift the cost and risk of IP litigation to a third party. In simplest terms, outside finance enables GCs with significant IP assets to move the cost and risk of pursuing litigation off their corporate balance sheets—because the litigation financier assumes the cost and risk of the IP litigation. The financier provides capital to cover fees or expenses, or both, typically in exchange for a portion of the proceeds if the litigation is successful. Due to the risky nature of IP litigation, the more innovative finance providers will most often develop bespoke financing approaches including portfolio deals where risk is diversified across a pool of matters.
Moving litigation cost off the balance sheet immediately removes any concern about the negative accounting impact of litigation on earnings and profits. When a litigation financier pays the costs of proceeding, those costs do not flow through the company’s P&L, thus conserving the company’s profitability from its operations. Working with an outside financier also enables the company to husband its cash to use for other purposes—and to avoid having it flow out of the company’s coffers and thus reducing its asset value. As a result, when the company wins its claim, the very first time its financial statements are impacted by being a litigant is when it has a positive cash and income event. That obviously yields a far happier accounting outcome for clients.
In sum, outside capital gives GCs a dramatically de-risked platform to unlock the asset value of IP litigation claims—and it also provides longevity and the ability to commit to the long-term nature of IP litigation, whatever the business situation of the company.
Chapter XXXIII of the Intellectual Property Law No. 36 of 2003 makes provision for the protection of geographical indications.
Geographical Indications (GI) are off shoots of indications of source and appellations of origin which were first accorded recognition in the Paris Convention. Indications of source is a broad concept and designates a country or place situated in that country from where the particular product in question originates. Accordingly expression such as made in Sri Lanka would fall into this category.
Appellations of origin is a geographical names of a country or place in that country. The product just necessarily have its characteristics and quality linked with the geography of the place by way of for instance agro climatic conditions and human factors.
Geographical indications are indications identifying a particular good as originating in a country or locality in that country. The quality of characteristics or reputation of such goods must be essentially attributable to the geographic origin. Definitions would include not only geographical names but also any non-traditional names which have acquired significance. Ceylon Tea would fall into this category.
There are has been no uniform approach by various countries in respect of protection of geographical indications. Some countries have enacted specific “sui generics” to protect GI’s. Other protect GI’s under existing laws and still others afford protection by a combination of both. For protection of GI’s Unfair Competition, Consumer Protection Laws protecting tradenames and marks and passing off and laws relating to false and misleading trade practices would also be relevant.
Agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual property right 1995.
the use of a geographical indication identifying goods including an agricultural product, food, wine or spirit not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying goods not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expression such as kind, type, style or imitation or the like.
(2) The protection accorded to geographical indications under sections 103, 160 and 161 shall be applicable against a geographical indication which, although literally true as to the territory, region or locality in which the goods originate, falsely represents to the public that the goods originate in another territory.
(3) In the case of homonymous geographical indications for goods including an agricultural product, food, wine or spirit, protection shall be accorded to each indication, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. The Minister in case of permitted concurrent use of such indications, shall determine by prescribed practical conditions under which the homonymous indications in question will be differentiated from each other, taking into consideration the need to ensure equitable treatment of the producers concerned and the protection of consumers from false or deceptive indications.
(4) The Court shall have power and jurisdiction to grant an injunction and any other relief deemed appropriate to prevent any such use as is referred to in this section. The provisions of Chapter XXXV of the Act shall mutatis mutandis, apply to such proceedings.
At present in Sri Lanka whilst there is a provision for the protection of GI’s including injunctive relief, the form of registration of GI’s is generally in the form of certification marks. For instance as far as Ceylon Tea is concerned Sri Lanka Tea Board grants a certification mark subject to the provisions contained in the Intellectual Property Act in respect of certification marks. However there are other produce of Sri Lanka which may not be eligible at present for the grant of certification marks because there is no authority to grant such rights under the provision of Chapter XXIX.
Subsection 2 refers to 8 such matters . In terms of section 2 (2) the Director General shall be vested with the powers of the implementation of the provisions of this Act control and superintendence of the registration and administration of industry designs, patents, marks and any other matters as provided by the Act and the supervision and control of all persons appointed for or engaged in the implementation of the provisions of this Act. As provisions relating to GI’s are contained in Part IX of the Act the regulations could be made in respect of GI’s as well. Accordingly the Government is expected to make regulations for the better protection of Ceylon Tea and Ceylon Cinnamon. Consideration is also being given as to whether a new Act should be enacted in respect of registration of GI’s. Meanwhile regulations as an interim measure referred to are expected to be enacted early and this would at least to some extent further protect the exporters of Ceylon Tea and Ceylon Cinnamon and other spices.

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