Source: http://fl.bna.com/fl/19990525/sp5114.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:12:04+00:00

Document:
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks,Richard D. Savell, Judge.
Appearances: Alan J. Hooper, Law Office of Alan J. Hooper, Fairbanks, for Appellant. Rita T. Allee, Fairbanks, for Appellee.
This case requires us to chart the boundaries of the paternity by estoppel doctrine. B.E.B. was not the biological father of his wife R.L.B.'s newborn son, K., but for several years treated K. as his own son. When B.E.B. and R.L.B. eventually divorced, the superior court ordered B.E.B. to make ongoing child support payments, finding that, in order to prevent K. from suffering emotional harm, B.E.B. should be estopped from denying paternity. We reverse, adopting the majority view of paternity by estoppel. Under this view, we apply the doctrine to prevent financial, not emotional, harm.
B.E.B. and R.L.B. were married in 1979. They had one child in 1977 and one in 1979. In 1981 B.E.B. had a vasectomy. Eight years later, in 1989, R.L.B. gave birth to a third child, K. Over the next three years, B.E.B. treated K. as his own son, intended K. to think of him as his father, and represented to the world that K. was his child. B.E.B. was the only adult male role model in K.'s life. K. even called B.E.B. "daddy."
B.E.B. and R.L.B. separated in November 1993. While B.E.B. maintained regular contact with his two older children, he distanced himself from K., denying that K. was his son. K. nevertheless continued to think of B.E.B. as his father.
Fourteen months after separating from B.E.B., R.L.B. filed for divorce, requesting child support for her three children. In response, B.E.B. denied paternity of K. Trial was scheduled for the first week of October 1995. Prior to trial, B.E.B. moved for an order requiring DNA testing to determine whether he was K.'s father; this motion was unopposed. The court granted B.E.B.'s motion in August 1995. Problems arose in obtaining the blood tests, however, and the results of the tests were not available as the date for the divorce trial approached. B.E.B. moved for a continuance, but the court denied the motion. The court stated that it would bifurcate the trial, trying all issues unrelated to paternity first and reserving paternity-related issues until the DNA test results were completed.
Trial began on October 10, 1995, with B.E.B. appearing pro se. At the outset, the court confirmed that the trial would be bifurcated. Despite the bifurcation order, the court allowed R.L.B. to testify during the first day of trial about some aspects of her paternity by estoppel claim, including the nature of K. and B.E.B.'s relationship. B.E.B. did not object to this testimony. Nevertheless, on several occasions after this testimony, the court reminded the parties of its bifurcation order. For example, when B.E.B. attempted to cross-examine R.L.B. about adultery, the court interrupted, emphasizing that "we are not litigating paternity in this case." Soon after, the court repeated that "[w]e are not going to decide paternity of K. in . . . this hearing because you've asked it to be delayed, and if the evidence is as you say, the Court will consider their defense and decide what happens. But that's not this case." At the end of the first day of trial, the court mused: "So this one-day case has become a two-day case. And without consideration of paternity."
I don't want any of the parties to be misled by a statement I made yesterday about what issues are being tried here. I have permitted, and there has been no objection to the testimony introduced that is intended to support the estoppel defense to disestablishment of paternity.
The court went on to say that, "pending the results of testing," it would not consider the issue of K. being "the biological child" and would leave the record open for admission of the DNA test results. The court concluded this announcement by saying, "you people can talk about relationships, bonds and things like that." Both parties agreed to this arrangement without further question or comment.
The trial ended on the second day, and the court directed B.E.B. to pay interim support for all of the children in R.L.B.'s custody, including K. Shortly thereafter, the DNA tests were completed. The tests conclusively established that B.E.B. was not K.'s biological father. On October 20 B.E.B. submitted the test results to the court and asked it to reconsider the interim child support order as to K. He later filed a post-trial motion in which he noted that his vasectomy predated K.'s birth. B.E.B. alleged that R.L.B. had fraudulently led him to believe that K. was his child. He offered to produce evidence of R.L.B.'s fraudulent conduct in response to R.L.B.'s claim of paternity by estoppel.
Despite B.E.B.'s allegations, the court denied further hearing. Relying on this court's decision in Wright v. Black,(1) the court observed that paternity by estoppel is "intended to avoid unfairness and emotional harm to the child from frustrating the child's expectation of care and support to adulthood . . . ." The court found that B.E.B. and K.'s relationship was established during K.'s first five years. Noting that these years were arguably K.'s most formative, the court held that B.E.B. was estopped from denying paternity. The court also rejected B.E.B.'s request for a hearing on his claim of fraud, ruling that he should have submitted his evidence earlier: "Trial was the time to assert that he had had a vasectomy. Trial was the time to assert that [R.L.B.] had lied and used fraudulent means to cause him to believe [K.] was his child. Trial was the time to assert that the factors of equitable estoppel should not apply to him."
B.E.B. appeals, arguing that the court wrongfully deprived him of an opportunity to present his evidence of fraud, and that the court misapplied the doctrine of paternity by estoppel.
A.The Trial Court Found Paternity by Estoppel Based on Evidence of Potential Emotional Harm to K.
B. Alaska's Prior Cases on Paternity by Estoppel Support a Broad "Emotional Harm" Standard of Prejudice.
C. The Alternative View of Paternity by Estoppel Favors a Narrower Test of Prejudice Focusing on Financial, Rather Than Emotional, Harm.
R.L.B. urges us to follow the lead of our prior cases by applying the Clevenger test here. She argues that the record supports the trial court's finding that K.'s strong, voluntarily fostered ties to B.E.B. cannot be severed without considerable emotional trauma. In contrast, B.E.B. cites a substantial body of cases in which courts have expressly declined to apply Clevenger's broad test of emotional harm. These courts assert that the doctrine of paternity by estoppel should ordinarily be invoked only upon a showing of economic, rather than emotional, prejudice.
D.	Despite Our Prior Decisions, We Conclude that the Narrower "Financial Harm" Test of Prejudice Must Apply in Paternity by Estoppel Cases.
Moreover, Clevenger's broad rule, centering as it does on a child's emotional well-being after the break-up of a marriage, tacitly assumes that requiring a non-biological parent to pay post-divorce support will encourage a lasting emotional bond. This assumption is highly questionable.
In contrast, the narrower rule, described in cases like Knill and Miller, strives to attain a more realistic goal. It recognizes "the desirability of encouraging [non-biological parents] to assume voluntarily support of children without the fear that doing so may obligate them permanently."(46) This goal is no less significant or desirable than Clevenger's policy of protecting children's emotional well-being. At the same time, the financial prejudice requirement substantially furthers the stated goal of encouraging voluntary relationships. Thus, unlike Clevenger's interpretation of paternity by estoppel, this alternative interpretation of the doctrine seems well suited to accomplish its goal.
Because we conclude that the trial court relied on an incorrect legal standard, we REVERSE the order and REMAND this case for a further hearing on this issue. On remand, the superior court may find estoppel only upon a showing that K.'s reliance on B.E.B.'s parental conduct resulted in financial prejudice.
1. 856 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1993).
2. Whether circumstances justifying estoppel exist is generally a question of fact that we review for clear error. See Wright, 856 P.2d at 479. But "[w]hether the superior court has the power to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to cases where a father denies paternity is . . . a question of law[,]" which we review independently. Id.
3. 704 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1985).
6. See id. (quoting Jamison v. Consolidated Utils., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1972)).
7. 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961).
8. See H.P.A., 704 P.2d at 208 (citing Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714); see also K.E. v. J.W., 899 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Alaska 1995) (interpreting these four criteria as covering the representation and reliance elements of equitable estoppel in the paternity context).
9. H.P.A., 704 P.2d at 208-09.
10. 856 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1993).
12. Id. at 481 (citing Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15); see also K.E., 899 P.2d at 135.
13. See Wright, 856 P.2d at 481.
15. 899 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1995).
17. See id. at 134.
18. See id. at 135.
19. See id. at 134-35.
20. See id. at 135.
21. 639 N.E.2d 725 (Mass. App. 1994).
22. Id. at 728-30; see also Quintela v. Quintela, 544 N.W.2d 111, 117-20 (Neb. App. 1996) (discussing paternity by estoppel cases).
23. See K.B., 639 N.E.2d at 728.
24. 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
25. See, e.g., Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545, 547 (R.I. 1994). See generally K.B., 639 N.E.2d at 728-30, and Quintela, 544 N.W.2d at 118-19 (both citing numerous cases). Cf. Natalie A. Minton, Equitable Estoppel Precludes Husband in Divorce Proceeding From Refuting Paternity to Avoid Child-Support Payments -- Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I. 1994), 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 625, 630 (1995).
26. 510 A.2d 546 (Md. 1986).
27. See K.B., 639 N.E.2d at 728.
29. See Knill, 510 A.2d at 551-52.
33. Id. at 550 (quoting Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 359 (N.J. 1984)).
34. 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
37. See, e.g., K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573 (D.C. 1994); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1985). See generally Quintela v. Quintela, 544 N.W.2d 111, 117-19 (Neb. App. 1996); K.B. v. D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725, 728-29 (Mass. App. 1994); Knill, 510 A.2d at 548-50 (citing cases in which courts adopt increasingly popular, narrow requirement of financial detriment).
38. See H.P.A. v. S.C.A., 704 P.2d 205, 208-09 (Alaska 1985).
39. See K.E. v. J.W., 899 P.2d 133, 135 (Alaska 1995).
40. See Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 481 (Alaska 1993).
41. See id. at 480-81.
43. See H.P.A., 704 P.2d at 207 ("Under normal circumstances it is the biological parents who shoulder the legal responsibility for the welfare of their off-spring.").
44. K.B. v. D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725, 731 (Mass. App. 1994). Indeed, it appears that California law effectively precludes non-biological fathers from challenging paternity more than two years after a child is born. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 444-45 (1996) (citing Cal. Fam. Code � 7541).
45. Clevenger additionally focused on the social injury that results when a child previously thought to be legitimate is recognized as having been born out of wedlock. Our reasons for rejecting the policy of preventing emotional harm as a basis for following Clevenger also lead us to reject Clevenger's "social injury" rationale.
46. K.B., 639 N.E.2d at 729.
47. To the extent that Wright, 856 P.2d 477, may be read as adopting the emotional harm standard of prejudice, we overrule that decision.

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