Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180508_0001456.SCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:06:25+00:00

Document:
Order On February 23, 2018, this Court denied Petitioner Gabriel Rodriguez-Rodriguez's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 (the “Petition” [Doc. 29]). (See Order Denying Mt. to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence [Doc. 42].) On April 16, 2018, Petitioner appealed the order and filed a motion for a certificate of appealability (“COA”). (See Notice of Appeal & Mt. for COA [Docs. 43, 44].) On May 3, 2018, the Court of Appeal ordered this court to decide Petitioner's motion. (See USCA Order [Doc. 46].) For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Petitioner's request for a COA.
On September 22, 2017, Respondent filed its opposition, including Petitioner's trial counsel's declaration as an exhibit. On October 16, 2017, Petitioner filed his reply. On February 23, 2018, this Court denied the Petition. Petitioner now requests a COA.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 State. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), a federal prisoner may not appeal the denial of a section 2255 habeas petition unless he obtains a COA from a district or circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts retain authority to issue certificates of appealability under the AEDPA). In deciding whether to grant a COA, a court must either indicate the specific issues supporting a certificate or state reasons why a certificate is not warranted. Asrar, 116 F.3d at 1270. A court may issue a COA only if the applicant has made a “substantial showing” of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this standard, Petitioner must show that: (1) the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; (2) a court could resolve the issues in a different manner; or (3) the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). Petitioner does not have to show “that he should prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that endeavor.” Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025 (citation omitted).
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-prong test to determine whether counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction. First, petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. at 687. In order to prove deficient performance, petitioner must demonstrate that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. In other words, petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, considering all the circumstances presented in a particular case. Id. at 688. The Supreme Court further elaborated that there is a “strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. . . .” Id. at 699.

References: § 2255
 v. 
 § 2253
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.