Source: https://www.sharelawyers.com/ParametersLimitationPeriodsPersonalInjuryActions.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:01:40+00:00

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A limitation period is a stated period of time, the expiry of which extinguishes a party's legal remedy and forbids the commencement of a legal action. Each province in Canada has general statutes of limitations and many provincial and federal statutes contain limitation periods applicable to a variety of causes of actions. Traditionally, limitation periods have been strictly enforced. More recently, the subject of when time begins to run has received greater attention from our courts.
The discoverability rule has evolved fairly recently in our civil jurisprudence.1 It gives relief in certain factual situations by extending a limitation period. According to the discoverability rule, a limitation period begins to run when the material facts upon which an action is based have been discovered, or ought to have been discovered by the plaintiff through the exercise of due diligence. The effect of the rule is to postpone the running of time until a reasonable person, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, would discover the facts necessary to maintain the action.2 It is a general rule applied to avoid injustice.
In my opinion, the judge-made discoverability rule is nothing more than a rule of construction. Whenever a statute requires an action to be commenced within a specified time from the happening of a specific event, the statutory language must be construed. When time runs from "the accrual of the cause of action" or from some other event which can be construed as occurring only when the injured party has knowledge of the injury sustained, the judge-made discoverability rule applies. But, when time runs from an event which clearly occurs without regard to the injured party's knowledge, the judge-made discoverability rule may not extend the period the legislature has prescribed.
In Peixeiro the court concluded that the limitation period under the Ontario Highway Traffic Act did not start to run in a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident until the plaintiff discovered facts that could sustain a claim that his or her injuries met the threshold under the Insurance Act.
The discoverability rule and the Supreme Court's treatment of Peixeiro have received mixed reviews amongst the legal profession in Ontario. Critics of the broad application argue that the rule provides the potential for almost indefinite postponement of the commencement of time.
Ontario, like many other provinces, has enacted legislation prescribing a limitation period specifically for damages or injury occasioned by a motor vehicle. In Ontario, time begins to run in a motor vehicle accident when the damages are "œsustained". Since June 22, 1990, legislative changes to the Insurance Act, commonly referred to as OMPP, Bill 164 and now Bill 59, have outlined exceptions for when a tort claim can be maintained by an injured party. A potential plaintiff must now pass what is now commonly referred to as a threshold in order to maintain a cause of action. The threshold requirements are different in OMPP, Bill 164 and Bill 59 legislation and cause some difficulty for counsel advising a potential plaintiff if they have a cause of action. Counsel advising a potential plaintiff may not be in a position to ascertain if the plaintiff's injuries meet the threshold.
Various cases have, since Peixeiro, looked at what triggers time to begin to run with respect to a plaintiff's damages as a consequence of the defendant's conduct. Some injuries are relatively easy to determine whether the plaintiff's injury may reasonably meet the threshold. Soft tissue injuries, however, are the classic example of the type of injury where time and additional information may be necessary to determine whether the plaintiff's injury may reasonably meet the threshold.
When one is seeking to apply the discoverability rule to the plaintiff in a case such as this, it behooves the court to grant a degree of latitude to a plaintiff before declaring that the limitation period has begun to run. For instance, the first medical report or letter from the family doctor suggesting that an injury may be permanent may not be a triggering event if it is reasonable to expect that the plaintiff might want a second or more expert opinion. The assessment of these injuries is a highly individual matter which requires great delicacy. One specialist may view a patient as an unreliable historian or a malingerer. That particular physician's assessment of the individual might well be contradicted by the assessment of another physician or of a judge or jury. It may be that further diagnostic test will bring to light some important physical symptom not earlier seen or, indeed, not visible on an earlier examination, such as in the case of Peixeiro.
Justice Wilson relying upon Justice Langdon's consideration of Peixeiro in Ioannidis and concluded that the court did not find the subjective or objective test to be useful for analysis. The seriousness must be evaluated in light of the fact and circumstances of each particular injured individual. Justice Wilson scrutinized the facts of the case to look at what evidence was available to the plaintiff and his counsel post-accident and concluded at par. 25 that it was not clear that at a given point in time prior to October 31, 1995 that the plaintiff had a sufficient body of evidence available to be placed before a judge that had a reasonable chance of meeting the threshold. As such the court ordered that the issue ought to be determined at trial.
In my view, there is no rational distinction between a person not being aware that there injury might meet the provisions for the exception to the bar against action in the Insurance Act and a person who has been injured in an accident and who, by reason of the unusual circumstances of the aftermath of the accident, has not identified some potential tortfeasor. The courts have overcome the fundamental unfairness of these circumstances through application of what is now generally referred to as the discoverability rule and the requirement of reasonable diligence by the party seeking the relief.
The court held that it would be highly inappropriate for a plaintiff to be deprived of a cause of action under circumstances where the plaintiff and/or the plaintiff's solicitor have been deprived of the identity of the tortfeasor.
As I read the cases, however, the discoverability rule is not an exercise of discretion on the part of the court to overrule a statutory limitation period. Rather, the proper construction to put on statutory limitation periods is that they begin to run from the date of discoverability. If that is correct, the statute provides two years from the date of discoverability and it is not open to the court to lengthen it or shorten it.
Master MacLeod concluded that discoverability is a question of fact and that it was probable and arguable that the discoverability rule has the effect of extending the limitation period to April 2000 as against the proposed defendants. As such the Master granted leave to amend the statement of claim as the proposed amendments disclosed a cause of action at this stage although the Master recognized that there may be facts raised in the defence that put this conclusion into question.
The potential plaintiff is required to act with due diligence in acquiring facts in order to be fully apprised of the material facts upon which negligence can be based. This includes acting with diligence in requesting and receiving both expert opinion and medical opinion, if required, so as not to delay the commencement of the limitation period.
In Ontario actions for non-repair of a highway or bridge and damages sustained as a result must be brought within three months of the time that the damages were sustained. No action shall be brought unless there is notice in writing of the injury claimed. In occupier's liability cases against the provincial Crown, failure to serve a notice of the action pursuant to section 7 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990 within ten days after the claim arises is generally fatal to the action.
In Bourne v. Saunby the Court of Appeal took the position that a transportation committee order was a fact to which the discoverability rule applied. On May 30, 1990 the plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. The accident took place on a road under the jurisdiction of the defendant township. The defendant county had jurisdiction over the road that intersected with the township's road. The plaintiff commenced an action alleging negligence and nuisance against the two municipalities approximately one year after the accident, beyond the three-month limitation period prescribed by s. 284(2) of the Municipal Act.
The law in Ontario respecting limitation periods continues to be in poor shape. It is clearly unjust for a claim to be barred before the potential plaintiff knows, or reasonably could know, that their cause of action exists. The fundamental policy underlying the discoverability rule is the recognized unfairness in requiring a plaintiff to bring a cause of action before he or she could have reasonably discovered that he had a cause of action.
There is an apparent increased liberality on the part of the Ontario courts in the application of principles that stall the running of time. Much of this liberality is probably due to the failure of our legislature to establish certainty in the field of Ontario limitation periods in personal injury actions or even to codify the existing judge-made discoverability rule. Such a codification would give further guidance to both the public and counsel.
The court's application of Peixeiro in the context of personal injury litigation is evolving. The body of jurisprudence in the area of motor vehicle actions and actions against municipalities and the provincial crown seem to suggest that only when it is factually clear that the plaintiff knew the extent of the damages or knew who the tortfeasor was prior to the limitation period expiring and chose not to act diligently the court will defer in applying the discoverability rule. Another clear trend is that counsel are now using Peixeiro where there is a potential solicitor's negligence claim against a former solicitor who failed to commence an action within the statutory limitation period.
The judge-made discoverability rule raises some serious problems for the Ontario personal injury bar. Where counsel fails to act diligently in commencing a claim based upon material facts known after the limitation period has already expired, counsel may be now exposing themselves to a solicitor's negligence claim. While the application of the discoverability rule is based upon principles of justice and fairness much uncertainty in our notion of finality derive from this rule and how the case law has applied it in personal injury actions in Ontario.
Steven Muller B.A.. (U. of Toronto) LL.B. (U. of Windsor) J.D. (U. of Detroit Mercy) is a trial lawyer with a specialized interest in representing plaintiff's in personal injury and disability insurance claims who practices at Share Lawyers in Toronto, Ontario.
1. See City of Kamloops v. Nielsen (1984, 10 D.L.R. (4tht)641 (SCC); Consumers Glass Co. Ltd. v. Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 385 (C.A.); Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse et al (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (SCC); M.(K.) v. M.(H.)  3S.C.R. 6; Murphy v. Welsh (1993), 106 D.L.R. (4th) 404 (SCC).
2. Novak v. Bond 1999 CarswellBC 1027 (SCC) at par. 9 affirming (1998, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (B.C.C.A.); reversing (1997), B.C.J. No. 1900 [hereinafter Novak].
3. This paper will not be reviewing areas of motor vehicle legislation where the discoverability rule could be applied; rather, it will be looking at where the Ontario court has applied Peixeiro and the reasoning of the court in its application.
4. Graeme Mew "Discoverability principle not a license to ignore time limits", The Lawyers Weekly, October 23, 1998.
5. Aguonie v. Galion Solid Waste Material Inc. 1998 CarswellOnt 417 (C.A.) at par. 24 [hereinafter Aguonie].
6. See Findlay v. Holmes 1998 CarswellOnt 2848 (C.A.) par. 31 a medical malpractice case.
7. See Ioannidis v. Hawkings (1998) CarswellOnt 1418 (Gen. Div.) at par. 24-28 [hereinafter Ioannidis].
9. Goessell v. Black 1998 CarswellOnt 1253 (Gen. Div.) at par. 17 [hereinafter Goessell].
10. Ibid. at par. 25-32 and Madere v. Cassin 1997 CarswellOnt 3087 (Gen. Div.) at par. 16 [hereinafter Madere].
11. See Bhamra v. Sweetnam 1998 CarswellOnt 905 (Gen. Div.) par. 11.
12. See Soper v. Southcott 1998 CarswellOnt 2906 (C.A.) affirming (1997), 30 O.R. (3d) 704 (Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Soper], a medical malpractice case, where the receipt of medical records, rather than a supportive medical expert's report, was held to have started the clock running. The Court of Appeal on a different set of facts came to the opposite conclusion in Urquhart v. Allen Estate 1999 CarswellOnt 2445 (C.A.). In that case, medical records, including a mammogram report, did not contain all facts necessary to base a claim in negligence. The plaintiff was in no position to recognize that she had a cause of action against a radiologist on the basis of a mammogram report and other medical records alone.
13. See Guerriero v. Hawthorne 1999 CarswellOnt 2284 (Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Guerriero] referring to the court in Soper, supra note 12.
14. See Madere, supra note 10 at par. 20. This case deals with the Court of Appeal decision of Peixeiro.
15. See Salvador v. Maher 1998 CarswellOnt 3111 (Gen. Div.) and also Salvador v. Mather 1999 CarswellOnt 324 (Ont. Div.). It is not uncommon for defendants to raise that a solicitor was negligent in countering the discoverability rule raised by a solicitor representing the plaintiff.
16. Grenier v. Canadian General Insurance Co. 1999 CarswellOnt 789 (C.A.) at par. 16; affirming 1997, 32 O.R. (3d) 343 [hereinafter Grenier].
17. Guerriero, supra, note 13.
18. See Aguonie, supra, note 5 at par. 21.
19. Grenier, supra, note 16 at par. 19-22.
20. Wong v. Sherman 1998 CarswellOnt 1413 ( Gen. Div.).
21. Ponni v. Aziz 1999 CarswellOnt 3237 (Ont. Master).
22. Ioannidis, supra, note 7 at par. 39.
23. Peixeiro v. Haberman 1995 CarswellOnt 1127 (C.A.) at par. 16.
24. Novak, supra, note 2 at par. 9.
25. Sheikh v. Lorusso 1998 CarswellOnt 2095 (Gen. Div.).
26 Interestingly, the facts suggest that between commencing the claim in February 1993 and December 1996 new counsel were retained by the plaintiffs. More likely new counsel chose to use the discoverability principle to commence a claim beyond the limitation period then to commence a claim against the former solicitor for solicitor's negligence.
27. See Bourne v. Saunby 1998 CarswellOnt 1227 (C.A.) reversing (1996) 26 M.V.R. (3d 227 (Gen. Div.).
28. See Greenaway v. Ontario Minister of Transportation and Communication (1999) 44 O.R. (3d) 296 (Gen. Div.) at 300 Justice Sharpe does not specifically refer to Peixeiro but does base his finding on the discoverability principles.
29. See Appleyard v. Ontario 1999 CarswellOnt 2771 (Gen. Div.) the Court of Appeal on September 3, 1999 dismissed the appeal from the Crown and held that questions as to the meaning and effect of s. 7(3) should be determined at the trial not on a Rule 21 motion. Costs were also ordered in favor of Appleyard.
30. See Elizabeth Raymer, "City Notice-Period Defence Wins Out" The Lawyers Weekly, November 26, 1999.
31. See Fortier v. Timmins (City) 1998 CarswellOnt 2950.
32. Fortier v. Timmins (City) (Divisional Court) September 29, 1999 unreported.
33. Novak, supra, note 2 par. 9.
34. See Antonio F. Azevedo, The Discoverability Rule-Striking The Balance, Special Lectures 1998 The Law Society of Upper Canada, at p9-3.
35. See Patrick v. Dowhos 1998 CarswellOnt 5012 (Gen. Div.) at par. 23; Ioannidis, supra, note 7 at par. 31.
36. Grenier, supra, note16 at par. 24.

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