Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/785-F-3d-79-3rd-Cir-2015-14-4341-United-States-v-Merlino-597585754
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:16:56+00:00

Document:
Judge Panel: Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring. SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (D.C. Criminal No. 2-99-cr-00363-001). District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick.
Zane D. Memeger, Esq., David E. Fritchey, Esq., Joseph F. Minni, Esq., David E. Troyer, Esq., [ARGUED], Office of the United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellee.
Edwin J. Jacobs, Jr., Esq., [ARGUED], Michael F. Myers, Esq., Jacobs & Barbone, Atlantic City, NJ; Gary S. Silver, Esq., Silver Legal Services, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellant.
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring. SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.
issued before the term of supervised release expired. We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) is a jurisdictional statute requiring that a warrant or summons must issue before the expiration of supervised release in order for a District Court to conduct revocation proceedings. Because the summons in this matter was issued after the termination of supervised release, we conclude that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke supervised release. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's order revoking supervised release and imposing a prison term on Appellant Joseph Merlino.
Delayed revocation.--The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment . . . extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation.
Id. (emphasis added). We must consider the meaning of this statutory provision in the following context.
Merlino, the reputed former head of the Philadelphia La Cosa Nostra, commenced a three-year term of supervised release on September 7, 2011. On June 18, 2014, law enforcement observed Merlino at a cigar bar in Boca Raton, Florida, conversing with several convicted felons, including John Ciancaglini, one of Merlino's former co-defendants. The Probation Office concluded that this contact violated the terms of Merlino's supervised release. Over two months later, on August 26, Merlino's probation officer presented a revocation petition to the District Court.
the deputy clerk who had spoken to counsel testified that, absent counsel's request for a delay, the notice of hearing would have issued on September 2 or 3, before the expiration of supervised release. On that basis, the Court concluded that the deadline in § 3583(i) had been equitably tolled, such that the notice filed on September 16 was timely.
On October 24, the District Court conducted a revocation hearing and found that Merlino had violated the terms of his release by associating with Ciancaglini. The Court sentenced Merlino to four additional months' imprisonment, which Merlino began serving on January 15, 2015. He timely appealed.
The District Court claimed jurisdiction to revoke supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of jurisdictional issues is plenary. United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2005).
The overarching question presented here is whether the District Court, on these facts, had subject-matter jurisdiction to hold a revocation hearing when no warrant or summons was issued prior to the expiration of Merlino's supervised release. We begin with the principle that " [f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted). In this matter, the pertinent congressional enactment states that " [t]he power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release . . . extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release . . . if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). This language is clear and unequivocal. Read literally, a warrant or summons must issue before a term of supervised release expires in order for the District Court to exercise its authority to revoke supervised release. The District Court, evidently acknowledging the import of this condition, nevertheless found that § 3583(i) was subject to " equitable tolling." We disagree, and to explain why we hold that the timely issuance of a summons or warrant is jurisdictional, some historical context is in order.
five-year probation window] and the probationer was formally notified within that period that the Government would seek to revoke his probation." United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 835 (3d Cir. 1983).
Although our sister circuits unanimously agreed that Congress could not have intended for district courts to abruptly lose jurisdiction over already initiated revocation proceedings at the expiration of the five-year window, varying standards emerged as to the precise triggering event for continuing jurisdiction. For our part, we required that " formal revocation proceedings [be] commenced (by arrest warrant or otherwise) within the five-year period." Id. The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits identified the trigger as the Government's filing of the revocation petition prior to the term's expiration. See United States v. Barton, 26 F.3d 490, 491-92 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Schimmel, 950 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. O'Quinn, 689 F.2d 1359, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 1982). The Eighth Circuit found jurisdiction even where no revocation petition had been filed and no arrest warrant had issued, but the probationer consensually appeared before the district court prior to the expiration of his term. United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974).

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