Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1009680.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 11:24:06+00:00

Document:
Simona OSORNIO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lawrence WEINGARTEN, as Personal Representative, etc., Defendant and Respondent.
David A. Fulton, Cartwright, Fulton & Adams, Santa Cruz, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Louis H. Castoria, Debra S. Blum, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.
Our case is one of first impression involving a potential extension of Lucas. Simona Osornio, a nonclient, was the named executor and sole beneficiary under a will. Because she was care custodian to the testator, a dependent adult, Osornio was a presumptively disqualified donee under Probate Code section 21350, subdivision (a)(6).1 Accurately anticipating that a probate court would decide that she could not overcome that presumption by clear and convincing proof, Osornio claimed that the bequest to her failed because of the negligence of Saul Weingarten, the attorney who drafted the will on behalf of the testator.
Though Osornio's allegations are less than clear, her theory of negligence is apparently that Weingarten owed her a duty of care as the testator's intended beneficiary, and that, at the time the will was drawn, Weingarten: (1) failed to advise the testator that her intended beneficiary, Osornio, would be presumptively disqualified unless the testator obtained a certificate of independent review from another attorney, under section 21351, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 21351(b)); and (2) failed to take appropriate measures to ensure that the testator's wishes were carried out by referring her to counsel to obtain such a certificate. The trial court sustained Weingarten's demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend, and Osornio appeals.
We conclude that the complaint, as drafted, did not state a cause of action. We find further, however, that nonclient Osornio could have readily amended the complaint to state a cause of action for professional negligence against attorney Weingarten under Lucas and its progeny. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and we reverse the judgment.
Weingarten was a licensed California attorney practicing law in the County of Monterey.2 In the early 1990's the testator, Dora Ellis, retained Weingarten to draft a will. On or about September 19, 2001, Ellis requested that Weingarten prepare a new will that would (a) revoke her prior wills and codicils, and (b) name Osornio as the executor and sole beneficiary under Ellis's new will.
The September 19, 2001 will (2001 Will) prepared by Weingarten on behalf of Ellis “failed to include a Certificate of Independent Review as required by California Probate Code Section 21350 et seq.” Therefore (the complaint alleges), Weingarten failed to exercise reasonable care in performing legal services for Ellis.
Osornio was the intended sole beneficiary of Ellis, and she would have received the entire value of Ellis's estate had Weingarten exercised reasonable care, skill, and diligence in preparing the 2001 Will. Osornio alleges that, as a direct and proximate result of Weingarten's negligence, she was precluded from receiving the value of the estate under the 2001 Will and was thereby damaged.
Peggy Williams was the beneficiary under Ellis's prior will, dated October 7, 1993 (1993 Will); the prior will contained two codicils dated June 29, 1994, and July 10, 1997, respectively. Ellis died in May 2002. Williams filed a petition to probate the 1993 Will. Osornio objected to the Williams petition and filed a separate petition to probate the 2001 Will. Williams objected to the Osornio petition on the grounds of lack of capacity and undue influence. The dispute proceeded to trial in the probate court in June 2003.
Osornio filed her complaint on May 20, 2003. Weingarten filed a general and special demurrer to the complaint. Weingarten contended, inter alia, that the complaint (a) failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, (b) was uncertain, and (c) contained allegations that were heard and decided previously by the court. Osornio opposed the demurrer. After hearing, on December 3, 2003, the trial court sustained the general demurrer without leave to amend. The court entered a judgment of dismissal nunc pro tunc as of March 1, 2004.
The single issue raised on appeal is whether the court erred in sustaining Weingarten's general demurrer without leave to amend. This order was apparently founded upon the conclusion that Weingarten as a matter of law owed no duty to Osornio, a nonclient.7 The issue on appeal contains two subquestions: (a) whether the court properly sustained the demurrer because the complaint, as drafted, failed to state a cause of action for professional negligence; and (b) whether the court abused its discretion by refusing Osornio leave to amend-i.e., that the court correctly concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that Osornio could amend the complaint to state a viable cause of action.
We first review: sections 21350 and 21351, concerning the presumptive disqualification of certain donees (including care custodians of dependent adults); the elements of a legal malpractice claim; the Supreme Court's decisions in Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (Biakanja ), and Lucas, supra, 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, the latter case having extended negligence claims to persons not in privity with attorneys in limited instances; and other California authorities addressing an attorney's duty of care to nonclients. Following this review, we address whether the trial court erred in sustaining Weingarten's demurrer, and whether it abused its discretion by denying Osornio leave to amend her complaint.
In the near half-century since the Supreme Court decided Lucas, California courts have considered numerous variations of the attorney's potential liability to nonclients. Some instances have involved an attorney's duty of care in the estate planning context, while others have addressed negligence claims by nonclients in other business settings. In order to address fully the parties' respective contentions herein, we first review these California decisions.
Weingarten relies heavily on Radovich and Moore in support of his assertion that he owed no duty to Osornio as a matter of law. As we discuss in detail, (see pt. VIII C, post ), neither case supports Weingarten's position. In Radovich, plaintiff was merely a potential beneficiary under an unsigned draft will. We rejected his claim against the attorney who drafted the unsigned will, based in large part upon our concern that imposing liability would undermine the attorney's duty of loyalty to the client, (Radovich, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 965, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 573), a circumstance not presented here. Likewise, the appellate court in Moore concluded that requiring an attorney to ascertain and document his or her client's testamentary capacity “would place an intolerable burden on attorneys [because n]ot only would the attorney be subject to potentially conflicting duties to the client and to potential beneficiaries, but counsel also could be subject to conflicting duties to different sets of beneficiaries.” (Moore, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1299, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 888.) As we discuss, post, no such problem of conflicting loyalties arises here; imposing a duty upon Weingarten under the circumstances presented promotes the objectives of the client to transfer the client's estate to the nonclient/beneficiary.
It is against the foregoing backdrop of California decisions concerning questions of the attorney's duty to nonclients that we now address the question on appeal. We first consider whether the complaint, on its face, stated a cause of action for professional negligence. We then discuss whether the court properly denied Osornio leave to amend her complaint.
As discussed above, the four elements of a legal malpractice claim are: “duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damage.” (Chavez v. Carter, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d 577, 579, 64 Cal.Rptr. 350.) It is not disputed that Osornio properly pleaded the latter three elements of negligence. The sole question-viewing only the four corners of the pleading-is whether the complaint alleged that Weingarten owed a legal duty to Osornio.
The complaint alleged that the 2001 Will “failed to include a Certificate of Independent Review as required by California Probate Code Section 21350 et seq.” Osornio claimed in the next sentence of the complaint that, “[a]s such, Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care and skill” in representing Ellis. The complaint alleged that Osornio “was the intended sole beneficiary of the Estate of Dora Ellis,” and that Osornio would have inherited the entirety of the Ellis estate, but for Weingarten's negligence in preparing the 2001 Will.
We readily conclude that the complaint failed to allege that Weingarten owed a duty of care to nonclient Osornio. Even assuming, arguendo, that the bare bones allegations of duty are facially sufficient, any claim of duty is directly refuted by sections 21350 and 21351, of which we take judicial notice. (See Evid.Code, § 451, subd. (a).) As we have seen, a certificate of independent review is a document that is signed by independent counsel representing the transferor, who then “delivers to the transferor [the] original certificate ․ with a copy delivered to the drafter.” (§ 21351(b).) Contrary to the allegations of Osornio's complaint, the certificate is not “included” in the testamentary instrument. Similarly, contrary to the implication in Osornio's pleading, the drafter of the instrument is not the person who supplies the certificate as part of his or her duties to the transferor. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly held that Osornio's complaint was subject to demurrer because of the failure to allege a legal duty on the part of Weingarten.
In determining whether the court should have granted leave to amend, we disregard Osornio's inartful pleading and examine whether there was a reasonable possibility that she could have amended her complaint to state a claim for legal malpractice. (See Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58; Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 460, 175 Cal.Rptr. 157, 629 P.2d 1369.) This requires us to first enunciate-as it appears from the opposition to demurrer and appellate briefs-Osornio's unpleaded theory of negligence.
Osornio could have alleged that, as a proximate result of this negligence, she-as third party beneficiary to Ellis's engagement of Weingarten to draft the 2001 Will-was damaged. The damage was Osornio's failure to inherit under the 2001 Will. Osornio could have alleged further that this failure to inherit occurred because: (a) there was no certificate of independent review concerning the proposed donative transfer to Osornio under the 2001 Will; (b) said certificate would have been obtained but for Weingarten's negligence in failing to advise Ellis and in failing to refer her to independent counsel; (c) absent this certificate, Osornio was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence (disregarding her own testimony) that the transfer of the estate to her under the 2001 Will was “not the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence” (§ 21351(d), italics added); and (d) she was unable to meet this high burden of overcoming the presumption that she was a disqualified person under section 21350(a).
Having framed the potential amended complaint in this fashion, we must now address whether this proposed pleading sufficiently alleges a legal duty owed by Weingarten to the nonclient, Osornio. If we answer this question in the negative, we must affirm the trial court. If, however, we answer the question in the affirmative, we must necessarily find that the court abused its discretion by sustaining Weingarten's demurrer without granting Osornio leave to amend.
Unquestionably, this factor supports Osornio. Here, there is no doubt that “the ‘end and aim’ of the transaction [i.e., the drafting of the 2001 Will] was to provide for the passing” of Ellis's estate to Osornio. (Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 650, 320 P.2d 16.) The engagement of Weingarten by Ellis was clearly intended to benefit Osornio. In this respect, the Supreme Court's analyses in Biakanja, Lucas, and Heyer directly apply.
We have no trouble concluding that this factor similarly supports Osornio. It was clearly foreseeable at the time Weingarten drafted the 2001 Will that, if he failed to exercise due care to effectuate the testamentary transfer that Ellis intended upon her death, Osornio would be damaged. Again, the circumstances the Supreme Court addressed in Biakanja, Lucas, and Heyer are indistinguishable from this case.
In addition, the 2001 Will was a revocation of Ellis's prior 1993 Will, under which another person, Williams, was beneficiary. This relevant fact increased the foreseeability of harm to Osornio in the event that there was no certificate of independent review of the 2001 Will. It concomitantly decreased the likelihood that Osornio would be able to meet her heavy burden (under § 21351(d)) of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the bequest was not the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence.
It is clear that Osornio sustained injury. Although Ellis intended under the 2001 Will that Osornio receive the entire estate, she will receive nothing if she is unable to rebut her presumptive disability under section 21350(a). Osornio's efforts to rebut the presumption have been unsuccessful. (See tentative decision In re the Estate of Dora J. Ellis, Monterey County Super. Ct. case nos. MP 16152, MP16195, Aug. 29, 2003.) Assuming these efforts are ultimately unsuccessful, Osornio will sustain the definite injury of being deprived of the estate she would have received, but for her disqualification.
We acknowledge that Weingarten's conduct as might be alleged in a proposed amended complaint does not have the same degree of closeness to Osornio's injury found in many of the authorities, ante, finding a duty owed by the attorney to a nonclient. This is admittedly not a case-such as Lucas, supra, 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, or Heyer, supra, 70 Cal.2d 223, 74 Cal.Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161-where there are no possible intervening factors that might break the causal connection between the attorney's conduct and the nonclient's damage. Here, the facts may ultimately disclose that it would have been unlikely for a variety of reasons that Ellis would have obtained a certificate of independent review, even had Weingarten advised her of the importance of seeking counsel to obtain it.28 Under at least one scenario, however, Osornio may be able to establish that, but for Weingarten's failure to advise Ellis and refer her to independent counsel to address Osornio's presumptive disqualification under section 21350(a), Osornio would not have been damaged.
As is evident, the closeness of Weingarten's conduct to the injury here is one resolvable only after the presentation of significant evidence. It suffices to say that we conclude here that the absence of an extreme closeness between conduct and injury, by itself, should not trump a finding of an attorney's duty to a nonclient in a case that otherwise-applying the remaining five factors-warrants it.
We conclude that this fifth factor supports Osornio's claim. The imposition of duty under the circumstances before us would thus promote public policy: it would encourage the competent practice of law by counsel representing testators, trustors, and other clients making donative transfers to persons presumptively disqualified under section 21350(a).
An attorney “is expected ․ to possess knowledge of those plain and elementary principles of law which are commonly known by well informed attorneys, and to discover those additional rules of law which, although not commonly known, may readily be found by standard research techniques. [Citations.] ․ [E]ven with respect to an unsettled area of the law, we believe an attorney assumes an obligation to his client to undertake reasonable research in an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and to make an informed decision as to a course of conduct based upon an intelligent assessment of the problem.” (Smith v. Lewis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 349, 358-359, 118 Cal.Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589, disapproved on another ground in In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 851, fn. 14, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) Thus, the estate planning attorney owes a “duty to act with due care as to the interests of the intended beneficiary” (Heyer, supra, 70 Cal.2d 223, 229, 74 Cal.Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161), which duty arises out of the agreement to provide legal services to the testator.
Further-as a matter related to the question of undue burden upon the profession-we find that the imposition of liability here would not result in the attorney becoming unduly preoccupied with the possibility of negligence claims from third parties who might have dealings with his or her clients. (See Goodman, supra, 18 Cal.3d 335, 344, 134 Cal.Rptr. 375, 556 P.2d 737.) Under the facts presented here, at the time Ellis engaged Weingarten, he clearly knew of his client's desire that her care custodian, Osornio, be her sole beneficiary under the 2001 Will. This case does not present a situation where the attorney would be faced with conflicting loyalties in representing the client. (See, e.g., St. Paul Title Co. v. Meier, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 948, 952, 226 Cal.Rptr. 538 [attorney for purchaser owed no duty to incidental third party, escrow agent, because, inter alia, attorney's duty of loyalty to client should not be divided].) Thus, imposing liability here does not burden the attorney with concerns that “ ‘would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests.’ [Citation.]” (Goodman, supra, at p. 344, 134 Cal.Rptr. 375, 556 P.2d 737.) To the contrary, imposing a duty upon attorneys preparing instruments containing donative transfers to presumptively disqualified persons under section 21350(a) would promote public policy: it would encourage attorneys to devote their best professional efforts on behalf of their clients to ensure that transfers of property to particular donees are free from avoidable challenge.
Moreover, our holding does not suggest that an attorney must “draft litigation-proof legal documents.” (Ventura, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d 897, 905, 115 Cal.Rptr. 464.) We do not imply from our ruling here that that a transferor's attorney guarantees the success of the client's intended transfer. (See Lucas, supra, 56 Cal.2d 583, 591, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 [absent express agreement, attorney is not “insurer of the soundness of his opinions or of the validity of an instrument that he is engaged to draft”].) Thus, there may be cases (including, possibly, the one before us) in which the attorney is ultimately held not liable for the failed transfer, despite the attorney's failure to advise the client concerning the potential impact of section 21350(a). For instance, the attorney might avoid liability if the intended beneficiary is unable to establish that the attorney's negligence was the cause of the failed transfer (e.g., because it was unlikely that the client could have obtained a certificate of independent review).
In arguing against a finding of duty under the narrow circumstances presented here, Weingarten relies primarily upon our decision in Radovich, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 946, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, and on Moore, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1287, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 888. Neither case supports Weingarten's position in support of affirmance of the judgment.
In Radovich-a case factually distinguishable-we refused to extend an attorney's duty to a nonclient who was a mere potential beneficiary under an unsigned draft will. (Radovich, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 965-966, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 573.) In that instance, there was no plain expression of the testator's intention to benefit the plaintiff: “Although a potential testator may also change his or her mind after a will is signed, we perceive significantly stronger support for an inference of commitment in a signature on testamentary documents than in a preliminary direction to prepare such documents for signature.” (Id. at p. 964, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 573.) In contrast, here we have a clear expression of Ellis's intention that Osornio be her sole beneficiary under the signed 2001 Will.
Likewise, in Radovich, we expressed concern that the imposition of liability by an estate planning attorney to potential beneficiaries under unsigned estate planning documents “could improperly compromise an attorney's primary duty of undivided loyalty to his or her client.” (Radovich, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 965, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 573.) Here, there is none of the ambiguity concerning the testator's donative intent as was presented in Radovich. Imposing liability in this instance would not compromise the attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to the testator. The attorney's duty here was to take appropriate action to carry out the testator's wishes-that were expressed and formalized in her signed will-that her intended beneficiary, Osornio, inherit her entire estate.
Moore, supra, also involved circumstances entirely distinct from those presented here. As noted, ante, the question in Moore was whether an attorney owed “a duty to beneficiaries under a will to evaluate and ascertain the testamentary capacity of a client seeking to amend the will or to make a new will and ․ to preserve evidence of that evaluation.” (Moore, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 888.) Moore, in essence, involved a challenge by beneficiaries to the last formalized expression of the client's testamentary intentions, and a claim of malpractice against the attorney for failing to investigate and document his own client's testamentary capacity. (Ibid.) Here, however, Osornio makes no such claim. Instead, she asserts that the 2001 Will did contain an accurate expression of Ellis's testamentary intentions, but the proposed transfer failed due to Weingarten's negligence in his representation of Ellis.
Here, as we have discussed, ante, the imposition of liability upon attorneys to advise their transferor-clients concerning the potential disqualifying effects of transfers to persons identified in section 21350(a) does not impose an undue burden on the legal profession. Further, such a finding of duty-unlike the circumstances in either Moore or Radovich-will not compromise the attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to the client-transferor. Moreover, unlike the duty theory rejected in Moore, our holding does not require the attorney to evaluate or document the capacity of his or her transferor-client. Instead, it imposes a duty upon the attorney to advise the client of section 21350(a)'s effect of potentially disqualifying the proposed donee, and to assist the client in attempting to eliminate those consequences to effectuate the client's donative intentions.
The Moore court cited section 51 of the Restatement Third of Law Governing Lawyers as a basis for its rejection of attorney liability. (Moore, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1301-1302, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 888.) The Restatement supports our conclusion in this case. It provides in part: “[A] lawyer owes a duty to use care ․ [¶] ․ [¶] (3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that: [¶] (a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the representation that the lawyer's services benefit the nonclient; [¶] (b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's performance of obligations to the client; and [¶] (c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to the client unlikely.” (Rest.3d Law Governing Lawyers, § 51.) Plainly, each of these factors is satisfied here.
Furthermore, the comment explaining subsection (3) of section 51 of the Restatement-a comment which was also quoted by the Moore court (Moore, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1301-1302, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 888)-similarly supports our holding: “When a lawyer knows ․ that a client intends a lawyer's services to benefit a third person who is not a client, allowing the nonclient to recover from the lawyer for negligence in performing those services may promote the lawyer's loyal and effective pursuit of the client's objectives. The nonclient, moreover, may be the only person likely to enforce the lawyer's duty to the client, for example because the client has died. [¶] A nonclient's claim under Subsection (3) is recognized only when doing so will both implement the client's intent and serve to fulfill the lawyer's obligations to the client without impairing performance of those obligations in the circumstances of the representation.” (Rest.3d Law Governing Lawyers, § 51, com. f, p. 361.) Clearly, Osornio was the “third person” that Ellis intended to benefit through the services Weingarten performed. It is equally clear that finding the existence of a duty owed by Weingarten to nonclient Osornio under the circumstances presented here will promote the attorney's “effective pursuit of the client's objectives.” (Ibid.) Moreover, were we to conclude otherwise here, no one would be left to enforce the testator's right to be effectively represented.
We thus disagree with Weingarten that “Moore is on all fours” with the case before us. We conclude that neither Moore nor our decision in Radovich is controlling here.
We have balanced the factors that must be considered in evaluating the question of an attorney's potential liability to third parties. As a matter of public policy, we must conclude that Weingarten owed a duty of care to Osornio under the facts as may be alleged in an amended complaint. Because Osornio could have amended her pleading to state a cause of action for professional negligence, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant Osornio leave to amend when it sustained the demurrer.
The judgment is reversed and, on remand, the trial court is directed to grant Osornio leave to file an amended complaint.
1. All statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise indicated.
2. In the briefing on appeal, we were advised that Weingarten passed away on February 18, 2004, shortly before judgment was entered below. Accordingly, we entered an order in this appeal on September 14, 2004, substituting, as defendant and respondent, Lawrence A. Weingarten as personal representative of the estate of Saul Weingarten. This substitution of parties notwithstanding, for convenience, we refer to defendant and respondent as “Weingarten” throughout this opinion.
3. In re the Estate of Dora J. Ellis, Monterey County Superior Court, case numbers MP16152 and MP16195.
5. The tentative decision directed that counsel for Williams prepare a statement of decision consistent with the court's ruling. The parties have not provided us with any pleadings reflecting that the decision of the probate court is final. This fact notwithstanding, the arguments on appeal strongly suggest that both parties believe that the probate court has rendered a final decision adverse to Osornio. Therefore, any potential lack of finality of the probate court's decision is of no consequence to our consideration of the issues in this appeal.
8. The statute defines the terms “dependent adult” and “care custodian” as follows: “For purposes of this section, the term ‘dependent adult’ has the meaning as set forth in Section 15610.23 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and also includes those persons who (1) are older than age 64 and (2) would be dependent adults, within the meaning of Section 15610.23, if they were between the ages of 18 and 64. The term ‘care custodian’ has the meaning as set forth in Section 15610.17 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” (§ 21350, subd. (c).) As noted in our recitation of facts (part II, ante ) Osornio has admitted that she was a care custodian of Ellis, a dependent adult.
14. For extensive reviews of multijurisdictional authorities on an attorney's duty to third parties, see generally, Annot., What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person Other than Immediate Client (1988) 61 A.L.R.4th 464; Annot., Attorney's Liability, to One Other than Immediate Client, for Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties (1988) 61 A.L.R.4th 615.
20. See footnote 7, ante.
21. See also Morales, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 307, 160 Cal.Rptr. 239 (counsel for trustee/executor owed duty to unrepresented remainderman beneficiary to disclose attorney's dual representation of parties in transaction involving trust).
25. As noted in our discussion of facts, ante, it is apparent that Weingarten knew at the time he drafted the 2001 Will that Osornio was, in fact, Ellis's care custodian.
27. As we indicate in footnote 15, ante, in determining an attorney's duty to a nonclient, courts have generally not addressed the additional Biakanja factor, namely, “the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct.” (Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16.) We agree that the “moral blame” factor is of limited usefulness in any analysis of duty. It suffices for us to say here that the balancing of the six relevant Biakanja/Lucas factors supports a finding that Weingarten owed a duty of care to Osornio.
28. Weingarten also asserts that Osornio “nowhere alleges that she retained (or paid) Mr. Weingarten to prepare the Independent Certification.” This argument misses the mark, and, indeed, makes no sense because it is the client, not the beneficiary, who is required to retain independent counsel under section 21351(b).
29. The Second District, Division One, has recently rejected negligence claims of beneficiaries against estate planning attorneys in two recent cases; neither case is final at this time. (See Boranian v. Clark (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1012, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 405; Featherson v. Farwell (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1022, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 412.) In each case, Justice Vogel, writing for the court, relied upon Moore in concluding that the imposition of duty would place the attorney in a position of having divided loyalties between his or her client, the testator, and the beneficiary. In our case, as we have discussed, imposing a duty upon the attorney here raises no such conflict issues; the interests of the testator, Ellis, in disposing of her estate to the person named in her duly executed will, Osornio, do not conflict with Osornio's interests as beneficiary.
WALSH, J.* FN* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
WE CONCUR: PREMO, Acting P.J., and BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

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