Source: https://www.michaelrehm.com/people-v-dubose-1971-17-ca3d-43
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:15:21+00:00

Document:
LEONARD DUBOSE, Defendant and Respondent.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci and George R. Nock, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
LeRue J. Grim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
The record discloses that defendant made a motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995 and a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5. Both of these motions were denied. Defendant then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that at the time of his arrest on the instant charge he was on parole on his earlier conviction for violating Health and Safety Code section 11500; that the term (2 to 20 years) on this earlier offense was enhanced by virtue of a prior conviction for violation of section 11721 of the Health and Safety Code; that without the prior conviction his term would have been 1 to 10 years; that the prior conviction was invalid for want of representation by counsel; and that at the time of his arrest on the present charge he had served more than 10 years on the earlier conviction for violating Health and Safety Code section 11500. The court found in accordance with the allegations of the petition and granted the writ of habeas corpus invalidating the conviction for violation of Health and Safety Code section 11721.
Defendant then filed a new motion to suppress evidence. At the hearing on the motion to suppress the following evidence was adduced. On June 18, 1969, Inspector William Logan of the San Francisco Police Department went to 1306 Fillmore Street to take defendant into custody pursuant to a “want” issued by the Adult Authority for violation of parole. Logan arrived just as another person was leaving. As he walked into the room, Logan saw a hypodermic needle on the coffee table. Defendant was in bed. Logan informed him that he was under arrest and ordered him to get out of bed. As defendant was getting out of bed, Logan noticed numerous multi-colored rolled balloons in defendant's pajama pocket. He seized the balloons and with a needle pierced one of them. The balloon contained a powdery substance. Defendant was placed under arrest and advised of his rights. The contents of the balloons were subsequently analyzed and found to be heroin. The instant charge followed.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress it was stipulated that the trial court could also consider the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus hearing. Having held the Health and Safety Code section 11721 conviction invalid, and thus having held in effect that defendant's sentence for violating Health and Safety Code section 11500 had expired prior to the issuance of the parole violator warrant, the court concluded that defendant 47*47 was not a parole violator at the time of the instant arrest, and that, therefore, his arrest by Logan was invalid. Accordingly, the court determined that since the subject search was justifiable only as incident to a valid arrest, the invalidity of the arrest rendered the products of the search inadmissible in court.
(4a) Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain a second motion pursuant to section 1538.5, it was not justified in suppressing the subject evidence because that evidence was obtained legally. The admissibility of the evidence depends on the legality of Logan's entry into defendant's home for the purpose of taking defendant into custody for violation of parole. We observe here that no search was conducted. The hypodermic kit was in plain sight on a coffee table when 48*48 Logan entered defendant's home and the balloons were observed in the pocket of defendant's pajamas as he got out of bed. The only issue, therefore, is whether Logan had a right to be in the place where the contraband was in plain sight.
Defendant does not claim that the facts were insufficient to justify the issuance of the parole violator warrant. His sole contention is that at the time he was arrested by Logan he was not a parolee. The People contend, however, that at the time Logan entered defendant's home for the purpose of arresting defendant for a violation of parole he was legally a parolee and that, therefore, the entry was legal. The People assert that the subsequent judicial action altering defendant's status did not operate retroactively to void the entry. We agree.
In reviewing the legality of Logan's conduct, we look only at the facts and circumstances presented to him at the time he was required to act. (People v. Ferguson, 214 Cal. App.2d 772, 775 [29 Cal. Rptr. 691]; People v. Hollins, 173 Cal. App.2d 88, 92 [343 P.2d 174].) At the time Logan entered defendant's home, he had knowledge that an all-points bulletin and parole violator warrant (“want”) had been issued for defendant. He was entitled to make an arrest upon the basis of this information because it was received from official sources. (People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107, 112 [56 Cal. Rptr. 902, 424 P.2d 342, 19 A.L.R.3d 708]; People v. Kraps, 238 Cal. App.2d 675, 679 [48 Cal. Rptr. 89]; People v. Schellin, 227 Cal. App.2d 245, 251 [38 Cal. Rptr. 593]; see People v. Rosales, 68 Cal.2d 299, 302 [66 Cal. Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489].) It was also his duty to execute such warrant “in like manner as ordinary criminal process.” (§ 3061; People v. Rosales, supra, at pp. 303-304; see § 816.) Logan's entry, therefore, was lawful.
(5) The status of a prisoner subject to administrative decisions of the 49*49 Adult Authority in the administration of the indeterminate sentence provisions of the Penal Code may be altered through judicial interference in a proper case. (In re Olden, 69 Cal.2d 845, 849 [73 Cal. Rptr. 229, 447 P.2d 341]; In re Mills, 55 Cal.2d 646, 653-654 [12 Cal. Rptr. 483, 361 P.2d 15].) Accordingly, such judicial interference is proper where it corrects judicial error. (In re Olden, supra; In re Mills, supra.) But until such correction is effected we apprehend that the term and status of a prisoner, who is under the jurisdiction of the Adult Authority pursuant to a judgment of conviction which has not been judicially set aside or modified, continues as fixed and determined by the Adult Authority pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Legislature. By the same token a prisoner is subject to the disabilities inherent in such status.
(4b) In the present case defendant's prison term had not legally expired when he was placed on parole, and it was not reduced until such time as it was judicially determined in the habeas corpus proceeding that the prior 50*50 conviction for violation of Health and Safety Code section 11721 was invalid. Until that determination was made defendant was a parolee and subject to arrest for a violation of parole.
The order dismissing the action is reversed; the trial court is directed to set aside the order suppressing evidence.
 Logan had knowledge that defendant was active in the sale of narcotics.

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 § 816