Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/233/886/636713/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:00:54+00:00

Document:
Before POLITZ, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Robert Wilkerson appeals the denial of his second habeas corpus petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons assigned, we vacate the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
In 1973, while an inmate at Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Wilkerson and fellow inmate Grady Brewer were convicted of the second-degree murder of inmate August Kelly, who was stabbed to death in a prison fight. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated Wilkerson's conviction, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring Wilkerson to appear before the jury handcuffed, shackled, and with his mouth taped.1 On retrial, Wilkerson was convicted and received a sentence of life imprisonment.
In August 1995, Wilkerson filed the instant habeas petition in the district court in which he raised three issues that were rejected in his prior § 2254 petition: grand jury composition; shackling; and limitation on cross-examination. Wilkerson also raised a new ineffective assistance of counsel claim, alleging that counsel was ineffective for failing to call John Baugh as a defense witness at the second trial. Baugh was one of the prison guards working on the tier the morning of the murder and had released the inmates from their cells to the showers. He testified at the first trial for the prosecution. This ineffective assistance claim was not raised in any prior habeas petition, although Wilkerson concedes knowledge of the facts relative to the claim were known to him when those petitions were filed.
The petition was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended that the writ be denied. Adopting the responsive report and recommendation, the district court rejected all of Wilkerson's constitutional claims and denied him a Certificate of Probable Cause. On appeal to this Court, Wilkerson's request for a CPC initially was denied. That order, however, was vacated and a CPC subsequently was granted.
Wilkerson's new evidence consists of the following. On June 16, 1988, William Riley executed an affidavit in which he recanted his testimony and stated that he did not witness the killing but, rather, merely related to prison officials what another inmate had told him. Similarly, inmate Charles Lawrence, who testified at the first trial but not the second, executed two affidavits in which he recanted his testimony. In the first, dated April 19, 1988, Lawrence avers that his testimony "should not have been considered credible" because he was coerced into testifying on behalf of the state. He stated that prison officials threatened to indict him for Kelly's murder and would revoke his pending release date if he did not testify. In his affidavit dated July 27, 1995, Lawrence repeated the statements from his first affidavit and added that he knew Wilkerson had no part in the killing because he was standing next to Wilkerson when the offense was committed. In 1997 Grady Brewer, Wilkerson's codefendant, executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for Kelly's death. At the second trial Brewer testified that he stabbed Kelly in the chest and back, but he did not say that Wilkerson was not involved.
Wilkerson contends that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by unduly restricting defense counsel's cross-examination of Riley, the purported eyewitness to the crime. More specifically, defense counsel was not permitted to question Riley about letters he had written to prison administrators prior to Wilkerson's first trial concerning a transfer request and his decision to testify for the state.17 The trial court limited the scope of counsel's questioning to whether Riley had received anything of value in exchange for his testimony.
The state insists that inquiry into the letters and subsequent transfer would have unduly prejudiced the defense because the jury would have learned that Wilkerson previously was convicted of Kelly's murder, and could have inferred that Riley was seeking a transfer to get away from Wilkerson. We reject this contention for two reasons. First, the jury already was aware that Wilkerson had gone to trial for Kelly's murder and that the verdict had been reversed on appeal. During voir dire, when questioned about whether he had heard anything about the case, one potential juror responded that he understood that the case had been to the state Court of Appeal and had been referred back for retrial. This statement was made in open court in the presence of the other potential and empaneled jurors. Second, on cross-examination Riley admitted that in October 1973, around the time of Wilkerson's first trial, he told his family that he feared for his life because one of the prison guards told another inmate to "get him." Thus, the jury could have inferred that Riley was afraid, not of Wilkerson, but of this other inmate and prison guard. Regardless, it was within the exclusive province of the jury to make this determination.30 Clearly, the jury was denied information essential to its assessment of Riley's believability and, in turn, of the strength of the state's case against the defendant. We must conclude that the trial court deprived Wilkerson of his sixth amendment right to confront fully the witnesses against him.
Finally, Wilkerson complains that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call prison guard Baugh as a defense witness in the second trial.35 Wilkerson contends that if Baugh had testified substantially as he did in the first trial, the defense would have shown that: (1) Baugh could not identify Wilkerson as having been involved in the murder; (2) Riley had a motive to testify for the prosecution because he was the only inmate on the tier who was not charged with Kelly's murder; and (3) Baugh's account of the events and, specifically, of Wilkerson's and Brewer's behavior, was inconsistent with Riley's testimony.
At Wilkerson's first trial, Baugh testified that he released eleven inmates from their cells to go to the showers, including Kelly, Wilkerson, Brewer, and Riley. The inmates congregated at the back of the tier for a meeting and Baugh overheard inmate Abraham Thompson arguing with Wilkerson. He also heard Wilkerson tell Thompson that he "didn't know anything about it" and that Thompson should ask Kelly. Thompson then started talking to Kelly. A few minutes later, Baugh noticed that Brewer was acting "like he wanted to fight with somebody," but then he "quitened [sic] down." A fight began shortly thereafter. There was a "big crowd... in the corner" and it looked like three to five unidentified inmates were fighting. The inmates initially ignored Baugh's instructions to stop fighting, but they eventually returned to their cells, leaving Kelly dying on the floor. When asked about the whereabouts of Riley and Lawrence, Baugh replied that all of the inmates were at the end of the tier where the fight occurred. He also testified that he did not see anyone using a weapon. Our review of the record persuades that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Baugh as a defense witness in the second trial.
For these reasons, we VACATE the decision of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent herewith including, but not necessarily limited to, a determination of the reliability of certain affidavits that heretofore has been assumed.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, specially concurring.
A Louisiana jury found Robert Wilkerson guilty of murdering fellow inmate August Kelly during a prison melee in 1973. The prosecution's key witness, inmate William Riley, testified that he saw Wilkerson stab Kelly, but he has since altered his testimony. I agree with the majority that we cannot hear Wilkerson's abusive and repetitive federal habeas corpus petition until an evidentiary hearing has shown him "actually innocent." I, however, do not join the majority's Sixth Amendment analysis because I believe it is premature.
The majority correctly notes that Wilkerson must show that he is, more likely than not, "actually innocent" to be able to present his third habeas petition. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The claim of actual innocence does not itself provide a basis for relief. It merely serves as "a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Id. at 315 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).
The district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the newly introduced affidavits because there are reasons to doubt their reliability. First, as a general matter, an affidavit, which is usually prepared by an attorney, states only what an affiant will purportedly testify about. It cannot replace a live hearing where a court can judge an affiant's reliability. As Schlup warned, "new statements may, of course, be unreliable." Id. at 331. Second, Riley submitted his affidavit fifteen years after the murder had occurred. Courts treat last-minute affidavits with "a degree of skepticism" because " [i]t seems that, when a prisoner's life is at stake, he often can find someone new to vouch for him." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 423. Third, we should question Riley's credibility, given that he now admits to perjuring himself at trial. " [R]ecanting affidavits and witnesses are viewed with extreme suspicion by the courts." United States v. Adi, 759 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, by holding an evidentiary hearing into "actual innocence," we ensure that Wilkerson does not receive a free pass through the Schlup v. Delo "gateway."
While I agree with the majority on the importance of an evidentiary hearing, I do not join its Sixth Amendment analysis. If the district court finds that Wilkerson has failed to meet the "actually innocent" standard, then it will render the Sixth Amendment problem moot. I believe the court should not prematurely and unnecessarily address this very difficult issue.
The majority writes that the state violated Wilkerson's right to confrontation by limiting the cross-examination into Riley's prison transfer. I question, but do not decide, whether the state indeed violated Wilkerson's Sixth Amendment right. I bring up the following critique only to show that we should not try to resolve this thorny (and potentially moot) issue at this point.
Second, the trial court's interest in preventing mistrial possibly outweighed Wilkerson's competing interest in cross-examining Riley about the letter. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 1111 (recognizing that an important state interest can sometimes trump the right to an unfettered cross-examination). The state trial judge limited the cross-examination into Riley's transfer because he worried that this line of questioning would broach Wilkerson's first trial, where Riley had also testified. He warned Wilkerson's attorney during a colloquy about the transfer: " [Y]ou are bordering  very close to a mistrial by asking him about the previous trial. The man [Riley] was careful enough in his testimony not to disclose anything about it but I want to caution you." Apparently, the state trial judge feared that Wilkerson's attorney would elicit testimony about the previous trial, and lay the seeds of a mistrial should Wilkerson be found guilty. The judge's fear of a manufactured mistrial may not have been misplaced: after his conviction, Wilkerson moved for a mistrial because a prospective juror during voir dire had mentioned that he knew this case was "back for retrial."3 See Louisiana v. Wilkerson, 326 So. 2d at 355 (rejecting the motion for mistrial).
Q: Were you charged with this murder?
Q: How many other people were charged with this murder?
A: Six or seven I guess, I'm not sure.
Q: Is it or is it not true that you were the only person that was out of his cell that was not charged with this murder?
Q: But you were not charged?
The court also allowed Ligon to attack other aspects of Riley's credibility: he pointed out that Ligon was a convicted armed robber, was dishonorably discharged by the Marines, took medication for psychological problems, and visited a psychiatrist at the penitentiary.
Finally, while res judicata does not attach to the denial of habeas relief, see Schlup, 513 U.S. at 317, I note that a Fifth Circuit panel rejected Wilkerson's prior habeas petition, which raised this same Sixth Amendment claim. See Wilkerson v. Whitley, 16 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit en banc then affirmed the panel's decision. See Wilkerson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc opinion).
State v. Brewer, 301 So. 2d 630 (La. 1974). These restraints were imposed due to an unseemly outburst by Brewer.
State v. Wilkerson, 326 So. 2d 353 (La. 1976).
Wilkerson v. Whitley, 16 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1994).
Wilkerson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1085, and reh'g denied, 513 U.S. 1199 (1995).
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.
Wilkerson's petition is both successive and abusive. As noted, his first three constitutional challenges were reviewed and rejected on the merits by this court and the fourth claim could have been raised in his prior petitions. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (acknowledging the distinction between the two terms).
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
Id. at 327; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Gochicoa v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 1997).
Fairman v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 1999).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982).
Riley testified that he was transferred in either September or October of 1973, after Wilkerson's first trial. Riley also stated, outside the presence of the jury, that he was transferred in July 1973, before the first trial.
Gochicoa, 118 F.3d at 445.
Johnson v. Puckett, 176 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 1999).
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17.
Landerman, 109 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316).
United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir. 1976)).
United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101 (5th Cir. 1995).
Defense counsel was able to establish that Riley was dishonorably discharged from the Marines and, through defense witnesses, that he had a reputation at the penitentiary for being untruthful. In addition, the jury obviously was aware that Riley was an inmate at Angola, and he admitted that he was serving time for armed robbery.
Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 ("A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.").
Davis, 415 U.S. at 318.
Riley's admission that he feared he would be killed by someone on the tier, other than Wilkerson, when coupled with the numerous letters he wrote to prison administration requesting a transfer, is even stronger evidence that inquiry into these matters should have been permitted. Indeed, Riley had "considerable incentive... to 'slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.'" United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d at 104 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)).
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (holding that harmless error standard announced in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), applied to habeas review of constitutional claims). See also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996), and O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995).
Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted).
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
Wilkerson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d. 498 (en banc); 16 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1994).
As stated earlier, Wilkerson did not raise this claim of ineffective assistance in any of his previous state or federal petitions, although he certainly could have. The magistrate and district court concluded, however, that Wilkerson had exhausted his state remedies with respect to this claim because it was merely a variation on the previous ineffective assistance claims that had been raised and rejected. Regardless, even if Wilkerson has failed to exhaust his state remedies, because exhaustion is not jurisdictional, under pre-AEDPA law we retain the discretion to reach the merits of the petition "to avoid unnecessary delay in granting relief that is plainly warranted." Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987); Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Cockrell, 720 F.2d 1423, 1427 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Riley's letters are not in the record, so we must rely on the characterizations of them described in the trial transcript and the judicial opinions.
Wilkerson's attorney noted in a sidebar conversation that Riley, in his letters, "asked in one place to be transferred to DeQuincy and in another place that he be transferred to Camp H just a medium security area." It is unclear from the record if DeQuincy is a maximum or medium security prison, but the attorney's contrast between DeQuincy and Camp H suggests that DeQuincy is a maximum security penitentiary. If that is the case, it undermines Wilkerson's argument that Riley had an incentive to lie in hopes of being transferred to a medium security prison.
The majority argues that this fear of a mistrial was unwarranted because a prospective juror had already informed the jury of the prior trial. But the Louisiana Supreme Court dismissed the significance of the prospective juror's statement, saying "it is extremely unlikely that the comment drew the attention" of the jurors. Louisiana v. Wilkerson, 326 So. 2d at 355.

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