Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/474/327/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:07:04+00:00

Document:
Due process is not implicated in negligent acts by state officials.
When a prison official acted carelessly, Daniels slipped and fell. He argued in federal court that the negligence of the official had infringed on his liberty interest in freedom from injury. This due process claim was rejected by the courts.
Deliberate violations of individual rights and government abuses of power are the appropriate areas for due process claims . Merely careless or negligent actions bring it too close to pre-existing tort doctrines under the common law and would improperly blend federal with state law.
Due process should not alter the customary tort law regarding claims against government officials. The negligence of prison guards does not rise to the level of significance needed to hold the government accountable for arbitrary exercises of power. This decision thus shows that a seemingly sweeping clause has limits.
Petitioner brought an action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained when, while an inmate in a Richmond, Virginia, jail, he slipped on a pillow negligently left on a stairway by respondent sheriff's deputy. Petitioner contends that such negligence deprived him of his "liberty" interest in freedom from bodily injury "without due process of law" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The Due Process Clause is not implicated by a state official's negligent act causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property. Pp. 474 U. S. 329-336.
(a) The Due Process Clause was intended to secure an individual from an abuse of power by government officials. Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care, such as respondent's alleged negligence here, suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Due Process Clause would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, overruled to the extent that it states otherwise. Pp. 474 U. S. 329-332.
(b) The Constitution does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society. While the Due Process Clause speaks to some facets of the relationship between jailers and inmates, its protections are not triggered by lack of due care by the jailers. Jailers may owe a special duty of care under state tort law to those in their custody, but the Due Process Clause does not embrace such a tort law concept. Pp. 474 U. S. 332-336.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., concurred in the result. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 474 U. S. 336, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 474 U. S. 336, filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), a state prisoner sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that prison officials had negligently deprived him of his property without due process of law. After deciding that § 1983 contains no independent state-of-mind requirement, we concluded that, although petitioner had been "deprived" of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State's postdeprivation tort remedy provided the process that was due. Petitioner's claim in this case, which also rests on an alleged Fourteenth Amendment "deprivation" caused by the negligent conduct of a prison official, leads us to reconsider our statement in Parratt that "the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation." Id. at 451 U. S. 536-537. We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.
In this § 1983 action, petitioner seeks to recover damages for back and ankle injuries allegedly sustained when he fell on a prison stairway. He claims that, while an inmate at the city jail in Richmond, Virginia, he slipped on a pillow negligently left on the stairs by respondent, a correctional deputy stationed at the jail. Respondent's negligence, the argument runs, "deprived" petitioner of his "liberty" interest in freedom from bodily injury, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 430 U. S. 673 (1977); because respondent maintains that he is entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, petitioner is without an "adequate" state remedy, cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 468 U. S. 534-536 (1984). Accordingly, the deprivation of liberty was without "due process of law."
The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that, even if respondent could make out an immunity defense in state court, petitioner would not be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present his case. 720 F.2d 792 (1983). On rehearing, the en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court, but under reasoning different from that of the panel. 748 F.2d 229 (1984). First, a 5-4 majority ruled that negligent infliction of bodily injury, unlike the negligent loss of property in Parratt, does not constitute a deprivation of any interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The majority therefore believed that the postdeprivation process mandated by Parratt for property losses was not required. Second, the en banc court unanimously decided that, even if a prisoner is entitled to some remedy for personal injuries attributable to the negligence of state officials, Parratt would bar petitioner's claim if the State provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Finally, a 6-3 majority concluded that petitioner had an adequate remedy in state court, even though respondent asserted that he would rely on sovereign immunity as a defense in a state suit. The majority apparently believed that respondent's sovereign immunity defense would fail under Virginia law.
Because of the inconsistent approaches taken by lower courts in determining when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort, see Jackson v. Joliet, 465 U. S. 1049, 1050 (1984) (WHITE, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (collecting cases), and the apparent lack of adequate guidance from this Court, we granted certiorari. 469 U.S. 1207 (1985). We now affirm.
its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242, contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right. Id. at 451 U. S. 534-535. We adhere to that conclusion. But in any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right; and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977) (invidious discriminatory purpose required for claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 429 U. S. 105 (1976) ("deliberate indifference" to prisoner's serious illness or injury sufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
official may "deprive" an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 59 U. S. 277 (1856) (discussing Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
We think that the actions of prison custodians in leaving a pillow on the prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate's property, are quite remote from the concerns just discussed. Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law.
"'would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States,'"
Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 424 U. S. 701 (1976), quoted in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 544.
That injuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed by the United States Constitution is not to say that they may not raise significant legal concerns and lead to the creation of protectible legal interests. The enactment of tort claim statutes, for example, reflects the view that injuries caused by such negligence should generally be redressed. [Footnote 2] It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.
officials in that situation is their deliberate decision to deprive the inmate of good-time credit, not their hypothetically negligent failure to accord him the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. But we need not rule out the possibility that there are other constitutional provisions that would be violated by mere lack of care in order to hold, as we do, that such conduct does not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized. "
LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 232 U. S. 340, 232 U. S. 354 (1914) (Holmes, J., partially concurring). More important, the difference between one end of the spectrum -- negligence -- and the other -- intent -- is abundantly clear. See O. Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1923). In any event, we decline to trivialize the Due Process Clause in an effort to simplify constitutional litigation.
"was intended to give Americans at least the protection against governmental power that they had enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the crown."
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 672-673. And South v. Maryland suggests that one such protection was the right to recover against a sheriff for breach of his ministerial duty to provide for the safety of prisoners in his custody. 18 How. at 59 U. S. 402-403. Due process demands that the State protect those whom it incarcerates by exercising reasonable care to assure their safety and by compensating them for negligently inflicted injury.
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept. Petitioner alleges that he was injured by the negligence of respondent, a custodial official at the city jail. Whatever other provisions of state law or general jurisprudence he may rightly invoke, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not afford him a remedy.
JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the result.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether, as petitioner contends, the possibility of a sovereign immunity defense in a Virginia tort suit would render that remedy "inadequate" under Paratt and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984).
See, e.g., the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Va.Code § 8.01-195.1 et seq. (1984), which applies only to actions accruing on or after July 1, 1982, and hence is inapplicable to this case.
Despite his claim about what he might have pleaded, petitioner concedes that respondent was at most negligent. Accordingly, this case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or "gross negligence," is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.
I concur in the judgment. See my opinion in dissent in Davidson v. Cannon, post p. 474 U. S. 349.
Two prisoners raise similar claims in these two cases. Both seek to recover for personal injuries suffered, in part, from what they allege was negligence by state officials. Both characterize their injuries as "deprivations of liberty," and both invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a basis for their claims.
the reasoning of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), to support this conclusion.
the first category (a violation of one of the specific constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights), a plaintiff may invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy. [Footnote 2/10] As explained in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), this conclusion derives from the fact that the statute -- the Ku Klux Act of 1871 -- was intended to provide a federal remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional right. Thus, when the Fourth Amendment is violated, as in Pape, the provision of an independent federal remedy under § 1983 is necessary to satisfy the purpose of the statute.
Similarly, if the claim is in the second category (a violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause), a plaintiff may also invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy. [Footnote 2/11] For, in that category, no less than with the provisions of the Bill of Rights, if the Federal Constitution prohibits a State from taking certain actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them," the constitutional violation is complete as soon as the prohibited action is taken; the independent federal remedy is then authorized by the language and legislative history of § 1983.
"abuse" of state power. Similarly, a deprivation may be the consequence of a mistake or a negligent act, and the State may violate the Constitution by failing to provide an appropriate procedural response. In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty without due process of law -- without adequate procedures.
Petitioners' claims are not of the first kind. Neither Daniels nor Davidson argues in this Court that the prison authorities' actions violated specific constitutional guarantees incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither now claims, for instance, that his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated. Similarly, I do not believe petitioners have raised a colorable violation of "substantive due process." [Footnote 2/16] Rather, their claims are of the third kind: Daniels and Davidson attack the validity of the procedures that Virginia and New Jersey, respectively, provide for prisoners who seek redress for physical injury caused by the negligence of corrections officers.
I would not reject these claims, as the Court does, by attempting to fashion a new definition of the term "deprivation"
and excluding negligence from its scope. No serious question has been raised about the presence of "state action" in the allegations of negligence, [Footnote 2/17] and the interest in freedom from bodily harm surely qualifies as an interest in "liberty." Thus, the only question is whether negligence by state actors can result in a deprivation. "Deprivation," it seems to me, identifies, not the actor's state of mind, but the victim's infringement or loss. The harm to a prisoner is the same whether a pillow is left on a stair negligently, recklessly, or intentionally; so too, the harm resulting to a prisoner from an attack is the same whether his request for protection is ignored negligently, recklessly, or deliberately. In each instance, the prisoner is losing -- being "deprived" of -- an aspect of liberty as the result, in part, of a form of state action.
Thus, I would characterize each loss as a "deprivation" of liberty. Because the cases raise only procedural due process claims, however, it is also necessary to examine the nature of petitioners' challenges to the state procedures. To prevail, petitioners must demonstrate that the state procedures for redressing injuries of this kind are constitutionally inadequate. Petitioners must show that they contain a defect so serious that we can characterize the procedures as fundamentally unfair, a defect so basic that we are forced to conclude that the deprivation occurred without due process.
and the legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of that Amendment should be construed to suggest that the doctrine of sovereign immunity renders a state procedure fundamentally unfair. [Footnote 2/20] Davidson's challenge has been only to the fact of sovereign immunity; he has not challenged the difference in treatment of a prisoner assaulted by a prisoner and a nonprisoner assaulted by a prisoner, and I express no comment on the fairness of that differentiation.
Thus, although I believe that the harms alleged by Daniels and proved by Davidson qualify as deprivations of liberty, I am not persuaded that either has raised a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore concur in the judgments.
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S.Const., Amdt. 14.
See, e.g., Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943).
See, e. g, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962).
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964) (right to protection from compelled self-incrimination applies to States); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969) (right to protection from double jeopardy applies to States).
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial applies to States).
See, e.g., Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496 (1972); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948).
See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972).
See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) (§ 1983 action for Fourth Amendment violation); Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30 (1983) (§ 1983 action for Eighth Amendment violation). See generally McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 373 U. S. 672 (1963) (§ 1983 is "supplementary to any remedy any State might have").
Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 451 U. S. 545 (1981) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973).
See, e.g., Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 470 U. S. 532 (1985); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). Cf. Groppi, supra.
Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 455 U. S. 436 (1982) (postdeprivation state remedy is inadequate when challenge is to "the state system itself"); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 443 U. S. 156 (1979) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 468 U. S. 533 (1984) ("[W]hen deprivations of property are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply "impracticable," since the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur"); Parratt v. Taylor, supra.
See id. at 468 U. S. 543-544.
Davidson explicitly disavows a substantive due process claim. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-6470, p. 7 ("[P]etitioner frames his claim here purely in terms of procedural due process"). At oral argument, counsel for Daniels did suggest that he was pursuing a substantive due process claim. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 84-5872, p. 22. However, the Court of Appeals viewed Daniels' claim as a procedural due process argument, see 748 F.2d 229, 230, n. 1 (CA4 1984) ("There is no claim of any substantive due process violation"), and Daniels did not dispute this characterization in his petition for certiorari or in his brief on the merits.
In any event, to the extent that petitioners' arguments about the special obligations of prison officials may be read as a substantive due process claim, I agree with the Court, ante at 474 U. S. 335-336, that the sheriff's "special duty of care" recognized in South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396 (1856), does not have its source in the Federal Constitution. In these circumstances, it seems to me, the substantive constitutional duties of prison officials to prisoners are defined by the Eighth Amendment, not by substantive due process. Cf. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719-721 (CA7 1973) (analyzing prison officials' responsibilities to prevent inmate assaults under the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied sub nom. Gutierrez v. Department of Public Safety of Illinois, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
Respondents in Davidson do raise a state action objection in one sentence, Brief for Respondents in No. 84-6470, p. 13, n., but that bare reference is inadequate to mount a challenge to the undisturbed District Court finding of state action.
See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306, 462 U. S. 314, n. 8 (1983); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 443 U. S. 181, n. 11 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 426 U. S. 345-347 (1976); Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 337 U. S. 486-487 (1949).
It borders on the absurd to suggest that a State must provide a hearing to determine whether or not a corrections officer should engage in negligent conduct.
In Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), we held that California's immunity statute did not violate the Due Process Clause simply because it operated to defeat a tort claim arising under state law. The fact that an immunity statute does not give rise to a procedural due process claim does not, of course, mean that a State's doctrine of sovereign immunity can protect conduct that violates a federal constitutional guarantee; obviously it cannot, see Martinez, supra, at 444 U. S. 284, n. 8, quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).

References: § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 242
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 

v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 8
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 § 1983
 § 5
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.