Source: http://va.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180301_0000172.EVA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 13:10:20+00:00

Document:
KAREN D. BROWN, et al., Respondent.
Thomas Ebron, a Virginia state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("§ 2254 Petition, " ECF No. 1). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny the § 2254 Petition and dismiss the action. Ebron filed objections. (ECF No. 17.) For the reasons that follow, Ebron's objections will be overruled and the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) will be granted.
On October 15, 1985, Ebron pled guilty to capital murder, robbery, and a firearm violation in the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria ("Circuit Court"). Plea Agreement 2, Commonwealth v. Ebron, No. F-7291 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 15, 1985). On December 16, 1985, the Circuit Court sentenced Ebron to life imprisonment plus two years. Judgment 2, Commonwealth v. Ebron, No. F-7291 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 16, 1985). Ebron neither appealed nor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
As explained below, Ebron's Claim Four lacks merit and his remaining claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives an individual of a legitimate liberty or property interest. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). Thus, the first step in analyzing a procedural due process claim is to identify whether the alleged conduct affects a protected liberty or property interest. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Where government action impacts a protected liberty interest, the second step is to determine "what process is due" under the circumstances. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (observing that "due process is flexible . . . not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure").
A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, or from state laws and policies. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 220-21 (2005). "There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). "With no constitutional right to parole per se, federal courts recognize due process rights in an inmate only where the state has created a ' legitimate claim of entitlement' to some aspect of parole." Vann v. Angelone, 73 F.3d 519, 522 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 1991)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consistently has found that the pertinent Virginia statutes fail to create a protected liberty interest in release on parole. See Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Gaston, 946 F.2d at 344; Vann, 73 F.3d at 522. Virginia, however, has created a limited liberty interest in consideration for parole. Burnette v. Fahey, No. 3:10CV70, 2010 WL 4279403, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2010); Burnette, 687 F.3d at 181. "The question thus becomes what procedures are required under the Due Process Clause in [considering] an inmate for discretionary release on parole." Burnette, 2010 WL 4279403, at *8 (quoting Neal v. Fahey, No. 3:07cv374, 2008 WL 728892, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2008)).

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