Source: https://blogs.law.gwu.edu/mcir/case/bryan-pringle-v-william-adams-et-al-black-eyed-peas/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:31:08+00:00

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“I Gotta Feeling” this claim of infringement should go nowhere … along with that of another recent claim (Batts v. Adams) against “Black Eyed Peas”… and that plaintiff Pringle would be advised to “Take a Hike” – if not a “Dive” – out of the courthouse.
On 29 January 2011 U.S. District Judge Josephine Tucker denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the case, noting the extremely low standard for a claim to survive a challenge of dismissal — namely that a court must accept as true all material allegations made in the complaint, and that the plaintiff’s allegations indicate that there exists a mere possibility that defendants acted unlawfully. Perhaps the only way for wealthy defendants like “Black Eyed Peas” to curtail annoying predatory attempts like these is not to throw plaintiffs a settlement bone (indeed, Pringle’s attorneys actually claim that prior settlements by “Black Eyed Peas” indicate an ongoing record of unlawful conduct) but rather to hold firm – and seek attorney fees.
In March of 2012, however, Judge Tucker dashed any hopes she may have built as to sympathy towards plaintiff’s infringement allegations. Not only did the court grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but it also sanctioned the plaintiff for having deliberately corrupted evidence on which he based his claim. In an extraordinary demonstration of chutzpah the plaintiff apparently not only attempted to falsify the date of creation of his work that he claimed plaintiffs infringed, but, as the court suggests, he also copied defendants’ work in creating the version of his song for which he attempted to obtain a copyright registration, and on which he based his infringement claim.
The audio clip above, of the plaintiff’s work, is the doctored version of his song, which he claimed the defendants copied.
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants David Guetta, Frederic Riesterer, and Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) (Mot., Doc. 159.) Moving Defendants assert several bases for summary judgment. Moving Defendants also assert that Pringle’s claims should be dismissed as a sanction for spoliation of evidence. Plaintiff Bryan Pringle (“Pringle”) filed an Opposition on December 19, 2011. (Opp’n, Doc. 195.) Moving Defendants filed a Reply on January 9, 2012. (Reply, Doc. 222.) Having heard oral argument and read and considered the parties’ papers, the Court GRANTS Moving Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court also concludes that dismissal is an appropriate sanction for Pringle’s willful spoliation of evidence.
Given that you have advanced a claim on [Pringle’s] behalf I am sure you have already advised Mr. Pringle of his duty to preserve all computer records. Out of caution, before Mr. Pringle is confronted with the topic of potential altered dates etc [sic], it is likely appropriate for you to have an independent forensic computer person image his entire hard drive etc. to capture and preserve everything on his system before you confront him. It will be something we will necessarily request in discovery should this case ever reach a filed action.
On behalf of my clients’ [sic], as I am sure you understand, I have to formally make a request for preservation of evidence. Please consider this email my formal request for preservation of evidence.
On December 21, 2010, Pringle delivered to his expert, David Gallant, a CD–ROM hand-marked “PROMO PHOTOS / 1999 ENSONIQ.NRG FILES” (“the NRG Disc”). (Gallant Decl. ¶ 4, Doc. 193.) This CD contained 134 digital photographs, the files for which were dated September 8, 1999, and the NRG files dated August 22, 1999.(Id. ¶ 5(a)).
On November 17, 2011, Moving Defendants moved for summary judgment on several bases. Moving Defendants also assert that Pringle’s claims should be dismissed as a sanction for spoliation of his Hard Drives.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson v.. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is proper “if the [moving party] shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A factual issue is “genuine” when there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could resolve the issue in the non-movant’s favor, and an issue is “material” when its resolution might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U .S. at 248.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record” supporting its assertion that a fact is “genuinely disputed.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see also In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (“non-moving party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s favor”).
In paragraph 30 of the FAC, Pringle defines “Take a Dive” to refer to “the derivative version [“Take a Dive” (Dance Version) ] .” (FAC ¶ 30.) Thereafter, Pringle’s FAC asserts that “Defendants … gained access to Plaintiff’s copyrighted song ‘Take a Dive,’ and then subsequently sampled and copies additional, substantial original elements of ‘Take a Dive,’ without Plaintiff’s permission, when they wrote, recorded, performed and made derivative works of their song ‘I Gotta Feeling.’” (FAC ¶ 62.) Therefore, from the FAC, it appears that Pringle alleges both sampling and other copyright infringement of “Take a Dive” (Dance Version).
I had many derivative versions of “Take a Dive” which contained the “guitar twang sequence” soloed out in the song, and provided samples of the same directly to. [sic] [Defendants] Guetta and Garraud, at least as far back as 1999 to 2003.
(Pringle Decl. ¶¶ 142–43.) Therefore, it is unclear whether Pringle asserts that “I Gotta Feeling” infringes “Take a Dive”, “Take a Dive” (Dance Version), or some other undisclosed “derivative” version of the song. However, “no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made….” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). “Copyright registration is not a prerequisite to a valid copyright, but it is a prerequisite to a suit based on a copyright.” Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence of registration of only two songs: “Take a Dive” and “Take a Dive” (Dance Version). Accordingly, these are the only two works on which Pringle’s copyright suit can be based. Therefore, to the extent Pringle claims copyright infringement as to an unidentified “derivative” version of “Take a Dive,” his claim fails.
The Court concludes that Pringle’s registration of “Take a Dive” (Dance Version) is invalid, and he therefore lacks standing to sue for infringement of that work. “In order to obtain a copyright registration, an applicant must deposit as a part of his application a ‘copy’ or ‘copies’ of the work.” Kodadek, 152 F.3d at 1211 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(b)(1) and (2)). The Ninth Circuit “[has] stated that the registration deposit requirement permits ‘bona fide copies of the original work only….” Kodadek, 152 F.3d at 1211 (citation omitted). This is because “[t]he Copyright Act does not contemplate the copyrighting of a now non-existent original on the basis of a tendered reconstruction.” Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1986). “This means that any ‘copy’ deposited as part of an application for a certificate of copyright registration must be virtually identical to the original and must have been produced by directly referring to the original.” Kodadek, 152 F.3d at 1212. A subsequent copy meets the “bona fide copy” requirement, but only if that copy is a copy that was ultimately produced by reference to the original. Id.
Here, Pringle deposited an MP3 sound file with his November 2010 application for registration of “Take a Dive” (Dance Version). (SUF ¶ 86.) This MP3 file was not created in 1999, nor was it directly copied from a file that was created in 1999. Rather, it was created later using the separate sound files for each individual instrument contained on the NRG file. (See SUF ¶¶ 68, 90.) As described by Pringle in his declaration, this process closely resembles a “reconstruction” of the original, rather than the creation of a bona fide copy. (See generally Pringle Decl. ¶¶ 159–73.) Although Pringle likens the process to loading a tape reel onto a reel-to-reel tape recorder machine and pushing play, the instructions Pringle provided to Defendants’ expert reveal a series of choices that one who wishes to hear the song has to make in order to correctly hear the song as it allegedly existed originally. (Id. ¶¶ 162, 168, Ex. 47.) The key difference is not that there are many more steps to playing the NRG file on an Ensoniq ASR–10 keyboard than to loading a tape into a tape recorder. Rather, the distinction is that these instructions contain not only guidance on operating an Ensoniq ASR–10 keyboard, but on how to load the files and what decisions to make at each step of the way to play the song properly. For example, step 6 provides an instruction on how to “lower[ ] or ‘mute[ ]’ all the wavesamples in this instrument, which allows isolation of the ‘guitar twang sequence’ wavesamples by raising the volume of only the wavesamples needed for the ‘guitar twang sequence’ to play.” (Id. Ex. 47 at 2.) If someone were to have only the NRG file and knew how to operate an Ensoniq ASR–10 keyboard, these instructions suggest that he would still not be able to recreate the song without additional guidance from Pringle.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the MP3 created through this process and deposited with the United States Copyright Office is not a bona fide copy. Thus, Pringle “did not properly receive a copyright registration in [“Take a Dive” (Dance Version) ] and his infringement action [on that basis] is foreclosed.” Kodadek, 152 F.3d at 1212.
It is undisputed that Pringle has a valid copyright in the original version of “Take a Dive” and has standing to sue for infringement of that copyright. To establish copyright infringement of Take a Dive, Pringle must show that (1) defendants had access to his work and (2) IGF and TAD are substantially similar in protected expression. See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003). “Where a high degree of access is shown, [the Ninth Circuit] require[s] a lower standard of proof of substantial similarity.” Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 2004). With respect to “Take a Dive,” Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence of access. Pringle’s declaration and that of his brother provide some facts relating to Defendants’ access to “Take a Dive” (Dance Version), but are completely devoid of any reference to “Take a Dive.” (SAF ¶¶ 129–37.) Jeffrey Pringle stated that Michael Brown played cuts from the Dead Beat Club album, but this statement omits any reference to “Take a Dive.” (SAF ¶ 136.) Furthermore, Jeffrey Pringle’s declaration lacks a showing of personal knowledge as to what music Michael Brown played on the radio. See Fed.R.Evid. 602.
Therefore, to the extent that Norris has identified any similarity, “no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity” between “Take a Dive” and “I Gotta Feeling.” See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2006). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Pringle’s claim for infringement of the original version of “Take a Dive” fails. The Court concludes that Pringle has met the registration prerequisite to a copyright suit only with respect to the original version of “Take a Dive.” However, because he has not provided evidence of access or substantial similarity between “Take a Dive” and “I Gotta Feeling,” his copyright claim fails. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Moving Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

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