Source: http://fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/vol9/9fsm114_119.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:04:38+00:00

Document:
For the Appellees: Kathleen A. Rittner, Esq.
With some exceptions, the FSM Supreme Court does not exercise jurisdiction over appeals that are not from final decisions. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 117 (App. 1999).
The FSM Supreme Court can hear appeals from final decisions of the highest state courts in Yap and Pohnpei if the cases require interpretation of the national Constitution, national law, or a treaty. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 117 (App. 1999).
The Pohnpei Constitution provides that single appellate justice orders are subject to review by a full appellate panel of justices hearing the appeal. This constitutional provision is self-executing. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 118 (App. 1999).
A single justice order in the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division is not a final decision of the Pohnpei Supreme Court because it is subject to review by a full appellate panel of the Pohnpei Supreme Court. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 118 (App. 1999).
A single appellate justice might not be considered the highest state court when his orders are subject to review by a full appellate panel. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 118 n.3 (App. 1999).
A motion to reconsider a single justice appellate order in the Pohnpei Supreme Court is an application for review by a full appellate panel. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 118 (App. 1999).
A motion to reconsider dismissal of an appeal by the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division is relief under comparable rules of any state court from which an appeal may lie equivalent to motions under the rules specifically cited in FSM Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) because the motion seeks reversal or modification of an earlier dispositive order. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 118 (App. 1999).
Appellate Rule 4(a)(2), which allows a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order to be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof, is designed for cases of premature appeals where it is known that the final order or judgment to be entered will merely reflect the earlier decision. It specifically does not apply when Rule 4(a)(4) does. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 118 (App. 1999).
A Rule 60(b) motion is for relief from the judgment of a trial court, not the reconsideration of an appellate order. A motion to reconsider before the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division is not analogous to a relief from judgment motion. It is instead analogous to the types of motions to reconsider specifically mentioned in FSM Appellate Rule 4(a)(4). Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 118-19 (App. 1999).
Generally, a properly filed notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction from the lower court to the appellate court. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 119 (App. 1999).
A properly filed notice of appeal will not create subject matter jurisdiction in FSM Supreme Court when there is none, but it always has jurisdiction over an appeal to determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 119 n.4 (App. 1999).
A notice of appeal filed in the FSM Supreme Court while a motion to reconsider is pending before the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division has no effect because it was prematurely filed. Jurisdiction was thus never transferred to the FSM Supreme Court appellate division. Damarlane v. Pohnpei, 9 FSM Intrm. 114, 119 (App. 1999).
On December 29, 1998, the court issued an order requiring the parties to file memorandums concerning our jurisdiction to hear this appeal when the record reveals that there is pending before the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division a motion to reconsider its dismissal of this case. Initial oral argument was confined to this jurisdictional question. After retiring to consider the question, we dismissed this appeal from the bench. We concluded that we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because it was not from a final decision. Our reasoning follows.
We therefore raised the question of our jurisdiction based on whether the appeal before us was from a final decision of the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division. We have carefully considered the parties' memorandums on this point and listened to their oral argument.
Generally, only final decisions may be appealed. In re Extradition of Jano, 6 FSM Intrm. 23, 24 (App. 1993). With some exceptions, none of which apply in this case, we do not exercise jurisdiction over appeals that are not from final decisions. We can hear appeals "from final decisions of the highest state courts in Yap and Pohnpei if the cases require interpretation of the national Constitution, national law, or a treaty." FSM App. R. 4(a)(1)(A).
The Damarlanes now contend that the single justice dismissal is a final order because the Pohnpei Supreme Court Appellate Rules do not contain any provision for motions to reconsider. The Damarlanes further contend that should the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division want to grant the motion to reconsider it would have to so indicate and ask the FSM Supreme Court appellate division to remand the case to it so it could, but that it could deny the motion without waiting for a remand. For this proposition they rely on various U.S. authorities interpreting U.S. Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). Additionally, the Damarlanes assert that the Pohnpei Supreme Court's long inaction amounts to a denial of its motion to reconsider.
The appellees contend that there is no final decision because Pohnpei Supreme Court Appellate Rule 6 allows the filing of motions in the appellate division, and because under section 16-4 of the Pohnpei Judiciary Act of 1995, Pon. S.L. 3L-99-95, § 16-4, single justice decisions may be appealed to the full appellate division. The appellees also contend that if the Pohnpei Judiciary Act were not in effect, a similar provision in the Pohnpei Constitution would still provide for full appellate review of a single justice order.
16-4 in the earlier judiciary act. But we do not have to decide whether section 16-4 would apply to a pending reconsideration motion. The Pohnpei Constitution provides that single appellate justice orders are "subject to review by a full appellate panel of justices hearing the appeal." Pon. Const. art. 10, § 5(2). We believe, and the appellants concede, that this constitutional provision is self-executing. It is therefore applicable. We conclude that the single justice order is not a final decision because it is subject to review by a full appellate panel of the Pohnpei Supreme Court.3 Moreover, we consider the Damarlanes' motion to reconsider can only be an application for such appellate review.
If a timely motion under the Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the Supreme Court Trial Division by any party: (i) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (ii) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (iii) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment, or (iv) under Rule 59 for a new trial or for any equivalent relief under comparable rules of any state court from which an appeal may lie, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order disposing of the motion as provided above.
FSM App. R. 4(a)(4). A motion to reconsider dismissal of an appeal is "equivalent relief under comparable rules of any state court from which an appeal may lie," when it comes from a state appellate court. The motion seeks reversal or modification of an earlier dispositive order, like motions under the rules specifically cited in Rule 4(a)(4). The Pohnpei constitutional provision allowing a single appellate justice's ruling to be reconsidered by the full appellate panel, Pon. Const. art. 10, § 5(2), is the comparable rule.
The saving provision of Appellate Rule 4(a)(2) would not assist the Damarlanes even if the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division had ruled on the motion before we considered the appeal. That rule provides that "[e]xcept as provided in (a)(4) of this Rule 4, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof." FSM App. R. 4(a)(2). That rule is designed for cases of premature appeals where, unlike the pending motion in the Pohnpei Supreme Court, it is known that the final order or judgment to be entered will merely reflect the earlier decision. It specifically does not apply when Rule 4(a)(4) does. Thus even if we did not act on this appeal until after the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division had ruled on the pending reconsideration motion, the notice of appeal would still have had no effect and this appeal would still have to be dismissed unless a new notice of appeal had been filed afterward.
of an appellate order. The motion to reconsider before the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division is not analogous to a relief from judgment motion. It is instead analogous to the types of motions to reconsider specifically mentioned in FSM Appellate Rule 4(a)(4).
Generally, a properly filed notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction from the lower court to the appellate court.4 See >Damarlane v. United States, 8 FSM Intrm. 14, 16 (App. 1997); Walter, 7 FSM Intrm. at 517; Election Commissioner v. Petewon, 6 FSM Intrm. 491, 498 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 1994). But the notice of appeal, filed June 27, 1995, had "no effect" because it was filed before the reconsideration motion had been ruled upon. FSM App. R. 4(a)(4). It was thus prematurely filed, and jurisdiction was never transferred to the FSM Supreme Court appellate division.
The Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division was thus free to rule on the reconsideration motion at any time because jurisdiction had never been properly transferred to the FSM Supreme Court. We can understand how the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division might be hesitant to act on the appellants' motion to reconsider once it had been served with the appellants' notice of appeal to the FSM Supreme Court appellate division. Nevertheless, it could have without infringing on our jurisdiction or sensibilities.
Accordingly this appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It was not from a final decision of the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division, the highest state court in Pohnpei. Furthermore, because the notice of appeal was filed in the FSM Supreme Court appellate division while a motion for reconsideration was pending before the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division, it had no effect to transfer jurisdiction to our appellate division.
1. They also attempted a direct collateral appeal to the FSM Supreme Court appellate division. We dismissed that appeal. Damarlane v. Pohnpei Transp. Auth., 5 FSM Intrm. 322 (App. 1992).
2. The events in this chronology, other than the notice of appeal, were unknown to us until after the state court provided its Certification of Records to our Chief Clerk in May, 1998.
3. Additionally, a single appellate justice might not be considered the highest state court when his orders are subject to review by a full appellate panel. See Gustaf v. Mori, 6 FSM Intrm. 284, 285 (App. 1993).
4. Naturally, a properly filed notice of appeal will not create subject matter jurisdiction in our court where there is none, but we always have jurisdiction over an appeal to determine if we have subject matter jurisdiction. In the present case, we have not addressed whether we would have had subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying appeal since our ruling rests primarily on our conclusion that the order appealed from was not a final decision.

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