Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/292/292mass58.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:37:48+00:00

Document:
JOSEPH CUMMINGS vs. FRED P. TOLMAN, trustee.
Equity Pleading and Practice, Appeal, Decree, Parties, Bill. Trust, Construction of instrument creating trust, What constitutes, To furnish support.
Appeal lies from a decree final in substance, though in form interlocutory.
A conveyance to a nephew of the grantor's wife upon trust to support the settlor for life, but not fixing the place of performance, could be found to allow the settlor to choose such place within reasonable limitations; and upon refusal by the trustee to furnish support to the settlor at the place of his choice the trustee could be ordered in equity to pay to the settlor a gross sum reckoned from the date of the refusal to the date of the decree, thereafter an amount periodically during the settlor's life, and a certain amount for funeral expenses upon the settlor's death. An additional defendant was not joined in a suit in equity by the plaintiff's motion to join him, assented to by the original defendant and filed but never allowed by the court; and no decree could be entered against him.
A deed poll in trust, accepted and partly performed by the trustee, bound him to full performance.
In a suit in equity by a cestui que trust against the trustee, a decree ordering the defendant to perform the trust was proper if it conformed to the frame of the bill and to the facts found, though the prayers in the bill were for termination of the trust or for the removal of the defendant and the appointment of a new trustee.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on April 5, 1932.
The proceedings are described in the opinion. The so called interlocutory decree was entered by Williams, J.
J. B. Sly, for the defendant.
put to any expense on his account. There has been no bad faith by either party. The defendant has done everything that could be reasonably expected of him in the circumstances to discharge his duties under the trust deed but his wife has been impatient and discourteous in her treatment of the plaintiff to the extent that a man of his years and physical and mental condition would be expected to feel that he was being neglected and badly treated. The reasonable value of the use, occupation and profits of the trust estate has been $50 per month. The minimum amount necessary to provide modest and adequate support for the plaintiff is $50 per month. The value of the trust estate which will become the property of the defendant and his wife at the death of the plaintiff is $10,000. The plaintiff has no means of support except that secured to him by the trust. The defendant has no property except his interest under the trust and $600 in cash.
A decree termed interlocutory was entered. By its terms the "respondents" are ordered to pay $1,450 for the maintenance of the plaintiff since he ceased living with the defendant and thereafter to pay $50 per month so long as he shall live and upon his decease to pay his funeral expenses to a specified amount.
1. The defendant appealed from this decree. That appeal is not rightly before us unless the decree is final in its nature. To determine whether a decree is final its substance rather than its form or name must be considered. It is not decisive that it is denominated interlocutory rather than final. Hays v. Georgian Inc. 280 Mass. 10, 15. This decree orders the defendant to pay for the support of the plaintiff although he is living at a place away from the trust estate; it deals with the past as well as with the future; it disposes of all the issues raised by the bill. We think that is final and appealable to this court. Churchill v. Churchill, 239 Mass. 443, 445. Forbes v. Tuckerman, 115 Mass. 115, 119. Cambridge Savings Bank v. Clerk of Courts, 243 Mass. 424, 427. Kingsley v. Fall River, 280 Mass. 395. New England Theatres, Inc. v. Olympia Theatres. Inc. 287 Mass. 485, 490.
the parties is not so close as to require the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to receive his support in the family of the defendant. It is plain that the defendant could not personally "furnish and supply" necessary "medical attendance." The circumstance that the support was furnished by the defendant at his home on the trust estate for a time did not prevent the plaintiff from leaving and charging his support elsewhere to the defendant. Pettee v. Case, 2 Allen 546, 547, 548. The plaintiff in all the circumstances was acting within his rights and the refusal of the defendant to pay for his proper support at a place other than the trust estate constituted a breach of his obligations under the trust deed. The case at bar is distinguishable from Baker v. Brown, 146 Mass. 369.
3. On the day when the master's first report was filed, there was also filed a motion by the plaintiff that Martha M. Tolman, the wife of the defendant, be joined as a party defendant. There was- assent to this motion by the attorney for the defendant. It was never allowed by the court. There was no appearance by or in behalf of the wife and no pleadings were filed by her. The wife never became a party to the proceeding. Massachusetts Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Go-Gas Co. 267 Mass. 122, 126. Cohen v. Levy, 221 Mass. 336. Although the decree runs against "the respondents" that means the defendant Fred P. Tolman alone, since he is the only defendant. The wife cannot be included in the decree. The use of the plural word "respondents" must be treated as a clerical error.
amount equivalent to the value of the use and occupation of the trust property. As bearing upon the general equities it is to be remembered that the defendant, upon the death of the plaintiff, now more than eighty-four years of age, will receive with his wife in fee property worth $10,000.
5. The decree conforms to the frame of the bill. The prayer for general relief is sufficient to warrant the relief afforded. Brockton Olympia Realty Co. v. Lee, 266 Mass. 550, 562. All the questions argued by the defendant have been considered. No error appears.

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