Source: https://openjurist.org/349/us/1
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:50:17+00:00

Document:
Argued Feb. 3 and 4, 1955.
A vital distinction was made between 'incorporated' and 'unincorporated' territories.5 The first category had the potentialities of statehood like unto continental territories. The United States Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, fully applied to an 'incorporated' territory. See, e.g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 25 S.Ct. 514, 49 L.Ed. 862. The second category described possessions of the United States not thought of as future States. To these only some essentials, withal undefined, of the Constitution extended. See, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627. The incidence of the differentiation fell in two areas: (a) the right of the individual to trial by jury and similar protections, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, supra; (b) the right of the Federal Government to tax territorial products on a nonuniform basis, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088.
The questions that have arisen under grants of legislative powers to territories have fallen into three main classes: (1) those in which the sovereign immunity of the territory was in issue, e.g., People of Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo, 227 U.S. 270, 33 S.Ct. 352, 57 L.Ed. 507; (2) those in which conflict was claimed with the United States Constitution or laws, e.g., People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 58 S.Ct. 167, 82 L.Ed. 235; Territory of Montana v. Lee, 2 Mont. 124; (3) those in which the 'rightful' nature of particular territorial legislation was assailed, e.g., Chuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 33 S.Ct. 585, 57 L.Ed. 960; People v. Daniels, 6 Utah 288, 22 P. 159, 5 L.R.A. 444. It is the third group that is our immediate concern. In determining the rightfulness of territorial legislation the courts have considered whether a territorial legislature has transcended the familiar bounds of legislation. See, e.g., Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356, 36 S.Ct. 114, 60 L.Ed. 327. One of the earlier questions regarding the power of territorial legislatures involved the right to pass laws applicable not generally but to specific individuals or portions of a territory. In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654, this Court held that a legislative divorce granted without cause by the Oregon Territorial Legislature to a local homesteader was valid though the wife was not in the Territory and had had no notice. The Court relied on the historic practice of individual legislative divorces.8 It is significant, however, that while the litigation was in progress Congress forbade territories to pass 'local' or 'special' divorce laws. 24 Stat. 170, now 48 U.S.C.A. § 1471, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1471.
The United States acquired the Virgin Islands by purchase from Denmark in 1917,9 but it was not until the Organic Act of 1936 that Congress provided a complete government—including a Legislative Assembly. The OrganicAct: (1) labeled the Islands an 'insular possession' of the United States, 49 Stat. 1807, 48 U.S.C. § 1405a, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1405a; (2) endowed the Legislative Assembly (consisting of the two pre-existing municipal councils in joint session) with power to enact laws on 'all subjects of local application not inconsistent with * * * this title or the laws of the United States made applicable to said islands, but no law shall be enacted which would impair rights existing or arising by virtue of any treaty entered into by the United States, nor shall the lands or other property of nonresidents be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents', 49 Stat. 1811, 48 U.S.C. § 1405r, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1405r; (3) enacted a due process clause for the Islands, 49 Stat. 1815, 48 U.S.C. § 1406g, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1406g; and (4) gave the District Court jurisdiction over '(a)ll cases of divorce', 49 Stat. 1814, 48 U.S.C. § 1406(4), 48 U.S.C.A. § 1406(4).
The Legislative Assembly was held on a checkrein by a presidentially appointed governor who shared with the President an absolute veto over legislation. Congress had the customary reserved power to annul legislation. 49 Stat. 1810, 48 U.S.C. § 1405o, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1405o.
By virtue of the 1936 Organic Act, the Legislative Assembly passed the 1944 divorce law making six weeks' 'residence' by an 'inhabitant' sufficient for divorce jurisdiction.10 In 1952, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit construed 'inhabitant' and 'residence' to imply 'domiciliary' and 'domicile.' Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799. The legislature thereupon provided that six weeks' 'physical presence' was adequate as a basis for divorce. The Governor vetoed this amendment.11 To overcome the veto, § 9(a) was enacted. Bill No. 55, 17th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States, 3d Sess., 1953.
In giving content to the power to pass legislation having 'local application,' two considerations at once obtrude. The phrase most liberally interpreted can be no broader than 'all rightful subjects of legislation.'13 Yet in the Organic Acts of the 'incorporated' territories, Alaska and Hawaii, there is specific limitation on divorce jurisdiction to cases where the plaintiff has resided in such territory for at least two years.14 37 Stat. 514, 48 U.S.C. § 45, 48 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Alaska); 31 Stat. 150, 48 U.S.C. § 519, 48 U.S.C.A. § 519 (Hawaii). It is hardly reasonable to believe that Congress was less concerned with the scope of divorce jurisdiction in the 'unincorporated' possession of the Virgin Islands, so temptingly near the mainland, and that it intended to give them unrestricted freedom in this sensitive field of legislation. The Virgin Islands divorce law, with the exception of substantive grounds drawn from Danish law, copied that of Alaska. See Compiled Laws of the Territory of Alaska (1913) §§ 1293—1306; cf. Terrill v. Terrill, 2 Alaska 475; Wilson v. Wilson, 10 Alaska 616. Secondly, 'local application' obviously implies limitation to subjects having relevant ties within the territory,15 to laws growing out of the needs of the Islands and governing relations within them. An example is provided by People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., supra, which involved the validity of a territorial antitrust law. 'It requires no argument to demonstrate that a conspiracy in restraint of trade within the borders of Puerto Rico is clearly a local matter, and that it falls within the precise terms of the power granted * * *.' 302 U.S. at page 261, 58 S.Ct. at page 171. And in upholding the power of the Philippine Legislature to deport dangerous aliens, Mr. Justice Holmes, for the Court, observed that 'the local government has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the Islands. * * * It would be strange if a government so remote should be held bound to wait for the action of Congress in a matter that might touch its life unless dealt with at once and on the sopt.' Chuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. at page 557, 33 S.Ct. at page 586.
We have no information as to the duration of residence of divorcees under the questioned law. But we are advised that contest of jurisdiction occurred in only 1% of the 310 cases concluded in St. Thomas and St. John in 1952 and that contest of the merits was no more frequent. A general appearance—which strips the court of its power to inquire further into domicile—but no contest as to any issue, was the practice in most cases. The clear impact of the legislation, even if we disregard the candid explanations of local political, commercial and legal sources23 and the rapid drop in divorces following the initial decision of unconstitutionality, is to provide a convenient forum for prosperous persons with substantial connections to the mainland, who desire to sever their marital ties while vacationing. The Commissioner in the case at bar did not even ask petitioner where she lived in the Virgin Islands.
The Legislative Assembly is much less liberal toward would-be voters.24 One-year domicile is required. Further, a personal property or income tax on persons physically present for six weeks but with no stronger link to the Islands would no doubt be strongly challenged and of questionable validity.
I must dissent here because I feel that the majority, in striking down the Virgin Islands' divorce law, is substituting its wisdom and policy for that of the Congress. I fail to see how the Virgin Islands' failure to require—in form as well as substance jurisdictional requirements for divorce equal to those presently in vogue in the States is any more than a 'legislative mistake.' The Court, however, in the face of an unbroken national history of granting to our territories full authority in legislating on such subjects, declares the Islands' divorce law invalid on the ground that, rather than being 'of local application,'1 it was 'designed for export.' In so doing, the Court does violence to the command of the Congress; it overrides a long line of its own decisions, as well as the unanimous opinion in this case of the seven judges of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, each of whom has had long experience with territorial acts; and, finally, it confounds the fundamental law governing our territories which heretofore has gone unquestioned.
Fifty years later, the Foraker Act, 31 Stat. 77, establishing a civil government for Puerto Rico, used the same 'not locally inapplicable' provision when extending the laws of the United States to that Island. With reference to the powers of the local legislature, the Act repeated this phrasing, extending the local authority to 'all matters of a legislative character not locally inapplicable * * *,'2 31 Stat. 83, instead of 'rightful subjects of legislation'. After the Foraker Act, the words evolved but little, until now, with the dropping of the double negative, the phrase has become 'subjects of local application'.
The majority does not dispute that the legislative power of the Virgin Islands is at least on a par with that of Puerto Rico under the Foraker Act. It does, however, contend that the phrase 'of local application' represents a positive limitation on the powers of the Islands below that of a State. That the Virgin Islands has not the quantum of self-government which a State possesses is beyond question. All local laws are subject to the absolute veto shared by the appointive governor and the President of the United States. There are specific limitations on the Islands' legislative power.3 And Congress has specifically provided that it may annul any local law. 48 U.S.C. § 1574c, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1575. However, the Islands' divorce law has been neither vetoed nor annulled.
While the Court's opinion makes no reference to any constitutional doubts, these may have motivated it in striking down the Islands' law on the statutory ground. In my opinion this may be an explanation but it is not an excuse. There are limits to which the Court should not run to escape a constitutional adjudication. Admittedly, the doubt that domicile is not a constitutional requirement is not free from doubters. Even though judge-made, it does involve a peculiarly sensitive area of American life. Nevertheless, the Virgin Islands are entitled to a forthright adjudication on their statute—not one by a phantom escape clause.
The only constitutional bugaboo is a judge-made one, domicile.8 It creates strange anomalies. A married couple, both of whom desire a divorce, can obtain one in Nevada merely by having one spouse 'reside' there uninterruptedly for six weeks, and claim an intention to take up permanent residence there. See, e.g., Business Week, July 14, 1945, p. 24. Then, after divorce, though the divorcee immediately leaves Nevada, as was always intended, both sides here concede that regardless of how evident it is there was no domicile in the divorcing State, no other State can question the validity of the divorce so long as both parties appeared in the action. See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 71 S.Ct. 474, 95 L.Ed. 552. We too agree with the language of Mr. Chief Justice Taft: 'All others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?'9 Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.) 259 U.S. 20, 37, 42 S.Ct. 449, 450, 66 L.Ed. 817. Still the Court strikes down the Islands' law which avoids this judicial fraud.
Beginning with Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287—344, 21 S.Ct. 770, 787—809, 45 L.Ed. 1088; see Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 Col.L.Rev. 823.
E.g., 37 Stat. 514, 48 U.S.C. § 77, 48 U.S.C.A. § 77 (Alaska).
39 Stat. 964, 48 U.S.C. § 821, 48 U.S.C.A. § 821 (Puerto Rico); 68 Stat. 500, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1574(a) (Virgin Islands); 64 Stat. 387, 48 U.S.C. § 1423a, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1423a (Guam).
The local law as it had existed under Danish rule was continued in effect, 39 Stat. 1132, 48 U.S.C. § 1392, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1392, subject to change by the two Colonial Councils, the instruments of municipal government for the two districts of the Islands. Presidential approval of any change in this body of law was required. Ibid. Each Colonial Council subsequently passed a divorce law, verbally drawn from that of Alaska. Burch v. Burch, 3 Cir., 195 F.2d 799, 805—806.
The Senate Report spoke as follows: 'S. 3378 declares the Virgin Islands to be 'an unincorporated territory of the United States of America.' Thus, their legal status would be distinct and wholly different from that of Hawaii and Alaska, which are Incorporated Territories. * * * (S)tatehood has unvaryingly been the destiny of all Incorporated Territories. * * * On the other hand, there is no precedent * * * for statehood for a political, geographic, and economic unit such as the Virgin Islands would become under S. 3378. * * * A still higher degree of self-government and autonomy is, of course, possible within that framework—such as an elective governor when the people are ready for it.' S.Rep.No.1271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8. Congressman Powell, on the other hand, criticized '* * * the unwarranted failure of the bill to provide for any advance whatsoever toward increased self-government.' 100 Cong.Rec. 8664.
For the history of the Alaskan provision, see 48 Cong.Rec. 5267—5270, 5293, 5297—5298.
'The people of the Virgin Islands have enjoyed great financial benefits by an influx of people to these islands for the purpose of getting divorced. * * * I recommend to my colleagues this piece of legislation for their favorable consideration inasmuch as they can see the disadvantage in which the municipalities have been placed by not having the divorce court functioning at the present time.' Proceedings and Debates, 17th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands of the United States, 3d Sess., 1953, pp. 46—47, 66—67.
The statistics which follow are derived from these sources: United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1954, pp. 9, 63, 85, 940, 942; United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Summary of Marriage and Divorce Statistics, United States, 1952, pp. 45, 52—53; United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 3, No. 12, Feb. 15, 1955, p. 7; Brief for Petitioner, p. 53.
See Virgin Islands Report, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 125—127; VIII Virgin Islands Magazine (Special Edition 1954) 7 et seq.; Murray, The Complete Handbook of the Virgin Islands 1951, 12—100.
These include the substance of the Bill of Rights, 48 U.S.C. § 1561, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1561, and provisions covering the pay of legislators, 48 U.S.C. § 1572, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1572, the extent of the franchise, 48 U.S.C. § 1542, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1542, and various aspects of legislative procedure, 48 U.S.C. § 1575, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1575.
See also Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. Co., 1897, 165 U.S. 593, 604, 17 S.Ct. 421, 425, 41 L.Ed. 837 (New Mexico); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 1872, 13 Wall. 434, 441, 20 L.Ed. 659 (Utah); Hornbuckle v. Tombs, 1874, 18 Wall. 648, 655, 21 L.Ed. 966 (Montana); Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 1912, 224 U.S. 362, 370, 32 S.Ct. 499, 502, 56 L.Ed. 801 (Puerto Rico); Christianson v. King County, 1915, 239 U.S. 356, 365, 36 S.Ct. 114, 118, 60 L.Ed. 327 (Washington); Maynard v. Hill, 1888, 125 U.S. 190, 204, 8 S.Ct. 723, 726, 31 L.Ed. 654 (Oregon); Chuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 33 S.Ct. 585, 57 L.Ed. 960 (Philippine Islands); In re Murphy, 1895, 5 Wyo. 297, 310, 40 P. 398, 402 (Wyoming); Territory v. Long Bell Lumber Co., 1908, 22 Okl. 890, 898, 99 P. 911, 914—915 (Oklahoma); 19 Op.Atty.Gen. 335, 338 (Arizona).

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