Source: http://old.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=53367
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:26:02+00:00

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Michael L. Stokes, Judicial Restraint and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 35 U. Tol. L. Rev. 347(Winter, 2003).
See Mark Tushnet, Weak-form Judicial Review: Its Implications for Legislatures, 2 NZJPIL 10-16 (2004).
The Presumption of Constitutionality Reconsidered, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2. (Feb., 1936), pp. 283-292.
The Presumption of Constitutionality, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 7. (Nov., 1931), pp. 1136-1148.
See Michael J. Perry, Constitutional Rights, Moral Controversy, and the Supreme Court, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p2.
See Michael J. Perry, Constitutional Rights, Moral Controversy, and the Supreme Court, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p3.
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p3.
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p3, note 3.
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p14.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Text, 3rd ed. West Publishing Co., 1972, p160.
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p16.
当然，莫纳汉（John Monahan）和沃克（Laurens Walker）教授还提出了第三种事实，即“社会结构”（social frameworks）。See Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. (1987).
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p16、p17、p19.
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p17.
See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2159 (2005).
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p16、p18.
See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
当然最后法院采纳的前一种解释，即利用社会科学研究在本质上推翻了规则本身，从而普遍性地禁止这种歧视。See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p20.
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p22.
Henry Wolf Bikle, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924).
Alfange, Jr, The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 637, (1966).
See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, p5.
See Joseph Eliot Magnet, Jurisdictional Fact, Constitutional Fact and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 11 Man. L. J. NO.1 (1980).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, Science vol. 297 (2002), p339-340.
See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 494, n.11 (1954).
See Ronald Dworkin, Social Science and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncertainty, J. L. & EDUC. 6 (1977): p3, p5.
See Alfange, Jr. The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 637 (1966).
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.31 S. Ct. 337 (1910-1911).
Construction Montcalm v. Commission du Salaire Minimum, 25 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.) (1979).
夫格曼（David L. Faigman）以宪法事实的类型（“宪法规则”事实、“宪法审查”事实与宪法裁判事实）为基础对下级法院可否审查上级法院的宪法事实进行了进一步的探讨。See David L. Faigman, A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, Bepress Legal Series, 2006, pp69-92.
Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 21 (1963), p627.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Frederick Schauer and Sinnott-Armstrong Walter, Ed. The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contempory Reading with Commentary, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996, p80-81.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Frederick Schauer and Sinnott-Armstrong Walter, Ed. The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contempory Reading with Commentary, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996, p82.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Frederick Schauer and Sinnott-Armstrong Walter, Ed. The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contempory Reading with Commentary, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996, p75.
See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Frederick Schauer and Sinnott-Armstrong Walter, Ed. The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contempory Reading with Commentary, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996, p78.
See Jeffrie G Murphy and Jules L Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence, Westview Press, 1990, p43.
See Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 21 (1963), p637.
此案涉及了大麻的有害性与个人隐私权保护之间的讨论。See State of Hawi'i, Respondent-Appellee, v. Lloyd Mallan, Petitioner-Appellant, 86 Haw. 440; 950 P.2d 178; 1998 Haw. LEXIS 6.
相关阐释可参见State v. Renfro, 56 Haw. 501, 503, 542 P.2d 366, 368 (1975).
See The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions and the Preservation of Judicial Review: Federal Court Treatment of the New Habeas Provisions, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 6. (Apr., 1998), pp. 1578~1595.
See O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. 282 U.S. 251(1931).

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