Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82912:56753&catid=1582&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:23:36+00:00

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G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014 - ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one’s fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision2 dated January 14, 2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court’s dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a resolution7 finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments that were a mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment24 that the appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that “judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the existence of probable cause.”26 He argued that the findings of the trial court should be accorded greater weight than the appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted “to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well–founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial,” in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then “personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence”30 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi–judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a complaint–affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information, which was granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in “the proper scheme of things” in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an “oppressive” exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and evidence were “sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x.”37 There was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco–Umali still had the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase “upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce” allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco–Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08–11604–05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
19 Id. at 33–44, Court of Appeals’ decision, per Tenth Division, penned by J. Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by J. Ricardo R. Rosario and J. Samuel H. Gaerlan.
27 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 310. Qualified Theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher in degree than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is large cattle or consists of coconuts, or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery.
29 See Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 575, 598 [Per J. Carpio–Morales, Third Division].
30 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 112, sec. 6.
31 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
32 Id. at 764–765, citing Paderanga v. Drilon, 273 Phil. 290, 296 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc]; Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 620–621 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc]; Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597, 611 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
33 G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 788 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
35 361 Phil. 401 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
38 G.R. Nos. 162144–54, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 264 [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
40Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 575, 598 [Per J. Carpio–Morales, Third Division], citing Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994, 237 SCRA 685 [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

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