Source: https://lonang.com/library/reference/story-commentaries-us-constitution/sto-312/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:19:51+00:00

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§ 835. THE next Clause is, “each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.” No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing each house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order. The humblest assembly of men is understood to possess this power; and it would be absurd to deprive the councils of the nation of a like authority. But the power to make rules would be nugatory, unless it was coupled with a power to punish for disorderly behavior, or disobedience to those rules. And as a member might be so lost to all sense of dignity and duty, as to disgrace the house by the grossness of his conduct, or interrupt its deliberations by perpetual violence or clamor, the power to expel for very aggravated misconduct was also indispensable, not as a common, but as an ultimate redress for the grievance. But such a power, so summary, and at the same time so subversive of the rights of the people, it was foreseen, might be exerted for mere purposes of faction or party, to remove a patriot, or to aid a corrupt measure; and it has therefore been wisely guarded by the restriction, that there shall be a concurrence of two thirds of the members, to justify an expulsion.1 This clause, requiring a concurrence of two thirds, was not in the original draft of the constitution, but it was inserted by a vote of ten states, one being divided.2 A like general authority to expel, exists in the British house of commons; and in the legislative bodies of many of the states composing the Union.
§ 836. What must be the disorderly behavior, which the house may punish, and what punishment, other than expulsion, may be inflicted, do not appear to have been settled by any authoritative adjudication of either house of congress. A learned commentator supposes, that members can only be punished for misbehavior committed during the session of congress, either within, or without the walls of the house; though he is also of opinion, that expulsion may be inflicted for criminal conduct committed in any place.3 He does not say, whether it must be committed during the session of congress or otherwise. In July, 1797, William Blount was expelled from the senate, for “a high misdemeanor, entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a senator.” The offence charged against him was an attempt to seduce an American agent among the Indians from his duty, and to alienate the affections and confidence of the Indians from the public authorities of the United States, and a negotiation for services in behalf of the British government among the Indians. It was not a statutable offence; nor was it committed in his official character; nor was it committed during the session of congress; nor at the seat of government.
§ 839. The history of public assemblies, or of private votes, does not seem to confirm the former suggestion of the learned author. Intrigue and combination are more commonly found connected with secret sessions, than with public debates, with the workings of the ballot box, than with the manliness of viva voce votes. At least, it may be questioned, if the vote by ballot has, in the opinion of a majority of the American people, obtained any decisive preference over viva voce voting, even at elections. The practice in New England is one way, and at the South another way. And as to the votes of representatives and senators in congress, no man has yet been bold enough to vindicate a secret or ballot vote, as either more safe, or more wise, more promotive of independence in the members, or more beneficial to their constituents. So long as known and open responsibility is valuable as a check, or an incentive among the representatives of a free people, so long a journal of their proceedings, and their votes, published in the face of the world, will continue to enjoy public favor, and be demanded by public opinion. When the people become indifferent to the acts of their representatives, they will have ceased to take much interest in the preservation of their liberties. When the journals shall excite no public interest, it will not be matter of surprise, if the constitution itself is silently forgotten, or deliberately violated.
§ 840. The restriction of calls of the yeas and nays to one fifth is founded upon the necessity of preventing too frequent a recurrence to this mode of ascertaining the votes, at the mere caprice of an individual. A call consumes a great deal of time, and often embarrasses the just progress of beneficial measures. It is said to have been often used to excess in the congress under the confederation;12 and even under the present constitution it is notoriously used, as an occasional annoyance, by a dissatisfied minority, to retard the passage of measures, which are sanctioned by the approbation of a strong majority. The check, therefore, is not merely theoretical; and experience shows, that it has been resorted to, at once to admonish, and to control members, in this abuse of the public patience and the public indulgence.
§ 842. Under the colonial governments, the undue exercise of the same power by the royal governors constituted a great public grievance, and was one of the numerous cases of misrule, upon which the declaration of independence strenuously relied. It was there solemnly charged against the king, that he had called together legislative [colonial] bodies at places, unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the repository of the public records; that he had dissolved representative bodies, for opposing his invasions of the rights of the people; and after such dissolutions, he had refused to reassemble them for a long period of time. It was natural, therefore, that the people of the United States should entertain a strong jealousy on this subject, and should interpose a constitutional barrier against any such abuse by the prerogative of the executive. The state constitutions generally contain some provision on the same subject, as a security to the independence of the legislature.
§ 842.* These are all the powers and privileges, which are expressly vested in each house of congress by the constitution. What further powers and privileges they incidentally possess has been a question much discussed, and may hereafter be open, as new cases arise, to still further discussion. It is remarkable, that no power is conferred to punish for any contempts committed against either house; and yet it is obvious, that, unless such a power, to some extent, exists by implication, it is utterly impossible for either house to perform its constitutional functions. For instance, how is either house to conduct its own deliberations, if it may not keep out, or expel intruders? If it may not require and enforce upon strangers silence and decorum in its presence? If it may not enable its own members to have free ingress, egress, and regress to its own hall of legislation? And if the power exists, by implication, to require the duty, it is wholly nugatory, unless it draws after it the incidental authority to compel obedience, and to punish violations of it. It has been suggested by a learned commentator, quoting, the language of Lord Bacon,16 that, as exception strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted, so enumeration weakens it in cases not enumerated; and hence he deduces the conclusion, that, as the power to punish contempts is not among those enumerated, as belonging to either house, it does not exist.17 Now, however wise or correct the maxim of Lord Bacon is in a general sense, as a means of interpretation, it is not the sole rule. It is no more true, than another maxim of a directly opposite character, that where the end is required, the means are, by implication, given. Congress are required to exercise the powers of legislation and deliberation. The safety of the rights of the nation require this; and yet, because it is not expressly said, that congress shall possess the appropriate means to accomplish this end, the means are denied, and the end may be defeated. Does not this show, that rules of interpretation, however correct in a general sense, must admit of many qualifications and modifications in their application to the actual business of human life and human laws? Men do not frame constitutions of government to suspend its vital interests, and powers, and duties, upon metaphysical doubts, or ingenious refinements. Such instruments must be construed reasonably, and fairly, according to the scope of their purposes, and to give them effect and operation, not to cripple and destroy them. They must be construed according to the common sense applied to instruments of a like nature; and in furtherance of the fundamental objects proposed to be attained, and according to the known practice and incidents of bodies of a like nature.
§ 847. The sixth section of the first article contains an enumeration of the rights, privileges, and disabilities of the members of each house in their personal and individual characters, as contradistinguished from the rights, privileges, and disabilities of the body, of which they are members. It may here, again, be remarked, that these rights and privileges are, in truth, the rights and privileges of their constituents, and for their benefit and security, rather than the rights and privileges of the member for his own benefit and security.35 In like manner, the disabilities imposed are founded upon the same comprehensive policy; to guard the powers of the representative from abuse, and to secure a wise, impartial, and incorrupt administration of his duties.
§ 849. In respect, to compensation, there is, at present, a marked distinction between the members of the British parliament, and the members of congress; the former not being, at present, entitled to any pay. Formerly, indeed, the members of the house of commons were entitled to receive wages from their constituents; but the last known case is that of Andrew Marvell, who was a member from Hull, in the first parliament after the restoration of Charles the Second. Four shillings sterling a day used to be allowed for a knight of the shire; and two shillings a day for a member of a city or borough; and this rate was established in the reign of Edward the Third. And we are told, that two shillings a day, the allowance to a burgess, was so considerable a sum, in these ancient times, that there are many instances, where boroughs petitioned to be excused from sending members to parliament, representing, that they were engaged in building bridges or other public works, and therefore, unable to bear so extraordinary an expense.36 It is believed, that the practice in America during its colonial state was, if not universally, at least generally, to allow a compensation to be paid to members; and the practice is believed to be absolutely universal, under the state constitutions. The members are not, however, always paid out of the public treasury; but the practice still exists, constitutionally, or by usage, in some of the states, to charge the amount of the compensation fixed by the legislature upon the constituents, and levy it in the state tax. That has certainly been the general course in the state of Massachusetts; and it was probably adopted from the ancient practice in England.
§ 862. The exception to the privilege is, that it shall not extend to “treason, felony, or breach of the peace.” These words are the same as those, in which the exception to the privilege of parliament is usually expressed at the common law, and was doubtless borrowed from that source.68 Now, as all crimes are offences against the peace, the phrase “breach of the peace” would seem to extend to all indictable offence, as well those, which are, in fact, attended with force and violence, as those, which are only constructive breaches of the peace of the government, inasmuch as they violate its good order.69 And so in truth it was decided in parliament, in the case of a seditious libel, published by a member, (Mr. Wilkes,) against the opinion of Lord Camden and the other judges of the Court of Common Pleas;70 and, as it will probably now be thought, since the party spirit of those times has subsided, with entire good sense, and in furtherance of public justice.71 It would be monstrous, that any member should protect himself from arrest, or punishment for a libel, often a crime of the deepest malignity and mischief, while he would be liable to arrest, for the pettiest assault, or the most insignificant breach of the peace.
§ 864. The next clause reads the disqualifications of members of congress; and is as follows: “No senator or representative shall, during the time, for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time. And no person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house of congress during his continuance in office.” This clause does not appear to have met with any opposition in the convention, as to the propriety of some provision on the subject, the principal question being, as to the best mode of expressing the disqualifications.78 It has been deemed by one commentator an admirable provision against venality, though not perhaps sufficiently guarded to prevent evasion.79 And it has been elaborately vindicated by another with uncommon earnestness.80 The reasons for excluding persons from offices, who have been concerned in creating them, or increasing their emoluments, are to take away, as far as possible, any improper bias in the vote of the representative, and to secure to the constituents some solemn pledge of his disinterestedness. The actual provision, however, does not go to the extent of the principle; for his appointment is restricted only “during the time, for which he was elected;” thus leaving in full force every influence upon his mind, if the period of his election is short, or the duration of it is approaching its natural termination. It has sometimes been matter of regret, that the disqualification had not been made co-extensive with the supposed mischief; and thus have for ever excluded members from the possession of offices created, or rendered more lucrative by themselves.81 Perhaps there is quite as much wisdom in leaving the provision, where it now is.
§ 865. It is not easy, by any constitutional or legislative enactments, to shut out all, or even many of the avenues of undue or corrupt influence upon the human mind. The great securities for society – those, on which it must for ever rest in a free government – are responsibility to the people through elections, and personal character, and purity of principle. Where these are wanting, there never can be any solid confidence, or any deep sense of duty. Where these exist, they become a sufficient guaranty against all sinister influences, as well as all gross offences. It has been remarked with equal profoundness and sagacity, that, as there is a degree of depravity in mankind, which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust; so there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher form, than any other.82 It might well be deemed harsh to disqualify an individual from any office, clearly required by the exigencies of the country, simply because he had done his duty.83 And, on the other hand, the disqualification might operate upon many persons, who might find their way into the national councils, as a strong inducement to postpone the creation of necessary offices, lest they should become victims of their high discharge of duty. The chances of receiving an appointment to a new office are not so many, or so enticing, as to bewilder many minds; and if they are, the aberrations from duty are so easily traced, that they rarely, or never escape the public reproaches. And if influence is to be exerted by the executive for improper purposes, it will be quite as easy, and in its operation less seen, and less suspected, to give the stipulated patronage in another form, either of office, or of profitable employment, already existing. And even a general disqualification might be evaded by suffering the like patronage silently to fall into the hands of a confidential friend, or a favorite child or relative. A dishonorable traffic in votes, if it should ever become the engine of party or of power in our country, would never be restrained by the slight network of any constitutional provisions of this sort. It would seek, and it would find its due rewards in the general patronage of the government, or in the possession of the offices conferred by the people, which would bring emolument, as well as influence, and secure power by gratifying favorites. The history of our state governments (to go no farther) will scarcely be thought by any ingenuous mind to afford any proofs, that the absence of such a disqualification has rendered state legislation less pure, or less intelligent; or, that the existence of such a disqualification would have retarded one rash measure, or introduced one salutary scruple into the elements of popular or party strife. History, which teaches us by examples, establishes the truth beyond all reasonable question, that genuine patriotism is too lofty in its honour, and too enlightened in its object, to need such checks; and that weakness and vice, the turbulence of faction, and the meanness of avarice, are easily bought, notwithstanding all the efforts to fetter, or ensnare them.
§ 866. The other part of the clause, which disqualifies persons holding any office under the United States from being members of either house during their continuance in office, has been still more universally applauded; and has been vindicated upon the highest grounds of public policy. It is doubtless founded in a deference to state jealousy, and a sincere desire to obviate the fears, real or imaginary, that the general government would obtain an undue preference over the state governments.84 It has also the strong recommendation, that it prevents any undue influence from office, either upon the party himself, or those, with whom he is associated in legislative deliberations. The universal exclusion of all persons holding office is (it must be admitted) attended with some inconveniences. The heads of the departments are, in fact, thus precluded from proposing, or vindicating their own measures in the face of the nation in the course of debate; and are compelled to submit them to other men, who are either imperfectly acquainted with the measures, or are indifferent to their success or failure. Thus, that open and public responsibility for measures, which properly belongs to the executive in all governments, and especially in a republican government, as its greatest security and strength, is completely done away. The executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influence, to private interviews, and private arrangements, to accomplish its own appropriate purposes; instead of proposing and sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its representatives. One consequence of this state of things is, that there never can be traced home to the executive any responsibility for the measures, which are planned, and carried at its suggestion. Another consequence will be, (if it has not yet been,) that measures will be adopted, or defeated by private intrigues, political combinations, irresponsible recommendations, and all the blandishments of office, and all the deadening weight of silent patronage. The executive will never be compelled to avow, or to support any opinions. His ministers may conceal, or evade any expression of their opinions. He will seem to follow, when in fact he directs the opinions of congress. He will assume the air of a dependent instrument, ready to adopt the acts of the legislature, when in fact his spirit and his wishes pervade the whole system of legislation. If corruption ever eats its way silently into the vitals of this republic, it will be, because the people are unable to bring responsibility home to the executive through his chosen ministers. They will be betrayed, when their suspicions are most lulled by the executive, under the disguise of an obedience to the will of congress. If it would not hare been safe to trust the heads of departments, as representatives, to the choice of the people, as their constituents, it would have been at least some gain to have allowed them a seat, like territorial delegates, in the house of representatives, where they might freely debate without a title to vote. In such an event, their influence, whatever it would be, would be seen, and felt, and understood, and on that account would hare involved little danger, and more searching jealousy and opposition; whereas, it is now secret and silent, and from that very cause may become overwhelming.
§ 867. One other reason in favor of such a right is, that it would compel the executive to make appointments for the high departments of government, not from personal or party favorites, but from statesmen of high public character, talents, experience, and elevated services; from statesmen, who had earned public favor, and could command public confidence. At present, gross incapacity may be concealed under official forms, and ignorance silently escape by shining the labors upon more intelligent subordinates in office. The nation would be, on the other plan, better served; and the executive sustained by more masculine eloquence, as well as more liberal learning.
§ 868. In the British parliament no restrictions of the former sort exist, and few of the latter, except such as have been created by statute.85 It is true, that an acceptance of any office under the crown is a vacation of a seat in parliament. This is wise; and secures the people from being betrayed by those, who hold office, and whom they do not choose to trust. But generally, they are reeligible; and are entitled, if the people so choose, again to hold a seat in the house of commons, notwithstanding their official character.86 The consequence is, that the ministers of the crown assume an open public responsibility; and if the representation of the people in the house of commons were, as it is under the national government, founded upon a uniform rule, by which the people might obtain their full share of the government, it would be impossible for the ministry to exercise a controlling influence, or escape (as in America they may) a direct palpable responsibility. There can be no danger, that a free people will not be sufficiently watchful over their rulers, and their acts, and opinions, when they are known and avowed; or, that they will not find representatives in congress ready to oppose improper measures, or sound the alarm upon arbitrary encroachments. The real danger is, when the influence of the rulers is at work in secret, and assumes no definite shape; when it guides with a silent and irresistible sway, and yet covers itself under the forms of popular opinion, or independent legislation; when it does nothing, and yet accomplishes every thing.
§ 869. Such is the reasoning, by which many enlightened statesmen have not only been led to doubt, but even to deny the value of this constitutional disqualification. And even the most strenuous advocates of it are compelled so far to admit its force, as to concede, that the measures of the executive government, so far as they fall within the immediate department of a particular officer, might be more (directly and fully explained on the floor of the house.87 Still, however, the reasoning from the British practice has not been deemed satisfactory by the public; and the guard interposed by the constitution has been received with general approbation, and has been thought to have worked well during our experience under the national government.88 Indeed, the strongly marked parties in the British parliament, and their consequent dissensions have been ascribed to the non-existence of any such restraints; and the progress of the influence of the crown, and the supposed corruptions of legislation, have been by some writers traced back to the same original blemish.89 Whether these inferences are borne out by historical facts, is a matter, upon which different judgments may arrive at different conclusions; and a work, like the present, is not the proper place to discuss them.
1. Mr. J. Q. Adams’s Report to the senate in the case of John Smith, 31 Dec. 1807; 1 Hall’s Law Journ. 459; Sergeant on Const. Law, ch. 28, p. 287, 288.
2. Journal of Convention. 218, 243.
4. Yeas 25, nays 1.
5. See Journal of Senate, 8 July, 1797; Sergeant’s Const. Law, ch. 28, p. 286; 1 Hall’s Law Journ. 459, 471.
6. Yeas 19, nays 10.
7. 1 Hall’s Law Journ. 459, 471; Journ. of Senate, 9 April, 1808; Sergeant’s Const. Law, ch. 28, p. 287, 288. See also proceedings of the senate in the case of Humphrey Marshall, 22 March, 1796; Sergeant’s Const. Law, ch. 28, p. 285.
8. 1 Black. Comm. 163, and Christian’s note; Id. 167 and note. See also Rex v. Wilkes, 2 Wilson’s R. 251; Com. Dig. Parliament, G. 5. See 1 Hall’s Law Term, 459, 466.
9. Journal of the Convention, p. 219, 243, 244, 245, 354, 373.
10. 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 204, 205; 2 Wilson’s Lect. 157, 158.
11. 1 Black. Comm. 181, 182.
12. 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 205, 206.
13. See Journ. of Convention, 219, 246. See also 2 Elliot’s Debates, 276, 277.
14. Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 206, 207.
15. 1 Black. Comm. 185 to 190; 2 Wilson’s Law Lect. 154, 155; Com. Dig. Parliament, L M. N. O. P.
* [Ed. Note: So numbered in the original text.] 16. Advancement of Learning; 1 Tuck. Black. App. 200, note.
17. 1 Tucker’s Black. 200.
18. 4 Black. Comm. 283, 284, 285, 286; 1 Black. Comm. 164, 165; Com. Dig. Parliament, G. 2, 5; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East R. I; Burtett v. Colman, 14 East R. 163; S. C. 5 Dow. Parl. Cases, 165, 199.
19. Christian’s note, 1 Black. Comm. 164.
20. 4 Black. Comm. 286.
21. Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 4, p. 48; 1 Kent’s Comm. (2d edit.) Lect. 11, p. 221, 235.
22. The learned reader is referred to Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East R. 1; Barderr v. Colaman, 14 East R. 163; 8. C. 5 Dow. Parl. R. 165, 199; and Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. R. 204. The question is also much discussed in JefFerson’s Manual, § 3, and 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. note, p. 200 to 205. See also 1 Black. Comm. 164, 165. Mr. Jefferson, in his Manual, (§ 3,) in commenting on the case of William Duane for a political libel, has summed up the reasoning on each side with a manifest leaning against the power. It presents the strength of the argument on that side, and, on that account, deserves to be cited at large.
The reasoning of Lord Chief Justice De Grey in Rex v. Brass Crosby, (3 Wilson’s R. 188,) and of Lord Ellenborough in Burdett v. Abbott, (14 East R. 1,) is exceedingly cogent and striking against that favoured by Mr. Jefferson. It deserves, and will requite an attentive perusal. See also Burdett v. Abbott, 4 Taunt. B. 401; 4 Dow’s Parl. Rap. 165.
“The pleadings have narrowed them down to the simple inquiry, whether the house of representatives can take cognizance of contempts committed against themselves, under any circumstances? The duress complained of was sustained under a warrant issued to compel the party’s appearance, not for the actual infliction of punishment for an offence committed. Yet it cannot be denied, that the power to institute a prosecution must be dependent upon the power to punish. If the house of representatives possessed no authority to punish for contempt, the initiating process issued in the assertion of that authority must have been illegal; there was a want of jurisdiction to justify it.
“It is certainly true, that there is no power given by the constitution to either house to punish for contempts, except when committed by their own members. Nor does the judicial or criminal power given to the United States, in any part, expressly extend to the infliction of punishment for contempt of either house, or any one coordinate branch of the government. Shall we, therefore, decide, that no such power exists?
“It is true, that such a power, if it exists, must be derived from implication, and the genius and spirit of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of implied powers. Had the faculties of man been competent to the framing of a system of government, which would have left nothing to implication, it cannot be doubted, that the effort would have been made by the framers of the constitution. But what is the fact? There is not in the whole of that admirable instrument a grant of powers, which does not draw after it others, not expressed, but vital to their exercise; not substantive and independent, indeed, but auxiliary and subordinate.
“The idea is utopian, that government can exist without leaving the exercise of discretion somewhere. Public security against the abuse of such discretion must rest on responsibility, and stated appeals to public approbation. Where all power is derived from the people, and public’ functionaries, at short intervals, deposited at the feet of the people, to be resumed again only at their will, individual fears may he alarmed by the monsters of imagination, but individual liberty can be in little danger.
No one is so visionary, as to dispute the assertion, that the sole end and aim of all our institutions is the safety and happiness of the citizen. But the relation between the action and the end is not always so direct and palpable, as to strike the eye of every observer. The science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if, indeed, that can be called a science, which has but few fixed principles, and practically consists in little more, than the exercise of a sound discretion, applied to the exigencies of the state, as they arise. It is the science of experiment.
“But if there is one maxim, which necessarily rides over all others, in the practical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers, which the people have intrusted to them. The interests and dignity of those, who created them, require the exertion of the powers indispensable to the attainment of the ends of their creation. Nor is a casual conflict with the rights of particular individuals any reason to be urged against the exercise of such powers. The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate, which awaits him; and yet iris no less certain, that the laws, under which he suffers, were made for his security. The unreasonable murmurs of individuals against the restraints of society have a direct tendency to produce that worst of all despotisms, which makes every individual the tyrant over his neighbor’s rights.
“That ‘the safety of the people is the supreme law,’ not only comports with, but is indispensable to, the exercise of those powers in their public functionaries, without which that safety cannot be guarded. On this principle it is, that courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates, and, as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults or pollution.
“It is true, that the courts of justice in the United States are vested, by express statute provision, with power to fine and imprison for contempts; but it does not follow, from this circumstance, that they would not have exercised that power without the aid of the statute, or not, in cases, if such should occur, to which such statute provision may not extend. On the contrary, it is a legislative assertion of this right, as incidental to a grant of judicial power, and can only be considered either as an instance of abundant caution, or a legislative declaration, that the power of punishing for contempts shall not extend beyond its known and acknowledged limits of fine and imprisonment.
“But it is contended, that if this power in the house of representatives is to be asserted on the plea of necessity, the ground is too broad, and the result too indefinite; that the executive, and every coordinate, and even subordinate, branch of the government, may resort to the same justification, and the whole assume to themselves, in the exercise of this power, the most tyrannical licentiousness.
“This is unquestionably an evil to be guarded against, and if the doctrine may be pushed to that extent, it must be a bad doctrine, and is justly denounced.
“But what is the alternative? The argument obviously leads to the total annihilation of the power of the house of representatives to guard itself from contempts; and leaves it exposed to every indignity and interruption, that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it. This result is fraught with too much absurdity not to bring into doubt the soundness of any argument, from which it is derived. That a deliberate assembly clothed with the majesty of the people, and charged with the care of all, that is dear to them; composed of the most distinguished citizens, selected and drawn together from every quarter of a great nation; whose deliberations are required by public opinion to be conducted under the eye of the public, and whose decisions must be clothed with all that sanctity, which unlimited confidence in their wisdom and purity can inspire; that such an assembly should not possess the power to suppress rudeness, or repel insult, is a supposition too wild to be suggested. And accordingly to avoid the pressure of these considerations, it has been argued, that the right of the respective houses to exclude from their presence, and their absolute control within their own walls, carry with them the right to punish contempts committed in their presence; while the absolute legislative power given to congress within this district, enables them to provide by law against all other insults, against which there is any necessity for providing.
“It is to be observed, that so far as the issue of this cause is implicated, this argument yields all right of the plaintiff in error to a decision in his favor; for, non constat, from the pleadings, but that this warrant issued for an offence committed in the immediate presence of the house.
“Nor is it immaterial to notice, what difficulties the negation of this right in the house of representatives draws after it, when it is considered, that the concession of the power, if exercised within their walls, relinquishes the great grounds of the argument, to wit: the want of an express grant, and the unrestricted and undefined nature of the power here set up. For why should the house be at liberty to exercise an ungranted, an unlimited, and undefined power within their walls, any more, than without them? If the analogy with individual right and power be resorted to, it will reach no farther, than to exclusion; and it requires no exuberance of imagination to exhibit the ridiculous consequences, which might result from such a restriction, imposed upon the conduct of a deliberative assembly.
“Nor would their situation be materially relieved by resorting to their legislative power within the district. That power may, indeed, be applied to many purposes, and was intended by the constitution to extend to many purposes indispensable to the security and dignity of the general government; but there are purposes of a more grave and general character, than the offences, which may be denominated contempts, and which, from their very nature, admit of no precise definition. Judicial gravity will not admit of the illustrations, which this remark would admit of. Its correctness is easily tested by pursuing, in imagination, a legislative attempt at defining the cases, to which the epithet contempt might be reasonably applied.
“But although the offence be held undefinable, it is justly contended, that the punishment need not be indefinite. Nor is it so. “We are not now considering the extent, to which the punishing power of congress, by a legislative act, may be carried. On that subject, the bounds of their power are to be found in the provisions of the constitution.
“The present question is, what is the extent of the punishing power, which the deliberative assemblies of the Union may assume, and exercise on the principle of self-preservation?
“Analogy, and the nature of the case, furnish the answer the —‘ the least possible power adequate to the end proposed;” which is the power of imprisonment. It may, at first view, and from the history of the practice of our legislative bodies, be thought to extend to other inflictions. But every other will be found to be mere commutation for confinement; since commitment alone is the alternative, where the individual proves contumacious. And even to the duration of imprisonment a period is imposed by the nature of things; since the existence of the power, that imprisons, is indispensable to its continuance; and although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows, that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.
“This view of the subject necessarily sets bounds to the exercise of a caprice, which has sometimes disgraced deliberative assemblies, when under the influence of strong passions or wicked leaders, but the instances of which have long since remained on record only as historical facts, not as precedents for imitation. In the present fixed and settled state of English institutions, there is no more danger of their being revived, probably, than in our own.
“But the American legislative bodies have never possessed, or pretended to, the omnipotence, which constitutes the leading feature in the legislative assembly of Great Britain, and which may have led occasionally to the exercise of caprice, under rite specious appearance of merited resentment.
“If it be inquired, what security is there, that with an officer avowing himself devoted to their will, the house of representatives will confine its punishing power to the limits of imprisonment, and not push it to the infliction of corporeal punishment, or even death, and exercise it in cases affecting the liberty of speech and of the press? The reply is to be found in the consideration, that the constitution was formed in and for an advanced state of society, and rests at every point on received opinions and fixed ideas. It is not a new creation, but a combination of existing materials, whose properties and attributes were familiarly understood, and had been determined by reiterated experiments. It is not, therefore, reasoning upon things, as they are, to suppose, that any deliberative assembly, constituted under it, would ever assert any other rights and powers, than those, which had been established by long practice and conceded by public opinion. Melancholy, also, would be that state of distrust, which rests not a hope upon a moral influence. The most absolute tyranny could not subsist, where men could not be trusted with power, because they might abuse it, much less a government, which has no other basis, than the sound morals, moderation, and good sense of those, who compose it. Unreasonable jealousies not only blight the pleasures, but dissolve the very texture of society.
“But it is argued, that the inference, if any, arising under the constitution, is against the exercise of the powers here asserted by the house of representatives; that the express grant of power to punish their members respectively, and to expel them, by the application of a familiar maxim, raises an implication against the power to punish any other, than their own members.
“This argument proves too much; for its direct application would lead to the annihilation of almost every power of congress. To enforce its laws upon any subject, without the sanction of punishment, is obviously impossible. Yet there is an express grant of power to punish in one class of cases and one only; and all the punishing power exercised by congress in any cases, except those, which relate to piracy and offences against the laws of nations, is derived from implication. Nor did the idea ever occur to any one, that the express grant in one class of cases repelled the assumption of the punishing power in any other.
“The truth is, that the exercise of the powers given over their own members was of such a delicate nature, that a constitutional provision became necessary to assert, or communicate it. Constituted, as that body is, of the delegates of confederated states, some such provision was necessary to guard against their mutual jealousy, since every proceeding against a representative would indirectly affect the honour or interests of the state, which sent him.
“In reply to the suggestion, that, on this same foundation of necessity, might be raised a superstructure of implied powers in the executive, and every other department, and even ministerial officer of the government, it would be sufficient to observe, that neither analogy nor precedent, would support the assertion of such powers in any other, than a legislative or judicial body. Even corruption any where else would not contaminate the source of political life. In the retirement of the cabinet, it is not expected, that the executive can be approached by indignity or insult; nor can it ever be necessary to the executive, or any other department, to hold a public deliberative assembly. These are not arguments; they are visions, which mar the enjoyment of actual blessings, with the attack or feint of the harpies of imagination.
See also Rex v. Brass Crosby, 3 Wilson R. 188. — In the convention a proposition was made and referred to the select committee appointed to draft the constitution giving authority to punish for contempts, and enumerating them. The committee made no report on the subject. Journ. of Convention, 2Oth Aug. 263, 264.
24. By a vote of 78 yeas against 17 nays.
25. 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 200 to 205, note; Jefferson’s Manual, §3.
26. Jefferson’s Manual, § 3.
27. See the Speeches of Mr. Doddridge and Mr. Burges on this occasion.
28. Journ. of Senate, 27th March, 1800; Jefferson’s Manual, § 3. See also Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1.
29. Bolton v. Martin, 1 Dall. R. 296. See also House of Delegates in 1784, the case of John Warden, 1 Elliot’s Debates, 69; Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. R. 1, 34, 35.
30. Dunn v. Anderson, 6 Wheat. R. 204, 230, 231.
31. Dunn v. Anderson, 6 Wheat. R. 204, 230, 231; 1 Kent’s Comm. Lect. 11, p. 221.
33. See learned article on this subject in the English Law Magazine for July. 1831, p. 1, etc. Parliamentary Debates, 1831.
35. Corn. Dig. Parliament, D. 17.
36. 1 Black. Comm. 174, and Christian’s note, 34; Id. Prynne on 4 Inst. 32; Com. Dig. Parliament, D. 16.
37. Journal of Convention, 67, 116, 117.
39. Journ. of Convention, 142.
44. See Yates’s Minutes, 4 Elliot’s Deb. 92 to 99.
45. See 2 Elliot’s Debates, 279, 280; Yates’s Minutes, 4 Elliot’s Deb. 92 to 99.
46. See Rawle on the constitution, ch. 18, p. 181.
47. See Yates’s Minutes, 4 Elliot’s Debates, 92 to 99.
48. Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 18, p. 179.
50. Articles of Confederation, art. 5.
51. 2 Elliot’s Debates, 279; 1 Elliot’s Debates, 70, 71.
52. 2 Elliot’s Debates, 279, 280, 281, 282.
53. 1 Elliot’s Debates, 70, 71.
54. See Gov. Randolph’s Letter; 3 Amer. Mus. 62, 70.
55. 1 Black. Comm. 164, 165; Com. Dig. Parliament, D. 17; Jefferson’s Manual. §3, Privilege; Benyon v. Evelyn, Sir O. Bridg. R. 334.
56. 1 Kent Comm Lect. 11, p. 221; Bolton v. Martin, 1 Dall. R. 296; Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass R. 1.
59. Com. Dig. Parliament, D. 17; 1 Black. Comm. 165, 166.
60. 1 Black. Comm. 165; Com. Dig. Parliament, D. 17.
61. Holiday v. Pitt, 2 Str. R. 985; S. C. Cas. Temp. Hard. 28; 1 Black. Comm. 165; Christian’s note, 21; Barnard v. Mordaunt, 1 Kenyon R. 125.
62. Com. Dig. Parliament, D. 17; 1 Black. Comm. 165; Jefferson’s Manual, §3.
65. 1 Black. Comm. 164, 165, 166; Com. Dig. Parliament, D. 17; Jefferson’s Manual, §3.
66. Jefferson’s Manual, §3; 2 Str. R. 986, 987.
67. Jefferson’s Manual, §3; but see Com Dig. Parliament, D. 17.
68. 4 Inst. 25; 1 Black. Comm. 165; Com. Dig. Parliament, D. 17.
69. 1 Black. Comm. 166.
70. Rex v. Wilkes, 2 Wilson’s R. 151.
71. See 1 Black. Comm. 166, 167.
72. See 2 Wilson’s Law Lect. 156.
73. 1 Black. Comm. 164, 165.
75. The King v. Creevy, 1 Maule & Selw. 273.
76. See the reasoning in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. R. 1.
77. Mr. Doddridge’s Speech in the case of Houston, in May, 1832; Mr. Burges’s speech, Ibid.
78. Journ. of Convention, 214, 319, 320, 322, 333.
79. 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 198, 214, 215, 375.
80. Rawle on the Const. ch. 19, p. 184, etc.; 1 Wilson’s Law Lect. 446 to 419.
81. Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 19. See 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 375.
82. The Federalist, No. 55.
84. See Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 19; The Federalist, No. 56.
85. See Black. Comm. 175, 176.
86. 1 Black. Comm. 175, 176, Christian’s note, 39.
87. Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 19. p. 187.
88. Mr. Rawle’s remarks in his Treatise on Constitutional Law, (ch. 19,) are as full on this point, as can probably be found. See also The Federalist, No. 55; 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 198, 214, 215; 2 Elliot’s Debates. 278, 279, 280, 281, 282; 1 Wilson’s Law Lect. 446 to 449.
89. 1 Wilson’s Law Lect. 446 to 449.

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