Source: https://www.commerciallitigationalert.com/author/dsantomauro/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:11:06+00:00

Document:
New Jersey’s Prompt Payment Act (“PPA”) can be a valuable tool available to contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, and product suppliers that are owed money on New Jersey construction projects, as aggrieved parties can recover interest on unpaid amounts at prime plus one (1%) percent in the event payment is not made within the time period provided by the PPA and attorneys’ fees. N.J.S.A. § 2A:30A-2. In TBI Unlimited, LLC v. Clearcut Lawn Decisions, LLC, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey considered the scope of the PPA, which is only the subject of a handful of written opinions.
Parties to construction contracts often include provisions that set forth time frames to file actions arising out of the contract that are different than the applicable statute of limitations. In the absence of any statutory prohibition, contract provisions limiting the time to file an action to less than the applicable statute of limitations are generally enforceable provided the time frame is reasonable. Although perhaps less common, some construction contracts include provisions that attempt to define when the applicable limitations period begins to run (i.e. when causes of action arising out of the contract accrue).
Like other states, Florida regulates parties in the construction industry and requires that contractors performing certain work be properly licensed. See Flor. Stat. Ch. 489. If an unlicensed contractor enters into a construction contract it cannot enforce that contract. See Flor. Stat. Ch. 489.128. In the recent decision in Earth Trades, Inc. v. T&G Corp., the Florida Supreme Court considered the impact of this law in a contract dispute between an unlicensed subcontractor and a general contractor, where the subcontractor claimed that the general contractor knew that it was unlicensed.
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp., the United States Supreme Court held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” As the parties in Stolt-Nielsen stipulated that their arbitration “agreement was ‘silent’ in the sense that they had not reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration,” the Court ruled that the arbitrator could not infer the parties’ consent to class arbitration solely from the fact of their agreement to arbitrate, or failure to preclude it.
New Jersey courts have long held that businesses may assert claims under New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) in appropriate circumstances. See Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Schuster. ﻿Whether a business is entitled to assert a CFA claim typically turns on the specific facts of the case and whether the transaction at issue constitutes a “sale of merchandise” within the meaning of the CFA. See N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2. In Princeton Healthcare System v. Netsmart New York, Inc., the Appellate Division confronted this precise issue in holding that Princeton Healthcare, a sophisticated business entity, was not entitled to assert a CFA claim against Netsmart arising out of the sale and implementation of a customized computer system.

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