Source: https://gelr.org/2015/03/11/high-courts-displacement-doctrine-extends-to-cercla-georgetown-international-environmental-law-review/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:07:04+00:00

Document:
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has also been involved in addressing hazardous contamination in the same area since 1999 when the Colville Confederated Tribes petitioned the Agency to conduct an environmental assessment of the Upper Columbia River Site. The assessment revealed elevated levels of hazardous contaminants and heavy metals, including arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, mercury, zinc, dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The EPA found that this contamination is largely due to Teck’s discharge of an estimated 15 million tons of metallic slag into the Columbia River over the course of a 100-year period. In 2001, the EPA determined that a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (“RI/FS”) was warranted. The EPA attempted to negotiate with Teck before issuing a Unilateral Administrative Order (“UAO”) in 2003, ordering a study of the site consistent with CERCLA. When Teck did not act, EPA initiated work at the site. In 2006, EPA entered into a settlement agreement with Teck for costs from the RI/FS consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
Like the plaintiffs in Kivalina, the Anderson plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their claims by arguing that CERCLA doesn’t provide a remedy for personal injury. The plaintiffs relied on CERCLA’s legislative history to show “that Congress rejected the inclusion of any statutory personal injury provisions within CERCLA and thus did not intend to occupy the field of personal injury liability caused by contaminants.” The court rejected this outright, holding that: “[t]his is too narrow a view of the question at issue. . . .” Rather than focusing its inquiry on the remedies available under the statute, the court looked to the boarder statutory purpose, finding that under CERCLA, “[t]he question at issue is liability for the release and threatened release of hazardous substances.” In broadly applying AEP’s rationale to CERCLA, the Anderson court presented a template for the application of this displacement doctrine to environmental laws beyond the Clean Air Act.
Notably, however, the court rejected Teck’s attempts to further narrow the application of federal common law claims that are not displaced by congressional action. Teck invited the court to adopt a narrow view of the circumstances in which federal common law claims can arise, arguing that previous cases recognized such claims only in interstate disputes between state entities. Teck relied on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in National Audubon Society v. Department of Water, which drew its reasoning primarily from foundational Supreme Court cases Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In National Audubon Society, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that both Milwaukee I and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., “involved a state suing sources outside its domain which were causing pollution within the state.” The Anderson court rejected the idea that National Audubon Society could be read to preclude federal common law claims beyond the narrow context of interstate pollution disputes directly involving state entities.
 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9600, (“CERCLA”).
 American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
 Anderson v. Teck Metals, Ltd., 2015 WL 59100, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2015).
 Complaint, 2013 WL 6908174 (E.D.Wash.).
 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
 Anderson, 2015 WL 59100, at *9, (quoting Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856).
 National Audubon Society v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.1988).
 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (“Milwaukee I”).
 National Audubon Society, 869 F.2d at 1205.

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