Source: http://healthlawreporter.bbablogs.org/2015/03/05/health-law-case-brief-robert-roe-et-al-vs-childrens-hospital-medical-center/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 01:56:26+00:00

Document:
The SJC noted, however, that the plaintiffs in this case were asking the Court to recognize a more expansive duty: to prevent a former employee from causing harm to an unknown class of plaintiffs, plaintiffs with virtually no relationship with or connection to the employer. The Court refused to do so, for reasons based both on precedence and practicality.
The Court reasoned that no other jurisdiction has recognized this type of duty, and in fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had explicitly refused to establish a duty of employers to actively locate and warn future employers of dangerous former employees.[iv] The imposition of such a duty would place an onerous burden on employers, requiring them to monitor former employees and then seek out and warn any potential future employers of the alleged past actions the employees. Moreover, special relationships between defendants and prospective plaintiffs are typically recognized only when a defendant can reasonably anticipate that his or her actions (or failure to take action) could cause harm to a foreseeable and clearly defined class of plaintiffs. In this case, the plaintiffs had virtually no temporal or geographic connection with Children’s Hospital, and so to find a special relationship in this case would expose the hospital to liability for a limitless class of unknown plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court declined to find a special relationship between the parties that would give rise to a duty of care.
The plaintiffs presented three arguments in favor of finding a duty of care in this case: (1) the medical community has imposed a duty on itself to report alleged abuse to protect future patients from predatory physicians; (2) the general public has demonstrated, through the enactment of statutes and regulations, that such a duty exists, and (3) public policy is served by the recognition of such a duty. The Court addressed the first two arguments and dismissed them in turn.
First, the Court agreed that while the medical community has imposed a duty on itself to protect children from sexual abuse, and has created mechanisms for reporting such abuse, the plaintiffs did not present evidence sufficient enough to show that the medical community has imposed a duty to report alleged abuse, and to protect unknowable future plaintiffs from harm by former employees. Second, the Court concluded that the Massachusetts laws[v] referenced by plaintiffs imposed a duty on Children’s Hospital to report any abuse experienced by Dr. Levine’s patients while he was employed by Children’s Hospital, but did not create a duty to protect potential future plaintiffs in other states, or to alert prospective employers that Dr. Levine had been accused of abuse.
Since Children’s Hospital did not have a special relationship with Dr. Levine’s UNC patients, and therefore did not owe his former UNC patients a duty of care, the plaintiffs’ complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court to dismiss the complaint was affirmed by the SJC.
Rachelle Rubinow, Esq. is a Program and Policy Associate at Community Catalyst, where she assists with providing technical assistance to consumer health advocates on Affordable Care Act implementation issues. She received her law degree from Boston College Law School, where she also worked as a staff attorney for the Boston College Legal Assistance Bureau after graduating. During law school, she interned for the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services and the Tenant Advocacy Project. She received her undergraduate degree from Cornell University.
[i] SJC-11533 (Mass. Oct. 1, 2014).
[ii] See Coombes v. Florio, 450 Mass. 182, 187 (2007), quoting Cremins v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289, 292 (1993).
[iii] See Lev v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 457 Mass. 234, 242 (2010). See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012).
[iv] Hornback v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 313 Wis. 2d 294 (2008).
[v] M.G. L. c. 119, § 51A; M.G. L. c. 111, § 53B; M.G. L. c. 112, § 5F.

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