Source: https://www.michaelrehm.com/hughey-v-dept-motor-vehicles-1991-253-cal-app-3d-752
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:20:51+00:00

Document:
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Appellant.
Court of Appeals of California, Third District.
John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attorneys General, Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Assistant Attorney General, N. Eugene Hill, Assistant Attorney General, Richard M. Frank and Ted Prim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
Michael S. Sands, Michael R. Nelson and M. Bradley Wishek for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Hughey then sought review of the order by petition to the superior court for a writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5). The trial court ruled: “The court in exercising its independent judgment finds the preponderance of evidence does not support respondent's [DMV's] findings. The weight of the evidence does not support the finding that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the petitioner was driving under the influence. The court finds that the petitioner was rendered incapable of refusing any chemical test by reason of the head trauma he sustained in the accident of July 30, 1988.” The court ordered a writ of mandate to issue directing DMV to set aside its decision suspending Hughey's driver's license. DMV timely appeals.
On appeal, DMV challenges both findings of the trial court, asserting the evidence demonstrates reasonable cause to arrest Hughey and that the trial court erred in finding Hughey was not capable of refusing to submit to a chemical test. These contentions are essentially attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court's findings. However, underlying 755*755 DMV's second assertion is the contention that the determination of whether a driver is capable of refusing a test should be subject only to the reasonable judgment of the arresting officer. In essence, DMV contends a driver may not defend an implied-consent hearing by proof of his or her lack of capacity to refuse to submit to a test.
We shall determine that a driver may defend in an implied-consent hearing by proof of lack of capacity to refuse a test and that the trial court's finding that Hughey lacked such capacity is supported by substantial evidence. This renders it unnecessary for us to review the trial court's finding that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest.
On the afternoon on July 30, 1988, California Highway Patrol Officer Jeremica was sent to the scene of a motorcycle accident. Various public safety personnel were on the scene. An eyewitness indicated Hughey had been the driver of the motorcycle, Hughey admitted he was the driver and he had multiple abrasions consistent with those of a motorcycle accident victim. A witness told the officer Hughey was travelling at 45 miles per hour, lost control and went into a fence, falling off the motorcycle. Hughey had not been wearing a helmet. Jeremica testified he had been taught to take suspected head-injury victims to a doctor. No head injuries were observed by the officer or by the ambulance or fire crews.
Hughey was both “in and out,” meaning he went from responsive to the irrational, and “up and down,” meaning he would go from the calm to the belligerent. He had a strong odor of alcohol upon his breath, staggered as he walked, had bloodshot and watery eyes and spoke in a slow, slurred voice. His eyes displayed lateral nystagmus as “his tracking was quite poor,” a phenomenon which often accompanies alcohol intoxication. (But see People v. Loomis (1984) 156 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1 [203 Cal. Rptr. 767]; Taylor, Cal. Drunk Driving Defense (1990) Suppression of Evidence, § 6.11, p. 35.). He was uncooperative and refused medical care. The officer abandoned his decision to take Hughey to the hospital.
On July 31, 1988, after Hughey was released from jail, he was admitted to the hospital where he stayed until August 4, 1988. His hospital records were introduced at the license suspension hearing. He had a skull fracture. One notation in his records describes his mental orientation as “variable.” A neurologist with substantial experience testified that Hughey had suffered a serious head injury during the accident. This would account for his bizarre combative behavior and amnesia. It would also have made it difficult, if not impossible, for Hughey to have understood the admonition delivered by the officer, nor would Hughey have understood the significance of his refusal to submit. It was unlikely that alcohol caused his behavior.
Hughey testified he had been working on the handlebars of his motorcycle and went for a test drive. He had drunk two 8-ounce beers that day. As he approached a curve the handlebars failed. He was travelling about 40 miles per hour. Hughey testified he remembered nothing between the time he lost control of his bike on a curve and the time he woke up on the floor of the jail. His fiance testified he was irrational and delirious after the accident and may not have recognized her. Another witness to the accident told Officer Jeremica that Hughey was unconscious for several minutes.
Under the statute, a driver who does not refuse a test thereby confirms his continuing implied consent to it. The refusal to submit to a test withdraws the consent already impliedly given.
(4a) The question on this appeal is the scope of the exception provided by subdivision (a) of section 23157. If Hughey was in a condition which rendered him incapable of refusing to take the test, the statute states he is deemed not to have withdrawn his consent.
DMV postulates this section means that no subsequent evidence of a driver's incapacity to refuse may be introduced if the officer at the scene acted “reasonably;” that the statute is a directive to officers that if a driver is unconscious or incapable of refusing consent, the test or tests may be administered whether or not the person is admonished as the implied consent remains in effect; and that the decision as to whether a driver is incapable of refusing a chemical test is to be determined by the arresting officer on the scene in the exercise of reasonable judgment. Under this assertion, the only 759*759 issue for review would be whether the officer acted reasonably in concluding the driver was or was not capable of refusing the test.
Hughey urges that the exception permits a driver to prove by subsequent evidence, irrespective of the driver's statements at the scene, that the driver was incapable of refusing a test by reason of mental incapacity induced by head trauma.
We have found no California case which presented the precise question herein, wherein the officer did not confuse the driver, and where the driver, through no fault of his own, is rendered mentally incapable of refusing to submit to the test.
Plunkett v. Alexis (1982) 136 Cal. App.3d 370, 374 [186 Cal. Rptr. 261], cited by the DMV on this point, is distinguishable. In Plunkett a panel of this court held the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the driver's pain from accident injuries did not preclude a finding of refusal. This was another substantial evidence case much as the case at bar, in which the court sustained as supported by substantial evidence the trial court's findings that the driver was conscious at all times, that there was no evidence the pain the driver suffered rendered him incapable of understanding the officer and the driver indicated he understood the officer. The instant appeal follows a finding of incapacity to refuse by the trial court.
None of the cases we have reviewed precludes a driver from showing he or she should be deemed not to have refused to submit due to a medical condition unrelated to alcohol use.
(4b) We conclude the view espoused by DMV does not comport with the proper interpretation of the statute in question.
We further conclude that viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence supports the finding that Hughey was rendered incapable of refusing to submit by reason of his head injury. Section 23157, subdivision (a)(5) provides that one who is incapable of refusal is deemed not to have withdrawn his or her consent. Hughey did not withdraw his consent as he was incapable of so doing.
In the instant case, the reasonable inference drawn by the trial court and supported by substantial evidence is that alcohol was not a cause of Hughey's mental state following the accident but that the serious head injuries sustained by him were the cause; and that Hughey was behaving 761*761 irrationally at the scene, was unconscious until the ambulance arrived and was “fading in and out.” In fact, the arresting officer intended to take Hughey to a hospital until he was confronted by aggressive, belligerent behavior on Hughey's part and opted instead for a jail cell.
Some of the cases on this issue have focused on the driver's conduct at the scene. “The determining factor is not the state of the suspect driver's mind, it is the fair meaning to be given his response to the demand that he submit to the chemical test.” (Maxsted v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 14 Cal. App.3d 982, 986 [92 Cal. Rptr. 579]. See Goodman v. Orr, supra, 19 Cal. App.3d at p. 857.) In this case, an inference to be drawn from Hughey's statement that “I'm not taking any test — just let me go, I'll show you something too cool man” is that Hughey actually refused the test. However, this is not the inference drawn by the trial court, which inference is likewise supportable. Even the arresting officer testified the statement made no sense. Moreover, the statutory scheme expressly permits a driver to prove incapacity to refuse, leaving his or her implied consent intact.
The DMV suggests this permits second-guessing of the officer's opinion that Hughey actually refused. The “exception” does permit officers to avoid mouthing futile admonitions to persons unable to understand them because of death or unconsciousness but nothing in the statute suggests the officer's judgment in the field is determinative for the purpose of the license-suspension hearing. The argument tendered by DMV would limit judicial review of law enforcement decisions in drunk driving cases to the reasonableness of the arresting officer's conduct and would negate review of the express statutory exception of incapable of refusing a test.
Under the rubric of the rule articulated in Thompson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 107 Cal. App.3d 354 [165 Cal. Rptr. 626], that officer-induced confusion in effectively communicating the requirements of implied consent to a driver excuses the refusal to take the test, Hughey contends he did not receive an effectively communicated advisement because he was unable, by reason of his head injuries, to comprehend the warnings which may or may not have been given him. This assertion, however, is subsumed within the broader rule of the exception for incapacity to refuse to submit. Obviously if one is rendered incapable of comprehension of what is going on about him or her, he or she would not be able to understand any advisements by the officer or to formulate a response thereto.
If, in what we perceive to be an infrequent case, the driver is able to convince a trier of fact that he or she was incapable of refusing a test for reasons unconnected with the consumption of alcohol, the statute contemplates a restoration of the driver's license. We recognize that police officers are not infallible, that all detentions are not found to be lawful, all searches are not legal and all arrests do not result in convictions. Nor is the police officer a neurologist, a pyschologist or on-the-scene trauma specialist. While obvious incapabilities may be apparent to an arresting officer, incapability engendered by trauma wherein the symptoms are similar to those of intoxication will likely be missed by the officer absent a medical examination. If the driver presents expert testimony of his incapability to refuse a test which convinces the trier of fact, this is permitted under section 23157, subdivision (a)(5).
Hughey observes that Illinois law is contra to his assertions. In People v. Kirby (1986) 145 Ill. App.3d 144 [99 Ill. Dec. 209, 495 N.E.2d. 656], the driver urged that the “`dead, unconscious or … incapable of refusal'” statute “expressly provides for testing those who are incapable of refusal. Thus, the argument goes, where a suspected drunk driver is dazed or disoriented, the trial court should determine whether a `meaningful refusal' 764*764 to undergo blood-alcohol testing was possible. If a meaningful refusal did not occur, the defendant concludes, there is no `refusal' for the purpose of invoking the implied consent law's sanctions.
The harshness of this rule was somewhat ameliorated in People v. Goodman (1988) 173 Ill. App.3d 559 [123 Ill.Dec. 417, 527 N.E.2d 1055] where (527 N.E.2d at p. 1058) the court held an officer must have had probable cause to arrest the driver for drunk driving which, in the court's view, eliminates the problem of revoking licenses of drivers who are merely dazed and injured. The court did not consider the problem presented here, where the dazed and injured driver coincidentally exhibits symptoms of alcohol intoxication.
Hughey does not expressly urge the officer should have engaged in a violent struggle to obtain a blood sample. He posits that transporting him to a hospital or doctor would have enabled him to have a medical evaluation of his condition; and that he is statutorily empowered by section 23157, subdivision (a) to prove he was by reason of injuries, not induced or exacerbated by alcohol consumption, rendered incapable of refusing a test. We agree the statute grants such right.
We do not foresee that rejection of DMV's “reasonable police officer” theory will lead to the violent confrontations envisioned by DMV. As a practical matter, generally an officer faced with a refusal to submit will not analyze the motorist's capability to refuse to submit, but will instead assume it is a volitional act on the driver's part and rely on the sanction of license suspension to punish the recalcitrant motorist: The officer will take “no” to mean “no” and proceed accordingly.
From our review of the cases on the incapable-of-refusal exception, we do not find any bright-line rule contended for by the DMV that the triers of fact in an implied consent hearing may not consider a driver's capacity to refuse a test but must confine its inquiry to the reasonableness of the officer's actions. In this case substantial evidence supports the finding by the trial court that despite how the officer may have interpreted Hughey's remarks and conduct at the scene, his severe injuries rendered him incapable of refusing consent. The statute requires the court to deem such a driver not to have withdrawn his or her implied consent. The trial court properly issued the writ.
If remedial action is required, the Legislature is the proper body to deal with the problem presented herein. While it is unfair for a dazed and disoriented driver to lose his or her license because she or he was genuinely unable to understand what was happening, it may as well be perceived as unfair to permit drunken drivers and their expert witnesses to thwart the needs of the populace for safe streets. (See South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553, 558-559 [74 L.Ed.2d 748, 755, 103 S.Ct. 916].) The present statutory scheme may well be viewed as placing an unreasonable burden on police officers to determine whether a motorist involved in an accident is injured and belligerent, or merely drunk and belligerent.
One solution to be considered by the Legislature is to require officers to take all suspected drunk driving motorists to a hospital if there is serious head injury or other serious trauma. This would ensure prompt medical 768*768 treatment and would permit a determination of the motorist's ability to refuse to submit to be made by trained medical personnel. It would also eliminate most of the danger of hostile confrontations between motorists and the police, as most motorists, even belligerent ones, are not concerned about going to the hospital for a medical check-up. They are concerned about going to jail after the results of the blood, breath, or urine test are made known to the officer. To require an officer faced with a motorist with a head injury to take him or her to the hospital before providing the blood, breath, or urine admonitions would comport with due process and would satisfy the public policy already established in the statute.
Serious injury to the head, even though not causing sustained unconsciousness, may nevertheless render the injured person incapable of refusal within the meaning of section 23157. In that circumstance, the determination whether an articulated refusal of a chemical test is volitional or not involves a medical judgment beyond the ken of the arresting officer. In most if not all such cases, however, the fact of head trauma, if not its effect on the injured individual, is objectively ascertainable by a trained officer through observable injury, the conduct of the accident victim, the surrounding circumstances or a combination of these.
Here the respondent lost control of his motorcycle while travelling at 45 miles per hour, was thrown off and crashed into a fence. He was not wearing a helmet. The arresting officer was informed of these facts when he arrived on the scene. He was also told by a witness that respondent had been 769*769 rendered unconscious for several minutes after the accident. When the officer talked to respondent, he was alternately responsive and irrational. A paramedic at the scene advised the officer that despite the lack of observable trauma to that area, injury to the head was a possibility. In his testimony at the administrative hearing, the officer acknowledged a possibility of head injury arose simply from the circumstances of the accident. He had been taught that persons suspected of sustaining head injury should be taken to a doctor. He had also been taught that some of the symptoms of head trauma are similar to those displayed by one under the influence. The officer formed the opinion the respondent was under the influence and arrested him for violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a).
The officer did not secure medical treatment for respondent but took him to jail. There, respondent was advised of the consequences of refusal and asked to submit to a chemical test. Respondent replied, “I'm not taking any test — just let me go. I'll show you something too cool man.” The officer took this for the refusal which it appeared on its face to be and, without attempting to administer a test as he might have done, relied instead on the sanction of license suspension under the implied consent law.
Few would argue with the officer's choice of remedies under these circumstances. Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight, few can fail to appreciate the dilemma in which the officer found himself. But it was a dilemma largely of his own making. Had the officer secured immediate medical treatment for respondent, as the objective circumstances and the officer's own training indicated he should have done, implementation of the implied consent law would likely have been informed and guided by expert medical judgment as to respondent's volitional capability and, if a chemical test was to be administered, the best way to proceed.
With nothing more than his own training and experience to rely on, an arresting officer is not capable of going behind a straightforward, express refusal to submit to chemical testing in order to calibrate its volitional quality. That is a matter for medical professionals. But trained officers, in the careful discharge of their duties, will appreciate the circumstances indicative of possible head injuries and, in acting to secure medical attention for the accident victim, consult with and benefit from the counsel of medical professionals. For those reasons, I do not share the Attorney General's concern that the interpretation of section 23157 which we adopt today 770*770 (which by its terms we are obliged to do) will inevitably lead to more violent confrontations between officers and physically injured motorists suspected of driving under the influence.
However, a caveat is in order. If, consistent with section 23157, medical experts may now testify at administrative license suspension hearings that a licensee was rendered incapable of refusing a chemical test by virtue of physical trauma, can those experts who minister to psychological and emotional trauma be far behind? Unlike physical injury, as to the head, there are no reliable indicia of psychological trauma available to an officer in the field who suspects a motorist of driving under the influence. The officer can infer head injury from a bleeding, lacerated cranium or, as here, from the fact the unhelmeted accident victim careened head first into a fence. But how can he discern a psyche scarred by, e.g., schizophrenia, or draw an inference from a concatenation of personally devastating events (e.g., loss of job, dissolution of marriage) of which he is not even aware? It may be confidently anticipated that there are experts for hire who would opine, after the fact of course, that conditions such as these diminished or destroyed a motorist's volition.
Administrative hearings under the implied consent law are informal, and advisedly so. Greater formality would exact from the state and the litigants substantially additional time and expense multiplied by the large number of such hearings across the state. While informality may serve the public interest in the typical case, it does not necessarily do so in cases where incapacity to refuse testing is in issue. In the administrative hearing in this case, the only persons present were the respondent licensee, his counsel, the arresting officer and the hearing officer. Respondent produced as an expert witness a neurologist who testified essentially that respondent's head injuries rendered him incapable of refusing a chemical test. The neurologist was not subjected to cross-examination nor did the DMV offer expert testimony in rebuttal. From all that appears, DMV had no notice respondent would offer expert testimony on the issue of incapacity. To note that the testimony of respondent's expert was wholly unchallenged implies no opinion on its quality or character. But in matters as important as these the opportunity to challenge and to rebut should be available. That opportunity could be afforded by conditioning the use of expert testimony on the requirement of advance notice to DMV sufficient to allow DMV to involve counsel in the 771*771 proceedings and, if advised, to secure rebuttal testimony. Of course, such a requirement would have to be imposed by the Legislature.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 22, 1991, and appellant's petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 13, 1992. Arabian, J., and Baxter, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
 Further unspecified statutory references are to this code.
 DMV filed a request for judicial notice of a civil complaint Hughey has filed against the arresting officer. We deny that request.
 The statute has since been amended to provide that a refusing motorist is subject to a one-year license suspension (Veh. Code, § 13353, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 1990, ch. 431, § 1.7, eff. July 26, 1990).
 The officer detected the odor of alcohol on respondent's breath, respondent staggered, his speech was slurred, his eyes were watery, bloodshot and demonstrated lateral nystagmus. These observations, in combination with the other information he acquired at the accident scene, gave the officer probable cause for the arrest. The fact remains, however, that an accident victim who is under the influence may also have sustained head injury.

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