Source: https://www.schwabe.com/newsroom-publications-13493
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:48:52+00:00

Document:
Interval –In its first application of the Supreme Court's Nautilus v. Biosig decision, the Circuit rules that the phrase "unobtrusive manner that does not dis‎tract a user," in reference to the manner in which an attention manager displays images, fails to inform those skilled in ‎the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable ‎certainty, and the Circuit therefore affirms the district court's judgment of invalidity under § 112, ¶ 2.
Scientific Plastic– A majority of the panel affirms a determination of obviousness, holding that the Board did not err in holding that it would have been obvious to modify a chromatography cartridge with the resealable threaded cap taught by art that the majority found to be analogous.
A patent must "conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject ‎matter which the applicant regards as the invention."‎ ‎35 U.S.C. §112, ¶ 2. A claim fails to satisfy this ‎statutory requirement and is thus invalid for indefinite‎ness if its language, when read in light of the specification ‎and the prosecution history, "fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of ‎the invention." Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, ‎Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
The key claim language at issue in this appeal includes a term of degree, "unobtrusive manner." The panel does ‎not understand the Supreme Court to have implied in ‎Nautilus, and it does not hold today, that terms of degree ‎are inherently indefinite. Claim language employing ‎terms of degree has long been found definite where it ‎provided enough certainty to one of skill in the art when ‎read in the context of the invention. As the Supreme Court ‎recognized in Nautilus, absolute precision in claim ‎language is unattainable. Although absolute or mathematical precision is not ‎required, it is not enough, as some of the language in ‎prior cases may have suggested, to identify some standard for measuring the scope of the phrase. The ‎Supreme Court explained that a patent does not satisfy ‎the definiteness requirement of §112 merely because a ‎court can ascribe some meaning to a patent's claims. The claims, when read in ‎light of the specification and the prosecution history, must ‎provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art.
The patents' "unobtrusive manner" phrase is highly ‎subjective and, on its face, provides little guidance to one ‎of skill in the art. The lack of objective boundaries in the ‎claim language is particularly troubling in light of the ‎patents' command to read the term "image" broadly to ‎mean any sensory stimulus that is produced from the set ‎of content data, including sounds and video. The patents contemplate a variety of stimuli ‎that could impact different users in different ways. A term of degree fails to provide sufficient notice of its scope if it depends on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person's opinion. Where, as here, there is a purely subjec‎tive claim phrase, the panel says to turn to the written descrip‎tion for guidance.
Although Interval identifies ‎portions of the specification that appear to use the "unob‎trusive manner" phrase in conjunction with the wallpaper ‎embodiment, other ‎portions of the specification suggest that the phrase may ‎also be tied to the screen saver embodiment.‎ The ‎hazy relationship between the claims and the written ‎description fails to provide the clarity that the subjective ‎claim language needs.
The prosecution history further illustrates the diffi‎culty in pinning down the relationship between the writ‎ten description and the "in an unobtrusive manner that ‎does not distract the user" claim phrase. The statements of ‎Interval, and the responses of the PTO, reflect considerable uncertainty about which embodiments were ‎tied to the "unobtrusive manner" language.
Turning to claim construction, the panel modifies the district court's construction of "attention manager" and "instructions" and therefore vacates and remands the judgment of noninfringement.
Nautilus was highly critical of the Circuit's "insolubly ambiguous" standard as to indefiniteness, but did not appear to provide clear guidance as to the standard that should be applied. Here, at least this panel appears to understand that the bar has been raised and the Circuit needs to apply a higher standard of claim certainty, whatever that standard is.
Are King and Strassheimer Analogous Prior Art?
‎"A reference is reasonably pertinent if . . . it is one‎ which, because of the matter with which it deals,‎ logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering his problem. If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection."‎ Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 637 F.3d‎ ‎1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Here, the King and Strassheimer references address the problem of providing a fluid-tight seal at elevated pressures, between a container and a resealable cap. According to the majority, this is sufficiently close to the problem addressed by the claimed invention, and substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that King and Strassheimer are available as prior art.
Was the Claimed Invention Obvious?
‎"[A] patent composed of several elements is not‎ proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.‎"
The issue here is not whether the Yamada cartridge leaked, but whether there was a concern with leakage in LPLC cartridges such that a person of ordinary skill would have provided a known pressure-resistant cap, as in King or Strassheimer, to the cartridge of Yamada. The majority concludes that substantial evidence supports a finding that there was such a concern, and goes on to hold that ‎the Board did not err in holding that it would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention to modify the chromatography cartridge of Yamada with the resealable threaded cap of King or Strassheimer.
Judge Moore dissents, feeling that the Board and the majority is exercising hindsight, and that the record does not contain substantial evidence that one of skill in the relevant art would have modified the chromatography cartridge in Yamada by replacing its sealing configuration with that of a soda pop bottle.‎ She also notes that the Board found the claims obvious without resolving the level of skill in the art. It is axiomatic that this is a "basic factual‎ inquiry" required of any obviousness determination.‎ Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). According to Judge Moore, we cannot answer‎ the analogous art question without knowing who the person of ordinary skill is.

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