Source: https://igazette.net/2016/06/23/proposed-un-model-for-arresting-international-criminals/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:42:26+00:00

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This article will examine the problematical area of international criminals accused of serious crimes and avoiding arrest. In turn, it cast serious doubts about the effectiveness of the international criminal justice system. It proposes creating a UN Special Task Force that would operate globally to arrest international fugitives. The model would derive from UN Chapter VII powers and Article 29 (subsidiary organs).
Section 1 will discuss the basic structure of international criminal justice and problems that arise when suspects like Omar al-Bashir brazenly defy ICC arrest warrants. Section 2 will examine the legal basis for enforcing warrants against non-cooperative States, along with the legal basis for creating a Special Task Force to arrest international fugitives accused of serious crimes. Section 3 will lay out the structure and capability of a Special Task Force and also provide a hypothetical example of a mission to capture an international criminal. Section 4 addresses the issue of conflict classification when the Special Task Force is operating in a conflict region or outside of armed conflict. It also explores how Art. 25 of the UN Charter could provide the jurisdictional basis for an overlapping law enforcement function when a UN Member refuses to surrender an international criminal. Lastly, section 5 concludes with a discussion on the ramifications of not adopting a Special Task Force in an era of increasing global conflicts, violence and serious crimes.
Apart from UN created tribunals and the ICC, there are also consensual hybrid tribunals such as the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone (STSL), and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).
Nonetheless, the basic structure for international criminal justice is ad hoc tribunals created by the UN under Chapter VII – or treaty based systems like the ICC.
Despite the nature of a UN 13(b) referral, without effective enforcement mechanisms, it is almost impossible to arrest a person accused of serious crimes when the State in which the accused is found refuses to cooperate and surrender them to the ICC. Other problem areas are when a State is not a party to the ICC, there can be no informal surrender of its nationals absent a valid extradition treaty.
For those reasons, immunity under customary international law is entirely inconsistent with South Africa’s Constitution and an Act of Parliament, thus immunity cannot be valid on its face, since both the Constitution and Parliament place a greater interest in bringing Bashir to justice, over that of granting him immunity for serious crimes.
Accordingly, despite the nature of the UN referral to the ICC culminating in an arrest warrant being issued for Bashir, neither the ICC nor UN tribunals have in place effective enforcement mechanisms. In the next section, we will look at legal methods on enforcing a warrant against an international criminal target.
against all UN members. That basis is found under Article 25 of the UN Charter in which all members must accept and comply with UN resolutions. The obligation arises by virtue of the implied consent each State has given to be bound by the conditions of the UN Charter.
And, under Article 103 of the UN Charter, when a State’s obligations under an international agreement conflicts with a member’s obligations under the UN Charter, the Charter prevails.18 For example, in the Lockerbie case, two Libyan suspects were wanted in connection with an aircraft that exploded in Scotland, which involved the deaths of Americans.
Libya refused to grant extradition claiming it was an interference with its internal affairs. It relied on Art. 7 of The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (rule of aut dedere judicare) as the controlling authority in which to prosecute its own nationals in the absence of an extradition treaty, despite the U.S. and UK demands for the surrender of the two Libyan suspects.
The matter was then presented before the UN Security Council and General Assembly resulting in two resolutions: Res. 731, urging Libya to comply with the requests of the U.S. and UK; and Res. 748, imposing sanctions. The matter also progressed before the International Court of Justice seeking provisional measures to stop the U.S. and UK from taking any action to coerce Libya to handing over the two suspects.
Although international courts do not generally follow the common law doctrine of stare decisis, in which decisions are binding on other courts, nevertheless, if we were to apply the Lockerbie holding to South Africa’s claim of a binding international agreement with the African Union, as regards granting immunity to African officials, such an agreement would be invalid under Article 103, and UN resolution 1593 (culminating in an arrest warrant being issued by the ICC for Omar al-Bashir) would prevail, because UN members must comply with resolutions.
Accordingly, Article 103 is controlling authority that binds all UN members, irrespective of any international agreement a State may have entered into.
B. UN Subsidiary Organs and the Creation of a Special Task Force.
Under Article 29 of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council has been given wide latitude to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.20 Inter alia, some of those subsidiary organs are expressed in the form of international criminal tribunals like ICTR and ICTY.
In the context of international enforcement of arrest warrants, the UN Security Council has the power to create a Special Task Force under Article 29 that would be tasked with arresting those accused of serious crimes, presumably, in States refusing to cooperate with a UN resolution extending to arrest. Because arrest falls outside the sphere of armed conflict, the types of operations conducted by the Special Task Force would fit into what the author describes as “Global Operations Other Than War” (GOOTW).
Ideally, GOOTW would entail placing the Special Task Force under the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, where its official mandate would be limited to arrest and to only use lethal force when strictly necessary.21 However, because international criminal targets are often located in conflict regions where members of the military are involved in protecting them, the Special Task Force would draw from candidates with specialized combat arms training, primarily among the infantry ranks.
Essentially, the Special Task Force would be an all voluntary force drawn from NATO militaries around the world. Furthermore, NATO forces have been involved in arresting war criminals in the former Yugoslavia; therefore, it brings extensive operational experience from a variety of regions.
In short, the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII and Article 29 would create a viable enforcement unit in connection with all UN referrals to the ICC pursuant to the Rome Statute. In instances of non-UN referrals, the ICC could contract with the Special Task Force.22 Further, as a subsidiary organ of the UN, the Special Task Force would not be in conflict with Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter, since it applies only to States and not organizations, hence, STF enforcement actions would not be deemed a use of force against the territorial integrity of any State.
The Special Task Force would comprise candidates selected from branches within NATO who are already trained in advanced infantry tactics. Ideally, it would draw volunteers from counterterrorist units who are also trained in close protection and evacuating diplomats in a foreign territory during a crisis, as they would be ideally suited for the task.
STF operations would focus on stealth and would be best categorized as clandestine missions, when States have refused to surrender an international criminal suspect. It would require an independent tactical air wing to insert and extract the STF unit in any region of the world. The STF would initially comprise 12 to 24 personnel operating on a rotational basis for six month periods. This rotational model would ensure the unit is infused with new personnel, in which departing operators would return to their home military units.
Therefore, for every person accused of a serious crime that avoids arrest is justice delayed and denied for the victims of those crimes along with surviving family members.
B. Hypothetical Mission Illustrating the Effectiveness of Special Task Force.
Using the ICC al-Bashir case as a hypothetical example, this section will illustrate the effectiveness of the Special Task Force.
Intelligence has ascertained Omar al-Bashir will be traveling to an event where members of his protective detail will be providing close protection. Pre-mission plans involve members of STF infiltrating a remote area in close proximity to the Bashir event. This area will be used as a staging base to the target area, so STF can position itself as close to the event as possible, in order to intercept Bashir.
After an area assessment is performed of the remote staging base, the STF will run through some practice drills to rehearse the time it takes to depart from the staging base and arrive at the target area, so the interception of Bashir is perfectly timed. These practice drills will be performed in a friendly area using helicopters.
On executing the actual mission, Special Task Force will be inserting by helicopter to the remote staging base undetected using electronic countermeasures to jam the non-cooperative’s State’s security and detection systems. Drones have been tracking Bashir’s movements at the event to determine accessibility, so when Bashir exits the event, the information will be immediately relayed to the Special Task Force, who will intercept Bashir before he reaches the convoy.
Two components of Special Task Force will handle the convoy and Bashir protective detail. The third component will provide a security perimeter for the mission, and the fourth component will place a helicopter in the air with an STF sniper.
As Bashir approaches the convoy, Special Task Force inserts by helicopter, while two members of the Bashir protective detail immediately engage STF personnel, who quickly return fire and neutralize the two targets. Bashir is then handcuffed, injected with a sedative and placed on a helicopter for extraction. The STF then moves out of the target area to a friendly region, where Bashir is dropped off and bound for The Hague.
The post mission debriefing determined the Special Task Force only used lethal force when they were fired upon by the Bashir protective detail. The unit’s actions were in accordance with Art. 3 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, stating, “Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.
Accordingly, an effective international enforcement mechanism would go a long way in diminishing the negative perception of international criminal justice.
Using a dual international humanitarian law and human rights law model (IHL/HRL), if, for example, the Special Task Force was operating outside of armed conflict, human rights law would apply. However, when an international suspect is residing in an armed conflict area or otherwise is protected by members of the military, including other variants, IHL would apply.
However, in situations deemed non-international armed conflicts (NIAC), that is, situations not triggering IHL, such as domestic riots and random acts of violence, depending on the situation it could trigger Common Article 328 protections – or the heightened requirements of Protocol II.29.
While theoretically, the UN is not a high contracting party in the traditional sense of armed conflict, nevertheless, a UN organ consisting of a Special Task Force would be bound by ROE when arresting an international criminal located in a conflict area. But when operating outside of armed conflict, the STF would be bound by HR norms. In those circumstances, a use of force continuum used by domestic law enforcement agencies could be adopted.
When a State is a member of the UN and fails to surrender an international criminal suspect stemming from a UN resolution a situation arises wherein by virtue of its membership it must comply with UN Security Council decisions under Art. 25. In effect, a State’s implied consent to be bound by those decisions would logically extend to arresting an international criminal located within its borders, where absent that State’s cooperation to arrest, would create an overlapping jurisdictional basis for STF law enforcement functions, at which point it would intervene.
The basis for this overlapping jurisdictional basis can be traced to joint police and cross border operations, where police officers from State A might participate in domestic police operations in State B with its consent. Generally, those types of operations involve placing the foreign State’s police officers under the control of the home State, where the operation is carried out.
If we apply this situation in the context of a non-cooperative State refusing to arrest an international suspect stemming from a UN resolution, the implied consent to be bound by Security Council decisions under Art. 25 would nevertheless operate as an overlapping jurisdictional basis – absent the participation of the non-cooperative State’s domestic law enforcement – because of its refusal to arrest the suspect. Therefore, the Special Task Force would be acting unilaterally to execute the arrest of the fugitive.
In those limited situations, the intervention into a non-cooperative UN member State could be viewed as a temporary suspension of the sovereign territory continuum, which would collapse during the actual STF intervention, and contract to its principle sovereign state on execution of the arrest; thus, minimizing the intrusion into that State’s domestic affairs pertaining to law enforcement functions.
As such, an overlapping jurisdictional basis for STF law enforcement functions would be in conformity with Articles 1, 25 and 103 of the UN Charter.
If domestic criminal justice systems operated without any law enforcement mechanism to arrest suspects, there would be few criminal trials, much less any sentences. In the case of al- Bashir, he has brazenly made a mockery of international justice while attending public events in defiance of the serious crimes he has been charged with.
Investigating crimes committed in a non-cooperative State’s jurisdiction is plagued with problems. Without a means to enforce a warrant, the likelihood of bringing those accused of serious crimes to justice borders on wishful thinking. Yet it does not have to be this way, since the UN Security Council has the power to create a responsive and tactical Special Task Force to enforce international criminal law.
The ICC’s present method of enforcement is built on soft power dependent on a State’s cooperation. But for those States that are not parties to the ICC, they have no obligation to surrender an accused.
In 1993, the UN Security Council authorized arresting and detaining Somali militiamen for attacks directed against UN personnel. Therefore, a mandate for international enforcement is certainly within the reach of the UN Security Council and would ensure criminals like al-Bashir are brought to justice.
It is time for all UN members to step up to the responsibility of international law enforcement, because it goes to the very heart of restoring and maintaining international peace and security, which absent such enforcement leaves the door wide open for criminals like al-Bashir to move about freely, while making a mockery of the notion of international criminal justice.
Every UN member owes it to their citizens to endorse such an enforcement model, as to continue to ignore the issue is a travesty for all victims of serious crimes.
The Special Task Force represents a cutting edge unit capable of inserting into any conflict region of the world. It is exactly what is needed in an era where war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are rapidly taking root across the globe.
1 See generally, Preamble of Rome Statute affirming “that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.” And Article 5 of the Rome Statute covers crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, such as, (a) the crime of genocide; (b) crimes against humanity; (c) war crimes; and (d) the crime of aggression (not yet in force).
2 International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
3 The ICC is a treaty based international criminal court contingent upon a State’s consent. However, non-party States have no obligation to surrender nationals accused of crimes, as treaties generally only purport to bind a State when it has ratified the treaty.
6 See Rome Statute Art 86 (General Obligation to Cooperate) and Art. 89 (Surrender of persons to the Court).
8 United States, China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey have not ratified the Rome Treaty and are therefore not bound by its Articles.
9 Art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute.
12 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations (Art. 85 – “The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession by States or by Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia.”).
13 See UN Resolution 1593 referring the atrocities committed in Dafur to the ICC, in which an arrest warrant was issued against Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir in 2009.
16 Section 232, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
17 See South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, Schedule 1, Parts 1, 2 & 3.
19 Libya v. United States 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 114 (April 14) at para. 42.
22 There is nothing under the Rome Statute preventing the ICC or OTP to contract with other organizations, including major police agencies specializing in complex investigations, such as, the FBI, Scotland Yard, RCMP, Interpol, among others.
23 See Herve Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Press Conference dated February 6, 2013 (stating “I would mention the deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for surveillance purpose in the Kivus, which was given an okay by the Security Council and that certainly will improve our situational awareness and I am sure will exert some deterrent over all those people who move around with bad intentions in that particular area.”), available at https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/articles/USG%20Ladsous.PC.transcript.060213.final.rtf.pdf&gt;.
24 Art. 63(1) of the Rome Statute stating, “The accused shall be present during the trial.” The word “shall” makes this condition mandatory. Cf. to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon where trials in absentia are permitted under the Lebanese judicial system.
25. Raymond De Goijer is an international human rights lawyer based in the Netherlands. This section draws from his suggestion of a dual IHR and HRL model, so when the Special Task Force is operating in a conflict region, Rules of Engagement would be observed by separating combatants from non-combatants. But when STF is operating outside of armed conflict, human rights norms would be observed.
26. International humanitarian law is a set of rules that regulates armed conflict while separating combatants from non-combatants.
27. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (October 2, 1995).
28. Covers conflicts between those groups competing for power within a State when the government is not a party or has ceased to exist, or in civil wars where rebel forces do not exercise territorial control or do not have a formal command structure.
29. Applies to a conflict between a State’s armed forces and rebels or dissident factions with the borders of that State.
30. Omar al-Bashir; Joseph Kony; Vincette Otti; Ahmed Haroun; Ali Kushayb; Abdel Rahim Hussein; Sylvestre Mudacumura; Walter Borasa; Okot Odhiambo (believed to have died); and Raska Lukwiya (died in 2006).

References: Art. 25
 Art. 7
 Art. 2
 Art. 3
 Art. 25
 Art. 25
 Art 86
 Art. 89
 Art. 13
 v. 
 Art. 63
 v.