Source: https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/joint/links/articles/lape.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:15:25+00:00

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Increased opportunities for collaborative efforts have developed during the tenure of the Copyright Act of 1976 in fields such as scientific research, the computer industry, and the entertainment industry. [FN3] In particular, interest in and use of computer-mediated collaboration has grown within the past decade. [FN4] Such computer-mediated collaboration includes forms such as video conferencing, desktop conferencing, and electronic mail applications. The growth of collaborative behaviors, combined with judicial restriction in the scope of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, [FN5] increase the significance of joint work doctrine under the Copyright Act.
This Article addresses the creation of joint works under the current Copyright Act, focusing on the courts' restrictive view of joint works. We turn then to a specific context, the Internet, to examine the impact of the use of express language reflecting intent regarding future use of transmitted material. Part II of this Article traces the history of joint work doctrine prior to the 1976 Copyright Act. Part III examines the courts' treatment of joint works under the 1976 Act. Finally, Part IV analyzes the effect of the presence and absence of express language regarding future use of matter communicated via the Internet.
It has been asserted that the doctrine of joint authorship under United States law owes its origins to Maurel v. Smith, [FN11] a 1915 case decided by Judge Learned Hand. [FN12] Learned Hand himself created that impression in Maurel by noting that he had "been able to find strangely little law regarding the rights of joint authors" and by relying on only one joint works case, an 1871 British case. [FN13] However, nineteenth-century judicial opinions show that courts assumed that joint authorship could be created, although their opinions did not specify how. [FN14] For example, nineteenth-century opinions refer to parties as joint authors or report allegations of joint authorship. [FN15] Thus, nineteenth-century parties were treated as joint authors by both the parties themselves and the courts.
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., [FN36] the Second Circuit's partial reliance on the parties' lack of intent to be joint authors in order to conclude that a finding of no joint authorship was likely, is only slightly more illuminating. [FN37] After a very brief discussion, the court concluded that the "matter is subject to further exploration at the trial," but would not bar a preliminary injunction. [FN38] The Second Circuit apparently believed that the 12th Street Rag doctrine, criticism of which the court noted, was necessary for a finding that the television program at issue was a joint work. [FN39] In fact, joint authorship could have been found in Gilliam under Marks, since the writers had intended, at the time they wrote the script, that it would be embodied with other contributions in a single work, the television program. [FN40] Further, the contract provision that the script writers would "retain all rights in the script not granted in the agreement," used by the court as evidence that "the parties did not consider themselves joint authors," in fact functioned much more directly as an agreement by the television producer to assign any joint authorship rights it might have, other than those specified in the agreement, to the script writers. [FN41] Precursors under the 1909 Act to the requirement of intent to be joint authors appear to be limited to the brief and ambiguous discussions in Picture Music and Gilliam.
The picture of the definition of a joint work as of the adoption of the 1976 Act, then, is one of a doctrine relatively recently developed, with the definition expanding beyond the tolerance of the courts and Congress, but with little in the way of precursors to the limits on joint works recently imposed by courts. Congress proceeded in 1976, in defining a joint work as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole," [FN42] to 1) explicitly reject the possibility of requiring inseparable contributions; [FN43] 2) reject case law permitting intent for a larger work to be formulated later and by one other than the first contributor; and 3) agree with case law permitting joint authors to work apart and at different times so long as there was intent to contribute to one work. [FN44] Thus, Congress struck a middle ground. We turn next to the courts' treatment of joint works under the 1976 Act.
In examining cases decided under the 1976 Act, we find that courts generally show hostility to the joint work doctrine. [FN45] This hostility manifests itself in a variety of ways: the language in which joint work doctrine is discussed in judicial opinions; the subordination of joint work doctrine to the work-made-for-hire doctrine; conclusory findings that contributions have not properly merged; and narrow definitions of a joint work adopted by courts.
Hostility to joint work doctrine is also apparent in conclusory and insupportable statements made by some courts to the effect that the parties' contributions have not, in fact, properly merged, [FN62] or that the parties did not intend merger. [FN63] For example, where a client made a "thumbnail sketch" of the desired floor plan for an architect, the Eleventh Circuit stated in MGB Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc. [FN64] that there was no evidence that it was the intent of either party for the sketch to become part of the finished plans. [FN65] One wonders why a client would produce such a sketch, if not to have it incorporated in the final plans, or why an architect would agree to take the job, if he had no intention of producing a plan to the client's specifications. Could the court have been failing to distinguish between any copyrightable material contained in the sketch, which would be incorporated in the final plan, and the paper the sketch was drawn on, which would not?
Most significantly, the joint work doctrine has been treated grudgingly in that some courts have defined a joint work more narrowly than required by the statutory language and its legislative history. Section 101 defines a joint work simply as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." [FN66] Thus, the statutory language requires only that each contributor intend that her contribution merge into a whole work, [FN67] and does not specify what the nature of that contribution must be. [FN68] The legislative history expands on the statutory definition by clarifying that joint authors need not work at the same time or together, but does not require, or even support, the narrower definitions adopted by some courts. [FN69] This judicial restriction of the joint work doctrine has been accomplished by making two adjustments to the statutory definition of a joint work. These adjustments deal respectively with the state of mind of the joint authors and with the nature of their contributions. Courts have narrowed the scope of joint work doctrine by: 1) requiring intent on the part of the creators of a work that they be joint authors and joint owners, rather than simply intent that their contributions be merged; and 2) requiring that each joint author make a copyrightable, or even more than a copyrightable, contribution.
Imposition of a requirement of intent to be joint authors results at times in overly limiting findings of joint works because in some genuine collaborations, one party did not regard the other as a co-author or intend for the other to own an interest in the resulting work. For instance, this appears to have been the case in Weissmann v. Freeman, decided by the Second Circuit. [FN98] Due to that court's requirement of an intent for joint authorship (that is, joint ownership), evidenced by joint credit, the court found that two scientists' collaboration on a joint work over a period of five years had terminated in 1985 when one scientist made additional changes to the work and placed on that most recent version her own name alone. [FN99] Had the court required only the parties' intent for her latest contributions to merge with the prior contributions of both parties, that standard would have been easily satisfied, since both parties expected additional versions of the syllabus (a paper reviewing past research on a given topic to be used as a handout at a lecture) to be prepared by one or the other of them. [FN100] The scientists in Weissmann had been passing the syllabus back and forth for five years making changes and additions to it. [FN101] The circuit court's finding that the latest version was a derivative work prepared by one of the prior joint authors was made possible by its imposition of a requirement that both parties intend that they share ownership. [FN102] The court relied on one scientist's use of her own name alone on the syllabus in 1985 to find that she lacked the intention for the work to be joint. [FN103] The court thus put it in the power of one joint author to unilaterally exclude the other from that status.
Similarly, the requirement of intent for joint authorship produced an overly restrictive concept of joint works in a case dealing with collaboration between a playwright and an actress. The play at issue in Childress v. Taylor may well have constituted a sufficiently genuine collaborative product for joint work status, since both the playwright and actress intended their contributions to merge, and since the actress's contributions may have satisfied the applicable standard. [FN104] The Second Circuit expressly did not decide whether the actress's contributions of selection of facts, scenes, and characters to be included in the play satisfied the copyrightability standard enunciated by the court, because the playwright did not intend that the actress receive credit or co-own the play and, therefore, did not intend joint authorship. [FN105] Should the playwright's failure to regard the actress as a co-author deny the actress that status if, in fact, she was one?
One contributor's unilateral intent that the other not own an interest in a work should not prevent finding a joint work, assuming appropriate contributions from both and the intent to merge their contributions. If it is necessary to exclude from joint authorship status certain contributors, such as the case of typical editors, [FN106] who may satisfy the requirements of sufficient contribution and intent to merge, a safer basis for such exclusion would be that neither contributor intends one of them to be a joint author.
In addition to narrowing the intent requirement for the creation of a joint work, some courts have restricted the scope of joint work doctrine beyond that provided by the Copyright Act with respect to the nature of a joint author's contribution. [FN111] Neither the 1976 Act nor its legislative history makes reference to the type of contribution required for joint authorship. [FN112] More recently, however, legislation was proposed, but not enacted, which would have inserted the word "original" into the definition of joint works, thus requiring that each joint author make an original contribution. [FN113] This bill was apparently intended to require that each contribution be both qualitatively copyrightable (i.e. constitute expression) and quantitatively copyrightable (i.e. contain sufficient expression to sustain a copyright). [FN114] The bill, which was never reported out of committee, also required a signed writing for the creation of certain joint works, and would have amended the definition of works made for hire, as well as that of joint works. [FN115] Thus, Congress' abandonment of this amendment does little to clarify Congress' views regarding the nature of the contribution required from a joint author.
In spite of the absence of any restriction explicitly stated in the statute or legislative history, most courts that have considered the nature of the necessary contribution have required that each contribution be independently copyrightable. [FN120] To the limited extent that the courts have attempted to supply authority supporting this requirement, they have done so by arguing that the term "author" in the Copyright Act or the Constitution implies a requirement of originality, so that each joint author's contribution must be a copyrightable work of authorship. [FN121] Certainly, in the case of a sole author, the requirement of originality has been supported by finding that the term "authors" in the Constitution implies satisfaction of a standard of originality. [FN122] On the other hand, it has been argued that a constitutional requirement of originality cannot apply to all uses of the term "author" in the Copyright Act, since the employer, as author of a work made for hire, need not have supplied any of the originality herself. [FN123] However, a distinction can perhaps be drawn between a joint author and an employer as author of a work made for hire, because in the latter case, the employer takes the copyright vicariously for the employee who did create a protectible work. In the case of a joint author, there is no one for whom a joint author can take the copyright vicariously, unless it be his joint author. Nonetheless, the argument that either the Constitution or the Copyright Act implies a requirement of originality for each joint author, although not illogical or unreasonable, is inconclusive.
It should be noted that the copyrightability standard for joint authorship does not by its terms appear to require much, if anything, more, quantitatively, than the more than de minimis standard. [FN128] The standards for copyrightability set forth by the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone. Service Co. [FN129] are low. [FN130] Indeed, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity." [FN131] Thus, the standard for copyright protection enunciated in Feist may be no higher, quantitatively, than the more than de minimis standard for joint authorship. The main impact of the copyrightability standard for joint works, in theory at least, is to exclude claims based upon the contribution of ideas alone.
A similarly questionable result was reached in Balkin v. Wilson, [FN137] in which the district court endorsed the copyrightability standard, but granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of infringement. [FN138] The court granted this motion in spite of the fact that the defendant had contributed "precise technical specifications" to the songs at issue, that the parties had discussed together the "content" of the songs before their composition, and that the plaintiff described himself as the "mechanic" of the songs and the defendant as the "architect." [FN139] Although the defendant did not claim to have written "a single note of the music or a single word of the lyrics," could not his contributions of technical specifications, content, and structure be copyrightable? [FN140] Thus, the court may well have in fact required more than a copyrightable contribution. Consider also Cabrera v. Teatro del Sesenta, Inc., [FN141] in which the District of Puerto Rico found that the contributions of four collaborators to a play were not sufficient to support joint authorship because they were not "tangible." [FN142] The court rejected the collaborators' contributions despite the court's previous conclusion that their participation was "real, effective and crucial throughout the writing of the script," [FN143] and despite the court's ultimate conclusion that its interpretation of the law "may have produced what might be considered an unfair result." [FN144] By "tangible," the court appears to mean contributions fixed in a tangible medium by the collaborators themselves. [FN145] The court thus made a requirement beyond copyrightability, by requiring that each collaborator physically fix his contribution, rather than orally communicate his contribution to another collaborator for fixation.
How do serial collaborations fare given the restrictions imposed by courts on joint work doctrine? The courts' hostility to the doctrine, and their use of conclusory findings that contributions have not merged, will affect serial collaborations, but not in a fashion different from their effect on any other purported joint work. [FN152] The subordination of joint work doctrine to work-made-for-hire doctrine prevents finding a joint work in many serial collaborations, such as a studio musician adding an accompaniment or a film editor rearranging footage. However, this subordination will presumably have little impact in the Internet setting, where a recipient could rarely be construed as having been hired by the author of transmitted material. [FN153] The second and subsequent contributors to serial collaborations may well make independently copyrightable contributions, as required by most courts recently considering the issue, although the manipulation of this standard to avoid joint authorship may prevent any given serial collaboration from being found a joint work. [FN154] But it is in the courts' requirement of intent to be joint authors that we find the greatest potential bar to joint authorship in the case of a serial collaboration. It is this question which we now examine in some detail.
Where a serial collaboration is alleged to be a joint work, but a joint work is not found, how is the resulting work to be classified? [FN155] Interestingly, courts rejecting the possibility of a joint work do not always consider the alternatives. [FN156] If the intent requirement for a joint work stated in the Copyright Act is applied (i.e., the intent for contributions to merge), [FN157] a serial collaboration may be a joint work if the first author produced her work with the intent that others might add to it. If, on the other hand, courts require an intent to be joint authors, a serial collaboration will be a joint work only where there is evidence that both authors intended co-ownership, such as express statements, copyright registration consented to in both names or joint credit consented to by both. [FN158] Thus, where intent to be joint authors is required, a serial collaboration is less likely to be found a joint work. Where a serial collaboration is not a joint work, it is either an infringing derivative work or a licensed derivative work, assuming sufficient use of material from the first work and the absence of fair use and other statutory exemptions. [FN159] In the absence of an express license by the first author, the question of infringement by the second author will turn on the existence of conduct by the first author creating an implied license. [FN160] Without such a license, the second contributor to the serial collaboration has infringed.
The foregoing scenario has increased in importance with the rapid growth of the Internet in recent years. [FN161] The Internet particularly implicates serial collaborations because it provides widespread availability of material protected by copyright, because it provides the material in a form in which it can be easily manipulated and adapted, [FN162] and because a culture of free use has prevailed in some Internet contexts. [FN163] A handful of judicial decisions have confirmed that copyright infringement can occur via the Internet, [FN164] and if the recommendations of the Working Group on Intellectual Property's final report are ultimately enacted by Congress in some form, liability for transmission via the Internet will be that much clearer. [FN165] A case in point may help illustrate the significance of serial collaboration via the Internet. In 1994, the Estate of Elvis Presley demanded that the creator of an Elvis Presley Home Page stop transmitting a "Cyber Graceland Tour" containing Elvis Presley songs and photographs of Graceland in which the estate held the copyright. [FN166] If the creator of the tour received the sound clips or photographs via the Internet, this was a good example of Internet serial collaboration. A first author distributed material via the Internet and a second author contributed the tour arrangement to produce the final work, which, assuming sufficient use of material and the absence of exemptions, is either an infringing or impliedly licensed derivative work, or a joint work.
Where no express language regarding future use is included in a message to a listserv, which appears to be true in the vast majority of cases, any license for making a derivative work or expression of the intent required for a joint work would have to be implied from the circumstances. It has been suggested that contributors to listservs do expect future use of their works. [FN171] If the expectation on listservs is that others will copy, in whole or in part, to comment or to make additions or other changes in the case of a creative work, this expectation could be construed as either an implied license for such use, or as the intent required for a joint work. As between these two outcomes, which is more advantageous to the first author? If the resulting work is a joint work, the first author can use and license that work, and is entitled to an accounting from the second author for any profits. [FN172] If, on the other hand, the first author is found to have granted an implied license for creation of a derivative work, she receives none of the above benefits. Consider here the impact of requiring, for creation of a joint work, on the one hand, intent for contributions to merge, and on the other hand, intent to be joint authors. [FN173] An expectation that one's contribution to a listserv might well be modified by another list subscriber, together with the decision to make the contribution under those circumstances, could be construed as intent for the contributions to merge. Such an expectation is most unlikely, however, to be construed as an intent to be joint authors together with some unknown individual. Thus, under these circumstances, requiring an intent for contributions to merge would permit the joint work outcome, whereas requiring an intent to be joint authors would probably preclude that result. Bear in mind that finding a joint work is more beneficial to the first author than finding an implied license for a derivative work. Of course, in the absence of an expectation that others will modify postings to listservs, any such modification would, assuming sufficient use and the lack of an applicable exemption, constitute an infringing derivative work.
We now examine the impact of the express language regarding future use which I found included in messages on the five listservs. Among the express language regarding future use were waivers of copyright, [FN174] such as "Unless otherwise indicated, I make no claim of copyright in messages I write for transmission over the Internet" and "No copyright claimed, reproduce at will should you inexplicably care to." [FN175] Such waivers appear intended, and should be effective, to place the material in the public domain. [FN176] Note that the first waiver quoted above was followed immediately by, "I hereby grant permission to all others to reproduce, retransmit or copy such messages, subject only to the request to retain the signature line or to give appropriate credit for the use of any such material." [FN177] This addendum is inconsistent with a waiver, since if there is no copyright, no permission is needed, and thus the addendum renders the waiver, as a whole, ambiguous. [FN178] Where a waiver is effective, and the material is therefore in the public domain, any subsequent work employing that material would be a derivative work based on public domain antecedents, and would not be a joint work.
Some express language on the five listservs regarding future use was ambiguous as to whether the intent was for reuse limited to unmodified uses of a work in its entirety, or for any reuse including modification. Consider the following four examples: 1) "I grant permission for all my postings to this list to be forwarded to other lists and freely circulated on the nets." 2) "I hereby give permission for the use of any material contained in this message but ask that the user give me appropriate credit." 3) "I also should have said that anyone can feel free to re-post elsewhere for non-commercial purposes. Attribution is appreciated, but not necessary." 4) "Feel free to spread it far and wide, but remember you saw it here first." [FN179] If such language is construed to include intent for modifications, the expression of that intent could constitute either a license to make derivative works, or expression of intent for the author's contribution to merge with others' contributions. The result in the latter case, assuming sufficient contributions, could therefore be a joint work. However, such language does not express intent to be joint authors, and thus, where intent to be joint authors is required, no joint work could result.
Unambiguous language prohibiting modifications was less commonly employed on the five listservs I examined. Language such as, "This message may be freely distributed, but only if unmodified and not used for commercial purposes," [FN180] precludes the possibility of a joint work under either intent requirement, and, assuming sufficient use and the absence of exemptions, renders any derivative work infringing. Even more rare on the listservs I examined was language expressly prohibiting any use. [FN181] Such language would, of course, preclude a joint work under either intent requirement, and leave any derivative work an infringement, again assuming sufficient use and the absence of exemptions. The scarcity of language expressly prohibiting any use or prohibiting modifications offers some support for the view that listservs are an environment in which creators do expect future use of their works, which has implications, as discussed above, for the vast majority of cases, in which no express language regarding future use is employed.
In sum, we have seen that serial collaborations are less likely to be found joint works under the courts' current requirement of intent to be joint authors, than under a requirement of intent for contributions to merge. [FN182] Where, as may be true at least in some contexts over the Internet, there is an expectation of future use, the requirement of intent to be joint authors is disadvantageous to the first author, because it will probably produce a finding of an implied license for derivative works, rather than a finding of a joint work. This result may be one more argument, in addition to those adduced in Part III above, against requiring an intent to be joint authors.
What advice for users of the Internet does the preceding analysis of express language used on the five sample listservs suggest? Waivers of copyright, in order to be effective, should be unambiguous. Where the author's intent is to permit only certain uses, those uses should be enumerated. Where reproduction, whether in whole or in part, is to be permitted, but no other modification, such modification should be expressly excluded. Finally, in a context such as the Internet, in which material may be widely available and readily adapted, and in which a culture of free use may prevail, it is important for authors to expressly state their intentions with respect to future use.
In constructing a definition of joint works, Congress chose, from the precedents available to it in 1976, the requirement that putative joint authors have the intention, at the time of production, that their creations contribute to one work. The limitations imposed by courts beginning in the late 1980s on the definition of a joint work, in the form of requirements of intent to be joint authors and independently copyrightable contributions, were not then an integral part of the judicial definition of joint works. These limitations form part of a narrow view of joint works taken by courts under the current Copyright Act. This restrictive view has led, in at least a handful of cases, to decisions that have denied creators who should be joint authors that status. We may expect to see more such cases in a variety of contexts; in particular, it is not unlikely that the Internet will provide a fruitful source of such controversies. Based on a limited investigation performed by the author, it appears that the failure of contributors to the Internet to expressly state their intentions regarding future use of their works will contribute to such conflicts. Finally, to the extent that intent for future use is shared by Internet contributors, a requirement of intent to be joint authors benefits the second author of serial collaborations at the expense of the first.

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