Source: https://www.court-martial-ucmj.com/category/uci/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:49:13+00:00

Document:
Seems to me that the best practice is to raise any possible UCI claims prior to trial on the merits–depending on when you learn of the alleged UCI.
The general rule is the defense does not waive UCI by failing to raise it at trial. Id. at 193. This rule, however, is not absolute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has distinguished UCI in the accusative phase (e.g., involving the preferral, forwarding, and referral of charges), from UCI in the adjudicative phase (e.g., interference with witnesses, judges, members, and counsel). United States v. Weasler, 43 M.J. 15, 17-18 (C.A.A.F. 1995). In making this distinction, the CAAF concluded claims of UCI during the accusative phase can be waived. Id. at 19 (“Where there is coercion in the preferral process, ‘the charges are treated as unsigned and unsworn,’ but the ‘failure to object’ constitutes waiver of the issue.”). The court has also found waiver of defects in the forwarding process if not challenged at trial. Id. (citing United States v. Hamilton, 41 M.J. 32, 36 (C.M.A. 1994)).
Having concluded referral is part of the accusatorial stage, we examine appellant’s knowledge of the facts at the time and whether appellant was in some way precluded from raising UCI at trial. “If command influence is known, or reasonably could be known in either the accusatorial stage or the selection process, failure to raise the issue constitutes waiver.” See United States v. Upshaw, 49 M.J. 111, 114 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (Crawford, J., concurring) (citing Weasler, 43 M.J. at 17).
This Court unequivocally endorses the Supreme Court’s observation that “[f]ederal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that … legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988).
United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 253 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
When the Congress, the media, and commanders called for a crackdown on military sexual assaults, the fear among the defense bar was the specter of unlawful command influence. Most of the cases have focussed on pretrial and post-trial. But the biggest fear was realized in United States v. Schloff, a case I did at trial and on appeal.
“At the beginning of deliberations on findings of appellant’s court-martial, the president and senior ranking member of the panel, [COL JW], made a statement to the effect that based on the political climate, the Army could not seem weak or soft in dealing with sexual harassment or assault. He also asked a question to the effect of, ‘How does the Chief of Staff of the Army’s current emphasis on sexual harassment affect the findings and our decision in this matter?’ [COL AM] made some unspecified but similar comments or comments indicating agreement with [COL JW].
The CAAF took the following action last Friday.
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL BY HIS COUNSEL FAILING TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE IN THE PREFERRAL PROCESS.
C.A.A.F. seems to have this definition, among several, of what clearly erroneous means.
At least one court has defined the clearly-erroneous standard by stating that it must be "more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must … strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish." Parts and Electric Motors Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
The family of a sailor slain in Newport News is pressing the Navy to court-martial and dishonorably discharge the fellow sailor convicted of killing her.
Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., has already weighed in, telling the Navy last month that the sailor, Darren W. Mackie, 22, should be dishonorably discharged "at the very least," which the Navy hasn’t pursued.
Here's a link to NMCCA's unpublished opinion in Chessani, which it released today. Bottom line up front: the Government's appeal is denied.

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