Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1693386.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 01:28:23+00:00

Document:
Henry J. WEILAND, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant–Appellee.
Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges, and J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge. John S. Lopatto III (argued), Law Offices, Washington, D.C.; Richard A. Voll, Law Offices, Ridgewood, NJ, for Plaintiff–Appellant. Robert Jon Hendricks (argued) and Larry M. Lawrence, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Los Angeles, CA; Donald L. Havermann, and David R. Broderdorf, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C., for Defendant–Appellee.
This case involves a difficult question of statutory construction that may currently apply only to a class of one. Although somewhat uncomfortable with the conclusion we reach, we hold that Plaintiff Henry Weiland, who turned 60 six days before the FAA's Age 60 Rule was abrogated by the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act (“FTEPA”), does not qualify for one of the FTEPA's exceptions to non-retroactivity. The district court reached the same result, and its decision is affirmed.
Id. § 44729(e)(1)(A). The FTEPA also contains a “protection for compliance” provision that immunizes Part 121 air carriers from liability for actions taken in conformance with the FTEPA or the prior Age 60 Rule. Id. § 44729(e)(2).
Weiland was a check airman when he turned 60 on December 7, 2007. American's Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) defined a check airman “as a pilot who is on Check Airman salary for the month.” As pleaded in his complaint, Weiland's duties as a joint check airman/pilot included evaluating pilots in land-based simulators and in the air during cockpit “line checks,” and piloting aircraft.
The Age 60 Rule was in effect on December 7 when Weiland turned 60 and American ceased scheduling him for active duty. Weiland requested to be reinstated in lieu of the FTEPA, and received a response from American on December 24, 2007. American explained that it interpreted § 44729(e)(1)(A) to not apply to Weiland, and accordingly he would remain “inactive” and be retired on his “Normal Retirement Date” pursuant to the Retirement PlanJanuary 1, 2008. Weiland filed a charge of discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) on December 23, 2008, and filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on September 27, 2010. The district court below granted American's motion to dismiss on February 18, 2011, which Weiland timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo the district court's granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). “We accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Zadrozny v. Bank of New York Mellon, 720 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir.2013) (internal citation omitted).
Weiland's complaint does plausibly plead that he was “in the employment of” American on December 13. Although undefined by the FTEPA, the plain meaning of “employment” is commonly understood as receiving compensation in return for work. Here, Weiland was employed by American on December 13 as an inactive check airman/pilot. American did not terminate Weiland's employment on December 7; it only ceased scheduling him for check airman and pilot duties pursuant to the FAA's Age 60 Rule then in effect. His retirement date was not until January 1, 2008 pursuant to American's policy. The record is unclear when Weiland received his final paycheck, but we note that the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board found Weiland's “end of employment date” was after December 24, 2007 for purposes of calculating his unemployment insurance. That finding provides further support for concluding that Weiland was employed by American on December 13. Moreover, presumably he continued to be eligible for employee benefits provided by American.
Section 44729(e)(1)(A) does not simply say, however, that a person must be “in the employment” of an air carrier on the date of the enactment of the FTEPA in order to qualify for the exception to non-retroactivity. It says that the person must be “in the employment of that air carrier in such operations.” (emphasis added). “Such operations” refers back to the language “covered operations” used in § 44729(e)(1), and “covered operations,” in turn, is defined in § 44729(b) as “operations under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.” Weiland could not have been lawfully engaged in any such operations on December 13, 2007—the effective date of the FTEPA—because he was ineligible to do so under the FAA's Age 60 Rule when he turned 60 on December 7. On December 13, 2007, he was employed by American as an inactive check airman.
“No person who has attained 60 years of age before the date of enactment of this section may serve as a pilot for an air carrier engaged in covered operations unless ․ such person is in the employment of that air carrier in such operations on such date of enactment as a required flight deck crew member.” 49 U.S.C. § 44729(e)(1)(A).
Statutory construction is frequently not easy. For that reason I set forth the sentence we are construing at the top of this dissent. In this case, however, a plain reading of the statutory language would seem to provide a clear answer to the question before us. Henry Weiland was “in the employment” of American Airlines on December 13, 2007. American Airlines was at the time engaged in part 121 operations, so that it was “in such operations” for purposes of § 44729(e)(1)(A). Weiland was a pilot and check airman, and a pilot, as the majority acknowledges, certainly is a “required flight deck crew member.” Weiland was thus “in the employment of [an air carrier engaged in covered operations] on such date of enactment as a required flight deck crew member.” He needs no more to prevail.
The majority argues that Weiland could not have been employed “in such operations” because he “could not have been lawfully engaged in any such operations on December 13, 2007.” The phrase “in such operations” in § 44729(e)(1)(A), however, modifies “air carrier,” not “person.” By “such operations” Congress referred to “covered operations,” which are in turn defined as “operations under part 121.” See 49 U.S.C. § 44729(b), (e)(1). Part 121 operations are the “operations of each person who holds or is required to hold an Air Carrier Certificate or Operating Certificate under part 119.” 14 C.F.R. § 121.1(a). Air Carrier Certificates or Operating Certificates are held by airlines, not by the individual pilots employed by airlines. It is thus American Airlines, not Weiland, who holds an “Air Carrier Certificate,” and it follows that the only entity that may properly be said to engage in “part 121 operations” is American Airlines, not Weiland. This common sense conclusion is reinforced by part 119, which defines by reference the scope of part 121 operations, and which “applies to each person operating or intending to operate civil aircraft ․ [a]s an air carrier or commercial operator, or both, in air commerce .” 14 C.F.R. § 119.1(a)(1). A pilot employed by an airline does not himself “operate civil aircraft as an air carrier or commercial operator.” The airline does. In sum, the statutory and regulatory scheme make it clear that the phrase “in such operations” in § 44729(e)(1)(A) qualifies “air carrier” and not “person” (the airline's individual pilot).
Even were we to assume that “in such operations” refers to Weiland, however, that section does not say that in order to qualify for the exception a person must be actually “engaged,” or even “able to lawfully engage,” in covered operations on the date of enactment. It only says that such person must be “in the employment of” the airline in covered operations on that date, and all parties agree that Weiland was in the employment of American Airlines on the relevant date. Aside from the Rule of 60, there are many reasons why an otherwise qualified pilot in the employment of an airline may not be able to lawfully operate a commercial aircraft on a given day. For example, he may have flown on a number of days or hours the preceding day or days that required him to be off duty on the day in question. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 117.5, 117.23, 117.25; see also id. § 91.17(a)(2) (intoxication); id. § 91.17(a)(3) (use of certain drugs). Thus, under the majority's logic, someone who would otherwise qualify for the exception but who happened to be on his “required rest period” on December 13, 2007 would not qualify because, as the majority says, he “could not have been lawfully engaged in any such operations on December 13, 2007.” See 14 C.F.R. § 117.25(a) (“No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may accept assignment to any ․ duty with the certificate holder during any required rest period.”). Similarly, otherwise qualifying pilots taking certain prescription drugs, or who consumed alcohol on December 13, 2007, would not qualify for the exception. See id. § 91.17(a)(2) (“No person may act ․ as a crewmember of a civil aircraft ․ [w]hile under the influence of alcohol.”); id. § 91.17(a)(3) (“No person may act ․ as a crewmember of a civil aircraft ․ [w]hile using any drug that affects the person's faculties in any way contrary to safety.”).
The majority also argues that Weiland was not a “required flight deck crew member” because far from being “required” he was in fact “prohibited from being a ‘flight deck crew member.’ “ The question, however, is not whether Weiland was himself individually required, but whether “pilots,” as a category, are “required.” In fact, under the majority's logic no one in a major airline would probably qualify because it can hardly be said that any individual pilot is truly “required.” Except in exceptional circumstances, there will likely be a replacement reasonably available. Furthermore, as with the majority's first argument, it follows from the majority's reasoning that someone who was disqualified from lawfully operating a commercial aircraft on December 13, 2007 for any of the multiple reasons that I mentioned above would not be a “required flight deck crew member” and would not qualify for the exception in § 44729(e)(1)(A).
I doubt that is what Congress intended, and it is certainly not what it wrote in the statute. The exception it made for pilots who were 60 as of the date of enactment and employed by the air carrier on that date fits Weiland to a T. I respectfully dissent.
Judge REINHARDT dissented because he would hold that Weiland qualified for the exception in § 44729(e)(1)(A).

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