Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40434:g-r-no-139306-august-29,-2000-maria-mercedes-nery,-et-al-v-gabriel-leyson,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:05:53+00:00

Document:
MARIA MERCEDES NERY, BENJAMIN NERY, MARIA PAZ NERY, APOLINAR NERY and ROBERTO FRANCISCO NERY — all represented by LICINIUS ABADIANO and LOURDES DEL RIO ESPIRITU, Petitioners, v. GABRIEL LEYSON, JOSEFINA LEYSON POBLETE, FE LEYSON, ESPERANZA LEYSON, CARIDAD LEYSON, ESTATES OF DECEASED Spouses JOSE LEYSON and LOURDES VELEZ, Respondents.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 10, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
"The [Petitioners] Maria Mercedes, Benjamin, Maria Paz, Apolinar and Roberto Francisco, all surnamed Nery[,] claim that they . . . are the children of . . . Mercedes del Rio, who died during World War II. They are also heirs of their maternal grandmother Agatona del Corro, who as a widow, died in 1976. When Mercedes del Rio died, she left a share in the parcel of land in Lapu-Lapu City covered by O.C.T. No. RO-0083 in the name of Agatona del Corro, Et. Al. The land is being managed by [petitioners’] uncle Eduardo del Rio and Lourdes del Rio Espiritu.
"They therefore filed this case [docketed as Civil Case No. 2379-L] seeking the declaration of nullity of T.C.T. No. 119747 in the name of the Leysons and of the judicial proceedings in Civil Case No. [R-]8646.
" [Respondents’] evidence, on the other hand, show that the land in dispute, Lot No. 73 of Cadastral Survey of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) is titled in their names under T.C.T. No. 19747 which was derived from O.C.T. No. 15615. Appearing in the said title is the name of their father Jose S. Leyson who acquired the land through purchase from Rosario Miranda. They were in possession of the property until 1963 when Agatona del Corro and her children took over the possession of the same. Lot No. 73 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) covered by T.C.T. No. 19747 became the subject of litigation in Civil Case No. R-8646 entitled ‘Lourdes Velez Leyson, Josefina Leyson Poblete, Fe Leyson, Esperanza Leyson, Caridad Leyson and Gabriel Leyson versus Agatona del Corro, Antolin del Rio, Consuelo del Rio, Mercedes del Rio, Socorro del Rio, Lourdes del Rio and Eduardo del Rio. The case was filed on December 2, 1964 before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V.
‘(6)	To pay P2,000.00 representing attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
"Defendants Agatona, Et. Al. appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 45878-R. In its Decision promulgated on March 15, 1976, the appellate court affirmed in all respects the decision appealed from (Exh.’2’ and ‘2-A’).
"For failure of the defendants Agatona del Corro, Et. Al. to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals, the same . . . [became] final and executory on April 10, 1976 as shown by the Entry of Judgment (Exh.’3’ and ‘3-A’).
As earlier stated, the CA denied the petitioners’ appeal.
The petitioners’ action for annulment was filed fifteen years after the above-mentioned judgment had become final on April 10, 1976. The long period of time that had lapsed precluded them from further prosecuting the same issue. Finally, a regional trial court has no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of a co-equal court; jurisdiction in such cases lies in the Court of Appeals.
"1.	Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petitioners’ cause of action was barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 49, Paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court.
The Court, after due deliberation, resolves to deny the Petition.
Petitioners challenge the application to this case of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, arguing that jurisdiction over them was never acquired by the trial court. Barring their action would be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law, they argue.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the trial court in Civil Case No. R-8646 acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants therein including the petitioners because (1) it was the duty of the attorney for the deceased Mercedes del Rio to inform the court of the client’s death, and (2) the attorney represented the same interest as the other defendants — their grandmother, uncles and aunts. Respondents add that petitioners’ failure to raise this defense in the Answer and Amended Answer constituted a waiver of this defense; hence, the latter are estopped from raising it now.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners when they failed to notify the lower court of the death of Mercedes del Rio during the trial of Civil Case R-8646. We disagree. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only in a pending case is the counsel of a party required to inform the court in case the client dies or becomes incapacitated or incompetent. A pending case necessarily implies that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the party who died or became incapacitated or incompetent. Prior to this development, the trial court cannot impose such requirement on the counsel for the defendants; Section 16 of Rule 3 thus finds no application to this case. On the other hand, it is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the complete determination of the action. OCT RO-0083/15615 reveals that Mercedes del Rio was a registered co-owner of the disputed lot, but she was not placed under the jurisdiction of the trial court in Civil Case No. R-8646. Neither were her heirs.
Respondents also posit that the service of summons on the petitioners could be dispensed with, since there is substantial identity between the mother and the siblings of Mercedes del Rio, on the one hand, and the petitioners on the other. The reason for this substantial identity is that the petitioners represent the same interest as the other defendants in Civil Case R-8646. Again, we disagree. True, res judicata is not defeated by a minor difference of parties, as it does not require absolute but only substantial identity of parties. 14 But there is substantial identity only when the "additional" party acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action. 15 This is not so in the present case. Co-owners are not parties inter se in relation to the property owned in common. 16 A subsequent action by a co-heir, who did not join the earlier dismissed action for recovery of property, should not be barred by prior judgment. 17 Neither will conclusiveness of judgment apply because there was no identity of parties.
In view of the foregoing discussion, petitioners should not be bound by the decision in Civil Case No. R-8646. This, however, does not justify the reversal of the assailed Decision. As will now be explained, the petitioners’ action suffers from a fatal defect which prevents their action for annulment from prospering.
The reason why the herein Petition cannot be granted is the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of a co-equal court. Petitioners allege that the decision in Civil Case R-8646 passed upon the validity of OCT RO-0083/15615. Such allegation makes the root of their present action one for annulment of a final judgment. This Court cannot ignore the fact that such action is outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. On this point, the CA ruled, albeit in passing, that." . . the court a quo does not have the jurisdiction to annul the judgment of a regional trial court as jurisdiction thereon is lodged with the Court of Appeals." 18 We sustain the Court of Appeals on this point.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and, for the reasons above-stated, the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
1.	Rollo, pp. 27-32; penned by Justice Salome A. Montoya, Division chairman; concurred in by Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Eloy R. Bello Jr., members.
3.	CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 32.
4.	CA Decision, pp. 1-5; rollo, pp. 27-31.
5.	Presided by Judge Teodoro K. Risos.
7.	RTC Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 26.
8.	This case was deemed submitted for decision on May 10, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the respondents’ Memorandum, signed by Atty. Alicia E. Bathan of Bathan & Associates Law Firm. Petitioners’ Memorandum, signed by Atty. Alan F. Paguia, was filed earlier.
10.	In the 1997 Rules of Court, this provision was renumbered and appears as Rule 39, Section 47.
11.	Casil v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 264, 276, January 28, 1998; Linzag v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 304, 319, June 26, 1998; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239, 256, July 27, 1998.
12.	CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 31.
13.	Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 262 SCRA 623, 630, October 2, 1996; Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 287, 308, October 7, 1998.
14.	Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 580, 586, January 22, 1998; Carlet v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 107; Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 711, 717, September 29, 1997.
15.	Concepcion v. Agana, 268 SCRA 307, 318, February 17, 1997.
16.	Santiago v. J.M. Tuason & Co, 110 Phil. 16, 20, November 23, 1960.
17.	Bancairen v. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 125-126, December 20, 1955.
18.	CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 32.
19.	The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
20.	Encoded as Rule 47 in the 1997 Rules of Court.
21.	Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173, 180-181, January 16, 1998; Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 198, 213, May 19, 1998.

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