Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2014/01/28/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:32:55+00:00

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The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Jones v. Samora on Monday, January 27, 2014.
Recall Election—CRS § 31-10-1307—Ballot Secrecy—Colo. Const. art. VII, § 8—Taylor v. Pile—District Court Error in Voiding Election.
The Supreme Court held that the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the results of a recall election in the Town of Center and ordering a new recall election. The district court interpreted Taylor v. Pile, 39 P.2d 670 (Colo. 1964), as placing a duty on it to void an election in which there was potential for a violation of the ballot secrecy provisions of Colo. Const. art. VII, § 8. The Court determined that the prohibition on “marked ballots” contained in § 8 was not intended to govern the use of detachable numbered stubs on paper ballots; rather, the use of detachable stubs is governed by statutory procedures. Although the election officials did not follow the proper procedures when counting the absentee ballots, their actions did not call into question the fundamental integrity or secrecy of the entire election. Taylor suggests that an election may be voided in a case where the election was conducted without a secret ballot; however, based on its factual findings in this case, the district court erred in declaring this recall election void. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment was reversed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in United States v. Gordon on Monday, January 27, 2014.
On June 5, 2011, Brandi Thaxton called 911 to report an incident of domestic violence which had occurred two days earlier with her boyfriend Shawn Gordon, who had outstanding warrants for his arrest. Thaxton said she and Gordon had been arguing when Gordon grabbed a samurai sword and swung it at her. When officers arrived, they found weapons, including a gun and swords, which they seized.
Gordon was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence found during the warrantless search of his home, most specifically the shotgun. The district court denied the motion. After the motion was denied, Gordon pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of exigent circumstances. One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.
Such an exigency existed in this case. When police arrived, Thaxton was too frightened to leave the basement. She told the officers she was in fear for her life. There were weapons throughout the house in addition to the swords and gun. Further, temporary seizure of the gun was permissible to stabilize the situation and eliminate the risk of immediate harm. Gordon was improperly deprived of his property for only a few minutes−the elapsed time between locking the house and discovering Gordon was a convicted felon−and while he was legitimately in custody. The seizure of the gun was a de minimis intrusion on Gordon’s rights and cannot justify suppression of the shotgun as evidence.
On Monday, January 27, 2014, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two published opinions and one unpublished opinion.
This article originally appeared in the February 2014 issue of The Colorado Lawyer. It is part of a two-part “Point/Counterpoint” series. Click here for the “Counterpoint” article.
Nazi Hermann Goering is on YouTube at his 1946 trial in Nuremburg testifying about the necessity of concentration camps. Charles Manson is on the Internet discussing his 1970 murder trial. F. Lee Bailey’s powerful 1995 cross-examination in the O. J. Simpson trial is on the Web.The thoughtful testimony of Bill Gates is posted from a 1998 video deposition. Bill Clinton’s 1998 attempts to weave through a deposition are uploaded. Andrew Fastow’s admission to Enron fraud in 2006 is posted throughout the Internet. The 2011 video deposition of Tony Hayward, nervous CEO of British Petroleum, also is preserved for us online. And there are thousands of other public court records and depositions available at the click of a few keystrokes.
Court records are public records, particularly after the trial is over. They are reviewed by us, and shared in books, studies, newspapers, television, and the movies. For centuries, these records have been open to the public, and for decades, they have included video exhibits and depositions. Public access is an accepted part of our constitutional plan for an open democracy. That venerable principle is being advanced by citizens who are securing their court files in cases that expose community hazards and then sharing the facts with the public on the Internet.
This practice is a growing pain for those who endanger our safety. Wayward corporations, and the insurance companies who represent them, expect that after trial, the court records of their misconduct will be forgotten, buried in a courthouse cellar, and covered with a sleepy layer of dust. Instead, these records are being uploaded so that the evidence is available to the public. The move is to openness and accountability—two necessary components of a healthy democracy.
People who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials. Judicial proceedings are public rather than private property and the third-party effects that justify the subsidy of the judicial system also justify making records and decisions as open as possible. What happens in the halls of government is presumptively public business. Judges deliberate in private but issue public decisions after public arguments based on public records. . . . Much of what passes between the parties remains out of public sight because discovery materials are not filed with the court. But most portions of discovery that are filed and form the basis of judicial action must eventually be released.
Our courts proclaim that the public has a constitutional right to access court records.
The presumption of public access recognized and promoted by the local rule finds its root in the common law rights of access to judicial proceedings and to inspect judicial records—rights which are “beyond dispute.” . . . The court in Publicker, and other circuit courts of appeal, have gone beyond the undoubted common law right, however, and have found a constitutionally protected right, rooted in the First Amendment, to public access to civil trials.
Hence, the rule creates a presumption that all court records are to be open; it allows a court to limit access in only one instance and for only one purpose (when the parties’ right of privacy outweighs the public’s right to know); and it grants to every member of the public the right to contest the legitimacy of any limited access order.
Public access to court records is founded on the principles of an open democracy.
A presumption of openness inheres in civil trials as in criminal trials. . . . [T]he civil trial, like the criminal trial, plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. . . . [P]ublic access to civil trials enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the fact finding process. It fosters an appearance of fairness, and heightens public respect for the judicial process. It permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process—an essential component in our structure of self-government. Public access to civil trials, no less than criminal trials, plays an important role in the participation and the free discussion of governmental affairs.
A claim that a court file contains extremely personal, private, and confidential matters is generally insufficient to constitute a privacy interest warranting the sealing of the file. Likewise, prospective injury to reputation, an inherent risk in almost every civil lawsuit, is generally insufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of public access to court records.
Naturally, when a party’s privacy concerns outweigh the public’s right to know, the court will enter a protective order sealing such matters. As trial lawyers know, protective orders are freely granted in cases that do not impact public safety or raise public concerns.
To protect community safety, parties have posted public records and videos of child abuse, abuse of the handicapped, nursing home abuse of the elderly, school violence, workplace violence, bank foreclosure fraud, drinking water contamination, air and water pollution, insurance bad faith, and hundreds of other cases of public concern. In response, errant corporations have counter-punched with personal attacks and much more. For example, in the food industry, where video evidence has lead to successful civil and criminal charges, corporate lobbyists in twelve states are pushing legislation that criminalizes such videos and the videographers. Fortunately, the fact that these laws would indict innocent witnesses has been noted by the press and prosecutors, and the bills have struggled for approval. It is in this environment that I was contacted by my new friend Fred Burtzos, counsel for State Farm Insurance Company, and asked to debate the issue here.
So, how do citizens share these types of records? They collect the public portion of their court file, minus any sealed material. Using the records, images, and video depositions, they create a short video and upload it to the Internet. If their video exposes dangers to the community, it is likely to be watched and shared, and it may go viral. If it is not newsworthy, it is likely to have limited circulation.
The sharing of public records is not just growing, it is exploding. Over the last few years, my company, JusticeTV, has joined the trend to assist lawyers and their clients with the technical aspects of creating, editing, and uploading the videos. The process is simple. The law is well-established. And, like sunshine, it is healthy for our community.
John K. Pineau is a trial lawyer in civil and criminal courts. He has handled a number of high-profile cases and lectures on trial tactics and strategy. He also is the president of JusticeTV, LLC, a company that assists lawyers and their clients in creating and sharing public record videos—(303) 440-4444, johnpineau@yahoo.com, www.johnpineau.com.
This article originally appeared in the February 2014 issue of The Colorado Lawyer. Articles are available online to CBA members.
 Union Oil Company of California v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 27-29 (1994), and In re Memorial Hospital of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1988)).
 Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)).
 Huddleson v. City of Pueblo, Colorado, 270 F.R.D. 635, 638 (D.Colo. 2010) (citing Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984)). See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140. 1149 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Courts have long recognized a common-law right of access to judicial records.”).
 Office of the State Ct. Administrator v. Background Info. Serv., 994 P.2d 420, 429 (Colo. 1999).
In the Open Records Act, § 24-72-201, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10B), the General Assembly has declared that, with certain specified exceptions, it is “the public policy of this state that all public records shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times. . . .” This public policy means that, unless there exists a legitimate reason for non-disclosure, any member of the public is entitled to review all public records. There is no requirement that the party seeking access must demonstrate a special interest in the records requested.
 Exum v. United States Olympic Committee, 209 F.R.D. 201, 206 (D.
 In re Texaco, Inc. 84 B.R. 14, 17 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing In Re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1987)).
 Huddleson, 270 F.R.D. at 635, 638 (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. 589).
 Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo.App. 1996) (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)).
 Doe v. Heitler, 26 P.3d 539, 544 (Colo.App. 2001).
 FRCP 26(c) and CRCP 26(c).
 Oppel, Jr., “Taping of Farm Cruelty Is Becoming the Crime,” The New York Times (April 6, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/taping-of-farm-cruelty-is-becoming-the-crime.html?_r=0.

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