Source: https://constitution-unit.com/tag/supreme-court/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:59:52+00:00

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On Wednesday the UK Supreme Court ruled court fees for claims before employment tribunals, introduced by the coalition government in 2013, to be illegal. Christina Lienen argues that this judgement is likely to join the ranks of landmark constitutional decisions, given its characterisation of the UK constitution as founded in common law and therefore in the hands of judges rather than politicians.
On Wednesday, in a single majority judgement, the United Kingdom Supreme Court (‘UKSC’) declared the recently introduced court fees for claims before employment tribunals and employment appeal tribunal to be unlawful. In this post it is argued that Unison v Lord Chancellor  UKSC 51 promises to join the ranks of constitutional landmark decisions owing to (i) the autochthonous choice of legal sources and particularly the reliance on common law constitutional rights, and (ii) the unequivocal commitment to the rule of law. Their significance is underpinned by the vigorous scrutiny with which the arguments on both sides were examined as well as by the quashing remedy given.
The law in question is the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, SI 2013/1893 (‘the Fees Order’), adopted by the Lord Chancellor in the exercise of his statutory powers. Under the rules, a claim can cost a single claimant between £390 and £1600. In September 2014, Unison issued a claim for judicial review seeking to have the Fees Order quashed on the grounds of effectiveness and discrimination, mainly on the basis of European Union law, although partial reference was made to some domestic authorities and judgements by the European Court of Human Rights. The Supreme Court went down the common law route instead, asking whether the fee order was ‘unlawful under English law’. Lord Reed’s judgement is endorsed by all members of the panel, with Lady Hale writing a separate judgement on the issue of discrimination, which is not considered at great length in the majority judgement.
The constitutional magic of the judgement happens in paragraphs 64 to 104. By saying that ‘the right of access to justice is not an idea recently imported from the continent of Europe, but has long been deeply embedded in our constitutional law’ , Unison echoes the jurisprudence on common law constitutional rights that was shaped powerfully by other UKSC judgements, including notably Osborn v Parole Board  61 UKSC, A v British Broadcasting Corporation  UKSC 25, Kennedy v The Charity Commission  UKSC 20, and also Rhodes v OPO (by his litigation friend BHM) and another  UKSC 32 and Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions  UKSC 49. Similar to those cases, Unison displays an emphasis on (a) the historical foundation of these rights by reference to Magna Carta , (b) intellectual authority by reference to Sir Coke’s seminal Institutes of the Laws of England, which address the right of access to the courts , and (c) case law from the first peak of common law constitutional rights in the 1980s and 1990s, prior to the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 [76-80]. Particular attention is paid to the Court of Appeal decision in R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham  QB 575, which is used as precedent.
Importantly however, Unison goes further than these authorities. In contrast to Osborn, it not only puts the common law centre-stage by making it the starting point of the legal analysis but also implies, in the context of this right at least, the sufficiency of the common law . Furthermore, in contrast to A v BBC, this judgement is more consistent as both the law and the application of the law to the facts is common law based rather than ECHR or EU law based, thereby mirroring the approach in Rhodes. Finally, citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Leech  QB 198 and R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKHL 26, Lord Reed says that ‘even where primary legislation authorises the imposition of an intrusion on the right of access to justice, it is presumed to be subject to an implied limitation’, thereby bolstering the authority of the common law and the discretion of the courts in the face of explicit statutory human rights abrogation . This last point is closely connected to the court’s commitment to a rich notion of the rule of law.
Lord Reed does not refer to his judgements in Osborn, A v BBC and the like, but instead spends considerable time discussing judgements from the first wave of common law constitutional rights. Perhaps this means that the substantive constitutional right in question, here access to the courts, is considered more pertinent than the underlying power of the courts to develop these rights. None of the younger judgements engage the right of access to the courts. Or perhaps the fundamental question as to the power of the courts to locate constitutional rights at common law and to enforce them against legislation was being avoided.
Following the Supreme Court ruling, what happens next?
Following today’s Supreme Court judgement, the focus of attention shifts back to parliament. How long will it take for parliament to pass the necessary legislation? How likely is it that the legislation will be amended? Robert Hazell and Alan Renwick assess the implications for the Brexit timetable, and the government’s negotiating strategy.
What will happen to the government’s timetable?
The government have confirmed that they will introduce a short bill, probably just one or two clauses, which it will seek to pass as a matter of urgency. Bills have occasionally been passed through parliament in a few days, or even a few hours. But that can only happen if both chambers recognise the urgency, and support the bill. Crucially, the government would need to get majority support for a timetabling motion in the House of Commons to expedite the process. That might not be forthcoming in a House where three quarters of MPs voted for Remain. (In 2012 Nick Clegg had to abandon his Lords Reform bill after the government lost the timetabling motion following a big Conservative rebellion).
In the House of Lords, the government has no majority, and no control over time. The Lords Constitution Committee and the Lords EU Committee will both want to scrutinise the bill and its implications. The Lords will not block or wreck the bill, but they will want to give it proper scrutiny; especially if they think the scrutiny in the Commons has been inadequate.
Can the bill be amended?
In November government sources suggested the bill would be ‘bombproof’. Parliamentary officials say that is a fantasy. All sorts of ingenious amendments can be tabled, on process as well as substance: requiring a white paper to be published setting out the government’s negotiating position; seeking a second referendum on the negotiated terms; requiring the government to acknowledge that Article 50 notification is revocable, etc. Debate risks exposing continuing splits within both the Conservative and the Labour parties. Because the referendum specified nothing about what Brexit means, the battle continues between Brexiteers, who mostly support a hard Brexit, and Remainers hoping for a soft Brexit. Meanwhile Labour remains split on how to respond to the referendum outcome – to respect the will of the 52 per cent (who make up a majority in constituencies such as Stoke-on-Trent Central, where the forthcoming by-election will be hard fought), or speak up for the majority of Labour voters, who backed Remain. Speaking in parliament after the judgement, Labour’s Shadow Brexit Secretary, Keir Starmer, indicated that Labour would seek to amend the Article 50 legislation to require a white paper on the government’s plans, stipulate mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny of the negotiations, and hold a ‘meaningful’ vote on the final deal. Legislation gives all groups in parliament multiple opportunities to table amendments or extract promises or impose conditions on the government during its passage.
The Judicial Independence Project recently held its third seminar for professionals (judges, politicians, civil servants and journalists, amongst others) on the topic of ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Role of Parliament’.
The discussion focused on the relationship between Parliament and the courts and reference was made to the idea of ‘comity’ as the basis for this relationship: mutual respect combined with distance. Some worried, however, that comity might freeze relations so that there is little communication between both sides. It was noted that there is no constitutional bar to political criticism of the judiciary. It was generally agreed that criticism (even unfair criticism) does not affect the independence of judges.
Several speakers emphasised also that the high profile breaches of super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions by parliamentarians in 2011 were not breaches of the sub judice rule but rather breaches of court orders which are not captured by that rule. Injunctions of this kind raise different issues to sub judice and a new rule may be required.

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