Source: https://de.scribd.com/document/348188869/17-05-12-Intel-Amicus-Brief-Iso-FTC-Opp-to-m2d
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 09:33:15+00:00

Document:
8 chad.golder@mto.com 2200 Mission College Blvd.
10 1155 F Street N.W.
6 innovation is Intels lifeblood.
13 of modern smartphones and cellular communications.
14 Intel is ready, willing, and able to challenge Qualcomms market dominance on the merits.
22 and to innovation and progress.
26 on consumers. Intel respectfully urges this Court to allow the FTCs complaint to proceed.
7 maintained its monopoly through practices that suppress competition and harm consumers.
16 hold up); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 103031 (9th Cir. 2015) (same).
21 standards. Compl. 54. As a result, Qualcomm holds upwards of 90 percent of 2G-CDMA SEPs.
25 do not last more than 20 years, most (if not all) SEPs associated with 2G-CDMA have expired.
28 one of hundreds of companies that were involved in the standards-development process for LTE.
4 Samsung each have 12 percent).
11 cameras. This evolution, too, should have weakened Qualcomms grip over the industry.
10 huge unjustified barriers in the path of competitors seeking to enter the market.
13 OEMs, other baseband chipset manufacturers, and consumers.
15 Qualcomm coerces OEMs into submission by threatening to disrupt their chipset supply.
Incorporated, Korea Fair Trade Commn Decision No. 2017-0-25, Jan. 20, 2017, 13136 (S.
28 be elicited in discovery should this matter proceed.
1 Qualcomms ability to coerce customers in this manner has deleterious consequences.
2 First, Qualcomm uses its advantage to strong-arm its customers into paying inflated royalties.
4 stream, Qualcomms customers have no choice but to pay whatever Qualcomm demands.
14 demands, and Qualcomms unlawful conduct has thus proceeded largely unchecked.
23 to proceed, this suit promises to be another critical step in that process.
2 businesses, unable to achieve the sales volumes and margins needed to sustain a viable business.
11 lacked the marketplace credibility that a supply contract with Apple would have bestowed.
13 attempts to compete with Qualcomm for future sales to OEMs.
20 conduct is stopped, Intel will remain at risk, and competition and innovation will remain stifled.
22 restore fair competition to an industry that is vital to the U.S. and global economies.
7 more plausibleand more damningallegations to the contrary.
11 unilateral conduct that constitutes monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
21 injures competition. Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008).
7 anticompetitive effects, which include increased prices, reduced output, and reduced quality.
8 W. Pa. Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 100 (3d Cir. 2010).
18 justified by the technical contribution of its patents?
22 RPX Corp., Standard Essential Patents: How Do They Fare? (2014), https://tinyurl.com/mss83lh.
4 license-no-chips policy into question.
12 discussed below, the motive) to coerce OEMs into accepting that arrangement.
14 assist [OEMs] in their infringement [of Qualcomms SEPs] by selling them modem chips. Mot.
1 Qualcomms use of monopoly power to increase royalties market-wide is anticompetitive.
11 charged if it had negotiated both prices independently.
23 raise the all-in prices of processors without spurring substitution or attracting entry. Compl. 94.
26 might challenge it. See Compl. 139 (alleging other firms exit from the chipset supply market).
28 without need or justification (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969))).
3 chipset market to elevate costs in the market for SEP licenses.
7 product (the tying product) on the buyers purchase of a distinct product (the tied product).
14 condemned under the rule of reason.
5 power in M and allows the scheme to continue. Id.
12 Associationwould include a 1% surcharge paid into a Fund for the benefit of the Association.
23 Exclusion: Raising Rivals Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986)).
17 irrelevant in negotiations with OEMs when it threatens to cut off their supply of chipsets.
22 transactions involving its competitors.
27 SEPs. None of Qualcomms arguments is sound.
17 the consistency that Qualcomm trumpets confirms, rather than refutes, the FTCs allegations.
5 of the elevated royalty as a tax, it is obviously better to be the tax collector than the taypayer.
21 an injunction against continuation of that conduct. 3 Antitrust Law 650a, at 92 (4th ed. 2015).
4 making a significant contribution to maintaining monopoly power is exclusionary.
9 fit between the facts alleged here and those in linkLine. But the correspondence is utterly lacking.
15 its price squeezed by pressure to insulate its customer from the monopolists anticompetitive acts.
19 caution in condemning conduct that may well be procompetitive. See Verizon Commcns Inc. v.
28 its revenue into its left pocket instead of its right pocket.
7 from seeking a neutral determination of the royalties for Qualcomms SEPs.
17 violates the antitrust laws.
20 setting is [not] without limits. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 30910 (3d Cir.
4 Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 794 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (same).
14 like Qualcomm must pay to avoid antitrust violations in the first place.
17 conduct for the purpose of establishing a Section 2 claim. Apple Inc., 2011 WL 4948567, at *4.
26 promise, constitutes actionable anticompetitive conduct. Apple Inc., 2011 WL 4948567, at *4.
5 standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), see Apple Inc., 2011 WL 4948567, at *4.
8 the reasons stated above, it does. And the FTC has properly alleged such a claim here.
24 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 71, and thus states a cause of action for anticompetitive exclusion.
3 in the LTE chipset market and stopped offering baseband chipsets altogether.
6 share of the market that the Ninth Circuit has required in Section 1 cases, see Tele Atlas N.V. v.
16 shop); 126 (duration); 132 (barriers to entry).
18 on the premium LTE chipset market given the companys role and stature in the handset industry.
24 Intel can confirm that these allegations capture the reality of the premium chipset market.
15 innovation and the substantial benefits that innovation brings to consumers. Compl. 142.
27 substantial royalty rebates in exchange for a promise to undermine support for WiMAX.
28 traction in the marketplace. Apple Compl. 109.
2 market that impacts the lives and livelihoods of millions of people around the world.
11 SARAH G. BOYCE 2200 Mission College Blvd.

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