Source: https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16124&amp;search=
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:43:23+00:00

Document:
This lawsuit, filed by the city of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on Aug. 30, 2017, challenged U.S. Attorney General Sessions' imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city. Philadelphia, represented by private counsel, filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Philadelphia alleged its own compliance with § 1373, explaining that its agents did not collect immigration status information in the first place, and as a result, the city was in no position to share or restrict the sharing of information it simply did not have. However, Philadelphia's policies allowed local law enforcement to cooperate with federal authorities and to share identifying information about criminal suspects in the city. Philadelphia further noted that its policies sought to foster trust between the city's vibrant immigrant population and the city's officials and employees. Philadelphia contended that it had, for years, prohibited its officers from asking individuals about their immigration status, and that its community policing and safe city standards functioned best "without the city's active involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration law." Philadelphia further noted that it relied upon the funding supplied by the Byrne JAG program to support critical criminal justice programming in the city, including funding the Philadelphia Police Department, District Attorney's Office, and local court system.
Philadelphia contended that in DOJ's July 25, 2017 press release, as Philadelphia interpreted it, DOJ placed three conditions upon the receipt of any Byrne JAG funds in FY 2017: Philadelphia must 1) certify that the City complied with § 1373; 2) permit Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials to access "any detention facility" in Philadelphia in order to meet with any persons of interest to DHS; and 3) provide at least 48 hours' advance notice to DHS regarding the "scheduled release date and time" of an inmate for whom DHS requests such advance notice.
Philadelphia alleged that DOJ lacked constitutional or statutory authority to place the above conditions on the Byrne JAG program. Statutorily, Philadelphia argued that the Byrnes JAG statute did not grant DOJ the authority to impose these conditions. Constitutionally, Philadelphia argued that DOJ was usurping the authority both of Congress to spend funds, and of state and local governments to administer their own law enforcement.
The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Philadelphia asked for a declaration that it complied with § 1373 and that DOJ's immigration-related conditions on Byrne JAG funding were unconstitutional. Philadelphia sought an injunction enjoining DOJ from imposing these conditions.
On Sept. 12, the Court (Judge Michael M. Baylson) ordered DOJ to answer, plead, or otherwise move in response to the complaint by no later than Oct. 13.
On Sept. 28, Philadelphia moved for a preliminary injunction. Philadelphia sought a declaration that DOJ's imposition of the new conditions on Byrne JAG funding was unlawful, that the action was contrary to the federal statute and to the Constitution's separation of powers, that Congress would have violated the Spending Clause in permitting the AG's action, and that Philadelphia was in full compliance with § 1373 (to the extent that compliance could be made an applicable condition to the receipt of Byrne JAG funds). Philadelphia also requested that the Court permanently enjoin DOJ from imposing the aforementioned three conditions in conjunction with the Byrne JAG application, as well as any future grants under the Byrne JAG program.
On Oct. 12, DOJ filed its opposition to the preliminary injunction motion. DOJ argued that Philadelphia's policies were frustrating the federal government's ability to remove immigrants with criminal records from the country. DOJ also maintained that it had long imposed conditions on federal grant funds to aid law enforcement, including on the Byrne JAG program, and that Philadelphia's position would allow the City, not DOJ, to determine the conditions associated with a federal grant that Congress had authorized the DOJ to award. The City replied on Oct. 19.
On Oct. 19, a number of cities, legal scholars, and social/legal service organizations filed amicus briefs in support of the preliminary injunction motion.
The Court heard oral argument on the preliminary injunction motion on Nov. 2. The parties filed their memos in support and in opposition on Nov. 9. On Nov. 15, the Court, in finding that Philadelphia demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claim that it substantially complied with § 1373 and enjoining the DOJ from rejecting Philadelphia's FY 2017 application for Byrne JAG funding, issued an opinion finding that Philadelphia "is not a 'sanctuary city' - if that term means that there are any policies that would prevent or inhibit the investigation, arrest, prosecution, and sentencing of aliens." 2017 WL 5489476 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2017).
On Jan. 8, 2018, Philadelphia filed an amended complaint. Noting the Nov. 15 preliminary injunction order, Philadelphia alleged that DOJ had still failed to disburse the City's FY 2017 Byrne JAG grant, and sought mandamus.
DOJ, however, appealed the District Court's preliminary injunction order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on Jan. 16. The Third Circuit opened a new docket (No. 18-1103) on Jan. 18. DOJ filed its opening brief on Mar. 26. In the brief, DOJ argued that the District Court erred in evaluating Philadelphia's compliance with § 1373 in advance of any final agency action supported by the record. Further, according to DOJ, the District Court did not explain how Philadelphia was in substantial compliance with § 1373, over DOJ's objection that Philadelphia deliberately refused to comply.
In the District Court, DOJ moved to dismiss Philadelphia's amended complaint on Feb. 1. DOJ argued that the challenged conditions were not unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Administrative Procedure Act (APA), or Constitution. Philadelphia responded on Feb. 16, and DOJ replied on Feb. 28. On Feb. 22, fifteen states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief supporting Philadelphia.
On Mar. 13, Judge Baylson denied DOJ's motion to dismiss. First, Judge Baylson held that Philadelphia's claims were ripe as challenges to final agency action under the APA. Next, Judge Baylson held that Philadelphia had advanced plausible arguments that the Byrne JAG statute did not authorize DOJ to impose the challenged conditions, and that DOJ had violated the APA, separation of powers doctrine, Spending Clause, and/or Tenth Amendment. Additionally, Philadelphia had made out a proper claim for a declaratory judgment that it complied with § 1373.
The parties filed summary judgment motions on Apr. 13. Judge Baylson held a three-day bench trial from Apr. 20 to May 2. Meanwhile, a series of cities and scholars filed amicus briefs in support of Philadelphia.
On June 6, 2018, the court (Judge Baylson), granted the city equitable relief, holding it was entitled to receive its JAG funding (2018 WL 2725503). The court found that Philadelphia generally had "no knowledge whether a person is or is not a citizen...[and a] non-citizens’ immigration status." Because the government presented little evidence that ICE could discern this information either, the court held that the JAG funding conditions were not useful. The court found that Philadelphia's policies were adopted in good faith and so as to protect individual civil rights. Indeed, the court found that "[t]he City assumes great risk if it violates individuals’ civil rights, which would, inter alia, subject the City to endless litigation and very expensive damage claims for violating civil rights of prisoners." Thus the court found that even if the funding conditions were valid, Philadelphia was in compliance or substantial compliance with the conditions.
On June 28, 2018, the court issued an additional memorandum to explain a portion of its June 6 decision providing that if a government agency "has probable cause to assert that an individual in the custody of the City of Philadelphia is a criminal alien...and seeks transfer to federal custody of such individual within a city facility, it shall secure an order from a judicial officer of the United States for further detention, as allowed by law." The court stated that this provision was necessary to ensure both the individual's rights by avoiding the use of immigration detainers, as well as the safety of the public since without the provision, the City would have to release individuals entitled to release. The court found that immigration detainers are not court orders and do not have legal effect.
The government appealed the decision to the Third Circuit.

References: § 1373
 § 1373
 § 1373
 § 1373
 § 1373
 § 1373
 § 1373
 § 1373