Source: http://www.cuthbertsonlaw.com/ny_land_use_blog
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:53:37+00:00

Document:
This dispute is a recurring theme on our blog, as this is the parties’ seventh appearance before the Appellate Division since 2003. The dispute arose when Petitioner Troy Sand & Gravel Company, Inc. (“Petitioner”) applied for a mining permit from the Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) to operate a quarry in the Town of Nassau in Rensselaer County (“Town”), and for a special use permit and site plan approval from the Town.
In 2006, DEC issued a positive declaration as lead agency under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”), and Petitioner prepared a draft environmental impact statement (“EIS”). After a public comment period, Petitioner prepared a final DEIS in 2007, and DEC issued its SEQRA findings approving the project and granting the mining permit. The Town then began its own review of the environmental impact of the proposed quarry as part of its zoning determination, however, this review was limited to information collected during the SEQRA process (note: this is an over-simplification of decisions on two separate appeals in this dispute). The Town Board then denied Petitioner’s application, and Petitioners commenced an Article 78 proceeding to annul the Town Board's determination. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the Town Board's denial of a special use permit. Petitioners appealed.
Petitioners challenged almost every aspect of the Town Board's decision as arbitrary and capricious, as it was contrary to the final EIS and not based on the SEQRA record. However, while the Court did find that the Town Board's determinations on the general land use standards were either founded on information outside of the SEQRA record or entirely inconsistent with the final EIS, the Court nevertheless found that the Town Board's denial of Petitioner’s application was properly based upon three of the four special use permit standards in the final EIS.
The Court found there was ample evidence in the SEQRA record that Petitioner’s proposed quarry would be a sizable operation and create a highly intensive industrial land use where only one small commercial entity currently existed. The Court also found that the Town Board was justified in concluding that the probability of decreased property values associated with the proposed land use rendered the second special use standard unsatisfied. On this issue, the Town Board relied on a property value impact analysis prepared by an expert whose qualifications had not been challenged. The Town Board also rationally concluded that the proposed project would alter the essential character of the Town and the immediate neighborhood, which is comprised of residential lots and undeveloped forest land. Accordingly, the lower court’s ruling in favor of the Town was affirmed.
The case was Troy Sand and Gravel Co., Inc. v Fleming, 156 A.D. 3d 1295 (3 Dep’t 2017).
Prior cases in this dispute include Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Town of Nassau, 125 A.D.3d 1170 ; Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Town of Nassau, 125 A.D.3d 1188 ; Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Town of Nassau, 101 A.D.3d 1505 ; Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Town of Nassau, 89 A.D.3d 1178 , lv dismissed 18 N.Y.3d 920, 941 N.Y.S.2d 554 ; Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Town of Nassau, 82 A.D.3d 1377 ; Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Town of Nassau, 80 A.D.3d 199  ).
Plaintiff Carney, appearing pro se, alleged Defendants (the Town Code Enforcement Officer, Town Supervisor, four Town Councilmen, and Town Assessor) sent him a letter that informed him that “the use of his sawmill is prohibited” by the local zoning ordinances. Plaintiff claimed this letter denied him “the use of his property and interferes with his freedom to contract.” Plaintiff also alleged Defendants violated due process when they did not “respond to Plaintiff’s reply dated October 15, 2015 asking for discovery of definitions and statutory authorization of zoning codes.” Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the District Court for the Western District of New York granted their motion and dismissed the claim.
In so holding, the Court noted that ripeness was a “jurisdiction prerequisite” for determining that an injury is not speculative. Here, the Complaint failed to allege that Plaintiff appealed Defendants’ initial allegation that he violated the Town Building and Zoning Codes by operating an illegal saw mill. Plaintiff also failed to allege that he requested a variance applied for a building permit for the structure, thus legalizing the activity. As Defendants demonstrated that Plaintiff had not appealed these issues, and that the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals had not taken any action, the Court held that there was no “final decision” giving the court jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims.
As to the futility exception, the Court found no basis to believe that the ZBA had “dug in its heels” or has otherwise prevented Plaintiff from appealing. Accordingly, the Court held Plaintiff’s claims were not ripe until he obtained a final decision from the ZBA, and dismissed the case.
The case was Carney v. Swanson, 2016 WL 7450459 (W.D.N.Y. December 28, 2016).
Petitioner Skyhigh Murals – Colossal Media Inc. (“Petitioner”) owns property in the City of New York. The New York City Department of Buildings (“DOB”) denied of Petitioner’s application to install an advertising sign on its property, and that decision was later affirmed by the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York (“BSA”) on May 17, 2016. Petitioner challenged brought a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to challenge the determination, and the Supreme Court, New York County annulled the BSA’s determination. The BSA appealed.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department held that the BSA rationally found that the proposed sign was prohibited by New York City Zoning Resolution § 42–561. The proposed sign was located within 100 feet of the boundary of a Special Mixed-Use District superimposed on a Residence District, and the record showed that the 1997 resolution of the City Planning Commission of the New York City Department of City Planning that created the first Special Mixed Use District indicated that restrictions governing Residence Districts could apply to Special Mixed Use Districts, depending on the regulations at issue. Thus, the Court found that the BSA’s determination that the DOB properly denied Petitioner’s application had a rational basis and was supported by substantial evidence. It concluded that the lower court should have deferred to BSA’s determination instead of applying a de novo standard of review, reversed the lower courts decision, and affirmed the ruling by the BSA.
The case was Skyhigh Murals - Colossal Media, Inc. v Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York, 162 A.D.3d 446 (1st Dep’t 2018).
Respondent Rhinebeck Village Place sought to develop a lodging facility on a lot owned by Respondent Mirbeau of Rhinebeck, LLC. Petitioner, owner of an adjacent hotel, sought to invalidate the issuance of a negative declaration of adverse environmental impact pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”), an area variance from the 5–foot maximum front-yard setback requirement in §120–8 of the Village of Rhinebeck Zoning Law (“Zoning Law”), and site plan and special permit approvals. The area variance was 296.7 feet to permit a front-yard setback of approximately 302 feet. The amended petition alleged that the project failed to comport with Village Center principles pursuant to §120–19 of the Zoning Law and would negatively impact the character of the community. The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. Petitioner appealed.
On appeal, Petitioner argued that the Village of Rhinebeck Planning Board erred in determining that the project would not create a material conflict with the community’s current plans or goals as officially approved or adopted, and that the project “would not result in the impairment of the character or quality of important historical, archeological, architectural, or aesthetic resources or existing community or neighborhood character.” The Court found that the record established that the review conducted by the Planning Board comported with the procedural and substantive requirements of SEQRA. In addition, while the area variance was substantial, there was no evidence that the variance would produce an undesirable change in the neighborhood, adversely impact the neighborhood’s physical/environmental conditions, that the benefit to the applicant could be achieved by other means, or that the difficulty was self-created. As such, the Court held that the Supreme Court properly denied the amended petition and dismissed the proceeding.
The case was Beekman Delamater Properties, LLC v. Village of Rhinebeck Zoning Board of Appeals, 150 A.D.3d 1099 (2d Dep’t 2017).

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