Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180305_0000280.NIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:46:14+00:00

Document:
Lottie asks me to reverse the ALJ's decision or remand the case for further proceedings by the Social Security Administration. My review of the ALJ's decision is deferential. I must affirm it if it is supported by substantial evidence, meaning “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). I cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute my judgment for that of the ALJ. Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015). But these standards do not mean that I “will simply rubber-stamp the Commissioner's decision without a critical review of the evidence.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). “In rendering a decision, an ALJ is not required to provide a complete and written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence, but ‘must build a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.'” Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015), quoting Schmidt v.Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005). Lottie makes four arguments in support of his appeal.
This approach does not provide an explanation of the ALJ's analysis sufficient to permit a meaningful review. Furthermore, the skeletal citation only to a list of exhibits that support the ALJ's conclusion contrary to the examining physician may constitute the sort of “cherry-picking” of supportive evidence that the Circuit has repeatedly criticized, as well as a failure to acknowledge and address significant contrary evidence. Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 860 (7th Cir. 2014); Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1124 (7thCir. 2014). The scanty treatment fails to provide the required “logical bridge” between the evidence and the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Onamusi's opinion should be given little weight, and less weight than that of Drs. Ruiz and Corcoran.
Besides challenging the adequacy of the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Onamusi's opinion, Lottie also challenges the ALJ's acceptance of the conclusions of the non-examining doctors Diaz and Corcoran over that of Dr. Onamusi, who had the benefit of examining Lottie. The applicable regulations provide that, generally speaking, more weight is given to the opinion of a doctor who examined the claimant than to one who has not. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(1), 416.927(c)(1). Nonetheless, “[a]s a general rule, an ALJ is not required to credit the agency's examining physician in the face of a contrary opinion from a later reviewer or other compelling evidence.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2014). But “rejecting or discounting the opinion of the agency's own examining physician...can be expected to cause a reviewing court to take notice and await a good explanation for this unusual step.” Id. See also Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003) (“An ALJ can reject an examining physician's opinion only for reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record; a contradictory opinion of a non-examining physician does not, by itself, suffice.”) These authorities highlight the inadequacy of the ALJ's treatment of the opinions of the three consulting doctors.
“In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). The ALJ's use of boilerplate language and sweeping characterization of multiple medical records does not constitute even a “minimal articulation” of reasons for his relative weighing of Dr. Onamusi's opinion versus that of Doctors Ruiz and Corcoran. Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503-04 (7th Cir. 2004). The ALJ's failure to “provide a valid explanation for preferring the record reviewer's analysis over that of the agency's examining doctor” compels a remand of this case for further consideration by the Commissioner. Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 839.

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