Source: http://news.lawreader.com/?p=383
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:03:42+00:00

Document:
« Judge may be charged with Violation if he fails to take possession of suspended drivers license.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Booker ushered in a new era in sentencing not only because it rendered the Sentencing Guidelines “advisory,” but also because it introduced a new standard of review for sentencing decisions: reasonableness.
Although appeals of above-the-range, and even within-the-range, sentences far outnumber appeals of below-the-range sentences, a number of recent decisions have explored the lower bounds of reasonableness. For many courts, reasonableness is a question of degree: the farther a sentence is from the guideline range, the more scrutiny the court will apply.
A review of recent below-the-range cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reveals that in this circuit at least, post-Booker appellate review is effectively the same as it was pre-Feeney: absent an error of law or clearly erroneous finding of fact, such a sentence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
The Second Circuit also has had the opportunity recently to review below-the-range sentences. In at least four such decisions, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing; yet the court appears to be affording more deference to the sentencing judge than its sister circuits. What follows is a look at those cases.
Joseph P. Thorn ran A+ Environmental Services Inc., an asbestos abatement company. A+ routinely submitted low bids for contracts on the assumption that it would employ illegal shortcuts, including failing to contain dust or provide protective gear and instructing workers to dump bags of loose asbestos.
The Second Circuit reversed, requiring a more-detailed record to review the criminal history departure and instructing the district court to reconsider its heartland departure in light of United States v. McCarthy,8 which specifically held that money laundering may lie in the heartland of cases despite not involving drug trafficking or organized crime.
The district court again departed to a criminal history category of I and applied a heartland departure. The court concluded that Mr. Thorn’s prior unrelated convictions did not demonstrate a risk of recidivism. McCarthy, the court held, was distinguishable because the money laundering was not critical to the enterprise. This time, however, Judge Scullin imposed a 168-month sentence.
The Second Circuit held that sentence unreasonable. “A district court abuses or exceeds the discretion accorded to it when its decision rests on an error of law . . . a clearly erroneous factual finding, or . . . cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”9 The court held that the district court committed an error of law because the heartland departure rested on a misinterpretation of McCarthy. It further held that the district court had also “abused its discretion” in departing to criminal history category I because it failed to account for two previous civil cases involving similar bad acts. The court remanded again for resentencing, directing the district court not to depart on these grounds.
James Rattoballi successfully built his printing company into a $7-million-dollar-a-year business. Part of that success, however, resulted from a kickback scheme. Mr. Rattoballi traded clothing, gifts and cash to advertisers in exchange for contracts.
Mr. Rattoballi pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rig bids and to commit mail fraud. Judge Thomas P. Griesa calculated a guideline range of 27-33 months but imposed a sentence of one year home confinement and five years’ probation, citing Mr. Rattoballi’s ultimate “com[ing] clean” after withholding information from the government, the stigma of a felony conviction, the damage imprisonment would cause his business and his lesser culpability relative to one of the advertisers.
Timothy J. Toohey, a New York attorney, pleaded guilty to willfully underreporting his income. Mr. Toohey agreed to a guideline range of 15 to 21 months imprisonment but moved for a departure based on the extraordinary impact imprisonment would have on his business.
The Second Circuit began by noting that its previous opinion had not mandated any specific sentence, but only required that the district court consider all of the 3553(a) factors in deciding upon a guideline or nonguideline sentence. The court viewed the district court’s statement that it does not abuse the guidelines as an indication that it had placed too much weight on the guidelines, especially in light of its misapprehension of the Second Circuit’s previous opinion. In light of Judge Elfvin’s acknowledged bias, the court remanded for resentencing before a different judge.
Judge Robert W. Sweet agreed. The court concluded that the 100:1 ratio called for under the guidelines created an unwarranted disparity between those convicted of crack and powder cocaine offenses. He noted that the Sentencing Commission itself had proposed a more lenient 20:1 ratio and, following that suggested policy, he imposed a sentence of 87 months.
The Second Circuit reversed. The court noted that the 100:1 ratio was derived from the mandatory minimum sentences Congress adopted in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Although the Sentencing Commission had three times suggested reducing or eliminating the ratio, Congress had repeatedly rejected such proposals. Thus, the court concluded, Congress had made its intentions clear and the district court had committed an error of law by substituting its own policy judgment for Congress’ rather than grounding its sentencing decision on facts specific to Mr. Castillo’s case.
Prior to the Feeney Amendment, appellate courts were required to give “due deference” to a sentencing court’s application of the guidelines to the facts presented in a particular case. Previously, in United States v. Koon,19 the Supreme Court interpreted the due deference standard. “District courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations,” the court held, “especially as they see so many more guidelines cases than appellate courts do.”20 Therefore, the court concluded, a district court’s sentencing decisions, other than errors of law or clearly erroneous factual determinations, were to be upheld unless they represented an abuse of discretion.
Nor should too much be read into the court’s multiple reversals of below-the-range sentences. The government is extremely selective about the sentencing decisions it appeals-for example, from October 2004 through September 2005, below-the-range sentences were imposed in more than 1,200 noncooperator cases in the Second Circuit,22 yet the government appealed only 19 of those sentences.23 In other words, the government generally appeals only those below-the-range sentences that it regards as most extreme, leaving the others undisturbed. Thus, the fact of multiple reversals in this small category of unusual cases cannot be taken as a sign that the Court of Appeals will routinely reverse below-the-range sentences.
The Second Circuit’s recent sentencing decisions do not represent a retreat from the principle that district courts have an institutional advantage in determining what a “reasonable” sentence is in a particular case. The Second Circuit appears ready to remand for resentencing only in the face of an error of law or fact or a record that demonstrates the judge’s failure to consider all of the 3553(a) factors. Nevertheless, these decisions serve as a reminder to defense counsel of the importance of presenting to the sentencing court all possible legitimate grounds for a below-the-range sentence in order to maximize the chances that such a sentence, if challenged, will be upheld as a reasonable, individualized exercise of discretion.
Alan Vinegrad, former United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, is a partner at Covington & Burling. Douglas Bloom is an associate at the firm.
1. 454 F3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. 455 F3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2006).
3. Crisp, 454 F.3d at 1291.
4. United States v. Thurston, 456 F.3d 211, 215 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal quotations omitted).
5. Id. at 220; see also United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005).
6. 446 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2006).
7. Thorn, 446 F.3d at 390.
8. 271 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 2001).
9. Thorn, 446 F.3d at 391 (quoting United States v. Brady, 417 F.3d 326, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2005)).
10. 452 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2006).
11. Id. at 137 (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006)).
13. 448 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2006).
14. United States v. Toohey, 85 Fed. Appx. 263, 263-64 (2d Cir. 2004).
15. United States v. Toohey, 132 Fed. Appx. 883, 886-87 (2d Cir. 2005).
16. Toohey, 448 F.3d at 544.
17. 460 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2006).
19. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
21. United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006).
22. United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Tables 26 and 26A, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/SBTOC05.htm.
23. Id. at Table 56A.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.