Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50177:gr-175594-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:41:04+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUNJUN DUCABO, Accused-Appellant.
For review is the Decision1 dated 31 July 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01116, which affirmed the Decision2 dated 31 January 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las PiÃ±as City, Branch 275, in Criminal Case No. 01-0055, finding herein appellant Junjun Ducabo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed against Rogelio Gonzales y Factor, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but modified the amount of damages awarded.
When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged.
During the pre-trial conference held on 11 December 2003, the counsel for the appellant admitted the written statement5 of Rolando Gonzales, Jr. y Factor (Rolando), but denied the certificate of death6 of the victim. The counsel for the appellant reserved the marking of evidence in the course of trial. In an Order7 dated 11 December 2003, the trial court considered the pre-trial closed and terminated. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the victim's brother, Rolando, to prove the material allegations in the Information and to identify the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime charged. Conversely, the defense presented the appellant to refute all the allegations in the Information.
In an Order8 dated 5 October 2004, the trial court, as stipulated upon by the parties, dispensed with the testimonies of SPO1 George Gabriel, the Police Investigator who conducted the investigation and prepared the Affidavit of Rolando, and Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, who performed the Post-Mortem Examination on the victim, for they had no personal knowledge of the crime charged.
Rolando testified that it was the appellant who shot the victim because at the time of the shooting incident, he was only five meters away from the victim and the appellant as he was inside their house near the door. He also claimed that he had known the appellant for about 10 years as they were neighbors at Simeon Street, Fatima Compound, Las PiÃ±as City. He added that prior to 24 October 2000, there was an altercation involving their neighbors. The victim tried to pacify those who were involved in the said fight. Consequently, he was threatened by these persons, one of them a relative of the appellant. Rolando considered the said incident to be the motive for killing the victim.
On the other hand, the defense presented the appellant, who interposed the defense of denial. The appellant denied he was the one who shot the victim because they were gangmates in Simeon Street, Talon Dos, Las PiÃ±as City, for more than two years and he had no motive to kill him. According to appellant, on 24 October 2000, at around 6:00 in the morning, he went to the store of the victim to buy bread and cigarettes. After those items where handed over to him by the victim, the latter followed him and sat in front of his store. Surprisingly, when he was about two meters away, two persons appeared somewhere behind the victim. Appellant recognized them as Joey Cuaderno (Joey) and Anicer Mingolio (Anicer). Joey immediately poked a gun at him and told him not to run, otherwise, he will be hurt. Unexpectedly, Joey shot the victim on his head. Anicer, on the other hand, served only as a lookout. Thereafter, Joey and Anicer ran away. The appellant claimed that when he saw Joey shoot the victim, he was not able to move (natulala) for 15 minutes. When the people arrived to help the victim, he went home.
Appellant averred that he did not report the killing incident to any police authority because the police officers arrived instantaneously. He did not inform the police officers that Joey and Anicer were the persons who shot the victim because of the death threats he and his family received. The appellant maintained that Rolando was not at the crime scene.
Appellant also revealed that prior to 24 October 2000, there was an incident that happened in a cockfight located in front of the house of Joey at Simeon Street, Talon Dos, Las PiÃ±as City. In said incident, the victim did not pay his cockfight bet to his opponents, Joey and Anicer. The victim ran amuck and punched Joey. Appellant claimed he witnessed the incident as he was only five meters away from the place where it happened and considered the same as the motive for killing the victim.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal.11 Appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed the aforesaid Decision to this Court.
After a meticulous review of the records, this court resolves to uphold the judgment of conviction against the appellant.
The appellant alleges that the trial court merely relied on the bare testimony of Rolando, the prosecution's alleged eyewitness, in convicting him of the crime charged. The appellant avers that Rolando testified that he saw him shoot the victim; however, during Rolando's cross examination, he categorically admitted that at the time of the shooting incident, he was looking at the ground, as he was then sweeping inside their house. Furthermore, Rolando cannot even describe the firearm allegedly used in killing the victim, which proved that he was not in the crime scene and he did not actually witness the shooting.
The aforesaid arguments raised by the appellant hinges on the credibility of a Rolando's testimony.
A: Nothing, sir, except when my brother was shot by him.
A: When my brother [the victim] was sweeping, he was shot by [appellant], while he is at the back.
A: Stooping down while sweeping.
The Witness demonstrated wherein the Witness stoop-down almost his head parallel to the waist.
Almost ninety degrees to his body.
Yes, almost ninety degrees to his body.
A: More or less one meter. It is MALAPITAN.
A: About five meters, because I was inside the house near the door.
A: He is (sic) walking back and forth in front of the house.
A: And then after that, sir, my brother went out to sweep and after that I saw he shot my brother.
A: At 6 in the morning.
A: He is walking to and fro in front of the house.
A: In front of our house but inside our premises.
From the foregoing, this Court finds Rolando's testimony plausible. His positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime charged was categorical and consistent; hence, we cannot cast any doubt on his credibility as prosecution witness. Also, there was no indication that he was improperly motivated when he testified against the appellant. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.19 It bears stressing that Rolando was the brother of the victim and it would be unnatural for him, being a relative and interested in vindicating the crime, to implicate someone other than the real culprit lest the guilty go unpunished. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence, and blame one who is innocent of the crime.20 In this case, Rolando's act of testifying against the appellant was motivated only by no other than his strong desire to seek justice for what had happened to his brother.
To stress, Rolando's credibility was not tainted by any modicum of doubt. He was certain that appellant was the lone assailant. Rolando had known appellant as a neighbor in the same compound spanning seven years since 1993 until that dreadful incident. His favorable condition of visibility that early morning enabled him to see the commencement and consummation of appellant's nefarious act. Rolando first saw appellant walking back and forth in front of their house. While he was sweeping, there was no noted obstruction that could have prevented him from noticing the sudden arrival of appellant. Rolando, stationed at their door at that time, from five (5) meters distance, saw appellant come within one meter at the back of the victim, after which appellant shot the victim at close range, hitting him on the nape. Significantly, Rolando identified appellant in court as the malefactor, to which the latter did not object.
The argument of the appellant that Rolando's failure to identify the firearm used in killing the victim strengthened the fact that he did not witness the shooting incident deserves scant consideration. It is already well established that the identification and the presentation of the murder weapon are not indispensable to the prosecution's cause when the accused has positively been identified.23 Since Rolando has positively identified the appellant, his failure to identify and present the firearm used in killing the victim cannot be considered fatal to his testimony.
The appellant likewise denies having committed the crime charged because the victim was his gangmate for almost two years and he had no motive to kill the victim. Instead, he imputed the commission of the crime charged to some other persons, who, according to him, had the motive for killing the victim. The said contentions of the appellant stand on hollow ground.
Having been positively identified by Rolando as the author of the crime, appellant's defense of denial and lack of motive, being self-serving and unsubstantiated, cannot be given any evidentiary value.
In the case at bar, the attack on the victim was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. The appellant, surreptitiously and without warning, shot the victim who was at that time unarmed and completely unaware of any impending danger to his life. He had no opportunity to offer any defense at all against the surprise attack by the appellant with a deadly weapon. All these indicate that the appellant employed means and methods which tended directly and specially to insure the execution of the offense without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might have.
The Information also alleged that evident premeditation attended the killing.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.29 Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive proof; that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.30 The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.31 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show the presence of any of these elements.
Appellant is guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, for the wrongful death of the victim. Under Article 24832 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 233 of the Revised Penal Code. The prison term imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is therefore correct.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.35 We affirm the award of civil indemnity given by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Under prevailing jurisprudence,36 the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is proper.
As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto because said damages were not duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty.37 However, the award of P25,000.00 in temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.38 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.39 Thus, the award of temperate damages by the appellate court is in order.
Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.40 The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is likewise in order.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01116 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant Junjun Ducabo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Rogelio Gonzales y Factor the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Reyes, JJ., concur.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 2-11.
2 Penned by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, CA rollo, pp. 15-20.
5 Marked as Exhibit "A." Records, p. 55.
6 Marked as Exhibit "B," id. at 56.
10 CA rollo, p. 20.
13 People v. Benito, 363 Phil. 90, 98 (1999).
14 People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547.
15 People v. Benito, supra note 13 at 98.
16 It should be 24 October 2000 and not 15 October 2000.
17 TSN, 3 March 2004, pp. 9-14.
18 TSN, 18 May 2004, pp. 5-6, 11.
19 People v. Rendoque, 379 Phil. 671, 685 (2000).
20 People v. Dulanas, G.R. No. 159058, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 58, 76-77.
21 TSN, 18 May 2004, pp. 11-13.
23 People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. 151251, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 529, 540.
24 People v. Benito, supra note 13 at 100.
25 People v. Galano, 384 Phil. 206, 217 (2000).
26 TSN, 9 November 2004, p. 17.
27 CA rollo, p. 20.
28 People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. NOS. 154348-50, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 388, 396-397.
29 People v. PO3 Tan, 411 Phil. 813, 836-837 (2001).
30 People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999).
31 People v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856, 879 (2003).
1. With treachery, x x x.
33 ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x.
34 People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 740.
35 People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 727, 742.
36 People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309, 23 January 2007, 512 SCRA 385, 400; People v. Cabinan, G.R. No. 176158, 27 March 2007; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 176158, 27 March 2007.
37 People v. Tubongbanua, supra note 35 at 742.
38 People v. Dacillo, G.R. No. 149368, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 528, 538.
39 People v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478, 12 July 2007.
40 People v. Bajar, 460 Phil. 683, 700 (2003).
41 People v. Beltran, Jr., supra note 34 at 741.

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