Source: http://wv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180301_0000257.SWV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:50:31+00:00

Document:
REM COMMUNITY OPTIONS, LLC, Defendant.
Pending is REM Community Options, LLC's (“REM”) motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement, filed November 17, 2017.
reported the additional staffing needed both verbally and in writing but [REM] refused to provide additional nurses. . . . The medication pass schedule was established as requested but [REM's] failure and refusal to adequately staff the positions resulted in inability to timely implement medication pass schedule for clients of [REM]. Bed bug treatment was ongoing and [Mr. Lynch] was in no worse condition regarding the bed bug infestation than were other regional directors who were not disciplined by [REM] over this issue. [Mr. Lynch] did lack certified staff to pass medications, but the same situation existed in all West Virginia offices and other regional directors . . . were not disciplined for [this reason]. Additionally, [Mr. Lynch] had requested additional direct care workers, nurses and supervisors from [REM] for approximately two years preceding his termination and was refused.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading “contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Correspondingly, Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a pleading may be dismissed for a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must recite “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008)). In other words, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
A district court's evaluation of a motion to dismiss is underlain by two principles. First, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the [pleading].” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”) (citations omitted). In doing so, factual allegations should be distinguished from “mere conclusory statements, ” which are not to be regarded as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Second, the court must “draw all reasonable factual inferences . . . in the [nonmovant's] favor.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (“[T]he complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of plaintiff.”).
[t]he rule that an employer has an absolute right to discharge an at will employee must be tempered by the principle that where the employer's motivation for the discharge is to contravene some substantial public policy principle, then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by this discharge.
Syl., id. at 116. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia instructs that the State's “constitution, legislative enactments, legislatively approved regulations, and judicial opinions” are the “sources of public policy for purposes of determining whether a retaliatory discharge has occurred.” Syl. Pt. 6, Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 423 (2000) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Servs., Corp., 188 W.Va. 371, 372 (1992)). Furthermore, to be considered “substantial, ” the source of the public policy must “provide specific guidance to a reasonable person.” Syl. Pt. 7, id. (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Birthisel, 188 W.Va. at 377); see also Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 210 W.Va. 740, 745 (2001) (“[T]o be substantial, a public policy must not just be recognizable as such but must be so widely regarded as to be evident to employers and employees alike.”). “A determination of the existence of public policy in West Virginia is a question of law . . . .” Syl. Pt. 1, Cordle v. Gen. Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W.Va. 321, 322 (1984).

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