Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/346/502/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:11:08+00:00

Document:
By a proceeding in the nature of coram nobis, respondent sought to have a Federal District Court set aside his conviction and sentence in that court for a federal crime, though he had served the full term for which he had been sentenced. He claimed that his conviction was invalid because of denial of his constitutional right to counsel at his trial. He had since been convicted in a state court of another crime, had been sentenced to a longer term as a second offender because of his prior federal conviction, and was still serving the state sentence.
Held: Under the All-Writs Section, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), the Federal District Court had power to issue a writ of error coram nobis; it had power to vacate its judgment of conviction and sentence, and respondent is entitled to an opportunity to show that his federal conviction was invalid. Pp. 346 U. S. 503-513.
1. Though respondent's papers disclose some uncertainty as to his choice of a remedy, this Court treats them as adequately presenting a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, enabling the trial court to properly exercise its jurisdiction. P. 346 U. S. 505.
2. Issuance by a Federal District Court of a writ of error coram nobis is authorized by the All-Writs Section, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and power to issue the writ comprehends the power of the District Court to grant this motion in the nature of coram nobis. Pp. 346 U. S. 506-510.
3. Such a motion is a step in the criminal case, and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly abolishing the writ of error coram nobis in civil cases, is inapplicable. P. 505, n 4.
4.Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing correction of "an illegal sentence at any time," is inapplicable. Pp. 346 U. S. 505-506.
5. The provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that a prisoner "in custody" may at any time move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate it, if "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," does not supersede all other remedies in the nature of coram nobis. Pp. 346 U. S. 510-511.
6. Continuation of litigation, after final judgment and after exhaustion or waiver of any statutory right of review, should be allowed through the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice. P. 346 U. S. 511.
7. Where it cannot be deduced from the record whether counsel was properly waived, where no other remedy is available, and where sound reasons exist for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, a motion in the nature of a writ of coram nobis must be heard by the federal trial court. Pp. 346 U. S. 511-512.
8. Since the results of the conviction may persist though the sentence has been served and the power to remedy an invalid sentence exists, respondent is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that his conviction was invalid. Pp. 346 U. S. 512-513.
In respondent's proceeding in the nature of coram nobis to set aside his conviction and sentence, the Federal District Court denied relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. 202 F.2d 67. This Court granted certiorari. 345 U.S. 974. Affirmed, p. 346 U. S. 513.
This review on certiorari requires us to decide whether a United States District Court has power to vacate its judgment of conviction and sentence after the expiration of the full term of service.
court on a state charge, sentenced to a longer term as a second offender because of the prior federal conviction, [Footnote 1] and is now incarcerated in a state prison.
the sufficiency of the allegations, directed remand for further proceedings. United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67, 68. Deeming the decision to conflict with United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682, we granted certiorari. 345 U.S. 974.
issue writs of coram nobis by the all-writs section, we hold it would comprehend the power for the District Court to take cognizance of this motion in the nature of a coram nobis. See note 4 supra. To move by motion instead of by writ is purely procedural. The question, then, is whether the all-writs section gives federal courts power to employ coram nobis.
remedy at common law is often described by references to the instances specified by Tidd's Practice, see note 9 supra, its use has been by no means so limited. The House of Lords, in 1844, took cognizance of an objection through the writ based on a failure properly to swear witnesses. See the O'Connell case, note 11 supra. It has been used in the United States with and without statutory authority, but always with reference to its common law scope -- for example, to inquire as to the imprisonment of a slave not subject to imprisonment, insanity of a defendant, a conviction on a guilty plea through the coercion of fear of mob violence, failure to advise of right to counsel. [Footnote 14] An interesting instance of the use of coram nobis by the Court of Errors of New York is found in Davis v. Packard, 8 Pet. 312. It was used by the Court of Errors, and approved by this Court, to correct an error "of fact not apparent on the face of the record" in the trial court, to-wit, the fact that Mr. Davis was consul general of the King of Saxony, and therefore exempt from suit in the state court.
This Court discussed the applicability of a motion in federal courts in the nature of coram nobis in United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 235 U. S. 67. There, a convicted defendant alleged he discovered through no fault of his, only after the end of the term in which he was convicted, misconduct of an assistant United States attorney and concealed bias of a juror against him, the defendant.
This Court refused to direct consideration of the motion after the term expired because the remedy, if any, was by writ of error or motion for new trial. As it was not applicable in the circumstances of the Mayer case, this Court refused to say whether a motion coram nobis would ever lie in federal courts. [Footnote 15] This Court has approved correction of clerical errors after the term. Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S. 141, 205 U. S. 154. However, we have not held that the writ of coram nobis or a motion of that nature was available in the federal courts.
The contention is made that § 2255 of Title 28, providing that a prisoner "in custody" may at any time move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate it if "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," should be construed to cover the entire field of remedies in the nature of coram nobis in federal courts. We see no compelling reason to reach that conclusion.
"Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions."
We know of nothing in the legislative history that indicates a different conclusion. We do not think that the enactment of § 2255 is a bar to this motion, and we hold that the District Court has power to grant such a motion.
legal representation for the accused. [Footnote 23] As the plea was "guilty," no details of the hearing appear. Cf. DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663. In this state of the record, we cannot know the facts, and thus we must rely on respondent's allegations.
In the Mayer case, this Court said that coram nobis included errors "of the most fundamental character." [Footnote 24] Under the rule of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 468, decided prior to respondent's conviction, a federal trial without competent and intelligent waiver of counsel bars a conviction of the accused. [Footnote 25] Where it cannot be deduced from the record whether counsel was properly waived, we think, no other remedy being then available and sound reasons existing for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, this motion in the nature of the extraordinary writ of coram nobis must be heard by the federal trial court. [Footnote 26] Otherwise, a wrong may stand uncorrected which the available remedy would right. Of course, the absence of a showing of waiver from the record does not, of itself, invalidate the judgment. It is presumed the proceedings were correct, and the burden rests on the accused to show otherwise. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, at 304 U. S. 468; Adams v. McCann, supra, at 317 U. S. 281; cf. Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 339 U. S. 218.
carry heavier penalties, civil rights may be affected. [Footnote 27] As the power to remedy an invalid sentence exists, we think, respondent is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that this conviction was invalid.
New York Penal Law, § 1941.
"The writ of habeas corpus commands general recognition as the essential remedy to safeguard a citizen against imprisonment by State or Nation in violation of his constitutional rights. To make this protection effective for unlettered prisoners without friends or funds, federal courts have long disregarded legalistic requirements in examining applications for the writ and judged the papers by the simple statutory test of whether facts are alleged that entitle the applicant to relief."
Such a motion is a step in the criminal case, and not, like habeas corpus where relief is sought in a separate case and record, the beginning of a separate civil Proceeding. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 115 U. S. 494. While, at common law, the writ of error coram nobis was issued out of chancery like other writs, Stephens, Principles of Pleading, 3d Amer. ed., 142, the procedure by motion in the case is now the accepted American practice. Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood, 7 Pet. 144, 32 U. S. 147; Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S. 141, 205 U. S. 151; United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 235 U. S. 67. As it is such a step, we do not think that Rule 60(b), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., expressly abolishing the writ of error coram nobis in civil cases, applies. This motion is of the same general character as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Reviser's Note. Cf. United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682, 684. And see, contra to the above note, People v. Kemnetz, 296 Ill.App. 119, 15 N.E.2d 883.
United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 201; see also Tinder v. United States, 345 U. S. 565.
"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
"The revised section extends the power to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction to all courts established by Act of Congress, thus making explicit the right to exercise powers implied from the creation of such courts."
"That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. . . ."
See United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U. S. 196, 325 U. S. 201; cf. United States v. Beatty, 232 U. S. 463, 232 U. S. 467.
"If a judgment in the King's Bench be erroneous in matter of fact only, and not in point of law, it may be reversed in the same court, by writ of error coram nobis, or quae coram nobis resident, so called from its being founded on the record and process, which are stated in the writ to remain in the court of the lord the king, before the king himself; as where the defendant, being under age, appeared by attorney, or the plaintiff or defendant was a married woman at the time of commencing the suit, or died before verdict, or interlocutory judgment: for error in fact, is not the error of the judges and reversing it is not reversing their own judgment. So, upon a judgment in the King's Bench, if there be error in the process, or through the default of the clerks, it may be reversed in the same court, by writ of error coram nobis. . . ."
Stephens, Principles of Pleading (3d Amer. ed.), 143; 2 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure (2d ed.) 1181.
See citations in n 10, and United States v. Plumer, 27 Fed.Cas. 561, 572, Mr. Justice Clifford; O'Connell v. The Queen, 2 Cl. & Fin. (H.L.Rep.) 155, 233, 252.
Archbold (7th ed., Chitty, 1840) 350, 389; 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1903) 224.
A collection of these cases appears in an article by Abraham L. Freedman, Esq., 3 Temple L.Q. 365, 372. See Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 104 U. S. 416.
Ex parte Toney, 11 Mo. 661; Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517; Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318; Hogan v. Court, 296 N.Y. 1, 9, 68 N.E.2d 849. See also a discussion of the New York cases by Judge Stanley H. Fuld, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, New York L.J. issues of June 5, 6, 7, 1947; note, 34 Cornell L.Q. 596. Spence v. Dowd, 145 F.2d 451; cf. Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S. 411; Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U. S. 252; People ex rel. v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189 N.E. 500.
". . . and, even if it be assumed that, in the case of errors in certain matters of fact, the district courts may exercise in criminal cases -- as an incident to their powers expressly granted -- a correctional jurisdiction at subsequent terms analogous to that exercised at common law on writs of error coram nobis (see Bishop, New Crim.Proc., 2d ed., § 1369), as to which we express no opinion, that authority would not reach the present case. This jurisdiction was of limited scope; the power of the court thus to vacate its judgments for errors of fact existed, as already stated, in those cases where the errors were of the most fundamental character -- that is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular and invalid."
235 U.S. at 235 U. S. 69. See also Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 104 U. S. 416; Phillips v. Negley, 117 U. S. 665, 117 U. S. 673.
In United States v. Smith, 331 U. S. 469, 331 U. S. 475, note 4, we referred to the slight need for a remedy like coram nobis in view of the modern substitutes.
Allen v. United States, 162 F.2d 193; Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 998, 1001, vacated and remanded for further proceedings, 316 U.S. 649.
Roberts v. United States, 158 F.2d 150; United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439. See also United States v. Monjar, 64 F.Supp. 746.
Garrison v. United States, 154 F.2d 106, 107; cf. Pierce v. United States, 154 F.2d 848.
Tinkoff v. United States, 129 F.2d 21; Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805; Spaulding v. United States, 155 F.2d 919; United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102; Crowe v. United States, 169 F.2d 1022; Bice v. United States, 177 F.2d 843; United States v. Rockower, 171 F.2d 423; Farnsworth v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 198 F.2d 600. Cf. Strang v. United States, 53 F.2d 820, 821.
United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682; Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199.
56 Yale L.J.197, 233; 34 Cornell L.Q. 598; Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 998, 1001, vacated and remanded for further proceedings, 316 U.S. 649.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 344 U. S. 486; see Gayes v. New York, 332 U. S. 145, 332 U. S. 149, note 3.
Until Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, there was no uniform practice in the federal courts to have the orders show the judges' conclusion that there had been a competent waiver of counsel. Cf. United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 443.
See note 15 supra. Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 807; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 104 U. S. 416; Powell, Appellate Proceedings (1872) 108; Black, Judgments (2d ed.) 460.
See also Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60; Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. rule 44.
Cf. Brown v. Allen, supra, at 344 U. S. 485-486.
Fiswich v. United States, 329 U. S. 211; note, 59 Yale L.J. 786.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE CLARK join, dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the decision of the Court resurrecting the ancient writ of error coram nobis from the limbo to which it presumably had been relegated by Rule 60(b), F.R.Civ.P. and 28 U.S.C. § 2255, assuming that the writ has ever been available in the federal courts to review criminal proceedings. A brief reference to the record will emphasize my reasons for doubting the wisdom of this action.
On December 18, 1939, respondent, upon a plea of guilty, was sentenced in a Federal District Court to four years' imprisonment on each of eight counts charging divers violations of 18 U.S.C. § 317 (now 18 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 1708) and 18 U.S.C. § 347 (now 18 U.S.C. § 500). The sentences ran concurrently, and were fully served by respondent, during which time he never questioned their validity. In 1950, respondent was convicted of a state crime, apparently attempted burglary in the third degree, by a New York court, and sentenced under that State's multiple Offenders Law. [Footnote 2/1] The 1939 federal conviction was relied upon to bring respondent within the multiple offenders statute, making possible an increased sentence for the state offense. Respondent is now imprisoned by New York pursuant to that sentence.
Approximately fourteen months after the New York conviction, more than twelve years after being sentenced on the federal conviction, and more than eight years after the federal sentence was completed, respondent filed this "Application for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis" in the Federal District Court in which he had been convicted. He requested that the federal judgment of conviction "be set aside, vacated, and be declared null and void," since, at the time of the conviction, he neither had the assistance of counsel nor was informed of his constitutional right to counsel, and, at the time, was only nineteen years of age, and without knowledge of the law. Respondent did not allege his innocence of the federal charges or set forth any facts from which innocence could be inferred. And respondent has attempted no explanation of his prolonged delay in seeking to remedy the asserted violation of his constitutional rights, nor intimated that he is now suffering some federal disability as a result of the conviction.
"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. [Footnote 2/2] "
I agree with the majority, for the reasons given, that procedures other than under the all-writs section are not open to respondent under the circumstances of this case. But I am also convinced that the all-writs section does not countenance the relief sought. Two essential prerequisites to the issuance of a writ pursuant to that statute are lacking: (1) the writ here authorized is not in aid of the jurisdiction of the District Court, and (2) the writ is not "agreeable to the usages and principles" of present-day law.
Proceedings to obtain the writ are generally considered to be civil in nature, [Footnote 2/7] just as habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, although most often used to obtain relief from criminal judgments. [Footnote 2/8] Rule 60(b) of the Civil Rules expressly abolishes writs of error coram nobis and prescribes that civil proceedings for attacking a final judgment shall be by motion as provided in the Rules or by an independent action. Six grounds for such relief are set forth in Rule 60(b), [Footnote 2/9] which also requires that a motion thereunder shall be made within a year after the judgment if based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud, and "within a reasonable time" if bottomed on other grounds.
Leaving open the question of whether respondent has advanced sufficient reasons for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) if the proceedings had been timely commenced, he has not established that these proceedings were instituted within a reasonable time after entry of the judgment of conviction, even if the one-year period of limitation is not applicable. Respondent has not sought to explain his long delay in seeking to set aside the federal judgment, and twelve years' delay would appear to be unreasonable on its face, absent unusual circumstances which are not shown to be present here. United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102, 105; Farnsworth v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 198 F.2d 600; United States v. Bice, 84 F.Supp. 290, aff'd, 177 F.2d 843.
the Reviser's Note makes clear, that section "restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis." [Footnote 2/12] H.R.Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A-180. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 342 U. S. 214-219. In enacting this comprehensive procedure for collateral attacks on federal criminal judgments, Congress has supplied the remedy to which resort must be had. Since Congress did not see fit in § 2255 to extend the remedy there provided to persons not in federal custody under the judgment attacked, I do not feel free to do so.
It may be said that the federal conviction is still being used against respondent, and therefore some relief ought to be available. Of course, the record of a conviction for a serious crime is often a lifelong handicap. There are a dozen ways in which even a person who has reformed, never offended again, and constantly endeavored to lead an upright life may be prejudiced thereby. The stain on his reputation may at any time threaten his social standing or affect his job opportunities, for example. Is coram nobis also to be available in such cases? The relief being devised here is either wide open to every ex-convict as long as he lives or else it is limited to those who have returned to crime and want the record expunged to lessen a subsequent sentence. Either alternative seems unwarranted to me.
must eventually come to an end. These conflicting principles have traditionally been accommodated in federal criminal cases by permitting collateral attack on a judgment only during the time that punishment under the judgment is being imposed, and Congress has so limited the use of proceedings by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. If that is to be changed, Congress should do it.
Decisions of state courts on the point are collected in 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 1668; 17 C.J., Criminal Law §§ 3326, 3327.
We do not know, moreover, that New York will modify its second offender sentence, imposed at a time when the federal conviction had not been questioned, even if the federal conviction is later vacated.
United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 235 U. S. 67-69; Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 998, 1001, vacated, 316 U.S. 649, reversed on other grounds, 130 F.2d 202; Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3 Temp.L.Q. 365. The scope of the writ has been expanded by some States to provide a vehicle for collateral redress of denials of constitutional rights, usually because the traditional procedures for affording such relief are for some reason inadequate. Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S. 411, 315 U. S. 415; Fuld, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 117 N.Y.L.J. 2212, 2230, 2248; Note, 26 Ind.L.J. 529; Note, 39 Ky.L.J. 440.
See United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102.
People v. Kemnetz, 296 Ill.App. 119, 15 N.E.2d 883; State ex rel. Meyer v. Youngblood, 221 Ind. 408, 48 N.E.2d 55; State ex rel. Cutsinger v. Spencer, 219 Ind. 148, 41 N.E.2d 601; State v. Ray, 111 Kan. 350, 207 P. 192; Elliott v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 614, 167 S.W.2d 703; cf. United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682. See also cases collected in 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 1606(a).
Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556.
"MISTAKES; INADVERTENCE; EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
See cases cited in note 7, supra.

References: § 1651
 § 1651
 § 2255
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2255
 § 2255
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1941
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2255
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1369
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2255
 § 317
 § 347
 § 500
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2255
 § 2255
 § 1668
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1606