Source: https://www.utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.337/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:55:23+00:00

Document:
The Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: A New Limit to the Mutual Trust Presumption in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice?
In this case, the CJEU answers the question whether Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant must be interpreted as meaning that when there are strong indications that detention conditions in the issuing Member State infringe Article 4 of the Charter, the executing judicial authority must refuse surrender of the person against whom a European arrest warrant is issued. The CJEU rules that if, after a two-stage assessment, the executing judicial authority finds that there is a real risk of an Article 4 violation for the requested person once surrendered, the execution of the arrest warrant must initially be deferred and, where such a risk cannot be discounted, the executing judicial authority must decide whether or not to terminate the surrender procedure. This conclusion shakes the system of mutual trust upon which the principle of mutual recognition is built.
The Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (FDEAW) is the first concrete measure in the field of European criminal law based on the principle of mutual recognition.1 Mutual recognition is based on the principle of mutual trust.2 The relationship between mutual recognition and mutual trust in the FDEAW is evident from Recital (10) which states that the FDEAW mechanism is based on a high level of confidence between Member States and that it may only be suspended in the event of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of Article 6(1) TEU.
Notwithstanding the presumption of mutual trust, based, inter alia, on adequate fundamental rights protection, practice shows that fundamental rights violations do occur in the Member States.12 Even the European Commission conceded this much.13 Does the fact that Member States violate fundamental rights permit judicial authorities not to execute arrest warrants in blind mutual trust? The literature has shown itself to be critical of such a notion of blind trust and has proposed to interpret Article 1(3) FDEAW as a general fundamental rights ground for non-execution of an arrest warrant.14 Article 1(3) states that the FDEAW shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU. Such an interpretation would provide balance between effective law enforcement and fundamental rights protection of persons subject to FDEAW proceedings.
The joined cases of Aranyosi and Căldăraru are the first cases where the CJEU tackles this problem directly. The Advocate-General (AG) and the Court differ on how to ensure compliance with fundamental rights while, at the same time, leaving the concept of mutual trust intact. Whereas AG Bot opts for a centralised form of review by the CJEU through the preliminary reference procedure based on the concept of proportionality, the Court gives the main responsibility to the executing judicial authority and allows, in certain circumstances, for a deferral of the arrest warrant’s execution. The CJEU’s solution raises many questions for the notion of mutual trust in EU criminal law in particular and for the AFSJ in general.
The CJEU opens its considerations by touching upon an issue that has plagued the FDEAW ever since its inception: the balance between effective law enforcement (through mutual recognition) and personal liberty (through fundamental rights protection).
The CJEU clarified two issues in this judgment: (i) that mutual trust in the FDEAW is not unconditional; and (ii) that there is a convergence between the ECtHR’s and the CJEU’s case law on Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of the Charter respectively. At the same time, the judgment reveals that the CJEU’s answers are limited in scope and pose many more questions that are in need of answers.
First, the judgment reveals that the obligation to presume that other Member States provide effective and equivalent fundamental rights protection (i.e. mutual trust) is not, as was presumed in older case-law, unconditional. As a result, judicial authorities in the executing Member State are not always obliged to execute an arrest warrant in case the exhaustively enumerated non-execution grounds in FDEAW Articles 3, 4, and 4a do not apply. In cases where (i) there is a real risk that detention conditions in the issuing Member State violate Article 4 of the Charter and (ii) where there are substantial grounds to believe that the person to be surrendered will be subjected to such a real risk, execution can be deferred and, eventually, terminated.
There is a stark contrast between the solution posed by the CJEU and the one proffered by the AG. The Court, in essence, allows the executing judicial authority to assess fundamental rights protection practices in the issuing Member States and, under very strict circumstances, defer surrender of the requested person. This approach allows the executing judicial authority to question the fundamental rights record of the issuing Member State, something which is clearly at odds with mutual trust which builds on the presumption that other Member States provide effective and equivalent fundamental rights protection. The AG leaves mutual trust intact by placing an obligation on the issuing judicial authority to conduct a proportionality test. The only way in which an executing Member State can question the issuing Member State’s fundamental rights record, is by starting a preliminary reference procedure. The overall result is, as Ostropolski correctly predicted,63 that the CJEU nuanced the meaning of mutual trust, as it had done before in its asylum law case law and opted for an alternative interpretation in which fundamental rights violations (can) constitute an exception to this trust.
An important question that the ECtHR had to face, and which CJEU faced in this case, is when an executing State that is to surrender or extradite a person is to assess the fundamental rights protection practices in the requesting country. In its seminal Soering ruling, the ECtHR held that the responsibility of the requested state under Article 3 ECHR can be raised ‘where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment in the requesting country’.65 In Vilvarajah and Others, which followed the principles set out in Soering, the ECtHR held that the ‘Court’s examination (…) must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicants (…) in the light of the general situation (…) as well as on their personal circumstances’.66 The two-stage test that the CJEU adopted in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, which required the executing judicial authority to assess both the general circumstances of detention and the situation of the person to be surrendered, is the same test adopted by the ECtHR in its case law on the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR. As a result, the ECtHR’s and the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of the Charter converge ever more and more.
A host of questions still require an answer after this judgment: I will put forward three of the most pressing queries that are relevant for the notion of mutual trust.67 First of all, does the CJEU’s conclusion that an executing judicial authority defer to execute to execute an arrest warrant if there is a real risk that detention conditions in the issuing Member State infringe Article 4 of the Charter mean that executing judicial authorities can also defer to execute when non-absolute rights are at stake? The CJEU explicitly stated that the prohibition laid down in Article 4 is absolute and is one of the fundamental values of the Union. Would the Court conclude the same if the right to be heard, as was the case in Radu, was at stake?
Second of all, what does the CJEU’s conclusion for other EU criminal law instruments based on the principle of mutual recognition which state, just like the FDEAW, that they shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the TEU? A good example thereof is the Council Framework Decision.68 Can executing judicial authorities defer the recognition of judgments and the enforcement of sentences based on this instrument, which is also based on mutual trust?
1Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States  OJ L190/1 (FDEAW) .
2Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Symbiotic Relationship Between Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’ (2015) 4 New Journal of European Criminal Law 457.
3Tina van den Sanden, ‘Het Principe van Wederzijds Vertrouwen in de Ruimte van Vrijheid, Veiligheid en Recht’ (2014) SEW, Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht 232, 235.
4Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters  OJ C12/10.
5Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union  OJ C115/13 (TEU) arts 6(1) and 6(3). See also Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings  OJ C295/1 .
6Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F v Premier minister, EU:C:2013:358, para 50.
7Opinion 2/13 of the Court on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, EU:C:2014:2454, para 191 (Opinion 2/13).
8Theodora A Christou and Karen Weis, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental Rights: An Opportunity for Clarity’ (2010) 1 New Journal of European Criminal Law 31, 41.
10The CJEU has stated on a number of occasions that the non-recognition grounds in the European arrest warrant are exhaustive. See eg Case C-388/08 PPU Artur Leymann and Aleksei Pustovarov, EU:C:2008:669, para 51; Case C-261/09 Gaetano Mantello, EU:C:2010:683, para 36; Case C-42/11 João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge, EU:C:2012:517, para 29; Jeremy F (n 6) para 36.
11Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 319, 324.
12Susie Alegre and Marisa Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study – the European Arrest Warrant’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 200; Catherine Heard and Daniel Mansell, ‘The European Arrest Warrant: The Role of Judges When Human Rights Are at Risk’ (2011) 2 New Journal of European Criminal Law 133; Alex Tinsley, ‘Protecting Criminal Defence Rights Through EU Law: Opportunities and Challenges’ (2013) 4 New Journal of European Criminal Law 461, 463; Lorena Bachmaier, ‘Mutual Recognition Instruments and the Role of the CJEU: The Grounds for Non-Execution’ (2015) 4 New Journal of European Criminal Law 505.
13Commission, ‘Report on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States’ COM (2011) 175 final, 6.
14See eg Mitsilegas, ‘Limits of Mutual Trust’ (n 11); Alex Tinsley, ‘The Reference in Case C-396/11 Radu: When does the Protection of Fundamental Rights Require Non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant?’ (2012) 2 European Criminal Law Review 338; Emily Smith, ‘Running Before We Can Walk? Mutual Recognition at the Expense of Fair Trials in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Justice and Security’ (2013) 1 New Journal of European Criminal Law 82; Vincent Glerum, ‘De Balans van Tien Jaar Europees Aanhoudingsbevel: Efficiency en Rechtsbescherming in Balans?’ (2014) Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 332; Bachmaier (n 12); Tomasz Ostropolski, ‘The CJEU as Defender of Mutual Trust’ (2015) 2 New Journal of European Criminal Law 166; Sabine Swoboda, ‘The Self-Perception of the European Court of Justice and Its Neglect of the Defense Perspective in Its Preliminary Rulings on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters: A Small Note on a Fundamental Misunderstanding’ (2015) Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 361.
15Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198, para 29.
When the location of the requested person is known, the issuing judicial authority may transmit the European arrest warrant directly to the executing judicial authority.
The issuing judicial authority may, in any event, decide to issue an alert for the requested person in the Schengen Information System (SIS).
Such an alert shall be effected in accordance with the provisions of Article 95 of the Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of controls at common borders. An alert in the Schengen Information System shall be equivalent to a European arrest warrant accompanied by the information set out in Article 8(1).
18Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) para 32.
[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (…) The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.
Article 52(3) of the Charter, which forms part of Title VII, regulates its scope and ensures the necessary consistency between the ECHR and the Charter. When rights laid down in the Charter ‘(…) correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ For a confirmation that Article 4 of the Charter has the same meaning and scope as Article 3 of the ECHR, see the Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights  OJ C303/17, 33.
24Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) para 43. The Hanseatische Oberlandesgericht Bremen refers to Varga and Others v Hungary, App nos 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13 (ECtHR, 10 March 2015) para 92.
25For the reports on the detention conditions in European correctional facilities, see European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, ‘CPT Visits’ <http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/visits.htm> accessed 14 April 2016.
26Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) para 48.
30ibid para 60. The CJEU refers to the following cases: Vociu v Romania, App no 22015/10 (ECtHR, 10 June 2014); Bujorean v Romania, App no 13054/12 (ECtHR, 10 June 2014); Constantin Aurelian Burlacu v Romania, App no 51318/12 (ECtHR, 10 June 2014); and Mihai Laurenţiu Marin v Romania, App no 79857/12 (ECtHR, 10 September 2014).
31Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) para 61. The CJEU refers to the following report: European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, ‘Rapport au Gouvernement de la Roumanie Relatif à la Visite Effectuée en Roumanie par le Comité Européen pour la Erévention de la Torture et des Peines ou Traitements Inhumains ou Dégradants (CPT) du 5 au 17 Juin 2014’ (24 September 2015) CPT/Inf (2015) 31.
32Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) paras 45 and 62.
(i) Is Article 1(3) FDEAW to be interpreted as meaning that surrender for the purposes of prosecution or the execution of a custodial sentence or detention order is impermissible for the purposes of prosecution is impermissible where there are strong indications that detention conditions in the issuing Member State infringe the fundamental rights of the person concerned and the fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU, or is it to be interpreted as meaning that, in such circumstances, the executing Member State can or must make the decision on the permissibility of extradition conditional upon an assurance that detention conditions are compliant? To that end, can or must the executing Member State lay down specific minimum requirements applicable to the detention conditions in respect of which an assurance is sought?
(ii) Are Articles 5 and 6(1) of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA) to be interpreted as meaning that the issuing judicial authority is also entitled to give assurances that detention conditions are compliant, or do assurances in this regard remain subject to the domestic rules of competence in the issuing Member State?
34Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:140, Opinion of AG Bot, paras 5 and 68.
39For more information on the concept of the individualisation of punishment, see Raymond Saleilles, L’Individualisation de la Peine: Étude de Criminalité Sociale (Adamant Media Corporation 2003).
40Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 35), Opinion of AG Bot, paras 137–140.
42ibid paras 8, 150–164 and 173.
45Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) para 75. See also Case C-192/12 PPU Melvin West, EU:C:2012:404, para 54; Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107, para 36; Jeremy F (n 6) para 34; Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Lanigan, EU:C:2015:474, para 27.
46Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) para 76. See also Case C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU:C:2013:39, para 34; Melloni (n 46) para 37; Jeremy F (n 6) para 35; Lanigan (n 46) para 28.
47Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) para 77.
48Opinion 2/13 (n 7) para 191.
50Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) paras 79–80. The mandatory non-execution grounds are listed in FDEAW art 3. The optional non-execution grounds can be found in FDEAW art 4.
[t]he mechanism of the European arrest warrant is based on a high level of confidence between Member States. Its implementation may be suspended only in the event of a serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles set out in Article 6(1) Treaty on European Union, determined by the Council pursuant to Article 7(1) of the said Treaty with the consequences set out in Article 7(2) thereof.
53See text at n 23.
54Aranyosi and Căldăraru (n 15) paras 85–87.
57ibid paras 91 and 93.
I do not believe that a narrow approach —which would exclude human rights consideration altogether— is supported either by the wording of the Framework Decision or by the case-law. Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision makes it clear that the decision does not affect the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental principles as enshrined in Article 6 EU (now, after amendment, Article 6 TEU). It follows, in my view, that the duty to respect those rights and principles permeates the Framework Decision. It is implicit that those rights may be taken into account in founding a decision not to execute a warrant. To interpret Article 1(3) otherwise would risk its having no meaning —otherwise, possibly, than as an elegant platitude.
See Case C-396/11 Ministerul Public – Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Constanţa v Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU:C:2012:648, Opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 69–70. See also Bachmaier (n 12) 518.
62See also Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, EU:C:2007:261; Case C-123/08 Dominic Wolzenburg, EU:C:2009:616; Opinion 2/13 (n 7).
64See text at n 23.
65Soering v the United Kingdom (1989) Series A no 161, para 91.
66Vilvarajah and Others v the United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 248, para 108.
67For a detailed analysis of issues on evidence and whether the judgment in this case allows for a new ground of refusal, see Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant’ (2016) 24 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 197.
68Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union  OJ L327/27, art 3(4).
69Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, EU:C:2011:865, para 86.
70Tarakhel v Switzerland, App no 29217/12 (ECtHR, 4 November 2014) para 104. See also Cathryn Costello and Mino Mouzourakis, ‘Reflections on Reading Tarakhel: Is ‘How Bad is Bad Enough’ Good Enough?’ (2014) Asiel & Migrantenrecht 404.
71The AG provides a number of reasons as to why such a comparison would not hold. For a justification of such a comparison, see Fenella Billing, ‘The Parallel Between Non-removal of Asylum Seekers and Non-Execution of a European Arrest Warrant on Human Rights Grounds: The CJEU Case of N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department’ (2012) 2 European Criminal Law Review 77.
Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, EU:C:2007:261.
Case C-388/08 PPU Artur Leymann and Aleksei Pustovarov, EU:C:2008:669.
Case C-123/08 Dominic Wolzenburg, EU:C:2009:616.
Case C-261/09 Gaetano Mantello, EU:C:2010:683.
Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, EU:C:2011:865.
Case C-42/11 João Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge, EU:C:2012:517.
Case C-396/11 Ministerul Public – Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Constanţa v Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU:C:2012:648, Opinion of AG Sharpston.
Case C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU:C:2013:39.
Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107.
Case C-192/12 PPU Melvin West, EU:C:2012:404.
Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F v Premier minister, EU:C:2013:358.
Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Lanigan, EU:C:2015:474.
Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198.
Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:140, Opinion of AG Bot.
Opinion 2/13 of the Court on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, EU:C:2014:2454.
Soering v the United Kingdom (1989) Series A no 161.
Vilvarajah and Others v the United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 248.
Bujorean v Romania, App no 13054/12 (ECtHR, 10 June 2014).
Constantin Aurelian Burlacu v Romania, App no 51318/12 (ECtHR, 10 June 2014).
Vociu v Romania, App no 22015/10 (ECtHR, 10 June 2014).
Mihai Laurenţiu Marin v Romania, App no 79857/12 (ECtHR, 10 September 2014).
Tarakhel v Switzerland, App no 29217/12 (ECtHR, 4 November 2014).
Varga and Others v Hungary, App nos 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13 (ECtHR, 10 March 2015).
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States  OJ L190/1.
Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union  OJ L327/27.
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights  OJ C303/17.
Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters  OJ C12/10.
Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings  OJ C295/1.
Alegre, S and Leaf, M (2004). ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study – the European Arrest Warrant’. European Law Journal 10: 200.
Bachmaier, L (2015). ‘Mutual Recognition Instruments and the Role of the CJEU: The Grounds for Non-Execution’. New Journal of European Criminal Law 4: 505.
Billing, F (2012). ‘The Parallel Between Non-removal of Asylum Seekers and Non-Execution of a European Arrest Warrant on Human Rights Grounds: The CJEU Case of N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department’. European Criminal Law Review 2: 77.
Christou, TA and Weis, K (2010). ‘The European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental Rights: An Opportunity for Clarity’. New Journal of European Criminal Law 1: 31.
Commission (2011). ‘Report on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States’ In: COM, p. 175. final.
Costello, C and Mouzourakis, M (2014). ‘Reflections on Reading Tarakhel: Is ‘How Bad is Bad Enough’ Good Enough?’. Asiel & Migrantenrecht, : 404.
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (2015). Rapport au Gouvernement de la Roumanie Relatif à la Visite Effectuée en Roumanie par le Comité Européen pour la Erévention de la Torture et des Peines ou Traitements Inhumains ou Dégradants. du 5 au 17 Juin 2014, CPTSeptember 24 2015CPT/Inf, p. 31.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, S (2016). ‘Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant’. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 24: 197.
Glerum, V (2014). ‘De Balans van Tien Jaar Europees Aanhoudingsbevel: Efficiency en Rechtsbescherming in Balans?’. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, : 332.
Heard, C and Mansell, D (2011). ‘The European Arrest Warrant: The Role of Judges When Human Rights Are at Risk’. New Journal of European Criminal Law 2: 133.
Mitsilegas, V (2012). ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’. Yearbook of European Law 31: 319.
Mitsilegas, V (2015). ‘The Symbiotic Relationship Between Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’. New Journal of European Criminal Law 4: 457.
Ostropolski, T (2015). ‘The CJEU as Defender of Mutual Trust’. New Journal of European Criminal Law 2: 166.
Saleilles, R (2003). L’Individualisation de la Peine: Étude de Criminalité Sociale. Adamant Media Corporation.
Smith, E (2013). ‘Running Before We Can Walk? Mutual Recognition at the Expense of Fair Trials in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Justice and Security’. New Journal of European Criminal Law 1: 82.
Swoboda, S (2015). ‘The Self-Perception of the European Court of Justice and Its Neglect of the Defense Perspective in Its Preliminary Rulings on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters: A Small Note on a Fundamental Misunderstanding’. Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, : 361.
Tinsley, A (2012). ‘The Reference in Case C-396/11 Radu: When does the Protection of Fundamental Rights Require Non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant?’. European Criminal Law Review 2: 338.
Tinsley, A (2013). ‘Protecting Criminal Defence Rights Through EU Law: Opportunities and Challenges’. New Journal of European Criminal Law 4: 461.
van den Sanden, T (2014). ‘Het Principe van Wederzijds Vertrouwen in de Ruimte van Vrijheid, Veiligheid en Recht’ In: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht. SEW, p. 232.

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