Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/168/674/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:57:51+00:00

Document:
Orleans to recover a square of ground situated in the City of New Orleans, the proceeding being known under the Louisiana Code as a "petitory action." C.P. Art. 43 et seq. The petition alleged the ownership by the plaintiff of the square of ground, and averred that the defendant McConnico was in possession, and claiming title thereto. It alleged that the source from which the defendant asserted his title to have been deraigned was a tax sale made by a state tax collector in November, 1885, to enforce delinquent state taxes for the years 1876, 1877, and 1878 at which sale Orloff Lake was the purchaser. It was averred that Lake sold the property thus bought by him, in December, 1885, to one Lallance, who, in January, 1891, sold it to Lang; that he in turn sold, in February, 1892, to Fitzpatrick and Reese, each in equal undivided proportions, and that each of them, in 1893 and 1894, respectively, conveyed their undivided interest to the defendant McConnico. The petition charged that the tax sale upon which the title of the defendant rested was absolutely void because, although the property belonged to the petitioner, whose name was Rafael Maria Del Castillo, the taxes thereon for the years 1876, 1877, and 1878, to enforce the payment of which the tax sale had been made, were assessed in the name of R. Castillo. It was also alleged that the tax sale was void because, in the advertisement which preceded it and which was made by the Louisiana law a prerequisite to a valid sale, the property was described as belonging to Rafael Maria Del Castillo, or her estate and heirs; that, as petitioner was a male person, the adding to the name the words "or her estate and heirs" caused the advertisement to be nothing worth, and the sale thereunder to be null. The various acts of sale in the chain of title from Lake, the purchaser at the tax sale, to the defendant McConnico, were referred to in the petition, which prayed that not only the tax sale, but all these various transfers between the several parties, be declared to be void, and the petitioner be recognized as the owner of the property, and entitled to the possession thereof.
of the following facts: 1st. that the property conveyed was subject to taxation; 2d., that none of the taxes for which said property was offered were paid, and said deed shall be conclusive evidence of the following facts: 1st, that the property was assessed according to law; 2d, that the taxes were levied according to law; 3d, that the property was advertised according to law; 4th, that the property was adjudicated and sold as stated in said deed; and 5th, that all the prerequisites of the law were complied with by all the officers from the assessment up to and including the execution and registry of the deed to said purchaser, and duly certified copies of said deeds shall be full proof without further evidence of all contained therein."
Acts La. 1884, p. 104.
"It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the property was not properly assessed for taxes prior to 1879, because the assessment was in the name of R. Castillo, instead of Rafael Maria Del Castillo. We are relieved of the necessity of passing on the question of the sufficiency of this assessment. The act of 1884 makes the deed conclusively of the sufficiency of the assessment of the property sold under it. The question of the competency of this legislation in this respect has been before this court on repeated occasions. The argument now addressed to us against the constitutionality and interpretation of the act must be viewed as directed against a series of decisions of this court. To those decisions we must adhere, and hold the act precludes the inquiry. In the Matter of Orloff Lake, 40 La.Ann. 142; In re Douglas, 41 La.Ann. 765; Breaux v. Negrotto, 43 La.Ann. 426 et seq. "
"In this case, the advertisement gave the full name of plaintiff, adding 'her estate or heirs.' In our view, the advertisement conformed to the requirement of the act."
argued, rendered it impossible to place the federal question on the record in the strict sense of the word, and caused it to be possible only to present such issue by means of the brief of counsel filed in the supreme court of the state before the hearing. This brief, duly certified by the clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, has been presented, and it is argued that in view of the system of practice obtaining in the State of Louisiana, this Court may look to the brief as a legitimate source of information, and Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 463, is relied on as supporting this proposition.
To decide the issue as to jurisdiction, we will at the outset ascertain whether a federal question was necessarily involved in the decision of the state supreme court. Even though it be that a federal controversy was decided, nevertheless, if the questions of a purely state character, upon which the Supreme Court of Louisiana passed, are completely adequate to sustain the decree by that court rendered, wholly independent of the federal question, it will result that no federal issue is presented for review. Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188, 165 U. S. 191; Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 441, and authorities referred to in both of the foregoing cases. And, if this conclusion be reached, it will be unnecessary to consider whether, under the practice which prevails in Louisiana, the federal question could have been presented in any other mode than by brief of counsel, and whether this fact would authorize this Court to go beyond the technical record, and look to such brief to aid in determining whether the federal issue was duly set up and claimed.
to determine whether the vices asserted to exist in the assessment and sale were of such a nature as to cause the enforcement of the assessment and sale to deprive the plaintiff in error of his property without due process of law. The contention advanced in argument on this subject is much broader than the case justifies. Thus, it is said the state statute directs that from a tax collector's deed a conclusive presumption of a previous assessment shall be deduced, hence the statute in terms is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, since it takes property under a tax sale, although no assessment whatever had ever been levied on the property so taken. But, as thus stated, the proposition presents a purely moot question. The plaintiff in error has no interest to assert that the statute is unconstitutional, because it might be construed so as to cause it to violate the Constitution. His right is limited solely to the inquiry whether, in the case which he presents, the effect of applying the statute is to deprive him of his property without due process of law.
did not cause it to be, in legal contemplation, no notice whatever. The contrary proposition could only be supported upon the theory that although a complete description of the property and the full name of the owner were inserted in the advertisement, the mere addition of the words referred to were so calculated to deceive and mislead as to render the notice legally inoperative. But such assumption would be to the last degree technical and unreasonable, and cannot be indulged in.
"It is not the province of this Court to interfere with the policy of the revenue laws of the states, nor with the interpretation given to them by their courts. Arkansas has the right to determine the manner of levying and collecting taxes, and can declare that the particular tract of land shall be chargeable with the taxes, no matter who is the owner, or in whose name it is assessed and advertised, and that an erroneous assessment does not vitiate a sale for taxes."
neglect to follow them may be remedied by the legislature unless its action in this respect is restrained by constitutional provisions prohibiting retrospective legislation. It is only necessary, therefore, in any case, to consider whether the assessment could have been ordered originally without requiring the proceedings, the omission or defective performance of which is complained of, or without requiring them within the time designated. If they were not essential to any valid assessment, and therefore might have been omitted or performed at another time, their omission or defective performance may be cured by the same authority which directed them, provided, always, that intervening rights are not impaired."
154 U. S. 421; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 322; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97.
this Court on appeal from a circuit court of the United States, and its decision involved ascertaining the meaning of the tax laws of the state as interpreted by the court of last resort thereof. In performing this duty, the court adopted and followed the construction given to the tax laws of the state by the supreme court of the state whence the case came.

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