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Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:10:59+00:00

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2 A. DOMAIN NAMES: THE UNDERLYING ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Registration Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The DN Resolution Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Domain Names and Trademarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 3 rulemaking, to markets as regulatory devices, to other forms of so-called “self regulation,” and even to privatization of previously governmental functions, less attention has been paid to semi-private rulemaking of the kind exemplified by the WIPO process, perhaps because until now it has been relatively rare. Semi-private rulemaking may be on the increase, however, as governments and others look for flexible and credible ways to regulate transnational phenomena such as the Internet. Whatever the long-run prospects for semi-private rulemaking, experience gained in the WIPO process provides useful lessons for the emerging semi-private rulemaking processes now taking shape under the rubric of ICANN. Indeed, ICANN seems set to re-invent the wheel several times over, as it creates a bewildering profusion of subsidiary bodies [Rutkowski, 1999], each of which will need to figure out its own rules of procedure. This paper offers a critical insider’s view of the WIPO Internet Domain Name process. It is an “insiders’s” view because I was a part of the process: I was a late addition to WIPO’s advisory “Experts” panel, brought in about one-third of the way into the domain name process described here. Nevertheless, in some important ways I was not an insider. My addition to the panel appears to have been in response to complaints that there were no civil liberties experts included in the original advisory group. For reasons that were never made clear to me, WIPO chose not to empanel a representative of the Domain Name Rights Coalition, the advocacy group that had the most expertise and the longest track record as a counterweight to intellectual property rights holders. Instead they sought an academic, and picked one who was not, by any standard, a trademark expert, although I had both written about civil liberties in cyberspace and practiced as an arbitration lawyer. Even so, appointing an internal institutionalized representative of civil liberties issues was a noble and courageous move on WIPO’s part, and I continue to hope that they do not now regret it especially since I was very public about my views as to where both WIPO’s Interim and Final Reports erred. [Froomkin 1999a, Froomkin 1999b] The WIPO experience raises broad questions about the appropriateness of public bodies engaging in creative procedures for rulemaking. As a general matter creativity of this short should be viewed with great caution, and perhaps even alarm. In democracies, traditional public rulemaking and rule-enforcement comes hedged with valuable substantive and procedural protections for those impacted by the rules. Semi-private processes may be subject to very attenuated democratic control at best, do not need to conform to due process, and if the WIPO process is any guide will be enforced in a way that makes it impossible to challenge the substance of the rules in any meaningful fashion. [Froomkin 1999c] All that, however, is another story: this article will focus on procedure and not on substance. Whether you agree with it or not, WIPO’s Final Report is elegantly written, contains a great deal of useful information, and sets out a clear view of the issues. I was very critical of some matters of substance, but my assessment of the procedure is that WIPO did many things right, and that those things can and should be emulated in any future semi-private process. I also will argue, however, that it did a few important things wrong–most of which could be avoided in the future. In fairness, however, one should note that WIPO was working on a very difficult issue, in a politically charged environment, to a short timetable, and that the WIPO process was in many ways the first of its kind.
Page 4 There are costs to going first, but one of the benefits is that those who come later can learn from the experience. There are also issues about how ICANN and others should weigh the end-product, the WIPO Final Report. External perceptions of the process may have diverged from what appeared, at least from my vantage point, to be the reality. These perceptions matter enormously in a semi-private rulemaking, because the end-product’s influence relies on perceptions of fair and encompassing process for its political legitimacy and potential adoption.
Page 10 have not been completely kind to the institution, and its caseload was low. [Bernstein 1998: § 1049]. Critics of the gTLD-MoU charged that its authors and proponents were over-solicitous of trademark interests, and they claimed that WIPO, a UN body charged with the promotion and protection of intellectual property, could not be a neutral body to hear or administer disputes between trademark holders and Internet-based competitors who might not have registered trademarks. The gTLD-MoU never achieved the critical mass of agreement necessary to claim consensus, and the belief that the plan was biased in favor of established trademark interests seems to have been a significant factor in the opposition. As passions ran high, many of those who opposed the gTLDMoU decided WIPO was in cahoots with those who sought to expand the rights of existing trademarks holders to additional world-wide rights online; even for other less dogmatic opponents, WIPO’s participation in what came to be seen as a partisan proposal made it next to impossible for them to conceive of WIPO as an honest broker. The White Paper’s call to WIPO to produce a study was thus not seen by all as a reference to a neutral, disinterested, expert body. On the contrary, by the time of the White Paper, battle lines were drawn and, at least in the eyes of the faction that wished to have new TLDs added to the legacy root quickly, WIPO was strongly identified with another faction, one that opposed large numbers of new gTLDs, and was very attentive to both the legitimate rights and the more ambitious claims of intellectual property holders. [Kleiman 1998] In the eyes of others, however, including the US government, WIPO was an expert body that could be asked to tackle an almost intractable problem. WIPO responded to the US government’s request for a report with the elaborate “Internet Domain Name Process” that is the subject of this paper. The WIPO process began a month after the White Paper, when WIPO published RFC 1, its draft “terms of reference,” [WIPO, 1998a] and culminated in a Final Report issued April 30, 1999. [WIPO, 1999]. ICANN ultimately adopted part of the suggestions in somewhat modified form. [ICANN 1999a, ICANN 1999b] Being an organ of the United Nations, responsible to all its member states rather than just the US, WIPO understandably felt empowered to define its own terms of reference rather than limit itself to the relatively narrow mandate set out in the White Paper. In its “Request for Comments 1,” WIPO set out a laundry list of possible issues it might address, and asked for comments. [ICANN 1998a: ¶¶ 4-5.] WIPO posted these on its web page, and invited e-mailed or written comments. WIPO received sixty-plus e-mailed comments, which were publicly archived on its web site. The large majority of which supported its approach. WIPO then met with its Panel of Experts (although NSI Chief Litigation Counsel Philip Sbarbaro and I were added later), and issued RFC 2 in midSeptember, 1998. [WIPO 1998b] In RFC2, WIPO stated that it intended to make recommendations concerning (1) dispute prevention, (2) dispute resolution, (3) process for the protection of famous and well-known marks in the gTLDs, and (4) effects on intellectual property rights of new gTLDs. [WIPO 1998b: ¶ 12]. WIPO thus gave itself a considerably broader and more ambitious charge than the fairly narrow one proposed by the US in the White Paper.
Page 12 attendees, but we were strongly discouraged from making statements of our own. In some cases, however, we did anyway, as did the members of the WIPO staff who efficiently chaired the meetings. The format was somewhat formal, but it was good-humored and there was a fair amount of give and take between panelists and audience, and even some comments from audience members responding to each other. The overall effect, however, was much more like a hearing before an administrative agency than, say, a faculty seminar. WIPO made audio files and transcripts of the meetings available on its website, although in most cases these did not become available until well after the actual meeting, or even after the close of the comment period. Perhaps because of the time lag, I had little sense that large numbers of attendees at one meeting were aware of, much less responding to, what persons said in earlier meetings; in this regard the presence of repeat participants from WIPO and the Panel of Experts provided most of what continuity there was. On-Line Consultations WIPO’s use of the Internet to further the consultative process was in some ways exemplary, in some ways poor, and in some ways timid. It was exemplary in that WIPO designed an attractive web site that was easy to navigate and which contained all the critical information about the process in very readable form. Although English was the primary working language for most meetings and commentaries, WIPO-produced materials and reports were available not only in English, but also in Spanish and French. WIPO reports that the web site received more than 700,000 “web hits”during the life of the process, although whether “web hits” are independent visits or page views is unclear. [WIPO, 1999: Annex 3, § 4]. Even taking the narrowest measure, in which the same people revisited the site repeatedly, this surely represents many thousands of independent visitors. The volume of traffic is all the more impressive as publicizing the web site does not appear to have been an especially high priority. Furthermore WIPO made e-mail announcements to a mailing list it created and also set up an e-mail discussion group. The utility of the mailing lists was limited, however, by the “consultative” paradigm: the ultimate authors of the WIPO report, the WIPO staff, read the list but did not post to it. There was thus very little traffic on it, and the discussions that started tended to fizzle out quickly in the absence of any sign of intellectual engagement from the management. Given that WIPO is a somewhat bureaucratic body, and a part of the UN at that, it is unsurprising that staff may have been reluctant to engage in public dialog on an ad hoc basis. In contrast, there was a private list for the advisory panel, to which WIPO staff did contribute. WIPO also received and publicly archived e-mailed comments to each of its three requests for comments. Again, the web tools were commendably easy to use and the comments easy to read, but the discussion was essentially one-way and one-time per request for comments. Comments were directed to WIPO, most came in at or near the deadline. WIPO did not undertake to reply, and there was little dialog amongst commentators.
Page 14 RFC 3, the "Interim Report," which contained WIPO’s first draft of its proposals. That report noted the Experts were not responsible for the text, [WIPO, 1998c: Annex I] but this fact often seemed to have been lost on attendees at the regional consultations I attended. As noted above, several Experts attended each of the regional consultations. We then had another two-day meeting to discuss the comments on the Interim Report in Geneva in March, 1999. Again, this was not a drafting session. We were promised time to review the text of the final report before it would be issued. In fact, chapters 2-5 arrived by e-mail during what proved to the final week before publication, with the last one arriving perhaps two days before the report was issued. This made commenting in detail rather difficult. None of the Annexes in the Final Report, some of which contain critical procedural recommendations, were sent to the Experts prior to publication. Both the Interim and the Final Report were drafted privately by WIPO staff after the close of the public comment periods, and after meeting with the panel. Mission Blur The purpose of the WIPO process was to produce a useful document. But uncertainties and varying perceptions as to the objective of the exercise – to whom the document should be useful, and for what purpose – lurked throughout the process. On the one hand, WIPO is part of the United Nations; as such it represents the nations and peoples of the world. It is thus seen by many, especially in the less-developed countries, as more than an honest broker, rather a trustee, a protector of their interests. In addition, both the White Paper and WIPO’s own terms of reference spoke of a balanced and transparent process–the kind of language that suggests a search for consensus. On the other hand, WIPO exists “to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world.” Indeed, the many thoughtful and intelligent staff members I came into contact with appeared sincerely committed to this mission from the highest of motives. The history of the gTLD-MoU further polarized WIPO’s position. The suggestions relating to famous marks, mentioned above, were the most controversial of the recommendations in the Interim Report that survived into the Final Report. Even the trademark bar appeared divided, since there is great uncertainty as to how the WIPO tribunals would work in practice, and also some worry about the effects on a mark that applied for designation as globally famous but was rejected. However, several large trademark holders felt intensely about the issue. In their view the most famous marks had been the ones most frequently victimized by cybersquatters who counted on the expense of a court case to extort substantial ransoms before releasing domains they had registered. To these trademark holders, the introduction of new gTLDs threatened to repeat the expensive and painful experience over and over again. They were adamant that no new gTLDs open to all comers should be created until and unless someone mandated a policy that would protect famous marks. Although it certainly had a significant number of vociferous supporters, no one who observed the process could plausibly claim that WIPO’s decision to keep the famous marks proposal essentially unchanged reflected a consensus on the issue, because there clearly was no consensus. Here, WIPO was clearly acting in some role more like advocate than consensus-builder, although precisely whose advocate was not explained.
Page 15 Everyone involved in the process understood that the WIPO report was only advisory, and that the NewCo described in the White Paper (later, ICANN) would make the ultimate decision after some further process. In my opinion–and what follows is inevitably a subjective view–the advisory, intermediate, character of the report affected the deliberative dynamic in a number of subtle ways: it reduced participation, polarized positions, and removed pressure for a truly transparent process. The WIPO DNS process happened during a busy time for Internet governance. The main stage was occupied by the debates over larger issues raised by the White Paper, especially the nature and structure of the “NewCo.” that would ultimately become ICANN. Many people without a direct financial interest in the trademark/cybersquatting issue felt, reasonably enough, that given onrushing deadlines, and limited time and resources, it was more important to focus on the fundamental structural issues being decided about NewCo, especially when it seemed clear that once NewCo was up and running they would have a chance to be heard on the intellectual property issues. This attitude was not lost on the trademark partisans within the WIPO process. It would not be surprising if the fear of being asked to make further compromises later led to a hardening of positions, since there was an evident danger that any compromise offered in the WIPO process might become an hors d’oeuvre. The result was that, even from my vantage point near the center of the WIPO process, it was not always clear to what extent various participants intended the final product to be a statement of a consensus position of all affected parties, or a consensus of the intellectual property community, or a bargaining token to be played before NewCo. Few people took the bargaining chip view, at least out loud. WIPO staff tended to suggest they were searching for a general consensus or at least an outcome fair to everyone, but at times they and other participants seemed to feel that their most effective contribution would to forge a consensus among an IP community that was itself of several minds on the key issues, and that it would be unreasonable to expect any more under the circumstances. C. WIPO PROCESS COMPARED TO OTHER TYPES OF RULEMAKING The WIPO domain name process can be usefully contrasted to international intergovernmental rulemaking via executive agreements or treaties, and also to a US federal agency notice and comment rulemaking. The WIPO process bore little resemblance to a traditional public international law-making or agreement procedure. For one thing, other than authorizing the WIPO secretariate to proceed [WIPO, 1998d: #P643_157650], governments appeared in the WIPO process primarily as commentators; the Final Report was drafted by the Secretariat and forwarded to ICANN without first being approved by the WIPO General Assembly. This differs from both the treatymaking and executive-agreement processes in which, whoever may do the actual drafting, states must take a formal action to ratify and effectuate the decision. In contrast, the WIPO process bore a substantial similarity to a US agency rulemaking, although the two processes also had critical differences. The look and feel of the experience of attending a hearing was remarkably like an US agency promulgating rules under the informal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Like a US agency engaged in informal rulemaking, WIPO published proposed texts, held public hearings, invited written comments, then published its final disposition.
Page 17 current ICANN process, may need considerably more time to allow people to comment when large numbers of issues are being considered in parallel, and information about what is going on is more dispersed and fragmented. The citizen’s right to comment under the APA [5 U.S.C. § 553] has received particularly important judicial glosses: the right to comment must be meaningful, not just a formality. One cannot, for example, have a meaningful opportunity to comment if one is denied access to relevant data, or if the agency adopts a final rule that could not have been reasonably foreseen from the notice of proposed rulemaking. [Kannan 1996] WIPO’s willingness to make substantial changes to its interim report demonstrates both the value of taking public comment and the organization’s willingness to listen. Nevertheless, at some imperfectly defined point, the introduction of new material after the close of the final comment period raises questions about the status of the final document. As the D.C. Circuit famously put it, a final rule should not be a "bolt from the blue". [Shell Oil v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 1991)] If a final rule diverges too much from a proposed rule, an agency must engage in another round of notice and comment. The WIPO Final Report contained a wealth of material not found in the interim draft. All the procedural sections, for example, were completely new and in my opinion fit into the “bolt” category. Similarly, although the White Paper asked WIPO to define cyberpiracy, WIPO’s Interim Report contained at most a very dubious definition of cybersquatting. [WIPO, 1998c: ¶ 244; Froomkin, 1998b: ¶ 164]. In contrast, the Final Report produced a substantially different and considerably superior definition. [WIPO, 1999: ¶¶ 171-172] Whether the second definition was a “logical outgrowth” of the first is, I think, debatable. My point is not that WIPO erred in changing its definition, quite the contrary, but rather than the decision to do significant new work after the close of the comment period sometimes makes another round of comments necessary. As the WIPO report was only an advisory report to ICANN, and ICANN itself would need to engage in its own comment procedure, this need was perhaps less great than usual–so long as everyone was clear on what had happened. Alas, this does not appear to have been the case. Many participants in the ICANN process have cited the WIPO report not only for the force of its arguments, but as the product of a consensus-seeking process in which its ideas were subjected to searching international examination. Cries of estoppel are not, I believe, reasonable on these facts, but the ad hoc nature of semi-private rulemaking makes unproductive debate over the import of what was agreed all too likely. Professor David Post’s suggestion that would-be Internet rulemakers take responsibility for documenting outreach and consensus [Post, 1999] is well-taken, but the WIPO experience demonstrates that documentation by the institution may not suffice. WIPO in fact did an excellent job of documenting the very elaborate series of consultations it undertook. [WIPO, 1999: ¶ 30(i)] On its face this appears to be excellent outreach. What the numbers do not tell you, however, is how much or little WIPO publicized the meetings and website, or to whom, and how lopsided (from my admittedly partisan perspective, of course) the participation in those meetings was–especially before a very small number of observers concerned about the process mounted a campaign to broaden awareness. The APA imposes a number of duties on agencies, including restrictions on ex parte contacts.
Page 20 keep the advantages of the form, which I take to be rapid start of a process, relative rapidity of decision, and regulatory creativity, while adding in as many of the bureaucratic and Internet virtues as possible. The bureaucratic virtues include predictability, regularity, and review. The selfregulatory virtues, sometimes called Internet virtues, include openness, explanation, and sometimes excessive debate in the search for consensus. A semi-private process may appear to offer the hope of working to a fast timetable, but this speed comes at a cost. It is no accident that the legitimacy of standards process is based on (over)full debate, and that even agency processes require a fresh round of notice and comment if the final rule begins to diverge too much from the one in the notice of proposed rulemaking. D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Regarding one critical matter, the WIPO process was a significant success: WIPO ultimately produced a clear definition of cybersquatting (abusive registrations) that, despite its flaws, was considerably superior to those before it. That definition subsequently underwent additional refinement both before the US Congress [Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act] and before ICANN [ICANN 1999a], but the WIPO process undoubtedly played a pivotal role in framing the issues, and in moving the discussion forward. Other parts of the report, notably the recommendations relating to famous marks, were in my opinion less welcome and undoubtedly much more controversial. Ultimately, however, the WIPO experience may be more important as a trail-blazing process than for any conclusions it reached. Lessons learned from this first run can be used to improve any future attempts at a semi-private process: Beware Mission Blur. Everyone, not least the parties managing the process, needs to have a clear sense of goal, and of the managing institutions role in achieving it. Outreach and Real Notice are Essential. Putting up a wonderful web page is important, but it is not enough. A very significant outreach program is needed to tell potentially affected parties about a semi-private process; in most cases there will be no reason to expect them to hear about it otherwise. In addition, long lead times are needed to allow information to propagate. If there are physical meetings, they (and, to the maximum extent feasible, their agendas) need to be announced well before the 21-day deadline for cheaper airfares. Last-minute changes need to be kept to a minimum, and if group decisions will be taken at physical or virtual meetings, procedural rules may need to be worked out with some detail in advance. Involvement Can Affect Outcomes. At the risk of immodesty, it is probably fair to claim I was the most vocal, or at least verbose, critic of WIPO’s interim report. [Froomkin, 1999a; Froomkin, 1999b] By no means all of my criticisms were adopted, or even addressed, in the Final Report. Nevertheless, many were, and I came away impressed with the degree to which participants were listening to opinions with which they tended to disagree.
Page 21 Visible Intellectual Engagement by the Deciders Promotes Participation. The absence of judicial review in semi-private rulemaking might be turned into a benefit if the persons charged with writing the final rule are emboldened to engage in discussions with the public rather than have communications be essentially one-way. If there is no court breathing down your neck, the risks of saying something in public are less. Internet norms envision the deciders taking part in the give and take with commentators on mailing lists or similar interactive mechanisms. Without this interaction, potential commentators will be less likely to take part. Furthermore, although costly in staff time, there is more to be learned from a very interactive conversation than a small series of set piece meetings. Explain and Document Procedures. The ad hoc nature of the process creates a greater need to explain the reasons for a decision. The explanation needs to both document the outreach, the consensus if any, and the reasons. This imposes substantial costs in staff time and in reader time as well, but a detailed report like the WIPO document is nonetheless greatly preferable to something conclusory. Be Prepared for “Swerves”. A good consultative process creates the risk of learning new things. Sometimes, often perhaps, these will require very substantial changes in existing proposals, or even wholly new ones. When that happens, another round of comments is essential, especially if the new ideas were not reasonably foreseeable from the process that preceded them. This has negative implications for the timetable. One way to blunt this danger, therefore, is to have the decision-makers engaged in a public dialog (e.g. an archived mailing list) with interested parties. If the thinking of the deciders begins to shift towards something new, detailed discussion of the proposal in a public forum reduces the “bolt from the blue” factor. Caveat Lector. I have argued elsewhere that the greatest challenge posed by ad hoc rulemaking is figuring out when a processes was sufficiently legitimate to be worthy of respect. [Froomkin, 1999c: 631] In this paper I have tried to suggest that although the task of running a semiprivate process that is not only legitimate but demonstrably so is not trivial, there are a number of things the convening body can do to at least run a better process. Whether even those suffice to overcome the fundamentally undemocratic nature of semi-private rulemaking remains debatable.
BERNSTEIN, R. ET AL., HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE (3RD ED. 1998) London : Sweet & Maxwell Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise And Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 Duke L.J. 1255 (1997); Domains FAQ §2.3, ftp://ftp.is.co.za/usenet/news.answers/internet/tcp-ip/domains-faq/part1 A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 ILL. L. REV. 543, available online http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/reinvent.htm. A. Michael Froomkin, 1999a, A http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf/critique.htm .
ELLEN RONY & PETER RONY, THE DOMAIN NAME HANDBOOK (1998). R&D BookS Emeryville, CA E. Rony & P. Rony, Domain Name Handbook, 1999, ICANN-accredited Registrars http://www.domainhandbook.com/registrars.html OSRC Root Zone, How To Use New Domain Names, http://support.open-rsc.org/How_To/ . Rutkowski, T., (1999), After ICANN-GAC. http://www.wia.org/icann/after_icann-gac.htm.
David Pos t , IC AN N a n d the Consensus of the Internet http://www.icannwatch.org/archives/essays/935183341.shtml (Aug. 20, 1999).
Page 24 WORLD INTELLECT UAL PROPERT Y ORGANIZAT ION, http://wipo2.wipo.int/process/eng/timetable.html.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, Contracting Parties of Treaties Administered by WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/eng/ratific/c-wipo.htm. [WIPO 1998d] WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, A/33/8 - General Report adopted by the Assemblies of the Member States (Sept. 15, 1998), http://www.wipo.int/eng/document/govbody/wo_gb_ab/a33_8-14.htm#P643_157650. WIPO, 1998e, Palo Alto meeting transcript, ftp://wipo2.wipo.int/pub/process/eng/sf-transcript-en.rtf Statutes Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, PL 106-113, November 29, 1999, 113 Stat 1501, § 3001 et seq. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 561 et seq. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at Lanham Act 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)); Treaties Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, (July 14, 1967, as amended) http://www.wipo.int/eng/iplex/wo_wip0_.htm Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1883, as amended at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), GATT Doc. MTN/FA IA1C (Dec. 15, 1993) Cases Aveery Dennison v. Sumpton (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 1999, no. 9855810), available online at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=9th&navby=case&no=9855810.
Page 25 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978). Prince PLC v. Prince Sports Group, Inc., Chancery Division 30 July 1997,  FSR 21 Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

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