Source: https://gilmerlegal.com/lawyer/blog/page_6/The-Gilmer-Law-Firm,-PLLC.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 23:02:58+00:00

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While divorce isn't always inevitable, death is. Unfortunately, sometimes the two intersect.
In many cases, this frankly simplifies matters. For example, there is usually no longer a need to battle an estranged spouse on matters of child custody, visitation or maintenance costs.
However, Brooklyn divorce attorneys recognize there are many situations in which a death in the midst of divorce could make matters more convoluted. Take for example the Yonkers case of Bordas v. Bordas.
She was a Naval reservist who had retired from the military to become a high school social studies teacher. He was also a teacher, which was how the pair met. They married and had two daughters.
But then, in 2012, after more than a dozen years of marriage, the husband filed for divorce, citing an irretrievable breakdown of their relationship. Less than six months later, the 38-year-old wife committed suicide after consuming a lethal mix of prescription drugs.
That might have ended proceedings right there. However, the widower then learned that his deceased wife, before she died, removed him as a beneficiary from her retirement account and life insurance policies. Instead, she named their two daughters, ages 10 and 13, as beneficiaries. This alone might not have been a major issue, but for the fact that she indicated if something happened to the girls, the entire $500,000 payout should go to her boyfriend.
Soon after, the widower filed a motion in the divorce case, which was still pending, arguing that the transfer of money and assets prior to her death violated legal guidelines. Generally, those assets and accounts would be considered marital property, meaning it would be subject to equitable division.
However, the fact that she is deceased could mean the husband won't be able to do much about it. A Westchester state Supreme Court justice called the wife's actions "regrettable," noting that the wife had seemingly "reached beyond the grave" to stymie her estranged husband's efforts to recover his share of assets, he said there was simply nothing the court could do to remedy the violation.
An attorney representing the husband called the ruling "unfair" in a quote offered to the New York Post. She said an appeal may be the appropriate next step. She cited other examples where courts will seek to hold people responsible for actions even after their deaths. For instance, police may issue a citation to a deceased drunk driver who caused a crash resulting in injury and death to others.
While a criminal trial might not proceed such action, a civil trial might.
There is evidence to suggest the ruling in this case is outside the norm. Many states have held that the death of a spouse during divorce results in the termination of continuing maintenance payments, they have also generally held that the surviving spouse should still at the very least receive his or her fair share of the marital property. In some instances, lump sum alimony awards have been granted from the deceased party's estate.
Additionally, surviving spouses can't assume that the divorce action will be dropped entirely after a death.
Though the assets acquired during the marriage might be in both party's names, once the divorce action is filed, equitable interest in the property becomes vested as part of the estate, and may still be divided. Whatever is left in your former spouse's estate might then go to any beneficiaries he or she has named.
Of course, you can't know at the beginning of a divorce proceeding whether death is on the horizon for either of you. Preparing for the possibility by hiring an experienced divorce attorney will assure you that in the event of an untimely passing, your interests will be defended.
New York was late to the no-fault divorce bandwagon, being the last state in the country to approve the proceedings in 2010.
However, New York City divorce lawyers know this does not mean neither party will be held culpable for misdeeds during the marriage, especially when that misconduct is financial in nature. For example, a husband who spends thousands of dollars buying jewelry and other gifts for a mistress will likely have to account for that money during the divorce settlement. So too will a wife who squanders a fair portion of a joint savings account to feed a gambling addiction.
The courts also have specific means of dealing with individuals who attempt to purposely sell off marital property in an effort to keep it from the spouse. This particular action is referred to concealment of assets by fraudulent conveyance.
This issue was addressed recently in Stanley v. Stanely by the West Virginia Supreme Court, which also has specific laws regarding the conveyance of marital property. There, state statute says that spouses have 30 days to notify one another of real estate conveyance. If they don't and a divorce is filed within five years of that conveyance, the other spouse is entitled to compensation for what would have been his or her share of that property.
Here, the wife entered the marriage with 27 acres of land, on which her home was located. The husband moved in, provided $30,000 for her to pay off the deed trust on the property (so that she could legally own it in full) and additionally made various improvements to the property over the years.
Following a decade of marriage, the pair sought a divorce. The husband initially offered to forfeit his interest in the property - and the marital home on it - if she would simply reimburse him his $30,000. She agreed at first, but then later backed out.
The court would later learn that instead, she legally gifted the property to her five adult children. She reportedly did so without providing notice to her husband of this deal.
The family court agreed that notice was not properly given, and ordered that the value of the property be considered as marital property for purposes of equitable distribution. That ruling was reversed by the circuit court, but then that ruling was reversed by the state supreme court, which backed the family judge's ruling.
As the property already legally belongs to a third party (the children), the court, in seeking equitable distribution, will likely offset that value against whatever the wife would have otherwise been awarded. So for example, her entitlement to her ex-husband's life insurance benefits, retirement accounts, savings, etc. could be significantly curtailed as a result of the decision.
New York spouses who believe they have been similarly taken may wish to take action under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, codified in N.Y. Debt. Cred. Law. §§ 270 – 281.
An example of this was the lawsuit of Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, in 2001, wherein the wife accused both her husband and his brother of concealing marital estate assets, with the husband transferring property to his brother prior to the divorce. The court held that she could pursue damages under the UFCA.
Further, the 2006 ruling in Jackson v. Brinkman indicated that a divorcing spouse can forfeit the right to recover a certain marital asset if the claim of wrongful transferee of marital property is not properly joined to a pending divorce case. Knowing whether such action is appropriate requires the review of an experienced New York divorce lawyer.
It can be tempting when pursuing action in family court to represent ones' self. After all, it's not required, and why not save the money on attorney's fees, right?
The problem is that this often ends up costing more in the long run, whether directly in cash or assets or, as in cases of child custody, parenting time and other benefits that one may deem important.
Our Brooklyn family law attorneys are dedicated to fighting for our clients, even in complex cases, and we strive to keep our prices reasonable in doing so. That's why we offer $399 uncontested divorce assistance, and $599 uncontested divorce assistance in cases involving children.
These costs should be considered investments in yours and your children's future. The recent case of Davidson v. Carrillo is an illustration of how not hiring an attorney can backfire.
In this case out of Wyoming, the parents had two children together. While both parents were separated, the relationship was cordial and both parents indicated that while they had greatly varying styles of parenting, they each respected the other.
For a time, the older child, who had special needs, was living with the father while the younger child was living with the mother. Both parents worked jobs earning less than minimum wage, though the mother was attending school full-time.
The father filed a petition seeking primary custody of the younger child, indicating it was in the children's best interests to live together, as they shared a close relationship. He also sought child support. He did both things without the aid of an attorney, and both of his requests were granted.
The problem was the terms on which these requests were granted. The parenting time order the court reached essentially gave the mother more daytime hours with the children than the father, despite his position as the parent with primary custody. Additionally, the mother was ordered to pay $280 monthly in child support payments, which the father would later contend were insufficient and improper because no financial affidavit had been requested prior to the order. Also, the court did not order those payments to made retroactively. The father would also later argue that his due process rights were circumvented when the court limited the amount of time during the trial court hearing in which he was allowed to cross-examine his ex-wife.
The Wyoming Supreme Court granted review upon appeal, which was also filed pro se (without a lawyer). The state high court rejected all of the husband's arguments. The court found that most lacked merit, but beyond that, husband had failed to raise objections to these issues during the trial court hearing. Raising objections during hearings - even if they are overruled - preserves the issue for later consideration upon appeal.
This is something we would not necessarily expect someone who is not an attorney to know. In fact, there are many procedural issues of which the parties involved may not be aware.
By all accounts, this individual fared better than most, having been granted his initial requests. This was likely due to the fact that, by all accounts, he was articulate and respectful and presented a good case. However, the divided outcome shows that this is not always enough.
While it's impossible to say for sure, there is a likelihood that had he been represented by an attorney, the outcome may have been more to his advantage.
In filing for a Brooklyn divorce, one of the first things both sides will seek to establish is a full accounting of a couple's assets, income, and interests. It is then up to the court to determine whether such property is divisible as part of marital property, or whether it should be retained solely by one spouse as separate property.
What is considered marital property and what is considered separate is a determination that varies from state-to-state. Generally, though, assets acquired during the marriage are marital. Those acquired before or received under special circumstances may be held separate.
As the recent case of Coburn v. Cook shows, this determination can impact not only whether a party gets to keep the property in question, but may also impact how other property is divided.
This is a case out of Vermont, which, like New York, is an equitable distribution state. This means the court is going to seek to divide marital assets equitably (which does not necessarily mean "evenly").
The dispute upon appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court was whether a husband's "expectancy interest" in a property should have been lumped in with the other marital assets.
Here, the parties married in 1997. They had a daughter in 1999 and separated in 2010. The court issued a final divorce order in 2013, when the wife was 48 and husband 55.
Prior to the marriage, the wife had her own horse stabling and training business, with property valued at $260,000. The husband assisted, and as a labor intensive operation, it was worth more when they worked together than when she worked alone. The husband also worked various other jobs. In 2010, prior to the couple's separation, the husband's mother deeded a 160-acre family farm to her son, though she retained a life estate and the power to sell or mortgage the property during her life. That property was appraised at $425,000, plus there was an adjacent empty lot he owned valued at $15,000. The parties also owned a small joint business together valued at $40,000.
The court analyzed both parties' employment and living situations, with the husband living with his mother and working part-time as a bus driver and the wife continuing to work in her stabling business and also running the business she started with her husband.
The court awarded the wife the horse stabling property, an adjacent lot, the couple's joint business and other personal property. The husband was awarded his mother's farm, the adjacent lot and other items of personal property. The court determined the value of the wife's award was around $436,000 while the husband's was around $453,000. No spousal support was awarded.
The husband appealed, arguing that the court wrongly included his mother's farm in the marital estate. He held that the terms of the warranty deed meant that he held an interest that would be considered similar to that of a beneficiary in a will or revocable trust. The court overlooked this fact, he contended. As such, the wife retained a disproportionate share of the marital estate.
The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with him on the first argument. While noting that the court has a wide range of discretion in determining what is marital property, the court harkened back to earlier case law that held any interest a spouse held as a beneficiary under a revocable trust or will wasn't deemed marital property, ripe for court-ordered distribution, if the settlor was still alive. The reason was that the property was or interest was a mere "expectancy."
The court ruled that in the Coburn case, the husband's interest in the property was inchoate, or not fully developed, and therefore could not be distributed as marital property.
The same kind of outcome could generally be expected in New York, though the major exception with expectancy of interest would be pensions or retirement benefits. The courts have ruled that these are earned by both spouses in a marriage, and may be considered as marital assets available for division.

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