Source: https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-24_IRB
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:41:24+00:00

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This revenue ruling provides guidance to employers funding their retiree health benefits through a wholly owned subsidiary. The ruling concludes that the arrangement is insurance for federal income tax purposes.
Federal rates; adjusted federal rates; adjusted federal long-term rate and the long-term exempt rate. For purposes of sections 382, 642, 1274, 1288, and other sections of the Code, tables set forth the rates for June 2014.
This revenue ruling holds that tangible assets used in converting corn to fuel grade ethanol are properly included in asset class 49.5 of Rev. Proc. 87–56 for depreciation purposes.
This notice provides guidance on an amendment to reflect the outcome of United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) that is adopted after the beginning of a plan year that is effective during a plan year (“mid-year amendment”) to a plan described in Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) § 401(k)(12) or (13) (“§ 401(k) safe harbor plan”) or § 401(m)(11) or (12) (“§ 401(m) safe harbor plan”) of the Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Q&A-8; of Notice 2014–19, 2014–17 IRB 979.
This notice updates the appendix to Notice 2013–1, which lists the Indian tribes who have settled tribal trust cases against the United States. Notice 2012–60 originally was published in IRB 2012–41 (October 9, 2012). Notice 2012–60 was superceded by Notice 2013–1 IRB 2013–3, and the appendix to Notice 2013–1 was superceded by Notice 2013–16 (IRB 2013–14), then Notice 2013–36, then Notice 2013–55, and then Notice 2014–22. However, an additional tribe has settled its case against the United States since the publication of Notice 2014–22, so we are publishing an updated appendix to Notice 2013–1. This notice would supercede Notice 2014–22.
What is the proper asset class under Rev. Proc. 87–56, 1987–2 C.B. 674, as clarified and modified by Rev. Proc. 88–22, 1988–1 C.B. 785, for the depreciation of tangible assets that are used in converting corn to fuel grade ethanol?
Taxpayer owns a facility operated primarily to produce fuel grade ethanol. Fuel grade ethanol is a colorless, flammable liquid that is an organic chemical, and a high octane alternative fuel source. Taxpayer produces fuel grade ethanol from corn.
Taxpayer grinds the corn into flour, mixes the resulting corn flour with water, increases the temperature, and adds enzymes to convert the starch in the solution to simple sugars. Taxpayer feeds the resulting mash (water, sugars, and non-convertible solids) into fermentation tanks where yeast is added. Over a period of several days the yeast metabolizes the sugars into ethanol and carbon dioxide (CO2). The CO2 produced during fermentation may be collected, compressed, and sold as a by-product.
Taxpayer then sends the ethanol solution to distillation columns to separate the ethanol from the solids and water. After distillation, taxpayer produces fuel grade ethanol by further processing part of the output using dehydration to increase alcohol content. Dehydration is accomplished by using molecular sieves that separate the remaining water molecules from the ethanol. Once the dehydration is complete, Taxpayer blends the fuel grade ethanol with 2 to 5 percent denaturant (such as natural gasoline or unleaded gasoline) and sends it to storage pending sale.
Taxpayer also processes the solids and other liquids derived from the distillation to produce distillers grains, an animal feed supplement, which it sells. More than 50 percent of the economic output at Taxpayer’s facility is from fuel grade ethanol production.
Section 167(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that there shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion and wear and tear of property used in a trade or business or held for the production of income.
The depreciation deduction provided by § 167(a) for tangible property placed in service after 1986 generally is determined under § 168, which prescribes two methods of accounting for determining depreciation allowances: (1) the general depreciation system in § 168(a); and (2) the alternative depreciation system in § 168(g). Under either depreciation system, the depreciation deduction is computed by using a prescribed depreciation method, recovery period, and convention. This revenue ruling addresses the applicable recovery period.
The applicable recovery period for purposes of either § 168(a) or § 168(g) is determined by reference to class life or by statute. Section 168(i)(1) provides that the term “class life” means the class life (if any) that would apply to any property as of January 1, 1986, under former § 167(m) as if it were in effect and the taxpayer had made an election under that section. Prior to its revocation, § 167(m) provided that, if a taxpayer elected the asset depreciation range system of depreciation, the depreciation deduction would be computed based on the class life prescribed by the Secretary that reasonably reflected the anticipated useful life of that class of property to the industry or other group. Rev. Proc. 87–56 sets forth the class lives of property in effect as of January 1, 1986, that are necessary to compute depreciation under § 168.
Section 1.167(a)–11(b)(4)(iii)(b) of the Income Tax Regulations provides rules for classifying property under former § 167(m) and, under these rules, property is included in the asset class for the activity for which the property is primarily used (the “primary use” test). Property is classified according to its primary use even though the activity for which the property is primarily used is insubstantial in relation to all the activities of the taxpayer.
Courts have considered the “primary use” standard for asset classification under § 1.167(a)–11(b)(4)(iii)(b). See, e.g., Clajon Gas Co, L.P. v. Commissioner, 354 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2004). In applying the “primary use” test, courts have clarified that the actual purpose and function of an asset determines its asset class (a use-driven functional standard) rather than the terminology used to describe an asset.
Rev. Proc. 87–56 sets forth the class lives of property that are necessary to compute the depreciation allowance under § 168. This revenue procedure establishes two broad categories of depreciable assets: (1) asset classes 00.11 through 00.4, which consist of specific assets used in all business activities (asset categories); and (2) asset classes 01.1 through 80.0, which consist of assets used in specific business activities (activity categories). The same item of depreciable property may fall within both an asset category and an activity category, in which case the item is generally classified in the asset category. See Norwest Corporation & Subsidiaries v.
Commissioner, 111 T.C. 105, 162 (1998).
Asset class 49.5 of Rev. Proc. 87–56, Waste Reduction and Resource Recovery Plants, includes assets used in the conversion of refuse or other solid waste or biomass to heat or to a solid, liquid, or gaseous fuel. This asset class also includes all process plant equipment and structures at the site used to (1) receive, handle, collect, and process refuse or other solid waste or biomass to a solid, liquid, or gaseous fuel, or (2) handle and burn refuse or other solid waste or biomass in a waterwall combustion system, oil or gas pyrolysis system, or refuse derived fuel system to create hot water, gas, steam, or electricity. Asset class 49.5 also includes material recovery and support assets used in refuse or solid refuse or solid waste receiving, collecting, handling, sorting, shredding, classifying, and separation systems. Asset class 49.5 does not include any package boilers, or electric generators and related assets such as electricity, hot water, steam, and manufactured gas production plants classified in classes 00.4, 49.13, 49.221, and 49.4 of Rev. Proc. 87–56. Asset class 49.5 includes, however, all other utilities such as water supply and treatment facilities, ash handling, and other related land improvements of a waste reduction and resource recovery plant. Assets in class 49.5 have a recovery period of 7 years for purposes of § 168(a) and 10 years for purposes of § 168(g).
Asset class 28.0 of Rev. Proc. 87–56, Manufacture of Chemicals and Allied Products, includes assets used to manufacture basic organic and inorganic chemicals; chemical products to be used in further manufacture, such as synthetic fibers and plastics materials; and finished chemical products. This asset class also includes, among other things, all land improvements associated with plant site or production processes, such as effluent ponds and canals, provided such land improvements are depreciable but does not include buildings and structural components as defined in § 1.48–1(e). Asset class 28.0 does not include assets used in the manufacture of finished rubber and plastic products or in the production of natural gas products, butane, propane, and by-products of natural gas production plants. Assets in class 28.0 have a recovery period of 5 years for purposes of § 168(a) and 9.5 years for purposes of § 168(g).
Rev. Rul. 77–63, 1977–1 C.B. 60, establishes that the mere use of a chemical process in the production of a product does not require an activity to be classified in asset class 28.0. That revenue ruling addresses the question of whether assets used to produce alumina are classified in asset class 33.2, Manufacture of Primary Nonferrous Metals, despite the fact that production used chemical processes. The chemical processes were part of the taxpayer’s overall process of producing semi-finished and finished aluminum products from bauxite ore that the taxpayer mined. Asset class 33.2 includes assets used in the smelting, refining, and electrolysis of nonferrous metals from ore. Rev. Rul. 77–63 concludes that the chemical processes used to produce the alumina were an integral part of refining of the nonferrous metal and further concludes that all of the assets used in the processing of the bauxite ore into primary aluminum (basic metal), including those used in the chemical processes to produce alumina, are classified in asset class 33.2. However, the revenue ruling provides that assets used to process the alumina for use in activities other than those required to produce the basic metal should be classified in other asset classes.
Asset class 49.5 of Rev. Proc. 87–56 specifically applies to assets used in the conversion of biomass to a liquid fuel. Under energy credit provisions that were enacted near the same time asset class 49.5 was first established in 1979 by Rev. Proc. 79–26, 1979–1 C.B. 566, “biomass” means any organic substance other than oil, natural gas, coal, or product of oil or natural gas or coal. See § 48(l)(15)(B)(i), (l)(3)(B) as in effect on the day before the date of enactment [11/5/90] of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–508. The depreciation and the former energy credit provisions of section 48(l) are both based on cost recovery concepts. Although § 48B(c)(4)(A) also includes a definition of biomass, that provision was enacted significantly later as part of the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 109–58) and is specific to the production of synthesis gas. Accordingly, the definition of biomass in former § 48(l) is a more appropriate definition of biomass for purposes of asset class 49.5.
The corn used in Taxpayer’s facility is biomass, that is, an organic substance other than oil, natural gas, coal, or a product thereof. Likewise, the fuel grade ethanol produced from corn (biomass) at Taxpayer’s facility is liquid fuel for purposes of asset class 49.5.
Asset class 28.0 of Rev. Proc. 87–56, which includes assets used to manufacture basic chemicals, is not the appropriate asset class for Taxpayer’s depreciable tangible assets that are used in converting corn to fuel grade ethanol, even though the interim product, ethanol, is an organic chemical. Taxpayer is primarily engaged in producing fuel grade ethanol, which is a liquid fuel, from corn, which is a biomass, at the facility. The production of ethanol by Taxpayer at the facility is integral to Taxpayer’s production of the final product, fuel grade ethanol. The production of ethanol as an interim part of the production of fuel grade ethanol and the conversion of corn to fuel grade ethanol by chemical processes does not require classification in asset class 28.0 or preclude classification in the asset class that specifically applies to the conversion of biomass to fuel. Accordingly, under the “primary use” test of § 1.167(a)–11(b)(4)(iii)(b), Taxpayer’s activity is described in asset class 49.5.
The proper asset class under Rev. Proc. 87–56 for depreciation of tangible assets used in converting corn to fuel grade ethanol is asset class 49.5 (other than § 1250 property not described in asset class 49.5 and assets classified in asset classes 00.11 through 00.4 of Rev. Proc. 87–56).
Notice 2009–64, 2009–36 I.R.B. 307 (September 8, 2009), proposed a revenue ruling concluding that ethanol plants should be depreciated using asset class 49.5 and requesting comments. Two comments were received and considered in finalizing this revenue ruling.
Pursuant to § 7805(b)(8), the Internal Revenue Service will not apply the holding in this revenue ruling to tangible assets that are used in converting biomass to a liquid fuel such as fuel grade ethanol that a taxpayer places in service before June 9, 2014.
The principal author of this revenue ruling is Ruba Nasrallah of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information regarding this revenue ruling, contact Charles Magee of the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting) at (202) 317–7005 (not a toll-free number).
 In defining “biomass property,” former § 48(l)(15), which was added to the Code in 1980, used (with some modifications) the definition of the term “alternate substance” in former § 48(l)(3), which was added to the Code in 1978.
Does the arrangement described below constitute insurance within the meaning of subchapter L of the Internal Revenue Code? If so, does the issuer qualify as an insurance company?
X, a domestic corporation whose stock is widely held, provides health benefits within certain limits to a large group of named retired employees and their dependents, even though it is not legally obligated to do so, and may cancel the coverage at any time. X maintains a single-employer voluntary employees’ beneficiary association that satisfies the requirements of § 501(c)(9) (VEBA) and makes a contribution to the VEBA to provide the health benefits. X deducts the contribution in accordance with, and to the extent permitted by, §§ 419 and 419A of the Code. X has complied with, and will continue to comply with, all requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA).
In connection with the provision of health benefits to retirees and their dependents and as an alternative to providing the benefits on a self-insured basis, the VEBA enters into Contract A with an unrelated commercial insurance company, IC. IC’s participation in the arrangement is a condition of an exemption from the Department of Labor from certain of the prohibited transaction provisions of ERISA.
IC is taxable as a life insurance company under § 801 of the Code. Contract A provides noncancellable accident and health coverage. Under Contract A, IC will issue quarterly reimbursements to the VEBA for medical claims that are incurred by the covered retirees and their dependents and paid by the VEBA. Contract A is regulated by the relevant State insurance commissioner as an accident and health insurance contract. At the time that Contract A goes into effect, neither X nor the VEBA have any commitment or obligation to offer health benefits to the covered retirees and their dependents, and both X and the VEBA may cancel any provided coverage at any time.
In an effort to keep the premium payment under Contract A affordable, IC then enters into Contract B with X’s wholly owned subsidiary, S1, under which S1 receives a premium and reinsures 100 percent of IC’s liabilities under Contract A. Contract B constitutes S1’s sole business. S1 is regulated as an insurance company under state law, and Contract B is regulated as insurance. The amount of premium under Contract B is determined at arm’s length in accordance with applicable insurance industry standards. S1 possesses adequate capital to fulfill its obligations to IC under Contract B. There are no guarantees that the VEBA or X will reimburse S1 with respect to its obligations under Contract B, nor is any of the premium received by S1 for Contract B loaned back to the VEBA or X. In all respects, the parties conduct themselves consistent with the standards applicable to an insurance arrangement between unrelated parties, except that S1 does not reinsure any other insurance contracts.
Subchapter L of the Code sets forth the regime for taxing insurance companies. In particular, § 801(a) provides that a life insurance company must pay tax on its life insurance company taxable income, which is defined in § 801(b) to mean life insurance gross income less life insurance deductions. Section 816(a), in part, defines a life insurance company as an insurance company that has life insurance reserves and unearned premiums and unpaid losses on noncancellable life, accident, or health policies comprising more than 50 percent of total reserves. Under § 816(a), the term “insurance company” means any company more than half of the business of which during the taxable year is the issuing of insurance or annuity contracts or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies. Section 831(c) applies the same definition of “insurance company” to determine whether a taxpayer is an insurance company other than a life insurance company and therefore subject to tax under § 831(a).
Neither the Code nor the regulations define the terms “insurance” or “insurance contract.” The United States Supreme Court, however, has explained that for an arrangement to constitute insurance for federal income tax purposes, both risk shifting and risk distribution must be present. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
The risk transferred must be risk of economic loss. Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978). The risk must contemplate the fortuitous occurrence of a stated contingency, Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 290–91 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950), and must not be merely an investment or business risk. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. at 542; Rev. Rul. 89–96, 1989–2 C.B. 114.
Risk shifting occurs if a person facing the possibility of an economic loss transfers some or all of the financial consequences of the potential loss to the insurer, such that a loss by the insured does not affect the insured because the loss is offset by a payment from the insurer. Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987). Risk distribution incorporates the statistical phenomenon known as the law of large numbers. Id. Distributing risk allows the insurer to reduce the possibility that a single costly claim will exceed the amount taken in as premiums and set aside for the payment of such a claim. Id. By assuming numerous, relatively small, independent risks that occur randomly over time, the insurer smoothes out losses to match more closely its receipt of premiums. Id.
Courts have recognized that risk distribution necessarily entails a pooling of premiums, so that a potential insured is not in significant part paying for its own risks. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Risk distribution involves spreading the risk of loss among policyholders.”); see also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[R]isk distributing’ means that the party assuming the risk distributes his potential liability, in part, among others.”); Crawford Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F.Supp. 136, 147 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (“[T]he court finds . . . that various nonaffiliated persons or entities facing risks similar but independent of those faced by plaintiff were named insureds under the policy, enabling the distribution of risk thereunder.”); AMERCO and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18, 41 (1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The concept of risk-distributing emphasizes the pooling aspect of insurance: that it is the nature of an insurance contract to be part of a larger collection of coverages, combined to distribute risk between insureds.”). Accordingly, Rev. Rul. 2005–40, 2005–2 C.B. 4, concludes that an arrangement under which an issuer contracts to indemnify the risks of a single policyholder does not qualify as insurance for federal income tax purposes because those risks are not, in turn, distributed among other insureds or policyholders. Similarly, Rev. Rul. 2002–89, 2002–C.B. 984, concludes that the requirements of risk shifting and risk distribution are not satisfied when a wholly owned subsidiary’s agreement to indemnify the risks of its parent represents 90% of the subsidiary’s business.
Although [parent corporation] purchased the group-term life insurance contract covering its employees from its wholly owned insurance subsidiary, S1, this fact does not cause the arrangement to be “self-insurance” because the economic risk of loss being insured shifted to S1 is not a risk of [parent corporation]. . . . This insurance on the employees’ lives is an economic benefit to the employees since it relieves them of the expense of providing life insurance for themselves.
Revenue Ruling 92–93 states that “[t]he holdings of this revenue ruling also apply to accident and health insurance.” See also Rev. Rul. 92–94, 1992–2 C.B. 144.
To determine the nature of an arrangement for federal income tax purposes, it is necessary to consider all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, including the risks being shifted and distributed. The proper characterization of an arrangement may determine whether the issuer qualifies as an insurance company for federal income tax purposes and whether amounts paid under such arrangement may be deductible.
In the situation above, the risks being indemnified are the covered retirees’ and their dependents’ risks of incurring medical expenses during retirement due to accident and health contingencies. Although the VEBA entered into Contract A, the covered retirees’ health insurance is an economic benefit to the retirees since it relieves them of the expense of purchasing health insurance for themselves and their dependents. Furthermore, at the time that Contract A goes into effect, neither X nor the VEBA have any commitment or obligation to offer health benefits to the covered retirees and their dependants, and both X and the VEBA may cancel any provided coverage at any time. Consequently, the risks that are shifted in the situation above are those of the covered retirees and their dependents and not risks of the VEBA or X. These risks are reinsured by S1 under Contract B. The risks under Contract B are distributed among this large group of covered individuals, and the analyses of Rev. Rul. 2002–89 and Rev. Rul. 2005–40 are inapplicable. Accordingly, the risks under Contract B are insurance risks, and Contract B constitutes insurance for federal income tax purposes.
In the situation above, S1 is regulated as an insurance company under state law. Contract B constitutes insurance. Because Contract B is more than half of the business done by S1 during this year, S1 qualifies as an insurance company under Subchapter L for this taxable year.
This revenue ruling does not address whether the health benefits are provided through a self-insured medical reimbursement plan for purposes of the nondiscrimination rules under § 105(h) (see Treas. Reg. § 1.105–11(b)(1)(iii)).
This ruling also does not address the deductibility of a contribution by X to the VEBA under §§ 419 and 419A; whether S1, or any account held by IC or S1, with respect to Contract A or Contract B is a welfare benefit fund (as defined in § 419(e)); or the application of § 419A(g). Furthermore, because the arrangement described in this revenue ruling provides welfare benefits through a VEBA, this ruling does not address certain issues that would arise if an employer provided welfare benefits other than through a VEBA, including whether an entity (or any account held by any person) that is part of such an arrangement is a welfare benefit fund or, if not, whether the arrangement is a plan deferring the receipt of compensation for purposes of §§ 404(a)(5) and 404(b).
Rev. Rul. 2002–89 and Rev. Rul. 2005–40 are distinguished.
The principal author of this revenue ruling is Sheryl B. Flum of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Financial Institutions & Products). For further information regarding this revenue ruling, contact Ms. Flum at (202) 317-6995 (not a toll-free number).
This revenue ruling provides various prescribed rates for federal income tax purposes for June 2014 (the current month). Table 1 contains the short-term, mid-term, and long-term applicable federal rates (AFR) for the current month for purposes of section 1274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code. Table 2 contains the short-term, mid-term, and long-term adjusted applicable federal rates (adjusted AFR) for the current month for purposes of section 1288(b). Table 3 sets forth the adjusted federal long-term rate and the long-term tax-exempt rate described in section 382(f). Table 4 contains the appropriate percentages for determining the low-income housing credit described in section 42(b)(1) for buildings placed in service during the current month. However, under section 42(b)(2), the applicable percentage for non-federally subsidized new buildings placed in service after July 30, 2008, with respect to housing credit dollar amount allocations made before January 1, 2014, shall not be less than 9%. Finally, Table 5 contains the federal rate for determining the present value of an annuity, an interest for life or for a term of years, or a remainder or a reversionary interest for purposes of section 7520.
This notice provides guidance on an amendment to reflect the outcome of United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), that is adopted after the beginning of a plan year and is effective during a plan year (“mid-year amendment”) to a plan described in § 401(k)(12) or (13) (“§ 401(k) safe harbor plan”) or § 401(m)(11) or (12) (“§ 401(m) safe harbor plan”) of the Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Q&A–8 of Notice 2014–19, 2014–17 I.R.B. 979 (April 21, 2014).
Notice 2014–19 provides guidance on the application (including the retroactive application) of the Windsor decision and the holdings of Rev. Rul. 2013–17, 2013–38 I.R.B. 201 (Sept. 16, 2013), to retirement plans qualified under § 401(a).
Under § 1.401(k)–3(e)(1) of the Treasury Regulations, a § 401(k) safe harbor plan must be adopted before the beginning of the plan year and be maintained throughout a full 12–month plan year, except as otherwise provided in § 1.401(k)–3(g) (relating to the reduction or suspension of safe harbor contributions) or in guidance of general applicability published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Under § 1.401(m)–3(f)(1), similar rules apply to § 401(m) safe harbor plans, including § 403(b) plans. The IRS has been asked whether a § 401(k) or (m) safe harbor plan may adopt a mid-year amendment pursuant to Q&A–8 of Notice 2014–19.
May a sponsor of a § 401(k) or (m) safe harbor plan adopt a mid-year amendment pursuant to Q&A–8 of Notice 2014–19?
Yes. A plan will not fail to satisfy the requirements to be a § 401(k) or (m) safe harbor plan merely because the plan sponsor adopts a mid-year amendment pursuant to Q&A–8 of Notice 2014–19.
Notice 2014–19 is amplified by providing further guidance with respect to safe harbor plan mid-year amendments.
For further information regarding this notice, please contact Telly Meier at phone number (202) 317-8494(not a toll-free number).

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