Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/317/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:32:41+00:00

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1. A federal court may refuse to issue a writ of habeas corpus where the facts alleged in the petition, if proved, would not warrant discharge of the prisoner. P. 317 U. S. 24.
2. Presentation to the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia of a petition for habeas corpus was the institution of a suit, and denial by that court of leave to file the petition was a judicial determination of a case or controversy reviewable by appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and in this Court by certiorari. P. 317 U. S. 24.
3. The President's Proclamation of July 2, 1942, declaring that all persons who are citizens or subjects of, or who act under the direction of, any nation at war with the United States, and who during time of war enter the United States through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile acts, or violations of the law of war, "shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals," does not bar accused persons from access to the civil courts for the purpose of determining the applicability of the Proclamation to the particular case; nor does the Proclamation, which in terms denied to such persons access to the courts, nor the enemy alienage of the accused, foreclose consideration by the civil courts of the contention that the Constitution and laws of the United States forbid their trial by military commission. P. 317 U. S. 24.
States . . . and went behind such lines, contrary to the law of war, in civilian dress . . . for the purpose of committing . . . hostile acts, and, in particular, to destroy certain war industries, war utilities and war materials within the United States."
(1) That the specification sufficiently charged an offense against the law of war which the President was authorized to order tried by a military commission; notwithstanding the fact that, ever since their arrest, the courts in the jurisdictions where they entered the country and where they were arrested and held for trial were open and functioning normally. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, distinguished. Pp. 317 U. S. 21, 317 U. S. 23, 317 U. S. 36, 317 U. S. 48.
(2) The President's Order of July 2, 1942, so far as it lays down the procedure to be followed on the trial before the Commission and on the review of its findings and sentence, and the procedure in fact followed by the Commission, were not in conflict with Articles of War 38, 43, 46, 50 1/2 and 70. P. 317 U. S. 46.
(3) The petitioners were in lawful custody for trial by a military commission, and, upon petitions for writs of habeas corpus, did not show cause for their discharge. P. 317 U. S. 47.
5. Articles 15, 38 and 46 of the Articles of War, enacted by Congress, recognize the "military commission" as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war not ordinarily tried by courts-martial. And by the Articles of War, especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Pp. 317 U. S. 26-28.
6. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, by the Articles of War has exercised its authority under Art. I, § 8, cl. 10 of the Constitution to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, of which the law of war is a part, by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals. And by Article of War 15, Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction. Pp. 317 U. S. 28, 317 U. S. 30.
conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. P. 317 U. S. 27.
8. The offense charged in this case was an offense against the law of war, the trial of which by military commission had been authorized by Congress, and which the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, distinguished. P. 317 U. S. 45.
9. By the law of war, lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war; unlawful combatants, in addition, are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. P. 317 U. S. 30.
10. It has long been accepted practice by our military authorities to treat those who, during time of war, pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, as unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission. This practice, accepted and followed by other governments, must be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of War. P. 317 U. S. 35.
11. Citizens of the United States who associate themselves with the military arm of an enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. P. 317 U. S. 37.
12. Even when committed by a citizen, the offense here charged is distinct from the crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is irrelevant to the other. P. 317 U. S. 38.
13. Article III, § 2, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution did not extend the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission or require that offenses against the law of war, not triable by jury at common law, be tried only in civil courts. P. 317 U. S. 38.
committed by enemies not in or associated with our Armed Forces. It is a construction which has been followed since the founding of our government, and is now continued in the 82nd Article of War. Such a construction is entitled to great respect. P. 317 U. S. 41.
15. Since violation of the law of war is adequately alleged in this case, the Court finds no occasion to consider the validity of other specifications based on the 81st and 82nd Article of War, or to construe those articles or decide upon their constitutionality a so construed. P. 317 U. S. 46.
Albert L. Cox, U.S.A. Provost Marshal of the Military District of Washington, who, pursuant to orders, was holding them in that District for and during a trial before a Military Commission constituted by an Order of the President of the United States. During the course of the argument, the petitioners were permitted to file petitions for writs of certiorari, directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to review, before judgment by that Court, orders then before it by appeal by which the District Court for the District of Columbia had denied applications for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
After the argument, this Court delivered a Per Curiam Opinion, disposing of the cases (footnote, p. 317 U. S. 18). A full opinion, which is the basis of this Report, was filed with the Clerk of the Court on October 29, 1942.
No. ___, Original, Ex parte Richard Quirin; No. ___, Original, Ex parte Herbert Hans Haupt; No. ___, Original, Ex parte Edward John Kerling; No. ___, Original, Ex parte Ernest Peter Burger; No. ___, Original, Ex parte Heinrich Harm Heinck; No. ___, Original, Ex parte Werner Thiel; and No. ___, Original, Ex parte Hermann Otto Neubauer.
No. 1, United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, Provost Marshal; No. 2, United States ex rel. Haupt v. Cox, Provost Marshal; No. 3, United States ex rel. Kerlin v. Cox, Provost Marshal; No. 4, United States ex rel. Burger v. Cox, Provost Marshal; No. 5, United States ex rel. Heinck v. Cox, Provost Marshal; No. 6, United States ex rel. Thiel v. Cox, Provost Marshal, and No. 7, United States ex rel. Neubauer v. Cox, Provost Marshal.
"In these causes, motions for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus were presented to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which entered orders denying the motions. Motions for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus were then presented to this Court, and the merits of the applications were fully argued at the Special Term of Court convened on July 29, 1942. Counsel for petitioners subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the order of the District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and they have perfected their appeals to that court. They have presented to this Court petitions for writs of certiorari before judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 347(a). The petitions are granted. In accordance with the stipulation between counsel for petitioners and for the respondent, the papers filed and argument had in connection with the applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus are made applicable to the certiorari proceedings."
"The Court has fully considered the questions raised in these cases and thoroughly argued at the bar, and has reached its conclusion upon them. It now announces its decision and enters its judgment in each case, in advance of the preparation of a full opinion, which necessarily will require a considerable period of time for its preparation and which, when prepared, will be filed with the Clerk."
"(1) That the charges preferred against petitioners on which they are being tried by military commission appointed by the order of the President of July 2, 1942, allege an offense or offenses which the President is authorized to order tried before a military commission."
"(2) That the military commission was lawfully constituted."
"(3) That petitioners are held in lawful custody for trial before the military commission, and have not shown cause for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus."
"The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied."
"The orders of the District Court are affirmed. The mandates are directed to issue forthwith."
"MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases."
Post, p. 317 U. S. 18.
on charges preferred against them purporting to set out their violations of the law of war and of the Articles of War, is in conformity to the laws and Constitution of the United States.
Court petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals before judgment, pursuant to § 240(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 347(a). We granted certiorari before judgment for the reasons which moved us to convene the special term of Court. In accordance with the stipulation of counsel, we treat the record, briefs and arguments in the habeas corpus proceedings in this Court as the record, briefs and arguments upon the writs of certiorari.
All the petitioners were born in Germany; all have lived in the United States. All returned to Germany between 1933 and 1941. All except petitioner Haupt are admittedly citizens of the German Reich, with which the United States is at war. Haupt came to this country with his parents when he was five years old; it is contended that he became a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of his parents during his minority, and that he has not since lost his citizenship. The Government, however, takes the position that, on attaining his majority he elected to maintain German allegiance and citizenship, or in any case that he has, by his conduct, renounced or abandoned his United States citizenship. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 307 U. S. 334; United States ex rel. Rojak v. Marshall, 34 F.2d 219; United States ex rel. Scimeca v. Husband, 6 F.2d 957, 958; 8 U.S.C. § 801, and compare 8 U.S.C. § 808. For reasons presently to be stated we do not find it necessary to resolve these contentions.
and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States . . . through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals."
the states in which each of the petitioners was arrested or detained, have been open and functioning normally.
While it is the usual procedure on an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts for the court to issue the writ and on the return to hear and dispose of the case, it may without issuing the writ consider and determine whether the facts alleged by the petition, if proved, would warrant discharge of the prisoner. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, 312 U. S. 284. Presentation of the petition for judicial action is the institution of a suit. Hence, denial by the district court of leave to file the petitions in these causes was the judicial determination of a case or controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals and reviewable here by certiorari. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 71 U. S. 110-113; Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 316 U. S. 458-461.
persons defined by the Proclamation, which aptly describes the character and conduct of petitioners. It is urged that, if they are enemy aliens or if the Proclamation has force, no court may afford the petitioners a hearing. But there is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for determining its applicability to the particular case. And neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission. As announced in our per curiam opinion, we have resolved those questions by our conclusion that the Commission has jurisdiction to try the charge preferred against petitioners. There is therefore no occasion to decide contentions of the parties unrelated to this issue. We pass at once to the consideration of the basis of the Commission's authority.
We are not here concerned with any question of the guilt or innocence of petitioners. [Footnote 2/4] Constitutional safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on some who are guilty. Ex parte Milligan, supra, 71 U. S. 119, 71 U. S. 132; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 273 U. S. 535; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 316 U. S. 406. But the detention and trial of petitioners -- ordered by the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger -- are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.
"the provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions . . . or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that, by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions . . . or other military tribunals."
of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations, as well as of enemy individuals. [Footnote 2/5] By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals. And the President, as Commander in Chief, by his Proclamation in time of war, has invoked that law. By his Order creating the present Commission, he has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war.
of war. It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. For here, Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions. We are concerned only with the question whether it is within the constitutional power of the National Government to place petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which they are charged. We must therefore first inquire whether any of the acts charged is an offense against the law of war cognizable before a military tribunal, and, if so, whether the Constitution prohibits the trial. We may assume that there are acts regarded in other countries, or by some writers on international law, as offenses against the law of war which would not be triable by military tribunal here, either because they are not recognized by our courts as violations of the law of war or because they are of that class of offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury. It was upon such grounds that the Court denied the right to proceed by military tribunal in Ex parte Milligan, supra. But, as we shall show, these petitioners were charged with an offense against the law of war which the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury.
United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 43 U. S. 232; The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 423-28; 18 U.S.C. § 481. [Footnote 2/6] Similarly, by the reference in the 15th Article of War to "offenders or offenses that . . . by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions," Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war (compare 61 U. S. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 61 U. S. 82), and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction. Congress had the choice of crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against the law of war, or of adopting the system of common law applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. It chose the latter course.
those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but, in addition, they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. [Footnote 2/8] The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals. See Winthrop, Military Law,2d ed., pp. 11997, 1219-21; Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, approved by the President, General Order No. 100, April 24, 1863, §§ IV and V.
"Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised in the dress of the country, or in the uniform of the army hostile to their own, employed in obtaining information, if found within or lurking about the lines of the captor, are treated as spies, and suffer death."
"Armed prowlers, by whatever names they may be called, or persons of the enemy's territory, who steal within the lines of the hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, or of destroying bridges, roads, or canals, or of robbing or destroying the mail, or of cutting the telegraph wires, are not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of war. [Footnote 2/11]"
"armed prowlers . . . or persons of the enemy territory who steal within the lines of the hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, or of destroying bridges, roads, or canals, of robbing or destroying the mail, or of cutting the telegraph wires, are not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war."
"Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."
a rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of War.
"being enemies of the United States and acting for . . . the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, secretly and covertly passed, in civilian dress, contrary to the law of war, through the military and naval lines and defenses of the United States . . . and went behind such lines, contrary to the law of war, in civilian dress . . . for the purpose of committing . . . hostile acts, and, in particular, to destroy certain war industries, war utilities and war materials within the United States."
Nor are petitioners any the less belligerents if, as they argue, they have not actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military operations. The argument leaves out of account the nature of the offense which the Government charges and which the Act of Congress, by incorporating the law of war, punishes. It is that each petitioner, in circumstances which gave him the status of an enemy belligerent, passed our military and naval lines and defenses or went behind those lines, in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. The offense was complete when, with that purpose, they entered -- or, having so entered, they remained upon -- our territory in time of war without uniform or other appropriate means of identification. For that reason, even when committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is irrelevant to the other. Cf. Moran v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632; Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 273 U. S. 11-12.
the Judiciary Article, had provided, "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury," and had directed that "such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed."
Presentment by a grand jury and trial by a jury of the vicinage where the crime was committed were, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, familiar parts of the machinery for criminal trials in the civil courts. But they were procedures unknown to military tribunals, which are not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article, Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243; In re Vidal, 179 U. S. 126; cf. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, and which, in the natural course of events, are usually called upon to function under conditions precluding resort to such procedures. As this Court has often recognized, it was not the purpose or effect of § 2 of Article III, read in the light of the common law, to enlarge the then existing right to a jury trial. The object was to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature as they might arise in the future, District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63, but not to bring within the sweep of the guaranty those cases in which it was then well understood that a jury trial could not be demanded as of right.
v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617. Trial by jury of criminal contempts may constitutionally be dispensed with in the federal courts in those cases in which they could be tried without a jury at common law. Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 128 U. S. 302-304; Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 131 U. S. 277; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 158 U. S. 594-596; United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 203 U. S. 572; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 284 U. S. 440; Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 313 U. S. 48; See United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 11 U. S. 34. Similarly, an action for debt to enforce a penalty inflicted by Congress is not subject to the constitutional restrictions upon criminal prosecutions. United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475; United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37, and cases cited.
give to them the right to a jury trial. But we think this argument misconceives both the scope of the Amendment and the purpose of the exception.
The exception from the Amendments of "cases arising in the land or naval forces" was not aimed at trials by military tribunals, without a jury, of such offenses against the law of war. Its objective was quite different -- to authorize the trial by court martial of the members of our Armed Forces for all that class of crimes which, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, might otherwise have been deemed triable in the civil courts. The cases mentioned in the exception are not restricted to those involving offenses against the law of war alone, but extend to trial of all offenses, including crimes which were of the class traditionally triable by jury at common law. Ex parte Mason, 105 U. S. 696; Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 255 U. S. 9; cf. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U. S. 376.
whose primary purpose was to continue unimpaired presentment by grand jury and trial by petit jury in all those cases in which they had been customary -- as either abolishing all trials by military tribunals, save those of the personnel of our own armed forces, or, what in effect comes to the same thing, as imposing on all such tribunals the necessity of proceeding against unlawful enemy belligerents only on presentment and trial by jury. We conclude that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military commission, and that petitioners, charged with such an offense not required to be tried by jury at common law, were lawfully placed on trial by the Commission without a jury.
"can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open, and their process unobstructed."
Elsewhere in its opinion, at pp. 71 U. S. 118, 71 U. S. 121-122 and 71 U. S. 131, the Court was at pains to point out that Milligan, a citizen twenty years resident in Indiana, who had never been a resident of any of the states in rebellion, was not an enemy belligerent either entitled to the status of a prisoner of war or subject to the penalties imposed upon unlawful belligerents. We construe the Court's statement as to the inapplicability of the law of war to Milligan's case as having particular reference to the facts before it. From them, the Court concluded that Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a nonbelligerent, not subject to the law of war save as -- in circumstances found not there to be present, and not involved here -- martial law might be constitutionally established.
with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war. It is enough that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were plainly within those boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered, or after entry remained in, our territory without uniform -- an offense against the law of war. We hold only that those particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission.
Since the first specification of Charge I sets forth a violation of the law of war, we have no occasion to pass on the adequacy of the second specification of Charge I, or to construe the 81st and 82nd Articles of War for the purpose of ascertaining whether the specifications under Charges II and III allege violations of those Articles, or whether, if so construed, they are constitutional. McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131.
procedure, and that the secrecy surrounding the trial and all proceedings before the Commission, as well as any review of its decision, will preclude a later opportunity to test the lawfulness of the detention.
by the Commission, in a trial of offenses against the law of war and the 81st and 82nd Articles of War, by a military commission appointed by the President.
From June 12 to June 18, 1942, Amagansett Beach, New York, and Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, were within the area designated as the Eastern Defense Command of the United States Army, and subject to the provisions of a proclamation dated May 16, 1942, issued by Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, United States Army, Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command (see 7 Federal Register 3830). On the night of June 12-13, 1942, the waters around Amagansett Beach, Long Island, were within the area comprising the Eastern Sea Frontier, pursuant to the orders issued by Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. On the night of June 16-17, 1942, the waters around Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, were within the area comprising the Gulf Sea Frontier, pursuant to similar orders.
As appears from the stipulation, a defense offered before the Military Commission was that petitioners had had no intention to obey the orders given them by the officer of the German High Command.
Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133, 3 U. S. 153, 3 U. S. 159-61; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 5 U. S. 441; Maley v. Shattuck, 3 Cranch 458, 7 U. S. 488; Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch 185, 8 U. S. 199; The Rapid, 8 Cranch 155, 12 U. S. 159-164; The St.Lawrence, 9 Cranch 120, 13 U. S. 122; Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, 13 U. S. 197-98; The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435, 16 U. S. 447-48; United States v. Reading, 18 How. 1, 59 U. S. 10; Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 67 U. S. 666-67, 67 U. S. 687; The Venice, 2 Wall. 258, 69 U. S. 274; The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 97 U. S. 517; United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U. S. 227, 120 U. S. 233; Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 297.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 41(17), conferring on the federal courts jurisdiction over suits brought by an alien for a tort "in violation of the laws of nations"; 28 U.S.C. § 341, conferring upon the Supreme Court such jurisdiction of suits against ambassadors as a court of law can have "consistently with the law of nations"; 28 U.S.C. § 462, regulating the issuance of habeas corpus where the prisoner claims some right, privilege or exemption under the order of a foreign state, "the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations"; 15 U.S.C. §§ 606(b) and 713(b), authorizing certain loans to foreign governments, provided that "no such loans shall be made in violation of international law as interpreted by the Department of State."
Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, Article I of the Annex to which defines the persons to whom belligerent rights and duties attach, was signed by 44 nations. See also Great Britain, War Office, Manual of Military Law (1929) ch. xiv, §§ 17-19; German General Staff, Kriegsbrauch in Landkriege (1902) ch. 1; 7 Moore, Digest of International Law, § 1109; 2 Hyde, International Law (1922) § 653-54; 2 Oppenheim, International Law (6th ed.1940) § 107; Bluntschli, Droit International (5th ed. tr. Lardy) §§ 531-32; 4 Calvo, Le Droit International Theorique et Pratique (5th ed. 1896) § 2034-35.
Great Britain, War Office, Manual of Military Law, ch. xiv, §§ 445-451; Regolamento di Servizio in Guerra, § 133, 3 Leggi e Decreti del Regno d'Italia (1896) 3184; 7 Moore, Digest of International Law, § 1109; 2 Hyde, International Law, §§ 654, 652; 2 Halleck, International Law (4th ed.1908) § 4; 2 Oppenheim, International Law, § 254; Hall, International Law, §§ 127, 135; Baty Morgan, War, Its Conduct and Legal Results (1915) 172; Bluntschli, Droit International, §§ 570 bis.
"Major Andre . . . ought to be considered as a Spy from the enemy, and that, agreeably to the law and usage of nations . . . , he ought to suffer death."
During the Mexican War, military commissions were created in a large number of instances for the trial of various offenses. See General Orders cited in 2 Winthrop, Military Law (2d ed. 1896) p. 1298, note 1.
"A messenger or agent who attempts to steal through the territory occupied by the enemy, to further, in any manner, the interests of the enemy, if captured, is not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of war, and may be dealt with according to the circumstances of the case."
Great Britain, War Office, Manual of Military Law (1929) § 45, lists a large number of acts which, when committed within enemy lines by persons in civilian dress associated with or acting under the direction of enemy armed forces, are "war crimes." The list includes: "damage to railways, war material, telegraph, or other means of communication, in the interest of the enemy. . . ." Section 449 states that all "war crimes" are punishable by death.
See Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons under the Articles of War, 4 Minnesota L.Rev. 79, 107-109.
In a number of cases during the Revolutionary War, enemy spies were tried and convicted by military tribunals: (1) Major John Andre, Sept. 29, 1780, see note 9 supra. (2) Thomas Shanks was convicted by a "Board of General Officers" at Valley Forge on June 3, 1778, for "being a Spy in the Service of the Enemy," and sentenced to be hanged. 12 Writings of Washington (Bicentennial Comm'n ed.) 14. (3) Matthias Colbhart was convicted of "holding a Correspondence with the Enemy" and "living as a Spy among the Continental Troops" by a General Court Martial convened by order of Major General Putnam on Jan. 13, 1778; General Washington, the Commander in Chief, ordered the sentence of death to be executed, 12 Id. 449-50. (4) John Clawson, Ludwick Lasick, and William Hutchinson were convicted of "lurking as spies in the Vicinity of the Army of the United States" by a General Court Martial held on June 18, 1780. The death sentence was confirmed by the Commander in Chief. 19 Id. 23. (5) David Farnsworth and John Blair were convicted of "being found about the Encampment of the United States as Spies" by a Division General Court Martial held on Oct. 8, 1778 by order of Major General Gates. The death sentence was confirmed by the Commander in Chief. 13 Id. 139-40. (6) Joseph Bettys was convicted of being "a Spy for General Burgoyne" by coming secretly within the American lines, by a General Court Martial held on April 6, 1778 by order of Major General McDougall. The death sentence was confirmed by the Commander in Chief. 15 Id. 364. (7) Stephen Smith was convicted of "being a Spy" by a General Court Martial held on Jan. 6, 1778. The death sentence was confirmed by Major General McDougall. Ibid. (8) Nathaniel Aherly and Reuben Weeks, Loyalist soldiers, were sentenced to be hanged as spies. Proceedings of a General Court Martial Convened at West Point According to a General Order of Major General Arnold, Aug. 20-21, 1780 (National Archives, War Dept., Revolutionary War Records, MS No. 31521). (9) Jonathan Loveberry, a Loyalist soldier, was sentenced to be hanged as a spy. Proceedings of a General Court Martial Convened at the Request of Major General Arnold at the Township of Bedford, Aug. 30-31, 1780 (Id., MS No. 31523). He later escaped, 20 Writings of Washington 253n. (10) Daniel Taylor, a lieutenant in the British Army, was convicted as a spy by a general court martial convened on Oct. 14, 1777, by order of Brigadier General George Clinton, and was hanged. 2 Public Papers of George Clinton (1900) 443. (11) James Molesworth was convicted as a spy and sentenced to death by a general court martial held at Philadelphia, March 29, 1777; Congress confirmed the order of Major General Gates for the execution of the sentence. 7 Journals of the Continental Congress 210. See also cases of "M. A." and "D.C.," G.O. Headquarters of General Sullivan, Providence, R.I., July 24, 1778, reprinted in Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution (1822) 369; of Lieutenant Palmer, 9 Writings of Washington, 56n; of Daniel Strang, 6 Id. 47n; of Edward Hicks, 14 Id. 357; of John Mason and James Ogden, executed as spies near Trenton, N.J., on Jan. 10, 1781, mentioned in Hatch, Administration of the American Revolutionary Army (1904) 135 and Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (1941) 410.

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