Source: http://www.gerryarmstrong.org/50k/legal/a1/889.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:39:06+00:00

Document:
RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, KRINSKY, STANDARD & LIEBERMAN, P.C.
Plaintiff Church of Scientology of California (”CSC”) and Intervenor Mary Sue Hubbard (”Mrs. Hubbard”) hereby move the Court for an order sealing portions of the record on appeal.
This motion to seal is made on the ground that the case was filed to vindicate property and privacy interests that had been invaded by defendant, and to leave these portions of appellate record unsealed will result in further violations of those interests. In addition, the trial court found that documents in issue in this case were stolen from plaintiff, and that CSC “had made out a prima facie case of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of confidence, and that Mary Sue Hubbard had made out a prima facie case of conversion and invasion of privacy.” When the case was settled in December 1986, the parties entered into a stipulation that the court files would be sealed, and the July 29, 1991 decision of this Court upheld the validity of that stipulation against a challenge by an individual who was not a party to the underlying action, and ruled that the files below should remain sealed pursuant to agreement of the parties upon settlement.
On July 29, 1991, this Court issued its decision in this case reversing an Order of the trial court unsealing the file in Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong (B038975). The Court ruled that the trial court files were to remain sealed, but also ruled that “plaintiffs have not formally requested sealing of the record on appeal,” and left it open for them to do so. (Decision at 18-19.) Appellants hereby accept that invitation and request that the Court order portions of the appellate record sealed as well.
The full record below has been sealed since December 1986 based upon stipulation of the parties at the time of settlement. Prior to that time, the underlying documents which are the subject matter of this suit were sealed during the pendency of the case because of their confidential nature. The trial court has ruled that defendant’s actions with respect to the documents constitute conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of confidence with respect to plaintiff, and conversion and invasion of privacy with respect to Intervenor Mary Sue Hubbard. The appellate record is permeated with references to and discussions of the stolen documents throughout. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate for the Court to order portions of the record on appeal sealed.
under seal from shortly after the inception of this lawsuit. At that time, Judge Cole of the Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction requiring defendant to deposit the documents which he had converted from plaintiff with the clerk of the court under seal. They remained under seal up to the time of trial, and many of them continued to be sealed after that time.
Appellants’ claims in this case were tried before Judge Breckenridge without a jury in May 1984. At trial, appellants presented their case without introducing any of the private documents so as not to undermine the very privacy rights they brought suit to protect. Nonetheless, at the close of trial, at Armstrong’s request, and over appellants’ objections, the court admitted into evidence and ordered unsealed a small percentage of the thousands of documents held under seal by the clerk on the ground that they were relevant to Armstrong’s defense. These documents were unsealed, and quotations from them and information derived from them entered the trial transcript and pleading file of the case.
After lengthy negotiations, the parties presented Judge Breckenridge on December 11, 1986, with a settlement of Armstrong’s countersuit and the injunctive portion of appellants’ claims against Armstrong. The injunctive claims were mooted by the return to plaintiff of all but six of the documents which were kept in the court’s files because they were in controversy in pending litigation in another case. The returned documents included all documents that had been entered into evidence. An integral, indispensable part of that settlement was the sealing of the court’s record 1 and the stolen documents still held by the court.
1. Because of the court’s evidentiary rulings, quotations and information from the private documents did appear in the transcript of the trial and the pleading file.
Superior Court Judge Geernaert went far beyond what Corydon requested and ordered the files totally unsealed. In its July 29, 1991 decision, this Court ruled that the unsealing by Judge Geernaert had been improper, and ordered the files resealed. The Court ruled, however, that the appellate files were not to be sealed, but that plaintiff could move for a sealing order.
The record on appeal consists of various categories of documents, primarily the trial transcripts, trial exhibits, including those which were sealed documents which Judge Breckenridge allowed into the trial record, and briefs discussing those exhibits in detail. Because of the findings of the trial court with respect to appellants’ prima facie case against defendant on several causes of action, the fact that the documents involved were stolen from plaintiff in the first place, the permeation of the record with the documents or discussion of them, and the negotiated agreement of the parties that the record be sealed, it is appropriate for this Court to seal portions of the record on appeal as well.
Matter of Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 783, 136 Cal.Rptr. 821, 824 (”Clearly a court has inherent power to control its own records to protect the rights of litigants before it . . ..”). The Supreme Court has explained that denial of access to judicial records may be appropriate in a variety of situations, including for the protection of privacy interests. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598.
public records should be kept open to the public, but that “countervailing public policy might come into play as a result of events that tend to undermine individual security, personal liberty, or private property, or that injure the public or the public good.” A number of factors in this case militate in favor of a conclusion that the record on appeal should be sealed based on such considerations.
First, this case involves property and privacy rights of plaintiff and Intervenor Mary Sue Hubbard, as found by the trial court, which fall within the category of “countervailing public policy.” The case arose because defendant violated those rights by stealing the proprietary documents, to which he had no legal right. That this is such a case is one factor warranting the sealing of the files. The nature of the documents stolen — consisting of personal, private, confidential and nonpublic documents — is a second factor which lends itself to a conclusion that the files should be sealed.
California, in fact, provides broader constitutional protection for privacy rights than does the federal constitution.
information derived from them clearly are protected by the right of privacy in California. E.g., City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 268, 85 Cal.Rptr. 18; Division of Medical Quality v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 678, 156 Cal.Rptr. 55, 60-61. When a constitutional right to privacy is implicated, the courts do not merely balance that right against the right of access to records. Rather, in such cases the judicial records are presumptively placed under seal. See, Richards v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 265, 150 Cal.Rptr.77 (party producing private financial information through discovery is presumptively entitled to a protective order limiting disclosure only to counsel for the other party and only for use in that litigation). Only specific, compelling state interests can overcome that presumption — and those interests must be expressly articulated by the trial court.
See, id. at 272, 150 Cal.Rptr. at 81 (”substantial reason … related to the lawsuit” is required for disclosure); Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 856 n.3, 143 Cal.Rptr.695, 702 n.3, 574 P.2d 766; Gunn v. Employment Development Dep’t. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 658, 156 Cal.Rtpr.584. Privacy rights, along with trade secrets and other limited types of rights, have long been held to warrant sealing of records. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 598; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C. (6th Cir. 1983) 710 F.2d 1165, 117 cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
Annot. 62 A.L.R.2d 509, 513. Thus, cases are legion in which courts have ordered that testimony and exhibits regarding business secrets be submitted in camera, sealed and impounded.
E.g., A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co. (6th Cir. 1934) 73 F.2d 531, 539 note, modified on other grounds (6th Cir. 1935) 74 F.2d 934 (trial and appellate records sealed); Vitro Corp. v. Hall Chemical Co. (6th Cir. 1958) 254 F.2d 787, 788 (affirming trial court order impounding transcripts, exhibits and briefs).
interest in this material will be irreparably harmed if the entirety of the court file is opened to the public.
were introduced into evidence by the proponents of confidentiality, in this case the proponents opposed the introduction of the documents. Perhaps even more important, while the documents in Hubbard were lawfully seized pursuant to a judicially authorized search warrant, the documents in this case were unilaterally “seized” by a private individual without probable cause and without prior judicial review. The intrusion on privacy is therefore more severe — and any countervailing justification for publicizing the documents and court records reflecting information from them is correspondingly weaker.
The record on appeal in this case consists of the trial transcripts, the documents constituting the appendix, and the various briefs filed in connection with the appeal. Many of these documents contain some discussion of the converted documents which were sealed by the trial court, as discussed in greater detail in the declaration of Kenneth Long, the individual who worked as CSC’s representative in connection with this case, and who is familiar with the appellate record. Because of the compelling reasons discussed herein, and particularly the fact that many of the documents in the appellate record, other than the briefs, are the same documents that have been sealed below for nearly five years, portions of the appellate record should also be sealed.
identical documents which exist in the appellate record. It is the policy of California’s courts to encourage settlements and to enforce judicially supervised settlements. Phelps v. Kozakar (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1078, 1082, 194 Cal.Rptr. 872, 874; Fisher v. Superior Court (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 434, 437, 440-441, 163 Cal.Rptr. 47, 49, 52. The acceptance of orders sealing judicial records as necessary and proper provisions of settlement agreements is supported by reported cases containing references to such orders without criticism or comment. See, e.g., Champion v. Superior Court (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 777, 247 Cal.Rptr. 624, 628 (requiring an assertion of need for continued sealing when documents are submitted to be sealed in the appellate court): Owen v. United States (9th Cir. 1983) 713 F.2d 1461, 1462.
In In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation (E.D.N.Y. 1981) 92 F.R.D. 468, aff’d sub nom. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst (2nd Cir. 1982) 677 F.2d 230 the confidentiality order — insisted on by one party — was a critical factor in the settlement of the case.
Id. at 472. The principles which underlie the ruling in the Franklin litigation apply as well to the sealing of portions of the appellate court file. Other parties to the lawsuit reached a partial settlement of the case — which included a monetary settlement of Armstrong’s cross-complaint for monetary damages — in reliance on the order sealing the file. For the same documents which were sealed as a result and other documents discussing the sealed papers, created in relation to the appeal, to be unsealed in the appellate court, works a serious injustice on the plaintiffs.
disregard of prior orders of this court, the court concludes that any restriction, short of complete closure would be ineffective. . . . Publicity of a private crusade has become her end, not the fair adjudication of the parties’ dispute. In doing so, plaintiff is stealing the court’s resources from other meritorious cases.
Various newspapers protested and appealed the closure order. At the conclusion of the closed proceedings, the magistrate found that Wakefield had wilfully violated the court’s injunction, and recommended criminal contempt proceedings. The district court granted the newspapers access to some of the transcripts of the hearings, but refused to permit them access to those which discussed the terms of Wakefield’s settlement agreement — that is, those portions of the proceedings which were permeated with discussions of matters which Wakefield and the Church had agreed to keep confidential, and which the Church had brought contempt proceedings to protect. On appeal by the newspapers, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the privacy interests which the Church sought to protect, and refused to grant public access to any more of the record. Id. at 4629 - 4630.
bringing this lawsuit. Self-help, in the form of “seizing the documents from Armstrong,” was certainly not appropriate, and no court would wish to encourage such action by penalizing a party for seeking to preserve its privacy rights through the courts.
1. I am over the age of eighteen. I have been employed by Church of Scientology of California (”CSC”) for 9 years as a paralegal, acting as CSC’s representative to assist various of its attorneys during that time period. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth below and would and could competently testify thereto if called upon to do so.
2. During the course of my employment as a paralegal, I have worked extensively on the case of Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. C 420153, and Appellate Case No. B025920 (”Armstrong”). I am well familiar with the documents on file in Armstrong, both in the Superior Court and on appeal.
3. The trial transcripts which are part of the Armstrong record consist of 4,346 pages of testimony. The single lengthiest testimony is that of defendant, Gerald Armstrong. His testimony covers approximately 852 pages.
Throughout Armtrong’s testimony, there was discussion of the documents converted by Armstrong that had been ordered returned to the court and sealed by Judge Cole near the inception of the suit.
Exhibits C, K, L and N in the “Appendix of Appellants” filed in Appeal No. B038975. If these portions of the appellate record are also sealed, it will preserve the property and privacy interests which CSC has fought to protect by its filing of the Armstrong suit, and which the trial court recognized in sealing the documents at the outset of the litigation.

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