Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/nyc-court/1388231.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 17:12:40+00:00

Document:
City Court, City of Poughkeepsie.
PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Daniel BRYAN, Defendant.
David Goodman, Public Defender, Poughkeepsie (Thomas N.N. Angell, Esq. of counsel), for defendant. William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie (Cindy Murphy of counsel), for plaintiff.
Defendant is charged with Obstruction of Governmental Administration in the 2nd Degree in violation of Penal Law Section 195.05. The defendant is also charged with a City Ordinance violation for littering, but that charge is not a subject of the instant motion. Defendant has moved for, inter alia, dismissal of the charge for facial insufficiency. The Court will address that issue first.
the west bound arterial on Mill Street Rt. 44/55 stopping traffic, through local yards and climbing over fences and was finally apprehended in the area of 28 Smith Street.
The People do not argue that the defendant committed the crime of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the 2nd Degree “by means of intimidation, physical force or interference” (Penal Law § 195.05). Rather, the People argue that the defendant obstructed a governmental function “by means of an independently unlawful act.” Specifically, the People assert that the defendant could have been charged with, among other things, Resisting Arrest, and that these uncharged offenses constitute an “independently unlawful act” upon which the charge of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the 2nd Degree may be grounded.
The section charged (Penal Law, § 195.05) was not designed for this situation. It was, rather, intended to make criminal conduct designed to interrupt or shut down administrative governmental operations. This court fears that there is a tendency to pervert its purpose in the manner disclosed in this case. This Judge would discourage the practice as unnecessary and counterproductive.
The Offen case was cited approvingly by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Davan L., 91 N.Y.2d 88, 91, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 689 N.E.2d 909 (1997).
This Court has held, and it is undisputed on this appeal by the presentment agency, that purely verbal interference may not satisfy the “physical” component under Penal Law § 195.05. (People v. Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98, 102, 396 N.Y.S.2d 841, 365 N.E.2d 872; see also, People v. Lopez, 97 Misc.2d 124, 410 N.Y.S.2d 787; People v. Offen, 96 Misc.2d 147, 408 N.Y.S.2d 914).
The police activity area was confined and defined, and the juvenile was put on specific, direct notice. There was evidence that he intentionally intruded himself into the specific area of police activity and directed his warnings toward a known criminal activity and assembly at the location identified to the juvenile by the police officer.
Thus, in Davan the Court of Appeals appears to have carefully avoided allowing the “independently unlawful act” component of Penal Law § 195.05 to stand on its own. Rather, Davan found that a “physical” component was present in that the defendant was said to have intentionally cause “a physical reaction” which obstructs governmental administration.
As a result of the Davan finding of a “physical” component even where the defendant engaged in no direct physical force or interference, and viewing this in conjunction with Davan's approving citation of Offen where the defendant's only physical action was in running away from the police, lower courts are left to ponder whether there remains in Penal Law § 195.05 any “independently unlawful act” element that may exist as the basis of a charge separate and apart from the “physical” component of that statute. Fortunately, the statute itself provides a clue to answering this question.
The crime of “obstruction of governmental administration” was originally a single-degree crime designed and written to apply generally to any person who intentionally obstructs a governmental function “by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by any independently unlawful act.” See Penal Law § 195.05 (practice commentaries). Through a series of amendments, the law was eventually subdivided into two degrees, with the original crime being further amended to include three parts. Id.
The first part of the current Penal Law § 195.05 1 prohibits the intentional obstructing of governmental administration “by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act.” The term “physical” has been held to modify both the term “force” and the term “interference.” People v. Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98, 99, 396 N.Y.S.2d 841, 365 N.E.2d 872 (1977). The second part of that statute 2 , however, prohibits obstruction by means of interfering with certain radio, telephone, television or other telecommunications systems “whether or not physical force is involved.” (Emphasis added.) By specifically providing in the second part of the statute that obstruction may found “whether or not physical force is involved,” it may at least arguably be inferred that the legislature intended that a “physical” component apply to the entirety of the first part of the statute. Considering the specific wording of the statute, and in light of previous judicial interpretation thereof, it is the opinion of this Court that the legislature did so intend.
Thus, it is the finding of this Court that the first part of Penal Law § 195.05 requires a “physical” component in all respects, including as applied to the “independently unlawful act” component of that provision, where “physical” may be broadly defined to include not only direct physical force but also any conduct that intentionally causes a “physical reaction” which can be said to have in turn caused the prohibited obstruction. Such an interpretation, it seems to this Court, not only comfortably encompasses the holdings of Davan and Offen, but also provides a bright line (or if not bright, at least a visible line) by which prosecutors and police may be guided in the application of the law.
Here, the defendant is alleged to have run away from the police after being told that he would be charged with an offense. His actions caused a “physical reaction” in that the police chased him, but it cannot be said that being chased was his intent. Therefore, the accusatory instrument fails to sufficiently allege the charge of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the 2nd Degree. Furthermore, the failure to set forth all the elements of the charge amounts to a jurisdictional defect that must be deemed fatal.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the charge of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the 2nd Degree is dismissed, leaving only the littering city ordinance charge to be determined.
3. This Court does not mean to suggest by this finding that a defendant may never be charged both with Obstructing Governmental Administration in the 2nd Degree and with Resisting Arrest. Certainly, a defendant may resist an arrest for the obstructing charge and thereby be charged with both. People v. Cacsere, 185 Misc.2d 92, 712 N.Y.S.2d 298 (App. Term 2nd Dept.2000). Furthermore, it is conceivable that a defendant may run from the police for the very purpose of having them give chase in order to obstruct some other governmental activity that was about to take place.

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