Source: https://mafiadoc.com/08a0438p06_599c3eb21723dd0f406edef9.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:50:12+00:00

Document:
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ X No. 07-1479 > v. , GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. N Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 05-70666—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.
McKnight, et al. v. General Motors Corp.
Although the plaintiffs suggest that the entire supplemental benefit payment is terminated upon eligibility for SSDIB, this does not appear to be the case. As the chart detailing the payments received by Leroy McKnight indicates, the supplemental benefit is reduced by the amount the beneficiary receives from the government in SSDIB (the “temporary benefit”), and, if the SSDIB amount is less than the supplemental benefit payment due to the beneficiary, GM continues to provide the remaining portion of the supplemental benefit.
Gonzales was overruled by Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001), in light of Robinson. However, the Johnson opinion was vacated when the Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc. The case has not yet been heard en banc, it has been held in abeyance until the resolution of the K Mart bankruptcy. See Johnson v. K Mart Corp, 281 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, it appears that Gonzales is the last word on this issue from the Eleventh Circuit.
As noted above, a “qualified individual” is someone “with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
judgment. Id. 1019. We also note that other courts have relied on the Parker I panel’s Title I discussion even after the opinion was vacated. See Fobar v. City of Dearborn Heights, 994 F. Supp. 878, 882-83 (E.D. Mich. 1998); see also Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1109; Hatch v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 22, 31-32 (D.R.I. 2007); EEOC v. Group Health Plan, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097 & n.6 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 2. Plaintiffs assert that, regardless of its precedential status, the Parker I panel’s discussion of Title I should be revisited in light of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). In Robinson, the Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff in a Title VII action could sue his former employer for postemployment actions allegedly taken in retaliation for the plaintiff’s filing of an EEOC claim. Id. at 339. The Court held in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that former employees are covered by section 704(a) of Title VII. Id. at 346. In reaching this conclusion, the Court laid out a roadmap for statutory interpretation. The Court began: Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” . . . The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 340-41 (internal citations omitted). While “at first blush, the term ‘employees’ in § 704(a) would seem to refer to those having an existing employment relationship with the employer in question,” the Court explained that this narrow interpretation of the term cannot withstand scrutiny in the context of § 704(a). Id. at 341. Specifically, the Court noted, neither § 704(a) nor Title VII’s definition of “employee” contains any “temporal qualifier” indicating that § 704(a) only applies to former employees. Id. at 341-42. Furthermore, the Court observed, while some provisions of Title VII clearly used the term “employees” to mean “current employees,” other sections used the word to mean something more inclusive than “current employees.” Id. at 342-43. The Court concluded, “once it is established that the term ‘employees’ includes former employees in some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous.” Id. at 343. Having found that the term “employees” as used in § 704(a) is ambiguous, the Court resolved the ambiguity by examining “[t]he broader context provided by other sections of the statute.” Id. at 345. In determining that “employees” includes former employees, the Court noted that several other sections of the statute plainly contemplate the use of the remedial mechanisms of Title VII by former employees, and, moreover, such broad interpretation of the term comports with the purpose of the antiretaliation provisions of the statute. Id. at 345-46. A narrow interpretation of the term, the Court reasoned, would “vitiate much of the protection afforded by § 704(a),” as it would allow an employer “to retaliate with impunity against an entire class of acts under Title VII—for example, complaints regarding discriminatory termination.” Id. 3. Plaintiffs urge this court to reconsider Parker I’s conclusion in light of Robinson and join the Second and Third Circuits in holding that disabled former employees can bring suit under Title I of the ADA. We decline to do so. Rather, we adopt the majority position and conclude that former disabled employees do not have standing under Title I of the ADA.
This is similar to an argument rejected by the Parker I panel, which noted that “[t]he circularity of this reasoning is apparent.” 99 F.3d at 186.
employee’s contemporary or future disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers different coverage for various disabilities. Id. at 806 (emphasis added). Likewise, in the instant case, each plaintiff had equal access to the same benefit plan; thus, they too received equal treatment from GM. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ ADA claims would also fail on the merits. V. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 12111
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 704
 § 704
 § 704
 § 704
 § 704
 § 704
 V.