Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2013/5770crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:13:40+00:00

Document:
Covey v. Home Medical Associates, LLC et al.
The respondent Home Medical Associates, LLC, was represented by Andrew J. Hern, Esq., Law Offices of Andrew J. Hern, 221 Main Street, 5th Floor, Hartford, CT 06106.
Respondents Jewish Home for the Elderly and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company were represented by Vincent DiPalma, Esq., Loccisano, Turret & Rosenbaum, 101 Barnes Road, 3rd Floor, Wallingford, CT 06492.
At oral argument, respondent Second Injury Fund was represented by Joy L. Avallone, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120. In the proceedings below, the Second Injury Fund was represented by Lawrence G. Widem, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120.
This Petition for Review from the July 18, 2012 Findings and Orders and the October 11, 2012 Supplemental Findings and Order of the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District was heard on February 18, 2013 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Commissioners Charles F. Senich, Peter C. Mlynarczyk and Scott A. Barton.
CHARLES F. SENICH, COMMISSIONER. The respondents Jewish Home for the Elderly and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company [hereinafter “respondents”] have petitioned for review from the July 18, 2012 Findings and Orders and the October 11, 2012 Supplemental Findings and Order of the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District. We find no error and accordingly affirm the decisions of the trial commissioner.
In her Findings and Orders of July 18, 2012, the trial commissioner made the following factual findings which are pertinent to our review. The claimant, Bonnie Covey, who was at all relevant times married to William Covey, M.D., [hereinafter “Covey”] filed a timely claim for survivor’s benefits pursuant to § 31-306 C.G.S. following the death of her husband on May 28, 2009.1 At the time of his death, Covey was, inter alia, the medical director of the Jewish Home for the Elderly [hereinafter “JHE”]. Pursuant to the Medical Director Agreement with the JHE, “Covey was required to be physically present at the JHE for forty hours per week,” Findings, ¶ 4, during which time he was to be on call for medical and administrative emergencies. He was also required to perform administrative duties as medical director for six hours per week and “was prohibited from engaging in any outside activities without the written approval of the CEO of the JHE.” Id.
As medical director for the JHE, Covey had specific administrative duties which were under the direction and control of the CEO for the JHE, including the duty to: 1) attend regularly scheduled meetings at specified times and to attend other administrative meetings on an as-needed basis; 2) maintain the medical charts for the residents of the JHE; 3) oversee the medical care of the residents and the administration of the panel of physicians permitted to care for the residents of the JHE; and, 4) perform other administrative duties such as chart review, correspondence and complaint follow-up.
In exchange for his administrative services, Covey was paid an annual salary of $30,000.00 and was provided additional benefits such as health insurance, an employee health savings account, and dental insurance.2 He was also given an educational stipend and received reimbursement for the costs associated with his application fees and dues at St. Vincent’s Medical Center as well as partial reimbursement (fifteen percent) of his malpractice insurance premiums. The JHE provided at cost both office space for Covey’s private medical practice and several JHE employees who staffed Covey’s medical practice within the JHE facility. In addition, Covey received malpractice coverage for his administrative services from the JHE, and the JHE furnished office equipment such as a computer, a telephone, and office supplies. Under the terms of the Medical Director Agreement, Covey agreed to reimburse the JHE for the expenses associated with the operation of Home Medical Associates [hereinafter “HMA”], the private practice Covey ran with Kenneth Fine, M.D., based on a percentage allocation. The Agreement also stated that Covey was an independent contractor and not an employee of the JHE, and the Medical Director Agreement “should not be construed to allow JHE to exercise control or direction over the manner or method by which the physician services were provided and performed, except for Dr. Covey’s obligations and responsibilities with respect to administrative services and other items set forth in Part III of the agreement.” Findings, ¶ 8.
Andrew Banoff, the CEO of the JHE, testified that Covey, in his role as medical director, reported to Banoff and Banoff had the right to terminate this employment. Banoff also had the right to control the administrative services aspect of Covey’s work as medical director. Covey’s private practice consisted of two elements: one involving the treatment of patients who lived either permanently or on a short-term basis at the JHE and the other involving the treatment of patients who came to the JHE for office visits. Covey also had three separate business relationships with the JHE: the role of medical director as set forth previously herein; his activities as a private practitioner who, under the terms of the Medical Director Agreement, had the ability to run a private practice and the responsibility to house that practice at the JHE; and his role as a member of the medical staff at the JHE, which was governed by a separate contractual relationship.3 Banoff indicated that several years ago, the JHE established a billing service known as GPG (Geriatric Professional Group) for the purpose of handling the billing for physicians on the active medical staff at the JHE, and checks received by HMA from patients were made out to this entity. Banoff testified that the bulk of Covey’s relationship with the JHE was “as a private practitioner who was in control of his own schedule, went on vacation when he wanted to and ultimately billed and collected what he wanted to make.” Findings, ¶ 9.h.
The trial commissioner declined to reach the issue of whether, at the time of Covey’s death, the JHE was liable as a principal employer pursuant to § 31-291 C.G.S. relative to Covey’s work with HMA, remarking that the resolution of that aspect of the claim should be deferred until compensability was adjudicated.6 However, on October 11, 2012, the trier granted a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Second Injury Fund requesting that the trier render a decision on the issue of principal employer liability so it could be joined with the other issues on appeal.7 The trier then issued a Supplemental Findings and Order of the same date in which she deleted Section C of the July 18, 2012 Findings and Orders relative to the deferral of the principal employer issue and concluded, on the basis of additional factual findings which will be addressed in more detail below, that based on the “totality of the circumstances regarding Dr. Covey’s unique relationship with the respondent JHE,” Conclusion, ¶ E, the JHE was liable as a principal employer of Covey relative to Covey’s professional activities as a physician at the uninsured HMA.
A flurry of pleadings ensued following the issuance of both the Findings and Orders of July 18, 2012 and the Supplemental Findings and Order of October 11, 2012, culminating in an appeal of both decisions by the respondents. On appeal, the respondents assert that the trial commissioner erroneously concluded that an employeremployee relationship existed between the JHE and Covey and that the JHE was Covey’s principal employer pursuant to § 31-291 C.G.S.
We begin with the respondents’ claim of error relative to the trier’s conclusion that an employer-employee relationship existed between Covey and the JHE. The respondents assert that “[i]n the present matter, the totality of factors clearly indicate that Dr. Covey was an independent contractor/sole proprietor and, as a result, no employeremployee relationship can be established as to the Jewish Home.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 14. We are not so persuaded.
In articulating the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor, our Supreme Court stated that the “ultimate test” for determining whether a worker is an employee as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Act “is the right of general control of the means and methods used by the person whose status is involved.” Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613, 617 (1998), quoting Ross v. Post Publishing Co., 129 Conn. 564, 567 (1943). Hanson established a “totality of the evidence test,” such that “[i]t is the totality of the evidence that determines whether a worker is an employee under the act, not ‘subordinate factual findings that, if viewed in isolation, might have supported a different determination.’” Rodriguez v. E.D. Construction, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 717, 728 (2011), cert. denied, 301 Conn. 904 (2011), quoting Hanson, supra, at 624-625.
Moreover, “[i]t is not the fact of actual interference with the control, but the right to interfere, that makes the difference between an independent contractor and a servant or agent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tianti v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 231 Conn. 690, 697 (1995), quoting Latimer v. Administrator, 216 Conn. 237, 248 (1990). “As a general principle, a hiring entity retains control over only the results of an independent contractor’s work, while an employer’s will governs the employee ‘regarding both the fruits of [their] labor and the mode and manner in which [their] services are performed.’” Lema v. Eoanou, 5056 CRB-4-06-2 (January 29, 2007), quoting Morrissey v. Lannon-Norton Associates, 3085 CRB-4-95-6 (December 23, 1996).
We have examined the subject contract, and we have no dispute with the respondents’ interpretation of the language contained therein. Moreover, we note that Andrew Banoff, the Chief Executive Officer of the JHE, testified that the JHE had no control over the manner in which Covey performed his duties as medical director, and Covey was free to accept or reject any new opportunities at the JHE and to take time off at his own discretion. We also realize that the method by which Covey filed his tax returns could ostensibly support the inference that Covey was an independent contractor, particularly in light of the fact that the JHE issued Covey a Form 1099, generally given to independent contractors, rather than the Form W2 customarily given to employees. Finally, it is undisputed that Covey owned HMA, and Banoff testified that no business relationship existed between the JHE and HMA apart from the space rental arrangements.
There is no question that the above-mentioned factors could have supported a finding by the trial commissioner that no employer-employee relationship existed between Covey and the JHE. However, a closer examination at the instant record and, in particular Banoff’s testimony, reveals a number of factors that support the trier’s conclusions to the contrary.
At trial, Banoff described the responsibilities of the JHE medical director as having three main areas of focus: 1) organization of the activities of the medical staff consisting of approximately 100 physicians, which duties “included credentialing, medical records, documentation, charting, oversight of the work of the physicians of the medical staff,” September 15, 2011 Transcript, p. 8; 2) development and implementation of the JHE policies and procedures; and, 3) cooperation with the administrative team on issues such as board governance, corporate structure, and various other administrative committee matters.9 Banoff explained that pursuant to the Medical Director Agreement, Covey was required to be on the premises for at least forty hours a week and of those forty hours, six hours per week were to be devoted to administrative duties. Moreover, if for some reason Covey was unavailable to perform any of the services under the contract, he was responsible for finding (and paying) a substitute physician who “shall be acceptable to the Home and shall meet all of the qualifications and representation under this agreement.” Id., at 61, quoting Respondents’ Exhibits JH-1, JH-2, § 3.1.
Banoff indicated that Covey was responsible for conducting the performance evaluations for the physicians and Banoff would also solicit Covey’s informal opinion regarding the assessments of the nursing staff. Banoff stated that Covey was “bound to follow the policies and procedures of the Jewish Home with treating patients on the premises of the Jewish Home.” Id., at 50. Banoff testified that the formula used for Covey’s health insurance benefits was the same as that used for other employees, Covey was given a guide to employee benefits, and the benefits for which Covey had negotiated were administered in the same manner as those for regular employees. Banoff testified that he did not know whether the JHE reported Covey as an employee for purposes of obtaining health insurance; however, the JHE Certificate of Group Health Plan Coverage dated July 5, 2009 indicates that Covey was an employee. Claimant’s Exhibit L. Covey was covered under the general malpractice policy for administrative staff and was allotted thirty days of vacation time which was “within the reasonable standards of all of us who had a full-time presence at the Home.” September 15, 2011 Transcript, p. 30.
a mutual agreement ... because we clearly had to have acceptance of the person as well. So, in the collaborative spirit of how this all really worked, if an individual was perfect for him and horrible for us, we weren’t going to hire them either. It took both parties to agree.
Banoff testified that while Covey and HMA had primary responsibility for day-to-day decision-making regarding the duties of the shared staff, if other issues arose, “[w]e would not let our employee be treated outside the law, for example. So there was a relationship as the leased employer, as, I’m not sure what the right terminology is, but as the employer leasing that staff member, we would not let anything happen to our employees.” December 19, 2011 Transcript, p. 32.
Having reviewed the foregoing, we find that the instant evidentiary record and, in particular, Banoff’s testimony, provided a satisfactory basis for the trier’s conclusion that the JHE retained a sufficient measure of control over Covey’s duties as a medical director such that the existence of an employer-employee relationship could reasonably be inferred. There is no question that the contract between the JHE and Covey purported to contemplate that the medical director would function as an independent contractor, and Banoff in his testimony went to considerable length to disavow the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Nevertheless, “the key factor in establishing employee status is not the label applied by the parties in a memorialized agreement; it is the putative employer’s right to control the means and methods used by the person whose status is implicated.” Johnson v. Braun Moving, Inc., 3861 CRB-7-98-7 (November 2, 1999).
Our review of the instant record indicates that the “totality of the evidence” supports the trier’s inference that the JHE retained a substantial “right to interfere” in the manner in which Covey carried out his daily responsibilities as medical director. Tianti, supra. As such, regardless of the language of the contract between the JHE and Covey, “there was also evidence presented to the commissioner that supported a finding that [the JHE] was the claimant’s employer. Where there is conflicting evidence, the trier is entitled to accept that which he finds most credible.” Johnson, supra. We therefore find no merit in the respondents’ claim of error on this issue.14 “It is ... immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [commissioner] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 540 (1988), quoting Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 287 (1935).
The respondents have also claimed as error the trier’s determination, issued in her Supplemental Findings and Order dated October 11, 2012, that the JHE was liable as a principal employer of Covey relative to Covey’s professional activities as a physician at HMA. In association with that Order, the trier made the following factual findings. The JHE, a 360-bed skilled nursing facility, employed a number of medical professionals to care for the residents of the JHE, including approximately ten primary care physicians who were primarily responsible for the residents. Physicians, dentists and podiatrists were covered under a separate agreement known as the Medical Staff Bylaws/Rules and Regulations which each practitioner was required to sign. According to these bylaws, Covey, in his role as medical director, was also a member of the standing committee of the active medical staff of the JHE.
The trier found that “Banoff testified that he asked Dr. Covey to move his private practice into JHE ... in order to have more of a medical presence in the building” and that Covey’s private practice was “absolutely a positive improvement for JHE” and its patients. Findings, ¶ 7. Moreover, in addition to providing Covey with office space and medical examination rooms, the JHE advertised that Covey’s services were available, and by operation of a rotating assignment process, approximately two-thirds of the residents had either Covey or Fine as their primary care physician after 2006. Banoff also testified that although the day-to-day decisions regarding the JHE staff members working at HMA were the responsibility of the physicians, if any of these employees “were treated in a manner that violated labor law or policy, JHE would intervene.” Findings, ¶ 11.
The purpose of § 31-291 C.G.S. was “to protect employees of minor contractors against the possible irresponsibility of their immediate employers, by making the principal employer who has general control of the business in hand liable as if he had directly employed all who work upon any part of the business which he has undertaken to carry on.” Bello v. Notkins, 101 Conn. 34, 38 (1924). In addition, “principal employer responsibility under the Workers’ Compensation Act is to allow recovery for accidents occurring in the work area which could be prevented or minimized by sufficient oversight or control.” Alpha Crane Service, Inc. v. Capitol Crane Co., 6 Conn. App. 60, 74 (1986), citing Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing Co., 136 Conn. 529, 535 (1950).
[t]he term “control” in this context has a specific meaning. It is merely descriptive of the work area and “is used instead of such words as ‘owned by him’ or ‘in his possession’ in order to describe the area in a more inclusive fashion. The emphasis is upon limitation of the area within which the accident must happen rather than upon actual control of the implements which caused the accident.
Alpha Crane, supra, at 73-74, quoting Crisanti, supra.
In King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636 (1943), our Supreme Court, after noting the difficulty attendant in defining the legislative intent of the phrase “part or process in the trade or business,” described it as follows: “If the work is of such a character that it ordinarily or appropriately would be performed by the principal employer’s own employees in the prosecution of its business, or as an essential part of the maintenance thereof, it is a part or process of his work.” Id., at 641. In addition, “[i]t has long been held that this condition is not limited to the main tasks performed in the principal employer’s trade or business. Rather, those tasks which are necessary to the routine functioning of a business are also included within the scope of this element of the defense.” Alpha Crane, supra, at 75.
Turning to the matter at bar, as mentioned previously herein, we note at the outset that the trier’s finding of principal employer liability against the JHE rests in part on her threshold finding of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Covey and the JHE, which we have affirmed herein. In addition to the evidentiary submissions adduced on that issue, a number of which lend themselves to the reasonable inference that the JHE exercised sufficient control over HMA such that the JHE was liable as a principal employer of Covey relative to Covey’s professional activities as a physician at HMA, the instant record contains the following evidentiary items which also serve to buttress the trier’s conclusions relative to the issue of principal employer liability.
September 15, 2011 Transcript, pp. 12-13.
Moreover, relative to the statutory requirement of § 31-291 C.G.S. that “the work be part or process in the trade or business of such principal employer,” Banoff testified that the JHE is a “skilled nursing facility and senior living provider of services for the elderly,” Id., at 5, on whose premises was housed, inter alia, an on-site medical practice made up of physicians who treated the JHE residents as well as patients from the community. Banoff testified that the JHE medical staff was organized in the same manner as a hospital and consisted of approximately ten primary care physicians along with a number of specialists who would be consulted on specific issues. Banoff stated that every resident of the JHE had to have a primary care physician, who was designated on a rotating basis, and that two-thirds of the residents were split between Covey and Fine.19 Banoff stated that the JHE was “responsible for all of the care for the residents that live there,” December 19, 2011 Transcript, p. 9, and while the choice of physician was left to the resident or the conservator, “[t]he physician then in consultation with the decision maker is going to use their best judgment about the medical care that’s needed ... and the Home’s responsibility is to carry out those physician orders. The oversight to that is through the medical staff in all nursing homes.” Id., at 10-11.
Finally, relative to the statutory requirement that the work be “performed in, on or about premises under [the principal employer’s] control, we would reiterate that many of the evidentiary submissions reviewed in the preceding analysis regarding the existence of an employer-employee relationship also lend themselves to the reasonable inference that the premises occupied by HMA were subject to the control of the JHE. The record also indicates that Covey, in addition to signing the Medical Director Agreement, would also have been required to sign a second agreement confirming his compliance with the rules and regulations of the by-laws of the medical staff.22 As such, we find no error in the trier’s determination that the statutory requirements for a finding of principal employer liability against the JHE were satisfied under the facts of this matter.
There is no error; the July 18, 2012 Findings and Orders and the October 11, 2012 Supplemental Findings and Order of the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District are hereby affirmed.
Commissioners Peter C. Mlynarczyk and Scott A. Barton concur in this opinion.

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