Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/387/294/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:50:30+00:00

Document:
1. "The exigencies of the situation," in which the officers were in pursuit of a suspected armed felon in the house which he had entered only minutes before they arrived, permitted their warrantless entry and search. McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 335 U. S. 456. Pp. 387 U. S. 298-300.
2. The distinction prohibiting seizure of items of only evidential value and allowing seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband is no longer accepted as being required by the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 387 U. S. 300-310.
(a) There is no rational distinction between a search for "mere evidence" and one for an "instrumentality" in terms of the privacy which is safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment; nor does the language of the Amendment itself make such a distinction. Pp. 387 U. S. 301-302.
(b) The clothing items involved here are not "testimonial" or "communicative," and their introduction did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757. Pp. 387 U. S. 302-303.
(c) The premise that property interests control government's search and seizure rights, on which Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, partly rested, is no longer controlling as the Fourth Amendment's principal object is the protection of privacy, not property. Pp. 387 U. S. 303-306.
(d) The related premise of Gouled that government may not seize evidence for the purpose of proving crime has also been discredited. The Fourth Amendment does not bar a search for that purpose provided that there is probable cause, as there was here, for the belief that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. Pp. 387 U. S. 306-307.
(e) The remedy of suppression, with its limited functional consequence, has made possible the rejection of both the related Gouled premises. P. 387 U. S. 307.
(f) Just as the suppression of evidence does not require the return of such items as contraband, the introduction of "mere evidence" does not entitle the State to its retention if it is being wrongfully withheld. Pp. 387 U. S. 307-308.
(g) The numerous and confusing exceptions to the "mere evidence" limitation make it questionable whether it affords any meaningful protection. P. 387 U. S. 309.
weapons had been found at the time he opened the machine. [Footnote 5] In these circumstances, the inference that he was, in fact, also looking for weapons is fully justified.
We have examined on many occasions the history and purposes of the Amendment. [Footnote 9] It was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, and was intended to protect against invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 630, from searches under indiscriminate, general authority. Protection of these interests was assured by prohibiting all "unreasonable" searches and seizures, and by requiring the use of warrants, which particularly describe "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," thereby interposing "a magistrate between the citizen and the police," McDonald v. United States, supra, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 455.
255 U.S. at 255 U. S. 309; that is, when the property is an instrumentality or fruit of crime, or contraband. Since it was "impossible to say, on the record . . . that the Government had any interest" in the papers involved "other than as evidence against the accused . . . ," "to permit them to be used in evidence would be, in effect, as ruled in the Boyd Case, to compel the defendant to become a witness against himself." Id. at 255 U. S. 311.
a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757. This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure.
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, and Gouled v. United States, supra, when it became established that suppression might be sought during a criminal trial, and under circumstances which would not sustain an action in trespass or replevin. Recognition that the role of the Fourth Amendment was to protect against invasions of privacy demanded a remedy to condemn the seizure in Silverthorne, although no possible common law claim existed for the return of the copies made by the Government of the papers it had seized. The remedy of suppression, necessarily involving only the limited, functional consequence of excluding the evidence from trial, satisfied that demand.
common law, could be seized with impunity: stolen goods, Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98; instrumentalities, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89; McDonald v.United States, supra, and contraband, Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108.
whether the search is for "mere evidence" or for fruits, instrumentalities or contraband. There must, of course, be a nexus -- automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband -- between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Thus, in the case of "mere evidence," probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. In so doing, consideration of police purposes will be required. Cf. Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346. But no such problem is presented in this case. The clothes found in the washing machine matched the description of those worn by the robber and the police therefore could reasonably believe that the items would aid in the identification of the culprit.
itself, entitle the State to its retention. Where public officials "unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattels, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity . . . ," the true owner may "bring his possessory action to reclaim that which is wrongfully withheld." Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 330 U. S. 738. (Emphasis added.) See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 256 U. S. 474.
to test this conclusion was slow to mount. Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporated the Gouled categories as limitations on federal authorities to issue warrants, and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, only recently made the "mere evidence" rule a problem in the state courts. Pressure against the rule in the federal courts has taken the form, rather, of broadening the categories of evidence subject to seizure, thereby creating considerable confusion in the law. See, e.g., Note, 54 Geo.L.J. 593, 607-621 (1966).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 333 U. S. 14. The Fourth Amendment allows intrusions upon privacy under these circumstances, and there is no viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure "mere evidence" from intrusions to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband.
Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 331 U. S. 154; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 285 U. S. 465-466; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 339 U. S. 64, n. 6; Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 362 U. S. 234-235.
The State claims that, since Hayden failed to raise the search and seizure question at trial, he deliberately bypassed state remedies and should be denied an opportunity to assert his claim in federal court. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443; Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391. Whether or not the Maryland Court of Appeals actually intended, when it reversed the state trial court's denial of post-conviction relief, that Hayden be afforded a hearing on the merits of his claim, it is clear that the trial court so understood the order of the Court of Appeals. A hearing was held in the state courts, and the claim denied on the merits. In this circumstance, the Fourth Circuit was correct in rejecting the State's deliberate bypassing claim. The deliberate bypass rule is applicable only "to an applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing, has forfeited his state court remedies." Fay v. Noia, supra, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 438. (Emphasis added.) But see Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 82 (C.A. 9th Cir.1965).
This Court has approved the seizure and introduction of items having only evidential value without, however, considering the validity of the distinction rejected today. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757; Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58.
E.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 379 U. S. 481-485; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 367 U. S. 724-729; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 359 U. S. 363-365. See generally Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937); Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966).
At common law, the Government did assert a superior property interest when it searched lawfully for stolen property, since the procedure then followed made it necessary that the true owner swear that his goods had been taken. But no such procedure need be followed today; the Government may demonstrate probable cause and lawfully search for stolen property even though the true owner is unknown or unavailable to request and authorize the Government to assert his interest. As to instrumentalities, the Court in Gouled allowed their seizure not because the Government had some property interest in them (under the ancient, fictitious forfeiture theory), but because they could be used to perpetrate further crime. 255 U.S. at 255 U. S. 309. The same holds true, of course, for "mere evidence"; the prevention of crime is served at least as much by allowing the Government to identify and capture the criminal as it is by allowing the seizure of his instrumentalities. Finally, contraband is indeed property in which the Government holds a superior interest, but only because the Government decides to vest such an interest in itself. And while there may be limits to what may be declared contraband, the concept is hardly more than a form through which the Government seeks to prevent and deter crime.
Chafee, op. cit. supra at 699. The Government assumed the validity of petitioner's argument that Entick v. Carrington, Boyd v. United States, and other authorities established the constitutional illegality of seizures of private papers for use as evidence. Gouled v. United States, supra, Brief for the United States, p. 50. It argued, complaining of the absence of a record, that the papers introduced in evidence were instrumentalities of crime. The Court ruled that the record before it revealed no government interest in the papers other than as evidence against the accused. 255 U.S. at 255 U. S. 311.
are an object of the pursuit or arrest of the suspect, and should be restored to their true owner. The seizure of contraband has been justified on the ground that the suspect has not even a bare possessory right to contraband. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 623-624 (1886); United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (C.A.2d Cir.1926) (L. Hand, J.).
It is true that this Court has not always been as vigilant as it should to enforce these traditional and extremely important restrictions upon the scope of such searches. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 339 U. S. 68-86 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 331 U. S. 155-198 (1947) (dissenting opinions).
This decision, in the very forefront when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, underlines the construction that it covers something other than the form of the warrant [Footnote 3/1] and creates a zone of privacy which no government official may enter.
Id. at 116 U. S. 623.
not incidental to a lawful arrest or not authorized by a search warrant, the fact that contraband is discovered does not make the seizure constitutional. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 334 U. S. 705; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 361 U. S. 103; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108.
We have, to be sure, breached that barrier, Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, being a conspicuous example. But I dissented then, and renew my opposing view at this time. That which is taken from a person without his consent and used as testimonial evidence violates the Fifth Amendment.
seizure, even under a technically proper warrant, were (1) an unexecuted form of contract between defendant and another person; (2) a written contract signed by defendant and another person, and (3) a bill for disbursement and professional services rendered by the attorney to the defendant. 255 U.S. at 255 U. S. 306-307.
Id. at 381 U. S. 485-486.
This right of privacy, sustained in Griswold, is kin to the right of privacy created by the Fourth Amendment. That there is a zone that no police can enter -- whether, in "hot pursuit" or armed with a meticulously proper warrant -- has been emphasized by Boyd and by Gouled. They have been consistently and continuously approved. [Footnote 3/3] I would adhere to them, and leave with the individual the choice of opening his private effects (apart from contraband and the like) to the police or keeping their contents a secret and their integrity inviolate. The existence of that choice is the very essence of the right of privacy. Without it, the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth are ready instruments for the police state that the Framer sought to avoid.
See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 149-150; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 285 U. S. 464-466; Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 328 U. S. 590, n. 11; Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 331 U. S. 154; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 339 U. S. 64, n. 6; Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 362 U. S. 234-235.

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