Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/404/477/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 15:03:50+00:00

Document:
Following a pretrial suppression hearing at which conflicting evidence was presented as to the voluntariness of a confession that petitioner had given the police, the trial judge, presumably applying the Illinois preponderance of the evidence standard, held the confession admissible, and it was introduced into evidence at the trial, which resulted in petitioner's conviction. The judge had instructed the jury as to the prosecution's burden of proving guilt, but did not instruct that the jury had to find the confession voluntary before it could be used in reaching its verdict. In a habeas corpus proceeding petitioner challenged his conviction. The District Court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner contends, relying upon In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, that the trial judge should have found the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before admitting it into evidence, or, alternatively, that the admissibility of the confession as evidence in a criminal trial (quite apart from its probative value) had to be determined by a reasonable doubt standard to protect the values that exclusionary rules are designed to serve. Petitioner also urges that, even though the trial judge ruled on his coercion claim, he was entitled, under Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, to have the jury decide that issue anew.
1. The hearing on the voluntariness of a confession required by this Court's decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, is not designed to implement the presumption of innocence and enhance the reliability of jury verdicts, but to prevent the use of a coerced confession as violative of due process quite apart from its truth or falsity. Consequently, determining the admissibility of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence is not inconsistent with the mandate of In re Winship, supra. Pp. 404 U. S. 482-487.
public interest in having probative evidence available to juries. pp. 404 U. S. 487-489.
3. The procedure followed here comported with the requirements of Jackson, supra, and petitioner was not entitled to have the voluntariness issue which had been resolved by the trial judge also submitted to a jury for its separate consideration. Nor did Duncan, supra, change the rule that determining the admissibility of evidence is a function of the court, rather than of the jury. Pp. 404 U. S. 489-490.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 404 U. S. 490. POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
since Jackson, state and federal courts have addressed themselves to the issue with a considerable variety of opinions. [Footnote 1] We granted certiorari in this case to resolve the question. 401 U.S. 992 (1971).
police station. The trial judge instructed the jury as to the prosecution's burden of proving guilt. He did not instruct that the jury was required to find the confession voluntary before it could be used in judging guilt or innocence. [Footnote 3] On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. People v. Lego, 32 Ill.2d 76, 203 N.E.2d 875 (1965).
Four years later, petitioner challenged his conviction by seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. He maintained that the trial judge should have found the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before admitting it into evidence. Although the judge had made no mention of the standard he used, Illinois law provided that a confession challenged as involuntary could be admitted into evidence if, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the judge found it voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. [Footnote 4] In the alternative, petitioner argued that the voluntariness question should also have been submitted to the jury for its separate consideration.
Petitioner challenges the judgment of the Court of Appeals on three grounds. The first is that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), because the confession used against him at his trial had been proved voluntary only by a preponderance of the evidence. Implicit in the claim is an assumption that a voluntariness hearing is designed to enhance the reliability of jury verdicts. To judge whether that is so, we must return to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964).
was introduced at the trial itself. If evidence challenging its voluntariness were adduced, the jury was instructed first to pass upon voluntariness and, if it found the confession involuntary, ignore it in determining guilt. If, on the other hand, the confession were found to be voluntary, the jury was then free to consider its truth or falsity and give the confession an appropriate weight in judging guilt or innocence.
and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession. Rogers v. Richmond, supra. [Footnote 8]"
We did not think it necessary, or even appropriate, in Jackson to announce that prosecutors would be required to meet a particular burden of proof in a Jackson hearing held before the trial judge. [Footnote 9] Indeed, the then-established duty to determine voluntariness had not been framed in terms of a burden of proof, [Footnote 10] nor has it been since Jackson was decided. [Footnote 11] We could fairly assume then, as we can now, that a judge would admit into evidence only those confessions that he reliably found, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, had been made voluntarily.
slightest on the fear that juries might misjudge the accuracy of confessions and arrive at erroneous determinations of guilt or innocence. That case was not aimed at reducing the possibility of convicting innocent men.
been as free since Jackson as he was before to familiarize a jury with circumstances that attend the taking of his confession, including facts bearing upon its weight and voluntariness. [Footnote 14] In like measure, of course, juries have been at liberty to disregard confessions that are insufficiently corroborated or otherwise deemed unworthy of belief.
"the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
U.S. 436 (1966), excludes confessions flowing from custodial interrogations unless adequate warnings were administered and a waiver was obtained. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), make impermissible the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In each instance, and without regard to its probative value, evidence is kept from the trier of guilt or innocence for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the reliability of verdicts. These independent values, it is urged, themselves require a stricter standard of proof in judging admissibility.
before state juries and by revising the standards applicable in collateral proceedings. Sound reason for moving further in this direction has not been offered here, nor do we discern any at the present time. This is particularly true since the exclusionary rules are very much aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and prosecution, and it is very doubtful that escalating the prosecution's burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment suppression hearings would be sufficiently productive in this respect to outweigh the public interest in placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at truthful decisions about guilt or innocence.
that Jackson neither raised any question about the constitutional validity of the so-called orthodox rule for judging the admissibility of confessions nor even suggested that the Constitution requires submission of voluntariness claims to a jury as well as a judge. Finally, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), which made the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury applicable to the States, did not purport to change the normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a question for the court, rather than the jury. Nor did that decision require that both judge and jury pass upon the admissibility of evidence when constitutional grounds are asserted for excluding it. We are not disposed to impose as a constitutional requirement a procedure we have found wanting merely to afford petitioner a second forum for litigating his claim.
State courts that have considered the question since Jackson have adopted a variety of standards, most of them founded upon state law. Many have sanctioned a standard of proof less strict than beyond a reasonable doubt, including proof of voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence or to the satisfaction of the court or proof of voluntariness in fact. E.g., Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840 (1965); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942 (1971); People v. Harper, 36 Ill.2d 398, 223 N.E.2d 841 (1967); State v. Milow, 199 Kan. 576, 433 P.2d 538 (1967); Barnhart v. State, 5 Md.App. 222, 246 A.2d 280 (1968); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815 (Mo.1968); State v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966); State v. Brewton, 238 Ore. 590, 395 P.2d 874 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968); Monts v. State, 218 Tenn. 31, 400 S.W.2d 722 (1966); State v. Davis, 73 Wash.2d 271, 438 P.2d 185 (1968).
Other States, using state law or not specifying a basis, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., State v. Ragdale, 249 La. 420, 187 So.2d 427 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967); State v. Keiser, 274 Minn. 265, 143 N.W.2d 75 (1966); State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 231 A.2d 598 (1967); People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965); State v. Thundershield, 83 S.D. 414, 160 N.W.2d 408 (1968); State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis.2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1966).
Two federal courts have held as an exercise of supervisory power that voluntariness must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (CA4 1970), clarifying United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (CA4 1965); Pea v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 397 F.2d 627 (1967); cf. United States v. Schipani, 289 F.Supp. 43 (EDNY 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 1262 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970), requiring the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that certain evidence was not tainted by violation of the Fourth Amendment.
"The petitioner has admitted under oath he had a struggle with the complaining witness over the gun; he was wounded, obtained a facial wound. The Officers testified he was bloody at the time he was arrested."
"I don't believe the defendant's testimony at all that he was beaten up by the Police. The condition he is in is well explained by the defendant himself."
Illinois followed what we described in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), as "the orthodox rule, under which the judge himself solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the confession. . . ." Id. at 378 U. S. 378. While the procedures of all the States could not be neatly classified, we noted that some followed the Massachusetts procedure, whereby the judge himself first resolves evidentiary conflicts and determines whether a confession is, in fact, voluntary. If he is unable so to conclude, the confession may not be admitted into evidence. If judged voluntary, and therefore admissible, the jury must also determine the coercion issue, and is instructed to ignore a confession it finds involuntary. Id. at 378 U. S. 378 n. 8. Other States had adopted the New York procedure at issue in Jackson. Our decision in Jackson cast no doubt upon the orthodox and Massachusetts procedures, but did call into question the practice of every State that did not clearly follow one of these procedures. A thorough tabulation of what States did in the wake of Jackson appears in 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence 585-593 (J. Chadbourn rev.1970).
People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill.2d 188, 133 N.E.2d 24 (1956); People v. Thomlison, 400 Ill. 555, 81 N.E.2d 434 (1948).
Respondent makes no contention here that petitioner either waived the right to adjudicate his federal claims or deliberately bypassed state procedures for testing those claims. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 372 U. S. 439 (1963).
The Seventh Circuit's affirmance is unreported. United States ex rel. Lego v. Pate, No. 18313 (CA7 Oct. 8, 1970).
A more thorough description of the New York procedure is found in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 377-391.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 376-377.
"Judge" is used here and throughout the opinion to mean a factfinder, whether trial judge or jury, at a voluntariness hearing. The proscription against permitting the jury that passes upon guilt or innocence to judge voluntariness in the same proceeding does not preclude the States from impaneling a separate jury to determine voluntariness. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 391 n.19.
See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 (1958).
See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 (1969); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478 (1969); Harrison v. United States, 392 U. S. 219 (1968); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519 (1968); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737 (1966); cf. Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U. S. 446 (1971).
We noted that coerced confessions are forbidden in part because of their "probable unreliability." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 385-386. However, it had been settled when this Court decided Jackson that the exclusion of unreliable confessions is not the purpose that a voluntariness hearing is designed to serve. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 (1961). The sole issue in such a hearing is whether a confession was coerced. Whether it be true or false is irrelevant; indeed, such an inquiry is forbidden. The judge may not take into consideration evidence that would indicate that the confession, though compelled, is reliable, even highly so. Id. at 365 U. S. 545. As difficult as such tasks may be to accomplish, the judge is also duty-bound to ignore implications of reliability in facts relevant to coercion and to shut from his mind any internal evidence of authenticity that a confession itself may bear.
In Jackson, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 377-391, we traced the genesis of the view that due process forbids the use of coerced confessions, whether or not reliable. The Court had departed from that view in Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156 (1953), whose premise was that a confession is excludable because of its inherent untrustworthiness. The Stein premise was repudiated in Rogers v. Richmond, and Rogers was reaffirmed in Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 739, and Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 384 U. S. 729 n. 9 (1966). That case continues to serve as the basis for evaluating coercion claims. See cases cited in n 11, supra.
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, hall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made, it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feel it deserves under all the circumstances."
Nothing is to be gained from restating the constitutional rule as requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of constitutionally obtained evidence and then arguing that rights under Winship are diluted unless admissibility is governed by a high standard. Transparently, this assumes the question at issue, which is whether a confession is admissible if found voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Schipani, supra, n 1, followed this unsatisfactory course in a Fourth Amendment case but stopped short of basing the decision on the Constitution.
It is no more persuasive to impose the stricter standard of proof as an exercise of supervisory power than as a constitutional rule. Cf. Ralph v. Warden, supra, n 1, clarifying United States v. Inman, supra, n 1; Pea v. United States, supra, n 1.
See cases cited in n 1, supra.
and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth,"
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 365 U. S. 541 (1961). What is thereby protected from governmental invasion is, quite simply, "the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." Malloy v. Hogan, supra, at 378 U. S. 8. Hence, a confession is involuntary and inadmissible unless it is "the product of a rational intellect and a free will." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 361 U. S. 208 (1960); see Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 367 U. S. 440 (1961).
"is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession . . . even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction."
"[t]he procedure we established in Jackson was designed to safeguard the right of an individual, entirely apart from his guilt or innocence, not to be compelled to condemn himself by his own utterances."
Ante at 404 U. S. 485.
"[W]hen a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against a criminal defendant at his trial, he is entitled to a reliable and clear-cut determination that the confession was in fact, voluntarily rendered."
Ante at 404 U. S. 489. But the Court goes on to hold that it follows from Jackson that "the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary." Ibid. I disagree. In my view, the rationale of Jackson requires the conclusion that the preponderance standard does not provide sufficient protection against the danger that involuntary confessions will be employed in criminal trials.
A Jackson hearing normally presents the factfinder with conflicting testimony from the defendant and law enforcement officers about what occurred during the officers' interrogation of the defendant. The factfinder's resolution of this conflict is often, as a practical matter, the final resolution of the voluntariness issue. Jackson, supra, at 378 U. S. 390-391. This case is a typical example. Petitioner testified that he confessed because the police had beaten him; the police testified that there was no beating. As the Court notes, "[t]he trial judge resolved this credibility problem in favor of the police, and ruled the confession admissible." Ante at 404 U. S. 480. When the question before the factfinder is whether to believe one or the other of two self-serving accounts of what has happened, it is apparent that the standard of persuasion will in many instances be of controlling significance.
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 525-526 (1958). Although the Court suggests "that federal rights have [not] suffered from determining admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence" and that there has been no showing "that admissibility rulings have been unreliable . . . because not based on some higher standard," ante at 404 U. S. 488, I do not think it can be denied, given the factual nature of the ordinary voluntariness determination, that permitting a lower standard of proof will necessarily result in the admission of more involuntary confessions than would be admitted were the prosecution required to meet a higher standard. The converse, of course, is also true. Requiring the higher standard means that some voluntary confessions will be excluded as involuntary even though they would have been found voluntary under the lower standard.
The standard of proof required for a criminal conviction presents a similar situation, yet we have held that guilt must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 397 U. S. 361-364 (1970); see id. at 397 U. S. 370-372 (Harlan, J., concurring). Permitting proof by a preponderance of the evidence would necessarily result in the conviction of more defendants who are, in fact, innocent. Conversely, imposing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt means that more defendants who are, in fact, guilty are found innocent. It seems to me that the same considerations that demand the reasonable doubt standard when guilt or innocence is at stake also demand that standard when the question is the admissibility of an allegedly involuntary confession.
"we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor."
Id. at 397 U. S. 371 (Harlan, J., concurring). We do not take that view in criminal cases.
"is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence. . . ."
"bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."
Id. at 397 U. S. 372.
Harlan again, the command of the Fifth Amendment reflects the determination of our society that it is worse to permit involuntary self-condemnation than it is to deprive a jury of probative evidence. Just as we do not convict when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt, we should not permit the prosecution to introduce into evidence a defendant's confession when there is a reasonable doubt that it was the product of his free and rational choice.
I add only that the absolute bar against the admission of a defendant's compelled utterance at his criminal trial is fundamentally an expression of the American commitment to the moral worth of the individual. What we said in Winship bears repeating here.
"[U]se of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned."
Id. at 397 U. S. 364. I believe that it is just as critical to our system of criminal justice that, when a person's words are used against him, no reasonable doubt remains that he spoke of his own free will.
"the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether the confession was 'free and voluntary. . . .'"
"[a]ny questioning by police officers which, in fact, produces a confession which is not the product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible."

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