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LL.M. (International Business Law) (1992), University of LondonCKing’s College London; J.D. (1991), Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; M.S. Electrical Engineering (1990), B.S.E.E. (1987), Louisiana State University. The author is an associate in the intellectual property section and international law practice group in the Houston office of Jackson & Walker, L.L.P., and is licensed to practice in Louisiana and Texas, and before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. [Updated author info as of 2002: see www.KinsellaLaw.com.] The author would like to thank J. Lanier Yeates and Professor Robert Pascal for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article. Of course, any remaining mistakes are those of the author alone.
For example, the table entry “Collateral relations, Propinquity of consanguinity” discusses both these concepts, and is alphabetically sorted under the first term. Additionally, the separate table entry “Propinquity of consanguinity” refers the reader back to the “Collateral relations” entry. Common-law terms are printed in bold print in the main table. A second table is provided listing significant common-law terms mentioned in the first table, and providing a correlation to the appropriate entry in the main table.
Typical Cajun characters used in jokes, such as “Boudreaux and Thibodeaux were fishing one day . . . .” When a third character is needed, Pierre, Tee-Boy, or Arceneaux are often used.12 See COONASS.
A collateral mortgage note is a note secured by a mortgage, itself called a collateral mortgage, where the note is pledged to secure a principal obligation. The principal obligation secured by the pledged collateral mortgage note is often evidenced by a note, called the hand note. The collateral mortgage note, the collateral mortgage, and any written pledge agreement are called the collateral mortgage package. See PARAPH; CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATION--PRINCIPAL CONTRACT.
A commodatum, also called a loan for use, is an agreement by which a person delivers a thing to another, to use the thing and then to return it after he is done using it. A mutuum, or loan for consumption, is an agreement by which one person delivers to another a certain quantity of things that are consumed by their use, under the obligation, by the borrower, to return to the other as much of the same kind and quality.21 See CONSUMABLES, NONCONSUMABLES.
A PREDIAL SERVITUDE is extinguished by confusion when the dominant and the servient estates are acquired in their entirety by the same person. Similar to merger of title.
Consumable THINGS are those that cannot be used without being expended or consumed, or without their substance being changed, such as money, foodstuffs, and beverages. Nonconsumable things are those that may be enjoyed without alteration of their substance, although their substance may be diminished or deteriorated naturally by time or by the use to which they are applied, such as lands, houses, shares of stock, animals, furniture, and vehicles.30 See COMMODATUM.
Definition A dilatory exception retards the progress of a lawsuit, but does not tend to defeat the action. Examples include prematurity, vagueness of the petition, and nonjoinder of a necessary party.45 The function of a peremptory exception is to have the plaintiff’s action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action. Examples include PRESCRIPTION, res judicata, nonjoinder of an indispensable party, no cause of action, and no right of action.46 Not to be confused with PEREMPTION.
Equivalent to torts. Damages ex delicto, or delictual damages, are those damages arising from delicts.47 See ABUSE OF RIGHTS.
Process by which FORCED HEIRS may be deprived of their 48 LEGITIME. Similar to disinheritance. See UNWORTHINESS OF HEIRS.
A hypothecary action is instituted to enforce a mortgage, sometimes called a contract of hypotheca (or hypothec), even if the property has been sold by the mortgagor to a third party.59 See PACT DE NON ALIENANDO.
See LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.
Immovables are similar to realty or real property, and movables are similar to personalty or personal property.60 Also called immovable and movable property. See COMPONENT PARTS; DEIMMOBILIZATION.
Definition Jactitation is a false claim repeated to the prejudice of another’s right, similar to slander of title. The jactitatory action, now included with the POSSESSORY ACTION, is an action to remedy this defamation or disturbance of title.63 See PROCEDURE--POSSESSORY ACTION.
Definition legal portion, forced portion, legitime, or legitimate portion. The disposable portion is the portion of an estate that a testator may freely dispose of, as it is not subject to the legitime. The falcidian portion is one-fourth of the testator’s estate that, under Roman law, had to be reserved to the INSTITUTED HEIR. The purpose of the falcidian portion, which was abolished in Louisiana, was to protect the institutions of the family and its gods, rather than to benefit the testator’s heirs directly, as in the regime of forced heirship.68 See DISINHERISON.
A type of spontaneous agency or interference by a person, called a negotiorum gestor, in the affairs of another, in his absence, from benevolence or friendship, and without authority.80 See MANDATARY.
See PACT DE NON ALIENANDO.
See SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE NOVATION.
A clause in a mortgage giving the mortgagee the right to foreclose by EXECUTORY PROCESS directed solely against the mortgagor, and giving him the right to seize and sell the mortgaged property, regardless of any subsequent alienations.87 An example is “The mortgagors hereby agree in solido not to sell, alienate, deteriorate, or encumber said mortgaged property to the prejudice of this mortgage.”88 See HYPOTHECARY ACTION.
A paraph is a signature by a notary on the evidence of an obligation, typically a COLLATERAL MORTGAGE NOTE, to identify the note with the COLLATERAL MORTGAGE securing the note.90 The phrase “ne varietur,” Latin for “it must not be altered,” is traditionally used in the paraph. “Paraphing means that the notary signs the note with his official signature, thereby certifying to the note’s genuineness. By paraphing the note ‘ne varietur,’ the notary binds and identifies the note with the act of mortgage.”91 Paraphing is no longer required for EXECUTORY PROCESS.92 The collateral mortgage will typically recite that collateral mortgage note “has been paraphed ‘Ne Varietur’ for identification with this act . . . .” The paraph itself, appearing at the end of the collateral mortgage note, can read as follows: ANe Varietur” For identification with an Act of Mortgage, dated the ___ day of __, 19__, passed before me, the undersigned Notary.
See RESOLUTORY AND SUSPENSIVE CONDITIONS.
See COMMON, PUBLIC, AND PRIVATE THINGS.
Definition A suspensive appeal is one that suspends the effect or execution of an appealable order or judgment. A devolutive appeal is one that does not suspend the effect of the judgment.104 A homologation is a confirmation or approval by a court, for example the confirmation and homologation of a sheriff’s sale.105 A petitory action is one brought by a person who claims the ownership, but who is not in possession, of IMMOVABLE PROPERTY or of a REAL RIGHT therein, against another who is in possession or who claims the ownership thereof adversely, to obtain judgment recognizing the plaintiff’s ownership.106 The possessory action is one brought by the possessor of immovable property or of a real right therein to be maintained in his possession of the property or enjoyment of the right when he has been disturbed, or to be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he has been evicted.107 See JACTITATORY ACTION.
Real rights, as opposed to personal or obligatory rights, confer direct and immediate authority over a THING, whether MOVABLE or IMMOVABLE PROPERTY. “Real right” is sometimes erroneously associated solely with a right in immovable property. Examples include ownership, and personal and predial SERVITUDES.109 See OBLIGATION--REAL OBLIGATION.
A demand or action for the restoration of money or a thing that was paid but that was not due.112 See OBLIGATION-NATURAL OBLIGATION.
A respite is an act by which a debtor, who is unable to satisfy his debts at the moment, transacts with his creditors and obtains from them time or delay for the payment of the sums that he owes them.115 See TRANSACTION.
The revocatory action is the right of an obligee to annul an act of the obligor that causes or increases the obligor’s insolvency. If an obligor causes or increases his insolvency by failing to exercise a right, the obligee may by the oblique action exercise the right himself, unless the right is STRICTLY 116 See OBLIGATIONS--STRICTLY PERSONAL to the obligor.
Habitation is the nontransferable REAL RIGHT of a NATURAL 126 PERSON to dwell in the house of another. A right of use confers in favor of a person a specified use of an estate less than full enjoyment, such as a right of passage or of light and view, or fishing or hunting rights and the taking of certain FRUITS of products from an estate. Similar to the common law’s right of way, privilege, or easements in gross and profits in gross.127 Legal servitudes are limitations on ownership established by law for the benefit of the general public or particular persons, e.g. the obligation to keep one’s building in repair so that it does not fall and cause damage to a neighbor or to a passerby.128 A predial servitude is a charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate. Similar to an appurtenant easement.129 A conventional or voluntary servitude is a predial servitude which is established by an owner on his estate or acquired for its benefit.130 A predial servitude is either apparent or nonapparent. Apparent servitudes are those that are perceivable by exterior signs, works, or constructions, such as a roadway or a window in a common wall. A nonapparent servitude has no exterior sign of its existence, such as the prohibition of building on an estate or of building above a particular height.131 A predial servitude may also be acquired by destination. Destination of the owner is a relationship established between two estates owned by the same owner that would be a predial servitude if the estates belonged to different owners. When the two estates cease to belong to the same owner, unless there is express provision to the contrary, an apparent servitude comes into existence of right and a nonapparent servitude comes into existence if the owner has previously filed for registry a formal declaration establishing the destination.
Solidary liability or liability in solido is similar to the common-law’s joint and several liability.133 See OBLIGATION--SEVERAL, JOINT, AND SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS.
Things are divided into COMMON, PUBLIC, and PRIVATE; CORPOREALS and INCORPOREALS; and MOVABLES and 140 IMMOVABLES.
Equivalent to settlement of a lawsuit, a transaction or compromise is an agreement between persons who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent.141 See RESPITE.
Heirs are called unworthy who, by the failure in some duty towards a person, have not deserved to inherit from him, and are therefore deprived of his succession.145 See DISINHERISON.
A virile portion is the portion of an obligation for which each solidary obligor is liable.151 As another example, a partner is bound only for his virile share--i.e., his partnership share--of the debts of the partnership (unlike other states, where each partner is liable for the whole debt of the partnership).152 See OBLIGATIONS--SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS.
Boudreaux v. Thibodeaux, 89 So. 250, 149 La. 400 (1921), which, admittedly, is not really any authority at all. I did confirm the Boudreaux-Thibodeaux joke usage with my friend Jamie Malcombe, a true Cajun lawyer from Lafayette. The joke in full is: Boudreaux and Thibodeaux were fishing one day on the bayou in Boudreaux’s BATEAU, and without warning the motor fell off, and sank to the bottom of the bayou. Thibodeaux immediately dove in the water after the motor. When Thibodeaux had not surfaced for a while, Boudreaux peered down into the water, and saw Thibodeaux on the bottom of the bayou, repeatedly pulling the crank rope on the motor in an attempt to start it. Boudreaux groaned and shouted down into the water, “Thibodeaux, you stupid COONASS, PULL THE CHOKE, PULL THE CHOKE!!” 13. CC 1705, Revision CommentsC1991 to CC 880, comment (b) (AThe heirs succeed even when there is a valid testament to any portion of the property not disposed of by the testament, due to caducity of a legacy or simple omission, for example.”); BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed.Cforthcoming) (defining “caducity”) (hereinafter “Garner, DMLU”); 14. CC 1966-67. 15. Revision CommentsC1984 to CC 1967, comment (c); Revision CommentsC1984 to CC 1970, comment (c). For a discussion of the differences between cause and consideration, see Christian Larroumet, Detrimental Reliance and Promissory Estoppel as the Cause of Contracts in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1209 (1986). 16. Black’s 246 (Acivil law”). 17. CC 3431; Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841); Black’s 314 (constructive possession). 18. CC 901. 19. CC 900; Black’s 261 (collateral; collateral consanguinity), 262 (collateral heir, collateral kinsmen), 303 (consanguinity), 1218 (propinquity). 20. CC 1227, 1229; Black’s 52 (advancement), 262 (collation), 263 (collect). 21. CC 2891, 2893, 2910; Black’s 937 (loan for consumption, loan for use). 22. CC 449-53; Black’s 278 (commons), 279 (communia), 1216-17 (propertyCclassificationCcommon property, private property, public property), 1229 (public domain, public lands). 23. CC 936; Nathan, Common Disasters and Common Sense in Louisiana, 41 TUL. L. REV. 33, 40 n. 19 (1966); Garner, DMLU (commorientes); Blanchard v. Tinsman, 445 So.2d 149 (La.App. 3d. Cir. 1984). 24. CC 2327, 2338, 2339; CC Book III, Title VI, Chapter 2, “The Legal Regime of Community of Acquets and Gains”; Garner, DMLU (community property); Black’s 280 (community property). 25. CC 1893; Black’s 283 (compensatio), and 1372 (set-off). 26. CC 462, 463, 493.1. 27. La.R.S. 10:9-313; Black’s 638 (fixture). 28. CC 468; A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY ' 125, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (3rd ed. 1991). 29. CC 765 and 1903; Black’s 300 (confusio, confusion), 989 (mergerCproperty interests, and rights).
30. CC 536 and 537. 31. CC 1756-57, 1906; Black’s 331 (conventionCRoman law). 32. CC Title IV (AConventional Obligations or Contracts”).
of Mississippi rednecks). 42. CC 461; Black’s 241 (chose in action), 343 (corporeal property), 767 (incorporeal property), 767 (incorporeal rights, incorporeal things), 809 (intangible property, intangibles), 1456 (tangible), and 1456 (tangible property). 43. West v. West, 475 So.2d 56, 59 (La.App. 2d. Cir. 1985); Black’s 412 (de cujus). 44. CCP 923 and 925. 45. CCP 923 and 926.
related terms, and current Louisiana usage). 60. CC 462 and 471; Black’s 751 (immovables), 1014 (movables). These terms are sometimes spelled “immoveables” and “moveables,” although they are spelled as listed in the text above by the Louisiana Civil Code. It is interesting to note one (only apparent, as will be seen below) theoretical difference between the civilian and common law conception of real property ownership, concerning the right of the sovereign (king or state) to ultimate ownership of land. In Louisiana, “Ownership is the right that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under the conditions established by law.” CC 477. Lands in the thirteen original American colonies were held in tenure, however, with the king as the ultimate lord and owner of the land. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 7-8, 22 (2d ed. 1988); see also ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, AND DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, Chapter 1 (West 1984). “The American Revolution clearly ended any tenurial relationship between the English king and American landholders. Some of the original thirteen states adopted the view that the state had succeeded to the position of the English king as ‘lord’ and that tenure continued to exist, while other states enacted statutes or constitutional provisions declaring that land ownership should thenceforth be ‘allodial,’ or otherwise declaring that tenure was abolished.” Cunningham, et al., at 25 (footnotes omitted). However, “In the remaining states it would seem that lands are still held in tenure of the state as overlord.” Moynihan, at 23. “Throughout the rest of the United States, it seems clear that tenure never existed.” Cunningham, et al., at 25 (footnote omitted). However, despite this theoretical difference between civilian and common law ownership, at least in some states such as Pennsylvania and South Carolina, Moynihan, at 23, “Even in the states where tenure may theoretically still exist between the state and one who owns land in fee simple, tenure would appear to have little or no practical significance. For all practical purposes, one who owns land in fee simple anywhere in the United States has ‘complete property’ in (full ownership of) the land.” Cunningham, et al., at 25 (footnotes omitted). It must be pointed out that, in reality, in none of the 50 United States do nominal “landowners” really have “complete property” in “full ownership of” “their” land. To say that land is owned “allodially” is a fiction. For land is subject to expropriation by way of eminent domain. See, e.g., La. Civil Code art. 2626: The first law of society being that the general interest shall be preferred to that of individuals, every individual who possesses under the protection of the laws, any particular property, is tacitly subjected to the obligation of yielding it to the community, wherever it becomes necessary for the general use. Article 2627 further provides: If the owner of a thing necessary for the general use, refuses to yield it, or demands an exorbitant price, he may be divested of the property by the authority of law. Furthermore, it cannot truly be said that one “owns” property which is subject to divestment if annual “rents” (i.e., property taxes) must be paid to the sovereign for the privilege of retaining possession of one’s property. Tenure, then, exists after all, in all fifty states, and the theoretical difference pointed to above is not really a difference at all. 61. CC 480; Black’s 335 (co-owner) and 1465 (tenancyCtenancy in common, joint tenancy). 62. CC 389 et seq.; Black’s 273 (commitment), 381 (curator), 811 (interdict, interdiction). 63. CCP 3659; General American Oil Company of Texas v. Meche, 442 So.2d 496 (La.App. 3d. Cir. 1983); Brown v. Wood, 451 So.2d 569 (La.App. 2d. Cir. 1984); Black’s 834 (jactitation). 64. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company, 236 So.2d 216, 218 (La. 1970).
65. Shael Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1125, 1134 n. 34, quoting Goodhard, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q. REV. 40, 42 (1934). 66. CC 178-80; Black’s 901 (legitimacy, legitimate, legitimation). 67. CC 181, 198-201. 68. CC 1234, 1494, 1495, 1616 (falcidian portion abolished); Succession of Lauga, 624 So.2d 1156 (1993) (holding unconstitutional a recent legislative attempt to limit forced heirship), and Lauga, at 1185-86 (Kimball, J., dissenting) (discussing the early history of forced heirship and discussing the falcidian portion); Joseph Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship: Its History in Texas and Louisiana, 41 LA. L. REV. 42 (1941), cited in Lauga, at 1185, n.2 (Kimball, J., dissenting); Black’s 600 (falcidian portion), 900 (legitime); Garner, DMLU (legitim(e)). 69. CC 1965, 2589, 2664; Clark v. Davis, 386 So.2d 1001 (La.App. 3d. Cir. 1980); Black’s 902 (lesion).
70. CCP 3445-48; Black’s 927 (limitationCstatute of limitations), 1183 (prescription); Garner, DMLU (prescribe). 71. CC 3469, 3472; Black’s 927 (limitationCstatute of limitations), 1183 (prescription), 1488 (toll). 72. CC 3462, 3465, 3466; Black’s 927 (limitationCstatute of limitations), 1183 (prescription). 73. CC 2652 (sale of litigious rights), 2653, 3506(18); Black’s 934 (litigious right). Preventing the sale of litigious rights diminishes the value of having a litigious right, since a secondary discount market, which might otherwise aid in the efficient enforcement of rights, is legislated out of existence. This, of course, makes rights themselves worth less to the rights-holder, since a less-enforceable and less-tradeable right is not as valuable as a more enforceable and fungible one. This article (CC 2652) is thus a good example of legislation which is intended to benefit certain individuals, but which instead impoverishes all rights-holders. 74. CC 2985; Black’s 62 (agency), 63 (agent), 962 (mandatary, mandate). 75. CC 2432; Black’s 968 (marital portion). 76. MC 6; Martin & Yeates, at 802 and 803. 77. MC 15, 16, 21, and 27; Martin & Yeates, 803, 804, and 805. 78. CC 1998, Revision CommentsC1984 to CC 1998, comment (b); Saúl Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 LA. L. REV. 1 (1977); Young v. Ford Motor Company, Inc., 595 So.2d 1123 (La. 1992). 79. CC 24, 2801. 80. CC 2295; Black’s 1036 (negotiorum gestior, negotiorum gestor). 81. CC 1760-62; Black’s 306 (considerationCequitable or moral considerations), 1074 (obligationCnatural or civil obligation). 82. CC 1763, 476, Revision CommentsC1978 to CC 476, comment (a); Black’s 1263 (real). 83. CC 1765, 1766; Black’s 1075 (obligationCpersonal or heritable obligation).
84. CC 1786-90, 2324; Black’s 837 (joint and several contracts, joint and several liability), 1074-75 (obligationCjoint or several obligations, solidary obligation), 1393 (solidarity, solidary). 85. CC 1807, 1808; Black’s 1074 (obligationCconjunctive or alternative obligation). 86. CC 1815-16; Black’s 322-23 (contractCdivisible and indivisible, entire and severable), 1074 (obligationCdivisible or indivisible obligation). 87. CCP 2701; Black’s 1109 (pactum de non alienando). 88. Harrelson v. Hogan, 451 So.2d 592, 595 (La.App. 2d. Cir. 1984). 89. Keene v. Williams, 423 So.2d 1065, 1069 (La. 1982); Garner, DMLU (preempt; perempt) (preemption; peremption). 90. CC 3325; L.S.A. R.S. 9:5180-5180.4; Black’s 1112 (paraph); Pioneer Enterprises, Inc. v. Goodnight, 561 So.2d 824 (La.App. 2d. Cir. 1990).
91. JAMES D. JOHNSON, JR., II A BASIC LOUISIANA NOTARIAL GUIDE ' 27.9.2, p. 88 (1986), citing Max Nathan, Jr., and H. Gayle Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L. REV. 497, 500 (1973). 92. CCP 2636(1); L.S.A. R.S. 9:5555(A); 14 L.S.A. Civ. Code, Book III, Title XXII, “Exposé des Motifs”, at pp. 5, 7, and 12 (West Supp. 1993). 93. Black’s 350 (county), 1115 (parish). 94. CC 807, 810, and 811; Black’s 922 (licitation) and 1119 (partition). 95. CC 2837. 96. CC 3458; Black’s 1136 (peremptorius); Garner, DMLU (preempt; perempt), (preemption; peremption). 97. CC 3133-35; Black’s 92 (antichresis). 98. Thomas A. Harrell, A Guide to the Provisions of Chapter Nine of Louisiana’s Commercial Code, 50 LA. L. REV. 711, 723 n. 14 (1990) (small caps added). 99. CC 3437. 100. CC 3186; Black’s 1197 (PrivilegeCCivil law). 101. CCP 4651; Black’s 292 (concursus), 817 (interpleader). 102. CCP 1031. 103. CCP 1061; Black’s 349 (counterclaim). 104. CCP 2123, 2087. 105. CCP 3337; MHC Properties, Inc. v. L.A.W. Three, Inc., 624 So.2d 977 (La.App. 3d. Cir. 1993); Black’s 735 (homologación, homologate), 736 (homologation).
106. CCP 3651; Black’s 1146 (petitory action), 1164 (possessory action). 107. CCP 3655; Black’s 1146 (petitory action), 1164 (possessory action). 108. CCP 2890; Black’s 1206 (procès-verbal). 109. CC 476, Revision CommentsC1978 to CC 476, comment (a); Black’s 1263 (real). 110. CC 2688; 1272 (reconduction). 111. CC 2520; Black’s 1279 (redhibition, redhibitory action, redhibitory defect or vice), 1566 (vice); Garner, DMLU (redhibition). 112. CC 2301-12; Black’s 1299 (repetition). 113. CC 1767; Black’s 293 (conditionCcivil law). 114. CC 1770 and Revision CommentsC1984; Black’s 293-94 (conditionCcivil law, French law). 115. CC 3084; Black’s 1311 (respite).
(profitCprofit à prendre); Garner, DMLU (pr(a)edial). 130. CC 697 et seq. 131. CC 707. 132. CC 2025-27; Black’s 349 (counter letter), 1384 (simulation). 133. CC 2324; Black’s 837 (joint and several contracts, joint and several liability), 1393 (solidarity, solidary); Garner, DMLU (joint and several). 134. CC 1978; Black’s 1480 (third party beneficiary). 135. CC 1881-82; Black’s 1064 (novation). 136. See new CC 2602 (effective January 1, 1995) for an example of a reference to the suppletive law. 137. CC 1574. See also Garner, DMLU (testament). 138. CC 1578 et seq.; Black’s 1069 (nuncupative will). 139. CC 1574-89; Black’s 732 (holograph), 1086 (olograph), 1474 (testamentCmystic testament); Garner, DMLU (holograph).
140. CC 448. See also Martin & Yeates, ' III, “Fundamental Property Concepts and Their Consequences,” at p. 782. 141. CC 3071; Black’s 287 (compromise and settlement) and 1372 (settlement). 142. CC 246, 256; Black’s 1518 (tutor). 143. CC 270; Black’s 295 (dative). 144. CC 273; Black’s 1527 (under-tutor). 145. CC 964-66. 146. CC 535; Black’s 924 (life estate, life interest), 1544 (usufruct), and 1546 (usus fructus). 147. CC 534; Black’s 1370 (servitude). 148. See Black’s 924 (life tenant). 149. CC 890. 150. CC 478; Black’s 1320 (reversion). 151. CC 1804; Garner, DMLU (virile). 152. CC 2817.

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