Source: http://www.caaflog.com/category/october-2016-term/united-states-v-swift/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 01:22:54+00:00

Document:
The CCA simply may not substitute uncharged for charged conduct as either the basis for a conviction or the basis for affirming a finding of guilty under Article 66(c), and its review was legally infirm.
The CCA conducted a new review. United States v. Swift, No. 20100196 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2017) (link to slip op.). Finding that the uncharged misconduct was properly admitted under both Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) and Mil. R. Evid. 414 – findings not made in the first decision – the CCA again affirms the findings and sentence.
CAAF decided the Army case of United States v. Swift, 76 M.J. 210, No. 16-0407/AR (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.), on Wednesday, April 26, 2017. Considering “the Government’s surprising assertion that the ACCA’s Article 66(c), UCMJ, review is defensible here,” CAAF finds that the CCA improperly based its review “solely by reference to uncharged conduct.” Slip op. at 11 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, CAAF remands the case for a new Article 66(c) review by the CCA. But the court also finds that any error in the admission of an uncorroborated confession was waived by both the failure to object and an affirmative statement that the defense had no objection.
I. Whether the Army court denied appellant his substantial right to an Article 66(c) review by affirming the findings and sentence on uncharged misconduct presented at trial rather than the charged offenses.
II. Whether the military judge erred by admitting appellant’s pretrial statement where there was no independent evidence to corroborate the essential facts admitted.
[specified issue] III. Whether the evidence of the two convictions of indecent acts with a child is legally sufficient.
Specialist (E-4) Swift was twice convicted of two specifications of indecent acts with a child in violation of Article 134. The first conviction was reversed on appeal in 2012 because the Government failed to allege a terminal element (noted here). At a rehearing before a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone, Swift was again convicted and he was sentenced to confinement for 11 years, reduction to E-1, and a dishonorable discharge.
The charges against Swift alleged that he committed indecent acts with his daughter on two occasions: the first in 2003 and the second in 2007. Swift admitted to touchings during the charged time periods, but he asserted that both were inadvertent. The charges were based on Swift’s admissions, and alleged acts that Judge Ryan refers to as the “Hawaii Bedside Incident” and the “Texas ‘Old Flame’ Incident.” Slip op. at 3. But the prosecution also offered evidence of three other alleged (but uncharged) incidents under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) and 414: the “Couch ‘Peeing’ Incident,” the “Hawaii Van Indicent,” and the “Texas Pool Incident.” Slip op. at 4-5. The military judge allowed this evidence “without ever actually ruling on whether [it was] admissible under M.R.E. 404(b) or 414.” Slip op. at 8.
On appeal, the Army CCA also “did not rule on whether the incidents of uncharged conduct were admissible under either M.R.E. 404(b) or 414. Instead, the ACCA facially treated them as if they were the charged conduct, concluded the findings of guilty were legally and factually sufficient, and affirmed.” Slip op. at 10. The CCA’s decision “affirmed the findings and sentence, albeit solely by reference to evidence of uncharged misconduct.” Slip op. at 9.
That, explains Judge Ryan, was wrong.
United States v. Swift, No. 16-0407/AR (CAAFlog case page): Oral argument audio.
United States v. Haverty, No. 16-0423/AR (CAAFlog case page): Oral argument audio.
The charges against Swift alleged that he committed indecent acts with his daughter on two occasions: the first in 2003 and the second in 2007. Swift had admitted to touchings during the charged time periods, but he asserted that both were inadvertent (the first because he thought he was touching his wife and the second because it occurred during a dream about a former girlfriend). Swift’s statement was admitted into evidence against him without objection from his defense counsel. The Government also offered evidence of additional touchings, seemingly (though perhaps not exclusively) as uncharged misconduct under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) and 414. One of these other touchings occurred in a van.
But the parties don’t agree on whether the touching in the van was charged or uncharged misconduct.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Many things aren’t hearsay (such as an out-of-court statement offered to show only its effect on the listener), and there are many exceptions to the hearsay rule that permit admission of a hearsay statement under various situations.
Two interesting grants from CAAF last week involve the hearsay rule.
Whether the military judge erred in applying the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule to permit the government to introduce through the testimony of law enforcement personnel that appellant’s wife nodded her head in response to a question whether her husband “did this,” and in concluding that the prejudicial effect of this testimony was outweighed by its probative value. See M.R.E. 802 and 803(2); M.R.E. 403; United States v. Donaldson, 58 M.J. 477 (2003); United States v. Jones, 30 M.J. 127 (C.M.A. 1990); United States v. Arnold, 25 M.J. 129 (C.M.A. 1987); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
An excited utterance is hearsay that is admissible because it is “relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Mil. R. Evid. 803(2). The Air Force CCA’s opinion in Bowen is available here and reveals that law enforcement responded to reports of screaming and discovered Bowen’s wife unconscious in the bathtub, and that she was only partially conscious when she was questioned. The military judge considered the circumstances and concluded that the head nod was admissible as an excited utterance, and the AFCCA affirmed that ruling.
III. Whether the evidence of the two convictions of indecent acts with a child is legally sufficient.
[W]e conclude, first, that the military judge inappropriately applied the outdated “victim outcry” principle. Nonetheless, we agree that a non-hearsay basis exists to allow the admission of the statement – namely, effect-on-the-listener. KS’s out-of-court statement is not barred by Mil. R. Evid. 802 because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Despite the military judge’s ruling on the out-of-date notion of “outcry doctrine,” the trial counsel specifically offered the victim’s statement as “effect on the listener” and as a “prior consistent statement.” The statement was properly offered to show why Ms. A contacted CPS and how the investigation ensued.
United States v. Swift, No. 20100196, slip op. at 4-5 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2016) (emphasis). This conclusion is deeply problematic for at least three reasons. First, there’s no indication that the members were instructed about any limitation on the use of the statement the judge considered the statement for only a limited purpose, and the CCA can’t restrict its use post hoc. Second, the effect on the listener (that CPS was contacted) was not an issue at trial, and so the statement had no probative value (but a high prejudicial effect). Third, there’s no indication of any foundation for admission of a prior consistent statement (and a footnote acknowledges this).
Despite its butchery of the hearsay rule, the CCA concluded that the admission of the statement was harmless in part based on the appellant’s pretrial admissions. CAAF’s grant of review, however, directly challenges that conclusion.

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