Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2015/05
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:40:33+00:00

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The law recognizes that if a person’s negligence puts one in peril, a rescuer injured in the course of rescue can claim damages against the person who created the peril. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal discussing the scope of rescuer law.
In today’s case (Ray v. Bates) the parties were involved in a motor vehicle collision in icy conditions. The Plaintiff claimed the collision was caused by the Defendants negligence. Following the collision the Plaintiff slipped and fell while walking with the intention of asking first responders to contact road maintenance authorities to get the icy road salted or sanded.
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognises them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer…. The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.
Whoever comes to the rescue, the law should see that he does not suffer for it. It seems to me that, if a person by his fault creates a situation of peril, he must answer for it to any person who attempts to rescue the person who is in danger. He owes a duty to such a person above all others. The rescuer may act instinctively out of humanity or deliberately out of courage. But whichever it is, so long as it is not wanton interference, if the rescuer is killed or injured in the attempt, he can recover damages from the one whose fault has been the cause of it.
 These pronouncements were cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Horsley v. MacLaren,  S.C.R. 441 at 444 and 467, and in Corothers v. Slobodian,  2 S.C.R. 633 at 638‑9 and 640‑41. They were also cited in Martin v. American International Assurance Life Co., 2003 SCC 16.
[T]he following propositions … may be extracted …: (1) The intervention of human action does not necessarily per se break the chain of causation between the negligence and the injury sustained. (2) To entitle the sufferer to damages, such intervention must have been reasonable and such as might have been in the contemplation of the wrongdoer. (3) In determining what is reasonable in the circumstances the interests sought to be protected must be measured in comparison with the risks involved in the action taken. (4) If the action taken is reasonable, the injured person will not be debarred from recovering damages by his not having adopted the best possible course in the circumstances, or by his having made a mere error of judgment: but he will be debarred if his action is unreasonable and unwarrantable and outside the exigencies of the emergency: and (5) It is not essential that the action should have been taken on the impulse of the moment. The same result will follow if it arises from a natural response to avert danger after time for deliberation on the consequences of the risk taken.
To these I would add that, as the instinct to save human life is greater than the instinct to save property, a hazardous intervention for the former purpose is more likely to be a natural and probable consequence of a negligent act than one for the latter, and in the reasonable contemplation of the wrongdoer.
 While Steel was not a common law case, I accept, as did Esson J., that the propositions referred to are also applicable in the common law.
[T]he proper approach here is to ask whether it was reasonably foreseeable that following an accident such as this and in these circumstances someone ought to walk up the roadway, and would walk up the roadway, to warn oncoming traffic of the danger of the vehicles on the roadway over the crest of the hill and, that being so, was it reasonably foreseeable that in those conditions that person could slip, fall and sustain further injury? The trial judge found the plaintiff walking up the highway was a sensible thing to do. That being so, in my opinion it follows that what happened here was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the negligence of the driving of the defendants and they are, as a result, responsible in law for this slip and fall and the consequent damages.
This is not a “rescue case” any more than it is a “nervous shock” case. There is no evidence of danger, escape from entrapment, risk of death from delayed treatment or otherwise which would support such a classification. Accordingly, the “rescue case” authorities cited to us must be distinguished along with the authorities dealing with “nervous shock” cases.
 Finally, I will refer to Bridge v. Jo (1998), 53 B.C.L.R. (3d) 338 (S.C.), in which a woman went to assist a person involved in a motor vehicle accident. After attending on the accident victim, she concluded that she should call an ambulance. While walking down the icy road toward her home to do so, she slipped and fell. Mr. Justice Boyle found that it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s negligence would result in an injury to a rescuer, and found for the plaintiff.
 In rescue cases, the law does not find the chain of causation to be broken by the rescuer’s actions because they are considered to be foreseeable consequences of the peril created by the negligence. In order for a plaintiff to bring him or herself within the principles applicable to rescue cases, therefore, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her actions were motivated by a reasonable perception of a peril that was caused by the defendant’s negligence.
 In my opinion, the plaintiff fails to meet this requirement in two respects. First, the plaintiff could not reasonably have perceived a peril in the circumstances of this case. Everything was under control, and there was no reason to believe that road maintenance authorities had not been advised of the situation. This is what the judge meant when he said “Whatever else may be said of the plaintiff’s decisions, it cannot be said that he needed to walk to the ambulance to summon road maintenance personnel when all of the emergency personnel described were already in attendance.” He was not applying a standard of necessity in rescue cases, but rather was making a finding that there was no purpose to be served by the plaintiff walking on the road.
 The plaintiff’s claim to be a “rescuer” in this case must also fail because any peril that the plaintiff was attempting to alleviate was one that was unconnected with the accident. This was not a case (like Bridge) where the plaintiff was attempting to assist a victim of the accident, nor was it a case (like Goodman) where he was attempting to reduce the danger posed to other drivers by the detritus left by the accident. The plaintiff was attempting to contact road maintenance officials to deal with the slipperiness of the road. That problem was purely a product of weather conditions, and not of the accident.
I have spent much time on this blog highlighting expert witnesses who have been criticized by trial judges. On this note it is refreshing to see when an expert witness is complimented by the Court for being candid in their role. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, doing this.
In today’s case (Gill v. Bhuller) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 collision caused by the Defendant. She was ok at the scene and did not experience any symptoms until the following day. She ultimately developed chronic soft tissue injuries. The Court assessed non-pecuniary damages at $75000.
 I was impressed by the testimony of Dr. Calvert called by the defence, because he was notably candid in his assessment of Ms. Gill, in keeping with the ethical responsibilities of an expert witness. He accepted that she suffers ongoing pain. He formed no impression that she malingers and he believed that she is genuine in searching for the cause of her problems. He accepts that it is unlikely Ms. Gill’s symptoms will go away, and he can only speculate that she may see improvement.
$75,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Trochanteric Bursitis and Plateaued STI’s.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries and bursitis.
 I accept that the plaintiff suffered what can be described as soft tissue type injuries to her low back, left hip and thigh, and left knee in the accident. These injuries have shown slow but substantial improvement over the course of more than four years since the accident. It is possible that the injuries have plateaued as suggested by Dr. Fuller and to a lesser degree by Dr. Hershler. However her G.P., Dr. Kam, only states that her aches and pains and limitations will persist for an extended time. In my view it is clear that the plaintiff’s condition can continue to improve, especially if she engages in the kinds of treatments suggested by Dr. Horlick.
 With respect to her low back pain, I prefer the opinion of Dr. Horlick to that of Dr. Fuller. Dr. Fuller diagnosed sacroiliac rotation and malalignment. In his view while manual therapy could assist with the alignment problem, it might do more harm than good. On the basis of his diagnosis he thought that remedial exercise would not likely help. However, as he conceded, Dr. Fuller was quite unsure of the plaintiff’s diagnosis. I am not persuaded that he is correct that her low back problem is other than soft tissue in nature. On that basis, the exercise therapy recommendations of Dr. Horlick are preferable, and in my view are supported by the other opinions and the course of her treatment and recovery so far. That is, physiotherapy and rehabilitation have been of benefit in the past.
 I also prefer Dr. Horlick’s diagnosis of trochanteric bursitis as being the main problem with her left hip. ..
 These authorities are helpful in that they serve neatly to bracket the appropriate award in this case. Considering all the circumstances in this case, in my view $75,000 is a fair and reasonable award of non-pecuniary damages. This award includes $10,000 for her loss of housekeeping capacity, which I find should be recognized as an aspect of her non-pecuniary loss in the circumstances of this case.
 Nevertheless, I am satisfied that Mr. Espinoza was indeed injured in the motor vehicle accident, and the defendant does not contest this. I find that he sustained soft tissue injuries to the neck and back, and that these indeed have become chronic, though not as disabling as he would suggest. In this regard, I rely most upon the evidence of Dr. Vinnitsky, whose examinations disclosed at least some objective symptoms and who had the opportunity to assess Mr. Espinoza over a period of time both before and after the accident. I found the evidence of Dr. le Nobel and Dr. Salvian less helpful on this issue given their total reliance on Mr. Espinoza’s reports, and my concerns with the reliability of Mr. Espinoza as a historian. As indicated, the evidence as a whole leads me to conclude that Mr. Espinoza has at times exaggerated his injury, attributing more to the motor vehicle accident than the evidence other than his own can support. I do accept, however, the reality of the problem of chronic pain as a syndrome, a reality rejected by Dr. McPherson.
 I consider the Rutledge case to be much closer to this one, as it involved a chronic pain situation where a diagnosis of thoracic outlet syndrome was rejected. Considering all of the necessary factors, and taking into account the evidentiary difficulties, I assess the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $55,000.

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