Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/354/354mass734.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:27:30+00:00

Document:
THEODORE GOODNEY, administrator, vs. CAROL A. SMITH & others.
and which contained no reference to her having been given permission to operate it by the son, it was prejudicial error to exclude the statement upon the plaintiff's general objection when it was offered by the insurer, both because it was admissible under G. L. c. 233, Section 23, as affecting the credibility of the witness and as an admission by her constituting substantive evidence on the issue of the son's consenting to her operation.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on July 14, 1966.
John B. Killilea (Richard K. Hadden with him) for the insurer.
Walter J. Griffin (John K. McGuire with him) for the plaintiff.
SPIEGEL, J. This is a suit in equity under G. L. c. 214, Section 3 (10), to reach and apply the obligation of an insurance company to a judgment debtor, the defendant Carol A. Smith, under a motor vehicle liability policy issued by the defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company (insurer) to the defendant Francis Flanagan. The trial judge made findings and a decree was entered ordering the insurer to pay the plaintiff on account of said judgment the sum of $10,000 plus interest and costs, and to pay the defendant Smith the sum of $1,330. [Note 1] The latter sum includes $1,250 for the "reasonable value" of services rendered by her attorneys in defence of the action which resulted in the judgment against her and $80 which she expended in hiring "a baby sitter each time she appeared" in court. The insurer appealed from this decree. The insurer also claims error in the exclusion from evidence of a written statement given by Smith. The evidence is reported.
to the Peacock Lounge in Auburn. When Smith was denied admission to the Lounge because of her age, Paul told her to take his automobile and drive it back to Worcester. Smith "took the car and on her way back to Worcester struck the deceased . . . who was injured and died as a consequence of the injuries." The plaintiff recovered a judgment, and "execution issued" against Smith. This execution has not been satisfied. Francis Flanagan did not expressly give permission to Smith to operate the automobile, but he did not prohibit his son Paul from permitting anyone else to operate the automobile. The judge ruled that because Paul had permitted Smith to operate the automobile, Smith had the implied permission of Francis Flanagan to do so.
witness had given the police at another time. The statement was excluded subject to the insurer's exception.
Under G. L. c. (Ter. Ed.) c. 233, Section 23, a party who produces a witness may "prove that . . . [the witness] has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before proof of such inconsistent statements is given, the circumstances thereof sufficient to designate the particular occasion shall be mentioned to the witness, and he shall be asked if he has made such statements, and, if so, shall be allowed to explain them." Here the time, place and content of the prior statement were mentioned to the witness; she was shown the statement which she identified and was given the opportunity to explain the statement. Having complied with the requirements of Section 23, the insurer was entitled at that time to have the statement admitted in so far as it affected the credibility of Smith. See Kavanaugh v. Colombo, 304 Mass. 379, 381. That Smith was also a party does not cause Section 23 to be inapplicable. Horneman v. Brown, 286 Mass. 65, 69-70. Klein v. Keresey, 307 Mass. 51, 52. The "hostility" of the witness and the absence of other prior statements are not prerequisites to the admission of a statement under Section 23.
Furthermore, the objection to the admission of the statement was a general one and was not limited. See Salonen v. Paanenen, 320 Mass. 568, 575; Thompson v. Beliauskas, 341 Mass. 95, 96-97. The statement constituted an admission by Smith and as such was admissible as substantive evidence relative to the question of whether she had the consent of Paul Flanagan to operate the automobile. See Langan v. Pianowski, 307 Mass. 149, 152. Its exclusion was prejudicial error.
Decree reversed with costs of appeal.
[Note 1] In her answer the judgment debtor filed a counterclaim against the insurer.
[Note 2] According to the written statement Smith and a girl friend, after having been refused admission to the Lounge, "saw one of the boys (the driver) named Paul Flannagan [sic.], and he said that he would not take us back to Worcester. Then we walked out into the parking lot where the car was, and then got back into the car and tried to figure a way to get back to Worcester. We then walked to the street to see if we could get a bus . . .. There were no buses, so we returned to the car. I said to my girl friend `We have got to get home.' I asked my girl friend for her keys to see if we could start the car. The switch was open so I started it up. We headed back for Worcester." The statement contained no reference to her having been given permission by Paul to operate the automobile.

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