Source: https://www.lipcon.com/work-in-progress/aronson-v-celebrity-cruises-inc-et-al/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:17:08+00:00

Document:
In this case an individual was hurt on a shore excursion he purhcased through a cruise line. Defendant Celebrity Cruises moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failing to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted. The basis of the Defendant’s argument is that Celebrity owed the Plaintiff no duty of care because the injury happened off of its ship. Celebrity also argues that it cannot be held responsible for the actions of its shore excursion partner or in the alternative that the Plaintiff signed a waiver. In this response in opposition, Plaintiff argues that the law requires that the Defendant exercise reasonable care under the circumstances beyond the confines of the ship. Additionally, the Plaintiff demonstrates that as pleaded in his complaint, the cruise line and shore excursion entity share a relationship which imparts ones liability to the other. The Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s motion must be denied because whether or not the Plaintiff understood the waiver he signed is a question properly left for a jury.
This case arises out of severe injuries sustained by Plaintiff while on a Celebrity cruise. As part of the cruise experience, Defendant Celebrity offered to Plaintiff the opportunity to go on various excursions from the vessel Equinox. [D.E. 1,13]. On or about March 17, 2011, Plaintiff purchased from Celebrity a ticket for a shore excursion in the scheduled port of call of Roseau, Dominica. [D.E. 1,10]. The excursion, referred to as the “High Hopes, High Ropes Tour,” was operated jointly by Celebrity and the “Excursion Entity” (Defendant Wrave Ltd. d/b/a Whacky Rollers). [D.E. 1,7]. During the course of the excursion, Plaintiff was required to navigate an elevated narrow rope bridge, without adequate assistance, causing him to fall and suffer severe injuries. [D.E. 1,22].
On January 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendant Celebrity and against the Defendant Excursion Entity [D.E. 1]. The claims against Celebrity consist of Negligence (Count I), Apparent Agency or Agency by Estoppel (Count III), Joint Venture (Count IV), and Third Party Beneficiary (Count V).
As the following memorandum of law makes clear, Celebrity’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied because Plaintiff’s Complaint properly states a claim for which relief can be granted on all five counts.
All in all, as this Honorable Court recently explained in the matter of Rocha v. Carnival Corporation, Case No: 10-22799-CV-LENARD/TURNOFF (S.D. Fla. 2011) [D.E. 26] even after Twombly, “it remains black-letter law today that in the ordinary case a complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations in order to withstand 12(b)(6) scrutiny.” “Twombly neither eliminated nor marginalized the liberal pleading rules.” Id., at 3-4, citing Caytrans BBC, LLC v. Equipment Rental & Contractors Corp., 2009 WL857554, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2009) and Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F. 3d 949, 958 (11th Cir. 2009).
3. ON COUNT I (NEGLIGENCE), PLAINTIFF PROPERLY AND SUCCINCTLY ALLEGED CARNIVAL’S “DUTY OF CARE.” THEREFORE, CELEBRITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I (NEGLIGENCE) SHOULD BE DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
A.Count I. The standard of care.
Therefore, it is undisputed that Plaintiff pled the correct duty of care in this matter. See, i.e. Gentry v. Carnival Corp., 11-21580-JG (S.D. Fla. October 5, 2011) [D.E. 36] (“Plaintiff properly alleges that Carnival’s duty was ‘to provide Plaintiff with reasonable care under the circumstances’).
The applicable standard of reasonable care also “requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier had actual or constructive notice of the risk creating condition.” Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line., Inc., 867 F. 2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1989). Constructive notice may be established through evidence which shows 1) that the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of ordinary care, the Defendant should have known of the condition; or 2) that the condition occurred with regularity and was therefore foreseeable. Kloster Cruise Ltd. v. Grubbs, 762 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). See, Complaint, D.E. 1,25 alleging: (“Celebrity knew of the foregoing conditions causing Plaintiff’s accident and did not correct them, or the conditions existed for a sufficient length of time so that Celebrity in the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances should have learned of them and corrected them”).
B.Count I. Long standing jurisprudence sets forth that Celebrity, as a common carrier, owed Plaintiff a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances throughout the entire length of her cruise. This duty included Plaintiff’s visit and shore excursion at the port of call ofRoseau, Dominica. Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, therefore, the fact that Plaintiffs injury occurred off the vessel is immaterial for purposes of the standard of care. Pursuant to binding precedent, Celebrity’s duty of care was the same whether Plaintiff was onboard the ship or off the ship in the port of call.
In its motion to dismiss, Celebrity argues that the duty of reasonable care under the circumstances varies when incidents occur off the vessel. [D.E. 9 pg. 4]. Celebrity’s argument appears to suggest that that a ship-owner’s duty of care to a passenger onboard the vessel varies or is somehow different when that same passenger is off the vessel in a scheduled port of call. Celebrity’s argument, however, is incorrect and contrary to law. As shown below, the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances is owed to passengers to the extent of their entire cruise (both onboard and off the vessel).
Herein, Celebrity’s duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances extended to Plaintiff’s shore excursion at the scheduled port of call of . Like Doe and Tradewind, the vessel’s visit to Roseau, Dominica, was a scheduled part of the four-night cruise, and therefore, an integral part of the on-going cruise or maritime activity. Further, like Doe and Tradewind the particular incident effectively began and ended aboard the cruise ship. It is immaterial – as explained in Sullivan above – that in addition to Celebrity, a third party may have controlled or owned the shore excursion on shore.
All in all, contrary to Celebrity’s assertions, the duty of reasonable care under the circumstances is owed to passengers to the extent of their entire cruise. This duty applies even where a cruise ship passenger has been injured in a port of call outside of the ship.
C. Count I. Contrary to Celebrity’s assertions, Plaintiff pled sufficient factual matter in support of the allegations in Count I (Negligence) in compliance with TwomblyandFed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Celebrity argues that Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet the pleading requirements because it does not contain sufficient factual matter. Celebrity also alleges that Plaintiffs negligence allegations are “legal conclusions.” [D.E. 9, pg. 5]. Celebrity is incorrect.
As illustrated earlier, it remains black-letter law today that a complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations in order to withstand 12(b)(6) scrutiny. As the Supreme Court explained in Twombly and subsequently in Erickson, Rule “8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that a pleader is entitled to relief.” The statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the… claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Here, Plaintiff has succinctly alleged that Celebrity owed him, as a passenger, a duty of care. (see, e.g., Compl. D.E. 1,20). In support of that allegation, Plaintiff has pled with sufficient factual matter the different ways by which Defendant breached that standard of care. (See e.g., Compl. D.E. 1,22(a)-(aa), and24).  Plaintiffs’ allegations have therefore notified Celebrity of his claim and the grounds upon which it rests. As footnote 1 shows, there is nothing “conclusory or formulaic” about Plaintiff’s allegations. On the contrary, Plaintiff’s allegations contain a great deal of facts in support of the Negligence count.
In large part, Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence under Count I is predicated upon a laundry list of duties allegedly owed by Carnival to Plaintiff … Nonetheless, Defendant would have this Court dismiss Count I on the basis that Plaintiff failed to plead “sufficient factual matter” to support a claim for negligence. The Court cannot agree. As was well settled by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), only a short and plain statement of a claim is required. Upon consideration of the Complaint (DE #1), there can be no doubt that the allegations are sufficient to provide notice to Carnival of both Plaintiffs claims and the factual bases upon which that claim is predicated. As such, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss must be denied as to Count I.
Id., D.E. 55 at 3.
As Judge King found in Bridgewater, there can be no doubt here that the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to provide notice to Celebrity of Plaintiff’s claim for negligence and the factual bases upon which that claim is predicated. Moreover, these facts are sufficient to draw a reasonable inference of negligence under Iqbal against Celebrity. See Propenko v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Ltd., 10-20068, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37618 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2010) (allegation that plaintiff “was caused to fall on water on deck of the ship at or near the swimming pool, causing her serious injury” was “sufficient to draw a reasonable inference of negligence” under Iqbal).
In its Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 9, p. 5], Celebrity argues that this is a “boilerplate allegation, without any factual basis.” Celebrity, however, is incorrect.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff succinctly alleges a) that “Celebrity arranged for, sponsored, recommended and/or operated” the excursion (D.E. 1,10), b) that “Celebrity was co-owner of the excursion” (D.E. 1,14), c) that Celebrity “failed to provide an excursion that utilized proper and adequate equipment” (D.E. 1,22(b)) and d) that “Celebrity negligently failed to determine the hazards that the excursion posed to Plaintiff [and] failed to eliminate the hazard” (D.E. 1,24). Thus, the Complaint succinctly gives Defendant notice of the fact that, by virtue of Celebrity’s operation and control of the excursion (10,14) and its failure to provide the necessary safety equipment (22(b)) and to eliminate the hazards that the excursion posed (24); at all times material, Celebrity knew of the conditions that caused Plaintiff’s accident and did not correct them, or the conditions existed for a sufficient length time so that Celebrity, in the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances should have learned of them and correct them.
Moreover, had Celebrity provided its passengers with an excursion that utilized the necessary safety equipment, the Plaintiff would not have sustained the serious injuries he ended up incurring, “when he was required to navigate an elevated narrow rope bridge, without adequate assistance, causing him to fall and suffer injury ” See [D.E. 1,22].Thus, all four allegations (at paragraphs 10, 14, 22(b) and 24), show that in the absence of the necessary safety equipment, Celebrity knew or should have known the condition that caused Plaintiff’s incident. Any assertion that the Complaint does not give Celebrity notice of “what it knew” or “what it should have known” is therefore simply incorrect.
…. The Court finds that Gentry sufficiently alleged a negligence claim for purposes of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and requiring Gentry to replead this claim in greater detail would be unnecessary and inefficient. The complaint contains “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that” Carnival was Negligent. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 … It provides Carnival with notice of what the claim is about. See Thomson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F. 2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1973). Gentry is not required to plead evidence, nor even all of the facts upon which her claim is based. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F. 2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). Carnival will have ample opportunity to learn more about Gentry’s injury and the specific dangers which she claims Carnival failed to warn her about during discovery.
Id., at pg. 8 (emphasis added).
Here, like in Gentry, during discovery Celebrity will have ample opportunity to learn more about Plaintiff’s injury and the specific facts which he claims would have prevented his injury. Therefore, Celebrity’s Motion to Dismiss Count I, should be denied.
D. Count I. Contrary to Celebrity’s assertions, a ship-owner’s duty to warn is not a separate standard of care. Rather, it is one of the many duties owed by a ship-owner (both onboard the vessel and at the scheduled port of call) within the “reasonable care under the circumstances” standard.
[D.E. 9, pg. 5-6]. Celebrity is incorrect.
As shown above, Celebrity owed to Plaintiff the same standard of “reasonable care under the circumstances” both while he was onboard the ship as well as while he was off the ship in the scheduled port of Roseau, Dominica. Despite the clear weight of authority, however, in an effort to improperly limit its liability, Celebrity not only asserts that the “reasonable care under the circumstances” standard does not apply off the ship, but also argues that its only duty to Plaintiff (while she was off the ship) was to warn her of the dangers/conditions it knew or should have known about.
E. Count I. Failure to warn: whether 1) Celebrity had actual or constructive notice of the danger and 2) whether the danger was open and obvious presents questions of fact, not ripe for adjudication at a motion to dismiss stage. Plaintiff should be given the opportunity to conduct discovery and develop the record regarding these factual questions.
All questions regarding Celebrity’s “notice” are issues of fact improperly determined at a motion to dismiss stage. See Goldbach v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92026 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (Huck, J.) (A cruise line “owes a duty to its passengers of reasonable care under all circumstances. This duty includes a duty to warn passengers of dangers the cruise line knows or reasonably should know … The question of whether Defendant knew or should have known of the danger posed is a genuine issue of fact precluding summary judgment.”) Id. (Emphasis added).
Like in Goldbach, Propenko and Rocha, here, whether Celebrity failed to warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition is a question of fact not ripe for adjudication at a motion to dismiss stage, requiring context specific inquiry and necessitating development of the factual record.
F. Count I. Celebrity’s assertion that Plaintiff has made allegations of a standard of care “greater than that supported by the law” is incorrect and has been expressly rejected by this Honorable Court as an argument not ripe at a motion to dismiss stage.

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