Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19810317-848579
Timestamp: 2017-04-30 11:19:45+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8485/79Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1981-03-17;8485.79 Analyses : (Art. 41) PREJUDICE MORALParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : SUISSETexte : APPLICATION /REQUETE NÂ° 8485/79 X . v/SWITZERLAND
X . c/SUISS E DECISION of 17 March 1981 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 17 mars 1981 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requ@t e
Arricle 5, paragraph 3 of the Convention : The ZÃ¼rich District Attorney is an "Officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" (Reference to the judgmerrt of the European Court of Human Rights in the Schiesser case). In the present case, the District Attorney before whom the applicant was brought after his arrest did not exercise prosecuting functions against the applicarrt . Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention : Examination of the procedural requirements of this provision . In the circumstances of the present case, appeal p roceedings before a court which are exclusively in writing meet these requirements .
Article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention : Le procureur de district, Ã Zurich, est un Â« magistrat habilitÃ© par la loi Ã exercer des fonctions judiciaires Â» (RÃ©fÃ©rence Ã l'arrÃªt de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme danr l'affaire Schiesser.) . En l'espÃ¨ce, le procureur de distrlct devant lequel le requÃ©rant a comparu aprÃ¨s son arrestation n'a pas exercÃ© l'action publique conlre lui . Article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention : Examen des exigences de procÃ©dure contenues dans cette disposition . Dans les circonstances du cas d'espPce, une procÃ©dure de recours exclusivement Ã©crite devant des tribunaux rÃ©pondait Ã ces exigences.
In June 1978, the applicant* was arrested and brought the same day before the ZÃ¼rich District Attorney . The latter informed him that he was suspected of drugs trafficking and ordered his detention on remand. The applicant who first denied the facts, confessed in part the next dav . Three days after the arrest, the ZÃ¼rich District Attorney transferred the case to the District Attorney in Hinwil for jurisdictional reasona . The /atter had issued a warrant for the applicant's arrest one week before . He was transferred to the Hinwil prison and released one month later. On the indictment filed by the Hinwil District Attorney, the applicant was convicted in 1980 by the Hinwit district court and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment . ShÃ´rtfy after the applicant's transfer to the Hinwil prison at the end of 1978, the president of the local court had ordered, without a hearing, that the applicant be kept in detention . The applicant appealed against this decision through his counsel to the Indictment Chamber of the ZtÃ¯rich Court of Appeal who, after written pleadings, rejected the appeal. The applicant lodged a public law appeal to the Federal Court invoking in particular Articles 5, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Convention. This appeal was dismissed in August 1978 .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant has alleged violation of Article 5 (3) and (4) of the Convention in connection with his detention on remand . He has raised these complaints in his constitutional appeal and the Swiss Federal Court considered them on their merits in its decision of . . . August 1978 . It is therefore of,no importance that the applicant failed to raise them also on an earlier occasion and he can be considered to have exhausted domestic remedies . 2 . The applicant has first complained that his detention on remand was ordered by a district attorney and not by a judge . The European Court of Human Rights has held, in the judgment on th e Schiesser case given on 4 December 1979, that detention ordered by a Winterthur District Attorney was in conformity with Article 5(3)of the Convention . According to the Court an "officer authorised to exercise judicial power" in the sense of Article 5 (3) must satisfy the following conditions :
â¢ The applicant was represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr E . Sch6nenberger, a lawyer practising in ZÃ¼rich .
- he must be independent of the executive and of the parties, which does not, however, mean that he may not to some extent be subordinate to other officers who enjoy similar independence ; - he must himself hear the individual brought before hi m - he must be under an obligation to review the circumstances militating for or against detention and to decide, by reference to legal criteria, whether there are reasons to justify detention, and to order release if there are no such reasons . (para . 31 of said judgment ) The Cou rt then noted that the status of the Dist ri ct A ttorney and his powers in the matter of detention on remand are laid down in detail in various Acts . In pa rt icular, the Cou rt stated, the Code on C riminal Procedure (StPO) sets out clearly the reason and procedure for placing someone in detention . As in the present case, the applicant Schiesser had not alleged any failure to comply with Cantonal law . In that case, as in the present case, it is the Zurich law as such which is called in question . In this connection the Court recalled that it cannot undertake an abstract review of rules, but must . as far as possible confine its examination to the manner in which the Zurich law has been applied in the particular circumstances . In this respect the Court found in the Schiesser cas e - that the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecutor never give District Attorneys orders or instructions concerning the placing of a given suspect in detention ; - and that also, in the case at issue, the Winterthur District Attorney had not received any advice or instruction from higher authorities before ordering Mr Schiesser's detention . The Court concluded that the Winterthur District Attorney, in ordering Mr Schiesser's detention on remand, exercised the personal discretion conferred on him by law (para . 35) . The Court stated in addition that the Winterthur District Attorney intervened exclusively in his capacity as an investigating authority and did not exercise concurrent investigating and prosecuting functions . Therefore the Court did not feel called upon to determine whether the converse situation would have been in conformity with Article 5 (3) of the Convention (para .34) . In view of the last-mentioned statements, the applicant argues that in the present case the converse situation is given because the Zurich District Attorney only acted as representative of the Hinwil District Attorney, who later assumed the role of prosecutor .
The Commission is not of the opinion that the facts of the present case can be distinguished from those of Schiesser . The applicant was interrogated on . . . June 1978 by the Zurich District Attorney, Mr N ., who also issued the detention order . The function of prosecutor was later assumed by another District Attorney, namely the District Attorney at Hinwil, Mr E . Although Mr E . had, on . . . June 1978, already issued a warrant to appear against the applicant, there is nothing to show that he gave any advice or instruction to his colleague . Mr N ., who, in any event, would not have been obliged to respect any such intervention . It follows that in the light of the findings of the Court in the judgment conceming the Schiesser case, the applicant's contention that he was not, after his arrest, brought before a judge or "an officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 27(2) of the Convention . 3 . The applicant has fu rther alleged a violation of Article 5 (4) of the Convention, arguing that the Swiss system of judicial control with regard to detention on remand does not offer the guarantees required by the Convention . The European Court of Human Rights has already examined a similar complaint of an even more serious nature in the Neumeister case (judgment of 27 June 1968) . In that case, the decisions relating to the appGcant's detention on remand were given after the prosecuting authority had been heard in the absence of the applicant or his legal representative, on the written request made by them (para . 22 of the judgment) . The Court indicated that it was inclined to take the view that such a procedure was contrary to the principle of Â°equality of arms" but it decided that the notion of fair trial mentioned in Article 6 (1) was not applicable to proceedings relating to requests for release from detention on remand . The term "court" employed in Article 5 (4) implied, according to the Court, only that the authority called upon to decide on requests for release must possess a judicial character (paras . 22 and 24 of the judgment) . It is tme that in itsjudgments concerning the Vagrancy cases (18 June 1971) and the Winterwerp case (24 October 1979) the Court has admitted that the procedure envisaged in Article 5 (4) must afford "the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matter of deprivation of liberty" and thereby moderated its former jurisprudence (see Vagrancy judgment p . 41, para . 76, and Winterwerp judgment para . 60) . However, both the Vagrancy cases and the Winterwerp case are distinguishable from the present case . The Vagrancy cases concerned detention of vagrants ordered in summary procedure by the police court against the decision of which a remedy was not open to the persons concerned . None of the applicants was represented by a lawyer at the hearing before the police court .
The Winterwerp case related to the Netherlands legislation on detention of persons of unsound mind and the applicant in that case, being detained, was never associated, either personally or through a representative, in the proceedings leading to the various detention orders made against him . The Court stated in the Winterwerp judgment : "It is essential that the penon concerned (by a detention order) should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation . . . " In the present case the applicant was represented by a lawyer and he had the possibility of appealing to the Court of Appeal as well as to the Federal Court . Although the decisions of these courts were given in written proceedings, without a hearing of the applicant or his representative, the Commission considers that the procedure before these courts is of a judicial character . First it has to be noted that the prosecuting authority was not heard either . Furthermore, the applicant had been informed about the charges laid against him and the reasons for his arrest at the oral hearing before the Zurich District Attorney . They were also stated in the arrest order . The Commission therefore considers that it was possible for the applicant to question the lawfulness of his detention on remand without having been given, at the early stage of the investigation proceedings, the possibility of examining the files . The Court of Appeal carefully examined, in its decision of . . . July 1978, the arguments advanced by the applicant's counsel, and found that the results of the investigation justified the applicant's continued detention, as there was a strong suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence and that there was danger of collusion and of absconding if the applicant were released .
In these circumstances there is nothing to show that the proceedings in question did not afford the applicant the guarantees required in matters of deprivation of liberty (cf . D .R . 16 . (115)) . An examination by the Commission of this complaint does not, therefore, disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the CÃ´nvention and in particular in Article 5 (4) . It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits En juin 1978, le requÃ©rant * a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© et conduit le mÃªme jour devant le procureur de district de Zurich . Ce dernier l'informa qu'il Ã©tait soupÃ§onnÃ© de trafic de stupÃ©fiants et ordonna sa mise en dÃ©tention provisoire . Le requÃ©rant, qui avait commencÃ© par nier les faits, fit des aveux pa rt ie(s dÃ¨s le lendemain . Trois jours aprÃ¨s l'arrestation, le procureur de district de Zurich se dessaisit, pour raison de conrpÃ©tence territoria(e, en faveur du procureur du district de Hinwil, qui avait dÃ©cerrrÃ© une semaine plus tdt un mandat d'amener contre le requÃ©rant . Celui-ci fut alors transfÃ©rÃ© Ã !a nraison d'arrÃªts de Hinwil et mis en libert Ã© un mois p(us tard. Sur acte d'accusation du procureur du district de Hinwi/, le requÃ©rant fut condamnÃ© en juin 1980 par le tribunal de ce tte ville Ã 18 mois d'emprisonnement . Peu aprÃ¨s le transfert du requÃ©rant Ã la maison d'arrÃªts de Hinwil, fin juitt 1978, le prÃ©sident du tribunal de cette ville avait ordonnÃ© sans audience son maintien en dÃ©tention . Contre cette dÃ©cision, le requÃ©rant recourut par son avocat auprÃ¨s de la chambre d'accusation de la cour d'appel de Zurich qui, aprÃ¨s une procÃ©dure Ã©crite, rejeta le recours . Le requÃ©rant forma un recours de droit public au Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral en invoquant notamment l'article 5, paragraphes 3 et 4, de la Convention. Ce recours fut rejetÃ© en aotlt 1978.
(TRADUCT/O M EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue, Ã propos de sa dÃ©tention provisoire, une violation de l'article 5, paragraphes 3 et 4 de la Convention . Comme il a formulÃ© ces griefs dans son recours de droit public et que le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral suisse en a examinÃ© le bien-fondÃ© dans son arrÃªt du . . . aoÃ»t 1978, il est sans importance que le requÃ©rant ne les ait pas soulevÃ©s aussi Ã un stade moins avancÃ© de la procÃ©dure . On peut donc estimer qu'il a Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes . 2 . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint d'abord que sa dÃ©tention provisoire a Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ© par un procureur de district et non par un juge . Dans l'arrÃ©t qu'elle a rendu dans l'affaire Schiesser le 4 dÃ©cembre 1979, la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a dÃ©clarÃ© que l'internement ordonnÃ© pa r
* Le requÃ©rant Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par Mâ¢ E . Schbnenberger, avocat Ã Zurich .
un procureur du district de Winterthur Ã©tait conforme Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3 de la Convention . Selon elle, un . autre magistrat habilitÃ© Ã exercer des fonctions judiciaires â¢, au sens de l'article S, paragraphe 3, doit remplir les conditions suivantes : - Ãªtre indÃ©pendant Ã l'Ã©gard de l'exÃ©cutif et des parties, ce qui n'exclut pas toute subordination Ã d'autres juges ou magistrats pourvu qu'ils jouissent eux-mÃªmes d'une indÃ©pendance analogue ; - entendre personnellement l'individu traduit devant lui ; - examiner les circonstances qui militent pour ou contre la dÃ©tention et se prononcer selon des critÃ¨res juridiques sur l'existence de raisons la justifiant et, en leur absence, ordonner l'Ã©largissement (paragraphe 31 de l'arrÃªt) . La Cour a ensuite constatÃ© que le statut du procureur de district et ses atttibutions en matiÃ¨re de dÃ©tention provisoire sont fixÃ©s en dÃ©tail dans diverses lois . En particulier, dÃ©clare la Cour, le code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale (StPO) indique clairement les motifs et la procÃ©dure de mise en dÃ©tention . Comme en l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant Schiesser n'avait pas allÃ©guÃ© l'inobservation du droit cantonal et, comme en l'espÃ¨ce encore, c'Ã©tait la lÃ©gislation zurichoise qu'il attaquait en tant que telle . Or, la Cour a rappelÃ© sur ce point qu'elle ne doit pas se livrer Ã un contrÃ´le abstrait de normes mais limiter son examen, dans la mesure du possible . Ã la maniÃ¨re dont ladite lÃ©gislation a Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©e dans les circonstances de la cause .
La Cour a dÃ©clarÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard dans l'affaire Schiesse r - que la Direction de la justice et le Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral n'adressent jamais aux procureurs de district d'ordres ou d'instructions sur la mise en dÃ©tention d'une personne suspecte : - et Ã©galement que, dans le cas prÃ©cis, le procureur du district de Winterthur n'avait reÃ§u des instances supÃ©rieures ni conseils ni instructions avant de placer M . Schiesser en dÃ©tention provisoire . La Cour en a conclu qu'en ordonnant la dÃ©tention provisoire de M . Schiesser, le procureur de district avait exercÃ© le pouvoir de dÃ©cision propre que lui attribuait la loi . Elle a dÃ©clarÃ© en outre que le procureur de district de Winterthur Ã©tait intervenu exclusivement comme organe d'instruction et qu'il n'avait donc pas cumulÃ© des fonctions d'instruction avec des fonctions de poursuite . Aussi a-t-elle estimÃ© qu'elle ne se trouvait pas appelÃ©e Ã dÃ©terminer si la situation contraire eGt cadrÃ© avec l'article 5, paragraphe 3 de la Convention (par . 34) . Au vu de ces considÃ©rants, le requÃ©rant soutient qu'en l'espÃ¨ce c'est prÃ©cisÃ©ment de la situation contraire qu'il s'agit, puisque le procureur du district de Zurich n'a agi que comme reprÃ©sentant du procureur du district de Hinwil qui a, par la suite, assumÃ© les fonctions de partie poursuivante . - 137 -
La Commission n'estime pas, quant Ã elle, que les faits de la prÃ©sente espÃ¨ce se distinguent de ceux de l'affaire Schiesser . En effet, le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© le . . . juin 1978 par le procureur du district de Zurich, M . N ., qui a Ã©galement Ã©mis le mandat d'arrÃªt . Le rÃ´le de partie poursuivante fut assumÃ© par la suite par un autre procureur de district, celui de Hinwil, M . E . Certes, celui-ci avait le . . . juin 1978, dÃ©jÃ lancÃ© un mandat d'amener contre le requÃ©rant, mais rien ne prouve qu'il ait donnÃ© conseil ou instruction Ã son collÃ¨gue, M . N . qui, du reste, n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© tenu de donner suite Ã pareille intervention .
Il s'ensuit qu'Ã la lumiÃ¨re des conclusions de la CÃ´ur dans l'arrÃªt Schiesser, la thÃ¨se du requÃ©rant selon laquelle il n'a pas Ã©tÃ©, aprÃ¨s son arrestation, traduit devant un juge ou . autre magistrat habilitÃ© par la loi Ã exercer des fonctions judiciaires . est manifestement mal fondÃ©e et doit donc Ãªtre rejetÃ©e par application de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . 3 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue en outre une violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 4 de la Convention, en soutenant que le systÃ¨me suisse de contrÃ´le juridictionnel de la dÃ©tention provisoire n'offre pas les garanties voulues par la Convention . La Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a dÃ©jÃ examinÃ© un grief, analogue mais plus grave, forrnulÃ© dans l'affaire Neumeister (arrÃªt du 27 juin 1968) . Dans cette affaire, les dÃ©cisions concernant la dÃ©tention provisoire avaient Ã©tÃ© rendues aprÃ¨s que le MinistÃ¨re public eut Ã©tÃ© entendu en l'absence du requÃ©rant et de son avocat au sujet de la demande Ã©crite prÃ©sentÃ©e par eux (par . 22 de l'arrÃªt) . La Cour indiqua qu'elle inclinait Ã admettre que ce fait est contraire au principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes mais dÃ©clara que la notion de procÃ¨s Ã©quitable inscrite Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1 n'est pas applicable Ã l'examen des demandes de mise en libertÃ© provisoire . Selon la Cour en effet, le tertne . tribunal . utilisÃ© Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 4 implique simplement que l'autoritÃ© appelÃ©e Ã statuer sur les demandes de mise en libertÃ© doit avoir un caractÃ¨re judiciaire (par . 22 et 24 de l'arrÃªt) . Certes, dans ses arrÃªts sur les affaires de vagabondage (18 juin 1971) et Winterwerp (24 octobre 1979), la Cour a admis que la procÃ©dure envisagÃ©e Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 4 doit offrir . les garanties fondamentales de procÃ©dure appliquÃ©es en matiÃ¨re de privation de libertÃ© ., tempÃ©rant par lÃ mÃªme sa jurisprudence antÃ©rieure (voir ArrÃªt sur les Affaires de vagabondage p . 41, par. 76 et ArrÃªt Winterwerp, par . 60) . Cependant ces deux affaires se distinguent l'une et l'autre du cas d'espÃ¨ce . Les premiÃ¨res concemaient l'internement de vagabonds, ordonnÃ© selon une procÃ©dure sommaire par le tribunal de police, et l'absence pour les intÃ©ressÃ©s de recours contre cette dÃ©cision . Aucun des requÃ©rants n'Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© par un avocat Ã l'audience du tribunal de police .
L'affaire Winterwerp, elle, avait trait Ã la lÃ©gislation nÃ©erlandaise sur l'internement des aliÃ©nÃ©s et le requÃ©rant, alors dÃ©tenu en asile psychiatrique, ne fut jamais associÃ© en personne ou par le truchement d'un reprÃ©sentant, aux procÃ©dures qui conduisirent aux diverses autorisations d'internement dÃ©cernÃ©es contre lui . La Cour dÃ©clara dans l'arrÃªt Winterwerp : . Encore faut-il que l'intÃ©ressÃ© ait accÃ¨s Ã un tribunal et l'occasion d'Ãªtre entendu lui-mÃªme ou, au besoin, moyennant une certaine forme de reprÃ©sentation . . . . (par . 60 de l'arrÃªt) . En l'espÃ¨ce, en revanche, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© par un avocat et a eu la possibilitÃ© de se pourvoir devant la cour d'appel et devant le Tribunal fÃ©dÃ©ral . MÃªme si ces juridictions ont statuÃ© au terme d'une procÃ©dure Ã©crite, sans que le requÃ©rant ou son reprÃ©sentant aient comparu lors d'une audience, la Commission estime que la procÃ©dure suivie devant ces instances a bien un caractÃ¨re judiciaire . Il faut d'abord relever que le parquet n'y a pas non plus comparu et qu'en outre, le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© informÃ©, Ã l'audience devant le procureur de district de Zurich, des raisons de son arrestation et des accusations portÃ©es contre lui . Celles-ci Ã©taient Ã©galement mentionnÃ©es dans le mandat d'arrÃªt . La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que le requÃ©rant a eu la facultÃ© de contester la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention provisoire mÃªme sans avoir eu, au dÃ©but de la phrase d'instruction, la possibilitÃ© d . econsultrdi La cour d'appel a soigneusement pesÃ©, dans son arrÃªt du . . . juillet 1978, les arguments avancÃ©s par l'avocat du requÃ©rant et a estimÃ© que les rÃ©sultats de l'enqu@te justifiaient le maintien en dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant qui Ã©tait fortement soupÃ§onnÃ© d'avoir commis une infraction pÃ©nale et compte tenu des risques de collusion et de fuite en cas de mise en libertÃ© . Dans ces conditions, rien ne montre que les procÃ©dures litigieuses n'aient pas offert au requÃ©rant les garanties requises en matiÃ¨re de privation de libertÃ© (cf. D .R . 16, p . 111, 115) . L'examen de ce grief par la Commission ne rÃ©vÃ¨le en consÃ©quence aucune apparence de violation des droits et libertÃ©s Ã©noncÃ©s dans la Convention, notamment en son article 5, paragraphe 4 . Il s'ensuit que cette partie de la requt?te est, elle aussi, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
- 139 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 17/03/1981Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 27
 l'article 5
 l'article 6
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 27