Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/kohl-v-new-sewickley-tp-zoning-hearing-bd
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:11:00+00:00

Document:
Country of Origin: United States Court Name: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Primary Citation: 108 A.3d 961 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) Date of Decision: Wednesday, January 21, 2015 Judge Name: Judge McCULLOUGH. Jurisdiction Level: Pennsylvania Alternate Citation: 2015 WL 249186 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) Judges: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge. Attorneys: Patrick M. Livingston, Pittsburgh, for appellants. Matthew D. Monsour, Pittsburgh, for appellees, Noreen and Richard Kohl. Docket Num: No. 126 C.D.2014.
*1 Barbara and William Layton (Intervenors) appeal from the December 27, 2013 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County (trial court), which reversed an order of the New Sewickley Township (Township) Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB), concluding that the dog-rescue operation run by Richard and Noreen Kohl (Applicants) was a non-permissible “kennel” under the Township's zoning ordinance (Ordinance) [FN 1] and denying Applicants' request for a variance. The trial court determined that because Applicants did not receive “economic gain” or a profit for their efforts, their dog-rescue operation was not a “kennel” and, therefore, was not a prohibited land use under the Ordinance. Upon review, we conclude that the term “kennel” as used in the Ordinance is ambiguous, and as we must construe that ambiguity in favor of Applicants as the landowners, we affirm.
The definition of Kennel provided in Section 3.1 of the [Ordinance] states “Any structure, pen or area set aside for the breeding, boarding, show, grooming or keeping of dogs, cats or similar domestic animals. For purposes of this Ordinance, the keeping of five (5) or more such animals for economic gain shall be deemed a commercial kennel.” The definition of Commercial (Business) provided in Section 3.1 of the [Ordinance] states “Engaging in a business, enterprise, activity or other undertaking related to or connected with trade or commerce in general.” The [ZHB] has determined that Applicants are operating a kennel per the definition provided in the [Ordinance]. This fact is supported by receipt of the 2012 Kennel Application form as well as the 2012 Kennel Inspection form obtained through the internet on the [Pennsylvania] Department of Agricultural website. Both of these forms identify the facility as a kennel, under the subcategory of Non–Profit Class. Kennels are regulated within Pennsylvania by the Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement.
*3 (ZHB's decision at 8.) As evidenced from its analysis, the ZHB relied predominately, if not solely, on the Dog Law to determine that Applicants operated a “kennel” for purposes of the Ordinance.
No evidence was presented that [Applicants] breed, board, show, groom or keep the dogs pursuant to the plain and ordinary meanings set forth above. [Applicants] do not derive economic gain as a result of maintaining the animals. Neither the zoning ordinance nor another ... ordinance limits the number of dogs that a property owner is permitted. When the term kennel is construed in conjunction ... with the zoning officer's testimony that kennel denotes a for-profit operation, the court concludes that the definition of kennel in the zoning ordinance is not intended to apply to a single-family dwelling in which rescued dogs are maintained until adopted or provided a permanent home by the owners. The above specifications for a kennel imply a use which is commercial in nature and not to a non-profit dog rescue service within a residence.
*4 The zoning ordinance's definition of kennel further requires that the structure, pen or area be “set aside” for one or more of the stated purposes. The evidence reveals that the dogs reside and are fed within [Applicants'] home. The [fenced-in] pens in the rear of the property are utilized by the animals for the deposit of waste and exercising. The dogs remain in the house overnight. The primary use of [Applicants'] residence is as a single-family dwelling and not set aside for any of the purposes in the definition of kennel.
(Trial court at op. at 21–22.) Accordingly, the trial court reversed the ZHB's order.
In the argument section of their brief, Intervenors contend that the trial court erred in interpreting kennel and applying it to the facts of this case. Intervenors assert that a kennel is not permitted in an R–1 district and that the number of dogs Applicants own far exceeds that which can reasonably be deemed an accessory or incidental use of a single-family dwelling. Intervenors maintain that by operating a non-profit kennel licensed by the Department of Agriculture, Applicants implicitly admit that they “keep” at least twenty-six dogs per calendar year. Intervenors argue that the concept of a “kennel” under the Dog Law is substantially similar to that in the Ordinance and the two should be read in pari materia.
*5 “The rules of statutory construction apply to ordinances as well as statutes.”In re Holtz, 8 A.3d 374, 378 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010). The interpretation of a statute or ordinance presents this Court with a pure question of law, which is generally subject to plenary review.Northampton Area School District v. Zoning Hearing Board of Township of Lehigh, 64 A.3d 1152, 1157 (Pa.Cmwlth.2013); Simko v. County of Allegheny, 869 A.2d 571, 573 n. 3 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005).
The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the enacting legislation. Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972(Act), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. In pursuing that end, we are mindful that a statute's plain language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent and, thus, statutory construction begins with examination of the text itself. Malt Beverages Distribution Association v. Liquor Control Board, 918 A.2d 171, 176 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007) (en banc ), aff'd601 Pa. 449, 974 A.2d 1144 (Pa.2009). In reading the plain language of a statute, “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.”Section 1903(a) of the Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). With respect to zoning matters, “[u]ndefined terms are given their plain meaning, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the landowner and the least restrictive use of the land.”Caln Nether Co., L.P. v. Board of Supervisors of Thornbury Township, 840 A.2d 484, 491 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004).
Further, where the words of the ordinance are ambiguous, courts construe the ordinance in favor of the landowner. Lench v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 13 A.3d 576, 579 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011). A zoning ordinance is ambiguous if the pertinent provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, Adams Outdoor Advertising, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Smithfield Township, 909 A.2d 469, 483 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), or when the language is vague, uncertain, or indefinite.Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 516 Pa. 142, 532 A.2d 325, 332 (Pa.1987). Finally, it is well settled that “a zoning hearing board's interpretation of its own zoning ordinance is entitled to great weight and deference. Such deference is appropriate because a zoning hearing board, as the entity charged with administering a zoning ordinance, possesses knowledge and expertise in interpreting that ordinance.”Risker v. Smith Township Zoning Hearing Board, 886 A.2d 727, 731 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). Similarly, “because [a township's zoning officer] is charged with the administration and execution of the [ordinance], his interpretation of the ordinance is entitled to deference and should not be disregarded unless shown to be clearly erroneous.”McIntyre v. Board of Supervisors of Shohola Township,150 Pa.Cmwlth. 15, 614 A.2d 335, 337 (Pa.Cmwlth.1992).
A “kennel” is not a permitted use in an R–1 district. While there are many different types of kennels with varying purposes under the Dog Law, [FN 9] the Dog Law is not incorporated in the Ordinance so the Court's role in this case is to interpret the language that the Township's legislative body utilized to define a kennel. The Ordinance states that a kennel is: “Any structure, pen or area set aside for the breeding, boarding, show, grooming or keeping of dogs, cats or similar domestic animals. For purposes of this Ordinance, the keeping of five (5) or more such animals for economic gain shall be deemed a commercial kennel.”Ordinance, III–11 (emphasis added).
When viewed in the particular context of tasks relating to dogs, we conclude that the gerunds “breeding,” “boarding,” “grooming,” and the verb “show” all connote, in their most commonplace parlance, a financial component. The basic theme running through all of these enumerated undertakings is that the dog serves as the impetus for economic enterprise and the receipt of monetary consideration. [FN 11] Consistent with this common sense interpretation, the last term in the string of the phrase in the first sentence, “keeping,” can most reasonably be read to relate to the main subject theme of financial profit. See McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization of Philadelphia, 546 Pa. 463, 686 A.2d 801, 806 (Pa.1996) (“Under our statutory construction doctrine ejusdem generis (‘of the same kind or class'), where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.”); Commonwealth ex rel. Fisher v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 4 A.3d 749, 756 n. 9 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010) (“The ancient maxim ‘noscitur a sociis' summarizes the rule that the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those words with which they are associated. Words are known by the company they keep.”). In this sense, the “keeping of dogs”—in order to maintain affiliation with the class of which it is associated—most likely means to possess and maintain the dogs in the context of a financial undertaking.
*7 If this is not the preferred reading of kennel, it is as equally reasonable as any other, and it is the interpretation proffered by Fowler, the zoning hearing officer. Fowler testified that the Ordinance does not restrict the number of dogs that a landowner can own and that a dog operation must be one conducted for profit or “economic gain” in order to be considered a “kennel.” Although it is disputable whether the ZHB officially adopted Fowler's interpretation, the ZHB did not denounce it, so the officer's interpretation must be given at least some weight in the calculus. See McIntyre, 614 A.2d at 337.
To be sure, the operative words above could be construed more broadly, and an individual can be said to “keep” a dog by virtue of the fact that the individual possesses the dog and has claimed the dog as his own. But as Applicants astutely note, this interpretation would lead to an absurd result, because anyone who “keeps” or has two dogs would be presumed to have a “kennel.” See MC Outdoor, LLC v. Board of Commissioners of Abington Township, 78 A.3d 1269, 1275 (Pa.Cmwlth.2013) (stating that in enacting an ordinance it is presumed that the legislative body “did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable.”). In the absence of definitive language to the contrary, we cannot conclude that this was the paramount intent of the Township's legislative body in enacting the Ordinance and defining a kennel.
More importantly, if “keeping” were construed to mean mere possession and ownership, there is no language in the definition of “kennel” that clarifies how many dogs an individual can “keep” before being designated a “kennel” under the Ordinance. Although “dogs” is written in the plural, implying two or more, the absence of a conclusive number leaves an individual guessing, without a sufficient guidepost, at what point his ownership of more than 1 dog qualifies as a kennel. The net result is that the zoning officer and the ZHB are left with unbridled discretion to decide the particular number of dogs, be it 2, 10, or some other figure, that an individual can possesses before that ownership is deemed a kennel. “It is a fundamental rule that an ordinance must establish a standard to operate uniformly and govern its administration and enforcement in all cases, and that an ordinance is invalid where it leaves its interpretation, administration or enforcement to the unbridled or ungoverned discretion, caprice or arbitrary action of the municipal legislative body or of administrative bodies or officials....”Orwell Township Board of Supervisors v. Jewett, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 30, 571 A.2d 1100, 1103 (Pa.Cmwlth.1990). Therefore, we conclude that the definition of kennel is ambiguous, not only because it is susceptible to two contrasting meanings, but also because the term “keeping” is inherently vague and indefinite.
The basis for the ZHB's interpretation and Intervenors' primary argument resorts to the definition of a kennel in the Dog Law. In pertinent part, “Kennel” is defined in section 102 of the Dog Law as “[a]ny establishment in or through which at least 26 dogs are kept or transferred in a calendar year....”3 P.S. § 459–102. However, the Dog Law is not incorporated into the Ordinance; the Ordinance does not refer to the Dog Law, cf. Ruley v. West Nantmeal Township Zoning Hearing Board, 948 A.2d at 270 (noting that local ordinance explicitly referred to the Dog Law and looking to the definition of “boarding kennel” in the Dog Law to define “boarding”); and unlike the Dog Law's definition of kennel, the Ordinance does not quantify the simple possession of a particular number of dogs within its parameters.
*8 Moreover, the Dog Law does not preempt municipal ordinances and the Dog Law is not “so pervasive and comprehensive as to preclude [a municipality] from exercising its police powers to limit the number of dogs which may be housed in a residential setting.”Muehlieb v. City of Philadelphia, 133 Pa.Cmwlth. 133, 574 A.2d 1208, 1210–12 (Pa.Cmwlth.1990). Consequently, the Township is free to restrict the number of dogs permitted in an R–1 district so long as that restriction bears a rational relationship to a health or safety goal of the community. Woll,948 A.2d 938–39 & n. 6. However, the Township has not done so here, and it cannot now try to import the Dog Law's definition of a kennel into its Ordinance and rewrite the Ordinance to mean where “26 dogs are kept.” Because the definitions of kennel in the Dog Law and the Ordinance are at odds with each other, with the former placing numerical restraints on ownership while the latter does not, the two enactments cannot be read in paria materia. See Cozzone v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (PA Municipal/East Goshen Township),621 Pa.23, 73 A.3d 526, 536 (Pa.2013) (“[A]s a fundamental principle, where two parts of a statute relate to the same persons or things, those statutory parts are to be construed and considered concurrently, whenever possible. They are not to be construed as if one part operates to nullify, exclude or cancel the other”); In re Paulmier, 594 Pa. 433, 937 A.2d 364, 371 n. 2 (Pa.2007) (stating that in pari materia applies only where two statutes “can be read as one statute without creating contradiction”). Accordingly, the Dog Law's definition of kennel cannot resolve the ambiguous nature of the Ordinance.
Similarly, the ZHB's and Intervenors' reference to the definition of “commercial” in the Ordinance is unavailing. While the term commercial is defined broadly (“Engaging in a business, enterprise, activity or other undertaking related to or connected with trade or commerce in general”), Ordinance, III–11, it cannot be incorporated into or otherwise expand the phrase “commercial kennel” in the definition of kennel because a “commercial kennel” is explicitly limited to “economic gain.” Ordinance, III–11. (“[T]he keeping of five (5) or more such animals for economic gain shall be deemed a commercial kennel.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, if the term “commercial” in “commercial kennel” was parsed out to re-define a “commercial kennel” to simply signify a kennel generically engaged in commerce, the plain language and concept of “economic gain” would be eviscerated and rendered superfluous. See Latimore Township v. Latimore Township Zoning Hearing Board, 58 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa.Cmwlth.2013) (“A zoning ordinance should be construed so that none of its language is superfluous.”). Here, the ZHB did not find that Gentle Ben's achieved or was operated for “economic gain,” and absent such a finding, Gentle Ben's cannot be considered a “commercial kennel,” regardless of whether that entity meets the stand alone definition of “commercial” in the Ordinance. Notably, Intervenors do not contest the trial court's conclusion that Applicants are not operating Gentle Ben's for “economic gain,” (Intervenors' brief at 11–12), and, in fact, Intervenors conceded at oral argument that Gentle Ben's does not achieve “economic gain” for purposes of the Ordinance. See Marmo v. Department of Transportation, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 191, 550 A.2d 607, 609 (Pa.Cmwlth.1988)(concluding that the Department was bound by its attorney's concession during trial that a licensee did not refuse to take a blood test for purposes of section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S § 1547), accord Commonwealth v. Wendler, 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 104, 638 A.2d 377, 378 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994).
*9 Finally, the case law cited by Intervenors is inapposite. In Hess v. Warwick Township Zoning Hearing Board, 977 A.2d 1216 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009), this Court interpreted the phrase “accessory use” in an ordinance and concluded that the residential ownership of twenty-one dogs could not be considered customarily incidental to the use of a residence. In Hoppe v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Portland, 910 A.2d 756 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), we concluded that a landowner did not qualify for a special exception as a “home occupation” where she sought to breed her dogs. In Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue v. Borough of Marcus Hook Zoning Hearing Board,(Pa.Cmwlth., No. 589 C.D.2011, filed June 4, 2012) (unreported), we agreed with the ZHB that the customary meaning of the term “office” and “office use” does not include the keeping, maintaining or housing of dogs. However, in all of these cases, this Court interpreted specific language in an ordinance, which, quite simply, is not present in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that the above case law does not provide us with guidance in resolving the matter at hand.
AND NOW, this 21st day of January, 2015, the December 27, 2013 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County is affirmed.
[FN 1] In Article III, Section 3.1 of Ordinance, entitled “Meaning of Words,” a “kennel” is defined as: “Any structure, pen or area set aside for the breeding, boarding, show, grooming or keeping of dogs, cats or similar domestic animals. For purposes of this Ordinance, the keeping of five (5) or more such animals for economic gain shall be deemed a commercial kennel.”Ordinance, III–11.
This same section also defines “commercial (business)” as: “Engaging in a business, enterprise, activity or other undertaking related to or connected with trade or commerce in general.”Ordinance, III–5.
[FN 2] Act of December 7, 1982, P.L. 784, as amended,3 P.S. §§ 459–101–459–1205.
“Kennel” is defined in section 102 of the Dog Law as: “Any establishment in or through which at least 26 dogs are kept or transferred in a calendar year, or a boarding kennel as defined in this act.”3 P.S. § 459–102.
[W]e must stress that the appealing party bears the burden of establishing that the trial court's decision is erroneous.Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Robinson, 505 Pa. 226, 478 A.2d 800, 804 (Pa.1984) (the appellant has the burden to demonstrate the trial court's decree is erroneous due to either the evidence or the law). As a corollary to that precept is the equally important concept that an appellate court cannot reverse a court order on the basis of an issue that has not been raised by the appealing party. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (Pa.1975) (sua sponteconsideration of issues deprives court of benefit of counsel's advocacy); Knarr v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 555 Pa. 211, 723 A.2d 664 (Pa.1999) (if appellant fails to present an issue on appeal, Superior Court is not permitted to address it, even if trial court's disposition was fundamentally wrong); Department of Transportation v. Boros, 533 Pa. 214, 620 A.2d 1139 (Pa.1993) (Commonwealth Court erred in reversing based on issue not raised by appellant); Phillips Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Continental Bank, 467 Pa. 43, 354 A.2d 542 (Pa.1976) (Superior Court was not permitted to reverse case based on claim not raised by appellant).
The York Group, Inc. v. Yorktowne Caskets, Inc., 924 A.2d 1234, 1246–47 (Pa.Super.2007).See Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Hempfield Township Municipal Authority, 916 A.2d 1183, 1192 (Pa.Super.2007) (holding that an appellate court cannot sua sponte address an issue that it perceives in the record where that issue is not presented at the appeal level).
[FN 4] Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10603.1.
No one compensated [the landowner] for housing their animals, and the donations from third parties do not constitute compensation for “housing” [i.e., boarding] because the donations were not assigned a particular use. As explained by [the landowner] in her brief, there was “no evidence of donations and gifts given in return for specific actions. There is noquid pro quo.” According to the uncontradicted testimony of [the landowner's witnesses], most donations are used to cover medical expenses and procedures and have nothing to do with [the landowner's] cost of housing the animals.
[FN 6] Where, as here, the trial court takes no additional evidence, our scope of review is limited to determining whether the ZHB committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Hamilton Hills Group, LLC v. Hamilton Township Zoning Hearing Board,4 A.3d 788, 792 n. 6 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010).
[FN 7] In response, Applicants contend, among other things, that Intervenors waived their particular challenges to the definition of kennel because they failed to raise their proffered interpretations before the ZHB. Due to our disposition, we need not address this issue.
[FN 8] Because the ZHB failed to file a brief in this matter, this Court entered a per curiam order on July 17, 2014, precluding the ZHB from filing a brief and participating in oral argument.
A “Nonprofit Kennel” is defined in the same section as: “A kennel registered under the laws of this Commonwealth as a nonprofit entity or a nonprofit animal control kennel under sections 901 and 1002. The term shall include kennels operated by approved medical and veterinary schools and nonprofit institutions conducting medical and scientific research, which shall be required to register, but shall not be required to pay any of the license fees set by this act, and which may use their own identification tags for dogs within their kennels without being required to attach tags hereinafter prescribed while dogs are within such kennels, if approved by the secretary.”Id.
Further, under the Dog Law, a “boarding kennel” is defined in pertinent part as: “Any establishment available to the general public where a dog or dogs are housed for compensation by the day, week or a specified or unspecified time.”Id. A “commercial kennel” is “[a] kennel that breeds or whelps dogs and: (1) sells or transfers any dog to a dealer or pet shop kennel; or (2) sells or transfers more than 60 dogs per calendar year.”Id. Finally, a “pet shop-kennel” is “[a]ny kennel or person that acquires and sells dogs for the purpose of resale, whether as owner, agent or consignee, and sells or offers to sell such dogs on a retail basis.”Id.
Section 206(a) of the Dog Law imposes licensing requirements on kennels: “Any person who keeps or operates a kennel shall, on or before January 1 of each year, apply to the department for a kennel license.”3 P.S. § 459–206.
[FN 11] For example, it is everyday knowledge that people make arrangements to “breed” dogs, especially purebred, for the sole purpose of receiving monetary consideration for the unique type that is procreated. In return for compensation, people also act as bailees and “board” or take care of dogs, as if running a day-care center or babysitting venture, temporarily for those owners who are at work and more prolonged for those owners who are on vacation. Further, people cut the hair and nails of dogs or otherwise “groom” them, an art form not known or mastered by all, and typically charge a fee for such specialized services.
[FN 12] Although our reasoning differs in some respects from that of the trial court, “it is well settled that this Court may affirm the trial court's order on any basis appearing in the record.”Victoria Gardens Condominium Association v. Kennett Township, 23 A.3d 1098, 1103 n. 10 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011).
[FN 13] Nonetheless, we note that our decision does not preclude Intervenors or other neighbors from filing common law claims against Applicants based upon the dogs' behavior.

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