Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/310/354/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 19:57:29+00:00

Document:
1. Mandamus is proper to review error of a district court in refusing to call in additional judges, under Jud.Code § 266, in a suit praying an interlocutory injunction against state officers. P. 310 U. S. 355.
2. The application for mandamus may be made by one of several defendants. P. 310 U. S. 356.
3. A suit by a national bank to enjoin the collection of a state tax is not a suit to restrain the enforcement of a statute of the State "upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute," within the meaning of Jud.Code § 266, where the bill makes no attack upon the state legislation involved, but alleges that state officials have misconstrued it and have made an assessment which is unconstitutional because excessive and discriminatory and which is also invalid because it discriminates against national bank shares in violation of R.S. § 5219, and includes preferred shares of the bank owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which are exempt under the Act of Congress of March 20, 1936. P. 310 U. S. 357.
is to be distinguished from one based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute which is not attacked as unconstitutional. The latter does not require a three-judge court, its attack being aimed at allegedly erroneous administrative action.
On a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus and on the respondent's return to a rule to show cause.
Assessments are made in the first instance by county assessors, with an appeal allowed first to a county and then to a state board of equalization. The state board returns the final assessment with a levy of the rate for state purposes to the county supervisors. This body adds the several local rates and places the assessment upon the tax roll. Collection is performed by the county treasurer, [Footnote 3] and the taxes collected are apportioned between state and county. [Footnote 4] Where a bank is doing business in several counties, the value of its stock is apportioned among the counties in accordance with the assets located in each. [Footnote 5] Because other property in the state has been under-assessed the state board, in 1935, ordered that bank shares be valued at 75% of capital stock, surplus and undivided profit. Assets, borrowings, deposits, and other liabilities are disregarded.
the Bank reported a total value of $524,629.50, 75% of $699,026 (the amount of its common, surplus, undivided profits and reserves), as the total taxable value of its shares, and apportioned this among the counties according to the assets there located. On this basis $139,088.80, 26.53% of its total taxable value, was apportioned to Pima County. The assessor of Pima County made an assessment of $327,590, the "actual cash value of the real and personal property" situated in Pima County. By agreement of the parties, the Bank paid the amount which under its computation was due Pima County, the right to litigate the validity of the county's assessment being reserved. Subsequently, the petitioner having threatened to institute proceedings to enforce the county's assessment, the Bank brought its suit in the district court to enjoin collection.
The Bank, by its bill in the district court, seeks an injunction upon several grounds. We are of the opinion that none of these compels the trial judge to call a three-judge court under § 266.
since the common stock in other banks is assessed at 75% of the value of common stock, surplus, and undivided profits and other classes of property at sixty percent of its actual value, while this valuation is on the basis of approximately twice the common stock, surplus, and undivided profits of the bank and twice its actual value. It is further alleged that this excessive and discriminatory valuation violates R.S. § 5219, which limits the rate of taxation of national bank shares to that assessed "upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens . . . coming into competition with the business of national banks." It is prayed that action under these assessments, for the reasons stated, be enjoined as violative of the Constitution and laws of the United States and Arizona.
Section 266 lays down as one of the requirements for a three-judge court that the injunction against the officer of the state to restrain the enforcement, operation or execution of the state statute must be sought "upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute."
Insofar as it is alleged that the assessments are void because unauthorized by the Arizona statute, the injunction sought is obviously not upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the state statute as tested by the federal Constitution.
"When a bank maintains branches or conducts business in more than one county, city, or town, the assessed value of the capital stock shall be apportioned among the several counties, cities, and towns in which the main office or such branches are maintained or business conducted, and the amount apportioned to each county, city, or town shall not be less than the actual cash value of the real and personal property of such bank situated in such county, city, or town."
If this is interpreted as requiring that the apportionment of the value of the capital stock to each county must not be less than the tangible property in that county, the aggregate apportionment may be much larger than the assessed value of the stock. A greater assessment per share will occur if the total valuation is allocated to common shares only. If the valuation, reached under the formula by treating the preferred as capital stock, is allocated among the common shares only, it would mean that the preferred was treated as stock for purposes of the valuation, and disregarded for the assessment of individual shares. The argument of petitioner is that, if the result, as he contends the Bank alleges, violates the federal Constitution by discrimination of common shares as compared to shares of other banks without preferred stock or owners of other property, the statute violates it. Therefore, in effect, the attack on the constitutionality of the assessment is an attack on the constitutionality of the statute.
that the assessment complained of is made properly under the statutes and that, by the statute, the assessment is to be prorated among the common shares, it would determine only a question of statutory construction. It is necessary to distinguish between a petition for injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of a statute as applied, which requires a three-judge court, [Footnote 15] and a petition which seeks an injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute which is not attacked as unconstitutional. The latter petition does not require a three-judge court. [Footnote 16] In such a case, the attack is aimed at an allegedly erroneous administrative action. [Footnote 17] Until the complainant in the district court attacks the constitutionality of the statute, the case does not require the convening of a three-judge court, any more than if the complaint did not seek an interlocutory injunction. [Footnote 18] Where, by an omission to attack the constitutionality of a state statute, its validity is admitted for the purposes of the bill, a determination by the trial court that the assessment accords with the statute would result in the refusal of the injunction and the dismissal of the bill. Jurisdiction, properly assumed, may be lost by the special court when it appears that a prerequisite such as need for relief against state officers is lacking. [Footnote 19] Even where the statute is attacked as unconstitutional, § 266 is inapplicable unless the action complained of is directly attributable to the statute. [Footnote 20] There is no indication that Congress sought by § 266 to have every attack on the constitutionality of a state statute determined by a three-judge court.
It sought such a bench only to avoid precipitate determinations on constitutionality on motions for interlocutory injunctions.
As the foregoing ground adequately disposes of the petition for mandamus, we do not discuss the other reasons for refusal urged by the Bank.
Ex parte Williams, 277 U. S. 267, 277 U. S. 269; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 282 U. S. 10, 282 U. S. 16.
Revised Code of Arizona, 1928, §§ 3069-3071.
Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21.
R.S. § 5219; Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 173 U. S. 668.
Art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . ."
271 U. S. 271 U.S. 461, 271 U. S. 465-466.
258 U. S. 258 U.S. 50, 258 U. S. 52.
Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 192 U. S. 407.
See D. A. Beard Truck Line Co. v. Smith, 12 F.Supp. 964.
Cf. Ex parte Williams, 277 U. S. 267, 277 U. S. 271; Jett Bros. Co. v. Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 252 U. S. 5.
Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 282 U. S. 10.
Ex parte Hobbs, 280 U. S. 168.
Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 282 U. S. 10, 282 U. S. 15.
Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Packing Co., 292 U. S. 386, 292 U. S. 391.
Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565, 277 U. S. 567, 569.

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