Source: http://hyperlaw.com/westlit/litdocs/1996-05-13-west-motion-to-reconsider.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:35:59+00:00

Document:
for the Southern and Eastern District, for reconsideration of the Court's May 1, 1996 order, as it applies to the Complaints filed by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. ("Bender"), and, alternatively, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), for certification of that Order, as it applies to the complaints filed by Bender, to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for interlocutory review.
I, KATHERINE J. DANIELS, an attorney at Weil, Gotshal & Manges, counsel for defendant, hereby certify that on May 13, 1996, I Caused the foregoing Notice of Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, Certification For interlocutory Review to be served by facsimile and Federal Express upon Irell & Manella, 1800 Avenue of the Stars, Los Angeles, California 90007, counsel for plaintiff, Matthew Bender and Company, Inc., and by facsimile and Federal Express upon Paul J. Ruskin, Esq., 72-08 243rd Street, Douglaston, New York 11363, counsel for plaintiff, HyperLaw, Inc.
CCC Information services, Inc. v. Macclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. deniied, 116 S.Ct. 72 (1995) . . . . . . . . .5,6 .
International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . .4,9,13 .
International Medical Prosthetics-Research Associates v. Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572 (Fed. Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 .
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) ......5.
of its request, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), that the Court certify that Order, as it applies to the complaints filed by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. ("Bender"), to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for interlocutory review.
at 23); and (iv) West's unequivocal assurances that it would never sue over the original New York product did not moot Bender's alleged apprehension of suit by West with respect to that original product because Bender's apprehension was not specific to any product. order at 18.
West respectfully submits that this Court's rulings on the "reasonableness" of Bender's alleged apprehension of suit are incorrect, as a matter of law, because they are based upon the erroneous assumption that copyright infringement can be determined or reasonably threatened on a non-product specific basis. Because of this error, West submits that the Court should reconsider its rulings that "West need not have threatened litigation with respect to a specific product" and that "Bender's general belief that West might sue it for using star pagination" was reasonable even though it knew that West had no knowledge of the specific products at issue. Order at 17. These rulings are at odds with fundamental principles of copyright law and the constitutionally based principle that the declaratory judgment procedure is not available to attack the validity of a patent or copyright in the absence of a reasonable belief by the plaintiff that the defendant is going to file a lawsuit contending that a specific product is likely to infringe. (Point 1, supra).
Alternatively, if the Court determines not to reconsider its holding with respect to Bender's "reasonable" apprehension of suit, West respectfully requests that the question of whether a reasonable apprehension of suit has to be product specific be certified to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Certification of this novel issue of subject matter jurisdiction would save substantial judicial and party resources in the event that the Court of Appeals agrees with West's position on this threshold issue of justiciability.
Bender has already announced its intention to continue producing its products as this case proceeds, and thus will not suffer any prejudice. (Point II).
1. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS RULING THAT BENDER CAN HAVE A REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF SUIT BY WEST THAT IS NON-PRODUCT SPECIFIC.
Reconsideration is proper if a party can point to controlling law or facts that the Court overlooked, which might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusions it reached. Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). In this instance, West believes that the Court has overlooked basic principles of copyright law which compel the conclusion that the reasonable apprehension of suit component of justiciability can only be met in a copyright case if the apprehension of suit is specific to the particular products at issue in the case.
copyrightability of West's selections and arrangements -there must be a separate determination as to whether a particular product duplicates a substantial enough portion of the copyrighted original to be considered infringing. Id. This means that a company like West could not file a copyright infringement suit -- without violating Rule 11 -unless it had at least some knowledge of the specific product which it contends infringes. Moreover, it necessarily follows that a declaratory judgment plaintiff, like Bender, could not, as a matter of law, have a reasonable apprehension of suit by West if it knew, as it did, that West did not have any knowledge about the existence or intent of Bender to produce the specific products at issue. Goldstein Dep. 60-61, 83-83, 90; Sann Dep. 44, 46, 53.
no intention of ever suing over that product. Supplemental Affidavit of Vance K. Opperman ("Opperman Supp. Aff.11) at 1 13. This set of facts -- which is undisputed -- simply underscores the fact that both a claim of copyright infringement and a reasonable apprehension of suit for copyright infringement rust be product specific. Otherwise, the Court and parties will, as in the case of the original New York product, spend months litigating over products about which it turns out there is no dispute.
to one case or duplicated and star paged to West's entire reporter system. This result cannot be squared with basic principles of copyright law.
materials and were not scanned from West's volumes. Thus, the six cases, which involved very different products, could not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of suit by West over the specific products described in Bender's complaints. See International Harvester, 623 F.2d at 1212 ("[t]he [other) pending litigation between Deere and 1H is of some relevance. . . . It does not indicates however, that Deere would pursue a Patent suit with respect to the CX-41 or that Deere had formed any opinion as to whether the CX-41 infringed its patent. The CX-41 was in no way involved in the prior suit and thus that suit cannot be viewed as anything more than a general indication that Deere considers litigation a viable alternative once it has determined that a competitor is producing a product which infringes the patent at issue here.") (emphasis added).
the CD-ROM products at issue here, which West did not even know about until after Bender filed its various complaints.
In sum, by finding Bender's Complaints justiciable based upon Bender's "general belief that West might sue" over the use of star pagination without regard to a specific product, the Court has overlooked fundamental copyright infringement law and constitutionally based principles holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act is not available to attack the validity of a patent or copyright simply because the owner has indicated that it believes that its intellectual property rights are valid and the declaratory plaintiff disagrees. See, e.g., International Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs. v. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In other words,, there is no justiciable basis for challenging the validity of a patent or copyright in the absence of a reasonable apprehension that the patent or copyright owner is going to sue over a specific product that it believes is reasonably likely to infringe.
existence of (or even Bender's intent to produce) the specific products at issue, and because there is no substantial similarity between the specific Bender products and the products West has sued over for copyright infringement in the past.
If the court does not reconsider its ruling that Bender's alleged apprehension of suit by West was reasonable without regard to any specific product, West respectfully requests that this controlling issue of law be certified to the Second circuit court of Appeals for interlocutory review. This procedure will enable the parties to get a final answer to the threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction without having to go through the substantial expense of further proceedings. Further, it will cause no prejudice to Bender, who has stated that it intends to continue producing its products during the pendency of the litigation without waiting for any ruling by the Court.
ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). West submits that both statutory elements clearly are present here.
First, West believes that the discussion in Point I above demonstrates why the Court's ruling that Bender can reasonably have a non-product specific apprehension of a copyright infringement suit by West presents a "controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial difference of opinion." There is little room to dispute that basic copyright law dictates that infringement is a product specific inquiry. see cases cited at page 5 supra. Further, the Second Circuit has never held, or even had the occasion to expressly consider whether, in light of these undisputed copyright principles, a declaratory judgment plaintiff could ever have a reasonable apprehension of suit when it knew that the copyright owner had no awareness of the specific product at issue to determine if it was likely to infringe. At a minimum, there are certainly grounds for "a substantial difference of opinion" over whether a nonproduct specific apprehension of suit can be reasonable where, as here, West has filed an affidavit stating that, as a matter of policy, it makes all decisions about copyright infringement and whether to sue on a product-by-product basis. Opperman Supp. Aff. J 6.
Similarly, an immediate appeal of this controlling legal issue "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation" because allowing it to proceed without interlocutory review would risk a tremendous waste of judicial resources if it is later determined that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to begin with. in the New York action, the parties and the court will be proceeding to major cross-notions for summary judgment and possibly a trial, while in the Texas action, substantial discovery would have to go forward. In both cases, it makes no sense to proceed and inflict these burdens on the Court and the parties if there is a substantial difference of opinion which could cause the court of Appeals to conclude that the cases are non-justiciable.
on whether the CX-41 product infringed and (iii) Deere's statement that it would permit IH to produce the CX-41 product upon payment of money. The case proceeded through discovery and extensive summary judgment briefing, only to be vacated by the Seventh Circuit because the court concluded that IH's had not satisfied the reasonable apprehension requirement for justiciability. in particular, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, although the prior suit was of some relevance in assessing the reasonableness of IH's alleged apprehension of suit by Deere, it "does not indicate, however, that Deere would pursue a patent suit with respect to the CX-41 or that Deere had formed any opinion as to whether the CX-41 infringed its patent." id at 12.
Finally, certifying an immediate appeal of the justiciability issue would not prejudice Bender in its business operations because Bender has indicated in the record that it is producing the products at issue and will continue to do so during the pendency of this litigation, without waiting for a judicial determination. Permitting the Second Circuit to resolve the threshold issue now will thus substantially further judicial efficiency and cause no prejudice to the parties.
For all of the foregoing reasons, West respectfully requests that the Court either reconsider its ruling that a reasonable apprehension of a copyright infringement suit by West against Bender can be non-product specific and still present a justiciable controversy or, alternatively, that it certify this novel issue of law for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

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