Source: https://meuserlaw.com/category/blog/page/30/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:00:19+00:00

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Part Three—A Look At The Case Law: What Is An “Unjustified” Action Under The Minnesota Animal Cruelty Statute?
In this third article of a five-part series on animal cruelty, we will learn what is considered an “unjustified” action in Minnesota.
To prove animal torture or cruelty, the State must provide evidence that shows beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s act, omission or neglect caused or permitted unnecessary or unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death to an animal. Because the act, omission or neglect must have been “unjustifiable” many defendants argue as a defense that their act, which harmed or killed an animal, was justified. The court has not developed a clear standard regarding what constitutes an “unjustifiable” action but has discussed the standard in a number of unpublished cases.
First, in State v. Weber, the Minnesota Court of Appeals resolved the issue of whether the word “unjustified” was unconstitutionally vague. In this case, two neighboring families had a contentious relationship with one another. On the day of the incident, a dog belonging to the Dohrmann family crossed onto property belonging to the Weber family, and allegedly damaged insulation under a mobile home. When the dog approached Mr. Weber, he took out a gun and shot the dog. Mr. Weber’s primary defense was that his actions were justified because the Sheriff told him he could shoot the dog if it was on his property. The Sheriff denied this accusation in his testimony, and Mr. Weber was convicted with unjustly killing the dog under Minnesota Statutes section 343.21.
This second article in a two-part series on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder work comp claims examines how the courts should interpret PTSD claims in the context of the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation statute. The first article explained why the date of injury in work comp claims are crucial to the viability of many PTSD claims and illustrated the various types of injuries recognized by the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act. Part II outlines the historical interpretation of psychological claims in work comp, how the statute defines compensable mental claims, and the mechanism of PTSD in further support of why PTSD is an occupational disease, not a specific mental injury.
CONTENT: In this second article of a five-part series on animal cruelty, we will look at the history of animal cruelty laws in Minnesota.
Animal cruelty laws did not exist at common law; rather, such laws are statutory in nature. See Stephens v. State, 65 Miss. 329, 331, 3 So. 458, 459 (1888) (“The common law recognized no rights in such animals, and punished no cruelty to them, except in so far as it affected the rights of individuals to such property.”); see also Corwin R. Kruse, Baby Steps: Minnesota Raises Certain Forms of Animal Cruelty to Felony Status, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1649, 1653 (2002) (noting that animal cruelty was not a crime at common law). In Minnesota, the first statute that prohibited torture or cruelty to animals was enacted while the state was still a territory. Rev. Stat., ch. 107, 18 (1851). It provided that a person who “cruelly beat or tortured any horse, ox, or other animal, whether belonging to himself or another, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail, not more than thirty days, or by fine not exceeding fifty dollars, nor less than five dollars.” Id.
In 1854, this language was modified to read: “every person who shall willfully and maliciously kill, maim or disfigure any horses, cattle or other beasts of another person . . . shall be punished.” Rev. Stat., ch. 101, 39 (1854); see also U.S. v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 292, 296 (1856) (quoting relevant language). Interestingly, this change restricted the crime only to those individuals who harmed an animal belonging to another, which essentially created a safe haven for an animal owner. Another notable change made by the legislature was the substitution of the word “animal” for “beast” because this further restricted the scope of the statute. A “beast” is arguably a subset of animals and therefore the change is a restriction on the statute’s applicability. Compare Oxford Dictionary (defining beast as “an animal, especially a large or dangerous four-footed one.”) with Merriam Webster Dictionary (defining “animal” as “a living thing that is not a human being or plant.”). Nevertheless, despite these changes, the 1854 law still appeared to apply broadly to “any horse, cattle or other beasts of another person” that was “kill[ed], maim[ed] or disfigure[ed].” However, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a much narrower view of the statute’s application in U.S. v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 292 (1856).
In U.S. v. Gideon, the defendant, Peter Gideon, was convicted of “willfully and maliciously killing” a dog by shooting it with a pistol. Upon review of the conviction, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the animal cruelty statute and determined that dogs were not included within the term “beasts” and thus fell outside the scope of the statute. Gideon, 1 Minn. at 296. The court stated that the only animals protected by the statute were those who had “intrinsic value,” such as oxen, swine, and cows. Moreover, it held that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could convict the defendant based on his malice toward the dog or its owner. The court held it was necessary to prove malice toward the owner of the animal––malice toward the animal alone was insufficient. Therefore, in the early days, the animal cruelty laws were narrowly defined and applied, and only those individuals who harmed another person’s animal with “intrinsic value” and with malice toward the owner, could be convicted.
[O]verdrive, overload, torture, cruelly beat, neglect, or unjustifiably injure, maim, mutilate, or kill any animal, or cruelly work any animal when it is unfit for labor, whether it belongs to that person or to another person. . . .[;] deprive any animal over which the person has charge or control of necessary food, water, or shelter . . . .[; or] willfully instigate or in any way further any act of cruelty to any animal or animals, or any act tending to produce cruelty to animals.
Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 1 (2014).
From the early twentieth century forward, the animal cruelty provisions largely persisted in the same form until 2001, when Minnesota Statute section 343.21 was amended to increase the penalties for certain types of animal abuse. The penalty increases in severity based on whether the defendant: (1) has been previously convicted of torture or cruelty; (2) violates the cruelty or torture provisions and causes substantially bodily harm, great bodily harm, or death to a companion animal; or (3) harms a service animal without justification so that it is unable to perform its duties, causes substantial or great bodily harm to the animal, or causes the animal’s death. In addition, there are specific elevated penalties for defendants who violate the cruelty or torture provisions and cause substantial bodily harm, great bodily harm, or death to a companion animal with the intention of threatening, intimidating, or terrorizing another person. Every violation of the animal cruelty statute except those specifically set out above remains a misdemeanor offense. Therefore, because the elevated penalties attach only to violations of the torture and cruelty provisions, the definition of “cruelty or torture” set out in Minnesota Statutes section 343.20, subdivision 3, becomes central to the prosecution of these crimes.
Upcoming articles in the series will discuss the Gerard v. State decision and examine the impact the decision may have on the “unjustifiable” standard. And finally, I will examine how the “unjustifiable” standard could be improved.
If you have been injured by an animal or are having problems with a pet in your neighborhood, call Meuser Law Office, P.A. to discuss your options. The protection of your property and family is important, but laws also serve as an important counter-balance in our society. At Meuser Law Office, P.A. we understand this balance and are happy to answer your questions.
Under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act, in particular Minnesota Statute § 176.011, subdivision 15, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) is defined as an occupational disease. Because PTSD is defined as an occupational disease, the date the employee became disabled is the date of injury, not a specific traumatic event(s). Employers’ and insurers’ reliance of the date of a traumatic incident, rather than the date of disablement, unfairly denies workers’ compensation benefits to injured workers suffering from PTSD.
This is the first in a 2-part series analyzing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder injuries in the Minnesota workers’ compensation system. Part I describes the types of injuries in the workers’ compensation system and Part II demonstrates that PTSD should be categorized as an occupational disease type injury.
The date of an employee’s injury is a controlling event in Minnesota workers’ compensation law. This means that the law in effect on the date of the employee’s injury determines the amount and type of benefits to which the employee may be entitled. The date of injury is also important in avoiding statute of limitation or notice issues that may prevent employees from receiving benefits. Because PTSD was not a compensable injury under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act until after October 1, 2013, determining the date of injury is vital to a successful PTSD claim.

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