Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=14-18-00273-CR%20&s=TX&d=125571
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:56:02+00:00

Document:
 a $40 “District Clerk” fee, authorized under article 102.005 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure;  a $4 “Jury Service Fund SB1704” fee, authorized under article 102.0045 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure;  10% of a $2 “Basic Criminal Legal Services” fee, authorized under section 133.107 of the Texas Local Government Code;  a $2 “Administrative Transaction Fee,” authorized under article 102.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; and  90% of a $25 “Time Payment” fee, authorized under section 133.103 of the Texas Local Government Code. 1. Standard of review and applicable law We review the constitutionality of a criminal statute de novo. Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Johnson v. State, 562 S.W.3d 168, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet. h.) (op. on reh’g). We begin with the presumption that the statute is valid and that the legislature was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary in enacting it. See Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Eugene v. State, 528 S.W.3d 245, 250–51 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Combs v. STP Nuclear Operating Co., 239 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021 (noting that courts presume “compliance” with Texas and United States Constitutions). We must uphold the statute if we can apply a reasonable construction that will render it constitutional. Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Johnson, 562 S.W.3d at 175; Sheldon v. State, 100 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. ref’d). The party challenging the statute has the burden to establish its unconstitutionality. Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We make every reasonable presumption in favor of the statute’s constitutionality unless the challenger clearly shows that it is unconstitutional. Id.
traveled. In calculating mileage, the officer must use the railroad or the most practical route by private conveyance. The defendant shall also pay all necessary and reasonable expenses for meals and lodging incurred by the officer in the performance of services under this subsection, to the extent such expenses meet the requirements of Section 611.001, Government Code. This subsection applies to: (1) conveying a prisoner after conviction to the county jail; (2) conveying a prisoner arrested on a warrant or capias issued in another county to the court or jail of the county; and (3) traveling to execute criminal process, to summon or attach a witness, and to execute process not otherwise described by this article. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.011(a), (b). Appellant argues that neither article 102.011 nor an interconnected statute direct where the funds collected for either fee are to be deposited. Citing the Study of the Necessity of Certain Court Costs,2 appellant contends that both the sheriff fee and the capias warrant fee are in fact deposited “into a general fund without limitation.” Because each fee is deposited into a general fund, appellant continues, each fee’s authorizing statute is facially unconstitutional under Johnson, Hernandez, and Casas. See Johnson v. State, No. 14-16-00658-CR, 2018 WL 1476275 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 27, 2018), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by Johnson, 562 S.W.3d at 171; Hernandez v. State, ---S.W.3d---, 2017 WL 3429414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Casas v. State, 524 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.).
2 See Office of Court Administration, “Study of the Necessity of Certain Court Costs and Fees in Texas,” available at http://www.txcourts.gov/publications-training/publications/filingfees-courts-costs.aspx. Our court has concluded that this report is of limited value in our analysis of the issue presented because the report was not part of the trial court record and because failure of the statute to direct the funds to a segregated account does not make the courts tax gatherers. See Moliere, 2018 WL 6493882, at *6 n.5. The First Court of Appeals has taken a similar view. Allen v. State, ---S.W.3d---, 2018 WL 4138965, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. granted) (op. on reh’g).
Appellant was assessed a $40 “District Clerk” fee, which he contends is unconstitutional because the fee is not directed by statute to a particular destination but instead goes to a general fund. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 102.005(a) provides that “[a] defendant convicted of an offense in a county court, a county court at law, or a district court shall pay for the services of the clerk of the court a fee of $40.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.005(a). The statute states that “[t]he fee imposed is for all clerical duties performed by the clerk.” Id. art. 102.005(c).3 This court has held that the district clerk’s fee is not an impermissible tax collected by the judiciary. See Moliere, 2018 WL 6493882, at *7. “Article 102.005(c) shows that the fee falls within the first category of constitutional courtcost statutes: it is collected to recoup costs expended in the trial of the case.” Id. Our holding aligns with those of other courts addressing the identical issue. See Thornton v. State, No. 05-17-00220-CR, 2018 WL 2773390, at *3 (Tex. App.— Dallas June 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (the clerk’s fee is “intended to be spent reimbursing the clerk for the services listed in the statute attendant to a criminal court proceeding and . . . serves a legitimate criminal justice purpose”); Davis v. State, 519 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (holding that article 102.005 is not a facially unconstitutional tax). Appellant has not cited a court decision sustaining a facial constitutional challenge to the district clerk fee.
3 The clerk’s duties include filing a complaint or information, docketing the case, taxing costs against the defendant, issuing original writs and subpoenas, swearing in and impaneling a jury, receiving and recording the verdict, filing each paper entered in the case, and swearing in witnesses in the case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.005(c)(1)–(8).
Johnson, 562 S.W.3d at 179 (jury expenses “include those pertaining to criminal juries”). Accordingly, the fee is directly “related to the recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the prosecution of criminal cases within our criminal justice system.” Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 517. Appellant has not demonstrated that article 102.0045 and the $4 fee it authorizes operate unconstitutionally in every instance. We hold that article 102.0045(a) is not facially unconstitutional. d. Legal Services Fee Appellant challenges a $2 “Basic Criminal Legal Services” fee in his bill of costs. Texas Local Government Code Section 133.107 provides that: A person convicted of any offense, other than an offense relating to a pedestrian or the parking of a motor vehicle, shall pay as a court cost, in addition to other costs, a fee of $2 to be used to fund indigent defense representation through the fair defense account established under Section 79.031, Government Code. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 133.107(a). Section 133.107 further provides that the comptroller, after receiving the collected fees under this statute, “shall credit the remitted fees to the credit of the fair defense account.” Id. § 133.107(b). The fair defense account is an account in the general revenue fund from which monies may be appropriated only to: (1) the commission for the purpose of implementing this chapter; and (2) the office of capital and forensic writs for the purpose of implementing Subchapter B, Chapter 78. Tex. Gov’t Code § 79.031.
4 Officers that may collect money payable under article 102.072 include district and county attorneys, clerks of district and county courts, sheriffs, constables, and justices of the peace. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 103.003(a).
5 In certain circumstances—i.e., if the municipality or county is not in compliance with article 103.0033, which concerns programs to improve the collection of court costs, fees, and fines imposed in criminal cases—the treasurer is directed to send 100 percent of the fees to the comptroller. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 133.103(c-1); see also id. § 103.0033.
funds collected are directed to general revenue and do not “relate to the criminal justice system,” the court held the accounts at issue did not qualify as an allocation of funds to be expended for legitimate criminal justice purposes. Id. at 109–10. Because the legislative directives at issue in Salinas did not constitute any legitimate criminal justice purpose, the court held that the fee operates unconstitutionally every time it is collected and thus was facially invalid. See id. at 109 & n.26. Salinas compels the same result here with respect to the portions of section 133.103 directing the funds collected to general revenue without limitation. Id.; Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 133.103(b), (d). Each time the district clerk collects the portion of the fee authorized by section 133.103(a), (b), and (d), it is gathering general revenue not sufficiently related to a legitimate criminal justice purpose. “We cannot uphold the constitutionality of funding . . . when all the funds in the account go to general revenue,” at least without a statutory directive that the funds be used for a legitimate criminal justice purpose. See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 110. Accordingly, we agree with appellant that section 133.103(b) and (d) are facially unconstitutional. See id. We sustain in part appellant’s first issue, as it relates to section 133.103(b) and (d) of the Texas Local Government Code. Our holding does not apply to section 133.103(c), which allocates ten percent of the fee to the general fund of the county or municipality to be expended for the purpose of improving the efficiency of the administration of justice in the county or municipality. We overrule the remainder of appellant’s first issue.
B. Diligent Participation Credit In his second issue, appellant asserts that the trial court’s judgment omits a statutorily required finding.
Article 42.0199 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if a person is convicted of a state jail felony, as appellant was here, “the judge shall make a finding and enter the finding in the judgment of the case regarding whether the person is presumptively entitled to diligent participation credit in accordance with Article 42A.559.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.0199. Article 42A.559 states that a defendant confined in a state jail felony facility does not earn “good conduct time” for time served in the facility, but “may be awarded diligent participation credit,” in certain circumstances. Id. art. 42A.559(b). For a defendant whose judgment contains a finding that the defendant is presumptively entitled to diligent participation credit and who has not been the subject of disciplinary action while confined in the jail facility, the Department of Criminal Justice shall credit against any time the defendant is required to serve in a state jail felony facility additional time for each day the defendant actually served in the facility while diligently participating in an educational, vocational, treatment, or work program, which ultimately reduces the length of time to be served by a convicted defendant. Id. art. 42A.559(f). Appellant’s judgment is silent as to whether he is, or is not, presumptively entitled to diligent participation credit. However, appellant was scheduled to be released from jail prior to the issuance of this opinion. Appellant’s counsel filed a letter in this court acknowledging that appellant’s release “appears to make Mr. Johnson’s second issue moot.” We agree, and accordingly we do not reach the merits of appellant’s second issue. See Jack v. State, 149 S.W.3d 119, 123 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“A case becomes moot on appeal when the judgment of the appellate court can no longer have an effect on an existing controversy or cannot affect the rights of the parties.”).
Outcome: We sustain in part appellant’s first issue as to the facial constitutionality of the time payment fee under Texas Local Government Code section 133.103(b) and (d). We overrule appellant’s first issue in all other respects. We modify the trial court’s judgment to change the time payment fee from $25 to $2.50, and affirm the judgment as modified.

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