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ministrative and Criminal Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a ... criminal law, according to which probabilities are aggregated across the differ-.
The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases. Christopher Slobogin*. This Essay is built around three propositions about expert testimony and criminal cases.
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Chapter 17. Evolution of Corporate Criminal Liability: Implications for Managers. Jennifer Arlen*. Until recently, most managers of publicly held corporations did.
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responsibility (sometimes also referred to as liability) in an antitrust proceeding ... of Human Rights, which has formulated the criteria for criminal responsibility.
Peer-reviewed scientific periodical, focusing on legal and economic issues of antitrust and regulation. Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 Poland License.
Abstract The present article aims to answer the question whether an undertaking’s responsibility (sometimes also referred to as liability) in an antitrust proceeding held by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (the Polish National Competition Authority) is of a criminal nature. The notion of ‘criminal charge’ is rather extensively construed in the jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, which has formulated the criteria for criminal responsibility. Taking these criteria into account, the author postulates that the severe character of pecuniary sanctions imposed in Polish antitrust proceedings is an argument for * Anna Błachnio-Parzych, Doctor of Law, Institute of Legal Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences.
the criminal character of the proceedings. Thus the guarantees of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights should be applicable to Polish antitrust proceedings.
See, inter alia: judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 08 December 1998, K 41/97 (1998) 7 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego item 117; judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 19 March 2007, K 47/05 (2007) 3 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego-A item 27; judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 12 May 2009, P 66/07 (2009) 5 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego-A item 65. 7 See, inter alia: judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 June 2004, SK 21/03 (2004) 6 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego-A item 56; judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 7 July 2009, K 13/08 (2009) 7 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego-A item 105; judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 September 2009, SK 3/08 (2009) 8 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego-A item 125. 8 See judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal f 15 January 2007, P 19/06 (2007) 1 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego-A item 2; judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 October 2009, Kp 4/09 (2009) 9 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego-A item 134.
See ECtHR judgment of 8 June 1976, Engel and others v Netherlands, appl. no. 5100/71, paras. 80–82. 10 See ECtHR judgment of 26 October 1984 De Cubber v Belgium, appl. no. 9186/80, para. 30. 11 See ECtHR judgment of 8 June 1976 Engel and others v Netherlands, appl. no. 5100/71, paras. 80–82. 12 See ECtHR judgment of 23 July 2002 Janosevic v Sweden, appl. no. 34619/97, para. 67; ECtHR judgment of 21 February 1981 Öztürk v Germany, appl. no. 8544/79, paras. 48–50; ECtHR judgment of 24 February 1994 Bendenoun v France, appl. no. 12547/86, para. 45.
not lead to a clear conclusion in the matter, it is well-established that the assessment should be based on their combination. In this article, the subject of the assessment using the set of the criteria presented above concerns the responsibility of undertakings in antitrust proceedings. It should be noted at the outset that the vast majority of the judgments of the ECtHR do not concern such proceedings. This does not preclude using the judgments as a basis for assessing the nature of liability in antitrust proceedings before the Polish competition authority, but it does require caution in formulating conclusions. Nonetheless the criteria set forth above for assessing a liability as a ‘criminal charge’ are generally well-established in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. They have been confirmed in cases relating strictly to antitrust proceedings18, as well as in cases of liability of a similar nature, such as accountability before the French banking commission in the Dubus S.A. v France judgment of 11 June 200919.
III. Formal qualification by the legislators 1. Undertaking’ responsibility in antitrust proceedings as an administrative responsibility We now turn to our analysis of the criteria for assessment of the criminal character of the responsibility of undertakings in Polish antitrust law. As has been already been pointed out, the first criteria that should be taken into account is the formal qualification of the offence/act under consideration. The liability of an undertaking in Polish antitrust proceedings is formally designated by Polish law as a responsibility of an administrative nature. According to Polish domestic law, criminal responsibility encompasses liability for those crimes and petty offences that are set forth in the Criminal Code and the Code for Petty Offences. With regard to provisions concerning acts which fall outside these codes, their potential criminal character is connected with the type of penalty provided for in the governing provision, and the way of formulating the provision.
18 See ECtHR judgment of 27 February 1992 Societe Stenuit, appl. no. 11598/85 (see ECtHR decision of 11 July 1989); ECtHR judgment of 14 October 2003 Lilly v France, appl. no. 53892/00, paras. 22–26; ECtHR decision of 3 June 2004 Nestee St. Petersburg and others v Russia, appl. no. 69042/01; ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011, Menarini Diagnostics v Italy, appl. no. 43509/08, paras. 38–45. 19 ECtHR judgment of 11 June 2009, Dubus S.A. v. France, appl. no. 5242/04, para. 45.
M. Bernatt, ‘Prawo do rzetelnego procesu w sprawach ochrony konkurencji i regulacji rynku (na tle art. 6 EKPC)’ (2012) 1 Państwo i Prawo 55. 21 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 331, as amended. 22 M. Błachucki, S. Jóźwiak, ‘Sankcje strukturalne w prawie antymonopolowym jako sankcje administracyjnoprawne’, [in:] M. Stahl, R. Lewicka, M. Lewicki (eds.), Sankcje administracyjne, Warszawa 2011, p. 450. 23 M. Szydło, Nadużywanie pozycji dominującej w prawie ochrony konkurencji, Warszawa 2010, pp. 269-270; M. Błachucki, System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców, Warszawa 2012 (forthcoming, Chapter 4, Section 1.3).
statement that this is an ‘unclear’ concept24. W. Radecki has even noted a tendency to avoid analysis of the concept and to focus instead on the concept of administrative sanction25. J. Boć emphasized that the basic criterion for assigning administrative responsibility seems to be a negative one. By this he means that what does not belong to the scope of civil, criminal or employee liability is designated as an administrative responsibility26. Bearing in mind that the notion of an ‘administrative matter’ is broader than the notion of ‘administrative responsibility’, it has to be underlined that the doctrine very rarely analyzes the administrative nature of a matter. There is even a statement in the doctrine that there is no sphere of matters that are administrative by their very nature27.
W. Radecki, Odpowiedzialność…, p. 72; M. Wincenciak, Sankcje w prawie administracyjnym i procedura ich wymierzania, Warszawa 2008, pp. 88–93. 25 A broader interest in the issue of ‘administrative responsibility’ can be noted in environmental protection law. Cf W. Radecki, Odpowiedzialność…, p. 72; M. Wincenciak, Sankcje w prawie administracyjnym…, pp. 88–93; K. Kwaśnicka, Odpowiedzialność administracyjna w prawie ochrony środowiska, Warszawa 2011, pp. 48–49. 26 J. Boć [in:]: J. Boć, K. Nowacki, E. Samborska-Boć, Ochrona środowiska, Wrocław 2000, p. 323. 27 Z. Kmieciak, Skuteczność regulacji administracyjnoprawnej, Łódź 1994, p. 50.
deemed to be an event which is subject to negative normative qualification. If, during anti-monopoly proceedings concerning competition-restricting practices, the UOKiK President affirms that an undertaking’s conduct violated the aforementioned provisions, or Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union, he or she issues a decision assessing the practice as one restricting competition and ordering the undertaking to refrain from it (Article 10 of the Act). In addition it should be noted that the UOKiK President can also issue a decision assessing the practice as one restricting competition and declaring it discontinued [Article 11(2) of the Act], and a decision imposing an obligation to exercise the commitments undertaken [Article 12(1) of the Act]. The UOKiK President may also impose a fine upon an undertaking [Article 106(1)(1) and (2) of the Act}. The amount of the fine cannot exceed 10% of revenue earned in the fiscal year preceding the year of imposition of a penalty. Regarding decisions in anti-monopoly proceedings concerning concentration, the UOKiK President can issue, by way of decision, a consent to implement a concentration (Article 18 of the Act), a consent conditioned upon the fulfillment of certain conditions [Article 19(1) of the Act], or a prohibition of the implementation of a concentration because competition in the market will be significantly impeded [Article 20(1) of the Act]. Besides, the UOKiK President may issue, during the proceedings, decisions ordering: division of the merged undertaking under conditions defined in the decision; disposal of the entirety or part of the undertaking’s assets; disposal of stocks or shares ensuring control over another undertaking or undertakings, or dissolution of a company over which undertakings have joint control [Article 21(2) and (4) of the Act]. Similarly as in the anti-monopoly proceedings concerning competition-restrictive practices, the UOKiK President may issue a decision imposing a financial penalty for making the merger without their consent, up to 10% of revenue earned in the fiscal year preceding the year of the imposition of the penalty [Article 106(1)(3) of the Act]. As the object of interest in this article concerns the criteria for treating antitrust responsibility as criminal responsibility within the meaning of ECtHR jurisprudence, we need to analyze whether, in a concrete case whereby a decision is issued, the UOKiK President is imposing such responsibility28. Taking into account the aforementioned elements of the responsibility, it is clear that the decisions issued under Art. 18-20 of the Act are not decisions imposing responsibility. In the cases of consent, conditional consent, or prohibition of concentration, there is no negative normative qualification of any behavior. In 28 For an assessment which cases belong to civil cases, cf. the various positions expressed in: M. Bernatt, ‘Prawo do rzetelnego procesu…’, p. 59, M. Błachucki, System postępowania…, (Chapter 4, Section 1.4).
See the considerations of W. Radecki on the nature of decisions imposing fees for using the environment, increased fees and administrative penalties in environmental law. W. Radecki, Odpowiedzialność…, pp. 61–62. 30 Cf. M. Błachucki, S. Jóźwiak, ‘Sankcje strukturalne…’, p. 450; A. Michór, Odpowiedzialność administracyjna w obrocie instrumentami finansowymi, Warszawa 2009, pp. 39–40. 31 In the case of non-compliance with the decision referred to in Article 21(1) or (4), the UOKiK President may, by way of a decision, accomplish a division of the undertaking (Article 99 of the Act). 32 Here I make use of the terminology proposed by M. Błachucki. The author applies these notions to the concentration cases, but they can be applied to anti-monopoly proceedings and more narrowly to anti-monopoly responsibility. Cf. M. Błachucki, System postępowania…, (Chapter 4 Section 1.1).
ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011, Menarini Diagnostics v Italy, appl. no. 43509/08, para. 40; ECtHR judgment of 27 February 1992, Societe Stenuit v France, appl. no. 11598/85 (see ECtHR decision of 11 July 1989). 40 Appl. no. 69042/01. 41 Cf. D. Slater, S. Thomas, D. Waelbroeck, ‘Competition Law Proceedings before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?’ (2008) 4 The Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series 17, available at http://www.gclc.coleurop. be; M. Bernatt, ‘Prawo do rzetelnego procesu…’, p. 57.
constituted an argument against the criminal character of the responsibility. The arguments used by ECtHR in this case were controversial however, and not only because it didn’t consider the fact that the antitrust law serves a public interest; they were also problematic because one can argue that at least some of the behaviors involved constituted an infringement belonging to the ‘malum per se’ category. Certainly some practices restricting competition may belong to such a category42. Notwithstanding the above, one has to agree with some of the other arguments used in the decision, which referred to the character of responsibility for behaviors categorized above as ‘secondary’ anti-monopoly matters, and to the character of the sanction imposed on the undertaking. The ECtHR stated that behaviors consisting of ‘obstructing the authorities’ investigation’ do not belong to ‘substantive’ antimonopoly responsibility43. Even if the ECtHR had stated that the free competition should be protected in the public interest, this assessment would not change the fact that this case concerned behaviors belonging to the “secondary” rung of antimonopoly responsibility. Therefore, as has been pointed out earlier, the criminal character of the pecuniary penalties imposed by the UOKiK President for non-execution of his or her decisions, orders or judgments as stated in Article 107 of the Act, or for infringing upon the obligations of participants of proceedings, are not imposed as derelictions of responsibility stemming from generally applicable norms as they are understood by the ECtHR.
ECtHR judgment of 23 October 1995, Schmautzer v. Austria, appl. no. 15523/89, paras. 26–28; ECtHR judgment of 2 September 1998, Kadubec v Slovakia, appl. no. 27061/95, paras. 46–47, 50–53; ECtHR judgment of 23 September 1998, Malige v. France, appl. no. 27812/95, para. 34, 39. 47 ECtHR judgment of 29 April 1988, Belilos v Switzerland, appl. no. 10328/83, para. 62. 48 Such conclusion could a contrario be drawn from the ECtHR judgment of 21 February 1984, Özturk v Germany, para. 53; ECtHR judgment of 2 September 1998 Lauko v Slovakia, appl. no. 26138/95, para. 58. 49 M. Błachucki, S. Jóźwiak, ‘Sankcje strukturalne…’, p. 452. 50 M. Bernatt, ‘Prawo do rzetelnego procesu…’, p. 56.
undertakings, from infringing Articles 6, 9 and 13 of the Act. As the sanction imposed for such offences has both a preventive and repressive function51, such offences should be deemed to be of a criminal character. It has to be underlined that when assessing the nature of an offence, the ECtHR does not consider its gravity. This is reflected in the fact that some offences are qualified as criminal even though, from the social point of view and taking into account the value of the public good protected, they are of a ‘minor’ character. Thus the legislators qualify such acts as ‘petty offences’52. Similarly, offences consisting of minor order infringements where no negative moral appraisal occurs may be treated by the ECtHR as criminal matters because of the purpose of the sanction imposed53. The principle, upon which responsibility is imposed, is also not taken into consideration by the ECtHr. In the decisions of ECtHR this element of the structure of responsibility is not determinative in assessing the nature of a particular case as to whether it constitutes a responsibility54. The fact that the responsibility is of an objective character does not preclude treating it as a criminal responsibility.
V. Type and severity of penalties The third criteria for distinguishing a criminal matter is the type and severity of the penalty established by a specific regulation. It should be noted that both the type and the severity of a penalty are relevant. If the penalty involves a imminent deprivation of liberty, this fact alone is sufficient to qualify an offence as criminal. The word ‘imminent’ is important however, and in the Engel v Netherlands judgment55 the ECtHR stated that in exceptional 51 See M. Król-Bogomilska, Kary pieniężne…, pp. 184–195; M. Bernatt, ‘Prawo do rzetelnego procesu…’, p. 56; D. Miąsik, [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009, p. 1597, cf. A. Andreangelli, EU Competiton Enforcement and Human Rights, Cheltenham, Northampton 2008, p. 26. 52 ECtHR judgment of 25 August 1987, Lutz v Germany, appl. no. 9912/82, para. 55; ECtHR judgments of 23 October 1995: Schmautzer v Austria, appl. no. 15523/89, para. 26; Pfarrmeier v Austria, appl. no. 16841/90, para. 31; Pramstaller v Austria, appl.no. 16713/90, para. 30; Umlauft v Austria, appl. No. 15527/89, para. 29; ECtHR judgment of 2 September 1998, Kadubec v Slovakia, appl. No. 27061/95, paras. 46–48, 50–53; ECtHR judgment of 9 October 2003, Ezeh and Connors v United Kingdom, appl. No. 39665/98, 40086/98, para. 104. 53 See P. Burzyński, Ustawowe określenie sankcji karnej, Warszawa 2008, pp. 52–53. 54 Cf ECtHR judgment of 7 October 1988, Salabiaku v France, appl. no. 10519/83, paras. 27–28; ECtHR judgment of 23 July 2002, Janosevic v Sweden, appl. no. 34619/97, paras. 68, 101. 55 ECtHR judgment of 8 June 1976, Engel v Netherlands, appl. no. 5100/71, para. 82.
circumstances the time and the manner of executing this penalty might constitute an argument against its criminal character. As for pecuniary fines, there is no way of establishing a severity level of this sanction in abstracto as a test for qualifying a matter as criminal (which would imply the automatic application of the procedural guarantees stemming from Article 6 ECHR). In addition, it has to be noted that for the ECtHR it is the severity of the regulation and not its practical application in a concrete case that matters56. In some judgments, a pecuniary fine exceeding 2500 euro was assessed as insufficient for qualifying a matter as criminal57, while in others a pecuniary fine corresponding to 400 euro was, in the ECtHR’s judgment, sufficient to trigger the application of the procedural guarantees set forth in Article 6 of the Convention58. As for other types of sanctions, the ECtHR has assessed their actual severity. For example, in the Malige v France judgment of 23 September 1998 it treated the deprivation of a driving license as so severe that the matter was considered to be criminal59. In giving the reasons for its judgment, the ECtHR referred to the fact that the use of a car is so general and prevalent that the deprivation of this right testifies to the severity of the sanction. On the other hand, the deprivation of electoral rights for a year60 or the deprivation of a license to sell alcohol61 were not considered severe enough to constitute criminal sanctions. This shows that the assessment made by the ECtHR concerning the degree of severity of a penalty makes reference to the surrounding conditions in which the penalty is carried out. In attempting to transfer these reflections to the character of sanctions imposed on undertakings as a result of antitrust proceedings, one has to stress that both types of sanctions – criminal and non-criminal – might be burdensome for an undertaking. Even if a sanction is aimed at the restoration of the lawful state of affairs, it nonetheless constitutes an obligation for an undertaking to refrain from certain practices or to introduce certain changes in the undertaking’s structure. Nonetheless if the Act on the protection of competition and consumers provided only for this type of sanctions, the 56 ECtHR judgment of 27 February 1992, Societe Stenuit v France, appl. no. 11598/85 (see ECtHR decision of 11 July 1989). 57 ECtHR judgment of 24 September 1997, Garyfallou Aebe v Greece, appl. no. 18996/91, para. 34. 58 ECtHR judgment of 22 May 1990, Weber v. Switzeraland, appl. no. 11034/84, para. 34; ECtHR judgment of 22 February 1996, Putz v Austria, appl. no. 18892/91, para. 37, in which a pecuniary fine exceeding 1500 euro was not considered sufficient to classify the matter as criminal. 59 ECtHR judgment of 23 September 1998, Malige v France, appl. no. 27812/95, para. 39. 60 ECtHR judgment of 21 October 1997, Pierre-Bloch v France, appl. no. 24194/94, para. 58. 61 ECtHR judgment of 7 July1989, Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v Sweden, appl. no. 10873/84, para. 46.
antitrust responsibility would not be considered criminal. They cannot be considered sanctions with a high degree of severity if their consequence consists in no other additional burden then the restitution of the lawful state of affairs. However if the Act provided for a sanction consisting of the prohibition of a certain activity, then despite its preventive function its level of severity would testify to its criminal character. The analysis of the pecuniary fines provided for in Article 106(1)(1)-(3) of the Act leads to different conclusions. The reasons for this lie in the variations in the character and extent of these sanctions. According to Article 106, the UOKiK President might impose upon an undertaking a maximum pecuniary fine of 10% of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding the year within which the fine is imposed. This testifies to a high degree of severity, even if one takes into account the fact the fines are imposed on undertakings. The setting of the maximum level of the fine in such a way that it refers to an undertaking’s total revenue also means that the legislator has not set an absolute maximum ceiling for such a fine. This is an argument for perceiving the fine as very severe62. The cardinal importance of pecuniary sanctions as instruments serving to protect competition and consumers is underlined in the legal doctrine63. Because they are so burdensome, the threat of their occurrence is a strong preventive instrument in anti-monopoly law64. Taking all this in consideration, one has to agree with the ECtHR that the level of fines imposed in antitrust proceedings would also be an argument for treating this type of responsibility as criminal65.
See M. Bernatt, ‘Prawo do rzetelnego procesu…’, p. 57; K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, The issue of the protection of fundamental rights in EU competition proceedings, z. 39, Centrum Europejskie Natolin, Warszawa 2010, p. 26. 63 A. Stawicki, [in:] A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki (eds.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2011, p. 1161. 64 A. Stawicki, [in:] Ustawa…, p. 1161. 65 ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011, Menarini Diagnostics v Italy, appl. no. 43509/08, paras. 41–42.
criteria to those decisions of the UOKiK President that do not attribute any responsibility to an undertaking, i.e. decisions on consent, refusal of consent, or prohibition of a concentration. Decisions imposing sanctions for an undertaking’s behavior for breaching orders or prohibitions should be divided into those that concern ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ antitrust responsibility. The second category does not possess a criminal character as it does not consist of responsibility for ‘generally prohibited’ behaviors within the meaning of ECtHR jurisprudence. As for other examples of responsibility – when they are linked with the imposition of pecuniary fines for antitrust infringements as set forth in Article 106(1)(1)-(3) of the Act – the undertaking’s responsibility should be considered a criminal responsibility.
Literature Andreangelli A., EU Competiton Enforcement and Human Rights, Cheltenham, Northampton 2008. Bernatt M., Sprawiedliwość proceduralna w postępowaniu przed organem ochrony konkurencji [Procedural fairness in the proceedings before the competition authority], Warszawa 2011. Bernatt M., ‘Prawo do rzetelnego procesu w sprawach ochrony konkurencji i regulacji rynku (na tle art. 6 EKPC)’ [‘The Right to a Fair Trial in Proceedings in Cases of Competition Protection and Market Regulation (in light of Article 6 of the ECHR)’] (2012) 1 Państwo i Prawo. Błachucki M., System postępowania antymonopolowego w sprawach kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorców [The System of Anti-monopoly Proceedings Concerning Concentration of Undertakings], Warszawa 2012 (forthcoming). Błachucki M., Jóźwiak S., ‘Sankcje strukturalne w prawie antymonopolowym jako sankcje administracyjnoprawne’ [‘Structural Sanctions in Anti-monopoly Law as Administrative Sanctions’], [in:] Stahl M., Lewicka R., Lewicki M. (eds.), Sankcje administracyjne [Administrative Sanctions], Warszawa 2011. Boć J., Nowacki K., Samborska-Boć E., Ochrona środowiska [Protection of the Environment], Wrocław 2000. Burzyński P., Ustawowe określenie sankcji karnej [Defining a criminal sanction in law], Warszawa 2008. Garlicki L. (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności [The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms], vol. I, Warszawa 2010. Kmieciak Z., Skuteczność regulacji administracyjnoprawnej [The Efficiency of Administrative Regulation], Łódź 1994. Kowalik-Bańczyk K., The issue of the protection of fundamental rights in EU competition proceedings, z. 39, Centrum Europejskie Natolin, Warszawa 2010. Król-Bogomilska M., Kary pieniężne w prawie antymonopolowym [Pecuniary fines in antitrust law], Warszawa 2001.
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