Source: https://www.criminallawlibraryblog.com/findlaw_case_summaries_constit_33/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:51:12+00:00

Document:
U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, May 17, 2010 Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 09-1688 In a former special-education teacher’s First Amendment retaliation suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants is affirmed as the district court correctly determined that, under Garcetti, when the plaintiff complained to her supervisor about the number of students assigned to her supervision, she spoke as a public employee rather than a private citizen, and as such, her statements were not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.
U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, May 18, 2010 Ogden v. Atterholt, No. 09-2953 In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit brought by a former employee with the Indiana Department of Insurance claiming that a memo he wrote was protected speech and his forced resignation violated his rights under the First Amendment, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed as plaintiff was speaking as a governmental employee and not a citizen when he wrote the memo under Garcetti because his complaints about the Deputy Commissioner and his request for a departmental reorganization were made in the performance of his professional duties as manager of the Title Insurance Division.
U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, May 17, 2010 Nikolas v. Omaha, No. 09-1679 In an action against the City of Omaha and its Planning Department Code Inspector, asserting federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and an inverse condemnation claim under state law, summary judgment for defendants is affirmed where: 1) the practical effect of plaintiff’s argument — that neither the County nor the City had jurisdiction to take action against a serious health and safety hazard on his property — was contrary to manifest legislative intent; 2) the alleged littering was prohibited by the city ordinance at issue long prior to its occurrence; 3) if action taken pursuant to the ordinance violated Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, the resulting criminal prosecution may be tainted, but that does not render the authorizing statute unconstitutional; and 4) an inspector who was lawfully on the premises and who saw an apparent public health and safety violation from the exterior of a detached structure did not need a warrant before looking in t! he window to confirm or refute the apparent violation.
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, May 19, 2010 Leu v. Int’l Boundary Comm’n., No. 07-35949 In a takings claim against the International Boundary Commission and the U.S. Boundary Commissioner in his official capacity, the district court’s denial of the current Boundary Commissioner’s motion to quash filings by a previous Boundary Commissioner is vacated where the former Commissioner lacked Article III standing to appeal from the district court’s order.
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, May 20, 2010 Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 08-16073 In a Title VII action claiming that defendant public university administrators failed to take immediate or appropriate steps to prevent a professor from sending allegedly racially harassing emails, the denial of qualified immunity to defendant is reversed where plaintiffs’ objection to the professor’s speech was based entirely on his point of view, and it was axiomatic that the government could not silence speech because the ideas it promoted were thought to be offensive.
U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, May 17, 2010 Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of County Cmm’rs of Boulder County, No. 09-1188 In an action by a church claiming that the City of Boulder’s denial of a special use application violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s (RLUIPA) substantial burden, equal terms, and unreasonable limitations provisions, a permanent injunction in favor of plaintiff is affirmed where: 1) plaintiff presented ample evidence of similarities between its proposed project and another at trial; 2) the jury could reasonably choose to weigh evidence of the County’s land use regulation effectively excluding churches more heavily than the County’s record of approving special use applications; and 3) the injunction was consistent with the jury’s verdict on both the RLUIPA claims and damages.

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