Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/4/4massappct357.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:43:53+00:00

Document:
S. VOLPE & CO., INC. vs. BOARD OF APPEALS OF WAREHAM.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on November 29, 1972.
The case was heard by Mason, J.
Steven J. Comen for the plaintiff.
Joseph R. Grassia for the defendant.
The plaintiff proposes to build a golf course on a tract of land which comprises a substantial portion of a salt water marsh known as Broad Marsh. The tract lies in two zoning districts designated in the Wareham zoning by-law as Residential District A and Residential District C-2. The uses permitted as of right in both districts, besides uses for residential purposes, include a use for "any . . . nonprofit recreational purpose." In both districts the zoning by-law provides that a special permit (G. L. c. 40A, Section 4 [Note 2]) is required if land is to be used as a "golf course." The by-law permits such use "provided that it is not injurious, noxious or offensive and only if authorized by the Board of Appeals subject to appropriate conditions where such are deemed necessary to protect the neighborhood and the town."
The board denied the permit, giving four reasons; the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. G. L. c. 40A, Section 21. The Superior Court, after hearing, dismissed the complaint. It made findings, rulings, and an order for judgment, including findings paralleling the reasons given by the board; the evidence is reported. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court.
Cf. Parrish v. Board of Appeal of Sharon, 351 Mass. 561 , 567-568 (1967) (denial of building permit upheld where applicant was clearly not entitled, but for reasons not given by the board of appeals). But if any reason on which the board can fairly be said to have relied has a basis in the trial judge's findings and is within the standards of the zoning by-law and The Zoning Enabling Act, the board's action must be sustained regardless of other reasons which the board may have advanced. Vazza Properties, Inc. v. City Council of Woburn, supra. Copley v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821 (1973). Here the plaintiff concedes, indeed protests, that the primary concern of the board was with the filling of the marsh. We therefore do not accept the plaintiff's suggestion that we must treat all four reasons as so far interdependent that the failure of one is the failure of all.
more severe if the marshland is filled for the plaintiff's golf course than if it is filled to construct a nonprofit golf course which (we assume for the sake of argument and without deciding) is permitted as of right as a "nonprofit recreational purpose" and less severe than if it is filled for a residential development, also a permitted use as of right.
It does not follow, however, that the board's action did not comport with the standard in the by-law for a special permit so that it can be said that its action was legally untenable or arbitrary. "Injurious" is not an absolute term. The town, in permitting housing and nonprofit golf courses as of right in the marsh and thus tolerating its destruction by those uses expressed the judgment that on balance the result was advantageous to the town rather than "injurious." The town did not make the same choice between marshland and a golf course operated for profit but left it to the board to decide, pursuant to its special permit power, whether on balance a choice in favor of a commercial golf course which would destroy marshland was "injurious" rather than advantageous to the neighborhood or the town.
itself thus establishes a congruence between the standard "not injurious" and the "protect[ion of] the neighborhood and the town."
Accordingly, the word "injurious" is sufficiently broad "to permit . . . the board to exercise `judgment' concerning the public welfare in passing on [a] request . . . for exception." See Zaltman v. Board of Appeals of Stoneham, 357 Mass. 482 , 483-485 (1970). The by-law grants no absolute right to a permit. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. at 605. When the board chose to retain a salt marsh rather than permit a commercial golf course in order to "protect . . . the town" and thus to prevent injury to the town its action was consistent with the standard of the by-law and not arbitrary. Compare, e.g., Moore v. Cataldo, 356 Mass. 325 , 328-329, 331 (1969) (special permit for nursing home is within "public welfare and convenience" in view of the shortage of such facilities). Nor was the board's action otherwise unreasonable since the owner is not deprived of the practical use of his land (see fn. 1).
Accordingly, the action of the board should be affirmed. However, there is no basis for a finding (nor did the Superior Court find) that the plaintiff acted "in bad faith or with malice" in bringing this action. G. L. c. 40A, Section 21. The assessment of costs by the Superior Court against the plaintiff was therefore erroneous. Cf. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. at 520; Salah v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 488 , 497 (1974). The judgment of the Superior Court is to be modified to affirm the action of the board and delete the provision for costs; as so modified the judgment is affirmed.
[Note 1] The plaintiff's president testified that the golf course would initially be opened to the public and operated for profit, but that when its residential development was completed it might become private or semiprivate, primarily to serve that development.
In 1963, the plaintiff had received tentative approval of a subdivision plan for a residential development in the Broad Marsh area subject to compliance with provisions of the State sanitary code for installation of appropriate sewage facilities. Thereupon the plaintiff began filling the area to prepare the site, and the Commissioner of Natural Resources brought an action to prohibit the filling. See Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co. Inc. 349 Mass. 104 (1965). That case, after remand to the Superior Court by the Supreme Judicial Court, culminated in a decree invalidating the prohibition.
[Note 2] All references are to The Zoning Enabling Act unaffected by St. 1975, c. 808.
[Note 3] The findings were based on testimony by the plaintiff's expert, an outstanding authority on salt marshes, that "[t]he production from the marsh is important in that it gets out into estuaries and provides food for various shellfish that live there. Water fowl come into the marshes and feed there . . . . We are now finding out also that marshes have value in absorbing nutrients and pollutants from coastal waters, and serving as areas to provide nutrients for the production of the coastal waters." He also testified that the marsh "suppl[ied] them [the fish] with food [and] with refuge areas" and referred to "the ability of the marsh to fertilize the waters around it . . . the value of marshes as a feeding place for wildlife, water fowl particularly . . . [and] the general productivity values, pollution control values."

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