Source: https://mcneilmason.wordpress.com/god-damn-the-first-amendment/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 01:50:50+00:00

Document:
U.S. Dist Judge Donald L. Graham and his Magistrate, Frank Lynch Jr., have exhibited an animus and disdain for the First Amendment that is both damning and contemptuous. In an unpublished decision, these men have issued the first prior restraint on pure speech in over 200 years. It is obvious that Judge Graham disagrees with the First Amendment. On June 13th and July 6th2000, Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji, Allen, Norton & Blue asked the Magistrate, Frank Lynch Jr.` to grant them preliminary injunctions that required Mason to contact them before he could talk to the government defendants. These orders required Mason, a nonlawyer, living in Sebring, FL to contact private attorneys some 90 miles away in Tampa, FL .
[D]efendants’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is Granted in that the Plaintiff shall be prohibitedfrom contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case . Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants’ counsel .
“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court except a motion for injunction relief,…” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A).
Plaintiff then moved to rescind the July 25, 2000 order, however, on August 15, 2000, Magistrate Judge Lynch denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Rescind. Plaintiff appeals the August 15, 2000 ruling. After careful review of the file and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court finds that t4agistrate Judge Lynch’s ruling is not clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also Cooper-Houston v. Southern Railway Company, 37 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1994).
On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham affirmed his “inherent authority” to prohibit direct communication with the government by a non-lawyer and stated: “including continual attempts to directly communicate with the Defendants rather their attorneys, the Court enjoined Mason from any further contact with the Defendants or Defendants’ employees. Mason, however, ignored the Court’s order and continued to contact the Defendants.” Docket No. 878. Imagine that, a citizen communicating with the government!
Judge Graham and his Magistrate has had multiple opportunities to cite legal authority for these orders prohibiting direct communication with the government, but adamantly refuses to do so. It is as if Judge Graham is saying, “You will not communicate with the government directly because I said so, the law and the constitution notwithstanding.” Marcellus Mason submitted several motions asking Judge Graham and his Magistrate where they got the legal authority to issue the above orders, and each time Judge Graham his Magistrate refused.
The following is representative of Judge Frank Lynch Jr. and Judge Graham’s responses.
THIS CAUSE haying come on to be heard upon the aforementioned Motion, and this court having reviewed the Motion and the response, and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification is DENIED, it is	further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall comply with the terms and provisions of this Court’s Order, filed July 25, 2000, and any violations of the order will result in the imposition of sanctions or dismissal with prejudice as to all plaintiffs claims.
The only explanation Mason has received thus far is the negative cite below: If the Plaintiff was represented, his attorney would know that this is proper procedure. .
“In its nearly two centuries of existence, the Supreme Court has never upheld a prior restraint on pure speech. ” Providence Journal Co, at 820 F.2d 1348. The presumption of unconstitutionally of prior restraints has been described as “virtually insurmountable” by Supreme Court judges and others. In Re Providence , at 820 F.2d 1348 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 713).In over two centuries, the United States Supreme Court, composed of nine Article 3 judges, has never upheld a prior restraint involving pure speech; however, in this matter, a statutory judge, Magistrate Judge Frank Lynch, Jr. and Judge Donald L. Graham breezes right through this barrier and issues a prior restraint on pure speech with no problem.
“[P]ure speech –[is]- speech not connected with any conduct..” In Re Providence , at 820 F.2d 1348. “’Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’; see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’” New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971);Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963)) . “[T]he principal purpose of the First Amendment’s guaranty is to prevent prior restraints.” In Re Providence at 820 F.2d 1348. “Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional and face strict scrutiny.” Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County , 365 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir., 2004). “In its nearly two centuries of existence, the Supreme Court has never upheld a prior restraint on pure speech. ” Providence Journal Co, at 820 F.2d 1348. The presumption of unconstitutionally of prior restraints has been described as “virtually insurmountable” by Supreme Court judges and others. In Re Providence , at 820 F.2d 1348 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 713). The Supreme Court has refused to uphold a “prior restraint” even when the matter of national security was involved. See New York Times, at 403 U.S. 713, above.
To quote selectively from the district court, the court found that the parties had demonstrated an “immaturity” and “mean-spirited[ness],” and that Singh was pursuing “vexatious litigation.” However, despite the perhaps need of these parties to never speak again, the court did not detail, and the record does not reflect, any “exceptional circumstances” to justify permanently enjoining Singh from generally communicating with TES, TES’s counsel and their staff and employees. The district court’s order enjoining Singh from communicating with TES employees, TES’s counsel, and its counsel’s employees was a prior restraint limiting Singh’s first amendment rights, and because the injunction order is not supported by exceptional circumstances, it is an unconstitutional restraint on Singh’s free speech rights. *** The cantankerous relationship between these parties is clearly evident from the record in this case. There is enough evidence presented in the record to justify an injunction order prohibiting Singh from threatening or harassing TES, its employees, its staff, TES’s counsel, counsel’s employees, or counsel’s staff. However, the injunction here went beyond enjoining harassing and threatening conduct. The district court’s order swept too broadly when it prohibited all communication between Singh and TES employees, staff or TES’s counsel, counsel’s employees or counsel’s staff. Id at 579-80.
If the Plaintiff in Test Masters has the first amendment right to engage in hostility and vitriol with a private entity, then surely Mason has the same right to engage in hostility and vitriol with a government entity like Highlands County that the First Amendment expressly permits, Judge Lynch’s personal notions of civility notwithstanding. Bernard v. Gulf-Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, is likewise instructive and analogous to the instant case. “Material unequivocally not protected by the Constitution may be the subject of a prior restraint if sufficient procedural safeguards are provided.” Id. at 471. > Stated alternatively, material unequivocally protected by the Constitution may not be the subject of a prior restraint. Mason’s right to “to petition the government for a redress of grievances” or Highlands County is expressly protected by the First Amendment.If the exigencies of the Sixth Amendment do not lessen the burden on those who seek to justify prior restraints, the interests of a civil litigant cannot do so. (internal citations omitted). The “interest of the judiciary in the proper administration of justice does not authorize any blanket exception to the first amendment.” . Thus, the general presumption against prior restraints is not mitigated by a claim that the fair and orderly administration of justice is at stake.
Id. at 474. The Magistrate’s heretofore undisclosed interest in rendering the “discovery orders” in the instant case clearly does not even rise to level of the Sixth Amendment interests in Bernard, nor the national security interest in New York Times, above.

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