Source: http://www.torttalk.com/2012/12/the-2012-tort-talk-top-10.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:30:16+00:00

Document:
In its decision in Tayar v. Camelback Ski, 47 A.3d 1190 (Pa. 2012), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was against public policy to release reckless behavior in a pre-injury exculpatory clause. The court more specifically found that a ski resort's release form attempting to release the resort and its employees for liability for reckless conduct was invalid Click HERE for more info on that case.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to review the case of Passarello v. Grumbine, 29 A.3d 1159 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal granted, 44 A.3d 654 (Pa. 2012), to address whether medical malpractice defendants may continue to rely upon an "error in judgment" defense at trial.
Under an application of the "error in judgment" defense, the trial courts instruct jurors at trial that "physicians who exercise the skill, knowledge and care customarily exercised in their profession are not liable for a mere mistake in judgment."
This defense was first found to be invalid in the Superior Court case of Pringle v. Rapaport, 980 A.2d 159 (Pa.Super. 2009). In its more recent decision in Passarello, the Superior Court held that its previous ruling in Pringle could be applied retroactively.
Now, the issue is proceeding up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Passarello for further review. The Supreme Court's decision in this regard could have a substantial impact on the defense of medical malpractice cases in the future.
Over the past year, the Superior Court rebuffed several attempts by the plaintiffs bar to overturn the regular use exclusion, which upholds the all-American principle that "you can't get something for nothing."
The regular use exclusion typically comes into play where an injured party is injured in an accident while operating a vehicle that was not covered under the insurance policy that the injured party has made a claim against. The exclusion basically works to prevent an insurance company from being subjected to an additional risk of coverage for a vehicle for which the insurance company did not receive a premium or intend to insure.
Earlier this year, the Superior Court upheld a non-owned, regularly used vehicles exclusion in its nonprecedential decision in the case of Erie Insurance v. Soroka, No. 1086 M.D.A. 2011 (Pa. Super. March 8, 2012 Gantman, Allen, and Mundy, J.J.) (Memorandum by Mundy, J.).
In a September decision in the case of Adamitis v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 893 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Sept. 25, 2012 Stevens, P.J., Lazarus, J. and Colville, J.) (Opinion by Stevens, P.J.), the Superior Court revisited the regular use exclusion issue and again affirmed the validity and enforceability of that exclusion in an underinsured motorist coverage benefits case involving alleged injuries sustained by the claimant while driving at work.
In its more recent October 18 decision in the case of Rother v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 1770 MDA 2011, 2012 Pa. Super. 228 (Pa. Super. Oct. 18, 2012 Bowes, Ott, and Straussburger, JJ.) (Opinion by Bowes, J.), the Superior Court again upheld the validity of the regularly used, non-owned vehicle exclusion.
Several decisions from the past year confirmed that, when it comes to rejection of UM/UIM forms, "the t's have to be crossed and thi i's have to be dotted."
The specific requirements for the language of a rejection of underinsured motorist benefits form are set forth under 75 Pa. C.S. §1731.
Noting that the other prior analogous decisions have required that the subject form "specifically comply" with the requirements of §1731(c), the Superior Court in Jones found that, by adding a sentence to the form between the required language and the signature line, the Unitrin UIM rejection form did not "specifically comply" with §1731(c) as required by §1731 (c.1) and was, therefore, void.
In a decision that was actually handed down at the end of 2011, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the expanding parameters of the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
By was of a Supreme Court split decision in the case of Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa. 2011), the Superior Court's decision found at 961 A.2d 192 (Pa.Super. 2008), recognizing a new variation of the tort, was allowed to stand.
According to previous precedent on this issue, the courts initially required the tortfeasor to impact the victim physically to justify recovery for NIED (impact rule). Thereafter, the requirements to state an NIED claim expanded to allow the victim to be in close proximity of physical impact (zone of impact liability). The tort was then further extended to permit recovery if the victim personally witnessed a tortfeasor physically impact a close relative (bystander liability). Now, with Toney, comes a fourth variation.
Under Toney, the Superior Court recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress exists where the emotional distress results from a "negligent breach of a contractual or fiduciary duty," absent physical impact or injury.
The Toney case involved a medical malpractice claim in which the plaintiff alleged that her medical providers had read an ultrasound during the plaintiff's pregnancy as being normal.
Unfortunately, the plaintiff's child was later born with several profound abnormalities. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' negligence prevented her from preparing herself for the shock of witnessing her child's birth with such deformities. The Supreme Court's split decision on the case allowed the Superior Court's extension of the tort of NIED to stand.
This a carry-over hot topic from last year's Tort Talk Top 10 list. A slew of trial court opinions continue to come down on the issue of Social Media Discovery, particularly on the topic of whether personal injury defendants are entitled to view the private pages of a plaintiff's Facebook pages.
A split of authority has continued and, hopefully, an appellate court will be given an opportunity in 2013 to address the issue of whether such disclosures should be allowed under the liberal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery. To review Social Media Discovery posts from over the past year, scroll through the Facebook Discovery Scorecard HERE.
Overall, the Pennsylvania trial court decisions handed down to date can be read as standing for the proposition that, where there is an initial threshold showing that discovery of the opposing party's private Facebook pages is likely to lead to the discovery of information pertinent to the claims or defenses presented, such discovery will ordinarily be allowed.
This threshold showing may be made through admissions by the party at a deposition that the private pages may reveal pertinent information. Another way to possibly make this threshold showing is by establishing that there is relevant information depicted on the public pages of the party's social media sites.
This is another carry-over from the 2011 Tort Talk Top Ten list. In 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the appeal in the case of Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital to address the issue of whether communications by an attorney to an expert retained by that attorney are discoverable.
By way of background, the Dauphin County trial court ruled in Barrick that these types of communications were indeed discoverable, particularly where an in camera review by the court of the written communications by the plaintiff's counsel with the plaintiff's medical expert confirmed that this contact from the attorney could have, in the words of the trial court judge, "materially impacted" the expert's formulation of his opinion.
On appeal, an original three-member panel of the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision that these types of communications by an attorney to an expert were discoverable. Then, on reargument, an en banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and held that these communications were not discoverable.
In a one-page order filed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on August 31 granting allocatur, the Supreme Court noted that it will review the issue of "whether the Superior Court's interpretation of Pa.R.C.P. No. 4003.3 improperly provides absolute work-product protection to all communications between a party's counsel and their trial expert."
The Supreme Court's decision will be closely watched by civil litigators, as it could substantially impact how attorneys confer with their experts from this point forward.
Here's another carry-over from the 2011 Tort Talk Top 10 list. The issue of impact on Medicare Liens and settlements continued to come into play in 2012.
In 2011, both the Cambria County case of Vincent v. Buck, No. 2011-CV-456 (Cambria Co., April 4, 2011, Swope, S.J.), and the Monroe County case of Dailey-Console v. Barnwell, PICS Case No. 11-1115 (Monroe Co. May 18, 2011, Zulick, J.), the trial court judges relied upon the Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632 (Pa. Super. 2010) decision to support a granting of a plaintiff’s motion to compel a defendant to pay a settlement over the Defendants’ objection that Medicare lien issues were not yet resolved.
In both decisions, the trial courts emphasized that there was nothing in the releases entered into between the parties that entitled the defense to insist that certain measures be taken by the plaintiff to ensure that the Medicare lien was addressed prior to the issuance of the settlement check.
A similar trial court result from 2012 with an excellent analysis on the issue can also be found in Wimberly v. Katruska, PICS Case No. 12-1060 (C.P. Allegheny 2012).
In 2012, federal courts also jumped into the mix on the issue. In Carty v. Clark, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98314 (E.D.Pa. 2012), U.S. District Judge Eduardo C. Robreno of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement after citing the clear terms of the release, which stated that, once the final demand letter was produced by the plaintiff from Medicare, as was accomplished in this matter, the settlement proceeds were to be released to the plaintiff.
Pennsylvania civil litigators have also been pointing to the District Court of New Jersey's unpublished decision in Sipler v. Trans Am Trucking, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109278 (D.N.J. 2012), in which that court also ruled, in no uncertain terms, that a plaintiff's settlement could not be held up by Medicare lien or set-aside issues.
It seems that litigators on both the plaintiffs side and the defense side of the bar have welcomed these decisions clarifying the ability of parties to conclude personal injury matters despite existing Medicare liens.
One of the most important, recurring issues over the past year has been whether the standard found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts or the different standard adopted in the Restatement (Third) of Torts should be utilized in products liability cases.
To date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not squarely ruled upon this issue. The Pennsylvania Federal Courts have issued conflicting decisions.
While the Restatement (Second) calls for a more narrow application of negligence principles in the products liability context, the Restatement (Third) decreases the emphasis upon the concepts of "intended use" and "intended user," along with placing a greater emphasis on the doctrine of "reasonable foreseeability," all of which changes arguably allow for a wider class of injured parties to recover against a manufacturer of a defective product.
It appears that litigators and the lower courts will have to continue to struggle with this issue until it reaches the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again.
For more information on the cases surrounding this issue, click HERE.

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