Source: https://mdafny.com/index.aspx?TypeContent=CUSTOMPAGEARTICLE&custom_pages_articlesID=16541
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 11:06:20+00:00

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Historically, CPLR §3115 has governed the process by which attorneys have objected to questions during an examination before trial. In 2006, however, 22 NYCRR §221.2 became effective and codified some of the objections that had arisen under the previous statute.
An objection under Section 221.2 must be clearly stated by the witness' counsel in order to preserve it in case of appeal.
to answer several questions. The first question concerned whether the defendant supplied any defective, unsafe or improper devices or materials which caused the plaintiff's fall or whether the work area appeared to be unreasonably dangerous. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, ruled this question objectionable on the grounds that it compelled plaintiff to answer questions seeking legal and factual conclusions or draw inferences from the facts.
Similarly, in another sexual assault case where the victim-plaintiff claimed that the incident adversely affected her sexual relations with her husband, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the plaintiff did not have to answer any questions about her sexual history prior to her marriage to her husband.9 The court ruled this way because of the burden it would place upon the victim-plaintiff and the fact that the plaintiff's claims of sexual dysfunction were confined only to her marital relationship and not previous ones.
Questions that seek information not relevant to the case at hand can also be ruled to be palpably improper or irrelevant. In a personal injury case where the plaintiff was injured after falling through a trap door while on a job interview, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, found the defendant's question whether the plaintiff had ever been treated for alcoholism irrelevant.10 The court stated that nowhere in the record was there any indication that the plaintiff was drinking alcohol on the night of the accident. Furthermore, to answer the question would violate the physician/patient privilege which can only be waived by the protected party.
The framework set forth for privileged communications is that they must be private between the two parties, relate to the professional services being provided, the information being sought must never have been mentioned by the witness and the privilege must never have been waived. These rules can be applied in most cases where a witness establishes a right to a privilege. Many of these privileges are codified in CPLR §4502-4510.
While information relating to the litigation at hand will still be discoverable, anything outside of the required information is strictly off limits, unless the witness waives the privilege. The overall purpose of these privileges is to facilitate a truthful exchange of information between co-dependent parties.
The attorney-client privilege enables a person receiving legal advice to communicate with his attorney in the comfort of knowing that the information exchanged will not be made known to others without the client's permission. For example, in Clark v. Schuylerville Cent. Sch. Dist.11 the Third Department held that statements made by a teacher to her attorney in a defamation case were privileged because she was seeking legal advice relating to the management of the district's teaching staff and their conversations were confidential and private. Furthermore, the defendant was able to prove that she had done nothing that would waive the attorney-client privilege.
In Kennedy v. Northern Westchester Hosp.12 the Westchester County Supreme Court laid out several factors to be considered when determining whether a spousal communication is subject to a privilege. A court must consider if the exchange occurred due to the absolute confidence in the marital relationship and was induced by this confidence, as well as whether or not the husband and wife would have been willing to discuss or repeat the conversation in the presence of other persons. If the spousal communications occurred in the presence of others then the privilege was waived at that moment.
The court also held that the burden of establishing the spousal privilege is on the party asserting it.
When asserting the doctor-patient privilege a witness cannot refuse to reveal medical incidents or facts once the witness has put the medical condition in controversy. Often in a personal injury case the plaintiff has already put a specific injury at issue by filing the lawsuit.
In Brower v. Beraka13 the defendant doctor was accused, in part, of medical malpractice when he performed surgery at a time when he may have been suffering from the aftereffects of an arm surgery. The Supreme Court, New York County, ruled the defendant did not waive the physician-patient privilege by denying allegations in a complaint. It was held that unless the defendant asserted the condition as an affirmative defense or voluntarily disclosed that he was suffering from an arm condition during the relevant time then his medical records would not be discoverable. However, the doctor could not avoid answering questions of fact regarding whether he had suffered the injury or not.
on the defendants' treatment of the plaintiff or knowledge of the case then it is proper to answer at the deposition including in instances where the questions are posed as a hypothetical.
In Dare v. Byram21 the Fourth Department illustrated the difference between acceptable and unacceptable questions. One defendant improperly objected to questions regarding acute care issues which were related to his examination, diagnosis, and treatment of the plaintiff; however, he properly declined to answer questions regarding well-child care issues which related solely to the alleged negligence of his co-defendant. Similarly, his co-defendant was not required to answer questions regarding acute care issues which were solely related to the defendants' alleged negligence.
Unlike some other objections, which occur during the examination before trial, a Fifth Amendment objection is often raised before the deposition even begins. Should an examination before trial nonetheless occur, the witness "may only assert the privilege when he reasonably perceives a risk from answering a particular question posed during the deposition."23 If the criminal proceedings are concluded then the deposition in the civil case may occur so long as the Fifth Amendment conflict no longer remains.
In light of the 2006 passage of NYCRR §221.2, there are few, and very narrowly defined, circumstances in which a witness may properly object to answering a question at an examination before trial. Generally, all questions must be answered even if the answer may not be admissible as evidence at trial. The four main categories of objectionable questions are palpably improper or irrelevant questions that place an undue burden on the witness, privileged communications, codefendants in an alleged medical malpractice case, and questions that run afoul of an individual's right against self incrimination. When an objection does occur it must be clearly stated by the witness' attorney in order to preserve the right to the objection upon appeal.
See Palacino v. Brogno, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6843, *7-9 (Sup. Ct., Orange Co. Oct. 22, 2013).
Hildebrandt v. Stephan, 42 Misc.3d 719, 724 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 2013).
Palacino v. Brogno, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6843, *7 (Sup. Ct. Orange Co. Oct. 22, 2013). 5. 83 A.D.3d 1516, 1517 (4th Dept. 2011).
7. See Id. at 1518-9.
8. Andersen v. Cornell Univ., 225 A.D.2d 946, 946 (3d Dept. 1996). 9. Dolback v. Reeves, 265 A.D.2d 625, 626 (3d Dept. 1999).
10. C.A. v. JSCP Corp., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3376, *1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2006). 11. 57 A.D.3d 1145, 1146 (3d Dept. 2008).
12. 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5055, *7-8 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. July 7, 2014). 13. 12 Misc.3d 1108, 1110 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2006).
Bubar v. Brodman, 30 Misc.3d 324, 327 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 2010) (citing McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, 15 N.Y.2d 20, 29 (N.Y. 1964)).
See Johnson v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 49 A.D.2d 234, 237 (2d Dept. 1975).
Bubar v. Brodman, 30 Misc.3d 324, 330 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 2010).
21. 284 A.D.2d 990 (4th Dept. 2001).
See Stolowski v. 234 E. 178th St. LLC, 12 Misc.3d 1159(A) (Sup. Ct., Bronx County 2006).
Lloyd v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany, 23 A.D.3d 783, 784 (3d Dept. 2005).

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