Source: http://ri.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180330_0000046.DRI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:59:55+00:00

Document:
BARRY RICCI, alias, Superintendent of Chariho Regional School District in his individual and official capacities; CHARIHO REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, by and through its Superintendent, Barry Ricci, alias; RYAN BRIDGHAM, alias, Dean of Students Chariho High School, in his individual and official capacities; LAURIE WEBER, alias, Former Principal of Chariho High School in her individual and official capacities; JON ANDERSON Esq., alias, Chariho Regional School District Attorney in his individual and official capacities; THE CHARIHO SCHOOL COMMITTEE, by and through its Chairperson, Sylvia Stanley, alias, in her official capacity; CRAIG LOUZON, alias, in his individual and official capacity as the former Chair of the Chariho School Committee; RACHEL MCGINLEY, alias, in her individual capacity; THE RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, by and through its Commissioner, Ken Wagner, alias; KEN WAGNER, alias, in his official and individual capacity; THE RHODE ISLAND COUNCIL OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, by and through its Chair Daniel P. McConaghy, alias; DANIEL P. MCCONAGHY, alias, in his individual and official capacity; JOHN/JANE DOES 1-20; and JOHN DOE GOVERNMENT ENTITIES/BODIES 1-10, Defendants.
The case comes before the Court on multiple motions: (1) Rhode Island Department of Education (“RIDE”) and Ken Wagner's (“Commissioner Wagner”) (collectively, “RIDE Defendants”) Motion To Dismiss (ECF No. 12); (2) Rhode Island Council of Elementary and Secondary Education (“Council”) and Daniel P. McConaghy's (“Chair McConaghy”) (collectively, “Council Defendants”) Motion To Dismiss (ECF No. 14); (3) Jon Anderson's Motion To Dismiss (ECF No. 22); (4) Rachel McGinley's Motion To Dismiss (ECF No. 26); (5) Ryan Bridgham (“Dean Bridgham”), Chariho Regional School District (“CRSD”), Chariho School Committee (“Committee”), Craig Louzon (“Chairperson Louzon”), Barry Ricci (“Superintendent Ricci”), and Laurie Weber's (“Principal Weber”) (collectively, “Chariho Defendants”) Motion To Dismiss (ECF No. 27); and (6) Plaintiffs' Motion for Supplemental Jurisdiction and Notice of Family Court Dismissal (ECF No. 51).
“I wish we could all get along like we used to in middle school. I wish I could bake a cake filled with rainbows and smiles and everyone would eat and be happy.” Although the circumstances leading to this case started out with rainbows and smiles, it wasn't that way for long; it was high school, after all. To be certain, it was October 16, 2015, the Friday of the annual “Spirit Week” at Chariho High School (“CHS”): a day marked by “mayhem” and “school-sponsored bad decisions” leading up to the “big homecoming football game.” (Pls.' Second Am. Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 39, 41-43, ECF No. 41.) In years past, for example, the high school permitted “actual hay and live animals” to fill the halls. (Id. ¶ 43.) The absence of live animals roaming the halls this year didn't make it any less of a zoo.
As seniors paraded through the halls, K.Z., who had been standing among a group of friends on the right side of the hallway, sprayed her silly string in the air “indiscriminately” toward various other students passing her by. (Compl. ¶¶ 49, 53.) Many other students sprayed silly string, too, both through the air and directly at other students, including in their faces at close range. (Id. ¶ 54.) Silly string had been flying from all directions.
This eleven-count, forty-nine-page Complaint followed. And then came Defendants' various motions to dismiss. On February I, 2018, the Court heard oral argument in this matter.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must “accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor.” Riggs v. Curran, 863 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Guadalupe-Báez v. Pesquera, 819 F.3d 509, 514 (1st Cir. 2016)). However, “to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . a complaint must contain factual allegations that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true . . . .'” Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, although “the pleading standard . . . does not require ‘detailed factual allegations, ' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
A similar standard is applied when the Court construes a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995). The Court, in its review, remains cognizant that “the party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence.” Taber Partners, I v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 1993).
At the outset, Plaintiffs (parents) Mark and Beth Zell lack standing as to any of their claims. This includes claims asserted on their own behalf and those brought in a representative capacity pursuant to Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Starting with the latter, it is now undisputed that Plaintiff K.Z. reached the age of majority prior to Plaintiffs' filing the Second Amended Complaint on November 24, 2017.See, e.g., Lausin ex rel. Lausin v. Bishko, 727 F.Supp.2d 610, 625 n.5 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“[W]hen [the minor plaintiff] became 18 years old, [her mother] lost her standing to bring this lawsuit in a representative capacity on behalf of [her daughter].”); see also Vandiver v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding parents lost standing to bring claims in representative capacity to enforce son's rights when son turned eighteen, the age of legal majority under state law); cf. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-12-1(a) (“[A]ll persons who have attained the age of eighteen (18) years shall be deemed to be persons of full legal age.”).
Plaintiffs' Mark and Beth Zell's claims on their own behalf also fall away for lack of standing. First, in Count I, they suggest a procedural-due-process violation premised on the assertion that they maintained a “property interest in not being deprived of their money without due process of law.” (Compl. ¶ 229.) Plaintiffs' averment that they spent money and other resources to prosecute this lawsuit does not implicate a recognized property interest under the Due Process Clause. Indeed, “the expense of defending against a lawsuit is not itself a protectable property interest.” Powell v. Fujimoto, 119 F. App'x 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 480 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994) (“These incidental losses do not give rise to an independent protected property interest.”).
Try as they might to allege a separate and distinct injury, the remainder of Mark and Beth Zell's allegations are entirely derivative of their daughter's. Yet one person lacks standing to advance the constitutional rights of another. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); see also Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[O]nly the person toward whom the state action was directed, and not those incidentally affected, may maintain a § 1983 claim.”).
Mark and Beth Zell lack standing as to each of their claims (Counts I, II, and III). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Complaint entirely as to Mark and Beth Zell. Accordingly, the analysis that follows discusses Plaintiffs' claims only as they pertain to Plaintiff K.Z, on her own behalf.
The Court need not even delve into whether Plaintiff states a claim for a violation of procedural due process, i.e., whether Plaintiff's claim implicates a viable liberty interest of which Plaintiff could be deprived, because the answer to a separate question, “what process is due, ” see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), is fatal to Plaintiff's claim. That is, as a matter of law, based on the punishment K.Z. received - a one-day, in-school suspension - it is clear that she received significantly more process than she was due.

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