Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180509_0001162.EPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:33:55+00:00

Document:
THE TRANE COMPANY et al., Defendants.
GENE E.K. PRATTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
After their new heating and air conditioning unit did not operate as promised, Michael and Elisa Pansini sued the unit's manufacturer and an intermediate seller for breach of contract and breach of warranty - but not for negligence.
The intermediate seller, Ferguson Enterprises, brought a third-party complaint against Marvin E. Kanze, Inc., the contractor who ultimately sold and installed the HVAC unit. Ferguson alleges that Kanze was negligent in installing the unit, causing it to malfunction.
Now, Kanze has moved to dismiss Ferguson's third-party complaint for failing to state claims for contribution and indemnity. Because Ferguson faces only claims for breach of contract and warranty and does not face a claim for negligence - or for any other tort - the Court dismisses its complaint against Kanze.
In 2014, Michael and Elisa Pansini were shopping for an HVAC unit for their home in Villanova, PA. They allege that a salesman from defendant Ferguson Enterprises persuaded them to buy a new Trane HVAC unit, which he called “top of the line” and the “best system on the market.” The Pansinis relied on the salesman's promises and bought the new unit.
According to Ferguson's third-party complaint, the HVAC unit was installed at the Pansinis' home by Marvin E. Kanze, Inc. As the HVAC contractor, Kanze was responsible for designing and installing the HVAC unit. Ferguson alleges that Kanze miscalculated important aspects of the design and installation process, causing the unit to malfunction.
Contrary to the Ferguson salesman's promises - and allegedly due to Kanze's carelessness - the unit was loud, costly, and did not independently control the temperature in each room.
The Pansinis sued Ferguson and unit manufacturer The Trane Company in state court. The defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction.
Initially, the Pansinis' brought claims sounding in contract, warranty, and fraud. Now that the Court has partially granted a motion to dismiss,  the only remaining claims are for various breaches of warranty and contract.
Soon after filing the motion to dismiss that eliminated the fraud-based claims, Ferguson filed a third-party complaint against Kanze. The third-party complaint contains three counts against Kanze: joint and several liability, indemnification, and contribution. In brief, Ferguson alleges that Kanze carelessly installed the HVAC unit. If Ferguson is found liable to the Pansinis in contract, Ferguson contends, then Kanze must also be liable for its carelessness.
Kanze filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, and the Court held an oral argument on April 27, 2018.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Specifically, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The question is not whether the claimant “will ultimately prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court “must consider only those facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as true.” ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994). Also, the Court must accept as true all reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations, and view those facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Revell v. Port Auth., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or even discount reality. “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. If a claim “is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).
The question presented in Kanze's motion is straightforward: may a defendant that faces only claims for breach of contract and warranty bring a third-party complaint for indemnity or contribution based on allegations that a third-party defendant is liable to the plaintiff in tort? For the reasons that follow, the answer is no.
This section proceeds in two parts: federal procedural law and state substantive law. First, the Court concludes that Ferguson's third-party complaint has not satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14. Second, the Court concludes that the complaint likewise fails to satisfy the substantive state-law requirements of contribution and indemnification.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.