Source: http://foiaproject.org/case_detail/?title=on&style=foia&case_id=30678
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:57:59+00:00

Document:
Case Description Greenpeace submitted a FOIA request to the Department of Homeland Security's National Protection and Programs Directorate for records concerning a list of chemical facilities no longer considered high risk. The agency provided an interim response that it had located 123 pages but was withholding them entirely under Exemption 5 (privileges), Exemption 7(E) (investigative method and techniques), and Exemption 7(F) (harm to any person). Greenpeace filed an administrative appeal. The appeals office agreed with Greenpeace and told the agency to reprocess the request. However, the agency provided Greenpeace a list with most information redacted under Exemption 7(F). Greenpeace appealed that decision once more, but the appeals officer indicated it had no authority for force the agency to comply with its decision. Greenpeace then filed suit.
FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Timothy Kelly has ruled that data on the level of dangerous chemicals at various facilities nationwide is protected by Exemption 7(F) (harm to any person) because the information could be used by terrorists to locate potential targets for attack. Kelly's decision shows how embedded the 9/11 mentality has become in withholding records that also have a public health and safety aspect to them, a knee-jerk political decision to always assume that a terrorist attack is far more likely than a chemical spill caused by negligence or a natural disaster. But even more telling is the extent of the influence of Justice Samuel Alito's concurrence, which was joined by no other Supreme Court Justice, in Milner v. Dept of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011), suggesting that agencies could characterize virtually any records as security-related and then withhold them under Exemption 7 (law enforcement records), has taken hold in allowing agencies to more aggressively use Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques) �" often as a substitute for the circumvention prong previously recognized as part of Exemption 2 (internal practices and procedures) �" and Exemption 7(F). Starting with PEER v. U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission, 740 F.3d 195 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and continuing with EPIC v. Dept of Homeland Security, 777 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), the D.C. Circuit adopted Alito's argument that records containing data that could potentially be exploited by terrorists qualified for 7(E) and 7(F) protection, regardless of how far-fetched such a scenario might be. While the flood inundation projections involved in PEER were the most ludicrous claim justified under 7(F), the subsequent use of 7(E) and 7(F) in EPIC to protect a DHS memo addressing a possible need to temporarily shut down the cellular network in the event of a terrorist attack was a much closer call. In the case before Kelly, Greenpeace had requested data DHS compiled under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program showing the "screening threshold quantity" of dangerous chemicals held in facilities nationwide. CFATS tracks the levels of dangerous chemicals and facilities can go in and out of maintaining the requisite level of chemicals, a process referred to as "de-tiering." Greenpeace requested records showing the number of facilities that had reduced their levels of dangerous chemicals so that they were no longer considered high risk. The National Protection and Programs Directorate located 123 pages of responsive records but told Greenpeace that it was withholding them all under Exemption 5 (privileges), Exemption 7(E), and Exemption 7(F). Greenpeace filed an administrative appeal, arguing that in ACLU v. Dept of Defense, 543 F.3d 59 (2nd Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit held that Exemption 7(F) applied only when an agency could describe a discrete group of individuals who could be harmed by disclosure. Greenpeace's appeal was heard by an attorney at the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard attorney ruled in favor of Greenpeace, finding the agency had gone beyond the holding in ACLU v. Dept of Defense. NPPD disagreed with the Coast Guard attorney's decision in light of the fact that in the PEER and EPIC decisions, the D.C. Circuit had decided that the ACLU v. Dept of Defense holding did not apply under the circumstances presented in those cases. Instead DHS's Office of General Counsel reviewed the Coast Guard attorney's decision and allowed NPPD to redact the records under Exemption 7(F). Greenpeace appealed that decision. The Coast Guard attorney once again ordered the agency to comply but indicated that he had no ability to enforce his decision. As a result, Greenpeace filed suit. Because of the peculiar circumstances of the case, Greenpeace asked Kelly to order DHS to comply with the Coast Guard attorney's decision and require the agency to disclose an unredacted copy of the records. This put Greenpeace in the odd position of asking Kelly to uphold the agency's appeal rather than deciding the merits of the case de novo. Kelly explained that "in most cases, de novo review is a boon to plaintiffs; unlike the APA standard of review, de novo review generally affords no deference to the agency's decisions." However, he noted that "but FOIA plaintiffs must take the bitter with the sweet. The FOIA standard of review does disadvantage plaintiffs who would prefer to focus on the niceties of agency procedures instead of the merits of their claims." He added that "that is not to say that FOIA's procedural provisions are irrelevant. . . If the agency fails to follow FOIA's procedures, the 'penalty' is that the agency cannot rely on the administrative exhaustion requirement to keep cases from getting into court. But the agency suffers no prejudice on the merits of its defense, nor could it, because review must be de novo." DHS stressed that disclosure of the data would make the facilities more susceptible to a terrorist attack. Kelly agreed, noting that "identifying information about these facilities shares a key characteristic. . .it represents highly useful information for terrorists planning attacks on them." He pointed out that "disclosing which facilities are considered 'high risk' and which are not, has the potential to reveal the government's thinking about which facilities are likely targets for terrorist attacks, and which are not. Revealing the names of 'de-tiered' facilities would be dangerous [because] it would provide terrorists with valuable insight into how the United States government, including its intelligence services, assesses the risk of attacks on chemical facilities in this country. . .[Further], such revelations would effectively identify 'de-tiered' facilities as 'soft targets' for terrorists." Greenpeace emphasized that disclosure would foster the public interest in ensuring that the facilities followed the appropriate safety regulations. Greenpeace pointed out that "disclosure creates an incentive for reductions, and more facilities will reduce their inventories of chemicals of interest, increasing safety." Kelly indicated that "these affidavits miss the mark. Exemption 7(F) merely requires the government to show 'a reasonable expectation of endangerment' if the records are released. It is not a 'balancing test' that requires the agency to weigh that danger against possible benefits of releasing the information. Therefore, DHS is not required to show that risks to human life and health from potential terrorist attacks outweigh the possibility that withholding the information might inhibit the development of best practices by the private sector." Even Greenpeace's argument that much information about chemical facilities was already publicly available through the EPA and other agencies was turned against it. Kelly observed that "such information enriches, and does not merely repeat, the information already in the public domain. As Defendants persuasively claim, terrorists might combine these different sources of information to make better-informed decisions about what facilities to target."

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