Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=33854:g-r-nos-101127-31-november-18,-1993-people-of-the-phil-v-cresencia-c-reyes&amp;catid=1308&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 19:07:01+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRESENCIA C. REYES, Accused-Appellant.
Timoteo A. David for Oriental Assurance Corporation.
Rosendo C. Ramos for Accused-Appellant.
1.	REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; TWO INFORMATIONS FILED, ONE UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 AND ANOTHER UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE ON ESTAFA, BASED ON IDENTICAL FACTS; NOT A CASE OF. — We re-affirm at the outset the established doctrine that: While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).
2.	CRIMINAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22; MERE ACT OF ISSUING A BAD CHECK, A MALUM PROHIBITUM. — The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check a malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
3.	ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE TO CHECKS ISSUED FOR DEPOSIT OR GUARANTY. — It is now settled that BP 22 applies even in cases where the dishonored checks were issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guaranty and not as actual payment. The law does not make any distinction. Criminal liability attaches to the drawer of the check whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. As we held in Que v. People (154 SCRA 160): . . . Inasmuch as the law does not make any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statutes evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bills . . . which was enacted later into BP 22, when it was introduced before the Batasang Pambansa that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scrap of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks . . . Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee.
4.	ID.; REVISED PENAL CODE; ESTAFA, ELUCIDATED. — To constitute estafa under this provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, whether postdated or not. It must be shown that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the other party. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
5.	ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22; FAILURE TO MAKE GOOD THE CHECKS WITHIN THREE (3) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND FOR THEIR VALUE, A PRIMA FACIE INFERENCE OF FRAUDULENT ACT. — The three postdated checks that were subsequently dishonored were issued at a time when funds in her account were insufficient and even nil. Two of these checks were dated April 10, 1986, and the third April 15, 1986. The records of the drawee bank showed that Reyes had a zero balance at the time the checks were issued and also when they were presented for payment. The dishonored checks she had issued to Garcia had a total value of P96,290.00, and this represented the damage sustained by Garcia because of the appellant’s deceit. Reyes had issued these checks upon her fraudulent assurance to Garcia that they were fully funded. Her situation worsened when she failed to make good the checks within three days from receipt of notice of their dishonor and the demand from the complainant for their value. Her failure to take advantage of this grace period offered by the law raised the prima facie inference of deceit consisting of "false pretense or a fraudulent act."
The appellant has instituted this proceeding for the reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 12, 1991, convicting her of estafa and violation of BP 22 under five separate informations which had been consolidated and tried jointly on her own motion.
The first purchase order was for 200 sacks. On April 4, 1986, Garcia delivered to Reyes 100 sacks of rice worth P31,500.00, for which two checks were issued by Reyes, each in the amount of P15,750.00. One was dated April 4, 1986 and the other April 10, 1986. On April 9, 1986, Garcia delivered 98 more sacks of rice to Reyes, and Reyes again issued two checks, each in the amount of P14,210.00, the first dated April 10, 1986, and the other April 15, 1986.
On April 9, 1986, Reyes placed another order for 200 sacks of rice, which Garcia delivered to her on the same day. While the 200 sacks were being unloaded, Reyes asked to buy an additional 200 sacks, and since there were 400 sacks of rice loaded on the trucks, Garcia agreed to sell the whole stock to her.
For the 400 sacks (plus 2 more sacks to complete the first purchase order for 200 sacks), Reyes again issued two checks, each for P66,330.00, one dated April 9, 1986 and the other April 15, 1986.
All the checks were drawn against the Bank of the Philippine Islands at its España Branch.
The other three checks were, either upon encashment or deposit, returned by the drawee bank to Garcia due to "insufficient funds." Garcia notified Reyes of their dishonor and the latter promised to pay her their total value. Despite repeated demands on Reyes, however, she failed to make good the checks or to replace them with cash.
The five criminal cases filed against Reyes were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-51206 to 86-51208, for violation of BP 22 in connection with the issuance of BPI Check No. 308202 for P15,750.00, 1 BPI Check No. 308223 for P14,210.00, 2 BPI Check No. 308226 for P66,330.00, 3 and Criminal Cases Nos. 86-51209 and 86-51210, both for estafa involving the same checks.
(4)	In convicting her for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having issued a bad check, even if the check had been issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
The Court, after deliberating on the above assignment of errors and the briefs submitted by the parties, finds for the People.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
. . . Inasmuch as the law does not make any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statutes evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bills . . . which was enacted later into BP 22, when it was introduced before the Batasang Pambansa that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scrap of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks . . .
Even on the assumption, then, that the subject checks were given by the appellant as a mere guaranty and not as payment, this circumstance will not absolve Reyes from her violation of BP 22.
It is recalled that Garcia was unwilling at first to deal with Reyes but was finally persuaded when she issued the two checks in payment for the first 100 sacks of rice. One of these checks was encashed before the second could mature and be subsequently dishonored. Believing that Reyes’s credit was good, Garcia accepted two more checks from her in payment for another 100 sacks, and Reyes redeemed one of them before the other could mature and be subsequently dishonored. Garcia was still unaware of Reyes’s deception when she entered into their last sale of 400 sacks, for which Reyes issued another two checks in payment, one of which was also to be dishonored later. In all this series of transactions, Garcia was induced to sell because of the checks issued by the appellant which the complainant believed to be funded.
The three postdated checks that were subsequently dishonored were issued at a time when funds in her account were insufficient and even nil. Two of these checks were dated April 10, 1986, and the third April 15, 1986. The records of the drawee bank showed that Reyes had a zero balance at the time the checks were issued and also when they were presented for payment. 14 The dishonored checks she had issued to Garcia had a total value of P96,290.00, and this represented the damage sustained by Garcia because of the appellant’s deceit. Reyes had issued these checks upon her fraudulent assurance to Garcia that they were fully funded.
The facts established by the prosecution belie this assertion. The evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. There is no doubt that the subject checks were issued by Reyes (and accepted by Garcia) in exchange for the three deliveries of rice as each delivery was made. We are satisfied that the postdated checks were issued by the appellant not as payment for a pre-existing obligation but as the consideration for each shipment of rice she received from the complainant.
The argument that the postdated checks were promissory notes and not for negotiation is so unsubstantial as to deserve no serious attention.
It is indeed pathetic that the appellant should suffer the physical handicap above described, but what is especially tragic is that she has chosen to use this handicap for the deception of Garcia, who trusted her partly out of sympathy for her abnormal appearance. By her deceitfulness, Reyes has forfeited all feelings of charity or kindness toward her and earned instead the punishment of the laws she has scorned.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DENIED, with costs against the appellant. It is ordered.
1.	Exhibit "B," Original Record, p. 252.
2.	Exhibit "B-1," Ibid., p. 254.
3.	Exhibit "B-2," Id., p. 253.
4.	Original Record, p. 288.
7.	Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 8.
8.	Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 338.
9.	People v. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305; People v. Nitafan, 215 SCRA 79; Que v. People, 15..4 SCRA 160; People v. Manzanilla, 156 SCRA 279.
12.	Vallarta v. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 336.
13.	People v. Tugbang, 196 SCRA 341; People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568; Bañares v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 59; Vallarta v. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 336.
14.	Original Record, p. 255.
15.	People v. Singson, 215 SCRA 534; Bañares v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 59.

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