Source: https://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/2007/01/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:30:08+00:00

Document:
In Fisher v. Pohlman, Inc., No. 4:06CV01761 AGF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725 (E.D.Mo. Jan. 23, 2007), the Court denied the employer's motion to dismiss plaintiff's FMLA interference claim. Cheryl Fisher worked for Pohlman as a Certified Mechanical Inspector from 1992 until her termination on September 17, 2004. In February 2003, Fisher asked for and was granted intermittent FMLA leave to care for her spouse with a serious health condition. Pohlman had a leave policy that assessed points for missed work and provided that an employee who accumulated 9 points was automatically fired. In 2003 and 2004 Fisher alleged that Pohlman assessed points to her for leave that was FMLA leave. Her attempts to have these points removed from her record were rebuffed. After an attempt to discuss the matter with the Director of Human Resources she was fired.
Pohlman moved to dismiss alleging that Fisher's interference claim filed because she did not assert that FMLA leave was denied. The court disagreed.
The Court found that Fisher's allegations, if proven, were sufficient to make out an FMLA interference claim. According to the court, "interference" includes not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave. The Court found that assessing absenteeism points and terminating an employee for use of FMLA leave could be construed to deter an employee from exercising her rights under the FMLA.
Comment: The FMLA's anti-interference provisions protect more than an employer's denial of FMLA leave. It also protects employees from adverse employment actions that may deter an employee from using FMLA leave. The Court determined that the assessment of absenteeism points that could (and in fact did) lead to discipline or removal arguably may deter an employee from exercising FMLA rights.
Reminder: You have until February 2, 2007, to submit comments responsive to the U.S. Department of Labor's December 1, 2006 solicitation for information on the current FMLA rules. If like or don't like the current FMLA rules, now is the time let the DOL know about it. Speak now or forever hold your grips. Comments may be e-mailed to the US DOL at: whdcomments@dol.goc. Comments of 20 pages or less may be submitted by fax machine to (202) 693-1432, which is not a toll-free number. Comments must be received by 5 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Friday, February 2, 2007.
Ashley McClain worked for McDonald's as a a first assistant manager of one of their restaurants. In July 2004 she requested leave after discovering that her father hand cancer. She was granted two weeks of unpaid FMLA leave. On October 18 she informed her manager that her father was scheduled to undergo surgery for a stent operation in 11 days. She asked for and took an indefinite period of leave. From October 18 to October 29 McClain was out on leave. She did not contact her employer during this time. McClain failed to report to work for her next scheduled shift on October 29. McDonald's initiated an investigation of her failure to report to work. During her investigatory interview McClain claimed that she did not report to work as she was caring for her father after surgery. She refused, however, to put her explanation in writing. She was told to go home and wait for further instructions. Plaintiff subsequently showed up to work and refused to leave when asked. McDonald's called the police. McClain left the premises only when the police arrived. After a second similar confrontation McClain was fired.
McClain sued alleging that she was terminated for her use of FMLA leave. The court disagreed.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a casual connection exists between he adverse employment action and plaintiff's exercise of FMLA rights. If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for retaliation the burden shifts, and defendants must state a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. Once defendants state a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action, the burden sifts again, and plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants' proffered reason is a pretext for FMLA retaliation. To show pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.
McDonald's moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim on two grounds: (1) plaintiff was not engaged in a statutorily protected activity; and (2) plaintiff could not show that defendants' non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action was pretextual.
McDonald's alleged that plaintiff cannot establish that she engaged in statutorily protected activity and, therefore, she could not establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation because the FMLA does not protected employees who create fictional reasons for taking leave. McClain testified at her deposition that she was with her father on October 29 while he underwent a stent operation. At trial McClain admitted that her father did not undergo a stent operation at any tine in October 2004, a fact confirmed by the testimony of her father. McClain claimed that when she requested leave on October 18 she honestly believed that her father was to undergo surgery. Significantly for the Court, McClain had no explanation why she did not call her manager at any time during her 10 day absence and tell him that her father had not undergone surgery. In fact, on her return to work and at her subsequent deposition McClain lied and stated that she cared for her father after surgery.
On these facts, the court concluded that McClain had not engaged in a statutorily protected activity (attending her father's stent implementation and caring for him thereafter).
The Court also concluded that, even if plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity, McDonald's was nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim because McClain had failed to establish that McDonald's reason for terminating her was pretextual. McDonald's fired McClain for failing to report to work for several days, insubordination, repeated use of foul language, and destruction of company property as a result of two confrontations she had during the company's investigation of her absences.
Comment: FMLA leave secured by fraud is not protected. Moreover, employee's have no greater employment rights because they use FMLA leave than if they did not exercise FMLA rights. Employees who lose their cool during a company investigation of the bona fides of their leave can be disciplined just as if the employee had never gone on FMLA leave and lost their cool. Of course, employers must be careful not to subject employee's who have exercised FMLA rights to disparate treatment in terms of discipline for conduct compared to the discipline for similar conduct issued to employees who have not exercised FMLA rights.
The decision is reported at McClain v. McDonald's Corp., No. 05-1117, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5461 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 25, 2007).
In Cobb v. Contract Transport, Inc., No. 04-305-KS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531 (E.D.Ky. Jan. 22, 2007), the employee called in notified the dispatcher that he needed leave because he was having gallbladder surgery. The employer's internal procedures require that an employee seeking leave must speak with either the co-owner, Ms. Nible, or Ms. Bergman in the Human Resources Department. Cobb took the leave. A week later he was fired because of his absence for surgery. Cobb filed suit alleging that his termination violated the anti-retaliation provisions of the FMLA.
The employer moved for summary judgment alleging that Cobb had failed to provide sufficient notice of the need for FMLA leave, citing Cobb's failure to provide notice in accordance with the employer's policy. Cobb argued that notice to the dispatcher was sufficient. The Court split the difference between the two positions.
The Court initially noted that the FMLA does not permit an employer to deny FMLA leave on the grounds that the employee failed to comply with an employer's internal procedures--so long as the employee gives timely verbal or other notice of the need for leave. The Court found that Cobb knew that who he should contact and could have easily done so but, without explanation, he did not provide notice to the individuals identified by the employer's policy. Under these circumstances, the court found that plaintiff was not requesting leave but was imply reporting an absence. However, because Ms. Noble, the co-owner who Cobb could have notified, had actual notice of the plaintiff's absence and that fact that it was for gallbladder surgery, the Court found that Cobb did provide his employer with sufficient notice of the need for FMLA leave to invoke the protections of the Act.
Comment: The decision holds that an employee on notice of an employer's reporting procedures generally will not be considered to have requested FMLA leave where the employee, without reasonable explanation, fails to follow that procedure but notifies someone else of his or her need for leave. An exception to that general rule exists where, notwithstanding the employee's failure to follow the employer's reporting procedure, the identified personnel who should have been provided the notice independently learned of the reason for leave.
The decision appears to undermine the FMLA's absolute prohibition on an employer denial of leave because the employee failed to follow an employer's internal leave reporting requirements.
An employer may require an employee on FMLA leave to report periodically on the employee's status and intent to return to work.
The Court found that Chevron's policy did not violate the FMLA.
[M]ay not be discriminatory and must take into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances related to the individual employee's leave situation.
29 CFR 825.309(a); 5 CFR 630.1208(j).
Here, it is unclear how the Court approved of Chevron's blanket policy mandating such reports every 30 days. Chevron's policy, which does not take into account the circumstances related to the individual employee's leave situation, does not appear to fit within the periodic status report requirements of the FMLA.
To remain within the requirements of the FMLA, employers would be well advised not to have a blanket policy mandating periodic status reports at specified intervals (e.g., every 30 days) regardless of the facts of any given case. Periodic report policies must take into account the facts of each case. It may be that in most cases requiring a report every 30 days is permissible. You want to be in the position, however, to say that every request for a periodic status report was evaluated on its merits.
In Wilson v. NJB Industries, Inc., No. 06-11422, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 953 (11th Cir. Jan. 17, 2007), the employee argued that the employee provided sufficient notice that he needed leave for a serious health condition to trigger the employer's duty to make further inquiry to determine whether the absences were FMLA covered. The employee argued that the duty to inquire further required the employer to contact the employee's physician. The court disagreed. The FMLA, the court found, prohibited the employer from making direct contact with the employee's health care provider.
Comment: The decision confirms that employer's are prohibited from directly contacting the health care provider of the employee or the employee's covered family member (depending on who is sick) to determine whether the employee's leave is FMLA-qualifying. As such, an employer's duty to make further inquiry where it is less than clear from the employee's notice that the leave may be FMLA-qualifying does not require the employer to directly contact the health care provider.
Section 825.302(c) of the DOL FMLA regulations generally requires employers to "inquire further of the employee if it is necessary to have more information about whether FMLA leave is being sought...and obtain the necessary details of the leave to be taken." (emphasis supplied).
The Eleventh Circuit covers Alabama, Georgia, and Florida.
In Delarama v. Illinois Dept. of Human Services, No. 05 C 5163, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 475 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 5, 2007), the employee called in sick every day she was scheduled to work between July 19 and August 19, for a total of 24 days. Delarama took the time off for a condition that would later be diagnosed as fibromyalgia. at no time did Delarama explain the nature of her illness.
Delarama supported her absences with several doctor's notes. The notes, however, did not explain the circumstances of her absences or indicate the severity of her condition. Her first note indicated that Delarama was under his care for back pain but that she would be able to return to work in a week. A second doctor's note from a different physician stated that Delarama was under his care that that she "needs to be off work until August 10/4." She ultimately produced several other similar doctor's notes. Ultimately, Delarama requested and received a five month leave of absence.
The employer originally recorded Delarama's 24 absences as unauthorized. After a meeting with Dalarama and her union representative, the employer subsequently agreed not to issue discipline for these absences, although any future unauthorized absences would trigger discipline. Delarama was unhappy with that outcome and filed a grievance seeking to expunge the 24 absences from her record entirely. At the third-level of the grievance process management and the union agreed that the 24 unauthorized absences would remain on her employment record. Delarama filed suit alleging that the citation of the 24 unauthorized absences interference with her FMLA rights.
The Court held that Delarama failed to establish that her employer interfered with her FMLA rights. The Court found that Delarama had failed to provide her employer with sufficient notice of her intent to take FMLA leave, a necessary element to establish an FMLA interference claim. The Court noted that at no time when she called in sick did she ever mention "any specific diagnosis" or indication " that her condition would require an extended period of sick leave." The Court also noted that not once of the several doctor's notes she submitted "elucidated the circumstances of her absences or indicated the severity of her condition." The Court concluded that this was not a situation where circumstances provided the employer with sufficient notice of the need for medical leave. Rather, it was Delarama's "own failure to provide notice, when she had every opportunity to do so..."
Comment: To perfect the right to FMLA leave an eligible employee must provide his or her employer with sufficient notice that the leave may be FMLA-qualifying. The employee does not have to invoke the FMLA by name in order to gain the benefits and protections of the FMLA. They must, however, provide sufficient facts in their request for leave to apprise the employer that the leave may be FMLA qualifying. Delarama illustrates that a lengthy period of absence coupled with several substantiating doctor's notes may not provide the employer with sufficient notice that the employee needs FMLA leave absent facts from the employee or in the doctor's notes that suggest that the leave may be FMLA-qualifying.
In Bailey v. Miltope Corp., No. 2:05-cv-1061-MEF (WO), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1760 (M.D.Ala. Jan. 8, 2007), the Court found that the employee failed to satisfy the FMLA's notice requirements because the employee did not include the duration of leave as part of his request for foreseeaable leave. The Court went on to find, however, that an employer may only waive the notice requirement or delay the leave until thirty days after notice was given where the employee fails to provide timely notice of the need for FMLA leave that is foreseeable. The statute and regulations, the Court found, "do not permit an employer to terminate an employee merely for failure to provide timely notice."
Comment: The case has several interesting points. First, the Court found the employee's notice untimely because it did not include the anticipated duration of the leave, as required by 29 CFR 825.302(c). Second, the Court found that the leave was foreseeable because the employee had been considering taking FMLA leave for at least a week. The FMLA regulations do not define how "foreseeable" leave must be in order for it to be considered foreseeable rather than unforeseeable. Finally, the Court's decision confirms that denial of leave or disciplinary action is an inappropriate response to an employee's untimely request for FMLA leave. Rather, the FMLA permits employers to either grant the leave by waiving the untimeliness of notice or delay the commencement of leave for up to 30 days from the date notice was first given.
The court concludes that compelling arbitration after Defendant's prevented the arbitration from going forward by failing to remit the proper fee would prejudice Plaintiff, who as a result of Defendant's failure , went forward with all of the administrative procedures required before filing a complaint in the District Court.
Comment: Employers who include arbitration clauses in employment contracts must take great care to ensure that all arbitration fees are timely paid to ensure that the matter will be heard by an arbitrator rather than through the traditionally more expense and time consuming civil jury trial process.
An employer's suggestion that an employee apply for FMLA leave did not constitute evidence that the employer regarded the employee as being disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
In Robinson v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-1704, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 331 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 2007), the employee suffered several seizures. He was out of work on approved disability leave for several weeks. He was diagnosed as having a seizure disorder. On returning to work Robinson's supervisor allegedly berated him for not "pulling his weight." He performance rating indicated that he "needed improvement." A proposal to put him on a Performance Improvement Plan was made but never initiated. At approximately the same time his supervisor suggested that Robinson apply for FMLA leave so that when he felt he couldn't come to work the absence could be charged the FMLA and not simply as an absence. While he was in the process of submitted forms in support of FMLA leave Robinson was terminated with three others allegedly due to budgetary cutbacks. Robinson sued alleging that his termination violated the ADA. He did not assert an FMLA claim.
Robinson argued that he was "regarded as" having a disability by his employer. The ADA protects employees from discrimination who are "regarded as" having a disability, even if the employee, in fact, is not physically or mentally disabled. As evidence, Robinson argued that Lockheed Martin believed he was disabled based on his supervisor's statement that Robinson should apply for FMLA leave. The court disagreed.
The Third Circuit found that his supervisor's statement did not create a material issue of fact that Robinson was regarded as" significantly restricted in his ability to work. The Court noted that "disability" under the ADA and "serious health condition" under the FMLA are different concepts that must be analyzed separately and that the leave provisions of the FMLA are distinct from the reasonable accommodation obligations under the ADA. The Court also noted that Robinson returned to work after this initial four-week absence to the same job. It also noted that Robinson was not placed on disability leave after his supervisor suggested that he apply for FMLA leave.
Comment: "Disability" within the meaning of the ADA Act and a "serious health condition" under the FMLA are not the same thing. An employee that is unable to perform "an" essential function of a job is incapacitated within the meaning of the FMLA. In contrast, to be "regarded as" having a disability, an employee must establish that the employer regarded the employee as suffering from an impairment within the meaning of the ADA Act, not just that the employer believed the employee to be somehow disabled. The employer must regard the employee as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities as a result of the attitudes of others toward the impairment. To be disabled from the major life activity of working, an employee must establish that his or her employer believed that the employee was limited in the ability to work in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. An employee does not establish that they are "regarded as" disabled from working because they they are precluded from performing their job.
Of course, an FMLA "serious health condition" can also be "disability" within the meaning of the ADA/Rehabilitation Act. Unlike the ADA Act, the FMLA does not protected employees who are "regarded as" having a serious health condition.
The Third Circuit covers New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.

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