Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82513:56393&catid=1576&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:48:39+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013 - MORETO MIRALLOSA AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS UNDER HIM, Petitioners, v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondent.
MORETO MIRALLOSA AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS UNDER HIM, Petitioners, v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondent.
This is an appeal by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 6 December 2010 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 105190, which reversed the Decision4 and Order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-22018. The RTC had reversed the Decision6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 52, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 03-27114, ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property in this case for ejectment.
Memorandum – Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this Certificate of Title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc.
WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs.
On 17 February 1988, the Register of Deeds then cancelled the Memorandum inscripted on respondent’s title,15 eventually restoring respondent’s ownership of the entire property.
3. To pay the costs of suit.
In so ruling, the trial court stated that respondent was the registered owner of the property until its title was voided by P.D. 293.21 It had no alternative but to allow petitioner’s occupancy of the premises.22 Since the latter’s occupation was only by mere tolerance of respondent, petitioner was necessarily bound by an implied promise that he would vacate the property upon demand.23 Failure to do so would render him liable for unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the complaint is accordingly DISMISSED. With costs against plaintiff-appellee.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated April 30, 2008 of the RTC (Branch 121) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-22018 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated November 9, 2007 of the MTC (Branch 52) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 03-27114 is hereby REINSTATED.
On 25 May 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution39 issued by the CA on 15 October 2010.
Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.
We shall discuss the issues seriatim.
Unfortunately, petitioner’s contentions are without merit. The MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being one of unlawful detainer.
In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties, is the sole issue for resolution. But where the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon said issue in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court’s adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
and confers no right upon any person.
The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed. x x x.
there we have likewise been unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. x x x.
As a general rule, a law declared as unconstitutional produces no effect whatsoever and confers no right on any person. It matters not whether the person is a party to the original case, because “[n]ot only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.”57 Thus, petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt cannot be countenanced. We have categorically stated that the doctrine does not apply when the party concerned is a “successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem, the judgment in which is binding against him.”58 While petitioner may not have been a party to Tuason, still, the judgment is binding on him because the declaration of P.D. 293 as a nullity partakes of the nature of an in rem proceeding.
In this case, petitioner could not be said to have been unduly burdened by reliance on an invalid law. Petitioner merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing petitioner to occupy the same.63 However, this Affidavit was executed only sometime in 1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case was promulgated.64 At the time petitioner built the structures on the premises, he ought to have been aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case and the subsequent unconstitutionality of P.D. 293. These circumstances necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operative fact doctrine.
to be a builder in good faith.
2 Id. at 7-19; CA Decision dated 25 May 2010, penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Florito S. Macalino.
3 Id. at 20; CA Resolution dated 15 October 2010.
4 Id. at 112-114; RTC Decision dated 30 April 2008, penned by Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
5 Id. at 115; RTC Order dated 11 August 2008.
6 Id. at 187-190; MeTC Order dated 9 November 2007, penned by Acting Presiding Judge Josephine M. Advento-Vito Cruz.
14 241 Phil. 650, 663 (1988).
46Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., G.R. No. 170509, 27 June 2012, 675 SCRA 132, citing Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694, 707 (2006).
47 Jose v. Alfuerte, G.R. No. 169380, 26 November 2012, 686 SCRA 323, citing Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 81, 89-90.
49 Cajayon v. Sps. Batuyong, 517 Phil. 648 (2006), citing Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, 23 September 1992, 214 SCRA 216.
50Leonin v. Court of Appeals, 534 Phil. 544 (2006), citing Cañiza v. CA, 335 Phil. 1107, 1117 (1997); Penas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112734, 7 July 1994, 233 SCRA 744, 747.
51Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365, 372 (1968).
52 Supra note 14, at 662-663.
53 G.R. No. 175990, 11 October 2012, 684 SCRA 130, 139.
55Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79732, 8 November 1993, 227 SCRA 509.
58Dar Adventure Farm Corp., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161122, 24 September 2012, 681 SCRA 580, 583.
59 Supra note 55, at 512.
60League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 819.
61Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012, 676 SCRA 579, citing Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 516-517.
67Rosales v. Castelltort, 509 Phil. 137, 147 (2005), citing Macasaet v. Macasaet, 482 Phil. 853, 871 (2004) (citation omitted).
68Lapid v. Laurea, 439 Phil. 887, 896-897 (2002).
69 Civil Code, Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

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 Art. 449