Source: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/125
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:44:57+00:00

Document:
District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.
commencement of the evening show, he caused his employee, one Melvin Wolf, to discharge one of the bombs in the air. It was undisputed that Golden State also brought to the grounds similar bombs and other supplies for a fireworks display and that while putting on the display three of these bombs were discharged. There was no evidence that there was any other similar bombs brought to the grounds by anyone but Golden State and Brooks. Although the minor's description of the object which injured him did not exactly tally with the description of the aerial bombs which Golden State and Brooks brought to the fair grounds, yet the jury could have concluded that the object which injured the minor was such an aerial bomb. Golden State and Brooks, each admitting that it brought a supply of such bombs to the fair grounds, produced testimony as to the exact number of bombs brought in, the exact number fired and the exact number taken away, so that, if believed by the jury, the proof was adequate that neither of them brought to and left upon the fair grounds the object which injured the minor. It further stands undisputed that there was no connection whatever between the activities of Golden State and those of Brooks. They were completely independent of each other, brought bombs to the fair grounds separately and used them for different purposes. One bomb only caused injury to the minor and so, as a matter of law, it must be said that both could not have been responsibly negligent in respect of the appellant's injuries and that if liability should be fastened upon both the result would be that the innocent would be held for the fault of the guilt. Say the appellants in their brief: 'In the present case appellants admit that one of the two defendants who previously had exploded fireworks probably is blameless. It could not be otherwise. Only one bomb blew off Ralph Litzmann's left hand. That bomb belonged to one or the other of the defendants, Golden State or Brooks. It did not belong to both.' We think there is no mere 'probability' about the blamelessness of one or the other of said two defendants and that the situation is as we have above stated it, that is, if one is found guilty, that finding, under the evidence in this case, exonerates the other.
was the proximate cause of injury to plaintiff, Ralph J. Litzmann, and if you should find that said plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, and if the evidence shows by the greater weight of probability that as to any one or more of such defendants above named, who are not charged absolutely with negligence in this case, that a reasonable uncertainty exists in respect to his, its or their alternative liability, and if you find that negligence has been proved against some one of such defendants, without identifying which one, you shall hold all of said defendants liable for such injuries unless the evidence shows by the greater weight of probability that the conduct of any one of said defendants, whom you can identify, was not approximate cause of the injury; and in such case you shall find such defendant not liable and the others liable.
of one hunter or one from the gun of each. The trial court found that both defendants were negligent and that as a direct and proximate result of the shots fired by them a bird shot pellet was caused to and did lodge in plaintiff's right eye and another bird shot pellet was caused to and did lodge in plaintiff's upper lip.' Interpreting these findings the Supreme Court said: 'Implicit in such finding is the assumption that the court was unable to ascertain whether the shots were from the gun of one defendant or the other or one shot from each of them.' By the finding, said the court, the trial court determined that the negligence of both defendants was the legal cause of the injury--or that both were responsible. Yet it was obvious in that case that if the pellets came from the gun of one appellant only, holding the other was to punish the innocent for the wrong done by the guilty. After discussing the principles involved, the Supreme Court closed by saying: 'We have seen that for the reasons of policy discussed herein, the case is based upon the legal proposition that, under the circumstances here presented, each defendant is liable for the whole damage whether they are deemed to be acting in concert or independently.' We are unable to distinguish Summers v. Tice from the case on appeal. Obviously the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in that case to each defendant and it followed that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case against each. This was no less true in the situation where the plaintiff had sued the two together than it would have been had he sued them separately. It was of course the duty of the trier of fact in that situation to determine from all the evidence, if that could be done, which of the two was in fact guilty of actionable negligence toward the plaintiff. The same thing was true in the case before us and the jury were instructed that if that could be done they were to fix the liability in accordance. In the Tice case, however, the situation also encompassed a possibility that the trier of fact would be unable to determine that proof of fault preponderated in favor of or against either of the two defendants. That same situation conceivably could have confronted the triers of fact in this case. And if it could be said in Summers v. Tice that concert of action was not necessary to holding two where only one was at fault and that such could be done even though the two acted independently, then we think it must be said in this case that if the triers of fact were unable to ascertain which of the two involved was guilty of the actionable negligence which injured the appellants, they should have been told that then in that situation they could hold and should hold both defendants. If we have correctly analyzed Summers v. Tice then we need not discuss the logic upon which it is based, for we are bound by it. Under the instructions given the jury, if they were unable from the evidence to determine which of the two respondents, Golden State or Brooks, was actionably negligent toward the minor, they were compelled to exonerate both. In short, they were told that in that event the appellants had failed to prove a case. We hold that under Summers v. Tice they should have been told that in that event they could render a verdict against both. This was done by the trial court in Ybarra v. Spangard, supra.
liability of one engaged in ultrahazardous activities. For the refusal to give such instruction they assign error. The instruction requested was taken from B.A.J.I., 1950 Supp., 223-223-D. 'It appears to be settled that the question of whether the case is a proper one for imposing absolute or strict liability is one of law for the court.' Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 496, 190 P.2d 1, 5. From the evidence in this case we think it apparent that the activities in which Golden State and Brooks were engaged, that is, the handling and discharge of fireworks at the Humboldt County Fair Grounds, were not such as to come within the definition of ultrahazardous activities. In Luthringer v. Moore, supra, the Supreme Court stated the rules for determining the ultrahazardous nature of an activity. Quoting from Restatement, Torts, Sections 519-524, the court said: "An activity is ultra-hazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care". The risks involved here were: 1. The risk that members of the public might be injured while the actors were discharging fireworks, or, 2. The risk that members of the public might be injured by failure of the actors to keep live fireworks inaccessible. The testimony was generally to the effect that these risks could be eliminated by a degree of care far within the bounds of 'utmost care'. It goes without saying that ordinary care could and would prevent the leaving of such matter upon the fair grounds through failure of proper custodial care. The testimony showed also that by the method of firing adopted it was a reasonably easy matter to direct the firing so that injury would not arise through misdirection of the missiles; and that observation by those skilled enough to be licensed to explode fireworks was adequate to detect the lack of explosion of the material shot into the air. It appears, therefore, that the activities engaged in and charged to be ultrahazardous were in fact risks which could be and would be eliminated if commensurate care had been exercised. It was the failure of care that caused the injuries and not the nature of the risks involved. Under such circumstances the court was justified in refusing to instruct upon the doctrine of absolute liability.
county is under the statute commonly known as the Public Liability Act and that said respondent County can only be liable thereunder for failure to repair within a reasonable time a defective or dangerous condition of the property of which it had actual or constructive knowledge.

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