Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/mr-justice-schultes
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:00:30+00:00

Document:
Adding to this site’s archives addressing non-pecuniary damages for traumatically induced thoracic outlet syndrome, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with such an injury.
 Considering the unique circumstances of this case, but keeping in mind awards made for roughly comparable injuries and levels of pain and suffering, and adding an amount for the insufficiently documented yet legitimate claim for future loss of housekeeping capacity, I will award $87,500 under this heading.
Corrected reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing fault between a pedestrian and a bus driver.
 On all the evidence I am satisfied that there was a period of time, of more than transitory length, during which the bus was travelling forward, still in the curb lane, but the focus of Mr. Kobbero’s attention was on his left mirror and the act of merging. It was during this period that Mr. Whelan stepped out on the road and, had Mr. Kobbero’s attention been prudently apportioned between merging and the curb lane in front of him, he could have seen and reacted to the pedestrian in time of avoid a collision. His focus on merging reflected an assumption, which I find was not reasonable in light of his overall awareness of the range of pedestrian hazards, that his forward check earlier in the process was sufficient. However briefly, I conclude that he did fall below his required standard of care.
75] I would characterize Mr. Kobbero’s lapse of care in conduct as falling more towards the momentary or minor end of the spectrum than towards the extremely careless end. I have found that it was a decision to focus his attention fairly briefly on an admittedly more pressing task, based on the faulty assumption that there were no risks directly ahead of him. This was not the kind of lapse that was inevitably going to cause harm; it required a pedestrian to do one of the foolish things that Mr. Kobbero has been trained to expect in order for that to happen. I conclude that Mr. Kobbero should bear 40% of the liability for this accident.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with fault for a school-ground injury.
In this week’s case (Gu v. Frisen) the 11 year old plaintiff was injured in 2008 when she was carrying a friend, piggyback-style, during recess. At the same time the defendant pushed the girls, with no intetion of ill-will but rather “to make the girls laugh”. Unfortunately the Plaintiff fell over and broke her arm.
 I am satisfied that Liam did not put his mind to the risk before he jogged up behind Elizabeth and pushed her. The question is whether, objectively viewed, he should have.
 He was 11 years old at the time of this incident. There was no evidence that he was of less than normal intelligence for his age. As to his experience, making the assumption most favourable to his position, which is that comparing him to children of the same “experience” is broad enough to include his maturity and impulsivity, I think that a child with those similar attributes would still have foreseen that, if he were running at a fast jog, even the gentle pushing from behind of another child who was being carried piggyback risked both the top and bottom person falling over and being injured in some way in the fall. It is a matter of the physical reaction of human bodies to the application of force — a kind of knowledge that is acquired by all children on the playground at a very young age.
 It is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the precise injury or the full extent of the injury was reasonably foreseeable. What he must show is that the type or kind of injury was reasonably foreseeable: Hughes v. Lord Advocate,  UKHL 1; Jolley v. Sutton London Borough Council,  UKHL 31; Ontario (Minister of Highways) v. Côté,  1 S.C.R. 595.
 This mishap is unlike the rather freakish accidents in which the liability of older children and adolescents for negligence was denied, based on a lack of foreseeability, in McHale v. Watson (1966), 115 C.L.R. 199 (Aus. H.C.) (a thrown piece of welding rod ricocheting off a post) and Mullin v. Richards,  1 All E.R. 920 (C.A.) (a piece of a plastic ruler breaking off during play sword-fighting). In both cases, childish horseplay led to serious eye injuries, but the defendants’ original ill-advised actions set in motion further physical effects that the judges concluded could not have been anticipated.
 This case, I have said, required only the rudimentary foresight that a person who is pushed from behind might fall over and in doing so get injured, something that was well within the capacities of a child in Liam’s situation.
A common occurrence at Trial Management Conferences is adjournment in circumstances where it is clear the time available for trial is insufficient. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, recognizing that this is a “serious penalty” and that in cases where the trial estimate when set was “not unreasonable” an advance payment order may be an appropriate remedy.
 It is common ground that the governing the authority is the decision of Mr. Justice Macfarlane in Serban v. Casselman (1995), 2 B.C.L.R. (3d) 316 (C.A.) leave to appeal ref’d  S.C.C.A. No. 120.
While such orders are often made when the adjournment was brought about through the fault of one party or where the conduct of the litigation demands such an order, the rule is not restricted to matters of that kind. It is obvious that an order for advance payments should only be made in special circumstances. Obviously such an order should not be made unless the judge who makes it is completely satisfied that there is no possibility that the assessment will be less than the amount of the advance payments.
 I think that the current situation meets the requirement of “special circumstances”. This trial was adjourned at the direction of the Court, pursuant to the Supreme Court Civil Rules, because it would exceed the original estimate and the trial schedule could not absorb that excess.
 Based on the material that I had at the trial management conference, I would not have been able to attribute any lack of care or diligence to either counsel for the increase in trial length since it was originally set. Mr. Van Gils’ counsel advised that he had set it for eight days in the specific anticipation that, if his estimate were to be exceeded slightly, the schedule can usually still accommodate a trial of up to ten days.
 When the estimate grew to potentially exceed that upper limit, he was still engaged in pruning his witness list when the defendants concluded that it was appropriate to add further witnesses. Neither approach is unusual in the course of trial preparation and neither is deserving of criticism.
 The penalty for an incorrect estimate is an extremely serious one: a court-compelled adjournment at the trial management conference if the schedule cannot accommodate the new time estimate.
 While this might be an appropriate deterrent for counsel who give their original estimates carelessly or who grossly underestimate the time required, it falls harshly on litigants and counsel whose original estimate was not unreasonable and whose requirement for additional time is based on changing circumstances as the trial grows closer.

References: v. 
 v. 
 UKHL 
 v. 
 UKHL 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.