Source: https://openjurist.org/13/f1d/595
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:39:00+00:00

Document:
Brasher' Brothers, a firm of this city, upon an accepted draft of $1,360. The defendants, in their answer, admitted the execution of the draft, and averred that it was given upon the sale to them of a hundred cases of wine. In that sale certain misrepresentations were made by the agent of the plaintiff as to the quality of the wine, and the demand for it in this state and in the territory of New Mexico. The agent of the plaintiff represented that the wine was as good as foreign champagnes, which was untrue, and also that it was well known to the trade of this state and in New Mexico, and that there was a large trade for the wine in this region of country, and that also was untrue. A great many matters were set up in the answer relating to the negotiation between the parties, and correspondence between them; what took place between them from time to time in reference to this purchase; and the plaintiff maQ,e a motion to strike out some parts of the answer as irrelevant and immaterial, and that motion was sustained'as to all, excepting one clause of the answer, and that clause-reads as follows: ..
"These defendants aver that, after they received the said 100 cases of said wine, they advertised th" same extensively in the newspapers of the state of Colorado, and by circulars and traveling agents', stating that they were the sole and exclusive 'agents for the sale of said wine. at Ilreat expense. to-wit. the expense of $600. " .
AMERICAN WINE CO. V. BBA!SHEB.
"The learned counsel for the respondent insists-First, that the complaint does not show that the appellant was injured by the alleged fraudulent representations and concealment of the respondent, and so fails to state any reason for a rescission of the contract: and, second, that it fails to show that he has returned, or offered to return, the note and mortgage to the respondent before the action was commenced, and in tMt respect, he fails to show himself in a position to demand his purchase money back. "We are inclined to hold that, after answer upon an objection for the first time to its sufficiency, the complaint is sufficient in both respects. In the case of Hazleton v. Union Bank, 32 Wis. 34-43, Justice Lyon, in delivering the opinion, says: . '''The rule is well settled that a greater latitude of presumption may be indulged in to sustain a complaint where the objection that it does not state a cause of action is taken for the first time at the trial, and after an issue of fact has been taken upon it by answer, than where the same objection is taken by demurrer.' rule was stated in Teetshorn v. Hull, 30 Wis. 162-167; HamUn v. Haight, 32 Wis. 238-242: Luth. Ev. Ol/,urch v. Gristzau, 34 Wis. 328: John. son v. Ashl!J,nd Lumber Go. 47 Wis. 326; Johannes v. YO",J,ngs,45 Wis. 445: Wittmann v. Watry, Id. 493. "Under the rule established by the cases cited, we think the complaint sufficiently alleges that the respondent was guilty of making either a fraudulent representation or a fraudulent concealment of the fact that a part of the property described in the mortgage had befiln released before the date of the sale, and that such fraud was injurious to the appellant."
himself testified it was not good wine j that it was in bad when received. But the conclusion of the court evidently is that the plaintiffs in the suit complied with their contract. They then go on to say that"On appellee's own evidence, however, the law is against him, and tlle instructions ought not to have been given without modification. 'fIle doctrine repeatedly announced by this court is tllat a party cannot affirm a contract in part, and rescind it as to the residue. If' he rescind he must do so in toto. He must put the opposite party in as good a condition as he was before the sale, by a return of the property purchased, unles!! it is entirely worthless. And where a. vendee has a right to object that goods delivered are different in quality from those he purchased, he m1.lstdo so within a reasonable time, and before exercising acts of ownership over them. If, oefore objecting to their quality, he exercises any /lct of ownership over them, as by selling a part, etc., he cannot afterwards repudiate the contract, so as to wholly defeat the vendor's claim for the price." .
AMERICAN WINE' CO. V. BRASHER.
"W!:':)re thu right to rescind springs from discovered fraud, there is an exception to the rule. The defrauded party does not lose his right to rescind because the contract has been partly executed, and the parties cannot be fully restored to their former position."
" If you find from the evidence that the defendant, as part of the purchase price of the team, paid a debt due from the plaintiff, and $58 (dollars) money due from her husband's estate, for which the same was liable. then the plaintiff cannot rescind the contract and reclaim the property without placing the defendant in the same position he was before the trade was made, by repaying or offering to repay the money paid out by him. unless. the defendant was guilty of some fraud practiced upon her, and you should find for the defendant; but if you firid he praoticed fraud, she can recover without tendeling what she received from bim."
The court say that this instruction was supported by Mr. Parsons' view of the law, and that it ought to have been given. "The foregoing instruction is in strict accord with this authority. It should, therefore, have been Wven." Whether they would have declared it to be a correct statement of the law if the instruction had coine from the other side, may be somewhat doubtful. It will be observed that the defendant was stating the law against himself, and stating it very drongly, and the court refused to give it as he stated it. The supreme court say the court ought to have complied with his request; but at all events the court seem to have accepted Mr. Parsons' view of the law, and gone a little further than he does, for, as the proposition is there given, it is to the effect that one who has been defrauded is under no obligation whatever to make restitution of what he has taken, and Mr. Parsons does not state .the proposition so strongly as that. In another case, in 32 Vt., the proposition is stated apparently with some care in this way: "But a defra,uded party does not lose his right to rescind beca.use the contract has been in part executed, and the parties cannot. be fully restored to their former position, but he must rescind as soon as the circumstances will permit." That'is the proposition as Mr. Parsons states it, I believe.
AMERICAN WINE 00. tJ. BRA,SHER.
offered to return what he had received upon. the contract, and that the respondent had refused to'receive it and return the purchase money.Thefollowing cases hold the same rule: Bank v. Keep,18 Wis. 209-214 Oorbitt v. I3tonemetz, 15 Wis. 186; McWilliams v. Brooke1uJ, 89 Wis. 334; Ounningham v. lJrown, 44 Wis. 72. ';, "If the vendor in such case is ready to rescind on his part, then it becomes necessary for the purchaser to tender and return to, the vendor all he has received under the contract. When the vendor refuses to do anything in the matter, and the vendee brings his action to recover the purchase price, he must prove on the trial that he is in a condition to restore, to the vendol' what he received upon the contract, and should make restoration upon th(; trial."
The principle, I think, of that case, and of the other one in Ver· mont, and of many cases which I have examined, is that in case of fraud, where the contract has been induced by fraud, that it is not necessary that the party seeking to rescind' the contract should absolutely tender what he has received on account of the contract. . It is necessary that he should give notice of his intention to rescind-that he will not abide by the contract; and it is neces8ary that upon the trial he should be in a situation to put the other party in the situation in which he was at the time of the discovery of the fraud. That the contract is partly executed at the time of the discovery of the fraud will not in itself prevent a rescission, unless it may be that it has gone so far that the subject-matter of the contract has disappeared, or the greater part of it. To illustrate that matter: if these parties had sold all, or nearly all, of the wine, there could be no question about it; but having sold but a small part, as relates to the entire quantity which they were to purchase, which was a car load, I think, by that act, the act being within the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract, they will not be precluded from rescinding it, and the circumstance that, at the time of notifying the plaintiff of their intention to rescind, they did not state to plaintiff that they had sold a portion of this wine, is not controlling; they did express the intention to rescind the contract, and if now they can put the plaintiff in substantially the position he then held, I think they ought to be allowed to rescind. Now, as to the money which was received for this wine, nothing was said about it at the trial. It was not mentioned to the jury in the charge which was given then, and it is fair to assume that it escaped the attention of connsel also; that they were so intent upon maintaining the principle issue. to recover the full amount of this they gave no attention to this subject of the sale of the wine.
If my attention had been called to it, I should have asked the jury to allow upon the damages which they found for the defendants, if they found any, the value of this wine; but nothing was said to them upon the subject, and the presumption is that they made no allowance whatever for it. But the matter is not beyond control. If they did not allow for it, we may do so at this time. The value of that wine can be easily ascertained, and it is competent now to deduct it from the amount returned by the jury. The jury have said in their verdict, with more than usual particularity, "we assess the damages, including freight and storage, to the amount of $323." Under the charge which was given them, as those were the matters submitted to them, and they were advised with reference to the expenditures of defendants for advertisements in their effort to sell .this wine, that they were so indefinite, so difficult to be determined, that they could make no account of them, I have not a doubt that the verdict was for these two items, the storage and the freight. The freight amounted, I believe, to something like $214. I think the value of t.he wine which was sold, to be ascertained, probably, at the rate of $13.60 per case, as that was the rate at which it was all sold, is to be deducted from the allowance of the jury,-that is, if the defendants assent to that,-and on that the motion for new trial will be overruled. There were some other questions presented, as that one witness was absent at the time of the trial, and some other matters which I do not clearly recall, but I think them unworthy of attention, and have no disposition to comment upon them. lithe defendants will deduct from the amount bf their damages whatever these '20 cases of wine come to, I shall be inclined to judgment upon the verdict. Defendants remitted $272 from the damages returned by the jury, and judgment was entered on the verdict.
CASE OF THE l.JHlNESE l\1EIloOllANT.
CASE OF THE CHINESE MERCHANT.
OlIINESB MERCHANT'S CERTIFICATE OF OHINESE GOVERNMENT.
Chinese merchants who resided, on the passage of the act of congress of May 6, 1882, in other count1'ie8 than China, on arriving on a vessel in aport of the gnited States are not required by said act to produce certificates of the Chinese government establishing their as merchants as a cOIimtion of their being allowed to land. Their character as such merchants can .beestablished by parol evidence. The certificate mentioned in sectiOn 6 of that act is evidently designed to facilitate proof by Chinese, other than laborers, coming from Chma and desiring to enter the United States, that they were not of the prohibited class. The particulars which the certificate must contain show that it was to be given by the Chinese gO,vernment to those then residing there, as their place of residence in China is to be stated. 2.
The act of May 6, 1882, was intended to carry out the prOVisions of the supplementary treaty of November, 1880, modifying the treaty of 1868 between China and the United States, and its purpose must be held to be what the treaty authorized,-to put a restriction upon the emigration of laborers, including those skilled in any art or trade,-and not to interfere with the COmmercial relations between China and this country, by excluding Chinese merchants, or putting unnecessary and embarrassing restrictions upon their coming to .this . country.
All laws are to be so cbnstrued as to avoid an unjust or absurd and general terms are to be so limited in their application as not to lead to justice, oppression, or an .absurd consequence.
CHINEB:\ll <MERCHANT COMING FROM CHINA-EvIIlENCE.
Whether a Chinese merchant, teacher, etc., arriving from China and failing to produce the certificate required by section 6, could by satisfactory evidence of his real character overcome the presumption that he is a lal>:orer raised by the absence of the certificate, and establish right secured by the treaty to go and come of his own free wilJ and accord, it is not necessary to decide in this case. HOFFMAN, D. J.
McAllister d Bergin, for petitioner. Milton Andros, for respondent. Philip Teare, Dist. Atty., for collector of port.

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