Source: https://www.lawbreed.com/site/blog/2018/12/06/expediting-the-court-process-through-the-appropriate-use-of-case-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:14:42+00:00

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”The essence of the administration of Justice, it must be emphasized, is to make access to Justice as quickly and cheap as possible” – Per Onu JSC ( as he then was ) in ELABANJO & ANOR V. DAWODU (2006) 6-7 SC 24 @ 48 page 35.
Over reliance on the use of numbered ratios by counsel has engendered laziness with improper case citation practice. The proper way and manner to cite a judgment, as we have learnt, is to refer first to the title of such case, the law Report in which it is reported, then the page in which it is reported and if there is any point of emphasis in any particular page, then that particular page or paragraph should be referred to as the case may be. I state with humility that it is not good practice to cite a judgment by reference to numbered ratios which more often than not, is nothing more than a written opinion of what the Editor perceives the Honourable Court to have said. The better way, I believe is to cite a judgment by reference to the direct pronouncement of the court, and not the Editor’s summary of same. The practice therefore, of citing cases by reference to numbered ratios should have no place in legal practice and should be seriously discouraged by the Bar and the Bench. The Supreme Court in the case of FRANCHAL v. NIGERIA ARAB BANK LTD. (2000) 6 S.C. (PT. I) 1 at 12 Per Uwais CJN; (as he then was) held thus; “It is hazy for counsel to rely on headnotes in Law Reports instead of reading the whole of the facts of the case he is relying on to see how relevant the decision in the case is to his own case”.
”My lords, the utility of precedents or the application of the doctrine of stare-decisis in the administration of justice cannot be over-emphasized. Muhammed, JSC; in ADO V. STATE (2017) 4 SC (Pt II) 96 @ III page 20 -25. Under the doctrine, decisions of superior courts are binding on inferior courts. Thus, in the hierarchical system of courts we operate in this country, the decision of the Supreme Court is binding on all other courts. See Suleiman v. C.O. P (2008) 2-3 S.C. (Pt. 1) 185 and Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) 4 S.C (Pt. II) 1.
Counsel should spare no effort in ensuring that he does not elevate an opinion rendered obiter to the status of a ratio. This is because the consequence can be grave and devastating to both Litigants and Counsel. See the case of COLLINS OBIH v. SAM MBAKWE (1984) 1 S.C 246, heavily relied upon by the appellant in BUHARI & ORS. v. OBASANJO & ORS. (2003) 11 S.C. 74 @ 82 – 84 Para 40 –50 in pressing for orders of injunction to restrain the swearing-in of the President-Elect whose election was being challenged. It turned out that the passage at pages 254-255 Para 15 – 35 of COLLINS OBI V. MBAKWE (supra) Per OBASEKI, JSC; (as he then was) was a mere obiter.
Head notes in Law Reports are only helpful if the Editor has done a good job in crafting it, otherwise Counsel may be mislead. It therefore, behoves Counsel and the Court to be on the lookout for misleading or incorrect Head notes.
“The editorial heading in Law Reports could be misleading as to the context of the judgment reported and courts must be extra careful in relying on such headings before verifying the context”.
Counsel and the Court, must appreciate the place of leading judgments vis-a-vis concurring and dissenting judgments in appellate decisions. It is the leading Judgment that is in Legal circles, regarded as the Judgment of the Court, being representative of consensus of opinion of the entire panel that read the Judgment, where the decision is unanimous or at least majority thereof as the Case may be – see BUHARI & ORS V. OBASANJO & ORS (2003) 11 SC 74 @ 82 – 84 Page 40 – 50. This is not to say that contributory Judgments have no value, given that it is a constitutional requirement that each Justice renders his opinion in every case he hears.
I make bold to say, that where counsel assist the Court through the correct application of case law, not only do we help to expedite the early determination of cases, we also help our practice because as decided in the case of HIRAT ADERINSOLA BALOGUN v. THE NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. (1978) 3 SC. (reprint) 111 a solicitor in practice is not in the same category as a “trader”, even though he is one “in business” and for that matter “commercial business”. In other words, while we as Legal Practitioners are in “Commercial business” we are not in the category of “traders “and should not practice as if we are. Afterall to whom much is given, much is expected.
One perhaps, would be correct to assume, that virtually every lawyer gathered in this hall is “a solicitor in practice” engaged in a way in “commercial business” for reward. But how much of understanding have we shown in managing ourselves, our business and expected Leadership role in the society?
Looked at from whatever perspective, delay in the disposal of cases, cannot be business like; nor in the interest of Justice. Except perhaps for lawyers who allow themselves to be maintained by clients/ litigants based on the number of appearances in Court. Avoidable repeated Court appearances in a given case, makes no business sense. Filing and pursuing cases that obviously by Law, particularly Case law, stand no chance, does the profession no good and belittles our calling and learning. To continue to seek the postponement of the hearing of cases and therefore prevent their early determination, for no genuine reason, than lack of knowledge does no good to our profession, nor the cause of justice.
If we, as Lawyers over time remind ourselves, of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in BALOGUN’S case (supra) and become business like in the handling of our briefs, perhaps this trend of avoidable delays that has bedeviled the administration of Justice in Nigeria would be alleviated.
The challenge for us therefore, is that we should begin to seriously explore more practical ways by which we can safely deploy case law to expedite the early determination of cases.
Secondly, ownership of land may be proved by production of documents of title which must, of course be duly authenticated in the sense that their due execution must be proved, unless they are produced from proper custody in circumstances giving rise to the presumption in favour of due execution in the case of documents twenty years old or more at the date of the contract (see section 129 of the Evidence Act and Johnson v. Lawanson (1971) 1 All NLR p.56). .
Thirdly, acts of the person (or persons) claiming the land such as selling, leasing or renting out all or part of the land, or farming on it or on a portion of it, are also evidence of ownership, provided the acts extend over a sufficient length of time and are numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference that the person is the true owner (see Ekpo v. Ita NLR p.68).
Fourthly, acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land may also be prima facie evidence of ownership of the particular piece or quantity of land with reference to which such acts are done (see Section 45 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 62). Such acts of long possession, in a claim of declaration of title (as distinct from a claim for trespass? are really a weapon more of defence than of offence; moreover under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, while possession may raise a presumption of ownership, it does not do more and cannot stand when another proves a good title (see DaCosta v. Ikomi (1968) 1 All NLR 394 at page 398).
The above, no doubt are clear statements of the law and guidelines that can be honestly and professionally applied by business like practitioners in advising their clients, over such claims. Indeed every serious Lawyer and the court with due respect, ought to identify on the pleadings whether a Claimant relies on one or more of such grounds or not. Once done, evidence can then be limited to only such ground or grounds as the case may be and where the averments in the pleading does not evince any of the grounds, I believe such a claim for title, should not be on the cause list, beyond the pre-trial conference period.
“Once pleadings are ordered, filed and exchanged, the parties, and indeed the courts, are bound by them. The implication, therefore, is that evidence must be led in accordance with the averments therein. That explains the impregnable prescription that evidence which is not in conformity with the pleadings go to no issue, Okoko v. Dakolo (2006) 7 S.C. (Pt. Ill) 84.
This ubiquitous principle in the vocabulary of Pleadings applies with equal force whether the pleadings and evidence are those of the Plaintiff or the Defendants, Akinloye v. Eyiyola (1968) NMLR 92, 95; Alii v. Alesinloye (2000) 4 S.C. (Pt. I) 111; Obulor v. Oboro (2001) 4 S.C. (Pt. 1) 77. As this court had, once, explained, the rationale behind this principle of law is that by our adversary system of civil procedure in the high court, facts are first erected on the pleadings before the trial of the case. This is to foreclose the likelihood of springing surprises at the trial and to circumscribe the compass or breadth of divergences. This inviolable or sacrosanct rule is only subject to the fairly liberal rules appertaining to the amendment of pleadings.
It is equally trite that evidence is not to be pleaded but material facts – See: PURIFICATION TECHNIQUE & 3 ORS V. JUBRIL & 9 ORS (2012) 6 S.C. (Pt. II) 1 @ 47.
“The duty of a court as an arbiter is to act for the benefit of all parties. It follows therefore that an amendment which will serve the interest of the justice of the case is beneficial to all parties and should be allowed and granted. The caveat however is also true that if an amendment is sought either in bad faith, for purpose of undermining the case of the opponent or is simply done with the intention of giving the party seeking same to have a second bite at the cherry, then such should not be allowed.
Now with such clear guidelines, one cannot but wonder why we spend so much valuable time, in some cases years contending over Applications to amend pleadings? It is unfortunate, that the Court Rules which in some states permitted counsel to consent to amendments of pleadings without the necessity of formal Applications in Court were jettisoned. It was only where counsel withheld consent that such Applications were taken in open Court. I believe it is time, to restore such provisions, which apparently recognized that counsel, should be able to determine such matters based on Case Law and the Rules of Court.
on the non-discernable Judgment of the Trial Court ordered a non-suit on the grounds that “it was impossible for this court to determine on which side the scale of Justice should tilt”.
This was unfortunately after Twenty Two (22) years of the parties being in court! What a waste of time, energy and resources. See: ODOFIN V. MOGAJI & ORS (1978) 4 S.C. (Reprint) 53 (decided 28th April, 1978) where the Supreme Court gave clear guiding principles on Judgment writing. Given the volume of binding judicial authorities on Judgment writing today, I venture to suggest with due respect , that the kind of blunder that occasioned the Supreme Court ordering rehearing de novo in OJOGBUE V. NNUBIA (1972) 6 S.C. (Reprint ) 127 @ 132 Page 15 – 35 should be rare in our Judicial Administration.See: ALIBO&2Ors v. OKUSIN & Ors (2010) 3-5 SC ( pt 1) 41 @ 64-66 paras 25-35 and USIOBAIFO v. USIOBAIFO (2005) 1 SC (pt 11) 60 @77 paras 20-40 on qualities of a good judgment .
In the same manner, it serves no useful purpose applying for the conduct of trial- within-a-trial where an accused denies making a statement. See; NWANGBOMU V. THE STATE (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt 327) 380 at 392 S.C; STATE V. GWANGWAN (2015) 2-3 S.C 111 @131 -133 as opposed to contending that he made it under duress. See; IGAGO V. THE STATE (1999) 10 – 12 S.C 84 @ 104 PARA 5 – 15 The two circumstances differ. There is no harm too in knowing when certain defences will just not wash e.g. insanity or intoxication- see Ekanu v. The State (1980) 3-4 S.C. (Reprint) 1 at 10 para. 15-30. These are without prejudice to other issues that may be legitimately urged on the court on behalf of the accused.
“Counsel for the Appellants and the 1st Respondent praying in aid Section 246 (3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) contended, and rightly too, that decisions of the lower court on appeals from the National and State House of Assembly Tribunal are final. This has long been settled.
… dealt with the meaning and breadth this Section (246 (3) of the 1999 Constitution) on numerous occasions. Only a handful of these decisions would be cited in this judgment, Qpara & Anor v. Amadi (2013) 6-7 SC (Pt. II) 49; Madumere v. Okwara (2013) 6-7 SC (Pt. II) 95; Okadigbo v.Emeka & Ors. (2012) 1 S.C. (Pt. IV) Emordi v. lgeke (2011) 4 SC (Pt. II)107, 145; Salik v. ldris (2014) 5 S.C.(Pt. II/) 45; Dangana v. Usman (2012) 2S.C. (Pt. Ill) 103; Onuaguluchi v. Ndu & Ors. (2001) 3 S.C. 48; Salik v. ldris(2014) 5 S.C. (Pt. II) 45; Jegede v.Akande (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt 1432) 43,72.
In conclusion, what I have tried to do by the above brief Address, which is not exhaustive, is to provoke our thoughts, on the subject of overcoming delays that often bedevil court proceedings, through appropriate use of case law. The subject of delay in proceedings is not new with it’s debilitating effect on the litigant, counsel and the society. Some have said and perhaps rightly so, that delay is one major contributory factor to poverty in the profession and lack of experience by juniors! Yet without well grounded juniors in the art of Litigation, the future of the profession and indeed quality of the bench in the future, becomes suspect. I believe that by appropriate use of case law, we may make some progress in ameliorating the situation. Human nature can be complex and tricky. Indeed litigation in particular, can be tricky and sometimes ‘justice rushed can be justice crushed’. Besides, there is hardly a’ one size fit all’ solution to legal issues, because after all ‘cases are like faces that sometimes look alike but are hardly the same.’ Notwithstanding, as learned gentlemen, it serves no useful purpose taking coal to Newcastle over and over again, on principles that are settled ( as it happened in APC & 2 Ors v. KARFI & 2 Ors -(Supra) when we can use our best professional endeavors to help resolve matters more quickly, by offering appropriate advise to our clients and assisting the court with helpful submissions. With appropriate use of Case Law, we can help free the Court’s Docket of causes that ought not linger. I believe this can be done, without compromising the essence of justice. The time to bring to bear our learning and respected status as gentlemen, with a deep understanding of the law is now , so that we can fare better and the law can better work , for the good of our society .
* ADDRESS DELIVERED BY LAYI BABATUNDE, SAN; FCTI; EDITOR IN CHIEF, JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA (S.C. REPORTS) AT THE 2017 ANNUAL LAW WEEK OF THE NIGERIA BAR ASSOCIATION, LAGOS BRANCH HELD MAY 24-27 2017.

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