Source: https://iplegalcorner.com/identical-or-confusingly-similar-to-trademarks-but-noninfringing-domain-names/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:21:29+00:00

Document:
Domain names may be confusingly similar to trademarks or even identical or but not infringing. This is particularly true of trademarks acquired later than the allegedly infringing domain names ArcBest Corporation v. Domains By Proxy, LLC, Registration Private / Vernon Troupe, D2016-2381 (WIPO January 13, 2017) (<arcbest.com>, in which “ark” is a contraction of “Arkansas”), but it can also apply to marks composed of common element that predate domain name registration, most recently World Future Society v. S.F.P. Koopmans, BCG eBrpojects B.V., D2016-2347 (WIPO January 13, 2017) (<worldfuturesociety.com>, Complainant U.S. and Respondent the Netherlands) in which the Panel examined the Respondent’s use of the domain name and concluded that “since the registration of the Domain Name over 13 years ago the Domain Name has been used to operate a website for the Respondent to occasionally blog about matters of personal interest, including the Respondent’s own politics.” Geographic location of the parties is also a factor in terms of proving knowledge of the mark.
In the first class of cases, trademark owners have no actionable claim in a UDRP proceeding, although they continue to initiate proceedings, sometimes sanctioned with reverse domain name hijacking as in Georg Mez AG v. Mez Kalra, D2016-1932 (WIPO January 6, 2017) (<mez.com>) and Easton Corp Pty Ltd v. Privacydotlink Customer 951873 / DNS Admin, Best Web Limited, D2016-1975 (WIPO November 12, 2016( (<hottie.com>), and sometimes (surprisingly) avoiding sanction as in MAS S.A.S. v. Joseph Kattampally, D2016-2408 (WIPO January 12, 2017) (<maaji.com>); Quintaz B.V. and Hoooked B.V. v. Whoisguard Protected, Whoisguard, Inc. / Terry Lee, D2016-2470 (WIPO January 9, 2016) (<hooked.com>); and The Lincoln Electric Company v. Assistant Mailroom Clerk Trainee / EXISTech Corporation, FA1611001704079 (Forum January 8, 2017) (<weartech.com>).
has established that, as one might expect, the term ‘MEZ’ is in widespread use, particularly as an acronym and that the disputed domain name is part of a pattern of similar three-letter domain names owned by it.” The Panel noted in its sanctions discussion that “Complainant … failed by a large margin.” It sanctioned Complainant for commencing a “Plan B” proceeding primarily because of its lack of candor and for failure to offer any evidence of bad faith.
Unless complainants marshal proof respondents intended to take advantage of their trademarks, registrations will not be disturbed. This affirms the law that monopoly on words, names, symbols, or devices extends only so far. The Panel adjudicating rights to <camilla.com>, for example, got it wrong in awarding the domain name to Complainant on the theory that a later mark can have superior rights. We can infer “getting it wrong” from the result in a subsequent action under the ACPA in which the trademark owner (appearing as defendant) consented to a judgment ordering the UDRP award vacated in its entirety. Mrs. Jello, LLC v. Camilla Australia Pty Ltd. 15-cv-08753 (D. NJ 8/1/2016).
There’s another reason for complainants’ disappointment, namely that respondents have learned their lessons well in choosing their acquisitions, populating their websites, and retaining experienced counsel. The argument in CIA, for example, that the decade old lapse supported acquiescence is particularly creative. Clients and counsel lacking an informed knowledge of the evidentiary demands of the UDRP will overlook supporting facts.
This case and others illustrates an important point, namely that respondents have learned to play to their strengths. This includes establishing a proper counter-narrative. There’s no point in alleging actual or constructive knowledge because a respondent’s denial of knowledge is notoriously difficult to refute (unless respondent has failed to pay attention to its own evidentiary demands).
Shorts strings of random letters (random that is to respondents even though they may be acronyms to complainants) comprise one subset of weak marks. Another subset are dictionary word marks either alone or combined with other common words capable of standing alone with other associations distinctive from complainant’s mark or are making bona fide offers of goods or services.
ROSEFIELD is an interesting example. Rosefield Watches B.V. v. Bryan Wick, Cheapyellowpages.com, D2016-2187 (WIPO December 15, 2016) (<rosefield.com>). Pro se Respondent (making all the right arguments) indicated there are at least four possibilities for non-infringing use: 1) the geographic name of places located in the United States, such as Rosefield, Illinois, Rosefield, North Dakota, Rosefield, South Dakota and Rosefield, Louisiana; 2) a generic expression meaning “in roses” or a field of roses; 3) a generic term used in numerous unrelated trademarks worldwide; and 4) a surname.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.