Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/36/171.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 01:12:06+00:00

Document:
Lee G. Lipscomb, Brian D. Depew and Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack for Plaintiff and Appellant.
David C. Werner, Douglas M. Degrave and Stockdale, Peckham, Estes & Werner for Defendants and Respondents.
We are called upon to consider the circumstances and procedure appropriate to the issuance, by an appellate court, of a peremptory writ of mandate in the "first instance," i.e., without prior issuance of an alternative writ.
Plaintiff in this negligence action appeals from a summary judgment for defendants which the trial court entered in obedience to such a peremptory writ from the Court of Appeal. The petition which defendants filed in the Court of Appeal did not seek a peremptory writ in the first instance, and the court did not notify plaintiff that such relief was being considered. The record does not reflect an invitation by the court to respondent or real party in interest to file opposition, and none was filed. Finally, instead of an order for the writ, the appellate court issued a document purporting to constitute the writ itself.
Plaintiff questions the propriety of the summary judgment, contending that there are triable issues of material fact, but the preliminary question we must decide is whether he is precluded from raising that question now, by reason of his failure to seek review of the appellate court's prior action. [36 Cal. 3d 176] Defendants argue that when plaintiff failed to petition this court for a hearing the "writ" became final, was res judicata, and constituted the law of the case.
For reasons we shall explain, a peremptory writ ought not be issued in the first instance by an appellate court unless the respondent, and real party in interest, have notice that such a procedure is being considered, or at least requested, and have either filed a response on the merits or been given the opportunity to do so. Moreover, the proper procedure is for the appellate court to issue an order or decision calling for issuance of the writ, rather than the writ itself, so as to provide opportunity for review before the writ becomes operative. Since the form in which the writ was issued in this case combined elements of both an order and a writ, and because the order was not filed as an order or decision of the court, it did not appear, at least, to be a decision subject to the provisions of rule 28(b) of the California Rules of Court. Accordingly, we shall conclude that plaintiff's failure to petition this court for a hearing on the writ did not require that the writ be given res judicata effect. Reaching the merits of the appeal, we shall also conclude that because triable issues of fact are present the judgment must be reversed.
On April 25, 1980, Richard Palma, appellant herein, filed a complaint for damages in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Count one sought recovery for personal injuries naming as defendants U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (Fasteners), Maynard Greenberg, Victor R. Castro, David Valdez, and "Does 1 through 50 inclusive." That count alleged that on May 6, 1979, Fasteners owned a truck which Castro and Valdez drove negligently causing it to run over and injure Palma.
Count two alleged negligent hiring and supervision of, and entrustment to, Castro. Count three alleged negligent supervision by three "Doe" defendants of premises on which the conduct of certain Does constituted a threat to the safety of others and caused damage to Palma.
Fasteners moved for summary judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, fn. 1 supporting the motion with affidavits showing that Castro, a former employee of Fasteners, had stolen the truck and had driven it to the home of Castro's former wife where the injury to Palma occurred. Fasteners asserted that Castro had not been negligent, that he was neither a permissive user of the truck nor an agent or employee of Fasteners, and [36 Cal. 3d 177] that as the victim of a theft Fasteners was neither negligent nor liable for the injury caused by the stolen truck.
Castro also moved for summary judgment, but on April 26, 1982, the trial court denied both motions fn. 2 in an order reciting that triable issues of material fact were presented on the issue of negligence.
The superior court complied with the writ on October 7, 1982, by entry of a minute order granting summary judgment. This appeal followed.
[1a] The Court of Appeal has original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of mandate, jurisdiction which it shares with this court and the superior courts. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) In the exercise of that jurisdiction it may, upon ascertaining that the petition is in proper form and states a basis for relief, issue an alternative writ which commands the respondent to act in conformity with the prayer of the petition or, alternatively, show cause before the Court of Appeal why it should not be ordered to so act. (§ 1087.) fn. 4 The respondent may choose to act in conformity with the prayer, [36 Cal. 3d 178] in which case the petition becomes moot; otherwise, the respondent and/or the real party in interest may file a written return setting forth the factual and legal bases which justify the respondent's refusal to do so. (§ 1089; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 56(c).)  The matter is then a "cause" to be decided "in writing with reasons stated," as required by article VI, section 14 of the Constitution. fn. 5 [1b] The issues joined by the petition and return must therefore be decided by the Court of Appeal in a written opinion. (People v. Medina, supra, 6 Cal. 3d 484, 490.) If the court concludes that a peremptory writ of mandate should be granted, the opinion will direct that it issue. If not, the petition will be denied.
The Code Commissioner's notes to section 1088 indicate that a 1907 amendment to that section "[r]equires a copy of the petition for a writ of mandate to be served with the alternative writ, or with the notice of application for the peremptory writ" (italics added), and an early case makes reference to a "relator" (petitioner) who "proceeds by petition and notice for the peremptory writ, without procuring an alternative writ." (People v. Supervisors of S. F. (1865) 27 Cal. 655, 684, italics added; see also People v. Turner, supra, 1 Cal. 143, 151 ["notice of the application having been given, and copies of the papers served, the court may award either an alternative or peremptory mandamus, according to the exigency of the case"].) Thus, it appears that the notice requirement in section 1088 was intended to place the respondent and real party in interest on notice, in the absence of an alternative writ, that a peremptory writ might issue.
Defendants contend that a formal request for issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is unnecessary because a party served with a petition for writ of mandate should be charged, as a matter of law, with knowledge of that possibility. Given the rarity of that procedure, however, there is a large gap between possibility and practical anticipation. Express notice at least serves to close the gap, particularly in the case of the litigant who may not be familiar with appellate practice.
We are mindful that a formal request for issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance does not provide the same level of notice as the issuance of an alternative writ, since the latter conveys a tentative opinion of the court that a peremptory writ might be in the offing, while the former reflects merely the hopes of a litigant. When responding to a petition for an alternative [36 Cal. 3d 180] writ in the Court of Appeal, the litigant often confronts a practical dilemma. Faced with the possibility of action ranging from outright denial of the petition to the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance, the real party may feel obliged to respond with a full scale barrage of legal armament under circumstances in which a narrowly targeted argument, or perhaps no argument at all, would suffice.
We therefore strongly approve the practice which, we are informed, exists in some districts and divisions of the Courts of Appeal, to routinely request informal opposition prior to the issuance of an alternative or peremptory writ. By eliminating the necessity for full scale response where such a response is unnecessary, such a practice helps to reduce the cost of litigation to the parties; and by encouraging opposition when the court is about to act affirmatively on a petition, it helps to conserve judicial resources as well. In the case of a peremptory writ in the first instance, such a practice helps also to assure that the respondent, or real party, has had full opportunity to oppose what may turn out to be the final, and to his interests adverse, resolution of a legal issue.
 We conclude that "due notice" under section 1088 requires, at a minimum, that a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition not issue in the first instance unless the parties adversely affected by the writ have received notice, from the petitioner or from the court, that the issuance of such a writ in the first instance is being sought or considered. In addition, an appellate court, absent exceptional circumstances, should not issue a peremptory writ in the first instance without having received, or solicited, opposition from the party or parties adversely affected.
In this case neither of those procedural safeguards is present. Their absence is not determinative of the question before us, however, since the trial court has already acted in accordance with the writ. We turn, therefore, to consideration of the asserted procedural defect in the writ itself, and to the impact on the instant appeal from the judgment entered pursuant to that writ.
The same distinction between the judgment or decision directing that the writ issue, and the writ itself, applies when the peremptory writ is issued in the first instance. In both situations a judgment or order directing that the writ issue must be entered by the court before the writ may be issued by an appellate court. (§ 1095; People v. Berger (1955) 44 Cal. 2d 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509]; cf. Healy v. Stationers Corp. (1964) 228 Cal. App. 2d 601 [39 Cal. Rptr. 679].) fn. 9  That judgment or order is an appealable judgment [36 Cal. 3d 182] if made by a superior court (§ 1110) or is a decision subject to a petition for hearing in this court if made by a Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 28.) A Court of Appeal lacks authority either to issue a peremptory writ without prior entry of an order directing its issuance or to make such an order final forthwith, thereby to permit the immediate issuance of the writ itself without opportunity for review of the order by this court.
In this case the document issued by the Court of Appeal was a hybrid, unknown to jurisprudential taxonomy. It was indisputably a writ. It was so entitled; it was attested by the clerk of the Court of Appeal; and it bore the seal of the clerk. All of these indicia are attributes of a writ, not of a judicial decision or order. The document also bore the initials of those justices who directed that it issue, and it recited that a previously issued stay was to remain in effect "pending finality of this writ." The document was not, however, filed with the clerk as a decision or order; nor had there been a prior order filed directing that a writ issue. fn. 10 Plaintiff was thereby denied any opportunity to seek a hearing in this court upon the filing of an order for the issuance of the writ.
 Similar considerations lead us to reject Fasteners' alternative argument that reconsideration of the merits is barred by the law of the case doctrine. Although that doctrine is generally applicable in writ proceedings as well as appeals (see Price v. Civil Service Com. (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 257, 267, fn. 5 [161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 604 P.2d 1365]), it has no application here where the plaintiff had no notice that the writ might issue and opportunity for review by this court on petition for hearing was foreclosed by the manner in which the writ issued.
We turn now to plaintiff's argument that entry of summary judgment for Fasteners was error.
In his opposition to the motion, plaintiff argued that Fastener's large commercial truck had been left unlocked with keys in it overnight in an open parking lot located in a high crime industrial area, and thus the special circumstances necessary to impose a duty of care were present. The declaration of Greenberg attached to Fasteners' motion, and the deposition of Castro relied on by plaintiff reflect triable issues as to whether Fasteners' trucks are locked at night or left with keys in them. Greenberg declared that the trucks are locked at the end of each day, and at no time are the keys left in them. Castro testified at his deposition that when he went to Fasteners' premises on May 6, 1979, he found the first truck unlocked and took the second which was unlocked, had a window open, and had keys inside.
The opposition was supported also with a declaration by Thomas Reddin, owner of a security service and former Chief of Police of Los Angeles stating that the City of Vernon, in which the truck was stolen, has an extremely high transient population, numerous bars, graffiti indicative of gang-type activity, and a high incidence of crime. fn. 12 The court was also asked to take judicial notice of the deposition of Victor Castro in which Castro had testified that the truck he had been driving was a flatbed, stake truck that he had taken from the open unfenced lot in front of Fasteners' property. The door and window of the truck were open. He had first entered another truck which was also open. The keys to the second truck were in the glove compartment.
Taken together the evidence in these documents is sufficient to establish triable issues of fact as to whether the circumstances in which Fasteners' truck was left created a foreseeable risk of harm that was unreasonable and thus imposed on Fasteners a duty of care to prevent harm to third persons by refraining from creating that risk.
Whether Fasteners could foresee that leaving its truck overnight, unlocked, on a lot adjacent to the street, in this industrial city with a transient population and a high crime rate, was an invitation to theft (see Enders v. Apcoa, Inc. (1976) 55 Cal. App. 3d 897 [127 Cal.Rptr. 751]) by persons not competent to safely operate the trucks and who might cause serious injury or damage to third persons and their property while attempting to operate the trucks is a question of fact for the jury to determine.
Bird, C. J., Mosk, J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.
U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., et al., Petitioners, v. Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, Respondent.
Richard Palma, Real Party in Interest.
Respondent court is required to vacate and set aside the order made on or about April 26, 1982 denying petitioners' motion for summary judgment, and enter a new and different order granting said motion. (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal. 2d 60 [271 P.2d 23]).
Pending the finality of this writ, the stay previously issued by this court shall remain in full force and effect.
Witness the Honorable Lester Wm. Roth, Presiding Justice of Division Two of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District.
Attest my hand and the seal of this court this 26th day of July, 1982.
FN 1. Al further references to code sections are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
FN 2. For reasons that are not apparent from the record the motion by Fasteners was treated as one by both Fasteners and Greenberg.
FN 3. A copy of this document is attached as an exhibit to this opinion.
FN 4. Section 1087: "The writ may be either alternative or peremptory. The alternative writ must command the party to whom it is directed immediately after the receipt of the writ, or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be performed, or to show cause before the court at a time and place then or thereafter specified by court order why he has not done so. The peremptory writ must be in a similar form, except that the words requiring the party to show cause why he has not done as commanded must be omitted."
FN 6. Section 1088: "When the application to the court is made without notice to the adverse party, and the writ is allowed, the alternative must first be issued; but if the application is upon due notice and the writ is allowed, the peremptory may be issued in the first instance. With the alternative writ and also with any notice of an intention to apply for the writ, there must be served on each person against whom the writ is sought a copy of the petition. The notice of the application, when given, must be at least ten days. The writ cannot be granted by default. The case must be heard by the court, whether the adverse party appears or not."
Because the decision to grant a peremptory writ, unlike the summary denial of a petition seeking a writ, is determinative of a "cause" within the meaning of article VI, section 14 (see fn. 5, ante; see People v. District Court of Appeal (1924) 193 Cal. 19, 20 [222 P. 353]), the order directing that it issue must, however, "be in writing with reasons stated."
FN 7. Section 1107: "When an application is filed for the issuance of any prerogative writ, the application shall be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof upon the respondent and the real party in interest named in such application. ... Within five days after service and filing of the application, the real party in interest or the respondent or both may serve upon the applicant and file with the court points and authorities in opposition to the granting of the writ.
"The court in which the application is filed, in its discretion and for good cause, may grant the application ex parte, without notice or service of the application as herein provided. [¶] ...."
Sections 1088.5 and 1089.5, added in 1982, as amended in 1983, now provide that if a petition filed in a trial court does not pray for an alternative writ, the time within which the respondent, and by implication the real party in interest, may reply is 30 days.
FN 8. Rule 24(a): "... A decision of a Court of Appeal becomes final as to that court 30 days after filing, except that the decision becomes final as to that court immediately after filing upon the denial of a petition for a writ within its original jurisdiction or a writ of supersedeas, without issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause ...."
FN 9. A superior court may direct that a writ of mandate issue contemporaneously with rendition of the judgment (see Weisman v. Board of B. & S. Commrs. (1927) 85 Cal. App. 493 [259 P. 768]), and in one recent case in which an appeal was attempted from a superior court writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal suggested that the writ issued in that case might be itself treated as a judgment. (Healdsburg Police Officers Assn. v. City of Healdsburg (1976) 57 Cal. App. 3d 444, 456 [129 Cal. Rptr. 216].) However, section 1095 requires that a judgment precede issuance of a writ of mandate. Therefore, when that judgment is rendered by a Court of Appeal both the California Constitution which authorizes this court to transfer a cause pending in a Court of Appeal to itself before the decision becomes final (art. VI, § 12) and the Rules of Court preclude issuance of the writ before the judgment or order directing that it issue has been filed and has become final.
FN 10. The handwritten order on the face of the petition was never entered by the clerk or transmitted to the parties as required by California Rules of Court, rule 24(a), and the document entitled "Peremptory Writ" issued well before that order could have become final had it been entered.
FN 11. Rule 28: "(a) Within 30 days after a decision of a Court of Appeal becomes final as to that court, the Supreme Court, on its own motion, or on petition as provided in subdivision (b), may order the cause transferred to itself for hearing and decision, and within the original 30-day period or any extension thereof the Supreme Court may for good cause extend the time for one or more additional periods not to exceed a total of an additional 60 days.
"(b) A party seeking a hearing must serve and file a petition therefor within 10 days after the decision of the Court of Appeal becomes final as to that court ...."
FN 12. Fasteners claims that this declaration was objected to as inadmissible hearsay based on out of date statistics. The record does not confirm the assertion that this objection was made or, if made, was sustained. Not only does Fasteners fail to support the assertion with citation to the record, but the minutes of the superior court recite that the motion was submitted on the points and authorities and declarations filed, and upon consideration of these items was denied.
FN 13. We note that two Court of Appeal opinions have questioned the continued viability of Richards in light of subsequent legal developments and empirical research (Hosking v. San Pedro Marine, Inc. (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104-105, fn. 4 [159 Cal. Rptr. 369]; Kiick v. Levias (1980) 113 Cal. App. 3d 399 [169 Cal.Rptr. 859]). The parties here have not argued that question, however, and in light of our conclusion we have no occasion to reach it.

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