Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/218/258/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:43:10+00:00

Document:
One court ought to deal with the whole matter in litigation even where the law of different jurisdictions is involved; foreign law may be ascertained and acted upon and rights depending thereon protected.
Where riparian rights of several parcels of land in different states but on the same river are involved, the courts of both states have concurrent jurisdiction, and the court first seized should proceed to determination without interference.
Quaere whether notice to an individual in regard to his property is not notice to a corporation organized by him after such notice and to which he conveys his property.
Where, as in this case, cross-bills are maintainable, jurisdiction in respect to them follows that over the principal bill.
suits, other defendants in the bill brought by Miller & Lux brought a cross-bill against their codefendant Rickey to establish their priority as against him. In 1906, the bills in these present cases were brought by Miller & Lux, and defendants other than Rickey in the original Miller & Lux suit, to restrain proceedings in the California actions on the ground that the United States court for Nevada had acquired jurisdiction before the California actions were begun. Injunctions were granted as prayed, and now are before this Court for review. 152 F. 11, aff'g 146 F. 574, 581, 588.
"concurrence between the two states, the one, so to speak, offering the right, the other permitting it to be accepted. Mannville Co. v. Worcester, 138 Mass. 89."
person to achieve such a result. Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co., 15 How. 233, 56 U. S. 242-244; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87; Norris v. Chambres, 29 Beav. 246, 253-254, s.c., 3 De G. F. & J. 583, 584. It is conceivable, to be sure, that the decisions of this Court may determine that the states have rights as against each other in invitum in streams that flow through the land of both. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 206 U. S. 84; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 200 U. S. 519-520. These rights may vary according to the system of law required by natural conditions. They may be more or less analogous to common law rights between upper and lower proprietors, where irrigation is not necessary, as in most of the older states. See New York v. Pine, 185 U. S. 93, 185 U. S. 96. There may be some, perhaps limited, right of appropriation in the upper state at least in the watershed of the stream, where irrigation is the condition of using the land. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 206 U. S. 100-104, 206 U. S. 117. But, whatever this Court may decide, if a private owner should derive advantage from such a decision it would not be in his own right, but by reason of and subordinate to the rights of his state, and those rights, the petitioner insists, can, or at least should be, determined only in a suit brought by the state itself.
But if for any reason the foregoing argument should not have prevailed as against Rickey if he had brought the actions in California after the beginning of the suit in Nevada, the present petitioner is not affected by the proceedings against Rickey, as they were purely personal, and did not concern a purchaser of land outside the jurisdiction. To affect a purchaser with a suit against his vendor, it is said that at least the res must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the suit is brought. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1.
of Miller & Lux involve a relation between parcels of land that cannot be brought within the same jurisdiction. This relation depends as well upon the permission of the laws of Nevada as upon the compulsion of the laws of California. It is true that the acts necessary to enforce it must be done in California, and require the assent of that state so far as this Court does not decide that they may be demanded as a consequence of whatever right, if any, it may attribute to Nevada. But, leaving the latter possibility on one side, if California recognizes private rights that cross the borderline, the analogies are in favor of allowing them to be enforced within the jurisdiction of either party to the joint arrangement. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster, 23 N.H. 462. Full justice cannot be done and anomalous results avoided unless all the rights of the parties before the court in virtue of the jurisdiction previously acquired are taken in hand. To adjust the rights of the parties within the state requires the adjustment of the rights of the others outside of it. Of course, the court sitting in Nevada would not attempt to apply the law of Nevada, so far as that may be different from the law of California, to burden land or water beyond the state line, but the necessity of considering the law of California is no insuperable difficulty in dealing with the case. Foreign law often has to be ascertained and acted upon, and one court ought to deal with the whole matter.
We are of opinion, therefore, that there was concurrent jurisdiction in the two courts, and that the substantive issues in the Nevada and California suits were so far the same that the court first seized should proceed to the determination without interference, on the principles now well settled as between the courts of the United States and of the states. Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 188 U. S. 544; Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 209 U. S. 161-162.
as against Rickey, it might be a question, even if the petitioner was a purchaser without notice, whether the purchaser would not be confined to asserting its rights in the pending cause. See Whiteside v. Haselton, 110 U. S. 296, 110 U. S. 301. But, in this case, if the judge below was of opinion as matter of fact on what appears that the institution of the petition was merely a device to dodge the jurisdiction of the Nevada court, and that the Rickey Land & Cattle Company was merely Rickey under another name, we could not say that his finding was wrong.
It is urged that the cross-bills on which the bill and injunction in the second case were based were not maintainable because not in aid of the defenses to the original suit of Miller & Lux. But it might very well be, as was shown by the argument for the respondents, that even if they admitted the right of Miller & Lux, still a decree as between themselves and other defendants would be necessary in order to prevent a decree for Miller & Lux from working injustice. See further Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian Mining Co., 146 F. 166. The cross-bills being maintainable, the jurisdiction in respect of them follows that over the principal bill.

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