Source: https://openjurist.org/607/f2d/339/goland-v-central-intelligence-agency
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:28:22+00:00

Document:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY et al.
Rehearing Denied 28 March, 1979.
James H. Wallace, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Thomas C. Arthur and Mark H. Lynch, Washington, D. C., were on brief, Alan B. Morrison and Larry P. Ellsworth, Washington D. C., were on the motion to vacate and on the petition for rehearing, for appellants.
John F. Cordes, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Rex E. Lee, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Leonard Schaitman, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellees.
Thomas C. Martin, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for respondent.
Before BAZELON, TAMM and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by WILKEY, Circuit Judge.
This case arises under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).1 Plaintiffs Goland and Skidmore requested documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) relating to the legislative history of the Agency's organic statutes. In this suit they challenge the thoroughness of the CIA's search for responsive documents and the Agency's refusal to give them certain admittedly responsive material it does possess. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA. We affirm.
The Agency responded on 23 June 1975, informing Holtz that a search of its records had revealed that it possessed one document relating to the legislative history of the CIA's organic statutes which was not publicly available, namely, a stenographic transcript of Hearings held before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on 27 June 1947 (hereinafter "Hearing Transcript"). The Agency stated, however, that the Hearing Transcript had been classified "Secret" by Congress and could be declassified only by that body; it suggested that Holtz request declassification and release of the document from the House of Representatives. There were no further communications between Holtz and the CIA.
On 16 December 1975 Goland and Skidmore wrote the CIA to "elaborate on the basis of (their) appeal," asserting that the Agency's letter of 26 November failed to make clear whether the Transcript and the five published documents accounted for all the material they had requested.12 In addition, plaintiffs expanded the scope of their request to embrace not only the reports and hearings they had sought originally, but also any "materials which may have been the basis for testimony at hearings" or "materials used by or submitted by the CIA or other Executive Branch sources which are included in (unpublished) reports" on the cited bills.13 When the CIA failed to respond to this supplemental appeal within 20 working days,14 plaintiffs filed suit on 28 January 1976.
On 10 March 1976 the CIA notified plaintiffs' counsel that it had identified two additional documents responsive to plaintiffs' FOIA request which "had not previously been located."15 The first document was entitled "Statement of Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence," delivered before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 29 April 1947. This document was released to plaintiffs in full. The second document was entitled "Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter) Before the House Armed Services Committee (on) 8 April 1948" (hereinafter "Hillenkoetter Statement"). This document was released to plaintiffs with certain portions (about 20% Of the total) deleted; the Agency explained that the deleted material was exempt from disclosure under FOIA.
The complaint sought an injunction directing the CIA to make available for copying all "records requested in plaintiffs' . . . letter" of 20 October 1975,16 a declaratory judgment holding the CIA's allegedly restrictive definition of "agency records"17 invalid, and an award of attorneys' fees. On 10 March 1976 plaintiffs filed interrogatories, a request for production of documents, and a notice of deposition to the CIA. Rather than submit to discovery, the CIA on 5 April 1976 filed a motion for summary judgment based on affidavits. The Agency contended that the Hearing Transcript was not an "agency record" but rather a congressional document not subject to FOIA;18 that both the Transcript and the deleted portions of the Hillenkoetter Statement were properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 3, relating to matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;"19 that both the Transcript and the deleted portions of the Hillenkoetter Statement were properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 1, relating to matters "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;"20 that the CIA's search had been complete and there existed no other responsive documents; and that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the CIA's definition of "agency records" inasmuch as the Agency had not relied on that definition in processing their FOIA request. Plaintiffs responded to the motion principally on the grounds that discovery was needed to resolve disputed issues of fact.
Judge Hart granted the CIA's motion for summary judgment on 26 May 1976.21 He found that the Hearing Transcript was a congressional document outside the ambit of FOIA, that the deleted portions of the Hillenkoetter Statement were properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 1, and that no further discovery was justified since the CIA had "made a full search in good faith."22 Judge Hart made no findings about plaintiffs' standing to challenge the CIA's definition of agency records or about their request for attorneys' fees. We consider these issues in turn.
The FOIA requires that an agency make "agency records" available to the public upon reasonable request.23 The Act does not define "records" or "agency records."24 Plaintiffs argue that since the CIA is an "agency" its possession of the Hearing Transcript, without more, renders that document an "agency record" subject to disclosure absent specific exemption.25 The CIA argues that possession is not enough; it points out that "agency," as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act, "does not include (A) the Congress . . . ,"26 and that the Hearing Transcript, regardless of whether it is a "record," is not an "Agency record" on the facts of this case.27 The district court found that the Hearing Transcript was "released to the CIA for limited purposes as a reference document only" and that it "remain(ed) within the control of Congress; "28 the court concluded that the Transcript was in consequence a "Congressional document,"29 and not an "agency record" within the meaning of FOIA. We agree.
At the outset, we reject plaintiffs' argument that an agency's possession of a document Per se dictates that document's status as an "agency record."30 We base our conclusion both on precedent and on policy. The precedent is the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Cook v. Willingham,31 the only decision cited to us or discovered by our own research that is squarely on point. In Cook, a prisoner sought a copy of his presentence investigation report under FOIA. Although the document was physically in the possession of the warden of a United States penitentiary, the Tenth Circuit held the place of possession not controlling. Noting that FOIA "does not apply to 'the courts of the United States,' "32 it concluded that the presentence report, "made for the use of the sentencing court," thereafter "remains in the exclusive control of that court despite any joint utility it may eventually serve."33 In consequence, the judicial document was "not an agency report and (was) therefore not available to the public" under FOIA.34 Since the FOIA's exemptions for Congress and the federal courts are In pari materia,35 Cook is firm support for the conclusion that the Hearing Transcript, a congressional document, is not "an agency record" here.
This conclusion likewise finds firm support in policy. Congress has undoubted authority to keep its records secret, authority rooted in the Constitution,36 longstanding practice,37 and current congressional rules.38 Yet Congress exercises oversight authority over the various federal agencies, and thus has an undoubted interest in exchanging documents with those agencies to facilitate their proper functioning in accordance with Congress' originating intent.39 If plaintiffs' argument were accepted, Congress would be forced either to surrender its constitutional prerogative of maintaining secrecy, or to suffer an impairment of its oversight role. We decline to confront Congress with this dilemma absent a more convincing showing of self-abnegating congressional intent. It may be assumed that plaintiffs could not easily win release of the Hearing Transcript from the House of Representatives; we will not permit them to do indirectly what they cannot do directly because of the fortuity of the Transcript's location.
For reasons both of precedent and policy, then, we believe that plaintiffs' litmus test must be rejected. An agency's possession of a document, standing alone, no more dictates that it is an "agency record" than the congressional origins of a document, standing alone, dictate that it is not. Whether a congressionally generated document has become an agency record, rather, depends on whether under all the facts of the case the document has passed from the control of Congress and become property subject to the free disposition of the agency with which the document resides.
In this case, the issue for decision is whether the CIA has shown by affidavit that release of the Hillenkoetter Statement in its entirety would reveal "intelligence sources and methods," E. g., by revealing the "organization" or "functions" of CIA personnel. According to an affidavit submitted by CIA Legislative Counsel George L. Cary, the deleted portions of the Hillenkoetter Statement contain detailed descriptions of (1) "intelligence collection and operational devices . . . still utilized"; (2) "methods of procurement and supply . . . unique to the Intelligence Community" which "are currently utilized"; (3) "basic concepts of intelligence methodology" of which "the essential elements remain viable"; (4) "specific clandestine intelligence operations," including the "names (of) the foreign countries involved"; and (5) "certain intelligence methodologies of a friendly foreign government." This affidavit has not been challenged. It demonstrates, in nonconclusory and detailed fashion,66 that the deleted material describes "intelligence . . . methods," including the "functions" and "organization" of CIA personnel.67 We hold, therefore, that the deleted portions of the Hillenkoetter Statement were properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 3.
The dissent would deny summary judgment on the Exemption 3 status of the Hillenkoetter Statement because the CIA did not furnish a Vaughn v. Rosen index of that document.68 This argument exalts form over substance. Vaughn involved a request for numerous documents running to "many hundreds of pages," and the Government made a blanket claim that "the documents, as a whole, (were) exempt under three distinct exemptions."69 We found it "preposterous to contend that all of the information (was) equally exempt under all of the alleged exemptions," and found "an adequate indexing system" necessary owing to our "inability to determine which exemptions appl(ied) to what portions of the information."70 The present case involves 23 pages of deletions from one document. The CIA's affidavit lists the deletions; provides a "relatively detailed analysis"71 of the material deleted; makes clear which exemptions are claimed for the deletions (Exemptions 1 & 3); and explains why the deleted material fits within the exemptions claimed (I. e., how the deletions relate to "national security" and "intelligence sources and methods"). The CIA's justifications, we think, could not have been much more detailed without "compromis(ing) the secret nature of the information."72 Although the Agency did not tender its analysis in the form of an "index," it satisfied the "detailed justification," "specificity," and "separation" requirements whose satisfaction the Vaughn index was meant to ensure. Although we do not retreat in the least from our belief that an index is of great assistance to requesters and courts in appropriate cases, common sense suggests that an index was unnecessary for the 23 pages that were so specifically described and justified here.
The CIA asserts that exhaustive searches of its files have succeeded in locating eight, and only eight, documents that are responsive to plaintiffs' FOIA request.73 Plaintiffs contend that discovery is needed to test whether the CIA's search was complete. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the CIA, finding that "the CIA ha(d) made a full search in good faith and that no further discovery (was) justified."74 We agree.
We think that Wilson's sworn affidavits on their face are plainly adequate to demonstrate the thoroughness of the CIA's search for responsive documents. The affidavits give detailed descriptions of the searches undertaken, and a detailed explanation of why further searches would be unreasonably burdensome. Plaintiffs argue, however, that even if Wilson's affidavits are otherwise sufficient to support summary judgment in favor of the CIA, discovery is required here because there is reason to doubt the Agency's good faith.
First, plaintiffs note that hearings occurred on the CIA's enabling statutes for which no published transcripts exist, and argue that unpublished transcripts of these hearings, as well as CIA back-up documents prepared for use at these hearings, "Must exist."86 Although appeals to common sense are not altogether to be condemned, plaintiffs' argument is unpersuasive here. Even if we assume that the documents plaintiffs posit were Created, there is no reason to believe that the documents, thirty years later, still exist, or, if they exist, that they are in the possession of the CIA. Moreover, even if the documents do exist and the CIA does have them, the Agency's good faith would not be impugned unless there were some reason to believe that the supposed documents could be located without an unreasonably burdensome search. It is well established that an agency is not "required to reorganize (its) files in response to (a plaintiff's) request in the form in which it was made,"87 and that if an agency has not previously segregated the requested class of records production may be required only "where the agency (can) identify that material with reasonable effort."88 Wilson's affidavits plainly show that the effort required to locate the hypothesized "back-up" documents would be unreasonable here.
Second, plaintiffs argue that the Church Committee Report89 refers to several documents that "appear to be within the scope of plaintiffs' FOIA request . . . , and copies of which could reasonably be expected to be in the possession of the CIA, but which defendants have neither identified or produced . . . ."90 This argument is similarly unpersuasive. In their expanded request for "legislative history," plaintiffs sought access to Congressional reports and hearings on specific bills, and CIA materials that may have been "the basis for testimony at hearings" or "included in . . . reports" on those bills. Fifteen of the seventeen documents plaintiffs cite from the Church Committee Report lie unmistakably outside the scope of their FOIA request.91 The two remaining documents are transcripts of Congressional hearings in executive session.92 In his affidavit, Wilson stated that these documents, "if they exist, are not held by the (CIA)."93 Since the transcripts are Congressional materials, and since there is no indication in the Church Committee Report that the transcripts were received from or returned to the CIA,94 there is no reason to question the good faith of Wilson's asseveration.
Third, plaintiffs argue that the CIA's "pattern of obfuscation and delay" in dealing with them signals the Agency's Mala fides. The Agency, they say, first denied having any responsive documents, then found some, then found some more: these "inconsistent positions" and this piecemeal disclosure are said to imply bad faith. We take a different view of the facts. Sara Holtz originally requested "legislative history," defined as Congressional hearings and reports; the CIA not unnaturally directed her to the Library of Congress. When Holtz replied that she wanted Unpublished hearings and reports, the CIA identified the Hearing Transcript. When Goland and Skidmore said that they wanted not only hearings and reports, but Executive Branch back-up documents, the CIA identified the Vandenberg and Hillenkoetter Statements. The Agency's "piecemeal" pattern of disclosure followed faithfully the piecemeal pattern of requests, and thus here indicated, if anything, good faith rather than bad; indeed, this Court held as much in Weissman v. CIA.95 The Agency's responses were not always timely; but in view of the well-publicized problems created by the statute's 10- and 20-day time limits for processing FOIA requests and appeals,96 the CIA's delay alone cannot be said to indicate an absence of good faith.
The dissent, while not seriously questioning the CIA's good faith, says that discovery is needed in any event to ascertain whether the CIA personnel conducting the search used an "underinclusive" definition of "legislative history."97 We disagree. The CIA personnel conducting the search evidently used the definition of "legislative history" that plaintiffs gave them, namely, "hearings, reports, and Executive Branch back-up documents." That this is so is suggested by the fact that the CIA's search produced hearings, reports, and Executive Branch backup documents. Nor do we think discovery was necessary to enable plaintiffs "to reformulate their request to eliminate confusion and the possibility of future lawsuits."98 "Legislative history" admittedly is not a term whose meaning can be nicely cabined within bright lines; but it is the term plaintiffs used, and if any ambiguity was introduced thereby plaintiffs must reap what they have sown. It would be bizarre indeed if a plaintiff, simply by employing ambiguous language in his FOIA request, could assure himself of potentially harassing discovery for the purpose of dispelling the confusion he had engendered.
We hold, therefore, that plaintiffs have made no showing of CIA bad faith sufficient to impugn the Wilson affidavit, which on its face suffices to demonstrate that the CIA's search for responsive documents was complete. For this reason, the district court's grant of summary judgment without discovery was within its discretion.
D. The CIA's Definition of Agency "Records."
Plaintiffs contend that the CIA's definition of agency "records" is unduly narrow,99 and that they have been injured because the Agency relied on this definition in denying them records to which they are entitled. The CIA responds that plaintiffs lack standing to maintain this challenge, arguing that it did not rely on the definition's "exceptions" in processing plaintiffs' request. The district court did not reach this issue. We do not reach it either. We have held that the CIA made a full search in good faith for responsive documents, and that the withheld material was withheld properly. Since plaintiffs have received all documents to which they are entitled, no live controversy remains between them and the CIA on the definitional issue.
I respectfully submit that the court today departs from well-established principles in this circuit in order to sustain summary judgment for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The court also adopts a restrictive definition of "agency records" that erodes the right to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act1 (FOIA) and promotes secret law.
Without discovery, a party to litigation may not have access to facts necessary to oppose a motion for summary judgment. This problem is especially acute for plaintiffs in FOIA cases. Indeed, recognition of this dilemma has shaped a number of our decisions. In Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 484 F.2d 820 (1973), Cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974), summary judgment was granted to the government on the basis of an affidavit declaring that the documents sought were exempt from disclosure. We reversed, recognizing that a FOIA plaintiff "obviously cannot know the precise contents of the documents sought; secret information is, by definition, unknown to the party seeking disclosure(,)" 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 343, 484 F.2d at 823; that "(t)his lack of knowledge . . . seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of our legal system's form of dispute resolution(,)" Id. 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 344, 484 F.2d at 824; and that, although "formal" discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not at issue,2 procedures would have to be instituted to provide FOIA plaintiffs information roughly equivalent to what they would obtain through such discovery. "(C)ourts will simply no longer accept (from the defendant agency) conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions . . . but will require a relatively detailed analysis in manageable segments (of the contents of documents the agency seeks to withhold)." Id. 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 346, 484 F.2d at 826. We held such a procedure necessary Before summary judgment could be granted to the government to enable a FOIA plaintiff "to argue with desirable legal precision for the revelation of the concealed information." Id. 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 343, 484 F.2d at 823.
Facts respecting the classification of the reports in question are solely in the control of the (defendant agency). (Plaintiff) should be allowed to undertake discovery for the purpose of uncovering facts which might prove his right of access to the documents which he seeks.
164 U.S.App.D.C. at 284, 505 F.2d at 391. It is significant that there was no evidence in Schaffer bolstering plaintiff's claim that the affidavit submitted by the defendant agency was either executed in bad faith or was somehow erroneous. Without discovery, plaintiff had no means of producing such evidence. Relying solely on his Rule 56(f) affidavit, the court remanded the case with instructions to permit plaintiff to undertake discovery relevant to whether the reports in question were properly classified "confidential."
In sum, I submit that the grant of summary judgment to the CIA was premature. This position is reinforced by the factual ambiguity which pervades this record and which is exacerbated by the questionable legal standard on which the court distinguishes "agency records" from "congressional documents in an agency's possession."
My brothers agree with the CIA's contention that the hearing transcript is simply unavailable to the public, whether or not specifically exempted from disclosure by the FOIA.7 They find that the transcript is a "congressional document," not an "agency record," and is therefore wholly beyond the reach of the Act. The court reasons that "the circumstances attending (the transcript's) generation and the conditions attached to its possession by the CIA" plainly reveal that it "remains under the Control and continues to be the Property of the House of Representatives." Maj. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 347 of 607 F.2d (emphasis added). This conclusion is reached as a matter of law, thus eliminating any justification for discovery, on the basis of representations by CIA officials. The agency has stated by affidavit that the transcript contains testimony taken in Executive Session; typewritten on both the cover and first page of the transcript is the word "Secret"; the text reveals that the stenographer and typist were sworn to secrecy; the CIA retains a copy of the transcript for "internal reference purposes" only. Id. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 347 of 607 F.2d, J.A. at 80.
I also find the court's "control property" test unpersuasive. We are not told what it meant by congressional "control" over a document in an agency's possession; or in what sense such a document can be considered congressional "property." The fact that Congress is a non-agency does not preclude a document or copy of a document it has Created from ever qualifying as an "agency record." Federal agencies regularly receive documents created by non-agencies that obviously become "agency records" in the ordinary course. See, e. g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 504 F.2d 238 (1974) (grant application submitted to National Institute of Mental Health by noncommercial research scientist); Irons v. Gottschalk, 369 F.Supp. 403 (D.D.C.1974) (patent applications). Nor can the court rely on the view that because Congress may have somehow forbidden the CIA to disclose the transcript, thus exercising "control" over its contents, the transcript cannot be considered an "agency record." "Control" in this sense goes to the question whether a document is Exempt from disclosure not to whether it is an "agency record."12 In every exemption 3 case, for example, the ultimate question is whether Congress has forbidden the agency to disclose the records sought. To illustrate, 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) makes it unlawful "to divulge to any person the amount of income . . . set forth . . . in any income return . . .." This proscription does not mean that tax returns are not "agency records." Rather, tax returns are agency records that must be withheld under exemption 3. See, e. g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 505 F.2d 350 (1974).
It appears that the court would supplement the element of "control" with other concepts having to do with "property." The court's ultimate position, as I see it, would be that Congress has a property interest in, as well as control over, the Contents of the transcript, the Paper on which the contents are typed, and any Copy of the transcript. But so sweeping a notion of congressional control and property is plainly at odds with the majority's concession that the Hillenkoetter statement is an "agency record." Maj. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 348 of 607 F.2d. Both the transcript and the Hillenkoetter statement contain testimony originally prepared by intelligence officials and subsequently delivered secretly before Congress. J.A. at 79-82. There is no logical reason to believe, and none has been suggested, that Congress would have an interest in controlling the testimony in one but not the other. The transcript contains, in addition to testimony, questions and comments by committee members. Perhaps, then, the testimony should be considered the property of the Executive branch, where it originated, and the comments the property of Congress. If so, to the extent the transcript consists of nonexempt testimony it should be disclosed under the majority's own rationale.13 The only further difference between the two documents that is even arguably material is that the copy of the Hillenkoetter statement which the CIA possesses was apparently typed by agency employees, while the CIA's copy of the transcript was transcribed and typed by employees of Congress. As I have indicated, the origin of a piece of paper is simply not dispositive of the question whether it qualifies as an "agency record."
In the case of exemption one the district court must determine the propriety of a document's classification according to "both procedural and substantive criteria contained in the Executive Order under which it was classified." Zweibon v. Mitchell, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 49, 516 F.2d 594, 642 (1975) (Quoting from H.R.Rep.No.1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1974)); See also Halperin v. Department of State, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 124 at 128, 565 F.2d 699 at 703 (1977). Such determinations could not have been made on the record in this case because the affidavit submitted by the CIA fails to reveal the date on which the Hillenkoetter statement was originally classified. J.A. at 81. Without discovery, the district court could merely speculate about which Executive Order, if any,19 governed the original classification.
The district court apparently relied on an asserted reclassification of the Hillenkoetter statement in concluding that "the withheld portions . . . have been properly classified according to the provisions of Executive Order No. 11652," J.A. at 189, which is the Order presently in force. See 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. IV 1974). Perhaps discovery pertaining to the validity of the original classification would be unnecessary if reclassification under Executive Order No. 11652 had been properly effected. The district court, however, was plainly in error. Section 4(A) of the Executive Order requires that classified material "show on its face its classification and whether it is subject to or exempt from the General Declassification Schedule. It shall also show the office of origin, the date of preparation and (the date of) classification . . . ." Excepting that the word "Secret" and the date of preparation appear on the face of the Hillenkoetter statement, J.A. at 80, there is no indication in the record that these procedures were followed.
Our decisions establish that in national security cases as in all others, summary judgment is proper without discovery or In camera inspection Only if the agency has submitted an itemized index that "subdivide(s) the document under consideration into manageable parts cross-referenced to the relevant portion of the Government's justification." Vaughn v. Rosen, supra, 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 347, 484 F.2d at 827. See also Weissman v. CIA, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 123, 565 F.2d 692, 698 (1977) (As amended, April 4, 1977); Phillippi v. CIA, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 243 at 247, 546 F.2d 1009, at 1013 (1977). Cf. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 350, at 358-360, 566 F.2d 242 at 250 -252 (1977). Such an index, as I discussed earlier, "can . . . be subjected to criticism by the party seeking the document. If In camera examination of the document is still necessary, the court will at least have the benefit of being able to focus on the issues identified and clarified by the adversary process." Phillippi v. CIA, supra, 178 U.S.App.D.C. at 247, 546 F.2d at 1013; Vaughn v. Rosen, supra, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 346-48, 484 F.2d at 826-828. See also S.Rep.No.93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 14-15 (1974).
The affidavit filed here by the CIA, quoted in part in the court's opinion at 21, plainly fails to supply the information necessary to facilitate the adversary process and De novo review. First, the affidavit speaks for the most part only of intelligence "devices," "sources," "methods," and "operations." Essentially it parrots the language of the exempting statutes, 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3) ("intelligence sources and methods") and 403g (intelligence "functions"), rather than providing the detailed description the "requesting party (needs) to present its case effectively," Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Dept. of the Air Force, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 350 at 359, 566 F.2d 242 at 251 (1977); Vaughn v. Rosen, supra, 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 343-44, 484 F.2d at 823-24, 828, and a reviewing court requires to make an independent evaluation of an agency's exemption claims.23 Second, as plaintiffs point out, the affidavit "makes no effort to match its assertions to given pages or paragraphs in the (Hillenkoetter) statement." Brief for Appellants at 33. For want of an itemized index, it is impossible to determine whether all nondisclosed portions of the statement have been described, much less properly withheld.
The court refuses to permit plaintiffs to conduct discovery pertinent to the scope of the CIA's search for "legislative history" on the ground that affidavits submitted by the agency reveal as a matter of law that the search was thorough. The majority emphasizes the assertion by the agency's Information and Privacy Coordinator that the "CIA 'interpreted (plaintiffs') request broadly enough to ensure that (it) would locate all documents within the scope of the request.' " Maj. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 353 of 607 F.2d; J.A. at 78. The majority states that "the Agency's good faith would not be impugned unless there were some reason to believe that (additional responsive) documents could be located without an unreasonably burdensome search." Maj. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 353 of 607 F.2d. Finding that the CIA did, in fact, act in good faith, the court refuses to reach plaintiffs' contention that the agency's definition of "agency records," 32 C.F.R. § 1900.3(g) (1976),24 is unduly narrow and may have served as an impermissible basis for withholding otherwise responsive documents. Maj. op. at --- - of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 355-356 of 607 F.2d.
The court may well be correct in concluding that the CIA has acted in good faith, and that its search was thoroughly responsive to plaintiffs' request. My disagreement, again, concerns not the substance but the timing of the judgment in favor of the agency.
As I understand plaintiffs' position, although they do raise questions about the CIA's good faith,25 the real issue here concerns the scope the agency attributed to the term "legislative history." Clearly, whether or not the CIA acted in good faith, its understanding of "legislative history" shaped its search for responsive documents. It is not enough for the CIA simply to state that it "interpreted the request broadly." Without discovery of the precise definition employed by the persons who conducted the search, plaintiffs were in no position to argue effectively that the search was under-inclusive.26 Such discovery, of course, might have led the parties to agree on an appropriate search. At a minimum, such discovery would have enabled plaintiffs to reformulate their request to eliminate confusion and the possibility of future lawsuits. Also, such discovery would have revealed whether the persons conducting the search did in fact withhold otherwise responsive documents on the basis of the CIA's definition of "agency records." If so, the question would arise whether that definition is permitted by the FOIA.
Plaintiffs claim to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees on the ground that the CIA produced several documents only after this litigation was instituted.27 The court rejects this claim in part because plaintiffs have not shown the required "causal nexus between their litigation and the CIA's disclosure." Maj. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C. at 356 of 607 F.2d. I do not disagree with the court's legal standard. What concerns me, however, is that here again plaintiffs have had no opportunity to make their case. A showing of an agency's subjective reasons for producing documents is difficult to accomplish at all events. It is virtually impossible without discovery.
In a recent FOIA case Judge Wilkey remarked that "(t)he data which plaintiff seeks to have produced . . . are matters of interest not only to him but to the nation." Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 161 at 164, 543 F.2d 308 at 311 (1976). This observation applies with particular force to the legislative history underlying the creation of the CIA. I regret that an issue of such importance has not been resolved in accordance with principles of summary judgment.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge BAZELON.
This petition for rehearing was occasioned by an inexcusable lapse on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). While litigating the appeal whose disposition is here questioned, the CIA discovered but failed to disclose within any reasonable time hundreds of documents which were arguably responsive to plaintiff-appellants' Freedom of Information Act request. The documents' existence was not revealed until after we issued our decision, affirming summary judgment for the CIA. The failure to make the disclosure plainly called for naturally casts a cloud over the entire proceeding. Nevertheless, and without the barest intention of countenancing the CIA's untimely disclosure, on analysis of the issues argued and decided, we decline to disturb our judgment, save on the question of attorneys' fees. With respect to that question, we remand to the district court to reconsider its ruling in light of the altered circumstances of this case.
(m)ost of these documents were discovered late last fall, and additional documents earlier this year, by the librarian of the Office of General Counsel. She discovered all of these documents which were unindexed, in the course of her independent research on legal projects unrelated to the Goland case. Although a sampling of the documents last fall revealed their possible relevance to Goland, it was not until late May 1978, when a partial list of the documents was completed by the law librarian, that the extent of the documents, and the significance of some of the documents to the Goland FOIA request, were fully appreciated.
Most of these documents were discovered last fall by the Office of General Counsel librarian in the course of extensive research on two projects unrelated to the Goland litigation. Many of these documents were found in a CIA installation outside of Washington where inactive records are kept, only after great diligence and persistence by the librarian in connection with her research. She became aware of the existence of these documents, which had been stored in cardboard boxes and had not been organized in any fashion, as a result of several interviews with current and former CIA employees conducted in connection with her research projects. These documents were not indexed and could not have been found under normal FOIA search procedures.
I can state most emphatically that there was no intent within the CIA to conceal the fact that these documents had been found. The librarian, who had some personal familiarity with the Goland case and thus recognized that some of the documents which she had found might have some bearing on the Goland litigation, immediately (i. e. in late November or early December 1977), informed the General Counsel, the Deputy General Counsel and the undersigned. Because at that time the documents had not been organized or analyzed, and because it was not immediately apparent which if any were within the scope of the FOIA request in Goland, the General Counsel instructed the librarian to begin to organize these documents and segregate from among them those documents which qualified for designation as "legislative history."
The law librarian proceeded with her assigned task, but her extensive involvement in other routine duties prevented her completing this task as expeditiously as might have been desired. It should be noted that during this period she was engaged in a major reorganization of the law library which incidentally also entailed a physical move from one location to another. Also, although the Table of Organization of the Office of General Counsel called for an assistant law librarian, no one was appointed to that position until March 1978. The law librarian first completed a partial inventory of the additional documents on May 19, 1978 and shortly thereafter it was decided that all the newly-found documents would be released, subject to FOI(A) deletions, and you were immediately informed.
This, then, appears to be the sequence of events: (1) The district court granted summary judgment to the CIA on 26 May 1976. (2) Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on 23 July 1976. (3) In November or December 1977 while this appeal was still pending But more than a year-and-a-half after the district court's decision the CIA discovered additional documents, some of which arguably fell within the scope of plaintiffs' FOIA request. (4) Failing to inform plaintiffs, the Justice Department, or this court of the discovery, the CIA undertook a sluggish four-month examination of the documents. (5) It was not until a week after we issued our 23 May 1978 decision that CIA finally revealed its discovery and began releasing the documents.
The majority opinion affirmed the district court decision based on CIA affidavits. It appears that these affidavits are incorrect. . . . (T)he CIA has now produced . . . additional documents "discovered late last fall and additional documents earlier this year." Moreover, (the CIA) concedes that "a sampling of the documents last fall revealed their possible relevance to Goland . . . ."No explanation has been offered by the CIA or the Justice Department for the CIA's strategy decision to stand mute as to the status of the affidavits relied upon by the Court until After the decision was handed down on May 23. Indeed, it appears the CIA chose to withhold this crucial information from the Justice Department until after such decision was handed down.
Based on these admissions and concessions . . . it should now be abundantly clear that discovery is appropriate in this case and in any event, attorneys' fees should be awarded because of the manner in which the CIA has chosen to conduct itself in this litigation.
Plaintiffs' contention seems to be grounded on three distinct facts or occurrences: first, the fact that additional responsive documents were found to exist; second, the fact that CIA delayed informing this court of the documents until the court had already issued its decision; and third, the fact that CIA ultimately released the documents to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs believe that these three facts warrant vacating the decision of 23 May 1978, at least in part.
In our 23 May decision we resolved five separate issues. We held: (1) that the CIA was not required under the FOIA to release a congressional hearing transcript that remained under the control of Congress; (2) that the CIA had properly deleted portions of the so-called "Hillenkoetter Statement" pursuant to Exemption 3 of the FOIA; (3) that, on the record, the CIA's search for documents responsive to plaintiffs' FOIA request was adequate and that the district court's grant of summary judgment without discovery was within its discretion; (4) that the CIA's definition of "agency records" was not in controversy; and (5) that plaintiffs' counsel were not entitled to attorneys' fees.
After carefully reviewing plaintiffs' contentions and the circumstances surrounding the discovery and belated disclosure of the documents, we find no occasion to disturb our affirmance as to issues (1) through (4), but we do vacate that part of our decision affirming the denial of attorneys' fees and remand to the district court for reconsideration of that issue.
Plaintiffs contend that the discovery of additional documents indicates that the CIA affidavits in this case, relied upon by both the district court and this court, "are incorrect." Therefore, they argue that we should vacate our decision, or at least that portion of the decision dealing with the "search" issue, because it was predicated on inaccurate affidavits. We disagree.
As a substantive matter, the mere fact that additional documents have been discovered does not impugn the accuracy of the Wilson affidavits. The issue was not whether any further documents might conceivably exist but whether CIA's search for responsive documents was adequate. The Wilson affidavits never stated that no further documents existed; they merely described the scope of the searches that had been undertaken and stated that no additional documents could be located absent an extraordinary effort not required by the FOIA. As we indicated in our opinion, an agency is required only to make reasonable efforts to find responsive materials;4 it is not required to reorganize its filing system in response to each FOIA request. The circumstances surrounding the discovery of additional documents as described in CIA's letters of 14 and 23 June do not contradict the statements made in the Wilson affidavits. According to CIA, the discovery of these documents was entirely adventitious. They were found by the law librarian in the course of independent research on projects unrelated to the Goland litigation. The documents were not indexed; they were found, only after extraordinary effort, stored in cardboard boxes primarily among the 84,000 cubic feet of documents at CIA's retired-records center outside of Washington. According to CIA, the documents "could not have been found under normal FOIA procedures." Thus, it would appear that the new facts before us now do not really conflict with the facts as presented to the district court and reflected in the record upon which our decision was based, and would not, as a substantive matter, prompt us to vacate our affirmance.
Concededly, the discovery of additional documents is more probative that the search was not thorough than if no other documents were found to exist. Moreover, the delay in disclosing the documents at least arguably evidences a lack of vigor, if not candor, in responding to FOIA requests. However, a disappointed litigant may not avail herself of every imaginable inference from newly disclosed facts in order to upset a final judgment. The occasions when newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances will warrant setting aside a final judgment are limited procedurally as well as substantively.
A final district court judgment may be altered on direct review only through two procedures.5 One, of course, is the present appeal. The other is a motion in district court for relief from the judgment under federal rule 60(b).6 Appellate review is ordinarily unaffected by matters not contained in the record.7 This we think is the case with the facts disclosed here, whether characterized as "newly-discovered evidence" or " changed circumstances." In neither event do the disclosures warrant vacating our judgment.
The fact that additional documents exist, insofar as it is probative of the thoroughness Vel non of the search, is rather plainly "newly discovered evidence." We have found no case in which the Supreme Court or a court of appeals has granted a rehearing or vacated its opinion based on newly discovered evidence. The reason for this should be self-evident: an appellate opinion is based on the record before it, and hence cannot be set aside on the basis of newly discovered facts outside the record.8 This rule is clear in the Supreme Court's cases, dating from those in the last centuryntu ry9 to the recent Standard Oil case10 where the Court refused to recall its mandate and vacate its opinion on the basis of newly discovered facts, stating that its opinion was confined to the record.
An appellate court has no fact-finding function. It cannot receive new evidence from the parties, determine where the truth actually lies, and base its decision on that determination. Factfinding and the creation of a record are the functions of the district court; therefore, the consideration of newly-discovered evidence is a matter for the district court. The proper procedure for dealing with newly discovered evidence is for the party to move for relief from the judgment in the district court under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Insofar as plaintiffs rely on the facts surrounding the documents' discovery and release by the CIA, their argument is more nearly dependent on "changed circumstances." To be sure, there are occasional cases in which altered circumstances are properly noticed on appeal.11 Invariably in such cases, however, events have altered the essential nature of the controversy, as, for example, where there has been an intervening change in the law or where the controversy has become moot. But in this case the distinction between new evidence and altered circumstances is largely a matter of technical usage rather than substance.12 Here the intervening events are allegedly probative of the same contentions as arose from the mere existence of the documents (I. e., that the search was not conducted thoroughly or in good faith). Consequently, for purposes of appellate review of these allegations, we think nothing turns on the arguable distinction between newly discovered evidence and altered circumstances. Under either theory the proper course ordinarily would be to proceed in the first instance in district court under rule 60(b).
This court recently reserved the question whether section 2106 afforded an alternate way of reopening a final judgment in light of new facts.15 Although our research has disclosed no case which has so held, we may suppose Arguendo that we do have ample revisory power under section 2106 In appropriate cases. We are nevertheless thoroughly convinced that this would not be a proper occasion for such extraordinary relief. Nothing in the circumstances which plaintiffs raise suggests to us that the district court judgment was incorrect. We are satisfied by the submissions to this court that the original failure to uncover the documents was wholly understandable and not inconsistent with the district court's finding that the search was thorough.
Moreover, although the delay in releasing the materials may not be excused, we do not think that that misconduct vitiates the district court's finding either. Only were we to indulge a fairly harsh inference as to the Bona fides of the CIA would we be inclined to upset the judgment. The instant facts fall quite short of supporting any such conclusion. Consequently, whether or not there is any possibility of relief from the judgment in district court, we decline to disturb our affirmance respecting the thoroughness of the search. We reach this conclusion fully aware that we deal here with a summary judgment whose factual basis derives from affidavits and without discovery.
Relief from a final judgment may be sought in district court through a rule 60(b) motion;16 our decision not to vacate our affirmance is, of course, without prejudice to plaintiffs' proceeding under that rule. However, as we have noted, that approach may be difficult or wholly unavailable.
Insofar as the additional documents are new evidence, recourse to rule 60(b) is governed (and apparently precluded) by the rule's strict timing requirements. There is an ironclad one-year limit on the filing of a rule 60(b) motion based on newly discovered evidence. Such motions must be filed within one year from the date the judgment was entered in the district court, which in this case was 26 May 1976 two years ago and more. The one-year period is not tolled by a pending appeal,17 and under the federal rules no court has power to extend the deadline.
We merely note the difficulty of satisfying the "stringent" rules which circumscribe the trial court's discretion in such matters; our disposition does not, of course, foreclose plaintiffs' bringing an independent suit for relief.
With respect to the Hillenkoetter Statement issue, we held that the deleted portions of the Statement could properly be withheld pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3, which was determined to encompass 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and 50 U.S.C. § 403g. Our analysis involved a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the CIA's nondisclosure statutes sections 403(d)(3) and 403g are Exemption 3 statutes; and (2) whether the withheld materials, as described by CIA's affidavit, fall within the nondisclosure statutes.
Finally, we refrained from reaching the definition of "agency records" issue because no live and genuine controversy remained on this matter between plaintiffs and CIA.
Neither the discovery of additional documents, nor CIA's delayed disclosure of this discovery, nor CIA's ultimate release of the documents in any way undermines our holdings on these three issues. The discovery and release of new documents obviously does not change the character of the Congressional Hearing Transcript. It remains a congressional record for the reasons stated in our opinion, and as such was properly withheld by CIA. Similarly, the discovery and release of additional documents clearly has no bearing on whether, as a matter of law, sections 403(d)(3) and 403g are Exemption 3 statutes or on whether portions of the Statement fall within those nondisclosure statutes. Finally, the circumstances of the discovery and release of new documents do not give rise to a controversy between the parties as to CIA's definition of "agency records."
Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that the CIA's discovery of additional documents does, in a very remote sense, bear upon the validity of our holdings on the Transcript, Statement, and Definition issues. They point out that our conclusions on these three issues were, to varying extents, based partially upon assertions in CIA's affidavits. Thus, they argue that, since the discovery of new documents suggests that CIA's affidavits may have been inaccurate in one respect, namely, the thoroughness of search issue, they may also have been inaccurate in other respects, namely on these other three issues. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, our decision on these points may have rested on incorrect affidavits. In other words, plaintiffs' contention is that the CIA's discovery of new documents is circumstantial evidence that the Agency's affidavits generally may not have been accurate.
Our reasoning with respect to the issue of the search's thoroughness is fully applicable here.25 We will not vacate our judgment on the basis of such a tenuous theory. The allegations raise no serious doubt as to the correctness of the district court's findings. Plaintiffs may nevertheless wish to seek relief from the district court under rule 60(b) or otherwise. In the meanwhile, our resolution of the Transcript, Statement, and Definition issues must stand as originally stated in our 23 May decision.
Plaintiffs now contend that this aspect of our decision has been undermined by subsequent events. They point Not to the CIA's discovery of additional documents or to the Agency's delay in revealing this discovery, but rather to the fact that CIA ultimately released these additional documents. Plaintiffs' argument seems to be that there is the requisite causal connection between their prosecution of the action and CIA's ultimate release of further documents such as they may Now be said to have "substantially prevailed" in the litigation. The Agency's release of documents occurred After the decision in this case. Thus, this part of plaintiffs' argument relies on a Post-judgment change in factual circumstances.
However, in the interest of expediting this matter and because we entertain little doubt that the merits of the attorneys' fees argument should be reheard in light of the new facts, we vacate that portion of our affirmance and the District Court judgment pertaining to fees and remand for the District Court's reconsideration.
BAZELON, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of the motion to vacate, the denial of rehearing, and the denial of rehearing en banc.
In November or December, 1977, while this case was pending before our panel, the General Counsel of the CIA learned that documents known to be relevant to plaintiffs' FOIA request had been discovered within the agency. Not until May 30, 1978, one week after our opinion issued, and some six months after the documents were "discovered," did the General Counsel inform the Justice Department that these documents had been found.1 We must now determine the effect of these events on our previous disposition of this case. I believe that both the disclosure of 321 additional documents and the circumstances surrounding their discovery cast serious doubt on the original disposition of this case. I therefore dissent from the majority's decision to leave that opinion undisturbed.2 I concur, however, in the decision to remand for consideration of plaintiffs' right to attorney fees.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to cases or controversies.4 Central to that provision is the requirement that the federal courts do not sit to give advisory opinions,5 nor to render decisions which can offer no relief to any party.6 Here the plaintiffs sought all CIA records concerning the legislative history of the agency's governing statute. As a result of the belated release of some 321 documents to plaintiffs by the CIA, it may well be that plaintiffs are fully satisfied that their request has been honored7 and no longer require further relief from this court on that issue.
If the plaintiffs are in fact satisfied, then any appeal from the denial of discovery is clearly moot. Because mootness would deprive this court of jurisdiction, we would be obliged to note it, regardless of when during the course of the litigation the controversy became moot.8 I therefore find it difficult to believe that we would not have inquired further into the issue of mootness, either by remanding to the district court for a determination of that issue,9 or at least requiring further submission from the parties.
Even assuming that there remained a live controversy between the parties over the existence of additional documents, it is inconceivable to me that we would have been indifferent to the significance of the CIA's admissions in assessing the adequacy of the original search. The majority rests its decision on the observation that "the mere fact that additional documents have been discovered does not impugn the accuracy of the Wilson affidavits." Maj. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 369 of 607 F.2d. To my mind, this is a question of fact that cannot possibly be decided on the record before us. The majority notes, "(a)ccording to CIA, the discovery of these documents was entirely adventitious. They were found . . . only after extraordinary effort . . . ." Id. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 370 of 607 F.2d. These representations may well be true. But the fact is that at this stage of the litigation they are simply Ex parte representations. Plaintiffs have had no opportunity to test these assertions under circumstances that would admit of appropriate findings of fact.
The majority's extreme reluctance to permit plaintiffs to explore the factual basis of the CIA's assertions thus repeats the basic error of the original panel opinion. The majority again prematurely forecloses plaintiffs' inquiry into the nature of the CIA's search in response to the FOIA request questTE, 197 U.S.App.D.C. 63>>quest.10 But the error is even more serious in this case, for we do not have the benefit of a trial court judgment, entered after appropriate inquiry, that these revelations do not undermine the validity of the CIA's original affidavits. The majority correctly notes that "(a)n appellate court has no fact-finding function." Maj. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 371 of 607 F.2d. I submit that the majority denies the motion to vacate precisely because it has found the facts against plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs point out that the § 3301 definition of records was quoted in the Attorney General's FOIA Memorandum Supra note 24 at 23. We do not see how this helps plaintiffs' case. The Attorney General noted that the FOIA did not define "records," then quoted the only available statutory definition of the term for what it was worth. He would have been remiss in not doing so. Yet his citation of the definition does not give it any greater extrapolative force than it inherently possesses. The Attorney General surely did not focus on the words "or received by," which plaintiffs italicize and which are relevant to our case. Indeed, the Memorandum elsewhere suggests that an agency's possession of a document does not Per se render the document an "agency record" which the possessing agency must release. See note 46 Infra.
36 U.S.Const. art. I, § 5: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy . . . ."
E. g., H.R. Rule XI(2)(k)(7), Reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2 Sess. 427 (1975): "No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be released or used in public sessions without the consent of the committee."
Cf. S.Rep.No.5, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. ("First Annual Report of the Investigations Subcomm. of the Comm. on Expenditures in the Executive Departments") 3 (1949): "Executive hearings were . . . utilized in cases involving national security and in other instances when it was determined that public disclosure might be detrimental to the public interest."
Where a record is requested which is of concern to more than one agency, the request should be referred to the agency whose interest in the record is paramount, and that agency should make the decision to disclose or withhold . . . . Where a record requested from an agency is the exclusive concern of another agency, the request should be referred to that other agency.
This rule was followed in Friendly Broadcasting Co., 55 F.C.C.2d 775, 775-76 (1975) (where FBI Reports were loaned to FCC solely for internal reference purposes, Reports were "property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation" and FBI, "as the originator of the Reports, . . . is the agency to which the request should be addressed" under FOIA).
The dissent argues that this test, and the conclusion it produces, prove too much: if the Hearing Transcript is a Congressional document, so also must the Hillenkoetter Statement be, a Reductio our colleague evidently views as Ad absurdum. See diss. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 361 of 607 F.2d. Since the CIA has never contended that the Hillenkoetter Statement is a Congressional document since, indeed, the CIA has acted inconsistently with any such contention by declassifying and releasing 80% Of the document we see no need to consider this question. We might note, however, that between the Hillenkoetter Statement and the Hearing Transcript substantial differences lie. The former is a statement by a CIA official prepared by the CIA; we do not know the circumstances of its delivery in Congress, and it was classified "Secret," not by Congress, but by the CIA. The latter is a transcript of colloquy between Congressmen and CIA witnesses; it was created in Congress under circumstances manifesting a plain Congressional desire for secrecy, and it initially was labeled "Secret," not by the CIA, but by Congress. These distinctions are not, as our dissenting colleague says, a matter of paper and ink. The Transcript originated in Congress and remains a congressional document because it bears clear indicia of a congressional purpose to ensure secrecy; the Statement originated in the CIA and bears no indicia of any congressional purpose to ensure secrecy. It is these indicia of Congress' continuing Control that are dispositive of a document's "congressional" status.
The dissent argues that " '(c)ontrol' in this sense goes to the question whether a document is Exempt from disclosure not to whether it is an 'agency record.' " Diss. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 360 of 607 F.2d. This argument seems to mean that Congress can exercise "control" over secret documents that leave its possession only by enacting FOIA exemptions. We disagree. Congress has broad powers to keep its documents secret; when Congress transfers secret documents to an agency, for a limited purpose and on condition of secrecy, we see no reason to think it thereby waives its own prerogatives of confidentiality and resigns itself to the FOIA exemptions which bind the agency and not it.
Robertson involved § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970), which provides in pertinent part: "Whenever (any person objects to public disclosure of information received by the FAA), the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld from public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public."
I have been asked whether 50 U.S.C. (s) 403g, a statute relating to CIA exemption from laws such as the Sunshine Act and the Freedom of Information Act, comes within the third exemption as recommended by the conference. I have examined section 403g and believe that it does come within the exemption.
The legislative history cites, by way of example, in addition to the statute involved in Robertson, supra note 59, several statutes that would Not qualify under amended Exemption 3. See H.R.Rep.No.94-880, pt. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976), Citing 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970); S.Rep.No.94-1178, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976) (Conference Report), Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (Supp. V 1975). These statutes are of the oceanic variety involved in Robertson and are in marked contrast to the CIA statutes involved here. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 provides that no disclosure of any information obtained at any time by or from the Departments of HEW or Labor shall be made except as relevant regulations prescribe. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 prohibits "(d)isclosure of confidential information generally" by any officer or employee of the United States "in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law."
(a) Two memoranda from Wm. J. Donovan to the President, dated 1941 and 1944 (cited in Report at 481 n.24 & 482 n.28). These documents antedate by at least three years the legislation cited by plaintiffs; neither memorandum discusses any legislation whatever, nor was either prepared for testimony on legislation. See Wilson Affidavit, J.A. 183.
(b) Three memoranda from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, dated 1947-49 (cited in Report, E. g., at 132 n.19, 72 n.7 & 492 n.70). These documents are internal CIA memoranda which were not prepared for testimony on the cited legislation and were in no way used in the legislative process. See Wilson Affidavit, J.A. 183.
(c) Three transcripts of Congressional testimony, dated 1975 (cited in Report, E. g., at 141 n.1, 133 n.27 & 483 n.32). These documents postdate by 26 years the legislation cited by plaintiffs; the testimony was not given in hearings on that legislation.
(d) Three internal CIA memoranda, dated 1961-74, and one memorandum prepared by the Justice Dept., dated 1962 (cited in Report, E. g., at 128 n.1a, 133 n.25, 478 n.10 & 133 n.26). These documents postdate by 13 years the legislation cited by plaintiffs; none of the memoranda was prepared for testimony on that legislation. See Wilson Affidavit, J.A. 183.
(e) Three draft legislative histories of the CIA prepared by the CIA Legislative Counsel's Office, dated 1967 (cited in Report, E. g., at 71 n.5 & 480 n.19). These documents postdate by 18 years the legislation cited by plaintiffs; none constitutes a report or hearings on that legislation and none was prepared for testimony on that legislation. See Wilson Affidavit, J.A. 183.
The CIA dealt with the instant request in a conscientious manner. It disclosed much material, it released additional material as the result of an administrative appeal, and it came forward with newly discovered documents as located. Agency documents have been released to plaintiff-appellant on four separate occasions.
See Fonda v. CIA, 434 F.Supp. at 502, Appeal docketed, No. 77-1989 (D.C. Cir. 4 Nov. 1977): "The CIA dealt with plaintiff's request in a conscientious manner. It disclosed much material and it came forward with newly discovered documents as located. . . ."
In order to obtain an award of attorney fees in an FOIA action, a plaintiff must show at minimum that the prosecution of the action could reasonably have been regarded as necessary and that the action had substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information.
In the present case, by contrast, plaintiffs urge that proper ventilation of the issues requires both discovery and more detailed affidavits. Plaintiffs seek to discover the circumstances surrounding the creation, and possession by the CIA, of the "hearing transcript," Part II, Infra ; the procedures and substantive criteria observed in classifying the "Hillenkoetter statement," Part III(A), Infra ; the breadth of the CIA's search for responsive documents and the reasons for delay, Part IV, Infra ; and whether the agency's decision to disclose certain materials was prompted by this lawsuit, Part V, Infra. In addition, plaintiffs contend that the affidavits filed by the CIA fail adequately to describe specific materials withheld and the reasons for nondisclosure, Parts II n.8 and III(B), Infra.
For a brief discussion of the history and purposes of the FOIA, see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973).
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, has considered a claim similar to that raised here by the CIA. In Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), the court decided that presentence reports are not "agency records" even though in the possession of prison authorities. I disagree. See note 13 Infra.
My brothers would facilitate the flow of information between Congress and the Executive branch, maj. op. at --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 346 of 607 F.2d, at the prohibitive cost of perpetuating the "secret law" we have condemned so frequently. See e. g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 246, 505 F.2d 350, 353 (1974); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 173, 484 F.2d 1086, 1091 n.13 (1973).
My colleagues justify their view of congressional "control" on the theory that "Congress has broad powers to keep its documents secret . . . (and does not) waive( ) its . . . prerogatives of confidentiality" when it transfers a "secret" document to an agency. Maj. op. at n.48.
I think it is fair to say that the court creates a tenth exemption for documents subject to what it terms "congressional prerogatives of confidentiality." To be sure, there can be no doubt about the existence of congressional power to maintain the secrecy of congressional proceedings, See U.S.Const. art. I, § 5, and thus to preserve the secrecy of documents in which the minutes of those proceedings are transcribed. The question in this case, however, is not whether such a power exists, but whether Congress continues to exercise it after transferring a document to an agency on an ostensibly permanent basis.
I read the FOIA as an unequivocal declaration by Congress that documents which have become part of the administrative process are subject to full disclosure unless specifically exempted.
That the majority fails to consider fully the perplexity of its "property" rationale is reflected also by its reliance on Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968) (per curiam). In that case the court held that a presentence report in the hands of prison authorities was not an "agency record" because it "was made for the use of the sentencing court and thereafter remains in the exclusive control of that court despite any joint utility it may eventually serve." Id. Perhaps the sentencing court can be said to have a "property" interest in a presentence report since such reports are prepared for that court by an arm of that court the United States Probation Office. See Rule 32(c)(1), Fed.R.Crim.P. Since the contents of a presentence report originate with the courts, however, not with the Executive branch, such reports would appear distinguishable under the majority's standard from the testimony contained in the hearing transcript at issue here.
In any event, I believe that Cook was wrongly decided. The brief opinion in that case fails to clarify exactly how the sentencing court exercises control over a document in the possession of prison authorities. Moreover, the opinion fails to envision the possibility that the sentencing court could ever relinquish such control. In my view, once the prison authorities had possession of the report for use in connection with administrative decisions (e. g., parole release), the report became a quintessential "agency record." See note 11 Supra and accompanying text.
The "practice" to which the court refers is ambiguous at best. For one thing, the court relies on practice in the Senate, and the House may have functioned differently. And the practice of either branch of Congress may have provided for disclosure without approval by committee after a specified duration. Moreover, assuming Senate practice is relevant, the court should consider whether disclosure of portions of the transcript by the Church Committee, See note 15 Infra, might substitute for approval by the committee that originally conducted the hearings.
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976).
Having failed to follow the procedures established by their own branch of government, appellants ask us in effect to save them from the consequences of that failure by providing an exemption the Congress did not create. The power of a court to refuse to order the release of information that does not qualify for one of the nine statutory exemptions exists, if at all, only in "exceptional circumstances in which a court could fairly conclude that Congress intended to leave room for the operation of limited judicial discretion." The need for this restriction on the power of the courts is apparent here. A broad judicial power to refuse to order disclosure of non-exempt information that a court feels would damage the national interest could obviously operate to frustrate the requirements of FOIA.
Id. 184 U.S.App.D.C. at 131, 565 F.2d at 706 (citations omitted). Narrowly circumscribing its discretion, we directed the district court to be "guided by an exacting standard similar to that suggested in Near v. Minnesota, (283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931))." Halperin, 184 U.S.App.D.C. at 132, 565 F.2d at 707. See also Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 248, 505 F.2d 350, 355 (1974); Getman v. NLRB, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 450 F.2d 670, 678 (1971); Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 154, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (1971).
In this case, as in Halperin, since the agency failed in reclassifying the Hillenkoetter statement to follow the procedures necessary to give exemption one effect, there is no need to address the question whether the reclassification satisfied the substantive criteria contained in Executive Order No. 11652. I should note, however, that for want of an itemized index of the contents of the Hillenkoetter statement, See Part III(B) Infra, the district court could not possibly have given the requisite De novo consideration to the question of substantive classifiability.
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld . . . in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
The CIA's definition excludes certain (1) "(i)ndex, filing, and museum documents;" (2) "(r)outing and transmittal sheets and notes;" (3) "(b)ooks, newspapers, magazines, and similar publications;" (4) "(d)ocuments and records prepared or originated by (other) agenc(ies);" and (5) "(d)ocuments and records furnished by foreign governments . . . on the understanding . . . (that they be) kept in confidence."
I submit that this view is at war with the purposes of the FOIA. A FOIA request may of necessity be based on imperfect information or none at all about the particular agency's methods of classifying and filing information. FOIA's legislative history acknowledges the problem, indicating that a request must supply only "a reasonable description enabling the Government employee to locate the requested records." S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965). See also Sears v. Gottschalk, 357 F.Supp. 1327 (D.C.Va.1973). To require more specificity would be futile, particularly where, as here, the requestor does not know whether or to what extent responsive documents exist. Moreover, FOIA's legislative history reveals that the requirement that a request identify the records sought, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), is "not to be used as a method of withholding records." S.Rep.No.813, Supra, at 8, Accord, Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 25, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (1970). See also Attorney General's Memorandum, Supra note 9, at 24. It follows that ambiguity resulting from imperfect information should not be used as a justification for prohibiting the discovery necessary to make the FOIA work.
In this case I would not cripple plaintiffs' right to access to agency records because there is ambiguity in their request. What they apparently seek is any and all information in whatever form pertaining to the CIA's organic statutes. Yet a request so formulated would provide agency employees with scarcely any more guidance than one for "legislative history." The problem, quite simply, is that plaintiffs do not know what form such information will take, or where it might be located in the CIA's files. I would rely on the discovery process to eliminate such a problem.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
For the purposes of this discussion I confine my remarks to the impact of these disclosures on the majority's previous discussion of the adequacy of the CIA's search.
Accordingly, this case comes in a different posture than Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 284 U.S. 547, 52 S.Ct. 215, 76 L.Ed. 476 (1932), where the Court of Appeals' order remanding to the District Court to consider new evidence was entered After the Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction of the case (by virtue of its earlier order dismissing the appeal). See id. at 551-52, 52 S.Ct. 215.
4 U.S.Const., Art. III, Sec. 2.
The possibility that the CIA has disregarded its responsibilities under the Freedom of Information Act presents a particularly appropriate occasion for the exercise of our § 2106 authority to require further proceedings. Under FOIA, as with any litigation, we adhere to "the fundamental precept that issues on appeal are to be confined to those duly presented to the trial court", Jordan v. Department of Justice, 192 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 591 F.2d 753 (1978). However, in Jordan we recognized that in unusual circumstances we might remand to the trial court (pursuant to § 2106) to permit consideration of a FOIA exemption raised by the government for the first time on appeal. In so observing, we recognized that the policies of FOIA might outweigh the generalized interest in finality that normally confines our review to the issues as presented in the trial court. If the government, under some circumstances, is to be permitted to expand its arguments on appeal to protect legitimate interests in non-disclosure, surely it is equally consonant with the principles of FOIA to permit one who requests information to enlarge the record, especially where there is disturbing evidence of impropriety by the government.
To be sure, there is one regrettable aspect to the CIA's recent disclosures. Apparently the Agency became aware of the existence of documents possibly relevant to Goland in the late fall of 1977. See Exhibits C and E. Despite the pendency of this case before this Court and plaintiffs' outstanding FOIA request, the documents were not compiled speedily, and Justice Department counsel were not informed of their existence. However, this was not a "strategy decision to stand mute," as claimed in plaintiffs' motion to vacate. As explained in the attached letter from the CIA's Office of General Counsel to Justice Department counsel (Exhibit E), insufficient priority was given to these additional documents because there was uncertainty to what extent the documents found by the law librarian were relevant to this litigation and because of the press of other business. Moreover, as is clear from the attached CIA letters (Exhibits C, D, and E), the number of additional documents turned out to be very great. The law librarian did not complete her first partial inventory of the additional documents until May 19, 1978. Id.
Opp. to Mot. to Vacate at --- - --- of 197 U.S.App.D.C., at 369-370 of 607 F.2d.

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