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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:14:56+00:00

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what weight was given by that officer to the decree of the McIntosh County court is not apparent.
The purpose and intent of the act of June 4, 1918, supra, which makes conclusive the determination of the question of fact by Oklahoma probate courts as to who are the heirs of deceased members of the Five Civilized Tribes, are not entirely clear, as prior thereto Congress, in sections 2 and 6 of the act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat., 312), had already conferred probate jurisdiction on such courts. Some light is thrown on the limitations of the act of June 4, 1918, in the case of In re Jessie's Heirs (259 Fed., 694). See also cases of Coleman v. Battiest (162 Pac., 786) and Lewis v. Gillard-Gardner v. Lewis(173 Pac. 1136). However, it is not believed that the provisions of said acts affect ,the present situation, especially as to the disbursement of funds in the hands of the Government. The practice has become well established for the Government to pay out such funds as are involved here, both individual and tribal, and it has proceeded to determine the heirs of deceased Indians for that purpose. No question has been raised as to the authority of the Government in the premises. As to undistributed per capita shares of tribal funds due these Indians there is no question that they are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Government. It has been held that a member of the Five Civilized Tribes is not at his death seized of an estate of inheritance in undivided tribal property, and that his heirs therefore take direct from the tribe and not by way of inheritance from the decedent. Solicitor's Opinion, October 17, 1914, Seminole Tribe: Mullen v. United States (224 U.S., 448). In practice no distinction has been made between the payment of individual and per capita shares of tribal funds in the hands of the Government for distribution to those found entitled. Both classes of funds are restricted, and in the absence of some specific legislation to the contrary are under the exclusive control of the Government. No reason is seen for disturbing the prevailing practice in the matter of the funds under consideration.
After all, the question involved herein turns primarily upon the matter of proof or evidence, as in other heirship cases. The generally accepted rule governing such cases is that there is legal presumption of death after seven years' absence. In some jurisdictions even a shorter period has been prescribed by statute. The necessity of such a rule is apparent as in its absence the settlement and distribution of estates would be indefinitely postponed. For a like reason the chance or possibility that it may subsequently develop that the absentee whose death is presumed is in fact alive, can not be permitted to forestall invoking the rule in proper instances. As stated, to justify a legal presumption of death arising from absence for seven or more years is a matter of evidence as in other cases, the only difference being as to the degree and character of such evidence.
My opinion after examination of the record is that the proof offered is sufficient upon which to base a legal presumption of death in each of the cases named, there being nothing in the record to rebut such proof, and that the request of the Superintendent of the Five Civilized Tribes for approval of heirship findings and authority to disburse the funds in question accordingly should be granted.
You request my opinion as to the advisability of discontinuing so-called "continuation certificates" in connection with surety bonds furnished by banks to secure deposits therein of Indian moneys.
While the above form contemplates that these bonds may be executed for varying designated periods, yet as a matter of fact the bonding companies, owing to fluctuating financial and other conditions, object to stipulated periods greater than one year. Hence our existing bonds almost uniformly provide for a stipulated period of one year within which neither party-the bonding company nor the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, according to the wording of that instrument-can terminate the liability even upon notice. After the stipulated period has expired, however, on giving the required thirty days' notice either party may terminate the bond which will relieve the surety company from any new liability arising after the notice of termination becomes effective. The surety, of course, is liable under the present form of bond for losses incurred not only during the stipulated period but thereafter until the bond is actually terminated on proper notice.
The "continuation certificates" have been resorted to as a means of renewing the stipulated period for like periods of one year during which neither party can terminate the bond. Annual renewal of such certificates necessitates considerable routine work here, at the banks, and by the bonding companies as well. Discontinuance of those certificates, of course, will obviate such routine work, a thing which the Indian Office is anxious to accomplish but is solicitous as to whether such action will in anywise jeopardize the safety of the Indian funds.
There is no statute which requires these continuation certificates. The matter, therefore, is one entirely of administrative regulations and agreement between the offices in charge, the banks, and the bonding company. This being true, such certificates may be dispensed with if the administrative officers find it advisable or convenient so to do. Under the present form of bond the surety remains liable after the stipulated period and until proper notice in writing of termination of the bond be comes effective. The funds of the Indians will in no way be placed in jeopardy by discontinuing these certificates provided that on receipt of notice of termination of liability under existing bonds the banks are required to furnish new bonds or the funds be withdrawn and placed elsewhere before the termination of the liability under the old bond.
49 L.D. 370 December 15, 1922.
There is no authority whereunder the Secretary of the Interior can require the purchasers, or their assignees, of lands allotted in severalty to Indians on the Wind River Reservation, Wyoming, to whom patents in fee had previously been issued, to contribute toward defraying the construction costs of the irrigation system upon that reservation.
Cases of Francis V . Francis (203 U.S., 233), and Burke v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company (234 U.S., 669), cited and applied.
It is further agreed that of the moneys derived from the sale of said lands the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the construction and extension of an irrigation system within the diminished reservation for the irrigation of the lands of said Indians.
Into the history of the latter legislation we need not now go other than to observe the manifest in tent on the part of Congress to shift the burden of the cost of such work from the tribal funds to the shoulders of the individual Indians benefited, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior might prescribe. Obviously the most equitable method of assessing costs of this character is on a per acre basis against the lands irrigated through each respective system. Manifestly also there is some conflict between that provision in the general law relating to such projects (which re quires reimbursement from the individual Indians benefited) and those specific appropriations for the Wind River and other designated projects wherein reimbursement is to be from tribal funds. My predecessor had occasion to consider this very conflict with reference to the Indians of the Wind River Reservation and in an opinion (unpublished) under date of May 25, 1920, it was held, in effect, that this reservation or project does come within the purview of the general law, thus altering the method of reimbursement by shifting it to the shoulders of the individual Indians benefited by the construction of such works. Without here questioning the soundness of that view the issue now before me will be approached from a some what different angle.
From time to time patents in fee simple have since been issued to individual allottees of this reservation deemed to be capable of managing their own affairs under the general authority so to do conferred on the Secretary of the Interior by the act of May 8, 1906 (34 Stat., 182). These latter patents recite no lien specific or otherwise for repayment of the irrigation charges and in the absence of statutory authority for the insertion of such a lien in patents of this kind it is not well seen how such action could be had. See Francis v. Francis (203 U.S., 233) and Burke v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company (234 U.S., 669, 670). Legislative authority is at hand for the insertion of liens of this kind in patents for irrigable land on a few of our Indian reservations as to which see the acts of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat., 1058, 1063), August 24, 1912 (37 Stat., 518, 522), May 18, 1916 (39 Stat., 123, 140, 154, 156), and June 4, 1920 (41 Stat., 751, 754), but no such statutory authority is found with respect to the Wind River Reservation.
In the absence of contractual obligations, therefore, between the United States and the purchasers of these allotted Indian lands, which I understand are not extant, I am unable to see how the purchasers of such lands, or their assignees, can be held liable for repayment of the cost of constructing the irrigation system at Wind River. Aside from the acts of Congress specifically relating to this project, all of which, substantially direct reimbursement for the cost of this work out of tribal funds, the only other applicable statute is that provision in the act of August 1, 1914 (38 Stat., 582), which places the obligation to repay against the individual Indians benefited, but not necessarily against the lands allotted to such Indians, by way of a lien or otherwise. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the purchasers or present owners of these lands, other than the Indians themselves can not be held accountable for repayment of a proportionate part of the cost of constructing the irrigation system on the reservation referred to.
49 L.D. 376 December 28, 1922.
Section 16 of the act of June 4, 1920, although purporting to be a grant in praesenti of certain lands within the Crow Indian Reservation to the State of Montana for school purposes, is not to be construed as a denial of the right of those Indians in certain specific classes designated by the act to select such lands for allotments.
The doctrine that congressional legislation pertaining to relations between the Indians and third parties, including the States, is to be construed in favor of the Indians has been so frequently announced by the courts that it has practically become a maxim.
While a State is not entitled to indemnity under its school and grant because the lands in place are of an inferior quality, yet where its place lands are "hedged in," even by subsequent acts of the Federal Government, so that they be come practically useless for school purposes, the right of the State to select indemnity lands elsewhere arises.
The term "Indemnity" as used in the statutes granting lands to the States for school purposes implies compensation for losses actually sustained by failure to receive designated sections in place, and not a right to select lands elsewhere because those in place happen to be of inferior quality.
November 24, 1922, you approved a schedule of allotments in severalty to some 358 members of the Crow Tribe of Indians in Montana made pursuant to the act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat., 751), but excepted from such approval, pending further instructions, two allotments involving lands in certain sections 16 within that reservation-"State school lands." Some question having been raised regarding these two allotments you have since requested my opinion as to the respective rights of the Indians and of the State in the premises.
While the particular schedule referred to contains but two allotments in conflict with the grant to the State yet the information now at hand discloses that there are some 5,000 acres of other land within the Crow Reservation similarly situated and which doubtless will appear on subsequent allotment schedules to be presented here for action. Under these circumstances it is essential that the matter be considered somewhat fully.
Standing alone and construed literally the expression "is hereby granted" as used above undoubtedly constitutes a grant in praesenti; one taking effect immediately upon the passage of the act if the lands are then surveyed, and if not surveyed then upon approval of an official survey (33 L.D., 181; 240 U.S., 192). With the latter situation, however, we are not here greatly concerned, as I understand that practically all lands within the diminished Crow Reservation have previously been surveyed, In the absence of some controlling reason to the contrary, therefore, the grant to the State became effective as of the date of that act. No affirmative action on the part of the State is necessary in order to perfect its title to its lands in place such as "an acceptance" of the terms of the act or a formal "selection" of the lands in place granted to it. We turn, therefore, to the remaining provisions of the same statute and to other relevant circumstances. It may be well, however, here to observe that under the compensating clauses of the act, Congress has seen to it that neither the Indians nor the State shall suffer substantial loss by virtue of any of the provisions of that statute, for, where any lands in place are lost to the State, whether by reason of allotment to the Indians or otherwise, then the right to indemnity instantly arises, and for all lands within their reservation ultimately passing to the State under the school land grant the Indians of the Crow Tribe are to receive $5 per acre.
Beyond all of that, however, rests still other pertinent considerations. Legislation anterior to June 4, 1920, provided for allotments in given areas to the Indians of the Crow Reservation, notably the act of April 11, 1882 (22 Stat., 42), which authorized an allotment of 160 acres of agricultural or 320 acres of grazing land to each head of a family, and 80 acres of agricultural or 160 acres of grazing land to each single person, including children "born prior to said allotments." Several successive efforts were made to allot the Indians of the Crow Tribe under this and subsequent acts of Congress prior to June 4, 1920. Into the history of all this we need not now go other than to observe that the earlier allotment rolls were "closed" as of December 31, 1905. After that date, of course, children born to members of the tribe were not regarded as entitled to an allotment. To this ruling the Crow Indians objected, contending in brief that the reservation was "their property" and this being so that they should be permitted to select allotments for children born to enrolled members of the tribe so long as any land suitable, for allotment purposes remained within their reservation. Selections of the lands wanted in behalf of such newborn children were made and filed at the local agency, not with out some misgivings, however, on the part of the administrative officers in charge, as it was not then known what additional legislation, if any, might be had, and it was feared that the selections so made might complicate future adjustment of affairs should be needed legislation not be enacted. That issue, however, has since been put at rest by the act of June 4, 1920, supra, in which, in so far as class A allottees are concerned, Congress has but recognized and confirmed allotments that were previously selected for these Indians. In truth and in equity, therefore, it might well be said that the Indians on this particular schedule possess rights antedating the grant to the State.
We turn, therefore, to still other pertinent facts at hand. The State is not here demanding its lands in place. With respect to the Crow, as with so many of the other Indian reservations within her borders, the State of Montana, speaking generally, has waived all technical rights she may have to any designated lands in place and selected indemnity lands elsewhere. The real question at issue, therefore, is the legal right of the State so to do. An extended memorandum from the General Land Office under date of October 28, 1922, regarding this matter presents this angle of the situation quite forcibly. Therein the case of Michael Dermody (17 L.D., 266) is referred to. That case has been duly considered. There it was held, in brief, that a State may not at will waive its right to lands in place and seek indemnity elsewhere-a holding that is undoubtedly sound. If we once recognize a naked right of election on the part of a State to take either its lands in place or indemnity elsewhere as it might choose, then the matter would simply resolve itself into one of inspection in order for the State to determine whether to retain its base lands or to seek lands of a better quality elsewhere by way of "indemnity." The latter term, within itself, negatives the existence of any such right. Rather it implies compensation for losses actually sustained by failure to receive any lands in place and not a right to select lands elsewhere because those in place happen to be of an inferior quality. Manifestly no such right ever existed in our public land States. On the other hand, a State is not always to be required to retain its base lands in place and this is amply illustrated by the departmental holding in 28 L.D., 57. There certain lands in place had passed to the State of California under the school land grant to it and after official survey of such lands had been made in the field those lands were included within a national forest. The State insisted that it had the right to surrender its base lands and select indemnity elsewhere. At first that contention was denied (19 L.D., 585), but on reconsideration the earlier ruling was vacated, and in the later decision (28 L.D., 57, 61), it was said: "The selection (indemnity), when approved, will operate as a waiver by the State of its right to the tract used as a basis." This ruling was referred to with approval and up held in principle by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of State of California v. Deseret Water, Oil and Irrigation Company (243 U.S., 415, 421). The true rule, therefore, seems to be that while the State may not be heard to complain because its lands in place are of an inferior quality, yet where its base lands are "hedged in" even by subsequent acts of the Federal Government then the right on the part of the State to select indemnity lands elsewhere arises.
As the State of Montana, by the provisions of section 7 of the act of May 30, 1908, supra, is entitled to select land in lieu of that lost to it within sections 16 and 36 in the Fort Peck Reservation, by reason of allotment or other disposition, the Indians on that reservation, if they so desire, may select lands in allotment within sections 16 and 36.
The act of March 1, 1907 (34 Stat., 1015, 1035), provided for the survey, allotments to the Indians in given areas, classification, appraisement and disposal of the surplus lands within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, Montana, which act also carried an explicit grant of the lands in sections 16 and 36 within that reservation to the State for school purposes. Provision was also made for indemnity to the State for any lands lost by reason of allotment to the Indians or otherwise. Prior to that act no lands within this reservation had been allotted to these Indians. After the surveys and allotments called for by the act of March 1, 1907, had been completed but before the remaining requirements of that act had been fully administered. Congress, by the act of June 30, 1919 (41 Stat. 3, 16), repealed so much of the act of 1907 as related to the disposal of the unallotted lands within this reservation and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to prorate the remaining unallotted lands among the Indians of the Blackfeet Tribe as shown by a tribal roll therein provided for. The latter act (1919), however, expressly provided that nothing therein contained should be construed to repeal the school land grant to the State of Montana, made by the act of March 1, 1907. That situation came be fore this Department in September, 1920, by way of instructions to the register and receiver at Kalispell, Montana (47 L.D., 568 et seq). Possibly some of the observations made in those instructions were some what wider than originally intended, or at least they are susceptible of a construction broader than the situation at hand actually justified. At any rate I am happy here to observe that since those instructions were issued, on ascertaining that practically every acre within sections 16 and 36 in the Black feet Indian Reservation had been allotted to the Indians, the State very graciously waived any technical right it might have had to designated lands in place and selected lieu lands elsewhere. By "Montana School Indemnity Clear List No. 33" approved February 12, 1921, indemnity lands out side of the reservation were approved to the State in lieu of all school lands within the Blackfeet Reservation. For reasons herein given I see no occasion to question the propriety of the action so had in that instance.
When we seek the fundamental principle under lying transactions of this kind it is not hard to find. But they illustrate the familiar doctrine so frequently announced by the Supreme Court as to now practically constitute a maxim to the effect that legislation pertaining to the Indians must be construed in their favor. The reservation of lands for each of the Indian Tribes referred to herein was originally established by treaty with the respective tribes. While the naked legal title to such lands did remain in the United States, yet for all intents and purposes it was regarded as the property of the Indians. This Department has ever been tender in its regard of the superior right of the Indians in the premises, and especially as between the Indians and third parties, including the States. Laying aside, therefore, for the time being, the superior power of Congress over the subject matter, when we come to consider the prior rights of the Indians and of third parties, including the States, we instantly recognize the stronger, i.e., the Indians. It would not be difficult, therefore, under eminently proper construction of statutes of this kind, supported at least in principle by the rulings of the highest judicial tribunal in this country, to hold that in matters of this character the rights of the State are subordinate to the rights of the Indians. This is particularly true in view of the indemnity clauses of legislation of this kind under which the State receives indemnity lands elsewhere in quantity equal to the loss."
the field have amicably adjusted conflicting claims between the State and the Indians in the premises and are in full accord as to the adjustment of the school land grant made to the State by the act of June 4, 1920, supra. I see no occasion here, legally or otherwise, to question the propriety of the adjustment so made.
I am of the opinion that the two suspended allotments first herein referred to should be approved and the issuance of patents therefor ordered. As to those schedules which have not yet been presented for departmental action, if any lands thereon lie within sections 16 and 36, I see no reason why the allotments so made should not be approved provided the State of Montana has selected indemnity lands elsewhere.
49 L.D. 396 January 2, 1923.
The act of March 3, 1901, which authorizes condemnation for public purposes pursuant to State or Territorial laws of lands allotted in severalty to Indians did not, either expressly or by implication, repeal any prior act, nor was it repealed by subsequent acts of Congress relating to the acquisition of rights of way across Indian lands; that act and the various Federal rights of way statutes are to be construed conjointly or, if need be, independently of each other.
In the ordinary sense the terms "public purpose" and "public use" are to be construed interchangeably.
The term "public purpose," as used in the act of March 3, 1901, is to be construed to mean any purpose which would be deemed a public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory within which the allotted Indian lands are sought to be condemned.
(2) Did the act of that date repeal any of the prior acts relating to the acquisition of rights of way across Indian land?
(3) Was the provision in the act mentioned repealed by any subsequent act of Congress under which Indian lands or rights of way thereover could be acquired for designated purposes?
The other statutes referred to, in the main, are: Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095, 1101)) sections 18 to 21, inclusive.
Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095, 1101) sections 18 to 21 inclusive.
Act of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat., 990).
Act of February 15, 1901 (31 Stat., 790).
Act of June 21, 1906 (34 Stat., 325, 330).
Act of March 3, 1909 (35 Stat., 781).
Act of May 6, 1910 (36 Stat., 349).
Act of March 4, 1911 (36 Stat., 1235, 1253-54).
Act of May 18, 1916 (39 Stat., 123, 157).
published departmental rulings relating to such matters but they are ample for our present purposes.
Taking up the specific questions reproduced above, discussing these inversely and considering the last two jointly, it may be said that none of the statutes listed nor any other act of Congress, in express terms, repeals that provision in the act of March 3, 1901, supra. It will also be observed that that provision does not, in terms, repeal any other statute. As repeals by implication are not to be favored (235 U.S., 422) unless these several statutes are so repugnant to the provisions of the act of 1901 referred to, or present such an irreconcilable conflict therewith that effect can not be given to each then it must be held that the provisions of the one act are not repealed by the other. I do not find that the true situation here impels a repeal by implication. Hence, these several measures are to be considered together, or if need be, independently of each other. This clarifies the matter considerably.
These quotations from the law of Congress and the laws of the State answer the inquiry and leave no room for discussion or argument. Indian allotments are subject to be condemned for public purposes under the laws of the State or Territory where located, before the issue of final patent, to the same extent as if the allot tee held the fee to the land. The use of the land for right of way for irrigating ditches is declared by the law of Utah to be a public use in support of which the right of eminent domain may be exercised.
Departmental decisions reported subsequently to the foregoing are not entirely silent in the matter.
A decree of condemnation by a court of competent jurisdiction, in proceedings under the act of March 8, 1901, which provides for condemnation for public purposes of lands allotted in severalty to Indians, has the effect to vest title in fee, and the issuance of patent to the Indian allottee for the land covered by the decree is not necessary.
The ruling had in the latter case is substantially dealt with also in 42 L.D., 4, as the same parties in interest and the same subject matter were involved. The fact that the power company there concerned also submitted to and did receive from Congress by the act of May 5, 1908 (35 Stat., 100) a confirmation of its title to the lands so acquired in no way detracts from the fact that the condemnation proceedings had in the first instance were perfectly legal, sufficient, and proper. The additional legislation by Congress simply "made assurance doubly sure." When analyzed the last mentioned act merely released and confirmed unto the power company the interests of the United States in and to the lands therein described. Those lands having previously been Indian "trust allotments," with the legal title remaining in the United States, doubtless the power company preferred to have of record some authenticated extinguishment of the latter title also.
After mature consideration of the entire subject matter I am of the opinion that the provisions of the act of March 3, 1901, are still in effect and that allotted Indian lands may still be condemned for public purposes. This brings us to a consideration of the question first presented, as to what constitutes "public purposes."
If the special benefit to be derived from the lands sought to be appropriated is wholly for private persons, the use is a private one, and is not made a public use by the fact that the public has a theoretical right to use it, or that the public will receive an incidental or prospective benefit therefrom. And on the other hand if the use is in fact a public one its character is not changed by the fact that the control of the property sought to be taken will be vested in private persons or private corporations who are actuated solely by motives of private gain, and that the private purposes will be thereby incidentally served. So a use is not rendered a private one by the mere fact that a part or even the whole of the cost of constructing the improvement is paid by individuals, although such individuals are the persons most benefited by the improvement.
While the foregoing employs the terms "private use" and "public use," yet if we substitute for those terms "private purposes" and "public purposes" the inevitable conclusion reached will be the same.
In his presentation of this matter the Commissioner of Indian Affairs refers to two particular local issues, one in the State of Oklahoma and the other in Wisconsin. The former refers to powerhouse sites and rights of way for electric transmission lines on and across lands allotted to Indians of the Kickapoo Tribe, although the particular areas desired are not described. It is further stated that the statutes of Oklahoma declare the furnishing of electricity to be a public purpose and that a grant of the power of eminent domain has also been had. This being true, I see no reason why condemnation proceedings, pursuant to the act of March 3, 1901, supra, would not lie as to the lands allotted to the Kickapoos.
cerned, or any one of them, refuse to grant the rights sought across lands allotted in severalty I would then be loath to hold as a matter of law that the power company could not resort to the act of March 3, 1901, and by condemnation acquire the lands needed to serve a manifest public purpose. Frankly, I am of the opinion that such a proceeding could be had as I do not see wherein the provisions of the act of May 18, 1916, operate as a repeal by way of implication or otherwise of the provisions of the act of March 3, 1901, supra.
As to the tribal lands involved, I find no act of Congress subjecting lands of this character to the operation of State statutes relating to condemnation. Hence, should the Lac Court Oreille Indians, as a tribe, refuse to consent to the use of tribal lands for the purposes indicated in the act of May 18, 1916, then it would seem that the power company must seek relief by way of additional legislation through Congress. This particular angle of the matter not being directly in controversy here is one which I deem it unnecessary to exhaustively consider.
49 L.D. 414 January 24, 1923.
The proceeds derived from sales of lands allotted to Indians with restrictions against incumbrance and alienation are impressed with a trust to the same extent as were the lands before the sale.
Lands purchased with Indian trust funds continue to be impressed with the trust as originally declared, irrespective of whether the purchased property was previously restricted or unrestricted, and the Secretary of the Interior is clothed with full authority to determine the descent thereof to the same extent as he is with respect to the original property from the sale of which the purchase funds were derived.
Property purchased with Indian trust funds, even though unrestricted prior to purchase, is exempt from taxation until the termination of the trust period.
There has been referred to me for consideration, on request of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, a question submitted by the superintendent of Pawnee Indian Agency, Oklahoma, as to the authority of the Department to determine the descent of property purchased with trust funds where such property was previously unrestricted or held in fee.
The superintendent also raises the question as to whether unrestricted property purchased for an Indian with funds held in trust for him is subject to taxation by the State.
The practice of the Department heretofore has been to determine the heirs of deceased Indians whose property is of the character of that referred to. That in itself constitutes decision of the Department as to its authority in the premises. One of the recent instances in which the Department assumed jurisdiction to determine the heirs was that of Charlie Wilson, deceased Pawnee Indian, whose property consisted in part of a house and lot in the town of Pawnee, Oklahoma, purchased with funds to the credit of decedent, there being inserted in the deed to such property a condition that it should not be alienated or incumbered without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. This property was unrestricted at the time of its purchase for the Indian.
The power to insert in deeds covering property purchased with trust funds a condition that the property shall not be alienated or encumbered without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; also the authority of the Department to determine the descent of the purchased property; and as to whether or not such property is subject to taxation are all allied subjects.
It is clearly within the power of the Secretary of the Interior to attach conditions to sales of Indian allotted lands because such power is expressly conferred in acts authorizing such sales; that is, they are to be made subject to his approval and on such terms and conditions and under such regulations as he may prescribe. It was held in the case of United States v. Thurston County, Nebraska, et al. (143 Fed., 287) that the proceeds of sales of allotted lands are held in trust for the same purposes as were the lands; that no change of form of property divests it of the trust; and that the substitute takes the nature of the original and stands charged with the same trust. From this situation arose the practice of inserting in deeds of conveyance covering property purchased for an Indian with trust funds the nonalienation clause referred to, which is merely a continuation over the new property of the trust declared for the old or original property. For sanction of this practice see 13 Ops. A. A. G., 109; Jackson v. Thompson et al. (80 Pac., 454); and Beck v. Flournoy Live-Stock and Real-Estate Co. (65 Fed., 30).
with trust funds continue under the trust as originally declared and that power exists to insert in deeds covering such lands a condition against alienation and incumbrance, it follows that upon the death of an Indian for whom the property is held in trust his heirs are to be determined by the Department the same as in the case of the original property from the sale of which the purchase funds are derived. Apparently no question is raised as to the authority of the Department to determine the descent of property purchased with trust funds derived from the sale of lands previously held in trust or restricted. The question submitted has reference to lands that were unrestricted prior to purchase. The theory on which the Department and the courts have proceeded in this matter is that property purchased with trust funds becomes impressed with the trust nature of the purchase money. In this view it can make no difference whether the purchased lands are restricted or unrestricted; the authority to determine heirs is coexistent with the continuation of the trust. By the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat., 855), Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the Secretary of the Interior to determine the heirs of deceased Indian allottees, and this power extends not only to property held in trust but also to property on which restricted fee patents have issued, under legislation providing for "determining the heirs of deceased Indian allottees having any right, title, or interest, in any trust or restricted allotment, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior." (United States v. Bowling et al, 256 U.S., 484).
The question as to whether lands or property acquired with the proceeds of the sales of allotted Indian lands are subject to taxation by the State is one fully settled by both departmental and court decisions which cover the purchase on behalf of Indians of both restricted and unrestricted lands. The general rule was long since established by the Supreme Court in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat., 315, 429) that "all subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation." See also cases of Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee (117 U.S., 151) and United States v. Nashville Railway Company (118 U.S., 120).
"The statute provides that the lands may be sold with the consent of the Secretary. It thus permits a change in form of the trust property from land to money. This change may be effected only with the consent of the trustee represented in the person of the Secretary of the Interior. No citation of authority is needed to sustain the general doctrine that into whatever form trust property be converted, it continues to be impressed with the trust.
"The property being held in trust by the United States for a period which had not yet expired and which period was subject to further extension by the President, the intention to terminate the trust must be found to be clearly expressed in order to warrant us in holding that trust does not follow the property in its changed form."
There is no question under the authorities that the power of the Government over trust property continues until the expiration of the trust period regardless of the form of such property, unless an intention has been expressed to relinquish such power.
The same reasons exist against the alienation of unrestricted land purchased with trust funds without the consent and approval of the Secretary of the Interior as existed in respect to the original allotment, from the sale of which such funds are derived. The land so purchased with trust funds becomes none the less an instrumentality employed by the Government for the benefit of the Indian than where land held in trust is purchased and, hence for the like reason, should be exempt from taxation. The Indian continues in the incompetent class and is entitled to the same protection and supervision. All these conditions are imposed on the theory that they are for the best interests of the Indian wards of the Government, among other things to protect them from the improvident disposition of the lands and funds.
Where an Indian allottee of the Yakima tribe in Washington died before the expiration of the trust period, and his land was sold by the Secretary of the Interior under Act May 29, 1908, section 1 (Comp. St. Sec. 4224), which authorizes such sale and the use of the proceeds during the trust period for the benefit of the heirs, and the proceeds were invested in other lands, the conveyances reciting that they could not be disposed of or incumbered without the consent of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, such substitute lands during the trust period held exempt from taxation.
A similar ruling was made by the United States District Court, eastern district of Washington, in the case of United States v. Yakima County, December 5, 1922, involving the purchase of lots in the city of Toppenish, Washington. In addition to the cases hereinbefore cited see Page et al. v. Pierce County et al. (64 Pac., 891); United States v. Law (250 Fed., 218); United States v. Chehalis County et al. (217 Fed., 281); United States v. Pearson et al. (231 Fed., 270); United States v. Gray et al. (201 Fed., 291); Ward v. Love County (253 U.S., 17); Choate v. Trapp (224 U.S., 665); and Morrow et al. v. United States (243 Fed., 854).
Applying the doctrine announced in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to the case at bar, it would seem reasonably clear that the lands in question can not be taxed by the State so long as the Government has an interest in them "either legal or equitable," or is even charged with the performance of some obligation or duty respecting them.
Congress has conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior authority to prescribe regulations and conditions to govern the sale of Indian allotted lands as well as the expenditure of the proceeds which implies an exclusion of all other authority. The lands and proceeds are held by the Government for a specified period in trust for the Indians, such trust being an agency for the exercise of a Federal power and therefore outside the province of State authority.
Administrative officers, being without authority to alter or amend existing law or to waive the specific requirement of a statute, cannot waive that requirement in section 26 of the act of June 30, 1919, which provides that an applicant for a lease based upon a mining claim on Indian lands shall file application therefor within one year from the date of location.
Inasmuch as an official survey of a mining claim located within an Indian reservation is not required prior to application for a lease based thereon under the act of June 30, 1919, delay on the part of administrative officers in causing a survey to be made, or in furnishing blank forms of lease, can not be pleaded as a ground for failure on the part of the applicant to comply with the plain requirements of the statute.
You request my opinion regarding the validity of a number of conflicting lode mining claims covering deposits of metalliferous minerals in certain lands within that part of the Navajo Indian Reservation, Arizona and New Mexico, lying under the immediate supervision of the San Juan Indian School and Agency.
1 * See opinions of July 7, 1922 and July 10, 1922 (49 L.D., 420 and 421).
3. Should valuable metalliferous minerals be found the section contemplates the location of mining claims in the same manner as mining claims are located under the mining laws of the United States. Should the locator fail to file a duplicate copy of the location notice with the officer in charge of the land within 60 days or fail within one year thereafter to make application through the officer in charge to the Secretary of the Interior for a lease of the land he will thereby forfeit all preference right to a lease. Any locator who fails to comply with the United States mining laws and the regulations of the General Land Office prescribed thereunder as to the location of mining claims will also forfeit all preference right to a lease.
5. * * * Locations, if upon surveyed land, must be located in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the survey. If made upon unsurveyed land the locations must be marked in the same manner as lode locations, but shall conform as nearly as practicable to what would be public land surveys and the rectangular subdivisions thereof.
6. Before a lease will be granted covering a lode mining claim, or a placer claim, on unsurveyed land, it will be necessary for the locator, at his expense, to have the claim surveyed by a United States deputy mineral surveyor. The survey must be made in the form and manner required by and under the laws and regulations governing the survey of claims under the United States mining laws, application for such survey to be made to the United States surveyor general for the State wherein the claim is located: Provided, That where a number of contiguous claims are held in common, the survey may be made of the exterior boundaries of the group and the entire group may be included in one lease. Two copies of the plat and two copies of the field notes must be filed by the locator with his lease.
It will be noted that the regulations, of course, follow the statute with respect to requiring applicants to serve duplicate copies of the notice of location on the superintendent or other officer in charge of the particular reservation "within 60 days" from the date of location, and to apply for a lease within one year from the date of such location. In other words, the requirements in this respect are statutory rather than by way of regulation.
superintendent, until February 12, 1921. Amended location certificates bearing dates of July 24, July 26, and July 27, 1920, covering respectively the Canary, North Star, and North Star No. 2 claims were likewise filed with said superintendent on February 12, 1921. Each of these latter certificates were also signed by the said Hunter, Morris, and Dalton. No copy of a notice of location or of an amended certificate of location is found in the record covering the claims known as North Star No. 3 and Valley View No. 4. By three separate quitclaim deeds, all dated January 4, 1921, V. E. Dalton, Biffle M. Morris, and W. F. Hunter released and quitclaimed unto the Carizo Uranium Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New Mexico, all of their rights, title, and interest, among other claims, to those particular locations known as Canary, North Star, North Star Nos. 2, 3, and 4, and Valley View Nos. 1 to 4 inclusive. Thereafter the Carizo Uranium Company appears as the party applicant for a lease covering said claims.
In a brief filed by said company in support of its application it is alleged that during the winter of 1920-1921 considerable assessment work was done by it and by its predecessors on said claims and the construction of a wagon road to the properties begun; that on March 28, 1921, it applied to one Allison L. Kroeger, United States mineral surveyor, at Durango, Colorado, to have an official survey made of said claims, but that because of the fact that these claims or a part of them at least are in the State of Arizona and a part in New Mexico considerable valuable time was lost in obtaining proper instructions and orders pertaining to such surveys to the deputy mineral surveyor from the offices of the two surveyor generals, one at Phoenix and the other at Santa Fe; that during the progress of the field work it became necessary to relocate and retrace some 17 miles of the boundary line between the two States in order to determine the jurisdiction of the respective surveyor generals; that the approved field notes covering the mineral claims applied for were not mailed out of Phoenix, Arizona, to the Carizo Uranium Company at Farmington, New Mexico, until April 13, 1922; that said approved field notes were not received by said company until April 18, 1922; that on April 26, 1922, application was made to the officer in charge of the San Juan Indian Agency for blank leases to fill out in accordance with the field notes of survey and the regulations of the Department, but that, that officer having no blanks on hand, the same had to be requested from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Washington; that the desired blanks were received on May 10, 1922, and that on May 18, 1922, application for lease was duly filed with the officer in charge of the reservation. In urging a consideration of its application on the merits the Carizo Uranium Company further alleges that it has always endeavored in good faith to diligently comply with the statute and the regulations of this Department relating thereto but that unavoidable delays over which it had no control, especially in connection with the prosecution of the survey work in the field and in obtaining proper blank forms on which to submit its application, prevented said company from perfecting its application within the time required by the statute; that it construed sections 3 and 6 of the regulations above reproduced together, under the assumption that an official survey of claims of this character must precede an application for lease thereof.
the notice of location covering the North Star No. 3 and Valley View No. 4 as having been filed with the superintendent in charge, and that the copy of the notice covering North Star No. 4 was not filed on said superintendent until after the 60-day period provided by law had expired. In itself these would be sufficient reasons for rejecting the application in so far as the three claims last mentioned are concerned. Administrative officers being without power to alter or amend existing law the requirements of the statute in this respect can not be waived.
2. The application by George O. Williams, covering the Syracuse lode claim, comes within the statute and can be accepted provided the applicant furnishes copies of the plat of survey, field notes, bond, and other data called for by the regulations.
3. The application of George O. Williams, covering the Red Wash Group, must be rejected for the reason that copies of the notice of location covering those claims were not filed with the superintendent within 60 days from the date of location as required by law.
4. In the absence of adverse intervening rights applicants whose claims have been rejected for failure to comply with the statutes may initiate proceedings de nevo for the same lands by filing new copies of notice of location and otherwise complying with the law. This is in accordance with my prior opinion of July 7, 1922 (49 L.D., 420).
My opinion has been requested in the matter of a proposed reservoir for reclamation purposes covering certain lands known as the "Fort Hall Bottoms," within the Fort Hall Indian Reservation, Idaho.
"No treaty for the cession of any portion of the reservation herein described which may be held in common shall be of any force or validity as against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least a majority of all the adult male Indians occupying or interested in the same; and no cession by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to deprive without his consent any individual member of the tribe of his right to any tract of land selected by him, as provided in Article VI, of this treaty."
Subsequently, by agreements with these Indians dated July 18, 1881, and May 27, 1887, ratified respectively by the acts of July 3, 1882 (22 Stat., 148), and September 1, 1888 (25 Stat., 452), the Indians agreed to cede certain strips of land through their reservation desired as rights of way by the Utah and Northern Railroad Company (now the Oregon short line) together with sufficient areas at Pocatello and other points for station ground and town site purposes. By a later agreement ratified by the act of February 23, 1889 (25 Stat., 687), the Indians ceded a large part of their reservation to the United States and provided for allotments in severalty within the diminished reservation. Again, by agreement dated February 5, 1898, ratified by the act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat., 672), the Indians ceded still another part of their original reserve. These later agreements have no material bearing on the question now here other than to show that in these subsequent appropriations of their domain for public and other purposes the wishes of the Indians were respected and their nominal consent at least obtained.
"set aside and reserve certain lands in the western part of the Fort Hall Indian Reservation, lying between the Snake River and the Port Neuf River, in ranges thirty-two and thirty-three east of the Boise meridian known as the 'Fort Hall Bottoms,' for the use in common of the Indians for grazing purposes."
ities some 340,000 acres have been allowed to Indians of the Fort Hall Reservation and some 37,210 acres, known as the Fort Hall Bottoms, set aside as a grazing reserve for use of the Indians in common. Within the latter area, however, 946.93 acres have been allotted to some 15 Indians.
It is now proposed to appropriate some 35,000 acres-practically the entire remaining Fort Hall Bottoms-as a reservoir site, known as the American Falls Reservoir, the waters from which will be used partly if not largely in supplying lands in white (private) ownership under the Minikado and Twin Falls Reclamation Projects, Idaho, which projects are now being supplied in part with stored waters, through the Snake River, from a reservoir at Jackson Lake, Wyoming. Substituting American Falls reservoired-water for use on the lands below will release for similar use elsewhere at a higher elevation an equal quantity of water from Jackson Lake. By way of compensating the Indians of the Fort Hall Reservation for their lands so appropriated it is proposed to accord them a fixed, definite water right mainly in the stored waters of Jackson Lake but partly also in the American Falls Reservoir; such value to be determined by appraisement of their lands so taken and offsetting this by an estimated value of the water rights to be given in return therefor. The water so made available to the Indians can be used in the irrigation of their lands now being supplied through the present Fort Hall irrigation system and also for supplying water to a large part of that aggregate area allotted in severalty to individual members of this tribe as grazing lands (160 acres to each of some 1,863 allottees, the entire acreage, however, possibly not coming within the contemplated project).
I understand that the Indians are opposed to such use of their lands, chiefly because they already have a water supply sufficient for the irrigation of the areas allotted to them as irrigable lands-40 acres to each allottee whose consort is (was) dead and 20 acres to each other member of the tribe-and also because the Fort Hall Bottoms, at times, are subject to overflow or at least are sub-irrigated to such an extent as to afford an excellent crop of native or wild hay which the Indians use to considerable advantage for pasturage purposes and from which they annually cut considerable quantities of hay for winter forage and for sale for local consumption. Numerous large springs scattered through these Bottoms annually yield an average flow of about 600 cubic feet of pure water per second. Considerable game, wild fowl, etc., also abound in the marshes there. This being the early habitat of these Indians, naturally, for sentimental reasons they also are reluctant to part with practically the last remnant of their ancestral tribal domain for an invisible and doubtless to them intangible asset even though the latter may be of substantial intrinsic value.
"That where in carrying out the provisions of this act it becomes necessary to acquire any rights or property, the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to acquire the same for the United States, by purchase or by condemnation under judicial process, and to pay from the reclamation fund the sums which may be needed for that purpose, and it shall be the duty of the Attorney General of the United States upon every application of the Secretary of the Interior, under this act, to cause proceedings to be commenced for condemnation within thirty days from the receipt of the application at the Department of Justice."
"Section 13. That the Secretary of the Interior, be and he is hereby, authorized, in his discretion, to reserve from location, entry, sale, allotment, or other appropriation any lands within any Indian reservation, valuable for power or reservoir sites, or which may be necessary for use in connection with any irrigation project heretofore or hereafter to be authorized by Congress: Provided, That if no irrigation project shall be authorized prior to the opening of any Indian reservation containing such power or reservoir sites the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, reserve such sites pending future legislation by Congress for their disposition, and he shall report to Congress all reservations made in conformity with this Act.
"Section 14. That the Secretary of the Interior, after notice and hearing, is hereby authorized to cancel trust patents issued to Indian allottees for allotments within any power or reservoir site and for allotments or such portions of allotments as are located upon or include lands set aside, reserved, or required within any Indian reservation for irrigation purposes under authority of Congress: Provided, That any Indian allottee whose allotment shall be canceled shall be reimbursed for all improvements on his canceled allotment, out of any moneys available for the construction of the irrigation project for which the said power or reservoir site may be set aside: Provided further, That any Indian allottee whose allotment, or part thereof, is so canceled shall be allotted land of equal value within the area subject to irrigation by any such project."
It will be noted that enactment of the latter statute, of general application in so far as Indian lands are concerned, came within a comparatively few days after the act of April 4, 1910, by which the Secretary of the Interior was expressly authorized to set apart the Fort Hall Bottoms as a grazing reserve for the Indians. Further, that section 13 of the act of June 25, 1910, which deals with tribal rather than individual allotted lands, undoubtedly contemplates that the areas withdrawn from location, entry, sales, allotment, or other appropriation are made subject to additional legislation by Congress, and I find no subsequent legislation specifically dealing with the area so withdrawn at Fort Hall. The temporary withdrawal by your predecessor of the lands within the Fort Hall Bottoms for use in connection with the American Falls Reservoir necessarily was contingent on subsequent legislation by Congress, and that was the under standing of the Indian Bureau at the time of its concurrence in the then contemplated withdrawal for reservoir purposes.
About the plenary power of Congress over the subject matter there can be no doubt even to the extent of abrogating or ignoring that expressed provision in the early treaty with these Indians to the effect that no cession of their tribal lands should be of any force or validity unless agreed to by them. That power, however, rests exclusively with Congress and is not lodged in any administrative officer of the Government. This, coupled with the further fact that Congress has heretofore indicated the disposal to be made of the lands within the Fort Hall Bottoms leads me to conclude that additional legislation is necessary.
My attention has been directed to the case of Henkel v. United States (237 U.S., 43), as being applicable or analogous. The situation there, however, turned on an essentially different basis. In that case the area desired for reservoir purposes, or a part of it at least, had been selected in allotment by individual members of the Blackfeet Tribe; but such selections had not been patented or even approved to them. The Government, however, negotiated with the heads of the Henkel family paying them the sum of $7,500 for a relinquishment of all their right, title, and interest in and to the areas so claimed, including the improvements thereon, this being a very liberal allowance in favor of the Indians. Thereafter the Henkels attempted to repudiate the transaction by alleging that no statute of the United States had conferred authority on its officers to thus acquire the lands desired and for the further reason that the "relinquishment" in favor of the Government on behalf of the minor members of the Henkel family has been executed by their parents as natural guardians rather than by a duly appointed legal guardian and therefore such relinquishment was void. The court, however, found in effect that the Government had dealt fairly by the Indians in the matter (page 50) and also upheld the validity of the relinquishment so made in behalf of the minors (page 52).
In a somewhat similar case involving lands also within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation desired by the Reclamation Service for use in connection with its projects there, the United States District Court for the district of Montana denied authority in the Secretary of the Interior to withhold from allotment the lands needed for reservoir purposes. See the case of David La Breche and George W. Cook v. United States, Equity No. 1069, decided April 2, 1914; unreported (unfortunately for reference purposes at least). Thereafter the lands were formally patented to the claimants and later they were paid some $16,500 for the improvements thereon. Under the subsequent act of April 1, 1920 (41 Stat., 549), the two Indians mentioned were paid an additional consideration exceeding $5,000 for the value of the lands within that reservoir site.
I do not regard either of these two cases as controlling, however, in that they deal with individual rather than tribal property rights, but for the reasons herein above given I am of the opinion that the power resting in the Secretary of the Interior under section 13 of the act of June 25,1910, supra, is merely to withhold from allotment, sale, or other disposition, pending further legislation by Congress, the lands within any Indian Reservation required for reservoir purposes.
Reference is made to memorandum of October 13, 1923, by Administrative Assistant Burlew, requesting my opinion as to the legality of projects managers of reclamation projects acquiring ownership of farms on the projects under their supervision.
Where lands are in private ownership, I know of no statute which would prevent a project manager from acquiring title to same. If it be deemed good policy to forbid such practice as conducive to favoritism in the distribution of water or unfair advantage in other respects, it appears to me that it is within the supervisory power of the Secretary of the Interior to forbid it by appropriate regulation.
"The officers, clerks and employees in the General Land Office are prohibited from directly or indirectly purchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of any of the public land; and any person who violates this section shall forthwith be removed from his office."
Similar provisions were contained in the early act of April 25, 1812 (2 Stat., 716), which established the General Land Office as a Bureau in the Treasury Department, and the act of July 4, 1836 (5 Stat., 107), which reorganized the General Land Office.
"The object of Sec. 452 was evidently to remove from the persons designated the temptation and the power by virtue of the opportunities afforded them by their employment to perpetuate frauds and obtain an undue advantage in securing public lands over the general public by means of their earlier and readier access to the records relating to the disposal of, and containing valuable information as to, such lands. Officers, clerks and employees in the offices of surveyors-general fall clearly within the mischief contemplated by the statute, and the reason of the law applies to them with equally as such force as to those in the central office at Washington. Statutes and regulations of this kind are based upon grounds of sound public policy and their strict enforcement is essential to the good of the public service."
Opportunities for mischief similar to that intended to be remedied by this legislation may exist to some extent in the Bureau of Reclamation, the Office of Indian Affairs and in the Forest Service, for these offices are all concerned in various ways with the disposal of public lands. However, I am of opinion that the rules of statutory construction would not justify the interpretation that the law mentioned has application to these respective offices.
"Land ownership by employees.-During the time of survey, examination, or preliminary study of a project it is not permissible for an employee of the Reclamation Service to be come directly or indirectly interested in the lands or region under survey.
After a project has been determined upon and contracts let it is permissible for an employee of the service to purchase land for a home to be occupied by himself and his im mediate family. This permission, however, does not extend to buying and selling as a dealer or speculator, but the intent must be merely to establish a home in good faith. (Regulations, June 24, 1905).
by the interests of the service. Any employee acquiring interest in land under a project does so entirely at his own risk, with the under standing that such interest shall not interfere with such transfers as may be found desirable. (Order of September, 1909).
No superintendent of irrigation, engineer, or other officer or employee in responsible charge of a reclamation project or unit of project will be permitted to acquire any interest in property within that project. This prohibition does not extend to laborers or assistants whose duties are confined to carrying out instructions given by chiefs but only to such men as initiate and put into effect those matters which are left to judgment and discretion. Rights initiated under the order of September, 1909, and prior to the date of this present order will be recognized as being within the scope of the said original order. (Order of April 11, 1912)."
The order of April 11, 1912, above quoted seems to be sufficiently broad to forbid a project manager from acquiring any interest in land, either public or private, within the project over which he has jurisdiction. Any violation of this order would subject the employee to disciplinary action as an employee, even though it would not perhaps serve to make the transaction illegal, as being in conflict with statutory law.
My opinion has been requested as to the validity of a marriage by Indian custom in the Five Civilized Tribes, Oklahoma; this question being presented in connection with a determination of the heirs of Wallace Capy, a deceased member of the Chickasaw Tribe.
Determination of the heirs of deceased members of the Five Civilized Tribes rests with the local courts, as to which see section 2 of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 573), sections 2, 6, and 9 of the act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat., 312), and the act of June 14, 1918 (40 Stat., 606).
The issue presented not being one even primarily recognizable by this Department, I express no opinion on the question submitted other than to observe that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a common law marriage and a marriage by Indian custom are equivalent. See Carney v. Chapman (247 U.S., 102-3).
You request my opinion in the matter of the validity of certain mining leases covering the allotments of Ta-mee-heh Quapaw, Quapaw allottee No. 157, the lands involved being described as the NE 1/4 and the NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4, Sec. 36, T. 29 N., R. 22 E., I. M., Oklahoma, 200 acres.
For reasons not now altogether clear, and unnecessary here to discuss, no effort was made shortly after the passage of the later act to classify allottees at the Quapaw agency as "competent" or "incompetent," and a large number of mining leases have been executed by these Indians and placed of record at Miami; those instruments not being submitted to or approved by this Department.
The mineral field in this locality has since proven very valuable, especially for lead and zinc. During the early part of 1917, or thereabouts, the manifest need for some supervision over these leases, particularly in behalf of some of the allottees at this agency, became so apparent that under date of April 7, 1917, regulations were promulgated wherein an incompetent member of this tribe was defined as "any Indian who has been declared by the Secretary of the Interior to be incompetent to improve or manage his restricted lands properly or with benefit to himself." Later, on November 12, 1920, those regulations were broadened somewhat so as to include minors and certain order classes of allottees, but nothing material here turns on that because all of the leases hereinafter referred to were executed prior to the last mentioned date. January 22, 1920, the Superintendent at Quapaw recommended that the allottee herein named, Ta-mee-heh Quapaw, be declared incompetent to manage her own affairs, but the order by this Department to that effect was not issued until March 26, 1920. In said order directions were given to the effect that the restricted lands allotted to or inherited by this Indian could be leased only upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary of the Interior might prescribe. That action, of course, could not impair or otherwise invalidate preexisting valid leases.
Aside from technical defects that may exist in any of the above instruments, such as errors in description, failure to properly execute, etc., there remains still another material element to be considered. In the case of United States v. Noble (23 U.S., 74) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of the legislation above referred to. Therein it was held, in brief, that by the act of June 7, 1897, supra, allottees at the Quapaw agency were permitted to lease their restricted lands for mining purposes for terms of ten years and no longer; that leases "in possession" only could be made; not leases "in future" or "in revision"; that is, having granted one lease concededly valid for the full period authorized by the statute an allottee could not, during the continuation of that term, grant another lease of the same lands, or even a lease to take effect at the expiration of an existing lease. This practice which had been indulged in so freely by the Indians and their lessees gave rise to the so-called "overlapping leases" which the court emphatically held to be void. The court did say, however (p. 83) that an agreement for a new lease at a fair rental made shortly before the expiration of an existing lease, would doubtless be sustained in equity. These same principles have been applied and upheld in a recent decision by the same court involving leases for agricultural purposes made by a full-blood allottee of the Cherokee Tribe, Oklahoma., See Bunch v. Cole, No. 33 October term, Supreme Court (decided November 19, 1923).
signment dated September 30, 1913, based on the latter lease (No. 11 above) falls, of course, with the lease on which it is predicated. Apparently the leases dated August 12, 1912, and July 23, 1913 (9 and 10 above), were designed to extend or continue, the ten-year terms provided for in the Prior lease of July 23, 1911 (No. 7) by the same parties, although an interval of eight days elapsed between the expiration of lease No. 7 and the beginning of lease No. 9. Be this as it may, however, clearly leases Nos. 9 and 10 were "in futuro" and therefore void under the rule laid down in the Noble case, supra.
On October 10, 1913, Mr. S. C. Fullerton, the lessee under the second lease herein conceded to be valid, sublet these lands to one 0. S. Picher, for a term ending July 1, 1923, at an increased royalty of 12 1/2% (No. 12 above). It may be observed at this point that no practical development of the mineral resources underlying these lands appears to have been undertaken until the Eagle-Picher Lead Company, as the successor in interest to of assignee of O. S. Picher, began operations under this sublease from Mr. Fullerton.
No difficulty, of course, is encountered indexing the lease dated October 27, 1913, in favor of Paul A. Ewert (No, 13 above) to be void as an overlapping lease. May 28, 1918, Mr. Fullerton entered into an agreement with this allottee by which he attempted to surrender and cancel all outstanding leases prior to May 25, of that year (No. 14 above). This agreement does not appear of record in so far as the abstract of title shows, and the Eagle-Picher Company remained in possession and occupancy of these premises under the sublease from Mr. Fullerton, dated October 10, 1913, the term of which provided for therein did not expire until July 1, 1923. By that sublease Mr. Fullerton had put in beyond his power to cancel and surrender his own lease covering these lands, without the consent of his subleasee. Vested rights so created can not be thus impaired. This principle was somewhat more fully discussed in a prior opinion by me dated July 31, 1923 (M. 10506) wherein a similar situation was before me involving the allotment of Ton-gah-hah Beaver, Quapaw allottee No. 152. The attempted cancellation and surrender being ineffectual, the subsequent lease dated February 20, 1920 (No. 15 above), clearly is an overlapping lease and therefore void. It may also be pointed out that the lease last mentioned does not appear to have been recorded at Miami, and under other circumstances that fact might have a material bearing on its validity, for the act of June 10, 1896, supra, requires that all instruments of this nature affecting lands at the Quapaw agency should be recorded at Miami. Having found this lease to be void on other grounds, however, renders it unnecessary to further consider the necessity for recording.
Payment to and acceptance by an officer or employee of the Government of the rental or consideration agreed to be paid under a void lease or other instrument does not render such instrument valid. Hence, the fact that subsequent to March 26, 1920 (the date on which the allottee herein named was declared by this Department to be incompetent) , the superintendent at the Quapaw agency accepted from Mr. Fullerton royalty at the increased rate agreed to be paid by him under the void lease of February 20, 1920, can not give life or validity to that instrument.
From the facts at hand, I am of the opinion that there is now no valid outstanding mining lease covering the allotment hereinabove described.
On recommendation of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs my opinion is requested in regard to the enrollment and allotment of Seper Willior, a deceased Creek Indian. The request is based on a petition filed by W. H. Dill et al., purchasers of the land covered by the allotment from the heirs of Seper Willior, for the issuance of patent to said heirs.
heirs according to the laws of descent and distribution of the Creek Nation and be allotted and distributed to them accordingly. The effect of this provision was to vest title in the heirs by operation of law. Skelton v. Bill (235U.S., 206). An allotment certificate was issued to the heirs and on March 12, 1903, a patent or deed running to said heirs was executed by the Principal Chief of the Creek Nation which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior April 25, 1903, as provided in the act of March 1, 1901, and was recorded on the books of the Commission. Apparently relying on the foregoing the lands were sold by the heirs of Seper Willior and title is now claimed to be in the above-mentioned petitioners.
The patent or deed executed by the Principal Chief of the Creek Nation and approved by the Secretary of the Interior bears the following notation: "Canceled July 25, 1904, P. Porter, Principal Chief". The signature of the Principal Chief is also clipped from the instrument. Attempt is made to explain this notation and mutilation on the theory that as there are two unexecuted deeds the intention was under changed practice to issue two deeds instead of one thus separating the allotted lands into homestead and surplus. The supposition is that with this end in view the Principal Chief made the notation in question and clipped his name from the deed, but no new deeds were ever executed and under instructions the forms were returned to the member of the Commission in charge.
The right of Seper Willior to enrollment and allotment was subsequently questioned and hearings were had with the final result that the following notation approved by the Department September 20, 1909, was placed opposite his name on the roll of the Creek Nation: "Died prior to April 1, 1899: not entitled to allotment". Upon application of The heirs the matter was re-opened and after extended correspondence and taking of further testimony the Department on November 12, 1912, approved the recommendation of The Indian Office that the above notation be allowed to stand.
The original petition of W. H. Dill was filed in June, 1917, it being set forth therein that relying on the record the land covered by said allotment was purchased in good faith from the allottee's heirs for a valuable consideration; that the purchaser had been in continuous possession and had placed valuable improvements on the land; and that by the change in the enrollment record due to the notation referred to a seeming cloud was cast on the purchaser's title. It was accordingly requested that a new deed or patent be issued to the heirs. No action was taken on this request further than to call for reports in the premises until attention was again invited to the matter by the Superintendent of the Five Civilized tribes under date of March 19, 1923.
The questions submitted for opinion are substantially whether the notation on the Creek roll opposite the name of Seper Willior was effective to cancel his enrollment and also the allotment to his heirs and whether the Secretary has authority to issue a new deed or patent to the heirs.
"The rolls so made by said Commission, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall be the final rolls of citizenship of said tribe, upon which the allotment of all lands and the distribution of all moneys and other property of the tribe shall be made, and to no other persons".
"That rolls of the tribes affected by this act shall be fully completed on or before the fourth day of March, nineteen hundred and seven, and the Secretary of the Interior shall have no jurisdiction to approve the enrollment of any person after said date".
"There was thus constituted a quasi-judicial tribunal whose judgments within the limits of its jurisdiction were only subject to attack for fraud or such mistake of law or fact as would justify the holding that its judgment were voidable. Congress by this legislation evidenced an intention to put an end to controversy by providing a tribunal before which those interested could be heard and the rolls authoritatively made up those who were entitled to participate in the partition of the tribal lands. It was to the interest of all concerned that the beneficiaries of this division should be ascertained. To this end the Commission was established and endowed with authority to hear and determine the matter.
When the Commission proceeded in good faith to determine the matter and to act upon information before it, not arbitrarily, but ac cording to its best judgment, we think it was the intention of the act that the matter, upon the approval of the Secretary should be finally concluded and the rights of the parties for ever settled, subject to such attacks as could successfully be made upon judgments of this character for fraud or mistake.
We think the decision of such tribunal, when not impeached for fraud or mistake, conclusive of the question of membership in the tribe, when followed, as was the case here, by the action of the Interior Department confirming the allotments and ordering the patents conveying the lands, which were in fact issued. If decisions of this character may be subject to annulment in the manner in which the Government seeks to attack and set aside this one, many titles supposed to be secure would be divested many years after patents issued, upon showing that the decision was a mistaken one. The rule is that such decisions are presumably based upon proper showing, and that they must stand until overcome by full and convincing proof sufficient within the recognized principles of equity jurisdiction in cases of this character to invalidate them. Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 379, 281; Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123, U.S. 307."
"It must be accepted now as finally settled that the enrollment of a member of an Indian tribe by the Dawes Commission, when duly approved, amounts to a judgment in an adversary proceeding determining the existence of the individual and his right to membership subject of course, to impeachment under the well established rules where such judgments are involved".
The above decisions are in themselves a convincing answer to the questions submitted for opinion. It may be stated further, however that the record taken as a whole is wanting in conclusive proof that Seper Willior did in fact die prior to April, 1899. It appears that suit was filed in this matter and later dismissed indicating that the proof was not sufficient to maintain action of the kind.
While it is plain that the notation on the roll opposite the name of Seper Willior was ineffective under the order of September 20, 1909, to cancel his enrollment or the allotment made to his heirs the fact is that so long as it is of record it constitutes a cloud on the title of the purchasers. Therefore in the matter of relief it is not sufficient merely to find that such notation was ineffective but the order on which it was based should be annulled and appropriate note thereof made on the roll. It is clearly within the power of the Secretary of the Interior to direct the execution and delivery in the regular way of a new deed or patent to the heirs which should embody a declaration that it is issued to be effective as of the date and in place of the original instrument mutilated by the Principal Chief of the Creek Nation.
lands. Incidentally this raises also some question as to the status of the surplus lands of the former Flathead Indian Reservation.
"Sec. 22. That the Secretary of the Interior be, and he is hereby, authorized, in his discretion, to reserve from location, entry, sale, or other appropriation all lands within said Flathead Indian Reservation chiefly valuable for power sites or reservoir sites, and he shall report to Congress such reservations."
in the manner therein specified (37 L.D., 698). Subsequently, the date of opening to public entry was postponed to November 1, 1910 (40 L.D., 57) but nothing material here turns on that as, on expiration of the date fixed by the President, the Flathead Indian Reservation, as originally constituted, practically ceased to exist. That action, of course, did not affect the title to the lands allotted to the Indians or to those areas still reserved for administrative or other purposes. Neither did it deprive the Indians of their right to the proceeds from any use or disposal of the unallotted lands within their former reservation. As to the latter, see Ash Sheep Company v. United States (252 U.S., 159).
By section 1 of the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 847), the President was authorized to withdraw temporarily from settlement, location, sale or entry any of the "public lands of the United States", and to reserve the same for water-power sites, irrigation, classification, etc., pending further action by Congress. Of similar import is section 13 of another set of the same date (36 Stat. 855-858) which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to reserve from location, entry, sale, allotment, or other appropriation, pending further action by Congress, any lands within any Indian reservation valuable for power or reservoir sites, or needed in connection with any irrigation project. It is stated in the record now before me that the lands immediately here involved were withdrawn by the President on September 10, 1913, under authority of the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 847), by inclusion in power-site withdrawal No. 397. It is to be understood therefore that those lands had previously been opened to settlement and entry under the prior proclamation referred to.

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