Source: http://mt.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180418_0001847.DMT.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:11:18+00:00

Document:
This case comes before the Court on Petitioner Nathanael Ray Greene's application for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254, filed January 12, 2018. Greene is a state prisoner proceeding pro se.
Greene was one of a group of petitioners that joined in filing what they characterized as an “en masse petition for writ of habeas corpus- 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as per Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc. 1). The “en masse” petitioners sought to challenge the constitutionality of the criminal charging process utilized against them by the State of Montana. Id. at 18-32. The group also attempted to file several motions as a group; each will be addressed in turn.
Greene, and the additional petitioners, were notified that the Court would not allow them to proceed as a group and that separate cases would be opened for each. (Doc. 6 at 2-3). Petitioners were then informed that each must respond individually and advise the Court of what steps had been undertaken to exhaust state court remedies. Id. at 3-5. Greene did not respond to this Court's order.
Greene has moved this Court to be granted in forma pauperis status. (Doc. 2). Because there is no reason to delay this matter further, Greene's motion will be GRANTED.
Greene asks this Court do dismiss a Sexual Assault conviction handed down in Montana's Ninth Judicial District Court, Pondera County, in Cause No. DC-2015-05. (Doc. 3 at 1). The argument is premised upon what Greene believes to be a faulty and unconstitutional state criminal charging process. Id. at 1-12. This Court is not able to provide Greene the relief sought. Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, do not serve as appellate tribunals to review errors allegedly committed by state courts. MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970)(“lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions”). It would be entirely inappropriate for this Court to review and dismiss the state conviction as suggested by Greene. The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
Greene has requested he be provided copies of all documents filed in this case. Although the Court will recognize Greene's in forma pauperis status, this designation merely authorizes him to file an action without prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. §1915. But given the nature of the voluminous and duplicative filings in this case and in the companion cases of Podry et. al., CV-18-24-DLC-JTJ, Pet. (filed January 31, 2018); Bruinsma et. al., CV-18-21-DLC-TJT, Pet. (filed January 29, 2018); and, Hamilton et. al., CV-18-30-DLC-JTJ, Pet. (filed Feb. 20, 2018), the Court believes it is unnecessary and a poor use of judicial resources to provide Greene with the requested documents and to impose the corresponding burden upon the Clerk of Court. Accordingly, Greene's motion for copies (Doc. 4) will be DENIED.
Greene seeks to proceed in a group along with the ten other petitioners with whom he originally filed. As set forth above, the group was previously advised that each petition would be treated individually and as a separate filing. In the renewed “Joint Action to Stay Joined as One Action as per Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 20(a), ” see (Doc. 8), Greene again seeks “en masse” filing status. The Motion will be denied.
As set forth above, the Court notes that three additional other groups of “en masse” petitioners have sought to proceed as a class and raise the same claim Greene's initial group raised. All petitioners will be treated in the same manner, each must proceed individually.
Presumably, Greene believes the Court may decide the constitutional issue first and then sort out their individual entitlements to relief. But courts generally do not pronounce on constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so. Even in a federal habeas action, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is generally followed to the extent of first ascertaining whether a petitioner meets the prerequisites for habeas relief and only deciding the constitutional question if a decision doing so will not amount to an advisory opinion. See, e.g., Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (stating that procedural issues should “ordinarily” be decided first).

References: §2254
 § 2254
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 §1915
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