Source: http://finemrespice.com/node/93
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 06:39:45+00:00

Document:
Long ago at the tail end of some question and answer period for some legal lecture or another, some young, bright student (almost certainly on the way to a masters degree in Computer Science) posited the import of some elegant and beautiful technical loophole, the details of which have long since become eroded by the ravages of bit rot in this author's long term memory, that threatened the legitimacy of a large body of intellectual property law. The speaker paused thoughtfully, squinted for a few seconds and replied with something resembling, "That is one of the more interesting and creative constructions I've heard on the subject. It is as unique as it is useless. It is simply... too cute." What followed was an almost chaotic exchange as a number of other members in the audience panned the speaker's interpretation as anything from unconstitutional to unethical to unjust and just about all points in between. "This," replied the speaker finally, "is why geeks, and I count myself among your number, should be required to take a semester of Civil Procedure. Whatever notions you have absorbed by virtue of spending your formative years watching LA Law or The Practice, be rid of them. Not only do courts have no patience for cute, technically correct but highly disruptive legal theories involving technologies they barely understand, but the ultimate arbiter of whether the facts suggest that the defendant violated Title X Section Y of this or that statute is probably going to be a group of twelve people who lack the wherewithal to get out of jury duty."
In summary: Don't get cute.
This little ditty applies rather more directly when the matter involves issues of unparalleled weight and import to, for instance, the United States.
Despite these works, it doesn't appear that any commentators have applied the specific facts (or such of them as are publicly known) surrounding the Wikileaks disclosures to anything like a detailed legal analysis. The fact is that arguments substantially resembling "Oh, the press is protected, remember the Pentagon Papers case back in the 1970s?" are simply too cute by half. Wikileaks may, in fact, be in far deeper water than anyone has bothered to realize.
The general statutory corpus that outlines criminal liability related to the disposition of classified information originates with the Espionage Act of 1917.2 18 USC § 793(a) restricts the collection of "information respecting the national defense," while 18 USC § 793(b) restricts the theft, receipt or copying of "anything connected with the national defense."
And, of course, "thing of value" applies quite neatly to classified information.
Perhaps decidedly relevant to Wikileaks are 18 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 1924 that both bear on the unauthorized publication of diplomatic correspondence by government employees which, when combined with the sort of inchoate liability courts seem readily able to attach to similar statutes, could easily trigger liability for "press reporting on encrypted communications between the United States and foreign governments or its overseas missions."10 It seems clear that at least one if not over one hundred thousand diplomatic cables PFC Bradley Manning purportedly claimed to have appropriated would trigger these statutes, perhaps irrespective of the Press Clause, if the material were published.
The astute finem respice reader will quickly notice that this section applies to "Whoever... discloses any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information...." (emphasis added).13 That is, liability under this section is not limited to individuals who were initially authorized to possess the information in question, nor does it require publication.
Press Immunity and the Definition of "Press"
Bartnicki, which dealt with the repeated rebroadcast of an illegally intercepted phone call by a radio station, outlined the beginnings of three criteria required by the media to avail itself of protection from prosecution. First, the fact that the radio station here had played no role in the illegal interception itself, and, in fact, only learned of it after the illegal act of interception. Second, that after the illegal interception the radio station had obtained the recording lawfully. Third, that the content of the recording was a matter of public concern.
Of course, the presence of technical liability under the relevant statutes and the absence of First Amendment protections from that liability are not the end of the argument. The wide swath of prosecutorial discretion, and the political elements that inevitably play into any public prosecution of a media outlet for such liability play an important role in outlining the effective liability for leakers and their cohorts. Even in the event, say, a reporter at the Washington Post may have clearly triggered criminal liability by, for example, stealing classified documents during a visit to offices in the Department of Justice, prosecuting that reporter and taking on the Washington Post would necessarily entail such a public and messy affair as to provide a strong deterrent effect on the administration. In this context it should suffice to say that a strong "choose your battles" element likely precedes these sorts of decisions.
This brings us to the instant facts and the question of Wikileaks and Julian Assange.
A media organization in the act of publishing would appear to be at its strongest with respect to constitutional protections. Accordingly, a deep analysis of these issues is beyond the purview of this work.
The collection and receipt prongs, however, would appear to be daunting.
As discussed supra, press protection against criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)-(b) presupposes the absence of "intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation." This presumption, however, seems to be more of an informal grant to the press, insofar as courts are likely to assume (recent evidence notwithstanding) that, for instance, the New York Times is not possessed of the intent or reason to believe that the information it publishes is to be used "to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation." But what of cases where the party collecting, receiving or possessing said information has expressly indicated such a motivation- be they press or otherwise?
This comment, of course, merely is one of many of the same flavor that Assange has made in public for quotation. One wonders what damning material might become available to a prosecutor with broad subpoena powers.
In short, Mr. Assange has any number of potentially adverse writings that may tend to illuminate his motivations as something just a bit more caustic than "the public good."
This seems just a bit bloodthirsty for "the public good" defense.
It further erodes the case that an entity is entitled to First Amendment protection when it releases classified information that is in fact of little or no public interest. In this context, to the extent that releasing the name of Valerie Elise Plame Wilson was a borderline case in the question of clear public interest in the famous Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate ("NIE") quagmire, it is difficult to imagine how the name, village name, names of family members and even GPS coordinates of Afghan informers could possibly constitute information that was in the "public interest" to release. It may occur to always skeptical finem respice readers that a Venn diagram of those individuals who howled for blood after the Plame disclosure and those individuals who now casually dismiss the Wikileaks disclosures with an effete flourish of the left hand would prove illustrative.
Hints From the General Counsels of Major Publications?
It is quite illuminating that former "journalistic partners" (in the words of Wikileaks) have begun to distance themselves from Assange and Wikileaks in the wake of the larger disclosures.
"...we're not in any kind of partnership or collaboration with him," said Eric Schmitt, one of the New York Times reporters on the case. Bill Keller, Schmitt's top editor, soon weighed in, too.
This last bit of language sounds suspiciously crafted by the General Counsel's office of the New York Times, an organization quite aware of the surface area of its First Amendment protection in national security cases, and is, therefore, particularly daunting for Assange.
Wikileaks has, of course, turned on the The New York Times and the Washington Post in recent weeks. Most notably in the case of The New York Times, for consulting with the White House before publication of the Afghanistan material, an act which caused Assange to call The New York Times "pusillanimous and unprofessional."31 Suffice it to say, it would likely not be particularly difficult to demonstrate that Wikileaks bears very little resemblance to the traditional sort of media entity that enjoys the protection of the First Amendment with respect to the collection, possession and publication of classified material.
Lamo said he doubts Manning had the technical savvy to copy all the data on his own. He thinks Manning received help from hackers in the area who provided him with encryption software to send the classified information to WikiLeaks, and who helped him ensure those leaks were featured prominently on the website.
This may go a long way to explaining the recent interest by the military and the FBI in members of the community at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
This passage seems to have Lamo suggesting that Wikileaks failed to scrub the Afghanistan data sufficiently to prevent it tracing directly back to Manning, who languished in military detention even as Wikileaks proceeded to release the data. This does not bode well for Wikileaks should the Manning defense wish to attempt to implicate it.
Graymail is normally only fruitful when the defendant in a case possesses classified or otherwise embarrassing information acquired lawfully over the course of his or her duties or work. The revelation of graymail data is through the mechanism of the rules of evidence and the Due Process clause- which is why the lawyers and defendants using such tactics avoided indictment under federal blackmail statutes.
If Wikileaks expects that encrypted data released into the wild represents an effective deterrent its officers may be in for a bit of a surprise, not to mention that the Classified Information Protection Act of 1980 (hereinafter the "CIPA")39 provided for in camera review of such material by a judge before disclosure of the material thus effectively killing the utility of graymail as a defense tactic.
Is it Even Safe to Leak to Wikileaks Anymore?
Given the literal riot of theories of liability that seem to attach to the conduct of Wikileaks (not to mention the fact that Wikileaks appears to be under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement along with the U.S. Army investigators have begun to make it a habit of detaining at the border certain associates of Mr. Assange, searching their laptops and asking if such associates happen to know where Mr. Assanage is just now)40 future leakers might well want to consider not just the demonstrated ineptitude of the Wikileaks crowd in protecting its sources, but the fact that, should Wikileaks or Assange find themselves indicted or searched at the border, any material, logs, chat sessions, IP records or testimony from cooperating witnesses as they bend to prosecutorial pressure one by one, are all likely to make Wikileak sources a bit more popular than they expected to be.
Wikileaks is simply too cute for its sources (or its own) good.
1. See e.g., Ann Woolner, "WikiLeaks Secret Records Dump Stays in Legal Clear," Bloomberg (July 27, 2010); Joshua E. Keating, "Could Julian Assange Be Prosecuted for the Afghan War Logs?" Foreign Policy (July 30, 2010).
2. Codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 et seq.
3. See: Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
6. New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
8. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 219-237 (2007).
10. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 230 (2007).
11. 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426.
12. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c).
13. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c).
14. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 232 (2007).
15. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
16. 532 U.S. 514 (2001) Footnote 19 (Citing Branzberg v. Hayes 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
17. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company, 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
18. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
19. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 233 (2007).
20. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 233 (2007).
21. John Goetz "I Enjoy Crushing Bastards," Der Spiegel (July 26, 2010).
22. Julian Assange (writing as "me@iq.org"), "Conspiracy as Governance," (December 3, 2006). Local copy available here. The New Yorker first attributed the work to Assange in its June 7, 2010 profile of him, and the indomitable Cryptome republished a segmented version of this document on July 31, 2010.
23. Julian Assange (writing as "me@iq.org"), "Conspiracy as Governance," (December 3, 2006).
24. Kevin Poulsen, "U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks Video Probe," Wired (June 6, 2010).
25. "Leaker Defends Release of Names," The Australian (July 30, 2010).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).
27. Peter Preston, "Wikileaks Afghan Story Raises Dilemma Over Safety of Sources," The Guardian (August 1, 2010).
28. Clint Hendler, "The Story Behind the Publication of Wikileaks' Afghanistan Logs," Columbia Journalism Review (July 28, 2010).
29. Clint Hendler, "The Story Behind the Publication of Wikileaks' Afghanistan Logs," Columbia Journalism Review (July 28, 2010).
30. Clint Hendler, "The Story Behind the Publication of Wikileaks' Afghanistan Logs," Columbia Journalism Review (July 28, 2010).
31. Peter Preston, "Wikileaks Afghan Story Raises Dilemma Over Safety of Sources," The Guardian (August 1, 2010).
32. Philip Shenon, "The Pentagon's Wikileaks Breakthrough," The Daily Beast (July 29, 2010).
33. David Abel, "MIT Graduate Admits Link in Leak Case," The Boston Globe (August 1, 2010).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 793(g).
35. Wikileaks Twitter feed (January 8, 2010).
36. Philip Shenon, "The Pentagon's Wikileaks Breakthrough," The Daily Beast (July 29, 2010).
37. Kim Zitter, "Wikileaks Posts Mysterious 'Insurance' File," Wired (July 30, 2010).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 873.
39. 18 U.S.C. App. III. §§ 1-16 (1980).
40. Elinor Mils, "Researcher Detained at U.S. Border, Questioned About Wikileaks," CNET (July 31, 2010).

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