Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28744:g-r-no-l-60287-august-17,-1988-jose-berenguer,-jr-v-court-of-appeals&catid=1240&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:14:33+00:00

Document:
JOSE BERENGUER, JR., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, MAMERTO VENASQUEZ, MANUEL F. VENASQUEZ, BIENVENIDO C. ZABALA, CONRADO RIVERA and RUFINO RIVERA, Respondents.
N.J. Quisumbing & Associates for Petitioner.
Judicial Cases Division for Respondents.
1.	REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENTS; AS A RULE, FACTUAL FINDINGS OF LOWER COURTS ARE CONCLUSIVE PROVIDED THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. — It is beyond cavil that, as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and trial courts are final and conclusive provided they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. (See Sese v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 585; Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679; Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 26).
2.	ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; DEFINED. — On substantial evidence, we held, in the case of Bagsican v. Court of Appeals (141 SCRA 226) citing Picardal v. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483) that: "Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion . . ." (See Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635; Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 135 ; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 ; and Cañete v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 136 SCRA 302 ).
3.	ID.; ID.; ID.; AS FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, SUCH FINDINGS ARE NOT BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT. — After a careful examination of the records of the instant case, we rule that the findings of fact made by the Court of Agrarian Relations which the public respondent affirmed are not supported by substantial evidence, hence such findings are not binding on us (Andres v. De Santos, 55 SCRA 623). We now re-examine the evidence on hand.
4.	AGRICULTURAL TENANCY LAW; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; CONSENT OF THE TRUE AND LAWFUL LANDOWNER REQUIRED. — It is a matter of jurisprudence that tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land but more importantly a legal relationship. (Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 484) Section 3 and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act, expressly require the consent of the true and lawful landowner before a tenancy relationship can be created. As far as the private respondents who based their status as tenants on their agreement with the alleged overseer Mamerto are concerned, the element of consent is unmistakably absent. There is no showing that the petitioner-land-owner authorized Mamerto to employ on the former’s behalf any tenants on the landholding under consideration. Neither did the said private respondents substantiate their claim that the petitioner personally knew about their arrangements with Mamerto. Their self-serving statements regarding their tenancy relations with the petitioner cannot establish the claimed relationship.
5.	ID.; ID.; FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN PROVING AGRICULTURAL TENANCY; CASE AT BAR. — The fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Other factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in the form of lease rentals or a share in the produce of the landholding involved.
6.	ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT ONLY ENTAIL THE PRESENCE OF A MERE SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE; FACT OF SHARING TO BE ESTABLISHED, THERE MUST BE CONCRETE EVIDENCE ADEQUATE ENOUGH TO PROVE SUCH. — Anent compensation, the private respondents maintain that the cavans of palay given to the petitioner represented his share in the harvest. On the other hand, the petitioner avers that said cavans were payment in the form of palay for tractor services with rotavator and drag harrow; for the use of the irrigation pump unit owned by the petitioner’s sister; and for the reimbursement of the diesel fuel drawn by Mamerto from the fuel stock in town. Considering that substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence (See Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra) in order that the fact of sharing can be established, we are constrained to rule that there is no concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove that the element of sharing is present.
7.	REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENTS; FINDINGS BASED ON WRONG INFERENCES SUBJECT TO THE CORRECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT; CASE AT BAR. — In the absence of any substantial evidence from which it can be satisfactorily inferred that a sharing arrangement is present between the contending parties, we, as a court of last resort, are duty-bound to correct inferences made by the courts below which are manifestly mistaken or absurd. (See Lacuna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 460).
8.	AGRICULTURAL TENANCY LAW; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP TO EXIST, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF CONSENT AND SHARING MUST BE PRESENT. — Now the petitioner was able to acquire possession of his entire landholding in 1965 to the exclusion of the private respondents who used to work on some portions thereof is a question that is not material to the issue of agricultural tenancy in this case. Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner and the private respondents (See Graza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48368, June 29, 1988; Magno-Adamos v. Hon. Bagasao, G.R. No. 63671, June 28, 1988).
On September 23, 1976, an action to recover possession of the landholdings in question consisting of about 11.5 hectares situated in Batasan, Arayat, Pampanga was filed with the agrarian court of Angeles City by the private respondents as the alleged tenants against the petitioner landowner.
It is alleged in the complaint that the private respondents are the agricultural tenants of the petitioner’s rice land on a 50-50 sharing basis; that sometime during the month of February 1975, the petitioner being an agriculturist asked them to allow him to do the planting of palay on his landholding for experimental purposes; that the petitioner promised to return the landholding to them in the same year after the harvesting of the crops to be planted thereon; that after the palay crops planted by the petitioner were harvested, the private respondents demanded the return of their respective landholding but the former refused; that thereafter, mediation proceedings were conducted at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) office at Sta. Ana, Pampanga but no settlement was reached; and that the petitioner, together with one Eliseo Pongco, is again working on the private respondents’ landholding by means of force and threats (pp. 1-3, Original Records).
The complaint asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to enjoin the petitioner from entering the premises and from committing further acts of dispossession against the private respondents. The temporary restraining order was granted.
"2)	The restraining order issued by this Court, dated September 28, 1976, placing the plaintiffs in possession of their respective landholdings and enjoining the defendant or any other persons acting for and in his behalf, from entering the premises and committing acts of dispossession against herein plaintiffs, is hereby made permanent.
"All other claims are denied for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the CAR’s alleged finding of fact that respondents are agricultural tenants of petitioner. But, that finding is not supported by any evidence whatsoever-and worse, contrary to and/or against the evidence presented.
The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that the CAR decision is supported by substantial evidence.
"First, common sense dictates that a tenant clearly knows his arrangement with his landowner. It is inconceivable for a tenant not to know his sharing arrangement as he depends on the same for his sustenance and as well as that of his family. In the complaint, all the plaintiffs alleged that they share with defendant Jose Berenguer, Jr., on a 50-50 sharing basis. However, in their affidavits submitted with the Court as well as with this office, they uniformly stated that the sharing basis is 45-55 . . .
"Second, . . . in his affidavit, Mr. Berenguer specifically stated, that in 1955 he returned to Arayat, Pampanga to supervise the family’s 70 hectares of agricultural landholdings . . .; and in 1957, the tenants of about 50 hectares of the same voluntarily returned and surrendered the landholdings to them. Since that time, they never worked the said landholdings by tenancy but only by administration by the use of machineries, hiring few seasonal workers who were paid on a daily basis and some by percentage basis. One of the seasonal workers was Mamerto Venasquez who was employed by them on and off from 1955 to 1968 . . . The undersigned is of the belief that this allegation or claim of the defendant Jose Berenguer, Jr., equally deserves a thorough analysis . . .
"Third, no single evidence was produced by plaintiffs that defendant shared with their harvest except testimonial . . . While plaintiff Mamerto Venasquez claimed that there was a record of the liquidation, he was not however able to produce any receipt showing that he shared with Mr. Berenguer his harvest . . .
"Fourth, . . . [T]his office is not prepared to accept 100% the tenability of this postulate of plaintiffs especially so when the alleged borrowing was, according to plaintiff Mamerto Venasquez, without any monetary consideration or similar thereto whatsoever. This is not to declare however that the same is not true. Only it is highly improbable for tenants to lend their landholdings for experimental purposes or for other purposes to another without any remuneration at all when the same is their principal or sole source of livelihood. This the plaintiffs failed to satisfactorily explain in the premises . . .
"Fifth, this office is at a quandary why it took plaintiffs a long time to demand the return of the landholding to them by Mr. Jose Berenguer, Jr., if indeed said promise was made . . .
"Sixth, plaintiffs except Mamerto Venasquez, alleged that they were taken in as tenants by Mamerto Venasquez with the consent of defendant. . . . The alleged authority of Mamerto Venasquez was not sufficiently proven . . .
"Seventh, in the complaint, a very serious charge was made by plaintiffs, namely that of the alleged use by defendant of force, threat, violence and intimidation to sustain his occupancy of the landholding . . . In their affidavits also, they stated that Mr. Berenguer used violence, threats and intimidation against them. However, during their cross-examination, they seem not to know these alleged threats and intimidation.
"Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion . . ." (See Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635; Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 135 ; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 ; and Cañete v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 136 SCRA 302 ).
After a careful examination of the records of the instant case, we rule that the findings of fact made by the Court of Agrarian Relations which the public respondent affirmed are not supported by substantial evidence, hence such findings are not binding on us (Andres v. De Santos, 55 SCRA 623). We now re-examine the evidence on hand.
Respondent Mamerto Venasquez claims that he has been tenant and overseer of the landholding in question from 1950 up to 1974 while the other private respondents declare in their respective affidavits (Exhs. "A," "B," and "E") that they were taken in as tenants by Venasquez in his capacity as overseer of the petitioner landowner.
The aforequoted provisions expressly require the consent of the true and lawful landowner before a tenancy relationship can be created. As far as the private respondents who based their status as tenants on their agreement with the alleged overseer Mamerto are concerned, the element of consent is unmistakably absent. There is no showing that the petitioner-land-owner authorized Mamerto to employ on the former’s behalf any tenants on the landholding under consideration. Neither did the said private respondents substantiate their claim that the petitioner personally knew about their arrangements with Mamerto. Their self-serving statements regarding their tenancy relations with the petitioner cannot establish the claimed relationship.
Anent compensation, the private respondents maintain that the cavans of palay given to the petitioner represented his share in the harvest. On the other hand, the petitioner avers that said cavans were payment in the form of palay for tractor services with rotavator and drag harrow; for the use of the irrigation pump unit owned by the petitioner’s sister; and for the reimbursement of the diesel fuel drawn by Mamerto from the fuel stock in town. Considering that substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence (See Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra) in order that the fact of sharing can be established, we are constrained to rule that there is no concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove that the element of sharing is present.
How the petitioner was able to acquire possession of his entire landholding in 1965 to the exclusion of the private respondents who used to work on some portions thereof is a question that is not material to the issue of agricultural tenancy in this case. Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner and the private respondents (See Graza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48368, June 29, 1988; Magno-Adamos v. Hon. Bagasao, G.R. No. 63671, June 28, 1988).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The mandatory injunction issued on March 31, 1982 is DISSOLVED and the private respondents are ordered to surrender possession of the disputed landholdings to the petitioner.

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