Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2010/07/02/board-cant-consider-new-legal-theories-hickson-v-shinseki-no-07-1311/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:50:27+00:00

Document:
the Court has recently held that the Secretary’s regulations prevent the Board from considering new legal theories in the first instance. Hickson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 394, 400-03 (2010). Thus, even if the Board later determines that the RO decision overlooked an issue, the claimant must receive notice of the issue and the opportunity to have it remanded to the RO. Id.
review on appeal to the Secretary” of a question subject to decision by the Secretary under 38 U.S.
and contrary to the section 7104 requirement that preserves and affords ” one review on appeal.” DAV, 327 F.3d at 1346.
waiver from a claimant or the Board determines that the claimant would not be prejudiced by proceeding to a decision on the merits. Bernard, 4 Vet.App. at 390; see Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that, in new and material evidence cases, the Board’s jurisdiction does not vary “according to how the [RO] ruled”).
Mr. Hickson fails to assert that the Board erred in its determination that he was provided an adequate VA psychiatric examination in March 2004, which considered his contentions, nor does he suggest any errors in that examination. See Hilkert, supra.
38 C.F.R. § 20.903(b) (“No notice is required under this paragraph if . . . the appellant or the appellant’s representative has advanced or otherwise argued the applicability of the law in question.”).
such consideration in the first instance by the Board could result in denial of the appeal.
was timely filed. No notice is required under this paragraph if the Board intends to grant the benefit being sought or if the appellant or the appellant’s representative has advanced or otherwise argued the applicability of the law in question.
Kenneth M. Carpenter, of Topeka, Kansas, for the appellant.
Gayle Strommen, with whom Will A. Gunn, General Counsel; and R. Randall Campbell, Assistant General Counsel, all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief for the appellee.
Before GREENE, Chief Judge, KASOLD and DAVIS, Judges.
GREENE, Chief Judge: Veteran Arthur Hickson appeals, through counsel, a February 5, 2007, Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) decision that determined there was new and material evidence to reopen his previously denied Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) service-connection claim for an acquired psychiatric disorder and denied the claim on the merits. Record (R.) at 1-29.
February2007 Board decision will be affirmed.
Mr. Hickson served in the U.S. Air Force from July 1968 to February 1969.
1981. Mr. Previous HitHicksonNext Hit appealed to the Board, and in September 1982, the Board denied his claim after finding that his service medical records showed that he had no evidence of a chronic psychiatric abnormality such as a psychosis or neurosis. The Board also found that his only postservice diagnosis was that of a personality disorder, which by VA regulation was a developmental defect and not a disability for which service connection could be granted. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) (2009) (A personality disorder is not considered a disease or injury for VA-benefits purposes). That decision became final.
claimant until the claim was well grounded. See Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Although the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 eliminated the well-grounded claim requirement, see Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) subsequently held that the Secretary does not have a duty to assist the claimant by providing a medical examination until the claim is reopened, see Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
the appeal, including an argument that, pursuant to Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir.
disability was related to the symptoms described in the affidavits he submitted in June 2006. R. at 1000.
granting benefits as soon as possible.” R. at 1009.
Veterans’ Appeals for de novo review (emphasis added by the Board).
an apparent waiver of consideration bythe RO of the merits of the claim.
of an injury or disease). Id.; see Conley v.
consideration of this issue on its merits.” R. at 16. With these findings, the Board determined that it would not be prejudicial to Mr. Hickson to proceed to adjudicate the merits of his reopened claim without first remanding the matter to the RO for initial consideration.
service connected and denied the claim. The Board determined that Mr.
resulting from service. R. 20-26.
Consequently, the Board found that the additional affidavits by Mr.
failing to demonstrate a medical nexus between Mr. Hickson’s service and his currently diagnosed condition.
At oral argument he conceded that Sims addressed the validity of Bernard and that the Board has jurisdiction to reopen and then adjudicate a claim on the merits.
possibility of substantiating the claim.
In March 2009, this appeal was stayed pending the resolution of Treece v.
which this Court was considering the application of 38 C.F.R. § 20.903.
Treece , however, was resolved by joint motion for remand. Consequently, the parties in this case were ordered to address the application of § 20.903 to the facts of their case.
38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009); see Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed.
and material evidence has been presented, the Board must presume that the newly submitted evidence is credible.” Duran v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 216, 220 (1994) (citing Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 510, 513 (1992)).
facilitate informed review in this Court. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 (1995).
jurisdiction does not vary “according to how the [RO] ruled”).
If . . . the Board intends to consider law not already considered by the [AOJ] and such consideration could result in denial of the appeal, the Board will notify the appellant and his or her representative, if any, of its intent to do so and that such consideration in the first instance by the Board could result in denial of the appeal.
representative has advanced or otherwise argued the applicability of the law in question.
As previously noted, Mr. Hickson argues that the Board violated this regulation when it proceeded to decide his claim on the merits.
The amended § 20.903 took effect on October 4, 2004, was in effect at the time of Mr. Hickson’s appeal to the Board, and remains unchanged.
position or demonstrating that his position is an accepted interpretation and practice, see Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991), he does not attempt to do so here.
. . . .”); Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 532, 539 (1993) (en banc) (Court reviews “questions of law de novo without any deference to the Board’s conclusions of law”).
interpretation is not ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations.'” Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344,1394 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997). The Secretary, however, has not provided anything to the Court that demonstrates that this interpretation reflects VA’s ” fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” Id. at 462. Indeed, contrary to the Secretary’s assertion, nothing in the plain language of the regulation, nor the documents published in conjunction with the notice and comment period after which the regulation was promulgated, supports the Secretary’s narrow interpretation.
this is not the forum to do so. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
interpretation of § 20.903 is inconsistent with the plain wording of the regulation, Mr.
Hickson’s argument that the Board considered law not already considered by the RO in violation of that regulation nevertheless is not supported by the record.
1. Law Not Already Considered by the RO Mr. Hickson argues that simply because the RO did not explicitly note a law in its decision, that law must not have been considered. We reject that argument. There is no requirement that the RO list every law it considered when rendering its decision. 38 U.S.C. § 5104(b) (“In any case where the Secretary denies a benefit sought, the notice required by subsection (a) shall also include (1) a statement of the reasons for the decision, and (2) a summary of the evidence considered by the Secretary.”). Moreover, the RO is presumed to have considered all applicable law, absent some showing that it did not. See Jennings v. Mansfield, 509 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Board can assume that the Secretary applied correct legal standards, absent clear evidence to the contrary); see also Dolan v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 358, 362 (1996) ( concluding that VA has duty to consider any presumption that may be applicable to veteran’s claim and, in absence of “clear evidence” to contrary, is presumed to have done so). Further, Mr. Hickson does not identify any law that we conclude the Board considered that had not been considered by the RO. See Hilkert v. West, 12 Vet.App. 145, 151 (1999) (en banc) (holding that appellant bears burden of demonstrating error on appeal).
the RO in its SSOC, to wit: Suttmann v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 127 (1993) (see R. at 980), Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488 (1997) (see R. at 991), Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990) (see R. at 992), Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (see R. at 992), or (2) submitted to the Board by Mr. Hickson’s counsel, to wit, Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 24 (1991) (see R. at 1014-15), and Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (see R. at 1015).
See 38 C.F.R. § 20.903(b) (“No notice is required under this paragraph if . . . the appellant or the appellant’s representative has advanced or otherwise argued the applicability of the law in question.”).
generally competent to opine on medical matters such as the date of onset of a claimed disability and the relationship of specific symptoms to a particular diagnosis); Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 470, 472 (1992) (VA medical examinations are not required if there is already competent evidence in the file).
occurrences described); Obert v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 30 (1993) (adjudicator may not substitute its opinion for medical opinions in the record); Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 467, 470-71 (1993) (probative value of medical opinion comes from medical expert’s personal examination of the patient, the physician’s knowledge and skill in analyzing the data, and the medical conclusion that the physician reaches). However, Mr. Hickson fails to observe that the legal principles addressed in these cases concern the weight and probative value to be assigned evidence, and that the RO, as discussed below, actually developed the claim and weighed the evidence, again evidencing its consideration of the law.
basis for requiring such an outcome.
In sum, Mr. Hickson’s argument based on his litany of statutes, regulations, and case law that purportedly were not cited by the RO fails to demonstrate that the Board violated § 20.903(b) by improperlyconsidering law that the RO failed to consider without first notifying him and giving him an opportunity to respond. See Jennings, Dolan, and Hilkert, all supra.
reopening is denied. See Justus and Paralyzed Veterans of Am., both supra.
statutory requirement. DAV and Bernard, both supra.
SSOC that issued in 2006.
examination, which is not required until and unless a claim is reopened.
determinations that should be made only after a claim has been reopened.
the totality of the evidence before reaching a conclusion that Mr.
Hickson’s claim would be denied.
(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948))).
review of the claim actually constituted “one review on appeal.” Id.
38 C.F.R. § 20.903(b) was not violated in this instance.
or obtain a medical opinion. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(2); McLendon v.
consideration in rendering his opinion.” R. at 18. Mr. Hickson fails to assert that the Board erred in its determination that he was provided an adequate VA psychiatric examination in March 2004, which considered his contentions, nor does he suggest any errors in that examination. See Hilkert, supra.
Board has the duty to determine the credibility and probative weight of the evidence); Reonal v.
Accordingly, because the statements submitted by Mr. Hickson were both redundant of his statements to the March 2004 VA examiner and those statements were found not to be credible, the Board did not err in not providing Mr. Hickson with an additional medical examination upon reopening his claim. See McLendon, supra.
merits of the claim.” R. at 16.
The Court reviews any Board finding of no prejudice de novo. Medrano v.
we find no prejudice in the Board proceeding to decide the claim on the merits.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the foregoing, the February 5, 2007, decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.

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