Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/241262886/REM2-Adoption-Custody-of-Minors-Cases-Dela-Pena
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:53:01+00:00

Document:
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
by the facts of the case.
born on J anuary 3, 1981.
family friend of the Clavanos.
he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
3. Her husband had divorced her.
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
their maternal uncle,” petitioner Ronald Clavano.
together and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
the court to have “snuggled” close to Ronald even though their natural mother was around.
she and petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
verisimilitude” as these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could not be verified.
265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass.
case study report required by law.
“Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted.
neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs.
voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations.
only by oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
initiated the “joint complaint” for divorce.
was residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City.
the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
written consent to the adoption of their minor children.
not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court.
expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record.
abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests.
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it.
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It’s nice to be thought of at X’mas. Thanks again.
when she would turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was IM.
told him that J oeton had become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner.
thanking petitioner, added that the latter should buy something for Mommy.
right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and J oeton.
expressed his desire that petitioner would come and visit them someday.
mother had told him not to be shy about it.
prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children.
Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v.
satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true.
spiritual needs of the child.
a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs.
capable of supporting her children.
because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon private respondents.
Clara, is an international flight stewardess.
admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she could still take care of the children.
taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father.
wisdom and common human experience show that a “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father.
father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children.
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.
of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption.
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses.
petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them.
not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption.
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged.
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s).
fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
that the petition for adoption was filed.
consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Penned by Associate J ustice Serafin E. Camilon and concurred in by Associate J ustices Celso L. Magsino and Artemon D. Luna.
Presided by J udge Renato C. Dacudao.
Docketed as Civil Case No. J D-707.
Presided by J udge Maura C. Navarro.
CA Decision, pp.16-17. Penned by J ustice Serafin E. Camilon, Celso L. Magsino and Artemon D. Luna, JJ., concurring.
Record of CA-G.R. CV No. 27108, pp.46-53.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326, J anuary 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, 362.
AQUINO, CIVIL CODE, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 299 citing Santos v. Aranzanso, 123 Phil. 160, 167 (1966).
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, supra, at p. 365.
Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, L-30576, February 10, 1976, 69 SCRA 298; Santos v. Aranzanso, supra.
Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 463, 471 (1996).
Imperial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102037, J uly 17, 1996, 259 SCRA 65, 71.
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69901, J uly 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 627.
P.M. Pastera Brokerage v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113657, J anuary 20, 1997, 266 SCRA 365, 371.
De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 130 Phil. 324 (1968).
Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, supra at p.304; Santos v. Aranzanso, supra at p. 168.
De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, supra.
86 Phil. 554, 559-560 (1950).
See; Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014, 1020 (1996).
TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 38.
TSN, February 3, 1988, p.13.
TSN. November 17, 1987, p. 24.
TSN, J anuary 12, 1988, p. 10.
TSN, December 8, 1987, p.12.
Silva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114742, J uly 17, 1997.
Chua v. Cabangbang, 137 Phil. 204 (1969).
TSN, December 8, 1987, pp.47-48; February 11, 1988, p. 6.
TSN, December 8, 1987, p. 20.
Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606 (1996).
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, supra.
TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 37.
SCRA 7) citing 59 Am. J ur. 2d 107.
Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995, 242 SCRA 407.
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 491 citing 4 Salvat 383.
TSN, February 11, 1988, pp. 9-12.
Cervantes v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, J anuary 27, 1989, 169 SCRA 575, 579.
The law was approved on J une 7, 1995.
The law was approved on February 25, 1998.
Art. 1, Sec. 2(a), R.A. No. 8552.
Philippines in J uly 1990 by virtue of Senate Resolution No. 109.
Art. 1, Sec. 2(c), ii, Ibid.
Art. 5, Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Art. 9, parag. 3, Ibid.
Art. 10, parag. 2, Ibid.
Art. 14, parag. 2. Ibid.
See: Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, supra at p.441.
y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents’ residence.
attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
binding and conclusive upon this Court.
portion of the order of the court below granting the petition for adoption.
whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.
adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name.
i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.
and in the orderly administration of justice.
the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant proceeding.
grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption.
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
the latter relief at law.
reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.
appear to be called for.
of action in a declaration.
of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
applicable joinder rules be joined.
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them.
in the problems presented. effectively disallows unlimited joinder.
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
action is dependent on the other.
(Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change requested.
the joinder would be improper.
respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment).
which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and change of name.
Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation.
a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.
order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.
process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
suspend the operation of the rules.
down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy.
agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience.
the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.
which he has been known since he came to live with private respondents.
parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child.
it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. x x x.
judge and must thus set it aside.
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.
change of name would prejudice public interest.
as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned.
qua non to a change of name.
authorize a change of name.
is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon.
as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law x x x.
supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.
accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Annex A. Petition; Rollo, 37-40; per Presiding J udge J ose R. Hernandez.
Annex B, Id.; Ibid.; 41-44.
Annex C, Id, Ibid., 47-50.
Annex A, Id.: ibid., 40.
See Art. 183 in relation to Art. 185, Family Code.
See Art. 188, Family Code; Arts. 32-3 8, Child and Youth Welfare Code; Secs. 1-5, Rule 99, Rules of Court.
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 37, 38.
Rizal, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 103142, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591.
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 39.
Cruz vs. Republic, L-20927, J uly 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 693.
See Art. 412, Civil Code; Re Ross, 8 Cal 2d 608,67 P2d 94, 110 ALR 217.
August 30, 1973, 52 SCRA 322.
1 C.J .S., Actions, Sec. 61, 1181.
1 Am J ur 2d, Actions, Sec. 81, 776.
Ibid., Id., Sec. 85, 778.
Ibid., Id., Sec. 86, 779.
Francisco V.J ., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. I 1973 ed., 186.
1 Am J ur 2d, Actions. Sec. 86, 779.
Ibid., Id., Sec. 89, 781.
Francisco, V.J ., op. cit., 185-189.
November 28, 1983, 126 SCRA 31.
See Flores vs. Mallare-Phillipps, et al., G.R. No. 66620, September 24,1986, 144 SCRA 377.
April 30, 1968,23 SCRA 438.
Young vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 110736, December 27, 1993, 228 SCRA 718.
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 99357, J anuary 27 1992,205 SCRA 537.
Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104437, December 17 1993,228 SCRA 565.
Vasco vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46763, February 28, 1978, 81 SCRA 762.
L-44642, February 20 1989, 170 SCRA 367. See also Edra vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No.
75041, November 13, 1989 179 SCRA 344.
Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, J r., etc., et al., G.R. 73210, February 10, 1994,230 SCRA 9; Buan, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101614, August 17, 1994,235 SCRA 424.
Sanidad vs. Cabotaje, 5 Phil. 204 (1905).
Arzadon vs. Arzadon, 15 Phil. 77(1910).
L-16085, November 29, 1961,3 SCRA 519.
Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and J urisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 864.
Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, supra fn. 49.
Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, supra, fn. 49; Republic vs. Tañada, etc., et al., supra, fn. 19; Secan Kok vs.
Republic. supra, fn. 19. See Tan vs. Republic, L-16384, April 26, 1962,4 SCRA 1128.
cited. See also Republic vs. Avila, etc., et al., L-33131, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 483.
Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, supra, fn. 49.
Ong Te vs. Republic, L-15549, J une 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 484.
Ong Pen Oan vs. Republic, supra, fn. 53; Grant vs. Republic, L-23609, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 517.
Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, supra, fn. 49.
Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 44, 67.
Cruz vs. Republic, supra, fn. 17.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, J anuary 24, 1992,205 SCRA 356.

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