Source: https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/05/in-re-tli-communications-llc-patent-litigation-fed-cir-2016.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:32:41+00:00

Document:
This case is notable mainly because it is the first Federal Circuit decision to distinguish itself from Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., and also because it is another reminder that the wall between patentable subject matter, obviousness, and written description is now rubble.
storing the digital images in the server, said step of storing taking into consideration the classification information.
According to the specification, the '295 patent "relates generally to an apparatus for recording of a digital image, communicating the digital image from the recording device to a storage device, and to administering the digital image in the storage device." Further, "the problems of locating the data of an image data file increase as the number of images to be archived increases," and the invention addresses this problem "by providing for recording, administration and archiving of digital images simply, fast and in such way that the information therefore may be easily tracked."
The defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, alleging that the '295 patent was not directed to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This motion was granted, with the District Court stating that the claims merely recited "the abstract idea of taking, organizing, classifying, and storing photographs." TLI appealed to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the Court proceeded to review the two-prong test for patent-eligibility set forth in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l. First, one must determine whether the claim at hand is directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea. If so, then one must further determine whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to something more than the judicial exception. Notably, generic computer implementation of an otherwise abstract process does not qualify as "something more."
With respect to the first prong, the Court observed that "[w]hile claim 17 requires concrete, tangible components such as 'a telephone unit' and a 'server,' the specification makes clear that the recited physical components merely provide a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner." Invoking Enfish, the Court confirmed that "a relevant inquiry at step one is to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea." Notably, the Federal Circuit's post-Alice case law draws a line (albeit a rather thin one) between "claims directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer with claims simply adding conventional computer components to well-known business practices, or claims reciting use of an abstract mathematical formula on any general purpose computer, or a purely conventional computer implementation of a mathematical formula, or generalized steps to be performed on a computer using conventional computer activity."
In order to determine where TLI's claims fall, the Court looked to the specification of the '295 patent. Particularly, the patent states that the prior art includes digitization and transmission of still images, as well as "an image and audio communication system having a graphical annotation capability in which voice, data and image communications are used in telephone systems." Further, the specification also concedes that it was known that cellular telephones could transmit images, audio, and video, and also had graphical annotation ability.
On top of these observations, the Court further determined that "the claims here are not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality . . . [r]ather, they are directed to the use of conventional or generic technology in a nascent but well-known environment, without any claim that the invention reflects an inventive solution to any problem presented by combining the two." Moreover, "[t]he specification fails to provide any technical details for the tangible components, but instead predominately describes the system and methods in purely functional terms."
As a result, the Court concluded that the claims were abstract under prong one of Alice.
Moving on to prong two, the Court essentially performed the same analysis again. Under prong two, "[i]t is well-settled that mere recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea . . . the components must involve more than performance of well understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry." Ultimately, the Court found that the claim terms of "telephone unit" and "server," while concrete, were both generic devices used in an expected fashion, thus having no patentable weight even when viewed as an ordered combination with the other claim elements.
Thus, the claims were found not to recite significantly more than the abstract idea therein, and were invalidated under § 101.
As alluded to above, the line distinguishing between this case and Enfish is not particularly clear. Both specifications explained at least some advantage of the respectively claimed invention, though the Enfish patent went into more detail when doing so. Also, the '295 patent conceded that many of its features were well known in the art, though the combination thereof might not have been. Consequently, one must be careful when characterizing the improvement that a claimed invention has over the prior art so that this characterization does not become an admission that parts of the invention were well known.
Following closely on that thought, this decision reads like the Court was finding the claims obvious over applicant admitted prior art. The bedrock principle from Diamond v. Diehr that §§ 101 and 103 do not overlap is completely shattered at this point (an probably has been for some time).
Furthermore, the Court's concluding remarks are telling: "Although the claims recite that the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner is carried out in a telephone system, the '295 patent fails to provide the requisite details necessary to carry out that idea." If this looks like § 101 is also being used as a proxy for § 112, you would not be mistaken.
Finally, the Enfish interpretation of Alice, where the improvement provided by an invention can be considered in both prong one and prong two of the latter's test, results in somewhat non-aesthetic situation in which the same analysis might be applied at both prongs. This goes to show that, for some claims, the Alice test essentially has one prong -- the claims either recite an improvement to a computer or a technology or they don't.
Just more evidence that the Alice test is utterly broken.
"because it is another reminder that the wall between patentable subject matter, obviousness, and written description is now rubble."
Is anyone really surprised when the Court attempts to ignore the words and desire of Congress - as evidenced in the 1952 Act - in trying to ply powers taken from it in that act, that any other result would be forthcoming?
Prior to 1952, there was but one single paragraph that reflected the "wall-less" (and now law-less) "rubble" and to which Congress had previously authorized the judicial branch to set the meaning of the word "invention" through the common law evolution tool.
The 1952 Act changed that - both removing that common law tool from the judicial branch and separating that single paragraph into the separate sections of the law of 101/102/103/112.
The Court would do well to reflect on the carnage wrought by its own actions, humbly recognize the limits of its authority - admit that it has overstepped that authority and fully respect the statutory law as written by Congress according to the Constitutional allocation of authority to write that statutory law.
If the Court can (validly) find some present case or controversy (notably not the mere future conjectural "may happen" as it has used in the past), then the Court should set the solution to such a problem properly. This means telling Congress to rewrite the law to "be" Constitutional, rather than the Court legislating from the bench to ESSENTIALLY rewrite the statute according to its desired "policies" - especially given the fact that such writing (scrivining - if you want to be so bold as return the slight) has been of such poor quality as to render the resulting law void for vagueness.
I mean really, when both the inferior courts and the executive branch cannot "develop" the law any better than to say "we can only use examples that the Court has provided," we have the effective situation that the statutory law is arbitrary until the Court itself makes up its mind - and given the inability to actually coalesce the mess of 101 jurisprudence - that "mind," is at best schizophrenic and cannot inform the normal person as to what is and what is not within the law.
Will - or perhaps a better question, CAN the Court realize its own "handiwork" of the current catastrophe of eligibility?
The difficulty with this opinion, as in a number of other recent Federal Circuit opinions is that the court goes first to the judicial exceptions without any, or any serious, attention to the wording of the statute and the four categories set out in it. Each category has considerable prior case law, and omission to consider inclusion in one of the statutory categories and going straight to the judicial exceptions is a mistake unbefitting a law student. It is not to construe the statute judicially but to ignore it.
In the present case the court might well have considered whether the claimed method is sufficiently transformative of the digital images and accompanying data to fall within 101 process eligibility as understood by straightforward interpretation of the statute. Such a finding would have avoided the embarrassment of invoking judicial exception. If on the other hand compliance was found, then judicial exception should have been applied with great caution.
I therefore find myself much in agreement with Skeptical. This point has been made to the Justices of the Supreme Court in the amicus brief filed by the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys in support of the Ariosa petition, and it remains to be seen whether the petition will be allowed and what improvement (if any) will result.

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