Source: https://bostonbarjournal.com/2013/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 21:57:50+00:00

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Are In-Firm Communications About A Current Client Privileged?
In the midst of a law firm’s handling of a case, a client announces that he believes the firm may have mishandled the matter and that he has retained separate counsel to evaluate the firm’s work. The client insists that the firm continue to handle the matter because withdrawing now would be prejudicial. He says that if the case turns out badly, he will seek indemnity from the firm for his losses.
The lawyers involved in the case turn to their colleagues for advice. They talk and exchange e-mails with the firm’s managing partner, and with others in the firm who have experience in the subject-matter of the case and in professional-liability matters. The managing partner requests a detailed memorandum explaining how the case was handled and why the now-disputed decisions were made.
If a malpractice lawsuit follows, are these in-firm communications privileged against discovery? The ongoing fiduciary obligation of a firm to a current client, and the potential for conflict between the firm’s own interests and those of a client who threatens a malpractice claim, have prompted judges in a series of cases to hold that in-firm communications such as those described in the example above are not privileged, even if conducted with the express purpose of seeking and obtaining legal advice about the client’s threatened claim. E.g., In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 130 F.R.D. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F.Supp.2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Koen Book Distributors, Inc. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
This view, sometimes referred to as the “fiduciary exception” to the attorney-client privilege, was adopted by Judge Gorton of the District of Massachusetts in a 2007 ruling in Burns v. Hale & Dorr LLP, 242 F.R.D. 170, and by Judge Stearns in a brief 2011 decision in Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 2011 WL 2884893.
In a November 2012 decision, however, Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Thomas Billings joined what may now be a counter-trend in favor of recognizing a privilege for in-firm communications on current-client matters, at least under certain conditions. RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 502 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2012). See also, e.g., TattleTale Alarm Systems, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, 2011 WL 382627 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011); Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 730 S.E.2d 608 (Ga. App. 2012).
Judge Billings’s decision produced an interlocutory appeal which the Supreme Judicial Court has taken for itself to decide (the case is SJC-11371) which as of this writing has been briefed and argued, and is under advisement. As we discuss below, Massachusetts lawyers will watch with interest to see whether the SJC uses this occasion to announce general rules on the subject of in-firm communications. Whether or not the Court does so, lawyers and firms may want to examine their procedures for responding to client disputes.
In RFF Family Partnership, the law firm handled a real estate loan foreclosure that produced a dispute over lienholder priority. The client retained a second lawyer, who sent a malpractice claim letter and draft complaint to the law firm, and demanded indemnification from any loss the client might suffer due to the firm’s alleged failure to detect, report and address the competing liens. The letter prompted an internal meeting at the firm between the lawyers involved in the matter and the firm’s managing partner.
When a malpractice suit was filed more than a year later, the firm took the position in discovery that the in-firm meeting was for the purpose of seeking the managing partner’s legal advice on how to respond to the potential malpractice claim. The plaintiff-client argued that even if this was so, the meeting occurred at a time when the law firm owed the client a fiduciary duty of disclosure as to facts material to the client’s interests, and that this fiduciary duty precluded the firm’s invocation of the attorney-client privilege.
In his November decision, however, Judge Billings observed that the fiduciary exception was originally developed to address situations in which a trustee sought legal advice, at the expense of trust beneficiaries, to guide the administration of a trust. Here, by contrast, the lawyers obtained legal advice at the firm’s own expense and solely for the firm’s protection.
Further, Judge Billings did not see any inherent inconsistency between a lawyer’s ongoing duty to disclose facts affecting the client’s interests—a duty that exists regardless of the lawyer’s decision as to whom, if anyone, to consult—and the reasons for encouraging a lawyer faced with a malpractice claim to seek the advice of another lawyer about how to evaluate and respond to the claim. Judge Billings reasoned that unless facilitating such advice-seeking is somehow perceived as likely to result in the involved lawyer’s deciding to conceal something from the client that he has a duty to disclose, there is no good reason to deny protection to the advice-seeking communications. Indeed, he suggested, it may be in the interests of the client as well as the lawyer that the latter be free to explore issues freely with competent ethics or professional-liability counsel, without the cloud of potential future disclosure.
Thus, the judge upheld in principle the law firm’s invocation of the privilege as to the in-firm communications to the extent they sought or gave legal or ethical advice. However, he found the firm’s discovery responses inadequately detailed and ultimately held that the firm had partially waived the privilege.
If the SJC decides to explore the boundaries of the in-firm privilege in the RFF Family Partnership case, the Court might, of course, adopt the absolutist view exemplified by the two federal decisions cited above, and hold that a firm’s obligations to its client simply bar any potential in-firm privilege. In that event, it will become critical for a firm faced with a potential malpractice lawsuit by a current client to consult with a specialist lawyer outside the firm, and to ensure that the firm’s lawyers understand when such consultation should supplant internal communications among colleagues. Engaging an outside lawyer provides a basis for clearly distinguishing between actually seeking legal advice about the threatened claim and merely discussing the matter as part of the business of running the firm. And since the outside specialist clearly owes no direct or imputed duty to the client, a claim of privilege will not be in tension with such competing obligations.
If the SJC were to uphold Judge Billings’s decision, there may still be many situations in which, for the reasons given above, consultation with outside counsel is the more sensible response to a malpractice threat from a client. But assuming this is not an option for a firm, either in general or in a particular matter, then it will be critically important (under a regime in which in-firm communications may be protected) that the role of the in-house advisor or advisors be clearly pre-established and defined. The firm’s goal should be to give itself a solid basis for arguing that any potential conflict of interests for the lawyers involved in representing the client alleging malpractice should not automatically be imputed to the in-house lawyer or lawyers from whom the involved lawyers seek advice. Rather, the in-house lawyer should be treated as the functional equivalent of an outside attorney for the firm, with whom confidential communications would undoubtedly be privileged.
Large firms may have the ability to create a full-time in-house counsel position and to appoint in that role a lawyer who has no involvement whatsoever in representing the firm’s clients. Smaller firms may be able to establish the role only on a part-time basis, but should do so with similar formality, so that when the in-house lawyer is consulted about the threat of a malpractice claim, it is clear in what capacity her advice is being sought. Choosing a lawyer with particular experience and expertise in professional-liability or ethics matters, and/or providing opportunities for the lawyer to seek special training on such issues, may help to distinguish the role. Referring to the position on the firm’s website will also help to establish it as a matter of record.
It may be useful, if it can be done gracefully, to refer to the in-house counsel role in a firm’s standard engagement letter, and to explain that lawyers in the firm may from time to time seek internal legal or ethical advice on a confidential basis. The in-house lawyer should have a designated matter number for recording her time spent on consultations and investigations, and no such activity should be recorded or billed by anyone to the client’s matter. Likewise, e-mail and other documents should, when created, clearly signal that they relate to the internal consultation or investigation rather than to the client’s matter itself, and strict segregation between the files should be maintained.
Mere creation of an in-house counsel position will not prevent practical difficulties; they are inevitable. For example, in the part-time arrangement likely to be suitable to smaller firms, since the in-house lawyer cannot be consulted as such where she herself is involved in representing the client alleging malpractice, one or more backup lawyers may need to be designated for such contingencies. And judgments will still have to be made as to when a particular issue leaves the realm of everyday conversation between colleagues, and graduates to the actual seeking of legal advice from in-house counsel.
Finally, whether consultation about a potential malpractice claim occurs within a firm or with outside counsel, the lawyer or lawyers involved in the ongoing representation of the client have an ongoing duty—one not altered by the fact of the consultation, or by whether or not it may ultimately be deemed privileged—to provide the client with information known by the involved lawyers that affects the client’s interests. The involved lawyers must also fairly assess and communicate with the client about whether and how they can continue with the representation given the threatened malpractice claim. Here again, this obligation is unaffected by whether or with whom the involved lawyers have consulted about the potential claim.
Yet despite these complications, and while Massachusetts lawyers will watch with interest to see whether the SJC uses the RFF Family Partnership case to provide guidance on this topic, it seems likely that attention to the concepts and formalities described in this article will continue to be important in ensuring that a lawyer threatened with a malpractice claim has an opportunity to seek advice about the threat, and to do so on a confidential and protected basis.
David A. Barry is a partner at Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., where he focuses his practice on complex litigation, including the defense of professional and products-liability cases. William L. Boesch is also a partner at Sugarman, Rogers. He represents lawyers and other professionals in malpractice cases and other matters, and litigates insurance and intellectual-property disputes.
Spurred by federal monetary incentives, the Massachusetts legislature in 2012 amended the Massachusetts False Claims Act, G.L. c. 12, §§ 5A-5O (“MFCA”) to allow government professionals not only to blow the whistle, but potentially profit handsomely for doing so. This article suggests some measures by which state agencies and municipalities may be able to avoid a financial windfall to senior employees who bring whistleblower claims.
When Massachusetts enacted the MFCA in 2000, the legislature excluded senior government professionals from the universe of potential relators who could file false claims lawsuits seeking treble damages and civil penalties on behalf of the government. G.L. c. 12, § 5G(4) (prior to amendment) (excluding any “auditor, investigator, attorney, financial officer, or contracting officer”). The exemption reflected a line of federal cases that had prevented certain government employees from acting as relators. Federal courts typically permitted relator suits by government employees who had no explicit obligation to disclose information to their employer, notwithstanding a “legitimate argument that every government employee has a fiduciary obligation to report fraud,” but restricted suits by those whose job responsibilities included detecting fraud. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions, § 4.01[b](8), at pp. 4-26 to 4-27. See, e.g. U.S. ex rel LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) ; U.S. ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., 72 F.3d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1995) ; U.S. ex rel Biddle v Stanford Univ., 147 F.3d 821, 829 (9th Cir. 1998) .
In 2012, the Massachusetts Legislature struck this exemption from the MFCA. The impetus of this Beacon Hill amendment was Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), a champion of relator rights. Since 2006, the Social Security Act has provided a financial incentive to states that enact false claims acts (“FCA”) to combat Medicaid fraud “that are at least as effective in rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions for false claims as . . . the federal FCA.” 42 U.S.C. §1396(h). The HHS Inspector General in consultation with DOJ determines if a State FCA is sufficiently favorable to relators, and Senator Grassley monitors to ensure their task reflects relator-friendly rigor. States that pass the test obtain a 10% increase in the state “share” of Medicaid fraud recoveries (for Massachusetts roughly 60% of recoveries instead of 50%). Because the Attorney General’s Office’s Medicaid Fraud recoveries can exceed $85 million annually (in 2012, reflecting state and federal shares of recovery), failing this test stood to cost the Commonwealth millions of dollars. After the HHS Inspector General informed the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office (“AGO”) in 2010 that the MFCA was not compliant, the AGO worked with the Legislature to enact a small package of MFCA amendments. With millions of dollars at stake, the State Legislature deleted the exemption.
As a result, government managers, and perhaps even outside professionals hired by the government, may now stand to reap the benefits of acting as relators (ranging from 15 to 30 percent of any ultimate recovery, plus costs and fees). MFCA, § 5F(1) & (4). This incentive contrasts sharply with the traditional expectations for government professionals: to avoid fraud, waste or abuse, or if contracting abuses are detected, to fix the problem — directly and internally rather than through a relator suit. State and municipal managers can hope and expect that government professionals will report and remedy contracting fraud internally, but — in light of the 2012 amendments permitting their employees to act as relators — they would be wise to consider some more affirmative options.
Any discussion of the tools government employers might employ to avoid or minimize the risk of their employees acting as relators must take into account section 5J of the MFCA, which prohibits agencies from restricting their employees from bringing actions or reporting violations under the MFCA. G.L. c.12, § 5J(1). Although this provision almost certainly was not drafted with government employers in mind, no explicit distinction between public and private employers is made. Therefore, section 5J may well preclude some, but probably not all, tools available to municipal and agency managers.
There is no reason to think that § 5J eliminates existing ethical and conflicts of interest laws that apply to government employees. These remain the most effective tools available to government employers seeking to address the implications of relator suits by employees. Massachusetts law demands of government employees, among other things, undivided loyalty, service free from conflict of interest, and prohibits profiting from one’s government service.
See G. L. c. 268A, §§ 4, 6, & 17-19 (similar restrictions for municipal employees); Ethics Commission, Summary of the Conflict of Interest Law, at IV.d. Given these laws, government employers may wish to consider the following requirements directed to senior employees and others with an obligation to report or detect fraud.
Contractual Prohibition on Government Professionals Serving as Relator? As a threshold matter, a complete bar on government professionals as relators may run afoul of Section 5J(1) and certainly invites litigation concerning its validity. Though conflict of interest law might justify a ban on government manager relators, section 5J(1) counsels toward a less onerous approach that still may protect the government’s interests.
Restricting Relator Recoveries or Requiring Relators to Share their Recovery with the Employing Agency or Municipality. An agency or municipality could require that a relator’s recovery be directed — in whole or in part — to the government employer. An employment contract — grounded in ethics laws that prohibit financial benefits (beyond salary) to government employees for performing their work — might be the legal basis for requiring that any financial benefits derived from the employee’s work be directed to the government. Alternatively, the employer could consider allowing the employee to keep some percentage of the recovery. This would maintain the MFCA’s financial incentives but direct those incentives to the harmed agency instead of an employee doing nothing more than performing his or her job.
Section5J(1) remains relevant to this “forced sharing” arrangement because it invalidates employment conditions that “limit or deny” relator rights. But the government employer can point to ethics law — which prohibits employees from financially benefiting from their work (G.L. c. 268A, §§ 4, 6) and generally forbids conflicts of interest — as a sound basis to restrict not a relator’s whistleblowing itself but the potential windfall for doing nothing more than one’s job. This approach also serves the overarching FCA principle that fraud should be uncovered and punished, but adjusts the FCA’s financial incentives in light of ethics laws applicable to government employees. Should litigation arise over this approach, the would-be relator would be in the unenviable position of fighting only for his payday instead of advocating for the broader benefits of exposing and remedying contractor fraud.
Requiring Prompt Disclosure to Employer of Evidence of Contractor Fraud or Abuse. Government employers would be well served to memorialize, in contracts, manuals or policies, the obligations of employees to report suspected contracting fraud or abuse. This will serve to instruct employees on the agency’s expectations for all employees. It also will bolster the position that a would-be relator has violated known policies when the employee chose to file a confidential relator action instead of reporting and pursuing a remedy internally. To take those rules into the FCA context, an employer could also identify the government alternative to remedying contractor fraud by describing how the particular agency will treat disclosures of fraud or abuse. For instance: after investigation, if the allegations appear to rise above typical contract disputes, the agency will refer the allegations to the Massachusetts AGO for investigation under the MFCA. Further, the agency could instruct that employees may also report suspected fraud directly to the AGO or Inspector General; although that may invite external reporting, it accounts for the possibility of supervisor complicity in the alleged fraud. These types of policies highlight in an eventual relator dispute that limiting government relators does not limit FCA investigations and recoveries, because the AGO offers agencies and municipalities an alternative and meaningful route to FCA recovery. Because the MFCA applies to all “political subdivisions,” the AGO routinely and seriously investigates agency and municipal referrals.
Non-Employee Contractors who provide professional services to the government. All of the issues raised in this article with respect to government employees may also arise with non-employee professionals hired by the government. The former section 5G(4) would have exempted certain contractors from relator status but no longer does; and section 5J(1) arguably limits restrictions on relator status for contractors as for employees. Conceivably, a third party auditor hired by a municipality to assess a supplier’s adherence to a contract could, while providing the audit to the municipality, also file a relator suit seeking FCA recovery. Therefore, the contractual tools outlined here may be applicable to non-employee contractors as well.
Rather than await the potential uncertainty of a government relator suit, agencies and municipalities should consider affirmative steps that promote reporting and remedying contractor fraud but that avoid financial windfalls for government professionals who do nothing more than the job they are paid to do.
Chris Barry-Smith is a Deputy Attorney General for Attorney General Martha Coakley. He oversees the office’s civil enforcement matters, including False Claims Act enforcement. This article represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author and not necessarily those of the Office of the Attorney General. Opinions of the Attorney General are formal documents rendered pursuant to specific statutory authority.
Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ( “SJC”) and the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts both issued important decisions addressing implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine under Massachusetts law. The decisions turned on application of the “at issue” doctrine: the implied waiver of privilege that occurs when a party puts otherwise privileged information “at issue” in litigation. Massachusetts courts have previously held that privilege waiver occurs when the privilege holder affirmatively interjects the substance of otherwise privileged information into a claim, counterclaim or defenses and an opposing party needs access to that information to respond properly.
But Massachusetts courts have not, until now, explored in detail the considerations of fairness that factor into whether waiver has occurred. The courts’ decisions in Clair v. Clair, No. SJC-11256, 2013 Mass. LEXIS 10 (Mass. Jan. 25, 2013), and Columbia Data Products v. Autonomy Corp. Ltd., C.A. No. 11-12077-NMG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175920 (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2012), provide practitioners with much-needed guidance on those considerations by making clear that litigants cannot use privileged material as both a sword and a shield. In other words, litigants may not base their legal positions on privileged material while simultaneously denying their opponent access to that information on the ground that it is privileged.
(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his defense.
However, this approach has been much criticized on the grounds that it conflates the question of waiver with separate issues of relevance.
Relying on Darius, other Massachusetts courts have since addressed the “at issue” doctrine, applying the two-part framework set forth above in deciding whether to find waiver. However, not until Clair and Columbia Data did the courts offer much guidance on how considerations of fairness bear on the judicial application of the “at issue” doctrine.
Clair involves the dissolution of Clair Auto Group, a chain of automobile dealerships owned by four brothers. In 2007, the brothers sold the majority of the companies’ dealerships, real estate, and other assets to Prime Motor Group (“Prime Motors”). In coordination with that sale, the brothers devised a plan to transfer corporate life insurance policies on their lives from the Clair companies to the brothers individually. Following the sale, and at the death of two of the four brothers, familial relations deteriorated. The two surviving brothers refused to recognize their deceased brothers’ widows as partial owners in the remaining assets, and the widows, in turn, suspected that the brothers were using post-sale assets for personal rather than business-related purposes.
On April 9, 2010, Claire M. Clair (“Claire”), the executrix of the estate of her husband, James E. Clair, Jr., and Jane M. Clair, the executrix of the estate of her husband, Mark J. Clair (together, the “Plaintiffs”), brought an action in Superior Court against the two surviving brothers, individually, Clair International Inc., and Clair LP (collectively, the “Defendants”), challenging the post-sale disposition of the business assets and seeking a declaratory judgment as to their ownership rights in the companies. The Defendants filed counterclaims alleging, among other things, that Claire’s deceased husband had breached his fiduciary duty to them.
During the course of discovery, Claire sought access to all privileged communications regarding valuation, purchase, and sale of the life insurance policies, including legal advice from corporate counsel. She argued that she was entitled to this information because the Defendants had waived the attorney-client privilege by placing such information “at issue” in their counterclaim. Relying heavily on its decision in Darius , the court agreed.
The court explained, consistent with Darius, that Claire’s ability to raise a defense depended upon her access to otherwise privileged information. Indeed, “at the heart of proving or disproving the counterclaim” were “disclosures that [Claire’s] [husband] may or may not have made to the Clair brothers and to corporate counsel” regarding the life insurance policies and transfer of ownership. The court concluded, therefore, that Defendants had “placed their otherwise privileged communications ‘at issue.’” Having determined that Claire had satisfied the first prong of the two-part test, the court turned to the second prong. The Clair court found that the only sources of this information were corporate counsel and the surviving brothers, “all of whom were within the circle of privilege held by the companies.” The court emphasized that Defendants “cannot have it both ways”; they may not rely on privileged communications as the basis of their counterclaim that Claire’s husband breached his fiduciary duty and simultaneously deny Claire a legitimate means to inquire into their assertions and raise a defense. .
Although the court granted Claire access to certain privileged information, it adhered to the Darius court’s call for a “limited” rather than “blanket” subject matter waiver. The court limited Claire’s discovery only to those privileged communications between the companies and their counsel that related to the life insurance policies at issue.
In March 2005, Columbia Data, a software company, entered into a license agreement with Connected Corporation (“Connected”). Under the license agreement, Columbia Data granted Connected a license to “integrate, market and distribute” its backup software. The parties agreed on the percentage of royalties to be paid and provided for Columbia Data’s right to retain an independent accounting firm to conduct an annual audit of Connected’s books and records. Iron Mountain later acquired Connected.
As of 2008, Iron Mountain had yet to make any royalty payments under the license agreement, citing poor sales of products incorporating Columbia Data’s software. In 2010, Columbia Data allegedly discovered that Iron Mountain had in fact sold products listed in the license agreement. Columbia Data confronted Iron Mountain, and the parties began negotiating over the payment of royalties.
Concerned that litigation was on the horizon, Columbia Data retained outside counsel, who in turn retained an accounting firm to conduct an audit of Iron Mountain’s books and records. Significantly, Columbia Data did not inform Iron Mountain that the accounting firm had been hired by outside counsel. The accounting firm ultimately concluded that Iron Mountain owed Columbia Data $23 million in royalty fees under the License Agreement. Accordingly, Columbia Data filed a complaint against Iron Mountain, seeking redress for copyright infringement, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.
In the early stages of litigation, Columbia Data represented that its accounting firm was independent and insisted that the royalty audit was conducted according to the terms of the license agreement. But, six months after filing suit, Columbia Data took the opposite position when its litigation counsel retained the accounting firm as a testifying expert in the case. At that point, Columbia Data argued that because the accounting firm was its expert, its discovery obligations were limited to those required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), which governs disclosure of expert testimony. In response, Iron Mountain filed a motion to compel.
In light of Clair and Columbia Data, practitioners now have a much better understanding of what arguments a court will likely find persuasive in considering the application of the “at issue” doctrine. While both courts applied the two-part framework set forth in Darius – namely, that waiver must be appropriately limited in scope and confined to instances where the information sought is not otherwise available – their analysis did not end there. Rather, they focused heavily on considerations of fairness, taking particular note of whether the party invoking the privilege did so as a means to gain an unfair tactical advantage in litigation. As the Columbia Data court aptly stated, litigants may not use protected information as “‘both a sword and a shield.’” Likewise, the Clair court emphasized that a party “cannot have it both ways.” Put another way, the courts will not tolerate, as a matter of fairness, a party relying on privileged material in support of a claim while simultaneously denying the opposing party access to that information because it is protected from disclosure.
Lawyers and clients must carefully weigh the risks of asserting a claim, counterclaim, or defense premised upon privileged material. They should contemplate whether the opposing party will need access to that information to respond. They should think about whether the opposing party can access that information from any other source. They should consider the potential consequences of having to disclose that privileged material to their opponent because, once they have put that material “at issue,” it may be too late to turn back. Finally, although courts to date have construed the scope of “at issue” waivers narrowly, there is always the risk that under certain circumstances, a court will adopt a more expansive construction.
Jonathan I. Handler is a partner in the Commercial Litigation department at Day Pitney LLP.
Emily A. Zandy is an associate in the Commercial Litigation department at Day Pitney LLP.
Jillian B. Hirsch is counsel in the Commercial Litigation and Probate Litigation departments at Day Pitney LLP.
2 XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of Records), 348 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2003).
4 Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
5 433 Mass. 274 (2001).
10 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Slade Assocs., Inc., 463 Mass. 181, 190-93 (2012) (finding no waiver where information sought was otherwise available); Global Investors Agent Corp. v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 76 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 816-19 (2010) (finding limited waiver of privilege where plaintiffs put at issue the advice of their counsel and information was unavailable from any other source).
11 Clair v. Clair, No. SJC-11256, 2013 Mass. LEXIS 10, at *32 (Mass. Jan. 25, 2013).
15 Columbia Data Products v. Autonomy Corp. Ltd., C.A. No. 11-12077-NMG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175920, at *53 (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2012).
18 Clair, 2013 Mass. LEXIS 10, at *34.

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