Source: https://www.ejiltalk.org/keep-calm-and-call-no-not-batman-but-articles-31-32-vclt-a-comment-on-istrefis-recent-post-on-r-m-t-v-the-uk/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:57:15+00:00

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the juridical practice, especially of international human rights courts, has long shown a propensity towards utilizing other ‘relevant rules’ which are applicable in the relations between the parties to the dispute (and sometimes even of only one or none of the parties to the dispute).
7.72 we need not, and do not, take a position on whether in such a situation [of rules applying to all parties to the dispute but not all WTO members] we would be entitled to take the relevant other rules of international law into account.
Additionally, the Panel’s interpretation seems to be somewhat self-contradictory. The Panel cannot and does not apply the VCLT (Art. 3.2 DSU). What it does, is interpret the customary law equivalent of Article 31(3)(c) (Article 31(3)(c) CIL). In doing so it resorts to the VCLT as a ‘relevant rule’. However, neither all WTO members nor even some the parties to the dispute (USA and EU) are parties to the VCLT. Consequently, the EC-Biotech, seems to apply the expansive interpretation which it later on rejects.
a delicate balance [that] must be struck between, on the one hand, taking due account of an individual WTO Member’s international obligations and, on the other hand, ensuring a consistent and harmonious approach to the interpretation of WTO law among all WTO Members.
This leaves the question still open, perhaps even allowing for an understanding of Article 31(3)(c) as meaning ‘any of the parties to the dispute’, as long as this delicate balance is struck. The AB Report does not offer much guidance on how this is to be achieved, but based on the AB’s analysis in the following paragraphs it seems, and rightly so according to this author, to switch the focus from what is meant by ‘the parties’ to what is meant by the term ‘relevant’.
Essentially, Judge Wojtyczek is not arguing that rules not binding all ECHR parties should not be taken into account under Article 31(3)(c), but that such rules should satisfy certain conditions and strike the necessary balance (as per EU – Large Civil Aircraft). In sum, that these rules should be ‘relevant’ (see also para.6).
Referring to other treaties when only the parties (or even one of the parties) to the dispute are parties to it, is not a novel approach. I could cite a long list of case law to that effect, both pre-VCLT and post-VCLT. However, I will raise only two brief points with respect to the ECtHR, since the point of departure of this discussion was R.M.T. v. UK. First, as in EC-Biotech, the ECtHR has often resorted to the VCLT as a ‘relevant rule’ in order to interpret the CIL rules of interpretation. It does this despite the fact that several Council of Europe (CoE) members are not parties to the VCLT (France, Norway, Iceland, San Marino, Romania, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Monaco). So in this context they are applying Article 31(3)(c) CIL expansively.
Second, there is also abundant jurisprudence on reference to treaties other than the VCLT. On the ECtHR’s website there is a 2011 Research Report on ‘The Use of Council of Europe Treaties in the Case-law of the ECtHR’, including the European Social Charter referred to in R.M.T. v. UK. The ECtHR has also referred to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (Hirsi Jamma and others v. Italy), ILO Conventions (ASLEF v. UK, Graziani-Weiss v. Austria, van der Mussele v. Belgium), to name but a few treaties in a long and ever-growing list.
Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights also casts a wide net (ILO Conventions, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Inter-American Convention against Torture, Convention on the Rights of the Child). It explains this by referring to a corpus juris of international human rights, within which the American Convention must be interpreted (e.g. Ituango Massacres Case, para.157; Right to Information on Consular Assistance, paras.112-115; “Street Children”, paras.193-194).
So what can be concluded from the above? First, that reading the term ‘parties’ of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT as meaning ‘parties to the treaty’ is far from established practice. If anything, pre- and post-VCLT jurisprudence seems to indicate the opposite, with courts having referred to other treaties where only the parties to the dispute (and sometimes when one or none of the parties to the dispute) were parties to it. While I am not arguing in support of such an expansive interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) in all cases, I raise the above issues in order to highlight two points. First, the restrictive interpretation is far from the only logical choice. Second and more importantly, this debate on the proper interpretation of ‘parties’, diverts our attention from what is actually the most important element of Article 31(3)(c) and should be the main focus of our criticism of judgments of international courts: the term ‘relevant’.
All these manifestations are complementary to one another, and they function as communicating vessels. A great degree of proximity of one manifestation can compensate for more distanced proximity of another manifestation. This also accounts for why no single interpretation of the term ‘parties’ can emerge from the existing case law. The reason is not that courts end up with conflicting interpretations of this term. The proximity criterion reveals that such conflicts are non-genuine. The different solutions given are due to the different degrees of ‘relevancy’ of the treaties (how much they satisfy the four different manifestations of the proximity criterion).
…It would be inconsistent with this method for the Court to adopt in relation to Article 11 an interpretation…that is much narrower than that which prevails in international law.
Many authors argue that Article 31(3)(c) is not a panacea, and they are correct in that assertion. On the other hand, the interpretative process taken as a whole, as enshrined in Articles 31-32 (VCLT and CIL), was intended to always lead to a single interpretation. As Batman always seems to have in his utility belt a gadget that can help him get out of any predicament, so do Articles 31-32 allow judges to always arrive at an interpretation no matter how hard the case, and avoid having to pronounce a non liquet.
It is true that this raises objections that in the ocean of available material any judge can find a statement reinforcing a predetermined conclusion, giving judges legislative power. However, that is a criticism of the judges themselves and their misapplication of the rules. It should not colour our understanding of the content of the rules themselves. As Lauterpacht argued, the fact that one can find material in support of his/her arguments anywhere should not mean that the number of materials should be restricted ab initio. This is exactly the role of the judge, to determine the probative value of each document.
To say that a restrictive interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) would offer greater legal certainty and act as a buffer from judges exercising a legislative power fails to take into account that even if such rules or treaties are deemed to fall outside the scope of Article 31(3)(c) they could still be taken into account under Article 32. What is important is ensuring that judges properly identify in their decisions the probative value of these documents—their ‘relevance’. The objection should not be to the use of these rules under Article 31(3)(c), but to the failure to establish their evidentiary value (either under Article 31 or 32). Or simply stated in pop-cultural fashion: Keep Calm and Call (the Proper Application of) Articles 31-32 VCLT.

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