Source: https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation43.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:12:47+00:00

Document:
Chief Justice Marshall for the Court held in Hepburn v. Ellzey 1610 that the District of Columbia was not a State within the meaning of the diversity jurisdiction clause of Article III. This view, adhered to for nearly a century and a half, 1611 was overturned by the Court in 1949 upholding the constitutionality of a 1940 statute authorizing federal courts to take jurisdiction of nonfederal controversies between residents of the District of Columbia and the citizens of a State. 1612 The decision was by a five to four division, but the five in the majority disagreed among themselves on the reasons. Three thought the statute to be an appropriate exercise of the power of Congress to legislate for the District of Columbia pursuant to this clause without regard to Article III. 1613 Two others thought that Hepburn v. Ellzey had been erroneously decided and would have overruled it. 1614 But six Justices rejected the former rationale, and seven Justices rejected the latter one; since five Justices agreed, however, that the statute was constitutional, it was sustained.
[Footnote 1590] J. Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, 1783- 1789 (Boston: 1888), 112-113; W. Tindall, The Origin and Government of the District of Columbia (Washington: 1903), 31-36.
[Footnote 1591] The Federalist, No. 43 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 288-289. See also 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: 1833), 1213, 1214.
[Footnote 1592] W. Tindall, The Origin and Government of the District of Columbia (Washington: 1903), 5-30.
[Footnote 1593] Maryland Laws 1798, ch. 2, p. 46; 13 Laws of Virginia 43 (Hening 1789).
[Footnote 1594] Act of July 16, 1790, 1 Stat. 130. In 1846, Congress authorized a referendum in Alexandria County on the question of retroceding that portion to Virginia. The voters approved and the area again became part of Virginia. Laws of Virginia 1845-46, ch. 64, p. 50; Act of July 9, 1846, 9 Stat. 35; Proclamation of September 7, 1846; 9 Stat. 1000. Constitutional questions were raised about the retrocession but suit did not reach the Supreme Court until some 40 years later and the Court held that the passage of time precluded the raising of the question. Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 130 (1875).
[Footnote 1595] Act of February 27, 1801, 2, 2 Stat. 103. The declaration of the continuing effect of state law meant that law in the District was frozen as of the date of cession, unless Congress should change it, which it seldom did. For some of the problems, see Tayloe v. Thompson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 358 (1831); Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833); Stelle v. Carroll, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 201 (1838); Van Ness v. United States Bank, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 17 (1839); United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291 (1842).
[Footnote 1596] Act of March 3, 1801, 1, 2 Stat. 115.
[Footnote 1597] The objections raised in the ratifying conventions and elsewhere seemed to have consisted of prediction of the perils to the Nation of setting up the National Government in such a place. 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: 1833), 1215, 1216.
[Footnote 1598] The Federalist, No. 43 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 289.
[Footnote 1599] Such a contention was cited and rebutted in 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: 1833), 1218.
[Footnote 1600] Act of May 3, 1802, 2 Stat. 195; Act of May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 583; Act of February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419; Act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. 116. The engrossing story of the postwar changes in the government is related in W. Whyte, The Uncivil War: Washington During the Reconstruction (Washington: 1958).
[Footnote 1601] Act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 103.
[Footnote 1602] Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, 32 Fed. Reg. 11699, reprinted as appendix to District of Columbia Code, Title I.
[Footnote 1603] District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, P.L. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774.
[Footnote 1605] P.L. 91-405, 84 Stat. 848, D.C. Code, Sec. 1-291.
[Footnote 1606] H.J. Res. 554, 95th Congress, passed the House on March 2, 1978, and the Senate on August 22, 1978, but only 16 States had ratified before the expiration after seven years of the proposal.
[Footnote 1607] Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820); Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114 (1922).
[Footnote 1608] District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953). The case upheld the validity of ordinances enacted by the District governing bodies in 1872 and 1873 prohibiting racial discrimination in places of public accommodations.
[Footnote 1609] Id., 109-110. See also Thompson v. Lessee of Carroll, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 422 (1860); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889).
[Footnote 1610] 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 445 (1805); see also Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cf.) 332 (1810); New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 91 (1816). The District was held to be a State within the terms of a treaty. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
[Footnote 1611] Barney v. City of Baltimore, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1868); Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U.S. 395 (1897); Hooe v. Werner, 166 U.S. 399 (1897).
[Footnote 1612] National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
[Footnote 1613] Id., 588-600 (Justices Jackson, Black and Burton).
[Footnote 1614] Id., 604 (Justices Rutledge and Murphy). The dissents were by Chief Justice Vinson, id., 626, joined by Justice Douglas, and by Justice Frankfurter, id., 646, joined by Justice Reed.
[Footnote 1615] Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
[Footnote 1616] United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
[Footnote 1617] Wright v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901); cf. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
[Footnote 1618] Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838): Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300 (1893); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 518 (1933).
[Footnote 1619] In the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, P.L. 91-358, 111, 84 Stat. 475, D.C. Code, Sec. 11-101, Congress specifically declared it was acting pursuant to Article I in creating the Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and pursuant to Article III in continuing the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Article I courts were sustained in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). See also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977). The latter, federal courts, while Article III courts, traditionally have had some non-Article III functions imposed on them, under the ''hybrid'' theory announced in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933). E.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.C.D.C. 1967), app. dismd., 393 U.S. 801 (1968) (power then vested in District Court to appoint school board members). See also Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883).
[Footnote 1620] Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 428 (1821).
[Footnote 1621] James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 143 (1937).
[Footnote 1622] Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1908).
[Footnote 1623] Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929).
[Footnote 1624] James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 143 (1937).
[Footnote 1625] Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 530 (1938).
[Footnote 1627] Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1908); Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939).
[Footnote 1628] Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930).
[Footnote 1629] Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (1909); Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929); Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 (1943). The Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 13, making applicable to a federal enclave a subsequently enacted criminal law of the State in which the enclave is situated entails no invalid delegation of legislative power to the State. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294 , 296-297 (1958).
[Footnote 1630] Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 545 (1885); Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940).
[Footnote 1631] Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624 (1953). As Howard recognized, such areas of federal property do not cease to be part of the State in which they are located and the residents of the areas are for most purposes residents of the State. Thus, a State may not constitutionally exclude such residents from the privileges of suffrage if they are otherwise qualified. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
[Footnote 1632] Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.S. 399 (1896).
[Footnote 1633] United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930).
[Footnote 1634] Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 331 (1892).
[Footnote 1635] Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.S. 399 (1896).
[Footnote 1636] S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 564 (1946).
[Footnote 1637] Id., 570, 571.
[Footnote 1638] Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 532 (1885); United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 142 (1930); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652 (1930).
[Footnote 1639] United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, 649 (No. 14,867) (C.C.D.R.I. 1819).
[Footnote 1640] James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 145 (1937).
[Footnote 1641] Mason Co. v. Tax Comm. 302 U.S. 186 (1937). See also Atkinson v. Tax Comm., 303 U.S. 20 (1938).

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