Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82058:g-r-no-197725,-july-31,-2013-mark-anthony-esteban-in-substitution-of-the-deceased-gabriel-o-esteban-,-petitioner,-v-spouses-rodrigo-c-marcelo-and-carmen-t-marcelo,-respondents&catid=1572&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:47:06+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 197725, July 31, 2013 - MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN (IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED GABRIEL O. ESTEBAN), Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RODRIGO C. MARCELO AND CARMEN T. MARCELO, Respondents.
MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN (IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED GABRIEL O. ESTEBAN), Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RODRIGO C. MARCELO AND CARMEN T. MARCELO, Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision2 dated January 17, 2011 and the resolution3 dated July 15, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112609.
The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner Mark Anthony Esteban,4 had been in possession of a piece of land located at 702 Tiaga St., Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong City, since the 1950s.5 In the 1960s, the late Esteban’s sister constructed a foundry shop at the property. In the 1970s, after the foundry operations had proven unproductive, the respondents-spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a monthly rental fee of P50.00. Since March 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped paying the rental fee (which by that time amounted to P160.00). On October 31, 2005, the late Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the respondents-spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to vacate within five (5) days from receipt thereof.6 For failure to comply with the demand to pay and to vacate, the late Esteban instituted an unlawful detainer case against the respondents-spouses on December 6, 2005.
The respondents-spouses appealed the RTC’s ruling to the CA.
The petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari to assail the CA rulings. The petitioner argues that the case has been properly filed as an accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC and was filed on December 6, 2005, or within the one-year prescriptive period counted from the date of the last demand on October 31, 2005; hence, the MeTC had proper jurisdiction over the case.
The petitioner likewise points out that the respondents-spouses are not covered by P.D. 1517 as there was no showing that the subject lot had been declared an area for priority development or for urban land reform.
Finally, the petitioner avers that it was improper for the CA to rule that the respondents-spouses are qualified beneficiaries under the RA 7279 as this point was not in issue and should not have been covered by the appellate review.
In their comment to the petition,19 the respondents-spouses claim that the substitution of petitioner was irregular as the other compulsory heirs of the late Esteban had not been made parties to the present case.
It was an error for the CA to rule that the respondents-spouses could not be ousted because they were protected by P.D. 1517. This decree, in fact, does not apply to them.
Based on the cited issuances, we find it clear that for P.D. 1517 to apply, the tenants must have been a legitimate tenant for ten (10) years who have built their homes on the disputed property. These circumstances do not obtain in the present case as it was not the respondents-spouses who built their dwelling on the land; it was the late Esteban’s sister who had the foundry shop built in the 1960s and eventually leased the property to the respondents-spouses in the 1970s. Even assuming that these two requirements have been complied with, P.D. 1517 still will not apply as the issue raised in the present petition is not the right of first refusal of the respondents-spouses, but their non-payment of rental fees and refusal to vacate. In fact, it was their non-payment of rental fees and refusal to vacate which caused the petitioner’s predecessor to file the action for unlawful detainer.
Finally, even assuming that the aforementioned circumstances were present, the respondents-spouses still cannot qualify under P.D. 1517 in the absence of any showing that the subject land had been declared an area for priority development and urban land reform zone.
As the petitioner correctly observed, the respondents-spouses never intimated, directly or indirectly, that they were seeking the protection of RA 7279. Therefore, the CA did not have any authority to rule that the respondents-spouses qualified as beneficiaries under RA 7279.
In the recent case of Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron,29 we explained that while all co-owners are real parties in interest in suits to recover properties, anyone of them may bring an action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Only the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property becomes an indispensable party thereto; the other co-owners are neither indispensable nor necessary parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated January 17, 2011 and the resolution dated July 15, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112609 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated January 13, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211, Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No. 20270, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the respondents spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo.
2 Id. at 31-47; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Michael P. Elbinias.
7 Penned by Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, MeTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60; id. at 119-124.
11 Accion Interdictal is the summary action for Forcible entry and detainer which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one (1) year in the justice of the peace court (Reyes v. Judge Sta. Maria, 180 Phil. 141, 145 (1979), citing Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 298).
12 Accion Publiciana is recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in the RTC (Reyes v. Judge Sta. Maria, supra).
d) Must not be a professional squatter or a member of squatting syndicates.
21Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36, 40 (1947). Emphases ours; italics supplied.
22Siapian v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 753, 762 (2000), citing Dio v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 129493, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 579, 590. Emphases ours.
23Cañiza v. CA, 335 Phil. 1107, 1117 (1997).
27 Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 134, 145. Citations omitted.
28 Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
29 G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013, citing Wee v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 695.

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