Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81732:gr-181973-2013&catid=1569&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:53:07+00:00

Document:
AMELIA AQUINO, RODOLFO TAGGUEG, JR.,* ADELAIDA HERNANDEZ and LEOPOLDO BISCOCHO, JR., Petitioners, v.PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision2 dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743 be set aside. In the assailed decision, the CA reversed the 10 August 2005 Decision3 and 15 September 2005 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55, Manila.
The Congress of the Philippines passed on 21 August 19895 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758 entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and for Other Purposes" otherwise known as The Salary Standardization Law.
The continued validity of the RATA grant to the maximum ceiling of 40% of basic pay finds support from the Opinions9 rendered by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), Department of Justice.
Finding justification in the increase in salary due these officials brought about by the standardization mandated by R.A. No. 6758, PPA paid RATA differentials to its officials.
The Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate Auditor, however, in a letter dated 14 November 1990, addressed to PPA, disallowed in post-audit the payment of the RATA differentials. It likewise disallowed in audit the grant of RATA to PPA Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel occupying positions with salary grades of 17 and above who were appointed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758.
In a decision dated 16 October 1992, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the COA and declared that an official to be entitled to the continued RATA benefit under LOI No. 97 must be an incumbent as of 1 July 1989 and more importantly, was receiving the RATA provided by LOI No. 97 as of 1 July 1989.
As a result of the aforesaid ruling, there are at present two categories of managers and supervisors at the PPA. The first category is composed of PPA officials who were occupying their positions and actually receiving the 40% RATA under LOI No. 97 as of 1 July 1989 and who continue to receive such benefit. The second category consists of officials who were not incumbents as of 1 July 1989 or were appointed or promoted to their positions only after 1 July 1989. The second category officials therefore receive a lesser RATA under the General Appropriations Act although they hold the same rank, title and may have the same responsibilities as their counterparts in the first category.
On 26 July 2000, petitioners, who are second category PPA officials filed a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition before the RTC of Manila, raffled to Branch 55. They claim anew that they are entitled to RATA in the amount not exceeding 40% of their respective basic salaries. They anchor their petition on recent developments allegedly brought about by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, et al.12 which was decided almost six (6) years after the Court's decision in PPA v. COA, et al.13 They further claim that certain issuances were released by the COA and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which in effect, extended the cut-off date in the grant of the 40% RATA, thus entitling them to these benefits.
Petitioners elevated the case before the Supreme Court by way of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court, however, in a Resolution16 dated 28 March 2001 referred the case to the CA for appropriate action. The case was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 64702.
On 31 July 2002, a decision was rendered by the CA on the referred case. It declared that the principle of res judicata is not applicable to the case. The appellate court explained that the existence of DBM and COA issuances which entitle herein petitioners to the grant of RATA is the pertinent fact and condition which is material to the instant case taking it away from the domain of the principle of res judicata.17 When new facts or conditions intervene before the second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the party, the issues are no longer the same; hence, the former judgment cannot be pleaded as a bar to the subsequent action.18 At the time judgment was rendered in the previous case, the fact and condition now in existence, which consist of the DBM and COA issuances, has not yet come about. In view of the issuances, petitioners are faced with an entirely separate facts and conditions, which make the principle of res judicata inapplicable.19 The decision ordered the remand of the case to the court of origin for continuation of proceedings.
After due proceedings in the trial court, a decision in favor of petitioners was rendered on 10 August 2005. The dispositive portion of the decision commanded respondent PPA to pay the claim for RATA equivalent to 40% of petitioners' standardized basic salaries authorized under LOI No. 97, commencing from their respective dates of appointments or on 23 October 2001 when the case of Irene V. Cruz, et al. v. COA20 was promulgated by the Supreme Court, whichever is later.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated 29 February 2008.
Hence, this petition assailing the 29 August 2007 decision of the CA and its 29 February 2008 resolution.
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINAL DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA. G.R. SP NO. 64702.
III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO 40% RATA AND SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO REFUND THE RATA THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED.
DBM has authorized certain GOCCs/GFIs to grant also to officials and employees hired between the period of July 1, 1989 and October 31, 1989 the allowances and fringe benefit enumerated in said Item 5.5 of CCC No. 10.
At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that although the effectivity date prescribed in R.A. No. 6758 is July 1, 1989, said Act and its implementing circulars were formally promulgated only in the later part of October 1989. The preparation of all required documents, more particularly the Index of Occupational Services (IOS) and the Position Allocation List (PAL) for the GOCCs/GFIs was completed at much later date. Thus, within the period of transition from July 1, 1989 up to the date of completion of all the required documents for the actual implementation by each GOCC/GFI of said salary standardization, flexibility in the interpretation of rules and regulations prescribed under R.A. 6758 was necessary. DBM felt it illogical to assume that during the period R.A. 6758 was not yet issued all GOCCs/GFIs were already aware of what implementing guidelines it (DBM) will prescribe and have their personnel actions accordingly adjusted to said guidelines. Likewise, it is counter-productive if at that time, we advised all GOCCs/GFIs to suspend their personnel actions as same could be disruptive to their operations and delay the completion of important projects.
Petitioners likewise raised as their cause of action the violation of their constitutional right to equal protection of the law. They contend that this alone would constitute sufficient justification for the filing anew of the instant petition. Contrary to the statement in the assailed decision of the CA to the effect that they failed to plead or raise such issue in the trial court, they submit that a perusal of their amended petition would show that paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33 thereof were devoted to that issue.
Finally, as regards the matter of refund of the RATA being demanded by COA, petitioners submit that they should not be required to make such refund since these were received in good faith and on the honest belief that they were entitled to it.
Respondent PPA maintains that PPA employees who were appointed to managerial and supervisory positions after the effectivity of RA No. 6758 are not entitled to the 40% RATA benefit provided under LOI No. 97. Consistent with the ruling of the Court in PPA v. COA, et al.,28 respondent PPA contends that only the first category officials or those who were granted and were receiving RATA equivalent to 40% of their salaries prior to 1 July 1989 are entitled to such benefits. Petitioners who are included in the second category officials or those who are not incumbents as of 1 July 1989 are not entitled to the 40% RATA benefit provided under LOI No. 97.
There is merit in petitioners' argument that their petition should not be dismissed on the ground of res judicata since this is based on jurisprudence and issuances not yet in existence at the time of the promulgation of the Court's decision in PPA v. COA, et al.29 Petitioners are, however, incorrect in their contention that the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 64702 which was not appealed by the PPA has become final and as such, barred the appellate court's subsequent ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743.
We note that when the petition was elevated to the CA in the first instance in CA-G.R. SP No. 64702, the matter submitted to be resolved by the appellate court was simply the issue on whether the trial court was correct in granting the motion to dismiss and in declaring that the case is barred by the principle of res judicata. Despite the non-appeal by PPA of the appellate court's ruling that res judicata is not applicable, the case did not attain finality in view of the order of the CA remanding the case to the trial court for continuation of hearing. The appellate court's ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 91743, therefore, was not barred by the ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 64702 since the ruling in the second instance was already a ruling after trial on the merits.
The issues raised by petitioners are no longer novel. In a catena of Cases31 promulgated after De Jesus v. COA32 and Cruz v. COA,33 this Court has ruled that the pronouncement it has established in the earlier case of PPA v. COA, et al.34 with regard to the interpretation and application of Section 12 of RA 6758 is still applicable. The subsequent decisions maintained that allowances or fringe benefits, whether or not integrated into the standardized salaries prescribed by R.A. 6758, should continue to be enjoyed only by employees who (1) were incumbents and (2) were receiving those benefits as of 1 July 1989.
An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office.
The consequential outcome, under sections 12 and 17, is that if the incumbent resigns or is promoted to a higher position, his successor is no longer entitled to his predecessor's RATA privilege x x x or to the transition allowance.
x x x. The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant. x x x.
x x x There was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. x x x.
The reliance of the court a quo on Cruz v. COA is misplaced. It was held in that case that the specific date of hiring, October 31, 1989, had been not only arbitrarily determined by the COA, but also used as an unreasonable and unsubstantial basis for awarding allowances to employees. The basis for the Court's ruling was not primarily the resulting disparity in salaries received for the same work rendered but, more important, the absence of a distinction in the law that allowed the grant of such benefits -- between those hired before and those after the said date.
Thus, setting a particular date as a distinction was nullified, not because it was constitutionally infirm or was against the "equal pay for equal work" policy of RA 6758. Rather, the reason was that the COA had acted without or in excess of its authority in arbitrarily choosing October 31, 1989, as the cutoff date for according the allowances. It was explained that "when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court." And for that matter, neither should the COA.
In consonance with stare decisis, there should be no more misgivings about the proper application of Section 12. In the present case, the payment of benefits to employees hired after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the law clearly mandated that those benefits should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying them before its enactment. Withholding them from the others ensured that the compensation of the incumbents would not be diminished in the course of the latter's continued employment with the government agency.
It bears emphasis also that in promulgating the Irene Cruz case, there was no intention on the part of the Court to abandon its earlier ruling in PPA v. COA, et al.37 The factual circumstances in the former case are different from those attendant in the case of herein petitioners. In fine, the Irene Cruz case is not on all fours with the present case. The petitioners in the former case, who were employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, were able to obtain from the Office of the President a post facto approval or ratification of their social amelioration benefit. No such authority granted by the Office of the President has been presented by the second category officials of the PPA.
Anent the issue of refund, we note that petitioners were referring to the RAT A received by the second category officials pursuant to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 36-89 dated 23 October 1989 and PPA Memorandum Circular No. 46-90 dated 14 November 1990. We deem it 110 longer necessary to discuss this issue considering that it was already ruled upon in the earlier PPA case and was even part of the dispositive portion43 of the decision which became final and executory. Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect. It is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein should be laid to rest.44 The arguments of petitioners regarding this issue should have been raised in that case and not in this present petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Ce11iorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 August 2007 and Resolution dated 29 February 2008 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
45 Philippine National Bank v. Palma, supra note 36 at 920.

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