Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/266/266mass329.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:38:28+00:00

Document:
GRACE E. RADWAY vs. SELECTMEN OF DENNIS & others.
Eminent Domain, Validity of taking, Recording of order of taking. Equity Pleading and Practice, Amendment after hearing, Waiver of defence. Equity Jurisdiction, To enjoin unlawful taking by eminent domain. Waiver.
Where it is sought to take land by eminent domain, there must be strict compliance with the governing statutes: all precedent conditions must be performed before land can be taken for public uses from a private owner against his will.
(2) There was no taking of the land and the proceedings to that end were void.
(3) Contentions, that the defendants were not liable to answer to the plaintiff in damages, not having been argued, must be treated as waived.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on February 4, 1924, and afterwards amended, against the selectmen of the town of Dennis and the inhabitants of that town, in which the plaintiff averred that proceedings by the defendants with respect to a taking of the plaintiff's property for a way were void because a certified copy of the order of taking was not recorded within thirty days of its adoption, that the defendants nevertheless had entered upon the plaintiff's land and "cut down and removed trees of the plaintiff which were growing upon said premises, and otherwise injured and damaged the said premises, and the defendants threaten to continue said trespass and to inflict further damage upon the property of the plaintiff." The prayers of the bill as originally filed were that "the defendants be permanently enjoined from trespassing upon the premises of the plaintiff;" and that "the plaintiff recover damages."
thereof informed the plaintiff whether or not the trees and fences within the parcel described in the order of taking were or were not taken, or contained any mention of said trees said fences or order in respect to them"; and a prayer that "the purported taking and all the proceedings based thereon, or in connection therewith, be adjudged null and void as a cloud upon the plaintiff's title."
By order of the judge, a final decree was entered on July 9, 1928, that "the taking of plaintiff's land by the defendant town, as set forth in the plaintiff's bill is illegal and void"; that "defendant town and the individual defendants have trespassed upon said land and have damaged the same in the amount of $900"; that "defendant town and the individual defendants shall severally pay the plaintiff $900 with interest thereon from June 2, 1928," and costs; "and that execution issue therefor." The defendants appealed from the final decree only.
W. A. Briggs, for the defendants.
J. W. Allen, (E. H. Abbot with him,) for the plaintiff.
registration . . . a description of the registered land so taken . . . A memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the assistant recorder. . . . All fees on account of any memorandum of registration or entry of new certificates shall be paid by the body politic . . . which takes the land."
The pertinent facts are that, pursuant to authority legally conferred by the voters of the town and after all necessary precedent legal action had been taken, the selectmen, on March 27, 1923, adopted an order taking in fee, for the layout and construction of a town way, a parcel of land owned by the plaintiff. Her title to this land was registered under G. L. c. 185. A certified copy of the order of taking was deposited in the registry of deeds within thirty days after March 27, 1923, but the necessary recording fee was not paid until July 2, 1923. The assistant recorder of the Land Court certified on the order of taking that it was received for registration on July 2, 1923, and on the same day he indorsed on the original certificate of title a memorandum of the right or interest thus taken in the plaintiff's land by the town.
receipt for registration of the order of taking, and of indorsement of the memorandum of the right or interest in the land of the plaintiff taken by the town, was conclusive. Chapin v. Kingsbury, 138 Mass. 194, 196. There is a well defined distinction between filing an instrument, Powers Regulator Co. v. Taylor, 225 Mass. 292, 298, Gorski's Case, 227 Mass. 456, 459, 460, Greenfield v. Burnham, 250 Mass. 203, 210, and offering it for record or causing it to be recorded, Hamilton v. Furrur, 131 Mass. 572, Harriman v. Woburn Electric Light Co. 163 Mass. 85, 87.
The requirement that the copy of the taking be recorded is not a mere direction, it is the vital act upon which depends the transfer of title from the landowner to the municipality. It is the operative alienation of the land. Turner v. Gardner, 216 Mass. 65, 69, and cases there collected. It is the act which fixes the rights of the parties. As to the time when the right to damages accrues, see G. L. c. 79, §§ 3, 6; Edmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535, 550, 551; Munroe v. Woburn, 220 Mass. 116, 120; Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp. v. Old Colony Railroad, 256 Mass. 41, 44.
This is not a case where there was an unjustifiable refusal to record the instrument after the one seeking the record had done all that was required of him, Orne v. Barstow, 175 Mass. 193, but it is a case where the record was made as soon as there was compliance with conditions precedent.
was not, as now, the "recording of an order of taking." Where it is sought to take land by eminent domain, there must be strict compliance with the statutory authority and all precedent conditions must be performed before land can be taken for public uses from a private owner against his will. Lajoie v. Lowell, 214 Mass. 8. Breckwood Real Estate Co. v. Springfield, 258 Mass. 111.
It follows that there was no taking of the land of the plaintiff and that the proceedings to that end were void.
It is unnecessary to consider whether the order of taking was invalid also, in that no mention was made of trees and fences on the land described. See G. L. c. 79, §§ 1, 13, Broderick v. Department of Mental Diseases, 263 Mass. 124.
ground for reversal on this aspect of the case. Posell v. Herscovitz, 237 Mass. 513, 516, 517.
It has been suggested by the defendants that there is no remedy in equity. No demurrer was interposed to the bill. In these circumstances the plaintiff must be taken to have had a case within the equitable jurisdiction of the court and for damages as an incident. Woodbury v. Marblehead Water Co. 145 Mass. 509, 512. Nichols v. Salem, 14 Gray 490.
It has been held generally in other jurisdictions that equity affords relief for the wrong of which complaint here is made. See Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.) § 901, and cases there collected. Proprietors of Mills on Monatiquot River v. Braintree Water Supply Co. 149 Mass. 478. Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 285.
The defendants also suggest that the plaintiff's remedy was by certiorari or by an action of tort. Whether there was a remedy by certiorari need not be decided. Locke v. Selectmen of Lexington, 122 Mass. 290. Foley v. Haverhill, 144 Mass. 352, 354. Doubtless an action of tort might have been brought. Murray v. County of Norfolk, 149 Mass. 328, 329.
The complete answer to these contentions is that the defendants, having answered to the bill and proceeded without objection to trial on the merits, cannot now rely upon want of equity. Bauer v. International Waste Co. 201 Mass. 197, 200, 201. Luciano v. Caldarone, 255 Mass. 270, 272.
The plaintiff was not prevented from seeking this form of relief by having filed a petition for the assessment of damages upon the theory that her land had been taken. The validity of the taking was not thereby admitted for the purposes of this proceeding. Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 285.
It has not been argued that, if the attempted taking was void, the defendants are not liable, or that the final decree in this respect was not warranted. Hence any question in that connection must be taken to be waived. See Miles v. Worcester, 154 Mass. 511; Moynihan v. Todd, 188 Mass. 301, 306; Daley v. Watertown, 192 Mass. 116; Johnson v. Somerville, 195 Mass. 370, 374-377.

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