Source: https://bswenviroblog.com/2014/09/10/the-clean-air-act-and-the-basis-for-regulation-of-greenhouse-gases-part-2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:53:14+00:00

Document:
After Massachusetts, EPA embarked on the process of grounding its reasons for action in the statute, as directed by the Supreme Court. In July, 2008, EPA published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) in which it solicited comments on “a wide variety of issues regarding the potential regulation of greenhouse gases under the CAA.”  Interestingly, the “ANPR also contained a summary of much of the work EPA had done in 2007 regarding draft greenhouse gas emission standards for light duty vehicles and trucks under section 202(a) of the Act.”  The fact that work was done in 2007 on such standards seems to imply that, at least informally, a ‘judgment’ under Section 202 had already been made.
The first determination under Section 202 requires a finding that air pollution may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.
The second determination under Section 202 involves whether emissions of any air pollutant from new motor vehicles or engines cause or contribute to this air pollution.
As to the source categories of new motor vehicles or engines, EPA included passenger cars, light-duty trucks, motorcycles, buses, and medium and heavy-duty trucks. Based on its data, EPA noted that four percent of total global greenhouse gas emissions and just over twenty-three percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions are emitted from this source category.  Clearly, then, this source category contributed to the total, cumulative stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Based on its interpretation and facts, EPA again easily arrived at its ‘judgment’ that “CAA Section 202(a) source categories contribute to air pollution that may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.”  Interestingly, this determination is one of contribution rather than cause.
After issuing the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Finding and making its ‘judgment’ under Section 202, EPA turned its attention to the mandatory requirement in Section 202, namely, that it prescribe standards applicable to the emission of GHG from new motor vehicles or engines. It initially did so for light-duty vehicles and later, for heavy-duty vehicles.
The Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Rule and the subsequent Light Duty Vehicle Rule applied to mobile sources and were grounded in the text of Section 202. However, in order to regulate greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources under the PSD or Title V Programs, statutory provisions beyond Section 202, or an interpretation of those provisions, was required. The Timing Rule provided that framework.
As noted above, the 100/250 TPY Threshold applies under the PSD Program. PSD applies to 28 source categories which emit or have the potential to emit 100 tons per year or more of any pollutant subject to regulation under the CAA or any other source which emits or has the potential to emit such pollutants in amounts equal to or greater than 250 tons per year.  GHGs are emitted in amounts greater than 250 TPY by multiple types of smaller sources, each of which would require permits if the CAA was applied literally.
The application of the ‘absurd results’ doctrine seemingly contradicted the two-step process established by the Supreme Court, called the Chevron analysis after the case in which it was articulated, to determine whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute was permissible.  Under Step 1 of the Chevron analysis, the agency must determine whether Congress’s intent is clear; if so, the agency is bound by and must follow that intent. Under Step 2 of the Chevron analysis, which is invoked if the intent is not clear, the agency must provide a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
EPA acknowledged that the “best indicator of congressional intent [is] the plain meaning of the statute.”  Here, the plain wording of the 100/250 TPY Threshold seems to provide a clear expression of congressional intent that sources emitting more than the threshold limits of GHG should be regulated under the PSD Program. However, EPA noted that courts may examine, among other things, “whether a literal application of the provisions produces a result that the courts characterize variously as absurd, futile, strange, or indeterminate, and therefore so illogical or otherwise contrary to sensible public policy as to be beyond anything Congress would reasonably have intended. In such cases, the literal language cannot be said to reflect the intention of the drafters, and therefore does not control.”  EPA concluded that applying the statute literally “would be contrary to congressional purpose … as found in the statutory provisions and legislative history.  Thus, EPA avoided a literal interpretation by concluding that Congress could not have intended the ‘absurd result’ that smaller sources of GHG be immediately subject to the PSD and Title V Programs.
Petitions to review all the above-mentioned GHG Rules were filed and consolidated in the United States D.C. Court of Appeal. A single decision was issued.  In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Finding and Light-Duty Vehicle Rule and found that the petitioners did not have standing to contest the Timing and Tailoring Rules.
In responding to the first challenge, the Supreme Court addressed whether the CAA mandated regulation of GHG within the PSD and Title V Programs, whether EPA had discretion to do so, and whether EPA acted contrary to the statute by doing so.
The sweeping, Act-wide definition of ‘air pollutant’ “is not a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may consider regulating under the Act’s operative provisions” and the Massachusetts decision “does not strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from the class of regulable air pollutants under other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.”  Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the CAA does not bar EPA from concluding that “the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as written.”  Thus, the CAA did not compel or mandate the regulation of GHG under the PSD and Title V Programs just because GHGs were regulated under Section 202.
EPA has finalized or proposed various other regulations regarding GHGs. Some of the major ones are detailed below.
President Obama released a Climate Action Plan in June, 2013, in which he stated that “we have a moral obligation to future generations to leave them a planet that is not polluted and damaged.”  EPA Administrator, Regina McCarthy, has stated that “carbon pollution … causes climate change and thereby poses a threat to the health and welfare of the American people” and that EPA’s actions to address GHG are “good policy.”  Based on these statements and positions, it is highly likely that additional regulations seeking to reduce GHG will be issued in the near term. However, beyond that safe prediction, there are very few certainties.
EPA will finalize the proposed rules for new and existing power plants. Once finalized, it is highly likely that judicial review will be sought. Challenges are expected based on the use of Section 111(d) to set a state’s specific CO2 reduction goals and the choice of CCS as BSER. While the outcome of such litigation is speculative, the deference provided by courts to a regulatory agency to make reasonable choices based on the agency’s review of the scientific facts before it would tend to favor EPA.
EPA will have to address the Supreme Court’s decision in Utility Air. The Supreme Court held that the CAA authorized the imposition of BACT on ‘anyway’ sources. It is unclear how EPA will apply this ruling, to whom it will be applied, and the BACT choices it will make. Further, as the 100,000 TPY CO2e limit was rejected as a substitute for the 100/250 TPY Threshold, it remains to be seen if EPA will attempt to establish an alternate limit.
It is possible that a new administration in 2016 may have a different view of climate change and the moral imperative to regulate greenhouse gases. Nevertheless, absent amendments to the CAA itself, it will be difficult to reject or ignore the provisions of the CAA, the Supreme Court’s precedential rulings as to greenhouse gases, and EPA’s rules that have already been put in place. Having gone down the path of regulating greenhouse gases under the CAA, it may prove impossible to retrace its steps.
 74 Fed. Reg. 18890 (April 24, 2009). The ANPR may be found at 73 Fed. Reg. 44354 (July 30, 2008).
 74 Fed. Reg. 18886 (April 24, 2009); 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (December 15, 2009).
 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010).
 Timing Rule: 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (April 2, 2010); Tailoring Rule: 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010).
 74 Fed. Reg. 18890 (April 24, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 18891 (April 24, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66505 (December 15, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66516 (December 15, 2009). Together, the six gas are referred to as CO2e.
 74 Fed. Reg. 66517 (December 15, 2009).
 Ethyl Corporation, 541 F.2d at p. 11.
 Ethyl Corporation, 541 F.2d at p. 13.
 42 USC §7602(h); 74 Fed. Reg. 66510 (December 15, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66510 (December 15, 2009), citing Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 531 U.S. 457, 466 (2001).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66510 (December 15, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66516 (December 15, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66524 (December 15, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66531 (December 15, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66508 (December 15, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66537 (December 15, 2009), citing 42 USC §7602(g).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66536 (December 15, 2009).
 74 Fed. Reg. 66537 (December 15, 2009).
 75 Fed. Reg. 25328 (May 7, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (April 2, 2010).
 EPA’s Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Federal Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit Program, December 18, 2008 (PSD Interpretive Memo); 73 Fed. Reg. 80300 (December 31, 2008); 75 Fed. Reg. 17005-17006 (April 2, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 17007 (April 2, 2010).
 PSD Interpretive Memo, p. 11.
 75 Fed. Reg. 17015 (April 2, 2010).
 PSD Interpretative Memo, p. 14; 75 Fed. Reg. 17015 (April 2, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 17019 (April 2, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 17019 (April 2, 2010); 42 USC §7522(a)(1).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31516 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31520 (June 3, 2010); 42 USC §7479(1).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31533 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31534 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31535-31536 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31522 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31523 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31524 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31533, 31541 (June 3, 2010).
 Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31543 (June 3, 2010). .
 Id., citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31555 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31577 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31578 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31548 (June 3, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 31549 (June 3, 2010).
 Coalition for Responsible Regulation Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
 134 S.Ct 418-419 and 468 (October 15, 2013).
 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct 2427 (2014).
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2438.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2439.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2440.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2441.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2442.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2443.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2444.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2445.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2448, citing 42 USC 7475(a)(4).
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2448.
 Utility Air, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2449.
 74 Fed. Reg. 56260 (October 30, 2009): Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases; 40 CFR Part 98.
 74 Fed. Reg. 56265 (October 30, 2009), citing 42 USC §§7414(a)(1) and 7542.
 74 Fed. Reg. 56267 (October 30, 2009).
 77 Fed. Reg. 62624 (October 15, 2012).
 76 Fed. Reg. 57106 (September 15, 2011).
 P.L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594; 42 USC §7545(o), (o)(2).
 72 Fed. Reg. 23900 (May 1, 2007).
 P.L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492.
 75 Fed. Reg. 14670 (March 26, 2010).
 75 Fed. Reg. 14798 (March 26, 2010).
 77 Fed. Reg. 49490 (August 16, 2012). Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews.
 77 Fed. Reg. 49492, 49533 (August 16, 2012). Methane has a global warming potential of 25, which means that this reduction totals about 25 million tons of CO2e. 40 CFR Part 98, Table A-1 to Subpart A.
 New Plants: 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (January 8, 2014); Existing Plants: 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (June 18, 2014) and 79 Fed. Reg. 34960 (June 18, 2014).
 77 Fed. Reg. 22392 (April 13, 2012).
 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (January 8, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 1432-1433 (January 8, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 1433 (January 8, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 1434-1435 (January 8, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 1435 (January 8, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 1435-1436 (January 8, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 34832 (June 18, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 34833, 34957-34958 (June 18, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 34835 (June 18, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 34856 (June 18, 2014).
 79 Fed. Reg. 1495 (January 8, 2014).
 The President’s Climate Action Plan, June, 2013, p. 4.
 McCarthy, Regina, Opening Statement of Regina McCarthy Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, June 29, 2012, at pp. 1 – 2.
Posted on September 10, 2014 August 9, 2016 by BSWPosted in Clean Air Act, EPA, Greenhouse GasesTagged Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Best System of Emission Reductions, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Rule, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Light Duty Vehicle Rule, Tailoring Rule, Timing Rule, U.S. Supreme Court.

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