Source: https://www.ca-c.org/journal/2002/journal_eng/cac-02/07.krien.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 05:01:44+00:00

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On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union (at the beginning of the 1990s), public life in Abkhazia underwent a sudden upswing, which resulted in the appearance of a large number of parties and political movements. But at that time, a multiparty system in this autonomous republic failed to take off. Ultraradical nationalism ran rampant in Georgia, and the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict which flared up polarized society according to ethnic rather than political characteristics. It split into “Georgian” and “Abkhazian” “parties,” whereby after tempestuous demonstrations and outbursts by Georgian radicals under the main slogan “Georgia for the Georgians,” most of the non-Georgian population found themselves in the Abkhazian party (along with the Abkhazians).
During the conflict and its aftermath, the authority of Abkhazian leader V. Ardzinba, as head of the nation and initiator of the victory in the brutal Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, was irreproachable. In the Abkhazian villages (and in the cities), the attitude toward the first state president frequently went as far as idolization. At the beginning of the field studies conducted in Abkhazia,1 the ubiquitous festive speeches and toasts in honor of V. Ardzinba (“our Great man,” and so on) often caused the author of this article to worry that another personality cult could form here, or that a North Korean, Turkmenian, or similar social model might prevail. But the multiparty system, legal opposition, and free press in present-day Abkhazia have thankfully assuaged these fears.
After the war, the various parties, public movements, and organizations which arose during the last years of the Soviet Union’s existence and after its collapse continued to exist in Abkhazia. They all supported the authorities, were more akin to “interest clubs” than political organizations, and did not have any perceptible impact on sociopolitical life. In reality, the formation of a multiparty system with the organized opposition inherent of it did not begin until recently.
As frequently happens, the most irreconcilable political opponents of the current president were his former advisors and former deputies of the republic’s Supreme Soviet (1991-1996), such as N. Akaba, G. Alamia, O. Damenia, L. Lakerbaia, S. Lakoba, D. Pilia, and others. Now it can be stated that demarcation of the Abkhazian political elite began on 26 November, 1994. On this day, the Supreme Soviet adopted the new Abkhazian Constitution, and V. Ardzinba was elected the country’s first president.
Abkhazia became a presidential republic with a National Assembly (parliament), which had far fewer powers than the former Supreme Soviet. Although the deputies themselves voted for a presidential form of rule, many of them found their new rights, which had been severely pared by the new constitution, to be unacceptable, and they were loath to accede to their new position (after all, just yesterday V. Ardzinba was merely the first among equals).
Only a few of the deputies found a place for themselves in the legislative and executive structures (S. Jinjolia, S. Bagapsh, V. Zantaria, K. Ozgan, S. Shamba, and others). The others reckoned that “the authorities would become increasingly supercilious toward the people, and any criticism of it would be taken as undermining the foundations of the state,”2 and that “pointless disputes with a president who openly ignores our opinion and discredits us cannot be of any benefit to our society.”3 Thus, a great many deputies found themselves in the opposing camp (at first unofficially) and at the next elections (1996) refused to ballot for parliament (incidentally, two of its previous deputies who nominated themselves lost to their rivals).
Articles criticizing the authorities appeared in the Abkhazian press approximately five years after the end of the Georgian-Abkhazian war. By this time, the mass euphoria over the victory had abated, and society began to realize that the end of the war and destruction of the Georgian army in no way meant (as very many thought) the resolution of all problems and the fulfillment of the hope for a “bright future” for all, whereby at breakneck speed.
The first direct universal presidential elections (1999) gave V. Ardzinba’s opponents the opportunity to remove him from power by constitutional means for the first time. Some well-known opposition figures intended to nominate themselves for the presidential post. The most likely candidate was A. Ankvab (former Abkhazian interior minister6) living in Moscow, who was in fact the leader of the Abkhazian opposition and, moreover, had the means to pay for running in the election.
The opposition’s hopes to nominate A. Ankvab, or another representative of the “Moscow Abkhazians,” were dashed after parliament adopted a special law on elections. Despite tough resistance from several opposition deputies, in March 1999, the parliament adopted the law, pursuant to which a candidate for president could only be a citizen of Abkhazian nationality who had free command of the Abkhazian language and had lived in the country for no less than the past five years.
Then the opposition tried to nominate L. Lakerbaia (former prime minister and foreign minister) as candidate for president, who had close ties with the “Moscow” opposition members. It was at this point (with less than two months to go until the elections) that the opposition members, finding themselves backed up against the wall, began their propaganda attack on the leadership, and on the president personally, of unrecognized Abkhazia.
Realizing that the opposition did not enjoy enough popularity in Abkhazian society to gather the thousands of voters’ signatures necessary for promoting L. Lakerbaia as candidate for president, the People’s Party of Abkhazia, of which he was never a member, tried to made him their contender for this post. But it was unable to conduct the nomination procedure in keeping with the law on elections, and its candidate was not registered. Moreover, it turned out that the party itself had not passed through the official registration procedure and was essentially acting illegally.
In October 1999, the first universal presidential elections and referendum on independence were held at the same time. Their results proved truly triumphant for the authorities: 97.7% of the electorate voted for V. Ardzinba and the state independence of Abkhazia.8 But the no-choice elections (combined with society’s clear fatigue from dealing with daily problems) aroused disillusionment in some of the intelligentsia. Dissatisfied with the rapid social stratification of society and its grave material state, this part of society, which was most critical of the authorities, became the social bastion of the opposition parties.
In February 2000, organized registration of the opposition began. An initiative group was created consisting of political and public figures who were well known in the republic: N. Akaba, G. Alamia, Ts. Gumba, O. Damenia, T. Ketsba, L. Lakerbaia, and V. Smyr. Their statements said: “During the past years, many problems have remained unresolved. Moreover, society is becoming weary, the people are becoming more alienated from the authorities, and the prospects for our development are taking no clearer shape.”9 In this situation, the group announced the creation of the sociopolitical movement Aitaira, which was called upon to express the views and interests of the opposition-oriented members of society.
Along with consolidation of the opposition forces, the formation of a new pro-government organization began—the Republican Party Apsny (RPA). The previously existing parties (PPA and CPRA—Communist Party of the Republic of Abkhazia), as well as entirely new parties and movements participated in building the multiparty political system in Abkhazia. As a result, the five main political organizations of present-day Abkhazia were formed: three parties (the CPRA, PPA, and RPA) and two sociopolitical movements, Aitaira (Revival) and Amtsakhara (Eternal Flame).
The leaders constantly stress their party’s mass nature and maintain that during the first months after its creation, it constituted more than three thousand members.14 In actual fact, the PPA did not have more than several hundred members. Its electorate consisted of city-dwellers and its influence was negligible in rural areas.
At present, the party is in favor of forming an alliance with the Abkhazian opposition organizations, as well as striving to develop foreign ties (it has made contact with the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia and with several Turkish parties).
The Communist Party of the Republic of Abkhazia (CPRA) (first secretary of the Central Committee, E. Kapba) was created in 1994 at its founding congress. The congress also adopted the party’s platform, which noted that after sustaining victory in the Georgian-Abkhazian war, Abkhazia became an independent, self-governing state which had gone through the complicated and arduous process of forming its statehood.
The CPRA has close ties with the communist parties of Russia (in particular with its structures in the North Caucasian republics and other regions of the country’s south), Belarus, and Ukraine. Contacts with the CPRF faction in the State Duma are helping the Abkhazian communists to have a certain influence on the stance of Russian legislators, supporting their pro-Abkhazian sentiments, and assisting the Duma’s adoption of resolutions and documents advantageous to Abkhazia. It also has its representatives in the Union of Communist Parties (UCP-CPSU), which unites the communist parties in the post-Soviet space.
In the economic and social sphere, the party is in favor of creating a socially oriented mixed economy and retaining the regulating functions of the state in its leading spheres, ensuring the right to private property, and conducting stage-wise privatization which meets the interests of most of the republic’s population.
The party is supported by the current Abkhazian leadership, which sees it as a means for fighting the opposition. It must be noted that this support is of a moral, rather than financial nature. Therefore, in contrast to the opposition, which virtually owns several printed publications with a total circulation of several thousand copies, the RPA experiences constant financial difficulties. Its modest (500 copies) printed matter—the newspaper Azhalar rybzhy (Voice of the People)—comes out rarely and irregularly.
The first founding congress of this movement (co-chairmen L. Lakerbaia, O. Damenia, and T. Ketsba) was held in July 2000, but the republic’s Ministry of Justice did not register it, indicating that it violated the law on registration of sociopolitical movements and parties.
After taking scrupulous account of the Ministry of Justice’s complaints (founding conferences were held, branches of the movement were created in most of the republic’s regions, and so on), in November 2001, a new founding congress was held. It essentially duplicated the decisions of the first: the charter was approved again, publications were founded, the membership of the political council leading the movement was expanded somewhat (to 32 people), and the same co-chairmen were elected. Soon after this, Aitaira was registered by the Ministry of Justice.
A Revival group was formed in the republic’s parliament (seven deputies, that is 20% of their total number), which included, in addition to vice-speaker of the National Assembly R. Kharabua, L. Lakerbaia, T. Ketsba, V. Ketsba, Ts. Gumba, V. Smyr, and E. Chakmach-Ogly.
As its leaders state, the movement’s priority goal is to “win the parliamentary elections and change the power system in Abkhazia. If we want our country to develop normally, we must redistribute power in such a way as to strengthen its legislative and judicial branches and create an efficient system of checks and balances”31 (i.e. restriction of presidential power).
According to its social composition, Aitaira’s members are mainly city-dwellers, that part of the intelligentsia which is most critical of the current authorities. The most common complaints about them are repeated on numerous occasions in the opposition press, according to which the republic’s current leadership is utterly incompetent, and the situation in Abkhazia is catastrophic, or very close to it. Here are a few evaluations characteristic of the opposition press.
In contrast to the Sukhumi authorities and pro-government parties, which uphold a clear pro-Russian stance, the Aitaira (the movement’s newspaper) and other opposition publications frequently publish anti-Russian articles. The Chechen problem, which is a particular sore spot for Russia, was characterized as “another national-liberation war of the Chechen people;” and the Abkhazians are accused of cowardliness and debility, since they “did not come to the Chechens’ aid” and did not fight against the Russian army in Chechnia.37 Several publications extolled the “flexible mind and human qualities” of Shamil Basaev, expressed bitterness and regret about the death of some Chechen fighter the author knew “in Budennovsk”38 (where, as it is known, Chechen terrorists headed by Shamil Basaev seized a maternity hospital and killed many civilians).
It was created in April 2001 (chairman S. Dbar) on the basis of the public-patriotic movement of the same name (which was “born” in the spring of 1999). At a special Amtsakhara congress (April 2001), its delegates came forward with perhaps the severest criticism of the current authorities.
The republic’s military prosecutor, Major General of Justice V. Nachal-Ogly, made a no less severe statement: “We are not living as a single nation, like during the war, but like tribes who have descended to the level of cavemen.”44 Some members of the movement have expressed particular displeasure with the fact that such well-known politicians in Abkhazia as A. Ankvab and others are “not in demand with the authorities”45 (such concern for the fate of the “Moscow oppositionists” suggests that there are relations between them and Amtsakhara).
The appeal adopted at the congress to the people of Abkhazia, the president, government, and parliament stated: “The administration we have created has proven incompetent in post-war times. It has led to mass unemployment, a collapse in the economy, a growth in crime and drug addiction among young people, and the exodus of the population beyond the republic.
“The weakness and incompetence of the law enforcement system is depriving us and our children of confidence in tomorrow, is sowing panic and fear, and is undermining the state’s authority. Rampant crime during the post-war period has affected all strata of the population. In this undeclared war, hundreds of our fellow-countrymen have perished, from ordinary citizens to political figures.
The power structures are not ensuring the republic’s state security, which makes profound reform of all the power departments an absolute necessity, including the armed forces. The structure of the army today is unwieldy and is not ensuring efficient management.
“Bad management, wastefulness, and lack of proper control in the economy have led to enormous losses, the stratification of society, and impoverishment of most of the population.
“The lack of demand for intellectual and professional potential has led to the departure of a significant portion of the population beyond the republic. The placement of personnel is occurring not according to professional capability, and moral and business qualities, but according to family and clan relations, or by fawning and personal devotion.
Amtsakhara is claiming the role of a political party, but the movement has still not been legally registered, and has no charter or platform. Uniting the participants in the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, it has not created an ideological platform. Stratification into “well-fed” and “hungry” fighters and commanders is observed within the sociopolitical movement, which has given rise to constant plunging from side to side, from cooperation with the authorities to extreme forms of opposition. Such internal friability is highly conducive to an increase in contradictions and an internal split. What is more, the radicalism and clear inclination of the movement’s members toward resolving the problems by forceful means is fraught with the most unpleasant surprises and harbors the danger of a buildup in the inner-Abkhazian internecine war.
A multiparty system became a reality of Abkhazia’s political life relatively quickly. Its special feature is the proximity or complete coincidence of the tasks declared by the pro-government and opposition parties alike. All the movements and parties (like the current authorities) are in favor of political independence and reject the possibility of Abkhazia’s return to Georgia. There are some differences in the approach to the resolution of economic problems, but they are very insignificant. The pro-government parties are in favor of a mixed, socially oriented economy regulated by the state, whereas the opposition prefers a market social economy.
There has essentially been no ideological demarcation of political forces in Abkhazia, which is characteristic of all democratic societies, but division according to the principle: “We love the president,” or “We do not love the president.” Therefore, the debate between the authorities and the pro-government parties, on the one hand, and the opposition, on the other, is not ideological, rather it boils down to inundating society with compromises and attacks against certain personalities and extreme forms of dislike for each other.
Of course, in a very short time, the Abkhazian opposition has managed to achieve great success and turned into an impressive component of the country’s political life. But its real influence will not become clear until after the parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring of 2002.
1 For their results, see: A.B. Krylov, Postsovetskaia Abkhazia, Moscow, 1999; idem, Religia i traditsii abkhazov (po materialam polevykh issledovanii 1994-2000 gg.), Moscow, 2001.
2 N. Akaba, “Tak kakaia zhe demokratia im po vkusu?” Nuzhnaia gazeta, 13 August, 2000.
3 O. Damenia, “Prezidenty imeiut takie prava i polnomochia, o kotorykh inye koroli mogli lish mechtat,” Nuzhnaia gazeta, 6 September, 1999.
4 Ia. Lakoba, “Okh uzh eti ‘monopolisty,’ monopolii i monopolizm!” NPA—Narodnaia partia Abkhazii, 7 December, No. 13, 1997.
5 NPA—Narodnaia partia Abkhazii, No. 13, 7 December, 1997.
6 A. Ankvab was removed from his post after a group of representatives of the Georgian administration headed by Zh. Shartava were arrested in Sukhumi and shot on 27 September, 1993. The minister was accused of not executing the order on urgent transfer of the prisoners to Gudauta and not providing them with the appropriate security. In Abkhazia, the opinion spread that it was only due to the intervention of numerous relatives that he was “exiled” to Moscow and avoided a more serious punishment.
7 In so doing, responsibility for the problem of crime lies precisely on the president, for without giving names, everyone knew who was being referred to in this incidence.
8 See: A. Krylov, “The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict,” in: The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. by G. Chufrin, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 287.
9 Nuzhnaia gazeta, No. 8, 28 February, 2000.
10 See: “Programma Narodnoi partii Abkhazii,” NPA—Narodnaia partia Abkhazii, No. 7, September 1996.
11 A. Lazba, “Za svetloe budushchee respubliki,” NPA—Narodnaia partia Abkhazii, No. 9, November 1996.
12 A. Lazba, “Istinno narodnaia,” NPA—Narodnaia partia Abkhazii, No. 6, August 1996.
13 “Politicheskiy kvartet: stroinoe mnogogolosie ili?...,” Ekho Abkhazii, 25 April, 2001.
15 Programma Kommunisticheskoi partii Respubliki Abkhazia (KPRA), Sukhumi, 1994.
16 See: Ekho Abkhazii, 11 April, 2001.
17 Ekho Abkhazii, 25 April, 2001.
18 For more detail, see: Ekho Abkhazii, 18-25 April, 2001.
21 See: Ekho Abkhazii, 21 April, 2001.
23 See: “Programma Respublikanskoi partii “Apsny” (RPA),” Golos naroda, No. 1, April 2001.
24 Aitaira, No. 7, May 2001.
26 N. Agrba, “Kto vy, doktor Zorge? K nekotorym argumentam predstavitelei abkhazskoi Frondy,” Ekho Abkhazii, 4 April, 2001.
27 Ekho Abkhazii, 28 February, 2001.
28 Data of the Moscow press center of the Republic of Abkhazia.
29 See: “Ustav OPD “Vozrozhdenie,” Glas naroda, special issue, 2000, p. 5.
30 See: “Abkhazia v novom mire.” Programma obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizhenia “Vozrozhdenie” (draft), Sukhumi, 2001.
31 See: OPD “Aitaira”—krupneishaia oppozitsionnaia sila v Abkhazii. Interview with co-chairman of the sociopolitical movement L. Lakerbaia, Ekho Abkhazii, 20 March, 2001.
32 A. Gunba, “Naivnaia vera ‘v dobrogo tsaria,’” Ekho Abkhazii, 20 November, 2000.
33 D. Pilia, “Abkhazia nakanune bol’shikh peremen,” Ekho Abkhazii, 12 September, 2001.
34 E. Avidzba, “RPA na starte,” Aitaira, No. 2, February 2001.
35 A. Otyrba, “Kak nam preodolet’ mezhdunarodnuiu izoliatsiiu,” Ekho Abkhazii, 16 May, 2001.
37 I. Kuakuaskir, “Voina, cherez kotoruiu nam nelegko perestupit’,” Aitaira, No. 2, February 2001.
38 See: I. Agrba, “Na fone neprekhodiashchego proshlogo,” Aitaira, No. 2, February 2001; I. Kuakuaskir, op. cit.
39 L. Lakerbaia, “I delo ne v segodniashnem zatmenii,” Nuzhnaia gazeta, 16 September, 1999.
40 See: Ekho Abkhazii, 25 April, 2001.
41 Ts. Gumba, “Zaiavlenie,” Aitaira, No. 14, August 2001.
42 A. Otyrba, “O tak nazyvaemoi ‘moskovskoi oppozitsii,’” Ekho Abkhazii, 13 November, 2000.
43 Ekho Abkhazii, 3 May, 2001.
48 See press conference of A.M. Jergenia, in: Respublika Abkhazia, No. 66, 12-13 June, 2001.

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