Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=28762:g-r-no-l-47475-august-19,-1988-manotok-realty,-inc-v-jose-h-tecson&amp;catid=1240&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:08:56+00:00

Document:
MANOTOK REALTY, INC., Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE JOSE H. TECSON, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and NILO MADLANGAWA, Respondents.
Ceferino V. Argueza for Petitioner.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for Respondents.
1.	REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; FINAL AND EXECUTORY; NO ADDITIONS CAN BE MADE THERETO EXCEPT ITS EXECUTION. — When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became incumbent upon the respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is, therefore, no basis for the respondent judge to deny the petitioner’s motion to avail of its option to appropriate the improvements made on its property. In the case of Duenas v. Mandi (151 SCRA 530, 545), we said: ". . .." . . Likewise settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto, and nothing can be done therewith except its execution, otherwise there would be no end to legal processes. (Fabular v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329)"
3.	ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTITLED TO THE FRUITS AS LONG AS POSSESSION IS NOT LEGALLY INTERRUPTED; WHEN POSSESSION DEEMED INTERRUPTED. — Furthermore, the private respondent’s good faith ceased after the filing of the complaint below by the petitioner. In the case of Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap (13 SCRA 190, 196), we ruled: ". . . Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between themselves their rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the transaction, this legal fiction of Yap’s good faith ceased when the complaint against him was filed, and consequently the court’s declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and proper. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and 1123, Civil Code)." Thus, the repairs and improvements introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was filed cannot be considered to have been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of the petitioner’s exercise of option. Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent’s right to retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.
On July 13, 1977, we issued a resolution dated July 11, 1977 denying the petitioner’s petition for lack of merit. Hence, on August 5, 1977, the petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by respondent Judge Jose H. Tecson, a motion for the approval of petitioner’s exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment, praying that the court issue an order: a) approving the exercise of petitioner’s option to appropriate the improvements introduced by the private respondent on the property; b) thereafter, private respondent be ordered to deliver possession of the property in question to the petitioner.
"‘This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid application of the law, but rather its action should conform to the conditions or exigencies of a given problem or situation in order to grant relief that will serve the ends of justice.
the Court is of the considered view that under the peculiar circumstances which supervened after the institution of this case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial improvements on the controverted property, the instant motion of the plaintiff is not well-taken and therefore not legally proper and tenable.
On April 15, 1978, the private respondent filed his comment on the petition alleging that the same has already become moot and academic for two reasons: first, fire gutted not only the house of the private respondent but the majority of the houses in Tambunting Estate; and second, as a result of the said fire, the then First Lady and Metro Manila Governor Imelda R. Marcos has placed the disputed area under her Zonal Improvement Project, thereby allowing the victims of the fire to put up new structures on the premises, so that the willingness and readiness of the petitioner to exercise the alleged option can no longer be exercised since the subject-matter thereof has been extinguished by the fire. Furthermore, the President of the Philippines has already issued a Presidential Decree for the expropriation of certain estates in Metro Manila including the Tambunting Estate. Therefore, the beneficient and humanitarian purpose of the Zonal Improvement Project and the expropriation proceeding would be defeated if petitioner is allowed to exercise an option which would result in the ejectment of the private Respondent.
On December 28, 1980, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1669 was issued providing for the expropriation of the Tambunting Estate. However, this decree was challenged before this Court in G.R. No. 55166 entitled "Elisa R. Manotok, Et. Al. v. National Housing Authority, Et. Al." Hence, we decided to hold the decision on this petition pending the resolution of the above-entitled case.
On May 21, 1987, the Court rendered a decision in the Elisa Manotok case (Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89) ruling that P.D. 1669 is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. Thus, since the present petition has not been rendered moot and academic by the decision in said case, we will now decide on its merits.
We find merit in these arguments.
When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became incumbent upon the respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is, therefore, no basis for the respondent judge to deny the petitioner’s motion to avail of its option to appropriate the improvements made on its property.
". . . Likewise settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto, and nothing can be done therewith except its execution, otherwise there would be no end to legal processes. (Fabular v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329)"
Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent’s right to retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.

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