Source: https://www.texasfamilylawyers.com/family-law/informal-marriage/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:32:03+00:00

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3) Representing to others that the parties are married.
See Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1994).
(2) they agreed to be married, and after the agreement they lived together in this state as husband and wife and there represented to others that they were married.
(b) In any proceeding in which a marriage is to be proved under Subsection (a)(2) of this section, the agreement of the parties to marry may be inferred if it is proved that they lived together as husband and wife and represented to others that they were married.
In sections 1.91(a)(1) and 1.92–95, the legislature added a provision allowing a couple to file a declaration of informal marriage with the county clerk. Although such a declaration constitutes prima facie proof of the parties informal marriage, the parties need not make the declaration to have a valid common law marriage.
(b) A proceeding in which a marriage is to be proved under this section must be commenced not later than one year after the date on which the relationship ended or not later than one year after September 1, 1989, whichever is later.
Further, the Texas Supreme Court, in Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1994), also addressed the 1989 amendment to the informal marriage statute and the new evidentiary burdens necessary to prove an informal marriage in light of the 1989 amendment.
The Russell case is directly on point and controlling in this case. Further, the Russell case is the most recent Texas Supreme Court decision relating evaluating evidence of an informal marriage under the current Texas informal marriage statute.
Rather than abolishing the doctrine of informal marriage as had been proposed on numerous occasions in the past, the legislature tightened the rules for reliance on the doctrine by repealing the provision that allowed a court to infer an agreement to be married from proof of cohabitation and holding-out. This amendment, therefore, raises the question of how the elements of agreement may hereafter be proved.
In the future one of two basic fact patterns will develop depending on whether both parties are living. If both parties to the alleged informal marriage are alive, one of them will commonly deny the agreement. When the other party to the alleged informal union offers direct evidence of an express agreement to be presently married, the trier of fact will be required to weigh the testimony in the context of other evidence of the relationship. If one of the parties is dead, the survivor will be required to meet the limitation imposed by Evidence Rule 601(b) by providing corroboration of an alleged transaction with the decedent. Under most circumstances the proponent of the marriage will have an easier case in the latter instance unless there is convincing evidence that the decedent denied the existence of the agreement. If evidence of an express agreement to marry is not offered, the fact finder will have to treat the facts of cohabitation and holding-out as circumstantial evidence of the agreement in order to find a tacit agreement to be married. This process is, however, virtually identical to the prior process of inference. But by repealing the provision authorizing the fact-finder to infer an agreement from proof of two elements of an informal marriage, the legislature has not excluded a finding of a tacit agreement to be married. In making such a finding, however, it seems that the evidence of holding-out must be more convincing than before the 1989 agreement.
In a society in which non-marital cohabitation for extended periods of time is far more common than it once was, the fact-finder will have to weigh the evidence of a tacit agreement more carefully than in the past. As the statute now stands, an occasional uncontradicted reference to a cohabitant as “my wife” or “my husband” or “mine” will not prove a tacit agreement to be married without corroboration. Such a reference by the contestant of the union will, of course, be stronger evidence of an agreement than such a statement by the proponent. The non-social context of the contestant’s reference to the proponent as his “wife” or her “husband” will also receive closer scrutiny. If the statement is made in a self-serving context, the fact-finder may be expected to disbelieve the truth of the statement. A forthright assertion of marriage with the consequence of liability (as when an alleged spouse seeks admission of the other to a hospital) may, on the other hand be far more probative of a tacit agreement to be married.*933 Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 44 SW.L.J. 1, 2–3 (1990) (footnotes omitted). But see Recent Changes, 28HOUS.L.REV. at 1151 (The 1989 amendment “effectively abolished common-law marriage in Texas.”).
34“Any ultimate fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” State v. $11,014.00, 820 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex.1991);Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex.1975). “A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when the fact may be fairly and reasonably inferred from other facts proved in the case.” Dallas County Flood Control v. Cross, 815 S.W.2d 271, 279–80 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied); Walter Baxter Seed Co. v. Rivera, 677 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Proof of an agreement to be married may be made by circumstantial evidence or conduct of the parties. “[I]n order to establish a common law marriage as a matter of law, it is not necessary to establish each element by direct proof, as each element may be established by circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence.” Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 208–09 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. granted, 486 U.S. 1053, 108 S.Ct. 2818, 100 L.Ed.2d 919 (1988), judgmt aff’d, 490 U.S. 754, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 834 (1989). “Marriage, whether ceremonial or common-law, although the character of the evidence might be different, is proved as any other fact might be proved.” Tompkins, 774 S.W.2d at 209. See Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d at 166. Proof of cohabitation and representations to others that the couple are married may constitute circumstantial evidence of an agreement to be married. However, the circumstances of each case must be determined based upon its own facts.1 We conclude that section 1.91, as amended in 1989, does not require direct evidence of an agreement to be married in order to establish a common law marriage, but that the agreement may be proved by circumstantial evidence.2” Id. (emphasis added).
5) While proof of cohabitation and representations to others that the couple are married may constitute circumstantial evidence of an agreement to be married the circumstances of each case must be determined based on its own facts.

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