Source: https://mcneilmason.wordpress.com/eleventh-circuit-case-no-01-13664-the-appeal-from-hell/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:14:32+00:00

Document:
The Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, Case No. 01-13664-A, is the epitome of what is wrong with the Federal Judiciary. Case No. 01-13664-A is a direct appeal that produced an unpublished opinion. The panel that sat for this appeal included: Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Judge Stanley Marcus, and Judge Susan Black. The clear objective of this appeal was to affirm U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham,”Teflon Don”, by any means necessary. The “rule of law” became a casualty in the Eleventh Circuit’s effort to reach the desired outcome. The Eleventh Circuit exploited the perfect scam, an unpublished opinion, to achieve the desired outcome. It is difficult to imagine a more dishonest act. If the Eleventh Circuit had the values and moral presence of the U.S. Army, there would be mass court-martials and relief of commands. The opinion in this matter is insulting and offensive. It is arrogant in that it implicitly states that we, federal judges, are omnipotent and can do anything we damn well please with impunity.
To provide data to support the outlawing of unpublished opinions.
To expose judicial corruption, artifice, and misconduct.
To provide the disinfectant of sunlight into the judicial process.
To provide real life examples of why “Judicial Independence” as it presently exists is woefully lacking in accountability.
To seek public sanctions of culpable Judges and staff.
It is hoped that those who have influence will take some measure either formally or informally to see that this matter is remedied, and further, to take action to prevent this kind of rogue jurisprudence.
To provide the impetus for a Congressional investigation to determine whether litigants rights under the law are being respected and especially with “mere” pro se litigants.
(DE #246). This order is dated July 25, 2000. Incidentally, at least three courts have found similar injunctions to be unconstitutional. see Lewis v. S. S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1976)(reversing an order which prohibited appellant from “discussing, directly or indirectly, settlement . . . with the plaintiffs” and from “contacting, communicating, or in any way interfering with the attorney-client relationship” as “too sweeping a restraint”); Bernard v. Gulf-Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), aff’d, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981),( explicitly held that requiring the litigant to meet the Court’s “post-communication filing requirements” of constitutionally protected communication was unconstitutional.). Additionally, in Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 579 (Fed. 5th Cir., 2005) the court held that an order which enjoined a litigant “from communicating directly with, threatening, or harassing Test Masters Educational Services, Inc., its employees, its staff, or TES’s counsel, counsel’s employees, or counsel’s staff” constituted an invalid prior restraint and a unconstitutional limitation on free speech.
They claimed that, during the week of 5 February 2001, Mason had demanded to view his personnel file from Highlands County’s Human Resource Director Fred Carino, a named defendant in the case. See Opinion, pg. 4.
Mason also appeared at Carino’s office and demanded to view the billing records for Highlands County’s attorney and Highlands County’s liability insurance documents. See Opinion, pps. 4,5.
They asserted that Mason made these requests of Carino without first requesting the documents from their counsel in compliance with the magistrate judge’s order and became aggressive, disruptive, and threatening with Carino. See Opinion, pg. 5.
They indicated that they had produced the documents for Mason, and attached a copy of a letter from Carino to Mason reminding Mason that he was to correspond only with their counsel. See Opinion, pg. 5.
More of these out of court communications are listed below under the “Banned Communications” heading.
The Eleventh Circuit fought against the appeal being filed and perfected. See Killing the Appeal on the Launching Pad, below. This section details how both Judge Graham and the Eleventh Circuit denied in forma pauperis motions arbitrarily.
The Eleventh Circuit made the cost of filing briefs very costly for a person that it knew was indigent. See Driving Up Costs To Perfect Appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit disregarded challenges to its jurisdiction because a summary reversal would have been mandated. See Jurisdictional Challenge. The Eleventh Circuit used trickery to avoid reviewing its jurisdiction on multiple occasions. See post “Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, Masters of Jugglery: Jurisdictional Challenge Converted To Summary Reversal Motion To Achieve Desired Outcome“.
The Eleventh Circuit disregarded the fact that Judge Graham declined to state where his Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr., got the legal authority to issue the “preliminary injunctions” in reply to a Motion For Clarification that was submitted while the appeal was pending and before the briefs were filed. See Motion for Clarification.
The Eleventh Circuit held up the appeal because the Appellees filed a suggestion of bankruptcy invoking the automatic stay provision provided to a debtor when the appellees had no interest in the bankruptcy proceeding. See Appellees’ Dilatory Tactic.
Material Issues were simply ignored. (1)The opinion refused to discuss the validity of two orders [“preliminary injunctions”, (DE #201), (DE #246) ] that were used to dismiss the case, but uses 14 pages to discuss alleged non-compliance with these orders. See Validity of the Preliminary Injunctions. (2)Judge Graham was excoriated on appeal for failing to recuse or disqualify; however the Eleventh Circuit does not discuss this issue. See Disqualification and Recusal. These omissions were intentional as the Eleventh Circuit were expressly told of these omissions in a motion for rehearing. See The Eleventh Circuit Intentionally Omitted Issues From Appellate Review.
The Eleventh declined to discuss the issue of email authentication, though fully briefed, while simultaneously using unauthenticated email to support their decision to affirm Judge Graham. See Inauthentic and Irrelevant Emails.
The Eleventh Circuit went beyond the scope of appeal. The Eleventh Circuit accomplished the logically impossible by using an order rendered on September 20, 2001 to justify the dismissal of case that was closed or dismissed on June 20, 2001. See Eleventh Circuit Uses Invalid Pre-Filing Injunction. Compounding this dishonesty, the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s brief for arguing this order because they claimed it was beyond the scope of appeal while simultaneously using this same order to affirm Judge Graham and reach the desired result. See Beyond the Scope of Appeal Chicanery.
The Eleventh Circuit disregarded several prior appellate binding decisions with respect to the requirements for a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 Dismissal Standard Failure.
The Eleventh Circuit refused to publish this case or release it to the Internet. See Eleventh Circuit Denies Publication Request.
Why Should Other Judges And Court Watchers Care?
(DE #246). This order is dated July 25, 2000. Incidentally, at least three courts have found similar injunctions to be unconstitutional. In contrast, the court in Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 579 (Fed. 5th Cir., 2005) , reversed U.S. Dist. Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore, presiding, for issuing an order which enjoined a litigant “from communicating directly with, threatening, or harassing Test Masters Educational Services, Inc., its employees, its staff, or TES’s counsel, counsel’s employees, or counsel’s staff” constituted an invalid prior restraint and a unconstitutional limitation on free speech. Judge Graham had an even more compelling reason to be reversed because Judge Graham’s case involved communication with the government which is protected under the first amendment.
Mason knew that the Eleventh Circuit would use an unpublished decision to reach the desired result as he begged the court on September 25, 2002 not to deploy this tactic. See Appellant’s Renewed Motion For Summary Reversal.pdf (“There is no legal basis for which this Court can affirm the district court, save an unpublished decision and an obscure procedural rule that obliterates Mason’s substantive rights. “). Mason was sure that the Eleventh Circuit would use an unpublished decision to reach the desired result because the Eleventh Circuit had used this weapon before against Mason, see post entitled “Eleventh Circuit Uses Same Set of Facts To Reverse One Florida Judge While Affirming Another Florida Judge“. On April 10, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit denied a motion to publish this case. See Docket. Why the refusal to publish this case? This does not inspire confidence in the opinion’s integrity and and the appellate panel’s honesty.
On Brief Apellee, Maria Sorolis, Esq, Brian Koji, Allen, Norton & Blue, Appellees’ Brief.
Opinion, Microsoft Word, PDF, Panel Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Judge Stanley Marcus, and Judge Susan Black.
The attorneys handling this matter, primarily Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji, Allen, Norton & Blue did some excellent “lawyering” as they knew the difference between the ideal, “rule of law” and the real world. In this respect, they took Mason, a mere pro se Plaintiff to school. Allen, Norton & Blue billed Highlands County some $800, 000 in legal fees, or Highlands County’s insurer Gallagher Bassett. Sorolis and Koji had a concede nothing, contest everything mentality, consequently the $800,000 in legal fees and costs. Sorolis and Koji coup de grace, with assistance from John Bolanavich, was to get Judge Graham to assess Mason, an indigent, $200,000 in legal fees when their clients did not prevail on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Similarly, Mason defeated Allen, Norton, Blue in a parallel unemployment compensation case that Highlands County’s attorneys charged $50,000 in costs and fees to avoid paying $3500 in benefits. Mason has similarly defeated Allen, Norton & Blue in the Second District Court of Appeal, Lakeland, Fl.
The filing of an appeal requires a filing fee which at the time of this appeal was $150.00. The lawsuit was initially filed without payment of filing fees because the district judge at time, Judge Edward Davis, now retired, granted Mason’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See (Doc. 3).
A motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis was submitted to Teflon Don on June 27, 2001. (D.E. 796). On July 13, Mason filed a motion for a ruling on his in forma pauperis motion. See Docket. On 08/10/2001, Mason files a second motion for a ruling on his in forma pauperis motion. See Docket 811. On September 11, 2001, Judge Graham refers the motion to the Magistrate Frank Lynch, Jr. See Docket Entry 860. On September 20, 2001, or three months after the motion is submitted, Judge Lynch denies IFP.
The Eleventh Circuit, without providing a scintilla of proof, simply stated that Mason had not been “truthful”. On December 12, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit denied a motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
Appellant’s motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED because appellant has not truthfully provided this Court with information concerning his ability to pay the filing and docketing fees. See Moreland v. Wharton. 899 F.2d 1168,1170 11th Cir. 1990) (holding that right to proceed is not absolute. but rather is left to the sound of the court).
December 12, 2001, Order Case No. 01-13664. A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION was filed on December 15, 2001 begging the court to state the basis for its conclusion that the appellant had been untruthful. On February 7, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit denied the motion and refused to provide an explanation.
When considering a motion filed pursuant to § 1915(a), “[t]he only determination to be made by the court … is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” (internal citations omitted). An affidavit addressing the statutory language should be accepted by the court, absent a serious misrepresentation, and need not show that the litigant is “absolutely destitute” to qualify for indigent status under § 1915. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338-40, 69 S.Ct. 85, 88-89, 93 L.Ed. 43 (1948). Such an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependent.
The Eleventh Circuit knew that Marcellus Mason lacked financial resources, but yet they took measures against Marcellus Mason which drove up the cost to Mason to perfect the appeal. On March 6, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s brief for arguing against a sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction because they claimed it was “beyond the scope of appeal.” See Order Striking Appellant’s Brief. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Mason to file seven new briefs. The cost of copying these briefs was about $0.15 per page. The Appellant Brief consisted of some 48 pages in total. The Appellees, Highlands County and their attorneys, Allen, Norton & Blue, who have copy machines and resources, had their brief stricken for arguing the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, but were not required to file new briefs as the court claimed it would not consider the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction in its deliberations. See Order Striking Appellees’ Brief.
On February 5, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit threatened to dismiss the appeal, if Mason did not provide indexing tabs for the record excerpt. See Letter from Clerk. Similarly, on the same day, the Eleventh Circuit attacked Mason’s brief because the brief lacked a “Sufficiently durable cover.” Additionally, the brief was attacked because the brief lacked a “Statement Regarding Oral Argument.” See Clerk’s Letter.
By what legal authority does the Magistrate act in issuing the orders in question, (DE #201, 246), directing that a nonlawyer must seek the permission of a private for profit lawfirm in order to communicate with his government directly and request public records under Florida Law? The refusal by this Court to previously answer this inquiry is needlessly wasting the judicial resources of multiple courts.
Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Court, requesting that his Motion for Clarification of Court Orders be filed with the Court. The Court shall accept this Motion as a filing. However, this motion will not be granted. Plaintiff has, on numerous occasions, filed motions for clarification in this case, all of which have been denied. The Court finds the present motion, Like the motions before it is without merit.
See Graham’s Order Refusing to Cite Legal Authority.
The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction….” [I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking. [B]efore rendering a decision every federal court operates under an independent obligation to ensure it is presented with the kind of concrete controversy upon which its constitutional grant of authority is based; and this obligation on the court to examine its own jurisdiction continues at each stage of the proceedings, even if no party raises the jurisdictional issue and both parties are prepared to concede it.
If, upon review of the district court docket entries, order and/or judgment appealed from, and the notice of appeal, it appears that this court may lack jurisdiction over the appeal, the court may request counsel and pro se parties to advise the court in writing of their position with respect to the jurisdictional question(s) raised.
Mason challenged the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit to hear the appeal on the theory that Judge Graham’s Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr., did not have the legal authority to render the orders in question, consequently, the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction of the appeal. This procedure invokes jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction of the lower court. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (“It is now held that, except in case of plain usurpation, a court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction…“). In order for the Eleventh Circuit to have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, it would have been forced to determine the validity of the preliminary injunctions in question. However, the Eleventh Circuit would have none of that. In a move of pure artifice that would make the schister lawyer proud, the Eleventh Circuit, sua sponte, converted the Motion to Determine Jurisdiction into a Motion for Summary Reversal and then denied the motion for summary judgment on April 15, 2002. Essentially the Eleventh Circuit gave itself permission not review its jurisdiction because it would have lead to a summary reversal for Mason the Appellant. See Eleventh Circuit’s Docket.
a bizarre view of the law, the Appellees suggested that the appeal should be stayed because of Mason’s bankruptcy petition. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay” against various steps of creditors to obtain collection of the debts owed to them. 11 U.S.C. 362(a). The automatic stay is designed to protect the debtor. Mason did not seek the protection of bankruptcy court in this appeal. As a result of Ms. Sorolis dilatory tactic, the stay was instituted and maintained until July 11, 2002. Why would a creditor or potential creditor want a stay?
Intentionally lying and misrepresenting the law. This is a serious allegation that if true requires disqualification. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs. 30-32 and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Never ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction that was pending from November 24, 1999 until the case was closed on June 20, 2001. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Improperly dismissing wholesale Mason’s five section 1981 claims. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs. 13-14 and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg . Interestingly enough in denying a petition for mandamus the Eleventh Circuit admitted that the basis for Mason’s section 1981 claims was proper.
Usurping legal authority by allowing a Magistrate to issue an injunction in direct contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)(“a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief,…”). Appellant’s Initial Brief, pg. 6 and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Usurping authority by rendering an injunction without meeting the legal requirements for issuing an injunction. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pg. 6 and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Usurping Legal Authority by acting without subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Florida public records. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs. 7-8 and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Usurping Legal Authority by violating Mason’s first amendment right to petition the government. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs. 8 and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Using unauthenticated and irrelevant email to support a decision to dismiss the complaint or lawsuit. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs. 7-8 and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
the District Court failed to properly manage this case, Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs. 28-30, and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Mismanagement of discovery. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs. 19-25, and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Allowing scores of motions and filings to languish without being decided. Appellant’s Initial Brief, pgs. 28-30, and Appellant’s Reply Brief, pg .
Compare Judge Graham’s behavior to the district judge in Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corporation, 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) where the district judge, Judge Duross Fitzpatrick, Middle District of Georgia, was excoriated for mismanagement. This case involved the district court’s failure to resolve discovery disputes and failure to decide motions. “Failure to consider and rule on significant pretrial motions before issuing dispositive orders can be an abuse of discretion.” Chudasama, supra.
See Opinion, pg. 10, Microsoft Word, PDF.
The Appellees’ response was the fairly typical condescending response that “he merely disagrees” with the district judge’s orders.
As support for his assertions, Mason states that “the Magistrate and the District Judge have been guilty of lying, misconduct, misfeasance, and malfeasance.” (Initial Brief, p. 31). However, as is patently clear from his Initial Brief, Mason predicates such an egregious attack on the character of the District Judges solely on the basis of his disagreement with them as to the legal issues involved in this matter. (Initial Brief, p. 31-33).18 As the mere disagreement regarding a Judge’s handling of a case is insufficient to establish the grounds necessary to compel disqualification, Mason’s argument in this regard is without merit. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It is well settled that the allegation of bias must show that the bias is personal as distinguished from judicial in nature'”).
Appellees’ Brief, pgs. 41-2. The Appellees do not argue against the specific facts that were raised by Mason to support disqualification.
How is your confidence today Roos [sic]? You guys have a tiger by the tail. I’d appreciate any comments you may have.
I want Carl Cool fired. You have never liked Carl Cool, yet you and him have an unholy alliance.
See Appellees’ Brief, pgs. 6-8. The Appellees made no legal argument with respect to the authentication and relevancy of these emails.
Mason argued that the preliminary injunctions, (DE #201), (DE #246), that led to the dismissal of the case were illegal for a host of reasons.
“Moreover, the magistrate judge and district court attempted to clarify with Mason that the Orders were not injunctions, but rather necessary for the orderly litigation of the case.” pg. 10.
Lastly, Mason’s contention that the Magistrate Judge lacked authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) to issue the Orders preventing him from making direct, undesired contact with Appellees as the Orders constitute injunctive relief is likewise without merit. As explicitly noted by the Magistrate Judge in the Orders at issue, the District Court considered the request for relief in this regard as a discovery matter and not as a matter involving injunctive relief. As the Magistrate Judge clearly possesses the authority to decide pre-trial discovery matters, the Orders at issue in this case were proper. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(A).
See Appellees’ Brief, pgs. 31-32.
[W]ith regard to his requests for relief from the order granting the defendants motions for preliminary injunction. which the court construed as a preliminary discovery motion. Mason has an alternative remedy. Me may either comply with the district courts discovery order and challenge it on appeal from the final judgment. or refuse to comply with the order and challenge its validity if cited for contempt. See Rouse Constr. Int’l. Inc. v. Rouse Constr. Corp., 680 F.2d 743, 745 (11th Cir. 1983).
See Opinion Case No. 01-11305.
The Eleventh Circuit accomplished the logically impossible by using an order rendered on September 20, 2001 to justify the dismissal of case that was closed or dismissed on June 20, 2001. On September 20, 2001, or three months after the Notice of Appeal had been filed, Judge Graham rendered a pre-filing injunction sua sponte, or on his motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte . The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 25, 2001. (Docket Entry 795).
It is well settled that sua sponte issued pre-filing injunctions are void because they violate due process. See Case Law Authority on Pre-filing Injunctions. This sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction played a critical role in this appeal for two reasons. Firstly, as will be illustrated below, the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s brief for arguing against this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction in his brief because they claimed it was “beyond the scope of appeal”. Secondly, after having struck Mason’s for brief for arguing against this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, the Eleventh Circuit then uses the very same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction to affirm Judge Graham in its opinion.
The Eleventh Circuit used two orders of Judge Graham that it deemed beyond the scope of appeal to affirm Judge Graham. Document Number 878, the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction rendered on September 20, 2001 and Document No. 900, R19-900-7, . Document No. 900 is an order to show cause that was issued on March 22, 2002, or six months after the Notice of Appeal was filed on June 25, 2001. Document No. 900 is referenced at page 12 of the Opinion.
See Opinion, pgs. 13-14, Microsoft Word, PDF. This is a clear reference to the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. (Doc. 878).
Appellant’s motion to strike Appellees’ brief is GRANTED IN PART to the extent that Appellees cite to the District Court’s September 20, 2001, Omnibus Order, as that order is outside the scope of this appeal. This Court will disregard any references in Appellees’ brief to matters outside the scope of this appeal.
We need not decide, however, whether the conduct of World Thrust’s lawyers was contumacious because the district court failed to make the necessary finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice in this instance, as required in the second prong of the inquiry. “Although we occasionally have found implicit in an order the conclusion that ‘lesser sanctions would not suffice’, we have never suggested that the district court need not make that finding, which is essential before a party can be penalized for his attorney’s misconduct.” Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-op of Florida, 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). This court has only inferred such a finding “where lesser sanctions would have ‘greatly prejudiced’ defendants.” Kilgo, 983 F.2d at 193 (quoting Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir.1985)). Because we cannot envision how the appellees would have been greatly prejudiced through the imposition of lesser sanctions, we refuse to infer a finding that lesser sanctions would not have sufficed in this case.
Mason made the argument that the government defendants were not and could not be prejudiced by the out of court communications with it by Mason.
Mason filed his PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO R&R (DE # 766) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT that specifically mentioned World Thrust v. Intern. Family Entertainment, 41 F.3d 1454, 1456-7 (11th Cir. 1995 and the Eleventh Circuit’s requirements under Rule 41(b). However, Judge Graham simply adopted the R&R and ignored Mason’s citation to law and World Thrust. See (D.E. 791).
The Eleventh Circuit chose Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983) as its legal standard for a Rule 41(b) dismissal. It is interesting to note that the Eleventh Circuit chose Jones, a case 16 years older than the World Thrust case, the case cited by Mason. Moreover, World Thrust discusses the importance of the two prongs that must be met to support a Rule 41(b) dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit does not state how the Appellees would have been greatly prejudiced with a lesser sanction than dismissal.
The Apellees cited Gratton v. Great Am. Communs., 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) in support of their argument that a Rule 41(b) dismissal was justified. Gratton is distinguishable from the instant case for two reasons. Firstly, the plaintiff in Gratton obstructed discovery to the prejudice of the Defendant. There is no such allegation in the instant case. Secondly, and more importantly, the district court in Gratton made an explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice. The Appellees made no argument in their brief that they would have been greatly prejudiced by a lesser sanction than dismissal.
See this site, post entitled ““Teflon Don” Avoids Reversal While Colleague Judge Ursula Ungaro-Benages Suffers Reversal“.
The Appellees used the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 in their brief to support their notion that the case was properly dismissed. See Appellees’ Brief, pgs. 19-20. They make no argument regarding the legality of this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction.
Mason filed a motion for rehearing specifically enumerating items the Court failed to consider in its unpublished opinion. See Motion For Rehearing. On January 31, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit simply denied the motion and took no further action. “The petition(s) for rehearing filed by appellant, Marcellus M. Mason, Jr., is DENIED.” Order Denying Rehearing. This order was signed by Judge Stanley F. Birch.
Marcellus M. Mason, Jr. of Sebring, Fl. filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against the Highlands County Board of County Commissioners and Heartland Library Cooperative and other governmental entities and individual government employees in February 1999. The case was originally assigned to then Chief Judge Edward Davis who retired. On February 20, 1999, Judge Davis allowed Mason to proceed in forma pauperis, “IFP”, or to proceed without paying the required filing fee for a lawsuit. Docket Entry No. 3. This case was ultimately assigned to Judge Donald L. Graham and Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr., Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch. After protracted litigation, the case was dismissed, not on the merits of the case, but based upon banned and irrelevant out of court constitutionally protected and legal communications between Highlands County and Mason. “R&R” (D.E. 766), Order adopting R&R (D.E 791). See Banned Communications.

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