Source: https://lawmostly.com/2018/10/24/supreme-court-shakes-up-immigration-law-on-the-rights-of-settled-children-appeal-7-year-rule-conession-exception-human-rights-uk-home-office/?replytocom=661
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:48:32+00:00

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Supreme Court shakes up immigration law on the rights of settled children 👏🏽 – Law, mostly.
The UK Supreme Court has given judgment in the landmark child rights case of KO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 53. In this post, I provide an overview of prior decisions and analyse the court’s judgment in some detail. To skip to the key points, use the contents box below.
8 What does it all mean?
The road to KO has been paved by a over decade of legislative changes aimed at bringing domestic law into line with the UK’s international law obligations, and the welter of cases (and confusion) that followed.
1. In all actions concerning children… the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
When the UK first ratified the UNCRC in 1991, it entered a reservation regarding its immigration functions. By 2008, the UK had dropped this reservation. Thus section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (‘BCIA 2009’) placed the government under a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when operating immigration controls (also known as chilren’s ‘best interests’).
In line with the above, the courts have held that in all immigration decisions that affect children, the child’s best interests must be assessed as ‘a primary consideration‘ that carries substantial weight, but that may be nevertheless outweighed by other compelling factors (ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 4 at § 33 and 44).
Importantly, ZH (Tanzania) held that when conducting the best interests assessment, children should not be held responsible for the actions of their parents (§ 44).
Although later Supreme Court cases asknowledged that factors such as nationality would be relevant to the strength of the child’s human rights claim, the principles from ZH (Tanzania) were re-affirmed in Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 74 at § 10.
The Court of Appeal developed a more restrictive branch of case law.
In EV (Philippines) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 874, the Court of Appeal applied ZH (Tanzania) and held that the best interests of children should be determined by reference to the child alone, without reference to the immigration history or status of either parent in non-criminal cases (§ 34, per Lord Justice Clarke).
On 28 July 2014, Parliament installed a new human rights framework in Part 5A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as amended). This was an attempt to set tidy things up through a statutory code that applied to immigration appeals that raised the right to family or private life under Article 8 of the European Convention. The idea was that Judges should adopt a more consistent approach in this area. It has not been a roaring success.
Over the next 4 years, as the Upper Tribunal tied itself up in ever more artisanal-legal knots over the meaning of this framework, the Court of Appeal maintained the restrictive approach sketched out in EV (Philippines).
So in MM (Uganda) & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 617, a deportation case concerning a ‘foreign criminal’, Lord Justice Laws held that when considering the harshness of the removal on the deportee’s children and/or partner, decision-makers must take into account the seriousness of the deportee’s offending and immigration history along with any other relevant circumstances (§ 24). That is because Part 5A, when read as a whole, emphasises the important public interest in deporting foreign criminals (§§ 23 and 24).
MM was applied by the Court of Appeal in the non-criminal case of MA (Pakistan) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 705. On the plus-side, MA held that the fact that the child has been in the UK for 7 years should be given significant weight by the Tribunal, and that leave should be granted unless there are ‘powerful reasons to the contrary’ (§ 49). However, Lord Justice Elias giving the lead judgment, found that the conduct and immigration history of a child’s parents were relevant factors when considering whether or not it would be reasonable to expect a child to leave the UK (§ 45).
None of these cases have attempted to resolve the apparent conflict between the case law on the best interests of children and the approach that has been adopted by the Court of Appeal court since EV (Philippines).
Whether a court or tribunal, when considering the public interest in deportation, should take into account parental misconduct when assessing whether the effect of deportation on a child (with whom the foreign criminal has a parental relationship) is ‘unduly harsh‘ under s.117C(5) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 / para 399 of the Immigration Rules.
Lord Carnwath gives the unanimous judgment of the 5 judge panel, in the court’s first decision on the operation of the human rights framework in Part 5A of the 2002 Act.
The appellants argued that the conduct of parents should not be considered when assessing whether it is reasonable for a child to be required to leave the UK or (in criminal cases) whether deportation of their parent was ‘unduly harsh’. The government argued that the framework required Judges to balance the impact on the child against the public interest in removing the parent.
On its face, the 7-year rule contained in paragraph 276ADE(1)(iv) which settled children can rely upon does not require consideration of parental misconduct. Section 117B(6), which parents of such children may rely upon, also does not refer to parental misconduct. Both tests focus on what is reasonable for the child.
However, inevitably, there must be consideration of whether the parents are expected to be located, ie. whether or not they are unlawfully present in the UK (§ 18).
In any event, is it unreasonable to require the child to leave the UK with the departing parent/s?
Lord Carnwath approves of the approach in EV (Philippines), and disagrees with Lord Justice Elias’ comments to the contrary in MA (Pakistan) at § 40.
…the structure is not entirely easy to follow. It starts with the general rules (1) that deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest, and (2) that the more serious the offence the greater that interest. There is however no express indication as to how or at what stage of the process those general rules are to be given effect.
The exception to the public interest in deportation of ‘foreign criminals’ that applies to settled children requires consideration of whether the effect of deportation is ‘unduly harsh’ on a settled child. The court concludes that Exception 2 is self-contained. It does not require decision-makers to take into account the relative severity of the parent’s offence as section 117C(2) might suggest (§ 23). The length of sentence is only relevant in deteriming whether Exceptions 1 and/or 2 apply.
…the tribunal is asked to decide whether consequences which are deemed unduly harsh for the son of an insurance fraudster may be acceptably harsh for the son of a drug-dealer. Quite apart from the difficulty of reaching a rational judicial conclusion on such a question, it seems to me in direct conflict with the Zoumbas principle that the child should not be held responsible for the conduct of the parent.
The individual appeals were dismissed following discussion of the principles laid out above. Lastly, the court observed that it would have been preferable for suitable appeals to ‘leapfrog’ from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal in order to avoid protracted disagreements at both levels.
When deciding whether the impact of deportation is ‘unduly harsh’ on a child (under section 117C(5)), the focus must be on the child. The gravity of a parent’s criminal offending is not relevant at that stage.
This is a nuanced decision which partly allows parental misconduct such as immigration history to be considered (under the 7-year rule), but excludes parental misconduct from the framework of exceptions to deportation. That may seem counter-intuitive but it is based upon the court’s careful reading of the language of the rules and the statute.
It is welcome to see the court re-affirm the importance of the principle that children should not be held responsible for the conduct of their parents, but in some cases, my view is that KO (Nigeria) may have just that effect and provides little re-assurance for those parents who have over-stayed or otherwise ceased to have visas.
There remains an unresolved tension at the heart of these cases, as Lady Hale first identified in ZH.
It may not have been the court’s intention, but I can see some confusion arising from KO (Nigeria) given that the two tests in non-criminal and criminal cases pull in very different directions. I hope my attempt to extract the key points in this post offers some clarity.
Will this case effect Toeic victims too on there in country remedy after ehsan,s case?
This case is relevant for cases involving children and yes that may include cases where parents are accused of TOEIC fraud (though not really relevant for out of country appeals). Unfortunately that is likely to be indirectly relevant to whether it is reasonable to expect a settled child to leave the UK, but nevertheless a child should be blameless.

References: UKSC 
 UKSC 
 § 33
 UKSC 
 § 10
 EWCA 
 EWCA 
 EWCA 
 § 40