Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/category/bcsc-civil-rule-9
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:53:35+00:00

Document:
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, ordering a Plaintiff to pay double costs after the dismissal of an injury claim.
In today’s case (Ross v. Andrews) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2011 collision, alleged injury and sued for damages. Prior to trial the Plaintiff declined two formal settlement offers, the first for $41,000 the second for $75,000.
After 15 days of trial “the jury deliberated and determined that the plaintiff had not been injured in the motor vehicle accident”.
20] The evidence aforesaid created significant areas where the credibility of the plaintiff was subject to negative findings by a jury. When those areas are added together the plaintiff ought to have actively considered any offer which offered a positive return without the risks of a trial.
 Based on a review of the evidence at trial, described in part above, and the cases cited, as well as a review of the submissions of counsel, I find that the offer to settle in the amount of $75,000 ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff having given consideration to the foreseeable credibility problems and the negative verdict of the jury. The offers to settle both included positive returns whereas at trial the plaintiff’s action was dismissed. The relative financial circumstances of the parties do not preclude an order for double costs in this situation. As a result, applying Rule 9-1 of the Supreme Court Rules, the defendants are entitled to the costs of this action generally and double costs of this action commencing on May 26, 2016. This date is seven days after the second offer to settle was delivered to the plaintiff; a reasonable period of time for the plaintiff to consider the offer. Double costs are awarded from May 26, 2016 until the end of the trial and will include the costs of the application to fix costs. The defendants are also entitled to disbursements but not doubled.
 If the parties are unable to agree on the quantum of costs and disbursements, there shall be a reference to the registrar to assess costs pursuant to Rule 14-1(4) of the Supreme Court Rules.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, stripping a Plaintiff of post offer costs after receiving a jury award less than a pre-trial defence settlement offer.
In today’s case (Rutter v. Vadnais) the Plaintiff was injured and sued for damages. About 2 years prior to trial the Defendant offered to settle for $50,000. The offer was rejected and at trial a jury awarded global damages of $20,000.
(d) if the offer was made by a defendant and the judgment awarded to the plaintiff was no greater than the amount of the offer to settle, award to the defendant the defendant’s costs in respect of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery or service of the offer to settle.
 Second, while the amount recovered is less than the settlement offer, that is rarely a determinative factor, particularly as jury awards are more difficult to predict than judge assessments (Smagh v. Bumbrah, 2009 BCSC 623 at para. 13).
 The relative financial circumstances are also a neutral factor in this case. Although Ms. Rutter does have some assets, I am not able to say that losing her costs or paying Ms. Vadnais her costs would not have a dramatic financial effect on Ms. Rutter.
 Finally, although the defendant suggests that the history of negotiations between the parties is such that the offer of $50,000 was reasonable in response to the plaintiffs immediately preceding offer of $61,000, I am persuaded by the plaintiff’s response submissions that there were good reasons for her increasing her offer beyond $61,000 “as her retraining exposed her to physical demands of what she could expect to encounter ‘on the ward’ this showed her that her loss was likely to be more than she had previously thought.” The offer of $61,000 was made at the start of her retraining.
 In conclusion, having considered the submissions of the parties and the factors set out in Rule 9-1, the plaintiff will have her costs of the action at Scale B until March 15, 2014, a reasonable time in which to consider the defendant’s offer. The parties will bear their own costs thereafter.
In a demonstration of the judicial flexibility that exists under the BC Supreme Court Rules when assessing costs consequences following trials with formal offers in place, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff full costs despite failing to beat a Defense formal settlement offer.
In today’s case (Anderson v. Kozniuk) the Plaintiff was involved in a pedestrian/vehicle collision. Both parties were found partially at fault. The Plaintiff suffered various physical injuries but also advanced a brain injury claim which was not accepted at trial. Prior to trial ICBC issued a formal settlement offer of $125,000. At trial the Plaintiff’s damages were assessed at $78,897 less 30% to reflect the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
 The plaintiff submitted that the award of costs in this case exceeds the total amount of the judgment. In his written submissions, the plaintiff states that “[i]f the court orders that the Plaintiff is to pay costs to ICBC, it means that Mr. Anderson must pay the entire judgment award to ICBC, instead of spending this money on his health condition and prognosis.” I agree that is a significant factor if the court is to be mindful that costs awards should not punish plaintiffs from taking forward meritorious claims, as discussed above.
 The plaintiff also says that the defendant was defended and funded by the insurer, whereas Mr. Anderson is impecunious having lost the ability to work, and previous cases have held this is a proper consideration: Smith v. Tedford, 2010 BCCA 302; Hunter v. Chandler, 2010 BCSC 1124 at paras. 23-25; Gregory v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2010 BCSC 1369 at para. 9; andMartin v. Lavigne at para. 23. I agree. Although there was no evidence before me about Mr. Anderson’s impecuniosity, I have no reason to doubt counsel’s word. Certainly at trial the evidence was consistent with counsel’s statement.
 Based on these factors (and all others), the plaintiff submits it would be unfair and unreasonable that the plaintiff be ordered to pay costs to the defendant.
 Finally, the plaintiff points to other factors that he says are relevant to the court’s exercise of discretion. He points out that two expert doctors did conclude that he suffered a brain injury. He also says it was not disputed that after the accident he displayed a number of characteristics consistent with having suffered a brain injury, including the fact that he had a flat affect and his behaviour around his family was different, as well as showing increased irritability, frustration and anger. The plaintiff also points out that the brain scans clearly show that he had brain lesions consistent with a brain injury. The plaintiff had increased difficulties with concentration and learning new tasks. Although I made a finding that both his alcohol consumption and anxiety had significant impacts on his life following the accident, the plaintiff suggests he should not be faulted for failing to guess that those factors would be essentially held against him when making a conclusion about whether he had a brain injury or not.
 The award of costs is an exercise of the court’s discretion, guided by the legal principles identified above. This is not an exercise of counting up which factors favour which party and doing a mathematical calculation. The court must take into account all of the factors weighed against the circumstances of the case. Remembering that ultimately the result must not impose injustice or unfairness on either party, I exercise my discretion and conclude the normal rule of apportionment does not apply and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to 100% of his costs at trial. Because he has been successful on this application, I also award him the costs of this hearing.
Adding to this site’s database of ICBC Unidentified Motorist prosecutions, reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, finding that the Summary Judgement rule cannot be used to determine if a plaintiff made all reasonable efforts to identify the at fault driver which is a prerequisite to a successful unidentified motorist prosecution.
 The issue in this appeal is purely a legal one. The standard of review is therefore correctness: Ralph’s Auto Supply (B.C.) Ltd. v. Ken Ransford Holding Ltd., 2011 BCSC 999, at para. 7.
 I do not agree with the plaintiff’s argument which artificially separates the cause of action against the unknown driver or owner from the claim against ICBC. Although it is common practice to name John Does as substitutes for the driver and owner, the section does not require that; an action may be brought against ICBC only. It is obvious that there is no John Doe to serve and no default judgment can be taken against the unknown driver or owner. ICBC is fully in control of the defence until the time of judgment or the driver or owner is found. I do not think there is a separate claim against under ICBC under s. 24 as the plaintiff maintains.
 Therefore, a decision on s. 24(5) alone is not determinative of a claim and cannot result in a judgment; it is only a decision on an issue. On the basis of Century Services, it is therefore not amenable to a Rule 9-6 application.
 That is sufficient to allow the appeal but there is a further related point (not argued by ICBC) which reinforces this conclusion. The obligation to attempt to locate the driver or owner is a continuing one in this sense: if facts come to light that make the identity ascertainable, the plaintiff is no doubt obligated to follow up on that information. And, if the identities become known, section 24(6) provides that the driver or owner must to be substituted for ICBC in spite of any limitation period. The wording of section 24(5) is that “a judgment against the corporation must not be given unless the court is satisfied that…”. This contemplates a single judgment.
 I therefore do not think that a separate decision on section 24(5) can be made in advance of a decision on liability as a whole. Put another way, the time at which the court must be satisfied as to the factors in s. 24(5) is the time of the determination of liability for the accident. The opposite interpretation would allow for a scenario where s. 24(5) is determined in favour of a plaintiff, and the driver becomes known before the trial on liability. It would then make the substitution for ICBC impossible as the matter would be res judicata.
 I therefore allow the appeal.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, highlighting the judicial flexibility and potential financial risks that come into play when a formal offer of settlement is not beat at trial.
In today’s case (Park v. Targonski) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages. Prior to trial the Defendants made a formal offer of $321,407. The Plaintiff declined this offer and proceeded to trial where she was awarded $302,643 after applicable statutory deductions.
The Defendants asked the Court to strip the Plaintiff of her post offer costs and disbursements of $56,207 and further to pay the Defendants’ post offer costs and disbursements of $63,769.
 Upon consideration of the above-noted factors, as well as the overall purpose of the rules respecting formal offers, I conclude that, pursuant to Rule 9-1(6)(a), the plaintiff shall have her costs at Scale B up to the date of the offer to settle, but not thereafter. The costs sanction to the plaintiff arising from this order is significant. She will be denied her costs and disbursements totaling $56,207 from the date of service of the offer to settle.
 I have given close consideration to whether the defendants should be awarded all or a portion of their costs for steps taken in the proceeding after service of the offer to settle pursuant to Rule 9-1(6)(d). Balancing the applicable considerations as best I can, I have determined not to make this order. In my view, it is unnecessary to make this order to give effect to the purposes underlying the rule. More importantly, and for the reasons already given, doing so in this case would visit upon the plaintiff an unduly punitive sanction – one that fails to give any weight: (1) to the challenges associated with forecasting how a court might assess her loss of future earning capacity claim; and (2) to the plaintiff’s compromised ability to accurately evaluate her own situation.
 The parties will bear their own costs arising out of this application.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.