Source: https://www.nlsinfo.org/bibliography/search/author=Jin%2C+Ginger+Zhe
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:16:06+00:00

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NBER Working Paper No. W7670, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2000.
In this paper, we examine the empirical implications of reputation formation using a game-theoretic model of intra-familial interactions. We consider parental reputation in repeated two-stage games in which daughters' decision to have a child as a teenager and the willingness of parents to continue to house and support their daughters given their decisions. Drawing on the work of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) on reputation in repeated games, we show that parents have, under certain conditions, the incentive to penalize teenage (and typically out-of-wedlock) childbearing of older daughters, in order to get the younger daughters to avoid teenage childbearing. The two key empirical implications of this model is that the likelihood of teenage childbearing and parental transfers to a daughter who had a teen birth will decrease with the number of the daughter's sisters at risk. We test these two implications, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), exploiting the availability of repeated observations on young women (daughters) and of observations on multiple daughters (sisters) available in this data. Controlling for daughter- and family-specific fixed effects, we find evidence of differential parental financial transfer responses to teenage childbearing by the number of the daughter's sisters and brothers at risk.
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz and Ginger Zhe Jin. "Games Daughters and Parents Play: Teenage Childbearing, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers." NBER Working Paper No. W7670, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2000.
JCPR Working Paper 167, Joint Center for Poverty Research, Northwestern University/University of Chicago, April 2000.
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz and Ginger Zhe Jin. "Games Daughters and Parents Play: Teenage Childbearing, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers." JCPR Working Paper 167, Joint Center for Poverty Research, Northwestern University/University of Chicago, April 2000.
CCPR-05-00, On-Line Working Paper Series, California Center for Population Research, University of California - Los Angeles, November 2000.
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz and Ginger Zhe Jin. "Games Daughters and Parents Play: Teenage Childbearing, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers." CCPR-05-00, On-Line Working Paper Series, California Center for Population Research, University of California - Los Angeles, November 2000.
This paper examines reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. We consider parental reputation in a repeated two-stage game in which adolescents decide whether to give a teen birth or drop out of high school, and given adolescent decisions, the parent decides whether to house and support his children beyond age 18. Drawing on the work of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that the parent has, under certain conditions, the incentive to penalize older children for their teenage risky behaviors in order to dissuade the younger children from the same risky behaviors. The model generates two empirical implications: the likelihood of teen risky behaviors and parental transfers to a child who engaged in teen risky behaviors will decrease with the number of remaining children at risk. We test these two implications, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79). Exploiting the availability of repeated observations on individual respondents and of observations on multiple siblings, we find evidence in favor of both predictions.
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz and Ginger Zhe Jin. "Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers." Working Paper, Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, January 2005.
NBER Working Paper No. 11872, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz and Ginger Zhe Jin. "Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers." NBER Working Paper No. 11872, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.
Economic Journal 118,528 (April 2008): 515-555.
This article examines parental reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. In a repeated two stage game, children decide whether to drop out of high school or daughters decide whether to have births as teens and parents then decide whether to provide support to their children beyond age 18. Drawing on Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that, under certain conditions, parents have the incentive to penalise older children for their adolescent risk-taking behaviour in order to dissuade their younger children from such behaviour when reaching adolescence. We find evidence in favour of this parental reputation model.
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz and Ginger Zhe Jin. "Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviour, Parental Reputation and Strategic Transfers." Economic Journal 118,528 (April 2008): 515-555.
This paper considers a model of a two-stage non-cooperative game. In this game, daughters decide whether to have an early birth and parents decide whether to provide or withhold resources (transfers) to them, but there is conflict between parents and daughters over teenage childbearing. Using data from the NLSY, we show that parents have an incentive to act strategically by differentially treating the childbearing behavior of older versus young daughters in an attempt to prevent teenage childbearing of younger daughters. The number of remaining younger daughters who are under 19 when parents make decision of transfer reduces the probability of transfers to the daughter in question, conditional on the teenage childbearing status of that daughter. We also show that such a relationship is weaker for black families than white families.
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz and Ginger Zhe Jin. "Games That Families Play: Parental Reputation, Transfers and Teen Childbearing." Presented: New York, NY, Population Association of America Annual Meeting, March 1999.
It is well documented that teenagers engage in risky behaviors at high rates. Usually these behaviors occur without parental consent and teens invest resources to preclude parents from knowing whether and to what extent they engage in such behaviors. This may give rise to parental incentives to learn about their children by paying close attention to observable "signals" of the underlying risky behavior. Moreover, parents can set up parenting rules which are contingent upon the realization of these signals in an effort to control the behavior of their children. We explore a game theoretic model of parent-child interactions and propose an empirical strategy to identify the equilibrium reaction functions that determine teenagers' risky behavior and parenting rules. In preliminary work, we estimate approximations to these reaction functions using data on teens' risky behavior and stringency of parental rules from the National Longitudinal Survey - Young Adults (NLS-YA).
Hao, Lingxin, V. Joseph Hotz, Ginger Zhe Jin and Juan Pantano. "Parental Learning and Teenagers' Risky Behavior." Presented: Detroit, MI, Population Association of America Meetings, April-May 2009.

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