Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/phillips-v-san-luis-obispo-county-dept
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:09:24+00:00

Document:
Country of Origin: United States Court Name: California Court of Appeals Primary Citation: 228 Cal.Rptr. 101 Cal.App. (2 Dist.,1986) Date of Decision: Tuesday, July 15, 1986 Jurisdiction Level: California Alternate Citation: 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986) Judges: concur. J. GILBERT Associate Justice; STONE P.J. and ABBE Attorneys: George & Collins, a Law Corp. and Shaunna Sullivan, Los Osos, for petitioners and appellants. Joyce S.A. Tischler, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Oakland, amicus for petitioners and appellants. James B. Lindholm, Jr., County Counsel, Jac A. Crawford, Asst. County Counsel and John Paul Daly, Deputy County Counsel, San Luis Obispo, for respondents.
This is a death penalty case. We reverse. Missy, a female black Labrador, shall live, and "go out in the midday sun."
Petitioners Susan, Russell and Mary Phillips appeal the judgment of the trial court denying their petition for a writ of mandamus. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085.) We reverse the judgment and hold that an ordinance permitting the county to destroy a dog without a noticed hearing to the dog owner who requests one is constitutionally infirm.
We resist the temptation that grabbed hold of our colleagues who have written dog opinions, and will not try to dig up appropriate sobriquets. You will not read about "unmuzzled liberty." Nor will you consider an argument "dogmatically asserted," or cringe with "we con-cur." (In re Ackerman (1907) 6 Cal.App. 5, 91 P. 429.) We will not subject you to phrases such as "barking up the wrong tree." (Romero v. County of Santa Clara (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 700, 704, 83 Cal.Rptr. 758.) We disavow doggerel.
The Phillips own "Missy." In 1981 and twice again in 1982, the San Luis Obispo County Department of Animal Regulation (the department) received reports that Missy bit a child. These incidents occurred while Missy lived with Mary Phillips in Morro Bay. After the third report, the department directed Mrs. Phillips to confine Missy to an enclosed kennel run.
In May 1985 Mrs. Phillips entered the hospital for surgery and surrendered Missy to the care of her son and daughter-in-law in Atascadero. On May 20 Missy bit a child entering the Phillips' residence to play. The child's mother, a registered nurse, observed a single puncture wound on the child's buttocks. The department seized Missy three days later and on the following day ordered Missy destroyed.
The Phillips demanded a hearing concerning the destruction order. The director of the department believed that the Atascadero City and San Luis Obispo County ordinances [FN1] did not permit a dog owner to appeal a destruction order. As an epilogue to this tale of two cities, Steve Carnes, a county environmental health officer, conducted a "courtesy" hearing at the request of a county supervisor to determine Missy's fate.
FN1. The San Luis Obispo Department of Animal Regulation provided animal control services to the City of Atascadero. Atascadero City Code section 4-1.212 and San Luis Obispo County Code section 9.08.130 were identical and provided in part: "If any dog within the City is known to have bitten any person or persons on at least two separate occasions, the Chief Animal Control Officer shall notify the owner or person having control of such dog to so keep or surrender the dog in such manner as the Chief Animal Control Officer shall direct. If it is determined by the Chief Animal Control Officer that the dog cannot be properly controlled in order to ensure public safety, then the Chief Animal Control Officer shall destroy the dog in a humane manner. [¶] If any dog within the City is determined by the Chief Animal Control Officer to be vicious and dangerous to the safety of any person or persons, the Chief Animal Control Officer shall notify the owner or person having control of such dog to keep or surrender the dog in such manner as the Chief Animal Control Officer shall direct. If it is determined by the Chief Animal Control Officer that the dog cannot be properly controlled in order to ensure public safety, the Chief Animal Control Officer shall destroy the dog in a humane manner."
The department sought to prove the first three biting incidents by testimony that the records reflected reports of three bites. The victim and her mother testified as to the fourth bite. The Phillips acknowledged paying medical bills for the first and third bites. The hearing officer concluded that Missy had bitten four children and that she should be destroyed.
The Phillips filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the court vacate the destruction order and declare the ordinances unconstitutional because they fail to provide notice and a hearing before permitting a destruction order. The trial judge agreed that the ordinances did not expressly provide for notice and a hearing. He found, however, that the requirement of a hearing could be implied from the language of the ordinances and that the hearing afforded the Phillips satisfied due process and produced sufficient evidence to support Missy's condemnation.
any person, the district attorney, or city attorney may bring an action in the municipal court against the owner of the animal to determine whether conditions of the treatment or confinement of the dog or other circumstances existing at the time of the bites have been changed so as to remove the danger to other persons presented by such animal. This action shall be brought in the county where a bite occurred. The court, after hearing, may make any order it deems appropriate to prevent the recurrence of such an incident, including, but not limited to, the removal of the animal from the area or its destruction if necessary. [¶] ........................... [¶] (e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent legislation in the field of dog control by any city, county, or city and county."
The County unleashes an argument that Atascadero City ordinance 4-1.207, providing a hearing regarding the lawfulness of impound, offered the Phillips a hearing on Missy's condemnation. The relevant portion of that ordinance provides in part: "No fees whatsoever shall be charged or collected for or on account of any dog which has been unlawfully taken up or impounded. If the owner or person entitled to the custody of the dog believes that the dog has been unlawfully taken up or impounded, that owner or person may, within the seventy-two (72) hour redemption period, request that an impartial hearing be conducted to determine the sole issue of whether the dog was lawfully seized and impounded ..." This argument strays from the point. Section 4-1.207 is not pertinent.
We agree with the trial judge that ordinance 4-1.207 concerns stray or trespassing dogs and not the legality of an order of destruction. Subdivision (b) concerns the collection of fees from the owner of an unlawfully impounded dog. Moreover, the placement of this ordinance within the code suggests that it applies to stray dogs (Ord. 4-1.201) and dogs at large (Ord. 4-1.204) and not vicious or biting dogs. Therefore, we must bury this argument. It does not concern the destruction of a vicious dog because he cannot be controlled in order to ensure public safety.
We also disagree with the County that Simpson v. City of Los Angeles (1953) 40 Cal.2d 271, 253 P.2d 464 legitimizes the County's actions regarding Missy. Simpson involved the constitutionality of a vivisection ordinance permitting the Department of Animal Regulation to donate unclaimed animals to medical research laboratories. (Simpson, at pp. 275-276, 253 P.2d 464.) Simpson approved the ordinance and held that "... when dogs have been lawfully impounded under the police power and have become subject to disposition under the terms of the ordinance by any of the means noted above, private property rights in such dogs, must, in the interest of public welfare, be treated as having been terminated." (Id., at pp. 279-280, 253 P.2d 464; emphasis added.) We think that our Supreme Court limited its holding to dogs "subject to disposition" under the factual circumstances of that case--stray dogs whose owners have not claimed them for five days. In contrast, the Phillips have claimed ownership of Missy, vigorously contested the seizure and destruction order, and have demanded a hearing since officials seized Missy.
It is obvious that summary seizure of dogs must be permitted when of immediate danger to the public, as for example when the dog is vicious or rabid. In that situation, the governmental interest in protecting the personal and property rights of others is paramount to the property right of the dog owner. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance or statute justifying seizure rests upon its provision for a prompt postseizure hearing. (Kash, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 308, 138 Cal.Rptr. 53, 562 P.2d 1302; Carrera, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 729, 134 Cal.Rptr. 14.) Ordinance 4- 1.212 does not provide for a hearing either before or after the taking of a biting or vicious dog.
The Phillips contend that the requirement of a hearing cannot be implied from the ordinance permitting the destruction of uncontrollable biting or vicious dogs. (Footnote 1, supra.) The trial judge found that the ordinance required the department to make two determinations: first, that a dog has either bitten two persons or is vicious and dangerous; and second, that the dog "cannot be properly controlled." The judge concluded that the second finding implied notice and hearing. (Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 40 Cal.2d at pp. 281-282, 253 P.2d 464.) We disagree with this analysis.
Our Supreme Court in Simpson concluded that the necessity of a hearing could be implied from that portion of the ordinance providing: "No fees whatsoever shall be charged or collected for or on account of any animal which has been unlawfully taken up or impounded, and any such animal shall be immediately delivered upon demand therefor to the owner or person entitled to the custody thereof." (pp. 281-282, 253 P.2d 464.) The requirement of a hearing could be implied from the phrase requiring return of unlawfully seized animals. (Carrera v. Bertaini, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d 721, 730, 134 Cal.Rptr. 14.) Although it is proper to read a legislative command for a hearing into a statute, there must be some language from which that requirement can be inferred. (Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 154, 168, 79 Cal.Rptr. 23.) Here the ordinance does not provide for the return of a dog and there is no room to imply the necessity of a hearing.
The Phillips also contend that the courtesy hearing that they received does not satisfy due process. They cite well established law that the statute or ordinance itself must provide for notice and a hearing and that a gratuitous hearing does not cure a deficient law. (Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works (1915) 237 U.S. 413, 424-425, 35 S.Ct. 625, 629, 59 L.Ed. 1027; Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 19 Cal.3d 294, 307, fn. 7, 138 Cal.Rptr. 53, 562 P.2d 1302.) This argument has merit.
It is irrelevant that the question may have been fairly decided by a courtesy hearing or that the plaintiff lacks a defense on the merits. (Coe, supra, at p. 424, 35 S.Ct. at p. 629; Carrera, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 727, 134 P.2d 14; Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc., supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at pp. 166-167, 79 Cal.Rptr. 23.) In Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc., supra, plaintiff received a hearing "after a fashion." (Id., p. 167, 79 Cal.Rptr. 23.) Nevertheless, this was held insufficient: " 'The rule is well settled that to constitute due process of law in regard to the taking of property the statute should give the parties interested some adequate remedy for the vindication of their rights [Citation.].' " (Ibid.) A provision in the statute or ordinance providing a hearing ensures that the response of the administrative entity will be a settled and uniform, and not an haphazard, procedure.
FN3. See The Hollow Men (1925), with apologies to T.S. Eliot.
The Phillips are entitled to the immediate return of Missy.
The judgment is reversed. Petitioners are entitled to costs on appeal.

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