Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/312/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:45:23+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 312 › Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.
Contempt citations are not proper when a party disregards an order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to submit to a physical examination, even though a federal court has the right to order it.
After an accident in Indiana, Sibbach brought a personal injury claim against Wilson in a federal court in Illinois. After denying the allegations in the complaint, Wilson sought to compel Sibbach to undergo a physical examination, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, which would determine the nature and extent of her harm. The district court granted this order, but Sibbach argued that it was invalid and refused to comply. Indiana courts would have allowed this order, while Illinois courts would not have allowed it. Sibbach was found in contempt for refusing to comply with the order. The lower court ordered her to be committed until she complied with the order for a physical examination.
Congress can set rules that govern the practices and procedures of federal courts, often by delegating authority to them to make these rules. But the authority of Congress does not extend to creating substantive state law. The issue here is whether Rules 35 and 37 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fall within the mandate of Congress to the federal courts. This should be determined according to whether the rules regulate procedure, which can be defined as the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties that are created by a substantive law. These rules are procedural. Refusing to comply with Rule 35 does not result in any invasion of the individual right to be free from invasion of the person or personal restraint, as the plaintiff argues.
The plaintiff did not challenge the treatment of her refusal to comply with the order under Rule 35 as an act of contempt, but Rule 37 creates an exception to punishment for contempt in a situation when a party refuses to obey an order to submit to a physical or mental examination. This means that the plaintiff should not have been held in contempt.
Even though contempt sanctions cannot be imposed for a violation of Rule 35, it still is an impermissible intrusion into the historically protected privacy of individuals.
Rule 35 is applicable only in certain narrow circumstances, generally when a party's mental or physical condition is directly at issue in the action. Its use must be supported by good cause, and it cannot be applied to a non-party. This case shows the most common context in which it appears, although it also may be relevant when a defendant makes an affirmative defense based on a physical or mental deficiency.
1. Congress has power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise it by delegating to the Supreme or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United States. P. 312 U. S. 9.
2. The Act of June 19, 1934, empowering the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the District Courts of the United States in civil actions, was restricted in its operation to matters of pleading, practice, and procedure. P. 312 U. S. 10.
3. Insofar as they are within the authority granted by Congress, the Rules of Civil Procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court under authority of the Act of June 19, 1934, repeal the Conformity Act. P. 312 U. S. 10.
4. Rule 35 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, which provides that, in a suit in which the physical or mental condition of a party is in controversy, the court may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician, held within the authority granted by Congress in the Act of June 19, 1934, and consistent with the limitation of that Act that the rules prescribed shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the "substantive rights" of any litigant. P. 312 U. S. 14.
5. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, and Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172, explained. P. 312 U. S. 11.
6.Rules 35 and 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are rules of procedure, and their prescription did not exceed the authority granted by the Act of June 19, 1934, merely because they involve "important" or "substantial" rights. P. 312 U. S. 13.
7. That Congress reserved the power to examine, before they should become effective, rules proposed pursuant to the Act, and took no adverse action in respect of Rule 35, indicates that no transgression of legislative policy was found. P. 312 U. S. 15.
8. Refusal to obey an order under Rule 35 requiring a party to submit to a physical or mental examination is exempted by Rule 37(b)(2)(iv) from punishment as for a contempt. The remedies for such refusal are those enumerated in Rule 37(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). P. 312 U. S. 16.
9. The action of the District Court in this case, punishing as for contempt a refusal to obey an order under Rule 35 requiring a plaintiff to submit to a physical examination, was such plain error as this Court may notice although not assigned or specified either in the Circuit Court of Appeals or here. P. 312 U. S. 16.
Certiorari, 309 U.S. 650, to review the affirmance of an order committing for contempt.
In an action brought by the petitioner in the District Court for Northern Illinois to recover damages for bodily injuries inflicted in Indiana, respondent answered, denying the allegations of the complaint, and moved for an order requiring the petitioner to submit to a physical examination by one or more physicians appointed by the court to determine the nature and extent of her injuries. The court ordered that the petitioner submit to such an examination by a physician so appointed.
not be punished for contempt. In response, the petitioner challenged the authority of the court to order her to submit to the examination, asserting that the order was void. It appeared that the courts of Indiana, the state where the cause of action arose, hold such an order proper, [Footnote 2] whereas the courts of Illinois, the state in which the trial court sat, hold that such an order cannot be made. [Footnote 3] Neither state has any statute governing the matter.
The Circuit Court of Appeals decided that Rule 35, which authorizes an order for a physical examination in such a case, is valid, and affirmed the judgment. [Footnote 4] The writ of certiorari was granted because of the importance of the question involved.
rights of any litigant. They shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect."
"Sec. 2. The court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both: Provided, however, That, in such union of rules, the right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such united rules shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such session."
"Rule 35. Physical And Mental Examination Of Persons."
"(a) Order for Examination. In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made."
"(a) Refusal to Answer. . . ."
"(1) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer any question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the refusal may be considered a contempt of that court. "
"(2) Other Consequences. If any party . . . refuses to obey . . . an order made under Rule 35 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and, among others, the following:"
"(i) An order that . . . the physical or mental condition of the party . . . shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;"
"(ii) An order . . . prohibiting [the disobedient party] . . . from introducing evidence of physical or mental condition;"
"(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;"
"(iii) An order striking out pleadings or orders or in addition thereto, an order directing the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination."
of Decision Act [Footnote 11] required the District Court, though sitting in Illinois, to apply the law of Indiana, the state where the cause of action arose, and to order the examination. To avoid this dilemma, the petitioner admits, and, we think, correctly, that Rules 35 and 37 are rules of procedure. She insists, nevertheless, that, by the prohibition against abridging substantive rights, Congress has banned the rules here challenged. In order to reach this result, she translates "substantive" into "important" or "substantial" rights. And she urges that, if a rule affects such a right, albeit the rule is one of procedure merely, its prescription is not within the statutory grant of power embodied in the Act of June 19, 1934. She contends that our decisions and recognized principles require us so to hold.
stating that the decision law of Indiana on the subject appeared not to be settled, and that a cited statute of that State was not in point, the court added that the question was not one of the law of Indiana, but of the law of the United States, and that the federal statutes, by their provisions as to proof in actions at law, precluded the application of the Conformity Act. Again, therefore, the opinion recognized that the matter is one of procedure, for both the cited federal statutes, concerning the mode of proof in federal courts, and the Conformity Act, deal solely with procedure.
In the Stetson case, the action was brought in the District Court for New Jersey by a citizen of Pennsylvania who, while a citizen of New Jersey, had been injured in the latter state. A statute of New Jersey authorized the state courts to order a physical examination of a plaintiff in an action for damages pending therein. The District Court refused to order such an examination, on the ground that it lacked power so to do. After a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, assigning the refusal as error. That court certified the question, 104 F. 1004, and this court answered that the District Court had power to order the examination.
In the instant case, we have a rule which, if within the power delegated to this Court, has the force of a federal statute, and neither the Botsford nor the Stetson case is authority for ignoring it.
The remaining case on which petitioner leans is Stack v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 177 Mass. 155, 58 N.E. 686, where the court agreed with the view expressed in the Botsford case that common law practice did not warrant the entry of such an order, and said it was for the legislature, rather than the courts, to alter the practice. But, if Rule 35 is within the authority granted, the federal legislature sanctioned it as controlling all district courts.
The asserted right, moreover, is no more important than many others enjoyed by litigants in District Courts sitting in the several states, before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered and abolished old rights or privileges and created new ones in connection with the conduct of litigation. The suggestion that the rule offends the important right to freedom from invasion of the person ignores the fact that, as we hold, no invasion of freedom from personal restraint attaches to refusal so to comply with its provisions. If we were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the alleged right, we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse confounded. The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure -- the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law, and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them. That the rules in question are such is admitted.
to the Congress so that that body might examine them and veto their going into effect if contrary to the policy of the legislature.
to accompany the final version of the rules. [Footnote 19] That no adverse action was taken by Congress indicates at least that no transgression of legislative policy was found. We conclude that the rules under attack are within the authority granted.
The District Court treated the refusal to comply with its order as a contempt, and committed the petitioner therefor. Neither in the Circuit Court of Appeals nor here was this action assigned as error. We think, however, that, in the light of the provisions of Rule 37, it was plain error of such a fundamental nature that we should notice it. [Footnote 20] Section (b)(2)(iv) of Rule 37 exempts from punishment as for contempt the refusal to obey an order that a party submit to a physical or mental examination. The District Court was in error in going counter to this express exemption. The remedies available under the rule in such a case are those enumerated in Section (b)(2)(i)(ii) and (iii). For this error, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion.
28 U.S.C. following § 723c.
South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60 N.E. 271; Aspy v. Botkins, 160 Ind. 170, 66 N.E. 462; Lake Eris & W. R. Co. v. Griswold, 72 Ind.App. 265, 125 N.E. 783; Valparaiso v. Kinney, 75 Ind.App. 660, 131 N.E. 237.
C. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S.C. §§ 723b, 723c.
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 23 U. S. 21; Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 23 U. S. 53; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329, 34 U. S. 359-361.
Wayman v. Southard, supra, 23 U. S. 42; Bank of the United States v. Halstead, supra, 23 U. S. 61; Beers v. Haughton, supra, 34 U. S. 359.
R.S. 721, 28 U.S.C. § 725.
Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 277, 156 U. S. 284; Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24, 209 U. S. 35; Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. Gibson, 213 U. S. 10, 213 U. S. 18; Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U. S. 426, 268 U. S. 434.
R.S. 914, 28 U.S.C. § 724.
See Notes to the Rules of Civil Procedure, printed by the Advisory Committee March, 1938, p. 32.
An analogy is found in the organic acts applicable to some of the territories, before their admission to statehood, which provided that laws passed by the territorial legislature should be valid unless Congress disapproved. § 5 of the Ordinance of 1787; See Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595. Territory of Florida, § 5 of the act of March 30, 1822 (3 Stat. 655); Territory of Louisiana, § 4 of the act of March 26, 1804 (2 Stat. 284), and § 3 of the act of March 3, 1805 (2 Stat. 331); Territory of Minnesota, § 6 of the Act of March 3, 1849 (9 Stat. 405); Territory of New Mexico, § 7 of the act of September 9, 1850 (9 Stat. 449); Territory of Oregon, § 6 of the act of August 14, 1848 (9 Stat. 325, 326); Territory of Utah, § 6 of the act of September 9, 1850 (9 Stat. 455); Territory of Washington, § 6 of the act of March 2, 1853 (10 Stat. 175); Territory of Wisconsin, § 6 of the act of April 20, 1836 (5 Stat. 12, 13). Similar provisions are now applicable to Alaska, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the Philippines. 48 U.S.C. §§ 90, 826, 1405o, 1054.
Cf. the provisions for lying over before Congress in § 407 of the act of March 3, 1933, 47 Stat. 1519, and § 5 of the Reorganization Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 562.
Supreme Court Rule 27, par. 6; Mabler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 264 U. S. 45; Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22, 307 U. S. 34.
the Botsford decision was treated as settled doctrine. The present issue is whether the authority which Congress gave to this Court to formulate rules of civil procedure for the district courts allows displacement of the law of the Botsford case. Stated more particularly, is Rule 35, authorizing such physical examination, valid under the Rules Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S.C. §§ 723b, 723c. It is urged that, since this Rule pertains to procedure, it is valid because outside the limitations of that Act, whereby "said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."
of or interference with the person of a free citizen."
Stack v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 177 Mass. 155, 157, 58 N.E. 686.
So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy in a matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side of the federal courts. I deem a requirement as to the invasion of the person to stand on a very different footing from questions pertaining to the discovery of documents, pretrial procedure, and other devices for the expeditious, economic, and fair conduct of litigation. That disobedience of an order under Rule 35 cannot be visited with punishment as for contempt does not mitigate its intrusion into an historic immunity of the privacy of the person. Of course, the Rule is compulsive in that the doors of the federal courts, otherwise open, may be shut to litigants who do not submit to such a physical examination.
In this view, little significance attaches to the fact that the Rules, in accordance with the statute, remained on the table of two Houses of Congress without evoking any objection to Rule 35, and thereby automatically came into force. Plainly, the Rules are not acts of Congress, and cannot be treated as such. Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions surrounding the business of Congress when the Rules were submitted, to draw any inference of tacit approval from nonaction by Congress is to appeal to unreality. And so I conclude that to make the drastic change that Rule 35 sought to introduce would require explicit legislation.
the issue pertain merely to diversity litigation. But Rule 35 applies to all civil litigation in the federal courts, and thus concerns the enforcement of federal rights, and not merely of state law in the federal courts.

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