Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/80/531/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:38:17+00:00

Document:
"That if any person or persons shall receive, conceal, or buy any goods, wares, or merchandise knowing them to have been illegally imported into the United States and liable to seizure by virtue of any act in relation to the revenue, such person or persons shall, on conviction thereof, forfeit and pay a sum double the amount or value of the goods, wares, or merchandise so received, concealed, or purchased."
Held 1st, that a civil action of debt will lie at the suit of the United States to recover the forfeitures or penalties incurred under this section; 2d, that the section is remedial, and not strictly penal in its character; and 3d, that the section applies to illegal importers as well as to accessories after the illegal importation.
2. Debt lies whenever a sum certain is due to the plaintiff, or a sum which can readily be reduced to a certainty requiring no future valuation to settle its amount, and it is immaterial in what manner the obligation is incurred or by what it is evidenced.
"That if any person shall fraudulently or knowingly import or bring into the United States, or assist in so doing, any goods, wares, or merchandise contrary to law or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise, after their importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, such goods, wares, and merchandise shall be forfeited, and he or she shall, on conviction thereof before any court of competent jurisdiction, be fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both, at the discretion of such court."
"That nothing in the act shall be taken to abridge or limit any forfeiture, penalty, fine, liability, or remedy provided for or existing under any law now in force except as herein otherwise specially provided."
And the forty-third section of the act repeals several acts by name, and also " all other acts and parts of acts conflicting with or supplied by this act." Held that the penalty of the second section of the act of 1823 is not repealed by this act of 1866. The design of this latter act was to punish as a crime that which before had subjected its perpetrator to civil liability or quasi-civil liability.
"that they were Province shingles, liable to duty and seizure, and illegally imported, it was not necessary for the government to prove that the defendants sued personally had actual knowledge of these facts, which were then within the knowledge of their partner,"
"if with this knowledge on the part of the absent partner that the shingles were illegally imported and liable to seizure, the firm, in the usual course of the business, received the shingles at Bangor and they were disposed of by them and the profits of the business divided among all the partners, the jury were authorized to find that the defendants received the shingles, knowing that the same were illegally imported and liable to seizure."
and J. L. Cutter to recover (inter alia) double the value of certain importations of shingles alleged to have been illegally made, and received, concealed, or bought by the defendants with knowledge that the shingles had been illegally imported into the United States.
The 5th section of the act enacted that all penalties and forfeitures incurred by force of it should be sued for, recovered, distributed, and accounted for in the manner prescribed by the act of March 2, 1799, entitled "An act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage." That act (by its 89th section) directs all penalties accruing by any breach of the act to be sued for and recovered, with costs of suit, in the name of the United States of America in any court competent to try the same, and the collector within whose district a forfeiture shall have been incurred is enjoined to cause suits for the same to be commenced without delay.
or sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise after their importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, such goods, wares, and merchandise shall be forfeited and he or she shall, on conviction thereof before any court of competent jurisdiction, be fined in any sum not exceeding $5,000 nor less than $50, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both, at the discretion of such court."
The same section declares that present or past possession of the goods by the defendant shall be sufficient evidence to authorize his conviction, unless such possession be explained to the satisfaction of the jury.
"That nothing in the act shall be taken to abridge or limit any forfeiture, penalty, fine, liability or remedy provided for or existing under any law now in force except as herein otherwise specially provided."
And the 43d section, that all other acts and parts of acts conflicting with or supplied by it should be repealed.
It was with both these statutes on the statute-\ book that the action was brought.
One set of courts was to recover the duties on the importations. Another set to recover, under the 2d section of the statute of 1823, double the value of the goods received by the defendants.
him in the shingle business done under this arrangement, but not in their general business.
No question was made in this Court that the shingles, for the double value of which the suit was brought, were subject to duties if they were of Provincial growth.
In the years 1863-1864, Leman Stockwell was in Aroostook County, in Maine, and on the St. John River, and at Frederickton and St. John, engaged in the business of collecting, buying, and forwarding shingles to Bangor, on the account of this arrangement, consigned to D. R. Stockwell & Co.
There was evidence tending to show that the shingles for the importation of which these duties and penalties are claimed were not of the growth and produce of the State of Maine or of that portion of the state watered by the River St. John or its tributaries, but were the growth and produce of the Province of New Brunswick. There was also evidence to rebut this, and tending to show that they were of the growth and produce of Maine, as aforesaid. There was evidence tending to show that the defendants did in fact know that the said shingles were of the growth and produce of New Brunswick and there was evidence tending to show that they had no knowledge or information on the subject.
and the revenue department did not claim duties nor attempt to seize the shingles, and made no claim against the defendants or anyone connected with them of any kind until the commencement of this suit, which was April 2, 1868, when the shingles had been sold for three or four years or so.
1. That a civil action will not lie to recover the double value, and that the United States cannot recover both the double values and the duties under the declaration.
2. That the jury must be satisfied, as to each defendant, that he knew that the shingles had been illegally imported and were liable to seizure before he received, concealed, or bought the same, and that such receiving, concealing, or buying must have been with an intent to defraud the revenues.
the firm on these matters in this suit is to be deemed the knowledge of the defendants, his co-partners in the shingle business."
"If Leman Stockwell, at the time of the importation and reception of the shingles at Bangor, knew that they were Province shingles, liable to duty and seizure &c., it was not necessary for the government to prove that the defendants personally had actual knowledge of these facts, which were then within the knowledge of their partner, Leman Stockwell."
"If with this knowledge, as before stated, on Leman's part that the shingles were illegally imported and liable to seizure, D. R. Stockwell & Co., in the usual course of the business, received the shingles at Bangor, and they were disposed of by them, and the profits of the business divided as stated above, the jury are authorized to find that the defendants, being Leman's partners, received the shingles, knowing the same were illegally imported and liable to seizure."
When the charge to the jury was completed, the defendants' exceptions to the refusal of the court to give the instructions requested by them, and to the instructions given to the jury as above stated, were duly reserved to them.
The verdict was for the plaintiffs on the counts for the duties and the double values, and judgment going accordingly in the district court, and this being affirmed in the circuit, the defendants brought the case here on writ of error, no error being, however, assigned relating to the first-mentioned counts.
or penalties incurred under this act of Congress, and that the court below erred in holding that such an action might be maintained. It is not contended that an action of debt will not lie to recover duties if the defendant be the owner or importer of the goods imported, for it is conceded that by the act of importing, an obligation to pay the duties is incurred. The obligation springs out of the statutes which impose duties. Nor is it doubted that when a statute gives to a private person a right to recover a penalty for a violation of law, he may maintain an action of debt, but it is insisted that when the government proceeds for a penalty based on an offense against law, it must be by indictment or by information. No authority has been adduced in support of this position, and it is believed that none exists. It cannot be that whether an action of debt is maintainable or not depends upon the question who is the plaintiff. Debt lies whenever a sum certain is due to the plaintiff, or a sum which can readily be reduced to a certainty -- a sum requiring no future valuation to settle its amount. It is not necessarily founded upon contract. It is immaterial in what manner the obligation was incurred or by what it is evidenced if the sum owing is capable of being definitely ascertained. The act of 1823 fixes the amount of the liability at double the value of the goods received, concealed, or purchased, and the only party injured by the illegal acts, which subject the perpetrators to the liability, is the United States. It would seem, therefore, that whether the liability incurred is to be regarded as a penalty or as liquidated damages for an injury done to the United States, it is a debt, and as such it must be recoverable in a civil action.
act, to be sued for and recovered, with costs of suit, in the name of the United States of America in any court competent to try the same, and the collector within whose district a forfeiture shall have been incurred is enjoined to cause suits for the same to be commenced without delay. This manifestly contemplates civil actions, as does the proviso to the same section which declares that no action or prosecution shall be maintained in any case under the act unless the same shall have been commenced within three years after the penalty or forfeiture was incurred. Accordingly it has frequently been ruled that debt will lie at the suit of the United States to recover the penalties and forfeitures imposed by statutes. [Footnote 3] It is true that the statute of 1823 imposes the forfeiture and liability to pay double the value of the goods received, concealed, or purchased, with knowledge that they had been illegally imported, "on conviction thereof." It may be, therefore, that an indictment or information might be sustained. But the question now is whether a civil action can be brought, and in view of the provision that all penalties and forfeitures incurred by force of the act shall "be sued for and recovered," as prescribed by the act of 1799, we are of opinion that debt is maintainable. The expression "sued for and recovered" is primarily applicable to civil actions, and not to those of a criminal nature.
Bangor, knew that they were Province shingles, liable to duty and seizure and illegally imported, it was not necessary for the government to prove that the defendants personally had actual knowledge of these facts, which were then within the knowledge of their partner, Leman Stockwell."
"If, with this knowledge, as before stated on Leman's part, that the shingles were illegally imported and liable to seizure, D. R. Stockwell & Co., in the usual course of the business, received the shingles at Bangor, and they were disposed of by them, and the profits of the business divided as stated above, the jury were authorized to find that the defendants, being Leman's partners, received the shingles knowing the same were illegally imported and liable to seizure."
Taking this together, and it must be so taken, for the exception was general to the instructions given, it cannot be said to justify the complaint that the court ruled knowledge of the defendants that the shingles had been illegally imported was conclusively presumed from the knowledge of Leman Stockwell, their partner. Qualified by what was added to the language alleged to be erroneous, it amounts to no more than that the jury might presume such knowledge from the facts stated.
To understand the force and merits of this instruction, it is necessary to notice concisely the facts of which evidence had been given at the trial.
"that they must be satisfied, as to each defendant, that he knew that the shingles had been illegally imported and were liable to seizure before he received, concealed, or bought the same, and that such receiving, concealing, or buying must have been with an intent to defraud the revenues."
well as that of the partner to all the members of the firm; nor is it much insisted that a principal, or co-partner, is not liable for the tort of an agent or co-partner, done without his knowledge or authority, in suits brought by third persons to recover compensation or indemnity for loss sustained in consequence of the tort; but it is argued that the rule does not apply in the case of suits for a penalty. It becomes, then, material to consider the nature and purposes of the statute under which it is claimed the liability of the defendants has arisen. Is it strictly punitive, or is it remedial?
business, is familiar doctrine. It rests upon the theory that the contract of partnership constitutes all its members agents for each other, and that when a loss must fall upon one of two innocent persons, he must bear it who has been the occasion of the loss or has enabled a third person to cause it. In other words, the tortious act of the agent is the act of his principals if done in the course of his agency, though not directly authorized. And this is emphatically true when the principals, as in this case, have received and appropriated the benefit of the act. These defendants received the shingles on their arrival at Bangor, presenting at the custom house false certificates of their American origin. They paid no duties. They removed the property to their own lumber sheds, sold it, and divided the profits, retaining a portion for themselves. They have therefore now the proceeds of sale of property which was not their own, but which had been forfeited to the United States, and they have secured and they now hold these proceeds through the tortious act of their own partner, who planned and effected the fraudulent importation for their benefit and his. Can it be that they may derive a profit from his fraud and yet repudiate his act by asserting that his knowledge of the fraud does not affect them? If they can, the revenue laws will be found utterly ineffectual to protect the revenues of the government and facilities to fraud will be abundant. If an irresponsible agent consigns to his principal foreign merchandise, documenting it as of American growth or production, it will always be difficult if not impossible to prove knowledge by the principal that the agent has perpetrated a fraud, and if that is necessary to give to the government a right of action under the act of 1823 against the principals who claim or conceal property thus brought into the country, the act utterly fails to secure a remedy for the mischief against which it was intended to guard.
subject the opinion of this Court has been outspoken, and it has been in accordance with the instruction given to the jury in the case before us. [Footnote 4] The principle asserted in all those cases is that whatever an agent does or says in reference to the business in which he is at the time employed and within the scope of his authority is done or said by the principal, and may be proved, as well in a criminal as a civil case, in like manner as if the evidence applied personally to the principal.
The British statutes for the prevention of smuggling differ from our act of 1823. They are both penal and remedial. They impose not only a liability for treble value of goods illegally imported upon assisting in unlading them or knowingly harboring or concealing them, but also a stipulated penalty, in some cases leaving to the revenue commissioners to determine whether proceedings shall be instituted for the penalty or for treble the damages. Yet in both classes of cases, the fraudulent act of a servant is held attributable to his master when the master has derived a benefit from the illegal importation. [Footnote 5] We think, therefore, the charge of the court of which the plaintiffs in error complain was not erroneous.
others. They may receive the goods or conceal them, and the wrong to the government is precisely the same, whether the concealment is by them or by others who were not the importers. It certainly would be most strange if the accessory to a wrongful act were held responsible therefor when the principal goes free. As was said in Graham v. Pocock, the question who is liable for receiving, concealing, or buying the shingles is a question to be determined irrespective of the inquiry who is the principal and who the accessory.
"That if any person shall fraudulently or knowingly import or bring into the United States any goods, wares, or merchandise contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation or concealment or sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise after their importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, such goods, wares, and merchandise shall be forfeited, and he or she shall, on conviction thereof before any court of competent jurisdiction, be fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both, at the discretion of such court."
certainly not so as to affect this suit, brought to enforce liabilities incurred before the later act was passed.
3 Stat. at Large 781.
United States v. Colt, Peters' Circuit Court 145; Jacob v. United States, 1 Brockenbrough 520; United States v. Bougher, 6 McLean 277; Walsh v. United States, 3 Woodbury & Minot 342; United States v. Lyman, 1 Mason 482; United States v. Allen, 4 Day 474.
Vide 25 U. S. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 468; American Fur Company v. United States, 2 Pet. 364; and Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 140.
Attorney General v. Siddon, 1 Crompton & Jervis 220; Rex v. Manning, 2 Comyus 616.
I am compelled to dissent from the judgment of the court in this case.
3d. That if the penalty be in force and the section be applicable to importers, the court below erred in ruling that the knowledge by the defendants required by the section to subject them to the penalty prescribed, could be conclusively presumed from the knowledge possessed by their partner.
imported. It further includes what is omitted in the statute of 1823 -- the selling of such goods and facilitating their transportation, concealment, and sale. It also declares that such goods shall be forfeited, and that every person who does any one of the things enumerated shall, on conviction thereof, be subjected to a fine in a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or to imprisonment not exceeding two years, or to both, in the discretion of the court. This is not all; the statute declares that present or past possession of the goods by the defendant shall be sufficient evidence to authorize his conviction unless such possession be explained to the satisfaction of the jury.
The statute of 1866, as thus appears, is much broader in its provisions than the statute of 1823. It supplements the first statute by including as offenses acts there omitted though equally connected as those designated with the disposal of goods illegally imported, and by providing a rule of evidence which renders it less difficult for the government to enforce the prescribed penalties. Had the statute of 1866 stopped here, there would be no pretense that it conflicts with the statute of 1823. But it does not stop here; it goes farther and changes the punishment for the offenses designated. By the first statute, the receiving, concealing, or buying any goods by a person knowing them to be illegally imported and liable to seizure under any revenue act is punishable by a forfeiture of double the value of such goods. By the second statute, the receiving, concealing, or buying goods after their importation by a person knowing them to have been imported contrary to law is punishable by fine and imprisonment or both at the discretion of the court. In both acts, the same offenses are designated, for the liability to seizure attends all illegal importation and a knowledge of this latter fact necessarily includes the other. Both acts are penal, the first equally so as the last, for it does not go for the value of the goods or indemnification to the government, but for the enforcement of a penalty upon a party offending in any of the particulars mentioned.
The very definition of a penal statute is that it is a statute which inflicts a penalty for the violation of its provisions. It is admitted in the opinion of the majority of the Court that the offenses designated in the act might be prosecuted by information or indictment, an admission which seems to me to be inconsistent with the position that the act is not penal. I have not been aware that an information or an indictment could be founded on any statute which was not penal in its character.
Different punishments being prescribed for the same offenses by the two statutes, the latter statute must be held, according to all the authorities, to have superseded and repealed the penalty prescribed by the first statute. Such was the unanimous decision of this Court in Norris v. Crocker, reported in 13th Howard, a case which does not differ from this in any essential particular. That was an action of debt to recover a penalty prescribed by the fourth section of the act of Congress of 1793 respecting fugitives from justice and persons escaping from the service of their masters. That section declared that any person who should knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder the claimant, his agent, or attorney in seizing or arresting the fugitive from labor, or should rescue him from such claimant, agent or attorney when arrested pursuant to the authority given by the act, or should harbor or conceal him after notice that he was a fugitive from labor, should for each of these offenses forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars, to be recovered in an action of debt.
Pending the action brought under this section, Congress, in 1850, passed an act amendatory of and supplementary to the Act of February, 1793, the seventh section of which embraced the same offenses specified in the act of 1793, and created new offenses and prescribed as a punishment for each offense fine and imprisonment upon indictment and conviction of the offender, the fine not to exceed a thousand dollars and the imprisonment not to exceed six months.
should "forfeit and pay" for each offense a specified sum, and authorized its recovery by civil action. For the same offenses of obstructing the claimant, rescuing the fugitive, or harboring him, as well as for offenses of a similar character, the act of 1850 declared that the offender should be punished by fine and imprisonment, and that this punishment should be enforced upon indictment and conviction.
The act of 1850 contained no repealing clause in terms, yet the Court held unanimously that it was repugnant to the act of 1793, and necessarily operated as a repeal of the penalty of that act. That case is not distinguishable in principle from the case at bar. The act of 1793, like the act of 1823, prescribed a penalty recoverable by civil action. The act of 1850, like that act of 1866, prescribed, for the offenses designated, fine and imprisonment enforceable by indictment.
"As a general rule, it was not open to controversy that where a new statute covers the whole subject matter of an old one, adds offenses, and prescribes different penalties for those enumerated in the old law, that the former statute is repealed by implication, as the provisions of both cannot stand together."
the mode of enforcement could not alter the substantial and important fact that the penalty for the same offense was changed, and that by the change the sovereign power which created the original law had declared that its penalties should no longer be enforced.
If there were no other provisions of law than the two sections mentioned of the acts of 1823 and 1866 before us, I should not hesitate to repeat the language of this Court in Norris v. Crocker, that it is not open to controversy that the latter act repeals the penalty prescribed by the former. But there is another provision of law which removes, as it appears to me, all possible doubt as to the intention of Congress. The forty-third section repeals several acts by name, and also "all other acts and parts of acts conflicting with or supplied by this act."
Now in my judgment it does not admit of any question that an act like that of 1866, which declares that certain specified offenses shall be punished by fine or imprisonment or both, does conflict with an act like that of 1823, which provides that the same offenses shall be punished by a forfeiture of double the value of the goods in respect to which the offenses are committed. And it appears to me that I have pointed out several particulars in which omissions of the act of 1823 are supplied by the act of 1866.
"That nothing in the act shall be taken to abridge, or limit, any forfeiture, penalty, fine, liability, or remedy provided for or existing under any law now in force, except as herein otherwise specially provided."
shall not continue to exist when other special provisions are made on the subject.
But if I am mistaken in this construction and Congress did actually intend this strange and anomalous legislation -- that for the offenses designated there should be three distinct punishments inflicted: 1st, by a forfeiture of double the value of the goods illegally imported; 2d, by a forfeiture of the goods themselves; and, 3d, by fine, which may go from fifty dollars to five thousand, or by imprisonment, which may extend to two years, or by both -- then I contend that the act of 1823 does not apply to the defendants in this case. They were the importers of the goods for double the value of which they are sued, and the section applies only to offenses committed after their importation. It is directed against the offenses of receiving, concealing, or buying the goods with knowledge of their having been illegally imported and being liable to seizure. There are numerous other acts providing punishment for all forms of illegal importation. This act was only intended to reach those who, after the original offense was committed, in some way aided, with knowledge of that offense, in keeping the goods out of the reach of the government. The language used is inappropriate and inapt to describe an act of the illegal importer. It is limited to an act done after the illegal importation. It requires knowledge of such importation, which, as counsel observes, it would be absurd to require of the illegal importer himself. He receives his own goods in the act of importation, not afterwards; he cannot buy them of himself; and if he conceals them, it is only an act in execution of the original offense.
So in the act of 1825, more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes, [Footnote 2/6] it is enacted that if any person upon the high seas shall "buy, receive, or conceal" any money, goods, bank notes, or other effects, subject to larceny, feloniously taken, or stolen from another, "knowing the same to have been taken or stolen," he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished by fine and imprisonment. And the act shows on its face that the language was intended only for the offense of an accessory, for it declares that the person offending may be prosecuted although the principal offender chargeable or charged with the larceny shall not have been prosecuted or convicted.
In all these cases, the receiver, the concealer, and the buyer are accessories after the fact, and the language would be inappropriate if applied to them in any other character; and in the present case, it would be extending, in my judgment, the construction of a penal statute beyond all precedent to apply these terms in the act of 1823 to the original importers.
one evidence, among others, that it was intended to supply the deficiencies of the original act, and thus supersede it.
The declaration in the case in the counts, upon which double the value of the goods is charged, does not allege that the defendants illegally imported the goods, but that such importation was made by persons unknown, and that the defendants, knowing of the illegal importation, received, concealed, and bought them. Yet it appears that the entire action of the court of the trial, and its instructions to the jury, proceeded upon the supposition that the defendants and the absent partner were the owners of the goods and that the defendants made the importation. It is expressly stated in the bill of exceptions that no attempts were made by either of the defendants, or any person connected with them, to conceal the property imported or in any way to interfere with the exercise of the power of seizing it. The case rests, therefore, entirely upon the alleged acts of receiving and buying.
"This being a civil action and not a criminal prosecution, the knowledge of one of the firm on these matters in this suit is to be deemed the knowledge of the defendants, his co-partners in the shingle business."
imported, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendants personally had actual knowledge of these facts, which were then within the knowledge of their partner, Leman Stockwell."
Here the court tells the jury that the knowledge of one of the firm, Leman Stockwell, is to be deemed the knowledge of the defendants, and that it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendants personally had actual knowledge of the facts which were within the knowledge of their partner.
If this language does not amount to an instruction that knowledge of the illegal importation by the defendants is to be conclusively presumed from the knowledge of their partner, it is difficult to perceive what else can be made of it.
The ruling of the Court in this respect goes against all notions which I have hitherto entertained of the law on the subject of imputed guilty knowledge, and my sense of justice revolts against its application. I cannot reconcile to either law or justice the doctrine that a person can be charged and punished for knowingly doing a thing of which he never had any actual knowledge, and that in a proceeding to enforce penalties imposed for knowingly doing a thing charged, the knowledge, which is an essential ingredient of the offense, can be conclusively imputed to him from its possession by another.
The claim in question, it is to be remembered, is not made for the forfeiture of the goods; that would follow from the act of illegal importation, without reference to the parties engaged. Neither is it made for the duties, for the right to them accrues to the government upon the importation. The claim is not for indemnification, but for penalties prescribed.
business will not bind the firm, for his agency goes not to that extent.
Nor will any act of a partner done in violation of law bind his partners unless they originally authorized or subsequently adopted it. Such authorization and adoption are not matters to be presumed from the relationship of the partners to each other, but are to be proved like any other matters done outside of the scope of the partnership business for which liability is sought to be fastened on the firm. It will often happen, owing to the position of the parties, the nature of the business, and the character of the act, that this authorization or adoption will be inferred from very slight additional circumstances. Thus in some cases it might be inferred that the importation of goods by one partner without payment of the duties thereon was approved by the other partners from the management taken by each partner in the affairs of the firm and the knowledge which such management must give of the payments made and goods received. A jury might sometimes even be justified in inferring authority or approval of the other partners from their silence. But very different evidence would be required if, when one partner made the importation, the other was absent from the country or was a silent partner, taking no part in the management of the affairs of the firm. In the present case, the importation of the shingles by the defendants might have been consistent with entire ignorance that they were the product of New Brunswick and therefore subject to duties. It does not appear that there was anything in their shape or character which would inform the defendants of their foreign origin or anything which would excite the suspicions, even, of the defendants on the subject. They were brought to Bangor accompanied by the proper documentary evidence that they were of American origin.
"I think there was evidence for the jury of the defendant's being acquainted with this fraud. "
"He obtained possession of goods for which less than the proper duty appeared to have been paid. If that were not so, it was incumbent on him to show that he paid the full amount of duty. He must have had books to show the price of the goods, and the amount of duties payable in respect of them, and those books he does not produce. He derives benefit from the fraud, and therefore the jury were warranted, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, in inferring that he had a knowledge of it."
It is not perceived that this case, where the question of knowledge was left to the jury, can give support to the ruling in the case at bar, which was substantially, as I understand it, that knowledge must be conclusively presumed from the fact of co-partnership.
The respondents, Pocock and Matthew, were partners doing business at Cape Town, in the Colony of Good Hope. Pocock, whilst in England, shipped to his partner at Cape Town twenty-five packages of glassware and three carriages. In the carriages a large number of corks were packed, which were liable to duty. When the goods arrived at Cape Town, the respondent, Matthew, made an entry for the landing of the glassware and carriages in which no mention was made of the corks. For this defect in the entry, the whole shipment was seized. The supreme court of the colony decreed a forfeiture of the carriages, but gave judgment for the respondents in the action for the penalty. On appeal to the Privy Council, it was contended in the second case that the respondent, Matthew, who made the entry, was liable to the penalty of treble the value of the goods and that Pocock, who was in England at the time, was answerable for his partner's acts, but the court held that Matthew was liable for the penalty and that Pocock, his partner, was not liable. Lord Cairnes, who delivered the opinion of the court, did not seem to think that the liability of Pocock was a matter to be considered, he not having participated in the actual entry. "I may put out of the case," he said, "the first respondent, Pocock, for it was admitted that there was no case of personal culpability against him." Personal, not imputed, culpability was here considered essential to a recovery by the Crown.
It will be found on examination of the authorities that in all cases where a principal or partner has been held liable penally or criminally for the act of his agent or partner, the act was originally authorized or assented to or subsequently adopted. The question in such cases has always been as to the effect of certain acts or employment as evidence of authorization, assent, or adoption, and it has always been held a matter for the jury.
The cases of Rex v. Almon [Footnote 2/9] and Attorney General v. Siddon, [Footnote 2/10] usually cited against this position, are consistent with it. In the first case, a bookseller was proceeded against for a libel sold in his bookstore by his servant in the course of his employment, and Lord Mansfield held that the relation of the defendant to the act of sale was prima facie evidence to establish his liability, but that he might avoid it by showing that "he was not privy nor assenting to it nor encouraging it." Here such was the nature of the employment as to imply prima facie authorization of the sale and consequent publication of the libel by the master.
In the second case, a trader was held liable to a penalty for the illegal act of his servant done in conducting his business with a view to protect smuggled goods, although absent at the time. The case was an information for penalties, the second count of which charged that the defendant had harbored and concealed property upon which duties had not been paid. The court placed great reliance upon the fact that the possession of the property without explanation was prima facie evidence to warrant conviction, and that the special circumstances detailed in connection with the transaction and the employment of the servant presented a prima facie case of authorization by the master.
In all these cases, the principals or partners are held liable only to make good the loss occasioned by the fraudulent act of the agent or partner. The rule which governs these cases has no application to an action for penalties, which goes not, as already stated, for compensation or indemnification, but for punishment. Where penalties which are punitive, and not mere liquidated damages, are concerned, there must in all cases be personal culpability arising from original authorization of the fraudulent act or assent to it or its subsequent adoption with knowledge. This principle is of the highest importance, and its conservation is essential to a just administration of the law. As this principle was disregarded in the trial of this case in the court below, I think the judgment should, on that account as well as for the other reasons stated, be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
force, was not applicable to fraudulent importers. He stated that he expressed no opinion as to the instructions imputing knowledge of the guilty partner to the others.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY concurred generally, dissenting from the opinion of the Court on all the points taken in it.
1 Stat. at Large 116, sec. 17.
4 Stat. at Large 114.
United States v. Crane, 4 McLean 317; United States v. Keene, 5 id. 509.
4 Stat. at Large 116, sec. 8.
12 Meeson & Welsby 39.
Law Reports 3 P.R.C. 345.
1 Crompton & Jervis 220.
Kilby v. Wilson, 1 Ryan & Moody, 178; Irving v. Motly, 7 Bingham 543; Root v. French, 13 Wendell 570; Cary v. Hotailing, 1 Hill 311.
Bennett v. Judson, 21 N.Y. 238; Veazie v. Williams, 8 How. 134, 49 U. S. 137.
Locke v. Stearns, 1 Metcalf 560; Story on Partnership, sec. 108; Story on Agency, 443; Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salkeld 289.

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