Source: https://www.scotxblog.com/case-notes/todays-decisions-recognizing-safety-as-an-aspect-of-privacy-electronic-voting-machines-upheld-medical-damages-limited/comment-page-1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:58:48+00:00

Document:
With today’s orders list, the Texas Supreme Court decided eleven pending cases.
But information does not exist in a vacuum. When disclosure carries with it a serious risk of bodily harm, we cannot ignore those consequences when deciding whether common law protections apply. … Our common law protects individuals from physical harm, and, consistent with the PIA, that protection extends to the disclosure of information that substantially threatens such harm.
The opinion acknowledges that it is expanding the common-law understanding of what information is private, and it therefore remands for the trial court to apply the new law.
Note for Court watchers: This is the same 5-2 vote pattern (with the same two recusals) that emerged from Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas, No. 08-0172 DB, in which the Court held that public employee birthdates could be withheld over concerns that those individuals might be put in danger of identity theft.
Esperanza Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, et al., No. 09-0420 (DB). This was a challenge by a group of voters to Texas’s electronic-voting equipment, which they contended prevented accountability in recounts. The State contended that the voters lacked standing. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered an opinion for the Court, concluding that the voters did have standing to raise this type of equal-protection challenge but that, on this record, the State’s choice to use electronic voting machines was reasonable.
“Actually paid or incurred”: What about when hospitals bill for more than they’re entitled?
What counts as an expert report under the medical-malpractice statute?
Tyler Scoresby, M.D. v. Catarino Santillan, No. 09-0497 (DB). The medical-malpractice statute provides a 120-day deadline for filing an expert report, but it lets trial courts grant extensions if an inadequate report has been filed. This case is about what it takes to qualify for that extension — what’s the line between a merely inadequate report and something that’s not a report at all?
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Wainwright joined. Justice Willett joined with the majority and also delivered a concurring opinion.
As a general matter, we have held that some agency determinations are entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Grp., Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. 2007) (applying res judicata to orders of the Texas Workforce Commission). Today, we must decide whether the Board’s determination that Stewart’s house was an urban nuisance, and the affirmance of that decision on substantial evidence review, precludes a takings claim based on the demolition of that property. Because substantial evidence review of a nuisance determination resulting in a home’s demolition does not sufficiently protect a person’s rights under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution, we hold that the determination was not preclusive.
Chief Justice Jefferson wrote the majority opinion. Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, and Justice Guzman also wrote a dissenting opinion.
City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, No. 08-0265 (DB). By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that a towing company whose property was seized by the City of Dallas should have sought relief under a statutory provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure rather than bringing a takings suit against the City. The Court concluded that any problems with that statute could have been litigated in due process terms (challenges against the statute) rather than as takings claims. Justice Wainwright wrote a dissent, contending that the towing company had sufficiently invoked this statute that the Court should not have dismissed the complaint.
Samuel T. Jackson v. State Office of Administrative Hearings, et al., No. 10-0002 (DB). In response to an open-records request, SOAH refused to disclose certain information from license-revocation hearings (where people who were delinquent on child support would lose other professional licenses). Justice Johnson wrote for a unanimous Court, concluding that the records should have been disclosed (with appropriate redactions). But the Court also concluded that Jackson could not recover attorneys fees for winning this suit because, even though he was a licensed attorney, he was suing on his own behalf and thus did not “incur” legal expenses.
these additional steps further distinguish this case from others where we have disqualified firms for a nonlawyer’s actual work on both sides of a case. For example, in In re Columbia, the paralegal had similarly performed limited work on both sides of the same case. 320 S.W.3d at 823. But the second law firm did not have any formal screening measures in place and, upon realizing a conflict existed, did not immediately remove the nonlawyer’s access to the case. Id. … Strasburger’s efforts after discovering the conflict parallel and reinforce its thorough attempts to preempt the conflict in the first place.
If you work in law-firm management, this should be a great example of the benefits of having a thorough conflicts-check and screening process in place. Expect to hear about it at your next ethics CLE.
Lancer Insurance Co. v. Garcia Holiday Tours, et al., No. 10-0096 (DB). The question was whether a bus company’s automobile-insurance policy covered the risk that a bus driver would spread a communicable disease (here, tuberculosis) to passengers. Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court, concluding that this insurance policy did not cover that particular risk.

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