Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/366/366mass18.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 16:49:32+00:00

Document:
COMMONWEALTH vs. GEORGE B. GILBERT.
Present: TAURO, C.J., REARDON, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN, & WILKINS, JJ.
INDICTMENT found and returned in the Superior Court on September 16, 1969.
The case was tried before McGuire, J.
Francis J. DiMento for the defendant.
this appeal, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33G, he makes six arguments for reversal. Four of these relate to evidentiary rulings by the trial judge. The other two separately raise the fundamental questions of (1) the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and (2) the defendant's right to a speedy trial. We affirm.
The chronology of events in this case involves a wide spectrum of dates and places covering a period of several years. Therefore, we believe it is best to discuss the specific facts as these relate to the respective issues when they are considered during the course of the opinion. Suffice to say at this point that the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife on September 14, 1966; that he dismembered her body and disposed of the remains in the Atlantic Ocean where some of them were dredged up by a fisherman some months later. Before the discovery of the remains it was generally believed that the defendant and his wife had perished at sea during a violent storm on the night of September 14. The defendant reappeared two years and four months later near Las Vegas, Nevada, claiming to be the victim of amnesia. He was arrested but resisted rendition for approximately a year and seven months before he finally returned to Massachusetts voluntarily, pleaded innocent to the charge of murder, and was released on bail pending trial. He was tried and convicted of murder in the second degree on May 30, 1973.
arrested by the North Las Vegas police. Rendition proceedings were begun on February 4, 1969, and on September 16, 1969, the Essex County grand jury returned a formal indictment. On September 3, 1970, the defendant stopped resisting the rendition process, voluntarily returned to Massachusetts, and surrendered himself at the Superior Court in Salem.
He was arraigned on the same day. His trial, however, did not commence until over thirty-one months later, on April 30, 1973. This period of delay is clearly sufficient in length to trigger serious consideration of the question whether the Commonwealth denied the defendant a speedy trial. Commonwealth v. Horne, 362 Mass. 738 , 743 (1973). Length of delay, however, is but one of several factors relevant to the inquiry. "[T]he reason[s] for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice" must also be weighed. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
Looking to the record in this case, and to the findings by the trial judge, who denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial, it is clear that the defendant and not the Commonwealth was primarily responsible for the major portion of the lengthy delay. On September 8, 1970, five days after arraignment, the defendant requested and was granted a continuance for the purpose of allowing him time to retain counsel on the question of bail. On October 5, the defendant was released on bail. On the same day, the defendant's motion to extend to October 26 the time for filing preliminary motions was allowed.
In November, 1970, the defendant's counsel, in response to an inquiry from the district attorney as to the setting of a trial date, suggested sometime after January 1, 1971. The case was then put on the trial list for January, 1971. In spite of the defendant's arguments to the contrary, the trial judge's findings warranted by the evidence reveal that the defendant's counsel had other court commitments pending from January to May of 1971, and "consequently the case was put over to the September list of 1971."
counsel and the prosecutor participated in meetings in preparation for a seminar on criminal practice held by the New England Law Institute in March, 1972. The parties have stipulated that at "two or three of those meetings and at a chance meeting at the New Court House in Boston . . . [the prosecutor] raised the subject of setting a trial date, but he and . . . [defence counsel] did not pursue the matter further on those occasions." It should be noted that the case had been put on the January, 1972, trial list. While these events do not demonstrate an excess of diligent effort on the part of the Commonwealth to bring the case to trial, they also reveal a degree of acquiescence in the delay by defence counsel. This may have been due, in part, to the fact that the defendant was out on bail and, therefore, had no particular anxiety to go to trial.
The trial judge's findings describe the chronology of subsequent events: "In March of 1972 counsel discussed a trial date, and the District Attorney requested of the Chief Justice [of the Superior Court] a trial date of August 7, 1972. Counsel for the defendant thereupon wrote the Chief Justice a letter requesting a trial date in September 1972, or thereafter, for reasons of personal convenience. From October 5, 1972, to February of 1973, defendant's counsel was unavailable for trial due to illness. Because of defense counsel's schedule of trial of another homicide in this same county, it was agreed to reschedule this trial for April 30, 1973." It was at the opening of the trial on the thirtieth that the defendant first moved to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial.
commitments to other cases. The only period in this case where the prosecution may have been delinquent in its duty to press for trial occurred between September, 1971, and March, 1972, a span of six months. However, during this time the defendant appears to have made little or no effort to expedite matters, a failure which does not amount to a waiver, Barker v. Wingo, supra, at 528, but one that does bear on the question whether the defendant met his "responsibility to assert his right." Id. at 531. The existence of such a "responsibility" indicates that an acquiescing defendant must also be held partially accountable for pretrial delays. While such acquiescence does not relieve the prosecutor of his duties, it is material in weighing the prosecution's inaction in the balancing test required under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531.
That the defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial at any point during the delay is also extremely relevant to the question of prejudice. Indeed, the "failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." Barker v. Wingo, supra, at 532. If the defendant were truly concerned that the passage of time would undermine his ability to defend himself, common sense dictates that he would have pressed for a speedy trial. By the time he voluntarily returned to Massachusetts, four years had elapsed since his alleged commission of the crime. If the defendant thought that the failure of witnesses' memories would be harmful to his defence, it seems reasonable to assume that he would have asked that the trial be held as quickly as possible after his return. Had he done so, that would have been a compelling argument in his favor. In summation, we think that the Supreme Court's observation that "[t]he more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain" is particularly appropriate here. Barker v. Wingo, supra, at 531.
defendant's wife, Mary Gilbert. The facts pertinent to this issue may be briefly summarized. On June 11, 1967, off the coast of Gloucester, a fisherman was engaged in the common fishing practice of dragging a large net along the ocean floor. At a point beyond the three mile territorial waters of Massachusetts, he pulled up his net and discovered a plastic bag containing what he believed to be human remains. He turned the bag and its contents over to the police, and on June 20, a medical examiner made an analysis. In the bag he found two feet, two lower legs, a mid portion of the trunk from the thoracic vertebra to the fourth lumbar vertebra, with several ribs still attached, and decomposed tissue. He concluded that the remains were those of a person approximately sixty inches in height, plus or minus two or three inches. He was of the opinion that the bones had been cut by a hatchet or saw, and that the person had been dead at least five, but possibly up to eighteen, months.
time and research to the development of his special expertise in this area. We believe he was clearly qualified to give testimony on the subject.
Wilton M. Krogman, a professor of anatomy with a Ph. D. in physical anthropology, also testified for the Commonwealth. He corroborated Dr. Sosman's conclusion. He examined X-rays of the remains and, like Dr. Sosman, compared them with those taken of Mary Gilbert when she was alive. He was of the opinion that the remains were those of Mary Gilbert. Dr. Krogman explained how he reached this conclusion. "What I did was to go over . . . [Dr. Sosman's] report on a check basis and verify randomly the points that he had made. . . . All I did was corroborate it." He further testified that he would not have offered his opinion that the remains were those of Mary Gilbert on the basis of X-ray comparison had he not had Dr. Sosman's report. The defendant moved to strike Dr. Krogman's opinion on the ground that it was improperly based on the report and conclusions of another witness. The denial of the motion was proper. While the report and findings on which Dr. Krogman relied in part were technically "hearsay," we think they were properly admitted in light of Dr. Sosman's earlier direct presentation of that information to the jury. Moreover, in verifying points of X-ray similarly identified by Dr. Sosman, Dr. Krogman was engaged in independent analysis -- he was not merely mouthing another expert's opinion. His testimony was worthwhile cumulative evidence on the reliability of a novel scientific identification technique, and, as such, was properly admitted.
Las Vegas police department and related to them some of the evidence against the defendant in connection with his wife's apparent murder. On the following day, a warrant for the defendant's arrest was issued by Marguerite W. Souza, clerk pro tem of the District Court of Eastern Essex, and at 10:30 A.M. McNulty called the North Las Vegas police and informed them of this fact. At 2:30 P.M. the Nevada police, on the strength of this information, arrested the defendant without a warrant. Lieutenant McNulty flew to Nevada the next day and at 8:45 P.M. began interrogating the defendant. The defendant was informed of, and waived, his so called Miranda rights. In the course of this interrogation, the defendant made certain statements which he now claims should have been suppressed at his trial. His argument rests on the failure of the Nevada police to comply with local statutory requirements for warrantless arrests of out-of-State fugitives from justice.
The defendant, inter alia, argues that under the Nevada rendition statute, Nev. Rev. Sts. Section 179 et seq., a clerk pro tem cannot properly issue a complaint. Under Massachusetts law, however, such a clerk may issue a complaint.
Superior Court judge found that the Nevada police, relying on Massachusetts police information, had probable cause to arrest the defendant. This finding is clearly in accord with Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). Moreover, the statements made by the defendant came after a knowing and intelligent written waiver of his so called Miranda rights. There is no evidence of coercive police behavior of any type. These statements were freely and voluntarily given, and as such, were properly admitted against the defendant at his trial. See generally, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
your Libellant striking her about the head, face, arms and body, causing her to have a black eye; and that on divers other occasions, too numerous to mention he did commit other brutal and unprovoked assaults upon the person of your Libellant; that as a result of the Libellee's behavior your Libellant has been put in fear for her safety." To the extent that the divorce libel was introduced for the purpose of showing the decedent's state of mind, and not to prove the truthfulness of the allegations, it was admissible. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 357 Mass. 190 , 192 (1970). Leach and Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence (4th ed. 1967) 183-184. Unlike the situation in Commonwealth v. DelValle, 351 Mass. 489 (1966), the decedent's state of mind in the instant case was material to a fundamental issue -- that of jurisdiction. Moreover, we think that the trial judge effectively minimized any prejudicial impact possibly stemming from introduction of the divorce libel by his instructions to the jury. [Note 1] While we think the better practice would have been to read portions of the libel to the jury which were pertinent to the decedent's state of mind and with appropriate instructions, instead of having the complete document introduced as an exhibit for continued examination in the jury room, we conclude that there is no error which requires reversal.
v. DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669 (1974). Since the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mary Gilbert was in fact murdered within Massachusetts, the only question we must consider is whether the evidence "gives rise to `reasonable and possible' inferences supportive" of that finding. Commonwealth v. Lussier, 364 Mass. 414 , 420 (1973). We believe that it does. George Gilbert was the owner of a cabin cruiser, the Gee Bee, used by him and his family during their summer stay in the Gloucester area. On September 14, 1966, at approximately 11:35 P.M., the Gee Bee was seen heading out to sea in what could be characterized as suspicious circumstances. Besides the late hour, the weather conditions were hazardous and particularly unsuitable for boating. An east to southeast storm was forecast, promising high tides two to three feet above normal, heavy winds, rain, and low visibility. As the Gee Bee headed out to sea that night, it showed no running lights, proceeded at idle speed, and was towing two small boats, one of them with an outboard motor.
that the defendant had planned to conceal his crime by simulating an accidental boating disaster at sea. Such a jury finding is supported by evidence that when last seen the Gee Bee was towing an outboard motor boat, the means for his return trip to shore. Mary's expressed fear of the defendant supports the inference that she would not have gone on the boat voluntarily. The record is barren of any evidence of a struggle either on shore or on the boat to indicate that she was alive and forced to go on the boat. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the murder was committed within the territorial limits of Massachusetts.
Pursuant to the requirements of G. L. c. 278, Section 33E, we have reviewed the entire transcript and record and have found no basis for ordering a new trial or directing entry of a lesser verdict of guilt.
[Note 1] "[T]he Court is allowing these in evidence, not as to the truth of anything contained therein, as far as any allegations are concerned, but only, I say to you, for the purpose of showing the state of mind of Mary Gilbert on the date that it was signed, not as to the truth of anything that was said therein, but only as to her state of mind on the day she signed it. . . . I cannot be too forceful in repeating to you, do not consider these papers as to the truthfulness of anything contained therein, but only on the state of mind, as I have previously stated to you."

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 

v. 
 v.