Source: http://fsmlaw.org/pohnpei/decisions/3plr_336.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 12:33:58+00:00

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Action for a declaratory judgment that the Speaker of the Pohnpei State Legislature, had a duty pursuant to the Pohnpei State Legislature Rules of Order (SL-1L-74-86), and the Legislature's Manual of Administration to cause a resolution to be prepared for submission to the Legislature for the implementation of a pay raise mandated for the benefit of the plaintiffs by statute.
(5) whether the Speaker of the Pohnpei Legislature had a duty to implement pay raises allegedly granted to the plaintiffs under S.L. 1L-74-86.
5. the Speaker had a duty to implement the pay raises awarded to the plaintiffs pursuant to the Comprehensive Budget Act of 1986, S.L. 1L-74-86, in accordance with Standing Committee Report No. 20 of April 5, 1986.
In the absence of any Pohnpei law in a case the Court may look to other jurisdictions for guidance on any rule of law.
A plaintiff who seeks a declaratory judgment under section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1982, S.L. 2L- 160-82, need not bring a second law suit if he is successful as where the defendant refuses to abide by the Court's ruling the plaintiff will have the right to seek mandatory relief based on the declaratory judgment after reasonable notice.
The granting of a declaratory judgment by the Court against an official of the Legislature does not draw the two branches of government into confrontation, and the Court cannot shirk its constitutional duty to exercise according to law the judicial power vested in it by Article 10, Section 1, of the Pohnpei Constitution.
Under the theory of separation of powers of government, legislative, executive, and judicial powers of each branch must be preserved to it.
It is one of the fundamental principles of government that the legislative and judicial powers shall be separate.
The separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, the independence of one from the other, and the requirement that one department shall not exercise or encroach upon the powers of the others is fundamental to our [State] government.
Under the constitutional division of government powers, the executive cannot exercise judicial or legislative power, the judiciary cannot be clothed with executive or legislative power, and the legislature cannot exercise the functions of the executive or the judicial department, and the officers of any branch of government may not usurp or exercise the powers of either of the others.
The doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of each branch to carry out its constitutional functions carries with it a responsibility of each branch to cooperate with the other branches to accomplish the purpose of each constitutional provision; and each branch in exercising its prerogatives and authority, must have regard for the prerogatives and authority of the others. For any one of the three equal and coordinate branches of government to police or supervise the operations of the others strikes at the very heart and core of the entire structure.
The completeness of the separation of the three departments and their mutual independence does not extend to the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in another department, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding on every department of the state government since each department is to a limited extent affected by the action of the other departments.
The limited control a department of the State may have over the other departments is illustrated by the power of the legislative department to enact laws by which both the other departments are controlled and bound; the qualified power of the chief executive to veto legislation, and his right to convene the legislature when he chooses, and his power to grant pardons the exercise of which may practically annul the judgments of the judiciary in certain cases.
The true meaning of the doctrine of separation of powers seems to be that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the departments, and that no one department ought to possess directly or indirectly an overriding influence over the others.
The doctrine of separation of powers should be applied only to the powers which because of their nature are assigned by the constitution itself to one of the departments exclusively.
The application of the doctrine of separation of powers does not necessarily follow that an entire and complete separation is either desirable or intended, for suph a complete separation would be impracticable if not impossible, for there may be - and frequently are - areas in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers blend or overlap; and many officers whose duties cannot be exclusively placed under any one of these heads.
The modern view of separation of powers rejects the metaphysical abstractions and reverts instead to a more pragmatic, flexible, functional approach, giving recognition to the fact that there may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the three powers of government.
The doctrine of separation of powers has never been strictly or rigidly applied, and indeed could not be, to all the ramifications of state or national government, for government would prove abortive if it were attempted to follow the policy of separation to the letter.
By the doctrine of separation of powers though the legislative, judicial and executive functions are vested in different departments, one department may perform acts which, in substance, are of the character of another, but this may be done only when coupled with its own paramount power and in use of some discretion essential to its existence.
government, in that the line of demarcation between the various departments of government is not distinct and cannot be clearly and distinctly drawn, nor can the various departments of government operate entirely distinct from and without connection or dependence upon each other.
There are certain powers of government which undoubtedly belong to certain of the departments provided by the constitution, such as the right to grant pardons or veto the act of the legislature which belongs to the executive department; the right to make laws, which belongs to the legislative department; and the right to construe laws and adjust controversies between citizens, which belongs to the judicial department, but there are many other powers which may properly be assigned to one or the other of two departments.
By the principle of separation of powers of government the Court cannot encroach upon the legislative functions of the Legislature; nor can it hazard any ruling upon questions which are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather than judicial, whether or not they relate to the internal or external affairs of the Legislature.
By the principle of separation of powers of government the Court cannot control an action of the legislature with respect to duties involving the exercise of discretion.
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed on the functions of the Court by the principle of separation of powers, it is generally considered a judicial function not interfering with the prerogative of the legislature, to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature is constitutionally valid, that is to engage in what is usually referred to as judicial review of legislation.
In deciding the constitutionality of legislation, the courts are discharging their habitual function of determining the applicable law and do not invade the legislative field or usurp a non-judicial function.
The Court will not hazard to do what it is constrained by the doctrine of separation of powers from doing, but the doctrine does not provide a shield protecting the legislative branch and its officers from judicial process where the duties to be performed are of a mere ministerial character.
The courts frequently enforce by mandamus ministerial duties not involving the exercise of discretion which rest on legislative officers, including presiding officers.
The hearing and determination by the Court of a case seeking to enforce by mandamus ministerial duties not involving the exercise of discretion which rest on legislative officers, including the presiding officer, of the Pohnpei Legislature does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers of government and does not bring the judicial branch of the Pohnpei State Government into any conflict with the legislative branch.
The Legislature's Manual of Administration, to the extent that its contents are drawn from sources other than statutory sources, does not have the same status as a statute passed in accordance with the mandates of the Pohnpei Constitution, and are thus in the nature of administrative regulations having been made pursuant to an enabling statute and adopted by resolution of the Legislature.
A Legislature resolution does not clothe the Legislatures' Manual of Administration with the status of a statute, as resolutions are not the constitutional mode by which statutes are enacted by the Pohnpei Legislature.
The admixture of statutory with non-statutory provisions in the Legislature's Manual of Administration does not give the entire Manual the status of a statute. For the non-statutory provisions to have the force and effect of statute, statute must not only authorize their making but also give those provisions that effect as is usual with administrative regulations.
Inasmuch as the enabling act D.L. 4L-39-76 does not provide that the Legislature's Manual of Administration shall have the force and effect of law, it follows that save in the case of the Manual's statutory provisions and any Rules of Procedure contained therein which have been made to have the force and effect of statute by law, the contents of the Manual do not have the status of a statute.
A statute is open to construction only where the language used therein requires interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous.
Where no ambiguity appears, it has been presumed conclusively that the clear and explicit terms of a statute express the legislative intention.
A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity.
The instrument by which the Legislature speaks its will is the statute itself, accordingly in the construction of statutes it is the legislative intent manifested in the statute that is of importance and such intent must primarily be determined from the language of the statute.
The Court may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words of the statute. For that reason a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted.
A statute is ambiguous where the language used is doubtful, has double meaning, is indistinct or uncertain in meaning.
Uncertainty as to the meaning of a statute may arise from the fact that giving a literal interpretation to the words would lead to such unreasonable, unjust, impracticable, or absurd consequences as to compel a conviction that they could not have been intended by the legislature.
In finding the legislative intent the safest starting point is the statute itself, but it is by no means the safest stopping point.
In construing a statute, the words of the particular provision are to be interpreted in the light of the statute as a whole and the courts may not by construction insert or supply a case omitted, or contingency for which no provision is made, thereby giving force and effect to the language of the statute when applied to a subject about which nothing whatever is said and to all appearances was not in the minds of the legislature at the time of the enactment of the statute.
The duty of the court when construing a statute is to apply the law objectively as found and not to revise the statute by insertions or omissions in its provisions.
The true legislative intent on budgetary general appropriations cannot be determined without regard to the back ground circumstances relating to the budget and the committee reports thereon.
Use may be made by the courts of aids to the construction of the meaning of words used in a statute even where, on superficial examination, the meaning of the words seems clear. Thus to arrive at the true meaning and purpose of Section 4-7 of S.L. 1 L-74-86 (the Comprehensive Budget Act of 1986) reference may be made to Standing Finance Committee Report No. 20 of April 5, 1986, with reference tp the bill for the act.
Where a Committee Report of the Legislature is in issue and no evidence is led to show that the Committee's recommendations were rejected by the Legislature, the Court would presume that the Legislature accepted those recommendations.
The mere failure to include in legislative form the recommendations of a Committee of the Legislature as adopted by the Legislature does not deprive those recommendations of their effect in discovering the Legislature's intent in enacting the Comprehensive Budget Act of 1986.
Laws to be incorporated into the Legislature's Manual of Administration under Section 1-5 (B) (2) of D.L.4L- 39-76 includes relevant laws in force at the time of the compilation of the Manual and all laws that are enacted from time to time pertaining to the management and administration of the Legislature staff.
Budgetary statutes, including general appropriation statutes, pertain to the management and administration of the governmental branches and departments to which they relate, therefore in accordance with the provisions of section 1-5 (B) (2) of D.L. 4L-39-76, the Comprehensive Budget Act of 1986 shall be incorporated in the Legislature's Manual of Administration, and thus the Manual and the Act shall be read to gather.
By the Legislature's Manual of Administration the Speaker, as Chief Executive of the Legislature, has the ultimate responsibility for the management and administration of the Legislature staff. It is his duty to implement or cause to be implemented any law, resolution or directive pertaining to the management and administration of the staff (including their remuneration.) Thus it is his mandatory duty to implement or cause to be implemented any pay raises awarded by the Legislature to employees of the Legislature, where the duty is merely ministerial and does not call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion.
Counsel for Plaintiffs: Roberta Lindberg, Esq.
Counsel for Defendant: Daniel J. Berman, Esq.
This case came on for hearing by me on January 13, 1989. The plaintiffs were represented by Roberta J. Lindberg, Esq., of the Micronesian Legal Services Corporation, and the defendant was represented by Daniel J. Berman, Esq., having been represented at various times earlier by James Hagerstrom, Esq. and Fred Ramp, Esq. In order that I may pass properly upon the main issue and the other issues raised by the parties in this case it is necessary to make a comprehensive statement of the material facts of this case and in doing so, I must of course interpret the evidence as strongly as is reasonably possible in support of the judgment.
duty pursuant to S.L. 1L-74-86, the Pohnpei Legislature Rules of Order and the Legislature's Manual of Administration to cause a resolution to be prepared for submission to the Legislature for the implementation of a pay raise mandated for the benefit of the plaintiffs by that statute.
The plaintiffs claim that their title to the increased salaries is based on the Legislature's Committee on Finance Report No. 20 in reference to the bill which was passed as S.L. No. 1L-74-86, which report placed them on certain enhanced levels of pay.
judgment, were it to be given, would then proceed to some compelling order, mandamus in nature, and would be a blatant violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The defendant accordingly brought a motion to dismiss which I denied.
After a lapse of time and before the case could be heard on its merits counsel for the parties filed a Settlement Agreement dated April 14, 1988, by which the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the action upon the payment by the defendant of the back salaries in specified amounts by certain dates. The defendant appears to have repudiated this agreement and the plaintiffs do not seem to be enforcing it. I shall therefore say no more about it.
Notwithstanding the said agreement, the defendant filed a motion on July 6,1988, asking the Court to dismiss the case on the ground that he had done what the plaintiffs wanted, namely the introduction of the resolution required to implement S.L. 1L-74-86 which they alleged awarded them the pay increases, and that there was no longer any controversy between the parties to be resolved by the Court. He said the question was moot.
motion opposing the defendant's motion to dismiss, and for leave to file an Amended and Supplemental Complaint. They contended that not until they had received the pay raise they were seeking the controversy was not moot.
On July 29,1988, this Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and granted the plaintiffs' motion opposing dismissal and for leave to file an Amended and Supplemental Complaint.
"9. On April 5, 1986, the Pohnpei Legislature Committee on Finance submitted its Standing Committee Report No. 20 in reference to the bill referred to in paragraph 6 above.
10. The Legislature adopted the bill referred to in paragraph 6 above in the form recommended by its Committee on Finance.
11. When the bill referred to in paragraph 6 above became law, it was designated S.L. 1L-74-86.
12. S.L. 1L-74-86 authorized for expenditure and appropriated funds for the operation of the Division of Legislative Counsel of the Office of the Legislature.
13. S.L. No. 1L-74-86 authorized for expenditure and appropriated funds to provide for an increase of six pay levels for each of the plaintiffs, beginning with the start of the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1986 (July 1, 1986).
14. The Committee on Finance report referred to in paragraph 9 above specified that plaintiff WEITAL be placed on step 3 of pay level 19, and that plaintiff DAMARLANE also be placed on Step 3 of pay level 19. Pay levels are determined in accordance with the Pohnpei Government Salary Conversion Act of 1985, S.L. No. 1L-71-86, section 2-1.
15. Defendant ANNES LEBEN, as Speaker of the Pohnpei Legislature, is responsible for the functioning of the Legislative staff, including the Division of the Legislative Counsel where plaintiff WEITAL is employed and where plaintiff DAMARLANE was employed.
16. As Speaker of the Legislature, Defendant LEBEN has a legal duty pursuant to S.L 1L-74-86 to implement the pay increases for plaintiffs beginning July 1, 1986.
the pay increase for plaintiffs beginning July 1,1986.
18. Plaintiffs have not received the salary increases to which they were entitled as of July 1, 1986, and therefore have been damaged by defendant LEBEN's failure to perform his legal duty.
19. In April, 1988, the Pohnpei Legislature authorized and appropriated funds forthe purpose of settling this lawsuit by paying the plaintiffs the back wages to which they are entitled.
20. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment declaring that defendant LEBEN has a legal duty to implement the pay raise for plaintiffs beginning July 1, 1986.
3. Ordering such further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable."
2. To Weital, the sum of $9,802.75 through September 2, 1988. The plaintiffs' argument in support of this motion is that there is no genuine issue as to material fact as the facts of the case, which are in most instances matters of public record, have not changed, except the amounts of back pay sought by the plaintiffs. These amounts were computed by comparing the amounts each plaintiff actually received with the amounts each would have received had the pay raises they seek been implemented on July 1, 1986.
Legislative Counsel of the Office of the Legislature. They go on to say, that "Examined in isolation, the statute itself does not indicate how the $126,800 figure was arrived at, or what it is intended to be used for, other than personnel cost," but section 47 of Standing Committee Report No. 20 dated April 5, 1986, which is central to this case shows the clear intent of the Legislature to provide the necessary funds to raise the pay of the plaintiffs. What this Report contains appears at a later point in this Opinion.
the Legislature required in 1986 had now been reaffirmed in 1988, that is they should receive a raise in pay to eliminate a disparity in their compensation. They thus urge the Court to enter summary judgment in their favor.
that defendant Leben has a legal duty to implement the pay raise for the plaintiffs beginning July 1, 1986.
(3) that the Court is without jurisdiction in matters that are moot for which there is no case or controversy.
is merely an effort to avoid the legal principle of separation of powers between the branches of government as set forth in People of Kapingamarangi v. Pohnpei Legislature, PCA No. 188-85 (Pon. Tr.Div.2/4/85). And in his cross-motion for summary judgment, the defendant urges the Court pursuant to Rule 5 (c) of the Pohnpei Rules of Civil Procedure to grant an order declaring that the defendant has no duty, legal or otherwise, to increase the pay of plaintiff Weital or to pay plaintiff Damarlane for any alleged increases from their assigned grade levels.
of higher grades and pay, the plaintiffs cannot enforce any rights based on a Committee Report's "recommendations".
On the other hand the plaintiffs argue that the Committee Report provides clear and unequivocal (and uncontradicted) evidence of the Legislature's intent in appropriating a specific amount of funds for the Legislative Counsel Division's personnel account.
(5) whether the Speaker of the Pohnpei Legislature has a duty to implement pay raises allegedly granted to the plaintiffs under S.L. 1L-74-86.
 I now address these issues one by one having regard to the submissions of the parties. As has been the practice of this Court I shall, in the absence of a Pohnpei law, look to other jurisdictions for guidance on any rule of law where the nature of this case requires.
them to reach into and interfere with the inner political workings of the Pohnpei Legislature." The defendant took the liberty to remind this Court that it has in the past been very sensitive and alert to avoid political entanglement with the Legislature when this Court ruled against its authority to enter an Order of Mandamus against the Pohnpei Legislature in the case of People of Kapingamarangi v. Pohnpei Legislature PCA 188-85 (Pon. Tr. Div. 2/4/88). This position is, of course, challenged by the plaintiff.
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, any court of this State, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment. (emphasis added).
 Further, I agree with the plaintiffs that the law as it stands makes a second law suit unnecessary in the event that they are successful, and that where the defendant in a case refuses to abide by the Court's ruling the plaintiffs will have the right to seek mandatory relief based on the declaratory judgment after reasonable notice and hearing. In my opinion, therefore, this Court may grant a declaratory judgment in this case, a case of actual controversy, declaring the legal and other relations of the plaintiffs whether or not further relief is or could be sought by the plaintiffs.
Pohnpei Constitution. If the defendant's submissions were meant to deter this Court from entertaining actions of this nature, I must say, without reservations, that this Court cannot shirk, and cannot be influenced by any means be they threats or promises to abandon, its constitutional duty to exercise according to law the judicial power vested in it by Article 10, Section 1, of the Pohnpei Constitution.
[5-7] It has long been established that under the theory of separation of powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial powers of each branch must be preserved to it. Wilson v. School Dist., 113 ALR 1401. It is one of the fundamental principles of government thatthe legislative and judicial powers shall be separate. People ex rel. Leaf v. Orvis, 132 ALR 1382. The separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, the independence of one from the other, and the requirement that one department shall not exercise or encroach upon the powers of the others is fundamental in our (U.S. Federal and State) government, State of West Virginia v. Huber 168 ALR 808, People of Kapingamarangi v. Pohnpei State Legislature, PCA 188-85 (Poh. Tr. Div. 2/4/85).
executive cannot exercise judicial or legislative power, the judiciary cannot be clothed with executive or legislative power, and the legislature cannot exercise the functions of the executive or judicial department. Langever v. Miller, 96 ALR 836, and officers of any branch of the government may not usurp or exercise the powers of either of the others. State ex rel DuFresne v. Leslie, 50 P. 2d 959.  "Indeed the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of each branch to carry out its constitutional functions carries with it a responsibility of each branch to cooperate with the other branches to accomplish the purpose of each constitutional provision; and each branch in exercising its prerogatives and authority, must have regard for the prerogatives and authority of the others. For any one of the three equal and co-ordinate branches of government to police or supervise the operations of the others strikes at the very heart and core of the entire structure.
tions, though the legislative, judicial and executive functions are vested in different departments, one department may perform acts which, in substance, are of the character of another, yet this may be done only when coupled with its own paramount power and in use of some discretion essential to its existence. Watkins v. Lessee of Holman, 41 U.S. 25, 10 L. Ed 873. This is what has led to what has been referred to as "the blending of powers of government". In other words, the line of demarcation between the various departments of government is not distinct and cannot be clearly and distinctly drawn. Nor can the various departments of government operate entirely distinct from and without connection or dependence upon each other. There are certain powers of government which undoubtedly belong to certain of the departments provided by the constitution, such as the right to grant pardons or veto the act of the Legislature, which belongs to the executive department; the right to make laws, which belongs to the legislative; and the right to construe laws and adjust controversies between citizens, which belongs to the judicial department. There are many other powers which may properly be assigned to one or the other of two departments. People v. Kelly 80 ALR 890.
[20-21] It follows from this principle of separation of powers of government that this Court cannot encroach upon the legislative functions of the Legislature. See Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond Mortgage Co. 289 U.S. 266, 275, Greenwood Cemetery Land Co., v. Routt 28 P 1125, Fergus v. Marks 46 ALR 960. Nor can this Court hazard any ruling upon questions which are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather than judicial, whether or not they relate to the internal or external affairs of the Legislature. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath 341 U. S.123. Neither can this Court control an action of the Legislature with respect to duties involving the exercise of discretion. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage 377 P 2d 299.
cable law and do not invade the legislative field or usurp a nonjudicial function. In Re Petition of Idaho State Federation of Labor 272 P 2d 707; see also Bowe v. Secretary of Commonwealth of Massachusetts 167 ALR 1447.
 This Court will not hazard to do what it is constrained by the doctrine of separation of powers from doing. However, the doctrine of separation of powers does not provide a shield protecting the legislative branch and its officers from judicial process where the duties to be performed are of a mere ministerial character. State ex re/. Donnell v. Osburn 136 ALR 667.
this action is not one against the Legislature requiring that body to discharge any legislative functions. It is against the Speaker, an officer of the Legislature, to perform a duty. The plaintiffs have standing before the Court but whether or not they are entitled to the relief they seek is an entirely separate question to be determined.
Before addressing the arguments of the parties in this connection I think it is important to find out what the Legislature Manual of Administration is and the purpose it serves.
District Law No. 4L-39-76, Section 1-5, which establishes the Legislature Manual of Administration provides that it shall incorporate all provisions for the administration and management of the Legislature staff. The Manual shall be adopted by Resolution and it shall provide the means for disseminating in an orderly fashion, instructions from the Legislature relative to the management and administration of such staff, its organization, delegations of authority, policies and certain procedures and general and continuous application affecting the day-to-day administrative operations of the staff.
"All laws, resolutions, Rules of Procedure and other directives of the Legislature pertaining to the management and administration of the Legislature staff shall be incorporated into the Manual. The members of the staff shall submit to the Speaker of the Legislature, their recommendations relating to the organization, delegation of authority, or changes in basic policy in the Manual. The Speaker shall review and present such recommendations to the Legislature for their adoption and incorporation in the Manual; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that if the Legislature is not in session, the Speaker shall submit such approved recommendations to the Judiciary and Governmental Relations Committee which shall have the power to approve such recommendations for incorporation in the Manual, subject to appeal to the Legislature by any Legislator."
and has the full force and effect of statutory law, but the plaintiffs assert thatthough D.L. 4L-39-76 provides forthe Manual it does not adopt the contents and that the fact that D.L. 4L-39-76 authorized the Manual does not and cannot give its contents the status of a statute. The plaintiffs also contend, and I think rightly so, that the constitutionally accepted procedure for adopting statutes is set out in Article 8, Sections 12 through 14 ofthe Pohnpei Constitution, and that the Manual was not adopted according to that procedure therefore it cannot have the force and effect of a statute.
for the enactment of statutes for its adoption. Indeed it was adopted only by a resolution of the Legislature. Assuming then that the contents of the Manual are drawn only from sources other than statutory sources, the Manual cannot have the same status as a statute passed in accordance with the mandates of the Constitution. In my opinion in the event the Manual's contents are nonstatutory, that it to say not derived from statute, then the Manual will be in the nature of administrative regulations having been made pursuant to an enabling statute and adopted by resolution of the Legislature. The Legislature resolution does not clothe the Manual with status of a statute as resolutions are not the constitutional mode by which statutes are enacted.
statutory with non-statutory provisions in the Manual does not give the entire Manual the status of a statute. For the non-statutory provisions to have the force and effect of statute, statute must not only authorize their making but also give those provisions that effect as is usual with administrative regulations. Nothing in D.L. 4L-39-76 shows that the Manual shall have the force and effect of law. It follows, therefore, that save in the case of its statutory provisions and any Rules of Procedure contained therein which have been made to have the force and effect of statute by law, the contents of the Legislature's Manual of Administration do not have the status of a statute. Another way of putting it is that it is the statutes or rules having such force in themselves that have the force and effect of law and not those provisions as incorporated in the Manual which has no such status because the statute which authorizes the Manual does not give the Manual such force.
(4) Construction of the Comprehensive Budget Act of 1986, S.L. 1L-74-86, whether the Legislature's intent was to grant pay raises to the plaintiffs.
sive Budget Act of 1986, S.L. 1L-74-86. Whilst the plaintiffs claim that the Legislature's intent to be discovered from the Finance Committee Report relating to the Bill which was passed as S.L. 1L-74-86, was to grant pay raises to the plaintiffs when the Act appropriated the precise amount of funds needed by the Legislative Counsel Division of the Office of the Legislature to put into effect the pay raises, the defendant on the other hand denies this. This Court is therefore called upon to interpret the relevant provisions of the Act as to its true meaning.
(2) All other accounts 48,750"
[35-36] The instrument by which the Legislature speaks its will is the statute itself, accordingly in the construction of statutes it is the legislative intent manifested in the statute that is of importance and such intent must primarily be determined from the language of the statute. The court may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. For that reason it has been declared that a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted. McClain v. Commr of Internal Revenue 311 U.S. 527.
the fact that giving a literal interpretation to the words would lead to such unreasonable, unjust, impracticable, or absurd consequences as to compel a conviction that they could not have been intended by the legislature. State by State Highway Com. v. Rawson 312 P 2d 849.
[34-41] In finding the legislative intent it has been said that the safest starting point is certainly the statute itself. But it is by no means the safest stopping point. Before the true meaning of the statute can be determined consideration must be given to the problem in society to which the legislature addressed itself, prior legislative consideration of the problem, the legislative history of the statute under litigation, and the operation and administration of the statute prior to litigation. Sutherland Statutory Construction Section 4505. Statutory interpretation is a fact issue, therefore where available, the courts should never exclude relevant evidence on that issue of fact. (See Sutherland, Section 4502 (Supra)).
background circumstances which brought the problem before the legislature, the legislative committee reports, the statements of the committee chairman and the course of the enactment. An honestly conducted inquiry into these considerations will, more often than not, disclose the purpose and intent of the legislature and will clarify the position whether or not the statute is applicable to the question in litigation. Sutherland, Section 4506 (Supra). The words of a particular provision of a statute are to be interpreted in the light of the statute as a whole and the courts may not by construction insert or supply a case omitted, or contingency for which no provision is made, thereby giving force and effect to the language of a statute when applied to a subject about which nothing whatever is said and to all appearances was not in the minds of the legislature at the time of the enactment of the statute. Bartron v. Codington County 140 ALR 550. The duty of the court is to apply the law objectively as found and notto revise it by insertions or omissions in its provisions.
and recommends that each position title be given one pay level while steps should reflect seniority of incumbents. Your Committee recommends that the Assistant Legislative Counsel position be placed on pay level 22 and the legislative aide position be placed on pay level 19. To reflect the seniority of the incumbents of the positions, your Committee recommends that ALC Biza and Legislative Aides Susaia, Weital, and Damarlane be placed on steps 8, 6, 3, and 3 of their assigned levels respectively. New aides should be placed on step 1 of their assigned pay level. Your Committee recommends that these conversions not be implemented until the beginning of fourth quarter of this fiscal year."
is enacted in accordance with a format that is regularly used in such enactments, i.e. without providing much detail as to what the general appropriations are intended for. For that reason the mere failure to include in legislative form the recommendations of the Committee as adopted by the Legislature does not deprive those recommendations of their effect in discovering the Legislature's intent in enacting S.L. 1L-74-86. The plaintiffs are, therefore, in consonance with S.L. 1L-74-86 as elaborated by Standing Finance Committee Report No. 20 of April 5,1986, entitled to the pay raises they seek.
at the time of the compilation of the Manual but I do not think it makes sense to limit the contents of the Manual to such Laws, hence I hold that "Laws" includes all laws pertaining to the management and administration of such staff that are enacted from time to time. I am convinced in my mind that budgetary statutes, including general appropriation statutes, pertain to the management and administration of the governmental branches and departments to which they relate. As such the provisions of S.L. 1L-74-86, the Pohnpei Comprehensive Budget Act for the Fiscal Year 1986 (otherwise referred to as the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1986) as detailed in Standing Finance Committee Report No. 20 of April 5,1986, shall in accordance with D.L. 4L-3976, section 1-5 (b)(2) be incorporated in the Legislature Manual of Administration. This is a mandatory requirement. S.L. 1L-74-86 requires no compliance of this mandatory provision for its force and effect. The Legislature Manual of Administration shall therefore be read together with and as including S.L. 1L-74-76. On this basis too, the plaintiffs are entitled to the pay raise they seek.
Speaker, as Chief Executive of the Legislature, has the ultimate responsibility for the management and administration of the Legislature staff. It is his duty to implement orcause to be implemented any law, resolution or directive pertaining to the management and administration of the staff (including their remuneration.) It follows naturally, therefore, that it is his duty to implement or cause to be implemented the pay raises awarded to the plaintiffs pursuant to the Comprehensive Budget Act of 1986, S.L. 1L-74-86, appropriation for the Legislative Counsel Division of the Office of the Legislature as specifically detailed in the Standing Committee Report No. 20 of April 5, 1986. This duty of the Speaker is merely ministerial and does not call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion.
5. the Speaker has a duty to implement the pay raises awarded to the plaintiffs pursuant to the Comprehensive Budget Act of 1986, S.L. 1L-74-86, in accordance with Standing Finance Committee Report No. 20 of April 5, 1986.
1. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 408 F. Supp 321 (1976), affd.433 U.S. 425, 53 L Ed 2d 867, 97 S Ct 277.
2. Bailey v. State Board of Public Affairs et al., 153 P. 2d 235.

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