Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/389/81.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 07:12:42+00:00

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Respondent brought this action in a West Virginia circuit court alleging that three editorials in petitioner's newspaper criticizing his official conduct as court clerk had libeled him. The jury had been instructed in part that it could find for respondent if it were shown that petitioner had published the editorials "with bad or corrupt motive," or "from personal spite, ill will or a desire to injure plaintiff." Respondent contended that there was sufficient proof for the jury to find that petitioner published the statements with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The jury awarded respondent damages and the State Supreme Court of Appeals denied appellate review. Held: The Court's independent examination of the whole record does not reveal that any failure of petitioner to make a prior investigation constituted proof sufficient to present a jury question whether the statements were published with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 -288 (1964).
Thurman Arnold and Jack A. Mann for petitioner.
Respondent Hanks is the elected Clerk of the Criminal and Circuit Courts of Raleigh County, West Virginia. He brought this libel action in the West Virginia Circuit Court, Wyoming County, alleging that during his reelection campaign he was libeled by three editorials, highly critical of his official conduct, which appeared in petitioner's morning newspaper. The jury returned a verdict for respondent and awarded him $5,000 damages. [389 U.S. 81, 82] The State Supreme Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for appellate review.
Although this action was tried subsequent to the decisions of this Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), and despite the fact that it was recognized at trial that the principles of New York Times were applicable, the case went to the jury on instructions which were clearly impermissible. The jury was instructed in part that it could find for the respondent if it were shown that petitioner had published the editorials "with bad or corrupt motive," or "from personal spite, ill will or a desire to injure plaintiff." Because petitioner failed to object to this erroneous interpretation of New York Times at trial, and in fact offered instructions which were themselves inadequate, the issue of these instructions is not before us. However, since it is clear that the jury verdict was rendered upon instructions which misstated the law and since petitioner has properly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, we have undertaken an independent examination of the record as a whole "so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 285. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 156 -159 (1967) (opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN); id., at 168-170 (opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE).
In New York Times we held that the Constitution forbids recovery of damages in a civil libel action by a public official, such as respondent, "for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless [389 U.S. 81, 83] disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S., at 279 -280. Our examination of the whole record satisfies us that "the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands . . . ." 376 U.S., at 285 -286.
"Here, again, [Mrs. Hurt] seems to want to follow in the footsteps of Hanks. For it was Hanks who ordered over the telephone once that he did not want his name to appear in the Beckley Post-Herald again. He backed up this order with an inexplicit threat - one merely intended to frighten those who are easily intimidated.
"Q. But you can't tell this jury that any specific investigation was made before this man was attacked in any of these articles, can you?
"A. We watch the activities of the public servant. You don't have to make an investigation. His whole life is out in front of everybody.
"Q. Those editorials were not written by anybody who wanted to find out whether or not he threatened Mrs. Hurt, were they?
"A. There was cause on their part to feel there was that possibility.
"A. That's right. `Perhaps,' they said.
We reject respondent's contention. Neither this passage nor anything else in the record reveals "the high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity demanded by New York Times . . . ." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 ; it cannot be said on this record that any failure of petitioner to make a prior investigation constituted [389 U.S. 81, 85] proof sufficient to present a jury question whether the statements were published with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 287-288; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 -389 (1967). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, at 153-154 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his concurring opinions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 , and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 .

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