Source: https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/time-limitations-and-stale-claims-in-investment-arbitration/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:26:58+00:00

Document:
Investment arbitration sometimes deals with legal issues that are particularly well-rooted in national laws, whereas their application at the international level is less evident. One of these issues revolves around the concept of time limitations. In fact, host States of investment might build their defence based on this concept, arguing that investors’ claims are stale, i.e., shall be time-barred, given that a considerable period of time has elapsed between the date when the dispute arose and the date of initiation of arbitral proceedings.
In this respect, a basic question emerges: does international law, or international investment law, require that investors bring their case in arbitration within any specific laps of time?
In order to answer this question, a difference needs to be drawn between limitation periods and extinctive prescription, although some arbitral tribunal appear not to differentiate these principles.
A dispute may be submitted for resolution pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of this Article after sixty (60) days from the date of notice of intent to do so was provided to the Party, party to the dispute, but not later than five (5) years from the date the investor first acquired or should have acquired knowledge of the events which gave rise to the dispute.
The Tribunal has found nothing in the NIPC Act which indicates the time frame for bringing a claim for breach of that Act. Rather, the limits under Nigerian law which have been drawn to the Tribunal’s attention address court actions related to contract claims or claims against the government.
Although limits under Nigerian law exist with respect to court actions related to contract claims and court actions against the government, none proves relevant to this arbitration, which relates to violation of international law. By their nature, the Claimants’ requests sound in expropriation of property, alleging that the government conspired with Mr. Fadeyi to wrest control of Pan Ocean from its rightful owners.
While there is no statute of limitations under international law and, therefore, a treaty claim cannot be time barred per se, a host State may rely upon the equitable notion of extinctive prescription in an attempt to defeat the claims.
The concept of extinctive prescription corresponds to the common law doctrine of laches, which is a principle based on equity, derived from the Latin maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit(equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights).
The Court recognizes that, even in the absence of any applicable treaty provision, delay on the part of a claimant State may render an application inadmissible. It notes, however, that international law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regard. It is therefore for the Court to determine in the light of the circumstances of each case whether the passage of time renders an application inadmissible.
The principle of prescription finds its foundation in the highest equity — the avoidance of possible injustice to the defendant, the claimant having had ample time to bring his action, and therefore if he has lost, having only his own negligence to accuse.
The inclusion of relevant circumstances is what distinguishes a statute of limitations under national law and the theory of extinctive prescription. As pointed out by one commentator “unlike under municipal law, prescription under international law therefore is based on two considerations: delay and actual prejudice for the respondent.”Such prejudice occurs when delay in presenting claims produces “certain inevitable results, among which are the destruction or obscuration of evidence by which the equality of parties is disturbed or destroyed, and, as a consequence, renders the accomplishment of exact or even approximate justice impossible”.
Municipal statutes of limitation have not been considered as binding on claims before an international tribunal, although such periods may be taken into account by such a tribunal when determining the effect of an unreasonable delay in pursuing a claim.
 Salini Impregilo v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/39, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 23 February 2018, p. 26, para. 83.
 Salini Impregilo v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/39, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 23 February 2018, p. 26, para. 84.
 Interocean Oil Development Company v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/20, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 29 October 2014, p. 26, paras. 123-124 (emphasis added).
 Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, Decision on Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Liability, 21 April 2015, p. 52, para. 147.
 A. Ray Ibrahim, The Doctrine of Laches in International Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 647 (1997), pp. 647 and 649.
 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 253-254, para. 32.
 Gentini Case, Italy-Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission (1903), R.S.A., Vol. X, p. 558.
 Ch. Tams, ‘Waiver, Acquiescence, and Extinctive Prescription’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet & S. Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility, (Oxford, 2010), p. 21.
 Case of Ann Eulogia Garcia Cadiz (Loretta G. Barberie) v. Venezuela, Opinion of the Commissioner, Mr. Findlay, R.S.A., Vol. XXIX, p. 298. Salini Impregilo v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/39, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 23 February 2018, p. 26, paras. 85-94.
 See e.g., Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, 8 December 2000, paras.102-110.

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