Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/358/354/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:34:03+00:00

Document:
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.
Petitioner, a Spanish subject, was employed on board a ship of Spanish flag and registry, owned by a Spanish corporation, for a voyage beginning and ending in Spain. He was injured while the ship was in American territorial waters, and he filed suit on the law side of a Federal District Court in New York. He claimed damages under the Jones Act and under the general maritime law for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and negligence against his Spanish employer and a New York corporation which acted as its husbanding agent in New York. Damages for negligence under the general maritime law were claimed against two other American corporations engaged in operations related to loading freight in New Jersey. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. Jurisdiction under the Jones Act was adequately alleged. P. 358 U. S. 359.
2. Jurisdiction on the law side of claims based on the general maritime law is not granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pp. 358 U. S. 359-380.
3. There was jurisdiction, "pendent" to jurisdiction under the Jones Act, to determine whether the claims against the Spanish corporation based on general maritime law stated a cause of action. Pp. 358 U. S. 380-381.
4. There was jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 over the claims under the general maritime law against the three American corporations. P. 358 U. S. 381.
5. Neither the Jones Act nor the general maritime law of the United States is applicable to the claims against the foreign shipowner. Pp. 358 U. S. 381-384.
6. The claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure against the husbanding agent were properly dismissed in light of the District Court's findings of fact. Pp. 358 U. S. 384-385.
7. The case must be remanded for consideration of the claims against the three American corporation based on negligence. P. 358 U. S. 385.
244 F. 2d 409, judgment vacated and cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
flag, and was owned by respondent Compania Trasatlantica (also known as Spanish Line), a Spanish corporation. At the completion of the voyage for which he signed, Romero continued uninterruptedly to work on the Guadalupe. Thereby, under the law of Spain, the terms and conditions of the original contract of hire remained in force. Subsequently the S.S. Guadalupe departed from the port of Bilbao in northern Spain, touched briefly at other Spanish ports, and sailed to the port of New York at Hoboken. From here the ship made a brief trip to the ports of Vera Cruz and Havana, returning to Hoboken, where, on May 12, 1954, Romero was seriously injured when struck by a cable on the deck of the Guadalupe. Thereupon, petitioner filed suit on the law side of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
of grain. International Terminal, incorporated in Delaware, was employed as stevedore to load the cargo. The jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked under the Jones Act and §§ 1331 [Footnote 2] and 1332 [Footnote 3] of the Judicial Code.
held that the action under the Jones Act against Compania Trasatlantica must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, since that Act provided no right of action for an alien seaman against a foreign shipowner under the circumstances detailed above. The claims under the general maritime law against Compania also were dismissed, since the parties were not of diverse citizenship, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, did not confer jurisdiction on the federal law courts over claims rooted in federal maritime law. The District Court dismissed the Jones Act claim against Garcia & Diaz, Inc., pursuant to its finding that Garcia was not the employer of Romero nor, as a husbanding agent for Compania, did it have the operation and control of the vessel. The remaining claims, including those against the other respondents, were dismissed because of lack of the requisite complete diversity under the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267. Upon examination of the Spanish law, the district judge also declined jurisdiction "even in admiralty as a matter of discretion." 142 F.Supp. at 574. The Spanish law provides Romero with a lifetime pension of 35% to 55% of his seaman's wages, which may be increased by one-half if the negligence of the shipowner is established; it also allows the recovery of the Spanish counterpart of maintenance and cure. These rights under the Spanish law may be enforced through the Spanish consul in New York.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, 244 F.2d 409. We granted certiorari, 355 U.S. 807, because of the conflict among Courts of Appeals as to the proper construction of the relevant provision of the Judiciary Act of 1875 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1331) and because of questions raised regarding the applicability of Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, to the situation before us. The case was argued during the last Term and restored to the calendar for reargument during the present Term. 356 U.S. 955.
(a) Jurisdiction under the Jones Act. -- The District Court dismissed petitioner's Jones Act claims for lack of jurisdiction.
"As frequently happens where jurisdiction depends on subject matter, the question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question whether the complaint states a cause of action."
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 341 U. S. 249. Petitioner asserts a substantial claim that the Jones Act affords him a right of recovery for the negligence of his employer. Such assertion alone is sufficient to empower the District Court to assume jurisdiction over the case and determine whether, in fact, the Act does provide the claimed rights.
"A cause of action under our law was asserted here, and the court had power to determine whether it was or was not well founded in law and in fact."
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, 345 U. S. 575.
the law side of the lower federal courts has recently been raised in litigation, and has become the subject of conflicting decisions among Courts of Appeals. Jurisdiction has been sustained in the First Circuit, Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, and denied in the Second and Third, Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662; Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615. See also Jenkins v. Roderick, 156 F.Supp. 299. Such conflict in the construction of an old and important statute calls for a full exposition of the problem.
Abstractly stated, the problem is the ordinary task of a court to apply the words of a statute according to their proper construction. But "proper construction" is not satisfied by taking the words as if they were self-contained phrases. So considered, the words do not yield the meaning of the statute. The words we have to construe are not only words with a history. They express an enactment that is part of a serial, and a serial that must be related to Article III of the Constitution, the watershed of all judiciary legislation, and to the enactments which have derived from that Article. Moreover, Article III itself has its sources in history. These give content and meaning to its pithy phrases. Rationally construed, the Act of 1875 must be considered part of an organic growth -- part of the evolutionary process of judiciary legislation that began September 24, 1789, and projects into the future.
and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law "inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 285 U. S. 55, and to continue the development of this law within constitutional limits. (3) It empowered Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution. See Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 285 U. S. 55.
Section 9 not only established federal courts for the administration of maritime law; it recognized that some remedies in matters maritime had been traditionally administered by common law courts of the original States. [Footnote 12] This role of the States in the administration of maritime law was preserved in the famous "saving clause" -- "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." [Footnote 13] Since the original Judiciary Act also endowed the federal courts with diversity jurisdiction, common law remedies for maritime causes could be enforced by the then Circuit Courts when the proper diversity of parties afforded access.
"all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. . . . [Footnote 17]"
"to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."
affirmatively indicates that this was the source. [Footnote 18] Thus, the Act of 1875 drew on the scope of this provision of clause 1, just as the Judiciary Act of 1789 reflected the constitutional authorization of Clause 1 of Section 2, which extended the judicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."
"We are therefore to inquire whether cases in admiralty and cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States are identical."
"If we have recourse to that pure fountain from which all the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is derived, we find language employed which cannot well be misunderstood. The Constitution declares, that"
consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
"The Constitution certainly contemplates these as three distinct classes of cases, and, if they are distinct, the grant of jurisdiction over one of them does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other two. The discrimination made between them in the Constitution is, we think, conclusive against their identity."
See also The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391.
Of course, all cases to which "judicial power" extends "arise," in a comprehensive, nonjurisdictional sense of the term, "under this Constitution." It is the Constitution that is the ultimate source of all "judicial Power" -- defines grants and implies limits -- and so, "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" arise under the Constitution in the sense that they have constitutional sanction. But they are not "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States. . . ."
Indeed, until 1950, in a dictum in Jansson v. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212, 217-218, followed by an opinion in Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, judges, scholars, and lawyers alike made the unquestioned assumption that the original maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts had, for all practical purposes, been left unchanged since the Act of 1789. Thus, Mr. Justice Clifford, an experienced admiralty judge, in 1876, one year after the passage of the Act here in question, could reiterate the classic formulation without the faintest indication of doubt as to its continued vitality.
"Parties in maritime cases are not . . . compelled to proceed in the admiralty at all, as they may resort to their common law remedy in the State courts, or in the Circuit Court, if the party seeking redress and the other party are citizens of different States. [Footnote 26]"
On the basis of an examination of sixty-six treatises on federal jurisdiction and on admiralty, and of a search of the reports, it can be confidently asserted that, for the seventy-four years following Mr. Justice Clifford's opinion, there is not a single professional utterance of legal opinion -- by judges, lawyers, or commentators -- disagreeing with his formulation. [Footnote 27] Negative testimony is often as compelling as bits of affirmative evidence. It is especially compelling when it comes from those whose scholarly or professional specialty was the jurisdiction of the federal courts and the practice of maritime law. Petitioner now asks us to hold that no student of the jurisdiction of the federal courts or of admiralty, no judge, and none of the learned and alert members of the admiralty bar were able, for seventy-five years, to discern the drastic change now asserted to have been contrived in admiralty jurisdiction by the Act of 1875. In light of such impressive testimony from the past, the claim of a sudden discovery of a hidden latent meaning in an old technical phrase is surely suspect.
judges, lawyers or scholars for seventy-five years because it is not there.
It is also significant that, in the entire history of federal maritime legislation, whether before the passage of the Act of 1875 (e.g., the Great Lakes Act -- also a general jurisdictional statute and one often termed an anomaly in the maritime law because of its jury trial provision), or after (the Jones Act), Congress has not once left the availability of a trial on the law side to inference. It has made specific provision. [Footnote 28] It is difficult to accept that, in 1875, and in 1875 alone, a most far-reaching change was made subterraneously.
Not only would the infusion of general maritime jurisdiction into the Act of 1875 disregard the obvious construction of that statute. Important difficulties of judicial policy would flow from such an interpretation, an interpretation which would have a disruptive effect on the traditional allocation of power over maritime affairs in our federal system.
removable under § 1441 of Title 28. [Footnote 30] The interpretation of the Act of 1875 contended for would have consequences more deeply felt than the elimination of a suitor's traditional choice of forum. By making maritime cases removable to the federal courts it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters -- a jurisdiction which it was the unquestioned aim of the saving clause of 1789 to preserve. This disruption of principle is emphasized by the few cases actually involved. [Footnote 31] This small number of cases is only important in that it negatives the pressure of any practical consideration for the subversion of a principle so long established and so deeply rooted. The role of the States in the development of maritime law is a role whose significance is rooted in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the decisions of this Court. [Footnote 32] Recognition of the part the States have played from the beginning has a dual significance. It indicates the extent to which an expanded view of the Act of 1875 would eviscerate the postulates of the saving clause, and it undermines the theoretical basis for giving the Act of 1875 a brand new meaning.
federal system, allocations of jurisdiction have been carefully wrought to correspond to the realities of power and interest and national policy. To give a novel sweep to the Act would disrupt traditional maritime policies, and quite gratuitously disturb a complementary, historic interacting federal-state relationship.
An infusion of general maritime jurisdiction into the "federal question" grant would not occasion merely an isolated change; it would generate many new complicated problems. If jurisdiction of maritime claims were allowed to be invoked under § 1331, it would become necessary for courts to decide whether the action "arises under federal law," and this jurisdictional decision would largely depend on whether the governing law is state or federal. Determinations of this nature are among the most difficult and subtle that federal courts are called upon to make. [Footnote 43] Last Term's decision in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S. 221, illustrates the difficulties raised by the attempted application of a state statute of limitations to maritime personal injury actions. These problems result from the effort to fit state laws into the scheme of federal maritime law.
regulate or federal law must govern. For example, if a State allowed the survival of a cause of action based on unseaworthiness as defined in the maritime law, it was immaterial whether the standard was federal and governed by decisions of this Court, or was subject to state variations. [Footnote 44] Thus, we have been able to deal with such conceptual problems in the context of a specific conflict and a specific application of policy, as is so well illustrated by the McAllister case. However, such practical considerations for adjudication would be unavailable under an expanded view of § 1331. Federal courts would be forced to determine the respective spheres of state and federal legislative competence, the source of the governing law, as a preliminary question of jurisdiction; for only if the applicable law is "federal" law would jurisdiction be proper under § 1331. The necessity for jurisdictional determinations couched in terms of "state" or "federal law" would destroy that salutary flexibility which enables the courts to deal with "source of law" problems in light of the necessities illuminated by the particular question to be answered. Certainly sound judicial policy does not encourage a situation which necessitates constant adjudication of the boundaries of state and federal competence.
Although it is true that the supremacy of federal maritime law over conflicting state law has recently been greatly extended, the federal nature of the maritime law administered in the federal courts has long been an accepted part of admiralty jurisprudence. The classic statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 257 U. S. 432, summed up the accepted view that maritime law derived its force from the National Government and was part of the laws of the United States; and this was merely a restatement of a view which was clearly set forth in 1874 in The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558. [Footnote 49] Thus, the theory which underlies the effort to infuse general maritime jurisdiction into the Act of 1875 rests on no novel development in maritime law, but on premises as available in 1875 as they are today.
of the statute calls for its strict construction. . . . Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined. [Footnote 52]"
Certainly this wise counsel is deeply persuasive when we are asked to accept a doctrine which would cut into a jurisdiction exercised by the States since Colonial days. Of course, if compelling reasons can be found for redefining the statute, if an ancient error cries out for rectification, we should not be deterred from applying new illuminations to the interpretation of past enactments. However, in our examination of the manifold considerations of history, of construction, of the policy, which underlies the allocation of competence over maritime matters in our federal system, and the considerations of judicial administration and procedure called into question -- all of which direct us to the rejection of the proposed infusion of general maritime jurisdiction into the Act of 1875 -- we are pointed to no considerations which lead us to overturn the existing maritime jurisdictional system -- a system which is as old, and as justified by the experience of history, as the federal courts themselves.
are related claims based on the federal maritime law. We perceive no barrier to the exercise of "pendent jurisdiction" in the very limited circumstances before us. Here, we merely decide that a district judge has jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of action has been stated if that jurisdiction has been invoked by a complaint at law, rather than by a libel in admiralty, as long as the complaint also properly alleges a claim under the Jones Act. We are not called upon to decide whether the District Court may submit to the jury the "pendent" claims under the general maritime law in the event that a cause of action be found to exist.
Respondents Garcia & Diaz and Quin Lumber Company, New York corporations, and International Terminal Operating Company, a Delaware corporation, are of diverse citizenship from the petitioner, a Spanish subject. Since the Jones Act provides an independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the non-diverse respondent, Compania Trasatlantica, the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, does not require dismissal of the claims against the diverse respondents. Accordingly, the dismissal of these claims for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous.
THE CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM.
We now turn to the claims against Compania Trasatlantica under the Jones Act and the general maritime law. In light of our recent decision in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, these claims present the narrow issue, whether the maritime law of the United States may be applied in an action involving an injury sustained in an American port by a foreign seaman on board a foreign vessel in the course of a voyage beginning and ending in a foreign country.
"not on a clean slate, but as a postscript to a long series of enactments governing shipping. All were enacted with regard to a seasoned body of maritime law developed by the experience of American courts long accustomed to dealing with admiralty problems in reconciling our own with foreign interests and in accommodating the reach of our own laws to those of other maritime nations."
recognition of our self-regarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations in the regulation of maritime commerce as part of the legitimate concern of the international community. These principles do not depend upon a mechanical application of a doctrine like that of lex loci delicti commissi. The controlling considerations are the interacting interests of the United States and of foreign countries, and in assessing them we must move with the circumspection appropriate when this Court is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our international relations. We need not repeat the exposition of the problem which we gave in Lauritzen v. Larsen. Due regard for the relevant factors we there enumerated, and the weight we indicated to be given to each, preclude application of American law to the claims here asserted.
"[t]he test of location of the wrongful act or omission, however sufficient for torts ashore, is of limited application to shipboard torts, because of the varieties of legal authority over waters she may navigate. . . . the territorial standard is so unfitted to an enterprise conducted under many territorial rules and under none that it usually is modified by the more constant law of the flag."
345 U.S. at 345 U. S. 583-584. Although the place of injury has often been deemed determinative of the choice of law in municipal conflict of laws, such a rule does not fit the accommodations that become relevant in fair and prudent regard for the interests of foreign nations in the regulation of their own ships and their own nationals, and the effect upon our interests of our treatment of the legitimate interests of foreign nations. To impose on ships the duty of shifting from one standard of compensation to another as the vessel passes the boundaries of territorial waters would be not only an onerous, but also an unduly speculative burden, disruptive of international commerce and without basis in the expressed policies of this country. The amount and type of recovery which a foreign seaman may receive from his foreign employer while sailing on a foreign ship should not depend on the wholly fortuitous circumstance of the place of injury.
Thus, we hold that the considerations found in Lauritzen v. Larsen to preclude the assertion of a claim under the Jones Act apply equally here, and affirm the dismissal of petitioner's claims against Compania Trasatlantica.
the injury. These issues were properly adjudicated, and thus the claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure were properly dismissed. However, the District Court did not consider, and its disposition of the case did not require it to consider, whether petitioner was asserting a claim based upon the negligence of Garcia & Diaz -- a claim independent of the employment relationship or operation and control. Thus, it is necessary to remand the case for further proceedings as to this respondent.
(b) The claims against International Terminal Operating Co., and Quin Lumber Co., for a maritime tort, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Our decision on the jurisdictional issues necessitates the return of the claims against these respondents for further adjudication.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The claim for maintenance and cure under the general maritime law included an amount for wages to the end of the voyage. We have not before us an independent claim for wages due, and therefore need express no opinion on such a claim by one in petitioner's position.
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy . . . is between: . . ."
"(2) Citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;"
Prior to the commencement of the trial, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the District Court lacked "jurisdiction" over the subject matter. The answers of some of the respondents also contained motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A pretrial hearing on the issue of "jurisdiction" was held, and the complaint was dismissed. Although the trial court viewed the issues as jurisdictional in the correct sense, the procedure followed was precisely that provided for a preliminary hearing to determine whether a claim was stated upon which relief can be granted. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 12(d). Although the court considered evidence outside the pleadings, Federal Rule 12(c) allows such evidence to be admitted, requiring the court then to treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 56(c). The determinations made by the District Court, in the course of its hearing on jurisdiction, insofar as they are relevant to our disposition, were within the properly conceived scope of Rule 56. Since all the requirements of Rule 12(c), relating to a hearing on a motion for judgment of the pleadings, were satisfied, and the findings made were properly relevant to such a hearing, we need not restrict our disposition to the issue of "jurisdiction" merely because the proceedings below were inartistically labeled.
Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. The modifications of language to be found in the present version of this Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, were not intended to change in any way the meaning or content of the Act of 1875. See Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The recent amendments to this Act, 72 Stat. 415, affected only jurisdictional amount, and are not relevant here. See U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1958, p. 2333, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
The present version of § 9 is in 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
"The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace. The most important part of them are, by the present Confederation, submitted to federal jurisdiction."
The Federalist, No. 80 (Lodge ed. 1908) at 497-498.
The original clause calling for the establishment of inferior tribunals was defeated in the Convention. 1 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention (1911), 125. A compromise vesting power in Congress to establish such tribunals was agreed to. Ibid. See also id. at 124.
"that the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts."
1 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention (1911), 124. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130; Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386.
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590.
See New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 6 How. 344, 47 U. S. 390; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 207 U. S. 404; 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 1672. See also Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty Over the Common Law, 21 Col.L.Rev. 647 (1921); Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 Col.L.Rev. 259 (1950).
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 76.
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470.
The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 644; Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185, 78 U. S. 188.
The removal provisions of the original Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79, conferred a limited removal jurisdiction, not including cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In none of the statutes enacted since that time have saving clause cases been made removable.
Of course, federal question jurisdiction was granted in the abortive Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 92, repealed by Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.
See 2 Cong.Rec. 4986-4987; Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1928), 65-69.
See The Federalist, No. 80 (Hamilton), note 8 supra.
See treatises cited in Appendix, post, p. 358 U. S. 385. Lack of clarity in Marshall's opinion was suggested in Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 834-844, note 8.
"Select passages of the opinion in that case [Canter], when detached from the context, may appear to support the theory of the respondents, but the actual decision of the court is explicitly and undeniably the other way"
merely indicated that Canter, like The City of Panama, interpreted a congressional statute to grant admiralty jurisdiction to territorial courts in light of the purposes of a particular statute. The City of Panama did not reject the principle of constitutional construction which Marshall used by way of reaching his "actual decision." It did not question the conclusion in Canter that the two clauses of Article III are distinct grants of jurisdiction, and that this truth is to be observed whenever it becomes relevant, as it does here. The City of Panama, like other decisions, serves to illustrate that jurisdictional statutes are not to be read literally, and are not to be construed as abstract collections of words, but derive their meaning from their setting in history and practice, with due regard to the consequences of the construction given them. See American Security & Trust Co. v. Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491; Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41.
"The several cases to which the judicial power extends are to be regarded as independent, in the sense that any one clause is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction in a case to which it applies, and that it is neither restrained nor enlarged by the other clauses, with the exception of the restraint imposed by amendment XI. . . ."
"The grant of jurisdiction over one of these classes does not confer jurisdiction over either of the others; the discrimination is conclusive against their identity. A case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not to be regarded as one 'arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States' merely because the exercise of judicial power in maritime cases is provided for in the Constitution and laws."
"The cases coming within this jurisdiction, as referred to in the Constitution, are not identical with, or embraced in, the cases of law and equity referred to in the same instrument, as arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. They belong to a different category, and are provided for by a distinct and specific grant of judicial power."
He then quotes from Marshall's opinion in Canter.
"his love of and devotion to legal studies and pursuits -- not as objects, but as subjects -- were the controlling passions of his life. . . ."
". . . Such, however, was the devotion of Mr. Carpenter to his profession that his election to the United States Senate seemed to be a matter of gratification principally for the broader field of professional labors which it enabled him to cultivate. . . ."
1 Reports of Wisconsin State Bar Association 227.
Among Senator Carpenter's collaborators on the Senate Judiciary Committee were men with outstanding professional experience as lawyers, professors of law, and judges: George G. Wright of Iowa (a professor of law and a member of his State's Supreme Court), Allen G. Thurman (Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court), John W. Stevenson (a professor of law, codifier of the law of Kentucky, President of the American Bar Association), and Frederic T. Frelinghuysen (eminent practitioner, Attorney General of New Jersey, subsequently Secretary of State).
After leaving the Senate, the bill went to conference, and was reported out on the floor of the House by Luke Poland of Vermont, an esteemed Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court.
Such men would not have made a revolutionary change in maritime jurisdiction sub silentio.
All suits involving maritime claims, regardless of the remedy sought, are cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction within the meaning of Article III whether they are asserted in the federal courts or, under the saving clause, in the state courts. Romero's claims for damages under the general maritime law are a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The substantive law on which these claims are based derives from the third provision of Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Without that constitutional grant, Romero would have no federal claim to assert. Cf. 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 1672.
See Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1928), 64-65; Chadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 639, 644-645 (1942).
Of course, in a few instances, Congress has provided the federal admiralty courts with a specific statutory jurisdiction. E.g., Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767.
Norton v. Switzer, 93 U. S. 355, 93 U. S. 356.
See Appendix, post, p. 358 U. S. 385.
^27a. For reasons that would take us too far afield to discuss, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, offers us no exception.
"That question was thrashed out, and it was decided best not to incorporate into this bill a jury trial, because of the difficulties in admiralty proceedings."
Congressman Igoe, speaking for the Judiciary Committee, 59 Cong.Rec. 4482, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
The policy of unremovability of maritime claims brought in the state courts was incorporated by Congress into the Jones Act. See Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1952).
"Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties."
See the compilation of state court cases in Seventh 5-Year Index-Digest of American Maritime Cases, 1953-1957 (1957), XLIII-XLVIII.
"[T]he jurisdictional act [the Act of 1789] does leave state courts 'competent' to adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings 'in personam.' . . . [T]his Court has said that a state, 'having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit' so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the 'substantive maritime law.' Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109."
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239; Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U. S. 409.
Vancouver S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Rice, 288 U. S. 445; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324. See also Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532.
The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199. "Death is a composer of strife by the general law of the sea as it was for many centuries by the common law of the land." Cardozo, J., in Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U. S. 367, 287 U. S. 371.
The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233; Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383.
The Hamilton, supra; Just v. Chambers, supra; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra.
Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U. S. 556.
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109.
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310.
Id. at 348 U. S. 313.
"The grounds of objection to the admiralty jurisdiction in enforcing liability for wrongful death were similar to those urged here -- that is, that the Constitution presupposes a body of maritime law, that this law, as a matter of interstate and international concern, requires harmony in its administration, and cannot be subject to defeat or impairment by the diverse legislation of the States, and hence that Congress alone can make any needed changes in the general rules of the maritime law. But these contentions proved unavailing, and the principle was maintained that a State, in the exercise of its police power, may establish rules applicable on land and water within its limits, even though these rules incidentally affect maritime affairs, provided that the state action"
"does not contravene any acts of Congress, nor work any prejudice to the characteristic features of the maritime law, nor interfere with its proper harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate relations."
"It was decided that the state legislation encountered none of these objections. The many instances in which state action had created new rights, recognized and enforced in admiralty, were set forth in The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, and reference was also made to the numerous local regulations under state authority concerning the navigation of rivers and harbors. There was the further pertinent observation that the maritime law was not a complete and perfect system, and that, in all maritime countries, there is a considerable body of municipal law that underlies the maritime law as the basis of its administration. These views find abundant support in the history of the maritime law and in the decisions of this Court."
Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383, 312 U. S. 389-390.
"It is a broad recognition of the authority of the States to create rights and liabilities with respect to conduct within their borders, when the state action does not run counter to federal laws or the essential features of an exclusive federal jurisdiction."
Id. at 312 U. S. 391.
Thus, Congress was careful to make the Death on the High Seas Act applicable only outside state territorial waters, so as not to intrude on state legislative competence. 59 Cong.Rec. 4482-4486.
See, e.g., Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155.
"In discussing the question of the duty which the defendant owed to its passengers, all of the parties agreed that the law of California is to be applied. The trial court made a like assumption. We find it unnecessary to indicate any view as to whether in this the parties were correct, for, as we see it, no matter which law applies, the rule is the same, whether that of California or that of the maritime law."
Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 215 U. S. 501. The more restrictive provisions apply in any action "wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
There may also well be situations in which the venue provisions prevent the joinder of defendants in a Federal District Court and the state court rules of procedure do not allow their joinder, thus precluding suit altogether.
Jenkins v. Roderick, D.C.Mass. 1957, 156 F.Supp. 299, 301.
In The Lottawanna, the Court clearly recognized that maritime law was a body of uniform federal law drawing its authority from the Constitution and laws of the United States.
115 U. S. 115 U.S. 1. Congress, with an exception having its own justification, has wiped out this unfortunate decision. Act of February 13, 1925, § 12, 43 Stat. 941, now 28 U.S.C. § 1349.
Of course, the many limitations which have been placed on jurisdiction under § 1331 are not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149; Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109; Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667; see Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Col.L.Rev. 157, 160-163 (1953).
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 292 U. S. 270.
The District Court adjudicated only the Jones Act claim on the merits, dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the claims under the general maritime law. However, since the considerations are identical, we here dispose of all the claims against Compania Trasatlantica.
See Wildenhus' Case, 120 U. S. 1.
The following is the list of treatises on federal procedure and jurisdiction and admiralty law which were examined to determine if any commentator gave any intimation that the Act of 1875 had swept admiralty jurisdiction within its scope. No such intimation is found in a single treatise. On the contrary, all those which dealt with the subject specifically assumed that the federal courts on the law side had jurisdiction over a maritime cause after the Act of 1875, as before, only when the parties were of diverse citizenship.
BOYCE, Manual of the Practice in the Circuit Courts (1869).
ABOTT, The United States Courts and Their Practice (1877).
PHILLIPS, Statutory Jurisdiction and Practice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1878).
DESTY, Manual of the Law Relating to Shipping and Admiralty (1879).
CURTIS, Jurisdiction, Practice and Peculiar Jurisprudence of the Courts in the United States (1880).
MILLER and FIELD, Federal Practice (1881).
COHEN, Admiralty -- Jurisdiction, Law and Practice (1883).
FIELD, Constitution and Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States (1883).
SPEAR, Law of the Federal Judiciary (1883).
THATCHER (Thatcher's Practice) -- A Digest of Statutes, Equity Rules and Decisions upon the Jurisdiction, Pleadings and Practice of the Circuit Courts of the United States (1883).
THATCHER (Thatcher's Practice) -- A Digest of Statutes, Admiralty Rules and Decisions upon the Jurisdiction, Pleadings and Practice of the District Courts of the United States (1884).
HENRY, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Admiralty Courts (1885).
HOLT, The Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Federal and State Courts (1888).
CURTIS, Jurisdiction, Practice and Peculiar Jurisprudence of the Courts of the United States (rev. ed. 1896).
BENEDICT, The American Admiralty (3d ed. 1898).
GARLAND and RALSTON, Constitution and Jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts (1898).
SIMONTON, CHARLES H. (U.S. Circuit Judge), The Federal Courts, Their Organization, Jurisdiction and Procedure (2d ed. 1898).
CARTER, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts as Limited by the Citizenship and Residence of the Parties (1899).
DESTY, Manual of Practice in the Courts of the United States (9th ed. 1899).
MAY, Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Supreme Court (1899).
DWYER, The Law and Procedure of United States Courts (1901).
HUGHES, Handbook of Admiralty Law (1901).
TAYLOR, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Supreme Court of the U.S. (1905).
ROSE, Code of Federal Procedure (1907).
BATES, Federal Procedure at Law (1908).
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1908).
BENEDICT, The American Admiralty (4th ed. 1910).
LOVELAND, Appellate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts (1911).
HUGHES, Handbook of Jurisdiction and Procedure in United States Courts (2d ed. 1913).
BUNN, Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of the United States (1914) (also 3d ed. 1927; 4th ed. 1939; 5th ed. 1949).
THAYER, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts (1914).
CHAPLIN, Principles of the Federal Law (1917).
LONG, Outline of the Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts (3d ed. 1917).
FOSTER, Federal Practice (6th ed. 1920).
HUGHES, Handbook of Admiralty Law (2d ed. 1920).
LOVELAND, Annotated Forms of Federal Procedure (3d ed. 1922).
ROSE, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts (2d ed. 1922).
MONTGOMERY, Manual of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (3d ed. 1927).
WILLIAMS, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1927).
DOBIE, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (1928).
LONGSDORF, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (1928).
ZOLINE, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction and Procedure (3d ed. 1928).
HUGHES, Federal Practice, Jurisdiction and Procedure (1931).
ROSE, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts (4th ed. 1931).
BROWNE, Federal Appellate Practice and Procedure (1932).
BROWN, Guide to Federal and Bankruptcy Practice (1933).
HOPKINS, Federal Judicial Code and the Judiciary (4th ed. 1934).
MARKER, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction and Procedure (1935).
ROSE, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts (5th ed. 1938).
SIMKINS, Federal Practice (3d ed. 1938) (also 1942 Supplement).
ROBINSON, Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States (1939).
BENEDICT, Law of American Admiralty (Knauth ed. 1940).
POUND, Organization of Courts (1940).
KIRSHBAUM, Outline of Federal Practice and Procedure (1941).
O'BRIEN, Manual of Federal Appellate Procedure (3d ed. 1941).
MONTGOMERY, Manual of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (4th ed. 1942).
FEDERAL REDBOOK AND PRACTICE ANNUAL (Schweitzer ed. 2d ed. 1943).
BENDER, Federal Practice Manual (1948).
GUANDOLO, Federal Procedure Forms (1949).
MOORE, A Commentary on the Judicial Code (1949).
WENDELL, Relations Between the Federal and State Courts (1949).
BARRON and HOLTZOFF, Federal Practice and Procedure (1950).
FINS, Federal Practice Guide (1950).
OHLINGER, Federal Practice (rev. ed. 1950), Replacement Vol. One-A.
Although this case has aroused much discussion about the scope of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, I cannot feel that the issue is either complex or earth-shaking. The real core of the jurisdictional controversy is whether a few more seamen can have their suits for damages passed on by federal juries, instead of judges. For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN here and by Judge Magruder in Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 839, I believe that federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 lies, and a federal jury trial is proper. In particular, I feel that technical or esoteric readings should not be given to congressional language which is perfectly understandable in ordinary English.
internationally, rather than on an actual interpretation of the language of the Jones Act. Thus, it seemed to me that the Lauritzen holding rested on notions of what Congress should have said, not on what it did say. Such notions, weak enough in Lauritzen, seem much weaker still in this case where the tort involved occurred in our own waters. I cannot but feel that, at least as to torts occurring within the United States, Congress knew what it was doing when it said "any seaman," and I must dissent from today's further, and, I believe, unjustifiable, reduction in the scope of the Jones Act. Moreover since the tort occurred in the navigable waters of the United States, I think the complaint against Compania Trasatlantica stated a good cause of action under general maritime law, whether jurisdiction of the cause is based, as I believe, on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or, as the Court assumes, on some theory of "pendent jurisdiction."
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins in the first paragraph of this opinion. He believes that Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, is inapposite to the present case because of the numerous incidents connecting this transaction with the United States. He therefore agrees with MR. JUSTICE BLACK that the District Court should take jurisdiction over petitioner's claim against Compania Trasatlantica.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in part and concurring in part.
suit at common law and the requisite jurisdictional amount is in controversy. I believe that the jurisdictional statute and the logic of the principles of this Court's decisions construing it compel a contrary result. I think the Court's opinion attempts to turn aside the statutory language and the thrust of this Court's decisions with reasoning that is altogether too insubstantial.
The point on which the Court and I are at issue is one which has been much mooted in the Courts of Appeals, and I agree that it is appropriate that a thorough expression of views on it be presented. I propose first to explain why jurisdiction should be sustained under § 1331, and then to offer some reply to specific arguments set forth by the Court which apparently proceed from supposed practical inconveniences that are thought to arise from sustaining the jurisdiction.
could have been established on the admiralty side of the District Court since 28 U.S.C. § 1333 specifically grants jurisdiction in the District Courts in "case[s] of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." The question is whether petitioner can bring this part of his action on the law side of a Federal District Court.
First. In a long series of decisions tracing from Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, this Court has made it clear that, in a seaman's action to recover damages for a maritime tort from his employer, the substantive law to be applied is federal maritime law made applicable as part of the laws of the United States by the Constitution itself, and that the right of recovery, if any, is a federally created right. [Footnote 2/3] Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U. S. 372; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406. Cf. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 264 U. S. 124-125.
"A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation itself, and the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise."
"[I]t is hardly necessary to argue that the maritime law is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country. . . ."
"[W]e must realize that, however ancient may be the traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from which it has been drawn, it derives its whole and only power in this country from its having been accepted and adopted by the United States. There is no mystic overlaw to which even the United States must bow."
of [state] law. His right of recovery . . . is rooted in federal maritime law." Id. at 346 U. S. 409.
Third. Notwithstanding these conclusions, jurisdiction under § 1331 would, of course, not lie if it were beyond the constitutional power of Congress to vest jurisdiction over this action of a seaman against his employer, a matter falling admittedly within the "admiralty or maritime jurisdiction," in a federal court sitting at law. But it is too late to make such an argument. The jurisdictional treatment of the rights of seamen under the Jones Act, a cause of action bound up with the cause of action in question here, is preclusive on the issue. The Jones Act was held in Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, to be authorized by the legislative power residing in the Admiralty Clause of Article III. The right of action granted was, however, specifically stated by Congress to be exercisable "at law, with the right of trial by jury" and in the Federal District Courts. This treatment was upheld, against constitutional challenge, by the Court, which held that jurisdiction properly lay at the option of the plaintiff, either in admiralty or on the law side of the District Court.
"[T]he constitutional provision interposes no obstacle to permitting rights founded on the maritime law or an admissible modification of it to be enforced as such through appropriate actions on the common law side of the courts. . . ."
Id. at 264 U. S. 388. And the unchallenged maintenance of the very cause of action in question here at law in the District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, where diversity of citizenship is present, is further proof that no constitutional inhibition to the maintenance of such an action at law under § 1331 exists. Cf. 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 644.
"to insure the availability of a forum designed to minimize the danger of hostility toward, and specially suited to the vindication of, federally created rights. . . ."
Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, supra, 221 F.2d at 618. Continuously since 1789, Congress has provided specially for admiralty courts in which rights under the federal maritime law could be asserted. The argument runs that it follows that claims under the maritime law were not intended to fall within the scope of § 1331. And here, the Court's conclusion rests primarily on an analysis of the terms and background of the 1875 Act which was the ancestor of § 1331, and on various inferences drawn from silence after that Act's passage.
Judiciary Act granted to the District and Circuit Courts no general federal question jurisdiction.
Section 9 of the First Judiciary Act, however, contained the clause " . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it. . . ." The Saving Clause survives in 28 U.S.C. § 1333, phrased ". . . saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. . . ." This provision plainly was a recognition that there were, prior to 1789, maritime claims within the concurrent jurisdiction of courts of admiralty and law, 1 Benedict, American Admiralty (6th ed. 1940), § 20; Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U. S. 118, 102 U. S. 119, and it was clearly the intention of Congress to perpetuate this duality of remedy. It is true that certain classes of cases, such as the traditional in rem, prize, and seizure cases, lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty, 1 Benedict, American Admiralty, § 23; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606, but all other suits under the maritime law of an in personam nature might be brought as well in the state courts or, under the diversity jurisdiction, in the Federal Circuit Courts. § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
from being so brought under § 1331. [Footnote 2/6] Indeed, I find it a gross anomaly to hold, as the Court holds today, that an action rooted in federal law can be brought on the law side of a federal court only if the diversity jurisdiction, usually a vehicle for the enforcement of state-created rights, can be invoked.
equity," and the very action that Romero would assert here he would assert "at law." The mere fact that the substantive claim a court enforces in a particular Saving Clause action is rooted in the general maritime law does not transform the proceedings from a suit "at law" to one "in admiralty"; the state courts can hardly be said to sit "in admiralty" when they try actions under the Saving Clause. Cf. The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 207 U. S. 404. The Saving Clause itself, in its 1789 form, stated that what it was "saving" was "a common law remedy" to be available in maritime fact situations. It can readily be admitted that a suit "in admiralty" is not the same thing as a suit "at law." But this is not to say that a suit involving a maritime cause of action cannot be the subject of a suit "at law" in the federal courts. Obviously, Saving Clause actions brought on the law side of the federal court, with diversity of citizenship present, are actions "at law." In fact, the grant of diversity jurisdiction in the 1875 Act was in the very same terms as the grant of the "arising under" jurisdiction; the same introductory phrase, "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity," governed both grants. It seems to me very odd to say that this phrase, introducing two grants of jurisdiction, had the effect of excluding maritime causes of action entirely from the one, but not at all from the other.
changes in the diversity jurisdiction that no considered scrutiny was given to the provisions which have become § 1331. See 2 Cong.Rec. 4978-4988; Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1927 ed.) 65-69. Nothing appears which would indicate a congressional intent to modify, by implication or otherwise, the sweep of the language of this Act, embodying as it does substantially the words of the constitutional grant. [Footnote 2/8] And nothing appears which would indicate any intention that the Act's coverage be "frozen" to exclude federal causes of action which were not fully developed in 1875.
action, I do not think that the Court here is called on to do so. Marshall's statement is not, when understood in its context, contrary to my position, and, in fact, its proper scope was recognized before 1875.
Before discussing the Canter case, I think it wise to restate the precise nature of the issue before the Court. This is so because I fear the Court, in an expansive reading of Canter not justified either by what was decided there or by what was said there considered in the light of what was decided, has blurred the issue for decision today. The issue before us is not whether all cases "of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" are per se encompassed in the statutory "arising under" jurisdiction. A suit seeking the sort of remedy that the common law is not competent to give could not be fairly contended to lie under § 1331; it would clearly be the sort of suit in which the jurisdictional grant of § 1333 was intended to be exclusive. The issue before us concerns only actions maintainable in some forum "at law" under the Saving Clause. And again, the issue is not even the narrower one whether Saving Clause actions are per se cognizable under § 1331. The tests of jurisdiction under § 1331 must still be met, and there is no contention that they are met merely by a showing that an action is one maintainable under the Saving Clause and involving the requisite jurisdictional amount. The plaintiff's right to recovery must still be one rooted in federal substantive law, and it has quite recently been made clear that there are Saving Clause actions that do not meet that test. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310. The issue before us is only whether the fact that an action is a Saving Clause action excludes it from § 1331 where it would otherwise be maintainable thereunder.
of course, that § 1331 is a grant of power to enforce remedies peculiar to the admiralty; the contention is solely that that section, which empowers a federal court to administer common law remedies in vindication of rights of plaintiffs which take their origin from federal law, is not subject to an exception for rights taking their origin in federal maritime law. Marshall's opinion simply is not addressed to this question, or dispositive of it.
Much is made by the Court of Marshall's language that the categories of actions he mentions are "distinct," and not "identical." Of course this is so, in a real sense and the only sense in which Marshall meant it. A matter affecting an ambassador or a counsel is not per se an action "arising under," just as it is not per se a maritime action. But could not a case involving a consul be also a case of admiralty jurisdiction under certain fact situation? And could not a suit by or against a consul happen, perchance, to be also one "arising under"? The fact that the jurisdictional categories are separate and distinct, as Marshall demonstrates, does not mean that a particular action could not come under the heading of more than one of them. Everyone recognizes that this is the case in a maritime matter in which the parties are of diverse citizenship. I see no reason why it should not be true here of Romero's general maritime law claims against his employer.
it remained so. Hence, the States could have no right to create courts of admiralty as such, or to confer on their own courts the cognizance of such cases as were exclusively cognizable in admiralty courts. But the States might well retain and exercise the jurisdiction in cases of which the cognizance was previously concurrent in the courts of common law. This latter class of cases can be no more deemed cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction than cases of common law jurisdiction.'"
"(3 Story's Com., sec. 1666, note.)"
20 How. at 61 U. S. 598.
And it was understood before 1875 that this concurrent jurisdiction at law was not one merely existent in the state courts, but one available to suitors in the federal courts. See The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 644; infra, pp. 358 U. S. 406-407.
case where the common law is competent to give him a remedy. Properly construed, a party under that provision may proceed in rem in the admiralty, or he may bring a suit in personam in the same jurisdiction, or he may elect not to go into admiralty at all, and may resort to his common law remedy in the State courts or in the Circuit Court of the United States, if he can make proper parties to give that court jurisdiction of his case."
The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 644. It is clear from the Court's language that the common law remedies saved to suitors could properly be enforced in any tribunal otherwise having jurisdiction; the remedies saved were saved generally to suitors without discrimination as to any tribunal.
enactment. It is a modern development in legal science in this country's federal system that increasing concern is taken with the source of the substantive law administered by the courts. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra, and, notably, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, are indications of this trend. When lawyers and judges in our federal system came to concentrate more and more on the source of the substantive law administered in the courts, and when this Court's opinions made it increasingly clear that there were kinds of maritime actions where the underlying right to recover was rooted in federally created law, inadmissible of significant modification by the States, it was an inevitable consequence that the relation of § 1331 to maritime matters would come for the first time to be examined, as Judge Magruder examined it in the Jansson and Doucette cases. If one views the history of the common law system of adjudication as the history of a process, one must conclude that the "historical" material relied upon by the Court has nothing to do with this sort of history at all except to illustrate its antithesis.
position. However willing one might be to resolve doubtful language against jurisdiction, exceptions to statutory language cannot be manufactured in a manner unwarranted by the words themselves and derived from the pertinent history only by a process of futile speculation. I am compelled to the conclusion that it is the effect of the 1875 Act and its intent, judged by the lights by which the courts must discern legislative intent, that the federal courts possess original jurisdiction at law to determine claims arising under federal substantive maritime law where the common law is competent to afford the remedy sought by the plaintiff.
Fourth. The Court envisions various unfortunate results, from a practical standpoint, that would ensue from a holding on the jurisdictional issue under § 1331 contrary to its own. I shall comment briefly on its arguments.
state judiciaries will be deprived of their historic active roles in the development of maritime law. Of the few actions that are left in the state courts, many may stay, for aught that can be predicted now. What sort of role do the state judiciaries now have in the development of the maritime law, with thirty-odd Saving Clause actions a year among them? Will the doctrine really put an end to this role, whatever it is? And it must be noted that such legislative competence as they possess remains to the States regardless of what may happen to the number of maritime cases in their courts; the view I have urged does not subtract one iota from the legislative competence of the States. And it is only because of an enlargement of removal that it affects their judicial competence; it does not take away their original jurisdiction at all, if suitors are content with it.
to § 1331. I agree perfectly with the Court's observation that, in our federal system, allocations of jurisdiction have been carefully wrought to correspond to the realities of power and interest and national policy. I think that § 1331 embodies this approach by vesting in the federal courts, in civil actions, jurisdiction, at the option of the suitors, over all suits seeking a legal or equitable remedy arising under federal law and involving a specified amount, and that this is so whether they involve maritime matters or not. I cannot see how it fits with the "realities of power and interest and national policy" to say that there is federal jurisdiction at common law over federally defined maritime causes of action only if there is diversity of citizenship among the parties involved in them.
serve do business) who can take much advantage from the fact that he can sue in the district of his own residence in an action based solely on diversity, and not otherwise. And, of course, the existence of proper venue at his own residence does not mean the plaintiff can sue the defendants there; he must still serve them with process. Except that process can be run throughout the limits of the State, while venue speaks in terms of the district, this means that the broader diversity venue only is of assistance where there is a defendant who, while not "doing business" in an area, is nonetheless amenable to process there. Of course, there are some such, but I think by now the dimensions of this "practical" reason for the Court's holding are patent.
courts do not have such jurisdiction over all his claims, there are state courts which do, and he may well prefer them in that event. The Court today tells him that, though it is doubtful whether there is enough common law jurisdiction in the federal courts to proceed to a plenary adjudication of his claim, there is enough certainly to award summary judgment against him on the merits. I must say I cannot understand a sort of jurisdiction that allows the federal courts to make a preliminary exploration of the merits of the case, and a binding adjudication upon them, but which may not allow them to go further.
the effect of a finding of facts common to both claims made by the judge before the rendition of the jury's verdict, or vice versa? Would the doctrine of collateral estoppel apply? These problems arise in the wake of the Court's rejection of jurisdiction under § 1331 and its restricted holding on any other jurisdictional basis (apart from § 1333) of Romero's claims under the general maritime law against his employer. I cannot consider that the Court's solution of the controversy among the lower courts that has prevailed since the Jansson dictum has shed much light on them.
Since, under my view, there would be jurisdiction at law (the only jurisdiction Romero invoked) to consider all his claims, I arrive at the merits of his claims against his employer, Compania Trasatlantica. As to them, I concur in the result set forth in 358 U. S. I also agree with the Court's disposition of the claims against the other respondents, as set forth in 358 U. S.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins in this opinion, and MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join in it except to the extent indicated in their dissents.
The grant of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 contains no language which would include a suit by one alien against another, even where there might also be citizen defendants. For the constitutionality of a broader statute at lease under Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, subclause 8, see Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch 303 [omitted].
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
Section 1, Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415, increased the requisite jurisdictional amount to $10,000.
It is true that, to a certain extent, state law may be consulted in this area, at least where it does not work "material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law" or interfere with "the proper harmony and uniformity of that law. . . ." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra, at 244 U. S. 216. For example, recovery has made use of state wrongful death acts, The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233; Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U. S. 648, and of state survival statutes, Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383.
There is not presented here the problem of interpreting, in its periphery where state and federal elements are blended, the scope of the arising-under provisions of § 1331. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180; Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109; Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667.
Since § 1331 is derived from § 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470, and since the language of the jurisdictional grant in that Act is taken from Art. III, § 2, it is worthy of note that the earlier draft forms of Article III had provided that the judicial power should extend to "cases arising under laws passed by the legislature of the United States." See Madison's Diary, for July 26, August 6, and August 27, 1787 (II Elliot's Debates (2d ed. 1941) 368, 376, 380); Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1937 ed.) 538-539; United States v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137, 289 U. S. 148.
It is argued that the policy of § 1331 "to insure the availability of a forum designed to minimize . . . hostility . . . to the vindication of federally created rights" has no application here because of the availability of a federal forum under § 1333. Substantially the same argument could be made in a diversity case under § 1332, since it would be assumed that the admiralty would be impartial in treatment of out-of-state parties. Cf. Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, supra, 221 F.2d at 618.
§ 1, Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470. This was the first permanent statute vesting original "arising under" jurisdiction in the federal courts. Section 11 of the Act of February 13, 1801, c. 4, 2 Stat. 92, extended such jurisdiction, but it was shortly repealed by § 1 of the Act of March 8, 1802, c. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
"This development in the Federal Judiciary ['arising under' jurisdiction], which, in retrospect, seems revolutionary, received hardly a contemporary comment."
At any rate, the Court's argument, to me, combines an unwarranted historical "cult of the personality" with an attribution of one's own views to prior generations. What is not involved here is some sort of conspiratorially silent change in federal jurisdiction, but the question whether a tacit exception should be engrafted on a thorough-going and explicit new jurisdictional grant; whether we should "read out" of the statute "what, as a matter of ordinary English speech, is in." United States v. Hood, 343 U. S. 148, 343 U. S. 151.
"The Constitution and laws of the United States give jurisdiction to the District Courts over all cases in admiralty, but jurisdiction over the case does not constitute the case itself. We are therefore to inquire whether cases in admiralty, and cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States, are identical."
"If we have recourse to that pure fountain from which all the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is derived, we find language employed which cannot well be misunderstood. The Constitution declares that"
"the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers, and counsuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
"The Constitution certainly contemplates these as three distinct classes of cases, and, if they are distinct, the grant of jurisdiction over one of them does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other two. The discrimination made between them in the Constitution is, we think, conclusive against their identity. If it were not so -- if this were a point open to inquiry -- it would be difficult to maintain the proposition that they are the same. A case in admiralty does not in fact arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation itself, and the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise."
1 Pet. at 26 U. S. 545-546.
I advert to these constitutional views only for such light as they may shed on Congress' probable intent at the time the Act of 1875 was under consideration. Marshall's statement may be thought to have been made in constitutional terms. As I have developed above, there can be no constitutional argument against the power of Congress to allocate this type of action, at least concurrently, to the law side of a federal court.
The power to enforce the remedy was, in fact, found in another section of the territorial organic act, § 7, 3 Stat. 752, under which jurisdiction could be vested in the court in question, rather than in the territorial Superior Court, to which § 8 related. Cf. note 14, infra.
This seems to be the import of the first sentence from the Marshall dictum quoted in note 9, supra. And see note 13, infra.
The opinion of Justice Johnson in the Canter case, rendering the judgment in the Circuit Court which Marshall's opinion affirmed on appeal, makes this very distinction. Johnson rejected the idea that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction made all admiralty cases cases arising under the Constitution. He did not believe that the cause of action for salvage arose under the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Yet he recognized, and enumerated, cases of a maritime nature where the substantive rights were rooted in federal law, and to which the grant of "arising under" jurisdiction would extend. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Fed.Cas. No. 302a. Johnson sat in the Supreme Court on the appeal, and did not express any indication that Marshall's opinion was contrary to what he had said at circuit. In fact, Marshall's language that "jurisdiction over the case does not constitute the case itself," note 9, supra, appears to recognize Johnson's distinction; the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction does not mean that all admiralty cases are "arising under" cases; the substantive law governing the case is determinative. Cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S. 476, 288 U. S. 483.
"Select passages of the opinion in that case, when detached from the context, may appear to support the theory of the respondents, but the actual decision of the court is explicitly and undeniably the other way."
101 U.S. at 101 U. S. 458.
Of course, the question whether "arising under" language in an organic act for a territory should be taken as vesting the entire admiralty jurisdiction, the subject of the Canter and Panama decisions, in itself has no relation to the issue here. It is not contended that § 1331 somehow entitles the federal district courts to exercise all the admiralty power "at law." The issue is whether that section grants them a jurisdiction at law over federally based claims that remains unaffected by the circumstance that particular claims may be of a maritime nature.
The original repositories of the diversity jurisdiction, § 11, Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 Stat. 78.
Judge Magruder thoroughly developed his views in Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834.
The Seventh 5-Year Index-Digest of American Maritime Cases, 1953-1957 (1957), xliii-xlviii. This source reports all state court decisions, including those not published otherwise.
The Court later, however, recognizes that no one is arguing that all Saving Clause actions per se are encompassed by § 1331. But the argument then progresses that it will be unfortunate if the courts are forced to determine in limine whether various Saving Clause actions do or do not "arise under" for § 1331 purposes. Is it really an obstacle to the efficient administration of justice if a trial court, at the first stage of litigation, is called upon precisely to determine what is the legal system that has created the cause of action on which the plaintiff is suing?

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