Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/chapman-v-decrow
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 11:52:26+00:00

Document:
Country of Origin: United States Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine Primary Citation: 93 Me. 378, 45 A. 295 (1899) Judge Name: STROUT, J. Jurisdiction Level: Maine Alternate Citation: 74 Am.St.Rep. 357 (1899) Judges: and SAVAGE EMERY JJ. HASKELL WISWELL STROUT Attorneys: C. E. & A. S. Littlefield, for plaintiff. D. N. Mortland & M. A. Johnson, for defendant.
Trespass for killing plaintiff's dog. Defendant claimed that the dog was trespassing on his premises, and was “then, or had been immediately before the shooting, engaged, with two other dogs, in chasing and worrying his domesticated animals, to wit, tame rabbits,” and that the killing was therefore justified.
The dog had not been licensed for that year as provided by chapter 287 of the Laws of 1893, though it had been the previous year. The defendant claimed that, because he was not licensed, there was no property in him, and that anybody had the right to kill him, and therefore the owner had no redress.
By the common law, a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie. Wright v. Ramscot, 1 Saund. 84; Athill v. Corbet, Cro. Jac. 463. But larceny could not be committed of a dog. But by St. 7 & 8 Geo. IV. it is made a misdemeanor to steal one.
If, as claimed by defendant, the fact that this dog was not licensed for that year rendered him a nuisance, which is not admitted, he would be a public nuisance; and no individual was authorized to abate it unless he was suffering damages therefrom peculiar to himself, and distinct from the injury to the public. Corthell v. Holmes, 87 Me. 27, 32 Atl. 715.
But the defendant claims that the statute of 1893 has by implication outlawed all dogs not registered as therein provided. That act provides for an annual registration of dogs before the 1st day of April, and imposes a penalty upon the owner if he fails to so register. Section 10 requires the selectmen “within ten days from the first day of May to issue a warrant” for killing unlicensed and uncollared dogs.
It may be that the owner who fails to register his dog before April 1st may be liable to the penalty prescribed, but, if he sells the dog at any time after that date, the then owner may register him and protect him against the warrant in the constable's hand; and, as revenue appears to be one object of the act, it would seem that the owner who neglected to register on April 1st might do so later. This dog was shot April 24th, before the municipal officers were authorized to issue a warrant.
It will be noticed that this act provides only for killing unlicensed dogs by a constable under a warrant, and impliedly forbids killing by any other person.
The postponement to May 1st of the authority to the municipal officers to issue a warrant indicates an intention to allow the negligent owner opportunity to repair his forgetfulness.
But it is said that section 11, which provides a civil liability for stealing or killing a registered dog, by implication outlaws all that are not registered, and authorizes anybody to steal or kill them. If this provision adds any remedy not known to the common law, it certainly*299 does not take away rights previously existing by it.
The defendant justified the killing upon the ground that the dog was worrying his rabbits. He asked the court to instruct the jury “that if the jury find that, at the time of the shooting of the dog, he had killed or wounded the defendant's domesticated animals on the defendant's premises, and was again there apparently for the purpose of destroying others, the defendant would not be liable for killing the dog, but would be justified in so doing, even though the dog was not at the time in the act of destroying or worrying the animals.
The defendant has no reason to complain of this instruction. In Morris v. Nugent, 7 Car. & P. 572, it was held that, to justify shooting a dog, he must be actually attacking the party at the time. In that case the dog ran out and bit the defendant's garter, and the defendant turned round and raised his gun, and the dog ran away, and he shot the dog as he was running away; and it was held he was not justified. So, to justify shooting a dog because he was worrying fowl, and could not otherwise be prevented, the party must show that the dog was in the act of worrying at the time. Janson v. Brown, 1 Camp. 41. See, also, Wells v. Head, 4 Car. & P. 568. It is not sufficient that the party had reasonable cause to believe that the dog was proceeding to worry the animals, but he should also have reasonable cause to believe that it was necessary to kill the dog to prevent him from killing the animals. So held in Livermore v. Batchelder, 141 Mass. 179, 5 N. E. 275.
The refusal to instruct, and the instructions given, were in accordance with law, and fully protected defendant's rights.

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