Source: https://supreme.findlaw.com/supreme_court/docket/2002/unscheduled.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:44:03+00:00

Document:
When a U.S. District Court re-characterizes a pro-se federal prisoner's first post conviction motion as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, does such re-characterization make the prisoner's subsequent attempt to file a 2255 petition a "second or successive petition" within the purview of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)?
Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision affirming the dismissal of a 2255 petition for writ of habeas corpus as second or successive?
Does 11 U.S.C. 330(a)(1) authorize a court to award fees to a debtor's attorney?
Linda Frew, et al. v. Albert Hawkins, Commissioner, Texas Health and Human Servs. Commission, et al.
Do State officials waive Eleventh Amendment immunity by urging the district court to adopt a consent decree when the decree is based on federal law and specifically provides for the district court's ongoing supervision of the officials' decree compliance?
Does the Eleventh Amendment bar a district court from enforcing a consent decree entered into by State officials unless the plaintiffs show that the "decree violation is also a violation of a federal right" remediable under [42 U.S.C.] 1983?
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the District Court's dismissal of respondent's antitrust claims?
Did the 8th Circuit err when it concluded that Feller's Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), was not violated because he was not interrogated by government agents when the proper standard under Supreme Court precedent is whether the the government agents deliberately elicited information from him?
Should second statements, preceded by Miranda warnings, have been suppressed as fruits of an illegal post-indictment interview without the presence of counsel, under this Court's decisions in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)?
Jeff Groh v. Joseph R. Ramirez, et al.
Whether the Ninth Circuit properly ruled that a law enforcement officer violated clearly established law, and thus was personally liable in damages and not entitled to qualified immunity, when at the time he acted there was no decision by the Supreme Court or any other court so holding, and the only lower court decisions addressing the issue had found the same conduct did not violate the law.
Whether law enforcement officers violate the particularity requirement of the 4th Amendment when they execute a search warrant already approved by a magistrate judge, based on an attached application and affidavit properly describing with particularity the items to be searched and seized, but the warrant itself does not include the same level of detail.
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Whether Sections 113(a)(5) and 167 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413(a)(5) and 7477, authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to issue administrative orders to prevent construction of a major emitting facility where a state permitting authority is prepared to grant the facility operator a "prevention-of-significant-deterioration" air quality permit based on an arbitrary and capricious application of the statutory requirement that such sources of air pollution be subject to the best available control technology.
Whether the Commissioner of Social Security may determine that a claimant is not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act because the claimant remains physically and mentally able to do her previous work, without considering whether that particular job exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
Whether law enforcement officers executing a warrant to search for illegal drugs violated the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109, thereby requiring suppression of evidence, when they forcibly entered a small apartment in the middle of the afternoon 15-20 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence.
Where drugs and a roll of cash are found in the passenger compartment of a car with multiple occupants, and all deny ownership, does the Fourth Amendment prohibit a police officer form arresting the occupants of the car?
When police arrest the recent occupant of a vehicle outside the vehicle, are they precluded from searching the vehicle pursuant to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), unless the arrestee was actually or constructively aware of the police before getting out of the vehicle?
Whether a failure to give a suspect the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires the suppression of physical evidence derived from the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statement.
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Dennis Cline, et al.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding, contrary to decisions of the First and Seventh Circuits, that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621-634, prohibits "reverse discrimination," i.e., employer actions, practices, or policies that treat older workers more favorably than younger workers who are at least 40 years old.
Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that an investment scheme is excluded from the term "investment contract" in the definitions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10), if the promoter promises a fixed rather than variable return or if the investor is contractually entitled to a particular amount or rate of return?
Did the 5th Circuit err in rejecting Banks' claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial, on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of "utmost importance" to showing a capital sentence was appropriate?
Did the 5th Circuit act contrary to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), when it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively?
Did the 5th Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceedings because "evidentiary hearings" in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials?
Whether the Office of Independent Counsel properly withheld, under Exemption 7(C), photographs relating to the death of former Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster.
Whether Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), prohibits police officers from conducting a checkpoint organized to investigate a prior offense, stopping all oncoming motorists to hand out flyers about the offense and arresting motorists for drunk driving.
Edith Jones, et al., etc. v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co.
Is the rule from Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled form waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings, abrogated when the initial failure to give the Miranda warnings was intentional?
United States Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., et al.
Antitrust, Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Definition of "Person"
The federal antitrust laws apply to a "person," which is defined to include "corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of * * * the United States." 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 (Sherman Act), 12(a) (Clayton Act). The question presented is whether the United States Postal Service is a "person" amenable to suit under the antitrust laws.
For the purposes of exhausting all available state court remedies to seek federal habeas corpus relief, does a state prisoner "alert" the State's highest court that he is raising a federal claim when, in that court, he neither cites a specific provision of the federal constitution nor cites at least one authority that has decided the claim on a federal basis?
Olympic Airways v. Rubina Husain, etc., et al.
Whether the "accident" condition precedent to air carrier liability for a passenger's death under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention is satisfied when a passenger's pre-existing medical condition is aggravated by exposure to a normal condition in the aircraft cabin, even if the carrier's negligence was a link in the chain of causation.
Engine Manufacturers Association, et al. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, et al.
Whether local government regulations prohibiting the purchase of new motor vehicles with specified emission characteristics--which are otherwise approved for sale by state and federal regulators--are preempted by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
Whether the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment permits the admission against a criminal defendant of a custodial statement by a potential accomplice on the ground that parts of the statement "interlock" with the defendant's custodial statement.
Whether the Confrontation Clause framework established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) should be reevaluated and read to unequivocally prohibit the admission of out-of-court statements insofar as they are contained in "testimonial" materials, such as tape-recorded custodial statements.
Is an undersecured creditor entitled to the "indubitable equivalent" of its nonbankruptcy entitlement for purposes of discounting deferred payments to present value under the Chapter 13 cramdown provision at 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), resulting in fixing of a subprime lender's 21% contract rate as the presumptive discount rate?
What is the proper method for discounting of deferred payments to present value on property retained by the debtor under the Chapter 13 cramdown provision, and what is the creditor entitled to be compensated for in calculating the appropriate discount rate of interest?
Whether a plaintiff who wishes to bring a [42 U.S.C.] Section 1983 suit challenging only the conditions, rather than the fact or duration, of his confinement, must satisfy the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey.
Whether a prison inmate who has been, but is no longer, in administrative segregation may bring a Section 1983 suit challenging the conditions of his confinement (i.e. his prior placement in administrative segregation) without first satisfying the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey.
United States v. Abel C. Galletti, et al.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri v. Missouri Municipal League, et al.
Federal Communications Commission and United States v. Missouri Municipal League, et al.
Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., fka Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Missouri Municipal League, et al.
Whether 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), which provides that "[n]o State * * * regulation * * * may prohibit * * * the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service," preempts a state law prohibiting political subdivisions of the State from offering telecommunications service to the public.
Docket Sheet (No. 02-1238) From the U.S. Supreme Court.
Docket Sheet (No. 02-1386) From the U.S. Supreme Court.
Docket Sheet (No. 02-1405) From the U.S. Supreme Court.
State of Tennessee v. George Lane, et al.
Richard Vieth, et al. v. Robert C. Jubelirer, President of the Pennsylvania Senate, et al.
Whether the working owner of a business (here, the sole shareholder of a corporate employer) is precluded from being a "participant" under Section 3(7) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1002(7), in an ERISA plan.
Whether, under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, an individual who has proven a violation of the Privacy Act, but cannot prove actual damages, is automatically entitled to $1000 in damages.
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, et al.
Whether petitioner's longstanding practice of pumping accumulated water from a water collection canal to a water conservation area within the Florida Everglades constitutes an addition of a pollutant from a point source for purposes of Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342, where the water contains a pollutant but the pumping station source itself adds no pollutants to the water being pumped.

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 § 253
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