Source: http://www.jeremywrichter.com/category/rules-of-civil-procedure/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:32:29+00:00

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Category Archive for "Rules of Civil Procedure"
That last two years have brought extensive changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 2015, the discovery rules underwent broad revisions, and I have recently discuss some of the practical effects of those changes. The amendments in 2016 were less comprehensive and only entailed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 6, and 82.
Civil Rule 4(m) addresses the time limit for service of a summons and was amended in two consecutive years, 2015 and 2016. In addition to shortening the presumptive time for service from 120 days to 90 days, the 2015 amendment added an exemption from the time limit for Rule 71.1(d)(3)(A) notices of a condemnation action. The 2016 amendment added another exemption for Rule 4(h)(2) service on a corporation, partnership, or association at a place not within any judicial district of the United States.
I recently had the rare displeasure of being completely dumbfounded by statements made by opposing counsel in a letter. Two months prior to receiving the letter, we had filed a notice of service of discovery requests that we were propounding to the Plaintiff. We then emailed the notice and the discovery requests to opposing counsel.
Me: What?! Screw him! That’s not his prerogative!
Co-Counsel: I think he actually can. I looked into it.
Me: No, he can’t. [Emphatically]. I don’t think. [Less Certainly]. That’s just dumb. I don’t know what the rules say, but that’s the whole point of electronic filing. I’m going to find out. I’ll let you know. This is dumb.
It’s moments like this that the nerd in me takes over, and I get giddy about digging into the rules of civil procedure. I’m going to go ahead and give you the answer to the question – of course, he can’t refuse service of discovery because we emailed it, rather than snail-mailed it. You know why? Because that’s just dumb! Also the rules say so.
So What Do the Rules Say about Service of Discovery by Email?
Rule 33 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure requires that Interrogatories be served on a party but doesn’t state how this can or cannot be accomplished. Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 34 likewise requires Requests for Production to be served upon a party, but with no indication of the method to be used. The same with Requests for Admission under Rule 36.
Having exhausted the discovery rules, I went all the way back to Rule 5(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure … where I struck gold!
If the attorney for the party to be served or the party to be served is a registered user of the electronic-filing system as provided for by order or rules of the Supreme Court of Alabama, service may be made by electronic transmittal in accordance therewith. Service by electronic means in compliance with those orders and rules shall be complete on transmission of the electronic document.
So the only caveat was whether opposing counsel had opted to use the statewide electronic-filing system. Of course, he participates in electronic filing, because only a self-loathing, self-defeating Luddite would choose to forego the system and have to send someone down to the courthouse every time something needs to be filed. Then again, opposing counsel did still use an aol.com email address, so that’s barely email.
So the short answer is: If opposing counsel participates in the electronic-filing system (and they do, all of them), then they can be served by email with discovery requests, discovery responses, pleadings, motions, or whatever other documents are filed with the court. And if they attempt to refuse? Well, that’s not their prerogative, so just ignore that nonsense and go about your merry way! They can explain their position to the court later.
Following the running of the statute of limitations, when can claims against fictitious parties relate back to the original claims made against the named parties, for the purposes of replacing fictitious parties with real defendants?
Abigail Adams has a car that’s titled in her name. But she’s getting up in age, so she let’s John Quincy Adams use the car and keep it at his house. John Quincy has a friend Andrew Jackson who was in need of some wheels, because his ride was in the shop. While Andrew had the car, he let his mistress Hannah drive it. Hannah got in a wreck in Montgomery, Alabama, with the insufferable Martin Van Buren.
Almost two years after the wreck, Van Buren sues both Hannah (as the driver) and Abigail Adams (as the owner). In the style of the suit Van Buren lists Hannah and Adams and some fictitious parties, just in case he’s left anyone out. In the body of the Complaint, Van Buren makes his allegations against Hannah for negligence and wanton conduct and against Mrs. Adams for negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Hannah. But he fails to make allegations in the body of the Complaint against any of the fictitious defendants.
Several months into the lawsuit, and well over two years after the accident, Van Buren finds out some additional facts. Even though the police report from the accident listed Mrs. Adams as the owner and Hannah as the driver, Mrs. Adams had no idea that Hannah was driving the car. Even John Quincy says he didn’t know Hannah was driving the car. So Martin Van Buren decides he needs to add John Quincy and Andrew Jackson as defendants for negligent entrustment. Because it’s been more than two years since the accident happened, the statute of limitations has run, and Van Buren needs to know if his claims against John Quincy and Jackson will relate back to his original claims, such that the claims against them won’t be barred by the statute of limitations.
ARCP15(c)(3) reads that an amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when “the amendment, other than one naming a party under the party’s true name after having been initially sued under a fictitious name, changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the applicable period of limitations or one hundred twenty (120) days of the commencement of the action, whichever comes later, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party, or (4) relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h).” And ARCP 15(c)(4) provides that “relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h).
However, in order to invoke the relation-back principle of Rule 15(c) in regard to fictitious party practice under Rule 9(h), a plaintiff “(1) must state a cause of action against the party named fictitiously in the body of the original complaint and (2) must be ignorant of the identity of the fictitiously named party, in the sense of having no knowledge at the time of the filing that the later-named party was in fact the party intended to be sued.” Ex parte Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 7 So.3d 999, 1002–03 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So.2d 1057, 1059 (Ala. 1996)).
Stated differently, in order to invoke the relation-back principle and proceed under the fictitious party rule, “the original complaint must adequately describe the fictitiously named defendant and state a claim against such a defendant.” Ex parte Nationwide Ins. Co., 991 So. 2d 1287, 1290–91 (Ala. 2008) (Emphasis added) (Internal citations omitted). “To avoid the bar of a statute of limitations when a plaintiff amends a complaint to identify a fictitiously named defendant, the plaintiff (1) must state a cause of action against the party named fictitiously in the body of the original complaint and (2) must be ignorant of the identity of the fictitiously named party, in the sense of having no knowledge at the time of the filing that the later-named party was in fact the party intended to be sued.” Ex parte Tate & Lyle Sucralose, Inc., 81 So.3d 1217 (Ala. 2011) (citing Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So.2d 1057, 1059 (Ala.1996)). (Emphasis added) (Internal citations omitted).
“In addition, a party must have been ignorant of the true identity of the defendant and must have used due diligence in attempting to discover it.” Pearson v. Brooks, 883 So.2d 185, 191 (Ala. 2003). “The correct standard for determining whether a party exercised due diligence in attempting to ascertain the identity of the fictitiously named defendant is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known, or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described fictitiously.” Davis v. Mims, 510 So.2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987). Where a plaintiff knows or had opportunity to know the identity of a party at the time of filing suit or prior to the tolling of the statute of limitations but does not name the party, the plaintiff has failed to meet the criteria for invoking the relationship back principles of ARCP 9(h) and 15(c). See Ex parte Ismail, 78 So.3d 399 (Ala. 2011).
In order to relate back a claim, the original complaint must adequately describe the fictitious parties, and more importantly for our purposes, the plaintiff must state a claim against such defendants in the body of the original complaint. See Ex parte Nationwide Ins. Co., 991 So. 2d 1287, 1290–91 (Ala. 2008); see also Ex parte Tate & Lyle Sucralose, Inc., 81 So.3d 1217 (Ala. 2011); Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So.2d 1057, 1059 (Ala. 1996).
In our case, because Van Buren did not state a claim in the body of the Complaint against any fictitious parties, he should be barred making any negligent entrustment claims against either John Quincy or Jackson because the statute has run and those claims will not be deemed to relate back to his original claims against Mrs. Adams and Hannah.
As to the merits of the negligent entrustment claim against Mrs. Adams, Van Buren is likely going to have some real problems, and that claim should be dismissed at the summary judgment level. In order to prove a claim of negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must show that (1) the borrower was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless; (2) the supplier knew or had reason to know of the borrower’s incompetence; (3) the supplier did entrust the vehicle to the borrower; (4) the entrustment created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff; and (5) the plaintiff’s harm resulted from the entrustment. Thedford v. Payne, 813 So.2d 905, 911 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001). In order for there to be negligent entrustment, there must be manifestations of incompetence of the borrow prior to the time of the entrustment. Pryor v. Brown & Root USA, Inc., 674 So.2d 45 (Ala. 1995). Since Mrs. Adamas did not have control of the vehicle while it was in the control or possession of either John Quincy or Andrew Jackson, she should not be found to have entrusted the vehicle to Hannah.
Artwork via Boston Public Library.
Ex parte LERETA, LLC: Under Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4, service on a corporation or business entity cannot be perfected by certified mail addressed merely to the entity itself, and ineffective service will result in a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.
In September 2012, Fronia Warhurst’s house flooded during a rainstorm. In July 2014, Warhurst sued the City of Tuscumbia, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), and LERETA, LLC. She alleged (1) that Tuscumbia negligently or wantonly maintained a storm drain, which resulted in the flooding; (2) that Chase wrongfully terminated her flood insurance; and (3) LERETA, who provides flood-zone determination reports and certifications, negligently informed Chase that Warhurst’s house was not in a flood zone.
Warhurst attempted to serve LERETA by certified mail but did not address the envelop to any individual. An employee of LERETA, who was neither an officer, partner, or agent, received and signed for the certified mail. That employee did not check on “agent” box on the certified mail return receipt. Thereafter, LERETA did not file an answer.
On September 15, 2014, Warhurst filed an application for entry of default against LERETA and requested that judgment be entered against LERETA in the amount of $250,000.00. Three weeks later the circuit court entered default judgment against LERETA in the requested amount. On March 25, 2016, LERETA filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, purporting that the judgment was not a final order, as the remaining claims against the other defendants remained pending. LERETA further contended that Warhurst had not perfected service on it because the certified mail was not addressed to an individual authorized to receive service of process. LERETA presented evidence that it was unaware of the action against it until March 2016.
The circuit court denied LERETA’s motion to set aside the default judgment, and LERETA filed a writ of mandamus, requesting that the Supreme Court of Alabama set aside the default judgment. Ex parte LERETA, LLC [Ms. 1151054, Dec. 2, 2016], — So.3d — (Ala. 2016).
The first question before the Alabama Supreme Court was whether the default judgment entered against LERETA was a final order, which would affect its determination of whether a writ of mandamus was the appropriate vehicle for appeal. The court found that because the default judgment in this matter did not adjudicate all claims as to all parties and the circuit court did not certify the judgment as final pursuant to Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the default judgment order is interlocutory rather than final. Therefore, a writ of mandamus was the appropriate remedy for LERETA.
The second question on appeal was whether the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over LERETA. LERETA contended that it did not because it was not served in accordance with Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which requires certified mail to a corporation to be addressed to an individual who is an officer, partner, managing or general agent, or any agent authorized by appointment of by law to received service of process. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, and determined therefore that the failure to perfect service rendered the default judgment void. Under Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4, service on a corporation or business entity cannot be perfected by certified mail addressed merely to the entity itself, but rather to be effective, it must be addressed and delivered to an individual prescribed in Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.
As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama ordered that the circuit court set aside the default judgment entered against LERETA.
 See Progress Indus., Inc. v. Wilson, 52 So.3d 500, 505 (Ala. 2010); Hallman v. Marion Corp., 411 So.2d 130, 132 (Ala. 1982).
 See Ex parte Family Dollar Stores of Alabama, Inc., 906 So.2d 892 (Ala. 1995).
 Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c).
 See Boudreaux v. Kemp, 49 so.3d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 2010) (holding, “The failure to effect proper service under Rule 4, Ala. R. Civ. P., deprives the trial court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant and renders a default judgment void.”); see also Nichols v. Pate, 992 So.2d 734, 736 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008).

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