Source: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/10/17/aurel-sari-biting-the-bullet-why-the-uk-is-free-to-revoke-its-withdrawal-notification-under-article-50-teu/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:36:14+00:00

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Your make the point that the treaties are subject to international law. Surely the only treaty that was strictly international was the one establishing the EU in the first place. When a country joins, they take on the acquis communautaire which in effect I think converts the arrangements from international law to internal matters of the EU itself.
After that, given the supranational nature of the EU and subsequent treaties, they strike me more as intergovernmental agreements set within the confines of supranational EU law. I suspect that the use of the word ‘treaty’ is a misnomer. If it were otherwise, wouldn’t the all this EU law be subject to review outside the EU?
Although the following invokes the word ‘federal’, surely agreements in federal-type systems, e.g. Canadian provinces/federal government, US states/federal government, (and so on: German Laender, Australian states), and indeed UK countries, are not subject to international law, are they? So the UK is really up the creek on this one.
Very well reasoned. I have previously suggested, in response to Barber et Al, that the issue illustrated by the “moving target” analogy, inter alia, may well be relevant in considering whether the ECA is necessarily nugated by a Notice under Article 50. This contribution is, in my view, a deeper and sounder analysis of the overall legal framework within which a Notice should be considered.
It is with interest that I read Mr Sari’s submission. However there are some obvious flaws in his reasoning. An International Treaty is only binding on the people of the State entering into that Treaty, if and only if, the Treaty has been re-enacted by its own Parliament. In so doing it becomes domestic law and binding. the UK Parliament is made up, in part, of Members who are the elected representatives of the people. Those Members of Parliament enjoy therefore only delegated authority. As such they could never claim to have a mandate to vote or act against the interest of their electors.
The authority for the UK to join the EU derived from the result of a referendum. It was this approval of the people that provided the legal mandate to join. Equally the referendum result that expressed the will of the UK people to leave the EU is binding and cannot be revoked lawfully by any Parliament or Government. The will of the people rules supreme. The people of the UK have voted to leave the EU and the result is therefore irrevocable and binding. It appears that Mr Sari is confused by the fact that the withdrawal of the EU is not instant upon notification. But please it should be clear to all, that a period of time must be prescribed in order to allow for an orderly departure that allows time for the parting parties to formulate alternative arrangements. There are so many existing arrangements to untangle.
It is also interesting that Mr sari wishes to rely on international law but overlooks the inviolable natural right to self determination of all people. Applying this natural right, it becomes clear that the referendum result must be obeyed and no section of the EU Treaty could possibly violate the will of the UK people, and they don’t.
Lord Pannick is correct in his statement that there is no going back, the people have voted and withdrawal from the EU must therefore follow as a direct consequence of that vote.
Great post Aurel, thank you.
On a slightly different note, how do you see the domestic legality of a Government-led withdrawal interacting with the VCLT’s procedure for withdrawal, and specifically the authorisation of state representatives under Article 67?
So lets say that the Government loses its case at the High Court, but forges on ahead without Parliamentary approval. Domestically it would be, I imagine, very difficult to put the genie back in the bottle, if that notification is accepted by the EU. But would there be leeway to argue that a domestically illegal notification would be insufficient for the purposes of the VCLT – that the Head of State would in effect lose its “full powers”?
Ah, I overlooked Article 50(1). A silly blunder.
I wonder how such a ruling would affect the UK debate around the ECHR, however. I imagine a finding that Parliamentary approval would be needed for Brexit would be similarly applicable to withdrawal from the ECHR. But Article 58 of the ECHR contains no such requirement of domestic constitutional approval. Would the Government have more leeway here to act unilaterally and/or would there be more space for an argument under the VCLT?
This is extremely and remarkably well presented. It is also well balanced and keeps to the point. Quite a few people would have a better understanding of the issues at hand if they read this.
These interpretations seem to me incompatible with the wording of Article 50(3) which states that the Treaties will cease to apply to the relevant Member State in a given time after the notification, i.e. whether or not the notification is withdrawn. So it’s not a blank round. Time waits for no man, as is well known.
Nonsense. Art 50 covers the matter, general international law is ousted (a fortiori given that the EU is not bound by the VCLT). Art 50 does not cover the question of revocation explictly, but it plain that the purpose of Art 50 is to protect the rights of the EU-27 and the EU’s own institutions, not the rights of the State that wants to leave. That is best achieved by stopping a State notifying, forcing costly negotiating and then reversing its notification. Pannick’s bullet analogy is spot on.
I don’t think the UK could expect to stay if it tried this. After creating huge costs, considerable instability and no small amount of hostility, neither the UK public not the EU partners would allow it. It also would render article 50 not fit for purpose as the UK could simply give notification again and circumvent the time limit for negotiations.
Pingback: Can an Article 50 notification be revoked?
Not my normal area of interest, but a very good piece here by Aurel Sari of the University of Exeter on whether an Art 50 notice can be revoked.
Interesting “mental masturbation” only… as the EU (let alone France) is not a signatory to the VCLT and therefore the argument is moot. It has no binding effect in the ECJ (or upon the ECJ’s interpretation of the EU treaties) at ALL.
Whence, the ECJ is free to adopt its own interpretation of A50 free from the doctrinal constraints of (as here) a non-binding treaty. Indeed, the fact that the EU is NOT a signatory allows the real argument that therefore there is no expressed intention to so be bound.
—-> In such regards, that point is underscored given case C-286/90, Poulsen and Diva, at §9 is inapposite. That case, indeed that para, as made clear by §10 op.cit., correctly referred to UNCLOS to which the European Union IS indeed a signatory. Cf., the position viz. the EU and the VCLT.
BTW, I have pleaded law in both chambers of the ECJ.
Not wishing to disagree with an occupant of the illustrious Amory Building but as I read this I had a very uneasy feeling that too many assumptions were being made. Having read the comments I would agree that Art. 50 is a one-way street.
This entry was posted on October 17, 2016 by Constitutional Law Group in Europe, European Union, International law, Judicial review, UK government, UK Parliament and tagged Article 50 TEU, Brexit, Court of Justice of the European Union, Lisbon Case, Lisbon Treaty, UK EU Referendum, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

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