Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/ramalingam-chettiar-v-mohamed-adjwad-et-al/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:12:28+00:00

Document:
Ramalingam Chettiar o. Mohamed Adjwad.
Present: Moseley A.C.J., Soertsz S.P.J., and Nihill J.
RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR v. MOHAMED ADJWAD et al.
Warranty of title—Notice to warrant and defend—Notice to mother of minorheirs and co-executor—Sufficiency of notice—Compromise by naturalguardian—How far binding on the heirs—Liability of heirs for damagesfor failure to warrant and defend.
Held, that the minors were bound by the result of the action.
Where, as the result of such a notice, a compromise is entered intobetween the mother as natural guardian and co-executrix and the otherco-executor on the one hand and the party giving notice on the other,the compromise would be binding on the minors subject to a right toclaim restitution if they have been prejudiced by the compromise.
The liability of the heirs depends upon proof that administration hasbeen completed by the executors and that property belonging to theestate has passed into their hands and is limited to the extent of suchproperty.
and defend title. The heirs were the wife of the vendor, who was alsoexecutrix of the last will of her husband, and her minor children.
The learned District Judge entered judgment for the plaintiffs.
H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him S. J. V. Chelvanayagam and E. B.Wikremanayake), for defendants, appellants.—The cause of action is setout in the plaint. It is one which is not known to our law.
50Ramalingam Chettiar v. Mohamed Adjioad.
to have consented to the settlement in the former action. The provisionsof section 500 of the Civil Procedure Code were not complied with.
Further, the wrong persons have been sued. It was the estate, i.e., theexecutors of the vendor who should have been made defendants—see section 472 of the Civil Procedure Code. On this ground alone, theappeal ought to succeed. The present defendants are only two of thethree heirs of the deceased. Nor is there any evidence as to what theirshare of the inheritance is. There is no reason why they alone of theheirs should be liable for the debts of the testator. One of the defendantsis a minor. A minor cannot adiate an inheritance and is not liable to besued for the debts of the ancestor (Robert v. Abeywardene et al.&apos;).
N. E. Weerasooria, K.C. (with him N. Nadarajah), for plaintiff,respondent.—There was no mistake in the-District Court as to what thisaction was. The action was on the deed of sale. In the deed, there werethe two covenants, viz.:—Warranty of title and covenant to warrantand defend title, and we are entitled to rely on both. That we relied onthe former covenant also is manifest from the fact that the very firstauthority which was cited in the District Court on plaintiff&apos;s behalf wasDingiri Amma v. Mudiyanse et al.1 That case decided that expresswarranty of title may be enforced without the preliminary condition ofnotice and eviction.
In regard to the covenant to warrant and defend title, the notice to theexecutors in the previous case should be taken as notice to the minors.Alternatively, the notice to the mother (one of the. executors) wassufficient, as a mother is the natural guardian of her minor children—Voet 21.2.21 (Berwick’s Translation, p. 527).
At the trial no isue was raised by the defendants whether the executorsshould have been sued. “ Should this action be brought against theexecutors, and not against the heirs? ”—such an issue might have beenraised. It is probable that the testamentary case is over and that theexecutors are not functioning now. The position, however, is thatthe defendants are heirs under the will. They became liable as soon asthe property vested in them. We are only asking that our claim shouldbe limited to the amount which the defendants actually received underthe will. All the relevant facts are before the Court and there is noreason why justice should be denied. See dictum of the Privy Council inJayawickreme v. Amarasuriya’.
H. V. Perera, K.C., in reply.—As regards the proper party to be sued,the executor only is responsible for the debt of the estate. An executornever ceases to be executor—section 540 of the Civil Procedure Code.Heirs can be sued only as executors de son tort. But once executors areappointed, the executor de son tort is displaced. In the present case, boththe executors are alive. Administration involves the payment of debtsand goes on until all the debts are paid off (Suppramaniam Chetty et al. v.Palaniappa Chetty et al. ) The executors represent the heirs always.
(1912) 15 N. L. R. 323.
(1931) 33 N. L. R. 282.
* (1918) 20 N. L. R. 289 at 297.« (1904) 3 Bed. Rep. 57.
SOEBTSZ S.P.J.—Ramalingam Chettiar v. Mohamed Adjwad.
On May 5, 1927, the incumbent of a Buddhist Vihare sued RamalingamChettiar for declaration of title to this land. The trial Judge found in hisfavour, but awarded Ramalingam Chettiar compensation for certainimprovements. There was an appeal. The decree entered was set asideand the case was remitted for trial de novo.
While the retrial was pending, Ramalingam Chettiar, through hisProctor, moved for a notice on four respondents “ to show cause why thefirst respondent should not be appointed guardian ad litem over thesecond and the third minor respondents, and to warrant and defend thepetitioner’s (i.e., Ramalingam Chettiar’s) title ”. Notice was allowedfor June 30, 1932. The journal entry of that date is as follows: —“ Notice served on respondents pointed out. Mr. C. files proxy of thefirst and fourth respondents. He has cause to show. Second and thirdminors ”. The first respondent is the widow of Tambirajah Sinne LebbeMarikar the vendor, and she is co-executrix with the fourth respondentof her husband’s last will and testament. The second and third respond-ents are her children by Sinne Lebbe Marikar. It is to her and herchildren that Sinne Lebbe Marikar bequeathed and devised his estate.It will be noticed that although the motion of November 15, 1932, askedthat the first respondent be appointed guardian ad litem of the second, andthird respondents, that was not done. But, there was really no occasionfor such an appointment, for all Ramalingam Chettiar had in view at thatstage was to notify the respondents of the action brought against him, sothat they might take such steps as they thought fit to warrant and defendhis title. The necessity for a guardian ad litem for the minors would havearisen only in the event of their becoming parties to the litigation. Thisthey never became, for when on March 23, 1933, Ramalingam Chettiar’sCounsel inquired whether respondents would “ take charge of thedefence ”, the first and the fourth respondents said they would afford himevery assistance, that is without becoming added parties to the litigation.
SOERTSZ S.P.J.—Ramalingam Chettiar v. Mohamed Adjwad.
Rs. 15,000 at which sum he assessed the damages sustained by him. Hiscause of action was that the defendants-appellants being liable to warrantand defend the title conveyed to him, and having been duly noticed to doso, had failed to fulfil this obligation in respect of the 12J acres whichhad gone to the temple in consequence of the settlement to which theyconsented.
The defendants-appellants filed answer, and the defences they putforward were—(a) that they are not liable because they had not beenproperly noticed to warrant and defend title; (b) that at the date of thesettlement they were minors and proper steps had not been taken tosecure their valid participation in the settlement, and that, therefore,any loss occasioned by that settlement could not be imputed to them;(c) that, in any event, they were not liable because the plaintiffs’ claim,if he had any, was against the executors of Sinne Lebbe Marikar.
Issues were framed to cover these defences and after trial, the learnedtrial Judge entered judgment for the plaintiff for Rs. 11,954.17 andcosts.
In regard to plea (a) in one part of his judgment, the learned Judge heldthat this was an action on an express warranty of title and that, therefore,notice and eviction were not conditions precedent to a claim for damagessuch as this. In a later part of his judgment he found that the defendantshad been given sufficient notice. As for plea (b) it is difficult to gatherthe view of the trial Judge in regard to it. I can only say that he foundagainst the defendants but I cannot follow the reasoning which led himto that view. So far as plea (c) is concerned, he held that “ the defendantsas heirs of the vendors are liable to warrant and defend the title conveyedby the deed in view of the express warranty of title ”.
I understood from Counsel who appeared before us that these were thematters discussed when this appeal was before my brothers Wijeye-wardene and Cannon JJ., and in view of the general terms of thereference to us, I assume that these are the questions we have been calledupon to decide.
SOERTSZ S.P.J.—Ramalingam Chettiar v. Mohanted Adjwad.
words, that the two things are counterparts of one single obligation.That, of course, is not correct, and Mr. Weerasooria sought to escapefrom the difficulty created by this confusion of thought by submittingthat this action is based on both the express warranty of title and on thecovenant to warrant and defend title. It is impossible to accede to thissubmission. Paragraphs 3, 5, 8, 9, and 10 of the plaint show unequivocallythat the cause of action is based on the covenant to warrant and defendtitle. There is no reference whatever to the express warrantly of title.
SOERTSZ S.P.J.—Ramalingam Chettiar v. Mohamed Adjtoad.
title is ascribable only to his executorship. There was no other reasonfor making him a respondent. In these circumstances we must, I think,pay attention to the substance of the proceeding more than to its formand hold that, in this case, there was service of notice on the executorand the executrix. Such a service clearly binds those beneficiallyinterested in the estate. The fact that the plaintiff sought to give noticeto the minors themselves makes no difference. It is surplusage and canbe ignored.
In regard to (b), the authorities indicate that the natural guardian ofthe minor is entitled to enter into a compromise on his behalf, and that theminor would be liable on such a compromise subject to his right to claimrestitutio-in-integrum, within a certain period if he has been prejudiced bythe compromise. In this instance, no prejudice is alleged. On the faceof it, the compromise appears to be beneficial to those liable on the deedon the express warranty and on the covenant to warrant and defend title.The temple sought to be declared entitled to the whole land, and by thecompromise, obtained only one third of it. In the first trial they hadjudgment for the whole land. That is one view of the matter. Thedefendants are bound by the compromise in that way. But, as I havealready indicated there is another view according to which they must beheld to be bound. The record shows that their mother and the otherexecutor consented to the compromise.
I need only add that this is not a case to which section 500 of the CivilProcedure Code, to which reference was made, applies because NabisaAmmah and her children were not parties to the action.
Cape Colony till it was swept away by statute law. He says “at thepresent day, the administration of the estate of a deceased person devolvesno longer upon his heir but is vested in testamentary executors whoseduty it is to liquidate the estate under their care,’ to pay the debts of thedeceased and the legacies left by them, and to hand over the nett balanceof the estate to the heir who is only liable for the payment of such legaciesas may have been imposed upon him by will …. The inheritanceis the nett balance of the estate of a deceased person which is left after thedebts and legacies have been paid …. The heir, therefore,• isonly a residuary legatee and is in no worse position as regards the debts• of the deceased testator than any other legatee with this exceptionthat he will before all other legatees be liable, at the suit of the executor, toa conductio indebiti or action for refund for any money paid to him insettlement of his inheritance before the debts of the testator were fullypaid, and also to a direct action for such refund at the suit of the creditors ofthe deceased; but beyond what he has actually received out of the estate hewill not be liable This is the position in our law too. Section 540 of theCivil Procedure Code provides that “ if no limitation is expressed in theorder making the grant (i.e., of probate) then the power of administrationwhich is authenticated by the issue of probate …. extends toevery portion of the deceased person’s property …. and enduresfor the life of the executor …. or until the whole of the saidproperty is administered, according as the death of the executor ….or the completion of the administration, first occurs ”. In this instance,both the executor and executrix appointed by the will are alive, and it isnot at all clear to me why the plaintiff singled out these defendants whowere the minor heirs, and one of whom is still a minor to make his claimagainst. Be that as it might, a direct action will lie against the heirs onlyif the administration of the estate has been completed by the executors, .and property belonging to the estate of the deceased testator has passedinto the hands of the heirs, and they would be liable only to the extent ofthe property that has so passed. But as I have observed, there is nomaterial on the record to show that the executors have completed theiradministration, and that property belonging to the deceased vendor hasdevolved on these defendants, while this claim against his estate isoutstanding. In that state of things, no case has been made out againstthese defendants, and the judgment entered against them cannot besustained.
period, send the" case back for decree to be entered here, allowing theappeal and dismissing the plaintiff’s action with costs in both Courts.
I need hardly add that this order does not preclude the parties fromcoming to a settlement if they so desire.

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