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Intimacy - Meeting Needs and Respecting Privacy in the Care of Elderly People: what is a good moral attitude on the part of the nurse/carer?
B E T W E E N: JOY CHESKES, DENBIGH PATTON, C.M. AND D.S.
birth parents, health or safety reasons aside, with the consent of both parties.
and 50s. They have lived their lives to date on the assumption that their birth and adoption records would remain confidential and would not be retroactively2 opened, revealing their personal identifying information without their permission.
amended VSA, the key provisions that provide for the disclosure of the identifying information.
past, it reaches back and retroactively opens up confidential records that for decades have been inaccessible and provides for the release of identifying information that until now required the consent of the party being identified. 3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 4 (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 172 (Sup. Ct. Jus.) at paras. 6-16.
S.O. 1921, c. 55. Marchand, supra note 4 at para. 6. 7 S.O. 1927, c. 53. 8 S.O. 1954, c. 8. 9 R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 11 [CFSA.] 10 S.O. 1978, c. 85, ss. 80-81 11 Marchand, supra note 4 at para. 9.
Dr. Ralph Garber, Dean of the Faculty of Social Work at the University of Toronto, delivered his report Disclosure of Adoption Information to the Minister of Community and Social Services in November 1985 [the Garber Report].
Marchand, supra note 4 at para. 10. CFSA, supra note 9, ss. 162-174. 15 Ibid, s. 168. 16 Ministry of Community and Social Services, Policy and Guidelines for the Disclosure of Adoption Information (February 1988).
Child Welfare Act, S.O. 1954, c. 8, s. 71 (as amended by S.O. 1958, c. 11); An Act to revise the Child Welfare Act, S.O. 1978, c. 85, s. 80(2); Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 11, s. 162(3); see also s. 165(2)(g). 18 An Act to provide for the Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths, S.O. 32 Victoria, 1868. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the accurate and prompt recording of births is a pressing and substantial legislative objective: Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General),  1 S.C.R. 835 at para. 33. 19 Vital Statistics Act, S.O. 1948, c. 97, s. 6; O. Reg. 217/48, Form 2; Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 524, s. 6; R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 942, Form 2. 20 Child and Family Services Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 5, s. 53. 21 An Act to amend the Vital Statistics Act, S.O. 1958, c. 122; O. Reg. 7/59, ss. 1-2; R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 942, s. 14 and Form 6; VSA s. 28(2).
Disclosure Act (AIDA).24 The AIDA, in essence, replaced the closed records system with a more open system by adding a new sub-part to the VSA titled Disclosure re Adopted Persons at ss. 48.1 to 48.12. The full text of the provisions that are being challenged on this application, ss. 48.1, 48.2 and 48.11, is set out in an appendix attached to these Reasons.
Marchand, supra note 4 at para. 26.
the Registrar General for a copy of his or her birth registration or adoption order.
Ibid. at para 105. S.O. 2005, c.25. 25 Any information about the adoptive parents would be removed: s. 48.2(1). 26 VSA ss. 48.4 and 56.1.
For persons who do not wish to have their identifying information disclosed, ss.
information can be released. There are two safeguards in the new law to protect those who do not want their identifying information disclosed - first, the no contact notice, and second, the right to apply to a government Board for a non-disclosure order that will be issued if certain preconditions are satisfied.
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),  S.C.J. No. 9 at para. 12; Blencoe v. B.C. (Human Rights Commission),  2 S.C.R. 307 at para. 47.
Section 1 of the Charter provides that the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter are guaranteed subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
My identity and location and the genetic relationship with my biological parents are intimate and personal matters of fundamental personal importance [this] is my personal information that I should have control over, so I can decide if and when. Because, personally, I cant see anything more fundamental than deciding for myself rather than having someone else decide for me.
Registering to allow my identifying information to be disclosed to a birth-parent would have an enormous impact on the people closest to me in my life including my parents, my siblings and my daughter. By disclosing my identity, I am disclosing theirs, too. My family structure is very stable, strong and supportive and they have always encouraged me to make my own decision whether or not to seek or allow disclosure of personal information. I believed that I had made the choice that was right for me, that met my personal needs and that would be of the greatest benefit to my personal emotional well-being as well as that of my family.
My reasons for not wishing to seek out my birth family and wanting to keep my family information private are my ownI do not see why I should be forced to reveal this information or go through the stress and emotional turmoil of having to divulge these feelings to a board in the hope of then being allowed to keep my personal information private.
My present decision is that I do not want my personal information that is in my adoption file to be disclosed to my birth parents. I am not currently willing to risk trauma to my life as it is, to my family, to my loving aging parents, to my identity. This is a weighty decision that I have carried all my adult life and will continue to ponder. But it is for me to ponder and it is I who will suffer or benefit as a consequence of this decision.
It would not be hard to use the Internet or do some simple investigation and research in order to learn myriad details about my life and who I am It causes me stress and anxiety that someone with a particular interest in my identity and who I am could then find my address and learn about my interests and associations. To me, that is much worse than a birth parent being able to meet me. The loss of control over that decision weighs heavily on my mind every day. Im very concerned about dissemination and sharing. I am most concerned and centrally concerned about the disclosure of the information, period.
When the first such ad appeared, I had lost my father only two years before. I did not want to have any correspondence or communication with the other party partly out of respect for my father and out of consideration for my mother. My mother told me to do what was best for me and I made a very well thought out decision. My main reasons for refusing contact was my satisfaction with my life, and the concern of introducing to my family a stranger for whom I had no emotional connection.
communication, and asking that the ads be stopped. Given the persistency of her searching birth parent, C.M. doubts that a no-contact preference would have any meaningful effect.
The no contact is totally irrelevant to me, because no contact will not mean that they cannot watch me, they cant drive past my house. This person could get my name and give this to children that she has, to other friends, to relatives. Itdoes not provide me any comfort whatsoever whatsoever, other than I could be stalked.
I have no evidence as to what kind of people my birth parents are and I do not want to have to gather such evidence to persuade a government Ministry or Board that they should safeguard my privacy. I have no illwill whatsoever towards my birth parents, but I do want to be left to make my own choice about disclosing my identity to them.
Despite her fears about the disclosure of her identity as an adopted person, C.M.
I feel that I have no choice but to plead to the court. Im hoping that by pleading to the court that this entire process can then be avoided for myself and for anybody else who does not want to go in front of a review board and have to plead for our privacy. We are not an organized group. There is nobody to speak for us. Ive gone through a process where I was searched for so many years, and I know the feelings that I went through when I was being searched. It felt like I was being hunted. And if I can help another person not have to go through those feeling, I feel - - I do feel a responsibility.
Given that my birth parent disregarded the personal request I made in my response to the first letter not to seek any further contact from me unless through the appropriate channels and that this person instead continued to pursue me publicly, I do not believe that a simple no-contact request will be of any use in protecting me, my children or my sibling and parents. The prospect of having my name made available to one of my birth parents, along with the actions of my birth parent to date in attempting to contact me causes me great anxiety and stress.
eased over time when she realized with each advertisement that the birth parent had not uncovered her identity: Each passing year made me feel more confident that they would not be able to find me. However, the new law, says C.M., has renewed these fears and anxieties.  D.S., the fourth applicant, is a business development director for a research firm.
had been adopted. He heard nothing further for more than twenty years. Sometime in 2001 or 2002, D.S. received a letter from an Ontario government ministry informing him that records indicate he is a birth father and asking whether he would consent to contact with the adopted person. D.S. believes it was sheer luck that he received the letter instead of his wife who does not know about the adoption. The unexpected letter has left D.S. fearful of the effect that an unexpected revelation would have on my relationships, especially with my wife.
I cannot risk having any phone calls or communications sent to my home. Nor do I want to have to reveal my identity in order to protect it or share my deepest fears with strangers in the hope that they may allow me to keep my privacy. This exposure would render me even more powerless, humiliated and vulnerable. Such an experience would cause me enormous emotional and psychological stress and I am very worried of what effect that would have on me and on the maintenance of my family relationships.
adopted adults and birth parents that favour open adoption records and retroactive access. It does not speak for non-searching adoptees or birth parents, such as the applicants, who oppose the retroactive aspect of the new law.
Garber Report, supra note 12 at pp. 234-241. Jennifer Stoddart, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, in a letter to the Ontario Government on May 11, 2005: The information at play is absolutely some of the most sensitive information in our society and it was gathered under the assurance of the utmost confidentiality. Reckless release of this information even 60 years after the event could certainly damage relations within families, and harm individuals.
See e.g. R. v. W. (D.D ) (1997), 114 C.C.C. (3d) 506 (B.C.C.A.) per McEachern C.J.B.C. at para. 43: I doubt if there could be any higher privacy right than that enjoyed by an adopted child at least until such time as she, having attained the age of majority, might decide to seek out her natural parents or one of them. Chief Justice McEacherns reasons on this point were adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W. (D.D.),  2 S.C.R. 681. 32 Lavigne v. Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages),  2 S.C.R. 773 at para. 24. 33 See the discussion, below, para. 114 et seq. 34 R. v. Mills,  3 S.C.R. 668 at para. 80. 35 R. v. Dyment,  2 S.C.R. 417 at para. 33. 36 R. v. Duarte,  1 S.C.R. 30 at para. 27.
place in their adoptive family. The top five reasons why biological parents reported that they were searching was because they wanted to establish a relationship with their child; they needed to know the child was well; they hoped to find inner peace or some kind of healing through contact; they wanted to tell the child they loved him or her; and they wanted to explain their placement decision. The literature on biological parents reveals that both genders report chronic anxiety over the fate of their birth children, as well as diminished self-esteem, depression, feelings of unworthiness, and recurrent emotions of grief and loss from placement. 38 Dr. Anne-Marie Ambert, a professor of sociology at York University: see discussion below and note 39 at 3. 39 Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, A Review of the Literature on Adoption-Related Research: The Implications for Proposed Legislation (2006).
Marchand, supra note 4 at para. 95. Supra note 31. In his decision at the Court of Appeal, McEachern C.J.B.C noted the reasonable expectation of the child and her parents that the adoption information would not be disclosed (para. 13).
Mills, supra note 34 at para. 136: with respect to the privacy interest in records [held by third parties] the expectation of privacy in adoption or counseling records may be very different from that in school attendance records. 44 I will discuss the legislative approaches in the other provinces, the U.S. the U.K. and Australia later in these reasons as part of the s. 1 analysis.
right to liberty as guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter?
right to security of the person as guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter?
security of the person, is the deprivation in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice?
VI. Analysis (1) Is the application premature?
application should be dismissed as premature.
participate in this constitutional challenge. I was concerned about the fact that he was not an acknowledged birth parent, only a possible birth parent. I queried whether D.S. could simply contact Ministry officials and have the erroneous information on the applicable birth record corrected. Since he had denied paternity, he should not have been listed as a birth father. In other words, I was asking if there were other and better birth parent applicants, i.e. birth mothers who were concerned about the release of their private information to searching adoptees or birth fathers who had acknowledged paternity and had been correctly identified as having done so on the birth record.  Counsel for both D.S. and the Attorney General urged me to grant standing.
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act provides that The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. 46 Falkiner v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) (1996), 140 DLR 4th 115 at para. 7.
whether the applicants have a Charter-protected right to privacy in circumstances such as these where confidential, personal information is about to be released by the government, retroactively and without their permission, to the persons whom they would least want to have it. The issue is not whether the applicants privacy has in fact been infringed by the impugned provisions clearly it has but whether this infringement constitutes a breach of their rights under the Charter and is therefore unconstitutional.
See Mills, supra note 34; Khadr v. Canada,  F.C.J. No. 2061; R v. Morgentaler,  1 S.C.R. 30; R. v. Hitzig (2003), 177 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused,  S.C.C.A. No. 5.
Euteneier v. Lee (2006), 77 O.R. (3d) 621 (C.A.) at para. 63. The intervener argues that if Parliament had wanted to protect privacy as a free-standing right in the Charter, it could have done so expressly. For example, section 5 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, enacted in 1975, provides explicitly that every person has a right to respect for his private life. 49 Dyment, supra note 35 at para. 26; Duarte, supra note 36 at para. 33: our right under s. 8 of the Charter extends to a right to be free from unreasonable invasions of our right to privacy. 50 R. v. Hebert,  2 S.C.R. 151 and R. v. Broyles,  3 S.C.R. 595, cited in Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance),  2 S.C.R. 403 at paras. 65-66. See also OConnor, infra note 53 at para. 110 and M.(A).v.Ryan, (1997) 4 C.R.(5th) 220 (S.C.C.) 51 Cash Converters Canada Inc. v Oshawa (City), 2007 ONCA 502 at para. 29 30; also see Euteneier v. Lee, supra note 48.
R. v. Malmo-Levine,  3 S.C.R. 571 at para. 85, quoting Godbout v. Longueuil (Ville),  3 S.C.R. 844 at para. 66. Also see Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission),  2 S.C.R. 307 at para. 83, at para. 49; B.(R.) v. Childrens Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,  1 S.C.R. 315 at 368-9; Morgentaler, supra note 47 per Wilson J. (concurring); and Hitzig, supra note 47at para 92.
Godbout, ibid. at paras. 67-8.
well support a second ground for finding a breach of the right to liberty in s. 7 of the Charter. However, as I have already noted, it is not necessary for me to resolve this issue. I have found a breach of the right to liberty by focusing on the informational privacy interest and applying the reasoning in OConnor as set out above. (4) Has there been a denial of security of the person?
that the applicants right to security of the person has also been infringed. For the sake of completeness, however, I will add these brief comments.
Hitzig, supra note 47 at para. 93. Dyment, supra note 35 at para. 33. 60 Garber Report, supra note 12 at 27.
the intensely personal nature of adoption information, any scheme that favors disclosure over privacy puts the emotional and psychological well-being of the affected individuals at serious risk. The risk of harm is not merely the actual disclosure of the information, she says, but also the contemplation that such disclosure could take place at any time without their consent or prior approval.
Blencoe, supra note 56 at para. 83.
For example, (8) the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, (9) the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, (10(a)) the right to retain counsel, (12) the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, (13) the right against self-incrimination and (14) the right to an interpreter. 65 B.C. Reference, supra note 63. at paras. 35-6. 66 As McLachlin J. (as she then was) noted in Hebert, supra note 50 at para. 73: It would be wrong to assume that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter are cast forever in the straightjacket of the law as it stood in 1982. 67 B.C. Reference, supra note 63 at para. 74.
Hitzig, supra note 47 at para. 78. Ibid. at para. 106. 70 Charkaoui, supra note 27 at para. 19. 71 B.C. Reference, supra note 63 at para. 72. 72 Malmo-Levine, supra note 56 at para. 113.
quoted dictum from OConnor and focused attention on the fact that, in the case at bar, a reasonable expectation of privacy in ones adoption records has been established on the evidence, and ones ability to control the dissemination of personal information has been judicially acknowledged as an element of the right to privacy.
OConnor, supra note 53 at para. 118.
B.C. Reference, supra note 63 at para. 64.
Malmo-Levine, supra note 56 at para. 113. Ibid. at para 9.
also evident in our federal privacy and access laws.
Mills, supra note 34 at para. 61, citing Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,  3 S.C.R. 835 at para. 75. 81 Marchand, supra note 4 at para. 100; Pringle v. Alberta (Human Rights, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Commission) (2004), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 502 (Alta. Ct. Q.B.) at paras. 55, 58; W. (D.D.), supra note 31 at paras. 23, 43, and 75. 82 Marchand, ibid. at para. 113. 83 Ibid. at para. 116. 84 W. (D.D.), supra note 31 at paras. 23, 43, and 75.
competing Charter-protected rights because the right to access confidential information as claimed by searching adoptees and birth parents is not a Charter-protected right. Nor is this a case where we have competing principles of fundamental justice as in Mills, where the Supreme Court had to balance the accuseds s. 7 right to make full answer and defence against the complainants s. 8 right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.89 It is interesting to note that even where one principle of fundamental justice, such as the right to make full answer and defence, competes with the right to privacy that is part of another principle of fundamental justice, namely the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure, the courts have typically found in favour of privacy.
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21. R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1. 87 H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd., supra note Erreur ! Signet non dfini. at paras. 24 and 26. I would only add that except as prescribed by legislation can only mean except as prescribed by constitutionally valid legislation. 88 R.S.O. 1990, c. F-31. When FIPPA was introduced, only certain classes of records were excluded from its reach due to their confidential nature. Adoption records are excluded from the application of FIPPA pursuant to s. 165 of the CFSA and s. 28(2) of the VSA. CFSA, supra note 9 at s. 165; VSA, supra note 1 at s. 28(2). 89 Supra note 34.
Supra note 31. Ibid. at para. 13. 92 Ibid. at para. 43.
fundamental justice. Any further balancing can therefore only take place within the context of s. 1. The Suggested Principle, in my view, clears the second hurdle it is a legal principle about which there is significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate.
Ibid. at para. 74. Supra note 31.
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),  1 S.C.R. 791 at para. 209, per Binnie and Lebel JJ., dissenting.
fundamental justice have been satisfied.
Malmo-Levine, supra note 56 at paras. 133 and 141-143.
disproportionate, this does not diminish or detract from the finding made above that the impugned provisions are in breach of s. 7. Laws that are not abhorrent or intolerable to average Canadians can still be unconstitutional. I have found that the applicants have been deprived of their right to liberty and that this deprivation has not been in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The applicants s. 7 Charter right has been breached. The next question is whether this breach can be justified under s. 1.
Ibid. at paras. 159-161 and 169.
therefore no need for me to engage in a s. 1 analysis. However, if I am wrong in this regard and for the sake of completeness, I will undertake the s. 1 analysis.
New Brunswick (Minister of Health) v. G. (J.), supra note 62 at para. 99. B.C. Reference, supra note 63 at para. 93. 100 Charkaoui, supra note 27 at para. 66.
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Egan v. Canada,  2 S.C.R. 513 at para. 182, per Iacobucci J., (dissenting, but not on this point), summarizing the Oakes test from R. v. Oakes,  1 S.C.R. 103.
purposes just stated may well be a pressing and substantial objective, but only to the extent that the legislation is not retroactive and does not, as they say, trample on the rights of other citizens to their own sense of identity, personal history and family.
hurdle has also been cleared. The rational connection component in the proportionality test requires that the measures abridging the right or freedom in question be rationally connected to the legislative objectives. As long as the challenged provision can be said to further in a general way an important government aim it cannot be seen as irrational.103 In my view, the impugned provisions in the new law cannot be said to be irrational in the sense of being unable to further the objectives of the new law as were summarized by the Minister in the above excerpt.
Canada Human Rights Commission v. Taylor,  3 S.C.R. 892 at para. 56; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004 1 S.C.R. 827 at paras. 29-30; R. v. Sharpe,  1 S.C.R. 45 at paras. 85 and 89.
R. v. Chaulk,  3 S.C.R. 1303 at para. 65.
Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 582-3; Adoption Information Act, S.N.S. 1996, c. 3, s. 19; Family Services Act, S. N. B. 1980, c. F-2.2, ss. 91-2; Adoption Act, R. S. P. E. I. 1988, c. A-4.1, s. 53. 106 Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5, s. 53; Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, R. S. A. 2000, c. C12, s. 74.2(4); The Adoption Act, C.C.S.M., c. A2, s. 112; Adoption Act, S. N. L. 1999, c. A-2.1, s. 50. 107 The Adoption Act, 1998, S. S. 1998, c. A-5.2, Reg 1, ss. 28. 108 See the on-line summary at http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/state.php.
recognizing their rights and spoke of their desire to know the fate of their children.
enactment of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, birth parents were given the right to apply for disclosure of identifying information, but this was made subject to the adopted persons consent to disclosure.111 Thus, the U.K. is very much like the seven U.S. states that have allowed access to identifying information for adult adoptees; the fact that birth parents in the U.K. also have this right is a minor difference because the birth parents right is subject to what amounts to a disclosure veto that has been given to the adoptee.
NSW Law Reform Commission Report at 7.1-7.23; Adoption Information Amendment Act 1995, No. 61 (NSW); Adoption Act 2000, No. 75 (NSW), Chap. 8.
continues to live in the same community, as does the birth father. Her family does not know about the adoption. If the adoptee identifies her and tells the birth father, the birth father will spread the news through the small community and this will cause great harm to her marriage, her children and to the stability of her family.
The no-contact is totally irrelevant to me, because no contact will not mean that they cannot watch me, they cant drive past my house. This person could get my name and give this to children that she has, to other friends, to relatives. Itdoes not provide me any comfort whatsoever - whatsoever, other than I could be stalked.
Ontario Hansard of April 26, 2005, supra note 102 at 6579.
procedural. The real problem with having to go before a government board is more fundamental. It was best expressed by the applicants themselves in their affidavit evidence: Joy Cheskes: My reasons for not wishing to seek out my birth family and wanting to keep my family information private are my own I do not see why I should be forced to reveal this information or go through the stress and emotional turmoil of having to divulge these feelings to a board in the hope of then being allowed to keep my personal information private. Denbeigh Patton: The notion that the privacy seeker should have to supply a justification to a government board to maintain his privacy is grotesque. C.M.: I believe this process would force me to reveal deeply personal information about myself and plead for someone elses permission to keep my life private. D.S.: I do not want to have to reveal my identity in order to protect it or share my deepest fears with strangers in the hope that they may allow me to keep my privacy. This exposure would render me even more powerless and humiliated.
requiring me to justify why my private information should not be disclosed?
Supra note 31 at para 23. I would add that the same observation can apply to the non-searching birth parent.
OConnor, supra note 53 at para. 117. Recall the discussion above in Part IV.
During the legislative debate, the point was made repeatedly by members of the opposition that if a disclosure veto was provided to the 3% that would use it, the vast majority of searching adoptees and birth parents (about 97%) would be able to obtain the information that they seek and the constitutionality of the new law would not have been challenged. 121 Ontario, Standing Committee on Social Policy, Official Reports of Debate (Hansard) (11 May 2005) at SP-1074.
Jennifer Stoddart, Statement in Support of the Remarks of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, (May 11, 2005) at 1.
While I believe it is quite right to go back and modify adoption policy to permit the more open approach we have today, which respects the human rights of the child, we cannot with the stroke of a pen rewrite the history of the lives of the individuals who trusted government to keep their birth records and adoption arrangements secret. Confidentiality commitments do not expire like patent protection.
protection are the applicants, who are part of a small minority of adoptees and birth parents that wish to protect their privacy. They have every right to do so. The applicants have established that their right under s. 7 of the Charter has been breached and the government has failed to justify this breach under s. 1.
written submissions from the applicants within 15 days and from the Attorney General and the Intervener within 10 days thereafter.
I am grateful to counsel for their assistance.
APPENDIX Sections 48.1*, 48.2* and 48.11 of the Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.V.4 [*PROCLAIMED IN FORCE ON SEPTEMBER 17, 2007] Disclosure to an adopted person 48.1 (1) An adopted person may apply to the Registrar General for an uncertified copy of the original registration, if any, of the adopted persons birth and an uncertified copy of any registered adoption order respecting the adopted person. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Age restriction (2) The adopted person is not entitled to apply for the uncertified copies until he or she is at least 18 years old. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Disclosure (3) Subject to subsections (5), (7) and (8), the applicant may obtain the uncertified copies from the Registrar General upon application and upon payment of the required fee, but only if the applicant produces evidence satisfactory to the Registrar General of the applicants identity and age. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Notice of preferred manner of contact (4) If a notice registered by a birth parent under subsection 48.3 (2) is in effect, the Registrar General shall give the applicant a copy of the notice when the Registrar General gives the applicant the uncertified copies. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Notice of wish not to be contacted (5) If a notice registered by a birth parent under subsection 48.4 (3) is in effect, the Registrar General shall not give the uncertified copies to the applicant unless the applicant agrees in writing not to contact or attempt to contact the birth parent, either directly or indirectly. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Same (6) The Registrar General shall give the applicant a copy of the notice when the Registrar General gives the applicant the uncertified copies. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Effect of application for order prohibiting disclosure (7) If the Registrar General receives notice of an application under section 48.7 for an order directing him or her not to give the uncertified copies to the applicant, the Registrar General shall not give the uncertified copies to the applicant before the Registrar General receives, (a) a certified copy of the order; or (b) notice that the application for the order has been dismissed, withdrawn or abandoned. 2005, c. 25, s. 6.
Effect of order (8) If the Registrar General receives a certified copy of an order of the Board directing the Registrar General not to give the uncertified copies to the applicant, the Registrar General shall not give them to the applicant. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Rescission of order (9) Subsection (8) does not apply if the Registrar General receives notice that the Board has rescinded the order. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Notice of prohibition against disclosure to a birth parent (10) If the Registrar General has received notice under section 48.9 that, by virtue of that section, he or she is prohibited from giving the information described in subsection 48.2 (1) to the applicants birth parent and if that notice has not been rescinded, the Registrar General shall give the applicant a copy of the notice when the Registrar General gives the applicant the uncertified copies. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Deemed receipt by Registrar General (11) For the purposes of this section, the Registrar General shall be deemed not to have received a notice or certified copy referred to in this section until the Registrar General has matched the notice or copy with the original registration, if any, of the adopted persons birth or, if there is no original registration, until the Registrar General has matched it with the registered adoption order. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Disclosure before deemed receipt (12) Subsections (7) to (10) do not apply if, before the Registrar General is deemed to have received the notice or copy, as the case may be, the Registrar General has already given the uncertified copies to the applicant. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Mandatory delay in disclosure (13) If the Registrar General receives notice that the Child and Family Services Review Board has given him or her a direction described in subsection 48.7 (6), the Registrar General shall comply with the direction. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Disclosure to a birth parent 48.2 (1) A birth parent of an adopted person may apply to the Registrar General for all the information contained in the following documents, with the exception of information about persons other than the applicant and the adopted person: 1. The original registration, if any, of the adopted persons birth. 2. Any birth registration respecting the adopted person that was substituted in accordance with subsection 28 (2). 3. Any registered adoption order respecting the adopted person. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Age restriction (2) The birth parent is not entitled to apply for the information described in subsection (1) until the adopted person is at least 19 years old. 2005, c. 25, s. 6.
Disclosure of information (3) Subject to the restrictions set out in this section, the applicant may obtain the information described in subsection (1) from the Registrar General upon application and upon payment of the required fee, but only if the applicant produces evidence satisfactory to the Registrar General of the applicants identity and the adopted persons age. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Notice of preferred manner of contact (4) If a notice registered by the adopted person under subsection 48.3 (1) is in effect, the Registrar General shall give the applicant a copy of the notice when the Registrar General gives the applicant the information described in subsection (1). 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Notice of wish not to be contacted (5) If a notice registered by the adopted person under subsection 48.4 (1) is in effect, the Registrar General shall give the applicant a copy of the notice when the Registrar General gives the applicant the information described in subsection (1). 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Temporary restriction on disclosure (6) The Registrar General shall not give the information described in subsection (1) to the applicant while any of the following circumstances exist: 1. The Registrar General is required by section 48.9 to ask a designated custodian for notice about whether the Registrar General is prohibited, by virtue of that section, from giving the information to the applicant, but the Registrar General has not yet received the notice. 2. The Registrar General has received notice of an application under section 48.5 or 48.6 for an order directing him or her not to give the information to the applicant, but the Registrar General has not yet received either a certified copy of an order or a notice that the application has been dismissed, withdrawn or abandoned. 3. A notice registered by the adopted person under subsection 48.4 (1) is in effect, but the applicant has not yet agreed in writing that he or she will not contact or attempt to contact the adopted person, either directly or indirectly. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Prohibition against disclosure (7) The Registrar General shall not give the information described in subsection (1) to the applicant if either of the following circumstances exist: 1. The Registrar General has received notice under section 48.9 that, by virtue of that section, the Registrar General is prohibited from giving the information to the applicant, that notice has not been rescinded, and there is not a notice of waiver under section 48.10 that is in effect. 2. The Registrar General has received a certified copy of an order under section 48.5 or 48.6 directing him or her not to give the information to the applicant, and the Registrar General has not received notice that the order has been rescinded. 2005, c. 25, s. 6.
Deemed receipt by Registrar General (8) For the purposes of this section, the Registrar General shall be deemed not to have received a notice or certified copy referred to in this section until the Registrar General has matched the notice or copy with the original registration, if any, of the adopted persons birth or, if there is no original registration, until the Registrar General has matched it with the registered adoption order. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Disclosure before deemed receipt (9) Subsections (4) and (5), paragraph 2 of subsection (6) and paragraph 2 of subsection (7) do not apply if, before the Registrar General is deemed to have received the notice or copy, as the case may be, the Registrar General has already given the information described in subsection (1) to the applicant. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. Mandatory delay in disclosure (10) If the Registrar General receives notice that the Child and Family Services Review Board has given him or her a direction described in subsection 48.5 (8) or 48.6 (6), the Registrar General shall comply with the direction. 2005, c. 25, s. 6. See: 2005, c. 25, ss. 6, 36 (2). Unsealing of files 48.11 For the purposes of sections 48.1 to 48.10, the Registrar General may unseal any file that was sealed under this Act or a predecessor of this Act. 2005, c. 25, s. 10.
JOY CHESKES, DENBIGH PATTON, C.M. AND D.S.

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