Source: http://mo.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180330_0000600.EMO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:01:02+00:00

Document:
FindACase | Burdess v. Cottrell, Inc.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Cottrell, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 5). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied.
Plaintiff Gregory Burdess was at all relevant times employed as a car hauler by Jack Cooper Transport Company (“JCT”), a registered motor carrier that regularly transports materials and makes deliveries in Missouri. (Complaint (“Compl.”), Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 4) Defendant Cottrell, Inc. (“Cottrell”) is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia. (Compl. ¶ 2) The rigs in the JCT motor carrier fleet, including the rig at issue here, are manufactured, designed and placed into the stream of commerce by sale or otherwise by Cottrell. (Compl. ¶ 3) Burdess alleges that “on or about April 26, 2013 and prior thereto, ” he was operating a rig manufactured by Cottrell when he was injured “while securing automobiles, during the operation of the ratchet tie down systems he had been using.” (Compl. ¶ 4) He further alleges that the injury date - April 26, 2013 - is “the date of diagnosis of bilateral shoulder impingement syndrome, ” a condition caused by specific and repetitive trauma. (Id.) Burdess and his wife Lisa Burdess (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Cottrell on May 16, 2017 asserting five causes of action: strict liability (Count I); negligence (Count II); breach of implied warranty (Count III); loss of consortium (Count IV); and punitive damages (Count V).
Cottrell moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that their claims “originated” in Illinois on April 26, 2013, and are thus barred by the Illinois statute of limitations for personal injury claims under Missouri's borrowing statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that Missouri's borrowing statute does not apply because their cause of action originated and accrued in Missouri.
Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state, territory or country in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of this state.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190 (emphasis added). As applied by Missouri courts, the Missouri borrowing statute “provides for application of a foreign statute of limitations when  the alleged action originated in the foreign jurisdiction and  the foreign statute of limitations would bar the action.” Hollingsworth, 2017 WL 564491, at *2 (quoting Harris-Laboy v. Blessing Hosp., Inc., 972 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Mo.Ct.App. 1998)).
The Supreme Court of Missouri has interpreted the term “originated” to mean “accrued.” Id. (citing Thompson by Thompson v. Crawford, 833 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Mo. banc 1992) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.100)). A cause of action accrues not “when the wrong is done . . . but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment[.]” Levitt v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 250 F.Supp.3d 383, 385-86 (W.D. Mo. 2017). Thus, Burdess' personal injury claim accrued when his “injuries were sustained and capable of ascertainment.” Hollingsworth, 2017 WL 564491, at *2 (quoting Benton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 632, 634 (Mo.Ct.App. 2014)).

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