Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2008/5200crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:53:30+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Timothy Gunning, Esq., Kinney, Secola & Gunning, LLC, 685 State Street, P.O. Box 1814, New Haven, CT 06508.
The respondents were represented by Richard Lynch, Esq., Lynch, Traub, Keefe and Errante, P.C., Attorneys at Law, 52 Trumbull Street, P.O. Box 1612, New Haven, CT 06506-1612.
This Petition for Review1 from the January 31, 2007 Finding of Dismissal was heard December 14, 2007 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners Amado J. Vargas and Scott A. Barton.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The present appeal concerns whether the claimant, who formerly drove a delivery truck for the respondent FedEx Ground, was an employee of FedEx Ground when he was injured while making deliveries on April 26, 2005. The trial commissioner determined that the claimant had an independent contractor relationship with the respondent, and therefore, dismissed the claim as this Commission does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the injury. The claimant has appealed asserting that the trial commissioner improperly applied the “right to control” test promulgated in Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613 (1998) by not finding the claimant was an employee of the respondent. Upon review, we believe that the trial commissioner appropriately applied Hanson to the facts herein. Therefore, we affirm the Finding of Dismissal and dismiss this appeal.
The trial commissioner found the claimant and respondent commenced their business relationship in April 2002 when the parties executed a contract entitled FedEx Home Delivery Standard Contractor Operating Agreement. The claimant understood at the time he would be operating his FedEx Ground delivery service as an independent contractor pursuant to the terms of the operating agreement. The agreement had a fixed two year term, subject to renewal. The claimant was required to purchase or lease a delivery truck to operate the route, which had a specific geographic area. The claimant was responsible for licensing his truck, paying for fuel and maintenance, and for the payment of taxes on the vehicle. He was also responsible for insuring the truck and himself, as well as obtaining his own hand trucks. The operating agreement indicates that the claimant could hire and train others to perform his delivery duties for him.
The claimant obtained an appropriate truck from a dealer recommended by the respondent and commenced working in 2002. The claimant was not satisfied with his initial delivery route and asked FedEx for another route; which they agreed to provide. He was required to load his own truck and had to be at FedEx’s North Haven terminal no later than 9:30 a.m. The claimant generally arrived at 6:30 a.m. to load his truck. The claimant was provided with a manifest of the packages to be delivered and he was provided with a scanner so that he could scan the packages to establish a list of customers and their addresses. The claimant generally delivered about 140 packages per day, as well as making pickups. He was not required to work a minimum amount of hours and could begin his route when he decided. The claimant was paid on a weekly basis for the total amount of pickups, stops and deliveries that he made. No income taxes or social security taxes were withheld from the payments made to the claimant from the respondent. The claimant filed his federal and state taxes as a sole proprietorship in 2002, 2003 and 2004 and claimed the appropriate deductions for his delivery service business.
The record indicated the respondent did place restrictions on the claimant. He was not allowed to wear necklaces or bracelets. The claimant was required to wear a FedEx uniform when making deliveries. The operating agreement required the claimant to put FedEx Ground decals on his truck. The claimant had to cover up the company decals to use the truck for his personal use. The claimant also had to attend four safety meetings per year at FedEx.
The trial commissioner also found that the claimant had substantial autonomy in the conduct of his business. The operating agreement permitted the claimant to hire and train others to perform his delivery duties for him, and the claimant did in fact hire subordinates.2 The claimant could have purchased additional delivery routes from other FedEx Ground contractors. Following his injury, the claimant sold his route and his truck to another contractor.
Following his April 26, 2005 injury the claimant alleged that he was an employee of FedEx and was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits; asserting that the respondent controlled the means and methods of how he conducted his delivery package service within the route they provided to him. The respondent denied that the claimant was their employee, claiming that he was an independent contractor, as indicated by the operating agreement and the manner in which the claimant conducted his business as a sole proprietorship. The trial commissioner agreed with the respondent. Citing the aforementioned subordinate facts, the commissioner concluded “[t]he greater weight of the evidence indicates that the claimant had control over the performance of his delivery service” and [t]he greater weight of the substantial evidence indicates that the claimant was a sole proprietor and an independent contractor.” The claimant has appealed from this dismissal.
“. . . we may disturb the legal conclusions of the trial commissioner only if they result from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found, or from an inference unreasonably or illegally drawn from those facts. Irizarry, supra, [v. Purolator Courier Corp., 4382 CRB-4-01-4 (May 2, 2002)], Mosman, supra, [v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 4180 CRB-4-00-1 (March 1, 2001)]; Warren, supra, [v, Federal Express Corp., 4163 CRB-2-99-12 (February 27, 2001)] citing Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988).” Phaiah v. Danielson Curtain (C.C. Industries), 4409 CRB-2-01-6 (June 7, 2002).
Hanson, supra, is the touchstone case in recent Connecticut jurisprudence concerning the issue of when a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. The facts in Hanson are rather similar to the facts herein. The claimant in Hanson was the surviving spouse of an owner-operator of a taxicab leased from the respondent, Transportation General, Inc. (d/b/a/ Metro Taxi). Mr. Hanson died while on the job. He had executed an owner-operator agreement with the respondent. The lessee in this agreement was responsible for maintaining insurance on the vehicle and paying all expenses associated with the use of the vehicle, including repairs, maintenance and taxes. Legal title to the vehicle would revert to the owner-operator upon termination of the agreement. The lessee could set the hours of operation, hire a driver for the taxicab, and use the vehicle for personal use. The respondent did not pay the owner-operator, provide benefits or collect payroll or social security taxes. Id., 615-616.
we agree with the Appellate Court, the board and the commissioner that the totality of the evidence did not demonstrate that Metro had retained sufficient control to require a finding of an employer-employee relationship between Metro and the decedent.” Id., 624. The factors the Supreme Court found determinative were such matters as the owner-operator being able to hire a second driver; his sole responsibility for all expenses related to operation of the cab; his right to regain ownership of the cab upon contract termination; and that the respondent did not pay any salary or fringe benefits to the drivers. Id., 624-625. “We conclude that the commissioner reasonably found that the totality of factors in this case indicates that Metro taxi drivers were not employees as that term is used under the act.” Id.
In considering these issues we note that the leading treatise, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 61-07 has cited a “growing tendency to classify owner-drivers of trucks as employees when they perform continuous service which is an integral part of the employer’s business.” Larson’s treatise explained that the level of supervision between a truck operator and the contracting party could create an employer-employee relationship; since the need for elaborate cooperation between the parties would preclude the ability of the truck operator to perform his work in the manner that he chose. See Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 61-03. We note that the facts in this case, where the claimant was required to make “appointment stops” during the course of the business day at the respondent’s direction, would be consistent with such an application of the law. Present Connecticut precedent, however, does not require such an application of the law.
We note that in Hanson, supra, the Supreme Court was presented with a direct challenge as to whether the legal standard of “right to control” should be replaced with a different test for determining when a worker is an employee. The appellant in Hanson sought to replace the present standard with the “relative nature of the work” standard. Id., 619-622. The Supreme Court rejected this suggestion to replace the “right to control” standard, pointing out that while “a determination of fact has elements of uncertainty” under the “right to control” standard, that the alternative standard also would lead to a determination reached after considering “close questions of fact.” Id., 622.
Having restated the “right to control” standard in Hanson, the Supreme Court then reviewed the factual basis underpinning the decision. The court distinguished the case on the facts from Lassen v. Stamford Transit Co., 102 Conn. 76 (1925), in which a taxicab driver was deemed an employee. In doing so, the court did point out that “the commissioner made some subordinate factual findings that, if viewed in isolation, might support a different determination.” Id., 624. The standard needed for the claimant to prevail however, was to establish that the “totality of the evidence” supported a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed. It is black letter law that a claimant has the burden of persuasion before the Commission. Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 (2001). In the Hanson case the Supreme Court concluded this burden had not been met as “the commissioner reasonably found that the totality of factors in this case indicates that Metro taxi drivers were not employees as the term is used under the act.” Id., 625.
As an appellate panel, therefore, we cannot substitute our assessment of the weight of the evidence for that of the trial commissioner. Under the Hanson precedent our role is solely to ascertain if there was a sufficient factual basis to sustain the trial commissioner’s decision based on his weighing of the “totality of the evidence.” We conclude the respondents proffered a sufficient quantum of such evidence to sustain the commissioner’s determination in this case.
Counsel for both the claimant and respondents have presented extensive case law from other jurisdictions concerning FedEx. For the reasons cited in Christensen v. H & L Plastics Co., Inc., 5171 CRB-3-06-12 (November 19, 2007) we decline to consider these cases, as we find existing Connecticut precedent adequately addresses the issues at hand.
Earlier this year, we were presented with a similar case involving an individual injured while working for a package delivery service. In Parkman v. Express Courier Systems, Inc., 5203 CRB-1-07-3 (February 25, 2008) we applied the test in Hanson and determined the trial commissioner appropriately determined the claimant was an independent contractor. “[W]e note that the determination of whether an employment relationship existed at the time of the injury is largely a factual question to be resolved by the commissioner. Merlin v. Labor Force of America, Inc., 3920 CRB-4-98-10 (December 22, 1999), aff’d, 62 Conn. App. 906 (2001)(per curiam), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 922 (2001).” Id. This factual question was resolved against the claimant herein. In both the present case and in Parkman the claimant has advanced a public policy argument in an effort to overcome the adverse factual determination. We must reach the same conclusion that “we must bear in mind that we are an adjudicatory body, and not an entity charged with legislating policy for the State of Connecticut.” Id.8 The trial commissioner in the present case appropriately applied the current governing law in Connecticut concerning independent contractor status based on the precedent in Hanson, supra.
There is no error, and the trial commissioner’s Finding of Dismissal is affirmed.

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