Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/498/103/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:35:06+00:00

Document:
Held: A person who receives genuine vehicle titles, knowing that they incorporate fraudulently tendered odometer readings, receives those titles knowing them to have been "falsely made" in violation of § 2314. Pp. 498 U. S. 106-118.
(a) Moskal misconstrues the doctrine of lenity when he contends that because it is possible to read § 2314 as applying only to forged or counterfeited securities, and because some courts have so read it, this Court should simply resolve the issue in his favor under that doctrine. The doctrine applies only to those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute. Such factors demonstrate that § 2314 unambiguously applies to Moskal's conduct. Pp. 498 U. S. 106-108.
and not on the scienter of the person who physically produces the security. Moskal's construction of § 2314 as excluding any security that is "genuine" or valid deprives the "falsely made" phrase of any meaning independent of the statutory terms "forged" and "counterfeited," and therefore violates the established principle that a court should give effect, if possible, to every clause or word of a statute. That "falsely made" encompasses genuine documents containing false information is also supported by § 2314's purpose of curbing the type of trafficking in fraudulent securities that depends for its success on the exploitation of interstate commerce to avoid detection by individual states, such as a title washing operation. The fact that the legislative history contains references to counterfeit securities but not to odometer rollback schemes does not require a different conclusion, since, in choosing the broad phrase "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities," Congress sought to reach a class of frauds that exploited interstate commerce. This Court has never required that every permissible application of a statute be expressly referred to in its legislative history. Moreover, the Court's § 2314 precedents specifically reject constructions that limit the statute to instances of fraud, rather than the class of fraud encompassed by its language. See United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379, 329 U. S. 390, 329 U. S. 391; McElroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642, 455 U. S. 655, 455 U. S. 656, 455 U. S. 658. 498 U. S. 108-114.
(c) The foregoing reading of § 2314 is not precluded by the principle of statutory construction requiring that, where a federal criminal statute uses a common law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the term must generally be given that meaning. Although, at the time Congress enacted the relevant clause of § 2314, many courts had interpreted "falsely made" to exclude documents that were false only in content, that interpretation was not universal, other courts having taken divergent views. Where no fixed usage existed at common law, it is more appropriate to inquire which of the common law readings of the term best accords with the overall purpose of the statute, rather than simply to assume, for example, that Congress adopted the reading that was followed by the largest number of common law courts. Moreover, Congress' general purpose in enacting a law may prevail over the "common law meaning" rule of construction. Since the position of those common law courts that define "falsely made" to exclude documents that are false only in content does not accord with Congress' broad purpose in enacting § 2314 -- namely to criminalize trafficking in fraudulent securities that exploits interstate commerce -- it is far more likely that Congress adopted the common law view of "falsely made" that encompasses "genuine" documents that are false in content. Pp. 498 U. S. 114-118.
(d) Moskal's policy arguments for narrowly construing "falsely made" are unpersuasive. First, there is no evidence to suggest that States will deem washed titles automatically invalid -- thereby creating chaos in the stream of automobile commerce -- simply because federal law punishes those responsible for introducing such fraudulent securities into commerce. Second, construing "falsely made" to apply to securities containing false information will not criminalize a broad range of "innocent" conduct. A person who transports such securities in interstate commerce violates § 2314 only if he does so with unlawful or fraudulent intent and if the false information is itself material, and conduct that satisfies these tests is not "innocent." P. 498 U. S. 118.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p. 498 U. S. 119. SOUTER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
"with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate . . . commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities . . . , knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited."
""the purpose of the term "falsely made" was to . . . prohibit the fraudulent introduction into commerce of falsely made documents regardless of the precise method by which the introducer or his confederates effected their lack of authenticity.'""
in interstate commerce. [Footnote 1] Moskal acknowledges that he could have been charged with violating this provision when he sent the Pennsylvania titles to Virginia, since those titles were "altered" within the meaning of § 2314. But he insists that he did not violate the provision in subsequently receiving the washed titles from Virginia because, although he was participating in a fraud (and thus no doubt had the requisite intent under § 2314), the washed titles themselves were not "falsely made." He asserts that, when a title is issued by appropriate state authorities who do not know of its falsity, the title is "genuine" or valid as the state document it purports to be, and therefore not "falsely made."
Whether a valid title that contains fraudulently tendered odometer readings may be a "falsely made" security for purposes of § 2314 presents a conventional issue of statutory construction, and we must therefore determine what scope Congress intended § 2314 to have. Moskal, however, suggests a shortcut in that inquiry. Because it is possible to read the statute as applying only to forged or counterfeited securities, and because some courts have so read it, Moskal suggests we should simply resolve the issue in his favor under the doctrine of lenity. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 401 U. S. 812 (1971).
In our view, this argument misconstrues the doctrine. We have repeatedly "emphasized that the touchstone' of the rule of lenity `is statutory ambiguity.'" Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381, 447 U. S. 387 (1980), quoting Lewis v.
"provides little more than atmospherics, since it leaves open the crucial question -- almost invariably present -- of how much ambiguousness constitutes . . . ambiguity."
United States v. Hansen, 249 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 30, 772 F.2d 940, 948 (1985) (Scalia, J.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986). Because the meaning of language is inherently contextual, we have declined to deem a statute "ambiguous" for purposes of lenity merely because it was possible to articulate a construction more narrow than that urged by the Government. See, e.g., McEIroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642, 455 U. S. 657-658 (1982). Nor have we deemed a division of judicial authority automatically sufficient to trigger lenity. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 466 U. S. 484 (1984). If that were sufficient, one court's unduly narrow reading of a criminal statute would become binding on all other courts, including this one. Instead, we have always reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to "the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies" of the statute. Bifulco v. United States, supra, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 387; see also United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 404 U. S. 347 (1971) (court should rely on lenity only if, "[a]fter seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived,'" it is "left with an ambiguous statute," quoting United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 6 U. S. 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)). Examining these materials, we conclude that § 2314 unambiguously applies to Moskal's conduct.
that the words of § 2314 are broad enough, on their face, to encompass washed titles containing fraudulently tendered odometer readings. Such titles are "falsely made" in the sense that they are made to contain false, or incorrect, information.
Short of construing "falsely made" in this way, we are at a loss to give any meaning to this phrase independent of the other terms in § 2314, such as "forged" or "counterfeited." By seeking to exclude from § 2314's scope any security that is "genuine" or valid, Moskal essentially equates "falsely made" with "forged" or "counterfeited." [Footnote 3] His construction therefore violates the established principle that a court should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.'"
United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 348 U. S. 538-539 (1955), quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 107 U. S. 152 (1883); see also Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 495 U. S. 562 (1990).
"com[e] to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful getaway and thus make the state's detecting and punitive processes impotent."
Id. at 329 U. S. 384. This, we concluded, "was indeed one of the most effective ways of preventing further frauds." Ibid.; see also McElroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642, 455 U. S. 655 (1982) (rejecting a narrow reading of § 2314 that was at odds with Congress' "broad purpose" and that would "undercut sharply . . . federal prosecutors in their effort to combat crime in interstate commerce").
as the facts of this case demonstrate, title washes involve precisely the sort of fraudulent activities that are dispersed among several States in order to elude state detection.
This Court has never required that every permissible application of a statute be expressly referred to in its legislative history. Thus, for example, in United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576 (1981), we recognized that "the major purpose" of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute was "to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime." Id. at 452 U. S. 591. Yet, we concluded from the statute's broad language and legislative purpose that the key term "enterprise" must include not only legitimate businesses but also criminal associations. Ibid.; see also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 441 U. S. 775 (1979) (Securities Act of 1933 covers fraud against brokers as well as investors, since "neither this Court nor Congress has ever suggested that investor protection was the sole purpose of [that] Act" (emphasis in original)).
"his operation was covered literally, and we think purposively. Had this not been intended, appropriate exception could easily have been made."
"Drawing the [forged] check upon an out-of-state bank, knowing it must be sent there for presentation, is an obviously facile way to delay and often defeat apprehension, conviction and restoration of the ill-gotten gain. There are sound reasons therefore why Congress would wish not to exclude such persons [from the statute's reach], among them the very ease with which they may escape the state's grasp."
Id. at 329 U. S. 391.
"although 'criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, . . . this does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.'"
"raise significant questions of ambiguity, for the statutory language and legislative history . . . indicate that Congress defined the term 'interstate commerce' more broadly than the petitioner contends."
Petitioner contends that such a reading of § 2314 is nonetheless precluded by a further principle of statutory construction.
"[W]here a federal criminal statute uses a common law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common law meaning."
United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 352 U. S. 411 (1957). Petitioner argues that, at the time Congress enacted the relevant clause of § 2314, the term "falsely made" had an established common law meaning equivalent to forgery. As so defined, "falsely made" excluded authentic or genuine documents that were merely false in content. Petitioner maintains that Congress should be presumed to have adopted this common law definition when it amended the National Stolen Property Act in 1939, and that § 2314 therefore should be deemed not to cover washed vehicle titles that merely contain false odometer readings. We disagree for two reasons.
"I cannot conceive how any significance can be given to the words 'falsely make' unless they shall be construed to mean the statements in a certificate which in fact are untrue. 'Falsely' means in opposition to the truth. 'Falsely makes' means to state in a certificate that which is not true. . . ."
"[i]t is not necessary that the act [of falsely making] should be done, in whole or in part, by the hand of the party charged. It is sufficient if he cause or procure it to be done."
"the authorities establish numerous instances wherein forgery is found, apart from the manual making or signing, as in the fraudulent procurement and use of a signature or writing as an obligation when it is not so intended or understood by the maker."
Id. at 881 (emphasis added). See also Annot., Genuine Making of Instrument for Purpose of Defrauding as Constituting Forgery, 41 A.L.R. 229, 247 (1926).
rather than simply assume, for example, that Congress adopted the reading that was followed by the largest number of common law courts. "Sound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover, and not to direct, the Congressional will.'" Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 415 U. S. 831 (1974), quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 317 U. S. 542 (1943). See also United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 352 U. S. 412 (1957) (declining to assume that Congress equated "stolen" with the common law meaning of "larceny" in light of varying historic usages of the terms "steal" or "stolen").
Our second reason for rejecting Moskal's reliance on the "common law meaning" rule is that, as this Court has previously recognized, Congress' general purpose in enacting a law may prevail over this rule of statutory construction. In Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990), we confronted the question whether "burglary," when used in a sentence enhancement statute, was intended to take its common law meaning. We declined to apply the "common law meaning" rule, in part, because the common law meaning of burglary was inconsistent with congressional purpose. "The arcane distinctions embedded in the common law definition [of burglary]," we noted, "have little relevance to modern law enforcement concerns." Id. at 495 U. S. 593 (footnote omitted). See also Bell v. United States, 462 U. S. 356, 462 U. S. 360-361 (1983) (declining to apply the common law meaning of "takes and carries away," as inconsistent with other provisions of the Bank Robbery Act).
made" to exclude documents that are false only in content does not accord with Congress' broad purpose in enacting § 2314 -- namely, to criminalize trafficking in fraudulent securities that exploits interstate commerce. We conclude, then, that it is far more likely that Congress adopted the common law view of "falsely made" that encompasses "genuine" documents that are false in content.
"to invalidate all of these automobile titles because they contain an incorrect mileage figure may well result in havoc in the stream of automobile commerce."
Brief for Petitioner 19 (emphasis added). Even if we were inclined to credit this concern as a reason for narrowing the statute, the argument -- so far as we can discern -- rests on a faulty premise. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that States will deem washed titles automatically invalid simply because federal law punishes those responsible for introducing such fraudulent securities into the streams of commerce.
Secondly, Moskal suggests that construing "falsely made" to apply to securities that contain false information will criminalize a broad range of "innocent" conduct. This contention, too, is unfounded. A person who transports such a security in interstate commerce violates § 2314 only if he does so with unlawful or fraudulent intent and if the false information is itself material. [Footnote 8] A person whose conduct satisfies these tests will be acting no more "innocently" than was Moskal when he engaged in the concededly fraudulent title-washing scheme at issue in this case.
"Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited; . . ."
"Shall be fined not more than 510,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
For purposes of § 2314, "securities" are defined to include any "valid . . . motor vehicle title." 18 U.S.C. § 2311.
Indeed, we offer no view on how we would construe "falsely made" in a statute that punished the act of false making and that specified no scienter requirement. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 342 U. S. 251-252 (1952) (implying scienter for statutory version of "common law" offense).
Moskal justifies doing so by arguing that "falsely made" was synonymous with "forged" at common law. We separately consider -- and reject -- Moskal's common law argument, infra at 498 U. S. 114-118.
The statute at issue in Sheridan was an earlier codification of § 2314. The clause governing "falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited securities" was at that time contained within 18 U.S.C. § 415 (1946 ed.).
Moskal appears to concede the logic, if not the result, of this analysis when he distinguishes -- solely on its facts -- the decision in United States v. Daly, 716 F.2d 1499 (CA9 1983), cert. dism'd, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984). The defendants in Daly operated a car theft ring and were convicted under § 2314 of transporting washed vehicle titles that falsely identified the numbers and owners of the stolen cars. Notwithstanding the extremely similar facts in Daly, petitioner does not ask us to disapprove the result in that case. Rather, he seeks to distinguish his own case on the grounds that, "[u]nlike the situation in Daly, here the [car] ownership information was never altered." Brief for Petitioner 12 (emphasis in original). We cannot fathom why the particular information that is falsified in a washed vehicle title -- assuming that it is material -- would be relevant to Congress' intent to criminalize the use of such fraudulent documents, particularly when both schemes serve the same goal of deceiving prospective car buyers. On the contrary, we find confirmation in the Daly court's analysis that Congress intended to reach precisely the sort of fraudulent behavior in which petitioner engaged.
Because of this conclusion, we have no trouble rejecting Moskal's suggestion that he did not have fair notice that his conduct could be prosecuted under § 2314. Moskal's contention that he was "entitled to rely" on one Court of Appeals decision holding that washed titles were not "falsely made" is wholly unpersuasive. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 466 U. S. 484 (1984) (existence of conflicting decisions among courts of appeals does not support application of the doctrine of lenity where "review of th[e] issue by this Court and decision against the position of the [defendant are] reasonably foreseeable").
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appeared to rely on this reasoning when it ruled that washed vehicle titles are not "falsely made" documents within the meaning of § 2314. United States v. Sparrow, 635 F.2d 794, 796 (1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1004 (1981). In that case, the court concluded that "falsely made" relates "to genuineness of execution, and not falsity of content.'" 635 F.2d at 796, quoting Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760, 763 (CA10 1954). As noted supra at 498 U. S. 106, it was because of the direct conflict between Sparrow and the Third Circuit's decision in the present case that we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals found that the false mileage figures on the washed vehicle title were material falsehoods. 888 F.2d at 285. At oral argument, petitioner sought to challenge that finding. Although this issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari to this Court, we do not doubt the correctness of the lower court's conclusion as to this matter.
Today's opinion succeeds in its stated objective of "resolv[ing] a divergence of opinion among the courts of appeals," ante at 498 U. S. 106, regarding the application of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. It does that, however, in a manner that so undermines generally applicable principles of statutory construction that I fear the confusion it produces will far exceed the confusion it has removed.
The Court's decision rests ultimately upon the proposition that, pursuant to "ordinary meaning," a "falsely made" document includes a document which is genuinely what it purports to be, but which contains information that the maker knows to be false, or even information that the maker does not know to be false but that someone who causes him to insert it knows to be false. It seems to me that such a meaning is quite extraordinary. Surely the adverb preceding the word "made" naturally refers to the manner of making, rather than to the nature of the product made. An inexpensively made painting is not the same as an inexpensive painting. A forged memorandum is "falsely made"; a memorandum that contains erroneous information is simply "false."
contain a false entrance." This is a far cry from "ordinary meaning."
"any tool, implement, or thing used or fitted to be used in falsely making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or tax stamps."
This obviously refers to the tools of counterfeiting, and not to the tools of misrepresentation.
calibrated terms, but a collection of near synonyms which describes the product of the general crime of forgery.
"[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings its soil with it."
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 527, 537 (1947).
"False making. An essential element of forgery, where material alteration is not involved. Term has reference to manner in which writing is made or executed rather than to its substance or effect. A falsely made instrument is one that is fictitious, not genuine, or in some material particular something other than it purports to be and without regard to truth or falsity of facts stated therein."
"[f]orgery, at the common law, is the false making or materially altering, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal liability."
2 J. Bishop, Criminal Law § 523, p. 288 (5th ed. 1872) (emphasis added). The distinction between "falsity in execution" (or "false making") and "falsity of content" was well understood on both sides of the Atlantic as marking the boundary between forgery and fraud.
"The definition of forgery is not, as has been suggested in argument, that every instrument containing false statements fraudulently made is a forgery, but . . . that every instrument which fraudulently purports to be that which it is not is a forgery. . . ."
is false, not genuine, fictitious, not a true writing, without regard to the truth or falsity of the statement it contains."
State v. Young, 46 N.H. 266, 270 (1865) (emphasis in original).
governing texts that did not include the term "falsely made". See Moore v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 630, 18 S.W. 833 (1892); Luttrell v. State, 85 Tenn. 232, 1 S.W. 886 (1886). Even they were in the minority, however. See Bank of Detroit v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 245 Mich. 14, 222 N.W. 134 (1928) ("forged"); Dexter Holton National Bank of Seattle v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 149 Wash. 343, 270 P. 799 (1928) ("forged"); Barron v. State, 12 Ga.App. 342, 77 S.E. 214 (1913) ("fraudulently make").
"A definition now very generally accepted explains forgery as the false making or material alteration, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal liability."
"[T]he term 'falsely,' as applied to making or altering a writing in order to make it a forgery, does not refer to the contents or tenor of the writing or to the facts stated therein, but implies that the paper or writing is not genuine, that in itself it is false or counterfeit."
I think it plain that "falsely made" had a well established common law meaning at the time the relevant language of § 2314 was enacted -- indeed, that the entire formulary phrase "falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited" had a well established common law meaning; and that that meaning does not support the present conviction.
Unsurprisingly, in light of the foregoing discussion, the lower federal courts that interpreted this language of § 2314 for more than two decades after its passage uniformly rejected the government's position that a genuine document could be "falsely made" because it contained false information. Melvin v. United States, 316 F.2d 647, 648 (CA7 1963); Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760 (CA10 Cir. 1954); Martyn v. United States, 176 F.2d 609, 610 (CA8 1949); Wright v. United States, 172 F.2d 310-312 (CA9 1949); Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512, 514 (CA4 1948).
"cases construing 'forge' under other federal statutes have generally drawn a distinction between false or fraudulent statements and spurious or fictitious makings."
370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 658. And we quoted Marteney for the principle that "[w]here the falsity lies in the representation of facts, not in the genuineness of execution,' it is not forgery." 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 658, quoting from Marteney, supra, at 763-764. As I shall proceed to explain, Gilbert's approval of these cases' interpretation of "forge" necessarily includes an approval of their interpretation of "false making" as well. Moreover, the very holding of Gilbert is incompatible with the Court's decision today.
Gilbert was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 495, which punishes anyone who "falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits" any document for the purpose of obtaining money from the United States. The difference between that and the phrase at issue here ("falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited") is only the tense and the order of the words. The defendant in Gilbert had endorsed tax refund checks, made out to other persons, as "Trustee" for them. The Government contended that the represented agency capacity in fact did not exist, and that, by reason of the misrepresentation, § 495 had been violated. The Court rejected that contention, and set Gilbert's conviction aside.
"In 1847, it was decided in the English case of Regina v. White . . . that 'indorsing a bill of exchange under a false assumption of authority to indorse it per procuration is not forgery, there being no false making.'"
"Lord East's comments . . . were:"
"Forgery at common law denotes a false making (which includes every alteration of or addition to a true instrument), a making malo animo of any written instrument for the purpose of fraud and deceit. . . . [The ancient and modern authorities] all consider the offence as consisting in the false and fraudulent making or altering of such and such instruments."
Id. at 370 U. S. 656 (emphasis in original).
"significant that cases construing 'forge' under other federal statutes have generally drawn a distinction between false or fraudulent statements and spurious or fictitious makings."
Id. at 370 U. S. 658.
better view, and that supported by the majority opinion, is that . . . the genuine making of an instrument for the purpose of defrauding does not constitute the crime of forgery."
41 A.L.R. at 231 (1926). "Majority opinion" is an understatement. The annotation lists 16 States and the United States as supporting the view, and only 2 States (Kentucky and Tennessee) as opposing it. If such minimal "divergence" -- by States with statutes that did not include the term "falsely made" (see supra at 498 U. S. 124-125) -- is sufficient to eliminate a common law meaning long accepted by virtually all the courts and by apparently all the commentators, the principle of common law meaning might as well be frankly abandoned. In Gilbert, it should be noted, we did not demand "universal" agreement, but simply rejected "scattered federal cases relied on by the Government" that contradicted the accepted common law meaning. 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 658.
"Congress' broad purpose in enacting § 2314 -- namely, to criminalize trafficking in fraudulent securities that exploits interstate commerce."
how "broad" Congress' purpose in enacting § 2314 was. Was it, as the Court simply announces, "to criminalize trafficking in fraudulent securities"? Or was it to exclude trafficking in forged securities? The answer to that question is best sought by examining the language that Congress used -- here, language that Congress has used since 1790 to describe not fraud, but forgery, and that we reaffirmed bears that meaning as recently as 1962 (in Gilbert). It is perverse to find the answer by assuming it, and then to impose that answer upon the text.
federal statutes have generally drawn a distinction between false or fraudulent statements and spurious or fictitious makings."
"Where a term of art has a plain meaning, the Court will divine the statute's purpose and substitute a meaning more appropriate to that purpose."
"before a man can be punished as a criminal under the federal law, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some statute."
"This principle is founded on two policies that have long been part of our tradition. First, a 'fair warning should be given to the world, in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible, the line should be clear.' McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 283 U. S. 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) . . . Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures, and not courts, should define criminal activity. This policy embodies 'the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.' H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and The Reading of Statutes, in Benchmarks, 196, 209 (1967)."
United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 404 U. S. 347-349 (1971).
"The case must be a strong one indeed which would justify a Court in departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest. To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its language must authorise us to say so. It would be dangerous indeed to carry the principle that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated."
United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 18 U. S. 96 (1820).
In re Count de Toulouse Lautrec, 102 F. 878 (CA7 1900), involved sample interest coupons which the petitioner obtained and passed off as genuine. The court upheld the conviction for uttering a forged instrument, because the coupons were not "genuine obligations of the purported promisors, but were, instead, false instruments," id. at 879, and "not genuine in fact," id. at 880.
In State v. Shurtliff, 18 Me. 368 (1841), the defendant had procured a signature upon a deed by misrepresenting the nature of the document signed (the deed did not contain false information). The court held that such conduct was forgery, because the resulting deed was a "false instrument," "purport[ing] to be the solemn and voluntary act of the grantor," which it was not. Id. at 371.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990), cited ante at 498 U. S. 117, stands for the quite different proposition that a common law meaning obsolete when a statute is enacted does not control the "generally accepted contemporary meaning of a term." Taylor, supra, at 495 U. S. 596. As I have discussed at length in Parts I and II, the common law meaning of "falsely made" was alive and well in 1939, and its then (and now) contemporary meaning does not contradict that common law meaning anyway. Bell v. United States, 462 U. S. 356, 462 U. S. 360-361 (1983), cited ante at 498 U. S. 117, turns upon the fact that the common law term relied upon ("takes and carries away," one of the elements of common law larceny) was combined with other terms and provisions that unquestionably went beyond common law larceny. Here, by contrast, the entire phrase at issue is a classic description of forgery. McElroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642 (1982), and United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379 (1946), cited ante at 498 U. S. 110, do not use Congress' "broad purpose" to depart from any common law meaning, but rather to interpret the ambiguous terms "interstate commerce" (McElroy) and "cause to be transported" (Sheridan).

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 § 2314
 v. 
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 § 2314
 v. 
 § 2314
 § 2314
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
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 § 2314
 § 2314
 § 2314
 § 2311
 v. 
 § 2314
 § 415
 v. 
 § 2314
 § 2314
 v. 
 § 2314
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2314
 § 523
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
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 § 2314
 § 2314
 v. 
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 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 495
 § 495
 v. 
 § 2314
 § 2314
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 v. 
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 v.