Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/208/452/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:09:06+00:00

Document:
The provisions of § 13, Rev.Stat. that the repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty incurred under the statute repealed are to be treated as if incorporated in, and as a part of, subsequent enactment of Congress, and, under the general principle of construction requiring effect to be given to all parts of a law, that section must be enforced as forming part of such subsequent enactment except in those instance where, either by express declaration or necessary implication, such enforcement would nullify the legislative intent.
The Act of Congress of June 29, 1906, c. 359, 34 Stat. 584, known as the Hepburn Law, as construed in the light of § 13, Rev.Stat., as it must be construed, did not repeal the Act of February 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847, known as the Elkins Law, so as to deprive the government of the right to prosecute for violation of the Elkins Law committed prior to the enactment of the Hepburn Law, nor, when so construed, does the Hepburn Law, under the doctrine of inclusio unius exclusio alterius, exclude the right of the government to prosecute for past offense not then pending in the court because pending causes are enumerated in, and saved by, § 10 of the Hepburn Law.
In citing approvingly, as to the particular point involved in this case, cases recently decided in the lower federal courts, this Court expresses no opinion upon any other subject involved in such cases, and does not even indirectly leave room for any implication that any opinion has been expressed as to such other issues which may hereafter come before it for decision.
Although a ground for demurrer to indictment may be sufficiently broad to embrace a contention raised before this Court, if it appears that such contention was disclaimed and was not urged in the trial court and in the circuit court of appeals, and was not referred to in any of the opinions below or in the petition for certiorari or the brief in support thereof, this Court will, without intimating any opinion in regard to its merits, decline to consider it.
published and filed by the said common carrier and in force at the time upon its said route."
"1. That neither the said indictment nor any count in the said indictment stated sufficient facts or grounds to constitute against the said defendants, or either of them, an offense against the laws of the United States, nor any offense."
"2. That the statute of the United States creating the offense or offenses pretended to be charged in the said indictment, and under which said indictment was found, was duly repealed, and was not in force at the time when the said indictment was found."
"in order to save our rights under the law questions involved, to make objection to the introduction of any evidence. And I desire to have it understood and agreed between the government and the defendant that I may now enter this objection with the same force and effect as if a witness had been already called and sworn to testify on behalf of the government."
"The Court: I understand that last ground. Let us see the first ground. "
"Mr. Brown: The first ground is the general ground of the insufficiency of the indictment. The second is the same thing, only more specific."
"I think the objection will be sufficient if confined to the first one."
"The Court: The point that you wish to make is that there can be no prosecution here, no matter what the evidence is, because of the repeal of this Elkins Act by the Hepburn Act."
"Mr. Brown: That is right."
"The Court: The objection will be overruled."
"Mr. Brown: I would ask an exception to the ruling of the court."
"The Court: An exception is allowed."
"such objections and motions and to take such action, either in this Court or upon appeal, as shall be deemed necessary and proper to have determined the question of the sufficiency of the indictment to state an offense, and the sufficiency of the facts admitted to state an offense, and it is further agreed that neither such admissions, nor the fact that they had been made in this trial, shall be used as evidence or otherwise upon any other trial of this case, or upon the trial of any case."
"That, in case of the several shipments specified in the several counts of the indictment herein, the concessions stated in the several counts respectively in the said indictment were given to W. P. Devereux Company by the direction and with the consent of the said defendant, the Great Northern Railroad Company."
"that the facts shown by the evidence are not sufficient to constitute against the defendant any offense against the laws of the United States, nor any offense."
"The Court: You admit all the material facts alleged in the indictment?"
"The Court: And practically admit that they are proved?"
"Mr. Brown: We can't say that. We admit the facts that are stated here -- the government has gone over -- and I understand they are the facts of the indictment."
"The Court: For the purposes of this case, we will say that you admit those facts."
The motion will be denied, and an exception allowed the defendant.
"The defendant has admitted by its counsel that all the material allegations of the several counts are true, and if you do not believe these allegations are proven, you are obliged to find the defendant not guilty. I suppose it is proper for the court to say that it can hardly see how you can find any other verdict than that of guilty, but that is for you to say. If you do not believe these allegations are proven you can find the defendant not guilty."
"The Court: That is equivalent to saying that the indictment itself is insufficient."
"Mr. Brown: Might I have that exception?"
grounds of my exception are the same three grounds named as the basis of my motion to instruct a verdict, to-wit:"
"1. That neither the indictment on which this prosecution is based nor any count in the said indictment states sufficient facts or grounds to constitute against the defendant an offense against the laws of the United States, nor any offense."
"2. That the statute or statutes of the United States creating the offense or offenses pretended to be charged in the indictment, and in each count thereof, and upon which statutes the said indictment and each count thereof is based, had been duly repealed, and were not in force as to any of the offenses in the said indictment pretended to be charged at the time when the said indictment was found."
"3. On the ground that the facts shown by the evidence are not sufficient to constitute against the defendant an offense against the laws of the United States, nor any offense."
There was a verdict of guilty, and the grounds upon which the exceptions previously taken had been rested were made the basis for a motion in arrest, which was overruled and excepted to. From the verdict and sentence thereon, the case was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, where the judgment was affirmed (155 F. 945), and the case is here because of the allowance of a writ of certiorari.
There is a contention in the brief of counsel for the petitioner that the demurrer to the indictment should have been sustained and that the motion to arrest, as well as the exceptions to the charge, should have prevailed because the indictment in all its counts was insufficient to state an offense under the Elkins Act, even if that act had not been repealed or modified by the Hepburn Law.
1. Did the Hepburn Law repeal the Elkins Act so as to deprive the government of the right to prosecute for violations of the Elkins Act committed before the Hepburn Law was passed? The conflicting contentions on these subjects are these: it is insisted on behalf of the railway company that the Elkins Act was amended and reenacted by § 2 of the Hepburn Law, and that thereby a repeal of the Elkins Act was accomplished, and that the express terms of the Hepburn Law manifest the intention of Congress that no offense theretofore committed against the Elkins Act should be prosecuted unless a prosecution was then pending. The government, whilst not challenging the doctrine that, where a criminal statute is repealed and a right to prosecute for a prior offense is not saved, such right is extinguished, yet insists that the principle has no application to this case, because the reenactment enactment of the Elkins Act by § 2 of the Hepburn Law did not amount to a repeal of the Elkins Act to the extent of preventing prosecutions for offenses against that act committed prior to the adoption of the Hepburn Law. And it is urged that this result is demonstrated not only by the clause of the Hepburn Law reenacting the Elkins Act, but also by other provisions of the Hepburn Law interpreted in the light of the principles of construction which are made applicable by operation of the general law -- that is, Rev.Stat. § 13.
propose to determine whether the right to prosecute for any prior offense committed before the going into effect of the Hepburn Law was lost by reason of the adoption of that law.
"SEC. 13. The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability."
This provision but embodies § 4 of the Act approved February 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 431, c. 71, which was entitled, "An Act Prescribing the Form of the Enacting and Resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construction Thereof." As the section of the Revised Statutes in question has only the force of a statute, its provisions cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested, either expressly or by necessary implication, in a subsequent enactment. But, while this is true, the provisions of § 13 are to be treated as if incorporated in and as a part of subsequent enactments, and therefore under the general principles of construction requiring, if possible, that effect be given to all the parts of a law, the section must be enforced unless, either by express declaration or necessary implication, arising from the terms of the law as a whole, it results that the legislative mind will be set at naught by giving effect to the provisions of § 13. For the sake of brevity, we do not stop to refer to the many cases from state courts of last resort dealing with the operation of general state statutes like unto § 13, Rev.Stat, because we think the views just stated are obvious and their correctness is established by a prior decision of this Court concerning that section. United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398.
Fourth, Eighteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven, and All Acts Amendatory Thereof, and to Enlarge the Powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission."
"That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed, but the amendments herein provided for shall not affect causes now pending in courts of the United States, but such causes shall be prosecuted to a conclusion in the manner heretofore provided by law."
"But the amendments herein provided for shall not affect causes now pending in courts of the United States, but such causes shall be prosecuted to a conclusion in the manner heretofore provided by law."
be applied in the future carrying on of such cases. Again, the contention that, unless the provision as to pending causes in § 10 be construed as relating to the further right to prosecute such cases, it becomes meaningless, but overlooks the fact that the purpose of the provision was, by express enactment, to prevent the application of the new remedies to the causes then pending in the courts of the United States -- a result which would not necessarily have followed without the direction in question.
for the slightest implication that we express an opinion as to such other issues.
here, no matter what the evidence is, because of the repeal of the Elkins Act by the Hepburn Act."
"the concessions stated in the several counts respectively in the said indictment were given . . . by the direction and with the consent of the said defendant, the Great Northern Railway Company."
technical character. Because we decline to consider the contention under the circumstances stated, we must not be understood as intimating any opinion whatever upon it. Into that question we have not deemed that we are called upon to enter.

References: § 13
 § 13
 § 10
 § 2
 § 2
 § 13
 § 4
 § 13
 § 13
 § 13
 v. 
 § 10