Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180312_0000662.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:05:42+00:00

Document:
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), regarding Plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. The issue before the Court is whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding that there was “substantial evidence” that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time since her alleged onset date of disability, December 1, 2012. For the reasons stated below, this Court will affirm that decision.
On July 5, 2013, Plaintiff, Sylvia Torres, protectively filed an application for DIB, initially alleging that she became disabled on February 8, 2008. After the SSA denied her DIB application, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing, along with an SSI application, with the amended disability onset date of December 1, 2012. Plaintiff claims that she can no longer work in her previous positions of office manager, order clerk, and billing clerk because she suffers from at least sixteen impairments, including rheumatoid arthritis, depression and anxiety.
A hearing was held on June 1, 2015, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on June 25, 2015. Plaintiff filed a Request for Review by the Appeals Council, which denied her request on January 13, 2017, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff brings this civil action for review of the Commissioner's decision.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny a complainant's application for Disability Insurance Benefits. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995). A reviewing court must uphold the Commissioner's factual decisions where they are supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence means more than “a mere scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The inquiry is not whether the reviewing court would have made the same determination, but whether the Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable. See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
The Social Security Act defines “disability” for purposes of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Under this definition, a Plaintiff qualifies as disabled only if her physical or mental impairments are of such severity that she is not only unable to perform her past relevant work, but cannot, given her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other type of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which she lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for her, or whether she would be hired if she applied for work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added).

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