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Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:31:08+00:00

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FindACase | 11/02/83 STATE EX REL. RALPH M. NORTH v. RUTH J.
11/02/83 STATE EX REL. RALPH M. NORTH v. RUTH J.
Appeal from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha county: Neal P. Nettesheim, Judge.
Scott, C.j., Brown, P.j. and Robert W. Hansen, Reserve Judge.
The Waukesha city clerk received a petition, with an attached proposed ordinance, from a member of the public demanding that it be forwarded to the city council for consideration, pursuant to sec. 9.20, Stats. The clerk refused to forward it because she believed the proposal was administrative, not legislative, and, therefore, did not fall under the statute. The petition's circulator, Ralph M. North, appeals from a trial court denial of his writ of mandamus. Because we conclude that the city clerk's duties under sec. 9.20 are ministerial only, such that she has no quasi-judicial authority to make the decision which she did, we reverse.
invalid in its entirety for the reason that subparagraph (b) thereof seeks to implement administrative policy and is therefore not a proper subject which can be presented to the Council for consideration under the provisions of Sec. 9.20, Wis. Stats.
The issuance of a writ of mandamus lies within the discretion of the trial court and will be affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion. Miller v. Smith, 100 Wis. 2d 609, 621, 302 N.W.2d 468, 474 (1981); State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 375-76, 166 N.W.2d 255, 258 (1969). "A writ of mandamus lies to compel public officers to perform their prescribed statutory duties." Morrissette v. DeZonia, 63 Wis. 2d 429, 432, 217 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1974). The duty of a public officer to act must be clear and unequivocal, and the responsibility to act must be imperative. Kurkierewicz at 377-78, 166 N.W.2d at 259-60. If the duty is not clear and unequivocal and requires the exercise of discretion, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to issue the writ. Morrissette at 432, 217 N.W.2d at 379.
The City argues that the city clerk's duties under sec. 9.20(3), Stats., to determine whether the petition is sufficient and whether the proposed ordinance is in proper form, are inherently discretionary. We disagree.
"'Every statute to some extent requires construction by the public officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense, construe it, in order to form a judgment from its language what duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one. If the law directs him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is committed to him, and which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute which requires, in some degree, a construction of its language by the officer.'"
Walter Laev, Inc. v. Karns, 40 Wis. 2d 114, 120, 161 N.W.2d 227, 230 (1968) (citations omitted).
The trial court apparently relied on a 1980 opinion of the Attorney General, 69 Op. Att'y Gen. 41, regarding the authority and basis on which a city clerk may refuse to forward to the common council a petition and ordinance that otherwise complies with the requirements of sec. 9.20(3), Stats. The Attorney General's opinion concludes that "where the authority to review and decline to further consider a petition has been found in the statutory language conferring authority on the council, at least as extensive as authority is vested in the city clerk." Att'y Gen. at 44.

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