Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1878209.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 13:49:37+00:00

Document:
GREGORY COLE; ANNIE SHIELDS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARATHON OIL CORPORATION; MARATHON PETROLEUM CORPORATION; MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY LP, Defendants-Appellees.
BEFORE: COOK, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
This case arises from Marathon Petroleum Company's operation of an oil refinery in Detroit, Michigan. Plaintiffs, residents living near the refinery, sued Marathon, alleging that the refinery's discharge of noxious pollutants contaminated their property and constituted a private nuisance. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' case on statute-of-limitations grounds. We reverse and remand.
Seeking to represent a class of similarly situated neighbors, Plaintiffs sued Marathon on February 22, 2016, asserting claims sounding in nuisance and negligence (they filed an amended complaint on March 8, 2016).1 In particular, Plaintiffs allege that their “properties have been contaminated with toxic and hazardous substances released from Defendants' Detroit Refinery,” that the “Refinery Contaminants have been linked to asthma, cancer, lung disease, nervous system harm, blindness and other serious illness,” and that noxious odors and loud noises emanating from the refinery interfere with their property use.
The district court declined to address the parties' sufficiency-of-the-pleadings arguments, instead dismissing the nuisance and negligence claims as time-barred. Plaintiffs appealed.
Michigan's statute of limitations for private nuisance and negligence claims requires filing within three years “after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff.” Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.5805(1), (10). The claim accrues “when both the last [wrongful] conduct and first, subsequent corresponding injury occured.” Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Tr. v. Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 769 N.W.2d 234, 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). Seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, Marathon argued that Michigan's statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' nuisance and negligence claims, and the district court agreed. We review de novo a district court's determination that a plaintiff filed a complaint outside of the applicable limitations period. Tolbert v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 938 (6th Cir. 1999).
The district court erred when it concluded that all of Plaintiffs' claims accrued at the first incident of Marathon's allegedly wrongful conduct, even though the conduct and resultant harm continue to the present day. Under Michigan's statute-of-limitations law, “each alleged violation ․ [is] a separate claim with a separate time of accrual.” Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Gomez, 896 N.W.2d 39, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016). Marathon's alleged wrongful conduct is the “generation, creation, release, emission and discharge of Refinery Contaminants.” Thus, each discharge is a violation giving rise to a separate claim. Id.; Garg v. Macomb Cty. Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 696 N.W.2d 646, 658 (Mich. 2005). Plaintiffs' complaint includes allegations of both past and present wrongful conduct. Any claims for alleged discharges occurring prior to February 22, 2013, which was three years prior to Plaintiffs' complaint, are time-barred. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Garg, 696 N.W.2d at 660. Any claims for discharges occurring after February 22, 2013, are timely. See Gomez, 896 N.W.2d at 53 (“[T]hat some of a plaintiff's claims accrued outside the applicable limitations period does not time-bar all the plaintiff's claims.”). The district court therefore erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred.
For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. The complaint also included a strict-liability claim, which the district court dismissed because “it is not a viable claim under Michigan law.” Plaintiffs decline to challenge that ruling on appeal.

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