Source: http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1999.06.02_use_of_force7.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:59:52+00:00

Document:
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of June, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively.
It is for these reasons that I felt compelled to vote against the operative paragraph 38 (1) of the present Order.
These are perhaps the most serious cases to come before the Court for injunctive relief. Under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, a request for provisional measures should have as its purpose the preservation of the respective rights of either party to a dispute pending the Court's decision. Jurisprudential^, the granting of such relief is designed to prevent violence, the use of force, to safeguard the peace, as well as serving as an important part of the dispute settlement process under the Charter. Where the risk of irreparable harm is said to exist or further action might aggravate or extend a dispute, the granting of the relief becomes all the more necessary. It is thus one of the most important functions of the Court.
In other words, and as stated in the commentary on the Article, the time [p 439] of the Commission of this breach is not limited to the moment at which the act begins, but extends over the whole period during which the act takes place and continues contrary to the requirements of the international obligation. Therefore, the Court's finding that Yugoslavia had not established the existence of a specific dispute, distinct from the preceding one, which arose after 25 April 1999 does not appear to me tenable in law.
For the foregoing reasons, I cannot concur with the inaction of the Court in this matter, although I concede that in some of the cases insti-[p 441]tuted by the Applicant the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, at this stage of the proceedings, is open to doubt, and in relation to Spain and the United States is non-existent.
While favouring subparagraph (2) of the operative paragraph in which the Court ordered that the case be removed from the General List of the Court in the cases of Spain and the United States, I voted against subparagraph (2) of the operative paragraph in the other eight cases in which the Court ordered that it " [r]eserves the subsequent procedure for further decision" because I believe that those eight cases should also be removed from the General List of the Court.
"the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can [p 444]not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations"
5. The Applications of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refer to the acts of the ten respondent States by which the Federal Republic of Yugo-[p 445]slavia alleges that they have violated certain obligations as listed in the section of each Application entitled "Subject of the Dispute". The acts which are listed in the section of each Application entitled "Claim" may have occurred, but the fact alone that a State allegedly committed these acts or actions as described in the section "Facts upon Which the Claim is Based" cannot constitute the existence of a "legal dispute" between two States within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
12. The making of a declaration is a unilateral act, which, far from being in the nature of a concession, is in fact to the State's advantage, in that it confers a right of action against States in a similar position. However, as the making of the declaration functions in the same way as an [p 448] offer to conclude an agreement and depends on reciprocity, the practical effectiveness of the system depends on the number of States which are willing to participate in it and on the relative breadth of the obligations which they are prepared to accept thereunder. The acceptance is commonly hedged with reservations and exclusions.
14. All of these facts indicate that some States accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court out of their good will but on the understanding that other States have the same good intentions. If this good faith is lack-[p 449]ing, the system of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court cannot work in the manner in which the drafters of the Statute intended.
17. As late as the second round of oral hearings, which took place on 12 May 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supplemented its Applications against Belgium and the Netherlands by invoking as additional grounds of jurisdiction of the Court, respectively, Article 4 of the 1930 Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration [p 450] between Yugoslavia and Belgium, and Article 4 of the 1931 Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation between Yugoslavia and the Netherlands. Irrespective of the question of whether these instru-ments still remain valid in the present-day relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the two respondent States, and whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is entitled to invoke them as a basis of jurisdiction at such a late stage, I have to say that in my view the reliance on these instruments by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is totally unfounded.
"[disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-[p 451]tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention . . . shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute".
As persons committing genocide or genocidal acts may possibly be 'constitutionally responsible rulers [or] public officials' (Art. IV), [p 563] the Convention contains a specific provision which allows '[a]ny Contracting Party [to] call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of [those acts]' (Art. VIII) and contemplates the establishment of an international penal tribunal (Art. VI).
The construction of Article IX of the Genocide Convention is very uncertain as it incorporates specific references to '[disputes . . . relating to . . . fulfilment of the Convention' and to 'disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or [genocidal acts]' � ref-[p 454]erences which can hardly be understood in any meaningful sense as a compromissory clause.
Provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party may be indicated by the Court "r/ it considers that the circumstances so require" (Statute, Art. 41, emphasis added). It thus falls within the discretion of the Court to grant provisional measures upon the request of the applicant State.
Where the Court finds that there is a prima facie basis of jurisdiction, this does not, of course, necessarily lead it to determine that it eventually has jurisdiction in the case. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case and the [p 457] Interhandel case, the Court, after granting provisional measures, ulti-mately found that it had no jurisdiction to be seised of these cases.
29. In conclusion I would like to express my sincere hope that the present situation in the territory of Yugoslavia, in the settlement of which the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the [p 458] United Nations has no role to play, will be resolved peacefully and in a way that satisfies all humanitarian aspects raised by this case.
and that, by reason of the rejection by Yugoslavia of the complaints formulated against it by Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'there is a legal dispute' between them (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 100, para. 22)" (Application of the Convention on [p 460] the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 614-615, para. 29).
"(a) to equalize the situation when the Bench already includes a Member of the Court having the nationality of one of the parties; and (b) to create a nominal equality between two litigating States when there is no Member of the Court having the nationality of either party" (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, Vol. III, pp. 1124-1125).
The Statute, accordingly, refers to the right of "any other party", namely, a party other than the party which has a judge of its nationality, in the singular. But, it would be erroneous to draw the conclusion from the above that "any other party", other than the party which has a judge of its nationality, cannot, under certain circumstances, choose several judges ad hoc. Such an interpretation would clearly be in sharp contradiction with ratio legis of the institution of judge ad hoc, which, in this particular case, consists of the function "to equalize the situation when the Bench already includes a Member of the Court having the nationality of one of the parties" (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, Vol. III, pp. 1124-1125). The singular used in Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute with reference to the institution of judges ad hoc is, consequently, but individualization of the general, inherent right to equalization in the composition of the Bench in the relations between litigating parties, one of which has a judge of its nationality on the Bench, while the other has not. The practical meaning of this principle applied in casum would imply the right of the Applicant to choose as many judges ad hoc to sit on the Bench as is necessary to equalize the position of the Applicant and that of those respondent States which have judges of their nationality on the Bench and which share the same interest. In concreto, the inherent right to equalization in the composition of the Bench, as an expression of fundamental rule of equality of parties, means that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should have the right to choose five judges ad hoc, since even five out of ten respondent States (the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands) have their national judges sitting on the Bench.
Regarding the notion of equalization which concerns the relation between the party entitled to choose its judge ad hoc and the parties which have their national judges on the Bench, the fact is that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as can be seen from the Order, did not raise any objections to the circumstance that as many as five respondent States [p 464] have judges of their nationality on the Bench. However, this circumstance surely cannot be looked upon as something making the question irrelevant, or, even as the tacit consent of the Federal Republic of Yugo-slavia to such an outright departure from the letter and spirit of Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
The meanings of equalization as a ratio legis institution of judges ad hoc, in the case concerning the Applicant and respondent States which [p 465] are parties in the same interest, and which do not have a judge ad hoc of their nationality on the Bench, have been dealt with in the practice of the Court, in a clear and unambiguous manner.
"The importance and sanctity of an individual human life are well established in international law. As recognized by Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, every human being has the inherent right to life and this right shall be protected [p 466]by law." (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports �999, p. 12, para. 8).
It can be said that in the cases referred to above, in particular those in which individuals were directly affected, the Court formed a high stand-[p 468]ard of humanitarian concern in the proceedings for the indication of interim measures, a standard which commanded sufficient inherent strength to brush aside also some relevant, both procedural and material, rules governing the institution of provisional measures. Thus, humanitarian considerations, independently from the norms of international law regulating human rights and liberties, have, in a way, gained autonomous legal significance; they have transcended the moral and philanthropic sphere, and entered the sphere of law.
That these are not empty words is testified to by destroyed bridges, power plants without which there is no electricity, water supply and production [p 469] of foodstuffs essential for life; destroyed roads and residential blocks and family homes; hospitals without electricity and water and, above all, human beings who are exposed to bombing raids and who, as is rightly stressed in the Application in the LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America) case, have the "inherent right to life" (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6), whose importance and sanctity are well established in international law. In the inferno of violence, they are but "collateral damage".
Therefore, it is my profound conviction, that the Court is, in concreto, confronted with an uncontestable case of "extreme urgency" and "irreparable harm", which perfectly coincides, and significantly transcends the [p 472] substance of humanitarian standards which the Court has accepted in previous cases.
7. I must admit that I find entirely inexplicable the Court's reluctance to enter into serious consideration of indicating provisional measures in a situation such as this crying out with the need to make an attempt, regardless of possible practical effects, to at least alleviate, if not elimi-nate, an undeniable humanitarian catastrophe. I do not have in mind provisional measures in concrete terms as proposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but provisional measures in general: be they provisional measures propria motu, different from those proposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, simply, an appeal by the President of the Court, as was issued on so many occasions in the past, in less difficult situations, on the basis of the spirit of Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court.
or, in paragraph 36 of the Order, that the Parties: "should take care not to aggravate or extend the dispute", and it is obvious that both the above pronouncements of the Court have been designed within the model of general, independent provisional measures.
The intent is, without doubt, the subjective element of the being of the [p 473] crime of genocide as, indeed, of any other crime. But, this question is not and cannot, by its nature, be the object of decision-making in the incidental proceedings of the indication of provisional measures.
Of course, to be able to speak about genocide it is necessary that there is an intent, namely, of "deliberately inflicting on the group con-[p 475]ditions of life" bringing about "its physical destruction in whole or in part".
The phrasing of the statement seems to me unacceptable for a number of reasons. First, the formulation introduces dual humanitarian concern. The Court is, it is stated, "deeply concerned", while at the same time the Court states "the loss of life". So, it turns out that in the case of "all parts of Yugoslavia" the Court technically states "the loss of life" as a fact which does not cause "deep concern". Furthermore, the wording of the formulation may also be construed as meaning that Kosovo is not a part of Yugoslavia. Namely, after emphasizing the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, the Court uses the phrase "in all parts of Yugoslavia". Having in mind the factual and legal state of affairs, the appropriate wording would be "in all other parts of Yugoslavia". Also, particular reference to "Kosovo" and "all parts of Yugoslavia", in the present circumstances, has not only no legal, but has no factual basis either. Yugoslavia, as a [p 477] whole, is the object of attack. Human suffering and loss of life are, unfortunately, a fact, generally applicable to the country as a whole; so, the Court, even if it had at its disposal the accurate data on the number of victims and the scale of suffering of the people of Yugoslavia, it would still have no moral right to discriminate between them. Further, the qualification that "human tragedy and the enormous suffering in Kosovo . . . form the background of the present dispute" not only is political, by its nature, but has, or may have, an overtone of justification of the armed attack on Yugoslavia. Suffice it to recall the fact that the respondent State refers to its armed action as humanitarian intervention.
12. The formulation of paragraph 37 of the Order leaves the impression that the Court is elegantly attempting to drop the ball in the Security Council's court. Essentially, it is superfluous because, as it stands now, it only paraphrases a basic fact that "the Security Council has special responsibilities under Chapter VII of the Charter". It can be interpreted, it is true, also as an appeal to the United Nations organ, specifically entrusted with the duty and designed to take measures in case of threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; but, in that case the Court would need to stress also another basic fact � that a legal dispute should be referred to the International Court of Justice on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter.
It is hard to find a justifiable reason for such a practice. Except of course if we assume political opportuneness and involved practical, political interests to be a justified reason for this practice. This is eloquently [p 478] shown also by the practice of the designation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After the succession of the former Yugoslav federal units, the organs of the United Nations, and the respondent States themselves, have used the term Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). However, since 22 November 1995, the Security Council uses in its resolutions 1021 and 1022 the term "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" instead of the former "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" without any express decision and in a legally unchanged situation in relation to the one in which it, like other organs of the United Nations, employed the term "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)". The fact that this change in the practice of the Security Council appeared on the day following the initialling of the Peace Agreement in Dayton gives a strong basis for the conclusion that the concrete practice is not based on objective, legal criteria but rather on political criteria.
14. A certain confusion is also created by the term "humanitarian law" referred to in paragraphs 18 and 35 of the Order. The reasons for the confusion are dual: on the one hand, the Court has not shown great consistency in using this term. In the Genocide case the Court qualified the Genocide Convention as a part of humanitarian law, although it is obvious that, by its nature, the Genocide Convention falls within the field of international criminal law (see dissenting opinion of Judge Kreca, in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 774-775, para. 108).
On the other hand, it seems that in this Order the term "humanitarian law" has been used with a different meaning, more appropriate to the [p 479] generally accepted terminology. The relevant passage in the Order should be mentioned precisely because of the wording of its paragraphs 18 and 35. The singling out of humanitarian law from the rules of international law which the Parties are bound to respect may imply low-key and timid overtones of vindication or at least of diminishment of the legal implications of the armed attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

References: Art. 41
 v. 
in casu
 v. 
 v. 
 Art. 6