Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2015/5956crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:09:31+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Michael L. Anderson, Esq., Anderson Law Firm, PC, 82 Chelsea Harbor Drive, Norwich, CT 06360. However, he waived oral argument and relied on his appellate documents filed.
The respondents were represented by David A. Kelly, Esq., Montstream & May, LLP, 655 Winding Brook Drive, Glastonbury, CT 06033-6087.
This Petition for Review from the April 29, 2014 Order Pursuant to C.G.S. § 31-278 of the Commissioner acting for the Second District was heard January 30, 2015 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners Randy L. Cohen and Stephen M. Morelli.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The respondents have appealed from the April 29, 2014 Order Pursuant to C.G.S. § 31-278 of the Commissioner acting for the Second District. The respondents appeal was filed July 9, 2014. In that April 29, 2014 Order the trial Commissioner directed that “[t]he Respondents have 30 days to schedule an IME [Independent Medical Examination] on Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS).” The order was issued following an informal hearing held April 24, 2014. The gravamen of the respondents-appellants appeal is that it was error for the trial Commissioner to issue the order without first holding a formal hearing.1 We disagree.
The general rule is that in order to engage in any meaningful review the record from a formal hearing must be provided to the board. See e.g., Merenski v Greenwich Hospital, 4822 CRB-7-04-6 (January 12, 2005). However, we think the issue raised by the appellants is more related to the adjudicative process itself as opposed to the ordinary mixed questions of law and fact generally presented for appellate review. We are troubled by various aspects of the appeal filed.
At this juncture we hold that the appeal is dismissed for the reasons discussed above. In effect the respondents’ failure to comply with the deadlines for filing an appeal waived any allegation of error arising from the trial commissioner’s issuing of the April 29, 2014 written Order.4 However, we write further as we believe additional commentary will be instructive to appellants and Workers’ Compensation practitioners generally.
Among the fundamental tenets of Chapter 568 is to provide an injured worker with an expedient and certain remedy. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 97 (1985); Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 147 (1915). Were we to institute a per se requirement as to the need for a formal hearing for every order of discovery we would confound a primary objective of the Act.
As this board noted in Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 5434 CRB-6-09-2 (February 22, 2012) subsumed within the purpose underpinning our Act is the objective to return an injured worker to gainful employment. Central to achieving that goal is providing a claimant with timely access to appropriate medical care and assessment. In McCarthy v. Hartford Hospital, 5079 CRB-1-06-3 (March 8, 2007), aff’d, 108 Conn. App. 370 (2008), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 910 (2008) we noted, “[o]ur workers’ compensation system is designed for physicians to play a vital role by providing medical care for injured workers, diagnosing their conditions and degrees of impairment, and facilitating their return to work once they are physically ready.” Id., 8. If we were to hold in accordance with the respondents’ argument our ruling would have a chilling effect on meeting that objective as well.
Further, as this board re-uttered in Quinones v. RW Thompson Company, Inc., 5792 CRB-1-12-10 (January 16, 2014) interlocutory appeals are to be discouraged. In Quinones, we quoted the following from Richardson v. Bic Corporation, 4953 CRB-3-05-6 (September 7, 2006).
This board has given voice to that principle in order to provide guidance to parties inclined to appeal interlocutory rulings. “The efficient and timely resolution of cases is of prime importance given the urgent need for remedial relief that many injured claimants experience. Maintaining the integrity of final judgments is crucial to the stability of our legal system, but this concern should not overshadow the fundamental need for speedy decisionmaking in the workers’ compensation arena.” [Bailey v. Stripling Auto Sales, Inc., 4516 CRB-2-02-4 (May 8, 2003)]. Appeals create delay, and participants in this system should strive to keep in mind the need for deliverance of timely decisions. Unfortunately, this Commission works with limited resources, and it takes time to process cases and appeals. Thus, it helps to expedite decisionmaking if parties refrain from immediately appealing evidentiary rulings and other interlocutory rulings.
Given the appellants’ failure to comply with the time constraints for filing an appeal pursuant to § 31-301(a) we dismiss the appeal from the April 29, 2014 Order Pursuant to C.G.S. § 31-278 of the Commissioner acting for the Second District.
Commissioners Randy L. Cohen and Stephen M. Morelli concur.
“1. Did the trial Commissioner’s ‘Order Pursuant to C.G.S. § 31-278’ deprive the respondents of their due process rights since no formal hearing was held, no transcript was established, and no evidence was submitted prior to the issuance of said Order?
2. Was the trial Commissioner’s ‘Order Pursuant to C.G.S. § 31-278’ an abuse of power absent a Formal hearing on the merits?

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