Source: http://cabfinancial.com/articles/category/cases-from-bits/c202-volume-18-edition-4-cases/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:43:45+00:00

Document:
COUNSEL: [*1] GARY S HUNTER, Plaintiff, Pro se, LANCASTER, PA.
For TERI PLUMMER MCCLURE, UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, Defendants: JERRY DESIDERATO, Dilworth Paxson LLP, Philadelphia, PA.
JUDGES: JEFFREY L. SCHMEHL, J.
Plaintiffs brought this pro se diversity action, seeking to recover $2000 for the cost of equipment that was allegedly lost by defendant United Parcel Service (“UPS”), and an additional $250,000 in consequential damages. Presently before the Court is the motion of the defendants to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A complaint has facial plausibility when there is enough factual content “that allows the court to draw he reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). A court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). Legal conclusions and recitals of the elements [*2] of a cause of action that are supported only by mere conclusory statements are to be disregarded. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F. 3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).
1 Although Plaintiff’s company is also named as a Plaintiff, it is well-settled that a corporation cannot represent itself pro se in federal court. Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02, 113 S. Ct. 716, 121 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1993). Therefore the only viable plaintiff is Gary S. Hunter and Acel International, LLC will be stricken as a plaintiff in this action.
Our Court of Appeals recently joined many other Courts of Appeal in holding that all state claims for compensation for the loss of or damage to goods shipped by a ground carrier in interstate commerce are preempted by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. Certain Underwriters at Interest at Lloyds of London v. United States Parcel Service of America, Inc., 762 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2014). As a result, plaintiff’s state law claims against the defendants for loss or damage to the equipment are preempted by the Carmack Amendment.
2 UPS contends that defendant Teri Plummer McClure is UPS’s Chief Legal, Communications and Compliance Officer. The Court agrees with UPS that the Complaint contains no allegations that Ms. Plummer was involved with the shipment of the equipment at issue, or that she has any personal knowledge of the applicable facts. Therefore, this action will also be dismissed with prejudice against Ms. Plummer.
1. Acel International, Inc. is STRICKEN as a plaintiff in this action.
2. The motion to dismiss [Doc. 4] is GRANTED.
3. The Complaint is DISMISSED as to both defendants with [*4] prejudice.
Robert D. GIBSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
First District, Division 1, California.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
*1 Robert D. Gibson appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his action against United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) after the court sustained without leave to amend UPS’s demurrer to Gibson’s second amended complaint. We affirm.
Gibson initiated this case by filing a complaint against UPS in March 2013. UPS demurred to the complaint, but Gibson filed a first amended complaint before the trial court ruled on the demurrer. In the first amended complaint, Gibson alleged he instructed a member of his family to post a parcel from Sacramento to an address in Charlotte, North Carolina. The family member posted the parcel at a UPS store in Sacramento for overnight delivery by next-day air service. The parcel weighed 67 pounds, cost $373.45 to ship, was assigned parcel No. 53596568, and was given a tracking number.
In his second amended complaint, Gibson alleges UPS is liable for the seizure by law enforcement officials of the contents of the parcel, and he seeks damages under multiple causes of action under state contract and tort law. We conclude, however, that the trial court properly sustained UPS’s demurrer without leave to amend because Gibson’s claims are preempted by federal law, and Gibson cannot amend the complaint to state a claim under federal law.
UPS handled the package as either a motor carrier and freight forwarder because the parcel was seized before it was shipped by air or as an air carrier because the delivery service purchased was UPS next-day air service. If UPS was acting as a motor carrier and freight forwarder, any claim against it is governed by the federal Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 14706). If UPS was acting as an air carrier, any claim against it is governed by the preemptive provisions of the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) (49 U.S.C. § 41713) and federal common law. In either case, Gibson’s state-law claims are preempted.
The Carmack Amendment governs the liability of motor carriers under receipts and bills of lading and provides “ ‘a uniform national liability policy for interstate carriers.’ “ (Hall v. North American Van Lines, Inc (9th Cir.2007) 476 F.3d 683, 687.) Thus, if UPS acted as a motor carrier in transporting the parcel to its shipping facility in Sacramento, all state claims against it related to the loss, damage, or delay of the parcel are completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment. (Hall, at p. 689 [“It is well settled that the Carmack Amendment constitutes a complete defense to common law claims alleging all manner of harms[,]” including “delay,” “mistaken delivery,” “loss,” and “fraud and conversion”]; see White v. Mayflower Transit, L.L.C. (9th Cir.2008) 543 F.3d 581, 584–585 [Carmack Amendment “completely preempts state[-]law claims alleging delay, loss, failure to deliver and damage to property” and “constitutes a complete defense to common law claims against interstate carriers for negligence, fraud and conversion”].) Similarly, if UPS acted as an air carrier in accepting the parcel for delivery by next-day air service, any claim against it is governed by the ADA. (Cf. Power Standards Lab, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1044–1045 [essence of Federal Express service is the transportation of freight by air, plaintiff’s lawsuit is “clearly founded on the unsatisfactory manner in which Federal Express performed that service,” therefore lawsuit was “related to a service of an air carrier” for purposes of ADA preemption].) The ADA preempts all state “law[s], regulation[s], or other provision[s] having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier” (49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)), including state common-law rules and causes of action where, as here, they relate to an air carrier’s service of shipping parcels by air. (See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg (2014) ___ U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 1422, 1430] [concluding that “ ‘other provision having the force and effect of law’ [under ADA] includes common-law claims”].) Thus, regardless of UPS’s status, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer on federal preemption grounds.
*4 Because Gibson’s state-law claims are preempted under applicable federal law, any claim Gibson has against UPS lies, if at all, under the Carmack Amendment or federal common law.7 (Read–Rite Corp. v. Burlington Air Express, Ltd. (1999) 186 F.3d 1190, 1195 [“federal common law applies to loss of or damage to goods by interstate common carriers by air”].)8 Gibson cannot establish such a claim for several reasons.
Although the report concludes the owner of the money has yet to be identified, Fichtner described in his report how in the days immediately following his seizure of the parcel he received telephone calls from an individual identifying himself as both “Jason Howell” and “Jeff Howell” asking about the whereabouts of the parcel. But when Agent Fichtner finally told the caller that damage to the parcel had revealed it contained money, the caller hung up and did not call back, and Agent Fichtner was unable to reach him.
Subsequently, the United States filed a verified complaint for forfeiture in rem against the $658,830. Gibson filed a claim to the currency and an answer to the complaint for forfeiture. On October 15, 2012, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California entered a final judgment of forfeiture in favor of the United States and ordered “all right, title, and interest of Robert D. Gibson” in the currency “shall be forfeited to the United States.” This judgment was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
No reporter’s transcript of the hearing appears in the appellate record.
An appeal may not ordinarily be taken from an order sustaining a demurrer but only from the order of dismissal or final judgment that follows. (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1032, fn. 1.) Although no separate order of dismissal or final judgment appears to have been issued in this case, the challenged order states in pertinent part, “The case is DISMISSED.” Thus, we construe the challenged order as an appealable order of dismissal.
For purposes of analysis only, we assume Gibson could establish standing to assert a federal claim, a point which UPS hotly disputes.
Furthermore, we note under federal common law that the carrier’s tariff “governs not only the nature and extent of [the carrier’s] liability but also the nature and extent of the shipper’s right of recovery.” (North American Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp. (2nd Cir.1978) 579 F.2d 229, 233; see also King Jewelry, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp. (9th Cir.2003) 316 F.3d 961, 964 [airbill and service guide formed the contract between the parties].) Here, the applicable UPS tariff (effective July 12, 2010) is included in the clerk’s transcripts. We do not consider it, however, because it was not a part of the relevant complaint, and the trial court did not take judicial notice of it. Still, while the tariff is not a basis for affirming the trial court ruling on the demurrer, we cannot help but observe that it appears to be another insurmountable impediment to a federal common law claim for contract damages.
In his reply brief, Gibson contends we “must view this entire case under the analysis of the Fourth Amendment” and argues that seizure of the package by the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement after an “unlawful drug dog sniff” violated the Fourth Amendment. This argument, raised for the first time in the reply brief, is irrelevant to any claim against UPS in this appeal.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 14706
 v. 
 v. 
 § 14706
 § 41713
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 41713
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.