Source: http://thecomplexlitigator.com/post-data/category/Complex+Litigation%3A+Summary+Judgment
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:39:30+00:00

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On one end of the Labor Code section 226 spectrum are the defendants who assert that the "injury" requirement of section 226 is met only when an employee suffers a broken leg as a result of the defective wage statement (this would occur when the statement is printed on stone and delivered by dropping it from a substantial height above the employee, whose legs are restrained in a horizontal position to ensure impact). On the other end of the spectrum are the few optimistic plaintiff-side firms that argue that any violation of Labor Code section 226(a) requirements is an infringement of a legal right sufficient to entitle the employee to, at minimum, statutory penalty damages.
Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc., et al., 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (February 8, 2010), which is the current standard in California, splits the difference at the very minimal injury level. Specifically, Jaimez holds: "While there must be some injury in order to recover damages, a very modest showing will suffice." Jaimez went on to state that '''this lawsuit, and the difficulty and expense [Jaimez has] encountered in attempting to reconstruct time and pay records,' may well be 'further evidence of the injury' he has suffered." In other words, it takes something, but not much.
On behalf of a class of current and former non-exempt employees, Morgan alleged that United Retail's wage statements failed to comply with section 226, subdivision (a) because they listed the total number of regular hours and the total number of overtime hours worked by the employee, but did not list the sum of the regular and overtime hours worked in a separate line. The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of United Retail on the section 226 claim. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary adjudication because United Retail's wage statements complied with the statutory requirements of section 226 by “showing . . . total hours worked.” (§ 226, subd. (a)(2).) We accordingly affirm.
Slip op., at 11. After much analysis, the Court concluded that summary judgment was correctly granted: "Consistent with the language of section 226 and the DLSE's May 17, 2002 opinion letter, United Retail's wage statements listed 'the precise, actual number of hours worked' by the employee at each hourly rate of pay in effect during the pay period." Slip op., at 12. You can't fault this panel for the work they did, construing statutory language, examining DLSE materials, looking at a wage statement exemplar on the DLSE's website, and analyzing the import of 1984 and 2000 legislation affecting section 226.
Villacres argued that violations of section 226(a) in and of themselves are injuries sufficient to make section 226(e) relief available to him and his proposed class. This is not how California courts typically have defined “injury.” See Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, 38 Cal. 3d 46, 54 (1985) (“‘Wrongful act’ and ‘injury’ are not synonymous. The word ‘injury’ signifies both the negligent cause and the damaging effect of the alleged wrongful act and not the act itself.”)(citations omitted); Lueter v. California, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“Although the words ‘injury’ and ‘damage’ often are used interchangeably, a distinction may be made. ‘Injury’ refers to the fact of harm suffered by the plaintiff due to the defendant’s conduct. ‘Damages’ refers to the monetary sum that the plaintiff may be awarded as compensation for injury.”). We have no reason to believe that the California Supreme Court would interpret section 226(e) differently. The district court did not err when it held that section 226(e) relief was unavailable to Villacres and his proposed class.
Memorandum, at 3. It is interesting to note, however, that this panel's construction of the term "injury" is at odds with another Ninth Circuit panel's view on injury, expressed days later. In Edwards v. First American Title Insurance (9th Cir. June 21, 2010), the Ninth Circuit, in a published opinion, found that "injury" existed in a RESPA case, despite the absence of an overcharge: "Because the statutory text does not limit liability to instances in which a plaintiff is overcharged, we hold that Plaintiff has established an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III. Slip op., at 9095. Applying that same analysis to a 226 claim, once could see that same Edwards panel concluding that the violation of a protected right under 226 causes the necessary "injury" and the alternative damage clause (greater of actual damage or statutory damages) is triggered when no "actual" damage exists.
So the Ninth Circuit has figured out what it thinks the California Supreme Court would do were it faced with the injury issue raised by section 226.
Until the California Supreme Court decides to tell us what it thinks about any of this, we'll have to settle for Jaimez, Morgan, and the Ninth Circuit's prognostications.
Ninth Circuit finds that propriety of independent contractor status is not well suited to summary adjudication in Narayan v. EGL, Inc.
[i]f we are to have multiple factors, we should also have a trial. A fact-bound approach calling for the balancing of incommensurables, an approach in which no ascertainable legal rule determines a unique outcome, is one in which the trier of fact plays the principal part. That there is a legal overlay to the factual question does not affect the role of the trier of fact.
Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1542 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbook, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
Slip op., at 10080-81. The Court then reviewed the record, criticizing the trial court for not crediting evidence of the right to terminate at will set forth in the contracts between defendant and plaintiffs and other evidence consistent with employment, including the lack of any need for specialized training and the fact that the Internal Revenue Service declared the plaintiffs employees under its multi-factor employment test.
As Judge Easterbrook observed in a closely analogous context, statutes enacted to confer special benefits on workers are “designed to defeat rather than implement contractual arrangements.” Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbook, J., concurring).
Slip op., at 10073. In other words, the protections granted by California's Labor Code are designed, in part, to defeat employer attempts to circumvent them with "independent contractor" agreements.
The Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Eight) generated a good bit of commentary with their construction of In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009). Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc. (October 28, 2009) was discussed in detail on this blog, and The UCL Practitioner had an extensive post as well. In Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court (November 10, 2009), the Second Appellate District, Division Eight tackles reliance and Tobacco II for the second time. But, in an interesting twist, Cohen receives no mention in this Opinion.
The plaintiffs, real parties in interest in the proceedings before us, H. Roger Wang and Vivine Wang (from time to time collectively referred to as the Wangs), sued petitioner Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., over charges added to the price of shore excursions taken during a cruise conducted by petitioner. The Wangs asserted five causes of action. The first three were based on Business and Professions Code sections 17200 (first cause of action) and 17500 (second) and on Civil Code section 1750 et seq. (third). Respectively, these statutes are California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), False Advertising Law (FAL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The fourth and fifth causes of action were based respectively on common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
Petitioner moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication. The trial court granted summary adjudication on the fourth and fifth causes of action because the Wangs could not show they relied on petitioner’s alleged misrepresentations. The trial court, however, denied the motion for summary judgment because it concluded that on the UCL, FAL and CLRA causes of action the Wangs did not have to show that they relied on petitioner’s alleged misrepresentations.
Slip op., at 6-7. Unlike Cohen, this Opinion presents as an effort to identify specific circumstances where it is valid to consider reliance in a UCL claim, using Tobacco II. In fact, its almost as if the Court was sensitive to potential fallout from describing Tobacco II as irrelevant.
The problem, from a pragmatic perspective, with the Wangs’ contentions about reliance is that it made no difference to them how much the excursions cost. As Vivine Wang put it in her deposition, she told her travel agent that she wanted to go on the same excursions that her traveling group had booked and that “I want to go on the shore excursion . . . whatever it cost [sic]. It’s fine.” At the threshold, therefore, it must be said that there was no reliance, i.e., the Wangs would have gone on the excursions whatever the price was and without reference to anything petitioner said or did in connection with the excursions. It therefore follows that it is immaterial how the Wangs heard about the excursions and what, if anything, petitioner said or wrote about the excursions.
It must also be said that we are not inclined to ignore the Wangs’ repeated admissions that they had no contact with petitioner and received nothing from the petitioner.
Slip op., at 8. The Court does its best to circumvent the reliance questions it raised in Cohen by citing Tobacco II for the contention that there is a limited area under the UCL where reliance can be an element of the claim, followed by a finding that the record contains admissions of absolutely no reliance.
It appears that the analysis of the phrase “as a result” found in Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th 298, 324-326, applies to this phrase in Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (a), which means that reliance is required for CLRA actions, with the limitations noted in Tobacco II.
So, if Cohen is enough of a lightning rod to elicit review, this one may escape that same fate.

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