Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2d/47/566.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:07:36+00:00

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Section 1074, subdivision 8, provides that: "A challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following causes, and for no other ... 8. If the offense charged be punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty; in which case he must neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror." Defendant contends that, although this provision requires the exclusion of jurors whose determination of guilt would be affected by their views of capital punishment, neither its language nor its policy require the exclusion of those whose assessment of punishment alone would be influenced, and that section 190 in providing that a person found guilty of murder in the first degree "shall suffer death, or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion [47 Cal. 2d 574] of the jury ..." has made the determination of guilt and the assessment of punishment separate questions. The prosecution contends that the statute and decisions of this court require exclusion even when scruples go only to the assessment of punishment.
We have recently criticized this interpretation of section 190 in People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209 [302 P.2d 307], holding it error to instruct a jury that it must find mitigating circumstances in a case to justify fixing the punishment at life imprisonment.  Section 190 does not impose the death penalty, leaving discretion with the jury to substitute a lesser penalty; it imposes neither death nor life imprisonment, but with a perfectly even hand presents the two alternatives to the jury. The Legislature, perhaps because of the very gravity of the choice, has formulated no rules to control the exercise of the jury's discretion.
 Admittedly, a literal reading of section 1074, subdivision [47 Cal. 2d 576] 8, does not compel the exclusion of jurors incapable of exercising the discretion contemplated by section 190. fn. * It would be doing violence to the purpose of these sections of the Penal Code, however, to construe section 1074, subdivision 8, to permit these jurors to serve. It would in all probability work a de facto abolition of capital punishment, a result which, whether or not desirable of itself, it is hardly appropriate for this court to achieve by construction of an ambiguous statute.
 Some of the .38 special shells contain bullets that were copper-coated factory loads, and others contained handcast lead bullets. There was expert testimony that the factory loads resembled in weight and shape a factory-load bullet found at the scene of the crime, and although the expert could not say that they came from the same box as that bullet, he did maintain that they were of the same type and from the same manufacturer. Defendant brought out that this type of bullet is in common use throughout the country; nevertheless, the similarity testified to by the expert, together with the prosecution's showing that the .38 shells found in the brief case would fit the type of revolver known to have been used in the killings, justified the trial court's admitting the factory loads.  The relevancy of the hand-cast bullets was even clearer. There was expert testimony, based on spectroscopic analysis [47 Cal. 2d 577] of the metal in the bullets, that those found in the brief case were probably poured from the same batch of lead as the hand-cast bullets found at the scene of the crime. The expert found "a remarkable resemblance."
The prosecution's own witness established that the bullets found at the scene of the crime had been fired from a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver, not from either the Colt .38 or the P38 that the court admitted into evidence.  When the specific type of weapon used to commit a homicide is not known, it may be permissible to admit into evidence weapons found in the defendant's possession some time after the crime that could have been the weapons employed. There need be no conclusive demonstration that the weapon in defendant's possession was the murder weapon. (People v. Ferdinand, 194 Cal. 555, 563 [229 P. 341]; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 113-114 [193 P. 92].)  When the prosecution relies, however, on a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other weapons were found in his possession, for such evidence tends to show, not that he committed the crime, but only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly weapons. (People v. Riggins, 159 Cal. 113, 121 [112 P. 862]; People v. O'Brien, 130 Cal. 1, 5 [62 P. 297]; People v. Yee Fook Din, 106 Cal. 163, 165-167 [39 P. 530]; People v. Wong Ah Leong, 99 Cal. 440 [34 P. 105].) People v. Beltowski, 71 Cal. App. 2d 18, 23 [162 P.2d 59], cited by the prosecution as contrary to this proposition, is adequately distinguished in People v. Richardson, 74 Cal. App. 2d 528, 541-542 [169 P.2d 44], on the ground that no specific weapon was relied on in the Beltowski case. It was error therefore to admit the Colt, two of the holsters, the belts, and the box of .22 shells. The P38 was admissible on other grounds that appear below.
 Defendant, however, was not prejudiced by these errors. The shells and one holster were clearly admissible, and from these the jury would have concluded that defendant possessed firearms. The admission of the Colt, more holsters, belts, and shells added little to the jury's knowledge gained from evidence correctly admitted. The introduction of the [47 Cal. 2d 578] Colt may have actually benefited defendant, for it provided an explanation for his possession of the .38 shells. An expert testified that these shells would fit either a Colt or a Smith and Wesson .38 Special, and without the Colt in evidence the jury might more easily have concluded that the ammunition was kept for a Smith and Wesson.
 Defendant says that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that Roscoe had in fact made the statements attributed to him; that since the prosecutor apparently had neither the intention nor the means of establishing the truth of his allegations, he must have made them solely to inflame the jury against the brothers. (Cf. People v. Evans, 39 Cal. 2d 242, 248-249 [246 P.2d 636].) We must assume, however, that in view of the court's instructions the jury did not consider defendant's alleged participation in the robberies. The injury, if any, was to Roscoe, and his appeal is not now before us.
As a further error, defendant complains of the admission in evidence of a bottle and a glass bearing fingerprints testified to be the fingerprints of Richard Riser. Deputy Sheriff [47 Cal. 2d 580] Lochry identified the bottle and glass as articles that he had taken from the Hilltop Cafe. When he arrived at the Cafe, early in the morning of July 12th, he found several bottles, glasses, and salt cellars on the bar. He dusted them for fingerprints, put them in a box, and locked the box in the sheriff's identification truck. About 4 or 5 a. m. he returned to the sheriff's office and put the articles in an open book case in an office that he shared with another police officer. This office was unlocked; it was flanked on one side by an office shared by two or three persons, and on the other side by a hall leading to a general office. According to Lochry, the evidence remained in the book case approximately four hours, until about 8:30 a. m., when it was removed and thereafter kept under lock and key or in the custody of specific persons.
The requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted [47 Cal. 2d 581] for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence analyzed was not the evidence originally received. Left to such speculation the court must exclude the evidence. (See Dobson v. Industrial Acc. Com., 114 Cal. App. 2d 782, 785 [251 P.2d 349]; McGowan v. Los Angeles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 386, 389-392 [223 P.2d 862, 21 A.L.R.2d 1206]; People v. Smith, 55 Cal. App. 324, 327-329 [203 P. 816]; Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F.2d 588 [82 App.D.C. 95].)  Conversely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its weight. (See People v. Tomasovich, 56 Cal. App. 520, 529 [206 P. 119]; State v. Smith (Mo.), 222 S.W. 455, 458- 459.)  In the present case defendant did not point to any indication of actual tampering, did not show how fingerprints could have been forged, and did not establish that anyone who might have been interested in tampering with the prints knew that the bottles and glasses were in Deputy Sheriff Lochry's book case. There was no error in the court's ruling.
Defendant contends that it was error for the court thus to remove from the jury's consideration the degree of murder, and whether in fact it had been in the course of a robbery or attempted robbery. The evidence, however, was overwhelming that the homicides had been committed in the perpetration of a robbery, and when there is no reasonable doubt on this issue the court is justified in withdrawing it from the jury. (People v. Sanford, 33 Cal. 2d 590, 595 [203 P.2d 534]; People v. Perkins, 8 Cal. 2d 502, 516 [66 P.2d 631]; see People v. Rupp, 41 Cal. 2d 371, 381-382 [260 P.2d 1].) Defendant offered no evidence indicating that a robbery had not been committed, and in his own statement of facts to this court he says that "the killing took place during the commission of a robbery."
 It is now well established that although the jury may not weigh the possibility of pardon or parole in determining the guilt of an accused, it may consider these consequences in exercising its discretion to choose between different punishments. (People v. Reese, 47 Cal. 2d 112, 116-117 [47 Cal. 2d 583] [301 P.2d 582]; People v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d 200, 206-208 [266 P.2d 505], cert. denied, 348 U.S. 848 [75 S. Ct. 73, 99 L. Ed. 668]; People v. Barclay, 40 Cal. 2d 146, 158 [252 P.2d 321]; People v. Osborn, 37 Cal. 2d 380, 384-385 [231 P.2d 850].)  Defendant contends, however, that it was error for the court to give the jury information about eligibility for parole before it had determined the question of guilt or innocence. This contention is without merit. In both People v. Reese, supra, and People v. Byrd, supra, we upheld the trial court when it had included in its original instructions to the jury the information that one sentenced to life imprisonment could be paroled. In those cases, as in the present one, the court cautioned the jury against allowing this information to influence its determination of guilt. Prudence requires no more; it does not require that the jury be kept in ignorance of the consequences of different penalties until it has finally determined guilt. Moreover, it is by no means clear in the present case that the jury, when it addressed its questions to the court, had not already found defendant guilty.
Section 3024, subdivision (b), provides that the minimum terms of sentence and imprisonment "for a person previously convicted of a felony either in this State or elsewhere, and armed with a deadly weapon [is] ... 10 years. ..." As we pointed out in People v. Reese, 47 Cal. 2d 112, 117-118 [301 P.2d 582], this provision is in an article of the code concerned with the length of sentences and the fixing thereof, and not with how much of a sentence must be served before a prisoner is eligible for parole. That subject is covered in a different article, embracing sections 3040 to 3065. Section 3049 provides that a person whose minimum term of imprisonment is more than one year may be paroled at any time after the expiration of one-third of the minimum term. Section 3046 limits section 3049 by stating that no person imprisoned under a life sentence may be paroled until he has served at least seven calendar years. Authority to grant parole after a certain portion of a minimum term has been served is not destroyed by a provision such as section 3024 which sets the minimum term itself.
Section 3048, also cited by defendant, limits eligibility for [47 Cal. 2d 584] parole when a defendant has been adjudicated an habitual criminal. Such an adjudication cannot be made unless the prior convictions on which it is to be based have been charged in the indictment. (People v. Wagner, 78 Cal. App. 503, 506-507 [248 P. 946].) No prior convictions were charged in the indictment in the present case, therefore section 3048 has no application.
After cross-examination of witnesses Burgess and Pantel, defendant had issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Captain Ross of the sheriff's office commanding him to produce the originals of the same statements sought by the pretrial motion. The affidavit in support of the subpoena asserted that the statements were material and relevant to issues in the case and contradictory to the witnesses' present testimony. Defendant first learned of the statements from local newspapers, which reported Captain Ross as saying that the witnesses had described the man who did the shooting as tall and slender, with a dark complexion and black hair, and the other man as dark complexioned with black hair. Apparently the Riser brothers have blond hair and light complexions, and differ significantly in other characteristics from the newspaper descriptions. On cross-examination Mrs. Burgess admitted having made a statement to the police. She claimed, [47 Cal. 2d 585] however, that she described the man who did the shooting as stocky, not as tall and slender, and although she admitted describing the man by the door as dark complexioned, she denied having said that he had black hair.
This precise problem, the relation between admissibility and the right to production, was presented in Gordon v. United States, supra, and the court there concluded that the prosecution had not conceded enough in admitting that it would be error to refuse to order production if it would be error not to admit the evidence once produced. "[P]roduction may sometimes be required though inspection may show that the document could properly be excluded." (344 U.S. [47 Cal. 2d 588] at 418.) As in the case before us, the court was faced with a record that showed no reason why the statements once produced could not be used for impeachment.
[30a] In deciding whether this error was prejudicial we must determine whether there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict had defendant been allowed to obtain and introduce in evidence prior inconsistent statements of the eyewitnesses. (People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Even if we assume that prior inconsistent statements would have impaired the value of the eyewitness testimony, there remained against defendant the fingerprint evidence, the evidence that he possessed hand-cast bullets that probably had a common origin with bullets found at the scene of the crime and a holster that had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38 Special, and the evidence that he had had a gun in addition to those he admitted owning.
Weighed against this evidence was the testimony of the Risers that they had not been at the Hilltop on July 11th. [47 Cal. 2d 589] Both stated that they had been at the house of Della Fay Jones, Roscoe's girl friend, until 7:30 or 8 o'clock in the evening, and then had gone on, Roscoe and Della to a movie and Richard on a round of Stockton bars. Richard returned home about midnight and did not see Roscoe until the next morning. Della Fay Jones did not testify.
In view of the holding in Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 [73 S. Ct. 369, 97 L. Ed. 447], it seems incredible that a majority of this court could hold that this error was not prejudicial. The same problem was there presented. The court had this to say: "By proper cross-examination, defense counsel laid a foundation for his demand by showing that the documents were in existence, were in possession of the Government, were made by the Government's witness under examination, were contradictory of his present testimony, and that the contradiction was as to relevant, important and material matters which directly bore on the main issue being tried: the participation of the accused in the crime. The demand was for production of these specific documents and did not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition among documents possessed by the Government on the chance that something impeaching might turn up. Nor was this a demand for statements taken from persons or informants not offered as witnesses. The Government did not assert any privilege for the documents on grounds of national security, confidential character, public interest, or otherwise. ... Indeed, we would find it hard to withstand the force of Judge Cooley's observation in a similar situation that 'The State has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons.' [People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569 (18 N.W. 362, 363).] In the light [47 Cal. 2d 591] of our reason and experience, the better rule is that upon the foundation that was laid the court should have overruled the objections which the Government advanced and ordered production of the documents.
The eyewitness testimony was by far the most important evidence against this defendant. The murder weapon was never found; the similarity in the hand-cast bullets was only that they were "probably of common origin"; and it was thought that defendant's holster had once carried a gun of a type of the murder weapon. It would appear to me that, in Judge Cooley's language, the state should have no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of facts; that all material and relevant facts should be set forth for the determination of the jury and, if certain state witnesses have been accused of making contradictory statements relating to a material fact, those statements should also be before the jury so that it could determine for itself the trustworthiness of such witnesses. The American concept of due process most certainly encompasses the right of an accused to be confronted by trustworthy witnesses and the right to show, if he can, that witnesses against him may not be worthy of belief. Due process most certainly also encompasses the concept that the state will not seek to conceal material evidence in the accused's favor. If due process of law does not encompass such concepts, then we have most assuredly departed a long way from the very foundation upon which our system of justice rests--the ideal that every man is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 [48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376]), it is better that one [47 Cal. 2d 593] criminal escape than that the government play an ignoble part.
In Mesarosh v. United States (25 L.W. 4001, 4004, 4005) the government moved to remand the case to the trial court because of untruthful testimony given before other tribunals by Mazzei, a government witness, although contending that the testimony given in the instant case by Mazzei was "entirely truthful and credible." The government sought to have the matter remanded to the District Court for a full consideration of the credibility of the testimony of the witness Mazzei. The counter-motion of petitioners asked for a new trial. In reversing the judgments below with directions to grant the petitioners a new trial, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the court, had this to say: "Mazzei, by his testimony, has poisoned the water in this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity. This is a federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings of the federal courts. If it has any duty to perform in this regard, it is to see that the waters of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place here, the condition should be remedied at the earliest opportunity. 'The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of the most cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance is one of our proudest boasts. This Court is charged with supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in the federal courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 [63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819]. Therefore, fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be asserted.' Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115, 124 [76 S. Ct. 663, 100 L. Ed. 1003].
FN *. The awkwardness of testing the juror by use of the exact language of section 1074, subdivision 8, was made abundantly clear in the present case. Time and again the court questioned the juror in the statutory language, and time and again the juror replied that he did not entertain such an opinion "as would prevent him finding the defendant guilty." Finally, in order to make it clear to the juror that he was being asked if he opposed the death penalty, the court was compelled to abandon the statutory language.

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