Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/217/217mass548.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:01:24+00:00

Document:
JOHN L. NICHOLS & another, executors, vs. WILLIAM W. VAUGHAN, executor. JOSIAH E. BACON vs. SAME.
Present: RUGG, C.J., LORING, BRALEY, SHELDON, & CROSBY, JJ.
Limitations, Statute of. Statute, Construction.
which the defendant, although he was in a foreign country, retained his domicil in this Commonwealth.
It is a well established rule of statutory interpretation, that, when a statute after having been construed by the courts is re-enacted without material change, the Legislature are presumed to have adopted the judicial construction put upon it.
TWO ACTIONS OF CONTRACT by different plaintiffs against the executor of the will of Charles G. Lundell, late of Boston. Writs dated May 3, 1910.
In each case the defendant in a substituted answer alleged that the causes of action set out in the plaintiff's writ and declaration did not accrue within six years before the suing out of the plaintiff's writ or within the time when the plaintiffs' testator in the first case or the plaintiff in the second case might by law bring the action.
In the Superior Court the cases were heard by Quinn, J., without a jury. The facts as found by him are stated in the opinion. In each of the cases the judge "ruled as a matter of law that change of domicil alone suspends the expiry of the statute of limitations" and on the facts found by him ruled that the statute was a bar to the plaintiff's action. He ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant on all the counts of the declaration in each action, and reported the cases for determination by this court.
S.M. Child, for the plaintiffs.
J.B. Warner, (F.S. Montgomery with him,) for the defendant.
defendant is entitled to prevail provided it is found that the statute was running in his testator's favor for the first or any one of the years of his absence. The finding of the Superior Court judge, that the statute had run in favor of the defendant, involved a finding that the domicil of his testator was in Boston for at least one year out of the period of his absence.
case of his absence from the State actual notice of the pendency of the action can be given to him, so that a valid and binding judgment can be obtained."
The defendant contends that these decisions are no longer law because of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, wherein it was held that there could be no personal judgment against a non-resident defendant over whom jurisdiction was obtained solely by attachment of property. That case does not go to the extent of holding that the courts of the State in which one is domiciled and to which he owes allegiance cannot acquire jurisdiction over him so as to be able to render a judgment in personam except after personal service of process upon him within the State. There are, however, expressions in several decisions of that court which lend support to that view. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 188. Clark v. Wells, 203 U.S. 164, 170. Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 432, 444. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521. Mexican Central Railway v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194. Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U.S. 165, 173. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 478. Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, goes very far toward sustaining that contention. It is supported by Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa, 511, De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, Smith v. Grady, 68 Wis. 215, and Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484. See 25 Ann. Cas. 680.
Of course, if that is the law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as established by the Supreme Court of the United States, it is authoritative and binding upon all State courts. Eliot v. McCormick, 144 Mass. 10. See also Porter v. Prince, 188 Mass. 80.
But, however that may be, the point here presented is one of interpretation of our statute of limitations and not one of sufficiency of service of process. We are constrained to adhere to the interpretation of this statute repeatedly given. The Legislature has re-enacted the statute at least twice without substantial change in this regard since our earliest decision interpreting its words. It is a well settled rule of statutory interpretation that, when a statute after having been construed by the courts is re-enacted without material change, the Legislature are presumed to have adopted the judicial construction put upon it. The doctrine of stare decisis is supported by legislative approval.
If the result of this interpretation, in the light of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. Reynolds, Pennoyer v. Neff, and the others above cited, is to work a possible injustice in some instances, as well it may, the remedy is with the Legislature.

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