Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/313/354/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:35:50+00:00

Document:
1. The judgment being erroneous on the merits, the Court abstains from inquiring whether this suit to enjoin a subordinate federal officer from alleged invasion of plaintiff's rights under color of a federal statute but without authority, is a suit against the United States, or whether the Secretary of the Interior should have been joined as a necessary party defendant, or whether the state court was without power to enjoin a federal officer. P. 313 U. S. 359.
2. In administering the Taylor Grazing Act of June 28, 1934, the Secretary of the Interior, relying on the broad powers conferred by § 2, issued temporary licenses to stockowners for the grazing of their livestock upon the public lands within grazing districts, and charged a uniform price per head, rather than have the grazing lands go unregulated pending the lengthy period required for instituting the plan, contemplated by § 3, of renewable term permits at reasonable fees adjusted to each case, etc. With full knowledge of this, Congress repeatedly appropriated part of the money thus brought into the Treasury for expenditure by the Secretary in improvement of the ranges.
Congress in the administration of the Act was thereby ratified. P. 313 U. S. 360.
60 Nev. 219; 106 P.2d 755, reversed.
Certiorari, 312 U.S. 674, to review the affirmance of a decree of injunction, entered upon the overruling of a demurrer to the bill.
shortly thereafter, the defendant, Brooks, who was acting as Regional Grazier of the United States, notified the respondents that, unless they paid the installments and obtained licenses by June 15th, they would be considered in trespass under the terms of the Act of 1934, and would be punished by fine as provided in the Act. The respondents alleged with particularity the urgent necessity in the conduct of their business that they be permitted in graze their cattle to public lands and that, unless they can do so, they will suffer irreparable and serious damage due to the destruction of their businesses. The bill charges that, although the Secretary, in promulgating the rules with respect to temporary licenses, purported to act under the authority of § 2 of the Act of 1934, that section confers upon him no power so to do, and that grazing fees specified by the rules were fixed without any attempt to determine their amounts as required by § 3 of the Act, and in violation of conditions prescribed by § 3.
The petitioner demurred, and assigned as reasons that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against him; that there was a defect of parties defendant for failure to join the Secretary of the Interior; that, as the United States, an indispensable party, had not consented to be sued, the court was without jurisdiction, and that the subject matter of the complaint was exclusively within the political power of the United States, and not subject to judicial review. The court overruled the demurrer, with leave to answer. The petitioner elected to stand upon his demurrer, and the court thereupon entered a decree in favor of the respondents, which the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed. [Footnote 3] We granted certiorari, 312 U.S. 674, because of the importance of the questions involved.
"The Secretary of the Interior shall make provision for the protection, administration, regulation, and improvement of such grazing districts as may be created under the authority of the foregoing section, and he shall make such rules and regulations and establish such service, enter into such cooperative agreements, and do any and all things necessary to accomplish the purposes of this Act and to insure the objects of such grazing districts, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, to preserve the land and its resources from destruction or unnecessary injury, to provide for the orderly use, improvement, and development of the range; . . . and any willful violation of the provisions of this Act or of such rules and regulations thereunder after actual notice thereof shall be punishable by a fine of not more than $500."
than ten years subject to the preferential right of the permittee to renewal in the discretion of the Secretary. There are other provisions for adjustment of the amount of grazing to be permitted under the permits and a corresponding adjustment of the grazing fees in the case of the occurrence of range depletion due to natural causes.
authorities. Since the jurisdiction and the procedure of the court below is sustained by decisions of this Court, we are unwilling to base our judgment upon a resolution of asserted conflict touching issues of so grave consequence where, as here, the bill fails to make a case upon the merits.
The respondents say that, under the Act of 1934, the Secretary is powerless to grant temporary licenses and charge fees therefor; that his sole authority is to issue permanent permits for specified periods not to exceed ten years at fees adjusted to the circumstances of individual permittees, and with preferential rights of renewal. If this view be correct, it might well be years before the Secretary could place the users of lands in any district under permits. The petitioner asserts that it was not the intent of Congress that the grazing lands should go unregulated and without license for any such extensive period as would be required for the issue of permits under § 3. He relies on the broad powers conferred by § 2, and points out that the section is a replica of the statute involved in United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, and there held to authorize similar rules and regulations.
See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U. S. 320; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343.
C. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended by Act of June 26, 1936, c. 842, 46 Stat. 1976, 43 U.S.C.Supp. V, § 315 et seq.
By § 11, provision is made for disposition of moneys received from districts located on Indian lands. Twenty-five percent. is made available, when appropriated for expenditure by the Secretary for range improvement.
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 109 U. S. 451.
"For construction, purchase, and maintenance of range improvements within grazing districts, pursuant to the provisions of sections 10 and 11 of the Act of June 28, 1934 (48 Stat., p. 1269), and not including contributions under section 9 of said Act, $250,000: Provided, That expenditures hereunder in any grazing district shall not exceed 25 percentum of all moneys received under the provisions of said Act from such district during the fiscal years 1936 and 1937."
Annual Report Secretary of the Interior 1936, pp. 16-17. Id., 1937, pp. xii, 102, 105-107. Id., 1938, pp. xv, 107.
Hearings Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 10,630, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 13-15; Hearings Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 6958, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 80, 83, 89; Hearings Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 9621, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 65, 70, 71; Hearing Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 9621, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 3, 28, 29.
81 Cong.Rec. part 4, pp. 4570, 4571; 83 Cong.Rec. part 11, p. 2376; 84 Cong.Rec. part 13, pp. 2931, 2932, 2933.
Wells v. Nickles, 104 U. S. 444, 104 U. S. 447.
Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U. S. 139, 300 U. S. 147.

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