Source: http://the9thcircuitwatch.com/wp/?cat=23
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:16:11+00:00

Document:
In a case that had “reversal” written all over it, the Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit (again) in a brief per curiam opinion. The facts are written in the 9th Circuit opinion on p.2 of the blog (Sims v. Stanton), but briefly: at 1:00 a.m. an officer responded to a reported disturbance at a location in a gang area. When he saw three men walking down the street, two quickly walked away into a nearby house but one continued. The officer, presuming that man might be involved in the disturbance, ordered him to stop. The man refused, hurried toward a gated house, and entered the yard. The office chased him, crashed through the gate, and accidentally collided with a woman standing behind the gate. She sued the officer who filed qualified immunity.
The 9th Circuit refused the defense, contending the officer violated the “curtilage” and committed a Fourth Amendment violation. Aside from the silliness of the plaintiff in suing an officer who accidentally injured her in pursuit of a man, the 9th Circuit denied qualified immunity. The Supreme Court, without commenting on the absurdity of this case and the wholly inapplicable rationale of invoking Fourth Amendment law, held that the officer in hot pursuit of a suspect under the facts of this case can enter the curtilage without a warrant for misdemeanors (P.C.148-refusing to comply with lawful order) as well as felonies and upheld the defense of qualified immunity.
Apparently if someone is injured by a law enforcement officer, acting in the course of his duties, the 9th Circuit will find civil damages without any consideration of conduct accidentally inflicted without any intent to injure someone and does not even qualify as negligence. The officer was unaware of anyone standing in the yard behind the gate at 1:00 a.m. in the morning. In fact, the officer’s conduct was not even negligence let alone a 1983 case.
The 9th Circuit holds an embarrassing record of refusing to find qualified immunity. Several years ago the court refused qualified immunity to officers who were in a high speed chase of an automobile. The passenger either fell out of the vehicle or was thrown out, and the officers were unable to stop in time to avoid striking him. In a 1983 lawsuit by the estate of the passenger alleging violation of due process, the 9th Circuit refused qualified immunity to the officer. Reversed in a scathing opinion by the Supreme Court; County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 835 (1998). There are more cases.
Wrongful expansion of the Fourth Amendment is further illustrated in Lavan v City of Los Angeles, a case similar to the Ninth Circuit decision in Stone v. Powell disallowing enforcement of a city vagrancy ordinance. In Lavan, the Ninth Circuit again invalidated an ordinance prohibiting unattended personal property located on public walks. The City, in an effort to retain a semblance of order in a “skid row “neighborhood, posted orders informing everyone in the neighborhood of the ordinance and the days and time for its enforcement.
The tonnage of the property previously removed from sidewalks had been formidable, including human waste, vermin and used syringes in conjunction with clothes and other personal property. Under the ordinance, for any personal property subject to disposal, the owner could claim the contents in a designated facility at no cost. The carefully drafted ordinance attempted to provide pedestrians, motorists, and businesses from congestion, filth, disease and injury. No one was arrested; none was searched. Yet the Ninth Circuit 2-1 majority disallowed enforcement of the ordnance on ground it was a “seizure” of property. The court also worried about the loss of privacy.
This decision is a complete departure from the language and rationale of the Fourth Amendment and serves no deterrent on police officers. The ordinance attempts to balance the interests of unfortunate people, presumably homeless, with the interests of the public in safety and prevention of disease. No one denies the desolate conditions of skid row, and we deplore the of the conditions of its inhabitants, but this social problem is not criminal case, certainly not a search or seizure in the sense of the Fourth Amendment and its rationale.
Nothing parallels the decision in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence comparable to Melendres v. Arpaio, 2012 WL 4358727 (9th C.A.) Plaintiffs filed a class action and sought an injunction prohibiting officers from detaining or arresting Latinos without commission of a crime or probable cause to arrest and solely on the basis of race. In other words, every Latino could challenge his detention or arrest on grounds of his ethnicity. Because most detentions and arrests occur in cities and counties of a state, the federal court will now determine in every case of an arrested or detained Latino whether reasonable suspicion or commission of a crime or probable cause exists, or that race was the only factor.
Because of the heavy Latino population in Arizona, the case load of the district will be swamped with cases alleging a violation of the injunction, and the district court forced to determine whether every detention or arrest of a Latino was based on race. In every case the issue of detention or probable cause becomes secondary to resolution of the race issue and presumably res judicata to a state case filed in state court. This court decision will not only intrude on state sovereignty, but subject to appeal in the Ninth Circuit. The underlying state case will be stayed during the appeal. The Fourth Amendment was never intended to apply its language to this type of case. And the decision includes stopping motorists for traffic violations.
The Ninth Circuit only approved the “limited injunction” issued by the district court. It concluded the plaintiffs, who may never be detained or arrested, could experience a future arrest or detention subject to the injunction.. Using the injunctive power of a federal court to determine whether one of the plaintiffs will be detained or arrested in the future is not the basis for enjoining a future speculative injury. The facts alleged of potential injury violates the jurisdictional requirement for standing.
Appeal from denial of summary judgment denying qualified immunity for defendant police officers and a municipality.
At 1:30 a.m. a police officer driving southbound and stopped at a red light on a city street observed a vehicle northbound. The evidence is in dispute whether the car windows of the driver of the other car were tinted, but according to plaintiff the officer could see each other, and could follow “him with his eyes.” The officer U turned, activated his red lights, and followed plaintiff who made a right turn at the next traffic light, then immediately made a left turn into a parking lot behind a burger stand, parked near a dumpster and turned off his lights.
According to the Ninth Circuit panel, plaintiff was a “designated driver.
Obviously the officer did not know that. And the panel noted the driver was an African American as was his passenger and the third occupant a Mexican American. How the officer could see that at 1:30 a.m through tinted rear windows is not questioned by the panel. And if the driver was the “designated driver” the other occupants must be intoxicated.
Plaintiff testified traffic was light yet he was uncertain whether a police car exhibiting red lights was following him. At 1:30 a.m.
Does the conduct of the driver warrant investigation? Does driving into an unlit parking lot after two contradictory vehicular turns and extinguishing the car lights while hiding behind a dumpster sound innocent?
The panel launches into an extended legal analysis of the Fourth Amendment and conclude the officer lacked a basis to stop the vehicle or arrest anyone. This case exemplifies the naivete of 9th Circuit panel members who have no experience in “street work” by police. Experience, intuition and conduct warrant investigation. And the panel could not resist racial identification.
In suppor of its decision in Liberal the panel cites Rodis v. City of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2009) and adds “cert. denied.” The Rodis 9th Circuit opinion was originally reversed by the Supreme Court and remanded. On remand the 9th Circuit panel wrote its decison in compliance with the Supreme Court order. In Liberal, the panel sites Rodis and adds “cert. denied” ignoring the fact the Supreme Court reversed its original opinion.
The principal of a high school contacted police and informed them one of the students (Vincent Huff) had threatened to “shoot up” the school, had been absent from school for two days, and many parents had kept their children at home. In talking with the principal, officers were unable to verify the information but decided to visit the home of the student. Upon arrival, one of the officers telephoned Mrs. Huff, identified himself and said he wanted to talk to her. She agreed, opened the door and came out with her son Vincent. Asked by the officers if any guns were in the house, she said she would get her husband and “went” into the house.
The officers, fearing she fled inside to obtain a weapon, entered the house and spoke to the husband for approximately ten minutes. Satisfied the rumor was not credible, the officers left the house without arresting anyone and without searching.
In response to a defense motion for summary judgment, the U.S. District Court found the conduct of the officers reasonable and no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred . On appeal, a 2-1 majority of the 9th Circuit panel reversed on grounds the entry was without probable cause, and no exigency occurred warranting entry into the house.
What should the officers have done after hearing from a school principal that one of her students reportedly would “shoot up” the school? Ignore the unverified information? And if someone did “shoot up” the school, who would be responsible for not investigating?
Considering all the student deaths by gunshot having occurred recently, the most reasonable option for police is questioning the student. Officers remained outside the house talking to Mrs. Huff and made no entry until she fled inside. The officers did not threaten her or engage in any conduct warranting flight. Unaware of her goal, the officers could stand outside and hope no one returned with a gun, or enter to prevent any danger. This is common sense and “reasonable” conduct the Fourth Amendment requires.
The officers remained in the house only ten minutes, neither arrested nor searched anyone, and departed. In the litigation, (this case arose on summary judgment) how much money should a jury give the plaintiffs? This is the kind of frivolous litigation that should result in imposition of attorney fees on counsel who filed this case on evidence of nothing more than inconvenience to the plaintiffs.
The following is taken from the original Ninth Circuit opinion: Fisher v. City of San Jose, 475 F.3d 1049 (2007). On rehearing en banc, the court reversed; Fisher, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009). As judges, we should not armchair quarterback a crisis from the safety of our chambers. Such post game analysis is disconnected from reality. . . What facts induced this Ninth Circuit judge, dissenting from a court decision written by two other judges, to write this scathing remark? Herewith an abbreviated version of the evidence in a civil case filed against a city and several of its police officers alleging violation of civil rights. A security guard responding to a complaint of excessive noise in an apartment complex contacted Steven Fisher, an intoxicated tenant in the process of cleaning a rifle, and invited him outside to talk about the source of the noise. Fisher exited his apartment carrying the rifle. During their conversation, the guard, frightened by Fishers menacing demeanor and fearing for his safety, contacted the San Jose Police Department. Police officers arrived shortly before 2:00 a.m. to investigate but Fisher, having returned inside his apartment, refused to open the door, responded incoherently to the officers, and cited the Second Amendment right to bear arms. He invited one of the officers into his apartment but threatened to shoot her-a felony-if she entered. The patrol officers called for support from an experienced team of officers. Several hours later and throughout the morning, officers observed Fisher walking around inside the apartment carrying a rifle. One officer testified at a subsequent trial that Fisher pointed his rifle at the officers and at another time apparently loaded the weapon in their sight. For a period of six hours the officers could not see whether Fisher was armed or had weapons accessible to him. Attempts to contact him by telephone were unsuccessful. Other uncontradicted testimony at trial established Fisher had eighteen rifles in his apartment. Police evacuated the entire apartment complex, extinguished the power in Fishers apartment, broke the glass door to his apartment and tossed in a throw phone to talk to him because the regular telephone line emitted a busy signal. Officers threw a flash bang device into the apartment in an attempt to disorient Fisher and subsequently hurled gas canisters through the broken glass door, all tactics unavailing. Ultimately police established contact with Fisher using the throw phone and he agreed to leave the apartment unarmed. Upon his exit, officers placed Fisher in custody but at no time requested an arrest warrant from a court. Fisher sued the City and several police officers for Constitutional violations (43 U.S.C. 1983) alleging the warrantless arrest entitled him to money damages. At the trial, the jury unanimously found in favor of the defendant City and its police officers-including a verdict rejecting Fishers claim that officers arrested him unlawfully without a warrant. Despite the jury verdict, the U.S. District Court judge invoked a federal rule* granting Fishers motion for judgment in his favor as a matter of law, and ruled the arrest conducted without a warrant violated his rights. In an exercise of judicial hubris, the court awarded Fisher one dollar in damages and ordered the police department to conduct training on the law of arrest and search. The two judge majority of the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the trial court ruling on appeal. The Ninth Circuit panel majority ruled that officers can only enter a house to effect an arrest if they have obtained an arrest warrant from a magistrate unless precluded by exigent circumstances constituting an emergency. According to the panel majority, the truncated version of the facts recited above does not constitute an emergency dispensing with the warrant requirement. In their opinion, evidence that an incoherent and intoxicated individual in possession of multiple firearms who threatened to shoot an officer, pointed guns at other officers and avoided every attempt inducing him to exit the apartment does not constitute an emergency dispensing with the need to obtain an arrest warrant. Here is the panel majority rationale: the arrest warrant requirement does not evaporate the moment officers surround a home with weapons and begin to take measures to induce an individual to leave his home. . . Rather, officers must obtain a warrant before any additional incursions into the home if the initial exigency dissipates sufficiently to allow the police to obtain a warrant. The dissenting judge replies: What we have here is very dangerous situation that was resolved safely for all concerned, Fisher, the public, and the police because of good police work. Nevertheless, the majority decision penalizes the police by announcing a new warrant requirement imposing liability upon them for failing to obtain a telephonic arrest warrant in the midst of a police standoff that could have turned deadly at any moment . . . Armed standoffs are fluid and dangerous situations that are stressful, tense, and require difficult decisions to resolve peacefully . . . Armed standoffs always require [complex] tactical decisions that attempt to balance the safety of all involved. Commentary: The Fisher case is not an arrest conducted by officers in a criminal case who mistakenly concluded they had probable cause to arrest, or lacked an arrest warrant. Fisher filed a civil case against the City of San Jose and its officers exposing them to liability for alleged violation of Constitutional rights. The jury verdict in favor of the City and its officers validated the propriety of the arrest, including a jury decision that police did not need an arrest warrant. The trial judge overruled the jury verdict and imposed his own version of the legal consequences of the arrest. Neither the majority nor minority panelists disagree the officers had probable cause to arrest Fisher. They disagree as to what point in time the arrest triggered the necessity for a warrant, whether at the time of the initial confrontation when Fisher refused to emerge from his apartment, or when the officers physically took him into custody. From the initial nighttime contact at 2:00 a.m. until 2:30 p.m. in the afternoon the standoff took place. The majority decision notes that for six hours during the standoff the police never saw Fisher armed, allowing ample time for officers to obtain a warrant, although he ignored repeated attempts to flush him out. The court failed to recognize that Fisher could have quickly concealed himself, ambush anyone who entered, and had the ability to stave off police with multiple firearms. Fisher caused the six hour period of time to elapse, not the officers, but according to the court majority, this period of time dissipated the emergency and permitted officers time to seek a warrant. The Fisher case stands for the proposition that when the initial emergency event is dissipated the justification for a warrantless arrest no longer exists. To avoid civil liability, the officers must seek judicial authorization for an arrest warrant, contact a judge, identify an officer to prepare papers or recite the facts telephonically to the judge in support of the affidavit, wait until the administrative process necessary to obtain the warrant concludes, review the accuracy of the warrant and affidavit, and notify relevant department personnel the arrest warrant has been issued. The panel majority decision is riven with legal discussions of the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unlawful searches and arrests potentially imposing civil penalties on police officers. But in the Fisher case, academic hairsplitting confirms the dissenting judges opinion of the panel majority decision: disconnected from reality. As the panelist minority notes, officers will now have to determine when dissipationoccurs. At their own risk. This case was originally reported in January, 2007; Fisher v. City of San Jose, 475 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2007). The panel majority unilaterally withdrew the opinion, superseded it on denial of rehearing, and rewrote it; Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007). The case was reheard en banc, reversed and the court reinstated the jury verdict; Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.2009). That three judges dissented is evidence that judicial naivete is alive and well;. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 50 (b).

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