Source: https://caselaw.lexroll.com/2019/03/30/in-re-j-g-no-s240397-cal-2-25-2019/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:31:52+00:00

Document:
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, and McKinster* concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
Under California’s deferred entry of judgment procedure, an eligible minor, after admitting the charges in a petition alleging a violation of law and successfully completing probation, may have the charges dismissed and the juvenile court records sealed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790.) A minor granted deferred entry of judgment “may . . . be required to pay restitution to the victim or victims pursuant to the provisions of” the Welfare and Institutions Code. (§ 794.) In this case, the juvenile court granted deferred entry of judgment to J.G., who was charged by petition with trespassing and vandalism, on condition that he pay restitution in the total amount of $36,381, at the rate of $25 per month. It later found that J.G. had successfully completed all terms of his probation other than the restitution requirement, dismissed the petition, and ordered that the restitution award may be enforced as a civil judgment. On appeal, J.G. challenged the restitution order, arguing that the juvenile court erred by: (1) converting the unpaid restitution to a civil judgment; (2) considering, in determining his ability to pay restitution, the benefits he received from the federal Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI); (3) finding, based on his receipt of SSI benefits, that he had the ability to pay restitution; and (4) imposing an amount that exceeded the $20,000 per-tort-cap set forth in section 742.16, subdivision (n). The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment. For reasons explained below, we likewise reject J.G.’s first and second arguments. However, based on concessions by the People with respect to the third argument, we remand the matter for a new hearing regarding J.G.’s ability to pay restitution. In light of this disposition, we do not address J.G.’s fourth argument.
On June 6, 2012, the Shasta County District Attorney filed a petition under section 602 alleging that J.G. was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because he had committed the following offenses: (1) vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)); (2) throwing an object at a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 23110, subd. (b)); (3) trespass and damage or removal of highway signs (Pen. Code, § 602, subd. (f)); and (4) trespass by entering and occupying property (Pen. Code, § 602, subd. (m)). In support of these charges, the petition alleged that J.G. had entered and occupied real property and a structure at Shasta State Historic Park and had defaced, damaged, and destroyed signs, brick walls, wood railings, skylights, and a roof at the park. Accompanying the petition was a filing indicating that J.G. was eligible for deferred entry of judgment. Several months later, the probation department recommended that the court grant deferred entry of judgment subject to several conditions, including J.G.’s payment of restitution in the amount of $30,156.
J.G. filed an appeal, arguing in relevant part that the juvenile court had erred by (1) converting the unpaid balance of restitution to a civil judgment, (2) considering his SSI benefits in determining his ability to pay restitution, (3) finding, based on his receipt of SSI benefits, that he had the ability to pay restitution, and (4) setting the total amount of restitution at over $36,000 notwithstanding section 742.16, subdivision (n), which limits the amount of restitution that may be ordered for a violation of Penal Code section 594 to $20,000 “for each tort of the minor.” The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments — some for procedural reasons and some on the merits — and affirmed the judgment.
We granted J.G.’s petition for review.
A. The Court Did Not Err in Ordering Conversion of the Unpaid Restitution Balance to a Civil Judgment.
A minor granted deferred entry of judgment “may . . . be required to pay restitution to the victim or victims pursuant to the provisions of” the Welfare and Institutions Code. (§ 794.) Given the facts of J.G.’s offenses, two restitution provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code are potentially relevant: sections 730.6 and 742.16. The former, which we have called the “general” restitution statute (Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 307 (Luis M.)), requires courts to order minors “found to be a person described in Section 602” to, among other things, pay “[r]estitution to the victim or victims.” (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(2)(B).) It also mandates that a restitution order issued pursuant to the section “shall be enforceable as a civil judgment” (id., subd. (i)) and “may be enforced in the manner provided in Section 1214 of the Penal Code” (§ 730.6, subd. (r)).
J.G.’s arguments are unpersuasive. To begin with, unlike J.G., we find nothing “oblique” about section 794’s reference to “other provisions of” the Welfare and Institutions Code, and nothing “illogical” about concluding, for reasons already explained, that by providing in section 794 that minors granted deferred entry of judgment may be required to pay restitution “pursuant to” — i.e., in conformity with and according to — the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the Legislature expressly authorized unpaid restitution in the deferred entry of judgment context to be converted to an enforceable civil judgment, as specified in sections 730.6 and 742.16. What we do find illogical — and unpersuasive — is J.G.’s argument that section 793, which does not address restitution, somehow limits section 794’s express incorporation, without limitation, of the other sections in the Welfare and Institutions Code regarding restitution.
J.G.’s argument is unpersuasive because reading section 793 to incorporate the conversion provisions of section 730.6 and 742.16 is fully consistent with the voters’ intent, as disclosed by the statement on which J.G. relies, to further rehabilitation by holding minors “accountable” for their offenses. (Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (j), p. 119.) As we have explained, “[a]n order of direct victim restitution” under these provisions “acts to make the victim whole, rehabilitate the minor, and deter future delinquent behavior.” (Luis M., supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 305; see People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 34 [requiring payment of restitution “renders defendant accountable for the financial harm he caused and contributes to his reformation and rehabilitation”]; Charles S. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 741, 747 (Charles S.) [“a requirement of restitution may serve a rehabilitative function consistent with the purposes of Juvenile Court Law”].) “[R]estitution serves valid . . . rehabilitative objectives by . . . helping [offenders] appreciate the harm done to the victim” (People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1097) and “holding [them] accountable for [their] actions” (In re J.S. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 414, 421). Thus, contrary to J.G.’s argument, reading section 793 to incorporate the conversion provisions of sections 730.6 and 742.16 serves the voters’ intent, as reflected by the statement J.G. cites and by the voters’ specification in section 794 that minors granted deferred entry of judgment “may . . . be required to pay restitution to the victim or victims pursuant to the provisions of” the Welfare and Institutions Code.
For the preceding reasons, we reject J.G.’s argument that the juvenile court erred in converting the amount of unpaid restitution to a civil judgment.
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Violate Federal Law By Considering J.G.’s SSI Benefits.
In light of Keffeler, J.G.’s claim that consideration of his SSI benefits in determining his ability to pay constitutes “legal process” for purposes of applying 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) is unpersuasive. Although such consideration did, “in the abstract,” involve “legal process” (Keffeler, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 384) — a judicial proceeding in which a court determined J.G.’s ability to pay restitution — as Keffeler held, 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) “uses the term ‘other legal process’ far more restrictively” (Keffeler, at p. 384) — i.e., “process much like the processes of execution, levy, attachment, and garnishment” (Keffeler, at p. 385) — “and at a minimum, would seem to require utilization of some judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism . . . by which control over property passes from one person to another in order to discharge or secure discharge of an allegedly existing or anticipated liability” (ibid.). “On this restrictive understanding of ‘other legal process,’ it is apparent that [mere consideration of J.G.’s SSI payments in determining his ability to pay restitution] involve[s] nothing of the sort.” (Id. at p. 386.) “[T]he object of the processes specifically named” in 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) — “to discharge, or secure discharge of, some enforceable obligation” (Keffeler, at p. 386, italics added) — is different from the object of the process at issue here — to determine in the first instance whether to impose an enforceable obligation, i.e., restitution. Nor does considering SSI benefits in making this determination “involve” an exercise of judicial authority “to gain control over” those benefits, which is the characteristic of the processes 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) specifies — execution, levy, attachment, and garnishment — and on which Keffeler focused. (Keffeler, at p. 386.) Under Keffeler, 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) does not preclude a court from considering SSI benefits in determining the ability to pay restitution.
In In re Cramner (10th Cir. 2012) 697 F.3d 1314, 1315, the court held that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor, in submitting a proposed repayment plan, may exclude SSI benefits in calculating his projected disposable income. However, the court based its decision on “the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code” (id. at p. 1318), which, the court stated, “expressly allows [a debtor] to exclude [SSI benefits] from the disposable income calculation” (id. at p. 1317). The court went on to add that its conclusion was “bolstered by” 42 U.S.C. section 407(a), “which shields [SSI] payments . . . from ‘execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process,’ or from ‘the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.’ ” (In re Cramner, at p. 1318.) Contrary to J.G.’s assertion, this brief statement, added merely to “bolster” the court’s conclusion based on “the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code” (ibid.), hardly constitutes a holding that 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) “prohibit[s] treating Social Security benefits as income.” In any event, In re Cramner was a bankruptcy case, and the part of 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) that was there relevant — SSI benefits are not “subject to . . . the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law” — is inapplicable in the nonbankruptcy case now before us.
In State v. Eaton (Mont. 2004) 99 P.3d 661, 666, the court held that an order requiring the defendant to make restitution payments equal to 20 percent of his net monthly income “conflicted with” 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) insofar as it required his social security benefits to be included in his net income. The order, the court stated, “improperly burden[ed] [the defendant’s] social security benefits” and constituted “an improper attempt to subject” them “to ‘other legal process.’ ” (Eaton, at p. 666.) In response to the state’s view that the defendant could simply “raise this defense at the time [the state] would seek a levy,” the court stated, “it is appropriate to eliminate the offending condition from the judgment in the first instance.” (Ibid.) Given this response, it is unclear whether the Eaton court held that a court may not order a defendant to make payments with social security benefits — a proposition with which the People here do not disagree — or that a court may not consider SSI benefits in determining a defendant’s ability to pay restitution — which is the proposition for which J.G. cites Eaton. Insofar as it speaks to the latter issue, its summary analysis is unpersuasive and out of step with the weight of authority, as set forth above.
Finally, in City of Richland v. Wakefield (Wn. 2016) 380 P.3d 459, 461-467 (Wakefield), the court vacated an order requiring a homeless, disabled, and indigent defendant, whose only income was $710 per month in SSI payments, to pay $15 each month to reimburse the state for the cost of her prosecution. As J.G. observes, the court relied in part on 42 U.S.C. section 407(a). (Wakefield, at pp. 465-466.) However, this discussion was dictum because it was preceded by the court’s conclusion that the order violated state law in numerous ways (id. at pp. 464-465) and was followed by the court’s conclusion that substantial evidence did not support the factual findings on which the order was based (id. at p. 466). Moreover, the entire opinion was advisory because the parties had agreed that, as a matter of state law, the order was erroneous and the defendant’s reimbursement payments should be remitted, and they had asked the court to remand the case for entry of an order remitting the payments. (Id. at pp. 461, 463.) The court itself explained that it was “nonetheless” (id. at p. 463) discussing the claim’s merits at the “request” of the parties “to provide guidance . . . in the future” (id. at p. 461).
In light of developments at oral argument, we need not take a position on these competing views in order to dispose of this case. Refining their position, the People stated during oral argument that the ability to pay determination in this case would be “improper” if the juvenile court “was contemplating the social security money as the source of the restitution payments,” i.e., that J.G. could pay “from [his] social security money.” The People also conceded that (1) it would be “reasonable” to conclude from the record that this was, in fact, the basis for the court’s decision, and (2) on this reading of the record, the correct remedy would be to remand for a new ability to pay hearing, during which the juvenile court could consider J.G.’s future earning capacity and the total amount of restitution to be ordered.
We agree with the People that the record indicates the juvenile court “was contemplating the social security money as the source of the restitution payments.” As earlier detailed, in its prefatory remarks, the court discussed only matters related to J.G.’s SSI benefits, including the amount he received, whether there were any “restrictions” or “requirements” as to “how” the money “was to be spent,” and how the money was “[i]n fact” being spent. The record reflects no express finding regarding J.G.’s future earning capacity, no mention of it as a basis for the juvenile court’s determination, and no reference to it in the parties’ briefs and arguments. Given our reading of the record, we accept the People’s concession that the proper disposition of this case is to reverse the judgment and remand for a new ability to pay hearing that includes consideration of J.G.’s future earning capacity, his current financial circumstances, and the total amount of restitution to be ordered.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Name of Opinion In re J.G.

References: § 790
 § 594
 § 23110
 § 602
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