Source: https://www.michaeldyck.ca/blog/tag/SCC
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:21:45+00:00

Document:
On July 8, 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada Released its decision R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27. It was a close decision with a 5-4 majority written by Justices Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown.
The issue in the case was whether or not there was too much delay in the criminal proceedings against the accused. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms gives everyone the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b). This is a critical right in a fair justice system to prevent the government from intentionally dragging a case along while an accused is detained in custody. For Mr. Jordan, his case took 49.5 months (just over 4 years) to finish from the time when he was charged. The lower courts determined the delay was not unreasonable and denied Mr. Jordan's earlier applications for unreasonable delay.
Part of the problem with unreasonable delay is that the only remedy or the only way to fix/address it is by a judge entering a stay of proceedings. In other words, the judge decides to drop the charges. The judge cannot decide to, instead, reduce a sentence for unreasonable delay. That would be an improper and illegal remedy. In other situations, where your right to counsel or your right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure are violated, the judge must decide what evidence, if any, ought to be excluded from a trial. Even if evidence is obtained illegally, the judge may determine to still allow the evidence in. There is another Supreme Court of Canada case that deals with that issue called R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32. So, judges may feel that the burden for unreasonable delay should be very high because there is only one remedy and it is a significant one.
Our system, however, has come to tolerate excessive delays. The circumstances in this appeal are illustrative. Notwithstanding a delay of over four years in bringing a drug case of modest complexity to trial, both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal were of the view that the appellant was tried within a reasonable time. Their analyses are reflective of doctrinal and practical difficulties plaguing the current analytical framework governing s. 11 (b). These difficulties have fostered a culture of complacency within the system towards delay.
The Supreme Court had problems with the previously existing approach and framework laid out in R. v. Morin,  1 S.C.R. 771. The Court outlined the framework from R. v. Morin at paragraph 30 and commented it was too unpredictable, too confusing, and too complex.
The Morin framework requires courts to balance four factors in determining whether a breach of s. 11 (b) has occurred: (1) the length of the delay; (2) defence waiver; (3) the reasons for the delay, including the inherent needs of the case, defence delay, Crown delay, institutional delay, and other reasons for delay; and (4) prejudice to the accused’s interests in liberty, security of the person, and a fair trial. Prejudice can be either actual or inferred from the length of the delay.
 At the heart of the new framework is a ceiling beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable. The presumptive ceiling is set at 18 months for cases going to trial in the provincial court, and at 30 months for cases going to trial in the superior court (or cases going to trial in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry).  If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (minus defence delay) exceeds the ceiling, then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut this presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. If it cannot, the delay is unreasonable and a stay will follow.
the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
So, we have a new framework for looking at institutional and systemic delay in the criminal justice system in Canada. In Manitoba, there was a recent decision (that was before R. v. Jordan) that dealt with this exact issue of unreasonable delay. In R. v. Vandermeulen (M), 2015 MBCA 84, the Manitoba Court of Appeal heard a motion for delay after the accused was convicted after a trial. The Court agreed the delay was excessive and entered a stay of proceedings. Manitoba Justice appealed the decision but leave to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied.
the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more."
The Supreme Court considered the tertiary ground in the 2002 decision R. v. Hall, and it refers to that earlier decision throughout this one. The Supreme Court reminded us that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees us all the right to "not be denied reasonable bail without just cause." This court held this means two things: "(1) the right to “reasonable bail” in terms of quantum of any monetary component and any other conditions that might be imposed; and (2) the right not to be denied bail without “just cause" at paragraph 27.
The court also clarified that in order for the tertiary ground to be relied upon, the crime does not have to be horrific, heinous, or unexplained. Justice Wagner held, "In my view, the question whether a crime is “unexplainable” or “unexplained” is not a criterion that should guide justices in their analysis under s. 515(10) (c)" at paragraph 47. Also, the rarity of a certain crime is not something to consider because the court held "I am of the view that a “rareness” of circumstances criterion would be vague and unmanageable in practice" at paragraph 52.
the fact that the trial of the accused will be held at a much later date.
Overall, it seems like the Supreme Court is trying to open the door for judges to rely upon the tertiary ground in more cases. That may have been the original intent of Parliament when the legislation was enacted, but the way judges in provincial and superior courts have interpreted the law over time may have slowly changed how we thought the tertiary ground was supposed to work. It was obviously an issue important enough that the court heard the case in the first place. We now have to wait and see how it has an impact on a day to day basis when we apply for a client's release from custody.
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.
In Manitoba, there were already two decisions from judges in the Court of Queen's Bench about minimum sentences for firearms offences and how they were unconstitutional. First, Justice Suche held the minimum sentence in section 95 violated sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter in R. v. Adamo, 2013 MBQB 225. An appeal has been filed by the Crown Attorney's office in this case and it was still pending at the time of this blog post but given the decision from the Supreme Court, I would think the appeal may be withdrawn.
Shortly after this, in October 2013, Justice Menzies concluded the section 12 was violated by a minimum sentence for a different firearm charge in the Criminal Code under section 244 of intentionally discharging a firearm into a place knowing that or being reckless as to whether another person was in that place under section 244 in R. v. McMillan, 2013 MBQB 229. An appeal has been filed by the Crown Attorney's office in this case and it was still pending at the time of this blog post. But this is about a different section of the Criminal Code than what R. v. Nur decided.
At the end of the day, removing the minimum sentence allows the sentencing judge to have discretion to impose a fit and appropriate sentence. In some cases, a 3 year jail sentence or more may still be appropriate. But minimum sentences turn the process into a one-size-fits-all when we know that sentencing is incredibly unique to each case and each set of facts. In fact, sentencing an accused is often described as an art more than a science. Removing minimum sentences allows judges to exercise their discretion and show mercy in cases that warrant it.

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