Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/422/255/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:01:01+00:00

Document:
Respondents requested the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to make available Systems Worthiness Analysis Program (SWAP) Reports which consist of the FAA's analyses of the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines. Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 permits the FAA Administrator, upon receiving an objection to public disclosure of information in a report, to withhold disclosure when, in his judgment, it would adversely affect the objecting party's interest and is not required in the public's interest. The Administrator declined to make the reports available upon receiving an objection from the Air Transport Association, which claimed that confidentiality was necessary to the effectiveness of the program. Respondents sued in the District Court seeking, inter alia, the requested documents. The District Court held that the documents were "as a matter of law, public and non-exempt" within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court "insofar as appellants rely upon Exemption (3)" of the FOIA.
Held: The SWAP Reports are exempt from public disclosure under Exemption 3 of the FOIA as being "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." Pp. 422 U. S. 261-267.
and would imply that Congress had undertaken to reassess every delegation of authority to withhold information that it had made before the passage of the FOIA in 1966, a task that the legislative history clearly shows it did not undertake. Pp. 261-266.
(b) The broad discretion vested by Congress in the FAA under § 1104 to withhold information from the public is not necessarily inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting the FOIA to replace the broad standard of the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act. Congress could appropriately conclude that the public interest in air transport safety was better served by guaranteeing confidentiality of information necessary to secure from the airlines the maximum amount of information relevant to safety, and Congress' wisdom in striking such a balance is not open to judicial scrutiny. Pp. 422 U. S. 266-267.
162 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 498 F.2d 1031, reversed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 422 U. S. 268. DOUGLAS and BRENNAN, JJ., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 422 U. S. 268.
"[t]he present practice of nonpublic submissions, which includes even tentative findings and opinions as well as certain factual material, encourages a spirit of openness on the part of airline management which is vital to the promotion of aviation safety -- the paramount consideration of airlines and government alike in this area."
a great extent, upon the full, frank and open cooperation of the operator himself during the inspection period. His assurance by the FAA that the resulting recommendations are in the interest of safety and operational efficiency and will not be disclosed to the public are the major incentives impelling the operator to hide nothing and to grant free access to procedures, system of operation, facilities, personnel, as well as management and operational records in order to exhibit his normal course of operations to the SWAP inspectors."
"the documents sought by plaintiffs . . . are, as a matter of law, public and non-exempt within the meaning of 5 United States Code [§] 552, and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment . . . as a matter of law."
interest of the national defense or foreign policy,'" 162 U.S.App.D.C. at 300, 498 F.2d at 1033. The Court of Appeals read the Act as providing a comprehensive guide to congressional intent. One of the Act's major purposes was seen as intending to eliminate what it characterized as vague phrases such as "in the public interest" or "for good cause" as a basis for withholding information. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that § 1104 cannot be considered a specific exemption by statute within the meaning of Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act.
This case involves no constitutional claims, no issues regarding the nature or scope of "executive privilege," but simply the scope and meaning of one of the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. EPA v. Mink, supra, at 410 U. S. 94 (STEWART, J., concurring). The Act has two aspects. In one, it seeks to open public records to greater public access; in the other, it seeks to preserve the confidentiality undeniably essential in certain areas of Government operations. It is axiomatic that all parts of an Act, "if at all possible, are to be given effect." Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U. S. 609, 412 U. S. 633 (1973). Accord, Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 417 U. S. 650 (1974).
that the relevant portions of the exemption are unclear and ambiguous, compelling resort to the legislative history. See United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U. S. 297, 393 U. S. 303 (1969). Cf. United States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 366 U. S. 648 (1961).
"It should be made clear that this bill in no way limits statutes specifically written with the congressional intent of curtailing the flow of information as a supplement necessary to the proper functioning of certain agencies. [Footnote 8]"
"nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records. These would not be modified by the public records provisions of S. 1160."
The respondents can prevail only if the Act is to be read as repealing by implication all existing statutes "which restrict public access to specific Government records." Ibid. The term "specific" as there used cannot be read as meaning that the exemption applies only to documents specified, i.e., by naming them precisely or by describing the category in which they fall. To require this interpretation would be to ask of Congress a virtually impossible task. Such a construction would also imply that Congress had undertaken to reassess every delegation of authority to withhold information which it had made before the passage of this legislation -- a task which the legislative history shows it clearly did not undertake.
Earlier this Term, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the Court in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, noted that "repeals by implication are disfavored,"
419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 133, and that, when courts are confronted with statutes "capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.'" Id. at 419 U. S. 133-134, quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 417 U. S. 551 (1974). As we have noted, here, as in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, there is "clear evidence that Congress was aware of the necessity to deal expressly with inconsistent laws," 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 129. To spell out repeal by implication of a multitude of statutes enacted over a long period of time, each of which was separately weighed and considered by Congress to meet an identified need, would be a more unreasonable step by a court than to do so with respect to a single statute such as was involved in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra. Congress' response was to permit the numerous laws then extant allowing confidentiality to stand; it is not for us to override that legislative choice.
authorities from the airlines. Congress could appropriately conclude that the public interest was better served by guaranteeing confidentiality in order to secure the maximum amount of information relevant to safety. The wisdom of the balance struck by Congress is not open to judicial scrutiny.
"[g]eneral oversight into the administration of the Freedom of Information Act [was] exercised by the [House] Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee and the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-1419, pp. 3-4 (1972). It is not insignificant that this overall scrutiny of the Act in 1972 brought no change in Exemption 3. Indeed, when Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, it reaffirmed the continued vitality of this particular exemption, covering statutes vesting in the agencies wide authority. S.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1200, p. 12 (1974); H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 91380, p. 12 (1974).
Moreover, Congress amended the Act in 1974 to require that all agencies submit to each House, on an annual basis, "the number of determinations made by such agency not to comply with requests for records . . . and the reasons for each such determination." 88 Stat. 1564, 5 U.S.C. § 552(d)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In light of this continuing close scrutiny, we are bound to assume that Congress exercised an informed judgment as to the needs of the FAA, and that it was persuaded as to the necessity, or at least of the practical compatibility, of both statutes.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
"(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."
"Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person. . . ."
The SWAP is set forth in the Federal Aviation Administration's Systemworthiness Analysis Program Handbook, 8000.3B (reprinted Nov.1970) (App. 44-111). A revised version of the SWAP Handbook is contained in FAA Order 8000.3C, Apr. 14, 1972. (With subsequent changes.) See also affidavit of FAA Administrator Shaffer, App. 40.
"Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of information contained in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or of information obtained by the Board or the Administrator, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, stating the grounds for such objection. Whenever such objection is made, the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld from public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public. The Board or Administrator shall be responsible for classified information in accordance with appropriate law: Provided, That nothing in this section shall authorize the withholding of information by the Board or Administrator from the duly authorized committees of the Congress."
The respondents had also sought disclosure of Mechanical Reliability Reports, which are daily reports of mechanical malfunctions submitted to the FAA by the aircraft companies. On January 11, 1972, the Administrator determined that he would permit the disclosure of such documents received after April 18, 1972. The District Court's subsequent order in this case, on November 8, 1972, ordered disclosure of these documents received prior to that date. The Administrator has not contested this aspect of the District Court's order either on appeal to the Court of Appeals or in his petition for writ of certiorari to this Court.
"sets out legislatively prescribed standards of guidelines that the Secretary must follow in determining what matter shall be exempted from disclosure."
Ibid. Accord, Schechter v. Weinberger, 165 U.S.App. D.C. 236, 238, 506 F.2d 1275, 1277 (1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing his prior dissenting opinion in the same case, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 498 F.2d 1015 (1974)). In California v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 767 (1974), the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result in regard to 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) on the ground that the general nondisclosure mandate constituted "words of congressional exemption," 505 F.2d at 768, and thus the material was "specifically exempted . . . by statute." The Secretary merely had the authority "to relax the absolute prohibition established by Congress." Ibid. Cf. Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122 (CA4 1974), finding sufficient specificity in the term "[a]pplications for patents" of 35 U.S.C. § 122 and in Rules 14(a) and (b) of the Patent Office to satisfy even the objections of the Stretch court and to bring 35 U.S.C. § 122 within the scope of Exemption 3.
Note, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 Notre Dame Law. 417, 453 n. 254 (1965).
Hearings on S. 1666 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1963) (statement of Senator Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee and sponsor of § 1666, which was not changed, in pertinent part, in the final enactment). See also Hearings on H.R. 5012 et al. before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965) (statement of Rep. Moss, Subcommittee Chairman).
Id. at 3: "All laws or part of laws inconsistent with the amendment made by the first section of this Act are hereby repealed."
Id. at 14, 20, 53.
Id. at 237. See also Hearings on S. 1160 et al. before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 366 (1965). The statute's predecessor (49 U.S.C. § 674) also was specifically listed on an exhibit of "exempt statutes" submitted during the 1958 Hearing on S. 921 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 985-987, 997. Subsequent lists -- specifically not claiming to be exhaustive -- include similar statutes. See House Committee on Government Operations, Federal Statutes on the Availability of Information, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 213, 209 (Comm.Print Mar.1960), listing 26 U.S.C. § 6104(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 78x(b). See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3A.18 (1970 Supp.).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR JUSTICE BRENNAN dissent for the reasons given in Judge Fahy's opinion for the Court of Appeals, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 498 F.2d 1031 (1974).
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the judgment.
"the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld from public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public."
The Court today rules that information may be withheld under § 1104 by reason of Exemption 3.
Legislation of unusually broad scope often reflects reconciliation of conflicting values and policies. On occasion, therefore, particular provisions of such legislation may seem at odds with its basic purpose. But when the statutory language is relatively clear and the legislative history casts no serious doubt, the only appropriate judicial course is to give effect to the evident legislative intent.
89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). But it seems equally clear that Congress intended to leave largely undisturbed existing statutes dealing with the disclosure of information by specific agencies. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966).
Simply stated, the respondents' position is that to allow administrative discretion under a general "public interest" standard to determine whether information shall be disclosed to the public is inconsistent with the general thrust of the Freedom of Information Act. For this Court to accept that position, it must accept its inevitable corollary: that, by enacting the Freedom of Information Act, Congress intended to repeal, by implication alone, those statutes that make disclosure a matter of agency discretion. [Footnote 2/1] It simply is impossible fairly to discern any such intention on the part of Congress. There is no evidence of such an intention in either the statutory language or the legislative history, and there are strong intimations to the contrary. See ante at 422 U. S. 263-265.
"to be determined in a district court's de novo inquiry is the factual existence of such a statute, regardless of how unwise, self-protective, or inadvertent the enactment might be. [Footnote 2/2]"
EPA v. Mink, supra at 410 U. S. 95 n. (STEWART, J., concurring).
"any . . . report . . . obtained at any time by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare . . . except as the Secretary. . . . may by regulations prescribe;"
"unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner;"
and 38 U.S.C. § 3301, which states that all files, records, and other papers pertaining to any claim under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration are not to be disclosed, except that "[t]he Administrator may release information . . . when in his judgment such release would serve a useful purpose."
It should be noted, however, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, that, under 49 U.S.C. § 1486, judicial review of an order of nondisclosure under 49 U.S.C. § 1104 is available in the courts of appeals.

References: § 1104
 § 1104
 § 552
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 552
 § 552
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1306
 v. 
 § 122
 § 122
 § 1666
 § 674
 § 6104
 § 78
 § 3
 § 1104
 v. 
 § 3301
 § 1486
 § 1104