Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/204/364/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:45:34+00:00

Document:
Commerce comprehends navigation, and to free navigation from unreasonable obstructions by compelling the removal of bridges which are such obstructions is a legitimate exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce.
Congress when enacting that navigation be freed from unreasonable obstructions arising from bridges which are of insufficient height or width of span or are otherwise defective, may, without violating the constitutional prohibition against delegation of legislative or judicial power, impose upon an executive officer the duty of ascertaining what particular cases come within the prescribed rule.
Requiring alteration to secure navigation against unreasonable obstruction is not taking private property for public use within the meaning of the Constitution; the cost of such alterations are incidental to the exercise of an undoubted function of the United States, exerting through Congress its power to regulate commerce between the state.
Although a bridge erected over a navigable water of the United States under the authority of a state charter may have been lawful when erected and not an obstruction to commerce as then carried on, the owner erected it with knowledge of the paramount authority of Congress over navigation and subject to the power of Congress to exercise it authority to protect navigation by forbidding maintenance when it became an obstruction thereto.
The silence or inaction of Congress when individuals, acting under state authority, place unreasonable obstruction in waterways of the United States does not cast upon the government any obligation not to exercise its constitutional power to regulate commerce without compensating such parties.
The provision in § 18 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121, 1153, providing for the removal or alteration of bridges which are unreasonable obstruction to navigation after the Secretary of War has, pursuant to the procedure prescribed in the act, ascertained that they are such obstructions, are not unconstitutional either as a delegation of legislative or judicial power to an executive officer or as taking of property for public use without compensation.
This is a proceeding in the nature of a criminal information in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Union Bridge Company, a corporation of Pennsylvania owning and controlling a bridge across the Allegheny River near where it joins the Monongahela River to form the Ohio River -- the Allegheny River being a navigable waterway of the United States, having its source in New York and being navigable in both New York and Pennsylvania.
and refused to make. Hence the present information against it. There was a verdict of guilty, followed by a motion in arrest of judgment, which motion being overruled, the company was sentenced to pay a fine of $5,000. To review that order this writ of error is prosecuted.
or association shall remain in default in respect to the removal or alteration of such bridge shall be deemed a new offense, and subject the persons, corporation, or association so offending to the penalties above prescribed: Provided, That in any case arising under the provisions of this section, an appeal or writ of error may be taken from the district courts or from the existing circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court, either by the United States or by the defendants."
Legislation similar in its general character can be found in river and harbor acts passed at previous sessions of Congress. Act of 1884, 23 Stat. 133, 148, c. 229; Act of April 11, 1888, 25 Stat. 400, 424, 425, c. 860, §§ 9, 10, and Act of September 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 426, 453, c. 907, §§ 4, 5. Finally, we have the Act of March 23, 1906, 34 Stat. 84, c. 1130, §§ 4, 5, which covers the same ground as the act of 1899 under which the present information was filed.
"That the erection of said bridge shall not obstruct the navigation of said river so as to endanger the passage of rafts, steamboats, or other watercrafts, and the piers shall not be so placed as to interfere with towboats proceeding out with their tows made up, and shall be constructed in such manner as to meet the requisitions of the law in regard to the obstructions of navigation."
height and the filling in of the river or rivers over which it passes in order to provide approaches for it. We respectfully request that you will investigate this matter, having full confidence that, after making such investigation, you will find it to be your duty to take action against its owners, the Union Bridge Company, under the provisions of Section 18 of the River and Harbor Act, approved March 3, A.D. 1899. . . . It was built of such a low height above the water as to cause the almost complete obstruction of all the packet and towboat trade passing from the Allegheny River into the Ohio and Monongahela Rivers, and from these rivers into the Allegheny. In building it, the width of the river was very materially narrowed, as already stated, by the fills made for the approaches. The river commerce of Pittsburgh, as you are aware, is of very great magnitude and importance, and is rapidly increasing in volume. For the last calendar year it amounted to 10,916,489 tons, being about equal to that of the harbor of New York. The extension of the manufacturing industries of Pittsburgh up the Allegheny River is making it of much greater importance than heretofore that the navigation to and from that river should not be obstructed. The present time is peculiarly appropriate for action by you. The Union Bridge is an old, wooden structure, and will soon need -- in fact, it already needs -- extensive repairs to make it safe for public use. Therefore, as the bridge in question deprives the community of a reasonable use of the Allegheny River in connection with the river business of this great harbor, we appeal to you to exercise the powers committed to you to abate, or to at least mitigate, this great public nuisance as you shall find yourself justified by the law and the facts of the case."
that the company be given notice to make certain alterations in its bridge.
bridge was built in 1873-1874 by the Union Bridge Company, incorporated under authority of an act of the Pennsylvania legislature of March 13, 1873, and that it has been the subject of complaint on the part of the navigation interests practically ever since its completion. Numerous investigations have been made by different engineer officers, who have held public hearings on the subject and who have concurred in expressing the opinion that the bridge was an unreasonable obstruction to navigation, and that it should be raised so as to give a headroom equal at least to that of the aforesaid Point Bridge at the mouth of the Monongahela River. The Union Bridge is situated at the mouth of the Allegheny River, and there seems to be no room for doubt that the alteration of the bridge is essential to the reasonable use for navigation and commercial purposes of that portion of the river forming a part of Pittsburgh Harbor. Captain Sibert recommends that the bridge in question be so altered as to give two navigable spans extending riverwards from the left abutment, of not less than 394 feet clear width each; the second span from the Pittsburgh shore to give a clear headroom over the Davis Island pool of not less than 70 feet, and the first span from the same shore to give a headroom of not less than 70 feet at the pier and 62 feet at the abutment; also that the piers of the altered structure shall have no riprapping or other pier protection above an elevation of 10 feet below the surface of Davis Island pool, and that all parts of the old structure not comprised in the new construction, and in conformity with the above requirements, shall be wholly removed. The period of eighteen months is considered by him ample time within which to make these alterations. I concur in his views and recommend that notice be served on the Bridge Company, requiring the alterations to be made and completed as specified by him."
"And whereas, eighteen months from the date of service of this notice is a reasonable time in which to alter the said bridge as described above, now therefore, in obedience to, and by virtue of, section eighteen of an act of the Congress of the United States entitled 'An Act Making Appropriations for the Construction, Repair, and Preservation of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, and for Other Purposes,' approved March 3, 1899, I, Elihu Root, Secretary of War, do hereby notify the said Union Bridge Company to alter the said bridge as described above, and prescribe that said alterations shall be made and completed on or before the expiration of eighteen months from the date of service hereof."
At the request of the Bridge Company, the time fixed by Secretary Root for altering, changing, and elevating the bridge was extended by his successor, Secretary Taft, to December 1, 1904. By order of the latter officer, the time was extended to January 1, 1905.
to inhibit the construction of bridges which were likely to obstruct navigation; but it appears that an army engineer, Colonel Merrill, in charge of the district, publicly announced that this bridge was an obstruction to navigation when it was erected. It was erected, therefore, in the face of the information given by the best authority that could be consulted in that matter in the government. These are the facts that I find independently of any previous adjudication, but added to this is the finding of my predecessor, Mr. Root, to exactly the same effect, upon which he based an order that the bridge, as an obstruction to navigation, be abated. This matter is now before me on a petition for rehearing of Mr. Root's order. As an original question, I should have ruled as Mr. Root ruled, and a fortiori because the orders of this Department are not to be lightly set aside, and are to be treated as a decree in equity would be, and be set aside only upon a showing of a palpable error or mistake. The petition for rehearing is denied, and the order suspending the operation of Mr. Root's order is now revoked. The order will be put in full force and executed by the proper officers, and the Union Bridge will be notified accordingly."
a system of locks and dams on the Allegheny which will slackwater the stream for twenty-seven miles from its mouth. The Davis Island dam, situate five miles below Pittsburgh on the Ohio River, raises the water in the Allegheny and Monongahela at their junction six feet above their normal depths, and backs its water to the first dams of the Allegheny and Monongahela slackwater systems, respectively. These waters form the harbor of Pittsburgh, the importance of which harbor will be appreciated from the fact that the tonnage in water transportation passing from it the past year exceeded that of the Suez Canal for the same period. From its size, interstate relation, and its being a part of this really great harbor, it will be seen that the Allegheny answers the requirement of a navigable stream, The Montello, 11 Wall. 411, and is also one over which the national government has assumed jurisdiction. The Union Bridge is a pier-supported wooden structure; it crosses from Pittsburgh to Allegheny City, and is the first bridge on the Allegheny. "
to the head of an executive department of the government. This question, the government contends, has been determined in its favor by the principles heretofore announced by this Court, and need not be discussed as if now presented for the first time. In its judicial as well as legal aspects, the question is of such importance as to justify a full reference to prior decisions.
"We can see no sufficient reason why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the Act of March 1, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct. The 19th section of that act, declaring that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer, could not restrict their power of extending its operation without limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events."
"This certainly is a decision that it was competent for Congress to make the revival of an act depend upon the proclamation of the President, showing the ascertainment by him of the fact that the edicts of certain nations had been so revoked or modified that they did not violate the neutral commerce of the United States. The same principle would apply in the case of the suspension of an act upon a contingency to be ascertained by the President and made known by his proclamation."
"in which a general provision may be made, and powers given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details,"
yet "Congress may certainly delegate to others powers which the legislature may rightly exercise itself," and "the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments."
"with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing the following articles and for this purpose, on and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States which, in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides into the United States, he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power, and it shall be his duty, to suspend, by proclamation to that effect the provisions of this act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the production of such country for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension, duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the product of or exported from such designated country, as follows, namely . . ."
named day so revoked or modified its edicts as not 'to violate the neutral commerce of the United States;' by the Acts of March 3, 1815, and May 31, 1830, to declare the repeal, as to any foreign nation, of the several acts imposing duties on the tonnage of ships and vessels, and on goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States, when he should be 'satisfied' that the discriminating duties of such foreign nations, 'so far as they operate to the disadvantage of the United States,' had been abolished; by the Act of March 6, 1866, to declare the provisions of the act forbidding the importation into this country of neat cattle and the hides of neat cattle, to be inoperative, 'whenever, in his judgment,' their importation 'may be made without danger of the introduction of spread of contagious or infectious disease among the cattle of the United States' -- must be regarded as unwarranted by the Constitution if the contention of the appellants in respect to the third section of the Act of October 1, 1890, be sustained."
lasted. Nothing involving the expediency or the just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the President. The words 'he may deem' in the third section, of course, implied that the President would examine the commercial regulations of other countries producing and exporting sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, and form a judgment as to whether they were reciprocally equal and reasonable, or the contrary, in their effect upon American products. But when he ascertained the fact that duties and exactions, reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, were imposed upon the agricultural or other products of the United States by a country producing and exporting sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, or hides, it became his duty to issue a proclamation declaring the suspension, as to that country, which Congress had determined should occur. He had no discretion in the premises except in respect to the duration of the suspension so ordered. But that related only to the enforcement of the policy established by Congress. As the suspension was absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence of a particular fact, it cannot be said that, in ascertaining that fact and in issuing his proclamation in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws. Legislative power was exercised when Congress declared that the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency. What the President was required to do was simply in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making of law. He was the mere agent of the lawmaking department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect. It was a part of the law itself as it left the hands of Congress that the provisions, full and complete in themselves, permitting the free introduction of sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, from particular countries should be suspended in a given contingency, and that, in case of such suspensions, certain duties should be imposed."
"'The true distinction,' as Judge Ranney, speaking for the Supreme Court of Ohio, has well said,"
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
"Cincinnati, Wilmington &c. Railroad v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88. In Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. 188, 202, the language of the court was:"
"So, in Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498:"
"To assert that a law is less than a law because it is made to depend on a future event or act is to rob the legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know."
"The proper distinction, the Court said, was this:"
"The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power, and must therefore be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."
"What has been said is equally applicable to the objection that the third section of the act invests the President with treatymaking power. The Court is of the opinion that the third section of the Act of October 1, 1890, is not liable to the objection that it transfers legislative and treatymaking power to the President."
"That the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of the said board, shall fix and establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United States, and shall procure and deposit in the custom houses of the ports of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and such other ports as he may determine, duplicate samples of such standards; that said Secretary shall procure a sufficient number of other duplicate samples of such standards to supply the importers and dealers in tea at all ports desiring the same at cost. All teas, or merchandise described as tea, of inferior purity, quality, and fitness for consumption to such standards shall be deemed within the prohibition of the first section hereof."
"The claim that the statute commits to the arbitrary discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury the determination of what teas may be imported, and therefore in effect vests that official with legislative power, is without merit. We are of opinion that the statute, when properly construed, as said by the circuit court of appeals, but express the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity or unfit for consumption or presumably so because of their inferior quality.
This, in effect, was the fixing of a primary standard, and devolved upon the Secretary of the Treasury the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in the statute. The case is within the principle of Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, where it was decided that the third section of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, was not repugnant to the Constitution as conferring legislative and treatymaking power on the President because it authorized him to suspend the provisions of the act relating to the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides. We may say of the legislation in this case, as was said of the legislation considered in Field v. Clark, that it does not in any real sense invest administrative officials with the power of legislation. Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and, from the necessities of the case, was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would in effect amount but to declaring that the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted."
contends received our approval, the conclusion could not be avoided that executive officers, in all the departments, in carrying out the will of Congress as expressed in statutes enacted by it, have, from the foundation of the national government, exercised and are now exercising powers as to mere details that are strictly legislative or judicial in their nature. This will be apparent upon an examination of the various statutes that confer authority upon executive departments in respect of the enforcement of the laws of the United States. Indeed, it is not too much to say that a denial to Congress of the right, under the Constitution, to delegate the power to determine some fact or the State of things upon which the enforcement of its enactment depends would be "to stop the wheels of government" and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct of the public business.
that the bridge in question was an unreasonable obstruction to commerce and navigation as now conducted.
The next principal contention of the Bridge Company is that the act of 1899 is unconstitutional in that it makes no provision, and the United States has not offered, to compensate if for the sum that will necessarily be expended in order to make the alterations or changes required by the order of the Secretary of War. In other words, the defendant insists that what the United States requires to be done in respect of defendant's bridge a taking of private property for public use, which the government is forbidden by the Constitution to do without making just compensation to, or without making provision to justly compensate, the owner. Stating the question in another way, the contention is, in effect, that even if the United States did not expressly assent to the construction of this bridge as it is, and even if the bridge has become an unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation of the waterway in question, the exertion of the power of the United States to regulate commerce among the states is subject to fundamental condition that it cannot require the defendant, whose bridge was lawfully constructed, to make any alterations, however necessary to secure free navigation without paying or securing to it compensation for the reasonable cost of such alterations.
and therefore navigation upon the waterways on and over which such commerce is conducted.
A leading case upon this subject is Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 166 U. S. 271, et seq. Congress, by the River and Harbor Acts of 1884 and 1886, 23 Stat. 133, 147, c. 229, authorized and directed the improvement of the Ohio River, and made appropriations to effect that object. Under the authority of the Secretary of War, and the Engineer Corps of the Army, a dike was constructed in that river for the purpose of concentrating the water flow in the main channel of the river, near Neville island. The dike began at a certain point on the island. Its construction substantially destroyed the landing on and in front of a farm owned by Mrs. Gibson on that island, preventing during most of the year free egress and ingress from and to such farm to the main or navigable channel of the river. At the time of the construction of the dike, that farm was in high state of cultivation, well improved, with a dwelling house, barn, and outbuildings. It had a frontage of a thousand feet on the main navigable channel, and the owner had a landing there which was used in the shipping of products from and supplies to her farm, and was the only one from which such products and supplies could be shipped. Before the construction of the dike the farm, by reason of the use to which it was put, was worth $600 per acre. The obstruction caused by the dike reduced its value to $150 or $200 per acre, resulting in damages to the owner in excess of $3,000. Suit was brought against the United States in the Court of Claims to recover such damages. That court found, as a conclusion of law, that the owner was not entitled to recover.
of the United States for the purpose of regulating and improving navigation, and although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various states and individual owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect of navigation created in favor of the federal government by the Constitution. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1; Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452."
"The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that private property shall not 'be taken for public use without just compensation.' Here, however, the damage of which Mrs. Gibson complained was not the result of the taking of any part of her property, whether upland or submerged, or a direct invasion thereof, but the incidental consequence of the lawful and proper exercise of a governmental power. The applicable principle is expounded in Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635. In that case, plaintiff, being an owner of land situated at the intersection of La Salle Street in Chicago with the Chicago river, upon which it had valuable dock and warehouse accommodations, with a numerous line of steamers accustomed to land at that dock, was interrupted in his use thereof by the building of a tunnel under the Chicago River by authority of the state legislature, in accomplishing which work it was necessary to tear up La Salle street, which precluded plaintiff from access to his property for a considerable time; also to build a coffer dam in the Chicago River, which excluded his vessels from access to his docks, and such an injury was held to be damnum absque injuria. The Court said, again speaking through Mr. Justice Strong:"
right of action. This is supported by an immense weight of authority."
". . . Moreover, riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of the government in that regard. The legislative authority for these works consisted simply in an appropriation for their construction, but this was an assertion of a right belonging to the government, to which riparian property was subject, and not of a right to appropriate private property, not burdened with such servitude, to public purposes. In short, the damage resulting from the prosecution of this improvement of a navigable highway for the public good was not the result of a taking of appellant's property, and was merely incidental to the exercise of a servitude to which her property had always been subject."
"All the cases concur in holding that the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and therefore navigation, is paramount, and is unrestricted except by the limitations upon its authority by the Constitution. Of course, every part of the Constitution is as binding upon Congress as upon the people. The guaranties prescribed by it for the security of private property must be respected by all. But whether navigation upon waters over which Congress may exert its authority requires improvement at all, or improvement in a particular way, are matters wholly within its discretion, and the judiciary is without power to control or defeat the will of Congress, so long as that branch of the government does not transcend the limits established by the supreme law of the land. Is the broad power with which Congress is invested burdened with the condition that a riparian owner whose land borders upon a navigable water of the United States shall be compensated for his right of access to navigability whenever such right ceases to be of value solely in consequence of the improvement of navigation by means of piers resting upon submerged lands away from the shore line? We think not."
by Justice Campbell, declared the right of navigation to be one to which all others were subservient. . . . But the contention is that compensation must be made for the loss of the plaintiff's access from his upland to navigability incidentally resulting from the occupancy of the submerged lands, even if the construction and maintenance of a pier resting upon them be necessary or valuable in the proper improvement of navigation. We cannot assent to this view. If the riparian owner cannot enjoy access to navigability because of the improvement of navigation by the construction away from the shore line of works in a public navigable river or water, and if such right of access ceases alone for that reason to be of value, there is not, within the meaning of the Constitution, a taking of private property for public use, but only a consequential injury to a right which must be enjoyed, as was said in Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 77 U. S. 504-505, 'in due subjection to the rights of the public' -- an injury resulting incidentally from the exercise of a governmental power for the benefit of the general public, and from which no duty arises to make or secure compensation to the riparian owner. The riparian owner acquired the right of access to navigability subject to the contingency that such right might become valueless in consequence of the erection under competent authority of structures on the submerged lands in front of his property for the purpose of improving navigation. When erecting the pier in question, the government had no object in view except, in the interest of the public, to improve navigation. It was not designed arbitrarily or capriciously to destroy rights belonging to any riparian owner. What was done was manifestly necessary to meet the demands of international and interstate commerce."
an improvement ordered by Congress. The subject with which Congress dealt was navigation. That which was sought to be accomplished was simply to improve navigation on the waters in question so as to meet the wants of the vast commerce passing and to pass over them. Consequently, the agents designated to perform the work ordered or authorized by Congress had the right to proceed in all proper ways without taking into account the injury that might possibly or indirectly result from such work to the right of access by riparian owners to navigability. . . . We are of opinion that the court below correctly held that the plaintiff had no such right of property in the submerged lands on which the pier in question rests as entitles him, under the Constitution, to be compensated for any loss of access from his upland to navigability resulting from the erection and maintenance of such pier by the United States in order to improve, and which manifestly did improve, the navigation of a public navigable water."
soil beneath the streets in cities is constantly increasing, for the supply of water and light and the construction of systems of sewerage and drainage, and every reason of public policy requires that grants of rights in such subsurface shall be held subject to such reasonable regulation as the public health and safety may require. There is nothing in the grant to the gas company, even if it could legally be done, undertaking to limit the right of the state to establish a system of drainage in the streets. We think whatever right the gas company acquired was subject, insofar as the location of its pipes was concerned, to such future regulations as might be required in the interest of the public health and welfare. These views are amply sustained by the authorities. National Water Works Co. v. Kansas City, 28 F. 921, in which the opinion was delivered by MR. JUSTICE BREWER, then circuit judge; Columbus Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 65; Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co. v. Brookline, 121 Mass. 5; In re Deering, 93 N.Y. 361; Chicago, Burlington &c. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 166 U. S. 254. In the latter case, it was held that uncompensated obedience to a regulation enacted for the public safety under the police power of the state was not taking property without due compensation. In our view, that is all there is to this case. The gas company, by its grant from the city, acquired no exclusive right to the location of its pipes in the streets, as chosen by it, under a general grant of authority to use the streets. The city made no contract that the gas company should not be disturbed in the location chosen. In the exercise of the police power of the state for a purpose highly necessary in the promotion of the public health, it has become necessary to change the location of the pipes of the gas company so as to accommodate them to the new public work. In complying with this requirement at its own expense, none of the property of the gas company has been taken, and the injury sustained is damnum absque injuria."
federal or state, finds it necessary to take private property for public use, it must obey the constitutional injunction to make or secure just compensation to the owner. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway, 135 U. S. 641, 135 U. S. 659; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 159 U. S. 399, 159 U. S. 402; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 148 U. S. 336; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445. If the means employed have no real substantial relation to public objects which government may legally accomplish -- if they are arbitrary and unreasonable beyond the necessities of the case -- the judiciary will disregard mere forms, and interfere for the protection of rights injuriously affected by such illegal action. The authority of the courts to interfere in such cases is beyond all doubt. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 136 U. S. 320. Upon the general subject there is no real conflict among the adjudged cases. Whatever conflict there is arises upon the question whether there has been or will be, in the particular case, within the true meaning of the Constitution, a 'taking' of private property for public use. If the injury complained of is only incidental to the legitimate exercise of governmental powers for the public good, then there is no taking of property for the public use, and a right to compensation, on account of such injury, does not attach under the Constitution. Such is the present case."
"Without further discussion we hold it to be the duty of the railway company at its own expense, to remove from the creek the present bridge, culvert, timbers, and stones placed there by it, and also (unless it abandons or surrenders its right to cross the creek at or in the vicinity of the present crossing) to erect at its own expense, and maintain, a new bridge for crossing that will conform to the regulations established by the drainage commissioners, under the authority of the state, and such a requirement, if enforced, will not amount to a taking of private property for public use within the meaning of the Constitution, nor to a denial of the equal protection of the laws."
"If, then, the right of the railroad company to have and maintain a tunnel under the Chicago River is subject to the paramount public right of navigation; if its right to maintain a tunnel in the river is a qualified one, because subject to the specific condition in the act of 1874 that no tunnel should interrupt navigation; if the present tunnel is an obstruction to navigation, as upon this record we must take it to be, and if the city, as representing the state and public, may rightfully insist that such obstruction shall not longer remain in the way of free navigation -- it necessarily follows that the railway company is under a duty to comply with the demand made upon it to remove at its own expense, the obstruction which itself has created and maintains. If the obstruction cannot be removed except by lowering the tunnel to the required depth and (if a tunnel is to be maintained) providing one that will not interrupt navigation, then the cost attendant upon such work must be met by the company. The city asks nothing more than that the railroad company shall do what is necessary to free navigation from an obstruction for which it is responsible, and (if it intends not to abandon its right to maintain a tunnel at or near Van Buren street) that it shall itself provide a new tunnel with the necessary depth of water above it."
maintains in the river under the condition that navigation should not at any time be thereby interrupted. The removal of such obstruction is all that is needed to protect navigation. So that whatever cost attends the removal of the obstruction must be borne by the railroad company. The condition under which the company placed its tunnel in the river being met by the company, the public has no further demands upon it. This cannot be deemed a taking of private property for public use, or a denial of the equal protection of laws within the meaning of the Constitution, but is only the result of the lawful exercise of a governmental power for the common good. This appears from the authorities cited in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, supra, just decided. The state court has well said that to maintain the navigable character of the stream in a lawful way is not, within the meaning of the law, the taking of private property or any property right of the owner of the soil under the river, such ownership being subject to the right of free and unobstructed navigation. People v. West Chicago Street R. Co., 203 Ill. 551, 557. What the city asks, and all that it asks, is that the railroad company be required, in the exercise of its rights and in the use of its property, to respect the public needs as declared by competent authority, upon reasonable grounds, to exist. This is not an arbitrary or unreasonable demand. It does not in any legal sense take or appropriate the company's property for the public benefit, but only insists that the company shall not use its property so as to interrupt navigation."
made or secured to the individuals or corporation who may be incidentally affected by the exercise of such power. The principle for which the Bridge Company contends would seriously impair the exercise of the beneficent power of the government to secure the free and unobstructed navigation of the waterways of the United States. We cannot give our assent to that principle. In conformity with the adjudged cases, and in order that the constitutional power of Congress may have full operation, we must adjudge that Congress has power to protect navigation on all waterways of the United States against unreasonable obstructions, even those created under the sanction of a state, and that an order to so alter a bridge over a waterway of the United States that it will cease to be an unreasonable obstruction to navigation will not amount to a taking of private property for public use for which compensation need be made.
suggestion of the railway company that the adequacy of its bridge and the opening under it for passing the water of the creek at the time the bridge was constructed determine its obligations to the public at all subsequent periods. In Cooke v. Boston & Lowell R. Corp., 133 Mass. 185, 188, it appeared that a railroad company had statutory authority to cross a certain highway with its road. The statute provided that if the railroad crossed any highway, it should be so constructed as not to impede or obstruct the safe and convenient use of the highway. And one of the contentions of the company was that the statute limited its duty and obligation to provide for the wants of travelers at the time it exercised the privilege granted to it. The court said:"
"The legislature intended to provide against any obstruction of the safe and convenient use of the highway for all time, and if, by the increase of population in the neighborhood, or by an increasing use of the highway, the crossing, which at the outset, was adequate, is no longer so, it is the duty of the railroad corporation to make such alteration as will meet the present needs of the public who have occasion to use the highway."
"In Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. Cluggish, 143 Ind. 347, the court said (quoting from Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. Smith, 61 F. 885):"
"The duty of a railroad to restore a stream or highway way which is crossed by the line of its road is a continuing duty, and if, by the increase of population or other causes, the crossing becomes inadequate to meet the new and altered conditions of the country, it is the duty of the railroad to make such alterations as will meet the present needs of the public."
"So, in Indiana ex Rel. Muncie v. Lake Erie & Western R. Co., 83 F. 284, 287, which was the case of an overhead crossing lawfully constructed on one of the streets of a city, the court said:"
"If, by the growth of population or otherwise, the crossing has become inadequate to meet the present needs of the public, it is the duty of the railroad company to remedy the defect by restoring the crossing so that it will not unnecessarily impair the usefulness of the highway. "
Some stress was laid in argument upon the fact that compliance with the order of the Secretary of War will compel the Bridge Company to make a very large expenditure in money. But that consideration cannot affect the decision of the questions of constitutional law involved. It is one to be addressed to the legislative branch of the government. It is for Congress to determine whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, justice requires that compensation be made to a person or corporation incidentally suffering from the exercise by the national government of its constitutional powers.
* Act of June 13, 1798, c. 53, 1 Stat. 565, 566; of February 9, 1799, c. 2, 1 Stat. 613; of April 18, 1806, c. 29, 2 Stat. 379; of December 19, 1806, c. 1, 2 Stat. 411; of March 3, 1815, c. 77, 3 Stat. 224; of March 3, 1817, c. 39, 3 Stat. 361; of January 7, 1824, c. 4, 4 Stat. 3; of May 24, 1828, c. 111, 4 Stat. 308; of Act of May 31, 1830, c. 219, 4 Stat. 425; of August 5, 1854, c. 269, 10 Stat. 587; 11 Stat. 790; of March 6, 1866, c. 12, 14 Stat. 3, 26 Stat. 616, c. 1244; of Act June 26, 1884, c. 121, 23 Stat. 57.

References: § 18
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.