Source: http://www.mtc.gov/Resources/Amicus-Briefs
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:19:47+00:00

Document:
Whether Utah’s individual income tax comports with both the dormant interstate Commerce Clause and the dormant foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that Utah’s tax does not allow its residents to apportion their income and does not provide a credit for national and substantial taxes their residents pay to foreign jurisdictions.
No. 2018SC3 1. Whether a holding company that has no foreign property, payroll, or operations is exempt from Colorado taxation under the “Water’s Edge” exemption (§39-22-303(8), (12)(c)).
No. 17-494 Whether the court should uphold South Dakota's remote-seller use tax collection statute, overturning Quill and permitting states to adopt workable nexus standards for imposing sales and use tax collection requirements. Resolved in favor of the state: Quill is overturned, and states may impose a sales and use tax collection requirement on remote sellers.
No. 16-1498 Whether the Yakama Treaty of 1855 creates a right for tribal members to avoid state taxes on off-reservation commercial activities that make use of public highways. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: in a plurality opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, concluded that the 1855 treaty between the US and the Yakama Nation preempts Washington state's fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den's importation of fuel by public highway.
No. A17-0923 Whether the commissioner properly used § 290.20 to apply the financial institution allocation rules to allocate income of LLCs where that income was generated entirely by the activities of the LLCs’ ultimate owner, a financial institution. Resolved in favor of the state: The Commissioner of Revenue properly invoked her alternative-apportionment authority under Minn. Stat. 290.20(1) and applied an alternative apportionment method that fairly reflected the income of Associated Bank, N.A. and its affiliates (the Bank) allocable to Minnesota.
No. 17-11705-G Under the 4-R Act’s “another tax that discriminates” provision—can a state justify granting a sales tax exemption to truckers for fuel purchases while imposing the sales tax on fuel purchased by trains by showing that truckers pay a roughly equivalent fuel tax on fuel purchases, or does the fact that fuel taxes are spent on roads prevent the state from justifying the differential treatment. And can railroads make a claim under the provision without showing actual injury. This is the third time the 11th Circuit is hearing this case. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: Alabama’s tax scheme, which imposes either a sales or use tax on rail carriers when they buy or consume diesel fuel but exempts competing motor and water carriers from those taxes, does not violate the 4R Act as to motor carriers, but does as to water carriers.
No. 15-0669 Compact case (see Gillette) Resolved in favor of the state: Section 171.106 provides the exclusive formula for apportioning the franchise tax and, by its terms, precludes the taxpayer from using the Compact’s three-factor formula. The Compact is severable and contains no unmistakable language waiving the state’s exercise of the sovereign tax power. Nothing in the Compact expressly prohibits the states from adopting an exclusive apportionment method that overrides the Compact’s formula.
No. 20160910-SC Can Utah use its separate § 482-type authority (Utah’s section 113) to disallow intercompany deductions for amounts paid by a retailer to a related entity to use trademark property transferred by that retailer to that related entity, or is the state bound to follow federal regulations which arguably do not provide for disallowing such deductions. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: the district court properly looked to section 113’s federal counterpart and its accompanying regulations for guidance. The original version of section 113 was lifted directly from the 1928 Internal Revenue Code. Because the Legislature modeled the original version of section 113 on its federal counterpart, the court must look to the federal statute’s history and interpretation for guidance.
No. 17-494 Whether the court should grant certiorari to review Quill v. North Dakota. Petition granted.
No. 92080-0 Whether the doctrine of dissociation prevents Washington from applying its B&O tax to the receipts of an out-of-state vendor who asserts that its in-state presence is unrelated to the sales made into the state. Resolved in favor of the state: neither the dormant commerce clause nor Rule 193 (explaining Washington's B&O tax and its application to inbound and outbound sales) bar the imposition of a B&O tax to Avnet's national and drop-shipped sales delivered in Washington.
No. 16-458 If the Supreme Court were to grant the DMA’s petition asking it to consider whether the Colorado use tax reporting statute discriminates against interstate sellers, should it also grant Colorado’s cross-petition asking the Court to reconsider Quill. Petition denied.
No. A-0001-CA-2015-34999 Whether provisions of federal statute 49 U.S.C. § 14505 which prohibit a state from imposing tax on receipts from passengers traveling in interstate commerce by motor carrier prevents the state from taxing intrastate transportation that may be connected with that interstate travel. Resolved in favor of the state: taxpayer's transport as a motor carrier of an interstate railroad's employees from point to point in New Mexico is not “transportation of a passenger traveling in interstate commerce by motor carrier” in order to preempt New Mexico gross receipts tax under a federal statute, 49 U.S.C. § 14505(2) (2012); tax refund is denied.
No. 12-1175 Whether the dormant Commerce Clause prevented Colorado from imposing information-reporting requirements necessary for tax compliance and enforcement on certain businesses that lacked the requisite physical presence to be required to collect sales and use tax. Resolved in favor of the state: Colorado may impose a notice and reporting requirement on remote sellers in order to enforce sales and use tax compliance.
No. 14-1175 Whether a state can assert its sovereign immunity against a suit brought in another state’s court (challenge to Nevada v. Hall) Petition granted.
The First Marblehead Corporation and Gates Holdings, Inc.
Commissioner of Revenue Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on remand from the US Supreme Court for consideration under Wynne.
No. SJC-11609 Whether the Massachusetts court properly found in First Marblehead (I), involving application of the state’s financial institutions apportionment rules, that the result met the internal consistency test as set out in Wynne. Resolved in favor of the state: the Massachusetts rule met the internal consistency test.
No. 14-1175 Whether a state can assert its sovereign immunity against a suit brought in another state’s court (challenge to Nevada v. Hall) Resolved partially in favor of the taxpayer and partially in favor of the state: (1) The Court is equally divided on the question whether Nevada v. Hall should be overruled and thus affirms the Nevada courts' exercise of jurisdiction over California's state agency; and (2) the Constitution does not permit Nevada to apply a rule of Nevada law that awards damages against California that are greater than it could award Nevada in similar circumstances.
Case No. A15-1322 Compact case (see Gillette) Resolved in favor of the state: The Legislature's 1987 repeal of the apportionment formula was constitutional and therefore the Commissioner properly denied Kimberly Clark's refund claims.
No. M2013-00947-SC-R1 1-CV Whether the commissioner properly exercised his authority to vary the standard apportionment formula in order to fairly reflect Taxpayer's activities (and, therefore, its net earnings and net worth) for purposes of Tennessee franchise and excise taxes. Resolved in favor of the state: The Commissioner did not abuse his discretion: the variance in the case comports with Tennessee’s franchise and excise tax statutes, the implementing regulation, and the statutory purpose of imposing upon corporations a tax for the privilege of doing business in the State.
No. 13-485 Whether the Commerce Clause requires Maryland to reduce its own tax on income realized by resident shareholders of a corporate entity by an amount equal to the taxes paid by those shareholders in other states in which the entity conducted business. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: Maryland’s personal income tax scheme, which taxes income that its residents earn both within and outside the state but does not provide residents with a full credit against the income taxes that they pay to other states, violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
No. 13-1032 Whether the federal Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, bars the suit from being heard in the federal courts. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: A lawsuit by a trade association of retailers, alleging that a Colorado law requiring retailers that do not collect sales or use taxes to notify any Colorado customer of the state’s tax requirement and to report tax-related information to those customers and the Colorado Department of Revenue violates the federal and state constitutions, is not barred by the Tax Injunction Act.
its commercial domicile in Massachusetts Resolved in favor of the state: The Appellate Tax Board (board) properly determined that the taxable property of the taxpayer (a financial institution under G. L. c. 63, § 1, with its commercial domicile in Massachusetts, and entitled to apportion its income pursuant to G. L. c. 63, § 2A), consisting of securitized student loans, was properly assigned to Massachusetts for purposes of financial institution excise tax liability, where the Massachusetts tax scheme, as applied to the taxpayer, was internally consistent and did not violate the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution, in that, given that the taxpayer had no regular place of business in any State, the creation of a rebuttable presumption that loans that the taxpayer wished to assign to another State should be assigned to Massachusetts as the State of the taxpayer’s commercial domicile would be the same result reached by every other State applying the same tax structure.
No. DA 14-0260 Whether Montana's sales and use tax applied to sellers where they did not "own" the underlying physical property being sold or leased to customers. The Lodging Facility Use Tax does not apply to OTC fees, but the Sales Tax does apply to OTC fees.
No. 13-553 What is the correct test for “discrimination” under 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. Resolved partly in favor of the taxpayer and partly in favor of the state: The Eleventh Circuit properly concluded that CSX’s competitors are an appropriate comparison class for its claim under subsection (b)(4) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulation Reform Act of 1976, which prohibits states from imposing “another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier.” But the Eleventh Circuit erred in refusing to consider whether Alabama could justify its decision to exempt motor carriers from its sales and use taxes through its decision to subject motor carriers to a fuel excise tax.
No. 146440 Whether Michigan may vary from Articles III.1 and IV of the Multistate Tax Compact Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: The tax bases at issue were “income taxes” within the meaning of the Compact, and, since the legislature had not properly repealed the Compact election, IBM was entitled to use the Compact’s elective apportionment formula for its 2008 Michigan taxes.
No. 306618 Whether Michigan may vary from Articles III.1 and IV of the Multistate Tax Compact Resolved in favor of the state: because there was a facial conflict between the Michigan Business Tax Act’s (BTA) mandatory sales-factor apportionment formula and the Compact’s elective three-factor apportionment formula, the Legislature had repealed the Compact’s election provision by implication when it enacted the BTA.
No. 2013-C-1855 Whether legal effect must be given to the purported registration in Montana of a motor home by a “shell” limited liability company established for the exclusive purpose of avoiding Louisiana’s sales tax on motor vehicles purchased in the state. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: The Department failed to show the veil of the Montana LLC should be pierced and Thomas should be held individually liable. The Supreme Court found this issue involved policy considerations that should be addressed by the Louisiana Legislature rather than resolved by the Court.
Nos. 1 CA-TX 11-0006 and 1 CA-TX 11-0008 Whether capital transactions may give rise to “business income” by meeting a stand-alone “functional test” under Section 1(a) of UDITPA. Resolved in favor of the state: The tax court properly applied the functional test to find that the gain from Taxpayer's sale of its wholly-owned subsidiary was business income.
No. 1 CA-TX 12-0005 Whether the taxpayer was engaged in a single unitary business with its wholly-owned subsidiary where the subsidiary received tax-free the parent company's intangibles and subsequently licensed them back to the parent. Resolved in favor of the state: Since the activities of Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. were substantially interdependent with those of its subsidiary, Homer TLC, Inc., the parent corporation was required to file a combined state return incorporating its subsidiary’s income.
No. 33,627 Whether barnesandnoble.com was subject to New Mexico gross receipts tax despite lacking physical presence in the State of New Mexico. Resolved in favor of the state: The activities conducted by the brick-and-mortar store in the state were sufficient to create a substantial nexus between the internet seller and New Mexico, so that the state could tax the internet sales to customers in New Mexico without offending the Commerce Clause.
No. 114496 Whether the Constitution is violated by a statute requiring an out-of-state retailer to collect sales tax on in-state sales if the retailer has paid referral contracts with in-state affiliates. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: “Performance marketing,” when engaged in through print media or on-the-air broadcasting, does not give rise to tax obligations under the Illinois statute. The statute was therefore a discriminatory tax on electronic commerce within the meaning of federal law, which preempts it.
No. 2010-CA-01857 Whether the Mississippi State Tax Commission had authority to invoke the "equitable apportionment" provisions of Miss. Admin. Code 35.III.806 § 402-10 to more fairly apportion the Taxpayers' income. Resolved in favor of the state: The taxpayers must carry the burden of proving that the Department’s use of an alternative apportionment method was arbitrary and capricious, and they failed to do so. Further, the Department’s use of an alternative apportionment method was not the promulgation of a new “rule,” in violation of the Mississippi Administrative Procedures Act, and the Department had not abused its discretion by imposing penalties on the taxpayers.
than the UDITPA formula that superseded the Compact's Article III election was an impermissible alteration or amendment of the Compact Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: The Compact was found to be a valid multistate compact, and California was bound by it and its apportionment election provision until it enacts a statute repealing the Compact provision.
taxes to challenge under 49 U.S.C. §11501(b)(4)(despite the fact that fuel for motor carriers is subject to an analogous but separate excise tax). Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: The railroad could challenge Alabama's sales and use taxes as discriminatory under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976.
No. M2009-00255-SC-R11-CV Whether Tennessee was precluded by the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution from imposing an excise tax on recognized capital gains triggered by the redemption of stock in a holding company. Resolved in favor of the state: the taxpayer's capital gains were business earnings pursuant to the functional test provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-4-2004(1) (Supp.2000) and therefore subject to the excise tax. Further, the tax assessment was constitutional pursuant to the unitary business principle.
No. 2009 - 0627 Whether Ohio’s imposition of its retail sales tax on the sale of direct-to-home satellite broadcasting services violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Resolved in favor of the state: Differential tax treatment of two categories of companies is constitutional when the difference results solely from the nature of the business and not from the location of the company’s activities. Therefore, taxation of sales of satellite-broadcasting services but not of cable broadcasting services does not violate the Commerce Clause.
No. 53264 Whether Hyatt’s interests in adjudicating tort claims against California in the Nevada courts were outweighed by these considerations of comity and federalism Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: The exception to immunity for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct survives the court’s adoption of the federal discretionary-function immunity test because intentional torts and bad-faith conduct are not based on public policy.
William W. Wilkins [Richard A.
No. 2008-2018 Whether the Ohio Commercial Activity Tax may be properly considered a franchise tax imposed on the privilege of doing business in the state, rather than a sales tax or other excise tax imposed on sales or retail transactions. Resolved in favor of the state: The Commercial Activity Tax is a tax on the privilege of doing business; the fact that it is measured by gross receipts that include proceeds from sale of food does not affect the constitutionality of the tax.
No. 08-310 Whether the “port-day” apportionment formula ( a single factor ratio of days spent in Port Valdez to days spent in all ports) offends either the due process or the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: The tonnage clause's prohibition reaches any taxes or duties on a ship, "whether a fixed sum upon its whole tonnage, or a sum to be ascertained by comparing the amount of tonnage with the rate of duty[,] ... regardless of [the tax or duty's] name or form ... which operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port.” Because Valdez taxed "ships and to no other property at all[,] ... in order to obtain revenue for general city purposes[, this was] ... the kind of tax that the Tonnage Clause forbids Valdez to impose without the consent of Congress, consent that Valdez lacks."
No. 09-223 Whether comity doctrine or the Tax Injunction act required IMs' complaint of allegedly discriminatory state taxation, framed as a request to increase a commercial competitor's tax burden, to proceed originally in state court. Resolved in favor of the state: Under the comity doctrine, which compels federal courts to defer to state courts under certain circumstances, lawsuits alleging discriminatory state taxation must initially be brought in state courts.
No. SJC - 10105 Whether a State's jurisdiction to levy a net income-based tax on the share of a taxpayer's income attributable to the State is limited by the dormant commerce clause to only those taxpayers with a physical presence in the State. Resolved in favor of the state: The taxpayers' activities (including the provision of valuable financial services to Massachusetts consumers, for which the taxpayers obtained significant compensation, and which required the use of banking and credit facilities in the Commonwealth) established a substantial nexus with the Commonwealth during the tax years at issue.
No. DA 08-0026 Whether the definition of "business income"
a "functional" test and a "transactional" test to determine whether income is subject to apportionment. Resolved in favor of the state: Applying a plain language analysis and examining extrinsic evidence of the legislature’s intent, the court found that the definition of “business income” contains both a transactional test and a separate functional test.
Cause No. 49S00-0711-TA-00553 Whether the State Tax Department was precluded from assessing Indiana tax on carrier pick-up sales (Commission's brief advocated for mandatory taxpayer disclosure of inconsistency in method of reporting income) Resolved in favor of the state: There was no preclusion.
No. 06-666 Whether Kentucky's treatment of bond interest income earned by its residents discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, and whether Pike applied. Resolved in favor of the state: the State of Kentucky does not engage in unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce by exempting the interest on its bonds from residents' taxable income while taxing the interest earned on the bonds of other states.
No. S133343 Whether returns of principal are “gross receipts,” to be included in the sales factor used for apportioning a taxpayer’s business income under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). Resolved in favor of the state: (1) the redemption of marketable securities at maturity generates “gross receipts” that are includible in the formula used to calculate a multistate entity's tax, but (2) the Franchise Tax Board (the Board) met its burden of establishing that, in this instance, an alternate formula should be used to calculate Microsoft's tax.
Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). Affirmed in part and reversed in part: A a repo is analogous to a secured loan for UDITPA purposes and thus only the interest received should be treated as gross receipts. However, only the taxpaying corporation that performed the research is entitled to the credit.
No. A-3285-03T1 Whether the physical presence requirement for commerce clause “substantial nexus” for sales and use taxes under Quill Corp. v. North Dakota extends to income taxes. Resolved in favor of the state: The Quill physical presence requirement applied to sales and use taxes, not income taxes, therefore, the New Jersey Corporation Business Tax did not violate the Commerce Clause.
No. 02-42 Whether Nevada court was required to extend full faith and credit to California statute conferring complete immunity on California agencies. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to give full faith and credit to California's statutes providing its tax agency with immunity from suit. The full faith and credit command "is exacting" with respect to a final judgment rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, but is less demanding with respect to choice of laws. The Clause does not compel a State to substitute the statutes of other States for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.
Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, on appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals Whether Intercard's in-state installation services exceeded a de minimis presence and created nexus under the Commerce Clause sufficient to subject it to Kansas' taxing jurisdiction Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: Since Intercard was not incorporated or registered as a foreign corporation doing business in Kansas; all contracts and sales occurred outside of Kansas; and Intercard had no offices or employees in Kansas, it did not have nexus sufficient to be taxed in Kansas.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri Whether National Bank for Cooperatives, which Congress had designated as federally chartered instrumentality of United States, was exempt from state income taxation after Congress' deletion of the Farm Credit Act provision exempting bank for cooperatives from state taxation. Resolved in favor of the state: The bank was not exempt. “[A]n instrumentality is entitled to implied tax immunity only when it is "so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities."
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California for the First Appellate District Whether California's interest matching rule resulted in extra-territorial taxation, and whether California's rule discriminated against interstate and foreign commerce; whether the Constitution mandates any method of matching interest expenses with taxable and non-taxable income. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: Because California's interest deduction offset provision is not a reasonable allocation of expense deductions to the income that the expense generates, it constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside the State's jurisdictional reach in violation of the Federal Constitution's Due Process and Commerce Clauses.
Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, on appeal from the Oregon Tax Court, the Hon. Carl N. Byers, Presiding Whether the denominator of the sales factor of UDITPA's 3-factor formula for the apportionment of multistate income includes the total amounts received (including return of capital) from redemption upon maturity or sale of debt instruments used for interim investment of working capital. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: ORS 314.610(7) defines "sales" as "all gross receipts of the taxpayer." Taxpayer's receipts from the sale of securities met that definition and must be included in the denominator.
Supreme Court of the United States on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Whether, under federal law that exempted PCA's from state taxes on their notes, debentures, and other obligations, a PCA was also immune from Arkansas sales and income taxes. (Brief argued that the Tax Injunction Act barred the subject matter jurisdiction of the court) Held: PCA's are not included within the judicial exception to the Act by virtue of their designation as instrumentalities of the United States and so may not sue in federal court for an injunction against state taxation without the United States as co-plaintiff. The court did not reach the merits of the taxation issue.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Whether the Crow Tribe and the United States had an equitable claim to taxes paid by a third party to Montana and Big Horn County (Brief asked court to grant petition for certiorari). Petition granted.
Maine Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law Court, on report from the Kennebec County Superior Court Whether the apportionment formula adopted by the Maine State Tax Assessor violated the Due Process Clause or Foreign Commerce Clause to the extent that it permitted Maine to include foreign-source dividends in the computation of the taxable income of a Maine-nexus corporation. Resolved in favor of the state: The formula did not violate the constitution.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio Whether Ohio's general sales and use tax exemption for natural gas purchased from utilities discriminated against interstate commerce. Resolved in favor of the state: The differential tax treatment of LDC and independent marketer sales did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, and there was unquestionably a rational basis for Ohio's distinction between these two kinds of entities.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedial scheme for taxpayers. Resolved in favor of the state: the Court concluded that § 1983 does not call for courts--whether federal or state--to disrupt state tax administration by issuing injunctive or declaratory relief when state law furnishes an adequate legal remedy.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri Is Missouri's statewide, uniform local government use tax law consistent with the Commerce Clause of the United States where it (i) was not adopted as a measure of "economic protectionism"; (ii) was, in part, enacted in response to the concerns expressed by this Court in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967) in an effort to eliminate potential use tax compliance burdens on interstate marketers in 1.573 political subdivisions; (iii) discriminates, if at all, in a de minimis degree against interstate commerce; and (iv) has no other reasonable alternative to solving the State's legitimate interests? Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: Missouri's use tax scheme impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce in those localities where the use tax exceeded the sales tax.
Franchise Tax Board, an Agency of the State of California, Respondent.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of California In and For the Third Appellate District 1. Whether California's application of worldwide combined reporting to determine the taxable income of domestic corporations with foreign parents, or foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries, is unconstitutional under the foreign Commerce Clause.
2. Whether California's application of worldwide combined reporting to determine the taxable income of domestic corporations with foreign parents, or foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries, intrudes into an inherently federal area and is pre-empted by the United States Constitution.
3. Whether California's application of worldwide combined reporting to determine the taxable income of domestic corporations with foreign parents, or foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries, is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause where such application imposes discriminatory compliance burdens on such entities.
4. Whether California's system for compliance with worldwide combined reporting violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution where compliance is not possible without undue cost and the system, to function, depends on discretionary relief provisions without constitutionally sufficient standards to guide application and prevent arbitrary enforcement. Resolved in favor of the state: The Constitution did not impede application of California's tax to Barclays and Colgate.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Whether state may grant property tax exemptions from generally applicable tax without subjecting taxation of railroad property to challenge under subsection of Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act prohibiting “another tax that discriminates against a railroad carrier.” Resolved in favor of the state: Section 11503 (the 4-R Act) did not limit the States' discretion to exempt nonrailroad property, but not railroad property, from generally applicable ad valorem property taxes.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia Whether the Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), should be applied retroactively. Resolved partly in favor of the taxpayer and partly in favor of the state: “When [the] Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate [the] announcement of the rule.” However, the state is free to choose the form of relief it will provide, so long as that relief is consistent with federal due process principles.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Jersey 1. Should the Court overrule Asarco v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Department, 458 U.S. 354 (1982)?
2. If Asarco and Woolworth were overruled, should the decision apply retroactively?
3. If Asarco and Woolworth were overruled, what constitutional principles should govern state taxation of corporations doing business in the several states? Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: the court did not overrule Asarco or Woolworth, and so did not reach the second and third question.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Jersey Does the unitary business principle permit a nondomiciliary State to tax a multistate corporation on income derived from a minority stock investment, when the investment is integral to the corporation's operational strategies of enhancing the corporation's existing businesses and diversifying into other businesses through the acquisition and divestiture of other corporations? Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: The state was not permitted to include the gain realized on the sale of Bendix's ASARCO stock in the former's apportionable tax base.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Dakota Whether mail-order business needed to have physical presence in state in order to permit state, consistent with requirements of due process and Commerce Clause, to require it to collect use tax from its in-state customers. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: A state could not impose a sales and use tax collection requirement without some physical presence on the part of the retailer.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida (on reargument) 1. When a taxpayer pays under protest a state tax found to violate clearly established law under the Commerce Clause, must the State provide some form of retrospective relief, such as a tax refund or an offsetting tax on past beneficiaries of the tax preference, or may the State elect to provide only prospective relief?
Supreme Court of the United States, on Appeal from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, fourth Appellate District, Division One 1. Whether the court of appeal's rejection of appellant's Due Process and Commerce Clause arguments rests on an independent and adequate state ground.
2. Whether appellant's systematic and purposeful exploitation of the California market in its mail order business provides an adequate "nexus" to support the imposition of the State's use tax. Resolved in favor of the state: The merits of appellant's Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause claim were not properly before, and not reached by, the Court. Although collection and payment will require some contact between appellant and the State, generally applicable administrative and recordkeeping burdens may be imposed on religious organizations without running afoul of the Clause.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Writ of Certiorari to the Michigan Supreme Court Whether Michigan's Single Business Tax was consistent with the Commerce and Due Process clauses of the Constitution. Resolved in favor of the state: As applied to Trinova during the tax year at issue, the SBT's three-factor apportionment formula did not violate either the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause.
2. Whether, assuming that standing exists, a federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief is nevertheless barred by the Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341) or the principle of comity which underlies the act. Held: the company had standing to challenge California, but their action was barred under the Tax Injunction Act.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Appeal from the Supreme Court of Iowa Whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act precludes the State of Iowa from imposing a tax upon that portion of a unitary net income base which is reasonably attributable to the taxpayer's income-producing activities. Resolved in favor of the state: The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act did not prevent Iowa from including income earned from the sale of oil and gas extracted from the Outer Continental Shelf in the apportionment formula it uses to calculate in-state taxable income.
Supreme Court of Illinois 1. Whether receipts of sales, consumated by delivery by appellant's suppliers from Illinois sources to appellant's customers located in states in which appellant was not taxable, were properly included in appellant's Illinois numerator of the sales factor of the apportionment formula, and, if not, were those receipts properly excluded from both the numerator and denominator of the sales factor.
2. Whether the receipts from appellant's sales to its out-of-state customers located in state in which the appellant was not subject to tax and delivered to such customers by appellant's out-of-state suppliers located in states in which appellant was not subject to tax were properly included in appellant's Illinois numerator of the sales factors in the formula, and, if not, were the receipts properly excluded from both the numerator and denominator of the sales factor. Resolved in favor of the state: The Director, under the general relief provision of the Act, had the administrative authority to include in the numerator of GTE's Illinois sales factor sales in which GTE was taxable neither in the state of origin nor the state of destination.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Appeal from the Supreme Court of California Whether California ad valorem property tax, as applied to Japanese shipping companies' cargo containers which were based, registered, and subjected to property tax in Japan, and were used exclusively in foreign commerce, was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. Resolved in favor of the taxpayer: In addition to answering the nexus, apportionment, and nondiscrimination questions posed in Complete Auto, a court must also inquire, first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from "speak[ing] with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." California’s tax did not satisfy these requirements.
Supreme Court of the United States, on Appeal from the Supreme Court of South Carolina Whether, incident to South Carolina's valid scheme of regulating the sale of liquor within the state, a requirement that a manufacturer do more, as a condition of doing business, than merely solicit sales was permissible even though it had the effect of requiring the out-of-state manufacturer to undertake activities that eliminate its P.L. 86-272 protection. Resolved in favor of the state: Heublein's activities within South Carolina exceeded the minimum standards established in 15 U. S. C. § 381 (a), and South Carolina may, pursuant to an otherwise valid regulatory scheme, compel Heublein to undertake activities that take it beyond the protection of 15 U. S. C. § 381 (a).

References: § 290
 § 482
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 § 14505
 § 14505
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 § 1341
 § 1
 § 2
 § 11501
 § 402
 §11501
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 § 1983
 § 1983
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 § 1341
 § 381
 § 381