Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/295/649/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:15:56+00:00

Document:
a railing on the gangplank, in failing to have the plank flush with the dock or taper off to the dock level, and in failing to give warning of the step was charged against the ship. Held that the gangplank was part of the ship, and the cause of action in admiralty. P. 295 U. S. 651.
Certiorari, 294 U.S. 702, to review a judgment affirming a judgment sustaining an exception to a libel in admiralty.
dock in such manner as to cause the injuries hereinafter set forth." Libelant alleged negligence in failing to provide a hand rope or railing extending along either side of the gangplank to the shore end, in failing to have the plank flush with the dock or taper off to the level of the dock, and in failing to give warning of the step.
Respondent's exception to the libel, upon the ground that the case was not within the admiralty jurisdiction, was sustained by the District Court, and its judgment dismissing the libel was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. In view of an asserted conflict with other decisions of the federal courts, * we granted a writ of certiorari.
This is one of the border cases involving the close distinctions which from time to time are necessary in applying the principles governing the admiralty jurisdiction. That jurisdiction in cases of tort depends upon the locality of the injury. It does not extend to injuries caused by a vessel to persons or property on the land. Where the cause of action arises upon the land, the state law is applicable. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 70 U. S. 33; Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388, 119 U. S. 397; Cleveland, Terminal & V. R. Co. v. Cleveland Steamship Co., 208 U. S. 316, 208 U. S. 319; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 234 U. S. 59; State Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U. S. 263, 259 U. S. 272; T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179, 276 U. S. 181; compare Vancouver S.S. Co. v. Rice, 228 U. S. 445, 228 U. S. 448.
over the land. Thus, while libelant was on the gangplank, she had not yet left the vessel. This was still true as she proceeded to the shore end of the plank. If, while on that part of the vessel, she had been hit by a swinging crane and had been precipitated upon the dock, the admiralty would have had jurisdiction of her claim. See Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., ante, p. 647. If, instead of being struck in this way, the negligent handling of the vessel, as by a sudden movement, had caused her to fall from the gangplank, the cause of action would still have arisen on the vessel. We perceive no basis for a sound distinction because her fall was due to negligence in the construction or placing of the gangplank. By reason of that neglect, as the libel alleges, she fell from the plank and was violently thrown forward upon the dock. Neither the short distance that she fell nor the fact that she fell on the dock, and not in the water, alters the nature of the cause of action which arose from the breach of duty owing to her while she was still on the ship and using its facility for disembarking.
should fall overboard, would this Court entertain jurisdiction if the seaman fell in the water, and decline jurisdiction if he fell on the dock or other land? The inception of a cause of action is not usually defined by such a rule."
"if a passenger on board a steamship should, through the negligence of the owners, stumble on the ship upon a defective gangplank, and be precipitated upon the wharf, the injury would not be a maritime tort. . . . The language employed in the Plymouth decision,"
"The cause of action originated, and the injury had commenced, on the ship, the consummation somewhere being inevitable. It is not of vital importance to the admiralty jurisdiction whether the injury culminated on the stringpiece of the wharf or in the water."
See also The Atna, 297 F. 673, 675, 676; The Brand, 29 F.2d 792.
"finished his work on the wharf, and, from the time he was lifted from it by the sling by means of the ship's tackle, was under the control of an instrumentality of the ship,"
in the instant case mistakenly supposed), as our writ was expressly limited to the question raised by the review of the deputy commissioner's finding as to the dependency of a claimant for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 285 U.S. 533. We decided simply that the finding of the deputy commissioner, upon evidence, against the dependency of the claimant, was final, and accordingly we directed the affirmance of his order. 286 U.S. 528. See Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 288 U. S. 162, 288 U. S. 166.
We think that the libel presented a case within the jurisdiction of admiralty. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
* Compare The Strabo, 90 F. 110; 98 F. 998; The H. S. Pickands, 42 F. 239; The Aurora, 163 F. 633; 178 F. 587; Aurora Shipping Co. v. Boyce, 191 F. 960; The Atna, 297 F. 673; The Brand, 29 F.2d 792.

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