Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/upasakappu-v-dias-et-al/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 07:05:01+00:00

Document:
Present: Soertsz A. C. J. and Keuneman J.
UPASAKAPPU v. DIAS et al.
Jus accrescendi—Gift inter vivos to six persons—Single fidei commissum.
A deed of gift contained the following clause :—As I have adopted thelate Daniel James Dias from his infancy as a beloved child of mine, I dohereby gift of my free will and pleasure unto …. his sixchildren by his married wife …. to have and hold in equalrights (ekka hateeata) and to inherit by their descendants, children,grandchildren for ever according to law, enacting that the said (i.e.,Daniel’s wife) do live there during her life-time and that the said interestsshall not be mortgaged, alienated or transferred to any outsider.
Held, that the terms of the deed indicated an intention on the part ofthe donor to create one fidei commissum and that on the death of a childwithout issue his or her share accrued to the others.
H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him E. B. Wikramanay ake and H. A.
Chandrasena), for the second and third defendants, appellants.
N. Nadarajah, for the plaintiff, respondent.
during her life time, and that the said interests shall not be mortgaged,alienated or transferred to any outsider.” It is not disputed that thisdeed created a fidei commissum inter vivos. The only question is whetherfour of the six childern having died without marriage or issue, and theirrights having accrued to the surviving children, Ellen and Stewart, aconveyance by Ellen who died childless, to the plaintiff her husbandwas a conveyance that passed title to him that endured to him after herdeath, or whether on her death, Stewart, who survived her, succeededto her interests and passed them to his childern the second and thirddefendants, when he himself died a short time after Ellen. The answerto that question depends on whether the deed of gift created six differentfidei commissi, or only one, for in the former case, there being no childrenbom to Ellen, her share was unaffected by any substitution, while in thelatter case, on her death, her share passed to the other donees and theirchildren, grandchildren, &c., in whose favour there was substitution.
:i t c. ir. R. 1* ’.
* 2 N. L. R. sir,.
testator or donor, or by an intention clearly to be inferred, that he desiredthe property to devolve in that manner. The jus accrescendi was a ruleof the Roman law by which among co-heirs in testamentary succession oramong co-legatees there is a right of accretion, so that if one of themcannot or will not take his portion, it falls to other heirs to the exclusionof heirs at law. This rule was evolved in deference to the Roman horror ofdying partly testate and partly intestate, but the Roman-Dutch lawadopted that rule to the extent of saying that in no case had it automaticoperation, but that it would be accepted or rejected as would best giveeffect to the testator’s intention. The point, however, is that iri that caseBertram C.J. and Shaw J. inclined to the view that either a testator ora donor could provide for such a result.
our pleasure therewith, and after the death of us both, our aforesaid sixchildren shall be at liberty to own in equal shares, and possess peaceablyfor ever throughout their generations the property, and the six childrenand their heirs may by leasing out possess the property and not sell,mortgage, &c.
In my view, the terms of the deed of gift in the case before us indicatemore strongly the intention of the donor to create one fidei commissumby which the property was to devolve on the donees and their children,grandchildren, &c., so long as there were any such in existence. It isquite a different matter that a local law stands in the way and curtailsthe line of such a devolution. Just as in the Divisional Bench case,so in this case, it was contended that the words by which the propertywas given “ in equal shares ” negatived an intention on the part of thedonor to create one fidei commissum. That contention was rejected inthe earlier case and I have no less hesitation in rejecting it in this.Indeed, in my view it can be urged with great force in this case that thewords ekka hateeata are more consistent with an intention to create onefidei commissum than the words ekkakara in Tillekeratne v. Silva3 andekkakara kotos wasseng, in Carlinahamy v. Juanis (supra).
We were also pressed to hold that the fact that the deed allowed amortgage, alienation or transfer to one who was not an outsider indicatedby necessary implication, a contemplation by the donor of the possibility* 26 N. L. R. 129.2 10 N. h. R. 214.
of the property passing out of the family, for the result, it was said, of amortgage to one within the family, might well be that an outsiderpurchased the property at an execution sale. But, in my opinion,the answer to that is the answer suggested by Mr. H. V. Perera duringthe argument, that at such an execution sale nothing more than theinterest of the mortgaging donee could pass to the purchasing outsider,namely, his life interest, and that on his death, if he died without issue,his share would accrue to the surviving donees and their children, &c.In other words, that the permission given to the donees to deal with theproperty in certain circumstances, operated only within the scope of theprohibition and could not transcend it. The result is that, in my viewthe rules in Tillekeratne v. Abeyesekere (Supra) and Carlinahamy v. Juanis(supra) apply in this case, and that, therefore, nothing passed to theplaintiff or to the first defendant.
i I set aside the judgment of the District Judge and dismiss theplaintiff’s action with costs in both Courts.

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