Source: https://www.faircompetitionlaw.com/2013/11/11/discovery-protective-orders-and-spoliation-in-trade-secrets-litigation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:43:34+00:00

Document:
I recently (October 23) spoke on a panel at the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) Annual Meeting (Washington, D.C.) entitled, “Terra Terror and Traveling Tricks – Developments in Cybersecurity, US and International Trade Secret Law.” My topic was discovery in trade secrets litigation.
1. Overview of the standards applicable to discovery in trade secrets cases nationally, including the use and substance of protective orders.
Discovery in the federal courts is governed by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “generally permits liberal discovery of relevant information.” Baker v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 123, 125 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1986)). Rule 26 does “not distinguish between public and private information. Nor [does it] apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30 (1984).
Nevertheless, trade secrets enjoy a qualified privilege and are therefore entitled to some protection. Fed. Open Mkt Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 355, 362 (1979) (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 28 U.S.C. App. p. 444; 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 26.76, pp. 26-540 to 26-543 (1970); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2212, pp. 156-157 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). Specifically, to be discoverable, the requested trade secrets “must be not only relevant, but also necessary.” Dow Corning Corp. v. Jie Xiao, 283 F.R.D. 353, 357 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (quoting R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 269 (6th Cir. 2010); citing Laborers Pension Trust Fund-Detroit v. CRS Poured Concrete Walls, Inc., WL 3804912, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G)); Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 443 U.S. at 362 (Courts “weigh the claim to privacy against the need for disclosure.”); Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460 (2009) (“In determining whether trade secret information is subject to a protective order under Rule 26(c)(7), federal and state courts typically apply a balancing test that incorporates a ‘relevant and necessary’ standard for the party seeking to discover the trade secret information.” (citing 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2043 (2d ed.1994); James J. Watson, Annotation, Discovery of Trade Secret in State Court Action, 75 A.L.R.4th 1009, 1028-30 (1990)).
However, even under this somewhat elevated standard, “courts routinely require disclosure of relevant and material information, even though asserted to be a trade secret and even though the parties are direct competitors . . . .” 3 Milgrim, Trade Secrets, § 14.02 (Mathew Bender & Company, Inc. 2013). Accordingly, “a party who asserts a claim or defense based upon trade secret or confidential information must be prepared to disclose the information so that the other party can prosecute its claim or prepare its defense.” Edward H. Pappas & Daniel D. Quick, Trade Secrets: Protection and Remedies, § C1 (BNA 3d ed. 2007).
Counsel to the trade secrets owner must take steps to insulate the trade secrets from disclosure beyond what is absolutely necessary for the case. This is typically achieved through the use of (and careful compliance with) a protective order issued under 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides a counterbalance to the broad scope of Rule 26(b). Rule 26(c) must also be read in light of Section 5 of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”). See, e.g., Pappas v. Frank Azar & Assocs., P.C., 2007 WL 1549037, *4 (D. Colo. May 25, 2007) (“[B]oth [Section 5 of the UTSA] and [Rule 26(c)] contemplate that [trade secrets] may be discoverable, particularly when accompanied by collateral orders designed to preserve [their] confidentiality and limit [their] dissemination.”); Republic Servs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Cos., 2006 WL 1635655, *3 (E.D. Ky. June 9, 2006); Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460, 674 S.E.2d 154 (2009) (Section 5 of “[t]he Trade Secrets Act . . . does not supplant, but rather complements, Rule 26(c) . . . .”); Brostron v. Warmann, 190 Ill. App. 3d 87, 90, 546 N.E.2d 3, 5 (1989); see also Vibromatic Co., Inc. v. Expert Automation Sys. Corp., 540 N.E.2d 659, *662 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (“To the extent that there may be a procedural conflict between [section 5 of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act] and . . . Rule 26(c), [Rule 26(c)] is controlling.”).
2. The need to identify, and the timing of identifying, trade secrets in trade secrets litigation, and the range of governing standards nationally.
While a plaintiff will not typically need to identify its trade secrets in the complaint, the time will quickly come when the plaintiff must particularize its alleged trade secrets. See, e.g., Medtech Prods. v. Ranir, 596 F. Supp.2d 778, 789-90 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008) (requiring identification of trade secrets after preliminary discovery); Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 2019.210 (requiring identification of trade secrets before discovery); 3 Milgrim, Trade Secrets § 14.02.
Although different jurisdictions vary as to the timing and specificity of the required disclosure, “[s]everal courts have held that a party alleging a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets is required to identify its alleged trade secrets with reasonable particularity before it will be allowed to compel discovery of its adversary’s trade secrets.” Switch Communications Group v. Ballard, 2012 WL 2342929, *4 (D. Nev. June 19, 2012) (citing Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 12 Del. J. Corp. L 249 (Del. 1986), citing Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 371–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); DeRubeis v. Witten Technologies, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 680–81 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Automed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F .Supp.2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Dura Global Technologies, Inc. v. Magna Donnelly, Corp., 2007 WL 4303294 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp.2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2001); and Ikon Office Solutions v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions, 2009 WL 4429156, *4-5 (W.D. N.C. 2009)).
3. Expedited discovery (the procedure).
Discovery can proceed in myriad ways. It is not uncommon in trade secrets disputes for discovery to proceed on an expedited course (usually limited in support of a preliminary injunction motion, though sometimes full-blow in anticipation of a quick trial). While the “normal” discovery process is set forth in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expedited discovery must be cobbled together from several rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (limiting the timing of discovery in certain contexts, except “when authorized . . . by court order”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (permitting depositions at any time with a court order); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (“[a] shorter or longer time may . . . be ordered by the court”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) (same).
Although the Federal Rules do not provide a standard for the court to use in exercising its authority to order expedited discovery, it is generally accepted that courts use one of the following two standards to determine whether a party is entitled to conduct such discovery: (1) the preliminary-injunction-style analysis set out in Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); or (2) the “good cause” standard. See Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 385, 386 (E.D. Wis. 2009); see also MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.121.
St. Louis Group, Inc. v. Metals and Additives Corp., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 236, 239 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Wilcox Industries Corp. v. Hansen, 279 F.R.D. 64, 67 (D. N.H. 2012). While “the preliminary-injunction-style analysis . . . is the more rigid standard,” the “good cause” standard has become the majority approach. St. Louis Group, 275 F.R.D. at 239.
4. Forensic evidence, including hard drives, electronic storage devices, and social media.
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “permits a party to seek ‘to inspect, copy, test, or sample,’ among other things, ‘data or data compilations . . . stored in any medium.’” Cefalu v. Holder, 2013 WL 4102160, *1 (N. D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013). “Electronic documents are no less subject to disclosure than paper records.” General Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, 2012 WL 570048, *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2012) (quoting Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)); see also, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002) and cited cases. Nevertheless, Rule 34 “is not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party’s electronic information system, although such access might be justified in some circumstances.” Cefalu, 2013 WL 4102160, *1 (quoting Advisory Committee notes). Rather, the Federal Rules of Evidence “take a categorical approach: [they] invite the classification of electronically stored information (‘ESI’) as either ‘accessible’ or ‘not reasonably accessible.’” Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
While cost and burden are critical elements in determining accessibility, a showing of undue burden is not sufficient by itself to trigger a finding of inaccessibility. For example, the sheer volume of data may make its production expensive, but that alone does not bring it within the scope of Rule 26(b)(2)(B). Rather, the cost or burden must be associated with some technological feature that inhibits accessibility. . . .
[The Rules Advisory Committee incorporated] the concept that cost and burden are related to the source of the ESI. Thus, the committee notes state that “some sources of electronically stored information can be accessed only with substantial burden and cost. In a particular case, these burdens and costs may make the information on such sources not reasonably accessible.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006 Amendment) (emphases added). The committee further observed that “[i]t is not possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features that may affect the burdens of costs of accessing electronically stored information.” Id. Thus, decisions subsequent to the enactment of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) address accessibility by analyzing the interplay between any alleged technological impediment and the resulting cost and burden. For instance in W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38 (D.Mass.2007), the court found data to be inaccessible because, although it was stored on a server, the method of storage and lack of indexing rendered it extremely costly to search. Id. at 42–43; see also General Electric Co. v. Wilkins, No. 1:10–cv–674, 2012 WL 570048, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding that accessibility generally turns on format in which ESI is stored); General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley, No. 10–cv–1398, 2011 WL 2415715, at *2 (D. Colo. June 15, 2011) (finding ESI inaccessible because of inability to search it except manually); Johnson v. Neiman, No. 4:09CV00689, 2010 WL 4065368, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010) (holding that accessibility depends largely on nature of media); Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, No. 4:08CV00342, 2010 WL 2179180, at *1, *8 (E.D. Ark. May 27, 2010) (same); Capitol Records, 261 F.R.D. at 51 (same); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 637 (D. Kan. 2006) (same).
Chen-Oster, 285 F.R.D. at 301-02 (citing The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles, Second Edition: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, Comment 2.c. at 42 (2007 Annotated Version)).
While discovery of social media is a relatively new phenomenon, the portions of social networking sites kept from public view have generally been treated like any other discovery. See, e.g., Johnson v. PPI Technology Services, L.P., C.A. No. 11-2773, 2013 WL 4508128, *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2013) (content of social network sites is not privileged or insulated from discovery due to privacy laws, but there is no “generalized right to rummage at will through information that [the responding party] has limited from public view”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Jewell v. Aaron’s, Inc., 1:12-cv-0563, 2013 WL 3770837, (N.D. Ga. July 19, 2013) (same); Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10-cv-1090, 2013 WL 1285285, *3 (D. N.J. Mar. 25, 2013) (granting defendant’s counsel access to plaintiff’s Facebook account); Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, C.A. No. 2012-0307, 2012 WL 6720752, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (Just like traditional discovery (of personal diaries, for example), “consideration [of privacy concerns] is more germane to the question of whether requested discovery is burdensome or oppressive and whether it has been sought for a proper purpose rather than to affording a basis for shielding those communications from discovery.” (citation omitted)); Tompkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“private” social media pages are subject to traditional discovery principals, and generally enjoy no privilege, nor are they protected by privacy laws24); E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Management, LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (“Discovery of SNS requires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel context. . . . [T]he challenge is to define appropriately broad limits – but limits nevertheless – on the discoverability of social communications in light of [the cause of action] . . . and to do so in a way that provides meaningful direction to the parties.”).
“Nevertheless, [s]ome courts have held that the private section of a Facebook account is only discoverable if the party seeking the information can make a threshold evidentiary showing that the plaintiff’s public Facebook profile contains information that undermines the plaintiff’s claims.” Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist., __ F.R.D. __, 2013 WL 2897054, *2 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013).
“‘Spoliation’ has been defined as ‘the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.’” Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 620 (D. Colo. 2007); see also Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F. 3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001); Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
In 2003 and 2004, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York issued a series of decisions that established the most influential, and likely strictest, standard for a party’s duties to preserve electronic (and traditional) evidence and the consequences for a failure to do so. The cases are known as the “Zubulake” cases. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake I”); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, No. 02 Civ. 1243,2003 WL 21087136 (S.D.N.Y. May 13,2003) (“Zubulake II”); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake III”); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.RD. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake IV”); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.RD. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Zubulake V”). These cases were a wake-up call for lawyers, ushering in an era of sanctions – including awards of attorneys’ fees and adverse inferences – for failing not only to take appropriate steps to preserve electronic (and other) evidence, but for failing to do so early.
“Litigants owe an ‘uncompromising duty to preserve’ what they know or reasonably should know will be relevant evidence in a pending lawsuit even though no formal discovery requests have been made and no order to preserve evidence has been entered.” United Factory Furniture Corp. v. Alterwitz, 2:12-cv-00059, 2012 WL 1155741, *3 (D. Nev. April 6, 2012) (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 1 12, 130 (2nd Cir.1998)). “Spoliation occurs where evidence is destroyed or significantly altered, or where a party fails to ‘preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.’” Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10-cv-1090, 2013 WL 1285285, *3 (D. N.J. Mar. 25, 2013) (quoting Mosaid Technologies v. Samsung Electronics, 348 F. Supp.2d 332, 335 (D. N.J. 2004) (internal citations omitted)). “At its simplest, [the preservation] duty requires a party anticipating litigation to refrain from deleting electronically stored information (‘ESI’) that may be relevant to that litigation.” Sekisui American Corp. v. Hart, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2013 WL 2951924, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
“Identifying the boundaries of the duty to preserve involves two related inquiries: when does the duty to preserve attach, and what evidence must be preserved? Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216.
Although some courts hold that the duty to preserve evidence arises when litigation is “imminent,” typically, the requirement starts somewhat earlier: “The duty to preserve evidence begins when litigation is ‘pending or reasonably foreseeable.’” Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir.2001); citing West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999))); Gordon v. DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2013 WL 1292520, *4 (D. Mass. March 28, 2013) (“The duty to preserve evidence arises when litigation is reasonably anticipated.” (quotation marks omitted); Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F.Supp.2d 332, 336 (D. N.J. 2004) (the parties are “under a duty to preserve what [they] know, or reasonably should know, will likely be requested in reasonably foreseeable litigation”).
When litigation is “reasonably foreseeable” is a flexible fact-specific standard that allows a district court to exercise the discretion necessary to confront the myriad factual situations inherent in the spoliation inquiry. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir.2001). This standard does not trigger the duty to preserve documents from the mere existence of a potential claim or the distant possibility of litigation. See, e.g., Trask–Morton v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 681–82 (7th Cir.2008). However, it is not so inflexible as to require that litigation be “imminent, or probable without significant contingencies,” as [defendant] suggests. . . .
Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217.
Before an inference of spoliation may be drawn, its proponent must show at a bare minimum that the opposing party had notice of a potential claim and of the relevance to that claim of the destroyed evidence. See Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (1st Cir. 1996). And there is an even more rudimentary requirement: the party urging that spoliation has occurred must show that there is evidence that has been spoiled (i.e., destroyed or not preserved). Tri– County Motors, Inc. v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 494 F. Supp.2d 161, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
Gomez v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 670 F.3d 395, 399 (1st Cir. 2012). Different courts have adopted different standards for determining whether the preservation obligation has been violated. The main difference is whether a negligent destruction of evidence can give rise to sanctions.
Sekisui American Corp. v. Hart, 2013 WL 2951924, *4 n.51.

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