Source: http://newsite.diplomaticlawguide.com/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:50:10+00:00

Document:
‘Immediately after World War II, multilateralism and regionalism replaced bilateralism… The situation has now shifted, with economically powerful nations reaching agreements between and amongst themselves. Examples of current negotiations include the US-European Union (EU) and China-Japan -Korea. These follow completed ‘blockbusters’ such as US-Korea and EU-Korea, and the negotiated but not yet in force agreement between Canada and the EU.
The result of the proliferation of these agreements is that today’s international trade rules now consist of a number of instruments. At the forefront, there is the multilateral WTO Agreement, which includes 161 countries or customs territories. In addition there are the traditional trading blocs, each with their own agreements, some of which provide for deep integration or customs unions amongst the member countries. Then there is the complex web of bilateral trade agreements between individual countries. All of these agreements – over 400 in total – exist together, creating a mish-mash of overlapping, supporting, and possibly conflicting obligations.
‘Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements – Commentary and Analysis’ Second Edition, edited by Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio and Lorand Bartels (2015).
‘The physical barriers encountered at borders between nations affect both goods and individuals. Border customs controls carry out a number of commercial functions: they make border collections of duties viable; they control the flow of farm items allowing different price levels for the same products to exist across member nations; they check plants and animals to preserve different health levels in different nations; they check trucks for road transport licences; and they protect the trade regimes that individual nations may have with countries that are not participants in a community or trade accord.
However one analyses the value of border crossings and the funds collected there, such customs post are in fact a matter of taxes. Since taxes are the primary civilian prerequisite of sovereignty, this issue has given nations their right to independence and justified their existence over and over again. Therefore reducing and eventually eliminating customs throughout an internal market would put an end to much of this. Borders do not divide markets, they separate different nations that they protect.’ (Rosenberg).
(2) a product is liable to an anti-dumping tax.
‘Import duty imposed over and above normal levels when an importing nation considers the export price to contain a subsidy. GATT permits the use of such duties if material injury to the importing country’s producers occurs.’ (Rosenberg).
(1) A form of regional economic integration group that eliminates tariffs among member nations and establishes common external tariffs.
(2) An arrangement whereby European Community nations agreed to do away with customs barriers between themselves and apply a common tariff to nations outside the European Community so that the level of protection will be the same wherever a product enters the Community. It was formed by the six Community founder members in 1968 and was extended to include newer member nations of the European Community.
‘(1) The selling of goods abroad at prices below those that the exporter charges for comparable sales in his or her own country, often involving a subsidy. Subsidies include most financial benefits granted to overseas corporations on the production or exports of goods (but not rebates of customs duties, or internal sales taxes) granted by governments when such items are exported.
(2) Selling items to other countries below cost for purposes of eliminating surplus or to hurt foreign competition.’ (Rosenberg).
Free trade agreements (FTAs) are international treaties that reduce barriers to trade and investment.
‘[An FTA is] a comprehensive agreement designed to remove barriers to substantially expand all trade through eliminating tariffs and quotas, enhancing market access, improving standards for treatment of investors, strengthening enforcement of intellectual property rights, improving standards for health and safety, and restraining certain government actions, such as subsidies.
Free trade agreements cover virtually every aspect of trade between signatories. They purport to remove all significant barriers to trade in goods and services and establish strong rules for investment and intellectual property rights, allowing participating economies to function according to market principles.
…free trade accords must cope with the primary issues of: (a) phased reduction and ultimate elimination of tariffs; (b) removing of non-tariff barriers; (c) removal of barriers to the free flow of investment; (d) providing a greater number of services in foreign markets; (e) provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights; (f) removal of most customs restraints; and (g) definition of appropriate rules of origin.’ (Rosenberg).
This represents two or more customs territories in which duties and other restrictions on trade are eliminated on most of the trade between the member nations. Unlike a Customs Union members of a Free Trade Area do not pursue a common external trade policy and do not therefore have any common external tariff. Since there are no internal tariffs its members are free to set their own tariffs on trade with the rest of the world.
‘Today, traditional nationalist opposition to free trade often comes from different quarters (including from certain varieties of conservatives) from the critique of globalisation by the left orientated (and arguably now misnamed) anti-globalisation movement. The latter are very little occupied by issues such as, for example, whether China’s currency practices are unfair and cost domestic jobs. Some of today’s most pressing problems – indeed, problems that are of particularly intense concern to people who identify themselves with the anti-globalisation movement – cannot be solved by the uncoordinated exercise of sovereignty by strong individual nation states. The most obvious is climate change, another example is biodiversity. A national – interest model of sovereign regulation, where the state is free to regulate to satisfy the balance of diverse constituencies within its borders without regard to external effects, does not take into account these kinds of global common problems …. The classic debate between globalisation and anti-globalisation largely assumed that the nation state was the repository of legitimacy – and thus, the question was whether economic globalisation threatened or unduly constrained the legitimate, ‘democratic’ choices made in and by the nation state. Yet, while the democratic deficit remains an important subtheme in the discussions about globalisation, the legitimacy of the claims of the supposed anti-globalizers increasingly seems to be based not in the democratic self-determination of national communities, but in values and norms thought to belong to or inhere in the global community itself, often reflected in multilateral regimes of international law, whether environmental treaties such as Kyoto, biodiversity regime such as Rio and Cartagena, the ILO declaration on core labour rights, or the UN covenants on human rights. The invocation of such norms depends at least implicitly on a shift in the scope of moral concern beyond the boundaries of the territorial nation state. In these circumstances, a defence of state sovereignty against globalisation makes little sense, often what one ends up defending is the state’s capacity to advance global values, including its capacity to influence decisions of other states that would traditionally have been understood as sovereign choices.’ The Regulation of International Trade, 4th Edition (2013), by Michael Trebilock, Robert Howse, and Antonia Eliason, pages 17 and 18.
‘A form of friendship where laws governing the marketing of domestic items in nations that have signed treaties are extended to items designated as ‘foreign’ or ‘imported’.
‘Specific limits on the quantity or value of goods that can be imported or exported during a specific time period. GATT generally prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions except under specified exceptional conditions.’ (Rosenberg).
Temporary restrictions to trade levied unilaterally by a government on an emergency basis against imported items that are seen as causing significant injury to a domestic industry.
The sovereignty of states has never been understood as absolute. It is embedded in an international legal order governing interests of sovereign entities or interests of the international community as a whole, imposing obligations that extend to the internal sphere of states. The consensual elements of customary rules and treaties link the establishment of international obligations to state sovereignty.
Even the limited transfer of elementary sovereign powers to international organizations does not necessarily destroy sovereign statehood. A far-reaching example of such a transfer is the establishment of the European Union. The unparalleled competences of the European Union cover vital economic sectors and include harmonization of rules for the internal market, competition, monetary and commercial policy. Member states have traded sovereign powers against a share in the administration of the competences transferred and a quota of representation in the European Parliament.
A modern view of sovereignty sees restraints on sovereign choices through treaties and other consensual arrangements as a rational response to the limited potential and options of individual states. From this perspective, submission to international regulatory regimes enhances a country’s status in an interdependent world: sovereignty becomes status as a recognized member in the international community. The international economic order corroborates this new understanding of sovereignty as status. In times of economic globalization, two principles co-exist alongside each other under the conceptual roof of modern sovereignty, sometimes in mutual support, sometimes in conflict: reciprocal obligations in the interest of free trade, investment protection, and financial stability on the one hand and national self-determination, and respect to socio-economic choices on the other hand. It is a lasting challenge for international economic law to strike an adequate balance between national preferences and the overarching interest in the stable and reliable framework of international economic relations. Even economists who emphasize the benefits of globalization clearly recognize that the elimination of barriers to trade and the free flow of capital cannot trump states’ interests and democratic choices. Democracies have the right to protect their social arrangements, and when this right clashes with the requirement of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way. From a constitutional and political perspective, an open international economic order draws its legitimacy essentially from treaty arrangements which rest on democratic approval. The legitimizing force of such assent grows with the degree of textual density and determinacy of international agreements and the predictability of their application in the long run. Thus modern sovereignty has to face challenges, which are entirely different from the concept of sovereignty rooted in ideas stemming from the 19th century.’ Principles of International Economic Law, 2nd Edition (2016), by Matthias Herdegen, pages 77 to 80.
(2) a published schedule showing the rates, fares, charges, classification of freight, rules and regulations applying to the various kinds of transportation and incidental services.’ (Rosenberg).
‘The agreement by contracting parties to maintain the duty rates on specified goods at negotiated levels or below; provided for in GATT.’ (Rosenberg).
‘A tariff that has a lower rate until the end of a specified period or until a specified amount of the commodity has been imported. At that point the rates increases.’ (Rosenberg).
‘The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation calls for a country to grant to every other country with which it has signed an MFN treaty the most favourable treatment that it grants to any other country with respect to imports, exports and related regulations. The most prominent example of such an obligation in the international economic order is found in Article 1 of the GATT… [The] main objective of the principle is to prevent discrimination, by generalizing concessions made to a specific trading partner. The MFN principle is often referred to as the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system, and an MFN obligation is included in numerous GATT/WTO agreements.’ (International Trade).
‘By far the most sweeping exception to the MFN principle is the authorization of PTA’s such as customs unions and free trade areas under Article XXIV of the GATT, provided that certain conditions are met. Most importantly, trade restrictions must be eliminated with respect to “substantially all the trade” between the constituent territories , and customs duties shall not be higher thereafter than the duties prevailing on average throughout the constituent territories prior to the formation of a customs union or free trade area. Subject to the requirements of Article XXIV, constituent territories are permitted to establish more favourable duty and other arrangements among themselves than pertain to trade with non-member countries… PTA’s are treaties between two or more countries granting preferential market access and therefore advancing trade liberalization and economic integration among parties to the PTA.’ (International Trade).
Denunciation and withdrawal are used interchangeably to refer to a unilateral act by which a nation that is currently a party to a treaty ends its membership in that treaty. In the case of multilateral agreements, denunciation or withdrawal generally does not affect the treaty’s continuation in force for the remaining parties.
‘The Vienna Convention limits the grounds for termination and suspension in the abstract and accords exclusivity to the grounds which are mentioned in the VCLT. Yet, for the scope of its application, it acknowledges in Art.54 VCLT that the parties generally have the right to provide for denunciation and withdrawal in the representative treaties or by agreement of the parties. But even if a treaty grants no express possibility of denunciation or withdrawal, there is a possibility for implicit regulation, which is described in Art 56 VCLT. This, however, only applies if the treaty provides neither for the termination nor (cumulatively) for denunciation or withdrawal. In these cases, the provision contains a general presumption against such an implicit right which can be rebutted in two circumstances: first, where it can be established that the parties intended to admit such a possibility; second: where the nature of the treaty might imply such a right. Both refer to a special way of interpreting the treaty. It has been contended that the two options can be termed as subjective in the case of the intention of the parties and objective in the case of the nature of the treaty … In essence, Art 56 VCLT alters the ordinary process of interpretation as to its means which has potentially an intertemporal effect. Art 56(1)(a) seems to be fixed in time and alters some of the methods of interpretation such as the travaux. Most importantly the determination of the interpretative question is tied to the original meaning. The VCLT here uses the static approach. Art 56(1)(b) introduces an alternative means of interpretation: it resorts to the “nature of the treaty”. The inferences we draw from the nature of treaty can change, similar to the object and purpose of the treaty. Yet, it can be assumed that the nature of a treaty remains stable most of the time.’(‘Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation’ by Christian Djeffal page 194).
‘(a) “treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.
does not have to be signed.
It is submitted that the elements of this definition represent customary international law.
‘Although the [US] Constitution mentions only one type of international agreement (‘a Treaty’), from its earliest days an alternative form has been employed by the US Government in order to avoid the problems inherent in obtaining Senate approval. They are termed “executive agreements”. This is because there is sufficient authority for the executive to conclude such agreements; they do not have to be submitted to the Senate. But they are regarded by both the US Government and other states as treaties for the purposes of international law.’ (Aust, page 175).
A treaty the invalidity of which is established under the present Convention is void. The provisions of a void treaty have no legal force.
In cases falling under article 49, 50, 51 or 52, paragraph 2 does not apply with respect to the party to which the fraud, the act of corruption or the coercion is imputable.
In the case of the invalidity of a particular State’s consent to be bound by a multilateral treaty, the foregoing rules apply in the relations between that State and the parties to the treaty.
If a State denounces or withdraws from a multilateral treaty, paragraph 1 applies in the relations between that State and each of the other parties to the treaty from the date when such denunciation or withdrawal takes effect.
‘Pacta sunt servanda embodies a rule that is an elementary and universally agreed principle fundamental to all legal systems, and is of prime importance for the stability of treaty relations … It goes without saying that if a party to a treaty does not perform it, that will to the extent of the non-performance, be a breach of its international obligations to the other party or parties … [Furthermore under] Article 27: a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal (i.e., domestic) law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Thus if a new law, or modification to existing law, is needed in order to carry out the obligations on the state by the time it consents to be bound by the treaty, a negotiating state should ensure that this is done at least by the time that the treaty enters into force for it. If this is not done, not only will the state risk being in breach of its treaty obligations, but it will also be liable in international law to another party if, as a result, that party, or its nationals, is later damaged … A state cannot plead a change of government to excuse failure to implement a treaty. Since the treaty is entered into on behalf of the state, the new government must also perform the treaty. Nor is it at all easy to plead successfully that a treaty is invalid because its consent to be bound was expressed in violation of its own law.’ (Modern Treaty Law and Practice by Anthony Aust, Third edition, pages 160 to 162).
Sir Humphrey Waldock in his ‘Second Report [to the ILC] on the Law of Treaties  VBILC, vol 11, 36 (draft Art 17) stated that a treaty ‘shall continue in force indefinitely [if it is] (c) … a treaty of disarmament, or for the maintenance of peace’… in other words that Art 56(1) does not apply to such a treaty.
if the treaty is ‘a treaty of disarmament, or for the maintenance of peace’ because Art 56(1) does not apply, an act of unilateral withdrawal from the treaty would be a breach of the VCLT, and therefore constitute a violation of international law, entitling the innocent party to refer the breach to the International Court of Justice for a decision under Art 66.
When a treaty is denounced and a dispute arises on the legality of the denunciation, a clause on the settlement of the dispute contained in the treaty is not considered to be terminated, Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (Jurisdiction), ICJ, Reports, 1973, p.16, at 29 and p.60 at 29.
A party which, under the provisions of the present Convention, invokes either a defect in its consent to be bound by a treaty or a ground for impeaching the validity of a treaty, terminating it, withdrawing from it or suspending its operation, must notify the other parties of its claim. The notification shall indicatethe measure proposed to be taken with respect to the treaty and the reasons therefor.
If, after the expiry of a period which, except in cases of special urgency, shall not be less than three months after the receipt of the notification, no party has raised any objection, the party making the notification may carry out in the manner provided in article 67 the measure which it has proposed.
If, however, objection has been raised by any other party, the parties shall seek a solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations of the parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes.
Without prejudice to article 45, the fact that a State has not previously made the notification prescribed in paragraph 1 shall not prevent it from making such notification in answer to another party claiming performance of the treaty or alleging its violation.
The notification provided for under article 65, paragraph 1, must be made in writing.
Any act of declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty pursuant to the provisions of the treaty or of paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 65 shall be carried out through an instrument communicated to the other parties. If the instrument is not signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs, the representative of the State communicating it may be called upon to produce full powers.
A notification or instrument provided for in article 65 or 67 may be revoked at any time before it takes effect.
The international agreements on the exchange of goods and services across borders are based on the reciprocal character of the respective rights and obligations of the parties and aim at achieving mutual benefits for all of them. The World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) provides the institutional basis for global trade relations and is built on pre-existing structures under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947). Its principal objectives are to reduce existing trade barriers and to expand international trade , raise the standard of living, attain sustainable development, and secure an adequate share in the growth of international trade for developing countries (WTO Agreement, preamble).
The institutional system of the WTO administers a number of trade agreements. The GATT 1947 and 1994) is the basic legal instrument for substantially reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods and for eliminating discriminatory treatment… The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) integrates services into the WTO system.
Bi – and multi-lateral free trade agreements and other forms of regional economic law overlap with WTO law. These agreements range from free trade areas over customs unions to more ambitious forms of regional economic integration…’ (Herdegen).
(ii) non tariff-barriers, such as technical barriers to trade, lack of transparency of national trade regulation, unfair and arbitrary application of national trade regulation, customs formalities and procedures and government procurement practices.
Different WTO rules are applicable to these various tariff and non-tariff barriers, reflecting a difference in the economic impact of these trade barriers.
A customs duty or tariff on imports, is a financial charge or a tax on goods due because of their importation. Market access for specified goods is then conditional upon the payment of the customs duty, which will usually be charged on an ad valorem basis, i.e. as a percentage of the value of the imported product.
Customs duties may also be specific , i.e. based upon a unit of quantity such as weight, length, area, volume, or numbers of a product.
The customs duties or tariffs imposed by a WTO Member on importation are set out in the Member’s national “tariff” or “customs tariff” (which is a structured list of product descriptions and of the corresponding customs duties).
WTO members may impose customs duties that are lower than their tariff concessions…[and] tariff concessions can be amended or withdrawn.’(‘Bossche & Prevost’).
In addition to ordinary customs duties, imported products can be subject to other duties and charges, e.g. financial charges or taxes on imported products other than ordinary customs duties such as import surcharges, security deposits, customs fees, foreign exchange fees and statistical taxes.
Whilst there are no WTO rules prohibiting or specifically regulating export duties, general GATT obligations, such as MFN treatment, apply to export duties.
The legal framework of antidumping in the GATT/WTO regime consists of GATT 1994 Article VI and the Antidumping Agreement. GATT 1994 is the general provision and the Antidumping Agreement is an implementation of Article VI.’(WTO).
‘A core objective of the multilateral trading system is the “elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.” In pursuit of this objective, WTO members must accord equal treatment to the goods and services of all other WTO Members (through “most-favoured-nation” or “MFN” treatment). In contrast, bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements – preferential trade agreements (PTA’s) – pursue trade liberalisation through precisely this type of discrimination. The parties to a PTA liberalise trade solely among themselves, creating a network of special preferences within the PTA that are not available to other WTO Members. PTA’s therefore entrench the very discrimination that WTO rules seek to eliminate.
In legal terms, the co-existence of the WTO and PTA’s among WTO Members creates a complex system of competing international rights and obligations.
WTO law permits preferential trade agreements, if covering ‘substantially all the trade’ (see Article XXIV: 4 and 8 of the GATT).
A trade agreement is a treaty.
(1) Keep it simple. The first draft should be as uncomplicated as possible; it will surely become more complex as the negotiations proceed.
(2) See the text as a whole. This is especially important during redrafting.
(3) Be consistent throughout the text. Do not use different words or formulations to say the same thing.
(4) Adopt (one) clear system of numbering, and keep to it.
You can learn how to draft the substance only ‘on the job’; and the more practice you get the better you should be at drafting.’ (Aust).
The challenge in all economic diplomacy is to find an agreed position among the various ministries, branches of government and stakeholders/sector interests and still be able to negotiate at an international level. Finding a common position requires some aggression of preferences, for example, between protectionist and liberally minded sectors of the economy.
Negotiations in economic diplomacy are almost always mixed value-creation and value-claiming. Value creation is where negotiators seek compromises in order to reach an agreement with mutual gains. Value-claiming is where one party seeks only to get concessions or claim value from the other. Only in very rare cases do countries pursue value-claiming strategies. So negotiators are nearly always in the business of trading concessions.
‘The process of negotiation begins with the negotiators’ opening moves and strategies and ends with some outcome.
domestic political – to mainatin or increase the popularity of our chief executive or ruling party with constituents.
These goals may not be fully consistent with one another. Furthermore the negotiator’s priorities may vary… The negotiating process itself may shift priorities.’ (Odell p.25).
Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Commentary and Analysis, edited by Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand Bartels, Cambridge University Press (‘Lester, Mercurio & Bartels’).
Cases and Materials on International Law, by Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale, & Sarah Williams, Oxford University Press (‘Cases and Materials’).
Cases and Materials on International Law, by David Harris, Sweet & Maxwell (‘Harris’).
Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free Trade Negotiations, by Michael Hart with Bill Dymond & Colin Robertson, UBC Press (‘Decision at Midnight’).
Dictionary Of International Trade, by Jerry M. Rosenberg, John Wiley & Sons, Inc (‘Rosenberg’).
Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement, edited by Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Marcelo G. Kohen, & Jorge E. Vinuales, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (‘Diplomatic Settlement’).
Diplomatic Dispute Settlement: The Use of Inter-State Conciliation, by Sven M.G. Koopmans, T.M.C Asser Press (‘Koopmans’).
Essentials Of WTO Law, by Peter Van den Bossche and Denise Prevost, Cambridge University Press (‘Bossche & Prevost’).
Evidence, Proof, and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute Settlement, by Michelle T. Grando, Oxford University Press (‘Grando’).
Handbook Of International Law, by Anthony Aust, Cambridge University Press (‘Handbook Of International Law’).
Modern Treaty Law and Practice by Anthony Aust, 3rd Edition, Cambridge University Press (‘Aust’).
Interpreting WTO Agreements: Problems and Perspectives, by Asif H. Qureshi, Cambridge University Press (‘Qureshi’).
International Law and Dispute Settlement: New Problems and Techniques, edited by Duncan French, Matthew Saul, & Nigel D White,Hart Publishing (‘International Dispute Settlement’).
Negotiating a Preferential Trading Agreement: Issues, Constraints and Practical Options, edited by Sisira Jayasuriya, Donald MacLaren & Gary Magee, Edward Elgar (‘Jayasuriya, MacLaren & Magee’).
Negotiating the World Economy, by John S. Odell, Cornell University Press (‘Odell’).
Preferential Trade Agreements: A Law and Economics Analysis, edited by Kyle W. Bagwell & Petros C. Mavroidis, Cambridge University Press (‘PTA’s’).
Principles Of International Economic Law, by Matthias Herdegen, Oxford University Press (‘Herdegen’).
Regional Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System, edited by Rohini Acharya, Cambridge University Press (‘Acharya’).
Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation: A Functional Reconstruction, by Christian Djeffal, Cambridge University Press (‘Djeffal’).
The Expert Negotiator, by Raymond Saner, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (‘Saner’).
The Law Of Treaties: An Introduction, by Robert Kolb, Edward Elgar (‘Kolb’).
The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, edited by Nicholas Bayne & Stephen Woolcock, Ashgate (‘Bayne & Woolcock’).
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation, by Peter Van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, Cambridge University Press (‘Bossche & Zdouc’).
The Settlement Of International Disputes: Basic Documents, compiled by Christian J Tams and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Hart Publishing (‘Settlement Documents’).
The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, And Policy, by Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Michael Hahn, Oxford University Press (‘WTO’).
The Oxford Guide to Treaties edited by Duncan B.Hollis, Oxford University Press (‘Hollis’).
The Regulation Of International Trade, by Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, Routledge (‘International Trade’).
The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, WTO Secretariat, Cambridge University Press (‘WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures’).
Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, edited by Andreas Dur & Manfred Elsig, Cambridge University Press (‘Dur & Elsig’).
Treaty Interpretation, by Richard Gardiner, Oxford University Press (‘Gardiner’).
European Union Economic Diplomacy: The Role of the EU in External Economic Relations, by Stephen Woolcock, Ashgate (‘EU Economic Diplomacy’).

References: Art.54
 Art 56
 Art 56
 Art 56
 Art 56
 Art 17
 Art 56
 Art 56
 Art 66