Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/324/204.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 05:20:52+00:00

Document:
[324 U.S. 204, 205] Mr. Robert W. Purcell, of Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioner.
Mr. Marvin C. Harrison, of Cleveland, Ohio, for respondents.
This case presents the question of the accountability of stockholders who objected to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act,1 and abandoned their appeal for a consideration to themselves, where the basis of the appeal was that, if successful, it would benefit the entire class.
The Higbee Company, a department store with assets of more than six million dollars, filed a voluntary petition [324 U.S. 204, 206] for reorganization. It had three types of stocks, common, and first and second preferred. Two of its directors, Bradley and Murphy, claimed that they had acquired by purchase a junior debt against the company of $1,952, 000.00. A plan for reorganization was presented under which the owners of this junior debt were to be awarded $600,000.00 in new notes and a large block of common stock. Potts and Boag, respondents here, and owners of some shares of first preferred, objected to confirmation of the plan. They contended, on several grounds, that unless the junior debt was subordinated to the preferred stock claims, the plan allotted that indebtedness too great a share in the distribution of the bankrupt's assets. 2 When the stockholders' committee of which they were members approved the plan, Potts and Boag resigned and announced the formation of a new committee to press their objections to the junior debt allowance. Notwithstanding these objections, the Securities & Exchange Commission recommended the plan's acceptance, 8 S.E.C. 777, and the District Court confirmed it. 50 F.Supp. 114. Potts and Boag appealed from the District Court's decree confirming the plan. Although appealing as individuals, their appeal was based almost entirely on objections to allowances for the junior indebtedness which left less for distribution among all the preferred stockholders. Their appeal sought no separate individual relief for them- [324 U.S. 204, 207] selves; they appealed only to have the confirmation set aside. Had their appeal succeeded, the District Court would have been required to reduce the value of junior claims asserted by Bradley and Murphy, thereby increasing the value of the claims of the preferred stockholders as a class.
First. It is argued that since the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of Potts and Boag over Young's attempt to intervene, Young is estopped from prosecuting the present petition. This contention has no merit, for the reason, among others, that the determinative issues [324 U.S. 204, 209] in the two proceedings were not the same. The first petition did not pray for an accounting by Potts and Boag. The court only decided then that Young could not intervene and continue that appeal, and that the appeal should be dismissed. Now, accepting the court's dismissal of the appeal as final, Young seeks an accounting for the consideration paid Potts and Boag for agreeing to dismiss.
Second: It is argued that since Potts and Boag did not expressly specify that they appealed in the interest of the whole class of preferred stockholders, but appealed only in their own names, they owed no duty to any stockholders but themselves. The appeal here, however, was not from a denial of any individual claim of Potts and Boag. Its basis was that every other preferred stockholder, as well as themselves, would be injured by confirmation. So far as the issues raised by the appeal are concerned, the rights of Potts and Boag and the other preferred stockholders were inseparable. Thus, even though their objection to confirmation contained no formal class suit allegations, the success or failure of the appeal was bound to have a substantial effect on the interests of all other preferred stockholders. The liability of one who assumes a determining position over the rights of thers must turn on something more substantial than mere formal allegations in a complaint. 6 Equity looks to the substance and not merely to the form.
Furthermore, the right of appeal granted by a statute should not be interpreted in such way as to defeat rights clearly granted in other parts of the same Act. Peck v. Jennes et al., 7 How. 612, 623. Potts and Boag appealed un- [324 U.S. 204, 210] der Sec. 206 of the Chandler Act, which, contrary to the general bankruptcy procedure, grants any stockholder or creditor the right to be heard on all matters relating to corporate reorganizations. Courts have liberally construed this language as authorizing appeals. 7 We are now asked to say that the privilege of appeal granted to Potts and Boag by the Act vested them with an indefeasible right to sell the privilege to the disadvantage of all other stockholders in their class. But, historically one of the prime purposes of the bankruptcy law has been to bring about a ratable distribution among creditors of a bankrupt's assets; to protect the creditors from one another. 8 And the corporate reorganization statutes look to a ratable distribution of assets among classes of stockholders as well as creditors. There would be no ratable distribution of this bankrupt estate if Potts and Boag could utilize their statutory right of appeal to get for their preferred stock.$7.00 for every $1.00 paid to other preferred stockholders. We are asked to say that Congress intended such a consequence, and to construe the right of a stockholder to be heard on a plan of reorganization as carrying with it the right to 'sell' the very appeal which the Act grants him.
The money Potts and Boag received in excess of their own interest as stockholders was not paid for anything they owned. It came to them in settlement of litigation which if carried to a successful conclusion would have added to the value of other preferred stockholders of the common debtor. That the suit was settled and dismissed does not alter the rights of parties as to distribution of the fruits of the settlement. A distinction as to rights arising from litigation, which rests upon the difference between a judgment and a settlement of a lawsuit, under these circumstances, as in others, is 'too formal to be sound.' Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 195 , 196 S., 59 S.Ct. 155, 159, 119 A.L.R. 410; Helvering v. Safe [324 U.S. 204, 214] Deposit and T. Co., 316 U.S. 56 , 63-67, 62 S.Ct. 925, 929, 930, 139 A.L.R. 1513. The appeal of Potts and Boag was alleged to be for the benefit of all preferred stockholders. In the contemplation of the statute which authorized the appeal, its fruit properly belongs to all the preferred stockholders. One creditor, therefore, cannot make that fruit his own by a simple appropriation of it. Cf. Terry v. Little, 101 U.S. 216 , 218.
Third: It is argued that even though the money paid in excess of the stock value does in equity and good conscience belong to the stockholders, the bankruptcy court is without power to award the relief prayed. Courts of bankruptcy are courts of equity and exercise all equitable powers unless prohibited by the Bankruptcy Act. Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 , 60 S.Ct. 1044, 1053. The District Court still has jurisdiction to exercise its powers under the Act both because of its express reservation and because of the provisions of Section 222, 11 U.S.C. A. 622.14 That power is ample to authorize the court to order an accounting for the funds in dispute here. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 , 303-310, 60 S.Ct. 238, 243, 246; American United Mut. Life Insurance Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 , 145-147, 61 S.Ct. 157, 161, 162, 136 A.L.R. 860; Consolidated Rock Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 , 521-523, 61 S.Ct. 675, 682, 683.
Nor can we sustain the contention that relief should be denied on the allegations that Young's motive in bringing the proceeding is an unworthy one. His petition sought relief for the benefit of all the stockholders. The rights of these stockholders are not to be ignored because of some motive attributable to Young.
The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice JACKSON concur in the result. Mr. Justice ROBERTS dissents.
[ Footnote 1 ] The proceedings were begun in 1935 under Section 77B, 11 U.S.C. 207, 11 U.S.C.A. 207, June 22, 1938, Congress passed the Chandler Act, and the provisions of Chapter 10 of the Act were thereafter applicable to these proceedings. 52 Stat. 883-905, 11 U.S.C. 501-676, 11 U.S.C.A. 501-676.
'Q. So that in a sense you were selling something more than your stock, I take it? A. It think so.
[ Footnote 4 ] In both courts below Young sought an order against Bradley and Murphy as well as Potts and Boag but Bradley and Murphy have not been made respondents in this Court.
Under these circumstances no judgment against Boag will be entered in this case and the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Appeals will be stayed as to him. Soldiers' & Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1178, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, 501 et seq.
[ Footnote 6 ] Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161 , 59 S.Ct. 777. See Atlas Bank v. Nahant Bank, 23 Pick., Mass., 480; Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 P. 312; Honesdale Shoe Co. v. Montgomery, 56 W. Va. 397, 49 S.E. 434; Rawnsley v. Trenton Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 N.J.Eq. 95; Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed.Cas. 435, No. 17,944.
[ Footnote 7 ] In re Keystone Realty Holding Co., 3 Cir., 117 F.2d 1003, 133 A.L.R. 1378; Dana v. S.E.C., 2 Cir., 125 F.2d 542; cf. Amick v. Mortgage Security Corp., 8 Cir., 30 F.2d 359.
[ Footnote 8 ] Boese v. King, 108 U.S. 379, 385 , 386 S., 2 S.Ct. 765, 769, 770; Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 , 61 S.Ct. 904, 907; cf. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106 , 60 S. Ct. 1. See also 66 Pa.L.Rev. 224; Senate Document No. 65, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 6, 10, 49-93.
[ Footnote 9 ] 'Sec. 203. If the acceptance or failure to accept a plan by the holder of any claim or stock is not in good faith, in the light of or irrespective of the time of acquisition thereof, the judge may, after hearing upon notice, direct that such claim or stock be disqualified for the purpose of determining the requisite majority for the acceptance of a plan.' 52 Stat. 894.
[ Footnote 10 ] A year before the House Committee on the Judiciary held its extensive hearings on the Chandler Act a Circuit Court of Appeals held that a creditor could not be denied the privilege of voting on a reorganization plan under Sec. 77B, although he bought the votes for the purpose of preventing confirmation unless certain demands of him should be met. Texas Hotel Corporation v. Waco Development Co., 5 Cir., 87 F.2d 395. The hearings make clear the purpose of the Committee to pass legislation which would bar creditors from a vote who were prompted by such a purpose. To this end they adopted the 'good faith' provisions of Sec. 203. Its purpose was to prevent creditors from participating who 'by the use of obstructive tactics and hold-up techniques exact for themselves undue advantages from the other stockholders who are cooperating.' Bad faith was to be attributed to claimants who opposed a plan for a time until they were 'bought off'; those who 'refused to vote in favor of a plan unless ... given some particular preferential advantage.' Hearings on Revision of the Bankruptcy Act before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 6439, Serial 9, pp. 180- 182.
See also, on the same general topic, McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 Yale L.J. 421; Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 Col. L.Rev. 574, Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 Col.L.Rev. 571, 588-601.
[ Footnote 11 ] See Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476 , 477 S., 60 S.Ct. 693, 698, 1037; I.C.C. v. Oregon-Washington R. Co., 288 U.S. 14, 25 , 27 S., 53 S.Ct. 266, 268, 269.
[ Footnote 13 ] Cf. Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 , 267-269, 61 S.Ct. 493, 496, 497; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1.
[ Footnote 14 ] This Section gives the judge power, under conditions applicable here, to alter and modify a reorganization plan even after confirmation.

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