Source: http://patents.hdp.com/?cat=20
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:19:12+00:00

Document:
In Jack Henry & Associates, Inc. v. Plano Encryption Technologies LLC, [2016-2700] (December 7, 2018), the Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings.
PET is a Limited Liability Company established in the State of Texas, and is registered to do business throughout Texas, with its registered address in Plano, Texas, in the Eastern District of Texas. PET’s sole business is to enforce its intellectual property. After receiving letters alleging infringement, Jack Henry and its customers brought the declaratory judgment action in the Northern District of Texas.
The district court granted PET’s motion for dismissal, stating that PET’s actions do not subject it to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Texas, noting that while such letters might be expected to support an assertion of specific jurisdiction over the patentee because the letters are purposefully directed at the forum and the declaratory judgment action arises out of the letters, the Federal Circuit has held that, based on policy considerations unique to the patent context, letters threatening suit for patent infringement sent to the alleged infringer by themselves do not suffice to create personal jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit identified three relevant factors: (1) whether the defendant “purposefully directed” its activities at residents of the forum; (2) whether the claim “arises out of or relates to” the defendant’s activities within the forum; and (3) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is “reasonable and fair.” It said that the first two factors comprise the “minimum contacts” portion of the jurisdictional framework, and that it has held that the sending of a letter that forms the basis for the claim may be sufficient to establish minimum contacts, and PET’s counsel conceded as much at oral argument.
The analysis then turned to whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is “reasonable and fair.” The Federal Circuit noted that PET is subject to general jurisdiction in the state of Texas and is registered to do business throughout the state, and that it has not asserted that jurisdiction in the Northern District is inconvenient or unreasonable or unfair.
The Federal Circuit said that the burden befalls PET, as the source of the minimum contacts, to make a “compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction in the Northern District would be unreasonable and unfair. However, PET did not argue that litigating in the Northern District would be unduly burdensome, or that any of the other factors supports a finding that jurisdiction would be unfair. The Federal Circuit concluded that PET has met the minimum contacts requirement without offense to due process.
In Xitronix Corp. v. Kla-Tehcor Corp., [2016-2746] (February 9, 2018), the Federal Circuit transferred an appeal of a Walker Process claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which has appellate jurisdiction over cases from the District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Xitronix raised a Walker Process monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act and §§ 4 and 6 of the Clayton Act based on the alleged fraudulent prosecution of a patent.
Xitronix asserted that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), and KLA-Tencor did not dispute this assertion, but the Federal did. The Federal Circuit said the question is whether the monopolization allegation necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims. Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance and rationale in Gunn, the Federal Circuit held that monopolization does not depend upon resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.
The Federal Circuit said that there is nothing unique to patent law about allegations of false statements. While a determination of the alleged misrepresentations to the PTO will almost certainly require some application of patent law, but consistency with the federal question jurisdiction statute requires more than mere resolution of a patent issue in a “case within a case.” Something more is required to raise a substantial issue of patent law sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
The underlying patent issue in this case, while important to the parties and necessary for resolution of the claims, does not present a substantial issue of patent law. The Federal Circuit noted that patent claims will not be invalidated or revived based on the result of this case. Because Federal Circuit law applies to substantive questions involving its exclusive jurisdiction, the fact that at least some Walker Process claims may be appealed to the regional circuits will not undermine its uniform body of patent law. The Federal Circuit noted that the fact that its law applies to Walker Process claims does not mean that it has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of such claims.
In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Elecctronics, Inc., [2016-2006](May 26, 2017), the Federal Circuit dismissed Pulse’s appeal from the district court’s decision awarding prejudgment interest because it lacked jurisdiction.
interest or set the amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded to Halo. As a result, there is no final decision because the district court has not “determine[d], or specif[ied] the means for determining the amount” of prejudgment interest.
In In re Arunachalam, [2016-1560] (May 27, 2016), the Federal Circuit dismissed Arunachalam direct appeal to the Federal Circuit from the final rejection of his claims in prosecution following a new ground of rejection entered by the PTAB.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A), the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from a “decision” of the Board. The Federal Circuit has held that § 1295(a)(4) should be read to incorporate a finality requirement. Thus the Federal Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a non-final appeal from the Patent Office. Pursuant to § 134(b), Dr. Arunachalam may appeal the Examiner’s decision to the Board, and only after the Board issues a final decision can the Federal Circuit exercise jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision.
In Microsoft Corporation v, GeoTag, Inc., [2015-1140] (April 1, 2016), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction (although on different grounds) and affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement.
In response to suits against their customers in the Eastern District of Texas, Microsoft and Google brought a declaratory judgment action against GeoTag for a declaration that U.S. Patent No. 5,930,474 is invalid and not infringed. GeoTag filed a motion to dismiss and an answer and counterclaim for infringement of the ‘474 patent, arguing that the infringement action was a compulsory counterclaim which could not confer jurisdiction on the original declaratory judgment action. The district court, applying Third Circuit law, found jurisdiction because the counterclaim was not a compulsory counterclaim. The Federal Circuit agreed that there was jurisdiction, but applying Federal Circuit, rather than Third Circuit law, and finding jurisdiction based upon GeoTag’s counterclaim, regardless of whether or not it was compulsory. The Federal Circuit found that the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction over GeoTag’s patent infringement counterclaims pursuant to § 1338(a), such that it need not determine whether the District Court properly found that it had jurisdiction over Google’s First Amended Complaint.

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