Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/collections-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:41:33+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Garrett v. Credit Bureau of Carbon County on Thursday, October 18, 2018.
Debt Collection—Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—Least Sophisticated Consumer.
Credit Bureau of Carbon County (Credit Bureau) is an agency that collects or attempts to collect debts owed, due, or asserted to be owed or due to another. It sent Garrett two collection notices demanding payment on a consumer debt. Garrett sued Credit Bureau, asserting that the language of its communications overshadowed and contradicted the statutory requirements of the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the Act). The district court concluded that Credit Bureau’s notices had not violated the Act and denied Garrett’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted Credit Bureau’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case.
On appeal, Garrett contended that the district court wrongly concluded that Credit Bureau did not violate the Act because the format and content of Credit Bureau’s notices overshadowed or contradicted the statutorily required disclosures. The Act requires debt collectors to provide a debt validation notice describing the debt. It prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations when collecting a debt. Overshadowing occurs when a collection letter contains the requisite validation notice, but that information is obscured or diminished by the letter’s presentation or format. Contradiction occurs when language accompanying the validation notice is inconsistent with the substance of the rights and duties that the statute imposes. In Flood v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, 176 P.3d 769 (Colo. 2008), the Supreme Court adopted the “least sophisticated consumer” test to determine whether a collection agency’s notice was confusing with respect to the statutorily required disclosures. Here, Credit Bureau’s use of the bold and capitalized phrase “WE CANNOT HELP YOU UNLESS YOU CALL” in the second notice would confuse the least sophisticated consumer because it was capable of being reasonably interpreted as changing the manner in which the consumer was required by law to dispute the debt or its amount. As a matter of law, the notice was deceptive or misleading in violation of the Act.
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for the district court to enter judgment for Garrett and award her statutory damages, costs, and a reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred on appeal.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ybarra v. Greenberg & Sada, P.C. on Monday, October 15, 2018.
Finance, Banking, and Credit—Insurance—Statutory Interpretation—Torts.
Ybarra petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the dismissal of her Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act action against Greenberg & Sada, P.C. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding that damages arising from a subrogated tort claim do not qualify as a debt within the contemplation of the Act. The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that the undefined term “transaction” in the Act’s definition of “debt,” required some kind of business dealing, as distinguished from the commission of a tort; and to the extent an insurance contract providing for the subrogation of the rights of an insured constitutes a transaction in and of itself, that transaction is not one obligating the debtor to pay money, as required by the Act.
The supreme court held that because a tort does not obligate the tortfeasor to pay damages, a tort cannot be a transaction giving rise to an obligation to pay money, and is therefore not a debt within contemplation of the Act; and because an insurance contract providing for the subrogation of the rights of a damaged insured is not a transaction giving rise to an obligation of the tortfeasor to pay money, it also cannot constitute a transaction creating a debt within contemplation of the Act.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Mortgage Investment Enterprises, LLC v. Oakwood Holdings, LLC on Thursday, July 14, 2016.
The debtors purchased the property at issue and subsequently defaulted on their obligation to pay monthly fees to the Kimblewyck Village Owners Association (Kimblewyck). Kimblewyck filed a lien against the property. The property was also encumbered by (1) a lien filed by the Fox Run Owners Association and (2) two judgments entered in favor of Community Management Association, Inc. (CMA). Kimblewyck obtained a judgment and decree of foreclosure. Mortgage Investments Enterprises LLC (Mortgage Investments) was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale. On the day before the foreclosure sale, Oakwood Holdings, LLC (Oakwood) purchased the Fox Run lien and both CMA judgments. Oakwood subsequently filed notices of intent to redeem the Fox Run lien and one of the CMA judgments. Mortgage Investments tendered, on behalf of the debtor, pursuant to a valid power of attorney, lien satisfaction payments to Oakwood. Although Oakwood’s period to redeem had not yet begun, it refused to accept the payments. Mortgage Investments filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that Oakwood was required to accept Mortgage Investments’ tenders on behalf of the debtor. Oakwood subsequently redeemed the property, and the district court granted Oakwood’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Mortgage Investments argued that the district court erred in concluding that Oakwood had no duty to accept tender of payment in satisfaction of its liens. Prior to the start of Oakwood’s period to redeem and before it tendered redemption funds, Oakwood had a duty to accept Mortgage Investments’ tender of payment, on behalf of the debtor, in satisfaction of the lien Oakwood sought to redeem. The district court’s judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Mortgage Investments.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pandy v. Independent Bank on Monday, June 20, 2016.
This case principally concerns whether property titled in the name of a judgment debtor’s co-settled revocable trust is subject to a judgment lien against the debtor. The petitioners are co-settlors and co-trustees of a revocable trust that holds title to certain real property in Colorado. Respondent obtained two judgments against one of the petitioners in another state. After domesticating those judgments and recording transcripts of the Colorado judgments, respondent filed an action to quiet title and for a decree of foreclosure. The petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that respondent’s complaint was barred by what the petitioner argued was the applicable statute of limitations set forth in C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(k). The district court denied the motion, a division of the Court of Appeals granted leave to file an interlocutory appeal and affirmed that ruling, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court concluded that as a settlor of a revocable trust, the petitioner held an ownership interest in the trust’s assets. Accordingly, respondent could properly seek to enforce its judgment against the petitioner in this case, and its action was not barred by the statute of limitations set forth in C.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(k).
On Thursday, February 4, 2016, the Colorado Supreme Court posted Rule Change 2016(01), adopted January 29, 2016. The rule change affects several of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, and there are various effective dates for the changes.
C.R.C.P. 10 was changed to specify that footnotes should be in 12 point font and motions should be double-spaced. The comment to § 1-12 of Rule 121 was changed to include oral discovery in its scope. Rule 121, § 1-15, was revised significantly, changing several of the specifications for word and page limits of motions and addressing when the court should rule on motions. The comment to § 1-15 was also changed to explain some of the revisions. The changes to Rule 10 and §§ 1-12 and 1-15 of Rule 121 apply to motions filed on or after April 1, 2016.
C.R.C.P. 23, “Class Actions,” was amended by the addition of a new subsection (g), dealing with residual funds left after class action settlements. The changes to Rule 23 are effective for all class settlements approved by the court on or after July 1, 2016.
Rules 103 and 403 dealing with garnishments in district and county court were amended to provide that for pro se judgment creditors, indebtedness must be paid into the registry of the court, whereas judgment creditors represented by attorneys and collection agencies may receive funds directly. The Writ of Garnishment form was amended accordingly. These changes are effective March 1, 2016.
The amendment to Rule 359, “New Trials; Amendment of Judgments,” changed the deadline for appeal from 21 days to 14 days. The change is effective April 1, 2016.
Finally, Form 35.1, “Mandatory Disclosure,” was changed significantly. Most of the changes clarified required disclosures when a decree has been filed, specifying that only documents filed or prepared since the entry of the decree need be disclosed. These changes are effective April 1, 2016.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Laleh v. Johnson on Thursday, January 14, 2016.
Mr. Johnson was appointed special master during the Lalehs’ complex forcible entry & detainer action. Ali and Kahlil Laleh, brothers, each signed engagement agreements with Mr. Johnson, outlining the scope of work and payment obligations. Mr. Johnson incurred attorney fees because the Lalehs’ former attorney refused to honor a subpoena, and billed the brothers for those fees as costs. Although the brothers settled their cases in February 2014, Mr. Johnson continued invoicing the brothers for costs, including his attorney fees, through May 2014. Kahlil Laleh sent a letter to Mr. Johnson in March 2014 expressing concern about his inclusion of attorney fees in his billings.
Although the trial court dismissed the case in February 2014 pursuant to stipulations by the parties, Mr. Johnson expressed concern to the court about his significant unpaid bills and the court issued an order to show cause as to why Mr. Johnson’s bills had not been paid. The court eventually accepted Mr. Johnson’s proposed order regarding the unpaid fees. The brothers appealed, arguing their due process rights were violated by the court’s entry of judgment against them.
The Colorado Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s order was procedurally deficient because it had issued only three days after Mr. Johnson proposed his order, defeating Rule 121’s requirement of a 7-day objection period. The court of appeals vacated the court’s judgment and remanded.
The brothers argued the trial court erred in ordering they pay Mr. Johnson’s attorney fees without express court approval, and in awarding Mr. Johnson’s fees incurred after the litigation settled. The majority disagreed with both contentions. The brothers challenged whether Mr. Johnson had authority to hire counsel, but because they did not object as soon as they learned of counsel’s role, the majority concluded they forfeited any objection, although the preferred option would have been for Mr. Johnson to request permission from the court before hiring counsel. Likewise, the brothers did not object to the first invoice containing a line item for Mr. Johnson’s attorney fees, and the court took this as further indication that they waived any contention. Even though Kahlil Laleh wrote to Mr. Johnson in March 2014 expressing concern about the attorney fees, this was not enough to constitute a sufficient objection.
The brothers also challenged the trial court’s award of post-settlement attorney fees, most of which post-dated Kahlil’s objection to the fees. The court of appeals determined the fees were proper pursuant to the court’s inherent authority. The majority affirmed the trial court’s order for the Lalehs to pay Mr. Johnson’s outstanding fees and costs. The dissent, written by Judge Webb, outlined how he would have disallowed any fees incurred after the parties settled.

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