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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:46:09+00:00

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"The rule should be that the quantity possessed by the patient or the primary caregiver, and the form and manner in which it is possessed, should be reasonably related to the patient's current medical needs. What precisely are the "patient's current medical needs" must, of course, remain a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact."
Defendant was convicted by the Contra Costa County Superior Court, No. 950331-9, Richard Patsey, J., of transporting and possessing marijuana. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal, Haerle, J., held that: (1) common law medical necessity defense was properly excluded as defendant had adequate legal alternatives to marijuana; (2) defendant's free exercise of religious rights were not infringed by religion-neutral general criminal drugs laws; (3) defendant did not demonstrate requisite strongly held personal religious belief; (4) Compassionate Use Act, that was enacted subsequent to convictions, applied retroactively; (5) under Act defense exists if marijuana is either recommended or approved by physician, and approval is less formal act than recommendation; (6) Act could provide only partial defense where defendant claimed spiritual purposes for portion of use, as her religious freedom defense had failed; (7) even with physician's recommendation or approval, patient may not possess unlimited quantity of marijuana under Act; (8) quantity possessed by patient or primary caregiver, and form and manner of its possession, must be reasonably related to patient's current medical needs; and (8) while generally Act does not exempt transportation of marijuana from prosecution, transportation may be allowed if quantity transported and method, time and distance of transportation are reasonably related to patient's current medical needs.
"Necessity" defense, which has been recognized in case law but has not been codified, may be available where defendant is charged with committing any criminal act except taking of an innocent human life.
Assuming that common law medical necessity defense exists and is valid against charges of transporting and possessing marijuana, over and above defense provided by Compassionate Use Act, it is composed of same elements as general necessity defense. West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 11362.5.
Standard for evaluating sufficiency of the evidentiary foundation to allow common law medical necessity defense to go to jury is whether a reasonable jury, accepting all the evidence as true, could find defendant's actions justified by necessity.
Testimony by defendant's psychiatrist was properly excluded with respect to common law medical necessity defense to marijuana charges where defendant's offer of proof of defense was insufficient; fact that psychiatrist's testimony was uncontradicted at hearing was irrelevant as defense was excluded because, even accepting all testimony as true, required elements of defense were not established. West's Ann.Cal.Evid.Code §§ 350, 402.
State may enact and enforce generalized criminal sanctions for marijuana possession and transportation, and may prohibit "religiously inspired" drug use, without running afoul of free exercise clause of the First Amendment, and religion-neutral general criminal drug law need not be supported by compelling state interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
Defendant's conclusory statement "I use it [marijuana] for spiritual and meditative needs" was insufficient to establish strongly held personal religious belief necessary to trigger consideration of free exercise clause of First Amendment as religious freedom defense to charges of transporting and possessing marijuana; despite court's admonitions, defendant declined to provide any evidence of her religious beliefs or that use of marijuana was central to her religious practice. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code §§ 11357(c), 11360(a).
Compassionate Use Act operates retrospectively to defend against criminal liability, in whole or part, for some who are appealing convictions for possessing, cultivating and using marijuana. West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 11362.5.
Compassionate Use Act could provide only partial defense against charges of possessing and transporting two pounds of marijuana where defendant, whose religious freedom defense had failed, testified that she sometimes had medical purposes for using marijuana and on other occasions used it for spiritual purposes. West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 11362.5.
Compassionate Use Act's use of conjunctive, providing defense if there is either recommendation or approval of physician for marijuana use, indicates that terms have different meanings, and "approval" connotes less formal act than "recommendation"; thus, in evaluating Act as defense, it must be determined whether physician either recommended or approved marijuana use. West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 11362.5.
Under Compassionate Use Act as defense for possession of marijuana, physician "approval" of marijuana use does not have to be antecedent to possession, although prior approval will ordinarily be the case, and physician's approval might be contemporaneous with possession, or subsequent to possession but prior to actual usage. West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code §§ 11357(c), 11362.5.
Under Compassionate Use Act, even with physician's recommendation or approval, patient may not possess an unlimited quantity of marijuana. West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 11362.5.
Under Compassionate Use Act as defense for possession of marijuana, determination of appropriate quantity that will fall within Act's protection, based on "patient's current medical needs," is a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact; one type of evidence relevant to that determination is recommending or approving physician's opinion regarding frequency and dosage that patient needs. West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 11362.5.
As a general matter, Compassionate Use Act does not exempt from prosecution the transportation of marijuana allegedly to be used for medical purposes, however, based on practical realities, all transportation of marijuana is not without any defense under Act and Act can provide implied defense for transportation; test for Act's protection is whether quantity transported and method, time and distance of transportation are reasonably related to patient's current medical needs. West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code §§ 11360, 11362.5.
[56 Cal.App.4th 1535] Sudi Pebbles Trippet, in pro. per.
either or both of the charges upon which she was convicted.
On October 17, 1994, Officer Patrick Sweeney of the Kensington Police Department stopped appellant in her car for lack of a license plate lamp light. Upon approaching the vehicle and requesting identification, Officer Sweeney noted a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Officer Sweeney searched the car. He found two bags containing a green leafy substance which he suspected was marijuana. He also found hand-rolled cigarettes, which appeared to contain marijuana. Samples of the contents of the two bags and the cigarettes tested positive for marijuana. Officer Sweeney estimated the total weight of the marijuana recovered from appellant's vehicle at approximately two pounds. At trial, appellant testified that she knew the bags were in her vehicle and that they contained marijuana.
[56 Cal.App.4th 1537] Prior to trial, appellant moved for dismissal of the charges on several grounds including "religious necessity" (FN2) under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The court denied appellant's motion, finding that the statutes prohibiting the possession and transportation of marijuana were constitutional as applied to appellant.
The People moved in limine to exclude appellant's medical necessity defense. During an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, appellant presented a psychiatrist and "drug researcher," Dr. Tod Mikuriya, who testified regarding the medical use of marijuana for conditions such as migraine headaches (of which appellant allegedly suffered). The court found that appellant had not established the required elements of a necessity defense. Thus, the trial court excluded all evidence related to the defense of medical necessity.
At oral argument of this case in April 1997, and in response to questions from the court, appellant's counsel first contended that Proposition 215 did not change the law applicable to her fact situation, but later retreated from this position and conceded it might. After that argument, we delayed submission of the case and requested further briefing on several issues related to Proposition 215 (to be noted and discussed later). Thereafter, on June 26, 1997, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asking to be permitted, on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, to take an entirely new appeal from the trial court's judgment. The disposition we make of the Proposition 215 issue in this case effectively moots that petition and we will, accordingly, deny it.
defense to the jury because her psychiatrist's testimony at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing was uncontradicted. We reject both contentions.
  A "necessity" defense is recognized in California case law; it has not been codified. The defense may be available where a defendant is charged with committing any criminal act except the taking of an innocent human life. (People v. Pena (1983) 197 Cal.Rptr. 264, 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 22 (Pena ); People v. Slack (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 937, 940-942, 258 Cal.Rptr. 702 (Slack ).) The only California case that mentions a defense of medical necessity seems to assume the validity of the defense; there is no discussion. (People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1759, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 705["[T]he jury did not accept Forster's defense of medical necessity, namely, that he drank only to deaden the pain of his ear injury."].) Assuming a medical necessity defense is valid in California (over and above, that is, any provided by Proposition 215), we agree with the trial court's implicit finding that it is composed of the same elements as the general necessity defense.
 A reasonable jury could not, therefore, find that appellant lacked adequate legal alternatives to marijuana. Although Dr. Mikuriya discussed the range of potential shortcomings of Marinol and various other drugs prescribed for migraine headaches, including lesser efficacy, potential side effects, and slower relief of symptoms, there was no evidence that Marinol is ineffective for appellant, causes side effects for her, or is in any way unavailable to her. Indeed, Dr. Mikuriya admitted that marijuana use can also have considerable adverse side effects. Appellant, acting in pro per, argued to the trial court that she was aware of the potential side effects and lesser efficacy of Marinol. However, the only evidence in the record of Marinol's effects on appellant is Dr. Mikuriya's acknowledgment that Marinol "does afford [appellant] some relief." On this record, Marinol is a "reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law" by possessing and transporting marijuana (Bailey, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 410, 100 S.Ct. at p. 635) and the common law medical necessity defense was therefore unavailable to appellant.
2. Appellant's psychiatrist's testimony was properly excluded.
enforce this state's drug laws as to appellant.
However, appellant also relies on pre-RFRA authority in contending that she established a religious freedom defense. For example, she cites People v. Woody (1964) 61 Cal.2d 716, 717, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (Woody ) for the proposition that a compelling interest test should apply to evaluate the state's interest in prosecuting marijuana possession. The defendants in Woody, members of the Native American Church, were arrested during a religious ritual in which they were using peyote. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court discussed extensively the centrality of peyote to their religion in finding that the statute prohibiting peyote "most seriously infringes upon the observance of the religion." (Id. at pp. 720-722, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813.) The court then looked to whether the government had demonstrated a compelling state interest to justify application of the criminal statute to the defendants, and found that it had not. (Id. at pp. 722-727, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813.) Appellant contends that this rule should apply here, and that no compelling state interest was shown in this case.
 The short and simple answer to this contention is found in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment Div., Oregon Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (Smith )(the opinion which allegedly motivated the Congress to pass RFRA). This relatively recent decision made clear that a state may prohibit "religiously inspired" (id. at p. 874, 110 S.Ct. at p. 1597) drug use without running afoul of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. Drastically limiting the reach of its earlier opinion in Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (the case our Supreme Court substantially relied upon in Woody), a 6-3 majority the Supreme Court held that application of religion-neutral, general criminal drug laws "need not be [56 Cal.App.4th 1542] supported by a compelling state interest." (People v. Peck (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 351, 358, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) Under Smith, therefore, a state may enact and enforce generalized criminal sanctions for marijuana possession and transportation without running afoul of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. Indeed, holding exactly this, albeit pre-Smith, is our decision in People v. Werber (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 598, 607-610, 97 Cal.Rptr. 150.
Via a supplemental brief submitted subsequent to the Flores decision, appellant also argues that, under Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security (1989) 489 U.S. 829, 830-34, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 1515-18, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (Frazee), she does not need to show that she was a member of a recognized religious group to assert the proffered defense, but only that her actions were "religiously-motivated."
There are two answers to this contention. First of all, the factual context of Frazee is about as remote as possible from the instant case. There, a unanimous court, in a six page opinion, held that one did not have to be a member of a recognized religious organization or group to claim the benefit of the long-established rule that a State may not "constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions [of its unemployment-compensation program] so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest." (Frazee, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 832, 109 S.Ct. at p. 1516, quoting Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. at p. 410, 83 S.Ct. at p. 1797.) That holding does not even come close to the issue involved in this case.
use it for spiritual and meditative needs." (FN5) Beyond this single sentence, she declined to provide any evidence of her religious beliefs or that her use of marijuana [56 Cal.App.4th 1543] was central to her religious practice. More specifically, at no time did she assert, much less establish, that marijuana use is mandated or even substantially motivated by her religion--whatever that religion might be.
"(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
"(d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or [56 Cal.App.4th 1544] to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.
we hereafter provide) whether Proposition 215 provides appellant a partial defense to either or both of the charges against her. However, and for the reasons we discuss hereafter, on this record it cannot provide appellant with a complete defense to those charges.
 This is a relatively easy question. As the Attorney General concedes, absent contrary indicia, "the Legislature is presumed to have extended to defendants whose appeals are pending the benefits of intervening statutory amendments which decriminalize formerly illicit conduct [citation], or reduce the punishment for acts which remain unlawful. [Citations.] No different rule applies to an affirmative defense to the crime for which a defendant [56 Cal.App.4th 1545] was convicted, which defense was enacted during the pendency of her appeal." Proposition 215 contains no savings clause and so, as the Attorney General further concedes, "it may operate retrospectively to defend against criminal liability, in whole or part, for some who are appealing convictions for possessing, cultivating and using marijuana."
2. The applicability of Proposition 215 to appellant's conviction.
We take seriously these consistent indicia of the intent of the drafters and proponents of Proposition 215. We accordingly have no hesitation in declining appellant's rather candid invitation to interpret the statute as a sort of "open Sesame" regarding the possession, transportation and sale of marijuana in this state. (FN8) To hold as she effectively urges would be tantamount to suggesting that the proposition's drafters and proponents were cynically trying to "put one over" on the voters and that the latter were not perceptive enough to discern as much.
[56 Cal.App.4th 1547] Before consideration of the application of the 1996 law to the present record, it is appropriate to note two pertinent background items. First, upon her arrest, appellant was found to have approximately two pounds of both leaf marijuana and marijuana cigarettes in her possession. (FN9) Both sections 11357 and 11360 make a distinction between charges of illegal possession or transportation of marijuana by drawing a line at 28.5 grams (FN10); those convicted of possessing/transporting more than that amount are punished more severely than those convicted of possessing/transporting "not more" than 28.5 grams. At the higher level, a defendant faces possible imprisonment; he or she does not at the "not more than 28.5 grams" level. Thus, appellant was in possession of and transporting over 30 times the quantity of marijuana the possession of which triggers the higher penalties.
religious freedom defense fails. Thus if, at the time of her arrest, more than 28.5 grams of the marijuana she possessed and was transporting was solely for her "spiritual purposes," to that extent she rather clearly has no defense to the charges against her.
We next consider whether and to what extent the statute may provide appellant with a partial defense. The first and perhaps most critical issue is whether the present record is sufficient to permit us to rule, as a matter of law, that she can or cannot show that section 11362.5, subdivision (d) encompasses so much of her usage as was assertedly medical in nature. That subdivision provides, insofar as relevant here: "Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana ... shall not apply to a patient ... who [56 Cal.App.4th 1548] possesses ... marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician."
 All of this leaves open two possibilities, either one of which might provide appellant with a partial defense to the section 11357, subdivision (c), possession charge: (a) Dr. Mikuriya "approved" of appellant's use of some or all of the marijuana in question at or about the time (FN13) appellant came into its possession or (b) some other physician approved (or possibly even "recommended") it.
  However, we are not remotely suggesting that, even with a physician's "recommendation or approval," a patient may possess an unlimited quantity of marijuana. The ballot arguments of the proponents, some of which are quoted above, are simply inconsistent with the proposition that either the patient or the primary caregiver may accumulate indefinite quantities of the drug. The statute certainly does not mean, for example, that a person who claims an occasional problem with arthritis pain may stockpile 100 pounds of marijuana just in case it suddenly gets cold. The rule should be that the quantity possessed by the patient or the primary caregiver, and the form and manner in which it is possessed, should be reasonably related to the patient's current medical needs. What precisely are the "patient's current medical needs" must, of course, remain a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact. One (but not necessarily the only) type of evidence relevant to such a determination would be the recommending or approving physician's opinion regarding the frequency and amount of the dosage the patient needs. Such a rule can and should apply to appellant in a retrial.
215 does not exempt the transportation of marijuana allegedly used or to be used for medical purposes from prosecution under section 11360.
However, and as even the Attorney General concedes, practical realities dictate that there be some leeway in applying section 11360 in cases where a Proposition 215 defense is asserted to companion charges. The results might otherwise be absurd. For example, the voters could not have intended that a dying cancer patient's "primary caregiver" could be subject to criminal sanctions for carrying otherwise legally-cultivated and possessed marijuana down a hallway to the patient's room. Our holding does not, therefore, mean that all transportation of marijuana is without any defense under the new law. But so stating is a far cry from agreeing that transportation of two pounds of marijuana in a car by one who claims to suffer from migraine headaches is, even assuming the necessary medical approval, ipso facto permissible, as appellant would have it. The test should be whether the [56 Cal.App.4th 1551] quantity transported and the method, timing and distance of the transportation are reasonably related to the patient's current medical needs. If so, we conclude there should and can be an implied defense to a section 11360 charge; otherwise, there is not. Because there is a possibility (albeit remote) that appellant can establish that, under this test, the two pounds of marijuana she was admittedly transporting at the time of her arrest (or at least all of it above 28.5 grams) (FN16) met this test, the trial court should also determine this issue on remand.
FN2. Although appellant uses this term to describe her defense based on her "religious purposes" use of marijuana, it is really more appropriately described as a "religious freedom" defense and we shall use that term hereafter.
FN3. We shall refer to this proffered defense as the "common law medical necessity defense" to distinguish it from a defense based on Proposition 215, which we will discuss post.
FN4. However, and as discussed below, on remand the trial court may well wish to consider whether Dr. Mikuriya's testimony is pertinent to the issue of whether appellant can establish a partial defense under Proposition 215 to either of her convictions.
FN5. Appellant cites this single sentence as sufficient "evidence of her religious use of marijuana." At oral argument, her counsel conceded that this was the only item in the record upon which the religious freedom defense was based.
FN8. Appellant contends, for example, that "there are no quantity or potency limits [in the proposition] and virtually no restrictions as long as the 'purposes' are 'medical' ....," that the proposition changed the "medical use of marijuana from a crime to a 'right,' " and that "patients get the benefit of any doubt as to law or fact; and their 'right to obtain and use marijuana' gets 'Compassionate' protection," and that its transportation by any means and in any quantity desired is now also completely protected.
FN9. In his supplemental brief, the Attorney General asserts that this amount is sufficient to allow the creation of "500 to 900 joints." We will have to take his word for it.
FN10. In 1983, the Legislature amended the section to change the line from "one avoirdupois ounce" to "28.5 grams." (See Historical and Statutory Notes, West's Ann. Health & Saf.Code (1991 ed.) § 11357, p. 441.) The two standards are, of course, essentially the same, one ounce equaling 28.349 grams on the metric system.
FN11. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Sweeney was cross-examined by appellant. He responded to one of her questions by testifying: "When I asked you how much you smoke a day, [you said] you smoke as much as you can, and you cook with it, and you do everything else that you can with the marijuana." To which appellant, qua cross-examiner, responded: "Right."
FN13. The Attorney General contends that any such "approval" must be antecedent to the possession. We do not agree; the statute does not so state or imply, nor do the dictionary definitions of "approval." Although prior approval will ordinarily be the case, having in mind the breadth of the term we can readily conceive of exigent circumstances in which the physician's approval might well be contemporaneous with the possession, or even subsequent to the possession although prior to actual usage.
FN15. As discussed above, if appellant possessed more than 28.5 grams for her alleged "religious purposes" or for some other non-medically approved use, to that extent she has no defense to the section 11357, subdivision (c), charge. If she possessed 28.5 grams or less for such non-approved purposes, she may nevertheless be subject to lesser punishment under section 11357, subdivision (b), notwithstanding the possible validity of a Proposition 215 defense as to some of the marijuana she possessed.

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