Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-%C2%A7-503/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:36:22+00:00

Document:
It is undisputed that, pursuant to CPLR 503(a), venue of the Ulster County Action is properly in Ulster County, where Bacci, one of the Ulster plaintiffs, resided at the time the action was commenced (see O'Brien v Vassar Bros. Hosp., 207 AD2d 169, 171). A motion to change venue on discretionary grounds, unlike motions made as of right, must be made in the county in which the action is pending, or in any county in that judicial district, or in any adjoining county (see CPLR 2212[a]; Minenko v Swinging Bridge Camp Grounds of N.Y., Inc., 155 AD3d 1413; Schwartz v Yellowbook, Inc., 118 AD3d 691, 692; Rubens v Fund, 23 AD3d 636, 637). The Fenstermen parties, therefore, were required to make a motion pursuant to CPLR 510(3) either in Ulster County, where the Ulster County Action was pending, in another county in the 3rd Judicial District, or in a county contiguous to Ulster County (see CPLR 2212[a]; Minenko v Swinging Bridge Camp Grounds of N.Y., Inc., 155 AD3d 1413; Schwartz v Yellowbook, Inc., 118 AD3d at 692; Rubens v Fund, 23 AD3d at 637). Since Ulster County and Nassau County are not contiguous, and Nassau County is not in the 3rd Judicial District, the Fensterman parties' motion to change venue pursuant to CPLR 510(3) based on discretionary grounds was improperly made in the Supreme Court, Nassau County (see Minenko v Swinging Bridge Camp Grounds of N.Y., Inc., 155 AD3d 1413; Schwartz v Yellowbook, Inc., 118 AD3d at 692; Rubens v Fund, 23 AD3d at 637-638). Although not argued by the parties in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, but argued on appeal, we reach this issue in the exercise of our discretion because it appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided or explained if raised in the Supreme Court (see Rubens v Fund, 23 AD3d at 638; see also Coscia v Jamal, 156 AD3d 861).
The parties' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, should have denied the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 510(3) to change venue of the Ulster County Action to Nassau County for the convenience of witnesses, with leave to renew in the Supreme Court, Ulster County.
CPLR 503(a) provides, in pertinent part, "except where otherwise prescribed by law, the place of trial shall be in the county in which one of the parties resided when it was commenced." Here, since the plaintiff and the defendants, the only parties to this derivative action (see Niles v New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 176 NY 119, 124; Flynn v Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 158 NY 493, 508; Jones v Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App Div 694, 697; cf. Jacobs v Cartalemi, 156 AD3d 605; Barbaro v Spinelli, 121 AD3d 727, 728), were residents of Nassau County when it was commenced, venue was improperly placed in Queens County. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the fact that two of the corporations and the LLC are located in Queens County did not make Queens County a proper venue to commence this action, since those entities are not parties to the action.
Furthermore, venue could not have been properly placed in Queens County pursuant to CPLR 507. While CPLR 507 mandates that venue of an action which seeks a judgment that will "affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property" shall be placed in the county where the property is located (see Clark v Clark, 93 AD3d 812, 816), here, the action seeks, inter alia, a determination of the plaintiff's membership interest in the LLC (see Fish v Davis, 146 AD3d 485, 486; Rubinstein v Bullard, 285 AD2d 366, 367; Suddin v Lynbrook Gardens Co., 127 Misc 2d 406, 409 [Sup Ct, Special Term, NY County]). In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the relief he is seeking will affect real property in Queens County.
The plaintiff failed to move by notice of cross motion to retain venue in Queens County pursuant to CPLR 510(3), and we decline to review the plaintiff's informal request in the exercise of discretion (see CPLR 2215; Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 AD3d 56, 64, 65).
Wakefern, a foreign corporation, submitted a copy of its application for authorization to conduct business filed with the Secretary of State, in which it identified New York County as "[t]he county within this state where its office is to be located" (Business Corporation Law § 1304[a]). Wakefern's designation of New York County in its application is controlling for venue purposes, even if it does not actually have an office in New York County (see Crucen v Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., 139 AD3d 538 [1st Dept 2016]; Shetty v Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 38 AD3d 202 [1st Dept 2007]; Job v Subaru Leasing Corp., 30 AD3d 159 [1st Dept 2006]; CPLR 503[c]).
Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting Target's motion to change venue to Suffolk County even though plaintiff properly placed venue in New York County based upon Target's principal place of business at the time the action was commenced (see CPLR 503[a], [c]). The motor vehicle accident happened in Suffolk County, plaintiffs and codefendants live in that county, the decedent received her medical treatment there (see Lopez v Chaliwit, 268 AD2d 377 [1st Dept 2000]). Target also submitted the affidavits of two Suffolk County police officers, who averred that they were involved in the investigation including interviewing witnesses at the accident location and that they would be inconvenienced by having to travel to New York County because it would cause them to be absent from their police duties for a full day (see Kennedy v C.F. Galleria at White Plains, 2 AD3d 222, 223 [1st Dept 2003]).
Here, the defendants failed to disclose the addresses of all but one of the prospective witnesses, made only conclusory statements that the prospective witnesses would be inconvenienced, and failed to establish the manner or extent to which those witnesses would be inconvenienced (see Ambroise v United Parcel Serv. of Am. Inc., 143 AD3d at 928; Matter of Supplier Distribution Concepts, Inc., 80 AD3d 869, 871). With regard to those witnesses who were New York State police officers, while "the convenience of local government officials, such as police officers, is of paramount importance because they should not be kept from their duties unnecessarily" (Lafferty v Eklecco, LLC, 34 AD3d 754, 755), here, only conclusory statements, without any details, were provided as to how those witnesses would be inconvenienced. As such, these statements were insufficient to establish that those witnesses would be inconvenienced if venue were not changed.
The motion to change venue was properly granted upon the grounds that, except for defendants Usher and Usher, M.D., P.C., all of the defendants and plaintiffs reside in Westchester County, and that while Usher, M.D., P.C., maintains a satellite office in Bronx County that it rents one day per month, Usher's primary office is located in Westchester County, the office where plaintiff was treated. Thus, movants met their initial burden of establishing that the Bronx County venue chosen by plaintiffs is improper (CPLR 503[a]; 510; Hernandez v Seminatore, 48 AD3d 260 ), and since [*2]plaintiffs forfeited their right to select the venue by choosing an improper venue in the first instance, venue is properly placed in Westchester County, where most of the parties reside (Weiss v Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 83 AD3d 461 ).
A party moving for a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(3) has the burden of demonstrating that the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change (see CPLR 510; McManmon v York Hill Hous., Inc., 73 AD3d 1137, 1138; Rochester Drug Coop., Inc. v Marcott Pharmacy N. Corp., 15 AD3d 899, 899; Heinemann v Grunfeld, 224 AD2d 204). In doing so, the moving party must set forth (1) the names, addresses, and occupations of prospective witnesses, (2) the facts to which the prospective witnesses will testify at trial, so that the court may judge whether the proposed evidence of the prospective witnesses is necessary and material, (3) a statement that the prospective witnesses are willing to testify, and (4) a statement that the prospective witnesses would be greatly inconvenienced if the venue of the action was not changed (see Lafferty v Eklecco, LLC, 34 AD3d 754, 755; O'Brien v Vassar Bros. Hosp., 207 AD2d 169, 172).
Here, the defendant failed to establish that the real estate agent who cobrokered the sale of the plaintiffs' apartment in its cooperative building would be greatly inconvenienced if venue was not changed to New York County (see McManmon v York Hill Hous., Inc., 73 AD3d at 1138; Walsh v Mystic Tank Lines Corp., 51 AD3d 908; Ferndandes v Lawrence, 290 AD2d 412; Blumberg v Salem Truck Leasing, 276 AD2d 577; Maynard v Oakes, 144 AD2d 229, 230), and failed to satisfy all of the required criteria for a change of venue with respect to an attorney who served the defendant [*2]with a restraining notice in a related action. The remaining prospective witnesses identified by the defendant are its employees or agents, whose convenience is not a factor in considering a motion for a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(3) (see McManmon v York Hill Hous., Inc., 73 AD3d at 1138; Curry v Tysens Park Apts., 289 AD2d 191; Cilmi v Greenberg, Trager, Toplitz & Herbst, 273 AD2d 266, 267; D'Argenio v Monroe Radiological Assoc., 124 AD2d 541, 542). Accordingly, the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 510(3) to change the venue of the action from Suffolk County to New York County based upon the convenience of material witnesses should have been denied.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Montgomery County, where the underlying motor vehicle accident occurred. The papers submitted by the appellants contained (1) the names, addresses, and occupations of two prospective witnesses, both of whom were officers with the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, (2) the facts to which the witnesses would testify at trial, (3) statements demonstrating that the witnesses are willing to testify, and (4) a statement that the witnesses would be greatly inconvenienced if the venue of the action was not changed (see Walsh v Mystic Tank Lines Corp., 51 AD3d 908; Lafferty v Eklecco, LLC, 34 AD3d 754; Professional Veh. Leasing v Continuing Dev. Servs., 275 AD2d 313). Moreover, the convenience of local government officials is of paramount importance, because they should not be kept from their duties unnecessarily (see Lafferty v Eklecco, LLC, 34 AD3d at 754; Professional Veh. Leasing v Continuing Dev. Servs., 275 AD2d at 313). In contrast, the plaintiff's residence was the only apparent connection to Kings County and, in opposition to the motion, and the plaintiff failed to offer proof that there were any independent witnesses who would be inconvenienced if the action were transferred to Montgomery County.
For venue purposes, generally the sole residence of a foreign corporation is the county within the State in which its principal office is located, as designated in its application for authority to conduct business filed with the State of New York, or an amendment thereof (seeCPLR 503[c]; Business Corporation Law § 102[a]; Ashjian v Orion Power Holdings, Inc., 9 AD3d 440; Bailon v Avis Rent A Car,270 AD2d 439, 440; Collins v Trigen Energy Corp., 210 AD2d 283). Thus, here, where the general rule applies, New York County was the residence of the defendant Meitetsu Express, a California corporation authorized to do business in New York State, as that was the county designated in its application for authority. Accordingly, since none of the parties maintained a residence in Queens County, the plaintiff's designation of Queens County as the place of trial was improper, and the Supreme Court erred in denying the defendants' motion for a change of venue from Queens County to Nassau County, where the plaintiff and the individual defendant resided and the accident occurred.
While there is no statutory time limit for a motion to change venue upon dismissal of a party whose residence provided the basis for venue, this Court has nonetheless required that such motions be made promptly (Clase v Sidoti, 20 AD3d 330 ; Caplin v Ranhofer, 167 AD2d 155, 157-58 ), that is, within a reasonable time after the movant obtains knowledge of the facts supporting the request (Herrera v R. Conley Inc., 52 AD3d 218 ; Diaz v Clock Tower Assoc., 271 AD2d 290 ). It also bears noting that a party need not wait for notice of entry of the order dismissing the improper party before it moves for a change of venue (see Emerick v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 272 AD2d 150  [venue motion made simultaneous with dismissal motion]).
Here, defendants may have been aware as early as February 28, 2008, fifteen months before making their motion, that Primary Care Development Corporation, the sole defendant on whose residence venue in New York County was based, sought dismissal of the action against it [FN1]. Thereafter, Primary Care's September 2008 dismissal motion, made more than eight moths prior to the other defendants' venue applications, was unopposed. By order entered March 4, 2009, the court dismissed Primary Care from the case. In its order, the court explicitly stated that [*2]"none of the remaining parties has any connection to New York County and that [the] case is therefor amenable to a motion to change venue".
Notwithstanding this pronouncement, the remaining defendants waited an additional three months, during which time they appeared in New York County and set a trial date, without giving any indication of a venue problem. Two months after the trial date was set, the motion was made to change venue to Westchester. Given these circumstances, the grant of the motion was an improvident exercise of discretion and an implicit endorsement of careless motion practice, in disregard of the important principles of fair notice and judicial economy (see e.g. Herrera v R. Conley Inc., 52 AD3d 218 ; Schwarz v Erpf Estate, 232 AD2d 316 ; see also Litt v Balmer, 146 AD2d 559  [that trial date had been set was factor supporting finding that granting untimely venue change was abuse of discretion]).
CPLR § 511(b) Sufficiency of affidavit can’t be weighed, but contents may be considered.
On this appeal, we must determine whether an affidavit served by a plaintiff in accordance with CPLR 511(b) may be scrutinized to ensure that it does, in fact, "show[ ] either that the county specified by the defendant is not proper or that the county designated by him is proper," or if the mere service of such an affidavit, irrespective of its content, satisfies the plaintiff's burden. We hold that, while the sufficiency of the factual averments set forth in such affidavits may not be weighed, the contents of the affidavits may nonetheless be considered to confirm that the averments therein do indeed "show[ ] either that the county specified by the defendant is not proper or that the county designated by [the plaintiff] is proper" as required by the statute (CPLR 511[b]).
It's a long decision, but it's worth reading. I'll add more later.
Author DMGPosted on September 18, 2010 Categories CPLR § 503, CPLR § 510, CPLR R. 511, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on CPLR § 511(b) Sufficiency of affidavit can’t be weighed, but contents may be considered.
For venue purposes, the sole residence of a foreign corporation is the county in which its principal office is located, as designated in its application for authority to conduct business filed with the State of New York, or an amendment thereof (see CPLR 503[c]; Business Corporation Law § 102[a]; Ashjian v Orion Power Holdings, Inc., 9 AD3d 440; Bailon v Avis Rent A Car, 270 AD2d 439; Collins v Trigen Energy Corp., 210 AD2d 283). Thus, the plaintiff properly placed venue of this action in Nassau County, as that was the county designated by the defendant American Teleradiology Nighthawks, P.C., in its application for authority. The defendant Kingston Hospital failed to sustain its burden of demonstrating that the convenience of nonparty witnesses would be [*2]served by changing venue from Nassau County to Ulster County (see Walsh v Mystic Tank Lines Corp., 51 AD3d 908; Markowitz v Makura, Inc., 29 AD3d 650; Mei Ying Wu v Waldbaum, Inc., 284 AD2d 434; McAdoo v Levinson, 143 AD2d 819).
2. there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had in the proper county; or3. the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change.
Brooklyn from her house in Staten Island after a "diabetic episode,"
and moved into it in November 2006.
degree of permanency" (Katz v Siroty, 62 AD2d 1011, 1012; see Jones-Ledbetter v Biltmore Auto Sales, 229 AD2d 518, 519; Mandelbaum v Mandelbaum, 151 AD2d 727, 728).
defendants resided, should have been granted (see CPLR 503[a]; Maggio v Wal-Mart Stores, 275 AD2d 350, 351).
corporate residence for the purposes of venue" (Conway v Gateway Assoc., 166 AD2d 388, 389 ), even if the corporation maintains an office or facility in another county (Altidort v Louis, 287 AD2d 669, 670 ), and even if it is a professional corporation (see Della Vecchia v Daniello, 192 AD2d 415 ).
November 2006 on what she thought was the 18th day of the month [FN1].
prior inconsistent testimony as evidence-in-chief that the liquid was encapsulate" (id. at 410 [emphasis added]).
because plaintiff's deposition constituted the only evidence of plaintiff's place of residence albeit "some evidence" of same.
There is a fairly long dissent. Worth reading. Worth is a weird word.
inconvenienced by the initial venue" (Rodriguez v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 293 AD2d 325, 326 ).
291 ), and who failed to particularize his anticipated testimony.
inconvenienced by traveling to New York County.
of the corporate defendant who was not a witness to the accident.
The bold is mine, all mine. Bwahahahaha.

References: § 1304
 § 102
 § 511
 § 503
 § 510
 § 511
 § 102