Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2017/08/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:22:41+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Pacitto v. Prignano on Thursday, July 27, 2017.
Uniform Arbitration Act—Award—Motion to Vacate—Deadline—Confirmation.
The Prignanos asserted multiple claims against Pacitto, a registered representative, in a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority securities industry arbitration. Pacitto raised several counterclaims. The arbitration panel denied the Prignanos’ claims and awarded Pacitto compensatory damages, punitive damages, and fees solely against Mr. Prignano. Many months later, when Mr. Prignano had not paid the award, Pacitto filed a combined complaint and motion to confirm the arbitration award in district court. Among other things, the Prignanos filed a motion to vacate the award and an amended answer that included a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment vacating the award. The district court order confirmed the arbitration award and found that the Prignanos filed the motion to vacate well past the 91-day deadline, thus waiving their right to object to confirmation of the award.
On appeal, the Prignanos asserted that the district court erred in applying the 91-day deadline in C.R.S. § 13-22- 223(2) and in failing to extend the deadline for filing a counterclaim for one year pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-80-109, when it confirmed the award. Under the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), a motion to vacate an arbitration award must be filed within 91 days after the movant receives notice of the award. The parties agreed that the Prignanos filed their motion to vacate and raised their declaratory judgment counterclaim well after the 91-day period for challenging arbitration awards. The more specific limitation period of C.R.S. § 13-22 223(2) that applies only to arbitration proceedings prevails over the more general limitation period contained C.R.S. § 13-80-109, which applies to any civil suit.
The Prignanos also argued that an equitable tolling exception should be read into the UAA. The court of appeals rejected this argument, stating that the notice of the arbitration decision made them aware of their responsibility to challenge the decision in a permitted format and by a statutory deadline. They were aware of all the grounds they could assert on appeal when the arbitration concluded.
The judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded for a calculation of Pacitto’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Ramos on Thursday, July 27, 2017.
Theft—Evidence—C.R.S. § 18-4-401(4)(a) —Jury Interrogatories—Lesser Included Offense.
Defendant was treasurer of the Bennett Elementary School Parent, Teacher, and Student Association (PTSA). The PTSA held the Believe Fundraiser, and defendant failed to deposit all of the proceeds from the fundraiser into the PTSA’s bank account. The verdict form required the jury to find whether defendant was guilty of theft (two or more within six months) for cash taken from three different fundraisers and instructed the jury to answer three interrogatories. The jury found defendant guilty, but it answered yes to only the Believe Fundraiser interrogatory.
On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of theft from the Believe Fundraiser. Based on evidence that defendant told the PTSA secretary that she had deposited $19,760.65 into the PTSA account when only $16,473.21 was actually deposited, and defendant’s statement later to the secretary that she was sorry and wanted to make it right, a reasonable person could conclude that defendant knowingly retained funds from the Believe Fundraiser and intended to permanently deprive the PTSA of the value of the funds.
Defendant also contended that the trial court erred in rejecting her proposed instruction paragraph for the verdict form. C.R.S. § 18-4-401(4)(a) required the prosecution to prove all of the thefts aggregated into a single count. Because the jury only answered yes to one of the interrogatories, its verdict conflicts with the statute. Therefore, the jury improperly convicted defendant of aggregated theft without finding that she committed all three of the thefts aggregated in one count. But a single act of theft is a lesser included offense of aggregated theft under C.R.S. § 18-4-401(4)(a), and the prosecution proved the elements of the lesser included offense.
Defendant further contended that the trial court erred in admitting the PTSA secretary’s testimony. However, the PTSA secretary properly gave lay opinion testimony under CRE 701.
The judgment of conviction for theft under C.R.S. § 18-4-401(4)(a) was vacated and the case was remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a conviction for a single count of theft under C.R.S. § 18-4-401(1) and (2)(f).
On Friday, August 4, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two published opinions and three unpublished opinions.
On Thursday, August 3, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published and six unpublished opinions.

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