Source: http://nc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180330_0000117.MNC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:03:16+00:00

Document:
FindACase | Clark v. Impact Home Care Services Inc.
Clark v. Impact Home Care Services Inc.
LASHONDA S. WILLIAMSON d/b/a Impact Home Care Services, Defendant.
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This is a proposed collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). Before the court is Plaintiff Dorothy Clark's motion for conditional certification of an FLSA collective and approval of notice. (Doc. 16.) This motion has been briefed and is ripe for consideration. (Docs. 17, 31, 32.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion to conditionally certify the collective action will be granted, and the motion for approval of notice will be granted in part and denied in part.
All current and former home healthcare workers (personal care aides, certified nursing assistants and in-home aides) who worked for LaShonda Swindell Williamson d/b/a Impact Home Care Services at any time since January 1, 2015 and who were classified as an independent contractor and who were not paid time and a half for all hours worked over 40 in a work week.
The FLSA requires covered employers to pay their employees overtime pay at one and one-half times the employee's normal hourly rate for hours worked in excess of forty during a work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207. However, the act contains various exemptions from its wage and hour requirements. See id. § 213. The “companionship services exemption” exempts “any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves . . . .” Id. § 213(a)(15).
In October 2013, the U.S. Department of Labor amended its regulations to preclude third-party employers and agencies from claiming the companionship services exemption. See Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 78 Fed. Reg. 60, 454 (Oct. 1, 2013). The amended regulations, which became effective on January 1, 2015,  extended the overtime payment provisions to home healthcare workers employed by third parties or agencies. 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a); see Guerrero v. Moral Home Servs., Inc., 247 F.Supp.3d 1288, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (noting “[t]he amended regulations preclude third-party employers-like [defendant's home healthcare agency]-from claiming the companionship services exemption”).
For any violation of the FLSA, an employee may bring a collective action on behalf of herself or “other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). To become part of the litigation, each “similarly situated” employee must file her written consent with the court. Id. Employees are “similarly situated” when they “raise a similar legal issue as to coverage, exemption, or nonpayment o[f] minimum wages or overtime arising from at least a manageably similar factual setting with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions.” Solais v. Vesuvio's II Pizza & Grill, Inc., 1:15CV227, 2016 WL 1057038, at *5 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 14, 2016) (quoting McLaurin v. Prestage Foods, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 465, 469 (E.D. N.C. 2010)) (alteration in original).
FLSA class certification takes place in two stages. Hollis v. Alston Pers. Care Servs., LLC, No. 1:16CV1447, 2017 WL 3327591, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 3, 2017) (citing Solais, 2016 WL 1057038, at *5). The first stage - applicable here - is conditional certification, during which the court determines whether the employees' claims are similar enough to merit the distribution of court-approved notice to possible class members. Id.; see also Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989) (“[D]istrict courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to implement [§ 216(b)] by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs.”). At this stage, “[c]ollective action plaintiffs are not bound by Rule 23's requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy; they need only demonstrate that they are ‘similarly situated' to proceed as a class.” Robinson v. Empire Equity Grp., Inc., No. WDQ-09-1603, 2009 WL 4018560, at *1 n.8 (D. Md. Nov. 18, 2009) (citing Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., No. CCB-08-273, 2008 WL 4735344, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2008)); Solais, 2016 WL 1057038, at *5 n.6.
Conditional certification is appropriate when it would serve judicial efficiency, Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170, and the court must be mindful that granting conditional certification expands the scope of the litigation and begins a process of class-wide discovery, see, e.g., D'Anna v. M/A-COM, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 889, 894 (D. Md. 1995). The standard for conditional certification is “fairly lenient, ” but it is not a “rubber-stamp approach.” Adams v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 93 F.Supp.3d 441, 453 (M.D. N.C. 2015) (citation omitted). While parties generally “have minimal evidence at this point in the proceedings[, ] . . . [m]ere allegations will not suffice; some factual evidence is necessary.” Id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff must only make “a relatively modest factual showing that a common policy, scheme or plan that violated the law exists.” Hollis v. Alston Pers. Care Servs., LLC, No. 1:16CV1447, 2017 WL 3327591, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 3, 2017) (quoting Adams, 93 F.Supp.3d at 453). At this stage, “the Court does not resolve factual disputes, decide substantive issues on the merits, or make credibility determinations.” Solais, 2016 WL 1057038, at *6 (quoting Adams, 93 F.Supp.3d at 454).
Williamson first contends that Clark has failed to allege any violation occurring as a result of a policy or custom. (Doc. 31 at 3-4.) In particular, Williamson notes that Clark provides no information regarding the potential size of the class she wishes to be certified. (Id.) Williamson further contends that Clark relies primarily on hearsay statements from other employees, which may not be considered by the court in connection with a § 216(b) motion. (Id. at 4 (citing Harrison v. McDonald's Corp., 411 F.Supp.2d 862, 865 (S.D. Ohio 2005)).

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