Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/315/495/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:56:09+00:00

Document:
1. A grant by the Interstate Commerce Commission of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle under the "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, authorizing service only from a particular city and all points within a radius of 10 miles thereof, to all points in certain States and to designated points in others, held not erroneous. P. 315 U. S. 498.
2. In a grant of common carrier rights under the "grandfather clause," that part of the order of the Commission in this case which limit the kinds of commodities which may be carried between specified points is not supported by the requisite basic or essential findings. United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers, ante, p. 315 U. S. 475. P. 315 U. S. 495.
Appeal from a decree dismissing the complaint in a suit to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
This case, like United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., ante, p. 315 U. S. 475, is an appeal from a district court of three judges (38 F.Supp. 556) convened to review an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission (24 M.C.C. 273) granting appellant a certificate of public convenience and necessity as a common carrier by motor vehicle under the so-called "grandfather clause" (§ 206(a)) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. 49 U.S.C. § 306.
entitled to a certificate authorizing the continuance thereof, and that the application in all other respects should be denied."
The District Court refused to enjoin enforcement of the order, and dismissed the complaint. The errors urged here do not relate to the substantiality of the evidence in support of the findings. They involve two questions: whether the Commission was warranted in limiting shipments to and from points located within a 10 mile, rather than a 100 mile, radius of Birmingham, and (2) whether the Commission erred in limiting the operating rights of appellant to the transportation of only a few commodities between certain points.
I. We perceive no error in the limitation which the Commission made on the territorial scope of appellant's operations.
only 55 shipments were transported prior to June 1, 1935, to or from points within 100 miles of Birmingham, as against 875 to or from that city. Only 12 points were served in that large area. After June 1, 1935, 270 shipments moved to or from points within 100 miles of Birmingham, as against 2,030 to or from that city. The Commission reduced the radius to 10 miles in an endeavor to include only the important industrial area surrounding that city. If we were to enlarge that area, we would clearly usurp a function which Congress entrusted to the Commission. Nor can that finding be assailed because permission to serve all points in other areas was allowed. Such a difference in treatment plainly is not erroneous as a matter of law. And nothing has been called to our attention which would even suggest that the record of prior operations or the characteristics of this transportation enterprise precluded the Commission from restricting the territory where shipments mainly originate while being more liberal as respects the territory where destination points are located.
"prior to and since June 1, 1935, applicant transported paper and paper products from Birmingham to New Orleans, La., and Chattanooga and Knoxville, Tennessee, and from Kingsport, Tenn., to Birmingham; nails, pipe, pipe fittings, steel, and metal ceilings from Canton, Ohio, to Birmingham; cloth from Alabama City, Ala. to Wheeling, W.Va., and matches from Wheeling to Chattanooga and Birmingham."
reliance on Powell Brothers Truck Lines, Inc., 9 M.C.C. 785, 791-792, which we have discussed in United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., supra, and which apparently treats irregular route carriers differently in this regard than regular route carriers. Since the influence of that view seems to have permeated the findings, we conclude that here, as in United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., supra, the case should be remanded to the Commission so that the basic or essential findings required under the rule of Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 282 U. S. 215, may be made.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON dissent for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinion in United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., ante, p. 315 U. S. 475.

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