Source: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2970/1
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:50:04+00:00

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National security is addressed in Title I of the American Space Renaissance Act. Significantly, aside from creating new policy directives, Title I also exercises Congress’s power of the purse through several funding directives. The significant sections of Title I of the Act are discussed below.
Considering geopolitical adversaries are focusing their strategies on information denial, interoperability between space and cyber systems could create a central vulnerability that might not otherwise exist for systems that do not share interoperability.
Notably, Section 101 appears to supplement the National Space Policy, whose National Security Guidelines create a policy environment that is preventative in nature and not responsive.3 That is to say, while the National Space Policy’s view towards threats is anticipatory in nature, Section 101 of the Act mandates a responsive archetype be developed.
Function as a tie-breaker to provide the Deputy Management Action Group with independent policy assessments when the DSC cannot reach consensus.
The overall effect of this provision appears to re-designate the position of Principal Advisor on Space Control per 10 U.S.C. § 2279a and flesh out the position’s statutory responsibilities. It stands to reason the duties outlined for Principal Defense Space Advisor are identical to those of Principal Advisor on Space Control, and the effect of the Act is to ensure those duties are mandated by Congress and not at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.
An account of regulatory and/or legislative action that would be required to implement the desired interoperability.
The act appears to desire more interoperability and hence data sharing between space and cyber systems. This dashboard approach to space situational and cyber awareness seems to represent a concerted effort towards an information-centric strategy for warfighters and less cost to the taxpayer. However, a central nexus and interoperability for both space situational awareness and cyberwarfare could prove to be an Achilles’ heel despite the cost savings. Considering geopolitical adversaries are focusing their strategies on information denial, interoperability between space and cyber systems could create a central vulnerability that might not otherwise exist for systems that do not share interoperability.
Section 101 of the act amends 10 U.S.C. 2275, which codifies reports on integration of acquisition and capability delivery schedules for segments of major satellite acquisition programs and funding for such programs.10 Section 101 amends 10 U.S.C. 2275 to replace subsection (g) to create a certification requirement. Specifically, the proposed amendment will require Secretary of Defense certify to Congressional defense committees11 that each major satellite acquisition program has received Milestone B12 approval as an integrated program.13 The amendment requires Milestone C approval not to be granted to an acquisition program without such a certification and for the Secretary of Defense to brief Congressional defense committees as to why certification was not made.
Beginning January 1, 2026, the Secretary shall give preference to launching hosted payloads on launch vehicles owned and operated by companies domiciled in the United States.
This mandate in the Act is curious because a hosted payload is a passenger on a commercial satellite, which means the commercial satellite carrying the hosted payload must intend to use a US-domiciled commercial launcher absent a grant of an exception.16 This is consistent with the National Space Transportation Space Policy. Doubtless, this mandate is aimed at companies like Intelsat, which have hosted payloads arrangements with DoD.17 A suggested rewording of this provision would require companies who have hosted-payload contracts with the DoD to utilize US-domiciled launchers for any primary spacecraft carrying a DoD hosted payload. This would place the directive to utilize US-domiciled launchers properly with the manufacturer/owner of the primary spacecraft and not the DoD and remain consistent with the National Space Transportation Policy.
While hosted payloads have a definite advantage and seeking commercial opportunities is consistent with the National Space Policy and the National Space Transportation Policy, the effect of political opinion should not override realistic requirements of a DoD mission.
Finally, the hosted payload provision of the Act mandates the Secretary of Defense and the Principal Defense Space Advisor to submit a plan to increase the use of hosted payloads, which must be submitted within 180 days of the Act’s authorization. The plan is required to contain an analysis of how the DoD can increase the use of hosted payloads, including any DoD missions over the next five years that can use alternatively become a hosted payload. The plan must also include criteria and standards for new entrants into the hosted payload program. This is plainly an effort to foster competition to achieve cost-savings.
The stipulation in the Act to require hosted payloads is consistent with the National Transportation Space Policy18. Hosted payload offer many advantages to the DoD, including shorter time to space, lower cost, a more resilient architecture, increased access to space, and operational options and shared control. The Act appears to be honing in on these advantages; however, the question is to what extent the use of hosted payloads is based on political motivations versus operational realities. The use of hosted payloads is attractive from the perspective of cost, but the advantage of cost versus operational realities should be given primary consideration. That is to say, while hosted payloads have a definite advantage and seeking commercial opportunities is consistent with the National Space Policy and the National Space Transportation Policy, the effect of political opinion should not override realistic requirements of a DoD mission.
A prioritized list, by space mission area, of protection capabilities that could improve the resilience of commercial space systems.
An examination of any issues associated with the quality, integrity, security, reliability, and continuity of commercial space data.
Before submitting the assessment, the Secretary of Defense is required to consult with the commercial space industry regarding the findings in the assessment.19 Similar to hosted payloads, there may be a cost advantage to seeking commercial spacecraft for DoD space needs, but the question is to what extent political influence would effect DoD requirements when making that decision.
The act requires the President to create a National Executive Committee on Weather no later than one year after the passage of the Act.35 The purpose of the committee will be to coordinate weather-related matters across the federal departments and agencies, and the act would require the President to appoint the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Administrator of NOAA co-chairs of the committee. The committee must consist of a permanent national office secretariat, an international working group and an engineering working group.
The act requires the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program to award at least one contract to test the practicability of using commercial weather data for DoD weather modeling and forecasting. The act authorizes the Secretary of Defense to spend at least $10,000,000 of fiscal year 2017 funding to carry out the pilot program.
If two launch providers bid on a payload and both launchers have US-built engines as defined by the act, does the Secretary of Defense make the 25-percent assumption? Also, there is a question of whether the 25-percent assumption truly reflects the cost of the launcher to the federal government.
On first blush this is troubling. SBIRS is a dedicated platform for missile early warning, missile defense, battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence mission areas for DoD and the intelligence community. It is unclear what effect gathering weather data will have on those missions, not to mention whether extending the mission to gathering weather data will shorten the lifespan of the satellites and the sensors. It is likely if this act is passed and the required report is produced, these issues will be explored in addition to the practicability of utilizing this asset for weather data collection.
The act prohibits the Secretary of Defense from relying on space-based weather data provided by foreign governments and requires a briefing no later than 180 days after enactment on how DoD plans to comply with the prohibition.42 This provision was likely motivated by events in 2014, where Europe committed to maintaining a satellite over the Indian Ocean and then reversed itself several months later, creating a gap in weather coverage for the DoD over that area.
The act addresses launch services through policy, funding, and amendments to existing law.
This provision of the act appears to incentivize the use of US-built rocket engines (as defined by the act) starting in 2023 by applying a political calculus to any bid for a launcher for a DoD payload. Per Section 106, the Secretary of Defense will assume the cost to DoD in a bid that uses a rocket engine described in the Act will be 25 percent less than the price quoted in the bid. The provision does not flesh this out nor give instruction to the Secretary of Defense as to how to incorporate this calculus when evaluating a bid, nor in what circumstances it should apply.
For example, if two launch providers bid on a payload and both launchers have US-built engines as defined by the act, does the Secretary of Defense make the 25-percent assumption? Also, there is a question of whether the 25-percent assumption truly reflects the cost of the launcher to the federal government. These and other peculiarities create variables that would make a bid using this political calculus ripe for a lawsuit before the Federal Court of Claims. However, it is likely this will be a moot point as US-domiciled launch providers will likely have moved to US-built engines before this provision would take effect.
Aside from the nebulous application of this provision to future bidding, it does appear to give an implicit nod to the continued use of the RD-180 for the Atlas V until 2022 for national security payloads. If this is the case, this provision of the act could run afoul of Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and his efforts to curtail and outright ban the use of the RD-180 for national security payloads. Moreover, efforts by Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, to bring a replacement engine online for the Atlas V by 2019 could be implicated, which brings into question the political viability of this proviso.
Significantly, the act maximizes the use of commercial services, which appears to be a means to augment the value to taxpayers. However, the use of commercial services is a two-edged sword.
Use of international standards, such as the Open Geospatial Consortium.
The American Space Renaissance Act takes a bold approach to bringing national security into harmony. It also takes steps to supplement the directives of the National Space Policy, the National Space Transportation Policy, and other policies in order to address the evolving fiscal, geopolitical, and threat environment.
Significantly, the act maximizes the use of commercial services, which appears to be a means to augment the value to taxpayers. However, the use of commercial services is a two-edged sword. On one hand, competition and the use commercial services can provide cost-effective means to perform some DoD functions. On the other hand, commercial space services and competition are too easily used as political tools, which can overshadow the actual needs of warfighters. Thus, while the act makes some ambitious suppositions about the practicability of commercial entities to take over military functions, Congressional leaders would be wise to be wary that needs of the warfighters takes precedence over political presupposition.
The next installment of this series will look at Title II of the act, civil space.
This bill has yet to be formally submitted. The text used for this series is that provided on The American Space Renaissance Act website.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 101(a-b), pp. 2-3.
National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010, National Security Guidelines, pp. 13-14.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 101(a-b), pp. 3-6.
§ 2279d may be an error in drafting as the previous section is § 2279b; there is no current § 2279c.
The act does not take into consideration Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work re-designated the position of the Department of Defense executive agent for space (EA4S) to the principal DOD space advisor (PDSA) on October 5, 2015. The Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James, who was formerly the EA4S, assumed the expanded responsibilities of the PDSA. Thus, the Principal Defense Space Advisor would replace the PDSA should the act be passed into law and would likely be assumed by Secretary James or her successor.
The Deputy Management Action Group (DMAG) is one of the principal integrated civilian-military governance bodies of DoD. The DMAG meets at the discretion of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and provides advice and assistance on matters pertaining to DoD enterprise management, business transformation, and operations; and strategic-level coordination and integration of planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and assessment activities within the department.
The Defense Space Council (DSC) was created in 2010 and it is chaired by the DoD Executive Agent for Space, the Secretary of the Air Force. The DSC is the principal advisory forum to inform, coordinate and resolve space issues for DoD and to be the principal advisory forum overseeing implementation of the National Security Space Strategy. The DSC is charged with aligning requirements, acquisition and budget planning and execution with strategy and policy. It was originally chaired by the Secretary of the Air Force, and if the Secretary of the Air Force becomes the Principal Defense Space Advisor DoD policy would be revised to reflect the Secretary of the Air Force no longer chairing the DSC.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 101(d), pp. 6-7.
Id. at Sec. 101(e), pp. 7-9.
The term "congressional defense committees" as used by this Act means-the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. See 10 U.S.C. § 101 – Definitions. See also American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 109, p. 33.
The term "Milestone B approval" means a decision to enter into system development and demonstration pursuant to guidance prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the management of Department of Defense acquisition programs. "Milestone C approval" means a decision to enter into production and deployment pursuant to guidance prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the management of Department of Defense acquisition programs. See 10 U.S.C. § 2366(e)(7-8).
In an integrated program for satellite acquisition the schedules for the acquisition and the delivery of the capabilities of the segments for the program, or a related program that is necessary for the operational capability of the program, provide for the acquisition or the delivery of the capabilities of at least two of the three segments for the program or related program are less than one year apart.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 101(f), pp. 9-10.
The National Transportation Space Policy permits hosted payload arrangements on spacecraft not owned by the United States Government, but it does not address the launch of a hosted payload on a foreign launcher, except to state United States Government payloads shall be launched on vehicles manufactured in the United States unless an exemption is granted. See National Transportation Space Policy, November 21, 2013, International Collaboration, p. 8.
DoD has contracted with 14 companies for hosted payload arrangements, including Eutelsat, Intelsat General, SES Government Solutions; ,Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Space Systems Loral and Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd.
See National Transportation Space Policy, November 21, 2013, Civil and National Security Space Guidelines, p. 4.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 101(g), pp. 10-12.
National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010, Radiofrequency Spectrum and Interference Protection, p. 9.
Id. at Sec. 102 pp. 12-19.
Id. at Sec. 102(b), p. 12.
Id. at Sec. 102(b), p. 12-14.
Id. at Sec. 102(c), pp. 14-16.
This is an Air Force effort to develop a protected tactical waveform in new modems and reworked terminals as part of a long-term strategy, which will strengthen the Air Force’s ability to offer protected communications using either military or commercial satellites.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 102(d), p. 16.
Id. at Sec. 102(e), p. 17.
Id. at Sec. 102(f), p. 17.
Id. at Sec. 102(g), pp. 17-18.
Id. at Sec. 102(h), p. 18.
Id. at Sec. 102(i), pp. 18-19.
Id. at Sec. 103(a), p. 19.
Id. at Sec. 103(b), pp. 19-20.
Id. at Sec. 104(a), pp. 20-21.
Id. at Sec. 104(b), pp. 21-22.
Id. at Sec. 104(c), p. 22.
Id. at Sec. 104(d), pp. 22-23.
Id. at Sec. 104(e), p. 23.
Id. at Sec. 104(g), pp. 23-25.
Id. at Sec. 104(h), pp. 25-26.
Id. at Sec. 104(i), pp. 26-27.
Id. at Sec. 104(i), p. 27.
National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010, Preserving the Space Environment and the Responsible Use of Space, p. 11.
JICSpOC was created in 2015 in conjunction with USSTRATCOM, Air Force Space Command, and the intelligence community. The center, which is located at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is designed to facilitate information sharing across the national security space organization. JICSpOC is intended to improve processes and procedures, and ensure data fusion among DoD, intelligence community, interagency, allied and commercial space entities. JICSpOC is intended to have capabilities that will enable it to provide backup to the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). It is not intended to replace JSpOC.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 105(a), p. 28.
Id. at Sec. 105(b), p.28.
Id. at Sec. 105(c), pp. 28-29.
For this Section 106(a)(2) of the act a “rocket engine” is one that uses only unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been mined or produced in the United States, and only manufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States, shall be acquired for public use unless the head of the department or independent establishment concerned determines their acquisition to be inconsistent with the public interest or their cost to be unreasonable. 41 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(1) (popularly known as the ‘‘Buy American Act’’).
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 106(a), p. 29.
Venture-Class Launch Services (VCLS) is a Firm-Fixed Price contract utilized by NASA as a dedicated launch service for U-Class satellites (cubesats). Under the program NASA has the sole responsibility for the payload on the launch vehicle. NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) supports the CubeSat Launch Initiative (CSLI) by providing launch opportunities for cubesats that are currently on the manifest back log. Companies who have received contracts under VCLS include Rocket Lab USA, Firefly Space Systems and Virgin Galactic.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 106(b), pp. 29-31.
§ 2273a generally addresses DoD’s Operationally Responsive Space Program Office.
National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010, Commercial Space Guidelines, pp. 10-11.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 106(c), pp. 29-31.
Id. at Sec. 106(c), p. 31.
Id. at Sec. 106(d), p. 31.
“[P]ayloads shall be launched on vehicles manufactured in the United States unless an exemption is coordinated by the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor and the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy through an interagency process.” National Transportation Space Policy, November 21, 2013, International Collaboration, p. 8.
American Space Renaissance Act, 114th Congress, 2D Session, Title I, Sec. 107(a), p. 32.
See Id. at Sec. 107(b), p. 32.
Id. at Sec. 108(a), pp. 32-33.
Id. at Sec. 108(b), p.33.
Michael J. Listner is an attorney and the founder and principal the legal and policy think tank, Space Law & Policy Solutions, which identifies issues and offers pragmatic solutions relating to outer space law, policy, security and development. He is also the author and administrator of the space law and policy blog Space Thoughts.

References: § 2279

§ 2279
 § 2279
 § 2279
 § 101
 § 2366
 § 8302

§ 2273