Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321207019/United-States-v-Timothy-Horton-4th-Cir-2012
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:37:54+00:00

Document:
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
James C. Fox, Senior District Judge.
date, Horton was at the home of his girlfriend, Timeca Bryant.
procedural and factual aspects of the case in context.
Exxon store in July 2006.
was arrested and charged in this case with violating 18 U.S.C.
922(g)(1) and 924, being a felon in possession of a firearm.
the reasons discussed below, we reject both of these challenges.
counsel . . . ." (JA 87.) He offered no additional details in support of his motion.
order filed October 7, 2008. In that order, the court "advised"
ever raised the issue with the court again and Speaks represented Horton at both trials.
Defender to assign substitute counsel, which was done.
838 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1988)).
to the extent of any breakdown in communication.
did not result in any prejudice to him. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim.
could reverse an otherwise proper conviction only after concluding that the error was not harmless."); United States v.
Wilks, 46 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Even if . . . the district court abused its discretion when it denied [the defendants] request for new counsel, such an error [was] harmless"
an adequate advocate for Horton.
appeared before the district court and was placed under oath.
entitled to have his conviction vacated on this ground.
motion constituted an abuse of discretion and that he is entitled to a new trial.
use such devices. Nickel did not testify at the first trial.
tipped the scales in favor of conviction.
record. We use the spellings the parties adopted before this Court.
standard for Brady violations, he is entitled to a new trial.
Cir. 1987), and United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1359 (4th Cir.
Nickel and Fanelly, the evidence was not likely to result in an acquittal.
contest that assertion in its brief.
early as the suppression hearing, and certainly before trial.
underlying legal determination is reviewed de novo.
United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 660-61 n.24 (4th Cir.
Hortons argument as to an alleged Brady violation de novo.
is entitled to a new trial.
318 (4th Cir. 2008)." Wilson, 624 F.3d at 661; see Winston v.
affected the outcome of the trial.").
not related to the homicide investigation.
the lack of effect on the outcome of the trial, as well.
at trial, but now seek to eschew it on appeal.
occurred and Horton is not entitled to a new trial.
Agent Fanelly to testify about Hortons refusal to talk about the homicide.
of these challenges in turn.
and in failing to adequately consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.
of the murder cross-reference here, and because we remand for resentencing, we do not address these arguments.
the indictment and the only offense of which Horton was convictedthe August 10, 2007 events at Ms. Bryants home.
PSR determinedand the district court agreedwas "relevant conduct."
later died from the injury.
that they were not disguised. The attempts by victims to identify the assailants through subsequent line-ups were unsuccessful and the shotgun was never recovered.
Horton was dismissed shortly after his sentencing in this case.
been used and calls for a base offense level of 43.
preponderance of the evidence supported the finding that Horton possessed a firearm during the August 17, 2007 robbery/home invasion.
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error."
United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2009).
to address in the first instance.
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." F.C.
because district court erred in applying enhancement for "extensive scope"
cross-reference is nonetheless improper. We turn to this contention next.
any evidence at sentencing that has sufficient indicia of reliability[,]"
provide sufficient explanation for its chosen sentence and any "major"
departure would require a "more significant justification than a minor"
one. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
interrelationship of sentencing components makes it advisable to do so."
component of the sentencing decision during resentencing").
erred in its Guidelines determination.
knowledge or intent that it would be used or possessed . . . in connection with another offense, . . .
offense level is greater than that determined above.
vacated in non-relevant part on rehg, 304 F.3d 335 (4th Cir.
determine whether the murder here falls within its scope.
and omissions . . . .
which, by its express terms, requires reference to the Grouping Guideline, USSG 3D1.2.
provides for grouping together (i.e., treating as a single count) all counts charging offenses of a type covered by this subsection. . . .
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for the offense of conviction," as required for Subsection (a)(1) to apply.
the grouping of homicide offenses and other violent offenses.
apply the Grouping Guideline when determining crossreferences for murder or other violent offenses.
of conviction because both are felon-in-possession offenses.
from the acts . . . specified in [Subsection (a)(2)]."
we do not reach this issue.
of conviction need be subject to grouping).
3D1.2(d)rendering 1B1.3(a)(2)s relevantconduct definition inapplicable here.
drug offenses or to those cases in which the offense of conviction has a higher offense level than the alleged relevant conduct." Id.
properly looked to 1B1.3(a)(2) in determining the scope of "relevant conduct."
the murders there likely would have been relevant conduct under Subsection (a)(1).
Cir. 1988) ("a sub silentio holding is not binding precedent").
[murder] guideline that is used to calculate the offense level,"
Levario-Quiroz, 161 F.3d at 906; Jones, 313 F.3d at 1023 n.3.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Hortons conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
F.3d 259, 267-69 (4th Cir. 2010).
in the August 17, 2007 robbery and responsible for the murder of Ms. Harris." Maj. Op. at 19.
crimes such as Hortons prohibited possession of the .22 rifle.
hypothetical variant sentence substantively reasonable.
would justify a substantial upward variance.
hearsay, much of which was double- or triple-hearsay, largely from cooperators whose veracity could reasonably be questioned on various grounds.
Sixth Amendment); see also United States v. Sandalis, 14 F.
new trial were to be awarded on the basis of juror misconduct), op. after remand, 39 F. Appx 798, 804-05 (4th Cir.
July 3, 2002) (unpub.) (affirming convictions after considering, inter alia, evidentiary sufficiency).
the Fifth Amendments Double Jeopardy Clause. Burks v.
on that issue that it could have heard at the first hearing."
basis for the findings contained in the presentence report credible and reliable and, therefore, the court adopts those findings." J.A. 791-92.
meet its burden again on remand.
the August 2007 murder. Sometimes, obiter dicta is both useful and harmless. At other times, it is both useless and harmful, and thus inappropriate. This is one of those cases.
or adjustments were identified, is of no moment in the context of this case.
resentencing on remand, ___ F. Appx ___, 2012 WL 1111335, (4th Cir.
April 4, 2012); United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1056 (10th Cir.
2011) ("On remand, the district court should examine what losses Mr.
States v. Newman, 614 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2010).
husband could be deemed a participant in the scheme and whether appellant occupied a position of trust in respect to the federal grantor. See id.
adjustments under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c) and 3B1.3." (emphasis added)).
in the calculation of the appellants Guidelines sentencing range.
error, not the absence of error; thus, it has no salience here.
that error was harmless under the facts of this case.").
In sum, we should say no more than is needed in this case.
Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 08-309-LPS (D. Del. June 30, 2014).

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