Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/330/330mass676.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:16:39+00:00

Document:
BICKNELL REALTY COMPANY & another vs. BOARD OF APPEAL OF BOSTON & another.
Present: QUA, C.J., LUMMUS, RONAN, SPALDING, & WILLIAMS, JJ.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on August 7, 1952.
The suit was heard by Morton, J. The defendant Franks appealed from the final decree.
George A. McLaughlin, (Charles M. Goldman with him,) for the defendant Franks.
Joseph B. Abrams & Lawrence R. Cohen, for the plaintiffs.
RONAN, J. This is an appeal from a final decree annulling a decision of the board of appeal of Boston which granted a variance in the application of the zoning law authorizing the defendant Franks to construct a commercial building in a general residential district.
Queensberry Street and between the L-65 zone and Park Drive is in a residential district. This district continues far south Queensberry Street and south of said L-65 district. A portion of this residential district is located opposite the front of the locus across Park Drive and along the Fenway.
The plan and photographs show that the locus occupies a conspicuous position with reference to the Fenway, and is in plain view of some of the various apartment properties on Peterborough Street. It is contemplated to erect a building containing three stores including a clothing store which will be open every week day evening until nine o'clock. The entrances to the proposed building will be from Peterborough Street, which will be the only direct entrance of any commercial building on that part of Peterborough Street with which we are concerned.
The board is authorized to grant a change in the application of the zoning law in respect to a particular parcel of land "where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the zoning district in which it is located, a literal enforcement of the provisions of this act would involve substantial hardship to the appellant, and where desirable relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially derogating from the intent and purpose of this act, but not otherwise." St. 1924, c. 488, Section 19, as appearing in St. 1941, c. 373, Section 18.
The board purported to authorize Franks to erect and maintain a one story building covering 10,000 square feet with a second story having a floor space of 2,000 square feet, to be occupied by three stores, the one nearest to Park Drive by the Clinton Clothing Company, the second a retail store for the sale of kitchen and restaurant supplies, and the third solely as an office for a large food concern for its salesmen. The basement is to be occupied as a garage for the parking of 20 automobiles for patrons and personnel. Around the building, space will be furnished for the parking of 16 automobiles. The second story is to be used for office purposes.
by a decision of the board of appeal in Boston has been superseded by the amendment of St. 1924, c. 488, Section 19, by St. 1941, c. 373, Section 18, which now provides that an appeal may be had to the Superior Court sitting in equity, which "shall hear all pertinent evidence and determine the facts, and, upon the facts as so determined, annul such decision if found to exceed the authority of such board, or make such other decree as justice and equity may require."
Upon appeal, it is the duty of the judge to hear all the evidence and to find the facts. He is not restricted to the evidence that was introduced before the board. The decision of the board is competent evidence to enable the judge to ascertain what conclusion the board reached in order that he may determine whether upon the facts found by him the decision of the board should stand or should be annulled or should be modified. In a word, the matter is heard de novo and the judge makes his own findings of fact, independent of any findings of the board, and determines the legal validity of the decision of the board upon the facts found by the court, or if the decision of the board is invalid in whole or in part, the court determines what decision the law requires upon the facts found. Co-Ray Realty Co. Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Boston, 328 Mass. 103, 106, and cases cited.
district which extended to the east, the west, the north, and the south, for a considerable distance. The boundaries of zones must be placed somewhere. The property on the more restricted side of the boundary may suffer more damage than the less restricted property on the other side of the boundary. It may well be that land in a more restricted area far from a dividing boundary will not be damaged as much as land in the same district but located adjacent to the boundary. Zoning is an exercise of the police power which is asserted in the interests of the public welfare, and the establishment of boundaries, if not done arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably, must stand in order to accomplish the legislative objects of stabilizing the use and occupancy of property in different sections of a municipality, of protecting property owners in the various districts, and of preventing the invasion of business into residential sections.
One of the principal contentions of the landowner is that the conditions pertaining to his lot are peculiar to it and different from those connected with other parcels in the district. The judge found that the nature of the soil is such that the construction of an apartment house upon the locus would be impractical because of its cost, especially the cost for the necessary piling to support the structure. He also found that this condition of the soil is not confined to the locus but extends generally throughout the entire Back Bay area in which the locus is situated. This whole area is a filled-in swamp. Some sections have been filled in to a higher level. It was undisputed that the foundations in all of the buildings in this area rest on piling. The defendant Franks is not under any greater handicap than any other owner who intends to build, including the owner of the vacant lot almost directly across Peterborough Street from the locus. This condition, which was not peculiar to the locus, was not within the statutory provision which with other factors empowered the board of appeal to grant the variance. See Norcross v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 255 Mass. 177, 185; Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N. Y. 71, 77; Hickox v. Griffin, 298 N. Y. 365, 370-371.
The locus is vacant and has never been used for any purpose other than a parking lot in accordance with a variance granted in 1947 by the board of appeal. The fact that the landowner is unable to put the premises to a more profitable use is a factor to be considered but alone is not an adequate cause for granting a variance. That power is to be sparingly exercised. The facts found do not warrant the action of the board. Coleman v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 281 Mass. 112. Phillips v. Board of Appeals of Springfield, 286 Mass. 469. Brackett v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 311 Mass. 52. Real Properties, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 319 Mass. 180.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.