Source: https://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/p-l-d-2001-sc-233-3/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 21:56:31+00:00

Document:
Per Irshad Hassan Khan, C.J.
The above petitions under Article 188 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with Order XXVI, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, seek review of judgment dated 12th May, 2000 rendered in Constitutional Petitions Nos. 62/99, 63/99, 53/99, 57/99, 3/2000, 66/99 and 64/99.
The circumstances in Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of the Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1977 SC 657) were totally different from the circumstances existing on 12th October, 1999 and that the precedent of Begum Nusrat Bhutto has been wrongly invoked in this case.
Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s case (supra) had been disapproved in subsequent two judgments of this Court i.e. Sh. Liaqat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 504) and Mehmood Khan Achakzai v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 426). The former judgment was referred to by this Court in the judgment under review but the latter was not and that it was not a case where disapproval in subsequent judgments could be treated as obiter dicta as indicated in the impugned judgment.
The judgment in Begum Nusrat Bhutto (supra) was also impliedly repealed by the Constitution under Article 270-A.
The precise plea was that this Court had taken judicial notice of certain facts to justify Military intervention on grounds of State necessity and welfare of the people as highlighted in the case of Begum Nusrat Bhutto (PLD 1977 SC 657) but such facts were wholly non-existent in the case in hand, in that, everything was normal and all the institutions were performing their duties in accordance with the Constitution. According to the learned counsel the Law of Necessity was a dead doctrine and was wrongly invoked in the case of Nusrat Bhutto. Since the judgment was delivered in 1977, this Court observed in Sh. Liaquat Hussain’s case that the Law of Necessity cannot be invoked if its effect is to violate any provision of the Constitution. Nevertheless, even the factors outlined above were not present on 12-10-1999 to re-invoke the Law of Necessity. There is thus, an error apparent on the face of the record in the extension of Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s case to the situation as it existed on 12th October, 1999.
On no principles of necessity could power of judicial review vested in the superior Courts under the 1973 Constitution, be taken away’ (p. 716 last para extending to page 717).
Nothing has been overlooked by this Court nor it has failed to consider any important aspect of the matter, therefore, the above plea is not sufficient to sustain the review petition.
Further elaborating his appoint, Mr. Wasim Sajjad submitted that it is a matter of faith with the people of Pakistan that Supreme Sovereign is Almighty Allah and the Constitution and other laws are made by the representatives fo the people under delegated authority wherein the concept of necessity has no place whatsoever and in any case is contrary to Article 2A of the Constitution, which is now a substantive part thereof and can never be suspended nor is there a finding by this Court to the contrary, therefore, there is an error apparent on the face of the record, inasmuch as, Article 2A has not been considered at all.
Mr. S.M. Zafar, after drawing a distinction between a coup d’etat and a revolution submitted that the change on 12th October, 1999, does not claim to be based on the principle of revolutionary legality, hence the principle of Dosso’s case is not relevant and Kelsen’s is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The logical conclusion in view theeof is that the new regime, if it is not a revolutionary regime, cannot claim to be the law giving source and its legislative power are to be spelt out by the Courts.
The above proposition put forth on behalf of the Federation was not contested by the petitioner’s learned counsel in rebuttal, which means that the same was conceded by him, therefore, the same cannot be allowed to be re-argued in these proceedings.
In order to reinforce his point, Mr. Wasim Sajjad took exception to the speech of the Chief Executive dated 17th October, 1999, in which he had outlined his economic priorities and listed economic recovery as one of the main items of his seven-point agenda to contend that unfortunately, in the last nine months, there are no signs of economic recovery and, in fact, in certain respects the economic and financial situation today is worse than it was on 12th October, 1999 and that in any case, the performance of the economy is not and cannot be a valid factor for the removal of an elected Government or for invoking the law of necessity.
Similarity in the circumstances of (i) in Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s case and (ii) in this cause, in that, the then scenario dated 12-10-1999 was more serious in nature.
The import/effect of the dicta in Sh. Liaquat Hussain (supra) and Mahmood Khan Achakzai (supra) with reference to Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s case.
The nature and extent of responsibility of the Cabinet to the Parliament.
Conferment of the power to amend the Constitution on one man, as alleged by the petitioners.
The departure of Nawaz Sharif.
The time schedule for restoration of democracy.
and submitted that all the ingredients which are summarised in the above passage were duly met.
Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty, Government of Pakistan, Karachi and others (PLD 1962 SC 335).
Fida Hussain v. The Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad and another (PLD 1995 SC 701).
Suba through Legal Heirs v. Fatima Bibi through Legal Heirs and others (1996 SCMR 158).
Mian Rafiq Saiqol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited and another (PLD 1997 SC 865).
“In view of the above categorical stand taken by Mr. Khalid Anwar, this Court laid down the limitations on the power to amend the Constitution as stated above, therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be allowed to set up a totally new case in these proceedings.
The basic question, which needs to be resolved is whether the restriction imposed by the PCO 1 of 1999 on the jurisdiction of this Court does in any way restrict the power of judicial review of this Court whereunder it has an inherent power to interpret any provision of the Constitution or any other legislative instrument or law, even if that particular provision is a provision which seeks to oust the jurisdiction of this Court.
The Objectives Resolution (Article 2A) and Declaration of Quaid-I-Azam about democratic set-up and social justice envisage independence of judiciary.
It was argued that the Proclamation and the entire superstructure thereon is outside the contemplation of the Constitution.
The representatives of the people were accused of corruption and failed to establish good governance. The process of accountability carried out by the former governmetn was shady as it was directed against the political rivals. All institutions including judiciary were being systematically destroyed in pursuit of self-serving policies and the democratic institutions were not functioning in accordance with the Constitution.
The question arises whether the Chief Executive can be granted unfettered powers to amend the Constituton. Mr. Khalid Anwar emphasised that in case the Army action is condoned/validated this Court must succinctly state whether the Chief Executive has power to amend the Constitution and if so, subject to what limitations. He emphasized that in the first instance power to amend the Constitution should not be conceded to the Chief Executive and Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s case (supra) should be re-visited. In case this Court follows the dictum of Begum Bhutto’s case (supra), the power to amend the Constitution by the Chief Executive must be stated with particularity and the fields which are not to be touched should be specifically stated. Mr. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada argued that once the Army action through extra-Constitutional measure is validated, the Chief Executive should be given the power to amend the Constitution. Same view was expressed by the learned Attorney-General and Dr. Farooq Hassan. We are of the considered view that if the Parliament cannot alter the basic features of the Constitution, as hed by this Court in Achakzai’s case (supra), power to amend the Constitution cannot be conferred on the Chief Executive of the measure larger than that which could be exercised by the Parliament. Clearly, unbridled powers to amend the Constitution cannot be given to the Chief Executive even during the transitional period even on the touchstone of ‘State necessity’. We have stated in unambiguous terms in the Short Order that the Constitution of Pakistan is the supreme law of the land and its basic features i.e. independence of Judiciary, federalism and parliamentary form of Government blended with Islamic Provisions cannot be altered even by the Parliament. Resultantly the power of the Chief Executive to amend the Constitution is strictly circumscribed by the limitations laid down in the Short Order vide sub-paragraphs (i) to (vii) of paragraph 6.
We have held in the Short Order that the cases of learned former Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court, who had not taken oath under the Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2000 (Order 1 of 2000), and those Judges of the Lahore High Court, High Court of Sindh and Peshawar High Court, who were not given oath, cannot be reopened, being hit by the doctrine of past and closed transaction.
The country has a chequered political history ever since it attained its legal birth and freedom with the adoption of Government of India Act, 1935 as an interim Constitution along with the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Unfortunate as it is, after the demise of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, there has been a political vacuum in the country and mal-functioning of the institutions giving rise to military intervention in the civil affairs of the country time and again. Irrespective of the causes for military intervention, its prolonged involvement in the civil affairs will not only politicise it but would also affect its professionalism in defending the borders of Pakistan. Such a course can never be countenance by this Court. however, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, learned Senior ASC, appearing on behalf of the Federation has reaffirmed the positive assurance made by the Chief Executive in respect of holding of general elections within the timeframe laid down by this Court for restoration of democratic institutions.
We also hereby reaffirm by way of emphasis that the validation and legitimacy accorded to the present Government is conditional, inter-linked and intertwined with the holding of general elections to the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies and the State of Pakistan within the timeframe laid down by this Court leading to restoration of the democratic institutions.
Since the Chief Executive was claiming in the Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2000 (Order No. 1 of 2000), legislative power to amend the Constitution, in the absence of appropriate representative institutions, it was the duty of this Court to place checks on it. After considering all the attending circumstances, limited powers of amendment were conferred as highlighted in the judgment under review and reaffirmed in the Short Order dated 7-2-2001.
The matter was heard for months together in which over twenty-five learned Advocates of this Court including learned senior Advocates and learned amicus curiae addressed the Court. the judgment under review was rendered after threadbare consideration of each and every aspect of the matter, the case law cited at the Bar as also the pleadings of the parties vide reasons assigned in paragraphs No. 221 to 287, which does not suffer form any error or flaw whatsoever warranting interference.

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