Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19830504-990882
Timestamp: 2016-10-24 07:13:18+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 6-1 ; Violation de l'Art. 8 ; Violation de l'Art. 13 ; Satisfaction équitable réservéeNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9908/82Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-05-04;9908.82 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) EGALITE DES ARMES, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES ORAL, (Art. 6-3-c) ASSISTANCE D'UN DEFENSEUR DE SON CHOIX, (Art. 6-3-c) ASSISTANCE GRATUITE D'UN AVOCAT D'OFFICEParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : FRANCETexte : On this point the Commission recalls that Ar[icle 25 of the Convention specifies that an application can only be brought by a person who claims to be the victim of an infringement of the Convention . It has consistently been held by the Commission and confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (Klass judgment of 6 September 1978, paragraph 33), that Article 25 does not institute for individuals a mind of actio popularis permitting them to complain in absbucto against a law simply because they feel that it contravenes the Convention . The application must, accordingly also in this respect, be declared inadmissible as being incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commission
APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9908/82 X . v/FRANCE X . c/FRANC E DECISION of 4 May 1983 on the admissibilitÃ¿ of the application DECISION du 4 mai 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention : Provision not applicable to proceedings relating to7ax assessments . Article 26 of the Convention : Six months time limit calculated from the day on which a judgment, which was not pronounced in open court, is served. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the First Protocol :/n matters of income tax, a tax based on personal expenditure would only contravene this provision if, by way of a pure investment tax, it led to the real confiscation of part of the taxpayer's property . Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convenlion : Disposition inapplicable aux procÃ©dures relatives aux taxations fiscales. _ Arlicle 26 de la Convention : DÃ©lai de six mois comptÃ© Ã partir de la notification d'un anÃ©t qui n'a pas Ã©tÃ© rendu en audience publique . Article 1, paragraphe 1, du P ro tocole addidonnel : En matiÃ¨re d'impBt sur le revenu, une taxation se fondant notamment sur les dÃ©penses personnelles ne saurait Ãªtre contraire Ã cette disposition que si, par le biais de la taxation d'un pur investissement, elle conduisait Ã une rÃ©elle confiscation d'une partie des biens du contribuable .
(English : see p. 270 )
Le requÃ©rant, X ., de nationalitÃ© franÃ§aise, est nÃ© en 1930 et est domiciliÃ© Ã F . (DÃ©partement de Haute-SaÃ´ne) . Pour la procÃ©dure devant la Commission, il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Maitre Ubertazzi, avocat au barreau de Milan, ayant Ã©lu domicile chez Maitre Alain Marx, avocat au barreau de Strasbourg .
Le requÃ©rant est prÃ©sident-directeur gÃ©nÃ©ral de la sociÃ©tÃ© anonyme .Grandes Distilleries les fils P . . . II explique que pour Ã©largir la base financiÃ¨re de cette sociÃ©tÃ©, il y a investi en 1968 une somme de 1 025 000 F et en 1970 une somme de 2 000 000 F en souscrivant Ã une augmentation du capital social . Ayant dÃ©clarÃ© au titre de ces deux annÃ©es un revenu personnel de 84 410 F et 79 355 F respectivement, le requÃ©rant se vit notifier par la Direction des impÃ´ts de Vesoul le 8 juin 1969, sur la base de ses dÃ©clarations, un bordereau d'impÃ´t sur le revenu de 9 900 F et le 30 juin 1971 un bordereau de 6 634 F . . Le 3 mars 1972, les services fiscaux notifiÃ¨rent au requÃ©rant deux redressements fiscaux portant Ã 1 009 245 F l'impÃ´t sur le revenu d0 au titre de l'annÃ©e 1968 et Ã 1 818 773 F l'impÃ´t sur le revenu dG au titre de l'annÃ©e 1970 . Ces redressements Ã©taient fondÃ©s sur l'article 180 du Code gÃ©nÃ©ral des impÃ´ts, qui prÃ©voit notamment qu'en cas de dÃ©penses personnelles ostensibles et notoires excÃ©dant le revenu dÃ©clarÃ©, l'impÃ´t est calculÃ© sur la base de ces dÃ©penses, sans que le contribuable puisse faire Ã©chec Ã cette Ã©valuation en faisant valoir qu'il aurait utilisÃ© des capitaux ou r'eÃ§u des libÃ©ralitÃ©s d'un tiets . L'administration considÃ©rait en effet comme des dÃ©penses personnelles ostensibles et notoires les sommes versÃ©es par le requÃ©rant pour la libÃ©ration de nouvelles actions de la sociÃ©tÃ© P . et ajoutvit une majoration de 50 % pour insuffisance de dÃ©clarations . Contre cette dÃ©cision de taxation, le requÃ©rant recourut le 7 avril 1975 auprÃ¨s du tribunal administratif de BesanÃ§on . Par jugement du 28 mars 1979, ce tribunal a rejetÃ© le recours . Par requÃ©te sommaire du 21 mai 1979, le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© au Conseil d'Etat d'annuler le jugement du tribunal administratif et de le dÃ©charger de l'imposition et des pÃ©nalitÃ©s contestÃ©es . Alors que ce recours Ã©tait pendant, la Direction rÃ©gionale des impÃ´ts accorda d'office au requÃ©rant, le 5 fÃ©vrier 1980, un dÃ©grÃ¨vement de 943 000 F, Ã©gal aux majorations pour insuffisance de dÃ©clarations qui avaient Ã©tÃ© inclues dans les bordereaux de redressement . Par arrÃªt du 10 juillet 1981, notifiÃ© le 24 septembre 1981, le Conseil d'Etat a dÃ©clarÃ© qu'il n'y avait plus lieu Ã statuer quant aux pÃ©nalitÃ©s et a rejetÃ© le recours pour le surplus . Dans ses considÃ©rants, le Conseil d'Etat admet que la souscription d'actions rÃ©alisÃ©e par M . P . l'a Ã©tÃ© Ã titre personnel et dans le cadre de la gestion de son patrimoine privÃ© mais que mÃ©me si cet investissement avait pour but d'assurer la bonne marche de la sociÃ©tÃ© P ., il ne perdait pas pour autant son caractÃ©re de dÃ©pense personnelle et que, dÃ¨s lors, le jugement du tribunal administratif n'avait pas Ã Ãªtre annulÃ© .
Le Rapporteur de la Commission agissant en vertu de l'article 40, paragraphe 1 du RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieur, a demandÃ© au requÃ©rant s'il pouvait fournir des indications sur l'origine des fonds qÃ» il avait utilisÃ©s en 1968 et 1970 pour souscrire les augmentations de capital de 1 025 000 F et 2 000 000 F . En guise de rÃ©ponse Ã cette question, le requÃ©rant a fait transmettre par M' Marx, avocat Ã Strasbourg, une photocopie des renseignements qu'il avait fournis en son temps Ã l'administration fiscale et qui se limitent Ã dÃ©clarer que les fonds nÃ©cessaires ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©levÃ©s sur des comptes bancaires . GRIEFS . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que l'article 180 du Code gÃ©nÃ©ral des impÃ´ts es t incompatible avec le principe du procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, du fait que le contribuable n'est pas admis Ã apporter la preuve de faits qui pourraient faire Ã©chec Ã l'impÃ´sition que l'Administration lui assigne . Il invoque l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Il fait valoir que l'application qui lui a Ã©tÃ© faite de l'article 180 du Cod e prÃ©citÃ© a un caractÃ¨re confiscatoire du fait que les sommes qui ont servi aux augmentations de capital de la sociÃ©tÃ© ont fait l'objet d'une taxation au titre de dÃ©penses personnelles et n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© considÃ©rÃ©es comme des dÃ©penses exposÃ©es dans le cadre d'une activitÃ© professionnelle . Il allÃ¨gue en outre que cette imposition heurte le principe de l'Ã©quitÃ© fiscale et invoque l'article 14 de la Convention combinÃ© avec l'article 1Â° 1 du Protocole additionnel .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en premier lieu de la procÃ©dure administrative puis judiciaire relative aux red ressements d'impÃ´ts qui lui ont Ã©tÃ© adressÃ©s en 1972 pour une somme de 1 009 245 F et une somme de 1 819 773 F . Il se prÃ©tend victime d'une viola tion du p ri ncipe du procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, Ã© noncÃ© Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, en ce qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© admis Ã contester par des preuves les bases d'imposition retinues par l'administration pour Ã©tablir lesdits red ressements . 1l ressort du dossier que l'arrÃªt du Conseil d'Etat du 10 juillet 1981 n' a pas Ã©tÃ© re ndu en audience publique, mais notifiÃ© au requÃ©rant le 24 septembre 1981 . fa prÃ©sente requÃªte ayant Ã©tÃ© int roduite le 19 fÃ©v rier 1982, la Commission considÃ¨re que le dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26 de la Convention a Ã©tÃ© observÃ© en l'espÃ¨ce. . rief lui-mÃªme, la Commission .Quantg rappelle ici sa ju ri sprudence constante selon laquelle l'article 6, paragraphe l,de la Convention est inapplicable aux procÃ©dures relatives aux taxations fiscales ( DÃ©cisions NÂ° 1904/63 et aut res, Ann . 9, P . 268 ; NÂ° 2717/66, Ann . 13, p . 176 ; NÂ° 8903/80, D .R . 21, p . 246) .
Il s'ensuit que cette partie de la requÃªte est incompatible ratione materiae avec les dispositions de la Convention, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en second lieu que l'application qui lui a Ã©tÃ© faite de l'article 180 du Code gÃ©nÃ©ral des impÃ´ts viole l'article 14 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec l'article 1Â° 1 du Protocole additionnel . Selon lui, le fait de l'avoir imposÃ© sur des dÃ©penses qualifiÃ©es par l'administration de dÃ©penses personnelles, au titre de l'impÃ´t sur le revenu, a abouti Ã une vÃ©ritable confiscation de ses biens . L'article 1Â« du Protocole additionnel garantit le droit de toute personne au respect de ses biens et l'a rt icle 14 de la Convention prohibe toute discrimination dans la jouissance des droits garantis par ailleurs dans la Convention et ses protocoles . La Commission constate tout d'abord que la lÃ©gislation de la plupart des Etats parties Ã la Convention prescrit Ã l'administration de tenir compte dans certains cas, pour le calcul de l'impÃ´t sur le revenu, d'Ã©lÃ©ments complÃ©mentaires Ã©trangers au revenu proprement dit et en particulier de traiter diffÃ©remment les dÃ©penses professionnelles liÃ©es Ã l'acquisition du revenu et les dÃ©penses personnelles . Elle estime qu'une rÃ©glementation de ce genre ne saurait, d'une maniÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©rale, Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme contraire Ã l'article leT du Protocole additionnel, sauf si, par le biais de la taxation d'un pur investissement et abstraction faite de la rÃ©pression des actes d'Ã©vasion ou de fraude, elle conduisait Ã une rÃ©elle confiscation d'une partie des biens d'un contribuable . En l'espÃ¨ce, la Commission note que le Conseil d'Etat, dans son arrÃªt du 10 juillet 1981, a estimÃ© que la souscription d'actions avait Ã©tÃ© faite par le requÃ©rant Ã titre personnel et dans le cadre de la gestion de son patrimoine privÃ© . Bien qu'il y ait Ã©tÃ© invitÃ© dans le cadre de l'examen de la prÃ©sente requÃ©te, le requÃ©rant n'a fourni aucune explication suffisante sur l'origine des biens qu'il prÃ©tend avoir remployÃ©s pour souscrire Ã des augmentations de capital de la sociÃ©tÃ© dont il est actionnaire et directeur . L'affirmation que les sommes nÃ©cessaires ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©levÃ©es sur des comptes bancaires est Ã cet Ã©gard sans pertinence et n'indique que la maniÃ¨re dont les transferts de fonds ont Ã©tÃ© opÃ©rÃ©s . La Commission considÃ¨re par consÃ©quent que le requÃ©rant n'a pas montrÃ© que l'impÃ´t sur le revenu qu'il a Ã©tÃ© astreint Ã payer pour les exercices 1968 et 1970, et dont le montant s'est trouvÃ© confirmÃ© par suite de l'arrÃªt du Conseil d'Etat du 10 juillet 1981, constituait un prÃ©lÃ¨vement sur ses biens qui serait tel qu'il puisse poser un problÃ¨me sur le terrain de l'article 1Â°' du Protocole additionnel .
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La Commission constate par ailleurs que le requÃ©rant n'a apportÃ© aucun Ã©lÃ©ment tendant Ã Ã©tablir que l'article 180 du Code gÃ©nÃ©ral des impÃ´ts lui a Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ© de maniÃ¨re diffÃ©rente, en particulier plus dÃ©favorable, qu'Ã tout autre contribuable se trouvant dans une situation analogue . La Commission n'entrevoit donc, en l'espÃ¨ce, aucune discrimination, au sens de l'article 14 de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que le restant de la requÃªte doit Ãªtre rejetÃ© pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
DÃCLARE LA REQUETE IRRECEVABLE .
(TRANSLAT/O M THE FACT S The applicant, a French national, was born on 1930 and is resident in F (Department of Haute-SaÃ´ne) . In the proceedings before the Commission, he was represented by Mr Ubertazzi, barrister practising in Milan, whose address for service is c/o Mr Alain Marx, a barrister practising in Strasbourg . The applicant is chairman and managing director of the limited company "Grandes Distilleries les fils P" . He explains that, in order to enlarge the financial basis of this company, he invested the sum of 1,025,000 F in 1968 and 2,000 .000 F by increasing the capital of the company and taking up the shares so issued . Having declared, for these two years, a-pe rs onal income of 84,410 F and 79,355 F respectively, the applicant received from the Inland Revenue in Vesoul on 8]une 1969, an income tax assessment based on his returns amounting to 9,900 F and another assessment of 6,634-F on 30 June 1971 . On 3 March, the Inland Revenue sent the applicant two re vised assessments increasing the income tax payable for 1968 to 1,009,245 F and the tax for 1970 to 1,819,773 F . These revised assessments were based on A rt icle 180 of the General Tax Code which stipulates that, in cases of obvious personal expenditure exceeding the declared income, tax will be assessed on the basis of this expenditure . without the taxpayer being able to counter this assessment by alleging that he had drawn on capital or received gifts from a third party . The
Revenue treated the amounts used by the applicant to pay up the new shares in the P . company as obvious personal in his expenditure and increased the amount pavable by 50% as a penalty for making an incomplete return . On 7 April 1975 the applicant appealed against this assessment to the BesanÃ§on administrative court which dismissed his appeal by its judgment of 28 March 1979 . In a summary application of 21 May 1979, the applicant requested the Conseil d'Etat to set aside the judgment of the administrative court and to release him from the obligation to pay the tax and penalty appealed against . While this appeal was pending, the regional tax authority of its own motion, on 5 February 1980, reduced the sum payable by the applicant by 943,006 F corresponding to the increase imposed as a penalty for making incomplete returns in the revised assessments . In its judgment of 10 July 1981, which was served on 24 September 1981, the Conseil d'Etat stated that it was no longer necessary to decide the question of the penalties and dismissed the rest of the appeal . In the grounds for its decision, the Conseil d'Etat found that Mr P's purchase of shares was a personal transaction concerned with the management of his private assets and that even if this investment was intended to ensure the satisfactory performance of his company, it nonetheless retained its character of personal expenditure and there was accordingly no reason to set aside the judgment of the administrative court .
The Rapporteur of the Commission, acting in accordance with Rule 40 (1) o( the Rules of Procedure, asked the applicant if he could provide information regarding the origins of the sums of money he had used in 1968 and 1970 to tinance increases in capital of 1,025,000 F and 2,000,000 F . By way of reply, the applicant sent the Commission, through Mr Marx, a barrister practising in Strasbourg, a photocopy of the information which he had originallv supplied to the tax authorities and which merely stated that the ntecessary money had been withdrawn from bank accounts .
COMPLAINTS The applicant alleges that Article 180 of the General Tax Code is incompatible with the principle of fair trial, as there is no opportunity for the taxpayer to furnish proof of matters of fact which might destroy the foundations ot the Revenue's assessments . He relies on Article 6(1) of the Convention . He ntaintains that the application to his case of Article 1 80 of the Tax Code amounted to de facto confiscation in that the sums used to increase the capital of the Company had been taxed as personal expenditure instead of expenditure incurred in the exercise of a professional activity . He further - 271 -
alleges that this assessment runs .counter to the principle of fiscal equity and invokes Article 14 of the Convention together with Article I of the Protocol .
THE LA W 1. The applicant firstly complains of the administrative and then the judicial proceedings relating to the revised assessments of 1,000,245 F and 1 .819,773 F sent to him in 1972 . He claims that he is the victim of a violation of the principle of fair trial, set forth in Article 6 (1) of the Convention, in that he was not permitted to submit evidence to disprove the .buses of the Revenue's revised assessments . It appears from the file that the Conseil d'Etat's judgment of 10 Jul y 1981 was not delivered at a public hearing but was served on the applicant on 24 September 1981 . As the present application was filed on 19 February 1982, the Commission considens that the six months period prescribed by Article 26 of the Convention, has bÃ©en complied with in the present case . Regarding the substance of the complaint, the Commission recalls that it has consistently held that Article 6 (1) of the Convention does not apply to proceedings relating to tax assessments (Decisions No . 1904/63 and others, Yearbook 9 p . 263 ; No . 2717/66, Yearbook13, p . 176 ; No . 8903/80, D .R . 21, p . 246) . It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione matÃ©riae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . The applicant complains in the second place that the application to his case of Article 180 of the General Tax Code constitutes a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, combined with Article I of the First Protocol . He maintains that the fact that tax was levied on expenditure which the authorities classified as personal expenditure for income tax purposes, amounted to .de facto confiscation of his property . Article I of the Protocol guarantees the right of eve rybody to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and Article 14 of the Convention prohibits the application of all forms of discrimination to the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed elsewhere in the Convention and its protocols . The Commission notes in the first place that the legislation of most of the States Parties to the Convention provides that the authorities should, when assessing income tax, take account in some cases of certain other factors distinct from income in the strict sense and, in particular, accord a different treatment to professional expenditure for the acquisition of income and purely personal expenditure .
It considers that regulations of this kind should not, generally speaking, be considered incompatible with Article I of the First Protocol, except in cases where, by taxing a straightforward investment-apart from measures to counter tax avoidence or fraud-it amounted to a de facto confiscation of some part of the taxpayer's possessions . In the present case, the Commission notes that the Conseil d'Etat, in its judgment of 10 July 1981, found that the applicant subscribed the shares in his personal capacity in connection with the management of his private assets . Although requested to do so during the examination of the present application, the applicant has not provided any adequate explanation as to the origin of the property which he claims to have re-invested to fnance increases in the capital of the company of which he is a shareholder and a director . The statement that the necessary sums were taken from bank accounts is irrelevant in this context and indicates nothing more than the way in which the sums in question were transferred . The Commission accordingly considers that the applicant has not show n that the income tax which he was obliged to pay for the years 1968 and 1970, the amount of which was later confirmed by a judgment of the Conseil d'Etat on 10 July 1981, constituted a deprivation of his possessions of such a nature as to raise a problem from the standpoint of Article I of the First Protocol . The Commission, moreover, notes that the applicant has brought no evidence to show that Article 180 of the General Tax Code was applied to him ditl'erentlÃ¿, and in particular more unfavourably, than to any other taxpayer in a similar situation . The Commission accordingly does not find that there is any appearance of discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention in the present case . It follows the remainder of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n
- 273 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 04/05/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 180
 l'article 40
 l'article 180
 l'article 6
 l'article 180
 l'article 14
 l'article 1
 l'article 6
 l'article 26
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
 l'article 180
 l'article 14
 l'article 1
 L'article 1
 l'article 1
 l'article 180
 l'article 14
 l'article 27