Source: https://thirdcircuit.lexroll.com/abazaj-v-attorney-general-of-the-u-s-10-4642-3rd-cir-9-1-2011/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:19:26+00:00

Document:
ALI ABAZAJ, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES.
No. 10-4642.United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) August 17, 2011.
Opinion filed: September 1, 2011.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A088-366-138) Immigration Judge: Honorable Frederic Leeds.
Before: SMITH, WEIS and GARTH, CircuitJudges.
Ali Abazaj petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal. For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
former Yugoslavia,” entered the United States without inspection in May of 2007, and was placed into expedited removal proceedings. Abazaj did not contest his removability. Soon thereafter, he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations’ Convention Against Torture (CAT), and was found to have a credible fear of persecution.
A.166-67 (basing his belief on “some killings and some explosions that they would take responsibility for, that’s what made us believe that it was them and there couldn’t be anybody else”). Abazaj departed Kosovo on April 24, 2007, planning to enter the U.S. illegally and migrate to Detroit, Michigan, where he would “reside and seek employment.” A.546.
evidence to sustain a finding that the government was unable or unwilling to protect him. A.64, 66. Throughout, the IJ emphasized his view that this was “not a political case” of violence. See, e.g., A.66. Thus, Abazaj had not “met [his] burden of proof” of showing either past persecution, A.67, or a well-founded fear of future persecution, A.76. As Abazaj had not satisfied the asylum standard, he was not able to meet the higher standard for withholding of removal; lastly, he had demonstrated no entitlement to relief under the CAT. A.77-78.
The BIA dismissed Abazaj’s appeal, “agree[ing] with the Immigration Judge that [he] ha[d] failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum.” A.3. Abazaj had failed to show that he engaged in the work of rebuilding homes for political reasons, “or that his attackers cared about his political opinions.” A.3-4. Even if the attackers were motivated by thei own political beliefs, Abazaj’s political beliefs were not a “central reason” for the attacks. A.4. The BIA separately concluded that the mistreatment, regardless of its motivation, did not amount to persecution, A.4, and that Abazaj had failed to independently state a well-founded fear of future persecution — the IJ’s finding on the latter ground was not “clearly erroneous.” A.4. Therefore, it denied asylum, withholding, and CAT relief, dismissing the appeal. A.4-5. This petition for review followed.
review the IJ’s opinion when the BIA has substantially relied upon it. Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009). The BIA’s factual determinations, including its findings regarding past or future persecution, are reviewed for substantial evidence. See Chavarria v.Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006). Under this deferential standard of review, we must uphold those outcomes “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001); see also8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); see also Dong, 638 F.3d at 228-29.
As Abazaj commenced his petition for asylum after the May 22, 2005, effective date of the REAL ID Act, the provisions of that law apply to his case. Cf. Kaita v. Att’yGen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008). Under the Act, the old standard, which required that persecution be motivated “at least in part” by the petitioner’s political opinion, was superseded by language requiring that the petitioner “establish that . . . political opinion was or will be at least one central reason” for the persecution he faced or expects to face, and relief may not be granted if his political opinion is merely a “incidental, tangential, or superficial” motivating factor. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added); Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 142 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2011).
Abazaj argues that “he was threatened, attacked, and otherwise harmed by Albanian extremists, based on their perception that he was supporting the Serbians by rebuilding Serbian homes and selling Serbian supplies”; by his reasoning, this is the “very definition” of an imputed political opinion. Br. Of Pet. 15; see also Br. Of Pet. 24 (“[T]he record established that the persecutors perceived Mr. Abazaj as support[ing] the Serbs by selling Serbian materials and help[ing] to build houses for Serbs who had their homes destroyed and harmed him on account of that perception.”) (internal citations, quotations, modifications omitted). Therefore, he urges, the BIA erred in determining that he had not established past persecution, which would lead to his being afforded the presumption of future persecution.
De Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 219 (1st Cir. 2007).
In the alternative, Abazaj argues that he is entitled to asylum due to a well-founded fear of future persecution, as his wife continues to receive threats and armed members of anti-Serbian forces patrol the streets of Kosovo. We find that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusion that Abazaj failed to meet his burden of showing the required objective fear of future persecution. SeeLeon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2010). He has offered nothing more than his own speculation that the police are unwilling to help him, based on an assumption that the officers’ ranks are composed of former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation army, see A.189; and while the AKSh (the organization to which he believes his attackers belonged, although the record is spare on proof of this assumption) may still be active, it is unclear whether its influence has changed in the period since Abazaj’s departure.
As Abazaj has failed to meet the standard for asylum relief, he is also not entitled to withholding of removal. To the extent that Abazaj properly raised the CAT claim in his brief before this Court, we agree with the BIA that he “has not presented evidence establishing that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon returning to Kosovo.” A.5.
Abazaj gave compelling testimony about the troubles he faced in Kosovo, and has advocated well for his cause both before the BIA and before this Court. That the attacks on him were motivated by an imputed political opinion based on anti-Serbian animus is not an implausible tale. But we find that the BIA’s conclusion to the contrary was based on substantial evidence; as we are not compelled to find fault in its reasoning and basis of factual support, our deferential standard of review mandates that we leave the administrative decision undisturbed. For this reason, we will deny the petition for review.
 In his brief before the BIA, Abazaj referred to his non-political reason for purchasing these Serbian materials: they were “better made and cheaper.” A.8.
 We separately observe that Abazaj would have difficulty showing that the treatment he received, inclusive of threats directed towards his family, constituted persecution under governing case law. See Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 518 (discussing the standard for persecution).
n. 1 (3d Cir. 2005).

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