Source: https://www.juridicainternational.eu/index.php?id=14976
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:55:43+00:00

Document:
In this article, the author first attempts to find a motivated answer to the question of whether, in cases where determining the unlawfulness of the damaging of legal rights necessitates establishment of the violation of the duty of care by the tortfeasor, the latter should be proved by the injured party or violation of the duty of care by the tortfeasor should be assumed, with the tortfeasor therefore obliged to prove that the duty of care was fulfilled. Secondly, the author tries to answer the question of what a methodically applied model for the solving of a case of violation of the duty of care should look like.
Because several problems discussed below are not present in cases with similar aspects outside the Germanic law tradition, the references in this article to works by Estonian authors are supplemented primarily by views from the literature on the regulations of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch *3 (BGB). In efforts to reveal the just delictual structure of the composition of delict, additional attention has been paid to the corresponding regulations of European model laws: the Draft Common Frame of Reference *4 (DCFR) and Principles of European Tort Law *5 (PETL), which are attempts to give a uniform direction to the development of European tort law.
To discuss the impact of recognising the concept of duties of care on the general composition of delict and the distribution of the burden of proof, one should first be reminded of the traditional general composition of delict and traditional distribution of the burden of proof. Similarly to the §823 (1) of BGB, Division 1 of Chapter 53 of Estonia’s current Law of Obligations Act *6 (LOA) states that generally the basis for liability caused by fault consists in three-level composition of a delict. On the first level of the composition of delict, the objective elements of an act—the act, the consequence, and the causal relationship—have to be established. The second level has to do with unlawfulness, and on the third level fault must be assessed.
In terms of the delictual structure, the legal orders seem to agree that, traditionally, the victim has to prove the existence of damage, a relationship between the damage and the putative cause thereof, and the facts crucial in establishment of the unlawfulness. The tortfeasor has to prove all the facts that might lead to his or her release from or alleviation of the liability. However, there is no common approach to the question of who must prove the fault of the tortfeasor as a prerequisite for liability, with certain subjective elements. *11 The author finds that the issue of proving fault is particularly acute in cases of violation of a duty of care.
Liability based on violation of duties of care is first and foremost evident in cases wherein damage is done through omission or indirect acts. The author believes that this is the first major departure of these cases from the traditional structure of the general composition of delict, in which the cause of damage—the first of the objective elements of an act—consists in direct action. In cases of omission and indirect acts, the violation of legal rights can be reproached only if there has been a violation of a legal duty to behave differently. *12 Therefore, in cases of violation of a duty of care, the elements of illicit acts depend not only on having caused the consequence of violation but also on the assessment of the behaviour of the person at fault.
In terms of consequence, the liability arising from violation of a duty of care does not differ from the liability seen in the traditional approach to the general composition of delict, because the elements of an act still rest on the consequence as main element. As with direct damaging, in the case of violation of a duty of care, the consequence also depends on whether the damage caused indicates violation of legal rights that deserve protection.
In cases of omission or indirect acts, the determination of the liability-related causality does not differ from the case of direct damaging. Neither in the case of violation of a duty of care is the conditio sine qua non formula alone enough to limit the tortfeasor’s liability and prevent harmful consequences in cases wherein an obligation to compensate for damage would be unreasonable or not recommended. *14 Therefore, for creation of the obligation to compensate for damage, one has to assess whether damaging of legal rights has led to the damage for which compensation is sought in terms of the law of delict. *15 The outcome of the lawful reason test traditionally has consisted first and foremost in various modifications of adequacy theory established by J. von Kries *16 and theory addressing the purpose of the obligation.
In view of the fact that liability arising from the violation of a duty of care leads to deviations in liability elements, the structure of the composition and distribution of the burden of proof cannot remain unaffected. According to B.S. Markesinis, the question of whether the establishment of the duties of care should belong to the level of behaviour, unlawfulness, or fault has been subject to some discussion, but significant difference do not result in terms of the consequent outcome. *28 The author finds that such a position is acceptable only when one overlooks the issue of distribution of the burden of proof—i.e., which of the parties to the proceedings must carry the burden of proving the existence and violation of the objective behavioural standard in the event of violation of duties of care.
According to the main rule laid down in §1050 (1), the LOA is based on the presumption of fault, which makes it impossible to use an approach that requires the victim to prove the violation of a duty of care by the tortfeasor. While both the LOA and other legislation provide for delict compositions wherein the obligation to prove the carelessness of the tortfeasor lies with the victim *34 , the author believes that in those cases where liability arises from violation of a duty of care, one should generally rely on the presumption of fault. The author finds that the burden of proof could be imposed on the victim only if the court finds that a particular duty of care can only be violated via intent or gross negligence and that the burden of proof of the tortfeasor’s intent or gross negligence should be imposed on the victim. In the author’s opinion, the specific nature of §1050 of LOA should not be suppressed by following the example of the BGB; on the contrary, it should be highlighted and viewed first and foremost in terms of its several advantages in imposing the burden of proof of lack of fault on the tortfeasor.
The author believes that the presumption of fault proceeds primarily from the fact that delictual liability is generally applied in cases in which damage caused by the behaviour of one person is imposed on another person without a prior legal relationship. In a delict situation, victim and tortfeasor are usually unfamiliar with each other before the event; they have no former legal relationship to rely on in terms of proof. *37 Delict is generally a violation of rights taking place in a split second, unexpectedly, and progresses in such a limited time frame that no-one is able to pay accurate attention to what happens or, to be more exact, has happened. *38 In addition, in a case of violation of a duty of care, there is no direct act by the tortfeasor, which makes it very difficult for the victim to gather evidence about what happened. Thus the violation of duties of care represents delicts that—owing to the systematic nature of the evidential difficulties—are in chronic need of evidential assistance. This, however, means that in such cases, reversal of the burden of proof based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in the court would be deemed a rule, not an exception. This being the case, the author believes it to be more logical and compliant with the wording of LOA §1050 (1) to apply the presumption of fault of the tortfeasor instead of constant doctrinal reversal of the burden of proof.
Imposing the burden of proof pertaining to adherence to extrinsic care on the tortfeasor involves stricter liability *39 , but it is justified in situations wherein the violation of the obligation that is the basis for a claim has been committed within the scope of risk or power of the tortfeasor, which is traditionally not fully understandable for the victim. *40 One has to consider that in cases of violation of duties of care the victim has no access to the ‘internal sphere’ of the tortfeasor for possible explanation of potential non-compliance of the tortfeasor’s behaviour with extrinsic care. For instance, in a situation in which A leaves a manhole uncovered and B falls in, A is held responsible for causing damage to B only if A violated a protection standard or duty of care. However, B has no access to A’s ‘internal sphere’ for verification of whether A’s behaviour complied with the duty of care. Therefore, if A states that he or she was not careless, because he or she provided relevant warning signs as prescribed, then—in the author’s opinion—it would be more reasonable that A must prove his or her statements, instead of B refuting them. It is much simpler for A to prove the events that occurred in his or her ‘internal sphere’—i.e., fulfilment of the duty of care—than for B to enter an unfamiliar ‘internal sphere’ and find evidence of the violation of a duty of care (through an omission or indirect act) on the part of A.
The author believes that one must adhere to the notion that ‘an honest man has nothing to fear’ and keep in mind that adhering to the duty of care—i.e., taking special measures to protect other persons after creating a danger or while controlling the danger—should facilitate the submission of evidence. The activities related to exercise of the duty of care are usually long-term and hence easier to prove. For example, in a danger area one can find a series of reliable witnesses to building of fences or erection of a warning sign, people who participated in building such fences or noticed the presence of a warning sign prior to the event of damage. The person with the duty of care may also collect evidence of execution of the duty of care or of precautions taken to avoid the actualisation of danger—e.g., taking a photo of the situation after building the fence or putting up a warning sign, or asking someone to witness the precautions taken. Understandably, because of the unexpected nature of the event for the victim, the latter has no equivalent measures to strengthen his or her position in the proceedings.
In addition to justified relief of the burden of proof of the victim, who usually represents an involuntary participant in the delictual relationship, the author believes that presumption of fault contributes to procedural simplification in the form of more reliable evidence. The requirement that the victim prove omission of an act by the tortfeasor essentially means the obligation of the victim to prove a negative circumstance. Not only is this unreasonable for the victim; the author finds that it also involves unnecessary procedural complexity for the court. It is clearly evident that it is easier to establish something that was done than something that was not done. This is due to the fact that an event or act committed can be reconstructed from the evidence, whereas an event that did not happen or an act never committed cannot.
In the end, imposing the burden of proof of the execution of the duties of care on the person who creates the risk would, in the opinion of the author, also contribute to the improvement of overall safety, as it would force the persons creating or controlling danger to pay greater attention. Forcing someone to consider possible liability by whatever means necessary has a preventive effect, which is one of the main objectives of the law of delict.
According to Raab, in cases of violation of a duty of care pursuant to BGB regulations, the elements in the general composition of delictual liability should be set in methodical sequence on the basis of a two-level structure. The construction of the first level should begin with the objective structure of delict; here, on the basis of the evidence provided by the plaintiff, it is necessary to establish the consequence of the violation—i.e., violation of legal rights—and to assess the non-compliance of the behaviour with a duty of care. The latter presumes establishment of the violation of a duty of care, or extrinsic carelessness. This means that it is necessary to explain whether the defendant had a duty of care and whether it has been violated. A positive response to these questions enables us to conclude that the defendant has also violated extrinsic care and his or her behaviour was unlawful. Here also the facts that justify the behaviour have to be determined, which means for the defendant an opportunity to provide evidence that precludes unlawfulness. On this level, also the causality that creates liability consisting in explaining the causal relationship between the violation of a duty of care and violation of legal rights has to be established and the relationship between the damage caused and the purpose of implementing a duty of care, which means verification of whether the purpose of the duty of care was to prevent the damage that was caused to the plaintiff in the case at hand, has to be explained. On the second level of the structure of the general composition of delictual liability, the question of fault has to be assessed through determination of the delictual capacity and the following of intrinsic care *42 through the evidence provided by the defendant.
As one compares the approach based on the BGB with the regulations of the model laws that serve as attempts to create uniform European tort law, it would, in the author’s view, be an exaggeration to call the differences with the proposed method of solving a case of violation of the duty of care and the difference in the obligation of proof in the latter case fundamental. The similarities in the general composition of the delictual structure are due to the fact that, as in the BGB, neither the DCFR nor the PETL document draws a strict distinction between unlawfulness and extrinsic carelessness and they are viewed together as uniform grounds for liability. *43 The joint view of unlawfulness and extrinsic carelessness is permitted not only through the fact that violation of the duty of care basically equals extrinsic carelessness but also because in both cases the general rule applies according to which the obligation to prove both the existence of the duty of care and the violation of it rests with the aggrieved party.
Article 1:101 of Book VI of the DCFR, which states the general rule for compensation for non-contractual damage, names legally relevant damage, which is defined in Article 2:101. This means that the violation of rights deserving legal protection is also primary in the DCFR in evaluation of conduct and hence has similarity to what is described in Article 4:102 of the PETL. Article 3:102 of Book VI of the DCFR, referring to extrinsic carelessness, is largely in accordance with the PETL approach. According to the approach of both model laws, it is necessary to evaluate whether the tortfeasor has violated a general objective standard of conduct. In this, the PETL approach takes into consideration factors stated in articles 4:102 (Section 1) and 4:103 and the DCFR’s above-mentioned Article 3:102. An important provision with reference to the liability arising from violation of the duty of care is found in Section b of Article 3:102 of the DCFR’s Book VI, which states that grounds exist for liability in behaviour that does not directly violate a certain provision of the law (the provision protected) but nonetheless is not in conformity with the level of due diligence to be expected from a reasonably cautious person under the circumstances in question. The stated view is largely consistent with the theory of the unjust conduct of the act. According to both model laws, it has to be evaluated whether the particular violator’s behaviour can be blamed, which means the establishing of the existence of extrinsic carelessness (Article 4:102, Section 2 of PETL) as the last step in ascertaining liability. Unlike the PETL, Article 3:103 of the DCFR takes extrinsic carelessness into consideration only in view of the violator’s age, ignoring other subjective factors arising from the violator as grounds for mitigating or excluding liability.
1) Establishment of the consequence of the offence: violation of the protected legal right, which is to be proved by the plaintiff.
3) Assessment of whether the behaviour violated the duty of care. Here, in light of the fact of causing of damage and on the basis of §1050 (1) of LOA, it must be presumed that the defendant has violated the objective behavioural standard proved to exist by the plaintiff and that the defendant’s behaviour was unlawful. The defendant must provide evidence to disprove this presumption. For that, the defendant may prove that he or she had a foundation for justification of such behaviour (§1045 (2) of LOA) and/or provide evidence of following extrinsic care (§1050 (1) of LOA). If the defendant is unable to prove either the facts precluding unlawfulness or following of extrinsic care, one has to conclude that the defendant has violated a duty of care and that his or her behaviour has been unlawful.
4) The causality that causes the liability, consisting in explaining the causal relationship between the violation of the duty of care and the damage to the legal right (conditio sine qua non; §127 (4) of LOA), has to be established as the first stage of the causal relationship. For this, a replacement-based method has to be used, wherein the unlawful behaviour of the defendant is replaced by a lawful act to verify whether lawful behaviour would have prevented such consequences. As the second stage of the causal relationship the lawful reason for liability has to be clarified, consisting in the establishment of the relationship between the damage caused and the purpose of implementing a duty of care, which means verification of whether the purpose of the duty of care was to prevent the damage that was caused to the victim in this particular case. This has to do with the scope of protection in the case of the particular duty of care and the extent of the damage to be compensated for. In addition to determining the two stages of the causal relationship in order to follow the principle of double-causality, here attention has to be paid also to the two-level nature of the causal relationship. For this, in addition to determining the causal relationship between the violation of the duty of care and the unlawful consequence (liability inflicting causality) it has to be also determined if the unlawful consequence was the reason for the particular damage (liability fulfilling causality). The burden of proof of the circumstances of the causal relationship lies on the plaintiff on both stages and levels of the causal relationship, except when being firsthand different due to law or judicial practice.
5) Establishment of the delictual capacity of the defendant, lack of which must be proved by the defendant. A person is deemed to have delictual capacity if he or she is capable of understanding that the violation of a duty of care was unlawful (§1052 (2) of LOA).
It is important to follow the structure in order to ensure the logic of the determination and guarantee economical proceedings. Similar to the traditional general composition of delict, the scheme proposed by the author relies on the principle that the elements of an act are established in stages—in the order listed above. If any of the elements is missing, there will be no evaluation of the next element in the sequence.
5) The level of establishing subjective components of fault.
The structure of the general composition of delict provided for in the LOA is not limited to absolute legal rights. Besides the rights to life, physical and mental health, freedom, property, and similar rights, protection is granted for personality rights (§1045 (1) 4) and §§ 1046 and 1047 of LOA) and the right to established and functional economic activities (§1045 (1) 6) and §1049 of LOA). Violation of these rights is possible through the neglect of duties of care. These delicts are characterised by the fact that the unlawfulness seen in the general composition of delict must be established via a separate decision. If the delicts in question are based on the violation of a duty of care, then on the level of the establishment and violation of a duty of care further provisions should be applied to establish unlawfulness (§§ 1046, 1047 and 1049 of LOA) and take into account the factors covered in those provisions. Should the victim rely on the claim that the tortfeasor violated the particular duty of care intentionally (§104 (5) of LOA), the delict structure should consider the exception that the intent as the form of fault should be proved by the victim.
The methodical appearance of a delictual structure in the case of violation of a duty of care depends on the structural level at which the violation of a duty of care is verified. The position of control, in turn, depends on the criteria considered in establishment of the existence and violation of a duty of care and what deviations in elements may occur. Given that recognition of the concept of duties of care adds further criteria to the assessment of almost all elements of the general composition, the verification of answers does not allow relying on the traditional three-level composition of a delict. Difference between use of the BGB, DCFR, or PETL approach and the LOA approach is caused by §1050 (1) of LOA, which, unlike §823 (1) of BGB, relies on the presumption of fault of the tortfeasor. For one to follow the presumption of fault, unlawfulness and extrinsic carelessness must be formally separated, regardless of their substantial similarity. In this case, the victim has to prove the existence of a duty of care, and the tortfeasor has to prove adherence to a duty of care. The author believes that such an approach has several advantages for adjudication of cases based on violation of a duty of care. The main advantages are the removal of the duty to prove a negative fact on the part of the aggrieved party, the placing of the obligation of proof with the party in whose ‘internal sphere’ the facts that have to be proved are positioned, the facilitation of court proceedings, more reliable proof, and the preventive effect with respect to violation of duties of care.
*1 C. von Bar. Verkehrspflichten. Reichterliche Gefahrsteuerungsgebote in deuchen Deliktsrecht. Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, & Munich: Carl Heyemanns Verlag KG 1980, pp. 112–113.
*2 E. Karner. The function of the burden of proof in tort law. – H. Koziol, B.C. Steininger (eds). Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook. European Tort Law 2008. Wien & New York: Springer 2008, p. 68.
*3 Available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/BJNR001950 896.html (most recently accessed on 1.5.2012).
*4 Principles, definitions and model rules of European private law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Outline edition, prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group). C. von Bar, E. Clive, H. Schulte-Nölke (eds). Munich: Sellier. European Law Publishers 2009. Available at http://ec.europa.eu /justice/contract/files/european-private-law_en.pdf (most recently accessed on 1.5.2012).
*5 Principles of European Tort Law. Available at http://www.egtl.org/ (most recently accessed on 1.5.2012).
*6 Võlaõigusseadus. – RT I 2001, 81, 487; RT I, 8.7.2011, 21 (in Estonian).
*7 T. Tampuu. Lepinguväliste võlasuhete õigus. Loengud (Tort Law. Lectures). Tallinn: Juura 2007, p. 159 (in Estonian).
*8 I. Giesen. The burden of proof and other procedural devices in tort law. – H. Koziol, B.C. Steininger (eds). Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook. European Tort Law 2008. Wien & New York: Springer 2008, pp. 50–51.
*9 Karner (see Note 2), p. 70.
*10 R. von Jhering. Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, 5. Aufl. Leipzig, Breitkopf und Härtel 1906, p. 206.
*11 J. Lahe. Süü deliktiõiguses (Fault in Delict Law). Doctoral thesis. Tartu, Estonia: Tartu Ülikooli kirjastus 2005, p. 84 (in Estonian).
*12 B.S. Markesinis, H. Unberath. The German Law of Torts: A Comparative Treatise, 4th ed. Oxford & Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 2002, p. 81.
*13 T. Raab. Bedeutung der Verkehrspflichten und ihre systematische Stellung im Deliktsrecht. Juristische Schulung. Zeitschrift für Studium und praktische Ausbildung. 42. Jahregang, Heft 11. Munich & Frankfurt am Main: Verlag C.H. Beck 2002, p. 1042.
*14 H. Koziol, B.C. Steininger. European Tort Law 2003. Wien & New York: Springer 2004, p. 27.
*15 See P. Schlechtriem. Võlaõigus. Eriosa (Law of Obligations. Special Part). Tallinn: Juura 2000, pp. 256–259 (in Estonian).
*16 See M. Heidelberg. From Mill Via von Kries to Max Weber: Causality, Explanation, and Understanding. – U. Feest (ed.). Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen. Springer 2010, pp. 241–267.
*17 Raab (see Note 13), p. 1041.
*18 C. van Dam. European Tort Law. Oxford University Press 2006, p. 73.
*19 Raab (see Note 13), p. 1047.
*20 Bar (see Note 1), p. 112.
*21 On the definition of the concept of the duty of care in German judicial practice, see, for example, BGH 28.4.1952, BGHZ 5, S. 378, 380-381; BGH 15.6.1954, BGHZ 14, S. 83, 85; BGH 30.1.1961, BGHZ 34, S. 206, 209. In Estonian judicial practice, see Supreme Court Civil Chamber decision 3-2-1-43-09 (in Estonian).
*22 Subsection §276 (1) of BGB; §104 3) of LOA).
*23 J. Lahe. The Concept of General Duties of Care in the Law of Delict. – Juridica International 2004 (IX), p. 113.
*24 Lahe (see Note 11), p. 68.
*25 Raab (see Note 13), p. 1048. Extrinsic care is understood as consisting of the care requirements imposed on the average careful person by the legal order for the protection of third parties’ legal rights in a specific situation. Intrinsic care refers to the endeavours and efforts that a person has to make to recognise and follow the requirements of extrinsic care.
*26 H. Kötz, G. Wagner. Deliktsrecht. Neunte, überarbeitete Auflage. Neuwied & Kriftel: Luhterhand 2001, p. 44.
*27 E. Deutsch, H.-J. Ahrens. Deliktsrecht. Unerlaudte Handlungen. Schadenersatz. Schmerzengeld. 4., völlig überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, & Munich: Carl Heyemanns Verlag 2002, p. 126.
*28 Markesinis, Unberath (see Note 12), p. 86.
*29 Raab (see Note 13), pp. 1050–1051.
*30 R. Welser, B. Jud, C. Rabl. Grundriss des bürgerlichen Rechts. Band II. Schuldrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. Schuldrecht. Besonderer Teil. Erbrecht. 12., neuarbeitete Auflage. Wien: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung 2000, pp. 300–301.
*31 C. von Bar. The Common European Law of Torts, Volume 1: The Core Areas of Tort Law, Its Approximation in Europe, and Its Accommodation in the Legal System. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998, p. 126.
*32 Markesinis, Unberath (see Note 12), p. 88.
*33 Bar (see Note 31), p. 126.
*34 Therefore, for example, if violation of the protective provision (§1045 (1) 7) of LOA) presupposes intent or gross negligence, the victim has to prove the existence of said form of fault. The same applies if damage is caused as a result of intentional behaviour contrary to good morals (§1045 (1) 8) of LOA). In that case, the victim has to prove both intent and that the behaviour of the tortfeasor was contrary to good morals. Proving fault can also be a prerequisite for establishing unlawfulness in cases of special elements of delict, wherein the victim may be subject to obligation to prove all of the special elements of the act. For instance, in order for §84 (2) of the Law of Property Act to apply, the plaintiff must prove the bad faith of the defendant in possession of a thing. See T. Tampuu. Deliktiõigus võlaõigusseaduses. Üldprobleemid ja delikti üldkoosseisul põhinev vastutus (Delict Law in the Law of Obligations Act. General Problems and Liability Based on the General Composition of Delict). – Juridica 2003/2, pp. 79–80 (in Estonian).
*35 Raab (see Note 13), pp. 1050–1051.
*36 Such an approach to the distribution of the burden of proof could be called ‘separation of the burden of proof of existence and violation of the duty of care’ or ‘formal separation of unlawfulness and extrinsic carelessness’.
*37 D.G. Mattiacci. The Core of Pure Economic Loss. Amsterdam Center on Law & Economics. Working Paper No. 2005-03, p. 169. See http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=gwp (3.4.2012).
*38 Giesen (see Note 8), p. 53.
*39 V. Emmerich. BGB Schuldrecht. Besonderer Teil. 10. völlig neubearbeitete Auflage. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller Verlag 2003, p. 254.
*40 Schlechtriem (see Note 15), p. 272.
*41 Raab (see Note 13), p. 1047.
*43 G. Wagner. The Law of Torts in the Draft Common Frame of Reference. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1394343 (most recently accessed on 1.5.2012); P. Widmer. Principles of European Tort Law, Text and Commentary. European Group on Tort Law. Springer, Wien, & NewYork 2005, p. 81.
*44 Raab (see Note 13), p. 1044.
*45 Deutsch, Ahrens (see Note 27), p. 126.
*46 I. Kull, M. Käerdi, V. Kõve. Võlaõigus I. Üldosa (Law of Obligations I. General Part). Tallinn: Juura 2004, p. 200 (in Estonian).

References: §823
 §1050
 §1050
 §1050
 §1050
 §127
 §1049
 §1050
 §823
 §276
 §104
 §84
 V. 
 V.