Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/265/17.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 17:24:46+00:00

Document:
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. BURNES NAT. BANK OF ST. JOSEPH v.
[265 U.S. 17, 18] Mr. J. D. Bowersock, of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff in error.
[265 U.S. 17, 20] Mr. Solicitor General Beck, of Washington, D. C., for the United States, as Amicus curiae. [265 U.S. 17, 21] Messrs. Morton Jourdan, of St. Louis, Mo., and Charles H. Mayer, of St. Joseph, Mo., for defendant in error.
The ralator, the Burnes National Bank of St. Joseph, was appointed executor by a citizen of Missouri who died on November 22, 1922, leaving a will. The Bank applied to the proper Probate Court for letters testamentary, but was denied appointment on the ground that by the laws of Missouri national banks were not authorized to act as executors. Thereupon it applied to the Supreme Court of the State for a writ of mandamus to the Judge of the Probate Court and an alternative writ was issued. The respondent demurred, the demurrer was sustained and the [265 U.S. 17, 23] peremptory writ was denied. 257 S. W. 784. A writ of error was allowed by the Chief Justice of the State Court. The Bank claims the capacity to fill the office under the statutes of the United States.
'This excluded the power of the State in such case, although it might possess in a general sense authority to regulate such business, to use that authority to prohibit such business from being united by Congress with the banking function.' 244 U.S. 425 , 37 Sup. Ct. 737.
Now that Congress has expressed its paramount will this language is more apposite than ever. The States cannot use their most characteristic powers to reach unconstitutional results. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 , 30 Sup. Ct. 190; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 , 30 Sup. Ct. 232; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 438, 1 A. L. R. 1278. There is nothing over which a State has more exclusive authority than the jurisdiction of its courts, but it cannot escape its constitutional obligations by the device of denying jurisdiction to courts otherwise competent. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 U.S. 411, 415 , 40 S. Sup. Ct. 371, 10 A. L. R. 716. So here-the State cannot lay hold of its general control of administration to deprive national banks of their power to compete that Congress is authorized to sustain.
The fact that Missouri has regulations to secure the safety of trust funds in the hands of its trust companies does not affect the case. The power given by the Act of Congress purports to be general and independent of that circumstance and the Act provides its own safeguards. The authority of Congress is equally independent, as otherwise the State could make it nugatory. Since the decision in First National Bank of Bay City v. Fellows, [265 U.S. 17, 25] 244 U.S. 416 , 37 Sup. Ct. 734, L. R. A. 1918C, 283, it generally has been recognized that the law now is as the relator contends. In re Turner's Estate, 277 Pa. 110, 116, 120 Atl. 701; Estate of Stanchfield, 171 Wis. 553, 178 N. W. 310; Hamilton v. State, 94 Conn. 648, 110 Atl. 54; People v. Russel, 283 Ill. 520, 524, 119 N. E. 617; In re Mollineaux, 109 Misc. Rep. 75, 179 N. Y. Supp. 90. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Enright (D. C.) 264 Fed. 236.
The real question here, as I understand it, is not whether Congress may safeguard national banks against ordinary state legislation of a discriminative character; but whether Congress may intrude upon and prohibit the exercise of the governmental powers of a state to the extent that such exercise discriminates against such banks in favor of competing state corporations. The authority of the Fellows Case, I think, is pressed too far. The statute there under review simply made national banks competent to act as executors, etc., 'when not in contravention of state or local law.' The statute did not attempt to override the will of the state in that respect, but expressly recognized its control and authority. The state Supreme Court conceded that the powers thus conditionally conferred by the federal statute, in fact, would not be in contravention of the state law, but held that Congress was without constitutional authority, because the functions sought to be given to such banks were subject of state regulation. That view of the matter was rejected; but, putting aside some expressions not necessary to the decision, I do not think the case can be regarded as authority for the conclusion, apparently now reached, that Congress may so limit the power of a state, against its expressly declared will to the contrary, that it may confer the right to act as executors and administrators upon state corporations which compete with national banks, only upon condition that the same right be conferred [265 U.S. 17, 26] upon the latter. Certainly that precise question was not there presented for decision.
It is fundamental, under our dual system of government, that the nation and the state are supreme and independent, each within its own sphere of action, and that each is exempt from the interference or control of the other in respect of its governmental powers, and the means employed in their exercise. Bank of Commerce v. Comrs. of Taxes and Assessments, 2 Black, 620, 634; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 , 452, et seq., 26 Sup. Ct. 110, 4 Ann. Cas. 737; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679 , 685 (24 L. Ed. 558). 'How their respective laws shall be enacted; how they shall be carried into execution; and in what tribunals, or by what officers; and how much discretion, or whether any at all shall be vested in their officers, are matters subject to their own control, and in the regulation of which neither can interfere with the other.' Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 407, 408. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution, the sovereignty of the states 'can be more invaded by the action of the general government, than the action of the state governments can arrest or obstruct the course of the national power.' Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 570 (8 L. Ed. 483).
It is settled beyond controversy, that the right of a state to pass laws, to administer them through courts of justice, and to employ agencies for the legitimate purpose of state government cannot be taxed (Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 547); and that rule is but an application of the general and broader rule, which forbids any interference by the federal government with the governmental powers of a state. The settlement of successions to property on death is a subject within the exclusive control of the states and entirely beyond the sphere of national authority. See Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43, 55 , 56 S., 28 Sup. Ct. 1; Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 137 , 20 S. Sup. Ct. 829. Upon the death of the owner his property passes under the control of the state, and remains there until all just charges against it can be determined and paid and those who are entitled to become its new owners can be ascertained. The duty and power of the state to provide a tribunal for the accomplishment of these ends (Tilt v. Kelsey, supra), it follows, cannot be abridged by federal legislation.
The right of the owner to direct the descent of this property by will or permit it under statute, as well as the right of a legatee, devisee or heir to receive the property, are rights exclusively derived from and regulated by the state. Plummer v. Coler, supra, page 137. During the process of administration the estate, in contemplation of law, is in the custody of the court exercising probate powers, and to this court the executor or administrator is an officer. Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276, 280 (22 L. Ed. 536). 'An administrator appointed by a state court is an officer of that court; his possession of the decedent's property is a possession taken in obedience to the orders of that court; [265 U.S. 17, 28] it is the possession of the court. ...' Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 615 , 13 S. Sup. Ct. 906.
'It is not easy to see upon what principle the national Legislature can interfere with the exercise, ... of this power.' Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 77 (19 L. Ed. 101).
In my opinion, the exercise of the powers conferred upon trust companies by the legislation here under review, is governmental in its nature; and the fact that the statute discriminates in that matter against national banks (as also it does against state banks) is a negligible incident, which does not affect the validity of the statutory limitation.

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