Source: https://arizona.lexroll.com/ackerman-v-boyd-74-ariz-77-1952/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:13:19+00:00

Document:
ACKERMAN v. BOYD et al.
No. 5658.Supreme Court of Arizona.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Pima County, Robert S. Tullar, J.
Willis R. Dees, of Tucson, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Robert Morrison, County Atty., and Morris K. Udall, Chief Deputy County Atty., of Tucson, for appellees and cross-appellants.
This is an appeal and a cross-appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in a declaratory judgment action brought by a taxpayer to test the legality of a proposed bond issue by the Pima County Board of Supervisors.
1. Upholding the right of the Board of Supervisors to issue bonds and construct the courthouse under Section 17-337 et seq., without holding a bond election.
2. Denying the Board of Supervisors the right to issue bonds for the construction of a county hospital under the purported authority of Section 17-337, upon the theory that a county hospital is not a “court-house, jail or other county building” as contemplated by said Section 17-337.
courthouse and hospital can be erected and financed without a bond election.
et seq. A.C.A. 1939 requires an affirmative vote by the real property taxpayers of the county before such bonds may be issued.
The basic issue involved is whether a county of the state of Arizona may borrow money to be evidenced by its bonds and with which moneys it proposes to construct a county courthouse and a county hospital without the assent of a majority of the real property taxpayers of the county, voting at such election, when the aggregate indebtedness of the county does not exceed four per centum of the taxable property in the county to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county purposes.
floating indebtedness without first obtaining the assent of qualified property taxpayers.
number of years into the future. Undoubtedly the framers of our constitution had in mind by the enactment of this provision that the creation of indebtedness to be evidenced by bonds payable not in the immediate future but rather over a long period of years should only be with the consent of the majority of those whose property was to be obligated.
Counsel argue that since Article 9, section 8 of the Constitution only requires an election when it is proposed to exceed the four per centum limitation, no election is necessary. Such an inference, if permissible, vanishes in the face of the mandatory language of Article 7, section 13. Both constitutional provisions must be read together and harmonized. They do not present a question for reconciliation. These two identical sections were thoroughly considered in Southern Pac. Co. v. Pima County, 1931, 38 Ariz. 11, 296 P. 533, and in Southern Pac. Co. v. Maricopa County, 1942, supra, and though the identical question here presented was not before the court in either case, one cannot help but be convinced that the court was understandingly aware that these two constitutional provisions not only suggested but commanded that a question upon a bond issue, as distinguished from other indebtedness, was within the exclusive determination of the real property taxpayers. The board of supervisors, as a preliminary matter may submit such questions, but not determine them.
construction resorted to when words have a doubtful meaning. Arizona Superior Mining Co. v. Anderson, 33 Ariz. 64, 262 P. 489. We do not believe that the words, as here used, are of doubtful meaning or leave in doubt the true intent of the legislature. We reach this conclusion by determining that we are not confined in interpreting them to the context of this particular section. Section 17-309, A.C.A. 1939, enumerates the powers of the board of supervisors and contains some 30 subsections. By subsection 5, the board is authorized to “erect and maintain homes an hospitals” for the injured, sick and dependent poor of the county. (Emphasis supplied.) See Jones v. Santa Cruz County, 72 Ariz. 374, 236 P.2d 361. By subsection 6, it is authorized to “provide suitable rooms for county purposes”. In subsection 8, it is authorized to “cause to be erected and furnished a court-house, jail, hospital and such other buildings as necessary, and construct and establish a branch jail, when necessary, at a point distant from the county seat”. (Emphasis supplied.) Considering these sections together, it occurs to us that the words “or other county buildings” should not be construed to mean only buildings having the general characteristics of a courthouse or jail but rather should be construed to mean any and all kinds of county buildings. We do not believe that it was the intention of the legislature, after having specifically authorized the supervisors to erect and furnish a county hospital, subsection 8 of Sec. 17-309, to withhold the right to issue bonds for that purpose. To hold that Section 17-337 authorizes bond issues only for courthouses and jails or buildings similar to courthouses and jails would handicap the board and present an insurmountable obstacle to the performance of the duty to provide for the indigent sick and poor of the county. We are confident that no such a barrier was intended. We are aware of our decisions in such cases as White v. Moore, 1935, 46 Ariz. 48, 46 P.2d 1077; State Board of Barber Examiners v. Walker, 1948, 67 Ariz. 156, 192 P.2d 723; Russell v. Golden Rule Min. Co., 1945, 63 Ariz. 11, 159 P.2d 776; and Meyers v. Rosenzweig, 1935, 27 Ariz. 286, 232 P. 886, wherein we applied the rule of ejusdem generis in endeavoring to determine the legislative intent where the legislature had used such terms as “or any other business”, “other laborer”, “other instrument” or “others improvements”, and where it was determined that such words were restrictive in meaning. For the reasons given we conclude that the words “other county buildings” as used in the section under consideration should not be considered to be words of limitation, nor do we think that by failing to give them a restrictive meaning that such refusal can be said to be arbitrary and not consistent with our previous holdings. See Elquest v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 277, 204 P.2d 1061.
2. That any contemplated bond issues for these purposes must be submitted to a vote of the qualified real property taxpayers of the county.
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed with directions to enter judgment not inconsistent with the pronouncements herein made.
UDALL, C.J., and STANFORD, PHELPS and DE CONCINI, JJ., concur.

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