Source: https://www.thomaslaw.com/blog/category/scope-of-ceqa/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:09:47+00:00

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In California Building Industry Association v. Bay Area Air Quality Management District (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, the Supreme Court held that the scope of CEQA did not require lead agencies to consider the effect of the existing environment on a future users of a project unless the project will exacerbate those existing conditions. See http://www.thomaslaw.com/blog/supreme-court-strikes-down-reverse-ceqa-and-part-of-the-ceqa-guidelines/. The First Appellate District was tasked with determining on remand how that holding affected the Receptor Thresholds adopted by BAAQMD.
In California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist., 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 758, the appellate court considered BAAQMD’s argument that approval of the receptor thresholds did not need to be set aside because there were possible valid uses. These uses included: (1) voluntary applications by a lead agency; (2) the determination of whether a project will exacerbate existing conditions; (3) the assessment of the health risks to students and staff at a proposed school site; and (4) the evaluation of whether a housing project is exempt from CEQA.
The Court agreed with BAAQMD, but cautioned that “any effort by an agency to require an EIR, mitigating measures, or other CEQA review under the Receptor Thresholds when one is not authorized would be subject to a strong legal challenge.” The Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to issue an order invalidating the portions of the BAAQMD Guidelines that suggested that lead agencies should routinely assess the effect of existing environmental considerations on future users or occupants of a project.
BAAQMD subsequently filed a petition for rehearing and argued that writ relief was inappropriate because the Guidelines are a nonbinding, advisory document and any review was premature because there was no specific controversy regarding an application of the Guidelines. (See California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist., 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 752.) The Court disagreed and found BAAQMD’s Guidelines to be akin to the guidelines at issue in Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commission (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158. They were not “interim steps in a larger review process,” where a court may decline to use the remedy of mandamus. Therefore, the Court denied the petition for rehearing.
Recently, the California Court of Appeals issued two CEQA decisions concerning marijuana dispensary ordinances, specifically addressing whether the ordinances constitute projects under CEQA, and if so, whether the ordinances fall under the common sense exemption.
First, in a published opinion, Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of Upland, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 223, the Fourth Appellate District upheld the City’s determination that a 2013 ordinance prohibiting mobile medical marijuana dispensaries was not a project under CEQA. The City had previously adopted an ordinance in 2007 that prohibited both fixed and mobile medical marijuana dispensaries. The City’s use of a negative declaration for the 2007 ordinance was not challenged.
The Union of Medical Marijuana Patients (UMMP), a non-profit civil rights organization advocating the rights of medical cannabis patients, argued that the 2013 ordinance could have new environmental impacts that should be analyzed under CEQA. The court rejected this argument, finding that the 2013 ordinance merely restates the 2007 ordinance and thus does not constitute a project that is subject to CEQA.
Even if the ordinance did not merely restate existing law, the court still would have found that the ordinance did not constitute a project because the alleged impacts from the 2013 ordinance were too speculative.
Because the court concluded that the 2013 ordinance was not a project, it did not address the City’s claim that the ordinance was exempt under the common sense exemption.
The use of the common sense exemption was addressed in the unpublished opinion T.C. v. County of Kern, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2333 (TC). In TC, the Fifth Appellate District held an initiative measure (Measure G) placed on the ballot by Kern County, which authorized medical marijuana dispensaries but restricted them to areas zoned for industrial use, was not exempt from CEQA review pursuant to the common sense exemption.
Measure G went to the voters on June 5, 2012 and was approved with 69 percent of the vote. A lawsuit was subsequently filed alleging that the County failed to comply with CEQA.
On appeal, the court held that Measure G did not qualify for CEQA’s common sense exemption because the County’s own findings concerning Measure G explicitly identified “serious secondary effects,” including increased traffic, noise, and litter, that are caused by unregulated dispensaries. The court found that Measure G could force dispensaries currently located in non-industrial zones to relocate to unregulated areas outside of the County, causing these environmental impacts to occur.
The court also rejected contentions that Measure G qualified for two categorical exemptions set forth in sections 15308 (Class 8) and 150321 (Class 21) of the CEQA Guidelines because the adoption of Measure G by the voters did not constitute an action taken by a regulatory agency. The court further held that Measure G did not assure protection of the environment and would have caused a rebalancing and reallocation of environmental impacts.
Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s invalidation of Measure G.
Whether a particular activity constitutes a project is a question of law. Therefore, the court considers in the first instance whether the public agency’s activity will cause either a direct physical change in the environment or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment.
In comparison, whether a particular activity qualifies for the common sense exemption presents an issue of fact that is examined by the court for an abuse of discretion. The standard of review for the use of the common sense exemption is not entirely clear after the Supreme Court’s decision in Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372. Here, in the unpublished decision, the court applied the deferential substantial evidence standard but still found that the County’s use of the exemption was not supported by evidence in the record.
On December 17, 2015, the Supreme Court filed a unanimous opinion in California Building Industry Association v. Bay Area Air Quality Management District (S213478). Interestingly, this is the first CEQA opinion to be drafted by the recently appointed Justice Cuéllar. This case pertains to the adoption of thresholds of significance for greenhouse gas emissions and toxic air contaminants by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD). Some of these thresholds required lead agencies to analyze how toxic air contaminants would affect the residents and workers who would be brought to the area as a result of the proposed project.
Initially, the litigation concerned whether BAAQMD’s adoption of these thresholds was a “project” subject to CEQA review. The trial court found that it was and issued a writ of mandate invalidating the thresholds for failure to comply with CEQA. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the thresholds were not subject to CEQA review for two reasons. First, the CEQA Guidelines establish the required procedure for enacting generally applicable thresholds of significance, and prior CEQA review is not part of that process. Second, the thresholds were not a “project” because the “environmental change” alleged by California Building Industry Association (CBIA) was speculative and not reasonably foreseeable. The Supreme Court did not grant review over this issue and thus the Court of Appeal’s holding that the act of adopting thresholds is not a project under CEQA stands.
The Supreme Court granted review only on the narrow issue of whether CEQA requires an analysis of how existing environmental conditions will impact future residents or users (receptors) of a proposed project. At the appellate court, BIA had raised a facial challenge against BAAQMD’s air pollution thresholds, arguing they were contrary to a line of cases holding that CEQA does not require lead agencies to evaluate impacts of the environment on the proposed project — the so-called ‘CEQA in reverse’ issue. The First District dodged the larger issue and held that the receptor thresholds have valid applications irrespective of whether CEQA requires an analysis of how existing environmental conditions impact a project’s future residents or users, and therefore were not facially invalid. The Supreme Court chose not to review this holding.
CBIA argued that this Guideline went beyond the scope of CEQA’s statutory language and should be struck down by the Court as invalid. The Court first held that Guidelines were entitled to great weight because of the Natural Resources Agency’s CEQA expertise and because the Natural Resources Agency adopted the Guidelines pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, with its inherent safeguards of notice and comment. But this deference does not extend to provisions that are “clearly unauthorized or erroneous” under CEQA.
The court was also not persuaded that special CEQA requirements to consider the existing environment for certain airport, school, and housing construction projects evidenced a larger rule. Instead, the court viewed these as exceptions to the general rule that CEQA’s analysis is concerned with the project’s impact on the environment rather than with the environment’s impact on a project or its users.
However, the court found that in certain instances, a project may exacerbate the environmental hazards or conditions that already exist, and in those instances an agency must analyze the potential impact of such hazards on future residents. The court characterized this as a situation in which the project was affecting the environment by exacerbating these existing hazards.
As for the BAAQMD “receptor” thresholds, they will be considered on remand by the appellate court in light of the Supreme Court’s holding.
Key Point: Going forward, agencies are not prohibited from considering how existing conditions might impact a project’s future users or residents, but there is no longer a requirement to do so unless the project may exacerbate an existing onsite hazard.
In Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento, 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 150, the California Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a writ of mandate challenging the environmental impact report (EIR) for an arena in downtown Sacramento (arena project) and held the City of Sacramento (City) did not prematurely commit itself to the downtown arena project before completing the EIR.
The case is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal ruled on the arena project in three months. (Summary of Saltonstall I by the Thomas Law Group available here: http://www.thomaslaw.com/blog/appellate-court-upholds-ceqa-amendments-streamlining-approval-sacramento-arena-project/) In that case, the court held the amendments to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) streamlining the review of the arena project did not violate the constitutional separation of powers.
In the instant case, the court first rejected petitioners’ argument that the City violated CEQA by committing itself to the arena before completing the proper environmental review. The court explained the City’s nonbinding term sheet with the arena project developer expressly provided that all proposed terms of the development were subject to CEQA review. Also, the exercise of eminent domain to secure a site for the arena project did not constitute a commitment to the ultimate project site requiring prior CEQA review. The court reasoned that together CEQA Guidelines section 15004, which permits entering into land acquisition agreements as long as the public agency conditions the future use of the site on CEQA compliance, and Public Resources Code section 21168.6.6, which expressly authorized the City to prosecute the eminent domain action at issue prior to completing CEQA environmental review, demonstrated the City’s eminent domain action did not improperly commit it to the arena project.
Next, the court held the EIR was not deficient for failing to include a remodel of the City’s current basketball arena as a project alternative. The City’s objectives for the arena project included the revitalization of downtown and building a state-of-the-art entertainment venue. Even if remodeling the existing arena might be environmentally superior, the court concluded a remodeled arena would not meet the City’s downtown redevelopment objectives.
The court also rejected petitioners’ other challenges to the arena project. The court held substantial evidence supported the City’s traffic analysis conclusions and the City was under no obligation to conduct further studies simply because petitioners desired a more thorough review. The court also rejected petitioners’ argument that the EIR was deficient for not including an analysis of crowd safety impacts. The court reasoned CEQA was limited to impacts to the physical environment, which did not include crowd safety. Finally, the court stated petitioners forfeited their request to introduce certain material into the administrative record by failing to offer any meaningful analysis on the issue.
The CEQA objectives for a project are critical when courts review the alternatives analysis in an EIR. Because the City established its objectives as requiring revitalization of downtown, other alternatives outside of the downtown area that may have had less of an environmental impact could properly be rejected.
In Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 864, the California Court of Appeal for the Third District rejected a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the governor’s authority to approve a land transfer allowing an Indian tribe to build a casino in Madera County. The court held the governor is not a public agency under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and therefore, he was not required to complete an environmental impact report (EIR) before approving the land transfer.
The Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (Picayune Tribe) filed the lawsuit after the governor concurred with a decision by the Department of the Interior (DOI) to allow the North Fork Band of Mono Indians (North Fork Tribe) to acquire land for a casino along Highway 99 in Madera County. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the governor is authorized to concur with the DOI’s determination that a casino would be in the best interest of the North Fork Tribe and not detrimental to the surrounding community. The Chukchansi Tribe contended the governor was a public agency under CEQA and his concurrence constituted a project under CEQA.
The court first looked to the definition of public agency in CEQA, which states that a public agency “includes any state agency, board, or commission, any county, city and county, city, regional agency, public district, redevelopment agency, or other political subdivision.” While the list was not exclusive, the court found the examples were all governmental bodies and because the governor was an individual, the governor was not intended to fall under the definition of a public agency.
The Picayune Tribe also contended that because the Government Code expressly exempts certain actions carried out by the governor and tribes from CEQA, then other actions by the governor must be subject to CEQA requirements. The Picayune Tribe pointed to Government Code section 12012.25(g), which exempted the negotiation and execution of intergovernmental agreements governing gaming operations from CEQA “in deference to tribal sovereignty.” The court held the Picayune Tribe’s interpretation was not the only possible meaning of this provision, and that the clause, “in deference to tribal sovereignty,” suggested the provision could also be interpreted as a clarification that the tribe’s actions were not subject to CEQA.
Finally, the court rejected the Picayune Tribe’s argument that public policy supported a broad interpretation of “public agency” in order to provide the fullest possible environmental protections. The court held CEQA section 21083.1 precluded the Picayune Tribe’s interpretation because the tribe’s interpretation would impose a procedural requirement beyond what was explicitly stated in the statute.
Under the rationale in this case, the governor of California is not a public agency for purposes of CEQA.
In Friends of Eel River v. North Coast Railroad Authority, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 877, the California Court of Appeal for the First District affirmed the trial court’s determination that federal law preempts the North Coast Railroad Authority’s (North Coast) obligation to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in repairing and operating a segment of rail tracks in Northern California.
The California Legislature established North Coast to maintain rail service on the Northwestern Pacific Railroad line between Humboldt and Napa counties. After several years of closure and limited operations due to safety and maintenance issues, North Coast sought to reopen the portion of the line between Mendocino and Napa counties. North Coast entered into an agreement with Caltrans for funding to repair the line. The agreement required North Coast to comply with CEQA as a prerequisite to obtaining funds. After a comprehensive environmental review, North Coast approved a resolution certifying an EIR and adopting a statement of overriding considerations in reopening the line.
Petitioners challenged the certification of the EIR, and North Coast subsequently passed a second resolution rescinding that certification. The subsequent resolution stated North Coast had mistakenly believed it had to comply with CEQA, but had later determined it was not required to comply with CEQA because the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) governed rail operations and preempted California’s environmental regulations.
The court found that ICCTA’s “broadly worded express preemption provision” preempted CEQA as applied to railroad operations. The court held the Surface Transportation Board had exclusive jurisdiction over rail operations in the United States, and any state or local statute requiring environmental review as a prerequisite to rail operations was unduly burdensome on interstate transportation.
North Coast’s previous agreement with Caltrans, in which it voluntarily agreed to prepare an EIR, did not alter the preemption analysis. If petitioners wished to enforce a clause in that agreement, petitioners needed to bring an action for breach of contract, which they did not. Additionally, the court noted that the contract language was ambiguous because the agreement to complete an EIR mandated by CEQA would be inapplicable where CEQA was preempted.
The court distinguished this case from the Third District’s recent decision in Town of Atherton v. California High Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314. In Atherton, the court found that the market participation exception to preemption required the High Speed Rail Authority to complete an EIR as part of the process for determining where to place a line of track. In contrast, North Coast sought to upgrade an existing track. While the market participant exception normally allows a state to regulate when it is acting in the capacity of a private market participant, petitioners could not “stand the doctrine on its head” and use it to avoid preemption of a federal statute the state wishes to invoke. Even if the market participation doctrine were to apply, the court explained it only protects proprietary activities of the states, and a writ of mandate to comply with CEQA is not proprietary, but is a regulatory action. The court acknowledged the similar facts and different result from Atherton, but respectfully disagreed with that court’s analysis.
The court also rejected petitioner’s other challenges under the Tenth Amendment and judicial estoppel grounds.
While the court in Atherton applied the market participant exception to preemption defensively to compel a state agency to comply with CEQA, not all courts will apply the doctrine in such a manner. The ICCTA governs railroad operations in the United States, and statutes, such as CEQA, that unduly burden interstate transportation will be preempted by this federal law, even when the state agency otherwise agrees to comply with the state statute.

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