Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2011StMULawBestBriefOverallMiller
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:14:33+00:00

Document:
BEAU RADLEY, Petitioner, v. FAIR COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT and ARTHUR GOODE, Respondents.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Whether Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond initial seizure? If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the Fourth Amendment protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond initial seizure should that protection extend?
Marlin. Id. Marlin handcuffed Radley’s hands behind his back, and Radley was put into the back seat of Marlin’s squad car. Id. Marlin then took Radley to the Fair Police Station. Id. Upon arrival at the police station, Radley was escorted by Marlin into the booking room and handed off to Respondent Arthur Goode (Goode), a police officer also employed by the Fair County Police Department. Id. Marlin left the booking room and left Radley in the sole custody of Goode. Id. Radley’s arms were still handcuffed behind his back. Id. Upon Marlin’s exit, Goode called Radley “scum” and “white trash,” to which Radley gave no response. Id. Radley’s handcuffs were removed by Goode for the booking process and, upon completion, were recuffed too tightly. Id. Radley complained to Goode that the handcuffs were too tight. Id. Goode did nothing to fix the handcuffs. Id. At this point, Marlin returned to the booking room. Id. Radley complained to Marlin that the handcuffs were too tight, and Marlin checked and then loosened the handcuffs. Id. Goode then escorted Radley, whose hands were still handcuffed behind his back, from the booking room to a holding cell. Id. This entire time Radley was again in the sole custody of Goode. Id. In the holding cell, Goode pushed Radley to the ground and hit Radley in the back with his knee. Id. Goode told Radley that he “shouldn’t have embarrassed [Goode].” Id. Goode threatened that if he had come back, he would make Radley “regret it.” Id. Hours later, when Radley was certain that Goode was off duty, Radley complained about his injuries to one of the officers on duty and was taken to the Fair County Hospital for examination. Id. Radley sustained bruising around his wrists from the handcuffs placed on him by Goode, as well as a cut lip and bruising along his jaw from being pushed to the ground while his hands were still handcuffed behind his back. (R. at 4).
that “seizure” extends beyond the point of arrest. Such an interpretation is most in keeping with this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. II. Fourth Amendment protection extends at least until an arrestee has been arraigned or formally charged. In Graham, this Court made clear that a pretrial detainee is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, pretrial detainee status does not begin until post-arraignment, while the individual is awaiting trial. An arrestee awaiting arraignment who has yet to be given the opportunity to appear before a judicial officer for a probable cause determination retains his Fourth Amendment protections. As probable cause has yet to be determined, a more relaxed standard for excessive force is not appropriate for an arrestee. To hold otherwise is contrary to the long standing value of presumed innocence and would violate a key component of our nation’s justice system. Moreover, extending Fourth Amendment protection until arraignment provides a workable, bright-line rule, setting a clear standard for police officers when determining the level of force to use in varying situations. By limiting Fourth Amendment protection to an arrestee only so long as that person is in the custody of the arresting officer, the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case erred. ARGUMENTS STANDARD OF REVIEW A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
Since Graham, the majority of circuits deciding the issue, including, now, the Fifteenth Circuit, have adopted a “continuing seizure” doctrine applying the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness test to the use of force by police officers after the initial arrest. See, e.g., Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2010) (until a probable cause hearing); United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (“seizure” is a continuum that can extend beyond the initial restraint); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991) (until the arrestee’s first judicial hearing) Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (at least to arraignment and remains in custody of the arresting officer).
Very few courts have rejected the “continuing seizure” doctrine. See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443 (5th Cir. 1993); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190,194 (7th Cir. 1989). However, these cases can be distinguished and should not be followed in this case. In Valencia, the court held that the Fourth Amendment test is inappropriate only when the official use of force occurs after the incidents of arrest are completed, after the plaintiff has been released from the arresting officer’s custody, and after the plaintiff has been in detention awaiting trial for a significant period of time. Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1443-44. In that case, the plaintiff’s excessive force claim arose during an incident that occurred three weeks after his arrest while he was still in detention awaiting trial. Id. at 1442. In the case at hand, Radley had only been in custody for a few hours when Goode used excessive force, a miniscule period of time as compared to Valencia. A few hours in custody is not a significant period of time, so Radley’s Fourth Amendment rights had not expired, even under the Valencia standard, at the moment excessive force was used. See id. Furthermore, the Valencia standard requires that the detainee be awaiting trial when his Fourth Amendment rights expire. Id. at 1444. Radley had not yet been arraigned or even formally charged at the time Goode used excessive force, so he was not “awaiting trial.” The Fourth Circuit in Riley, relied upon this Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), claiming that Bell instructs the court to analyze excessive force under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Fourth Amendment. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162. However, this cannot be the case, as Graham, decided ten years after Bell, expressly declined to decide whether Fourth Amendment protection applies between arrest and pretrial detention. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. Also, the plaintiff in Riley was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant, so probable cause had already been established. See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1161.
Radley had not yet been arraigned, formally charged, nor had a probable cause hearing been held with regards to his arrest. The Seventh Circuit decided Wilkins before this Court decided Graham. Applying a now obsolete test, the court in Wilkins decided that the plaintiff, a person arrested but not charged or convicted, was protected by the Due Process Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193. However, one year later, and after Graham, the Seventh Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment will determine the standard of force on a person in custody most of the time. See Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990). This Court should follow the trend of the United States Courts of Appeals and uphold the Fifteenth Circuit’s decision that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect arrestees beyond their initial seizure. Such an interpretation is most in keeping with this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEIZURE EXTENDS AT LEAST UNTIL AN ARRESTEE HAS BEEN ARRAIGNED OR FORMALLY CHARGED. A. Radley’s Status at the Moment Excessive Force Was Used Does Not Fall Under This Court’s Definition of Pretrial Detainee, So His Claim Is Best Analyzed Under a Fourth Amendment Standard.
standard. Radley, when struck by Goode, could best be classified as an arrestee. As previously mentioned, the majority of circuit courts apply the Fourth Amendment, “objective reasonableness” standard to arrestees under the “continuing seizure” approach. Therefore, as Radley does not fall under this Court’s definition of pretrial detainee, he is an arrestee and any excessive force claims made by an arrestee should be judged by the Fourth Amendment standard. B. A More Relaxed Force Standard Is Not Appropriate For an Individual Prearraignment.
Amendment right to freedom from seizure was the violated constitutional right. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion, employed the “continuing seizure” approach and argued that a person is effectively seized until trial, because such a person is “scarcely at liberty” during the pretrial period. Id. at 279 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Even though Albright did not involve an excessive force claim, it is clear Justice Ginsburg sought to extend Fourth Amendment protection of an arrestee until trial, due to the fact that his liberty is still being restrained by the state. C. The “Arresting Officer” Rule Is Arbitrary and Unprecedented in This Court’s Jurisprudence, and Therefore Should Not be Utilized When Determining an Arrestee’s Constitutional Rights.
The Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the “arresting officer” rule, thus holding that the Fourth Amendment protection extends only while the arrestee remains in the custody of the arresting officer. The court based its decision on the standards set out in the Second and Sixth Circuits. See, e.g., Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (Fourth Amendment standard should probably apply until arraignment, and remains in the custody of the arresting officer); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (Fourth Amendment seizure continues while the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers). However, whether the arrestee is in the custody of the arresting officer is not the proper standard for the Fourth Amendment protection. There is nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court’s precedent that makes a distinction in the application of Constitutional rights on the basis of whether an individual remains in the custody of the arresting officer. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has since applied a Fourth Amendment standard to arrestees detained following a warrantless arrest prior to a probable cause hearing, regardless of whether arrestee was in the custody of the arresting officer. Aldini, 609 F.3d at 867.
Amendment and, as such, has a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. D. A Bright-line Rule Extending Fourth Amendment Protection Until Arraignment Would Provide a Workable Standard to Guide Police Officers as to What Type of Force They Can Use and When They Can Use It.
Adopting a “continuing seizure” approach which extends seizure until at least arraignment would provide police officers a delineation as to what type of force they can use and when they can use it. Erica Haber, Demystifying a Legal Twilight Zone: Resolving the Circuit Court Split on when Seizure Ends and Pretrial Detention Begins in § 1983 Excessive Force Cases, 19 N.Y.L Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 939, 966 (2003). Citizens should feel secure in their right to be free from excessive force, and police officers should be provided with a clear framework for the amount of force they are permitted to use in any given situation. Such a clear, bright-line rule will provide both citizens and police officers a reasonable expectation of the amount of force police officers are permitted to use. Armed with a proper guideline for appropriate force, police officers will adjust and implement the corresponding appropriate force in a particular situation. Hopefully, this will result in fewer lawsuits, relieving a small part of district courts already overcrowded dockets. Extending seizure until arraignment provides a bright-line rule that would provide a workable standard for police officers. Unlike the arresting officer rule, arraignment represents an important procedure in the criminal justice system where the accused is presented with his crime and a judicial officer reviews the probable cause. An arraignment is evidence of the value our society places on the presumption of innocence. It is also a set point in time which allows all parties to clearly understand the nature of the proceeding and the rights involved.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Undersigned counsel for petitioner certifies that this brief has been prepared and served upon all opposing counsel in compliance with the rules of the freshman moot court competition.
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Stephanie Miller, “Best Brief Contest Winner: Beau Radley v. Fair County Police Department and Arthur Goode 09-9100 Brief for Respondents,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2011StMULawBestBriefOverallMiller.

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