Source: https://www.kirschenbaumesq.com/article/city-of-santa-barbara-et-al-petitioners-v-the-superior-court-of-santa-barbara-county-respondent-terral-janeway-et-al-real-parties-in-interest
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:56:16+00:00

Document:
CITY OF SANTA BARBARA et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, Respondent; TERRAL JANEWAY et al., Real Par-ties in Interest.
(1) Contracts § 8.1--Legality--Contravening Public Policy--Exculpatory Agreements.--As a general rule, no public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the other party.
(2) Contracts § 8.1--Legality--Contravening Public Policy--Exculpatory Agreements.--Civ. Code, § 1668, invali-dates contracts exculpating a contracting party from liability for negligence when the transaction giving rise to the ex-culpatory contract affects the public interest. The social forces which characterize the public interest are volatile and dynamic, and no definition of the concept of public interest can be contained within the four corners of a formula. In-stead of attempting a formulaic definition, the court has set forth six nonexclusive factors that characterize a transaction involving the public interest and where enforcement of a release would contravene that public interest. The Tunkl fac-tors are: (1) the transaction concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation; (2) the party seeking exculpation performs a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public; (3) the service is offered to the public at large; (4) in the economic setting of the trans-action, the party seeking exculpation has a decisive bargaining advantage because the service is essential; (5) the person obtaining the service is required to sign a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation; and (6) the person obtaining the service bears the risk of the other party's carelessness.
(3) Contracts § 8.1--Legality--Contravening Public Policy--Exculpatory Agreements.--To require a party to sign an exculpatory release as a condition of participation lacks the compulsion typically found in a contract of adhesion and would not impair the public interest or violate public policy.
(5) Negligence § 91--Actions--Trial and Judgment--Questions of Fact--Gross Negligence.--A determination that gross negligence has occurred is a question of fact. Conduct that qualifies as gross negligence will vary according to the nature of the act and the surrounding circumstances as shown by the evidence.
(6) Contracts § 8.1--Legality--Contravening Public Policy--Exculpatory Agreements--Gross Negligence.--In a wrongful death action, remand was necessary for a trial court to determine whether parents could recover damages against a city and a program counselor on the theory of gross negligence, even though the mother had executed a release agreement. Undisputedly, the city and the counselor were informed of the child's propensity to suffer seizures while in the water and took substantial precautions to provide close supervision for the child in light of this propensity and her disabilities in general. Nevertheless, it was also undisputed that the child suffered a seizure shortly after she came to the pool area on the day of her drowning, and there was disputed evidence that the counselor failed to notify senior city staff of the seizure, and that the city failed to consider the significance of this seizure on the child's swimming activity that commenced minutes later. In addition, although mere inattentiveness in watching the child in the swimming pool would constitute only ordinary negligence, the record showed that the child was allowed to dive into the deep end of a crowded pool at a time when her counselor was not at her side and could not provide immediate assistance.
COUNSEL: Stephen P. Wiley, City Attorney, Janet K. McGinnis, Assistant City Attorney, Haight; Brown & Bones-teel, Peter Q. Ezzell and Nancy E. Lucas for Petitioners.
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Joanne Hoeper, Chief Trial Deputy, and Donald P. Margolis, Deputy City Attorney, for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Jane H. Adams for California Park & Recreation Society as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
[*1348] No appearance for Respondent.
Grassini & Wrinkle and Roland Wrinkle for Real Parties in Interest.
JUDGES: Perren, J., with Gilbert, P. J., concurring. Dissenting opinion by Coffee, J.
[**435] PERREN, J.--Katie Janeway, a disabled 14-year-old child, drowned while participating in a recreational activities program for developmentally disabled children operated by petitioner City of Santa Barbara (City). Her par-ents, Maureen and Terral Janeway (Janeways), filed a wrongful death action alleging that the accident was caused by the negligence [***2] of the City and Veronica Malong, a program counselor. The City and Malong filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that a release agreement signed by Katie's mother barred liability. The trial court denied the motion, and we summarily denied the City's petition for an extraordinary writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its order and grant summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted review and directed us to order respondent court to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted. We have done so.
[**436] The principal issue in the case is whether the release signed by Katie Janeway's mother is valid under Civil Code section 1668 as interpreted by Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [2 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441] (Tunkl). We conclude that, based on an analysis of the factors set forth in Tunkl, the release is valid and enforceable as a matter of law to the extent it releases the City and Malong from liability for acts of ordinary negli-gence in the operation of the City's recreational program for disabled children. Undisputed evidence establishes that the circumstances under which [***3] the release was executed by the Janeways did not have the characteristics of a con-tract of adhesion or pertain to an essential activity that was a matter of practical necessity to them. Therefore, although offering opportunities to disabled children is clearly beneficial to the public, the "public interest," as that term is used in Tunkl, would not be served by invalidating the release as to ordinary negligence.
We also conclude, however, that the release does not exculpate the City or Malong from liability for conduct con-stituting gross negligence, and that the record includes evidence creating a material triable issue as to whether the City or Malong acted with gross negligence. Public policy and the legitimate objective of the release dictate that we limit the scope of the release to ordinary negligence by the City, and exclude the more extreme and aggravated conduct that con-stitutes gross negligence.
[*1349] Accordingly, we deny the writ and return the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the Janeways may recover damages against the City and Malong on the theory of gross negligence.
The City provides extensive summer [***4] recreational facilities and activities for children, including a summer camp for children with developmental disabilities called "Adventure Camp." Katie Janeway, who suffered from cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and other disabilities, participated in Adventure Camp in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002.
Adventure Camp is conducted from noon until 5:00 p.m. on weekdays for an approximately three-week period in July and August. Camp activities include swimming, horseback riding, bowling, skating, arts and crafts, group games, sports and field trips. In 2002, as in prior years, swimming activities were held on two of five camp days each week in a City swimming pool.
In 2002, the application form for Adventure Camp included a release of all claims against the City and its employ-ees from liability, including liability based on negligence, arising from camp activities. 1 Katie's [**437] mother Mau-reen Janeway signed the release on behalf of Katie. She signed similar releases covering Katie's participation in the Camp in prior years.
1 In relevant part, the release provided: "THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DIS-CHARGES AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE THE CITY OF SANTA BARBARA, ITS EMPLOYEES, OF-FICERS AND AGENTS (hereinafter referred to as 'releasees') from all liability to the undersigned, his or her personal representatives, assigns, heirs and next of kin for any loss, damage, or claim therefore on account of in-jury to the person or property of the undersigned, whether caused by any negligent act or omission of the re-leasees or otherwise while the undersigned is participating in the City activity or using any City facilities in con-nection with the activity. [¶] THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS the releasees from all liability, claims, demands, causes of action, charges, expenses, and attorney fees ... resulting from involvement in this activity whether caused by any negligent act or omission of the re-leasees or otherwise. [¶] THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND RISK OF BODILY INJURY, DEATH OR PROPERTY DAMAGE while upon City property or participating in the activity or using any City facilities and equipment whether caused by any negligent act or omission of re-leasees or otherwise. The undersigned expressly agrees that the foregoing release and waiver, indemnity agree-ment and assumption of risk are intended to be as broad and inclusive as permitted by California law ... ."
[***5] Maureen Janeway disclosed Katie's developmental disabilities and medical problems to the City, specifi-cally informing the City that Katie was prone to epileptic seizures often occurring in water, and that Katie needed su-pervision while swimming. In addition, the City was aware that Katie had suffered seizures while attending Adventure Camp events in 2001. She had a seizure [*1350] when sitting on the pool deck and another seizure at the skating rink. Paramedics were called after her seizure on the pool deck. Nevertheless, Maureen Janeway indicated that Katie was a good swimmer, and never sought to prevent or restrict her participation in the swimming portion of Adventure Camp.
Based on the information provided by Maureen Janeway and Katie's history of seizures, the City took special pre-cautions during the Adventure Camp swimming activities in 2002. The City assigned Veronica Malong to act as a "counselor" whose responsibility was to keep Katie under close observation during the Camp's swimming sessions. Pre-viously, Malong, a college student, had worked for a year as a special education aide at the middle school Katie at-tended. Malong had observed Katie have seizures at the school, and received [***6] instruction from the school nurse regarding the handling of her seizures. Malong also received instruction during training sessions conducted by the City on handling seizures and other first aid matters.
Katie participated in the first swimming day at the 2002 Adventure Camp without incident. On the second day she drowned.
About an hour before her drowning, Katie suffered a mild seizure that lasted a few seconds while waiting to enter the pool's locker room. Malong observed the seizure and sent another counselor to report the incident to a supervisor. The supervisor stated that the report was never received. Malong watched Katie for about 45 minutes after the mild sei-zure. Then, receiving no word from her supervisor, Malong concluded that the seizure had run its course and it was safe for Katie to swim.
Malong sat on the side of the pool near the lifeguard watching the pool's deep end. In addition to the Adventure Camp participants, there were as many as 300 other children in the pool area. Malong watched Katie jump off a diving board and swim back to the edge of the pool. At Malong's insistence, Katie got out of the pool and rested for a few min-utes. Malong then asked Katie if [***7] she wished to dive again, and Katie said that she did. Katie dove into the water, bobbed up to the surface, and began to swim towards the edge of the pool. As she did so, Malong momentarily turned her attention away from Katie. When she looked back, Katie had disappeared from her sight. Approximately five min-utes later, lifeguards pulled Katie from the bottom of the pool. She died the next day.
Katie's parents, Terral and Maureen Janeway, filed a wrongful death action alleging that the accident was caused by the negligence of the City and Malong. The City and Malong moved for summary [**438] judgment and summary [*1351] adjudication. The City argued that Adventure Camp was a recreational activity that did not involve the public interest and, accordingly, the release was enforceable under Civil Code section 1668 as interpreted by Tunkl and subse-quent cases applying the Tunkl standards.
Respondent trial court denied petitioners' motion, concluding that there were material triable issues of fact regard-ing whether the release was valid under Tunkl, and whether the City and Malong acted with gross negligence. The trial court described Tunkl as invalidating any release [***8] that involved the public interest, and ruled that the City had not established that the Janeway release did not involve the public interest as a matter of law. The court analyzed the factors set forth in Tunkl, and concluded that while certain factors were present, the facts underlying other factors were dis-puted. The court also concluded that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the City and Malong acted with gross negligence. The court denied the City's request for summary adjudication of other issues.
The City and Malong contend that the release is enforceable as a matter of law under Civil Code section 1668 as in-terpreted by Tunkl because Adventure Camp provides nonessential recreational activities, and the Janeways were not compelled to sign the City's release in order to obtain recreation for their daughter. We agree.
(2) In addition, Civil Code section 1668 invalidates contracts exculpating a contracting party from liability for neg-ligence when the transaction giving rise to the exculpatory contract affects the public interest. (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 95-96; see also Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662, 670 [131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168].) In Tunkl, our Supreme Court recognized that the "social forces" which characterize the public interest "are volatile and dynamic" and that "[n]o definition of the concept of public interest can be contained within the four corners of a formula." (Tunkl, supra, at p. 98.) Instead of attempting a formulaic definition, the court set forth six nonexclusive factors that characterize a transaction involving the public interest and where enforcement of a release would contravene that public interest. The Tunkl factors are: (1) the transaction "concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation" (ibid.); (2) the party seeking exculpation performs a service "of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity [***12] for some members of the public" (id. at p. 99); (3) the service is offered to the public at large (ibid.); (4) in the economic setting of the transaction, the party seeking exculpation has a "decisive" bargaining advantage because the service is "essential" (id. at pp. 99-100); (5) the person obtaining the ser-vice is required to sign a "standardized adhesion contract of exculpation" (id. at p. 100); and (6) the person obtaining the service bears the risk of the other party's carelessness (id. at p. 101).
Here, although Katie Janeway was disabled, the reasoning and result of the numerous cases upholding releases re-quired for participation in sports and recreational activities apply to Adventure Camp and compel the conclusion that the release signed by Maureen Janeway is valid and enforceable. Adventure Camp provides recreational activities for chil-dren and Katie Janeway was swimming when her accident occurred.
The Janeways contend that the recreational activity cases are inapposite because Adventure Camp is not merely a recreational program but also provides opportunities for developmentally disabled children to participate in mainstream life. For this reason, the Janeways argue, Adventure Camp implicates different public policies and interests [***16] than a program providing summer recreation for all children.
[***17] We do not question the importance to the public of the Lanterman Act and the ADA or their policy objec-tives of eliminating discrimination and integrating the disabled into mainstream society. But, the Janeways do not claim that their daughter was denied the benefit of these statutes in the operation of Adventure Camp.
[*1355] Nor do the Janeways identify how the public policy goal of providing equal opportunity to the disabled is undermined by permitting the shifting of the risk of injury resulting from ordinary negligence to the participants. (Cf. Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 224 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1564.) The Lanterman Act and the ADA guarantee equal opportunity, not separate or preferential treatment. (See Helen L. v. DiDario (3d Cir. 1995) 46 F.3d 325, 329-330, fns. 7 & 8.) As the City and its amici curiae argue, enforcement of the release furthers the public interest because it per-mits municipalities and private business to provide recreational services to children with developmental disabilities un-der the same terms as they provide services to other children. To prevent the City from requiring a release would com-pel the City to do more [***18] than provide equal opportunity.
The evidence shows that Katie voluntarily participated in a commendable, but optional, recreational program. No public policy mandating the availability of recreational equality for the disabled requires recreational facilities or pro-grams to take any particular form or to include any specific type of activity. The Janeways were not faced with the choice of signing the City's release or leaving their daughter with no recreation during the summer months. Undisput-edly, there were other parks, other pools, other providers of various sports and recreational facilities. Adventure Camp may have been [***19] the best program for developmentally disabled children in the Santa Barbara area, but there were countless alternatives that would have given Katie an opportunity for recreation. In fact, the relevant Adventure Camp activity concerned swimming in a public pool. Katie could have gone there without enrolling in Adventure Camp.
There is also no evidence permitting the conclusion that the release, to the extent it covers ordinary negligence, fell outside the Janeways' reasonable expectations or that it was unduly oppressive or unconscionable. [**442] (See Gra-ham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 820 [171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165].) Adventure Camp provided a recreational program for disabled children that was both inclusive and directed towards the individual needs of the chil-dren. The Janeways, like countless parents of children participating in [*1356] recreational activities with some level of inherent risk, were asked to give up their right to sue for negligence. And, although a participant in Adventure Camp may have been unable to reject the proffered release, the City on its own initiative provided special supervision for Ka-tie that would seemingly be unavailable in a contract of [***20] adhesion.
The enforceability of the City's release becomes even clearer when it is measured against transactions where courts have invalidated releases under Tunkl. None of these cases have any material similarity to the instant case. None in-volved recreational services or any other governmental program offered to the public, and all involved services provided in an entirely different economic setting.
The City and Malong contend that the release covers not only ordinary negligence, but also exculpates them from liability for acts of gross negligence. 3 They [**443] argue that Civil Code section 1668 and Tunkl do not distinguish between levels of negligence, the language of the release covers "any negligent act,? and that California law does not recognize gross negligence unless the term is used in a statute. We disagree.
3 The parties submitted supplemental letter briefs at our request concerning the issue of gross negligence.
We have concluded that the release is enforceable as to ordinary negligence based on the factors set forth in Tunkl, and the City's legitimate interest in conducting its Adventure Camp program without an inordinate risk of liability. Pub-lic policy [***23] and the legitimate objective of the release, however, dictate that we limit the scope of the release to ordinary negligence. Accordingly, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the release does not exculpate the City or Malong from liability for acts or omissions constituting gross negligence.
[*1358] In deciding that the release does not extend to gross negligence, we focus on different public policy inter-ests than those considered in analyzing the release transaction under Tunkl. Here, a gravely disabled child was given the opportunity to participate in recreational activities that might otherwise be limited to children who are not disabled. The City has a legitimate interest in protecting itself [***25] from the risk of unlimited liability in offering the program. But, exculpating the City from liability for acts of gross negligence exceeds the protection reasonably necessary to pro-tect the City in the operation of Adventure Camp, and would remove its obligation to adhere to even a minimal standard of care.
We also have no reason to believe that limiting the release to ordinary negligence will expose the City to unfair second-guessing, or deter the City from providing recreational activities for its residents with developmental disabilities. We are not dealing with a high-risk sporting activity where the [*1359] inherent danger of the activity forms a [***27] principal motivation for participation. We are concerned with the supervision of vulnerable children engaged in an ac-tivity where simple enjoyment motivates participation. There may be circumstances where a release of gross negligence would be reasonable, but they are not the circumstances of this case.
The City and its amici curiae contend that, subject to Tunkl, Civil Code section 1668 only invalidates releases that exculpate a party for his or her fraud, willful injury, or violation of statutory law. They ask us to hold that releases of liability for negligence, including gross negligence, are permitted [*1360] under Civil Code section 1668 unless an-other statute expressly provides otherwise. We decline to do so.
The City and its amici curiae also claim that the release covers gross negligence because it expressly covers liability for a "negligent act and otherwise." But, to release gross negligence, the language used must be comprehensible in its essential details and clearly notify the other party of the scope of exculpation intended to the covered by the release. (See Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 748, 755 [29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177]; Madison v. Superior Court, supra, 203 Cal. App. 3d at p. 598.) Here, the phrase "negligent acts and otherwise" arguably extends to all levels of negligence and beyond, but the language does not explicitly notify the Janeways that the release is intended to cover aggravated misconduct such as gross negligence. The Janeways can be charged with fully understanding that they were releasing the City from liability for injury caused by ordinary [***31] negligence in the care of a severely disabled per-son. We cannot conclude, however, that the Janeways reasonably believed they were releasing the City from an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct. Nor can we conclude that the City itself clearly understood that its release was virtually without limitation.
In our request for supplemental letter briefs, we asked the parties to identify evidence that showed the existence of a triable issue concerning gross negligence as that term is defined under California law. The City and the Janeways both filed letter briefs.
The record supports the conclusion of the trial court that there was a material triable issue regarding gross negli-gence. There is evidence from which a trier of fact reasonably could conclude that the [**446] City and Malong were grossly negligent in their decision to allow Katie to participate in the swimming activities of Adventure Camp on the day of her death, and to use the diving board during those activities.
[*1361] (6) Undisputedly, the City and Malong were informed of Katie's propensity to suffer seizures while in the water, and took substantial precautions [***32] to provide close supervision for Katie in light of this propensity and her disabilities in general. Nevertheless, it is also undisputed that Katie suffered a seizure shortly after she came to the pool area on the day of her drowning, and there is disputed evidence that Malong failed to notify senior City staff of the sei-zure, and that the City failed to consider the significance of this seizure on Katie's swimming activity that commenced minutes later. In addition, although mere inattentiveness in watching Katie in the swimming pool would constitute only ordinary negligence, the record shows that Katie was allowed to dive into the deep end of a crowded pool at a time when her counselor was not at her side and could not provide immediate assistance.
The petition is denied. The Janeways may continue prosecution of their case in the trial court based on a gross neg-ligence theory of liability consistent with this opinion. Costs in this proceeding are awarded to the Janeways.
COFFEE, J., Dissenting.--I agree with the majority's conclusion that the release in the instant case is valid under the factors set forth in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 [32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441] [***33] (Tunkl), but dissent from the holding that the release is invalid as a matter of public policy to the extent it purports to release conduct that can be characterized as "gross negligence."
The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates that the Janeways were aware of the risks posed by their daugh-ter's participation in recreational activities. While attending Adventure Camp in prior years, Katie had suffered seizures on the pool deck and at the skating rink. Additionally, evidence offered by the City in support of its summary judgment motion showed that when Katie was in fifth grade, she attended a pool party with her classmates and suffered a seizure in the pool. A teacher and a lifeguard rescued Katie from the pool, administered first aid, and revived her. Although the Janeways were not present during this incident, they were contacted and instructed the teacher to allow Katie to go back into the pool if she wanted to resume swimming. Notwithstanding these prior incidents, the Janeways enrolled Katie in the swimming portion of Adventure Camp and declined the City's offer to require that she wear a flotation device while in the pool.
[*1362] The release executed by the Janeways provides [***34] that the City and its employees are released from all liability for personal injuries and damages caused by "any negligent act or omission ... or otherwise." In addition, the Janeways agreed to assume the risk of "BODILY INJURY [or] DEATH ... while ... using any City facilities" whether caused by "any negligent act or omission ... or otherwise." Finally, the Janeways agreed that the release was intended "to be as broad and inclusive as permitted by California law."
Civil Code section 1668 provides that it is against public policy to contract away one's responsibility for "fraud," "willful injury" or "violation of law." 1 California courts interpret the phrase "violation of [**447] law" in section 1668 to mean a violation of statutory law, not ordinary negligence. (Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662, 670 [131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168] (Gavin W.); Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 713, 716 [225 Cal. Rptr. 757].) Other than negligent violations of statutory law, section 1668 does not prohibit a release for ordinary or gross negligence.
1 All statutory references are to the Civil Code.
[***35] In Tunkl, the California Supreme Court held that the enforceability of a release of negligence must be tested on the basis of whether the transaction at issue is one that affects the public interest. (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 96-101.) If it does, the release is unenforceable; if it does not, the release is enforceable. California case law since Tunkl makes clear that it is the type of transaction and the relationship of the parties to the release, not the degree of culpability, that determines the enforceability of a release of negligence. (See, e.g., Gavin W., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 670 ["[u]nder Tunkl ... determining whether a release of liability affects the public interest, and is thus void as a mat-ter of public policy, requires analysis of the transaction giving rise to the contract--not the allegedly negligent conduct by the party invoking the release"].) Under the approach mandated by Tunkl, whether or not the party seeking to absolve itself from liability is "grossly" negligent is not relevant. A release of negligence in a transaction that does not harm the public interest is valid against [***36] any negligence.
Refusing to enforce a release under section 1668 against a "gross negligence" [***37] claim would be tantamount to creating a cause of action for gross negligence. This would, in turn, open the courthouse doors to litigants seeking to avoid the effect of standard recreational releases in favor of public entities, eliminating the protection those entities re-quire in order to conduct fiscally responsible recreational programs.
Allowing this case to proceed to trial based on a gross negligence theory despite the Janeways' prior contractual re-lease of negligence liability would also rewrite section 1668. Section 1668 renders unenforceable contracts that purport to exempt one from responsibility for his own fraud, willful personal or property damage, or violation of law. The Leg-islature has not equated negligence of any "degree" with fraud, willfulness, or violation of law. This court should not act where the Legislature has chosen not to. Any change in the law should come from the Legislature, after balancing the interests of all interested persons.
[**448] Section 2175 distinguishes between ordinary and gross negligence by expressly prohibiting a common carrier from obtaining a release from its gross negligence. 2 Because sections 1668 and 2175 were enacted in the same year, [***38] the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another) indicates that the Legislature did not intend section 1668 to prevent service providers other than common carriers from obtaining a release from gross negligence. Even if the maxim is not applied, it is clear the Legislature understood the distinction. It expressly distinguished between degrees of negligence in a specific statute covering releases obtained by common carriers, but did not make the same distinction in the more general section 1668 for service providers other than common carriers.
2 Section 2175 states that "[a] common carrier cannot be exonerated, by any agreement made in anticipation thereof, from liability for the gross negligence, fraud, or willful wrong of himself or his servants."
[***41] [*1365] [**449] The undisputed evidence showed that the Janeways did not request that any restric-tions be placed on Katie's swimming activities. Malong observed Katie have a mild seizure that lasted only a few sec-onds while she was walking in the pool lobby area. Malong tended to Katie after the mild seizure, asked her if she had taken her medication, and then waited 45 minutes before letting her enter the shallow end of the pool. Allowing Katie to resume her camp activities after a mild seizure was consistent with Malong's prior experience with Katie at school. Be-cause Katie appeared fine and cheerful, Malong allowed Katie to play in the shallow end of the pool. Twenty minutes later, Katie asked Malong if she could use the diving board. Malong sat on the side of the pool near the lifeguard as-signed to the diving well to observe Katie. Malong watched Katie jump from the diving board and swim to the edge of the pool. Malong then insisted that Katie get out of the pool to rest. After 8 to 10 minutes, because of Katie's assurances and appearance of being fine, Malong allowed her to jump from the diving board again. Malong watched Katie jump from the board, come to the surface of the water, and begin [***42] swimming to the edge of the pool. According to the undisputed evidence, Malong's attention was then diverted and she turned her eyes away from Katie for no more than 15 seconds. When she looked back, she could not see Katie and immediately walked to the deep end of the pool to look for her. Malong asked another counselor swimming toward the diving board if he had seen Katie. Malong then got into the pool and swam to the shallow end and then back to the middle of the pool. She then heard the evacuation horn and saw Katie receiving first aid.
At the time of the incident, the pool was fully staffed with five lifeguards, four of whom were stationed on the pool deck. One of the lifeguards was assigned solely to the diving well area. Although the majority opinion refers to the pool as "crowded," the City presented evidence that the diving well area was a restricted area. Only one person was allowed to use the diving board at a time, and the board user was required to clear the diving well by swimming to the side of the pool before the next person was allowed to go off the diving board. The lifeguard assigned to watch the diving well no-ticed Katie's distress, jumped out of her tower, and [***43] got to Katie, along with another lifeguard, to administer first aid. The record contains no evidence that either the City or Malong acted "willfully," "wantonly," or "recklessly" as those terms are defined in the common law. Malong's brief inattentiveness in the presence of a lifeguard and alleged failure to report Katie's earlier mild seizure to a supervisor were not, as a matter of law, "willful," "wanton," or "reck-less" acts sufficient to invalidate the release under section 1668.
[*1366] In line with the legal truism that "hard cases make bad law," we can expect this case to be cited as prece-dent in a new wave of litigation involving issues that [**450] should be legislated rather than litigated. I would grant the petition for a writ of mandate and direct the respondent superior court to grant petitioners' motion for summary judgment.

References: v. 
 § 8
 § 8
 § 1668
 § 8
 § 91
 § 8
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.