Source: https://trademarks.lexroll.com/2017/01/20/re-mt-enterprises-llc-serial-no-86420598-162017/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:14:53+00:00

Document:
Cheryl A. Clarkin, Esq. of Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C. for MT Enterprises LLC.
Tamara Hudson, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 104, Dayna Browne, Managing Attorney.
Before Zervas, Lykos and Shaw, Administrative Trademark Judges.
MT Enterprises LLC (“Applicant”) seeks to register on the Supplemental Register the mark The No Pull Harness & Leash in One in standard characters for “Animal harnesses for dogs; Animal leashes; Dog leashes; Leashes for animals; Pet products, namely, pet restraining devices consisting of leashes, collars, harnesses, restraining straps, and leashes with locking devices” in International Class 18. The terms “Harness & Leash” have been disclaimed apart from the mark as shown.
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark so resembles the registered mark NO-PULL in typed format2 on the Principal Register for “halters for domesticated animals” in International Class 18,3 that, when used on or in connection with Applicant’s identified goods, it is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration. The Trademark Examining Attorney maintained the refusal to register and denied the request for reconsideration. Thereafter, the appeal was resumed and is now briefed.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Section 2(d) refusal.
Following the refusal of the mark as merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), Applicant amended the application to the Supplemental Register. The descriptiveness refusal was then withdrawn.
“Prior to November 2, 2003, ‘standard character’ drawings were known as ‘typed’ drawings. … A typed mark is the legal equivalent of a standard character mark.” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (“TMEP”) § 807.03(i) (Oct. 2016).
Registration No. 1822770, issued on February 22, 1994; alleging February 11, 1993 as the date of first use anywhere and February 19, 1993 as the date of first use in commerce; Section 8 and 15 affidavit and declaration accepted and acknowledged; renewed.
balanced all relevant du Pont factors either argued or for which evidence was made of record. See M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (even within du Pont list, only factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered).
Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975)). Our analysis cannot be predicated on dissection of the involved marks. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Rather, we are obliged to consider the marks in their entireties. Id. See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). Nonetheless, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1161.
Applicant argues that overall, the marks are different in sound and appearance, and that the Examining Attorney has discounted the significance of the additional wording Harness & Leash in One in Applicant’s mark. As Applicant points out, its mark consists of nine syllables whereas the cited mark consists of only two syllables.
Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988). The addition of the definite article The preceding No Pull in Applicant’s mark fails to obviate the similarities since that word in this context carries little trademark significance, and if anything, serves to reinforce the significance of the term No Pull. See United States Nat’l Bank of Oregon v. Midwest Savings and Loan Assoc., 194 USPQ 232, 236 (TTAB 1977); Jay-Zee, Inc.
118 USPQ2d 1464, 1470 (TTAB 2016); Charrette Corp. v. Bowater Commc’n Papers Inc., 13 USPQ2d 2040, 2042 (TTAB 1989).
(Fed. Cir. 1997). We therefore find that No Pull is the dominant portion of Applicant’s mark. When considering The No Pull Harness & Leash in One in its entirety, it is highly similar in connotation and commercial impression to Registrant’s mark NO-PULL. Thus, because Applicant’s applied-for mark is similar in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression to the registered mark, the first du Pont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
1565, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991). Evidence of relatedness may include news articles and/or evidence from computer databases showing that the relevant goods/services are used together or used by the same purchasers; advertisements showing that the relevant goods/services are advertised together or sold by the same manufacturer or dealer; and/or copies of prior use-based registrations of the same mark for both applicant’s goods/services and the goods/services listed in the cited registration. See, e.g., In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1817 (TTAB 2014) (finding pepper sauce and agave related where evidence showed both were used for the same purpose in the same recipes and thus consumers were likely to purchase the products at the same time and in the same stores). The issue is not whether purchasers would confuse the goods, but rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of these goods. L’Oreal S.A.
Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (TTAB 2012); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984).
Harnesses and Halters. There are several great alternatives to the traditional leash and collar. While these products offer advantages to stop pulling, they must be used properly and in conjunction with training in order to be successful. Without training, dogs can and will still pull, regardless of the product being used; they must be taught to walk with slack in the leash. If you are unsure how to fit your harness, we can schedule an appointment for a technician to fit the harness or head halter to your pet.
Excerpt from Lincoln Land Animal Clinic, Ltd. web site http://www.lincolnandac.com/harnesses-and-head-halters.pml submitted with Final Office action dated August 28, 2015.
See also the web page excerpt from That Pet Place “Picking the Perfect Collar: The right choice makes all the difference!” at http://www.thatpetplace.com/choosing-dogcollars-harnesses-and-halters submitted with Final Office action dated August 28, 2015 (“Halter – Also known as a Head Collar, and sometimes confused with a muzzle, a Halter Dog Collar is a specialized anti-pulling training collar.”). In addition, animal leashes and halters are used together, making them by their very nature complementary products. See id.
(TTAB 1993); and In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988).
Hamilton Premium Pet Products (http://hamiltonproducts.com): An online retailer and manufacturer of pet products offering leashes, harnesses and halters for dogs, cats, horses, show animals and livestock under the same mark Hamilton.
Genuine Dog Gear (http://www.genuinedoggear.com/dog_halter.html): An online retailer selling a variety of goods manufactured by others for dogs including leashes and halters.
Wonder Walker Body Halter (http://www.wonderwalkbodyhalter.com) an online retailer offering a halters for dogs and various types of leashes.
See Final Office Action dated August 28, 2015. As the aforementioned evidence demonstrates, it is not uncommon for manufacturers to both make and offer for sale domesticated animal halters, harnesses and leashes. This constitutes further evidence that consumers may expect to find both Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods as identified in the involved application and cited registration as emanating from a common source.
In view of the evidence of record, we find that the goods identified in the application and registration are either closely related, perform the same function or consist of complementary products. As such, the second du Pont factor also weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
Next we consider established, likely-to-continue channels of trade, the third du Pont factor. Because the identifications in the application and cited registration for the mark have no restrictions on channels of trade, we must presume that the goods travel in all channels of trade appropriate for such goods, which the record shows include direct manufacturer operated web sites specializing in pet and animal products. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 62 USPQ2d at 1005). See Final Office Action dated August 28, 2015 (evidence summarized above from third party web sites). In addition, both parties’ goods may be encountered by the same prospective consumers, which includes members of the general public who own domesticated animal and are seeking to limit or prevent their domesticated animal or pet from pulling.
As such, the third du Pont factor regarding the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely to continue trade channels also favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
We will now consider the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods, the sixth du Pont factor. In an ex parte appeal, “[t]he purpose of [an applicant] introducing third-party uses is to show that customers have become so conditioned by a plethora of such similar marks that customers have been educated to distinguish between different such marks on the bases of minute distinctions.” Palm Bay, 73 USPQ2d at 1694. See also Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co.
American Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research Institute, 101 USPQ2d 1022, 1028 (TTAB 2011) (citing Tea Board of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1881, 1899 (TTAB 2006) and McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:83 (4th ed. 2011) (“The first enquiry focuses on the inherent potential of the term at the time of its first use. The second evaluates the actual customer recognition value of the mark at the time registration is sought or at the time the mark is asserted in litigation to prevent another’s use.”)).
Applicant maintains that the common element in both marks – the word “pull” – is conceptually weak and highly descriptive as applied to pet products. In support thereof, Applicant has made of record the following Principal Register third-party registrations purportedly to show that “pull” as a trademark is weak in connection with the goods and therefore deserving of less protection.
(TTAB 1987); United Foods Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 4 USPQ2d 1172, 1174 (TTAB 1987).
The mark PULL-EZE is of little relevance here because it projects a different meaning and commercial impression in light of the double entendre with the word “please.” Similarly, the mark PULL STOP engenders a different connotation and commercial impression than the cited mark because it appears to be a play on the phrase “full stop.” Registration Nos. 4581881, 4808919, 4264070, 2809848, 4052865, 4381519 (albeit for pet products) are not for the same or related goods (such as harnesses, halters or leashes) and as such are of minimal probative value. The remaining registration for the mark SOFT-PULL is of minimal, if any, probative value because we cannot determine from the face of the registration whether the term “pull” is descriptive or generic of Registrant’s “halters for domesticated animals” since it is on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness and includes a hyphen between the two terms in the mark, and the assigned Examining Attorney may have consider the mark to be unitary. .
“There are two types of no-pull harnesses. One type has a leash attachment at the ring of the center of the dog’s chest … The other type works by gently tightening around your dog’s chest or leg area.” Excerpts from Pet Smart web site entitled “FAQs About Dog Harnesses” attached February 2, 2015 Office Action.
“In order to help every dog and person to have an enjoyable walk, we offer a variety of gentle and tested to be effective no-pull solutions. Excerpts from Pet Expertise web site article entitled “Compare Gentle & Effective No-Pull Training Devices from Pet Expertise” attached to February 2, 2015 Office Action.
“In a limited gait analysis study, Dr. Zink observed that dogs wearing no-pull, front clip harnesses bore less weight on their front legs than they normally would …” The Whole Dog Journal article entitled “The No-Pull Debate” attached to February 2, 2015 Office Action.
HORGAN NO-PULL HARNESS HIND-END HARNESS. See February 2, 2015 Office Action.
Pizza Holding Co., 95 USPQ2d 1271, 1278 (TTAB 2009), aff’d, 415 Fed. Appx. (Fed. Cir.
2010). This sixth du Pont factor therefore weighs against finding a likelihood of confusion.
Next we consider the conditions under which the goods are likely to be purchased, e.g., whether on impulse or after careful consideration, as well as the degree, if any, of sophistication of the consumers. Purchaser sophistication or degree of care may tend to minimize likelihood of confusion. Conversely, impulse purchases of inexpensive items may tend to have the opposite effect. Palm Bay, 73 USPQ2d at 1695.
Applicant argues that the goods offered under Applicant’s mark and the cited mark are not impulse purchases and that purchasers are highly knowledgeable with respect to the pet restraining device industry. Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded by these arguments. It is well established that the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. See, e.g., Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1163-64; Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011). Moreover, Applicant has provided no evidence regarding consumer expertise, and neither the application nor registration are restricted with regard to purchasers. When the relevant consumer includes both knowledgeable consumers and the general public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1163; Alfacell Corp. v. Anticancer, Inc., 71 USPQ2d 1301, 1306 (TTAB 2004). In any event, even assuming arguendo that consumers have a high degree of knowledge with respect to domesticated animal restraint devices, they are likely to be confused when encountering the phrase NO- PULL in connection with highly similar goods, as the similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods outweigh any presumed sophisticated purchasing decision. See Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1163-64.
Moreover, because neither Applicant’s nor Registrant’s identification limits the sale of the goods to a particular price point, we must treat the goods as including both inexpensive as well as high-end products. Indeed, the record shows that, at a minimum, at least some of the involved goods are sold at a relatively low price point.
1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 223 USPQ 1281, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Thus, the du Pont factor of the conditions of sale also weighs in favor of a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
We have carefully considered all evidence of record and Applicant’s arguments, even if not specifically discussed herein, as they pertain to the relevant du Pont factors. We treat as neutral any du Pont factors for which there is no evidence or argument of record.
As explained above, the sixth du Pont factor does not favor a likelihood of confusion because the term “no-pull” appears to be inherently weak and has been widely used as part of a trademark in connection with dog harnesses designed to limit pulling by the dog. Nonetheless, the remaining factors analyzed above (the similarity of the marks, relatedness of the goods, established, likely-to-continue channels of trade and purchasing conditions) each weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. While there are instances where a single du Pont factor is dispositive (see, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Enters. Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 21 USPQ2d 1142 (Fed. Cir.
CAREFIRST and FIRSTCAROLINACARE, the crowded field of marks featuring “care” and/or “first” in the healthcare industry, and the relatively sophisticated decision in purchasing or even using healthcare services, all warrant a finding of no likelihood of confusion.”). In addition, because the cited mark is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f), it is entitled to the presumptions accorded by Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (i.e., prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration). See American Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research Institute, 101 USPQ2d at 1028. Thus, the cited mark may not be considered merely descriptive or generic; at worst the mark NO-PULL must be viewed as highly suggestive. See id.
‘strong’ mark.” Anthony’s Pizza, 95 USPQ2d at 1283 (quoting King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (CCPA 1974)). See also American Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research Institute, 101 USPQ2d at 1028.
We therefore find that there is a likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark The No Pull Harness & Leash in One in standard characters for “Animal harnesses for dogs; Animal leashes; Dog leashes; Leashes for animals; Pet products, namely, pet restraining devices consisting of leashes, collars, harnesses, restraining straps, and leashes with locking devices” in International Class 18 and Registrant’s mark NO-PULL in typed format on the Principal Register for “halters for domesticated animals” in International Class 18.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is affirmed.
 Application Serial No. 86420598, filed October 10, 2014, under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), alleging January 1, 2012 as the date of first use anywhere and in commerce. The application was originally filed under the Principal Register.
 The “Board reviews an Examining Attorney’s decision on appeal to determine if the refusal to register was correctly made. In doing so, the Board need not adopt the rationale of the Examining Attorney.” In re AFG Indus. Inc., 17 USPQ2d 1162, 1163 (TTAB 1990) (citing In re Avocet, 227 USPQ 566 (TTAB 1985)).
 From the face of the application, we can determine that Harness & Leash is generic because the application seeks registration on the Supplemental Register and this wording has been disclaimed.
 We take judicial notice of the following definitions from the online version of the MerriamWebster Dictionary (www.merriam-webster.com): “domesticated” as “to adapt (an animal or plant) to life in intimate association with and to the advantage of humans”; “pet” as “a domesticated animal kept for pleasure rather than utility” and “dog” as “a highly variable domestic mammal (Canis familiaris) closely related to the gray wolf.” The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including definitions in online dictionaries which exist in printed format or that have regular fixed editions. See, e.g., In re White Jasmine LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1385, 1392 n.23 (TTAB 2013). See also Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (“TBMP”) § 1208.04 (2016) and cases cited therein.
 Despite the fact that this evidence was submitted by the Examining Attorney (not Applicant) and was neither discussed by Applicant nor the Examining Attorney in their briefs (or for that matter during ex parte prosecution), we have considered this evidence as it could potentially weigh in Applicant’s favor.
 The cited mark NO-PULL is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act. As such, it is entitled to the statutory presumptions of validity as a non-descriptive mark. To find otherwise would amount to an improper collateral attack on the registration. The proper action for attacking the validity of a registration is a cancellation action. See Fiserv, Inc. v. Elec. Transaction Sys. Corp., 113 USPQ2d 1913, 1919 n.7 (TTAB 2015) (stating that absent a counterclaim, an applicant may not pursue an impermissible collateral attack on an opposer’s registration).

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