Source: https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/texas-style-sausage-making-gleaning-legislative-history-and-legislative-intent/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:59:42+00:00

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If you’ve ever read TDCAA’s Legislative Update book or our Annotated Criminal Laws of Texas, you’ve probably noticed the authors’ personal notations on many pages. Although some statutes can stand on their own words without explanatory notes, many demand clarification. Notes call attention to how a new statute contradicts an existing one, muddies the waters over how to implement it, or simply doesn’t make sense. It’s all part of a legislative sausage-making process that can be the subject of ridicule, but prosecutors are still charged with enforcing those laws that can confound us.
If legislative committee members have abandoned the project in disagreement, what should those who must implement the legislature’s handiwork do? Somehow we who live and breathe the law everyday must interpret legislation and, occasionally, discern legislative intent. Besides the host of sometimes poorly drafted statutes we must construe, we must also attempt to reconcile provisions where the legislature passes multiple bills on the same topic, as happened last session with the offense of evading arrest and with the expansion of protective orders to victims of human trafficking and stalking.
If those methods come up short, we are fortunate to have a few other tools at our disposal: 1) the Code Construction Act, 2) the state constitution and civil statutes, 3) publications from the Texas Legislative Council, and 4) the appellate courts. Now let’s examine in greater detail how these resources help to divine the meaning of a confusing statute.
Headings of titles, subtitles, chapters, subchapters, and sections do not restrict or expand the statutory meaning.10 For example, while the heading of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.141 refers to “Testimony of Undercover Peace Officer or Special Investigator,” the text of the article requires corroboration of only confidential informants who are not peace officers or special investigators—the exact opposite of what one might expect from the heading. Similarly, the legislature will sometimes use the same language in statutory headings to describe different things. A “mechanical security device” under Penal Code §16.01, for example, is something used to improperly open locks, e.g., lock picks, but under Occupations Code §1702.234 it is, far more logically, a device that also includes locks or deadbolts.
Unfortunately, even with all of these rules at one’s disposal, the legislature still manages to pass multiple, sometimes confusing acts of legislation that cannot be easily deciphered.
When amendments to the same statute are enacted in the same legislative session without reference to each other, the amendments shall be harmonized so that effect can be given to each. The most recent example of such harmonizing came during the 82nd Regular Session in 2011, where three different bills changed the evading statute in §38.04 of the Penal Code. Though the three bills did not conflict, there was enough confusion that we at TDCAA (by “we” I really mean Shannon Edmonds and Clay Abbott) were called upon to untangle the mess.
(d) permitting prosecution under this and/or other provisions.
• House Bill 3423 added federal special investigators to subsection (a), subsection (b)(2)(B), and subsection (b)(3).
• Senate Bill 496 added watercraft to subsection (b) and instructed on the meaning of the term in subsection (c)(2).
• Senate Bill 1416 created liability for using tire deflation devices by adding subsection (b)(2)(C) and (b)(3)(B) and instructed on the meaning of the term in subsection (c)(2). This bill also deleted subsection (b)(1)(B) and the “previous conviction” language from subsection (b)(2)(A).
Adding federal special investigators and watercraft to the evading statute allowed for no interpretative problem—it just created additional exposure (post-September 1, 2011) for evading involving either tire deflation devices or watercraft—so these provisions are easily harmonized.
One legislative oversight, however, was the failure to include federal special investigators within SB 1416’s version of subsection (b)(2)(C). Thus, there is no offense under §38.04 for using tire deflation devices—often known as caltrops—against federal investigators. So as you knew, the legislature is far from perfect.
But the principal problem with the amendments arose because under the pre-September 1, 2011, statute, evading using a motor vehicle when not previously convicted was a state jail felony. But along came SB 1416 that made all cases of evading while using a vehicle a third-degree felony. (And by virtue of SB 496, evading while using a watercraft is also now a third-degree felony.) This change created no conflict; the bill simply replaced the former law and took some application to comb our way through the fur-ball. Crisis averted!
However, various publishers of the Penal Code—including the state’s own website19—decline to apply the CCA to these multiple changes. As a result, lawyers and judges who do not have TDCAA publications are left adrift to reconcile these bills for themselves, oftentimes without success. Short of mandating that all lawyers purchase TDCAA publications (now wouldn’t that be some good lobbying!), the legislature is left with the option of re-enacting the changes wrought by these three bills in a more digestible manner—which was the goal of HB 2130 (83rd R.S.).20 However, the vagaries of the legislative process resulted in this bill not passing, so prosecutors will continue to have to educate those around them on the proper interpretation of §38.04 with the help of the Code Construction Act.
When general and specific/local provisions conflict, effect shall be given both if possible. But if they are irreconcilable, the special/local provision prevails—unless the general provision was later enacted and the manifest intent of the general provision is that it shall prevail.25 As an example, in the rather bizarre case of Azeez v. State, the defendant received a citation for speeding and failed to appear in municipal court.26 He was charged with failing to appear. At his trial on the latter offense, however, the city prosecutor argued that he was proceeding with a charge under a City of Houston ordinance, the trial court thought the charge was grounded in the Penal Code, and the defendant asserted the proper charge was one under the Transportation Code!
Also, be aware that a number of other provisions not covered here apply specifically to the construction of civil statutes.36 Some of the sections, however, are similar to those above.
Further enlightenment on what particular legislation means may be obtained by reviewing two publications of the Texas Legislative Council.37 The council issues a guide on Reading Statutes and Bills38 and a Drafting Manual.39 The former might be a little basic for most lawyers but serves as a refresher to a distant law school legal-writing class. It contains some tips to get around the sheaves of paper quickly. The latter is lengthy and highly detailed—at times even reminiscent of the all-too-pedantic BlueBook—but it explains the conventions and preferred language in drafting legislation. Most helpful is the chapter “Style and Usage” and its subchapters “Rules of Style” and “Drafting Rules.” If the reader understands these tools for creating legislation, they should also assist with interpreting it.
Absent any ambiguity in statutory language, a court must construe the language as written unless doing so would lead to an absurd result.44 Ambiguity exists when a statute may be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses; conversely, a statute is unambiguous where it reasonably permits no more than one understanding.45 Increasingly, the legislature—with some helpful prompting—is including language in statutes prescribing conduct that allow prosecution under other applicable laws. So the massive confusion/ambiguity generated by the advent of the sexting statute, Penal Code §43.261, in the 2011 regular session may be avoided altogether thanks to subsection (g) of that offense, and the courts may never have to decipher the mess.
As this article is written, the 83rd Legislature is in a Special Session. And many of the conflicts discussed in this article were resolved by the legislature this session. Like the product or not, as prosecutors and their staff, we must work with it. To assist you, this summer—by way of a publication and numerous regional updates—the legislative team at TDCAA will be diligently dissecting and actively disseminating its gourmet review of the new batch of sausage. Bon appétit!
1 This article would not have been completed without the significant contributions of my TDCAA colleagues Shannon Edmonds and Sarah Wolf. I extend my gratitude to them.
2 Interim Report to the 83rd Texas Legislature, at 17. The entire report can be accessed at http://www.house.state.tx.us/_media/pdf/committees/reports/82interim/House-Committee-on-Judiciary-and-Civil-Jurisprudence-Interim-Report-2012.pdf.
3 See Tex. Pen. Code §§1.05, 1.07, and 3.01.
4 See Tex. Pen. Code §3.02.
5 Readers should turn to the statutory provisions themselves for the precise language. I have simply attempted to convey their meaning as succinctly as possible. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Texas Government Code.
6 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.002.
12 SB 555 (83rd R.S., 2013), signed by the governor as this article went to print, remedies this confusion by specifiying that such “possession” of a pet can be actual or constructive.
13 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.005.
14 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.006.
15 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.012.
16 Tex. Penal Code §1.04 is one example. But this usage is decreasing because the Texas Legislative Council will frequently make non-substantive gender-neutral substitutions of “person” for “his,” etc., in bills making other substantive changes.
17 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.014.
18 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.016.
21 Tex. Gov’t Code §§311.025(b) and 312.014(b).
22 Tex. Gov’t Code §312.014(d).
23 Which simply won’t do, of course, so HB 8 (83rd R.S.) has been sent to the governor to, among other things, restore the harsher penalty range that was passed last session as HB 2014 but trumped by lesser punishments of HB 290 (82nd R.S.).
24 Tex. Gov’t Code §312.014(e).
25 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.026.
26 Azeez, 248 S.W.3d at 182.
27 In the interest of relating the story so it could be easily understood (I hope), I may have oversimplified. But this case is quite the tangled web that would otherwise take up more space than deserved in this general article.
28 SB 688 (82nd R.S., 2011).
29 Visit the Texas Legislative Reference Library’s website at www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/legintent/typicalMaterials.cfm for more information on legislative intent.
30 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.023.
31 Tex. Gov’t Code §312.013.
32 Tex. Gov’t Code §311.032.
33 Karenev v. State, 258 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008), rev’d, 281 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
34 Tex. Const. art. III, §35(c).
35 See Tex. Const. art. V, §12, implemented by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art 1.14(b).
36 Tex. Gov’t Code §§312.001–008.
38 Available at www.tlc.state.tx.us/pubslegref/ readingabill.pdf.
40 See Mahaffey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
42 State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
43 Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
44 Garrett v. State, 377 S.W.3d 697, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
45 State v. Neesley, 239 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
46 Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785.
47 Cornet v. State, 359 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

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