Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/322/398.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 11:11:37+00:00

Document:
[322 U.S. 398, 399] Mr. Renah F. Camalier, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Mr. Thomas F. Emerson, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.
The present suit was brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the enforcement of the suspension order. A temporary restraining order was issued. Respondents moved for summary judgment. That motion was granted and the complaint was dismissed. On the appeal that judgment was affirmed. App. D.C., 140 F.2d 703. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari [322 U.S. 398, 403] which we granted because of the importance of the problem in the administration of the rationing regulations.
The sole question presented by this case is whether the power of the President under 2(a)(2) of Title III of the Second War Powers Act to 'allocate' materials includes the power to issue suspension orders against retailers and to withhold rationed materials from them where it is established they have acquired and distributed the rationed materials in violation of the ration regulations.
The argument, rather, is that the authority to 'allocate' materials does not include the power to issue suspension orders; and that no such power will be implied since sus- [322 U.S. 398, 404] pension orders are penalties to which persons will not be subjected unless the statute plainly imposes them. See Tiffany v. National Bank, 18 Wall. 409, 410; Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 , 25 S.Ct. 443, 445; Wallace v. Cutten, 298 U.S. 229, 237 , 56 S.Ct. 753, 754. In that connection it is pointed out that Congress provided criminal and civil sanctions for violations of Title III of the Act. By 2(a)(5) any person who wilfully violates those provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or order promulgated thereunder is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine and imprisonment. By 2(a)(6) federal courts have power, among others, to enjoin any violation of those provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or order thereunder. It is therefore contended that when violations of regulations under the Act are used as the basis for withholding rationed materials from persons, sanctions for law enforcement are created by administrative fiat contrary to the Act in question and contrary to constitutional requirements.
We agree that it is for Congress to prescribe the penalties for the laws which it writes. It would transcend both the judicial and the administrative function to make additions to those which Congress has placed behind a statute. United States v. Two Hundred Barrels of Whiskey, 95 U.S. 571 ; Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U.S. 599 , 50 S.Ct. 412; Wallace v. Cutten, supra. Hence we would have no difficulty in agreeing with petitioner's contention if the issue were whether a suspension order could be used as a means of punishment of an offender. But that statement of the question is a distortion of the issue presented on this record.
The problem of the scarcity of materials is often acute and critical in a great war effort such as the present one. Whether the difficulty be transportation or production, there is apt to be an insufficient supply to meet essential civilian needs after military and industrial requirements [322 U.S. 398, 405] have been satisfied. Thus without rationing, the fuel tanks of a few would be full; the fuel tanks of many would be empty. Some localities would have plenty; communities less favorably situated would suffer. Allocation or rationing is designed to eliminate such inequalities and to treat all alike who are similarly situated. The burdens are thus shared equally and limited supplies are utilized for the benefit of the greatest number. But middlemen-wholesalers and retailers-bent on defying the rationing system could raise havoc with it. By disregarding quotas prescribed for each householder and by giving some more than the allotted share they would defeat the objectives of rationing and destroy any program of allocation. These middlemen are the chief if not the only conduits between the source of limited supplies and the consumers. From the viewpoint of a rationing system a middleman who distributes the product in violation and disregard of the prescribed quotas is an inefficient and wasteful conduct. If the needs of consumers are to be met and the consumer allocations are to be filled, prudence might well dictate the avoidance or discard of such inefficient and unreliable means of distribution of a scarce and vital commodity. Certainly we could not say that the President would lack the power under this Act to take away from a wasteful factory and route to an efficient one a precious supply of material needed for the manufacture of articles of war. That power of allocation or rationing might indeed be the only way of getting the right equipment to our armed forces in time. From the point of view of the factory owner from whom the materials were diverted the action would be harsh. He would be deprived of an expected profit. But in times of war the national interest cannot wait on individual claims to preference. The waging of war and the control of its attendant economic problems are urgent business. Yet if the President has the power to channel raw materials into the most efficient industrial [322 U.S. 398, 406] units and thus save scarce materials from wastage it is difficult to see why the same principle is not applicable to the distribution of fuel oil.
None of the findings is challenged here. Taken at their face value, as they must be, they refute the suggestion that the order was based on considerations not relevant to the problem of allocation. They sustain the conclusion that in restricting petitioner's quota the Office of Price Administration was doing no more than protecting a com- [322 U.S. 398, 407] munity against distribution which measured by rationing standards was inequitable, unfair, and inefficient. If the power to 'allocate' did not embrace that power it would be feeble power indeed.
What we have said disposes of the argument that if petitioner has violated Ration Order No. 11 the only recourse of the government is to proceed under 2(a)(5) or 2(a)(6) which provide criminal and civil sanctions. Those remedies are sanctions for the power to 'allocate'. They hardly subtract from that power. Yet they would be allowed to do just that if it were held that violations by middlemen of the ration orders and regulations could never be the basis of reallocation of fuel oil into more reliable channels of distribution.
It is finally pointed out that Congress has seldom used the licensing power16 and that that power, when used, has been employed sparingly. Thus one of the sanctions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 33, 50 U.S.C.App. (Supp. III) 925, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 925, is the power to revoke licenses for violations of maximum prices or rents. 205( f). That power may be utilized only in judicial proceedings; and licenses may be suspended only for limited periods. 205(f)(2). That consideration would be germane to the present problem if Congress had implemented the allocation procedure with a licensing system. Then the question might arise whether revocation of the license rather than the reallocation of materials by administrative action was the appropriate procedure in case of violations. Congress, however, did not adopt the licensing system when it came to rationing. And the failure to do so is hardly a reason for saying that the power to 'allocate' is less replete than a reading of the Act fairly permits.
[ Footnote 1 ] Executive Order April 8, 1942, No. 9125, 7 Fed.Reg. 2719; War Production Board, Supplementary Directive 1-0, Oct. 16, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg. 8418.
[ Footnote 2 ] 7 Fed.Reg. 8480.
[ Footnote 3 ] Id., p. 8480.
[ Footnote 4 ] Id., p. 8480. Ration Order No. 11 initiated rationing of fuel oil in thirty eastern, southeastern, and midwestern states and in the District of Columbia.
[ Footnote 5 ] 1394.5652.
[ Footnote 6 ] 1394.5707, 1394.5708.
[ Footnote 7 ] 1394.5656.
[ Footnote 8 ] 1394.5803. And see 8 Fed.Reg. 2720.
The office of Price Administration conferred on its Hearing Commissioners and Hearing Administrator the function of issuing suspension orders. General Order 46, 8 Fed.Reg. 1771. It also adopted, Feb. 6, 1943, Procedural Regulation No. 4, which prescribed the procedure to be used in the issuance of rationing suspension orders. 8 Fed.Reg. 1744. And see 9 Fed.Reg. 2558 for the revision of this regulation, issued Mar. 6, 1944.
[ Footnote 9 ] Some 328,000 gallons according to OPA, around 181,000 gallons on petitioner's computation.
[ Footnote 11 ] Ration Order No. 11 became effective October 22, 1942.
[ Footnote 12 ] Established December 2, 1942, by Executive Order No. 9276. 7 Fed. Reg. 10091.
[ Footnote 13 ] The suspension order also provided for an accounting by petitioner of its fuel oil transactions since October 22, 1942.
[ Footnote 14 ] Procedural Regulation No. 4, supra, note 8.
[ Footnote 15 ] The Government has conceded that there may be judicial review of suspension orders.
[ Footnote 16 ] See 5 of the Act of August 10, 1917, 40 Stat. 276, 277.

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