Source: http://www.thehamiltonfirm.com/en/news/page/7/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:47:26+00:00

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In its fall issue, The Verdict, the journal of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, has published an in-depth article entitled, “Preparing Your Personal Injury Client to Testify,” by Hu Hamilton and Patrick Cruise. The material outlined in the article was gleaned from years of trial experience in the school of hard knocks. It offers detailed practical suggestions for preparing injury clients for depositions, as well as for trial.
The Hamilton Firm LLC is committed to improving the practice of law through continuing legal education, leading workshops and seminars, and sharing with others through professional journals and magazines.
Ante litem notice in claims against the State of Georgia has become trickier. To sue the State under the State Tort Claims Act, written notice must be provided to DOAS (Department of Administrative Service) and to the particular agency involved within 12 months of the date “the loss was discovered or should have been discovered”, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a). On October 6, 2014, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Board of Regents v. Myers, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 768, that a student’s ante litem notice of her injuries suffered in a university parking lot failed to strictly comply with notice requirements because it did not state any amount of loss whatsoever. The Court concluded that the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E) required notice of the amount of the loss claimed at that time, within the belief and knowledge of the claimant, as was practicable under the circumstances. Although the notice stated that the student’s loss was yet to be determined, she was incurring medical bills, and although she did not yet know the full extent of her injury, she had actually incurred medical expenses of $4,180 at the time she gave notice.
This new interpretation creates a another pitfall for plaintiffs pursing claims against the State of Georgia, as there is always room to argue over the meaning of what “as may be practicable under the circumstances,” but it is clear that the “amount of the loss claimed” should be stated specifically.
For the second year in a row Patrick A. Cruise was selected as a “Mid South Super Lawyer.” Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high-degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The selection process includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations.
On May 12, 2010, Greg and Diane Parker, came to Tennessee from their home in California to visit Ms. Parker’s father. Mr. Parker was paralyzed from the waist down, so the couple rented a handicap accessible room at the Holiday Inn Express in Harriman, Tennessee. After they checked in, they took a look at the bathroom and noticed a “gap between the shower bench and the wall”, and that the bench was loose. They reported the problem and requested a different room, but none was available. Hotel staff assured Mr. Parker that someone would repair the shower bench. They left for dinner, and their upon return they inspected the shower bench. It seemed to be repaired, “bolted up flush to the wall like it should be.” Mr. Parker pushed on the shower bench, and it did not “shake or sound loose.” The next morning he went into the bathroom to shower, transferred himself from his wheelchair to the shower bench and had been showering for approximately ten minutes when the bench suddenly collapsed. He was injured.
Shouldn’t the hotel owner/operator be held responsible? A guest checks in, notices a problem and the hotel sends in a maintenance man to tighten the bolts, but it collapses anyway, injuring a disabled person. Sounds like a no-brainer, but not to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
Incredibly, in Parker v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 638 (9/12/14), the Supreme Court absolved the hotel of all responsibility. The hotel was built in 2006 by D&S Builders, who had improperly installed the shower bench without using proper blocking to secure it to the interior wall. The contractor could not be sued due to Tennessee’s four year statute of repose on negligent construction claims, T.C.A. §§ 28-3-202 and 203. The hotel owner had accepted the contractor’s work and opened the hotel to the public. However, he claimed to have no notice of the defective condition of the shower bench, even though they sent a maintenance man to adjust it after the guest complained!
Contrast this extremely unfair outcome involving a Tennessee hotel with the decision in Bright v. Sandstone Hospitality LLC, A13A1811 (3/26/14), where the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to the owner of a Wingate branded hotel in Kennesaw, Georgia that had similarly denied responsibility for a defective grab bar in a shower/bathtub, blaming the contractor who built the hotel several years before. That case was recently settled after mediation for $250,000 with Hu Hamilton as lead counsel for the plaintiff.
It has long been the law in Georgia that anyone having a tort claim against a municipality (a city or town) had to serve written notice of the claim within six months of the event causing the injury. This, of course, was a trap for the unwary and could lead to a legitimate injury claim being barred simply because timely notice was not given the city or town. The injured person might not seek legal advice until it was too late, and occasionally, lawyers without much experience handling personal injury cases might not be aware of the notice requirements.
Effective July 1, 2014, not only must notice of the claim be presented within six months, but a demand for a specific sum of money must be included, even though the injured person may not have completed medical treatment, may still be out of work and may have no idea of the extent of permanent impairment and disability.
Anyone having an injury claim against a Georgia city or town should seek competent legal advice as soon as possible, so that proper ante litem notice can be given. Otherwise even a very serious injury claim against a city will be barred.
Tennessee trial judges must explain why they are granting or denying a motion for summary judgment.
In a unanimous opinion today (7/15/14), Mary C. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc. the Tennessee Supreme Court has determined that the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure require trial judges to explain why they are granting or denying a motion for summary judgment before they ask the lawyer for the winning party to prepare a proposed order.
Motions for summary judgment are requests by one or more parties to a lawsuit for the court to rule on the merits of an issue before a case goes to trial. The court can determine prior to the start of a trial that there is no genuine issue of material fact and all or a portion of the case will come to an end.
In the specific case the Court decided today, Mary C. Smith sued UHS of Lakeside, Inc. in the Shelby County Circuit Court following the death of her husband who had been treated at the Lakeside Triage Center in September 2004. UHS filed motions for summary judgment asking the trial court to dismiss Ms. Smith’s lawsuit. During hearings in March 2010 and September 2011, the trial judge orally granted UHS’s motions but did not explain the basis for her decisions. Instead, the trial judge asked UHS’s lawyer to draft orders that provided the legal basis for her decisions. The trial judge signed the orders prepared by UHS’s lawyer despite Ms. Smith’s objections.
Ms. Smith appealed, and the Court of Appeals set aside the summary judgment orders. The Court of Appeals decided the trial court failed to comply with Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires trial courts to “state the legal grounds” when deciding a motion for summary judgment.
The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 56. The Court emphasized that deciding a motion for summary judgment is a high judicial function. The requirement that a trial court state its grounds promotes respect for the judicial system by ensuring that a summary judgment decision is the product of the trial court’s own independent analysis.
In this case, the Court determined the contested orders were not the product of the trial court’s independent judgment, therefore the case was returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
Governor Haslam’s Workers’ Compensation Reform Bill goes into full effect in Tennessee on July 1st and applies to any worker injured after June 30th.
An injured worker with a 5% impairment rating will receive only 22.5 weeks of benefits for PPD.
If he or she does not return to work, or returns to work earning less, only marginal increases of 1.35 to 1.45 times the impairment rating are available. For example, a worker with a 5% rating who can’t return to work might be entitled to 30 to 32.6 weeks of benefits.
No reasonable employment opportunities locally.
For most workers, however, benefits for permanent disability will be very limited, no matter how devastating the effect of a serious injury is on his or her ability to earn a living in the future.
Georgia law may provide better benefits to an injured worker than Tennessee, and in some situations a claim can be filed in either state. If the accident occurred in Georgia there may be jurisdiction in Georgia. Even if the accident occurred outside Georgia, if the worker was hired in Georgia and the employer has a place of business there or if the worker lives in Georgia, the claim can be brought in Georgia.
If there is any possibility of dual jurisdiction in Georgia, call us.
Workers injured on the job should not blindly accept an insurance company’s decision to handle a workers compensation case as a Tennessee case. If there might be jurisdiction in Georgia, call us immediately!
A Tennessee company that routinely sends service technicians into Georgia to serve or repair equipment, such as heat and air units, industrial machinery or plumbing may be subject to Georgia workers compensation law if the accident occurs in Georgia.
A Tennessee trucking company that hires workers through its terminal in Georgia will be subject to Georgia workers compensation laws regardless of where the accident occurs.
While the owner can be held liable, the franchisor, Wingate, escaped responsibility, although the hotel prominently bore the Wingate name and despite Mr. Bright’s testimony that he chose the hotel based on Wingate’s reputation as a safe, secure and clean place to stay while traveling.

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