Source: http://fathersunite.org/New/case_law_showing_that_family_courts_are_unlawful.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:55:23+00:00

Document:
Therefore Judges Break their oath and are considered to be guilty of treason legally when they do each time they uphold state laws and procedures that violate the constitution.
Divorce was a criminal action not a civil one, Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260 (1813) (“Regulations on the subject of marriage and divorce are rather parts of the criminal, than of the civil, code; ...” and later “A divorce, for example, in a case of public scandal and reproach, is not a vindication of the contract of marriage, or a remedy to enforce it; but a species of punishment, which the public have placed in the hands of the injured party to inflict, under the sanction, and with the aid, of the competent tribunal, operating as a redress of the injury, when, the contract having been violated, the relation of the parties, and their continuance in the marriage state, has become intolerable or vexatious to them, and of evil example to others.”); hence divorce could only be granted in response to a criminal action and the father, by natural right was automatically given custody, even if he had committed the crime that ended the marriage1 due to the obligation to support his children or otherwise stated and “the duty which nature imposes upon him”, Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 MA 203 (1834).; De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 51 (1804); Rex v. De Manneville, 5 East 222, (1804).
Heretofore, there custody was not a civil matter. Custody was determined based on natural rights of one party who had sole responsibility to support the child, heretofore, there was no civil dispute regarding custody. Custody following divorce always went to the father since he had the sole responsibility to support the child. Custody could only be taken from a father should he commit a crime against the child, e.g., abandonment, abuse, or neglect.
In this Commonwealth and throughout the states it is clearly the case that the obligation to to support children came with it rights or reciprocal rights or was coupled to or has a corresponding right to the custody of the child(ren). See at least, McNamara v. Logan, 100 Ala. 187; 14 So. 175 (1893); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 121 Ind. 215; 23 N.E. 69 (1889); Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173; 33 P. 23 (1893); Directors of Poor v. Dungan, 64 Pa. 402 (1870); Hornketh v. Barr, 8 Serg. & Rawle 36 (1822); Ex parte Boaz, 31 Ala. 425 (1858); Washaw v. Gimble, 50 Ark. 351; 7 S.W. 389; (1887); In re Guardianship of Campbell, 130 Cal. 380; 62 P. 613 (1900); Amos v. Atlanta R. Co., 104 Ga. 809; 31 S.E. 42 (1898); Campbell v. Wright, 130 CA 380 (1900); State ex rel. Neider v. Reuff, 29 W. Va. 751; 2 S.E. 801 (1887), (By the common law the natural right of the father to the custody of his infant child arose out of his duty to maintain and support it, ...”); Campbell v. Wright, 130 Cal. 380 (1900) (“The father's right is, however, coupled with the obligation to support and educate the child.”).
In Massachusetts, as with the other states, child support entails a reciprocal natural right to the care, guardianship, and companionship of ones children which, as a natural right, falls under the protection under the state Constitution, see at least Reidell v. Morse, 36 Mass. 358 (1837), (“As the parent is bound by nature to support and educate his minor children, so he has a natural right to their guardianship, their society and their services.”) [Emphasis added] Also see, Boylston v. Princeton,13 Mass. 381; (1816), (“... that the mother of an illegitimate child has a natural right to its custody, and is bound to support and maintain him.”).
Heretofore, the father has a natural right to the children born of the marriage and this absolute natural right was tied to the sole responsibility for the obligation of support. Unmarried women had the identical obligation and natural rights. Natural rights are immutable.
The conclusion the state purportedly arrived at in Bigelow, supra, regarding the heretofore clause and the sacred right to a trial by jury is contradicted by at least: Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass 227 (1817); Milford v Worcester, 7 MA 48 (1810); Dalton v. Bernardston , 9 Mass 201 (1812); Shirley v. Watertown, 3 Mass. 322 (1807); Wightman v. Coates, 15 Mass. 1 (1818); Middleboroulh v Rochester, 12 MA 363 (1815); Commonwealth v. Putnam 18 MA 136 (1822); Angel v. Mclellan, 16 Mass. 28 (1819); Baldwin v. Foster, 138 Mass. 449 (1885); Foss v. Hartwell, 168 Mass 66 (1897); Bazeley, supra; Rawlyns v. Vandyke, 3 Esp 252.
The conclusion the state arrived at in Bigelow, supra, is also in direct contrast to Kent's Commentaries (“It will always be a question for a jury, ...” referring to the question of providing child support.). It should be noted that the right to a trial by jury noted by Kent was based on Massachusetts case law.
For example, in Hanover, supra, a trial by jury determined if the husband had treated the wife cruelly and if the wife had left the husband for “justifiable cause” and if support was permitted. This case, and the others, directly contradict the findings of Bigelow, supra.
In Burrus, supra, the US Supreme Court stated, relying heavily on Barry, supra, that the Federal Courts did not have Common Law jurisdiction; therefore, the Federal Courts, to include the Supreme Court, could not intervene in custody or as parens patriae matters since both of these required Common Law jurisdiction. The Federal decision used Massachusetts case law to support its claim regarding Common Law jurisdiction. Burrus relied so heavily on Barry that Barry was appended to the Burrus decision.
Now, however, Massachusetts practices custody and parens patriae under Equity jurisdiction. This “blending” or conversion of law is unlawful regardless of any supposed sanction by the legislature. Even if allowed, such a change significantly changes the nature of divorce, custody and child support issues and are not as heretofore practiced. Divorce, custody, nor child support were heretofore practiced under equity jurisdiction.
The Best Interest of the Child determination is based on an equity variant of parens patriae, see, at least E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824 (1999), which is in direct contradiction of In re Burrus, 136 US 586 (1890) and In re Barry, 42 F 113 (1844) where it was explicitly stated that parens patriae requires Common Law jurisdiction.
The distinction between law and equity cannot be blended or obliterated by state legislation. Thompson v. Railroad Companies, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134 (1868).
Federal statutes prohibiting courts of the United States from sustaining suits in equity where the remedy was complete at law served to guard the right of trial by jury and were liberally construed. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932).
Furthermore, it was heretofore practiced that the innocent party of a divorce had the right to be free from any restraints on the natural right of personal liberty. Now the state places arbitrary restraints on the personal liberty of both litigants.
The Grady case. In the lower court Panaro v. Grady. In the Appeals Ct, Grady v Grady.

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