Source: https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/06/15/a-review-of-the-patent-shield-acts-and-recent-proposals-to-reform-patent-litigation/id=41835/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 16:18:27+00:00

Document:
“Patty Sue Just Won’t Go Away.” So went a 2002 article in the San Francisco Chronicle, one of a many articles spanning several years about Patricia McColm, a vexatious litigant blacklisted since 1994. She was the Most Vexatious Pleader of the vexatious litigants. If she were a patent attorney, frightened examiners would give her a 100% allowance rate without amendments. If the anti-joinder provisions of the America Invents Act (“AIA”) applied to Patricia McColm, she would have her own clerk’s office.
One draws similarities between the problems presented by firms such as Intellectual Ventures, Acacia, and Lodsys and those presented by Ms. McColm, and a flurry of proposals were recently introduced in Congress.
Co-sponsor Jason Chaffetz was the corporate spokesman for Nu Skin International, Inc. a marketing company that donated to his campaign and was sued for patent infringement in the loathed pirated waters of the Eastern District of Texas.
Ouch. It’s one thing to have professors and corporate spokesmen ruminate about the trouble with trolls or report on about the rise of patent suits in the last year (though the “rise” is due to the new, anti-joinder rules of the AIA), but a fireside chat about a horde of trolls invading corporate capitals across the globe sent waves across the tech world, that made Twitter’s declaration of Patifism sound as effective as the Maginot Line.
Couple that with a flurry of headlines about the rise in troll filings, and the claims by Chaffetz, DeFazio, and Schumer that trolls cost companies $29 billion in 2011 alone, relying on a questionable study published by Boston University using data from anti-troll firm RPX, and the mojo might be in the defendant’s, or as Gene Quinn of IPWatchdog.com calls them, “the infringer lobby’s’” corner.
Thus, one of the immediate effects of this bill would be to chill any communications between a patentee and others that might infringe. “Fine by me” might say those members steering titanic members of the “infringer’s lobby.” Greater burden will be placed on the small business or individual inventor who might be genuinely interested in discussing whether a license, is in fact, warranted. On the flip side, if you’re a troll that paints with a broad stroke, perhaps this provision will make you hesitate prior to sending out infringement letters, and outfits that send thousands of letters, should be paying close attention. Since this is a one-sided fee shift, greater emphasis will also be placed in writing enforceable NDA’s, and forum selection agreements.
The Scope: What is a Computer?
With little help from Title 35 or similar statutes, the definition of “computer” will be left for courts to interpret, and in any event, the bill’s insertion of subsection (B) suggests that “computer” is intended to include anything. In interpreting the comparatively narrower use of “computer” in Title 18, the Eighth Circuit aptly quoted Steve Wozniak in observing that “everything has a computer in it nowadays.”[vii] The Kramer Court was weighing in on the definition of “computer” when ruling that U.S. Sentencing Guideline enhancements for use of a computer included a Motorola Motorazr V3, or, as the Deputy District Attorney called it, a “computer” to call and text an underage girl for an illicit rendezvous.
Ideally if statutory language is to be borrowed, it would be promoting similar policy such that the patent bar is not citing criminal authority aimed at modern Humbert Humberts.
SHIELD Act 1 only provided for fee shifting in cases where the validity of the “patent” is challenged. If a patent has 30 claims asserted, but only the validity of only 15 claims is challenged, is the “patent” challenged, triggering 285A? If a patentee asserts some claims against multiple products, resulting in a mixed result of validity and infringement, who is the prevailing party?
How does this change the law?
Therein is a notable change: Section 285 requires that the movant show a subjective and objectively baseless case was brought. SHIELD Act 1 and Rule 11 in most circuits require only the objectively baseless showing.
Part 2 addresses the newly revised SHIELD Act introduced earlier this year, as well as other proposals and suggestions.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 285, in an action disputing the validity or alleging the infringement of a computer hardware or software patent, upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, the court may award the recovery of full costs to the prevailing party, including reasonable attorney’s fees, other than the [sic] United States.
[ii] On June 4, 2013, in an apparent effort to harmonize the scattered legislation, the White House published a report on the troll business model, and recommends legislative fixes, most of which appear in one or more proposals recently introduced in Congress and discussed herein. Interestingly, the report walks a fine line, focusing on “abusive litigation” and “overly broad patent claims,” but defends the legitimacy of “intermediaries” that connect inventors to patent buyers who will “use” the technology. The report does not analyze the availability of any such buyers for such patents.
[iii] MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds, MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 130-31 (“Whether an actual case or controversy exists so that a district court may entertain an action for a declaratory Judgment of non-infringement and/or invalidity is governed by Federal Circuit law.”).
[vi] Imazio Nursery v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1 (interpreting the term “variety” as it is used in the Plant Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 161) and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)) to have two different definitions based on differing purposes of statutes).
[vii] U.S. v. Kramer 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011).
[viii] United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902-903 (8th Cir. Mo. 2011). See The New Oxford American Dictionary 277 (2d ed. 2005) (defining “central processing unit” as “the part of a computer in which operations are controlled and executed”).
[ix] Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co. 736 F.2d 198.
[x] Gentry Gallery Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
[xi] Yarway Cop. v. Euro-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277-278 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
[xii] Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 688, 690-91 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-1503 (1946)).
[xiv] Cambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
[xv] Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
My comments are mirrored across the web. Post them, or be exposed.
The word on the street is Fazio is severely duped, or severely bought.

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