Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/066wn2d/066wn2d0578.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:30:18+00:00

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Eminent Domain - Public Use - what Constitutes. An order adjudicating a public use will be issued if it is found that the proposed use is really a public use; that the public interests require it; and that the property appropriated is necessary for the proposed public purpose.
 Same - Highways - Condemnation. The use of land for highway purposes is a public use, since the public interest requires the construction, operation, and maintenance of highways.
 Same - Highways - Limited - Access Facilities. Construction of traffic regulating facilities beyond the edge of a freeway right of way, if designed within reasonable limits, is an integral part of the limited-access highway policy enunciated in RCW 47.52.001; and it is a judicial decision whether such construction is for a public use, although a decision by a proper public administrative authority as to the question of public use is conclusive, in the absence of bad faith, or arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent action.
Certiorari to review an order of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 158495, John D. Cochran, J., entered April 27, 1964. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Action in eminent domain. Review sought of an order granting in part and denying in part the condemnation sought.
The Attorney General, Delbert W. Johnson and Theodore O. Torve, Assistants, for petitioner.
Eisenhower & Carls on and Paul Sinnitt, for respondents.
This is a sequel to the case of State ex rel. Dawes v. State Highway Comm'n, 63 Wn.2d 34, 385 P.2d 376 (1963), in which we found that, as a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action of eminent domain, the Highway Commission had afforded respondent Dawes, as an abutting property owner, a hearing pursuant to RCW 47.52.072-075.
«*» Reported in 404 P.2d 20.
 See Ann. 54 A.L.R. 7; Am. Jur., Eminent Domain (1st ed. § 36).
By writ of certiorari, the state now seeks a review of an order adjudicating public use in the action of eminent domain. The order grants in part the property and property rights sought by the state as described in the petition and notice in condemnation, but denies an adjudication of public use for a portion of respondents' property.
The following sketch, prepared by the court from various exhibits, is for illustrative purposes only. Engineering accuracy is not claimed.
We expand the facts set forth in our prior opinion.
Linden Drive in the city of Sumner extends north and south. (Generally, it extends northeasterly-southwesterly, but for ease of reference we assume the north-south description.) It is the present route of Primary State Highway No. 5. The Washington State Highway Commission, deeming it necessary to relocate P.S.H. No. 5, instructed the Director of Highways to prepare a plan for the establishment of a limited-access highway. The plans as proposed establish a freeway extending east to west and passing under Linden Drive at substantially right angles to it. Linden Drive will be elevated approximately ten feet above its present level.
Respondents are the owners of 1.95 acres of valuable income property located, for the most part, in the northwest quadrant formed by the overpass intersection of Linden Drive and the proposed freeway. The property is identified on the sketch by the double line. The east side of the property abuts Linden Drive for about 225 feet. It is important to note that the north boundary of the property abuts Le Grange Street, which extends to an intersection with Hunts Avenue, Thompson Street and Linden Drive.
In general the state's plan calls for the construction of a "partial cloverleaf" interchange having two western quadrants as illustrated by the "EL" and "ER" loops on the chart. As proposed, "EL" would leave the freeway, pass under Linden Drive, curve north, cross Le Grange Street, curve southeast, cross the northeast corner of respondents' property, and lead into Linden Drive on a tangent. Thus, west bound traffic would leave the freeway on the "EL" off-ramp, traverse the loop, make a "free right turn" and proceed south on Linden Drive. In addition to the necessary right of way, the state seeks to condemn all of respondents' property encompassed by the "EL" off-ramp loop and Linden Drive. The area within the confine of the interchange would be leveled, graded and seeded.
Shorn of legal descriptions and technicalities, the order adjudicating public use permits the state to condemn that portion of the Dawes property necessary to construct P.S.H.
Grange Street or Linden Drive.
In short the trial court "re-engineered" the northwest quadrant of the partial cloverleaf by (1) eliminating that portion of the "EL" loop north of Le Grange Street; (2) holding that state acquisition of the property within the "EL" loop was not for a public purpose; and (3) permitting access from the abutting property to both Le Grange Street and Linden Drive, thereby destroying the very characteristics of a limited-access highway.
A plethora of statute and decisional law has been made applicable to roads and highways since the day they were simply an opening through the forests, Conestoga wagon tracks across the plains, or a trail over a mountain pass. During the past two decades or so, in a constant search to improve the method of transporting persons and goods safely by motor vehicles, a new dimension has been addedfreeways, limited-access highways, overhead crossings, ramps, acceleration and deceleration lanes, partial cloverleafs, cloverleafs, split-level interchanges, and a multitude of new engineering and constructional concepts.
(University of Wisconsin Press 1963).
It is apparent that if respondents are permitted to retain access to Le Grange Street and Linden Drive, the free flow of traffic through the interchange will be affected.
Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public . . .
Although the issue of public use and necessity is, under our constitution, a judicial one, we have long adhered to the theory that administrative selection is conclusive, in the absence of bad faith, arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent action. State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, supra. [52 Wn.2d 282, 325 P.2d 300 (1958)].
(1) On numerous occasions, when considering the first phase of an action of eminent domain - the issuance of an order adjudicating public use - we have pointed out that the decision pivots on three interrelated findings: (1) That the proposed use is really a public use; (2) that the public interests require it; and (3) that the property appropriated is necessary for the proposed public purpose. State ex rel. Lange v. Superior Court, supra; State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, 52 Wn.2d 282, 325 P.2d 300 (1958); State ex rel. Bremerton Bridge Co. v. Superior Court, supra.
the construction, operation and maintenance of highways. State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, supra.
The crux of this review is whether the property sought to be appropriated is necessary for the proposed public use.
We are aware that freeway interchanges are obviously prime locations for commercial and industrial use, as well as for residential development. Thus, if the non-access area is carried beyond the point necessary to assure that traffic will move in and out of the interchange in a safe and orderly manner, then it cannot be said that the area is needed for a public use. Maximum access to the interchange compatible with safety and efficient design should always exist.
It has never been a possibility that a property could remain within an interchange loop and not destroy the workability of that interchange.
"Necessary," has been defined in statutory condemnation determination as reasonable necessity in the circumstances of the particular case. State ex rel. Lange v. Superior Court, supra, and cases cited. We recognize that there is a conflict between the expert testimony produced by the state and by the respondents; but we cannot say that the record supports the conclusion that the administrative and engineering determinations of the highway commission were made in bad faith, or were arbitrary and capricious. See State ex rel. Dawes v. State Highway Comm'n, 63 Wn.2d 34, 385 P.2d 376 (1963). We conclude, therefore, that the property sought by the state is necessary for the proposed public purpose.
order adjudicating public use in accordance with this opinion.
DONWORTH, FINLEY, and OTT, JJ., and SHORETT, J. Pro Tem., concur.
September 22, 1965. Petition for rehearing denied.

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