Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule148
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:07:55+00:00

Document:
Article 4(4) of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property provides that the High Contracting Parties “shall refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property”.
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 4(4).
In the event of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property.
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, Article 19(1).
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. I, Part Three, Draft Additional Protocols, June 1973, p. 36.
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. I, Part Three, Draft Additional Protocols, June 1973, p. 38.
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. I, Part Three, Draft Additional Protocols, June 1973, p. 40.
Paragraph 6 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with Articles 48–58 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Paragraph 2.5 of the 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with Articles 48–58 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 150, § 532(1).
India’s Manual of Military Law (1983) prohibits reprisals. The provision is in a section relative to the actions of a commander acting in aid of civil authorities for the handling of crowds and mobs. The manual adds that action is preventive and not punitive and that no soldier can punish a civilian, except under martial law.
India, Manual of Military Law, Three Volumes, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1983, Vol. 1, Chapter VII, § 8.
Italy’s Combatant’s Manual (1998) instructs: “[D]o not engage in reprisals”.
Italy, Manuale del Combattente, SME 1000/A/2, Stato Maggiore Esercito/Reparto Impiego delle Forze, Ufficio Dottrina, Addestramento e Regolamenti, 1998, § 250.
At the CDDH, in its explanation of vote concerning draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, the Australian delegation stated that it had abstained from voting because it considered that the article “did no more than prohibit in internal conflicts acts that violate the provisions of the Protocol and that the article was not concerned with reprisals”, whereas “many delegations interpreted the article as a prohibition of reprisals, which they claimed found no place in the law applicable to internal armed conflicts”. Australia further stated that delegations of other States “also saw the article as an interference with the sovereignty of the State”. The Australian delegation expressed its disappointment that the provision had not been acceptable to a majority of States.
Australia, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 119.
At the CDDH, the representative of Belarus said that he fully supported the opinion of the German Democratic Republic and Poland in favour of draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II.
Belarus, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 16.
The words ‘are, and shall remain prohibited at any time and at any place whatsoever’ which already appeared in Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 … should serve as a rule of conduct and an absolute prohibition of recourse to reprisals in the Articles of Part II.
Belgium, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.40, 14 April 1975, p. 425, §§ 21–22.
Belgium, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 109, § 11.
voted for this provision in the belief that a blanket prohibition of reprisals would not be feasible. No State could reasonably be asked to stand by and allow grave and repeated breaches of the Conventions or the Protocols by its adversary. The prohibition of reprisals should … be limited to certain well-defined cases, restrictively enumerated.
Cameroon, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 455.
Canada, Article 8 draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/37, 14 March 1974, pp. 23–24.
Canada, Article 9(4) of draft amendment concerning Additional Protocol II as a whole submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/212, 4 April 1975, p. 196.
Canada, Article 17 of draft amendment concerning Additional Protocol II as a whole submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/212, 4 April 1975, p. 199.
Canada, Article 22(3) of draft amendment concerning Additional Protocol II as a whole submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/212, 4 April 1975, p. 201.
If a Party to the conflict persistently violates the provisions of the Protocol and refuses to comply with those provisions after being called upon to do so, then, except concerning the persons protected by articles … [footnote: these would be the articles that concern, in particular, the protection of persons within the power of one of the Parties to the conflict], the adverse Party may nevertheless resort to measures which are in breach of the Protocol, provided it had warned the offending party that such action will be resorted to if the offensive acts are not terminated within a specific time [footnote: As is clear from the language of the proposal, this is intended to be of general application affecting the entire Protocol].
Canada, New proposal concerning an Article to be introduced in Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 109.
As his delegation regarded the concept of reprisals as appertaining to international law, it considered that there was no place for that concept in Protocol II. There was a risk that the introduction of such a concept in Protocol II might increase the danger of reprisals followed by counter-reprisals and result in an escalation of hostilities. Its conclusion might also inhibit some States from becoming Parties to the Protocol.
Canada, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 428, § 9.
[The 1977 Additional Protocol II], concerned with internal armed conflicts, does not contain the word “reprisal” or any similar expression.
Canada, Ministry of Defence, Memorandum on Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Reprisals Reservation, Operational Considerations, Doc. 3440-13-2 (D Law/I), 14 March 1986, Annex A, §§ 5 and 9.
At the CDDH, Colombia, backed by a representative of Indonesia, supported the view that draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II should be deleted.
Colombia (supported by Indonesia), Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 14.
The Arab Republic of Egypt, while declaring its commitment to respecting all the provisions of Additional Protocols I and II, wishes to emphasize, on the basis of reciprocity, that it upholds the right to react against any violation by any party of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocols I and II with all means admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation.
Egypt, Declaration made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, 9 October 1992, § 3.
At the CDDH, Finland proposed an amendment concerning the provision of fundamental guarantees within the Additional Protocol II (Part II, Article 6) according to which “measures of reprisal” should have been prohibited.
Finland, New proposal concerning Article 6 draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/93, 4 October 1974, p. 18.
[A] reference to measures of reprisals should be included in [the 1977 Additional Protocol II], so that civilian populations would have at least minimum guarantees against inhumane treatment by the parties to non-international armed conflicts … The amendment by the Finnish delegation was aimed at adding a new subparagraph [in the draft provision of the 1977 Additional Protocol II dealing with fundamental guarantees] in order to place a general prohibition on reprisals, as had been done in Article 33 of [the 1949 Geneva Convention IV].
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 324, § 7.
Contrary to what was often stated, reprisals were not limited to times of war or other types of armed conflict, but were also exercised in times of peace. Reprisals should never in any circumstances be used against the civilian populations. They could possibly be employed between States or Parties to a conflict. For example, they could be regarded as legitimate in the event of destruction of public property or a violation of international law by one or other Party to a conflict. But there was universal agreement that reprisals of an inhumane nature were inadmissible. That was why innocent civilians should be protected against such acts in times both of war and peace.
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 324, § 8.
With regard to the word “reprisals”, he still considered that there was no reason why it should not be used also in connexion with non-international armed conflicts; but his delegation would be willing to accept another word, provided that the content [i.e. of the proposal prohibiting reprisals] was not changed.
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 339, § 79.
As the article was put to the vote … the Finnish delegation had to cast a favourable vote in view of its consistent support throughout the Conference for the prohibition of reprisals or measures in kind in armed conflicts, whether international or non-international.
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 119.
At the CDDH, the delegation of France, in its explanation of vote concerning draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, stated that it had voted against the retention of the provision, without, however, expressing any views on the substance of the provision.
France, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 120.
At the CDDH, the Federal Republic of Germany proposed an amendment to Article 8 of the draft Additional Protocol II which read, inter alia: “Amend Article 8 to read: … 2. … (b) measures of reprisals against [all persons whose liberty has been restricted by capture or arrest for reasons in relation to the armed conflict] are prohibited”.
Germany, Federal Republic of, New proposal concerning Article 8 draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/236, 13 March 1975, p. 25.
Was it advisable to use the word “reprisal” in draft Protocol II? Perhaps it would be possible to find another term where non-international armed conflicts were concerned. There were no objections from the legal point of view to the use of the word “reprisal”, but from the political point of view it could be inferred that its use gave the Parties to a conflict a status under international law which they had no right to claim. He suggested that another formulation, for example “measures of retaliation comparable to reprisals”, might not meet with the same objections.
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 325, § 11.
At the CDDH, the German Democratic Republic delegation expressed its strong support for draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II.
German Democratic Republic, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 428, § 10.
At the CDDH, in the run-up to the vote on draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, Greece supported the views expressed by the representative of Mexico, whose delegation objected to any provision that would authorize reprisals either directly or a contrario.
Greece, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 20.
At the CDDH, the Holy See expressed its favourable position concerning the inclusion of draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II.
Holy See, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 428, § 12.
In its explanation of vote concerning the draft Article, the Holy See declared that it had voted for the retention of the article, “because it provided for the prohibition of reprisals”.
Holy See, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 120.
At the CDDH, India said that it supported the view of a US representative according to which Article 10 bis should be deleted and also prepared to vote against the provision. Nevertheless, it expressed the opinion that while compromises were to be appreciated, they tended to jeopardize the national sovereignty of States.
India, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 108, § 8.
At the CDDH, a representative of Indonesia supported the view of the delegation of Colombia that draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II should be deleted.
Indonesia, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 14.
At the CDDH, Iran submitted a new proposal to be included in the draft Additional Protocol II, according to which “acts of vengeance likely to affect the humanitarian rights conferred upon persons protected by this Part are prohibited”.
Iran, New proposal concerning an Article of draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 109.
At the CDDH, Iran stated that “it had reservations concerning the addition of the word ‘reprisals’, which was not appropriate in a protocol concerning non-international armed conflicts”.
Iran, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 330, § 37.
At the CDDH, Iran stated that it “supported the Canadian representative’s view that the concept of reprisals should not be included in Protocol II”.
Iran, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, § 15, p. 429.
Iraq, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 326, § 16.
Italy, New proposal concerning an Article of draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 110.
The Italian delegation abstained in the vote leading to the deletion of Article 10 bis, which provided that certain articles of Protocol II “shall not, in any circumstances or for any reason whatsoever, be violated, even in response to a violation of the provisions of the Protocol”.
Moreover, everything in Protocol II which represents a development of the common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, is subject to the conditions and rules set out in that article. And that article specifically mentions rules which must be applied “as a minimum” or “at any time and in any place whatsoever”; this clearly shows that these rules (and thence the rules derived from them in the present Protocol) must be understood as requiring unconditional respect.
Italy, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, pp. 120–121.
At the CDDH in 1976, in an explanation of vote concerning Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, Mexico stated that it “had opposed the adoption of article 10 bis, because it introduced the notion of reprisals in internal conflicts, which was unacceptable”.
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.64, 7 June 1976, p. 318, § 80.
At the CDDH in 1977, Mexico reiterated “its formal objection to any provision that would authorize reprisals either directly or a contrario”.
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/349/Rev.1, published as CDDH/405/Rev.1, 17 March–10 June 1977, p. 231, § 43.
With regard to draft Article 10 bis of Additional Protocol II, Mexico re-emphasized that it “objected to any provision that would authorize reprisals either directly or indirectly”.
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 429, § 13.
In its explanation of vote on draft Article 74 of the Additional Protocol I and draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II, Mexico stated that it had voted against draft Article 10 bis of the Additional Protocol II on the basis of its conviction that “experience shows that reprisals do not lead the enemy to respect humanitarian law, but result in an increase in violations and hostilities”. Mexico believed that the draft provision, as well as the French and Polish proposals, would have authorized reprisals (the Polish in an a contrario sensu) and that “the mandatory nature of humanitarian law does not depend on the observance of its rules by the adverse Party, but stems from the inherently wrongful nature of the act prohibited by international humanitarian law”, and therefore voted against these provisions.
Mexico, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, pp. 449–450.
At the CDDH, a representative of New Zealand suggested that the Finnish amendment concerning reprisals in Part II of the draft Additional Protocol II should be accepted.
New Zealand, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 331, § 44.
At the CDDH, the representative of Nigeria stated that “he was unhappy about the use of the word ‘reprisals’, but might endorse the Finnish amendment if another term were found, as for example ‘retaliation’ or ‘vengeance’”.
Nigeria, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 327, § 21.
This article is no less and no more than a disguised article on reprisals. Right from the beginning … the Nigerian delegation had repeatedly opposed the inclusion of an article on reprisals in this additional Protocol II. We are of the firm conviction that reprisals as a legal notion properly belongs to international legal relations as between sovereign States and should have no place in a Protocol dealing with internal armed conflicts. Also, the inclusion of an article on reprisals in this Protocol could lead Governments and States into embarrassing situations. This is because it is not inconceivable that in the course of an internal conflict, rebels may deliberately commit acts to which the normal reaction would be in the nature of reprisals but because of a prohibitory article such as this, Governments would feel bound to fold their arms while dissident groups go on a rampage killing and maiming innocent civilians and burning dwellings and food crops. No responsible Government can allow such a situation to develop, but if this article had been adopted this is the kind of scenario that would repeat itself time and again.
Nigeria, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 122.
In introducing Resolution 2675 (XXV) (providing for the prohibition of reprisals against civilian populations or individual members thereof), which it co-sponsored, in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1970, Norway explained that as used in the resolution, “the term ‘armed conflicts’ was meant to cover armed conflicts of all kinds, an important point, since the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations did not extend to all conflicts”.
Norway, Statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1785, 11 November 1970, p. 281.
Isolated cases of disrespect of the provisions of the present Protocol by one party shall not in any circumstances authorize the non-compliance by the other party with the provisions of [the relevant Part], even for the purpose of inducing the adverse party to comply with its obligations.
Pakistan, New proposal concerning an Article of draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 109.
Pakistan, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 107, § 4.
Philippines, New proposal concerning an Article of draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/I/287/Rev. 1, 3 February–18 April 1975, p. 109.
At the CDDH, the delegation of Poland, in its explanation of vote on articles of the draft Additional Protocols I and II relating to reprisals, stated that it had withdrawn an earlier proposed amendment which envisaged a general prohibition of reprisals, while stressing that if a group of persons should not be covered by specific provisions prohibiting reprisals, “there should be no attempt to prove by an a contrario argument that such a group is outside the prohibition of reprisals” and that this would be, in its understanding, “an argument in bad faith directed against the very spirit of the Geneva Law”.
Poland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 452.
At the CDDH, in her comments on the Finnish proposal to prohibit all measures of reprisal in draft Article 6 of the Additional Protocol II, the Swedish representative recalled approvingly a statement by the UK representative expressing the view that the phrase “at any time and in any place whatsoever” excluded the possibility of reprisals against the categories of persons in question. Questioning why this should not be stated explicitly, she supported the Finnish proposal.
Sweden, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 331, § 45.
Syrian Arab Republic, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, p. 453.
At the CDDH, a representative of the United Kingdom stated that the provision of draft Article 6(2) “‘at any time and in any place whatsoever’ was so comprehensive that it would probably not leave room for the operation of reprisals in any form”. Draft Article 6(2) contained a detailed list of specially prohibited acts directed against persons in the power of the parties to the conflict.
United Kingdom, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, 19 March 1975, p. 330, § 40.
At the CDDH, a representative of the United States stated that “he hoped that … Article 10 bis would be rejected, since the whole concept of reprisals had no place in Protocol II”.
United States, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 108, § 7.
The basic core of Protocol II is, of course, reflected in common article 3 of the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions and therefore is, and should be, a part of generally accepted customary law. This specifically includes its prohibitions on violence toward persons taking no active part in hostilities, hostagetaking, degrading treatment, and punishment without due process.
United States, Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, US Department of State, The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, American Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 2, 1987, pp. 430–431.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IX, CDDH/I/SR.73, 16 May 1977, pp. 456 and 457.
1. For every attacked and seized object of the [YPA] – an object of vital importance for the Republic of Croatia will be destroyed immediately.
2. For every attacked and occupied garrison – an object of vital importance to the town in which the garrison is located will be destroyed. This is, at the same time, a warning to civilian persons to abandon such settlement in time.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Warning to the attention of the President of Croatia, the Government of Croatia and the General Staff of the Croatian Army, 1 October 1991.
This warning calls for detailed analysis, but arguably it can be classified as a threat of the use of belligerent reprisals. In any event, a question may be raised whether the approach of the YPA Supreme Command reflected the position that belligerent reprisals may be freely carried out in internal conflicts as well, without the IHL restrictions that apply to international conflicts. The text of the Supreme Command warning leads to this conclusion.
Report on the Practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1997, Chapter 2.9.
UN General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII) adopted in 1968 affirmed Resolution XXVIII of the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and the basic humanitarian principle applicable in all armed conflicts laid down therein that “it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such”.
UN General Assembly, Res. 2444 (XXIII), 19 December 1968, § 1(b), voting record: 111-0-0-15.
This phrase was interpreted by some government experts at the CE (1971) as including a prohibition of reprisals against the civilian population.
ICRC, Protection of the Civilian Population against the Dangers of Hostilities, Documents submitted to the First Session of the Conference of Government Experts, 24 May–12 June 1971, Vol. III, Geneva, January 1971, p. 38.
UN General Assembly, Res. 2675 (XXV), 9 December 1970, preamble and § 7, voting record: 109-0-8-10.
In a resolution on Afghanistan adopted in 1993, the UN General Assembly urged all the Afghan parties “to protect all civilians from acts of reprisal”.
UN General Assembly, Res. 48/152, 20 December 1993, § 8), adopted without a vote.
It reiterated this appeal in another resolution in 1994.
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/207, 23 December 1994, § 9, adopted without a vote.
Recalls, in accordance with international humanitarian law, that indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including children, are prohibited and that they shall not be the object of attack, including by way of reprisal or excessive use of force, condemns these practices, and demands that all parties immediately put an end to them.
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/141, 18 December 2007, § 40, voting record: 183-1-0-8.
In a resolution adopted in 1993 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged all the Afghan parties “to respect accepted humanitarian rules, as set out in the  Geneva Conventions … and the Additional Protocols thereto …, [and] to protect all civilians from acts of reprisal and violence”.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1993/66, 10 March 1993, § 6, adopted without a vote.
The same appeal was reiterated in 1994.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1994/84, 9 March 1994, § 8, adopted without a vote.
Deploring continued attacks, acts of reprisal, abductions and other acts of violence committed against United Nations personnel, personnel of other humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations and representatives of the international media in Somalia, sometimes resulting in serious injury or death.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/56, 3 March 1995, preamble, adopted without a vote.
In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the UN Commission on Human Rights noted “with deep concern that the civilian population is still the target of … acts of reprisal”. It urged “all Afghan parties fully to respect accepted humanitarian rules, as set out in the  Geneva Conventions … and the Additional Protocols thereto … to halt the use of weapons against the civilian population and to protect all civilians”.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/74, 8 March 1995, preamble and § 6, adopted without a vote.
(c) The reprisals against the civilian population in the territories controlled by RCD-Goma and MLC, especially the operation “Effacer le tableau” (“Clean the blackboard”) at the end of 2002, in addition to the exactions committed by the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), and stresses that the foreign forces which support RCD-Goma, MLC and UPC should also be held responsible for the massacres and atrocities that have occurred.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/15, 17 April 2003, preamble and § 3(c), adopted without a vote.
The persistent violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly the armed violence and reprisals against the civilian population in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, northern Katanga and other areas in the eastern part of the country.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/84, 21 April 2004, § 3(a), adopted without a vote.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/85, 21 April 2005, § 4(a), adopted without a vote.
190. … Numerous killings were said to have taken place during counter-insurgency operations and reprisal attacks against persons perceived by government security forces as members or supporters of rebel groups because of their ethnic origin or place of residence.
193. The Special Rapporteur received alarming reports about massive killings of civilians by security forces in the regions of Moyen-Chari and Logone Oriental during the first half of 1993. A number of these killings were said to have been committed in retaliation for earlier attacks on security forces by armed opposition groups.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7, 7 December 1993, §§ 190 and 192.
The Special Rapporteur continued to receive alarming reports of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions of civilians by members of the Chadian army. According to the information received, the authorities did not take any steps to prevent such acts. On 26 August 1994, the Special Rapporteur sent an urgent appeal to the Government after receiving reports of the extrajudicial execution of more than 25 villagers in the Kaga district between 12 and 14 August 1994. The victims were said to have included at least two minors, Justin Helkom (15) and Raymond Ekoudjewa (16). According to the reports received, the killings were reprisal actions by the army after the death of five soldiers during armed confrontations between the security forces and the rebel Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (Armed Forces for the Federal Republic, FARF).
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, § 88.
The Special Rapporteur sent four urgent appeals to the Government. Fears had been expressed for the lives of [individuals], who were said to have been detained during a raid by the security forces at their village, allegedly in reprisal for the refusal of the villagers to participate in the village guard system for fear of reprisal attacks from the PKK.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, §§ 308–309.
The report also noted that, following the urgent appeals, “the Government [of Turkey] replied to the [Special Rapporteur], informing him that shots had been fired from within the village of Payamli against gendarmes performing a field operation in the vicinity of the village”.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, § 311.
On 4 August 1994, the Government informed the Special Rapporteur that [s]ome of the former MFUA combatants, who had been integrated into the army in 1991, reportedly deserted and committed acts of violence against their former colleagues and civilians.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, 14 December 1994, §§ 213–214.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/12, 12 August 1994, § 30.
in Rwanda, genocide and reprisals are dialectically linked: genocide seems inevitably to lead to reprisals … All the acts committed [violations of property rights, of the right to personal safety and of the right to life] taken together would appear to constitute reprisals by the victims of genocide.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/71, 17 January 1995, §§ 29–34.
One of the most salient recent cases of human rights violations by members of the security forces was the killing of 10 civilians, mostly fishermen, from the village of Puerto Lleras by soldiers from the Artillery Group No. 19 Revéiz Pizarro of the Colombian Army on 3 January 1994. The massacre was said to have been carried out in reprisal for a guerrilla attack against a military base earlier on the same day, in which three soldiers had died.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Torture and Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Joint report on the visit by the Special Rapporteurs to Colombia from 17 to 26 October 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/111, 16 January 1995, § 59.
In 1997, in a report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported that, in Lutabura, “FAZ [Forces Armées Zaïroises], with the help of civilians, killed some 100 Banyamulengue as a reprisal for [a] massacre … in Epombo”.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Zaire, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/6, 28 January 1997, § 191.
In 1995, in a report concerning the conflict in Guatemala, MINUGUA recommended to the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) that “it should also prevent any retaliatory attacks against civilian persons or property”.
MINUGUA, Director, First report, UN Doc. A/49/856, 1 March 1995, Annex, § 194.
In a subsequent report, MINUGUA urged the URNG “to refrain from attacks on civilian property, such as its destruction of installations on rural estates in retaliation against agricultural producers who refuse to pay the so-called ‘war tax’, and any other kind of reprisal”.
MINUGUA, Director, Second report, UN Doc. A/49/929, 29 June 1995, Annex, § 198.
In two further reports, MINUGUA reiterated its denunciations of actions against civilian property or reprisals as violations of the commitment to end the suffering of the civilian population. These statements were made in the context of the collection of so-called “war taxes”.
MINUGUA, Director, Third report, UN Doc. A/50/482, 12 October 1995, Annex, §§ 145 and 206; Fourth report, UN Doc. A/50/878, 24 February 1996, Annex, §§ 156 and 170(b).
ICRC, Suggested amendment to Article 6 draft Additional Protocol II submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/302, 23 April 1976, p. 19.
Failure by a Party to the conflict to observe the provisions of this Protocol shall not entitle the adverse Party to take countermeasures infringing the provisions of this Protocol against persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take a part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, and against medical units and transports, even if the aim of such countermeasures is to make the adverse Party respect his own obligations.
CDDH, Suggested amendment to Article 10 bis draft Additional Protocol II submitted by the ICRC, Official Records, Vol. IV, CDDH/I/302, 23 April 1976, p. 37.
This draft provision was rejected in the plenary session by 41 votes in favour, 20 against and 22 abstentions.
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.51, 3 June 1977, p. 109.
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/405/Rev. 1, Annex II (circulated as Working Group document CDDH/I/GT/95), 17 March–10 June 1977, p. 234.
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. X, CDDH/405/Rev. 1, Annex IV, 17 March–10 June 1977, p. 283.
The emergence of international rules governing internal strife has occurred at two different levels: at the level of customary law and at that of treaty law. Two bodies of rules have thus crystallised, which are by no means conflicting or inconsistent, but instead mutually support and supplement each other. Indeed, the interplay between these two sets of rules is such that some treaty rules have gradually become part of customary law. This holds true for common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions … but also applies to Article 19 of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and … to the core of Additional Protocol II of 1977.
ICTY, Tadić case, Interlocutory Appeal, 2 October 1995, § 98.
According to the ICTY, UN General Assembly Resolutions 2444 (XXIII) of 1968 and 2675 (XXV) of 1970 “were declaratory of the principles of customary international law regarding the protection of civilian populations and property in armed conflicts of any kind”.
ICTY, Tadić case, Interlocutory Appeal, 2 October 1995, § 112.
Many provisions of this Protocol can now be regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallised emerging rules of customary law or else as having been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general principles.
ICTY, Tadić case, Interlocutory Appeal, 2 October 1995, § 117.
16. … Although [the 1977 Additional Protocol II] does not specifically refer to reprisals against civilians, a prohibition against such reprisals must be inferred from its Article 4. Reprisals against civilians are contrary to the absolute and non-derogable prohibitions enumerated in this provision. Prohibited behaviour must remain so “at any time and in any place whatsoever”. The prohibition of reprisals against civilians in non-international armed conflicts is strengthened by the inclusion of the prohibition of “collective punishments” in [Article 4(2)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II].
17. Therefore, the rule which states that reprisals against the civilian population as such, or individual civilians, are prohibited in all circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behaviour of the other party, is an integral part of customary international law and must be respected in all armed conflicts.
ICTY, Martić case, Review of the Indictment, 8 March 1996, §§ 16–17.
In a declaration issued in 1994 in the context of the conflict between the Mexican Government and the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), the Mexican Red Cross reminded the parties of their obligation to protect the life, dignity and human rights of combatants and civilians under their authority from all acts of violence or reprisals, on the basis of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Mexican Red Cross, Declaración en torno a los acontecimientos que se han presentado en el estado de Chiapas a partir del 1o. de enero de 1994, 3 January 1994.
In 1990, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights of the Senate of the Philippines reported that members of the media viewed some military counterinsurgency operations as having been carried out as wanton reprisals, with little or no regard to the social and human costs. These views were expressed in the context of the internal situation.
Philippines, Senate, Report of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 1990, Report on the Practice of the Philippines, 1997, Chapter 2.9.
According to the Report on the Practice of the Philippines, Human Rights Advocates of Negroes, a Philippine NGO, reported in 1990 that reprisals were frequent in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. An operation carried out in response to an attack on a military detachment had caused destruction of property and the evacuation and deaths of civilians.
Report on the Practice of the Philippines, 1997, Chapter 2.9, referring to Report of the Human Rights Advocates of Negroes, 1990.
The question of whether retaliatory actions in the context of armed conflict constitute belligerent reprisals will … depend on the status of the parties to such actions, that is on whether these can be regarded as a State or similar autonomous entity. This is already apparent in the event of civil war, where the concept of belligerent reprisals can only find application to the extent that the insurgents have succeeded in establishing themselves as an essentially autonomous party, for instance by bringing part of the territory under their effective control.
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, A.W. Sijthof, Leyden, 1971, p. 36.
[The] episode involving measures on the part of a belligerent … could at first sight be taken for belligerent reprisals … The scope of the rebellion and the nature of the actions on both sides were such that the situation could without any doubt be classified as an internal armed conflict … [The central Government] resorted to the employment of white mercenaries and of bombing aircraft manned by foreign pilots … On the other hand, the insurgents (who likewise received outside support) took to holding as hostages the white residents whom they found in the areas under their control … The rebels announced that they would hold all the whites as hostages so long as [the adversary] would not desist from the use of mercenaries.
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, A.W. Sijthof, Leyden, 1971, pp. 305–306.
The taking of hostages, far from serving to enforce the law of war, in reality was designed to exert influence on the progress of the military operations … Thus, the policy of keeping hostages as applied by the insurgents in Stanleyville lacked the characteristic feature of a belligerent reprisal: it was not so much a means to enforce the law of war as to guarantee the insurgents a degree of safety and to further their policy objectives.
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, A.W. Sijthof, Leyden, 1971, p. 311.
Therefore, Kalshoven considered that the actions taken were a violation of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, A.W. Sijthof, Leyden, 1971, p. 315.

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