Source: http://rlangone.com/blog/federal-habeas-corpus-after-cullen-v-pinholster/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 15:13:18+00:00

Document:
By Richard M. Langone, Esq.
Every attorney representing state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief should read, three times – carefully! – Habeas after Pinholster by Professor Samuel R. Wiseman. The article examines the significance of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Cullen v. Pinholster and offers possible exceptions to the limitations Pinholster now places on the ability of federal courts to consider any evidence not presented to the state court in deciding the merits of federal constitutional claims.
The Constitutional provision was codified in 1789; however, its application to state prisoners remained unclear until, in 1867, Congress specifically authorized its availability.
The practical effect of Pinholster was to make it almost impossible to obtain an evidentiary hearing in federal court to develop new facts in support of a constitutional claim, even if the petitioner lacked the resources necessary to uncover new evidence or alleged that state authorities impeded his efforts to uncover the supposed relevant information.
But all is not lost after Pinholster.
Pinholster has no application to a section (d)(2) claim that the state court’s determination of the facts was “objectively unreasonable.” For example, in Lopez v. Miller, Judge Garaufis of the Eastern District held that a federal district court could grant an evidentiary hearing where the state court failed to accord adequate weight to an affidavit that went far toward establishing a colorable claim of actual innocence. In that case, Judge Garaufis held an evidentiary hearing to test the bona fides of the affiant and later relied on the testimony adduced at the federal evidentiary hearing in deciding the merits of the constitutional claims.
But do not confuse “an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the state court record under section (d)(2) with a state court’s “findings of facts” under CPLR section 2254(e). Only the latter is entitled to a presumption of correctness that requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut, as findings of fact made after an evidentiary hearing require credibility determinations. An unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record, on the other hand, involves an assessment of the evidence already in the record and does not involve “eye-balling” the affiant as part of the fact-finding function.
Later that same year, in Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court held that ineffective counsel at an initial-review collateral proceeding can constitute “cause” and “prejudice” excusing a petitioner from having adequately developed the state court record if the inadequacy was due to ineffective counsel at the mandatory initial-review proceeding. This decision appears to accord with the venerated holding in Townsend v. Sain, a pre-AEDPA decision that was incorporated into subsection (d)(2), and that permits federal courts to hold an evidentiary hearing if the state court, due to no fault of the defendant, failed to develop an adequate record for federal habeas corpus review.
Thus, it appears there now exists a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at an initial C.P.L. 440.10 proceeding, at least to the extent that the State seeks to limit the scope of federal habeas corpus review of constitutional claims based solely on the State court record.
Time will tell whether the Second Circuit will revisit this issue in light of Sears. It seems that an argument can be made that there may be instances where an error that “undermines confidence in the proceeding” may not be sufficiently egregious to qualify as a denial of a “fair [albeit not perfect] trial.” If so, then “double deference” would no longer be accorded to the “reasonableness” of New York State court decisions denying federal ineffective counsel claims.
It is an open question whether evidence establishing a colorable claim of actual innocence under House v. Bell can be used to decide the merits of the constitutional claim.
However, in Rivas v. Fischer, Chief Judge Gary Sharpe refused to consider evidence developed at a federal evidentiary hearing from which the Second Circuit had held that the petitioner had established a colorable claim of actual innocence, thereby enabling the petitioner to have his constitutional claims heard in federal court despite having filed his federal habeas corpus petition beyond AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations period.
A strange irony thus exists: the Second Circuit in Rivas v. Fischer, held that had Rivas’ jury known of the undisclosed information, they more likely than not would have acquitted Rivas of second degree murder; yet Judge Sharpe refused to consider that evidence based on Pinholster and held that based on the evidence in the original state court record, Rivas had failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged errors committed trial counsel.
This matter is once again on appeal to the Second Circuit. Don’t bet the case will be decided on Judeo-Christian ethic that “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free,” given the current Supreme Court’s overarching concern with comity and federalism.
There are other interesting (and unresolved) issues involving the Supremacy Clause and the prohibition against the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus addressed by Prof. Wiseman. My recommendation is to read Habeas after Pinholster!
1. 53 B.C. L. Rev. 953 (2012).
2. 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
3. 5 The Works of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, 368, 371 (Paul L. Ford, ed. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, Fed. Ex. 1904).
5. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011).
6. Shriro v . Landrigan,550 U.S. 463, 474 (2007).
7. 906 F. Supp. 2d 42 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), granting writ, 915 F. Supp. 2d 373 (2013).
8. See also, Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1288, fn. 5 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that where state court unreasonably determines the facts relevant to petitioner’s claim, federal court “does not owe the state court’s findings deference under AEDPA”); Detrich v. Ryan, 677 F.3d 958, 982 (9th Cir. 2012) (same).
9. 566 U.S. 1, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2013).
10. 131 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
11. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
12. 109 A.D.3d 621, 623 (2d Dept. 2013).
13. See Townsend, 373 U.S. at 313 (requiring federal courts to grant evidentiary hearing when, inter alia, “the fact-finding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing”).
14. 561 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010).
15. See Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 2012).
16. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403; accord, Wilson v. Mazzuca, 570 F.3d 490, 507 (2d Cir. 2009).
17. 601 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2010).
18. People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 237, 147 (1981).
19. People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 155-56 (2005).
20. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Double deference” refers to requirement that the federal district court find both that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and that the State court’s finding to the contrary was itself objectively unreasonable; i.e., no reasonable jurists would disagree that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. However, the degree of State court incorrectness does not have to rise to the level of judicial incompetence. Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 68 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Some increment of incorrectness beyond error” is required; but the “increment need not be great”).
21. 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
22. See In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009) (Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, J. dissenting) (opining that extrinsic evidence may be considered in deciding merits of constitutional claim of actual innocence).
23. No. 01-cv-1891(GLS), 2013 WL 4026844 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2013).
24. 687 F.3d 514 (2d Cir. 2012).
25. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Triestman, 124 F.3d 361, 377-80 (2d Cir. 1997) (mentioning the “serious” constitutional concerns that would arise if AEDPA were interpreted to bar judicial review of actual innocence claims).

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