Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82115:g-r-no-199890,-august-19,-2013-jerome-m-daabay,-petitioner,-v-coca-cola-bottlers-phils-,-inc-,-respondent&catid=1573&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:14:42+00:00

Document:
JEROME M. DAABAY, Petitioner, v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., Respondent.
This resolves petitioner Jerome M. Daabay’s (Daabay) Verified Petition for Review1 , which assails the Decision2 dated June 24, 2011 and Resolution3 dated December 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant Jerome Daabay as illegal, and ordering respondents to pay complainant his backwages in the amount of [P]750,996.00.
Additionally, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant his separation pay at one (1) month for every year of service, or his retirement benefits based on the latest Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his suspension/termination.
Other claims are hereby ordered dismissed for failure to substantiate.
Dissatisfied, Coca-Cola, Huang, Salvador and Garcia, appealed from ELA Magbanua’s Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Daabay filed a separate appeal to ask for his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, the payment of backwages instead of separation pay or retirement benefits, and an award of litigation expenses, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of complainant is DENIED for lack of merit, while that of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed 18 April 2008 Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the present complaint for want of evidence.
Let, however, this case be REMANDED to the Executive Labor Arbiter or the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for the computation of complainant’s retirement benefits in accordance with the latest Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his termination.
Coca-Cola’s partial motion for reconsideration to assail the award of retirement benefits was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution19 dated October 30, 2009. The NLRC explained that there was a need “to humanize the severe effects of dismissal”20 and “tilt the scales of justice in favor of labor as a measure of equity and compassionate social justice.”21 Daabay also moved to reconsider, but his motion remained unresolved by the NLRC.22 Undaunted, Coca-Cola appealed to the CA.
FOR THESE REASONS, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED; the portion of the Resolution promulgated on 27 August 2009 remanding of the case to the Executive Labor Arbiter or the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for computation of retirement benefits is DELETED.
Daabay’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution25 dated December 9, 2011; hence, this petition.
It bears stressing that although the assailed CA decision and resolution are confined to the issue of Daabay’s entitlement to retirement benefits, Daabay attempts to revive through the present petition the issue of whether or not his dismissal had factual and legal bases. Thus, instead of confining itself to the issue of whether or not Daabay should be entitled to the retirement benefits that were awarded by the NLRC, the petition includes a plea upon the Court to affirm ELA Magbanua’s Decision, with the modification to include: (a) his allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent in the computation of his backwages; (b) his actual reinstatement; and (c) damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
We emphasize that the appeal to the CA was brought not by Daabay but by Coca-Cola, and was limited to the issue of whether or not the award of retirement benefits in favor of Daabay was proper. Insofar as CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN was concerned, the correctness of the NLRC’s pronouncement on the legality of Daabay’s dismissal was no longer an issue, even beyond the appellate court’s authority to modify. In Andaya v. NLRC,26 the Court emphasized that a party who has not appealed from a decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.27 Further, we explained in Yano v. Sanchez,28 that the entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that he can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised below only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor.29 Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.30 Considering that Daabay had not yet appealed from the NLRC’s Resolution to the CA, his plea for the modification of the NLRC’s findings was then misplaced. For the Court to review all matters that are raised in the petition would be tolerant of what Daabay was barred to do before the appellate court.
Before the CA and this Court, Daabay attempts to justify his plea for relief by stressing that he had filed his own motion for reconsideration of the NLRC’s Resolution dated August 27, 2009 but the same remained unacted upon by the NLRC. Such bare allegation, however, is insufficient to allow the issue to be disturbed through this petition. We take note of Daabay’s failure to attach to his petition a copy of the motion which he allegedly filed with the NLRC. It is also quite baffling why Daabay does not appear to have undertaken steps to seek the NLRC’s resolution on the motion, even after it remained unresolved for more than two years from its supposed filing.
Granting that such motion to reconsider was filed with the NLRC, the labor tribunal shall first be given the opportunity to review its findings and rulings on the issue of the legality of Daabay’s dismissal, and then correct them should it find that it erred in its disposition. The Court cannot, by this petition, pre-empt the action which the NLRC, and the CA in case of an appeal, may take on the matter.
Even as we limit our present review to the lone issue that was involved in the assailed CA decision and resolution, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA.
[S]eparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
Clearly, considering that Daabay was dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct, breach of trust and loss of confidence, the award based on equity was unwarranted.
It is patent that the statements made by Coca-Cola were in light of ELA Magbanua’s ruling that Daabay was illegally dismissed. Furthermore, any admission was only for the purpose of explaining the non-inclusion of the amount of retirement benefits in the computation of the appeal bond posted with the NLRC. Coca-Cola’s statements should be taken in such context, and could not be deemed to bind the company even after the NLRC had reversed the finding of illegal dismissal. And although retirement benefits, where not mandated by law, may still be granted by agreement of the employees and their employer or as a voluntary act of the employer,38 there is no proof that any of these incidents attends the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 24, 2011 and Resolution dated December 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN are AFFIRMED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Mendoza,*JJ., concur.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Abraham B. Borreta and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang, concurring; id. at 39-48.
8 Id. at 40, 54.
22 Id. at 11, 42.
26 502 Phil. 151 (2005).
27 Id. at 159, citing Policarpio v. CA, 336 Phil. 329, 341 (1997).
28 G.R. No. 186640, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 347.
30Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera, G.R. No. 201701, June 3, 2013.
31 G.R. No. 123294, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 18.
32 Id. at 44-46; See also Aquino v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 118 (1992).
34Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., and/or Chiongbian v. Sedan, 521 Phil. 61, 71 (2006); San Miguel Corporation v. Lao, 433 Phil. 890, 898-899 (2002); Eastern Paper Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 252 Phil. 618, 620 (1989).
35 247 Phil. 641 (1988).
38Aquino v. NLRC, G.R. No. 87653, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 118.

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