Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_appeal_sanctions/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:02:51+00:00

Document:
Among Other Things, Lambasting The Trial Judge Was Not Proper.
In Estate of Kim & Weston, Case No. B281109 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Dec. 18, 2018) (unpublished), appellant relied on a voluminous appendix and 66-page opening brief with very few citations. Appellant also lambasted the trial judge in the AOB. That resulted in the appellate court finding the appeal frivolous, given an in pro per attorney was involved, awarding $22,515 paid to respondent and $8,500 to the appellate clerk for the costs of the reviewing court working up the appeal.
We See A Growing Trend Of Appellate Sanctions In Recent Cases.
Appellant in Knudson v. Ryer, Case No. A149532 (1st Dist., Div. 5 Dec. 17, 2018) (unpublished) failed to show why RFA costs-of-proof sanctions under CCP § 2033.420 should be reversed based on deficient analysis in the appellate briefing. That led the DCA to find the appeal frivolous, assessing $32,960.70 jointly and severally against plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel and in favor of the respondent—a growing trend if you look at our posts in the last couple of months!
Attorney Has Professional Obligation Not To Pursue A Frivolous Appeal.
The Third District, in Marriage of Daniliuc, Case No. C084293 (3d Dist. July 3, 2018) (unpublished), decided husband’s appeal of a fees award to his ex-wife was frivolous in nature. It decided that appellant’s husband should pay wife $10,000 out of a requested $22,550 in fees and an additional $6,000 to the appellate clerk for the state’s costs of processing the frivolous appeal.
Costs Have Gone Up Over The Years.
The costs for filing a frivolous appeal are going up. In Schmittle v. Baldwin Park Unified School District, Case No. B282431 (2d Dist., Div. 8 June 26, 2018) (unpublished), the appellate court imposed a $31,947.50 sanctions award, payable to the respondent side, upon appellant for a frivolous appeal. Co-contributor Mike can remember getting a frivolous appeal sanctions in the early 1990s for $10,000, and he thought that was significant then—but hourly rates and office costs have certainly gone up since then.
Employment—Nicolosi v. Cooper, Case No. B264459 (2d Dist., Div. 6 May 17 2017) (Unpublished)--$64,000 In Fees Just Fine In $80,933.75 Back Wages Case.
This one is not hard to fathom. Employee obtained $80,933.75 in back wages and $64,000 in attorney’s fees (out of a requested $130,000). Employee appealed, arguing not enough was awarded as far as fees. Naught. The trial judge properly apportioned out time spent on trust/mortgage claims—no abuse of discretion here in not awarding more.
Indemnity—Montebello Unified School Dist. v. Fitness Profile, Inc., Case No. B267436 (2d Dist., Div. 1 May 17, 2017) (Unpublished)—Big Fee Grant Reversal Where Fees Clause Was A True Indemnity Clause And Nothing More.
The second one was no problem for the appellate court, even though the trial judge granted $672,317.96 in attorney’s fees based on contractual fees clauses in operative contracts. The reviewing court reversed the fee award after determining the fees clauses were true third-party indemnification provisions rather than true fee clauses, relying on the Building Maintenance-Myers line of cases in overturning fees on appeal.
Appeal Sanctions—Kinney v. Clark, Case No. B265267 (2d Dist., Div. 1 May 17, 2017) (Published)--$10,000 For Frivolous Appeal Levied Against Loser.
The last one involved multi-year litigation by a losing party seeking to avoid payment of a modest, earlier attorney’s fees award, even though fees kept mounting once loser kept going on, and on, and on. Loser unsuccessfully argued that the fee awards were void, such that loser was declared a vexatious litigant. The appellate court could find no authority indicating that an appeal from a fee order prevented the lower court from entering further fees for “in the pipeline” activities giving rise to fees despite the fact that the appeal had not yet been decided. The Court of Appeal ultimately decided that loser needed to pay $10,000 for a frivolous appeal in this matter.
Request By Opposing Party Was $44,744.
Range Is $6,000 For Non-Complex Appeal To $8,000 For General Processing Costs Of Appeal Leading To An Opinion.
Above: “Print shows a lawyer taking papers that state ‘Fake Lawsuit for Damages’ from a bag labeled ‘A Shyster’ in a courtroom; as he turns toward the bench, he sees the judge point to a paper hanging from the bench that states ‘Notice to insure against the bringing of frivolous or blackmailing suits, lawyers will hereafter be held responsible for the costs of all the suits brought by them.’” Louis Dalrymple, artist. 1899. Library of Congress.
Another $56,311 In Appellate Sanctions Assessed, Some In Favor Of Opposite Side And Some To the Appellate Court Itself.
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 does allow sanctions for frivolous pleadings and other courses of conduct in litigation, including extension to sanctions during appellate proceedings. Bucur v. Ahmad, Case No. D068689 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 26, 2016) (published) illustrates the potency of such sanctions and also counsels practitioners to avoid doing whatever a client wants where lawyers are on thin (or no) ice.
In Bucur, the 4/1 DCA affirmed a 128.7 lower court sanctions award against both plaintiffs and their attorney in the sum of $16,648.75. The reviewing court rebuffed the suggestion that the filing of a first amended complaint after the expiration of the safe harbor period somehow immunized prior activity. However, it got worse.
Plaintiffs’ appeal was also deemed frivolous, such that sanctions were ordered paid to the defense for appellate work to the tune of $31,311 under section 128.7. But there is more. Given the costs to the legal and judicial system as a whole, another $25,000 was ordered paid to the court clerk to compensate taxpayers for the costs of working up and deciding the appeal. All of these awards were made jointly and severally against Plaintiff and their counsel, plus the opinion had to be reported to the State Bar. Ouch, ouch, ouch!
Respondents Were Able To Supplement Lack Of Reporter’s Transcript Of Hearing Through CCP § 909; Appeal Sanctions Request By Respondents Denied.
Respondents judgment debtors were awarded $14,850 in fees for their opponents’ failure to file a judgment satisfaction, with there being a fee entitlement basis through a mandatory fee-shifting statute for such a failure as codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 724.080. Appellants challenged that notion that any fee order was actually made based primarily on the absence of a reporter’s transcript of a hearing, but that premise was rejected soundly in Taylor Concrete Pumping Corp. v. Zippy’s Currency X-Change, Inc., Case No. B258831 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Dec. 15, 2015) (unpublished).
The problem here was that other documents of record did show a fee award was made by the trial judge. However, in an interesting appellate practice aspect relating to this cause, the reviewing court did grant respondents’ motion for the appellate court to consider additional evidence under CCP § 909, namely, a declaration by respondents’ counsel explaining what happened at the hearing. Because there were other documents which meshed consistently with this declaration and it was essentially a “gap filler,” the appellate court granted the motion and sustained that a fee order had been entered.
Respondents moved for sanctions against appellants under CCP § 128.5(a). However, that was the wrong section because it only applies to trial courts. The right section was CCP § 907 as far as appeal sanctions was concerned, but the request was denied because respondents failed to follow California Rules of Court, rule 8.276 procedures requiring that that the request be filed in a separate motion with a supporting declaration.
Appellate Court Also Assessed $9,000 Against Appellant For Frivolous Appeal.
Plaintiff sued to collect on a note with a fees clause, alleging that an individual defendant was the alter ego of the entity obligor. However, plaintiff’s case was dismissed for failure to prosecute it. The lower court then awarded fees of $125,000 out of a requested $731,340 to the prevailing defendant.
That result was upheld on appeal in Ascarrunz v. Hsu, Case No. A143766 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Oct. 23, 2015) (unpublished).
The leading case of Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal.3d 124 (1979) allows Civil Code section 1717 fee recovery against a litigant losing an alter ego claim. Appellant never showed why this authority was not dispositive, as it was.
Then, the appellate court assessed $9,000 against appellant as sanctions for a frivolous appeal, payable to the First District court clerk. It has a nice survey of frivolous appeal awards in the past few years for you readers out there who might need this type of information for a frivolous appeal sanctions motion.
Sanctions Assessed Under Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
The Ninth Circuit, in Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 12-35986 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2015) (published), did not take kindly to the pursuit of a frivolous appeal of a denial of a motion to disqualify a bankruptcy judge, especially given the ad hominem assaults and unfounded conspiratorial allegations targeted at the bankruptcy judge. It was also not impressed by counsel’s reference to emails from client’s ex-wife without disclosing ex-wife had filed affidavits and documents which were found to be forged. That led to the imposition of sanctions against appellant and his lead counsel (although four other attorneys for client distanced themselves so as to just receive a warning) under Fed. R. App. 38 (frivolous appeal rule) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (against an attorney, for multiplying the proceedings in any case in unreasonable, bad faith fashion). The Ninth Circuit Appellate Commissioner was ordered to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions against client and lead attorney and in favor of appellees for defending against the appeal. The Ninth Circuit also ordered that client and lead attorney each pay $500 damages to the clerk of the court as reimbursement for the costs incurred during the appeal.
Second District, Division 5 Issues $53,153.44 Sanctions Against Losing Appellant.
The price for a frivolous appeal seems to be going up, as demonstrated in Johnson v. Syed, Case No. B258701 (2d Dist., Div. 5 July 15, 2015) (unpublished). A losing appellant in that cause was ordered to pay $53,153.44 in fees incurred by the other side as sanctions for having to oppose a frivolous appeal. Co-contributor Mike obtained a frivolous appeal sanctions of a similar sort in 1994 from the Fourth District, Division 3 to the tune of $18,000, but sanctions amount have been steadily going up over the years—including the appellate court ordering the sanctioned party to pay anywhere between $5-10,000 to the clerk to reimburse taxpayers for the time that the court spent in working up the case for hearing.
Dissenting Justice Did Not Think Sanctions Were Appropriate Based on Inadequate Appellate Record.
However, Winning Plaintiff Attorney Negotiating Personal Injury Settlement Not Entitled to SLAPP Fee-Shifting Fees or Frivolous Appeal Sanctions.
Well, we have an appellate court decision saying fees disputes do not rise to constitutional protected activity under the SLAPP statute. We are not offended, because these usually are more in the nature of private disputes in most situations.
In Drell v. Cohen, Case No. B253688 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Dec. 5, 2014) (published), most of the litigation activity involved a fight between attorneys representing a personal injury claimant. After ex-attorneys for the claimant withdrew from representation albeit having an attorney’s lien, claimant’s second attorney negotiated a successful settlement with an insurer, who tendered a settlement check made payable to the second attorney and the ex-attorneys. That prompted second attorney to file a declaratory relief action relating to the impact of the ex-attorneys’ attorney lien. Ex-attorneys moved to SLAPP the declaratory relief complaint, but that was denied. The lower court also denied second attorney’s fee request predicated on the rejected theory that the SLAPP motion was frivolous.
All results were affirmed on appeal.
Because second attorney never cross-appealed the lower court fee denial, his claim of error could not be considered. Finally, although indicating the appeal by ex-attorneys had “no merit whatsoever and [was] poorly conceived,” the panel believed there was not enough to impose appellate sanctions for a frivolous appeal.
However, Appeal Sanctions Not Imposed Against Appellants’ Attorney.
We can discern that the Second District, Division 2 is tired of the appeals in ASAP Copy and Print v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., Case No. B249588 (2d Dist., Div. 2 June 23, 2014) (unpublished), all of which arose from a copier lease dispute. This was the fifth appeal.
Certain Respondents filed requests for attorney’s fees in prevailing on prior appeals, with the court granting all but about $10,000, for a total award of fees against Appellants of over $91,000, prompting the latest appeal.
Nothing changed. Appellants contended that a prior award of costs by the appellate court to respondents precluded an award of further fees on appeal; nope—read Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(d)(2), said the Court. Reasonableness of the awards was then raised, but appellants had only themselves to blame on this one—50 pages of prior consolidated appeals opinions and 32 volumes of exhibits in the Appellant’s Appendix.
However, Respondents wanted appeals sanctions against Appellant’s attorney, who had been sanctioned before. But, the reviewing court found that Respondents could be adequately compensated by filing appropriate fee motions for winning this appeal rather than expending additional court resources to find the present appeal frivolous in nature.
Also, Appellant and Attorney Had to Pay $7,500 to Clerk of the Court For Frivolous Appeal.
In somewhat of a companion post to several cases we have looked at recently, the Third District in Singh v. Lipworth, Case No. C073177 (3d Dist. June 18, 2014) (unpublished) provided us with the expenses which may befall an appellant and their attorney for a prosecuting a frivolous appeal. Here, the appellant and appellant’s counsel were found jointly and severally liable for (1) $7,478.74 in fees and costs awardable to respondent for defending against the appeal, and (2) additional sanctions of $7,500 payable to the appeals court clerk for the court’s time in working up the case (a taxpayers’ saving), with the reviewing court noting that the general range for additional sanctions of this type clocking in at $6,000-$8,500.
Appeal Sanctions: What Is The Price Of Appellate Sanctions For A Frivolous Appeal?
Side Defending Against Frivolous Appeal Is Awarded $25,000.
Emily Post. 1937. Library of Congress.
Husband’s Appeal Was Frivolous, With Lower Court To Determine Fees On Remand.
Marriage of S., Case No. G047517 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 26, 2013) (unpublished) is a case where an ex-husband unsuccessfully appealed a family judge order that each side bears his/her own fees/costs. The record certainly supported the denial on a “needs basis”--husband had more liquid assets, and husband had paid his attorneys while wife was arrears in paying her attorneys.
However, that is not the end of the tale in this case. Ex-husband’s counsel made factual misrepresentations of the record below, which led the appellate court to sanction husband and counsel for a frivolous appeal--with the trial judge having to decide the amount of the sanctions to be awarded to the other side.
Justice Ikola authored this decision for a 3-0 panel.
If you are tracking the costs of a frivolous appeal, the recent opinion in Estate of Schooler, Case No. D062217 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 15, 2013) (unpublished) might help you. There, the reviewing court imposed these sanctions for a frivolous appeal: (1) $10,725 in favor of one set of respondents; (2) $8,760 in favor of another respondent; and (3) $8,500 to the clerk of the court, representing the estimated costs for the appellate court to “work up” the case.
Two Appeals Demonstrate How Overall Equities Factor Into Appellate Sanctions Decisionmaking Process.
Here are two interesting appeals by a sanctioned client and attorney from lower court decisions, with appellate sanctions being sought by the respondents on appeal. The results are interesting and decided by Acting Presiding Justice Bedsworth on behalf of identical 3-0 panels in Nu v. Nguyen, Case No. G046839 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 4, 2013) (unpublished) and Truong v. Nguyen, Case Nos. G047039/G047151 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 6, 2013) (unpublished).
In Nu v. Nguyen, lower court sanctions under CCP § 128.7 were affirmed after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her action because her story about a Vietnamese money transaction simply had too many contradictions between deposition and later declaration testimony--$22,292.04 in sanctions against plaintiff and her attorney were affirmed against plaintiff in this appeal. However, respondent sought appellate sanctions, which were denied. Reason? Respondent did not fully answer questions about where plaintiff’s money went and did not clear up her confusion about the transaction--a confusion also shared by the appellate court.
Then, in Truong v. Nguyen, plaintiff’s attorney hit with the $22,292.04 sanctions award appealed, but also appealed a $3,660 second sanctions imposed for bringing an untimely motion for reconsideration. Attorney lost the appeal of the $22,292.04 sanctions award because he appealed too late--he did not file a valid reconsideration motion, so the 60-day appeal period was not extended. (This decision is good reading on when a reconsideration motion must be timely filed after a notice of ruling.) However, appellate sanctions were not assessed against attorney for this appeal because, although untimely filed, the merits of the appeal had some semblance of sense given respondent’s inability to explain fully what happened to appealing attorney’s client’s money in the transaction at issue. However, attorney did not do so well on the $3,660 reconsideration motion second sanctions. This sanctions order was not appealable but should have been pursued through an extraordinary writ challenging the sanction, something not done. However, only token appellate sanctions of $100 payable to the court were levied against attorney given that the appellate court did not spent much time on the issue and it had to ask for supplemental briefing on the untimeliness of the reconsideration motion in the first appeal.
So, that is how justice panned out in this client/attorney appellate trifecta!
City Ignored or Misrepresented Controlling Authorities on Appeal.
In City of Santa Rosa v. Villages at Wild Oak Assn., Case No. A134107 (lst Dist., Div. 4 Aug. 28, 2013) (unpublished), City appealed the denial of its SLAPP motion. Bad move. In its moving papers below, City ignored or misrepresented controlling authorities. The appellate court, besides not being impressed, believed appellate sanctions were in order to City’s opponent. The amount? Opponent submitted proof it expended $39,810 in opposing City’s appeal, and that was the amount City was sanctioned for bringing/prosecuting the frivolous appeal.
904 McDonald Avenue, Santa Rosa. Setting for the Newton’s house in Alfred Hitchcock’s Shadow of a Doubt. Source.
This next case reminds us that you need to give up after you or your client is on a losing string, especially once a couple of appeals tend to establish an adverse trend. Appealing Defendant Attorneys, unfortunately, apparently did not read the tea leaves.
In Kleveland v. Siegel & Wolensky, LLP, Case No. D060906 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Apr. 17, 2013) (published), a beneficiary’s challenges to a trustee were rebuffed, with the appellate court affirming a lower court determination that the beneficiary pursued the challenging trustee petition in bad faith and for an improper purpose, something not even emphasized in the pending appeal (a big mistake, we might say--with the appellate court miffed that this was not at least highlighted at all). Trustee brought a malicious prosecution suit against beneficiary and his attorneys, both of whom believed the best defense is a grand offense. (Boy, oh boy, assess this strategy carefully.) Defendant attorneys moved to SLAPP the malicious prosecution suit, but the lower court denied the motion and found the SLAPP motion to be frivolous so as to award $20,055 in fees and costs to plaintiff.
You think that might have been the end of the story? No, not quite--that is what keeps appellate courts (and, this blog, we might add) in the running for the end of the story when everyone gets invested into the apparent emotionalism of the moment. Had they simply paid $20,055, attorneys would have been better off, but not to be.
So what is that end? Breathless as you may be, here is what happened.
The appellate court was miffed that the appealing parties did not concede there was a favorable termination given the prior appeal sustaining a determination that the trust petition was a bad faith/improper purpose challenge. (Ouch!) This meant that the SLAPP motion directed to the malicious prosecution action was ill-founded, with all of the elements established on a “probability of merit” standard. Appellants argued that the SLAPP fees order violated Childs v. PaineWebber Inc., 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 996 (1994), but this was rejected because the fee recovery order explained the basis for the decision and did not just do a rote recitation to the SLAPP statute.
Longview Farm, Manure Pit. David Kaminsky, photographer. 1978. Library of Congress.
Civility Is Also Stressed in Decision.
Wong v. Genser, Case No. A133837 (1st Dist., Div. 5 Nov. 30, 2012) (unpublished) is not only a lesson in tenacity, but also shows how an appealing party must be candid with the appellate tribunal--under penalty of harsh appellate sanctions. Also, the decision has some important words about civility, worthy of repetition.
What happened here was that appellant and her attorney did not produce a missing superior court notice of order entry that showed her appeal was untimely. However, respondent’s appellate counsel doggedly investigated the matter and found the entry notice showing the appeal should be dismissed.
Prevailing Parties Get Them, With No Frivolity Requirement Necessary, But In Pro Per Litigant Dodged Appeal Sanctions.
Appeal Sanctions Denied Because No Declaration Filed to Support Fee Request.
Preserving claims for trial court error depends on raising the argument below and providing an adequate record to the appellate court. Violation of either principle likely means an appeal will be unsuccessful. Likewise, with respect to appeal sanctions, one must follow the California Rules of Court, filing a separate motion and declaration supporting the requested sanctions in a timely and proper manner.
Transgressions by both sides in Serna v. Polanco, Case No G046323 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Oct. 24, 2012) (unpublished) [with similar appellate causes involving Ms. Polanco not discussed because they are largely duplicative in facts and results] meant that a request for fees and appellate sanctions were rejected.
Defendant appealed an adverse restraining order against her and also requested an an award of attorney’s fees. Both sides requested appellate sanctions under CRC, rule 8.276.
Both sides’ requests were denied.
Although defendant’s appeal on the merits of the restraining order was moot because the order expired by its terms, the attorney’s fees order was certainly in play as far as whether positive money should flow to her. (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach, 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 866 (2012).) However, the fee request was flawed because defendant failed to provide an adequate appellate record--nothing indicated the request was even made to the trial court and she cited no authority for fee entitlement.
The dueling appellate sanctions requests by both sides were rejected because neither filed a declaration with the sanctions motions supporting the monetary amounts requested, a violation of CRC, rule 8.276(b)(1).
The opinion was written by Justice Ikola on behalf of a unanimous panel.
Cal. Rules of Court Do Contain the Proper Procedures in These Areas.
Justice Yegan in Sandler v. San Wall Properties, Case No. B234643 (2d Dist., Div. 6 July 31, 2012) (unpublished) does remind us of some procedural nuances on two subjects: (1) appeal sanctions; and (2) attorney’s fees on appeal.
There, winning respondent requested appeal sanctions against loser for violating some California Rules of Court on appeal in its respondent’s brief. No go, said the appellate court, because the brief request was incorrect. The reason was that this sanctions request must be made by separate motion including a declaration supporting the amount of any requested sanctions, which motion has to be filed before any order dismissing the appeal but no later than 10 days after appellant’s reply brief is due. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(b)(1); Committee to Save Beverly Highlands Home Assn. v. Beverly Highlands Home Assn., 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1273 n. 10 (2001).
Respondent also requested an award of attorney’s fees on appeal in his brief. Nope, wrong procedure said the appellate court. The correct procedure is to file a motion in the superior court within the time delineated in California Rules of Court, rule 2.1702(c). Tesoro Del Valle Homeowners Assn. v. Griffith, 200 Cal.App.4th 619, 642 n. 7. (2011).
Creative Argument Okay, But Better Not Base Appeal on Rejected/Sanctioned Argument In Another Case That Was Affirmed On Appeal.
We can only guess that some practitioners believe that appellate courts will not thoroughly research a matter or miss something along the way. Not likely, as this next opinion shows.
In this one, defendants lost a SLAPP motion against plaintiff court reporting company, and then appealed. They raised the same argument that had been rejected and sanctioned in another trial court and affirmed on appeal by another appellate court--even though defense counsel, too, actually was involved in the prior case. Bad idea to appeal, because that had repercussions on attorney’s and clients’ pocketbooks.
The price of the defense’s frivolous appeal? Plaintiff requested $26,837.50, but the appellate awarded it $22,000, jointly and severally, against defendants and their counsel after eliminating some duplicative/unnecessary charges.
Appellate Courts Are Not Messing Around With Frivolous Appeals.
Thanks to Justice Yegan, we have a memorabe one in the appellate sanctions archive in Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Case No. B233679 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Apr. 16, 2012) (certified for publication).
Although we have to surmise a bit, residential subprime borrower was facing foreclosure and was trying to derail a nonjudicial foreclosure of her home. She did obtain a preliminary injunction, but on condition that borrower deposit $1,700 a month in a client trust account in lieu of a bond toward delinquent mortgage payments. Borrower did not make any payment, forcing lender to move ex parte but resulting in a denial ---albeit with stern warnings from the lower court that payments needed to be made and no “free house” was in the offing. After lender filed papers showing no payments had been made, the lower court dissolved the preliminary injunction so that the trustee’s sale could go forward. Borrower appealed, which the appellate court indicated effectively “stayed” the trustee’s sale.
The appellate court found that the appeal was frivolous, given nothing showed an abuse of trial court discretion in dissolving the preliminary injunction. Because the trustee’s sale was delayed for over two years with the help of counsel, the appellate court was not pleased with what happened. The bank did not ask for sanctions, but that did not end the matter. The appellate court ordered that bank would be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees on remand and the clerk of the reviewing court was ordered to send a copy of the opinion to the State Bar for consideration of possible discipline with respect to borrower’s appellate counsel (also borrower’s counsel at the trial level).
Two Recent Opinions Show the Trend.
When appellate courts sanction someone for a frivolous appeal, we have noticed lately that the tally is going up even in fairly routine appeals. In Willis v. Page, Case No. B230638 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 28, 2012) (unpublished), the winning party on appeal was awarded $20,000 out of a requested $25,884.52 in sanctions for his opponent’s frivolous appeal. Similarly, in Marriage of Bhardwaj, Case No. A128171 et al. (1st Dist., Div. 5 Feb. 28, 2012) (unpublished), the appellate court awarded $60,000 to the winning party in three appeals, out of a requested $67,500. Looks like around $20,000 is the “going rate” for frivolous appeal sanctions in a routine matter.
Appellate Frivolous Sanctions Also Awarded Against Appellant/Her Counsel.
Marriage of Wahl and Perkins, Case No. H035712 (6th Dist. Feb. 2, 2012) (certified for publication) is a situation where an ex-wife was ordered to pay $552,153.28 as a fee “sanctions” to ex-husband under Family Code section 271. (For any newbees or anyone who might need reminding, this is a statutory section in the family law area allowing an award of fees against a litigant--without any real showing of injury but indicating that the litigant can financially bear the award--for not furthering settlement or making the matter more litigious in nature.) It is an interesting opinion to show how the abuse of discretion standard will result in affirmance, as well as show how appellate courts may be pulling the “trigger” more often on frivolous appeals--awarding expenses to the clerk of the court for the costs of processing such appeals.
Based on the record, ex-wife had assets of $7 million, $5 million of which were accessible. So, she certainly could bear the consequences of a loss given the facts recited in the opinion--including numerous custody/visitation battles both in California and Pennsylvania. However, the real ouch was ex-wife who had to pay $15,000 to the clerk for a frivolous appeal and her two attorneys had to pay $5,000 each for the same reason.
Case #1: Appellate Sanctions Are Imposed.
Case #2: Brusso Allows for Defendants to Obtain Section 1717 Fees Against Nonsignatory Plaintiffs in Derivative Actions.
In our January 29, 2009 post on West Hill Farms v. RCO Ag Credit (a nonpublished Fifth District decision), we learned that winning defendants in shareholder derivative lawsuits are usually limited to the amount of a posted Corporations Code section 800 bond (capped at $50,000). However, West Hill Farms did observe that there were other bases for an award that is not so capped--namely, Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 228 Cal.App.3d 92, 107-108 (1991), where a court determined that a successful defendant may collect fees from plaintiff shareholders under Civil Code section 1717 if derivative claims are based on a contract containing a fees clause. Well, Brusso was front and center in the companion case to the one we just discussed, with that case being Conrad v. KOR Electronics, Inc., Case Nos. G044457/G044682 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Dec. 30, 2011) (unpublished).
Conrad involved nonsignatory plaintiff shareholders who lost a derivative suit against numerous defendants (KOR shareholders, KOR directors, and KOR), with the lower court awarding two adverse fees awards against one plaintiff broken down as $747,012 to KOR directors/KOR and $919,224 to two shareholders. Even though the losing plaintiff was a nonsignatory shareholder to repurchase/investor agreements with a fees clause, the lower court determined that Brusso allowed the recovery.
Civility To Both Other Lawyers and the Court, Cries Out Loud and Clear in Justice Bedsworth-Authored Opinion.
Here is a very interesting decision that is going to be cited in what needs to be done in “proving up” for default judgment purposes, general civility to other lawyers and the court system, and appellate sanctions that are appropriate for the conduct listed in our first headline.
Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc., Case No. G044216 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 29, 2011) (certified for publication), authored for a 3-0 panel by Acting Presiding Justice Bedsworth, involved the reversal of a $5 million default judgment against six defendants (or a total $30 million judgment) and is must reading in this area alone on the care that must be taken in “proving up” default judgments. However, there is more in this one. After defendants appealed from the judgments, plaintiff’s counsel requested an extension of time to file his respondent’s brief based on the complexity of the issues and conflicting counsel time commitments. Although the extension was granted by the appellate court, respondent’s counsel submitted a brief that was a near verbatim duplicate of another brief in a 2009 case that involved different circumstances (with counsel even signing the brief as representing the client in the earlier 2009 case). The brief had an identical assertion as in the prior brief that opposing counsel was guilty of falsely arguing the case and an identical assertion that the appeal was frivolous (the latter argument running afoul of the extension request being based on the complexity of the matter). Opposing counsel asked the appellate court to take judicial notice of the 2009 brief, which it did and issued a sua sponte notice that the court was considering imposition of sanctions against respondent’s counsel.
This did get a response from respondent’s counsel, who denied any wrongdoing and reargued his sanctions request against the defendants. He also defended his right to copy prior work product and informed the appellate court that the sanctions notice was erroneous and likely should have been targeted at appellants’ counsel. At the appellate sanctions hearing, another attorney not aware of the sanctions notice appeared, which prompted the appellate court to send a second order to get respondent’s lead counsel to appear personally.
The appellate court found numerous violations by respondent’s counsel: (1) failure to back up his appellate extension request properly (especially shown by filing a copycat of a 2009 brief rather than truly addressing complex issues); (2) failure to file a respondent’s brief compliant with the California Rules of Court (again corroborated by copying a prior brief that involved different circumstances); and (3) falsely accusing opposing counsel of making false arguments and requesting sanctions based on such a contention. Although opposing counsel did not request sanctions, the appellate court imposed sanctions of $10,000 on respondent’s counsel, upping the “conservative” $6,000 the same appeals court imposed in another case, DeRose v. Huerlin, 100 Cal.App.4th 158 (2002).
“ . . . Sanctions are serious business. They deserve more thought than the choice of a salad dressing. “I‘ll have the sanctions, please. No, on second thought, bring me the balsamic; I‘m trying to lose a few pounds.” A request for sanctions can never be so lightly considered as to be copied word for word from another brief – much less copied in reliance on facts from another case that do not obtain in the present one. A request for sanctions should be reserved for serious violations of the standard of practice, not used as a bullying tactic.
“Our profession is rife with cynicism, awash in incivility. Lawyers and judges of our generation spend a great deal of time lamenting the loss of a golden age when lawyers treated each other with respect and courtesy. It‘s time to stop talking about the problem and act on it. For decades, our profession has given lip service to civility. All we have gotten from it is tired lips. We have reluctantly concluded lips cannot do the job; teeth are required. In this case, those teeth will take the form of sanctions.
“We do not come to this conclusion lightly. Judges are lawyers, too. And while we have taken on a different role in the system, we have not lost sight of how difficult it is to practice law. Indeed, at the appellate level, we are reminded daily how complex and recondite the issues that confront practitioners daily can be.
“So we are loath to act in any way that would seem to encourage courts to impose sanctions for mistakes or missteps. But for serious and significant departures from the standard of practice, for departures such as dishonesty and bullying, such steps are necessary. We will step onto the slippery slope and trust our colleagues on the trial court bench to tread carefully along with us. It is time to make it clear that there is a price to pay for cynical practices.
Rocinante. Detail of the Cervantes Monument. Madrid. Wikipedia.
Appeal Labeled “Insulting” by Appellate Court.
In Kempton v. Prudential California Realty, Case No. B2311633 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 16, 2011) (unpublished), appellant appealed a costs award but made a blatantly false argument to the court, namely, that the trial court did not have a costs memorandum before it in ruling on a motion to tax costs. The appellate court found the appeal “insulting” and, on its own motion, remanded for frivolous sanctions to be determined in favor of respondent. Also, the Court of Appeal imposed $2,000 in sanctions payable to its own clerk for the taxpayer burden of having to process the frivolous appeal. Ouch!
Frivolous Appeal No Laughing Matter.
Marriage of Shannahan, Case No. D058220 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 10, 2011) (unpublished) is not blog-worthy for its ultimate result of affirming a $20,000 Family Code section 271 sanctions award against husband. However, it is worthy for establishing the “going rate” for frivolous appeal sanctions to the clerk of the court when the winner on appeal fails to submit proof of its fees/costs on appeal. What is the going rate? $8,000, according to the 4/2 appellate court, which relied on (but reduced a little) the $8,500 figure derived from a 2008 study by the Second District. (See Huschke v. Slater, 168 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1163-1164 (2008).) It will be interesting to see if the Second District ups the ante in upcoming decisions.
Appellate Court Gives Us Updated Figures on Costs for Processing Appeal That Goes to Opinion.
This one will be of interest to general readers and appellate practitioners, a diverse audience but one that should pay attention nonetheless.
In Marriage of Peng and Hsieh, Case No. B221318 (2d Dist., Div. 8 July 12, 2011) (unpublished), appellant was hit with appellate sanctions payable to the court clerk for bringing a frivolous appeal. Although this sanction payable to the government is a proper sanction for a frivolous appeal (Pollock v. University of Southern California, 112 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1433 (2003); accord, Pierotti v. Torian, 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 35 (2000) [because frivolous appeal harms the court, not just the respondent, additional award of sanctions payable directly to the court clerk to compensate the state for the cost of processing such appeals is appropriate]), the opinion is helpful in giving an update on the sanctions amount that is appropriate.
Here is how it stacks up.
Not surprisingly, appellant in Marriage of Peng and Hsieh was hit with appellate sanctions of $8,500 payable to the court clerk and $15,000 payable to respondent for the frivolous appeal.

References: v. 
 § 2033
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 909
 v. 
 § 909
 § 128
 § 907
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1927
 v. 
 § 1927
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 128
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.