Source: https://chrismcdonoughesq.wordpress.com/2017/02/23/defining-the-practice-of-law-after-matter-of-brandes/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:22:58+00:00

Document:
A second application for reinstatement was filed by Brandes in 2010, again revealing that he had been performing paralegal services for attorneys from his home in Florida. This application went before a subcommittee of the Committee on Character and Fitness. At the hearing, he was asked about his paralegal business. The subcommittee recommended reinstatement, noting: “Since Petitioner never spoke to or met a client and only dealt with attorneys, the Petitioner did not violate any New York Disciplinary Rules applicable to disbarred attorneys.” However, the full Character Committee voted 12-11 to deny reinstatement because his website did not state that he was not an attorney—although his website prominently stated that Joel R. Brandes Consulting Services was not a law firm and did not give legal advice. In a decision dated December 17, 2012, the court, inter alia, denied him reinstatement in a one-line decision stating that he did not possess the character and fitness to practice law.
Brandes was granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which, after a lively oral argument, issued its decision on November 1, 2016, in which the court “punted.” Matter of Brandes, 2016 WL 6427680, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07111. Instead of addressing the precedent which has evolved regarding what constitutes the “practice of law,” the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division decision, stating that its standard of review was “limited to whether the Second Department abused its discretion” and found that “because there was record support for the court’s decision, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the reinstatement application.” Id. (citing, in part, Matter of Anonymous, 79 N.Y.2d 782 (1991)).
In People v. Alfani , 227 N.Y. 334 (1919), the Court of Appeals held that preparing business legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured constituted the practice of law. It limited Alfani in Matter of Marino, 20 N.Y.2d 176 (1967) to prohibiting drafting of legal instruments for the public.
Spivak was refined in Matter of New York County Lawyers’ Assn. v. Dacey where the Appellate Division held that the sale of Dacey’s book with legal forms, titled “How to Avoid Probate,” constituted the practice of law. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the drafting of documents that create legal rights is not always the practice of law. It adopted Justice Stevens dissenting opinion at the Appellate Division which observed that there was “no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. This is the essential of legal practice—the representation and the advising of a particular person in a particular situation.” 28 A.D.2d 161, 173-74 (Stevens, J. P., dissenting), rev’d on dissenting opn. below, 21 N.Y.2d 694) (1967).
In El Gemayle v. Seaman, 72 N.Y.2d 701 (1988), the Court of Appeals offered that the “practice” of law includes the rendering of legal advice as well as appearing in court and holding oneself out to be a lawyer and that such services must be rendered to particular clients.
In Matter of Rowe, 80 N.Y.2d 336 (1992), the Respondent published an article while suspended in which he identified himself as “Robert T. Rowe, J.D.” The Court of Appeals held that this did not violate any of the specific prohibitions of Judiciary Law §90(2). It directs suspended or disbarred attorneys to desist and refrain “(1) from practicing law in any form … (3) from giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) from holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law,” as set forth in Judiciary Law §90(2).
The appellate divisions have held that a non-lawyer may not consult with or prepare legal papers for a client “who is unaware that the employee is not admitted to the practice of law,” Matter of Caracas, 171 A.D.2d 358 (2d Dep’t 1991); a non-lawyer may not try a Housing Court case or draft court complaints, Matter of Mason, 208 A.D.2d 1 (1st Dep’t 1995); a disbarred attorney, employed by a lawyer, may not make “determinations to initiate actions at law and settle collection claims and actions,” Matter of Stahl, 200 A.D.2d 285 (2d Dep’t 1994); and an attorney may not permit a disbarred attorney, employed by him, to affix his name to affirmations included in court papers, Matter of Gajewski, 217 A.D.2d 90 (1st Dep’t. 1995). These decisions offer limited guidance as to what constitutes the “practice of law” as they rest upon the clear language of the Judiciary Law or merely reiterate holdings of earlier decisions. Significantly, none of the decisions distinguish between persons who are not admitted to the New York Bar and suspended or disbarred attorneys.
The Second Department held that Brandes engaged in the practice of law by giving advice to another lawyer about a case being handled by that other lawyer, and by drafting briefs and legal documents for him. It stated that Brandes’ intelligence and expertise were factors that transformed that attorney into a client.
Prior to Matter of Brandes, it was generally accepted that disbarred and suspended attorneys could do legal research, give advice to lawyers, and draft briefs and litigation documents for lawyers. It appears the Second Department has now concluded that Brandes is prohibited from earning a living by doing these things in the future, should he chose to and want to be reinstated in New York.
The question remains: Is Matter of Brandes limited to its unique facts and applicable only to experts in a particular field of law, or does it apply to all disbarred and suspended attorneys? If the decision is to be read literally, a disbarred and suspended attorney may not perform any services which include giving an opinion or advice to an attorney, including legal research conclusions, brief writing, and document drafting. The decision also raises the question of whether Judiciary Law §90(2) is unconstitutional as a denial of freedom of speech and equal protection, since, on its face, it prohibits disbarred and suspended attorneys from doing things they would be able to do had they not been admitted to the bar in the first place—a question the Court of Appeals did not address.
So, what may a suspended or disbarred attorney do? The case law prior to Brandes made clear that disbarred or suspended attorneys could perform legal research, drafting, and brief writing since the practice of law required the giving of specific legal advice to a specific person about their particular problem. It now seems that the unauthorized practice of law by suspended or disbarred attorneys includes the giving of any legal advice or opinion to even a licensed attorney — seemingly as informed by the court’s subjective determination of the intelligence of the offeror.
1 Brandes’ home state of Florida allows disbarred attorneys to do para-legal work. See Florida Bar Rule 3-6.
3 The Court of Appeals held that as so applied, the suspension order violated Rowe’s constitutional right to speak freely.
Chris McDonough is a grievance lawyer with The Law Office of McDonough & McDonough, a New York disciplinary defense law firm. The author was counsel for Joel Brandes before the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.

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