Source: http://fsmlaw.org/pohnpei/decisions/2psr_513.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 12:57:43+00:00

Document:
Appeal following conviction of two criminal offenses of malicious mischief and petit larceny. The appellant's ground of appeal was that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law and tact to support the convictions. There was a disagreement (variance) between the allegations in the complaint and the proof at trial, but the prosecutor failed to seek the Trial Court's permission to correct the defect. Also the complaint did not specify the value or the owner of the property alleged to have been stolen in the charge of pent larceny. The Appellate Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court, per EDWEL H. SANTOS, Chief Justice reversing the conviction of malicious mischief and affirming the conviction of petit larceny, held : (1) the failure of the prosecutor to correct a technical detect in the complaint should not be used to penalize the accused in a criminal trial; and (2) the failure of the prosecutor on a charge of petit larceny to specify in the complaint the value of the property stolen, and to identify the owner of the property was not fatal as it must be presumed that the value was within the statutory limit and must be proved by evidence; and larceny was committed where the property stolen was property of some person other than the accused even though the owner was unknown.
Where a criminal appeal is based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence the essential question that the appellate court must first address is whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the trial court's making the finding which it made considering primarily the evidence most favorable to the decision of the lower court.
All the appellate court is obliged to do when an appeal is taken on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is to determine whether or not there is any reasonable evidence to support the verdict of guilty.
should not be used to penalize the defendant.
The due process clause of the Pohnpei Constitution requires proof beyond reasonable doubt as the condition for criminal conviction.
To demand the defendant to rectify a technical defect on the ground of the old doctrine of variance would amount to shifting the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant.
Although the ownership of stolen property must be in a person other than the thief in a case of pent larceny, it is not necessary that the owner shall be known.
In a petit larceny prosecution under the Trust Territory law (11 TTC 851) the Government need not prove the actual owner of the property stolen, so long as the record is clear that the property stolen is not the property of the thief.
It is a general principle of criminal law that the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution to prove every essential ingredient of its case, and the connection of the accused with the crime, so that the guilt of the accused may appear to the satisfaction of the court beyond a reasonable doubt.
In order for one to be convicted of a crime of larceny, it is necessary that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements.
Though the value of the property involved in the offense of petit larceny is one of the ingredients in the offense which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the proof of the value of the stolen property is primarily for the purpose of grading the offense, and the value proved need not be the real or actual value; it may be the market value.
15. Criminal Law- Petit Larceny- Evidence - Proof of Value of Stolen Property.
So long as the prosecution leads sufficient evidence to satisfy the trial judge that value of the property stolen falls within the statutory limit that should discharge the government's burden of proof of value.
Where the prosecution in a complaint namesthe offense committed as pent larceny but fails to specify the value of the property stolen,it must be presumed that the value is within the statutory limit, and thefactthat the value was not set forth in the complaint is not fatal.
EDWEL H. SANTOS, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court.
(a) There was insufficient evidence as a matter of law and fact that the defendant was guilty of either [sic] count of petit larceny.
(b) There was insufficient evidence as a matter of law and fact that the defendant was guilty of malicious mischief.
(c) The five months sentence imposed was excessive.
In his brief, the appellant deleted ground (c) of his appeal and in response to a question from the appellate panel, counsel stated that it was his intention to delete ground (c) of from the appeal. Thus it leaves only two grounds to be considered and to be decided in this appeal. The appellant's two grounds of appeal can be summarized to state: there was insufficient evidence to sustain the finding of guilty on both counts of malicious mischief <11 TTC 951 > and petit larceny <11 TTC 851 >.
Territory or any district or municipality thereof, or shall unlawfully throw, discard, or scatter upon any public road, street or ground or other land owned, reserved, controlled or maintained, for any purpose other than a public dumping ground, by the government of the Trust Territory or any district, municipality or other subdivision thereof, or otherwise carelessly or willfully litter such places, shall be guilty of malicious mischief, and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned for not more than six months, or fined not more than one hundred dollars, or both."
432 ; Amis v. 7T., 2 TTR 364; Aiichi v. T7:, 3 TTR 2290.
We adopt this practice for our jurisdiction and apply same as justice required.
Count one of the complaint charged that on or about January 25,1985, the appellant went to Ellen Ehsa's market and unlawfully destroyed the main door of the market.
Q. Ke kak kosoiaiong Mwoal wet dahme Yoster Aron wiewiaseli wasau dahme eh wiewia? Kosoiada.
A. E kohla mihmiseli likin marketo, ih dapeng peseng wenihmw en imwen kainen en marketo oh pwedlong kihsang tape ieu mwo. Tr. P. 2.
A. I diarada me a pwusikpeseng wenihmw en imwen kainen oh solahr dipwisou nan ihmwo. Tr. p-2-3.
Q. Isauki, ni amwa lel mwo, dahme ke kilang de dahme ke wehwehki me wiawi?
A. Duwen me I wehwehki, I kilang lahpe kawehla ihmw oh wahsang keseng ieu. Tr. p.8.
Q. Menia ihmw, ke kak kawehwe?
A. Ihmw me kodilahngete en Ellen ah marketo Tr. p.10.
in this regard should not be used to penalize the defendant. As the appellant correctly argued,the"due process clause of out: Constitution requires proof beyond reasonable doubt as condition for criminal conviction." Demanding the defendant to rectify this technical defect on ground of the old doctrine of variance would amount to shifting the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. <Art. 4 Sec. 9 (1) - Pohnpei Constitution>. We feel ground one of the appellant's appeal is made out, that the guilty verdict of malicious mischief should be reversed.
The appellant's ground two is similar to that of ground one, that is, whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's finding of guilty to the count of petit larceny where government fails to show the owner of the property and the value of the property taken.
complaint or information and proved at trial;, and two -whether the exact value of the personal property taken be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
"The actual status of the legal title to stolen property is no concern of the thief. Possession in person from whom property is stolen is sufficient ownership in a larceny case." Martin v. TerrItOry, 43 P 1067; Cassoll v. State, 128 P.2d 1016-1017.
able doubt who actually owned the property stolen?
[11 ] If we are to adopt the appellant's theory that in larceny cases, the government must prove the actual owner of property stolen, it would mean that we are granting every body the license to take any personal property wherever he finds it where no owner is known to him. This is absurd and we can not grant that. Forthe reasons given and the foregoing cases consulted, we hold that in a petit larceny prosecution under the Trust Territory law, <11 TTC 851 > the Government need not prove the actual owner of a property stolen, so long as the record is clear that the property stolen is not the property of the thief.
 The appellant's second point on the second ground again deals with the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the actual value of the property stolen. It is a general principle of criminal law that the burden on proof rests upon the prosecution to prove every essential ingredient of its case, and the connection of the accused with the crime, so that the guilt of the accused may appear to the satisfaction of the court beyond a reasonable doubt. This principle is embodied as part of the fundamental rights granted to an accused pursuant to Article 4 of the Pohnpei State Constitution.
 Thus, larceny being a crime, in order for one to be convicted thereof, it is necessary that the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements. Trust Territory v. Mick, 4 T. T. R. 147.
It is clear from the definition of larceny <whether petit or grand> by 11 TTC Sections 851 and 852 as well as by Section 7-3 - grand larceny and 7-5 - petit larceny of the Pohnpei Crimes Act <S.L. 1 L-3-85> that an element to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is, among other things, the value of the property involved in the offense: it should be $50 or more in the case of grand larceny underthe Trust Territory code, and if the value of the property involved is less than $50.00 it should be petit larceny; under the Pohnpei Crimes Act the value of property involved in grand larceny should be $100 or more but less than $1,000; and less than $100 in the case of petit larceny.
larceny is charged and the evidence shows the taking of chattels but fails to establish their market value as of the taking, the accused can be convicted of no greater offense than petit larceny. Escobar v. State 17ALR 3rd 1390.
In a case decided in Oregon the court held that an indictment <under our jurisdiction we use information or complaint>, alleging that the value of stolen property was less than $35 was sufficient to charge an offense of petit larceny, although the indictment did not state the specific value of the articles alleged to have been stolen, either in the aggregate or separately. In that case the court held that although value is an essential ingredient of the crime of larceny in order to determine to which class the offense belongs, the indictment was sufficient. It was of course necessary for the State to prove that the article mentioned in the indictment had some value and hence testimony is admissible to show such value. State v. Poyntz, 120 P. 2d 966. The Trust Territory High Court had held that in a criminal prosecution for petit larceny, since the trial judge is assumed to have sufficient acquaintance with local values of new and used merchandise, his findings in this regard will be followed by an appellate court. Fanamthin v. TTPI, 1 TTR 412.
[14-15] We feel this appeal presents similar situations as described in other jurisdictions. We hold therefore that the value of the property involved in the offense of petit larceny is one of the ingredients in the offense which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt primarily for the purposes of grading of the offense. The value proved need not be the real or actual value; it may be the market value. And so long as the prosecution leads sufficient evidence to satisfy the trial judge that the value of the property stolen falls within the statutory limit of less than $50 under the T.T. Code; <less than $100 under the Pohnpei Crimes Act S.L.1.L.-3-85>, that should discharge the government's burden of proof of value. It would lead to an absurd result in our society if the courtwould let athief off the hooksimply becausethe value interms of money of the property alleged to have been stolen is not proved.
 It should also be noted here that the complaint did not specify the value, of the property stolen, but named the offense of petit larceny and the T. T. Code section. From this fact it must be presumed that the value was within the statutory limit of the T. T. Code, and the fact that the value was not set forth in the complaint was not fatal.
The appellant's conviction of count i <Malicious Mischief> in the Trial Court is reversed, and his conviction with respect to Count 2 <Petit Larceny> is AFFIRMED.
This case is remanded to the Trial Court for the purpose of adjusting the sentence order to conform with this opinion.
YOSTER CARL, Associate Justice, concurring. JUDAH C. JOHNNY Associate Justice, concurring in Count 2, but dissenting on Court 1.
The appellant, a young man from Uh Municipality, State of Pohnpei, was charged in the Trial Division with two criminal offenses to wit, Count i, Malicious Mischief, and Count II, Petit Larceny. He was tried and convicted of each count, and sentenced to three months of imprisonment for the first count and two months of imprisonment for the second count. He appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court.
I join the majority opinion in affirming the conviction of petit larceny.
the evidence differs from my colleagues, necessitating this minority opinion. I join the majority opinion in finding that while the complaint described the door destroyed, or damaged as the main door of Ellen's Market, the evidence shows that the door destroyed ordamaged was the door of a restroom. I join the majority further in finding that there is a technical defect. I do not however, join the majority opinion that such technical defect, or in other terms variance, is a fatal variance. Consequently, I respectfully dissent. I hereunder submit my dissenting opinion.
As stated, evidence adduced at the trial showed that the defendant damaged the door for the restroom. There is a clear disagreement between the complaint and the evidence produced. There therefore is a variance.
In the law of criminal pleadings, a variance is a disagreement between the allegations in the indictment or information and the proof (evidence), as to some matter which is legally essential to the charge. Fox v. United States, 45 F.2d 364; Whartons Criminal Law and Procedure (12th Ed., Vol. 5, Chapter 84 Section 2054;.
Trust Territory or any district or municipality thereof ...shall be guilty of malicious mischief..." 11 T.T.C. 951.
Malicious Mischief, by unlawfully going to Ellen's Market and damaged the main door of this market."
variance. The first time that the issue of variance in this whole process, was raised is in the defendant's appellate brief, which was filed on October 4, 1985. (see page two). And even in that brief, the defendant did not raise the question of "destruction" or "damage" to different doors. It seems that he pursued his line of argument that there in fact was no destruction of any property. Note that he argued that of the two Government witnesses, one testified that the defendant destroyed the restroom door and other testified that he entered the main door to the market. His line of reasoning, to me, was that the evidence contradicts each other and therefore does not prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was malicious mischief as charged. There, the defendant never on trial made a claim of variance.
"Objection for a variance cannot be made for the first time on appeal." State of Minnesota v. Edward Sweeney, 73 A.L.R. 380 384.
the right name of Nellie Stover was Myrtle Watson. The Supreme Court held the point was not made either in the trial court or in the court of appeals, and held it too late, affirming judgment of the lower court."
Under the view discussed above, even if there is in fact a variance between the pleadings and the proof in the case before us, I view that the defendant, having failed to raise the issue, now waives his right and cannot raise it on appeal for review.
allegations of the indictment which are essential and material to charge the offense. This rule is based on the requirement that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, and that he may be protected against another prose ution for the same offense. Berger v. United States, 295, U.S. 78, 79 L Ed 1314, 55 S. Ct. 629. There is no necessity for the prosecution to prove that which is not an element of the offense and which, under the circumstances of the case, is negated by the averment of the complaint which fully charges the offense denounced by the statute. A claim of variance based on failure to prove such matters is without force. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 206 US 120, 51 L Ed 987, 27 S. Ct. 606; Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 206 US 138, 51 L Ed 992, 27 S. Ct 608; American Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 206 US 139, 51 L Ed 993, 27 S. Ct. 609.
The charge of variance, to be sustained, must have reference to some matter essential to the indictment or information, and in general, the descriptive averment of the mode in which an offense has been committed are not required to be strictly proved, if in substance the evidence supports the allegations. Bennet v. United States 227 US 333, 57 L ed 531, 33 S Ct. 288.
3. the property must be destroyed, damaged, or injured.
These, to me are the tests of the alleged criminal act of Yoster Aron, to constitute malicious mischief. If what he did constitutes these elements of the crime, he must be held liable for his act and the finding of the lower court affirmed. If the evidence fails to show beyond reasonable doubt, that the act about which he is charged constitutes these elements, he must be found innocent, and the findings of the court below reversed.
1. Is the act unlawful?
That is, if the evidence establishes that Yoster Aron "destroyed" "damaged" or "injured" the door is the act unlawful? For an act to be unlawful, it must be done without authority of law. Fooshee v. State, 108 P 554. Further, to "unlawfully" "destroy" "damage" or injure" in my view connotes that the defendant did not have the right to do the act, but did it illegally and wrongfully. As in this case, l view that Yoster Aron does not have any right to destroy, damage or injure any door, be it the main door or the door to the restroom. He has no relation to Ellen and further does not own, have possession of any of the buildings involved in this matter, nor did he obtain consent or authorization to do the act complained of. If he, in fact, destroyed the restroom door, it follows that his destroying the property is unlawful.
2. Is the door the property of another?
both real and personal. If it is otherwise the statute would have specifically stated so. The door is included. It is clear from the evidence that the door is the property of someone other than the defendant. Every house in Pohnpei is the property of someone, or the Government.
3. Was the door destroyed, damaged or injured?
Market and other markets are located is public facility under lease to the market owners. As such, it is not necessary to prove who owns the property or the restroom. See 52 Am Jur 2d, Malicious Mischief, Section 20.
The crucial question here, which makes the difference in our views is whether the technical defect or variance between the complaint and the proof is fatal or material to the offense as to entitle the defendant to a reversal. The majority view is that the variance suffices reversal; this minority view is that the variance is not fatal and therefore entitles the appellant to no reversal. I hold that the variance, developed from the the difference as to which door was actually destroyed, does not constitute a fatal variance to warrant a reversal. The law, 11 TTC 951 does not require specific description of the property. So long as it is proved that the item destroyed, damaged or injured is the property of another, and the defendant has no legal right to do so, the element of malicious mischief is met. There are of course, defenses in the crime of malicious mischief, but I will not discuss them because they were not employed in this matter.
act with which he is charged that, taking into consideration the proof which is introduced against him, he is not misled in making his defense, orplaced in dangerof being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." People of the State of California v. Smith, 323 P 2d 435. Also see State v. Shoeone, 499 P2d 834.
the main door of the market would have constituted an element of the offense. He was not misled by the proof, and even if he was, he did not object on ground of variance. He knew, during trial that he was by evidence, liable for the destruction of the restroom door but he did not raise issue of variance. Even if he did, the variance is immaterial to the offense charged.
The question of jeopardy is another consideration for a fatal variance, in consideration that a variance would be material as to place the defendant in danger of being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. In my view, the defendant is not in danger of being placed in jeopardy if he is convicted as charged, because it is well settled that on a plea of double jeopardy, extrinsic evidence is admissible on the trial to identify a crime of which a defendant has been convicted. People v. Williams, 27 Cal. 2d 220, 226,163 P 2d 692, 695; State v. Smith, supra. This means that if the defendant is convicted of the complaint charging that he destroyed the main door, to the market, when evidence in the case shows it was the restroom door that he destroyed, the State cannot bring another case charging that he destroyed the restroom door, arising from the same incident, for to do so will constitute double jeopardy.

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