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1 LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER: HOW AND WHY TEXAS COURTS SHOULD DETERMINE LANDOWNERS DO NOT OWN GROUNDWATER IN PLACE Susana Elena Canseco* I. BACKGROUND II. TEXAS GROUNDWATER CASE LAW REVIEW: TEXAS LAW REMAINS UNCLEAR ON GROUNDWATER OWNERSHIP IN PLACE A. Terminology B. What Texas Groundwater Case Law Has Addressed and How Case Law s Terminology Varies over Time C. How the Cases Might Be Read D. Groundwater Ownership in Place? Today s Cases Ask the Right Questions Bragg I and II Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust v. City of Del Rio III. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE THERE IS NO PROPERTY RIGHT IN GROUNDWATER IN PLACE A. Why the Court? B. Lessons from Oil-and-Gas Law About the Rule of Capture and Absolute Ownership C. Why Protecting Correlative Rights in Groundwater Might be Impossible, and Why Groundwater Regulation Should Not Mirror Oil-and-Gas Regulation A Brief Overview of Texas Water Code Chapter 36 and Groundwater Conservation Districts *Susana received her J.D. from The University of Texas School of Law in 2007 and her B.A. in History from Harvard University in She currently clerks for the Honorable Lee Yeakel of the Western District of Texas, Austin Division.
4 494 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 Texas landowners are especially sensitive to groundwater regulation because in some situations they feel groundwater district regulation encroaches on their private property rights. 22 Recently litigation has broached the extent of that property right, and the question whether landowners hold a vested right in groundwater in place has been increasingly important in groundwater litigation. 23 Some commentators stress that the Texas Supreme Court has always recognized a property right in groundwater in place, 24 while others believe Texas groundwater case law only uses the rule of capture as a tort rule of non-liability. 25 These commentators disagree over whether a landowner has a vested property right in groundwater in place, or whether the right vests only at capture. Either way, the Texas Supreme Court has never addressed the question facing today s districts and landowners, namely, does a landowner own groundwater in place? And if he does have a vested property right in unpumped groundwater, does groundwater conservation district regulation potentially effect a compensable taking or affect groundwater s severability from the surface estate? 26 his neighbors did); Mike Mrkvicka, Behind the Dell City Water Deal, El Paso Inc., March 14 20, 2004, Section E, *1, 2, Robert Elder Jr., Water Wars in Texas, LAREDO MORNING TIMES, *1 4, August 24, 2003, (explaining business deals and lobbying that enabled landowners falling within Hudspeth district s historic use period to obtain permits that would enable them to sell water to El Paso). 22 Joe Nick Patoski, Water Wars, TEXAS PARKS AND WILDLIFE MAGAZINE, July 2005, at 59, available at (quoting Kinney County landowners who believe the district s pumping caps amount to a taking). 23 See, e.g., Coates v. Hall, 512 F. Supp. 2d 770, 788 (W.D. Tex. 2007); see Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment at *3, Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-06-CV-1129-XR, 2008 WL , at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2008) (Bragg II); Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust v. City of Del Rio, No (83d Dist. Ct., Val Verde County, Tex. judgment Oct. 10, 2006) (City of Del Rio). 24 See, e.g., Dylan O. Drummond, Lynn Ray Sherman & Edmond R. McCarthy, Jr., The Rule of Capture in Texas Still Misunderstood After All These Years, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 53 (2004). 25 See, e.g., Greg Ellis, Regulatory Takings and Texas Groundwater Law, TEXAS WATER LAW INSTITUTE, Tab 4, at 15 (Dec. 2006). 26 The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged the question in Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tex. 1996), stating, [t]he parties simply fundamentally disagree on the nature of the property rights affected by this Act. The court decided the constitutional questions before it without deciding the nature of the property right in groundwater. Id. at 626.
5 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 495 Texas courts faced a similar question early in the twentieth century as they pondered the nature of the property right in oil and gas in place. 27 The Texas Supreme Court squarely faced the question and declared that landowners owned oil and gas in place. 28 The way oil-and-gas cases met these questions head-on illuminates how little Texas courts have considered this question in the context of groundwater. 29 This Article recommends that the Texas Supreme Court use whichever appropriate groundwater property case first comes its way to clarify the extent of a landowner s property right in groundwater. It analyzes Texas groundwater case law and contrasts it with oil-and-gas case law deciding the question whether landowners owned oil and gas in place. This Article further suggests the court should decide that landowners do not own groundwater in place, because recognizing a property right in place would require protecting landowners correlative rights similarly to oil-and-gas law. But the policy reasons for regulating groundwater differ from the reasons we regulate oil and gas, and those policy considerations favor not recognizing a property right in groundwater in place. II. TEXAS GROUNDWATER CASE LAW REVIEW: TEXAS LAW REMAINS UNCLEAR ON GROUNDWATER OWNERSHIP IN PLACE Seminal Texas groundwater decisions turn on a variety of legal determinations; the cases encompass tort questions, property rights, statutory interpretation, and constitutional questions. 30 But none of these cases carefully delineates the boundaries between tort and property rules; most cases address tort questions with property-laced terminology. 31 Once East adopted the English rule, courts tended to address all groundwater questions with the same convenient language, never needing to answer the question whether a landowner owns groundwater in place. 32 Most significantly, none of the oft-cited Texas groundwater cases explicitly 27 See Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, , 176 S.W. 717, (1915); see A.W. Walker, Jr., Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEX. L. REV. 125, 127 (1928). 28 Daugherty, 176 S.W. at Id. 30 See, e.g., Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am. Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, (Tex. 1999); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (1904). 31 See Corwin W. Johnson, The Continuing Voids in Texas Groundwater Law: Are Concepts and Terminology to Blame? 17 ST. MARY S L.J. 1281, (1986) S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
6 496 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 addresses whether landowners own groundwater in place. This section describes significant Texas groundwater cases, analyzes how they characterize landowners rights in groundwater, and concludes that the property-right-in-place question remains unanswered. This section will also highlight some of the groundwater cases currently making their way through the court systems that are asking the right question. A. Terminology Texas groundwater cases use terminology inconsistently, which has probably contributed to today s confusion about landowners property interest in groundwater. 33 This Article uses the term rule of capture to refer to the rule of non-liability for drainage adopted in East and reaffirmed in Sipriano v. Great Springs Waters of America, Inc. 34 This Article uses the term absolute ownership to refer to the idea that a landowner owns groundwater in place by virtue of surface-estate ownership, based on the maxim that surface ownership includes everything from the depths of the earth upward into the sky. 35 Of course, the term absolute has caused some of the confusion over groundwater law concepts. Professor Corwin Johnson clarified that the term absolute ownership does not mean a landowner s right in groundwater is a super-right subject to no limitations whatever, even legislative control. 36 Instead, it serves to distinguish the American rule of reasonable use, which the East court rejected, from the English rule the East court chose to follow. 37 Professor Johnson s clarification indicates the term absolute refers only to the scope of a landowner s right to pump and does not accurately describe the scope of the property right in groundwater, which enjoys no judicial protection from harm by a neighbor. 38 But Professor Johnson s distinction, while accurate, does not describe what courts, pro-property-rights commentators, and older oil-and-gas property commentators seem to mean when they discuss absolute ownership. 33 See Drummond, et al., supra note 24, at 53 (listing Texas groundwater law s many names for its legal concepts) S.W.3d at See A.W. Walker, Jr., Theories of Ownership and Control of Oil and Gas Compared with Those of Ground Water, WATER LAW CONFERENCE 121, 121 (1956). 36 Johnson, supra note 31, at Id. at Id.
7 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 497 In Texas groundwater jurisprudence, the term absolute ownership probably comes from East s Pixley v. Clark quote, which states, the owner of the land is the absolute owner of the soil and of percolating water So even though surface-estate-ownership based groundwater ownership is not an absolute right, this Article uses the phrase absolute ownership to refer to groundwater ownership in place based on surface-estate ownership. B. What Texas Groundwater Case Law Has Addressed and How Case Law s Terminology Varies over Time In East, a landowner sued the railroad company next door for drying up his home s well with its larger well. 40 The trial court applied the American doctrine of reasonable use, and found the defendant had used groundwater unreasonably. 41 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, choosing to apply the English rule of non-liability, as articulated in Acton v. Blundell, over the American rule of reasonable use. 42 The court chose the English rule based on two policy rationales previously recognized in an Ohio groundwater case: that groundwater s movement was too secret and occult to regulate, and because recognizing correlative rights in groundwater would impede economic progress. 43 East s quote from Acton describes what we call the rule of capture: That the person who owns the surface may dig therein and apply all that is there found to his own purposes, at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off the water collected from underground springs in his neighbor s well, this inconvenience to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground for an action Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279, 281 (1904)(quoting Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 527 (N.Y. 1866). 40 Id. at Id. 42 Id. (quoting Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 354, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Ex. Ch. 1843)). 43 Id. at 281 (quoting Frazier v. Brown, 12 Oh. St. 294, 294 (1861)). 44 Id. at 280 (quoting Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 354, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Ex. Ch. 1843)).
8 498 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 The East court also quoted language describing the absolute-ownership rationale for choosing the rule of capture: An owner of soil may divert percolating water, consume or cut it off, with impunity. It is the same as land, and cannot be distinguished in law from land. So the owner of land is the absolute owner of the soil and percolating water, which is a part of, and not different from, the soil. No action lies against the owner for interfering with or destroying percolating or circulating water under the earth s surface. 45 Landowner advocates believe East s absolute-ownership language establishes a landowner s property right in groundwater in place. 46 Other commentators argue that the rule described in Acton and adopted in East only limits liability between landowners for groundwater withdrawals. 47 Although East s effect was only to limit the defendant s liability, it is impossible to ignore the significance of East s absolute ownership language. The concept acknowledges the ancient maxim that a surface owner owns from the depths to the heavens, and if groundwater exists under his property, then he owns it while it is there. 48 In Texas Co. v. Burkett, plaintiff Burkett sold his water rights to the Texas Co. for one year. 49 Burkett sued when the Texas Co. breached the contract, and the Texas Co. responded in defense that the contract was invalid because the water Burkett contracted to sell actually belonged to the state. 50 Burkett turned on whether Burkett s groundwater was his property or the state s. 51 The Burkett court examined the record, and because the evidence did not show the groundwater to be subsurface streams within defined channels, it presumed the groundwater to be ordinary percolating waters, which are the exclusive property of the owner of the surface of the soil, and subject to barter and sale as any other species of property. 52 The Burkett court s 45 Id. at 281 (quoting New York s articulation of the English rule in Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 527 (1866)). 46 E.g., Michael Powell, TEXAS WATER LAW INSTITUTE, Tab 4, at 3 (Dec. 2006). 47 E.g., Ellis, supra note 25, at Walker, supra note 35, at Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273, 274 (1923). 50 Id. 51 Id. at Id.
9 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 499 language was less precise than East s in describing what it believed was the legal origin of Burkett s alienable water right, unless by exclusive property, the court meant to express the absolute-ownership concept. 53 The court held the groundwater belonged to Burkett, and he could validly sell it. 54 Pecos County Water Control & Improvement District No. 1 v. Williams (Comanche Springs), on the other hand, more precisely pinpoints land ownership as the legal basis for a landowner s groundwater ownership, which may indicate the court intended to recognize absolute ownership. 55 In Comanche Springs, the El Paso Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff s request for recognition of its rights in springflow with which groundwater pumping interfered and a declaration of its correlative rights to the groundwater sources of Comanche Springs. 56 The Comanche Springs court allowed landowners rule-of-capture rights to defeat vested surface water rights, 57 because Texas groundwater cases seem to hold that the landowner owns the percolating water under this land and that he can make a nonwasteful use thereof, and such is based on a concept of property ownership. 58 The decision exemplifies Texas s separate surface and groundwater legal regimes and demonstrates the power of Texas s rule of capture. Although the injury in this case was similar to that in tort cases such as East, because the defendant s pumping dried up the plaintiff s water supply, the Comanche Springs irrigators were not just seeking damages; they sought declarations of their property rights in relation to the defendant s property rights. 59 The Comanche Springs opinion distinguished Texas groundwater law from other states groundwater law, because Texas came into the Union claiming ownership of her lands,... and... such lands, when patented as these have been to defendants, carry with them as a property right the ownership of percolating underground water. 60 In City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton (Corpus Christi), the Texas Supreme Court construed a statute about wasteful transport of 53 Id. 54 Id S.W.2d 503, (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1954, writ ref d n.r.e.). 56 Id. 57 Id. at 504. The plaintiff s irrigators had used the waters of Comanche Springs for 90 years. 58 Id. at 505 (emphasis added). 59 Id. 60 Id. at 506.
10 500 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 artesian water. 61 The City of Pleasanton sued the City of Corpus Christi for an injunction under the statute for transporting the water in a wasteful manner, causing harm to the plaintiffs water supply. 62 The court found for the City of Corpus Christi because the statute only prohibited waste in eventual use, not waste in transport, and no evidence showed the City of Corpus Christi had wastefully used the water. 63 The Texas Supreme Court stated that percolating waters are regarded as the property of the owner of the surface..., 64 but the court s language offers no hints as to its belief on the provenance or extent of that property interest. The court discussed groundwater common law to emphasize that landowners had the right to transport and sell groundwater, and that the statute in question did not make such uses unlawful. 65 The Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc. (Friendswood) court likewise respected a landowner s rights in groundwater and believed the rule of capture was based on those rights. 66 In Friendswood, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether Texas groundwater law allowed it to compensate plaintiffs whose property had been damaged by groundwater-withdrawal-caused subsidence. 67 The plaintiffs alleged negligence and nuisance causes of action. 68 The Texas Supreme Court based its denial of relief on the idea that Texas groundwater law consisted of established property rules. 69 The Friendswood court created a prospective exception to the rule of capture for subsidence caused by negligent groundwater withdrawals. 70 It did not apply the exception retroactively to the Friendswood defendants, however, because it stated doing so would have been improper in the context of a property rule Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1955). 62 Id. at 803. Defendant City of Corpus Christi bought water from the Lower Nueces River Supply District, which flowed water from its wells to Corpus Christi in the Nueces River. Evidence showed that between 63 and 74% of the water was lost to seepage and evaporation along the way. Id. at Id. at Id. at Id. at S.W.2d 21, (Tex. 1978). 67 Id. at Id. at Id. 70 Id. at Id.
11 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 501 The Friendswood court used the term absolute ownership, but as a label rather than a property concept, equating the term with the common law rule, and the English rule. 72 The court later mentioned that the East court based its decision on the absolute-ownership doctrine of underground percolating waters. Friendswood went on to quote East s approving Frazier v. Brown quote. 73 That Frazier v. Brown quote stated the common law recognized no correlative rights in percolating groundwater. 74 As will be discussed more fully below, recognition of surface-estate-based groundwater ownership in place, or what this Article terms absolute ownership, requires recognition of correlative rights in groundwater. Friendswood apparently failed to differentiate these concepts, and the case serves as a good example of the confused state of Texas s groundwater law. In 1983, the Texas Supreme Court decided City of Sherman v. Public Utility Commission. 75 The court was called upon to decide whether the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) had jurisdiction over a utility s groundwater production. 76 City of Sherman is one of the only Texas cases that attempts to distinguish the relationship between the rule of capture and the concept of absolute ownership; it states the absolute ownership theory regarding groundwater was adopted by this Court in [East]. A corollary to absolute ownership of groundwater is the right of the landowner to capture such water. 77 It used that principle to explain that the Texas Water Code was the only source of statutory regulation of groundwater production, and that nothing in the Texas Water Code authorized the PUC to regulate groundwater production. 78 As in Friendswood, the City of Sherman court failed to appreciate the logical inconsistency of the coexistence of absolute ownership of groundwater and the rule of capture. 79 As has been discussed above, from East through the City of Sherman decision, the Texas Supreme Court used the absolute-ownership concept to decide various questions unrelated to whether landowners own groundwater 72 Id. at Id. 74 Id. (quoting Frazier v. Brown, 12 Oh. St. 294, 294 (1861)) S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1983). 76 Id. at Id. at 686 (internal citations omitted). 78 Id. 79 See discussion infra Part II.C.
12 502 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 in place. But by the 1990s, the court used property-related language more carefully. For example, the Sipriano court carefully avoided mentioning property rights; it discussed the rule of capture in terms of the remedies it did not provide to landowners whose neighbors deprived them of their water. 80 Sipriano s facts are similar to East s, although they occurred nearly 100 years later. Plaintiff landowners sued Defendant Ozarka for negligently draining their wells by pumping 90,000 gallons of water a day, seven days a week. 81 The plaintiffs asked the Texas Supreme Court to replace the rule of capture in Texas with the rule of reasonable use. 82 The court declined to do so, recognizing that groundwater regulation in Texas is a legislative function, and that the legislature had just acted to regulate groundwater in the 1997 omnibus water bill Senate Bill The Sipriano opinion describes East as a case that refused to recognize tort liability against a railroad company whose pumping of groundwater under its property allegedly dried the neighboring plaintiff s well. 84 Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court s opinion in Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation District No. 1 also carefully avoids property terminology, describing East as a case in which the court refused to award damages, and calling the right to withdraw groundwater absolute, as opposed to saying the rule of capture is based on a landowner s absolute ownership of groundwater. 85 Barshop involved a facial constitutional challenge to the Edwards Aquifer Act. 86 Landowners claimed that regulation under the act would result in unconstitutional takings of their vested property right in groundwater. 87 The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged the tension between the state s and landowners positions but resolved the constitutional questions before it without deciding whether landowners own groundwater in place Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 1999). 81 Id. at Id. at Id. at Id. at 77 (emphasis added) S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tex. 1996) (emphasis added). 86 Id. at Id. at Id. at 626.
13 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 503 C. How the Cases Might Be Read In every one of the major Texas groundwater cases discussed above, groundwater ownership in place was irrelevant to the court s resolution of the case. East, Friendswood, and Sipriano were all tort-based actions whose resolutions were based on the rule of capture. 89 Corpus Christi turned on statutory interpretation. 90 Even Burkett and Comanche Springs, although based on what landowners can do with their rights in groundwater, could have been based on a usufructuary water right; the cases would have turned out the same whether the landowners owned groundwater in place or whether their right vested on capture. 91 Groundwater case law s intermingling of property and tort rules contrasts with how early twentieth century courts addressed these issues as related to oil-and-gas and struggled with the tension between the rule of capture and absolute ownership theories. The East court acknowledged absolute ownership while choosing not to protect that property right, but the court seemed unconcerned with the confusing implications of using both rule of capture and absolute ownership rationales. 92 At the same time, courts across the country were trying to reconcile the two concepts in oil-and-gas cases. 93 The Texas Supreme Court s early oil-and-gas cases did consider the implications of using both rule of capture and absolute ownership rationales. In Texas Co. v. Daugherty, the Texas Supreme Court first recognized a landowner s ownership interest in oil and gas in place despite their fugitive natures. 94 While Daugherty did not explicitly address the rule of capture s implications, Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co. stated that [t]he objection lacks substantial foundation that gas or oil in a certain tract of land cannot be owned in place, because subject to appropriation, without the consent of the owner of the tract, through drainage from wells on 89 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 75; Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 24, (Tex. 1978); Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 149, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (1904). 90 City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798, 804 (1955). 91 See Johnson, supra note 31, at See East, 81 S.W. at But cf. W. L. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas, 29 YALE L.J. 174, 179 (1919) (lamenting that absolute ownership doctrine is used to make legal the act of taking and is refused when a remedy for the taking is asked ). 93 See generally Summers, supra note 92, (describing courts struggle to protect absoluteownership property rights because oil and gas tended to escape from under landowners property) Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717, (1915).
14 504 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 adjacent lands. 95 The court dismissed the rule of capture s troublesome nature by pointing out that each landowner has the right potentially to drain his neighbor s land. 96 Stephens County and Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., another important early oil-and-gas case, both cite East for the rule-of-capture proposition. 97 But both Stephens County and Brown cite Daugherty, among other cases, for the proposition that oil and gas are capable of ownership in place. 98 None of the cases cite East for the absolute-ownership proposition, and even if they had, these cases holdings are still only applicable to oil and-gas law. None of these cases purport to be establishing groundwater law. And although East set Texas s groundwater rule of capture on a strong foundation, it never intended to establish groundwater ownership in place. Returning to groundwater case law, Burkett only addressed how Burkett could use his groundwater, not when his property right in groundwater vested. 99 The case confirmed that groundwater did not belong to the state, and that the surface owner could sell the right to pump groundwater. 100 The court did not address whether Burkett owned the groundwater in place. Resolving that issue was unnecessary to determining whether Burkett had validly sold his right to pump to the Texas Company, and that the Texas Company breached its contract. Subsequent groundwater cases like Comanche Springs, Corpus Christi, Friendswood, and City of Sherman used magic words about property rights in groundwater, but the cases did not address whether the defendant landowners held a property right in groundwater in place. Each of these cases affirmed the broad scope of Texas s rule of capture. 101 In each case, the court s holding turned on the meaning and scope of the rule of capture, Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290, 292 (1923). 96 Id. 97 Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (1935); Stephens County, 254 S.W. at Brown, 83 S.W.2d at 940; Stephens County, 254 S.W. at See Tex. Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273, (1927). 100 See id. at See City of Sherman v. Pub. Util. Comm n of Tex., 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, (Tex. 1978); City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798, 802 (1955); Pecos County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1954, writ ref d n.r.e.).
15 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 505 despite the fact that the courts also mentioned property. 102 Regardless of the court s language, Friendswood s resolution actually turned on the tortlaw concept of the rule of capture; plaintiffs could not state nuisance and negligence claims against groundwater withdrawers when Texas s groundwater law explicitly allowed a landowner to harm his neighbor. 103 City of Sherman just established a state agency s powers under the Texas Water Code. 104 By the time the Texas Supreme Court decided Sipriano in 1999, the debate over the property right in groundwater had already begun. The Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) and the State of Texas had already presented their argument in Barshop that landowners do not own groundwater until capture, 105 and the Barshop court knew what was potentially at stake. Sipriano s silence on property rights indicates that while the rule of capture is alive and well in Texas groundwater common law, the rule of capture is not itself a property rule. The Sipriano court did not base its decision on the concept of absolute ownership; it based it on a tort rule and a policy of deference to the legislature in the groundwater-law arena. 106 The Sipriano court was not asked to answer a property-right question and its characterization of the East decision indicates that East is about tort liability regarding groundwater withdrawals City of Sherman, 643 S.W.2d at 686; Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 25 27; Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 802; Comanche Springs, 271 S.W.2d at See Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at S.W.2d at Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tex. 1996) ( The State insists that, until the water is actually reduced to possession, the right is not vested and no taking occurs. ). The State of Texas has actually argued landowners do not own groundwater until capture since long before Barshop. See City of Altus, Okla. v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 839 (W.D. Tex. 1966). The City of Altus court did not need to address groundwater ownership in place to answer the question presented in that case whether a Texas statute prohibiting groundwater export to other states violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 837, See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, (Tex. 1999). 107 See id. at 76.
16 506 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 D. Groundwater Ownership in Place? Today s Cases Ask the Right Questions 1. Bragg I and II The Braggs own pecan orchards in Medina County, which is located within the boundaries of the EAA. 108 There is a well on each of their two pecan orchards; one was completed in 1979 (the Home Place Orchard), and the other was completed in 1995 (the D Hanis Orchard). 109 Under the EAA s permitting rules, the Braggs received an initial regular permit for the Home Place Orchard well in the amount of the statutory maximum of two acre-feet per acre irrigated during the historical period. 110 The statutory historical period ran from June 1, 1972 through May 31, The EAA s general manager recommended denying the Bragg s permit application for the D Hanis Orchard well because it had produced no water during the historical period. 112 In 2001, the Braggs sued the EAA for promulgating permitting rules without performing a takings impact analysis as required by the Property Rights Act (Bragg I). 113 The court held the EAA was not required to perform a takings impact analysis because the EAA s actions fell into exceptions for actions taken under a political subdivision s statutory authority to prevent waste or protect rights of owners in groundwater. 114 The court also held the EAA s actions on the Bragg s permits were covered by the exception for enforcement of a governmental action. 115 Because the court decided the case based on statutory interpretation, it did not have to consider the underlying question inherent in whether EAA regulation could effect a taking: whether a property right existed that could be taken. The EAA formally denied the Braggs D Hanis Orchard well application on September 21, Two years after that denial, the 108 See Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. 2002) (Bragg I). 109 Id. 110 Id. at Id. 112 Id. 113 Id. at Id. at Id. at Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-06-CV-1129-XR, 2008 WL , at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2008).
17 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 507 Braggs sued the EAA in federal district court under the Texas and United States Constitutions, alleging Equal Protection and Due Process violations (Bragg II). 117 Bragg II is one of many cases asking courts to decide issues that turn on whether landowners own groundwater in place under Texas law. These cases differ from earlier groundwater cases because they require such a determination. As discussed above, Texas courts have never addressed this question in the context of groundwater. The Bragg II court recently denied the Braggs motion for summary. 118 The court concluded summary judgment was inappropriate because assuming the Braggs held a vested property right in the groundwater beneath their land, the EAA s denial of their permits had not effected a per se regulatory taking under takings jurisprudence. 119 The Bragg II court disposed of the rest of the Braggs federal claims by granting summary judgment in favor of the EAA on March 25, The Bragg II court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Braggs statelaw takings claims because they raise important, complex issues of Texas constitutional law. 121 The court remanded the state-law takings claims to the 38 th Judicial District Court in Medina County, 122 where the case will surely be watched closely by landowners, attorneys, and commentators. Bragg I and Bragg II are good examples of the struggle between landowners and regulation in the Edwards Aquifer Authority region. The 117 Id. at * Id. at * Id. It is puzzling Plaintiffs felt they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law in such an unsettled and hotly-contested area of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Although the court s January 16, 2008 order tidily denied the motion by concluding no taking had occurred, even if takings jurisprudence had allowed the court to find a taking had occurred, awarding summary judgment on a taking claim would require an initial determination that Texas landowners own groundwater in place under Texas law. However, in Coates v. Hall, the same court acknowledged the Texas Supreme Court has not addressed the scope of a landowners cognizable property interest in groundwater beneath their land, and did not decide the question. 512 F. Supp.2d 770, 786 (W.D. Tex. 2007). The Coates court also expressed a preference for abstention out of respect for the novel issues of state law. Id. at 21. See id Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-06-CV-1129-XR, 2008 WL , *10 (W.D. Tex. March 25, 2008). 121 Id. 122 Id.
18 508 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 EAA will not be issuing new permits. 123 The Edwards Aquifer Act set a cap on aquifer withdrawals, and the EAA ended up awarding more acre-feet of water under initial regular permits than the cap allowed. 124 This means that no new permits are available, and the Braggs will not be able to produce groundwater at their D Hanis orchard beyond exempt amounts again without buying a permitted water right. 125 For landowners who always believed they owned the groundwater under their land, the government s ability to take that right away for good must feel like a taking whether a court agrees or not. On the other hand, the legislature charged the EAA with the difficult task of managing the water supply of 1.7 million people in the San Antonio area, the only large city in the country that remains entirely dependent on one aquifer for its water source. 126 The EAA s provenance also reflected the state s desire to protect endangered species and prevent federal regulation of such an important water source. 127 Managing the Edwards Aquifer with a growing city and environmental protection in mind requires groundwater pumping limits. 128 Cases like these clarify the extent of a landowner s property right in groundwater, and will help both sides better understand how much they can get out of litigation, perhaps keeping these types of conflicts out of Texas courts in the future. The Bragg II court s January 16, 2008 denial of the Braggs motion for summary judgment also highlights that even if the Texas Supreme Court someday decides landowners own groundwater in place, takings lawsuits may not turn out to be viable or lucrative landowner endeavors. Now that some cases have worked their way through the courts, it is clear that scare 123 See EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTH., FACT SHEET: FINAL GROUNDWATER WITHDRAWAL PERMIT AMOUNTS ESTABLISHED, at *1 (2005), See id. 125 See id. 126 TEX. COMM N ON ENV T QUALITY, PROTECTING THE EDWARDS AQUIFER: REGULATIONS AND SCRUTINY FOCUS ON ONE OF THE MOST PRODUCTIVE AQUIFERS IN THE U.S., at *1 (2007), Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish that Roared: The Endangered Species Act, State Groundwater Law, and Private Property Rights Collide Over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. L. 845, 845 (1998). 127 See Votteler, supra note 123, at , See id. at 876.
19 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 509 tactics estimating the state s potential takings debt in the billions were just that Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust v. City of Del Rio Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust v. City of Del Rio (City of Del Rio) is another important case in which litigants are asking Texas courts to resolve whether landowners own groundwater in place. Unlike other recent groundwater cases, the case does not involve landowners conflicts with districts over regulation. The Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust (Trust) sold 15 acres out of a 3,200-acre tract to the City of Del Rio in In the deed conveying the property, it reserved all water rights associated with said tract..., but expressly relinquished its right to enter the tract to produce water. 131 When the city pumped groundwater on the tract a few years later, the Trust sued based on its reservation of the water rights. The City responded that the Trust could not have reserved its groundwater rights when it sold the land because landowners do not own the groundwater beneath their land, and therefore cannot reserve it. 132 The 83rd Judicial District Court in Val Verde County rendered judgment in favor of the Trust, holding the reservation was valid. 133 The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed on February 27, The appeals court agreed with the Trust s position that the term absolute ownership, as articulated in East, City of Sherman, Friendswood, and Burkett indicated groundwater ownership such that the Trust could validly sever the groundwater estate when it transferred the surface estate to the City See Drummond et al., supra note 24, at 91 (estimating the state s potential takings liability in the $24.5 billion to $170 billion range). 130 Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust v. City of Del Rio, No (83d Dist. Ct., Val Verde County, Tex. Oct. 10, 2006); Brief of Appellant City of Del Rio at 1 2, City of Del Rio v. Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust, No CV (Tex. App. San Antonio, 2008). 131 Brief of Appellant City of Del Rio, supra note 129, at 3 n Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust v. City of Del Rio, No (83d Dist. Ct., Val Verde County, Tex. Oct. 10, 2006). 133 Id. 134 City of Del Rio v. Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust, No CV, 2008 WL , * 1 (Tex. App. San Antonio, 2008, no pet. h.). 135 Id. at *3.
21 2008] LANDOWNERS RIGHTS IN TEXAS GROUNDWATER 511 districts for the purpose of groundwater marketing. 143 Granted, the state s groundwater-conservation-district-regulation scheme does not apply in City of Del Rio, as there is no groundwater conservation district in Val Verde County. 144 It remains unclear whether the City of Del Rio will appeal the Fourth Court of Appeals decision, but as yet, courts have not addressed the inconsistency between the rules of absolute ownership and capture. 145 III. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE THERE IS NO PROPERTY RIGHT IN GROUNDWATER IN PLACE Even if the Texas Supreme Court still used absolute-ownership terminology a few decades ago, 146 it has not necessarily decided the question of ownership in place. The case law s terminology indicates the court has not seriously considered the nuances of the property-right question as applied to groundwater. Today s Texas Supreme Court could go either way without overruling a century of precedent; no on-point cases exist. 147 At its first opportunity, the Texas Supreme Court should clarify that Texas landowners do not own groundwater in place. This choice will facilitate necessary groundwater regulation through groundwater conservation districts. The court can make this choice despite the property 143 See Patoski, supra note 22, at 61 ( [O]ne of the first things WaterTexas... told [a Kinney County landowner interested in marketing groundwater] was that Kinney County needed a groundwater district before exportation could begin. ). 144 Creating a groundwater conservation district in Val Verde County has been the subject of discussion and dispute in both the 79 th and 80 th Legislative sessions. See, e.g., Tex. S.B. 1896, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005); Tex. H.B. 3484, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005); Bill Sontag, Groundwater Conservation District Legislation Moribund, Thanks to Local Squabbles, SOUTHWEST TEXAS LIVE, April 25, 2007, available at Bill Sontag, City of Del Rio and Citizen Groundwater Environmental Interests Approve Draft Water Legislation Despite Landowner Boycott, SOUTHWEST TEXAS LIVE, April 20, 2007, available at See Bill Sontag, City of Del Rio's Losses Approaching $1 Million in Water Rights Case, SOUTHWEST TEXAS LIVE, February 27, 2008, available at node/ See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 21 (Tex. 1978). 147 Johnson, supra note 31, at 1292 ( If one takes the view that stare decisis is applicable to the decision of a case and not necessarily to the rationale for that decision, it would be proper for the Supreme Court of Texas to announce in the next case before it involving this issue that it is rejecting the corporeal ownership rationale in favor of the usufructuary rationale.... (citing Goodhart, Three Cases on Possession, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 195 (1927))).

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