Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180305_0000588.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:51:10+00:00

Document:
FindACase | ADP, LLC v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc.
ADP, LLC v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc.
ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP, INC., Defendant.
Kevin McNulty United States District Judge.
Plaintiff, ADP, Inc. ("ADP"), is suing a competitor, defendant Ultimate Software Group, Inc. ("USG"), which has allegedly hired ADP's ex-employees in violation of their non-compete, non-disclosure, and non-solicitation agreements. USG has asserted counterclaims for tortious interference with its prospective business relationships and unfair competition. It alleges, in part, that ADP has sent pre-litigation letters warning these employees that violations of the agreements could result in legal action, creating a "cloud of fear" among prospective employees and clients.
ADP now moves under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss USG's counterclaims for failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated herein, ADP's motion is denied.
A motion to dismiss counterclaims is reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 648 F.Supp.2d 340, 346 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing Organonlnc. v. MylanPharm., 293 F.Supp.2d 453, 456-57 (D.N.J. 2003)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move for the dismissal of a claim, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2011). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. New Jersey Carpenters & the Trustees Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).
A counterclaimant's obligation to provide the grounds for entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions; a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55 (2007). Thus, the counterclaimant's factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a counterclaimant's right to relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is "plausible on its face." Id. at 570; see also West Run Student Housing Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013). That facial-plausibility standard is met "when the [counterclaimant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference tiiat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement'... it asks for more than a sheer possibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), I am confined to the allegations contained within the counterclaims, with some narrow exceptions. Courts may consider "document[s] integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint, " or any "undisputedly authentic document. . . attache[d] as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the [counterclaimant]'s claims are based on the document." In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 134 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) ("However, an exception to the general rule is that a 'document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint' may be considered 'without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment."*) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196). I may also take judicial notice of another court's opinion, "not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity." S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. WahKwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1999). See generally Fed. R. Evid. 201.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.