Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84111:59380&catid=1594&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:06:14+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 211497, March 18, 2015 - HOCHENG PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO M. FARRALES, Respondent.
HOCHENG PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO M. FARRALES, Respondent.
Attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
On November 27, 2009, [Farrales] borrowed a helmet from his co-worker Eric Libutan (“Eric”) since they reside in the same barangay. They agreed that Eric could get it at the house of [Farrales] or the latter could return it the next time that they will see each other. Eric told him that his motorcycle was black in color. As there were many motorcycles with helmets, he asked another employee, Andy Lopega (“Andy”) who was in the parking area where he could find Eric’s helmet. Andy handed over to him the supposed helmet which he believed to be owned by Eric, then he went home.
On November 28, 2009, at around 6 o’clock in the morning, he saw Eric at their barangay and told him to get the helmet. But Eric was in a rush to go to work, he did not bother to get it.
On February 15, 2010, the HPC issued a Notice of Termination12 to Farrales dismissing him for violation of Article 69, Class A, Item No. 29 of the HPC Code of Discipline, which provides that “stealing from the company, its employees and officials, or from its contractors, visitors or clients,” is akin to serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative, which are just causes for termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
1. Full backwages from date of dismissal on February 15, 2010 until date of decision equivalent to P276,466.67.
2. Separation pay of one (1) month salary per year of service for a period of twelve years equivalent to P228,800.00.
3. Appraisal year-end bonus in the sum of P11,000.00.
4. Moral damages in the sum of P200,000.00.
5. Exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00.
6. 10% of all sums owing as attorney’s fees or the amount of P81,626.67.
Concerning the substantive issues, the appellate court agreed with the LA that Farrales’ act of taking Reymar’s helmet did not amount to theft, holding that HPC failed to prove that Farrales’ conduct was induced by a perverse and wrongful intent to gain, in light of the admission of Eric that he did let Farrales borrow one of his two helmets, only that Farrales mistook Reymar’s helmet as the one belonging to him.
THE HONORABLE [CA] PLAINLY ERRED AND ACTED CONTRARY TO EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [NLRC] AND DECLARING ILLEGAL THE DISMISSAL FOR [HPC’s] ALLEGED FAILURE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF JUST CAUSE.
1. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT [FARRALES] COMMITTED THEFT IN [HPC’s] PREMISES.
2. THEFT IS A JUST CAUSE FOR TERMINATION.
3. BY COMMITTING THEFT, [FARRALES], BEING A SUPERVISORIAL EMPLOYEE, FORFEITED THE TRUST REPOSED IN HIM BY [HPC], THUS RENDERING HIM DISMISSIBLE FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.
IN DECLARING ILLEGAL THE DISMISSAL OF [FARRALES], THE HONORABLE [CA] VIOLATED DOCTRINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT.
1. COURTS CANNOT SUBSTITUTE THEIR JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE MANAGEMENT.
The Court resolves to deny the petition.
To validly dismiss an employee, the law requires the employer to prove the existence of any of the valid or authorized causes,24 which, as enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, are: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter’s representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.25 As a supervisorial employee, Farrales is admittedly subject to stricter rules of trust and confidence, and thus pursuant to its management prerogative HPC enjoys a wider latitude of discretion to assess his continuing trustworthiness, than if he were an ordinary rank-and-file employee.26 HPC therefore insists that only substantial proof of Farrales’ guilt for theft is needed to establish the just causes to dismiss him, as the NLRC lengthily asserted in its decision.
Article 4 of the Labor Code mandates that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions thereof shall be resolved in favor of labor. Consistent with the State’s avowed policy to afford protection to labor, as Article 3 of the Labor Code and Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution have enunciated, particularly in relation to the worker’s security of tenure, the Court held that “[t]o be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood. This is merely in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws which lean over backwards in favor of the working class, and mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favor.”27 Moreover, the penalty imposed on the erring employee ought to be proportionate to the offense, taking into account its nature and surrounding circumstances.
As aptly pointed out by the LA, while HPC has the onus probandi that the taking of Reymar’s helmet by Farrales was with intent to gain, it failed to discharge this burden, as shown by the following circumstances: Farrales sought and obtained the permission of Eric, his co-employee as well as barangay co-resident, to borrow his helmet; at the parking lot, Farrales asked another employee, Andy, to fetch a yellow helmet from one of the parked motorcycles, mistakenly thinking it belonged to Eric (whom he knew owned two helmets); the following day, November 28, Farrales asked Eric why he had not dropped by his house to get his helmet, and Eric replied that Farrales got the wrong helmet because he still had his other helmet with him; Farrales immediately sought the help of the company guards to locate the owner of the yellow helmet, who turned out to be Reymar; Farrales apologized to Reymar for his mistake, and his apology was promptly accepted.30 All these circumstances belie HPC’s claim that Farrales took Reymar’s helmet with intent to gain, the LA said.
But the Court agrees with the CA that Farrales committed no serious or willful misconduct or disobedience to warrant his dismissal. It is not disputed that Farrales lost no time in returning the helmet to Reymar the moment he was apprised of his mistake by Eric, which proves, according to the CA, that he was not possessed of a depravity of conduct as would justify HPC’s claimed loss of trust in him. Farrales immediately admitted his error to the company guard and sought help to find the owner of the yellow helmet, and this, the appellate court said, only shows that Farrales did indeed mistakenly think that the helmet he took belonged to Eric.
It is not, then, difficult to surmise that when Farrales told Andy that the yellow helmet was his, his intent was not to put up a pretence of ownership over it and thus betray his intent to gain, as the NLRC held, but rather simply to assuage Andy’s reluctance to heed his passing request to reach for the helmet for him; Andy, it will be recalled, was at that moment already seated in his motorbike and about to drive out when Farrales made his request. As to Farrales’ claim that he and Eric were neighbors, suffice it to say that as the CA noted, they resided in the same barangay, and thus, loosely, were neighbors.
The CA also pointed out that although the alleged theft occurred within its premises, HPC was not prejudiced in any way by Farrales’ conduct since the helmet did not belong to it but to Reymar. In light of Article 69, Class A, Item No. 29 of the HPC Code of Discipline, this observation may be irrelevant, although it may be that the LA regarded it as proving HPC’s bad faith.
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the CA’s dismissal of the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of merit. There is no satisfactory proof that the concerned officers of HPC acted in bad faith or with malice in terminating Farrales. Notwithstanding the LA’s assertion to this effect, Farrales’ bare allegations of bad faith deserve no credence, and neither is the mere fact that he was illegally dismissed sufficient to prove bad faith on the part of HPC’s officers.38 But concerning the award of attorney’s fees, Farrales was dismissed for a flimsy charge, and he was compelled to litigate to secure what is due him which HPC unjustifiably withheld.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales concurring; id. at 54-64.
3 Penned by Presiding Commissioner Herminio V. Suelo, with Commissioners Angelo Ang Palana and Numeriano D. Villena concurring; id. at 150-168.
5 Issued by Labor Arbiter Edgar B. Bisana; id. at 117-124.
24Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. v. Ariola, G.R. No. 181974, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 679, 692.
25Concepcion v. Minex Import Corporation/Minerama Corporation, G.R. No. 153569, January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA 497, 504-505.
26Aurelio v. NLRC, G.R. No. 99034, April 12, 1993, 221 SCRA 432, 442.
27Gutierrez v. Singer Sewing Machine Company, 458 Phil. 401, 413 (2003), citing The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. NLRC, 328 Phil. 1156, 1166 (1996).
28Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC, 334 Phil. 84, 93 (1997).
29Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime Agency, et al., 611 Phil. 291, 311 (2009).
30 Per Antonio’s explanation, rollo, p. 312.
34Cosmos Bottling Corp. v. Fermin, G.R. No. 193676, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 310, 317.
35Cosep v. NLRC, 353 Phil. 148, 158-159 (1998).
36Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp./Samir Maddah & Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp., 408 Phil. 570, 584 (2001).
37Asuncion v. NLRC, 414 Phil. 329, 341-342 (2001); Nicario v. NLRC, 356 Phil. 936, 943 (1998).
38See Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186, 217.

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