Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/417/535/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:40:57+00:00

Document:
1. Congress did not intend to repeal the Indian preference, and the District Court erred in holding that it was repealed by the 1972 Act. Pp. 417 U. S. 545-551.
(a) Since in extending general anti-discrimination machinery to federal employment in 1972, Congress in no way modified, and thus reaffirmed, the preferences accorded Indians by §§ 701(b) and 703(i) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment by Indian tribes or by private industries located on or near Indian reservations, it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended to eliminate the longstanding Indian preferences in BIA employment, as being racially discriminatory. Pp. 417 U. S. 547-548.
(b) In view of the fact that, shortly after it passed the 1972 Act, Congress enacted new Indian preference laws as part of the Education Amendments of 1972, giving Indians preference in Government programs for training teachers of Indian children, it is improbable that the same Congress condemned the BIA preference as racially discriminatory. Pp. 417 U. S. 548-549.
(d) This is a prototypical case where an adjudication of repeal by implication is not appropriate, since the Indian preference is a longstanding, important component of the Government's Indian program, whereas the 1972 anti-discrimination provisions, being aimed at alleviating minority discrimination in employment, are designed to deal with an entirely different problem. The two statutes, thus not being irreconcilable, are capable of coexistence, since the Indian preference, as a specific statute applying to a specific situation, is not controlled or nullified by the general provisions of the 1972 Act. Pp. 417 U. S. 549-551.
2. The Indian preference does not constitute invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government. Pp. 417 U. S. 551-555.
(a) If Indian preference laws, which were derived from historical relationships and are explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, 25 U.S.C. in its entirety would be effectively erased and the Government's commitment to Indians would be jeopardized. Pp. 417 U. S. 551-553.
(b) The Indian preference does not constitute "racial discrimination" or even "racial" preference, but is rather an employment criterion designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. Pp. 417 U. S. 553-554.
(c) As long as the special treatment of Indians can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Pp. 417 U. S. 554-555.
to the various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office, [Footnote 1] in the administration of functions or services affecting any Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to appointment to vacancies in any such position. [Footnote 2]"
In June, 1972, pursuant to this provision, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, issued a directive (Personnel Management Letter No. 72-12) (App. 52) stating that the BIA's policy would be to grant a preference to qualified Indians not only, as before, in the initial hiring stage, but also in the situation where an Indian and a non-Indian, both already employed by the BIA, were competing for a promotion within the Bureau. [Footnote 3] The record indicates that this policy was implemented immediately.
normally performed by the Bureau. [Footnote 13] Committee sentiment, however, ran against such a radical change in the role of the BIA. [Footnote 14] The solution ultimately adopted was to strengthen tribal government while continuing the active role of the BIA, with the understanding that the Bureau would be more responsive to the interests of the people it was created to serve.
Third: Indian preferences, for many years, have been treated as exceptions to Executive Orders forbidding Government employment discrimination. [Footnote 23] The 1972 extension of the Civil Rights Act to Government employment is in large part merely a codification of prior anti-discrimination Executive Orders that had proved ineffective because of inadequate enforcement machinery. There certainly was no indication that the substantive proscription against discrimination was intended to be any broader than that which previously existed. By codifying the existing anti-discrimination provisions, and by providing enforcement machinery for them, there is no reason to presume that Congress affirmatively intended to erase the preferences that previously had coexisted with broad anti-discrimination provisions in Executive Orders.
Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U. S. 186, 393 U. S. 193 (1968). They and the District Court read the congressional silence as effectuating a repeal by implication. There is nothing in the legislative history, however, that indicates affirmatively any congressional intent to repeal the 1934 preference. Indeed, as explained above, there is ample independent evidence that the legislative intent was to the contrary.
In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 324 U. S. 456-457 (1945). Clearly, this is not the case here. A provision aimed at furthering Indian self-government by according an employment preference within the BIA for qualified members of the governed group can readily co-exist with a general rule prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race. Any other conclusion can be reached only by formalistic reasoning that ignores both the history and purposes of the preference and the unique legal relationship between the Federal Government and tribal Indians.
one, regardless of the priority of enactment. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 365 U. S. 758 (1961); Rodgers v. United States, 185 U. S. 83, 185 U. S. 87-89 (1902).
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 308 U. S. 198 (1939). In light of the factors indicating no repeal, we simply cannot conclude that Congress consciously abandoned its policy of furthering Indian self-government when it passed the 1972 amendments.
Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 318 U. S. 715 (1943). See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 118 U. S. 383-384 (1886).
Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the governed in the governing agency. The preference is similar in kind to the constitutional requirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be "an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen," Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, or that a member of a city council reside within the city governed by the council. Congress has sought only to enable the BIA to draw more heavily from among the constituent group in staffing its projects, all of which, either directly or indirectly, affect the lives of tribal Indians. The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion. See n 24, supra. In the sense that there is no other group of people favored in this manner, the legal status of the BIA is truly sui generis. [Footnote 25] Furthermore, the preference applies only to employment in the Indian service. The preference does not cover any other Government agency or activity, and we need not consider the obviously more difficult question that would be presented by a blanket exemption for Indians from all civil service examinations. Here, the preference is reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal. This is the principal characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination.
Hearings on H.R. 7902, Readjustment of Indian Affairs, before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-7 (1934) (hereafter House Hearings). See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 411 U. S. 152-153, n. 9 (1973).
"The bill admits qualified Indians to the position [sic] in their own service."
"This disproportionatte [sic] distribution of minorities and women throughout the Federal bureaucracy and their exclusion from higher level policymaking and supervisory positions indicates the government's failure to pursue its policy of equal opportunity."
Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior et al.
C. R. Mancari et al.

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