Source: http://www.ghanalandlaw.com/html/Mansu.v.Abboye.htDir/Mansu.v.Abboye.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 23:53:22+00:00

Document:
APPEAL against a judgment of a circuit court for, inter alia, a declaration of title to land. The facts are sufficiently Stated in the judgment of Abban J.A.
FRANCOISE J.A. By his writ, the plaintiff-appellant, hereafter called the plaintiff, sought a declaration of title to his family's land at Yarbiw in the Western Region. He pleaded that his ancestors had reduced the virgin forest into cultivation and had been in uninterrupted occupation of it until the trespass complained of.
The co-defendant's case was, however, that as the Odikro of Yarbiw, he was the allodial owner of Yarbiw lands. He had also fought for the release of the lands for the State Farms Corporation which had previously acquired them compulsorily. The lands had reverted to him with the blessing of the town committee, and therefore he had every authority to grant a licence to the defendant to tap and uproot palm trees, perhaps in the better interest of husbandry and for the good of the entire community. He, however, made no claim against the plaintiff for breaches of customary tenure which would justify for feature, nor was he attempting re-possession following abandonment.  Indeed, his was the novel proposition that a stool could estreat a subject's land extinguish his possessory title, if land compulsorily acquired were later released, or if the town committee decreed it.
To the same effect are Mansah v. Asamoah  1 G.L.R. 27 225 at p. 236, C.A.; Nyaasemhwe v. Afibiyesan  1 G.L.R. 27 at p. 31, C.A and Attah Panyin v. Asani II; Atta Panyin v. Essuman (Consolidated)  1 G.L.R. 83.C.A.
On the issue of damage the plaintiff showed that 215 of his palm trees had been uprooted; at 4 each that would among to the 860 claimed. Neither the sum claimed nor the figure of destroyed palm trees was disputed; the defendants merely contended that the palm trees grew wild, so they belonged to the allodial stool. This overlooked the fact that this was ancestral property stretching back six generations and the palm trees could not in that circumstance be considered to be wild. They grew out of habitation, even if they had not been purposely planted. In any case, the owner of the determinable title at law is the owner of the palm trees: Atta v. Esson  1 G.L.R. 128 C.A.
I would grant the perpetual injunction claimed. In my view the claim for both special and general damages is justified. I would award 860 special damages. Costs awarded in the court below is set aside, and if paid should be refunded. The plaintiff is entitled to his costs in the court below and in this court.
COUSSEY J.A. The plaintiff-appellant, hereafter called the plaintiff claimed a declaration of title to land situate at Yarbiw on the basis of the land having devolved on him from his ancestors Ezia Badu. His other ancillary reliefs were for perpetual injunction and damages for trespass. The defendants-respondents, hereafter called the defendants, denied the title of the plaintiff to the land in dispute and it would appear form the averment in paragraph 3 of the defence filed that contend that even if the plaintiff was the owner of the land, he lost any rights he might have had over the land when it was acquired compulsorily for the State Farms Corporation. The learned judge in the court below upheld the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff lost the land after its acquisition by the State Farms; and therefore, when it was given up it reverted to its allodial owner, the second defendant, who thought that as the allodial owner of the wild palm trees, he was right in asking the first defendant to distil gin from the wild palm trees.
On the appeal coming on for hearing, counsel for the defendants was asked to support the judgment. He contended that the land in dispute became estreat to the Yarbiw stool, because upon its release by the State Farms it was agreed that it should revert to the chief of Yarbiw. I find no merit in the submission because it is not supported by  the evidence adduced before the trial judge. The evidence does not suggest that there was ever compulsory acquisition of the land for the State Farms Corporation. It appears that the Yarbiw stool offered lands to the corporation for farming but when there was a further encroachment which would have affected farms such as the plaintiffs missioner after various meetings at the regional office. The people of Yarbiw, in fact, made contribution in cash towards the cost of fighting the further encroachment in question. There is not a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the land thereby saved, which included the plaintiff's, became estreated to the Yarbiw stool.
The plaintiff's claim of title to the land was not seriously challenged by the defendants. He proved this claim. The evidence was overwhelming in support of his claim that the land in dispute devolved on him from his ancestors Ezia Badu. The evidence of his boundary owners clearly made definite his land and leaves no one in doubt. I would therefore, declare title of the land in dispute in the plaintiff and further grant him of perpetual injunction against the defendants. The evidence on the special cost of 4 per tree which comes to 860. This was not in contention and I will grant it. General damages will be as stated by the president of the court. The judgment of the court and costs below is hereby reversed.
ABBAN J.A. This appeal is from the judgment of the Circuit Court, Takoradi, delivered on 22 October 1979. The appellant (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) sued the defendant for a declaration of title, account, damages for trespass and perpetual injunction in respect of a piece of farm land situate and lying at Yarbiw near Apowa in the Western Region. The land in dispute was a portion of Yarbiw stool lands. The occupant of the said land applied to be made a party and he was accordingly joined as a co-defendant.
`` The defendant in answer to paragraph 3 and 4 of the statement of claim avers than even if, and it is not admitted, the plaintiff was the owner of the land as claimed, he lost any rights he might have had over land when the same was acquired compulsorily for the State Farms Corporation.
That it was through the efforts of Yarbiw Town Committee that the land was released to the chief of the community of Yarbiw.
(The emphasis is mine.) The trial judge accepted the defence and entered judgment for the defendant and the co-defendant, dismissing the plaintiff's claim.
This piece of evidence clearly supports the view that no steps were taken either by the defunct Agricultural Development Corporation or the state Farms Corporation to have the stool lands of Yarbiw properly and compulsorily acquire; and as I have already stated, there was, in fact, no compulsory acquisition of the said lands. The trial judge therefore erred in holding that plaintiff thereby lost his unfructuary interest in the said land.
It is significant to note that learned counsel for the defendants had to concede that there was no compulsory acquisition of any portion of the stool lands of Yarbiw. He was then asked why the defense pleaded compulsory acquisition in paragraph 3 of the statement of defense. Learned counsel was at paints to admit that it was an erroneous plea. It might have been an defendant and the co-defendant failed to establish the loss of the plaintiffs usuffructuary interest in the disputed land through compulsory acquisition.
(The emphasis is mine.) See also Baidoo v. Osei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 289 and Atta Panyin v. Ashanti II  G.L.R. 305. It can therefore be seen that the usufructuary interest is potentially perpetual. So that apart from the statutory powers for expropriation or acquisition as  provided in Act 125, as amended by N.L.C.D. 234, the interest of the usufructary can be determined only by his consent abandonment or upon failure of his successors. All these conditions were absent in the present case. Consequently, the plaintiffs land could not be said to have reverted to the co-defendant. That being the case, the plentiff was in full and exclusive control and possession of his said land at the time the co-defendant authorized the defendant to enter upon it and to uproot those palm trees. Since the entry was without the permission of the plaintiff, the defendant's conduct constituted trespass.
For the above reasons, I also agree that the appeal should be allowed, and the judgment appealed from set aside, including the order for costs; and in substitution thereof judgment is entered for the plaintiff against the defendant and the co-defendant jointly and severally for (a) a declaration of title to the disputed land as described in the writ of summons, (b) 860 being the value of the palm trees unlawfully uprooted and tapped into palm wine, (c) 750 as damages for trespass, and (d) perpetual injunction restraining the defendant and the co-defendant, their agents, servants, labourers or workmen from entering the disputed land or from having anything to do with same.

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