Source: https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/abuse-opening-statements-and-closing-arguments-civil-litigation-5672.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 05:17:53+00:00

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â€œIf the gloves donâ€™t fit, you must acquit.â€ Johnny Cochranâ€™s outrageous statements to the jury in his closing argument distracted the O. J. Simpson jury from the strong evidence against his client, and helped Mr. Simpson win an acquittal. Similarly outrageous jury arguments are increasingly common in civil litigation.
American trial procedure provides attorneys with two opportunities to speak directly to juries, opening statements and closing arguments. The purpose of opening statements is to allow attorneys to give juries a roadmap of what the attorneys intend to prove during trial. Closing arguments, meanwhile, allow attorneys to summarize the evidence they have presented at trial, and emphasize important points the jury may have missed or forgotten.
In practice, however, courts have been quite deferential to attorneys, and generally have allowed them to go beyond appropriate argument to the jury. Until recently, experienced attorneys rarely bothered to object to all but the most outlandish statements made by opposing counsel; they knew that judges were unlikely to sustain their objections, and that the interruption would appear rude to the jury.
There are two primary reasons why judges have allowed parties to abuse opening statements and closing arguments. One is ideological, the other is practical.
The ideological explanation is the popularity of the theory, held explicitly or implicitly by many judges, lawyers and law professors, that the purpose of civil jury trials is not to ensure that current law is correctly applied to the facts. Rather, juries are seen as a check on legal rigidity and are expected to be indicators of the direction of the lawâ€™s evolution.4 Juries therefore are not expected to strictly apply the facts to the law in all circumstances. Instead, juries are expected to base their verdicts on â€œextralegal valuesâ€ or â€œtheir sense of justice.â€5 Judges have therefore been inclined to acquiesce to attorneysâ€™ unduly emotional appeals in jury argument, even when the attorneys have been technically in violation of the rules of proper argument.
Nevertheless, over the last decade or so judges have become more willing to police jury argument. Part of the reason for this shift in behavior is the increasing interest in what Peter Huber calls the â€œrule of factâ€â€”ensuring legal decisions actually conform to the underlying evidence. Interest in the rule of fact has led to more liberal rules for the granting of summary judgment, a crackdown on junk science, and it seems, a nascent crackdown on attorneys who make illicit, unfairly prejudicial arguments to the jury.
Fortunately, judges who choose to crack down on improper jury arguments have the tools to do so.
Traditional remedies for the abuse of jury argument include â€œinvited response,â€ limiting instructions, and in extreme cases, granting mistrials. More recently, courts have been issuing pre-trial orders in limine banning the attorneys from raising certain issues, and exercising direct judicial control over jury argument.
An additional problem with invited response is that the parties may not be equally capable of taking advantage of the leeway given to them by the trial judge. When a case involves an underdog, such as an individual plaintiff suing a large corporation, it is unlikely that the defendantâ€™s attorney will be able to effectively counter unfairly prejudicial remarks made by the plaintiffâ€™s attorney.
Third, violations of an order in limine make a court more likely to declare a mistrial, or grant a reversal on appeal, than if no such order was issued. Courts seem to be far less reluctant to go to the extreme of granting a new trial when an in limine order was repeatedly violated than if the rules of jury argument were violated in the absence of such an order.
However, several state courts have held that civil litigants have a federal or state constitutional right to a final argument,39 and it is not clear whether direct judicial intervention into the content of a closing argument would be permissible. In this authorâ€™s view, requiring an attorney to present to the judge the text, or at least an outline, of his closing argument to ensure that it complies with well-established rules of argument would not violate any right to present a closing argument.
As we have seen, judges have traditionally been reluctant to crack down on the abuse of arguments to the jury. Fortunately, judicial attitudes are changing, albeit slowly, as more judges realize that the abuses of opening statements and closing arguments are not isolated incidents, but part of a disturbing pattern of misconduct by overzealous attorneys.
Unfortunately, little research has been conducted on creative ways in which judges are controlling abusive jury argument. The author would welcome further examples from readers of this Civil Justice Memo.
1 E-Mail: dbernste@wpgate.gmu.edu. Paul Pepper, GMUSL Class of 1998, provided valuable research assistance for this article. An earlier version of this article was published in Court Review: Journal of the American Judgesâ€™ Association, Fall/Winter 1997, at 16.
2 Peter C. Langarias, Effective Closing Argument, Â§1.04 (1989); National Conference of State Trial Judges of the Judicial Administration Division of the ABA and the National Judicial College, The Judgeâ€™s Book 277 (2d ed. 1994).
Technically, opening statements are not arguments, but â€œsome courts use the terms â€˜opening statementâ€™ and â€˜opening argumentâ€™ interchangeably.â€ Michael J. Ahlen, Opening Statements in Jury Trials: What Are the Legal Limits?, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 701, 710 (1995). In this article, the phrase â€œjury argumentâ€ encompasses both opening statements and closing arguments.
Mentioning the wealth or poverty of a party.
Kent Sinclair, Trial Handbook Â§ 3.08, 5.05 (2d ed. 1990).
4 Michael J. Saks, Blaming the Jury, 75 Geo. L. J. 693, 704 (1986); Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judgeâ€™s Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1285-86 (1952).
5 Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil Jury, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System 88-90 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 Hastings L.J. 61, 160-61 (1995).
6 On the rare occasions when evidence professors write about jury argument, they tend to focus on strategy, not the rules. See, e.g., Ronald L. Carlson & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Three Types of Closing Arguments, 18 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 115 (1994).
7 Bradley R. Johnson, Closing Argument: Boom to the Skilled, Bust to the Overzealous, Fla. B. J., May 1995, at 12.
9 Walt Disney World Company v. Blalock, 640 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1994).
10 Thomas W. Pirtle & Richard N. Laminack, Winning a Breast Implant Case: The Plaintiffâ€™s Point of View, Med. Leg. Aspects Breast Implants, Oct. 1997, at 4, quoted in David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 457, 495 (1999).
11See Plaintiffâ€™s Opening Statement, Tr. at 25, Laas v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 93-04266 (Tex. Harris Cty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 21, 1994) (analogizing defendantsâ€™ attorneys to a criminal defense attorney who will â€œtalk about anything except the fact that [his client] coldbloodedly murdered someone elseâ€); id. at 33 (stating that just as the defendantsâ€™ attorneys will argue that there is no proof that implants harmed the plaintiffs, cigarette companies argue that their product does not cause lung cancer).
12 Plaintiffsâ€™ Closing Argument, Laas v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 93-04266 (Tex. Harris Cty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 21, 1994), available at http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/frontline.html.
13See Bernstein, supra note 10, at 496-97.
14 Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361 (1891).
15 Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
16 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 21 (1985).
17 Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850, 850-51 (Fla. App. 1985).
18 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1985); Hunter v. Chicago & North Western Transp., 558 N.E.2d 216, 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
19 Newton N. Minow and Peter David Blanck, Welcoming Remarks and Statement of the Issues, 68 Ind. L.J. 1033, 1035 (1993).
21 Ahlen, supra note 2, at 104.
23See, e.g., Baptist Hospital v. Rawson, 674 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Norman v. Gloria Farms, 668 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Muhammad v. Toys â€œRâ€ Us, 668 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Johnson, supra note 7; John W. Reis, Improper Jury Argument: Guilding the Lustre of the Golden Rule, Fla. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 60.
24 Shaw v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 9312-08347 (Ore. Cir. Ct. April 22, 1996).
25 Motions in limine are submitted in writing before the trial begins on specific evidentiary matters. They are authorized by the inherent power of the trial court to admit or exclude evidence in the interests of a fair trial. Robert G. Johnson & Thomas P. Hogans, Motions In Limine: Use and Consequences in Illinois, 26 J. Marshall L. Rev. 305 (1993).
26See, e.g., Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 1996 WL 14027 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
27 Michael Sean Quinn, Closing Arguments in Insurance Fraud Cases, 23 Tort & Ins. L.J. 744, 768 (1988). See, e.g., Bellsouth Human Resources Administration, Inc. v. Colatarci & Hylton, 641 So. 2d 427 (Fla. App. 1994). The Bellsouth court warned attorneys, â€œwhen we observe conduct which we think should be reported to the bar, we do so by letter, a fact which we point out here lest anyone think the only time we take that step is when it appears in an opinion.â€ Id. at 430 n. 1.
28See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods Â§ 7.12 (2d ed. 1973). Professor Ahlen notes that â€œthe mere act of objecting may also highlight the improper remark for the jury.â€ Ahlen, supra note 2, at 702.
29 Professor Ahlen suggests that a sustained objection followed by an admonition or forced retraction has a very negative impact on an attorneyâ€™s case. Ahlen, supra note 2, at 702.
30Kutchins v. Berg, 638 N.E.2d 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
33 Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Local Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 (d).
34 Interview with Robin Tabora, Deputy Clerk, Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut (July 19, 1996).
37 United States v. Salovitz, 701 F. 2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (â€œWe believe that an opening statement by the defendant is not such a guaranteed right, and that the making and timing of opening statements can be left constitutionally to the informed discretion of the trial judge.â€); United States v. 5 Cases, 179 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding in a civil case that â€œopening is merely a privilegeâ€).
38Salovitz, 701 F.2d at 21.
39 Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977); Aladdin Oil Burner Corp. v. Morton, 187 A. 350 (N.J. 1936), Moore v. Moore, 135 A.2d 643 (D.C. 1957); Lewis v. Federal Services Discount Corp., 170 A.2d 235 (D.C. 1961). Nestor v. George, 46 A.2d 469 (Penn. 1946); Sperry v. Berry, 503 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); cf. Langarias, supra note 2, at Â§ 1.02 (â€œcounsel have an absolute right to present closing arguments in both criminal and civil jury trials.â€); but see Korbelik v. Staschke, 596 N.E.2d 805 (Ill. App. 1992) (stating oral argument in a civil non-jury trial is a privilege in Illinois); Jacob A. Stein, Closing Argument Â§ 3 (1985, Supp. 1987) (â€œArgument of counsel would appear to be more jealously protected in criminal than in civil cases, especially nonjury civil cases, where argument of counsel has often been referred to not as a right, but as a privilege within the trial courtâ€™s discretion.â€).
40 Texas Employersâ€™ Insurance Association v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 868 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).

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