Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2010/04
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:20:00+00:00

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Countless people have been injured in car crashes over the years in British Columbia and had their injury claims denied by ICBC on the basis of the Low Velocity Impact Program.
I have written many times about this program explaining that it has no legal force in BC. Reasons for judgement were released today proving this yet again and in doing so providing one of the better explanations of why a certain threshold of vehicle damage is not necessary in order to have a successful personal injury claim in this Province.
In today’s case (Gignac v. Rozylo) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2004 collision in Victoria, BC . At trial a ‘senior estimator‘ employed by ICBC testified that the Plaintiff’s vehicle suffered “cosmetic damage only to the rear bumper cover. ‘ and that ‘there is no bumper misalignment or sheet metal damage‘.
The Plaintiff was injured but ICBC advanced the LVI defence arguing that “given the very minor nature of the collision it is difficult to conceive how someone could possibly be injured, or injured in the significant fashion the plaintiff claims‘.
 I am not persuaded that the third party’s argument is open to me to accept. There are two propositions which lead me to that opinion.
I do not subscribe to the view that if there is no motor vehicle damage then there is no injury. … It is not a legal principle of which I am aware and I have never heard it endorsed as a medical principle.
Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slips and falls. … The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court.
Perhaps no injury has been the subject of so much judicial consideration as the whiplash. Human experience tells us that these injuries normally resolve themselves within six months to a year or so. Yet every physician knows some patients whose complaint continues for years, and some apparently never recover.
 Therefore, I conclude that Gordon is authority for the proposition that the magnitude of forces unleashed, in any given contact, is not determinative of the injuries sustained. Accordingly, in this case, there was a “real risk” of the harm now complained of.
 And, Price is authority for the proposition that, objectively, some patients, of “ordinary fortitude” sustain injuries which are permanent. In this case, I am not dealing with the particular vulnerabilities of this particular plaintiff.
 In result, I find the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. That is to say, the defendant’s carelessness caused, as I will describe below, the plaintiff’s injuries, in fact and in law.
When Should I Settle My ICBC or Other British Columbia Personal Injury Claim?
Other than “how much is my case worth?” the question probably most asked of personal injury lawyers is “when should I settle my claim?“.
The short answer is when your claim can be fairly valued and an acceptable settlement offer is made. So when can a claim be valued? Here is a brief video I uploaded to YouTube discussing this topic (complete with an unexpected phone call in the middle of the video!) I hope this information is of some assistance.
If there are concerns that witnesses at trial will try to ‘match-up‘ their testimony it is important to exclude them from Court before they testify. In British Columbia the Supreme Court Rules don’t have any provision addressing the exclusion of witnesses during trial, however the Court retains a discretion to make such an order pursuant to it’s ‘inherent jurisdiction‘. Reasons for judgement were released today providing a summary of this area of law.
One limitation on the principle of an open court is the practice as to exclusion of witnesses. The court, upon application of any party, may order that witnesses be excluded in the interest of securing the best possible evidence. While the British Columbia Rules, unlike those of certain other jurisdictions, do not expressly confer a power to exclude witnesses on the court, it appears that the court has an inherent power to make such an order: see Moore v. Lambeth County Court Registrar,  1 All E.R. 782 (C.A.). The practice is for counsel to ask for an order excluding witnesses. …. If a witness defies an order of exclusion or circumvents it by discussing the proceedings with those who were present in the courtroom, his evidence cannot be excluded for this reason, although the weight given it may be reduced: Crawford et at. v. Ferris,  O.W.N. 713 (H.C.); R. v. Dobberthien,  6 W.W.R. 539 (Alta. C.A.), affd (sub nom. Dobberthien v. The Queen) (1974), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 305 (S.C.C.). Moreover, the witness may be cited for contempt:R. v. Carefoot,  2 D.L.R. 22 (Ont. H.C.).
If the judge deems it essential to discovering the truth that the witnesses should be examined out of the hearing of each other, he will order them all on both sides to withdraw, excepting the one under examination. Such an order is, upon the application of either party at any period of the trial, rarely withheld, but it cannot be demanded of strict right.
 A more extensive history tracing the practice as far back as the story of Susannah from the Book of Daniel is set out in Wigmore, A Treatise in the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trial at Common Law, Vol. 6 (Boston: Little Brown, 1940). Wigmore states that the practice came from Germanic common law which the English law inherited.
 While the Rules of Court in Alberta (since 1923), in Manitoba (since 1913), in Ontario (since 1913), and in Saskatchewan (since 1921) provide that a judge may order a witness to be excluded at the request of either party, no such provision is specified in the British Columbia Rules or in a British Columbia statute. Accordingly, it is the inherent jurisdiction of the Court which confers the power to exclude witnesses in civil trials.
 The traditional reasons for excluding witnesses include: (a) if the hearing of opposing witnesses were permitted, the listening witnesses could ascertain the points of difference between their testimonies and could shape their own testimony to better advantage; and (b) regarding witnesses on the same side of the litigation, it deprives the later witness of the opportunity of shaping his or her testimony to correspond with the testimony of the earlier witness.
If that were granted and the plaintiff excluded, something might arise and counsel would not be aware of what his client’s views were on the matter, and he would have to run out of Court. … The party instructing counsel would not be in a position to conduct his case if he were excluded from the Court. (at p. 582).
In my practice, in our law courts, counsel have always asked for an order excluding witnesses and the order is a discretionary one. On the civil side the litigants, of course, have an absolute right, subject to certain exceptions, to remain in court and on a criminal charge the accused has the same right.
When the driver of a vehicle strikes an animal in the roadway and injures their passengers they can only successfully sue for damages (a tort claim) if it can be demonstrated that the driver did something careless. Sometimes collisions with animals are unavoidable even with the most careful driving and in these cases injury lawsuits against drivers get dismissed. Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In today’s case (Freidooni v. Freidooni) the Plaintiff was injured when the vehicle she was occupying struck a deer. The Plaintiff was sitting in the passenger seat. Her husband was driving. They were travelling in the left of two westbound lanes on a highway. The speed limit was 110 kmph but the defendant was driving, in cruise control, at 130 kmph. To the right of the highway was an ‘open field with no trees or shrubs that would preclude an individual from seeing animals next to the travelled protiomn of (the) Highway“, There was vegetation to the left of the highway that “could have impeded the defendant’s view of deer in that areal“.
There were no vehicles which limited the driver’s view. A deer entered the Defendant’s lane of travel and the collision occurred. Neither he nor the Plaintiff saw the deer before impact. The Defendant said he was not at fault in these circumstances arguing that “it cannot be determined with any certainty as to whether the deer entered the westbound lanes of Highway No. 16 from the open area to the north, that being the open field to the defendant’s right, or whether it emerged from the vegetation to the defendant’s left“.
 The defendant submits that it has not been shown that the deer did not emerge from cover in the median of the roadway, and that since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant saw the deer before the collision, it cannot be inferred that the defendant could have seen the deer in sufficient time to avoid the impact.
 The evidence, however, is unequivocal in that the deer approached the defendant’s vehicle from its right. Even if it had initially emerged from the median of the roadway, it must have crossed entirely over the lane in which the defendant was driving before turning and re-entering the defendant’s lane of travel. Alternatively, the deer emerged from the open field to the right of the highway. I am of the opinion that in either case, the defendant’s failure to see the deer was negligent. The only explanation as to why he did not see the deer is that he was not paying attention to the roadway. The defendant was on cruise control on a wide roadway in perfect conditions with no other traffic about. By his own account, he was drinking coffee and listening to music. In my opinion, the reason why he did not see the deer on the roadway was that he was not paying attention. He was not paying attention because he did not expect anything to be there.
 The accident occurred in an area where there is wildlife. The defendant knew that.
 In White v. Webster, Esson J.A. says that the question comes down to this. He says it was a virtually unavoidable inference that there was some absence of look out on the part of the driver. I am of the same opinion in this case. The defendant was not paying attention. He did not see the deer when he should have seen it. He took no evasive action to avoid the impact when he should have been able to do that.
 I find that the defendant was negligent. He is liable for the accident.
When the driver of a vehicle injures passengers by colliding with an animal in British Columbia the passengers should be cautious before giving a statement to the driver’s insurance company addressing the issue of fault. As I’ve previously written, if any issues of carelessness are glossed over in the statement it will certainly be used against you if you later seek to advance a tort claim for compensation for your injuries.
One principle that is becoming well defined with respect to Rule 37B is that settlement offers made on the eve of trial may not trigger any costs consequences. Reasons for judgement were released today demonstrating this.
In today’s case (Parwani v. Sekhon) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 BC car crash. The Plaintiff sued for damages. As trial approached the Plaintiff offered to settle his case for $37,000 plus costs and disbursements. On the last business day before trial the Defendants responded with a formal settlement offer under Rule 37B for $10,000 plus 50% of disbursements.
The claim went to trial and the Plaintiff claimed damages of $270,000. The claim was largely unsuccessful with the Plaintiff being found 75% at fault. Damages were assessed at $25,000 leaving an award of $6,250 for the Plaintiff (25% of $25,000).
 The defendants submit that the offer to settle was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted given the evidence with respect to the liability issue. In addition, the position taken by the plaintiff at trial with respect to his losses was unreasonable given the medical evidence and the paucity of evidence to support the claims. The offer exceeded the plaintiff’s recovery at trial. The position of the plaintiff was that he did not have adequate time to consider the offer, coming as it did on the eve of trial. Moreover, had the plaintiff accepted the offer, considering the disbursements already incurred, the plaintiff would have recovered only $765.34. Accordingly, it was not reasonable to accept the offer. The plaintiff had made an early offer to settle that reflected a considerable discount to reflect the uncertainties in the case.
 In my view, while the defendants’ offer was reasonable, it was not early. It came on the eve of trial, after substantial costs and disbursements had been incurred. Such an offer is not the embodiment of the conduct the rule intends to promote. In the circumstances, and considering the factors identified in the rule, I am not prepared to consider the offer in relation to the award of costs.
As readers of this blog are likely aware, Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 on July 1, 2010 when the new BC Civil Rules come into force. The new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B which should help cases such as this one retain their value as precedents.
You can click here to read access my archived posts discussing Rule 37B in injury lawsuits.

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