Source: https://openjurist.org/506/f2d/207
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:09:00+00:00

Document:
Willie BELL, Appellant (two cases).
Leonard I. Rosenberg, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Herbert B. Hoffman, Asst. U.S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellee. Harold E. Reukauf, Asst. U.S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, and ROBINSON, Circuit Judge.
A jury found Willie Bell guilty of two federal narcotic offenses1 and, additionally, of carrying a pistol without a license.2 On these appeals, one from the judgment of conviction3 and the other from denial of a motion for a new trial,4 Bell argues a number of grounds for reversal.5 In this opinion we consider, in varying detail, each of his contentions, and for reasons articulated we affirm.
We begin with a recital of the highlights of the Government's evidence at Bell's trial. Bell and two others, Willie Cardwell and Freddie Davis, were suspected of trafficking in narcotics.6 In a coordinated effort to execute a search warrant on them, a group of plainclothes police officers undertook a stakeout of Fisherman's Wharf, on the Washington Channel in Southwest Washington. Officer Charles A. Miller, who previously had monitored the suspects' activities at the wharf and elsewhere,7 functioned as coordinator for the group; from East Potomac Park, directly across the Channel, he kept the wharf under observation through binoculars. Three officers patrolled the Channel in a boat just offshore, while three others were stationed in a position overlooking the wharf area. Communicating by radio, the officers awaited the suspected arrival of the three subjects.
Cardwell and Davis came first, and went on Pier 1 with fishing tackle and paper bags. Shortly thereafter, they were seen exchanging a tinfoil packet for money handed to them by an unidentified man. Bell, also carrying a bag, made his appearance on the pier somewhat later. As soon as Officer Miller sighted all three men, he alerted his fellow officers, joined them at the wharf, and led them onto Pier 1.
As Officer Miller announced his identity, Bell and his companions endeavored to dispose of the contents of the bags. Bell tossed four tinfoil packets over his shoulder into the Channel. Davis kicked into the water another bag of packets, and Cardwell threw overboard still another bag from which more tinfoil packets spilled. By this time, however, the officers cruising the Channel had moved in, and with Officer Miller pointing out the floating bags and packets,8 they retrieved them with a net. Two more packets were found on the pier in a barrel beside which Bell was standing.
The three subjects were placed under arrest and searched. Bell was carrying a loaded pistol, over $1,500 in cash and an envelope containing marijuana.9 In each of the six tinfoil packets attributed to Bell was a powder containing heroin, and in four of them the heroin content was unusually high.10 None of the packets bore federal tax stamps,11 nor did Bell have a permit to carry the pistol.12 In due course, Bell, Cardwell and Davis were jointly indicted; the latter two pleaded guilty, but Bell stood on his plea of not guilty and went to trial.
That, in the main, was the Government's case.13 Bell's defense was that at no time did he possess any of the packets. He testified that he went to the wharf with a friend14 to purchase fish, stopping first at the stands to browse and then to chat with Cardwell and Davis on the pier. As he was making his way back to the front of the pier, Bell said, he was met by the onrushing policemen who yelled 'freeze,' and he immediately obeyed the order. Bell stated that the money he had was to be used in a business venture,15 and avowed that he had nothing to do with the narcotics trade.
The jury accepted, for the most part, the Government's evidence and convicted.16 Following return of the verdict, the trial judge heard argument on Bell's in-trial motion, on which the ruling had been reserved, for dismissal of two counts of the indictment. The motion was based on the Government's refusal to reveal the identity of an informant who participated in a transaction which the Government used to rebut testimony by Bell that he was unfamiliar with narcotics.17 In a written opinion, the judge denied the motion.18 Shortly thereafter, Bell engaged new counsel who moved for a new trial on several additional grounds.19 The judge held an evidentiary hearing on that motion and, in another opinion, denied it also.20 The case was then brought here for review.
Bell was the first witness for the defense. Questioned on cross-examination as to whether Cardwell and Davis were selling drugs on Fisherman's Wharf just prior to their arrest, Bell testified that he had never seen narcotics except on television.21 In rebuttal, the Government recalled its star witness, Officer Miller, to recount a drug sale allegedly made by Bell a few days prior to his arrest. According to Officer Miller, on that occasion he and another officer completely strip-searched an informant to make certain that he had no drugs on his person, and provided him with police funds to undertake a purchase from Bell. Officer Miller then took the informant to the wharf and, keeping him in sight at all times, watched him buy a 'halfspoon' of a substance which, as indicated by a field test, contained a narcotic drug of the opiate group.
On cross-examination of Officer Miller, Bell's counsel sought the name of the informant. The trial judge overruled the Government's objection to that effort, but Officer Miller could recall only that the informant's nickname was 'BoBo.' The officer stated that he could furnish the informant's surname on the next court day.
When trial resumed, however, the Government announced that it would not identify the informant further. The trial judge expressed the feeling that disclosure of the informant's full name might be in the interest of a fair trial, but after hearing argument he decided to hold his ruling in abeyance pending return of the jury's verdict.
Bell's complaint with respect to Officer Miller's rebuttal testimony is twofold. Firstly, he asserts that it was error to allow the officer to say anything about an alleged drug transaction which was not charged in the indictment on trial.23 Secondly, he argues that the trial judge's refusal to require the Government to specify the identity of the informant utilized in that transaction was likewise erroneous. We consider, and reject, each of these contentions in turn.
It was upon just that type of investigation that the judge ruled that the informant's identity need not be revealed.55 He began by culling out the circumstances deemed pertinent to the inquiry, and he then appraised them in terms of the balance to be made.56 His conclusion that the privilege should prevail was drawn, not from any one particular, but only after 'considering the array of factors outlined' in his written opinion57 'and the overwhelming nature of the proof.'58 Our review of the judge's ruling in light of the trial record gives us no cause to upset his evaluation.
We think, too, as did the trial judge, that another important factor in the equation was that the informant did not in any way participate in or witness any of the offenses on trial.71 As we have seen, the Supreme Court has discountenanced a rule which would inexorably require revelation of an informant's identity even in that kind of situation.72 And the courts,73 including our own,74 have frequently recognized that the call for disclosure may well be weaker when the informant's role did not project him into the incidents comprising the crimes charged,75 and consequently could not enable him to testify directly to guilt or innocence.76 We do not suggest that the informant's participation in those events is a precondition to disclosure;77 we simply honor the Supreme Court's admonition to consider 'the possible significance of the informer's testimony'78 when we say that the informant's testimonial potential may properly-- and should-- be taken for just what it was. Here the testimony was confined to an impeachment purpose, and its propriety is accordingly to be tested by the legal rules pertaining to impeachment.
The trial judge was also influenced by the fact that by no means was Officer Miller's rebuttal testimony the only evidence of a drug sale which Bell had participated in.79 As part of the Government's case in chief, Officer Miller had already testified that during the pre-arrest surveillance of Pier 1, he personally observed 'numerous' transactions wherein Bell, Cardwell and Davis traded tinfoil packets to others for money.80 Typically, said Officer Miller, Bell would arrive on the pier an hour or so after Cardwell and Davis, and would deliver to them paper bags containing the packets which they dispensed. We agree with the trial judge that the Government's rebuttal was cumulative in the sense that it addressed, this time for purposes of impeachment, one more narcotic sale in a series already long.
There is still another consideration demanding weight in the balance of 'the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense.'81 In his written opinion, the trial judge adverted to a Government affidavit which specified the informant's utility, past and future, in the cause of law enforcement.82 Over a two-year period, the informant had provided reliable information to federal and District of Columbia agencies concerning illegal narcotics and illegal guns, and was one of their most valuable sources of information. That information had resulted in approximately 20 seizures of contraband, 45 arrests for violations of narcotic and gun laws, and 25 convictions. Contemporaneously with Bell's trial, the informant was cooperating on four investigations of large narcotic dealers, in which arrests were contemplated in the near future. The affidavit charged, and the facts it alleged made evident, that the disclosure which Bell sought would have destroyed the informant's effectiveness and impaired governmental investigations into illegal drug traffic.
It was not only this 'array of factors'83 but also 'the overwhelming nature of the proof'84 that led the trial judge to conclude that the admission of Officer Miller's rebuttal testimony would not justify interference with the jury's verdict. By our assessment, the proof of the crimes charged against Bell was indeed overwhelming, and precluded any rational finding of substantial prejudice even if it could have been said that the judge's ruling on disclosure of the informant's identity was wrong.85 Each of six arresting officers testified unequivocally that as he closed in on Pier 1, he saw Bell toss several tinfoil packets over his shoulder into the Washington Channel.86 The packets, the testimony reveals, fell into the water a short distance from the pier and four to five feet from the boat occupied by other officers, who immediately retrieved them with a net.87 These witnesses also described similar efforts by Cardwell and Davis, Bell's companions, to dispose of tinfoil packets, and the frustration of those efforts by recovery of the floating packets from the water by the officers in the boat.88 Without question, the packets discarded by Bell yielded a large quantity of a mixture containing an unusually high heroin content.89 The informant was not in position to say anything in direct refutation of any of those events.
Opposing the Government's evidence was only Bell's denial that he had possessed any of the packets, and Roland Holiday's disclaimer that he had seen Bell attempting to dispose of anything.90 Of course, had the informant contradicted Officer Miller on the impeaching transaction, Bell's credibility might have been given a boost and Officer Miller's simultaneously a demerit. But we think it highly unlikely that that would have persuaded the jury, which deliberated less than three hours, to dismiss the rest of the Government's overpowering case.
We recognize that any thoroughgoing weighing of the public interest in the continued flow of informant-information against the exigencies of a fair trial for the accused necessitates reconciliation of any number of competing considerations.91 By the same token, the jurist called upon to initially strike the balance is entitled to some lee-way at those points in the process at which the determinations are essentially judgmatic.92 Beyond that, our own analysis and evaluation of the relevant factors confirms and fortifies the validity of the ruling which the trial judge made here.93 Moreover, our review of the evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence moves us to the conclusion that in any event the jury's verdict must prevail over the nondisclosure of the informant's identity.94 We turn, then, to other contentions which Bell presses on these appeals.
After the jury returned its verdict finding Bell guilty of most of the offenses laid to him by the indictment,95 he retained new counsel who filed a motion for a new trial alleging several errors in the conduct of the proceedings. The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing and in due course denied the motion for reasons explained in an unpublished memorandum and order,96 which for convenience we appendicize to this opinion.97 The appeal from denial of the motion98 presents basically the same arguments rejected by the judge. We now address those arguments, and like the judge, find no ground for disturbing Bell's conviction.
Prior to Bell's trial, in consequence of negotiations between counsel respectively representing the Government and Bell's co-indictees, Cardwell and Davis, the latter two entered pleas to less than all of the counts in which they were charged,99 and ultimately received sentences comparatively lighter than those which Bell was later to draw.100 Bell did not take that course, nor was he offered a chance to do so, and neither Cardwell nor Davis appeared as a witness at Bell's trial. Bell contends that the plea bargins unfairly and illegally singled him out for prosecution and, additionally, deprived him of the testimony of Cardwell and Davis. The record does not bear out either contention.
'Similarly situated defendants should be afforded equal plea agreement opportunities.'101 That standard the American Bar Association adopted six years ago.102 'Such equality is needed,' ABA says, 'to reach desired correctional goals, and to protect the process from attack on equal protection grounds.'103 Bell asserts such grounds-- as Fifth Amendment entitlements104 -- but his situation falls far short of supporting them.
Prosecutorial discretion in law enforcement, we have recognized, 'is by its very nature exceedingly broad.'109 And 'the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation,'110 but only so when 'the selection (is) deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'111 We discern no vice of that character in this case. The Government's evidence indicated strongly that Bell was a major dealer in narcotics, and that Cardwell and Davis were subordinates functioning under his direction.112 The prosecutor undoubtedly had this information as background when he agreed to guilty pleas by Cardwell and Davis. Dissimilar treatment reasonably accorded persons dissimilarly situated does not implicate the equality demand of the Fifth Amendment.
Another ground advanced in Bell's new-trial motion was that he was deprived of testimony by Cardwell and Davis because, the motion asserts, the Government conditioned its acceptance of their pleas upon their commitment to refrain from testifying in Bell's behalf. Inarguably, governmental impairment of the accused's ability to call witnesses in his behalf cannot be tolerated.113 The trial judge dismissed Bell's claim as lacking in factual substance, however, and we think he was entirely right in doing so.
The trial judge's findings in this case are of the character which should be accepted on appeal unless clearly erroneous.124 And '(a) finding is 'clearly erroneous' (only) when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,'125 that is, that 'the finding either is not supported by or is clearly against the weight of the evidence, or induced by an erroneous view of the law.'126 Authority to reject findings based on witness-credibility is even narrower, and is always to be exercised with great caution.127 Our painstaking review of the evidence adduced at the hearing on Bell's motion for a new trial reveals more than ample evidentiary support for the trial judge's findings, including his credibility assessments, and we perceive no error of law in his rulings. We therefore sustain his action on the motion insofar as it pertains to the availability of the testimony of Cardwell and Davis for the defense.
Bell also argues that he was deprived of effective assistance by his trial counsel128 because of a relationship which he bore to counsel for codefendant Cardwell. In support of his motion for a new trial, Bell asserted that his attorney was associated with Cardwell's attorney in law practice in the same firm, and that matter was fully explored at the hearing on the motion. The trial judge found that assertion contrary to fact, and we think the judge's determination on that score must stand.
In light of the evidence, this finding is not clearly erroneous, and we have no warrant to disturb it.134 Beyond that, we are unable, in any event, to discern any prejudice to Bell. Since Cardwell did not stand trial, the usual spectre of injury-- from inconsistent intrial courses of action for multiple clients-- could not possibly materialize.135 Bell's only suggestion of harm is that the cotenancy of the two attorneys in the same professional quarters may have swayed the decision to omit Cardwell and Davis as defense witnesses. That approach, however, is plainly foreclosed by the trial judge's separate finding that the decision, which Bell endorsed, was dictated by entirely different considerations.136 In sum, counsel did not have the affinity that Bell charged, and "we can find no basis in the record for an informed speculation' that (Bell's) rights were prejudicially affected'137 by the relationship that actually did exist.
profits from the poor people of this community. The poor people who shell out their money for the filth that he causes to be sold. That is how he profits. He profits of the worst kind.
Bell argues that this remark was unsupported by any evidence adduced at trial, and was so inflammatory as to jeopardize the impartiality of the jurors who were to pass judgment upon him. We agree the prosecutor's comment was inflammatory and outside the evidence, but disagree that in the overall circumstances of the case reversal of Bell's conviction is warranted.
The record contains no evidence indicating that Bell caused sales of narcotics to be made to 'the poor people of this community.' A jury may consider only the evidence properly laid before it during the course of the trial.139 Counsel's arguments to the jury must be confined to the evidence admitted and to such inferences as may be reasonably deducible therefrom.140 The observation Bell complains of was at war with these wholesome principles. Even more fundamentally, 'evidence which has the effect of inspiring sympathy for the defendant or for the victim . . . is prejudicial and inadmissible when otherwise irrelevant.'141 The economic status of the people to whom Bell supplied narcotics was 'wholly irrelevant to any facts or issues in the case,'142 and could have had no effect other than to inflame the jury.
The prosecutor's statement, then, was improper, but we cannot believe that it was so far out of bounds that it could have corrupted the jury's verdict. The proof of Bell's guilt, we have said, was overwhelming.143 The statement under attack comprised but three sentences at the end of an otherwise proper summation covering fifteen pages of the trial transcript. We are satisfied that, however viewed, the statement was not so offensive to the truth as to imperil the fairness of the trial.
Nonetheless, this incident leaves us concerned. Despite the well known legal rules governing prosecutorial argumentation, we have, particularly of late, witnessed a growing number of similar instances of misconduct. Indeed, it seems that judicial decisions holding particular conduct improper but harmless have had but little effect on prosecutorial misbehavior. It may be that the day is near when reversal instead of admonition may become a necessary prophylactic tool to insure that prosecutorial arguments hew to the law.
This Motion for New Trial has presented several issues.
Primarily, Bell contends that he was precluded from presenting favorable testimony of major import from two former co-defendants because they were prevented from testifying by a commitment exacted by the prosecutor as part of the plea bargain at the time their guilty pleas were taken by another Judge. A full hearing was held on this issue.
Whenever minor defendants are severed by a plea bargain, the prosecutor considers taking steps to minimize the possibility that once the bargain is consummated the severed defendants will seek to exonerate the remaining defendant by false or incomplete testimony. It is the practice in this jurisdiction for the prosecutor to tie the pleading severed defendant to key facts either by a detailed account at allocution or by taking a signed statement for later impeachment use if necessary. Although Bell was considered by the prosecutor to be a major narcotic violator, the prosecutor in this instance failed to take statements from the minor defendants who pled guilty and the facts developed at allocution did not implicate Bell in any detail.
During the plea negotiations, however, the defendants who were each close friends of Bell and assisted by him financially wanted assurance that if they pled guilty they would not be called by the Government to testify against Bell. This assurance was given and recorded in open court before the Judge who took the pleas. So much is undisputed. The proof was in sharp conflict, however, as to whether an agreement barring the pleading defendants from testifying, if called by Bell, was also exacted. Both defendants and one of their attorneys say this is what in effect occurred while the prosecutor denies that such was the case. The prosecutor who arranged the pleas left for private practice before Bell's trial and turned his file over to his successor. The U.S. Attorney's jacket contains no indication of any such arrangement. This prosecutor, moreover, denied that any such commitment was exacted as part of the pleas.
Both defendants are unworthy of credence. Their testimony at the hearing was at variance with their affidavits in support of the motion, their comprehension was limited, and their motive to falsify is apparent. The Court concludes that the prosecutor and counsel spoke loosely of preventing testimony on Bell's behalf by the pleading defendants but that the objective was only to set up a basis to impeach if they should appear, not to foreclose appearance as defense witnesses if called at Bell's trial. The Judge taking the pleas was not advised of such an understanding and the plain fact of the matter is that the prosecutor failed to take the proper precautions to foreclose testimony by obtaining a full statement at allocution or otherwise. Either defendant who pled guilty could have freely testified.
Bell's retained counsel, a seasoned and respected practitioner in this Court, testified that after interviewing the co-defendants at least twice in Bell's presence he decided long before the plea bargain that they would be of no use to Bell, that their testimony would not be helpful; that Bell fully agreed with this decision; that Bell never asked to have either co-defendant called as a witness, either before or during trial; and that, as counsel, he knew of no aspect of the pleas that foreclosed calling them or either of them at any time if he decided this was desirable. The attorney for one of the defendants, who believed an arrangement against testifying had been made, also felt his client could not help either his own or Bell's case. Bell gave some general contrary testimony, but the jury at the trial rejected his explanations and excuses and the Court also considers his testimony unworthy of belief.
Bell was not party to any of these dealings. Both defendants who pled guilty were incarcerated in the District of Columbia area, available throughout Bell's trial and could have been brought forward at any time to testify. No objection could have been made to such testimony if it had been offered. It goes without saying that a prosecutor cannot by plea bargain or otherwise prevent a witness from appearing and testifying for the defense. Any understanding of this kind would be wholly improper and no member of the Bar should condone or participate in such an arrangement.
Although a substantial period elapsed between the pleas and Bell's trial, it is significant that Bell, who was on bond, made no effort to communicate with the other defendants about possible testimony after he and his lawyer rejected them as undesirable witnesses and neither of them communicated with him. The failure to call the former co-defendants was solely the result of the informed tactical decision of experienced retained counsel made after consultation with his client. The claims of inadequate assistance of counsel and conflict of interest are without any support in the record.
The Motion for New Trial also claims that favorable defense evidence, a photograph, was withheld and that a police officer who testified against Bell was shown by later developments to be prejudiced. These claims lack substance. It is not established that any colored photograph was ever taken of Bell. Nor did defendant request its production during trial. As for the claim of the police officer's prejudice, it appears that the police officer claims to have received postcards purporting to come from Bell in the Bahamas and that Bell says he never was in Bimini and never sent the postcards. Bell apparently implied to counsel he owned property in the Caribbean. All of this came up post-trial at a bond hearing and is insufficient to undermine the officer's credibility or to constitute newly discovered evidence.
The Motion for New Trial is in all respects denied.
Later, Officer Miller was informed that the drug-peddling operation had been moved to Fisherman's Wharf. The officer testified that on numerous occasions he observed Bell, Cardwell and Davis on the wharf exchanging tinfoil packets for money. See note 61, infra.
Q. Now, what happened when you were talking to Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Davis? What were they doing?
A. Fishing and clowning around.
Q. Were they selling any narcotics down there?
A. I have never seen any of them.
Q. Have you ever seen narcotics before?
A. Not, I would say, actually close right down-- right to look at it. I have seen it on television and I have heard it described.
Q. And, this trial is the first time where you have got a chance to see real live narcotics, isn't it?
A. I haven't seen it in the trial. I have just seen it from a distance. I couldn't verify it was narcotics. That is only what they told me.
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief. Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility.
Id. at 65, 74 S.Ct. at 356. See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); id. at 226-228, 91 S.Ct. 643 (dissenting opinion).
an affidavit on behalf of the Government avowed that the informant maintained a valuable informing role in ongoing drug investigations which disclosure of his identity would destroy. See text infra following note 82. That, we believe, all the more brought the privilege into play.
on numerous occasions Mr. Bell, Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Davis were observed by me exchanging tinfoils on numerous occasions and receiving an unknown amount of money on numerous occasions.
Cochran v. United States, 291 F.2d 633, 636-637 (8th Cir. 1961); Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99, 100-101 (9th Cir. 1962).
new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Gaither, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 236, 440 F.2d 262, 264 (1971); United States v. Alexander, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 163, 165, 430 F.2d 904, 906 (1970); Smith v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 30, 283 F.2d 607, 609 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 938, 81 S.Ct. 387, 5 L.Ed.2d 369 (1961); Wilkins v. United States, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 67, 228 F.2d 37, 38 (1956); Murphy v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 118, 198 F.2d 87 (1952).
Bell also contends that the sentence imposed upon the narcotic counts were illegal because the sentencing judge should have utilized the more lenient provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.L.No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq. (1970). This argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 93 S.Ct. 1151, 35 L.Ed.2d 528 (1973).

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