Source: http://blog.hiplegal.com/tag/law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:22:47+00:00

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In Exelixis, Inc. v. Kappos in the Eastern District of Virginia, Judge Ellis stated that the USPTO’s interpretation of the patent term extension for length of pendency is incorrect.
The Patent Office has interpreted this to mean that an RCE ends the term adjustment for delay by the Patent Office under Section B, regardless of when that RCE was filed.
The plain and unambiguous language of subparagraph (B) requires that the time devoted to an RCE tolls the running of the three year clock if the RCE is filed within the three year period. And, put simply, RCE’s have no impact on PTA if filed after the three year deadline has passed.
Though this decision may be appealed, it is significant. Exelixis got a 114 day additional term for its patent. Many other long-pending patents would likely receive equally large if not larger adjustments.
Patent owners can request a recalculation of the PTO’s Patent Term Extension for two months after a patent issues. The Request must be filed as described in MPEP 2735.
Therefore, my recommendation is that you review all patents that have issued in the last two months, and calculate the new patent term adjustment. For older patents, you have up to six months to appeal the determination to the District Court, so if you have a key patent that may get a few more years validity, this path may be an available option.
The new simple term extension calculation is as follows. First, determine whether your patent was pending for more than three years. If so, check whether an RCE was filed within the three years. If no RCE was filed in the first three years, then your patent term adjustment should be a day-for-day adjustment from the expiration of the three year period, until your patent actually issued.
I will update this post if an appeal is filed.
The Second Circuit said, RATES TECHNOLOGY INC v. SPEAKEASY INC and others, Tuesday that patent licensing agreements reached before litigation cannot be used to bar a licensee from later challenging the validity of a patent, even if the deal is called a legal settlement. The court held that such an agreement, signed after accusations of infringement but before litigation, is void for public policy reasons under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
Rates Technology Inc. (RTI) notified Speakeasy that it believed Speakeasy was infringing its patents and offered to release Speakeasy from liability in exchange for a one-time payment. It used a standard tiered pricing structure based on the size of the accused infringer measured by its annual sales. RTI and Speakeasy entered into a Covenant Not to Sue, with a one-time payment of $475,000. In addition to acknowledging the validity of the patents in question, and agreeing not to challenge their validity, the Convenant also included a liquidated damages clause, which said that Speakeasy would pay $12M if they assisted in any such challenge.
Subsequently, Speakeasy, then owned by Best Buy, was somehow affiliated with Covad. When RTI asked Covad to license those same patents, Covad filed a Declaratory Judgment action. RTI countersued, for violation of the Convenant not to Sue based on an allegation that Speakeasy and Best Buy assisted Covad in filing the DJ action.
The court noted that consent decrees, agreed to after the commencement of litigation, would estop future challenges to a patent’s validity. Furthermore, they approvingly cite Flex–Foot, Inc. v. CRP in which the Federal Circuit held that a settlement, even without the entry of a consent decree, would likely not violate public policy.
Weighing for not holding the clause enforceable was that “neither side filed a lawsuit, and thus Speakeasy never had the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the validity of RTI’s patent.” The court noted that this meant that the defendant did not have a full opportunity to assess the validity of the patent, and there is no evidence that they had a genuine dispute.
As RTI argued, this may lead to more “sham litigation” in which a patent holding company files a lawsuit, prior to allowing a consent decree/settlement agreement, to ensure that its questionable patents’ validity not be challenged. Given the enormous cost of patent litigation, defendants will have the incentive to settle, with a consent decree, to avoid the costs of litigation. Whether or not a settlement filed prior to discovery will be sufficient to block later validity challenges remains an open question.
In an attempt to make the late submission of IDSes less costly, the Patent Office is instituting a pilot program to extend the ability to submit an Information Disclosure Statement under 37 C.F.R. 1.97(d) to after the payment of the issue fee. The pilot program starts on Wednesday, March 16, 2012, and is slated to end September 30, 2012. However, the process is somewhat complex, and unlikely to be much used.
The Patent Office issued a Press Release, and published the Federal Register Notice that includes all the rules.
That no item of information contained in the information disclosure statement was cited in a communication from a foreign patent office in a counterpart foreign application, and, to the knowledge of the person signing the certification after making reasonable inquiry, no item of information contained in the information disclosure statement was known to any individual designated in § 1.56(c) more than three months prior to the filing of the information disclosure statement.
The Examiner will, upon review of the IDS, determine whether prosecution needs to be reopened. If so, the RCE will be entered, and prosecution will be reopened. However, the IDS fee will not be refunded.
If the Examiner determines that the IDS does not raise new issues, the Examiner will issue a Corrected Notice of Allowability, indicating that the IDS has been considered. The RCE fee will be refunded. There will be no need to respond to the corrected Notice of Allowability, the case will automatically progress to issue.
So the new policy effectively requires exactly the same process as you would use now, upon receiving a late reference, except that the Patent Office will treat the RCE request as conditional, and will refund the RCE fee if they determine that the references do not raise new issues.
As a general policy, we do not recommend the use of declarations under 1.97(e)(2) because it requires “reasonable inquiry” that no one associated with the case was aware of any of the references. There is a real risk that someone, maybe an inventor who is no longer with the assignee, was aware of a reference. However, a declaration under 1.97(e)(1) only requires is a reference from a foreign patent office in a computerpart foreign application. Unfortunately, that does not include related patent applications, whether U.S. or foreign, only references from foreign counterpart applications.
There are two potential advantages to this procedure. First, there is the savings of the RCE fee, a savings of between $750 and $285, since the IDS fee is now required). Second, any such submission will be placed on the examiner’s “expedited” stack. Currently the wait for RCE responses has been increasing drastically, due to the pressure on Examiners to reduce wait time for the first office action. Thus, being on the expedited stack may be a significant time advantage. Despite these advantages I don’t think this procedure will significantly change existing practice, or help with the excessive RCEs.
I will update this post after the hearing, or potentially during the hearing if network is accessible. I expect that my opinions will not get much traction, since the Patent Office isn’t a big fan of small inventors, but I do intend to express my dislike of the huge increases in RCE fees & Appeal fees.
I would much rather have the fees shifted to either larger patents (e.g. patent size fees increased by a lot more) or shifted to maintenance fees. If you have opinions about the fees, and want to have input, attend a hearing, or write to the Patent Office. Let your voice be heard.
The first challenge to the America Invents Act is against the termination of the private right to enforce false marking. The end to false marking, providing that the only private litigants with a claim are competitors who can show actual harm, became effective immediately after President Obama signed the America Invents Act. It applied to all cases, including those pending. Since then, numerous cases have been dismissed, including some sua sponte.
Ken Brooks had a pending case against Dunlop Manufacturing, in the Northern District of California, San Francisco for false marking, filed back in 2010. In response to Dunlop’s Motion to Dismiss, under the new America Invents Act rules, Mr. Brooks brings a constitutional challenge to the AIA. In his memorandum Mr. Brooks states that he relied upon the statutory right which existed prior to the passage of the AIA, and that this destroyed an existing property interest. He cites to U.S. ex re. Stevens v. State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (162 F.3d 195, 2nd Circuit 1998) which held that qui tam plaintiffs have a private property interest in the outcome of such cases.
While the brief is written rather flamboyantly, and likely to appeal to lay readers not the judge, the point is interesting. Mr. Brooks did in fact invest some amount of money in pursuing this case, in the clear expectation of recovery, if he could prove a violation of the false marking act.
Of course, the Supreme Court held unanimously in the United States v. Carlton that retroactive tax laws were constitutional, thus making it unlikely that Brooks would succeed in his claim.
Furthermore, there are at least two cases that held that qui tam actions for false marking are unconstitutional, prior to the passage of the America Invents Act. This may mean that the court would find the act a mere clarification of an existing standard.
The more interesting question is whether, if any challenge is successful, the entire statute would be thrown out, since the America Invents Act does not include a severability clause.
Via Greg Aharonian‘s eponymous newsletter.
I’m trying to figure out corner cases under the new America Invents Act rules. In most cases, people won’t be directly affected by the rule change, but I can see the below four scenarios coming up.
• Scenario #1: Inventor A invents and immediately discloses (by publishing in obscure journal). Inventor B invents, and files a patent application, but does not disclose. Inventor A files a patent application, after Inventor B. Who if anyone gets a patent?
• Scenario #2: If Inventor A and Inventor B both disclose at the same conference. Both then file a patent, Inventor A files before Inventor B. Who if anyone gets a patent?
• Scenario #3: Inventor A discloses X. Inventor B files a patent for X+Y. Subsequently, Inventor A files a patent for X+Y. Who, if anyone, gets a patent, on X, Y, and X+Y.
• Scenario #4: Inventor A has a non-enabling disclosure. A third party C publishes an enabling disclosure. Inventor B files a patent on the invention. Subsequently, Inventor A files a patent. (Timing is A disclosure, C publication, B filing, A filing). Who, if anyone, can get a patent?
I’ve pulled together a list of each change, and categorized it in terms of timing. I highlighted those items that will likely change the way we practice.
If you see any mistakes, or items missing, please let me know so I can correct it.
Vostu’s purpose, according to Zynga is to copy literally every feature of every Zynga game.
Zynga sued Vostu in District Court in California, on June 16th.
Then, they filed another lawsuit on August 2nd in Brazil, Vostu’s home country. The Brazilian judge granted an injunction quickly, telling Vostu it had to shut down its games within 48 hours.
So, while Zynga won a round in Brazil, their decision to file the case initially in the U.S. prevents them from enforcing the Brazilian court’s decision.
Lesson learned: Choose your jurisdiction carefully. Especially when looking for an injunction, consider finding a fast jurisdiction, and filing there first. U.S. judges will not look kindly upon a later suit impacting their jurisdiction.

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