Source: http://brokenchains.us/tdcj/TDCJ-Guidelines/discipline.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:46:11+00:00

Document:
DISCIPLINE All offenders are required to obey the rules established by TDCJ and by the unit to which they are assigned. Offenders receive information concerning rules soon after they arrive.
Depending on the degree of seriousness, violations of rules may be handled informally by counseling and verbal reprimand, or formally through disciplinary hearings.
(except for state jail offenders, who earn no good conduct time).
A state jail offender involved in a disciplinary hearing may receive any penalty categorized as minor, or as major for the state jails. However, a state jail offender may be provided with a major hearing if assessment of monetary damages is imposed due to destruction of state property. Disciplinary hearings for offenders sentenced to prison, but assigned in transfer status to a state jail, shall be conducted in accordance with the grade assigned to the disciplinary report and under the applicable minor or major hearing procedure.
Trained personnel, called counsel substitutes, are assigned to units to represent offenders at major hearings who are charged with disciplinary violations. Offenders shall be provided with counsel substitutes prior to a major hearing when the following requirements are met.
f. When a witness requested by the accused offender is unable to attend a disciplinary hearing because the requested witness or the accused offender has been transferred to another unit.
The TDCJ's internal prison disciplinary system is a "farce".
a prison guard writes up a disciplinary case against a prisoner.
The prisoner receives notice of the charges from his "counsel substitute.
"A "counsel substitute" is a TDCJ employee (not a lawyer) who "represents" the prisoner at the disciplinary hearing.
At the hearing, another TDCJ employee acts as the judge ("disciplinary hearing officer").
His job is to find the prisoner guilty (regardless of whether he is in fact guilty), and then assess "an appropriate sanction."
Sanctions range from commissary, recreation and cell restriction, to solitary confinement, to the loss of good time, to reductions in line class.
The entire process is arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair.
As a result, many prisoners want to sue for redress for being wrongfully and/or falsely charged and convicted in a disciplinary proceeding, or for losing good time or line class as a disciplinary sanction.
Unfortunately, based on the state of the law, very few prisoners have standing to actually bring suit in court to have a disciplinary conviction overturned.
The proper vehicle to challenge a prison disciplinary conviction and sanction is a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. �54 [FN 1] and not a civil right claims under 42 U.S.C. �83.
If a prisoner files a 42 U.S.C. �83 suit to challenge a disciplinary charge and conviction, the case will be dismissed pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck a prisoner sued state prosecutors and police officials for false arrest and destroying evidence resulting in his conviction.
The Supreme Court held that a prisoner cannot maintain a civil rights action for damages based on the legality of a prior criminal proceeding unless a state court or federal habeas court has determined that the terms of confinement are in fact invalid.
If a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence, then the claim is barred unless it has been reversed or declared invalid.
see also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 531 U.S. 959 (2000).
The Heck bar applies to challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings, challenges to parole proceedings, and claims for declaratory relief.
See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (declaratory relief); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (parole proceedings); Clarke v. Stadler, 154 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1998) (prison disciplinary proceedings).
The only exception to the Heck bar to a �83 challenge to a prison disciplinary case is if the prisoner alleges that the disciplinary case was written as retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.
In such retaliation cases, Heck is not a bar to a �83 suit and the prisoner is not required to demonstrate a favorable outcome of the disciplinary case.
See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164-66 (5th Cir. 1995); Lynn v. Cockrell, et. al., No. 03-51013 (5th Cir. Jan. 29, 2004).
In order to having standing to file a writ under �54, the sanction must have affected a property or liberty interest.
Prisoners can seek to recover good time credits lost in a prison disciplinary proceeding through a writ of habeas corpus only if the prisoner had a vested liberty interest in the lost good-time credits.
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 500 (1973); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that federal habeas relief cannot be had absent the allegation that the prisoner has been deprived of some right secured to him by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States).
In Texas, only prisoners who are eligible for release on mandatory supervision under the mandatory supervision law in effect prior to September 1, 1996 have a vested interest in their accumulated good time credits.
This means that only prisoners who are eligible for release on mandatory supervision (before it became discretionary mandatory supervision), have standing to file a writ to challenge a disciplinary case and sanction.
When a prisoner is eligible for mandatory supervised release, and when prison disciplinary proceedings result in a change in good-time earning status that extends the prisoner's release date, the prisoner's petition challenging such proceedings falls within �54.
See Kimbrell v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d. 361 (5th Cir. 2002), citing Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000); Malchi v. Thaler , 211 F.3d 953, 956 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that Texas prisoners eligible for mandatory release who allege that they were erroneously denied good-time credit that, if restored, would effect sooner release from prison may seek relief under 28 U.S.C. � 2254); Story v. Collins, 920 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir. 1991).
These decisions rest ultimately on the Supreme Court's holding in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) that authorized �54 as the sole remedy for a prisoner's challenge to revocation of good-time credits. Kimbrell, 311 F.3d at 362.
As a general rule, only sanctions which result in loss of good conduct time credits for prisoners who are eligible for release on mandatory supervision, or which otherwise directly and adversely affect release on mandatory supervision will implicate a liberty interest.
See Spicer v. Collins, 9 F.Supp.2d 673, 685 (E.D. Tex. 1998), citing Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-33 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1059 (1996).
There is also no constitutional expectancy to parole in Texas, because it is entirely speculative whether a prisoner will be released on parole.
Madison, 104 F.3d at 768; Malchi v. Thaler , 211 F. 3d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 2000).
Therefore, if the prisoner lost good time during a prison disciplinary hearing, and the loss adversely affected his parole eligibility date, or his actual parole date, but not his mandatory mandatory date, he does not have a federal writ remedy because there is no constitutional expectancy of release on parole.
Prisoners do have a property interest in the money in their Inmate Trust Fund accounts, but do not have a property interest in the interest on the funds.
See Hatfield v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2002); Brewer v. Collins, 857 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App. [1st Dist], 1993).
Prisoners serving life sentences are not eligible for mandatory supervision under the old or current law.
See Arnold v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2002); Ex parte Franks, 71 S.W.3d 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).
a felony for which the punishment is increased under Section 481.134 (drug free zone) or Section 481.140, Health and Safety Code (use of a child in commission of offense).
See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. �8.149 (Vernon 2002).
If the prisoner was convicted of any of the foregoing offenses, he is ineligible for release on mandatory mandatory (or discretionary mandatory supervision for that matter), so he does not have a vested liberty interest in his good time.
Therefore, even if he lost good time as a disciplinary sanction, because it will not adversely impact his mandatory mandatory release date, he does not have standing to challenge the disciplinary sanction via a writ of habeas corpus.
If the prisoner is only eligible for discretionary mandatory supervision under the current statute, and is not eligible for mandatory mandatory supervision under the old (pre-1996) statute, then a sanction of lost good time does not affect a vested liberty interest and he will not have a legal remedy.
When determining whether the prisoner falls under the old statute, or the current statute, look to the date of the first element of his offense of conviction.
That date is the governing date.
If he committed the first element of his instant offense before September 1, 1996, he falls under the pre-1996 mandatory supervision statute (mandatory mandatory).
If he committed the first element of his instant offense on or after September 1,1996, he falls under the current mandatory supervision statute (discretionary mandatory).
If the prisoner falls under the old (pre-1996) statute, and is mandatory mandatory, then he has a constitutional expectancy of early release and a vested liberty interest in his mandatory date.
This means that if he lost good time in a prison disciplinary hearing, and the loss adversely affected his mandatory supervision date, he can challenge the disciplinary case in federal court via a federal writ of habeas corpus.
If the prisoner falls under the current mandatory supervision statute (effective for offenses occurring on or after September 1, 1996), and he is discretionary mandatory, then he does not have a constitutional expectancy of early release or a vested liberty interest in his mandatory date.
This means that even if he lost good time in a prison disciplinary hearing, and the loss adversely affected his mandatory supervision date, he cannot challenge the disciplinary in federal court because he does not have a constitutional expectancy of release under the current mandatory supervision statute.
For a prisoner to maintain an action under �54, he must first exhaust state habeas remedies.
See Serio v. Members of the Louisiana State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987) ("If a prisoner challenges a single hearing as constitutionally defective, he must first exhaust state habeas remedies.").
Texas courts do not hear cases challenging prison disciplinary cases.
Therefore, state remedies for purposes of � 2254(b) are exhausted when the prisoner pursues the TDCJ's internal grievance procedures.
Spaulding v. Collins, 867 F. Supp. 499, 502 (S.D. Tex. 1993) ("Because this case involves a prison disciplinary action, it is not reviewable by state courts and is properly brought by federal habeas corpus petition to this court" after exhaustion of the TDCJ grievance procedure); see also Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085 (1981); Lerma v. Estelle, 585 F.2d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979); Ex parte Brager, 704 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (holding that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals will not entertain state habeas actions challenging violations of prison disciplinary procedures).
The deadline for filing a writ to challenge is prison disciplinary case is one year.
The limitations period for filing a habeas petition challenging loss of good-time credit as result of disciplinary action is equitably tolled during the pendency of the prisoner's administrative appeals through the prison grievance process.
Foley v. Cockrell, 222 F.Supp 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Tex. 2002) ("Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations until the date that he completed the TDCJ administrative review process.").
In June 2003, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an inadequate prison law library may constitute a state created impediment that would toll the limitations period on filing a federal writ.
See Egerton v. Cockrell, 334 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2003) ("We conclude that an inadequate prison law library may constitute a state created impediment that would toll the AEDPA's one-year limitations period pursuant to Ё 2244(d)(1)(B)").
If a prisoner files a federal writ of habeas corpus to challenge a disciplinary sanction, he must file it in either the federal district court of his state conviction or the federal district court in which he is confined at the time he files suit.
Jurisdiction is not always proper in the federal district court in which the disciplinary action occurred. See Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959 (5th Cir 2000).
Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution; therefore, the full panoply of rights to which a defendant is entitled in criminal proceedings does not apply to a prisoner-defendant in a prison disciplinary case.
See Broussard v. Johnson, 253 F.3d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 2001) citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, (1974).
- The prisoner should be given the right to confront and cross-examine [FN 3] adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.
See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 559; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
The right to attend a disciplinary hearing is an essential due process protection, but it is not absolute or guaranteed.
See Battle v. Barton, 970 F.2d 779, 782 (11th Cir. 1992); Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1989) (if a prisoner, through no fault of prison officials, is unable to attend a disciplinary hearing, due process requires nothing more than that the hearing be held in accordance with all of the other requirements of due process that are called for under the circumstances).
When reviewing a writ challenging a prison disciplinary conviction, the federal court does not retry the prison disciplinary charge.
Rather, the Court looks only to whether there was any evidence to support the disciplinary charge and conviction. See Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 545 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 455 U.S. 992 (1982) (stating "federal courts cannot retry every prison disciplinary dispute;" and that courts may act only where "arbitrary or capricious action is shown.") this means that the federal court does not need to examine the entire record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence.
Because federal courts cannot make independent determinations or weigh the evidence, the only relevant question is whether there was any evidence in the record to support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.
See Ramirez v. Dretke, No. 03-40740 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2004) citing Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985).
This means that prison disciplinary proceedings will be overturned only where there is no evidence whatsoever to support the decision of the prison officials. Smith, 659 F.2d at 545; Reeves v. Pettcox, 19 F.3d 1060 (5th Cir. 1994).
Sufficient support for a finding of guilt is provided by "some facts" or "any evidence at all."
Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986); Hudson v. Johnson , 242 F.3d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 2001) (officer's report standing alone provides some evidence of guilt).
A disciplinary hearing officer's decision will satisfy the due process requirements if there is "some evidence" in the record to support the decision.
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
A prison guard's testimony also constitutes "some evidence."
To challenge problems for which there is no court remedy, the prisoner must use the TDCJ's grievance procedure and file a Step 1 grievance (also called a Step 1 appeal).
When the Step 1 grievance/appeal is denied (not if, but when), he must file a Step 2 grievance (also called a Step 2 appeal).
For a detailed description of the TDCJ's grievance procedure, see Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998).
No matter how meritorious a prisoner's claim, the TDCJ will deny the Step 1 and Step 2 grievances the majority of the time.
Regardless of what the TDCJ may state publicly, its unwavering position in administrative matters is that (1) its employees never lie; and (2) prisoners always lie.
The TDCJ gives absolutely no weight to a prisoner's word.
Because most allegations come down to a prisoner's word versus a guard's word, the prisoner will always lose.
Nonetheless, there are two reasons it is important that prisoners use the grievance procedure.
First, for issues that can be taken to court, the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code (Inmate Litigation) require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Second, and equally important, when prisoners file grievances, the complaints are recorded and copies of the grievances are placed in their classification files for future reference.
This paper trail can help the prisoner in future individual or class litigation.
A disciplinary hearing officer is required to make an independent evaluation of the credibility and reliability of a confidential informant and his information.
The evaluation must be in a fashion "that fulfills the principles of due process."
The disciplinary hearing officer may not simply accept and rely on the investigating officer's conclusions of credibility and reliability without making an independent inquiry.
An inmate should not be held responsible for contraband found in an area to which he merely has access unless there is other evidence linking him to the contraband.
Mere access or mere presence linking prisoner to contraband is insufficient to constitute "some evidence"
Affirming district court decision that mere fact that bolt cutters were found in an area in which an inmate worked, but to which approximately one hundred inmates had access, was insufficient to satisfy the due process requirement of "some evidence" to support disciplinary charge of possession of contraband intended for use in an escape.
Reversing trial court judgment in favor of prisoner-plaintiff.
The prisoner filed a writ challenging his disciplinary conviction for aiding and abetting an attempt to escape.
The Court held that the prison guard's testimony that the prisoner confessed to stealing, possessing and selling contraband, while not overwhelming evidence, was "some evidence" sufficient to sustain the disciplinary conviction.
FN 1 In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that to recover damages in a 42 U.S.C. � 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by federal court?s issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
Clarke v. Stadler, 154 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1998) (prison disciplinary proceedings).
FN 2 There are several statutes that provide for the seizure, forfeiture or garnishment of ITF funds.
See Tex. Code of Crim. Procedure �.22, Tex. Gov't Code �1.014, Tex. Gov't Code �0.002, Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code �.007.
FN 3 The Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners do not have a due process right to confrontation or cross-examination during prison disciplinary proceedings.
Id. "Thus, the prisoner's right to call witnesses and present evidence in disciplinary hearings can be denied if granting the request would be 'unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.'"
Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985) quoting Wolff , 418 U.S. at 566.
However, due process does require, at a minimum, that there be "some evidence" in the record to support the disciplinary decision. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.