Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50157:gr-170583-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:16:57+00:00

Document:
ERNESTO M. FULLERO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,1 petitioner Ernesto M. Fullero seeks to set aside the Decision2 dated 19 October 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, affirming in toto the Decision3 dated 9 October 2003 of the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 7712, finding petitioner guilty of falsification of public document as defined and penalized in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
That sometime in 1988, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud, being then the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga City Telecommunication's Office, while acting in said capacity and taking advantage of his official function, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or caused to be falsified a genuine public document, that is when he prepared his CSC 212 (Personal Data Sheet) for submission to Bureau of Telecommunication Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, he made it appear that he passed the Civil Engineering Board Examinations given by Professional Regulation Commission on May 30 and 31, 1985 with a rating of 75.8%; however, upon verification issued by PRC, said accused took the examination in May 1984 and another one [in] May, 1985 with general ratings of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively.
When arraigned on 5 January 1998, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioner denied executing and submitting the subject PDS containing the statement that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He claimed that the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine signature.11 He added that the letters contained in the PDS he accomplished and submitted were typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have small letters. As such, the subject PDS could not be his because it had both small and capital typewritten letters.
In sum, the Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established all the elements of the offense of falsification of a public document and that the trial court correctly rendered a judgment of conviction against appellant.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT, EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED FILLED UP THE PERSONAL DATA SHEET (PDS) INCLUDING THE STATEMENT THAT HE IS A LICENSED ENGINEER, ACCUSED WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO STATE SAID DATA AND NO CRIMINAL INTENT WAS SHOWN.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF IRIGA CITY, WHERE THE ALLEGED PERSONAL DATA SHEET WAS ACCOMPLISHED NOT IN THE RTC OF LEGAZPI CITY.
In establishing its charge of falsification against petitioner, the prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: Magistrado, Joaquin C. Atayza (Atayza), Romeo Brizo (Brizo), Emma Francisco (Francisco) and Edith C. Avenir (Avenir).
On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as its sole witness. No documentary evidence was proffered.
Petitioner interposed denials and alibi to support his contentions. Petitioner denied that he executed and submitted the subject PDS containing the statement that he passed the board examinations for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He averred that the PDS he accomplished and submitted was typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have small letters; thus, the subject PDS could not be his since the letters were typewritten in small and capital letters; that the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine signature; that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case against him since he issued a memorandum against her for the latter's misbehavior in the BTO, Iriga City; that he is not a licensed civil engineer; and that he accomplished a different PDS in the BTO, Iriga City.
The initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between the prosecution and defense is credible.
Although none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the petitioner falsifying the PDS, they, nonetheless, testified that that they are very familiar with the petitioner's handwriting and signature. Magistrado testified that, being a subordinate of petitioner, she is very familiar with petitioner's signature and actually witnessed petitioner affixing his signature on her daily time records for September 1987 to May 1988.37 Brizo testified that he is also familiar with petitioner's signature because he personally knows petitioner and that he regularly received petitioner's daily time records and other documents bearing petitioner's signature.38 Both Magistrado and Brizo opined that the signature in the PDS belongs to petitioner.
The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Magistrado and Brizo as trustworthy and believable.
In absolute disparity, the evidence for the defense is comprised of denials. Petitioner denied having accomplished and signed the PDS. He tried to impart that someone else had filled it up. However, aside from this self-serving and negative claim, he did not adduce any convincing proof to effectively refute the evidence for the prosecution.
The subsequent matter to be determined is whether the elements of falsification for which petitioner is charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
All of the foregoing elements of falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, have been sufficiently established.
First, petitioner was a public officer, being then the Acting Chief Operator of the BTO, Iriga City, when he accomplished and submitted his PDS on 4 January 1988 at the BTO, Legazpi City. It is settled that a PDS is a public document.46 He stated under Item No. 18 of his PDS that he passed the civil engineering board examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%. Thereafter, petitioner submitted his PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City.
Finally, as a public officer, petitioner is duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS pursuant to the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.51 Were it not for his position and employment in the government, he could not have accomplished the PDS. In People v. Uy,52 Santiago Uy, a field agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, was charged with falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for making false statements in his Personal Information Sheet. We ruled therein: "[T]hat the defendant (Santiago Uy) took advantage of his position may be gathered from the fact that he himself filled the information sheet which obviously was to be submitted by each and every officer or employee of the NBI." In the same vein, petitioner also had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS at the time he made a false statement therein that he is a licensed civil engineer. Hence, it is clear that petitioner took advantage of his position as Acting Chief Operator of BTO, Iriga City when he falsified his PDS.
Anent the second issue, petitioner posited that being a licensed civil engineer is not a qualification for him to hold office and such is not a requirement for his promotion; that the false statement caused no prejudice to any private person as he did not have any competitor in his position nor was the government damaged by such false statement; that the false statement would not in any way redound to his benefit and, as such, no criminal intent could have impelled him to make such false claim; and that no evidence was produced showing that he had intent to cause injury.
The fact that the petitioner's false statement in the PDS did not redound to his benefit, and that the government or any private individual was not thereby prejudiced, is inconsequential. What is clear and decisive in this case is that petitioner made an entry in his PDS that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering despite his full awareness that such is not true.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.57 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Exhibit A, or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila.60 Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence.
Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, explicitly provides that a transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit G, which is the alleged letter of petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit I, which is the machine copy of a certification allegedly issued by the PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and which was allegedly submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, as his credential in applying for the aforesaid positions, are certified true copies of their original documents recorded or kept in the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City63 and, thus, admissible to prove the contents of their originals.
Exhibits J to R, which are the daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner and which were offered to compare petitioner's alleged signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are admissible in evidence since they are relevant and material to the charge of falsification against petitioner. The signatures of petitioner in the said exhibits, the authenticity of which were not denied by petitioner, were presented to prove that these signatures were similar to petitioner's signature in the PDS where he made the alleged falsification.
The Legazpi City RTC was, therefore, not obliged to put a handwriting expert on the witness stand and direct the latter to examine petitioner's signatures in the foregoing exhibits before ruling on their admissibility. It can, as it did, rely on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are familiar with petitioner's handwriting/signature in determining the admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. It can, by itself, also compare petitioner's signature in the PDS with the petitioner's signatures in the subject exhibits with or without the aid of an expert witness and thereafter rule on the admissibility of such exhibits based on its own observation. In short, it can exercise independent judgment as regards the admissibility of said exhibits.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the offense or the subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. And third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.67 There is no dispute that the Legazpi City RTC has jurisdiction over the offense and over the person of petitioner. It is the territorial jurisdiction of the Legazpi City RTC which the petitioner impugns.
In the case at bar, the information specifically and positively alleges that the falsification was committed in Legazpi City. Moreover, as heretofore discussed, the testimonies and documentary evidence for the prosecution have sufficiently established that petitioner accomplished and thereafter submitted the PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City. The foregoing circumstances clearly placed the locus criminis in Legazpi City and not in Iriga City.
We find no reason to disturb the prison term and fine imposed on petitioner by the Legazpi City RTC and the Court of Appeals, as they are in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 19 October 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Nachura, JJ., concur.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring; rollo, pp. 24-35.
3 Penned by Presiding Judge Vladimir B. Brusola; rollo, pp. 36-42.
6 TSN, 17 September 2002, p. 4.
8 TSN, 30 March 1998, p. 14.
10 TSN, 30 March 1998, pp. 21-24.
11 TSN, 17 September 2002, pp. 4-6.
17 TSN, 30 March 1998, pp. 18-24.
20 TSN, 1 March 2002, pp. 5-13.
21 TSN, 3 February 2003, pp. 3-10.
22 Exhibit B and its sub-markings, Records, pp. 254-255.
23 Exhibit C, id. at 256.
24 Exhibit E and its sub-markings, id. at 258-260.
25 Exhibit F, id. at 323-360.
26 Exhibit G and its sub-markings, id. at 361.
27 Exhibit F, id. at 362-368.
28 Exhibit I, id. at 367.
29 Exhibits J-R, id. at 370.
30 Exhibits S-V, id. at 371-375.
31 TSN, 17 September 2002, p. 12.
35 People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504, 513; People v. Lagao, Jr., 337 Phil. 497, 510 (1997).
36 Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
37 TSN, 8 May 2003, p. 6.
38 TSN, 30 March 1998, p. 16.
41 People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 642, 661.
43 People v. Comiling, 468 Phil. 869, 890 (2004); Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 465, 483; People v. Gusmo, 467 Phil. 199, 219 (2004).
44 Santos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NOS. 71523-25, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 386, 424.
45 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law (Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998), Book Two, Arts. 114-367, p. 216, citing People v. Uy, 101 Phil. 159, 163 (1957) and United States v. Inosanto, 20 Phil 376, 378 (1911); Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154886, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 460, 478-479.
46 Lumancas v. Intas, G.R. No. 133472, 5 December 2000, 347 SCRA 22, 34.
47 G.R. NOS. 52446-48, 15 May 1980, 97 SCRA 494, 499.
48 People v. Aguila, supra note 41.
49 At the back page of Exhibit C, Records, p. 256.
50 TSN, 17 September 2002, p. 6.
51 People v. Aguila, supra note 41.
53 People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 917 (1955).
54 Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 324, 345.
55 Syquian v. People, G.R. No. 82197, 13 March 1989, 171 SCRA 223, 233.
57 D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 137873, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 253-254.
58 Section 44, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
59 VI Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rules 131-133 (1999 ed.), p. 290, citing Antilon v. Barcelona, 37 Phil. 148, 151 (1917).
61 Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
62 Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
63 Records, p. 361 and p. 367.
64 Bautista v. Castro, G.R. No. 61260, 17 February 1992, 206 SCRA 305, 312.
65 Section 50(b), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
67 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 641, 654 (2002).
68 People v. Olermo, 454 Phil. 147, 164 (2003).

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