Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2013/05
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:05:03+00:00

Document:
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing whether an expert report should be excluded because the expert reviewed the examination for discovery transcripts of the parties prior to authoring the report. In short the answer is no.
 A review of Dr. Sobey’s reports does not give rise to any of the concerns underlying the previous criticism of the practice of allowing experts to review examination for discovery evidence.
 Dr. Sobey was provided with a set of factual assumptions. Those factual assumptions are set out in detail in his report and where further assumptions have been drawn from a review of the documentary evidence those assumptions and their source have been indicated. For instance, at times, Dr. Sobey makes explicit reference to those assumptions and one example can be found at p. 13 of his July 19, 2013 report where in answering question five, he states, “I have been asked to assume that Dr. Omelchenko was available by telephone contact”.
 When read as a whole, Dr. Sobey’s reports leave no doubt as to the factual assumptions underlying his opinion. As such, the case is distinguishable from Sebastian, supra, and the trier of fact is able to properly evaluate and discern whether the factual assumptions have been proven in evidence at trial and what weight should be given to Dr. Sobey’s opinion.
 The plaintiff’s application to have the reports of Dr. Sobey excluded on the basis that he reviewed transcripts from examination for discovery is dismissed.
Can a Liability Admission Reached by Agreement Be Judicially Set Aside?
The BC Court of Appeal had an opportunity to address this issue and the short answer is yes.
In this week’s case (Goundar v. Nguyen) the Plaintiff was injured in a multi-vehicle collision. The Plaintiff sued two motorists and ICBC initially denied fault on behalf of both. As the lawsuit progressed the Defendant’s lawyer ‘inadvertently’ agreed to admit liability on behalf of one Defendant in exchange for a discontinuance against the second Defendant. This deal was agreed to and an amended Response was filed. Subsequently a Court order was obtained setting aside the admission of liability accepting that it was agreed to inadvertently by defence counsel.
 I have already concluded that Rule 7-7(5) applies to withdrawing an admission even if it arose from an agreement, and determined that the agreement in issue in this case does not purport to attempt to oust the application of the Supreme Court Civil Rules and, in particular, the rule governing the withdrawal of an admission made in a pleading. The fact of the agreement and the conduct of the parties relying on it is a factor that can, to the extent necessary, be taken into account in the balancing of prejudice as part of answering the ultimate question whether the interests of justice require permitting the admission to be withdrawn.
 In the result, I am satisfied that the chambers judge adopted the correct test in deciding the issue before her.
 Allowing the withdrawal of an admission is a discretionary matter. Deference is owed to the chambers judge, unless the judge erred in principle in the exercise of her discretion. Here I see no such error. The judge found there to be a triable issue. She concluded that the admission had been made inadvertently. She balanced any prejudice arising from the proposed withdrawal of the admission. She addressed the extent to which a prejudice could be compensated by costs. I would not interfere with the exercise of the chambers judge’s discretion.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, addressing the adequacy of a warning sign in an occupier’s liability lawsuit.
In last week’s case (Simmons v. Yeager Properties Inc.) the Defendant owned a bakery in Chemainus, BC. Outside the bakery was a concrete landing and a wooden patio deck. There was a 2-4 inch height difference between these surfaces. The Defendant marked this with paint and also with a sign that read “watch your step please“. The sign faded over tie with the words ‘watch‘ and ‘step‘ becoming ‘quite faded and difficult to see‘.
 In my opinion, the presence of white paint demarcating the patio step was not a sufficient warning, as the patio step was quite different in nature from the both the front and back stairs, and it was also sloping along its edge so that its height varied from two to four inches. In addition, with a patio table and chairs in front of it, the entire painted edge may not have been visible to customers approaching from the back stairs as the plaintiff did. As the defendants must have considered, it was necessary to specifically alert customers to the presence of this step with warning signs. Here, the warning sign that was most visible to the plaintiff was ineffective due to wear and tear.
 The plaintiff says that the measures taken by the defendants after this incident, which were easily done and inexpensive, show that the previous measures were insufficient to make the premises reasonably safe. As with evidence of prior safe use, evidence of what is done after the fact is also a factor to consider in assessing whether the area at the time of the incident was reasonably safe. After the fact conduct is not an admission of negligence, but it may establish that measures were taken which converted an unsafe area into a reasonably safe one, and it may also establish the ease or difficulty with which a risk may have been avoided: see Cahoon at para. 21; O’Leary v Rupert, 2010 BCSC 240 at paras. 47-48.
 In re-painting the edges of all stairs and the patio step in yellow paint, and replacing the red, black and white warning signs with yellow and black signs, the defendants enhanced the safety of the premises. However, other than replacing the faded warning sign, I do not consider that these changes show the previous measures to have been insufficient to alert customers to the change in level at the patio step.
 I find that the ineffective warning sign is evidence of a prima facie breach of the Occupiers Liability Act. In these circumstances, the defendants may refute the breach by leading evidence that they had put into place a reasonable system of inspection and maintenance that was being followed at the time of the accident: Newsham at para. 131, citing Atkins v. Jim Pattison Industries Ltd. (1998), 61 BCLR (3d) 183; and Davis v Kin’s Farm Market (Lynn Valley), 2010 BCSC 677.
 Ms. Laughlin’s evidence was that the outdoor sign needed to be replaced every six to eight months due to fading. She did not have a record of when she replaced the sign but she was at the bakery almost every day and would prepare a new sign when needed. Given how faded the sign was on the date of this incident, I do not consider her inspection and maintenance to be sufficient. It was obvious that the outdoor sign needed to be replaced.
 Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff has proved on a balance of probabilities that by failing to maintain the outdoor warning sign, the defendants failed to take reasonable care to ensure the exterior area leading to the entrance of the bakery was reasonably safe.
Tags: bc injury law, Madam Justice Fisher, Simmons v. Yeager Properties Inc.
In reinstating a successful damages award, the Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to discuss if and when it is ok for a trial judge to copy a lawyer’s submissions in their reasons for judgement.
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed and reinstated the damages awarded at trial (although differed in who the liable parties were allowing the cross appeals of some of the defendants). In doing so Canada’s highest Court provided the following reasons discussing “the long tradition of judicial copying“.
 This was a complex case involving many issues. The trial judgment, rendered some time after a lengthy trial, consisted of 368 paragraphs. Only 47 were predominantly in the judge’s own words; the balance of 321 paragraphs was copied from the plaintiffs’ submissions. This raises the concern that the trial judge did not put his mind to the issues, the evidence and the law as he was sworn to do, but simply incorporated the plaintiffs’ submissions.
 The concern about copying in the judicial context is not that the judge is taking credit for someone else’s prose, but rather that it may be evidence that the reasons for judgment do not reflect the judge’s thinking. They are not the judge’s reasons, but those of the person whose prose the judge copied. Avoiding this impression is a good reason for discouraging extensive copying. But it is not the copying per se that renders the process of judgment-writing unfair. A judge may copy extensively from the briefs in setting out the facts, the legal principles and the arguments, and still assess all the issues and arguments comprehensively and impartially. No one could reasonably contend that the process has failed in such a case.
 In summary, courts in Canada and elsewhere have held that copying in reasons for judgment is not, in itself, grounds for setting the judge’s decision aside. However, if the incorporation of the material of others would lead a reasonable person apprised of all the relevant facts to conclude that the trial judge has not put his or her mind to the issues and made an independent decision based on the evidence and the law, the presumption of judicial integrity is rebutted and the decision may be set aside.
 This does not negate the fact that, as a general rule, it is good judicial practice for a judge to set out the contending positions of the parties on the facts and the law, and explain in his or her own words her conclusions on the facts and the law. The process of casting reasons for judgment in the judge’s own words helps to ensure that the judge has independently considered the issues and come to grips with them. As the cases illustrate, the importance of this may vary with the nature of the case. In some cases, the issues are so clear that adoption of one party’s submissions or draft order may be uncontroversial. By contrast, in complex cases involving disputed facts and legal principles, the best practice is to discuss the issues, the evidence and the judge’s conclusions in the judge’s own words. The point remains, however, that a judge’s failure to adhere to best practices does not, without more, permit the judge’s decision to be overturned on appeal.
Adding to this site’s archived case summaries of collisions invovling jaywalking pedestrians, two separate cases involving such a collision recently were dismissed at trial by the BC Supreme Court.
 It is acknowledged by Mr. Talbot that he was not crossing the street at a crosswalk, marked or unmarked, at the time he struck or was struck by Ms. Kijanowska’s vehicle. Even if he had been crossing a crosswalk, there is a common law duty on a person in Mr. Talbot’s position to take care of his own safety upon leaving the curb: Kovacova v. Ray,  B.C.J. No. 3309, 48 M.V.R. (3d) 56 (S.C.) at para. 17….
38] The headlights Mr. Talbot saw upon emerging from the alleyway and upon looking to his right must have come from Ms. Kijanowska’s approaching vehicle. There were no other vehicles on the roadway at the time. Mr. Talbot was unable to explain how or why he did not see Ms. Kijanowska’s vehicle as it approached him after having first observed it about one block away. Mr. Talbot was not able to refute the defence’s theory that he had walked or run into the side of Ms. Kijanowska’s vehicle.
 The only conclusion that I can draw from these unfortunate circumstances is that Mr. Talbot was simply not paying attention or having regard to his own safety when he left the alleyway and walked onto Trutch. He may very well have been distracted by listening to music on his headphones, which were observed lying on the ground next to him.
Accordingly, on the facts as I find them I cannot attribute negligence to the defendant. I conclude the accident of March 27, 2010 was caused solely by the negligence of Mr. Talbot in failing to take care of his own safety by keeping a proper lookout as he left the alleyway and walked onto Trutch and into Ms. Kijanowska’s vehicle.
 The plaintiff’s action is dismissed. In the ordinary course the defendant would be entitled to costs. If there are matters of which I am unaware counsel may speak to the issue.
 The mere fact that the driver did not see the pedestrian before striking him, is not in itself, sufficient to establish that the driver kept an inadequate lookout: Plett v. ICBC (1987), 12 B.C.L.R. (2d) 336 (C.A.). The driver is required to operate his vehicle so that he will be able to avoid striking a pedestrian who is crossing his path in a reasonable manner: Funk v. Carter, 2004 BCSC 866….
 Ms. Brown testified that she was familiar with the area and not distracted. She did not see Ms. Pinsent until Ms. Pinsent stepped out from behind the parked car and stepped into her path. I find that Ms. Brown was exercising reasonable care and attention. I find further that Ms. Pinsent was not visible to Ms. Brown until it was too late to avoid the accident.
 In all of the circumstances I have concluded that the plaintiff has not established that Ms. Brown was travelling at an excessive rate of speed or that she failed to exercise the care and attention of a reasonably prudent driver.
 The accident occurred while Ms. Pinsent was jaywalking. Accordingly, Ms. Brown had the right of way. Ms. Pinsent has failed to establish that after Ms. Brown became aware, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have become aware, of Ms. Pinsent’s own disregard of the law, Ms. Brown had a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident of which a reasonably careful and skilful driver would have availed himself.
 I find that Ms. Brown was not negligent in the manner she operated her vehicle. Ms. Pinsent was the sole cause of this unfortunate accident. In the result the action is dismissed.
Adding to this site’s soft tissue injury damage archives, reasons for judgement were released earlier this year by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing damages for chronic moderate soft tissue injuries imposed on a pre-existing condition.
 Based upon the evidence before me, I find that the plaintiff is a very stoic and hardworking man who has suffered a moderate soft tissue injury to his neck, lower back and shoulders as a result of the October 25, 2007 accident. I also find that, at the time of the October 25, 2007 accident, the plaintiff was suffering from pre-existing neck pain, headaches and a degenerative condition of the cervical spine. That is why Dr. Koelink was continuing to prescribe Tylenol 3 for him. The soft tissue injuries suffered during the October 25, 2007 accident exacerbated his pre-existing condition.
 Despite some inconsistencies in his evidence, I find that the plaintiff’s injuries have had and will have a lasting effect on his work life and, to a lesser degree, on his home and recreational life. He continues to be able to work but not without pain and discomfort. He continues to have headaches which flare up when he is welding.
 He is able to travel both for vacation and work without adverse effects with the exception of occasional numbness in his left leg after sitting for prolonged periods of time. However, as Dr. Craig testified, that discomfort can be eased by changing position.
 The plaintiff was suffering from pain, headaches and a degenerative condition of the cervical spine well before the October 25, 2007 accident. In my view, there is at least a 25% chance that the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition would have interfered with his work and other activities had the October 25, 2007 accident not occurred.
 After considering all of the plaintiff’s circumstances, the principles set out in Stapley and the cases provided by counsel, and after applying a 25% contingency in respect of the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition, I find that an award of $60,000 for non-pecuniary damages is appropriate.

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