Source: https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?full_search=VsMcDowell
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:19:25+00:00

Document:
McDowell These Das Denken, das auf Urteile gerichtet ist, ist insofern der Art und Weise, wie die Dinge sind (der Welt ) verantwortlich, als es richtig oder falsch ausgeführt sein kann.
Es geht um Rechtfertigung vor dem "Tribunal der Erfahrung".
Rorty17: RortyVsMcDowell: er tut etwas, was Kritiker der Korrespondenztheorie seit je beklagen: er nimmt Wahrnehmungsurteile als Muster für Urteile überhaupt.(VsKorresondenztheorie).
Conviction /belief/ EvansVsMcDowell: should be understood more demanding, namely as a judgment with reasons. This does not mean that they are always explicitly created in an active process of opinion formation. Beliefs are dispositions to the judgments and verdicts - an act of spontaneity.
Beliefs/Rorty: a belief that can be justified before anyone is not interesting for anybody! The traditional distinction between "rational conviction" and "belief, which is brought about by causes rather than reasons" should be abolished! In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value.
Belief/Rorty: a belief that could be justified to anyone would interest no one.
In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! - The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value.
Truth/Rorty: there is no cause of the truth of beliefs.
Belief/existence/Dennett/Rorty: sometimes you do not accept the existence of an entity, but concede that we must have faith in this entity. E.g. belief in qualia and the phenomenological. >Ontology.
Belief/Davidson: thesis: most of our beliefs must be true - beliefs are no more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior. - One cannot determine first the belief and then its cause, but rather the reverse. - Rorty: (like Davidson) we are interested in the beliefs of the others, because we want to be able to deal with their behavior.
Beliefs/Davidson/Sellars/Brandom/Rorty: are imposed on us by the world, and that happens in the course of causal interactions between the program forced upon us in the educational process and the sensual organs. - (DavidsonVsMcDowell).
Belief/Davidson/Rorty: self-attribution of experiences presuppose the self-attribution of intentional states. - That’s only possible for someone who already believes many true things of about the world. - That is about the causal link between beliefs and world.
Belief/Davidson. we can only know the content of our intentional states if we know about their causes. - (Causality) - M. WilliamsVsDavidson: this is just the foundation thought that he rejects.
Belief/experience/Rorty: the spirit of the adult is more complex than that of the child. - Thus, the distinction between causation and justification of beliefs disappears. - (> Beliefs/Davidson).
Brandom/Davidson/SellarsVs"Content"/Rorty: content is an incomprehensible concept. You need nothing more than a concept that acts as a node of an inference pattern. Thus all words systematically put into circulation are on the same level, regardless of whether they come from superstitious people or cavemen. (VsMcDowell).
Pone Example: Thought content must be known - to find it simple or difficult.
RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world would do us a favor when it is not fooling us. - Cf. >McDowell: "Responsibility to the world".
McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up Searle's desire and clarify what the non-obvious descriptions are. (With Evans): the conceptual area should not be regarded as a "predicative", but as "belonging to the area of Fregean sense".
McDowell Thesis: Fregean sense is effective in the area of reasons. Because rationality is a condition in the community, we do not distinguish between different senses. But in order to attribute rationality to a subject, we must distinguish between senses (rational and irrational).
VsMcDowell: but then we need some theory of descriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/McDowell: Indirect relation to the world.
Determinism/Hume/Davidson/Rorty: the problem is not solvable. But the instruments that we use to apply our standards are often different from the ones we use for prediction. >Prediction. RortyVsMcDowell: There is no need for a "search for an understanding of nature that includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons". >Logical space, >space of reasons, >space of nature.
Rorty: Brandom does not mention "experience" even once! Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson: for all three we are constantly interacting with things and with people, but none of the three needs a >"tribunal of experience" or experience at all. Causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary.
Experience/BrandomVsMcDowell: not part of my words: unneeded mediating entity between facts and reports - no mediation between facts and reports required.
Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: causality is sufficient for experience. - VsMcDowell: no "rational control", not a "tribunal of experience" necessary. >Experience/McDowell.
Def Experience/Davidson/Sellars: the ability to acquire convictions due to neurologically describable causal transactions with the world, without drawing conclusions ". (> Causal theory of reference). Rorty: which can be reformulated this way: "the only way to confront the world is the same for people as for computers".
Understanding/explanation/RortyVsMcDowell: we should not talk about comprehensibility. It is very easy to get: if we train two people to have the same manner of speaking.
Explanation Rorty Carnap: the movement of anything and everybody can be predicted based on the movement of elementary particles. Rorty: that way we should be on top of all that living things, but we would not have explained it! > Other authors on explaining.
Elementary particles are well applicable in any section of the universe, but the talk of politicians or emerald flowers only in particular contexts.
Knowledge/Rorty: there is no reason to object to statements about the acquisition of knowledge that refer to internal representations. But explanation and justification must be distinguished: one can put forward such explanations without reviving the traditional mind-body problem. Justification: E.g. through sensual data. --- Explanation: causal.
Explanation: How can you say when a complete causal explanation of X must contain statements about X.
Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell: we should not talk about comprehensibility! Comprehensibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people to speak the same way!.
Explanation/f.o.th./Rorty: something that changes, while everything else remains the same cannot be an explanation.
Idealism/VsMcDowell/McDowell: his opponents could speak of a "danger of idealism": idealistic basic mood of the "elimination of the outer boundary". This eludes us a possibility which we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the spiritual and the objects.
Judgment/RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world would do us a favor if it did not constrict us. He does not believe that trees and stones are talking, but he believes that they do not just make us make judgments. He conceives of a phenomenon as an invitation for a judgment which proceeds from the world. It is not a judgment itself, but has the conceptual form of a judgment.
According to McDowell, "impressions" are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferent beliefs themselves, but something between these two: a component of the "Second Nature."
Rules/language game/ Derrida/Rorty: Derrida does not want to make a move in the language game. - He does not want to play. - He does not wants to refute anyone.
RortyVsMcDowell: one should not speak of forms of comprehensibility. McDowell: logical space of reasons and logical space of the laws are sui generis respectively. >Logical Space, >Space of Reason, >Space of Nature.
RortyVsMcDowell: They are not so strictly separate areas (the reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They can not be reduced to one another. e.g. Football and biology. But that is philosophically sterile question.
With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes.
Research/Standards/McDowell: it is just the wit of the standards of research, that their compliance increases the probability to get closer to the the world as it is, the "suchness"! RortyVsMcDowell: again leading to a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's critique of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this.
Sensory impressions do not belong in the area of the reasons. Sensory impressions/Empiricism: not in the same space as knowledge.
Sensory impressions are not in such a space in which the one is justified by the other. (Otherwise the naturalistic fallacy threatens).
Sensory impressions/McDowell: Thesis: from the outset there is no distance between the conceptual content and the effects of reality on the sensuality. The sensory impressions already have the most basic conceptual content.
Definition sensory impression/McDowell: The impact of the world on our senses. (s) So the world's achievement, not the subject's achievement. Not the impression we have, but the impression made by the world. According to Sellars/Davidson: non-conceptual.
A sensory impression: the belief that an object has certain properties is due to the fact that the corresponding fact itself exerts an impression on the subject. This is the same as the impression which the object exerts.
Sensory impressions/DavidsonVsMcDowell: 1. There are no facts at all.
2. Causality: only conclusions from knowledge about causal connections - causality itself does not reveal the world.
Sensory Impressions/McDowell: are transparent according to me, Sellars and Davidson do not see it like this.
Sensory Impressions/McDowell: Thesis: a harmless concept of this could be: we can assume that spontaneity is rationally controlled by the receptivity without the receptivity blocking our access. For this we must reject only the dualism of reason and nature.
Microstructure/macrostructure: Putnam: we cannot understand from the knowledge of elementary particles why square pegs do not fit into round holes. But that’s not a disturbing ontological gap!
Def understanding/Rorty: ability to link old descriptions with new descriptions.
Comprehensibility: it is hard to explain what it is supposed to mean that tables and chairs are incomprehensible and God is not (or vice versa!). Logical positivism is already something of a solution with its formal type of speech.
Comprehensibility: problem from Parmenides to Ayer: we are constantly tempted to say "the intelligibility conditions of a statement are..." Although the statement itself does not fulfil the specified conditions.
McDowell: logical space of reasons - and logical space of the laws are each sui generis. >Space of reason, >space of nature.
RortyVsMcDowell: there are no strictly separated areas (of reason and law). All language games are sui generis.
Understanding/explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about comprehensibility. >Explanations. Comprehensibility/Rorty: is quite cheap to have: if we train two people to speak the same way.
2) X’s beliefs about the relevant facts in the context.
GriceVsEvans/VsMcDowell: a Gricean could say that we set too much store by the unreflected behavior and postulate smoothly functioning super beings that mimic our unconscious behavior. (>Platonism).
We behave in an unreflected way as if we behaved very reflected.
And a proper understanding of this behavior depends on us recognizing this fact. Evans/McDowellVs: this seems very attractive, but we reject it: we find the question extremely difficult and our following considerations are insufficient.
Signs/"Bestowing"/Wittgenstein: every sign in itself is dead, what bestows life upon them?
Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito.
McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality.
Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other.
Second Nature/(s): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education/McDowell.
Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature.
Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world.
McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background.
Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm.
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face.
Sensation / McDowell: the belief that an object has certain characteristics is due to the fact that the relevant fact exerts an impression on the subject itself. This is tantamount to the impression exerted by the object. >Beliefs/Davidson. Sensations / DavidsonVsMcDowell: 1. There are no facts! 2. Causality: we only draw conclusions from the knowledge of causal links, the causality itself not revealing the world. >Facts/Davidson.
Social Practice/Esfeld: so far it does not include any rational restriction by the world on our beliefs. (>McDowell). EsfeldVsMcDowell: to reject this, we must first show how the social practices that determine the conceptual content respond to the world.
Rule Following/EsfeldVsMcDowell: even if the realm of the conceptual is unlimited, we are confronted with the problem of rule following. How can beliefs have content?
We therefore need social practices in any case, even if the conceptual realm is unlimited. We should try to conceive rational limitation ((s) correction, control, "responsibility to the world") within social practices, instead of granting a conceptual status to the physical world itself. Social holism is sufficient for this.
The world exerts a restriction on our practices which is not only causal but also rational. This is necessary to ensure that those whose content consists in inferential relationships are beliefs whose truth value depends on the world.
This would then also prevent the objection that not only language but also the content of our belief is conventional.
Judgment / Evans: thinks that intuition and concept must be divided among experience and judgment. (McDowellVs). Information System / Evans: its states are independent of beliefs. Beliefs cannot explain the contents of a perceptual experience, because it could be that you have no beliefs with an appropriate content!
Belief / EvansVsMcDowell: should be understood in a more demanding way, namely as a judgment with reasons. This does not mean that they always explicitly arise in an active opinion-forming process.
Beliefs are dispositions to judgments and judging is an act of spontaneity.
McDowell: We need to reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for whom an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject / object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. >Space of reason, >space of nature.
McDowell/Rorty: Thesis: "Responsibility to the world": to understand the world-directedness of mental state or process (conviction, judgment) you have to put it into a normative context. It has to be an attitude that you take to rightly or wrongly. A way of thinking aimed at judgments is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correctly or incorrectly.
RortyVsMcDowell: he does something that critics of the correspondence theory always lament: he takes perceptual judgments as a model for judgments in general. (VsCorresondence Theory).
Standards/BrandomVsMcDowell: is content with understanding them in the sense of responsibility among people. RortyVsMcDowell: his decision for Kantian concepts is also a visual metaphor.
"Minimal Empiricism"/Terminology/McDowell: the notion that experience must constitute a tribunal. Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: for all three we are in constant interaction with things as well as with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all.
RortyVsMcDowell/DavidsonVsMcDowell: causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary.
2. "Second Nature" 3. "Rational freedom"
Experience/Understanding/McDowell/Rorty: Problem: "whether our experience might not be excluded from the field of the kind of intelligibility that is appropriate to the concept of meaning." >Second nature.
RortyVsMcDowell: we should not speak of "forms of intelligibility"!
Rationale/Law/McDowell/Rorty: logical space of reasons and logical space of ​​law each are sui generis.
RortyVsMcDowell: there are no such strictly separated areas (of reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They cannot be reduced to one another. E.g. soccer and biology. But that has something philosophically sterile to it.
Quine/Rorty: Particle physics provides the only viable paradigm. McDowell/Rorty: we have two paradigms.
Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about intelligibility! Intelligibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people at the same speech!
McDowell/Rorty: the notion of openness to facts has an advantage in terms of "intelligibility" over the notion of ​​"memorizing facts".
RortyVsMcDowell: Such metaphors depend merely on the rhetoric.
RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world did us a favor if it does not trick us.
Although he does not believe that trees and stones speak, he does believe that they do not merely cause us to make judgments. He understands an appearance as a challenge judge that comes from the world. Although in itself it is not yet a verdict, but it already has the conceptual form of one.
"Impressions"/McDowell: are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferential beliefs themselves, but something in between: a part of the "Second Nature".
VsMcDowell: no need to "search for a conception of nature, which also includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons."
Research/Standards/Science/McDowell: it is precisely the point of the standards of research that their compliance increases the likelihood of coming on to the essence of the world! RortyVsMcDowell: this re-introduces a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's criticism of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this. >Scheme/Content.
James: would ask: What difference would it make in behavior?
SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: man has no responsibility to the world.
2. It must be explained how we are supposed to be in any cognitive connection with this "real direction" at all.
Def "rule-skeptical Charybdis": the view, according to which there are no objective requirements at all, which are produced by rules, but exclusively natural unrestricted human abilities. Thus no "general real objectivity".
Solution/McDowell/Wright: the "fully satisfying intermediate position": insight that the only thing that is wrong with the Scylla is that objectivity must be assessed from an external perspective.
Rules exist only within a practice that is maintained by the fact that the participants agree.
Moral/Ethics/McDowellVsNon-Cognitivism: assumes an impure construction of ethical facts and objectivity (Scylla). As if the moral facts were "there" independently of the evaluative point of view. Fact/Wright: but also the appreciation of any fact requires a point of view!
Realism/Anti-Realism/Wright: in this debate the realist represents the side of the Scylla, the anti-realist the side of the Charybdis.
This debate is now being undermined by the "fully satisfying intermediate position". There has never been a debate, only a misunderstanding of what the interaction of our mind with an objective content requires. (In McDowell only implicitly). WrightVsMcDowell: this is not convincing at all: if the debate is to be undermined, the opponents must remain clearly tied to the horns.
anti-realism must always be presented as an escape from it. But there is no solution in this way.
For example, the question of whether cognitive coercion applies a priori has no essential connection to a hyperobjective concept of facts, and therefore no obligation to an external point of view.
McDowellVsWright: one could reply that any distinction under the aegis of cognitive coercion would be our decision. Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that opposites of objectivity could be "there" in a more solid way than, say, the requirements of addition.
McDowell's Wittgenstein: wants to open escape routes from the debate.
VsMcDowell: some accuse me of anthropocentrism: a groundless confidence that the world is completely within the reach of our thinking.
McDowell: there is no guarantee for this and the ability of spontaneity brings with it the obligation to constantly reflect on the evidence that guides the active activity at all times.
VsMcDowell: danger of idealism: idealistic prevailing mood of elimination of the outer border. This deprives us of a possibility that we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the mental and the objects!
VsMcDowell: the objection is now that Wittgenstein's "commonplace" (see above) aligns the mind with the realm of meaning, but not with the realm of object reference (meaning).
VsMcDowell: then we need some kind of theory of description.
Theory of Description/Russell/McDowell: indirect reference to the world.
Loar / meaning theory: near Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, thesis: do not separate semantics and pragmatics - (Grice ditto) - Wiggins/McDowell: Separation th. of sense /th. of force - Loar: ultimately psychologically and thus reductionist.
Esfeld: Thesis: the physical world is not part of the conceptual content of our belief states. But it is part of the social practices in which this content is determined.
...: we must accept an aspect of the physical world that lies beyond what can be scientifically grasped (>McGinn). Thesis: social holism takes this into account: beliefs are separated from the world in the sense that only they and "nothing in the world" is conceptual. (EsfeldVsMcDowell).
SchifferVsDavidson / SchifferVsMcDowell / SchifferVsEvans / SchifferVs EMD: for RI a theory of translation is possible.

References: sui generis
sui generis
sui generis
sui generis
sui generis
sui generis