Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/84-century-ltd-partnership-v-board-of-tax-review-207-conn-250-1988/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 05:58:20+00:00

Document:
HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and HULL, Js.
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant board of tax review of the town of Rocky Hill affirming the town assessor’s increase in the valuation of certain of the plaintiff’s real property which the assessor based on the fact that a sale of the property in question showed that it had greatly increased in value in relation to other properties in the town. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the decennial revaluation of real property mandated by statute (12-62) is the exclusive remedy for a town to deal with changes in property values. On the defendant’s appeal, held that, because the power to equalize the tax lists given to assessors by statute (12-55) permits them to make interim adjustments in real property tax assessments, the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Appeal from a decision by the defendant board of tax review refusing to reduce the valuation of certain real and personal property owned by the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford- New Britain at Hartford, where the court, Satter, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed. Error; further proceedings.
The appellee filed a motion for reargument which was denied.
Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Susan M. Comer and Daniel H. Kennedy, Jr., for the appellant (defendant).
I. Milton Widem, with whom was Emily N. Roisman, for the appellee (plaintiff).
George C. Hastings and Lori R. Wilson filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether a municipal assessor has the power, under General Statutes 12-55, to increase a real property assessment between decennial revaluations on the ground that a sale of the property in question demonstrates that the property has greatly increased in value in relation to other properties in the municipality. We conclude that although an assessor, absent unusual circumstances that do not exist in this case, cannot be required to make such an interim revaluation of real property, he may do so in accordance with 12-55, under appropriate circumstances.
property under the provisions of General Statutes 1262. The court denied that motion. The court, in its memorandum of decision, stated that the plaintiff’s reliance on Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 182 Conn. 619, 438 A.2d 782 (1981), for its claim that 12-62 precludes interim revaluations, was misplaced. The court noted that, despite dicta in Uniroyal, Inc., that pursuant to 12-62 “revaluation . . . need only be available once each decade,” the Uniroyal, Inc. court did not hold that more frequent revaluations are illegal.
The plaintiff then moved for reargument of its motion for summary judgment, claiming that the case of Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 203 Conn. 425, 439-41, 525 A.2d 91 (1987), held that assessors are “precluded” from making interim revaluations based on a change in the fair market value of the property “attributable solely to changes in the market conditions.” The court concluded that Ralston Purina Co. “clearly holds that the decennial revaluations of real property mandated by General Statutes 12-62 [are] the exclusive remedy for the town to deal with changes in market values, and more frequent adjustments are not permitted.” The court then rescinded its earlier decision denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted it. The defendant appealed from the judgment granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, claiming that the assessor had the power under 12-55 to adjust the assessment in the interim years between decennial revaluations on the ground that the sale of the property in question shows that the property has greatly increased in value in relation to other properties in town.
in that town. The plaintiffs had claimed that the fair market value of their property had declined substantially since the last decennial revaluation conducted by the town, as evidenced by the subsequent sale of the property in 1983 at a price significantly below its assessed value. Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 428. The trial court did not discuss whether either of the plaintiffs was entitled to an interim adjustment of its property assessment, but adopted the implicit conclusion of an earlier judge in the case that the defendant was obligated to make such adjustments. The trial court sustained the appeals and ordered a reduction in the assessed values of the properties. This court found error in the court’s ruling that the board of tax review was required, as a matter of law, to adjust the plaintiffs’ tax assessments in the interim between decennial revaluations of the real property. We noted that an appeal under General Statutes 12-118 conditions relief upon proof of failure to comply with 12-64, which in turn provides that all real estate “`shall be liable to taxation at a uniform percentage of its present true and actual valuation . . . to be determined by the assessors.'” Id., 434. The defendant in Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 435, relied principally on the language of General Statutes 12-62 and this court’s interpretation of that statute in Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra. The defendant board conceded that, under certain circumstances, such as the destruction or expansion of property, a substantial change in its use or zoning classification, or a decision by the taxpayer to go out of business, it would be required to conduct an interim revaluation of property. Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 436.
it mandates the reassessment they sought. Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 436-37.
This court noted that the issue of whether assessors are required to conduct interim revaluations of property to account for the effect of changes in market conditions was not addressed by the pertinent statutes. The court then stated: “The plaintiffs’ reading of the statutes, standing alone, is therefore as plausible as the defendant’s interpretation. . . . [H]owever, the plaintiffs’ argument directly contradicts our interpretation of 12-62 in [Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra].” (Emphasis added.) Id., 437.
134-35, 104 A.2d 212 (1954). The plaintiffs’ reliance upon 12-64 is therefore misplaced because 12-64, in contrast to 12-62, `is concerned with the manner of taxation, not the frequency of valuation, and it does not purport to require assessors to be updated on their valuations at all times.’ Kays, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra; [Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 629].” Id., 437-38.
This court concluded that the legislature was aware that “even though property values may fluctuate within a ten year period, it is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable to require more frequent property revaluations.” Id., 438. The court found that it was bound by the interpretation of 12-62 in Uniroyal, Inc., since the plaintiffs did not provide a convincing rationale for the court to depart from that interpretation. Id., 439. “Since the legislature has not amended 12-62 subsequent to our decision in Uniroyal, Inc., we can discern no reason now to amend that statute judicially so as to alter the apparent intent of its drafters to preclude, as a general rule, interim revaluations of real property.” Id.
has precluded such interim revaluations except in unusual circumstances, which did not exist in that case and likewise do not exist here. The plaintiffs presently before us are therefore no more entitled to an interim adjustment of their tax assessments than were the plaintiffs in [Uniroyal, Inc.]” Id., 440. The court remanded both cases with direction to render judgments for the defendant.
In its second briefed argument, the defendant, citing Kays, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, claims that its interpretation of the effect of 12-55 does not leave the taxpayer unprotected because he has a remedy if he shows that he has assumed a disproportionate tax burden, a claim the plaintiffs in Ralston Purina Co. did not make. The defendant claims that the Ralston Purina Co. majority’s statement that the lack of an allegation in that case of a disproportionate burden “has no significance” contradicts Uniroyal, Inc.’s pronouncement that “`[t]he plaintiffs would be entitled to relief under 12-118 if [they] could prove that [their] property was bearing a disproportionately high tax burden because of the defendant’s failure to comply with 12-64.'” Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 626.
Thus, it finally argues, the assessor’s remedy under 12-55 when a taxpayer’s assessment is disproportionately low is the corollary of the taxpayer’s remedy under 12-118 when his assessment is disproportionately high.
The plaintiff in its brief relies solidly on language previously cited in Ralston Purina Co., which in turn cited Uniroyal, Inc., to the effect that an increase or decrease in the sale price of real property which reflects a change in market conditions may only be adjusted as part of a general revaluation pursuant to 12-62. The plaintiff quotes the Uniroyal, Inc. court which stated that the average ratio of the assessed values of properties to their actual selling prices was “not applicable to discrepancies in valuation which arise during the ten-year period between valuations.” Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 630.
The plaintiff stresses that the limitation on the assessor’s power to make interim revaluations, only in the unusual circumstances referred to in Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 435-46, is also reflected in two statutory exceptions, General Statutes 12-53a, permitting a reassessment where new construction is completed on property between revaluations, and General Statutes 12-64a, authorizing a reduction in the assessed value of property upon the demolition and removal of damaged buildings.
We look first to the holding in Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra. The plaintiffs, pursuant to 12-118, appealed to the Superior Court from the refusal of the board of tax review to reduce the valuation of its land and buildings in Middlebury. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the action of the board and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Id., 620.
they actually applied a much lower valuation to other Middlebury property. It stated that “[s]uch a practice would violate the requirements of General Statutes 12-64. The plaintiffs would be `entitled to relief under 12-118 if [they] could prove that [their] property was bearing a disproportionately high tax burden because of the defendant’s failure to comply with 12-64.’ Hays, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 481, quoting Lerner Shops of Connecticut, Inc. v. Waterbury, [151 Conn. 79, 86, 193 A.2d 472 (1963).] As our cases indicate, relief under 12-118 is conditioned upon proof of failure to comply with 12-64.” Id., 626.
The court then found that the average ratio evidence did not prove any violation of the statutory assessment scheme. Id., 627. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ property most likely benefited from continued use of the 1971 valuation figures for assessment purposes throughout the 1970s and the failure of the 1971 figures to reflect property value increases in subsequent years, as much as any other property owner. Such variation accruing within ten year periods is a permissible variation under 12-62. Id., 629. It then made the statement previously cited, that “in Connecticut, the remedy for variations in the effect of market conditions on different parcels is set forth in General Statutes 12-62. The remedy of revaluation was established by the legislature and it was the judgment of the legislature that the remedy need only be available once each decade.” Id.
permissive interim revaluation as a power of the assessors under 12-55, nor did Uniroyal, Inc., on which Ralston Purina Co. relied, concern the question involved in this case. Further, the right of a taxpayer to seek interim relief under 12-118 on a claim of a disproportionate burden need not come into play. The resolution of the issue in this case requires only that we go directly to the plain language of 12-55, shorn of any irrelevant judicial gloss adhering to it.
Section 12-55 contains three operative phrases pertinent to our inquiry: (1) “When the lists of any town have been so received or made by the assessors, they shall equalize the same, if necessary”; (2) “make any assessment omitted by mistake or required by law”; and (3) “the assessors may increase or decrease the valuation of property as named in any such lists or in the last preceding grand list . . .” (There follow directions for notice to a taxpayer in the event of an increased assessment.) (Emphasis added.) There is no ambiguity in this broad grant of powers to assessors. It is a clear legislative mandate to grant to local assessors a continuing duty unrelated to decennial revaluations, to achieve administratively a fair and equal assessment for all taxpayers. The power to equalize the lists, if necessary, imports a watchtower role for the assessor to correct inequalities, whether too high or too low. The “if necessary” language clearly comprehends interim changes in assessments for there is no such requirement in 12-62 which mandates decennial revaluations. The latter have obviously been legislatively deemed necessary.
earlier in the statute. The most logical interpretation of the effect of these two additional powers is that in addition to the power to equalize assessments the assessors are also empowered to make these specified changes. Assessing property omitted by mistake is a common sense administrative duty having no relation to the “equalizing” function of the assessors. The same may be said of the added function of making any assessment “required by law.” If it is required by law, the assessors are required to make it whether or not it is included in this section. Finally, the statute specifically gives to assessors the power to increase or decrease the value of assessed property. “`[S]tatutes should be construed so that no part of a legislative enactment is to be treated as insignificant and unnecessary, and there is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment.'” State ex rel. Kennedy v. Frauwirth, 167 Conn. 165, 168, 355 A.2d 39 (1974). “In construing a statute, common sense must be used and we must assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result.” Gentry v. Norwalk, 196 Conn. 596, 606, 494 A.2d 1206 (1985).
of fact, the necessary proof of such a disparate rise in value of the plaintiff’s property has not been made in this case. The trial court declared in its memorandum of decision denying the plaintiff’s first motion for summary judgment, that there existed a question of fact as to the method the assessor had used in making his revaluation and whether it conformed to 12-64. These and other issues of fact can only be resolved at trial.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to deny the renewed motion for summary judgment and for further proceedings.
In this opinion SHEA, CALLAHAN and GLASS, Js., concurred.
 Swiss-American Spawn, Inc., is the plaintiff in the second case combined on appeal with Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 203 Conn. 425, 525 A.2d 91 (1957). It operated a spawn production facility near Ralston-Purina’s mushroom farm, designed to produce spawn, a protein product used to grow mushrooms.
ARTHUR H. HEALEY, J., dissenting.
I do not agree with the majority that “a municipal assessor has the power, under General Statutes 12-55, to increase a real property assessment between decennial revaluations on the ground that a sale of property in question demonstrates that the property has greatly increased in value in relation to other properties in the municipality.” I, therefore, dissent.
is to be treated as insignificant and unnecessary, and there is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment.” State ex rel. Kennedy v. Frauwirth, 167 Conn. 165, 168, 355 A.2d 39 (1974). Statutes relating to the same subject matter, such as the property tax assessment statutory scheme, may be looked to for guidance in reaching an understanding of the meaning of a statutory term. Doe v. Institute of Living, Inc., 175 Conn. 49, 58, 392 A.2d 491 (1978). Where we have, as we do here, a statutory scheme for property tax assessments, we should “make every effort to construe a statutory scheme as a consistent whole.” Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 149, 440 A.2d 885 (1981). Needless to say, prior decisions of this court, especially recent decisions touching on relevant statutory constructions, are entitled to weighty consideration. This is especially significant where this court interprets a statute and the legislature fails to take action to change that interpretation, thus raising a presumption that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation. Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 203 Conn. 425, 439, 525 A.2d 91 (1987); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1984) 45.10. “It is fundamental that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such a construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would clearly be inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” 2A J. Sutherland, supra; see State v. Campbell, 180 Conn. 557, 563, 429 A.2d 960 (1980). Courts are warranted in presuming that a reasonable and rational result was intended by the legislature. See Norwich Land Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 170 Conn. 1, 4, 363 A.2d 1386 (1975).
entitled “Lists; notice of increase; public inspection; abstracts.” Cf. General Statutes 12-62, entitled “Periodic revaluation of real estate.” Section 12-55 sets out the administrative procedure for the assessor to follow for giving notice of a change in the valuation of property. The first sentence of 12-55 has been literally the same in this statute for at least seventy years. In like fashion, the language of the second sentence, “The assessors may increase or decrease the valuation of property as named in any such lists, or in the last preceding grand list . . .” has been literally the same for at least seventy years. The only amendment to this statute over this period concerns to whom and how the notice of any increase in valuation is to be given. It strikes me as highly unusual, from a practical standpoint, that if the “clear legislative mandate” the majority finds in 12-55 exists, no point has been made by counsel for the town that this is the manner in which assessors have treated 12-55 at least for the last seventy years.
property. Section 12-64a authorizes an adjusted assessment value whenever a building is damaged, demolished and removed as set out in that statute.
439. In that case, the “certain circumstances” were said to be “such as the destruction or expansion of property, a substantial change in its use or zoning classification, or a decision by the taxpayer to go out of business . . .” Id., 435-36; see generally General Statutes 12-53a and 12-64a. None of those existed in Ralston Purina Co., none of those exist in this case, and 12-55 cannot reasonably be interpreted in this case to accomplish here what our construction of 12-62 in Ralston Purina Co. and Uniroyal, Inc., precluded. The Ralston Purina Co. majority properly noted that we would not reexamine our interpretation of 12-62 set out in Uniroyal, Inc., because the legislature had not amended 12-62 after Uniroyal, Inc. Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 439. I submit that it is also unnecessary to do so in this appeal.
of approximately 70 percent in value that we refused to recognize in Ralston Purina Co. This unfairness highlights the flaw in the majority’s analysis of the statutory scheme. I conclude that 12-62, entitled “Periodic revaluation of real estate,” is the operative statute. Under any logical and consistent reading of Ralston Purina Co., not only may the tax assessor not be forced to decrease an assessment on a taxpayer’s property, but that officer cannot increase a taxpayer’s assessment, absent certain limited circumstances, except every ten years under 12-62.
I would affirm the trial court, and, accordingly, I dissent.
 It is interesting to note that although General Statutes 12-55 does have language that says that “[t]he assessors may increase or decrease the valuation of property as named in any of such lists . . . it only provides for notice to the person (presumably the taxpayer) of any increase in the valuation. This statute is silent on the matter of notice to be given in the event of any decrease.
(1981). Here, the majority claims that “in the context of this case this court’s quotation in Ralston Purina Co. (p. 438) from Uniroyal, Inc., (p. 629) that the procedure in 12-62 `need only be available once each decade’ is dicta.” Even assuming it is dicta, the majority should discuss it in view of the nexus between Ralston Purina Co. depending as it does on Uniroyal, Inc., on the one hand and, on the other hand, the treatment of Ralston Purina Co. by the majority in this appeal. The quoted statement of the majority in this footnote cannot serve as a sort of judicial circuit-breaker to foreclose any meaningful analysis of the distinction claimed by the defendant.

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