Source: http://acoel.org/category/Enforcement.aspx?page=1
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 13:59:25+00:00

Document:
On August 20, 2018, a Michigan state district court judge bound over Nick Lyon, the current director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, for trial on two counts of involuntary manslaughter and one count of misconduct in office arising out of the deaths of two men from Legionnaire’s disease at a Flint-area hospital. In a rambling opinion read from the bench, district judge David Goggins found that two elderly men with prior health problems contracted Legionnaire’s disease at Hurley Hospital and died in 2015 because the health department director failed to give public warnings until January 2016 of outbreaks of the disease in the Flint area in 2014-2015.
Contradictory testimony linked Flint water to the outbreaks generally but did not establish that Flint water was the cause-in-fact of spreading the disease. The challenge of establishing that Flint water was the specific source of the disease for the decedents was made more difficult by the fact that the hospital was already hyperchlorinating its water supply. In theory, at least, hyperchlorination should have eliminated the Legionnaire disease toxin.
Apart from the causation question, the result does not easily square with Michigan law. In Michigan, misconduct in office is a common law felony. Caselaw defines misconduct in office as including (1) conduct in the exercise of the duties of the office or done under color of the office; (2) discretionary acts that were either misfeasance or malfeasance; and (3) acts that represent “corrupt behavior.” Examples of corrupt behavior would be enriching oneself or one’s friends while performing duties of one’s office.
The public health statute requires public notice based on the director’s “determination” that an “imminent danger to the health or lives of individuals” exists. The court found probable cause to believe that the director’s failure to give notice of an outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease was corrupt behavior.
The preliminary examination transcript is thick with evidence of negligence of department staff in responding to local health department requests for help. The evidence also showed that the director was concerned about panic from a public notice and saving the state money by not addressing the disease outbreak. But the transcript is thin on whether corruption was the basis for the misfeasance. The misfeasance was surely bad judgment. But there was no evidence that corruption motivated the director in exercising his discretion in the timing of the notice.
The result may not be surprising in view of the desire of Flint citizens to punish state actors involved with the crisis, combined with the pressure that may be created on judges who are elected by the same citizens. The current attorney general ran for governor in part based on the state spending over $26 million prosecuting state actors in the Flint water crisis. He lost. His successor, the Democratic attorney general-elect, must now decide whether she wants to continue spending similar amounts prosecuting members of a Republican former administration or work with the Democratic governor-elect to spend the state’s money fixing the Flint water system. The state may not have money to do both. And if that is true, perhaps prosecutorial discretion will give way to fixing the water system once and for all.
The release from the impoundment into groundwater clearly violated the prohibition in the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law on discharging or permitting the discharge of industrial wastes into the waters of the Commonwealth. Anticipating that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) would seek a penalty for each day that contaminants remained present in the environment, EQT sought a judicial declaration that civil penalties may be imposed only for days that pollutants were actually discharged from the impoundment.
As the declaratory judgment action progressed, PADEP acknowledged that the mere presence of contaminants in groundwater would not alone support the imposition of penalties. But it contended that a violation occurred on each day that the contaminants initially released from the impoundment passively migrated from soil to groundwater (the “soil-to-groundwater” theory) or moved from one part of the waters of the Commonwealth to another (the “water-to-water” theory).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the language of the Clean Streams Law, which prohibits any discharge of an industrial waste “into” a water of the Commonwealth, is ambiguous. The language could be interpreted to cover only movement of a pollutant from outside the waters of the Commonwealth into these waters, but could also be read to include movement of a previously released contaminant from one part of the Commonwealth’s waters into another part.
In resolving the ambiguity, the Court noted that even after remediation occurs, a small quantity of contaminants may remain present in groundwater and continue to migrate. If each day constitutes a violation, massive civil penalties would result. Principally because it believed this consequence to be unreasonable, the Court rejected the water-to-water theory. By excluding water-to-water mitigation from the ambit of the Clean Streams Law’s prohibitions, the Court created Pennsylvania’s version of the “unified waters” approach. At least in this context, it makes good sense.
But EQT still suffered serious liabilities. It was required to remediate the contamination that it caused. And the soil-to-groundwater theory remains in play; the Court chose not to rule on its validity because EQT’s pleadings and application for summary relief did not raise that challenge. Penalties in excess of $1 million were assessed against EQT and will be reviewed on appeal. In a fictional game show world, all consequences are happy ones. In real life, even a solicitous state Supreme Court will not guarantee an entirely happy ending for a party who has violated environmental laws.
Tags: Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, Civil Penalties, Wastewater Impoundments, Discharge of Industrial Wastes, Groundwater.
On December 8, 2017, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt designated 21 Superfund sites for “immediate, intense action”. It’s an open question whether this effort will be more successful than many of EPA’s previous failed efforts to comply with its policies for contaminated sediment sites.
EPA has not met many of its prior commitments regarding sediment sites. On July 25, 2017, EPA’s Superfund Task Force identified 42 recommendations intended to, among other things, “evaluate and expedite NPL sites to completion”, “encourage and facilitate responsible parties’ expeditious and thorough clean-up of sites”, “create oversight efficiencies for PRP lead cleanups”, and “promote redevelopment/reuse of sites by encouraging PRPs to invest in reuse outcomes”. Since that time, some stakeholders have sought action from EPA based on the principles set forth in Task Force recommendations. In response, some have received commitments from EPA headquarters to seriously consider the requests, but the promises made by Headquarters often have not been turned into constructive action consistent with the recommendations.
Last year, EPA’s Office of the Land and Emergency Management (OLEM) issued Directive 9200.1.130 (Jan. 9, 2017), which identified 11 recommendations “based on current best practices for characterizing sediment sites, evaluating remedial alternatives, and selecting and implementing appropriate response actions”. OLEM directed the regions to, among other things, “develop risk reduction expectations that are achievable by the remedial action”. Unfortunately, just two days earlier, EPA issued a Record of Decision for the Portland Harbor Superfund Site that, in direct conflict with the OLEM Directive, established cleanup goals that are unachievable.
And these are just EPA’s recent promises. In 2002, EPA identified 11 principles in its Principles for Managing Contaminated Sediment Risks at Hazardous Waste Sites (OSWER Directive 9285.6-08). EPA announced that, among the key principles, it was important to “control sources early”, “ensure that sediment cleanup levels are clearly tied to risk management goals”, and “design remedies to minimize short-term risks while achieving long-term protections”. Similar principles were articulated in EPA’s 2005 Contaminated Sediment Remediation Guidance for Hazardous Waste Sites (OSWER Directive 9355.0-85). Unfortunately, many of EPA’s decisions regarding sediment contamination sites have been made without consideration or application of these principles.
Will things be different for the 21 sites targeted by Administrator Pruitt for “immediate, intense action”? Unlike earlier pronouncements by the agency, which established program-wide recommendations to be implemented at all applicable sites, the list of actions for the 21 sites sometimes are specific and measurable, e.g., “initiate and complete negotiations to begin implementation of early actions” at the Anaconda Co. Smelter. It’s possible that, where the recommendations are specific and measurable, EPA will be able to take action to advance progress at a particular site. On the other hand, some of the actions proposed for other sites on the list are so general, e.g., “resolve issues expeditiously” at Allied Paper, Inc./Portage Creek/Kalamazoo River; “initiate actions to allow revitalization of the site” at Des Moines TCE (aka Dico Company, that it will be difficult to measure success.
Environmental groups have for years sought greater regulation of coal ash waste from coal-fired power plants. It turns out an old-fashioned Clean Water Act (CWA) citizen suit is sometimes a more effective tool.
In August, Judge Waverly Crenshaw, of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, ordered the Tennessee Valley Authority to “wholly excavate the ash waste disposal areas” at the Gallatin Steam Plant and “relocate the excavated coal ash to a lined impoundment with no significant risk of discharge to waters of the United States.” TVA estimates that this will take 24 years at a cost of $2 billion. The least surprising aspect of this case: TVA has filed a notice of appeal.
This pretty much sums up the central issue in the case: Is the groundwater flow through the lower part of coal ash landfill, picking up contaminants and transmitting them laterally to the Cumberland River, regulated by the CWA?
With that, he ordered that TVA remove the coal ash to an appropriate lined site that will not discharge into waters of the United States.
There was one bit of good news for TVA: because of the cost of the chosen remedy, Judge Crenshaw decided not to assess penalties.
Not every argument was about such large costs. TVA’s objection to the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and costs included an objection to caviar included in a claim for $200 for food and snack items purchased from Kroger before and during the trial. The plaintiff’s response included a receipt showing the “caviar” purchase was $16.24 of “Texas Caviar,” and attached Kroger’s recipe therefor. It is devoid of fish eggs but does include chopped cilantro. The recipe is available through PACER here.
Last month, Attorney General Sessions barred DOJ from entering into settlements that provide for payments to non-governmental persons not a party to the dispute. At the time, I peered into my crystal ball and proclaimed that the practice of incorporating supplemental environmental projects into environmental settlements was “hanging by a thread.” For once, my speculation was accurate.
Yesterday, DOJ notified the District Court for the District of Columbia that the United States and Harley-Davidson had jointly agreed to modify a consent decree that had already been lodged with the Court. The original decree provided for a $3 million SEP, to replace old woodstoves. Notwithstanding that SEPs have traditionally been used to mitigate penalty amounts, the modified decree did not increase the penalty to Harley-Davidson; it merely eliminated the SEP. Well done, Harley-Davidson lawyers!
Questions exist as to whether this mitigation project is consistent with the new policy.
The only question remaining at this point is whether other defendants will be able, like Harley-Davidson, simply to pay smaller penalties or whether, going forward, penalties will increase where SEPs are unavailable as mitigation. I know where this administration’s proclivities lie, but I’m going to stop speculating while I’m ahead of the game.
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) fairly boasts that it lived up to its tag line “Rescuing Liberty from Coast to Coast” by following its 2012 Supreme Court victory in Sackett v. EPA with its May 31, 2016 victory in United States Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc. In both Clean Water Act cases the PLF represented the property owners on appeal, arguing that the particular agency action was final, subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court agreed both times. Some boasting is due.
The particulars of each case flow from disputes about the scope of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act. Neither case resolved the merits issue. Both cases considered only whether the dispute may be brought to court by challenging a pre-enforcement agency action.
The Sacketts filled in a half acre of their 2/3-acre residential lot near Priest Lake, Idaho with dirt and rock in preparation for building a home. EPA served a compliance order advising the Sacketts that they violated the Clean Water Act by filling in waters of the United States without a Section 404 dredge and fill permit. The Order unilaterally prevented further construction and required the Sacketts to remove the fill material then restore the wetland pursuant to an EPA Restoration Work Plan.
The Sacketts tried to challenge EPA’s order, but were told by EPA, then by the District Court, that they had no right to challenge the order until EPA attempted to enforce it. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, setting the Sacketts squarely on the horns of their dilemma. Disregarding the unilateral compliance order subjected the Sacketts to potential fines of up to $75,000 per day. Complying with the order meant spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to carry out the EPA’s Restoration Work Plan, and never getting to build on their property.
The Hawkes case, four years later, is the same song, second verse. This time the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) issued the offending decision -- a jurisdictional determination (JD) that waters of the United States existed on 530 acres from which Hawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes) and its affiliated companies planned to mine for peat. Hawkes provides peat for golf courses and sports fields, and mining peat on the 530 acres would extend the life of its peat mining business by ten to fifteen years. The USACE concluded that the property was connected by a “relatively permanent water” (a series of culverts and unnamed streams) that flowed into the Middle River and then into the Red River of the North, a “traditional navigable waterway” about 120 miles away. With the USACE determination, Hawkes needed a permit to harvest peat. Moreover, USACE advised that before it issued a permit, it would require additional hydrological and functional resource assessments and an evaluation of upstream potential impacts, the cost of which would exceed $100,000.
Using an analysis, discussed in my colleague’s post Sending a Message on WOTUS, the Court concluded that a JD satisfied both prongs of Bennett, and affirmed the Eighth Circuit, remanding the Hawkes companies to District Court of Minnesota - Minneapolis with the right to litigate the jurisdictional determination, same as the Sacketts. When the Supreme Court ruled favorably on their case the Sacketts were remanded to the Idaho District Court, where their court battle continues. Presumably, the battle will continue with the Hawkes’ companies as well.
At the heart of each battle is whether or not the property actually contains “Waters of the United States.” Following the procedural “yellow brick road” won’t get anyone out of Oz -- not until a clear definition of waters of the United States emerges.
Sending a Message on WOTUS?
The May 31 decision in Hawkes may be less important for what it says about the reviewability of jurisdictional determinations (JDs) under the Clean Water Act than for what is says about the far more consequential stakes in the pending challenges to EPA’s Clean Water Rule (aka WOTUS), which will undoubtedly find its way to the Court following a decision by the Sixth Circuit which is expected before the end of the year.
Contrary to my prediction the Court did rule (unanimously) that JDs are final agency actions subject to review under the APA. In an opinion penned by Chief Justice Roberts the Court upheld the conclusion of the Eighth Circuit but substituted a different test for finality, one that emerged during oral argument and one that introduces a novel and perhaps questionable rationale. The key question was whether JDs have legal consequences. In roundabout fashion, Roberts concluded they did because a positive finding of jurisdiction meant that the applicant was denied the advantage of a negative determination (or NJD). That had the effect of denying the applicant the benefit of what Roberts called a “safe harbor” provision contained, not in the statute or implementing regulations, but in a 2015 Memorandum of Agreement between by EPA and the Corps. Roberts read the MOA as creating a legal right – similar to a covenant not to sue – binding the government to a five year commitment not to revisit the NJD, an interpretation the government vigorously disputed as pointed out by Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence.
This ruling could have significant practical effects. Since 2008 the Corps and EPA have issued over 400,000 JDs of which approximately 40% were approved JD’s. Under the MOA, the process has become more formal, giving it at least the appearance if not the reality of adjudication. The formality of the process convinced a number of the Justices, particularly Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Kagan, that JDs should be considered final actions under the Abbott Labs test. They emphasized the fact that under the MOA the agencies were not simply giving advice to the public. This raises the question whether the agencies may want to rethink the MOA and consider revising the safe harbor provision to make clear it is not binding. The Solicitor raised this possibility during the oral argument (transcript at p 16 lines 16-25).
It is too soon to write the obituary for the Clean Water Rule. But Kennedy’s vote is more in doubt now than when he authored the concurring opinion in Rapanos showing a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of both the values enshrined in the CWA and the constitutional issues it raises. Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, widely accepted as controlling by the lower courts, was the blueprint EPA and the Corps used to write the rule. Given these more recent statements, that may not be enough to win his approval. The fate of the rule may well depend on how soon and by whom the vacancy on the Court is filled.
Should Environmental Agencies be able to Revoke Consent Orders Unilaterally?
In a highly unusual case that has led to a near unanimous call for legislative change by environmental lawyers in Connecticut, a Superior Court judge ruled that the Connecticut Department of Energy & Environmental Protection (“DEEP”) can unilaterally revoke a consent order that it negotiated with a company requiring the investigation of a contaminated site. The lawsuit was initially brought by DEEP, among other reasons, to enforce the consent order. However, after the defendant filed a counterclaim against DEEP alleging that the department had not acted reasonably and breached the order, the department unilaterally revoked the order and moved to dismiss the counterclaim. The court held that the state statute that authorizes the department to issue, modify, or revoke orders, allows the department to revoke consent orders.
Although the state agency may have had good reason to revoke the consent order in this case to help it improve its position in the litigation, that decision undermines the public policy in favor of encouraging negotiated settlements in environmental matters. Most environmental consent orders are carefully negotiated, with give and take on each side. If a private party knows that the environmental agency can simply revoke a consent order at any time, why would that party make concessions to resolve a dispute through an administrative order on consent?
The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. ITT Continental Baking Company long ago recognized that administrative consent orders and judicial consent decrees are in the nature of contracts and should be construed basically as contracts. Therefore, the federal courts typically place a heavy burden on a party seeking to modify a consent decree. Even the Connecticut court which ruled that DEEP can unilaterally revoke consent orders questioned the wisdom of such authority.
It remains to be seen whether the Connecticut state legislature will clarify that the state environmental department lacks the authority to unilaterally withdraw from an agreement that it negotiated. A bill, S.B. 431, was recently proposed by the Judiciary Committee of the State General Assembly to reverse the Superior Court decision. The general assembly has until May 4, 2016, when the session ends, to pass such legislation. If the legislation does not pass, and DEEP retains such authority, it is likely to find it much more difficult to settle administrative orders on consent in Connecticut.
For many of us, the only “drone” we knew of growing up probably was that boring, monotonous lecture late on a sunny afternoon. Or if you were expert in biology, you would have known that a “drone” is a stingless male bee whose sole job is not to gather nectar or pollen, but to mate with the queen. Today, however, everyone over the age of 5 knows that drones are a hot gift item, anything that flies without a pilot onboard but controlled remotely. A “drone”, in government parlance, is generally termed a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), or a UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) -- which is a UAV, plus the ground-based controls.
It is not a big leap from use of UAVs for wildlife conservation purposes, to enforcement efforts against unlawful pollution of waterways and illegal logging. For example, a drone can obtain imagery of discoloration suggestive of discharges of hazardous substances; can detect differences in water temperature using thermal sensors to detect illegal discharges; can film illegal mining or deforestation activities; or can even collect small volume water samples from remote areas. But in the US, if one of your clients is the target of such surveillance, is the evidence admissible in an enforcement proceeding?
The answer is—maybe. It depends. The type of answers clients hate to receive from their trusted legal counsel. It is beyond the scope of this post to discuss all of the ongoing machinations of the Federal Aviation Administration as it attempts to develop final rules for the commercial (non-hobby) operation of UAVs. But while the federal government attempts to preempt the field, States have stepped in and, in conflicting ways, attempted to respond to the growing drone game. In 2015, 45 states considered 168 drone bills, and 20 states enacted legislation. In some states, use of a drone over the private property of another person, without prior consent, could result in criminal or civil prosecution or damage claims—even if the drone is used for the environmentally beneficial uses described above. Thus, one must become familiar with her or his state’s laws, as well as monitor the ongoing FAA and Congressional activities, to best effectively prepare and advise clients on this brave new world.
China currently is using UAVs to track excessive air and water pollution is China. In one city with 40,000 sources of industrial pollution and 900 industrial parks, drones are using “high-resolution digital cameras, infrared and laser scanners, and magnetometers…. Some UAVs are also fitted with an infrared thermal imaging unit that shows the operation of facilities at night.” How this information will be used in China remains to be seen.
At home in the US drones are going to fuel more and more back-and-forth legal maneuvers of environmental regulators and NGOs against companies and their lawyers. The gathering and use of drone-generated information may be as intense a fight as the sport use of the UAVs themselves. To get a preview of that emerging arena, check out the more recent “Flight Club” aka Game of Drones—the “bad boys” who want to be the next big sports league. Coming soon to a screen near you.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency recently modernized its implementation of its two primary self-disclosure incentive policies – the Audit Policy and the Small Business Compliance Policy – by creating a centralized, web-based “eDisclosure” portal to receive and automatically process regulated entities’ self-disclosed civil violations of environmental law. The Audit Policy and Small Business Compliance Policy provide penalty mitigation and other incentives for large and small businesses that discover, promptly disclose and expeditiously correct environmental violations and take steps to prevent future violations. According to EPA, the automated eDisclosure system will make the processing of more routine voluntary disclosures faster and more efficient, and save time and resources for both regulated entities and EPA. Nonetheless, while efficiency is desirable for both public and private parties, potential users of the new system should bear in mind that self-disclosure of a violation to EPA should be undertaken with the assistance of experienced environmental consultants and legal counsel.
In the future, all self-disclosed civil violations (except for disclosures under EPA’s New Owner Policy) must be made through the eDisclosure portal. Entities that disclose potential violations through the portal may qualify for one of two types of automated treatment, Category 1 or Category 2. Category 1 disclosure is available only for minor violations of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”). For Category 1 disclosures, the eDisclosure system automatically issues an electronic Notice of Determination (“eNOD”) confirming that the violations have been resolved with no assessment of civil penalties, on the condition that the certified eDisclosure is accurate and complete.
Category 2 Disclosures include all non-EPCRA violations, EPCRA violations where the entity can certify compliance with all of the Audit Policy’s nine conditions except that the method of violation discovery was systematic, violations of CERCLA § 103/EPCRA § 304’s chemical release reporting requirements, and EPCRA violations with ”significant economic benefit” (as defined by EPA). For these disclosures, the eDisclosure system automatically issues an electronic Acknowledgement Letter confirming EPA’s receipt of the disclosure and promising that EPA will make a determination regarding eligibility for penalty mitigation if and when it considers taking an enforcement action for environmental violations.
EPA stated in its December 9, 2015 Federal Register notice announcing the launch of the eDisclosure portal that it “is not modifying the substantive conditions in its Audit Policy or Small Business Compliance Policy.” However, anyone considering using the eDisclosure portal to self-report a civil violation of environmental law needs to be aware that EPA has significantly changed its longstanding approach to responding to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests for such disclosures.
Since 1997, EPA has deemed resolved voluntary disclosures under the Audit Policy and Small Business Compliance Policy publicly releasable under FOIA. The agency will continue to take this approach to Category 1 disclosures submitted through the eDisclosure portal. Specifically, it will grant FOIA requests for eNODs issued for Category 1 disclosures in most cases.
As the agency explains it, this policy shift is consistent with the 2009 memoranda from President Barack Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder in favor of federal government transparency. Nonetheless, it could reduce the perceived benefits of the Audit Policy and Small Business Compliance Policy for some in the regulated community and provide a disincentive to self-report. Moreover, at least one commentator has suggested that EPA’s new willingness to release information in response to FOIA requests may “fuel… private attorney general litigations.” This could be particularly problematic where EPA releases disclosure information through a FOIA request before it has determined whether in fact the business in question is eligible for penalty mitigation or will not be a target of enforcement action. Although EPA is trying to reassure the regulated community that this policy change will not result in more citizen suits, potential eDisclosure portal users are legitimately concerned about such arguably premature releases of disclosure information, and should carefully evaluate their circumstances before making any disclosure, especially under Category 2.
The potential for the release of unresolved disclosures to cause harm to eDisclosure users could be further exacerbated as an unintended result of the expansion of intergovernmental data exchanges such as the Environmental Information Exchange Network, a partnership of states, territories, tribes and EPA working to provide increased access to high-quality environmental data.
In sum, by introducing the eDisclosure system, EPA has streamlined the self-disclosure process for certain environmental violations, which likely will reduce the time and expense involved in making such disclosures. However, EPA has not provided any additional detail or direction for businesses to use in determining whether a specific violation meets the substantive criteria of the Audit Policy or Small Business Compliance Policy. This determination – and the ultimate decision of whether disclosure will be beneficial – should be made with careful consideration of the relevant facts and applicable law, under the guidance of knowledgeable environmental consultants and legal counsel..
In my last blog entry, I advocated for the amendment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to eliminate the bar on pre-enforcement review as one step toward improving the investigation and cleanup of sediment sites. In this entry, I propose that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and potentially responsible parties (PRPs) significantly revise the dispute resolution process for EPA Administrative Settlement Agreements and Orders on Consent (“ASAOCs”) to require the resolution of disputes by neutral third parties unaffiliated with EPA or an affected PRP.
The goal of sediment remediation is to protect public health and the environment through prompt and cost-effective remedial action. Unfortunately, this goal has not been met at many sediment sites. At some sites, neither the public nor the PRPs have been served by investigations that have unnecessarily taken decades and wastefed hundreds of millions of dollars to undertake. EPA’s selection of remedies at many sites has been delayed and has not resulted in the selection of protective and cost-effective remedies.
Most sediment cleanups are performed in accordance with consent decrees, which appropriately vest dispute resolution authority in federal district court judges. In contrast, most sediment investigations are conducted under ASAOCs, which vest dispute resolution authority in EPA personnel. While many at EPA with responsibility for dispute resolution have the best of intentions and seek to be objective, the fact that they work for EPA, often supervise the EPA staff who made the decision leading to the dispute, and are often steeped in EPA practices renders most of them unable to serve in a truly independent role. To ensure fairer dispute resolution, ASAOCs should instead vest dispute resolution authority in neutral third parties with no affiliation with either EPA or the PRPs subject to the ASAOC. This would require the amendment of existing ASAOCs and the insertion of new dispute resolution language, which differs from EPA’s model language, in ASAOCs that have not yet been signed.
Additionally, while the dispute resolution official should be deferential to EPA, he or she should not rubber-stamp agency decisions, as currently is often the case. Where investigations have been mired in years of inaction, an independent dispute resolver with a fresh perspective may determine that EPA has sufficient data to make informed cleanup decisions and could compel agency action. At other sites where EPA is requiring PRPs to prepare feasibility studies advocating for remedies that almost certainly will fail, it is essential that a neutral decision-maker act independently to ensure that feasible remedies are selected.
EPA will resist any effort to revise its approach to dispute resolution, and it may require the intervention of elected officials or others to compel such a change. The public, EPA, and affected PRPs would all benefit from it.
As a private practitioner and former trial attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, I have advocated for timely and cost-effective cleanups that protect public health and the environment. Unfortunately, only a minority of cleanups under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) have met these criteria. Of the many impediments to the thorough, prompt and cost-effective remediation of contaminated sites, and sediment sites in particular, one of the most significant is CERCLA’s bar on pre-enforcement review of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) remedial decisions. To promote more effective and timely cleanups of sediment sites, I suggest that CERCLA be amended to eliminate the current bar on pre-enforcement review. By allowing potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to seek and obtain judicial review of EPA decisions or failures to make decisions, more progress would likely be made on more sites.
CERCLA Section 113(h) states that, with limited exceptions, “No Federal court shall have jurisdiction … to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title ….” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Despite many challenges, courts have generally upheld the validity of this provision. As a result, PRPs typically cannot challenge EPA's decisions unless EPA has sought to compel performance under an enforcement order or if EPA is acting under a consent decree. As the “opportunity” for challenge may not come until years after EPA has made its cleanup decision, most PRPs are not willing to face the risk of losing a remedy challenge and the potential imposition of treble damages.
CERCLA should be amended to allow parties to challenge agency action or inaction at other times in the process, such as during the preparation of remedial investigations and feasibility studies. At many sediment sites, EPA has delayed remediation and required parties to incur hundreds of millions of dollars during investigations. If PRPs had the opportunity to obtain judicial review of agency action and inaction earlier in the process, they could seek to compel the agency to act in a way that is consistent with CERCLA’s requirements.
Having worked at the Department of Justice when CERCLA Section 113(h) was drafted, I recall my colleagues stating at the time that a bar on pre-enforcement review was necessary to avoid the challenges of having a non-expert federal judge address complex scientific questions and to prevent PRPs from tying up EPA in litigation. I offer three suggestions in response to these concerns. First, if a federal judge were confronted with a particularly complex issue, the court could appoint a special master to handle the proceedings. Second, to encourage PRPs to seek prompt resolutions, a CERCLA amendment could require PRPs to fully comply with an agency’s directives pending resolution of the judicial dispute and impose a penalty on those parties whose challenge of agency action was unsuccessful. Third, agencies could seek an expedited hearing of disputed issues.
While it is very unlikely that Congress would consider a CERCLA amendment to address only this issue, PRPs should raise this issue the next time amendments are being considered. It will succeed only through the concerted efforts of advocates who seek more and better cleanups and those who seek prompt and reasonable government decision-making.

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