Source: https://www.ptab.us/2015/08/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:18:34+00:00

Document:
As to commercially available sufentanil compositions (Br. 17), our reviewing court has explained that “[n]othing in the statute or our case law requires [the proponent] to prove obviousness by starting with a prior art commercial embodiment and then providing motivation to alter that commercial embodiment.” Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
We understand the Appellant to be arguing that Okamoto does not provide an enabling disclosure for a composition that satisfies the formula in paragraph 4 of Okamoto (i.e., α > 1). In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A prior art reference cannot anticipate a claimed invention ‘if the allegedly anticipatory disclosures cited as prior art are not enabled.’” (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). The Appellant, not the Examiner, bears the burden of showing nonenablement. Antor Media, 689 F.3d at 1289.
Appellant's arguments also are predicated improperly on the steps of the method being preformed in the order recited in the claims (i.e., "subsequently restoring," "then restoring"). "[A]s a general rule[, a] claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order." Baldwin Graphic Sys. Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342-43 (Fed, Cir. 2001)).
In order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness, the Examiner must show that each and every limitation of the claim is described or suggested by the combination of prior art references or would have been obvious based on the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Because the Examiner has not shown that Kroger, or any of the art of record, teaches or suggests the use of folic acid, we reverse the rejection of claims 34-36.
The Board finds no evidence that a terminal disclaimer has been filed in either application. More to the point, a statutory double patenting rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 cannot be cured by terminal disclaimer. See In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441 (CCPA 1970).
Rather, "dynamic data" and "static data" are merely undefined terms of degree. When a term of degree is used in a claim, the specification must provide some standard for measuring the requisite degree. Datamise, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc. 417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as indefinite." Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential).
Our reviewing court explained the rationale for requiring such definiteness for terms of degree in Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-1 LLC, 514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Halliburton, the court was asked to determine whether the relative claim term "fragile gel" was sufficiently definite. Id. at 1246. In spite of that Patent's Specification containing an express definition for the term "fragile gel" (id. (citing Kirsner et al., U.S. No. 6,887,832 B2; issued May 3, 2005, at col. 2, II. 26-42)), the Halliburton court nonetheless found that no "possible construction resolves the ambiguity in the scope of the term." Id. at 1250.
The fact that Halliburton can articulate a definition supported by the specification, however, does not end the inquiry. Even if a claim term's definition can be reduced to words, the claim is still indefinite if a person of ordinary skill in the art cannot translate the definition into meaningful precise claim scope."
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 requires that the specification of a patent "conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Because claims delineate the patentee's right to exclude, the patent statute requires that the scope of the claims be sufficiently definite to inform the public of the bounds of the protected invention, i.e., what subject matter is covered by the exclusive rights of the patent. Otherwise, competitors cannot avoid infringement, defeating the public notice function of patent claims. Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1996) ("[T]he primary purpose of the requirement is `to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their [respective] rights.'") (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Carp., 304 U.S. 364, 369, 58 S.Ct. 899, 82 L.Ed. 1402, (1938)). The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in, claims is met only when [the claims] clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise." United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236, 63 S.Ct. 165, 87 L.Ed. 232 (1942).
Id. at 1249 (citations omitted).
the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.
As to claims 22–28, we are persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that the Examiner did not overcome the presumption that the limitation “protocol translator for receiving” does not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph.
EnOcean GmbH v. Face Intern. Corp., 742 F.3d 955, 958 (2014) (citations omitted). See also Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, No. 2013-1130, 2015 WL 3687459, at *7 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (en banc) (“we should abandon characterizing as ‘strong’ the presumption that a limitation lacking the word ‘means’ is not subject to § 112, para. 6”). As with the term “receiver” in EnOcean, the term “protocol translator” (i.e., the absence of the term means) presumptively connotes sufficiently definite structure to those of skill in the art. See EnOcean at 960. The Examiner made no finding to rebut that presumption.

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