Source: https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/nollandolan_exactions/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:39:31+00:00

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Posts categorized "▪ Nollan/Dolan | Exactions"
We're looking forward to a good crowd at the upcoming ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference, when we shall converge on Charleston, SC, January 25-27, 2018. We've received word that our main conference hotel, the Francis Marion, has sold out.
But if you haven't reserved your space yet, don't despair. The conference organizers have made arrangements at a hotel that is very nearby, the Marriott Courtyard, for a special conference rate. That hotel is just across the park from the Francis Marion. ALI is also making arrangements for conference room blocks in two other nearby hotels. Details on all of these alternatives are posted here.
One more thing that we didn't mention in our preview: there will also be a special sneak preview of the movie about Kelo v. City of New London, Little Pink House. If you joined us in Austin in 2016, you’ll remember that we spoke with Ted Balaker, the film's producer about the movie, which was then being shot. It is now complete, and we're privileged to be getting a before-the-public screening of the film on Friday evening of the Conference.
So plan on joining us in Charleston, January 25-27, 2018. Sign up now!
Update: our colleague Bryan Wenter has his take on one of the cases denied review here ("U.S. Supreme Court Again Declines to Consider Important Property Rights Issue Regarding the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine") ("Because the current composition of the U.S. Supreme Court leans ideologically conservative by any traditional measure and it takes only four of nine Justices to grant certiorari, on the surface it is surprising that the Court has yet to take up a case, such as CBIA or 616 Croft Ave., that would finally resolve this distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings. The surprise is enhanced to a degree by the fact that the Court considered both cases in conference four times, which suggests a serious interest in the issue.").
Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, No. 16-1305 (cert. denied Oct. 2, 2017). This is the case where the NC Legislature gave municipalities the green light to move the location of the "public trust" shoreline. What had always been private was thus public. We filed an amicus brief urging the Court to review the case. This case caught at least one Justice's attention, since it was relisted after a response was requested. Here's a local news story on the case: "U.S. Supreme Court declines to hear case that threatened public's right to beach access."
Jarreau v. S. Lafourche Levee District, No. 17-163 (cert. denied Oct. 30, 2017). This is the case asking whether a state can, consistent with the Just Compensation Clause, categorically bar "business losses" which occur as an inevitable result of a taking. We filed an amicus brief in this one, too. Here's an oped about the case, which summarizes the issues. This one also seemed like it might have legs, since a response was requested. But cert denied.
616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, No. 16-1137 (cert. denied Oct. 30, 2017). This case presented the "legislative vs. executive exaction" question that has been left unanswered for a while. We said so in an amicus brief we joined. This case seemed like a good vehicle, too, especially after it was relisted four times.
Wayside Church v. Van Buren County, No. 17-88 (cert. denied Oct. 30, 2017). Williamson County ripeness, again. An issue that is really ripe for SCOTUS review (pun intended). Lots of amici jumped in, although we didn't file a brief in this case (so we know it isn't us causing the denials, at least).
What to make, if anything, from these denials in cases that looked pretty good? No real vehicle problems, and issues that are primed for the Court to take up: yet cert denied, denied, denied...and denied.
There are many ways to read the tea leaves, including the usual "the Court just wasn't interested." But we have speculated that these denials are not something to necessarily despair about, and are more a sign of inopportune timing and the Justices who are supportive of property rights wanting to keep their powder dry for a time when they have a more solid majority. We base our speculation on two cases.
First, Murr v. Wisconsin, a decision where Justice Kennedy authored a perplexing majority opinion that seems to satisfy no one except those who simply think regulatory takings case should always be decided against the property owner. With Justice Kennedy possibly controlling the majority in property cases, perhaps the risk of another Murr was simply too much, and it was better for the pro-property Justices to vote to deny cert than risk it.
Bolstering this speculation is the second case, Bay Point Properties v. Mississippi Transportation Comm'n, No. 16-1077 (cert. denied June 26, 2017), in which we represented the petitioner. There, after relisting the case multiple times, the Court denied cert on the last day of the term, three days after ruling in Murr. No Justice dissented from the denial, but Justices Gorsuch and Thomas filed a curious "statement" which says (we're paraphrasing here) good issue, lower court split, and interesting case; you should raise this issue down the road "at the next opportunity." If so, then why not now? The only answer we could muster was that things were not just ready on the merits to get a good result.
Which is what led us to the conclusion that this maybe what is going on in these other cases -- good issues all, but timing is just not good now.
That's our take. So what do you think is going on?
One last reminder: next Tuesday, July 25, 2017 at 2:00 pm Eastern, is "The U.S. Supreme Court and Property Rights: The 'Larger Parcel" Issue and the Future of Regulatory Takings," ALI-CLE's first look at the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision on the "larger parcel" or denominator issue in regulatory takings cases where the plaintiff owns more than a single parcel, Murr v. Wisconsin.
Please come and join Sara Beachy, Michael Berger, Steven Eagle, and John Groen for lively and informative analysis and discussion. I will be introducing and moderating the panel.
We've reserved much of the allotted time for questions. See you on Tuesday.
Ultimately, the Commission approved a coastal development permit allowing seawall demolition and reconstruction, with the addition of midbluff geogrid protection below Lynch‟s home. The permit was subject to several conditions, three of which are at issue here. Special condition No. 1(a) prohibits reconstruction of the lower stairway. Special condition No. 2 provides that the seawall permit will expire in 20 years and prohibits future blufftop redevelopment from relying on the seawall as a source of geologic stability or protection. Special condition No. 3 requires that, before expiration of the 20-year period, plaintiffs must apply for a new permit to remove the seawall, change its size or configuration, or extend the authorization period.
The owners recorded these restrictions, as the were required to do, and "[a]round the same time," they objected to the conditions. While this case was being decided, they rebuilt the seawall.
In the land use context, a landowner may not challenge a permit condition if he has acquiesced to it either by specific agreement, or by failure to challenge the condition while accepting the benefits afforded by the permit. Generally, challenges to allegedly unlawful conditions must be litigated in administrative mandate proceedings.
Slip op. at 5-6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Why the court qualified the above statement with "in the land use context," the opinion does not explain. Is this not the same in other contexts? If not, all we can figure is that the court views land use regulations as some sort of super-duper exercise of government's police powers, or that property rights are not on equal footing with other civil rights.
Does this mean that in other contexts that if you accept a permit to exercise your rights, you can accept and challenge simultaneously? For example, what if a city says "here’s your parade permit, granted only on the condition that you don’t speak ill of Donald Trump." So if you hold your parade despite this unconstitutional condition, have you waived your free speech challenge under Lynch, or does the italicized limitation on the holding show that land use regs are different in the California court's view?
In general, permit holders are obliged to accept the burdens of a permit along with its benefits. (See Sports Arenas Properties, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1985) 40 Cal.3d 808, 815.) This rule stems from the equitable maxim, “He who takes the benefit must bear the burden.” (Civ. Code, § 3521.) Plaintiffs obtained all the benefits of their permit when they built the seawall. They cannot now be heard to complain of its burdens.
The court rejected the owners' arguments that they might lose their home was a reason to not apply the general waiver rule. We can't make exceptions to legislative acts (referring to the fact that the California legislature has, in the past, allowed simultaneous challenge to allegedly illegal exactions, even though the owner accepted a permit), that's not our role as a court. "If such an expansion is needed, the Legislature is the appropriate body to create it." Slip op. at 9.
Besides, "[a]n exception allowing applicants to challenge a permit‟s restrictions after taking all of its benefits would change the dynamics of permit negotiations and would foster litigation." Slip op. at 9. All we can say to that is "wow." So it's cool that your home may fall into the ocean if you want to challenge this condition on your exercise of your constitutional rights, but hey, that's your problem or the legislature's problem, not ours. The court's role is to save local government from litigation.
We can't say we were surprised by this ruling -- it is California, after all -- but to have the opinion lay out the court's disregard for anything but government power so starkly, with nary a nod towards the predicament that the owners found themselves in, is still shocking.
The Federal Circuit's Lost Tree decision (cert denied just after Murr, so this should be seen as a bookend to that case).
Town of Ponce Inlet v. Pacetta, LLC, No. 5D14-4520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 16, 2017).
Case to watch: 616 Croft Avenue, LLC v. City of West Hollywood, No. 16-1137 (cert. petition filed Mar. 17, 2017) (legislative vs. administrative exactions).
Case to Watch II: Highland-in-the-Woods, LLC v. Polk County, No. 2D15-2801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2017) (quasi-legislative exactions and Nollan/Dolan).
Case to Watch III: Scher v. Burke, No. S230104 (Cal. June 15, 2017) (public recreational dedications along the coast, and vested rights).
Case to Watch IV: State of New Jersey v. North Beach 1003, LLC, No. A-3393-15T4 (N.J. App. Div. June 22, 2017) (coastal dunes and takings).
Case to Watch V: "Voters May Not Usurp City’s Administrative Land Use Authority Through Initiative Process" (from Miller, Starr, Regalia's land use blog).
Thanks to all those who were on the call. They tell us there was record attendance.
Links From Today's ABA Presentation - "Takings: Emerging Issues"
Update: the audio recording is posted here.
Here are the links to the cases we mentioned in today's ABA State and Local Government Law Section presentation, "Takings: Emerging Issues."
Here's the latest in the "audacious" takings case brought by AIG against the federal government for the 2008 fed takeover. The heart of the complaint is that the acquisition of AIG was an unconstitutional exaction. The Court of Federal Claims rendered a verdict that was hailed as a groundbreaking victory, but which ultimately denied the only relief which the CFC can enter, a money judgment. An appeal to the Federal Circuit followed, naturally.
In Starr International Co., Inc. v. United States, No. 15-5103 (May 9, 2017) that court threw out the takings claim for lack of standing. The corporation had standing to assert the claim, not individual shareholders.
There's a lot to digest in the 38 page opinion, and the 32 page concurring opinion, and we will allow you to read them for yourself. The key portion of the majority opinion, in our view, starts on page 33, which addresses the plaintiff's claims for standing under the Fifth Amendment. Starr argued that "the Government has a duty not to violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause because the Fifth Amendment creates a 'special relationship' between AIG's shareholders and the Government. Starr does not cite any support for its submission that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause creates a Government 'duty.'" Slip op. at 33. Even if it did create a duty, the duty would run to the corporation, and not the shareholders.
In the end, the Federal Circuit concluded "while we have no reason to doubt that Starr was affected by the Government’s acquisition of AIG equity, Starr has not established any ground for direct standing under either federal or Delaware law. The alleged injuries to Starr are merely incidental to injuries to AIG, and any remedy would go to AIG, not Starr." Slip op. at 35.
Judge Wallach's concurring opinion, focused on the CFC's Tucker Act jurisdiction and the plaintiff's Article III standing, concluded that the CFC both lacked jurisdiction, and that Starr did not have standing. As we noted above, a long concurring opinion if you'd like the details of why.
Is this the last of this litigation? Given the players, we kind of doubt it.
Remember back from Admin Law the notion of a "quasi-judicial" proceeding? That term always has bugged us, because, you know, it was used when an agency was sorta acting like a court (but also was sorta acting like a legislative body). Half full, half empty, take your pick.
We are not convinced that the County's decision regarding Highlands was only legislative in nature and not adjudicative. While the County ordinance requiring the connection to a reuse system may also apply to other subdivisions in the county, Highlands' permit was conditioned on the construction of the reuse improvements as well as its dedication of the improvements and land to the County.
Slip op. at 6-7 (footnote omitted). This was merely a sorta-legislative exaction, and therefore subject to the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz tests. Things seemed to be looking up for the property owner.
Highlands applied for a permit to develop a subdivision consisting of sixty residential lots as well as areas. The County required the installation and dedication of reuse improvements the subdivision that will be used by the future residents for landscape irrigation. The conditions imposed by the County are directly related to the impact of the subdivision on the state's water resources and do not impermissibly reach beyond that impact. The fact that reclaimed water was not available for two years, requiring Highlands to use potable water to irrigate the landscaping in its common areas during that time, does not alter the conclusion that the reuse improvements have a rough proportionality to the impact of the development. The unavailability of reclaimed water for the common areas for a period of two years is insignificant in comparison to the availability of reclaimed water for the indefinite future of the entire sixty-lot subdivision.
Slip op. at 9. Having survived the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz test, the court upheld the exaction, and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim.
Here are the full set of petitioner-side amici briefs in 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, No. 16-1137, the case which asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz exactions standards apply to conditions on development imposed by a legislature.
The City waived response, but the Court asked for one. This could get interesting, so stay tuned.
Here's the amicus brief filed yesterday by the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, joined by Owners' Counsel of America, in a case we've been following.
This case asks the Court to resolve a big outstanding issue: are legislatively-imposed exactions (however that term is defined) subject to the same high level of scrutiny under the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz test as are administratively-imposed exactions?
The Respondent, City of West Hollywood (“City”), forces property owners into the same unconstitutional dilemma which faced James and Marilyn Nollan, Florence Dolan, and Coy Koontz. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). Specifically, the Petitioners were forced to choose between their fundamental rights to either (a) obtain just compensation or (b) develop and use their property. Indeed, they were foreclosed from obtaining a building permit without dedicating significant monetary assets to fund the City’s affordable housing program—i.e., private property that the City could not have taken out right. 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of W. Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“The City calculates the ‘in-lieu’ fee according to a schedule developed via resolution by the West Hollywood City Council…”).
While that permitting condition would have unquestionably been subject to a heightened standard of review, under Koontz, if imposed at the discretion of executive actors—the California courts held that a much more deferential standard should apply in this case solely because the condition was imposed by dictate of an enacted ordinance. 616 Croft Ave., 3 Cal. App. 5th at 625; Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854, 860, 880–881 (Cal. 1996). But the constitutional injury is the same whether inflicted at the discretion of a lawless zoning commission or a legislative body indifferent to an individual’s constitutional rights. And the Takings Clause applies by the same terms regardless of which governmental entity has taken the lead in advancing confiscatory regulatory policies. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Flordia Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2012).
Here's the recording of the March 20, 2017 oral arguments in Murr v. Wisconsin, the e "larger parcel" or "denominator" case.
The printed transcript is posted here, and our summary of the arguments is posted here. Our preview of the arguments, which includes link to the briefs, is here.
Friday Round-Up: Murr Arguments, Exactions Cert Petition, Houston "Zoning"
Here's a more complete analysis of the recently-filed cert petition on whether legislatively-mandated permit conditions are exactions subject to Nollan/Dolan. From our colleague Bryan Wenter, former City Attorney for Walnut Creek, California. at Miller Starr Regalia's land use blog.
Professor Kanner on the Murr oral arguments. Our summary of the arguments here.
Another summary of the Murr arguments, from a local Wisconsin paper.
"Miners win $100 million from Sacramento County in political influence case." Wow. From the Sacramento Bee.
Forbes' review of the Kelo movie, Little Pink House.
How does Houston get by without zoning? "How Spontaneous Order Keeps Houston Affordable."
New Cert Petition: Are Legislatively-Imposed Permit Conditions Subject To Nexus/Proportionality?
Here's the cert petition, docketed yesterday, in a case we've been following on legislatively-imposed permit exactions, an issue in dire need of Supreme Court resolution.
creates a need for low-cost housing.
Whether a legislatively mandated permit condition is subject to scrutiny under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as set out in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
After the Hawaii Supreme Court decided GATRI v. Blane, 962 P.2d 367 (Haw. 1998) one big question remained.
But the state legislature in the Coastal Zone Management Act mandated a different result in the coastal zone and there, the planning also controls land use, as the court held in GATRI. Thus, in order to develop property in the coastal zone in accordance with the applicable zoning, the applicable CP/GP must also permit the use. This is know as "plan-zone consistency," and when the zoning and the planning are consistent, all is well.
The big question, however, is what happens when the zoning and the CP/GP are not consistent? First, we know that as a consequence of the inconsistency, the landowner cannot use her land in accordance with the zoning. Second, what, if any uses can be made of the property under the CP/GP designation? If none, this should set off your takings alarm bells: when a property is deprived by regulation of its economically beneficial uses, what is left but a Lucas wipeout?
As we detailed in our preview post, this is the issue confronting the Hawaii Supreme Court in a case argued last week, Leone v. County of Maui. There, the parcel is zoned "Hotel" (which permits residential use as a matter of right), but is designated on the CP as "park." In other words, its GATRI inconsistent.
We won't go into the background or the arguments made by each side (for details, see our earlier post, and the amicus brief we filed in support of the property owners in an earlier phase of the case in which the County lost its argument that the case wasn't ripe under Williamson County because the owners hadn't made an attempt to get the hotel zoning and the park CP consistent by seeking an amendment to the CP which would allow for residential use). Instead, we've posted the oral argument recording above for your edification.
After the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Williamson County doesn't require a takings plaintiff to seek a change in the law in order to ripen her claim, the Lucas wipeout question ended up being presented to a Maui jury, which somehow concluded that despite the plan/zone inconsistency, the Leones' have some economically viable uses remaining.
What those uses are, we can't imagine. We know the Leones can't build a home which the hotel zoning would otherwise permit. And we know the Leones can't make use of it as a park because the lot is too small (the minimum lot size in the park CP is 1 acre, and the Leone parcel is less than 1 acre). That should have been game, set, and match.
The oral argument recording (above and at the top of the post) has all of the details, and is a worthy listen for you takings junkies. The issues are all there: Williamson County, Lucas, Nollan/Dolan, nothing omitted.

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