Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/fpmd/chapter6/section1
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:52:45+00:00

Document:
Very shortly after the complaint is filed, you will need to prepare for a set of conferences. Federal Rules 16 and 26(f) govern these conferences, but set forth the timing of them in a fairly confusing way. Consult your court's Local Rules or your judge's standing order for an understanding of the sequencing of these conferences. The purpose of the discovery conference is to develop a mutually acceptable discovery plan which anticipates and attempts to resolves potential discovery issues. The pretrial conference with the court -- used to greater or lesser extent depending on the judge and the nature of the case -- is intended to permit the court to exercise managerial control over the case in order to resolve it efficiently.1 Important decisions are made at these conferences; you should prepare for them carefully. This preparation requires you to anticipate and take positions on issues which may occur much later in the litigation.
Apart from the discovery plan that must be discussed with opposing counsel, you must develop your own internal plan, which should be reviewed and revised as the litigation progresses. Successful discovery requires that you identify what you must prove as early as possible. The plan should identify the facts that you must prove, the discovery tools most likely to assist in proving those facts, and a sequence for using the various discovery tools. As you accumulate information, you must maintain a carefully organized file that shows both the content and the source of every document. As the case develops, continue to identify the facts that you can prove and how you will prove them. In more complex litigation, you may find it useful to create a computerized database of documents and potential testimony.
The discovery plan should set forth the sequence of discovery. If you anticipate protracted discovery, you should begin it promptly and proceed in stages. Some basic information should be given automatically under the Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures. You can then use carefully drafted interrogatories to identify other documents and their respective custodians, potential witnesses, objective facts and the contentions of the opposing parties. Next, request production of documents and, when appropriate, request admissions. Last, depose important witnesses and again consider requests for admission. In a class action, early discovery should also establish the existence of a class and, when feasible, the identity and addresses of class members. As you complete each stage in your discovery plan, you should review and modify it to reflect what you have learned.
The amount, order, and type of discovery needed varies from case to case. In many instances, however, recurring issues make it possible to borrow liberally from discovery requests used in similar cases. National support centers may have forms available. In an appropriate case, form books on discovery, particularly American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts, may be helpful. Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper’s Federal Practice and Procedure forms can be helpful, and forms are becoming increasingly accessible on the Internet. Recognize the limitations of forms: they save time, but they were not written with your specific case in mind. Use them as a beginning rather than as an end.
There is danger in not using discovery tools to the fullest extent. If you are unfamiliar with the full potential for discovery, you may overlook important opportunities. Discussing discovery with more experienced counsel is always worthwhile. The underutilization of discovery is especially common in test case litigation, where a focus on critical legal issues may obscure the need for thorough discovery. Impact litigation is often dependent upon compelling facts that convince the court that its intervention is necessary to correct a systemic injury. Discovery is vital to finding the facts to make a record as the foundation for successful litigation.
The role and authority of federal magistrate judges is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72 and 73. Rule 72 permits magistrate judges to decide pretrial matters referred to them by district court judges, and Rule 73 permits them to conduct trials “[w]hen specially designated ... by local rule or order of the district court and when all parties consent.” Magistrate judges may act as special masters,16 and may have additional duties established by court order or local rule, so long as these are not “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”17 In all of these situations, magistrate judges are authorized to act only to the extent granted by the district court. The advisability of referring matters to a magistrate judge is one of the subjects to be discussed at a pretrial conference. The manner in which cases are assigned to magistrate judges is determined by local rule.
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
4. The Federal Rules have presumptive limits on some forms of discovery. E.g., absent stipulation or leave of court, each side is limited to 10 depositions and interrogatories are capped at 25. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i); 33(a)(1). If the parties intend to exceed these limits, many courts require the issue to be addressed at the 26(f) conference and report.
5. Many courts require the 26(f) report to address the dates and sequence for disclosure of expert reports and related expert depositions under Rule 26(a)(2). Therefore, conferring with your expert prior to the 26(f) conference is advisable.
6. Many courts require the parties to discuss and report on issues relating to the disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information as part of the Rule 26(f) requirement. The parties may be required to report on matters such as the nature and extenet of the contemplated disclosure of electronically stored information, the form in which the electronically stored information should be produced, and the estimated burden or costs of retrieving and reviewing that information.
7. Rule 26(f)(4) allows local practice variations regarding timing of the conference and the issuance of a report. Consult your court’s local rules for implementation of the mandatory initial disclosure requirements and procedures. Id.
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2).
12. Id. 16(b)(4). Compare Summers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599, 604-06 (10th Cir. 1997) (permitting modification) and Burton v. United States, 199 F.R.D. 194, 197 (D. W. Va. 2001) (same) with Book v. Nordrill Inc., 826 F.2d 1457, 1461 (5th Cir. 1987) (refusing to permit new expert to testify); Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D. 138, 140 (D. Me. 1985) (denying modification). See Marmo v. IBP, Inc., No. 8:00CV527, 2005 WL 675809, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 3, 2005) (In holding there was no showing of good cause for modification of case management order to allow designation of new expert witness, court noted that the “primary measure” of the Rule 16 good cause standard “is the moving party's diligence in attempting to meet the case management order's requirements.”).
13. 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice para. 16.05 (2010).
14. Spain v. Bd. of Educ. of Meridian Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 214 F.3d 925, 930 (7th Cir. 2000).
15. See, e.g., Sanders v. Union Pac. R.R., 193 F.3d 1080, 1082 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a), (b)(3) .
18. See, e.g., Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2006) (denial of motion to amend not dispositive, but noting cases to the contrary); Vogel v. U.S. Office Prods. Co., 258 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2001) (order of remand is dispositive and can only be entered by district court); Calabro v. Stone, No. CV2003-4522 (CBA)(MDG), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5527, at *1, 2005 WL 327547, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2005) (ruling on motion to amend complaint treated as dispositive, but acknowledging contrary case law); Benedict v. Zimmer, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 305 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (motion for leave to provide expert report is nondispositive matter); Yang v. Brown Univ., 149 F.R.D. 440, 442-43 (D.R.I. 1993) (order precluding testimony of expert witness as discovery sanction deemed dispositive). Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(D) (district court “may refer a motion for attorneys' fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b) as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter.”).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
20. Particularly in the discovery context, this is viewed as an abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 1999).
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2009).
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The right to de novo review is confined to the specific issues raised by the objection. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 187 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 1999).
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). See McCombs v. Meijer, 395 F.3d 346, 360 (6th Cir. 2005) (district court cannot simply “concur” in the magistrate’s findings, but must conduct its own review).
24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
25. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153 (1985).
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
27. See, e.g., Patel v. Baluyot, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13442, at *5 (5th Cir. Jun. 30, 2010); United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 526 (3d Cir. 2010); Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991). See also McCombs, 395 F.3d at 360.
28. Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 766 (10th Cir. 2000); see also, United States v. Bach, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16339, at *9-10 (1st Cir. Aug. 5, 2010).
29. In some jurisdictions, one benefit of consenting to trial by a magistrate judge is that the parties are able to obtain a date certain for trial. District judges are required to give priority to criminal trials, and this priority often results in changes or delays in the trial of civil cases.
30. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585 (2003).
31. See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) . Parties are to be advised “that they are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences.” Id.
32. Roell, 538 U.S. at 590.
33. Mark I, Inc. v. Gruber, 38 F.3d 369, 370 (7th Cir. 1994).
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) . See also Manion v. American Airlines, Inc., 251 F. Supp.2d 171, 175 (D.D.C. 2003) (allegation of magistrate bias found insufficient to meet “extraordinary circumstances” standard required to vacate referral with consent of parties).
35. Sockwell v. Phelps, 906 F.2d 1096, 1097 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(5) .
37. See, e.g., Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine Inc., 228 F.3d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 636
 § 636
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 636
 v. 
 § 636
 v. 
 v. 
 § 636
 v.