Source: http://texas-opinions.com/files/05-06-00063-CV-pet-denied-Aug-2009-Batson-challenge.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:49:03+00:00

Document:
overruling his objection to the racially discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge during jury selection.
We agree. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
protection rights of the excluded juror. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
Ins. Co., 905 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, writ dism'd by agr.); see also Snyder v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (2008).
on the equal- protection or due-process rights of the litigant. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616.
(5th Cir. 1995); Dominguez, 905 S.W.2d at 715; Tex. Tech Univ. Health Sciences. Ctr. v. Apodaca, 876 S.
an equal-protection challenge to Blanc's exercise of peremptory strikes.
Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1208; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (“Miller-El II”); Davis v. Fisk Elec.
Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 514 n.4 (Tex. 2008); Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445-46.
strikes and the trial court ruled on them, so we proceed directly to the second step of the analysis.
peremptory strikes. Moeller contends that Blanc did not carry this burden as to Juror No. 28.
discretion if, on the evidence, it reasonably could have reached only one decision and failed to do so.
the strike at face value and determines whether it is a reasonably specific race-neutral reason.
discretion standard, appellate courts “do not defer to the trial court on questions of law”), petition for cert.
Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587, 590 (Colo. 1998); People v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 715, 726-27 (Mich.
that the neutral explanation must be “related to the particular case to be tried.” Id.
neutral on its face, even if it had a disparate impact on Latino venire members. Id. at 361-63.
of discriminatory intent or a bald assertion of good faith to be valid. Id.
legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e].” 545 U.S. at 239 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20).
specific” to provide a factual basis that courts can review for legitimacy.
variety” was an impermissible race-based strike. Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 208 (S.C. 1998).
explanation that the prosecutor “had no information about” a particular venire member that he struck.
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987). Other cases are in accord. See, e.
based on juror's “appearance and reaction to voir dire” was too vague to satisfy second step); Zakour v.
challenges were “all based on experience and body mechanics”).
explanation . . . was legally insufficient to refute a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination.” Id.
determine if it is pretextual).
(rejecting explanation that prosecutor “just did not get a good feel from” a potential juror).
after it became apparent that the court would not be able to seat a jury drawn only from the first venire.
No. 28, an African-American venire member.
putting that person on the jury.
what that juror's beliefs are.
It would be sole impartiality, Your Honor.
juror, and I'm not going to accept that juror.
some panelists, he did not individually question Juror No. 28.
legally distinguishable from a general denial of discriminatory intent.
reasonably specific race-neutral reason for striking her.
requirement of a race-neutral reason. See, e.g., Horsley, 864 F.2d at 1546.
the peremptory challenge of Juror No. 28.
issues on appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.
Batson objection. Accordingly, we will generally refer to the strikes as Blanc's.
El II, 545 U.S. at 266.
persuasive authority. See Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993).
appellees struck; he said only that his notes did not reflect their race.
to a lawsuit and had never served on a jury.

References: v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v.