Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=49817:gr-163352-2007&amp;catid=1494&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 13:01:56+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 163352 - WT Construction Inc., et al. v. Dept. of Public Works & Highways, et al.
WT CONSTRUCTION, INC. and CHIARA CONSTRUCTION (represented by its Proprietor, Efren N. Rigor), Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE - DPWH-REGION VII and WTG CONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondents.
On December 8, 2003, the petitioners filed a letter-complaint against public respondent BAC Region VII before the Secretary of DPWH. Without awaiting the decision of the DPWH Secretary on the aforesaid complaint, the petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction, Civil Case No. 29790, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch VII, against public respondent BAC Region VII. It was the petitioners' contention that BAC Region VII did not comply with the May 28, 2003 Decision of the DPWH Secretary that the petitioners be awarded the Flyover Project should their bid be the lowest. The petitioners sent a letter to the DPWH Secretary informing the latter of the elevation of the case to the RTC.
On April 30, 2004, the case was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies for failure of the petitioners to await the decision of the DPWH Secretary. On the other hand, DPWH Secretary Soriquez issued a resolution on March 12, 2004 denying the petitioners' appeal and affirmed the recommendation of public respondent BAC Region VII. Thereafter, the contract for the Flyover Project was approved by DPWH Secretary Soriquez. The Notice to Commence Work was issued to private respondent WTG on March 15, 2004.8 Private respondent WTG then proceeded with the construction of the Flyover Project.
The petitioners allege that as the bidder who submitted the lowest numerical bid, they are entitled to the award of the contract on the Flyover Project. It is their position that the PCAB special license is necessary only after the award of the contract has been made and the bidder's bond they submitted should be considered as a surety bond which is sufficient compliance with the requirements. They likewise contend that bad faith attended their disqualification and the subsequent award of the contract to private respondent WTG. They allege, among others, that the award of the contract to WTG was premature considering they have filed an appeal to the DPWH Secretary and that the approval of the contract by then Acting Secretary Soriquez was a forgery. They further insist that the decision of the DPWH Secretary on the letter-complaint of the petitioners after the opening of their bid is of doubtful origin and validity.
Public respondent BAC Region VII, on the other hand, disputes the allegations made by the petitioners. They contend that they complied with the May 28, 2003 Decision of the DPWH Secretary to "open and read" the bid envelopes of the petitioners and "to evaluate the same as to the responsiveness and compliance with existing laws, rules and regulations." It was only after passing such evaluation was the BAC Region VII mandated to award the Flyover Project to the petitioners. The petitioners, however, failed to present a special PCAB license for the joint venture and to submit a surety bond, both of which are required in order to declare the petitioners' bid the lowest and most advantageous to the Government. Further, the public respondent BAC Region VII contends that the contract with private respondent WTG was only approved by the DPWH Secretary after the issuance of the Order denying the appeal of the petitioners. As such, the notice to commence was issued only after the award has been made.
A preliminary mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy that parties may avail of for the preservation or protection of their rights or interests, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action.10 Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, however, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded for the reason that it requires the performance of particular acts that go beyond the maintenance of the status quo.11 As such, the requirements for its issuance are more stringent. Generally, a preliminary mandatory injunction may only issue in cases of extreme urgency and where the rights of the requesting party are clear and unmistakable. It may also issue in cases where the relative inconvenience bears strongly in the requesting party's favor, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties, which was recently and arbitrarily interrupted by another party, rather than to establish a new relationship between and among the parties. Being an extraordinary remedy, the burden is on the requesting party to clearly show entitlement to the issuance thereof.12 The requesting party or movant must show the existence of the right to be protected and that the subject of the injunction violates such right. Further, the movant must show that the invasion of such right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent serious damage.13 The petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
In the case at bar, the petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to direct public respondent BAC Region VII to award the contract to the Flyover Project to the petitioners. The petitioners claim that they are entitled to the award as the lowest bidder for the construction of the said infrastructure project of the Government. In support of their claim, the petitioners allege fraud and bad faith on the part of public respondent BAC Region VII. They allege conspiracy, forgery and fraud on the part of the public respondent in awarding the subject contract to private respondent WTG. These grave allegations were not sufficiently substantiated.
The same may be said of the allegation of forgery on the signature of DPWH Secretary Soriquez on the contract with private respondent WTG. The petitioners' allegation, without more, is not sufficient to determine whether or not the alleged forgery was committed. This involves a factual issue that requires evidentiary proof as forgery cannot be presumed but must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
In the instant case, the controversy arose from the complaint filed by a bidder seeking to enjoin the award and implementation of a government infrastructure project. As such, the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order was properly filed with this Court in accordance with the provisions of R.A. 8975.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
2 Id. at p. 6.
4 Id. at p. 8.
5 Id. at p. 10, citing Decision of Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez dated May 28, 2003. Caption supplied.
6 Id. at pp. 11, 166.
7 Id. at pp. 166-167.
8 Id. at p. 283.
10 The Commissioner of Customs v. The Honorable Judge Cloribel, 125 Phil. 651 (1967); Uniciano Paramedical College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 285.
11 Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto v. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005; Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 30, 37 (1999).
12 The Commissioner of Customs v. The Honorable Judge Cloribel, see note at 10; Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Walfrido de los Angeles, G.R. No. L-27829, August 19, 1988, 164 SCRA 543.
13 Rimeo Gustillo v. Ricardo Real, Sr., A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 1, 9.
15 Eduardo J. Jalandoni v. National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration, 108 Phil. 486, 491 (1960); Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 101678, February 3, 1992, 205 SCRA 705.
16 An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for Other Purposes, November 7, 2000.
17 Heherson Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 162243, November 29, 2006.

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