Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/408/901/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 05:05:16+00:00

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It is barely a century since men in parts of this country carried guns constantly because the law did not afford protection. In that setting, the words used in these cases, if directed toward such an armed civilian, could well have led to death or serious bodily injury. When we undermine the general belief that the law will give protection against fighting words and profane and abusive language such as the utterances involved in these cases, we take steps to return to the law of the jungle. These three cases, like Gooding, are small but symptomatic steps. If continued, this permissiveness will tend further to erode public confidence in the law- that subtle but indispensable ingredient of ordered liberty.
must be spoken with the intent to have the above effect or with a reckless disregard of the probability of the above consequences.' State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 353, 266 A.2d 579, 583-584 (1970).
that a person may constitutionally indulge his taste for obscenities in private does not mean that he is free to intrude them upon the attentions of others.' 419 F.2d, at 646.
"It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-377 (1927) ( Brandeis, J., concurring).' 403 U.S., at 24.
The line between such rights and the type of conduct proscribed by the New Jersey statute is difficult to draw.
The preservation of the right of free and robust speech is accorded high priority in our society and under the Constitution. Yet, there are other significant values. One of the hallmarks of a civilized society is the level and quality of discourse. We have witnessed in recent years a disquieting deterioration in standards of taste and civility in speech. For the increasing number of persons who derive satisfaction from vocabularies dependent upon filth and obscenities, there are abundant opportunities to gratify their debased tastes. But our free society must be flexible enough to tolerate even such a debasement provided it occurs without subjecting unwilling audiences to the type of verbal nuisance committed in this case. The shock and sense of affront, and sometimes the injury to mind and spirit, can be as great from words as from some physical attacks.
'. . . the words must be spoken loudly, in a public place and must be of such a nature as to be likely to incite the hearer to an immediate breach of the peace or to be likely, in the light of the gender and age of the listener and the setting of the utterance, to affect the sensibilities of a hearer. The words must be spoken with the intent to have the above effect or with a reckless disregard of the probability of the above consequences.' State v.
Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 353, 266 A.2d 579, 383 (1970).
any constitutional problems. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-310.' 315 U.S., at 572, 62 S.Ct. at 769.
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 ( 1940). In other words, the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression.' Gooding v. Wilson, supra, 405 U.S. at 521-522, 92 S.Ct. at 1106.
Footnote 1 Insofar as the Court's decision in Gooding turns on vagueness principles, it seems inapplicable to this case. The essence of the due process vagueness concern is that no man shall be punished for violating a statute which is not 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them lable to its penalties.' Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126 (1926). Although the New Jersey statute involved in this case is hardly a model of clarity, it cannot reasonably be said that appellant could have been unaware that the language used under the circumstances was prescribed by the statute. Unless he is a person of infirm mentality, appellant certainly knew that his deliberate use four times of what Mr. Justice Harlan terms in Cohen a 'scurrilous epithet,' in the presence of a captive audience of women and children, violated the statute.
Footnote 2 See, e. g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960).
Footnote 3 See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 844, 853 (1970).
Footnote 4 Nor does the continued existence of the New Jersey statute, which must now be construed and applied by the New Jersey courts in light of Gooding, have the effect of deterring others in the exercise of their First Amendment rights. To remand this case with the suggestion that the overbreadth doctrine be applied accomplishes only one result: it creates the potential that appellant will receive an undeserved windfall.

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