Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/probable-cause/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:51:40+00:00

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The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Bailey on Monday, October 15, 2018.
Searches and Seizures—Probable Cause—Search Without Warrant—Odor Detection—Use of Dogs.
In this interlocutory appeal, the supreme court considered whether the trial court erred in ruling that state troopers lacked probable cause to search defendant’s car when they placed Mason, a narcotics-detecting dog, inside the car to sniff around. The court held that the totality of the circumstances, including Mason’s alert to the odor of narcotics while sniffing the exterior of defendant’s car, provided the troopers with probable cause to search the car. The fact that Mason’s alert was not a final indication did not render it irrelevant to the troopers’ probable cause determination. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing evidence collected by the troopers during a subsequent hand search of the car.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Zuniga on Monday, June 27, 2016.
Probable Cause to Search—Totality of the Circumstances—Marijuana Odor.
In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the odor of marijuana is relevant to the totality of the circumstances test and can contribute to a probable cause determination. Even though possession of one ounce or less of marijuana is allowed under Colorado law, many marijuana-related activities remain unlawful, meaning the odor of marijuana can support an inference that a crime is ongoing. Under the facts of this case, the Court concluded that there was probable cause to search the vehicle for illegal drugs in light of the two occupants’ divergent stories about their time visiting Colorado, their “extreme” nervousness, the strong odor of raw marijuana coming from the vehicle, and a drug-sniffing dog’s alert.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Callahan v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas on Monday, November 16, 2015.
In 2010, the Kansas City Police Department (KCKPD) received three allegations of theft when its specialized SCORE unit was involved in executing search warrants. As a result, the KCKPD and the FBI set up a sting operation, “Operation Sticky Fingers,” to determine the integrity of the SCORE unit. Operation Sticky Fingers involved the execution of a fictitious search warrant at a residence monitored via live video and audio. Bait items had been placed in a bedroom and the basement. During the execution of the search warrant, KCKPD Detective Jon Kelley observed several instances of actual theft but could not tell which officer was involved because of the protective gear worn by SCORE officers. Detective Kelley relayed his observations of the theft to Captain Lawson at another location, who then contacted Captain Nicholson at the residence. Because of the delay in relaying the information from Detective Kelley to Captain Nicholson, it was possible for the officers to have moved around the house before being identified.
After the sting, the SCORE officers returned to the parking garage at KCKPD headquarters and KCKPD commanders arrested all of the SCORE officers as they exited the van. It was later discovered that only Officers Forrest, Bell, and Sillings were involved in the theft. The other three officers, Officers Callahan, Pitman, and Hammons, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City and various individual defendants, asserting violations of their Fourth Amendment rights for arrests without probable cause. The plaintiffs also moved for partial summary judgment on the issue. The district court denied summary judgment, finding that the record supported a finding that probable cause existed to arrest the entire SCORE unit. The individual defendants then moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court denied without making specific findings on the issue. Defendants moved for reconsideration in one of the cases, requesting a more thorough explanation of the disputed material facts on which the district court relied, and simultaneously filed a notice of appeal. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration and later denied summary judgment in the other two cases. The Tenth Circuit consolidated the three plaintiff officers’ motions for purposes of appeal.
The Tenth Circuit evaluated whether qualified immunity was appropriate based on a clearly established right. The Tenth Circuit first questioned whether the law was clearly established such that defendants would know their actions were illegal, and determined that it was not. The Tenth Circuit noted that plaintiffs and the district court broadly asserted that making an arrest without probable cause was illegal without pointing to the specific inquiry of whether the law was clearly established that an officer cannot arrest an entire group when he knows that some unidentifiable members have committed a crime. The Tenth Circuit determined that Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), provided the appropriate precedent under which to evaluate the officers’ actions in the instant case. The Tenth Circuit found that Pringle‘s application to this case was debatable, and concluded that qualified immunity applied. The Tenth Circuit remarked that qualified immunity exists to prevent officers from being held liable for making an incorrect legal determination on the spot without guidance from the courts.
The Tenth Circuit declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction to address the Unified Government’s appeal, because it was not entitled to qualified immunity and the denial of summary judgment to the government was not immediately appealable.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the individual defendants and dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Chavez-Barragan on Monday, February 29, 2016.
The Supreme Court held that an assessment of whether a motorist’s driving gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of a violation of CRS § 42-4-1007(1)(a), which requires a vehicle to be driven entirely within a single lane “as nearly as practicable,” requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order, which concluded the officer lacked an objectively reasonable basis to stop defendant. Defendant’s semi-truck crossed the line separating the right lane from the shoulder twice. The Court concluded that, under the circumstances, defendant’s driving gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the statute had been violated. Therefore, the initial stop was reasonable.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Moore on Thursday, July 30, 2015.
Tracey Moore was driving through Oklahoma when he was pulled over for going three miles per hour over the speed limit. The trooper ordered him to get out of the car give the officer his license and registration. Moore complied, meeting the trooper in front of his patrol car. The trooper later testified that Moore seemed excessively nervous, even after he advised that he was only going to issue a warning. The trooper completed the warning, returned Moore’s documents to him, and told him to have a good day. Before Moore could go, though, Trooper Villines asked if he could speak to Moore a bit longer. The trooper asked Moore if he had ever been in trouble before. Moore said he had but did not want to discuss the details, adding he “could probably look it up easy enough.” The trooper then asked Moore if he had anything illegal in the car and Moore said no. Trooper Villines asked for consent to search the vehicle and Moore refused. At that point, the trooper advised Moore that he was being detained so a dog could sniff his vehicle.
Approximately two and a half minutes later, Trooper Fike and his dog, Jester, arrived. As they were walking around the rear of Moore’s vehicle, Jester snapped his head around and jumped through the open driver’s side window. Jester had his nose on the center console and was wagging his tail. Villines and Fike then searched Moore’s vehicle. Although they found no drugs, there was a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition in the trunk. Because Moore had a prior felony conviction, he was arrested and indicted on three counts: (1) being a felon in possession of ammunition, (2) knowingly transporting in interstate commerce a sawed-off shotgun, and (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing Trooper Villines lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him after the traffic stop was completed and Jester’s entry into his vehicle constituted an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied his motion. Moore pleaded guilty to Count 1, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release.
On appeal, Moore argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the trooper’s decision to detain him unreasonably exceeded the initial scope of the traffic stop and the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. The government contended that Moore’s excessive nervousness, his acknowledgment of a prior criminal history, and his admission that he had recently been added to the car’s registration were sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to Trooper Villines. The Tenth Circuit agreed. Although none of the factors in isolation was enough to support reasonable suspicion, taken as a whole they provided sufficient basis for the dog sniff.
Moore also argued that when the dog jumped into his vehicle the search became unlawful because the dog did not properly alert before jumping into the vehicle and because Jester “was acting like a police officer when he was allowed to go inside [the] vehicle.” The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Following prior precedent, the Tenth Circuit found no error in allowing the dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle, and because the window was open the officers did not manipulate the evidence to get their desired result.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Moore’s suppression motion.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Huff on Tuesday, April 14, 2015.
A vehicle stopped at an intersection over the median line, then backed up and stopped the vehicle correctly. Two Kansas City police officers witnessed the violation and initiated a traffic stop. The officers approached on either side of the vehicle, and the passenger-side officer spotted a handgun under the driver’s seat as he approached. The officers ordered the two men to put their hands on the dash, but the driver, Dana Huff, made movements toward the center console that led the officers to believe he was about to drive away. The passenger-side officer opened the door, reached into the car, and removed the keys from the ignition. He spotted another weapon, a sawed-off shotgun, when he opened the door. The officers removed the men from the vehicle and Huff was subsequently indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of possession of an unregistered short-barreled rifle.
At trial, Huff sought to suppress evidence of the firearms, arguing the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when searching his vehicle, and also arguing that they unlawfully arrested him without a warrant and without probable cause to believe he had committed a crime. The trial court held the initial stop to be lawful because of the moving violation, and held that the officer who removed the keys from the vehicle acted lawfully, but granted the motion to suppress the firearm evidence because at the time of the arrest the officers had found no evidence of a legal violation. The government moved to reconsider suppression, citing a Kansas City municipal ordinance that prohibits transporting uncased loaded weapons. The trial court granted the government’s motion and found the officers had probable cause for the arrest. A jury convicted Huff of being a felon in possession, but did not convict on the unregistered rifle count. Huff appealed.
The Tenth Circuit first considered whether the district court properly granted the government’s motion to reconsider. Huff argued the government provided no excuse for its failure to bring the municipal ordinance to the trial court’s attention, but the Tenth Circuit found it need not do so. The government’s motion for reconsideration related to an omission of a legal argument, not the failure to present evidence on a particular issue, so the trial court concluded there was no police misconduct to deter by suppressing the evidence. Revealing a circuit split on the issue of how district courts should handle motions to reconsider suppression orders, the Tenth Circuit found persuasive the reasoning of the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which do not require a bright-line justification rule. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit found that application of the exclusionary rule provides no meaningful deterrence when suppressed evidence later turns out to have been legally obtained, and instead exacts a high toll on the justice system by potentially allowing guilty defendants to go free.
The Tenth Circuit next evaluated Huff’s argument that the officers arrested him without probable cause. Huff contended that because the officer who reached into the vehicle and removed his keys did not specifically cite the municipal ordinance in his testimony, it seems unlikely that the officer’s action was based on that ordinance and therefore the officer lacked probable cause. Again following Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit found these arguments foreclosed, since an officer’s subjective reason for making an arrest may be different from the criminal offense from which probable cause arises. Upon seeing the uncased weapon, the officers in this case had probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle and arrest Huff based on the weapons violation.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Puller v. Baca on Friday, March 20, 2015.
In the summer of 2009, Detective Baca was investigating a string of robberies by groups of black gang members on inebriated white male victims. After an incident on August 23, 2009, Detective Baca interviewed several people and eventually concluded that Aaron Joel Puller was involved in the August 23 attack. He prepared an arrest warrant for both aggravated robbery and a bias-motivated crime, but he omitted certain details from his interviews, including that certain of his sources could not identify Puller by name and that one of the sources denied that Puller would have assaulted the victims. Puller was arrested, but after watching the interview tapes, Puller’s attorney moved to dismiss the charges. The state court dismissed the charges without a hearing, concluding there was not probable cause to arrest Puller based on the omissions in the arrest warrant.
Puller then sued Baca in federal court under § 1983, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and manufacture of inculpatory evidence. Baca moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court granted. After adding the omitted material to Baca’s affidavit and setting aside false information, the district court found it was reasonable for Baca to believe probable cause existed for Puller’s arrest and granted qualified immunity to Baca on all Puller’s claims. Puller timely appealed.
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by removing false information from Baca’s affidavit and considering omitted material information. After amending the arrest affidavit accordingly, the Tenth Circuit found ample evidence of a race-motivated crime. Although no one contended Puller actually assaulted the victim, he was part of a group whose motive was intimidate a victim to place him in fear of imminent bodily harm. Puller asserted that the mere act of being part of a group is not sufficient to establish probable cause, but the Tenth Circuit found the interviews proved Puller was more than a stationary object in a law-abiding group—he, with the others, approached the victim based on his race with the intent to attack and rob the victim.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment and grant of qualified immunity to Detective Baca.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Gilmore on Friday, January 16, 2015.
In January 2013, National Western Stock Show workers alerted police to the presence of a disoriented and seemingly intoxicated man, Andre Gilmore, wandering near cattle tie-ins in an exhibitor parking lot at the Stock Show. The responding officers parked near Mr. Gilmore, exited their vehicle, and began walking toward him. Mr. Gilmore did not appear to notice the police officers until they spoke to him. When the officers asked if he was alright and what he was doing in the area, Mr. Gilmore did not respond. One of the uniformed officers identified himself a police officer and asked again, and Mr. Gilmore mumbled an incoherent answer. The officers determined that Mr. Gilmore was highly intoxicated and was a candidate for protective custody. They conducted a pat-down search of Mr. Gilmore and found a handgun tucked into his waistband. The officers arrested him for possessing a firearm while intoxicated in violation of C.R.S. 18-12-106(d) and drove him to the Stock Show security office. Mr. Gilmore was in and out of consciousness during this time, but he managed to provide his name and birthdate to one of the officers, who used the information to access his criminal history. They discovered he had a prior felony conviction that prohibited him from possessing a firearm, and a federal grand jury eventually charged Mr. Gilmore with one count of being a felon in possession.
Before trial, Mr. Gilmore filed a motion to suppress the gun seized during the pat-down search, arguing the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and dangerous. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that although the evidence did not support a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gilmore was armed and dangerous, the police had probable cause to take Mr. Gilmore into protective custody for detoxification, and as such were justified in conducting a pat-down search before taking him into custody. After the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Gilmore signed a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He was sentenced to 28 months in prison and timely appealed.
On appeal, Mr. Gilmore argued the district court erred in concluding the officers had probable cause to believe he was a danger to himself based on (1) his intoxication, (2) the dangerousness of the surrounding area, and (3) the danger posed by the cold weather. He conceded that if the officers had probable cause to believe he was a danger to himself, they were justified in conducting the pat-down search.
Mr. Gilmore contended that there was no evidence of his intoxication other than witness testimony that he appeared intoxicated, since there was no blood or breath analysis for alcohol intoxication. However, examining the totality of the circumstances, the Tenth Circuit found the officers were justified in finding Mr. Gilmore was a threat to himself or others due to his intoxication. His behavior suggested that he was disoriented and under the influence of alcohol or drugs, he did not initially react to the presence of the uniformed officers, and his reaction times were impaired.
Mr. Gilmore next argued that the government offered no evidence that the Stock Show was dangerous. However, officers testified that there was significant gang activity in the surrounding areas, and a disoriented person carrying a briefcase would be at risk for harm. Additionally, there were busy streets nearby, and Mr. Gilmore was at risk for wandering into traffic in his disoriented state.
As to Mr. Gilmore’s claims that he was dressed appropriately for the weather, the Tenth Circuit found evidence to support an inference that he would not have been appropriately dressed if he had passed out and been subjected to the day’s low temperature of -10 degrees Fahrenheit.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, concluding the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Gilmore was a danger to himself because of his apparent intoxication in an environment that posed significant risks. The Tenth Circuit stressed that its finding was fact-specific and narrow, and that officers must have probable cause to take a person into protective custody.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in United States v. Augustine on Wednesday, February 19, 2014.
Defendant Dennis Augustine was convicted on two counts of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Prior to trial, he filed two separate motions to suppress evidence. The first motion was to quash a warrant to search Defendant’s residence and to suppress evidence found in that search which led directly to his arrest. The second motion was to suppress Defendant’s statements to law enforcement officials after his arrest. The district court denied both motions. It denied the motion to quash and suppress evidence found in the search of Defendant’s residence by applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The district court denied the motion to suppress Defendant’s statements based on its factual findings regarding the circumstances of Defendant’s interrogation. After the subsequent trial, the jury found Defendant guilty on both counts of conspiracy.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered the denial of both motions, starting with the motion relating to the search of Defendant’s residence. Under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, if a warrant is not supported by probable cause, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant need not be suppressed if the executing officer acted with an objective good-faith belief that the warrant was properly issued by a neutral magistrate. Good faith may exist when a minimal nexus between the place to be searched and the suspected criminal activity is established. In this case, the court disagreed with Defendant that the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause and was so devoid of factual support as to prevent application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Indeed, the affidavit readily satisfied the minimal nexus requirement. The Tenth Circuit held that the affidavit described circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that drugs, drug records, or drug paraphernalia would be found in Defendant’s residence and established a minimal nexus between Defendant’s residence and the drug-related items being sought in the warrant. Since a minimal nexus existed, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was properly applied by the district court.
The court then turned to Defendant’s appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers. Defendant’s argument on this point was based on the claim that his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily made. Defendant claimed on appeal that his ability to properly waive his Miranda rights was impaired because he was under the influence of controlled substances during the interview, despite having explicitly told the officers during the interview he was not currently under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Defendant also claimed he was further impaired by his need for his prescription drugs. Defendant thus argued his illicit drug use combined with his need for his prescription drugs rendered his waiver of his Miranda rights invalid.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, and after considering a video recording of Defendant’s interrogation and the testimonies of the interrogating officers, the district court found that Defendant appeared sober in the recording of the interview and that any alleged presence of drugs in Defendant’s system did not render Defendant unaware of the nature of his rights and the consequences of his decision to speak with the police. The district court also found that while defendant may have been more comfortable with his medication, the absence of his medication did not cause Defendant to proceed involuntarily or in ignorance of the consequences of his actions and statements. The district court therefore denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.
Nothing in the record persuaded the Tenth Circuit that the district court’s factual finding that Defendant was in control of his faculties and his conduct throughout the interview was clearly erroneous. After reviewing the video recording of the interview and other materials in the record, the court agreed with the district court’s determination that Defendant was not so impaired that his waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Grassi v. People on Tuesday, February 18, 2014.
Fellow Officer Rule—Probable Cause—CRS § 42-4-1301.1.
In this suppression matter, the Supreme Court considered whether the police possessed probable cause pursuant to the fellow officer rule to draw blood from an unconscious driver following a motor vehicle accident, even though the officer who actually ordered the blood draws lacked independent probable cause. The Court held that the fellow officer rule imputes information that the police possesses to an individual officer who effects a search or arrest if (1) that officer acts pursuant to a coordinated investigation, and (2) the police possesses the information at the time of the search or arrest. Because the record here reflects that the police as a whole, pursuant to a coordinated investigation, possessed probable cause to believe that defendant had committed an alcohol-related offense at the time of the blood draws, the fellow officer rule imputed that probable cause to the officer who ordered the blood draws. Therefore, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in United States v. Ponce on Wednesday, October 30, 2013.
Julio Ponce appealed the Oklahoma district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant that Ponce claimed issued without probable cause. A confidential informant (CI) told Tulsa Police officer William Mackenzie that Ponce was “selling methamphetamine from his residence,” and that Ponce also had “firearms, scales and baggies used to weigh and package” the drugs and a “large amount of U.S. currency within his residence.” The CI told Mackenzie Ponce’s address and an alias he used. Mackenzie surveilled Ponce’s home and observed drug activity. He also walked a dog outside Ponce’s garage and the dog alerted to drugs. After Mackenzie submitted an affidavit containing the above information, and that an anonymous tipster had called with similar information about Ponce, a magistrate judge issued a search warrant, the execution of which led officers to discover firearms, scales, baggies, and large quantities of cash and methamphetamine at Ponce’s residence.
At trial, Ponce moved to suppress all the evidence from his home. The district court denied the motion on the basis that probable cause did exist or, alternately, that United States v. Leon’s good-faith exception applied. Ponce pleaded guilty conditionally and appealed, arguing that the dog sniff was an illegal warrantless “search” under the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit chose to decide the appeal without deciding the Fourth Amendment issue or any of Ponce’s other lack of probable cause arguments.
The court held that the officers executing the search acted with an objective good-faith belief that the warrant was properly issued by a neutral magistrate under Leon and affirmed the district court.

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