Source: https://mynation.net/docs/582-2008/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:56:01+00:00

Document:
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissing the Criminal Revision Petition (Crl.R.P.No.356/2004) on the ground that there was inordinate delay in filing and re-filing the revision petition.
The respondent, who is a resident of Jammu &, Kashmir, was apprehended at Sheila Cinema in Delhi on 05.03.1997 on the basis of information that he belongs to a terrorist outfit “Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen’ (TUM) of J&K. From a search of his person and his hotel room, a letter containing instructions regarding activities to be carried out in Delhi for collecting money and arms for freedom of Kashmir was recovered. The letter contained coded information regarding RDX and Grenades as “AT’TA’ and ‘ANAR’ and was allegedly written by one Abu Ibrahim. A personal diary containing telephone numbers of Pakistan and a sum of Rs.30,000/- suspected to be Hawala money were also recovered from the respondent. It was found that the respondent had been frequently coming to Delhi and stayed at Welcome Guest House and used to make telephone calls to his contacts in Pakistan and collected money in Delhi which he used to transfer to Srinagar through carpet dealers at Kashmir and Commission agents for goats and thus, he actually got transferred Rs.17-1/4 lacs through Ghayasuddin and Mohd. Ahad of Srinagar.
The respondent was charge sheeted under Sections 121/121A/122/124-A/120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `IPC’) on the above allegations of being a member of TUM and for conspiring in waging war against the Government of India. The respondent was thereafter tried in the Court of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No.7/98.
By order dated 30.10.1998 in Sessions Case No.7/98, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge discharged the accused at the threshold, holding that prima facie there was no legal evidence to show that the respondent has committed any of the alleged acts.
Aggrieved, the appellant filed Criminal Revision Petition 356/2004, along with an application for condoning the delay in filing the petition. After filing the revision petition, the Registry of the High Court raised certain objections, and the file was received back in the Department for curing the defects. Unfortunately, due to paucity of space, the file got mixed up with other files in the office of the Standing Counsel, and was traced only in June, 2003. The revision petition was thereafter re-filed along with an application for condonation of delay in re-filing.
The High Court dismissed Crl. Rev. Petition No.356/2004 and Crl. M.A. No. 5227/2004 by judgment dated 10.8.2005, being of the view that there was unexplained delay in filing and re-filing the revision petition.
by the appellant in explaining the delay. The summary rejection by the High Court holding that delay has not been properly explained was not correct. It is pointed out that the conclusions of learned trial Judge directing discharge are unsustainable both on facts and in law.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that merely because the allegations were serious in nature, the order impugned before the High Court does not require interference as it is blemishless. Learned trial Judge rightly noted that there was no evidence of criminal conspiracy against him and therefore his discharge was rightly directed.
6. At this juncture, it is stated, at this length of time it would not be proper to set aside the order of High Court.
8. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (1975 (2) SCC 840) this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (AIR 1969 SC 575) a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
9. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi (1979 (4) SCC 365) which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan (1969 (2) SCC 770), this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.
the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merits.
condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.
preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra (1987 Supp SCC 339), this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.
READ Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs Vinod Kumar &amp; Ors.
to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning – of course, within reasonable limits – is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.
adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.
16. We find that the appellant had indicated the reasons for the delay in filing and re-filing the revision petition. The High Court unfortunately did not deal with those explanations and merely stated that the delay has not been explained. The High Court was required to examine the correctness of the explanation given, keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in several cases. According to us, the explanations offered were plausible and deserved to be accepted. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it to hear the Criminal Revision on merits. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits.
17. The appeal is allowed.

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