Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/427/307/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:20:36+00:00

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It is constitutional to require police officers to retire at age 50.
Retirement at 50 was mandatory for uniformed state police officers in Massachusetts. Murgia, who was automatically retired under the law when he turned 50, argued that it violated the Equal Protection Clause, and the lower court agreed.
Only a rational basis standard of review is appropriate because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved. Government employment is not a fundamental right, while age is not a suspect classification. Older individuals have not been subject to a long history of deliberately unequal treatment on the basis of their age, compared to groups defined by race or national origin. Elderly people are not an insular or discrete group because everyone eventually may join that group.
The statute is valid under rational basis review because the state has a legitimate interest in providing for a physically fit police force. Physical ability declines with age, so there is a rational relationship between the means and the objective.
Heightened scrutiny is appropriate because the right to work is a fundamental right, and here it has been removed from people who can show that they are medically fit to work. People who lose their jobs late in life have greater difficulty finding new employment, and elderly individuals have been subjected to repeated and arbitrary discrimination. While the state does have a compelling purpose, it has not chosen the least restrictive means to achieve that objective. It should be required to test police officers individually to determine their fitness rather than automatically terminating them at a certain age.
Age is not a protected group, so rational basis is the appropriate standard of review for such classifications. In this particular situation, there was not a significant issue at stake, since police officers over 50 are commonly subjected to physical evaluations.
A Massachusetts statute making it mandatory for a uniformed state police officer to retire at age 50 held not to deny equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) Rationality, rather than strict scrutiny, is the proper standard for determining whether the statute violates equal protection. Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when it impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. Here, mandatory retirement at 50 does not implicate any fundamental right of a uniformed state police officer over that age, since a right of governmental employment per se is not fundamental, and the class of such officers over 50 does not constitute a suspect class, since classifications based on age are not considered suspect.
(b) Since physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed police work has presumptively diminished with age and is, therefore, rationally related to the State's announced legitimate objective of protecting the public by assuring the physical preparedness of its uniformed police. There is no indication that the statute has the effect of excluding from service so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age 50 a criterion wholly unrelated to such objective. While the State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish its purpose, where rationality is the test, a statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by [it] are imperfect." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 397 U. S. 485.
376 F.Supp. 753 and 386 F.Supp. 179, reversed.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. [Footnote 2] The District Judge dismissed appellee's complaint on the ground that the complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional question. 345 F.Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of depositions, affidavits, and other documentary material submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an opinion that declared § 26(3)(a) unconstitutional on the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone lacks a rational basis in furthering any substantial state interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 376 F.Supp. 753, 754 (1974). We noted probable jurisdiction, 421 U.S. 974 (1975), and now reverse.
advancing age and decreasing physical ability to respond to the demands of the job."
These considerations prompt the requirement that uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical examination biennially until age 40. After that, until mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental health still rendered him capable of performing the duties of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians: that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the physiological and psychological demands involved in the performance of uniformed police functions; that of an associate professor of medicine, who testified generally to the relationship between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testified to aging and the ability safely to perform police functions. The testimony clearly established that the risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing stress functions increases with the age of the group. App. 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would require a number of detailed studies. Id. at 77-78.
it determined that the age classification established by the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Since there had been no showing that reaching age 50 forecasts even "imminent change" in an officer's physical condition, the District Court held that compulsory retirement at age 50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the capabilities of officers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. We disagree, however, with the District Court's determination that the age 50 classification is not rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest.
under the Massachusetts statute involves neither situation.
This Court's decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se is fundamental. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 405 U. S. 73 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, supra at 397 U. S. 485. Accordingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities." Ibid.
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict judicial scrutiny.
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject the State's resolution of competing interests in this case to the degree of critical examination that our cases under the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized as "strict judicial scrutiny."
That the State chooses not to determine fitness more precisely through individualized testing after age 50 is not to say that the objective of assuring physical fitness is not rationally furthered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say that, with regard to the interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish this purpose. [Footnote 10] But where rationality is the test, a State "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 485.
"[w]e do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised."
Id. at 397 U. S. 487. We decide only that the system enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny appellee equal protection of the laws.
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division of state police, together with such other employees as the governor may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . . Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as such an officer."
"(a) . . . Any . . . officer appointed under section nine A of chapter twenty-two . . . who has performed service in the division of state police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, whichever last occurs."
"(b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service . . . for not less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Branch be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past 50 until the expiration of 20 years' service.
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in Cannon v. Guste, 423 U.S. 918 (1975), aff'g No. 74-3211 (May 6, 1975, ED La.); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F.Supp. 933 (DC 1974); McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974), dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973). Our cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 415 U. S. 670-671 (1974).
Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602,29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948) (ancestry).
See, e.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 411 U. S. 40-41 (1973); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 309 U. S. 88 (1940); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 220 U. S. 78-79 (1911).
See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra at 411 U. S. 17.
"The Division of State Police, by virtue of the nature of the work demanded of its members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically able to perform such duties."
"not prepared to say that the contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [state police] over age forty-five should be eligible [for] retirement, is unsound as a matter of public policy."
Ibid. The commission, however, deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the state police to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness of the age with respect to job qualification. Id. at 7-9. Though the age-50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass.Acts & Resolves 737-738 (1939), it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation was to protect the public by assuring the ability of state police to respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. H. Doc. No. 5316, pp. 16-17 (1967); Mass. H. Doc. No. 2500, pp. 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the State's maximum age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retirement ages for less demanding jobs. See Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3(2)(g), 26(3)(a) (1966 and Supp. 1975).
Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.Gen.Laws Ann.c. 32, §§ 1, 3(2)(g), 26(3)(a), also deny equal protection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that the work of uniformed state officers is more demanding than that of other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. Mass. H. Doc. No. 2500, pp. 21-22 (1955).
"maximum retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examinations through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of mandatory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality, since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even the healthiest 50-year-old officers would be implemented by annual individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as the best 50-year-old officers.
E.g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (O. Kaplan, 2d ed.1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S.Rep. No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 and 2, pp. 36-46, 87-100, 121-127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967).
suspect class. Accordingly, the Court undertakes the scrutiny mandated by the bottom tier of its two-tier equal protection framework, finds the challenged legislation not to be "wholly unrelated" to its objective, and holds, therefore, that it survives equal protection attack. I respectfully dissent.
Although there are signs that its grasp on the law is weakening, the rigid two-tier model still holds sway as the Court's articulated description of the equal protection test. Again, I must object to its perpetuation. The model's two fixed modes of analysis, strict scrutiny and mere rationality, simply do not describe the inquiry the Court has undertaken -- or should undertake in equal protection cases. Rather, the inquiry has been much more sophisticated, and the Court should admit as much. It has focused upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the state interests asserted in support of the classification. Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 414 U. S. 432-433 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 411 U. S. 98-110 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 404 U. S. 90-91 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 397 U. S. 519-530 (1970) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See also City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U. S. 283, 426 U. S. 286 (1976); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 415 U. S. 253-254 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 405 U. S. 335 (1972); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U. S. 621, 395 U. S. 626 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 393 U. S. 30 (1968).
Orleans v. Dukes, ante p. 427 U. S. 297 (overruling Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957), the only modern case in which this Court has struck down an economic classification as irrational). It cannot be gainsaid that there remain rights, not now classified as "fundamental," that remain vital to the flourishing of a free society, and classes, not now classified as "suspect," that are unfairly burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of their members. Whatever we call these rights and classes, we simply cannot forgo all judicial protection against discriminatory legislation bearing upon them, but for the rare instances when the legislative choice can be termed "wholly irrelevant" to the legislative goal. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 366 U. S. 425 (1961).
These cases make clear that the Court has rejected, albeit sub silentio, its most deferential statements of the rationality standard in assessing the validity under the Equal Protection Clause of much noneconomic legislation.
But there are problems with deciding cases based on factors not encompassed by the applicable standards. First, the approach is rudderless, affording no notice to interested parties of the standards governing particular cases and giving no firm guidance to judges who, as a consequence, must assess the constitutionality of legislation before them on an ad hoc basis. Second, and not unrelatedly, the approach is unpredictable and requires holding this Court to standards it has never publicly adopted. Thus, the approach presents the danger that, as I suggest has happened here, relevant factors will be misapplied or ignored. All interests not "fundamental" and all classes not "suspect" are not the same; and it is time for the Court to drop the pretense that, for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, they are.
of the three factors I have identified above -- the importance of the governmental benefits denied, the character of the class, and the asserted state interests -- demonstrates the Court's error.
"is an inalienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence. . . . This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen."
Id. at 111 U. S. 762 (concurring opinion). And in Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630 (1914), in invalidating a law that criminally penalized anyone who served as a freight train conductor without having previously served as a brakeman, and that thereby excluded numerous equally qualified employees from that position, the Court recognized that "all men are entitled to the equal protection of the law in their right to work for the support of themselves and families." Id. at 233 U. S. 641.
"Insofar as a man is deprived of the right to labor his liberty is restricted, his capacity to earn wages and acquire property is lessened, and he is denied the protection which the law affords those who are permitted to work. Liberty means more than freedom from servitude, and the constitutional guarantee is an assurance that the citizen shall be protected in the right to use his powers of mind and body in any lawful calling."
U.S. 535 (1971); Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 385 U. S. 605-606 (1967); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 353 U. S. 238-239 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Upderaff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 239 U. S. 41. Even if the right to earn a living does not include the right to work for the government, [Footnote 2/3] it is settled that, because of the importance of the interest involved, we have always carefully looked at the reasons asserted for depriving a government employee of his job.
While depriving any government employee of his job is a significant deprivation, it is particularly burdensome when the person deprived is an older citizen. Once terminated, the elderly cannot readily find alternative employment. The lack of work is not only economically damaging, but emotionally and physically draining. Deprived of his status in the community and of the opportunity for meaningful activity, fearful of becoming dependent on others for his support, and lonely in his new-found isolation, the involuntarily retired person is susceptible to physical and emotional ailments as a direct consequence of his enforced idleness. Ample clinical evidence supports the conclusion that mandatory retirement poses a direct threat to the health and life expectancy of the retired person, [Footnote 2/4] and these consequences of termination for age are not disputed by appellants.
"[I]n the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs[.]"
"[T]he setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons[.]"
"[T]he incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their employment problems grave[.]"
81 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (subsection numbers omitted). See also ante at 317 n. 11.
Of course, the Court is quite right in suggesting that distinctions exist between the elderly and traditional suspect classes such as Negroes, and between the elderly and "quasi-suspect" classes such as women or illegitimates. The elderly are protected not only by certain anti discrimination legislation, but by legislation that provides them with positive benefits not enjoyed by the public at large. Moreover, the elderly are not isolated in society, and discrimination against them is not pervasive but is centered primarily in employment. The advantage of a flexible equal protection standard, however, is that it can readily accommodate such variables. The elderly are undoubtedly discriminated against, and when legislation denies them an important benefit -- employment -- I conclude that, to sustain the legislation, appellants must show a reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably closely tailored to achieving that interest. Cf. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 124-126 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). This inquiry, ultimately, is not markedly different from that undertaken by the Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971).
Turning, then, to appellants' arguments, I agree that the purpose of the mandatory retirement law is legitimate, and indeed compelling. The Commonwealth has every reason to assure that its state police officers are of sufficient physical strength and health to perform their jobs. In my view, however, the means chosen, the forced retirement of officers at age 50, is so overinclusive that it must fall.
the duties of the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police."
jobs. [Footnote 2/7] Thus, the Commonwealth is in the position of already individually testing its police officers for physical fitness, conceding that such testing is adequate to determine the physical ability of an officer to continue on the job, and conceding that that ability may continue after age 50. In these circumstances, I see no reason at all for automatically terminating those officers who reach the age of 50; indeed, that action seems the height of irrationality.
Some classifications are so invidious that they should be struck down automatically absent the most compelling state interest, and by suggesting the limitations of strict scrutiny analysis I do not mean to imply otherwise. The analysis should be accomplished, however, not by stratified notions of "suspect" classes and "fundamental" rights, but by individualized assessments of the particular classes and rights involved in each case. Of course, the traditional suspect classes and fundamental rights would still rank at the top of the list of protected categories, so that in cases involving those categories analysis would be functionally equivalent to strict scrutiny. Thus, the advantages of the approach I favor do not appear in such cases, but rather emerge in those dealing with traditionally less protected classes and rights. See infra at 427 U. S. 321-327.
See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1972).
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 408 U. S. 587 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Appellee makes no such claim; nor does he allege that procedural due process requires that he be afforded a hearing prior to termination.
See American Medical Association, Committee on Aging, Retirement, A Medical Philosophy and Approach; M. Barron, The Aging American 76-86, and sources cited (1961). Because, as one former AMA president bluntly put it, "[d]eath comes at retirement," quoted in M. Barron, id. at 76, the AMA has formally taken a position against involuntary retirement and has submitted an amicus brief in this case to inform us of the medical consequences of the practice.
R. Browning, Rabbi Ben Ezra, stanza 1.
There may be an age at which passing a physical examination provides no substantial guarantee that the officer is fit for service for the coming year. In that case, the test has lost its predictive ability. There is no showing that age 50 marks such a line -- although appellants ask us to hypothesize that it does -- and indeed the evidence seems contrary to that supposition. First, among officers aged 40-49, who undergo yearly examinations, there is no general trend of increasing rejections with age, nor any suggestion that those who passed the examination served in less than a satisfactory manner. 376 F.Supp. 753, 756 (Mass.1974).
This evidence presents no reason to assume that testing suddenly loses its predictive ability after age 50. The only relevant studies presented are contrary to appellants' assumption. These studies support the conclusion that airline pilots should be terminated at age 60 because, after that age, medical examinations lose their predictive ability. See Air Line Pilots Assn., Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (CA2 1960).
The suggestion that age 50 is not the critical point for predictive ability is also supported by the national experience. Appellee has produced a study of the laws of the 50 States that shows that Massachusetts' age-50 retirement law prescribes the earliest retirement age in the Nation, and that no other State requires its state police to retire before age 55. Brief for Appellee 37 n. 14.
In short, I refuse to hypothesize that testing after age 50 loses its predictive ability when the appellants have introduced absolutely nothing that supports this position.
"[a]ny individual member of the Uniformed Branch . . . whose age is fifty years or more may be capable of performing the physical activity required of the Uniformed Branch . . . depending upon his individual physical condition."
App. 44. See id. at 52.
The Court's conclusion today does not imply that all mandatory retirement laws are constitutionally valid. Here the primary state interest is in maintaining a physically fit police force, not a mentally alert or manually dexterous workforce. That the Court concludes it is rational to legislate on the assumption that physical strength and wellbeing decrease significantly with age does not imply that it will reach the same conclusion with respect to legislation based on assumptions about mental or manual ability. Accordingly, a mandatory retirement law for all government employees would stand in a posture different from the law before us today.

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