Source: https://www.nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=77-201&print=true
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:48:03+00:00

Document:
77-201. Property taxable; valuation; classification.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) through (4) of this section, all real property in this state, not expressly exempt therefrom, shall be subject to taxation and shall be valued at its actual value.
(2) Agricultural land and horticultural land as defined in section 77-1359 shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of property taxation, shall be subject to taxation, unless expressly exempt from taxation, and shall be valued at seventy-five percent of its actual value.
(3) Agricultural land and horticultural land actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural purposes which has value for purposes other than agricultural or horticultural uses and which meets the qualifications for special valuation under section 77-1344 shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of property taxation, shall be subject to taxation, and shall be valued for taxation at seventy-five percent of its special value as defined in section 77-1343.
(4) Historically significant real property which meets the qualifications for historic rehabilitation valuation under sections 77-1385 to 77-1394 shall be valued for taxation as provided in such sections.
(5) Tangible personal property, not including motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers registered for operation on the highways of this state, shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of property taxation, shall be subject to taxation, unless expressly exempt from taxation, and shall be valued at its net book value. Tangible personal property transferred as a gift or devise or as part of a transaction which is not a purchase shall be subject to taxation based upon the date the property was acquired by the previous owner and at the previous owner's Nebraska adjusted basis. Tangible personal property acquired as replacement property for converted property shall be subject to taxation based upon the date the converted property was acquired and at the Nebraska adjusted basis of the converted property unless insurance proceeds are payable by reason of the conversion. For purposes of this subsection, (a) converted property means tangible personal property which is compulsorily or involuntarily converted as a result of its destruction in whole or in part, theft, seizure, requisition, or condemnation, or the threat or imminence thereof, and no gain or loss is recognized for federal or state income tax purposes by the holder of the property as a result of the conversion and (b) replacement property means tangible personal property acquired within two years after the close of the calendar year in which tangible personal property was converted and which is, except for date of construction or manufacture, substantially the same as the converted property.
Source:Laws 1903, c. 73, § 12, p. 390; R.S.1913, § 6300; Laws 1921, c. 133, art. II, § 1, p. 546; C.S.1922, § 5820; C.S.1929, § 77-201; Laws 1939, c. 102, § 1, p. 461; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 77-201; R.S.1943, § 77-201; Laws 1953, c. 265, § 1, p. 877; Laws 1955, c. 289, § 2, p. 918; Laws 1957, c. 320, § 2, p. 1138; Laws 1959, c. 353, § 1, p. 1244; Laws 1979, LB 187, § 191; Laws 1985, LB 30, § 2; Laws 1985, LB 271, § 2; Laws 1986, LB 816, § 1; Laws 1989, LB 361, § 5; Laws 1991, LB 404, § 2; Laws 1991, LB 320, § 2; Laws 1992, LB 1063, § 52; Laws 1992, Second Spec. Sess., LB 1, § 50; Laws 1997, LB 269, § 34; Laws 1997, LB 270, § 11; Laws 1997, LB 271, § 38; Laws 2004, LB 973, § 6; Laws 2005, LB 66, § 11; Laws 2006, LB 808, § 24; Laws 2006, LB 968, § 2; Laws 2007, LB166, § 3; Laws 2009, LB166, § 4; Laws 2016, LB775, § 2.
This section requires that all property be taxed at actual value. Chief Indus. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Equal., 228 Neb. 275, 422 N.W.2d 324 (1988).
Uniform valuation of tangible property is required under this section. Fremont Plaza v. Dodge County Bd. of Equal., 225 Neb. 303, 405 N.W.2d 555 (1987).
The statute provides that the uniform method of valuing property for taxation as required by Neb. Const., art. VII, section 1, is valuation at actual value. Xerox Corp. v. Karnes, 217 Neb. 728, 350 N.W.2d 566 (1984).
Taxes must be levied uniformly and proportionately on all tangible property valued at its actual value. Kearney Convention Center v. Board of Equal., 216 Neb. 292, 344 N.W.2d 620 (1984).
Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing for purposes of taxation. Richman Gordman v. Board of Equalization, 214 Neb. 470, 334 N.W.2d 447 (1983); Hastings Building Co. v. Board of Equalization, 212 Neb. 847, 326 N.W.2d 670 (1982); Riha Farms Inc. v. County of Sarpy, 212 Neb. 385, 322 N.W.2d 797 (1982).
"Actual value" of a development's common areas is not reflected in the increased value of the adjacent lots where the grant of use privileges to lot owners in the common areas lacks sufficient formality, definition, and duration of creation to constitute valid restrictions on the use of the common areas. Beaver Lake Assn. v. County Board of Equalization, 210 Neb. 247, 313 N.W.2d 673 (1981).
All property not exempt is subject to taxation upon its actual value. Rehkopf v. Board of Equalization, 180 Neb. 90, 141 N.W.2d 462 (1966); H/K Company v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 175 Neb. 268, 121 N.W.2d 382 (1963).
Stock of merchandise is valued at actual value. Podewitz v. Gering Nat. Bank, 171 Neb. 383, 106 N.W.2d 497 (1960).
In 1959, all tangible property was required to be assessed at thirty-five percent of its actual value. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 170 Neb. 77, 101 N.W.2d 856 (1960); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 170 Neb. 106, 101 N.W.2d 873 (1960); Union P. R.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 170 Neb. 139, 101 N.W.2d 892 (1960).
The cost of a stock of merchandise is not its actual value. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Jensen, 164 Neb. 833, 83 N.W.2d 569 (1957).
Actual value means value in the market in the ordinary course of trade. Ahern v. Board of Equalization of Richardson County, 160 Neb. 709, 71 N.W.2d 307 (1955).
Property was valued and assessed at its actual value. Gamboni v. County of Otoe, 159 Neb. 417, 67 N.W.2d 489 (1954).
State board should value and assess property at its actual value in ordinary course of trade. County of Howard v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 158 Neb. 339, 63 N.W.2d 441 (1954); County of Douglas v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 158 Neb. 325, 63 N.W.2d 449 (1954); County of Grant v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 158 Neb. 310, 63 N.W.2d 459 (1954).
Property is required to be assessed at its actual value. Laflin v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 156 Neb. 427, 56 N.W.2d 469 (1953).
All property of a city of the second class must be assessed at its actual valuation. Thomson v. City of Chadron, 145 Neb. 316, 16 N.W.2d 447 (1944).
Evidence of sale price of other farm lands was not admissible to prove fair market value. Swanson v. Board of Equalization, 142 Neb. 506, 6 N.W.2d 777 (1942).
Witness may express his opinion as to actual value without stating that he has taken each and every element affecting the actual value into consideration. Edgerton v. Board of Equalization, 140 Neb. 493, 300 N.W. 413 (1941).
In determining actual value of farm property, taxing authorities must take into consideration the market value and all other elements. Knox County v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 138 Neb. 895, 296 N.W. 157 (1941).
All nonexempt property is subject to taxation on its actual value, which means its value in the ordinary course of trade. Nebraska State Building Corporation v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 535, 290 N.W. 421 (1940); Schulz v. Dixon County, 134 Neb. 549, 279 N.W. 179 (1938), overruling Schmidt v. Saline County, 122 Neb. 56, 239 N.W. 203 (1931).
While evidence may not definitely show a market value of property in ordinary course of trade, values may be fixed from all the evidence. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co. v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 119 Neb. 28, 226 N.W. 810 (1929).
Party could not complain that property was not assessed at actual value and at same time claim that tax on intangible property was invalid. Sommerville v. Board of County Commissioners of Douglas County, 116 Neb. 282, 216 N.W. 815 (1927).
Revenue act of 1921 changed the basis of assessment generally from twenty percent of actual value to actual value. State ex rel. Liberty High School District of Sioux County v. Johnson, 116 Neb. 249, 216 N.W. 828 (1927).
Effect of change of taxation of property at its actual rather than assessed valuation was to increase the taxable value of the property fivefold. Drew v. Mumford, 114 Neb. 100, 206 N.W. 159 (1925).
Shares in foreign corporation, owned and possessed by resident, are taxable at actual value. Bute v. Hamilton County, 113 Neb. 230, 202 N.W. 616 (1925).
An assessment will not be set aside merely because all property has not been assessed at its actual value, where the assessment has been made with reasonable uniformity upon all classes of property. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 111 Neb. 362, 197 N.W. 114 (1923).
This section contemplates that all property be assessed at its true value. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921).
Property is to be valued at its taxable value for purpose of making a levy to raise the tax provided for. Cunningham v. Douglas County, 104 Neb. 405, 177 N.W. 742 (1920).
Owner cannot require board to value property at seventy-five percent of actual value on plea that it is custom to make such reduction. Lincoln Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Johnson County, 102 Neb. 254, 166 N.W. 627 (1918).
Bridge company is denied equal protection of laws by assessment of its property at full value while the other property in the county is assessed at a fraction of its value. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
All property not expressly exempt is subject to taxation. K-K Appliance Co. v. Board of Equalization of Phelps County, 165 Neb. 547, 86 N.W.2d 381 (1957).
Leasehold interest in buildings constructed on air force base was taxable. Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W.2d 382 (1955).
Shares of stock in foreign corporation owned by resident were taxable. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Jensen, 157 Neb. 22, 58 N.W.2d 582 (1953).
Tangible property of grain broker must be returned and assessed as other tangible personal property. State v. T. W. Jones Grain Co., 156 Neb. 822, 58 N.W.2d 212 (1953).
Exempt or nonexempt character of property arises from the use to which it is put and the purpose thereof at the time the levy is made. American Province of Servants of Mary Real Estate Corp. v. County of Douglas, 147 Neb. 485, 23 N.W.2d 714 (1946).
All property, not exempt, is taxable, and obligation to return property for taxation is a continuing one. In re Estate of Rogers, 147 Neb. 1, 22 N.W.2d 297 (1946).
Legislature has implemented the general provision that all property in this state, not expressly exempt, shall be subject to taxation. International Harvester Co. v. County of Douglas, 146 Neb. 555, 20 N.W.2d 620 (1945).
Under former law all property in this state, not expressly exempt therefrom, was subject to taxation and was to be valued and assessed at its actual value. Novak v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 145 Neb. 664, 17 N.W.2d 882 (1945).
Intangible property of nonresident owner is not taxable in this state. Massey-Harris Co. v. Douglas County, 143 Neb. 547, 10 N.W.2d 346 (1943).
Laundry owned and used by charitable institution in carrying on its work is exempt from taxation. House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 113 Neb. 489, 203 N.W. 632 (1925).
Cause of action in tort is not a right in property and is not taxable. Seward County v. Jones, 105 Neb. 705, 181 N.W. 652 (1921).
Personal property in possession of owner at his place of residence in another state is not subject to taxation in this state. Preston v. Harlan County, 97 Neb. 667, 150 N.W. 1009 (1915).
When certificate is issued entitling company to patents, land is liable to taxation. Elkhorn Land & Town Lot Co. v. Dixon County, 35 Neb. 426, 53 N.W. 382 (1892); White v. Burlington & M. R. R.R. Co., 5 Neb. 393 (1877).
Government bonds are not subject to taxation if held in good faith. Dixon County v. Halstead, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888).
Notes belonging to nonresident, placed in hands of agent in this state for collection and reloaning, are taxable. Finch v. York County, 19 Neb. 50, 26 N.W. 589 (1886).
Homestead may be taxed as soon as owner has right to complete title. Bellinger v. White, 5 Neb. 399 (1877).
Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, although differing factors may cause the appraised value of property to be less than its actual value, some relationship exists between appraised and actual value such that the appraised value is relevant evidence of at least the minimum value of the land. First Nat. Bank of York v. Critel, 251 Neb. 128, 555 N.W.2d 773 (1996).
The burden of proof is upon a taxpayer to establish that the value of his property has not been fairly and proportionately equalized with all other property. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County Board of Equalization, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981).
Presumption that a board of equalization has faithfully performed its official duties, which obtains only while there is an absence of competent evidence to the contrary, disappears when there is competent evidence on appeal to the contrary, and from that point on the reasonableness of the valuation fixed by the board of equalization becomes one of fact based on the evidence, unaided by presumption, with the burden of showing such value to be unreasonable resting upon the appellant on appeal from the action of the board. Gradoville v. Board of Equalization, 207 Neb. 615, 301 N.W.2d 62 (1981).
A mineral interest severed from the surface ownership remains real estate but may be listed on the tax rolls separate from the surface rights. If the owner of the surface rights so requests, severed mineral interests must be separately listed on the tax rolls. State ex rel. Svoboda v. Weiler, 205 Neb. 799, 290 N.W.2d 456 (1980).
Where statute provides a method for valuing tangible property different from that prescribed for other tangible property, it is unconstitutional. Homan v. Board of Equalization, 141 Neb. 400, 3 N.W.2d 650 (1942).
Excessive valuation of nonexempt property may be corrected by proceedings in error to the district court. Eppley Hotels Company v. City of Lincoln, 138 Neb. 347, 293 N.W. 234 (1940).
Whether assessed on interest of mortgagor or mortgagee, taxes must be deemed assessed on land. Matthews v. Guenther, 120 Neb. 742, 235 N.W. 98 (1931).
Amount of assessment of bridge was proper. Meridian Highway Bridge Co. v. Cedar County, 117 Neb. 214, 220 N.W. 241 (1928).
Findings of board of equalization will not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong. Meridian Highway Bridge Co. v. Cedar County, 117 Neb. 214, 220 N.W. 241 (1928); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921).
In assessing for taxation stock in domestic corporations, mortgages in which mortgagor agrees to pay tax, should not be deducted. J. B. Kelkenney Realty Co. v. Douglas County, 116 Neb. 796, 219 N.W. 140 (1928).
To secure equal taxation, property undervalued should be raised. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921).

References: § 12
 § 6300
 § 1
 § 5820
 § 77
 § 1
 § 77
 § 77
 § 1
 § 2
 § 2
 § 1
 § 191
 § 2
 § 2
 § 1
 § 5
 § 2
 § 2
 § 52
 § 50
 § 34
 § 11
 § 38
 § 6
 § 11
 § 24
 § 2
 § 3
 § 4
 § 2
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