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Timestamp: 2019-04-24 13:46:12+00:00

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Appellants' applications to a City Council for permits to use a city park for Bible talks were denied, for no apparent reason except the Council's dislike for appellants and disagreement with their views. For attempting to hold public meetings and make speeches in the park without permits, they were convicted on charges of disorderly conduct, although there was no evidence of disorder, threat of violence or riot, and they had conducted themselves in a manner beyond reproach. There was no ordinance prohibiting or regulating the use of the park and there were no established standards for the granting of permits; but permits customarily had been granted for similar purposes, including meetings of religious and fraternal organizations. Held: Appellants were denied equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of freedom of speech and religion, contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 269-273.
(a) The right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims or personal opinions of a local governing body. P. 272.
(b) A contention that state and city officials should have the power to exclude religious groups, as such, from the use of public parks was no justification when permits had always been issued for the use of the park by religious organizations. Pp. 272-273.
(c) A contention that the park was designated as a sanctuary for peace and quiet was no justification when its use for patriotic celebrations by fraternal organizations was permitted. P. 273.
(e) Since the convictions were based upon the lack of permits which were denied unconstitutionally, the convictions cannot stand. P. 273.
____ Md. ____, 71 A. 2d 9, reversed.
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 18, Kelley v. Maryland, also on appeal from the same court.
For attempts to hold religious meetings in a public park without permits, appellants were convicted of disorderly conduct under Flack's Md. Ann. Code, 1939 (1947 Supp.), Art. 27, 131. The Maryland Court of Appeals declined to review their convictions. ____ Md. ____, 71 A. 2d 9. On appeal to this Court, reversed, p. 273.
Hayden C. Covington argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.
Kenneth C. Proctor, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Hall Hammond, Attorney General.
Having been informed that an Elks' Flag Day ceremony was scheduled for the first Sunday, the applicants did not pursue their request for the use of the park for that particular day, but, instead, filed a written request with the City Council for the following three Sundays. This [340 U.S. 268, 270] request was filed at the suggestion of the Mayor, it appearing that under the custom of the municipality there is a right of appeal to the City Council from the action of the Park Commissioner. The Council held a hearing at which the request was considered. At this hearing the applicants and their attorney appeared. The request was denied.
Because they were awaiting the decision of the Council on their application, the applicants took no further steps on the second Sunday, but, after the denial of the request, they proceeded to hold their meeting on the third Sunday. No sooner had appellant Niemotko opened the meeting and commenced delivering his discourse, than the police, who had been ordered to the park by the Mayor, arrested him. At the meeting held in the park on the fourth and following Sunday, appellant Kelley was arrested before he began his lecture.
In cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court is not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will reexamine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are founded. See Feiner v. New York, decided this day, post, p. 315. A brief recital of the facts as they were adduced at this trial will suffice to show why these convictions cannot stand. At the time of the arrest of each of these appellants, there was no evidence of disorder, threats of violence or riot. There was no indication that the appellants conducted themselves in a manner which could be considered as detrimental to the public peace or order. On the contrary, there was positive testimony by the police that each of the appellants had conducted himself in a manner beyond reproach. It is quite apparent that any disorderly conduct which the jury found must have been based on the fact that appellants were using the park without a permit, although, as we have indicated above, there is no statute or ordinance prohibiting or regulating the use of the park without a permit.
This Court has many times examined the licensing systems by which local bodies regulate the use of their parks and public places. See Kunz v. New York, decided this day, post, p. 290. See also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). In those cases this Court condemned statutes and ordinances which required that permits be obtained from local officials as a prerequisite to the use of public places, on the grounds that a license requirement constituted a prior restraint on freedom of speech, press and religion, and, in the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officials to follow, must be invalid. See Kunz v. New York, post, p. 290. In the instant case we are met with no ordinance or statute regulating or prohibiting the use of the park; all that is here is an amorphous [340 U.S. 268, 272] "practice," whereby all authority to grant permits for the use of the park is in the Park Commissioner and the City Council. No standards appear anywhere; no narrowly drawn limitations; no circumscribing of this absolute power; no substantial interest of the community to be served. It is clear that all that has been said about the invalidity of such limitless discretion must be equally applicable here.
In this Court, it is argued that state and city officials should have the power to exclude religious groups, as such, from the use of the public parks. But that is not this case. For whatever force this contention could possibly have is lost in the light of the testimony of the Mayor [340 U.S. 268, 273] at the trial that within his memory permits had always been issued for religious organizations and Sunday-school picnics. We might also point out that the attempt to designate the park as a sanctuary for peace and quiet not only does not defeat these appellants, whose own conduct created no disturbance, but this position is also more than slightly inconsistent, since, on the first Sunday here involved, the park was the situs for the Flag Day ceremony of the Order of Elks.
These cases present three variations upon a theme of great importance. Legislatures, local authorities, and the courts have for years grappled with claims of the right to disseminate ideas in public places as against claims of an effective power in government to keep the [340 U.S. 268, 274] peace and to protect other interests of a civilized community. These cases are of special interest because they show the attempts of three communities to meet the problem in three different ways. It will, I believe, further analysis to use the three situations as cross-lights on one another.
1. Nos. 17 and 18. - Havre de Grace, Maryland, sought to solve this tangled problem by permitting its park commissioner and city council to act as censors. The city allowed use of its park for public meetings, including those of religious groups, but by custom a permit was required. In this case, the city council questioned the representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses, who had requested a license, about their views on saluting the flag, the Catholic Church, service in the armed forces, and other matters in no way related to public order or public convenience in use of the park. The Mayor testified that he supposed the permit was denied "because of matters that were brought out at [the] meeting." When Niemotko and Kelley, Jehovah's Witnesses, attempted to speak, they were arrested for disturbing the peace. There was no disturbance of the peace and it is clear that they were arrested only for want of a permit.
2. No. 50. - New York City set up a licensing system to control the use of its streets and parks for public religious services. The New York Court of Appeals construed the city's ordinance so as to sanction the right of the Police Commissioner to revoke or refuse a license for street-preaching if he found the person was likely to "ridicule" or "denounce" religion. In 1946, after hearings before a Fourth Deputy Police Commissioner, Kunz's license was revoked because he had "ridiculed" and "denounced" religion while speaking in one of New York's crowded centers, and it was thought likely that he would continue [340 U.S. 268, 275] to do so. In 1947 and 1948 he was refused a license on the sole ground of the determination made in 1946. In September of 1948 he was arrested for speaking at Columbus Circle without a license.
3. No. 93. - Syracuse, New York, did not set up a licensing system but relied on a statute which is in substance an enactment of the common-law offense of breach of the peace. Feiner, the defendant, made a speech near the intersection of South McBride and Harrison Streets in Syracuse. He spoke from a box located on the parking between the sidewalk and the street, and made use of sound amplifiers attached to an automobile. A crowd of 75 to 80 persons gathered around him, and several pedestrians had to go into the highway in order to pass by. Two policemen observed the meeting. In the course of his speech, Feiner referred to the Mayor of Syracuse as a "champagne-sipping bum," to the President as a "bum," and to the American Legion as "Nazi Gestapo agents." Feiner also indicated in an excited manner that Negroes did not have equal rights and should rise up in arms. His audience included a number of Negroes.
One man indicated that if the police did not get the speaker off the stand, he would do it himself. The crowd, which consisted of both those who opposed and those who supported the speaker, was restless. There was not yet a disturbance but, in the words of the arresting officer whose story was accepted by the trial judge, he "stepped in to prevent it from resulting in a fight. After all there was angry muttering and pushing." Having ignored two requests to stop speaking, Feiner was arrested.
Adjustment of the inevitable conflict between free speech and other interests is a problem as persistent as it is perplexing. It is important to bear in mind that this Court can only hope to set limits and point the way. It [340 U.S. 268, 276] falls to the lot of legislative bodies and administrative officials to find practical solutions within the frame of our decisions. There are now so many of these decisions, arrived at by the ad hoc process of adjudication, that it is desirable to make a cruise of the timber.
In treating the precise problem presented by the three situations before us - how to reconcile the interest in allowing free expression of ideas in public places with the protection of the public peace and of the primary uses of streets and parks - we should first set to one side decisions which are apt to mislead rather than assist. Contempt cases and convictions under State and Federal statutes aimed at placing a general limitation upon what may be said or written, bring additional factors into the equation. Cases like Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 , and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 , are rooted in historic experience regarding prior restraints on publication. They give recognition to the role of the press in a democracy, a consideration not immediately pertinent. The picketing cases are logically relevant since they usually involve, in part, dissemination of information in public places. But here also enter economic and social interests outside the situations before us. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464 -465.
1. The easiest cases have been those in which the only interest opposing free communication was that of keeping the streets of the community clean. This could scarcely justify prohibiting the dissemination of information by handbills or censoring their contents. In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 , an ordinance requiring a permit to distribute pamphlets was held invalid where the licensing standard was "not limited to ways which might be [340 U.S. 268, 277] regarded as inconsistent with the maintenance of public order or as involving disorderly conduct, the molestation of the inhabitants, or the misuse or littering of the streets." Id., at 451. In Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496 , a portion of the ordinance declared invalid prohibited the distribution of pamphlets. In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 , three of the four ordinances declared invalid by the Court prohibited the distribution of pamphlets. In Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 , the Court again declared invalid a municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of all handbills.
2. In a group of related cases, regulation of solicitation has been the issue. Here the opposing interest is more substantial - protection of the public from fraud and from criminals who use solicitation as a device to enter homes. The fourth ordinance considered in Schneider v. State, supra, allowed the chief of police to refuse a permit if he found, in his discretion, that the canvasser was not of good character or was canvassing for a project not free from fraud. The ordinance was found invalid because the officer who could, in his discretion, make the determinations concerning "good character" and "project not free from fraud" in effect held the power of censorship. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , conviction was, in part, under a State statute requiring a permit for religious solicitation. The statute was declared invalid because the licensing official could determine what causes were religious, allowing a "censorship of religion." Id., at 305. Again, in Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 , an ordinance requiring a permit from the mayor, who was to issue the permit only if he deemed it "proper or advisable," was declared invalid as creating an administrative censorship. The Court has also denied the right of those in control of a company town or Government housing project to prohibit solicitation by Jehovah's Witnesses. Marsh v. Alabama, [340 U.S. 268, 278] 326 U.S. 501 ; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 . In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 , the solicitation was in the interest of labor rather than religion. There a State statute requiring registration of labor organizers was found unconstitutional when invoked to enjoin a speech in a public hall. The interest of the State in protecting its citizens through the regulation of vocations was deemed insufficient to support the statute.
3. Whether the sale of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses can be subjected to nondiscriminatory taxes on solicitation has introduced another opposing interest - the right of the community to raise funds for the support of the government. In Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 , vacating 316 U.S. 584 , and in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 , the Court held that imposition of the tax upon itinerants was improper. In Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 , the Court went further to hold unconstitutional the imposition of a flat tax on book agents upon a resident who made his living selling religious books.
4. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 , represents another situation. An ordinance of the City of Struthers, Ohio, forbade knocking on the door or ringing the doorbell of a residence in order to deliver a handbill. Prevention of crime and assuring privacy in an industrial community where many worked on night shifts, and had to obtain their sleep during the day, were held insufficient to justify the ordinance in the case of handbills distributed on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses.
6. Control of speeches made in streets and parks draws on still different considerations - protection of the public peace and of the primary uses of travel and recreation for which streets and parks exist.
(a) The pioneer case concerning speaking in parks and streets is Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 , in which this Court adopted the reasoning of the opinion below written by Mr. Justice Holmes, while on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113. The Boston ordinance which was upheld required a permit from the mayor for any person to "make any public address, discharge any cannon or firearm, expose for sale any goods, . . ." on public grounds. This Court respected the finding that the ordinance was not directed against free speech but was intended as "a proper regulation of the use of public grounds." 162 Mass. at 512, 39 N. E. at 113.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 , made it clear that the United States Constitution does not deny localities the power to devise a licensing system if the exercise of discretion by the licensing officials is appropriately confined. A statute requiring a permit and license fee for parades had been narrowly construed by the State courts. The license could be refused only for "considerations of time, place and manner so as to conserve the public convenience," and the license fee was "to meet the expense incident to the administration of the Act and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed." Id., at 575-576, 577. The licensing system was sustained even though the tax, ranging from a nominal amount to $300, was determined by the licensing officials on the facts of each case.
(c) On a few occasions the Court has had to pass on a limitation upon speech by a sanction imposed after the event rather than by a licensing statute. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, one of the convictions was for common-law breach of the peace. The problem was resolved in favor of the defendant by reference to Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 , in view of the inquiry whether, on the facts of the case, there was "such clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense in question." 310 U.S. at 311.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , a State statute had enacted the common-law doctrine of "fighting words": "No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name . . . ." The State courts had previously held the statute applicable only to the use in a public place of words directly tending to cause a breach of the peace by the persons to whom the remark was addressed. The conviction of a street speaker who called a policeman a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist" was upheld.
The results in these multifarious cases have been expressed in language looking in two directions. While the Court has emphasized the importance of "free speech," it has recognized that "free speech" is not in itself a touchstone. The Constitution is not unmindful of other important interests, such as public order, if interference with free expression of ideas is not found to be the overbalancing consideration. More important than the phrasing of the opinions are the questions on which the decisions appear to have turned.
(1) What is the interest deemed to require the regulation of speech? The State cannot of course forbid public proselyting or religious argument merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views. It must act in patent good faith to maintain the public peace, to assure the availability of the streets for their primary purposes of passenger and vehicular traffic, or for equally indispensable ends of modern community life.
Due regard for the interests that were adjusted in the decisions just canvassed affords guidance for deciding the cases before us.
I cannot make too explicit my conviction that the City of New York is not restrained by anything in the Constitution of the United States from protecting completely the community's interests in relation to its streets. But if a municipality conditions holding street meetings on the granting of a permit by the police, the basis which [340 U.S. 268, 285] guides licensing officials in granting or denying a permit must not give them a free hand, or a hand effectively free when the actualities of police administration are taken into account. It is not for this Court to formulate with particularity the terms of a permit system which would satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. No doubt, finding a want of such standards presupposes some conception of what is necessary to meet the constitutional requirement we draw from the Fourteenth Amendment. But many a decision of this Court rests on some inarticulate major premise and is none the worse for it. A standard may be found inadequate without the necessity of explicit delineation of the standards that would be adequate, just as doggerel may be felt not to be poetry without the need of writing an essay on what poetry is.
"2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others;. . . ."
A State court cannot of course preclude review of due process questions merely by phrasing its opinion in terms of an ultimate standard which in itself satisfies due process. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 ; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 -671; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 -590. Compare Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 379 -380. But this Court should not re-examine determinations of the State courts on "those matters which are usually termed issues of fact." Watts v. Indiana, supra, at 50. And it should not overturn a fair appraisal of facts made by State courts in the light of their knowledge of local conditions.
Here, Feiner forced pedestrians to walk in the street by collecting a crowd on the public sidewalk, he attracted additional attention by using sound amplifiers, he indulged in name-calling, he told part of his audience that it should rise up in arms. In the crowd of 75 to 80 persons, there was angry muttering and pushing. Under these circumstances, and in order to prevent a disturbance of the peace, an officer asked Feiner [340 U.S. 268, 288] to stop speaking. When he had twice ignored the request, Feiner was arrested. The trial judge concluded that "the officers were fully justified in feeling that a situation was developing which could very, very easily result in a serious disorder." His view was sustained by an intermediate appellate court and by a unanimous decision of the New York Court of Appeals. 300 N. Y. 391, 91 N. E. 2d 316. The estimate of a particular local situation thus comes here with the momentum of the weightiest judicial authority of New York.
This Court has often emphasized that in the exercise of our authority over state court decisions the Due Process Clause must not be construed in an abstract and doctrinaire way by disregarding local conditions. In considering the degree of respect to be given findings by the highest court of a State in cases involving the Due Process Clause, the course of decisions by that court should be taken into account. Particularly within the area of due process colloquially called "civil liberties," it is important whether such a course of decisions reflects a cavalier attitude toward civil liberties or real regard for them. Only unfamiliarity with its decisions and the outlook of its judges could generate a notion that the Court of Appeals of New York is inhospitable to claims of civil liberties or is wanting in respect for this Court's decisions in support of them. It is pertinent, therefore, to note that all members of the New York Court accepted the finding that Feiner was stopped not because the listeners or police officers disagreed with his views but because these officers were honestly concerned with preventing a breach of the peace. This unanimity is all the more persuasive since three members of the Court had dissented, only three months earlier, in favor of Kunz, a man whose vituperative utterances must have been highly offensive to them.
As was said in Hague v. C. I. O., supra, uncontrolled official suppression of the speaker "cannot be made a substitute [340 U.S. 268, 289] for the duty to maintain order." 307 U.S. at 516. Where conduct is within the allowable limits of free speech, the police are peace officers for the speaker as well as for his hearers. But the power effectively to preserve order cannot be displaced by giving a speaker complete immunity. Here, there were two police officers present for 20 minutes. They interfered only when they apprehended imminence of violence. It is not a constitutional principle that, in acting to preserve order, the police must proceed against the crowd, whatever its size and temper, and not against the speaker.
It is true that breach-of-peace statutes, like most tools of government, may be misused. Enforcement of these statutes calls for public tolerance and intelligent police administration. These, in the long run, must give substance to whatever this Court may say about free speech. But the possibility of misuse is not alone a sufficient reason to deny New York the power here asserted or so limit it by constitutional construction as to deny its practical exercise.
"Now the right of free speech undoubtedly exists, and the right of free speech is to promulgate your opinions by speech so long as you do not utter what is treasonable or libellous, or make yourself obnoxious to the statutes that deal with blasphemy and obscenity. But the right of free speech is a perfectly separate thing from the question of the place where that right is to be exercised. You may say what you like provided it is not obnoxious in the ways I have indicated, but that does not mean that you may say it anywhere.
"I am not going to deal with what may be the case in open spaces or public places. It seems to me that no general pronouncement upon that subject could be made, because, although for convenience sake one often speaks of open spaces or of public places, the truth is that open spaces and public places differ very much in their character, and before you could say whether a certain thing could be done in a certain place you would have to know the history of the particular place. For example, there may be certain places which are dedicated to certain uses, . . . and things that otherwise were lawful might be restrained if they interfered with the purposes of that dedication. Each of those cases must be dealt with when it arises. Here we are dealing with a street proper, because this place at the Mound is just one of the streets of the city. It is a thoroughfare, although, probably, not a very much used thoroughfare at that particular corner. In such a place there is not the slightest right in anyone to hold a meeting as such. . . ." Id. at 1073-1074.
[ Footnote 2 ] This is the second time that the ordinance which gave rise to Kunz's conviction has been before the Court. That fact is relevant however only for the purpose of appreciating that the context in which and the circumstances under which the Court considered the ordinance the first time are quite different from the conditions underlying the present appeal. The first time the Court had to consider the ordinance was on an appeal from People v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 255, 188 N. E. 745. In that case the New York Court of Appeals sustained a conviction for expounding atheism in the street without a permit. The appeal to this Court was based solely on the argument that regulation of speakers on religion without regulating other speakers was an unreasonable classification. Responding to this issue, the Court summarily dismissed the appeal, 292 U.S. 606 , citing three cases: Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 ; Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 ; and Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 396 . All three concern the problem of reasonable classification and in no wise bear on the issue now before us. The difference in the issues between the Smith case and the Kunz case is strikingly manifested by the fact that the conviction of Smith was affirmed by a unanimous Court of Appeals of New York, whereas in the present case the conviction was affirmed by the narrowest division in that court.

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