Source: https://illinois.lexroll.com/herndobler-v-goodwin-310-ill-app-267-1941/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:16:10+00:00

Document:
Richard Herndobler, Minor, by Harry Herndobler, His Father and Next Friend, Appellee, v. Calvin Goodwin, Appellant.
Gen. No. 41,548.Appellate Court of Illinois, First District.
Opinion filed April 23, 1941. Rehearing denied May 21, 1941.
1. AUTOMOBILES AND MOTOR VEHICLES, § 132.1[*] — pedestrianinjured, negligence as jury question. In action for injuries sustained by four-year-old boy when struck by defendant’s automobile, evidence that boy crossed the street to his father, who shouted at him, that defendant was looking toward the other side of the street, that there was only one parked car for a distance of 120 feet, that defendant was going 40 to 45 miles per hour when he crossed intersection, and that defendant’s car traveled 90 feet after it struck child before it came to a stop, presented question of fact for jury as to defendant’s negligence.
2. AUTOMOBILES AND MOTOR VEHICLES, § 153.3[*] — instruction, duty toward pedestrians. In action for injuries sustained by four-year-old boy when struck by defendant’s automobile, instruction that defendant was bound to anticipate meeting persons at any point on public highway and he must maintain lookout for them, and keep car under such control as would enable him to avoid collision with another person using the highway, constituted reversible error.
3. DAMAGES, § 637[*] — instruction, future suffering and loss of health. In action for injuries sustained by four-year-old boy when struck by defendant’s automobile, instruction that in determining damages jury could consider future suffering and loss of health was warranted by the evidence.
4. AUTOMOBILES AND MOTOR VEHICLES, § 103.5[*] — photograph of plaintiff in hospital bed, admissibility. In action for serious injuries sustained by four-year-old boy when struck by defendant’s automobile, court did not err in admitting photograph of plaintiff lying in bed with a weight and pulley arrangement, as such photograph did not unduly excite the jury’s emotions.
5. DAMAGES, § 413[*] — leg injuries, excessiveness of verdict.
In action for injuries sustained by four-year-old boy when struck by defendant’s automobile, $6,500 verdict was not excessive, where both of plaintiff’s legs were broken a few inches below the hip, he received two gashes to the head and suffered a brain injury, he was forced to remain in bed with a weight and pulley arrangement, and his ability to walk was impaired.
Appeal by defendant from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. LOYD M. BRADLEY, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the December term, 1940. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. Opinion filed April 23, 1941. Rehearing denied May 21, 1941.
CASSELS, POTTER BENTLEY, of Chicago, for appellant; LESLIE H. VOGEL and RICHARD H. MERRICK, both of Chicago, and RALPH F. POTTER, of counsel.
A.B. MANION and EARL F. SCHOENING, both of Chicago, for appellee; A.B. MANION, of counsel.
Plaintiff, a four-year-old boy, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook county for personal injuries suffered as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendant in the operation of an automobile. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty and assessing plaintiff’s damages at the sum of $6,500. The court overruled defendant’s motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the verdict. This appeal followed.
upper and lower fragments; that he received two gashes in his head, each requiring five sutures; that these gashes extended down from the skull; that when he was examined at the hospital his skin was cold and clammy, his pupils dilated and his pulse weak and thready; and that he suffered a brain injury, cerebral depression of the brain centers and had skin abrasions on his face, arms and hands. It was necessary, due to the location and severity of the breaks, to place both legs in Thomas splints, and he was placed in a bed with his head down and feet up at a 45 degree angle with pulleys and weights attached to the Thomas splints. He hung in that position for one month. He was then placed in a plaster cast completely covering the lower part of his body. He remained in the cast a little over a month. When the cast was removed, his feet were everted, that is, turned out. At that time he was unable to walk, and had to learn to walk all over again. He was confined to his bed for some weeks after the cast was taken off. He started to crawl a few weeks later. He was unable to stand by himself or get around on his legs until the spring of the following year, then, when he walked he threw his feet out and was stiff from his knees up. There is evidence that when he started to walk he walked with a “Charlie Chaplin manner of throwing his feet.” Plaintiff maintains that at the time of the trial this condition persisted, and that the jury had an opportunity to observe such condition for themselves. There was evidence that since the accident and up to the time of the trial the boy had been nervous and had not slept well and had been under the care of a doctor.
“You are hereby instructed that no owner or operator of an automobile is necessarily exempt from liability for collision on a public highway by simply showing that at the time of the accident he did not run at a rate of speed exceeding the limit allowed by the law. On the contrary, he still remains bound to anticipate that he may meet persons at any point in the public highway and he must keep a proper lookout for them, and keep the motor vehicle under such control as will enable him to avoid a collision with another person using said highway.” This instruction apparently was taken from the language found i Kessler v. Washburn, 157 Ill. App. 532. The opinion in th Kessler case states, however, that the “true test is that he must use all the care and caution which an ordinarily careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the same circumstances.” Plaintiff insists that there is nothing in the instruction that in any way misled the jury as to the degree of care required of defendant. He also calls our attention to the fact that the instruction was one of a series of 28 instructions, and that the jury was fully instructed as to the degree of care defendant was required to exercise. At best, this instruction is misleading and confusing. It cast upon the defendant the burden of avoiding a collision with another person under any and all circumstances. Under the instruction, exemption from liability is determined by the ability of the driver to avoid a collision. It requires him to maintain such a lookout for pedestrians and to keep such control of his vehicle as will enable him to avoid a collision at all hazards. The instruction places upon the defendant a duty greater than that required by the law. This instruction was clearly erroneous.
Plaintiffs do not cite any authority which supports the giving of such an instruction. We do not believe that under the facts and circumstances of this case the damage done by the giving of the erroneous instruction was cured or mitigated by other instructions. The jury was required to pass on a question of fact and it was important that they be properly informed as to the law applicable thereto. Defendant also contends that an instruction on the subject of damages is erroneous in that it told the jury that in determining the amount of damages they have the right to take into consideration “such future suffering and loss of health, if any, as the jury may believe from the evidence before them in this case he has sustained or will sustain by reason of such injuries, if any.” Defendant insists that there is no basis in the evidence for the giving of this instruction, and that under it the jury was permitted to assess damages by way of conjecture and without proof. In our opinion, there is evidence in the record warranting the giving of this instruction.
in conduct and remarks which may be justly criticized. We would not, however, feel constrained to direct a new trial because of such conduct and remarks.
Finally, defendant argues that the judgment is excessive. A mere statement of the injuries suffered by this child should satisfy anyone that the damages awarded by the jury were not excessive.
Because of the error in giving an erroneous instruction, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
HEBEL, P.J., and DENIS E. SULLIVAN, J., concur.

References: v. 
 § 132
 § 153
 § 637
 § 103
 § 413
 v.