Source: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/archive/index.php/t-11786.html?s=14fc612b732489b6ae806735c89d08c7
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:34:51+00:00

Document:
Not a lawyer, but I would not be to quick to think this will be a blanket law and will have an effect on all contractors since UCMJ would apply to DoD contractors. Alot of PMC contractors work for State Dept or " other". Not sure but as everything else, I would be willing to bet that law will get chewed up by the corp lawyers.
Everyone hates them, but knows they are not getting anything done without them.
During the Kosovo campaign, Halliburton was hauled before a Congressional hearing over price gouging. It seems Halliburton was really gouging on plywood. H. told the committee that if they didn't like it they could hire someone else to do the work:end of hearing. I simply call H and others "camp followers" but their connection to the people of Iraq is primarily economic which binds the people to them better and stronger than they are to military forces. Screw with the camp followers and they will simply move to a new location leaving a bunch of unemployed people in their wake who will have nobody to blame but the military for their loss of jobs. A purple finger or a paycheck? Which would you want? One 'Lifer' wanting to push some new rules could cause more problems than you can imagine.
This is unworkable on so many levels, especially irt the press. I wouldnt expect this to last.
"Jim" sent me this little gem. The MSM misses most important things and this is one of them. Under this Department of Defense directive, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates takes action to assure the extension of the authority of US military law over all civilians serving with or for US military forces.
The direcives provides authority for officers and NCOs to arrest and detain persons seen conducting a crime and for military authorities to pursue investigations that may lead to trial by general court martial.
The directive requires DoD to inform the US Department of Justice (DoJ) that it is proceeding against particular civilians. This provision exists to allow DoJ to take charge of the case involving civilians if it wishes. If DoJ declines then the military is authorized to proceed under its own legal system.
The question is whether a conviction obtained would withstand appeal to the Supreme Court.
See Reid v. Covert 345 US 1.
I am not a lawyer or student of the law, so I would welcome them to criticize my work.
There have been a number of decisions in the lower federal courts which have upheld military trial of civilians performing services for the armed forces "in the field" during time of war. To the extent that these cases can be justified, insofar as they involved trial of persons who were not "members" of the armed forces, they must rest on the Government's "war powers." In the face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront.
It is apparent that this interpretation would allow the military to try private security contractors under some conditions, namely, if the country were at war. Whether the current conflict in Iraq meets the definition of a war is something that would have to be determined by a US Court of Appeals, in the event that a contractor is prosecuted under the UCMJ.
1) The Federal Acquisition Regulation does tell contractors up front about circumstances of applicability in clause 222.225-7040, Contractor Personnel U.S. Armed Forces, etc. (http://farsite.hill.af.mil/otcgi/llscgi60.exe?ACTION=Highlight&SORTBY=%54%49%54%4C%45&QUERY=%75%6E%69%66%6F%72%6D%20%63%6F%64%65%20%6F%6 6%20%6D%69%6C%69%74%61%72%79%20%6A%75%73%74%69%63% 65&OP=and&DB=2&SUBSET=SUBSET&FROM=1&SIZE=50&ITEM=1#P1522_92231) This is spelled out in the contract, so there shouldn't be much of a surprise.
2) CENTCOM's lawyers also have the deployed contracting officers putting a notification (https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=23125) in contracts warning contractors about the applicability of MEJA.
(NOTE: For legal advice in your state, please consult a lawyer. Sandbag is NOT a lawyer, but knows a thing or two about contract law).
how does one adapt UCMJ punishments to civilians that are U.S. citizens? (see Seth's post) What if they are not U.S. citizens?
how does one apply the rule of law to civilians through civilians when military lawyers have trouble assembling evidence from a battlefield (few cases will have the resources the Nissor Square incident 'enjoyed' and even then...)? Didn't Rep Price's bill enhancing MEJA to authorize the FBI to investigate crimes in theater pass?
As far as Fed Acq Regulations, FARs needs to be implemented fully and I'm not sure we've canceled or let expire all the contracts that bypassed FARs.
There's an implication in FARs that if you don't do the job correctly, you'll be fired and replaced by another vendor. How many times has that happened?
Have the contracts been been rewritten to make PMC produced reports gov't reports or are they still corporate property like Aegis's 200 pager compiled after the "Elvis Video"?
Do based commanders have any insight (or new authority for that matter) over contractors, or is it still informal and haphazard?
It will be interesting to see the first case play out.
.....Alaa “Alex” Mohammad Ali, an interpreter, is the first contractor to be charged under a 2006 amendment to the Uniform Code of Military Justice – Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2007, MNC-I officials said.
It would be interesting to see how this turn of events might pave the way for increased usage of PMCs on the ground, if there is sufficient trust that's nurtured in the long term..
does not apply to contractors hired by other USG agencies (e.g. State which hired Blackwater).
At a court-martial Sunday, Alaa “Alex” Mohammad Ali, a contractor serving as an interpreter with U.S. armed forces in Iraq, pleaded guilty to wrongful appropriation of a knife owned by a U.S. Soldier; obstruction of justice for wrongfully disposing of the knife after it was used in a fight with another interpreter; and making a false official statement to military investigators. A military judge sentenced Mr. Ali to five months confinement.
Because he plead guilty this case won't advance through the judicial system, which means it may be some time before we know if the Supreme Court will allow civilians to be tried under the UCMJ. As I posted earlier this year, it had been illegal for a long time.
at least, some of us think that is true.
In short, Reid v Covert has probably not withstood the positive changes in the military justice system since it was decided - and it was decided well before the era of PMCs (and PICs based on the changes at CIA and other agencies).
Here are some background sources on Section 552 (now Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ).
Applies UCMJ provisions to declared wars or contingency operations (currently, only "war").
SEC. 861. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON MATTERS RELATING TO CONTRACTING.
(a) Memorandum of Understanding Required- The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall, not later than July 1, 2008, enter into a memorandum of understanding regarding matters relating to contracting for contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan.
(6) Responsibility for the collection and referral to the appropriate Government agency of any information relating to offenses under chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice) or chapter 212 of title 18, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act), including a clarification of responsibilities under section 802(a)(10) of title 10, United States Code (article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), as amended by section 552 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
The updated MCM 2008 incorporates Section 552.
Article 2(a)(10) was amended to apply jurisdiction to persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field in time of declared war or contingency operation.
(10) In time of declared war or contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.
The Manuel does issue a caution in its discussion of RCM 202.
(a) In general. Courts-martial may try any person when authorized to do so under the code.
(1) Authority under the code. Article 2 lists classes of persons who are subject to the code. These include .... and, under some circumstances, specified categories of civilians (Article 2(a)(8), (9), (10), (11), and (12); see subsection (3) and (4) of this discussion).
(3) Public Health Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Members of the Public Health Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration become subject to the code when assigned to and serving with the armed forces.
(4) Limitations on jurisdiction over civilians. Courtmartial jurisdiction over civilians under the code is limited by judicial decisions . The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(11) in peacetime has been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. Article 2(a)(10) has also been limited. Before initiating court-martial proceedings against a civilian, relevant statutes and decisions should be carefully examined.
(8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces.
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
An excellent article, which presaged the 2007 amendment, is here.
Modern United States military operations have become increasingly reliant upon services provided by civilian employees of the Department of Defense, other federal employees, and contractors. The range of such services is remarkably diverse. Large numbers of civilians now accompany Armed Forces on virtually all deployments, including combat operations. In short, civilian personnel are key members of the modern military team. Their actions, like those of uniformed military members, may have profound effects upon national interests. While commanders are now heavily reliant upon civilian services, commanders have relatively little disciplinary authority over the conduct of deployed civilian personnel.
This paper proposes extending Uniform Code of Military Justice jurisdiction to United States citizen civilian personnel accompanying United States Armed Forces outside the United States in theaters of armed hostilities. It reviews and analyzes existing statutory bases of jurisdiction over civilians and the case law which has interpreted it. It also analyzes relevant evolutions of military jurisdiction and criminal practice in recent decades which call into question older case law which restricts UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces. Finally, it recommends how the law may be shaped to effectively re-establish UCMJ jurisdiction over deployed civilian personnel in combat environments.
The 25 years following the end of World War II witnessed significant Supreme Court litigation regarding the extent of courts-martial jurisdiction and a definite erosion of the authority of military courts to try civilians. When analyzed, however, the decisions of the Supreme Court reveal that the Constitutional foundation for the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces on the battlefield remains intact.
Congressional action to amend Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ to state that jurisdiction exists “during periods of armed hostilities” is necessary to re-establish the legislative basis for jurisdiction. Should Congress act, case law suggests a significant body of authority upon which the courts could sustain Congressional action.
The guts of Jacobson's article - the erosion of the anti-UCMJ cases since Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) - are found at pp, 10-17.
 98 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (2000). As originally enacted, this provision did not include civilian employees of federal agencies or departments outside the Department of Defense. Public Law 108-375 ( 2005) (the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005) amended 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) to extend MEJA jurisdiction to civilian employees of federal agencies and provisional authorities “…to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.” As of this writing, this change is not reflected in the published text of the United States Code. The amendment is nevertheless operative.
Because SCOTUS cuts slack in favor of the Executive and Congress - when they act together and do not stomp on the essential jurisdiction of the Federal courts (such as habeas), the old cases (Toth and Reid, for example) seem a bit shaky today.
but the way I read them, Blackwater, escorting Embassy officials doing Embassy business, under contract to the State Department would be excluded. Big loophole that could be closed easily if the President would simply designate a single commaner whether military or the Ambassador.
Big loopholes could abound in this legal area. For example, if the US ambassador were the "commander", a very basic issue is whether the UCMJ would apply at all to civilians under his "command" (UCMJ implies a military situation).
1. The terms of the US-HN SOFA (if any) and any other relevant international agreements.
2. The terms of inter-agency co-operatrion in the HN.
3. The terms of the civilian contracts - e.g., an individual could waive constitutional rights (jury trial, etc.) and agree to be tried under the UCMJ - in cases where Art. 2(a)(10) provides a jurisdictional basis.
For a general overview see.
The various legal issues are addressed in the ongoing updates to the Operational Law Handbook (5+ MB) from the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School.
See, CHAPTER 7, CONTINGENCY CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL (CCP), starting at p. 127, with reference to Art. 2(a)(10) here (p. 140 - p 148 in .pdf file).
5. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
a. Retired military members who are also CCP are subject to the UCMJ. Art. 2(a)(4), UCMJ. DA policy provides that retired Soldiers subject to the UCMJ will not be tried for any offense by any courts-martial unless extraordinary circumstances are present. Prior to referral of courts-martial charges against retired Soldiers, approval will be obtained from Criminal Law Division, ATTN: DAJA–CL, Office of The Judge Advocate General, HQDA. AR 27-10, para. 5-2b(3).
b. Under the law for at least the past 30 years, contractors were only subject to the UCMJ in a congressionally declared war. During that time, there was never UCMJ jurisdiction over contractor personnel because there were no congressionally declared wars.
c. Congress amended the UCMJ in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (2007 NDAA). In the 2007 NDAA, Congress changed Article 2(a)(10), addressing UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces, from “time of war” to “time of declared war or contingency operation.” This appears to subject contractors to the UCMJ in OIF/OEF; however, this change has not yet been implemented by DoD.
d. It is not clear whether this congressional attempt at expanding UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians in less-than congressionally declared war is constitutional. Prior congressional attempts at expanding UCMJ jurisdiction have been rejected by the Courts as unconstitutional.
So, there is a caution here as well.
For a huge collection of military law links, go here.
For a study course for unit commanders, go here.
Military operations, from day-to-day activities to large-scale combat maneuvers, must operate in an increasingly legalistic world. Some may see this reality only in negative terms, but the law works in many ways; it enables as much as it restricts, it protects as well as punishes. Commanders at all levels need to follow the law while working towards their mission objectives, whether their goal is a zero defect aircraft, a disciplined squadron, or a defeated enemy. Through the use of The Military Commander and the Law and other materials, the course will provide an overview of the legal environment that faces the unit commander. Emphasis will be placed on the practical application of law in the military justice, administrative, and operations law arena, and the role of the JAG as supporting staff to the commander.
You really have some good stuff there. Why don't you write it up as a blog piece or a SWJ article. Personally, I'd be interested in your recommendations.
but, out-of-CONUS military contracts are well outside of my areas of "expertise".
recommendations as to what areas, questions, etc. ? Provide me an outline of your concerns.
PS: Ken - the mind of the parachuting lapin is never boggled - it merely says that as it calculates its next move.
in this area? I think we all agree that there is a problem with the accountability for contractors with regard to their behavior when they act outside the law (or are accused of so doing). Placing contractors who work for or in support of military ops under the UCMJ was IMO an important step. My concerns have to do with what's next. My recommendation - which you articulately questioned - was to designate a commander for all USG activities during a contingency which would bring contractors who work for State, like Blackwater, under the UCMJ roof. But, as you pointed out, there are still questions. Anyway, how might you solve the problem of accountability for "other people's" contractors?
Part of what I was suggesting you do (since I don't really want to do the legal research or read the lawyerly verbosity in many of your cites:rolleyes:) was to digest for us the essence of what you found and then draw a few conclusions and recommendations as above.
Anyway, how might you solve the problem of accountability for "other people's" contractors?
Hi John, I can tell you from personal experience inside the US (Alabama) as far as civil liablity the courts do not make any distinction between contractor and the person (Agency) who contracted them. They are considered to be part of the contracting angency. That is part of the Law of agency(jmm can better comment on that than me) which I never understood how groups like Blackwater could get around.
The principal (State in the Blackwater case) is exempt from violations of Iraqi law as are all US contractors under the CPA passed rules still in force. In UN ops, for example, peacekeepers have extraterritoriality as well.
Commander X issued a new rule that military and civilian personnel on Camp A cannot have any alcohol at all any establishment that serves alcohol is now off limits. However, 10 minutes away Camp B is not under the same rule yet under the jurisdiction of the same commander.
P.S. just wondering did my 20 but am looking for the clarification.
Yesterday the Swiss Federal Departement of Foreign Affairs announced that nearly 60 firms have signed the International Code of Conduct for Providers of Private Security. The CoC is a follow-up document to the Montreux Document from 2008 which had been perceived positively by the international community.
The ICoC "is based on the assumption that companies must respect human rights independently from the condition of national state law."
"International law is only applicable to non-state actors in certain limited circumstances, whereas an International Code of Conduct overcomes these legal and theoretical ambiguities. If companies express their commitment to respect these standards, the International Code of Conduct can become the basic document to spell out rules for private security providers and offer practical advice on how to deal with them"
So, if my concept of human rights include that the human right of self-defense and the absolute God given right to keep and bear arms, that means I can run guns, regardless of national or international law, right?
The concept of "human rights" has been overused so much as to be worthless in application.
Today Federal Councillor Simonetta Somaruga (Social Democrats) presented a draft law by which Switzerland hope to ban "mercenary acitivities" of security firms.
The law forsees a notification requirement for firms which want to do business outside Switzerland and the EU. The authorities then have the possibility to allow or decline the activity. In case of violation the confederation can sanction the companies.
The text of the law and the communiquee is only available in German, French and Italian. Therefore, I post the link of the translated news release (Google).
So who is going guard the Pope now?
Some background: Aegis Defence Services, the UK PMC, has its holding company based in Switzerland. Since they have grown to be a large company with operations in a number of countries - I would imagine this has raised issues with the matter of Swiss neutrality.
Some history: The Swiss banking industry developed as an outgrowth from the export of Swiss mercenaries during the 15th to 19th century.
This is correct indeed! The move of Aegis provoked a lot of anti-"mercenary" reactions. Thoug a survey made in 2010 showd that at least about twenty contractor companies resided in Switzerland. Many of them working with NGOs and humanitarian organizations like the UN and the Red Cross.
Therein lies also one of the contradictions IMO. The law forbids firms to recruit personnel and to promote activities that lead to direct involvement in hostilities in conflict zones. But how will they control that?
(NEW YORK) — A former U.S. Army sniper and two other ex-American soldiers agreed to become contract killers for an international crime boss who wanted to settle a score with a real estate agent in the Philippines he thought had cheated him on a land deal, a prosecutor said Tuesday in opening statements at the trial of the three men.
Joseph Hunter, a onetime sergeant with a Special Forces background, Adam Samia and Carl David Stillwell have denied they planned the 2012 execution-style hit — a case that’s provided an inside glimpse into the secret fraternity of private mercenaries willing to kill in cold blood for cash.
Prosecutors said the 52-year-old Hunter was working as a security chief for weapons and drug trafficker Paul Le Roux when he recruited Samia and Stillwell to travel from their homes in Roxboro, North Carolina, to the Philippines for what was called “ninja work.” Hunter provided firearms and silencers and told them Le Roux would pay them $35,000 a piece to get the job done, Assistant U.S. Attorney Patrick Egan said in federal court in Manhattan.
The chilling testimony was part of Mr. Le Roux’s cooperation with the government. In late 2012, he was arrested by the Drug Enforcement Administration after being lured to Liberia. Ever since, Mr. Le Roux, 45, has been assisting the authorities in rounding up the members of his sprawling organization in an effort to reduce a possible life sentence.

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