Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/225/272/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:07:16+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 225 › Railroad Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
Railroad Commission of Mississippi v.
A mere conflict between courts concerning the right to adjudicate upon a particular matter growing out of a priority of jurisdiction in another forum involves a question of comity, which there is no right to consider on a direct appeal to this Court under § 5 of the Act of 1891. Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89.
In this case, held that the circuit court, in taking jurisdiction and deciding the cause on the merits notwithstanding there was a partial demurrer to the jurisdiction, maintained its power and jurisdiction as a Circuit Court and also necessarily decided questions arising under the Constitution expressly alleged in the bill.
Where, in rendering a decree on the merits, the court necessarily decided the constitutional question expressly alleged in the bill, the issue on that subject is open in this Court, whether the jurisdictional question be certified or not.
of the motion, a fuller statement than otherwise would be necessary.
On August 5, 1908, a suit in equity was commenced in the Chancery Court of Hancock County, Mississippi, against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company to compel obedience to an order of the State Railroad Commission of Mississippi requiring the stoppage of certain interstate trains at a particular place. Upon the ground of diversity of citizenship, the railroad company removed the cause into the appropriate circuit court of the United States. Thereupon proceedings were commenced in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, against the railroad company, to enforce an act of the Legislature of Mississippi, approved March 20, 1908, known as the anti-removal statute, by perpetually enjoining the company from engaging in intrastate commerce within the State of Mississippi, and by subjecting it to large pecuniary penalties. It was specifically averred in the bill that the railroad company was a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Kentucky, and that it had never been incorporated under the laws of Mississippi.
description except the franchise to be and exist as a corporation, to complainant, who has ever since owned said railroad and operated it as a common carrier of interstate and intrastate freight and passengers as aforesaid."
"that the complainant, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, is a Mississippi corporation, and that the defendants are also citizens of Mississippi, and that therefore there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties to give the court jurisdiction of the cause."
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and said suit is made an exhibit to this demurrer for the purpose of considering the same."
"That this cause may be submitted and heard at the May term, 1911, of said court at Jackson, and that the time for taking proof under the rules is waived, and that said cause may be heard on the original bill, partial demurrer, and partial demurrer and replication by the court, and that setting the cause for hearing under this agreement shall not operate to admit the allegations of the answer."
"upon the bill and answer and replication upon the testimony theretofore taken by affidavits . . . and any other evidence that may be offered orally by either side on the hearing,"
and various specified printed charters and statutes which were enumerated and which concerned facts alleged in the bill and answer were stipulated to be admitted in evidence.
statute complained of, the exact form of that decree is not disclosed, for although there is a paper in the record which in one aspect apparently states the terms of the decree, in another aspect it is uncertain whether the paper referred to is anything but a motion made by the defendants for the modification of the decree. Be this as it may, the record leaves no doubt that, on October 28, on the motion of the defendants, a new and changed form of final decree was entered which was deemed to conform to the stipulation for submission. In this new decree it was first recited that the case had been submitted to and considered by the court primarily upon the partial demurrer, and that, on such demurrer's being overruled, the defendant had elected to stand thereon, and had not excepted to the final decree on the merits. There was a recital in the concluding paragraph of the decree that a direct appeal to this Court was allowed notwithstanding the objection of the complainant.
"And because the bill shows on its face that the federal court is without jurisdiction, and could not hear and determine the issues raised by the said bill of complaint because the Louisville & Nashville Railroad is a Mississippi corporation, and the Act of 1908, which prevents the removal of causes of foreign corporations to the federal court, had no reference and application to the said Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, which is a domestic corporation, and because the Act of 1908, referred to in said bill of complaint, enacted by the Mississippi Legislature, is unconstitutional and void, and in contravention of the federal Constitution. "
"The appeal in this case should be dismissed because the jurisdiction of the circuit court is the sole question raised, and such question has not been certified by the circuit court to this court."
question is not the sole question because of the existence of one involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States. This is so obviously true as to the position taken by the appellee as to need only statement. That it is also true as to the position of the appellants is demonstrated by observing that it has long since been settled that a mere conflict between courts concerning the right to adjudicate upon a particular subject matter growing out of a priority of jurisdiction in another forum involves a question of comity, which there would be no right to consider if the direct appeal involved solely a question of jurisdiction. Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89, 196 U. S. 91, and cases cited.
The confusion in the contentions of the parties which thus appears, in our opinion, will be dispelled, and the questions for decision be made apparent, by a consideration of the statement heretofore made. From that statement, we think there is no real room for controversy, first that the court below, in taking jurisdiction of the cause and deciding it notwithstanding the partial demurrer, maintained its power and jurisdiction as a federal court; second, that, in rendering a decree on the merits, the court necessarily decided the question or questions under the Constitution expressly alleged in the bill. This conclusion dispenses with the necessity of considering the question of certificate as to jurisdiction, since the issue on that subject, whether certified or not, is open in view of the constitutional questions raised in the bill. Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499, 160 U. S. 509.
think, however, there is room for concluding that the argument on behalf of the appellants, upon the theory that it is justified by the record, proceeds upon the hypothesis that, if there was no diversity of citizenship, the statute assailed in the bill was on its face so plainly inapplicable to the situation as to cause the assertion of its repugnancy to the Constitution to be unsubstantial and frivolous, and therefore insufficient to afford a basis either for jurisdiction in the court below or to warrant an affirmance by this Court of the decree which was made below. As even although the premise upon which this proposition rests be not conceded, the demonstration of its unsoundness would require a consideration of the subject of diversity of citizenship and the relation of that subject to the assault made by the bill upon the statute, to avoid unnecessary analysis, we come at once to consider the sufficiency of the averments of the bill as to the diverse citizenship of the complainant.
in the bill relied upon to create the doubt or inconsistency, when construed in connection with the context, had reference to the alleged impairment of the obligation of a contract, and were not addressed to the subject of citizenship; (b) because it would do violence to the very purpose of the bill to attribute to it the self-destructive effect which would result from upholding the contention insisted upon, especially in view of the nature and character of the litigation and the relation of the parties to the subject matter in controversy. We say this because the very object of the bill was to prevent the state from enforcing against the company, as a foreign corporation owning and operating the road in Mississippi, a forfeiture and penalties which it is admitted would not have been applicable to the corporation if it was a domestic corporation of Mississippi. Nothing could make the conditions stated clearer than to recall the argument, heretofore adversely disposed of, which was pressed upon our attention by counsel for appellants to demonstrate that the court erred in exerting jurisdiction because of the pendency of the suit in the state court, brought by the State of Mississippi, wherein it was expressly averred that the railroad company was a corporation of the State of Kentucky, and that it had never been incorporated in the State of Mississippi.

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