Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/alvarez-v-wal-mart-stores-inc-no-5378-crb-5-08-9-7-27-2009/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:02:29+00:00

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The respondents were represented by Nicholas C. Varunes, Esq., Varunes Associates PC, 5 Grand Street, Hartford, CT 06106.
The claimant in the present action was awarded benefits for permanent partial disability. The respondent Wal-Mart Stores has appealed the award; arguing the award should be apportioned against a prior injury sustained by the claimant. We find that the trial commissioner rejected the testimony presented by the respondent which would have supported apportionment of the claimant’s award, and this decision was within his discretion. We affirm the trial commissioner and dismiss this appeal.
The respondents argue that the claimant had suffered a “previous disability” as a result of the 1997 injury working at Waldbaum’s Foodmart. Therefore the respondents believe some, if not all, of the sum the claimant received for that accident must be set-off against her award for this accident. The difficulty with this argument is that the record prior to the claimant’s settlement of that claim does not clearly establish the claimant was partially permanently disabled as a result of this accident. The record herein does not provide any means to ascertain how the settlement sum of $9,500 was reached, and therefore, any effort to infer this was a payment against a permanency rating would be “grounded in speculation or conjecture.” DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo, 99 Conn. App. 336, 344-346 (2007). We may distinguish Johnsonv. Manchester Bus Service, Inc., 3472 CRB-01-96-11 (April 1, 1998) from the present case on the facts. In Johnson the trial commissioner credited expert testimony on the record that ascribed a percentage of the claimant’s disability to a prior accident.
(November 16, 2006). In Ben-Eli the commissioner offered an explanation for his decision not to rely on the opinions of the commissioner’s examiner. The trial commissioner in the present case also explained why he chose not to rely on Dr. Karnasiewicz.
did.” In circumstances like this, we must respect the trial commissioner’s evaluation of contested evidence; O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., 52 Conn. App. 813, 818 (1999), especially since an appellate body must extend “every reasonable presumption” to the fact-finder’s decision. Daniels v. Alander, 268 Conn. 320, 330 (2004).
We also note that the respondents failed to file a Motion to Correct to challenge the trial commissioner’s factual findings in this matter. Under these circumstances, “we must accept the validity of the facts found by the trial commissioner, and that this board is limited to reviewing how the commissioner applied the law.” Stevens v. RaymarkIndustries, Inc., 5215 CRB-4-07-4 (March 26, 2008).
(1999). We cannot conclude that this assessment was clearly erroneous.
 While the stipulation acknowledged the claimant had sought benefits alleging permanent partial disability, the text of the agreement also contains a denial by the respondents that the claimant was entitled to any further compensation as to that date. The agreement was the resolution of a contested matter and does not establish that in fact the claimant was permanently disabled as a result of that accident; nor does it discuss any need for surgery.
 The record indicates the doctor’s surname is spelled “Onyiuke.” Claimant’s Exhibit A. We deem this to be a harmless scrivener’s error. See Hernandez v. American Truck Rental, 5083 CRB-7-06-4 (April 19, 2007).
 Counsel for the claimant points out that Dr. Karnasiewicz reached this conclusion despite acknowledging he did not review the actual x-ray films following the 1997 injury. See Respondents’ Exhibit 12. Since the trial commissioner did not find Dr. Karnasiewicz persuasive and credible on this issue, the respondents offered no evidence the commissioner found probative on the central issue herein.
 Respondents argue that Fimiani v. Star Gallo Distributors, Inc., 248 Conn. 635 (1999) supports their position. However, in light of the fact that the prior stipulation is silent on what relief, if any, was to be applied against the contested and undetermined level of disability from the first injury, we must presume that the trial commissioner concluded the entire level of the claimant’s present disability was due to the subsequent injury, and that no set-off was required against the prior stipulated amount.

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