Source: https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol03_Ch0121-0200D/HRS0134/HRS_0134-0007.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:58:41+00:00

Document:
§134-7 Ownership or possession prohibited, when; penalty. (a) No person who is a fugitive from justice or is a person prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition under federal law shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition therefor.
(b) No person who is under indictment for, or has waived indictment for, or has been bound over to the circuit court for, or has been convicted in this State or elsewhere of having committed a felony, or any crime of violence, or an illegal sale of any drug shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition therefor.
shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition therefor, unless the minor has been medically documented to be no longer adversely affected by the addiction, mental disease, disorder, or defect.
For the purposes of enforcing this section, and notwithstanding section 571-84 or any other law to the contrary, any agency within the State shall make its records relating to family court adjudications available to law enforcement officials.
(f) No person who has been restrained pursuant to an order of any court, including an ex parte order as provided in this subsection, from contacting, threatening, or physically abusing any person, shall possess, control, or transfer ownership of any firearm or ammunition therefor, so long as the protective order, restraining order, or any extension is in effect, unless the order, for good cause shown, specifically permits the possession of a firearm and ammunition. The restraining order or order of protection shall specifically include a statement that possession, control, or transfer of ownership of a firearm or ammunition by the person named in the order is prohibited. Such person shall relinquish possession and control of any firearm and ammunition owned by that person to the police department of the appropriate county for safekeeping for the duration of the order or extension thereof. In the case of an ex parte order, the affidavit or statement under oath that forms the basis for the order shall contain a statement of the facts that support a finding that the person to be restrained owns, intends to obtain or to transfer ownership of, or possesses a firearm, and that the firearm may be used to threaten, injure, or abuse any person. The ex parte order shall be effective upon service pursuant to section 586-6. At the time of service of a restraining order involving firearms and ammunition issued by any court, the police officer may take custody of any and all firearms and ammunition in plain sight, those discovered pursuant to a consensual search, and those firearms surrendered by the person restrained. If the person restrained is the registered owner of a firearm and knows the location of the firearm, but refuses to surrender the firearm or refuses to disclose the location of the firearm, the person restrained shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. In any case, when a police officer is unable to locate the firearms and ammunition either registered under this chapter or known to the person granted protection by the court, the police officer shall apply to the court for a search warrant pursuant to chapter 803 for the limited purpose of seizing the firearm and ammunition.
For the purposes of this subsection, good cause shall not be based solely upon the consideration that the person subject to restraint pursuant to an order of any court, including an ex parte order as provided for in this subsection, is required to possess or carry firearms or ammunition during the course of the person's employment. Good cause consideration may include but not be limited to the protection and safety of the person to whom a restraining order is granted.
(g) Any person disqualified from ownership, possession, control, or the right to transfer ownership of firearms and ammunition under this section shall surrender or dispose of all firearms and ammunition in compliance with section 134-7.3.
Empowering Battered Women: Changes in Domestic Violence Laws in Hawai`i. 17 UH L. Rev. 575.
Summary judgment granted to defendants where plaintiff's 1997 harassment conviction constituted a conviction for a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" and, as a matter of statutory construction, the unavailability of a procedure for either expungement, set-aside, pardon, or civil rights restoration did not remove plaintiff from the ambit of federal prohibition or by extension, this section. 855 F.3d 1067 (2017).
Defendant police chief was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff firearm permit applicant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims for monetary damages for alleged violations of plaintiff's Second Amendment right to bear arms and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process right because a reasonable official in defendant's circumstances would not have understood that defendant's conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the denial of plaintiff's permit; this section, on which the denial was based, had not been invalidated by case or legislative action. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).
Plaintiff firearm permit applicant's allegations that plaintiff was denied a permit and ordered to surrender plaintiff's weapons due to a conviction of harassment under §711-1106 more than ten years before and that the conviction was not a crime of violence under subsection (b) or federal law for the purposes of prohibiting ownership or possession of firearms were sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for a violation of plaintiff's Second Amendment rights. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).
Genuine issue of material fact existed regarding: (1) whether plaintiff had been under counseling for addiction to, abuse of, or dependence upon a drug or intoxicating liquor; and (2) whether plaintiff had been "medically documented to be no longer adversely affected" by drugs or intoxicating liquor. As a result, plaintiff had not established a Second Amendment right to possess firearms. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).
Subsection (b) did not disqualify plaintiff from exercising plaintiff's Second Amendment rights because the court could not conclude that plaintiff's convictions for harassment constituted a crime of violence. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).
Where defendants argued that plaintiff was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law because of the federal Lautenberg Amendment, which prohibits firearm ownership by any person who "has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence", plaintiff's convictions for harassment did not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal law. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).
Where defendants asserted that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a lawsuit because plaintiff was precluded from obtaining firearms under this section, and, therefore, could not establish a violation of plaintiff's Second Amendment rights, police department's denial of plaintiff's application for a firearms permit, order to surrender firearms plaintiff possessed, and letter affirming the denial of the application constituted an "injury-in-fact" sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of Article III standing. 49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).
Where plaintiff was disqualified from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) and applying subsection (a) would not have an impermissible retroactive effect, subsection (a) precluded plaintiff from acquiring a firearms permit. 49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).
Felon convicted of possessing firearm properly sentenced under this section instead of §706-610. 68 H. 622, 725 P.2d 799.
Defendant exercised control when defendant sold gun. 70 H. 219, 768 P.2d 230.
Previously convicted felon must have intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possessed or controlled the firearm. 70 H. 509, 778 P.2d 704.
Defendant may not assert the invalidity of the prior conviction as a defense under this section. 71 H. 101, 784 P.2d 872.
Convicted person may not assert the invalidity of the prior offense as a defense to this section. 71 H. 111, 784 P.2d 873.
Subsection (b) applies to felons who are convicted through a nolo contendere plea. 83 H. 507, 928 P.2d 1.
Where defendant's convictions were premised upon the use of "any firearm" and language of indictments and trial court's instructions "to wit, a semiautomatic pistol" did not alter the statutory elements of §§708-840, 134-6, or this section, trial court's error of not providing definition of "semiautomatic firearm" did not warrant reversal of convictions of first degree robbery, carrying or use of firearm in commission of separate felony, or felon in possession of firearm. 91 H. 33, 979 P.2d 1059.
For the purposes of subsection (b), "possession" must be analyzed using a two-pronged analysis: (1) the voluntary act of "possession" of an object "itself" is, by way of §702-202, satisfied where an individual acts knowingly with respect to his or her conduct; and (2) the requisite state of mind with respect to the attendant circumstances--i.e., the particular qualities of the object that make it illegal to possess it--is, by way of §702-204, satisfied by a reckless state of mind. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13.
Where one bag containing a gun was found on truck seat next to defendant and another bag with two guns was found on truck floor where defendant had been sitting, jury could have inferred from totality of circumstances that defendant had the state of mind requisite to commit possession of a firearm and/or ammunition by a person convicted of certain crimes. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13.
A person commits the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm, pursuant to §705-500(1)(b) and (3), and subsection (b), if he or she intentionally engages in conduct that, under the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in his or her commission of the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479.
As the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm under this section does not include a result-of-conduct element and §705-500(2) does not therefore apply, trial court instruction erroneously defined the state of mind necessary to prove the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm as something less than intentional, as required by §705-500(1)(b). 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479.
Pursuant to §§701-109(4)(b), 705-500(1)(b) and (3), and subsection (b), attempted prohibited possession of a firearm is an included offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479.
Where defendant failed to carry defendant's burden of establishing that defendant's conduct--of possessing ammunition in violation of subsection (b), a class B felony involving conduct that had the potential for serious public safety consequences--was de minimis within the meaning of §702-236, appellate court's dismissal of trial court's granting of motion to dismiss charges as a de minimis infraction under §702-236 affirmed. 123 H. 329, 235 P.3d 325.
Requisite state of mind for a violation of subsection (b) is that of acting intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; failure to instruct jury on state of mind element, as required by §701-114(1)(b), was prejudicial and not harmless error. 78 H. 422 (App.), 895 P.2d 173.
Where the State's evidence only went so far as to show defendant's ownership and presence in the vehicle and defendant's proximity to the firearm and ammunition, absent evidence of intent, the circuit court correctly granted defendant's renewed motion of judgment of acquittal; the appeals court thus erred in vacating circuit court's judgment by concluding that there was sufficient evidence of intent for jury to infer that defendant constructively possessed the subject rifle and ammunition in violation of subsection (b). 128 H. 18, 282 P.3d 560 (2012).
Where State failed to establish defendant's prior felony conviction and no lesser included offense of a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition in chapter 134, defendant's convictions of being a felon in possession of a firearm and firearm ammunition under subsection (b) reversed. 82 H. 517 (App.), 923 P.2d 934.
Under subsection (b), multiple punishments are not authorized for violating the prohibition against possession of "any firearm or ammunition therefor"; thus, where defendant was already convicted of possessing a firearm, defendant could not be convicted for possession of ammunition loaded into that firearm. 89 H. 59 (App.), 968 P.2d 1070.
Although evidence that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony was relevant for purposes of this section, evidence that defendant may have received ineffective assistance of counsel during that prior felony trial would not have any bearing on the validity of that felony conviction; thus, trial court did not err in precluding evidence that defendant may have received ineffective assistance during prior trial. 90 H. 489 (App.), 979 P.2d 85.
Unless expressly permitted by the court, subsection (f) unqualifiedly prohibits a person subject to a chapter 586 order from possession and control of a firearm during the pendency of that order; this prohibition is effective irrespective of whether the respondent owned the firearms involved. 91 H. 438 (App.), 984 P.2d 1264.
Trial court erred in sentencing defendant to ten years of incarceration with a mandatory minimum term of ten years under §706-660.1(3)(c) as convicting defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to subsection (b) and sentencing defendant to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to §706-660.1(3)(c) essentially punished defendant twice for a single possession of a firearm; a rational interpretation of §706-660.1 is that the legislature did not intend its application for felonies where the entirety of the felonious conduct is the use or possession of a firearm. 107 H. 273 (App.), 112 P.3d 759.
In a prosecution of a felon under subsection (b) for possession of firearm ammunition, the State must prove, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the ammunition was "actually loaded"; given detective's authoritative identification of the bullets as ammunition, and in the absence of evidence that the ammunition was not loaded or otherwise incapable of being fired, was substantial evidence that the ammunition was actually loaded. 108 H. 124 (App.), 117 P.3d 856.
Mentioned: 9 H. App. 333, 839 P.2d 1186.

References: §1983
 §711
 §1983
 §922
 §706
 §702
 §702
 §705
 §705
 §705
 §702
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