Source: http://www.pelletcouncil.org.uk/news/forever-fuels-list-of-health-safety-issues-in-the-wood-pellet-industry
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 07:45:35+00:00

Document:
Bruno Prior and the team at Forever Fuels have produced a preliminary list of health and safety issues that all within the pellet industry should be concerned about.
This detailed and considered list should be used as the starting point for the industry to work together to address these urgent health and safety issues.
Gexcon have carried out DSEAR Risk Assessments for us and Bristol Ports, and advised that fines should not be stored loose. They must be contained at all times, for example in bins or bags, to avoid the risk that they are disturbed in the presence of an ignition source (e.g. a vehicle). Without containment, even a small initial explosion could result in a more serious secondary event as the fines are thrown up by the initial explosion into a concentration in air that is itself explosive.
So far as I know, most of the Harrison/Andritz loading-out systems that became ubiquitous in our market are simply dropping their fines on the floor. The same applies to most other systems that we have seen. We aren’t aware of most of the systems used by the smaller operators who have entered the market in the past two years. This could well be a widespread risk.
For some bizarre reason, version 3 of the ENplus Handbook removed the requirement for a visual inspection of the pellets at loading, but it retained the requirement to measure the temperature, and to take samples. It did not require the samples to be taken from across the flow (i.e. from the head of the conveyor in most cases), as it should have done. But one of the ENplus auditors has rightly been insisting that this technique, which is the only reasonable way to get a representative sample, is used at the sites they inspect. At many sites, therefore, people are having to work at heights with their hands. I cannot think of a practical way that someone could take a temperature reading or a sample from a ladder and maintain the required three points of contact.
It is sometimes necessary to access the top of a truck for other reasons. In the case of tankers, it may be necessary to do maintenance work such as replacing the air lines. Tippers may need access for maintenance such as clearing product that has gathered on the body and inspecting/freeing the sheet. Most vehicles provide a ladder on the body, and some provide a walkway. However, our advice is that the collapsible barriers on these walkways are not normally sufficient to guarantee that a fall would be prevented, and they are normally only on one side anyway. The ladders on the truck are not suitable for any work, other than simply ascending or descending.
1. A harness and inertia reel. The positioning would be important. In our experience, the drivers loathe the discomfort and limitations on movement that these create, and probably don’t use them whenever they are not being watched by management. But they would be an acceptable option where there was a suitable plan in place to ensure that they were used.
2. A gantry. This should provide a stable and level platform from which people could work securely. I think you have something like this at Rugeley, and we have it on all our depots, and steps to secure working platforms at the ports. I am not aware of anything like it on other people’s systems. One suspects some combination occurs of avoiding working at height (meaning that the testing and inspection will not be carried out as well as it should be) and taking risks when there is no avoiding working at height.
The primary risk of an explosion in a pellet store is where dust has settled and is then thrown up in the presence of a source of ignition. One aspect of reducing this risk is to remove the sources of ignition (see below), but it is almost impossible to guarantee that there will never be sources of ignition. For instance, every vehicle that operates in a shed is probably a source of ignition.
It is important, therefore, to prevent the dangerous build-up of dust. Dust will inevitably be generated and thrown up by handling, both when loading into the shed and when loading out.
On loading in, there is little that can be done to prevent a cloud of dust in the shed that will settle on any horizontal surfaces. This therefore has to be managed by a strict cleaning regime to remove dust from all those surfaces after it has settled. Accessibility (e.g. to the top and back of any rocket wall behind the new pile of pellets) is an issue that has to be considered carefully. But if the pellets are transported by sea, at least this only needs doing occasionally.
1. Where the pellets are picked up by the front-loader.
2. Where the pellets fall into the body of a tipper (in a tanker, a reasonably close fit between the chute and the hatch should minimise the escape of dust from the truck).
The hooding of the hopper, screen and conveyors does not remove the dust. It contains it, but unless the contained dust is dealt with, that can make matters worse as containment is one of the other factors required for a dust explosion. But at least it has localised the problem. A cleaning regime will be needed to remove the dust often enough that it never gathers in significant volumes. ATEX-compliant cleaning equipment will be required.
Cleaning the contained areas within a handling system is not a simple job. Some parts will be difficult to access safely (see Working at Heights above), the hoods may not be simple to remove, and the process may cost significant operational time when you would rather be loading trucks. And cleaning the wider areas could also involve a significant amount of labour if the pellets are dusty and the system is not sufficiently contained (e.g. if tippers are used).
For this reason, a cleaning regime is likely to slip (assuming the operator had implemented an appropriate regime in the first place), unless there is frequent policing by management and external assessors. One option to mitigate the requirements, and therefore make it more likely that a safe routine will be workable and implemented, is Local Exhaust Ventilation (LEV, aka suction) on the enclosed areas of the handling system. We implemented this in our depots, but from what we have seen elsewhere, it is not common. The LEV would have to be implemented to a suitable safety standard (not just ATEX, but suitable explosion panels and clearance). That is a significant cost. The industry needs to consider whether it will mandate LEV on handling systems as an option that materially reduces the risk of explosion from predictable human fallibility.
All equipment should be suitably rated for the relevant ATEX zone. But as mentioned above, the chances are slim that all vehicles that operate in the store will be suitably ATEX-rated. And risks may also occur in fixed equipment that might not present an obvious risk, such as the rollers on conveyors. It may be necessary to monitor the bearing temperatures on rollers and motors. A detailed risk assessment by a suitably-qualified professional is required.
Handling equipment should be driven by electrical motors, which can be equipped to a suitable ATEX standard, rather than by a reciprocating engine. If a suitable electricity supply is not available, a generator should be located in a non-explosive zone. There is no good reason for using a reciprocating engine within an explosion-risk zone (e.g. inside a pellet storage shed), particularly one built in to the handling system. It creates a source of ignition close to the highest-risk areas, and could be avoided by the measures described above. It is theoretically possible for a reciprocating engine to be ATEX rated, but the cost is prohibitive and we have never seen it implemented in practice.
The level of Personal Protective Equipment required in the store will vary under different conditions.
When pellets are being handled, a mask and goggles will be required, but not all masks and goggles are suitable. Paper masks will not give a close enough fit for anything but the thinnest of dusty atmospheres. In the heaviest of dusty atmospheres, such as those that occur when multiple loads are being tipped into a shed (e.g. when a ship is discharging), forced-air, fully-enclosed breathing apparatus should be used to prevent harmful impacts from sustained periods of operation in that atmosphere.
High-visibility clothing and protective footwear are required when vehicles are operating in the store. Head protection may be required. The type of head protection (helmet or bump cap) will depend on the nature of the work going on in the shed, i.e. is there a risk of falling objects?
The risk of carbon-monoxide poisoning in a large, well-ventilated space like most sheds is minimal. Nevertheless, carbon monoxide should be monitored for other purposes (see below). If the store is a confined space (e.g. a silo) then the appropriate care (see HSE regulations and guidance) should be taken for confined spaces and toxic atmospheres if it is necessary to enter the storage space.
Only suitably-qualified personnel should operate equipment, including specialist vehicles such as front-loaders/telehandlers. Access to areas where equipment is operating (and particularly where vehicles are moving) should be managed by procedures that ensure that operators are aware of the presence of pedestrians, and pedestrians are aware of where they are permitted to go.
Lone-working procedures should be implemented if someone may be alone in the store for any sustained period of time.
Suitable guarding should protect operators and visitors from any moving equipment, and suitable rails should protect them from any fall hazards. These need to be maintained in good condition and checked regularly.
• “Fresh” (i.e. recently-produced) pellets that have not been allowed to cool sufficiently.
The causes are sufficiently uncertain that the risk cannot be eliminated by minimising the above factors, and there are knowledge problems that would make it difficult to say for sure that these factors had been minimised. It is therefore necessary to monitor static piles of pellets for signs of self-heating or off-gassing, to the extent that is feasible.
Wood is an excellent thermal insulator. Hot spots may therefore not be detected if the temperature readings do not hit the exact spot.
Self-heating releases water vapour. This travels upwards and condenses on the pellets above the hot spot. Those pellets (a) disintegrate from the moisture, (b) release their own heat and water vapour, and (c) are heated by the hot spot below. Hot spots often create their own cavern within which the process accelerates. This may inhibit detection as the heat and gases may be contained.
For these reasons, one should not over-estimate the certainty with which self-heating and off-gassing can be detected. Risk assessments of any activities around a static pile of pellets should allow for the possibility that there is undetected thermal activity within the pile.
Nevertheless, one should do what one can to detect these factors. Self-heating is normally a slow process, so if it is detected early enough (while temperatures are low enough that they are not dangerous), it can be resolved as easily as by moving the affected area. If temperatures get beyond low levels, then moving the pile may have the opposite result – allowing oxygen to the hot areas may encourage a fire or even an explosion if there are unsafe dust concentrations in the area.
Temperatures may be variable and localised, so it should not be assumed that a temperature reading indicates the maximum temperature in the area. Anything above ambient is cause for concern. It is hard to think of a good reason why the temperature in a pile of wood pellets should exceed 40°C, so we have set that as our trigger level.
Where we store pellets in static piles, we ensure that the pile is monitored weekly. Readings are taken in a grid across the pile. A temperature probe is inserted as far as possible into the pile to take a temperature reading. As the probe is withdrawn, we take a carbon monoxide (CO) reading from the point where the probe is removed, in the hope that the probe has created a pathway for any gases collecting within the pile.
It is important to be realistic how limited this is. The temperature probe is only around 1.2 metres long. A longer probe would not help, because there is a limit to how far one can manually push a probe into a pile of pellets. If the pile is 6 metres deep, there is a high probability that a temperature probe will not get close enough to a hot spot to detect it. CO is probably a marginally better indicator, because the gas will be looking for pathways to escape and should therefore be less localised, but there is no certainty that the gas will escape in the areas where the monitoring is carried out.
Visual inspections may supplement this monitoring regime. If degradation is observed, this should be investigated to see if the cause is external (e.g. condensation dripping from the roof or even high atmospheric humidity at ports) or internal (e.g. evaporation from a hot spot).
To be realistic, none of this can provide a guarantee that an undetected hot-spot will not develop. The best defences are procedural and logistical.
Because self-heating is normally a slow process, if the turnover of product is rapid, it is unlikely that there will be enough time for self-heating to become a problem. If stock is stored in smaller volumes, not only does this make detection more likely (because there is less chance that a hot spot is buried at a distance that cannot be reached by monitoring equipment), but also the turnover is likely to be rapid, and the consequences of any undetected self-heating will be less severe because of the smaller volume of combustible material.
Purchase contracts from manufacturers should specify a minimum period for homogenisation before shipping, for quality as well as safety reasons. We suggest around 3 weeks minimum. Manufacturers prefer to ship some fresh pellets, because they would otherwise have to deal with the storage and cash-flow implications, but shipping fresh pellets is thought to be one of the most significant factors in the risk of self-heating and off-gassing. It is also a factor in higher degradation in transit, as the durability tends to increase gradually over the first few weeks after manufacture. Higher degradation means more fines and dust, and the associated risks and impacts.
Care should be taken to implement a First-In-First-Out stock-management regime, so that residual stock is not repeatedly left at the back of the store.
Wood pellets may have a high angle of repose if they contain sufficient fine particles. That may result in a steep slope on the face of a pile of pellets. Care should be taken that people cannot be trapped if a steep slope of pellets collapses.
On at least two occasions, we have discovered smoldering in a customer’s pellet store when we have opened the access hatch prior to delivery. Fortunately, the ability to check inside the store before delivery meant that the driver was able to notify the authorities and abort the delivery without exacerbating the situation by attempting a delivery.
There are many other reasons why an access hatch is required for quality reasons, but this is a critical safety point that should not be ignored simply because most pellet stores do not have an access hatch that can easily be opened for inspection (i.e. one that conforms with the industry’s Pellet Storage Guidelines).
Bioenergy 2020 have done tests on various factors that might act as a source of ignition inside a store that might cause an explosion. Many of the suspected risks are negligible. For instance, they discovered that the energy is insufficient for ignition in the sparks created by a piece of metal that is accidentally entrained in the pellets being fired down the delivery pipe and striking a metal wall opposite the outlet of the pipe. Likewise, the static charges generated by an un-earthed delivery pipe are unlikely to ignite an explosion, partly because the energy is insufficient and partly because of the cage effect. The most credible source of ignition, in their experiments, was if pellets are smoldering in the store.
To be clear, it is not expected that the dust entrained in the delivery air will be sufficiently dense to be at explosive concentrations. But dust that has settled on horizontal surfaces in the store and not been cleaned off, can be disturbed by the blown delivery, and the concentrations of disturbed dust could interact with a smoldering source of ignition to cause an explosion.
Even if an explosion is not caused, smoldering is likely eventually to lead to a fire, with serious consequences for the building in which the fuel-store is located. Inspection inside the store prior to delivery is an important opportunity to identify and address this risk.
There should be no excuse for pellet silos not to have an access hatch that can be opened easily at all fill levels, such as the design illustrated in the Pellet Storage Guidelines. It is an indictment of the UK’s biomass equipment industry that very few pellet stores in the UK are so equipped. The Guidelines have been available for years that advise that this feature should be included.
The Guidelines have historically differentiated between off-the-shelf and bespoke stores in this regard. They suggest that the requirement for an access hatch applies only to bespoke stores. That is an inexplicable error. The risk is the same whether the store is off-the-shelf or bespoke. If anything, the inclusion of a suitable access hatch should be easier for off-the-shelf units, as they can be mass-produced to a standard design, and they are manufactured by organisations who should not claim ignorance as an excuse.
One partial exception could be for fabric silos. Some fabric-silo manufacturers include large zipped flaps for access. But these can only be opened when the store is almost empty. It is impossible to close them if they are opened with a significant weight of material in the store. It is difficult to think of a practical way that a fabric silo could be equipped with an access hatch that could be opened easily at all fill levels.
However, some manufacturers of fabric silos include a porthole for viewing inside. Viewing ports in most stores are ineffective, as there is no light in the store, so typically all that can be seen is a reflection. This is usually compounded by a layer of dust on the inside (the port is often made of perspex, which becomes charged during a delivery and attracts the airborne dust). They are also often located at a level where they are obstructed by pellets until the store is nearly empty. However, fabric silos are typically translucent and therefore allow some light into the store. And being flexible, it is possible to shake the area of the viewing port to loosen a coating of dust. A viewing port near the top of the store might be an acceptable alternative to an access hatch for this purpose for a fabric silo (although a zipped hatch should still be incorporated for other purposes, such as cleaning).
For all other types of store, a proper (i.e. easy-opening at all levels) access hatch is probably eminently practical to install if it is built (and costed) into the design, and a viewing port will not be a satisfactory alternative for the reasons explained above. Sadly, proper access hatches are rarely encountered in British pellet stores.
The UKPC should agree a common warning to all pellet users, which each distributor will send to their customers, notifying them that their store should be equipped with a proper access hatch that accords with the Storage Guidelines (with the possible exception mentioned above). They will be asked to confirm that their store has such an access hatch or will be retro-fitted with one prior to their next delivery, and notified that suppliers will abort their deliveries if they find that the store is not properly equipped. If they are tempted to find a supplier who will work round this requirement, it should be clear that both the supplier and the customer will be liable in the event of any harm occurring, and the supplier will be expelled from the UKPC if identified.
The driver must stand by the back of the truck during a delivery. If there is no line of sight from where the driver will stand to the connectors, it is possible for the connectors to detach themselves during a delivery without the driver knowing. Besides the mess and waste, the pipe may wave in a whiptail pattern that may be dangerous to people in the area, both from contact with the pipe and through the impact of pellets sprayed in their direction.
Where line of sight is not possible, the customer may provide a spotter to stand at a point where both the driver and the connectors are visible, to warn if this occurs.
It is common enough for pellet-delivery drivers to experience back problems requiring medical attention that this should be a concern for the industry. The flexible delivery pipes are heavy and unwieldy. When they are being manhandled into position, they can at least be supported in a reasonably upright posture.
The greater risk of injury arises when the permanent connectors are above an acceptable level. If they are above shoulder height but within reach, the driver will be tempted to try to attach them above his head. The combination of an upwards stretching posture with a heavy, resistant load (i.e. thick rubber wanting to spring straight) and the leverage required to make a secure connection with a Storz or Camlock connector, creates an excessive risk of damage to the driver’s back.
If the connectors are higher still (or indeed if they are above shoulder height and the driver recognises the risk to their back and refuses to stretch), a platform will be required to reach the connectors safely. This is often missing, and the customer will try to improvise something, such as bales of straw or hay. Improvised solutions are not a suitably safe platform.
Neither is a ladder a safe way to reach the connectors. It is impossible to maintain three points of contact on the ladder whilst attaching the connectors, and the leverage required to make the connections may threaten the stability of the ladder.
If the connectors are not at a suitable height from the ground, a proper platform is required, with fall-prevention barriers and a stable, high-friction surface. The access to the platform should be safe for someone carrying a heavy pipe. That would normally preclude a ladder, but a ladder could be acceptable if an assistant is provided to pass the pipe up to the operator on the platform.
It is common for connectors to be in the range 1.8 – 2.4 metres above the ground, because they are a simple straight, horizontal length of pipe into the top of the store, and that is a common height for pellet stores. The problem could easily be avoided with a 90° sweeping bend and a length of vertical pipe to bring the connectors down to a comfortable level (1.2 – 1.5 metres above the floor is ideal). This is often omitted to save a modest amount of cost.
In general, it is normally more sensible to bring the connectors down to a safe level from the floor than to install a platform to provide access to connectors at a higher level.
There is also a risk of injury (not to mention a risk that delivery will be impossible) if the connectors are too low and facing downwards. Delivery pipes can only be bent in very wide radius arcs. The lower a downward-facing connector, the narrower the arc that is needed to make the connection. It requires considerable force to try to bend the pipes in a narrower arc. The driver will be bent over, applying force in one direction to bend the pipe, whilst applying forces in other directions to make the connections. Injury is likely to ensue.
Outwards-facing connectors may safely be positioned anywhere from close to ground level (allowing clearance for making the connections) to shoulder height. But outwards-facing connectors have quality implications, because of the risk that condensation will pool in a horizontal section of pipe.
Downwards-facing connectors are better, but if so, they should be positioned between 1.2 and 1.5 metres above the ground (or the platform) to avoid the problems described above.
There is little virtue in connectors at an angle between vertical and horizontal. The cost of providing the extra bend is not justified by safety or quality benefits.
In the boiler manuals that we have seen, the majority of manufacturers instruct that the boiler should be turned off before the fuel is delivered. We requested importers and installers to inform us if their makes of boiler needed to be turned off, but got a limited response, the “ostrich” being the dominant position in the biomass equipment world. Of the limited responses, again the majority confirmed that the boilers should be turned off.
We understand that one reason for this is the risk of gas-back or burn-back if a negative pressure is generated in the store due to active venting. Our attention was drawn to this when we experienced a case of burn-back into the fuel-transport system to a boiler, which was blamed by the installer on exactly this factor. This is therefore a material safety issue, as this presents risks of carbon monoxide poisoning, asphyxiation, explosion and fire.
Different makes of boiler instruct different lead times between the boiler being turned off and the system being ready for a fuel delivery.
Fuel suppliers cannot be responsible for turning off the boiler. In many cases, they do not have access to the boiler. They will certainly not be trained in the operating techniques for all types of boiler that they may encounter. And if the manufacturer recommends a significant lead time between turning off and delivering the fuel, the fuel supplier cannot be expected to sit around waiting for the boiler to cool down, even assuming that the other obstacles were overcome.
It must be the responsibility of the owner/operator of the boiler to turn it off in advance of the truck’s arrival. Ignorance is not an excuse: not for the owner/operator to claim that they didn’t realise that it needed to be turned off, and not for the fuel supplier to claim that they didn’t know whether it was turned off. The former has a responsibility to ensure safe operation by following the instructions in the boiler manual. The latter has a responsibility to ensure the safety of their employees and customers by refusing to deliver unless it is known either that the boiler is turned off, or that the boiler does not need to be turned off according to the manufacturer or installer.
Forever Fuels advised other members of the UKPC of this issue two years ago, and offered to the UKPC a chit that customers could print out, sign and leave for drivers if they will not be present at the time of the delivery. The chit confirms that one of the above two conditions (off, or doesn’t need to be off) applies. Drivers should collect this chit and attach it to their delivery paperwork, to record that the delivery has been made safely. If there is no chit, drivers should abort the delivery.
For those with a boiler that does not need to be turned off, it should be acceptable for a customer to confirm this in writing to each fuel supplier that they use. The supplier would record this on the customer’s account details, and on the delivery note for each delivery, so the driver knows that no chit is required.
In practice, few of Forever Fuels’ competitors have implemented this system, as confirmed by a show of hands at the recent UKPC Conference. That makes it almost impossible to enforce, because customers will simply switch to a supplier that is ignoring their duty of care if a prudent supplier attempts to enforce this condition.
After two years of doing nothing, it is essential that the UKPC act to require all members to implement this system, to counteract the current race to the bottom. It cannot be addressed by voluntary action, as two years’ experience has shown that too many players default in this prisoners’ dilemma.
The UK version of the ENplus Handbook stipulates that a store should be cleaned whichever is the sooner of every other year or every fifth delivery. It is not specific about how a store should be cleaned. In particular, it should be clear that all perched dust must be removed, to address the explosion risk.
We hear of companies offering manual clean-outs (e.g. a man with a shovel and a vacuum cleaner), and have seen the odd example. Typically, an operative enters the silo to clean it out. In the pictures we saw, the operative did not have the proper PPE. If their employer was that lax, it begs the question of whether they had suitable CO detection equipment, an ATEX-compliant vacuum cleaner, and whether they were qualified in confined-spaces operation.
The confined spaces regulations dictate that this is a two-person job, with the second person stationed outside the confined space to raise the alert if there is a problem inside the store. A risk assessment should have identified a safe method of extraction if the operator inside the store is incapacitated. It is doubtful whether companies who can’t even supply the appropriate PPE are complying with requirements like these.
There should be lock-off systems on the boiler and any ancillary equipment (most significantly, any moving parts in the store such as a sweeping arm) to ensure that the equipment remains off the whole time that someone is operating inside the store.
The Storage Guidelines also include a design for a sticker that warns of the various hazards that may be encountered. The sticker should be placed in a visible location near to the access hatch (visible when the hatch is open and closed). Most boiler manufacturers provide one of these stickers with the manuals for their equipment. Yet the sticker is often not visible at many sites.
The ironic, saving grace is that many (but not all) of the hazards relate to entry into the store, and most stores are not designed to allow practical entry. However, this creates significant risks (as explained above) to set against the avoided risks of entry. Pellet stores unfortunately cannot be a black box in which the internal operations are hidden and irrelevant to users. They must be properly equipped for access, and users must therefore be properly educated and warned about the risks and safe operating techniques.
Earthing of the permanent pipes and the ability to earth the fuel-supplier’s equipment are two of the few safety measures that (in our experience) are honoured more in the observance than the breach. The rare cases of unearthed permanent piping (e.g. occasional use of plastic piping) should be eliminated.
The debate over whether pressure relief panels should be incorporated into pellet stores has concluded with the victory of the camp that opposed them. They pointed out that such panels were ineffective to release the explosive force in only one direction unless the store was constructed to withstand much greater forces than was common. This would add dramatically to the weight and cost of the store, and render many installations impractical. There was also a question of the space into which the panels should release the pressure. The panels should be facing a long empty space. In most indoor installations, this would not be available.
Pressure relief panels are still sometimes found on large, external, cylindrical silos (animal-feed-style). They may be set on a hair-trigger pressure that can be triggered by sudden differentials in the delivery pressure. They are normally inaccessible, requiring a cherry-picker to access for repairs. The parts may not be easily available, so the blown panel may not be replaced for several days. Often positioned on the top of the silo, they provide (once blown) a point of ingress for rain, which can create disastrous consequences for the contents of the silo. The points in the previous paragraph about the structural integrity of the silo in the event of a dust explosion are particularly applicable to the geometry and construction of this type of silo. On balance, the harm from these pressure-relief panels probably exceeds any benefit.
One of the most common safety hazards that our drivers encounter is an “obstacle course” between their parking place and the connectors. They are often expected to negotiate walls, fences, hedges, steep banks, etc.
Flexible pipes are difficult enough objects to carry on firm, level ground. A clear route with no slip or trip hazards must be provided between the truck’s parking space and the connectors.
Conversely, operators must carry and use trip-hazard warning-signs wherever the delivery pipes cross public rights of way (e.g. pavements).
Trucks are sometimes expected to park on the pavement in urban environments. This creates a hazard for people with disabilities using the pavement. A proper parking space off the pavement must be provided for the truck. We have ended up in dispute with one customer who we refused to deliver to, because the only way to deliver to his location on a one-way street was to park on the pavement and yet still partially block the road (e.g. to larger vehicles such as fire engines, particularly if other vehicles were also parked in the road). Sadly, the customer has used the fact that other fuel suppliers have been willing to ignore this hazard as grounds to attack us.
Hazards that we have experienced on the delivery-pipe route include attack by guard dog, and a garden so liberally strewn with dog faeces that it was impossible to lay the pipes down without covering them in excrement. The driver cannot avoid contact with the faeces, with the associated health risks, when he packs the pipes away. Customers should provide secure and sanitary access to their connectors.
Suction is required for the majority of pellet stores. In order to achieve the benefit expected from that suction (avoiding pressurisation of the store, and some dust removal), the suction fan should have a higher nominal flow rate than the blower. That requires a very substantial suction fan. Proper suction fans are heavy pieces of equipment. There is typically restricted access to the storage compartment in which they are carried. The access to the storage compartment may force the driver to lift the heavy fan in a bending position. This posture creates a material risk of a back injury.
Manufacturers of pellet delivery vehicles should provide a suitable method for drivers to lift the suction fan out of and into the storage compartment without straining. We have been in discussion with Feldbinder on this subject for some time, but to my knowledge, it has not been resolved yet.
An inadequate, lightweight fan with an insufficient flow-rate, though common, is not a solution to this problem. Pressurisation of the silo creates its own risks, in terms of damage to the containment and escape of dust into the surrounding area, where it may create a fire, explosion or health risk. In the worst case, if the structural integrity of the store is damaged, it may collapse, spilling the contents over whoever is in the immediate vicinity (although, to be fair, the main factors in occurrences like this are more often poor design and the horizontal forces from the pellets).
It is not uncommon to find standard light fittings in bespoke pellet stores. All electrical fittings inside a pellet store should be ATEX rated for at least Zone 22. A risk assessment should be conducted to assess the appropriate zoning for the installation.
In March 2013, we decided to reduce the size of our pallets from 1 tonne (of product, i.e. probably around 1030kg allowing for the pallet and film) to 875 kg. A principal reason was that we were concerned about the stability of the 1-tonne pallet. This left us at a significant disadvantage, because the fixed costs amount to around one-quarter of the cost of the pallet, so this left us with a materially higher cost per unit than competitors who continued to supply 1-tonne pallets. One thing we learnt quickly is that safety will not be driven by customer demand!
Barber has a driver off on long-term sick, potentially unable to return to work, as a consequence of this. The firm’s insurer has put aside £295,000 to deal with the personal injury action under way.
• “There is increasing concern among hauliers, legal professionals and networks about the inherent danger of delivering heavy pallets to far-from-ideal locations, often to customers oblivious to that risk”.
• The proportion of deliveries to home addresses, where conditions are often far from ideal and customers have high expectations and little understanding of the challenges and responsibilities, had increased significantly, to around 20% of the total.
• Driver injuries as a result of heavy pallets were increasing.
• The weight limit commonly applied in Europe for tail-lift deliveries was 500kg.
• 750kg was widely believed to be an appropriate limit in the UK.
• The HSE would have to be involved in setting new rules if they were to be made to stick, but the HSE was not rising to the needs of the industry.
• A customer had been killed in 2013 when a tail-lift delivery went wrong. The pallet did not “breach the maximum load capabilities of the tail lift”, but there is often “confusion over distribution of loads on tail lifts” and “lowering of the weight for tail lifts to 750kg may act as a useful cushion for operators and drivers to avoid leaving them on the edge of failure if they get load distribution wrong”.
The Association of Pallet Networks welcomed the move too and told CM it was working with the HSE on a sector-wide code of practice.
In September 2015, the Fortec network decided to join Palletline in implementing a 750kg limit from 1 October 2015. A third network (Pallex) indicated privately to us that they expected to implement the 750kg limit around spring 2016, and expected that the whole pallet haulage industry would be going the same way.
We switched our production to 750kg pallets in October 2015, in recognition that this was a justified safety measure (“you don’t compete on safety”, as someone said at the UKPC Conference), and in anticipation that the rule would be adopted across the board before too long. We had significant stock of 875kg pallets, so we offered both products through the winter of 2015/16, with a view to exhausting the 875kg stock by spring 2016 and switching exclusively to 750kg pallets.
Although work on a code of practice was already under way in March 2015 between the industry and the HSE, nothing materialised. In the absence of regulatory constraints to ensure a level playing field, in January 2016, the Palletways network confirmed that it would be placing commerciality ahead of safety. Although the reporting on Palletline’s decision indicated that the majority of networks agreed with them in principle, most networks took the same approach as Palletways in practice. Pallex did not join Palletline and Fortec in applying this limit in spring 2016, as they had indicated they would.
Early in 2016, in the absence of any news of progress on the issue, we contacted the HSE to find out what action was being taken to ensure a level playing field for safety. After two weeks of silence, not knowing whether the enquiry had been received, let alone whether it was being addressed, I wrote to their Chief Executive to bring the issue to his attention.
As I understand, RHA members expressed concerns regarding pallet weights during single driver deliveries using a tail lift. As a result the RHA sought to establish a working group which would develop guidance in this area which included a recommendation for a maximum pallet weight. HSE agreed to be part of the working group. RHA have contacted other stakeholders and are currently reviewing whether this work can be included as part of other work re: deliveries which is already underway.
The description is as though the efforts were at an early stage, although the HSE was said in the report a year earlier to already have been cooperating with the APN on a code of practice, and the effort was in response to a death 18 months before that (and in fact, there had been others before that of which the HSE must have been aware).
In November 2016, a pallet delivery driver was crushed to death by a pallet falling off a tail-lift at a location close to our head office. Learning of this in the local papers, I was prompted to have another go at pressing for action. I hoped people might see the seriousness of the lack of action.
As part of that effort, I brought this issue to the attention of the UKPC, with a proposal that the industry should implement its own weight limit, even if the HSE and RHA were dragging their feet on proper regulation. Some members of the UKPC board were opposed, and the proposal was not adopted.
• the HSE, RHA, APN and other industry and regulatory bodies were close to issuing new rules to clarify what was appropriate.
Indeed, communications with the HSE made it clear that they had made no meaningful progress on the working group established to develop a code of practice, and did not intend to force the issue. In fact, the working group did not appear to have met for the previous two years. And the HSE took the view that any tightening of the rules would only happen by consensus of all the stakeholders, including some groups who had a very peripheral interest, such as the British Retail Consortium. The HSE and the RHA would commit only to further discussions in response to pressure from us.
Without any prospect of a level playing field, we resigned ourselves that nothing could be done for the foreseeable future, and that we would therefore have to raise our pallet weight to be more competitive, in an industry that was relaxed about the safety implications of this issue. Not wanting to abandon safety concerns completely, we compromised on 875kg to still be more stable than the 1-tonne pallets but more competitive than the 750kg pallets.
In June 2017, our haulier (part of the Pallex network) notified us that the rules were about to be changed, and a 750kg limit would be introduced. Once again, this has failed to materialise, and most of the networks continue to deliver 1-tonne pallets.
I am disturbed by the widespread apathy on this issue. Anyone who has spoken to pallet delivery drivers, and more reputable operators, knows that this is an issue of great concern to them, and that risks and minor incidents are more frequent than the major incidents that receive some brief attention before the issue is swept under the carpet again. No excuse will be justifiable if someone is killed or injured by a 1-tonne pallet of wood pellets. This is a known issue over which the stakeholders have prevaricated for years, for no better reason than a small commercial advantage. It will not do to respond to a future incident by saying that we will now look at the measures to prevent it happening again, as though it was something that had not been considered until that point. The industry is consciously choosing to put people at risk, and must take the consequences should this choice result in serious harm.
The HSE provides guidance about lifting heights and weights. See “Manual Handling at Work” (http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg143.pdf) Figure 1, p.8. For most bag-fed pellet boilers, it will be necessary to lift above “elbow height” in order to pour the pellets into the hopper. “Shoulder height” should be adequate in most cases (if the hopper is higher than shoulder height, the user cannot inspect inside to see the fill level). Assuming the user is sensible enough to lift the bags close to the body, which enables heavier weights to be lifted safely, the guidance recommends a maximum of 20 kg for men and 13 kg for women.
It is impossible for vendors to know whether a man or woman will be filling the hopper. They should not sell a product that risks injury to half the population. That suggests that bags should be no bigger than 13 kg.
Unfortunately, it is common to see 15 kg bags offered, and occasionally even bigger sizes. The UKPC should at the least recommend that its members should draw customers’ attention to the guidance and weight limits, and it should consider an advisory maximum bag-size of 13 kg.
15 kg bags are also often offered for bedding. The nature of bedding is that it will normally be spread on the ground and will not normally need to be lifted to shoulder height. There is a reasonable case that 15 kg bags are not a H&S hazard where the pellets are used for bedding, rather than for energy.
If 15 kg bags are available for bedding, customers may choose to use them for energy as well (if they ignore the tax incentives). So long as they have been advised on the safe lifting weights, and recommended the appropriate product for their use, that is up to them. The fact that some may choose to use 15 kg bags for energy does not undermine the importance of advising customers of the safety implications of that choice.

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