Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/213/103/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:22:07+00:00

Document:
A penalty may be recovered by a civil action, although such an action may be so far criminal in its nature that the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself therein in respect to any matter involving his being guilty of a criminal offense.
A suit brought by the United States to recover the penalty prescribed by §§ 4 and 5 of the Alien Immigration Act of March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, is a civil suit and not a criminal prosecution, and when it appears by undisputed testimony that a defendant has committed an offense against those sections, the trial judge may direct a verdict in favor of the government.
for violation of the Alien Immigration Law, are stated in the opinion.
This action of debt was brought by the United States to recover a penalty under the statute of Congress of March 3, 1903, regulating the immigration of aliens into this country. 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, c. 1012. The case is now before this Court upon a question certified by the judges of the circuit court of appeals under the authority of § 6 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. 26 Stat. 828, c. 517.
"SEC. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation or in any way to assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien into the United States, in pursuance of any offer, solicitation, promise, or agreement, parol or special, expressed or implied, made previous to the importation of such alien to perform labor or service of any kind, skilled or unskilled, in the United States."
in his own name and for his own benefit, including any such alien thus promised labor or service of any kind as aforesaid, as debts of like amount are now recovered in the courts of the United States, and separate suits may be brought for each alien thus promised labor or service of any kind as aforesaid. And it shall be the duty of the district attorney of the proper district to prosecute every such suit when brought by the United States."
In the present action, there was a judgment for the United States against the defendant, Hepner, for the prescribed penalty of $1,000. It is certified by the judges of the circuit court of appeals, to which the case was taken upon writ of error, that the testimony showed that an alien was induced by an offer, solicitation, or promise of the defendant to migrate to the United States for the purpose of performing labor here.
"When it appears by undisputed testimony that a defendant has committed an offense against secs. 4 and 5 of the Act of March 3, 1903, may the trial judge direct a verdict in favor of the government, plaintiff, which has sued for the $1,000 forfeited by such offense under said section 5?"
Is this to be deemed as in all substantial respects a civil suit, as distinguished from a strictly criminal case or criminal prosecution? This must be first determined before answering the specific question propounded by the judges below. It is well to look at some of the adjudications in suits for statutory penalties.
"shall, on conviction thereof, forfeit and pay a sum double the amount or value of the goods, wares, or merchandise so received, concealed, or purchased."
of America, in any court competent to try the same, and the collector within whose district a forfeiture shall have been incurred is enjoined to cause suits for the same to be commenced without delay. This manifestly contemplates civil actions, as does the proviso to the same section, which declares that no action or prosecution shall be maintained in any case under the act, unless the same shall have been commenced within three years after the penalty or forfeiture was incurred, accordingly, it has frequently been ruled that debt will lie at the suit of the United States, to recover the penalties and forfeitures imposed by statutes. It is true that the statute of 1823 imposes the forfeiture and liability to pay double the value of the goods received, concealed, or purchased, with knowledge that they had been illegally imported, 'on conviction thereof.' It may be, therefor, that an indictment or information might be sustained. But the question now is whether a civil action can be brought, and, in view of the provision that all penalties and forfeitures incurred by force of the act shall 'be sued for and recovered,' as prescribed by the act of 1799, we are of opinion that debt is maintainable. The expression, 'sued for and recovered,' is primarily applicable to civil actions, and not to those of a criminal nature."
"It is scarcely necessary to stop here to observe that the proceeding in question was not a proceeding in a criminal case within the meaning of the provisions of Congress, but was in truth a civil suit, though for an act of disobedience for which a criminal prosecution might possibly have been commenced if the act of Congress does not expressly or impliedly exclude it, a point not now material to consider, because the civil suit has, in this instance, been in fact adopted. A criminal proceeding unquestionably can only be by indictment or information. The proceeding in question was neither."
Similar views as to the civil nature of actions for penalties were expressed in United States v. Younger, 92 F. 672; United States v. B. & O. S.W. R. Co., 159 F. 33, 38; Hawlowetz v. Kass, 23 Blatchf. 395. See also Chaffee v. United States, 18 Wall. 516, 85 U. S. 538; Wilson v. Rastall, 4 Term 753; Roberge v. Burnham, 124 Mass. 277, 279; People v. Briggs, 114 N.Y. 56, 64-65; Mitchell v. State, 12 Neb. 538, 540; Webster v. People, 14 Ill. 365, 367; Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N.H. 97, 103-104; State v. Brown, 16 Conn. 54, 59.
doubt that the words of the statute on which the present suit is based are broad enough to embrace, and were intended to embrace, a civil action to recover the prescribed penalty. It provides that the penalty of $1,000 may be "sued for" and recovered by the United States or by any "person" who shall first bring his "action" therefor "in his own name and for his own benefit," "as debts of like amount are now recovered in the courts of the United States;" and "separate suits" may be brought for each alien thus promised labor or service of any kind. The district attorney is required to prosecute every such "suit" when brought by the United States. These references in the statute to the proceeding for recovering the penalty plainly indicate that a civil action is an appropriate mode of proceeding.
"such merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered from the person making the entry, shall be forfeited, . . . and such person shall, upon conviction, be fined for each offense a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned for a time not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court."
"The words in the Sixth Amendment, 'to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,' obviously refer to a person accused of crime, whether a felony or misdemeanor, for which he is prosecuted by indictment or presentment, or in some other authorized mode which may involve his personal security. So the clause declaring that the accused, in a criminal prosecution, is entitled 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him' has no reference to any proceeding (although the evidence therein may disclose, of necessity, the commission of a public offense) which is not directly against a person who is accused, and upon whom a fine or imprisonment, or both, may be imposed. A witness who proves facts entitling the plaintiff in a proceeding in a court of the United States, even if the plaintiff be the government, to a judgment for money only, and not to a judgment which directly involves the personal safety of the defendant, is not, within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, a witness against an 'accused' in a criminal prosecution, and his evidence may be brought before the jury in the form of a deposition, taken as prescribed by the statutes regulating the mode in which depositions to be used in the courts of the United States may be taken. The defendant in such a case is no more entitled to be confronted at the trial with the witnesses of the plaintiff than he would be in a case where the evidence related to a claim for money that could be established without disclosing any facts tending to show the commission of crime."
"An action in which a judgment for money only is sought, even if in some aspects it is one of a penal nature, may be brought wherever the defendant is found and is served with process, unless some statute requires it to be brought in a particular jurisdiction. "
Two things, then, appear from the Zucker case: 1. That it recognized an action to recover a penalty to be a civil action, and a proper mode of procedure. 2. That in such an action the defendant was not entitled, by virtue of the Constitution, to be confronted in court with the witnesses against him. No such question as the last one arises in this case. But the decision in the Zucker case is important in that it recognizes the right of the government, by a civil action of debt, to recover a statutory penalty, although such penalty arises from the commission of a public offense. It is important also in that it decides that an action of that kind is not of such a criminal nature as to preclude the government from establishing, according to the practice in strictly civil cases, its right to a judgment by depositions taken in the usual form, without confronting the defendant with the witnesses against him.
"this, though an action civil in form, is unquestionably criminal in its nature, and in such a case a defendant cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself,"
meaning thereby only that the action was of such a criminal nature as to prevent the use of depositions. Among the authorities cited in the Lees case was Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 634. In the latter case, it was adjudged that penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law are of such a quasi-criminal nature that they come within the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and of that part of the Fifth Amendment declaring that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
"In the discharge of this duty, it is the province of the court, either before or after the verdict, to decide whether the plaintiff has given evidence sufficient to support or justify a verdict in his favor. Not whether, on all the evidence, the preponderating weight is in his favor -- that is the business of the jury -- but, conceding to all the evidence offered the greatest probative force which, according to the law of evidence, it is fairly entitled to, is it sufficient to justify a verdict? If it does not, then it is the duty of the court after a verdict to set it aside and grant a new trial. Must the court go through the idle ceremony in such a case of submitting to the jury the testimony on which plaintiff relies, when it is clear to the judicial mind that, if the jury should find a verdict in favor of plaintiff, that verdict would be set aside and a new trial had? Such a proposition is absurd, and accordingly we hold the true principle to be, that, if the court is satisfied that, conceding all the inferences which the jury could justifiably draw from the testimony, the evidence is insufficient to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, the court should say so to the jury."
"that, although there may be some evidence in favor of a party, yet, if it is insufficient to sustain a verdict, so that one based thereon would be set aside, the court is not bound to submit the case to the jury, but may direct them what verdict to render."
"It is now a settled rule in the courts of the United States that, whenever, in the trial of a civil case, it is clear that the State of the evidence is such as not to warrant a verdict for a party, and that, if such a verdict were rendered, the other party would be entitled to a new trial, it is the right and duty of the judge to direct the jury to find according to the views of the court. Such is the constant practice, and it is a convenient one. It saves time and expense. It gives scientific certainty to the law in its application to the facts, and promotes the ends of justice."
"It is true that, in the above cases, the verdict was directed for the defendant. But where the question, after all the evidence is in, is one entirely of law, a verdict may at the trial be directed for the plaintiff, and where the bill of exceptions, as here, sets forth all the evidence in the case, this Court, if concurring with the court below in its views on the questions of law presented by the bill of exceptions and the record, will affirm the judgment."
"Taken as a whole, the evidence fully proved that the packages were unladen and delivered without the permit required by the act of Congress, and inasmuch as there was no opposing testimony, the direction of the court to the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs was entirely correct,"
"There certainly is no question here for the jury, as there is no conflict of testimony. . . . I shall therefore direct a verdict for the government for the full amount, $1,000."
See also Hines v. Darling, 99 Mich. 47.
The objection made in behalf of the defendant, that an affirmative answer to the question certified could be used so as to destroy the constitutional right of trial by jury, is without merit and need not be discussed. The defendant was, of course, entitled to have a jury summoned in this case, but that right was subject to the condition, fundamental in the conduct of civil actions, that the court may withdraw a case from the jury and direct a verdict according to the law if the evidence is uncontradicted and raises only a question of law.
Restricting our decision to civil cases in which the testimony is undisputed, and without qualifying former decisions requiring the court to send a case to the jury, under proper instructions as to the law, where the evidence is conflicting on any essential point, we answer the question here certified in the affirmative. Let this answer be certified to the court below.

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