Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/202/429
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:57:44+00:00

Document:
JOSIAH MILLARD, Appt., v. ELLIS H. ROBERTS, Treasurer of the United States; Henry B. F. Macfarland, Henry L. West, and John Biddle, Commissioners of the District of Columbia, et al.
Argued: and submitted April 18, 1906.
Mr. Josiah Millard in propria persona for appellant.
Solicitor General Hoyt, Edward H. Thomas, Wayne MacVeagh, Frederic D. McKenney, John Spalding Flannery, George E. Hamilton, and Michael J. Colbert for appellees.
An act entitled 'An Act to Provide for Eliminating Certain Grade Crossings of Railroads in the District of Columbia, to Require and Authorize the Construction of New Terminals and Tracks for the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company in the City of Washington, and for Other Purposes,' approved February 12, 1901; an act entitled 'An Act to Provide for Eliminating Certain Grade Crossings on the Line of the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Company in the City of Washington, District of Columbia, and Requiring Said Company to Depress and Elevate its Tracks, and to Enable it to Relocate Parts of Its Railroad Therein, and for Other Purposes,' approved February 12, 1901; an act entitled 'An Act to Provide for a Union Railroad Station in the District of Columbia and for Other Purposes,' approved Rebruary 28, 1903. (31 Stat. at L. 767, 774, chaps. 353, 354; 32 Stat. at L. 909, chap. 856), and to enjoin the other defendants from carrying into effect said acts of Congress, and that said acts 'be declared null and void for want of constitutional authority.' Defendants interposed demurrers to the bill, which were sustained by the supreme court, and a decree entered dismissing the bill. The court of appeals affirmed the decree.
The principal allegations of the bill are that the railroad defendants are private corporations and all interested in the railway and terminal facilities of the District of Columbia; that the District of Columbia owns no stock in any of the companies nor is otherwise interested in any of them save as useful private enterprises, and yet it is required by said acts, 'without any lawful consideration therefor,' to pay the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Company the sum of $750,000, and a like sum to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 'to be levied and assessed upon the taxable property and privileges in the said District other than the property of the United States and the District of Columbia,' and for the exclusive use of said corporations respectively, 'which is a private use, and not a governmental use;' that the public moneys of the District of Columbia are raised chiefly by taxation on the lands therein, and that the complainant is obliged to pay and does pay direct taxes on land owned by him therein. And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are 'acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to article 1, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are, therefore, null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they, and each and every one of them, originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives.' Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill.
In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law.
This language is applicable to the acts of Congress in the case at bar. Whatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act.
'The case is practically that of a contract between the United States and the District of Columbia on the one side and the railroad companies on the other, whereby the railroad companies agree to surrender certain rights, rights of property as well as other rights, and to construct a work of great magnitude, greater, perhaps, than their own needs require, but which Congress deems to be demanded for the best interest of the national capital and by the public at large; and for this surrender of right and this work of magnitude commensurate with the public demand, Congress agrees to pay a certain sum, partly out of the funds of the United States and partly out of the funds of the District of Columbia. It is a simple case of bargain and sale, like any other purchase.' 25 App. D. C. 221.
We have assumed that appellant, as a taxpayer of the District of Columbia, can raise the questions we have considered, but we do not wish to be understood as so deciding.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result only.
UNITED STATES, Appellant v. SPERRY CORPORATION et al.
UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. German MUNOZ-FLORES.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS v. MELLON, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. FROTHINGHAM v. SAME.

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