Source: https://www.juridicainternational.eu/index.php?id=12673
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:48:09+00:00

Document:
The issue of substantive identification of the sets of elements of mistake and/or fraud is topical and problematic in contemporary European legal order on a wider scale. *7 It appears from the published studies that in an identical factual situation some legal orders would allow rescission of a transaction based on either mistake or fraud only, others on both mistake and fraud. Furthermore, even within the same legal order, the practice need not always be uniformly clear as to whether a case involves a mistake or a fraud.
Along the lines of modern legal theory, provisions of the GPCCA do not foresee mistake as nonconformity of the intent with the declaration of intent but rather as the development of intent — based on false circumstances. According to GPCCA § 92 (1), mistake is an erroneous assumption relating to existing facts. One cannot speak of a legally relevant mistake in a case where the risk of proceeding from the correct circumstances rests with the person who declared his or her intent (see GPCCA § 92 (5)). Thus, it may be presumed that modern contract theory proceeds from the principle that each person bears the risk of his or her intent having evolved from correct presumptions and having taken into account all circumstances relevant for the particular transaction. The mistake that entitles the person making a declaration of intent to cancel the transaction entered into, serves as an exception, and with the view to the protection of legal usage and trust presumes a situation in which the partner of the mistaken person does not have confidence in the other party making a declaration of intent that lacks mistakes. Such a situation may arise, above all, when the other party to the transaction acts in bad faith or is also mistaken about the relevant circumstances related to the transaction.
Proceeding from the above, three main sets of elements are identified in the PECL, PICC, NBW as well as GPCCA: (1) a mistake caused by the other party (GPCCA § 92 (3) 1)); (2) a mistake that was known/should have been known to the other party (GPCCA § 92 (3) 2)); (3) a common mistake of the parties (GPCCA § 92 (3) 3)). In the case of both a caused and a known mistake, the mistaken party is given the opportunity to cancel the transaction on the grounds that the other party to the transaction is related to circumstances or acts in bad faith concerning the circumstances about which the mistaken party erred, and consequently his or her confidence in maintaining the validity of the transaction does not deserve to be protected. In the case of a caused mistake, erroneous assumptions are directly caused by the other party, whereas in the case of the recognised (recognisable) mistake, the other party is blamed because he or she knew or should have known about the mistake, and proceeding from the principle of good faith, was obliged to inform the mistaken party thereof. In order to cancel a transaction due to a mistake, it must always be a relevant mistake, i.e., a mistake concerning a circumstance of sufficient importance to influence a reasonable person, similar to the person who entered into the transaction, to enter into the particular transaction under the particular circumstances (GPCCA § 92 (2)).
Similarly, fraud also involves a mistake, while the liability for the mistake arising rests with the other party to the transaction. Thus, fraud is associated with the two main sets of elements of the mistake, i.e., the mistake caused by the other party to the transaction and the recognised mistake. Fraud presumes that the other party to the transaction is led into or left in error either by disclosing false information or by failing to disclose such circumstances that are subject to the duty to disclose under the principle of good faith (see GPCCA § 94 (1) and (2)). A case of disclosing some information as correct without actually verifying its correctness is deemed to be equal to disclosure of false circumstances (GPCCA § 94 (2)) if subsequently such information proves to be false. It is important that, unlike a mistake, only intentional leading into or leaving in error can be regarded as a fraud.
In the situation where the notion of fraud is described through the notion of mistake and the sets of elements of both may be related to the disclosure or non-disclosure of circumstances by one party of the transaction to the other, a more precise delimitation of the sets of elements of mistake and fraud is vital. While in the case of mistake, the right to cancel the transaction, inter alia,procedurally presumes proving that the mistake by the mistaken person was relevant, in the case of fraud, the relevance of the mistake is of no significance. In case of fraud, it is necessary to establish the deceiving person’s intent in leading into or leaving the other party in error, with the purpose of inducing the other person to enter into the transaction. Thus, the circumstances that need to be established and proved differ in the case of mistake and fraud.
In order to distinguish between fraud and mistake, the main criterion is the deceiving party to lead into or leave the other party in error and thereby induce the latter to enter into the transaction. Intent to deceive has been established as the main component of the concept of fraud. *13 According to GPCCA § 94 (1), the intent of the deceiving party must be aimed at leading into or leaving the person in error and the deceiving party must have the purpose of inducing the other person to enter into the transaction thereby. Intent may be either direct or indirect; yet in the case of negligence, fraud is excluded under Estonian civil law. The comments on article 3.8 of the PICC also require the existence of a special intent to deceive *14 , but it is noteworthy that, according to both the comments on the PECL *15 and the Dutch legal theory *16 , negligence may suffice to detect fraud — regardless of the fact that in the texts of both PECL article 4:107 (2) and NBW article 3:44 (3) intent is required for fraud.
The analysis of intent gives rise to the question of whether only a particular person can be intentionally induced to enter into a transaction or is fraud also possible in a situation in which the other party to the transaction is not known. Entry into a contract at auction could serve as an example here, in which case the deceptive information has initially been intentionally disclosed to all participants, although pursuant to GPCCA § 94 it has legal significance as fraud only in respect of the person with whom the contract is entered into. The question has been also raised in literature concerning possible fraud in issue of securities — if an issuer of securities prepares and publishes a misleading prospectus, would it be necessary to prove the issuer’s acknowledged purpose to lead a particular person into error in order to establish presence of intent to deceive? *17 The authors believe that it is possible to assume the position that neither mistake nor fraud requires that at the moment when the other party to the transaction discloses false information (including as defined in GPCCA § 94 (2)), he or she must know the particular person that will enter into legal relationship with him or her in the future, but the intent to deceive may be aimed at the “wider public”. If a party to a future transaction calls upon the public to make declarations of intent, by presenting for this purpose false (including unverified) information, intent to deceive may be established regardless of the fact that the intent was not aimed at a specifically identified person, but rather at unidentified persons as potential parties to the contract.
Next we will proceed to separately analyse the intent to deceive in comparison to the mistake caused separately (GPCCA § 92 (3) 1)) and recognised mistake (GPCCA § 92 (3) 2)).
Differentiating a case of a mistake caused by the other party to the transaction (GPCCA § 92 (3) 1)) from that of a fraud is one of the most problematic issues in legal practice.
In addition to the disclosure of false information, both mistake and fraud may be established when a party to the transaction has a good faith duty to inform the other party of circumstances relevant to the entry into the transaction which the party fails to disclose, creating an incorrect perception of the actual circumstances for the other party. The notification obligation will be reviewed in greater detail in part 4 of this article.
In the case of both disclosure of false information and non-disclosure of relevant information, the question arises: when can such activities be considered as intentional with regard to the other party? Establishing intent is further complicated by the rule that disclosure of unverified circumstances as correct is deemed to be equal to disclosure of false circumstances if the unverified circumstances subsequently prove to be false (GPCCA § 94 (2)). Thus, a case may involve fraud when the person disclosing the circumstances does not know that he or she is disclosing false information, but he or she does not apply the care required for verification of their authenticity. Based on the above, we may assume the position that according to the regulation of fraud under Estonian law, a case cannot involve fraud when the alleged defrauding party lacks any information about the incorrectness of the disclosed information and he or she has with due case conducted verification of the information. It is disputable of course at what point it is possible to assume that the person has verified the disclosed circumstances sufficiently and when not. For example, when a person buys a used vehicle and, upon a further transfer of the vehicle relies on the confirmation initially given by the former owner or independent expert that the vehicle had been in no accidents, the case does not constitute fraud even if such confirmation proves incorrect later on (although it may involve a relevant mistake). However, when for example, a seller of a used vehicle does not rely on any confirmation of the former owner but claims, without verifying the facts first, that the vehicle has been in no accidents, the case involves disclosure of false circumstances as defined in GPCCA § 94 (2).
If adjudicating the same case according to Estonian law, based on applicable law and legal literature, the court would also have had to establish the existence of separate intent to deceive in order to qualify the seller’s behaviour as fraud. Yet such a solution does not seem to be justified. The authors of the article are of the opinion that, as in German law, it should suffice to prove an intent to deceive if the defrauding party has disclosed information the correctness of which he or she has not verified, although he or she should have done so, and which later proves to be false.
Compared to the mistake caused by the other party, differentiating the case of a mistake recognised by the other party from that of a fraud has a little less significance in practice, but is no less problematic.
The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia has in its decision in civil matter 3-2-1-5-99 *27 noted that “in fraud, the intent may lie in the knowledge of the allegedly defrauding party that he or she tells a lie or withholds the truth in order to induce the other person to enter into a transaction”. The recognised mistake, however, can also be perceived when the attitude of the person recognising the mistake is neutral. *28 In such a situation, different legal orders solve the issue of delimiting mistake from fraud differently. An example could be a situation in which a person offers for sale a painting that he or she considers to be a copy of little value, but which, in actuality, is an expensive original work by a famous artist. The buyer actually gets the idea that the painting is valuable and buys it, without disclosing his or her idea to the seller. Is it a mistake or a fraud? Judging from legal literature, the buyer’s behaviour must be qualified by the set of elements of fraud pursuant to the laws of some countries (e.g., France , Belgium , Greece , Austria and Portugal ), under some other jurisdictions (e.g., English) it should not. *29 As in German law *30 , the assessment of the notification obligation provided in GPCCA § 95 is of critical importance for adjudicating the case based on Estonian law. Pursuant to this section, in order to identify whether the party has the notification obligation, it must, above all, be taken into account whether the circumstance is obviously important for the other party, what specific expertise the parties have, what the reasonable options of the other party are to obtain the necessary data, and how large the costs are that the person needs to incur to obtain the data. Thus, the solution may depend on the individuals, their specific expertise and other circumstances specific to the case.
It is less problematic to distinguish between the above-described situation and a situation in which the other party did not know about the mistake of the person making the declaration of intent, but should have known about it, and leaving the mistaken party in error was in conflict with the principle of good faith. A situation in which a person should have been aware is related to gross negligence according to modern transaction studies. Pursuant to LOA § 15 (4), if a person was unaware of circumstances with legal effect due to gross negligence, it is deemed that the person should have been aware of the circumstances. Gross negligence is failure to exercise necessary care to a material extent (LOA § 104 (4)). Consequently, if a person fails to exercise necessary care to a material extent, is therefore unaware that the person making a declaration of intent is in error (and thus naturally fails to inform the person making the declaration of intent about his or her mistake), it cannot constitute an intentional leaving of a person in error. In the latter case, we can only speak about the right to cancel the transaction due to a (recognisable) mistake (GPCCA § 92 (3) 2)).
If a person wishes to be released from the transaction due to circumstances that provide grounds to believe that the case involves mistake and/or fraud, the transaction can be cancelled by making a unilateral declaration of rescission pursuant to GPCCA §§ 90 and 98. When making such a declaration, the transaction becomes void from the start. The above delimitation problem, however, implies that upon making a declaration for cancelling the transaction, it may be difficult for the party making the declaration of rescission to adequately assess whether the other party caused the mistake by his or her neutral attitude to the violation of the notification obligation or by the intent to induce entering into the transaction. As the existence or lack of intent to deceive can be established, above all, after learning about the explanation or position of the other party and obtaining an overview of all the circumstances related to the entry into the particular transaction, it would in practice be advisable to rely upon making the declaration of rescission besides fraud, alternatively also on mistake, in order to avoid a situation in which it may be later established that the elements of cancelling a transaction due to fraud (e.g., because of lack of intent to deceive) were missing and thus the declaration cancelling the transaction due to fraud is void.
Both sets of elements of mistake and fraud discussed herein involve the fact that one party’s mistake is brought about by the other party to the transaction either by disclosing false circumstances or failing to disclose circumstances that should be disclosed according to the principle of good faith. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse under what circumstances a party to the transaction has a duty related to the provision of information to the other party.
Violations of the duty to disclose may, under certain conditions, constitute as fraud. Namely, fraud can be committed both by action (i.e., disclosure of false circumstances) and by silence (i.e., by non-disclosure of circumstances that should have been disclosed to the other party according to the principle of good faith). For example, fraud by silence is most common in German judicial practice *36 , while French legal theory is of the opinion that fraud (dol) may consist of silence, i.e., when the defrauding party is silent about a circumstance, knowing which the other party would not have entered into such a transaction. *37 The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court has in its decision in matter 3-2-1-93-05 *38 also noted that in order to establish the right to cancel a contract due to mistake, on the basis of GPCCA § 92 (3), it must be identified whether the other party to the transaction was subject to the objective duty to disclose arising from the principle of good faith.
For establishing the duty to disclose under the principle of good faith (LOA § 6), regard shall be had, above all, for the following circumstances according to GPCCA § 95 *39 : (1) whether the circumstance is clearly important to the other party, (2) to the specific expertise of the parties, (3) the reasonable opportunities of the other party to obtain the necessary information, and (4) the extent of the necessary expenses to be made by the other party in order to obtain such information. The list is not exhaustive.
German judicial practice, which imposes very extensive duties to disclose upon the obligor, has also been criticised for creating legal uncertainty and making it difficult to predict the outcome of any court case. The criteria used to decide upon the existence of the duty to disclose are allegedly also too vague. *43 At the same time, Dutch law is of the position that if fraud has been proven, the existence of the duty to disclose is not subject to especially high standards: the acts committed by the defrauding party in bad faith constitute such a substantial argument that extremely substantial reasons would be required to overthrow the duty to disclose information. *44 We rather agree with the position — a similar approach under Estonian law is supported by the fact that the relevance of the mistake is not important in fraud, unlike in mistake.
According to GPCCA § 95, the notification obligation depends, inter alia,on the reasonable opportunities of the other party to obtain the necessary information and the extent of the necessary expenses to be made. Once again, the obligation is tied to the professionalism of the parties: when one of the parties is a professional and the other a consumer, the latter usually has considerably worse opportunities to obtain the necessary information. Thus, it is usually much easier for providers of goods or services in the field of their economic and professional activity to obtain information about the services or goods offered by them, than it is for consumers.
As discussed in this article, the right to rescind a transaction on the grounds of mistake and fraud presumes a causal link between the disclosure or non-disclosure of circumstances by a party and the creation of an incorrect perception of the actual circumstances by the other party.
Pursuant to GPCCA § 94 (3), a person who entered into a transaction due to fraud may cancel the transaction. Thus, rescission of a transaction due to fraud based on GPCCA § 94 presumes the existence of causation (conditio sine qua non) between the fraud (i.e., leading the defrauded party into or leaving in error) and entry into the transaction. This means that disclosure of mistaken circumstances or non-disclosure of some relevant circumstances must lead the other party into error (or leave in error) and thereby induce that party to enter into such a transaction. Such causation need not be there, e.g., in case the defrauded party actually took into account the possibility of fraud and nevertheless entered into the transaction. *60 Thus, the Tallinn Circuit Court has established that signing a contract without reading it through does not constitute either mistake or fraud as the defendant did not exercise sufficient care when signing the contract and did not act as a reasonable person. *61 Naturally, there is no causation also if when the defrauded party had a truthful overview of the actual state of circumstances from the very beginning (e.g., knew about the deficiency of the object of sale from the beginning).
In order to distinguish between the so-called caused mistake or recognised/recognisable mistake and the set of elements of fraud, according to law applicable in Estonia and modern legal theory, attention must be paid to the following circumstances: (1) in the case of fraud, it is necessary to identify the intent to deceive, i.e., a direct or indirect intent to induce the other party to enter into the transaction; (2) fraud may be either active — submission of false information for the purpose of deception — or passive — failure to follow the duty to disclose or leaving the other party in recognisable mistake; (3) the existence and extent of the duty to disclose must be determined on a case by case basis, taking into account GPCCA § 95, while the prohibition to disclose false information applies at all times; (4) unlike rescission based on mistake, fraud does not require relevancy of the mistake although the false information must impose a significant effect on entering into the transaction on the specific terms; (5) a causal link must be identified between intentional deceit and entry into the contract. A case does not constitute fraud when an intentional deceit took place but did not bring about the fact of entry into the contract. As criticism of law in force at present, the authors point out the need to simplify proving intent to deceive in case a party has disclosed unverified false information despite of being obliged to verify it under the circumstances. The authors of the article are of the opinion that similarly to German law, the fact that the defrauding party has disclosed unverified information which should have been verified and which proves incorrect later, should serve as sufficient evidence as to the intent to deceive of the same party. Neither is it possible to demand that the establishment of intent to deceive in other cases of fraud involve the definite demonstration of knowledge by the defrauding party.
*1 Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus. – RT I 2002, 35, 216, 2007, 24, 128 (in Estonian). English translation available at http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/tekst.asp?loc=text&dok=X30082K2&keel=en&pg=1&ptyyp=RT&tyyp=X&query=%FCldosa+seadus (21.06.2007).
*2 Available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm (21.06.2007).
*3 O. Lando, H. Beale. Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II. Kluwer Law International 2000.
*4 Entered into force on 1 January 1992. Available at http://www.civil-code.nl/index.htm (15.07.2007).
*5 Explanatory memorandum to the proposal of the GPCCA. Available at http://web.riigikogu.ee/ems/saros-bin/mgetdoc?itemid=991600043&login=proov&password=&system=ems&server=ragne11 (21.06.2007) (in Estonian).
*6 See also M. Käerdi. Eksimuse käsitlus tsiviilõiguses. Magistritöö (Treatment of Mistake in Civil Law. Master’s Thesis). Tallinn 2002, p. 7 (in Estonian).
*7 See, e.g., R. Sefton-Green. Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law. Cambridge University Press 2005.
*8 Võlaõigusseadus. – RT I 2001, 81, 487; 2005, 61, 473 (in Estonian). English translation available at http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/tekst.asp?loc=text&dok=X60032K1&keel=en&pg=1&ptyyp=RT&tyyp=X&query=v%F5la%F5igus (21.06.2007).
*9 K. Larenz, M. Wolf. Allgemeiner Teil des bürgerlichen Rechts.München:Verlag C. H. Beck 2004, p. 642.
*10 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code of Federal Republic of Germany), adopted on 18 August 1896. – RGBl., p. 195.
*11 H. Köhler. Tsiviilseadustik. Üldosa (Civil Code. General Part). Tallinn 1998, p. 108 (in Estonian).
*12 M. Käerdi (Note 6), p. 39.
*13 See, e.g., R. Sefton-Green (Note 7), p. 24.
*14 UNIDROIT Principles and official comments. Available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13637&x=1 (18.02.2007).
*15 O. Lando, H. Beale (Note 3), p. 252.
*16 See D. Busch, E. Hondius, H. J. Van Kooten, H. Schelhaas, W. M. Schrama. The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002, p. 208.
*17 M. Hint. Avalikustamiskohustuse rikkumine Eesti väärtpaberituruõiguses (Violation of Notification in Estonian Security Market Law). – Juridica 2003/6, pp. 408–415 (in Estonian).
*18 O. Palandt. Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. 65. Aufl. München: Verlag C. H. Beck 2006, § 123, paragraph 2. Commentator: H. Heinrichs. The comments on the PICC, on the contrary, require such goal: “[...] conduct is fraudulent if it is intended to lead the other party into error and thereby to gain an advantage to the detriment of the other party.” See UNIDROIT Principles and official comments (Note 14).
*19 Decision of the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of 26.01.1996. – Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Rechtschprechung Report (NJW-RR) 1996, pp. 690 ff.
*20 PICC (Note 14); O. Lando, H. Beale (Note 3), pp. 252–253.
*21 O. Palandt, H. Heinrichs (Note 18), § 123, paragraph 30.
*22 H. Köhler (Note 11), p. 124.
*23 O. Palandt, H. Heinrichs (Note 18), § 123, paragraph 11; see also K. Larenz, M. Wolf (Note 9), p. 686.
*24 Decision of the Supreme Court of the Frankfurt Land of 19.02.1999. – NJW-RR 1999, 1064.
*25 See also M. Käerdi (Note 6), p. 55.
*26 W. Erman. Begr. Handkommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, herausgegeben von Harm-Peter Westermann und Klaus Küchenhoff. Bd. 1. 9 Aufl. Münster 1993. H. Brox, paragraph 29 concerning § 123. See M. Käerdi (Note 6), p. 67.
*27 Available at http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&indeks=0,2,197,440&tekst=RK/3-2-1-5-99 (15.07.2007) (in Estonian).
*28 M. Käerdi (Note 6), p. 67.
*29 R. Sefton-Green (Note 7), pp. 131–160.
*30 O. Palandt, H. Heinrichs (Note 18), § 123, paragraphs 5a–5c; M. Käerdi (Note 6), p. 67.
*31 P. Varul, I. Kull, V. Kõve, M. Käerdi (compilers). Võlaõigusseadus I. Üldosa (§§ 1–207). Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Law of Obligations Act I. General Part (§§ 1–207). Commented Edition). Tallinn 2006, p. 332 (in Estonian).
*32 For relating intent to the standard of reason see also PICC article 3.8 (Note 14).
*33 P. Gilikier. Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law. – European Review of Private Law 2005/5, p. 623.
*34 B. Markesinis, H. Unberath, A. Johnston. The German Law of Contract. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2006, pp. 305–308.
*35 P. Gilikier (Note 33), pp. 624, 631. There are exceptions to this principle in contracts where a trust relationship exists between the parties: e.g., in the case of insurance contract, the policyholder must inform the insurer about all circumstances that a reasonable insurer would consider important. Ibid., pp. 625–626. See also O. Palandt, H. Heinrichs (Note 18), § 123, paragraphs 5a–5c.
*36 Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. Bd. 1:Allgemeiner Teil. 5. Aufl.München:Verlag C.H. Beck 2006, § 123, paragraph 16. Commentator: Kramer.
*37 M. Fabre-Magnan, R. Sefton-Green. Defects of Consent in Contract Law. – Towards a European Civil Code. 3rd ed. 2004, p. 403.
*38 RT III 2005, 35, 343 (in Estonian).
*39 The circumstances provided in GPCCA § 95 verbatim coincide with those provided in PECL article 4:107 (3).
*40 See Supreme Court decision 3-2-1-93-05 (Note 38).
*41 A case obviously involves fraud when the seller has, e.g., the walls repainted to cover up the damage from moisture before the sale. See O. Lando, H. Beale (Note 3), p. 253.
*42 A decision of the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of 4.04.2001. – NJW 2001, p. 2163.
*43 B. Markesinis et al (Note 34), p. 309.
*44 See D. Busch et al (Note 16), p. 208.
*45 See I. Parrest. Teavitamiskohustus lepingueelsetes suhetes (Notification Obligation in Precontractual Relations). – Juridica 2001/5, p. 321 (in Estonian).
*46 A decision of the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of 3.03.82. – NJW 1982, p. 1386.
*47 P. Gilikier (Note 33), p. 631.
*48 A decision of the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of 7.10.91. – NJW 1992, p. 300.
*49 I. Kull, I. Parrest. Teatamiskohustus võlaõigusseaduse kontekstis (Notification Obligation in the Context of the Law of Obligations Act). – Juridica 2003/4, p. 216 (in Estonian).
*50 O. Lando, H. Beale (Note 3), p. 254.
*51 See decision of the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of 4.04.2001. – NJW 2001, p. 2163.
*52 O. Lando, H. Beale (Note 3), p. 232.
*53 I. Parrest (Note 45), p. 326.
*54 B. Markesinis et al (Note 34), p. 309.
*55 P. Varul et al (Note 31), p. 59.
*56 O. Palandt, H. Heinrichs (Note 18), § 123, paragraph 5a.
*57 K. Larenz (Note 9), p. 684.
*58 B. Markesinis et al (Note 34), pp. 303–304.
*59 P. Varul et al (Note 31), p. 60.
*60 MüKo/Kramer (Note 36), § 123, paragraph 12.
*61 Civil matter 2-2/901/04 of the Tallinn Circuit Court, available at http://kola.just.ee/docs/public/dokument_180443.pdf (21.06.2007) (in Estonian).
*62 MüKo/Kramer (Note 36), § 123, paragraph 12.
*63 Ibid., § 123, paragraph 12.
*64 O. Lando, H. Beale (Note 3), p. 255.

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