Source: https://taxinterpretations.com/tax-topics/statutory-interpretation/interpretation-act
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:14:25+00:00

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I acknowledge that rectification under Quebec civil law and rectification in equity will not, however, always lead to the same result. This is because of differences between the principles of contract law specific to the two legal systems and variations in the facts from case to case.
Still, the natural convergence in principles and outcomes I have described above is generally desirable, particularly in the tax context. Taxpayers in both Quebec and the common law provinces are subject to the same federal taxation system. They could expect to encounter similar results when they seek to amend documents that express their agreement and lead to unintended tax consequences.
After concluding that the common law doctrine of rectification did not permit the parties to change their agreement so as to avoid unanticipated tax consequences, Brown J referenced the somewhat similar conclusion that was reached in the companion Jean Coutu appeal dealing with the attempted correction of a Quebec transaction, and stated (at para. 33) that “this convergence is undoubtedly desirable in the context of applying federal tax legislation,” and noted that, in particular, under both legal systems, taxpayers’ had no facility to redo their contracts retroactively should their tax planning fail.
The position that the resident taxpayer, who resided outside Quebec, could generate a credit for at least the cash portion of his “donations” made as part of a leveraged donation tax shelter was buttressed in his pleadings by advancing the proposition that Parliament did not intend for split gifts to receive significantly different treatment in the rest of Canada as contrasted to Quebec (where split gifts were accepted in the Civil Code) even before the introduction of the split gift rules in the Act effective after 2002.
[T]ax law applies to transactions governed by, and the nature and legal consequences of which are determined by reference to, the common law or the civil law [of contract].
Tax law is, in a way, superimposed on the civil law and the corporate law, that which one could call the common or general law. When tax law is based on such law, one must have recourse first to the existing juridical concepts.
C. Miller J rejected a Crown submission that he lacked the jurisdiction to determine whether, under Ontario law, a Quistclose trust attached to funds lent to help fund leveraged donations. Although the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to declare that there is a Quistclose trust, it has the jurisdiction to determine whether taxpayer assessments are correct, and this requires that the “Tax Court… look at a taxpayer’s circumstances and make a determination as to what facts are true and what legal and equitable rights are available to the taxpayer” (para. 19).
quaere whether there is a federal law of "debt" or "charity"
An offshore fund ("SLT"), in which the taxpayer had an interest, invested in instruments (styled as "Notes") of non-resident subsidiaries of Canadian banks. The Notes did not bear interest and provided for a payment on maturity that reflected the performance of a matching actively-managed portfolio of assets held by affiliates of the obligors. If the Notes constituted "debt obligations" under s. 95(1) or "debt" under s. 94.1, the taxpayer (a unitholder of SLT) would be required to recognize its share of resulting foreign accrual property income of SLT.
It is not clear that there is a federal meaning of the concept of debt, and neither of the parties asked the Court to adopt one. There is arguably some support in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R.  1 S.C.R. 10 for the proposition that a common-law term used in the Act, like "charity" in that case, could or should perhaps be recognized to have a uniform federal meaning that may not accord precisely with provincial meanings. I was not asked to and do not propose to take that route in this reference.
C Miller J granted the Minister's motion to strike the civil law argument from pleadings, calling it "hopeless" (para. 22). Sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act specifically reject uniformity in favour of bijuralism, to say nothing of the Harmonization Act, jurisprudence preceding the enactment of ss. 8.1 and 8.2 (see St. Hilaire, 2001 FCA 63), published articles, and s. 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
It is well established that, since "director" is not a defined term in the ETA, it is appropriate to look to a corporation's incorporating legislation for determining whether a person was a director of a corporation at a particular time for the purposes of section 323.
[I]t appears to us, based in particular on the conflict of law rules, that the provincial and territorial laws of property and civil rights in Canada provide for mutual recognition of different types of entities or arrangements established under the respective jurisdictions of the various provinces and territories, thus providing an expanded base for analysis that is uniform across Canada for the purposes of applying the two-step approach.
Bell TCJ. found that if s. 160(1) had not been amended to speak in the present tense rather than in the past tense, a subsequent discharge from bankruptcy of a transferor of property would not have retroactively eliminated liability of the transferee under s. 160(1).
Furthermore, I do not share the Judge's concerns … about the need, on Mr Barker's construction, to imply "or becomes" into paragraph (d) or to construe "is" in (d) in a way which means that it has to apply at all times throughout the life of the trust. … Paragraph (d) is intended to apply in relation to any person whether in (a), (b) or (c). Therefore, it needs to be read in a way which covers all of the temporal circumstances covered in those earlier paragraphs. I can see no reason why "is" should not be read in an "ambulatory" fashion or for that matter, that "or becomes" should not be implied.
After noting that recent decisions have diminished the importance of the distinction between directory and mandatory provisions, Desjardins J.A. found that failure of the Minister to assess with all due dispatch as required by s. 152(1) did not invalidate a late assessment by the Minister.
The statement in s. 6(2)(d) of the Act, that "for the purposes of this subsection, it shall be assumed, unless the taxpayer establishes otherwise in the prescribed form, that the aggregate number of kilometres referred to in subparagraph (c)(i)" was not less than 1,000 km. per month, was mandatory given jurisprudence on the meaning of the word "shall".
The statement in Regulation 4700 that an election under ITAR 26(7) "shall" be made on the form prescribed was imperative rather than directory. In addition to referring to s. 11 of the Interpretation Act, Strayer, J. applied the decision in Re Manitoba Language Rights,  1 S.C.R. 721.
'such an interpretation of the word 'shall' would be utterly inconsistent with the context in which it has been used and would render the sections irrational or meaningless.'"
A provision in the Excise Tax Act stating that a refund "may" be granted gave the Minister the discretion to refuse refund applications.
"Section 166.1 obviously is designed to afford relief to a taxpayer who disagrees with an assessment. Although it sets out specif requirements it should not, in these circumstances, be interpreted to foreclose the possibility of an earnest taxpayer, unsophisticated in tax matters, being able to proceed with an appeal. That is simply unjust."
The Canada-U.K. Convention, like the Income Tax Act, was governed by s. 12 of the Interpretation Act.
It was found that granting the Crown leave to require a third party to participate by joinder as a defendant in an action was the result that would best attain the objects of ss.174 and 175 of the Income Tax Act.
The amount of proceeds of disposition was assessed "realistically", notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision authorizing the deduction from the proceeds, the amount of accounts whose collectibility was doubtful.
In order to give effect to the spirit of the Act, the "cost" of gold bullion was interpreted as including carrying charges (such as interest) notwithstanding the absence of a specific adjustment for carrying charges in section 53(1) (with the exception of the adjustment for land carrying charges in section 53(1)(h)).
"[W]hen there is a provision in a statute that every Act shall be deemed remedial and shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act, according to its true intent, meaning and spirit .... these words do not diminish the rule that a statute imposing a tax must be in clear, unambiguous language, and should be strictly construed".
Bowman TCJ. applied s. 12 in finding that a reference in s. 118.2(2)(l.2) of the Act to reasonable expenses relating to "renovations or alterations to a dwelling" included costs of constructing a new dwelling that were attributable to the medical condition of the taxpayer's daughter.
An assessment that erroneously referred to the taxation year of the taxpayer as ending on January 2, 1987 rather than December 31, 1986 was deemed to be valid under s. 152(8) of the Income Tax Act, after a brief reference was made to s. 12 of the Interpretation Act.
"If there is doubt on which side of the line a claimant falls, that doubt should be resolved in favour of the claimant."
Linden J.A. found support for his interpretation of s. 79(c) by referring to the marginal notes, and stated (at p. 6575) that although the marginal notes "'form no part of an enactment', it is permissible to consider them as part of the context of the legislation as a whole".
"Despite section 13 of the Interpretation Act to the effect that marginal notes form no part of the enactment but shall be deemed to have been inserted for convenience of reference only they do, in most instances, and in this instance, accurately reflect the general sense of the language of the subsection and may therefore, be referred to for that purpose." Thus, s. 56(2) is designed to prevent "Indirect Payments".
Rouleau J. applied s. 15(1) of the Interpretation Act in finding that because ss.125.1(3)(b)(v), (vi) and (vi.1) excluded the production of ferric oxide and titanium dioxide from "manufacturing or processing" the sale of such production also was excluded from "the selling... of goods manufactured or processed in Canada" referred to in s. 125.1(3)(b)(x) of the Income Tax Act. Accordingly, because the taxpayer's sales of ferric oxide and titanium dioxide could not be included in its sales of goods manufactured or processed in Canada for purposes of s. 125.1(3)(b)(x), its secondary activity of manufacturing iron powder did not qualify.
"Where a term is defined in a particular statute, as 'earned income' is defined in the ITA, that definition prevails over its ordinary or dictionary definition."
"That definitional section cannot, in my view, prevail to render the terms assessment and reassessment entirely interchangeable in a provision that clearly distinguishes between them and expressly provides differently in respect of them."
"While a statute requires strict interpretation and this is especially so of a complex statute such as the Income Tax Act, it is nevertheless necessary to look at this statute as a whole and what it seeks to accomplish rather than relying on any specific section and especially the definitions in section 248 in order to reach an interpretation which would defeat the intent of the Act."
Joyal, J. stated "that statutory definitions of terms contained in Part XVII - Interpretation of the Income Tax Act may be far from conclusive when applied to the same term found or used elsewhere in an excessively long and complex piece of legislation," and held that "corporation" in s. 256 did not include an off-shore corporation, notwithstanding the definition of "corporation" in s. 248(1).
Although Regulation 701(2)(a) defined "income derived from mining operations" to mean income calculated under the federal Act, the clear meaning of "income from mining operations" in Regulation 701(1)(a) was mining income calculated as provided by provincial statute. Accordingly, there was a contrary intention as contemplated in s. 15(2) of the Interpretation Act.
Although s. 63(2) of the pre-1972 Act (the predecessor of s. 104(2)) deemed executors to be individuals for certain purposes, that provision had no application to s. 68(1)(a) of the pre-1972 Act "because a plain intention to the contrary is to be gathered from the context of the section itself" (p. 1130).
In denying charitable credits for the cash contributions on the basis that inflated amounts shown on the receipts rendered them invalid under the applicable Regulations, Scott JA stated (at para. 79):.
It is a well-established principle that delegated legislation, such as the Regulations, is to be interpreted in accordance with the general principles of interpretation, in addition to being read in the context of its enabling Act.
See summary under Reg. 3501(6).
McNair J. stated that he proposed to ignore the words "directly or indirectly" modifying the word "use" in paragraph a(i) of Class 29 of Schedule II in light of the absence of those words in the corresponding provision of the Act, given the principle that "the 'intent of the statute transcends and governs the intent of the regulation'" (p. 6294).
"In my view the word 'development' in the context in which it appears in Regulation 1205 indicates that the word is used in the same sense that it is used in section 83A of the Act."
L'Heureux-Dubé J. stated (at p. 5368) that reading s. 20(1)(a) "without considering the regulations would not be in accordance with appropriate principles of statutory interpretation".
Section 4 of the Power Commission Act (Nova Scotia) provided that the Nova Scotia Power Commission " ("NSPC") "shall continue as a body corporate and as agent of Her Majesty The Queen in right of the province" under the name of "Nova Scotia Power Corporation. The respondent, which had acquired the undertaking of NSPC, sought to establish that NSPC was not an agent of the Crown, so that purported elections made by NSPC under s. 21 of the Act, to step up the capital cost of the depreciable assets transferred to the taxpayer pursuant to s. 85(5.1) of the Act, would be valid.
"Once a corporation is found to be an agent of the Crown, the question of Crown immunity turns on the scope of the corporation's mandate and whether, on the facts, it was acting within that mandate."
Here, NSPC had acquired and operated the assets pursuant to its objects of developing for Nova Scotia the maximum use of power on an economic and efficient basis with the result that the questions put to the Court should be answered on the basis that NSPC was acting within its authorize purpose so as to benefit from Crown immunity.
The Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) was found not to bind the Crown in that there are no provisions of that Act which would indicate a clear intention to bind the Crown and given the lack of evidence that the intent and purpose of that Act would be wholly frustrated by its non-application to the Crown.
To the extent that s. 178 of the Bank Act gives a bank priority over the Crown, the Crown's rights are not affected since by virtue of the s. 178 security the Crown has no interest in the subject property.
The word "mortgagor" was given its common-law meaning rather than the extended meaning accorded to it by the Mortgages Act (Ontario).
"It is a well established rule that provincial enactments are presumed to be intended to avoid interference with federal legislation". The Payment of Wages Act (Manitoba) did not affect the interepretation of S.153 of the Act.
It was found that the provincial Legislature unquestionably had the power to declare the nature of the relationship between the provincial Crown and a vendor with respect to taxes collected by him under the Social Services and Education Tax Act (N.B.), notwithstanding that such declaration brought the provincial Crown within the definition of a "secured creditor" under the Bankruptcy Act, a federal statute.
As Saturdays are "public holidays" as defined in s. 35 of the Interpretation Act, this means that if the return filing deadline of the taxpayer falls on a Saturday (e.g., Saturday, April 30, 2016), the filing deadline for related forms to be filed by that deadline (e.g., Forms T2057, T1134 and T5013) will be extended to the following Monday. The situation where there is a maximum number of months (e.g., 15 months) following the end of the taxation year to file a form is handled in the same manner.
19. [extension if holiday] When the last day to comply falls on a holiday, the taxpayer has until the next day that is not a holiday to comply, according to section 26 of the Interpretation Act. A holiday includes statutory and provincial holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays….
The “normal reassessment period”…[ends] three years after the day of sending the notice of an original assessment or an original notification that no tax is payable by the taxpayer for the year. In this regard, subsection 27(3) of the Interpretation Act states that where a time is expressed to begin or end at, on or with a specified day, or to continue to or until a specified day, the time includes that day. Accordingly, under paragraph 152(3.1)(b)…where an original assessment is issued on December 31, 2013, the normal reassessment period ends on December 31, 2016 (i.e., 3 years after that date). The courts confirmed this in Brunette,  1 C.T.C. 2008 (TCC) [Docket: 98-2080-IT-I].
Paragraph 152(4)(b)…provides that a…reassessment… may be made after the taxpayer’s normal reassessment period…only if the…reassessment…is made before the day that is 3 years after the end of the normal reassessment period for the taxpayer in respect of the year… .
Although a taxation year ends at the last instant of the last day of that year, it nevertheless ends on that day. Consequently, TD was required to file its return within 18 months after October 31, 2012. By operation of s. 25(5) of the Interpretation Act, October 31, 2012, is excluded, [and] the time for filing began to run on November 1, 2012, and expired on April 30, 2014.
Because s. 157(1) of the Act contemplated that time should not be computed on a calendar-year or a calendar-month basis, ss. 28 and 35(1) of the Interpretation Act did not apply due to the presence of the contrary intention referred to in s. 3(1) of the Interpretation Act.
17. [s. 247(4)(c): "within 3 months"] Under paragraph 28(c) of the Interpretation Act, the day on which the three-month period expires will bear the same calendar day number as the specified day….
18. [ "within 3 months" examples] [W]hen a request is served on April 30, the taxpayer has until July 30 to provide the documentation, not July 31. However, if a request is served on January 31, the taxpayer has until April 30 to provide the documentation… If the request is served on November 30, the taxpayer has to provide the documentation by February 28 of the following calendar year (or February 29 in the case of a leap year).
S.23(3) of the Interpretation Act (B.C.) (similar to s. 31(3)) does not apply to an administrative power of a quasi-judicial character that is exercised by a Minister in relation to a particular taxpayer for a particular year. In such a situation the Minister is functus after having exercised his discretion to allow an expense when the original assessment is made, and is precluded from later re-exercising his discretion.
inflated charitable receipt not an "advantage"
A group of individuals made cash contributions to a registered charity on the basis that the charity would issue charitable receipts to them for 10 times the amount of their contributions.
Scott JA agreed with Woods J below that the inflated charitable receipts did not constitute a benefit (so as to vitiate the cash amount of the contributions as "gifts" on general principles), and similarly found that the the inflated receipts were not "advantages" so as to invalidate the contributions under s. 248(30)(a). However, he denied a charitable credit for the cash contributions on the basis that the inflated amounts shown on the receipts rendered the receipts invalid.
See summary under s. 118.1(1) – total charitable gift.
A letter was found to be a waiver for purposes of s. 152(4)(a)(ii) notwithstanding that it was not contained on a prescribed form.
Since there was no indication in the New Housing Rebate application that the Property had been rented and no mention of the duration of the rental period, it seems apparent that this was much more than a mere “deviation” and that the Appellant cannot be said to have “complied substantially” with the requirements of subsection 256.2 of the Act.
S.32 was of no assistance to cure a purported election under s. 39(4) because "section 32 is concerned with variations in the form itself and not with its content" (p. 452) whereas the taxpayer had used the prescribed form but without the required content.
In considering the potential application to the taxpayer of Regulation 105(2), which required persons paying remuneration to fishermen to withhold and remit source deductions if the fishermen had elected in prescribed form, Margeson TCJ. found (at p. 1584) after citing s. 32 that "it was not necessary for the prescribed form to be filed if the same result that the form was intended to bring about was achieved by the filing of another form or forms", he went on to find that the taxpayer was not liable because, here, no documents were produced which indicated that the fishermen had elected.
"In light of the Department's acceptance of the letter of June 22, 1993, it would be unconscionable to insist on the further filing of a prescribed form at this point."
In my view, the use of the terms "more than 50%", "deal with each other" and "at arm's length" all evidence a contrary intention to the application of subsection 33(2) of the Interpretation Act to the definition under review.
s.232(1)(e), which refers to the accounting record of a lawyer, was interpreted to refer to the accounting records of a firm of lawyers.
In order to give effect to the overall objective of s. 8(4) of the Income Tax Act, "establishment" was applied in its plural sense, whereas "municipality" was applied in its singular sense.
In light of s. 31(j) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1952, C. 158, Sheppard D.J. found that the reference in s. 39(4)(d) to "one of those persons" referred to the previous reference in that section to "one person" controlling a corporation in addition to referring to a further reference in that section to a "group of persons" controlling another corporation.
Kearney J. found that the word "amount" in s. 11(1)(f) of the pre-1972 Act should be interpreted as referring to "amount or amounts" in light of s. 31(j) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 1: and that in like manner, the word "plan" should be read to include more than one plan.
"When section 127 by clause (b) provides that corporations controlled directly or indirectly by the same person shall be deemed not to deal with each other at arm's length it appears to me to negative the view that corporations are to be deemed not to deal with each other at arm's length when controlled not by the same person but by the same group of persons. Expressio unius exclusio alterius. When the wording of clause (b) of section 127 is contrasted with that of clause (a) it seems to me impossible to read the word 'person' in clause (b) as including the plural".
It does not seem reasonable that Parliament would have intended that only units used simultaneously by more than one person would qualify and therefore there is no reason to not apply the Interpretation Act to include a single individual.
See summary under ETA - s. 256.2 for the facts.
Webb J. found that a s. 118.5(1)(b)(i), which disallows deductions of fees for courses of study outside of Canada if they are "paid in respect of a course less than 13 consecutive weeks duration," did not apply in situations where the student took several consecutive courses over a period of at least 13 weeks. He reasoned (at para. 22) that the singular "course" includes the plural.
In this definition only the plural form of "courses" is used. It does not seem to me that a program would not be a qualifying educational program if it otherwise satisfies this definition but each student spends his or her time on only one course and not multiple courses. It seems to me that the use of the plural in this definition would include the singular and therefore it would seem logical that the use of the singular "a course" in subparagraph 118.5(1)(b)(i) of the Act would include the plural.
S. 72(3) of the Law and Property Act 1925 provided that "a person may convey land to or vest land in himself." It was accepted that "the singular ‘person' must include the plural so that two persons may…convey land to, or vest lands in themselves" (p. 505, per Viscount Simonds).
CRA has ruled that where the expropriation proceeds of a farm will be used to purchase two nearby farms (with the scale of the farming business also to be expanded), the two new farms would qualify as replacement properties for s. 44 purposes.
CRA stated that it “may consider…two agreements to constitute a single joint venture agreement” for the purpose of the requirement in ETA s. 273(1) that in order for a registrant to qualify as the “operator” under a GST joint venture election it must inter alia be a participant in the joint venture “under an agreement, evidenced in writing, with” a co-venturer. In particular, where a joint venture starts off comprising two co-owners, and then in a subsequent year they enter into an agreement with a property manager or other “operator” which deals only with the property management subject matter rather than also repeating all the rights and obligations under the original co-ownership agreement, joint venture elections potentially could be made in the second year with the manager qua operator.
S. 149(1)(o.2)(iv)(B) refers to "one or more trusts all the beneficiaries of which are registered pension plans." In light of s. 33(2) of the Interpretation Act, CRA considers that s. 149(1)(o.2)(iv)(B) will be satisfied where the shareholder is a trust with a single registered pension plan beneficiary. See summary under s. 149(1)(o.2)(iv).
The definition in s. 211.6(1) of a "qualifying environmental trust" refers to trust that is maintained solely for the purpose of funding the reclamation of "a" qualifying site. Favourable rulings respecting the settlement of a single new reclamation trust with respect to multiple mining sites of the taxpayer.
The words of s. 26(7) [now 33(2)] "do not in our view act to pluralize words contained in a provision of the Act which obviously addresses itself solely to the singular (e.g., the provisions relating to principal residence)."
"In so doing, the court also seems to infer that 'manufacture or production' were not in themselves parts of speech and grammatical forms of 'manufacturer or producer' ..."
S.443 only has specific application to the Criminal Code and is incapable of being read to apply to the Income Tax Act.
Since s. 231(4) was in breach of s. 8 of the Charter, there was no code of search and seizure in the Income Tax Act and resort accordingly could be had to the search and seizure provisions of the Criminal Code.
The amendment of a provision effective after the taxation year in question to refer to ordinary residence "at any time in the year" rather than "during" the year was found by Kerwin J (at p. 819 DTC) not to establish that any change in meaning was intended, so that in the taxation year in question a reference to ordinary residence "during" the year did not establish a requirement that the taxpayer be ordinarily resident in Canada throughout the year.
Definitions in the Interpretation Act do not apply automatically to every treaty or legislative enactment. Subsection 3(1) of the Interpretation Act indicates that a provision of the Interpretation Act may not apply if a contrary intention appears (either expressly in the text or as part of the context of the provision being applied). Furthermore, Article 3(2) of the Canada-U.K. Tax Treaty indicates that the meaning of a term under Canada’s domestic laws may not apply if the context requires otherwise. We are of the view that the text, context and purpose of Article 12(3)(a) of the Treaty indicate that an ordinary meaning was intended to be given to the words “television” and “broadcasting” and that their meaning, under either domestic or international law, is broad enough to include the digital streaming of television content.
In finding that a vessel was as defined in the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, notwithstanding the reference in the s. 13(21) definition to the Canada Shipping Act, CRA noted that s. 44(h) of the Interpretation Act effectively referenced the equivalent definition in the 2001 statute.
Whether an amendment clarifies the prior law or alters it turns on the construction of the prior law and the amendment itself. As explained, the Interpretation Act prevents any conclusion from being drawn as to the legal effect of a new enactment on the prior law on the sole basis that Parliament adopted it. Keeping this limitation in mind, the only way to assess the impact of a subsequent amendment on the prior law is to first determine the legal effect of the law as it stood beforehand and then determine whether the subsequent amendment alters it or clarifies it.
It is reasonable to conclude that when Parliament in 1983 replaced the Latin phrase in subsection 227(10) with "plain" English and French words it merely intended to make the provision more accessible. This suggests that the change was in the nature of a consolidation of the law. There is a strong presumption that consolidations are not intended to make substantive changes to the law: Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) at 655-59.
"Does not mean however that it cannot be inferred from the context of an amendment that the previous law has in fact been amended."
The enactment of s. 249(4) in 1987, whose provisions would have prevented the taxpayer from acquiring a corporation with an accrued but unrealized loss on inventory and receiving the benefit of that loss on a rollover basis under s. 88(1), was found to have not necessarily altered the previous state of the law in light of s. 45(2) of the Interpretation Act.
MacKay J. found that no assistance as to the meaning of the phrase "motion picture films" should be derived from subsequent amendments to the Canada-U.S. Income Tax Convention in light of s. 45(2) of the Interpretation Act.
"[s.45(2)] simply states that there is no presumption that a legislative amendment indicates a change in the law. This cannot mean that an amendment can never be interpreted as reflecting a change in the law, especially when there is external evidence to that effect."
It was noted that the use of "for greater certainty" language in S.164(4.1) precluded the application of the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to the provision that thereby was enacted.
In light of s. 45(2) of the Interpretation Act, it was held that it was not permissible to infer that the enactment of s. 12(1)(x) was an admission that before the amendment, inducement payments were not income.
A comparison of s. 256(1)(e) with s. 39(4) of the pre-1972 Act helped establish that in s. 256(1)(e) Parliament intended that the shareholding of one member of a group was insufficient to fulfill the cross-shareholding requirement in s. 256(1)(e).
An amendment to regulation 805(1) was not intended to change its meaning.
The enactment of s. 111(8)(c) did not effect a change in substance to the Act.
Semble, that it does not transgress ss. 45(2) and (3) of the Interpretation Act to refer to a subsequent amendment to a provision to establish that there was some "mischief" in that provision that was cured by that amendment.
A provision providing that the Minister of Revenue "may" refund overpayments of taxes, was amended to read that taxes that have been overpaid "shall" be refunded if certain conditions are met. The Court derived assistance from this change in rejecting an argument that the word "may" in the pre-amendment provision should be interpreted to mean "shall".
It was impermissible to infer from the enactment of subsection 18(2), which provided for the capitalization of realty taxes in situations where the property was being held as a capital investment, that prior to its enactment such taxes were deductible expenses.
The amendment limits the amount by which the amalgamated company may bump the cost of any qualifying partnership interest held by the subsidiary.
Although the simple fact that there is an amendment to the law does not give rise to a presumption of an intent to change the law, the Court should take into account the nature of the amendment and the surrounding circumstances in deciding if the object of the amendment was to change the law. …[I]t is evident that the addition of paragraph 7(1)(b.1) effected a change to section 7 and not a clarification.
Subsections 45(2) and 44(f) of the Interpretation Act…provide that the repeal and the re‑enactment of a provision are not presumed to change the law. However, amendments, repeals and re‑enactments to the Act usually represent a change in the law due to the nature, object and context of the Act: see Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),  3 S.C.R. 379; 2010 SCC 60 at para. 54, per Deschamps J., at para. 129, and… Silicon Graphics Ltd. v. R., 2002 FCA 260 at para. 43.
Silicon Graphics Ltd. v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 379 (TCC), rev'd supra.
Teskey T.C.J. rejected a submission that he should look to a subsequent amendment of the Act to determine the proper interpretation of provisions before him.
"Quite apart from section 45 of the Interpretation Act and the jurisprudence on the point, there are cogent reasons for not looking to subsequent legislation as an aid to interpretation. Different people looking at the same subsequent amendment could come to precisely the opposite conclusion about its effect."
O'Connor TCJ. noted (at p. 231) that "notwithstanding subsection 45(2), the courts have taken account of amendments in construing the amended statute", and went on to find (at p. 232) that "there is internal and external evidence to show that the addition of subsection 256(5.1) [to the Act] effected a change in the law."
A provision of the Alberta Corporate Tax Act requiring a taxpayer to "deliver" a return by a given date was replaced by a requirement that the taxpayer "file" the return by that date. In rejecting an argument that such amendment implied that a taxpayer no longer was required to ensure that the Treasurer of Alberta received the return by the specified date, Stratton J.A. noted that s. 33(2) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. I-7 specifically negated such a conclusion.
Lord Bridge applied the statement in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC,  2 K.B. 403 at 414 "'that subsequent legislation on the same subject may be looked to in order to see what is the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous'".
Counsel argued that the prospective addition of subsection 96(8) demonstrates unequivocally that the transactions in issue did not offend the object and spirit of the Act at the time when they took place. I rather think that this amendment demonstrates that Parliament moved as quickly as it could to close the loophole exploited by the appellants precisely because the result achieved was anomalous having regard to the object and spirit of the relevant provisions of the Act.
McDonald J.A. indicated that although Bathurst Paper Limited v. New Brunswick  S.C.R. 471 indicated that subsequent amendments might be considered as part of the legislative history bearing on the construction on the amended statute, this did not mean, in light of s. 45(3) of the Interpretation Act, that subsequent amendments could themselves serve as a declaration concerning the previous state of the law. Accordingly, he found that subsequent amendments to s. 80 of the Act were only relevant to interpreting the section as it previously read insofar as they were part of the general legislative history of the section.
[T]his proposed amendment…is a relevant consideration in ascertaining the purpose underlying the provision at issue in this appeal. The proposed amendment does not retroactively change the law but simply amends the subsection while embodying its underlying rationale as it existed at the time of the transactions in this appeal [then citing Water’s Edge].
Jared Mackey, "The Role of Subsequent Legislative Amendments in the GAAR Analysis", 24 Can. Current Tax, January 2013, p. 37.
For example, in Fredette v. The Queen …, [fn 19:… 2001 DTC 621 (T.C.C.).] the taxpayer used tiered partnerships to create a multi-year deferral of rental income….

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