Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83110:57111&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:23:33+00:00

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G.R. No. 200148, June 04, 2014 - RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, Petitioner, v. TERESITA D. RIVERA, Respondent.
RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, Petitioner, v. TERESITA D. RIVERA, Respondent.
Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) and likewise owns interests in construction, restaurant and hospital businesses. On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00.
About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to complete the turn over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded her.
that with the said text message, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact she did mean and convey, malicious and offensive insinuations and imputations that tends [sic] to destroy the good name and reputation of Ramon Syhunliong, with no good or justifiable motive but solely for the purpose of maligning and besmirching the good name, honor, character and reputation of the said complainant and to expose it, as in fact [he] was exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash14 the aforequoted information. She argued that the text message, which was the subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had suffered due to the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives. Further, the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel as the elements of malice and the making of defamatory imputation for public consumption were wanting. Her text message was not prompted by ill will or spite, but was merely sent as part of her duty to defend her own interests.
[T]he grounds raised by [Rivera] in the motion to quash [are] evidentiary in nature[,] which can only be threshed out in a full blown hearing to determine if said [t]ext message falls squarely within the parameters of “Privileged Communication” or the elements of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code [are] not fully established by the Prosecution’s evidence.
The Rule on Criminal Procedure in the prosecution of any felony or offense requires only the existence of probable cause in order to indict an accused of the crime charged. x x x [P]robable cause was established seasonably during the preliminary investigation. [Rivera] should have participated during the preliminary investigation or filed a Motion for re-investigation [if] she was not accorded such right and raised these grounds, before she enter[ed] her plea during arraignment.
The RTC thereafter issued an Order18 on June 18, 2009 denying Rivera’s motion for reconsideration to the foregoing. Citing Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu Tiong Gui,19 the RTC explained that the privileged character of a communication merely does away with the presumption of malice. However, the plaintiff is not precluded from proving the existence of such malice. The RTC once again concurred with the Public Prosecutor’s finding that there was probable cause to indict Rivera for having ascribed to Syhunliong the possession of a vice or defect, or for having committed an act, tending to cause dishonor or discredit to the latter’s name.
The focal issue to the parties in the present case is whether the facts charged in the information[,] as well as the undeniable facts appearing on the record[,] show that an offense of libel has been committed. Our criminal law convincingly provide us with a definition of libel – It is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect ... or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of ... a person. x x x.
The first procedural requisite in the determination of the existence of libel is whether there is a defamatory imputation. The history of the law on libel abounds in examples of utterances or statements that are not necessarily considered libelous because they are a [sic] mere expression[s] of an [sic] opinion[s] of a [sic] person[s] in connection with a [sic] plea[s] or grievance[s]. Libel is inherently a limitation on the liberty of speech and press freedom, and must be construed in a manner that does not trench upon constitutionally protected freedoms.
x x x There can be libel only if the words used are calculated to induce the hearer or reader to suppose and understand them as impeaching the honesty, virtue or reputation of another. The question is not what the writer or speaker meant by his words but what they convey to those who heard or read them.
We can break up the text message of [Rivera] to [Lumapas] into three parts. The utterance is mercifully short so that it could not be difficult to infer the whole sense and understanding of the message from the standpoint of Lumapas to whom the message was conveyed. In context, [Rivera] was seeking payment of her wage claims consequent to her resignation and receiving [BANFF’s] response through Lumapas. [Rivera] retorted with three things in her message to Lumapas – (1) that she suffered a lot in collecting her last pay from [BANFF] Grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko.[;] (2) that she does not deserve to suffer this way [because she] did [her] job when [she was] still there[;] and (3) turning to [Syhunliong] himself [she] said – God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.
If libel is to be understood as an imputation of a crime, vice or defect to another, there can be no libel in the first two of the three statements which announced only the sufferings, albeit undeserved[,] of [Rivera]. The proposition gets to be dicey in the third statement because now she makes a distinct reference to [Syhunliong][,] [b]ut is the imputation defamatory? We hesitate to reach this conclusion, and all doubts in criminal law, we are basically taught, must be resolved in favor of the accused. To articulate the legal wisdom, [Rivera] has the right to express an opinion in a matter in which she has an undeniable interest.
[Rivera said] in the last part of the text that [Syhunliong] should understand the real meaning of the mass when he goes to attend it. It is in this tail end of the message that [Syhunliong] is mentioned. But what is conveyed by the words [“]sana alam niya real meaning?[?] Does it impute a crime, vice or defect in [Syhunliong], either directly or by way of innuendo? But the innuendo can only be explanatory of a libelous imputation and cannot alter the sense of the words claimed to be libelous. If the publication is not actionable per se, an innuendo cannot make it so, and if the publication is actionable per se, the innuendo would not even be necessary.
We hold that the text message is not actionable libel. It does not serve to cast a shadow on [Syhunliong’s] character and integrity[,] there being no direct and personal imputation of a venality to him. At best, the statement that [Syhunliong] should understand the meaning of the mass suggests that [Syhunliong] should be more compassionate and caring to the employee. But is being the converse of compassionate and caring suggestive of a vice or defect in the person alluded to? We do not think so. Otherwise, even courts should be exposed to contempt and ridicule for reaching at times decisions in favor of capital and against labor. x x x To follow the intent of the message as ordinarily conveyed by the words and the context in which they are said, it can only suggest the intention of [Rivera] to describe [Syhunliong] as strict and selfish. But[,] there are legitimate reasons why a person who acts in the interest of the employer may appear strict and selfish to the other side. One may have to be so to protect the interest of his company and, indeed, the outcome of the labor case vindicates the stand of [Syhunliong] against giving [Rivera] the claims she sought after.
A responsible officer whose decisions may affect the fortunes of others and who is faced with criticism such as in this case should not be so onion-skinned as to react through the criminal law. Instead, he should use methods of discussion and persuasion to dispel the misgivings over his decisions. He should, in particular, explain through the same source that told him of the comment why [BANFF] cannot satisfy all [of Rivera’s] claims.
In support of the petition, Syhunliong cites Soriano, et al. v. People, et al.31 where the Court declared that in assailing the denial of a motion to quash an information, the accused should not file a special civil action for certiorari. Instead, the accused should enter a plea, go to trial sans prejudice to present the special defenses he or she had invoked in the motion to quash, and if an adverse decision is rendered, file an appeal therefrom.
Syhunliong further avers that Rivera was arraigned on October 11, 2007. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the accused may only be allowed to file a motion to quash at any time before entering a plea. In Rivera’s case, she had already voluntarily entered a plea; hence, it was tantamount to an effective abandonment of her motion to quash.
It is also Syhunliong’s argument that the CA improperly arrogated unto itself the power to review the Public Prosecutor and RTC’s uniform finding of the existence of probable cause. Even if it were to be assumed that the RTC erred in its disposition, it was a mistake of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Syhunliong also refutes the CA’s finding that the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel. The text message was apparently an indictment of his personality and character since it portrayed him as a hypocrite.
Lastly, Syhunliong invokes People v. Judge Gomez32 which enunciated the doctrine that in a libel case, the privileged nature of a communication is not a ground for a motion to quash, but is merely a matter of defense to be proven during the trial.
In Rivera’s Comment,33 she reiterates the arguments in the Motion to Quash filed with the RTC. Additionally, she contends that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Syhunliong’s complaint. The text message was sent on April 6, 2006. Per Syhunliong’s narration in the instant petition, his complaint was filed on August 18, 2007,34 beyond the one year prescriptive period for instituting actions for libel provided for in Articles 9035 and 9136 of the RPC.
Further, the ground that the facts charged in the information did not constitute an offense can be raised even after arraignment and is broad enough to cover within its ambit lack of probable cause. This, the court can re-assess in the exercise of its inherent power of judicial review.
Rivera also laments that she was deprived of due process and of the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence during preliminary investigation.
There is no merit in the instant petition.
Syhunliong raised five issues before this Court, but the Court’s resolution of the same would be a superfluity in the light of Rivera’s unrefuted averment that prescription had set in before the complaint for libel was instituted.
In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas. Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007,40 it would not alter the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90 of the RPC. The Court finds no persuasive reason why Rivera should be deprived of the benefits accruing from the prescription of the crime ascribed to her.
Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before pleading constitute a waiver to raise the question of prescription at a later stage of the case?
While Castro is an old jurisprudence, it still finds application in the case at bench in view of Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which in essence partially provides that the defense of extinction of criminal action or liability, e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash. In Rivera’s case, the issue of prescription is raised in her comment to the instant petition before this Court. Syhunliong does not specifically refute Rivera’s averment, thus, it is deemed admitted.
In sum, even if the Court were to sustain Syhunliong’s stance that Rivera availed of the wrong remedy when she resorted to filing a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the RTC orders denying the motion to quash, the result would only prove circuitous. Even if the trial proceeds and an adverse decision is rendered against Rivera, she can appeal the same, but the CA and this Court would still be compelled to order the dismissal of the information on account of prescription of the crime.
Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal of the libel information, but the Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication.
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the latter’s claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed through the subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera’s claims.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered on July 11, 2011 and Resolution issued on January 6, 2012 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110335 ordering the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, to dismiss the information for libel filed by Ramon A. Syhunliong against Teresita D. Rivera are AFFIRMED.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring; id. at 29-38.
4 Issued by Presiding Judge Luisito G. Cortez; id. at 56-59.
8 The initials of Syhunliong.
12 Per Syhunliong’s narration in the instant petition, the complaint was filed on August 18, 2007 (id. at 14). However, the information for libel filed with the RTC against Rivera was dated June 21, 2007 (id. at 44). The said information could not have been filed earlier than Syhunliong’s complaint. The CA decision and the orders of the RTC do not indicate when Syhunliong filed the complaint. However, in Rivera’s Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA, it was indicated that Syhunliong’s complaint was instituted on April 16, 2007 (id. at 68).
19 76 Phil. 669 (1946).
22 483 Phil. 568 (2004).
25 Sec. 9. Failure to move or quash or to allege any ground therefor. – The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in the said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a) [the facts charged do not constitute an offense], (b), (g) [the criminal action or liability has been extinguished] and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
31 609 Phil. 31 (2009).
32 187 Phil. 110 (1980).
36 Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. – The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
37 529 Phil. 90 (2006).
38 44 Phil. 387 (1923).
39 Supra note 37, at 112-113.
40 Please see note 12.
41 95 Phil. 462 (1954).
43Novicio v. Aggabao, 463 Phil. 510, 517 (2003).
44Buatis, Jr. v. People, 520 Phil. 149, 162-163 (2006).

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