Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/1315-hamden-llc-v-hamden-pzc-no-cv02-0471309-s-aug-11-2003/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:19:27+00:00

Document:
1315 HAMDEN, LLC v. TOWN OF HAMDEN PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION.
The property consists of 10 acres, is located in a CDD-1 (Controlled Development District) Zone, and is bisected by a railroad line.
On 5.82 acres of the parcel located west of the railroad line, stands an 80-year-old 160,000-square-foot structure, once used as a factory.
Prior to applying for site plan approval, 1315 Hamden, LLC applied to the Hamden Zoning Board of Appeals requesting a use variance for the property, pursuant to § 861.3 of the Hamden Zoning Regulations.
The variance was requested, to allow warehousing in a zone (CDD-1) where the use is restricted to Industrial Circle, and Hamden Park Drive (§ 572.1.C, Hamden Zoning Regulations).
Following its submission of the site plan on May 15, 2002, the plaintiff, 1315 Hamden, LLC, conveyed its interest in the premises, by way of a quitclaim deed, to Hamden Associates, LLC.
The deed, recorded at Volume 2246, page 1 of the Hamden Land Records (Exhibit 1), did not divest 1315 Hamden, LLC of all interest in the property.
The site plan application was before the defendant Town of Hamden Planning and Zoning Commission on July 23, 2002, and was continued until September 24, 2002.
At the commission’s October 22, 2002 meeting, plans were again reviewed. Counsel indicated that the proposed site plan complied with all zoning regulations, and that comments made by the town engineer had been addressed.
The motion was made by Commissioner Robert Rostow, and seconded by Commissioner Raymond Sims.
When the vote was taken, the commission’s chair, Michael Ajello, did not vote, and Commission Sims abstained.
As a matter of custom and tradition, the chair of the commission does CT Page 9797 not vote, unless his vote would affect the outcome.
The motion to reject carried, by a vote of 1-0, with Commissioner Rostow casting the only vote.
From this decision, denying site plan approval, the plaintiff, 1315 Hamden, LLC, brings this appeal.
A party claiming aggrievement must satisfy a well established two-fold test: 1) the party must show that it has a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinct from a general interest, such as a concern of all members of the community as a whole, and 2) the party must demonstrate that its specific personal interest has been specifically and injuriously affected by the action of the agency. Primerica v. Planning Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85, 93 (1989); Hall v. Planning Commission, 181 Conn. 442, 444 (1980).
Aggrievement is jurisdictional, and a prerequisite for maintaining an appeal. Winchester Woods Associate v. Planning Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 307 (1991).
The question of aggrievement, is one of fact. Hughes v. Town Planning Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 508 (1968).
Ownership of the property which is the subject of the proposed site plan, demonstrates a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision. Huck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 530 (1987).
Denial of the site plan application has specifically and injuriously affected the interest of the plaintiff, 1315 Hamden, LLC, in property located at 1299-1315 Dixwell Avenue, Hamden. It is therefore, found that the plaintiff is aggrieved by the decision appealed from.
When considering a site plan application, a planning and zoning commission acts in an administrative capacity, rather than in a legislative or quasi-judicial capacity. Goldberg v. Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. 23, 29 (1977); Allied Plywood, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 2 Conn. App. 506, 512 (1984).
A commission has no independent discretion beyond determining whether the plan before it, as presented, complies with the applicable regulations. Kosinski v. Lawlor, 177 Conn. 420, 426-27 (1979).
The commission’s powers are specifically limited pursuant to §8-3 of the General Statutes. If a plan, as presented, conforms to the applicable regulations, the commission has no discretion or choice but to approve it. R.K. Development Corporation v. Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 375-76 (1968).
In discharging its responsibility, a commission is endowed with liberal discretion, and its action is subject to review by a court only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal. Connecticut Sand Stone Corporation v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 150 Conn. 439, 442 (1963).
A municipal land use agency has a right to interpret its regulations to determine whether or not a regulation applies in a given situation Lawrence v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 509, 513 (1969).
A trial court is charged with determining whether a commission has correctly interpreted its regulations, and applied them with reasonable discretion to the facts. Baron v. Planning Zoning Commission, 22 Conn. App. 255, 257 (1990).
General provisions cannot serve as the basis for denying a site plan application. TLC Development, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 215 Conn. 527, 532 (1990). The discretion exercised by an administrative agency must be controlled by known and fixed standards applicable to all cases of a like nature. Sonn v. Planning Zoning Commission, 172 Conn. 156, 163 (1976).
The plaintiff first claims that the solitary vote of Commissioner Rostow, is insufficient as a mater of law to reject the site plan application.
It further argues that Commissioner Rostow’s absence from two meetings of the zoning section, at which the site plan was considered, rendered him ineligible to participate in the decision.
These claims are not persuasive.
The zoning section of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Hamden consists of five members.
On the evening of the vote, October 22, 2002, four members were in attendance.
One member indicated that he would recuse himself, given a business relationship with the applicant, leaving three commission members available to vote on the matter.
Because one commissioner chose to abstain, and the commission’s chair, based on a long standing policy did not vote, the final vote was 1-0.
The plaintiff argues that the failure of the Commission Chairman, Michael Ajello, to vote, dooms the vote, because a majority of a quorum (two votes) must vote in favor of any resolution.
This is a misreading of the vote, and of the chair’s voluntary decision to refrain from voting.
Had it been the desire of Commissioner Ajello to defeat the motion, he CT Page 9800 could have voted “no,” and the motion to reject the site plan would have failed on a tie vote.
No provision of the General Statutes requires a specific number of commissioners to cast a vote on a site plan application, so long as a quorum of the full commission is present.
This is in contrast to statutes which require a specific number of votes to approve an application.
The record fails to reveal any evidence that Commissioner Rostow was not familiar with the application at the time of the vote, notwithstanding his failure to attend two meetings.
This is not a situation in which a commissioner failed to attend a statutorily mandated public hearing, and the obligation to become acquainted with issues raised at the public hearing is required. (Se Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 470 (1991); Loh v. Town Plan Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 32, 42 (1971).
A court should not infer an absence of knowledge on the part of a commissioner, where the record is silent in that regard.
The commission’s single reason for denying the plaintiff’s site plan application, concerned the definition of warehousing.
There is no claim that the site plan, in any other respect, failed to meet the requirements of the regulations.
When a commission has formally stated reasons for its decision, a reviewing court should not go beyond the official collective statement and attempt to search out or speculate upon other reasons. DeMaria v. Planning Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 534, 541 (1970); Kaufman v. Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 112, 143 (1995).
of the regulations to permit self storage facilities.
The commission’s change in its interpretation of the regulations did not occur following a change in the language of the regulation, which would have subjected the revision to the public hearing requirements of § 8-3 of the General Statutes.
Instead, it occurred as the result of an interpretation of § 552.1 of the regulations, which occurred one day prior to the filing of the plaintiff’s site plan application.
The plaintiff, in April 2002, applied to the Hamden Zoning Board of Appeals seeking a use variance, pursuant to the zoning ordinances.
of the General Statutes, to apply the applicable zoning regulations as of the date of the filing of the application for a use variance.
The Zoning Board of Appeals considered self-storage, as described in the plaintiff’s application, to involve “warehousing,” a determination which was consistent with the interpretation of the term which had been applied by land use bodies in the Town of Hamden at that time.
(1972); L G Associates, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 40 Conn. App. 784, 787-88 (1996).
The granting of the use variance to the plaintiff was not appealed, following the April 18, 2002 decision of the Hamden Zoning Board of Appeals.
A variance runs with the land. Reid v. Zoning Board of Appeals, CT Page 9802 235 Conn. 850, 858 (1996); § 8-6 (b), C.G.S. The variance must be based only on property conditions. Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 239 (1972).
Because a variance runs with the land, it creates vested rights. If the acts of municipal officials are in conformity with the zoning regulations, the legally authorized acts confer indefeasible rights upon the property owner. West Hartford v. Rechel, 190 Conn. 114, 122 (1983); Robert A. Fuller, Land Use Law and Practice (second edition), § 53.2, p. 574-75 (1999).
Based on the interpretation of § 552.1 of the zoning regulations, the decision of the Hamden Zoning Board of Appeals to grant a use variance encompassing self storage was both authorized, and appropriate.
This court is not prepared to say that the long-standing construction of the ordinance, not only by the Hamden Zoning Board of Appeals, but also by the defendant Town of Hamden Planning and Zoning Commission, was arbitrary, illegal, or unreasonable.
To dismiss this appeal, would be to permit the defendant commission to reinterpret provisions of its regulations without the benefit of a public hearing, thereby affecting the scope of a valid variance, and impacting vested rights.
Since the granting of the use variance created rights running with the CT Page 9803 land, the reinterpretation of the regulation by the commission on May 14, 2002, does not apply to this application, and cannot serve as a basis for denying the proposed site plan.
Whether the same result would be required, concerning a site plan application which was not supported by a use variance, or by the existence of a preexisting nonconforming use, need not be determined.
However, to avoid future confusion, and in the interest of clarity, the defendant Town of Hamden Planning and Zoning Commission is free to adopt a definition of “warehousing” applicable for all purposes, prospectively, if it elects to legislate in this area.
The appeal of the plaintiff, 1315 Hamden, LLC, is sustained.
 Section 8-7, C.G.S. (Four members of zoning board of appeals necessary to reverse order of zoning enforcement officer).
Section 8-7, C.G.S. (four votes necessary to grant a variance).
Section 8-3 (b), C.G.S. (Protest petition filed requires two-thirds of all members of the commission).
 Section 861.3, Hamden Zoning Regulations.

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