Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82490:56362&catid=1576&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:22:39+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 200029, November 13, 2013 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BASILIO VILLARMEA Y ECHAVEZ, Accused-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BASILIO VILLARMEA Y ECHAVEZ, Accused-Appellant.
Before this Court is an appeal from the May 25, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00021 affirming the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 28, finding appellant Basilio Villarmea y Echavez (Villarmea) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Arnaldo Diez (Diez). The victim was stabbed to death along a street in Mandaue City during a fistfight that involved several persons who allegedly assaulted and ganged up against the victim and his uncle, Jaime Candelada (Candelada).
That on or about the 13th day of March, 2000 in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one Arnaldo Diez y Dadang with a bladed instrument, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds at his vital portion which caused his death soon thereafter.
Since the original Information4 only charged appellant, the Amended Information included the following other co-accused: Jonathan Labora, Ronnie Obatay, Florie Aplece and Marlon Canlom. Appellant and Canlom were detained and entered a plea of Not Guilty upon arraignment. The other co-accused remain at-large.
A few minutes after the incident[,] the accused was arrested at his place of work at J. King Construction. Accused however claimed that he did not flee.
Jaime Candelada, a prosecution witness, saw accused at the police station immediately after the incident.
WHEREFORE, this Judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Basilio Villarmea y Echavez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accordingly, the accused Basilio Villarmea is hereby sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua together with the accessories imposed under the law. Accused is also hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnaldo Diez, the amounts of: P50,000.00 as damages ex delicto; P25,000.00 as actual damages; P10,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
For lack of evidence, the accused Marlon Canlom is hereby acquitted. The Court hereby orders the immediate release of Marlon Canlom from detention unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court and sustain that the award of moral damages be increased to P50,000. We, however, modify the award of civil indemnity to be increased from P50,000 to P75,000, and the amount of exemplary damages to be increased from P25,000 to P30,000, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another with any of the enumerated qualifying circumstances – including treachery and conspiracy. In a litany of cases, this Court has consistently explained that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.29 In People v. Barde,30 we stated that the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done swiftly and unexpectedly, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
We also sustain the finding that appellant conspired with his co-accused in killing the victim. They ganged up on the victim and took turns in stabbing and mauling him – animated by the same purpose and criminal intent to kill. Such unity of mind and purpose is shown by the twelve stab wounds and several abrasions found on different parts of the body of the victim that led to his instantaneous death. We agree with the trial court that while there may be no “evidence of an appreciable time that these persons agreed on the criminal resolution prior to the incident, x x x the stabbings were not separate but were geared towards the consummation of the same end – to attack and kill the victim.”33 Appellant’s positive identification by Candelada as one of those persons who stabbed the victim makes him criminally responsible as principal by indispensable cooperation. There is nothing in the evidence on record that can make this Court doubt the credibility of Candelada in his positive identification of appellant as the person who first boxed him, as the one who stabbed the victim, and as one of the persons who attacked him and the victim.
In sum, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the CA when it affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. We have consistently held that in criminal cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not. This deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused. This is especially true when the factual findings of the trial court were affirmed by the appellate court.36 Thus, absent any showing that the trial court in this case had overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered would change the result of the case,37 this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses.
As to the award of damages, we make the following modifications to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. The award by the trial court of P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim is increased to P75,000 which is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime which caused the victim’s death.38 We agree with the appellate court that the award of moral damages by the trial court should be increased from P10,000 to P50,000. This amount is awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs as a violent death necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.39 As to the award of exemplary damages, we increase the award made by the appellate court from P25,000 to P30,000.40 The actual damages amounting to P25,000 as awarded by the trial court is sustained.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00021 affirming the conviction of appellant Basilio Villarmea y Echavez is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000 and the award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the damages awarded in this case from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid shall likewise be paid by appellant to the heirs of Arnaldo Diez.
With costs against the appellant.
1Rollo, pp. 6-13. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. concurring.
2 CA rollo, pp. 24-38. Penned by Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap.
3 Id. at 9. Underscoring in the original.
6 Id.; TSN, May 15, 2001, pp. 5-8.
7 TSN, May 15, 2001, pp. 9-14, 18-19.
8 TSN, May 22, 2001, pp. 2-6.
10 TSN, May 30, 2001, pp. 2-5.
13 TSN, June 19, 2001, pp. 2-5, 9.
15 TSN, September 10, 2001, pp. 2-8.
17 TSN, October 22, 2001, pp. 2-11; TSN, November 5, 2001, p. 3.
18 TSN, January 23, 2002, pp. 2-8, 18-20.
19 TSN, March 15, 2002, pp. 2-6, 8.
20 TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 2-3, 5.
21 CA rollo, p. 38.
26 Id. at 9, 13.
29People v. Tan, 373 Phil. 990, 1010 (1999); People v. Mallari, 369 Phil. 872, 885 (1999).
30 G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 187, 215.
32 CA rollo, p. 32.
36People v. Obina, G.R. No. 186540, April 14, 2010, 618 SCRA 276, 281.
37Rollo, p. 12. Citation omitted.
38People v. Laurio, G.R. No. 182523, September 13, 2012, 680 SCRA 560, 572.
40 Id. at 572-573; People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 633, 647.

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