Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19800313-808377
Timestamp: 2017-04-26 00:35:47+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Radiation partielle du rôle ; Frais et dépens - demande rejetée (deuxième requérant)Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8083/77Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1980-03-13;8083.77 Parties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REOUETE NÂ° 8083/7 7 X . v/the UNITED KINGDO M X . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 13 March 1980 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 mars 19 80 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Article 5, paragraph 1 Icl of the Convention :/ndividual deprived of his liberty for several hours pursuant to a bench warrant for contempt of court . The fact that the Court of Appeal subsequently absolved the applicant does not imply that the original detention was invalid. An'icle 6, peregreph 1 and peregraph 3 ( b) of the Convention : An acquitted defendant may not complain of alleged bias of the Court or of difficulties he experienced in preparing his defence . Article 25 of the Convention : An acquitted defendant may not claim to be a victim of violations of the Convention which, according to him, took place in the course of the proceedings as a result of which he was acquitted.
Article 5, paragraphe 1/ift, c, de /a Convention :Personne privÃ©e de sa libertÃ© durant quelques heures en exÃ©cution d'un mandat d'amener pour "contempt of court". Le fait que la cour d'appel ait ultÃ©rieurement absout l'intÃ©ressÃ© n Ã¢ pas pour consÃ©quence de rendre la dÃ©tention illicite. Article 6, paragraphe 1 et paragraphe 3, litt. b, de la Convention : L Ã¢ccusÃ© reconnu innocent ne peut plus se plaindre d'une prÃ©tendue partialitÃ© du tribunal ou de difficultÃ©s rencontrÃ©es dans la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense . Article 25 de la Convention : L'accusÃ© reconnu innocent ne peut plus se prÃ©tendre victime de violations de la Convention qui, selon lut ; auraient eu lieu au cours de la procÃ©dure.
Summary of the relevant facts I franpais : voir p . 226) At the beginning of November the applicant, a solicitor practising i n London, agreed to represent a defendant committed for trial before the Central Criminal Court. During the course of a telephone conversation on 10 November the Clerk of the lists assured the applicant that the case would not come on for rwo weeks. Neverthe%ss the Clerk telephoned the applicant on 20 November to inform him that the case would be heard the following day . The applicant protested but was informed that the list could not be amended. The applicant therefore wrote to the Court Administrator in unmoderate terms . The case was called on 21 November and the hearing was fixed for 24 November . The applicant then had an accrimonious telephone conversation with the Court Administrator .
No one appeared for the defence on 24 November and the case was adjourned until the following day, when again no defence appeared. The judge, who had been informed in the meantime that the applicant had received Â£7L17 from the defendant, issued a bench warrant, pursuant to which the applicant was arrested at 11 .45 a .m. and brought before the judge at 3 p .m . He was given two days to arrange for his own representation . On the 27 a barrister appeared for the applicant, who, having refused to apologise, was declared in contempt of court and ordered to pay Â£1Ã¢9 as the costs of the adjournment . On appeal by the applicant, the Court of Appeal held that the incident did not constitute a contempt of court such as to justify the applicant's arrest .
THE LAW (Extract ) 1 The applicant complains that his arrest and detention by order of Judge L . on 25 November 1975 contravened the provisions of Article 5 of the Convention .
Article 5 .1 states as follows : "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person . No one shall be deprived ot his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law . .1 adds as follows :"the lawful arrest or detention of a perso n "Article5
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence . . . " .
The applicant contends inter alia, that the actions of Judge L . were malicious and that there was no basis for a reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence . The Government, on the other hand, state that it is clear from the arrest warrant issued on 25 November that the applicant was arrested because he was suspected of having committed an offence . Furthermore it is submitted that the essential finding by the Court of Appeal that the applicant's conduct did not constitute contempt of court neither affects the reasonableness of the judge's suspicion or the validity of the applicant's arrest and detention . The Commission notes that the applicant was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant which had been properly issued and executed on 25 November 1975 . Moreover it is established that a judge has jurisdiction to deal with contempt of court summarily without necessarily referring it first to the Attorney-General as claimed by the applicant (see Balogh v . Crown Court of St . Albansl' . It is further established that a judge may order an arrest, either by parole order or by issuing a bench warrant, of those suspected of contempt of court . The Commission is therefore satisfied that the applicant's arrest and brief detention was "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 5 .1 . In fhe present case, as the bench warrant indicates, the applicant was arrested because it appeared to the court that his actions were calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice . This was due to his repeated failure to turn up in court on 21, 24 and 25 November 1975 . Accordingly, the Commission considers that the applicant was arrested, for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, ie that of contempt of court . It is true that the Court of Appeal subsequently found that his behaviour did not constitute contempt of court . However, such a finding does not, in the absence of arbitrary behaviour, invalidate the lawfulness of the applicant's initial arrest and detention which was based on a reasonable suspicion against him .
The Commission thus finds that the applicant's deprivation of liberty is justified under Article 5 .1 .c of the Convention . It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention and that no question arises under Article 5 .5 of the Convention (see Report of the Commission . Heinz Krzycki v the Federal Republic of Germany at p . 12) .
See 1974, 3 . ALL . E .R . 283 .
2 . The applicant has further complained, in respect of the hearing of the charge of contempt of court on 27 November 1975 that he was denied an independent and impartial tribunal and also adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence . It is true that Article 6 guarantees that "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing, within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . . . " The Commission considers that the present case concerns the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 . 1 . However, the Commission notes that the applicant successfull y appealed the judge's finding that he was in contempt of court to the Court of Appeal who quashed the order that he pay costs . In such a situation the Commission is of the opinion that any defects which may have existed at the time of the applicant's trial must be considered to have been rectified by the findings of the Court of Appeal (see eg Application No . 5575/72, Decisions and Reports 1, p . 44) . It follows that the applicant cannot now claim to be a "victim" of a violation of the Convention as required by Article 25 since he has sought and gained redress for his complaints in the Court of Appeal . This part of the application must therefore be considered as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention in accordance with Article 27 .2 of the Convention .
Au dÃ©but d'un mois de novembre, le requÃ©rant, solicitor Ã Londres, avait acceptÃ© de reprÃ©senter une personne renvoyÃ©e en jugement devant la Central criminal court . Lors d'un entretien tÃ©lÃ©phonique qui eut lieu le 10 novembre, le fonctionnaire chargÃ© de la tenue du rÃ´le assura le requÃ©rant que la cause ne serait pas appelÃ©e avant une quinzaine de jours . Toutefois, ce tonctionnaire lui tÃ©lÃ©phona le 20 novembre pour l'informer que la cause serait appelÃ©e le lendemain . Le requÃ©rant protesta mais il lui fut rÃ©pondu que le rÃ´le ne pouvait plus Ãªtre modifiÃ© . Le requÃ©rant adressa alors au greffier une lettre de protestations en termes cavaliers.
La cause fut appelÃ©e le 21 novembre et le procÃ©s fut fixÃ© au 24 novembre . Le requÃ©rant eut alors une altercation tÃ©lÃ©phonique avec le greffier. Personne n'ayant comparu pour la dÃ©fense le 24 novembre, le juge ajourna le procÃ¨s au lendemain . Personne ne comparut le 25. Le juge, qui avait appris entre-temps que le requÃ©rant avait reÃ§u de son client une provision de 700 Â£, dÃ©cerna contre lui un mandat d'amener (bench warrant) . Le requÃ©rant fut arrÃªtÃ© 8 son cabinet Ã 11 h 45 et prÃ©sentÃ© au juge Ã 15 h W. Celui-ci lui accorda un dÃ©lai de deux jours pour se faire reprÃ©senter. Le 27, un avocat se prÃ©senta au nom du requÃ©rant . Celui-ci, ayant refusÃ© de prÃ©senter ses excuses, fut dÃ©clarÃ© en Ã©tat de n contempt of court r et condamnÃ© Ã payer 169 Â£ Ã titre de frais d'ajournement . Sur recours du requÃ©rant, la cour d'appel dÃ©cida que l'incident ne constituait pas une situation de ir contempt of cou rt y pouvant justifier une arrestation .
(TRADUCTION ) EN DROITIExtrait l 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint que son arrestation et sa dÃ©tention, ordonnÃ©es par le juge L . . . le 25 novembre 1975, aient Ã©tÃ© contraires aux dispositions de 1larticle 5 de la Convention . L'article 5, paragraphe 1, est ainsi libellÃ© : Â« Toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© et Ã la sOretÃ© . Nul ne peut Ãªtre privÃ©de sa libertÃ©, sauf dans les cas suivants et selon les voies lÃ©gales . Â» L'article 5 . paragraphe 1 Icl, ajoute : a s'il a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© et dÃ©tenu en vu e d'Â®tre conduit devant l'autoritÃ© judiciaire compÃ©tente, lorsqu'il y a des raisons plausibles de soupÃ§onner qu'il a commis une infraction . . . s . Le requÃ©rant soutient'notamment que le juge L . . . a agi malicieusement et qu'il n'y avait aucun motif plausible de soupÃ§onner qu'il ait commis une ihfraction . Le Gouvernement en revanche dÃ©clare qu'il ressort clairement du mandat d'arrÃ©t dÃ©cernÃ© le 25 novembre que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© comme soupÃ§onnÃ© d'avoir commis une infraction . Il soutient au surplus que la conclusion de la cound'appel selon laquelle le comportement du requÃ©rant ne constituait pas umacte de Â« contempt of court Â» n'affecte ni le caractÃ¨re raisonnable des soupÃ§ons du juge, ni la rÃ©gularitÃ© de l'arrestation et de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant .
La Commission relÃ¨ve que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃªtÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã un mandat d'arrÃ©t rÃ©guliÃ©rement dÃ©cernÃ© sur le siÃ©ge et exÃ©cutÃ© le 25 novembre 1975 . II est en outre Ã©tabli qu'un magistrat a pouvoir de connaÃ®tre sommairement d'un acte de Â« contempt of court Â» sans renvoyer d'abord l'affaire au parquet comme le prÃ©tend le requÃ©rant (voir Balogh c/Crown Court de St . Albansl' . Il est par ailleurs Ã©tabli qu'un juge peut ordonner l'arrestation, soit par dÃ©cision verbale soit par mandat d'arrÃªt dÃ©cernÃ© sur le siÃ¨ge, des personnes soupÃ§onnÃ©es de Â« contempt of court Â» . La Commission est donc convaincue que l'arrestation et la brÃ©ve dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© opÃ©rÃ©es a selon les voies lÃ©gales Â», au sens de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 . En l'occurrence, comme l'indique le mandat d'arrPt, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arr@tÃ© parce qu'il apparaissait au lribunal que ses faits et gestes visaient Ã entraver le cours de la justice . Il s'agissait de dÃ©fauts de comparution rÃ©pÃ©tÃ©s devant le tribunal les 21, 24 et 25 novembre 1975 . En consÃ©quence, la Commission estime que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© arrÃªtÃ© en vue d'Ãªtre conduit devant l'autoritÃ© judiciaire compÃ©tente parce qu'il y avait des raisons plausibles de soupÃ§onner qu'il avait commis une infraction, celle de Â« contempt of court n . Certes, la cour d'appel a ultÃ©rieurement dÃ©clarÃ© que le comportement du requÃ©rant ne constituait pas un acte de Â« contempt of court Â» . Mais cette conclusion ne saurait, en l'absence d'arbitraire, invalider la rÃ©gularitÃ© de l'arrestation et de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant, qui se fondaient sur des soupÃ§ons raisonnables . La Commission conclut donc que la privation de libertÃ© infligÃ©e a u requÃ©rant se justifiait au regard de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 Icl, de la Convention . II s'ensuit que ce grief doit Ãªtre rejetÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention et qu'il ne se pose aucun problÃ©me au regard de l'article 5, paragraphe 5, de la Convention (voir le rapport de la Commission dans l'Affaire Krzycki c/RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, page 12 ) 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre qu'en ce qui concerne l'audience du tribunal du 27 novembre 1975 sur la prÃ©vention de a contempt of court Â», le droit Ã un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial lui a Ã©tÃ© refusÃ© et qu'il n'a pas disposÃ© du temps ni des facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense . II est vrai que l'article 6 garantit que Â« toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial, Ã©tabli par la loi . . . n .
Cf . 1974, 3 ALL . ER . 283 .
La Commission estime qu'il s'agissait, en I'espÃ©ce, de dÃ©cider du bienfondÃ© d'une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Elle relÃ©ve toutefois que le requÃ©rant a recouru avec succÃ©s contre la dÃ©cision du premier juge qui l'avait trouvÃ© coupable de Â« contempt of court Â» et que la cour d'appel a annulÃ© la condamnation aux dÃ©pens . Dans ces conditions, la Commission est d'avis que les dÃ©fauts qui auraient pu entacher le procÃ©s du requÃ©rant doivent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme ayant Ã©tÃ© redressÃ©s par la dÃ©cision de la cour d'appel (voir par exemple la requÃªte NÂ° 5575/72, DÃ©cisions et Rapports 1, pp . 44) . II s'ensuit que le requÃ©rant ne saurait se prÃ©tendre Â« victime Â» d'une violation de la Convention, comme l'exige l'article 25, puisqu'il a demandÃ© et obtenu de la cour d'appel le redressement des violations allÃ©guÃ©es . Cette partie de la requÃªte doit donc Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme incompatible ratione personae avec les dispositions de la Convention, au sens de son article 27, paragraphe 2 .
- 229 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 13/03/1980Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: L'article 5
 L'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 27
 l'article 5
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 25