Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/456/456mass128.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:39:11+00:00

Document:
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Practice, Criminal, Execution of sentence.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on April 16, 2009.
Stephanie Martin Glennon, Special Assistant District Attorney (George R. Jabour, Special Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.
On August 10, 2007, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that the exclusion of his friends and supporters from the jury selection proceedings at his trial violated his right to a public trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On August 24, he moved to stay the execution of his sentence pending appeal. On August 27, the judge denied the motion for a stay without findings or a statement of reasons, and sentenced the defendant to concurrent State prison terms of from two and one-half to three years on the two charges of intimidation of a witness, a concurrent sentence of one year in a house of correction on the charge of filing a false police report, and a sentence of three years' probation on the charge of attempted extortion.
The judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on June 27, 2008, and the defendant thereafter filed with the single justice of the Appeals Court a renewed motion for a stay of execution of sentence. On October 1, 2008, the single justice denied that motion, determining that "questions of law and fact leave the defendant short of a 'reasonable possibility of success' necessary for a stay of execution of the remainder of his sentence." However, he concluded that the public trial question raised by the defendant presented "a new issue of a constitutional nature warranting expedited appellate treatment," and allowed the defendant's motion for expedited panel review of his order.
on these facts, the single justice ordered a stay of execution of the defendant's sentence pending appeal.
The Commonwealth filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court for relief from the stay of sentence ordered by the single justice of the Appeals Court. On April 30, 2009, a single justice of this court allowed the petition and vacated the order of the single justice of the Appeals Court. The single justice read the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. 851 , 855 (1980) (Hodge), to mean that in ruling on a motion for stay of sentence pending appeal, a single justice did not have authority to review de novo the issue of security. The defendant appealed to this court from the order of the single justice.
that a single justice may undertake an independent review and independent exercise of discretion on the question whether a stay should be granted or denied, but is not in any way obligated to do so, and may choose simply to review the determination of a trial judge for any abuse of discretion. [Note 7] In Aviles, decided after Hodge, this court reiterated, " 'Each judge or Justice has the power to consider the matter anew, taking into account facts newly presented, and to exercise his [or her] own judgment and discretion.' . . . This principle applies at the appellate court level to situations in which a stay has been allowed as well as to situations in which a stay has been denied." Aviles, 422 Mass. at 1009, quoting Allen, 378 Mass. at 496.
of the single justice of the Appeals Court staying execution of the defendant's sentence of incarceration is vacated, and the order of the single justice of the Appeals Court granting the defendant a stay of execution of his sentence pending appeal is reinstated.
[Note star] This opinion, which was originally released on January 7, 2010, was temporarily withdrawn by the court and has been republished -- REPORTER'S NOTE.
[Note 1] On October 9, 2009, this court issued, without opinion, an order in this appeal and in the defendant's appeal from his conviction, see Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), ante 94 (2010), staying execution of the defendant's sentence pending our decisions in the two appeals.
[Note 2] The other conditions -- most of which had been imposed as conditions of the defendant's pretrial release -- included a requirement that the defendant remain in the town of Stoughton, surrender firearms and permits, stay away from the Stoughton police department, and refrain from intimidating or contacting witnesses or police officers.
[Note 3] We apply the versions of Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 and Mass. R. A. P. 6 in effect when the relevant events occurred. Effective October 1, 2009, amendments to these rules changed the procedure available to the parties after a trial judge acts on a motion for a stay. Mass. R. Crim. P. 31, as amended, 454 Mass. 1501 (2009); Mass. R. A. P. 6, as amended, 454 Mass. 1601 (2009). Under the amended rules, either the defendant or the Commonwealth may seek relief from a single justice of the court that will hear the appeal. Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (a); Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b) (1). Rule 6 (b) (3) of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, "An order by the single justice allowing or denying an application for a stay may be appealed to the appellate court in which the appeal is pending. An order by the appellate court in which the appeal is pending, allowing or denying an application for a stay, shall be final."
[Note 4] Additional proceedings not determinative of the issues raised here took place before single justices of both the Appeals Court and this court.
[Note 5] On the question of security, the single justice considered the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Hodge (No. 1), 380 Mass. 851 , 855 (1980) (Hodge), namely, "familial status, roots in the community, prior criminal record, and general attitude and demeanor." He noted that the defendant had remained free and had complied with security conditions for the twenty-nine months between arraignment and the end of trial. He also noted that the judge allowed the defendant to remain free for an additional month between trial and sentencing, with the added conditions of global positioning system monitoring and an order to remain in Stoughton. The single justice found that the defendant: was a long-time resident of Stoughton; on release would reside with his wife and son in proximity to his parents, siblings, and other family members; had a job offer; had no prior criminal record; and had served twenty months of his sentence with no infractions or difficulties.
[Note 7] We read the court's discussion of security considerations in Hodge, see Hodge, 380 Mass. at 855, to mean only the following. Of the two considerations relevant to a stay pending appeal, a single justice will more likely decline to exercise his own, independent discretion on the issue of security, which involves factual determinations, sound judgment, and common sense. The second consideration, likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal, presents "a pure question of law or legal judgment[.]" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 378 Mass. 489 , 498 (1979).
[Note 8] Under the rules in effect when the events at issue occurred, Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (a), 378 Mass. 902 (1979), the single justice of this court could have decided to deny the defendant a stay pending appeal based on his own independent exercise of discretion, review of the record, and determination that the defendant posed a security risk. But see Commonwealth v. Aviles, 422 Mass. 1008 , 1009-1010 (1996); Commonwealth v. Allen 378 Mass. 489 , 497 (1979). The single justice, however, could not vacate the stay granted by the single justice of the Appeals Court on the ground that he did.

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