Source: http://academy.lawofselfdefense.com/statute/co-13-80-119-damages-sustained-during-commission-of-a-felonious-act-or-in-flight-from-the-commission-of-a-felonious-act/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:20:22+00:00

Document:
(1) No person, his or her estate, or his or her personal representative shall have a right to recover damages sustained during the commission of or during immediate flight from an act that is defined by any law of this state or the United States to be a felony, if the conditions stipulated in this section apply.
(III) As a peace officer, as such person is described in section 16-2.5-101, C.R.S., acting within the scope of the officer’s employment and acting pursuant to section 18-1-707, C.R.S.
(a.6) For purposes of paragraph (a.5) of this subsection (2), a finding of not guilty of criminal charges does not include a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity or a finding of not guilty by reason of impaired mental condition.
HISTORY: Source: L. 87: Entire section added, p. 568, § 7, effective July 1.L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 464, § 1, effective July 1.L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 386, § 1, effective August 5.L. 2003: (2)(a)(III), (2)(a.5)(III), and (2)(b)(III) amended, p. 1620, § 32, effective August 6.
The legislative intent underlying the statute here at issue is to allow a citizen to prevent the commission of a felony, or flight by the felon, by the use of physical force, so long as the citizen reasonably believes that such use is reasonable and appropriate and the degree of force used is reasonable without incurring liability from any injury sustained by the other party. Molnar v. Law, 776 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1989).
It is irrelevant whether the injury is sustained as the result of the deliberate application of reasonable force or by the negligent use of physical force that is otherwise reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances. Molnar v. Law, 776 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1989).
The issue of reasonableness of defendant’s actions under the statute was one for resolution by the jury. Molnar v. Law, 776 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1989).
It is unreasonable and contrary to legislative intent to interpret the statute to mean protection for the citizen ceased at the very moment that his actions were successful in causing the cessation of the unlawful actions by the other party. Until the incident is brought to a close, it cannot be said, at least as a matter of law, that the citizen is not still in the act of preventing injury to himself or others or of preventing the commission of a felony. Molnar v. Law, 776 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1989).
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting attorney fees to the defendant since the requirements of this section were satisfied. Molnar v. Law, 776 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1989).
Dismissal of state common-law claims and award of attorney fees based on this section inappropriate where no finding was made that person acted in reasonable belief that actions were required to prevent the commission of a felony. Crouse v. City of Colo. Springs, 766 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1988) (decided under former § 13-80-129).

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