Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/the-king-v-kadirgaman-et-al/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:02:58+00:00

Document:
HOWARD C.J.—The King. v. Kadirgaman.
1940 Present : Howard C.J., Moseley S.P.J. and Wijeyewardene J.
THE KING v. KADIRGAMAN et al.
Evidence—Contradiction of witness by deposition in Magistrate’s Court—Proofof deposition—Crown’s right of reply—Evidence Ordinance, s. 80,Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 237 (2) and 296 (2).
Where a witness is asked at a trial before the Supreme Court whetherhe made a particular statement in the lower Court his reply must beaccepted unless the record of the case is produced to contradict him.
The deposition of a witness cannot be used in evidence without formalproof.
The production in evidence on behalf of the accused of the depositionof a witness gives the Crown the right of reply.
J. E. M. Obeyesekere, for appellant.
H. T. Gunasekera, C.C., for the Crown.
The evidence of the injured man, Velupillai, -was to the following-effect:—On the previous day he met the two accused and a man calledNannian Kandan about 6 p.m; on the road close to the house of theappellant’s brother. Velupillai states that he was going along the roadsinging when the first accused said: “You fellow, why are you singingalong the road. I will break your teeth ”. The appellant said : “ Youshould not come this way singing like this ”. Velupillai said: “ Why, itis I who sang ”; on which the appellant replied “ Let us see when you comesinging hereafter ”. About 7 p.m. the following day Velupillai went tothe boutique of Thambiah accompanied by a boy called Rasiah. Whilstthere Nannian Kandan spoke to him and asked him to accompany him.He walked some distance with Nannian, Rasiah being fifteen yards behindholding a hurricane lamp. The two accused were standing near theVyrava Temple. The appellant seized him round the body whilst thefirst accused gave him a blow on the head with an iron rod. Velupillaifurther states that he was pushed by the appellant, given a blow on thenape of the neck by Kandan and then fell down and lost consciousnesswhich was not regained until he had been in hospital.
Medical examination at the hospital indicated a contused wound on theleft side of the head with fracture of the bone. The injured man’s lifewas in danger for a week and the injury was consistent with its beingcaused by an iron rod.
The evidence of Velupillai is corroborated by the boy Rasiah whostates that the appellant held Velupillai from a side pinning his arms.The first accused then struck Velupillai with a club or an iron rod, whilstthe appellant pushed him and the third man gave him a blow on the napeof his neck with a club.
HOWARD C.J.—The King v. Kadirgaman.
object. This is not a case of mere presence at the scene of a crime.From the nature and effect of the facility given by the appellant hisintentions must be presumed.
It has also been contended on behalf of the appellant that, even if theevidence implicating the appellant indicated that abetment of attemptedmurder had been committed, it should not have been accepted by theJury inasmuch as it depended on the testimony of Velupillai alone. Inthis connection reference was made, to that part of the learned Judge’scharge in which he directed the jury that they could infer that Rasiahwas not an eye-witness, or, if he was an eye-witness, he was not ableto identify the assailants. The question of Velupillai’s credibility was,however, left for the jury to decide and if he impressed them as a witnessof truth they were entitled to act on his evidence alone.
Counsel for the appellant also complained that in the learned Judge’scharge to the jury he made two misstatements of fact. He informedthe jury (a) that the blow was dealt with an iron rod and (b) that but formedical aid Velupillai would have died. Although these statementswere not absolutely correct, Velupillai did state that an iron rod was usedand the medical evidence was to the effect that Velupillai’s life was indanger. We are of opinion that these statements even if not strictlyaccurate did not prejudice the defence of the appellant.
“ I am afraid to give evidence any further because when the accusedwere being brought to Court this morning the second accused threatenedto kill me if I gave evidence ”.
“ I do not think it is necessary to be afraid of this threat. Youcarry on ”.
Counsel for the appellant argued that the Judge assumed that thethreat was made and such an assumption must have had a prejudicialeffect on the mind of the Jury. Before making such an assumption hecontends that the Fiscal’s peon should have been questioned. We are ofopinion that there was nothing improper in Rasiah giving evidence of thisalleged threat which was relevant and admissible. It was open to thedefence to have rebutted it by calling the Fiscal’s peon. An applicationcould, moreover, have been made for the discharge of the jury. Insteadof doing this Counsel for the defence participated in the inquiry into thetruth of Rasiah’s allegation. In these circumstances we do not considerthat the appellant has suffered prejudice as the result of this incident.
HOWARD CJ.—The King v. Kadirgaman.
use this record to contradict a witness ”.
Later on Counsel for the defence informed the Court that he was puttingthe depositions in and was informed that it was not necessary to call theChief Clerk of the Magistrate’s Court to do so. At the close of the casefor the prosecution Counsel for the defence stated he did not propose tocall any evidence for the defence and that he would address the jury,formally putting in&apos;the depositions which had been put to the witnesses.Counsel then read these depositions and addressed the jury. CrownCounsel then addressed the jury.
On this aspect of the case Counsel for the. appellant in this Court hasraised three contentions as follows : — (1) By reason of sections 237- (2) and296 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code the final word with the jury isonly lost when evidence other than that of the person or persons chargedis called for the defence.
The only evidence tendered by the defence in this case was thereforenot given by any “ person or persons ” and hence not within the meaningof this term as employed in these two provisions of the Criminal ProcedureCode.
person desires to make use of such depositions under section 145 or 155of the Evidence Ordinance, we are of opinion that he must prove sudhdeposition and thereby such deposition becomes evidence given by or onhis behalf and allows Counsel for the prosecution the right of reply inaccordance with sections 237 (2) and 296 (2).
conditions required by law have been fulfilled.
Section 80 allows these presumptions and on the strength of themdispenses with the necessity of proving by direct evidence what it wouldotherwise be necessary to prove. Thus in Queen Empress v. Viran *, itwas held that section 80 of the Indian Evidence Act which is similar tosection 80 of the Ceylon Evidence Ordinance merely gives legal sanctionto the maximum omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta with regard todocuments taken in the course of a judicial proceeding. In Reg. v.Shivya it was held that the fact that the accuracy of the record, thepresence of the Magistrate and the voluntary nature of a confession werestated on the face of the document, permitted the Court under section 80as to draw the presumption of their "having occurred and dispensed withtheir proof by direct evidence.
In Empress v. Zawar Rahman3, Counsel for the accused contended that_ hejwas entitled to read to the jury the depositions of witnesses takenbefore the committing Magistrate for the purpose of showing that theirevidence in the Sessions Court was contradictory to that given before theMagistrate, and he tendered those depositions after the case for theprosecution had closed. The Court composed of five Judges held that thecontention of Counsel for the accused was not correct and Henderson J.stated in his judgment that it seemed to him that until depositions in theCourt below are tendered and received in evidence or under section 288of the Code of Criminal Procedure are treated by the Presiding Judge as» /. L. R. 0 Mad&apos;. 224.2 I. L. R. I Boxi. 2V1.3 I■ £. R. 31 Cal. 142.
Theobald v. Commissioner of Income Tax.
“The evidence of a witness duly recorded in the presence of theaccused under Chapter XVIII. may in the discretion of the presidingJudge, if such witness is produced and examined, be treated as evidencein the case for all purposes subject to the provisions of the IndianEvidence Act, 1872 ”.
This section enables the Judge to use a deposition as part of the evidencein the case for all purposes subject to the provisions of the Indian EvidenceAct. No formal proof is therefore required. A provision similar tosection 288 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code is not to be found inthe Ceylon Criminal Procedure Code. In these circumstances we are ofopinion that, if the deposition of a witness is to be used as evidence, itmust be produced on the sworn evidence of a witness. This witness inproducing the document should having regard to the presumptionreferred to in section 80 of the Evidence Ordinance merely testify to thefact that it comes from proper custody. Hence any officer of the SupremeCourt connected with the custody of the record of the case will suffice forthis purpose.
From a perusal of the English cases of Regina v. Hallett1; Regina v.Riley and another"; Regina v. Wright*; and Regina i). Hearn it wouldappear that English law requires the proof of a deposition if the defenceproposes by such evidence to contradict the evidence of a witness. It isnot, however, necessary in such circumstances to call as a witness eitherthe Magistrate who took the deposition or his clerk.
For the reasons given in this judgment we are of opinion that the appealshould be dismissed.

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