Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/237/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:07:29+00:00

Document:
Under Par. 20, of § 24, of the Judicial Code, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of a suit against the United States for refund of money paid for documentary stamps affixed to charter parties under § 25 of the War Revenue Act of 1898 and the district court of the proper district has concurrent jurisdiction of claims of that nature not exceeding ten thousand dollars.
Under the various refunding statutes, culminating in the Act of July 27, 1912, c. 256, 37 Stat. 240, such claims are founded upon a law of Congress within the meaning of the Tucker Act as now incorporated in the Judicial Code.
Although the pendency of one class of claims may have induced the passage of an act of Congress providing for their adjustment, the act may embrace other claims if its terms are sufficiently wide so to do.
While, under § 297 of the Judicial Code, § 5 of the Tucker Act was saved from repeal and the district court having jurisdiction of a claim against the United States is the one of the district in which the plaintiff resides, that requirement may be waived, and if no specific objection is taken before pleading to the merits, it will be deemed to have been waived, and if the district court otherwise has jurisdiction, the case may proceed.
documentary stamps was not essential to recovery. Right to repayment exists if the record shows that the sums sought to be recovered were not legally payable and the claim was duly presented within the time prescribed.
The constitutional freedom from taxation on imports assured by § 9, Art. I, of the federal Constitution means more than mere exemption from taxes specifically laid upon the goods themselves. It means that the process of exportation shall not be obstructed by any burden of taxation.
Where a charter party is practically a bill of lading for the entire cargo of the vessel, and is essential to the business of exportation in shipload lots, a tax on the charter party is, in substance, a tax on exportation and, as such, a tax on the exports, and, if on charter parties of vessels exclusively for foreign ports, is invalid under § 9, Art. I, of the federal Constitution.
There is a distinction between tonnage taxes, as laid by the federal government, and export taxes, and the fact that Congress has power to lay a tonnage tax on entry does not authorize it to lay taxes on exportation which practically amount to taxes on the exports themselves.
This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the district court awarding a recovery against the United States for the amount paid as stamp taxes upon certain charter parties under § 25 of the War Revenue Act of June 13, 1898, c. 448, 30 Stat. 448, 460, Comp.Stat. 1913, § 6144. These charter parties were exclusively for the carriage of cargo from ports in the states of the United States to foreign ports, and the imposition of the taxes was held to be in violation of § 9, Article I. of the Constitution of the United States, which provides: "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."
"That all claims for the refunding of any internal tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected under the provisions of § twenty-nine of the Act of Congress approved June thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, known as the War-Revenue Tax, or of any sums alleged to have been excessive, or in any manner wrongfully collected under the provisions of said Act may be presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on or before the first day of January, nineteen hundred and fourteen, and not thereafter."
claims, and shall establish such erroneous or illegal assessment and collection, any sums paid by them or on their account or in their interest to the United States under the provisions of the Act aforesaid."
The government demurred to the petition upon the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction of the defendant, or of the subject of the action, and that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled (217 F. 680), and, after answer, the case was heard on the merits. The court found in substance that the firm, of which the defendants in error were the surviving members, had paid without protest certain stamp taxes on charter parties of the character described; that, on filing their claim under the Act of 1912, it had been certified by the collector to be correct in its statement of facts, but that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had rejected it for the reason that the act was not applicable. Holding the taxes to be unconstitutional, and the claim to have been duly presented, the court rendered judgment for the claimants.
1902, various provisions of the War Revenue act, and amendments thereof, including §§ 6, 12, 25, schedules A and B, with regard to stamp taxes, and § 29 as to taxes on legacies and distributive shares, were repealed. Act of April 12, 1902, c. 500, 32 Stat. 96, 97. The repealing act was to take effect on July 1, 1902, and, shortly before that date, Congress made specific provision that certain taxes collected under the repealed statute should be refunded. Act of June 27, 1902, c. 1160, 32 Stat. 406. These taxes were (1) those that had been paid upon bequests for uses of a religious, literary, charitable, or educational character, etc.; (2) the "sums paid for documentary stamps used on export bills of lading, such stamps representing taxes which were illegally assessed and collected;" and (3) taxes theretofore or thereafter paid upon legacies or distributive shares to the extent that they were collected "on contingent beneficial interests" which had not become vested prior to July 1, 1902. It was also provided that no tax should thereafter be assessed under the act in respect of any such interest which had not become "absolutely vested in possession or enjoyment" prior to the date mentioned.
"against the value of products or merchandise actually exported to foreign countries, such stamps representing taxes which were illegally assessed and collected, said refund to be made whether said stamp taxes were paid under protest or duress or not."
Act of February 1, 1909, c. 53, 35 Stat. 590; see also Acts of August 5, 1909, c. 7, 36 Stat. 120; June 25, 1910, c. 385, 36 Stat. 779; August 26, 1912, c. 408, 37 Stat. 626.
as to all claims described in the Act of 1912, and in this view we are not concerned in the present case with questions arising under the general provisions of the internal revenue laws.
It is urged by the government that Congress intended to limit the Act of 1912 to the refunding of death duties erroneously or illegally assessed under § 29 of the War Revenue act. Reference is made to the legislative history of the statute, but the contention lacks adequate support. See House Reports, 62d Cong.2d Sess., Report No. 848, June 6, 1912. While the pendency of claims for the refunding of such taxes may have induced the passage of the act, its terms were not confined to these. On the contrary, after providing for the claims arising under § 29, Congress added the further clause making express provision for the presentation of claims for the refunding "of any sums alleged to have been excessive, or in any manner wrongfully collected under the provisions of said act;" and the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to pay to those who duly present their claims and establish the erroneous or illegal collection "any sums paid by them . . . to the United States under the provisions of the act aforesaid." We are not at liberty to read these explicit clauses out of the statute.
made in the court below. The general language of the demurrer with respect to jurisdiction had appropriate reference to the general authority of the court to entertain such a suit against the United States and to the jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. But assuming that the subject matter was within the jurisdiction of the court, the requirement as to the particular district within which the suit should be brought was but a modal and formal one, which could be waived, and must be deemed to be waived in the absence of specific objection upon this ground before pleading to the merits. St. Louis &c. Ry. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 141 U. S. 131; Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129, 151 U. S. 133; Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 151 U. S. 673, 151 U. S. 688; Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 160 U. S. 220; Western Loan Co. v. Butte & Boston Mining Co., 210 U. S. 368; Arizona & New Mexico Ry. v. Clark, 235 U. S. 669, 235 U. S. 674.
repayment was established by the express terms of the statute.
The question, then, is whether the tax, so far as it was laid upon charter parties which were exclusively for the carriage of cargo from state ports to foreign ports, was a valid one. The constitutional provision that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state" has been the subject of elaborate and authoritative exposition, and we need but to apply the principles of construction which have been settled by previous decisions.
"the process of exporting the products of a state, the goods, chattels, and property of the people of the several states should not be obstructed or hindered by any burden of taxation."
from any state. There is some diversity in language, but none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited. The United States have the same right to tax occupations which is possessed by the states. Now suppose the United States should require every exporter to take out a license, for which he should pay such tax as Congress might think proper to impose; would government be permitted to shield itself from the just censure to which this attempt to evade the prohibitions of the Constitution would expose it by saying that this was a tax on the person, not on the article, and that the legislature had a right to tax occupations?"
Id., pp. 25 U. S. 444-445. And in Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, applying the same principle, the Court said, by Chief Justice Taney, that "a tax or duty on a bill of lading, although differing in form from a duty on the article shipped," was "in substance the same thing," for "a bill of lading, or some written instrument of the same import" was "necessarily always associated with every shipment of articles of commerce from the ports of one country to those of another." There, as was pointed out in Woodruff v. Parham, supra, shipments to foreign ports were not in fact involved, but this did not detract from the force of the statement so far as it concerns the effect of the tax described.
"that it was one of the compromises which entered into and made possible the adoption of the Constitution. It is a restriction on the power of Congress, and as, in accordance with the rules heretofore noticed, the grants of powers should be so construed as to give full efficacy to those powers, and enable Congress to use such means as it deems necessary to carry them into effect, so in like manner a restriction should be enforced in accordance with its letter and spirit, and no legislation can be tolerated which, although it may not conflict with the letter, destroys the spirit and purpose of the restriction imposed."
"If mere discrimination between the states was all that was contemplated, it would seem to follow that an ad valorem tax upon all exports would not be obnoxious to this constitutional prohibition. But surely, under this limitation, Congress can impose an export tax neither on one article of export, nor on all articles of export. In other words, the purpose of the restriction is that exportation, all exportation, shall be free from national burden."
to be unavailing in view of the clear meaning and scope of the constitutional provision.
Following this decision, it was held by the district court that the stamp tax on manifests of cargoes for foreign ports was invalid. These manifests were essential to the exportation. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. United States, 125 F. 320. And while the case was determined in this Court upon another ground, the correctness of this ruling as to the invalidity of the tax was conceded by the United States. 200 U. S. 200 U.S. 488, 200 U. S. 491.
described voyages on which "cargoes of goods were to be, and were in fact carried" to the places mentioned.
Instead of a contract for the carriage of a particular lot of goods occupying less than the entire cargo space, as in the case of an ordinary bill of lading, the charter party was a contract for the carriage of a full cargo lot. In legal principle, there is no distinction which can condemn the tax in the one case and save it in the other. Whether the contract of carriage covers a small lot, or a partial cargo, or an entire cargo, whether the goods occupy a part of the cargo space or the whole cargo space, can make no constitutional difference. The charters were for the exportation; they related to it exclusively; they served no other purpose. A tax on these charter parties was in substance a tax on the exportation, and a tax on the exportation is a tax on the exports.
applied to the charter parties here in question was nothing else than a tax on exportation, and to this extent was, in any event, invalid. The same principle governs that has constantly been held to obtain in cases where it has been sought to give effect to taxes upon interstate commerce under general legislation of the states. In Robbins v. Shelby County, supra, it was strongly urged, "as if it were a material point in the case," that no discrimination was made "between domestic and foreign drummers," -- that is, between those of the state whose legislation was in question and those of other states; that all were taxed alike. But the court held that this did not meet the difficulty, inasmuch as interstate commerce could not "be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce." This had been decided, as the Court pointed out, in the case of The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, and it has become one of the commonplaces of constitutional law. See Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 153 U. S. 304; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622, 187 U. S. 629; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 203 U. S. 510; Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389. We know of no ground upon which a different effect can be given to the explicit constitutional provision which denies to Congress the right to tax exportation from the states.

References: § 24
 § 25
 § 297
 § 5
 § 9
 § 9
 § 25
 § 6144
 § 9
 § 29
 § 29
 § 29
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