Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/120725934/WHO-ARE-THE-PARTIES-IN-IV-D-CHILD-SUPPORT-PROCEEDINGS-AND-WHAT-DIFFERENCE-DOES-IT-MAKE
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:24:32+00:00

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WHO ARE THE PARTIES IN IV-D CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDINGS AND WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?
John L. Saxon It seems clear that the obligor and the IV-D agency—or, perhaps, the county or State—are parties to these legal proceeding. But it is less clear whether • the IV-D agency that initiates, institutes, takes up, or pursues a paternity or child support proceeding is the real party in interest in the proceeding; • the IV-D agency that initiates, institutes, takes up, or pursues a paternity or child support proceeding sues in the interest of the county or State, sues in a representative capacity on behalf of the custodial parent who is the agency’s client, or sues on behalf of the custodial parent and the county or State; • the custodial parent on whose behalf a IV-D proceeding is initiated, instituted, taken up, or pursued is, or may become, a party to the IV-D proceeding. http://sogpubs.unc.edu//electronicversions/pdfs/flb22.pdf?
I John L. Saxon* G.S. 110-130 and G.S. 110-130.1 authorize a county or state child support enforcement agency (also known as a IV-D agency) to initiate, institute, take up, or pursue, on behalf of the custodial parent of a dependent child,1 a legal proceeding to establish the childs paternity or to establish, enforce, or modify an individuals legal duty to support the child.2 These IV-D child support proceedings often are titled Guilford County, by and through its Child Support Enforcement Office, ex rel. Jane Doe [the custodial parent], Plaintiff, vs. John Doe [the obligor], Defendant, or State of North Carolina, on behalf of Jane Doe, Plaintiff, vs. John Doe, Defendant. It seems clear that the obligor and the IV-D agencyor, perhaps, the county or Stateare parties to these legal proceeding. But it is less clear whether the IV-D agency that initiates, institutes, takes up, or pursues a paternity or child support proceeding is the real party in interest in the proceeding; the IV-D agency that initiates, institutes, takes up, or pursues a paternity or child support proceeding sues in the interest of the county or State, sues in a representative capacity on behalf of the custodial parent who is the agencys client, or sues on behalf of the custodial parent and the county or State; the custodial parent on whose behalf a IV-D proceeding is initiated, instituted, taken up, or pursued is, or may become, a party to the IV-D proceeding.
paternity and child support law. He may be contacted at 919-966-4289 or saxon@sog.unc.edu.
1 IV-D paternity or child support proceedings also may be initiated, instituted, taken up, or pursued on behalf of a dependent child or a person, other than the childs parent, who has custody of a dependent child. Unless otherwise indicated, the term custodial parent, when used in this bulletin, includes the custodial parents and nonparent custodians of children who receive services from state or county child support enforcement agencies and the children who are the subjects of IV-D paternity or child support proceedings. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, this bulletin will use the term IV-D proceeding to refer to legal proceedings that are initiated, instituted, taken up, or pursued by a IV-D agency to establish the paternity of a child or to establish, modify, or enforce a child support order with respect to a dependent child.
This Family Law Bulletin examines who is, and who isnt, a party in a IV-D proceeding; whether a custodial parent is, or may become, a party in a IV-D proceeding; whether the IV-D agency that initiates, institutes, takes up, or pursues a paternity or child support proceeding does so on behalf of the custodial parent who is the agencys client or acts on behalf of and for the benefit of the county or State; why it is important to determine who is and isnt a party in IV-D proceedings; and what it means to be a party in a IV-D proceeding.
What Does It Mean To Be a Party?
Practice and Procedure 571 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter McIntosh]. 4 Blacks Law Dictionary (8th ed.), 1154. See also G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13 (counterclaims and crossclaims); G.S. 1A-1, Rule 14 (third party claims); G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17. 5 See G.S. 1A-1, Rules 19 and 20 (joinder of parties); G.S. 1A-1, Rule 22 (interpleader); and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 25 (substitution of parties). 6 See G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24 (intervention).
313, 316 (1968). 8 McIntosh, 571. 9 McIntosh, 571. A person is in privity with a party to a civil action if the person and the party share a mutual or successive right or legal interest in the property or claim that is the subject of the action and the persons rights or interests are adequately represented by the party in the proceeding. Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 526, 124 S.E.2d 574, 578 (1962). 10 McIntosh 572. 11 McIntosh 572, citing Patillo v. Lytle, 158 N.C. 92, 73 S.E. 200 (1911). 12 Richardson v. Welch, 232 N.C. 331, 332, 59 S.E.2d 632 (1950). Cf. In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 171, 352 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1987).
Who Are the Parties in IV-D Proceedings?
Neither G.S. 110-130 nor G.S. 110-130.1 expressly says who is, and who isnt, a party in paternity or child support proceedings that are initiated, instituted, taken up, or pursued by a IV-D agency pursuant to G.S. 110-130 and G.S. 110-130.1. Nonetheless, it seems clear that, at a minimum, the county or local IV-D agency is, or may become, a party to a IV-D proceeding.
May a County IV-D Agency Sue in the Agencys Name Rather Than the Countys Name?
the child and that the assignment does not apply to support that accrues after a child ceases to receive assistance or to support that accrued before a child began to receive assistance and is not collected before the date the child ceases to receive assistance). See also State ex rel. Crews v. Parker, 319 N.C. 354, 358, 354 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1987). 17 McPherson v. First and Citizens Natl. Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 18, 81 S.E.2d 386, 397 (1954); Revels v. Oxendine, 263 N.C. 510, 512, 139 S.E.2d 727, 738-739 (1964); In re Coleman, 11 N.C. App. 124, 127, 180 S.E.2d 439, 442 (1971); Rollins v. Junior Miller Roofing Co., 55 N.C. App. 158, 162, 284 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1981); G.S. 1-75.2(1), (2), (3). 18 McIntosh, 681. 19 McIntosh, 682. 20 G.S. 153A-11; Johnson v. Marrow, 228 N.C. 58, 44 S.E.2d 468 (1947). 21 Bourne v. Board of Financial Control for Buncombe County, 207 N.C. 170, 177, 176 S.E. 306, 310 (1934); Revels v. Oxendine, 263 N.C. at 512, 139 S.E.2d at 738-739; Malloy v. Durham County Dept. of Social Services, 58 N.C. App. 61, 66-68, 293 S.E.2d 285, 287-288 (1982); Craig v. Chatham County, 143 N.C. App. 30, 31, 545 S.E.2d 455, 456 (2001).
Some county IV-D agencies, therefore, initiate IV-D proceedings in the countys name, rather than in the name of the county IV-D agency and title their IV-D actions as Orange County on behalf of Jane Doe v. John Doe or Orange County, by and through its Child Support Enforcement Agency, on behalf of Jane Doe v. John Doe. State law, however, may authorize a IV-D agency to initiate IV-D proceedings in its own name, rather than that of the county. As noted above, G.S. 110-130.1(c) requires that IV-D proceedings be brought in the name of the county or State [IV-D] agency on behalf of the custodial parent who is receiving services from the agency.22 So, a county IV-D agency probably has the implicit legal capacity and authority under G.S. 110-130.1 to bring a IV-D proceeding in the agencys name, rather than that of the county.
Who Is the Real Party in Interest in a IV-D Proceeding?
county to institute, take up, or pursue paternity and child support proceedings, while providing that such actions be undertaken by the countys IV-D agency. 23 G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17. If a civil action is filed in the name of a plaintiff who is not the real party in interest and is not authorized to bring the action in his or her own name, the court may not dismiss the action in response to an opposing partys objection without allowing a reasonable opportunity for ratification, joinder, or substitution of the real party in interest. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17(a). Cf. Street v. Smart Corp., 157 N.C. App. 303, 309, 578 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2003). 24 Rackley v. Orangeburg Regional Hospital, 35 F.R.D. 516, 517 (D.S.C. 1964). 25 Charles A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 1542 (1969) [hereafter Federal Practice and Procedure].
assignee.32 If, however, an assignor makes a partial assignment of her interest in a legal claim or property, the assignor and the assignee are both real parties in interest, and may be necessary parties, in a civil action involving the partially assigned claim or interest.33 On the other hand, North Carolinas case law has consistently held that an assignee for purposes of collection is not a real party in interest.34 There are, however, instances in which a person is authorized by statute to bring a civil action on behalf of another person even though the person on whose behalf the lawsuit is brought, rather than the named plaintiff, ultimately will benefit from any recovery in the litigation.35 And in these instances, the person who by substantive law has the legal right to enforce the claim in question, rather than the person who will benefit from the fruits of the litigation, is the real party in interest.36 Rule 17(a), therefore, expressly authorizes a person to bring a civil action in his or her own name for the benefit of another person and without joining the person for whose benefit the action is brought if a statute authorizes him or her to do so. And in these cases, the named plaintiff who brings a civil action for the benefit of another person, rather than the person for whose benefit the action is brought, is the real party in interest.
Is the IV-D Agency or the Custodial Parent the Real Party in Interest in a IV-D Proceeding?
799, 806 (1973); Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 619, 308 S.E.2d 288, 289 (1983). 28 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Walker, 33 N.C. App. 15, 1819, 234 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1977); Energy Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 351 N.C. 331, 337, 525 S.E.2d 441, 445 (2000), citing Choate Rental Co. v. Justice, 311 N.C. 54, 55, 188 S.E. 609, 610 (1936) and Parnell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 263 N.C. 445, 448-49, 139 S.E.2d 723, 726 (1965). 29 Goodrich v. Rice, 75 N.C. App. 530, 537, 331 S.E.2d 195, 199 (1985). 30 Choate Rental Co. v. Justice, 211 N.C. at 55, 188 S.E. at 610; Energy Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 351 N.C. at 337, 525 S.E.2d at 445; Street v. Smart Corp., 157 N.C. App. at 306, 578 S.E.2d at 699. 31 NCNB National Bank of N.C. v. Western Surety Co., 88 N.C. App. 705, 708, 364 S.E.2d 675, 677 (1988).
360, 365 (1978). 33 Booker v. Everhart, 294 N.C. at 156, 240 S.E.2d at 366. 34 Booker v. Everhart, 294 N.C. at 156, 240 S.E.2d at 366 (citing Morton v. Thornton, 259 N.C. 697, 131 S.E.2d 378 (1963); Federal Reserve Bank v. Whitford, 207 N.C. 267, 176 S.E. 584 (1934); First Natl Bank v. Rochamora, 193 N.C. 1, 136 S.E. 259 (1927); Third Natl Bank v. Exum, 163 N.C. 199, 79 S.E. 498 (1913); Morefield v. Harris, 126 N.C. 626, 36 S.E. 125 (1900); and Abrams v. Cureton, 74 N.C. 523 (1876)). 35 Federal Practice and Procedure 1543. 36 Energy Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 351 N.C. at 337, 525 S.E.2d at 445.
37 Wake County ex rel. Carrington v. Townes, 53 N.C.
App. 649, 655, 281 S.E.2d 765, 769 (1981), modified 306 N.C. 333, 293 S.E.2d 95 (1982). The issue in Townes was whether an indigent putative father has a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in a civil paternity or child support proceeding that is brought by a county or state IV-D agency on behalf of a minor child or the childs custodial parent. The courts discussion of the countys or States status as a party occurred in connection with the defendants argument that his interest in liberty was affected in the pending paternity and child support proceeding because his obligation to support the child could be asserted as res judicata or collateral estoppel in a subsequent contempt or nonsupport proceeding that might result in his incarceration for failing to pay court-ordered child support. 38 The court incorrectly cited G.S. 110-128 and G.S. 110-135, rather than G.S. 110-137, as the source of the countys or States right to assignment. As noted above, G.S. 110-137 provides that when a child receives public assistance from a county or the State, the childs right to support is assigned to the county or State up to the amount of public assistance paid for or on behalf of the child. 39 Wake County ex rel. Carrington v. Townes, 53 N.C. App. at 655, 281 S.E.2d at 769.
Townes, Settle, and Frinzi all involved IV-D PA proceedingspaternity and child support proceedings brought on behalf of children who were receiving, or had received, public assistance and whose rights to receive child support had been assigned to the county or State under G.S. 110-137.
S.E.2d 127 (1996). 43 Justices Webb and Frye dissented from the courts decision.
360 (1978) (holding that an assignee, other than an assignee for the purpose of collection only, is the real party in interest with respect to a cause of action involving the subject of the assignment). 45 State ex rel. Crews v. Parker, 319 N.C. at 358, 354 S.E.2d at 505 (noting that the assignment of child support rights under G.S. 110-137 is a partial, rather than complete, assignment of the childs rights with respect to support).
366. It can be argued, of course, that even if a child has never received public assistance, the State or a county has some interest in ensuring that the childs paternity is established (if paternity is at issue) and that the child receives adequate support from his or her parents. It is not at all clear, though, that the nature of the countys or States interest is such as to make the county or State the real party in interest in a IV-D NPA child support proceeding. The countys or States interest in a IV-D NPA proceeding can be characterized broadly as an interest that is based on the role of the county or State as parens patriae. In this role, the county or State acts as the parent of those citizens who, because of their age, disability, or vulnerability, cannot provide for their own welfare or support. And one way in which a county or the State can assert its parens patriae interest with respect to the welfare and support of minor children is to provide services to establish the paternity of children and to establish, enforce, and modify child support orders. The State and counties, however, also have a potential economic interest in IV-D NPA cases since the establishment of paternity and the establishment and enforcement of child support orders for minor children relieves the county and State of their financial responsibility for providing public assistance to children who otherwise would be eligible for public assistance if they were not being supported by their noncustodial parents. This interest, however, is merely a potential interest and is quite unlike the countys or States interest as the assignee of child support rights in IV-D cases involving children who receive public assistance. Thus, in IV-D NPA cases, the county or State has some interest in the litigation and its outcome but they do not have a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation itselfthat is, the childs paternity or the child support payable on behalf of the child. But a mere interest in a pending lawsuit, as opposed to a real interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit, generally is insufficient to make one the real party in interest with respect to the litigation. 47 G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17(a).
What Does It Mean to Bring a IV-D Proceeding On Behalf of a Custodial Parent?
As noted above, G.S. 110-130.1(c) requires that IV-D proceedings be brought in the name of the [IV-D] agency on behalf of the public assistance recipient or nonrecipient client of the agency. What, though, does it mean to bring a IV-D proceeding on behalf of the custodial parent who is receiving services from the IV-D agency? Does the on behalf of language imply that, although the IVD agency is the real party in interest in a IV-D proceeding, it acts in a representative capacity for the use or benefit of the custodial parent or child? Does it require that the custodial parent be named in the title of the action? And, if so, how should IV-D proceedings be titled? Is it really correct to style them as Orange County ex rel. Jane Doe v. John Doe?
50 Lawson v. Langley, 211 N.C. 526, 530, 191 S.E.
party in interest in a paternity or child support proceeding that is commenced by a IV-D agency. But this does not necessarily mean that a custodial parent is not, or may not become, a party to a paternity or child support proceeding commenced by a IV-D agency. 49 Rule 17(a) also allows an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, or a party in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another to sue in his or her own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.
229, 232 (1937) (citing the code section from which the language of Rule 17(a) was taken); King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. at 357, 200 S.E.2d at 806, quoting In re Ives, 248 N.C. 176, 181, 102 S.E.2d 807, 811 (1958); Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 688, 44 S.E.2d 203, 205 (1947). 51 See G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17(a) (allowing a party to prosecute a civil action on behalf of another person as the real party in interest without joining as a party the person for whose benefit the action is brought). 52 G.S. 1A-1, Rule 9(a). See also Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 691, 133 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1963); Westinghouse v. Hair, 107 N.C. App. 106, 109, 418 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1992). 53 Blacks Law Dictionary (8th ed.), 1154.
The State of North Carolina, for example, is a nominal party in a civil action that is brought in the States name on the relation of (or ex rel.) a person (the relator) who has been injured by the act of a public official and seeks to recover damages against the officials bond, which is payable to the State.54 The relator in such a proceeding is real party who controls the litigation and benefits from any recovery therein.55 The State, by contrast, has little or no role in the litigation, but is bound by a judgment therein. Similarly, in civil actions that are brought in the name of one person (X) for the use and benefit of another (Y), the named plaintiff (X) is a nominal party only and the use plaintiff (Y) is the real plaintiff in the action. In neither case, however, does the nominal party act in a representative capacity on behalf of the relator or use plaintiff. So, it isnt legally correct to title an action brought by a fiduciary or other representative on behalf of a beneficiary as A ex rel. B or A for the use and benefit of B, because doing so would imply that the beneficiary (B), rather than the fiduciary or representative (A), is the real party to the litigation.
110-130.1(c) expressly provides that when a IV-D agency initiates a paternity or child support proceeding, it does so on behalf of the custodial parent who receives IV-D services. And in IV-D NPA cases, the agency, county, or State does not obtain any legal interest in the paternity or child support claim by virtue an assignment under G.S. 110-137. By contrast, it seems clear that in IV-D PA cases, the IV-D agency sues in the interest of the county or State to the extent that a childs right to support has been assigned to the county or State pursuant to G.S. 110-137. But because the on behalf of language in G.S. 110-130.1(c) applies to IV-D PA cases as well as to IV-D NPA cases and the assignment of child support to the county or State under G.S. 110-137 is only a partial assignment of the proceeds of a child support proceeding, it seems equally clear that the IV-D agency also acts, at least in part, in a representative capacity on behalf of the custodial parent or child in IV-D PA cases.
How Should Pleadings in IV-D Proceedings Be Titled?
Does the IV-D Agency Act in a Representative Capacity?
The fact that a IV-D agency is the real party in interest in a IV-D PA or IV-D NPA case does not determine, by itself, whether the agency acts (a) in its own interest (or, more precisely, in the interest of the State or county), (b) in a representative capacity on behalf of the custodial parent who receives IV-D services, or (c) in its own interest and in a representative capacity. It seems clear that in IV-D NPA cases, the IV-D agency that initiates or takes up a paternity or child support proceeding on behalf of a custodial parent does so in a representative capacity on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the custodial parent or child.56 G.S.
54 G.S. 58-72-1. See also G.S. 1-58. 55 See State ex rel. Warrenton v. Arrington, 101 N.C.
Are Custodial Parents or Children Proper or Necessary Parties in IV-D Proceedings?
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought if a statute authorizes him or her to do so. 59 As noted above, IV-D proceedings often are titled Orange County [or State of North Carolina] ex rel. Jane Doe, Plaintiff, v. John Doe, Defendant. IV-D proceedings, however, are not, in a strict legal sense, ex rel. actions, and the use of ex rel. in the title of IV-D proceedings is legally incorrect and potentially misleading with respect to the identity, capacity, and role of the parties in IV-D proceedings. 60 G.S. 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(7) and 19. 61 Crosrol Carding Developments, Inc. v. Gunter & Cooke, 12 N.C. App. at 452, 183 S.E.2d at 837. See also G.S. 1A-1, Rule 20 (governing permissive joinder of parties).
Cooke, 12 N.C. App. 448, 451-452, 183 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1971). 63 Crosrol Carding Developments, Inc. v. Gunter & Cooke, 12 N.C. App. at 453-454, 183 S.E.2d at 838. 64 Crosrol Carding Developments, Inc. v. Gunter & Cooke, 12 N.C. App. at 451, 183 S.E.2d at 837. The decision to join or not join a proper party in a pending civil proceeding rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Crosrol Carding Developments, Inc. v. Gunter & Cooke, 12 N.C. App. at 453, 183 S.E.2d at 838. 65 State ex rel. Parker v. Crews, 319 N.C. 354, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987). 66 Smith v. Bumgarner, 115 N.C. App. 149, 443 S.E.2d 744 (1994); Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).
Who May Intervene in a IV-D Proceeding?
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his or her ability to protect that interest; 3. a statute gives the person a conditional right to intervene in the proceeding; or 4. the persons claim or defense and the pending action share a common question of law or fact. In the first two instances cited above, the person has a right to intervene in the pending proceeding. In the last two instances, the court has discretion to allow or not allow the person to intervene in the pending action. In order to intervene in a pending action, an intervenor must file a timely motion to intervene and serve the motion on all parties affected thereby.69 The motion must state the grounds [for intervention] and be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.70 If the motion is granted, the intervenor is joined as a party to the pending proceeding and, thereafter, has the same rights and obligations as the other parties to the proceeding.71 Rule 25 of North Carolinas Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the substitution of a new party for a party following the original partys death, separation from office, or incompetency.72 When a partys interest in the subject matter of a pending civil action is transferred to another person by reason other than death after the action is filed, Rule 25 provides that the action is continued in the name of the original party but, upon motion by any party, the court may allow the transferee to be joined with the original party as a party to the pending proceeding.
add or drop parties in a civil action on such terms as are just). See also Corbett v. Corbett, 249 N.C. 585, 589, 107 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1959) (holding that the joinder of a proper, but not a necessary, party is within the courts discretion); Henredon Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Southern Railway Co., 27 N.C. App. 331, 332, 219 S.E.2d 238, 239 (1975). 68 The North Carolina Supreme Courts decision in State ex rel. Parker v. Crews strongly suggests that the custodial parent or child on whose behalf a IV-D proceeding is brought is not a party to the proceeding unless the parent or child intervenes or is otherwise joined as a party therein. State ex rel. Parker v. Crews, 319 N.C. 354, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987). The mere fact that the caption of a IV-D proceeding includes the name of the custodial parent or child is not sufficient to make the custodial parent or child a party to the proceeding. 59 Am.Jur.2d Parties 6, citing S.O.V. v. People in Interest of M.C., 914 P.2d 355 (Colo. 1996).
served pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 5, rather than Rule 4. In re Shamp, 82 N.C. App. 606, 347 S.E.2d 848 (1986). The timeliness of a motion to intervene depends on the circumstances of the case. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24 (Official Comment). See also Procter v. City of Raleigh Board of Adjustment, 133 N.C. App. 181, 514 S.E.2d 745 (1999). 70 G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24(c). 71 Harrington v. Overcash, 61 N.C. App. 742, 301 S.E.2d 538 (1983); Leonard E. Warner, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 66 N.C. App. 73, 311 S.E.2d 1 (1984). The granting or denial of a motion to intervene is interlocutory and therefore is not immediately appealable unless the order adversely affects a substantial right. Wood v. City of Fayetteville, 35 N.C. App. 738, 242 S.E.2d 640 (1978); Stockton v. Estate of Thompson, 165 N.C. App. 899, 600 S.E.2d 13 (2004). 72 See also G.S. 1A-1, Rule 21 (allowing parties to be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative).
May a Custodial Parent Intervene in a Pending IV-D Proceeding?
In State ex rel. Parker v. Crews, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the custodian of a child who received public assistance had the right to intervene under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24(a)(2) as a party in a pending IV-D child support proceeding in order to assert her residual rights with respect to the childs support.73 The Crews case involved a seventeen-year-old child who had lived since birth with her grandmother. The grandmother received public assistance on behalf of the child. After the IV-D agency filed a child support action against the childs father, the agency and the childs father filed a proposed consent order under which the father would pay $125 per month in child support beginning on the date the child support action was commenced and would reimburse the State $900 for public assistance paid prior to that date. The proposed consent order, however, did not reimburse the grandmother for the expenses that she had incurred for the childs care before the date the action was filed. The childs grandmother, therefore, filed a motion to intervene, claiming that the State had failed to assist her in obtaining reimbursement with respect to her claim for prior maintenance. Writing for the court, Justice Martin first noted that the assignment of child support under G.S. 110-137 is an assignment of the childs right to support up to the amount of public assistance paid.74 He then concluded (a) that the assignment of child support under G.S. 110137 does not utterly destroy any interest [a] custodial parent [has] in the other parents duty to pay child support; (b) that public assistance recipients retain some active and continuous interest in support rights that have been assigned to the State; and (c) that the State and a dependent child or the childs custodial parent or other custodian have concurrent interests in [a noncustodial parents child] support obligation.75 The Supreme Court therefore held that the grandmothers interest in child support payments for the child in her custody was sufficient, notwithstanding the partial assignment of child support to the State under G.S. 110137, to provide a basis for her intervention in the pending IV-D proceeding.
May the IV-D Agency Intervene in a Pending Paternity or Child Support Proceeding?
S.E.2d 501 (1987). 74 See also 42 U.S.C. 608(a)(3). 75 State ex rel. Crews v. Parker, 319 N.C. at 358, 360, 354 S.E.2d at 504, 505.
a transfer of a partys interest in a pending action by means other than the partys death, the action is continued in the original partys name but, upon motion of a party, the court may allow the transferee to be joined with the original party in the proceeding). 79 See G.S. 1A-1, Rule 10.
to initiate a paternity or child support action through execution of a voluntary paternity acknowledgement or voluntary support agreement is only $4.00. G.S. 110-134. 81 G.S. 7A-317. 82 The county, however, may be ultimately responsible for paying these fees unless they are taxed as costs to the defendant pursuant to G.S. 6-20 or G.S. 6-21. 83 The Administrative Office of the Courts has taken the position that a state IV-D agency is not required to pay the facilities fee, General Court of Justice fee, or service of process fee in a paternity or child support proceeding that is brought on behalf of an indigent parent or child. Memorandum to Clerks of Superior Court from Thomas J. Andrews and Pamela W. Best regarding Collection of Filing Fees in IV-D Cases dated April 6, 2001. The provisions of G.S. 1-110, however, apply only to indigent partiesspecifically, indigent plaintiffswho bring civil actions and do not apply to an indigent person who is not a party to a civil proceeding that is brought by another person on his or her behalf.
Representing Clients to Serving Recipients: Transforming the Role of the IV-D Child Support Enforcement Attorney, 67 Fordham L.Rev. 2155 (1999). 85 27 N.C. Admin. Code 02 Rule 4.3(b). 86 27 N.C. Admin. Code 02 Rule 1.06. 87 27 N.C. Admin. Code 02 Rule 4.3(a). 88 G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13.
intervening or being joined as a party to the pending proceeding, parties to the proceeding may obtain discovery from the IV-D agency pursuant to Rules 30, 31, and 45 of North Carolinas Rules of Civil Procedure. 92 A party who is the subject of a subpoena may object to or file a motion to quash or modify the subpoena. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 45(c). A party who fails, without adequate excuse, to comply with a subpoena may be held in civil contempt, sanctioned under Rule 37(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and ordered to pay the moving partys costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in enforcing the subpoena. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 45(e). 93 A party upon whom a request for production of documents is served generally must serve a written response to the request on the requesting party within 30 days. If the party upon whom the request is served objects to the production of any or all of the designated documents, the moving party may file a motion seeking a court order to compel discovery and to impose sanctions for failure to provide discovery pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 34(b).
agency in establishing and enforcing child support orders, it seems clear that otherwise discoverable information, records, or documents that are in the possession of a IV-D client are in the control of the IV-D agency and therefore are subject to production and discovery in response to a subpoena or request for production of documents served on the IV-D agency. Likewise, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 33 generally requires a party to respond to interrogatories by furnishing any otherwise discoverable information that is available to the party.94 A IV-D agencys obligation to respond to interrogatories, therefore, clearly extends to nonprivileged, discoverable information that is contained in the agencys records or known to the agencys employees, and probably extends to information that is within the possession or knowledge of the custodial parent who is the agencys client, regardless of whether the custodial parent is a party to the IV-D proceeding. Similarly, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 36, provides that a party upon whom requests for admission have been served may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny [a request to admit] unless [the answering party] states that [the party] has made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by [the party] is insufficient to enable [the party] to admit or deny [the requested admission].95 A IV-D agencys response to a request for admissions under Rule 36, therefore, clearly must be based on information that is contained in the agencys records or known to the agencys employees, and probably requires the agency to make reasonable inquiries of, or obtain information from, the custodial parent who is the agencys client.
object to the interrogatory. If a party fails to answer an interrogatory, the moving party may file a motion seeking a court order to compel discovery and to impose sanctions for failure to provide discovery pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 33(a). 95 If a party objects to a request for admissions or fails to provide a sufficient answer in response to a request for admissions, the moving party may file a motion seeking a court order to compel discovery and to impose sanctions for failure to provide discovery pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 36(a).
indirectly from a custodial parent who is a client of a IV-D agency if a request for discovery is properly served on the IV-D agency and the requested information, records, or documents are in the possession of the custodial parent but under the control of the IV-D agency or readily obtainable by the agency from the custodial parent.
child support proceeding, to file a motion to modify a child support order. In that case, the court held that when a county department of social services provides public assistance on behalf of a minor child, the agency is an interested person that has standing to file a motion to modify a court order that provides for the childs support.97 It seems clear, therefore, that, given the authority of IV-D agencies to initiate, take up, and pursue actions on behalf of IV-D clients to establish or modify child support orders, a IV-D agency has a sufficient interest to file a motion on behalf of a IV-D client to modify a child support order regardless of whether the IV-D agency is a party, or intervenes as a party, in the proceeding in which the order was entered. And conversely, it also seems clear that the interest of a custodial parent is sufficient to give the parent standing to file a motion to modify a child support order entered in a IV-D proceeding even if the custodial parent is not a party to the proceeding and is not seeking to intervene as a party in the proceeding.
a child support order on behalf of a IV-D client even if the IV-D agency is not a party to the proceeding in which the order was entered. And similarly, a custodial parent almost certainly has standing to ask a court to enforce a child support order through civil contempt in a pending IV-D proceeding even if the custodial parent is not a party in the IV-D proceeding.
97 Cox v. Cox, 44 N.C. App. 339, 260 S.E.2d 812 (1979).
An interested person who files a motion to modify a child support order but who is not a party to the pending child support proceeding, however, does not become a party to the pending proceeding unless he or she is joined as a party pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Cox v. Cox, 44 N.C. App. at 342, 260 S.E.2d at 813. 98 A IV-D agencys authority to take action on behalf of a IV-D client to enforce a child support order through administrative or nonjudicial meansfor example, by filing a lien against insurance benefits under G.S. 58-3-185 or administratively garnishing a delinquent obligors federal or state income tax refundis not affected by the agencys status as a party or nonparty in the judicial proceeding in which the order was entered.
799, 805 (1973); Thomas M. McInnis & Associates, Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 429, 349 S.E.2d 552, 557 (1986). 100 Masters v. Dunstan, 356 N.C. 520, 526, 124 S.E.2d 574, 578 (1962).
IV-D proceeding and was not in privity with the county IV-D agency that brought the prior paternity and child support proceeding. Writing for the court, Justice Martin first noted that, for the purpose of determining whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable, courts must look beyond the nominal party whose name appears or record and consider the legal questions raised as they may affect the real party in interest.103 He then went on to conclude that because the childs right to support had been assigned to the county pursuant to G.S. 110-137, the prior IV-D proceeding was for the sole economic benefit of the county, not the child or the childs mother, and that the county, not the child or the childs mother, was therefore the real party in interest in the prior IV-D proceeding.104 And, finally, he reasoned that the child was not in privity with the county IV-D agency because the childs interest in the pending paternity and child support proceeding was different from the countys interest in the prior proceeding.105 In State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, a county IV-D agency brought a paternity and child support action on behalf of a dependent child and the childs mother against the childs putative father (Mr. Frinzi) but dismissed the action with prejudice. Many years later, a state IV-D agency in another county brought a second action against Frinzi to establish his paternity of the same child and require him to support the child. Mr. Frinzi argued that res judicata barred the second action. The Supreme Court held that res judicata did not apply, concluding that (a) Forsyth County was the real party in interest in the first IV-D proceeding; (b) that the State of North Carolina was the real party in interest in the second IV-D proceeding; and (c) that, despite the fact that the countys and the States claims were both based on the assignment of the childs right to support under G.S. 110-137, the State was not in privity with the county because the State had no control over the prior IV-D proceeding brought by the county.
judgment determining that a man is the father of a child, that judgment generally is conclusive and binding against the man in subsequent proceedings in the same case or in any subsequent proceedings in another case in which the issue of the childs paternity arises, regardless of whether the party invoking res judicata or collateral estoppel in the subsequent proceeding was a party to the proceeding in which the judgment was entered or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. 102 Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288 (1983); State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411, 474 S.E.2d 127 (1996).
principles governing res judicata, collateral estoppel, and privity, and is based on a misunderstanding of the state and federal laws governing assignment of child support and enforcement of child support through the IV-D system. When a party brings a claim, a judgment is entered against that party, and the party subsequently assigns his or her rights with respect to the claim, the judgment against that party is conclusive not only against that party but also against that partys assignee if the assignee brings subsequent legal proceeding based on the assigned claim.
G.S. 110-135 creates a cause of action by the State against the parent of a dependent child to recover the cost of public assistance that the State or a county has paid on behalf of the child. Claims for reimbursement of public assistance under G.S. 110-135 are related, indirectly, to child support claims under G.S. 50-13.4 and to the States rights with respect to the assignment of child support under G.S. 110-137. The amount of a parents debt under G.S. 110-135, for example, may not exceed the amount that the parent was required to pay under a child support order for the time during which the child received public assistance. Claims under G.S. 110-135, however, are legally separate and distinct from child support claims under G.S. 50-13.4 and from the States claim, under G.S.
108 Opinion of the Justices, 558 A.2d 454, 458 (N.H.
Smith v. Smith, 334 N.C. 81, 84, 431 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1993). 107 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments 595. See also Hayes v. Ricard, 251 N.C. 485, 492, 112 S.E.2d 123, 128 (1960).
1989); Bradley v. Division of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Patterson, 582 A.2d 478 (Del. 1990). Cf. Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288 (1983); Hall v. Lalli, 977 P.2d 776 (Az. 1999). 109 T.R. v. A.W., by Pearson, 470 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. App. 1984). 110 Cf. State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411, 474 S.E.2d 127 (1996).
110-137, as the assignee of child support when a child receives public assistance.111 And while claims under G.S. 110-135 sometimes are joined in IV-D paternity and child support proceedings involving children who receive public assistance, the issue of who is and isnt a party with respect to a paternity or child support claim in a IV-D proceeding is distinct from the issue of who is and isnt a party with respect to a claim for reimbursement of public assistance under G.S. 110-135. There are no reported appellate decisions that directly address issues involving real, proper, and necessary parties in actions under G.S. 110-135. It seems clear, though, that 1. the State of North Carolina is the real party in interest in an action under G.S. 110-135; 2. an action under G.S. 110-135 should be brought in the name of the State against the parent of a dependent child;112 and 3. neither the child who received public assistance nor the childs custodial parent is a proper or necessary party in an action under G.S. 110-135.
Despite the statutory provisions of G.S. 110-130 and G.S. 110-130.1(c) and more than thirty years of experience with IV-D paternity and child support proceedings, there is a surprising amount of ambiguity and confusion regarding the identity and status of parties in IV-D proceedings. And, too often, this ambiguity and confusion raise real questions, issues, and problems regarding practice and procedure in IV-D proceedings.
fact that an action for child support may be brought at any time before the childs emancipation or 18th birthday, while an action to recover public assistance under G.S. 110-135 must be brought within five years of the date of the last payment of public assistance on behalf of the child. 112 In at least some cases, however, actions under G.S. 110-135 have been brought in the name of a county, rather than in the States name, and claims under G.S. 110135 frequently are joined with paternity or child support claims that are initiated or taken up by state or county IV-D agencies. See Moore County v. Brown, 147 N.C. App. 692, 543 S.E.2d 529 (2001); State ex rel. Terry v. Marrow, 71 N.C. App. 170, 321 S.E.2d 575 (1984); State ex rel. Parker v. Crews, 319 N.C. 354, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987).
A careful examination of the question who is and who isnt a party in IV-D proceedings, however, suggests that: 1. a IV-D agency that initiates a paternity or child support proceeding pursuant to G.S. Ch. 110 is a party to the action; 2. a IV-D agency that initiates a paternity or child support proceeding pursuant to G.S. Ch. 110 is the real party in interest in the proceeding; 3. a IV-D agency that takes up a paternity or child support proceeding by intervening in the pending proceeding becomes a party to the proceeding; 4. a custodial parent who has brought a paternity or child support proceeding remains a party to the proceeding after a IVD agency takes up the proceeding; 5. a IV-D agency that initiates a paternity or child support proceeding under G.S. 110130 and G.S. 110-130.1 may do so in the agencys own name without joining the custodial parent as a party in the proceeding; 6. a IV-D agency that initiates or takes up a paternity or child support proceeding acts, at least in part, in a representative capacity on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the custodial parent or child, regardless of whether the custodial parent or child is a party to the action; 7. a custodial parent who receives IV-D services is not a necessary party in a IV-D proceeding; and 8. a custodial parent who receives IV-D services may be a proper party in a IV-D proceeding and may have standing to intervene therein. And these conclusions regarding who is and isnt a party in IV-D cases may provide a useful starting point in addressing some of the other questions, issues, and problems involving pleading, practice, and procedure in IV-D proceedings.
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