Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/81/81massappct394.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:22:52+00:00

Document:
Present: GREEN, VUONO, & MILKEY, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 21, 1999.
After review by this court, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 8 (2009), further proceedings were had before John C. Cratsley, J.
John J. Russell for the plaintiff.
George R. Jabour for Robert K. McGarrell.
Adam Cederbaum, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for zoning board of appeal of Boston.
MILKEY, J. On December 8, 1998, defendant zoning board of appeal of Boston (board) granted five variances to defendant Robert K. McGarrell to build a single-family home of a certain size and configuration on a lot he owned in the South Boston section of Boston. Plaintiff Alison Sheppard, an immediate abutter, filed an action challenging these variances pursuant to § 11 of the Boston zoning enabling act, St. 1956, c. 665, as amended through St. 1993, c. 461, § 5. She now appeals a decision by a Superior Court judge affirming the board's actions. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Background. We summarize the facts from the record. [Note 2] In 1997, McGarrell purchased a 2,600 square-foot lot at 65 P Street in South Boston. The lot is only twenty-six feet wide by one-hundred feet deep, a size and shape that is typical of the neighborhood. As the judge found, "all the lots in the neighborhood are long and narrow, with insufficient frontage or width to build a conforming structure."
he had thought and that its foundation was crumbling. As a result, the old house had to be razed and a new house built from scratch.
Given the size and shape of the lot, any replacement home would necessarily violate existing dimensional zoning requirements in various respects. Nevertheless, as the parties stipulated, McGarrell could have reconstructed the old house as of right, because it was a preexisting nonconforming structure. As Sheppard acknowledged at oral argument, this could have been accomplished through reliance on the preexisting, nonconforming structure provisions of the Boston zoning code (included in what is known as article 9). In fact, according to the board, article 9 potentially allows for some expansions of existing prior nonconforming structures, subject to certain limitations. [Note 3] However, apparently because the house was torn down, the board took the position that McGarrell could not make use of article 9 (even if he simply wanted to reconstruct the old house), but instead needed to pursue variances.
of the house). [Note 4] The front of the new structure would be approximately three or four feet closer to the front property line, and the house would extend approximately four feet deeper into the lot (bringing it closer to Sheppard's three-decker house, which abuts the southwestern corner of the McGarrell house). The main respect in which the new house would be larger was its mass, with the new, townhouse-style home having a full second story (under a flat roof) over virtually its entire footprint (with a basement floor opening up to the back yard, as before).
The board again granted McGarrell the variances he sought, and Sheppard brought the current action. After she unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin construction, McGarrell built his proposed house. [Note 5] Following a three-day trial in 2004, the judge concluded that Sheppard lacked standing and issued a judgment dismissing her appeal. We reversed and remanded for a decision on the merits. Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 8 (2009). Relying on the existing trial record, the judge upheld the decision of the board after concluding that all of the variance requirements had been met.
appeal is necessary to prevent "manifest injustice." See King v. Driscoll, 424 Mass. 1 , 7-8 (1996), quoting from United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862 (1991). See also Reilly v. Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 633 , 641-642 (1991).
frequency or liberality, and without strict compliance with the prescribed statutory criteria, zoning regulations can become a matter of administrative whim." Damaskos v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 359 Mass. 55 , 61- 62 (1971).
The size and shape of McGarrell's lot present its principal limitations. However, as the judge below recognized, those "conditions" are not "peculiar to McGarell's lot" but are instead shared by all the other lots "in the neighborhood." Therefore, under the express terms of the Boston zoning code, the lot's dimensional limitations cannot serve as the basis for a variance. See Feldman v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 296 , 297 (1990) (variances typically not available due to a failure to meet dimensional requirements).
that the condition of the house would qualify as the basis for a variance, McGarrell still needs to prove that "for reasons of practical difficulty and demonstrable and substantial hardship . . . the granting of the variance is necessary for the reasonable use of the land or structure and that the variance as granted by the Board is the minimum variance that will accomplish this purpose." Boston Zoning Code, art. 7, § 7-3(b). By definition, proposed construction would require the "minimum" variances needed to allow for a reasonable use, only if it caused the least divergence from applicable zoning requirements necessary to allow for such a use.
It is uncontested that McGarrell purchased the property for the very purpose of living there in a home of the size and configuration of the old house. This establishes a baseline for reasonable use of the property, absent proof of what change in circumstances rendered the former intended use of the property no longer reasonable. See Steamboat Realty, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 70 Mass. App. Ct. at 606 (upholding denial of variance where "Steamboat does not assert that the building, in its preexisting condition, was inadequate for reasonable uses such that failure to grant an exception could be considered unreasonable"). [Note 10] McGarrell offered no such proof, nor did he make any showing that building a larger house was necessitated by his having to tear down the old one. [Note 11] Instead, the record reflects only his understandable preference for a larger home.
In light of McGarrell's failure to demonstrate that he could make a reasonable use of the property only by building a larger house, the construction of the larger house would require more than the "minimum variance" needed for a reasonable use if it would increase noncompliance with the zoning code. The judge recognized that the larger house would in fact increase the existing nonconformities. However, he ultimately deemed these increases inconsequential, because he concluded that the new house was only "slightly larger in size" and that "the expansion is not significant." In coming to that conclusion, the judge accurately referred to the increased average height of the building as "the most significant area of expansion in the new structure." Nevertheless, he discounted this vertical expansion because he concluded that -- given that the new house still did not exceed the maximum height allowed under the zoning code -- it "could have been accomplished as a matter of right under the code." With regard to the expanded footprint of the house, [Note 12] the judge concluded that "[a]s these extensions of the footprint have relatively no impact on the surrounding neighborhood, I find them to be de minimis."
The judge committed an error of law when he concluded that McGarrell could expand the house vertically as matter of right. Because the lot was undersized, any house there violated the minimum lot size requirement. In such a circumstance, an increase in the size of an existing building could "intensify" the nonconformity (regardless of the extent to which the new house complied with setback or height requirements). See Bjorklund v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norwell, 450 Mass. 357 , 360-361 (2008) (Bjorklund). [Note 13] A property owner may not intensify an existing nonconformity as of right.
(rejecting argument that a 6.68 percent deviation from a frontage requirement was de minimis). See also Steamboat Realty, 70 Mass. App. Ct. at 602 n.4, 606 (height differential of "at least four feet" not de minimis).
In sum, the judge erred in concluding that the variances the board granted were the "minimum" necessary to allow for a reasonable use of the property, and the board therefore acted in excess of its authority when it granted the variances.
Viewed in its best light, McGarrell's argument appears to be that, if construction of the larger home was necessary to accommodate a disability, then insisting on strict compliance with the zoning requirements would amount to unlawful "discrimination" under c. 40A, § 3. Such an argument finds some support in case law under the analogous Federal statute. See, e.g., Howard v. Beavercreek, 276 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2002) (Federal Fair Housing Act "creates an affirmative duty on municipalities . . . to afford [their] disabled citizens reasonable accommodations in [their] municipal zoning practices if necessary to afford such persons equal opportunity in the use and enjoyment of their property"). [Note 20] In this manner, McGarrell's argument is not really that the board could have taken his medical condition into account in assessing whether the specified requirements for obtaining variances had been met; rather, it is that the board could not deny him the relief he requested without violating its obligations under G. L. c. 40A, § 3.
for "discrimination" based on the trial record. [Note 21] When he purchased the property, McGarrell intended to live in the old house after it was renovated. Although there was testimony that certain aspects of the new house's interior were designed with an eye toward McGarrell's condition, there was no testimony that the house's extended footprint and increased height were necessary to enable him to live there. Under these circumstances, McGarrell cannot make out a claim that he was denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of his choice as a result of a disability. Compare Howard v. Beavercreek, 276 F.3d at 806 ("In order to prove that an accommodation is 'necessary,' plaintiffs must show that, but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice").
Remedy. With McGarrell having failed to prove his entitlement to the variances he had sought, Sheppard urges us to remand this case with a directive that the house be torn down. We decline to do so.
assert that article 9 potentially allows for some expansion of preexisting nonconforming structures, and Sheppard actually does not appear to argue to the contrary. Instead, she maintains that -- with McGarrell having gone so far down the variance path -- it is too late for him to change theories now. See Warren v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 383 Mass. 1 , 8-9 (1981) (party who had sought approval for a project only through a variance cannot be heard to argue for first time on appeal that he could have built project "as of right").
down order would be premature. In the event that McGarrell seeks relief from the board pursuant to a different provision of the Boston zoning code, we leave it to the discretion of the Superior Court judge whether to stay further proceedings in the current litigation while the board considers such a request.
Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment affirming the board's grant of the variances and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[Note 1] Robert K. McGarrell.
[Note 2] Although there was a three-day bench trial, many of the key underlying facts were established by stipulation. The facts set forth below are drawn from the trial judge's findings, supplemented by the parties' stipulation, documentary evidence appended to that stipulation (or that was otherwise uncontested), and concessions the parties made on the record.
[Note 3] McGarrell has appended what purports to be a copy of article 9 to his brief. Since this portion of the zoning code was apparently not introduced in evidence below, it is not properly before us. See Russell v. New Bedford, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 715 , 722 (2009), quoting from Fournier v. Central Taxi Cab, Inc., 331 Mass. 248 , 249 (1954) (municipal ordinances and by-laws not subject to judicial notice; "[n]either a trial judge nor this court can consider such alleged ordinances [or by-laws] unless they are put in evidence").
[Note 4] A portion of the south side of the old house extended all the way to the lot line, while a portion was offset over eight feet from the lot line (as compared to the ten-foot sideyard set back required by the code). After the renovation, the entire south side of the house extended to the lot line.
[Note 5] McGarrell acknowledged at trial that he proceeded with construction at his risk.
[Note 6] Primarily at issue in Kenner was the extent to which a seven-foot taller home would affect both the plaintiffs' view of the ocean from their own home and "the visual character of their neighborhood." 459 Mass. at 121. The court concluded that the plaintiffs "did not put forth credible facts to support their allegation that the increased height of [the defendants'] new house will block their view of the ocean," and that "apart from [the plaintiffs'] unsubstantiated claims and personal opinions, there was no evidence that the increased height of [the defendants'] new house would have a detrimental impact on the visual character of their neighborhood, the interest that the zoning by-law is designed to protect." Ibid. This case, by contrast, deals with a crowded urban neighborhood, a context in which our case law makes clear that additional "crowding of an abutter's residential property by violation of the density provisions of the zoning by-law will generally constitute harm sufficiently perceptible and personal to qualify the abutter as aggrieved." Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 8 , 12 (2009), quoting from Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 292 , 297 (2008).
"(c) That the granting of the variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this code, and will not be injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare . . . ."
Boston Zoning Code, art. 7, § 7-3.
[Note 8] Although the judge did not focus on the issue, there was also evidence regarding some apparently unique soil conditions on the parcel. However, McGarrell presented no evidence of how such soil conditions affected the size of the house, so the existence of the "peculiar" soil conditions offers no additional help.
McGarrell additionally maintained that his chronic emphysema created a hardship that justified the variances. As a general matter, a hardship resulting from a personal condition or characteristic of the owner (rather than from conditions affecting the land itself) is not a valid basis for a variance. "[A] variance applies to the land rather than to its current owner, and . . . runs with the land when it is conveyed to [another] person." Huntington v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Hadley, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 710 , 716 (1981), quoting from 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 18.64, at 311 (2d ed. 1977). For this reason, a variance should be granted "based only upon circumstances which directly affect the real estate and not upon circumstances which cause personal hardship to the owner." Huntington, supra at 715. This general rule applies not only to personal financial hardships, but also to hardships occasioned by the poor health of the owner. Aronson v. Board of Appeals of Stoneham, 349 Mass. 593 , 595 (1965). Winn v. Board of Appeals of Saugus, 358 Mass. 804 , 805 (1970). Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 707 , 711 (1984). See generally 8 Rohan, Zoning Land Use & Controls § 43.02[b][ii] (2011); 3 Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice § 20-11 (4th ed. 2008). As to whether McGarrell's emphysema might justify zoning relief on other grounds, see discussion infra.
[Note 9] Pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 10, the circumstances requiring a variance must relate to "the soil conditions, shape or topography of such land or structures," while under the Boston zoning code, the requisite special circumstances are referenced "such as, but not limited to, the exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape of the lot, or exceptional topographical conditions thereof." Boston Zoning Code, art. 7, § 7.3 (a).
[Note 10] Compare Lombard v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 348 Mass. 788 , 789 (1965), where, in the context of an appeal of the denial of a special permit for the minor expansion of a prior nonconforming structure (a garage that had been constructed in 1937), the owner showed that the expansion was necessary in order to accommodate the width of modern cars. Although there was some limited testimony here that at least one aspect of the interior of the building (the slope of the stairs) might need to be modified because of the building code, there was no testimony that this required the house to be larger.
[Note 11] While McGarrell testified that he had to borrow more money once he learned that the old house had to be torn down, he offered no evidence that the lender had insisted that the new house be larger, or that constructing a house the size of the old one otherwise would have been economically infeasible. Compare Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719 , 726 (1996) (variance from requirement that hotel provide certain number of parking spaces upheld in part on grounds that full compliance would have been "economically impractical").
[Note 12] The judge found that the footprint of the new house "is the exact same width as the old structure." This is an accurate statement insofar as it refers to the maximum width of the two structures, but it is misleading to the extent that it implies that the average width of the house did not change. See note 4, supra.
[Note 13] Bjorklund was decided under G. L. c. 40A, but the defendants have not demonstrated why a different rule would apply to the Boston zoning code. See McGee v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 930 , 930 (2004).
[Note 14] Indeed, in Bjorklund, the court concluded that such changes would not amount to intensifications "as matter of law." 450 Mass. at 363.
[Note 15] McGarrell filed a motion to strike Sheppard's reply brief, claiming that it is "nothing more than an attempt to introduce before the Appeals Court evidence and Sheppard's self-serving analysis of this evidence, which was not introduced below." The "evidence" in the reply brief (diagrams of the footprints of the old and new houses) appears in substance in the trial record. The motion to strike is denied.
[Note 16] In addition, the south side of the house was expanded deeper into the lot.
[Note 17] At oral argument, the board represented that, where article 9 of the Boston zoning code applies, it can potentially allow expansion of a preexisting nonconforming structure up to a certain percentage increase. The board also stated that it is unable to formulate a position on whether the specific expansion of the house here could qualify under article 9 without going through the requisite article 9 procedures. The specifics of article 9 and whether the new house could meet them are not currently before us. However, the fact that such a provision exists underscores the ill fit of the variance process here. Although the limitations of the record prevent a precise determination, it appears at least possible that the expansion the board asks us to treat as "insignificant" for purposes of endorsing its variance, would exceed the percentage limit applicable under the Boston zoning code to expansions of nonconforming structures.
[Note 18] We recognize that the Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that a trial court judge's determination that a zoning impact was "de minimis" is generally entitled to great deference. Cf. Kenner, 459 Mass. at 123 (where trial "judge stated that the evidence showed that the increased height of the new house would have a de minimis impact on the [plaintiffs'] view of the ocean," and the judge had the benefit of taking a view, "we cannot conclude that [his] ultimate finding that the [plaintiffs] were not aggrieved persons . . . was clearly erroneous"). However, the judge here was explicit that he found the increased footprint of the house "de minimis" based on his determination that the expansion had "relatively no impact on the surrounding neighborhood." That consideration is relevant only to the third requirement for granting a variance. See note 6, supra. To the extent the judge's conclusion that the expansion was "de minimis" can be seen as a factual finding that the variances granted were indistinguishable from the minimum necessary variances, that finding is inconsistent with the judge's subsidiary findings about the differences between the old house and the new house, and we accordingly are not bound by it. See Simon v. Weymouth Agric. & Industrial Soc., 389 Mass. 146 , 151-152 (1983). Compare Capodilupo v. Vozzella, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 224 , 227 (1999) (where there was actual encroachment of only few inches, this was determined to be "spatially inconsequential" and "truly de minimis").
[Note 19] The pertinent language, which was inserted by St. 1989, c. 106, states that "local land use and health and safety laws, regulations, practices, ordinances, by-laws and decisions of a city or town shall not discriminate against a disabled person." This language was made specifically applicable to all municipalities, including Boston.
[Note 20] The Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f), which was enacted the year before the relevant language was added to G. L. c. 40A, § 3, makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap," § 3604(f)(1), and defines "discrimination" to include "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." § 3604(f)(3)(B).
[Note 21] For purposes of our analysis, we assume arguendo that McGarrell is a "disabled person" within the meaning of the statute and that the requested variances would be a "reasonable accommodation" of his disability.
[Note 22] The parties have also alluded to provisions of the zoning code, in addition to article 9, that may be relevant. Further, when pressed at oral argument as to whether existing dimensional zoning requirements made sense in areas such as South Boston that are made up predominantly of undersized lots, the board responded that the relevant Boston body was in the process of a comprehensive reexamination of such issues.

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