Source: http://www.torttalk.com/2018/02/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:25:56+00:00

Document:
In his recent decision in the case of Santiago v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., No. 16-CV-1529 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 2, 2018 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a property owner’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall action.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was an employee of an independent contractor that was retained by the property owner to provide janitorial services. The Plaintiff was allegedly injured in a slip and fall event on the premises.
The Defendant-owner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that it allegedly owned no duty of care to the employee of the independent contractor. The landowner Defendant argued that a landowner who retains an independent contractor cannot be vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor or its employees.
However, Judge Nealon denied the Motion for Summary Judgment under the “retained control” exception to that theory of non-liability. Under the exception, a property owner who entrusts work to an independent contractor remains subject to liability if its contract with the independent contractor grants the landowner control over the manner, method, and operative details of the independent contractor’s work.
Judge Nealon found that there were issues of fact in this regard that required the court to deny the Motion for Summary Judgment filed.
In the case of Rutyna v. Schweers, No. 895 WDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Jan. 4, 2018 en banc) (Op. by Lazaurs, J.) (Olson, J., concurring), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the entry of summary judgment and ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiff a continuance where, through no fault of the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiff’s expert was suddenly unable to testify less than three (3) weeks before trial.
This case involved a legal malpractice action related to an underlying medical malpractice action.
The court ultimately found that, given the history of the case, the Plaintiffs were left with insufficient time to obtain a new expert.
In its Opinion, the Superior Court emphasized that, while the swift resolution of cases is a "linchpin of judicial economy," is not an end in and of itself. Op. p. 18.
The Rutyna decision can be viewed HERE.
In the case of Arvonio v. PNC Fiinancial Services Group, Inc., No. 11 CV 478 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 14, 2018 Nealon, J.), the court reviewed a case involving commercial torts including breach of a fiduciary duty in a financial conversion case.
More specifically, the court addressed a motion in limine filed by a defendant seeking a court ruling on the proper measure of damages in an action filed by debtors/mortgagors against their investment management company alleging breach of contract and fiduciary duties for allegedly liquidating the Plaintiff's investment management accounts without the Plaintiff's authorization to do so.
Judge Terrrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas held that 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8335 set forth the proper measure of damages as being the difference between the proceeds of the wrongful conversion of the Plaintiff's investments and the higher value that the property may have reached within a "reasonable time" after the owner received notice of the conversion.
Anyone wishing to read this Opinion online may click this LINK.
Tort Talkers may recall prior posts on the Lebanon County case of Shearer v. Hafer pertaining to whether a Plaintiff is entitle to have a representative present during portions of a neuropsychological IME.
The Tort Talk post on the Superior Court's decision in this case can be viewed HERE. The post on the trial court's decision can be viewed HERE. Concisely, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order allowing a representative of the Plaintiff to be present during the preliminary interview phase of the neuropsychological evaluation, but not during the standardized testing portion of the evaluation.
Now comes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision recently handed down in this case on January 18, 2018 ruling that the Pennsylvania Superior Court erred in even considering the issue on appeal as the trial court's order was not an appealable order as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313 where the trial court order only met one of the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine. As such, the Superior Court's decision on the issue was vacated.
The Majority Opinion of the Court in Shearer v. Hafer, No. 93 MAP 2016 (Pa. Jan. 18, 2018), written by Justice Todd, can be viewed HERE.
Justice Mundy's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.
This Opinion may be a good one to consult if you have a question on whether a trial court order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 313.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of law that the collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed and that each of the three prongs to allow for an appeal must be clearly present.
(3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until the final judgment of the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
In Lackawanna County, Attorneys are still needed to fill the Jury Box for the Finals of the Lackawanna County Mock Trial Competition.
In the case of Gaffin v. Walker, No. 7974-CV-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 30, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas overruled a trucking Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to a Plaintiff’s Complaint with respect to punitive damages alleged based upon a rear-end motor vehicle accident.
The defense contended that the case involved a simple rear-end collision sounding in ordinary negligence.
In response, the Plaintiff asserted that the subject accident involved a tractor trailer rear-ending the Plaintiff’s flatbed truck. The Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendant violated portions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law pertaining to punitive damages and allegations of recklessness, the court found that the Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to allow the punitive damages claim to proceed beyond the pleadings stage. The court cited to other cases in which punitive damages claims were allowed to proceed where a Plaintiff alleges violation of state and federal statutes pertaining to commercial vehicle driving.
The court also noted that punitive damages could be awarded under the Plaintiff’s allegations of vicarious liability in addition to the allegations of direct conduct.
I send thanks to Attorney John P. Finnerty, Esquire of the Moosic, Pennsylvania office of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price, LLP for bringing this case to my attention.
In the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas case of Rosencrance v. Smith, No. S-1535-2017 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. Jan. 19, 2018 Domalakes, J.), the court denied a Defendant's Preliminary Objections to allegations of recklessness and the request for punitive damages in a rear end trucking accident case.
This matter arose out of a chain reaction accident in a construction area on Interstate 81 during which the Defendant tractor trailer driver allegedly rear-ended a vehicle, causing several additional rear end impacts up ahead, including to the Plaintiff's vehicle.
After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law on punitive damages, the court found that the allegations in the Plaintiff's Complaint were sufficient to allow such claims to proceed beyond the pleadings stage.
More specifically, the Plaintiff averred that the Defendant tractor trailer failed to operate his vehicle at a safe and prudent speed in that he was unable to stop his vehicle without rear ending the vehicles ahead, that he failed to apply his brakes in time, failed to stop within the assured clear distance ahead, followed too closely, and violated several provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code.
In the end, the court denied the Defendant's Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff's Complaint.
I send thanks to Attorney Stephen J. Fendler of Fendler Law Offices in Kingston, PA for bringing this decision to my attention.
In the case of Cagey v. PennDOT, No. 36 WAP 2016 (Pa. Feb. 21, 2018)(Maj. Op. by Donohue, J.), handed down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court yesterday, the Court expressly overruled Fagan and its progeny and held that PennDOT is only immune when it fails to install a guardrail. The Court held that when PennDOT installs a guardrail, sovereign immunity is waived if the agency’s negligent installation and design creates a dangerous condition that causes or contributes to an accident.
Although there are two Concurring Opinions, it appears that all of the Justices agreed on the ultimate holding of the case set forth above.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper for bringing this decision to my attention.
In the case of Alley v. MTD Products, Inc., No. 3: 17-CV-3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2017 Gibson, J.), the court denied summary judgment filed by the Defendant in this products liability case involving alleged injuries from a snowblower.
This decision is also notable for its Choice of Law analysis in terms of whether Ohio law or Pennsylvania law should be applied. In the end, the court found that Pennsylvania law should be applied under the analysis.
In its decision, the court ruled that, where a product manufactured in another state injures a Pennsylvania resident who bought and used the product in Pennsylvania, the law of Pennsylvania will be applied to the personal injury case. The court found that Pennsylvania’s contacts and interests are stronger than those of the state where the product is merely manufactured.
In the case of Barnard v. The Travelers Home and Marine Ins. Co., No. 17-00290 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2018 McHugh, J.) (Mem. Op.), the court addressed the issue of whether a carrier was required to obtain an additional written waiver of stacking of UIM benefits where the insured had signed a waiver of stacked benefits when the policy was originally issued but, two (2) years later, sought to purchase a higher level of UIM benefits.
According to the Opinion, the UIM benefits originally purchased were in the amount of $50,000.00 and stacking was rejected on two (2) vehicles. When the insured later secured increased UIM limits, a new rejection of stacking form was never secured.
In his Memorandum Opinion, Judge McHugh held that a new rejection of stacking form was required when the UIM benefits were increased since, under the judge’s review of the applicable statutes, a carrier is required to secure a rejection of stacking from the insured whenever higher UIM policy limits are purchased.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania law offices of Schmidt Kramer, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.
Tort Talkers may recall the prior blog post on the case of Selective Insurance of South Carolina v. Koons-Gill, No. 13-CV-6415 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 14, 2016 Nealon, J.), in which Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas issued a decision in this declaratory judgment action on the issue of whether an employee of ambulance service company, who was injured in a work-related accident while occupying her employer’s ambulance, may stack the underinsured motorists coverage limits for the six (6) ambulance vehicles that were insured under the employer’s commercial business automobile insurance policy.
By way of update, it is noted that this decision was recently affirmed on appeal in a non-precedential Opinion by the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued on February 13, 2018 under Superior Court Docket No. 163 MDA 210. The Superior Court's non-precedential Opinion may be viewed HERE.
The courts of Pennsylvania continue attempt to move forward in the post-Tincher world of products liability cases, including in the actual Tincher case.
On remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the trial judge in the actual Tincher case denied any relief to the defense.
However, the trial court’s denial of the Defendant’s motion for post-trial relief has been reversed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in its February 16, 2018 decision in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., No. 1285 EDA 2016, 2018 Pa. Super. 33 (Pa. Super. Feb. 16, 2018 Lazarus, J., Platt, J., Strassburger, J.)(Op. by Lazarus, J.). The Pennsylvania Superior Court particularly found fault with the trial court’s jury instructions with respect to standards for finding a "defect" and a new trial was ordered in light of the extensive changes that the Tincher Supreme Court decision made to Pennsylvania product liability law.
Notably, the Superior Court noted that the trial court’s jury instructions which relied, in part, on the law of the prior case of Azzarello v. Black Brothers, Inc., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978), were “incorrect.” Op. at p. 18.
The Superior Court in this Tincher opinion noted that “[t]he charge thus contained all of the product liability law under Azzarello that the Supreme Court has now disapproved, including a definition equating a defective product with one that “leaves the suppliers’ control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use,” and a declaration that a manufacturer “is really a guarantor of [a product’s] safety” but not “an insurer of [that] safety.” Op. at p. 18.
The Superior Court, in no uncertain terms, emphasized that “[t]he Supreme Court has now overruled Azzarello and determined that this statement of product liability law was incorrect. The trial court’s jury charge, therefore, was erroneous.” Op at p. 18.
The Tincher Superior Court went on to state, “Here, the trial court gave a charge on a determinative issue that failed to conform to the applicable law, as stated in Tincher. We conclude, therefore, that the charge amounted to fundamental error.” Op. at p. 20.
The court also noted, “[T]he trial court gave a charge under law that the Supreme Court has explicitly overruled in this very case. Such a charge would appear to be a paradigm example of fundamental error.” Op. at p. 23. The appellate court emphasized that the provision of an incorrect definition of a "defect" in conflict with the standards on the same set forth in Tincher required the granting of a new trial.
In the end, the Superior Court found that “[t]he trial court had no authority to deny a new trial on the basis of its own speculation about what the jury would do under the Supreme Court’s new formulation of the law.” Op. at p. 27. It further noted that “[t]he trial court’s declaration that the new legal reformulation resulting from the Supreme Court’s thorough and extensive decision … can cause no change to the verdict undervalues the importance of the Supreme Court’s decision.” Op at p. 27.
The appellate court ultimately found that given that the jury instructions were incorrect under the new Tincher analysis, a new trial was required to be ordered.
The Superior Court otherwise confirmed that under the new Tincher analysis enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “only the fact-finder – in this case, the jury – may determine whether a product is defective.” Op. at p. 28.
Commentary: In this new decision, the Superior Court makes clear that the Azzarello analysis and, therefore, any jury charge based upon that case, has been expressly “disapproved” by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Accordingly, it appears that the Pennsylvania Standard Suggested Jury Instruction issued after the Supreme Court’s decision in Tincher purporting to restore the Azzarello formulation may be inconsistent with the new standards set down in Tincher.
Tort Talkers may recall that a committee of attorneys affiliated with the Pennsylvania Defense Institute formulated alternative post-Tincher standard jury instructions that are represented to be consistent with the new analysis adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Tincher. A Link to these proposed jury instructions can be found HERE.
I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this decision to my attention.
In his recent decision in the case of Grimes v. Velez, No. 2016-CV-4071 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 22, 2018 Gibbons, J.), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted a Plaintiff’s Motion to Coordinate separate motor vehicle accident litigations filed in separate counties. The court granted the motion under Pa. R.C.P. 213.1.
By way of background, the entire case against the tortfeasor Defendant and the Plaintiff’s own UIM carrier initially began under a single Complaint filed in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. However, the UIM carrier succeeded on Preliminary Objections to the Complaint on the basis that venue was improper in Lackawanna County under a forum selection clause. The UIM portion of the case was therefore carved out and transferred to Monroe County.
Through an error by the Lackawanna County Prothonotary, the entire case was transferred to Monroe County. At that point, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Consolidate the matters in Monroe County. The Monroe County court denied the Plaintiff’s motion based upon a lack of jurisdiction over Defendant Velez given the mistake by the Lackawanna County Prothonotary in also transferring that part of the case. The Monroe County Court directed that the tort claim against the tortfeasor defendant be transferred back to Lackawanna County.
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed the subject Motion to Coordinate pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213.1 seeking a transfer of the tort claim back to Monroe County.
In his decision, Judge Gibbons noted that the claims against the tortfeasor Defendant and the UIM carrier arose from the same occurrence, i.e., the same motor vehicle accident. The court noted that this factor alone served as a basis for granting the coordination motion. The court additionally noted that common questions of law or fact existed as well.
On the issue of the convenience of parties, the Lackawanna County Court recognized that litigation in Monroe County would involve roughly one (1) hour of travel from Lackawanna County.
The ruling in favor of coordination was also compelled by the notion that only one trial should take place on the questions presented as they all arose out of the same accident. The court additionally noted that it was likely that all of the witnesses and parties called to testify with respect to the tort action would also be called to testify with respect to the UIM action.
Judge Gibbons rejected the tortfeasor’s Defendant’s claims of prejudice and unreasonable delay if he was required to defend the case in Monroe County.
Lastly, the court found that the interest of judicial economy and the prevention of duplicative or inconsistent Orders weighed in favor of coordinating and transferring to Lackawanna County to the Monroe County case.
For these reasons, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Coordination under Pa. R.C.P. 213.1.
In Lackawanna County, Attorneys are still needed to fill the Jury Boxes at the Lackawanna County Mock Trial Competition.
In the case of Carpenter Technology Corp. v. Weida, 2018 W.L. 398297 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2018 Stengel, C.J.) (Mem. Op.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s action for equitable relief to enforce the terms and preserve the assets of an Employee Welfare Benefit Plan under the terms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
The court explained that the Plaintiff, Carpenter Technology Corporation Health & Welfare Plan was a self-funded Employee Welfare Benefit Plan. The plan contained a provision to fulfill ERISA’s requirement that such a plan be established and maintained by a written plan document. That document contained an expressed provision indicating that Plan participants must fully reimburse the Plan from payments received from a settlement of personal injury claims against third parties.
By way of further background, the Defendant in this matter was injured in a car accident. The Plan paid medical benefits on the injured party’s behalf. The injured party filed suit against the tortfeasor and settled that action.
The Plan then filed this suit asserting that the injured party was in possession of funds that belonged to the Plan and, through this lawsuit, the Plan was attempting to compel the injured party to reimburse the plan from the settlement proceeds.
The Plan was seeking (1) an Order imposing a constructive trust and/or equitable lien in favor of the Plan against any settlement funds or any property into which the settlement funds had been converted by the injured party; (2) an Order enjoining the injured party from dissipating any of these settlement funds until the Plan’s rights could be adjudicated; (3) an Order enjoining the injured party from transferring or disposing of the settlement funds; and/or reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
In response, the injured party Defendant/Plan beneficiary filed the subject motion to dismiss which was granted by the court.
In granting the Motion to Dismiss, the court noted that the ERISA Plan waited approximately nine (9) months after receiving notice from the injured party’s personal injury attorney of the pending third party settlement distribution before the Plan ever filed this Complaint for equitable relief.
The Court also noted that, although the language of the Plan entitled the Plaintiff to relief, by the time the Plaintiff had filed this Complaint, the settlement proceeds, which had been deposited into a joint marital account, had already been dissipated. The court additionally noted that, generally speaking, a joint property is protected from creditors for an individual spouse’s debt.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The accompanying Order may be viewed HERE.
A recent update was provided on the Lawrence County case of Gallatin v. Gargiulo (C.P. Lawrence Co., 2016 Hodge, J.), in which that trial court allowed a lawsuit to proceed beyond the pleadings stage against a man who had texted a driver who was involved in a fatal accident allegedly at the time she received the text sent.
In the recent update, reference was made to reports that the court had since dismissed the claims asserted against the sender of the text.
Further investigation has confirmed that the case against the sender of the text was dismissed by Stipulation by the Plaintiff shortly before a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue was to be argued to the court. Defense counsel was prepared to argue that the Plaintiff failed to produce facts that the sender of the text knew that the recipient was driving at the time the text was sent.
Cummins is also available to serve as a Mediator through Cummins Mediation Services (www.cumminsmediationservices.com).
Locally, Attorneys are still needed to fill the Jury Boxes at the Lackawanna County Mock Trial Competition in the state and federal courthouses in Scranton, PA.
In the medical malpractice case of Venosh v. Henzes, No. 11 - CV - 3058 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 18, 2018 Nealon, J.), the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted in part and denied in part a Plaintiff's motion to compel relative to requested additional discovery responses from, and a supplemental deposition of, a defendant doctor.
In this case, the Plaintiff attempted to secure the additional deposition of the doctor after the Plaintiff had certified the case for trial under a certification that all discovery had been completed. The Plaintiff wished to depose the doctor on a written statement he had made to a health insurer relative ot an internal quality-of-care review of the treatment provided to the Plaintiff.
The court allowed the deposition but circumscribed the scope of the questioning to a very narrow issue. The court noted that no prejudice was established relative to the additional discovery, particularly since the trial date was still nine months into the future.
On January 30, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a per curiam Order agreeing to hear the appeal on the case of BouSamra v. Excela Health, No. 318 WAL 2017 (Pa. Jan. 30, 2018), to hear argument on the issue of whether a law firm’s sending of pre-litigation emails to a public relations firm serves to waive the attorney work-product doctrine, and whether a third party must provide legal advice, or be acting under the control of an attorney or the client, to qualify as a privileged person.
Tort Talkers may recall that the Pennsylvania Superior Court previously determined in this case that emails involving an internal investigation that were sent by a hospital’s attorney to a public relations firm were not barred from discovery under the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. Here is a LINK to the Tort Talk blog post on that decision.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Order granting the appeal may click this LINK.
Source: “Justices to Eye Discoverability of Emails Between Hospital Counsel and PR Firm” by Max Mitchell of The Legal Intelligencer (Feb. 1, 2018).

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