Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/fpmd/chapter7/section2
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 03:49:46+00:00

Document:
Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the requirements for class certification. Rule 23(a) sets forth four threshold requirements for class certification, each of which must be met: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of class members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class (typicality); and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy).
To certify a class, a court must also find that one of the following requirements, set forth in Rule 23(b), are met: (1) that prosecution of separate actions risks either inconsistent adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant or would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of others; (2) that defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class; or (3) that there are common questions of law or fact that predominate over any individual class member’s questions and that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication.
Before filing a case as a class action, counsel should analyze carefully if and how the case meets the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements. The complaint should plead specifically each of the Rule 23 requirements rather than merely parrot the language of Rule 23. Indeed, many local rules require that class action allegations contain specific information regarding the class, such as an estimate of the number of persons in the class.1 In addition to Rule 23(a) and (b), as explained below, courts have added implicit requirements for class certification. The courts require (1) that a definable class exists, (2) the named representatives are members of that class, and (3) the claim of the class is live, rather than moot.
The four preliminary requirements for class certification—numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation—must all be met.
The Supreme Court, however, recently decided an important Rule 23(b)(3) class action case, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,35 which, while focusing on the Rule’s predominance inquiry, is significant on the issue on commonality because, distinguishing Wal-Mart, it refused to bar the use of representative evidence in establishing liability. The case dealt with compensable time spent by factory employees in donning and doffing protective uniforms, time that the employer did not record. As a result, the plaintiffs retained an expert who examined a representative sample of employees and determined the average time devoted to these activities. Tyson Foods argued that the time each worker devoted to donning and doffing and whether that time pushed them to overtime status were individual, not common class, questions. As a result, it urged the Court to bar all use of representative evidence in class actions.
Rule 23 (a)(4) requires a class representative to represent fairly and adequately the interests of absent class members. As with other aspects of Rule 23, due process governs the determination of adequacy of representation.48 By assuring adequacy of representation, Rule 23 permits class judgments to bind absent class members.49 The requirement of adequate representation applies to both the plaintiffs and counsel. The 2003 Amendments, which added subsection (g) to Rule 23, have changed somewhat the inquiry into adequate representation of counsel.
First, the court asks whether the named plaintiffs will serve as adequate class representatives. By separating the inquiry into adequacy of representation from the issues of commonality and typicality, the rule requires a critical assessment of issues on which the named plaintiffs and any part of the class might disagree.50 Class certification is improper when the interests of the representative party and the class conflict, although they need not be identical. In a leading Supreme Court case in this area, a class was decertified upon a finding that the claims of the named representatives were not aligned with those of the other class members. In that case, putative class members were all exposed to asbestos, but many members suffered injuries completely different than those suffered by other class members.51 Defendants often attempt to defeat class certification by making allegations of antagonistic interests between the named representatives and the remainder of the class.
The courts have added some “implicit” requirements for the putative class to meet in order to obtain class certification: (1) a definable class exists, (2) the named representatives have standing, and (3) the claim of the class is live, not moot.
Upon finding that a class is not sufficiently definable, the court may limit or redefine the class using its authority under Rule 23(c)(4),69 or it can deny class certification and allow the named members to proceed individually.70 A precisely defined class is necessary in order to analyze whether that class meets the other requirements for certification under Rule 23. Further, a court must have a precise class definition in order to be able to determine which individuals are entitled to notice or relief as well as which individuals will be bound by a judgment.
In addition to meeting all four Rule 23(a) requirements, a class action must meet one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b).
Unlike with the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), factual differences between the named plaintiffs following the classwide injunctive relief may sometimes defeat certification.86 While manageability is not explicitly required in a Rule 23(b)(2) class, courts sometimes consider it nonetheless.87 Certification is unlikely if the putative class seeks particularized relief for each class member.
Increasingly, courts are finding an implicit "cohesiveness" requirement in Rule 23(b)(2).100 The Lightfoot v. District of Columbia case fell victim to such a requirement, found nowhere in the Rule. There, the court found that differences in the amounts of time class members had between notice and termination, all alleged to be constitutionally insufficient, yielded a conclusion that the class was not sufficiently cohesive to warrant class certification.101 The irony of such a cohesiveness requirement in Rule 23(b)(2) cases is seemingly arbitrary deviations from a common unwritten custom and practice can preclude class certification.
Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification under subdivision (b)(3) when the primary relief sought is damages. In such a case, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions and that a class action be superior to other methods for fair and efficient resolution of the conflict.102 The district court has broad discretion in determining whether common questions predominate and whether a class action is manageable, using the factors set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A-D).
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are expensive and time-consuming, requiring notice to all class members;103 opportunity for opt-out; more expensive and extensive discovery; and individual representation post-judgment. As such, counsel should carefully consider the resources required for litigation before undertaking representation of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. Whenever possible, certification should be sought under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2).
1. E.g., L.R. 23.1 (A)(2) (N.D. Fla.) and L.R. 23.1 (b)(2)(A) (E.D. Pa.). Local rules may also have other specific and/or additional requirements regarding class actions.
2. Wal-Mart Stores, Incorporated v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
3. Id. (citing General Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).
4. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974)).
5. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52. The 2003 rule changes allow for a slightly later determination of class certification and eliminate the possibility of “conditional” class certification; some courts have understood such rule changes as compelling a more thorough evaluation at the class certification stage, including a limited review of the merits. For cases predating Wal-Mart Stores, see In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.3d 305, 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006), clarified on reh'g, 483 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); Fener v. Operating Engineers Construction Industry and Miscellaneous Pension Fund (Local 66), 579 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (class certification denied because plaintiffs failed to prove at certification stage that alleged action, in fact, caused stock prices to fall).
6. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
7. 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (2013). See also Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) (cautioning that district courts may not “turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the trial on the merits.”).
8. Stirman v. Exxon Corporation, 280 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2002).
9. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320; Fener, 579 F.3d at 407.
10. See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 847 F.3d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 2017); Whitlock v. FSL Mgmt., LLC, 843 F.3d 1084, 1089 (6th Cir. 2016). See also Amchem Products Incorporated v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
11. Whitlock, 843 F.3d at 1089.
12. Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Markets, Incorporated (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litigation), 544 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 2008).
13. “Numerosity” is the term generally used to identify this requirement. However, classes of various numbers have been certified. This requirement might be more appropriately termed “impracticality.” See, e.g., Anderson v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1998); 1 William Rubenstein, Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:3 (4th ed. and Supp. 2010). See In re Modalifinil Antitrust Litigation, 837 F.3d 238, 248 (3d. Cir. 2016) (holding that inquiry into impracticability should be particularly rigorous when the putative class consists of fewer than 40 members).
14. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the NW. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) (suggesting 15 is too few); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Incorporated, 725 F.3d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 2013) (presuming numerosity at 40); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (same). There are, of course, exceptions. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 245 F.R.D. 478 (D. Colo. 2007) (rejecting class of 115); Peoples v. Sebring Capital Corp., 209 F.R.D. 428 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (certifying a class of eleven individuals); Grant v. Sullivan, 131 F.R.D. 436 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that in some cases, particularly where declaratory and injunctive relief is sought classes as small as fourteen may be certified); Hernandez v. Alexander, 152 F.R.D. 192 (D. Nev. 1993) (indicating that a class of fifty-two might meet numerosity requirements but declined to certify because of failure to show “impracticability” of individual joinder).
15. Gen. Tel. Co. of the NW. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980); Rannis v. Recchia, 380 F. App'x 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1993); 5 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice at § 23.22[a];1 Rubenstein, Conte & Newberg, supra note 13, § 3:6.
16. 7AA Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1762, at 176 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2010); 5 Moore et al., supra note 15, § 23.05 at 23-156. See Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 935-36.
In some cases, class size may be proven by appending to the motion for class certification public documents, census data, or responses to Freedom of Information Act requests. In other cases, affidavits can establish the number of class members. If plaintiffs lack information regarding the size of the class, consideration should be given to filing a discovery request at the same time or soon after the filing of the complaint. If the exact number of class members cannot be proven, the court can use common sense and draw inferences about the class size,See Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry, 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983); Sullivan v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 268 F.R.D. 356, 362 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Neese v. Johanns, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25344, at *15, 2006 WL 1169800, at *5 (W.D. Va. May 2, 2006); Talbott v. GC Servs., Ltd. Pshp., 191 F.R.D. 99 (W.D. Va. 2000); McGlothlin v. Connors, 142 F.R.D. 626, 632 (W.D. Va. 1992).
18. Marcus v. BMW of North Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2009); Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 966 (6th Cir. 2005) .
19. Courts have struggled to produce a rule governing the inclusion of future adversely affected persons within a class. Although those already injured by an unlawful practice can be identified, knowing how many will be injured if the practice is continued is inherently impossible. Accordingly, some courts routinely include future victims of the challenged conduct within the class definition. See e.g., Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 868 n.11 (5th Cir. 2000). Such inclusion of future victims does not render the class definition too vague for certification. Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010); Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986); Williams v. City of Antioch, No. 90, 2010 WL 3632197, at *6, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97829, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010).
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2556; Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997).
21. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2556; Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 536 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1050 (2009); Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
22. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2556. See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481, 497 (7th Cir. 2012); D.G. ex rel. Stricklin v. DeVaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010); In Re Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 75 F.3d at 1080; Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56; Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 246 F.R.D. 326, 337 (D.D.C. 2007).
23. D.G., 594 F.3d at 1195; Lightfoot, 246 F.R.D. at 337; Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2003).
24. Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. WMATA, 239 F.R.D. 9, 26 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting 7A Wright, et al., supra note 16, § 1763.).
25. D.G., 594 F.3d at 1195; Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, No. 01-01484 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2011).
27. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
29. Id. at 2551-57 .
30. See, e.g., DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 126 (D.D.C. 2013) (vacating certification of class of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)-eligible children for failure to satisfy commonality, citing Wal-Mart Stores’ change of the landscape, collecting cases); M.D. ex re. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840-41 (5th Cir. 2012) (vacating class certification based on failure to establish commonality, citing “heightened” standard established by Wal-Mart Stores); Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498 (vacating certification of class of IDEA-eligible children and order approving subsequent settlement based on lack of commonality). Notably, however, the district courts in D.L. and M.D. addressed commonality again, with the benefit of the Wal-Mart decision and granted class certification. D.L. v. Dist. of Columbia, 302 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2013); M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 2013). See also Steward v. Janek, 315 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (certifying class of of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities at risk of or actually institutionalized); N.B. v. Hamos, 26 F. Supp. 3d 756 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (certifying class of chidren with mental health disorders denied Medicaid services).
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4); See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 951 (2002).
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5). See e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 2009); McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461, 473–74 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
35. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
37. Id. at 1047 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 680, 685 (1946)).
40. General Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, at 157, n.13 (1982).
43. Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2000).
44. D.G. ex rel. Stricklin, 594 F.3d at 1199; Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 2004); Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 34.
45. See Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 480 (2d Cir. 2010).
46. See, e.g., In re Franklin Mutual Funds Fee Litigation, 388 F. Supp. 2d 451, 461 (D.N.J. 2005).
47. Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2002); La Mar v. H & B Novelty and Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
48. See generally Rubenstein, Conte & Newberg, supra note 13, § 1.03 (notice and adequacy of representation are touchstones of due process in class actions). See also In re Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 75 F.3d at 1083 and Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining the class action premise that, because “litigation by representative parties adjudicates basic due process rights of all class members, named plaintiffs must possess undivided loyalty to absent class members”).
49. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). For a good explanation of this case, see Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Richards v. Jefferson Co., 517 U.S. 793, 800-01 (1996).
50. But see General Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 at 157 n.13 (1982) (requirements of commonality and typicality tend to merge and so does adequacy-of-representation requirement, although adequacy of representation raises concerns about competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest).
52. See, e.g., Diaz v. Romer, 961 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1992) and cases cited therein (appropriate to certify subclasses due to conflict between those class members who were HIV-positive and those who were HIV-negative). See also Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, at 378-79 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming class certification but suggesting to district court on remand ways to subdivide the class).
53. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining options open to a district court).
55. Rattray v. Woodbury County, 614 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2010); Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 2009) (apparent disinterest in case); cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010); Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 1993).
56. Horton, 690 F.2d at 485 n.26.
57. Sheinberg v. Sorenson, 606 F.3d 130 (3rd Cir. 2010).
59. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1997) (inquiry into whether named plaintiffs will represent potential class with necessary vigor most often described as turning on questions of “whether plaintiffs’ counsel are qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct proposed litigation”). See also Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2001) (adequacy requirement mandates inquiry into zeal and competence of representatives’ counsel). The adequacy of counsel is generally pled in the motion for class certification and resumes of counsel are attached.
60. See, e.g., Kandel v. Bro. Int'l Corp., 264 F.R.D. 630, 634-35 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Armstrong v. Chi. Park Dist., 117 F.R.D. 623, 631-34 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding inexperience alone may not be sufficient, but examining mistakes in other class actions as well as the one before in denying certification based on mistakes and inexperience). See also Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir. 2011) (vacating order certifying class, holding class counsel was not adequate due to “lack of integrity” of counsel and court’s lack of conviction that they would represent interests of class); Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding proposed class counsel inadequate based on lack of diligence and promptness, faulty discovery efforts, and lack of respect for judicial resources).
61. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977); Rattray, 614 F.3d at 836-37. But see In re Arakis Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., No.1:95-civ-3431 (AAR), 1999 WL 1021819, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22246 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 1999) (finding small delay insufficient to deny certification and collecting cases discussing issue).
62. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., 431 U.S. at 405.
63. John v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007).
64. See, e.g., Garrish v. UAW, 149 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (finding that union membership was an objective criterion sufficient to define a class); Daniels v. City of N. Y., 198 F.R.D. 409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that a proposed class of persons stopped and frisked by a street crimes police unit in the absence of reasonable suspicion was sufficiently definable for certification); Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding a sufficiently definable class when farmers suing the U.S. Department of Agriculture defined a class as those African American farmers who farmed between certain dates, applied to participate in department programs between those dates, and filed with the department a written complaint alleging a discriminatory response to their applications).
65. Burley v. City of New York, 2005 WL 668789, at *8–9, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4439, at *25-28 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (class that refers to “arrestees who were subject to excessive handcuffing” not precise enough to be certified); Oldroyd v. Kugler, 352 F. Supp. 27, 31 (D.N.J. 1972) (class not certified where putative class members had a “fear of prosecution” for flag desecration because class defined in terms of subjective criterion of state-of-mind). See also Carrera v. Bayer Corporation , 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013) (class not certifiable if it is impossible to identify members without extensive individual fact finding); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1970) (class definition “active in peace movement” too vague for objective criteria to identify class).
66. See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481, 496 (7th Cir. 2012) (de-certifying class, holding that it would be impossible to identify students who had potentially been eligible for special education services during relevant time period); Mueller v. CBS Inc., 200 F.R.D. 227 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (declining to certify class where numerous individual determinations were necessary to identify class members). See generally UAW v. GMC, 235 F.R.D. 383 (E.D. Mich. March 31, 2006), aff'd, 497 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 2008) (resolving definition problem by finding typicality was not satisfied). In attempting to save a class definition that is insufficiently definite or ascertainable, advocates must also steer clear of impermissible “fail-safe” classes, which are classes defined so that qualification for the class depends on whether the person has a valid claim. See, e.g., McCaster v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 845 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2017); Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 918 (7th Cir. 2017).
67. Pagan v. Dubois, 884 F. Supp. 25 (D. Mass. 1995).
68. See Santillan v. Ashcroft, No. C 04-2686 MHP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20824 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2004); Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986). See also 7A Wright et al., supra note 16, § 1760, at 139.
69. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 2004); Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 490 (S.D. Ill. 1999).
71. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (holding each named plaintiff must show that he has been personally injured, not simply that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class); Johnson v. GEICO Cas. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D. Del. 2009); In re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 388 F. Supp.2d 451 (D.N.J. 2005).
72. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1977).
73. Compare Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2015), In re Whirpool Litigation, 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013) (allowing certification), and Kohen v. Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009) (same), with Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to certify class that includes members without standing). See also Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that fear of petroleum contamination not sufficient injury to support a common law claim of nuisance)). For a discussion of this issue and legislative attempts to curtail these class actions, see Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 Emory L. J. 1569, 1578-1586 (2016).
74. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); see Roman v. Korson, 307 F. Supp. 2d 908, 914-15 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
75. U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). See Chapter 3.3.C of this MANUAL for further guidance on this point.
76. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); see Portis v. City of Chicago, 347 F. Supp. 2d 573 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
77. Wilson v. Gordon, 822 F.3d 934, 947, 951 (6th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied (Aug. 1, 2016). See also Unan v. Lyon, 853 F.3d 279, 287-88 (6th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc denied (May 26, 2017) (holding that “inherently transitory” exception to mootness applied to Medicaid applicants’ claims, but “picking off” exception did not).
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee's notes, 1966 amends.
80. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir.), amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). See also 7AA Wright et al., supra note 16, § 1773, at 13.
81. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes, 1966 amends.
82. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
84. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, Case No. 09-31156 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2010).
85. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
86. Compare Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming certification of (b)(2) class despite factual differences since there was at least one question of fact and law common to each class member) and Jordan v. Commonwealth Fin. Sys., 237 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Pa. 2006) with Shook v. Board of County Commissioners, 543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008) ("In short, under Rule 23(b)(2), the class members' injuries must be sufficiently similar that they can be addressed in a single injunction that need not differentiate between class members.") and Vallerio v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1268 (10th Cir. 2009) (reversing grant of certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because plaintiff did not meet burden of showing that injuries were sufficiently similar and because suit sought to enjoin wide range of conduct).
87. See Shook v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008).
88. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975).
89. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 361 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that question of whether class representative has standing can overlap with question of whether he fits within class definition).
90. However, the 2003 amendment to Rule 23(c), provides that the court “may” direct appropriate notice to the class.
92. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 U.S. at 2557.
94. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
95. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 U.S. at 2560. See also Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 646-51 (6th Cir. 2006); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001); Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2000).
96. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
97. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 U.S. at 2560.
100. See, e.g., Benjamin by and through Yock v. Department of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania, 701 F.3d 938, 950 (3d Cir. 2012); Romberio v. UnumProvident Corporation, 385 Fed. App'x 423, 432 (6th Cir. 2009); Shook, 543 F.3d at 604; In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1121 (8th Cir. 2005); Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 210 F.R.D. 61, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
102. See generally 7A Wright et al., supra note 16, § 1777. The relevant considerations for so determining are listed in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). The Supreme Court has recently held that “Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more demanding” than the rigorous standard for satisfying the requirements of 23(a). Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). Mere assertion is not sufficient to satisfy the predominance requirement; rather, evidence must be submitted. Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2014).
103. The 2003 amendments significantly change the notice requirements in (b)(3) cases: courts now may refuse to approve settlements unless they contain post-settlement opt-out notice to all class members. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3).

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