Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/330/867/2126141/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:02:13+00:00

Document:
Clarice Jobes, Philo, Maki, Ravitz, Jobes, Cockrel & Robb, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.
Neil R. Peterson, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Fred M. Mester, Asst. U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for defendant.
3. To federalize any or all of the units of the Army National Guard of the State of Michigan.
4. The guardsmen negligently shot plaintiff.
The Government has filed a motion to dismiss. A dismissal must be granted.
"The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
no liability will be predicated.
The first three allegations of negligence and probably the fourth come within the above exception.
The President is commander-in-chief of "* * * the militia of the several States, when called into actual service of the United States under U.S.Const. Art. II, § 2. There is a duty on the part of the federal government to `protect each [State] against Invasion * * * and domestic Violence.'" United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 4.
Congress has enacted legislation under this clause (and others) to implement this provision. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334. The decision that conditions exist requiring federalization of the guard is immune from judicial examination. This is a decision involving political judgment into which the courts should not inquire. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (48 U.S. 1) 12 L. Ed. 581. In Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L. Ed. 537 (1827), a person who had been court-martialed for failure to obey a call up of the militia challenged the authority of the orders. The court stated per Justice Story: "[T]he authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President and that his decision is conclusive upon all persons." 25 U.S. 12 Wheat. at 30.
Plaintiff does not argue that factors existed requiring the use of the National Guard, but rather that such factors as quality and the capability of the guard to carry out its assigned task should have been assessed in the decision to use the guard, and further that in the exercise of this duty of restoring order in Detroit, better rules and orders should have been formulated.
Plaintiff therefore alleges negligence at a very high level. Under 10 U.S.C. § 3033, a committee of officers from the Army General Staff and the Army National Guard is charged with responsibility to pass on policies and rules affecting training of the National Guard.
"The acts found to have been negligent were * * * performed under direction of a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation of plan-making authority from the apex of the Executive Department." 346 U.S. at 39-40, 73 S. Ct. at 970.
The negligence alleged in the instant case involves the Secretary of Defense and high-ranking officers of the National Guard and the Army. The means and method of restoring order in a city faced with anarchy and breakdown of civilian authority are delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, not the judiciary. That some may say with the wisdom of hindsight that the National Guard was not sufficiently prepared to cope with the delicate task of quelling a riot motivated by racial tensions does not create a cause of action. It is more appropriately a plea addressed to the legislative and executive departments of Government.
"One aspect of the problem involves intricate issues about proper distribution of governmental powers. Much of what is done by officers and employees of government must remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry, as it always has been. For instance, if the Secretary of State miscalculates in getting too close to the brink of war, clearly we do not want the courts in damage suits to determine whether the Secretary was negligent in dealing with the problem of international relations." K. C. Davis, Administrative Law, § 25.11.
The present case falls squarely in the above class.
"The United States, Katzenbach, and McShane lacked skill and ability in the formulation of plans or control of their personnel and should have known that the Deputy Marshals * * * were immature, nervous, or unseasoned in the use of gas projectiles and the controlling of large groups of persons." United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 873 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971, 85 S. Ct. 1327, 14 L. Ed. 2d 268.
"Just as the tasks of carrying out the orders of this Court and of handling an unruly mob are among the responsibilities of the Chief Marshal and the Deputy Attorney General, so is the choice of means for performing these tasks peculiarly within their discretion. The decision to choose the modus operandi and to decide the time in which to put it into action was specifically delegated to McShane and Katzenbach." 332 F.2d 872, 874-875 (5th Cir. 1964). See also, Nichols v. United States, D.C., 236 F. Supp. 260 (1964).
"* * * includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by *870 executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government * * * cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when a subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal step, each action or nonaction being directed by the superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion." Dalehite, supra, 346 U.S. at 35-36, 73 S. Ct. at 968.
"The test is not the theory upon which the plaintiff elects to proceed or how artfully the pleadings may have been drawn. Rather, the decisive factor is whether, in substance and essence, the claim arises out of an assault and battery."
It would appear that the National Guardsman's act would, in essence, be an assault.
Yet, argues plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Michigan has recognized the possibility of a tort based on negligence in connection with the firing of a gun. In Felgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965), it was held that negligence was involved in an accidental discharge of a gun in a hunting accident, but that case is not applicable to the conduct of a National Guardsman quelling a riot. The court simply finds no basis for applying that principle to the facts in this case.
"We think * * * that where the United States excepts itself from certain liabilities, as in Section 2680 * * * such exceptions must be interpreted under the general law rather than under some peculiar interpretations of a State." 207 F.2d 909, 911. See also Ferran, supra, 144 F. Supp. at 654.
"(2) The use of force * * * which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm for the purpose of suppressing a riot or preventing the other from participating in it is privileged if the riot is one which threatens death or serious bodily harm."
Thus, the common law recognized that some harm inflicted during a riot must remain uncompensated.
*871 For the reason that the Government has not consented to be sued on the claim brought by plaintiff, the Government's motion to dismiss must be granted.
An appropriate order may be presented.

References: § 2674
 § 2
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 § 3033
 § 25
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 § 2680
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