Source: https://delaware.lexroll.com/395-associates-llc-v-new-castle-county-05a-01-013-del-super-2006-2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 05:40:11+00:00

Document:
395 Associates, LLC, Plaintiff, v. New Castle County, New Castle County Department of Land Use, New Castle County Board of License, Inspection Review, Defendants.
C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (JRJ).Superior Court of Delaware for New Castle County.Submitted: December 1, 2005.
Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, of the Abbott Law Firm, Hockessin, Delaware, Attorney for the Plaintiff.
Brian J. Merritt, Esquire, Assistant County Attorney, New Castle, Delaware, Attorney for the Defendants.
395 Associates, LLC, the Plaintiff, filed its Complaint for Writ of Certiorari on January 26, 2005, seeking review of two administrative decisions issued by the New Castle County Department of Land Use (the “Department”) and the New Castle County Board of License, Inspection and Review (“the Board”). As explained below, the decision of the New Castle County Board of License, Inspection and Review is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED INPART and REMANDED IN PART.
395 Associates, LLC (“the Plaintiff”) is a home builder. On August 26, 1998, it received a building permit to construct a new, single family home at 109 Rutledge Court (“the Home”), in the Estates of Farmington, a residential subdivision located in Newark, Delaware. The Department issued a Certificate of Occupancy (“CO”) for the Home on April 30, 1999. Calvin and Lisa Wise purchased and moved into the Home.
On June 12, 2002, the Department held a Rule to Show Cause Hearing on these Violation Notices. Based on the evidence and testimony presented, the Department held that the Plaintiff improperly installed approximately six windows, had five days to respond to the Grading Violation Notice and that it communicate when it intended to address the grading issue. In its July 8, 2002 Rule to Show Cause Decision, the Department directed the Plaintiff to repair the windows, comply with manufacturer’s installation instructions, revise the lines and grades plan, and correct the grading. The Plaintiff did not appeal this Decision.
On July 25, 2002, the Department issued a third Violation Notice (“the Handrail Violation”). This violation described a staircase handrail installed below the minimum height prescribed by the Code and required installation of a “handrail as required by Code.” The Plaintiff did not appeal this Violation Notice. It corrected the height problem by replacing the finished railing with an unfinished railing. On May 19, 2003, however, the Department notified the Plaintiff that it would not issue a “compliance letter” for the Handrail Violation until an inspection showed the railing and spindles resembled the original finished railing, in compliance with the home warranty standards.
On January 30, 2004, the Department held another Rule to Show Cause Hearing to address the Window Violation, Grading Violation and Handrail Violation Notices. The Department issued a written Notice of Rule to Show Cause Decision on July 13, 2004. Based on the evidence and testimony presented, the Department found all three violations unresolved. Specifically, it held that the Plaintiff: (1) had not repaired or requested an inspection of the windows, which showed signs of leakage during a September 2003 Department site visit, (2) as of a September 2003 site visit, had not achieved the appropriate “fall away” grading in two areas, as required by law, and (3) had not completed the handrail installation because the handrail still lacked the appropriate paint or stain finish. With regard to the Plaintiff’s statute of limitation defenses, the Department found that the Window Violation and Handrail Violation were issued within three years of the CO and not barred by the statute of limitations.
With respect to the Grading Violation, the Department found that although this violation was not issued within the three years, the Plaintiff “had a responsibility to raise this defense at previous hearings” but failed to do so. Thus, the Department held that Plaintiff waived its statute of limitations defense.
The Department directed the Plaintiff to correct and have inspected all outstanding violations by August 12, 2004, or incur a fine of $500.00 per day for each day after that date on which the violations remained outstanding. On August 2, 2004, the Plaintiff appealed the Department’s July 13, 2004 written decision (pertaining to the January 30, 2004 hearing) and its scheduling of a follow-up Rule to Show Cause Hearing.
The Board heard this matter on December 14, 2004, and affirmed the Department’s Decision. The Board issued a written decision on December 30, 2004. The Board held that the Department’s actions were not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. Specifically, the Board found that: (1) the Department committed no error of law by refusing to close the Handrail Violation because repairs to the obvious Code violation were not completed in the “workmanlike and acceptable manner” required by BOCA, the new handrail remained unfinished, and the home warranty does not prevent the Department from enforcing the Code as to this violation; (2) the Department had sufficient evidence to reconcile the conflicting testimony on the Grading and Window Violations and after judging the witnesses’ credibility and weighing all the evidence, the Department properly determined the violations still existed; (3) the Department issued the Handrail and Window Violation Notices prior to April 30, 2002, before the limitations period closed; and (4) as to the Grading Violation, the Plaintiff waived its Statute of Limitations argument by failing to raise the defense within a sufficient amount of time after receiving the violation notices.
On January 26, 2005, the Plaintiff filed the present Complain in Certiorari in this Court seeking review of the Board’s decision. The Writ of Certiorari issued on February 7, 2005. On March 8, 2005, the Department returned the Record of the Proceedings Before the Board on Application No. 04-0003. Briefing has concluded and the matter is ripe for decision.
It is the function of “the agency, not the court, to weigh evidence and resolve conflicting testimony and issues of credibility.” Thus, the Court does not consider the case below “on its merits” or “substitute its own judgment for [that] of the inferior tribunal.” Instead, the Court’s review is limited to considering “the record to determine whether the lower tribunal[:]” (a) exceeded its jurisdiction, (b) committed errors of law, or (c) proceeded irregularly.
The Court must address a preliminary issue before it can consider the Plaintiff’s substantive arguments on review. First, the Court must address Defendants’ claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board’s Decision. The Defendants did not raise this argument until now. According to the Defendants, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the writ because the Plaintiff failed to timely appeal the July 8, 2002 Notice of Rule to Show Cause Decision, the July 25, 2002 Handrail Violation, and the May 19, 2003 Letter directing completion of the Handrail repairs in accordance with New Castle County Code § 6.10.003. As a result, argue Defendants, the Plaintiff lost the opportunity to challenge the Department’s enforcement actions before the Board. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff’s failure to timely file an administrative appeal created a jurisdictional defect that the Board did not discover at the time of the December 14, 2004 Hearing. Relying on Draper King Cole v. Malave, the Defendants argue this Court lacks jurisdiction because the Board lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The Defendants concede “the jurisdictional defect of a late appeal was not brought to the attention of the . . . Board. . . .” Thus, the Board had no opportunity to consider this issue during the proceedings below and, as Plaintiff aptly points out, this issue is not contained in the record on review. What the Defendants ask this Court to do is to assume or make its own determination that the alleged jurisdictional defect in fact existed, and, as a consequence, divested the Board of the necessary “intermediate” jurisdiction. The Court cannot do this.
First, the present writ only permits the Court to review the conduct of the Board by looking for errors that appear on the face of the record returned in obedience to it. Thus, in ascertaining whether the Board “exceeded its jurisdiction” or “proceeded irregularly” in making the disputed determination, the Court’s certiorari review is confined to the record.
Second, unlike an appeal that “brings up the case on its merits,” certiorari review only permits the Court to look “at the regularity of the proceedings” below. The Court may not, in this instance, weigh evidence or review the Board’s factual findings. This is consistent with the general rule that an appellate or reviewing court will not decide any question that was not raised in the tribunal below.
vested with authority to consider administrative appeals pursuant to § 6.09.003. . . . Pursuant to § 6.09.003(E), the Board may affirm, modify, reverse, vacate, or revoke the action appealed provided that such action be affirmed if the action was not arbitrary or capricious or was not taken contrary to law.
The record indicates that within the scope of this authority, and after considering the evidence and argument, the Board affirmed the Department’s July 13, 2004 Notice of Rule to Show Cause Decision. Thus, the record returned shows that these matters were within the Board’s subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
In response, the Defendants argue that the record demonstrates the Board applied the complete and correct legal standard during the Hearing; no irregularities exist in the preparation, content or signing of the Board’s subsequent written decision; and the record includes a fair statement of the Board’s conclusions and facts supporting its decision.
The Court finds that the record returned shows the grounds for, and includes a fair statement of, the Board’s conclusion that Department’s actions were neither “arbitrary and capricious” nor “contrary to law.” The Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s claims that the written decision is invalid under the Article V of the Board’s Rules of Procedure, § 6.09.003 of the New Castle County Code, 9 Del. C. § 1315 or that it violated the Due Process Clause. It is apparent from the record that the Board heard evidence, made findings and rendered a decision. It rendered a decision at the close of the hearing and in writing based upon the record created at the hearing. Therefore, the Board’s December 30, 2004 Decision should not be reversed on any of these grounds.
The Plaintiff contends that the Board committed errors of law by: (1) failing to conclude from the record before it that all three violations appealed should be reversed due to the three-year statute limitations; and (2) concluding that the Plaintiff waived the right to assert the statute of limitations as to the Grading Violation by failing to raise it during prior proceedings, when there was no evidence that the Plaintiff intended to or made an express, knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. The Plaintiff further argues that the Department waived its right to assert waiver by not issuing new Notice Violations based on changed circumstances.
Because this last issue does not appear in the record, the Court cannot consider it on the merits for the first time on review.
In response, the Defendants argue that: (1) the statute of limitations period commenced on the date the CO issued; (2) pursuant to § 6.09.002 (c) of the New Castle County Code, tolling rules and other applicable common law principles concerning 10 Del. C. § 8106 apply to County administrative enforcement actions; (3) of the three violations issued on April 19, 2002, May 28, 2002, and July 25, 2002 the April leaking Window Violation is uncontested; (4) the Board heard testimony that the ponding of water started after the CO was issued as a result of subsequent sidewalk repairs by the Plaintiff; and (5) the statute of limitations is not a constitutionally protected right but rather an affirmative defense that is waived if not pled.
At their core, the Plaintiff’s arguments actually take issue with the Board’s interpretation of the facts and its determination that the Department’s actions were not barred by the three-year statute limitations and that Plaintiff waived the statute of limitations defense. It appears to the Court that both sides are simply attempting to re-argue the merits of their respective positions on the statute of limitations and waiver issues. Resolution of these arguments on review would require the Court to consider the sufficiency and weight of the evidence and to substitute its own judgment for that of the Board.
Having said that, however, the Court can and will review the record returned to determine if the Board “`proceeded illegally or manifestly contrary to law.'” The record shows that on January 30, 2004, the Plaintiff presented its legal and factual positions as to the expiration of statute of limitations and its repairs. Both parties argued their positions on the statute of limitations issues to the Board during the December 14, 2004 Hearing. These positions are restated again in the Board’s December 30, 2004 Decision.
No. No. . . . Particular I note that there were violation issues . . . violation notices issued January 18, 2002, April 19, 2002 [Window Violations] which certainly were within the statute of limitations even if the argument was, well that’s . . . whether we consider that or not I mean that’s certainly within the three year statute of limitations.
I feel that the County did not act arbitrarily and capricious in their actions. [the first Member polled] covered the lot of it. . . . The builder . . . has clearly been involved in repair work and committed to repair work . . . I don’t know what their argument is for leaving the windows water coming in. I don’t think I’ve ever heard that other than it’s outside the statute of limitations. On that issue I’m not convinced that their statute of limitations excludes them from fixing the leaky windows. I believe I understood from the County’s presentation the statute of limitations can be extended based on certain issues and circumstances which makes logical sense to me. So for those reasons that’s my vote.
I look at the violation notices here. And clearly the windows are within the three years because the first one was issued in January of 2002 [Window Violation]. I’m going back to [the first member polled] too. But I noticed the other two violations the handrailing [July 25, 2002 or May 19, 2003] and the grading [May 28, 2002] were beyond the three year if this is the first violation. If this was the first violation notice they were beyond the three year limitation. Because it’s May 2002 and July 2002. We can see clearly that the grading was not up to standards so to speak but yet it is outside the three year statute of limitation so that then it becomes another matter. But the violation on the part of the windows concerned 100 percent that the developer is in violation of that particular item.
With respect to the statute of limitations, the Department argues that it specifically cites the Delaware statute in its code so that the case law referring to the statute would apply. One concept found in the case law is that latent defects can allow the period of limitations to be tolled. In the case of the windows, the leaking windows would not become apparent until storms revealed the problem. More importantly, the Department relies on the concept that, as an affirmative defense, the statute of limitations is waived if not asserted. Although there is no pleading like a complaint to mark as beginning of a 5 day period to assert the defense, by analogy, the violation notice acts as a complaint. According to the Department, by analogy to the Delaware Code, when the statute of limitations is raised as a defense to enforcement of the building code, the defense must be raised within a reasonable time from the date of the violations notice. Moreover, the Department notes that the windows do not receive a separate inspection and the period would begin with the Certificate of Occupancy.
With respect to the statute of limitation, two of the violation notices were issued before the period came to a close. Both Violation #1 and #2 [the Handrail Violation and the Window Violation] were sent to the appellant before April 30, 2002. Violation #3 [the Grading Violation] was sent after three years had passed, but the appellant did not raise this argument within a sufficient amount of time after receiving this or any other violation notice, effectively waving the argument.
However, the Court finds the Board’s decision that Plaintiff waived its statute of limitations argument on the Grading Violation is manifestly contrary to law. The record indicates that the Board relied on the Department’s legal analogy between a complaint and violation of notice, suggesting that the Plaintiff had five days in which to raise its affirmative defense or risk waiver. The Board explained in its decision that “[a]ccording to the Department, by analogy to the Delaware Code, when the statute of limitations is raised as a defense to enforcement of the building code, the defense must be raised within a reasonable time from the date of the violation notice.” It ultimately determined that the Plaintiff waived its defense as to the Grading Violation.
Recognizing the limited scope of its review and that the issue of whether “a defendant has waived an affirmative defense by failing to assert it timely is a matter left to the discretion” of the Court, the Court finds the Board’s determination on waiver constitutes an error of law. The Court is not persuaded that a notice violation is sufficiently analogous to a “complaint” or a “pleading” so as to require a recipient to file a responsive pleading stating its affirmative defense within five days (the time allotted to remedy a deficiency or risk civil, criminal or administrative remedies). Nor is the Court persuaded that five days from the date of the violation notice is a “reasonable time” in which to require the recipient to raise such defenses. This is especially so here because the record establishes the Plaintiff did in fact raise the defense at the January 30, 2004 Rule to Show Cause Hearing. Consequently, the Court reverses the Board’s Decision as to the Plaintiff’s waiver of its statute of limitations defense to the Grading Violation.
review. Therefore, the Court remands this issue to the Board for clarification.
Next, the Plaintiff argues that the Department may not assert any violations after issuance of the CO, because it inspected and confirmed the Plaintiff’s compliance with the Code.
the County approved the installation of the windows long before the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy. . . . As a result, the County waived any objection to the issue of proper installation of windows, and it is now estopped from asserting any violations regarding the windows.
I think the point here is that the County essentially waived or estopped from asserting this because in fact the County did all the inspections. The property passed all the inspections or else it never would have been issued a certificate of occupancy. . . . So before the C of O was issued on April 30, 1999 the County has to, is obligated and required to go out to that property and to ensure that the protective slope is properly graded. . . . So we have to assume that the County properly performed their inspections . . . when the home builder handed over this property to the homeowner everything was copasetic. So here we are five and half years later talking about this grading issue. . . .
This is the extent of the record as to this issue. Thus, the parties again ask the Court to decide an issue, raised for the first time on review, by examining the facts and merits of their arguments. The Plaintiff claims the Board committed an error of law in “failing to conclude that all the claims asserted . . . are barred pursuant to the principle of equitable estoppel.” The Department contends the Plaintiff waived this affirmative defense and cites to testimony in the record. Although the record shows that Plaintiff briefed the issue on administrative appeal and briefly argued it during the two hour hearing, the matter was never decided by the Board.
The present writ only permits the Court to review of the conduct of the Board by looking for errors that appear on the face of the record returned in obedience to it. The “transcript of the evidence below is not part of the reviewable record . . . the Court cannot examine the transcript in order to evaluate the adequacy of the evidence which supports the conclusion rendered below.” The Board never ruled on this issue, the Department did not address it and the Plaintiff did not raise it again until now. Thus, “there is nothing for this Court to review” “under the rubric of a writ of certiorari” and this claim will not be considered on review.
The Plaintiff argues that the Board committed an error of law by affirming the Department’s July 13, 2004 Notice of Rule to Show Cause Decision, based in part on its finding that the BOCA National Building Code (“BOCA”) required a stain or finish coat on the re-installed handrail. It contends that the July 25, 2002 Violation Notice cites the CABO Code, and that BOCA was inapplicable at the time the Violation issued. Therefore, the Plaintiff claims the Board should have reversed the Department’s July 13, 2004 Decision, which was originally based on the home warranty standard.
The Defendants argue that Plaintiff never raised this issue during the December 14, 2004 Hearing. They assert that the record shows the Board discussed and considered the facts and law relevant to the Handrail issues raised by the Plaintiff on administrative appeal. Finally, the Defendants contend that BOCA was the applicable building standard because it was in effect when the CO issued in 1999.
A finished hand rail was originally installed below the required height. 395 replaced and reinstalled the handrail, but the handrail and spindles were not finished with stain or paint. . . . While the building code does not specifically require that handrails along stairs must be finished, the Department asserts that the violation has not been adequately addressed, relying on BOCA . . . section 116.0 (1990), which states “[a]ll work shall be conducted, installed and completed in a workmanlike and acceptable manner so as to secure the results intended by this code.” When violations require remedial work to be performed, the Department requires this standard to be observed. The Department argues . . . it was . . . not arbitrary or capricious . . . to determine . . . the work was not completed in a workmanlike [and] acceptable manner when the deficient handrail . . . was left unfinished.
After considering the evidence and . . . arguments . . . the Board votes to affirm. . . . Where the appellant attempts repairs on an obvious building code violation such as a short handrail, and where this repair is only partially completed, the Department made no error of law in refusing to close the case. . . . Pursuant to BOCA, the repair must be completed in a workmanlike and acceptable manner. It is obvious that by leaving the homeowner with an unfinished handrail, the . . . repair was not completed, nor . . . performed in a workmanlike and acceptable manner. That the issue might be more specifically addressed under the home warranty . . . does not prevent the Department from enforcing the code. . . . As it stands, the repair is presently inadequate.
The final claim raised by the Plaintiff asserts that the Department failed to present evidence to the Board showing the Plaintiff was not in compliance with the new lines and grade plan for the property. In essence, the Plaintiff asks the Court to find that the professional engineering certification that it offered into evidence trumps the testimony of the inspector and photographs offered by the Department.
review. Because it is the function of “the agency, not the court, to weigh evidence and resolve conflicting testimony and issues of credibility,” the Court will not consider this claim.
for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 2, 395 Assocs., LLC v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Apr. 29, 2005) (D.I. 8).
 See Def. Answer. Br. at Exhibit A, 395 Assocs., LLC v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Jul. 22, 2005) (D.I. 14).
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 2. See also Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibits A-C; Def. Answer. Br. at 3-5. The record shows that on January 18, 2002, the Department issued a Violation Notice for the Plaintiff’s failure to issue a new home warranty to the Wises within 30 days of the issuance of the CO. See Def. Answer. Br. at Exhibit B, p. 2. The record further reveals that Home Warranty of Delaware, LLC provided a home warranty to the Wises on or about June 5, 2003. See Def. Answer. Br. at Exhibit A. The parties agree that this issue is “resolved” and that the warranty violation “corrected.” Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I, p. 2; Pl. Amend. Reply Br. at 1, 395 Assocs., LLC v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Nov. 29, 2005) (D.I. 17).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit A.
 Def. Answer. Br. at 4. The Court notes that other Rule to Show Cause Hearings were “previously held on March 4, 2002, April 15, 2002 and April 30, 2002” with regard to the home warranty issue. See Def. Answer. Br. at Exhibit B, p. 2.
 An inspection found approximately six windows showed signs of leaking. Two of these windows were “unzipped,” revealing that they were not installed in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions, the presence of compromised Tyvek house wrap and the absence of nails and caulk under the flange. See Def. Answer. Br. at 4. See also Def. Answer. Br. at Exhibit B.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 4. See also Def. Answer. Br. at Exhibit B, pp. 2-3.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 5.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit C. See also Pl. Open. Br. at 2.
 Def. Answer. Br. at 5.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 5; Pl. Open. Br. at 3; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit G.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 5; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit G.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 3; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 5-6; Pl. Open. Br. at 3-4; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 3-4; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 4; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I.
 Def. Answer. Br. at 6; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit I.
 Def. Answer. Br. at 7; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, p. 1; Record of the Proceedings before the Bd., Application No.: 04-0003, Pl. 395 Assocs.’ Memo. of Law in Supp. of Appeal at ¶ I 395 Assocs., LLC v. New Castle County, C.A. No. 05A-01-013 (Mar. 7, 2005) (D.I. 4).
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 1, 62-67; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, pp. 1, 5.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J. The Court notes that both the copy of the Board’s Decision found in Exhibit J to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and the copy returned in obedience to the writ were submitted without a page 3.
 Def. Answer. Br. at 7.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, pp. 5-6.
 Goldberg v. City of Wilmington, 1992 WL 114074, at *1 (Del.Super.). See also Christiana Town Ctr., LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.) (citing Shoemaker v. State, 375 A.2d 431, 436-37 (Del. 1977); Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 894. See e.g. Hundley v. O’Donnell, 1998 WL 842293, at *3 n. 7 (Del.Ch.).
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.).
 Jardel Co., Inc. v. Carroll, 1990 WL 18296, at *2 (Del.Super.); State v. J.P. Ct. No. 7, 1989 WL 31600, at *1 (Del.Super.); Breasure v. Swartzentruber, 1988 WL 116422, at *1 (Del.Super.) (citations omitted).
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC v. New Castle County, 2003 WL 22120857, at *1 (Del.Super.). See e.g. Adjile, Inc. v. City of Wilmington, 2004 WL 2827893, at *1 (Del.Super.), aff’d, 2005 WL 1139577 (Del.Supr.).
 Luby v. Town of Smyrna, 2001 WL 1729121, at *2 (Del.Super.), citing Castner v. State, 311 A.2d 858, 860 (Del. 1973).
 Breasure, 1988 WL 116422, at *1.
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), citing Reise v. Bd. of Bldg. Appeals of Newark, 746 A.2d 271, 274 (Del. 2000)).
(Del.Super.Ct. 1995), aff’d, 1995 WL 466586 (Del.Supr.). See e.g. Matter of Butler, 609 A.2d 1080, 1081-82 (Del. 1992) (declining to consider a transcript of the underlying Superior Court proceedings or overrule Castner, 311 A.2d 858, and holding that the Superior Court’s order “is the entire record before us for purposes of certiorari review.”). Cf. Barbour v. Bd. of Adjustment of Bethany Beach, 1992 WL 302292, at *2 (Del.Super.) (noting that “statutory writ of certiorari is broader and allows for the filing of a transcript of the evidence” but that “a transcript could not be filed in a common law certiorari proceeding since the reviewing court was prohibited from considering the evidence before the lower tribunal.”).
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.); Breasure, 1988 WL 116422, at *1.
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), citing Reise, 746 A.2d at 274.
 Id. at *2, citing Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 921.
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.), citing Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 939.
 Id. at *2, citing Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 923.
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 1551457, at *2.
 Def. Answer. Br. at 10-11.
 Draper King Cole v. Malave, 743 A.2d 672 (Del. 1999).
(Del.Super.); McDonald’s Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for Wilmington, 2002 WL 88944 (Del.Super.).
 Pl. Amend. Reply Br. at 3-4.
 Def. Answer. Br. at 11.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 11.
 Luby, 2001 WL 1729121, at *2.
 Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 897.
 See El Di, Inc. v. J.P. Ct. No. 17, 1998 WL 109823, at *5 (Del.Super.).
(Del.Super.Ct. 1936)). The Court notes that this rule occasionally gives way to certiorari review of constitutional questions involving jurisdiction presented by petitioners for the first time on review or appeal. See Shoemaker v. State, 375 A.2d 431 (Del. 1977); Becker, 185 A. 92 (Del.Super.Ct. 1936). Compare Liebman Co. v. Del-Chapel Assocs., 1980 WL 324511, at *2 (Del.Super.). However, as the Defendants assert no constitutional claims or issues that “falls into the `question of grave public policy and interest’ exception,” the Court declines to broaden the limited scope of its review on certiorari. See Upshur, 2005 WL 2615391, at *3. Compare Becker, 185 A. 92; Shoemaker, 375 A.2d 431; El Di, Inc., 1998 WL 109823, at *5; Comm. of Merch. and Citizens Against Proposed Annexation, Inc. v. Longo, 1996 WL 769764, at *6-7 (Del.Super.).
 Record of the Proceedings before the Bd., Application for Hearing at ¶ II (D.I. 4).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, p. 1. See 9 Del. C. § 1315.
 Pl. Open. Br. at 9-10.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 8, 9; Pl. Amend. Reply. Br. at 5-6.
 See Woolley, Delaware Practice, Volume I, § 897.
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.) (citing Reise, 746 A.2d at 274). Cf. Petrucelli v. New Castle County Bd. of Adjustment, 1997 WL 817891, at *8 (Del.Super.) (“The Board must articulate its findings of fact and conclusions of law in order to enable the Superior Court, in the exercise of its function on appellate review . . .”).
 Barbour, 1992 WL 302292, at *3.
 Tarapchak v. Town of South Bethany Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 WL 109829, at *2 (Del.Super.).
 Conway Conway v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 WL 283393, at *2 (Del.Super.), citing Searles v. Darling 83 A.2d 96, 98 (Del. 1951).
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.). Compare Conway, 1998 WL 283393, at *2. See Pl. Amend. Reply Br. at 6-7.
 Record of the Proceedings before the Bd., Tr. Application 04-0003 at 3 (Dec. 14, 2004) (D.I. 4). See also Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, pp. 1, 5.
 Id. at Exhibit J, pp. 5-6.
 See Conway, 1998 WL 283393, at *2.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit L, pp. 3-4.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 9-10; Pl. Amend. Reply Br. at 5-7.
 See 9 Del. C. § 1315.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 9-10; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit L, pp. 3-4.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 11-13; Pl. Amend. Reply Br. at 7-11.
 See Pl. Amend. Reply Br. at 8.
 See supra text and notes Part III. A.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 15-17.
 El Di, Inc., 1998 WL 109823, at *4.
 El Di, Inc., 1998 WL 109823, at *4; Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.). See also Bailey v. Wilmington Dept. of Police, 1996 WL 658997, at *2 (Del.Super.).
 Middleton v. Wilmington Dept. of Police, 1996 WL 453363, at *2 (Del.Super.), citing Hatchett v. City of Wilmington, 1996 WL 111206, at *1 (Del.Super.).
 Cf. Hatchett, 1996 WL 111206, at *3.
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del. Supr).
 Record of the Proceedings before the Bd., Exhibit A (Jan. 30, 2004) (D.I. 4).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 9-11, 15-17, 26-28, 45-46, 52-55.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, pp. 2-5.
 Def. Answer. Br. at Exhibit B.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 58.
 Id. at Exhibit D, p. 62.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 64.
 Id. at Exhibit J, p. 4.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, p. 5.
 Id. at Exhibit J, p. 6.
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *3 (Del.Supr.).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 26-28.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J, p. 4.
 See Feralloy Indus. v. Wilson, 1998 WL 442937, at *2 (Del.Super.) (applying Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8 in the context of an IAB appeal involving the statute of limitations for a worker’s compensation claim).
 Fletcher v. Ratcliffe, 1996 WL 527207, at *2 (Del.Super.), citing Cannelongo v. Fid. Amer. Small Bus. Invest. Co., 540 A.2d 435, 440 (Del. 1988).
 Feralloy Indus., 1998 WL 442937, at *2.
 Fletcher, 1996 WL 527207, at *2.
 See Pl. Open . Br. at Exhibit J, p. 6; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibits B-C.
 See Pl. Open . Br. at Exhibits A-C, D, pp. 26-28.
 See Pl. Open . Br. at Exhibit D at pp. 58, 62-64; Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit J at pp. 2, 4, 5-6.
 Cf. Barbour, 1993 WL 180353, at *3.
 See Brandywine Sec., Inc. v. Dep’t of Licenses and Inspection, 1993 WL 18784, at *4 (Del.Super.); Breasure, 1988 WL 116422, at *4.
 See Pl. Open Br. at 13-16.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 17-19.
 Pl. Open Br. at Exhibit K, p. 5. See also Record of the Proceedings before the Bd., Appellant Mem. of Law (D.I. 4).
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 13, 16.
 Pl. Open. Br. at 16.
 See Luby, 2001 WL 1729121, at *2. See Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 2921830, at *2 (Del.Supr.).
 Green, 668 A.2d at 773.
 See El Di, Inc., 1998 WL 109823, at *5.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at 16-18; Pl. Amend. Reply Br. at 14-17.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 19-22.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit C, p. 1.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit G.
 Id. at Exhibit I, p. 3. See also Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit K, p. 2.
 Id. at Exhibit K, p. 3.
 Id. at Exhibit D, p. 5.
 Id. at Exhibit D, pp. 25-40.
 See Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 8, 24-25, 44-46.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 53-54.
 Id. at Exhibit D, p. 63.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, p. 65.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit K, pp. 6-7.
 Pl. Open. Br. at Exhibit D, pp. 14-15.
 El Di, Inc., 1998 WL 109823, at *5.
 See Pl. Opening. Br. at 18-20.
 See Def. Answer. Br. at 22-23.
 Christiana Town Ctr., LLC, 2004 WL 1551457, at *2 (Del.Super.).

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