Source: https://de.scribd.com/document/310841764/Withrow-v-Williams-507-U-S-680-1993
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 23:05:06+00:00

Document:
Rehearing Denied June 28, 1993.
See U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 3066.
should apply to bar habeas review of Williams' Miranda claim.
against applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, on collateral review.
opportunity to present evidence bearing on that claim's resolution. Pp.
which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
Jeffrey Caminsky, Detroit, MI, for petitioner.
Seth P. Waxman, Washington, DC, for respondent.
report indicates that the officers arrested Williams at his residence. App. 12a13a, 24a-26a.
other, the officers decided not to advise Williams of his rights under Miranda v.
"You know everything that went down. You just don't want to talk about it.
told him where he had discarded the weapon and other incriminating items.
Williams maintained that he had not been present at the crime scene.
and during subsequent questioning made several more inculpatory statements.
N.W.2d 416 (1989). We denied the ensuing petition for writ of certiorari.
Williams v. Michigan, 493 U.S. 956, 110 S.Ct. 369, 107 L.Ed.2d 355 (1989).
point and his receipt of the Miranda warnings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a-52a.
review. See Stone, supra, 428 U.S., at 494-495, n. 37, 96 S.Ct. at 3052-3053, n.
underlying Stone ); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379, n. 4, 106 S.Ct.
exercise of federal-court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2254"); cf. 28 U.S.C.
854 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
review such a claim on habeas imposed no great burdens on the federal courts.
Id., at 321-322, 99 S.Ct., at 2790-2791.
federal courts are to exercise their Fourteenth Amendment responsibilities"
would not likely raise tensions between the state and federal judicial systems.
accused's right to effective representation." Id., at 378, 106 S.Ct., at 2584.
purposes they were designed to serve, is in order.
U.S. 104, 109-110, 106 S.Ct. 445, 448-449, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985).
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
taken in violation of Miranda).
"particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process,"
and left it open to a State to meet its burden by adopting "other procedures . . .
S.Ct. 2626, 2630, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
As we explained in Stone, the Mapp rule "is not a personal constitutional right,"
criminal process by improving the reliability of evidence introduced at trial.
the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 428 U.S., at 490, 96 S.Ct., at 3050.
in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination Miranda safeguards "a fundamental trial right." United States v.
'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.' " Murphy v.
12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) (citations omitted).
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-154, 64 S.Ct. 921, 925-926, 88 L.Ed.
74 S.Ct. 716, 719, 98 L.Ed. 948 (1954); the defendant's maturity, Haley v.
S.Ct. 1338, 1341, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967); physical condition, Greenwald v.
Miranda, but not the back.
question requiring an "independent federal determination" on habeas. Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S., at 112, 106 S.Ct., at 451.
occasional abuse that the federal writ of habeas corpus stands ready to correct."
Jackson, 443 U.S., at 322, 99 S.Ct., at 2791.
her insufficient notice to address a due process claim. Brief for RespondentAppellant in No. 90-2289, p. 6 (CA6). Petitioner pursues the objection here.
See Pet. for Cert. 1; Brief for Petitioner 14-15, n. 2.
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
part and dissenting in part.
449, 83 S.Ct. at 854 (dissenting).
afford forever to question the correctness of its every judgment. "[T]he writ,"
however, "strikes at finality," McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct.
justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power."
long recognized that habeas corpus [is] governed by equitable principles"
relief until after state proceedings had terminated. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) (actual innocence of penalty); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
different occasions. Ante, at ____.
did the exclusionary rule claims at issue in Stone itself.
428 U.S., at 486, 96 S.Ct., at 3048 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
truthfinding process and often frees the guilty." Id., at 490, 96 S.Ct., at 3050.
solely because a police officer bungled.
and fair opportunity to litigate.
prophylactic rule. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct.
203, 109 S.Ct., at 2879; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S.Ct.
307, 105 S.Ct., at 1292.
Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 163 (1970).
of an admittedly guilty individual who may pose a continuing threat to society."
Any rule that so demonstrably renders truth and society "the loser," McNeil v.
pay its way by deterring official lawlessness.' " United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
rule on habeas "falls short" of justification. Ante, at ____.
concerns but find them misplaced nonetheless.
(quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct.
obtained without the benefit of Miranda's now-familiar warnings, should be.
The questions are not the same; nor are their answers.
1056, 1060, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990)), is thus both correct and irrelevant.
93 S.Ct., at 2047 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct.
voluntary, be excluded at trial. Miranda, 384 U.S., at 444, 86 S.Ct., at 1612.
conviction rested on an involuntary confession").
added)). On that much, our cases could not be clearer. See, e.g., Michigan v.
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda."
habeas, surely they do so where there is no constitutional harm to remedy.
decisively against the Court's decision today.
[will] simply be recast" and litigated as voluntariness claims. Ante, at ____.
pressure, or mistreatment. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct.
me ironic. If the police have truly grown in "constitutional . . . sophistication,"
errors in the administration of Miranda's warnings are just that.
lines to be drawn with precision in each case.
confession outside the prosecution's case in chief, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct.
compelled confessions but tainted subsequent confessions as well, Clewis v.
only one factor in determining voluntariness).
sovereignty; it diminishes only our justification for intruding in the first place.
against claims raised by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. 2255).
review might reveal flaws . . . that went undetected at trial and on appeal."
any reason to question the truth of Stone 's observation.
efficiency, and federalismcounsel in favor of the Court's chosen course.
Court's opinion but respectfully dissent from the remainder.
mocks our federal system to accord state convictions less respect.
require a claim of legal error in the original proceedings, compare Herrera v.
laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction." Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall.
318, 325-326, 18 L.Ed. 816 (1868).
U.S. 72, 90-91, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508-2509, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); Coleman v.
see Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251, 6 S.Ct. 734, 740, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886).
tempered by the restraints that accompany the exercise of equitable discretion.
shall appertain." 1 id., at 131.
tribunals of the Union and of the States," ibid.
extend habeas relief to all cases of state procedural default, the Court in Fay v.
Noia said: "Discretion is implicit in the statutory command that the judge . . .
equitable principles such as "finality," "comity," and "federalism." Brecht v.
As the Court today acknowledges, see ante, at ____, the rule of Stone v.
an innocent person) will ordinarily not exist.
defendant for violation of unconstitutional statute); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
67 L.Ed. 543 (1923) (same); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct.
to say that such prior opportunity is no longer a relevant equitable factor.
or to the accuracy of the ultimate result.
the accuracy of the ultimate result.
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)).
profoundly wrong for several reasons.
proceedings there would be plenary federal review of all constitutional claims.
on habeas corpus. 117 U.S., at 253, 6 S.Ct., at 741. See Fay, 372 U.S., at 453454, 83 S.Ct., at 856-857 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Schneckloth v.
filed after state conviction, Royall cited Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L.Ed.
says all state courts are bound by, and all state judges must be sworn to uphold.
demeaning to the States in its consequences, and must be eliminated.
Miranda claim on habeas corpus.
consequently extended to those statements as well. App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a75a.
petition be precluded?"), and we see no good reason to address it in this case.
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
We have in the past declined to address the application of Stone in this context.
S.Ct. 2497, 2506, n. 11, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).
organizations. See Brief for the Police Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae.
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 1099, 99 L.Ed.2d 262 (1988); Cobb v.
(drunk driver questioned at accident scene before arrest; not in custody), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1014, 111 S.Ct. 585, 112 L.Ed.2d 590 (1990).
(defendant volunteered information without questioning), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
904, 110 S.Ct. 1923, 109 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990); United States ex rel. Church v.
finding condom filled with white powder, constituted interrogation), cert.
invocation of right to silence), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1077-1078, 108 S.Ct.
of contact waived previous invocation of rights).
S.Ct. 3037, 3067, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

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