Source: http://fsmlaw.org/pohnpei/decisions/alex_v_pni.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 12:43:04+00:00

Document:
MLSC, by Mr. Kosaksy Phillip, Tr. C., for plaintiff.
Attorney General, by Mr. Kevin P. Shea, Esquire, for Defendant.
along the causeway to Dekehtik, selling certain merchandises, including alcoholic beverages to the general public.
violating the law for entering Public Land and doing business there again. Mr. Yamada then outlined the procedure for use of Public Land, and indicated that plaintiff has contravened the procedure even though plaintiff was there temporarily, that plaintiff has gone against the State for not obeying Mr. Elsin Elias. Mr. Yamada then gave plaintiff seven (7) days to move out or he will be prosecuted;" and (6) By letter of January 14, 1993, the Assistant Attorney General instructed the plaintiff to remove his business from the causeway by 4:00 p.m. Monday the 18th of January 1993" (All communications above are as alleged and styled in the plaintiff's complaint).
Consequently, the plaintiff was arrested, (Plaintiff's complaint, para. 16), but was not prosecuted criminally (Defendant's answer).
1. Whether the defendant had standing to instruct the plaintiff to stop from operating his business out of his Nissan Bus along the Dekehtik causeway.
3. Whether the plaintiff obtained his alcoholic beverages licence under false pretence.
4. Whether the plaintiff's complaint amounts to Slander and Libel against the defendant.
Issue number 1 being an issue of law, the Plaintiff moved for the rendering of a partial summary judgment thereon to establish the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff for the former's effort to stop the plaintiff's business operation.
A summary judgment may be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment according to the law applicable under the circumstances. PN. RCP 51 (c). Our Rule 51 is borrowed from U.S. Federal Rules 56, thus it is helpful to review certain U.S. case law construing and applying Rule 56 for assistance. Paulus v. State, 2 P.S.Ct. R 481, 494.
the evidence must create fair doubt; wholly speculative assertion will not suffice." Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F. 2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1 979). In determining whether the showing of genuineness has been made, the court must assess the evidence as forecast in the documentary material before it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 994 (1962). Where as here, the nonmoving party would on trial carry the burden of proof, he is therefore entitled, as on motion for directed verdict, to have the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his version of all that is in dispute accepted, all internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him, the most favorable of possible alternative inferences from it drawn in his behalf; and finally, to be given the benefit of all favorable legal theories invoked by the evidence so considered. Charbonnages de France. v. Smith, 597 F. 2d 406 (4th Cir. 1979).
favorable legal theories invoked by the evidence as considered."' Roehiling v. National Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Building Products, 786 F. 2d 1225, 1228, n. 4 (4th Cir. 1986); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F. 2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1979).
In his argument for summary judgment, plaintiff argued that because of the provision of Section 11 (8) of S.L. No. 1L-155-87, which grants the Public Land Trust Board the power "to sue and be sued" in the name of the Trust . . ." the defendant alone (without the initiation from the Board of the Public Land Trust) lacks the standing to instruct or stop the plaintiff from conducting his mobile business venture at Dekehtik causeway.
The defendant in response states that 4L-69-76 3 gives the Commissioner of Land, (now the Director of Land) which is a cabinet officer in the Executive branch, certain authority and responsibility to administer public land, therefore the defendant had standing to instruct the plaintiff to desist his business from the Dekehtik causeway. Additionally, the defendant being the branch of Government responsible for the faithful execution of State laws had standing to stop the plaintiff from operating his business from his mobile unit on grounds of public safety and health reasons.
The argument of counsel seem to crisscross each other; plaintiff is arguing that in order for a legal proceeding relating to a violation of the public land trust law to stand, it is the Public Land Trust Board, not the State Government, that should bring such action.
The defendant, on the other hand, argues that it was acting as it did in this case on behalf of the Department of Land, under whose umbrella the Division4 of the Management and Administration of Public Lands is lodged. In addition, the defendant was concerned that certain health regulations had been violated by the plaintiff as a result of the plaintiff's conduct of his mobile business on the Dekehtik causeway.
"(8) To enter Into contracts, sue and be sued in the name of the Trust, and have other powers and duties as may be necessary or appropriate to further the purposes of this act..
The words "sue and be sued" in a statute authorizing and instrumentality to sue and be sued, normally include the natural and appropriate incident of legal proceedings. R.F. Corp. v. J.G. Men ihan Corp. 61 S.Ct. 485, 312 US 81. The words "sue and be sued", in normal connotation, embrace all civil process incident to commencement or continuance of legal proceedings. Sigona v. Slusser, 124 F. Supp 327, 329. The phrase included power to employ counsel. Paslay v. Brooks, 17 S.E.2d 865, 868 (S.C.).
The power to enforce the laws of Pohnpei State is vested in the Governor who is elected by the qualified voters of Pohnpei. (Art. 3 9, sec. 1, Pohnpei Constitution). In his oath of office the Governor swore to "uphold, defend and support the Constitution and to faithfully execute the laws of Pohnpei to the best of his knowledge and ability."
"Establishment" means any place, including without limitation, bars, restaurants, hotels, or retail store . . .which sells gives, offers to sell, or gives away, or otherwise dispenses alcoholic beverages to the general public. (Sec. 3-1 (S)).
"Premises" includes land, buildings, rooms, and equipment under the control of the licensee and used in connection with or in furtherance of the business covered by the license. (3-1 (13)). "Off-sale" means the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption off the premises. (3-1 (8)).
an Off-Sale business is to be conducted. Subsection (2) prescribes that "The consumption of alcoholic beverages shall not be permitted on the premises of an off-sale establishment or club, whether wholesale or retail."
"The premises, including all furniture, furnishing, and equipment, of all such establishments and clubs shall, at all times be clean, sanitary, sufficiently lighted, safe, and in good repair, and shall otherwise be in compliance with all other applicable [National, State], or Municipal laws and regulations pertaining to health, safety, and other conditions." Finally, Section 3-15 (2) prescribes that "it is unlawful for any person to carry or drink from any open can, glass, bottle or any other container containing alcoholic beverages on any public road, or in any moving vehicle, or in any business establishment not having an on-sale or restaurant-sale retail license. Being cognizant of the ABC law, the defendant ought also to be sensitive to guarding the health and welfare of the general public over the area of the Dekehtik causeway whereupon the plaintiff was operating his mobile off-sale business.
police power is subject to limitations of the Federated States of Micronesia and Pohnpei Constitutions, and especially to the requirement of due process.
Applying the fact of the case to the law, it appears without doubt that the Attorney General of the State, in taking the steps as narrated in the pleadings, was exercising the State's police power to enforce the laws. The process of arrest of an individual for violation of an offense, including arrest for examination is part of the criminal procedures employed by the Executive branch to enforce the laws of this State.
The plaintiff's concern relates particularly to the fact that the Director of the Department of Land, a cabinet officer, took some initiative in notifying "the plaintiff to immediately cease and desist from operating his Mobile Off-sale Unit" on the causeway as ultra vires, that such initiative gave no authority to the Pohnpei State to instruct the plaintiff to move his business from the causeway. If the conduct of the defendant was grounded on that fact alone, the plaintiff's claim of lack of standing may have some merit. However, it is.clear from the defendant's answer, as well as in its argument that it was also concern about the potential violation of public safety and health regulations.
(iii) whether there exists an agreement or understanding between the Board of the Public Lands Trust and the Governor to help enforce the laws regulating the use and any dealing in the so-called public land trust.
Knowledge of the position of the Board to the above questions would certainly assist the plaintiff and any other person similarly situated in prosecuting his case against the defendant.
Inasmuch as the conduct of the defendant as seen in this case falls within its authority to prosecute violators of State law criminally, I hold that the Defendant had standing to act as it did. Whether the Government's action in the instant case accords with due process is a question left for another day after determination of the other three factual issues.
the agreement of the Board of the Public Land Trust, that undertaking may not be legally permissible under the statute as the words "sue and be sued", in normal connotation, embrace all civil process incident to commencement or continuance of legal proceedings in the name of the Trust and not in the name of defendant--the Pohnpei State. It should be remembered however, that certain portions of the public land trust had been designated, either by deed, tradition, or by common understanding to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches for their respective use. The Executive branch, through the Attorney General's Office may, at the request of the affected branch, evict a trespasser or bring action to restrain the person unlawfully in possession of such designated areas of the public land trust. In a situation of this type the Board of the Public Land Trust needs not be the party to bring such suit.
The defendant has standing to sue the plaintiff criminally for any violation of any state law, including any violation of the provisions of the Public Land Trust Act. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment based primarily on the first issue is accordingly denied.
3. Whether the plaintiff's complaint amounts to Slander and Libel against the defendant; require evidentiary hearing. Although counsel went at length arguing the rest of the issues, I think that they really did not need to go that far as the issues require evidence.
Accordingly and for purpose of setting the Calendar of the Court, counsel are given 20 days from the date of this Order to advise the Court as to when they will be prepared to go to trial on the three remaining issues.
So Ordered, 20 December 1993.

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