Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/772490/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:13:47+00:00

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1. In this case a lady who describes herself as Noor Jehan Begum sues for a decree for the dissolution of her marriage with Eugene Tiscenko, a Russian subject, at present residing at Edinburgh in Great Britain. In the alternative, she asks for a declaration that her marriage with the defendant stands dissolved. The plaintiff's suit first appeared in the undefended list but, having regard to certain legal points of far-reaching importance which arise in connexion with this matter, I thought it desirable that the law relating to the case should be discussed in full, and I therefore asked Mr. S. M. Bose to appear as amicus curiae. He has been assisted by Mr. Clough and Mr. Das, and I am very grateful to these gentlemen for the help which they have given me in deciding this ease. In her plaint the plaintiff states that she is of Russian parentage and until recently was a Christian. She was born in Poland and, on 28th May 1931, was married in Berlin according to civil rites to the defendant, who is a Russian. She goes on to state that she lived with her husband at various places in Europe until June 1938, during which period her life with her husband was unhappy. The parties last resided in Rome whence the plaintiff came to Calcutta, while the defendant went to Great Britain in order to qualify himself for a British medical degree. The plaintiff arrived in Calcutta at the beginning of September 1938, where she has been residing ever since, and the defendant has not joined her. She states that her husband has not been maintaining her or her son since their arrival in India and she has been living partly on her own earnings and partly on help received from her mother from time to time. In para. 7 of her plaint she states that, on 27th June 1940, she of her own free will and after due deliberation embraced the Islamic faith and took the name of Noor Jehan. The conversion took place at the Nakoda Mosque at 19 Chowringhee Road, Calcutta. In para. 8 of the plaint the plaintiff states that upon her conversion as aforesaid she sent a message by telegram on 28th June 1940 to the defendant informing him of her conversion to Islam and calling upon him to accept the Islamic faith. The defendant however did not comply with the plaintiff's request and indignantly refused to embrace Islam. The defendant informed the plaintiff of that fact by a telegraphic message which was delivered to the plaintiff at her place of residence aforesaid on 2nd July 1940.
Certain principles of law relevant to the determination of this question are, in my opinion, firmly established in the realm of private international law: (1) The forms necessary to constitute a valid marriage and the construction of the marriage contract depend on the lex loci contractus, that is, the law of the place where the marriage ceremony is performed; (2) on marriage the wife automatically acquires the domicile of her husband; (3) the status of spouses and their rights and obligations arising under the marriage contract are governed by the lea domicilii, that is by the law of the country in which for the time being they are domiciled : see Harvey v. Farnie (1883) 8 AC 43 and Nachimson v. Nachimson (1930) LRP 217; (4) the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the dissolution of the marriage do not form part of the marriage contract, but arise out of, and are incidental to, such contract, and are governed by the lex domicilii : see Nachimson v. Nachimson (1930) L R P 217.
It is the duty of the Court before which an action of this description is brought to decide, in accordance with the rules of its own municipal law, whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the action. If the lex fori contains a definite rule governing jurisdiction over the case, that rule must be followed irrespective of the question whether it is in accordance with the corresponding rule of other countries or not, and whether the decree granted by the Court would or would not be recognized by the tribunals of a foreign country.
4. With regard to the prayer in the plaint, in which the plaintiff asks for a decree for the dissolution of her marriage, it was admitted by Mr. Majumdar during the course of his argument that this is not a case which comes within the matrimonial jurisdiction of this Court under Section 35 of the Letters Patent or in which this Court would have jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage either under the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, as amended by Act 25 of 1926, or under those of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act of 1926, read in the light of the rules framed under Section 1(4) of that Act. The difficulty with which the plaintiff would be con-fronted in applying to this Court in its matrimonial jurisdiction for the dissolution of her marriage would be that she would have to show that she and her husband were domiciled in India or were British subjects domiciled in England or Scotland at the time of the presentation of her petition for divorce. Admittedly, however, the plaintiff and her husband are Russians who were married in Berlin according to civil rites on 20th May 1931. It follows therefore that they have a Russian domicile.
Their Lordships have in these circumstances, and upon these considerations, come to the conclusion that, according to International law, the domicile for the time being of the married pair affords the only true test of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage. They concur, without reservation, in the views expressed by Lord Penzance in Wilson v. Wilson LR 2 P & D 442, which were obviously meant to refer, not to questions arising in regard to the mutual' rights of married persons, but to jurisdiction in the matter of divorce . It is the strong inclination of my own opinion that the only fair and satisfactory rule to adopt on this matter of jurisdiction' is to insist upon the parties in all cases referring their matrimonial differences to the Courts of the country in which they are domiciled. Different communities have different views of laws respecting matrimonial obligations, and a different estiniato of the causes which should justify divorce. It is both just and reasonable, therefore, that the differences of married people should be adjusted in accordance with the laws of the community to which they belong, and dealt with by the tribunals which alone can administer those laws. An honest adherence to this principle, moreover, will preclude the scandal which arises when a man and woman are held to be man and wife in one country and strangers in another.
6. The principle laid down in Wilson v. Wilson (1895) 1895 AC 517 was followed by Sir Henry Duke in Keyes v. Keyes (1921) LRP 204. In that case it was contended that the Courts in India were empowered to dissolve a marriage between parties domiciled in England but resident in India. Reliance was placed on the provisions of Section 2 of Act 4 of 1869, as it stood before the amendment of 1926, upon the practice of 50 years, under which Indian Courts had granted divorces to petitioners who were resident in India, and upon the dictum of Sir Lawrence Jenkins C. J. in Jogendra Nath Banerjee v. Elizabeth Banerjee ('99) 3 Cal WN 250 to the effect that "the Indian Legislature has not made domicile the test of the Court's authority to grant a divorce." The learned President pointed out that, in so far as it might have been decided in Niboyet v. Niboyet (1879) 4 PD 1, that jurisdiction in divorce could be held to depend upon the residence of the parties, the authority of that case had been destroyed by the judgment of the Privy Council in Wilson v. Wilson (1895) 1895 AC 517 and that; according to the law of England, apart from any express statutory provision which might exist, the jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a marriage depended upon the domicile of the parties. He further held that the provisions of the Indian Councils Act "could not be deemed to warrant the making of laws by the Government of India to interfere with the status of subjects of the Crown not domiciled in India," and he adopted the principle laid down in (1895) A C 5176 as being conformable to international law and preferable to a principle which would involve infringement of the rules of other communities. Although on the facts of that case the learned President granted the petitioner a decree for the dissolution of his marriage, the effect of his decision was to hold that the Indian Courts had no jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of marriage between parties not domiciled in India.
Nothing hereinafter contained shall authorize' any Court to grant any relief under this Act except where the petitioner or respondent profess the Christian religion.
Or to make decrees of dissolution of a marriage except where the parties to the marriage are domiciled in India at the time when the petition is presented.
9. Further, in order to enable certain British subjects not domiciled in India, to obtain relief in matrimonial causes in the Indian Courts, the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act was passed in 1926, which conferred upon High Courts in this country power in certain cases with respect to the dissolution of marriages, the parties whereof are domiciled in England and Scotland. As regards non-British subjects, however, the law remains unchanged and it follows that, according to the ordinary principles of private international law, a petitioner in this country with a foreign domicile, who wishes to obtain dissolution of his marriage must seek the appropriate relief in the Courts of the country in which he is domiciled. On this ground, therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to make a decree for the dissolution of the plaintiff's marriage with her husband.
10. Mr. Majumdar, however, contends that his client is nevertheless entitled to a declaration to the effect that her marriage with her husband stands dissolved in accordance with the principles of Mahomedan law which she has now adopted as her own. He admits that such a declaration would not operate as a judgment in rem, having regard to the provisions of Section 43, Specific Belief Act, and he also admits that it would not possess any extra-territorial validity. He maintains, however, that, whatever the effect of such a decree might be, it is the duty of this Court to grant it under the municipal law of this country in accordance with the principle laid down by Sir Shadilal in Lee v. Lee ('24) 11 AIR 1924 Lah 513 to which I have already referred. He argues that the ordinary law relating to domicile can have no application in the present case because the plaintiff, by becoming a convert to Islam, is entitled to dissolve her marriage under the principles of Mahomedan law which is administered by this Court in connexion with a wide range of subjects including marriage and which must be regarded as the lex fori of British India. Mr. Majumdar contends that his client has observed the formalities required by Mahomedan law by presenting Islam to her husband, and as the latter has refused to adopt Islam as his religion, she is now entitled to bring this suit under Section 12, Letters Patent, to obtain a declaration under Section 42, Specific Belief Act, that her former marriage is dissolved.
Upon the conversion of one of the parties, the Magistrate is to require the other to embrace the faith, and must separate them in case of recusancy. When the wife becomes a convert to the faith, and her husband is an infidel, the Magistrate is to call upon the husband to embrace the faith also; if he accede, the woman continues his wife; but if he refuse, the Magistrate must separate them; and this separation with Hannefa and Mahammed is a divorce.
When one of two spouses embraces the Musalman faith, Islam is to be presented to the other, and if the other adopt it, good and well; if not, they are to be separated. If the party is silent and says nothing, the Judge is to present Islam to him, time after time, till the completion of three by way of caution. And there is no difference between a discerning youth and one who is adult; so that a separation is to be made equally on the refusal of the former as of the latter, according to Aboo Hannefa and Mahammed...If the husband should embrace the faith and the wife refuse, the separation is not accounted repudiation; but, if the wife should embrace the faith, and the husband decline, and a separation is made in consequence, the separation is accounted a repudiation, according to Aboo Hannefa and Mahammed.
If the conversion takes place in a country subject to the laws of Islam, the faith will be offered for acceptance to the husband, and on his refusal the Judge will make a decree for separation or cancellation of the marriage. But if the wife were to become "a Musalman in a non-Islamic country, and the husband should also adopt the faith before the completion of three of "her terms," the marriage would remain subsisting, otherwise they would become separated on such completion without any decree or order of the Judge.
As long as a Musalman retains his original domicile, so long his status and his personal capacity to do certain legal acts remain subject to the Islamic law. The moment however he abandons the domicile of origin, or as soon as he acquires or adopts a new domicile, he ceases to be governed by the law of his nation. For example, an Indian Musalman, when he once takes up his abode permanently in England, or shows distinctly by some conduct on his part, that his stay in this country (i.e., England) is not in the nature of a sojourn, but that he has what is called an animus manendi, is subject thenceforward, in all matters relating to succession and personal status, to the English law. He ceases to be under the jurisdiction of the Musalman civil law. The moral and religious portions of the law remain binding upon his conscience, but his subjection to the jurisdiction of the English law has the effect of withdrawing him from the regime of the secular law of his own nation.
Marriage has been well said to be something more than a contract, either religious or civil-to be an institution. It creates mutual rights and obligations, as all contracts do, but beyond that, it confers a status. The position or status of "husband" and 'wife' is a recognized one throughout Christendom; the laws of all Christian nations throw about that status a variety of legal incidents during the lives of the parties, and induce definite rights upon their offspring. What then is the mature of this institution as understood in Christondom? Its incidence vary in different countries, but what are its essential elements and invariable features? If it be of common acceptance and existence, it must needs (however varied in different countries in its minor incidents) have some pervading identity and universal basis. I conceive that marriage, as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.
The principle which has been laid down by those oases is that a marriage which is not that of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others, though it may pass by the name of marriage, is not the status which the English law contemplates when dealing with the subject of marriage...Therefore, though throughout the judgments that have been given on this subject, the phrase 'Christian marriage,' 'marriage in Christendom' or some equivalent phrase, has been used, that has only been for convenience, to express the idea. But the idea which was to be expressed was this, that the only marriage recognised in Christian countries and in Christendom is the marriage of the exclusive kind I have mentioned.
The only words in this definition that create any difficulty are the words 'for life,' Lord Penzance's judgment was given in the year 1866 at a time therefore when the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 had been in operation for several years, and at a time when in most Christian countries a marriage could 'be dissolved for various causes. It seems clear therefore that in deciding whether any particular union of one man and one woman is for life, the fact that the union is made dissoluble in certain events by the laws of the country where it is entered must be disregarded. This is in precise accordance with the statement made by Lord Brougham in Warrender v. Warrender (1835) 2 Cl & F 488 that dissolubility or indissolubility is not of the essence of the contract of marriage.
Proceedings for the dissolution of the marriage are governed by the law of the domicile of the spouses at the time when they are instituted: see Bater v. Bater (1906) LRP 209 and Per Lord Haldane in Lord Advocate v. Jaffery (1921) 1 AC 146 at page 152.
As I understand Lord Brougham's observations in Warrender v. Warrender (1835) 2 Cl & F 488 the contract of marriage does not include the conditions of defeasance. If it be regarded as doing so, the difficulties pointed out by him, will at once arise, and a marriage effected by a man of English domicile in a country whose laws provide for dissolution on the ground of incompatibility of temper might, on that ground, have to be dissolved by the Courts of this country. But dissolubility or indissolubility of a marriage in truth depends upon the domicile of the parties to it at the time it is sought to dissolve it.
20. It is true, as pointed out by Mr. Majumdar, that we do not know what the present law of Russia is on the subject of divorce but it is nevertheless clear that, as the plaintiff must be deemed to have taken her husband's domicile and, as she has contract-ed a Christian marriage, her right to obtain the relief which she seeks must be decided in Russian Courts and does not depend in any way upon the personal law of her religion, even if it be assumed that such personal law forms part of the lex fori of the Indian Courts. But even if it be assumed that no question of domicile arises and the plaintiff is entitled to dissolve her marriage on the refusal of her husband to adopt Islam after its presentation to him, the question must be considered whether she has adopted the correct procedure for this purpose. According to her evidence she was converted to Islam at the Nakoda Mosque on 27th June 1940. On the following day she informed her husband by telegram that she had adopted Islam and called on him to adopt the same religion and communicate his consent or refusal to her by cable. On 2nd July 1940 she received a cable from her husband to the effect that his religious convictions were unshakable and that he absolutely refused to change his faith. On 14th November 1940 the plaintiff received a letter from her husband to the effect that he had received the papers which had been served on him in this suit and that he was amazed at their contents. He stated, however, that he did not propose to put forward any defence.
If the party is silent and says nothing, the Judge is to present Islam to him, time after time, till the completion of three, by way of caution.
22. The procedure which has been prescribed by the jurists is designed to ensure that the unconverted party fully understands the implications of a refusal to embrace Islam and it does not appear to be applicable when it is impossible to bring that party before the Kazi. In any case, it is the Kazi and not the convert who should present Islam to the unconverted party and it is for him in a suitable case to pronounce a decree dissolving the marriage. In this view of the case the proper procedure has not been followed, so the marriage between the plain. tiff and her husband must be regarded as still subsisting. Even if it can be held that there has been sufficient compliance with the procedure prescribed by the Muslim jurists, the question still requires consideration whether it is the law of India that a convert to Islam can obtain dissolution of his or her marriage by following this procedure, On this point Mr. Bose argues that the rules of Mahomedan law detailed in such treatises as the Hedaya and the Fatawa Alamgiri presuppose the existence of Mahomedan law as the law of the State and Islam as the State religion. He contends that these rules can only be enforced as the law of India, in a case in which one of the parties is a non-Muslim, in so far as they may be consistent with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. He maintains that it cannot be regarded as just or equitable that the plaintiff should be allowed to dissolve her marriage, which contemplated a life-long union, merely on the ground that she had become a convert to Islam and that, according to the law of India, a Christian marriage can only be dissolved under the provisions of a statute of general application. He also argues that the recognition of the rule of Mahomedan law, which allows a convert to divorce an unconverted spouse on the refusal of the latter to adopt Islam, would be contrary to public policy, as such recognition would tend to encourage dissolution by a subterfuge of marriages intended to be indissoluble. Mr. Majumdar, on the other hand, maintains that the rules formulated by the Islamic jurists, which are under discussion, are still operative as part of the personal law of Muslims. He admits that, if that personal law conflicts with the personal law of some other community, the matter must be decided according to the rules of justice, equity and good conscience, but he maintains that the right of a woman who has been converted to Islam to obtain dissolution of her marriage with an unconverted spouse, has been recognised as the law of India by the Courts in this country and that such right can be supported as being both equitable and just.
It is not lawful that an apostate marry any woman, whether she be a believer, an infidel, or an apostate, because an apostate is liable to be pat to death. Moreover his three days of grace are granted in order that he may reflect upon the errors which occasion his apostacy, and as marriage would interfere with such reflection, the law does not permit it to him.
The Mahomedan law is not the law of British India. It is only the law so far as the laws of India have directed it to be observed. We are not bound by all the rules of the Mahomedan law which are in force under Mahomedan Governments nor by the law as laid down by Fatawa Alamgiri, the digest of Mahomedan law, prepared under the Emperor Aurangzeb. We are bound by Regn. 4 of 1793, except so far as that regulation has been modified by Regn. 7 of 1832. Section 15 of the former regulation enacts, "that in suits regarding succession, inheritance, marriage, and caste, and all religious usages and institutions, the Mahomedan laws with respect to Mahomedans, and the Hindu laws with regard to Hindus, are to be considered as the general rules by which the Judges are to form their decisions.
Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talak, zihar, lian, jhula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts, and trust properties, and wakfs, (other than charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
If one of two married persons, not Muslim, embraces Islam, Islam is to be presented to the other; if he accepts, the marriage is not affected; if not, it is a ground for divorce.
Where persons not governed by Mahomedan law, contract or celebrate a valid marriage in accordance with a system of law other than Mahomedan law, the marriage and its dissolution will be subject to the provisions of that other system of law . . . notwithstanding that one of the parties to the marriage has, after being so married, been converted to Islam.
Section 194A often raises questions difficult to decide. Considerations of justice, equity and good conscience are not inapplicable. The law to be enforced may be that of the defendant (Section 8). Hence, no fixed rule governing every case can be laid down .... The rules of law that would be applied by the Courts in a Muslim State to a case where persons, who do not follow Islam, and who are married1 in accordance with their own non-Muslim law, are not enforceable in India inasmuch as, the law that prevails is not the law of Islam but the law of India, which may generally be said to be, that the personal law of the parties shall be enforced (Section 6). . .
With reference to the second head mentioned above, where persons, who have married under a non-Muslim system of law, adopt Islam, the rules contained in the texts of Islam are again not applicable. The reason is that the Muslim texts contemplate a State religion, which does not exist in India.
The law of every religion being enforced in India on a footing of equality, the rules that are applicable in India to converts to Islam from another religion, who were married prior to their conversion, may be somewhat different from the rules that would be applied to such converts in a Muslim State.
But we cannot hold that British India is a foreign country within the meaning and intention of the above rules, so that a Hindu marriage would here become dissolved by the conversion of the wife to Islam, on the expiration of a certain interval without any notice to the husband.
A sacred and solemn relation like marriage cannot we think be regarded as terminated simply by the change of faith of either spouse without notice to the other, or the intervention of a Court of justice.
31. They therefore found that the first marriage of the petitioner was not dissolved by reason of her change of faith according to the Hindu law or the Mahomedan law, and that her second marriage was in consequence void.
32. In re Ram Kumari ('91) 18 Cal 264 was decided ex parte and, although it was assumed that the first marriage might have been dissolved by the petitioner by giving proper notice to her husband after her conversion, no reasons for this assumption were stated in the judgment beyond a reference to the Hedaya and Baillie's Digest. Moreover, having regard to the nature of Ram Kumari's defence, the question was not even in issue, whether by giving such a notice, she could have dissolved the marriage with her first husband. On the finding of fact contained in the judgment no question arose as to what would have been She legal position if Islam had been presented to the first husband in accordance with the prescribed procedure. It follows, therefore, that this case merely decided that Ram Kumari had committed bigamy and that a marriage cannot be terminated by a change of faith of either spouse. In my view any observations which the judgment may contain in support of the proposition formulated in para. 74-A of Wilson's Digest must be regarded as obiter dicta. I think, therefore, that, in some of the subsequent cases such as that in Mahatab-un-Nissa v. Rifaqatullah , too much weight has been attached to the decision in In re Ram Kumari ('91) 18 Cal 264, and it is of small value to the plaintiff in the present case for the purpose of supporting the proposition on which she relies, namely, that she is entitled to dissolve her marriage by the mere operation of the law of her religion.
Neither authority nor principle can be found in English law to establish the proposition that a marriage contracted in England is dissolved according to the law of England by mere operation of the laws of the religion of the husband and without decree of a Court of law.
The law of his religion is the applicant's personal law; it is not the general law applicable to all who are domiciled in India. It is not a law peculiar to India but to Mahomedans wherever they may be domiciled. It is recognized by the Courts of India as stated by Sir Gorell Barnes, President in Venugopal Chetti v. Venngopal Chetti (1909) LRP 67. But the applicant is seeking to travel a very long way and over a hitherto unbridgeable gulf when he claims that the marriage he contracted with Ruby Hudd is dissolved in this country by the operation of the law of his religion. An English woman or a woman domiciled in England who married in England a. person domiciled in Scotland, Ireland or India, or elsewhere out of the realm of England, acquires by the status of marriage the domicil of the husband and is subject to the law of that domicil, but she does not acquire his religion or become subject to the laws of his religion except in so far as they are the law of his domicile and then to that extent only.
Now under these circumstances the marriage which was celebrated between the appellant and Ruby Hudd on 17th March 1913, has not been dissolved by any Court of competent jurisdiction (the appellant says there is none), and it is not a marriage in the Mahomedan sense which can be dissolved in the Mahomedan manner. No question arises that according to the Mahomedan law, if a member of that persuasion has taken several wives (within the limit allowed) and has entered into a union of that kind with those ladies according to his law, he may terminate that union by a writing of divorce and such a union is so terminated, The appellant has adduced evidence to make it clear that the husband has that right without assigning any reason; where to him, and him alone, it seems good to put her away, in those circumstances he can do it; but it is quite impossible to hold that such a writing of divorce could dissolve a marriage contracted here in England with an English woman, although the husband is a Mahomedan.
Therefore, it is, in my opinion, sufficient to dispose of this appeal to say that there is no evidence of any personal law applicable to the appellant, which gives him the right to put away a wife, whom he has married by Christian marriage, by a writing of divorce. But I am prepared to go further if the marriage of 1913 is to be treated as a Christian marriage, and adopt the language of Lord Brougham, which has already been referred to in Warrender v. Warrender (1835) 2 Cl & F 488 where he says that the suggestion that the marriage could be dissolved without any judicial proceedings at all, merely by the parties agreeing in pais to separate, would be absurd.
One of the many peculiar features of the suit arises from the circumstance that, in the case of spouses resident in India, their personal status, and what is frequently termed the status of the marriage, is not solely dependent upon domicile, but involves the element of religious creed. Whether a change of religion made honestly after marriage with the assent of both spouses, without any intent to commit a fraud upon the law, will have the effect of altering rights incidental to the marriage, such as that of divorce, is a question of importance, and it may be, of nicety.
37. A similar question relating to the application of the personal Mahomedan law for the purpose of dissolving a Christian marriage was considered by the Bombay High Court in 1981 in Muncherji Kursetji Khambatta v. Jessie Grant Khambata ('35) 22 AIR 1935 Bom 5. In that case it was held that a Muslim who had contracted a Christian marriage in Scotland might divorce his wife by talak after his return to India if his wife in the meantime had embraced the Muslim faith. This question arose in connexion with a petition for the dissolution of a marriage which had been celebrated under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1872, Section 17 of which requires that marriages under that Act shall be dissolved in the manner provided in the Indian Divorce Act and for the causes therein mentioned. The respondent argued his marriage with the petitioner was a nullity as her previous marriage with a Muslim husband was still subsisting. The petitioner however maintained that her previous husband had divorced her by pronouncing a talak in accordance with Mahomedan law.
It has been argued for the appellant that the status imposed by operation of law upon persons who marry in Christian form, cannot be altered by the voluntary act of the parties. But if a change of domicile, which is a voluntary act, may result in a change of status by reason of the application of a different system of law, it is difficult to see why a change of religion, the domicile remaining unchanged, may not also result in a change of status, it the law to be applied is then different by reason of the difference of religion.
39. On the other hand, it might be argued with considerable force that the decision in Muncherji Kursetji Khambatta v. Jessie Grant Khambata ('35) 22 AIR 1935 Bom 5 rejects certain fundamental principles relating to the status of the par-ties to a Christian marriage, which have been adopted in England in such cases as Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P 130, Rex v. Hammersmith Registrar of Marriages; Ex parte Mir Anwaruddin (1917) 1 K B 634 and the case in Brinkley v. Attorney-General (1890) 15 P D 76 which have already been cited. In this connexion, it might be urged that, in the exercise of their matrimonial jurisdiction which was expressly invoked in Muncherji Kursetji Khambatta v. Jessie Grant Khambata ('35) 22 AIR 1935 Bom 5 Courts in this country are enjoined by Section 7, Indian Divorce Act of 1869, to observe the principles which would be followed in matrimonial suits in England.
40. Further, a Christian marriage is essentially monogamous in its character and indisoluble except under the provisions of a law of general application: Emperor v. Mt. Ruri ('19) 6 AIR 1919 Lah 389. The State in statutes applicable to India has designedly restricted the grounds upon which the marital tie in such a marriage may be dissolved, namely by the provisions of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act of 1926 and the Indian Divorce Act of 1869. The latter Act is applicable when either the petitioner or the respondent professes the Christian religion and entitles the wife to present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage on the ground that, since the solemnization thereof, her husband has exchanged the profession of Christianity for the profession of some other religion and gone through a form of marriage with another woman. But it does not allow either the wife or the husband to sue for divorce merely on the ground that the other party to the marriage has adopted another faith, presumably because it is the policy of the State to recognize complete freedom of religion even in connexion with marriages, and a change of religion does not in itself interfere with the monogamous character of a Christian marriage. Even as regards Hindu marriages which are ordinarily indissoluble, the State has prescribed certain limited conditions under which such marriages may be dissolved under the Indian Converts Marriage Dissolution Act of 1866. It appears to be an anomaly that the Legislature has not provided some method by which a Christian marriage celebrated abroad by persons domiciled in India may be dissolved on suitable grounds if both parties to the marriage have been converted to Islam. At the same time, if it were the policy of the State to enlarge the grounds upon which marriages might be dissolved, it would be for the Legislature to intervene, but I do not think that by adopting the procedure prescribed in the personal law of a particular community, it is permissible to dissolve a marriage which at the time of its celebration contemplated a monogamous and indissoluble union. A marriage such as that which was under discussion in Muncherji Kursetji Khambatta v. Jessie Grant Khambata ('35) 22 AIR 1935 Bom 5 could only have been celebrated in India under the provisions of the Christian Marriage Act of 1872. A marriage under this Act, in my view, contemplates a monogamous union and cannot, I think, be dissolved by having recourse to the provisions of a personal law inapplicable to such marriages. Further there can be no doubt, if two persons, who were married under the Special Marriage Act of 1872, subsequently became converted to Islam, the marriage could only be dissolved under the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act. The general policy of the Legislature seems, therefore, to be that a Christian marriage can only be dissolved under the provisions of a statute of general application to such marriages and not by means of a procedure prescribed by the personal law of any particular community. In these circumstances I incline to the view that the point decided in Muncherji Kursetji Khambatta v. Jessie Grant Khambata ('35) 22 AIR 1935 Bom 5 requires further consideration.
So long as the petitioner remained a Christian, the position was, in my view, not free from doubt. A Mahomedan husband may claim that by the law applicable to him he is entitled to divorce his wife by talak; the wife, being a Christian, may affirm that, though by marriage she acquired the domicile of her husband, she did not acquire his religion, and that by the law of his domicile applicable to Christians, she is not liable to be divorced by talak.
On these rival contentions, I incline to the opinion that the applicant is right, As at present advised, I think that the marriage in Scotland was a monogamous marriage, and that a Court in India should, so long as the wife remains a Christian, hold that the grounds upon which such a marriage can be dissolved are laid down in the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, and should refuse to recognize a divorce by talak.
The reasonable presumption is that the parties intended a marriage as understood by the law to which in the transaction they purported to conform. It appears to me that on the whole the better view is that the meaning of the marriage relation, the status of the parties in that sense, is to be determined by the lex loci contractus, as being a matter of construction of the contract, and that in the present case the effect of the marriage in Scotland was to make the parties man and wife in the Christian sense and not in the Mahomedan sense. In that case, and to that extent, the lex domicilii would be irrelevant. But so long as we are merely considering what kind of marriage it must be taken to have been, it seems that it would make no difference at all whether we were to apply the lex loci contractus or the lex domicilii.
44. The learned Judge then proceeded to discuss the relevant provisions of the Christian Marriage Act, Act 15 of 1872, and those of the Indian Divorce Act of 1869.
Even if the law of the domicile were to be applied, therefore, there can be little doubt, in my opinion, that the marriage, which these parties contracted, must be regarded as a marriage in the Christian sense, a monogamous marriage. It did not seem to me that the learned Counsel for the petitioner seriously disputed this position.
It would I think be straining these authorities to an unreasonable extent to hold that they afford any sanction for the view that a marriage of that description may be dissolved by a form of divorce provided or allowed by the law of the domicile in respect of a different kind of marriage.
If it were necessary to decide the matter, I should certainly not be prepared to hold that Gulam Mahomed Ebrahim could have legally divorced the petitioner by talak, if she had remained a Christian, governed by and entitled to the protection of the Indian Divorce Act.
48. I agree generally with the observations made by the learned Judges in Muncherji Kursetji Khambatta v. Jessie Grant Khambata ('35) 22 AIR 1935 Bom 5 on the first of the two points which arose for decision in that case, and by applying the principles on which they are based, I must hold that it is not the law of India that a marriage which has been duly celebrated according to the lex loci contractus and contemplated a lifelong union, can be dissolved by having recourse to some provision of the personal religious law of one of the parties to the marriage in a case in which the parties belong to different religious communities. In a case such as that with which we are now dealing, even if it is held, as argued by Mr. Majumdar that no question of domicile arises the matter must be decided either according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, or according to the provisions of the general law of the State which may be applicable to such matters. In my view there is no equity in the rule which the plaintiff seeks to apply. It conflicts with the most fundamental principles of English law, which are followed in India in matrimonial cases. It is unsupported by the provision of any statute and does not form part of the common law.
49. I do not think that the decision in John Jiban Chandra Dutta v. Abinash Chandra Sen , to which Mr. Majumdar has referred, is of any assistance to him. It was merely held in that case that an Indian Christian who had been converted to Islam might legally contract a second marriage while his marriage to his Christian wife was still subsisting. I question the correctness of the decision in this case as I consider that a marriage solemnized under the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act is essentially a monogamous union: vide the observations of Broomfield J. in Muncherji Kursetji Khambatta v. Jessie Grant Khambata ('35) 22 AIR 1935 Bom 5 at pp. 303, 304. In any event, however, John Jiban Chandra Dutta v. Abinash Chandra Sen is no authority for the proposition that a Christian marriage can be dissolved by having recourse to the personal religious law of the convert. In fact Henderson J., expressly said that "it might be difficult to say whether Dukhiram could have divorced Sudhakina by talak."
50. On the facts of the present case I must decide that the plaintiff, if she is at all entitled to a dissolution of her marriage, can only obtain it according to the lex fori of her husband's domicile. The rule of Mahomedan law, on which she relies, must be regarded as obsolete and contrary to public policy. Even if it were still in force, she has not observed the proper procedure prescribed thereby and, in any event, she would not be entitled to have recourse to it for the purpose of obtaining a dissolution of a Christian marriage. In view of the above considerations the plaintiff's suit must be dismissed.

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