Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180322_0000676.EPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:52:09+00:00

Document:
Presently before the Court is Defendants 200 Christian Street Partner's, Arthur Elwood's, and Virgil Procaccino's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Pursuant To Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 18.) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion will be DENIED.
This action arises from the sale of a house. Defendants Virgil Procaccino (“Procaccino”) and Arthur Elwood (“Elwood”) are partners in the Defendant company 200 Christian Street Partners (“200 CSP”), which built and then sold a house (“the Home”) to Plaintiff MILO, LLC (“MILO”). MILO now asserts claims against Defendants, all related to Defendants' alleged defective construction of the Home.
MILO's Complaint alleges the following claims against all Defendants: Count I - violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) 73 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-2(4)(v), (vii), and (xii)(2017); Count II - breach of contract; Count III - breach of implied warranty; Count IV - negligence; Count V - negligent supervision claim; Count VI - civil conspiracy; and Count VII - violation of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”), 68 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7303. Procaccino and Elwood seek dismissal of all of MILO's claims. 200 CSP seeks dismissal of Count V, the negligent supervision claim, Count VI, the civil conspiracy claim, and Count VII, the RESDL claim.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). Courts need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . .” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. This ‘“does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, ' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In determining whether dismissal of the complaint is appropriate, courts use a two-part analysis. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, courts separate the factual and legal elements of the claim and accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true. Id. at 210-11. Next, courts determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “‘plausible claim for relief.'” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Given the nature of the two-part analysis, “‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Elwood and Procaccino contend that MILO's breach of contract claim against them must fail because 200 CSP, the corporation which built and sold the Home, is the only proper defendant in this case. They argue that only MILO and 200 CSP were bound by the contract and that MILO has not alleged sufficient reasons to pierce the corporate veil. MILO contends that it has alleged sufficient justification to pierce the corporate veil and to go after Elwood and Procaccino as individuals for their role in the breach of contract. MILO also contends that Defendants violated the RESDL by failing to disclose material defects to the Ferreiras. MILO argues that because Defendants were obligated to comply with the RESDL as provided in the Agreement of Sale, the RESDL violation resulted in a breach of the Agreement.
To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms; (2) a breach of duty imposed by the contract; and (3) resulting damages. Chemtech Int'l, Inc. v Chemical Injection Techs., Inc., 170 F. App'x 805, 807 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). It is fundamental to the law of contracts that one cannot be liable for a breach of contract unless one is a party to the contract. Accurso v. InfraRed Servs., Inc., 23 F.Supp.3d 494, 503 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 2014) (internal quotation omitted). When a corporate agent signs a contract on behalf of the principal corporation, it is the corporate principal that is alone liable for any breach of the contract. Id. (citing Daniel Adams Assoc., Inc. v. Rimbach Pub., Inc., 519 A.2s 997, 1000-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1987)).
Here, the contract for the sale of the Home lists the buyer as “David Ferreira or assignee” and the seller as “200 Christian Street Partners.” (Am. Compl. Ex. B at 37.) We must therefore determine whether MILO's Complaint alleges facts sufficient to justify the imposition of liability on Elwood and Procaccino as individuals for breach of contract.

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