Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/177-broad-street-owner-v-stamford-no-fst-cv-08-4013964s-jul-16-2009/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:28:39+00:00

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The property in question is a parcel of land known as 177 Broad Street, Parcel ID number 004-0984. Complaint, First Count, ¶ 1. The property, on October 1, 2007 was owned by the plaintiff, 177 Broad Street Owners, LLC which purchased it around August 2, 2007 along with another property for a total price of $79 million Id.; Affidavit of Francis Kirwin, City of Stamford Assessor, ¶ 4. In 2007, Stamford performed a city-wide revaluation of property as of October 1, 2007 and assessed the two parcels owned by the plaintiff at $81,541,943. Kirwin Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5. Based in part on the owner’s allocation of the purchase price, which is not at issue in this case, the valuation assigned to the parcel that is the subject of this appeal was $73,870,886 and the assessed value, at 70% of full value, was $51,646,620. Complaint ¶ 2.
CT Page 12094 The Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209 (2000). Summary judgment “is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way.” Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 751 (1985). “The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitles him to judgment as a matter of law.” Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 209. “A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Oil Co. v. Urban Development Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 379 (1969). The trial court, in the context of summary judgment motion, may not decide issues of material fact, but only determine whether such genuine issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500 (1998).
The Connecticut Supreme Court discussed the purpose and elements of General Statutes § 12-119 in Second Stone Ridge Cooperative Corporation v. Bridgeport, 220 Conn. 335 (1991). The statute allows a taxpayer one year to bring a claim that the tax was imposed when the town had no authority to tax the subject property, or that the assessment was “manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining” real property value. Id., 339-40. (Emphasis added by Second Stone Ridge court.) See also Pauker v. Roig, 232 Conn. 335, 340-42 (1995) (emphasizing the two requirements of Section 12-119). In this connection “something more than mere valuation is at issue.” Second Stone Ridge, supra, 220 Conn. 340. The plaintiff must show “there was misfeasance or nonfeasance by the CT Page 12095 taxing authorities, or that the assessment was arbitrary or so excessive or discriminatory as in itself to show a disregard of duty on their part.” Id., 341 [quoting Mead v. Greenwich, 131 Conn. 273, 275 (1944)].
Second Stone Ridge Cooperative Corporation v. Bridgeport, supra. 341.
Stamford contends that the valuation, and therefore the tax assessment, of plaintiff’s property was not manifestly excessive because according to the Assessor Kirwin’s affidavit, the valuation was strikingly close to the actual purchase price paid by the plaintiff two months prior to the valuation date of October 1, 2007. According to the affidavit, the assessor’s valuation was 3.2% higher than the purchase price paid by the plaintiff.
This was not an isolated sale of a single property (which might be discounted as an aberration); according to the Stamford Land Records, there were a number of transfers of legal interests in office buildings recorded on August 2, 2007 (comprising all of Volume 9098 on the Stamford Land Records), with a total transaction value of approximately $850,000,00, involving six legally-distinct purchasers (One Stamford Plaza Owner; Three Stamford Plaza Owner; Four Stamford Plaza Owner; 177 Broad Street Owner; 201 Broad Street Owner (leasehold interest — cost data obtained from owner’s recitation in appeal to Board of Assessment Appeals); 300 Atlantic Street Owner). Although the valuation of the parcels involved in each of these transactions is under appeal, the amounts paid for the `other’ properties tend to confirm the City’s valuation of this property. To the extent that these transfers appear to have been part of a single CT Page 12097 transaction for a total price of about $850,000,000, there may be some minor variations as to allocations of value among the properties, but the payment of such a large sum would seem to eliminate any possibility of the transaction being characterized as rash or irrational.
Plaintiff’s contention that summary judgment may not be granted when Stamford has not identified what method of valuation was used precludes summary judgment is largely, if not entirely, based on the case of Ganim v. Town of Monroe, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, CV 93 305126 (March 15, 1994, Fuller J.). It is not persuasive. In Ganim, Judge Fuller held that “without concrete information as to which assessment method was applied for each property, the plaintiff cannot effectively oppose the summary judgment by introducing countervailing evidence . . .” While it is not apparent in Ganim what types of property were involved, the fact remains that the Kirwin affidavit makes it quite clear that the valuation of the property in this case was largely based on its recent sale price, and not on any other method such as replacement cost or income capitalization. The plaintiff, CT Page 12098 however, chose not to submit any evidentiary facts by affidavit or otherwise, to establish that the method was improper, and moreover, did not make a showing pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47 that additional facts were required but unavailable. Furthermore, whether an incorrect valuation method was employed, is not a claim giving rise to a cause of action under Section 12-119. Breezy Knoll Association v. Town of Morris, 286 Conn. 766, 778 n. 20 (2008).
In contrast, Stamford argues that Section 12-63d prohibits an assessor from revaluing a property solely when there is a sale of the property and there is no city-wide revaluation. It contends that when there is a city-wide revaluation undertaken all, or nearly all, property valuations are changed and it is well accepted that in most cases sales prices of the property or comparable sales are routinely and appropriately used to ascertain fair market value. The City points out that fair market value is defined by the courts as the price paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller. The City also cites Judge Aronson’s decision in A/C Chatfield Limited Partnership v. West Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, CV 94 0538038 (October 11, 1996) in support of its position that Section 12-63d only disallows changes in valuation based on sales in assessment years that are not revaluation years.
because the revaluation of the plaintiff’s property in 2007 was not based CT Page 12100 solely on the fact that the property was sold, but because 2007 was a revaluation year for all properties in Stamford. In other words, the court interprets Section 12-63d as prohibiting a revaluation when the sole basis for revaluation of a piece of property is its sale. That is not the case here. The property’s value may well have been largely based on the sale earlier in 2007, but the fact that it was subject to revaluation was the result of the City’s decision to revalue city-wide in 2007.

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