Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/304/304mass325.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:56:43+00:00

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EDMUND L. DOLAN vs. COMMONWEALTH.
Evidence at a hearing on the merits in the Superior Court resulting in a judgment of criminal contempt properly was not included in the record returned by that court upon a writ of error to review the judgment.
The oath of an alleged contemnor is not a bar to his prosecution for criminal contempt.
Particulars which the defendant in a complaint for criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the court, is entitled as of right to have from the Commonwealth are only such as, together with the allegations of the complaint, satisfy the requirement that he be so advised of the charges against him as to have a reasonable opportunity to meet them.
A complaint for criminal contempt, setting forth in several numbered paragraphs statements as to alleged conduct of the defendant tending to obstruct the proper administration of justice through solicitation of jurors, was construed, not as setting forth separate acts of contempt in successive counts, but as charging a single contempt through a course of action, each numbered paragraph containing an element thereof; and motions to expunge and to quash a paragraph dealing solely with a conspiracy with others to do such acts properly were denied.
The several averments of a complaint for criminal contempt, setting forth in numbered paragraphs a course of action as a single contempt although they stated acts of the defendant in conspiracy with other. and also acts through others as agents as well as individual acts on his part, were not mutually inconsistent or open to the objection of uncertainty, and a motion that the complaint be quashed as an entirety properly was denied.
A coconspirator may be the agent of another coconspirator.
One accused of criminal contempt has no right to a trial by jury on that charge.
A request to rule that "corrupting a juror or jurors does not by itself constitute an obstruction to the court in the performance of its duty" properly was denied at the hearing of a complaint charging criminal contempt of court.
The provisions of G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 268, Section 13, making it a crime to corrupt or attempt to corrupt a juror with intent to influence his decision do not preclude criminal contempt proceedings in the Superior Court based on acts described in the statute.
A sentence of two and one half years' confinement in the common jail upon conviction of contempt of court in a course of conduct tending to obstruct the course of justice through attempted corruption of jurors was not excessive or unreasonable.
On a writ of error, only matters assigned as error by the plaintiff in error are open for consideration.
PETITION, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 27, 1938, and afterwards amended, for a writ of error.
E. M. Dangel, (T. F. Callahan & L. E. Sherry with him,) for the plaintiff in error.
E. O. Proctor, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.
in the common jail for a contempt of which he had been adjudged guilty. A single justice of this court reserved and reported the case (see G.L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 211, Section 6; Liggett Drug Co. Inc. v. License Commissioners of North Adams, 296 Mass. 41, 44, and cases cited) "upon the petition and assignment of errors as amended, the writ of error, plea [in nullo est erratum], writ of scire facias and the record and process herein filed of the Superior Court for the transaction of criminal business in Suffolk County, for the consideration of the full court." The writ of error addressed to the Chief Justice of the Superior Court commanded him to "distinctly and openly send us the record and process of the suit aforesaid, with all things touching them." The Chief Justice filed return containing, as he certified, such record and process "with all things touching the same." But no transcript of the evidence taken at the trial on the merits was sent to the Supreme Judicial Court. The single justice further reported as follows: ". . . when the cause came before me the plaintiff in error brought forward a motion that `suitable process' issue to the end that a transcript of the evidence taken at the trial on the merits in the court below be made a part of the record; that I denied the motion subject to the exception of the plaintiff in error, and that it is agreed that if the denial of the motion was error, a duly authenticated transcript of the evidence before referred to may be presented to the full court for its consideration."
and interfere with the course of justice did enter upon and follow a course of action which had a tendency unlawfully to obstruct and interfere with said course of justice and which in fact did so obstruct and interfere with said course of justice, in that you did conspire with Robert Dinsmore and J. Walter Quinn to corrupt and influence unlawfully in their capacities as jurors persons duly serving as such in this court at a time when it was possible that some or all of them would be drawn to sit in the trial of indictments in which you, Edmund L. Dolan, and said J. Walter Quinn were charged with having committed crimes; and in that by means and in pursuance of said conspiracy you did offer bribes to certain of said jurors and did give bribes to certain of said jurors and did unlawfully solicit certain of said jurors, and all to the end that they should in your behalf corruptly and unlawfully act contrary to their oaths and duties as jurors if they should be accepted to sit in such trial; and in that by means and in pursuance of said conspiracy you did succeed in making impossible a fair trial of said indictments at the time set therefor."
the Superior Court, is referred to herein as the defendant, and the Superior Court as the trial court.
to bring the defendant before the court and show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt.
The defendant filed a "motion for bill of particulars," to which the Commonwealth filed answers. The defendant filed a "motion for further particulars," which was denied in part and allowed in part. The Commonwealth filed answers to the motion as allowed. The substance of these answers is set forth in a footnote. [Note p330] The defendant filed a motion that the court "order the complainant to file interrogatories to the defendant," a motion to quash paragraph numbered 3 of the complaint for the reasons that "1. It does not set forth any criminal contempt. 2. It is clearly insufficient to sustain a judgment against the defendant," a motion that said paragraph 3 be expunged for the same reasons, and a motion to quash the complaint for the reason that it "charges the accused disjunctively, so as to leave it uncertain what is relied on as the accusation against him." These motions were denied and the defendant excepted.
The defendant filed a sworn answer to the complaint, and, at the trial, made a motion for trial by jury which was denied. The return sets out about seventy requests by the defendant for rulings with notations of the action of the court thereon, and also sets out a request by the defendant "that the court report this case to the Supreme Judicial Court for its determination."
1. There was no error in the denial by the single justice of the defendant's motion that "`suitable process' issue to the end that a transcript of the evidence taken at the trial on the merits in the court below be made a part of the record." Denial of this motion was in accordance with the settled law of this Commonwealth relating to writs of error in cases of criminal contempt, as stated in Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 360, 377, that evidence "heard at the trial on the merits is no part of the record and hence cannot be considered on a writ of error." See also Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 28, 33. In the first Blankenburg case it was sought not only by suggestions of diminution of the record, but also by a writ of certiorari to have brought before the Supreme Judicial Court the evidence at the trial of the proceeding for criminal contempt, but the single Justice ruled adversely, and the full court said that "The ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to a writ of certiorari was right. The evidence heard at the trial before the judge is no part of the record in the case even though it was taken stenographically by a commissioner. . . . Certiorari is not designed in any event to secure a report of evidence. Such report would be an encumbrance and no part of the record." Page 377. The remark in Woodbury v. Commonwealth, 295 Mass. 316, 319 -- where review upon a writ of error was sought in a case of criminal contempt -- that the "record does not disclose the evidence presented at the trial of the contempt proceedings in the Superior Court" cannot rightly be regarded as casting doubt upon the proposition settled in the earlier case. This remark shows merely recognition of the fact that the evidence was not included in the record and does not import that this evidence could rightly have been so included. It does not differ in significance from the remark in Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 33: "The evidence on which the findings were made is no part of this record. We do not know what it was."
in cases of criminal contempt and is in accord with the nature of the remedy. It was there declared that the principle prevails in this Commonwealth that at common law "no court reviewed the proceedings of another court in contempt matters," (see also Hurley v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 443, 444; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co. 194 U.S. 324, 330), but that review upon a writ of error was authorized by what is now G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 250, Section 9, providing that a "judgment in a criminal case may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed upon a writ of error for any error in law or in fact," read in connection with what is now G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 211, Section 3, conferring upon the Supreme Judicial Court "general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided," and to "issue writs of error . . . to such courts . . . necessary to the furtherance of justice and to the regular execution of the laws." Pages 374-375. See Hurley v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 443, 444-445. Moreover, it was recognized that the statutory authorization of review upon writ of error of a sentence of punishment for criminal contempt carries with it the ordinary incidents, and is subject to the ordinary limitations, of a writ of error and, consequently, that a "matter of fact once tried and established [in a proceeding for criminal contempt] by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be retried by writ of error." And it was pointed out that an error of fact in a judgment which may be reviewed upon a writ of error under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 250, Section 9, "does not refer to errors as to findings of fact made at a trial," but refers "to matters of fact not heard and decided at the trial under review." Pages 376-377.
reenactments. Nichols v. Vaughan, 217 Mass. 548, 551. Kelly v. Morrison, 231 Mass. 574, 577. With respect to the sections in Rev. Sts. c. 81 and related sections it was said by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 212, 214, that these statutes "are to be taken in connection with various other legislative provisions, directing when, how, and in what cases, appeals may be taken and prosecuted, exceptions filed, writs of error, habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, and the like, sued out, as of right, or granted on application." See also Peters v. Peters, 8 Cush. 529, 538. Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 418, 420. And it is provided by G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 250, Section 2, applicable to writs of error in both civil and criminal cases, in form substantially unchanged since Rev. Sts. c. 112, Section 15, that the proceedings upon such writs as to certain specific matters "and all other matters not expressly provided for, shall be according to the course of the common law as modified by practice and usage in the commonwealth and by the general rules of the supreme judicial court." Eliot v. McCormick, 141 Mass. 194. Conto v. Silvia, 170 Mass. 152, 154. Commonwealth v. Marsino, 252 Mass. 224, 228. Lee v. Fowler, 263 Mass. 440, 443. The interpretation of what is now G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 250, Section 9, as authorizing review "upon a writ of error" of a sentence for punishment for criminal contempt as a "judgment in a criminal case" imports that the proceedings upon such a writ of error shall conform to the provisions of the related section, which is now G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 250, Section 2. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 211, Section 3, does not justify a different conclusion.
decision in Storer v. White, 7 Mass. 448. See also Peirce v. Adams, 8 Mass. 383. Even then this had long been characteristic of writs of error at common law. See Holdsworth's History of English Law, vol. I, pages 215-216. And this rule was recognized in Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 212, 215, where it was pointed out that "even by the aid of a writ of error, the material questions of law, raised and decided on the trial of a criminal prosecution . . . [cannot] be brought before this court, because they would not appear upon the record." See also Tyndale v. Stanwood, 186 Mass. 59, 61-63. Moreover, in other forms of review evidence is not a part of the record unless made so by some specific statutory provision, as for example, in the case of criminal appeals (see G.L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 278, Section 33A), or unless such evidence is incorporated in the record by some authorized method, as, for example, by a bill of exceptions. See De Propper, petitioner, 236 Mass. 500, 501, and cases cited. See also Nashua & Lowell Railroad v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 169 Mass. 157, 161. Compare Farmington River Water Power Co. v. County Commissioners, 112 Mass. 206, 212; Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 545-546.
a "judgment in a criminal case" enlarged to a substantial extent the rights of a person adjudged guilty of such a contempt. But this statute, interpreted, as it must be, in the light of the common law (see Armburg v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 276 Mass. 418, 426; Levin v. Wall, 290 Mass. 423), cannot be held to confer any right of review other than that which its words naturally import -- that is, a right of review subject to the limitations upon review by writ of error. This is true even if no other form of review is available to a person adjudged guilty of criminal contempt. Consequently we need not decide whether any other form of review -- by exceptions or otherwise -- is available. With respect to exceptions, G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 278, Section 31, provides in part that they "may be alleged by a defendant in a criminal case who is aggrieved by an opinion, ruling, direction or judgment of the superior court rendered upon any question of law arising at the trial of such case." But in Commonwealth v. McNary, 246 Mass. 46, 48, a proceeding for criminal contempt, where exceptions were considered by this court because in any event the ultimate decision would have been adverse to the defendant, the court said: "The proper way to raise an error of law in such case is by writ of error. . . . There is grave doubt whether exceptions lie in a case for contempt. . . . We do not pause to discuss or to decide that question." See also New York Central Railroad v. Ayer, 253 Mass. 122, 128.
2. The defendant's first assignment of error is the "denial of his motion for interrogatories to be filed to him so that he might answer the same under oath and be relieved from the alleged contempt." The sole ground relied on by the defendant in support of this assignment is that he was entitled to purge himself of contempt by his oath and to make such oath in sworn answers to interrogatories. And the defendant's sixth assignment of error -- the "denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint for contempt" -- is argued solely on the ground that he was entitled to purge himself by his oath. By the defendant's sworn answer to the complaint he denied generally that he was guilty of the contempt charged therein and denied specific allegations of facts relied on as constituting such contempt. There was no error in the denial of these motions.
as here, of a controlling decision to the contrary, it should be followed in this Commonwealth. In view of this conclusion the grounds advanced by the defendant for the granting of these motions fail.
3. The defendant's second assignment of error is the "denial of his motion for further particulars concerning the complaint for contempt, and the court's limiting certain particulars ordered." This denial was not error.
we think it clear that the complaint together with these particulars fully advised the defendant of the nature of the offence charged against him, and advised him of the facts relied on as constituting such offence in sufficient detail to give him reasonable knowledge of the grounds of the charge and reasonable opportunity to meet such charge. He had no right to anything more. Whether in any respect the technical accuracy of an indictment is lacking need not be considered.
4. The defendant's third assignment of error is the denial of his motion to expunge paragraph numbered 3 of the complaint for contempt, and his fourth assignment is the denial of his motion to quash this paragraph.
defendant -- sufficiently alleges the element of the charge of contempt with which it deals and could not rightly have been quashed or expunged as incomplete. Compare Commonwealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472, 491.
5. The defendant's fifth assignment of error is the denial of his motion to quash the complaint for contempt. This was a motion to quash for the reason that the complaint "charges the accused disjunctively, so as to leave it uncertain what is relied on as the accusation against him." The denial of this motion was not error.
for uncertainty. Different means by which an offence was committed may be alleged in the alternative even in an ordinary criminal case. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 277, Section 31. Furthermore -- assuming that the point was raised by the motion -- the complaint is not bad on the ground that it charges several distinct offences of contempt. It charges a single offence of contempt, consisting of a course of conduct of the defendant tending "to interfere with, impede and obstruct the proper administration of justice." The case of Commonwealth v. Fuller 163 Mass. 499, related to an offence consisting of a single act and is readily distinguishable. The complaint is not open to the objection of duplicity, even if certain elements of the defendant's conduct alleged constituted contempt independent of other alleged elements of such conduct. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 165 Mass. 457, 459; Commonwealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472, 491. Moreover, since the defendant was fully advised of the nature and grounds of the offence charged, an objection to the complaint for duplicity was merely formal and not substantial. See Commonwealth v. Hogan, 249 Mass. 555, 561.
6. The defendant's seventh assignment of error is the denial of his motion for a jury trial. The motion was denied rightly.
the meaning of Magna Charta and of the twelfth article of our Declaration of Rights."
is involved in the present case. Compare Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310; opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 584. There is no such statute.
7. The defendant's eighth, ninth, fourteenth, fifteenth, seventeenth to twenty-second, inclusive, and twenty-fifth assignments of error are refusals to make requested rulings based upon the evidence. In the absence of the evidence which, as already stated, is not part of the record no error is shown. Likewise the defendant's thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth, fortieth and forty-first assignments of error, also relating to the evidence, are without merit.
8. Many of the other assignments of error are refusals to make requested rulings. The rulings requested to which these assignments relate, however, were not necessarily based upon the evidence. Since the result to the defendant will be the same in any event we consider these requested rulings without deciding whether the requests and the disposition of them by the trial judge are properly included in the record and whether the assignments of error relating thereto are properly before us in view of the limitation upon the scope of review by writ of error. See Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 36. See also Commonwealth v. McNary, 246 Mass. 46, 48; Commonwealth v. Morgan, 280 Mass. 392, 303.
authority of the case cited. So far as the rulings requested were covered in substance by the rulings made by the trial judge he would not have been required to make them even if they had been correct. Clough v. Cromwell, 254 Mass. 132, 135. Rezendes v. Prudential Ins. Co. 285 Mass. 505, 514. And he was not required to make the incorrect rulings requested merely because they would have been consistent with other rulings made by him. The trial judge dealt with the rulings relating to this subject matter in a manner at least sufficiently favorable to the defendant.
10. The defendant's thirteenth assignment of error is the refusal of the trial judge to rule that the "defendant; has committed no act which itself had the direct and natural effect to obstruct or impede the administration of justice." So far as this requested ruling is to be construed as based on the evidence the necessary absence of the evidence precludes examination thereof. And so far as it depends upon the facts found by the trial judge and set forth in the order adjudging the defendant in contempt it was clearly incorrect. See Hurley v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 443, 447; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 762-763. Moreover, the refusal of the requested ruling that "corrupting a juror or jurors does not by itself constitute an obstruction to the court in the performance of its duty" -- the defendant's twenty-sixth assignment of error -- was right. Such obstruction would be the natural and necessary consequence of "corrupting" a juror or jurors.
11. The defendant's twenty-third and twenty-fourth assignments of error are the refusals of certain requested rulings to the effect that the defendant in a criminal case is "required" or "bound" to investigate prospective jurors to avoid waiving or being estopped to object to disqualifications of jurors. With respect to these requested rulings the trial judge stated, "Not applicable, as I have already ruled that lawful investigation is proper." This was not error. The subject was adequately covered by other rulings made at the request of the defendant.
have a trial by jury," to the exclusion of contempt proceedings.
13. The defendant's twenty-ninth assignment of error is that the trial judge granted, but did not follow in making his decision, a number of the defendant's requests for rulings. The rulings requested and made were, in some respects at least, too favorable to the defendant. But we find nothing in the record showing that they were not followed by the trial judge in making his decision.
14. There is no merit in the defendant's thirtieth assignment of error that the "facts found by the court do not constitute contempt of court." We do not understand the defendant to argue this assignment. At any rate it clearly is without merit. The facts found constitute contempt. Hurley v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 443. Opinion of the Justices, 301 Mass. 615, 618. The thirty-second, thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth assignments of error -- which must be taken as referring to the facts found -- for a like reason are without merit. They recite respectively that "No word or act" on the part of the defendant "constituted a contempt," "hindered the administration of justice" "had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice," and "warranted a conviction for contempt."
and wicked attempt to interfere with the administration of justice in court, and was a contempt which deserved severe punishment. It was an attempt at bribery of persons in an important position of trust. Contempts of this kind are most dangerous assaults upon the integrity of our courts in the trial of cases. It is inconceivable that any court would treat such an offence as anything less than a criminal contempt of the gravest character." See also Opinion of the Justices, 301 Mass. 615, 618-619.
16. The defendant's thirty-ninth assignment of error is that it "was error for the court to enter a judgment or sentence without setting out sufficiently the facts which were found by the trial judge." The facts recited in the order adjudging the defendant in contempt were sufficient, as already pointed out, to support the judgment for contempt. The defendant was not entitled as of right to more detailed findings. See Woodbury v. Commonwealth, 295 Mass. 316, 319. See also Hurley v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 443, 447.
the record. See Commonwealth v. McKnight, 289 Mass. 530, 539. See also Commonwealth v. Child, 10 Pick. 252, 255.
It follows that since the ruling of the single justice was right the exception thereto must be overruled, and since no error is disclosed in the record of the case in the Superior Court the judgment of that court must be affirmed.
[Note p329] The complaint in its third paragraph alleged that "subsequent to March 21, 1938," the defendant and six other persons "conspire[d] . . . to influence and to corrupt the jurors who had been duly drawn, qualified and subject to service in the trial" of these cases "by soliciting the said jurors with intent wilfully, wrongfully and illegally to influence the decision of said jurors in the aforesaid cases, and by giving and offering to give the said jurors gifts and gratuities, with intent wilfully, wrongfully and illegally to influence the decision of said jurors in the aforesaid cases, and with intent, to impede and obstruct the due administration of justice," and that the defendant and the six other persons agreed mutually to inform each other as to the progress that was being made. The complaint alleged in its fourth paragraph that the defendant "did hire, retain and solicit" five of said persons "to solicit said jurors with intent wilfully, wrongfully and illegally to influence the decision of said jurors in the aforesaid cases, and to give and offer to give the said jurors gifts and gratuities, with intent wilfully, wrongfully and illegally to influence the decision of said jurors in the aforesaid cases, and with the intent, to impede and obstruct the due administration of justice," and that these five persons "did agree to solicit and did solicit said jurors with intent wilfully, wrongfully and illegally to influence the decision of said jurors in the aforesaid cases, and did agree to give and offer to give, and did give and offer to give the said jurors gifts and gratuities with intent wilfully, wrongfully and illegally to influence the decision of said jurors in the aforesaid cases, with intent to impede and obstruct the due administration of justice." The complaint further alleged in its fifth paragraph that the defendant and six other persons "did wilfully, wrongfully and illegally attempt to influence and corrupt the decision of said jurors in said cases, as aforesaid, and did influence and corrupt said jurors, as aforesaid; and further did inform each other of the progress and results obtained in their said attempts to influence the decisions of said jurors, as aforesaid, in their attempts to corrupt said jurors, as aforesaid, and in their attempts to impede and obstruct the due administration of justice, as aforesaid."
[Note p330] In the answers to the motions for particulars the time and place of the formation of the conspiracy were stated to be on or about March 21, 1938, in Suffolk County, and the other acts were stated to have occurred since March 21, 1938, in said county. It was stated that oral solicitation of the jurors was contemplated, and that the gifts and gratuities contemplated, agreed upon and actually made or offered to the jurors were "money." It was stated also that the defendant hired, retained and solicited others named in the complaint "by personal contact and contacts through agents and mutual acquaintances," that the defendant and others named in the complaint agreed to solicit the jurors, gave or offered to give to them gifts or gratuities, and attempted to influence and corrupt their decision substantially by like contacts, and that the decision of the jurors and the arrangement made with jurors receiving gifts or gratuities were for the purpose of influencing their decision to render verdicts of not guilty for the defendant and Quinn. The names of jurors "allegedly solicited," "allegedly offered gifts or gratuities," "allegedly influenced and corrupted," and the names of jurors to whom, according to statements of persons named in the complaint, it was agreed that gifts or gratuities should be given were stated in the answers, together with the further words, in each instance, "and twelve others whose names are unknown to the complainant." The name of another juror whom the defendant attempted to influence and corrupt was also given.

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