Source: https://www.ptab.us/2016/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:00:45+00:00

Document:
[P]icking and choosing may be entirely proper in the making of a 103, obviousness rejection, where the applicant must be afforded an opportunity to rebut with objective evidence any inference of obviousness which may arise from the similarity of the subject matter which he claims to the prior art, but it has no place in the making of a 102, anticipation rejection.
In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587–588 (CCPA 1972).
While it is true that the transitional phrase "comprising" leaves the claimed subject matter open to additional elements not recited in the claims, to allow the additional elements connected to the winding structure to include additional voltage source converters would render the "requirement that "a single voltage converter [be] connected to the winding structure' nugatory. Cf., e.g., Mannesmann DeMag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products co., Inc., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The district court correctly observed that the phrase "consisting of" appears in clause (a), not the preamble of the claim, and thus limits only the element set forth in clause (a). The court correctly declined to read this usage of 'consisting of' as excluding all other elements from the claim as a whole"; emphasis added).
"[C]laims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim." Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (refusing to adopt a claim construction which would render a claim limitation meaningless).
The particular labels attached to the codes that are associated are discernable only in the mind of the beholder, and such labels are afforded no patentable weight. King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2010). (“If we were to adopt Ngai’s position, anyone could continue patenting a product indefinitely provided that they add a new instruction sheet to the product.”).
Cir. 1994). “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl'ns. S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). At best, the prior art here merely discloses an alternative, which is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate a teaching away. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
"The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citing In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032 (CCPA 1979)); see also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[l]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.") (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co., Inc. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); and In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) ("Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.").

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