Source: http://awa2012.concurrences.com/academic/article/proof-in-cartels-state-of-play-and
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:50:13+00:00

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In order to deal with the increasing difficulties associated with gathering evidence, the European Commission has started to rely more and more on oral evidence to substantiate its cases, in particular with regard to the existence of cartels. This trend, combined with the current deficiencies of the European Commission’s enforcement procedure, may lead to a decrease in the quality of evidence relied upon in a case, thus affecting the parties’ rights of defence. In this context, certain changes in the European Commission’s enforcement procedure may be appropriate.
In order to establish competition law infringements, competition authorities have gradually adopted leniency programs, encouraging companies involved in a crime to provide evidence in exchange for full or partial exemption from fines.  As part of these programs, where there is no written evidence, business leaders are often called upon to provide the Commission with oral statements – without facing much risk of penalties for providing false statements. The probative value of these oral statements is determined by case law. In addition, following the adoption of Regulation No. 1/2003, the Commission may collect oral statements from any person who may have information relating to the alleged infringement, as long as the person consents.
In light of these developments, there are legitimate questions as to whether the burden of proof in Community law is converging with – or is at least informed by – the approach used in the United States, where the Department of Justice primarily relies on direct testimony and cross-examination to prosecute and punish cartels, while written evidence – once the almost exclusive source of proof – now occupies a secondary role.
These developments, combined with the sui generis character of proceedings before competition authorities – or at least the Commission and the French Competition Authority (the “Authority”) –, have enabled the latter to distance themselves to a certain extent from the requirements of criminal law, in particular those concerning the nature and the quality of evidence tending to demonstrate the existence of an infringement, and thus to justify the imposition of a fine. At the same time, companies sometimes have the impression that they are being confronted by competition authorities equipped with extensive investigatory tools and being found, sometimes based on evidence that is more than questionable, or at least questionable, to have violated the competition rules.
Almost a decade after the entry into force of Regulation No. 1/2003 and pending the outcome of the discussions initiated by Commissioner Almunia on adjustments to the administrative procedure of investigation and punishment of cartels, it seems important to show how the Commission’s decisions in cartel proceedings have, in recent years, reflected the increasingly important role of oral evidence (I) and to analyse the limitations of the current system, which will likely result in requiring a lower level of proof, as well as possible desirable developments (II).
If the enactment and more generally the rules and principles applicable to the evidence required in cartel proceedings (Article 101 TFEU and L. 420-1 of the Commercial Code) remain unchanged (1.), the Commission’s decisional practice will, due to the introduction of leniency programs, rely increasingly systematically on oral evidence (2.).
According to the European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”) “the principle that prevails … is that of the unfettered evaluation of evidence and that it is only the reliability of the evidence that is decisive when it comes to its evaluation.”  The system set forth in Community law therefore stands in contrast to the system of legal proof that confers on the legislature the task of assessing the relative value of evidence.
With regard to the probative value of evidence, the Community courts traditionally consider “the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed, and whether, on its face, the document appears sound and reliable.”  and that, “[i]n assessing the evidential value of a reporting document, regard should be had first and foremost to the credibility of the account it contains.”  One consequence of the Community courts’ pragmatic approach is that a document of anonymous origin may be produced in cartel proceedings and can potentially be used as evidence to justify a finding of infringement.  It is also possible that the Commission or the Authority may decide to open an investigation based solely on a document of anonymous origin, since both regulators can open investigations on their own initiative.
The existence of such a standard of proof, however, does not exclude that the existence of an infringement may be inferred from a number of “coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules.”  From a quantitative point of view, Community law does not limit the Commission from finding an infringement, even where the infringement is based only on a single piece of evidence. In such a case, the evidence, sometimes called a “smoking gun”  to the extent that it demonstrates all or part of the anti-competitive agreement and its participants, will not be in doubt and it will have to alone clearly demonstrate the existence of the offense.  The corresponding probative value of the evidence depends, of course, on the facts of the case and the characteristics of the evidence.
The Community courts also rely on hearsay evidence. This particular issue of hearsay evidence was debated in the recent case of Toshiba,  in which the applicant contended that evidence used by the Commission to demonstrate the existence of collusion should be dismissed because it originated from a person who had not personally attended the meeting at which the collusion allegedly occurred. The General Court, after noting that this person had confirmed during his testimony he was not present at the conclusion of the joint arrangement,  for its part observed that “a witness is able to furnish evidence of a long-standing phenomenon even if he was not present at its inception”  and that, therefore, this testimony was an indication of the existence of common understanding.  This approach may be problematic in terms of rights of defence.
Moreover, it should be noted that due to difficulties encountered by the Commission in gathering evidence sufficient to prove of the existence a cartel, the Community courts admit that the weight of evidence is based more on its overall consistency than on the value of each individual item of evidence.  The Community courts consider that “it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement.”  By conducting a comprehensive analysis of the evidence, the competition authority is not obliged to interpret each piece of evidence, which can be sometimes unclear or even contradictory.
The Commission has extensive powers to search for evidence of an infringement, allowing it to collect documentary evidence demonstrating violations of competition law. The renewal of the Commission’s powers under the Regulation No. 1/2003, and in particular the Commission’s power to take oral statements (a) and the success of its leniency program (b) seem to support the principle, established in case law, that testimony has only a marginal role in terms of providing evidence of cartels (c). On the contrary, these methods of investigation appear to be heavily loaded with testimonial evidence.
b) The Commission’s power to collect oral statements The objective for the adoption of Regulation No. 1/2003 was to improve the Commission’s investigative powers. Following its adoption, the Commission now has two new methods of investigation: (i) it may inspect premises other than those of the company in question (Article 21) and (ii) it may collect oral statements (Article 19).  Under Article 19, the Commission may collect statements from the representatives or employees of the company inspected, or any person or entity through their representative.  The Commission may also collect oral statements from leniency applicants and from complainants.  To the extent that Article 19(2) states that, “Where an interview pursuant to paragraph 1 is made on the premises of an undertaking”, we believe that this interview may also take place outside the context of a “dawn raid” and instead take place at the Commission’s premises. This provision was harshly criticised by companies and practitioners during the public consultation concerning draft Regulation No. 1/2003, and the final Regulation was accordingly amended on this point.  While the draft Regulation would have given the Commission power to interview anyone with useful information, resembling the power available to the US antitrust authorities, the final Regulation is more limited, with Article 19(1) expressly providing that the Commission may only interview those persons “who consent”. Similarly, while the draft Regulation envisaged that interviews would take place in the Commission’s premises, the final Regulation is silent as to the location of the interview. Interviews conducted under Article 19 of Regulation No 1/2003 must be recorded “by any means.”  A copy of the recording must be returned to the person interviewed who will have the opportunity to make corrections within a period of at least two weeks.  Regulation No. 773/2004, on the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (“Regulation No. 773/2004”), Article 3(3) states that “[t]he Commission may record the statements made by the persons interviewed in any form.” Note, however, that although neither Regulation No. 1/2003 nor its implementing Regulation, Regulation No 773/2004, obliges the Commission to memorialise the statements of persons interviewed, in practice the Commission does so, and the person interviewed must sign the record. In contrast to what is provided for responses to requests for information, Regulation No. 1/2003 does not impose any penalty for providing false or misleading information in a voluntary oral statement. Some commentators have also stressed that the power to take statements should be distinguished from the Commission’s power to ask “for explanations on facts or documents relating to the subject-matter and purpose of the inspection” under Regulation No. 1/2003, Article 20(2)(e), which must be interpreted restrictively. Indeed, a broad interpretation of this provision would allow the Commission to ask any question related to the object and purpose of the inspection, and thus to circumvent the requirements and guarantees provided in connection with requests for information (Article 18) and hearings (Article 19). In order to respect the rights of the defence, it seems preferable that the Commission use a reasonable approach and seek clarification since the person questioned, who is not entitled to the protections afforded under Articles 18 and 19, will not benefit from a delay in developing his or her response and cannot refuse to be interviewed.  In a complaint filed by Intel, the European Ombudsman acknowledged that the Community courts have, to date, not commented on the regime of declarations made under section 19,  and that pursuant to the interpretation of this article,  the Commission had discretion to take statements. However, the Ombudsman also considered that when the Commission conducts interviews to gather information related to a pending case, these discussions must necessarily be listed as interviews under section 19 , so that the guarantees under that section are met. It is also envisaged that the Hearing Officer could be called upon to decide on the applications by Commission officials concerning the powers conveyed on them by Regulation No. 1/2003, in particular with regard to the power of taking statements.
One of the major shortcomings of the current procedures in cartel cases is that the parties are unable to interview the people who made statements, especially the employees of other companies, whose declarations influence the Commission’s infringement decisions. This seems to be inconsistent with Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) which states that every accused person has the right “to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.” Therefore, the European Union’s future compliance with the ECHR may require a development on this particular point.
Recognizing the shortcomings of the current situation, the Commission recently published a document entitled “Guidance on procedures of the Hearing Officers,” the objective of which is to facilitate resolution of disputes concerning.  The recent appointment of Wouter P.J. Wils to the position of Hearing Officer may, too, allow for some improvement in the situation and in particular to enable the oral hearing to take on greater importance in resolving disputes.  More broadly, Commissioner Almunia launched a major reform of antitrust procedures.  This initiative may include the question of proof in cartels.
While the hearing provides the recipient of the statement of objections the opportunity to present his defence in a more spontaneous manner, the Commission does not have to respond to the defendant’s arguments and the defendant does not have the right to examine or cross-examine the Commission, or any third party from which the Commission obtained evidence. Thus, although the Hearing Officer can, at the end of the hearing, ask questions, he rarely does. Recent complaints to the European Ombudsman in competition cases, including in the Intel case, also suggest a growing concern of the parties about the development of adversarial administrative procedure leading to the adoption of a penalty, and in particular concerning the hearing. To strengthen the adversarial nature of proceedings, the Commission would need to reform the purpose and procedural rules of the hearing and, more broadly, the investigative phase of proceeding (including the content of the file). On this point, it seems essential that the companies under investigation have (i) the possibility to cross-examine the representative of the immunity applicant and the various individuals who made the statements (“corporate statements”) in support of the immunity application and (ii) access to the Commission’s file in as complete a form as is possible, to enable them to formulate a defence strategy.
The Community courts have found that company statements, especially statements submitted in support of a leniency application, are merely clues that, if challenged, should be corroborated by other evidence.  Faced with the difficulty of collecting evidence and resource austerity, the Commission may, however, be tempted to rely largely or almost exclusively on the statements of complainants, leniency applicants or other parties involved.
In the Vitamins case, the Commission became aware of the risk contained in statements of the parties to the proceedings, noting that the latter must “be treated with some caution, particularly if they seek to put a gloss on the events related which is favourable to themselves, for example by diminishing their role in the violation.”  Conversely, in the Cartonboard case, the Commission considered that the fact that the statements of the company Stora went against its own interests which made them very credible.  The General Court considered, pragmatically, that “statements made in the context of the leniency policy play an important role. Those statements made on behalf of undertakings have a probative value that is not insignificant, since they entail considerable legal and economic risks.”  The judgment of JFE Engineering, provides an analytical framework for determining the probative value of statements, which depends on whether (i) the statements were made by a representative of a company or individual, (ii) the declarant was required to act in the interests of the company, (iii) the declarant was a direct witness to the anticompetitive facts, (iv) the statement was made deliberately and after careful consideration, (v) the declarant confirms his statements throughout the investigation process, and (vi) the statement is against the interests of the declarant or his company. The General Court also observed that “an admission by one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the accuracy of which is contested by several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate proof of an infringement committed by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence.”  Thus, in case T-384/06 (corporate IBP and International Building Products France against the decision of the Commission in Raccords), the General Court considered that in the absence of such additional evidence, evidence of the allegedly anticompetitive business contacts of IBP group and the association that managed the cartel’s communications were deemed insufficient. Proof of the content of telephone conversations could not be established and therefore this evidence could not prove an anticompetitive purpose.  The risk of false statements or approximations are, in our opinion, reinforced by the absence of any statutory provision designed to ensure the reliability of evidence. In particular, complainants are not subject to any penalty - other than the dismissal of their complaint - in respect of the evidence they voluntarily submit to the Commission. With regard to leniency applicants, the General Courts stated that a declarant who attempted to hide all or part of the offense would run a serious risk “of having helped the Commission to established that he committed an infringement, but without being granted any substantial reduction of his fine for having cooperated.”  In addition, although the company that is subject to a complaint can challenge the complainant’s statement in his own statements or in its response to the statement of objections, there is no means by which the targeted company can subject a complainant or a leniency applicant to cross-examination.  The possibility of orally challenging a complainant or statement of objections is actually limited to one hearing, which does not seem satisfactory since, at this stage of the proceedings, the statement of objections has already been formulated and notified to the implicated parties.
According to a member of the Legal Service of the Commission, the question concerning whether the fact that third parties to proceedings (not subject to inspection) do not risk of penalties for their statements may encourage them to provide inaccurate information, remains open.  In the event that the statements were obtained under Article 19 of Regulation No. 1/2003, it is permissible to consider the possibility that criminal sanctions be imposed by a national court in the event of giving a false testimony. Within the European Competition Network, when officials of a national competition authority assist Commission officials in connection with an inspection, they do so at the request of the competition authority of the Member State concerned. In these circumstances it is reasonable to think that the national law of the Member State, particularly concerning penalties for providing false testimony and statements, may apply. Regarding the possibility of the Commission directly imposing sanctions on leniency applicants, complainants or third parties for submitting false statements, the European Union’s lack of competence in criminal matters excludes a priori the possibility of penalising individuals who provide false statements. It seems quite possible that the companies on whose behalf such statements could be subject to a fine for providing incorrect or misleading information. However, such a possibility would require an amendment to Article 23 of Regulation No. 1/2003 because in its the current form, it only provides for penalties in cases where someone provides incorrect or misleading information in response to a request for information, or during an inspection.
If the Community courts have powers of investigation and inquiry - including the important opportunity of holding hearings, we note with regret that it rarely utilises its investigative instruments. In doing so, the Community courts therefore generally rely on pleadings, which are mainly comprised of a motion to quash, responses and the Commission’s records. The Rules of Procedure provide, however, that "[i]n reply or rejoinder a party may offer further evidence” subject to providing reasons “for the delay in offering it.”  With more particular regard to the power to conduct evidentiary hearings or summon expert testimony,  the analysis of Community case law demonstrates that it is up to the judge to interpret the conditions under which that power may be exercised. Thus in the Baustahlgewebe case,  the General Court dismissed the applicant’s belated request for the examination of a witnesses, which was presented in its reply. The ECJ affirmed the General Court’s decision  and said that even when an application for hearing of witnesses is made in the application, indicting precisely the facts on which it is appropriate to hear the witness or witnesses and the natural reasons justifying their testimony, it is for the court to ultimately assess the relevance of such a request in relation to the subject matter and the need to proceed with hearing the witness testimony.  In Dansk Rørindustri, the ECJ once again endorsed the General Court’s refusal to conduct a hearing on the grounds that “the request that the six persons concerned be examined did not indicate precisely the facts in respect of which those persons should be heard as witnesses.”  Finally, in the Clearstream decision, the Court found that it could “rule on the basis of the pleas in law and the arguments presented in the course of both the written and oral procedure” without having to grant the request for a hearing of a witness presented by the applicants.  Cases in which the Community courts have taken the opportunity to hear witnesses are, to our knowledge, ultimately limited in number.  Besides the examination of witnesses, there have been instances where the Community courts ordered other types of investigations. Thus, in the series of decisions concerning the production of beams, the ECJ took instructive measures in relation to requests for document production and the transmission of written questions to the parties.  The Community courts may also use expert reports. This was indeed the case in Wood Pulp where the Court made use of two expert reports to determine whether the Commission’s analysis as to the explanation of parallel conduct (resulting, according to the Commission, in collusion among producers of wood pulp) was correct.  These expert reports allowed the Court to conclude that “the normal operation of the market [was] a more plausible explanation for the uniformity of prices than concertation” and thus annul the Commission’s decision. It appears that the Community courts very rarely agree to undertake such investigations.
3.2. Desirable changes towards strengthening of judicial review Strengthening the Community courts’ judicial review of the Commission’s analysis and the evidence on which it relies seems to be both necessary and possible in our view. This may be done via a more systematic use of investigative measures expressly provided for in the existing procedural rules (e.g., expert reports, witness statements).
The current situation is not entirely satisfactory, and the Commission could take advantage of its current reflections on procedures used in competition law cases to make certain amendments so as to strengthen the quality of evidence used in the procedures of cartels. In particular to ensure a more systematic use of testimonial evidence that is consistent with rights of defence of the companies under investigation. This would ensure a balance between the Commission’s mission and powers in respect of public enforcement and the rights of businesses prosecuted, to prevent “hunting cartels” from becoming more like “witch hunts.”  It seems in this context that the recommendations suggested in this article could help achieve this goal, or at least go some way towards attaining this objective.
 This article will not discuss the reversal of the burden of proof under Article 101(3) TFEU, by which certain practices can be justified by economic efficiencies, or the burden of proof in merger control proceedings.
 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (EC) (hereafter “Regulation No. 1/2003”), Recital, para. 25. On this point, see also the conclusions presented on September 12, 2006 by Advocate General ML A. Geelhoed in Case C-411/04 Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission, para. 52: The production of evidence in competition cases is characterised by special problems, which were recently summarised again by the Court of Justice in the Aalborg-Portland judgment: •	it is normal for activities connected with anti-competitive practices and agreements to take place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, most frequently in a non-member country, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum; •	even the few documents evidencing unlawful contact between traders will normally be only fragmentary and sparse; •	in most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules.
 Nathalie Jalabert-Doury, Oral statements in antitrust law procedure, CONCURRENCES No. 2-2005, §3, p. 41.
 Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, 1998, E.C.R. I-5417, para. 58; Case C-49/92P Commission v. Anic, 1999, E.C.R. I-4125, para. 86. See also Regulation No. 1/2003, Article 2: “In any national or Community proceedings for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) or of Article 82 of the Treaty shall rest on the party or the authority alleging the infringement….” This principle is also stated in Recital 5 of Regulation No. 1/2003.
 Case T-67/00 JFE Engineering v. Commission, 2004, E.C.R. II-2501, para. 173 (citations omitted).
 Autorité, etude thématique du rapport annuel 2006 [Authority, Annual Report 2006, Thematic Study], La prevue des accords de volontés constitutifs d’entente, p.78.
 Case C-235/92 Montecatini v. Commission, 1999, E.C.R. I-4539, para. 176; Case T-279/02 Degussa v. Commission, 2006, E.C.R. II-897 para. 115; Case T-113/07 Toshiba v. Commission 2011, 5 C.M.L.R. 20, at para. 79. The principle of the presumption of innocence is also guaranteed by Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
 According to the Commission, nearly 75% of cartel cases handled by it are the result of a leniency application. See Commission Report on Competition Policy 2009, para. 100.
 Jalabert-Doury, supra note 3, p. 43, para. 3.
 Regulation No. 1/2003, Recital 5. On this point see also Laurence Idot, Droit communautaire de la concurrence – Le nouveau système communautaire de mise en œurve des articles 81 et 82 EC, BRUYLANT, (2004) p. 20, para. 22, footnote on page 74.
 Rapport de M. Bargue, conseiller rapporteur, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Report of M. Bargue, Rapporteur, in the supreme court for judicial matters], Philips France, Sony France, Références aux arrêt CEDH July 12,1988 Schenk c / Switzerland, Series A, No. 140, March 25, 1999, Pelissier and Sassi c / France.
 Jalabert-Doury, supra note 3, at p. 43, para. 16.
 Case T-1/89 Rhone-Poulenc v. Commission (Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf of 10 Jul.1991) (“Considerable importance must be attached to the fact that competition cases of this kind [cartels] are in reality of a penal nature, which naturally suggests that a high standard of proof is required”).
 Case C-411/04 Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission, 2007, 4 C.M.L.R. 682, para. 45.
 Case T-1/89 Rhone-Poulenc v. Commission (Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf of 10 July 1991); Case T-25/95 etc. Cimenteries CBR Cement SA v. Commission, 2000, E.C.R. II-491, para.1053; Case T-3/89, Atochem v. Commission, 1991, E.C.R. II-1177, paras. 31-38; Case T-157/94, Empresa Nacional Siderúrgica (Ensidesa), 1999, E.C.R. II-707, para. 312.
 Case C-407/04 P, Dalmine v. Commission, 2007, para. 63.
 Cour de cassation [supreme court for judicial matters] decision no. 587 of Jan. 7, 2011 pourvois n° 09-14.316 et 09-14.667, Philips France et Sony France c. Ministre de l’Économie.
 Case IV/33.384 Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Federatieve Groothandel op Elektrotechnische gebied und Technische Unie (26 October 1999), para. 32.
 Anne-Lise Sibony, Eric Barbier de La Serre, Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle en droit communautaire de la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective, RTDE, Apr.-Jun, 2007, para. 28, p. 226.
 Id., para. 29, p. 227.
 Case C-12/03P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, 2005, E.C.R. I-897, paras. 37, 41 & 61; Joined Cases C-403 & 405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries v. Commission, 2007, 4 C.M.L.R 650; Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann AG and Sony v. Impala, 2008, E.C.R. I-4951; Case C-501/06 P etc. GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission, 2009.
 See especially Case C-49/92P Commission v. Anic, 1999, E.C.R. I-4125.
 Among a significant body of literature see especially the Authority’s Thematic Study, Objet, effet et intention anticoncurrentiels in its Rapport Annuel 2003 [Annual Report], at pp. 55-78. See also Laurence Idot Notion of Anticompetitive Object/Effect…, CONCURRENCES No.4-2009, pp. 1-2.
 James S. Venit, Human All Too Human: The Gathering and assessment of evidence and the Appropriate Standard of Proof and Judicial Review in Commission Proceedings Applying Articles 81 and 82, p. 61, available at http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/R.... reprinted in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2009: EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPETITION CASES (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis (eds.)) (2010).
 Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v. Commission, 2005, E.C.R. II-4407, para. 217; Case T-62/98 Volkswagen AG v. Commission, 2000, E.C.R. II-2707, paras. 43 and 72.
 Joined Cases 29 and 30/83 CRAM & Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission,1984, E.C.R.1679, para. 19.
 Case T-53/03 BPB plc. v. Commission, 2008, E.C.R. II-1333, para. 63.
 OECD, Policy Roundtable: Prosecuting Cartels Without Direct Evidence, supra note 32, at p. 114.
 Case T-25/95 etc. Cimenteries CBR Cement SA v. Commission, 2000, E.C.R. II-491, para. 1838.
 In this regard, it is worth reiterating that the only Commission decision finding an infringement based solely on circumstantial evidence (i.e., economic evidence) was annulled by the European Court of Justice. Case C-89/95 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö e.a v. Commission (Wood Pulp),1993, E.C.R I-1037. On this point, see also OECD, Policy Roundtable: Prosecuting Cartels Without Direct Evidence, supra note 32, at p. 116 & p. 30 (footnote).
 Marie-Chantal Boutard Labarde & Guy Canivet (et al) L’application en France du droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles, LGDJ, 2008, p. 86 para. 82.
 Valerie Fauré, ibid., § 579, p. 378.
 Case 48/69 ICI v. Commission, 1972, E.C.R. 619, paras. 64-68; Joined Cases 29 and 30/83 CRAM & Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission,1984, E.C.R.1679, paras. 16-20, Case C-89/95 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö e.a v. Commission (Wood Pulp),1993, ECR I-1037, para. ,71.
 Case C-89/95 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö e.a v. Commission (Wood Pulp),1993, ECR I-1037, para. ,31: By order of 25 November 1988 the Court decided to obtain an expert’ s report on parallelism of prices. The experts charged with drawing it up were appointed by order of 16 March 1989. They were asked whether the documents used by the Commission in drawing up Tables 6 and 7 annexed to the decision justified the conclusion as to parallelism of announced prices and transaction prices.
 OECD, Policy Roundtable: Prosecuting Cartels Without Direct Evidence, supra note 32, at 120 (contribution of France).
 Case T-113/07 Toshiba v. Commission, 2011, 5 C.M.L.R. 20.
 Marie-Chantal Boutard Labarde & Guy Canivet, supra note 41 at 87, § 83.
 Case T-67/00 JFE Engineering v. Commission, 2004, E.C.R. II-2501, para.180.
 Jalabert-Doury, supra note 3, at §1 p. 41.
 Case C-411/04 Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission, 2007, 4 C.M.L.R. 682, at para. 42.
 Case C-411/04 Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission (Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, 12 Sept. 2006), para. 55.
 The rules applicable to the Commission’s power to take statements are set forth in Commission Regulation 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (EC) (hereafter “Regulation No. 773/2004”).
 Regulation No. 1/2003, Article 19: Power to take statements 1. In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission may interview any natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject-matter of an investigation. 2. Where an interview pursuant to paragraph 1 is conducted in the premises of an undertaking, the Commission shall inform the competition authority of the Member State in whose territory the interview takes place. If so requested by the competition authority of that Member State, its officials may assist the officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to conduct the interview.
 In its contribution, the International Chamber of Commerce noted that it would be desirable for the Commission to inform individuals sought to be interviewed of their rights, including the right not to respond. The lack of clarity and rules governing the Commission’s power to take statements was also mentioned in other contributions. Some respondents suggested that individuals the Commission seeks to interview should be assisted by a lawyer and should be informed of the legal basis and purpose of the interview. The Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, meanwhile, suggested that the copy of the statement recording the interview not only be made available to the person interviewed, but actively provided to him. On this point see also Idot, supra note 29, p. 99 para. 207.
 Id., Art. 17(3) (“The time-limits referred to in Article 3(3)… shall be at least two weeks.”).
 MARIO SIRAGUSA & CESARE RIZZA, EU COMPETITION LAW: CARTELS AND HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICES BETWEEN COMPETITORS , p. 176, para. 2.161 (2007).
 Case 1935/2008/FOR (Intel), Decision of the European Ombudsman of 14 Jul. 2009, para. 90.
 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in Cartel Cases, OJ 2006 C298/17 (hereafter “Leniency Notice”), para. 25.
 Commission Guidance on Procedures of the Hearing Officers in Proceedings Relating to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (ex- articles 81 and 82 EC), para. 38.
 Wouter P .J. Wils, The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis, WORLD COMPETITION: LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW Vol. 27 No. 2 (2004), pp. 202-224 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers...., pp. 15-19 See also Venit, supra note 30, at pp. 11-13.
 Wils, supra note 77 at 216.
 Venit, supra note 30, p. 12 & 28 (footnote).
 Bruno Lasserre, The new Competition Authority, CONCURRENCES N ° 1-2009, p. 2.
 Regulation No. 773/2004, Article 10(3).
 Case 103/80 Musique French Diffusion v. Commission (Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, 8 Feb. 1983), p.17.
 SIRAGUSA & RIZZA, supra note 65, p.221 para. 2.263.. See especially COMP/38.240 Industrial Copper Tubes 16 Dec. 2003, para. 74; COMP/37.857 Organic Peroxide, 10 Dec. 2003, para. 78  5 C.M.L.R. 579; COMP/37.370 Sorbates, 2 Oct. 2003, para. 21 5 C.M.L.R. 2054; COMP/37.519 Methionine, 2 July 2002, para. 59,  C.M.L.R.1062; COMP/38.281 Italian Raw Tobacco, 20 Oct. 2005, para. 25,  4 C.M.L.R. 1766.
 SIRAGUSA & RIZZA, supra note 65, p.222 para. 2.263.
 Joined Cases 43 & 63/82, VBVB and VBBB v. Commission, 1984, E.C.R. 19, para. 18; Case T-9/99R HFB Holding v. Commission, 2002, E.C.R. II-1487 , para.383.
 Case 9/83 Eisen und Metall Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission, 1984, E.C.R. 2071, para. 32; Case T-9/99R HFB Holding v. Commission, 2002, E.C.R. II-1487 , para.383.
 Regulation No. 773/2004, Art. 14(7).
 SIRAGUSA & RIZZA, supra note 65, p. 230, para. 2.285.
 Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 27(2); Regulation No. 773/2004, Art. 15(2); Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2005) (hereafter “Commission Notice on Access to the File”), para. 10.
 Jalabert-Doury, supra note 3, at p.45, para. 31.
 Venit, supra note 30, at p.24.
 COMP/31.906 Flat Glass , 7 Dec. 1988, p. 44, 1990, 4 C.M.L.R. 535.
 Case T-68/89 etc. Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA and PPG Vernante Pennitalia SpA v. Commission, 1992, E.C.R. II-1403.
 Commission Notice on Access to the File, supra note 93, Recital 13.
 Case T-191/98 Atlantic Container Line v. Commission (TACA), 2003, E.C.R. II-3275, para. 351.
 Venit, supra note 30, p.26.
 Case T-67/00 JFE Engineering v. Commission, 2004, para. 219, E.C.R. II-2501.
 COMP/37.512 Vitamins, 21 Nov. 2001, para. 538, 2003, 4 C.M.L.R. 1030.
 COMP/33.833 Cartonboard, 13 Jul. 1994, para. 111, 1994, 5 C.M.L.R. 547.
 Case T-384/06, IBP Ltd. and International Building Products France v. Commission, 2011, para. 69. For a review of that decision, see especially Pascal Cardonnel, Procedural rights: The European Commission adopts three texts to strengthen the procedural rights of the parties, CONCURRENCES, N° 4-2011, p. 185 at 186.
 Case T-67/00 JFE Engineering v. Commission, 2004, E.C.R. II-2501, para. 219. For a recent restatement of this principle, see especially Case T-384/06, IBP Ltd. and International Building Products France v. Commission, 2011, para. 69.
 Case T-384/06, IBP Ltd. and International Building Products France v. Commission, 2011, para. 69.
 Case T-67/00 JFE Engineering v. Commission, 2004, E.C.R. II-2501, para. 214.
 Jalabert-Doury, supra note 3, p.44, para. 26.
 Venit, supra note 30, at p.39.
 Regulation No. 1/2003, Arts. 17, 18 & 20.
 Jalabert-Doury, supra note 3, at p. 44, para. 26.
 Id. at p. 44, para. 26.
 Leniency Notice para. 12(a)(4) & 30(2).
 Eric Gippini-Fournier, The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with Regulation 1/2003, supra note 61, at p.58.
 Case C-272/09 KME Germany v. Commission (Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston 10 Feb. 2011), para. 69.
 Case C-291/98P Sarrió v. Commission (Opinion of Advocate General Mischo of 18 May 2000), para. 38.
 Venit, supra note 30, at pp.63-64.
 Fauré, supra note 43, p. 383 para. 587.
 Rules of Procedure of the General Court (2 July 2010) Art. 48(1).
 Case T-145/89, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission, 1995, E.C.R. II-867.
 Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission, 1998, E.C.R. I-8417, para. 70.
 [[Case C-189/02 P Dansk Rørindustri ea v. Commission , E.C.R. I-5425, para. 60.
 Case T-301/04 Clearstream Banking and Clearstream International SA v. Commission, 2009,  C.M.L.R. 2677, para. 217.
 Joined Cases C-100 to 103/80, SA Musique Diffusion French ea v. Commission, 1983, E.C.R. 1825, para. 50; Case C-199/99 P, Corus UK Ltd v. Commission, 2003, para. 32.
 Fauré, supra note 43 at 426, para. 624.

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