Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/articles/PerkinsEtAl
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:23:51+00:00

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Such 5-to-4 rulings were common during the Term. Out of 63 decisions, 19 were decided by a 5-to-4 margin. In his final year on the Court, Justice Kennedy never voted with the four progressive justices; the year before, he had voted with them 57 percent of the time.3 The Court’s newest addition, Justice Gorsuch, was a reliable conservative vote.
As we discuss here, the conservative justices controlled the outcome of most access-to-court cases. We highlight opinions that deal with Article III standing and separation of powers, mootness, statutory construction and deference, injunctions, standard of review, stare decisis, timeliness of appeals and tolling, and administrative procedure.
In Trump v. Hawaii the plaintiffs challenged Proclamation No. 9645, the third in a series of executive actions barring nationals from selected predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States.
In Patchak v. Zinke the Court examined the interplay between Congress’s power to make laws and the powers that Article III confers on the Judicial Branch.10 Patchak sued the secretary of the Interior for taking land adjacent to his land into trust on behalf of a Native American tribe, which then built a casino on the entrusted land. While Patchak’s suit was pending, Congress passed a law that barred any suits relating to the subject land, called the “Bradley Property,” and required prompt dismissal of any pending suits.11 Patchak claimed that this violated separation of powers. The Court disagreed.
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez concerned a Southern District of California policy that permitted the use of full restraints on most in-custody defendants produced for nonjury proceedings.
As always, most of the Court’s decisions this Term turned upon interpretations of federal statutes, requiring it to engage in the uniquely judicial task of “statutory construction.” Here we highlight such decisions not so much to discern their substantive merits as to seek insights into how the Court and individual justices approach this interpretive task.
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch simply declined to join the part of the opinion that cited portions of the congressional record to support interpretation of the statute.
Contrary to public perception, most of the Court’s cases involving disputes over legislation do not provoke passionate disagreement and are resolved by routine application of statutory construction analysis.43 However, every year the substantive disputes in a few cases implicate critical issues of political, economic, or social policy, and in those decisions the fault lines between the ideological wings of the Court reemerge.
Plaintiffs contended that the denial of any opportunity to challenge their detention violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The majority, with almost palpable reluctance, remanded the case for the court of appeals to consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.
Led by Justice Gorsuch, the Court repeatedly questioned the 34-year-old Chevron precedent.
The Federal Arbitration Act, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, said, trumps the National Labor Relations Act, and so courts must enforce the arbitration provision.
Benisek v. Lamone offers a primer on the preliminary injunction standard.96 Republican voters sued Maryland elections officials and alleged that the officials gerrymandered a congressional district in 2011. The voters sought a preliminary injunction in May 2017 to try to stop the officials by August 18, 2017, from proceeding with the election for the congressional seat based on the 2011 map; the voters believed August 18 to be the latest date by which a map could be redrawn before the election. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and stayed the proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s highly anticipated decision in Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case from this Term.97 After Gill was decided, the plaintiffs requested that the Court vacate the district court’s order and remand for a decision on their pending preliminary injunction motion.
Benisek v. Lamone offers a primer on the preliminary injunction standard.
When an appellate court is presented with a mixed question of law and fact, what standard of review applies? The Court answered this question in U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge Limited Liability Company.115 Debtor company Lakeridge filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Lakeridge’s efforts to reach agreement with its creditors on a debt reorganization plan stalled when a creditor, U.S. Bank, refused to consent because of another creditor’s romantic relationship with an officer of Lakeridge. The bankruptcy court rejected U.S. Bank’s argument that the romantic relationship meant that Lakeridge did not have the requisite arm’s-length relationship with its creditors. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, applying a deferential clear-error standard of review of the bankruptcy court’s finding.
In South Dakota v. Wayfair Incorporated the Court considered whether South Dakota’s law imposing sales tax on Internet sellers with no physical presence in the state was unconstitutional under the commerce clause.121 The Court said “no,” but to reach that holding, it had to buck precedent.
Artis v. District of Columbia is yet another Justice Ginsburg opinion on tolling, this time for a five-justice majority in which Chief Justice Roberts joined the liberal justices.
Artis v. District of Columbia is yet another Justice Ginsburg opinion on tolling, this time for a five-justice majority in which Chief Justice Roberts joined the liberal justices.143 The issue was how much time a plaintiff has to refile her state claim in state court after a federal district court dismisses the state claim. Federal district courts generally may exercise jurisdiction over state claims over which they otherwise would not have jurisdiction if those claims arise from the same controversy and are brought alongside proper federal claims.144 The statute of limitations for such a state claim “shall be tolled while the claim is pending [in federal court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”145 The Supreme Court’s decision turned on the meaning of the word “tolling” in the statute.
These were the competing interpretations: (1) a “stop-the-clock” interpretation, “mean[ing] that the limitations period is suspended (stops running) while the claim is [in federal court], then starts running again when the tolling period ends, picking up where it left off,” versus (2) a “grace period” interpretation, meaning “the statute of limitations continues to run while the claim is pending in [federal court,] [b]ut the risk of a time bar is averted by according the plaintiff a fixed period in which to refile.”146 Applying the tenets of statutory interpretation, the majority went with the first interpretation. “[L]ook[ing] first to [the] language [of the subject statute], giving the words used their ordinary meaning,” the Court found that the “stop-the-clock” interpretation of “tolling” was consistent with the way “tolling” was used in many other statutes and with the Black’s Law Dictionary definition.147 The Court further noted that neither the defendant nor dissenting Justice Gorsuch identified a single statute in which “tolling” meant “grace period.”148 And the Court identified just one of its decisions in which it characterized a grace period as tolling the limitations period—“a feather on the scale against the weight of decisions in which ‘tolling’ a statute of limitations signals stopping the clock.”149 “Furthermore,” said Justice Ginsburg, the “grace period” interpretation would render the absurd result of “permit[ting] a plaintiff to refile in state court even if the limitations period on her claim had expired before she filed in federal court.”150 For plaintiff Artis, who refiled in state court 59 days after the district court dismissed her state claim, the ruling meant that, rather than being 29 days late, she got her state claim in with two years to spare.
The Court decided a handful of cases affecting how administrative agencies conduct their quasi-judicial functions. Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission looked at whether the Securities and Exchange Commission’s administrative law judges are employees of the federal government or “Officers of the United States” within the meaning of the Constitution’s appointments clause. The answer is significant because the appointments clause allows only the president, courts of law, or heads of departments to appoint officers of the United States.151 If the administrative law judges were officers, then the commission’s administrative hearing was invalid because the administrative law judge was selected by commission staff rather than the commission itself.
Because the Court found the commission’s administrative law judges to be officers subject to the appointments clause, the administrative hearing was invalid.
Another administrative procedure case, In re United States, concerns the administrative record.159 This case arose when the acting secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced he was going to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The plaintiffs filed suit and, among other reasons, argued that the administrative record filed by the government was incomplete. The district court agreed and issued an order requiring supplementation of the record. After the Ninth Circuit refused to disturb that ruling, the government went back to the district court and asked that the order to supplement be stayed until after the court had decided the government’s pending motion to dismiss the case. That motion made the difficult-to-win argument that the secretary’s determination to rescind DACA was committed to agency discretion and thus unreviewable by a court.160 The district court did not grant the government’s request for a stay, and the government appealed.
Mona serves as faculty and as a member of the advisory committee for the Shriver Center's Racial Justice Training Institute, and the Western Center on Law and Poverty is part of the Legal Impact Network.
1 Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (overruling Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
2 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (travel ban); Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (forced arbitration).
3 See Erwin Chemerinsky, A New Era for the Supreme Court: Its Guiding Principle Will Be the Republican Party Platform, American Prospect (July 2, 2018).
4 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404.
7 Id. (citing Spokeo Incorporated v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016)).
10 Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
12 Id. at 905 (internal quotation omitted).
14 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
17 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
18 Id. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
19 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018).
20 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017).
21 Id. at 655, 658.
22 Id. at 657–59 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)).
23 Id. at 658 (internal quotation omitted).
24 Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1538.
26 Id. at 1538–39 (summarizing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)).
27 Id. at 1539 (summarizing Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103).
28 Id. (discussing Genesis Healthcare Corporation v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013)).
29 Id. at 1540 (internal quotations omitted).
30 Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1792 (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation omitted).
31 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
32 Digital Realty Trust Incorporated v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) (analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2017) (Sarbanes-Oxley) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2017) (Dodd-Frank)).
34 Id. at 784 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 783 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
36 Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1105 (2018) (discussing 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2017)) (internal quotation omitted).
39 Id. at 1112 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41 Lamar, Archer & Cofrin Limited Liability Partnership v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1757 (2018) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2017)).
42 Id. See also Encino Motorcars Limited Liability Company v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (2018) (majority opinion by Justice Thomas, interpreting provision of Fair Labor Standards Act, noting that legislative history of statute at issue was unhelpful “[e]ven for those Members of this Court who consider legislative history”).
43 See, e.g., Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684, 1688–89 (2018) (unanimous opinion by Justice Breyer resolving dispute under Mandatory Victims Restitution Act by invoking doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “the well-worn Latin phrase that tells us that statutory words are often known by the company they keep”).
44 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018).
46 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), (b) (2017)).
47 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)).
49 Id. at 838 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), (c)).
51 Id. (citing Rodriquez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 2015)).
52 Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1082 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001)). The Ninth Circuit thus did not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s due process claims (id. at 1087).
53 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830.
54 Id. at 843 (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005)).
55 Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1077.
56 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 843.
60 Id. at 859 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62 Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018).
63 Id. (examining 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2), (c), (d) (2016)).
64 Id. at 1850 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 1863 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
66 See Encino Motorcars Limited Liability Company v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2121 (2016).
69 Navarro v. Encino Motorcars Limited Liability Company, 845 F. 3d 925 (9th Cir. 2017).
70 Encino Motorcars Limited Liability Company, 138 S. Ct. at 1143 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) (2017)).
71 Chevron United States of America Incorporated v. Natural Resources Defense Council Incorporated, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)).
72 See, e.g., Wisconsin Central Limited v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) (interpreting disputed provision of Railroad Retirement Tax Act of 1937); Digital Realty Trust Incorporated, 138 S. Ct. at 782 (reconciling different statutory protections for reporters of securities fraud).
73 See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
74 SAS Institute Incorporated v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
75 Id. at 1358 (quoting Pittston Stevedoring Corporation v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.)) (internal quotations omitted).
76 Id. But see id. at 1360–65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77 Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
78 Id. at 1622 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2017)).
79 Id. at 1624 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157).
80 Id. at 1647 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 1630 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865).
87 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).
88 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
89 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111 (citing Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10332 (March 6, 1997)).
90 Id. at 2110 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)).
92 Id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95 Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
96 Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943–44 (2018) (per curiam).
97 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (voters alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering by Wisconsin elections officials lacked Article III standing).
98 Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1943–44 (quoting Winter v. National Resources Defense Council Incorporated, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
103 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
104 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
105 Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
108 Id. at 2316–17. Texas initiated the D.C. district court case seeking preclearance of its 2011 plans by way of declaratory relief.
110 Id. at 2315, 2318.
115 U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge Limited Liability Company, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018).
121 South Dakota v. Wayfair Incorporated, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
124 National Bellas Hess Incorporated v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
126 Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992).
127 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089, 2097.
128 Id. at 2096 (internal quotation omitted).
130 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C).
131 Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 16–17 (2017).
136 See China Agritech Incorporated v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018).
138 Id. at 1804 (citing American Pipe and Construction Company v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 544, 552–53 (1974)).
139 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
143 Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018).
145 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2017).
146 Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 601–2.
147 Id. at 603 (internal quotation omitted).
151 See Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
152 Compare id. at 2051–54 with id. at 2065–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 2053 (citing Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)).
156 Id. at 2053 (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.111, 201.180 (2018)).
157 Id. at 2054 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2)).
158 Id. at 2055 (internal quotations omitted).
159 In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017) (per curiam).
162 See Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018) (denying motion to dismiss).
163 See Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed (U.S. March 21, 2018) (No. 17-1340) (allowing private enforcement of Medicaid freedom of choice provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A) (2017)); Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast Incorporated v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (U.S. April 27, 2018) (No. 17-1492) (same). But see Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) is not privately enforceable).
164 In Re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, 869 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Frank v. Gaos, 138 S. Ct. 1697 (U.S. April 30, 2018). Courts use the cy pres doctrine to distribute unclaimed proceeds to nonprofit entities and charities. This keeps the defendant from taking unclaimed funds but has been criticized as allowing uninvolved entities to reap benefits. Many public interest organizations, legal and nonlegal, rely upon cy pres awards for program funding. Chief Justice Roberts has raised concern about the practice (see Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Statement of Chief Justice Roberts respecting denial of certiorari) (“In a suitable case, this Court may need to clarify the limits on the use of such remedies.”)).
165 Lambert v. Nutraceutical Corporation, 870 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2675 (U.S. June 25, 2018). The decision conflicts with that of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.
166 Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub nom. Obduskey v. McCarthy and Holthus Limited Liability Partnership, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (U.S. June 28, 2018).

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