Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/44214
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:16:25+00:00

Document:
SPOUSES NORMANDY AND RUTH BAUTISTA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ERNESTO L. SULA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENT.
On 6 December 2003, Ruth B. Bautista (Ruth) borrowed P300,000 from Ceniza C. Glor (Glor). The loan, payable in three months, bore a monthly interest of five percent. The three-month period commenced on 6 December 2003 and expired on 6 March 2004. To secure the loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her Honda CRV in favor of Glor.
Upon maturity of the loan, Glor repeatedly demanded payment from Ruth. Despite the repeated demands, Ruth refused to pay her debt, or surrender possession of the vehicle. Thus, on 6 May 2004, Glor filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City (trial court), a civil case for judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.
WHEREAS, plaintiff Ceniza C. Glor, in the above-entitled case, having filed an application with this Court praying for the seizure and delivery to Ceniza C. Glor of the property, more particularly described hereafter, and having filed the affidavit required by the Rules of Court and executed to the defendant a bond in the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P800,000.00).
and to keep the said property in your possession for five (5) days. At the expiration of the said period, you shall deliver, subject to the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, to the plaintiff the said property, provided that your legal fees and all the necessary expenses are fully paid.
Respondent enforced the writ on 17 May 2004. On 20 May 2004, spouses Normandy R. Bautista and Ruth B. Bautista (complainants) filed with the trial court an urgent motion for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond. On 21 May 2004, complainants filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion, attaching thereto an omnibus motion for entry of appearance, urgent setting of hearing, and redelivery of the vehicle to them. Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60, complainants required the return of the vehicle to them by filing a counter-bond and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond.
Because the trial court failed to approve complainants' counter-bond within the five-day period provided in Section 6 of Rule 60, Glor, in a letter dated 24 May 2004, asked respondent to deliver the vehicle to her. In a letter dated 26 May 2004, complainants asked respondent not to deliver the vehicle to Glor because (1) pursuant to Section 5, they had required the return of the vehicle to them and filed the corresponding counter-bond; (2) the vehicle's delivery to Glor was not justified under Section 6; and (3) there was no order from the trial court directing the delivery to Glor. In a letter dated 26 May 2004, Glor reiterated her demand on respondent to deliver the vehicle to her; otherwise, she would be constrained to pursue legal actions against him.
At 4:50 P.M. he came to us at the designated place and while we were reading his Sheriff's Manifestation, he said he had not eaten lunch yet because in his words "dahil sa paggawa ko ng Manifestation at sama ng loob dahil ako ang naipit dito sa kaso nyo, si judge kasi ang bagal mag-release ng order. Kakasuhan na ko sa Ombudsman ng plaintiff." Trying to clarify what he meant about this, we ask [sic] him what we on our part need [sic] to do so that the property will be ensured that its [sic] under the custody of the court or "custodia legis" until such time that the Honorable Court could resolve our motion. However we were totally surprised when he said that "Nasa sa inyo yan pero yun kasing kabila talagang desidido na makuha ang property, kung makapagbigay kayo ng kahit Twenty (20) Thousand sa akin magagawan natin yan ng paraan na di makuha ng plaintiff, yun ay kung gusto nyo lang, kasi pag napunta yan sa kanila baka di nyo na makita yan".
[O]n the following day 27th May 2004 at 8:10 A.M. We met him at the benches at the back of the 3rd floor of the Justice Hall Bldg. We immediately apologized and told him that we failed to borrow money for the balance of our agreement and ask [sic] if he could wait until at [sic] Friday 29th May 2004 to come up with the balance of our agreement because it might take some time before we can raise it. x x x He answered that "Medyo mahirap pala kayong kausap" and left us.
[T]his Manifestation is respectfully filed before the Honorable Court, in order that he maybe [sic] guided on whether he should release the vehicle as demanded by plaintiff or hold its release until such time that the Motions and Counter[-]bond filed by defendants is [sic] resolved as requested by the defendant.
[O]n May 27, 2004, after the expiration of the five (5) days [sic] period and in the absence of any Court Order/s, undersigned turned-over the possession of the motor vehicle to the Plaintiff as per Court/Sheriff's Receipt hereto attached.
On 31 May 2004, complainants alleged that they went to the trial court to check on the vehicle and to look for respondent. There, respondent admitted to them that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor -- he acted on his own discretion. Complainants asked respondent how much he received from Glor and why he did not give them a chance to fulfill their agreement. He just said "pasensiyahan na lang tayo."
On 2 and 7 June 2004, complainants filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), respectively, a joint affidavit-complaint against respondent. Since the acts complained of were related to respondent's functions as an officer of the court, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its 1st Indorsement dated 20 July 2004, referred the matter to the OCA.
Complainants' accusations against him were malicious and unfounded. They filed the instant case against him because they "amassed so much anxiety and wrath against respondent to the point of even telling telltales." They felt aggrieved because of the vehicle's delivery to Glor and its subsequent foreclosure.
He was only guided by the orders of the court and, in their absence, by the Rules of Court particularly Rule 60. Under Section 6 of the said Rule, the vehicle's delivery to Glor followed as a matter of course because she posted a bond which was approved by the court. On the other hand, up to the time of the delivery, complainants' counter-bond had not been approved by the court.
Complainants' accusation that he asked for P20,000 was incredulous and a total lie. He never dealt clandestinely with complainants, much less demanded money from them. He did not personally know Glor, nor was he acquainted with complainants.
Complainants had no evidence to support their accusation. If it were true that he asked and received money from them, it would have been easy for them to entrap him, yet, they did not do so.
He enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.
In their comment to respondent's comment dated 4 August 2004, complainants prayed that respondent be preventively suspended pending the investigation of the case. They alleged that they had a witness who was willing to testify on the circumstances surrounding respondent's demand and receipt of the money from them. However, the witness did not want to testify unless respondent was placed under preventive suspension because she was afraid that her testimony would endanger her means of livelihood inside the Hall of Justice building.
In its memorandum dated 14 October 2004, the OCA found that respondent erred when he released the vehicle to Glor without waiting for the trial court's instructions on who had a better right over the vehicle. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be held liable for grave abuse of authority and fined P4,000. The OCA recommended that the charges for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
In a Resolution dated 8 December 2004, the Court ordered the re-docketing of the case as a regular administrative matter and, in a Resolution dated 16 March 2005, the Court required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed.
Complainants filed a motion for further investigation and preventive suspension of respondent pending the investigation of the case. They prayed that the case be referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, for investigation. They also prayed that respondent be placed under preventive suspension to allow their witness to testify without fear of being harassed by respondent.
The Court noted complainants' motion for further investigation and preventive suspension and referred the case to the OCA for investigation, report, and recommendation. In an Order dated 24 August 2005, the OCA set the case for investigation on 15 and 16 September 2005. In the investigation, only respondent appeared. The complainants filed a manifestation and motion dated 10 September 2005 stating that although they were willing to participate in the investigation, they could not convince their witness to testify unless respondent was preventively suspended.
In a letter dated 20 September 2005, the OCA returned the rollo of the case together with complainants' manifestation and motion to the Court for further instructions. In a Resolution dated 10 October 2005, the Court noted the said letter and referred the same to the OCA for report and recommendation. Accordingly, the OCA set the case for investigation on 23 and 24 August 2006. Again, only respondent appeared in the investigation. The complainants reiterated their claim that they could not participate in the investigation unless respondent was preventively suspended.
In its Report dated 13 September 2006, the OCA recommended that (1) the motion to preventively suspend respondent be denied; (2) the previous recommendation imposing a fine of P4,000 on respondent for grave abuse of authority be adopted; and (3) the charges for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court finds respondent liable for simple misconduct.
Complainants bear the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. "Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
From the very words of the respondent Sheriff himself (page 5 of his Reply), he admitted to have [sic] APPROACHED US when he furnished us a copy of his Manifestation x x x. Why then did the respondent Sheriff approached [sic] us when his Manifestation is addressed and concerns only the Court? To put to rest that this is just a bare allegation, a third person is willing to present herself to the investigation of this Honorable Office to testify to the truth of the circumstances of the said incident which she personally witnessed but which [sic] we could not reveal her identity at the moment upon her own request because the said person makes her living in the hallway of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City.
Complainants, however, never appeared in any of the investigations, nor presented their witness. The fact that respondent approached complainants in the Hall of Justice building is not enough basis for this Court to conclude that respondent demanded and received money from them. On complainants' witness, the OCA found that "[t]he alleged fear from harassment of the complainants' unnamed witness [precluding her] to testify against the respondent unless the latter is suspended from office is purely speculative." Complainants failed to present the quantum of evidence required to hold respondent liable.
There is also no sufficient evidence to prove that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As the OCA correctly held, "[t]he charges for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service must likewise fail, for insufficiency of evidence; if there was any fault by herein respondent, it was his overzealousness to perform his duty."
The Court, however, finds respondent liable for simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. It is an unlawful behavior. "Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose although it may not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent."
In this case, plaintiff/applicant had posted a replevin bond duly approved by the court. Nevertheless, one of the elements upon which the property subject of replevin may be delivered to the plaintiff/applicant is lacking. There appears to be no court order issued yet for the release of the aforementioned property to the plaintiff/applicant. The order dated 12 May 2004 issued by the court only directed respondent to take into his custody the subject motor vehicle. Further, respondent filed a manifestation seeking guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property. Hence, respondent's justification that the release of the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevin bond to answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants may not be given weight.
It must be stressed that the prerogatives of Sheriffs do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject property. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning, he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste raised questions on his actions and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case.
Moreover, under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without due process.
Indeed, respondent went beyond the call of his duties when he delivered the vehicle to Glor. The writ of replevin issued by the trial court specifically stated that the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor subject to the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. Yet, respondent opted to ignore these provisions.
SEC. 5. Return of property. - If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the property as stated in the applicant's affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant.
Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing a redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff's affidavit within the period specified in Sections 5 and 6.
If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants require the return of the vehicle and their bond is objected to and found insufficient and they do not forthwith file an approved bond.
In the instant case, complainants duly complied with all of the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 for the return of the vehicle. Respondent took possession of the vehicle on 17 May 2004. On 20 May 2004, complainants filed their urgent motion for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond and, on 21 May 2004, they filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion and change the same with an omnibus motion. Both the urgent motion and the omnibus motion were filed before the delivery of the vehicle to Glor and before the expiration of the five-day period. Later, the trial court approved complainants' counter-bond. Thus, respondent committed an irregularity when he hastily delivered the vehicle to Glor.
Respondent as an officer of the Court is charged with certain ministerial duties which must be performed faithfully to the letter. Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court has a specific reason or objective. In this case, the purpose of the five (5) days is to give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety or sureties thereon or require the return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond.
The nature of their functions is essentially ministerial. Their prerogatives do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject properties. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondents to inform their judge of the situation by way of a partial Sheriff's Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure to be observed. These respondents failed to do.
[T]he novelty of his predicament did not call for him to use his discretion x x x without waiting for instructions from his judge. A sheriff's prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of the attached property.
[R]espondent filed a Manifestation seeking guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property. Hence, respondent's justification that the release of the seized property to plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevin bond to answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants may not be given weight.
The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning, he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste raised questions on his action and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case.
Since respondent had filed a manifestation seeking the trial court's guidance, the most appropriate course of action should have been for him to wait for the trial court's instructions on what he should do with the vehicle. Assuming that the issue may have been too technical for respondent to decide on the spot, it would have been prudent for him to let the trial court decide on the matter. However, he was overzealous and delivered the vehicle to Glor without even giving the trial court a chance to act on his manifestation. His unusual zeal and precipitate decision to give possession of the vehicle to Glor effectively destroyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. "While the expeditious and efficient execution of court orders and writs is commendable, it should not, under any circumstances, be done by departing from the Rules governing the same."
Respondent should execute the directives of the trial court strictly "in accordance with the letter thereof and without any deviation therefrom." As an officer of the court, he should follow the provisions of the Rules to the letter especially when the law is clear.
When, as in this case, the law is clear, respondent owes it to himself and to the public he serves to adhere to its dictates. The failure to do so exposes the wrongdoer to administrative sanctions. When the inefficiency of an officer of the court springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, he is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith or with grave abuse of authority.
Section 52(B)(2) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Having been in the service for more than 26 years, respondent cannot wrongly interpret basic rules without appearing grossly incompetent or having acted in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ernesto L. Sula, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City, GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, we SUSPEND him for six months without pay and STERNLY WARN him that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
 Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-04-52587, entitled "Ceniza C. Glor v. Ruth B. Bautista, assisted by her husband Normandy R. Bautista."
 Id. at 42-46 and 1-5.
 1st Indorsement, CPL C-04-1027, 20 July 2004.
 OCA's Report and Recommendation, A.M. No. P-04-1920, 13 September 2006, p. 6.
 OCA's Report and Recommendation, A.M. No. P-04-1920, 13 September 2006, p. 7.
 Pan v. Salamat, A.M. No. P-03-1678, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 460, 466.
 Castelo v. Florendo, 459 Phil. 581, 597 (2003).
 Imperial v. Santiago, Jr., 446 Phil. 104, 118 (2003).
 Villaceran v. Beltejar, A.M. No. P-05-1934, 11 April 2005, 455 SCRA 191, 201.
 Bernabe v. Eguia, A.M. No. P-03-1742, 18 September 2003, 411 SCRA 259, 265.
 Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 328, 348 (1999).
 A.M. No. P-90-408, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 323, 328-329.
 A.M. No. P-91-549, 5 July 1993, 224 SCRA 256, 259.
 427 Phil. 229, 234 (2002).
 370 Phil. 278, 285 (1999).
 Villanueva-Fabella v. Lee, 464 Phil. 548, 568 (2004).
 Miramar Fish Co., Inc. v. Jalon, A.M. No. P-04-1904, 25 October 2005, 474 SCRA 22, 26.
 De Guzman v.Gatlabayan, 404 Phil. 901, 913 (2001).
 Tolarba v. Conejero, 454 Phil. 28, 32 (2003).
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. - Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
 Promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated 31 August 1999 and implemented by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999.

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