Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/67-cal-2d-695-609210830
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:57:30+00:00

Document:
67 Cal.2d 695, 29439, Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.
Party Name: Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.
YELLOW CAB COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
David Daar, Los Angeles, in pro. per., Max Tendler and Leon Perlsweig, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., and Jay L. Shavelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.
Hanna & Morton, David A. Thomas and Douglas P. Grim, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
Plaintiff David Daar, suing 'in behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated,' appeals from an order of the superior court sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint without leave to amend and transferring the cause to the municipal court. 1 It is clear from the record that the action was transferred pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396 2 after the court determined that plaintiff could neither maintain a class action (§ 382) nor state a cause of action for his prior damages in excess of $5,000 (§ 89). 3 Initially we must determine whether the order of January 28, 1965, is appealable.
but what is its legal effect. (Citations.)' (Howe v. Key System Transit Co. (1926) 198 Cal. 525, 531, 41; Lyon v. Goss (1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 670; Bakewell v. Bakewell (1942) 21 Cal.2d 224, 227; In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Society (1953)40 Cal.2d 852, 857--858; People v. Succop (1966) 65 Cal.2d 483, 486, 55 Cal.Rptr. 397.) Although an order sustaining a demurrer with or without leave to amend is not the final judgment in the case (Berri v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 856, 860) and is nonappealable (Evans v. Dabney (1951) 37 Cal.2d 758, 759; Cole v. Rush (1953) 40 Cal.2d 178), here the order under examination not only sustains the demurrer, but also directs the transfer of the cause from the superior court, where it was commenced as a class action, to the municipal court. We must assay the total substance of the order. It determines the legal insufficiency of the complaint as a class suit and preserves for the plaintiff alone his cause of action for damages. In 'its legal effect' (Howe v. Key System Transit Co., supra) the order is tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all members of the class other than plaintiff. (See McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 856; Bowles v. Superior Court of Tulane County (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582; Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953) 41 Cal.2d 300, 303.) It has virtually demolished the action as a class action. If the propriety of such disposition could not now be reviewed, it can never be reviewed. This court has observed that it 'has long been the rule in this state that an order of dismissal is to be treated as a judgment for the purposes of taking an appeal when it finally disposes of the particular action and prevents further proceedings as effectually as would any formal judgment.' (Herrscher v. Herrscher, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 303--304, 259 P.2d at p. 903; see Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Willett (1932) 216 Cal. 387, 390, and cases therein cited.) We conclude that the order in the case at bench is in legal effect a final judgment from which an appeal lies and we therefore proceed to the issues raised before us.
as Yellow Cab) for taxicab services furnished to plaintiff and the aforesaid other persons during the four years immediately preceding the commencement of the action. The complaint is in two counts: the first, seeking recovery on behalf of taxicab users paying for the services with script book coupons; and the second seeking recovery on behalf of taxicab users paying cash for the services.
Count one alleges in substance that defendant is engaged in the business of providing taxicab transportation in the City of Los Angeles (hereinafter referred to as the city); that at all times mentioned, said defendant has been franchised in writing and by agreement with the Public Utilities Commission of said city to engage in such business and to charge rates in taxicabs only in those amounts fixed by the commission; that defendant used meters approved by the commission which automatically registered the rates and the cost of transportation of each particular trip; that the meters could be set to register rates of transportation set by the commission and 'could be adjusted to any other unit of rate for purposes of registering the total cost of each trip'; that defendant, under the conditions of its franchise, could charge no rates other than those fixed by the commission; that defendant was authorized to and did sell coupon books, denominated 'Yellow Cab Script' to be accepted by it in payment for transportation; that each of said script books bore a serial number and contained coupons of various denominations, each bearing the same serial number as that of the respective book.
last past'; that the exact amount of said overcharge is not known to plaintiff and the aforesaid class but is and can be ascertained from defendant's books and records, and upon information and belief exceeds the sum of $100,000; that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy other than by maintenance of the instant class action; 6 that 'within four years last past,' plaintiff individually has expended $100 for script books, has used the coupons therefrom for payment of transportation and has been overcharged as set forth above in an amount unknown to him but known to defendant.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.