Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-5th-circuit/1657293.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 05:06:21+00:00

Document:
Andres Paez SARMIENTOS, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. Javier N. Maldonado, Law Office of Javier N. Maldonado, P.C., San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner. Jesse Matthew Bless, Tangerlia Cox, Thankful Townsend Vanderstar, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Andres Paez Sarmientos petitions for review from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an Immigration Judge's (IJ's) determination that he is not eligible for cancellation of removal because he committed an aggravated felony. Because we hold that the Florida offense of which Paez Sarmientos was convicted is not categorically an aggravated felony, we grant the petition, vacate the order, and remand for further proceedings.
Paez Sarmientos, a native and citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in December 1990. In 2005, he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine in violation of Florida Statute § 893.13(1)(a)(1).1 The trial judge withheld the adjudication of guilt and ordered that Paez Sarmientos serve one day in jail and be placed on 24 months of supervised probation. For federal immigration purposes, a state guilty plea accompanied by some form of punishment is a conviction,2 and we thus refer to Paez Sarmientos's Florida offense as a conviction.
The IJ agreed with DHS. In an oral decision, the IJ first concluded Paez Sarmientos was inadmissible because he was convicted of violating a controlled substance law. The IJ also denied Paez Sarmientos's request to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), concluding that Paez Sarmientos had been convicted of an aggravated felony.4 Paez Sarmientos had contended that the Florida offense of cocaine delivery was broader than a federal drug trafficking offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), which is an aggravated felony, because the Florida statute did not have the same mens rea requirement as the federal law.
In rejecting Paez Sarmientos's position, the IJ noted that, unlike the federal offense of distribution of a controlled substance, the Florida statute placed the burden on the defendant to prove he lacked knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance as an affirmative defense. The IJ reasoned that there was no significant distinction between the Florida crime and the federal offense even though Florida treats knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance as an affirmative defense rather than as a traditional element of the crime that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The IJ accordingly concluded that Paez Sarmientos was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Paez Sarmientos appealed to the BIA, challenging the IJ's decision to deny him the opportunity to seek cancellation of removal. In considering the argument that the Florida offense did not contain the same mens rea requirement as the federal offense and was therefore not categorically an aggravated felony, the BIA acknowledged that the Florida statute converted “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance ․ from an element into an affirmative defense.” However, the BIA concluded that the Florida statute was “sufficiently analogous to the federal felony offense of distribution of a controlled substance,” an aggravated felony. The BIA thus agreed with the IJ that Paez Sarmientos was not eligible for cancellation of removal and dismissed his appeal. A petition for review was filed in this court.
(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of [Scott and Chicone ] holding that the state must prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or her actual or constructive possession, were contrary to legislative intent.
Paez Sarmientos argues that a conviction under § 893.13(l)(a)(l), as modified by § 893.101, does not require that the defendant knew that the substance at issue was a controlled substance whereas conviction under the federal statute does. He asserts that, contrary to the BIA's reasoning, his 2005 state conviction for delivery of cocaine is therefore not analogous to the federal offense of distribution of a controlled substance. We agree.
Although this question is a matter of first impression in this circuit,42 we find persuasive the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Donawa v. U.S. Attorney General.43 There, the court held that § 893.13 is not an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.44 The case involved possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver,45 not delivery of cocaine as here, but the analysis applies equally to this case. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “[u]nder the categorical approach, it is clear that the least of the acts criminalized' [by the Florida statute] does not necessarily violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).”46 This is because, although a person could be convicted under the Florida statute without any knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance he possesses, the same person could not be convicted of drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).47 Applying the same logic here, the least of the acts criminalized by the delivery of cocaine crime under Florida Statute § 893.13(l)(a)(l) does not necessarily violate the federal cocaine distribution statute since the federal offense requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an element that the state offense does not: knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance.48 Paez Sarmientos's state conviction is thus not categorically an aggravated felony.
This argument misses the mark. A defendant can be convicted under the Florida law at issue without a finding beyond a reasonable doubt or an admission in a plea agreement that the defendant knew of the substance's illicit nature if the defendant either fails to raise the affirmative defense or fails to meet his burden of persuasion.49 Because we cannot say that “the least of the acts criminalized” by the Florida statute is encompassed by the federal offense,50 the Florida crime of delivery of cocaine does not, as a matter of law, constitute an aggravated felony.
The BIA erred in holding that § 893.13(1)(a)(1) is categorically an aggravated felony and in denying Paez Sarmientos the opportunity to seek cancellation of removal from the Attorney General.
Paez Sarmientos's petition is GRANTED, and we VACATE AND REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. Fla. Stat. Ann.. § 893.13(l)(a) (providing, “it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance”). Subsection 893.13(l)(a)(l) states that a person commits a felony of the second degree if the offense involves, among other substances, cocaine. Id. § 893.13(l)(a)(l) (citing § 893.03(2)(a), where cocaine is listed as a Schedule II controlled substance).
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (providing that an alien who is inadmissible may seek cancellation of removal from the Attorney General if the alien has been a lawfully admitted permanent resident for not less than 5 years, has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted, and has not been convicted of an aggravated felony).
5. Rodriguez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 594–95 (5th Cir.2007).
7. See Rodriguez, 705 F.3d at 210.
9. Dale v. Holder, 610 F.3d 294, 301–02 (5th Cir.2010); Larin–Ulloa v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 456, 461 n. 7 (5th Cir.2006).
10. Rodriguez–Barajas v. Holder, 624 F.3d 678, 679 (5th Cir.2010).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a).
14. Moncrieffe v. Holder, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1683, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
16. Moncrieffe, 133 S.Ct. at 1683 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006)).
17. ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013).
18. Moncrieffe, 133 S.Ct. at 1684–85 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33–38, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009)).
19. Id. at 1684 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
21. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
22. Id. at 1685 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013).
24. See Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2284–86.
27. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.l3(l)(a).
28. See Moncrieffe, 133 S.Ct. at 1685 (“We know from his plea agreement that Moncrieffe was convicted of the last of these offenses [listed in a similar Georgia statute].”) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
32. See id. § 841(b)(1)(C).
33. See United States v. Gamez–Gonzalez, 319 F.3d 695, 699–700 (5th Cir.2003) (recognizing that a conviction under § 841(a)(1) requires knowledge that the substance was a controlled substance, but rejecting the argument that knowledge of the exact drug type or quantity is an element of the offense); see also United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir.2012) (“The § 841(a) offense is complete once the person commits the proscribed act and knows that the substance is a ‘controlled substance.’ ”); United States v. Abdulle, 564 F.3d 119, 125–26 (2d Cir.2009) (“[T]he law is settled that a defendant need not know the exact nature of a drug in his possession to violate § 841(a)(1); it is sufficient that he [or she] be aware that he [or she] possesses some controlled substance.”).
34. Fla. Stat. Ann.. § 893.13(1)(a).
35. Id. § 893.13(1)(a)(1) (citing id. § 893.03(2)(a), where cocaine is listed as a Schedule II controlled substance).
36. Stale v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415 (Fla.2012).
37. 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996).
38. Chicone, 684 So.2d at 743–44; see also Adkins, 96 So.3d at 415 (discussing Chicone ).
39. 808 So.2d 166, 169–70 (Fla.2002).
40. Fla. Stat. Ann.. § 893.101.
41. Adkins, 96 So.3d at 416. In State v. Adkins, the Florida Supreme Court held that it was not unconstitutional to convert “knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance” from an element of the Florida crime to an affirmative defense through Florida Statute § 893.101. Id. at 423.
42. In unpublished decisions, this court has held that § 893.13(l)(a) is a drug trafficking crime and therefore an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. But these decisions did not address the argument that Paez Sarmientos raises here: that the Florida statute does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance. See Davis v. Holder, 514 F. App'x 517, 518 (5th Cir.2013) (unpublished); Jackson v. Holder, 487 F. App'x 181, 181 (5th Cir.2012) (unpublished).
43. 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.2013). This decision was issued after the parties' briefing was completed, but Paez Sarmientos brought it to our attention in a Rule 28(j) letter.
44. Donawa, 735 F.3d at 1283.
46. Id. at 1281 (referencing Moncrieffe v. Holder, –––U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013)).
47. See id. at 1281–82.
48. See United States v. Gamez–Gonzalez, 319 F.3d 695, 699–700 (5th Cir.2003).
49. State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415–16 (Fla.2012) (explaining that “knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance” is no longer an element of the Florida crime that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt); see Donawa, 735 F.3d at 1282–83 (rejecting the argument that the prosecution ever bears the burden to prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the substance under Florida law, even when the defendant raises the affirmative defense of lack of knowledge).
50. Moncrieffe, 133 S.Ct. at 1684 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

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