Source: http://bib26.pusc.it/can/p_martinagar/lrgiurisprinternaz/HUDOC/musulmBulgaria/MUSLIM%20COMMUNITYvBULGARIA.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:23:57+00:00

Document:
1. The case originated in an application (no. 39023/97) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged on 9 September 1997 with the European Commission of Human Rights (�the Commission�) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (�the Convention�) on behalf of the Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community (�the applicant organisation�), which was at the relevant time one of the rival factions claiming leadership of the Muslim community in Bulgaria.
2. The applicant was represented by Mrs S. Margaritova-Vutchkova, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government (�the Government�) were represented by their agent, Mrs M. Dimova, of the Ministry of Justice.
5. The application was allocated to the First Section of the Court (Rule 52 � 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 � 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 � 1.
9. At the end of 1991 a new Government, formed by the Union of Democratic Forces (Съюз на демократичните сили � �the SDS�) and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Движение за права и свободи � �the DPS�), took office.
10. On 10 February 1992 the Directorate of Religious Denominations (Дирекция по вероизповеданията - �the Directorate�), a governmental agency attached to the Council of Ministers, declared the election of Mr Gendzhev in 1988 as Chief Mufti of the Muslims in Bulgaria null and void and proclaimed his removal from that position. This decision was based on findings, inter alia, that Mr Gendzhev�s election in 1988 had been politically motivated.
11. The Directorate appointed a three-member interim governing body of the Muslims� religious organisation, considering that that was �the only possible means of preventing the organisational disintegration of the Muslim denomination�.
13. Mr Gendzhev, who claimed that he remained the Chief Mufti, challenged the decision of 10 February 1992 before the Supreme Court. The proceedings ended with a final judgment of 7 April 1993. The Supreme Court, while considering that the impugned decision was not amenable to judicial review, nevertheless commented that the Directorate�s decision to declare Mr Gendzhev�s election null and void had been within its competence. In so far as the impugned decision had also proclaimed �the removal� of Mr Gendzhev from his position of Chief Mufti, this had been ultra vires. However, it was unnecessary to annul this part of the Directorate�s decision as in any event it had no legal consequences.
14. The leadership dispute between Mr Gendzhev and Mr Hasan continued throughout 1993 and 1994. The official position of the Directorate of Religious Denominations remained that Mr Hasan was the legitimate Chief Mufti of the Bulgarian Muslims. At the same time the Directorate apparently sought to �resolve� the dispute through the �unification� of the two factions under a common leadership.
16. At the end of 1994 parliamentary elections took place in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (Българска социалистическа партия � �the BSP�) obtained a majority in Parliament and formed a new government, which took office in January 1995.
18. Mr Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Directorate registering Mr Gendzhev�s leadership. Mr Hasan submitted, inter alia, that the conference of 2 November 1994 had been organised by people outside the Muslim religious organisation presided over by him. Accordingly, they could register their own religious organisation but could not claim to replace the leadership of another. Mr Hasan asked the Supreme Court either to proclaim the February 1995 decision null and void as being contrary to the law or to declare that it constituted the registration of a new religious community, the existing Muslim organisation being unaffected. The State did not have the right, he argued, to impose a single leadership on the Muslims.
19. On 27 July 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court stated that under the Religious Denominations Act the Council of Ministers enjoyed full discretion in its decision as to whether or not to register the statute of a given religion. The Supreme Court�s jurisdiction was therefore limited to an examination of whether the impugned decision had been issued by the competent administrative organ and whether the procedural requirements had been complied with. In that respect the decision of February 1995 was lawful.
21. Following the removal of Mr Hasan, in 1995 the Muslim believers who supported him held their own assembly and re-elected him Chief Mufti, while introducing changes in the organisation�s statute and leadership. Mr Hasan then applied to the Directorate of Religious Denominations for registration of the amended statute and the new leadership. Not having received any response, Mr Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court against the tacit refusal of his application.
22. On 14 October 1996 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment. It noted that in 1992 the Chief Mufti�s Office as represented by Mr Hasan had been duly registered as a religious denomination and had thus obtained legal personality of which it had not subsequently been deprived. Therefore, the Council of Ministers was under an obligation, pursuant to sections 6 and 16 of the Religious Denominations Act, to examine a request for registration of a new statute or of changes in the leadership of the existing religious denomination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that the Council of Ministers� tacit refusal had been unlawful and remitted the file to the Council of Ministers, which was required to examine it.
23. On 19 November 1996 the Deputy Prime Minister refused to register the 1995 statute and leadership of the Chief Mufti�s Office as represented by Mr Hasan. He sent him a letter stating, inter alia, that the Council of Ministers had already registered a leadership of the Muslim community in Bulgaria, which was that elected by the November 1994 conference with Mr Gendzhev as President of the Supreme Holy Council. The Deputy Prime Minister concluded that the request �[could not] be granted as it [was] clearly contrary to the provisions of the Religious Denominations Act�.
25. On 13 March 1997 the Supreme Court quashed the refusal of the Deputy Prime Minister to register the 1995 statute and leadership headed by Mr Hasan on the ground that it was unlawful and contrary to Article 13 of the Constitution. That refusal was, moreover, �an unlawful administrative intervention into the internal organisation of [a] religious community�. The Supreme Court again ordered the transmission of the file to the Council of Ministers for registration.
�1. The all-Muslim conference shall be organised on the basis of full representation of the Muslim denomination. It shall not be based on the two existing statutes [of the rival leaderships]. [The] Deputy Prime Minister ... and the Director of Religious Denominations undertake to guarantee the implementation of this principle.
32. On an unspecified date the joint committee ruled that the assembly of each local community attending a mosque should elect two delegates to the national conference. It also decided that the minutes of the assemblies� proceedings had to be entered on a form provided by the Directorate of Religious Denominations and certified by the local mayor.
36. On 21 and 22 October 1997 Mr Gendzhev and those who had signed the unification agreement on behalf of the Supreme Holy Council headed by him wrote to the Prime Minister and the Directorate of Religious Denominations stating that the conference planned for 23 October was not being organised in accordance with the statute of the Muslim religious organisation and that it was therefore unlawful. Those who had signed the agreement of 30 September 1997 stated that they had been forced to do so by the Director of Religious Denominations and declared the withdrawal of their support for that agreement. The letter signed by Mr Gendzhev further described the participation of the Directorate in the preparation of the conference as unacceptable State interference in the Muslims� internal affairs.
37. On 23 October 1997 more than one thousand delegates attended the conference. Only those whose election had been certified by the mayors were allowed to participate. According to the press, the verification of the delegates� credentials was carried out by employees of the Directorate of Religious Denominations. Its Director addressed the conference, stating, inter alia, that Mr Gendzhev, who did not attend, had �failed the test�. With these words the Director apparently blamed Mr Gendzhev for having withdrawn from the unification process.
41. Mr Gendzhev, who claimed that he remained the President of the Supreme Holy Council, appealed on its behalf to the Supreme Administrative Court against the Government�s decision to register the new leadership. He claimed that the persons who had signed the agreement for the holding of a unification conference on behalf of the applicant organisation had never been officially authorised to do so; that the conference had been unlawful because of that fact and since those persons had in any event withdrawn; and that the authorities had interfered in an inadmissible manner in the internal affairs of the Muslim community. That was so because the Directorate of Religious Denominations had prepared the forms on which the results of the local elections for delegates had been recorded and also because those results had been certified by the mayors. Furthermore, among the elected delegates there had been a number of persons who were local mayors or active members of one political party, the DPS. Finally, the applicant organisation argued that there had been irregularities and manipulation in the election of delegates.
44. On an appeal by the applicant organisation, on 9 October 1998 a five-member bench of the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 16 July 1998 and remitted the case for examination on the merits. The bench noted that by judgment of 27 July 1995 the Supreme Court had found that the 1995 registration of the Supreme Holy Council headed by Mr Gendzhev had been lawful. That finding was final and binding. Therefore, the applicant�s appeal could not be rejected for lack of locus standi.
45. In the reopened proceedings a three-member bench of the Supreme Administrative Court examined the appeal on the merits and dismissed it on 3 May 1999. The presiding judge was the same person who had presided over the previous examination of the case, which had ended with the inadmissibility decision of 16 July 1998. He was also one of the three judges who had delivered judgment on 28 April 1992 in the case concerning Mr Gendzhev�s removal in 1992.
46. The court found that the acts of the authorities did not constitute an interference with the internal organisation of the Muslim community. The decision to hold a unification conference had been taken freely by representatives of the two rival groups. The rules and procedures for the election of delegates and for the holding of the October 1997 conference, including those concerning the results of the local elections for delegates and their certification, had been drawn up by the joint committee. The Directorate of Religious Denominations had contributed to the organisation of the conference purely at the parties� request. It had acted in accordance with the agreement between the two leaderships and the decisions of the joint committee. The Directorate�s task had been to contribute to and guarantee tolerance and respect in inter-religious relations as well as in the relations between different groups belonging to one and the same religion. The fact that the Supreme Holy Council presided over by Mr Gendzhev had withdrawn at the last minute did not call into question the validity of the conference, which had taken place in accordance with the negotiated rules. It was true that these rules derogated from the statute of the Muslim community as in force at the relevant time but the derogation had been decided upon freely by the two leaderships in order to resolve the conflict within the community. It followed that the impugned act, the decision of 28 October 1997 registering the newly elected leadership of the Muslim community, was in accordance with the law.
�(1) Religions shall be free.
�(1) The freedom of conscience, the freedom of thought and the choice of religion or of religious or atheistic views shall be inviolable. The State shall assist in the maintenance of tolerance and respect between the adherents of different denominations, and between believers and non-believers.
52. The Constitutional Court�s judgment no. 5 of 11 June 1992 interpreting the above provisions states, inter alia, that the State must not interfere with the internal organisation of religious communities and institutions, which must be regulated by their own statutes and rules. The State may interfere with the activity of a religious community or institution only in the cases contemplated in Articles 13 � 4 and 37 � 2 of the Constitution. An assessment as to whether there is such a case may also be undertaken at the time of registration of a religious community or institution.
�(1) A religious denomination shall be considered recognised and shall become a legal person upon the approval of its statute by the Council of Ministers, or by a Deputy Prime Minister authorised for this purpose.
�(1) Every religious denomination shall have a leadership accountable to the State.
55. Under Decree No. 125 of the Council of Ministers of 6 December 1990, as amended, the competence of the Directorate of Religious Denominations includes �contacts between the State and religions denominations�, assistance to central and local administrative authorities in solving problems which involve religious matters and assistance to religious organisations as regards education and publications.
57. The Religious Denominations Act 1949 has been interpreted in the administrative practice of the Directorate and the Council of Ministers as requiring that each religious denomination must have a single leadership and that parallel organisations of the same religious denomination are not allowed. The judicial practice during the relevant period evolved from the initial position that the Council of Ministers and the Directorate enjoyed unfettered discretion in the registration of the leadership and statute of a religious denomination (see paragraphs 13 and 19 above) to the position that the courts, when asked to rule on the lawfulness of a Government decision registering a new religious leadership, had to examine whether the new leadership had been appointed in compliance with the religious denomination�s statute, in its version as registered by the Directorate (see paragraphs 22 and 25 above and also the following judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court: judgment no. 4816 of 21 September 1999 in case no. 2697/99, judgment no. 2919 of 28 April 2001 in case no. 8194/99 and judgment no. 9184 of 16 October 2003 in case no. 6747/02).
60. Section 15(2) provides that no more than one registration may be made concerning a religious denomination with the same name. Section 36 provides that a person who acts on behalf of a religious denomination without authorisation is to be fined by the Directorate of Religious Denominations. Paragraph 3 of the transitional provisions to the Act provides that persons who had seceded from a registered religious institution before the Act�s entry into force in breach of the institution�s government-registered internal rules are not entitled to use the name of the religious institution or its assets.
63. The Constitutional Court could not reach a majority verdict, an equal number of judges having voted in favour and against the request to declare that provision unconstitutional. According to the Constitutional Court�s practice, in such circumstances the request for a legal provision to be struck down is considered to be dismissed by default. The judges who voted against the request considered, inter alia, that the principle of legal certainty required that persons who had seceded from a religious denomination should not be allowed to use its name. Further, it was obvious that they could not claim part of its assets, as the assets belonged to the religious denomination as a legal person. The judges who considered that the provision was unconstitutional stated that it purported to regulate issues that concerned the internal organisation of religious communities and thus violated their autonomy. Those judges further stated that the provision, applied in the context of existing disputes, favoured one of the groups in a divided religious community and, therefore, did not contribute to maintaining tolerance but rather frustrated that aim. It thus violated Article 9 of the Convention.
66. The applicant organisation submitted that Mr Gendzhev had been unlawfully removed in 1992 by Mr Hasan and that in 1997 Mr Hasan had sought a repeat of these events, counting on the support of the SDS, the political party which had �helped� him in 1992, and which had again come to power in 1997.
67. The applicant organisation further stated that Mr Gendzhev had actively sought the achievement of unification, which he considered important for the well-being of the Muslim community, but had had to withdraw because of irregularities in the election of delegates. The Government�s argument that the withdrawal of several persons did not affect the legitimacy of the conference was flawed since the leaders had withdrawn precisely because of the illegitimacy of the local elections of delegates.
70. Furthermore, as established by the courts later, the election of delegates had proceeded normally. The large turnout had demonstrated the community�s will for unification.
71. The Government also underlined that the case did not concern a process of putting two religious communities under a single leadership but a situation where one religious community had two leaderships. Contradictory decisions of the authorities during the period 1992-1997, including those criticised by the Court in its Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria judgment, had resulted in confusion as to the leadership of the Muslim community. Unlike in previous years, however, in 1997 the State had not interfered in the internal affairs of the community but had only assisted it in its efforts to achieve unification, as part of the authorities� duty under the Constitution to help maintaining a climate of tolerance in religious life.
73. In accordance with the Court�s case-law, while religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to manifest one�s religion, alone and in private, or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares. Participation in the life of the community is a manifestation of one�s religion, protected by Article 9 of the Convention. The right to freedom of religion under Article 9, interpreted in the light of Article 11, the provision which safeguards associations against unjustified State interference, encompasses the expectation that the community will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary State intervention (see Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, � 62, ECHR 2000-XI).
74. The applicant organisation was the official body representing and managing the Muslim religious community in Bulgaria between February 1995 and October 1997. It complained about alleged arbitrary interference by the State with the organisation and leadership of that community. An ecclesiastical or religious body may, as such, exercise on behalf of its adherents the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention (see, Cha�are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, � 72, ECHR 2000-VII).
75. It follows that the applicant organisation�s complaints fall within the ambit of Article 9 of the Convention, which is applicable.
76. According to the Court�s case-law, State measures favouring a particular leader or group in a divided religious community or seeking to compel the community, or part of it, to place itself under a single leadership against its will would constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion (see Serif v. Greece, no. 38178/97, �� 49, 52 and 53, ECHR 1999-IX and Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, cited above, � 78).
77. The present case concerns the replacement of the Bulgarian Muslim community�s leadership in October 1997 and the ensuing proceedings. The central issue in dispute is whether these events were the result of undue State pressure or nothing more than a change of leadership freely effected by the community.
80. The Court agrees that States have such a duty and that discharging it may require engaging in mediation. Neutral mediation between groups of believers would not in principle amount to State interference with the believers� rights under Article 9 of the Convention, although the State authorities must be cautious in this particularly delicate area.
81. The Court notes, however, that the unification process in 1997 took place against the backdrop of the events in 1992 and 1995 when changes of government were swiftly followed by State action to replace religious leaders and grant legal recognition to one of the two rival leaderships (see paragraphs 8-20 and 27 above). It is highly significant that the relevant law as applied in practice required � and still requires � all believers belonging to a particular religion and willing to participate in the community�s organisation to form a single structure, headed by a single leadership even if the community is divided, without the possibility for those supporting other leaders to have an independent organisational life and control over part of the community�s assets (see paragraphs 17, 23, 40, 53-63 above). The law thus left no choice to the religious leaders but to compete in seeking the recognition of the government of the day, each leader proposing to �unite� the believers under his guidance.
83. The Court considers that the applicant organisation�s allegation that the mayors of a number of localities and political figures participated too closely in the selection of delegates to the October 1997 assembly does not appear implausible.
84. Furthermore, even if the initial participation of the Directorate is seen as nothing more than neutral mediation in the preparation of a unification assembly, matters changed at the moment when the Directorate continued to insist on �unification" despite the fact that the leaders of the applicant organisation decided to withdraw. It was not for the State to decide whether or not Mr Gendzhev and the organisation presided over by him should or should not withdraw. The Directorate could have noted the failure of the unification effort and expressed readiness to continue assisting the parties through mediation, if all concerned so desired. Instead, the leaders elected by the October 1997 conference obtained the status of the sole legitimate leadership of the Muslim community and as a result the applicant organisation could no longer represent at least part of the religious community and manage its affairs and assets according to the will of that part of the community (see paragraphs 31-40 above).
85. The Court thus finds that there has been an interference with the applicant organisation�s rights under Article 9 of the Convention in that the relevant law and practice and the authorities� actions in October 1997 had the effect of compelling the divided community to have a single leadership against the will of one of the two rival leaderships.
87. The Government�s decision registering a change of leadership in the Muslim community relied on sections 6 and 16 of the Religious Denominations Act (see paragraph 53 above).
88. In the case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, cited above (� 86), the Court found that the interference with the internal organisation of the Muslim community in 1995-1997 had not been �prescribed by law� as it had been arbitrary and based on legal provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the executive and did not meet the required standards of clarity and foreseeability of the law.
89. Although the same legal provisions applied in the present case, the Court observes that there were considerable differences in the authorities� approach. In 1997 the authorities did not make use of the unfettered discretion they enjoyed under the applicable law and proceeded on the basis that the rival groups had set up their own rules through an agreement derogating from the existing statute of the Muslim denomination (see paragraphs 31 and 46 above).
90. In these specific circumstances, the Court, having regard to the fact that the gist of the applicant organisation�s allegations concerns the alleged lack of justification for the State interference with the internal affairs of the Muslim community, considers that it is not necessary to rule on the lawfulness of that interference.
91. The applicant organisation submitted that the authorities� aim had been to remove Mr Gendzhev and the leadership presided over by him. The Government stated that they had sought to help resolve the conflict in the Muslim community and remedy the consequences of past unlawful State actions.
92. The Court accepts that the authorities� general concern was to restore legality and remedy the arbitrary removal in 1995 of Mr Hasan and the leadership presided over by him. Seen in this perspective, the interference with the internal organisation of the Muslim community was in principle aimed at the protection of public order and of the rights and freedoms of others.
93. The Court reiterates that the autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society. While it may be necessary for the State to take action to reconcile the interests of the various religions and religious groups that coexist in a democratic society, the State has a duty to remain neutral and impartial in exercising its regulatory power and in its relations with the various religions, denominations and beliefs. What is at stake here is the preservation of pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy, one of the principal characteristics of which is the possibility it offers of resolving a country�s problems through dialogue, even when they are irksome (see Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A, p.18, � 33, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, � 123 ECHR 2001-XII, and Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, cited above, � 78).
94. In the present case, the relevant law and practice and the authorities� actions in October 1997 had the effect of compelling the divided community to have a single leadership against the will of one of the two rival leaderships (see paragraph 85 above).
96. It is true that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in the particularly delicate area of their relations with religious communities (see Cha�are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, cited above, � 84). The Court reiterates, however, that in democratic societies the State does not need in principle to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership. The role of the authorities in a situation of conflict between or within religious groups is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other. As the Court has already stated above, State measures favouring a particular leader of a divided religious community or seeking to compel the community, or part of it, to place itself under a single leadership against its will would constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion. (see Serif v. Greece, cited above, �� 49, 52 and 53, and Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, cited above, � 78).
97. The Government have not stated why in the present case their aim to restore legality and remedy injustices could not be achieved by other means, without compelling the divided community under a single leadership. It is significant in this regard that despite the �unification� process in 1997 the conflict in the religious community continued (see paragraphs 49 and 50 above).
98. In sum, the Court considers that the Bulgarian authorities went beyond the limits of their margin of appreciation under Article 9 � 2 of the Convention.
99. It follows that the interference with the applicant organisation�s rights under Article 9 of the Convention in 1997 was not necessary in a democratic society for the protection of public order or the rights and freedoms of others and was therefore contrary to that provision.
102. The Government submitted that the courts, by examining the applicant organisation�s appeals on the merits, provided an effective remedy against the alleged interference with the believers� Article 9 rights.
103. In accordance with the Court�s case-law, Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy in respect of grievances which can be regarded as �arguable� in terms of the Convention. Such a remedy must allow the competent domestic authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they discharge their obligations under Article 13. The remedy required by Article 13 must be �effective� in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State (see �akıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, � 112, ECHR 1999-IV).
104. The applicant organisation�s claim under Article 9 of the Convention was undoubtedly arguable (see paragraph 99 above). It follows that Article 13 required the availability of an effective domestic remedy.
106. The Supreme Administrative Court decided against the applicant organisation as it assessed the organisation�s complaints in the light of the domestic legal regime and practice that forces a divided religious community to have a single leadership, even against the will of one of the rival groups (see paragraphs 46, 48, 53-57 and 81 above).
107. The Court reiterates, however, that Article 13 does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State�s laws as such to be challenged before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention (see Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, � 61; Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, � 151, ECHR 2000‑XI, and Connors v. the United Kingdom, no. 66746/01, � 109, 27 May 2004).
108. The applicant organisation�s complaint related in essence to one of the principles underlying the applicable legal regime. It cannot be considered that Article 13 of the Convention required the provision of a remedy to challenge that regime.
114. The applicant organisation claimed 25,000 euros (�EUR�) for the alleged damage to the reputation of Mr Gendzhev and the leadership presided over by him and the consequences of the State interference in the internal affairs of the Muslim community.
116. Having regard to the circumstances of the present case and its case-law concerning claims for non-pecuniary damage made on behalf of legal persons or organisations (see Freedom and Democracy Party (�ZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94, � 57, ECHR 1999-VIII; Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], no 35382/97, ECHR 2000-IV, � 35; Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, � 121, ECHR 2001-IX; and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, cited above, � 146), the Court considers that an award under this head is appropriate. The unjustified State interference with the organisation of the religious community must have caused non-pecuniary damage to the applicant organisation. Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid to Mr N. Gendzhev as the representative of the applicant organisation.
117. The applicant organisation claimed approximately EUR 6,800 for legal work in the domestic proceedings and before the Convention institutions and the equivalent of approximately EUR 500 for translation costs, express mail and overhead expenses. It presented copies of legal-fee agreements between the applicant organisation and Mrs Margaritova‑Vutchkova, its legal representative before the Court, receipts showing that it had paid sums to three lawyers, including Mrs Margaritova-Vutchkova, for work done in several sets of separate judicial proceedings in Bulgaria and receipts concerning translation costs and postal expenses.
118. The Government stated that no time-sheet for Mrs Margaritova‑Vutchkova�s work had been submitted and that some of the fees paid to other lawyers concerned domestic proceedings unrelated to the present case. The Government also stated that the fees and expenses claimed were excessive.
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant�s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 December 2004, pursuant to Rule 77 �� 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

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