Source: http://infolanka.com/org/srilanka/issues/ACSLU25.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 07:53:44+00:00

Document:
A new Appendix has been added to this revision. It also contains some minor changes in the body of the publication, minly correcting some minor errors.
On August 3 1995 the President of Sri Lanka released her Government's "political solution" to the so-called ethnic problem. This came to be known in popular parlance as the "Devolution Package". Since then this package has been subjected to a wide discussion both in Sri Lanka and abroad. The Australian Centre for Sri Lankan Unity (ACSLU) contributed to this discussion by the publication of its own analysis of the proposals[NOTE 1] in September 1995.
(1) The Separatist Terrorists. The LTTE, whom the Government had been courting for a long time, rejected the devolution proposal out of hand insisting that its demand for the immediate partition of Sri Lanka (or Ceylon as they call it) is non-negotiable. It may be mentioned that the Government delayed the release of the proposals for a long time because they wanted to present it first to the LTTE, which shows that the proposals was little more than an attempt to appease the terrorists.
(2) The non-LTTE Tamils. These were the Tamil groups domiciled in Colombo (including the TULF). They are for the most part Eelamists, who while arguing that the proposals did not go far enough, nonetheless were willing to consider the package as the basis for discussions with the Government.
(3) Supporters of the Package. These included, in addition to the authors of the proposals, Muslim parties, the left-wing ("Marxist") political parties in Sri Lanka who had consistently supported Tamil demands, Christian religious organisations, and the plethora of groups allegedly seeking a "peaceful" solution to an ill-defined "ethnic problem". Recently the supporters of the package started the "sudu-nelum campagin" modelled on the leftist "Suriya-mal Campaign" of the 1930s.
(4) Revisionist Supporters of Devolution. This refers to those who, while not condemning devolution outright, argued that the package needed modification in the distribution of powers. They also argued that the boundaries of the devolved units, especially of the North-East Province, should be redrawn. One suggestion was that geographical criteria (e.g. river basins) be used. However they subscribed to the view that Federalism or devolution was a viable solution.
(5) The pro-Sinhala Opposition. They were critical of the whole devolution process and the principle of Federalism that it entailed. But they did not actively canvass an alternative solution. They appeared content to leave things as they are with only the military effort continued to eliminate terrorism and end secession. They included organisations like the Sinhala Arakshaka Sanvidhanaya and the Buddhist Maha Sangha.
(6) Other Quixotic Proposals. While many (including the Opposition UNP[NOTE 2] remain uncommitted) a few quixotic proposals have emerged. These include the suggestion to "share power at the Centre" (which of course can happen if a coalition Government is formed) define the regions along geographical lines, etc..
Opinion outside Sri Lanka too was divided. On the international level support for the proposals came from some expatriate groups, most Western governments and international bodies like the European Union, and the host of private and semi-official international organisations allegedly concerned with human-rights, humanitarian activity and the like. There were many expatriate Sri Lankan groups who rejected the proposals for a variety of reasons, or advocated changes to the devolution package. Still other expatriate groups, like ACSLU, argued that the proposed package will create a racially-based Federal or Confederal arrangement, which like most racially based federations elsewhere would be extremely unstable and only serve as a stepping stone to the creation of Tamil Eelam. ACSLU proposed an alternative "political solution" based on five principles. This position was further elaborated in the ACSLU publication The Federal Solution to the Sri Lankan Conflict[NOTE 3].
We now have the final version of the Government's proposals. It has been called the "Legal text" and will form the Chapter on Devolution to be incorporated in the Government's Constitutional proposals. This was released to the Press on 21 January 1996; it is to be put before the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reform[NOTE 4] in early March. It is this legal text that will be considered in this document; it will be referred to as the Chapter on Devolution. The procedure envisaged for adopting the new Constitution is that it must first be approved by the Select Committee, then by Parliament by a two-thirds majority, and finally by the people in a Referendum. The approval of the Select Committee seems foregone, but the passage through Parliament with a two-thirds majority will depend on the position taken by the UNP. Already the UNP has been lobbied by the Government and by Tamil parties. It is possible that the UNP may agree to the devolution package perhaps with some minor amendments. If it reaches this stage the proposals may well be unstoppable as much reliance cannot be placed on the people rejecting it in the Referendum given the amount of misinformation that is propagated presenting the devolution proposals as a "peace plan"[NOTE 5].
The Chapter on Devolution consists of a Preamble and 29 Articles and two lists. It is thus considerably longer than the original package which consisted only of 10 articles. Despite this the fundamental thrust in the Chapter on Devolution remains the same as in the original proposals with relatively minor changes. Because of the similarity with the original proposals the main criticisms made in the two earlier ACSLU documents dealing with the original proposals remain valid. It would be tedious to repeat them again. Instead the focus will be on the relatively minor amendments that have been incorporated, and also on the detail which the earlier document lacked. On 9 February 1996 the President of Sri Lanka delivered a Policy Address to Parliament which included a Statement on "The Resolution of the War and the Ethnic Conflict". This could be taken as the latest statement of the Government's intentions and as an amplification of some points in the Chapter on Devolution.
The significant changes in the Chapter on Devolution relate to a revised declaration of principles, a redistribution of powers between the Centre and the Regions, the clause on Emergency Powers and some organisational changes.
The Preamble identifies five principles which replace the six principles given in the preamble to the original proposals.
The first principle speaks of "democracy, freedom, humanity, tolerance and justice" being fully observed in Sri Lanka. But this is either a statement of intention or a mere platitude. The second principle speaks of the guarantee of "human rights and fundamental freedoms". This presumably refers to the rights stated in the other sections of the Constitution and will not be considered here. But it remains to be shown that if these rights are guaranteed why there should be a need to establish a federal system.
The third principle states that "the territories constituting the nation shall form one indissoluble union, the units thereof shall be characterised by such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed". This is of course a surreptitious way of saying that Sri Lanka will cease to be a unitary state and become a federal state[NOTE 6]. The claim of indissolubility made is only a pious hope and the mechanisms expected to keep the union together may not work given the reality on the ground.
The fourth principle is a statement that territorial integrity, independence and unity will be safeguarded. In many countries similar clauses are inserted to indicate the obligation to defend a country against external threats. However the main danger facing the SL is not an external threat but the internal threat of the rupture of the proposed union.
"...peace and fraternity between all communities shall be secured and provision made enabling all communities to enjoy and nurture their distinct culture, practise and profess their own religion and promote their own language, thus preserving the rich cultural and ethnic diversity typifying a plural society".
In its more usual usage the word "community" denotes people living in a common environment without any necessary implication of racial or religious homogeneity. However in Sri Lanka the word "community" is generally used to denote an ethnic or racial group. In the present context "all communities" means primarily Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors and Malays (the latter two referred to as Muslims) [NOTE 7].
The fifth principle replaces the notorious principle of "racial space" contained in the original proposals and was the subject of a strong ACSLU critique. However it is only a cosmetic change. The "provision" that is contemplated to secure inter-racial "peace and fraternity" is not spelled out, but there is no doubt that it is none other than the old principle of racial space.
"Our policy in the ethnic question and the war in the North East has been enunciated clearly and courageously, from the outset. I stated last year in this House that: `We have a vision of Sri Lanka where all communities can live in safety and security, where human dignity is valued, and equality of treatment becomes an accepted norm of public life. We believe that all communities must be given the space to express their identity and to participate fully in the life of the nation, whether it be at the national, provincial or local level. Our commitment to non-violence and democracy will automate our policy towards internal conflict and unrest' ''.
There is no suggestion in this speech that the Government's policy on the "Ethnic Question" has changed in any way since its original formulation. Thus there is a clear affirmation that the declared policy that was enshrined in the original proposals still continue to be the basis of the Chapter on Devolution.
The communal division enshrined in the fifth principle contains many peculiarities. It seems to imply that each community is endowed with a unique culture, religion and language. As far as "culture" is concerned we may accept the claim made even though persons of the same race may actually subscribe to quite different cultural norms. In the case of religion the claim cannot be entertained. There are both Christians and Hindus amongst Tamils. Similarly many Sinhalese have been converted to Christianity (and more recently even to Islam). Since religion cuts across race segregating on the basis of race will not necessarily enable them to "enjoy and nurture" a common religion. With respect to language there could be a problem with the Muslims some of whom speak Tamil and others Sinhalese. These problems arise because of the false premise that to "enjoy and nurture" something people should be segregated territorially. As ACSLU has argued this is the apartheid principle which is really what the fifth principle amounts to.
The Chapter on Devolution describes Sri Lanka as "an indissoluble Union of Regions". The Regions are to be set out in the First Schedule which is presumably still not in a final form. Some may consider this an improvement over the original draft in which the Regions were identified with the Provinces with the Northern and Eastern Provinces combined to form the largest unit (albeit subject to some minor adjustment).
But it is difficult to consider this as an improvement. The final demarcation may well constitute the Northern and Eastern provinces into a Region. The "indissoluble" clause refers to the requirement that Regions cannot secede from the Union, or change their boundaries. It is doubtful, after the Republic is constituted, whether even the Centre will have the power to change the boundaries of the Regions. If so it would require a Constitutional Amendment to change the First Schedule to the Constitution which may not be feasible. The principles behind the carving out of the Regions in the First Schedule is never spelled out. In fact it is likely that it is the old Provinces carved out by the British for purposes of administrative convenience well over a century ago that will in effect determine the delimitation of Regions.
The way in which Regions could circumvent the clause regarding indissolubility is to engineer a breakdown in the mechanisms envisaged in the Constitution relating to the division of powers. In that situation there could be de facto breakdown of the Union and the indissolubility clause will be a dead clause.
Article 3 vests sovereignty in the people, but this is merely a formal statement as in practice the people delegate their sovereignty to one party or the other. Sub-section (a) of this article states that "the legislative power of the People shall be exercised by Parliament, Regional Councils and the People at a Referendum". Since the resort to a Referendum is likely to be a rare event, and one which cannot be initiated by the People, in effect the legislative power is shared (co-equally ?) by the Parliament at the Centre and the Regional Councils.
Just as there is a dilution of legislative power there is also a similar dilution of executive power. In effect the executive power is shared co-equally between the President and the Governors of the Regions. A non-executive President is foreshadowed as the President will have to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; similarly the Governor is also of the non-executive type acting on the advice of the Chief Minister and Board on Ministers of the Region. Thus in effect the real executive power is shared between the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers of the various Regions. Once again no existing Federal constitution has this feature. In Australia for instance the Prime Minister does not "share power" with the Premiers of the various states. In all significant matters the primacy of the Prime Minister is assured, and the Premiers operate within strictly circumscribed limits. In the Sri Lankan Union there is Constitutional provision for the co-equal exercise of legislative and executive powers between the Prime Minster (via the nominal President) and the Chief Ministers (via a nominal Governor). It confirms once again that what is presented as a Union of Regions is in effect a confederal arrangement of the loosest kind.
It may be mentioned that while most constitutions devote most of their clauses to describing the powers and the functions of the Centre the Draft Law actually devotes most of its articles to describing the functions of the Regional units. This may well be because this is only a chapter in a fuller Constitution, but even so more attention should be paid to the powers of the Centre. But as the President says in her parliamentary address of 6 February: "The theme of the proposals which underlies the entire effort is the facilitation of a wide devolution of power to Regions while safeguarding the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation". It would appear that it is the Regional interest not the Central interest that is paramount in this "political solution".
In describing the constitutional arrangement not as a Federation but as a "Union" the authors of the proposals may well be imitating India. But the general consensus is that in terms of Federalism the Indian Constitution is closer to the unitary system than to a real federal system. As we have seen the proposed Draft Law actually goes well beyond a Federation rather than falling short of it as is the case of India. In using the terminology favoured by the fathers of the Indian constitution those responsible for the Sri Lankan Draft Constitution may either be ignorant of the nature of the Indian Constitution, or may well be perpetrating a deception.
Finally it must be reiterated that the Union will be based on racial principles. The camouflage adopted that devolution is based on geographical units (provinces, river basins, etc) should not be entertained. There has never been a great demand for statehood by the inhabitants of, say, the Sabaraganuwa or the Uva Provinces. But there has been one from the Tamils. So to appease the latter the people of other regions of Sri Lanka are to be corralled into a Union which they have neither sought nor want.
Having shown that despite the rhetoric the proposed Union is a Federal system, leaning more towards confederalism, and giving utterance to the racial principle, it is pertinent to consider the principal structural features of the proposed Union.
Every Federation is identified by the relationship between the Centre and the Units of Federation. Not much is said about the Centre in the Chapter on Devolution as it is presumably dealt with in other Chapters of the Constitution. One would assume that the Centre would be similar to the Constitutional arrangement that prevailed before the Jayawardene Constitution was adopted creating and Executive Presidency and Provincial Councils. The details of that arrangement is not very pertinent for this critique of the Devolution law (although it would be relevant if the unitary solution based on the five principles of ACSLU is to be considered). It is therefore the arrangements for the peripheral units that are relevant.
The institutions relevant to a unit of Federation are the Governor, the Regional Council, the Board of Ministers, and the Chief Minister. A region is a kind of mirror image of the President- Parliament-Cabinet-Prime Minister system envisaged for the Centre. The size of the Council depends on area and population but the actual method of election is not specified. The commission to form the Regional administration is given to the party with the majority whose leader is appointed Chief Minister by the Governor. The Chief Minister appoints the Board of Ministers. The only restriction on the Board is that its size is limited to 6 persons. Given the number and importance of the items in the Regional List this will mean that each Minister will have to oversee a wide range of functions.
"The appointment of the Governor will provide the Eelam Region with a convenient trigger to break-up the Union. The Chief Minister could insist that a terrorist be appointed as Governor. If this is not acceded to an unresolvable crisis will be precipitated resulting in the break-down of the Constitution and the Federation".
Whether in the new version the President can override such a recommendation is rather doubtful. The "advice" may become formal and binding. This is one of those tailor-made loopholes that will enable a determined Chief Minister to create a rupture with the Union which must be the nightmare of confirmed federalists.
Under the scheme envisaged the Governor cannot be anything other than a rubber stamp if the Chief Minister has the confidence of the Council. The Governor's right to address the Council [Art 8(10)] may be hollow right given the fact that Council will consist of the nominees of the several parties who are elected on a party basis and subject to the discipline of the party.
The locus of executive power is not clearly identified in the Chapter on Devolution. The original draft gave this power to the Board of Ministers. Now it is merely stated that the Board should "aid and advice the Governor ... in the exercise of his functions". This is extremely vague, particularly as the executive "functions" of the Governor are not clearly listed. The wording with regard to this important matter is very vague, and does not repair the deficiencies identified in the original proposals.
The Chief Minister is thus the lynch-pin of the Federal System envisaged in the Chapter on Devolution. With the police powers given to the Chief Minister, which we shall consider in the next section, there is nothing to prevent him preparing for the day when there shall be UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence).
To counter this possibility a new clause that has been introduced into the Draft Law. This is Art. 26(4) which is the counterpart to Articles 356-7 of the Indian Constitution which allows the Centre to impose Presidential Rule over any State in a wide set of circumstances. The absence of such a clause was a fatal weakness in the original proposals.
Clause 26(4) could be invoked if a "Regional administration is promoting armed rebellion or insurrection or engaging in intentional violation of the Constitution which constitutes a clear and present danger to the unity and sovereignty of the Republic". This scenario that is envisaged here is not some remote and hypothetical possibility; it is a situation that will almost certainly arise if not from the very first administration of the Eelam Region after the promulgation of devolution then at least from a succeeding one. The culture of the LTTE is so deeply ingrained in a substantial section of the Tamil people and an entire generation of school children have been inculcated into it, that even if the LTTE is militarily defeated there will still remain a sufficient incubus of LTTE-minded people that it will only be a matter of time before they get control of the Eeelam Regional Council through "democratic" means. The "silent majority" of the people of the Eelam Region will tolerate them just as they had tolerated the LTTE through a decade of terror. The present Government may think that it has won the "hearts and minds" of the people of the Region, but confronted with a resurgent LTTE the hearts will harden and the minds will close. Then the "demand for secession" will be made, "the promoting of armed rebellion" will take place, and the "intentional violation of the Constitution" will occur.
What does Art. 26(4) empower the President to do in this situation? It says that the Regional Council may be dissolved and "the President may by Proclamation assume to himself (sic) all or any of the functions of the administration of the region and all or any of the powers vested in, or exercisable by, the Governor, the Chief Minister, the Board of Ministers or any body or authority in the region". This is of course the same as the imposition of Presidential Rule in India in circumstances that are very much less critical that the possibility contemplated in Art. 26(4). But the difference between India and Sri Lanka is that Presidential intervention in India is perfectly credible and has taken place many times. In Sri Lanka it will be highly problematical. This is particularly so if the SL government, greedy for the Peace Dividend, will have partially dismantled its military. Even when the "military solution" was in full force, and the LTTE were a band of brigands without legal control of any territory, the President as Commander- in-Chief was hard put to contain the LTTE. How (s)he would do so in the circumstances envisaged is beyond the bounds of credibility.
To be realistic circumstances under which Presidential Rule can be invoked must be far less severe than the circumstances envisaged in Art. 26(4). After all no Chief Minister will articulate a demand for secession, promote armed rebellion and violate the Constitution unless careful preparations had already taken place. These preparations will involve the secretion of arms, the training of cadres, etc. all of which is possible under the powers devolved to the Regions. If UDI is proclaimed after such preparations had been made then the President's own "proclamation" might well be only a breath of hot air. The intervention should come well before the arms are secreted and the cadres trained. But to do so the Centre must have more power than those provided in the reserved list. In fact this task cannot be done within the framework of the Federal system. That is why the unitary principle is an indispensable precondition if Sri Lanka is to remain the indissoluble unit that the Chapter on Devolution says it should be.
Article 26(1) also provides for Presidential intervention of a lesser kind to deal with armed insurrections, civil disorder, etc. The situation envisaged appears to be civil disturbances which the Region may not be able to deal with on its own. It is perhaps meant to deal with situation that may arise in the non-Eelam Regions, if for instance the JVP were to mount another insurrection. Such intervention may not be against the ruling group in the Region concerned. The Article also speaks of "any action or omission of the Regional administration" endangering the unity and sovereignty of the Republic. But all that the Presidential proclamation will do in this situation is to extend the Public Security provisions into the Region in question. Whether this will not work without the active co-operation of the Regional administration (which of course will not happen if it is the administration which is doing the destabilising) is problematical.
While there are improvements over the original proposals these may well prove to be cosmetic improvements. When compared to the reality of the situation the safeguards written into the Constitution may well be inadequate to preserve the unity of the Republic.
As in the original proposals there are two lists giving the powers reserved for the Centre and those given over to the Regions. The former consists of 63 items and the latter 46. In the original list the number of items were 58 and 45 respectively. Thus there has been a slight increase in the total number of enumerated functions, and also a few changes.
A common criticism of the original proposal was that the powers given to the Regions were excessive in terms of normal federal practice. This has not been addressed at all in the Chapter on Devolution. The changes made comprise of the transfer of one item from the Regional to the Reserved list and the addition of 4 new items to the Reserved List and two new items to the Regional list. The item transferred from the Regional list to the Reserved list is "turnover taxes on wholesale or retail sales to the extent to be specified". No doubt this could deprive the Regional administration of a lucrative source of income, but given that in the original scheme the extent could be specified this might not involve a radical change. The other sources of income to the Region remain intact.
Four new items have been added to the national list viz. libraries, educational publications, industrial development and lotteries. These are not of great consequence given that they could have been exercised under some other heads. The two new functions given to the Regions are significant. They are "Law and order to the extent provided in Chapter III" (of the of the Chapter on Devolution), and the Administration of Justice within the Region. Both these are substantial additions to the list of Regional powers and shows that the present revision has gone down further along the route of separation.
Because of the slight changes made to the distribution of powers all the criticism made in the original ACSLU report on the devolution proposals in this area still stand. As such this matter will not be dealt with in this report. All that needs be said is that the original critique has been further strengthened because now the powers of regions over law, order and justice have been strengthened.
There are several other features in the Chapter on Devolution that deserve a few comments.
(a) Place Given to Buddhism.
An entrenched provision (Art. 7) gives to Buddhism "the foremost place" and obligates the State to "protect and foster the Buddha Sasana". It is not clear whether this obligation extends to the Regional Councils. A Hindu, Muslim or Christian dominated Region Council will treat it with contempt. Other religions are guaranteed protection under the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution. There is to be a Council established after consultation with the Maha Sangha who are to advice the Government in the implementation of the obligations under Art 7.
It is questionable whether Art 7 is nothing more than a sop to the Maha Sangha. Buddhism is also an item reserved for the Central Government. But of course the Central Government will not have physical control over Buddhist sites in the Eelam region. The fate of the historic Naga Vihara in Jaffna, which was levelled by the LTTE and the site said to be converted into a bus-stand, is perhaps a portent of what could happen.
(b) The Administration of Justice.
On the administration of justice (which is a new function given to Regional Councils) a Regional High Court and a Regional Judicial Service Commission have been created. It is this Commission that will be responsible for judicial appointments. The Commission will be appointed by the Constitutional Council "in consultation with the Chief Minister". As mentioned with respect to another matter this mandatory "consultation" will in practice amount to the acceptance of the Chief Minister's nominations. If so it is possible that the administration of justice could be overseen by a former (or current) terrorist.
The Regional attorney General is to be appointed by Governor, perhaps the only area where the Governor has unfettered right. But as we have seen the Chief Minister has an input to the selection of the Governor, so how real the independence of the Regional Attorney General will be is a debatable matter. Under the proposed constitution the Attorney General has several important functions including ruling whether statutes passed by the Council violate the Constitution.
A regional public service is to be established and to run it a Regional Public Service Commission. It is to be appointed by the Constitutional Council in consultation with the Governor.
In Sri Lanka the public service though theoretically independent has in fact been manipulated by the Government. Given this culture it is doubtful whether we will have a truly independent Public Service.
A curious fact is that there will be as many public services as there are Regions. This will lead a proliferation of bureaucracy, with a given set of bureaucrats completely segregated into the confines of a single region. It is not the panacea that will create an efficient and experienced public service.
Each Region has been given policing power and this together with the National Policy will lead to a multiplicity of police forces and the creation of an elaborate policing structure. There is to be one National Police Commission (NPC) and a Regional Police Commission (RPC) with respect to each Region. This might give the idea that the NPC has a leading or supervisory role over the RPCs. This is not the case. It is merely stipulated that the RPC "may, if it deems it appropriate" adopt the criteria set out by the NPC. Thus there is nothing preventing the RPC from setting its own standards and guidelines. An RPC could well be a paramilitary force concerned with things other than the mere maintenance of local law and order.
An RPC is to consist of a Regional Police Commissioner appointed by the Chief Minister, and two others appointed by the Constitutional Court. It is not clear how this arrangement will work, but there can be little doubt that in practice the Chief Minister's nominee will determine the policy of the RPC.
ence between these two objectives of policing is likely to get blurred in practice, and there is no one who can "police" this aspect. Art 25(4) identifies some offences which the Regional police cannot investigate. Presumably these are to be investigated by officers of the NPC, but article 25(6) states that "all police officers serving in the Region shall function under the Regional Police Commissioner of the Region". This would mean that the RPC would have jurisdiction over NPC officers investigating offences reserved for the National police.
Other conflicts are likely to exist. Thus it is said that the RPC is responsible for recruitment of officers [Art 25(3)(c)] but once recruited the NPC could transfer them to other regions [Art 25(11)].
The multiplicity of police forces and the conflicting lines of authority will make policing a difficult task even for ordinary crime, but when it comes to subversive activities aimed at disrupting the Republic it would be almost impossible.
This has always been a contentious issue in Sri Lanka and one of the principal complaints of the separatists has been the alleged colonisation of the "Tamil homeland" by Sinhalese colonists. This is not the place to refute this claim but it would appear that the authors of the devolution proposals have accepted to a great extent the separatist argument.
Thus Art. 24(1) vests all state land in a region with the Regional Council and state land and its alienation and disposal is a right given to the Regions. It is specifically state that in land settlement priority shall be accorded "first to persons in the District and then persons in the Region". There is no mention of persons in other Regions. This would effectively stop the transfer of people from over-populated to under-populated regions. It would amount to a complete acceptance of the separatist demands with respect to this important question.
The use of Regional land for Central government purposes is subject to "consultation" with the regional administration even though it is also stated that the regional administration must "comply" with the request. Whether this will rectify the problem under the original proposals where the Centre may be debarred from using land in a Region for essential purposes such as those connected with national defense is not clear. Certainly there is ample ground to create a deadlock which could be a trigger for a full-scale confrontation between the region and the centre.
The bulk of the taxation powers are left to the Centre even though the Regions are left with quite considerable sources of revenue independent of the actions of the Centre. In all federal system there arises the problem of the allocation of taxation proceeds and other revenue collected by the Centre. Under the proposed scheme this task of regional allocation is to performed by a Finance Commission consisting of three persons appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council.
A peculiarity of the Finance Commission is that its three members must represent "the three major communities". This means that it must consist of a Sinhalese, a Tamil and a Muslim. A Burgher or anyone else will be barred from membership by the Constitution! It is difficult to think of a more racist clause in the Constitution, and very few constitutions endorse racism in appointments to a crucial body in this blatant way. The criteria for appointment seem to cut across race and religion. Can a Tamil who becomes a Muslim be appointed to the Fiance Commission? If so it would make two of its members Tamils, but still would satisfy the requirement of the Constitution! This particular requirement is not surprising in a document that is based on racism.
The Finance Commission if effect becomes the arbiters in the allocation of funds to the various regions. A number of criteria are laid down, several of them conflicting with each other, but what is clear is that it will be racial and political ones and not economic ones that will determine the actual outcomes.
Quite apart from funds coming from the Centre a region could raise money in several ways. Besides the function allocated to regions involve domestic and international burrowings (the latter subject to certain unspecified limitations) and the regulation and promotion of foreign direct investment, international grants and development assistance to the region. The anomaly involved here had been commented upon in connection with the original devolution package. This aspect has not been changed, and therefore the previous critique will remain valid.
Should a region embark on a course leading to UDI there would be ample financial resources to fund such a move.
This replaces the Permanent Commission on Devolution foreshadowed in the original package. The principal task of that Commission was to adjudicate and mediate on disputes arising between Regions. This is now one of the functions of the Chief Ministers' Conference.
The Chief Ministers' Conference is to take place monthly. If its mediation and conciliation efforts with respect to disputes between Regions fail there is provision for an external tribunal to make a determination. The tribunal is an ad hoc body appointed for a unique problem.
This method of dispute resolution may work for relatively minor dispute but may fail for major ones. Thus, for instance, if a Region were about to attempt secession the Conference may be quite unequal to the task. Indeed it would be quite toothless in all major disputes.
"One of the principal objectives of the proposals is the settlement of the ethnic crisis. However, there is a wider aim sought to be achieved. It is the empowerment of all Sri Lankans, wherever they live, to wield the authority to make decisions relating to their future. The ideal of democracy is better served, we feel, by the sharing of power with local representative units which will enable persons to determine their own destiny... The Government is resolved to secure a victory for democracy and peace..."
The three misconceptions are that first devolution solves an Ethnic Problem, the second that it empowers the people and shares power, and the third that it is a step to peace.
ACSLU has repeatedly pointed out that the SL problem is not an "Ethnic Problem" but a separatist problem. Of course ethnic problems (in the plural) may exist in SL as they do in scores of other countries. These other countries are not usually considered as being beset with an Ethnic Problem needing drastic surgery and Constitutional change. Unless racially-based Federalism is accompanied by total racial separation there will still be ethnic problems in those parts where many races co-exist. Thus devolution, as presently conceived, will neither solve the so-called "Ethnic Problem" nor the actual ethnic problems that may exist. What it will facilitate is the move towards separation and the partition of the country.
Devolution will also not bring about peace. The threat to peace has always been the armed Tamil separatist groups. Initially there were half a dozen of these but now there is only one openly committed (the LTTE) but the others are also still potentially terrorist groups. The only way to peace is the defeat such terrorists. Even if peace is secured by this means the Eelam Region will be a natural breeding ground for separatist terrorists. Thus if devolution were to succeed the Damoclean sword of terror will be permanently held above the Sri Lankan nation. The only way to a real peace is to defeat terrorism within the confines of a unitary state and seek other solutions to any ethnic problems (in the plural) that may still exist.
The view that devolution means more democracy and empowerment of the people and sharing of power is a serious error. Reducing the size of the relevant political unit does not eliminate the faults of democracy currently existing in SL. What the electoral record in SL shows is that the people have changed governments almost at every opportunity. Elections are held after long intervals, there is little informed discussion, bribery and corruption is the rule, and there is a blatant appeal to race, religion, caste and class. Unless these are tackled there can be no improvement in the democratic process. What the devolution process will do is to increase the importance of race, religion and other sectarian considerations, and immensely increase corruption with the proliferation of politicians and bureaucrats. What will really occur is not a sharing of power between communities and racial groups but between corrupt politicians. Already this is what is happening in the political process. Only devolution will expedite the negation of democracy as it gives the opportunity for unscrupulous regional leaders to use race, religion, etc. to break up the Sri Lankan nation and establish their own rule in their petty fifedoms.
None of the virtues claimed for devolution stand up to a cool analysis.
The Chapter of Devolution to be added to the proposed new Constitution of Sri Lanka, now laid before the people, is not an improvement over the devolution package introduced in August 1995. The few changes that have been introduced have not nullified the dangers which this plan holds for the Sri Lankan nation. In some respects they appear to have increased these dangers.
In almost every respect the devolution scheme is the opposite of what the real political solution should be. ACSLU had identified five principles that should be the basis of such a solution. These are the unitary principle (not federalism and devolution without any meaningful rationale), the non-racist principle (not the entrenchment of racism in the very Constitution of the nation), the democratic principle (not the rewarding of terrorism and the sharing of power between racist political leaders), the fundamental rights principle (which requires an entrenched and enforceable code of human rights defined in terms of individuals as human beings not as members of ethnic groups) and the independence principle (which requires that there should be no bowing down to outside pressure, or even medialtion from, outside powers.). The devolution proposals in the original form, and in their Legal Draft, fail every one of these five principles.
At the time of the publication of above document ACSLU was not aware of the analysis of the Devolution Law by one of its principal authors Prof. G. L. Pieris. This Appendix to the Revised Edition consists of a consideration of Prof Pieris' views of the subject.
The ACSLU critique of the Chapter on Devolution in the proposed Constitution of Sri Lanka was published shortly after the Draft Law was released in Sri Lanka. Since then a document entitled "Devolution Proposals of the Government of Sri Lanka" by Prof G. L. Pieris, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs has come to the attention of ACSLU[NOTE 9]. Since Prof Pieris was one of the principal architects of the proposed Law it is pertinent to examine his views on this subject.
After studying the text of Prof Pieris' article ACSLU feels that no revisions are needed to its original analysis. Nonetheless Prof Pieris' article should be studied closely because of its author's involvement in the drafting of the law in question. The article consists for the most part of a recapitulation of the principal provisions of the proposed Law interspersed with a few comments which add very little to what is already contained in the proposed Law. Such arguments as are adduced in favour of the Law are the stock in trade of the apologists for devolution and evade the essential questions which these proposals raise, particularly the detestable principles of "racial space", apartheid and racism on which this Constitution is based. There is very little new light shed on the specific clauses in the proposed law. These have been adequately dealt with in the ACSLU critique, so few additional comments are necessary. None of Prof. Pieris' comments really answer the faults in law, the ambiguities and the contradictions that riddle this proposed piece of legislation. But as ACSLU has shown even if this law is word perfect (or clause perfect) in this regard it will still fail because it does not address the political reality in Sri Lanka relating to the demand for Tamil Eelam, and in fact grossly misunderstands and ignores it. However Prof Pieris' comments are useful as they give an insight into the thinking of devolutionists.
Sri Lanka has never had a good track record in writing Constitutions. A Constitution written by one group of politicians has been rescinded the moment another set takes office. By contrast only a few amendments have been added to the American Constitution in over two centuries, while the Australian Constitution has remained largely unchanged for over a century. The short life of Sri Lankan Constitutions is because they are not based on justice and lasting principles and are merely expedients to serve the short-term political interests of those in power. This is also the case with Prof Pieris' proposed Constitution. Its fate will be no different from that of its predecessors, except that it would have created the inescapable preconditions for the partition of Sri Lanka into a patchwork of racist states. If this Constitution has the misfortune of being adopted the next Constitution will be for a truncated Sinhala state which itself will soon splinter as the Estate Tamils and the Muslims stake their claim for their own "racial space". The result will resemble the solution now imposed by the arbiters of the New International Order on Bosnia. ACSLU has termed this process the Balkanisation of Sri Lanka and the proposed Constitution will provide the keystone for this process of disintegration.
Prof Pieris begins by referring to "the ethnic crisis" but as with all devolutionists does not care to discuss what this "crisis" really is. The Maha Sangha recently asked the Government to explicate what really the problem is that they are trying to "solve" but all that we have heard from the Government is a deafening silence. The real crisis is that precipitated by racist terrorists who seek a substantial part of the Island of Sri Lanka to create an apartheid-style state called "Tamil Eelam". This very real crisis cannot be solved by the proposed Constitution.
With the problem not defined, let alone analysed, Prof Pieris goes on to claim that the Government's "political solution" is the answer, and further that "All ethnic groups - Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Malays and Burghers - and adherents of all religions - Buddhists, Christians, Hindus or Muslims - have, by and large, endorsed this view." This kind of statement reveals the racial- thinking out of which the present Constitutional proposals have emanated. Ethnic groups do not have collective wills. What Prof Pieris perhaps means is that bodies claiming to represent ethnic groups support the Government's proposed Constitution. This too is not correct. As far as the Tamils are concerned some Colombo-based groups have partially supported the proposed Law even though the President recently complained that they have been lukewarm in their support. Other Tamil groups, notably the LTTE, oppose it. There is no pan-Sinhala organisation whose views can be considered representative of "Sinhala" opinion. On the religious level some Muslims (who see in the proposals a means for the creation of an Islamic State in Sri Lanka) and Christian groups (whose primary aim is to weaken what they see as Buddhist dominance) have supported the move towards devolution. The Maha Sangha, as we have seen, has condemned it. In fact it is only racists, religious exclusivists, many foreign-funded "ethnic problem study groups", and some deluded persons who support the so-called "political solution". Those deluded have been fobbed off by false claims, e.g. that the proposal will bring about "peace", or that it will yield a financial dividend, or that it will be a substitute for the Eelam demand. None of these claims can be shown to be true, but the Government hopes that with its control of the levers of propaganda and largesse it will be able to secure a majority for its proposals. The ACSLU critique of the proposals is not based on the numbers supporting it but on the intrinsic principles that underlie it.
Prof Pieris quotes from a statement by the President of Sri Lanka to the effect that: "We believe that all communities must be given the space to express their identity and to participate fully in the life of the nation, whether it be at the national, provincial or local level." This is the notorious principle of "racial space" favoured by fascists, racists and the supporters of apartheid[NOTE10.] and directly contradicts the other claim of the President, made in the same breath, that "We have a vision of Sri Lanka where all communities can live in safety and security". The essential contradiction of these two statements which escape both President Kumaratunga and Prof Pieris is this: If it is possible for the communities to live in peace and safety then there is no need to splinter the country into "racial spaces". What is really meant is that the communities cannot live in safety and security in a common polity, so they have to be segregated territorially and have to retreat into their racial enclaves if they are to seek peace and safety.
Prof Pieris then goes on to reiterate, without further comment, the six principles contained in the preamble. As these have been examined in the original critique of the Law no further comment need be offered on them.
(f) the UNP manifesto for the Presidential Elections of November 1994.
Of these it is only (c) which has been implemented but a word may be said of the others as well.
The two Chelvanayakam pacts were opportunistic agreements between a communalist politician and political parties forming SL governments. They were completely unprincipled and in the event were never implemented. Tamil theorists have elevated the B-C Pact into a solemn concordat between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and always cite its non-implementation as a classic act of Sinhala perfidy. Of course the Sinhalese cannot be held responsible for this "pact". Quite early in the development of the problem Mr Bandaranaike was responsible for two extremely destructive ideas - the first being his ideas on national language and the other his devolution idea. The UNP was also quick to embrace both these ideas. Now both sides of Sri Lankan politics have effectively dropped the first of these ideas but they desperately cling to the second. The Moonesinghe Report and the UNP Manifesto merely show that the Government's delusions are entertained by a wider circle of Sri Lankan politicians. This does not mean that they are necessarily correct.
This leaves us with only with the 13th Amendment. It is now universally recognised that the Provincial Council system has been an expensive failure. It was supposed to decentralise decision making and "share power" but what it did was to spawn another tier of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. The latest shenanigans with the Government dissolving opposition controlled Provincial Councils and the Courts upholding them merely highlight the absurdity of the system. But Prof Pieris ascribes the failure to the "weakness of the proposals" and "opposition from various forces holding extreme points of view". What he means by their weakness is that the devolution proposed by his predecessors did not go the whole way to Federalism and beyond. The "extreme points of view" he refers to are the voices of reason which unmask these proposals for what they are. The six instances cited are steps in the wrong direction, and the tragedy is that the present proposals are further steps along the same route.
"For the realistic devolution of power to take place it is necessary to bypass certain constitutional, legal and practical constraints which may otherwise hamper effective implementation. For this reason it is necessary to redefine the concept of the "unitary state" which hitherto underpinned the Constitution. This is sought to be achieved by the definition of Sri Lanka as a Union of Regions".
This kind of verbal chicanery does not hide the reality. The nature of the state is identified by the actual assignment of powers not the words used to describe it. As ACSLU has shown the proposed arrangement goes well beyond Federalism (using accepted Federal states like the United State and Australia as bench marks) and in fact leans towards confederalism. Prof Pieris also does not shed any light on the mysterious First Schedule which will actually identify the units. He merely states: "The current demarcation of Provinces will, to a large extent, prevail but changes will be necessitated with regard to the present North-Eastern Province which has given rise to much controversy". Thus while other provinces become "regions" the "Eelam Region" will be the North-Eastern Province plus and/or minus territory from elsewhere. This region is to provide the racial space for the Tamils.
In his section dealing with these topics Prof Pieris seems to taking the claptrap that "power belongs to the people" too literally. In reality in all democratic states real power belongs to political parties, lobby groups, and those who control economic power and the information sources. Even taken in the more literal sense of the people vesting power in formal institutions ACSLU has pointed out that whereas Federal Constitutions like the US and Australia vest power directly to the Central unit, in the proposed Constitution it is vested co-equally to the Centre and the Regions. This matter is not raised by Prof. Pieris but is one that will give the Regions unusual authority.
"The objective of the proposals is the distribution of this power to such an extent that power is devolved to the smallest constitutive unit of society, thus maximising the opportunities available to the people to exercise their power."
If Prof Pieris really believes that the smaller the unit of devolution the greater is the "maximisation" of the peoples' power then he should devolve power to the Districts (as was the original intention of Solomon Bandaranaike). As it is even the provinces are not used as units of devolution as two of the original nine have been amalgamated to form the Eelam region. The plain fact is that the regional arrangement has nothing to do with "maximising the peoples' power" but with pandering to the demand of racist terrorists for a homeland in territory to which they have no entitlement. Instead of admitting this plain and unvarnished fact Prof Pieris tries to spin out dubious political theories.
To argue against the inevitable disintegration which this system will create Prof Pieris refers to words in his Law like "indissoluble" ignoring the political reality. ACSLU has shown that there is absolutely no way the integrity of the "Union" can be maintained against a determined Chief Minister in the Eelam Region. That such a Chief Minister will emerge, sooner than later, is one of the few certainties we can expect from this proposal. Even as it is the Government is hard put to contain terrorists with all the powers of a unitary state. How it could do so under the proposed Union strains credulity. Prof Pieris is either naive in saying that words he has written into the Constitution will save the integrity of Sri Lanka or he is engaged in a gigantic deception.
In Sri Lanka democratic norms are even more corrupt than in other democracies. As ACSLU has pointed out in Sri Lanka the sharing of power, and the spoils of power, will go principally to corrupt politicians and bureaucrats.
Prof Pieris' discussion of the details of the Constitution is unenlightening. He seems to take the view that because something is written down in the Constitution this is how things will work out in practice. He does not address any of the grave problems inherent in the Constitution which have been pointed out in the ACSLU critique.
Instead of going through all the various aspects that have been questioned by ACSLU let us take only a few examples to see whether Prof Pieris sheds any more light on them.
(a) The Governor. On the appointment of the Governor Prof Pieris says: "A governor will be appointed, upon nomination, to each Region. The Governor will be appointed by the President acting upon the advice of the relevant Chief Minister." This is simply the Constitutional provision. Is the President merely a rubber-stamp in the process of appointing the Governor? If so it is the Chief Minister who appoints the Governor. If the President is not a rubber-stamp and a disagreement arises on this issue between these two august personages how is this to be resolved. Will not this single clause provide the Chief Minster with a lever to break up the Union by insisting that a terrorist be appointed as Governor? Prof Pieris will like to wait until such a situation arises but a prudent constitutionalist will seek to anticipate such contingencies without bequeathing a Constitution which will splinter at the first crisis it encounters.
While executive power is vested in the Governor the mode of his appointment will make the Governor a tool of the Chief Minister.
(b) The Chief Minister and Board of Ministers. Prof Pieris seems to underplay the role of the Chief Minister and his Board with only two sentences devoted to this subject. He says that they will "aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of executive power in the Region". Again the reality is ignored. The Chief Minister will be something far more than a mere adviser; he will in effect call all the shots, particularly as he can claim to be the repository of the peoples' mandate. The neglect of this important element in the Constitution shows how little Prof Pieris knows of the actual working of the draft Constitution.
The LTTE could well rule the Eelam region, and the Supremo will be the Chief Minister. If the Governor does not toe his line the Governor will fall the fate of the Supremo's other deputies who crossed the Supremo's path. Even if the leader of one of the Colombo-based Eelamist groups becomes the Chief Minister the scenario will not be different.
(c) The Judiciary We have seen that there has been a further extension of Judicial powers of Regions over the proposals tabled in August 1995. Prof Pieris considers this to be a "hallmark" of the devolution scheme. He does not say anything about the appointment of judicial officers, which will determine the quality of justice at the Regional level. In the Eelam region it will be no different to the system of "justice" established by the LTTE now in the areas they control.
(d) Land Prof Pieris claims that the existing exclusive control over land by the Central Government is a part of the colonial legacy. However this feature has nothing to do with colonialism, as it is also seen countries that have not been colonised. He justifies the devolution of power in this area thus: "The relaxing of legal and administrative barriers regarding land utilisation is essential for the achievement of balanced and equitable development". Balance and equity can only be ensured if land utilisation is determined from an overall context. Regional council control could lead to unbalance and inequality. Thus so-called "colonisation schemes" cannot be used to spread the population evenly across the nation and overcrowding in some regions will co- exist with under-utilisation of land in others.
With respect to regional land needed for national purposes Prof Pieris confirms that this must depend on the consent of the Regional Government, a consent which will be withheld with respect to the discharge of several vital functions of the State.
The ACSLU analysis pinpointed this as one of the most unsatisfactory parts of the proposed Law. Prof Pieris does not deal with the conflict that the several jurisdictions in this area will create. He does confirm that it is the Chief Minister who will run the Regional Police Commission. There is nothing that will prevent the Regional Police Force being converted into a para-miliary force which one day will be even superior to the armed forces at the disposal of the Centre. And all this will be perfectly legal. It will be too late for the nation when this paramilitary force launches an all-out war in defence of a unilateral declaration of independence. Then all Prof Pieris carefully drawn-up lists and classification of offences will remain merely scraps of paper.
(f) Emergency and "Presidential Rule". The criticism made by ACSLU on these subjects remain unanswered by Prof Pieris. With respect to the Eelam Region these are not a theoretical possibility but a near certainty. How the President will deal with a defiant regional para-military "police force", particularly when it will have difficulty in finding land to establish military bases before the insurrection begins is something that defies imagination but which Prof Pieris seems to take in his sanguinary stride. These provisions in the Constitution are destined to be deadest of dead letters.
(g) Financial Powers. Prof Pieris says that "regional units should be vested with a degree of fiscal competence" but he does not say is that the degree of competence given exceeds the powers available to states in federal systems. This is justified on the grounds of "promoting balanced national development" when what will happen is that there will be guaranteed unbalanced development as the Eelam region will have access to unprecedented foreign funds perhaps in excess of all other regions put together.
The treatment of the other subjects by Prof Pieris is no different to the ones on which we have made brief comments. It would be tedious to enumerate them once again as the relevant points had already been made in the critique of the devolution Law.
The very superficial treatment of the Draft Law by one of its principal authors is indeed disappointing. What it shows that the authors of this Constitution have not taken into account the actual political reality in Sri Lanka today.
To justify the creation of an Eelam Region which is to be the racial playground for separatist Tamils will not stand even a cursory examination. While granting racial space to Tamils may be bad enough to split up the remaining area into unnecessary Regions which will be abused by local tier of politicians is unpardonable.
The tragedy is that the Tamils who are to be the beneficiaries of this process are not keen on the proposals themselves. As we have seen the LTTE rejects them outright while the Colombo-based groups are lukewarm. Of course when the potential opportunities for outright secession become clear the Tamil leaders may well swing behind the proposals. But this will not be further the naive thinking of Prof Pieris and other devolutionists. It will be to use the opportunity created by the Federal System to make the final leap for total severance.
Once again we must pose the question of what "problem" the Constitutional changes will solve, a question evaded by Prof Pieris and other devolutionists. Of course it will not solve the question of the armed insurrection of the LTTE. The LTTE has been able to operate all these years without a Regional Council of the type envisaged in the North-East. If such a Council is given it will only make the task of the LTTE that much easier and that of the SL army that much difficult. If on the other hand the LTTE is defeated militarily then it is the "military solution" that has worked, not the "political solution" will only make the re-emergence of the LTTE all that much easier. The description of this particular political solution as a "peace process" is simply not correct.
Perhaps Prof Pieris hopes that the half-dozen Tamil communalist parties now domiciled in Colombo will take over the Eelam Regional Council and behave like exemplary statesmen. This is a forlorn hope. Most of these groups have a terrorist history no less vicious than the LTTE. Furthermore they are all unrepentant Eelamists. If any of them, or a coalition of them, control the Eelam Region it would hardly be an improvement over the LTTE controlling this region. There is nothing that will prevent them from bringing about the end of the Union.
But the most sinister aspect of the Law is that it will not only facilitate the severance of the Eelam Region but also the creation other racist and sectarian sections carved out of the rump that will be left over. Already the Estate Tamils are stirring and will soon stake out their claim for their own piece of "racial space". The call for an Islamic State funded by Middle Eastern money has already been made. If these proposals will make it into law SL will have to confront something more than Tamil Eelam.

References: Art. 26
 Art. 26
 Art. 26
 Art. 26
 Art 7
 Art 7
 Art 25
 Art. 24