Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2d/70/842.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 23:09:28+00:00

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 2d › Volume 70 › Decker v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.
Decker v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.
[L. A. Nos. 29550, 29551.
Frank M. Benedict for Defendants and Appellants.
William J. Rathje and N. R. Samuelsen as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Labowe & Ventress and Joseph L. Ventress for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this action to recover amounts due and owing under a life insurance policy covering the unpaid balance on a contract of purchase and sale with the California Department of Veterans Affairs, defendant insurers appeal from a partial summary judgment (L.A. 29550) and from a summary judgment (L.A. 29551) entered in favor of plaintiff and against said defendants.
While married to plaintiff in August of 1955, Lloyd Decker purchased certain Culver City residential property through a contract of sale with the California Department of Veterans Affairs. With the latter's consent, title to the property was assigned by Decker and plaintiff to themselves as joint tenants. As provided by law, there was issued by the department upon Decker's application a Certificate of Life Insurance Home Protection Plan. Thereunder the defendant insurance companies obligated themselves to pay to the department, upon Decker's death, the balance still owing under his contract of sale provided he then had an insurable interest therein or was not otherwise in default. In February of 1963 plaintiff secured an interlocutory decree of divorce [by default] from Decker; by the terms thereof, after first reserving the right to grant other and further relief at the time of entry of the final decree, "The Court [found] that the real property located at 10738 Flaxton Street, Culver City, is community property and award[ed] the said real property to the plaintiff. ..." No appeal was taken therefrom.
The Certificate of Insurance contains the following termination clause: "The insurance automatically terminates when the purchase contract is paid in full or canceled, or when the insured's interest in the property has terminated, voluntarily, or involuntarily, by operation of law or otherwise, or when the Department of Veterans Affairs terminates its Master Agreement with the Insurance Companies."  This clause is in keeping with the provisions of section 987.1, Military and Veterans Code, which authorizes the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide veterans with the opportunity of acquiring farms and homes upon contract terms therein specified. fn. 2 Such opportunity of farm and home acquisition is but one of the several duties assigned the department since its succession to the responsibilities formerly vested in other agencies. (Mil. & Vet. Code, § 70.) The statutory program is essentially one for the benefit of veterans; hence, the contract may not be assigned without the permission of the Department which is also empowered to increase the interest rates to assignees who are not veterans. (Mil. & Vet. Code § 987.01.) In this latter regard, "That the assignee here is the former wife of the veteran is not a factor in determining the rate of interest to be charged. Divorced wives of veterans are given no special benefits by the Military and Veterans Code, at least not with respect to farm and home purchases." (25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 103.) Any seeming harshness in the adverse determination we presently must make of plaintiff's claims should accordingly be weighed against the above statutory scheme to which we cannot blind ourselves.
"(a) Upon the entry of an interlocutory decree of divorce or entry of a decree of separate maintenance of a veteran contract purchaser and his wife, the department will recognize the nonveteran wife as the sole purchaser provided the veteran's entire beneficial interest is transferred to the wife and she agrees to: (1) actually reside in the home; (2) pay interest at the rate prescribed by the California Veterans Board for nonveteran assignees and the resulting increased installments; (3) apply for the Home Protection Plan.
"(b) Should the veteran retain his entire beneficial interest in the property after divorce or legal separation, he may continue as purchaser provided either he or his divorced wife continues to occupy the property." Counsel for defendants has represented to us that "The Department, in keeping with the foregoing provisions of the Administrative Code, has adopted the practice for many years, upon entry of the interlocutory decree of divorce, to transfer the contract interest of the spouse, whose interest is lost by the decree, to the remaining [70 Cal. 2d 848] spouse as of the date of the entry of the decree at such time as the Department becomes aware of the entry of the decree." He then invokes the familiar rule that the contemporaneous administrative construction of the enactment by those charged with its enforcement will, unless clearly erroneous, be entitled to great weight by the courts. (Anders v. State Board of Equalization, 82 Cal. App. 2d 88, 98 [185 P.2d 883].) Whether the provisions of section 316 were made known to plaintiff, we do not know; if they were, perhaps she simply refused to pay the increased installments required of the nonveteran. In any event, and in view of the peculiar legislation governing the instant transaction, we see no escape for plaintiff except continued compliance with the contract under the laws and regulations thereto applicable.
Traynor, C. J., Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred.
However, in merely adopting the Court of Appeal opinion the majority have failed to discuss or resolve two frequently recurring questions: (1) Does a trial court commit reversible error in ordering an immediately effective disposition of property in an interlocutory decree? (2) If not, where the language of the decree is ambiguous or silent on the question of intended timing, does the presumption favor immediate or delayed disposition?proper resolution of this case, as well as necessary guidance to trial courts and the bar, compels a reply to these queries.
The first question is raised by implication, if not directly, in the instant case. In Luepe v. Luepe (1942) 21 Cal. 2d 145, 149 [130 P.2d 697], this court determined that a trial court had the power--i.e., jurisdiction--to make an immediately effective disposition of property in an interlocutory decree, [70 Cal. 2d 849] though perhaps it "should not" do so. Based on that hortatory expression, Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 202, 214 [259 P.2d 656], held that regardless of the trial court's jurisdictional power, it was reversible error to make an immediate disposition. So far as our subsequent pronouncements indicate, this is the present state of the law.
However, Fritschi v. Teed (1963) 213 Cal. App. 2d 718 [29 Cal. Rptr. 114], on which the majority largely rely, cast considerable doubt upon the Gudelj holding. Granted that Fritschi purported to distinguish Gudelj and later "dissonant authorities," it went beyond that point and strongly implied that Gudelj was not an accurate statement of the law and that it was "out of harmony with common practices of trial judges and divorce counsel throughout the state." (Id at p. 723.) This implication was fortified by the court's readiness to conclude, in the face of ambiguous language, that the trial court had in fact made an immediate disposition. A clear inference is that, contrary to Gudelj, the trial court involved in Fritschi not only acted within its power, but it acted properly--i.e., did not commit reversible error--in making an immediate disposition.
This court, by adopting the Court of Appeal opinion herein which relies on Fritschi for an identical conclusion, without mention of the Gudelj question, unfortunately perpetuates this confusion. It is now this court that implies an immediate disposition is proper--as I agree it should be--but without forthrightly stating as much. The Fritschi court, like the Court of Appeal below, was without power to do more than question the Gudelj holding; this court, however, can and should overrule it. I would hold that a trial court in its discretion may make an immediately effective property disposition in the interlocutory judgment of divorce if the intention to do so is expressly stated therein.
Even were a majority persuaded that a presumption should favor immediate disposition, however, we should unequivocally say so; for having some firm guideline would encourage courts and counsel to adopt more precise language in the preparation of interlocutory decrees and thus eventually the present uncertainties would be eliminated from this area of the law.
In short, I believe this court should resolve all the issues in the instant case in a manner calculated to avoid, rather than encourage, a repetition of this type of litigation. The majority, by adopting the Court of Appeal opinion, have regrettably foregone the opportunity to do so. They compound their omission by gratuitously adding to the opinion a paragraph in parentheses stating that rules of construction applicable to ambiguous interlocutory decrees "are not before us in this case." Such ipse dixit and cavalier dismissal of an issue ignores a record replete with the injection and discussion of the subject in every brief on file. fn. 1 Appellate responsibility dictates responding to a proper query.
FN 1. In No.  the appeal is from a partial summary judgment adjudging the liability of defendants under the subject policy but making no determination of the amount due thereunder. In No.  the appeal is from the summary judgment, subsequently entered, which disposes (as hereinabove noted) of all matters requiring determination. Since it serves no useful purpose, the first numbered appeal must accordingly be dismissed.
FN 2. Section 987.1, supra, reads: "The department in each individual case may specify the terms of the contract entered into with the purchaser, but no property sold under the provisions of this article shall, voluntarily or involuntarily, by operation of law or otherwise, be transferred, assigned, encumbered, leased, let or sublet, in whole or in part, without the written consent of the department, until the purchaser has paid therefor in full and has complied with all the terms and conditions of this contract of purchase."
FN 1. I cite chapter and verse: (1) plaintiff's petition for hearing, p. 10; (2) defendant's answer to petition for hearing, pp. 1-2; (3) defendant's opening brief in the Court of Appeal, p. 9; (4) plaintiff's reply brief in the Court of Appeal, p. 9; (5) defendant's reply brief in the Court of Appeal, pp. 2-3; (6) amicus curiae brief, p. 5; and (7) in addition, the trial court discussed the Gudelj problem from the bench (Rep. Tr., p. 3).

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