Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/reassignment/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:49:41+00:00

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I know I said that last week’s blog entry would be my last substantive blog entry of the year, but events can always happen to change my mind. Recently, the 11th Circuit came down with a published decision on December 7, 2016, in EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, Inc. , which has several issues worth talking about, including: what it means to have a disability; whether a person is a qualified person with a disability; whether the ADA mandates reassignment when a person is no longer qualified to do the job they are currently in; Rule 59(e) motions, EEOC legal malpractice, and why it is important for a plaintiff to have their own attorney. As is usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; was the plaintiff a person with a disability under the ADA; was a plaintiff a qualified individual under the ADA; does the ADA require mandatory reassignment where a person is no longer a qualified individual with a disability for their current job; whether the court erred in granting a Rule 59(e) motion; did the EEOC commit legal malpractice; is there a Circuit court split; and takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to concentrate on any or all of the categories. Later in the week, I will be posting my top 10+1 blog entries of 2016 as determined by your views.
Plaintiff had a condition called spinal stenosis. She also developed arthritis and underwent hip replacement in 2009. It was at that point in time she began to use a cane to alleviate her back pain and to provide support. Without the cane, the plaintiff, 62 years old and obese, could only walk short distances and would need to stop to realign her body.
During the course of a disciplinary action in October of 2011, she was observed using a cane in the psychiatric ward. The Director of Behavioral Health Operations was concerned that patients could use the cane as a weapon. Once the plaintiff was demoted, the hospital advised her that she could no longer use the cane in the psychiatric ward because it posed a safety risk.
The Manager of Team Resources spoke to the plaintiff and offered her the opportunity to remain employed with the hospital and gave her 30 days to identify and apply for other positions.
Normally, the hospital did not permit an internal candidate to apply for a transfer unless they had been in the current position for at least six months and had no final written warnings in their record, and the plaintiff met neither criteria. Even so, the hospital waived the requirements and allowed her to compete with other internal applicants as opposed to being in the general pool of job applicants. Although the hospital authorized the plaintiff to apply to internal channels as an active employee, all of her job applications were as an external applicant.
The Team Resources Director told the plaintiff that it wasn’t the hospital’s job to get a job for the plaintiff, but they were available to answer questions and guide her through the process. She also stated to the plaintiff that she was not charged with reassigning the plaintiff to another position.
The plaintiff advised the Team Resources Director that she was going on vacation for two weeks at the start of the 30 day period, and that she would not look at the hospital’s job board until her return. The plaintiff never came to the Team Resources Director with questions about the application process, the website, or the particular details of any position. Further, she did not apply for another position until November 11, 2011, which was three weeks into her 30 day allowance. A hospital job board listed over 700 jobs available. The plaintiff did apply for seven positions, three of which were applied for on the last day of the 30 day period and one of which she applied for after her 30 day application had expired.
At trial, the parties focused on three positions that the plaintiff applied for during the 30 day period: educational specialist, care transition coordinator, and home health clinician. The plaintiff was not interviewed for any of these positions.
Following the expiration of her 30 day application, the hospital terminated the plaintiff, but she continued to have access to the hospital’s job board. Even so, she only applied for one additional position on December 17, 2011. Had the plaintiff been further along in the interview process at the 30 day mark, the hospital would have also extended her employment to allow time for the interviewing process.
At trial, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: the jury first had to determine whether the hospital had failed to provide a reasonable accommodation by not assigning plaintiff to the educational specialist, care transition coordinator, or home health clinician position; if yes, the jury had to decide whether the hospital established its affirmative defense that it made a good-faith effort to provide a reasonable accommodation; if no, the jury had to figure out whether the hospital established its affirmative defense that the proposed accommodation would have constituted an undue hardship; and if no, the amount of damages that should be awarded.
Both the EEOC’s and the hospital’s proposed verdict form required the jury to cease deliberations upon a finding that the hospital made good faith efforts to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff.
The jury answered the first question yes finding that the hospital failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. They also answered the second question yes finding that the hospital made good faith efforts to identify reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff. In accordance with the jury verdict form, they then ceased deliberations. Neither party requested the District Court to instruct the jury to render a verdict on the undue burden defense, in addition to its finding of good faith. Accordingly, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the hospital.
Perhaps, in an effort to undo its mistake, the EEOC filed a rule 59(e) motion for alteration of the judgment asking the district court to vacate the good-faith finding, find the hospital liable, and remand for a trial and damages. The EEOC argued the jury’s good-faith finding applied only as a defense to compensatory and punitive damages and not as a defense to liability. The court held that good faith was a defense only to jury awarded damages and not to liability. It then turned to equitable relief and decided that the plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement. The District Court ordered the parties to mediate to determine the specific parameters for the plaintiff’s application for reinstatement, but after one month, the mediator notified the court that the parties had reached an impasse. Plaintiff eventually found full-time work as a telephonic behavioral nurse at a satellite of the MacDill Air Force Base.
Was the Plaintiff A Person With A Disability?
The plaintiff had spinal stenosis and had undergone hip replacement in 2009. The evidence clearly shows that she was substantially limited in her ability to walk. She depended on the cane to alleviate back pain and provide support for her hip. Without it, she could only walk short distances and would have to stop, line up her body, and balance herself.
Walking is a major life activity under the ADA.
With the amendments to the ADA, the threshold issue of whether a person has a disability does not require extensive analysis. Accordingly, plaintiff was a person with a disability under the ADA.
Was The Plaintiff Qualified Individual Under The ADA?
It is not relevant whether the plaintiff could perform her then-current job in the psychiatric ward because she sought reassignment. When an employee seeks reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, the critical question is deciding whether she is a qualified individual for those new jobs and not whether she was qualified for her current position. That view is supported by the ADA itself, 42 U.S.C. §12111(8), which says that the relevant position is the one that the individual holds or desires.
Does the ADA Require Reassignment Without Competition for A Person with A Disability No Longer Qualified for Their Current Job and Who Is Seeking Reassignment?
While the ADA says an employer must reasonably accommodate the employee with a disability, it does not say how an employer must do that. Rather, it offers a nonexclusive list of accommodations that may be reasonable with one of them being reassignment to a vacant position.
The ADA does not say or imply that reassignment is always reasonable. In fact, the use of the word “may,” argues just for the opposite. Namely, that reassignment is reasonable in some circumstances but not in others.
In the 11th Circuit, employers are only required to provide alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer’s existing policies.
In a footnote, the court notes that had Congress understood the ADA to mandate reassignment, it could easily have used mandatory language but it did not. Such a decision reflects that Congress did not intend reassignment to be required in all circumstances.
Requiring reassignment in violation of an employer’s best-qualified hiring or transfer policy is not reasonable in the run of cases. Since employers operate their businesses for profit, as a general rule, which requires efficiency and good performance, passing over the best qualified job applicants in favor of less qualified ones is not a reasonable way to promote efficiency or good performance. Further, when it comes to hospitals, the well-being and lives of patients can depend upon having the best qualified personnel. Undermining a hospital’s best qualified hiring transfer policy imposes substantial costs both on the hospital and potentially on patients as well.
The intent of the ADA is that an employer needs only to provide meaningful equal employment opportunities.
The ADA was never intended to turn non-discrimination into discrimination against persons without disabilities.
The ADA is not an affirmative action statute and only requires the employer to allow the person with a disability to compete for the job; it does not require the employer to turn away a superior applicant. Accordingly, the District Court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that the ADA requires reassignment without competition.
The 30 day period to identify a new position was a reasonable amount of time. In particular: in addition to the 30 days to find a job, the hospital told her that the time period would be extended for any position for which the plaintiff was being considered; the Team Resources Director instructed the plaintiff’s supervisor to check with her before terminating the plaintiff’s employment because the Team Resources Director knew that plaintiff could still have outstanding applications at the time; and even once terminated, the Team Resources Director told the plaintiff she could continue identifying and applying for positions.
The evidence was such that the jury’s verdict that the hospital failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff by not assigning her to one of the three positions was not an appropriate one to be disturbed.
The evidence also supported the jury’s finding that the hospital acted in good faith when it: waived the prohibition against applying for an internal job transfer despite the plaintiff’s disciplinary history and demotion; assigned a person to assist the plaintiff in the application process for other positions and gave her 30 days to identify and apply for jobs; waived the requirements for internal transfer; and would have extended her employment if she was in the process of seeking reassignment to another position.
Did the Court Err in Granting the Motion to Alter the Judgment?
Both parties proceeded as if a good-faith finding absolved the defendant of all ADA liability.
The EEOC’s own proposed jury instructions and verdict form read together, treated good faith as a complete defense to liability. The verdict form unequivocally did so by instructing jurors that if they found that the hospital had made a good-faith effort to identify and make a reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff, they were to end of deliberations without deciding whether the plaintiff’s requested accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the hospital.
The jury instructions on good faith and undue hardship both state that a finding of either good faith or undue hardship obviates the need for a verdict on damages.
Undue hardship is a complete defense to ADA liability.
No doubt exists that any reading of the jury instruction and verdict leads to the logical conclusion that the parties believed that the jury’s finding of good faith equated with a hospital verdict.
It was only after the District Court entered judgment that the EEOC filed a rule 59(e) motion for the first time raising the issue that good faith only precludes jury awarded damages. As such, this rule cannot be used to raise new legal theories or arguments, much less one contradicting verdict forms or instructions that the moving party proposed to the District Court.
Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion and should have denied the motion and left in place the original judgment for the hospital instead of allowing the EEOC to correct it decision because of its poor strategic choices.
Since the Rule 59(e) standard was not met, the court specifically declined to address whether a good faith defense is an absolute defense to ADA liability. For that matter, it wasn’t necessary to address the hospital’s undue burden defense or the denial of equitable remedies to the plaintiff.
Could You Argue That the EEOC Committed Legal Malpractice?
The ADA makes it quite clear that good faith is a defense to damages (see, 42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(3), but not to liability. Accordingly, if an employer shows good faith, they can escape damages, but that does not mean they can escape equitable relief.
In light of that, it is quite odd that the EEOC did not ask the court to render a verdict on the undue burden defense, in addition to its finding of good faith.
Even assuming the EEOC committed legal malpractice, an argument which I think can be made, does the plaintiff have any recourse. That is, could the aggrieved person sue the EEOC for legal malpractice? The answer is unequivocally no because the EEOC cannot engage in an attorney-client relationship with an aggrieved person since it does not represent that person’s interest. See Adler v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3321 (D. Nev. January 10, 2012).
Is There a Circuit Court Split?
The Seventh Circuit has an opinion on mandatory reassignment that we discussed here. As discussed in that blog entry, the Seventh Circuit took the following approach. First, one has to decide whether mandatory reassignment was ordinarily, in the run of cases, a reasonable accommodation. Second, if so, are there fact specific considerations particular to the employment system that create an undue hardship and make the mandatory reassignment unreasonable. Third, the employee has insert to show that the accommodation is of the type that is reasonable in the run of cases. Fourth, if the employee makes that showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that granting the accommodation would impose an undue hardship under particular circumstances of the case. Finally, if the accommodation is not shown to be a type of accommodation reasonable in the run of cases, the employee can still prevail by showing that special circumstances warrant a finding that the accommodation was reasonable under the particular circumstances of the case.
In the Seventh Circuit, the ADA requires employers to appoint employees with disability to the vacant position unless an undue hardship is present or a collective bargaining agreement dictates otherwise.
Comparing the Seventh Circuit decision, including the one from the Northern District of Illinois, with the 11th Circuit, there certainly seems to be a difference in tone between the Seventh and 11th Circuit, particularly with respect to burdens of proof. Also, while not a direct conflict between Circuits, the 11th Circuit opinion is certainly in conflict with the decision from the Northern District of Illinois, which we discussed in this blog entry. In that decision, Judge Kennelly held that an attempt to reassign an employee with a disability to an alternative position is required where that an employee cannot perform the essential function of her position and there are no other available accommodations. He also said that in considering reassignment to a different position, the employer must make a reasonable effort to explore the possibilities with the employee.
The 11th Circuit specifically relies on Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, a decision which the Seventh Circuit specifically disowns in their decision, for the proposition that the ADA allows for competitive bidding.
If this case shows anything, it shows the importance of a plaintiff having his or her own attorney to represent his or her own interest. If the EEOC brings a claim, the actual person alleging discrimination has the absolute right to intervene. If that had happened in this case, presuming an attorney well-versed in the ADA represented the plaintiff, the attorney for the plaintiff could have argued at trial that good faith was not an absolute defense to all ADA liability and upon winning that argument, the jury verdict form would have been corrected. That would have prevented all the problems.
I think an argument can be made that a Circuit court split does exist now on mandatory reassignment. Certainly, the 11th Circuit relying on Huber with the Seventh Circuit explicitly saying they were overruling a case that relied on that decision indicates as much. We also do not know who the next Supreme Court Justice will be. Keep in mind, 60 votes of the U.S. Senate will be needed for the U.S. Supreme Court Justice to even be considered. That said, the United States Supreme Court, even as currently configured, has not been a big fan of affirmative action lately, or anything resembling it. So, competitive bidding is something likely to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Also, competitive bidding is definitely something likely to appeal to the new incoming president considering his business background and his well-known statements over the years of saying that the only thing he is interested in is the best person for the job.
Correcting strategic errors are not grounds for a successful Rule 59(e) motion.
Whether a person has a disability under the ADA doesn’t usually require extensive analysis.
When dealing with cases of reassignment, the issue is entirely focused on whether the individual is a qualified person with a disability for the job that they are seeking. It of course assumes that the person is no longer qualified for the job they currently hold.
30 days for a person to find another job is a very tight timeframe and an aggressive policy by the employer. One thing this case shows, is that having a policy on reassignment of workers with disabilities is a must. It seems to me that this employer took a chance by being so aggressive in that it gave the employee little time to find a job and the employee had to do it all by herself. Preventive law suggests a better approach might be actively assisting the employee to find a suitable position.
A plaintiff should take full advantage of what an employer offers with respect to finding other jobs in the company when they are no longer qualified in ADA parlance for their current job. Also, the employee would be wise to put off that vacation and take it while in between jobs rather than while the time is running out on their current job.
If you are going to go with the competitive bidding route, my guess is that the Supreme Court will ultimately agree that you can comply with the ADA by using a competitive bidding process, as a preventive measure, it is a good idea to have your reasons in order as to why you hired other candidates and not the person with a disability seeking reassignment.
Jury instructions are critical. Here, it should have been made clear that undue hardship is an absolute defense to ADA liability but if not shown, there can still be ADA liability regardless of whether the employer acted in good faith.
Due to “the strategic errors,” of the EEOC in this case, I don’t think this case would be the best one to take up with the United States Supreme Court.
Attorney fees is an interesting question. The plaintiff winds up losing despite getting a couple of favorable verdicts. But for the EEOC strategic errors, the plaintiff could have received equitable relief. Not sure about the equities in awarding attorney fees where the strategic errors were responsible for jettisoning the case and where the plaintiff did not have her own counsel.
About that jury instruction… A jury instruction that gets it right so to speak like might look like this: 1) Did the employer fail to provide a reasonable accommodation by not assigning plaintiff to a particular job; 2) If yes, did the employer establish its affirmative defense that it made a good-faith effort to provide a reasonable accommodation; 3) If no, what is the amount of damages that should be awarded? 4) Regardless of the answer to whether the employer made a good-faith effort to provide a reasonable accommodation, did the employer establish its affirmative defense that the proposed accommodation would constitute an undue hardship?
First off, I want to thank everyone who voted for me for the 2016 ABA blog 100. It has been two years in a row for Understanding the ADA, and I am keeping my fingers crossed for a third. Thanks again everyone!
Turning to the topic of the week, about a week or so ago my Google alerts lit up concerning the EEOC Guidance on Employer-Provided Leave and the ADA, which came down on May 9 of 2016. I am not sure why my Google alerts lit up about a week ago considering the guidance came down in May. Nevertheless, I thought it would be useful to go over the guidance. I have been thinking in my head about how to organize this particular blog entry, and I came up with a system where the odd numbers would be the EEOC view and the even numbers would be my thoughts. So, section I is the EEOC view juxtaposed against my comments. While section II, are the takeaways.
EEOC view: just what is a reasonable accommodation? Citing to an appendix to their regulations, the EEOC says that a reasonable accommodation is generally any change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities.
Comments: Don’t have a problem with the formulation. As I have written numerous times in my book over the years, it helps to think of this in terms of getting the person with a disability to the same starting line as those without disabilities.
EEOC view: employer policy requiring employees on extended leave to be 100% healed or able to work without restrictions may deny some employees reasonable accommodations that would enable them to work.
Comments: absolutely as we discussed in this blog entry, which was one of my very first blog entries.
EEOC view: employers often fail to consider reassignment as an option for employees with disabilities who cannot return to their job following leave.
Comments: for sure. See this blog entry for example.
EEOC view: consider this situation: an employer provides four days of paid sick leave each year to all employees and does not set any condition for use. That is, the employer’s sick leave policy does not require any documentation, and requests for sick leave are routinely granted based upon an employee’s statement that he or she needs the leave. If the employer demands documentation for the use of such leave because the employee is dealing with a disability, then the supervisor’s actions violate the ADA because the employee is being subjected to different conditions for use of sick leave than employees without a disability.
EEOC view: consider this situation: an employer permits employees to use paid annual leave for any purpose and does not require they explain how they intend to use it. If the employer denies an employee’s use of annual leave due to her disability, then you have an ADA problem. In this situation, the supervisor forced an employee with a disability to use sick leave instead of annual leave to deal with a disability even though he had never denied other employees annual leave based upon the reason for using it.
EEOC view: employers are entitled to have policies requiring all employees to provide a doctor’s note or other documentation to substantiate the need for leave.
Comments: makes perfect sense as all employees are being treated the same.
EEOC view: an employer must consider providing unpaid leave to an employee with a disability as a reasonable accommodation if the employee requires it so long as an undue hardship is not created even where: the employer does not offer leave as an employee benefits; the employee is not eligible for leave under the employer’s policies; or the employee has exhausted the leave the employer provides as a benefit.
Comments: not a problem but the emphasis of the EEOC is that the employer must consider providing unpaid leave. The specific accommodation could be different depending upon the results of the interactive process.
EEOC view: reasonable accommodation does not require an employer to provide paid leave beyond what it provides as part of its paid leave policy.
EEOC view: consider this situation: an employer provides 10 days of paid annual leave and four days of paid sick leave each year to employees who have worked for the company less than three years. After three years, employees are eligible for 15 days of paid annual leave and eight days of paid sick leave. An employee who has worked for only two years and has used his 10 days of paid annual leave now requests six days of paid sick leave for treatment for his disability. Under its leave program, the employer must provide the employee with four days of paid sick leave but may refuse to provide paid leave for the two additional days of sick leave because the employee has not worked long enough to earn this benefit. However, the employer has to provide two additional days of unpaid sick leave as a reasonable accommodation unless it can show that providing the two additional days would cause undue hardship.
Comments: no problems with much of this section. However, the section saying that the employer must provide the two additional days of unpaid sick leave as a reasonable accommodation absent a showing of undue hardship overstates the case. Again, the specific accommodation should be the result of the interactive process. Sure, it is absolutely conceivable that such a process would mean granting the two days of unpaid leave, and that it would be unlikely to be an undue hardship considering the rest of the employer’s policy. However, that is not the same as saying the granting of this accommodation is mandatory. We simply don’t know what the interactive process would reveal.
EEOC view: consider this situation: an employer’s leave policy does not cover employees until they have worked for six months. An employee who has worked for only three months requires four weeks of leave for treatment of his disability. Although the employee is ineligible for leave under the employer’s leave policy, the employer must provide unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation unless it can show that providing the unpaid leave would cause an undue hardship.
Comments: completely agree that once a person is an employee, the ADA applies regardless of probationary status or regardless of length of tenure of the employee. Also agree that unpaid leave could be a reasonable accommodation and that anything goes with respect to accommodating a person with a disability unless an undue hardship exists. My issue is the statement that providing unpaid leave is mandatory absent an undue hardship. Again, as mentioned above, we simply don’t know what the interactive process would reveal. It is possible that the unpaid leave is the best situation, but maybe the interactive process would reveal something else. Reassignment perhaps?
EEOC view: consider this situation: an employer’s leave policy explicitly prohibits leave during the first six months of employment. An employee who has worked for only three months needs four weeks of leave for treatment of a disability and the employer tells him that if he takes the leave, he will be fired. Although the employee is ineligible for leave under the employee’s leave program, the employer must provide unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation absent a showing of undue hardship. If the employer could provide unpaid leave without causing an undue hardship, but fires the individual instead, then the employer violates the ADA.
Comments: don’t have a problem except for the mandatory nature of the unpaid leave. Again, we just don’t know what the interactive process would reveal.
EEOC view: When an employee requests leave, or additional leave, for a medical condition, the employer must treat the request as one for reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
Comments: the EEOC is making this argument in a case, Capps v. Mondelez Global LLC, currently on appeal with the Third Circuit. However, as the lower court noted in the opinion hyperlinked above, it isn’t that simple. One has to remember, that to get FMLA leave, it has to be shown that a person cannot do the job’s essential functions. It does not have to be shown that the person can do the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations. Therefore, making a request for FMLA leave does not, according to the lower court, mean a request for reasonable accommodation is involved since whether a person can do the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations is not the question under the FMLA. In essence, it is much the same argument used by employers when a person files for Social Security Disability Income and later claims they have a right to proceed under the ADA, which we discussed in this blog entry. That said, as a preventive matter, it would make sense for the employer to use some common sense when a leave request comes through and start the interactive process to see what would work best for both sides.
EEOC view: when seeking information to help figure out where the interactive process will go, much of the focus will go to the following issues: the specific reasons the employee needs the leave; whether the leave will be for a block of time or intermittent; and when the need for leave will end. Also, depending upon the information the employee provides, the employer should consider whether the leave would cause an undue hardship.
Comments: makes sense. I do find the phrasing, “depending on the information the employee provides…,” a bit funny, as the employer should always be keeping in mind whether an undue hardship exists. Keep in mind, undue hardship can either be logistical or financial (see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (p)(2)), and that a showing of financial undue hardship is a very rare occurrence.
EEOC view: an employer may obtain information from the employee’s health care provider (with the employee’s permission of course), in order to confirm or to elaborate upon information that the employee has provided. Employers may also ask the healthcare provider to respond to questions designed to enable the employer to understand the need for leave, the amount and type of leave required, and whether reasonable accommodations other than (or in addition to), leave may be effective for the employee (perhaps resulting in the need for less leave).
Comments: absolutely. However, it doesn’t make a lot of sense for the employer to do any of this unless the employer is having it all evaluated against the essential functions of the job. So, the employer should make sure that the person assessing the employee is given a copy of the essential functions of the job as the job is actually practiced. Once the employer has that information, don’t forget about the interactive process and utilizing the Job Accommodation Network.
EEOC view: consider this situation: an employee with a disability is granted three months of leave by an employer. Near the end of the three month leave, the employee requests an additional 30 days of leave. In this situation, the employer can request information from the employee or the employee’s health care provider about the need for the 30 additional days and the likelihood that the employee will be able to return to work, with or without reasonable accommodation, if the extension is granted. However, an employer that has granted leave with a fixed return date may not ask the employee to provide periodic updates, although it can reach out to an employee on extended leave to check on the employee’s progress.
Comments: not a problem here.
EEOC view: although employers are allowed to have leave policies establishing the maximum amount of leave an employer will provide or permit, they may have to grant leave beyond this amount as a reasonable accommodation to employees requiring it because of his disability unless the employer can show that doing so will cause an undue hardship.
Comments: very confusing. On the one hand, the EEOC is saying that they may have to grant leave beyond the amount of maximum leave, but on the other hand they are saying that it has to be done unless an undue hardship exists. As mentioned above, the EEOC also uses in this guidance the term, “must.” It simply isn’t clear what is going on here. Again, as mentioned above, the granting of leave per the ADA may very well happen, but it is also possible that the interactive process will come up with a different solution. The key is making sure the interactive process occurs.
EEOC view: consider this situation: an employer covered under the FMLA grants employees a maximum of 12 weeks of leave per year. An employee uses the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave to deal with her disability but still needs five additional weeks of leave. The employer must provide the additional leave as a reasonable accommodation unless the employer can show that doing so will cause an undue hardship. However, the employer may consider whether other reasonable accommodations may enable the employee to return to work sooner than the employee anticipate, as long as those accommodations would be consistent with the employee’s medical needs.
Comments: first, this situation happens all the time. Keep in mind, that in granting additional leave, the courts have held that there must be a fixed time. An unfixed time for additional leave is not a reasonable request for a reasonable accommodation. Second, while the EEOC says that leave must be provided, they then turn around and say that it is possible that reasonable accommodations may allow the employee to return to work sooner. The phrasing is very confusing. Again, the key is the interactive process. Third, the phrasing that “the employer may consider whether other reasonable accommodation may enable the employee to return to work sooner than the employee anticipates so long as those accommodations would be consistent with the employee’s medical needs,” is a bit funny because the critical question is not the employee’s medical needs. The question is whether in the employee’s current physical or mental condition, the employee is capable of performing the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations.
EEOC view: consider this situation: an employer not covered by the FMLA, and its leave policy specifies that an employee is entitled to only four days of unscheduled leave per year. An employee with a disability informs her employer that her disability may cause periodic unplanned absences and that those absences might exceed four days a year. The employer should consider that request a request for reasonable accommodation and the employer should engage with the employee in an interactive process to determine if her disability requires intermittent absences, the likely frequency of the unplanned absences, and if an undue hardship exists.
Comments: in this situation, the critical piece is that the employee is not eligible for FMLA leave. Accordingly, I give it a makes sense rating. If the employee is eligible for FMLA leave, then see ¶24, discussing Capps.
EEOC view: with respect to form letters to communicate with employees nearing the end of leave provided under the employer’s leave program, such form letters should contain information within them that if the employee needs additional unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation for his disability, the employee should ask for it as soon as possible in order for the employer to consider whether it can grant an extension without causing an undue hardship. If an employer relies on a third-party provider to handle lengthy leave programs, including short and long-term disability leave programs, it should ensure that any automatic form letters generated by these providers comply with the employer’s obligations under the ADA.
EEOC view: Employers handling request under the regular leave policy separately from request for leave as a reasonable accommodation should ensure that those responsible communicate with one another in order to avoid mishandling the request for accommodation. The employer should ensure that the contractor is instructed to forward to the human resources department in a timely manner any request for additional leave beyond the maximum period granted under the long-term disability program, and it refrain from terminating the employee until the human resources department has the opportunity to engage in an interactive process.
Comments: makes sense. Also, when it comes to short-term and long-term disability policies, you may be facing the same situation alluded to in Capps and in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.
EEOC view: Where an employee requests additional leave exceeding an employer’s maximum leave policy, the employer may engage in an interactive process to assess the situation.
Comments: I don’t understand the use of the term, “may.” Seems to me that failure to engage in the interactive process in that situation, would expose the employer to liability. Even if it wouldn’t somehow, engaging in the interactive process in this situation would be good preventive law.
EEOC view: an employer violates the ADA if it claims an employee with a medical restriction poses a safety risk but cannot show that the individual is a direct threat. If an employee’s disability poses a direct threat, an employer must consider whether reasonable accommodation will eliminate or diminish the direct threat.
Comments: makes sense. On this, you might want to check out Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal.
EEOC view: consider this situation: the clerk has been out on medical leave for 16 weeks for surgery in order to address a disability. The employee’s doctor releases him to return to work but with a 20 pound lifting restriction. The employee refuses to allow the employee to return to work with the lifting restriction even though the employee’s essential and marginal functions do not require lifting 20 pounds. The employer’s action violates the ADA because the employee can perform the job and she does not pose a direct threat.
Comments: my problem is with the use of the term, “” The only issue under the ADA is whether the employee can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations. When it comes to marginal functions, those functions can be written off by the employer or assigned to someone else. If indeed the marginal functions are something that has to be performed for that person’s job, then wouldn’t it be an essential function in the first place? Finally, keep in mind a function can be essential even if it is performed infrequently.
EEOC view: an employer may not prohibit the employee from returning to work solely because she needs reasonable accommodations. Of course, if the requested accommodation would constitute an undue hardship, that is another matter.
Comments: the word “solely,” is bothersome. See this blog entry for example.
EEOC view: When it comes to the interactive process, issues that need to be explored include: the specific accommodations and employee requires; the reason the accommodation or work restriction is needed; the length of time the employee will need reasonable accommodation; possible alternative accommodation that might effectively meet the employee’s disability -related needs; and whether any of the accommodations result in an undue hardship.
Comments: not a problem here. Keep in mind, that temporary disabilities may be a disability under the ADA as discussed in this blog entry.
EEOC view: where a person with a disability is no longer qualified/otherwise qualified for the position they are in, reassignment to a position that they are qualified for is mandatory.
Comments: this view is certainly consistent with the view of the Seventh Circuit, as we discussed above. Even there, a seniority system may be involved as we discussed in this blog entry from last week. Also, mandatory reassignment is not a view that is universal among all the U.S. Court of Appeals. Look for the United States Supreme Court to ultimately step in.
EEOC view: in determining whether leave results in an undue hardship, consider the following: the amount and/or length of leave required; the frequency of the leave; whether there is any flexibility with respect to the days in which leave is taken; whether the need for intermittent leave on specific dates is predictable or unpredictable; the impact of the employee’s absence on coworkers and on whether specific job duties are what constitute being performed in an appropriate and timely manner; and the impact on the employer’s operations and its ability to serve customers/clients appropriately and in a timely manner, taking into account for example, the size of the employer.
Comments: I don’t see why these factors have to be exclusive. These factors do make sense when considering whether a logistical undue hardship is present. As I have written numerous times over the years, it makes sense to think of logistical undue hardship in terms of fundamental alteration (I once heard an EEOC Commissioner say the same thing).
EEOC view: when considering whether additional leave constitutes an undue hardship, the employer has the right to consider whether that additional leave on top of the leave already granted taken together constitute an undue hardship.
EEOC view: Leave as a reasonable accommodation includes the right to return the employee to his or her original position.
Comments: this is interesting. FMLA by statute requires such a return, but the ADA does not. If you don’t, is that an adverse action violating the ADA? Keep in mind, a demotion could be a reasonable accommodation as we discussed in last week’s blog entry. Also, an employer wants to keep in mind what obligations it has to reassign the employee to a vacant position the employee is qualified for, which we have also discussed above. Finally, the key is going to be the interactive process, whether it breaks down, and who is responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process.
Never forget about the interactive process and utilizing the Job Accommodation Network. It is possible that granting a leave is not the only option. After all, it is entirely possible that the employee would rather work with or without reasonable accommodation than go on leave.
Make sure you understand just where your jurisdiction is on whether a person who is no longer qualified per the ADA to do their job must be re-assigned that they are qualified/otherwise qualified for.
This is a guidance by the EEOC and so it is anybody’s guess as to how persuasive the courts will take this. See this blog entry for example. Even so, this guidance contains many excellent preventive law ideas.
For people working in this area, Cleveland, mentioned above, and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar are mandatory reading.
Don’t forget about the possibility of direct threat, particularly but not exclusively where public safety is involved.
Marginal functions of the job can either be reassigned or written off. It is also possible that the marginal function is really an essential function. Remember, a function that is done every so often could still be an essential function.
Temporary disabilities may be protected under the ADA.
Whether leave as a reasonable accommodation includes the right to return the employee to his or her original position may or may not be the case. However, a thorough use of the interactive process could go a long way towards protecting the employer from liability in that regards.
Don’t forget about FMLA, but do not impose that scheme on the ADA either.
Today’s case is Kirincich v. Illinois State Police, a decision from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, by Judge Kennelly that came down on July 22, 2016. This case explores essential functions, direct threat, interactive process, and reassignment. As is the usual practice for my blog entries, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Plaintiff suffered from type I diabetes since she was a child. In August 2011, the Illinois State Police hired her, and it was aware of her diabetes before hiring her. At the time of hiring, her diabetes appeared to be well controlled. For 13 years she had been treated by an endocrinologist using a program that aims to maintain her blood sugar levels and reduce the risk of diabetic complications. In the time after being hired by the Illinois State Police, she experienced at least two hypoglycemic episodes in which her blood sugar got so low that she lost consciousness. In late 2012 or early 2013, she was assigned to the night shift per the seniority system. The night shift required her to be on patrol from 10 PM to 8 AM the following day and her duties included driving a squad car, investigating crime, and intervening in ongoing criminal activity. She was also required to appear in court following the end of her shift if necessary, thereby extending the shift on an unpredictable basis at times. She was also required to be on call for statewide emergencies or other call up requirements.
On February 28, 2013, she suffered a hypoglycemic episode while on patrol as a state trooper. This caused her to lose consciousness and drive erratically for several miles, including: running a red light; driving over the center line; and colliding with several other vehicles at a high rate of speed. Ultimately, her vehicle stopped as the result of the collisions, and firefighters had to cut the roof off of her squad car in order to remove her from the vehicle. After this episode, the Illinois State Police placed her on restricted status in order to evaluate her ability to continue working as a state trooper. Ultimately, its medical review board referred her to an endocrinologist for an independent medical valuation. That person noted her blood sugar level should be closely monitored and controlled and recommended that her treating physician would have more insight into her ability to work based on the chronic nature of diabetes and the physician’s long relationship with her.
After conducting additional meetings to review the independent physician’s notes and other information related to her disability in the accident, the Illinois State Police determined that she could no longer perform the essential functions of the job and began the process of finding an accommodation by sending her a letter stating that she was unable to perform the essential functions of a sworn officer and could no longer continue in her position as a trooper. That letter identified her options moving forward, including applying for reassignment to a civilian position.
Following a meeting on November 5, 2013, the plaintiff did submit an application for reassignment to a civilian position. However, in the application she did not request a civilian position but rather requested an accommodation of change to the day shift explaining that the night shift was very problematic with respect to her diabetes. She said that her physician had told her that working exclusively on the day shift would alleviate the possibility her blood sugar levels would become unbalanced and would allow her to fully perform her duties without complications. On December 2, 2013, her counsel submitted to the Illinois State Police the letter from her endocrinologist confirming what she said in the application. However, at trial her endocrinologist did not testify that she knew the duties of state troopers other than that the plaintiff carried a badge and drove the vehicle for long periods of time. She also said that she did not receive any information on the essential functions of state troopers. The Illinois State Police said that her request for a patrol change was in conflict with the request for reassignment to a non-sworn civilian position. This led to a year-long period of correspondence. On October 3, 2014, the plaintiff was invited to interview for a guard II position at the James R Thompson building in Chicago as well as for the position of truck weight stop inspector. She attended both interviews and was eventually offered both positions. She accepted the truck weight stop inspector position but took issue with the required transfer documentation, which framed the transfer as a resignation from a trooper position. When she manually redacted the word resignation and replaced it with notification that she was not resigning and was not being accommodated under the ADA, the Illinois State Police considered her return of the form as a resignation from the trooper position and an acceptance of the truck weight stop inspector position. It scheduled her to report to her position on February 1, 2015. In the meantime, the Illinois State Police notified her of an additional open position for which he could interview, a criminal intelligence analyst, which had a salary considerably higher than that of the truck weight stop position or even her state trooper position. After an interview, the Illinois State Police offered that position to her. When it offered that position to her, the Illinois State Police notified her that it was the third offer of an alternative accommodation and that if she declined the open offers, she would be terminating the reasonable accommodation process. Despite the warning, the plaintiff did not report for duty on any of the position she was offered. She then, presumably after exhausting administrative remedies, filed a lawsuit saying that the ADA had been violated.
In order to prove a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff has to show: 1) she is a qualified individual disability with a disability; 2) her employer was aware of her disability; and 3) her employer failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.
While it is true that an individual is qualified under the ADA if she is able to perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodations, a person is not qualified for the ADA where they present a direct threat to the safety of herself or others. A determination of direct threat has to be based upon a reasonable medical judgment relying on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence after an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.
The Illinois State Police contended, and it was not disputed by the plaintiff, that one of the essential functions of a state trooper was being available 24 hours a day seven days a week for emergency call ups in the case of arrest, state emergency, or civil disturbances.
No reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff could perform as a state trooper at night since both she and her doctor admitted that she could not do so.
The ability to work at night was an essential function of the position.
After an employee’s initial disclosure of his disability, the ADA requires an employer to engage in an interactive process in order to determine the appropriate accommodation under the circumstances. This process imposes a duty upon employers to engage in a flexible process with the employee with a disability so that they might identify the employee’s precise limitations and discuss accommodations enabling the employee to continue working.
A refusal to grant a particular accommodation does not automatically subject an employer to liability. Rather, an employer flunks its obligation under the ADA when it refuses to grant a request for an accommodation and then does nothing to engage in finding alternative accommodations.
An attempt to reassign an employee with a disability to an alternative position is required where that employee cannot perform the essential functions of her position and there are no other available accommodations.
In considering reassignment to a different position, the employer must make a reasonable effort to explore the possibilities with the employee. Here, it was undisputed that the Illinois State Police not only explored the possibilities with the plaintiff, but ultimately also offered her three alternative positions, including one of which paid more than her state trooper position. While the plaintiff may not have been satisfied with those alternatives, that doesn’t mean the Illinois State Police is liable.
The Illinois State Police did use a seniority system and therefore, it was not required to bump other employees or create new position when reassigning an employee with a disability. It was only required to reassign an employee with a disability to a vacant position for which she was otherwise qualified/qualified.
Since the Illinois State Police offered several alternative positions as reasonable accommodations to the plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find that the Illinois State Police failed to engage in the interactive process.
The plaintiff considered the non-sworn status of the offered positions a demotion, but even so, a position amounting to a demotion can be a reasonable accommodation in appropriate circumstances. That is, the employer is obligated to identify the full range of alternative positions for with the individual satisfied the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory prerequisites and consider transferring the employee to any of those jobs, including those representing a demotion.
Where an employer takes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it does not face liability when the employee refuses to participate in that process. Here, the Illinois State Police offered the plaintiff several different alternative position aligning with her need to work only during daytime hours. It was also undisputed that she accepted one of the positions but failed to report for duty. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that the Illinois State Police acted in bad faith or tried to thwart the interactive process and blocked reasonable accommodations.
An employer cannot reasonably accommodate an employee who refuses to return to work.
Even assuming, the Illinois State Police did prompt the end of the interactive process, that claim has to fail because the plaintiff simply could not show that the employer’s failure to engage in an interactive process resulted in a failure to identify an appropriate accommodation for the qualified individual.
A shift change to the day shift for her to be a state trooper was not something the Illinois State Police had to do because doing so would have conflicted with it seniority system. Per U.S. Airways Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), the Illinois State Police was under no obligation to make that transfer absent a showing, which was not made by the plaintiff, that the Illinois State Police either regularly ignored the seniority system, operated outside of its bounds, or the seniority system contained exceptions.
While the Circuits are split, in the Seventh Circuit anyway, reassignment to a vacant position is mandatory where the employee is no longer qualified/otherwise qualified for the position she is in.
The court doesn’t really analyze the direct threat piece, but that piece is certainly present in this case. The trooper had a record of losing consciousness on the job and was involved in a public safety position. Accordingly, if the court had analyzed the direct threat piece in detail, it is probable it would have been decided in favor of the employer.
In the Seventh Circuit, when considering reassignment to a different position, the employer must make a reasonable effort to explore the possibilities with the employee. While this may not be something required in all Circuits, it is certainly good preventive law since it prevents the employee from being able to show that the interactive process resulted in a failure to identify an appropriate accommodation.
If you represent an employer with a collective bargaining agreement or a seniority system, bumping is not required in order to accommodate an employee with a disability who is no longer qualified/otherwise qualified for her current position.
When reassigning a person, jobs constituting a demotion can be in play without fear of liability under the ADA. Whether a demotion is in play, depends upon the alternatives explored to figure out what job(s) the employee can do the essential functions of with or without reasonable accommodations.
A failure to report for duty for a job offered as an accommodation is evidence of the plaintiff causing a breakdown in the interactive process.
If a physician is going to help you determine whether they can do the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, make sure they know what the essential functions of the job are as the job is actually practiced. Also, as a backup, it is a good idea to contact the Job Accommodation Network as well.
At some point, an employer can terminate the interactive process without fear of liability where the employee is not accepting offers of reasonable accommodations.

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