Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/91806/grannis-vs-ordean
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:54:59+00:00

Document:
In determining what is due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is a distinction between actions in personam and actions in rem; in the former, judgments without personal service within the state are devoid of validity either within or without the state, but in the latter, the judgment, although based on service by publication, may be valid so far as it affects property within the state. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 .
There is a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the federal question was not properly raised in the state court. This motion must be denied. It is true that, until the decision of the supreme court of the state, the federal right was not clearly asserted. But it was not infringed in the trial court, which held in favor of the contention of defendant (now plaintiff in error) that the decree in the partition suit was not valid because of the insufficiency of the notice to Geilfuss. It was the decision of the supreme court, upholding the notice, that first ran counter to the alleged federal right. In a petition for reargument, filed by the now plaintiff in error, it was suggested that the necessary effect of the decision was to deprive him of his property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The supreme court entertained the petition, considered and overruled the contention that petitioner's rights under the Amendment were infringed, declared that its decision was to be interpreted as holding against the contention, and therefore refused a reargument. This is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589 , 181 U. S. 592 ; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 , 193 U. S. 85 ; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458 , 204 U. S. 463 ; Sullivan v. Texas, 207 U. S. 416 , 207 U. S. 422 ; Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140 , 219 U. S. 158 .
But it is also settled that, where a state has jurisdiction over a res -- as, of course, it has over the partition of lands lying within its borders -- the judgment of the court to which that jurisdiction is confided, in order to be binding with respect to the interest of a nonresident who is not served with process within the state, must be based upon constructive notice given by publication, mailing, or otherwise, substantially in the manner prescribed by the law of the state. Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701 , 110 U. S. 705 ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Green Cove Railroad, 139 U. S. 137 , 139 U. S. 148 ; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274 , 93 U. S. 283 ; Hassall v. Wilcox, 130 U. S. 493 , 130 U. S. 504 ; Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551 , 226 U. S. 562 .
But, the question whether the process thus sanctioned by the court of last resort of the state constitutes due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment being properly presented to this Court for decision, we must exercise an independent judgment upon it. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 , 154 U. S. 45 ; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241 , 204 U. S. 260 ; Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261 .
The "due process of law" clause, however, does not impose an unattainable standard of accuracy. If a defendant within the jurisdiction is served personally with process in which his name is misspelled, he cannot safely ignore it on account of the misnomer. The rule, established by an abundant weight of authority, is that if a person is sued by a wrong name, and he fails to appear and plead the misnomer in abatement, the judgment binds him. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 59 U. S. 409 ; Crawford v. Statchwell, 2 Strange, 1218; Oakley v. Giles, 3 East, 167; Smith v. Patten, 6 Taunt, 115, s.c. 1 Marsh. 474; Smith v. Bowker, 1 Mass. 76, 79; Root v. Fellowes, 6 Cush. 29; First Nat'l Bank v. Jaggers, 31 Md. 38, 47; McGaughey v. Woods, 106 Ind. 381; Vogel v. Brown Township, 112 Ind. 299; Lindsey v. Delano, 78 Ia. 350, 354; Hoffield v. Board of Education, 33 Kan. 644, 648.
" Fifth. When the subject of the action is real or personal property in this state, and the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, therein, or the relief demanded consists wholly or partly in excluding the defendant from any interest or lien therein. . . ."
" ACTIONS FOR THE PARTITION OF REAL PROPERTY"

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