Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=49811:gr-161304-2007&amp;catid=1494&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:26:15+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 161304 - Sps. Arturo Condes & Nora Condes v. The Hon Court of Appeals, et al.
SPOUSES ARTURO CONDES and NORA CONDES, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DR. PACIFICO A. DISTURA, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76927, dated August 28, 2003, which granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent from the trial court's order denying the respondent's demurrer to evidence. Likewise assailed in this petition is the CA Resolution dated November 21, 2003, denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.
On September 21, 1995, the petitioners, spouses Arturo and Nora Condes, filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale or declaration thereof as an equitable mortgage, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-110767, and the restoration of TCT No. T-78260 with damages. According to the petitioners, they are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 684 sq. m., covered by TCT No. T-78260. To release the property from a mortgage with a certain Bernan Certeza, they allegedly re-mortgaged the property to respondent, Dr. Pacifico Distura, through their attorney-in-fact, Josephine Condes-Jover, on April 26, 1995 for the sum of P665,504.81 (P572,296.58 at 5% interest per month for three months, plus P3,000.00, attorney's fees). They averred that, contrary to what was agreed upon, Josephine was made to sign a deed of sale instead of a mortgage contract.
The petitioners further narrated that on June 7, 1995, the respondent and their attorney-in-fact executed an Agreement of Option to Repurchase2 the property giving the petitioners until August 26, 1995 within which to pay the loan. They, however, failed to pay on the said date and pleaded with the respondent for additional time. The latter agreed and told them to raise the amount of P665,504.81, plus 5% interest for one month or P33,275.24, for a total of P698,780.05. They were allegedly able to raise the amount of P665,504.81 on September 4, 1995, and they expressed willingness to pay the additional interest due but the respondent told them that he will only sell back the property for P1 million. The petitioners averred that they found out later that the respondent had the Deed of Sale notarized on June 7, 1995 by Notary Public Joenel Alipao, without the presence of Josephine. They posited that to evade payment of the right amount of taxes, the respondent executed another falsified Deed of Sale dated August 29, 1995, wherein he misrepresented that the consideration was only P68,000.00. As a result, the respondent succeeded in obtaining a new title, TCT No. T-110767, in his name. The petitioners averred that the last time they contacted the respondent, the latter was willing to sell back the property for P1,070,678.78.
The petitioners prayed that the Deed of Sale dated April 26, 1995 be declared as an equitable mortgage; the Deed of Sale dated August 29, 1995 be declared a forgery; and moral and exemplary damages be paid to them, plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 the respondent contended that the petitioners sold the property to him on the condition that they will be given a right to repurchase the property for a period of one month; thus, he executed the Agreement of Option to Repurchase. He asserted that when the petitioners failed to repurchase the property, he insisted that the certificate of title be transferred to his name. The petitioners allegedly agreed provided that the consideration appearing in the deed of sale be reduced to P250,000.00 so that they can save on the payment of taxes. He said that he found out later on that there was another deed of sale for P68,400.00 registered in the Registry of Deeds.
The petitioners also employed the services of Col. Pedro Elvas, Jr., a practicing Questioned Documents Examiner, who testified that based on his examination, the signature of Josephine Condes-Jover appearing in the Deed of Definite Sale dated August 29, 1995 is a forgery.
Thereafter, the petitioners rested their case.
On November 29, 2002, the respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence12 on the ground that the petitioners had not proven their claims by a preponderance of evidence. He contended that the petitioners' evidence contradict their claims considering that the Deed of Definite Sale dated August 29, 1995 notarized by Florecita Gelvezon, which they claimed as a forgery, was not the one used in the transfer of the certificate of title in his name. He pointed out that Exhibit "T," TCT No. 78260, shows that it was cancelled by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated August 28, 1995, for the sum of P68,000.00 executed by Josephine Jover and acknowledged before Notary Public Joenel T. Alipao,13 not Notary Public Florecita Gelvezon. Hence, even if the said Deed of Definite Sale dated August 29, 1995 is declared as void, it would not affect the transfer of title to his name.
On January 9, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 36, issued the Order14 denying the demurrer to evidence on the ground that some of the petitioners' claims could be supported by their evidence and will prevail in the absence of controverting evidence. On January 28, 2003, the trial court reiterated its previous ruling and denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Orders, dated January 9, 2003 and January 29, 2003, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant complaint in Civil Case No. 22566 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36, is hereby DISMISSED.
Briefly, the issues posed by the petitioners are as follows: (a) whether the CA erred when it failed to resolve all the issues in its decision granting the demurrer to evidence considering that such a decision is in effect an adjudication on the merits; (b) whether the petition for certiorari before the CA should have been dismissed for being defective in form; and (c) whether the CA erred in granting the demurrer to evidence.
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we first delve into the procedural issue raised by the petitioners'that the CA erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to attach important testimonial and documentary evidence. We do not agree. The CA committed no reversible error in giving due course to the petition for certiorari even without the said documents being attached thereto.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
The rule does not specify the precise documents, pleadings, or parts of the records that should be appended to the petition other than the judgment, final order, or resolution being assailed. These documents and pleadings are generally the ones needed by the reviewing courts to decide whether to give due course to the petition.18 The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or orders are relevant and pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner.19 Thereafter, the CA will review the petition and determine whether additional pleadings, documents or orders should have been attached thereto.
The petitioners insist that the demurrer to evidence should not have been granted since they have been able to establish some, if not all, of their claims through a preponderance of evidence. They point out that the decision which granted the demurrer to evidence was, in effect, adjudication on the merits of the case. Thus, they claim that the CA should have ruled on all the issues submitted by them, particularly the issue on whether the deed of sale should be declared as an equitable mortgage.
It is clear from these arguments that the petitioners misunderstood the essence of a demurrer to evidence and the meaning of preponderance of evidence. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is filed after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced, is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.26 The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, has been able to establish a prima facie case.
It would have been unnecessary, if not antithetical, for the CA to resolve all the issues submitted by the petitioners when it found that the evidence of the plaintiffs was not sufficient. The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiffs have been able to show that they are entitled to their claim and it was incumbent upon the CA to make such a determination. A perusal of the CA Decision however shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter.
Collectively, the petitioners' evidence, testimonial and documentary, sufficiently proved the essential averments of the complaint, that is, that their attorney-in-fact was made to sign the Deed of Sale dated April 26, 1995 when what was actually agreed upon was only the mortgage of their property; and that their attorney-in-fact only signed the said Deed of Sale dated April 26, 1995, and that the other deeds of sale, particularly the Deed of Definite Sale dated August 29, 1995 for P68,400.00, were forged.
We do not agree. Petitioner Arturo Condes testified that the deed of sale which he obtained from the Registry of Deeds was the Deed of Definite Sale dated August 29, 1995, notarized by Florecita Gelvezon. This testimony, taken with the testimony of Josephine Condes-Jover, the petitioners' attorney-in-fact, that she did not execute any other deeds of sale except the one that was dated April 26, 1995, was more than enough to prove that the transfer of the certificate of title in the name of the respondent was questionable.
All told, without prejudice to the trial court's findings, we hold that the petitioners' evidence, in the absence of any controverting evidence, will stand and would be sufficient to prove some, if not all, of their claims. In order to arrive at a just decision on the contending claims of the parties, trial on the merits is, therefore, necessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No, 76927, dated August 28, 2003 and November 21, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 22566. Costs against the respondent.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Arturo D. Brion, concurring; rollo, pp. 9-13.
2 CA rollo, pp. 31-32.
4 TSN, August 2, 1996, pp. 8-10; id. at 80-82.
5 Id at 7; id. at 79.
6 TSN, June 8, 1998, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 97-98.
7 Id. at 22; id. at 104.
8 Id. at 29; id. at 111.
9 Id. at 32-39; id. at 114-121.
10 TSN, September 28, 1998, pp. 36-37; id at 184-185.
18 Barcenas v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321. March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 593, 605.
19 Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160798, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 768, 780.
20 Floren Hotel v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 155264, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA128, 141.
22 Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 181 (2002).
24 Deutsche Bank Manila v. Chua Yok See, G.R. No. 165606, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 672, 692.
26 Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, G.R. No. 161817, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 690, 693.
27 Ong v. Yap, G.R. No. 146797, February 18, 2005, 452 SCRA 41, 50.
28 Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 742 (1998).
29 Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, G.R. No. 160832, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 665, 679.

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