Source: https://arizona.lexroll.com/ackel-v-ackel-57-ariz-14-1941/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:45:53+00:00

Document:
SALIM ACKEL, Appellant, v. BRIGIDA ACKEL, Appellee.
Civil No. 4190.Supreme Court of Arizona.
2. DIVORCE. — The fact that judgment in divorce proceeding where both parties ask for divorce does not show on whose petition judgment is allowed does not affect enforceability of the judgment, since both parties are divorced and a judgment of divorce always has the same legal effect.
3. DIVORCE. — Where both parties asked for a divorce which was granted without stating on whose petition it was allowed, appellate court would presume that trial court believed that recriminations sufficient to preclude divorce did not exist.
4. DIVORCE. — Where both parties asked for divorce and division of property and divorce was granted without stating upon whose petition it was allowed, the effect of the judgment was the same whether it was granted specifically to either party or generally without reference to who was more at fault, since both parties were divorced and the settlement of property rights and the custody of children is always in the sound judicial discretion of the court regardless of which party was the more guilty.
6. APPEAL AND ERROR. — After an appeal has been perfected, the court loses jurisdiction of all matters connected with the case except in furtherance of the appeal.
10. EQUITY. — The fact that there are no precedents for the course determined upon is no argument against course required by justice if course is within the general principles of equity.
12. PARTNERSHIP. — When a partnership is dissolved and the partnership affairs are to be wound up, if it appears that the best method of protecting the partnership assets until they may be finally divided is to place them in the hands of a receiver under the jurisdiction of the court, this may be done.
13. DIVORCE. — Where community property was encumbered and on divorce no immediate division could be made without injustice to both parties and probable destruction of equities possessed by them and interests of parties demanded conservation of assets, all community assets would be placed in possession of receiver acting under direction of court for purpose of adjusting various community debts so as to best preserve the equities of the parties until a division could be made.
14. DIVORCE. — On appeal from a judgment granting divorce and dividing community property, court could affirm that portion of the judgment granting a divorce and attorney’s fees and costs and reverse that portion of the judgment disposing of community property and liabilities and remand the cause with instructions to place the whole community assets in the hands of a receiver under the order of the court and to retain jurisdiction until estate was in a condition for an equitable division between the parties.
could be made, a reasonable family allowance for the wife should be a first charge against the assets.
16. DIVORCE. — Where community assets of parties to divorce were to be placed in hands of a receiver until an equitable distribution could be made, ability of divorced husband whose efforts had accumulated the estate and his interest in seeing to its preservation at least possible cost, might be worthy of consideration, and if appointed, divorced husband should be required to give same security and act under same strict supervision by the court as any other receiver.
 Appointment of receiver in divorce action, see note in 95 A.L.R. 902. See, also, 23 R.C.L. 28.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa.
J.C. Niles, Judge. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
Mr. Henderson Stockton and Mr. S.N. Karam, for Appellant.
Messrs. Lewkowitz Wein, for Appellee.
This is an appeal by Salim Ackel from a judgment rendered in a suit wherein Brigida Ackel was plaintiff and Salim Ackel was defendant and cross-complainant. The undisputed facts affecting the appeal may be stated as follows.
divested of any jurisdiction to make any order of this nature after the appeal was perfected.
“There are some fifteen assignments of error, which we shall consider on the legal propositions raised, and not seriatim.
The first is that no valid decree of divorce was ever rendered in the case. This is based upon the theory that the judgment above set forth does not specify the grounds upon which it was rendered, or whether the decision is in favor of plaintiff or defendant. It is urged by counsel for defendant that such a judgment is void on its face.
“The reason for the rule is obvious; ordinarily a judgment cannot be enforced unless it shows in whose favor it is, and against whom it is rendered. In a divorce case, however, when both parties ask for a divorce and it is granted, the fact that the judgment does not show on whose petition it was allowed does not affect its enforceability, for such a judgment always has the same legal effect; both parties are divorced.
penalty for the guilty party, the situation would be different, but the result is the same for both, and no uncertainty in the decree is caused by its failure to state on whose petition it was granted.
[4, 5] We think this rule is applicable to the situation appearing in the present case. The effect of the decree is the same whether it be granted specifically to either party or generally without reference to which is the more at fault, for both parties are divorced, and the settlement of property rights and the custody of children is always in the sound judicial discretion of the court, regardless of which of the parties is the more guilty. McFadden v. McFadden, 22 Ariz. 246, 196 P. 452. We think, therefore, that the decree is valid so far as the dissolution of the bonds of matrimony is concerned. This disposes of two other propositions of law which question the sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint and the conduct of the court in denying a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s case. The error, if any, goes to the form and not to the substance.
 The next question is whether the court had the authority to make an allowance of costs and attorney’s fees to plaintiff pending the appeal. We have held frequently that after an appeal has been perfected the court loses jurisdiction of all matters connected with the case except in furtherance of the appeal. Navajo R. Co. v. County Nat. Bank Trust Co., 31 Ariz. 128, 250 P. 885; Sam v. State, 33 Ariz. 383, 265 P. 609.
[7, 8] We have held that the court may, in its discretion, require the husband to pay all the expenses of the divorce proceeding, including attorney’s fees, and that even after the entry of final judgment such orders may be modified from time to time. Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 34 Ariz. 340, 271 P. 717 Long v. Long, 39 Ariz. 271, 5 P.2d 1047; Brown v Brown, supra. The evident purpose of the statute is to insure that the wife may have the proper means to litigate a pending divorce action, and since the husband usually controls the community estate and funds, he may be required to advance such costs. While the statute does not expressly provide that this also covers the expenses of an appeal, since the effect of an appeal is to make the final issue of the action doubtful until it is determined, we think the spirit of the statute permits the trial court to make such an order “in furtherance of the appeal”. We also think it is in the discretion of the court to secure this sum by a lien on the separate property of defendant. Section 27-805, Arizona Code of 1939.
This leaves but one question of law for our consideration, and that is whether the court abused its discretion in disposing of the community assets and liabilities.
The record in regard to the nature of the community property, its value and encumbrances and the unsecured community debts, which latter may by the action of the creditors eventually become a lien against each and all of the separate parcels of such property, is voluminous. We have considered it carefully, together with the presentation of the issues on this point by able and earnest counsel in the oral argument, and are convinced that under all the circumstances of the case, it is impossible now to make a division of the property and the debts by specific parcels which will not work an injustice to both parties and probably destroy the equities which they now possess jointly therein. The trial court made a most earnest and conscientious attempt to accomplish a task which was practically impossible, and we do not feel we could make a better immediate division. After careful consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion that under the peculiar circumstances there is one, and but one, method which offers a reasonable opportunity of working out the various interests and claims involved, so there may be a remnant for plaintiff and defendant, in their old age, of what was once an extremely valuable estate.
method of protecting the partnership assets until they may be finally divided is to place them in the hands of a receiver, under the jurisdiction of the court, this may be done. 47 C.J. 1217, and notes. The mere fact that it has not been done in the past in the case of a marital partnership is no reason why, if that is the best method to protect the partnership estate, it cannot and should not be done now. We are convinced that the interest of both plaintiff and defendant will be served by placing all of the community assets in the possession of a receiver acting under the direction of the superior court, for the purpose of adjusting the various community debts in such a manner as may best preserve the equity of the parties in the property until a division thereof can be made.
security and act under the same strict supervision by the court as any other receiver.
The judgment is therefore affirmed as to the divorce, attorney’s fees and costs, and reversed and remanded as to the community assets and liabilities in accordance with this opinion.
McALISTER, and ROSS, JJ., concur.

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