Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180320_0000358.NIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:41:23+00:00

Document:
WHITNEY, BAILEY, COX, & MAGNANI, LLC, Defendant.
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment (DE # 50) and defendant's motion to strike (DE # 72). For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part. The motion to strike will be denied.
On April 26, 2017, WBCM filed its reply brief to the motion for summary judgment (DE # 71) and also filed a motion to strike the Tolling Agreement from the City's response (DE # 72). The City responded to the motion to strike (DE # 76), and WBCM filed a reply in support of the motion (DE # 78). Thus, both motions are fully briefed and ripe for review.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate-in fact, is mandated-where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that these requirements have been met. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must identify specific facts establishing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). In doing so, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must present fresh proof in support of its position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998).
In its motion, WBCM argues the City's negligence claim should be dismissed under the economic loss doctrine. (DE # 51 at 5.) Specifically, Indiana's “economic loss rule” precludes tort liability for purely economic loss. Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 727 (Ind. 2010) (hereinafter “IMPCL”). “Rather these losses are viewed as disappointed contractual or commercial expectations.” Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 2005). This means that when a plaintiff buys an inferior product, and then that product does not perform its generally intended function, he cannot sue in tort for the product's diminution in value, incidental and consequential losses as lost profits, rental expense, or lost time. Id. “Economic loss” also includes “[d]amage to the product itself, including costs of its repair or reconstruction.” Id. On the other hand, the economic loss rule does not shield a defendant from tort liability when “the defect causes personal injury or damages to property other than the product . . . itself.” IMPCL, 929 N.E.2d at 726.
In two relevant cases, the Supreme Court of Indiana has helped to clarify what constitutes a product in the construction context. In IMPCL, the Public Library in the City of Indianapolis brought suit against engineering subcontractors alleging that they provided defective design and inspection services during construction of an underground parking garage built as part of a renovation project of the entire library facility. 929 N.E.2d at 731. The Indiana Supreme Court explained that “the ‘product' is the product purchased by the plaintiff, not the product furnished by the defendant.” Id. There, the Library “purchased a complete renovation and expansion of all the components of its facility as part of a single, highly-integrated transaction.” Id. “The Library did not purchase a blueprint from the Defendants, concrete from the materials supplier, and inspection services . . . in isolation.” Id. Since the entire library facility was the product, any damages resulting from the subcontractors' services was to the product itself, and not to other property. Id. at 732.
WBCM tries to distinguish IMPCL by saying that it only involved the construction of a single structure/building, unlike the case at hand. (DE # 69 at 17.) However, WBCM provides no legal support for this distinction between a single structure and a larger facility. What matters is what the City purchased-not its size-and, here, the City purchased an entire lakefront park-even if that park was divided into sub-projects by the Prime Agreement. Just as the defective garage in IMPCL was purchased as part of the greater library facility, the defective revetment in this case was purchased as an integral part of the greater lakefront project. Accordingly, the court concludes that the “product” here is the entire Project.

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