Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/1375-silver-lane-v-teal-landscaping-no-hdsp-137467-oct-2-2006/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:01:17+00:00

Document:
The Tenant argues that the correct address is 1365 Silver Lane. In support of this argument, the Tenant submitted a number of documents. Town of East Hartford tax records reflect that the Tenant pays personal property tax at 1365 Silver Lane. Exhibit 1. Furthermore, the exhibit specifies that the occupants of 1375 Silver Lane for tax purposes are Vinny’s Garden Center, Inc. and K G Keena Memorials, Inc. The Tenant also submitted information from the Secretary of State’s Office. Exhibit 3. The record cites 1365 Silver Lane as the business address of Teal Landscaping Design LLC. On July 19, 2006, the Tenant submitted a town map. Exhibit 4. A marking on the map, dated May 26, 2004, notes that 1365 Silver Lane is the address of Teal Landscaping.
The Landlord contends that the Tenant was not confused or misled by the mistaken address. The Landlord argues that when the Marshal attempted to serve the notice to quit, he realized the scrivener’s error and changed the address to 1365 Silver Lane. The Landlord believes that the information contained in the CT Page 17556 notice to quit was reasonably accurate to avoid confusion. Furthermore, the Lease describes the premises as “a part of 1375 Silver Lane,” and there is no separate parcel on record for 1365 Silver Lane. The address 1365 Silver Lane is a mailing address only. The Landlord submitted Exhibit C in support of its position. This document lists the occupants of 1375 Silver Lane as 1375 Silver Lane Associates LLC C/O Vinny’s Garden Center Inc. The exhibit makes no reference to Teal Landscaping.
(1989).” Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. Uni. Of Bridgeport, 41 Conn. App. 790, 793, 677 A.2d 1378 (1996).
“General Statutes § 47a-23 (b) sets forth the form of the notice to quit with which there must be substantial compliance.”Sandrew v. Pequot Drug, Inc., 4 Conn. App. 627, 632, 495 A.2d 1127 (1985). § 47a-23 (b) provides in relevant part: “The notice shall be in writing substantially in the following form: `I (or we) hereby give you notice that you are to quit possession or occupancy of the (land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, or of any trailer or any land upon which a trailer is used or stands, as the case may be), now occupied by you at (here insert the address, including apartment number or other designation, as applicable), on or before the (here insert the date) for the following reason (here insert the reason or reasons for the notice to quit possession or occupancy using the statutory language or words of similar import, also the date and place of signing notice). A.B.'” (Emphasis added.).
In Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 143-145, 520 A.2d 173 (1987), the Supreme Court, in determining the sufficiency of termination notices, held: “In order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for a proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the CT Page 17558 tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of 47a-15 must be construed strictly. . . . Strict construction does not, however, require ritualistic compliance with statutory or regulatory mandates. . . . As we have held in other contexts, in which regulatory and constitutional rights were also implicated; . . . not every deviation from the strict requirements of either statutes or regulations warrants dismissal of an action for summary process. When good cause for termination of a lease has clearly been shown, and when notices of termination have been sent in strict compliance with statutory timetables, a landlord should not be precluded from pursuing summary eviction proceedings because of hypertechnical dissection of the wording of the notices that he has sent. . . .” (Citations omitted.) Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 202 Conn. 143-145.
SNBR-329, May 30, 1989, (Riefberg, J.); Holtz v. Zona, NH-278, October 29, 1984, (Barnett, J.); Vogel v. Bacus, supra 101.”Seventeen High St. v. Shoff-Darby, Ins., supra, 1995 Ct. Sup. 3433-3434.
When the Marshal attempted to serve the notice to quit at 1375 Silver Lane, he realized the address was incorrect. In trying to rectify the problem, he changed the address in the salutation to 1365 Silver Lane but not the address in the body of the notice. “The fact that the heading was corrected cannot cure the defect in the body.” Reed v. Wilson, Superior Court, judicial district CT Page 17559 of New Haven Housing Session, Docket No. SPNH 8111-252 (December 10, 1981, Foti, J.) (NH #6).
supra.” Wilson Properties v. Pres. Int’l Food, supra, 1995 Ct. Sup. 12422-12423.
The final issue is whether the address in the body of the notice is sufficiently precise. “A notice to quit which does not accurately and reasonably specifically describe the premises sought to be recovered by the landlord is fatally defective Vogel v. Bacus, 133 Conn. 95, 98 (1946).” Street Retail, Inc. v. Tyropolis, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford Housing Session, Docket No. SPH 96244 (Apr. 27, 1998, Beach, J.) (1998 Ct. Sup. 6409). “A dismissal is required whenever an address is misdescribed in a notice to quit unless, despite the error, the tenant is served at the correct address, and the misdescription is so minor that a reasonable person would not be confused by it. What must be appreciated is that General Statutes § 47a-23(b) requires that the tenant be notified that he must vacate specific premises or face dispossession.” (Citation omitted) Holt v. Zona, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven Housing Session, Docket No. NH840807470 (October 29, 1984, Barnett, J.), p. 5.
In Street Retail, Inc., the court found that: “Case law, cited by both sides in the instant matter, is replete with examples of descriptions which have been deemed to be sufficient and those which are not. A summary of the ample case law suggests that the description must be sufficiently precise so that not only the parties to the action but also the sheriff and other third parties can be apprised as definitively as is practicable CT Page 17560 in the circumstances as to the premises in issue. Hypertechnicality, on the other hand, is not required.” Street Retail, Inc. v. Tyropolis, supra, 1998 Ct. Sup. 6410. “If there is any confusion or doubt raised by a misdescription caused by the plaintiff, then all such doubts ought to be resolved against the party giving the notice.” DiMauro v. D’Atil, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford Housing Session, Docket No. 3966 (January 10, 1980, Spada, J.) (H #162).
In Reed, the notice to quit erroneously listed the address as 683 Winchester Avenue, 2nd floor, rather than the correct address of 685 Winchester Avenue, 2nd floor. Reed v. Wilson, supra, p. 1. The error was contained both in the heading of the notice to quit and in the body of the notice to quit. Id. When the sheriff attempted service at 683 Winchester Avenue, 2nd floor, he discovered the error. Id. “He then wrote over the address at the heading of each notice, in the form of a strike-over: the number `5′ over the number `3.'” Id. The sheriff, failed “to conform the address in the body of the notice to quit which remained in error as 683 Winchester Avenue.” Id. “There was no dispute that the notice to quit was served by abode service, and that the defendant actually received notice.” Id., p. 1. In dismissing the case, the court held: “The plaintiff . . . incorrectly listed that address. He caused the notice to be defective. The fact that the heading was corrected cannot cure the defect in the body. The opposite, of course, might not be so. Where the Notice to Quit is defective, this Court is without jurisdiction. . . . The correct address in the body of the Notice to Quit, if included, is a matter of substance and not of form.” (Citation omitted.) Id., pp. 2-3.
supra, p. 1. The three apartments on the easterly side were designated as No. 52 Bond Street, and the three apartments on the CT Page 17561 westerly side were known as No. 54 Bond Street. Id., p. 2. The subject premises were on the west side and were designated as No. 54 Bond Street. Id However, the notice to quit demanded that the defendant vacate No. 52 Bond Street, second floor. Id. In the return of service, the sheriff manually altered the return by writing in No. “54” Bond Street over No. “52.” Id. The defendant did not contest that proper service of the notice to quit was made, but rather argued that the misdescription of the premises voided the notice. Id. In granting the motion to dismiss, the court held that: “The plaintiff landlord served a notice to quit with an inaccurate street address. If we excuse this inaccuracy, then where do we place the jurisdictional demarcation. We foresee an eventual erosion of our principle that the summary process statute is to be strictly followed and narrowly construed, if the instant notice is approved.” Id., p. 5.
Here, a “realistic chance for confusion or ambiguity exists.”Harvey R. Ofshay, Et Al. v. Christy’s Market, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain Housing Session, Docket No SPH 90676 (March 26, 1997, Beach, J) (1997 Ct. Sup. 1892). The notice to quit possession does not describe the premises with the specificity required. The ambiguity is evident given that state and local authorities recognize 1365 Silver Lane as the Tenant’s address. The misdescription in the body of the notice is such that a reasonable person would be confused by it. Under the circumstances, there can be a misunderstanding of the exact premises that are subject of this Notice to Quit. The Landlord failed to serve a notice to quit that protects against “premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction.” Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 202 Conn. 143-145. “Any CT Page 17562 confusion or doubt raised by the misdescription must be resolved against the plaintiff in order for the defendant, the marshal, and any third parties to be properly apprised as to the premises in question.” Condon v. Viera, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain Housing Session, Docket No. NBSP 043993 (September 23, 2005, Bentivegna, J.).

References: v. 
 § 47
 v. 
 § 47
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 47
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.