Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83202:57186&catid=1585&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:49:26+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014 - SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN, Respondent.
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN, Respondent.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to review, reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated January 25, 2007 and March 28, 2007, respectively, in the case entitled Aurora Mendoza Fermin v. Eduardo C. Sanchez, Serconsision R. Mendoza and Ofelia E. Abueg-Sta. Maria, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65760.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff. The instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
All counterclaims are similarly dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court still finds it prudent to maintain the DISMISSAL of this case and to DENY the claims of plaintiff as well as defendants’ counterclaims, as stated in the dispositive portion of [the] Decision dated April 14, 1999. ACCORDINGLY, plaintiff’s “Motion for Reconsideration” is hereby DENIED.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the CA.
DECLARING as NULL and VOID the Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by Leonardo Mendoza and Serconsision Mendoza in favor of defendant-appellee Eduardo C. Sanchez over a parcel of land, specifically Lot 39, Block 12 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-04-00250 of Parañaque City.
ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City to cause the CANCELLATION of TCT No. 52593 issued in the name of Eduardo C. Sanchez by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale and to REVIVE TCT No. 48946 in the name of Leonardo Mendoza and Serconsision Mendoza.
ORDERING defendants-appellees Serconsision Mendoza and Eduardo Sanchez to pay plaintiff-appellant Aurora Mendoza Fermin P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution38 dated March 28, 2007.
The rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court over appealed cases from the CA is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive.40 Thus, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.41 However, this rule admits exceptions, such as when the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court42 such as in the case at bar.
The foregoing, however, was disregarded by the RTC on the ground that such general observations could not overcome the positive declaration of petitioner that Leonardo indeed signed the questioned documents on the place and date written. With this, the RTC maintained that there was no forgery and upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Contrary to the RTC’s view, the positive declaration of petitioner that Leonardo affixed the assailed signatures in her presence cannot be taken as gospel truth, as it is self-serving and biased at best. Petitioner’s interest on the sale of the property contained in the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale is glaring, and it is only logical that she would foster the due execution and genuineness of the questioned documents if only to enforce the same between the parties, as well as against third persons.
More, the conclusion of the RTC that no direct and credible testimony of witnesses as to matters within their personal observation was present in the instant case is belied by respondent’s testimony that she is familiar with the signature of her father because she was his private secretary during the period of 1972 to 1981, when her father was still the mayor of San Pascual, Batangas. Considering the proximity of respondent to Leonardo and her personal knowledge of the latter’s signatures, her conclusion that the signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale did not fit that of the genuine signature of her father is sound and reliable.
The witness testified that Tubig is a Notary Public of Pasay City and the property was transferred by virtue of the document executed before Tubig?
That’s misleading, Your Honor. The document would speak for itself. This was signed in Manila. He was speaking to the other document.
It’s not. She said that the property was transferred by virtue of the document executed before Tubig and then you insist that this document was in Manila?
Yes, the documents would speak for itself. The acknowledgment states.
This is manila then interposition Pasay.
Taking into account the foregoing defects, as well as the testimony of respondent and her expert witnesses (had it been properly appreciated), is sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to public documents and to meet the stringent requirements to prove forgery.
The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability.64 The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.65 A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument.66 Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.67 Here, preponderance of evidence heavily tilts in favor of respondent.
Having ruled that the signatures of Leonardo in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries, then it follows that such document should be annulled for lack of consent on the part of Leonardo. Notably, the subject property was part of the conjugal property of the Spouses Leonardo and Serconsision Mendoza, this can be gleaned from TCT No. 48946 wherein it states that the same is owned by “Leonardo G. Mendoza & Serconsision R. Mendoza, both of legal age.” Besides, Aurora has not adduced any proof to substantiate her allegation that Serconsision was just the common-law wife of her father.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 25, 2007 and Resolution dated March 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Raffle dated February 22, 2010.
* Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court), concurring; Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 30-40.
2 Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 42-43.
20 Penned by Judge Ignacio M. Capulong (now deceased); Annex "C" to Petition, id. at 44-47.
22 Annex "D" to Petition, id. at 48-52.
40Meneses v. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 577, 585.
43 Heirs of the Late Felix M. Bucton v. Spouses Gonzalo and Trinidad Go, G.R. No. 188395, November 20, 2013.
50Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 200, 209.
53 360 Phil. 753 (1998).
55Heirs of the Late Felix M. Bucton v. Spouses Gonzalo and Trinidad Go, supra note 43.
58Heirs of the Lae Felix M. Bucton v. Spouses Gonzalo and Trinidad Go, supra note 43.
60Meneses v. Venturozo, supra note 40, at 586.
64Meneses v. Venturozo, supra note 40, at 585-586.
69 372 Phil. 370 (1999).
70Heirs of Christina Ayuste v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 379.
71 G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA 334.
72Ros v. Philippine National Bank-Laoag Branch, supra, at 342.
73 563 Phil. 495 (2007).
74 BPI Family Bank v. Franco, supra, at 516.

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