Source: https://www.blanelaw.com/library/judicial-approaches-to-dealing-with-constitutional-limitations-surrounding-ecosystembased-manage.cfm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:58:21+00:00

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze recent judicial precedent interpreting the extent of federal jurisdiction over ecological resources within the context of coastal resource management. A focus will be placed on the recent US Supreme Court opinion in Rapanos v. United States.1 The intent is to determine, to some extent, the willingness of the judicial branch to read “ecosystem principles” as a basis for accepting federal jurisdiction under the commerce power of the United States Constitution.2 What may be defined as “ecosystem services” will likely include resources that extend into jurisdictions traditionally reserved to the states. One such area is coastal resources, including terrestrial waters that ultimately influence the biological, chemical, and physical health of those resources. Ultimately, the extent of federal jurisdiction will be resolved in the judicial arena. This paper attempts to look at how the judiciary, within the context of the Rapanos opinion, most recently tried to resolve a longstanding jurisdictional debate. The decision, as well as at least one subsequent federal appellate opinion, seems to suggest ecosystem principles may be a judicially allowable manner of federal regulation, even where such regulation extends to traditional state resources.
1 547 U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006). 2 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
3 See, Pew Oceans Commission. America’ s Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change (2003). Available at: http://pewtrusts.org/pdf/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf (last visited: April 7, 2007); U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century (2004). Available at: http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf (last visited: April 7, 2007).
4 See, Editor, Ocean Policy: Troubled Waters, Nature, August 15, 2002, at 718-720 (Discussing the fragmented nature of federal policy regarding ocean management, as well as the need for a uniformed, ecosystem-based approach based on scientific principles).
5 It should be noted certain programs related to ocean sources have already embraced principles of ecosystem-based management. See generally, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1431-1445a (Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act); 16 U.S.C.A §§ 1801-1882 (Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act). Unlike the concepts developed in these marine-focused laws, the purpose of this paper is to analyze a broader concept of “ecosystems-based” management, encompassing hydrologic spatial scales from terrestrial to marine sources.
6 See, Kristen M. Fletcher, Regional Ocean Governance: The Role of the Public Trust Doctrine, 16 DUKE ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y F. 187 (2006).
7 Recent academic work has suggested managers in the public arena are not adopting ecosystem-based management principles. Part of the problem is a lack of agreement on a precise definition of ecosystem-based management. See, Arkema, KK., et al., Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 4(10): 525-532 (2006).
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well Being: Wetlands and Water Synthesis (2005). Available at: http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.358.aspx.pdf (last visited: January 7, 2008).
9 Some suggest a true ecosystem analysis is critical to properly protecting important aquatic resources. This extends from oceans and coastal areas, to inland rivers, streams, tributaries and wetlands, as well as to the terrestrial dry lands of a particular eco-region. For a discussion of ecosystem breadth, see generally, National Research Council, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Toward Better Environmental Decisionmaking, 59 (2005).
10 See generally, 16 U.S.C.A §§ 1451-1464 (Coastal Zone Management Act). 11 Id. at §1456(c)(1)(A) (The “Federal Consistency” Requirement).
12 See, National Governor’s Association, Public Comment on Ocean Commission’s Final Report (October 29, 2004). Available at: http://ocean.ceq.gov/comments/2_gov_assoc.pdf . Last visited (February 1, 2007). The comments from the governor’s council highlighted the following points: “Maintain State Primacy;” “Avoid Federal Preemption.” See also, Lawrence Juda, The Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy: States Perspectives. Coastal Management, vol. 34, pgs. 1-16 (2006) (Summarizing coastal state objections to a centralized, federal management scheme of coastal resources based on state sovereignty, and the current federal consistency requirements found in the CZMA).
13 Supra, n. 8 (noting the emergence, and importance of “regional ocean governance” (ROG) entities).
14 Supra, n. 2. The Commerce Clause power under the U.S. Constitution grants the federal government the ability to regulate activities that impact interstate commerce. This can occur between states, or wholly intra-state. See generally, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The key is to find the activity will tend to impact interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause would be the main source of power for the federal government to enact ecosystem-based management of water resources. However, there are other forms of “power” that may be used by the federal government. An example might be the spending power of the federal government. Many states comply with federal standards for no other reason than federal funds are made available to the state program. Indeed, much of the compliance seen by states to the federal guidelines of coastal management, under the Coastal Zone Management Act, is directly tied to federal funding of such state coastal programs.
16 The question stems in great part from the judicially interpreted constraints to federal control placed on certain “isolated” water bodies (to be discussed further infra), and the scientific evidence suggesting these water bodies are nonetheless critical in the overall hydrologic cycle. See generally, The Heinz Center: The State of the Nation's Ecosystems: Measuring the Lands, Waters, and Living Resources of the United States. 21, 36 (2002).
17 The U.S. Supreme Court has generally held water bodies (most importantly wetlands) are subject to federal jurisdiction and control under the Clean Water Act only when there is some substantial connection to navigable waters. The navigable waters requirement is itself attached to the commerce power from which the federal government derives its general power over terrestrial waters.
18 Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006).
19 Recent congressional action is attempting to clarify the expanse of federal jurisdiction over wetlands. Representative James Oberstar, Chair of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, plans to introduce a bill titled the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act. The bill would aim to clarify the scope of the Clean Water Act and its applicability to wetlands by codifying broad protection and specifically stating the law extends to intermittent streams, wet meadows, and several other types of water, including bodies not physically adjacent to larger, navigable waters.
II. The Future Policy of Ocean/Coastal Governance is Likely to Involve Ecosystem-Based Management in Some Measure.
Available at: http://oberstar.house.gov/ (last visited: January 7, 2008).
20 Modern coastal resource management stemmed from the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, also known as the “Stratton Commission.” The Commission’s final report to Congress entitled, “The Nation and the Sea,” was submitted to Congress in 1969 and is credited as being the impetus for the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.
23 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for Assessment (2003). Available at: http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.300.aspx.pdf (last visited: January 7, 2008).
27 National Science and Technology Council’s Joint Subcommittee on Ocean Science and Technology. National Ocean Research Priorities Plan and Implementation Strategy (2007). Available at: http://ocean.ceq.gov/about/docs/orpp12607.pdf. (last visited: January 7, 2008).
28 Supra, n. 10. Other federal laws have played a role in regulating coastal marine resources. These include the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C §1251, et seq.; and the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §401, et seq.
29 Supra, n. 10 at §1456(c)(1)(A).
30 See, Bruce Kuhse, The Federal Consistency Requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972: It’s Time to Repeal This Fundamentally Flawed Legislation. 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 77, (2001).
III. From a Judicial Perspective, The Question of Whether Ecosystem Management is a Viable Federal Exercise Remains to Be Seen.
31 See, John A. Duff, The Coastal Zone Management Act: Reverse Pre-emption or Contractual Federalism? 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 109 (2001).
33 Supra, n. 12 (Noting State Governor’s numerous objections to any plan equating to less state input and control).
35 See generally, Patrick Comer et al., Biodiversity Values of Geographically Isolated Wetlands in the United States, NatureServe (2005). See also, Stuart Pimm, The Value of Everything, Nature, May 15, 1997, at 231-32.
of “commerce.” Thus, acknowledging the commerce confines surrounding federal jurisdiction; is it likely the judicial branch is willing to allow an expanded federal control over terrestrial water resources that are otherwise ecologically-connected to coastal water resources, even where a direct physical connection is lacking? The recent holding in Rapanos suggests an intriguing possibility.
IV. Rapanos Offers Potential Support for Extending Federal Rights Over Ecosystems, to Include Non-Navigable Waters.
A. Rapanos may extend the definition of “waters of the United States” based on a “Significant Nexus” test.
Rapanos is a Clean Water Act (“CWA”)36 case. However, the implications from a federal jurisdiction standpoint seem potentially far-reaching. Rapanos dealt with the meaning of “waters of the United States,” under the CWA, and therefore the extent of federal jurisdiction over wetlands and other “non-navigable” waters.37 There is a direct connection between such jurisdiction under the CWA, and the potential expansion of federal control over coastal resources, since both acts deal with “waters of the United States,” and constitutional limits of federal power attached thereto. In order to better understand the core issue decided in Rapanos, and more importantly the effect for “ecosystem-based” management in general, a short history of federal jurisdiction of non- navigable water bodies under the CWA follows.
36 33 U.S.C.A. §1251 et seq. 37 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).
1. Historical Developments of Federal Wetland Regulation.
38 It has traditionally been assumed the federal government’s jurisdiction regarding water was directly related to claims of commerce, as the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provided the main legal grounds for federal jurisdiction. Therefore, commerce, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, has always been directly related to navigation; the main ability of engaging in commerce is through the use of navigable waterways. See generally, The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870); United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 337 (1940).
39 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455 (1985).
40 In the later Rapanos decision, this purported limit of defining physically adjacency as a test for federal jurisdiction is discussed in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion.
41 Supra, n. 39, at 131. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated its affirmation of the physically adjacent rule set forth by the Army Corps of Engineers was based in large part upon Congress’s approval of the Corps’ regulations interpreting the CWA to cover wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. Id., at 135-39.
42 Supra, n. 39, at 134.
expressly note its decision was not based on a hydrological connection between the wetlands and adjacent bodies of water, and its decision did not address federal jurisdiction over wetlands that are not adjacent to navigable waters.43 Rather, the Court limited its decision to water bodies that are clearly navigable in character, as well as non- navigable waters physically adjacent to such navigable waters.44 Thus, although Riverside Bayview discussed the importance of an “ecosystem” approach in identifying important contributors to water pollution, it specifically limited CWA jurisdiction to water bodies with a physical adjacency to traditional navigable waters. This may have been a purposeful attempt to place “waters of the United States” in a statutory framework that did not offend constitutional limits on federalism. After Riverside Bayview, the question of federal jurisdiction over wetlands not physically adjacent to navigable water bodies remained unsettled. A further clarification was to come from the Court in a case dealing with migratory birds.
43 Supra, n. 39, at 134.
44 Supra, n. 39, at 134. It should be noted the Court’s emphasis here was on one of physical adjacency, rather than a hydrological connection between the non-navigable and navigable water bodies.
45 531 U.S. 159, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001).
46 Id., at 160. 47 Id., at 172. 48 Id., at 159. 49 Id.
extension of federal jurisdiction over isolated water bodies raised serious constitutional and federalism questions. Since the Court determined there was a lack of Congressional intent under the CWA to extend jurisdiction to these lands, it did not address the magnitude of these constitutional concerns. Thus, although it did not decide the constitutional issue directly, the Court did address the fundamental concerns associated with expanding federal jurisdiction into traditional state territory. Such an expanse of federal jurisdiction may be necessary to properly implement an ecosystem-based approach to protecting coastal marine resources.
51 See generally, Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001). “Under Solid Waste Agency, it appears that a body of water is subject to regulation under the CWA if the body of water is actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water.” Id., at 269.
approach would consider all relevant mechanisms affecting ocean resources; all inputs and outflows that tend to aggregate and affect the system over time.52 Ultimately, such an analysis would include both natural and artificial bodies of water, including “isolated,” non-navigable wetlands, which are not directly connected to larger navigable bodies of water. Previous judicial opinions, including SWANNC, seemed to limit the inclusion of potentially significant water bodies from federal regulation. This was true until the recent concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in Rapanos.
52 For example, the amount of nitrogen carried by major U.S. rivers has increased dramatically in recent decades as a result of terrestrial activities, including deposits of nitrogen from isolated water bodies, which feed into larger, navigable waters. Nitrogen levels in the Mississippi River, which drains forty percent of the coterminous United States, have tripled since the 1950s. Nitrogen causes excess algae growth, reduces recreational and aesthetic values, and contributes to low dissolved oxygen conditions that can kill aquatic organisms. As a result, wetlands lost in the Mississippi watershed far upstream from the Gulf of Mexico can nonetheless contribute to the formation of "dead zones" that threatens the Gulf's fisheries and aquatic resources. See generally, Judy L. Meyer et al., American Rivers, Where Rivers Are Born: The Scientific Imperative for Protecting Small Streams and Wetlands (2003).
53 Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2220-21.
54 Id. at 2220. 55 Id. at 2222.
56 See generally, Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (2002) (noting coastal ecosystems include the headwaters, tributaries, wetlands, and surface geology of the surrounding watershed because these land areas and waterways directly contribute to the environmental health of coastal ecosystem habitats).
discussion of federal jurisdiction “connections” to water that go beyond physically identifiable connections, and incorporate deeper, ecosystem-based criteria.
B. The “Significant Nexus” test established in Rapanos seems the equivalent to an “ecosystem-based” argument supporting federal jurisdiction.
court’s to support, or disprove, jurisdiction over bodies of water. See, United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006).
58 Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2236, 2248. 59 Id.
60 Previous U.S. Supreme Court cases, generally resolving issues of federal jurisdiction based on “navigability” have included, to some degree, notions of ecological connections.
It should be noted Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test is not all encompassing. Kennedy limited its expanse by noting that when the effect of the wetland on water quality in navigable waters is “speculative or insubstantial,” the wetland does not fall within “waters of the United States.”61 However, even with this limitation, the “significant nexus” test clearly adopts a broad-based scientific standard between bodies of water for purposes of determining federal jurisdiction.62 The important determination under the significant nexus test is that the water body is likely to play an important role in the integrity of an aquatic system that includes navigable waters.63 Thus, a hydrologic connection is neither immediate proof, nor necessary, to establish a “significant nexus.”64 This suggests an attack on federal jurisdiction over certain water bodies can be rebutted based on scientific proof showing hydro-geologic connections. Thus, the scientific inquiry takes the place of a legal inquiry based on definitions of navigability.
For instance, see Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 183-84, 100 S.Ct. 383, 394-95 (1979) (describing the “ebb and flow” test for defining “commerce” to include the “geographic, chemical, and environmental limits...” of coastal water bodies).
61 Supra, n. 58, at 2248.
62 Indeed, in order for one to show a wetland connection to navigable waters is “speculative or insubstantial,” they would likely have to engage in a scientific analysis of the cause/effect relationship between the wetland and larger navigable waters. This kind of showing clearly requires, as a prerequisite, strong scientific understand of the hydrologic connections between at-issue water bodies.
63 Rapanos at 2248. 64 Id.
establishing legal proof in cases of water body connectivity.65 Second, such an inquiry leads the way for scientific inquiry as the primary evidentiary tool is such cases, whether attempting to prove or disprove a contested “connection” between distinct water bodies. Such connections can only bolster claims of broad federal jurisdiction over ecologically linked water resources. This is essential if the United States is serious about a centralized policy regarding coastal marine resources.
C. The “Significant Nexus” test may be seen as a judicial acquiescence of an expansive federal role over coastal marine resources.
65 Id., at 2249 (Justice Kennedy indicating the Army Corps of Engineers, absent specific regulations, will have to make a significant nexus determination on a case-by-case basis).
66 As of January 27, 2007, EPA and/or the Army Corps of Engineers had not yet instituted any specific guidelines for implementation of the Rapanos decision. However, in an official statement to the Subcommittee of Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the Committee of Wildlife and Public Works of the Senate, EPA indicated it would soon be establishing guidelines implementing the Rapanos decision. EPA Statement available at: http://www.epa.gov/water/speeches/060801bg.html. Last visited: January 7, 2008.
D. Federal Courts of Appeal interpreting Rapanos have followed the “Significant Nexus” approach to determining federal jurisdiction.
The opinions citing Rapanos have differed in their approach to determining “waters of the United States.” However, whether the reading is expansive or restrictive, courts seem to be addressing the “ecological connections” of aquatic systems in their analysis.
One example is Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg.68 The Ninth Circuit applied Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test to a pond and its connected wetlands that were separated from a navigable river by a man-made levee and where there was a subsurface hydrologic connection between the pond and the river.69 The details of this case are important, as they highlight, in a specific example, exactly what “connections” are being considered between a water body and navigable waters.
67 Although recent decisions interpreting Rapanos have generally employed the Kennedy “substantial nexus” test, federal courts have generally been divided as to the extent in which federal jurisdiction should be applied to wholly intrastate bodies of water. The arguments surround the question of federalism, as well as difficult interpretations of precedent following the SWANNC decision. For an in-depth review of this issue see; Gregory T. Broderick, From Migratory Birds to Migratory Molecules: The Continuing Battle Over the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 473 (2005).
68 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006). 69 Id.
70 Id., at 1026. 71 Id.
72 Id. (Plaintiff’s were arguing the city was required to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit under the CWA, but had failed to do so).
73 Id. 74 Id. at 1030. 75 Id., citing Rapanos, 124 S.Ct. at 2248.
and biological connections between the two bodies of water. In doing so, the Court found ample evidence, founded in ecological principles, to support a significant nexus between the pond and the river.76 It is doubtful any of the prior precedent in this area, to include Riverside Bayview and SWANNC, would yield a similar result, at least not in terms of a focus on all possible ecological connections. Thus, we see at least one occasion where the judiciary was willing to allow for federal jurisdiction to be expanded to waters based on an ecological connection between the waters, in-line with Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion. This may suggest traditional limitations of federal jurisdiction over “navigable waters,” highlighted in SWANCC, eroding in favor of a more expansive definition based on ecological connections.77 This seems a necessary step if the U.S. is to move towards a comprehensive ocean management scheme based on principles of ecosystem-based management.
V. A Comprehensive, Centralized Federal Scheme May be Necessary to Adequately Protect Resources on an Ecosystem-Scale.
77 One comment that should be made is the general reluctance by the Court in this field of water protection to address the constitutional limits placed on such control measures. In each of the cases mentioned herein (Riverside Bayview, SWANNC, and Rapanos), the Court has mentioned, to some degree, the potential Constitutional limits of regulations attempting to exert federal control over varied water bodies. However, the Court has specifically limited its analysis to a statutory construction of Congressional intent, rather than addressing the Constitutional issue. It is quite possible such an issue would be addressed directly in a federal attempt to regulate coastal resources on an ecosystem- based approach. See, Congressional proposal to re-define “wetlands” under the CWA. Supra, n. 19.
78 Supra, n. 9. 79 Supra, n. 6.
80 “However, in reality, states may not always cooperate intensively or continuously. For political purposes, states' chief executives may insist upon negotiation between Governors, resulting in intermittent progress. A lack of intensive cooperation may lead to protracted negotiation and disagreement, exacerbating delay. Rather than representing the interests of the region, members of these interstate bodies typically represent the interests of their respective jurisdictions.” Supra, n. 6, at 197-98.
necessary bargaining chip to help states with unilateral interests focus on the need to engage in measures aimed at improving marine water quality from an “ecosystem” perspective.
The “substantial nexus” test adopted by Justice Kennedy, and followed in a recent federal court decision, gives hope to the advocates of an “ecosystem-based” approach to water management. Regarding marine waters, recent science would suggest the most productive areas – coastal waters – cannot be adequately protected without protecting terrestrial waters that flow into coastal basins.82 Thus, the hydro-geologic cycle requires a systematic approach of both terrestrial and marine environments (an ecosystem approach) in order to fully protect the quality of such environs.
determining water body connections, especially after SWANNC, seems to open the “judicial” door for an expansion of federal authority based on claims of ecological connections. This is of critical importance for any future development of federal coastal regulation based on an ecosystem-based management approach.
83 Supra, n. 38. It is clear in Rapanos, as well as other precedent in this area has, in-part, been affected by the statutory language of the CWA (maintaining the chemical, biological, and physical integrity). Beyond the statutory construction, it also appears the Court has fully considered the Constitutional limits placed on Congress.
whether physical, chemical, or biological, to the aquatic world. Justice Kennedy’s expression of what can be considered “waters of the United States” to take accounting of this scientific “worldview” is likely a necessary perception shift needed if centralized ecosystem-based management is to be realized.
The importance of Kennedy’s contribution, especially in the current political environment, deserves special attention. Moreover, those in favor of an ecosystem-based management regime for coastal resources should pay close attention to the factors driving the outcome in this case. Included are the judicial questions presented, the possibility of congressional clarification, as well as the “federalism” issue implicit in this area of regulation. The future development and refinement through the lower courts, including which test should be adopted, should be followed closely. Indeed, the battleground may be different when a future ecosystem-based federal management scheme is challenged, but the arguments will likely be the same.
Posted on 02/06/2011 Remediating Contaminated Sediments Under California’s Regulatory Regime: Are Regional Water Quality Boards Using the Correct Standard as Required by Law?

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