Source: https://www.ptab.us/2014/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:46:03+00:00

Document:
“Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine intended to prevent improper timewise extension of the patent right by prohibiting the issuance of claims in a second patent which are not ‘patentably distinct’ from the claims of a first patent.” In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “It requires rejection of an application claim when the claimed subject matter is not patentably distinct from the subject matter claimed in a commonly owned patent.” In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Two different tests have been set forth to determine whether the claims of an application are obvious over the claims of a commonly-owned patent. The “one-way” test asks whether the application claims under examination are obvious in view of the patent claims. Berg, 140 F.3d at 1432. The one-way test is the test usually applied in obvious-type double patenting rejections. In unusual circumstances, a “two-way” test is applied in which a second question (the second “way”) is asked: whether the patent claims are obvious in view of the application claims. Id.
“The two-way test is only appropriate in the unusual circumstance where, inter alia, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is ‘solely responsible for the delay in causing the second-filed application to issue prior to the first.”’ Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968 n.7 (Fed.Cir.2001) (quoting Berg, 140 F.3d at 1437); see also Basell, 547 F.3d at 1376; Emert, 124 F.3d at 1461 (applying the one-way test because the applicant “had significant control over the rate of prosecution of the application,” “was responsible for the delays in prosecution,” and “orchestrated the rate of prosecution”); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying the one-way test because “PTO actions did not dictate the rate of prosecution”); . . . . In short, the applicant is entitled to the narrow exception of the two-way test when the PTO is at fault for the delay that causes the improvement patent to issue prior to the basic patent.
In re Fallaux, 564 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
The Examiner has not cited evidence showing that this statement is not accurate. Cf. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (CCPA 1971) (specification is “presumptively accurate” and examiner has the burden of showing it is not).
Construing a means-plus-function claim limitation is a two-step process. First, the claim must be analyzed to determine whether the claim language actually invokes the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. See Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“If a claim element contains the word ‘means’ and recites a function, th[e] court presumes that element is a means-plus-function element under § 112, ¶ 6. . . . That presumption falls, however, if the claim itself recites sufficient structure to perform the claimed function.”). The second step is to “determine what structures have been disclosed in the specification that correspond to the means for performing that function.” Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “[S]tructure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim. This duty to link or associate structure to function is the quid pro quo for the convenience of employing § 112, ¶ 6.” B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). A means-plus-function claim “shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that “the 'broadest reasonable interpretation' that an examiner may give means-plus-function language is that statutorily mandated in paragraph six of 35 USC § 112.” MPEP § 2181. “Accordingly, the PTO may not disregard the structure disclosed in the specification corresponding to such language when rendering a patentability determination.” (id.) This “sets a limit on how broadly the PTO may construe means-plus-function language under the rubric of reasonable interpretation.” (emphasis added.) In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
A structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as a “corresponding structure” if the specification or the prosecution history “clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). With means-plus-function claiming, the narrower the disclosed structure in the specification, the narrower the claim coverage. Ibormeith IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 732 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.
In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Determining whether art is in the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s claimed invention “requires the PTO to determine the appropriate field of endeavor by reference to explanations of the invention's subject matter in the patent application, including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.” Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. Although the Examiner is correct that the Examiner’s claimed invention and the cited references are all broadly directed to computer programming (Ans. 24), Subramanian diverges substantially from the “the embodiments, function, and structure of [Appellant’s] claimed invention,” Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325, and the other cited prior art.
Citing Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Electronics of America, Inc., 609 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the district court noted that under § 120, a later filed application may claim priority based on an earlier filed application if, inter alia, the later filed application contains or is amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application.
Section 120 allows a later filed patent application to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date in the United States if, among other requirements,3 “it contains or is amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application . . . submitted at such time during the pendency of the application as required by the Director.” 35 U.S.C. § 120. We recently clarified that the “specific reference” requirement mandates “each [intermediate] application in the chain of priority to refer to the prior applications.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 609 F.3d at 1352.
3 The other requirements, which are not at issue in this appeal, are that (1) the invention described in the new application must be disclosed in an application previously filed in the United States; (2) the application must be filed by the inventor(s) named in the previously filed application; and (3) the application must be co-pending with the earlier application at some point. 35 U.S.C. § 120; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 609 F.3d at 1349-50.
First, in claim construction, one must not import limitations from the specification that are not part of the claim. Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Indeed, claims generally are not limited to any particular embodiment disclosed in the specification, even where only a single embodiment is disclosed. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Second, and relevant to this case, a system claim generally covers what the system is, not what the system does. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (“The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.”). Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

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