Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180112_0000412.SGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:52:08+00:00

Document:
Before the Court are Plaintiff's motions for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). (Doc. nos. 30, 35.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's motions for attorney's fees be GRANTED (doc. no. 30, 35), and the Commissioner be ORDERED to pay Plaintiff's counsel $15, 815.75 out of Plaintiff's past-due benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The Court herein recommends approval of a total fee award under § 406(b) of $20, 373.00. However, the Court has deducted from this total the prior fee award of $4, 557.25 made pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”), which Plaintiff's counsel shall retain. See Jackson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 601 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010) (preferring courts deduct EAJA award from § 406(b) award rather than plaintiff's counsel having to issue refund of EAJA award); see also Paltan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 518 F. App'x 673, 674 (11th Cir. 2013) (deducting EAJA award from § 406(b) award).
A. Plaintiff's Counsel Incorrectly Computed Compensable Hours.
The Court previously disallowed the disputed 1.5 hours when determining fees under the EAJA because requesting an extension for filing a brief benefits Plaintiff's counsel alone and is not compensable at taxpayer expense. (Doc. no. 29 (citing Nelson v. Colvin, No. 8:14-CV-2297-EAK-MAP, 2015 WL 5867439 at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2015)).) The policy behind disallowing fees for such tasks in the context of the EAJA, where the taxpayer bears the cost burden, is not applicable in the context of fees under § 406(b), where fees are paid out of Plaintiff's past due benefits. In addition, extension requests are a normal and customary part of litigation. Thus, there is no clear justification for excluding the previously disallowed hours claimed by Plaintiff's counsel here, and, accordingly, those hours are compensable.
However, the Commissioner is correct that Plaintiff's counsel is not entitled to fees for hours expended attempting to obtain fees under § 406(b), as they do not represent a service to the client. See Strickland v. Bowen, 669 F.Supp. 1086, 1088 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (“[T]ime spent by counsel to cause the opposing side to be liable for attorney's fees is compensable, while time spent by counsel to cause his own client to be liable for attorney's fees is not compensable.”) (citing Whitt v. Califano, 601 F.2d 160, 161 n.2 (4th Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, the 9.25 hours spent by Plaintiff's counsel petitioning the Court for fees under § 406(b) are not compensable, and Plaintiff's counsel may only seek compensation for a total of 25.75 hours.
Attorney's fee awards in Social Security cases are governed by two statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 of the EAJA. Jackson, 601 F.3d at 1271. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412 of the EAJA, counsel may petition for a fee award based on an hourly rate. Alternatively, counsel may seek a reasonable contingency fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) not in excess of “25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled.” Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1276. The fee is payable “out of, and not in addition to, the amount of the past-due benefits.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 795 (2002). Counsel can obtain a § 406(b) award even after receipt of EAJA fees, so long as the EAJA payment is deducted or refunded to avoid double recovery. See Pub. L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985); Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Brown, 2014 WL 4928880 at *1. Under § 406(b), an attorney must seek the court's approval even if there is a client agreement. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807.

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