Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50102:gr-149995-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:16:17+00:00

Document:
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001,1 affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as charged and sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to indemnify the private complainant the sum of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until full payment.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioner's "investment theory". In ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palana's General Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of petitioner.13 The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily amount to an investment of capital.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS REVERSALS.
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner's argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit.
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment17 at the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.18 The Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioner's conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as well as the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and banking communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction as to the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. What is important is the fact that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and those checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first delivery of the check.28 In the case at bar, the Information alleged that the check was postdated February 15, 1988 although issued in or about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.29 In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioner's allegation that private complainant knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for account or for value. As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when presented for payment.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%) percent interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision, the amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
1 Rollo, pp. 22-27. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Marina L. Buzon.
6 TSN, November 21, 1995, pp. 10-11.
8 Id. at 66; TSN, June 13, 1996, p. 11.
9 TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 17.
10 Id. at 12; Records, pp. 3-4.
11 Records, pp. 111-112; penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos.
13 TSN, September 9, 1997, p. 17; Records, p. 5.
15 Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 380, 387 (2003).
16 THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980.
17 B.P. Blg. 22, Sec. 1.
18 See Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455, 470.
19 The inferior courts were granted jurisdiction to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine.
20 People v. Velasco, 322 Phil. 146, 158-159 (1996).
22 TSN, April 29, 1997, pp. 18-20; TSN, September 9, 1997, p. 16.
23 See Cueme v. People, 390 Phil. 294, 302 (2000).
24 TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 7; September 9, 1997, p. 6 .
25 See Ongson v. People, G.R. No. 156169, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 656, 671-672.
27 Ruiz v. People, G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476, 491-492.
28 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, Sec. 191.
29 Andaya v. People, G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 539, 558.
30 Young v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140425, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 109, 121.
31 Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine or imprisonment.

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