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2. The parents right must be maintained lacking a showing by this strict standard that the parent is "unfit".
The following text of "Constitutional Rights of Parents" has been reproduced from: P.A.C.E. The work belongs to Mr. Don Hubin, and he retains all rights to it. We wholeheartedly support Mr. Hubin's efforts, and urge all our followers to lend their support to him, via his site. Thank you.
The level of scrutiny required for state actions that infringe upon fundamental rights is 'strict scrutiny,' which requires the state to show that the infringement serves a 'compelling state interest' and that there is no Constitutionally less offensive way for the state to satisfy this compelling interest.
There are sweeping--though seldom appreciated--implications of recognizing parental rights as Constitutionally fundamental. Domestic relations courts routinely declare one parent a 'non-custodial parent' and, thereby, deprive him or her of 'the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control' of their children. This practice has 'a real and appreciable impact on, and constitutes a significant interference with,' the exercise of a fundamental Constitutional right. Therefore, 'it cannot now be doubted that' such a determination interferes with a fundamental constitutional right.
Under the strict scrutiny standard, such a deprivation of rights must occur only when there is a compelling state interest served by interfering with these rights and there is no more Constitutionally benign way to achieve this compelling state interest.
While it is uncontroversial that, under the parens patria doctrine, the state has a compelling interest in preventing harm to children, this interest is not sufficient to Constitutionally justify the infringement in question. The state must show that there is no method of achieving this state objective that is less offensive to the Constitution than that of routinely depriving one parent of these fundamental rights. Where there is clear and convincing evidence that, in the specific case, the retention of parental rights by both parents would compromise a compelling state interest, the state may be justified in restricting the parental rights of one, or both, parents. However, where both parents are fit, there will normally be no reason for a state to deprive one of custodial rights.
The implication of this is that, to be Constitutionally sound, state law must contain a strong legal presumption of joint legal custody of minor children upon the divorce of the parents.
The complete history of the Court's rulings on the nature of parental rights includes also: Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534535 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
(4) the acts or omissions of the defendant caused the constitutional deprivation. Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F.
property rights." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), quoting May v. Anderson, 345, U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), See, e.q. Castigno v Wholean, 239 Conn. 336 (1996); In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557 (1992). In Re: May V Anderson (1953) 345 US 528, 533, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221, 1226.
which was followed by a series of decisions holding that parenting is a fundamental constitutional right, and among "the basic civil rights of man." Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among those rights the Court has ranked as "of basic importance in our society," and as sheltered by the 14th Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. Assembled here are a majority of those cases defining or reaffirming these fundamental rights. Links are provided to each case on the FindLaw Internet Legal Resources service. Each is in hypertext format, with links to related opinions of the court contained in the ruling.
and/or other abuse in the Petitioner/Mother's residence).
disrespect. This case, involving the State's authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demanded the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important was at stake.
Amendment, and does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. A parental rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty interest. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.
that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest." Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the "best interests of the child."
natural parents as balanced against the rights of foster parents, as well as a comprehensive discussion of foster care conditions.
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters have consistently acknowledged a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." When the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, the Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced.
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
14th Amendment, and the 9th Amendment.
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."
carefully and particularly reserved to the people." Reaffirming the principles set forth in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyers v Nebraska.
decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
to the very existence and survival of the race."
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
"No state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." "While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
345 U.S. 528, 533, (1952). As such, the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
nurture of the child reside first with the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
and may administer reasonable punishment without being liable for battery.
People v. Whitehurst, 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050 (1992). In order to be considered disciplinary the punishment must be necessary (i.e.
believes the punishment was reasonable.
at 37 (first dissenting opinion); see id., at 24-32 (opinion of the Court); id., at 59-60 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). See also Little v.
in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 -535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)."
decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one." 452 U.S., at 27.
natural parents, however, the consequence of an erroneous termination is the unnecessary destruction of their natural family.
A standard that allocates the risk of error nearly equally between those two outcomes does not reflect properly their relative severity.
fit parents." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at 652."
near-equal allocation of risk between the parents and the State is constitutionally intolerable."
above, in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 102(f), 92 Stat. 3072, 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), Congress requires "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" for termination of Indian parental rights, reasoning that "the removal of a child from the parents is a penalty as great [as], if not greater, than a criminal penalty" H. R. Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 22 (1978)."
natural parent's fundamental liberty interests if the State is willing to tolerate undue uncertainty in the determination of the dispositive facts."
parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest,'" quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977)."
the dispositional phase, after the parents have been found unfit."
Foster Families, supra, at 862-863."
permits a State to interfere with this right (infringing on parents' fundamental right to rear their children) only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child...".137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed."
decisions regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304."
infringement on Granville' (the Parent's) right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her children. Pp. 8ù 14."
compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision"
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392."
achievement of those objectives" in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental relationship with their children absent a finding that they are unfit as parents." Reed v.
hand, that a father's interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and management" of his children is "cognizable and substantial,"
a fit parent, id., at 657-658." De Minimus defined: Trifling or insignificant matters, with which a court will not concern itself.
The full expression is de minimis non curat lex. This is a Latin phrase which means "the law does not care about very small matters".
as a whole, and will have no legal relevance or bearing on the end result.
recognized parent and is given exclusive authority to exercise all parental prerogatives, 74-203."
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246, "We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley v.
choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest."
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977).
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, supra; Craig v. Boren, supra. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)."
disparity and an important State purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 -199 (1976).
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (opinion concurring in judgment), it by no means follows that each unwed parent has any such right.
action as a matter of due process." Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 414 (emphasis added). [463 U.S. 248, 261]"
in `promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood relationship." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 -233 (1972)). 17 [463 U.S. 248, 262]"
child] for additional obligations." Id., at 535. The linkage between parental duty and parental right was stressed again in Prince v.
requisites of the Due Process Clause." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie."
relation between the disparity and an important state purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 -199 (1976).
the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." Id., at 392."
natural fathers as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the same Amendment." "if and when one develops, the relationship between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection against arbitrary state action as a matter of due process. See Stanley v.
discrimination - to the stated purpose for which the classification is being made."
308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A. L.R. 1352. All are interwoven there together.
law more than in life."
and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no man's land where this battle has gone on."
U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct. 571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had sustained the parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the state's requirement of attendance at public schools. "
of the First Article occupy, the statute in its present application must fall. It cannot be sustained by any presumption of validity. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146. And, finally, it is said, the statute is, as to children, an absolute prohibition, not merely a reasonable regulation, of the denounced activity."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), " "Religious training and activity, whether performed by adult or child, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against interference by state action, except insofar as they violate reasonable regulations adopted for the protection of the public health, morals and welfare." "a The state court has construed these statutes to cover the activities here involved, cf. State v. Richardson, 92 N.H. 178, 27 A.2d 94, thereby imposing an indirect restraint through the parents and guardians on the free exercise by minors of their religious beliefs. This indirect restraint is no less effective than a direct one. A square conflict between the con- [321 U.S. 158, 173] stitutional guarantee of religious freedom and the state's legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its children is thus presented. In dealing with the validity of statutes which directly or indirectly infringe religious freedom and the right of parents to encourage their children in the practice of a religious belief, we are not aided by any strong presumption of the constitutionality of such legislation. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 , 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, note 4.
life does not warrant every limitation on their religious training and activities. If the right of a child to practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means, there must be convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 , 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186.
liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152.""The state, in my opinion, has completely failed to sustain its burden of proving the existence of any grave or immediate danger to any interest which it may lawfully protect." "Nor can parents or guardians be subjected to criminal liability because of vague possibilities that their religious teachings might cause injury to the child. The evils must be grave, immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 , 62 S.Ct. 190, 193. Yet there is not the slightest indication in this record, or in sources subject to judicial notice, that children engaged in distributing literature pursuant to their religious beliefs have been or are likely to be subject to any of the harmful 'diverse influences of the street.' Indeed, if probabilities are to be indulged in, the likelihood is that children engaged in serious religious endeavor are immune from such influences."
circumstances all that is comprehended in the former is included in the latter. "
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "a claim of parental right as secured by the due process clause of the latter Amendment. 8 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446." PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "...two claimed liberties are at stake. One is the parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go."
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens. Between contrary pulls of such weight, the safest and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no man's land where this battle has gone on."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The rights of children to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition here, most recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. [321 U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct. 571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had sustained the parent's authority to provide religiousa" "And in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446, children's rights to receive teaching in languages other than the nation's common tongue were guarded against the state's encroachment." "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."
constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family established in numerous decisions of this Court extends to the family choice involved in this case and is not confined within an arbitrary boundary drawn at the limits of the nuclear family (essentially a couple [431 U.S. 494, 495] and their dependent children). Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but from careful "respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). The history and tradition of this Nation compel a larger conception of the family."
crimes OR being found unfit OR incompetent as a parent, my Right to Constitutional protection, Equal Treatment Under the Law and My God Given Liberties as a Law Abiding Citizen of the United States of America, have been violated by the Circuit Court for Howard County Maryland, and the State Maryland. My personal property - my children - have been effectively seized and without a Constitutional basis OR the "clear establishment of unfitness as a parent" as mandated by Federal case law.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." "the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." * We recently referred [381 U.S. 479, 485] in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 , to the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people." See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960).
requirements of a free society." Poe [381 U.S. 479, 494] v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517."
Natural Law, this same level of Constitutional protection of Family Rights must be extended to the unemancipated minor offspring of that lawful and law abiding marital relation û even in event of marital divorce.
which are considered fundamental principles of the family by these very people.
experimentation by the States in the area of the fundamental personal rights of its citizens. I cannot agree that the Constitution grants such power either to the States or to the Federal Government." The systematic exclusion of Fathers from the traditional Family by the Courts, represents little more than a "social experiment" which violates Natural Law and the fundamental personal rights of its citizens. As such, the Court's social-experiment - the systematic exclusion of Fathers from the lives of their children - in the absense of any law breaking or wrong doing on the part of the Father - IS UnConstitutional. Based up the state of the American Family AND Our Nation, this social experiment as clearly gone-awry, and must be immediately eliminated from Our Families and Our Nation.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "the Government, absent a showing of a compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree a." [381 U.S. 479, 497] "Yet by their reasoning such an invasion of marital privacy would not be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be "silly," no provision of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from curtailing the marital right to bear children and raise a family." "a the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such totalitarian[ism] a, which is at complete variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing [voluntary birth control] by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected." Just as the Government does not have the Constitutional authority to interject itself into the issue regarding the decision by it's Citizens to bear children, so it is also true that the same Government does not have the Constitutional authority to interject itself into any issue regarding the raising of those children once they are born unless AND until the law abiding parents are "clearly established to be unfit as parents" or engage any some other form(s) of lawlessness. By extension, it holds true that the offspring of Citizens are not wards of, nor property of, the Government OR it's Courts, and therefore beyond the authority of the Government or it's Courts so long as those Citizens AND off spring are abiding by the Constitutionally authorized laws of this Nation.
be shown "necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 . See Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "...law obviously encroaches upon a fundamental personal liberty, the State does not show that the law serves any "subordinating [state] interest which is compelling" or that it is "necessary [381 U.S. 479, 498] a to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." The State, at most, argues that there is some rational relation between this statute and what is admittedly a legitimate subject of state concern. The rationality of this justification is dubious, a see Tileston v.
dealt with and intruding upon the privacy of all married couples. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 ; NAACP v.
to "invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 307. See McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 196.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , the Court, referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, stated: "While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also [for example,] the right ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children"
may see by turning to the [381 U.S. 479, 490] last clause of the fourth resolution [the Ninth Amendment]." Annals of Congress 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834).
fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "See Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment (1955). "Mr. Patterson urges that the Ninth Amendment be used to protect unspecified "natural and inalienable rights." P. 4. The Introduction by Roscoe Pound states that "there is a marked revival of natural law ideas throughout the world. Interest in the Ninth Amendment is a symptom of that revival." P. iii. In Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People"?, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 787, Professor Redlich, in advocating reliance on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to invalidate the Connecticut law before us, frankly states: "But for one who feels that the marriage relationship should be beyond the reach of a state law a, the a case poses a troublesome and challenging problem of constitutional interpretation. He may find himself saying, `The law is unconstitutional - but why?' There are two possible paths to travel in finding the answer. One is to revert to a frankly flexible due process concept even on matters that do not involve specific constitutional prohibitions. The other is to attempt to evolve a new constitutional framework within which to meet this and similar problems which are likely to arise." Id., at 798." The Courts finding was that a citizen had absolute freedom from the state with respect to the parents decision to produce offspring. By Natural extension, this same Constitutional protection must be extended to include protection from those same States following the birth of these "protected" children. Insofar as no Constitutionally recognized laws are broken by these citizens (parents and children) - the "sacred familial domain" must be "Constitutionally Protected from the Arbitrary and unlawful interjection by the States' and their illegal courts.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Compare Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 , upholding a New York dog-licensing statute on the ground that it did not "deprive dog owners of liberty without due process of law." And as I said concurring in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 , "I believe that faithful adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of individual libertya"
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 ; Barron v. Baltimore, supra, Pet. at pages 250, 251; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 416-420.
and De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 ; freedom of assembly, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 , 259; at the very least, certain types of cruel and unusual punishment and former jeopardy, State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 ; the right of an accused in a criminal case to be in- [332 U.S. 46 , 85] formed of the charge against him, see Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 332, 90 A.L.R. 575; the right to receive just compensation on account of taking private property for public use, Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 . And the Court has now through the Fourteenth Amendment literally and emphatically applied the First Amendment to the States in its very terms. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 ; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 , 1186, 147 A.L.R. 674; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 , 196, 159 A.L.R. 1346."
original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights.
frustrate the great design of a written Constitution. [332 U.S. 46, 90].
several states. 144 U.S. at page 363, 12 S.Ct. at page 708.
law abiding" AND are "not clearly established as unfit parents."
Protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), When we allowed States to give constitutional sanction to the "shabby business" of unlawful entry into a home (to use an expression of Mr. Justice Murphy, Wolf v. Colorado, at 46), we did indeed rob the Fourth Amendment of much meaningful force."
United States, have never been charge OR adjudicated as "unlawful" or "clearly established as unfit to parent." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." At p.
unconscionable invasions of privacy.....,' Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 -544 "The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence -" 367 U.S., at 656 -657.
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property."
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenta"
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), "basic civil rights of man,"
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and "rights far more precious . . . than property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "The Court observed that"[t]he writ of habeas corpus is one of the centerpieces of our liberties." Brown v.
Parties unemancipated minor children, which they would never been subjected to had these governmental entities simply "minded there own business" (The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold,55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960) and left the private matters of the law abiding familial domain, to those best-equipped to address those matters û THE PARTIES. See Also: O'NEIL v. VERMONT, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); TWINING v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); U.S. v. DARBY, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399;Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 82; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882; MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
finding that they are unfit as parents."
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit holds that a non-custodial parent’s fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his child and directing the child’s education and upbringing survives a divorce decree. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 594-95 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Franz, a non-custodial father lost contact with his children when they went into the witness protection program with their mother and step-father. In response to the father’s claim of a substantive due process right to maintain a relationship with his children, the court observed that while the right is “acknowledged to be potent,” it might be argued that it is “less formidable when asserted by a non-custodial parent – one who retains and regularly exercises ‘visitation rights’ but who participates little in the day-to-day care and nurturing of his children.” Id. at 595.
The court then rejected this argument, concluding that “the bulk of the pertinent precedent seems to suggest that we should not differentiate between custodial and non-custodial contexts when deciding what protections are constitutionally due a parent-child relationship.” Id. at 595-96 (collecting cases). The court also conducted an extensive analysis focusing on the importance of parent-child relations in our culture, the social functions served by shielding such relations, and 16 the profound importance of the parent-child bond to the emotional life of both. Id. at 597-602. It concluded that the non-custodial father’s interests were in critical respects comparable.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), this crucial (6-1) decision invalidated a Massachusetts statute making it a crime for anyone to distribute contraceptives, other than doctors and pharmacists prescribing them to married persons. The lead opinion, written by Brennan and getting the vote of three others, went far past the limited right of "marital privacy" found in Griswold by holding that the right to privacy inheres in the individual not married couples--and that the law therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against unmarried people. Brennan's oft quoted opinion says: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt at 453.
If there is an “award” of children, it should be to the father. “The father owns the child against the mother as well as against the world…which no court is to disregard.” State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 277.
"The statist notion that government may supercede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions. Judges and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests." Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990), citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982).
means 'grievous shortcomings or handicaps' that put the child's welfare much at hazard. (Footnotes omitted.) Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 28 (1997), quoting [from] Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 646 (1975)." Adoption of Greta, 431 Mass. 577, 587 (2000).
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining custody of their children, which is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 58, 60, 556 N.E.2d 993 (1990).

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