Source: https://www.boluslaw.com/Published-Cases/Roy-v-Russell-County-Ambulance-Service.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:35:04+00:00

Document:
COUNSEL: [**1] Plaintiff's Counsel: Edward E. Dove, 200 Security Trust Building, 271 W. Short Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40507.
Defendant's Counsel: Robert L. Bertram, Bertram & Wilson, One Monument Square, P. O. Box 25, Jamestown, Kentucky 42629. O. Lee Cave, III, James M. Bolus, Jr., Clark, Ward & Cave, Suite 355, Paragon Place, 9100 Shelbyville Road, Louisville, Kentucky 40222.
Plaintiff in this employment discrimination suit requests leave of this Court to amend her Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Defendants oppose the motion and assert their own motion to remand Plaintiff's pendent state law claim.
Plaintiff filed suit in June, 1991, alleging violations by Defendants of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Her original complaint detailed two instances in which Defendants allegedly refused promotions to her on the basis of her gender. The complaint also promised that Plaintiff had complied with all conditions precedent to this Court's jurisdiction, including § 2000e-5's filing requirements.
Plaintiff now asks this Court for permission to file an amended Complaint, [**2] which restates her original allegations and asserts two additional job discrimination claims. Her amended pleading would include a charge that Defendants altered the terms of her employment as punishment for her efforts to redress earlier unlawful practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The amended Complaint would also allege that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of her pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(2)(a)(1) and 2000e(k).
Over a year has passed since Plaintiff filed her original Complaint. The parties have conducted initial discovery. Defendants contend that revised Complaint throws its net more broadly than did the first, and focuses on actions outside the scope of the original pleading. Defendants add that the proposed amendment will force them to undertake additional discovery to rebut Plaintiff's new charges.
Permission to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Courts should grant leave to amend a complaint unless: (1) revision of the pleading would prejudice the opponent, or (2) the amended pleading could not withstand [**3] a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. United States v. Wood, 877 F.2d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1989).
An amendment will prejudice the opponent if it will "adversely affect its posture in the litigation." Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983). Defendants, however, have not established that they will be prejudiced due to insufficient time to conduct discovery, or that they have been unfairly surprised by Plaintiff's new assertions, or that they will be unable to rebut the new claims effectively. Roth, 705 F.2d at 155. Nor have Defendants claimed that Plaintiff's delay in requesting leave to amend was intended to harass the Defendants. Janikowski v. Bendix Corp., 823 F.2d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 1987). And if the proposed revision forces Defendants to undertake duplicative discovery, "the proper remedy . . . would be to require the amending party to bear a portion of the additional expense", not to deny permission to amend. Id. at 952. Defendants have not demonstrated sufficient prejudice [**4] to warrant withholding permission to amend.
Nor have Defendants convinced this Court that the Complaint, as amended, fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. An amended pleading states a claim unless, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing all ambiguities in favor of the amending party, "it appears to a certainty that the pleader would not be entitled to any relief. . . ." Roth, 705 F.2d at 155. The Complaint, as amended, alleges [*519] facts that would entitle the Plaintiff to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the pleading continues to maintain that Plaintiff complied with all filing requirements imposed by § 2000e-5. A dismissal for failure to state a claim would not be proper.
Plaintiff asserts a right to recover under Kentucky law based upon the same discriminatory conduct alleged in violation of Title VII. See K.R.S. § 344.010 et seq. Plaintiff asks this Court to exercise its pendent jurisdiction and adjudicate her state law claim together with her Title VII cause of action. Defendants contend that this Court has no authority to determine a state law cause of action [**5] in concert with Title VII claims, and add that judicial economy and fairness should in any event preclude the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
Before it may assert pendent jurisdiction, a federal court must be convinced of two facts: first, that it has the power to hear the state law claim; and second, that it would be proper to adjudicate the state and federal claims in one proceeding. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966). Federal law thus dictates whether this Court may hear Plaintiff's state claim; it remains within this Court's discretion to determine whether it should extend its jurisdiction. Each of these elements will be considered in turn in the discussion below.
Absent diversity jurisdiction, a federal court possesses the power to adjudicate a state law claim only if: (1) a federal cause of action with substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction is properly before the court; (2) the state claim derives from the same "nucleus of operative fact" which gives rise to the federal cause of action; and (3) the statute governing the federal cause of action has not expressly or impliedly negated [**6] the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373, 57 L. Ed. 2d 274, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978); Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Sch., 825 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (6th Cir. 1987). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and (c).
Plaintiff's claim to Title VII relief carries sufficient substance to warrant federal jurisdiction. The presence of a "common nucleus of operative fact" is equally clear: Kentucky law's definition of employment discrimination is virtually identical to Tide VII's description of "unlawful employment practice", and conduct which violates Title VII almost certainly contravenes state law as well. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and K.R.S. § 344.040(1). Defendants therefore focus on the third prerequisite to pendent jurisdiction power. They argue that Congress implicitly negated pendent jurisdiction over state claims when it enacted Title VII, and contend that the simultaneous adjudication of Plaintiff's state claim would be incompatible with the Congressional [**7] intent underlying Title VII.
Defendants find the source of Congress's intent to forbid pendent jurisdiction in Title VII's procedural and remedial provisions. They note, for example, that Title VII mandates bench trials and expeditious disposition of employment discrimination lawsuits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5). The law also limits its remedies to equitable relief and two years' back pay. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (West 1992); see also Kitchen, 825 F.2d at 1010. By contrast, state laws governing employment discrimination, like Kentucky's, typically permit jury trials and the more extensive remedy of compensatory damages. K.R.S. § 344.450. Defendants insist that the addition of a state law claim to Title VII litigation would undermine Title VII's philosophy, objectives, and streamlined procedure.
The Sixth Circuit ventured briefly onto this field in its opinion in Kitchen, supra. The plaintiff in that action had alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII, and Michigan's Civil Rights Act. Her opponents asked the court to remand the state law claim, [**8] advancing the same arguments as Defendants present in this suit. Kitchen, 825 F.2d 1004 at 1009-10. But the Sixth Circuit concluded that the effort to protect Title VII's procedural and remedial integrity [*520] would be futile under the circumstances existing in that case: the plaintiff's § 1983 claim would inevitably inject a jury trial and compensatory damages into the Title VII litigation, regardless of the court's treatment of the state law action. Id. at 1010. Had the plaintiff alleged violations of Title VII alone, though, "the concerns apparent when Title VII is the only basis for federal jurisdiction" might have persuaded the court to remand her state claim. Id. But the Sixth Circuit ultimately refused to decide whether federal courts could exercise pendent jurisdiction where, as squarely presented here, a plaintiff seeks to attach a state claim solely to Title VII. Id. at 1010 n.1.
The Sixth Circuit has not returned to the issue discussed in Kitchen, and the interplay of Title VII and pendent jurisdiction continues to divide the District Courts. n1 The controversy has yielded conflicting [**9] results among courts within the Sixth Circuit, n2 and has even been the subject of sharp disagreement between Judges in the same District. n3 But the weight of authority in recent years suggests a growing consensus that federal courts do possess the authority to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state causes of action joined solely to Title VII claims.
n1 See, e.g., Bradford v. General Tel. Co., 618 F. Supp. 390, 397 (W.D.Mich. 1985) and cases cited therein.
n2 Compare Taylor v. National Group, 765 F. Supp. 411, 417 (N.D.Ohio 1990) (holding pendent jurisdiction proper) with Bennett v. Steiner-Liff Iron & Metal, 714 F. Supp. 895, 897 n.1 (M.D.Tenn. 1989) (suggesting pendent jurisdiction legally improper).
n3 See, e.g., Yousef v. Borman Foods, 667 F. Supp. 443, 445 (E.D.Mich. 1987) (pendent jurisdiction proper), disagreeing with Jong-Yul Lim v. International Inst. of Metro. Detroit, 510 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.Mich. 1981).
Years of debate and the able investigations of many courts have uncovered little evidence to refute the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that neither Title VII's language nor its legislative history indicate an intent to negate pendent jurisdiction. Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 552 (10th Cir. 1986). An intent to prohibit pendent jurisdiction would have arisen in sharp contrast to the jurisdictional "impulse . . . toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties" prevailing at the time of Title VII's enactment. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724. "Against the backdrop of the volume of pendent jurisdiction cases," the Tenth Circuit contended, "one would be surprised if Congress did not deal expressly with the issue if it intended to change the general law." Jones, 794 F.2d at 552. Nor can a express intent to divest federal courts of pendent jurisdiction be discerned in the record of Congress's debates regarding Title VII. Id.
And if, despite the absence of an express provision addressing the issue, Congress truly meant to imply an intent [**11] to preclude pendent jurisdiction, it chose language which was singularly ill-suited to accomplish its goal. It is well-settled, for example, that nothing in Title VII prevents the conjunction of other federal claims to a Title VII cause of action. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295, 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975). Such federal claims quite commonly will permit jury trials and a broader award of compensatory damages, notwithstanding the presence of a Title VII claim in the same litigation. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460; Kitchen, 825 F.2d at 1010. Plaintiffs may easily attach their state claims to these federal provisions and completely circumvent Congress's supposed intent to preclude all pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kitchen, 825 F.2d at 1010. If Congress had indeed desired to protect Title VII's bench trial and equitable remedy provisions from outside interference, it presumably would have insulated Title VII actions from contradictory federal claims as well.
n4 It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit cited the federal courts' "exclusive jurisdiction" over Title VII claims as another basis for refusing to find an implied negation of pendent jurisdiction. Jones, 794 F.2d at 553. The court reasoned that Congress would not have intended to force plaintiffs to file suit in federal court, but deny them an opportunity to assert their state claims in the same proceeding. Id. This "exclusive jurisdiction" argument, however, has clearly been robbed of its force. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. at 1570. Nevertheless, as noted above, Congress's presumed intent to assure a state forum to Title VII litigants suggests in its own right that Congress was not offended by the conjunction of state law and Title VII claims, and did not mean to imply a desire to negate pendent jurisdiction.
n6 The laborious search for a implied intent to negate pendent jurisdiction may no longer be necessary under prevailing law. A recent federal statute, which in essence codifies the Gibbs pendent jurisdiction rules, allows District Courts to exercise "supplemental jurisdiction" over appropriate claims "except . . . as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added). As noted above, the Supreme Court has recognized Congress's power to exclude, by implication, the ability of federal courts to assert pendent jurisdiction. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373. The new supplemental jurisdiction statute suggests, though, that Congress wishes to bar pendent adjudication only in such instances where federal law expressly declares that intent.
Defendants' theory is not without merit. But this Court is convinced that neither the provisions of Title VII nor its policy divest federal courts of their general power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over related state claims. This Court therefore will [**15] align itself with the Tenth Circuit and those other courts which hold that Title VII permits the adjudication of pendent state causes of actions. See Jones, supra; Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1230 (9th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 356 (1st Cir. 1989); and Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Services, 711 F.2d 1524, 1531 (11th Cir. 1983).
To determine that this Court possesses the authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's state law claim does not compel the conclusion that this Court should consent to the addition of that claim. The Supreme Court describes pendent jurisdiction as "a doctrine of discretion" whose "justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants. . . ." [*522] Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. A federal court should not hesitate to dismiss a pendent state claim if it appears that state issues with respect to proof or remedies will predominate at trial; or if the addition of the state claim will create a likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent theories of [**16] relief; or if resolution of the state claim will require the court to interpret novel state issues better left to the determination of the state's courts. Id. at 726-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
n7 That court also cited "the unsettled condition of Tennessee law" with respect to the plaintiff's state claim as additional factor influencing the court's refusal of pendent jurisdiction. Bennett, 714 F. Supp. at 898.
But these considerations are not as compelling under the circumstances presented by the instant case. Plaintiff, for instance, does not seek punitive damages in her Complaint, and [**18] contends that Kentucky law prohibits such an award. See K.R.S. 344.230(3)(h) and Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky. 1981). Plaintiff's limitation to compensatory damages under Kentucky law would reduce the likelihood that an inflated recovery would cause state law issues to overwhelm Plaintiff's Title VII claims, and would thereby remove the danger that so concerned the District of Columbia Circuit in Bouchet, supra.
And Plaintiff's theory of recovery under Kentucky law will closely parallel that asserted under Title VII. State and federal law describe unlawful employment practices in the same terms, and evidence supporting Plaintiff's Title VII claim may properly be considered by the jury with respect to Plaintiff's Kentucky action. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and K.R.S. § 344.040(1). It is true that Plaintiff advances two additional Title VII claims, alleging pregnancy discrimination and retaliation, for which she asserts no pendent Kentucky law actions. The presentation of evidence regarding these claims will interest only the Court, [**19] and thus the jury inevitably will hear some information which they cannot properly consider with respect to Plaintiff's sole state law claim. But the Court is confident that this additional evidence will not be so extensive or inflammatory that the jury will be incapable of focusing on those issues entrusted to their judgment. Plaintiff in any event will not introduce the sort of confusing, widely divergent streams of evidence which prompted the District Court in Bennett, supra, to refuse pendent jurisdiction.
n8 As the Supreme Court counseled in Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727: "Pretrial procedures or even the trial itself may reveal a substantial hegemony of state law claims, or likelihood of jury confusion, which could not have been anticipated at the pleading stage. Although it will of course be appropriate to take into account . . . the already completed course of litigation, dismissal of the state claim might even then be merited."
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 809 F. Supp. 517.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's pendent state law claim is DENIED.
This 30th day of December, 1992.

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