Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19791213-840878
Timestamp: 2017-07-28 00:55:14+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Requêtes jointes ; RecevablesNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8408/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1979-12-13;8408.78 Analyses : (Art. 35-1) EPUISEMENT DES VOIES DE RECOURS INTERNESParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 8408/78 X . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAN Y X . c/RÃPUBLIQUE FÃDÃRALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 13 December 1979 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 dÃ©cembre 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requ9t e
A rticle 26 of the Convention : Personal incidental expenses imposed on the accused after a decision to discontinue the proceedings due to a procedural impediment. Situation different from those in Applications Nos. 6281173 (Neubecker) and 6650175 (Liebig), so that an appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court ought to be attempted.
Article 26 de la Convention : DÃ©bours personnels laissÃ©s A la charge de l'accusÃ© aprÃ©s un non-lieu d0 A un empÃªchement de caractÃ©re procÃ©dural . Situation diffÃ©rente de celle des requÃªtes NÂ° 6281/73 INeubeckerl et 6650/75 (Liebig), de sorte qu'un recours A la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale devait Ãªtre tentÃ©.
I franÃ§ais : voir p. 212 )
Summery of the relevent /ects
In 1976 the Dtstrict Court of Kiel convicted the applicant and fined her 300 DM for defamation and acquitted her on a charge of coercion IN6tigungl . The Public Prosecutor and the defence appealed . In the meantime the applicant had transferred her domicile to Bavaria and she requested the Regional Court of Kiel to grant her an advance of 1, 130 DM to cover travel in a lying position, required by her state of health . Upon this, the Court of Appeal decided to stay provisionally the proceedings, according to Section 205 of the Code on Criminal Procedure . The applicant appealed unsuccessfully against this decision . The Court of Appeal, after three requests from the applicanr, and with the consent of the Public Prosecutor, decided to discontinue indefinitely the proceedings under Section 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . The Court ordered that th e
public treasury should pay the costs of the proceedings except the applicant's personal incidental expenses incurred in connection with the charge of defamation under Section 467 (3) No . 2 of the Code on Criminal Procedure . The Court reasoned that in the present state of proceedings it was likely that the appeal would have been rejected and the conviction confirmed . Thls consideration was repeated by the Regional Court of Appeal in August 1978, on the appficant's appeal.
THE LAW (Extract ) The applicant (further) complained of the court orders according to which she has to bear her own necessary expenses on the ground that her appeal against conviction would probably have been unsuccessful . She has invoked Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention in this respect which embodies the principle of presumption of innocence . However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of this provision as, under Article 26 of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law . In the present case the applicant failed to lodge a constitutional appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) . This court has already stated that the principle of "presumption of innocencÃ©" is embodied in the constitution (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic (see BVerfGe 22, p . 254 et seq ., at p . 265) . It is true that in the decision cited the Federal Constitutional Court examined the question whether or not Section 467 (2) of the Code on Criminal Procedure IStP01 violated the said principle and came to a negative result . However the decision was given in 1967 and the provision has in the meantime been modified . In the present case the orders concerning costs were based on Section 467, paragraph 3, No . 2 of the Code on Criminal Procedure . This also distinguishes the case from Applications Nos . 6281/73 and 6650/75 which the Commission declared admissible on 5 May 1976 and 17 July 1976 respectively (Decisions and Reports, 5, pp . 13 and 58) . There the question of personal expenses had been settled by the German courts on the basis of a Section 467, paragraph 4 of the Code on Criminal Procedure and a panel of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court had in the matter No . 6281/73 on 15 May 1973 rejected a constitutional appeal . In the two previous cases cited the proceedings were discontinued on account of the trivial nature IGeringfÃ¼gigkeitl of the cases while in the present case the proceedings had to be discontinued on account of a procedural impediment (Verfahrenshindernis) .
Section 467 SiPO reads as follows : para . 1 "If the accused is acquitted, or if the opening of the main proceedings against him is refused, or if the proceedings against him are disconlinued the costs of the proceedings and the necessary expenses incurred by the accused shall be borne by the Treasury . "
para . 2 "The costs of the proceedings caused by any culpable failure of the accused's shall be imposed on him . The necessary expenses incurred by him to this extent shall not be imposed on the Treasury . "
para . 3 "The accused's necessary expenses shall not be imposed on the Treasury if the accused has caused the public charge to be preferred by pretending in an information laid against himself that he committed the offence of which he stands accused . The court may refrain from imposing the necessary expenses incurred by the accused on the Treasury if h . caused the public charge to be preferred by incriminating himsel f e1 in essential points, contrary to the truth or in contradiction to any subsequent statements of his, or withheld essential facts that might have exonerated him, although he did make a statement in respect of the accusation, o r 2 . is not convicted of an offence for the sole reason that there is a procedural impediment . " para . 4 "If the court discontinues the proceedings in accordance with a provision which permits this by leaving it to the court's discretion, it may refrain from imposing the necessary expenses incurred by the accused on the Treasury . "
para . 5 "The necessary expenses incurred by the accused shall not be imposed on the Treasury if, following provisional discontinuance ISection 153 a) the proceedings are discontinued definitely . " The Commission finds that the present case is as regards the factual and legal situation distinguishable from the cases which were before it and before the Federal Constitutional Court . The Commission also notes that the court orders complained of by the applicant were given two years after the Commission had declared Applications Nos . 6281 /73 and 6650/74 admissible . The Federal Constitutional Court was thus aware that the Commissio n - 211 -
attached a certain importance to the problems raised in connection with the application of Section 467 of the Code on Criminal Procedure . , In all these circumstances it cannot be found that a constitutional appeal would have been wholly ineffective and the applicant can therefore not be considered to have exhausted the remedies available to her under German law (cf . decision on admissibility of Application No . 702/60, Retimag v . the Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook 4, pp . 385 and 406) . Moreover, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have absolved the applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at his disposal . It follows that the applicant has not complied with the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and her application must in this respect be rejected under Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Convention .
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits pertinents En 1976, le tribunal cantonal de Kief a condamnÃ© la requÃ©rante 8 3 0 0 DM d'amende pour diffamation et l'a acquittÃ©e du chef de contrainte I NÃ´tigungl . Le ministÃ©re public et la dÃ©fense ont fait appel. Entre temps la requÃ©rante avait transportÃ© son domicile en BaviÃ©re et elle demanda Ã la cour d'appel (tribunal rÃ©gionan de Kiel de lui accorder une avance de 1 130 DM pour frais de voyage Ã Kie/ en position couchÃ©e, vu son Ã©tat de santÃ© . Sur ce, la cour d'appel dÃ©cida de suspendre provisoirement la procÃ©dure, selon l'article 205 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . La requÃ©rante recourut sans succÃ©s contre cette dÃ©cision . AprÃ©s trois demandes de la requÃ©rante, la cour d'appel, sur avis conforme du parquet, dÃ©cida la suspension dÃ©finitive de l'instance, selon l'article 2LX 'i (a) du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . La cour ordonna que les frais de la requÃ©rante soient Ã©/a charge du TrÃ©sor, Ã l'exception de ses dÃ©bours personnels relatifs Ã l'accusation de diffamation, selon f'article 467, paragraphe 3, chapitre 2, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . La cour motiva sa
dÃ©cision en dÃ©clarant qu'en l'Ã©tat de la procÃ©dure, il Ã©tait probable que l'appel aurait Ã© tÃ© rejetÃ© et la condamnation confirmÃ©e. Cette considÃ©ration fut rÃ©pÃ©tÃ©e par le tribunal rÃ©gional supÃ©rieur en ao0t 1978, sur recours de la requÃ©rante .
(TRADUCTION) EN DROIT IExtrait l La requÃ©rante se plaint (en outre) des dÃ©cisions judiciaires l'obligeant Ã supporter ses dÃ©bours personnels, au motif que l'appel qu'elle avait interjetÃ© contre la condamnation aurait sans doute Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ© . A cet Ã©gard, elle invoque l'article 6, paragraphe 2 de la Convention, qui consacre le principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence . Toutefois, la Commission n'est pas appelÃ©e Ã dÃ©cider si les faits allÃ©guÃ©s par la requÃ©rante rÃ©vÃ©lent l'apparence d'une violation de cette disposition ; en effet, aux termes de l'article 26 de la Convention, elle ne peut Ãªtre saisie d'une affaire qu'aprÃ©s Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus . En l'occurrence, la requÃ©rante n'a pas introduit de recours auprÃ©s de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale IBundesverfassungsgerichtl . Or, cette derniÃ©re a dAjÃ affirmÃ© que le principe de la Â« prÃ©somption d'innocence Â» est contenu dans la loi fondamentale de la RÃ©publique fÃ©dÃ©rale (cf . BVerfGE 22, p . 254 ss . Ã la p . 265) . II est vrai que dans l'arrÃªt citÃ©, la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale a examinÃ© la question de savoir si l'article 467, paragraphe 2 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale (StPO) porte atteinte Ã© ce principe et elle a conclu nÃ©gativement . L'arrÃªt en question a toutefois Ã©tÃ© rendu en 1967 et ces dispositions ont Ã©tÃ© modifiÃ©es depuis lors . En l'occurrence, les dÃ©cisions concernant les dÃ©bours se fondaient sur l'article 467, paragraphe 3, ch . 2 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Sur ce point Ã©galement, la prÃ©sente affaire diffÃ©re des requÃªtes NÂ° 6281/73 et 6650/75, que la Commission a dÃ©clarÃ© recevables les 5 mai et 17 juillet 1976 respectivement IDÃ©cisions et Rapports 5, pp . 13 et 58 ss) . Dans le cas de ces requÃªtes, la question des dÃ©bours avait Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ©e par les tribunaux allemands sur la base de l'article 467, paragraphe 4, du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale et, dans la requÃªte NÂ° 6281/73, un comitÃ© de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale avait rejetÃ© un recours constitutionnel . Dans les deux requÃªtes citÃ©es, une dÃ©cision de non-lieu avait Ã©tÃ© rendue en raison de la futilitÃ© IGeringfiigigheitl de l'affaire, tandis que dans la prÃ©sente affaire, le non-lieu a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ© en raison d'un obstacle de procÃ©dure (Verfahrenshindernis) .
L'article 467 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale est libellÃ© comme suit : par. 1â¢ 1 Â« En cas d'acquittement ou si l'ouverture des dÃ©bats principaux est refusÃ©e, ou en cas de non-lieu, les dÃ©pens ainsi que les dÃ©bours personnels de l'intÃ©ressÃ© sont Ã la charge du TrÃ©sor . Â» par. 2 Â« Les dÃ©pens causÃ©s par une dÃ©faillance coupable de l'inculpÃ© doivent Ãªtre supportÃ©s par celui-ci . Dans ce cas, le TrÃ©sor n'est pas tenu de supporter les dÃ©bours personnels . Â» par.3 : Â« Le TrÃ©sor n'est pas tenu de supporter les dÃ©bours personnels de l'intÃ©ressÃ© si celui-ci a provoquÃ© son inculpation en prÃ©tendant lors de l'instruction prÃ©paratoire qu'il avait commis le dÃ©lit dont il Ã©tait accusÃ© . Le tribunal peut renoncer Ã mettre Ã la charge du TrÃ©sor les dÃ©bours personnels de l'inculpÃ© si celui-c i 1 . a provoquÃ© son inculpation en s'accusant sur des points essentiels, contrairement Ã la vÃ©ritÃ© ou en contradiction avec des dÃ©clarations ultÃ©rieures, ou en taisant lors de ses dÃ©clarations Ã propos des chefs d'accusation, des faits essentiels qui auraient pu le disculper, ou bie n 2 . n'est pas condamnÃ©, pour le seul motif qu'il existe un obstacle de procAdure . Â» par. 4 Â« Si le tribunal rend un non-lieu en vertu de dispositions qui laissent une telle dÃ©cision Ã son apprÃ©ciation, le tribunal peut renoncer Ã mettre les dÃ©bours personnels de l'inculpÃ© Ã la charge du TrÃ©sor . Â»
par. 5 : Â« Le TrÃ©sor n'est pas tenu de supporter les dÃ©bours personnels de l'inculpÃ© si, Ã la suite d'une suspension provisoire d'instance larticle 153 a), un non-lieu est prononcÃ© . Â» La Commission considÃ©re qu'en fait et en droit, la prÃ©sente affaire est diffÃ©rente des affaires dont elle-mÃªme et la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale ont dÃ©ji3 Ã©tÃ© saisies . La Commission constate Ã©galement que les dÃ©cisions judiciaires dont se plaint la requÃ©rante ont Ã©tÃ© rendues deux ans aprÃ©s que la Commission ait dÃ©clarÃ© recevables les requÃªtes NÂ° 6281/73 et 6650/75 . La Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale savait donc que la Commission attachait une certaine importance aux problÃ©mes soulevÃ©s par l'application de l'article 467 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale .
Les circonstances ne permettent donc pas d'affirmer qu'un recours constitutionnel aurait Ã©tÃ© entiÃ©rement inefficace et l'on ne peut donc pa s - 214 -
considÃ©rer que la requÃ©rante a Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours Ã sa disposition en droit allemand (cf . dÃ©cision concernant la recevabilitÃ© de la RequÃªte NÂ° 702/60, Retimag c/RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, Annuaire 4, pp . 385, 406) . De plus, l'examen de cette affaire n'a fait apparaitre aucune circonstance particuliÃ©re de nature Ã dispenser la requÃ©rante, selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus en la matiÃ¨re, d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours internes . Il s'ensuit que la requÃ©rante n'a pas satisfait Ã la condition relative Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et que sa requÃªte doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3 de la Convention .
- 215 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 13/12/1979Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 205
 l'article 2
 l'article 6
 l'article 26
 l'article 467
 l'article 467
 l'article 467

L'article 467
 l'article 467
 l'article 27