Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/361/147/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 07:10:48+00:00

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Appellant, proprietor of a bookstore, was convicted of violating a city ordinance which was construed by the state courts as making him absolutely liable criminally for the mere possession in his store of a book later judicially determined to be obscene -- even if he had no knowledge as to the contents of the book. Held: As thus construed and applied, the ordinance violates the freedom of the press which is safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. Pp. 361 U. S. 148-155.
(a) The free publication and dissemination of books obviously are within the constitutionally protected freedom of the press, and a retail bookseller plays a most significant role in the distribution of books. P. 361 U. S. 150.
(b) Legal devices and doctrines, in most applications consistent with the Constitution, may not be constitutionally capable of application where such application would have the effect of inhibiting freedom of expression by making persons reluctant to exercise it. Pp. 361 U. S. 150-152.
(c) Obscene expression is not constitutionally protected; but this ordinance imposes an unconstitutional limitation on the public's access to constitutionally protected matter. For, if the bookseller be criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected, and thus a restriction will be imposed by the States upon the distribution of constitutionally protected, as well as obscene, books. Pp. 361 U. S. 152-154.
(d) The existence of the State's power to prevent the distribution of obscene matter does not mean that there can be no constitutional barrier to any form of practical exercise of that power. Hence, that there may be more difficultly in enforcing a regulation against the distribution of obscene literature if booksellers may not be held to an absolute criminal liability does not require a different result here. Pp. 361 U. S. 154-155.
"for any person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, [or] book . . . in any place of business where . . . books . . . are sold or kept for sale. [Footnote 1]"
Department of the Superior Court, [Footnote 2] which affirmed the Municipal Court judgment imposing a jail sentence on appellant, as consisting solely of the possession, in the appellant's bookstore, of a certain book found upon judicial investigation to be obscene. The definition included no element of scienter -- knowledge by appellant of the contents of the book -- and thus the ordinance was construed as imposing a "strict" or "absolute" criminal liability. [Footnote 3] The appellant made timely objection below that, if the ordinance were so construed it would be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. This contention, together with other contentions based on the Constitution, [Footnote 4] was rejected, and the case comes here on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2); 358 U.S. 926.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 707. It is too familiar for citation that such has been the doctrine of this Court, in respect of these freedoms, ever since. And it also requires no elaboration that the free publication and dissemination of books and other forms of the printed word furnish very familiar applications of these constitutionally protected freedoms. It is, of course, no matter that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233. Certainly a retail bookseller plays a most significant role in the process of the distribution of books.
Court said of the elimination of scienter in this context: "To thus inhibit individual freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of democratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources." Id. at 344 U. S. 191.
"Every bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience. [Footnote 9]"
It is argued that unless the scienter requirement is dispensed with, regulation of the distribution of obscene material will be ineffective, as booksellers will falsely disclaim knowledge of their books' contents or falsely deny reason to suspect their obscenity. We might observe that it has been some time now since the law viewed itself as impotent to explore the actual state of a man's mind. See Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 1. Cf. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 339 U. S. 411. Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's perusal of a book hardly need be a necessary element in proving his awareness of its contents. The circumstances may warrant the inference that he was aware of what a book contained, despite his denial.
Roth v. United States, supra, at 354 U. S. 488. [Footnote 10] This ordinance opens that door too far. The existence of the State's power to prevent the distribution of obscene matter does not mean that there can be no constitutional barrier to any form of practical exercise of that power. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U. S. 349. It is plain to us that the ordinance in question, though aimed at obscene matter, has such a tendency to inhibit constitutionally protected expression that it cannot stand under the Constitution.
In this sort of proceeding, "the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Cal.Const. art. VI, §§ 4, 4b, 5. See Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U. S. 160, 314 U. S. 171.
The effectiveness of absolute criminal liability laws in promoting caution has been subjected to criticism. See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, pp. 300-301. See generally Williams, Criminal Law -- The General Part, pp. 267-274; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col.L.Rev. 55; Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 Minn.L.Rev. 1043; Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246.
The appellant was sentenced to prison for possessing in his bookstore an "obscene" book in violation of a Los Angeles city ordinance. [Footnote 2/1] I concur in the judgment holding that ordinance unconstitutional, but not for the reasons given in the Court's opinion.
The Court invalidates the ordinance solely because it penalizes a bookseller for mere possession of an "obscene" book, even though he is unaware of its obscenity. The grounds on which the Court draws a constitutional distinction between a law that punishes possession of a book with knowledge of its "obscenity" and a law that punishes without such knowledge are not persuasive to me. Those grounds are not conviction of a bookseller for possession of an "obscene" book when he is unaware of its obscenity "will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected," and therefore "may tend to work a substantial restriction on freedom of speech." The fact is, of course, that prison sentences for possession of "obscene" books will seriously burden freedom of the press whether punishment is imposed with or without knowledge of the obscenity. The Court's opinion correctly points out how little extra burden will be imposed on prosecutors by requiring proof that a bookseller was aware of a book's contents when he possessed it. And if the Constitution's requirement of knowledge is so easily met, the result of this case is that one particular bookseller gains his freedom, but the way is left open for state censorship and punishment of all other booksellers by merely adding a few new words to old censorship laws. Our constitutional safeguards for speech and press therefore gain little. Their victory, if any, is Pyrrhic one. Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 343 U. S. 267, at 343 U. S. 275 (dissenting opinion).
State intrusion or abridgment of freedom of speech and press raises a different question, since the First Amendment, by its terms, refers only to laws passed by Congress. But I adhere to our prior decisions holding that the Fourteenth Amendment made the First applicable to the State. See cases collected in the concurring opinion in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 530. It follows that I am for reversing this case because I believe that the Los Angeles ordinance sets up a censorship in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 635. While it is "obscenity and indecency" before us today, the experience of mankind -- both ancient and modern -- shows that this type of elastic phrase can, and most likely will, be synonymous with the political, and maybe with the religious, unorthodoxy of tomorrow.
Of course, neither Jefferson nor Madison faced the problem before the Court in this case, because it was not until the Fourteenth Amendment was passed that any of the prohibitions of the First Amendment were held applicable to the States. At the time Jefferson and Madison lived, before the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, the First Amendment did not prohibit the States from abridging free speech by the enactment of defamation or libel laws. Cf. 32 U. S. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243. But the meaning of the First Amendment, as it was understood by two such renowned constitutional architects as Jefferson and Madison, is important in this case because of our prior cases holding that the Fourteenth Amendment applies the First, with all the force it brings to bear against the Federal Government, against the States. See, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 319 U. S. 639, and other cases collected in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 530 (concurring opinion). But see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 343 U. S. 288 (Court and dissenting opinions).
Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of New York, 360 U. S. 684, 360 U. S. 690-691 (concurring opinion). The views of a concurring opinion here, if accepted, would make this Court a still more inappropriate "Board of Censors" for the whole country. That opinion, conceding that "there is no external measuring rod of obscenity," argues that the Constitution requires the issue of obscenity to be determined on the basis of "contemporary community standards" -- "the literary, psychological or moral standards of a community." If, as argued in the concurring opinion, it violates the Federal Constitution for a local court to reject the evidence of "experts" on contemporary community standards of the vague word "obscenity," it seems odd to say that this Court should have the final word on what those community standards are or should be. I do not believe the words "liberty" and "due process" in the Fourteenth Amendment give this Court that much power.
16, 1958) cols. 1009-1010, 1042-1043; 604 Parliamentary Debates, H.Comm., No. 100 (April 24, 1959), col. 803), as well as by the most considered thinking on this subject in the proposed Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute. See A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 6 (1957), § 207.10. [Footnote 3/3] For the reasons I have indicated, I would make the right to introduce such evidence a requirement of due process in obscenity prosecutions.
in some manner to introduce proof on this score. While a State is not debarred from regarding the trier of fact as the embodiment of community standards, competent to judge a challenged work against those standards, [Footnote 4/3] it is not privileged to rebuff all efforts to enlighten or persuade the trier.
We are concerned in this instance with an objection to what a book portrays, not to what it teaches. Cf. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684.
See also the exposition of this view in American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 6), at 30. It may be that the Roth case embodies this restriction, see 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 487, note 20; but see id. at 354 U. S. 499-500 (separate opinion).

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