Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/contempt/key.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:46:34+00:00

Document:
A. PARTIES AND AMICI: This appeal arises from an adjudication of criminal contempt entered after a nonjury trial involving the defendant-appellant, xxxxxxx xxxxxxx, and the plaintiff-appellee, the United States of America. These were the only parties below and are the only ones on appeal. There are no intervenors or amici. The appellant, who was a non-party witness in a civil trial that was pending in the district court, was held in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition relating to the civil case.
B. RULINGS UNDER REVIEW: This is an appeal from an order of the district court, the Honorable Royce C. Lamberth, dated November 3, 1994, adjudging appellant guilty of criminal contempt of court.
C. Related Cases: There are no related cases and this case has not previously been before this Court.
I. Whether the evidence was sufficient for the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. xxxxxxx wilfully and knowingly disobeyed or disregarded a court process or order by failing to comply with a subpoena issued by an attorney without court involvement commanding that Ms. xxxxxxx appear in the attorney's office for a civil deposition.
The pertinent statutes and rules appear in the addendum to this brief.
The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. A timely notice of appeal from the final judgment of the district court having been filed on November 3, 1994, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The government presented its case through three witnesses: Carol Patterson, Mary Elizabeth Gately and Walter Lee Willis.
When Ms. xxxxxxx did not appear at the law office by 9:30 a.m.on September 26th, Ms. Gately called the district judge's Chambers to request a bench warrant. (11/2/94 Tr. 17-18) Prior to calling the court, Gately made no attempt to locate or contact Ms. xxxxxxx. At 10:00 a.m., only one hour after the scheduled deposition time, Gately personally appeared in court and requested a bench warrant. (11/2/94 Tr. 18) The court immediately issued an attachment for contempt, authorizing Ms. xxxxxxx's arrest. (A. 2). The attachment was executed the next day when Ms. xxxxxxx voluntarily appeared in court.
After accepting the subpoena from Willis, Ms. xxxxxxx still felt that the case had nothing to do with her and she was confused about what the subpoena required her to do. (11/2/94 Tr. 33, 53, 56, 75-77, 85, 88, 92) Because she had never been subpoenaed before, she did not know about the subpoena's legal effect. (11/2/94 Tr. 76) She did not know or even recognize the parties named in the subpoena. The attorneys who subpoenaed her did not contact her before she was served. (11/2/94 Tr. 75-77) Additionally, Ms. xxxxxxx did not have any of the documents requested in the subpoena and was not the proper custodian of records or the person in charge of the hair salon.
The criminal contempt statute, 18 U. S.C. § 401 (3), grants federal courts the authority to punish by fine or imprisonment contempt for their authority as exhibited by any disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, process, order, decree, or command. Case law is consistent in requiring an intent to disobey or disregard an order of the court to support a contempt conviction. Here, the district court mistook Ms. xxxxxxx's confusion as to her obligations under a civil subpoena she received "for the contemptuous conduct which defies rulings and deserves punishment." Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952). Ms. xxxxxxx's failure to appear was nothing more than a lay person's innocent misunderstanding of a technical legal process in a civil action in which she was merely a potential witness.
The conviction cannot stand. The conclusion is inescapable on this record that Ms. xxxxxxx was not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal contempt. Ms. xxxxxxx's action in failing to appear for the first scheduled deposition did not come close to the type of obstructive, contumacious conduct that the criminal contempt statute was meant to punish. Contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience of public authority. In this case, there is insufficient evidence to support any such finding with respect to this critical element under § 401(3). Therefore, Ms. xxxxxxx's contempt conviction should be reversed.
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MS. xxxxxxx WILFULLY AND KNOWINGLY DISOBEYED OR DISREGARDED A COURT PROCESS OR ORDER BY FAILING TO COMPLY WITH A SUBPOENA ISSUED BY AN ATTORNEY WITHOUT COURT INVOLVEMENT COMMANDING THAT MS. xxxxxxx APPEAR IN THE ATTORNEYS' OFFICE FOR A CIVIL DEPOSITION.
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. This Court does not defer to the district court, but rather must make its own independent judgment regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, viewing it in the light most favorable to the government. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 1407, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Ms. xxxxxxx's conviction must be reversed if, on the evidence presented, a reasonable mind could not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).
This Court must reverse the contempt conviction because there is insufficient evidence that Ms. xxxxxxx wilfully violated the subpoena. Criminal contempt requires that Ms. xxxxxxx's violation of the subpoena was wilful. In Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 658 (1993), the Court held that "wilfulness" requires that the actor knows that the actions he or she undertakes are unlawful. Proof merely that the actor wilfully committed the acts absent knowledge that the acts violate a "known legal duty" is insufficient. Id. at 659. In the present case, although the record indicates that Ms. xxxxxxx failed to appear for the first scheduled deposition, there is no evidence that she knew that the subpoena imposed a legal duty for her to be at the deposition. The subpoena on its face did not indicate that it was a court "order" or "process". It also lacked any judicial seal or stamp, or signature by a judge or court clerk. Moreover, the subpoena did not indicate that the court authorized its issuance. Finally, there was no explanation as to any penalties for failure to appear. The government failed at the trial to present any evidence that Ms. xxxxxxx had knowledge that the subpoena was an order or command from the court, as opposed to a directive issued by an attorney. Since the evidence failed to establish that Ms. xxxxxxx knew the subpoena constituted a court order, it follows that she could not have wilfully and contumaciously disobeyed it.
During the contempt proceeding, Ms. xxxxxxx testified that she did not realize that the subpoena compelled her to be at the deposition. (11/2/94 Tr. 33, 53, 56, 75-77, 85 88, 92) She had never been subpoenaed to testify previously and did not understand that she was legally obligated to appear at the law office for the deposition. (11/2/94 Tr. 76) The process server did not inform her that she was required under law to appear. Thus, Ms. xxxxxxx did not understand that the subpoena was tantamount to a court order and that certain penalties, a fine or imprisonment, could be imposed for failure to appear. As a result, Ms. xxxxxxx did not find out about the legal effect of the subpoena until she spoke with Mr. Martin after the contempt attachment was issued.
. . .there was no evidence that [the appellant] deliberately or recklessly disregarded his obligation to the court, or that he intended any disrespect for the court. On the contrary it is clear from his unchallenged explanation that his failure to appear was not by design but resulted from a lapse of memory, preoccupation with another case, and confusion as to dates. There were no unusual circumstances justifying a conclusion that his conduct was reckless. . . Nor was there any suggestion that the appellant's lapse was anything but an isolated aberration.
The analogous situation is present in this case. Ms. xxxxxxx did not deliberately ignore the subpoena, but failed to appear because of a combination of preoccupation, forgetfulness, and confusion. She was preoccupied by the grief of Mr. Ward's death and by her elderly grandmother's illness. (11/2/94 Tr. 52-54, 78-79) She also was confused about the requirements of the subpoena as she knew nothing about the legal effect of the subpoena or about the litigation. Since she did not recognize the parties' names on the subpoena, she did not know that the case involved the incident she had witnessed. Because the process server did not know anything about the facts of the case, he merely read off the subpoena itself and did not tell Ms. xxxxxxx anything more about her connection to the case. This confusion, in combination with her preoccupation with Mr. Ward's death and her grandmother's illness, caused Ms. xxxxxxx to fail to appear. As a result, her non-appearance was not by design. As this Court has explained, knowledge that one's act is wrongful and a purpose to nevertheless do the act are prerequisites to criminal contempt, as to most other crimes." In Re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Therefore,"[g]ood faith pursuit of a plausible though mistaken alternative is antithetical to contumacious intent." Id. at 1007 (footnote omitted). The evidence does not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. xxxxxxx acted with a contumacious intent. Although the court found that she acted intentionally, it failed to make a specific finding that her failure to appear was accompanied by a contumacious intent. (11/2/94 Tr. 104) The record is insufficient on that score to support a contempt conviction. Ms. xxxxxxx's mistaken construction of the subpoena was one which was adopted in good faith and which, given the subpoena's failure to identify itself as a court order and her confused state of mind, was plausible.
(reversing and remanding the conviction of an attorney for criminal contempt for a late appearance before one judge due to fact that a matter before another judge ran later than anticipated.).
actual act of disobeying the court order to the state of mind of the actor. It is clear that most courts apply criminal contempt only in cases in which the defendant knowingly disobeyed an order of the court with a sense of defiance or purposeful disregard for the court's authority. Courts should not uphold a conviction based on carelessness on the part of the defendant in not inquiring about the significance of a subpoena and its relevance to her. While the act may be blameworthy in many respects, it was not an intended or deliberate violation of the court order because the defendant did not know that it was, in fact, an order of a court.
In United States v. Greyhound Corporation, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974), the court sets out a standard for determining willfulness that is in accordance with criminal law, rather than a standard concerned with a court's authority over enforcement of court decorum and procedure.
Willfulness for criminal contempt may, as in other areas of criminal law, be inferred from the facts and circumstances in proof. . . .In a criminal contempt case involving a court order,. . . the court should consider the entire background behind the order--including the conduct that the order was meant to enjoin or secure, the interests that it was trying to protect, the manner in which it was trying to protect them, and any past violations and warnings--in determining whether the order is sufficiently specific and in determining whether the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct was wrongful.
This language charges trial courts to inquire into facts beyond the basic one that a witness consciously chose not to comply with a subpoena, to the reasons why the witness made that choice. In the case at hand, Ms. xxxxxxx was under a great deal of emotional stress when she was served with the subpoena, and she was understandably confused about what it had to do with her, not having ever seen the names of the parties before and not having been contacted by any attorney requesting her presence to inform her as to why her testimony was required.
The fact that Ms. xxxxxxx voluntarily appeared in court the day after the scheduled deposition and voluntarily agreed to be deposed a day later, when the attorneys involved finally informed her of why her deposition was required, goes to show that her failure to appear was done without knowledge of her legal obligations under the subpoena without any intent to show disrespect for the court. See Sykes, 444 F.2d at 930. Further, as recognized by both the Greyhound and Sykes courts, the fact that Ms. xxxxxxx had not violated court orders previously is evidence of a lack of knowledge and intent. Greyhound, 508 F.2d at 532; Sykes, 444 F.2d at 930.
Section 401(3) also requires a showing beyond a reasonable doubt of "[d]isobedience or resistance to [the court's] lawful writ, process, order, rule decree, or command." It is well settled that a criminal contempt conviction under this provision may not be premised on the violation of a court order unless the terms of the order are "clear and specific, and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed." United States v. Joyce, 498 F.2d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 1974). See also, e.g., United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 252-53 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); In re Brown, 454 F.2d at 1008 n. 49.
Moreover, "[t]o serve as a valid basis for contempt, the court's direction must be clear and unequivocal at the time it is issued." Traub v. United States, 232 F.2d 43, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955)(footnote omitted). Because the subpoena failed to indicate that it was issued through the court and was enforceable through its contempt power, it was not sufficiently "clear and unequivocal" to serve as a valid basis for a contempt conviction.
Ms. xxxxxxx failed to comply with the subpoena because she was confused as to her legal obligations and as to her connection to the underlying civil case. Moreover, she was distracted and emotionally distraught at the time. Under these circumstances, the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she willfully violated the court's order or process.
For the foregoing reasons, the adjudication of criminal contempt should be reversed and the contempt charges should be dismissed.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing brief for appellant, Mark Anthony Hilson, does not exceed the number of words permitted by Circuit Rule 28(d).
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Brief and one copy of the Appendix for Appellant have been delivered by hand to the United States Attorney's Office, John R. Fisher, Esq., Chief,Appellate Division, Room 4229, 555 Fourth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001, this 1st day of May, 1995.

References: § 3231
 § 1291
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