Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/128/598/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:06:41+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 128 › Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Rubber Co.
The name of "Goodyear Rubber Company," containing a name descriptive of well known classes of goods produced by the process known as Goodyear's invention, is not one capable of exclusive appropriation, and the addition of the word "Company" only indicates that parties have formed an association to deal in such goods, either to produce or to sell them.
Relief in equity to restrain unfair trade is grouted only where the defendant, by his harks, signs, labels or in other ways, represents to the public that the goods sold by him are those manufactured or produced by the plaintiff, thus palming off his goods for those of a different manufacture to the injury of the plaintiff.
In equity to restrain the use of a company name in business. The case is stated in the opinion.
itself "Goodyear's Rubber Manufacturing Company," and, for the purpose of diverting to itself the business and goodwill of the plaintiff, resorted to various devices and contrivances having for their object the imitation and appropriation to its use of the plaintiff's name; that among these devices was the representation of the words "India" and "Glove," sometimes in small letters, and sometimes by initials, thereby constituting a name for practical purposes almost identical with the name of the plaintiff, producing much loss and inconvenience to plaintiff's business by causing a diversion of letters and telegrams addressed to it; that for the like purpose of taking from the plaintiff its customers and trade and appropriating its goodwill, that company, on or about the 1st of January, 1882, adopted for its principal sign the name "Goodyear's Rubber Mfg. Co." over the entrance to and in front of its warehouses, and that these devices deceive the public and divert business and customers from the plaintiff, by which it sustains, and, without the interference of this Court, will in the future sustain, great loss and damage.
The bill also alleges that the defendants Allerton and Vermule, with other persons unknown to the plaintiff, pretend to be a corporation under the name of "Goodyear's Rubber Manufacturing Company," and that they are the principal owners and managers of the business carried on under the name of "Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company," and of "Goodyear's Rubber Manufacturing Company," and, as such, direct and control whatever is done under the names of both.
goods, treated according to the patents of Goodyear; that it has been for upwards of twenty years the most prominent corporation or association in the City of New York engaged in the manufacture of those goods, and has become known to the trade by abbreviated and generally used titles of "Goodyear's Rubber Manufacturing Company," or "Goodyear Rubber Company," or "The Goodyear's Company," and other similar titles Abbreviated from its full corporate name; that the name of "Goodyear," in connection with the word "Company," or "Co.," or with similar brief letters or words indicating a company engaged in rubber manufacturing, has been its distinguishing characteristic; that by adoption of the name of Goodyear in connection with its business and acquiescence of the public therein and general usage, that company acquired a valuable right and interest in it, and has exercised the same for upwards of twenty years; that its use has been recognized by the plaintiff and its predecessors in repeated business transactions; that a large part of its correspondence during this period has been under the abbreviated names of "Goodyear Rubber Company," "Goodyear's Rubber Manufacturing Company," or "Goodyear's Company," or other similar abbreviated title; that it registered a trademark in the name of Goodyear's Rubber Manufacturing Company, and for the purpose of protecting it filed a certificate of incorporation under that name in New York in March, 1873, and that its trustees and managers subsequently organized as a corporation under that name in Connecticut. The answers also allege that the organizers of the plaintiff company, prior to 1873, had done business only under the name of "Rubber Clothing Company," or as F. M. & W. A. Sheppard, or as Sheppard & Dudley; that about January 1, 1873, for the purpose of injuring the defendant and appropriating its well known name and goodwill and securing its business, they organized the plaintiff under the name of the Goodyear Rubber Company, against which the defendant protested, and that such action on the part of the plaintiff has caused a diversion of the business of the defendant, and general interference with it.
As a separate defense, the answers also set forth various transactions of the plaintiff which tended to show unfair and inequitable measures to divert to itself business from the defendant Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Company, but it is not deemed important to state them. That company also filed a cross-bill to restrain the conduct of the plaintiff in that respect, and praying that damages might be decreed against it for its wrongful and inequitable acts. Replications having been filed to the several answers, proofs were taken, upon which the court below rendered a decree in favor of the plaintiff, perpetually enjoining the defendants from using or in any way employing the name "Goodyear's Rubber Manufacturing Company," or the name "Goodyear Rubber Company," or any abbreviation thereof representing such integral name, in their business, upon their signs, bills of merchandise, receipts, letters, products of their manufacture, or otherwise, and directing that the cross-bill be dismissed. From the whole of that decree an appeal was taken to this Court.
respect impair the equal right of others engaged in similar business to use similar designations for the obvious reason that all persons have a right to deal in such articles and to publish the fact to the world. Names of such articles cannot be adopted as trademarks and be thereby appropriated to the exclusive right of anyone, nor will the incorporation of a company in the name of an article of commerce, without other specification, create any exclusive right to the use of the name.
"as 'Pennsylvania wheat,' 'Kentucky hemp,' 'Virginia tobacco,' or 'Sea Island cotton' be protected as trademarks, could anyone prevent all others from using them, or from selling articles produced in the districts they describe under those appellations, it would greatly embarrass trade and secure exclusive rights to individuals in that which is the common right of many."
"the trademark must, either by itself or by association, point distinctively to the origin or ownership of the article to which it is applied. The reason of this is that unless it does, neither can he who first adopted it be injured by any appropriation or imitation of it by others nor can the public be deceived."
of an article of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, be employed as a trademark and the exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection."
"The object of the trademark is to indicate, either by its own meaning or by association, the origin or ownership of the article to which it is applied. If it did not, it would serve no useful purpose either to the manufacturer or to the public; it would afford no protection to either against the sale of a spurious in place of the genuine article."
See also Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599; Falkinburg v. Lucy, 35 Cal. 52; Choynski v. Cohen, 39 Cal. 501; Raggett v. Findlater, L.R. 17 Eq. 29.
The designation "Goodyear Rubber Company" not being subject to exclusive appropriation, any use of terms of similar import, or any abbreviation of them, must be alike free to all persons.
The case at bar cannot be sustained as one to restrain unfair trade. Relief in such cases is granted only where the defendant, by his marks, signs, labels, or in other ways, represents to the public that the goods sold by him are those manufactured or produced by the plaintiff, thus palming off his goods for those of a different manufacture to the injury of the plaintiff. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Sawyer v. Horn, 4 Hughes 239; Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beavan 66; Croft v. Day, 7 Beavan 84. There is no proof of any attempt of the defendant to represent the goods manufactured and sold by him as those manufactured and sold by the plaintiff, but, on the contrary, the record shows a persistent effort on its part to call the attention of the public to its own manufactured goods, and the places where they are to be had, and that it had no connection with the plaintiff.
The decree of the circuit court as to the original bill must be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss that bill with costs. No case was made out for relief to the plaintiff in the cross-bill. The costs of the appeal are awarded to the appellants.

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