Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/571597/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:05:04+00:00

Document:
DR. KASHINATH G. JALMI AND ANR.	 ETC.  ETC.
whether has implied power to review--Disqualification order.
and formed his Council of Ministers including R.M. and	S.B.
of the High Court was impugned before this Courts.
the  admission	stage  for  the	 same  reason,	ie.  laches.
Equity Cases 71, relied on.
[19651 3 S.C.R. 53, explained and held inapplicable.
Wales, (1990) 2 W.LR. 1320, held inapplicable.
Khoto  Hollohan v. Zachillu and Ors.,  Supp. 2  S.C.C.
Observations   in   Patel  Narshi  Thakershi   &   Ors.	  v.
the Goa Legislative Assembly held inapplicable.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1094 of 1992. WITH Civil Appeal No.1095 of 1992.
AND Civil Appeal No. 1096 of 1992.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.2.92 & 24.2.92 of	the Bombay High Court in W.P. Nos.11, 8 & 70 of 1992. R.K. Garg, Ram Jethmalani, V.A. Bobde,Harish N. Salve,	K.J. John, Ms. Deepa Dixit, Rakesh Gosain, Ms. Rani	Jethmalani, P.K. Dev and Ms. Shanta Ramchand for the Appellants. Ashok Desai, F.S. Nariman, R.F. Nariman, P.H. Parekh, Sunil Dogra, J.D. Dwarka Das and S.C. Sharma for the Respondents. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by 827 VERMA,	J. These appeals, by special leave, arise from	writ petition Nos.11 of 1992,8 of 1992 and 70 of 1992,	all dismissed by the Bombay High Court at the Goa Bench merely on the ground of laches; and they involve for decision	the common question relating to the power of review, if any, of the Speaker to review his decision on the	question of disqualification of a Member of the House, rendered under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. In	those	writ petitions, the orders passed by the Speaker, in purported exercise of the power of review, setting aside the earlier orders of disqualification of certain Members made on merits by the	Speaker, were challenged on the ground that	the Speaker	has no such power of review. The High	Court	took the view, that the	writ petitions	were filed after considerable delay,	and, therefore, upholding	the preliminary objection, had to be dismissed merely. on	the ground	of laches; and, therefore, merits of the contention that the Speaker had	no such power	of review was	not considered. The main questions which arise for decision in these appeals are, therefore, two; namely (1)LACHES	Are the impugned orders of the High Court dismissing the writ petitions merely on the ground of	laches susceptible	to interference under Article 136 of	the Constitution in the present case; and (2)POWER	OF REVIEW If so, does the Speaker, acting as the authority under	the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, have no power of review, so that	any order made	by him in purported exercise of the power of review is a nullity?
The further question of the consequence and nature of relief to be	granted, would arise only if these questions	are answered in favour of the appellants.
lative Assembly on the ground that he had voluntarily given up the Membership of his political party. On 16.2.1991, the Speaker, Surendra V. Sirsat passed an order under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, disqualifying	Ravi Naik on the ground of defection. On 16.2.1991, Ravi	Naik filed writ petition No.48 of 1991 at the Goa Bench of	the Bombay	High	Court	challenging the order of	his disqualification, made	by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. On 18.2..1991, the High Court passed	an interim order in that writ petition staying operation. of	the order of disqualification made by	the Speaker. During the pendency of this	writ petition, on 27.2.1991, Simon Peter D'Souza was elected Deputy Speaker of the Goa Legislative Assembly; on 4.3.1991 Surendra V. Sirsat was removed from the office of Speaker and	the Deputy Speaker, Simon	Peter	D'Souza	began	functioning as	the Speaker in place of Surendra V. Sirsat.	The same day,	i.e. on 4.3.1991, Ravi S. Naik made an application to Simon Peter D'Souza, the Deputy Speaker functioning as the	Speaker of the Goa Legislative Assembly, for review of the order dated 15.2.1991 of his disqualification made by the Speaker, Surendra V. Sirsat under the Tenth Schedule. On 8.3.1991, the Acting Speaker, Simon Peter D'Souza made an order, in purported exercise of the power of the- review under	the Tenth Schedule, setting aside the order dated 15.2.1991 made by the	Speaker, Surendra V. Sirsat disqualifying Ravi S. Naik as a Member of the Goa Legislative Assembly. Thereafter, Writ Petition No.48 1991 filed by Ravi	Naik challenging the order of the his disqualification made by the Speaker on 15.2.1991 was dismissed as not	pressed by him, on 22.4.1991.
On 8.1.1992, Writ Petition No.11 of 1992 was filed by	Dr. Kashinath Jalmi and Ramakant Khalap challenging the order of review	dated 8.3.1991 passed by the Acting Speaker, inter alia on the ground that the Speaker did not have any power to review the earlier order of disqualification made under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The	High Court by the order dated 4.2.1992 upheld the	preliminary objection of Ravi S. Naik that the writ it petition filed ten months after the date of the impugned order, was liable to be	dismissed at the admission stage on the ground of laches.	This order, dismissing the writ petition for	this reason	alone,	is challenged in Civil Appeal No. 1094 of 1992.
After the dismissal of writ petition No.11 of 1992, another Member	of the Goa Assembly, Churchill	Alemao	filed	writ petition No.70 of 1992, also challenging the order of review dated 8.3.1991 made by the Acting 829 Speaker setting aside the earlier order dated 15.2.1991 made by the Speaker disqualifying Ravi Naik, on similar grounds. The High Court dismissed writ petition No.70 of 1992 also at the admission stage, for the same reason, on the ground of laches.	Civil Appeal No.1096 of 1992 by Churchill Alemao is against	the order dated 24.2.1992 dismissing writ petition No.70 of 1992.
On 10.12.1990, Ramakant D. Khalap applied to the Speaker, Surendra V. Sirsat seeking disqualification	of Sanjay Bandekar and Ratnakar	Chopdekar as Members	of the	Goa Legislative Assembly,	for the defection under the Tenth Schedule. On	11.12.1990, the Speaker	served	notices on these Member. On 13.12.1990, Bandekar and Choopdekar filed writ petition No.321 of 1990 at the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court challenging the show cause notices issued to them by the	Speaker. On the same day i.e. on 13.12.1990,	the Speaker, Surendra V. Sirsat made the orders disqualifying Bandekar and Chopdekar as Members of the Assembly, under the Tenth Schedule.	On 14.12.1990. Writ Petition No.321 of 1990 was amended to challenge the	orders	of disqualification dated 13.12.1990 made by the Speaker against Bandekar	and Chopdekar. The Writ	Petition was admitted by the	High Court,	and an	interim order made staying the orders of disqualification dated	13.12.1990 made by the Speaker. Unlike	the writ petition No.48 of 1991 by Ravi	Naik which was dismissed as not pressed on 22.4.1991 after the order of review	made by the Deputy Speaker, writ petition No.321 of 1990 by Bandekar and Chopdekar is still pending in the	High Court with the interim order made therein subsisting. In the meantime, in a manner similar to that in the case of Ravi Naik, the Deputy Speaker functioning as the Speaker, on applications made to him for the purpose, passed orders on 7.3.1991, purporting to exercise the power	of review, whereby	the orders dated 13.12.1990 made by	the Speaker disqualifying	Bandekar and Chopdekar under	the Tenth Schedule have	been set aside.	This led to the filing of writ petition	No. 8	of 1992 by Ramakant D. Khalap on 7.1.1992 at the Goa	Bench of the	Bombay	High Court, challenging the orders of the review dated 7.3.1991 passed by the Acting Speaker.	This writ petition also, has	been similarly dismissed merely on the ground of laches on 4.2.1992. Civil Appeal No.1095 of 1992 has, therefore,	been filed against dismissal of writ petition No.8 of 1992.
This is how the same questions relating to laches justifying dismissal of these writ petitions, and the power of review, if any, of the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule, arise	for decision in these appeals.
The rival contentions	may now be mentioned. Shri	Ram Jethmalani for the appellant in C.A. No.1094 of 1992,	Shri Harish	Salve for the appellant in C.A. No.1095 of 1992	and Shri R.K. Garg for the appellant in C.A. No.1096 of	1992 advanced substantially similar arguments, to contend	that dismissal of the writ petitions by the High Court on	the ground	of laches is insupportable, in the present context, where challenge to the order of review made by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule is on the ground of nullity, since the Speaker has no power of review under Tenth Schedule, and that the order of review being a nullity,	must be so declared. In reply, Shri F.S. Nariman for respondent	Ravi S. Naik in Civil Appeal Nos. 1094 and 1096 of 1992, and Shri Ashok Desai for respondents Bandekar and Chopdekar in Civil Appeal No.1095 of 1992, strenuously urged that the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution being discre- tionary, the refusal to exercise that power at the instance of the	writ petitioners was a proper exercise of	the discretion, which does not call for any interference by this court in exercise of its power under Article	136 of	the Constitution.	Both the learned counsel, in their reply, further	submitted, that by the very nature of the	high office	of the Speaker and the finality attaching to	the order made by	the Speaker under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule, the power of the review inheres in the Speaker for preventing miscarriage of justice, in situations when	the Speaker	himself is of the view that	continuance of	his earlier	order	of disqualification	would	perpetuate injustice. It	was further submitted by them, in	the alternative, that in view of the limited scope of judicial review of the Speaker's order of disqualification made under para 6	of the Tenth Schedule, as held in the majority opinion	in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors.,  Supp. 2 SCC 651, it is implicit that at least a limited power of review inheres in the Speaker, to correct palpable errors	outside	the scope of the limited judicial review available against the order of disqualification made by	the speaker	under	the Tenth Schedule. It was urged by them, that the alleged infirmities in	the	orders	of disqualification made	in the present case by	the Speaker fell within, at least this limited power of review which inheres	in the Speaker. Shri Nariman, as well as	Shri Desai,	strongly relied on the majority opinion in Kihoto Hollohan to support these submissions.
The last alternative submission of Shri Nariman was, that in case there is no power of review in the Speaker under	the Tenth Schedule, as a result of which the orders made by	the Acting	Speaker in purported exercise of that power have to be declared nullity and ignored, then writ petition No.48 of 1991 by Ravi	S. Naik being dismissed as not	pressed on 22.4.1991 because the order of his disqualification had been set aside by the order of review, must be revived along with the interim stay granted therein to enable Ravi S. Naik to pursue	the remedy which he had invoked, to challenge	the order of his disqualification which is open	to judicial review.	This	submission of	last resort made by	Shri Nariman, was strongly opposed by Shri.	R.K. Garg appearing for the appellant Church Alemao. On the other	hand,	Shri Ram Jethmalani appearing for the appellants in C.A. No.1094, not only did not oppose such a direction being given, but in his opening address itself suggested this as the equitable course	to adopt. But for the stand taken on this aspect, there was no difference in the submissions of Shri Garg	and Shri Jethmalani.
Both sides attempted to refer to the facts leading to	the making of the orders of disqualification of the Members, and the merits thereof However, we do not propose to advert to them, as we had indicated to the learned counsel at	the hearing, since those aspects will have to be gone into , in the first instance by the High Court, on the view we	are taking	in these appeals and, therefore, we would like to avoid the likelihood of any possible prejudice to either side resulting from any reference made by us to the same. Accordingly, we are confining ourselves only to the facts and the arguments relating to the aforesaid two questions, which alone arise before us.	We may add, that for	the purpose of these appeals, it has been assumed by both sides that the Deputy Speaker functioning as the Speaker would have the powers of the Speaker under	the Tenth Schedule including that	of review, if any. The further question whether the Deputy Speaker, who discharging the functions of the Speaker, has all the powers of the Speaker under	the Tenth Schedule	is, therefore, undisputed for	the present purpose.
We shall now consider the aforesaid two main questions which arise for decision in the present	case.	Any further question arising for decision, in case both these questions are answered in favour of the appellants, will be considered thereafter.
The High Court has taken the view that the impugned orders of review having been made by the Acting Speaker on 7th	and 8th March, 1991, the writ petitions challenging them filed on 7.1.1992, 8.1.1992 and 10.2.1992 were highly belated and, therefore, liable to be dismissed merely on the ground of laches.	It is for this reason that they were dismissed at the admission	stage itself,	sustaining the	preliminary objection taken on this ground by Ravi S. Naik, Chopdekar and Bandekar, in whose favour the orders of review had	been made.	The High Court has referred to certain decisions of this Court for applying the doctrine of laches, and declined to consider the merits of the main point raised in the	writ petitions, that the Speaker does not have any power of review acting under the Tenth Schedule.	The High Court	has also held as untenable, the explanation given by the	writ petitioners that uncertainty of the law settled only by	the decision of this Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) rendered on 12th November, 1991 was the reason for not filing those writ petitions earlier.	Learned counsel for the appellants have assailed application of the doctrine of laches in	the present	situation, and also contended that if	any explanation was needed for the intervening period, pendency of the question of constitutional validity of Tenth Schedule itself in this Court was sufficient to explain the period up to the	date of the decision, and the writ petitions	were filed soon thereafter. It was also submitted	by learned counsel	for the appellants, that the continuance in office of disqualified persons, even now, provides recurring cause of action, since the continuance in office without lawful authority of these persons,	one of	whom is the Chief Minister of the State of Goa, is against public policy	and good administration.	It was submitted, the Court cannot decline to examine the validity of the authority under which they continue to hold office.	On this basis it was urged that the mere delay, if any, in challenging the legality of the authority under which these three persons	continue to hold office, after being disqualified as Members of	the Assembly, could not be a valid justification for the	High Court to refuse to examine the main question of existence of power of review in the Speaker acting under the Tenth Schedule, since the discretion of the High	Court under Article	226	of the	Constitution must be exercised judicially, so as not to permit perpetuation of	an illegality. Shri Jethmalani	also submitted, that	the doctrine of laches does not apply where declaration sought is of nullity, in order to prevent its continuing operation, and laches is not relevant in the domain of public 833 law relating to public office, where the purpose is to prevent an usurper from continuing to hold a public office. Shri Harish Salve adopted these arguments	and further submitted that Dr. Kashinath Jalmi and Ramakant Khalap	had consistently taken the stand, that the Speaker's order of disqualification is final and not open to review by anyone. He submitted, that for this reason no prevarication in their stand can be attributed to either of them, as has been	done against	Churchill Alemao, by the learned counsel for	the respondents, for his	support	to Ravi Naik	during	the intervening period. It was further urged by	the learned counsel	for the appellants, that the motive and conduct of the writ petitioners in such matters is not	decisive or fatal to the enquiry claimed in the writ petition, in as much as the relief claimed in the writ petition was not	for personal benefit of the writ petitioner but	for larger public	interest and good governance of the State of Goa by persons holding public offices, including that of the Chief Minister, only by lawful authority.
Both Shri F.S. Nariman and Shri Ashok Desai supported	the Judgment of the High Court, and strenuously urged that	the High Court in exercise of its	discretionary	power under Article 226 of the Constitution was justified in refusing to exercise that power at the behest of the writ	petitioners who were disentitled to grant of the relief on	account of their conduct and motive for filing the writ petition.	It was submitted	by them that the writ petitioners, namely, Churchill Alemao, Dr. Kashinath Jalmi and Ramakant Khalap are all persons who, at different times, were associated with Ravi S.Naik as Chief Minister and were also obtaining benefit from him, which conduct coupled with their motive of getting more political power to themselves, disentitled them from claiming the relief. Shri Nariman submitted that	the doctrine of laches applies equally	to a writ of	quo warranto, as it does to a writ of certiorari.	It was	also submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that	the explanation given for the delay in filing the	writ petitions, challenging	the orders of review made by	the Acting	Speaker, is facile and untenable It was submitted, that notwithstanding the pendency of the question of	the validity of the Tenth Schedule in this Court, writ petitions were being filed challenging the orders made by the Speakers under the Tenth Schedule. It was submitted that all	the writ petitioners, in view of their status in	life,	were fully aware that the Speaker's order of review could be challenged by	a writ petition, even before the decision rendered by this Court on 12th November, 1991 834 in Kihota Hollohan. The main thrust of the argument of	the counsel for the respondents was, that in these circumstances the High Court was justified in dismissing the	writ petitions at the threshold in exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution, and, therefore, the power under Article 136 of the Constitution also being discretionary, this Court would be justified in refusing to interfere with	the discretion so exercised by the	High Court.
Having	given our anxious consideration to the forceful submissions of learned counsel for the both sides, we	find ourselves unable to sustain the judgment of the High Court that the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed, merely on the ground of laches.
One of the submissions of Shri Nariman was, that even though there is no period of limitation prescribed by statute	for filing a writ petition, yet in a case like the present,	the apt analogy is of an election petition calling in question an election, which is required to be filed within 45	days from the date of election of the returned candidate, as provided in Section 81(1) of the Representation of	the People	Act, 1951, to indicate that unless such a challenge is made promptly the courts would refuse to examine such a question after the lapse of a reasonable period. On	this basis, he argued that a writ petition filed after ten months of the	date of the order of review made by	the Speaker acting	under the Tenth Schedule, must be treated as unduly delayed and is liable to rejection on the ground of laches, as has been done by the High Court in the present case.	We are unable to accept this part of the submission since it is not an apt analogy.
The remedy of an election petition is statutory, governed by the limitation prescribed therein, unlike the remedy under Article	226 of the Constitution. That apart,	the analogy which is more apposite, is the decision on questions as to the disqualification of Members in accordance with Article 103 in the case of a Member of Parliament or Article 192 in the case of a Member of a House of a Legislature of a State. For raising a dispute, giving rise to any question whether a Member	of a House has become subject to	any of	the disqualification mentioned in clause (1) of Article 102 or 191, as the case may be, there is no prescribed	limitation, and so	also for challenging the decision rendered under Article 103 or 192 by a writ petition.	The question of	the disqualification of a Member on the ground of defection	and the Speaker's order thereon, rendered under the 835 Tenth Schedule, is of a similar nature and not based on	the result	of an election which can be challenged only by an election petition in	accordance with	the provisions of Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The decision by a constitution bench in Brundaban Nayak v. Election Commission of India and another,  3 SCR 53 indicates the	significance of deciding the	question of disqualification of a Member as soon as it arises, even at the instance of a citizen, since 'the whole object of democratic elections is to constitute legislative chambers composed of members who are entitled to that status, and if any member forfeits that status by reason of a subsequent disqualification, it is in public interest,'............ that the matter was decided.
There is no indication in Brundaban Nayak, that the delay in raising	the	question of	disqualification provides justification for refusing to decide the same, and	the emphasis really is on a prompt decision by the competent authority on the question being raised, since it is not	the interest of the constituency which such a Member represents, to delay the decision.	This decision is an indication	that the authority	competent to	decide	the question	of disqualification must	act promptly in deciding the same, once it is raised even by a citizen, in order to prevent a disqualified Member from representing the constituency after incurring a disqualification subsequent to his election, so long as the question remains a live issue during the tenure of the Member.	This aspect is significant for dealing	with the question of laches in the present case. In order to justify dismissal of the	writ petitions	for laches	Shri Nariman placed reliance on	certain decisions, some of which have been referred by the High Court.	Shri Nariman argued that the doctrine of laches applies as much to the	writ of quo warranto, as it does to	a writ of certiorari, and that the oblique motives of the petitioner together with his conduct may disentitled him to grant of the relief claimed by such a petition.	We now refer to some of these decisions.
The basic decision for submission on the doctrine of laches, relied	on, is	The Lindsay Petroleum	Company	v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell and John Kemp, 1874 L.R. 5 PC 221 which has been followed in the decisions of this Court in The Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court,	Bombay	and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1450 and	Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service 836 Amravati & Ors.,  1 SCR 808. In The Moon Mills Ltd, a writ of certiorari was sought to challenge	a decision affecting the rights of the Petitioner, wherein the question arose whether the petitioner could be denied the relief on the ground of acquiescence or laches.	In that	context it was observed that the issue of a writ of certiorari is a matter	of sound discretion, and that 'the writ will not be granted if there is such negligence or omission on the	part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party.' It was observed, that	the exercise of discretion under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari is	based on the principle to a great extent, though	not identical	with, similar to the	exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery.' For this principle, involving the	doctrine of laches in	courts	of equity, reference was made to the observation of Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. The decision was followed in,	and the principle reitered in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation again in the context of the discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution to issue a %Wit of	certiorari. Like all equitable principles, the	doctrine of laches applies	where	it would be unjust to give a remedy to	the petitioner, who is disentitled to grant of the same by	his conduct	or any other relevant circumstances, including	the creation of third party rights during the	intervening period,	which	are attributable to the laches of	the petitioner.
Strong reliance was placed on the decision in M/s Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H.B. Munshi & Anr.,  1 SCC	110, wherein	relief	under Article 32 of the Constitution	was refused on the ground of delay, to contend that if delay can be fatal under Article 32, itself a fundamental right, it is more so in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, wherein grant of the relief is discretionary. The decision of this Court in Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.,  3 SCC 362 and M/s Delhi Rohtas Light Railway Company Lid v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors.,  2 SCC 598 were also cited on the point. In Shri Vallabh Glass Words Ltd, a writ petition	by way of alternative remedy was filed after expiry of statutory period	of limitation prescribed for filling suit for	the same claim, and yet that alone was not held to be fatal taking	the view that reasonableness of delay in filing	the writ petition is to be assessed having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, since grant of	the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is a matter of sound judicial discretion and governed by the doctrine of laches.
In M/s Dehri	Rohtas	Light	Railway	Company Limited, Tilokchand Motichand's	case was distinguished and it	was indicated that the test is not to physical running of time' and 'the real test to determine delay in such cases is	that the petitioner	should	come to the writ court before a parallel right is created.' It is	significant that all	these decisions relate to enforcement of personal rights, wherein a writ of certiorari was claimed for quashing some decision adverse to	the petitioner and	neither of them related to assertion of a public	right in the nature of a class action. In	the present	case the claim is for the issue of a writ of	quo warranto on the ground that Ravi S. Naik, Chopdekar	and Bandekar are	holding	public	office, having suffered disqualification as Member of the Assembly subsequent to their election, and of them, Ravi S. Naik continues to	hold the high public office of Chief Minister of Goa. The relief claimed	in the present case is not the conferment of a personal benefit to the petitioners, but for cessation of the usurpation of public offices held by these persons, if the contention of the petitioners be right that orders of review setting aside the earlier orders of disqualification made by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule are nullity The decision of the Privy Council in the Lindsay Petroleum Company was followed by the House of Lords in Emile Erlanger and Ors. v. The New Sombrero Phosphate Company and Ors.,  3 Appeal Cases 1218 wherein reliance on the doctrine of laches by Courts of Equity for refusing relief where it would	be practically	unjust	to grant the	same,	was reiterated. It was also reiterated that two circumstances always	important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect the justice of the cause.
Once again this principle was reiterated by the Privy Council	in Anachuna Nwakobi, The Osha of Obosi and Ors. v. Engene	Nzekwu and Anr.,  1 WLR 1019 quoting the	same passage from The Lindsay Petroleum Company. None of these cases relate to the writ of quo warranto	and in them the relief claimed was only for the personal benefit of the claimant. We are not persuaded to hold that on	the basis of these decisions, some of which are referred by	the High Court, the writ petitions in the present	case could have been dismissed merely on the ground of laches of	the petitioners.
We would now refer to the contention of Shri Nariman	that this principle	attracting the doctrine of laches equally applies	to a writ of Quo Warranto, sought in	the present case. For this purpose, Shri Nariman placed reliance on the decision in Everett v. Griffiths,  1 K.B. 941 at	959 in addition to Halsbury's Law of England, Fourth Edition, Reissue, Volume 16, Para 926.
"It is plain, however, that in quo warranto proceedings the	Court can and will inquire into the conduct and motives of the relator."
Reference is made to a passage from	Halsbury's Laws of England and some earlier decisions which have been referred for treating the point as well settled.	These	observations were made after examining the claim on merits, and in	view of the fact that the plaintiff was known for his frequent persistent and	fruitless litigation	proceedings, having commenced primarily with the motive of resentment. In spite of these strong observations in the	judgment about	the conduct and motive of the plaintiff the court did not refuse to go into the points raised, for that reason alone. In our opinion	this decision can not persuade us to hold that	the dismissal at the admission stage of the present petitions by the High Court, on the ground merely	of laches can be sustained, when the alleged	usurpation of	the public offices, including that of the Chief Minister of the State of Goa, continues.
Reference was	made by Shri Nariman as well as	Shri Ashok Desai to Rules 1 and 4 of Order 53 of the Rules of Supreme Court and Section 30	of the Supreme Court Act,	1981 (England) wherein limitation is prescribed for	application for judicial review and delay in applying for relief 'LS a ground	for denying the relief, unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period of making the application. It was urged that these provisions	are substantially the same as the earlier English Practice according to which, as held in Everett v. Griffuths (supra) the order is not issued as of course, and the	conduct	and motives	of the applicant may be enquired into. Reference was also made to R. v. Stratford-on-Avon District Council and Anr., ex parts Jackson (1985) 3 All ER 769 which	was followed by the House of Lords in Caswell and	Another v. Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales  2 WLR 1320.
In our opinion, the position remains the same.	Emphasis in these	decisions is	on public interest	and	good administration, and the jurisdiction of the Court to extend time in suitable cases for making such an application.	In Caswell, the House of Lords took into account	the larger public	interest for the view that the	interest of	good administration	required non-interference with the decision which was challenged after a lapse of a considerable time, since any interference at that stage, when	third party interests had	also arisen, would be detrimental to	good administration.
In our opinion the exercise of discretion by the court	even where the application is delayed, is to be governed by	the objective of	promoting public interest	and	good administration;	and on that basis it cannot be said	that discretion would not be exercised in favour of	interference where it is necessary to prevent continuance of usurpation of office or perpetuation of an illegality. We may also advert to a related aspect.	Learned counsel for the respondents were	unable to dispute, that any other member	of the	public, to whom the oblique	motives	and conduct	alleged against the appellants in the present	case could not be attributed, could file such a writ petition even now for the same relief, since the alleged usurpation of the	office is continuing, and this	disability on	the ground	of oblique motives and conduct would not attach to him. This being so, the relief claimed by the appellants in their writ petitions filed in the High Court being in	the nature	of a class action, without	seeking	any relief personal to them, should not 840 have been dismissed merely on the ground of laches.	The motive	or conduct of the appellants, as alleged by	the respondents, in such a situation can be relevant only	for denying them the costs even if their claim succeeds, but it cannot be a justification to refuse to examine the merits of the question raised therein, since that is a matter of public	concern	and relates to the good governance of	the State itself Shri R.K. Garg submitted that laches of the appellants	can not legitimise	usurpation of	office	by Ravi S. Naik, Chopdekar and Bandekar; and Shri Jethmalani submitted	that manifest illegatlity will not be sustained solely on	the ground of laches when it results in continuance in a public office of a person without lawful authority. The fact	that the situation	continues unaltered, since these persons continue to hold the public offices, to which they	are alleged	to be disentitled, is in our opinion sufficient to hold that the	writ petitions ought	not to have	been dismissed merely on the ground of laches at the admission stage, without examining the contention on merits that these offices	including that of the Chief Minister of the State, are being held by persons without any lawful authority.	The dismissal of the writ petitions by the High Court merely on this ground can not, therefore, be sustained. The further question now is of the availability of power of review in the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule. POWER OF REVIEW The challenge to the orders dated 7th and 8th	March,	1991 made by the Acting Speaker under the purported exercise of power of review, setting aside the earlier orders of	the Speaker	disqualifying Ravi S. Naik, Chopdekar and Bandekar under the Tenth Schedule, is made by the appellants on	the ground	that the Speaker does not have any power of review under the Tenth Schedule. It was stated in Patel Narshi Thakershi and	Ors. v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji,	AIR 1970 SC 1273, thus "It is well settled that the power to review is not	an inherent power. It must	be conferred	by law either specifically or by necessary implication."
This position is not disputed before us. Admittedly, there is no express provision conferring the power of review on the Speaker in the 841 Tenth Schedule.	The only question therefore, is whether the Speaker acting as the authority under the Tenth Schedule has the power of review by necessary implication, empowering him to set aside the earlier order of disqualification made by him on merits.
On behalf of the appellants it was contended that such a power of review in the Speaker can not be implied from	the provisions in	the Tenth Schedule, and the	only remedy available to the aggrieved Member is by judicial review of the order of disqualification.	In reply it was contended on behalf of the respondents, that the power of review inheres in the	Speaker under the Tenth Schedule, in view of	the finality attaching to the order made under.para 6 of	the Tenth Schedule. It was submitted that this inherent power of review in the Speaker must be read in the Tenth Schedule, at least up to 12th November, 1991 when the	Judgment in Kihoto	Hollohan was rendered declaring the availability of judicial review against the Speaker's	order	of disqualification made under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule. It was	further submitted by	learned counsel for	the respondents, that only a limited judicial review being available against the Speaker's order of disqualification, as held by the majority in Kihoto Hollohan, some power of review	inheres	in the Speaker even thereafter	to correct palpable errors falling outside the	limited scope	of judicial review. It was then submitted, that the defects in the orders of disqualification made by the Speaker in	the present	case,	which were corrected by	review, were	such defect	which come within the ambit of the limited power of review available to the Speaker in addition to	availability of judicial review as declared in Kihoto Hollohan.	Both sides referred	to the merits of the orders of	dis- qualification made by	the Speaker but we refrain	from adverting to this aspect as indicated earlier, in view of the conclusion reached by us that the Speaker has no power of review under the	Tenth Schedule, and an order of disqualification made	by him under para 6 is	subject to correction only by judicial	review	as held in Kihoto Hollohan. Accordingly, the alleged defects would require examination by judicial review in the writ petitions filed in the High Court challenging	the	orders	of disqualification.
Shri Nariman contended that the power of review inheres in the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule as a necessary incident of his otherwise plenary jurisdiction to decide the question of disqualification.	He submitted that according to	the majority in Kihoto Hallohan only 'limited scope of judicial review' is available, and, therefore, the power of review 842 inheres	in the Speaker to review his own orders on grounds analogous to those in Order 47, Rule	1, Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this submission Shri Nariman placed reliance on the decisions in Shivdeo Singhs and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1909 and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors.  2 SCR 341. Another limb of Shri	Nariman's submission is that the majority opinion in Kihoto Hollohan does not declare para 7 of	the Tenth Schedule to be unconstitutional from the inception, and Article 13 having no application to a constitutional amendment, the existence of para 7 in the Tenth Schedule till the judgment	was rendered in Kihoto Hollohan on 12th November, 1991 must be accepted, and	the provisions in the Tenth Schedule, including para 7 therein, must be examined for	determining the implied power of	review in the	Speaker till	12th November, 1991. On this basis, it was submitted that	the finality declared in para 6 of the Tenth Schedule coupled with the ouster of judicial review in para 7	re-enforces existence of the implied power of review in the Speaker at least till 12th	November, 1991, prior to	which	the impugned orders of review were made in the present case. A further	submission made by Shri Nariman was that by virtue of para 6(2) read with para 8 of the Tenth Schedule,	the general	rules	of procedure as well as Rule 7(7) of	the Members of the Goa Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on ground	of Defection) Rules, 1986 applied, under which	the Speaker	ordinarily has the power of review. In	this connection, reference was made particularly to Rule 77 of the Rule of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the	Goa Legislative Assembly, regarding breach of privilege which enables the Speaker to reconsider his earlier decision,	and Rule 7(7) of the Members of the Goa Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on grounds of defection) Rules, 1986, relating to	the procedure. It was submitted	that these general rules relating to Speaker's power while dealing with a breach of privilege can be read to	confer	an express power of review.
The last limb of Shri Nariman's contention may be disposed of, at the outset. There is no scope for reading into	the Tenth Schedule	any of the powers of the Speaker which he otherwise has	while functioning as the Speaking in	the House, to clothe him with any such power in his capacity as the statutory authority functioning under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. This is well settled by the decisions of the Court relating to Speaker's orders under the Tenth Schedule. Accordingly, any power of the Speaker, available to him while functioning in the House, is not to be 843 treated	as his power or privilege as the authority under the Tenth Schedule.
The majority opinion in kihoto Hollohan was pressed	into service	by Shri Nariman as well as Shri Ashok Desai to support	several aspects of their submissions. We may	now refer to that opinion.
In Kihoto Hollohan there was no difference	between	the majority and minority opinions on the nature	of finality attaching to the Speaker's order of disqualification	made under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule, and also that para 7 therein	was unconstitutional in view of the non-compliance of the proviso to clause 2 of Article 368 of	the Constitution, by which judicial review was sought to be excluded. The main difference in the two opinions was, that according to the majority opinion this defect	resulted in the constitution standing amended from the inception	with insertion of the Tenth Schedule minus para 7 therein, while according to	the minority	the entire exercise	of constitutional amendment was futile and an abortive attempt to amend the constitution, since Para 7 was not severable. According to the minority view, all decisions	rendered by the several Speakers	under	the Tenth Schedule were, therefore, nullity and liable to be ignored. According to the majority view, para 7 of	the Tenth Schedule being unconstitutional and severable, the Tenth Schedule minus para 7 was validly enacted and, therefore, the orders	made by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule were not nullity but subject	to judicial review. On the basis of the majority opinion, this	Court has exercised the	power	of judicial review	over the orders of disqualification made by	the speakers from the very inception of the Tenth Schedule,	and the exercise of judicial review has not been confined merely to the orders of disqualification made after 12th November, 1991 when the judgment in Kihoto Hollohan was rendered. Venkatachaliah,	J (as	he then was)	wrote the majority opinion	and, thereafter, on this premise, exercised	the power of judicial review over orders	of disqualification made prior to 12.11.1991. The basic fallacy in	the submission made on behalf of the respondents that para 7 must be treated as existing till 12th November, 1991 is that on that view there would be no power	of judicial review against	an order of disqualification made by the Speaker prior to 12th November, 1991 since para 7 in express terms totally excludes judicial review.
Accepting the	submission of	learned counsel for	the respondents that para 7 must be read in the Tenth Schedule till 12th November, 1991 when 844 the judgment in Kihoto Hollohan was rendered, for which submission they place reliance on the majority	opinion in Kihoto	Hollohan, would amount to taking a view contrary to the decision in Kihoto Hollohan itself, as indicated. At one	stage,	Shri Nariman also attempted to read	the majority opinion in Kihoto Hollohan	as not expressly declaring para 7 in the Tenth Schedule as unconstitutional, adding that such a declaration was made only in the minority opinion	which	declared the entire Tenth Schedule to be unconstitutional. We	are unable to	read the majority opinion in this manner.	Any attempt to find support for the submissions of the respondents, in the majority opinion in Kihoto Hollohan, is futile.
The Constitution Bench decision in Shivdeo Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. (supra) is distinguishable and of no assistance to the respondents in the present case.	That was a case, wherein the High Court had exercised its power in a second writ petition filed under Article 226 of	the Constitution by a person who was not made a party in	the earlier	writ petition, the order made in which was adverse to him. This court held that the second writ	petition by such a person was maintainable, and the High Court had	not acted without jurisdiction in reviewing its previous order at the	instance of a person who was not a party to	the previous writ proceedings. That decision has no application in this situation.
Strong	reliance was placed by Shri Nariman as well as	Shri Ashok Desai on the decision of a two Judge bench in Grindlays Batik Ltd. It was submitted by learned counsel, that in the present case the defects	in the orders of disqualification fell	in the first of the two categories mentioned at page 347 (SCR), to which extent there is inherent power	of review in	the Speaker.	It may be mentioned that the decision in Patel Narshi Thakershi & Ors. v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970	SC 1273 is referred and distinguished at page 347 SCR on the facts of that case. In that decision the question was, whether	the Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section	7A of	the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had the power to set aside an exparte award made by it. It was held with the aid of	Rule 24(b),	Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 that	the Tribunal had the power of a civil court under Order XVII of the Code of	Civil	Procedure relating to	grant	of adjournments and therefore, as a necessary corollary	the power under Order IX, Rule 13 was attracted to	enable	the Tribunal to set aside an ex 845 parte award. In our opinion, the decision in Grindlays Bank Ltd., wherein certain statutory rules attracted the power under Order XVII read with Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award, is clearly distinguishable and is of no assistance in the present case.
The power of review which, it is suggested by	counsel	for the respondents, inheres in	the Speaker by necessary implication has to be found in the provisions made in	the Tenth Schedule alone, and not elsewhere. Para 7 has to be treated as non-existent in the Tenth Schedule from the	very inception, as earlier indicated. As held by the majority in kihoto	Hollohan, judicial review is available	against an order of disqualification made by the Speaker under para 6 of the Tenth	Schedule, notwithstanding the finality mentioned therein. It is on account	of the nature of finality attaching by virtue of para 6, that the judicial review	available against the Speaker's' order has	been labeled	as limited in para 110 (at page 711 of SCC) of	the decision in Kihoto Hollohan?  Supp 2 SCC 651, and	the expression has to be understood in that sense distinguished from the wide power in an appeal, and no more.	As held in Kihoto Hollohan, the Speaker's order is final being subject only to judicial review, according to the settled parameters of the exercise of power of judicial review in such cases, which it is not necessary to	elaborate in	the present context. The	existence of judicial	review	against	the Speaker's order of disqualification made under para 6 is itself a strong indication to the contrary that there can be no inherent power of review in the Speaker, read in	the Tenth Schedule	by necessary implication. The need	for correction of errors in the Speaker's order made under	the Tenth Schedule is met by the availability of judicial review against the same, as held in Kihoto Hollohan. In our opinion there is no merit in the submission that	the power of review inheres in the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule as a necessary incident of his jurisdiction to decide	the question of disqualification; or that such a power existed till 12th November, 1991 when the decision in Kihoto Hollohan was rendered; or at least a limited power of review inheres in the Speaker to correct any palpable error outside the scope of judicial review.
CONSEQUENCE On the above view taken by us, the orders dated 7th and	8th March, 1991 made by the Acting Speaker in purported exercise of the power of 846 review are liable to be declared nullity and to be ignored, with the result that the order dated 13th December,	1990 disqualifying	Chopedekar and	Bandekar and	dated	15th February, 1991 disqualifying Ravi S.Naik as Members of	Goa Legislative Assembly would continue to operate. Writ petition No.321 of 1990 filed by Chopdekar and Bandekar challenging the orders of their disqualification is pending in the	High Court wherein an interim	order	staying	the operation of their orders of disqualification is subsisting. Chopdekar and Bandekar can pursue that remedy to challenge their disqualification and no further order is required to be made by this Court for that purpose.
However, writ petition No.48 of 1991 which was filed in	the High Court by Ravi S. Naik challenging his disqualification, wherein also an interim order was made staying the operation of the	order of his disqualification, was not	pressed by Ravi S.Naik after the order in purported exercise of power of review was made in his favour on 8th March, 1 991	and, therefore, that writ petition was dismissed as not pressed on 22.4.1991. The question is of the order, if any, required to be made by this Court in this situation.
Shri Ram Jethmalani appearing for the appellants in	C.A. No.1094/92 suggested that, in all fairness writ petition No.48 of 1991 should be revived in the High Court to enable Ravi S.Naik to pursue his remedy of seeking judicial review against his disqualification. On the other hand, Shri	R.K. Garg, learned	counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No.1096/92 opposed the making of such an order. Both	the learned	counsel, however. submitted that the interim order of stay made therein would not revive even if that	writ petition is revived and the High Court will have to consider Afresh	the question of making an interim order, at	the behest	of Ravi S. Naik. On the other hand, Shri	F.S. Nariman	appearing for Ravi S. Naik in both these appeals submitted that it would be just in the circumstances of	the case, to revive writ petition No.48 of 1991 for decision on merits	by the	High Court and the interim order of	stay should also enure to the benefit of Ravi S. Naik during	the pendency of the writ petition, more so when he is the Chief Minister of the State and refusal of stay would result in uncertainty in the State.
Having given our anxious consideration to the matter we have no doubt that	the fact to Ravi S. Naik being the Chief Minister of the State 847 of Goa is a wholly irrelevant circumstance for this purpose. All the same an order which would be just and proper to make in the	circumstances of this case has to be made, taking into account also the fact that the law was declared	and came to be settled only by the decision of this Court in Kihoto Hollohan, after making of the orders of review by the Acting	Speaker	in the present case, where	after	writ petition No.48	of 1991 was dismissed as not pressed.	We have no doubt that Article 142 of the Constitution enables us, if necessary, to enlarge the powers of this Court	for making	an order which would be just	in the facts	and circumstances of this case.
In our	opinion, it would be appropriate to	revive	writ petition No.48	of 1991 for hearing on merit by the	High Court as suggested even by Shri Ram Jethmalani, and to	also order interim	stay of the operation of the order of disqualification dated 15.2.1991 made by the Speaker, which was the situation prevailing till that writ petition	was dismissed as not pressed. It is, however, necessary	that writ petition No.48 of 1991 and also writ petition No.321 of 1990 should be heard and disposed of at the earliest, on account of their expediency.
(4) Similarly,	order dated 15.2.1991 made by	the Speaker disqualifying Ravi S. Naik continues to operate and	writ petition No.48	of 1991 filed in the High Court by him is revived by setting aside the High Court's order 848 dated 24.2.1991 dismissing that writ petition as	not pressed. The High Court will proceed to decide that	writ petition also on merits, in accordance with law-, (5) The interim order staying the order of disqualification in writ petition No.48 of 1991 is revived. However,	the parties	would be at liberty to apply to the High Court	for modification or cancellation of the said interim order or for any other interim relief or direction, if so advised; (6) The High	Court should hear and dispose of the	writ petition No.48 of 1991 itself on merits as expeditiously as possible, preferably by 30th April, 1993; (7) Writ Petition No321 of 1990 filed by	Ratnakar M. Chopdekar and Sanjay Bandekar pending in the High Court be also heard and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, preferably by 30th April, 1993.
(8) Parties are directed to appear at the Goa Bench of	the Bombay	High Court on 6th April, 1993, without	any further notice, for obtaining further directions in this behalf. (9) In the circumstances of the case, the parties will	bear their own costs.

References: v. 
 v.

 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 v. 
 v. 
	v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 Art. 226
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.