Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/volosen-v-state-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:27:36+00:00

Document:
Full Case Name: Mircea VOLOSEN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
Country of Origin: United States Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas Primary Citation: 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tx.Crim.App. 2007) Date of Decision: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 Judge Name: KELLER, P.J. Jurisdiction Level: Texas Judges: JJ. KEASLER WOMACK HOLCOMB and COCHRAN HERVEY KELLER and EYERS P.J. Attorneys: David L. Richards, Fort Worth, for Appellant. David M. Curl, Anne Swenson, Assistant Criminal District Attys., Fort Worth, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State. Docket Num: No. PD049206.
The appellant/defendant mauled a miniature dachshund to death after the dog entered a yard where the appellant kept his chickens. The State of Texas prosecuted the appellant/defendant for cruelty to animals on the ground that the appellant/defendant killed the dog without legal authority. The appellant/defendant, however, argued that section 822.033 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, an entirely different statute, provided that authority. After the appeals court reversed the district court’s decision to convict the defendant/appellant, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the appellant/defendant had failed to meet his burden of production to show the applicability of his claimed defense and thus reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case back to that court.
We are called upon in this case to determine how an appellate court should handle a question of ultimate fact that turns upon county or municipal law where that law has not been presented to the courts by either of the parties. We shall reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
The incident giving rise to appellant's prosecution occurred in his back yard in the city of Colleyville. Kevin Ball and his family owned a dog, a miniature dachshund. Appellant, a veterinarian, lived directly behind Ball and kept chickens in a pen in his back yard. On July 4, 2003, the dog was in appellant's back yard, among the chickens. Seeing the dog in his neighbor's back yard, Ball called to it and attracted the dog's attention. When appellant entered his yard holding a maul, Ball told him, “Hey, sorry, she got out again.” Appellant looked at Ball and struck the dog with the maul, killing it.
The State prosecuted appellant for cruelty to animals on the ground that he killed the dog without legal authority.[FN1] The case was tried to the bench. At trial, appellant contended that Health and Safety Code § 822.033 provided him with legal authority because the dog was attacking his chickens.[FN2] The State responded that § 822.033 applied only to civil lawsuits,[FN3] but that, even if the statute did apply to criminal prosecutions, the dog did not engage in an “attack.” The trial judge found appellant guilty and placed him on probation.
The State's argument is that § 822.033 falls within a statutory scheme that must be ratified by the voters of a particular county before it becomes effective for that county. The State contends that it was appellant's burden to show that such a ratification occurred.
The first question raised in this case is whether it is appropriate to review a claim raised for the first time in a petition for discretionary review. Under the circumstances presented here, we hold that it is.
Because the State prevailed at trial, it was not required to raise any allegations before the court of appeals. The Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to file a brief but impose no such requirement on an appellee.[FN5] Regardless of whether an appellee files a brief, a first-level appellate court has the obligation to conduct a thorough review of an appellant's claims, including any subsidiary issues that might result in upholding the trial court's judgment. An appellee's failure to make a particular argument is a factor that may be considered when this Court decides whether to exercise its discretion to grant review, but it does not bar this Court from granting review to address the issue if the Court, in its discretion, decides that review is warranted. We turn, then, to the merits.
This applicability statute contains one provision of inclusion and one of exclusion. A county is included within the coverage of Chapter 822C if it is adopted in a county election. But even where that has occurred, the county or a municipality within that county is excluded if the county or municipality has enacted regulations pursuant to the Rabies Control Act. By the terms of the applicability statute, the defense found in § 822.033 was applicable in appellant's case only if (1) the voters in Tarrant County had adopted the subchapter in an election, and (2) registration or restraint laws pursuant to the Rabies Control Act had not been enacted by Tarrant County or by the City of Colleyville.
Appellant contends that § 822.033 applied statewide, despite its presence in a subchapter of limited applicability. In support of this proposition, he cites the fact that the provision was renumbered in 2003 as § 822.013, taking the provision out of subchapter C and making it a law of general applicability.[FN8] But in interpreting a prior law, we generally accord little weight to subsequent legislative enactments.[FN9] The Legislature's amendment *81 cannot negate the import of the unambiguous language of the applicability statute, § 822.021.
The next question, then, is whether Chapter 822C applied to Tarrant County or to the City of Colleyville. The trial record, of course, contains no information in this regard.[FN10] Where a matter is appropriately subject to judicial notice, an appellate court can take judicial notice for the first time on appeal.[FN11] A matter of law would seem to be an especially appropriate subject of judicial notice by an appellate court, but county and municipal laws pose some unique challenges.
As of 1995, then, Tarrant County had not adopted Chapter 822C. But we have no information (aside from the State's proffered *82 affidavit) that definitively shows whether it was ever adopted in a subsequent election. We cannot determine the content of local law with sufficient certainty to take judicial notice of whether or not former § 822.033 applied to the location in which the incident occurred.
The final question presented is which party bears the burden to demonstrate the content of local law and thus suffers if the content of local law cannot be ascertained. The answer in this instance is that the defendant bears this burden. Although “without legal authority” constitutes an element of the offense of cruelty to animals,[FN18] the State provided prima facie support for that element when it proved that the dog was owned by someone other than appellant. Appellant wishes to rely upon an entirely different statute to supply legal authority for his conduct. In doing so, he has essentially invoked a defense, upon which he has the burden of production.[FN19] Indeed a very similar, but more restrictive, provision is codified as a “defense” in the same Penal Code section as the cruelty to animals offense.[FN20] Because § 822.033 was contained within a subchapter of limited applicability, a defense based upon that provision necessarily includes as one of its elements the statute's applicability.
We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court to address appellant's remaining points of error.
[FN1] “A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly ... kills, seriously injures, or administers poison to an animal, other than cattle, horses, sheep, swine, or goats, belonging to another without legal authority or the owner's effective consent.” TEX. PEN.CODE § 42.09(a)(5).
[FN2] “A dog that is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked sheep, goats, calves, or other domestic animals or fowls may be killed by any person witnessing or having knowledge of the attack.” TEX. HEALTH & SAF.CODE § 822.033(a).
[FN3] See TEX. HEALTH & SAF.CODE § 822.033(b)(“A person who kills a dog as provided by this section is not liable for damages to the owner of the dog.”).
[FN4] Volosen v. State, 192 S.W.3d 597, 602–604 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006).
[FN5] See TEX.R.APP. P. 38.8.
[FN6] Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
[FN8] Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1002, § 1.
[FN9] Ex parte Schroeter, 958 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
[FN10] With its petition, the State submitted an affidavit from a county official stating that the subchapter was never adopted in Tarrant County. Because of our disposition, below, we need not address the propriety of considering an affidavit submitted at this stage of the proceedings.
[FN11] Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Robinson v. State, 783 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989), aff'd and opinion adopted, 841 S.W.2d 392 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
[FN12] Lange v. State, 639 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
[FN13] Id. (quoting Karchmer v. State, 61 Tex.Crim. 221, 221, 134 S.W. 700, 700 (1911)).
[FN16] Acts 1995, 74th Leg., Ch. 489.
[FN17] Senate/House Committee Reports, S.B. 1437 (April 6 and May 9, 1995).
[FN18] TEX. PEN.CODE § 42.09(a)(5)(“A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly ... kills, seriously injures, or administers poison to an animal, other than cattle, horses, sheep, swine, or goats, belonging to another without legal authority or the owner's effective consent.”).
[FN19] See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex.Crim.App.2003)(explaining that the defendant bears the burden of production with respect to a defense while the State bears the burden of persuasion).
[FN20] It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(5) that the animal was discovered on the person's property in the act of or immediately after injuring or killing the person's goats, sheep, cattle, horses, swine, or poultry and that the person killed or injured the animal at the time of this discovery. TEX. PEN.CODE § 42.09(e).
[FN21] Indeed, appellant has provided no such information on discretionary review, after the State brought the issue to this Court's (and appellant's) attention.
[FN22] We also keep in mind that appellant lost in the trial court, so he does not gain the benefit of any implied findings that might support the trial court's judgment. See State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818–819 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). We need not decide today whether an appellate court could imply, from a silent record, findings with respect to local law in the prevailing party's favor.

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