Source: https://www.braininjurylawyer24-7blog.com/this_is_an_action_for_personal/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:20:56+00:00

Document:
As a result, defendants Rizzo and Scaravillo bring a motion pursuant to CPLR § 3124, CPLR § 3113(b), CPLR § 3104 and 22 NYCRR § 1301.1 seeking an order compelling a “non-party” witness, Susan Adams, to appear and give testimony at a further deposition in regard to matters on which the witness was previously deposed but directed by counsel not to answer. Moving defendants also seek an order appointing a Judicial Hearing Officer to supervise such follow-up deposition. Also, moving defendants seek an order imposing costs and sanctions on plaintiffs’ counsel in the form of payment to the court for the expense for the Judicial Hearing Officer for supervision of said further deposition based upon the alleged frivolous conduct of plaintiffs’ counsel at the earlier deposition of Susan Adams. Lastly, defendants also move for an order pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 202.17[j] relieving them from compliance with plaintiffs’ notice for physical examination.
The issues in this case are whether defendants have made a sufficient factual showing of the possible relevance of the information sought to be extracted from Susan Adams a non-party witness, to appear and give her testimony at a further deposition with regard to matters on which the witness was previously deposed but directed by the counsel not to answer; whether Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct at the prior deposition of Susan Adams was obstructive and unprofessional warranting his sanction; and whether defendants are relieved from complying with plaintiff’s notice for physical examination.
The Brooklyn Court insofar as to answer the question on the defendants’ right to compel Susan Adams to give her testimony in a further deposition, cited the provisions of CPLR § 3101(a) and cited a Court of Appeals decision.
CPLR § 3101(a) entitles parties to “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.” What is “material and necessary” is left to the sound discretion of the lower courts and includes “any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason”.
The Court said that in the Andon case, the Court of Appeals clarified the law in the area of discovery in lead-paint personal injury actions. The Court in the said case, emphasized that in such cases, discovery determinations are discretionary each request must be evaluated on a case by case basis with due regard for the strong policy supporting open disclosure. Moreover, the Andon court specifically rejected the plaintiff’s claim that there was a “blanket rule” prohibiting certain types of discovery in lead-paint personal injury actions. The Andon court also noted that to the extent defendants relied upon cases permitting certain forms of discovery in lead-paint personal injury cases, such reliance was misplaced in that each such request must be evaluated on a case by case basis.
In evaluating a discovery request in this context, and recognizing New York’s policy favoring open disclosure as a means for discovering the truth, the Court must consider defendants’ need for the information requested against its possible relevance, the burden of subjecting Susan Adams to the disclosure and the potential for unfettered litigation on collateral issues. The court must evaluate competing interests and conduct a discretionary balancing of those interests.
7. Factual information relating to the witness’s participation in social services programs and in particular, rental assistance programs at the premises where the alleged lead paint exposure occurred.
were proximately caused by the lead paint exposure, is the central focus at this juncture.
This court is mindful that it is well established that lead-based paint exposure presents a serious potential health hazard to children. The court is also mindful that the Third Department has stated that “lead poisoning itself is an actionable injury.” However, the observation that lead poisoning is an “actionable injury” in itself does not give rise to the grand logical and evidentiary leap that every developmental, behavioral or neuropsychological problem experienced by a plaintiff has been proximately caused by a prior lead paint exposure.
This information from the plaintiffs’ submissions is harmonious with the court’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ burden of proof and the areas of discovery available to the defense. Establishing elevated lead blood levels is not the end of the inquiry insofar as plaintiffs’ burden of proof on the issue of damages and disabilities claimed (an EBLL is a “risk factor” for neurodevelopmental problems, “not a diagnosis”).
In the case at bar, an EBLL establishes “an injury” (acute lead poisoning) but does not establish the universe of sequel that may be associated with an EBLL. Rather, the plaintiffs continue to have the burden of proof on the issue of damages and the defense is entitled to pursue and submit evidence on the issue of the proximate cause of claimed sequel flowing from the EBLL. Here, plaintiffs have provided no evidence that every exposure to lead or every measured EBLL automatically and unfailingly results in the universe of neuro-developmental injuries at issue herein.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds in this case that defendants have made a sufficient showing of the materiality and relevance of the subject matter about which they seek to further depose the infant plaintiffs’ mother, Susan Adams, in this lead paint personal injury action. Defendants have submitted competent expert opinion, supported by authoritative treatises and studies which demonstrate a sufficient scientific basis for the defendants to pursue the areas of deposition questioning at issue.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the application of any evidentiary privilege to the subject matter at hand. Plaintiffs have not competently challenged or rebutted defendants’ showing through the application of any evidentiary privilege or with expert opinion disputing the medical relevance of the subject areas of deposition questioning sought by defendants. Defendants have made a sufficient showing of a medical, scientific and fact based need to depose Susan Adams notwithstanding the alleged “private” or “confidential” nature of the subject matter at issue.
The Court has undertaken an extensive review and study of the statutes, decisional law and exhibits submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel in opposition to what plaintiffs’ counsel characterizes as simple and settled legal issues. The Court, however, finds that the legal, scientific and medical bodies of knowledge involved in lead paint litigation and discovery present complex issues for the court’s resolution. The court’s lengthy decision attests to those complexities, necessitated in large part by plaintiffs’ counsel’s misleading and obfuscatory analysis of decisional law, statutory authority and the relative burdens of proof of the parties on numerous issues.
Untangling the Gordian knot of lead exposure specific injury causation presents a complex and wide reaching examination of numerous medical, scientific, socioeconomic and environmental variables. This examination is not subject to conclusory, superficial or artificial restriction on the scope of information that may be necessary for careful and just resolution by a jury.
As regards the issue on the conduct of the plaintiff’s counsel, the Court said, that defendants seek a further deposition of Susan Adams for the purpose of pursuing the aforementioned areas of inquiry about which plaintiffs’ counsel directed the witness not to answer or otherwise obstructed or interfered with defense counsels’ opportunity to conduct a fair and thorough examination of the witness.
The Court has carefully reviewed every word of both of Susan Adams’ deposition transcripts. Having done so, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct during the depositions was so obstructive and improperly and unilaterally controlling of the witness as to render the deposition a futile attempt to obtain relevant information and information material and necessary to the discovery of relevant information.
The Court finds that it was not defense counsels’ questions that were improper, but rather plaintiffs’ counsel’s instructions to the witness not to answer and his otherwise obstructive and excessive interference which was improper. Indeed, the evidentiary scope of an examination before trial is at least as broad as that applicable at trial itself.
Hence, the Court held that plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct at the prior deposition of Susan Adams was obstructive and unprofessional which in turn resulted in an improper frustration of defendants’ attempts to conduct discovery of information material and necessary to the defense of the injury and damage claims embraced within plaintiffs’ pleadings. Accordingly, the undersigned will attend and preside over the further deposition of Susan Adams by defense counsel. The Court ordered that plaintiff’s counsel pay all cost associated with the conduct of the further deposition of Susan Adams including the cost of the stenographer.
Lastly on the third issue of this case, the Court held that because plaintiffs have failed to provide defendants with the type of records required in § 202.17(b)(1), defendants are relieved at this juncture from compliance with plaintiffs’ notice of physical examination.
Exposure to lead-paint can cause several brain injuries to your children. You need the help of Onondaga Brain Injury Attorney to advise you on what actions you can file in order to prevent or suppress the parties causing lead exposure to your children. Stephen Bilkis and Associates have competent Onondaga Personal Injury Attorneys as well as Onondaga Injury Attorneys that can represent you.

References: § 3124
 § 3113
 § 3104
 § 1301
 § 202
 § 3101
 § 3101
 § 202