Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/184/624.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 19:08:06+00:00

Document:
RELOJ CATTLE CO. v. U. S.
The Reloj Cattle Company, claiming to be the owner in fee of a tract of land in the county of Cochise, Arizona, which it described as the San Pedro grant, filed its petition for confirmation in the court of private land claims, May 29, 1897. The petition alleged that the grant contained 37,000 acres in the United States, and, by a sketch map attached, 19,000 acres in the Republic of Mexico, or a total of 56,000 acres, within its exterior boundaries. It gave a description of the grant by courses and distances from certain natural objects, and relied on a survey made by one Howe. The petition further alleged that plaintiff was the owner of the tract by virtue of certain instruments in writing, by which it had acquired from Rafael Elias, the original grantee, title to all the property he had therein; that the grant title bore date May 2, 1833, and was duly made, executed, and delivered by Don Jos e Maria Mendoza, treasurer general of the state of Sonora, in the name of that state, under and by virtue of article 11 of the general [184 U.S. 624, 625] sovereign decree No. 70, passed August 4, 1824, by the sovereign constituent congress of the United States of Mexico, which article conceded to all of the states of the Republic the rents or revenues which by said law were not reserved to the general government, one of which revenues was the vacant lands within the states of the Republic, thereby confirming to the states the lands so described.
It was further averred that by law No. 30 of May 20, 1825, and other decrees subsequent thereto, the constituent congress of the state of Sonora and Sinaloa prescribed regulations for the sale of such lands; that the initiatory proceeding to obtain the grant title to the lands in question was by petition dated 1820 or 1821, addressed to the governor intendente, the officer of the Spanish government in charge of and having exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of the sales of public lands in the precinct of Fronteras, in which precinct the lands petitioned for were situated, which petition was made and signed by Jos e Jesus Perez, and proceedings thereon taken as required by the applicable royal ordinances of December 4, 1786; that thereafter, on July 5, 1822, at Arispe, Sonora, the tract petitioned for was sold by the proper officers to Perez for the sum of $190; that on July 6 the intendente ordered Perez to pay into the treasury that sum, together with costs and charges; that on July 7 the sale was approved by the provincial imperial treasury at Arispe, and was referred to the superior board of the treasury for its approval or determination, and that thereafter the $190, together with costs and charges, was paid into the national treasury of the Republic of Mexico; but that the superior board of the treasury was abolished before the sale was approved, and no further action was taken until October 25, 1832, when proceedings were instituted to transfer the rights and title of Perez to Rafael Elias, and to have the formal title to the lands issue to Elias; that in accordance therewith, on May 8, 1833, Jos e Maria Mendoza, the treasurer general of the state of Sonora, issued to Elias the final testimonio or evidence of title to the grant, which was thereupon duly recorded in the proper records of Sonora.
The petition alleged that the claim was presented by certain [184 U.S. 624, 626] grantors of petitioner to the surveyor general of Arizona, and a report made by a duly authorized agent of the United States to the effect that the expediente was among the archives in the state of Sonora, and that all the proceedings were regular, and the certificates showing payment and the record of the transfer between Perez and Elias were properly recorded, and in the proper place, among the archives of Sonora; that there was on file in the office of the surveyor general of Arizona a report of one Wharton, apparently acting under special instructions of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, in which he reported against the land grant, and that the land described therein was situated in the state of Sonora, Mexico, but the petition charged that the report was not made with full knowledge of the facts; and also that there was a report on file by one Borton, apparently acting under instructions of the surveyor general of Arizona, of an indefinite character. And it was alleged that beyond what was so stated the San Pedro grant had not been acted on by Congress, or any other competent authority of the United States, constituted by law for the adjustment of land titles within the territory of Arizona.
The petition averred that all the proceedings in the matter of the grant were regular, complete, and legal, and vested a perfect and valid title in fee thereto in the grantee; that the grantee went into actual possession and erected proper monuments, and that the grantee and his descendants and legal representatives and assigns have continued until the present time in the actual possession, use, and occupation of the same, and were seised and possessed in fee thereof; that petitioner was entitled to all of the lands embraced within the original survey of the grant lying in the territory of Arizona, and that they were the lands delineated on the map filed with the petition; and that there was no person in possession of the grant otherwise than by permission of petitioner, except one Roberts, who was made a defendant. On May 13, 1899, plaintiff filed an amended petition in which the description followed an amended map and survey made by one Contzen, and attached to the amended petition, which survey was the one relied on at the trial, and made the contents of the grant within the United States 38,622.06 acres. [184 U.S. 624, 627] The answer of the United States denied the correctness of the surveys and maps of Howe and of Contzen, and alleged that the tract, whether located according to quantity, or courses and distances, or natural objects, was situated entirely south of the boundary line between the Republics of the United States and Mexico, and without the jurisdiction of the court.
The answer further denied that the claim set forth was at the date of the treaty a complete and perfect title, and pleaded the statute, whereby all imperfect claims not filed within two years from March 3, 1891, became forever barred.
The answer also set up that under and pursuant to proceedings of denouncement, commenced in July, 1880, by the predecessors of the Reloj Cattle Company, the government of Mexico measured off and delineated to said persons the legal area or cabida legal of 4 sitios mentioned in claimant's title parers; and in the same proceedings it was adjudged that the ranch of San Pedro had no known boundary, and thus no surplus or demasias; that the 4 sitios were measured off and delineated to said persons by the Mexican government and located entirely within the Republic of Mexico; and that the claim sued for was thus entirely satisfied and discharged by the location of the said 4 sitios within the Republic of Mexico.
March 12, 1821, this petition was referred by the governor intendente for survey, appraisement, and other customary proceedings, and for citation to the adjoining owners, with instructions to return the proceedings when completed, for further action. On May 3, 1821, a promotor fiscal, appraisers, and recorder of courses were appointed by the constitutional alcalde of the district and judge surveyor of that registry, who accepted their positions, took the proper oaths, and were duly commissioned. On the same day publication of notice was had to all whose rights might be affected to appear at the house of San Pedro, the place of the proposed purchase; in response to which one Antunes of the place of Terrenate, claiming certain sitios in the vicinity, appeared and objected that if the survey went up the river, or south (the river ran north) from the house of San Pedro, it would interfere with his rights, to which Perez's attorney objected, on the ground that if the survey went down the river, or north, it would deprive Perez of the benefit of the water from the marsh, which was the mother of those pastures. The matter was compromised by an agreement to divide the water of the marsh. This part of the expediente is of importance in respect of the contention that the [184 U.S. 624, 629] entire grant was south of the boundary line between the United States and Mexico, and as to the starting point of the primitive survey.
In the proceeding for the denouncement of the overplus of the ranch of San Pedro subsequently had in Mexico, it is recited that the district judge 'has before him the testimonio of [184 U.S. 624, 633] the title of the grant of 4 sitios of land for raising large stock issued by the citizen treasurer general of the state in the city of Arispe under date of 8th of May of the year 1833, Jos e Manuel Mendoza, in favor of citizen Rafael Elias, and after payment of $208, 1 grain, which said Elias paid into the funds of said treasury as the value of the 4 sitios, expenses and fees of the title. The land is generally known by the name of ranch of San Pedro, in the jurisdiction of the town of Santa Cruz and near the presidio of Fronteras in the district of Magdalena.' Plaintiff also introduced in evidence a copy of the titulo to the San Rafael del Valle grant. Oral evidence was introduced on both sides in respect of the original and subsequent surveys.
The government also introduced in evidence the expediente [184 U.S. 624, 636] of an adverse suit brought by Plutarco Elias respecting himself and his mother and brothers on the denouncement of the overplus of the Agua Priete grant made by Camou Brothers, in which, in deciding the matter, the district judge recited that the fact that the Elias family had already denounced a large area of demasias in the Republic of Mexico, and mentioned many other tracts denounced by them besides the overplus of the San Pedro ranch, and called attention to the fact that the Eliases in consequence of such denouncements had secured a larger grant than they were allowed to obtain under the law of July 22, 1863. He quoted from the regulations of the department of public works in which the method of acquiring demasias and other vacant lands is set forth, and showed from the order of the department of public works that overplus within a grant rests on exactly the same basis as other public lands, except that under the provisions of the law of July 22, 1863, a preference in its purchase is given the owner of the legal area. The district judge held that the Elias family had no right to be admitted as denouncers, since they had already obtained an area greater than that designated by law.
The Reloj Cattle Company was incorporated September 24, 1885, and various quitclaims of the interests of the Elias heirs in 18,000 acres in the grant, described as being north of the boundary line, commencing with April 2, 1883, and down to October 13, 1885, were introduced by it as muniments of title. The cause was submitted June 2, 1899, and November 27, 1899, the court entered a decree rejecting the grant and dismissing the petition. The court held that the grant was one of 4 sitios only, and that the owners had secured full satisfaction from the Mexican government and within its territory of all that they were entitled to. Thereupon this appeal was prosecuted.
Messrs. H. H. Cobb and Rochester Ford for appellant.
The entire proceedings were directed to the acquisition of 4 sitios. Four sitios were valued; 4 sitios were put up at the auctions; 4 sitios were purchased; 4 sitios were paid for; and 4 sitios were granted. The intention to convey only so much and no more is plain, and is controlling. The title of the grantee was limited to that Ainsa v. United States, 161 U.S. 208 , 40 L. ed. 673, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544; Ely v. United States, 171 U.S. 220 , 43 L. ed. 142, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840; United States v. Maish, 171 U.S. 242 , 43 L. ed. 150, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 948; Perrin v. United States, 171 U.S. 292 , 43 L. ed. 169, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 861.
The primitive survey was had at the place of San Pedro, and Las Nutrias was 2 or 3 miles to the southwest. It is plain that the old house of San Pedro was in existence at that time. When Antunes appeared from the place of Terrenate, which was a short distance west of the house of San Pedro, he was willing that the survey should proceed 'from the house of San Pedro down the river' (the river ran north or somewhat east [184 U.S. 624, 638] of north), while Perez claimed it should be located up the river to get the benefit of the water of the marsh. This dispute was compromised by agreeing to divide the water of the marsh, which lay some distance above the house of San Pedro. The starting point of the survey was plainly up the river from the house, and then the line ran below it, for the survey states: 'I caused a monument to be placed at a rectangular corner, from which, taking the course southwest to northwest, there were measured and counted 50 cords, the last of which terminated down the river from the house, on the edge of the ford, on the bank.' That the house of San Pedro was an important call in the location of the grant on the ground is unquestionable. That house was the ancestral home of the Elias family, and on that place some of its members still reside. It was and is in Mexico, several miles south of the boundary line. Accordingly, when Manuel Elias made a formal denouncement, July, 8, 1880, of the demasias there might be in the ranch of San Pedro, and it became necessary to mark the cabida legal on the ground, the Mexican authorities laid off the 4 sitios so as to embrace the San Pedro settlement. The omission of San Pedro from the lawful area of the San Pedro grant would have, indeed, been something remarkable. The owners of the grant thus obtained from Mexico full satisfaction of its cabida legal, and no legal or equitable claim therefor existed against the United States when this petition was filed.
In Ely v. United States, 171 U.S. 220 , 43 L. ed. 142, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840, the court, referring to Ainsa's Case, observed: 'In that case it ap- [184 U.S. 624, 639] peared that while the out boundaries of the survey extended into the territory ceded by Mexico to the United States, the grantee had taken and was in possession of land still remaining within the limits of Mexico to the full extent which he had purchased and paid for, and therefore no legal or equitable claim existed against the United States in reference to land within the ceded territory.' It is quite impossible to entertain the proposition that the court of private land claims should have adjudged to appellants another cabida legal on this side of the boundary line. According to the doctrine of Ely's Case no different location could have been recognized if the entire area had been in this country.
Something is said in respect of the right to confirmation of the tract sued for treated as demasias. But, apart from other insuperable objections to that suggestion, such a claim would be imperfect for want of fulfilment of conditions, and barred by 12 of the act of March 3, 1891 [ 26 Stat. at L. 854, chap. 539].

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