Source: http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2000/2000-009.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:47:55+00:00

Document:
While a court could choose to uphold the definition of partial birth abortion found in 2000 Substitute for House Bill No. 2581 by ruling that it cannot be applied in any situation involving a D & E procedure, we believe it is more likely the court would find that the term "partial birth abortion" is defined in the Bill in such general terms, and the exception for D & E defined so narrowly, that some versions of the D & E procedure are included within its prohibition thus rendering it a substantial obstacle and unconstitutional because it applies to all stages of pregnancy, rather than just post-viability. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-6721; 2000 Sub. for HB 2581.
You request our opinion on the constitutionality of the amendments proposed in 2000 Substitute for House Bill No. 2581, as passed by the House Federal and State Affairs Committee on Wednesday, January 26, and by the full House of Representatives on Monday, February 7.
Section 1 of the Substitute Bill would amend K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 65-6721 to make it applicable to all stages of pregnancy rather than just post-viability. The Bill also would remove the health exception from the statute so that a partial birth abortion, as defined in the Bill, could be performed only if it is determined that it is necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman.
"1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for preservation of the life or health of the mother. . . ." 93 S.Ct. at 732.
2000 Substitute for House Bill No. 2581 defines "partial birth abortion" in Section 1(b). Paragraph (1) of Section 1(b) describes the procedure that the Bill prohibits and paragraph (2) sets out what is not prohibited.
Although the seventh circuit took a different course, it agreed with the sixth and the eighth circuit appellate courts that if the statutes were enforced so as to prohibit the D & E procedure in pre-viability situations, they would clearly be unconstitutional.(11) We have located no cases that stand for the proposition that the D & E procedure can constitutionally be prohibited prior to viability of the fetus. We note that the United States Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in the Nebraska case, Carhart v. Stenberg, will be hearing oral arguments in April and most likely rendering a decision in August. Thus, the issue you present may very well be resolved with that decision, although because the Kansas statute is not identical to any of the other statutes yet considered by the federal courts of appeal, the decision may have only tangential effect on our situation.
Finding that the Bill's definition of partial birth abortion renders it unconstitutional does not mean that the current legislation is likewise tainted. Current partial birth abortion law in Kansas applies only post-viability - triggering a different test under Casey - and contains a maternal health exception. As such, we believe it would survive a constitutional challenge of this sort.
We note that 2000 Substitute for House Bill No. 2581 has a severability clause stating that "if any word, clause, phrase or other provision of subsections (b) through (f) of this section or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is found to be unconstitutional, the same are hereby declared to be severable and the other provisions of this section shall remain effective notwithstanding such unconstitutionality. . . ." The definition of partial birth abortion is contained in subsection (b) of the Bill. However, if the Bill passed as is and the definition is later struck, the statute would continue to prohibit partial birth abortion throughout all stages of pregnancy without regard to maternal health. The Bill would then have the constitutional problem of vagueness for lack of any definition of the prohibited practice. Thus, we do not believe the severability clause saves the Bill in this instance.
In conclusion, while a court could choose to uphold the definition of partial birth abortion found in 2000 Substitute for House Bill No. 2581 by ruling that it cannot be applied in any situation involving a D & E procedure, we believe it is more likely the court would find that the term "partial birth abortion" is defined in the Bill in such general terms, and the exception for D & E defined so narrowly, that some versions of the D & E procedure are included within its prohibition thus rendering it a substantial obstacle and unconstitutional because it applies to all stages of pregnancy, rather than just to post-viability.
1. 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973).
2. 505 U.S. 833, 120 L.Ed.2d 674, 112 S.Ct. 2791(1992).
3. Supra, note 2, 112 S.Ct. at 2804.
4. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. at 2820.
6. The Kansas Legislature considered this definition during its consideration of partial birth abortion in 1997. See 1997 Senate Bill No. 234, as amended by Senate Committee and as amended by Senate Committee of the Whole.
7. Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).
8. Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster, 43 F.Supp.2d 604 (E.D.La. 1999); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F.Supp.2d 478 (D.N.J. 1998); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F.Supp.2d 1024 (W.D.Ky. 1998); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F.Supp. 847 (N.C.Ill. 1998); A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F.Supp.2d 1148 (S.D.Fla. 1998); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F.Supp. 1283 (E.D.Mich. 1997).
9. 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999).
10. Id. at 869, 876.
11. Id. at 861, 869, 871, citing Casey, supra, note 2, and Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). See also Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998) (case not decided on the merits, but for purposes of issuing a stay).
12. Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d at 1146-1148; Little Rock Family Planning v. Jegley, 192 F.3d at 797; Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 198; Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F.Supp.2d 441, 453 (E.D.Va. 1999); A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F.Supp.2d at 1152-1153; Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster, 43 F.Supp.2d at 608-609; Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F.Supp.2d at 493; Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F.Supp.2d at 1031-1032. But see Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d at 861; Richmond Medical Center for Women, 183 F.3d at 329-330.
13. 28 F.Supp.2d at 1036. See also, Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d at 492; Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F.Supp. 847, 855 n. 1 (N.D.Ill. 1998). See n. 10.
14. See Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. James, 984 F.Supp. 1404, 1455 (M.D.Ala. 1998); Verniero, supra, note 23 at 497-498; Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 183 F.3d at 306 (dissent).

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