Source: https://www.ptab.us/2009/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:45:39+00:00

Document:
U.S. Patent No. 5,403,067, issued to Kumar Rajaratnam, Apr. 4, 1995.
U.S. Patent No. 6,840,125 B1, issued to Herbert M. Reynolds et al., Jan. 11, 2005.
U.S. Patent No. 4,685,739, issued to Elmar Deegener et al., Aug. 11, 1987.
U.S. Patent No. 4,981,325, issued to Dennis Zacharkow, Jan. 1, 1991.
U.S. Patent No. 5,178,163, issued to Edward H. Yewer, Jr., Jan. 12, 1993.
Ex Parte Vargas et al TIERNEY 102(e) CARDICA, INC.
In determining the differences between the prior art and the claims, the question under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not whether the differences themselves would have been obvious, but whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1983). There is no legally recognizable essential gist or heart of the invention. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). All words in a claim must be considered in judging the obviousness of the claimed subject matter. See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970). Obviousness may not be established using hindsight or in view of the teachings or suggestions of the inventor. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 721 F.2d at 1551, 1553.
The machine-or-transformation test is a two-branched inquiry; an applicant may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or by showing that his claim transforms an article. See [Gottschalk v.] Benson, 409 U.S. [63,] 70, 93 S. Ct. 253 [(1972)]. Certain considerations are applicable to analysis under either branch. First, as illustrated by Benson and discussed below, the use of a specific machine or transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart patenteligibility. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72, 93 S. Ct. 253. Second, the involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity. See [Parker v.] Flook, 437 U.S. [584,] 590, 98 S. Ct. 2522 [(1978)]. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961-62.
Although the [Supreme] Court spoke of “postsolution” activity, we have recognized that the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to any insignificant extra-solution activity regardless of where and when it appears in the claimed process. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding a simple recordation step in the middle of the claimed process incapable of imparting patent-eligibility under § 101); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding a pre-solution step of gathering data incapable of imparting patent eligibility under § 101). Id. at 957 n.14.
Furthermore, “[a] requirement simply that data inputs be gathered–without specifying how–is a meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because every algorithm inherently requires the gathering of data inputs.” Id. at 963 (citing Grams, 888 F.2d at 839-40). Also, “the inherent step of gathering data can also fairly be characterized as insignificant extra-solution activity.” Id. (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 590).
Also, as noted in Bilski, the Diehr Court also held that “mere field-ofuse limitations are generally insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible process claim patent-eligible. See [Diamond v. Diehr,] 450 U.S. [175,] 191- 92, 101 S. Ct. 1048 [(1981)] (noting that ineligibility under § 101 ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’).” Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957.
“[L]ong-felt need is analyzed as of the date of an articulated identified problem and evidence of efforts to solve that problem.” Texas Instruments, Inc. v. International Trade Comm., 988 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
“[I]t is well settled that unexpected results must be established by factual evidence. ‘Mere argument or conclusory statements in the specification does not suffice.’” In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
“An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.” In re Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470.
Ex Parte Popp et al WALSH 102(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.
“A transitory, propagating signal is not a ‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.’ Those four categories define the explicit scope and reach of subject matter patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007), “If a claim covers material not found in any of the four statutory categories, that claim falls outside the plainly expressed scope of § 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and useful.” Id. at 1354, reh’g en banc denied, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 70 (2008).
Non-functional descriptive material refers to data content that does not exhibit a functional interrelationship with the substrate and does not affect the way the computing processes are performed. See MPEP § 2106.01. In a precedential decision, an expanded Board panel recently held that elements that do not affect the claimed process are non-functional material and are merely descriptive. See Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1887 (BPAI 2008) (precedential).
The Examiner need not give patentable weight to descriptive material absent a new and unobvious functional relationship between the descriptive material and the substrate. See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1582-1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Ex parte Mathias, 84 USPQ2d 1276 (BPAI 2005) (nonprecedential informative), aff'd, 191 Fed.Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Nonfunctional descriptive material cannot render nonobvious an invention that would have otherwise been obvious. In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339.
Ex Parte Morper HAIRSTON 102(e)/103(a) BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
Ex Parte Bergman WALSH 112(2)/103(a) James L. Young Westman, Champlin & Kelly, P.A.
Fredette 1,590,572, June 29, 1926.
Vaughn 3,536,285, Oct. 27, 1970.
Biggio 4,860,891, Aug. 29, 1989.
Effertz 5,277,733, Jan. 11, 1994.
Kerr 5,033,704, Jul. 23, 1991.
"The entirety of the evidence must be reviewed in order to determine whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the field." In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
“[D]iscovery of an optimum value of a result effective variable in a known process is ordinarily within the skill of the art. . . . It is well settled that a prima facie case of obviousness may be rebutted ‘where the results of optimizing a variable, which was known to be result effective, (are) unexpectedly good.’” In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (CCPA 1980) (quoting In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 620 (CCPA 1977)).
Ex Parte Hough et al MEDLEY 102(b)/103(a) Pitney Bowes, Inc.
“Under the proper legal standard, a reference will teach away when it suggests that the developments flowing from its disclosures are unlikely to produce the objective of the applicant's invention.” Syntex (U.S.A) v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005), citing In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Ex Parte Park WHITEHEAD, JR. 102(e)/103(a) MCKENNA LONG & ALDRIDGE, L.L.P.
The primary purpose of the definiteness requirement set forth in the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is to ensure that the claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public of the extent of the legal protection afforded by the patent, so that interested members of the public, e.g., competitors of the patent owner, can determine whether or not they infringe. All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The test for definiteness is whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
“[A]n indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising’ . . . . Unless the claim is specific as to the number of elements, the article ‘a’ receives a singular interpretation only in rare circumstances when the [applicant] evinces a clear intent to so limit the article . . . . Under this conventional rule, the claim limitation ‘a,’ without more, requires at least one.” KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

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