Source: http://lawsdocbox.com/Legal_Issues/92532378-Supreme-court-of-the-united-states.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:11:16+00:00

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9 5 there must be either evidence of an express policy of violating the Constitution, a widespread practice or custom, or a decision by an individual with policymaking authority. Heath Opp. at 6 (emphasis added). Respondent Heath is correct that a widespread practice or custom is sufficient to establish municipal liability. Truvia and Bright contend that is exactly what the evidence shows in this case: a widespread practice and custom of the Orleans Parish District Attorney wrongly withholding Brady material. The question presented by this case is what is sufficient evidence to make this a triable issue as to whether there was a municipal policy or custom. Truvia and Bright introduced a great deal of evidence of a pattern of Brady violations by the Orleans Parish District Attorney s office to demonstrate a policy or custom. 1 For example, Truvia and Bright presented other criminal discovery responses by Connick s Office showing that 44 of Connick s prosecutors committed over 90 Brady violations in just a two-year period from 1974 to 1976 by refusing to produce exculpatory written or oral statements 1 Respondent Heath repeatedly contends that Petitioners waived their argument that the NOPD had a practice (or a policy, for that matter) of withholding Brady materials. Heath Opp. at 5. This simply ignores all of the evidence that Truvia and Bright presented, and that is summarized in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, as to violations of Brady by the Orleans Parish District Attorney s office. In light of all this evidence this clearly is not a situation of failure to provide any legal or factual analysis of an issue. Id. (citation omitted).
10 6 and/or material impeachment evidence of state s witnesses. (DE , ; R , R , R , R.5807). The actual writing on these criminal discovery responses included not entitled to direct requests for Brady, exculpatory or material impeachment evidence. The prosecutors in these cases did not say that this was not Brady material, but rather that the defendants were not entitled to the Brady material. That is exactly what occurred in this case. Bright requested the FBI rap sheet of any witnesses the State planned to call at trial (which would have shown a key witness s arrest record), and the DA responded Defense is not entitled to this information. (DE100-4, DE100-5, DE100-6). Bright unquestionably was entitled to this, as the Louisiana courts later found in overturning his and Truvia s convictions. This is powerful evidence that this case was part of a pattern of defendant s Brady violations. 2 It makes this case far different from Connick v. Thompson where the Court said that the basis for municipal 2 Respondent s Connick and Jordan quote the district court that these denials of discovery requests are of little value. Opp. at 7. But they are of significant value in that they involved precisely what happened in this case: the District Attorney s office denying a Brady request by saying not entitled, when the defendants clearly were constitutionally entitled to the material.
13 9 was Harry Connick s policy to obey the law. Connick and Jordan Opp. at 11. This entirely misses the point because it does not respond to the evidence Truvia and Bright introduced as to the failure to train prosecutors and police regarding their Brady obligations. Respondent Connick s self-serving statement that he followed the law does not address the inadequacies in training while he was district attorney, nor for that matter the reality that his office was notorious for not following the law with regard to its Brady obligations. Similarly, Respondents Connick and Jordan state that Henry Julien, the prosecutor in the criminal case, maintained that Connick s official policy recognized prosecutor s legal and ethical obligations to comply with applicable law concerning evidence disclosure. Id. at 12. But again, this does not refute Julien s statements that he did not receive training as to his obligations under Brady. Thus, the key question is what is sufficient evidence to show a triable issue of fact with regard to deliberate indifference as to training. Truvia and Bright introduced much more evidence of this than in Connick v. Thompson. This Court should grant certiorari to clarify what is enough evidence to establish a local government s liability under Monell for a local government s policy of not complying with its obligations under Brady v. Maryland.
15 11 confusion and a split in the lower courts as to what evidence is sufficient to show a policy with regard to Brady violations. Truvia and Bright point to cases with facts virtually identical to theirs where lower courts found these same types of evidence of violations would be sufficient to show a municipal policy or custom. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 16-17, citing Owens v. Baltimore City State s Attorney s Office, 767 F.3d 379, 403 (4th Cir. 2014); Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2011); Bertuglia v. City of New York, 839 F.Supp.2d 703, (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Respondents Connick and Jordan attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground that they were decided on a motion to dismiss. Connick and Jordan Opp. at 6. But this misses the point. In these cases, the courts said that the allegations stated a claim and thus if proven would establish municipal liability. Truvia and Bright introduced evidence establishing exactly these allegations. In other Circuits this evidence thus would have been sufficient to go to trial and ultimately to prevail. It is very likely that under their precedents, the First and Fourth Circuits would have found that Truvia and Bright put forth sufficient evidence to show a triable issue as to whether there was a municipal policy or custom sufficient to meet Monell. But the Fifth Circuit said that there was insufficient evidence to go to trial. It is exactly this confusion in the lower courts that warrants the grant of certiorari in this case.

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