Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83105:57103&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:49:09+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 199283, June 09, 2014 - JULIET VITUG MADARANG AND ROMEO BARTOLOME, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT AND ACTING IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES, RODOLFO AND RUBY BARTOLOME, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES AND CAROLINA N. MORALES, Respondent.
JULIET VITUG MADARANG AND ROMEO BARTOLOME, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT AND ACTING IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES, RODOLFO AND RUBY BARTOLOME, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES AND CAROLINA N. MORALES, Respondent.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under exceptional circumstances.1 To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, parties must file the petition within 60 days from notice of the judgment and within six (6) months after the judgment or final order was entered; otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed outright.
If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show that their counsel’s negligence could not have been prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence.2 The mere allegation that there is excusable negligence simply because counsel was 80 years old is a prejudicial slur to senior citizens. It is based on an unwarranted stereotype of people in their advanced years. It is as empty as the bigotry that supports it.
This is a petition3 for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ resolutions dated July 27, 20114 and November 10, 20115 in CA-G.R. SP No. 120251. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, Rodolfo Bartolome, and Ruby Anne Bartolome’s6 petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order7 denying their petition for relief from judgment.
On January 9, 2001, Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint8 for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City.
The Spouses Morales alleged that on March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome loaned P500,000.00 from them. The Spouses Bartolome agreed to pay within two months with interest of five percent (5%) per month. To secure their loan, the Spouses Bartolome mortgaged9 the Bago Bantay property to the Spouses Morales.
The period to pay lapsed without the Spouses Bartolome having paid their loan. After demand, the Spouses Bartolome only paid part of the loaned amount.
In the meantime, the Spouses Bartolome died. The Spouses Morales, thus, filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome.
The Spouses Morales sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented herself as Lita Bartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend money to the Spouses Bartolome.10 Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate heirs of the Spouses Bartolome. Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo Bartolome’s wife.
In their answer,11 defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage covering the Bago Bantay property, specifically, the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the instrument. They added that the complaint was already barred since it had been dismissed in another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for failure to comply with an order of the trial court.
In its decision12 dated December 22, 2009, the trial court ordered defendants to pay the Spouses Morales P500,000.00 plus 7% interest per month and costs of suit within 90 days but not more than 120 days from entry of judgment. Should defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
Defendants received a copy of the trial court’s decision on January 29, 2010.
On February 8, 2010, defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision. They amended their motion for reconsideration and filed a request for a Philippine National Police handwriting expert to examine the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s alleged signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage.
According to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its amendment were pro forma as defendants failed to specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that were not supported by the evidence or contrary to law.
Thus, in its order14 dated May 25, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, its amendment, and the request for a handwriting expert.
Defendants received a copy of the May 25, 2010 order on June 24, 2010.
On August 11, 2010, defendants filed a notice of appeal. In its order15 dated August 13, 2010, the trial court denied due course the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. According to the trial court, defendants, through their counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon, received a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24, 2010. This is evidenced by the registry return receipt on file with the court. Consequently, they had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to appeal the trial court’s decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-day period to appeal.
In its order18 dated April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court held that the petition for relief was filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On July 13, 2011, Madarang, Romeo, and Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome filed the petition for certiorari 19 with the Court of Appeals. In its resolution20 dated July 27, 2011, the appellate court denied outright the petition for certiorari . The Court of Appeals found that petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari .
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution21 dated November 10, 2011.
Petitioners filed the petition22 for review on certiorari with this court. They argue that they need not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment because the questions they raised in the petition for relief were pure questions of law. They cite Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals23 as authority.
Petitioners add that the trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal. They personally received a copy of the decision only on August 11, 2011. They argue that the period to file on appeal must be counted from August 11, 2011, not on the day their “ailing counsel”24 received a copy of the decision.
A comment25 was filed on the petition for review on certiorari by respondents Spouses Morales. They argue that the trial court did not err in declaring pro forma petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision.
Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition for certiorari since petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment.
II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright petitioners’ petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.
In Gesulgon v. National Labor Relations Commission,28 the Labor Arbiter ordered Mariscor Corporation to reinstate Edwin Gesulgon as chief cook on board one of its vessels. Mariscor Corporation had notice of the decision on March 27, 1987, but it did not appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Since decisions of Labor Arbiters become final 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision, the decision became final on April 6, 1987.
On February 28, 1989, Mariscor Corporation filed a motion to set aside judgment with the National Labor Relations Commission. The Commission treated the motion as a petition for relief from judgment and granted the petition for relief from judgment. It remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
In Spouses Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Voluntad,30 the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan rendered a decision against the Spouses Reyes’ predecessors-in-interest. The decision became final on December 8, 1995. The Spouses Reyes had notice of the decision on May 30, 1997 when they received a Court of Appeals order directing them to comment on the petition for certiorari filed by respondents heirs of Voluntad. Attached to the Court of Appeals’ order was a copy of the trial court’s decision.
That with due respect to the Honorable Court, the decision is contrary to law & to the defendants[’] evidence presented in court. Hence, this urgent motion.
Petitioners cannot argue that the period to appeal should be counted from August 11, 2011, the day petitioners personally received a copy of the trial court’s decision. Notice of judgment on the counsel of record is notice to the client.35 Since petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the decision on January 29, 2010, the period to appeal shall be counted from that date.
Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment.
Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable negligence.
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period was “a mistake and an excusable negligence due to [their former counsel’s] age.”40 This argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens. It asks this court to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence. This cannot be done.
Petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision on June 24, 2010.42 Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010,43 the trial court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
In its resolution dated July 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment. We agree with the appellate court.
Section 1. Petition for certiorari .
In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners failed to avail themselves of this remedy. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari .
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ resolutions dated July 27, 2011 and November 10, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 120251 are AFFIRMED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr.,*and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
1Insular Life Savings and Trust Company v. Spouses Runes, 479 Phil. 995, 1006 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
2Guevarra v. Spouses Bautista, 593 Phil. 20, 26 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
4 Id. at 32-35. This resolution was penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring.
6 Romeo Bartolome is represented by Rodolfo Bartolome and Ruby Anne Bartolome as evidenced by the General Power of Attorney dated December 11, 1997, rollo, pp. 63-64.
7 This order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 222, Quezon City.
12 Id. at 77-82. This decision was penned by Presiding Judge Edgar Dalmacio Santos.
23 361 Phil. 566, 576 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
26 Spouses Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 557 Phil. 241, 248 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, First Division].
27Gesulgon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 561, 567-568 [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division], citing Turqueza v. Hernando, 186 Phil. 333 (1980) [Per J. Teehankee, First Division].
28 G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 561 [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division].
30 557 Phil. 241 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, First Division].
33 Rules of Court, Rule 37, sec. 2.
34 Rules of Court, Rule 37, sec. 2.
35Torres v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 134, 149 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
36 Insular Life Savings and Trust Company v. Spouses Runes, 479 Phil. 995, 1006 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
38Guevarra v. Bautista, 593 Phil. 20, 26 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
41 Guevarra v. Bautista, 593 Phil. 20, 26 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
44 574 Phil. 481 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
47Bentulan v. Bentulan-Mercado, 487 Phil. 364, 376 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division], citing Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al., 125 Phil. 701 (1967) [Per J. Bengzon, J.P., En Banc].
48 361 Phil. 566 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.