Source: https://fr.scribd.com/document/121524829/Dunes-West-Golf-Club-LLC-v-Town-of-Mount-Pleasant-No-2011-194211-S-C-Jan-9-2013
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:20:22+00:00

Document:
G. Trenholm Walker and Katie Fowler Monoc, both of Pratt-Thomas Walker, PA, of Charleston, for Appellant. Frances I. Cantwell, of Regan and Cantwell, LLC, of Charleston, and David G. Pagliarini, of Hinchey Murray & Pagliarini, LLC, of Daniel Island, for Respondent.
acres. As more fully described below, in 2006, the Town of Mount Pleasant amended its zoning ordinance to create the Conservation Recreation Open Space zoning district, which imposed land-use restrictions on all golf course properties in Mount Pleasant, permitting only recreation and conservation uses. Appellant desired to carve out residential lots on the golf course property by designating several noncontiguous parcels as potential home sites. Although Appellant has presented varying acreage amounts and has failed to identify specifically what portion of the golf course property it seeks to develop,1 it is clear residential development would require significant alterations to the golf course area of play. Because the new zoning designation did not permit construction of new homes, Appellant sought to have the golf course property rezoned to allow residential development. The Town denied the rezoning request, and Appellant filed suit, claiming the Town's actions violated its equal protection and due process rights, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its property. Following discovery, the Town of Mount Pleasant successfully moved for summary judgment. We have carefully reviewed each assignment of error and find summary judgment was properly granted. With this synopsis in mind, we now discuss the relevant facts and applicable law in detail. I. The Dunes West Development ("Development") is located on 4,518 acres of land within Respondent Town of Mount Pleasant ("Town"). The principal of Appellant Dunes West Golf Club, LLC ("Appellant"), John Weiland, through other corporate entities, purchased the undeveloped residential lots and the master developer rights to the Development in 2002, and thereafter invested considerable sums repairing the Development's infrastructure and updating its amenities. This appeal concerns only a small portion of the Developmentnamely, the 256 acres laid out over six contiguous tax map parcels that comprise the Dunes West Golf Course, related facilities and the immediately surrounding property, which we will refer to as the "Golf Course Property." Appellant acquired the Golf Course Property in 2005,2 Appellant's various proposals are best described as a moving-target approach, which we discuss fully in the body of this opinion. In essence, Appellant has failed to identify precisely what property is the subject of this lawsuit, as it has given widely varying representations, ranging from 16.48 acres to 17.86 acres to 25.16 acres to 60.4 acres.
and at that time, the Development and the Golf Course Property were subject to the zoning requirements of the Dunes West Planned Development ("DWPD"), which permits flexible land use at the developer's discretion.3 According to Weiland, at the time Appellant acquired the Golf Course Property, he believed the golf course was an important amenity for the Development4 and that there was unused land located on and around the golf course that had potential for residential development. It is this potentially developable land on the Golf Course Property that is at the center of this case. Weiland initially identified these developable portions of the Golf Course Property by instructing an employee to walk the property and make note of any undeveloped areas outside the out-of-bounds markers on the golf course.5 This informal sold to a separate owner. Since initial construction in the early 1990s, the Golf Course Property has been used continuously for golf purposes with few, if any, changes.
The DWPD is a site-specific development plan allowing considerable flexibility regarding land use. Essentially, the DWPD master land-use plan provides for mixed uses throughout the Development and sets forth amounts of land assigned for particular uses but in no particular locations. Accordingly, the location of a particular use is determined at the developer's discretion and may be changed or shifted, essentially without Town oversight so long as minor development standards, such as setback requirements, are met and the overall density of the 4,518-acre development does not increase. For a detailed discussion regarding the characteristics of planned development districts in general, see Sinkler v. County of Charleston, 387 S.C. 67, 690 S.E.2d 777 (2010). Weiland also believed the golf course was an important recreational feature to attract future residents of the Development and that continuity of ownership between the Development and the golf course was desirable to protect his substantial investments in the 4,518 acre Development.
beyond the out-of bounds markers as "good dirt" or developable land. Weiland stated that he "made the assumption that everything that was beyond those boundaries w[as] right for development."
only recreation and conservation uses and prohibits residential development.6 According to a Town planning commission staff report: Rezoning all [golf] courses to CR-O or amending the PDs would not necessarily prevent future development of the golf course properties. It would provide that the owner of the course would be subject to the rezoning process including a public hearing should the owner desire to redevelop part or all of the golf course for some other type of development. Town Council approval would be required. See Town of Mt. Pleasant Planning Comm'n Public Hearing (April 19, 2006) (statement of Christiane Farrell, Div. Chief, Mt. Pleasant Planning Dep't). During the public hearing process on the proposed CRO Ordinance, Appellant voiced its opposition to including the entirety of the Golf Course Property in the CRO designation, claiming a total of 60.4 acres was not "part of the golf course" and was suitable for residential development. Appellant contended this 60.4 acres should remain subject to the DWPD's flexible floating zoning. However, no plat or survey of the proposed developable land existed at that time, and no graphic or other pictorial depiction of those areas was ever presented to the Town. The Town's zoning administrator testified at deposition that: [I]t would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for [the Town] to decide or to determine what was indeedwhat the developer considered developable land, not a part of the golf course, unless they showed it to us. And to my knowledge, that didn't occur until later on in the process [after the enactment of the CRO ordinance]. Following the public hearing process, the Mount Pleasant Town Council ("Council") voted to amend the Town's zoning ordinance to create the new CRO zoning district. See Town of Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Ordinance No. 06031 (June 14, 2006). Using tax-map-parcel boundaries, the Town identified the land parcels The various recreational uses permitted in a CRO district include: golf courses, driving ranges, tennis courts, play fields, swimming pools and park land. Accessory uses, such as club houses, restroom and locker room facilities, snack bars, and parking areas, are also permitted. See Town of Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Code 156.333(B).
comprising part of any one of the Town's five golf courses, and either by way of direct rezoning or an amendment to the relevant planned development, each of those parcels was designated as a CRO district. See Town of Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Ordinance Nos. 06032 (Patriot's Point Golf Course); 06033 (Snee Farm Country Club); 06034 (Charleston National Country Club); 06035 (Dunes West Golf Club); 06036 (Rivertowne Country Club) (June 14, 2006). At Dunes West, the new CRO district was comprised solely of the 256-acre Golf Course Property. Following this amendment, the Golf Course Property was no longer subject to the flexible floating zoning of the DWPD. Instead, that land was subject to the use limitations of the CRO Ordinance, which did not permit residential development. In 2008, Appellant submitted a rezoning petition seeking residential development of a portion of the Golf Course Property. This time, Appellant claimed that 17.93 noncontiguous acres located within the Golf Course Property were developable for residential lots. The location of the acreage sought to be rezoned fell within areas of play of the golf course and would have required extensive alterations to the course.7 The rezoning petition also contemplated filling wetlands and the abandonment of an easement not owned by Appellant. In addition, at the time of Appellant's rezoning request, there were approximately 1,200 available lots outside the Golf Course Property in the Development designated for residential use. Appellant's petition prompted spirited public debate. The planning commission recommended that Appellant's proposal be denied by Council on the basis that it did not comport with the rezoning criteria set forth in the Town's Code of The 2008 proposal included relocation of the teeing areas of four different holes, which would result in the reduction of the ninth hole from a par-four to a par-three hole and the eleventh hole from a par-five to a par-four hole. Additionally, that proposal would have required the reconfiguration of the putting greens for two holes, clearing various wooded areas, and relocation of approximately 1,700 linear feet of cart path, partly to areas without existing cart-path easements. Appellant's desire to maximize development prompted it to propose adding various lots in such close proximity to the course that installation of almost 1,000 linear feet of safety netting would be required along the tenth hole and the practice range to protect nearby homes from errant golf shots.
Ordinances. See Town of Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Code 156.031(C) (providing the factors for consideration by the planning commission for rezoning requests, including: the relationship of the request to the Town's comprehensive plan; whether the request violates or supports the comprehensive plan; whether the uses permitted by the proposed change would be appropriate in the area concerned; whether adequate public facilities and infrastructure exist or could be provided in the area of the proposed development; the amount of vacant land in the vicinity currently classified for similar development; and whether the proposed change is consistent with the land development regulations of the Town). However, Appellant withdrew its rezoning petition prior to its submission for Council's consideration. In April 2009, Appellant submitted another petition, this time seeking rezoning of 16.48 acres of noncontiguous land to permit residential development. Like the 2008 petition, the 2009 proposal included acreage within areas of play that would have required the filling of wetlands, the abandonment of easements it did not own, and many of the same extensive alterations to the golf course involved in the previous rezoning petition.8 Spirited public debate again ensued, with Town residents strongly opposing the request. Ultimately, Council denied Appellant's rezoning petition. Appellant filed the underlying suit, claiming the Town's actions in designating the entirety of the Golf Course Property as a CRO district and refusing its rezoning petition amounted to a taking of 60.4 acres of the Golf Course Property and violated Appellant's substantive due process and equal protection rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on each of Appellant's claims, which Appellant now appeals. II. A trial court properly grants summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving These necessary alterations include reconfiguration of the fairway of the tenth hole, shortening the ninth and eleventh holes, including reducing the eleventh hole from a par-five to a par-four hole, moving several tee boxes, and relocating the maintenance shed and numerous cart paths throughout the Golf Course Property.
deprivation of the property interest must fall so far beyond the outer boundaries of legitimate governmental authority that no process could remedy the deficiency." Id. "Every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; and a statute will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution." McMaster, 395 S.C. at 504, 719 S.E.2d at 663. "A legislative body does not deny due process simply because it does not permit a landowner to make the most beneficial use of its property." Harbit, 382 S.C. at 394, 675 S.E.2d at 782. "Courts cannot become city planners but can only correct injustices when they are clearly shown to result from municipal action." Knowles v. City of Aiken, 305 S.C. 219, 222, 407 S.E.2d 639, 642 (1991). "In order to successfully assault a city's zoning decision, a citizen must establish that the decision was arbitrary and unreasonable." Id. at 224, 407 S.E.2d at 642. "And in the context of a zoning action involving property, it must be clear that the state's action 'has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense.'" Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928)). 1. Facial Substantive Due Process In its facial substantive due process challenge, Appellant argues the trial court erred by applying an "arbitrary and capricious" standard rather than the freestanding "substantially advances" standard test it claims was set forth in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). Further, Appellant contends summary judgment was improperly granted because there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the CRO ordinance "substantially advances" a legitimate Town interest. We find the trial court did not err by applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Further, we find the CRO Ordinance is not arbitrary or capricious and, in any event, the ordinance substantially advances numerous legitimate Town purposes. We therefore hold the Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(1) To provide for, and permit, an appropriate valuation by the tax assessor and/or land appraiser that reflects the conservation, recreation, and/or open space use of land. (2) To ensure the preservation of conservation, recreation, and/or open space use of land against undesirable development. (3) To lessen the hazards and loss of property, life, and the reduction of health and safety due to periodic inundation of flood waters, by restricting or prohibiting uses in those areas. (4) To provide opportunities for improved public and/or private recreation activities. (5) To provide for a community-wide network of open space, buffer zones, and recreation spaces. Town of Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Code 156.333(A). Joel Foard, the director of the Town's planning and development department, testified at deposition that, although he did not know of any studies conducted specifically with regard to drafting the CRO Ordinance, the Town "had a long history of trying to preserve open space." Foard further testified that, since the mid-1980s, the Town extensively studied open space preservation through various master planning and comprehensive planning processes, including the creation of the Mount Pleasant Open Space Foundation to assess the need for and existence of open space areas within the Town on an ongoing basis. "The burden of proving the invalidity of a zoning ordinance is on the party attacking it, and it is incumbent on respondent to show the arbitrary and capricious character of the ordinance through clear and convincing evidence." Town of Scranton v. Willoughby, 306 S.C. 421, 422, 412 S.E.2d 424, 425 (1991). "[I]n cases requiring a heightened burden of proof . . . the non-moving party must submit more than a mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Hancock v. Mid-S. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 330-31, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009).
Appellant claims the trial court erred in analyzing its substantive due process claim under the "arbitrary and capricious" framework instead of pursuant to a "substantially advances" theory. We disagree. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the United States Supreme Court stated that regulation of private property "effects a taking if [it] does not substantially advance [a] legitimate state interes[t]," and concluded that, under the facts of that case, no taking occurred because the challenged zoning ordinances "substantially advance legitimate governmental goals." 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980). Twenty-five years later, in Lingle, the Supreme Court "correct[ed] course" and clarified that "the 'substantially advances' formula was derived from due process, not takings precedents." 544 U.S. at 540 (noting that "a municipal zoning ordinance would survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare'") (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926)). Justice Kennedy concurred separately in Lingle, specifically noting that although the Supreme Court had "no occasion to consider" whether the challenged regulation violated due process,9 the majority opinion was not meant to "foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process," and noted "[t]he failure of a regulation to accomplish a stated or obvious objective would be relevant to that inquiry." Id. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Appellant argues the United States Supreme Court's Lingle decision establishes that the "substantially advances" theory is a new, freestanding due process test and that the trial court erred by applying the "arbitrary and capricious" due process framework in granting summary judgment. Although we acknowledge the potential relevance of a "substantially advances" inquiry within the due process analysis, we do not read the Lingle decision as abandoning the established "arbitrary and capricious" framework; rather, we view the "substantially advances" theory as embraced within the "arbitrary and capricious" analysis. See id. at 542 There was "no occasion to consider" that issue because the landowner had voluntarily dismissed its due process claim below and argued only a "substantially advances" theory in support of its takings claim on appeal.
its residential development rights in the Golf Course Property Land were vested at the time of the downzoning "is irrelevant to a substantive due process analysis," and claims it possesses a constitutionally protected property right by virtue of its title to the Golf Course Property. Initially, we find Appellant's argument is not procedurally appropriate.11 Further, because Appellant lacks a property interest in the former PD zoning classification, the Town's act of rezoning of the Golf Course Property did not, and could not, deprive Appellant of any right. See Friarsgate, Inc. v. Town of Irmo, 290 S.C. 266, 269-70, 349 S.E.2d 891, 893 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[A] contemplated use of property by a landowner on the date a zoning ordinance becomes effective is not protected."). Therefore, Appellant's due process challenge fails as a matter of law. Appellant possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in the context of its substantive due process claim and in evaluating Appellant's claimed investment backed expectations, as discussed below, concerning its taking claim. Appellant has abandoned its previous argumentnamely, that it possessed a vested development right prior to the 2006 rezoning of its property. See Biales v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 168, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1993) ("Failure to argue is an abandonment of the issue and precludes consideration on appeal."). Further, Appellant argues for the first time to this Court that its title to the Golf Course Property, rather than its specific right to use and develop the property, forms the requisite property interest upon which a substantive due process challenge may be based. Appellant cannot present this argument for the first time on appeal. See Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC, v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 330, 730 S.E.2d 282, 287 (2012) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review."). Moreover, before the trial court, Appellant took the position that a vested right was required to establish a substantive due process violation. Appellant may not argue a different position on appeal. See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 657, 723 S.E.2d 198, 204 (2012) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal."). Further, on the merits, we agree that title to land is a property interest cognizable under state law; however, we disagree that, under these facts, the CRO ordinance abrogates that interest in any way because the ordinance merely restricts the manner in which Appellant may use its property in the future and in no way affects Appellant's title to the land.
granted as to both theories, as such a determination is a question of law for the court. See Ex Parte Brown, 393 S.C. 214, 224, 711 S.E.2d 899, 904 (2011)("The question of a taking is one of law."). 1. Relevant Parcel As an initial matter, Appellant claims the trial court erred in considering, for the purposes of its takings analysis, the relevant parcel to include all 256 acres of the Golf Course Property. Appellant argues that only the discrete portion it seeks to develop for residential use should be considered. The obstacle Appellant presents here concerning its "discrete portion" argument is that we cannot tell what that portion is. Before this lawsuit was filed Appellant presented varying acreage amounts as the affected areas of the Golf Course Property for residential development. Those varying acreage amounts ranged from 16.48 acres to 17.86 acres to 25 acres. In its complaint, Appellant asserted that "[a]pproximately 60.4 acres of the Parcels is developable land outside the areas of play of the Golf Course." Before the trial court, Appellant presented a figure of 25 acres. On appeal, Appellant's brief contains inconsistent acreage representations, ranging from 25 to 60 acres. Before determining whether a taking has occurred, a court must first determine what, precisely, is the property at issue. See Dist. Intown Props. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Under both Lucas and Penn Central, then, we must first define what constitutes the relevant parcel before we can evaluate the regulation's effect on that parcel."). "The definition of the relevant parcel profoundly influences the outcome of the takings analysis." Id. at 880. "Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property 'whose value is owner's distinct investment-backed expectations; the economic impact of the regulation; and the character of the government action. Id. at 124. Based on those factors, the United States Supreme Court found no taking occurred by denying the owner's right to exploit the air space above the terminal; rather, "[t]he restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities to further enhance not only the Terminal site but also other [adjacent] properties [owned by appellants]." Id. at 138.
takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of property rights. . . . Its value is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the surface." 480 U.S. at 50001. In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has declined to resolve the uncertainty and confusion involved in determining the relevant parcel based on the particular circumstances presented by each case. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (noting "[Petitioner's] contention asks us to examine the difficult, persisting question of what is the proper denominator in the takings fraction. Some of our cases indicate that the extent of the deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured against the value of the parcel as a whole, but we have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of this rule, a sentiment echoed by some commentators," but declining to resolve the question on issue preservation grounds); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 n.7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured. . . . Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.").
lingering uncertainty has led some courts to stand firm in the seemingly safe refuge of the parcel-as-a-whole approach in analyzing takings claims.17 See, e.g., Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Wis. 1996) ("[T]he United States However, other courts have found United States Supreme Court jurisprudence to be more nuanced and concluded that "[t]he effort should be to identify the parcel as realistically and fairly as possible, given the entire factual and regulatory environment." Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318-19 (1991) ("Factors such as the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, the extent to which the protected lands enhance the value of remaining lands, and no doubt many others would enter the calculus."). Accord Dist. Intown Props., 198 F.3d at 880 (noting that "[a]bove all, the parcel should be functionally coherent," and finding relevant factors to be "the degree of continuity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which the restricted lots benefit the unregulated lot[s]"); Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("With regard to the relevant parcel, our precedent displays a flexible approach, designed to account for factual nuances. . . . Where the developer treats legally separate parcels as a single economic unit, together they may constitute the relevant parcel."); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (1994) (rejecting a bright-line rule to define the relevant property in the context of a takings challenge and employing a "flexible approach, designed to account for factual nuances"); Giovanella v. Conserv. Comm'n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 457-58 (Mass. 2006) (finding "the extent of contiguous commonlyowned property gives rise to a rebuttable presumption defining the relevant parcel" which may be overcome to either increase or decrease the size of the parcel by the application of various factors including whether the property is divided by a road; whether the property was acquired at the same time; whether the purchase and financing of parcels were linked; the timing of development; whether the land is put to the same use or different uses; whether the owner intended to or actually did use the property as one economic unit; and the treatment of the property under state law); Quirk v. Town of New Boston, 663 A.2d 1328, 1332-33 (N.H. 1995) (noting the relevant property may be a discrete portion of a larger tract where the landowner has fragmented the property into distinct segments before the regulatory environment existed or where portions of the larger tract have already been dedicated to benefit the public but finding no compelling reason to view a single parcel as discrete segments where the landowner had never treated the affected area as distinct from the unaffected portion of the property).
This evidence is the deposition testimony of Kevin Popson, Appellant's Rule 30(b)(6), SCRCP, witness as to general matters.
This evidence is the deposition testimony of J.T. McMickle, Appellant's Rule 30(b)(6), SCRCP, witness as to financial matters. Although the record also contains several appraisals valuing the Golf Course Property at $3,798,000, $3,840,000, and $4,900,000, our analysis is based on a valuation of $3,500,000, which is the lowest figure and the one most favorable to Appellant.
of ownership that are not properly considered a taking); Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that redevelopment ordinances, "even if they result in a decline in property values, do not constitute a taking requiring compensation to the property owner"). Lastly, the factor concerning Appellant's investment backed expectations militates against Appellant. "[C]ontinuation of the existing use of the property is the property owner's 'primary expectation' when considering an owner's investmentbacked expectations for the property." See Carolina Chloride, 394 S.C. at 173, 714 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting Byrd, 365 S.C. at 662, 620 S.E.2d at 82). Further, "[a] 'reasonable investment-backed expectation' must be more than a 'unilateral expectation or an abstract need.'" Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting Webb's Famous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)). All of the evidence in the record shows the only use to which the Golf Course Property has ever been put is a golf course. As such, continued use as a golf course is necessarily Appellant's primary expectation, which was not impaired in any way by the enactment of the CRO Ordinance; rather, the CRO Ordinance was designed specifically to preserve that existing use. Moreover, Appellant has failed to produce any evidence showing its "expectations" were reasonable or investment-backed. In acquiring the valuable Golf Course Property, Appellant only casually approached the idea of converting a portion of the property to residential development and never submitted any formal development plan or subdivision plat to the Town in furtherance of its abstract desire. Further, Weiland did not investigate, prior to purchase or anytime thereafter, the feasibility of the desired developmentthus, it is clear Appellant's unilateral development expectations did not take into account the wetlands, easements, or substantial changes to the golf course that would be required. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Town took any action or made any representation which served to increase Appellant's expectations or led Appellant to believe that residential use would be forthcoming. To the contrary, Weiland knew, before purchasing the Golf Course Property, that public sentiment regarding any residential development would be a factor in its approval, notwithstanding the prior PD zoning designation. Next, the Vested Rights Act presented a potential opportunity to achieve the goal of residential development Appellant now seeks, yet Appellant offers no explanation for letting the opportunity pass without even attempting to avail itself of that prospect.
Further, as to the investment-backed aspect, the record is devoid of any evidence showing Appellant substantially relied or materially altered its position based on the prior PD zoning or its desire to develop residentially a portion of the Golf Course Property. Although Appellant claims significant expenditures were made, none of those expenditures were in furtherance of residential development; rather, all of the evidence in the record shows money spent in furtherance of the existing recreational use of the Golf Course Property.20 Although the record shows Appellant prepared preliminary projection of costs and revenues associated with residential development of the Golf Course Property, there is no evidence that any of those expenditures were actually incurred. Indeed, the only objective, overt act appearing in the record is Appellant's informal identification of potential future home sites, and to the extent any costs were incurred during that process, Appellant failed to submit any such evidence. For government regulation to constitute a taking, the property owner must objectively demonstrate the existence investment-backed expectations. Therefore, Appellant's effort to elevate its anticipated development prospects to the level of tangible, investment-backed expectations is unavailing. Appellant has failed to show any concrete steps taken in furtherance of prospective residential development. Rather, we are presented with a unilateral expectation unsupported by the kind of solid evidence necessary to establish a regulatory taking. This lack of evidence is perhaps best illustrated by Appellant's ever-changing approach in identifying what portion of the Golf Course Property it wants to develop. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 267-68 (stating "an accurate description of the property taken is essential" and, in the absence of a precise description, refusing to identify the relevant property through "conjecture rather than a conclusion from the evidence"); Cothran, 357 S.C. at 217-19, 592 S.E.2d at 633 (noting that a party cannot take inconsistent positions in an attempt to create a sham issue of material fact).
The record includes an itemized list of Appellant's expenditures for the period of time between 2005 and 2009; however, none of these expenditures was in furtherance of residential development. Rather, the bulk of expenditures related to maintenance and renovation of the clubhouse (i.e. the installation of various new lighting fixtures and new tile and carpet) and acquisition of new equipment for golf course operations (i.e. the purchase of 77 golf carts and various pieces of landscaping equipment), with a small portion being devoted to purchasing office supplies (i.e. a Xerox copy machine and several computers).
In short, the 256-acre Golf Course Property remains a valuable property, not only as a golf course, but also for other, related uses permitted by the CRO designation. Appellant is essentially left to argue that its takings claim is founded upon only its inability to exploit certain portions of the Golf Course Property for residential development. As the Penn Central Court noted, "the submission that appellants may establish a taking simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development is quite simply untenable." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. We reject Appellant's regulatory taking claim. In sum, we find the Town was legitimately concerned about the possibility that golf courses could be converted to residential use without any land-use oversight, and in response to those concerns, the Town simply "adjust[ed] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good" in a way that incidentally impacted Appellant's ability to maximize the profit from the development of its land. Id. at 124. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town. AFFIRMED. PLEICONES, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE, BEATTY, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.