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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:41:30+00:00

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HENCYE V. WHITE, ET AL.
A Domestic Violence Order had been entered against Husband, after which Wife filed a post-divorce motion requesting a parenting coordinator. Extensive litigation followed, including several motions for contempt and requests for attorney fees. Despite the fact that no active custody motion was before the court, Husband pursued numerous discovery requests, many of which were focused on obtaining financial information from Wife’s boyfriend and later husband (herein “boyfriend”). Husband requested attorney fees for Wife’s and boyfriend’s failure to comply with discovery in the amount of $24,847.91. The trial court ordered Wife to pay $8,000 towards Husband’s attorney fees. Wife appealed and Husband cross-appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the circumstances of this case do not justify any award of attorney fees. The American Rule, upheld in Rumpel v. Rumpel, requires parties’ to pay their own fees and costs. Rumpel v. Rumpel, 428 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Ky. 2014). There are two narrowly construed exceptions to the American Rule pertinent herein.
KRS 403.220 allows for an award of attorney fees based on disparity in income between the parties. In this case, the trial court did not make any finding that there was a disparity in income. Additionally, the trial court failed to consider other relevant factors including Husband’s obtrusive tactics and conduct.
CR 37.01 allows courts to require a party who fails to respond to discovery to pay for the other party’s reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining discovery, but makes an exception for when the parties’ refusal is “substantially justified” or when “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” In this case, Husband was not entitled to attorney fees to compel discovery because he should not have been permitted to conduct the discovery in the first place. The Court of Appeals cites the ruling in Combs v. Daugherty, which prevents a party post-decree from engaging in discovery when no motion is pending. Combs v. Daugherty,170 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Ky. App. 2005). There was no pending motion when Husband made his discovery requests. Thus, the Court of Appeals concludes the sole purpose of the requests was to harass Wife and boyfriend.
Finally, the Court of Appeals notes that the trial court could not order Wife to pay attorney fees for boyfriend’s noncompliance with discovery. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the $8,000 award of attorney fees rendering Husband’s cross-appeal moot.
Maternal grandmother filed action for visitation against child’s aunt and uncle who had possession of the child, as well as biological parents of child. The trial court denied grandmother’s request for visitation rights and she appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling denying visitation and remanded holding the trial court failed to consider all of the necessary factors under Kentucky law. The Court of Appeals used a less stringent standard than the clear and convincing standard set forth in Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862 (Ky. 2012) because aunt and uncle were denying grandparent visitation not biological parents who did not respond to the court action.
Aunt and uncle were granted discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Supreme Court fist addresses the appropriate legal standard finding grandmother failed to preserve the issue for appeal. The “clear and convincing” standard was used in the trial court proceedings and grandmother failed to object.
Next the Supreme Court turns to the Court of Appeals holding that the trial court erred by failing to consider all of the factors under Kentucky law. Walker sets forth several factors for courts to utilize in determining whether or not grandparent visitation is in a child’s best interest, incorporating the U.S. Supreme Court case Troxel v. Grandville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). The Supreme Court holds that all of the Walker factors need not be considered. As is the case here, where the trial court considers several relevant factors and denies grandparent visitation its factual findings are not clearly erroneous. Grandmother failed to directly challenge any of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, therefore the Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and reinstates the trial court’s order.
Father is an NBA basketball player earning a salary of $1,434,665 and an additional $197,240 in endorsements. Mother, who has primary physical custody of daughter, earns $1,050 and lives with her parents and other family members. After finding the child had reasonable needs of $4,250 per month, the trial court ordered Father to pay $4,250 a month in child support. The order was retroactive to the month following the month in which Mother filed her original motion for child support.
Father appealed and the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the trial court’s order holding the retro-activity of the order was untenable and the trial court abused its discretion by not basing child support on the child’s responsible needs, stating the trial court relied on speculative evidence.
Mother sought and was granted discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upholds the trial court’s order of $4,250 per month in child support. The Supreme Court first states that this case is clearly not bound by the child support guidelines, as the combined income of Father and Mother surpasses the limits of the guidelines. Thus, child support is within the trial court’s discretion when considering the reasonable needs of the child.
The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court holding that the reasonable needs of the child were based on speculative evidence citing prior Appellate Court cases Bell v. Catwright, 277 S.W. 3d 631 (Ky. App. 2009) and Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. App. 2001). The Supreme Court holds that the Court of Appeals imposed an overly burdensome standard and inappropriately substituted its understanding of the child’s reasonable needs. The Supreme Court holds that on review “An order setting child support above the guidelines will be affirmed so long as the trial court sets out specific supportive findings and the award, as a whole , is reasonable in lights of those findings and the record.” In this case, the trial court properly held an evidentiary hearing and set forth specific facts supporting its child support award. The proof was not speculative just because some of the expenses had not yet been incurred by Mother.
The Supreme Court also upholds the retroactivity of the trial court’s child support award holding that the effective date of child support is undisputedly “within the sound discretion of the trial court” and the child’s reasonable needs did not begin with the entry of the court’s support order supporting the retroactivity of any child support order.
Mother and Father, each collecting disability, had a child with Down Syndrome and significant health issues. The parties agreed to pay child support per the Kentucky guidelines, but Father never made any payments to Mother for support of the child.
Via Domestic Relations Commissioner, the trial court held a hearing on child support and found Father’s income totaled $1,391 per month, while Mother’s income totaled $938 per month, thus under the guidelines Father’s obligation was $232 and Mother’s was $157. Considering Father’s ability to pay, the court reduced Father’s child support obligation to the statutory minimum of $60 per month. No evidence was heard regarding the expenses of Mother nor the needs of the child.
The Supreme Court recognizes that in the case at hand, the needs of the child exceed the abilities of either Father or Mother to pay. While the child’s needs would allow the court to deviate from the guidelines and increase support, the disabilities of both parents are a reason for a downward deviation. The Supreme Court holds that while deviation was appropriate, the trial court acted incorrectly in failing to consider Mother’s income and expenses, or the reasonable needs of the child. By decreasing Father’s support the trial court allocated 25% of the child support obligation to Father and 75% to Mother without giving any rationale. Thus, the Supreme remands the case to the trial court for consideration of the child’s reasonable need for support and the allocation of the support between each parent.
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in finding domestic violence occurred and was likely to occur again where husband threatened suicide multiple times in front of his wife and children. Husband argued that threatening to kill himself was insufficient to establish that he committed domestic violence and abuse. The Appellate Court cites an unpublished case that while a suicide threat is “not directed at hurting any family members, the inevitable consequence of such a statement is to terrorize the recipients of the information.” The Appellate Court held that the Trial Court’s DVO was proper and affirmed.
Mother and father's parental rights were terminated involuntarily by trial court after a hearing. While Mother and Father had counsel present at the hearing, counsel believed he had a conflict of interest and did not participate in the hearing. Although counsel asked to withdraw, the trial court did not allow his withdrawal and permitted the hearing to continue. The witnesses testifying on behalf of the Cabinet were not cross-examined. While counsel subsequently withdrew and separate counsel was appointed for mother and father, the witnesses were never subject to cross-examination.
The Court of Appeals holds that counsel's conflict of interest "constituted ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a new termination hearing." The court looks to KRS 625.080(3) and Z.T. v. M.T., holding that "in this Commonwealth, it is a fundamental right of parents facing termination of their parental rights to have counsel not only present but also conflict-free." Z.T. v. M.T., 258 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Ky.App. 2008). As mother and father were denied their statutory right to counsel because counsel had an actual conflict of interest, the court holds that prejudice is presumed. Therefore, the court reverses and remands the trial court's order providing that Mother and Father should be allowed a new termination hearing.
A DVO was entered by Fayette Family Court preventing father from exercising his parenting time as ordered by Whitley Circuit Court, the court with jurisdiction and venue over custody and visitation. Father filed a motion in the Whitley Court case requesting sole custody and for restoration of his visitation rights. Mother responded by filing an original action in the Court of Appeals asking for writs of prohibition pursuant to CR 76.36.
Mother asked for writs preventing the Whitley Court from enforcing its parenting time order, preventing the Whitley Court from “modifying, amending, vacating or reversing” the DVO, and mandating the Whitley Court honor the DVO.
The Court of Appeals first sets forth the standard for a writ of prohibition, holding a writ can only be granted when "(1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted." Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004).
The Court of Appeals declined to grant Mother's request for writs preventing the Whitley Court from enforcing its parenting time order and vacating, altering or amending the Fayette DVO. The Court of Appeals holds that there is no merit to Mother's argument as the Whitley Court has jurisdiction over custody and parenting time, and Mother has the right to an appeal should the Whitley Court act erroneously.
The Court of Appeals also declined to grant a writ mandating the Whitley Court honor the DVO, holding the DVO does not take precedence over the earlier custody and visitation order.
The Court of Appeals adds that the Fayette Court should have transferred the DVO case to Whitley, stating that "the best practice is for the court where the DVO was filed to transfer the DVO action to the court where the custody action is already pending."
In a previous related case, the Supreme Court held that Husband’s Kentucky teacher’s retirement account was considered marital property under KRS 403.190(1). Shown v. Shown, 233 S.W.3d 718 (Ky. 2007). Subsequently, the trial court divided the marital portion of husband’s retirement without consideration of the complex financial calculations used to make the distribution. In fact, the court took no proof on the issue and granted wife 50% of the marital portion of the account. Husband appealed arguing it was inequitable for the trial court to divide his teacher’s retirement account without considering its unique characteristics, primarily the fact that his teacher’s retirement is a substitution for social security. The Appellate Court agreed, reversing and remanding the matter to the trial court so that it can exercise its KRS 403.190 discretion and take expert testimony to "compute the present value of a Social Security benefit that Robert would have received had he contributed to Social Security. That value should be deducted from the present value of Robert's teachers' retirement, prior to division of the parties' pension plans."
Husband died many years after his divorce, but despite his remarriage, he had not removed his former wife as the beneficiary of his IRA. In the parties’ marital settlement agreement they had agreed to make “no claim upon any interest owned by the other, now or in the future” of their Individual Retirement Accounts.
The court looks to the holdings made in Ping, Hughes and Napier and extends their precedent to the retirement account context. The Supreme Court holds a divorce alone does not give rise to a presumption an ex-spouse is removed as a beneficiary of a retirement account; however, parties have the power to divest an interest of a beneficiary by agreement. The agreement must be clear and unambiguous and a general waiver is not enough. In this case, the parties clearly and unambiguously agreed to assign the exclusive ownership of the IRA to husband. Therefore, the former wife has no beneficiary interest in the IRA.
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. S.H,; V.N.M.J.R.N., A CHILD, ET AL.
The family court held a termination of parental rights hearing allowing a social worker to testify on behalf of CFHS with no prior notice to Mother. Mother objected arguing FCRPP 7(1) applied to a termination of parental rights hearing and she should have received 14 days-notice of the witnesses and their testimony. The family court ruled the termination hearing was not a permanent custody hearing and allowed the social worker to testify. Mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights arguing FCRPP 7(1) applied. The Court of Appeals agreed finding the error was not harmless and remanded, reversed and vacated the termination order.
The Ky Supreme Court granted discretionary review. CFHS argued FRCPP 7(1) did not apply because custody was not at issue. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals holding that custody is undoubtedly at issue and 7(1) applies to termination proceedings. Although the Supreme Court holds that the language of FRCPP 7(1) gives the trial judge discretion to alter the notice requirement, it agrees with the Court of Appeals that in this case the family court erred by allowing the social worker to testify.
Biological parents voluntarily placed children in Appellants' care during a custody dispute in which biological father was seeking sole custody in an action for dissolution of marriage. Father was granted sole custody of the children. Appellants returned children to biological father and filed a petition requesting status as de facto custodians under KRS 403.270.
The Court of Appeals held the trial incorrectly interpreted KRS 403.270 as requiring the de facto custodians to have possession of the children when filing a petition for de facto status. A person asking for status as a de facto custodian need not have physical possession of the child, but must have had physical possession, as the primary caregiver and financial support, of the child for at least six months.
However, this case, the Appellants did not meet the six month requirement because during the time the children were in their care there was an ongoing custody dispute. Under KRS 403.270 “any period of time after a legal proceeding has been commenced by a parent seeking to regain custody of the child shall not be included in determining whether the child has resided with the person for the required minimum period.” Thus, the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing Appellants' petition for de facto custodian status.
Grandparents assumed care of children, with the exception of a special needs child, after biological mother and biological father were both incarcerated. The special needs child was placed with friend of grandparents equipped to deal with his special medical needs. Grandparents filed motion to be designated as de facto custodians and for permanent custody of all three children. Biological father consented to grandparent’s motion for permanent custody and waived his right to appear at the hearing. After a hearing on the matter, the family court awarded grandparents permanent custody, finding biological father had waived his rights, biological mother was unfit to have custody, and it was in the best interest of the children for grandparents to have custody, although the grandparents were not de facto custodians.
Biological mother argues that the family court failed to prove she was an unfit parent, and therefore there are no grounds to award permanent custody to a non-parent. The court merely stated “The mother has a serious substance abuse problem,” while the mother provided testimony she as attended AA meetings, was sober, had passed all drug tests, maintained full-time employment, and cared for the children for almost the entire month of June after being released from prison. As the family court provided a conclusory statement regarding mother’s unfitness, and made no other findings of fact, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the order granting grandparents custody. Although not necessary, the Court of Appeals also notes the family court did not conduct a proper best interest analysis, as the court failed to address the factors set forth in KRS 403.270.
Where child receives social security retirement dependent benefits, and child support obligation of retired child support obligor is not modified, child support payor is entitled to a credit against child support. And, where such benefits are paid retroactively so there is a fund available for recoupement, trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering mother to reimburse father for the 22 months of dependent benefits paid in a lump sum.

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