Source: http://wv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180305_0000267.SWV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:48:32+00:00

Document:
FindACase | Treadway v. Bluestone Coal Corp.
Treadway v. Bluestone Coal Corp.
BLUESTONE COAL CORP., et al., Defendants.
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class, (Document 15), the Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Certify Class (Document 16), the Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class (Document 17), the Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Motion to Certify Class (Document 18), and all attached exhibits. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' motion should be granted.
More succinctly, Rule 23(a) requires a potential class plaintiff to show numerosity, common questions of law or fact, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Id. Rule 23(a) “ensures that the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate, ” and limits the class to those with claims “fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff.” Dukes v. Walmart Stores, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)). Rule 23(a) is not a “mere pleading standard.” Rather, the rule requires that “[a] party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance, ” by being “prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Id. at 2551.
“(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties of managing a class action.” Id.
A district court has broad discretion to decide whether to certify a class action under Rule 23, but the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in establishing all requirements of Rule 23. Leinhart v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 146 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996)); Int'l Woodworkers of Am. V. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259, 1267 (4th Cir. 1981). At the class certification phase, the district court must “take a close look” at the “facts relevant to the certification question, and, if necessary, make specific findings” relevant to certification. Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Co., 445 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 2004)). These findings are necessary, even if “the issues tend to overlap into the merits of the underlying case.” Id., citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 (“[S]ometimes it may be necessary for the [district] court to probe beyond the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.”); Gariety, 368 F.3d at 366.
B. The WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. §2102 et seq.

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