Source: https://iclg.com/practice-areas/product-liability-laws-and-regulations/england-and-wales
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:55:34+00:00

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Product liability claims may be made under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (“CPA”), in negligence or in respect of breach of contract. Although claims can be made in respect of the breach of some statutory obligations, such as certain duties imposed by product safety and health and safety legislation, consumer fraud legislation does not give rise to private law rights to claim compensation.
The CPA, which implements the Product Liability Directive, 85/374/EEC, in the UK, imposes liability on the producer of defective products for damage caused by the defect. A product is defective if it is not as “safe as persons generally are entitled to expect”, taking account of all of the circumstances, including any instructions or warnings provided with the product and the manner in which it has been marketed. Recent authority suggests that this assessment depends on the facts of the case, but that a wide range of factors may be relevant circumstances, including compliance with regulatory requirements, whether the risks could be avoided, and the risks-benefit balance in the case of medicinal products where safety is always relative (Wilkes v Depuy International Limited  EWHC 3096). This conflicts with an earlier decision that adopted a much narrower approach to the assessment of defect (A and Others v The National Blood Authority and Others  3 All ER 298 (the so-called “Hepatitis C” case). Liability is strict: it is not necessary to prove that the manufacturer was at fault in causing the defect. The Claimant need only prove a defect and a causal relationship between the defect and the injury.
Claims may only be brought under the CPA in respect of products put into circulation (i.e. entering the distribution chain) after 1 March 1988. Claims relating to products supplied before this date must be brought in negligence or for breach of contract. Even if the dispute is governed by English law, the CPA may not apply to non-EEA claims (Allen v Depuy International Ltd  EWHC 753 (QB), where the court held that the CPA did not apply as the damage was caused outside the EEA, the Claimants had no connection with the EEA, and the defective product was supplied outside the EEA).
In order to establish negligence, it is necessary to prove that the Defendant owed a duty of care to the Claimant, that he breached that duty by failing to take reasonable care, and that the breach caused the damage complained of. Such claims are commonly brought against the manufacturer of a defective product, although they may also be brought against other parties in the supply chain, if fault can be established.
Claims for breach of contract may only be brought against the immediate supplier of the defective product to the person injured. Liability is strict where the contract has been breached and will depend upon the terms of the contract agreed between the parties or implied into the contract.
Consumer contracts are regulated by the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which provides consumers with certain statutory rights. All contracts to supply goods include a term that the goods are of satisfactory quality and comply with the description applied to them or a sample supplied. The goods must also be fit for any particular purpose made known by the consumer to the seller before the contract is concluded. However, the seller will not be liable for faults drawn to the buyer’s attention prior to the contract, or which should have been revealed by the buyer’s examination of the goods. There is a presumption that goods that malfunction during the first six months after delivery were in breach of contract at the time of supply. Public statements made by manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers of the product, for example, in labelling and advertising, must also be factually correct and form part of the retailer’s contract with the consumer. These statutory rights may not be excluded. Additional rights apply in respect of standard terms not individually negotiated with consumers.
Business to business contracts are regulated under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (“UCTA”). Although similar standard terms regarding the quality and description of the goods are implied into such contracts, businesses have greater flexibility to exclude liability under UCTA provided the exclusion is reasonable. However, liability under the CPA and for death or personal injury resulting from negligence can never be excluded in any contract, whether with a consumer or a business.
Claims for breach of statutory duty can be brought where the courts are satisfied that a statute was intended to create a private law right, actionable by an individual harmed by the breach. It is well established that claims can be made in respect of damage caused by the breach of many product safety and health and safety regulations. However, no such rights have been found to arise from breach of consumer statutes such as the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008, which regulate unfair commercial practices and the provision of trade descriptions and advertisements to consumers. To date, there has been no UK litigation similar to the consumer fraud litigation pursued in some US states. However, a new EU Commission proposal for a Directive providing for collective redress actions in cases of breach of EU consumer protection legislation was published on 11 April 2018. See question 4.4, below.
[Under the Vaccines Damage Payments Act 1979, fixed compensation is paid to persons suffering severe disablement as a result of certain vaccinations. Compensation schemes are also sometimes set up to resolve specific claims, e.g. the schemes relating to HIV and Hepatitis C contamination of blood products.
Under section 2 of the CPA, liability principally rests on the ‘producer’ (the manufacturer), the importer of the product into the EU, or an own brander (i.e. any person who, by labelling or the use of trademarks, holds himself out as being the producer of the product). The supplier (whether the retailer, distributor or a wholesaler) may be liable in place of the manufacturer if he fails to identify the producer or at least the person who supplied the product to him. In Case C-358/08, O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur SA, the CJEU said that the requirement is that “the supplier, against whom proceedings are brought by an injured person, inform the latter, on its own initiative and promptly, of the identity of the producer or its own supplier”. Whether these conditions are met is a factual matter to be determined by the national court. The CPA postulates the obligation to identify being triggered by a request by the Claimant and it is questionable whether the plain meaning of the words of the English statute can be interpreted in line with the CJEU’s ruling.
In negligence, fault rests on the party found to be negligent; this can be any person or organisation in the supply chain.
Contractual liability may be passed down the supply chain through a series of contractual agreements between the manufacturer, distributor, retail supplier, customer and others, depending on proof of breach of the contractual terms in each case and subject to any exclusion clauses.
In England and Wales, a public body charged with exercising a regulatory function in relation to public welfare may be liable for breach of statutory duty if a right to sue for breach of statutory duty is included or may be inferred from the relevant legislation. In limited circumstances, a regulatory body may be liable in negligence for the careless performance of its statutory duty. However, while a claim is possible in principle, the courts are generally reluctant to find that a duty of care arises (X v Bedfordshire CC  2 A.C. 633).
That situation may change, at least in relation to notified bodies and their responsibilities under the Medical Devices Directive (Directive 93/24/EEC), following the decision of the CJEU in Case C‑219/15 Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH. In that case, which involved faulty breast implants, the CJEU confirmed that the functions of notified bodies are intended "to protect the end users of medical devices", and stated that, where there is evidence that a device is not in compliance with EU standards, notified bodies are required to "take all the steps necessary" to ensure that they meet their obligations to ensure the device is in conformity with the directive. Whether a notified body may be found liable in respect of injury caused by a defective device is, however, determined by national law. Finally, it should be noted that the EU Medical Devices Regulation, which will become applicable from 2020, provides greater specificity surrounding the obligations of notified bodies and seems likely to increase their accountability in cases where defective devices result in injury to patients. The implications of the new Regulation so far as the UK is concerned are currently uncertain.
Claims for a failure to recall may be brought under the CPA, in negligence and in contract. A duty to withdraw unsafe products underpins the CPA as this imposes strict liability for defective products. Manufacturers/retailers may owe a duty of care in negligence to institute a recall or product withdrawal in appropriate cases. They owe a duty to keep the products they produce/supply under review and to warn of risks that come to light after the product has been supplied. If warnings are not adequate to manage the risk, the product may need to be modified or withdrawn.
Under the General Product Safety Regulations 2005 (the “GPS Regulations”), producers must ensure that they only place safe products on the market, and must take measures to manage any risks that are identified including, in appropriate cases, issuing warnings or withdrawing or recalling the product from the market. The GPS Regulations impose an obligation on producers and distributors to inform the authorities if a product is unsafe. Although the regulations impose criminal penalties, breach of the requirements may be of evidential value in supporting a civil claim.
Yes. Criminal sanctions are imposed for breach of the GPS Regulations. It is an offence for a producer to offer or agree to supply or otherwise place an unsafe product on the market, punishable on conviction with an unlimited fine and/or a 12-month term of imprisonment. A range of penalties apply to other breaches of the GPS Regulations. The enforcement authorities also have the power to issue notices compelling the producer to take certain actions, e.g. compelling the withdrawal or recall of products or requiring the provision of warnings.
The GPS Regulations apply to all products to the extent that these are not subject to other specific safety requirements imposed by EU law. Separate regulations apply to specific types of products, such as medicines, medical devices, foods, toys, cosmetics, machinery and electrical equipment, and this legislation imposes its own criminal sanctions.
Under the CPA, the Claimant must prove that the product is defective, and that the defect caused damage to the Claimant. The Claimant does not need to prove the cause of the defect or why the product failed, or to identify the defect with precision. He only needs to prove in general terms that a defect exists and that it caused the damage complained of (Hufford v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd  EWHC 2956 (TCC)). However, where the producer relies on defences under the CPA, including the development risks defence, the producer has the burden of proving that defence: see the answers to questions 3.1 and 3.2 below.
In negligence, the Claimant must prove that the Defendant breached the duty of care he owed to the Claimant, and that this negligence caused damage to the Claimant.
In contract, the Claimant must establish that the Defendant breached his contract with the Claimant by supplying product(s) that did not meet the terms and conditions of the contract, and that such breach damaged the Claimant. The burden of proving breach of contract is reversed in the case of consumer contracts if the product malfunctions in the first six months after delivery; the product is presumed not to conform to the contract at the time of supply.
The Claimant has the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that the Defendant’s product caused or materially contributed to the Claimant’s injuries. The traditional test of causation is the ‘but-for test’: the Claimant must prove that, but for the Defendant’s negligence, or (as the case may be) supply of a defective product, the Claimant would not have sustained the injury. However, in a series of decisions (Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd and Others  3 All ER 305, Barker v Corus (UK) Plc  2 WLR 1027 and Sienkiewicz v Grief (UK) Limited  UKSC 10) the Supreme Court has ruled that special rules apply in relation to mesothelioma claims. In such cases, causation will be established where the Claimant demonstrates that the Defendant’s wrongdoing materially increased the risk of injury (whether the tortious breach of duty was by a single or by multiple tortfeasors). This principle has recently been extended to a claim for lung cancer caused by multiple exposures to asbestos (Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd and Others  EWCA 86). It is unclear whether the exception will be extended to other classes of claim. In Heneghan the Court of Appeal stated that the so-called ‘Fairchild exception’ could be applied to situations which are ‘not materially different’ to that case; to date, it has not been applied to product liability claims.
What amounts to a material contribution depends on the facts. Where the alleged injury is non-divisible and there are several possible causes, but it cannot be established which of them caused the injury, causation may not be established (Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority  AC 1074). However, in the case of a divisible injury, such as pneumoconiosis, where the injury is caused by multiple factors which have an additive or multiplicative effect, and the tortious cause materially contributed to the injury, causation may be established (Bonnington Castings Limited v Wardlaw  AC 613), but liability is likely to be apportioned to reflect the extent of the tortfeasor’s liability for the injury. Where the defendant caused or contributed to an indivisible injury, the defendant will be held fully liable, even though there may well have been other contributing causes (see Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board  UKPC 4). These principles have not been applied to product liability claims, as yet, but are as likely to be relevant as they are to clinical negligence claims.
Although the UK courts have not been asked to address the position on causation where a product is part of a batch of potentially faulty products, the CJEU considered this issue in Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt, Case C-503/13. In that case, the decision in which is binding on UK courts, the CJEU ruled in the context of a claim under the Product Liability Directive that if a product, such as a pacemaker, has a potential defect, products belonging to the same production series may also be classified as defective without the need to establish that each individual product is faulty. In reaching its decision, the court took account of the increased risks of damage arising from the fact that the relevant products were implanted. Although the decision is concerned with the legal test of “defect”, it is clear that in certain circumstances the courts will find liability under the Directive without proof that a product has actually malfunctioned and caused injury.
At present, the position remains that, where it cannot be established which of several possible producers manufactured the defective product, the Claimant’s evidential burden cannot be met and the claim will be dismissed. The English courts have not adopted so-called “market-share” liability. In Fairchild (see the answer to question 2.2 above), Lord Hoffman considered this issue and stated obiter that market share liability did not fall within the scope of the present law on causation as the existence of several manufacturers supplying the same defective product did not materially increase the risk of injury. However, he indicated that the issue should be left for further consideration. In Barker v Corus he drew a comparison between the Fairchild principle and market share liability, but again declined to decide the point. It remains to be seen whether the English courts will extend the Fairchild decision to impose market share liability where the manufacturer of the defective product cannot be identified. In this context, an important distinction needs to be made between liability based only on marketing a product (“market-share liability”) and a fact-pattern closer to Fairchild in which the Claimant has been exposed to the same product, such as a medicine, made by different manufacturers and the actual dose or doses of the drug which caused or materially contributed to the cause of the injury cannot be identified.
A failure to warn may give rise to liability under both the CPA and in negligence.
The CPA specifically identifies the “get up” of the product and any instructions or warnings relating to its use as part of all the circumstances to be taken into account in assessing if the product is defective. In Palmer v Palmer  All ER (D)86, the court found a device, designed to allow some slack on a seat belt to enhance comfort, to be defective on the basis that the instructions were incomplete and encouraged misuse, thereby compromising the effective operation of the seat belt itself.
In Wilkes v Depuy International Limited, the court ruled that in addition to warnings provided directly to consumers, warnings provided to learned intermediaries, such as doctors, should be taken into account as part of “all the circumstances” in assessing whether a product is defective. In that case, the allegedly defective product was a component part of a replacement hip, which was fitted by a surgeon, so no information about the device was supplied to the patient by the manufacturer. Detailed instructions for use (IFU), including warnings about the risks associated with the device were, however, provided to the surgeon. The court found that the IFU formed part of the circumstances taken into account in assessing defect.
This decision, combined with the decision in Webster v Burton Hospitals NHS Foundation  EWCA CIV 62, can reasonably be viewed in the medical product field as increasing the spotlight upon the activities of the learned intermediary and, in practice, making it more likely that a claimant will focus a claim on the negligence of the clinician, rather than advance a speculative claim against the manufacturer that he is strictly liable for injury arising, despite the regulatory authorities having approved the product and patient information supplied with the product. In Webster, the court of Appeal determined that there was an overriding obligation for a health care professional to advise the patient directly on any material risks associated with a proposed treatment and reasonable alternative treatment, unless there was good evidence that this information would itself “damage the patient’s welfare”. In so doing, the court effectively set aside decades of jurisprudence that treated a doctor as not negligent in the counselling provided to a patient, if the doctor could show that a body of expert opinion would have behaved in the same way as the defendant behaved. This test almost certainly caused many claimants to advance a product liability claim for injury against a manufacturer based on strict liability (or even negligence) rather than seek to prove clinical negligence against a doctor.
In negligence, manufacturers and suppliers owe a duty to take reasonable care to provide adequate warnings and instructions with their products. There is no duty to warn of dangers that are obvious or a matter of common knowledge (see, for example, B (A Child) v McDonalds Restaurants Ltd  All ER (D) 436, where the court found McDonalds were not negligent in supplying cups of hot tea and coffee without a warning as consumers generally knew that there was a risk of scalding if hot drinks were spilled). Manufacturers owe a duty to warn of dangers identified after the product was first supplied. Failure to warn of design defects identified after marketing may give rise to issues surrounding the application of the development risks defence (see question 3.2 below).
In some circumstances, warnings provided to learned or responsible intermediaries may be sufficient to discharge the manufacturer’s duty of care in negligence. Whether such a warning is sufficient will depend on factors including the likelihood and gravity of the risk and the practicality of providing a personal warning to the ultimate consumer. The learned intermediary doctrine has become less important in cases involving medicinal products as manufacturers of medicines are now required to provide patient information leaflets with their medicines unless the warnings and information can be provided on the container or outer packaging of the product.
A failure to warn in breach of duty may sometimes be sufficient to establish liability even if it cannot be established that the inadequate warning caused the damage suffered by the Claimant. In Chester v Afshar  1 AC 134, the House of Lords found that a neurosurgeon was liable for his negligent failure to warn of a rare, but serious complication of spinal surgery even though the risk was unavoidable and the Claimant would probably have had the surgery in any event, even if later. The court considered that a remedy should be available where there was a failure to obtain informed consent. It is unclear whether the same principles would be extended beyond the facts peculiar to that particular case, or whether they would be adopted in a product liability context in relation to a company’s obligation to warn in product information.
A contrasting approach was adopted in the case of Coal Pension Properties Ltd v Nu-Way Ltd  EWHC 824 (TCC). The manufacturer of a gas booster for use in gas heating systems failed to give sufficient warning about the risk of the booster casing cracking if inspection and maintenance were not carried out regularly and effectively. However, the manufacturer was not liable for an explosion caused by a gas leak from a cracked casing because the court held that as a matter of fact the operator of the system would not have heeded the warning and would not have had the casing replaced, whether they had been warned or not.
a producer of component products will not be liable if he can show that the defect was due to the design of the final product, or to defective specifications provided to the component producer by the producer of the final product.
The Defendant has the burden of proving each of these defences. Such defences have rarely been successful. However, in Terence Piper v JRI (Manufacturing) Limited  92 BMLR 141, the Court of Appeal found that the manufacturer of a defective hip prosthesis was not liable when the prosthesis fractured after implantation as the prosthesis was not defective at the time it was supplied to the hospital. The court was satisfied, based on evidence of the manufacturer’s inspection and quality control systems, that a defect in the surface of the prosthesis would have been detected prior to delivery, even though there was no evidence of inspection of the specific prosthesis. It was not necessary for the manufacturer to prove the actual cause of the defect and when it arose.
Liability under the CPA and in negligence may also be limited by the principles of contributory negligence (see the answer to question 3.6 below).
In negligence, it is a defence if the Claimant freely and voluntarily agreed to run the risk of injury in full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk (volenti). Otherwise, the Defendant will defeat the claim if the Claimant cannot establish each of the elements of negligence. Thus, if the Defendant can show that no duty was owed, or his conduct was reasonable, or the negligent act or omission was not causally related to the damage, or that no damage was in fact sustained, he will escape liability. Proof that the fault in the product was not discoverable based on the state of scientific knowledge at the time of supply is often described as the ‘state of the art’ defence (see the answer to question 3.2 below).
In contract, no specific defences arise, but the claim will fail if the Claimant cannot establish the breach of contract and damage due to that breach.
In addition, Judges now have an obligation to strike out a personal injury claim where there is a finding of fundamental dishonesty by the Claimant.
Yes, there is a development risks defence. The UK Government opted to include it in the CPA: see the answer to question 3.1 above. Under the CPA it is for the producer to prove that the defect was not discoverable.
The defence was considered by the English courts in the Hepatitis C case, which found that its scope is limited. Based on current authority, the defence applies if the defect was not discoverable in the light of the scientific and technical knowledge at the time the product was supplied. The Defendant’s conduct is irrelevant. The court found that the defence was not available if the existence of the defect in the product was, or should have been, known. It was irrelevant whether or not the defect could be avoided because measures to identify and rectify the defect were impractical or impossible; once the defect was known the defence became unavailable. (Such factors may, however, be relevant to the assessment of defect – see the Wilkes v Depuy International case cited above.) In negligence, whether the Defendant exercised reasonable care in relation to the design/development, manufacture, supply, marketing and, in appropriate cases, licensing of the product, will be assessed in the light of the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time these activities were carried out. Manufacturers also owe a continuing duty to warn of any faults identified after the product has been supplied and, where a warning is not sufficient, to modify or withdraw the product. If the Defendant manufacturer is able to show that he acted in the way that a reasonable manufacturer would have done, this is often described as the “state of the art” defence. It is significantly wider than the development risks defence outlined above, because the court must assess the Defendant’s conduct; not just whether the defect was discoverable. Factors such as whether the defect could be avoided and compliance with statutory obligations are relevant.
These issues are not relevant to claims for breach of contract.
It is a defence to proceedings under the CPA if the manufacturer can show that the defect is due to compliance with UK or EU laws. Otherwise, there is no general defence under the CPA, in negligence, or in contract, in circumstances where the manufacturer is able to demonstrate compliance with regulatory and statutory requirements relating to the development, manufacture, licensing, marketing and supply of the product.
Such compliance is, however, of evidential value, and may help in the defence of negligence claims by demonstrating that the manufacturer exercised reasonable care. It is also a relevant circumstance for the purpose of determining what persons are generally entitled to expect in relation to the safety of a product for the purpose of proceedings under the CPA. In the Wilkes case, the court held that compliance with regulatory standards carried considerable weight because these “have been set at a level which the …[regulator] has determined is appropriate for safety purposes”. Similarly, the court held that compliance with broader regulatory requirements was evidence of the level of safety of the product that persons are entitled to expect. Although the Defendant’s conduct is generally irrelevant for the purpose of CPA claims, evidence that it had in place appropriate systems to detect any defects in the product and for post-marketing surveillance may also be relevant to the question of whether a defect was “discoverable” for the purpose of establishing whether the development risks defence is applicable. Such systems are commonly mandated by statute, for example, in the field of medicines and medical devices.
However, failure to comply with a regulatory standard, compliance with which is not required by law, may not be decisive in determining liability. In Tesco v Pollard  EWCA Civ 393, Tesco was not liable for supplying a bottle of dishwasher powder with a screw top, where the child resistant cap fitted did not meet the British Standard, as there was no statutory requirement for such a cap to be fitted and all that the public could legitimately expect was that the bottle would be more difficult to open, which it was.
In general, a final judgment or order is conclusive as between the parties to the proceedings and their successors (save where the judgment can be set aside, for example, because of fraud, or because the decision was not based on the merits). An estoppel arises that prevents the parties from re-litigating in subsequent proceedings the decision or any issues that were an essential part of the legal basis of the judgment. In group litigation, a judgment or order is binding on the parties to all claims that are on the group register at the time the judgment or order is made, unless the court orders otherwise.
In principle, an estoppel cannot arise in proceedings involving non-parties. However, in certain circumstances, it may be possible to defeat a challenge to a prior decision by a party to that decision on grounds of abuse of process. Even if the doctrines of estoppel and abuse of process do not apply, the prior findings of another court based on similar facts are likely to be persuasive.
Yes. Claims for contribution or indemnity can be made against a third party where the third party is liable to the Claimant for the same damage as the Defendant. Such claims can be brought either in the same proceedings (by means of a “Part 20” claim) or in subsequent proceedings. In the case of subsequent proceedings, the claim must be brought within two years from the date of judgment in or settlement of the Claimant’s claim.
Yes. Liability under both the CPA and in negligence can be limited if the Defendant can prove that the Claimant’s negligence caused or contributed to the damage.
Trials are by a judge.
Yes, but this power has never been used in the product liability field. In practice, assessors are most commonly appointed where technical issues arise. In product liability claims, assessors have not been appointed to assist the court in deciding issues of liability; on the whole, in such cases, the court prefers to leave technical issues to the experts called by the parties themselves and to evaluate the experts’ evidence having heard it tested in cross-examination.
The court can appoint one or more assessors to assist the judge to enable him to reach a properly informed decision on matters in which the assessor has skill and expertise. The assessor provides assistance as directed by the court. This can include sitting with the judge during all or part of the trial and preparing a report for the court on any matter at issue in the proceedings. The assessor does not have judicial status and does not play a part in deciding the case; his role is to educate and assist the judge.
Under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), which lay down procedural rules for the conduct of proceedings in England and Wales, the parties to any proceedings must be notified of the appointment of the proposed assessor and can raise objections.
Yes. Where claims give rise to common or related issues of fact or law the court has the power to make a group litigation order (GLO) enabling it to manage the claims covered by the Order in a co-ordinated way. Many group claims have been brought over the last 30 years in relation to defective products and medicines, cases of industrial disease and sudden accidents or disasters.
The procedure is ‘opt-in’. Claims managed under a GLO remain individual actions in their own right. However, the court will usually order that one or more actions that are representative of the rest of the claims cohort are tried as lead actions. The outcome of the lead actions does not, in theory, determine liability in the remaining cohort of claims, but those actions will establish findings of law and fact that may, in practice, allow the parties to compromise or simplify resolution of the remainder of the litigation by focusing further proceedings on clarifying any remaining points of principle.
Proceedings can be brought by any party that has a claim, whether an individual, a company or another legal entity. There is currently no mechanism by which claims can be brought by a representative body on behalf of a number of claimants, although this may change as a result of a recently published EU proposal for a Directive providing for collective redress in respect of infringements of consumer legislation (see the answer to question 4.4, below).
Once a GLO has been made, a group register will be established on which details of the individual claims to be managed under the GLO are entered. A managing judge will also be appointed with overall responsibility for case management of the litigation. He may be assisted by a Master or District Judge appointed to deal with procedural matters.
Co-ordinating judges have an extremely wide discretion to manage the litigation as they see fit. The court will usually make directions, including directing the transfer of claims to the court that will manage the litigation, giving directions to publicise the GLO so that Claimants may join the group register, and imposing a cut-off date during which claims proceeding under the GLO must be issued. The court often also appoints lead solicitors to act on behalf of the Claimants and Defendants.
Claims can also be pursued in a representative action where one representative Claimant or Defendant acts on behalf of a group of individuals. The procedure is rarely used as it is only available where the group of litigants have the same interest in one cause of action; it is not available if they have different defences or remedies. The court also has power to consolidate a number of individual proceedings into one action, or order that two or more claims should be tried together.
There is currently no ‘opt-out’ class action procedure in England and Wales applicable to product liability claims.
No. Proceedings must be brought by the person/body that has suffered the damage/injury. There is presently no means of bringing a product liability claim through a representative body as part of a collective action. However, the European Commission has recently (11 April 2018) published a proposal for a Directive that would allow qualified entities, which represent the collective interest of consumers, to bring representative actions against infringements of provisions of EU law, seeking remedies as available under national laws. The Annex to the proposal lists EU legislation, infringement of which could potentially give rise to a representative action, including the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC, the Community Code relating to Medicinal Products Directive 2001/83/EC and legislation relating to sale of goods and services, advertising, and data protection in various sectors. The General Product Safety Directive 2001/95/EC is not listed, nor is the sectoral product safety legislation covering e.g. toys, chemicals, machinery, and low voltage electrical equipment. It remains to be seen how this proposed legislation will develop and whether it will be implemented in the UK. However, representative actions may already be brought in England and Wales on behalf of consumers seeking damages for infringement of competition law.
This depends on the complexity of the case and the value of the claim. According to the Court Statistics Quarterly for October to December 2017, published by the Ministry of Justice, unitary civil actions proceeding in the County Court (excluding certain small claims which are fast-tracked), on average, took 58.3 weeks from the issue of proceedings until trial. Equivalent statistics are not available for High Court actions, but these cases are generally more complicated and therefore take longer to come to trial. Complex group actions may take many years to come to trial. For example, in the third generation, oral contraceptives litigation it took approximately six-and-a-half years from the issue of the first proceedings until judgment. In all cases, delay is largely a result of the conduct of the parties and is not inherent in the court system.
Yes. In accordance with general case management powers the judge can order the trial of preliminary issues of law and fact in separate proceedings prior to the main trial, and can decide the order in which issues are to be tried in the main trial. In a suitable case, the court also has power to give a summary judgment dismissing a claim which has no realistic prospect of success.
An appeal may only be made with the permission of the court (either the appeal court or the lower court that made the decision subject to appeal) and such permission will only be granted if the appeal appears to have a real prospect of success or there are other compelling reasons why it should be heard.
The appeal will usually be limited to a review of the lower court’s decision, but the court retains the power to order a re-hearing in the interests of justice. An appeal will be allowed where the decision of the lower court was wrong (because the court made an error of law, or of fact, or in the exercise of its discretion) or was unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity of the lower court. However, in practice, the courts will rarely disturb findings of fact made by the trial judge who had the benefit of hearing first hand the witness and expert evidence.
The appeal court may affirm, vary or set aside any order or judgment made by the lower court, order a new trial or hearing or make any other appropriate order.
The extent of the expert evidence that is permitted will depend on the type and value of the claim, with more extensive evidence permitted in complex cases. In all personal injury cases, the Claimant must serve a medical report with his or her Statement of Case substantiating the injuries alleged in the claim.
Expert evidence should be independent and comprehensive. An expert owes an overriding duty to assist the court on matters falling within his expertise; this duty overrides any obligation to the party instructing the expert. Experts can only give evidence on matters of opinion falling within their expertise.
Evidence must be provided in the form of a report disclosed to the other parties. The Court Rules give the parties a right to put written questions to an expert about his or her report in order to clarify the report. Where several experts are instructed it is usual for experts in particular disciplines to meet on a “without prejudice” basis, after the exchange of reports and before giving oral evidence, in order to explore areas of agreement and narrow the matters in dispute.
The factual and expert evidence that the parties intend to rely upon at trial must be provided in the form of witness statements and expert reports that are disclosed by the parties prior to the trial. The court may make directions limiting the scope of factual and expert evidence by, for example, identifying those disciplines or issues to which such evidence may be directed. Evidence is usually mutually exchanged, but the court may, in appropriate circumstances, direct that it is served sequentially.
Factual and expert witnesses are required to give oral evidence at the trial unless the court orders otherwise. However, the witness can only amplify the evidence given in his/her written statement or report with the court’s permission. Expert evidence is usually given sequentially, but the court may order that it is given concurrently (so-called ‘hot-tubbing’).
Witnesses are not generally required to present themselves for pre-trial deposition. However, the court may order evidence to be given by deposition if the witness is unable to attend the trial. The increased use of video conferencing facilities has reduced the use of depositions in proceedings in England and Wales. Evidence can be taken by video if the witness is abroad or too ill to attend court.
In claims involving personal injuries, the general rule is that a party to an action is required to disclose the documents in his control on which he relies and which adversely affect his own case or support another party’s case (so-called ‘standard disclosure’), although the court may dispense with or limit such disclosure in appropriate cases. In other claims (except certain low value claims), the court can tailor the disclosure order to reflect the circumstances of the individual case and can choose from a menu of options including: dispensing with disclosure, requiring disclosure of documents on which a party relies and specific documents requested by their opponent, issue based disclosure, ‘train of inquiry’ disclosure, standard disclosure, or any other order that the court considers appropriate. In determining the scope of disclosure, the court will take account of the costs of giving wide-ranging disclosure of documents and will ensure that these are proportionate to the overall sums in issue in the proceedings.
A document is in a party’s control if he has, or had, physical possession of it, a right to possession of it, or a right to inspect and take copies of it. The obligation may therefore extend to documents in the hands of a party’s professional advisers or an associated company provided control can be established.
‘Document’ means anything on which information of any description is recorded and includes paper records, drawings, microfilms, information held on tape, video, CD or DVD, and electronic documents such as emails and metadata (including electronic documents that have been ‘deleted’ which are held on servers and back up systems).
The parties are required to conduct a reasonable and proportionate search for disclosable documents. The obligation to give disclosure continues until the action is at an end and applies to documents created while the proceedings are underway. Additional obligations apply in the case of the disclosure of documents held in electronic form and the Court Rules require the parties to exchange information about the electronic documents that they hold and to seek to agree the scope of searches for electronic documents.
The duty to disclose the existence of documents is a strict one and is enforced by the court. A party may not rely upon any documents that it does not disclose. Moreover, if a party withholds documentation that should have been disclosed, the court may impose cost penalties or draw an adverse inference.
Disclosable documents are identified in a List of Documents served on the opposing party. All disclosed documents can be inspected save for those which are privileged from inspection. Two of the most important types of privilege are “legal advice privilege”, which applies to confidential communications between a lawyer and his client made for the sole or dominant purpose of seeking or giving legal advice and assistance, and “litigation privilege”, which applies to documents between the potential party, his lawyer and any third party, created after litigation is contemplated or pending, for the sole or dominant purpose of seeking or giving advice in relation to the claim, or collecting evidence for use in the litigation. Legal advice privilege only applies to lawyer-client communications with company employees who are regarded as the “client” (generally senior managers or the in-house lawyer), not all employees. Litigation privilege will only apply if there is a real likelihood of litigation, rather than a mere possibility.
Disclosure usually takes place after pleadings setting out the parties’ cases have been served. In addition, a party may also seek an order for disclosure of specific documents or classes of documents. However, the court also has power to order pre-action disclosure in appropriate cases in order to fairly dispose of the proceedings. Such disclosure may only be ordered in respect of specific documents or classes of documents that would have to be disclosed in any event once the proceedings are underway. Any documents disclosed in accordance with these rules may only be used in connection with the proceedings in which they are disclosed until such time as they are referred to at a hearing held in public, or the parties agree, or the court otherwise gives permission.
A revised disclosure regime which seeks to limit disclosure is the subject of a proposed pilot scheme in some business and property courts. The key feature of the proposed new disclosure rules is that there will be no automatic entitlement to search based ‘standard disclosure’. Instead, ‘basic disclosure’, limited to the key documents on which a party has relied and those that are necessary to enable the other parties to understand the case they have to meet, will usually be provided with the statement of case (pleading). At this stage, a party will be required to state whether it intends to seek “extended disclosure”. The pilot scheme is planned to last for some two years and, if successful, may be applied more generally.
There are a variety of different methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) including mediation, arbitration and neutral evaluation, which can all be pursued as an alternative to litigation. Mediation is also commonly used during the course of litigation in an attempt to compromise the proceedings. The courts encourage the use of ADR to resolve disputes and the pre-action protocols to the court rules provide that the parties should consider whether some form of ADR is more suitable than litigation before commencing proceedings. While the courts cannot compel the parties to use ADR procedures (Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust  EWCA Civ 576), failure to follow the protocols or to respond to an invitation to participate in ADR may amount to unreasonable conduct and result in a cost sanction (PGF II SA v OMFS Company 1 Limited  EWCA Civ 1288 ). Courts have refused to award costs to a successful party where they unreasonably refused to mediate (Dunnett v Railtrack plc  EWCA Civ 303), although it has also been held that complex questions of law might make a case unsuitable for mediation and, if there is no realistic prospect of a successful outcome, it may not be unreasonable to decline to mediate (Gore v Naheed  EWCA 369).
The rules on jurisdiction in cases involving parties domiciled in the EU are governed by the Judgments Regulation, EC 44/2001. This provides that, in tort claims, a Defendant may be sued in the courts of the place where the tort occurred, which may be either the place where the harmful event giving rise to the tort occurred (in cases involving defective products this will usually be the place where the defective product was manufactured: Case C-45/13, Kainz v Pantherwerke AG), or the place where the damage occurred. In contract claims, the Defendant may be sued in the courts of the place where the contract was performed, which in the case of contracts for the sale of goods is the place where the goods were or should have been delivered. In proceedings involving a number of parties, jurisdiction may also be established against a Defendant domiciled in another EU country if they are a proper defendant to proceedings brought in England and Wales against another party and the claims are “so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments arising from separate proceedings”.
Where the claimants are non-EU, the English courts generally have jurisdiction to hear cases brought against persons domiciled in England. The courts no longer have discretion to refuse jurisdiction against such English Defendants on the ground that the courts in another jurisdiction would be a more suitable venue for the trial of the action (Owusu v Jackson  ECR I-1383).
Proceedings may be brought in England and Wales by foreign claimants against English based corporations or bodies based on their actions or those of their subsidiaries in other jurisdictions. For example, group actions have been pursued in England in respect of actions arising from exposure in South Africa to asbestos mined or processed by an affiliate of an English company (Lubbe v Cape Plc  1WLR 1545); by a group of claimants from the Ivory Coast against a British based oil trader, Trafigura, for damage allegedly caused by the dumping of toxic waste and by a group of Bangladeshi villagers against The Natural Environment Research Council, a British organisation which allegedly conducted a negligent survey, in respect of damage arising from contaminated ground water (Sutradhar v Natural Environment Research Council  UKHL 33). The Court found that parent company control had been present in Lungowe and Ors. v Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc  EWCA Civ 1528, allowing the claim to proceed in England Wales. However, the extent to which parent companies may be liable for the acts and omissions of their overseas subsidiaries was further clarified in His Royal Highness Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell Plc  EWCA Civ 191: issuing mandatory policies across a group may not be enough to establish a duty of care in the absence of evidence of more direct and substantial control of the operations of the subsidiary.
Yes, see our answer to question 5.2 below.
Under the Limitation Act 1980, the basic limitation period for tortious actions (including negligence claims) and for breach of contract is six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. Additional requirements apply in the case of latent damage caused by negligence.
Special time limits apply to personal injury claims for damages in respect of negligence, nuisance or breach of duty. In such cases, the claim must be brought within three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (i.e. the date of injury or death) or the date of knowledge by the Claimant of certain facts. The date of knowledge is when the Claimant is aware of the identity of the Defendant, that the injury was significant, and that it was attributable in whole or part to the alleged negligence, nuisance or breach of duty. Knowledge of attribution may be established where a Claimant’s subjective belief that his injury is capable of being attributed to the breach of duty/defective product is held with sufficient confidence to make it reasonable for him to begin to investigate whether he has a valid claim (Ministry of Defence v AB and others  UK SC9). The court has a discretionary power to disapply this time limit where it would be equitable to do so. In doing so it can take into account the merits of the case and whether the claim has a reasonable prospect of success (Ministry of Defence case above).
Where proceedings are brought under the CPA there is also a general long-stop provision. A right of action under the CPA is extinguished 10 years after the defective product was put into circulation and this applies irrespective of the other provisions of the Limitation Act (including the requirements relating to the date of knowledge set out above). In Case C127/04, O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MDS Limited and Sanofi Pasteur SA, the CJEU held that “a product is put into circulation when it is taken out of the manufacturing process operated by the producer and enters a marketing process in the form in which it is offered to the public in order to be used or consumed”.
In a further reference in the same proceedings (Case C-358/08, Aventis Pasteur SA v OB), the CJEU ruled that national legislation cannot permit the courts to substitute one producer Defendant for another company (in this case mistakenly sued as a producer) after the long-stop period has expired. It is unclear whether the English courts would permit substitution after the expiry of a limitation period (as opposed to the long-stop period). Although this was approved in Horne-Roberts v SmithKline Beecham plc  1 WLR 1662, a subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal has cast doubt on the correctness of that decision (Lockheed Martin Corporation v Willis Group Ltd  EWCA Civ 927).
Special rules apply to persons under a disability, during such period as they are a minor or of unsound mind. In general, time only begins to run for limitation purposes when the Claimant dies or ceases to be under a disability. However, the 10-year long-stop for CPA claims still applies.
Where an action is based on the Defendant’s fraud, or the Defendant has deliberately concealed any fact relevant to the Claimant’s right of action, the relevant limitation period does not begin to run until the Claimant has, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud or concealment.
It is possible to seek a range of remedies including monetary compensation (damages) and injunctive or declaratory relief. However, most Claimants in product liability cases seek to recover damages.
Under the CPA, damage includes death or personal injury (including mental injury) or loss of, or damage to, property for private use and consumption (provided the damages recoverable in respect of property loss exceed the minimum threshold of £275). Damages are not recoverable in respect of damage to the defective product itself.
In negligence, damages are awarded to put the injured party into the position he would have been in if the negligent act had not occurred. Damages can be recovered for death or personal injury (including mental injuries) and damage to property. Pure economic losses which are not consequent on physical damage are not generally recoverable in negligence.
In contract, damages are intended to put the injured party into the position he would have been in if the contract was performed. Damages are usually awarded for monetary loss (for example, in respect of damage to property and to the defective product itself), but they can include non-pecuniary losses, such as damages for death or personal injury (including mental injury), where this was within the parties’ contemplation as not unlikely to arise from the breach of contract. Economic losses, such as loss of profits, are recoverable if these are a foreseeable consequence of the breach.
In the case of mental injuries, the English courts only permit recovery for recognised psychiatric injuries. Mere anxiety or distress are not actionable and are not, on their own, sufficient to ground a claim for damages (see AB and Others v Tameside & Glossop Health Authority and Others  8 Med LR 91).
Medical monitoring claims of the type pursued in the USA in recent years have not been litigated before the English courts. English law does not generally permit recovery of the cost of tests or investigations unless the product has actually malfunctioned and caused physical or psychiatric injury or damage. Such medical monitoring costs are recoverable only as medical expenses consequential upon the main injury or damage. In addition, the courts will not usually allow a Claimant to recover damages where he/she sustains a recognised, but unforeseeable, psychiatric illness as a result of becoming aware that he/she is at risk of sustaining a disease/illness, or to recover the costs of future medical monitoring to determine if that disease/injury has arisen (Grieves v FT Everard & Sons Ltd  1 AC 281).
Where claims are pursued under the CPA, it is unclear whether the position set out above remains good law in the light of the CJEU’s decision in Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt, Case C-503/13. In that case the CJEU ruled that if a product, such as a pacemaker, has a potential defect, products belonging to the same production series may also be classified as defective without the need to establish that each individual product is faulty. Damage was construed broadly to include compensation “that is necessary to eliminate harmful consequences and to restore the level of safety which a person is entitled to expect” including, in that case, the costs of replacing the defective device. Although the relationship between the decision in the Boston Scientific case and medical monitoring claims has yet to be explored, the widened definition of damage applied by the CJEU may be used by Claimants to argue that the restrictions of English law are no longer appropriate.
Punitive or exemplary damages are rarely, if ever, awarded. They are not generally available in respect of claims for breach of contract. Although they are available in tort claims (see Kuddus (AP) v Chief Constable of Leicester Constabulary  2 WLR 1789), exemplary damages will only be awarded in certain limited circumstances, including where the Defendant’s conduct was calculated to make a profit that exceeds the compensation recoverable by the Claimant or where there has been oppressive, arbitrary and unconstitutional conduct by Government servants (see Rowlands v Chief Constable of Merseyside  All ER (D) 298 (Dec)). Exemplary damages may be awarded in claims regarding infringements of competition law, but only where the breach was intentional or reckless and the Defendant’s conduct was so outrageous as to justify an award (2 Travel Group Plc (in Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services  CAT 19). Exemplary damages are not generally recoverable in circumstances where a Defendant has already been fined in respect of his conduct (see Devenish Nutrition Limited v Sanofi-Aventis SA and Others  EWHC 2394 (Ch)).
In general, a Claimant may unilaterally discontinue all or part of his/her claim at any time. However, the court’s permission is required for compromise or settlement of proceedings instituted against or on behalf of a minor (aged under 18) or an adult who is incapable of managing their own property and affairs. Court approval is also usually sought where there is a settlement or compromise of an unlitigated claim made by, or on behalf of, or against, such a person as a compromise is not enforceable without the approval of the court. There is no requirement to seek court approval in other circumstances, for example, on the settlement of the claims comprising a group action.
Yes. Under the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997, where compensation is paid in respect of an accident, injury or disease, the compensator is liable to repay to the Government state benefits paid to the Claimant in respect of that accident, injury or disease. The scheme is administered by the Compensation Recovery Unit (CRU), which issues certificates setting out the recoverable benefits (CRU payment). The compensator can offset the CRU payment against certain types of compensation paid to the Claimant (in respect of loss of earnings, costs of care and loss of mobility). No deductions can be made from the damages paid in respect of the injury/disease itself.
A similar scheme applies to the recoupment of National Health Service (NHS) charges in accordance with the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003. Where the Claimant has received NHS treatment or been provided with NHS ambulance services as a result of the injury which is being compensated, the costs of that treatment must be paid by the compensator in accordance with a statutory tariff.
The general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the legal costs of the successful party, (including expert fees and other incidental expenses such as court fees). However, ‘Qualified One-way Cost Shifting’ (“QOCS”) applies to claims for death or personal injuries (provided a funding arrangement was not entered into prior to 1 April 2013). This means that a Defendant may only enforce an order for costs against a Claimant, without the court’s permission, to the extent of any damages and interest ordered in favour of the Claimant. In practice, this means that in most personal injury claims an unsuccessful Claimant will not be responsible for the Defendant’s costs, although this principle will not apply if the claim is struck out, or if the court determines that the Claimant is fundamentally dishonest. If the Claimant is successful they may recover their costs from the Defendant in the usual way, subject to a ‘set-off’ of any costs orders made in the Defendant’s favour (provided such costs do not exceed the amount of damages awarded).
The assessment of costs is a matter for the court’s discretion and the court can make such orders as it considers appropriate reflecting matters such as the parties’ conduct and their success or failure on particular issues in the proceedings (either by reducing the costs award made in favour of the successful party to reflect the fact that they were unsuccessful on certain issues, or by making issue-based cost orders). In determining the amount of recoverable costs, the court will assess whether the sums claimed were reasonably incurred and were proportionate to the overall value of the case. However, they will rarely depart from the costs budgets agreed by the parties or approved by the court as outlined in the answer to question 7.6.
Where a party makes an offer to settle which meets certain procedural requirements (a “Part 36 offer”) and this is not accepted by the other party in satisfaction of the claim, unless that other party achieves a better result at trial various sanctions will apply. A party which fails to ‘beat’ a Part 36 offer becomes liable to pay the costs incurred after the date the offer could last have been accepted. In the case of a Defendant failing to beat a Claimant’s Part 36 offer additional sanctions apply: the damages payable will be increased by between 5 and 10% (depending on the amount awarded) subject to a maximum uplift of £75,000, the costs incurred after the offer was made will be payable on an indemnity basis, and interest on the value of the claim will be payable at an enhanced rate.
Public funding is available in England and Wales, but such funding is not generally provided in product liability cases (see below).
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 largely abolished public funding for civil claims. Civil legal aid is not available in respect of tort claims, including negligence actions and claims for personal injury and death. There are a number of limited exceptions to this general rule and funding is available in the case of certain clinical negligence actions (involving serious birth injuries and lifelong disabilities) and in other cases, including proceedings concerning family, children, disability, mental health, welfare benefits and immigration matters.
Yes, funding is available through Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) and Damages Based Agreements (DBAs), a form of contingency fee.
There are broadly two types of CFA: “no win no fee” agreements and “less (or nothing) if you lose” agreements. The precise terms of the CFA are strictly regulated and agreements that fall outside the legal requirements are unenforceable. Under a CFA, the client initially pays a reduced (or no) fee to his lawyers, but in the event of “success” the client becomes liable for the standard fees plus a percentage uplift on those standard fees. What is a “success” or “failure” is defined in the CFA, often by reference to a level of damages recovered. The uplift is based on the level of risk associated with the claim. Under a DBA, the lawyers’ fees are set as a percentage of the sum recovered as damages in the claim, net of any costs recovered from the losing party.
Rules which came into effect in April 2013 have significantly changed the way CFAs operate and legalised DBAs (which were previously unenforceable). Prior to April 2013, a successful Claimant could recover from their opponent the CFA uplift or success fee in addition to their standard costs and also any premium payable to obtain After the Event (ATE insurance purchased to protect the client against exposure to the other side’s costs in the event of defeat. Where agreements are entered into after this date the CFA success fee and the ATE premium are no longer recoverable from the opposing party: a successful litigant will have to bear these costs and can only recover standard costs from their opponent. In addition, in personal injury claims the success fee or percentage of damages payable under both CFAs and DBAs is capped at 25% of damages other than those for future care and loss. In other cases, a CFA success fee of up to 100% of standard costs can be negotiated; the DBA payment is capped at 50% of damages.
Yes, in certain circumstances. In Arkin v Borchard Lines  1 WLR 2055, the Court of Appeal made clear that, in principle, third party funding may be an acceptable means of funding litigation. However, certain third party funding arrangements may be unenforceable. In R (Factortame) Ltd v Transport Secretary (No.8)  EWCA Civ 932, the court held that in deciding whether a funding agreement is objectionable (champertous) the courts will take into account whether the funder controls the proceedings, whether the agreed recovery rate is fair and whether the agreement facilitates access to justice. If the funder controls the proceedings the agreement will usually be champertous and unenforceable. In addition, as he will generally be treated as if he was a party to the proceedings, he will be exposed to costs liability.
Arkin concerned the award of costs against a third party funder. The Court of Appeal held that in the case of an objectionable agreement the funder will be liable to pay his opponent’s costs without limit if the claim fails; in the case of acceptable agreements the funder’s cost liability is limited to the amount of the funding he provided, although in Sandra Bailey & Others v GlaxoSmithKline UK Limited  EWHC 3195 (QB) the cap was held not to apply and it was confirmed that it was within the court’s discretion to order security in excess of the funding provided. Third party funders will generally be liable for the defendant’s costs on the same basis as the funded party; they may be required to pay indemnity costs even though they are not personally responsible for the matters which caused the order to be made (Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc & Ors (Rev 2)  EWHC 3436 (Comm)). In the context of proceedings carried out under a CFA, the Court of Appeal has clarified that a firm of solicitors’ agreement to indemnify a client against their liability for costs if they were unsuccessful was permissible and was not champertous (Sibthorpe and Others v London Borough of Southwark  EWCA Civ 25).
A voluntary “Code of Conduct for the Funding by Third Parties of Litigation in England and Wales” has been agreed by members of the Association of Litigation Funders and sets out standards of practice and behaviour for members.
Yes. In most cases commenced after April 2013, except for some types of high-value claims (where the sums in dispute exceed £10 million excluding interest and costs), the parties are required to file and exchange costs budgets after the defence is served or prior to the first procedural hearing, setting out their estimate of the costs they anticipate recovering from their opponent if successful. Strict time limits are applied to filing these budgets, and if these are not met the party in default may only recover court fees. If they are not agreed, the budgets will be reviewed by the court, which may make a costs management order. This may be revised as the litigation progresses, but only significant developments will justify such revisions. In assessing the amount of recoverable costs at the conclusion of the litigation, the court will not depart from the agreed budget unless it is satisfied that there is good reason to do so. The budget therefore effectively acts as a cap on the level of costs which the winner may recover from the losing party. This does not restrict the freedom of the parties to investigate and litigate claims as they consider appropriate (the parties may exceed the amount of the court-approved budget if they wish to do so), but those costs will not be recoverable from the opposing party on the successful conclusion of the litigation.
The Court can also impose a cap limiting the amount of future costs that a party may recover where there is a substantial risk that without such an order the costs incurred will be disproportionate to the amounts in issue and the costs cannot be adequately controlled through usual case management procedures (see AB and Others v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust and in the matter of the Nationwide Organ Group Litigation  Lloyds Law Reports 355).
See above. The key developments over the past year have been procedural. The changes to disclosure obligations, currently under consideration, could have substantial implications for the costs associated with litigation including in relation to product liability claims. The proposed Directive permitting collective redress actions could alter the litigation landscape in the EU if enacted; in these circumstances, the UK’s response in the context of Brexit could be important in determining whether the UK is seen as an attractive forum for such litigation in the future.
The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of their colleague Tom Fox in the preparation of this chapter.
Tom Fox is a counsel in the London office of Arnold & Porter, whose practice focuses on litigation and general product safety regulatory work. His main litigation practice concerns the defence of product liability claims on behalf of medical device and pharmaceutical companies. He also has considerable experience of commercial litigation and personal injury. He also has experience in bringing judicial review actions based on public and administrative law on behalf of pharmaceutical companies, both at the Court of Justice of the European Union and in national courts. He advises on general product safety and regulatory issues such as conformity marking, labelling, and compliance with standards in relation to a range of consumer products including electrical and electronic goods, clothing, cosmetics and toys.

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