Source: https://hartmanfamilylaw.com/2015/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:10:19+00:00

Document:
I have written on S.Z. v. D.Z., 2015 BCSC 2157 in two previous articles because of Justice Voith’s great mobility analysis. The purpose of this article is to explore his reasoning towards whether certain expenses qualify as special and extraordinary expenses under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines.
Does the expense qualify as an extraordinary expense?
If so, what is the appropriate level of contribution from the person being asked to pay?
The section 7 (1) list is exhaustive; the expense does not qualify if it is not listed (Clarke v. Clarke, 2014 BCSC 824, Kase v. Bazinet, 2011 ONCJ 718).
If the expense falls under section 7 (1) (d), educational programs, or (f), extracurricular activities, the claimant must prove the expense is “extraordinary”.
(b) where (a) does not apply, a proportionality analysis of factors accounting for ability to pay and the nature and circumstances of the activity.
“reasonable” means in relation to the combined financial means of the parents, and child where appropriate, and the family’s pre-separation spending patterns.
Spending extraordinary amounts of money on sports/activities just because a child is talented will not always be reasonable (Richter v. Richter).
Generally, recreational sports and similar activities are considered “ordinary” and the issue is whether the child’s participation goes beyond that of the “average child” (Clarke v. Clarke, L.C. v. F.M.C., 2010 BCSC 1312).
Does it address a medical/health situation?
Is it a one time or recurring expense?
Is it an emergency expense?
I have written on S.Z. v. D.Z., 2015 BCSC 2157 previously as it is an outstanding how-to guide for mobility applications. Now I would like to briefly address Justice Voith’s illuminating discussion of how we, as family lawyers, should understand the meaning of the views of the child in this context.
Justice Voith affirmed the principle from Stevenson v. Florant,  4 D.L.R. 530 at 544, that the child’s best interest must not be confused with the child’s views. Rather, as noted in Rupertus v. Rupertus, 2012 BCCA 426 at para 13, the child’s wishes simply provide context to better understand the all the evidence in determining best interests. The reliability of the child’s evidence must also be carefully considered: L.E.G. v. A.G., 2002 BCSC 1455, at para 48, calls for analysis of any specific factor that may affect reliability, including age, intelligence, maturity, the stage and hostility of litigation, and so on.
The views of the child requires a nuanced analysis. Here, the children preferred to live with mom if she moved to Kamloops. This, however, does not mean they wanted to move to Kamloops; it means simply that they want to live with mom.
Section 211 reports must also be carefully scrutinized. The report in this case was riddled with error and that affected its weight.
Again, S.Z. v. D.Z. provides an outstanding mobility analysis and BC family lawyers should review it when facing such an application.
S.Z. v. D.Z., 2015 BCSC 2157, deals with a mobility application. Mom wanted to move the children away from dad so they could participate more fully in activities like hockey and cheerleading.
This is an important judgment for BC family lawyers to bear in mind when facing a mobility application that is motivated by the children’s activities.
Buckley v. Morgan, 2015 BCSC 2025, is an excellent primer on the basic principles of BC spousal support claims and interjurisdictional support orders.
The Applicant applied in BC Supreme Court to set aside a Nova Scotia spousal support order and cancel arrears flowing from a long marriage. There was a history of family violence including two convictions for the Applicant and various other instances of abuse. The Applicant was age 59 and the Respondent 61. She worked early on in the marriage but towards the end she managed the household and became financially dependent on the Applicant. They entered a consent order for spousal support. The negotiation was marred by family violence. The Respondent essentially fled Nova Scotia to live with her child in BC, whom she was financially dependent upon. The Respondent could not achieve self-sufficiency due, in part, to the family violence.
Predictably, citing Chutter v. Chutter, Moge v. Moge, and W. v. W., the Court ordered ongoing spousal support on compensatory and non-compensatory bases, and reviewed the seminal principles of spousal support law.
The Court also reviewed the basic principles underlying the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, legislation allowing BC courts to handle child and spousal support orders from other jurisdictions. Part 4 deals with varying support orders and Division 2 applies where the applicant is outside BC.
Section 30 outlines the evidence the Court must consider (generally any relevant evidence) and empowers the Court to demand further information from the applicant. If it does not receive said information within 12 months, it may dismiss the application.
Section 32 outlines the Court’s powers, specifically: vary the order, make an interim order and adjourn the application, adjourn without an interim order, and refuse to vary. The Court may also order periodic or lump sum payments, encumber property with the order, deal with retroactive issues, and address certain specific expenses.
Section 33 allows the Court to make an order if the respondent does not respond to the application.
Counsel should, as always, carefully review the legislation, but Buckley is a good starting point for handling such claims.

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