Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/Cancellation.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:26:34+00:00

Document:
A cancellation action, brought under Section 14 of the Trademark Act, are limited for a registration that has been in existence for five years; Section 2(d) is not one of these grounds.
It is well settled that the grounds on which a cancellation action may be brought under Section 14 of the Trademark Act are limited for a registration that has been in existence for five years; Section 2(d) is not one of these grounds. See Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Carolinas Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1492 (TTAB 2005); TBMP § 307 (2d ed. rev. 2004). Thus, to the extent the petition presents allegations of a claim under Section 2(d), they are barred by Section 14(3), inasmuch as respondent's registration is more than five years old.
Section 14(3) only provides for a claim where the allegation is that the mark, as a whole rather than a portion, is generic.
CONSOLIDATED: Opposition No. 91161028, FINANZ ST. HONORE, B.V. v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON; Cancellation No. 92044444, JOHNSON & JOHNSON v. FINANZ ST. HONORE, B.V. (TTAB 2007).
Although Count II of the counterclaim sets forth a claim based on an allegation that a portion of the mark is generic, Section 14(3) only provides for a claim where the allegation is that the mark, as a whole, is generic.
Section 14 of the Trademark Act provides that after five years from the date of the registration of a mark, a petition (or counterclaim) to cancel said registration may be filed only on grounds specified in subsections 14(3) and 14(5).
Properly plead grounds for cancellation in a counterclaim need only allege facts in the pleading, which if proved true would establish valid ground for canceling a registration.
In order to properly plead its grounds for cancellation in the counterclaim and avoid dismissal thereof at this stage of the proceeding, Johnson need only allege facts in its pleading which, if proved, would establish there is a valid ground for seeking to cancel the registrations. See Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982).
A cause of action to cancel a registered mark must assert the mark has been abandoned and allege the ultimate facts pertaining to the abandonment.
In order to set forth a cause of action to cancel the registration of a mark which assertedly has been abandoned, plaintiff must allege ultimate facts pertaining to the alleged abandonment. See Clubman's Club Corporation v. Martin, 188 USPQ 455, 456 (TTAB 1975).
The party petitioning to cancel a federally registered trademark must plead that it has standing and that there is a valid ground for the cancellation of the registration.
Furthermore, the party petitioning to cancel a federally registered trademark must plead that it has standing and that there is a valid ground for the cancellation of the registration. Young v. AGB Corp., 152 F.3d 1377, 47 USPQ2d 1752, 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Section 14 has been interpreted as requiring a cancellation petitioner to show (1) that it possesses standing to challenge the continued presence on the register of the subject registration and (2) that there is a valid ground why the registrant is not entitled under law to maintain the registration") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
A presumption of validity attaches to a service mark registration, and the party seeking cancellation must rebut this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, a presumption of validity attaches to a service mark registration, and the party seeking cancellation must rebut this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence." West Florida Seafood Inc. v. Jet Restaurants Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 31 USPQ2d 1660, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Another point we consider is that "a presumption of validity attaches to a service mark registration, and the party seeking cancellation must rebut this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence." West Florida Seafood Inc. v. Jet Restaurants Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 31 USPQ 1660, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
A party claiming prior use of a registered mark may petition to cancel the registration on the basis of such prior use.
A party claiming prior use of a registered mark may petition to cancel the registration on the basis of such prior use pursuant to section 14 of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. Section 1064.
The party seeking cancellation must rebut the presumption of a registration's validity by a preponderance of the evidence.
We start by noting that the party seeking cancellation must rebut the presumption of a registration's validity by a preponderance of the evidence. West Florida Seafood, 31 USPQ at 1662. See also Cerveceria Centroamericana S.A. v. Cerveceria India Inc., 892 F.2d 1021, 13 USPQ2d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[I]n a [trademark registration] cancellation for abandonment, as for any other ground, the petitioner bears the burden of proof. Moreover, the petitioner's burden is to establish the case for cancellation by a preponderance of the evidence"); Martahus v. Video Duplication Services Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 27 USPQ2d 1846, 1850 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Burden of Proof: The burden of proof in a cancellation proceeding for a service mark registration is no different from that for a trademark or certification mark.
The burden of proof in a cancellation proceeding for a service mark registration is no different from that for a trademark or certification mark.
Burden of Proof: The opposer's burden of proof in both opposition and cancellation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence.
FOOTNOTE 11 "Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Products Co., 994 F.2d 1569 26 USPQ2d 1912, 1918 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (The "challenger's burden of proof in both opposition and cancellation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence")."
Uncontrolled ("naked") licensing can result in a registered mark being deemed abandoned for losing its significance as an indication of origin and constitute grounds for canceling the registration.
Petition to cancel registration is to be served on the owner of the registration or its domestic representative, if so appointed, and not counsel for respondent.
FOOTNOTE 3: "3 Petitioner filed a copy of this letter with the Board. The Board notes that it was incorrect for petitioner to serve the petition on counsel for respondent, rather than on respondent, i.e., the owner of the registration. A petition is to be served on the owner of the registration or its domestic representative, if one has been appointed, at the correspondence address of record for the owner or domestic representative, if any. See Trademark Rule 2.111(b). Nonetheless, as previously noted, counsel for respondent has filed an answer and it is clear that respondent will be represented by counsel in this proceeding. Under these circumstances, therefore, petitioner need not forward a service copy directly to respondent."
Trademark Rule 2.111(a) requires a petition to cancel must include proof of service on the owner of record for the registration, or the owner's domestic representative of record.
Amended Trademark Rule 2.111(a), effective November 1, 2007, states that a petition to cancel "must include proof of service on the owner of record for the registration, or the owner's domestic representative of record, at the correspondence address of record in the Office, as detailed in §§ 2.111(b) and 2.119" (emphasis added).
Discussion of change in service requirement.
Case Finding: Petition not entitled to filing date, even where TTAB so assigned one, where it failed to comply with service obligations.
Thus, although the Board accorded the petition an October 9, 2008 "filing date" based on petitioner's ESTTA filing, petitioner clearly is not entitled to such a filing date because it failed to comply with its service obligations on that date.
Failure to properly serve a notice of opposition results in the the case being dismissed as a nullity.
So long as a party cures a defective filing by its amendment of the proof of service petition to cancel within the time to cancel a mark, the petition will be accorded a filing date as of the amendment.
However, unlike a notice of opposition wherein an opposer cannot remedy a failure to comply with the service requirements if the remedy is provided after the close of the opposition period, as originally set or as extended, a petition to cancel a registration issued on the Principal Register on a claim that the mark is merely descriptive may be filed at any time within five years from the date of the registration of the mark.
Inasmuch as petitioner acted promptly to cure its acknowledged failure of service, and given the fact that this petition would not be time-barred as of the date of actual compliance with the service requirement, petitioner cured the defective filing by its amendment of the proof of service. Therefore, the Board will not dismiss this petition as a nullity but instead will accord the petition a new filing date of October 17, 2008, which is the date of such amendment.
Evidentiary matters should not be pleaded in or with a complaint or filed at any time other than the petitioner's assigned time for submitting evidence in a cancelation proceeding.
Finally, the Board notes that on November 17, 2008, petitioner filed several items "in support of" its petition to cancel. However, evidentiary matters should not be pleaded in or with a complaint or filed at any time other than the petitioner's assigned time for submitting evidence, i.e., its assigned testimony period.
Evidence: Plaintiff's pleaded registrations may be filed along with the petition to cancel or notice of opposition.
Moreover, with the exception of a plaintiff's pleaded registrations, which may be filed along with the petition to cancel or notice of opposition, documents and other exhibits may be made of record only during the testimony period of the offering party in the following two ways: (1) they may be introduced by a witness during the course of a deposition, and (2) they may be submitted pursuant to a notice of reliance filed with the Board if they meet the requirements of Trademark Rule 2.120 or 2.122. See generally, TBMP Chapter 700 (2nd ed. rev. 2004).7 In view thereof, petitioner's November 17, 2008 submission will not be given any further consideration.
Evidence: Documents and other exhibits may be made of record in the following two ways.
Evidence: Registrations relied upon by opposer are not open to attack of their validity, so long as the remarks remain uncanceled.
The law, of course, is well settled that an applicant cannot collaterally attack opposer's registration in the absence of a counterclaim for cancellation. 37 C.F.R. § 2.106(b); Contour Chair-Lounge Co. v. The Englander Co., 324 F.2d 186, 139 USPQ 285, 287 (CCPA 1963) ("[T]his is an opposition only and in an opposition, this court has always held that the validity of the opposer's registrations are not open to [collateral] attack"); Cosmetically Yours, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 424 F.2d 1385, 165 USPQ 515, 517 (CCPA 1970) ("As long as the registration relied upon by an opposer in an opposition proceeding remains uncanceled, it is treated as valid and entitled to the statutory presumptions"). Nonetheless, we do not find applicant to have engaged in an impermissible collateral attack on opposer's registration.
Case Finding: Labs' failure to file affidavits of continued use with respect to its Class 35 services and its explicit request to delete such services from its registrations – resulting in cancellation of that class – fit squarely within the ambit of Trademark Rule 2.134(a). In view thereof, and because Pharma's written consent to Labs' voluntary cancellations is not of record, judgment is hereby entered against Labs.
With regard to its services in Class 35, Labs has stated that it deleted those services from each of its registrations when it filed its Section 8 affidavits in connection with the registrations, and provided copies of the relevant Section 8 affidavits. Labs' failure to file affidavits of continued use with respect to its Class 35 services and its explicit request to delete such services from its registrations – resulting in cancellation of that class – fit squarely within the ambit of Trademark Rule 2.134(a). In view thereof, and because Pharma's written consent to Labs' voluntary cancellations is not of record, judgment is hereby entered against Labs.
In a cancellation proceeding against a registration having multiple classes, the respondent's request in a Section 8 affidavit to delete a class that is subject to cancellation is governed by Trademark Rule 2.134(a).
The determination of opposer's compliance with the signature requirement was an ex parte examination issue addressed during prosecution, and as with similar ex parte examination matters, does not form a basis for cancellation.
The determination of opposer's compliance with the signature requirement was an ex parte examination issue addressed during prosecution. This issue, as with similar ex parte examination matters, does not form a basis for cancellation. Cf. Saint-Gobain Abrasives Inc. v. Unova Indus. Automation Syst. Inc., 66 USPQ2d 1355, 1359 (TTAB 2003) (fairness dictates that the ex parte question of the sufficiency of the description of the mark not be a ground for opposition or cancellation); Phonak Holding AG v. ReSound GmbH, 56 USPQ2d 1057, 1059 (TTAB 2000) (failure to enforce requirement of filing of foreign registration is examination error and not a ground for counterclaim for cancellation); Marshall Field & Co. v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 11 USPQ2d 1355, 1358 (TTAB 1989) (the insufficiency of the specimens, per se, does not constitute grounds for cancellation); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 10 USPQ2d 2034, 2035 (TTAB 1989) (the adequacy of specimens is solely a matter of ex parte examination).
The request to delete a class of goods or services sought to be cancelled is, in effect, a voluntary cancellation of the registration as to that class under Section 7(e).
The request to delete a class of goods or services sought to be cancelled is, in effect, a voluntary cancellation of the registration as to that class under Section 7(e) of the Trademark Act. See TBMP § 602.02(a) (2d ed. rev. 2004).
To the extent that applicant seeks to assert a counterclaim based on the allegations that the underlying application was incomplete, and thus void ab initio, opposer's submission of an unsigned application does not form a statutory ground for cancellation.
Trademark Rule 2.111(b) provides that a petition for cancellation need not be verified but must be signed by either the petitioner or petitioner's attorney.
Trademark Rule 2.134(a) provides that after the commencement of a cancellation proceeding, if the respondent applies for cancellation of the involved registration under Section 7(e) of the Act without the written consent of every adverse party to the proceeding, judgment shall be entered against the respondent.
We recognize that prosecution of a trademark application involves numerous regulatory requirements, and that whether an applicant has satisfied them often entails some degree of subjective judgment on the part of the examining attorney. Considerations of due process, as well as fairness to parties against whom allegations of examination error are asserted, dictate that such matters be solely a matter for ex parte determination, and not grounds for opposition or cancellation.
We recognize that prosecution of a trademark application involves numerous regulatory requirements, and that whether an applicant has satisfied them often entails some degree of subjective judgment on the part of the examining attorney. Considerations of due process, as well as fairness to parties against whom allegations of examination error are asserted, dictate that such matters be solely a matter for ex parte determination, and not grounds for opposition or cancellation. Saint-Gobain Abrasives, 66 USPQ2d at 1359 ("It would be manifestly unfair to penalize defendant for noncompliance with a requirement that was never made by the Examining Attorney."), citing Marshall Field & Co., 11 USPQ2d 1355.
The grounds available to petition to cancel a registration which is more than five years old are limited.
Unlike a notice of opposition, a petition to cancel a registration issued on the Principal Register on a claim that the mark is merely descriptive may be filed at any time within five years from the date of the registration of the mark.
If this case were an opposition proceeding, and October 9, 2008 had been the deadline for filing a notice of opposition, proof of subsequent service of the notice on defendant or its counsel would be insufficient and the case would have to be dismissed as a nullity. See Springfield Inc. v. XD, 86 USPQ2d 1063 (TTAB 2008) and In re Sasson Licensing Corp., 35 USPQ2d 1510, 1512 (CommÕr 1995).6 However, unlike a notice of opposition wherein an opposer cannot remedy a failure to comply with the service requirements if the remedy is provided after the close of the opposition period, as originally set or as extended, a petition to cancel a registration issued on the Principal Register on a claim that the mark is merely descriptive may be filed at any time within five years from the date of the registration of the mark. Since the mark in this case registered on September 14, 2004, petitioner has until the fifth anniversary of the date of the registration, namely, September 14, 2009, to properly file a petition to cancel asserting a claim of descriptiveness.
Since the TTAB can cancel registrations in whole or in part, applicant could have sought to restrict the description of goods in the cited registration by filing a partial petition to cancel the cited registration and alleging that the proposed restriction will avoid a likelihood of confusion and that registrant is not using the mark on the products being excluded from the registration.

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