Source: http://cl.bna.com/cl/19990519/s065511.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:07:54+00:00

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In People v. Cortez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 426 (Cortez), the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District held that a trial judge is not required to advise a defendant, upon his or her guilty plea, that the "Three Strikes" law (Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i), 1170.12) limits the defendant�s ability to earn conduct and work credits while incarcerated. 1 In the present case, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District (Division Three) expressly disagreed with the reasoning set forth in Cortez, instead determining that in sentencing under the Three Strikes law, the trial court was required to advise defendant, prior to his guilty plea, that he was ineligible for parole until he had served four-fifths of his sentence. We granted the People�s petition for review to resolve the conflict.
As we shall explain, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a defendant�s parole eligibility date is not a direct consequence of which a defendant must be apprised before pleading guilty. (Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, 55-56.) The credit limitation contained within the Three Strikes law serves a role functionally equivalent to a parole eligibility date, and we conclude that neither the federal or the state Constitution, nor California�s judicially declared rules of criminal procedure, required the trial court to advise defendant, prior to his guilty plea, that he would be ineligible for release from prison until he had served four-fifths of his sentence. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
The facts of this case, derived from the probation officer�s report, are undisputed. Having received information from a confidential informant that defendant was a seller of heroin, Lake County Narcotics Task Force officers conducted a surveillance of defendant�s apartment on August 23, 1995. Officers observed Robert Bounty, a suspected "customer" of defendant�s, arrive at the apartment, after which the two men entered Bounty�s vehicle and drove away, returning approximately 30 minutes later. When officers thereafter approached, defendant started to walk away. He ignored orders to stop and physically resisted arrest, throwing a "hype-kit" (i.e., drug paraphernalia) and a package of heroin over a fence during the struggle. Officers recovered the "hype-kit" and .28 grams of heroin.
Defendant subsequently waived his constitutional rights and provided a written statement to the police, acknowledging that he "threw some heroin down." He stated, however, that the heroin was for personal use, not for sale. Bounty also provided a statement, admitting that he went to defendant�s apartment for the purpose of obtaining heroin; defendant told Bounty he was out of heroin; Bounty agreed to drive defendant to another location to acquire some, and in return, defendant agreed to give Bounty some heroin.
On October 20, 1995, defendant was charged by amended complaint with possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, � 11350) and misdemeanor resisting arrest. (� 148, subd. (a).) The complaint alleged that defendant had suffered prior serious felony convictions ("strikes") for burglary (� 459) and robbery (� 211) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law.
On November 17, 1995, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of heroin and admitted a single prior serious felony conviction, and the court dismissed the count that charged resisting arrest.
On or about December 8, 1995, defendant received the probation officer�s report, which contained a statement referring to section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(5). 2 This statutory provision � commonly known as the "4/5 Rule" � provides that "[t]he total amount of credits awarded [under the statutes governing good time and work time credit] shall not exceed one-fifth of the total term of imprisonment imposed . . . ." (Ibid.) Thus, each defendant sentenced under the Three Strikes law generally must serve at least four-fifths of his or her sentence prior to becoming eligible for parole.
Shortly thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to six years in prison, representing the upper term for the possession charge, doubled, pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable cause (� 1237.5).
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court�s denial of defendant�s motion to withdraw the plea, concluding that the credit limitation contained within the Three Strikes law "falls within the Boykin-Tahl-Bunnell requirement of advisement as to sentencing range and other direct consequences of a guilty plea," thus requiring the trial court to advise defendant that, in consequence of his plea, he would serve a minimum of four-fifths of the sentence before becoming eligible for parole. 4 We thereafter granted the People�s petition for review.
In considering the parties� respective positions regarding the trial court�s responsibility to provide parole eligibility advisements upon the entry of defendant�s guilty plea, it is instructive briefly to consider prior pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court and of this court, upon which the Court of Appeal ostensibly relied. As the following discussion makes clear, the question whether the trial court was required to advise defendant that he would be ineligible for parole until he had served four-fifths of his prison term, turns on whether the 4/5 Rule properly should be characterized as a "direct" or "collateral" consequence of defendant�s plea, within the meaning of the controlling decisions.
In Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592, we elaborated: "In all guilty plea and submission cases the defendant shall be advised of the direct consequences of the conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute . . . ." (Id. at p. 605.) Although we recognized in Bunnell that the Boykin-Tahl advisements might not be constitutionally required in all circumstances, we concluded that in the interest of justice it was appropriate to adopt a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure, requiring the giving of certain advisements in a broad category of cases.
In subsequent decisions, we have clarified that "[u]nlike the admonition of constitutional rights, . . . advisement as to the consequences of a plea is not constitutionally mandated. Rather, the rule compelling such advisement is a �judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.� " (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1022, quoting People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 495.) Accordingly, the question in this case is whether the limitation upon the amount of good time or work time credit that a defendant may earn in prison should properly be characterized as a "direct consequence" within the meaning of the judicially declared rule of criminal procedure set forth in Bunnell.
Although this court has not addressed the question whether a defendant�s parole eligibility date represents a direct or collateral consequence of a plea for purposes of the Bunnell rule, a number of California�s intermediate appellate courts have done so, reaching varying results. We examine these cases below.
In the present case, after reviewing the Tabucchi and Huynh decisions, the Court of Appeal observed: "[T]he question remains whether the 4/5 Rule is usual within the meaning of Tabucchi as limited by Huynh." The court noted that this issue had been addressed in Cortez, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 426.
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Court of Appeal in Cortez held that the defendant had been advised that he would be sentenced under the Three Strikes law. "Since the conduct credit limitation contained in that law broadly applies to all persons sentenced thereunder, we conclude the trial court was not required to advise [the defendant] of the ordinary limitations on conduct credits. (See People v. Huynh, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d [1067,] 1082.) Accordingly, advisement that sentencing would be pursuant to the [T]hree [S]trikes law adequately and implicitly informed [him] of his limited eligibility for early release on parole.
As noted, the Court of Appeal in the present case expressly disagreed with Cortez, observing that the reasoning in that opinion "fails to address the troubling prospect of a lack of notice where the prosecution negotiates a guilty plea with a defendant under a new and different sentencing scheme." Characterizing the Three Strikes law as a "complicated piece of legislative reform," the Court of Appeal held that it was "unlikely" the public debate surrounding the law�s enactment "effectively educated the general public to the extent that the new law can be said to be in any sense �usual.� Since the Three Strikes sentencing provisions are a major departure from the previous, widely understood sentencing scheme, we conclude that it is unusual within the meaning of Tabucchi." (Original italics.) Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that "the 4/5 Rule falls within the Boykin-Tahl-Bunnell requirement of advisement as to sentencing range and other direct consequences of a guilty plea." Further, the court found sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal.
In concluding that the Constitution requires a trial court expressly to advise a defendant of the 4/5 Rule in view of the "new" and "complicated" nature of the Three Strikes law, the Court of Appeal failed to consider whether the opinion in Tabucchi correctly reflects current law. The appellate court in the proceedings below also deviated from the "direct consequence" standard we articulated in Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592, 605 (requiring that a defendant be advised of "the permissible range of punishment provided by statute . . . ."). Under the vague and impractical test articulated by the Court of Appeal, trial courts would be responsible for advising defendants of a myriad of contingencies related to eligibility for good-time or work-time credits � an unduly burdensome task and one unnecessary to ensure the voluntariness of a guilty plea.
Numerous factors inform the decision to release an inmate into law-abiding society, and courts need not inform the defendant of all the contingencies and possibilities that may ensue from a plea of guilty. Nor does the fair and efficient administration of justice require that the trial court inform the defendant of the theoretical minimum portion of a sentence that will have to be served in custody (taking into account potential in-prison conduct or work credits) when he or she pleads guilty to a term whose potential length may be greater; such knowledge, although important to the defendant who pleads guilty, is not required to facilitate a knowing and intelligent decision to plead. (See Hunter v. Fogg, supra, 616 F.2d 55, 61.) An advisement of the statutory or stipulated sentence � without reference to permissible credits � is sufficient.
In accord with Cortez and the numerous out-of-state decisions cited above, we conclude that a defendant is not entitled to withdraw or set aside a guilty plea on the ground that the trial court, in accepting the plea, failed to advise the defendant of a limit on good-time or work-time credits available to the defendant. To the extent it is inconsistent with this conclusion, Tabucchi, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d 133, is disapproved.
The Court of Appeal also held that even if the credit limitation were not a direct consequence of a guilty plea, defendant was entitled to have his plea set aside on appeal on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise defendant of the 4/5 Rule. Because the record on appeal does not definitively establish whether or not counsel so advised defendant (beyond defendant�s bare assertion that he did not), or whether if defendant had been so advised, he in fact would not have entered into the apparently favorable plea agreement resulting in the elimination of one "strike" that potentially could have subjected defendant to a life sentence, defendant�s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding rather than on appeal. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 265-266.) The Court of Appeal thus erred in reversing the judgment on this ground.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1	Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2	Section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(5), in pertinent part provides: "The total amount of credits awarded . . . shall not exceed one-fifth of the total term of imprisonment imposed and shall not accrue until the defendant is physically placed in the state prison."
Section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(5), added by initiative (Gen. Elec., Nov. 8, 1994 [Proposition 184]), is identical to the legislative version of the Three Strikes law, codified at section 667, subdivision (c)(5).
3	The trial court found: "The Defendant�s testimony is somewhat at variance with his declaration. His declaration seems to clearly state that he was aware th[at] his sentence would be doubled and not that it just be an additional two years.
"But that does not seem to be the central part of his argument. His argument is clearly that he didn�t know that his behavioral credits were limited to 20 percent of the time imposed.
"And the Court finds that to be a collateral matter. It would be impossible to advise the Defendant as to all of the eventualities that might occur in the prison system.
"Things may occur which would cause his behavioral credits to be taken away for other conduct. And those things can�t be advised.
"I don�t find that this is something for which the Court is required to or could adequately advise the Defendant about. So the motion to withdraw the plea is denied.
"With regard to the sentence given, the Defendant alleges that he feels that Mr. Ruffcorn may have misadvised him or didn�t advise him fully."
4	Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin); In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 (Tahl); Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 (Bunnell).
Gerry W. McGee, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Stan M. Helfman and Christopher W. Grove, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
*Judge of the Lake Municipal Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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