Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2010/07/07/vazquez-flores-v-peake-vcaa-prejudice-hearing-officer-duties-bryant-v-shinseki/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:35:57+00:00

Document:
This memorandum decision is interesting because it looks at VCAA notice as seen by the Federal Circuit and is one of the first applications of Bryant. While the cast itself may not be cited as precedent the logic, for the pro se veteran is of interest and may provide some guidance toward the creation of some similar sort of argument.
38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) (2010). He also argues that the notice he received did not indicate that he could submit lay evidence to substantiate the assignment of an effective date up to one year earlier than the date of his claim.
claim was granted in 1959, VCAA notice was no longer required for any subsequent claim related to that disability.
identify the information and evidence necessary to substantiate the particular type of claim being asserted by the veteran.” Wilson, 506 F.3d at 1059.
phrase “particular type of claim” used in Wilson was “intended to distinguish between types of claims, i.e., between claims seeking service connection and those seeking increased ratings.” 580 F.3d at 1277.
with a failure to suggest to Mr. Mitchell that he should secure and submit evidence regarding when his service-connected disability worsened–evidence that was lacking at the time of the hearing and that remained lacking through final Board decision. Had Mr. Mitchell been so notified, he could have obtained and submitted such information. His prejudice arises from the lost additional opportunity to try and do so before his claim was finally adjudicated, which is one of the prima facie purposes of the regulatory requirement that the Board hearing officer suggest the submission of material evidence that the appellant may have overlooked. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2); see also Parker v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 476, 481 (1996)(stating that “‘[p]rejudice . . . means injury to an interest that the statute, regulation, or rule in question was designed to protect'” (quoting Intercargo Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 F.3d 391, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1996))); cf. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1708 (indicating as a factor for determining notice-error prejudice, the identification of evidence that might have been obtained or sought if proper notification had been given); Wagner v. United States, 365 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that “[w]here the effect of an error on the outcome of a proceeding is unquantifiable . . . , we will not speculate as to what the outcome might have been had the error not occurred”). The Court concludes, therefore, that Mr. Mitchell was prejudiced by the hearing officer’s failure to fulfill the duties specified in 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2).
than the date of his claim.
.” Wilson, 506 F.3d at 1059.
service connection and those seeking increased ratings.” 580 F.3d at 1277.
connection claim was substantiated must fail.
rating.” Record (R.) at 7.
worsening has on the claimant’s employment.
and such notice is therefore not required under the VCAA.
the hearing officer in identifying the outstanding issues. Previous HitBryantNext Document, __ Vet.
slip op. at __ n.3 (July 1, 2010).
Consequently, the hearing officer failed to fulfill his duties under 38 C.
with a failure to suggest to Mr.
have overlooked. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2); see also Parker v. Brown, 9 Vet.
the duties specified in 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2).
and argument. See Kay v.
the Board’s new final decision is mailed to Mr. Mitchell. See Marsh v.

References: § 3
 § 3
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3
 § 3
 v. 
 § 3
 v.