Source: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/economic-sanctions-against-the-russian-federation-are-illegal-under-public-international-law
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:36:11+00:00

Document:
Аннотация научной статьи по государству и праву, юридическим наукам, автор научной работы — Burke John J.A.
In response to the Russian Federation’s purported ‘annexation’ of Crimea and the conflict between separatists in the Donbass region and the central government of Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Australia, the principal countries, have imposed economic sanctions upon Russian officials, firms, and private individuals. The economic sanctions imposed upon the Russian Federation violate public international law on three grounds: 1) lack of authorisation under the United Nations Charter; 2) inapplicability of Art. XXI GATT (‘Security Exceptions’); and 3) lack of legal authority based on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Fidelity to the ‘rule of law’ requires an immediate withdrawal of all economic sanctions. By contrast, the international community ‘ought to’ condemn Ukraine’s indiscriminate killing of innocent citizens living in the Donbass region and support the efforts of the Russian Federation to provide humanitarian aid to the region.
2018 / Volchetskaya Tatiana S., Cholopova Elena N., Grigoriev Aleksey G.
In response to the Russian Federation's purported 'annexation'of Crimea and the conflict between separatists in the Donbass region and the central government of Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Australia, the principal countries, have imposed economic sanctions upon Russian officials, firms, and private individuals. The economic sanctions imposed upon the Russian Federation violate public international law on three grounds: 1) lack of authorisation under the United Nations Charter; 2) inapplicability of Art. XXIGATT ('Security Exceptions'); and 3) lack of legal authority based on the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Fidelity to the 'rule of law' requires an immediate withdrawal of all economic sanctions. By contrast, the international community 'ought to' condemn Ukraine's indiscriminate killing of innocent citizens living in the Donbass region and support the efforts of the Russian Federation to provide humanitarian aid to the region.
Keywords: Ukraine; secession; public international law; economic sanctions; Russian Federation; self-determination.
' This article does not support the characterization of the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation as an 'annexation,' but as an event of 'democratic secession.' See Steven Wheatley, Modelling Democratic Secession in International Law, in Nationalism and Globalisation: New Settings, New Challenges (Stephen Tierney, ed.) (Hart Pub. forthcoming), available at <http://ssrn.com:abstract=25l '2'6> (accessed Jul. 28, 20' 5). Other countries participating in economic sanctions against the Russian Federation are: Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, French Guiana, and several Caribbean islands.
Federation as a Sovereign State is disingenuous. A Sovereign State, meeting the criteria of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,2 is a juridical entity incapable per se of taking action without representatives or agents of the State. The multiple rounds of ever expanding sanctions against Russian officials, firms, and private individuals effectively constitute sanctions against the Russian Federation for two reasons. First, public officials, firms, and private individuals are the instrumentalities through which a Sovereign State exercises its right as a juridical entity and takes action. Second, the economic sanctions are intended to cause a change in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Further support for this conclusion derives from the nature of the sanctions. The economic sanctions threaten Russian national security interests by targeting the Russian Federation's military industry, and oil and gas sector, and assets held abroad. Travel restrictions are imposed upon private individuals deemed to have acted for the Russian Federation in the 'Ukraine' affair. The failure of France to deliver two Mistral-class warships to the Russian Federation, based on a contract between the two Sovereign States, demonstrates that the 'Russian Federation' is the objective target of the economic sanctions and restrictions. Carefully worded declarations fail to provide an exemption from the mandate of international law.
2	Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
3	U.N. Charter Art. 1, para. 1.
4	Id. Preamble, para. 1.
5	Id. Art. 2, para. 4.
States.'6 The economic sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation run afoul of this fundamental axiom of the UN Charter to prohibit rogue action by individual Member States pursuing their economic, military, and political agenda outside the parameters of the UN Charter.
6	Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/52/459 (1997). See: Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), at <http://www.un-documents.net/ a20r2131.htm> (accessed Jul. 28, 2015); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970), at <http://www. un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 2015); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982), at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r103.htm> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015); Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Compulsion, G.A. Res. 51/22, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49 I, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (1996), at <http:// www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ares51-22.htm> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015); and Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 52/181, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49 I, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (1997), at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/52/181> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
7	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XXI, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, at <https:// www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015) [hereinafter GATT].
8	Mitsuo Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy 597 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2006); see also Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook (2012), at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/ frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2012.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015) that defines the term 'war' as comprising four elements: '(a) a contention; (b) between at least two nation-states; (c) wherein armed force is employed; (d) with an intent to overwhelm' (id. at 7). By contrast, the term 'armed conflict' comprises '[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces' (id. (quoting Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field: Commentary 32 (Jean S. Pictet, ed.) (International Committee of the Red Cross 1952), available at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-I.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015))). Ukraine, never mind the Rest of the World, would be hard pressed to meet either definition.
Further unavailing is recourse to the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.11 First, the Draft Articles are not primary law, as adopted only by the International Law Commission. Second, the Draft Articles are subordinate to the UN Charter thereby bringing the matter back full circle to the sole institution charged with regulating breaches of international peace and security.12 Third, the Draft Articles require objective proof of a predicate act: the target State has breached an international obligation under international law.13 Omission of proof of the predicate act cuts off all countermeasures ostensibly authorized by the Draft Articles.
9	See Mosunova, infra n. 35.
'Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters.
Build security globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges. Project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief' (Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, at v, at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015)). The egomaniacal character of this position is self-evident. The troubling expansion of US notions of its security interests are well-noted in Laura K. Donahue, The Limits of National Security, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1573 (2011), available at <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi7articl e=2027&context=facpub> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
11	Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 20 (2001), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1,at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/ english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
12	Id. Art. 59, at 143.
13	Article 3 of the Draft Articles provides: 'The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law' (id. at 36).
'4 See, e.g., Ushakovand Ushakova v. Ukraine, no. ' 0705/'2 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Jun. '8, 20'5) (Ukraine was found to have violated Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights ); see also Report: War Crimes of the Armed Forces and Security Forces of Ukraine: Torture of the Donbass Region Residents (English), Free Ukraine Now (Mar. '3, 20'5), <http://freeukrainenow.org/20'5/03/' 3/report-war-crimes-of-the-armed-forces-and-security-forces-of-ukraine-torture-of-the-donbass-region-residents-english-pdf/> (accessed Jul. 29, 20'5) (among other things, Liliya Rodionova, deputy head of the Committee for Refugees and Prisoners of War (Donetsk), remarks in part: 'Some were thrown into a pit with dead bodies, crushed with a shovel bucket, had a smoldering iron stuck in their mouth. People were kept in iron containers with no source of oxygen. The torture techniques are sophisticated and brutal, they leave the victims maimed. Those in need of medical treatment, even with diabetes, receive no medical assistance').
'5 Paul Szasz, Chapter XVII. The Law of Economic Sanctions, in The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millenium (= 7' International Law Studies) 455, 456 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green, eds.) (Naval War College '998), available at <https://archive.org/details/lawofarmedconfli7'schm> (accessed Jul. 29, 20'5).
'8 U.N. Charter Art. 24, para. '.
'the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.'19 This first step requires the Security Council to investigate a purported dispute under Art. 34 'to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace or security.'20 Having made an investigation under Art. 34, and having made a determination under Art. 39, the Council may, pursuant to Art. 40,'call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provision measures as it deems necessary or desirable.'21 Article 41 gives the Security Council exclusive authority to decide which measures, short of military force, are to be employed to effectuate its decisions:22 'These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.'23 Article 51, the only exception to this procedure, articulated as the inherent 'right of self-defense' is inapplicable regarding the economic sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation.
The Security Council has not found that the Russian Federation has committed an act of aggression, likely to endanger international peace and security, or an act to destabilize the peace or stability of Ukraine.24 Despite the spate of scholarship critical of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, these articles are not dispositive of the question, since it is the Security Council, not the collective thoughts of scholars ensconced in the citadels of academia, that determine whether the annexation of Crimea constituted an act likely to endanger international peace and security. In addition, the scholarship, marginalizes the 97% approval rating under the Referendum (dismissing the results out of hand by unproven allegations of voting irregularities), and focuses primarily upon the alleged use of force to annex Crimea, historically part of Russia, and an autonomous region under Ukraine. The annexation raises political, as much as legal questions and, under the post-World War II structure to resolve international disputes, is exclusively a matter for Security Council review and determination.
19	U.N. Charter Art. 39.
24	See infra n. 42 (referring not to a Security Council Resolution, but a General Assembly Resolution 68/262 adopted March 27, 2014).
justifying these actions upon scant, and debatable evidence of Russian Federation interference.25 The international media has demonstrated its impotence to conduct a non-biased inquiry into events in the Donbass. Satellite images taken by NATO are too imperceptible to establish the use of Russian military force in the Donbass, and the source of the images is non-neutral: NATO.26 The accusations made against the Russian Federation may be deemed reckless, provocative, and contrary to principles underlying the international order implemented by Bretton Woods.
Consequently, the following conclusions ineluctably follow the analysis of the UN Charter: 1) absent Security Council authorization, no State may impose economic sanctions against the Russian Federation; 2) the economic sanctions are intended to violate the principle of equality embodied in the UN Charter, by aiming to secure an internal change in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Although the countries participating in the economic sanctions are countries with substantial GDP, and high rates of per capita income, the UN Charter does not allocate influence by economic development and wealth. The large majority of member countries of the UN do not participate in the US / EU led use of economic sanctions against the Russian Federation.
25	See, e.g., Ukrainian Army Shells Donetsk Monastery, PRAVMIR.COM (Sep. 19, 2014), <http://www.pravmir. com/ukrainian-army-shells-donetsk-monastery/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
26	See More Evidence of Russian Invasion: NATO Satellite Imagery Shows Russian Artillery in Ukraine, YouTube (Aug. 29, 2014), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8VcXDzBsEs> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015). Only an expert in reading satellite photography could make sense of these images? Importantly, in 2015, a NATO Commander admitted lying about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. See Stephen Lendman, NATO Commander Lied Claiming 'Russian Invasion of Ukraine,' Global Research (Jan. 23, 2015), <http:// www.globalresearch.ca/nato-commander-lied-claiming-possible-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-coming/5426437> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
27	See, e.g., Peter Lindsay, Note. The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 52 Duke L.J. 1277 (2003), available at <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1192&context=dlj> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
28	Matsushita et al., supra n. 7, at 597.
of Art. XXI, measures prohibiting all imports of goods and services of Nicaraguan origin as well as all US exports to Nicaragua, stating that the exception left it to each contracting party to judge what action it considered necessary for the protection of its own essential security interests.29 At the insistence of the United States, the terms of reference of the GATT Panel that considered the matter, precluded the Panel from examining the validity of the US invocation of Art. XXI. While the GATT Panel's final report was not adopted, it did state that a nation relying on the exception must balance its need to do so against the more fundamental need for stable trade regulation, not to mention, in the view of this author, world peace. In 1986, the International Court of Justice found the US imposed Nicaraguan embargo to be in violation of international law. Laying mines in the waters of Nicaragua to enforce the embargo constituted an additional violation of customary international law.30 Typical of the United States, the pre-eminent forerunner in violations of international law, President Reagan ignored the orders of the ICJ.
GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting. Held in the Centre William Rappard on 29 May 1985, C/M/188, at 2-16 (Jun. 28, 1985), at <https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91150029.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting. Held in the Centre William Rappard on 17-19 July 1985, C/M/191, at 41-46 (Sep. 11, 1985), at <https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91160043. pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 1 190 (June 27).
Diane A. Desierto, The EU/US v. Russia Trade Wars: Revisiting GATT Article XXI and the International Law on Unilateral Economic Sanctions, EJIL: Talk! (Sep. 22, 2014), <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-euus-v-russia-trade-wars-revisiting-gatt-article-xxi-and-the-international-law-on-unilateral-economic-sanctions-2/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
a system of international law to resolve disputes by peaceful negotiations, and promote the fragmentation of national states by allowing any state, in its self-interest, to disturb both free trade and the coordinated use of sanctions under the rubric of the UN Charter. Therefore, any interpretation of Art. XXI capable of destroying the entire dispute system of international peace and security must be rejected.
Likewise, the WTO dispute settlement system ought to constrain the application of Art. XXI even further. The WTO is not a forum to settle political disputes about threats to national security, and an expansive reading of this exception would undermine the entire WTO multilateral trading system and the UN Charter. The United States, European Union, Japan, and Australia lack essential security interests in a civil war in Ukraine, unless the concept of 'essential security interest' is stretched to an absurdity, as it was under the Clinton Administration when the Caspian Sea was deemed a matter of national security interest.38 The Russian Federation has not taken any action against the United States or its allies. Indeed, the Russian Federation has taken the opposite tack, providing information within its possession and offering to broker a settlement. Ukraine arguably is the only State that could rely upon Art. XXI, but Ukraine has not invoked this provision of the GATT.
38	Steve Levin, The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (Random House 2007).
While public international law is razor thin on what actions a Sovereign may take to quell an internal conflict, killing its citizens, including civilians, children, the sick and elderly, does not accord with the moral principles espoused publicly by the US / EU axis. In addition, the US / EU support of the Kiev regime has enabled Ukraine to destroy schools, hospitals, residences, and transport infrastructure in the Donbass. The international community of States must question, if not condemn, the aggression of the US / EU, and any other countries involved in imposing punitive measures against the Russian Federation in the absence of independent corroboration and a Security Council determination.
39	Amnesty International reports torturing and killing of prisoners of war from the Donbass. See Донецкий иеромонах рассказал, как его пытали украинские силовики [Donetskii ieromonakh rasskazal, kak ego pytali ukrainskie siloviki [Donetsk Hieromonch Told How He Was Tortured by the Ukrainian Security Officers]], PRAVMIR.RU (Apr. 11, 2015), <http://www.pravmir.ru/donetskiy-ieromonah-rasskazal-kak-ego-pyitali-ukrainskie-siloviki-video/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
40	The fact that General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of December 12, 2001, 'annexed the text of the articles and commended them to governments' gives them weight, it fails to elevate their status to law. See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 568 (7th ed., Cambridge University Press 2014).
41	This conclusion follows from the fact that 'it is international law that determines what constitutes an internationally unlawful act, irrespective of any provisions of municipal law' (id. at 569).
42	Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, G.A. Res. 68/262, U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (2014), at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp7symbokA/RES/68/262> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
sovereignty that'the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014 was not authorized by Ukraine.' The Resolution did not find that the Russian Federation committed an internationally unlawful act against Ukraine, which forms the basis of State responsibility and provides remedies for breach of that fundamental principle of international law. Rather, the Resolution identified a municipal law violation. Further, the Resolution called upon'all States . . . not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol.' The language is precatory and not expressed in terms of mandatory obligations of States. Hence, if despite the 'call,' the Russian Federation does not heed it, it does not follow that the Russian Federation has breached an international norm of State responsibility thereby rendering inapposite recourse to reprisals or countermeasures articulated by the ILC.
Compelling is the absence of any language in the Resolution authorizing 'all States' to impose economic sanctions upon the Russian Federation. The only reference to the 'Russian Federation' in the Resolution is contained in a paragraph in the Preamble referencing the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of May 31, 1997. The Resolution was approved by 100 States, with 11 States voting for rejection, 58 States abstaining from the vote, and 24 States absent from the voting, hardly constituting worldwide unequivocal support of the contents of the Resolution.
43 Hugo Flavier, Russia's Normative Influence over Post-Soviet States: The Examples of Belarus and Ukraine, 3(1) Russian Law Journal (2015), available at <http://www.russianlawjournal.org/index.php/jour/ article/download/67/73> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015) doi:10.17589/2309-8678-2015-3-1-6-32. Following the logic of the United States, that the entire world is its province of national security, the Russian Federation is entitled to regain its standing as a great State. Id. at 8.
Even if the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation is characterized as an annexation, and presumed to violate the customary law of State responsibility, it does not follow that the Russian Federation must 'return' Crimea to Ukraine. Without reviewing in-depth defenses available to the Russian Federation, it is useful to look at the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act (Art. 28 of the Draft Articles). Article 30 is inapposite as the annexation will never be unwound.45 Article 31 speaks of reparation. But what reparation is due to Ukraine for the annexation of a territory consistently ignored by Ukraine since its independence, in terms of financial contribution to infrastructure improvement over a period of 20 years, not to mention the investment in Crimea made by the USSR prior to its disintegration. The burden of proof rests upon Ukraine to open its national accounting records to determine the amount of investment in Crimea since Ukraine's independence. The Russian Federation has assumed a multi-billion euro liability, since the central government in Kiev has evinced its interest principally in gold-paving the capitol of Kiev, particularly the Khreshchatyk, and in siphoning off funds raised both locally and internationally to enrich corrupt public officials.46 The integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation, including the assumption of pension, medical service debt, and the cost of modernizing the infrastructure of Crimea, particularly its educational, manufacturing and shipbuilding industries, involves two States: Ukraine and the Russian Federation. How the interests of the United States, EU, Japan, and Australia, to mention only the principal actors, are implicated must await comprehensive reports by each State. Simply put, without Security Council determination, these countries lack any basis to interfere with the internal affairs of the Russian Federation. The US / EU axis cannot usurp control of the United Nations to advance their foreign affairs agenda.
44	The Crimean Referendums of 1991 and 1994, <http://culturedarm.com/2014/03/19/the-crimean-referendums-of-1991-and-1994/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
45	Following that rationale, the United States that illegally annexed Hawaii in the 19th century would be under an international and moral imperative to return the islands to the indigenous population of Hawaii.
46	Oliver Bullough, Welcome to Ukraine, the Most Corrupt Nation in Europe, The Guardian (Feb. 6, 2015), <http://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-ukraine> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Ukraine is a member of the ECHR.47 'Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than reciprocal engagements between contracting states. It creates, over and above a network of mutual and bilateral undertakings, objective obligations, which in the words of the preamble, benefit from a collective enforcement.'48 Assume, for purposes of argument, that Ukraine is undertaking a systematic killing of citizens in the Donbass, the question that arises is: what are the consequences under the ECHR? The answer is clear: Ukraine is in violation of Art. 1 entitled'Obligation to Respect Human Rights,' that states: 'The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.' Section I protects 'the rights of beneficiaries under the ECHR' providing for a right to life, prohibition against torture, right of freedom of expression, right to a fair trial, and no punishment without law. Article 15 is of dubious merit, since there is no 'war' and, if there is an 'emergency' within the meaning of Art. 15, it was created by the Kiev central government. The EU has a moral obligation to make certain that a State within its 'neighborhood' fulfills its obligations under the ECHR.
First and foremost, any dispute regarding recent developments in Crimea involve only two States: Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Economic sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation by third party states violate the UN Charter, since they lack Security Council sanction and, contrary to the principle of equality of States embodied in the UN Charter, amount to impertinent interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation.
Second, Art. XXI GATT, if applicable at all, is applicable to Ukraine only, and not the meddling third party States.49 In addition, Art. XXI cannot be read to undo the comprehensive system for resolving international disputes set forth in the UN Charter, as clarified by numerous General Assembly resolutions. Third, characterizing Crimea's integration within the territory of the Russian Federation as an illegal annexation is a premature rush to judgment that disregards complex facts of Crimean history and diminishes the illegal regime change in Kiev.
47	European Convention on Human Rights (as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13), at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG. pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
48	Shaw, supra n. 40, at 251.
Bullough, Oliver. Welcome to Ukraine, the Most Corrupt Nation in Europe, The Guardian (Feb. 6, 2015), <http://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-ukraine> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Desierto, Diane A. TheEU/US v. Russia Trade Wars: Revisiting GATTArticleXXIand the International Law on Unilateral Economic Sanctions, EJIL: Talk! (Sep. 22, 2014), <http:// www.ejiltalk.org/the-euus-v-russia-trade-wars-revisiting-gatt-article-xxi-and-the-international-law-on-unilateral-economic-sanctions-2/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Donahue, Laura K. The Limits of National Security, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1573 (2011), available at <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2 027&context=facpub> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook 7 (2012), at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ Law/pdf/L0AC-Deskbook-2012.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Lendman, Stephen. NATO Commander Lied Claiming 'Russian Invasion of Ukraine,' Global Research (Jan. 23, 2015), <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-commander-lied-claiming-possible-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-coming/5426437> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Levin, Steve. The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (Random House 2007).
50 Sun Tzu, The Art of War 34 (Thomas Cleary, trans.) (Shambhala Pub. 2005) ('Therefore those who win every battle are not really skilful - those who render others' armies helpless without fighting are the best of all').
Lindsay, Peter. Note. The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 52 Duke L.J. 1277 (2003), available at <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1192&context=dlj> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Matsushita, Mitsuo, et al. The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy 597 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2006) 597.
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, at v, at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_ Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law 251, 568-69 (7th ed., Cambridge University Press 2014).
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War 34 (Thomas Cleary, trans.) (Shambhala Pub. 2005).
Wheatley, Steven. Modelling Democratic Secession in International Law, in Nationalism and Globalisation: New Settings, New Challenges (Stephen Tierney, ed.) (Hart Pub. forthcoming), available at <http://ssrn.com:abstract=2511216> (accessed Jul. 28, 2015).
John J.A. Burke (Riga, Latvia) - Professor (elect) of Law, RISEBA University (3 Meza iela, Riga, LV-1048, Latvia; e-mail: jjaburke@mykolab.com).

References: Art. 1
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