Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/69-f-785-8th-595466550
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:35:35+00:00

Document:
Party Name: SHREVE et al. v. CHEESMAN et al.
Thomas M. Patterson and Charles C. Parsons, for plaintiffs in error.
Tyson S. Dines (Charles J. Hughes, Jr., on the brief), for defendants in error.
Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.
Does section 272, c. 23, of the Colorado Code of Civil Procedure of 1887, require the defeated party, in an action to recover the possession of real property to pay the costs of a prior mistrial of the action, in which the jury has disagreed, to entitle him to a new trial as of right under that section? If so, do the facts that the circuit court in which the action was pending had, several years prior to his application, decided that this section did not require such payment, and that the defeated party complied with the provisions of that section as it had been construed by that court, relieve him from the consequences of his failure to comply with the terms of the section as properly construed? These are the principal questions presented by this record.
On November 3, 1890, in Parkhurst v. Price, 1 the resident district judge and acting circuit judge of the district of Colorado delivered an opinion, in which he held that a party who was finally defeated in an action for the recovery of possession of real property was not required to pay the costs of a prior mistrial of the action in which the jury had disagreed, in order to entitle him to a new trial under this section. In accordance with this ruling, the plaintiffs in error paid all the costs in this action, except the costs of the mistrial, and on November 2, 1893, before the term next succeeding the entry of the judgment, applied for a new trial under this section. It so happened that the district judge of another district was then temporarily holding the circuit court in the district of Colorado. He heard this application, took it under advisement and on May 26, 1894, denied it, on the ground that the defendants in error had failed to pay the costs as required by law. On November 23, 1894, the plaintiffs in error sued out the writ of error in this case to reverse this order denying the new trial.
A motion was made by the defendants in error to dismiss this writ because the plaintiffs in error had, on June 26, 1894, sued out of the supreme court of the United States a writ of error to reverse the judgment in this action, on the ground that the court below had no jurisdiction of the case. The order denying the new trial, which the statute granted as a right, is a final decision that is reviewable in this court under the act which established it. 26 Stat. 828, c. 517, Sec. 6; Supp.Rev.St. p. 903, Sec. 6; Standley v. Roberts, 8 C.C.A. 305, 308, 59 F. 836; Iron Silver Min. Co. v. Mike & Starr Gold & Silver Min. Co., 6 C.C.A. 180, 56 F. 956; Mining Co. v. Campbell, 10 C.C.A. 172, 61 F. 932. The fact that the plaintiffs in error are exercising a right, given to them by the same act of congress, to the decision of the supreme court upon another question in this case, is no reason for us to deprive them of their right to a hearing and determination of the question committed to our decision by that act. The fact that our writ of error was not issued until after the supreme court had issued its writ is not material. The question before the supreme court arises upon proceedings anterior to the judgment, and the question before this court upon proceedings subsequent to the judgment, so that the requisite records, as well as the questions before the two courts, are different, separate, and distinct.
The fact that the bill of exceptions was certified after the writ of the supreme court issued is not a fatal objection to the bill. It was made and certified during the term at which the order denying the new trial was made. It contains a record of the facts disclosed at the hearing which resulted in that order. The fact that a writ of error had been issued to review the judgment certainly did not deprive the court below of its jurisdiction, or relieve it of its duty, to make a true record of the proceedings in that court after the judgment. This bill of exceptions is that record. It was rightfully made, and is properly in this case for our consideration. Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U.S. 333, 353, 354. The motion to dismiss is denied.

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