Source: https://theprincefirm.wordpress.com/tag/united-states-patent-and-trademark-office/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:18:38+00:00

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On June 23, 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the America Invents Act (H.R. 1249), which follows in the wake of the Senate version, S. 23, approved on March 8, 2011. Although differences between the two bills will have to be reconciled before the proposed legislation can be signed into law by the President, Congress is poised to enact major reforms to the patent laws. After many years of debate and compromise, patent reform seems to be just steps from the finish line.
We focus here on two provisions relating to challenging patents before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, as currently set forth in the House bill. First, inter partes reexaminations will be replaced with inter partes review proceedings. Second, the legislation will create post-grant review proceedings for the first time. Together, these proceedings will expand the options available to competitors who wish to challenge patents before the USPTO.
Both inter partes review and post-grant review will be adjudicated by a three-judge panel of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The PTAB will be formed from and supplant the current Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. As with current interference proceedings, inter partes review and post-grant review will involve filing motions (e.g., to amend claims) and provide for limited discovery. Thus, there are likely to be many procedural parallels between interferences, inter partes review and post-grant review. Additionally, inter partes reviews and post-grant reviews must be concluded within one year, extendable to 18 months in unusual cases.
Inter partes review includes some significant differences from the current inter partes reexaminations. Like inter partes reexamination, inter partes review will permit a third party to challenge one or more patent claims as anticipated or obvious on the basis of prior art patents or printed publications. Unlike reexamination, which can be ordered at any time during the period of enforceability of a patent, a petition for inter partes review can only be filed after the later of: (1) nine months after the grant of a patent or a reissue of a patent; or (2) the termination of post-grant review, if a post-grant review has been instituted for that patent. The standard for commencing an inter partes review will be higher than that for ordering reexamination. Reexamination is ordered if there is “a substantial new question of patentability affecting a claim of the patent.” In contrast, inter partes review will be commenced upon a determination that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged.” Thus, competitors will find it more difficult to mount challenges to patents under this provision of the law.
The legislation addresses the interplay between inter partes review and district court litigation, and it places constraints on the extent to which the proceedings will overlap. Inter partes review may not be instituted if the petitioner has already filed a civil action challenging the patent’s validity. However, a counterclaim by a defendant in a civil action may challenge the patent’s validity without barring inter partes review. Following a final decision in an inter partes review, a petitioner will be estopped from subsequently disputing a claim’s validity in litigation or before the USPTO on grounds that the petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised” during the inter partes review. Settlement of the inter partes review proceeding will eliminate any estoppel, thus giving parties greater incentive to settle than under the current scheme. Thus, in a settlement context, the estoppel provisions underinter partes review are somewhat less onerous than under inter partes reexamination.
Finally, the legislation also provides for reexaminations that are instituted as the result of supplemental examination of the patent. A patent owner may request supplemental examination of a patent to have the Office consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the patent. In contrast to current law regarding reexaminations, this information is not limited to prior art patents and publications, and it may include, for example, information relating to an on-sale bar or experimental data relevant to the enablement requirement. If information presented in the request raises a substantial new question of patentability, the Director will order reexamination. Supplemental examination immunizes a patent against a later holding of unenforceability based on the same information provided during supplemental examination.
As a supplement to inter partes review proceedings, the new legislation also creates post-grant review as a mechanism for challenging patents. Although there are many similarities between the two procedures, significant differences are present, and they warrant a closer look. Unlike inter partes review, a third party may challenge an issued patent on any invalidity ground by filing a petition within nine months after issuance or re-issuance of the patent. The broad grounds available for seeking post-grant review parallel those available for finding invalidity in a civil action in district court. For example, post-grant review will permit challenges based on lack of written description or lack of enablement, thus expanding the bases for attacking patents in proceedings before the USPTO. The USPTO will authorize a post-grant review upon a showing that “it is more likely than not” that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable. This standard is more stringent than the “substantial new question of patentability” standard for initiating inter partes reexamination under the current law. Alternatively, post-grant review may be authorized if a petitioner raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or applications. As with inter partes review, post-grant review cannot be initiated if the petitioner has filed a civil action challenging the validity of the patent. Additionally, a final decision in a post-grant review proceeding will create an estoppel on any ground that the petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised” during thatpost-grant review.
The new legislation will give competitors greater options for challenging patents. Although it remains to be seen how effectively the USPTO will be able to handle the proceedings, given the one-year time constraint for concluding such proceedings, the existence of each option should be borne in mind both by patent owners who may seek to enforce their patents and by competitors who wish to eliminate the patents of others. As compared to civil litigation, post-grant review and interpartes review may prove to be attractive tools for challenging patents, particularly in view of the faster resolution and lower costs than typical district court litigation, the “preponderance-of-theevidence” standard of proof, and the broadest reasonable claim construction that are applied at the USPTO. Potential patent challengers will wish to stay informed regarding the patent landscape, so that they can timely file for post-grant review if desired.
Despite all of the anticipation surrounding the outcome of the Microsoft v. i4i case, on June 9, 2011, the Supreme Court upheld the current state of patent law rather than change long-held precedent. Specifically, the Court held unanimously that when an accused infringer alleges that a patent is invalid, such an allegation needs to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
This “clear and convincing evidence” standard has been defined as requiring “evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” This standard provides a relatively high hurdle for accused infringers to overcome in order to invalidate a patent and, thus, provides a rather stable environment for patents.
In this case, Microsoft asserted an invalidity defense to an allegation of infringement which relied on evidence that had not been considered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) during examination. Microsoft alleged that i4i sold a version of the software covered by U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449 (“the ’449 patent”) more than a year before the patent was filed. Microsoft presented evidence that suggested the software at issue was previously marketed and sold to another company. The evidence included various documents describing the software such as manuals, a funding application, and letters to potential investors, etc. However, i4i maintained that the software that was sold did not include the contents of the patent at issue in this case. Unfortunately, the code at issue was destroyed and was not available for a comparison to the patent. The lower courts determined that the evidence presently did not clearly and convincingly show that the software sold was the same as the software described in the ’449 patent. While one might be able to infer that fact from the evidence in question, it did not meet the clear-and-convincing standard of proof. Therefore under the Court’s interpretation the patent remains valid.
Further, the Court determined that the standard of evidence should be consistent regardless of whether the evidence was previously considered by the USPTO. However, the Court also stated that juries may be instructed to give more weight to evidence not previously considered by the USPTO when considering the issue of patent validity. Thus, in cases, such as Microsoft, where some material was not before the USPTO during prosecution, the jury may be instructed to give these materials more weight during consideration. Unfortunately for Microsoft, no such request was made of the district court.
The Court affirmed the current standard of proof for invalidity. Many patent holders are now breathing a sigh of relief.
On June 9, 2011, the Supreme Court rejected Microsoft’s contention that a preponderance of the evidence should be sufficient to establish patent invalidity in an 8-0 (Roberts abstained) opinion, which affirmed the Fed. Cir.’s opinion (for a change). (The decision can be found at the end of this post.) The Court interpreted Congress’ intent in 35 USC 282 to preserve the presumption of validity of a patent claim unless an attacker can meet the burden of presenting “clear and convincing” evidence of invalidity.
The Court also rejected the notion that some sort of “fluctuating standard of proof” should apply in situations in which the evidence relied upon was not considered by the PTO during prosecution. Even if the primary rationale behind the clear and convincing standard, that the PTO applied its expertise correctly, “seems much diminished’ (citing KSR 550 US 398), the Court held that Congress “codified the common-law presumption of patent validity and, implicitly the heightened standard of proof attached to it” and that standard of proof must still be met. The Court suggested that, in such cases, the jury could be instructed that it could give weight to the fact that the evidence before it is “materially new” when determining if clear and convincing evidence of invalidity had been presented.
“A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. Innovention Toys, LLC, v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., No. 2010-1290, slip op. at 12 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 2011); In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Bigio, at 1325. Here, the Board focused exclusively on the “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem” test. “A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. “If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection.” Id.
Earlier today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L.P. The Court had granted certiorari to consider the question of whether section 282 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282, requires a defense of patent invalidity to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Contrary to what many commentators were expecting, the Court left the burden of proof for invalidity defenses unchanged-defendants still must prove any invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence.
Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Scalia and Alito) also filed an interesting concurrence stressing that the clear-and-convincing standard applies only to factual issues relating to invalidity defenses, and not to legal questions. “Where the ultimate question of patent validity turns on the correct answer to legal questions-what these subsidiary legal standards mean or how they apply to the facts as given-today’s strict standard of proof has no application.” The concurring Justices thus urged district courts to keep these issues separate “by using instructions based on case-specific circumstances that help the jury make the distinction or by using interrogatories and special verdicts to make clear which specific factual findings underlie the jury’s conclusions.” For years, some members of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have been urging district courts and litigants to use verdict forms and jury interrogatories that ask for more detail about the factual findings underlying decisions on issues such as obviousness, but those efforts have met with mixed results. It will be interesting to see whether these comments from three Supreme Court Justices will have any significant effect on how patent cases are actually tried.
In patent litigation, a finding of inequitable conduct renders a patent unenforceable, exposes the patentee to an assessment of attorney’s fees, and has other significant consequences. The Federal Circuit has characterized the remedies from inequitable conduct as the “atomic bomb” of patent litigation. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., ___ F.3d ___, slip op. at 21 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2011) (en banc). Yesterday, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, sought to limit the use of that weapon by tightening the standards for finding inequitable conduct. Under the new standard, to prevail on a claim for inequitable conduct, the alleged infringer must show “but-for” materiality and, by clear and convincing evidence, specific intent to deceive the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).
The majority opinion was written by Chief Judge Rader and joined in full by Judges Newman, Lourie, Bryson, Linn, Moore, and Reyna; an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part was rendered by Judge O’Malley; and a dissenting opinion was written by Judge Bryson and joined by Judges Gajarsa, Dyk, and Prost.
To establish intent to deceive for a failure to disclose a reference, “the accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it.” Slip op. at 24. Mere negligence, showing that the patentee “should have known” of the reference, is insufficient. Id. In most circumstances, where direct evidence if intent to deceive is lacking, “a district court may infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence.” The Federal Circuit clarified that materiality and intent are separate requirements and abandoned the “sliding scale” approach. Id. at 24–25. A court may not infer intent solely from materiality. Id. at 25. While the Court did not hold that materiality was irrelevant to intent, specific intent to deceive must be “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.” Id.
The Court adopted a new standard for materiality required to establish inequitable conduct, “but-for materiality.” Slip op. at 27 (emphasis added). When prior art is withheld from the PTO, the prior art is but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art. In other words, prior art that invalidates a claim and was withheld from the PTO is material. This is substantially narrower that the past practice of deciding whether the reference had to be disclosed under PTO Rule 56, which had previously been the standard.
The new materiality test does not mean the claims will necessarily be invalidated based upon the undisclosed prior art. A district court must determine whether the PTO would have allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed prior art. Slip Op. at 28. Unlike the clear and convincing standard required to invalidate a claim in litigation, to determine whether the PTO would have allowed the claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art, the district court “should apply the preponderance of the evidence standard and give claims their broadest reasonable construction.” Id. Accordingly, there may be situations where the undisclosed prior art is insufficient to invalidate a claim during litigation, but it is otherwise “material” for purposes of inequitable conduct.
In addition to announcing a new standard for materiality, the Federal Circuit carved out an exception to the but-for materiality test. “When the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material.” Slip op. at 29.
The Federal Circuit expressly declined to adopt the definition of materiality set forth by the PTO in Rule 56. Slip op. at 32; but see Dissenting Op. at 3 (adopting Rule 56 definition of materiality). The Federal Circuit criticizes Rule 56 as too broad because inequitable conduct may be based on information that becomes irrelevant in view on subsequent arguments by the applicant to the PTO. Id. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, practitioners will continue to comply with the requirements of Rule 56 during prosecution.
The ruling will make it more difficult for an accused infringer to plead inequitable conduct with specificity as required by the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). An accused infringer should now need to plead with specificity factual averments to show that the PTO would not have allowed a claim but-for non-disclosure of the prior art reference and that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it.
The facts and history of the case are summarized in an earlier alert which you can review at this link: Federal Circuit Agrees To Review Standard For Inequitable Conduct.
A change to the False marking Statute (Sec. 2).
The House of Representatives introduced their own version of the Patent Reform Bill (House of Representatives Bill No. H.R. 1249) on March 30, 2011. The House bill is very similar to the Senate bill, but includes some notable differences. The first-inventor-to-file system and limitation of the one year grace period is the same in the passed Senate bill and recently introduced House bill. Regarding the post-grant review and inter partesreview proceedings, however, the House bill changes some of the standards of review and time limits in the Senate bill.
Below is a summary of some of the key features of the Senate bill, followed by a short analysis describing some important differences in the House bill.
The Senate bill moves to a first-inventor-to-file system, which would become effective 18 months after its enactment. The Senate bill eliminates current 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) and interferences, and questions of conception, diligence, reduction to practice, abandonment, suppression, and concealment.
References (not derived from the inventor) that are published by another less than one year before the effective filing of the patent application.
Some Section 102(e) secret prior art references.
For example, there would be no possibility to swear behind patent applications filed more than one year before the effective date of the patent application at issue, but published less than one year before that effective date.
The Senate bill appears to limit public uses or sales of the invention before the effective filing date. Under the current law, sales and offers-to-sell do not constitute a loss of right of a patent if those sales or offers-to-sell occurred less than one year before the effective filing date of the application. Any such grace period appears to be removed. This, however, may depend on the definition of “disclosure” made by the inventor. The Senate bill allows for “disclosures” made by the inventor if “1 year or less before the effective filing date” of the patent application. If sales or offers-to-sell constitute “disclosure,” then the rules regarding sales and offers-to sell of the invention (at least in the United States) would remain the same.
The Senate bill also removes geographic limitations for public uses or sales of the invention. Under the current law, an invention is not patentable if it was in public use or on sale in the United States more than one year prior to the effective filing date of the application (§ 102(b); or it was known or used by others in the United States prior to the date of invention (§ 102(a)). The Senate bill removes these geographical limitations. 35 U.S.C. § 102 of the Senate bill states that an invention is not patentable if it was “patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” No limit to the United States is stated. Thus, public use, sales, and knowledge by others, anywhere in the world could result in the loss of right to a patent.
House bill Provides the exact same language regarding 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.
Allows third parties to file a petition within nine months from when the patent issues.
Third party may challenge any claim of the patent based on any provision of the statute (i.e., §§ 101, 102, 103 and 112). In other words, it is not limited to just prior art references as in presentinter partes and ex parte Reexamination.
if “information presented in the petition, if not rebutted would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” The determination for conducting a post-grant review “may also be satisfied by showing that the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent applications.” § 324.
The patent owner may file a statement to challenge the petition.
The determination to proceed with a post-grant review is not appealable.
Post-grant reviews will be handled by a Patent Judge (Patent Trial and Appeal Board).
Post-grant reviews may not instituted if the petitioner has filed a civil action challenging the validity of the patent. § 325.
If an infringement claim is filed within three months of the issuance of a patent, the court cannot stay the consideration of the patent owners motion for preliminary injunction against infringement due to the filing of petition of a Post-grant review or Post-grant review was granted. § 325.
The Director is given broad discretion on how to regulate the post-grant review process, including for example procedures for submitting supplemental information, procedures for discovery, and providing either party with the right to an oral hearing. § 326.
The proceeding can be terminated by settlement of the parties or by a final decision of the board. § 327.
Final decisions are appealable to the Federal Circuit.
The standard for granting a request for inter partes review has changed in the Senate bill to “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with regard to at least one claim,” thereby raising the standard from a “substantial new question of patentability” under current inter partes reexamination. § 314(a).
The scope of review is still patents and printed publications, i.e., only challenging the patentability of one or more claims under §§ 102 or 103. § 311(b).
Unlike the current inter partes reexamination, the Senate bill’s inter partes review proceeding will be held before a Patent Judge (Patent Trial and Appeal Board).
The inter partes review may be terminated by settlement or by a final decision of the board. § 317.
The Director is given broad authority to establish regulations and how the proceedings will be carried out. For example, giving each party the right to an oral hearing, establishing procedures for submitting supplemental information, setting standards for discovery. § 316.
The decision to proceed with inter partes review is not appealable § 314(d).
Allows a preliminary response to be filed by the patent owner to explain why no inter partes review should be instituted. § 313.
The Senate bill prohibits an inter partes review from being initiated or maintained if the petitioner has filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent or if more than six months have passed since the petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement. § 315(a and b).
The Senate bill includes estoppel provisions as provided in inter partes reexamination and does not allow for broadening of the claims. § 315(e).
The final decision by the board may be appealed to the Federal Circuit. § 319.
This provision of the Senate bill allows for third parties to file publications or patents for consideration to the USPTO if the submission is made in writing before the notice of allowance or the a later of: 1) 6 months after the application for patent is first published; or 2) the date of the first rejection of any claim by the USPTO. The brief language is provided below.
ii. the date of the first rejection under section 132 of any claim by the examiner during the examination of the application for patent.
Currently, Congress diverts some fees collected by the PTO for government operations. It has been estimated that about $800 million in collected patent fees have been diverted over the past two decades. The Senate bill eliminates fee diversion by amending 35 U.S.C. § 42(c).
B. any requirement of section 251.
The Senate bill provides a post-granted review proceeding to determine the validity of business method patents. The proceeding is limited to petitioners who have been sued or charged with patent infringement of the particular business method patent.
The Senate bill limits false-marking suits to the United States or any person who suffered a competitive injury as a result of a false-marking violation.
Again, the first-inventor-to-file system and limitation of the one year grace period is the same in the House bill. The big differences in the House bill relate to the post-grant review and inter partes review proceedings. The House bill changes some of the standards for determining whether to proceed and the House bill includes some important language regarding stay of other proceedings, such as patent infringement litigation. In general, the House bill’s changes are not favorable to the patentee. The House bill makes it easier to proceed with an inter partes review by lowering the standard and the House bill appears to make it easier to stay patent infringement actions in civil courts until these proceedings are terminated.
The House bill also includes a new section providing guidance regarding requests for stays in other proceedings. The House bill includes considerations the courts should make regarding whether to grant a stay in a “civil action” (including patent infringement litigation as well as actions before the International Trade Commission); the court “shall decide” whether to grant the stay based on “whether the stay, or denial thereof, will simplify the issues . . . and streamline the trial.” (§ 330).
The House bill differs from the Senate bill by keeping the old standard for proceeding with a reexamination — a substantial new question of patentability (rather than showing a “reasonable likelihood that the petition would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition” in the Senate Bill).
The inter partes review timing period is changed due to the expansion of the post-grant review window. A petition can be filed for an Inter partesreview from the later of twelve months after the issuance of a patent or after a post-grant review is terminated.
The House bill also includes a new section not in the Senate version regarding requests for stays similar to the post-grant review. The House bill provides guidance when a party seeks a stay in a “civil action” (including patent infringement litigation as well as actions before the International Trade Commission); the court “shall decide” whether to grant the stay based on “whether the stay, or denial thereof, will simplify the issues . . . and streamline the trial” (§ 320).
1. DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE FILING DATE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION.
2. DISCLOSURES APPEARING IN APPLICATIONS AND PATENTS.
if the patent or application for patent is entitled to claim a right of priority under section 119, 365(a), or 365(b), or to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under section 120, 121, or 365(c), based upon 1 or more prior filed applications for patent, as of the filing date of the earliest such application that describes the subject matter.
A prior post emphasized the importance of a well crafted petition in cases where the examiner determines that there is no SNQ in an inter partes reexamination request. Recall that the BPAI determined it had no jurisdiction to review of a determination that there was no SNQ (for certain claims) in inter partes reexamination control no. 95/001,089 (Belkin International v Optimumpath 95 001089).
An example of a successful petition (3PR petition here) can be found in inter partes reexamination control no. 95/001,461. On December 20, 2011, the Third Party Requester petitioned the order finding certain proposed SNQs cumulative to issues raised in the ex parte prosecution of the patent (U.S. Patent No. 7,213,762). The Director of the Central Reexamination Unit granted the petition on January 21, 2011(granted petition).
But note that the Patent Owner filed a “Patent Owner’s Petition to Vacate Director’s Decision” on February 14, 2011. And the Third Party Requester filed an “Opposition Under 37 CFR 1.182 and 1.183 to Patent Owner’s Petition to Vacate Director’s Decision” on March 11, 2011. So the Central Reexamination Unit has more petitions on this issue to consider. Stay tuned!
You see a competitor’s patent and believe it is invalid. You perform a prior art search and find prior art that you think would render at least some of the patent claims unpatentable. So after thinking about it some more, you decide to file a reexamination request in the Patent Office. In that request you illustrate that the prior art was not considered before (or can be considered in a new light) and you propose how the prior art can be used to reject the patent’s claims. You file the request.
To your surprise, you learn that the Patent Office determined that some of your proposals were substantial new questions of patentability (SNQs) and some were not. Therefore, a reexamination is ordered, but not against all of the claims you requested. You petition the Director to order reexamination for the proposed substantial questions of patentability that were not adopted. The Director denies that petition. What can you do?
But the BPAI disagreed, because 35 U.S.C. 312(c) states that the determination whether a SNQ is raised by the request “by the Director . . . shall be final and non-appealable.” And since no reexamination will proceed, no final decision can be rendered pertaining to those claims.
To summarize, in an inter partes reexamination there is no appeal of the Director’s decision to not find that SNQ for those claims under 35 U.S.C. 312(c) and no reexamination of those claims means that no final decision will be rendered (favorable or otherwise) that is subject to appeal. Therefore, in such cases 35 U.S.C. 315 does not afford a right of appeal and the BPAI has no jurisdiction to decide a non-appealable issue.
So, when no SNQ is determined for certain claims in an inter partes reexamination, that determination can be petitioned, but if the petition is denied then the BPAI has no jurisdiction to decide whether that determination should be reversed.

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