Source: http://www.717madisonplace.com/?m=200908
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:48:19+00:00

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With the PTO recently posting a job opening for the position of Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy having a salary range of $117,787- $177,000, I became curious what other public officials are paid. Can you match the following government positions with their 2008 salary?
For extra credit, can you name the Librarian of Congress?
Answer key in the next posting.
Brenner v. Manson was decided by the US Supreme Court in 1966. The case dealt with whether a method claim to produce a product is patentable when the putative inventor knew of no use for the produced product. The Supreme Court decided that the method claim did not satisfy 35 USC section 101 under those circumstances.
This oral argument* is primarily of interest in regard to Bilski v. Kappos for the policy arguments that are made in regard to the purpose of section 101. Interestingly, Justice Fortas, in writing for the majority, concluded the opinion with this final sentence: “[A] patent system must be related to the world of commerce, rather than to the realm of philosophy. . . .” One might find that statement useful when considering whether 35 USC section 101 was intended to cover business methods.
*I believe this is the only place on the Internet where you can currently listen to this oral argument. I ordered it from the Supreme Court archives.
Mark your calendar. The oral argument for Bilski v. Kappos before the United States Supreme Court has been set for Monday, November 9, 2009. You can view the entire docket sheet [Here].
I am always impressed when I listen to recordings of Tom Krause arguing before the Federal Circuit on behalf of the PTO. He comes across as knowledgeable, fair, and articulate. Most importantly, it does not appear that he is trying to pursue any hidden agenda. Rather, he always seems to be trying to accurately apply existing case law to the facts at hand.
Mr. Krause recently argued the case of In re Siemens Water Technologies Holding Corp. You can listen to the entire oral argument here: [Listen]. I think this case is particularly interesting for the way that Judge Clevenger probed for an explanation of how the PTO goes about making the factual determination of combining references in a 103 rejection and whether an examiner should be entitled to such a high degree of deference in stating a prima facie case of unpatentability in matters of “common sense” and “design choice” [Listen].
Most prosecutors will get a chuckle out of this exchange about the limits on the use of “design choice” by examiners: [Listen].
The 2007 case of The Saunders Group v. Comfortrac is an interesting case for a number of reasons. The patent at issue was a continuation that included claims broader than the claims of its parent patent. The Federal Circuit had to construe the term “pneumatic cylinder” in the child patent. Namely, the court had to determine whether the term pneumatic cylinder, as used in the child patent, was meant to include at least one pressure activated seal. The phrase “pressure activated seal” had been used to further define “pneumatic cylinder” in the claims of the parent patent; but, the phrase “pressure activated seal” had been expressly omitted from some of the claims of the child patent.
The exchange above is also interesting because the patentee’s attorney was able to argue that the boilerplate language appearing at the end of the patent was relevant to the meaning of the term at issue.
You can read the court’s opinion here [Read]. Again, note that this is a 2007 opinion.
Following Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972 and Parker v. Flook in 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court again had the opportunity to consider 35 USC section 101 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 1980. The Court held that a patent claim for a live, human-made microorganism is patentable subject matter as either a manufacture or composition of matter under 35 USC section 101.
The counsel for the patent applicant argued, in part, that because the USPTO had recognized microorganisms as a unique subclassification in its classification system and had issued at least 60 patents for microorganisms that the PTO had already recognized microorganisms as being patentable. You can hear part of that argument [here].
Interestingly, the USPTO just recently published a PowerPoint presentation on business methods. It is available [here]. In this presentation, the USPTO recognizes that it issued 1600 business methods in 2008. Assuming the PTO issues roughly 157,800 patents every year, the 1600 patents accounted for only 1.0% of all patents issued by the USPTO.
You can listen to the entire oral argument in Diamond v. Chakrabarty [here].
Regardless of whether you agree with Professor Lemley and Judge Moore on the fairness of such a limitation or find it somewhat divorced from the practical reality of patent prosecution before today’s USPTO, I think you will agree with me that he is an excellent oral advocate. You can listen to his oral argument in Monsanto Co. v. McFarling [Here].
Parker v. Flook was the U.S. Supreme Court’s second chance to assess 35 USC section 101 in the context of a computer related claim. The opinion was written by Justice Stevens and he was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. A dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Stewart, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist. A few years later in Diamond v. Diehr, Justices White and Powell would switch sides and join Justice Stewart, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist (i.e., the dissent in Flook), leaving Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun as the dissent. Notably, Justice Stevens is the only member still serving on the Court. He joined Justice Breyer and Justice Souter in dissenting in the dismissal of the Labcorp v. Metabolite case in 2006.
As a patent attorney who admittedly favors patent protection for software and business methods, it is difficult to read the Parker v. Flook decision and find any logic in it. The opinion tries to inject elements of 35 USC section 103 into the 35 USC section 101 analysis. The Court and the public would be better-served to let sections 102, 103, and 112 serve their intended purposes rather than trying to make a complete analysis of patentability under 35 USC section 101. With the Court’s recent decision in KSR v. Teleflex there are ample constraints on claiming obvious uses of a natural phenomenon. And, with the Federal Circuit’s cases concerning section 112, there is ample protection against overbreadth in claiming. One would hope that the Court will take the opportunity with the Bilski v. Doll case to clarify the law by expressly overruling Parker v. Flook.
You can listen to the Parker v. Flook oral argument here [Listen]. You can read the decision here [Read].
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