Source: https://levinedisputeresolution.com/divorce-mediation-blog/tag/Alimony_Reform_Act/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 19:11:54+00:00

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Lump Sum Alimony Enforceable after Remarriage: Becker v. Phelps But Does Keller v. O’Brien Live Still?!
In the recent case, Becker v. Phelps, the Massachusetts Appeals upheld Judge Dorothy Gibson of the Middlesex Probate and Family Court in enforcing the second of two $500,000.00 payments, which was due under a divorce agreement. The payor-wife sought to terminate the payment obligation because the Husband had married again, arguing that the Alimony Reform Act barred the payment post-remarriage, despite the fact that the alimony terms both survived, and did not provide for any termination whatever.
Undoubtedly, the judge and the reviewing court ruled consistently with the parties’ mutual intent as expressed in agreement language cited in the case: if the parties had intended a remarriage cut-off, they would undoubtedly have said so; and the wife’s attack appears opportunistic, at best. The courts correctly stopped her in her legal tracks.
That said, while coming to the right result, the Appeals Court chose to wink at inconsistent language in the divorce agreement, and in so doing, created its own internal conflict. Specifically, the opinion states that: “In their agreement, the parties denominated the lump sum payments in question here not as “alimony,” but as payments made as consideration for the husband’s “waiver of periodic alimony.”” Yet, in footnote 2, the court set out the parties’ own contract language: “In consideration of the Husband’s waiver of periodic alimony…the Wife shall pay [two $500,000.00 payments by dates certain], as non-taxable alimony to the Husband…” (our bolded italics).
Lost in translation: the decision is right not because the payments were not alimony, but because the lump sums were clearly intended to be a permanent alimony “buy-out”, and as such not subject to termination in a surviving agreement absent specific terms that provided therefor. End of story?
Well, maybe not. In cringe-worthy dictum, the Appeals Court revived the SJC’s 1995 Keller v. O’Brien, which we had all thought consigned to the legal dustbin by the Alimony Reform Act, if not previously by Justice Marshall’s SJC opinion in Cohan v. Feuer (2004). For reasons that we cannot fathom, the Appeals Court found it necessary to opine that the new law is not a “direct contradiction of the holding in Keller v. O’Brien…”, suggesting that there may still be circumstances in which an ex-spouse is required to pay alimony to a remarried former spouse without having agreed to do so. Really?
We have focused before on alimony case law that includes concepts that are unnecessary to resolve the issue at hand, and expressed concern that intended consequences are often spawned by over-reach. Keller v. O’Brien was neither germane to Becker, nor likely indicative of any policy that the legislature intended here.
In the recent case of Hassey v. Hassey, the Appeals Court reversed Judge Jeffrey A. Abber of the Essex Probate and Family Court, in part, for ordering alimony as a percentage of the husband’s ongoing income, rather than as a flat sum. They justices ruled that the judge had pre-decreed a modification of his own judgment based on facts and circumstances that had not yet changed. Thus, they reasoned, he deprived the husband of the right to resist such a change based on the host of other material and substantial changes that might occur in the interim, in the context of a complaint for modification.
This part of the decision was not surprising. The principle enunciated arises from long-standing precedent, with only 2 previous reported and relatively narrow appellate exceptions. Yet, curiously, the Appeals Court did not vacate that part of the judgment that determined that alimony shall terminate upon the wife’s cohabitation. Before the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 (eff. 3.1.12), this provision would have been absolutely contrary to law. Now, cohabitation is a statutorily recognized basis for change.
But the statute does not dictate the kind or extent of change. The law provides that if cohabitation occurs within the definition provided in the act, then the court shall do something. However, it requires the modifying judge to calibrate the remedy to the circumstances that exist at the time of the cohabitation. A judge may reduce, suspend or terminate alimony. So, when the Hassey judgment decreed that the wife’s cohabitation would automatically terminate alimony, the wife was denied the right, assured by the Alimony Reform Act, to resist termination based on the host of other material and substantial changes that might occur in the interim, in the context of a complaint for modification.
Did the wife fail to perfect this as an issue on appeal, relieving the court of an obligation to address it? We cannot know from the text of the decision. Without doubt, though, the decision is inconsistent, and the cause of consistency and predictability, its victim.
Previously, we wondered why the legislature tied a trial judge's mandatory inquiry into available health insurance at a reasonable cost to the provision of alimony in M.G.L., chapter 208, section 34. Particularly in view of the individual mandates of MA and now federal law, this seems anachronistic, at best, and begging for reform.
In the recent case of Young v. Young (12-P-1573), a Memorandum and Order Pursuant to Rule 1:28 (a so-called "unreported" decision) the Appeals Court, upheld a Probate Court judgment in which one appellate issue was the husband's complaint that the court had ordered him to provide health insurance for the wife when he was not ordered to pay alimony.
The case did not specify why no alimony issued, but we surmise from the facts reported that this was a forty year marriage and that wife was not yet retired, that either the Husband had passed the statutory retirement age and/or that neither party had "need" for spousal support. The judge did conclude, however, that the health insurance order was justified by the wife's expectation of losing work coverage at retirement and the fact that eventually, both parties will receive low cost health benefits attendant to the onset of the husband's military retirement pay.
Putting aside that these reasons seem to be a non-sequitor (What does the wife's anticipated loss of coverage have to do with coverage now? If she has coverage now, why does she need the husband's? What does post-retirement military health benefits have to do with either?), clearly this trial judge did not feel inhibited from awarding health insurance coverage to a non-alimony recipient.
Under the right circumstances, of course, this is a perfectly sensible result, which raises this question: is it time to look at post-divorce health insurance coverage anew? Since Massachusetts stepped out in front of all other states with its spousal continuation laws, and then with health exchanges and individual mandate, should it not be the first to look at this incredibly important subject comprehensively?
At a minimum, we think that the legislature ought to look at the discrepancies between M.G.L., chapter 208, section 34 and the Alimony Reform Act (can a payor's cost reduce alimony or not?), close the self-insurance loophole for employer-provided coverage (why should large companies with the capacity to absorb employee medical cost risks be exempt from covering ex-spouses where insurance companies are not), clarify portability of post-divorce spousal coverage (discretionary for subsequent employers now) and provide guidance as to what level of coverage and cost can or should be mandated. Importantly, this topic should be covered in one, comprehensive chapter or section of its own. The stakes are way too critical to the security of MA residents to be left to grasping at disparate authorities and guessing at outcomes.
As divorce mediators and family law arbitrators, we feel the need for clarity, consistency and a reflection of broad societal change in this vitally important area.

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