Source: http://co.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180404_0000458.DCO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:03:49+00:00

Document:
In this matter, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) seeks to enforce an administrative subpoena issued to Centura Health (“Centura”). (See generally ECF Nos. 1, 2.) Currently before the Court is Centura's Objection to Magistrate [Judge] Shaffer's September 1, 2017 Order (“Objection”). (ECF No. 51 (objecting to ECF No. 49).) For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules the Objection. Centura must produce the remaining documents within thirty days.
When reviewing an objection to a magistrate judge's non-dispositive ruling, the Court must affirm the ruling unless it finds that the ruling is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Ariza v. U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 131, 133 (D. Colo. 1996). The clearly erroneous standard “requires that the reviewing court affirm unless it on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The “contrary to law” standard permits “plenary review as to matters of law, ” see 12 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3069 (2d ed., Apr. 2017 update), but the Court will set aside a magistrate judge's order only if it applied the wrong legal standard or applied the appropriate legal standard incorrectly, see Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 239 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1236 (D. Wyo. 2002). In short, “[b]ecause a magistrate judge is afforded broad discretion in the resolution of non-dispositive . . . disputes, the court will overrule the magistrate judge's determination only if his discretion is abused.” Ariza, 167 F.R.D. at 133.
In December 2014, the EEOC issued an administrative subpoena to Centura, requesting information and documents under eighteen headings (with most headings also broken into multiple sub-headings). (ECF No. 2-49.) Centura complied with certain parts of the subpoena but refused to comply with items 1-9, 10(a), 11-12, 15(d), and 18. The EEOC therefore sought an order compelling Centura to comply with those portions of the subpoena.
This Court granted the EEOC's requested relief in part. Specifically, as relevant here, the Court found that there was no real dispute over many of the subpoena items (specifically, 1-8, 10(a), 11(a), 12(a), and 18(a)-(d)), and so the Court ordered Centura to produce the documents requested under those items. (ECF No. 20 at 3-4.) As to the remaining items (9, 11(b), 12(b), 15(d), and 18(e)), the Court found a more significant dispute because Centura claimed that these items were irrelevant and that gathering the requested information would present an undue burden.
The Court finds that this information is relevant to the EEOC's investigation, particularly given the number of ADA charges the EEOC has received and the widespread geographic distribution of those charges. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984) (“courts have generously construed the term ‘relevant' and have afforded the Commission access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer”; “it is crucial that the Commission's ability to investigate charges of systemic discrimination not be impaired”).

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