Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/55/55massappct354.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:33:05+00:00

Document:
DIANE L. LITCHFIELD vs. PAUL M. LITCHFIELD.
Present: LAURENCE, DREBEN, & TRAINOR, JJ.
Abuse Prevention. Protective Order. Public Policy. Practice, Civil, Judicial discretion.
COMPLAINT for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on September 29, 1995.
Proceedings to modify and extend an abuse prevention order were had before Edward M. Ginsburg, J.
William G. Small for Paul M. Litchfield.
Geoffrey H. Lewis for Diane L. Litchfield.
Toni G. Wolfman & Stephen C. Warneck, for The Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
silencer. [Note 5] She stated that the children were afraid of the defendant, and she was very fearful of him, even now in court, and would never feel safe.
54 Mass. App. Ct. 488 , 493 (2002). This is consistent with the " 'long-standing' common-law principle that, absent contrary indication from the Legislature, we assume that the Legislature did not intend 'to make accidents and mistakes crimes.' " Commonwealth v. Finase, 435 Mass. 310 , 315 (2001), quoting from Commonwealth v. Collier, 427 Mass. 385 , 388 (1998). Commonwealth v. Raymond, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 493.
The defendant also claims that the order is invalid on two other grounds. Without in any way suggesting that these claims have merit, we do not reach them. His contention that an order by another judge extending an earlier c. 209A order for one week to October 31, 1997, to allow the judge familiar with the case to act on the permanent terms of the order, was invalid is not properly before us. At the hearing on October 24, 1997, when the judge indicated she would extend the order, the defendant acquiesed to the extension or at least waived any objection to it. We also do not reach the defendant's constitutional arguments as they were raised for the first time on appeal.
[Note 1] We acknowledge the helpful brief of amici curiae the Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts, the Domestic Violence Council, Inc., and Jane Doe, Inc.
[Note 2] The order contained the same terms as a previous order issued under G. L. c. 208, § 34B, which on its face stated that it was agreed to by the parties. Although the defendant did not attempt to have the order corrected to show that he had not agreed to its geographic terms (he had agreed to its permanency), we do not base our decision on whether the defendant agreed to the order.
[Note 3] The order contained in the record appendix indicates it was issued on June 3, 1997, and vacated on July 31, 1997, when another order entered.
[Note 4] Portions of the October 31, 1997, hearing are inaudible and it may be that the parties were not under oath. Neither party raises any objection on that score.
Both parties filed motions to include additional material in the record on appeal, and each opposed the other's motion. The plaintiff sought to file a supplemental appendix which included, among other things, her affidavits in support of the several abuse prevention orders that were issued since 1995; the defendant wanted to include the transcript of the hearing at the divorce proceeding in support of his contention that he did not agree to the geographic terms of the G. L. c. 208, § 34B, order. Since we do not base our decision on the defendant's agreement to the terms of the c. 208 order, and since the statements of each of the parties at the October 31, 1997, hearing set forth their contentions and were transcribed, we deny both motions to supplement the record.
[Note 5] In his brief, the defendant acknowledged that at the time of the June 3, 1997, hearing, when he had been brought to court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus, he was incarcerated at M.C.I., Cedar Junction, on a sentence for possessing a machine gun.
[Note 6] Had the record not indicated the extreme danger posed to the plaintiff, particularly by the defendant's possession of a machine gun and silencer, the imposition of such a great distance in a "stay away" order should have been accompanied by findings explaining the unusual order.
[Note 7] See Commentary to § 4.0 of the Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings at 59 (Dec. 2000), pointing out that an order which requires the defendant to stay a great distance away from the plaintiff is difficult to enforce, and that an order up to 100 yards is usually sufficient.
[Note 8] The plaintiff seeks legal fees under G. L. c. 208, §§ 17, 38. Those provisions do not apply to this case. In the absence of any claim under G. L. c. 209A, § 3(f), we do not consider whether that section may be applicable to these proceedings. See Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854 , 858 (1995).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 34
 § 34
 § 4
 § 3
 v.