Source: https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/01190001.smb.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:28:18+00:00

Document:
Appellant-defendant Jason A. Allen (Allen) appeals from his three convictions for robbery, all as Class B felonies. We affirm.
Allen raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences for his robbery convictions.
On May 17, 1997, Allen entered the lobby of a Ramada Inn in Richmond, Indiana. Armed with a BB gun that appeared to be a .357 revolver, Allen demanded money, warned an employee that he would put a hole in his head if he pull[ed] anything funny, and left the hotel with money from the cash drawer.
On May 18, 1997, Allen and a companion entered a Dominos Pizza store in Richmond, Indiana. Allens companion wielded a handgun that appeared to be a .357 revolver and demanded money. Allen grabbed money out of the cash register, and both men left the store.
On May 23, 1997, Allen and a companion entered the lobby of a Days Inn motel in Richmond, Indiana. The companion carried a .22 caliber rifle and demanded money. Allen grabbed the money, and both men left the motel.
As a result of these and other incidents, Allen was charged with four counts of robbery, all as Class B felonies, and one count of attempted robbery as a Class B felony on May 29, 1997. On November 23, 1998, he plead guilty to three counts of robbery, and the State dismissed the two remaining charges. On January 28, 1999, the trial court sentenced Allen to six years each on two of the counts and eight years on the third count (two years thereof to be served on probation), with the sentences to be served consecutively. See footnote Allen now appeals his sentence.
It is axiomatic that sentencing decisions are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse a sentence only upon a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. Ault v. State, 705 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Recognizing that a certain degree of subjectivity cannot be eliminated from the sentencing process, our supreme court has stated that it is inappropriate to substitute the opinion of an appeals court regarding sentencing for that of the trial court. Id. (quoting Hurt v. State, 657 N.E.2d 112, 114 (Ind. 1995)). We will not revise a sentence unless it is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Thacker v. State, 709 N.E.2d 3, 10 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B)). See footnote [T]he issue is not whether in our judgment the sentence is unreasonable, but whether it is clearly, plainly, and obviously so. Thacker, 709 N.E.2d at 10 (quoting Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 779, 783-84 (Ind. 1998)).
In determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court may consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b) and Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(c). Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Ind. 1999) (citing Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c)). The trial court is required to state its reasons for imposing enhanced or consecutive sentences as follows: it must (1) identify all significant aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each circumstance is determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and, (3) articulate the courts evaluation and balancing of the circumstances. Thacker, 709 N.E.2d at 9. In view of the sentencing issues presented in the instant case and the frequency with which they recur on appeal, we present a more detailed clarification of the requirements that trial courts must follow when imposing enhanced or consecutive sentences.
(5) whether the person violated a protective order issued against the person ¼ð and (6) any oral or written statement made by a victim of the crime. Subsection (b) lists 13 factors that a trial court may consider as aggravating circumstances or as supporting imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment. Subsection (c), on the other hand, enumerates 11 factors that a trial court may consider as mitigating circumstances or as favoring suspension of the sentence and imposition of probation. As explained in subsection (d), [t]he criteria listed in subsections (b) and (c) do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determining the sentence. See footnote Although Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1 lists factors that may be considered by the trial court as aggravating, those factors are not exclusive, and the court has discretion to consider other relevant factors. See, e.g., Ballard v. State, 531 N.E.2d 196, 197 (Ind. 1988). The trial court is not required to specifically address and discuss each of the factors listed in the statute. Jones v. State, 614 N.E.2d 936, 937 (Ind. 1993).
With respect to mitigating circumstances, it is within a trial courts discretion to determine both the existence and the weight of a significant mitigating circumstance. Jones v. State, 705 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind. 1999). Given this discretion, we will conclude that the trial court overlooked a mitigating circumstance only when there is substantial evidence in the record of significant mitigating circumstances. Id. at 455. See Page v. State, 689 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. 1997) (when significant mitigating circumstances are supported by the record, they may reasonably give rise to a belief that they were overlooked and hence not properly considered); see also Battles v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1230, 1236 (Ind. 1997) (better practice for trial court to indicate rejection of any proffered mitigating circumstances to assure reviewing court that they have not been overlooked).
A trial court must include mitigators in its sentencing statement only if they are used to offset aggravators or to reduce the presumptive sentence, and only those mitigators found to be  significant must be enumerated. Battles, 688 N.E.2d at 1236 (emphasis in original). A trial court is not required to find the presence of mitigating factors or to give the same weight or credit to mitigating evidence as does the defendant, Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993), nor is it obligated to accept the defendants assertions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Legue v. State, 688 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. 1997); see also Smith v. State, 670 N.E.2d 7, 8 (Ind. 1996) (no error in failing to find mitigation when claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance) (citation omitted). Although a trial court must consider evidence of mitigating factors presented by a defendant, Aguirre v. State, 552 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ind. 1990), it is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist. Fugate, 608 N.E.2d at 1374. See also Cooper v. State, 687 N.E.2d 350, 354-55 (Ind. 1997) (while trial court may not ignore mitigating facts in record, it need not explain why it found a particular circumstance insufficiently mitigating).
A record of arrest, without more, does not establish the historical fact that the defendant committed a criminal offense on a previous occasion such that it may be properly considered as evidence that the defendant has a history of criminal activity. In order to enhance a criminal sentence based, in whole or in part, on the defendants history of criminal activity, a sentencing court must find instances of specific criminal conduct shown by probative evidence to be attributable to the defendant. A bare record of arrest will not suffice to meet this standard.¼ð The historical fact that a defendant has committed a crime, such that it may then be properly found to constitute the aggravator of a criminal history, may be established upon evidence that the defendant has been convicted of another crime, or upon evidence that the defendant committed another crime which is properly admitted at trial under an exception to the general prohibition against evidence of prior bad acts. Once a defendants guilt of the other crime is established by conviction, admission, or properly admitted trial evidence, whether or not he was ever placed under arrest is irrelevant. The substance of the aggravator, history of criminal activity, is the fact that the defendant committed the other crime, not that he was arrested for it.
gives a sentencing court the flexibility to consider any factor which reflects on the defendant s character, good or bad ¼ð. While a record of arrests does not establish the historical fact of prior criminal behavior, such a record does reveal to the court that subsequent antisocial behavior on the part of the defendant has not been deterred even after having been subject to the police authority of the State and made aware of its oversight of the activities of its citizens. This information is relevant to the courts assessment of the defendants character and the risk that he will commit another crime and is therefore properly considered by a court in determining sentence.
Id. at 545. Pending charges may be similarly considered as an aggravating factor, being reflective of the defendants character and as indicative of the risk that he will commit other crimes in the future. Id. We note that there is no requirement that the defendants criminal history be necessarily violent to support a trial courts finding of an aggravating circumstance to enhance a sentence. Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 804 (Ind. 1999).
Next, the trial court is required to list the specific facts and reasons that led to its finding of the existence of each mitigating and aggravating circumstance. Archer v. State, 689 N.E.2d 678, 684 (Ind. 1997); Ind. Code § 35-38-1-1(3).
Hardebeck, 656 N.E.2d at 491-92 (citations omitted).
Finally, when the trial court performs the required balancing process, the balancing test need not be quantitative, and is generally qualitative. Archer, 689 N.E.2d at 684. See also Ault, 705 N.E.2d at 1081 (certain degree of subjectivity cannot be eliminated from sentencing process). When the trial court properly identifies and articulates all significant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, this requires that the trial court merely indicate that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 1999).
A trial judge who chooses to deviate from a presumptive sentence owes a duty to the legislature, the appellate court, the public, and the defendant to explain such a decision. Thoughtful sentencing statements should be made not only because [ Ind. Code §] 35-38-1-3 requires them, but also because they are a desirable feature of our criminal justice system: they facilitate appellate review of the trial courts exercise of discretion in sentencing, they promote to the public a sense that our courts dispense even-handed justice, and they forestall acrimonious complaints by defendants of arbitrary sentencing. In addition, thorough statements may contribute to judicial economy by reducing the number of criminal appeals on the issue. It seems reasonably less time consuming for the trial judge to make a proper statement at the time of sentencing than for the appellate court to issue an opinion evaluating the adequacy of the challenged statement. Moreover, trial judges can avoid the burden of remand for a more detailed statement by making such a statement in the first place.
We hope that members of the bench and bar will continue to be mindful of these important sentiments as they address the intricate and fact-sensitive issues that inevitably arise during the sentencing process.
The defendant, in fact, is at risk of a maximum, cumulative sentence of sixty years in this cause. He could get twenty years for each sentence, and those to run consecutively. There are a number of ways that the Court could arrive at practically any number, by either consecutizing [ sic] sentences or imposing various terms of years for the three different offenses. But by so doing, the range of sentences would be from six to sixty years. I have concluded that what Im about to indicate is the appropriate term of years and there are various ways I couldve imposed that cumulative term of years. Ive chosen the particular manner Im going to indicate here shortly. Ive considered the factors set out in Indiana Code 35-38-1-7.1. Ive considered the mitigators that youve advanced, Mr. Jones, the -- his youth, eighteen years, his GED, remorse, guilty pleas, mental health, drug use. Ive considered the following aggravat[o]rs, the history of delinquent activity culminating at one point with a commitment to the Indiana Boys School, a history that involved somewhere near fourteen different arrests. Ive considered his -- the facts and circumstances of the offenses wherein he was a very active participant, not simply an aider or abettor. Ive considered that, based on the juvenile history, most children when arrested would take a message from that and that would probably be enough to scare most children straight. This defendant has been arrested time after time after time. In 1993, in 1994, in 1995, 1996, 1997, right up until he turned eighteen and then he was eighteen for about a month when he engaged in a series of armed robberies. I am convinced that the defendant is in need of a long term correctional or rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by a significant commitment to a penal facility. Also the multiplicity, that there were three separate armed robberies is an aggravt[o]r, and also indicates the need for correctional or rehabilitative treatment.
Allen raises several claims of error, arguing that the trial courts imposition of consecutive sentences is inappropriate and that his sentences should run concurrently. We address each claim in turn.
Citing Davenport v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1226, 1232 (Ind. 1997), rehearing granted in part on other grounds, 696 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. 1998), Allen correctly observes that [a] defendants juvenile record may be treated as an aggravating circumstance if the trial court is presented with specifics as to juvenile criminal activity and those specifics support evidence of a history of criminal activity. (Emphases supplied.) See also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(2) (trial court may consider defendants history of criminal or delinquent activity as an aggravating circumstance or as favoring imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment). Allen argues that the trial court was presented with no details involved in any of [his] arrests or the juvenile disposition and that its finding of an aggravating circumstance is therefore unsupported and unfounded. Allens juvenile criminal record reflects that he was arrested approximately 15 times between 1993 and 1997, but was adjudicated a delinquent only once, in May 1995, resulting in his commitment to Indiana Boys School.
an enhanced sentence, the court may look to the particularized circumstances of the criminal act. Ellis, 707 N.E.2d at 804-05; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2) (court shall consider nature and circumstances of the crime committed in determining sentence). To enhance a sentence in this manner, the trial court must specify why the Defendant deserves an enhanced sentence under the particular circumstances. Ellis, 707 N.E.2d at 805 (emphasis supplied).
commits robbery, a Class C felony. However, the offense is a Class B felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon or results in bodily injury to any person other than a defendant ¼ð. In reviewing the facts adduced at his guilty plea and sentencing hearings, we agree with Allen that the trial court failed to articulate sufficient facts to support its finding that his role in the robberies justified consecutive sentences. Indeed, Allen brandished a handgun during the course of only one of the three armed robberies, and although his threats to the Ramada Inn employee may certainly be construed as menacing, we cannot conclude that his role was sufficiently aggressive and serious beyond the material elements of the crime to warrant the imposition of consecutive sentences.
Footnote: armed robberies at three different establishments in Richmond, Indiana. Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.
Footnote: ulates all significant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it must merely indicate that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances). Despite its generalized description of the significant mitigating factors in this case, the record clearly reflects that the trial court sufficiently evaluated and balanced them against the aggravating circumstances.
GARRARD and BAILEY, JJ., concur.
We remind Allens counsel that [t]he summary of facts required by [Ind. Appellate Rule] 8.3(A)(5) is not intended to be a portion of the appellant s argument. It should be a concise narrative summary of the facts in a light most favorable to the judgment.¼ð It is to be informative, not persuasive. Moore v. State, 426 N.E.2d 86, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (emphases supplied).
Allens reliance on Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1073 (Ind. 1996) as an authority for our standard of review with respect to evaluating sentences under App. R. 17(B) is misplaced; the reasonable person language was removed from the rule effective March 1, 1997.
Footnote: Sherwood v. State, 702 N.E.2d 694, 700 (Ind. 1998) (remorse as mitigator); Madden v. State, 697 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied (guilty plea as mitigator); Campbell v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1164, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (violation of position of trust and confidence in local community as aggravator); Dinger v. State, 540 N.E.2d 39, 40 (Ind. 1989) (lack of remorse as aggravator).
Footnote: aggravator to complement our discussion of Allens history of delinquent activity under Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(2).
Footnote: es in the plural, we (as did the Thorne court) find Judge Ratliffs dissenting reasoning in Staton to be persuasive: Indeed, if the same [aggravating] factors can support both, and a single factor will support either, there is no logical reason why that same single aggravating factor cannot support both. 640 N.E.2d at 743. In Thorne, Judge Najam noted that cases referring to aggravating factors in the plural did so simply because the trial court had, in fact, articulated multiple aggravators in its sentencing order, and that they did not intend to distinguish between sentences which rely on a single factor and those that rely on multiple factors to support an enhanced sentence and to impose consecutive sentences. 687 N.E.2d at 606. Nevertheless, absent any contrary indications from our supreme court, we may safely observe that a trial courts use of a single aggravating factor to impose both enhanced and consecutive sentences will not be summarily condemned on appellate review.
Footnote: _ S.Ct. ___ (1999) (quoting Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 955 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S.Ct. 783 (1996)).
[T]he primary consideration of the trial court during sentencing is rehabilitation of the defendant. Hardebeck, 656 N.E.2d at 490.
Footnote: hearing. See Warthan v. State, 443 N.E.2d 1191, 1192 (Ind. 1983).

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