Source: https://1attorneys.net/brown-v-united-states-decided-10-15-2018/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:51:34+00:00

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Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
Today this Court denies petitioners, and perhaps more than 1,000 like them, a chance to challenge the constitutionality of their sentences. 1 They were sentenced under a then-mandatory provision of the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines, the exact language of which we have recently identified as unconstitutionally vague in another legally binding provision. These petitioners argue that their sentences, too, are unconstitutional. This important question, which has generated divergence among the lower courts, calls out for an answer. Because this Court’s decision to deny certiorari precludes petitioners from obtaining such an answer, I respectfully dissent.
18 U. S. C. §924(e). Like the Guidelines, the ACCA also required enhanced punishments for career offenders. And, like the Guidelines, the ACCA included its own residual clause. In fact, the ACCA’s residual clause was identical to the Guidelines’ residual clause. See §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“ . . . involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”).
Johnson struck down the ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). You might think that if a sequence of words that increases a person’s time in prison is unconstitutionally vague in one legally binding provision, that same sequence is unconstitutionally vague if it serves the same purpose in another legally binding provision. Indeed, after Johnson, the Sentencing Commission deleted the residual clause from the Guidelines. See USSG §4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2016). But for petitioners like Brown, who were sentenced long before Johnson, this Court has thus far left the validity of their sentences an open question. See Beckles v. United States, 580 U. S. ___, ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 5, 9–10); id., at ___, n. 4 (slip op., at 10, n. 4) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The Court’s decision today all but ensures that the question will never be answered.
28 U. S. C. §2255(f). One event that can reopen this window is this Court “newly recogniz[ing]” a right and making that right “retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” §2255(f)(3). The right recognized in the ACCA context in Johnson, we have held, is retroactive on collateral review. Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9).
The question for a petitioner like Brown, then, is whether he may rely on the right recognized in Johnson to challenge identical language in the mandatory Guidelines. Three Courts of Appeals have said no. See 868 F. 3d 297 (CA4 2017) (case below); Raybon v. United States, 867 F. 3d 625 (CA6 2017); United States v. Greer, 881 F. 3d 1241 (CA10 2018). One Court of Appeals has said yes. See Cross v. United States, 892 F. 3d 288 (CA7 2018). Another has strongly hinted yes in a different posture, after which point the Government dismissed at least one appeal that would have allowed the court to answer the question directly. See Moore v. United States, 871 F. 3d 72, 80–84 (CA1 2017); see also United States v. Roy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 421 (Mass. 2017); United States v. Roy, Withdrawal of Appeal in No. 17–2169 (CA1). One other court has concluded that the mandatory Guidelines themselves cannot be challenged for vagueness. See In re Griffin, 823 F. 3d 1350, 1354 (CA11 2016).
Regardless of where one stands on the merits of how far Johnson extends, this case presents an important question of federal law that has divided the courts of appeals and in theory could determine the liberty of over 1,000 people. 4 That sounds like the kind of case we ought to hear. See this Court’s Rules 10(a), (c). 5 Because the Court nevertheless declines to do so, I respectfully dissent.

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