Source: http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180322_0000231.WKY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 15:03:35+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff Lovell Javhon Jones, a prisoner presently incarcerated at the Fulton County Detention Center (FCDC), filed this pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while he was incarcerated in the Henderson County Detention Center (HCDC). Subsequent to filing the complaint, Plaintiff sent four letters to the Court (DNs 7, 9, 10 & 11), which the Court construes as motions to amend the complaint. In one of the amendments filed January 11, 2018 (DN 9), Plaintiff seeks to change the name of one of the Defendants named in Plaintiff's original complaint, Bill Markwell, to William I. Markwell. The motion to amend (DN 9) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to change Defendant Bill Markwell to William I. Markwell in the docket of this action. The other three motions to amend (DNs 7, 10 & 11) mostly restate allegations Plaintiff included in his original complaint. These motions to amend (DNs 7, 10 & 11) are GRANTED.
This matter is now before the Court for initial review of the complaint (DN 1) and two amendments (DNs 10 & 11) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the Court will allow an excessive-force claim and a bodily-privacy claim to proceed against Defendant Stone in his individual capacity. The Court will also allow Plaintiff to amend his failure-to-treat claims brought against Defendant “RN Kendra” in her individual capacity. All other claims and Defendants will be dismissed from this action.
[Plaintiff] was in court due to writing many letters and hand written motions to get this matter settled. [Plaintiff] also offered to pay $500 towards [his] restitution that day if the prosecution would honor the shock agreement and release [him]. [He] was told by [Defendant] Markwell that they would take the $500.00 towards [Plaintiff's] restitution, but [Plaintiff] need[ed] to find a job from jail before he would release [Plaintiff]. Again harsh stipulation were enforced that anyone knows can't be done. How can anyone find a job while sitting in a jail cell? Again, [Plaintiff] was refused release and [his] attorney Heather Hotson was unable to get [Defendant] Markwell to release [Plaintiff] on shock probation.
Plaintiff states that he asked Defendant Markwell “to give [him] the same chance that he was giving to everyone else who was receiving shock probation, and to be treated with the same fairness that he was giving to a certain group of people who is not the same color as me, but yet their charges was much worse.” Plaintiff asserts that he is “being treated differently than everyone else receiving shock probation.” According to Plaintiff, on December 20, 2017, his attorney Margret Ivie tried to “get [him] released.” Plaintiff states that at that time, his mother agreed to pay $700.00 to get him released, but Defendant Markwell would not release him. Plaintiff states that “Mrs. Ivie stated that [Defendant] Markwell gave her several reasons that don't make sense to why he will not agree to release [Plaintiff].” Plaintiff states that “if you take a look into everyone else from Henderson, Evansville, and surrounding area's you would see that [Defendant] Markwell is not holding anyone else in jail over a restitution payment. He is actually letting people out with worse charges than [Plaintiff].” As to his plea agreement and failure to be released on June 7, 2017, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, and 11 of the Kentucky Constitution; and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff states that on the date he was supposed to be released, Deputy Carter “abused his authority during count instead of seeing the tears in [Plaintiff's] eyes from being denied release and chose to write [Plaintiff] up instead of to try to help [Plaintiff] getting [him] kicked out of the Life Changing Program.” Plaintiff states he was again written up on July 22, 2017. According to Plaintiff, some inmates threatened to do bodily harm to him and “stole a nice amount of stuff from [Plaintiff] while the Deputies had [Plaintiff] sitting up in booking. With them threatening [Plaintiff's] safety the jail staff should have removed them from the gym not [Plaintiff].” Plaintiff states that he talked to Defendant Stone about his stuff being stolen and “kept trying to explain [his] side of things.” According to Plaintiff, while his hands were behind his back, Defendant Stone struck him and put him into a “chock forcing [Plaintiff] down the hall while [Plaintiff's] pants was all the way down exposing [his] privates to female staff and others.” Plaintiff states that all he “ever wanted was fair treatment like everyone else! Now the jail has refused [Plaintiff] to work and earn good time. . . . They claim it is due to medical reasons.” Plaintiff states that he was asked by Deputy Cradock, “[h]ow do [you] expect Southern Health Partners to release [you] to work when [you] keep putting in sick calls.” Plaintiff states that he is sleeping on the floor where he has “been for most of the time here with bugs craweling on [him].” Plaintiff also states that “the health providers here Southern Health Partners [are] denying [him] medical services, refusing to check [his] blood pressure, refusing to check [his] blood sugar, and failing to obtain [his] medical records, so [he] could take all the proper medication and dosages that [he] need[s].” Plaintiff states that he has been threatened by Defendant Gibson “to be thrown in the seg until [Plaintiff] leave[s] for expressing [his] concerns about mistreatment by her staff.” Plaintiff further states that on September 6, 2017, he was “taken to traffic court about [his] fines.” Plaintiff states that he told the judge in traffic court all about the wrong that was being done to him regarding his May 8, 2017, plea agreement. According to Plaintiff, when he returned to HCDC he was never given lunch that day.
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Nat. Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court's duty “does not require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations, ” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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