Source: http://masslegalresources.com/mclaughlin-v-city-of-lowell-lawyers-weekly-no-11-093-13
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:49:36+00:00

Document:
James McLAUGHLIN vs. CITY OF LOWELL.
Middlesex. February 7, 2013. – July 25, 2013.
Fire Fighter, Retirement, Incapacity. Municipal Corporations, Fire department, Retirement board. Public Employment, Accidental disability retirement, Reinstatement of personnel. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission. Division of Administrative Law Appeals. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board. Administrative Law, Judicial review. Collateral Estoppel. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Judgment notwithstanding verdict. Employment, Discrimination. Anti-Discrimination Law, Employment, Handicap.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 24, 2004.
Motions for summary judgment were heard by Joseph M. Walker, III, J., and the case was tried before him.
Betsy L. Ehrenberg (Alfred Gordon with her) for the plaintiff.
Kimberley A. McMahon, Assistant City Solicitor, for the defendant.
On the other hand, the city contends that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over McLaughlin’s discrimination claims and erroneously allowed McLaughlin to relitigate matters already decided before the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) and the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB). The city additionally argues that McLaughlin did not prove a prima facie case of handicap discrimination or interference, and further, that the judge erred in giving certain jury instructions. [FN2] We affirm in part and reverse in part.
McLaughlin’s claims under G.L. c. 151B proceeded to trial by jury in December, 2010. On December 13, 2010, the jury found for McLaughlin on all remaining counts, including that McLaughlin was a handicapped person qualified to perform the essential duties of a captain and that the city intentionally interfered with McLaughlin’s protected rights, and awarded $ 350,000 in damages. The trial judge entered judgment on the jury verdict on December 15, 2010, ordering that McLaughlin recover $ 350,000 plus interest, together with costs. On April 28, 2011, the trial judge allowed McLaughlin’s posttrial motion for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and the city’s motion for a remittitur of the damages award, which McLaughlin accepted. The trial judge denied the city’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. On April 29, 2011, the trial judge issued an amended judgment, ordering that McLaughlin recover $ 200,000 plus interest, together with costs of $ 15,000 and attorney’s fees of $ 235,000. The city filed its notice of appeal on May 27, 2011, and McLaughlin filed his notice of cross-appeal on June 8, 2011.
3. Discussion. a. Reinstatement claims. McLaughlin avers that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment for the city by engaging in fact-finding on issues that McLaughlin had disputed at that juncture. Specifically, McLaughlin contends that record evidence, including admissions by the city, demonstrated that the use of an inhaler at a fire scene was neither impossible nor impermissible and as such, the trial judge’s findings to the contrary were improper. McLaughlin further argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for summary judgment based on the first medical panel’s December, 2001, unanimous determination that he was able to perform the duties of a captain.
i. Standard of review. “On appellate review of a judge’s decision on cross motions for summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judge allowed summary judgment, here [McLaughlin],” Marhefka v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sutton, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 515, 516 (2011), to determine whether “all material facts have been established and [the city] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). See Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). “When reviewing a grant of summary judgment we consider the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and responses to requests for admission under Mass.R.Civ.P. 36, 365 Mass. 795 (1974), together with the affidavits, and ask if there is any genuine issue as to any material fact.” Federal Natl. Mort. Assn. v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 637 (2012).
On the facts before us, the medical panel unanimously determined that McLaughlin was able to perform the essential functions of captain in December, 2001, and again in January, 2002, following the LRB’s request for clarification. It was not until after the city’s second request for clarification in May, 2002–which, inter alia, articulated a categorical prohibition on McLaughlin’s use of inhaler or any other medication while actively engaged in fighting a fire and inquired whether, if so informed, the panel had a change of opinion in response thereto–that Dr. Kaplan ultimately determined that McLaughlin was unable to perform the essential duties of a captain, thereby disrupting the unanimity of the medical panel’s two prior determinations. [FN15] McLaughlin urges, however, that Dr. Kaplan’s third decision was deficient, and thus should be regarded as a nullity because he impermissibly relied on an LFD rule allegedly fabricated by the city in order to intentionally delay McLaughlin’s restoration to service.
Specifically, McLaughlin contends that he properly disputed whether a firefighter would be able to use an inhaler at a fire scene and whether any rule, regulation, or order from the LFD prohibited a firefighter from doing so. In support, McLaughlin cites to that portion of the “Consolidated Statements of Facts and Responses Thereto,” which included reference to Lowell fire Chief William Desrosiers’s deposition, and provided that firefighters routinely exit a fire scene every twenty to thirty minutes to switch their oxygen tanks and remove their breathing apparatuses. While the city, in response, noted that firefighters wear fresh air–not oxygen–tanks while combating active fires, it did not dispute that firefighters routinely exit a fire scene every twenty to thirty minutes in order to switch their empty fresh air tanks. Given this agreed fact, McLaughlin’s argument that this evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the city’s repeated assertions that “the performance of [McLaughlin’s] duties as a firefighter would prevent him from using an inhaler at a fire scene because he cannot remove a face mask while fighting a fire in a smoky area” has surface appeal, unless otherwise precluded. The LFD is not heard to dispute that McLaughlin could use an inhaler during a tank change away from the active firefighting activities. Moreover, McLaughlin does not genuinely dispute the fact that he would not be allowed to remove his mask when actively engaged in fighting a fire, nor that the circumstances of the fire suppression activities might prevent him from being able to exit at will. Nonetheless, we determine that McLaughlin is precluded from relitigating the issue.
iii. Collateral estoppel. To evaluate the validity of Dr. Kaplan’s determination that McLaughlin is unable to perform the essential functions of a captain, we must revisit the decisions rendered by both the DALA magistrate and CRAB; we note, however, that McLaughlin never appealed from CRAB’s ultimate determination. In July, 2003, the DALA magistrate reversed PERAC’s decision denying the city’s request for further clarification from the medical panel.
departmental prohibition on inhalers. Although G.L. c. 30A, § 14, affords any person aggrieved by a final decision of an agency in an adjudicatory proceeding a judicial review thereof, McLaughlin did not seek judicial review within thirty days after his receipt of notice of CRAB’s March 31, 2004, decision. See Retirement Bd. of Salem v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 453 Mass. 286, 288-289 (2009) (discussing judicial review of CRAB decisions).
“41. On or about June 8, 2004, PERAC provided Drs. Dorris, Kaplan, and Hashimoto (‘the doctors’) with a memorandum falsely asserting that [the city] maintained a policy prohibiting the use of inhalers at a fire.
“42. Based upon this false assertion, the doctors were asked if their opinions of McLaughlin’s ability to perform the essential duties of his position would change.
“The judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that ‘[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.’ ” Alba v. Raytheon Co., 441 Mass. 836, 841 (2004), quoting from Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 61 (1987). “The doctrine may be applied with respect to administrative agency determinations so long as the tribunal rendering judgment has the legal authority to adjudicate the dispute.” Alba v. Raytheon Co., supra. “The guiding principle in determining whether to allow defensive use of collateral estoppel is whether the party against whom it is asserted ‘lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or [whether] other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue.’ ” Martin v. Ring, supra at 62, quoting from Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 534, 541 (1985).
Porio v. Department of Rev., 80 Mass.App.Ct. 57, 61-62 (2011), quoting from Green v. Brookline, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 120, 123 (2001).
We must next “consider whether the findings made by [CRAB] were identical to the issues raised in the Superior Court, and if so, whether those findings were essential, or treated as essential, to [CRAB’s] order.” Alba v. Raytheon Co., 441 Mass. at 842. The DALA magistrate made a subsidiary finding, adopted by CRAB, that the LFD strictly prohibits the use of inhalers at a fire scene in support of her decision that the first and second medical panels relied on erroneous information in determining McLaughlin’s ability to perform essential duties of a captain, thus justifying the city’s request for further clarification. See Green v. Brookline, 53 Mass.App.Ct. at 125-126 (subsidiary findings given preclusive effect). In the Superior Court, McLaughlin alleged that the LFD does not prohibit the use of inhalers and on appeal, he contends that he properly disputed the existence of that very rule, thereby rendering the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city erroneous. For the purposes of preclusion, the issue resolved by the DALA magistrate and CRAB is identical to the issue raised by McLaughlin in the Superior Court.
Last, whether the LFD prohibited the use of an inhaler at the fire scene was essential to the findings of the DALA magistrate and CRAB, who considered numerous exhibits and heard the testimony of both Desrosiers and McLaughlin. See Supeno v. Equity Office Properties Mgmt., LLC, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 470, 474- 475 (2007). Without first assessing the existence of the LFD’s purported rule, the administrative tribunals could not ascertain whether the first and second medical panels had relied on erroneous information in arriving at their conclusions and ultimately, whether remand to the medical panel was necessary. CRAB ordered PERAC to request clarification from the medical panel as to whether the fact that the city strictly prohibits the use of an inhaler at a fire scene changes its opinion as to McLaughlin’s ability to perform the essential duties of his position. That order reflects that CRAB’s findings with respect to that prohibition were “the product of full litigation and careful decision,” Green v. Brookline, supra at 126-127, quoting from Commissioner of the Dept. of Employment & Training v. Dugan, 428 Mass. 138, 144 (1998), and therefore, should be treated as essential to CRAB’s ultimate determination. Alba v. Raytheon Co., supra at 844. Contrast Porio v. Department of Rev., 80 Mass.App.Ct. at 62 (plaintiff, who had been discharged by the department due to alleged budgetary concerns, was not precluded from pursuing age discrimination claim based on prior civil service appeal where the first action turned on job titles and seniority rights, the resolution of which concerned neither the legitimacy nor the motives underlying the department’s cited concerns at issue in the subsequent action).
b. Discrimination claims. Following a seven-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of McLaughlin on two separate theories of employment discrimination–discrimination on the basis of handicap, G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16), and interference with his protected rights, G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4A). The city’s arguments on appeal are numerous, including that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over McLaughlin’s discrimination claims for failure to exhaust the administrative process, [FN23] that the court erroneously allowed McLaughlin to relitigate matters decided before DALA and CRAB, and that McLaughlin failed to prove both a prima facie case of handicap discrimination and a claim of interference.
“The jury reasonably could have found that the [city] discriminated against [McLaughlin] by fabricating a rule prohibiting the use of inhalers in order to thwart [McLaughlin’s] efforts to resume his prior position of fire captain in the Lowell Fire Department. Although the [city] articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its stated policy against inhalers, the jury was not compelled to accept the [city’s] justification. It would be inappropriate for this court to supplant its own judgment for that of the jury’s on this factual determination.
i. Standard of review. Review of the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict requires that we determine whether “anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.” Raunela v. Hertz Corp., 361 Mass. 341, 343 (1972), quoting from Kelly v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 315 Mass. 301, 302 (1943). The city asserts that since the third medical panel did not unanimously opine that McLaughlin can perform the essential functions of his former job, he is not a “qualified handicapped person” under G.L. c. 151B, § 1(16), inserted by St.1983, c. 533, § 2. We agree.
ii. Handicap discrimination. General Laws c. 151B, § 4(16), states in material part that it is an unlawful practice “[f]or any employer … to … refuse to hire, rehire or advance in employment or otherwise discriminate against, because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation.” The statute defines a “qualified handicapped person” as “a handicapped person who is capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job, or who would be capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job with reasonable accommodation to his handicap.” G.L. c. 151B, § 1(16).
The present discrimination claim is one of alleged “disparate treatment.” See School Comm. of Braintree v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 377 Mass. 424, 428-429 (1979). “A disparate treatment case is one in which the employer ‘purposefully uses’ the protected status in making its employment decisions.” Porio v. Department of Rev., 80 Mass.App.Ct. at 61, quoting from School Comm. of Braintree v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, supra at 428. McLaughlin avers that the city falsely created and asserted the departmental prohibition against the use of inhalers for the purpose of, or with the intended effect of, interfering with his attempt to seek reinstatement. “We have recognized a distinction between employment discrimination cases where the plaintiff alleges ‘disparate treatment’ and those cases involving a claim of ‘disparate impact.’ ” Whalen v. NYNEX Info. Resources Co., 419 Mass. 792, 795 (1995). See Smith College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 227 (1978); Cox v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 384 (1993).
A claim of “disparate treatment” requires a three-stage order of proof. Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 821 (1997), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). For recent articulations of the standard by the Supreme Judicial Court, see Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 127-128 (1997); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 116-118 (2000); Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 420 n. 4 (2003); Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 39-40 (2005); Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 594-595 (2009). First, the plaintiff bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of handicap discrimination. Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, supra. “Once a prima facie case is made, the burden [of production] shifts to [the employer] to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Ibid. “In the event that occurs, … the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the reason offered by the employer is not the real reason, but is in fact a pretext.” Boston v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 816, 821 (1999). “At the third stage the employee must show that the basis of the employer’s decision was unlawful discrimination.” Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, supra at 117. “Evidence that the employer’s reasons are untrue gives rise, therefore, to an inference that the plaintiff was a victim of unlawful discrimination … [but] [t]he employer may counter the effect of this evidence by showing that, even if his articulated reason for the adverse action is untrue, he had no discriminatory intent, or that his action was based on a different, nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. at 118.
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of handicap, McLaughlin must produce some evidence that he (1) “is ‘handicapped’ within the meaning of the statute”; (2) “is a ‘qualified handicapped person’ capable of performing the essential functions of his job either without accommodation or with a reasonable accommodation”; and (3) “was subject to an adverse employment action because of his handicap.” Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 120 (2010). See Whalen v. NYNEX Info. Resources Co., supra at 796. On appeal, the city does not dispute that McLaughlin is “handicapped” within the meaning of the statute.
McLaughlin’s first challenge in establishing his prima facie case was to demonstrate that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, a matter on which two statutes bear. See Carleton v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 791, 807-810 (2006); Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 610 (2009). McLaughlin contends that an adverse determination of his qualification under G.L. c. 32, § 8, does not foreclose his action under G.L. c. 151B, and as such, the jury properly found him to be capable of performing the essential functions of a captain. We disagree, and instead conclude that McLaughlin had no reasonable expectation of proving that he was capable of performing the essential functions of a captain after the third medical panel, upon further reconsideration, validly determined otherwise.
In prohibiting the appointing authority from interposing itself as the final arbiter of a disability retiree’s right to restoration, the Legislature accordingly vested in the regional medical panel the exclusive authority to determine whether a disability retiree is qualified for and able to perform a position’s essential duties. Additionally, in 2000, PERAC amended 840 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.13(2) to require that the regional medical panel’s determination be unanimous, and this amendment has been held a valid exercise of PERAC’s rulemaking authority contained in G.L. c. 7, § 50(a ). [FN25] Id. at 796-798. “[E]ven though [G.L. c. 32, § 8] standing alone does not express a ‘manifest intent’ to require unanimous action by regional medical panels …, the Legislature’s subsequent approval of PERAC’s regulations imposing such a requirement sufficed to endorse PERAC’s exercise of its rulemaking authority as being in harmony with the statute.” Id. at 797. See MRI Assocs., Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 337, 342 n. 8 (2007).
With respect to G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16), the underlying public policies “are clear: to protect ‘handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of [employers] as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks.’ ” Carleton v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. at 808, quoting from Dahill v. Police Dept. of Boston, 434 Mass. 233, 240 (2001). Furthermore, the antidiscrimination statute expressly permits an employer to “condition an offer of employment on the results of a medical examination conducted solely for the purpose of determining whether the employee, with reasonable accommodation, is capable of performing the essential functions of the job.” G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16). That G.L. c. 32, § 8, together with the corresponding regulations ratified by the Legislature, compels reinstatement of a disability retiree only upon unanimous approval by the regional medical panel is “consistent with and promote[s] the Legislature’s purposes and policies of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice … while giving appropriate weight to … avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks.” Carleton v. Commonwealth, supra at 810 (quotation omitted). We accordingly find no irreconcilable difference between G.L. c. 32, § 8, and G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16). [FN26] See id. at 809.
Furthermore, G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16), does not necessarily require that a judge or a jury make a determination essential to a plaintiff’s prima facie case where, as here, a deliberate statutory scheme of civil service law expressly resolves itself to such a determination. In Carleton v. Commonwealth, supra, standards promulgated by the division of human resources at the direction of the Legislature prohibited a municipal firefighter candidate from using a nonimplantable hearing aid, the precise accommodation sought by the plaintiff, to meet hearing requirements necessary to the performance of the job’s essential functions. Id. at 806. The Supreme Judicial Court held that a candidate unable to meet health and fitness requirements by operation of a standard which rendered a certain accommodation unreasonable had no expectation of proving that he was a qualified handicapped person within the meaning of the antidiscrimination statute. Id. at 810.
The Supreme Judicial Court’s analysis in another recent case, Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, further informs our interpretation, although that case stands on slightly different procedural footing. There, the court concluded that the plaintiff, a former commercial truck driver seeking reinstatement following his discharge from a psychiatric hospital, did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he was a qualified handicapped person within the meaning of G.L. c. 151B because he did not comply with Federal Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring a commercial truck driver to have a certificate, based on a medical examination, attesting to his physical and mental fitness to drive. Id. at 589 & n. 8, 610 & n. 33. The doctor’s conclusion that he was not “healthy to drive” rendered him presumptively unqualified, a status which he failed to properly appeal to the DOT. Id. at 610. “The question of his qualifications for his job–a dispositive prong of his prima facie case–was not for the jury, or for the judge, but for the DOT, subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals.” Ibid. The plaintiff’s recourse in the face of the employer’s alleged discrimination, therefore, lay with the administrative process, effectively precluding the plaintiff from litigating the propriety of the employer’s reliance on the doctor’s recommendation, id. at 609 (“Because DOT had exclusive authority over the qualification issue … the judge was required to refer the issue to the agency”), and irrationally allowing the jury to “serve as the ultimate arbiter[ ] of the meaning and application of DOT regulations.” Id. at 611, quoting from Campbell v. Federal Express Corp., 918 F.Supp. 912, 919 (D.Md.1996).
On the facts before us, there is no dispute that McLaughlin followed proper procedure in challenging the propriety of the third medical panel’s determination under G.L. c. 32. See Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. at 355 n. 1 (“Neither G.L. c. 32, § 8, nor § 16, provides administrative appeal from a regional medical panel’s decision. The plaintiff was, therefore not subject to any exhaustion requirement [before bringing his complaint in Superior Court]“). Similar to the plaintiff in Everett v. 357 Corp., supra, however, McLaughlin was improperly permitted to litigate an issue–his qualification to perform essential job duties–based on facts that were not then subject to review. [FN28] Here, McLaughlin failed to obtain the requisite approval for reinstatement under G.L. c. 32, § 8(2). As previously discussed, the third medical panel did not unanimously opine that McLaughlin was capable of performing the essential functions of his job. The basis of that decision rested on the existence of a departmental prohibition against the use of inhalers, deemed valid following administrative review by both DALA and CRAB. [FN29] McLaughlin argues that the existence of this departmental prohibition–the fact to be given preclusive effect–is fundamentally different from his allegation that the city falsely asserted that prohibition for the purpose of, or with the intended effect of, interfering with his attempt to seek reinstatement. McLaughlin’s view overly narrows the preclusive effect of DALA’s and CRAB’s determinations, however. What DALA and CRAB determined was that knowledge by the medical panel of the existence of the departmental prohibition was a factor critical to its ultimate determination. Simply put, the administrative proceedings concerned the full extent of information bearing on McLaughlin’s ability to perform his essential duties. The validity of the prohibition was an issue fully and finally litigated before two different tribunals, from which no appeal was perfected. To the extent that McLaughlin contends that the city falsely asserted this prohibition, his remedy rested with the administrative appeal process afforded him pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14.
Therefore, it was error to admit evidence tending to demonstrate that McLaughlin nevertheless met the definition of a qualified handicapped person within the meaning of the antidiscrimination statute. In this instance, absent other allegations indicative of impropriety, the third medical panel’s determination under G.L. c. 32, § 8, constituted conclusive evidence of McLaughlin’s status as an unqualified handicapped person for the purposes of G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16). Moreover, we are aware of no situation in which a judge or a jury may properly substitute its decision for one within the authority of the regional medical panel under G.L. c. 32, § 8. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 57 Mass.App.Ct. 728, 730, 731 (2003) ( “[w]hen a negative certificate of a medical panel member is deficient because an incorrect legal standard has been applied by a physician … [t]he appropriate remedy is a remand directing CRAB to submit the matter to a new regional medical panel”). As such, here, the jury impermissibly “serve[d] as the ultimate arbiters of the meaning and application of [PERAC regulations].” Everett v. 357 Corp., supra at 611 (quotation omitted).
The complaint alleged, and the jury found, that the city’s conduct constituted discriminatory interference with McLaughlin’s protected rights in violation of G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4A). At trial, McLaughlin represented that the interference consisted of the city’s creation and/or assertion of the purported departmental prohibition on inhalers. On appeal, the city correctly contends that the evidence failed to prove interference, albeit for reasons less nuanced than those which we announce today. [FN33] We accordingly hold that the trial judge erred in denying the city’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this count.
We are not aware of any case in which a Massachusetts court has addressed squarely the issue whether an employer may be held liable for interfering with an employee’s protected right in the absence of unlawful discrimination. The challenges more readily confronted by courts in applying G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4A), have instead related to the contours of the underlying relationship between the parties and the effects thereof. See Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 706 (2012) (defendant “need not be an employer to be subject to an interference claim under § 4[4A]“); Thomas O’Connor Constructors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 72 Mass.App.Ct. 549, 554-560 (2008) (employee of a subcontractor permitted to sue general contractor). We conclude that the broad language of G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4A), easily reaches the employment relationship between McLaughlin and the city.
Of importance here, the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that as the term is used in G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4A), “interfere” “is appropriately considered with, and interpreted in light of, the words ‘coerce,’ ‘intimidate,’ and ‘threaten’ that precede it, and that each implies some form of intentional conduct.” Lopez v. Commonwealth, supra at 708. At the very least then, interference with a plaintiff’s right to be free from discrimination must be intentional. Id. at 709. In Lopez v. Commonwealth, supra at 711, the plaintiffs, minority police officers employed by various municipalities not named as defendants in the action, alleged that the Commonwealth and the division of human resources knowingly created and administered a Statewide multiple-choice examination which disproportionately disadvantaged minority candidates seeking promotions. The court rejected the defendants’ contention that the term “interfere” encompassed only acts specifically undertaken with the intent to deprive the plaintiffs a protected right, and in doing so, recognized that in cases of alleged disparate impact, “the element of intentionality is satisfied where it is shown that a defendant knowingly interfered with the plaintiffs’ right to be free from discrimination.” Id. at 710-711.
Conclusion. Consequently, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the allowance of the city’s motion for summary judgment, and reverse the judge’s denial of the city’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
FN1. McLaughlin sought damages and injunctive relief in the Superior Court against the city and Lowell fire Chief William Desrosiers, alleging (1) violations of G.L. c. 32, § 8 (relating to reinstatement and retraining) (Counts I & II), (2) violations of G.L. c. 151B, §§ 4(16), 4(4A), and 4(5) (relating to handicap discrimination and interference with protected rights) (Counts III & IV), and (3) intentional interference with contractual relations (Count V). McLaughlin also sought declaratory relief in connection with the city’s failure to reinstate him (Count VI). By a “Stipulation of Dismissal,” all claims stated against Desrosiers were dismissed. Accordingly, Counts I-IV proceeded solely against the city. Count V was dismissed in its entirety.
FN2. In light of our disposition, we need not decide whether the jury instructions were proper.
FN3. The relevant portion of G.L. c. 32, § 8, is reproduced at, infra.
FN5. The city filled two vacant captain positions earlier that month. According to record evidence, two appointments were made by an “Authorization of Employment Form” dated January 4, 2002, with effective employment dates of January 5, 2002, and January 27, 2002. See note 22, infra.
FN7. The city appeared to take issue with the following statements contained in the second medical panel’s clarification reports: McLaughlin’s asthma “is under control using a properly prescribed medication” (Dr. Kaplan); McLaughlin’s “use of inhalers does not limit his functions as a firefighter” (Dr. Dorris); McLaughlin “has not used inhalers in the past several years” (Dr. Hashimoto).
those fires” and “that the use of inhalers was strictly prohibited at fire scenes.” Therefore, based on Desrosiers’s testimony, the DALA magistrate concluded that the second medical panel relied on erroneous information in determining that McLaughlin was able to perform the essential duties of captain. See note 7, supra.
2004. See note 5, supra.
FN11. 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.13(2)(b) provides: “If after two years from the date of retirement a medical panel unanimously determines that the disability retiree is qualified for and able to perform the essential duties of the position from which he or she retired or a similar position within the same department, as determined by the State Human Resources Division, the member shall be returned to said position, provided the position is vacant…. If no vacancy exists, the member shall be granted a preference for the next available position or similar position for which he is so qualified.” (Emphasis supplied).
FN13. McLaughlin does not appeal from the entry of summary judgment with respect to the city’s alleged unlawful retraining program, which required yet another medical evaluation as a condition of McLaughlin’s reinstatement; this claim was rendered moot by the fact that McLaughlin did not first establish a right to reinstatement.
shall provide a copy of such request to the [PERAC]. At the request of the retirement board, the [PERAC] shall assist the retirement board in obtaining whatever information is deemed necessary.” (Emphasis supplied).
FN15. The LRB appears to be an independent and autonomous entity from the city. Everett Retirement Bd. v. Board of Assessors of Everett, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 305, 308 (1985) (“a retirement board established under G.L. c. 32 is independent of the city or town whose employees it serves”). Although the issue is not properly before us, we note that while 840 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.11(2) entitles the LRB to request further clarification from the medical panel, it does not appear that the city is entitled to do the same. However, as discussed, infra, McLaughlin did not seek judicial review within thirty days after his receipt of notice of CRAB’s March 31, 2004, decision ordering PERAC to seek further clarification from the medical panel, as requested by the city.
refusal to reinstate him.” When McLaughlin filed his complaint, however, the third medical panel had not yet rendered its decision, and accordingly, the city’s purported reason for refusing to reinstate McLaughlin was, at that time, nonexistent.
FN19. The doctrine of collateral estoppel aids our assessment of the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city, albeit “for slightly different reasons than those of the judge below.” Okoli v. Okoli (No. 2), 81 Mass.App.Ct. 381, 384 (2012). “[O]n appeal [an appellate court] may consider any ground apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the lower court.” Id. at 384-385, quoting from Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 455 (2002).
FN20. We recognize that ordinarily, an agency order remanding a matter to a subordinate agency is not considered a final decision. See East Longmeadow v. State Advisory Commn., 17 Mass.App.Ct. 939, 940 (1983). However, where the order gives the subordinate agency no discretion, but instead requires that it resolve the matter in the manner specified, the order is final and appealable. See Politano v. Board of Selectmen of Nahant, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 738, 740 (1981). See also Lankheim v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 454 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2009). CRAB’s March 31, 2004, decision resolves the issue of the prohibition against the use of inhalers at a fire scene, and left nothing more for PERAC to do but to submit CRAB’s resolution of that issue to the medical panel.
litigated for the purposes of collateral estoppel even where it is decided only on documentary submission and arguments of the parties. Ibid. With respect to the issue here, both McLaughlin and Desrosiers testified before DALA. Moreover, McLaughlin submitted written objections to CRAB, challenging two findings of fact made by the DALA magistrate, specifically, that a captain is required to wear a self-contained breathing apparatus while fighting fires, which he is not permitted to remove until proper ventilation of the fire scene has been achieved, and that the use of inhalers at a fire scene is strictly prohibited. CRAB considered the objections lodged, but ultimately determined that the LFD prohibits the use of inhalers at a fire scene. Accordingly, the adversary proceeding afforded McLaughlin is sufficient to constitute actual litigation. Id. at 531-532.
FN22. McLaughlin’s contention that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for summary judgment where the medical panel unanimously found him fit to resume employment in December, 2001, and the uncontroverted record established that the city filled not one, but two vacant fire captain positions in January, 2002–one on January 5 and one on January 27–is without merit.
(1998); O’Neill v. City Manager of Cambridge, 428 Mass. 257, 258-259 (1998). Instead, this court has recognized the general importance of a retirement board’s right to seek supplemental clarification from the medical panel pursuant to 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.11(2), which cannot be exercised until after the medical panel has already rendered its decision. Narducci v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 68 Mass.App.Ct. 127, 132-136 (2007).
Furthermore, that the city filled two vacancies on January 4, 2002, during the pendency of LRB’s request for clarification does not constitute a violation of G.L. c. 32, § 8, entitling McLaughlin to a summary judgment in his favor. Specifically, the city disputed through record evidence that it promoted two employees to captain on January 4, 2002, one with a start date of January 5, 2002, and the other with a start date of January 27, 2002. See note 5, supra. As previously discussed, G.L. c. 32, § 8(2), compels reinstatement of a retired employee “once properly cleared by the retirement board, and a vacancy exists.” Facella v. Newton, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 459, 461 n. 2 (2007), quoting from Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. at 354. It was not until January 25, 2002, that the LRB directed the city to reinstate McLaughlin as captain. At that time, no vacancies existed.
properly before us for review.
FN23. Specifically, the city contends that McLaughlin failed to file a predicate complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) prior to filing his complaint in Superior Court, as required by G.L. c. 151B, § 5. That much is undisputed. McLaughlin filed his original Superior Court complaint on May 24, 2004, his MCAD complaint on June 18, 2004, and his amended Superior Court complaint on February 9, 2006.
in the Superior Court prior to filing a complaint with the MCAD.” Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 397 Mass. 761, 762 n. 3 (1986).
FN24. A copy of the city’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not appear in the record appendix. The record is, at best, unclear as to whether the city reiterated in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict its argument with respect to McLaughlin’s claim of interference.
We discern that the city argued that no facts existed on which McLaughlin could prove his claim of interference in its directed verdict motion, Mass.R.Civ.P. 50(a), 365 Mass. 814 (1974), which the city renewed at the close of all evidence.
be raised which were not asserted in the directed verdict motion”).
FN26. The express provision in G.L. c. 32, § 8(2)(d ), as amended by St.1982, c. 630, § 19, that “[n]othing in this section shall excuse an employer … from compliance with the provisions of … paragraph sixteen of section four of chapter one hundred and fifty-one B” does not, as McLaughlin contends, require a claim under G.L. c. 151B to be remedied without regard to G.L. c. 32, § 8.
regional medical panel account for the possibility of a reasonable accommodation when determining a disability retiree’s qualification to perform essential job duties. Here, however, it is of utmost significance that McLaughlin did not allege in his amended complaint that he ever requested an accommodation or that the city denied his accommodation request, and there is no evidence suggesting otherwise. See Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 457 (2002) (“[I]t is the employee’s initial request for an accommodation which triggers the employer’s obligation to participate in the interactive process of determining one”) (quotation omitted). See also Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 450 Mass. 327, 341-342 (2008). Contrast Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 632, 649-650 (2004) (three letters taken together against the backdrop of previous ignored requests constituted substantial evidence supporting an unmistakable request for an accommodation triggering an employer’s obligation under c. 151B).
Instead, at trial, McLaughlin maintained that between December, 2000, and the present, he had not felt that he needed any accommodation to perform firefighting duties and thus, he never requested one. Moreover, on appeal, McLaughlin states that he “neither sought nor obtained from the jury a verdict holding the city liable for denying McLaughlin a reasonable accommodation….
FN28. Although, generally, a “[d]etermination of a job’s essential functions requires an individualized inquiry” typically reserved for a fact finder, and an “employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential is a factor to be considered, but it is not controlling[,]” Smith v. Bell Atl., 63 Mass.App.Ct. 702, 712 (2005) (quotation omitted), both Carleton v. Commonwealth, supra, and Everett v. 357 Corp., supra, illustrate instances where a question with respect to a dispositive prong of the plaintiff’s prima facie case may properly fall outside the province of a judge or a jury. Thus, that under G.L. c. 32, § 8(2), “[t]he determination of what constitutes an essential duty of a job or position is to be made by the employer, based on all relevant facts and circumstances and after consideration of a number of factors” is of no consequence here. 840 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.20 (2004). See Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 121 (2010) (where the parties do not dispute which functions of an employee’s job are essential, there is no material dispute of fact).
written motion for directed verdict preserved so long as it had been raised at other points during trial and therefore adequately brought to the judge’s attention).
FN30. Our analysis is further informed, by analogy, to the line of cases applying the doctrine of estoppel to a claim of handicap discrimination based on an apparent contradiction arising out of a plaintiff’s prior application for disability benefits or the plaintiff’s prior acceptance of a worker’s compensation settlement.
other evidence with respect to his or her qualification to perform a job’s essential functions. Where, however, the plaintiff’s previous action creates, under the terms of an applicable statute, a presumption that he or she is unable to work and that presumption cannot be rebutted, the plaintiff is not a “qualified handicapped person” for the purposes of G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16). Scott v. Encore Images, Inc., 80 Mass.App.Ct. 661, 667-668 (2011).
Therefore, a plaintiff may lose the fight to pursue a discrimination claim either because there exists no disputable issue of fact with respect to his prior claim of disability or because of his inability to rebut a statutory presumption of his inability to return to work. Likewise, McLaughlin lost his fight to pursue his discrimination claim by his failure to receive a unanimous medical panel determination.
FN31. Given this result, there is no need to address McLaughlin’s claim that the judge failed to order appropriate relief under the statute, including reinstatement and back pay.
of the underlying discrimination claim. See Sahli v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 437 Mass. 696, 699-700 n. 8 (2002); Smith v. Winter Place LLC, 447 Mass. 363, 364 n. 4 (2006); King v. Boston, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 460, 474 n. 12 (2008).
FN33. This is not an instance where the city’s brief fails to support an issue with legal authority as mandated by Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). Contrast Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 81, 85 (1995).
Discrimination, 72 Mass.App.Ct. at 556-557. As such, § 4(4A) is best understood as a device through which an individual falling outside the scope of the definition of “employer” may otherwise be liable for conduct which the antidiscrimination statute aims to prevent. Additionally, we note that where the MCAD has imposed liability on an individual pursuant to G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4A), for interfering with the complainant’s right to work free of unlawful handicap discrimination, the complainant first had established by substantial evidence a violation of G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16). See, e.g., Woodason v. Norton Sch. Comm., MCAD No. 98-BEM-624 (Feb. 19, 2003); Bendell v. Lemax, Inc., MCAD No. 95-BEM-807 (Mar. 6, 2003); Damon v. Incre, Inc., MCAD No. 95-BEM-2594 (July 2, 2003).

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