Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321206827/The-Real-Truth-About-Abortion-v-Federal-Election-Commission-4th-Cir-2012
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:52:23+00:00

Document:
James R. Spencer, Chief District Judge.
opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Floyd joined.
J. Gerald Hebert, Tara Malloy, Paul S. Ryan, THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amici Supporting Appellees.
applying the "exacting scrutiny" standard applicable to disclosure provisions, we affirm.
candidate or "make any contribution" to a candidate.
identified candidate); 11 C.F.R. 100.57(a) (defining contributions for certain purposes under FECA); and 11 C.F.R.
challenged the Commissions policy of determining PAC status by using a "major purpose" test on a case-by-case basis.
Democrat Barack Obamas position on abortion?
(Actors voice mimicking Obamas voice) Change.
Appoint more liberal Justices on the U.S.
of character and compassion that should give everyone pause.
it expressed the fear that these expenditures might be construed as "independent expenditures" under 2 U.S.C.
Commn, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010).
Commn, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
court found that 100.22(b) was consistent with the "appealto-vote" test articulated in Federal Election Commission v.
746, 751 (E.D. Va. 2011).
Real Truth filed this appeal.
speech, we should apply the less stringent "exacting scrutiny"
$1,000, which would impose not only disclosure requirements, but also organizational requirements. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Commn, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.
case law, however, which has consistently applied only one type of exacting scrutiny.
Real Truth is a PAC, again implicating disclosure and organizational requirements.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
certain disclosure provisions of the BCRA).
n.52, which are codified in subsection (a).
that use phrases "which in context can have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the election or defeat" of a candidate," 11 C.F.R. 100.22(a)words such as "vote for,"
express advocacy "magic words." See McConnell v. Fed.
express advocacy. Id. at 193, 206.
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
Id. at 474 n.7 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech,"
determined that it was a PAC).
opinion specifically stated was not "impermissibly vague."
intent of the speaker is not a relevant consideration").
have an "electoral portion" that is "unmistakable" and "unambiguous." 11 C.F.R. 100.22(b)(1).
encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of action."
applied the requirement in Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S.
expenditures," we therefore need not apply those requirements applied in Leake when considering "express advocacy"
in the context of independent expenditures.
BCRAs electioneering communication definition in minimizing the potential vagueness of campaign finance regulations.
United 100.22(b) only implements disclosure requirements.
Natnl Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir.
significantly more complicated on its face than 100.22(b).
of communications that are considered independent expenditures.
"suggestive" and "electoral portion," which are facially vague.
simply inherent in any kind of standards-based test. Cf.
when reasonable people could not disagree about a communications status.
Wisconsin Right to Life and is not unduly vague.
influencing any election for Federal office." Id.
regulatory definition of "political committee" is not a "final agency action"
rights and obligations, namely, the obligations of PAC status. Id. at 17778 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"major purpose" is the nomination or election of candidates.
by a candidate must therefore register as a PAC if its contributions or expenditures exceed $1,000 and its "major purpose" is the nomination or election of a federal candidate.
on a particular electoral or issue-advocacy campaign, see id.
purpose," as revealed by that groups public statements, fundraising appeals, government filings, and organizational documents, see id.
case adjudication rather than a rulemaking. See Shays v. Fed.
("Shays I"). Therefore, it remanded the case to the Commission "to explain its decision or institute a new rulemaking."
committee status." Id. at 5595-96.
203 (1947) ("[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual . . . litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency").
detailed analysis of its various activities.
511 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
adopted. See, e.g., Fed. Election Commn v. Malenick, 310 F.
Supp. 2d 230, 23437 (D.D.C. 2004), revd in part, No. Civ.
859, 86466 (D.D.C. 1996); see also Shays II, 511 F. Supp.
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263, and Leake, 525 F.3d at 289.
And Real Truths reliance on Leake is similarly misplaced.
candidates, that organization is under "fair warning"
that it may fall within the ambit of Buckleys test.
Buckleys major purpose requirement. Id. at 289 n.6.
the Commission from using a more comprehensive methodology.
130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v.
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 697-98.
categorized an organization as a PAC.
"unannounced criteria." 525 F.3d at 28990.
protected speech. Accordingly, we find the policy constitutional.

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