Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180323_0000183.WTN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 13:16:16+00:00

Document:
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, et al., Defendants.
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and employees Tasha Prevette, Leesa Whitt-Potter, and Joseph Wenker, (collectively “Wells Fargo”) that was filed on March 7, 2017. (ECF No. 28.) On March 21, 2017, Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed a response to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 35.) Pursuant to Administrative Order 2013-15, the case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for management of all pretrial matters. On January 8, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that the Court grant the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 52.) On March 2, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an Affidavit of Facts In Support of Plaintiffs' Objections to Magistrate Report and Recommendations, Plaintiffs' Objection to Denying Leave to Amend Civil Complaint in response to the report and recommendation. (ECF No. 59). Upon de novo review, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation and finds that the Wells Fargo Defendants should be Dismissed.
Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) “to relieve some of the burden on the federal courts by permitting the assignment of certain district court duties to magistrates.” See e.g. Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed. App'x. 308, 311, (6th Cir. 2003) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). A district court judge must review dispositive motions under the de novo standard. See Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976); Baker, 67 Fed. App'x. at 311 and 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B). After review, the district court is free to accept, reject or modify the magistrate judge's proposed findings or recommendations. See Thomas, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
Any party who disagrees with a Magistrate Judge's recommendation may file written objections. Id., 474 U.S. at 142; Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Tenn. West. LR 72.1(g)(2). A failure to file specific objections to a magistrate judge's report does not meet the requirement of filing an objection at all. Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir 1991); McCready v. Kamminga, 113 Fed. App'x. 47, 49 (6th Cir. 2004). A district judge should adopt the findings and rulings of the magistrate judge to which no specific objection is filed. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Shelby County Schools, 47 F.Supp.3d 665, 674 (W.D. Tenn. 2014). “Pro se complaints are to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed. . . . Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
In his report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge summarized the facts as follows: Plaintiffs contest whether Wells Fargo actually financed their home mortgage; assert that Wells Fargo improperly refused payments offered to Wells Fargo in order to pay off the mortgage; and therefore, assert the follow claims against these parties: breach of contract, UCC violations and fraud. As noted above, Plaintiffs have filed an Affidavit of Facts that the Court will construe as objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation to grant the dismissal and to the Magistrate Judge's order deny the request for leave to amend the complaint. Upon consideration, Plaintiffs' objections do not pertain to the proposed factual findings in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation. Therefore, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's background summary as the relevant factual history of this case.
In this case, [the borrower] is not at risk of paying the debt twice, because [the assignee] has established that it holds the original note. [The assignee] has produced ample documentation that it was in possession of the note and had been assigned all rights therein prior to the initiation of foreclosure proceedings.… Without a genuine claim that [the assignee] is not the rightful owner of the loan and that [the borrower] might therefore be subject to double liability on its debt, [the borrower] cannot credibly claim to have standing to challenge the First Assignment.
Carmack v. Bank of New York Mellon, 534, Fed.Appx. 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2013)(quoting Livonia Property Holdings, LLC v. 399 Fed.Appx. 97, 102 (2010)). The lender listed on the original note executed on January 13, 2012 is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and the borrower/debtor is Tia L. Johnson for the purchase of property at 6740 Pheasant Walk Cove, Memphis, Tennessee 38141 for $126, 606.00. The same security instrument designated that payments were to be made to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, the lender. (ECF No. 28-2, 1, Exh. 1.) The accompanying deed of trust indicates that the beneficiary of the deed of trust is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and that tax statements were to be mailed to Well Fargo Home Mortgage. (ECF Nos. 28-2, 4 & 59-1). In addition to the security instrument, the parties executed a “Planned Unit Development Rider” or “PUD” in order to further secure the mortgage note owed to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (ECF No. 28-2, 12.) Therefore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's determination that Wells Fargo owned and serviced the loan. These documents also negate any possibility that the borrowers in this case could face double liability based on a fraudulent or unlawful assignment. (ECF No. 28-2, 1-2.) Plaintiffs' objections that they have standing to challenge the loan and that Wells Fargo did not establish proof of ownership of the note are without merit.

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