Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/84928/hurtado-vs-california
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:23:50+00:00

Document:
"2. No man shall be diseised, etc., unless it be by the lawful judgment, that is, verdict of his equals (that is, of men of his own condition) or by the law of the land (that is to speak it once for all) by the due course and process of law. "
"1. No man shall be taken (that is) restrained of liberty by petition or suggestion to the King or to his council, unless it be by indictment or presentment of good and lawfull men, where such deed be done. This branch and divers other parts of this act have been notably explained by divers acts of Parliament, &c.;, quoted in the margent."
"Here is no inconvenience to the people. Here is a trial per pais, fair notice, liberty of pleading dilatories as well as bars. Here is subpoena and attachment, as much time for defence, charge, &c.;, for the prosecutor makes up the record, &c.; then, in case of malicious prosecution, the person who prosecutes is known by the note to the coroner, according to the practice of the court."
And he quotes 3 Inst. 136, where Coke modifies the statement by saying, "The King cannot put any to answer, but his court must be apprized of the crime by indictment, presentment, or other matter of record, " which, Shower says, includes an information.
"if anyone is accused before the justices of our Lord the King of murder, or theft, or robbery, or of harbouring persons committing those crimes, or of forgery or arson, by the oath of twelve knights of the hundred, or, if there are no knights, by the oath of twelve free and lawful men, and by the oath of four men from each township of the hundred, let him go to the ordeal of water, and, if he fails, let him lose one foot. And at Northampton it was added, for greater strictness of justice ( pro rigore justitiae ), that he shall lose his right hand at the same time with his foot, and abjure the realm and exile himself from the realm within forty days. And if he is acquitted by the ordeal, let him find pledges and remain in the kingdom, unless he is accused of murder or other base felony by the body of the country and the lawful knights of the country; but if he is so accused as aforesaid, although he is acquitted by the ordeal of water, nevertheless he must leave the kingdom in forty days and take his chattels with him, subject to the rights of his lords, and he must abjure the kingdom at the mercy of our Lord the King. "
The concessions of Magna Charta were wrung from the King as guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations of his prerogative. It did not enter into the minds of the barons to provide security against their own body or in favor of the Commons by limiting the power of Parliament; so that bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws declaring forfeitures of estates, and other arbitrary acts of legislation which occur so frequently in English history were never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land, for, notwithstanding what was attributed to Lord Coke in Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 115, 118 a, the omnipotence of Parliament over the common law was absolute, even against common right and reason. The actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a free public opinion represented by the Commons.
See also Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22 -31; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 288 -290.
"The Fourteenth Amendment [as was said by Mr. Justice Bradley in Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22 -31] does not profess to secure to all person in the United States the benefit of the same law and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two States separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line, there may be a right of trial by jury, and, on the other side, no such right. Each State prescribe its own mode of judicial proceeding."
"The Constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative, as well as on the executive and judicial, powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make any process 'due process of law' by its mere will. To what principles are we to resort to ascertain whether this process enacted by Congress is due process? To this the answer must be two-fold. We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. "
"The words due process of law' were undoubtedly intended," said this court, in Murray's Lessees v. Hoboken, &c.;, "to convey the same meaning as the words `by the law of the land' in Magna Charta." That the one is the equivalent of the other was recognized in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 . See also 2 Kent, 13; 2 Story Const. § 1789; Cooley's Const.Lim. 353; Pomeroy's Const.Law, § 245; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curtis 325. Whether the phrase in our American constitutions, national or State, be "law of the land" or "due process of law," it means in every case the same thing. Cooley's Const.Lim. 352.
"But though, as my Lord Hale observes, in all criminal causes, the most regular and safe way, and most consonant to the statute of Magna Charta, &c.;, is by presentment or indictment of twelve sworn men, yet he admits that, for crimes inferior to capital ones, the proceedings may be by information."
"representing Magna Charta as the pedestal on which was raised the column and cap of liberty, supported by twelve hands, and containing the words ' Hane Tuemur, Hac Nitimur. ' "

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 § 1789
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