Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/73/371/556765/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:29:50+00:00

Document:
Before: CHOY, WIGGINS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Mohammed I. Kussair was convicted of committing bank larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) for withdrawing $900,000 that had been erroneously deposited into his savings account due to an encoding error by bank personnel. Kussair contends on appeal that the district court misconstrued Sec. 2113(b) in holding that he "took" the erroneously deposited funds when he withdrew them, rather than when the funds were first deposited into his account or when he first learned the funds were in his account. In addition, he claims there is insufficient evidence of his intent to steal to support his conviction and challenges the district court's exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 2113(b).
We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291 and, for the following reasons, we affirm the district court's conviction.
On February 9, 1993, Kussair deposited an insurance settlement check for $100,000 into his savings account at the Bank of Stockton. At the time, Kussair's account had a balance of approximately $750. The same day, the Bank erroneously encoded the check as a deposit of $1,000,000 and then deposited that amount in Kussair's account. Kussair had nothing to do with the encoding error.
Kussair did not make any further deposits to his savings account after the encoding error occurred. Over the next several weeks, Kussair withdrew the funds, using the proceeds to pay off various loans, to transfer funds to his local Citibank account, and to transfer $400,000 to his Bank of America account in Pakistan.
Despite Kussair's knowledge that he had not deposited $1 million into his savings account, Kussair testified that he believed the erroneously deposited money was his. Kussair testified that upon noticing his balance had "too many zeros," he inquired at the Bank concerning the origin of the funds; the teller told him the $1 million had been electronically deposited. Kussair testified that he therefore believed the $1 million had been wire transferred to him by his wife's relative in Pakistan, Shazadah Asadurrehman.
On arriving in Pakistan, Kussair was informed that the police had been to his house, asking about the $1 million dollars. Kussair withdrew the remaining $400,000 from his account in Pakistan and was evasive when answering questions concerning the whereabouts of these funds.
We review questions of law de novo. Anderson v. U.S., 966 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1992). In addition, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Finally, we review the district court's assumption of jurisdiction de novo. U.S. v. Peralta, 941 F.2d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 940 (1992).
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2113(B) KUSSAIR TOOK THE $900,000 FROM THE BANK WHEN HE WITHDREW THE FUNDS.
Kussair contends that the district court erred in holding that under Sec. 2113(b) Kussair took delivery of the funds when he made the successive withdrawals. Kussair argues that, according to cases interpreting common law larceny, he "took" the funds when the funds were erroneously deposited into the account, or, in the alternative, when he first learned that the funds were in the account. Thus, he claims that he did not have the requisite coincidence of "intent to steal" and taking the funds.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (emphasis supplied). The language of the statute thus broadly prohibits taking money or property "belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management or possession of any bank." Id.; see also U.S. v. Morgan, 805 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 949 (1987) (under Sec. 2113(b) the crime is complete whether the property belongs to the bank or it is simply in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of such institution). Kussair does not dispute that until he withdrew the funds the bank still maintained custody, control and management of the funds. Therefore, under the circumstances of the instant case, the statute is more naturally interpreted as prohibiting a withdrawal of funds from Kussair's account, whether or not Kussair had access to the funds prior to the withdrawal.
Moreover, contrary to Kussair's argument, the definition of "takes" under Sec. 2113(b) need not be derived exclusively from the common law larceny cases. Section 2113(b) prohibits both common law larceny and other felonious takings (such as obtaining money by false pretenses), provided there is a taking and carrying away. Bell v. U.S., 462 U.S. 356, 360-61 (1983); U.S. v. Registe, 766 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1985). In the false pretense cases under Sec. 2113(b), courts have assumed without discussion that the withdrawal of funds by false pretenses constitutes the "taking" under Sec. 2113(b).2 In addition, courts have upheld convictions under Sec. 2113(b) in factual situations almost identical to the case at bar. See Thaggard v. U.S., 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 86 S. Ct. 1222 (1966) (bank customer withdrew $43,000 that had been erroneously credited to his account); U.S. v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Md. 1976) aff'd 551 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 127 (1977) (bank customer withdrew $180,000 erroneously deposited into his account). Kussair provides no basis for distinguishing these cases from the case before us.
For the above reasons, we hold that under Sec. 2113(b) Kussair took the funds when he withdrew the funds from his account.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT KUSSAIR'S "TAKING" OF THE FUNDS WAS TRESPASSORY.
Kussair also argues that the "taking" was not trespassory because the bank consented to the deposit of the funds in his account. We reject this argument.
III. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO FIND THAT KUSSAIR POSSESSED THE REQUISITE INTENT TO STEAL THE FUNDS WHEN HE WITHDREW THE FUNDS FROM HIS ACCOUNT.
Kussair contends that, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was insufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Kussair possessed the intent to steal the funds at the various times he withdrew the funds. Kussair argues that the inquiries he made at the Bank regarding the origin of the funds as well as the passage of time before he began to make the withdrawals (7 days) shows that he had no intent to steal the money, but rather was attempting to verify that the money was his and could be withdrawn. Kussair also argues that the testimony of Asadurrehman and Schoenleber regarding Asadurrehman's intent to invest $1 million in a business in the U.S. in order to obtain a visa creates a reasonable doubt because it demonstrates that Kussair had a reasonable belief that the $1 million was wired to him from Asadurrehman.
We, however, find ample evidence to support the district court's verdict regarding Kussair's intent to steal. First, the trier of fact may rely on circumstantial evidence, such as the fact that Kussair knew his bank balance before and after he made the $100,000 deposit, the fact that he withdrew the funds within several weeks of the erroneous deposit and the fact that he transferred almost half of the money to Pakistan, to infer his intent to steal. See U.S. v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508, 515 (9th Cir. 1990) (under the circumstances, defendant's implausible testimony provides a basis for concluding the opposite is true).
Moreover, Kussair's actions after he was officially notified of the bank error--the withdrawal of the funds from his account in Pakistan and his refusal to aid in returning the funds--can be used to infer his prior intent to steal. See U.S. v. Gibson, 625 F.2d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 1980) (subsequent conduct of defendant can throw light upon defendant's motive and intent in kidnapping prosecution).
Finally, the testimony of Asadurrehman, Schoenleber and Kussair did not as matter of law establish a reasonable doubt as to Kussair's intent to steal. Kussair's own testimony contained numerous discrepancies. To cite one example, he testified he believed the money had come from Asadurrehman so that Asadurrehman could obtain a visa by investing money in the U.S. However, Kussair used the money to pay off his own loans and to send the money to his own account in Pakistan. Given such discrepancies, the court could disregard Kussair's explanation regarding his belief that Asadurrehman sent him the money. See Stauffer, 922 F.2d at 575.
Therefore, we find there was sufficient evidence of Kussair's intent to steal to support the trial court's verdict.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE.
Kussair also contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this case for two reasons: (1) he did not unlawfully take money from a federally insured bank as prohibited by Sec. 2113(b) and (2) the erroneously deposited funds that were subsequently withdrawn were not themselves federally insured. Neither of these arguments has merit.
First, Kussair's claim that he lawfully withdrew the money simply repeats the arguments we reject above regarding when the taking occurred, whether it was trespassory, and whether there was sufficient evidence of his intent to steal.
Second, the fact that the FDIC only insures up to $100,000 in any bank account does not affect the jurisdictional analysis under Sec. 2113(b). Section 2113(b) makes it a crime to take "any property or money or any thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management or possession of any bank." 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). There is no requirement that the money, property or thing of value be specifically insured by the FDIC. Rather, the statute defines a bank for the purposes of the above section to include "any institution the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation." 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f) (emphasis supplied). Thus, in order to commit a violation of Sec. 2113(b), Kussair need only have taken money or property from a bank that has its deposits insured by the FDIC--he need not actually have taken deposits that are federally insured.
For these reasons, we reject Kussair's jurisdictional arguments.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Kussair's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b).

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