Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/146wn2d/146wn2d0947.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:22:52+00:00

Document:
Argued May 14, 2002. Decided July 25, 2002.
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JUSTIN WILLIAM WATSON, Petitioner.
CHAMBERS, JOHNSON, MADSEN, and SANDERS, JJ., dissent by separate opinion.
David B. Koch(of Nielsen, Broman & Koch, P.L.L.C.), for petitioner.
Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, and Ann M. Summers, Andrea M. Vitalich, and Stephen P. Hobbs, Deputies, for respondent.
SMITH, J. - Petitioner Justin William Watson, a juvenile, seeks review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, which reversed two orders of the King County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, granting consecutive deferred dispositions on a charge of taking a motor vehicle without permission of the owner in the first case and a charge of fourth degree assault in the second case.«1» We affirm.
The sole question in this case is whether under RCW 13.40.127 a juvenile court judge may defer disposition in two separately charged cases against a juvenile defendant arising out of conduct committed on different dates and involving different subject matter.
«1» State v. Watson, 107 Wn. App. 540, 27 P.3d 249 (2001).
tionally assaulting his sister, Kelly Fassett, on October 23, 1999.«2» On January 13, 2001 the State filed a second information under a different cause number charging Petitioner with taking a motor vehicle without permission of the owner, Howard Dowell, between November 25 and 26, 1999 in violation of RCW 9A.56.070.«3» Both cases were initially filed and later appealed separately by the State, but were consolidated by the Court of Appeals. The State submitted two sets of clerk's papers with parallel contents and numbering.
«2» Clerk's Papers, Cause No. 99-8-05848-0, at 1.
«3» Clerk's Papers, Cause No. 99-8-06728-4, at 1.
«4» Clerk's Papers (both cases) at 6-7.
«7» Report of Proceedings at 3-4.
The court then issued two separate deferred disposition orders, bearing separate cause numbers, with different conditions as to each charge, the sentences to run consecutively.«11» In each case the court entered a finding adjudging Petitioner "guilty" of the charged offense based upon the stipulated facts. The first order, involving the taking of a motor vehicle offense, was continued for six months until September 3, 2000 and required Petitioner to comply with certain specified conditions, including community supervision for six months, 24 hours of community service, no unwanted contact with Howard Dowell, counseling, regular school attendance, a curfew, an approved residence, no alcohol or drugs, and no weapons. The second order, involving the assault offense, "to be served consecutive to 99-8-06728-4" was continued from September 3, 2000 to March 3, 2001 and included behavior requirements similar to those in the first order (except community service and no contact) and community supervision for six months.
«11» Clerk's Papers (both cases) at 3-5.
The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division One, arguing that the trial court violated the prohibition under former RCW 13.40.127(1)(c) against deferred disposition of charges for persons who had "a prior disposition or deferred adjudication." The State contended that because Petitioner had committed two unrelated criminal acts on different dates which had been charged in separate informations, the trial court could defer disposition in only one of the two cases. The State asserted that on the date the first order on deferred disposition was signed, Petitioner then had a "prior deferred disposition" and became ineligible for the second deferred disposition granted by the court.
The Court of Appeals, in a majority opinion, the Honorable William W. Baker writing, agreed with the State and reversed the trial court, holding that former RCW 13.40.127 is unambiguous and under subsection (1)(c) "[a] juvenile is eligible for deferred disposition" unless the juvenile "[h]as a prior disposition or deferred adjudication," and because two different orders on deferred disposition were filed, once the first order was signed, Petitioner had a "prior deferred disposition" and was ineligible for the second deferred disposition granted by the trial court.
«13» State v. J.H., 96 Wn. App. 167, 180-81, 978 P.2d 1121, review denied, 139 Wn.2d 1014, 994 P.2d 849 (1999).
«14» RCW 13.40.127(3)(a), (b), (c).
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the provisions of RCW 13.40.127 when it concluded the trial court could not grant two consecutive deferred dispositions in his cases. He urges this court to interpret "prior deferred disposition" as one which occurred on a date prior to the disposition hearing. He argues that where a juvenile offender has not received a deferred disposition prior to the disposition hearing, the trial court has discretion to grant deferred disposition on all current offenses regardless whether the State chose to charge separately and under one or more cause numbers.
«18» Subsection (d) was amended in 2001 to read "Has two or more adjudications." LAWS OF 2001, ch. 175, § 3. The amendment is not material to this case.
«19» State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001).
«20» State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 174-75, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001).
«21» Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276.
«22» Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d at 175.
«23» Id.; see, e.g., Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001) (stating that words are not to be given their ordinary meaning when a contrary intent is manifest, for example, when a statute expressly expands the "ordinary dictionary meaning" of a term and "[t]hat definitional expansion clearly removes the term from its arguably more common usage.").
«24» Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276.
«25» Id. at 276-77 (quoting W. Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma Dep't of Fin., 140 Wn.2d 599, 608, 998 P.2d 884 (2000)).
«26» Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276.
«27» Wash. State Coalition for the Homeless v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 133 Wn.2d 894, 904, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997).
«28» Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d at 175 (citing State v. Taylor, 97 Wn.2d 724, 728, 649 P.2d 633 (1982)).
«29» State ex rel. Royal v. Bd. of Yakima County Comm'rs, 123 Wn.2d 451, 462, 869 P.2d 56 (1994) (quoting State v. Neher, 112 Wn.2d 347, 351, 771 P.2d 330 (1989)).
«30» Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 808.
«31» Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999).
On its face, former RCW 13.40.127(1) is not ambiguous. There is no need for judicial interpretation beyond its plain language. Although the term "prior disposition" is not defined in the statute, this court may resort to dictionary definitions, if necessary, to ascertain the term's plain and ordinary meaning.«34» "Prior" means earlier in time or order«35» and is commonly understood to mean "before" and "previously."
The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted former RCW 13.40.127(1). During Petitioner's sentencing, the trial court signed two separate orders that addressed separately filed charges arising from Petitioner's conduct occurring on different dates and involving different subject matter. Under the plain language of the statute, Petitioner had a "prior deferred disposition" as soon as the trial court granted an order deferring disposition in the first case. Once that order was signed, Petitioner was ineligible for a second deferred disposition. This interpretation of the statute does not result in unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences and is not contradicted by other language in the same act. The trial judge had authority to grant Petitioner only one deferred disposition.
«32» Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 114 Wn.2d 677, 688, 790 P.2d 604 (1990).
«33» Associated Gen. Contractors of Wash. v. King County, 124 Wn.2d 855, 865, 881 P.2d 996 (1994).
«34» Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d at 175.
«35» WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804 (3d ed. 1993).
ability to take advantage of the deferred disposition sentencing alternative. He claims this is an absurd result which directly contravenes the rehabilitative goals of the Juvenile Justice Act.
The State responds that this argument ignores the requirement of mandatory joinder under Criminal Rule (CrR) 4.3.1,«36» which prohibits the State from engaging in the conduct envisioned by Petitioner. Under the mandatory joinder rule, two or more offenses must be joined if they are related. Offenses are related if they are within the jurisdiction and venue of the same court and are based on the same conduct.«37» "Same conduct" is conduct involving a single criminal incident or episode.«38» The two charges in this case are not based upon the same criminal incident or episode and are thus not subject to the mandatory joinder rule.
In this case, Petitioner was charged with two separate offenses which were not subject to mandatory joinder. Nor were they appropriate for permissive joinder under CrR 4.3(a)(1) and (2). Petitioner's offenses were committed a month apart and involved different courses of conduct and different subject matter.
The sole question in this case is whether under RCW 13.40.127 a juvenile court judge may defer disposition in two separately charged cases against a juvenile defendant arising out of conduct committed on different dates and involving different subject matter. Our answer to the question is "no."
«36» See also Juvenile Court Rule 7.9(a).
«38» State v. Lee, 132 Wn.2d 498, 503, 939 P.2d 1223 (1997).
interpretation beyond its plain language. Although the term "prior disposition" is not defined in the statute, this court may resort to dictionary definitions, if necessary, to ascertain the term's plain and ordinary meaning. "Prior" means earlier in time or order and is commonly understood to mean "before" and "previously."
The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted former RCW 13.40.127(1). During Petitioner's sentencing, the trial court issued two separate orders that addressed separately filed charges arising from Petitioner's conduct occurring on different dates and involving different subject matter. Under the plain language of the statute, Petitioner had a "prior deferred disposition" as soon as the trial court granted deferred disposition on the first order. Once that order was signed, Petitioner was ineligible for a second deferred disposition. The trial judge had authority to grant Petitioner only one deferred disposition.
We affirm the Court of Appeals, Division One, which reversed two orders of the King County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, granting consecutive deferred dispositions on a charge of taking a motor vehicle without permission of the owner in one case and on a charge of fourth-degree assault in the other case.
ALEXANDER, C.J., and IRELAND, BRIDGE, and OWENS, JJ., concur.
CHAMBERS, J. (dissenting) - I respectfully dissent. The majority holding ignores the rehabilitative goal of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW, and favors form over substance. Clearly, the Legislature intended that restitution be balanced with rehabilitation and that deferral should be ordered when a child first enters the juvenile justice system. Every child deserves a chance at redemption within the sound discretionary power of the juvenile court.
Under the JJA,«39» a court may grant a deferred disposition if the defendant has no prior dispositions or deferred adjudications. RCW 13.40.127. Once a deferred disposition is granted, the child is found guilty upon stipulated facts and sentencing is postponed, placing the child on a kind of probationary status. Id. During this interim period, the child must comply with court ordered conditions of supervision and restitution. Id. A child who complies with the court's conditions earns dismissal of the case and a clear record. RCW 13.40.127(9). Failure to comply with any conditions results in a revocation of the deferral and the court enters an order of disposition. RCW 13.40.127(7). Although offender accountability is a goal of the JJA, its primary principles are rehabilitation and meeting the needs of the juvenile. State v. J.H., 96 Wn. App. 167, 180-81, 978 P.2d 1121, review denied, 139 Wn.2d 1014, 994 P.2d 849 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1130 (2000).
«39» In 1997, chapter 13.40 RCW of the JJA was amended, adding the deferred disposition sentencing alternative. See RCW 13.40.127.
I think the statute would allow for a respondent to be eligible for a deferred disposition so long as he does not have a prior deferred disposition. And it's pretty clear that he does not have a prior disposition at this time. So really the inquiry is not whether the Respondent is eligible but whether the Court is going to exercise discretion in giving it to him.
I can imagine a scenario in which I wouldn't do it, for instance, if he had four pending matters. I probably wouldn't give it to him if he had three pending matters.
supervision periods were to run consecutively. The majority holds that a deferred disposition existed as soon as one of the orders was signed, ignoring the fact that Watson signed a single "Statement of Juvenile on Submittal or Stipulation to Facts for Deferred Disposition" and acknowledged that failure to comply with the conditions of the deferred disposition could result in its complete revocation.
The plain meaning of "prior" is "earlier in time or order," but this definition offers but sparse legal insight here, where two charges were presented to the trial judge simultaneously. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804 (3d ed. 1993). Although the majority is correct in noting that a child may receive only one deferred disposition, its application of the statute is flawed. Indeed, the majority relies on the plain meaning of "prior" in order to prevent juveniles from circumventing the limitation of the JJA, but in doing so, it defeats the long standing goal of the JJA: rehabilitation of the juvenile.«41» Juvenile restitution is a remedial matter, not punitive, unlike the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW. J.H., 96 Wn. App. at 182. Therefore, we must dig deeper to fully understand the function of this word.
«41» The JJA "attempts to tread an equatorial line somewhere midway between the poles of rehabilitation and retribution. The adult sentencing system, on the other hand, does not place such importance on rehabilitation." State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 393, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982). Further, "[a]lthough the JJA seeks a balance between the poles of rehabilitation and retribution, the purposes of accountability and punishment are tempered by and at times must give way to the purposes of responding to the needs of the juvenile." State v. J.A., 105 Wn. App. 879, 886, 20 P.3d 487 (2001) (citing State v. T.C., 99 Wn. App. 701, 707, 995 P.2d 98 (2000)). Although these cases determined the extent of the juvenile court's discretion to revoke a deferred disposition rather than the definition of the word "prior," this difference does not impair their relevance here.
majority interprets the same phrase to mean that each charge before the sentencing court is viewed separately. Therefore, a deferred disposition is created as soon as the court signs the order of deferral.
Under the SRA, "[a] prior conviction is a conviction which exists before the date of sentencing for the offense." RCW 9.94A.525(1). Given this language, there is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended some alternate meaning when using the phrase "prior deferred disposition." Therefore, a prior deferred disposition is that which exists before the date of disposition of the current charges. This interpretation is consistent with the goal of the JJA: a court may grant a deferred disposition to juvenile offenders who have not yet had a chance to prove themselves worthy of a clean record.
«42» Although Akin referred to similar language within a particular statute or act, the JJA and the SRA both deal with sentencing. Therefore, the use of the word "prior" in the SRA should inform the court's interpretation of the JJA.
I therefore dissent, and would reverse the Court of Appeals, reinstating the single order of deferred disposition.
JOHNSON, MADSEN, and SANDERS, JJ., concur with CHAMBERS, J.
«43» In oral argument, the State relied in part on the fact the disposition orders were not signed simultaneously. Instead, they were signed one after the other. An ambidextrous judge might well be able to sign both simultaneously. That peculiarity illustrates the frailty of the majority's premise that signing one deferred disposition order bars a judge from signing the other, as he might, even under the majority's reasoning, if the charges were consolidated.

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