Source: http://wifcon.com/pd28_101.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 06:35:14+00:00

Document:
New A bid bond is a form of guarantee, which ensures that a bidder will not withdraw its bid within the period specified for acceptance and, if required, will execute a written contract and furnish required performance and payment bonds. See FAR § 28.001; American Artisan Prods., Inc., B-292380, July 30, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 132 at 4. The purpose of a bid bond is to secure the liability of a surety to the government by providing funds to cover the excess costs of awarding to the next eligible bidder in the event that the successful bidder defaults by failing to fulfill these obligations. See FAR § 52.228-1(d), (e); Paradise Constr., Co., B-289144, Nov. 26, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 192 at 2; Alarm Control Co., B-246010, Nov. 18, 1991, 91-2 CPD ¶ 472 at 2. When required by a solicitation, a bid bond or other bid guarantee is a material part of the bid with which there must be compliance at the time of bid opening. When a bidder submits a defective bid bond or uncertainty exists at the time of bid opening that the bidder has furnished a legally binding bond, the bid itself is rendered nonresponsive and generally requires rejection of the bid. FAR § 28.101-4(a); Alarm Control Co., supra.
A bidder's use of a commercial bid bond form, as here, rather than an SF 24 bid bond form is not per se objectionable, since the sufficiency of the bid bond does not depend on its form, but on whether it represents a significant departure from the rights and obligations of the parties as set forth in SF 24. Alarm Control Co., supra; Allgood Elec. Co., B-235171, July 18, 1989, 89-2 CPD ¶ 58 at 2. The determinative question is whether the bond establishes unequivocally at the time of bid opening that the bond is enforceable against the surety should the bidder fail to meet its obligations. If the agency cannot determine definitively from the bid bond documents that the surety would be bound, the bond is defective and the bid must be rejected. See, e.g., Collins Cos., B-274765, Dec. 27, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 243 at 2; Techno Eng'g & Constr., Ltd., B-243932, July 23, 1991, 91-2 CPD ¶ 87 at 2.
Here, G2G does not dispute that its bid bond "limits the amount of reprocurement costs to the difference in the G2G bid and a replacement contract," which is contrary to the requirement of FAR § 52.228-1(e) that allows the government to recover all costs attributable to the contractor's default. Comments at 7, 10. Nonetheless, G2G argues that it submitted a valid bid bond with its bid, the rejection of which by the agency was improper. In support thereof, G2G contends that when read as a whole, its bid bond clearly established that the provisions of FAR § 52.228-1 are "deemed incorporated" into G2G's bid bond, and that paragraph 1, which impermissibly limited the surety's liability for reprocurement costs, was "deemed deleted" under the terms of paragraph 3 of the bid bond. Id. at 8-9. According to the protester, the VA ignored the terms of its bid bond that when read together, unequivocally committed the surety to satisfy all the requirements of FAR § 52-228-1, including the obligation to pay all excess reprocurement costs in the event of default.
We disagree with G2G that it furnished a legally enforceable bid bond at the time of bid opening. As noted above, the express terms of G2G's submitted bid bond limited the surety's liability to pay costs to the government in the event of default to "the difference, not to exceed the amount of this Bond, between the amount specified in said bid and such larger amount for which the Owner may in good faith contract with another party to perform the work." AR exh. 3, Protester's Bid Bond at 1. We have repeatedly noted that a bid bond is defective if it is submitted on a form that represents a significant departure from the rights and obligations of the parties as set forth in the IFB, which includes FAR § 52.228-1(e), and SF 24. See, e.g., Seither & Cherry Co., B-242220, Apr. 10, 1991, 91-1 CPD ¶ 365 at 2-3; Allgood Elec. Co., supra, at 3. Here, acceptance of G2G's bid bond would have obligated the VA to accept the surety's limited liability to pay reprocurement costs in the event of default. In other words, the government would not receive full and complete protection in the event G2G fails to fulfill its obligations. On this basis, we find that the VA properly rejected G2G's bid as nonresponsive because G2G's bid bond was noncompliant with the solicitation requirements for a bid guarantee.
In reaching this conclusion, we also reject G2G's arguments that paragraph 3 of its bid bond incorporated by reference the "substance" of FAR § 52.228-1 into G2G's bid bond. Comments at 8. The protester insists that the limitation of the surety's liability to pay reprocurement costs was "cured" upon incorporation of the requirements of FAR § 52.228-1; therefore, its bid bond was valid and enforceable. Id. at 10-11. However, the VA contends that the broad reference to "a statutory or other legal requirement in the location of the [p]roject" in paragraph 3 of G2G's bid bond was ambiguous and could be interpreted to exclude the solicitation's bid guarantee requirements as set forth in FAR § 52.228-1. Legal Memorandum at 8-10. While the VA acknowledges that no "magic words" are required to incorporate by reference the solicitation requirements into G2G's bid bond, the agency points out that the phrase "statutory or legal requirement" lacks specificity and/or references to the solicitation or FAR requirements. Legal Memorandum at 9-10.
The protester asserts that its bid guarantee met the requirements of FAR § 28.203, and that it provided documentation that assigned the CO sole and unrestricted authority to draw on the funds. Protest at 2. The agency contends that the CO’s rejection of the bid was reasonable, based on the individual surety’s failure to meet the requirements for providing an escrow account as a security interest pursuant to FAR § 28.203-1(b). Specifically, the agency contends that K.C. Electrical’s bid did not: (1) create an escrow account in the contracting agency’s name; (2) provide the CO with the sole and unrestricted right to draw upon any or all funds deposited in the account; and (3) provide that the terms of the escrow account could not be amended without the CO’s consent. Legal Memorandum at 4. We have examined the protester’s various arguments and find that none has merit.
The CO is vested with a wide degree of discretion and business judgment in determining the acceptability of an individual surety, including the adequacy of the surety’s assets, and we will not question such a determination so long as it is reasonable. Jay Jackson & Assoc., B-271236.3, Sept. 10, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 111 at 3. An individual surety may be accepted only if a security interest in acceptable assets is provided to the government by the individual surety. FAR § 28.203-1(a). One individual surety is adequate support for a bond, provided the unencumbered value of the assets pledged by that surety equals or exceeds the amount of the bond. FAR § 28.203(b). The value at which the CO accepts the assets pledged must be equal to or greater than the aggregate penal amounts of the bonds required by the solicitation. FAR § 28.203-1(b). As relevant here, assets may be provided through an escrow account with a federally-insured financial institution in the name of the contracting agency and must, at a minimum, provide the contracting officer the sole and unrestricted right to draw upon all or any part of the funds deposited in the account and indicate that the terms of the escrow account cannot be amended without the consent of the CO. FAR § 28.203-1(b)(1)(i), (vi). To satisfy the underlying bond obligations, the government will accept from individual sureties only acceptable assets, such as cash or irrevocable letters of credit, from a federally-insured financial institution. FAR § 28.203-2(a), (b). A CO may, but is not required to, allow a bidder a reasonable amount of time to augment surety information previously requested by the solicitation. Santurce Constr. Corp., B-240728, Dec. 10, 1990, 90-2 CPD ¶ 469 at 5.
The protester argues that the omission of the penal sum does not render the bid bond unenforceable because its surety is liable up to the amount authorized in the power of attorney. Comments on AR at 2. The agency argues that there is considerable uncertainty as to the agency’s ability to bind the surety for any amount because the liability limit listed on the bid bond exceeds the authority granted to the attorney-in-fact who signed the bid bond on behalf of the surety. Agency Report (AR) at 2.
The general rule is that a bid is nonresponsive and must be rejected when accompanied by a bid bond that does not include the penal sum. Kennedy Electric Company, Inc., B-239687, May 24, 1990, 90-1 CPD ¶ 499 at 1; See also; M/V Constructor Co., B-232572, Sept. 20, 1988, 88-2 CPD ¶ 272 at 1; F&F Pizano, B‑219591, B-219594, July 25, 1985, 85-2 CPD ¶ 88 at 1; Allen County Builders Supply, B-216647, May 7, 1985, 85-1 CPD ¶ 507 at 1. The purpose of a bid bond is to assure that a bidder will not withdraw its bid within the time specified for acceptance; it secures the liability of a surety to the government in the event the bidder fails to fulfill its obligations. Allen County Builders Supply, supra. Thus, the sufficiency of a bid bond will depend on whether the surety is clearly bound by its terms; when the liability of the surety is not clear, the bond properly may be regarded as defective. Id.
In support of its argument that the failure to list the penal amount on the bid bond does not render its bid nonresponsive, the protester relies on a decision issued by our Office, in which we held that a bid bond was enforceable against a single corporate surety, despite the omission of the penal sum, where the bond otherwise established the intent of the surety to be bound for a sufficient penal sum. Professional Restoration Services, Inc., B-232424, Jan. 9, 1989, 89-1 CPD ¶ 13 at 1 (hereinafter referred to as PRSI). As explained below, the protester’s reliance on PRSI is misplaced, and the general rule that a bid is nonresponsive and must be rejected when accompanied by a bid bond that does not include the penal sum applies in this case.
The protester contends that the facts in PRSI are analogous to the facts here in that in both instances, the protesters omitted the penal sums from their bid bonds, while including liability limits. HPC’s bid bond suffers from an additional problem not implicated in PRSI’s protest, however, which clearly distinguishes it from the PRSI decision. Specifically, based on the language in the bid bond in PRSI, there was no reason to question whether the surety intended to bind itself up to the liability limit listed in PRSI’s bid bond, but the same is not true with regard to HPC’s bid bond. The liability limit in PRSI’s bid bond was very close to the amount of the penal sum, and there was no indication that the attorney-in-fact signing the bid bond on behalf of the surety had exceeded the authority granted by the surety. See id. HPC’s bid bond, on the other hand, included a liability limit that exceeded the authority vested in the attorney-in-fact who signed the bid bond by over a million dollars. AR, Exhibit 4, HPC’s Proposal at 3-4. Additionally, the liability limit listed in HPC’s bid bond ($6,457,000) was vastly greater than the penal sum ($225,800). Id.
HPC contends that US2’s submission of a photocopied bid guarantee without original signatures rendered US2’s bid nonresponsive, and is not a “minor informality or irregularity” that may be waived or cured after bid opening. Protest at 2.
The VA responds that, although US2 submitted only a copy of its bid guarantee, the accompanying power of attorney shows that US2’s surety, SureTec Insurance Company, agreed to be bound by a facsimile or photocopy version of the power of attorney, as well as “any bond or undertaking to which it is attached”. AR at 3. VA argues accordingly that a copy of US2’s bid guarantee sufficiently demonstrated SureTec’s intent to be bound and that therefore US2’s bid was responsive. Id. at 4, citing Ray Ward Constr. Co., B-256374, June 14, 1994, 94-1 CPD ¶ 367. VA also notes that the bid guarantee was submitted in the correct amount and was signed by US2’s President, as the principal, and by the surety’s attorney-in-fact; and it bore copies of the corporate seals of both companies. The VA further notes that US2’s original bid consisted of a signed Standard Form 1442, on which US2 acknowledged all solicitation amendments, and that US2 did not take any exceptions to the solicitation’s material terms and conditions.
The VA elected to conduct this procurement using sealed bidding. Under the sealed bidding framework, bids are publicly opened, FAR § 14.101(c), and upon opening “must comply in all material respects with the invitation for bids”. FAR § 14.301(a). The issue of the bid’s compliance with the material terms of the invitation, i.e., the bid’s responsiveness, must be clear at bid opening. GAO has long recognized that permitting a bidder to correct an issue of responsiveness after bid opening would open the door to manipulation of the competitive bidding system to permit a bidder to decide after bids have been exposed whether to attempt to have its bid accepted or rejected. See Johnson Mach. Works, B-297115, Oct. 20, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 188 at 3 (involving questionable bid guarantee); see also Trans South Indus., Inc., B-224950, Dec. 19, 1986, 86-2 CPD ¶ 692 at 2.
When required by a solicitation, a bid guarantee is a material condition of the IFB with which there must be compliance at the time of bid opening. A.D. Roe Co., Inc., B-181692, Oct. 8, 1974, 74-2 CPD ¶ 194 at 3. Noncompliance with a solicitation requirement for a bid guarantee generally renders the bid nonresponsive and requires rejection of the bid. FAR § 28.101-4(a); Shaka, Inc., B-405552, Nov. 14, 2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 252 at 3. The sufficiency of a bid guarantee depends on whether the surety is clearly bound by its terms; when the liability of the surety is not clear, the bond is defective. Hostetter, Keach & Cassada Constr., LLC, B‑403329, Oct. 15, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 246 at 3. For the bid guarantee to be viewed as enforceable, the surety must appear to be clearly bound based on the information in the possession of the contracting officer at the time of bid opening. Frank & Son Paving, Inc., B–272179, Sept. 5, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 106 at 1.
Be it Resolved, that the signature of any authorized officer and seal of the Company heretofore or hereafter affixed to any power of attorney or any certificate relating thereto by facsimile, and any power of attorney or certificate bearing facsimile signature or facsimile seal shall be valid and binding upon the Company with respect to any bond or undertaking to which it is attached.
AR, Tab 9, US2 Bid (Copy), SureTec Limited Power of Attorney. We read this resolution to indicate the surety’s agreement that it would be bound by facsimile signatures and seals with respect to the appointment of an attorney-in-fact to sign bid bonds on the surety’s behalf. Despite the VA’s contention to the contrary, however, the power of attorney does not address, or otherwise commit, the surety to be bound by the facsimile signature of its attorney-in-fact on a bid bond. As a result, we do not view this situation as covered by the exception in Ray Ward Constr. Co., supra, at 3-4 (a facsimile of power of attorney could be accepted at bid opening where the power of attorney clearly established the intent of the surety to be bound by the facsimile signature of a corporate officer on the power of attorney that included an original corporate seal).
Since the power of attorney does not commit the surety to be bound by a photocopied signature on a bid bond, the question here is whether a photocopy of the omitted original bid bond could satisfy the solicitation’s requirement that Hamilton provide a bid guarantee in the form of a firm commitment. As the VA recognizes, we have long held that copies of bid guarantee documents, whether transmitted electronically or hand-delivered, generally do not satisfy the requirement for a bid guarantee since there is no way, other than by referring to the original documents after bid opening, for the contracting agency to be certain that there had not been alterations to which the surety had not consented and could use as a basis to disclaim liability. See Excel Bldg. & Dev. Corp., B-401955, Dec. 23, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 262 at 3; Regional Dev. Corp.--Recon.; Ware’s Van & Storage Co., Inc.--Recon., B-251299.2; B-251431.2, Mar. 16, 1993, 93-1 CPD ¶ 238; Executone Information Sys., Inc., B-246155, Oct. 21, 1991, 91-2 CPD ¶ 353. In the absence of compelling argument, which is absent here, we will follow our long-standing precedent.
In this case, the record does not establish that US2 submitted an enforceable bid guarantee, as required by the IFB. Without referring, after bid opening, to the document containing the surety agent’s original signature, the VA could not ascertain whether or not there had been alterations to which the surety had not consented and could use as a basis to disclaim liability. In these circumstances, the submission of a copy of the bid guarantee was not a correctable minor informality, as the VA suggests, and could not be cured by the submission of the original bond after bid opening because this would essentially provide the bidder with the option of accepting or rejecting the award by either correcting or not correcting the bond deficiency, which is inconsistent with the concept of procuring using sealed bids. TJ’s Marine Constr. LLC, B-402227, Jan. 7, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 19 at 4.
BCI challenges the agency’s rejection of its bid, arguing that the bond’s citation to an incorrect solicitation number and bid opening date were minor clerical errors that BCI could have easily corrected or that the agency should have waived. Protest at 3, 5, citing FAR §§ 14.405 (Minor Informalities or Irregularities in Bids), 14.407 (Mistakes in Bids); Comments at 2-3. In this respect, the protester contends that the contracting specialist’s initial request that BCI submit a new bid bond confirms that the agency believed the incorrect date and solicitation number to be minor defects. Protest at 4. The protester argues that rejection of BCI’s bid was unwarranted, because there is no confusion regarding the liability of the surety or to which solicitation the bid bond applied. See id. at 3, 5; Comments at 3. For example, BCI argues that, although its bond identified the wrong bid opening date (August 17), the date identified in its bond reflected the bid opening date announced in IFB amendment 2 and the identified date does not relate to the solicitation erroneously identified in its bond. Comments at 3. BCI also maintains that its bond’s description of the project satisfies the requirements of Standard Form (SF) 24, which does not specifically require a bidder to identify the specific location of the work in its bond. Id. at 3; Protest at 5.
The Corps responds that the bond was materially defective and disputes that the errors in BCI’s bid bond constitute minor informalities or clerical mistakes that could be corrected or waived. See AR at 9. The agency claims that the errors, collectively, provide no assurance that the surety intended to be obligated to the government for the procurement in question. See id. The Corps argues that the FAR provisions for waiving noncomplying bid guarantees do not apply in this case. Id. at 14-15, citing FAR §§ 28.101-4(a), (c).
The determinative question in judging the sufficiency of a bid guarantee is whether it could be enforced if the bidder subsequently fails to execute required contract documents and to provide performance and payment bonds. TJ’s Marine Constr. LLC, B-402227, Jan. 7, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 19 at 3. As such, a required bid bond is a material condition of an IFB with which there must be compliance at the time of bid opening; when a bidder submits a defective bid bond or uncertainty exists at the time of bid opening that the bidder has furnished a legally binding bond, the bid itself is rendered defective and must be rejected as nonresponsive. See, e.g., id.; BW JVI, LLC, B-401841, Dec. 4, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 249 at 3.
The solicitation number referenced in a bid bond is a material element of the bond affecting its acceptability. Joseph B. Fay Co., B-241769.2, Mar. 1, 1991, 91-1 CPD ¶ 234 at 2. Nevertheless, a bid bond that cites an incorrect solicitation number may be acceptable where there are clear indicia on the face of the bond that otherwise identify it with the correct solicitation. Kirila Contractors, Inc., B-230731, June 10, 1988, 88-1 CPD ¶ 554 at 2-3 (incorrect solicitation number in bond appeared to be a typographical error and did not refer to an ongoing procurement). Such indicia may include correct identification of the bid opening date; accurate description of the type of services sought; and/or designation of a maximum penal sum in an amount which correlates with the amount of the bid. SEEMA, Inc., B-255884, Apr. 13, 1994, 94-1 CPD ¶ 256 at 2-3. Another significant factor to be considered in determining the acceptability of such a bond is whether or not there are other ongoing procurements to which the misstated solicitation number could reasonably refer. Kirila Contractors, Inc., supra.
Here, the record shows that the agency properly determined that BCI’s bid bond was defective and rejected the protester’s bid. It is uncertain whether, at the time of bid opening, BCI had provided the government a legally binding bid bond as required by the IFB, because the bond referenced a solicitation number for another ongoing procurement by the Corps and included an incorrect bid opening date. A bid bond is defective, and the agency may properly reject the bid, where the bond references a wrong bid opening date and identifies a different solicitation instead of the solicitation that the bond is actually intended to cover. A & A Roofing Co., Inc., B-219645, Oct. 25, 1985, 85-2 CPD ¶ 463 at 3. This is because the bid bond’s reference to a different solicitation provides the surety with an opportunity to subsequently assert that it was liable only for a default on a bid for the wrongly cited procurement, not the bidder’s intended procurement. See Conservatek Indus., Inc., B-254927, Jan. 26, 1994, 94-1 CPD ¶ 42 at 4 (bid rejected where bond referenced different construction project number). Moreover, the description of the project in BCI’s bind bond--which is more general than the IFB’s description of the project--by itself, is not enough to overcome the incorrect solicitation number and bid date. See Kinetic Builders, Inc., B-223594, Sept. 24, 1986, 86-2 CPD ¶ 342 at 3-4, aff'd, Fitzgerald & Co., Inc.--Recon., B-223594.2, Nov. 3, 1986, 86-2 CPD ¶ 510 at 1-2 (where bid bond references incorrect solicitation number for another ongoing procurement, bond’s citation to correct bid opening date and general description of work did not sufficiently identify the bond with the correct solicitation); Joseph B. Fay Co., supra, at 2-3 (generic description of work does not render bid bond enforceable where bond references standard bidding form number instead of solicitation number and incorrect bid opening date).
Cummins protests the agency’s rejection of its proposal based on the sufficiency of its bid guarantee. See Protest at 1. The protester maintains that the language of its bond “obligate[s] the Surety to post all bonds” required for Cummins’ performance of the contract, including the submission of performance and payment bonds as required by the terms of RFP and contract. See Comments at 2 (emphasis in original). The protester also suggests that the agency should have “clarified” Cummins’ apparent noncompliance with the RFP’s bonding requirements during “negotiations” (i.e. discussions), because the acquisition was conducted as a negotiated procurement under FAR Part 15. See Protest at 2; see also Comments at 3.
The agency responds that Cummins’ commercial bid bond only addresses the obligation to furnish a performance bond, and not the payment bond, and therefore is insufficient. AR at 3. The Corps also states that, because award was to be made without conducting discussions, the agency could not allow the protester to correct its bid bond. Id. at 4, citing FAR § 28.101-4(b).
A bid guarantee is a form of security that ensures that a bidder will not withdraw its bid within the period specified for acceptance and, if required, will execute a written contract and furnish required performance and payment bonds. FAR § 28.001. The bid guarantee secures the surety’s liability to the government, thereby providing funds to cover the excess costs of awarding to the next eligible bidder in the event that the bidder awarded the contract fails to fulfill these obligations. A.W. and Assocs., Inc., B-239740, Sept. 25, 1990, 90-2 CPD ¶ 254 at 2; General Ship and Engine Works, Inc., B-184831, Oct. 31, 1975, 75-2 CPD ¶ 269 at 2. The determinative question in judging the sufficiency of a bid guarantee is whether it could be enforced if the bidder subsequently fails to execute required contract documents and to provide performance and payment bonds. TJ’s Marine Constr. LLC, B-402227, Jan. 7, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 19 at 3.
An offeror’s use of a commercial bid bond form, rather than a standard government form is not per se objectionable, since the sufficiency of the bond does not depend on its form, but on whether it represents a significant departure from the rights and obligations of the parties as set forth in FAR standard form 24. See, e.g., Alarm Control Co., B-246010, Nov. 18, 1991, 91-2 CPD ¶ 472 at 2. In this respect, the bid bond must clearly establish the liability of the surety; when the liability is not clear, the bond is defective. BW JVI, LLC, B-401841, Dec. 4, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 249 at 3.
We find that the agency reasonably determined that the protester’s bid bond was insufficient and properly rejected Cummins’ proposal. The express language of Cummins’ bid bond holds the surety liable only for the protester’s failure to give bond for the performance of the contract. AR, Tab 2, Protester’s Bid Bond, at 1. Cummins’ bid bond on its face does not establish that the surety would be liable in the event that the protester failed to furnish a required payment bond after contract award. At best, the bond is ambiguous with respect to the liability of the surety in this regard, and our Office will not convert ambiguous aspects of bid bonds into mere matters of form which can be explained away and waived. See Standard Roofing USA, Inc., B-245776, Jan. 30, 1992, 92-1 CPD ¶ 127 at 4.
Insofar as the protester suggests that the agency should have addressed any ambiguity in Cummins’ bid bond by holding discussions with the firm, where, as here, award is made on the basis of initial proposals without discussions, noncompliance with a solicitation requirement for a bid guarantee requires rejection of a proposal as unacceptable (except in situations not present here). FAR § 28.101-4(b); Islands Mech. Contractor, Inc., B-404275, Jan. 24, 2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 26 at 3.
Capture contends that it submitted a valid and enforceable bid bond. In this regard, Capture argues that the letter attached to its bid bond merely disclosed a third-party indemnification arrangement, which Capture argues is a standard business practice. Capture contends that the letter does not place any restrictions or conditions on the government or limits the VA’s rights against the surety. Protest at 3.
The determinative question in judging the sufficiency of a bid guarantee such as a bid bond is whether it could be enforced if the bidder subsequently fails to execute required contract documents and to provide performance and payment bonds. TJ’s Marine Constr. LLC, B-402227, Jan. 7, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 19 at 3. The bid bond must clearly establish the liability of the surety; when the liability is not clear, the bond is defective. BW JVI, LLC, B-401841, Dec. 4, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 249 at 3.
Here, we find that the agency properly rejected Capture’s proposal. The express language of the letter attached to Capture’s bid bond indicated to the agency that the surety’s obligation under the bond was based upon undisclosed conditions. In this regard, the letter specifically stated that the surety had been assured by Capture that the agency had been notified of the conditions, the record shows that Capture had not informed VA of any conditions (either prior to submitting its proposal or along with the proposal). Thus, the VA could not know what conditions had been placed upon the surety’s obligation or whether the surety would be liable on the bond in the event of Capture’s default. Given this, we agree with the agency that the attached letter created uncertainty as to the obligation of the surety to the government.
The protester has made various arguments attempting to explain away the attached letter. For example, Capture essentially contends that the agency should not have considered the attached letter as conditioning the surety’s obligations where the face of the bid bond, SF 24, stated that the surety would be bound. The protester also parses the words of the attached letter to argue that because the letter stated in the past tense that the surety agreed to be bound, all of the conditions had been met. None of these arguments has any merit. The fact remains that, in its proposal, Capture provided a letter attached to its bid bond, and the express language of the letter reasonably indicated to the agency that the surety’s obligations were conditioned upon unstated terms.
A bid guarantee is a form of security that ensures that a bidder will not withdraw its bid within the period specified for acceptance and, if required, will execute a written contract and furnish required performance and payment bonds. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 28.001. The bid guarantee secures the surety's liability to the government, thereby providing funds to cover the excess costs of awarding to the next eligible bidder in the event that the bidder awarded the contract fails to fulfill these obligations. A.W. and Assocs., Inc., B-239740, Sept. 25, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 254 at 2; General Ship and Engine Works, Inc., B-184831, Oct. 31, 1975, 75-2 CPD para. 269 at 2.. When required by a solicitation, a bid guarantee is a material part of the bid and must be furnished with it. Hostetter, Keach & Cassada Constr, LLC, B-403329, Oct. 15, 2010, 2010 CPD para. 246 at 3. Noncompliance with a solicitation requirement for a bid guarantee generally renders the bid nonresponsive and requires the rejection of the bid. FAR sect. 28.101-4(a); A.W. and Assocs., Inc., supra.
Responsiveness of a bid is determined from an examination of the face of the bid bond provided by a bidders' surety, and is limited to whether the surety is clearly bound by the terms of that bid bond. Stay, Inc., B-237073.2, Feb. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 225 at 3. Thus, we have repeatedly held that a bid bond is defective, rendering a bid nonresponsive, if it is not clear that the bond will bind the surety. All Star Maint., Inc., B-234820, Mar. 24, 1989, 89-1 CPD para. 305 at 2. On the other hand, when a required bid bond is found to be proper on its face, the bond is acceptable and the bid responsive. Contract Servs. Co., Inc., B-226780.3, Sept. 17, 1987, 87‑2 CPD para. 263 at 2-3. Specifically, where a corporate surety is designated, a bid bond is proper "on its face" when it has been duly executed by the surety's agent, the surety has agreed to be obligated for the penal amount of the bond, and the surety appears on the Treasury Circular list of acceptable sureties. See Stay, Inc., supra, at 3.
IMC's proposal, 1 of 48 submitted, was evaluated as overall satisfactory. However, the agency found that IMC's bid bond was legally insufficient because it was not an original, lacked an original surety agent's signature, and failed to demonstrate that a duly authorized IMC officer had executed the bid bond. The agency thus excluded IMC's proposal from further consideration for award. The agency selected five contractors to participate in the MATOC and awarded a seed task order for construction of the Albritton Junior High School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. After notice of the awards and a written debriefing, IMC filed this protest.
IMC protests the agency's rejection of its proposal as legally insufficient, asserting that it submitted an original, duly executed bid bond. Specifically, IMC maintains that, in accordance with the RFP's instructions, it submitted both an original proposal Volume I (stamped "original") which included the original bid bond, and a copy which included a photocopy of the bid bond. IMC speculates that the contracting officer mistakenly furnished the attorney reviewing IMC's bid bond with the copy instead of the original bid bond. Since the only version of IMC's proposal Volume I retained by the agency is not marked "original" and contains a photocopy of the bid bond, Agency Response to Initial Comments para. 6, IMC further speculates that the agency destroyed the original bid bond by mistake. In support of its position, IMC has submitted affidavits from the employees who prepared its proposal that attest to the inclusion of the original bid bond, and a letter from its surety attesting to its provision of an original bid bond. Affidavits of Corporate Secretary and Program Manager; Surety Letter. The contracting officer and specialist, on the other hand, have submitted sworn statements that "to the best of [their] knowledge," IMC submitted a photocopy and not an original of its bid bond. Declarations of Contracting Officer and Contract Specialist.
The determinative question in judging the sufficiency of a bid guarantee such as a bid bond is whether it could be enforced if the bidder subsequently fails to execute required contract documents and to provide performance and payment bonds. TJ's Marine Constr., LLC, B-402227, Jan.7, 2010, 2010 CPD para. 19 at 3. The bid bond must clearly establish the liability of the surety; when the liability is not clear, the bond is defective. BW JVI, LLC, B-401841, Dec. 4, 2009 CPD para. 249 at 3. In general, copies of bid guarantee documents do not satisfy the requirement for a bid guarantee since there is no way, other than referring to the original documents, for the agency to be certain that there had been no alterations to which the surety had not consented and could use as a basis to disclaim liability. TJ's Marine Constr., LLC, supra.
Here, the RFP expressly provided that photocopied bid guarantees would not be acceptable. Further, where, as here, award is made on the basis of initial proposals without discussions, noncompliance with a solicitation requirement for a bid guarantee requires rejection of the proposal as unacceptable, except in situations not present here. FAR sect. 28.101-4. Since the record indicates that at the time of review, IMC's bid bond was determined to be a photocopy, the agency properly rejected IMC's initial proposal.
IMC's assertion that the agency must have discarded IMC's original bond, provides no basis for relief. Agencies have a fundamental obligation to have procedures in place to receive submissions from competitors under a solicitation, to reasonably safeguard submissions received, and to fairly consider all submission received. Safety and Health Consulting Servs., Inc., B‑290412, June 10, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 95 at 2. As a practical matter, however, even with appropriate procedures in place, an agency may lose or misplace a submission, and such occasional loss generally does not entitle an aggrieved competitor to relief. Joint Venture Penauillie Italia S.p.A, B‑298865, B‑298865.2, Jan. 3, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 7 at 6.
This result is justified by the unique circumstances arising in protests concerning lost information. The only means generally available to establish the content of allegedly lost information is for the offeror to reconstruct that information. However, allowing the offeror to do so would be inconsistent with maintaining a fair competitive system. Shubhada, Inc., B-292437, Sept. 18, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 161 at 3-4. Here, there is nothing in the record to independently establish the contents of IMC's original proposal Volume I. In this regard, IMC's corroborating evidence (employee affidavits and surety letter) does not constitute independent corroborating evidence of the original version's contents, including whether it contained an original bid bond instead of a photocopy. See Jay-Brant Gen. Contractors, B-274986, Jan. 10, 1997, 97‑1 CPD para. 17 at 4 (employee statement attesting to submission of original bid bond is insufficient to establish submission of original bond); P.W. Parker, Inc., B-190286, Jan. 6, 1978, 78-1 CPD para. 12 at 3 (evidence from surety, with substantial interest in procurement, cannot be considered independent evidence).
Our office has recognized a limited exception to the rule that negligent loss of proposal information does not entitle the offeror to relief. The exception generally applies where the loss was not an isolated act of negligence, but rather arises out of a systematic failure in the agency's procedures that typically results in multiple or repetitive instances of lost information. Project Res., Inc., B-297968, Mar. 31, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 58 at 2; Shubhada, Inc., supra, at 4. The exception does not apply here as there is no evidence--and IMC has not suggested--that the agency has, for example, lost the proposal information submitted by other offerors, or previously lost proposal information.
Hostetter argues that the discrepancies between its bid and bid bond are minor informalities that do not cast into doubt that the bidder and the bid bond principal are the same entity.
The VA disagrees that the discrepancy is a minor informality, arguing that because the names of the bidder and the bid bond principal are different, it is not clear that the bond would bind the surety. The VA states that VA's Information Letter 049-05-11 provides guidance to the agency's contracting officers regarding their review of surety bonds; this letter generally informs contracting officers that the name of the bid bond principal and the bidder must be the same, and that the type of organization shown on the bid bond must be the same as that on the bid or in ORCA. AR at 3‑4.
A bid guarantee is a form of security that ensures that a bidder will not withdraw its bid within the period specified for acceptance and, if required, will execute a written contract and furnish required performance and payment bonds. FAR sect. 28.001. The bid guarantee secures the surety's liability to the government, thereby providing funds to cover the excess costs of awarding to the next eligible bidder in the event that the bidder awarded the contract fails to fulfill these obligations. A.W. and Assocs., Inc., B-239740, Sept. 25, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 254 at 2. When required by a solicitation, a bid guarantee is a material part of the bid and must be furnished with it. A.D. Roe Co., Inc., B-181692, Oct. 8, 1974, 74-2 CPD para. 194 at 3. Noncompliance with a solicitation requirement for a bid guarantee generally renders the bid nonresponsive and requires the rejection of the bid. FAR sect. 28.101-4(a); A.W. and Assocs., Inc., supra, at 2.
The sufficiency of a bid guarantee depends on whether the surety is clearly bound by its terms; when the liability of the surety is not clear, the bond is defective. Techno Eng'g & Constr., Ltd., B-243932, July 23, 1991, 91-2 CPD para. 87 at 2. Under the law of suretyship, no one incurs a liability to pay the debts or perform the duties of another unless that person has expressly agreed to do so. Andersen Constr. Co.; Rapp Constructors, Inc., B‑213955, B-213955.2, Mar. 9, 1984, 84-1 CPD para. 279 at 4. Thus, generally, a bid bond which names a principal different from the bidder is deficient, and the bid must be rejected unless it can be established that the different names identify the same entity. Goss Fire Protection, Inc., B-253036, Aug. 13, 1993, 93‑2 CPD para. 97 at 4; A.D. Roe Co., Inc., supra, at 4-5.
On the other hand, where the entity that submitted the bid and that is identified as the bid bond principal are exactly the same, any discrepancy between the bidder's and bid bond principal's names is merely a matter of form that does not require rejection of the bid. BW JV1, LLC, B-401841, Dec. 4, 2009, 2009 CPD para. 249 at 3. The proper question to be considered is whether the nominal bidder and bid bond principal are the same entity, such that it is certain that the surety will be obligated under the bond to the government in the event that that bidder withdraws its bid within the period specified for acceptance or fails to execute a written contract or furnish required performance and payment bonds. Harris Excavating, B-284820, June 12, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 103 at 4.
Here, Hostetter's bid itself establishes that the bidder and the bid bond principal are the same entity. Although the bid identifies the bidder as "Hostetter, Keach & Cassada, LLC," the bid also includes a DUNS number, ORCA representations and certifications, and certified articles for incorporation that identify the bidder to be "Hostetter, Keach & Cassada Construction, LLC." Moreover, the address identified for the bidder and bid bond principal is the same, and the bid and bid bond are signed by the same individual, who identified himself as vice-president. The record thus shows that the bidder and bid bond principal are the same entity, despite the omission of "Construction" from the name of the bidder. This minor informality or irregularity should have been waived by the contracting officer. See FAR sect. 14.405.
The sufficiency of a bid bond relates to whether the government will receive full and complete protection in the event that the bidder fails to execute the required contract documents and deliver the required performance and payment bonds. BW JVI, LLC, B-401841, Dec. 4, 2009, 2009 CPD para. at 3. As such, a required bid bond is a material condition of an IFB with which there must be compliance at the time of bid opening; when a bidder submits a defective bid bond or uncertainty exists at the time of bid opening that the bidder has furnished a legally binding bond, the bid itself is rendered defective and must be rejected as nonresponsive. See Blakelee Inc., B-239794, July 23, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 65 at 4; A & A Roofing Co., Inc., B‑219645, Oct. 25, 1985, 85-2 CPD para. 463 at 1-2.
The determinative question in judging the sufficiency of a bid guarantee such as a bid bond is whether it could be enforced if the bidder subsequently fails to execute required contract documents and to provide performance and payment bonds. Southern California Eng'g Co., Inc., B‑232390, Oct. 25, 1988, 88-2 CPD para. 391 at 1. For the bid guarantee to be viewed as enforceable, the surety must appear to be clearly bound based on the information in the possession of the contracting officer at the time of bid opening. Frank & Son Paving, Inc., B-272179, Sept. 5, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 106 at 1. Copies of bid guarantee documents, whether transmitted electronically or hand-delivered, generally do not satisfy the requirement for a bid guarantee since there is no way, other than by referring to the original documents after bid opening, for the contracting agency to be certain that there had not been alterations to which the surety had not consented and could use as a basis to disclaim liability. Excel Bldg. & Dev. Corp., B-401955, Dec. 23, 2009, 2009 CPD para. __ at 3. See Jay‑Brant Gen. Contractors, B-274986, Jan. 10, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 17 at 3; G&A Gen. Contractors, B‑236181, Oct. 4, 1989, 89-2 CPD para. 308 at 1.
Here, we find that the USACE properly rejected TJ's Marine's bid. The bid bond submitted with the protester's bid did not contain the surety's agent's original signature. Without referring, after bid opening, to the document containing the surety agent's original signature, the USACE cannot ascertain whether or not there had been alterations to which the surety had not consented and could use as a basis to disclaim liability. Accordingly, TJ's Marine's bid guarantee cannot be viewed as enforceable based on the information in the possession of the contracting officer at the time of bid opening.
We do not agree with the protester that the E-SIGN Act requires the USACE to accept the copy of the surety agent's signature on TJ's Marine's bid bond. The E‑SIGN Act provides that a governmental agency need not accept electronic signatures with respect to a contract. See Excel Bldg. & Dev. Corp., supra, at 4, citing 15 U.S.C. sect. 7001(b)(2), FAR sect. 4.502. TJ's Marine's arguments concerning the FRE are also without merit. The FRE govern the admission of evidence in federal courts. They do not, however, answer the issue here as to whether an agency can ascertain at bid opening whether or not a copied document has been altered from the original. See id. at 4 n. 3.
Excel, which submitted the apparent low bid, provided a bid bond that contained the original signature of the principal and a copy of the surety agent’s signature and seal. The contract specialist contacted the surety, who informed her that the original bond would have an original seal affixed to it. The contract specialist also contacted the surety’s agent, who signed the bond, and he explained that he had emailed a copy of the bond to Excel and that the original, which he sent by FedEx, was received by the protester after bid opening. Agency Report (AR), Tab 8, Contracting Specialist’s Memorandum, at 1. The agency rejected the protester’s bid as nonresponsive and awarded the contract to the second low bidder. Contracting Officer’s Statement at 2. This protest followed.
Excel argues that it in fact submitted an original bid bond, explaining that its submitted bid bond was an original print of the bond emailed to it by the surety’s agent. Protest at 1. The protester argues that “once the contents of the email were printed and signed by Excel . . . an original bid bond was created.” See Protester’s Comments at 2. The protester also contends that the signatures and seals on the bond are clear and legible and that the bond is binding regardless of whether the signatures are in their original ink, and adds that the power of attorney accompanying the bond expressly states that “[t]he corporate seal is not necessary for the validity of any bonds . . . [and t]he signature of any such officer and the corporate seal may be printed by facsimile.” Protester’s Response to Agency’s Dismissal Request at 1-2, citing Excel’s Bid Bond at 3. According to the protester, signing, sealing, emailing, and then physically mailing the bond is standard industry practice. See Protester’s Comments at 1, 3. Moreover, the protester argues that the Uniform Electronics Transactions Act (UETA) and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (E-SIGN) Act have legitimized the use of email as a binding method of conducting business, and the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) recognizes a print-out of an email to be an original document. Id. at 2-3, citing FRE Rule 1001(3).
The agency responds that the protester did not submit an original bid bond, which raised questions as to whether the bid document was altered. AR at 1. In this regard, the Forest Service questions why the surety would send the original bond document by FedEx if, as the protester argues, the emailed version was the original. The agency adds that it is not concerned with whether the power of attorney is binding because photocopies or facsimile copies of powers of attorney are permitted under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). See FAR sect. 28.101-3 (2009). Citing the IFB’s incorporation of FAR sect. 52.228-1(a), which provides that “[f]ailure to furnish a bid guarantee in the proper form and amount, by the time set for opening of bids, may be cause for rejection of the bid,” the agency argues that it properly rejected the protester’s bid in accordance with that provision and FAR sect. 14.404-2(j) (bid shall be rejected where bidder fails to furnish bid guarantee in accordance with requirements of IFB).
The sufficiency of a bid bond relates to whether the government will receive full and complete protection in the event that the bidder fails to execute the required contract documents and deliver the required performance and payment bonds. BW JVI, LLC, B-401841, Dec. 4, 2009, 2009 CPD para. at 3. As such, a required bid bond is a material condition of an IFB with which there must be compliance at the time of bid opening; when a bidder submits a defective bid bond or uncertainty exists at the time of bid opening that the bidder has furnished a legally binding bond, the bid itself is rendered defective and must be rejected as nonresponsive. See Blakelee Inc., B--239794, July 23, 1990, 90--2 CPD para. 65 at 4; A & A Roofing Co., Inc., B--219645, Oct. 25, 1985, 85--2 CPD para. 463 at 1-2.
The determinative question in judging the sufficiency of a bid guarantee such as a bid bond is whether it could be enforced if the bidder subsequently fails to execute required contract documents and to provide performance and payment bonds. Southern California Eng’g Co., Inc., B‑232390, Oct. 25, 1988, 88-2 CPD para. 391 at 1. For the bid guarantee to be viewed as enforceable, the surety must appear to be clearly bound based on the information in the possession of the contracting officer at the time of bid opening. Frank & Son Paving, Inc., B-272179, Sept. 5, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 106 at 1. Copies of bid guarantee documents, whether transmitted electronically or hand-delivered, generally do not satisfy the requirement for a bid guarantee since there is no way, other than by referring to the original documents after bid opening, for the contracting agency to be certain that there had not been alterations to which the surety had not consented and could use as a basis to disclaim liability. See Jay‑Brant Gen. Contractors, B-274986, Jan. 10, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 17 at 3; G&A Gen. Contractors, B-236181, Oct. 4, 1989, 89-2 CPD para. 308 at 1.
Moreover, a bond deficiency may not be cured by submitting the original bond documents after bid opening because this would essentially provide the bidder with the option of accepting or rejecting the award by either correcting or not correcting a bond deficiency, which is inconsistent with the sealed bidding system. Bird Constr., B-240002; B-240002.2, Sept. 19, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 234 at 2. For this reason, a surety’s post-bid opening letter to the contracting officer cannot establish the liability of the surety and responsiveness of the protester’s bid. A nonresponsive bid cannot be made responsive after bid opening through an explanation of what the bidder or surety intended. Design for Health, Inc., B-239730, Sept. 14, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 213 at 3.
Here, we find that the Forest Service properly rejected Excel’s bid. The bid bond submitted with the protester’s bid did not contain the surety’s agent’s original signature and seal. Without referring, after bid opening, to the document containing the surety agent’s original signature, the Forest Service cannot ascertain whether or not there had been alterations to which the surety had not consented and could use as a basis to disclaim liability. Accordingly, Excel’s bid guarantee cannot be viewed as enforceable based on the information in the possession of the contracting officer at the time of bid opening.
The protester's bid identified the bidder as "BW JV1" of 2735 S. Krahn Road, New Berlin, Wisconsin, and was signed by Bruce Witt, President, and Keith Harenda, Project Director. The accompanying bid bond identified the principal as "BW JVI" of 1237 W. Bruce Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and contained signatures that appeared to be those of Messrs. Witt and Harenda. The principal on the bid bond was identified as a "joint venture" under the "Type of Organization" section of the bid bond. Attached to the bid bond was a notarized "Acknowledgement of Principal" that identified the principal that executed the "foregoing instrument" (that is, the bid bond) to be "KPH Construction Corp."; this acknowledgment was signed by Keith P. Harenda as President of KPH Construction Corp. AR, Tab 4, BW JV1 Bid.
The protester contends that the bid and bid bond were submitted by the same entity. In this regard, the protester explains that the bidder, BW JV1, is a joint venture and that both members of the venture signed the bid and bid bond as President and Project Director of BW JV1. Protest at 2, 5. The different addresses, the protester further explains, are mutually agreed upon offices provided under the joint venture agreement. Id. at 4. Any discrepancy between the names, the protester argues, is an insignificant typographical error which the agency should waive as an informality or minor irregularity under applicable provisions of the FAR. Id. at 4, 7--8, citing FAR sections 14.301(a), 28.101-4(c)(7), 52.214-19(b). The protester also argues that the additional acknowledgment of principal does not affect the validity of the bid bond, because this acknowledgment was not required by the IFB. Finally, the protester has provided a letter from its surety, which states that it stands behind the validity of bond.
The sufficiency of a bid bond relates to whether the government will receive full and complete protection in the event that the bidder fails to execute the required contract documents and deliver the required performance and payment bonds. Martina Enter./Tom Swenson Gen. Contractors, B-250766, Oct. 21, 1992, 92‑2 CPD para. 266 at 2 (holding that the bid of a joint venture, which submitted a bid bond in the name of only one of the corporations forming the joint venture, is nonresponsive). Among other things, the terms of the bid bond must clearly establish the liability of the surety at the time of bid opening; when the liability is not clear, the bond is defective. Design for Health, Inc., B-239730, Sept. 14, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 213 at 2. A surety does not incur a liability to pay the debts of another unless it expressly agrees to be bound. Mount Diablo Corp., Inc., B‑228193, Nov. 10, 1987, 87-2 CPD para. 475. For this reason, we rigidly apply the rule that the principal listed on the bid bond must be the same as the nominal bidder. Opine Constr., B-218627, June 5, 1985, 85-1 C.P.D. para. 645. If the bid bond names a principal different from the nominal bidder, it is deficient and may not be corrected after bid opening as a minor informality. Atlas Contractors, Inc./Norman T. Hardee, a Joint Venture, B-208332, Jan. 19, 1983, 83-1 CPD para. 69 at 3.
Where the entity that submitted the bid and that is identified as the bid bond principal are exactly the same, any discrepancy between the bidder's and bid bond principal's names is merely a matter of form that does not require rejection of the bid. Harris Excavating, B-284820, June 12, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 103 at 3, citing K-W Constr., Inc., B-194480, June 29, 1979, 79-1 CPD para. 475. Extrinsic evidence that is reasonably or publicly available and in existence at the time of bid opening may be provided to establish the identity of the bidder and bid bond principal as the same entity. Gem Eng'g Co., B-251644, Mar. 29, 1993, 93-1 CPD para. 303 at 2 (award to second-low bidder properly terminated where corporate records and Dun & Bradstreet report resolved discrepancy in the name of the low bidder and bid bond principal); Lamari Elec. Co., B-216397, Dec. 24, 1984, 84-2 CPD para. 689 at 2 (entity submitting the bid and identified as the bid bond principal was the same, an individual using different trade names); Jack B. Imperiale Fence Co., Inc., B-203261, Oct. 26, 1981, 81-2 CPD para. 339 at 2 (discrepancy in corporate names used in bid and bid bond resolved through submission of corporation records, tax forms, bid bonds, insurance papers, loan documents, and contract documents); K-W Constr., Inc., supra. (bidder's and bid bond principal's identity established through submission of corporate documents).
Although extrinsic evidence available to the contracting officer indicates that the different spellings of the bidder's name (that is, BW JV1 and BW JVI) concern a discrepancy that appears to be a mere matter of form, the identification of a corporation as the entity that executed the bid bond calls into question the liability of the surety with respect to the joint venture, thus rendering the bid nonresponsive. Specifically, the bid bond's notarized acknowledgment of the principal states that the person executing the bid bond is Keith P. Heranda, as president of KPH Construction Corp., and that this is "the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument," i.e., the bid bond. AR, Tab 4, BW JV1 Bid. The principal identified on the face of the bid bond, however, is BW JV1, a joint venture, and not KPH Construction Corp. Moreover, although KPH Construction is one of the two joint venture members, the protester's joint venture agreement provides that the bid bond had to be executed by both venture members. See Joint Venture Agreement at 6. We find that the bid bond is unclear as to which entity executed the bid bond and that this casts doubt on whether the surety would be liable to the government in the event that the joint venture failed to execute contractual documents after acceptance of the bid.
The IFB, issued on August 11, 2008, required a bid guarantee in the form of a bid bond in the amount of 20 percent of the bid. Mill City Partnership, the apparent low bidder at $5,678,625, identified itself in the bid forms alternately as Mill City Environmental Corp. (MCE), or Mill City Environmental Corp. w/ Teaming Partner C.R.C. Co., Inc. (Mill City Partnership). Agency Report (AR) Tab 13.
The accompanying bid bond identified its principal as C.R.C. Company, Inc. AR, Tab 13, at 13. The principal was identified as a "corporation" under the "Type of Organization" section of the bid bond. Id. The signature block on the bond contained the signature of CRC’s president. Id.
By letter dated September 29, the contracting officer notified Mill City that its bid was nonresponsive because of a deficiency in its bid bond. AR, Tab 7. The Corps awarded the contract to the next low bidder, Green Seal Environmental, Inc., at $5,793,221.45. Contracting Officer’s Statement at 2.
The sufficiency of a bid bond relates to whether the government will receive full and complete protection in the event that the bidder fails to execute the required contract documents and deliver the required performance and payment bonds. Martina Enter./Tom Swenson Gen. Contractors, B-250766, Oct. 21, 1992, 92‑2 CPD para. 266 at 2 (holding that the bid of a joint venture, which submitted a bid bond in the name of only one of the corporations forming the joint venture, is nonresponsive). Among other things, the terms of the bid bond must clearly establish the liability of the surety at the time of bid opening; when the liability is not clear, the bond is defective. Design for Health, Inc., B-239730, Sept. 14, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 213 at 3. A surety does not incur a liability to pay the debts of another unless he expressly agrees to be bound. Mount Diablo Corp., Inc., B‑228193, Nov. 10, 1987, 87-2 CPD para. 475 at 2. For this reason, the principal listed on the bid bond must be the same legal entity as the nominal bidder. Reliable Elec. Constr., Inc., B‑250092, Sept. 23, 1992, 92-2 CPD para.198 at 2. If the bid bond names a principal different from the nominal bidder, it is deficient and may not be corrected after bid opening as a minor informality. Atlas Contractors, Inc./Norman T. Hardee, a Joint Venture, B-208332, Jan. 19, 1983, 83-1 CPD para. 69 at 3.
In its protest, Simont argues that the omission of the bid guarantee was in good faith, and that it should be allowed to submit a bid guarantee now. Simont states that it was misled by the deletion of “NFAS sect. 5252.228-9302” and the failure to list the bid guarantee as a required element of the bid in the “Instructions to Bidders” section of the IFB. Protest at 2.
Simont also points to the IFB provision requiring prospective bidders to pose any questions at least 10 days before the bid opening. IFB at 5; Amend. 2 at 4. The protester explains that since the bid opening was scheduled for July 24, and amendment 2 was posted electronically on July 16 (which was only 8 days before the bid opening), Simont was prohibited from resolving its confusion over the requirements of the amended IFB.
NAVFAC argues first that amendment 2 eliminated the conflict between the 2 percent bid guarantee required by FAR sect. 52.228-1 and the 20 percent bid guarantee required by NFAS sect. 5252.228-9302 by deleting the NFAS provision.
The NAVFAC argument is complicated by the fact that the NFAS bid guarantee provision was misidentified in the original IFB as sect. 5254.201-9300. As a result, prospective bidders faced a challenge in understanding what was being deleted. Since amendment 2 did not explain that the provision being deleted had a different label in the original IFB, the prospective bidders (1) had to discern that the provision being deleted could be found in the NAVFAC Contracting Manual (made more difficult because its provisions are not part of the Navy FAR Supplement), (2) locate a copy of the Manual (such as at the Internet address noted previously), (3) look up sect. 5252.228-9302, and (4) search the IFB for text that matched the provision in the manual. Ultimately, bidders had to deduce that, notwithstanding the discrepancy, NAVFAC’s intention was to delete the mislabeled provision.
NAVFAC emphasizes that the amended IFB reiterated the requirement for a two percent bid guarantee, the protester’s bid did not include a bid guarantee of any type, and none of the exceptions in FAR sect. 28.101-4 applies. Therefore, NAVFAC argues, it was legally required to reject the protester’s bid. See FAR sect. 28.101-4(a).
A bid guarantee assures that the bidder will, if required, execute a written contract and furnish performance and payment bonds. Curry Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-228214, Dec. 9, 1987, 87-2 CPD para. 570 at 2. Where a solicitation requires bidders to submit bid guarantees with their bids, and a bidder fails to do so (and no exception applies), the bid must be rejected. Lawson’s Enters., Inc., B-286708, Jan. 31, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 36 at 2. Affording a bidder the opportunity to supply its bid guarantee later provides the bidder the option of accepting or rejecting the award by either correcting or not correcting a deficiency, which would be inconsistent with the sealed bidding system. Western Mgmt. Servs., Inc.; Mac-Bestos, Inc., B-266147, B‑270153, Jan. 23, 1996, 96‑1 CPD para. 17 at 2-3.
New 4. The Court’s Resolution.
Pursuant to FAR 52.228-15(d), bonds must be supported by “corporate sureties . . . list[ed] . . . in Treasury Department Circular 570, individual sureties, or by other acceptable security such postal money order, certified check, cashier’s check, [ILC], or . . . certain bonds of the United States.” 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-15(d). Each of three requirements is addressed herein.
a. Whether Anthem Builders, Inc.’s Bond Properly Was Supported By A Corporate Surety Listed In Treasury Department Circular 570.
First, Plaintiff’s bonding company, First Standard, is not listed as a corporate surety on Treasury Department Circular 570.16 Therefore, Plaintiff’s bond was not supported by a corporate surety listed in Treasury Department Circular 570.
b. Whether Anthem Builders, Inc.’s Bond Properly Was Supported By An Individual Surety.
Second, the court must determine whether Plaintiff’s bond satisfied the requirements for an individual surety. Pursuant to FAR 52.228-11(a), Plaintiff properly pledged assets and submitted Standard Form 28, Mr. Harris’s Affidavit of Individual Surety. AR 206–09. Pursuant to FAR 52.228-11(b), the pledged assets must be in the form of either “(1) [e]vidence of an escrow account containing cash, certificates of deposit, commercial or Governmental securities, or other assets described in FAR 28.203-2 . . . ; and/or (2) [a] recorded lien on real estate.” 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-11(b). Therefore, Plaintiff complied with FAR 52.228-11(b)(1), by providing Mr. Harris’s Affidavit of Individual Surety that the ITR from FMB was a “trust secured with cash valued assets totaling over $1 Billion, including parts totaling over $30 million in HSBC Bank issued [certificates of deposit] held in escrow account by FMB at Northern Trust Bank in USA.” AR 208. Thus, Plaintiff’s bond complied with FAR 52.228-11(b).
But, FAR 28.203, 28.203-1, and 28.203-2 further limit the acceptability of individual sureties. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 28.203, 28.203-1, 28.203-2.17 First, FAR 28.203 grants the CO discretion to “determine the acceptability of individuals proposed as sureties” and to reject “the offeror utilizing the individual surety . . . as nonresponsible.” 48 C.F.R. § 28.203(a), (c); see also 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-1(b)(1) (stating that the terms and conditions of the escrow account “must be acceptable to the [CO]”).
If the successful bidder, upon acceptance of its bid by the Government within the period specified for acceptance, fails to execute all contractual documents or furnish executed bond(s) within [ten] days after receipt of the forms by the bidder, the [CO] may terminate the contract for default.
Therefore, on its face, the forty-five day period specified in the ITR exceeds the ten-day period in the Bid Guarantee provision of the Solicitation. Compare AR 193 (ITR) with AR 73 (Bid Guarantee provision). Further, there is also no indication in the Administrative Record that the CO specified another time period. Therefore, the court has determined that the forty-five day period for payment under the ITR exceeds the time period in the Bid Guarantee provision of the Solicitation, thereby violating FAR 28.203-1(b)(1)(i)’s requirement that the escrow account “provide the contracting officer the sole and unrestricted right to draw upon all or part of the funds.” 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-1(b)(1)(i).
In addition, FAR 28.203-2(a) states that “the Government will accept only cash, readily marketable assets, or [ILCs] from a federally insured financial institution from individual sureties to satisfy the underlying bond obligations.” 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(a); see also 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(b) (listing acceptable assets); 48 C.F.R. § 28.203(c) (listing unacceptable assets). Given the acceptable assets listed in FAR 28.203-2(b), Plaintiff’s bond only could qualify as “[ILCs] issued by a federally insured financial institution in the name of the contracting agency and which identify the agency and solicitation or contract number for which the ILC is provided” or “[c]ash, or certificates of deposit, or as other cash equivalents with a federally insured financial institution.” 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(b)(5), (1). These alternatives also are addressed herein.
i. Whether Anthem Builders, Inc.’s Bond Properly Was Supported By An ILC.
FAR 28.203-2 provides that “[t]he Government will accept . . . . irrevocable letter of credit [ILCs] issued by a federally insured financial institution in the name of the contracting agency and which identify the agency and solicitation or contract number for which the ILC is provided.” 48 C.F.R. § 28.203(a), (b)(5).
In this case, the ITR was issued in the name of the contracting agency and identified the Solicitation No. VA-786A-14-R-0047. AR 168, 193. But, FMB is not a FDIC insured financial institution.20 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., INDUSTRY DIRECTORY, available at https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (finding no results when searching for “First Mountain Bancorp,” only one different bank when searching for “First Mountain,” and no results when searching “First Standard”); see also 31 C.F.R. § 208.2(j) (defining insured financial institution as “any financial institution, the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation[.]; AR 168, 193 (there was no “FDIC Insured” seal on FMB’s letterhead). Because the ITR was not “issued by a federally insured financial institution,” the ITR is not an ILC. 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(b)(5).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s bond was not properly supported by an ILC.
ii. Whether Anthem Builders, Inc.’s Bond Properly Was Supported By Cash Or Cash Equivalents.
FAR 28.203-2 provides that “[t]he Government will accept . . . . [c]ash, or certificates of deposit, or other cash equivalents with a federally insured financial institution.” 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(a), (b)(5); see also 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-15(d) (stating that the bonds may be “in the form of firm commitment, supported by corporate sureties whose names appear on the list contained in Treasury Department Circular 570, individual sureties, or by other acceptable security such as postal money order, certified check, cashier’s check, [ILC], or, in accordance with Treasury Department regulations, certain bonds or notes of the United States”); 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-11(b) (“Pledges of assets from each person acting as an individual surety shall be in the form of—(1) Evidence of an escrow account containing cash, certificates of deposit, commercial or Governmental securities, or other assets described in FAR 28.203-2[.]”).
In this case, the parties dispute whether the ITR must be issued by a “federally insured financial institution,” or whether the certificates of deposit issued by HSBC and held in escrow at Northern Trust Bank—both of which are “federally insured financial institution[s]”—are sufficient. Compare Pl. Resp. at 10 (stating that the Government “appears to ignore that the Affidavit of Individual Surety . . . states specifically that the [certificates of deposit] are being held i[n] an escrow account at Northern Trust Bank, which is a federally insured financial institution”) (citing AR 208)) with Gov’t Reply at 6 (arguing that the ITR is an asset, not the certificates of deposit).
FAR 28.203-2 does not clearly resolve this issue. Compare 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(a) (requiring that the cash, readily marketable, assets, or ILCs be “from a federally insured financial institution”) (emphasis added) with 48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(b)(1) (stating that “[c]ash, or certificates of deposit, or other cash equivalents with a federally insured financial institution” are acceptable assets) (emphasis added).23 Moreover, FAR 52.228-11(b) requires only “evidence of an escrow account containing cash, certificates of deposit, commercial or Governmental securities, or other assets described in FAR 28.203-2[.]” 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-11(b)(1) (emphasis added). In this case, Plaintiff has shown “evidence of an account containing . . . certificates of deposit” (48 C.F.R. § 28.203(b)(1)) that are “with a federally insured financial institution” (48 C.F.R. § 28.203-2(b)(1)); AR 138 (stating that the ITR was issued “from First Mountain Bancorp [(“FMB”)] trust secured with cash valued assets, including over $30 million in HSBC Bank as issued [certificates of deposit] held in escrow account by FMB at Northern Trust Bank in USA”).
The plain language of the relevant SBA regulation states that the SBA is not liable if a prior approval surety agrees to or acquiesces in a material alteration to the bond amount without first obtaining written SBA approval. Such is the situation here; ACIC agreed to increase the bond amount before SBA approval. To shield itself from the consequences that flow from its failure to comply with the SBA regulation, ACIC asks the court to read requirements into the pertinent regulation regarding enforceability. For instance, ACIC argues that the original surety rider was never delivered to either obligee, and as a result, it was not effective until after SBA approval. In a similar vein, ACIC claims that because the original power of attorney remains in its files, ACIC could not have agreed to a material alteration to the bond amount before SBA approval. As discussed below, the court does not find ACIC’s arguments persuasive.
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 694b(a), the SBA can enter into bond guarantee agreements with sureties “against loss resulting from a breach of the terms of a bid bond, payment bond, performance bond, or bonds ancillary thereto, by a principal on any total work order or contract amount at the time of bond execution that does not exceed $2,000,000.”8 Section 694b(e) further states that the SBA “shall reimburse the surety,” except that the SBA shall be relieved of all liability if, for instance, “the total contract amount at the time of execution of the bond or bonds exceeds $2,000,000,” or “the surety has breached a material term or condition of such guarantee agreement.” 15 U.S.C. § 694b(e)(2)-(3) (2000).
(2) In the case of a Prior Approval Surety, acquiescing in any alteration to the bond which would increase the bond amount by at least 25% or $50,000.
As stated above, ACIC was a prior approval surety and the increase in the bond amount ($240,000) is greater than the $50,000 minimum stated in the regulation. Thus, there is no dispute that 13 C.F.R. § 115.19(e) applies. The question, rather, is whether ACIC agreed or acquiesced to this alteration before it received written approval from the SBA on June 2, 2004.
The record before the court reflects that ACIC agreed to a material alteration of the bonds before the SBA provided written approval on June 2, 2004. Based on the plain language of the regulation, 13 C.F.R. § 115.19(e), if the surety agrees or acquiesces to an increase without prior approval, then the SBA is relieved of liability. See Am. Contractors, 570 F.3d at 1376.
When Mr. Behlar, an employee of Omni Bank, learned about the increase to the contract amount, he requested an increase to the bond amount. Even if Mr. Behlar was mistaken that a surety rider was needed because Mr. Ho was paying for the increase with his own funds, rather than requesting that the bank finance that amount, as ACIC argues, the record establishes that Omni Bank nonetheless requested a rider. ACIC collected a fee from Mr. Ho of $6,720 to cover the increase in the premium, and Mr. Zwart executed the surety rider on March 31, 2003, which states in pertinent part that “[f]or valuable consideration, receipt of which is acknowledged,” the “surety hereby gives its consent to change the contract/bond amount” in light of the approved change order of $240,000. App. 38. Clearly, by function of that payment and execution of that document, Mr. Ho, Omni Bank, and ACIC agreed to an increase in the amount of the bonds. The surety rider, which was executed in exchange for the fee, serves as an unambiguous expression of an agreement by ACIC to an increase in the bond amount. Therefore, ACIC agreed or acquiesced to an increase at the time Mr. Zwart acknowledged receipt of valuable consideration (the $6,720 check from Mr. Ho) in exchange for increasing the amount of the bonds (by $240,000)—all of which occurred in or around March 2003, well before the SBA’s written approval on June 2, 2004.
ACIC makes various arguments to escape the plain language of the regulation. One, it asserts that the court should first consider what effect a change to a construction contract has on a surety bond and conclude that a change to the construction contract does not automatically change the amount of the bond. The court agrees that an increase to the contract amount did not automatically result in an increase to the bond amount. However, this inquiry is irrelevant to the question before the court. The issue before the court, rather, is when ACIC agreed to or acquiesced in a material alteration to the bond amount.
Next, ACIC asserts that it could only have agreed to or acquiesced in a material alteration to the bond if a current, sufficient power of attorney establishing Mr. Zwart’s authority to issue an enforceable bond in the amount sought was presented simultaneously with the original surety rider. Specifically, it argues that it could not have agreed to the material alteration before SBA approval because 1) no valid power of attorney existed until May 25, 2004, and 2) no original surety rider was delivered to any of the obligees before SBA approval. ACIC claims that enforceability is the measure for agreement or acquiescence because any other interpretation of the regulation would mean that “where the surety creates the paperwork that would document a change in the bond amount in order to satisfy SBA requirements that such paperwork be submitted prior to the SBA issuing its approval, an argument could be made that the surety had ‘agreed’ to the change in the bond before the SBA approved it!” Resp. 12. However, the mere fact that ACIC began paperwork attendant to effecting a bond amount increase does not establish that it agreed to or acquiesced in the material alteration; rather, it is ACIC’s additional actions that reflect that it agreed to the material alteration before the SBA provided written approval, as discussed above.
ACIC argues that in order for a bond to be enforceable, such that the SBA’s guarantee would attach, a current power of attorney with a sufficient limit had to be presented to show that the person signing the bond had the authority to do so. Here, however, ACIC asserts that Mr. Zwart had no written authority to issue the surety rider before May 25, 2004, and as a result, ACIC could not have agreed or acquiesced before this date.
There are several flaws with ACIC’s argument. First, the SBA regulation, 13 C.F.R. § 115.19(e), allows the SBA to disclaim liability as soon as ACIC agrees or acquiesces to a material increase if the SBA has not provided prior written approval. It does not require the SBA to first ascertain whether Mr. Zwart had the authority to bind ACIC. Moreover, when Mr. Zwart possessed a valid power of attorney does not address the issue of when ACIC agreed or acquiesced to the increase in the bond amount. Finally, even if ACIC’s assertion that a valid power of attorney had to exist before ACIC could be deemed to have agreed or acquiesced to the increase, Mr. Zwart’s power of attorney was valid beginning on May 25, 2004, days before the SBA provided written approval. Thus, even under ACIC’s theory, ACIC cannot demonstrate that it did not agree or acquiesce before SBA’s June 2, 2004 approval.
Additionally, even if ACIC’s argument that it could not have acquiesced or agreed to the increase until Mr. Zwart possessed a valid power of attorney for the full amount of the bond (May 25, 2004), ACIC has not clearly established that this power of attorney is conclusively linked to the rider for the bonds. At his deposition in March 2011, Mr. Zwart could not remember much about the surety rider, such as when he signed it, could not remember if he saw the check from Mr. Ho for the premium, and could not remember the SBA procedures for obtaining approval regarding an increase to the bonds. App. 92-95. But in his affidavit almost a year later in April 2012, Mr. Zwart recalled the SBA procedures that he followed in order to obtain SBA approval for the increase to the bond amount and stated that at all times, he coordinated with and followed the directions of the ACIC home office and the SBA as to how to proceed Resp., Ex. 2, ¶¶ 8-14. Mr. Zwart also stated in his affidavit that he did not “prior to obtaining the approval of the SBA to the increase, deliver the original ‘Rider’ to anyone or otherwise communicate to anyone that the ‘Rider’ had been issued, nor did [he] affix a power-of-attorney form to the ‘Rider’ prior to SBA approval . . . .” Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Zwart further stated that the SBA reminded him that they needed a written power of attorney showing that he had the authority to issue bonds for which an SBA guarantee was to be provided and that there was not a power of attorney on file with the SBA showing that he had sufficient authority to issue a bond in the amount that the DiGiovanni bonds would be after they were increased. Id. ¶ 12. Notably, Mr. Zwart stated that while he had both telephonic and written (in electronic mail and letter format) communications with the SBA between March 2003 and May 2004, the record does not contain any such communications, much less communications from the SBA directing Mr. Zwart to take certain actions in order to get SBA approval for the increase.
In his deposition on April 7, 2011, Mr. Lanak stated that he did not know why there was a March 24, 2003 surety rider that was apparently attached to a May 25, 2004 power of attorney or why those two documents should be linked together. App. 101. Mr. Lanak, however, stated in a January 20, 2012 affidavit that the May 25, 2004 Zwart power of attorney was “prepared for the issuance of the rider on the DiGiovanni bond.” Mot., Ex. 1, ¶ 8. He also stated that the original power of attorney was contained in the file, so it was never delivered to or provided to either obligee (Mr. Ho or Omni Bank). Id. ¶ 9.
Defendant asserts that the sham affidavit rule applies here. The court agrees. Under this rule, an affidavit may be disregarded as a sham “‘when a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . [and that party attempts] thereafter [to] create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony.’” Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting T. Junkins & Assocs. v. U.S. Indus., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1984)). “If a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.” Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2nd Cir. 1969); see also Abbey v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 430, 457 (2011) (“Under the sham affidavit doctrine, a party cannot create an issue of fact by supplying an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony, without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). As such, Mr. Lanak’s statement in his affidavit, which directly contradicts his previously given clear answer to an unambiguous question, is stricken under the sham affidavit doctrine.
Moreover, Mr. Zwart held himself out as ACIC’s attorney-in-fact throughout the time that the bonds at issue were active, and as a result, Mr. Behlar reasonably relied upon Mr. Zwart’s authority, either actual or apparent. Apparent authority is the “power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (2006). Apparent authority “is created by a person’s manifestation that another has authority to act with legal consequences for the person who makes the manifestation, when a third party reasonably believes the actor to be authorized and the belief is traceable to the manifestation.” Id. § 3.303. Here, Mr. Zwart signed the surety rider sometime in March 2003, acting as ACIC’s attorney-in-fact; thus, Mr. Behlar reasonably relied upon Mr. Zwart’s apparent authority.
In support of its argument that the court must look to the enforceability of the bond increase in determining when ACIC agreed to that increase, ACIC makes two arguments regarding the surety rider. One, ACIC claims that the bank did not need the surety rider because Mr. Ho was financing the $240,000 increase from his own finances, rather than requesting that the bank finance the increase. Next, ACIC asserts that because the original surety rider was not delivered to anyone before SBA approval, ACIC could not have agreed to the increase in the bond amount.
First, ACIC argues that Mr. Behlar mistakenly believed that Omni Bank required the surety rider. Mr. Behlar states that he communicated with Messrs. Ho and Zwart and required that the bond amount be increased and requested documentation of that increase. App. 23, ¶ 8. He states that before the April 9, 2003 draw on the loan, Omni Bank received the surety rider. Id. at 23, ¶ 9. ACIC disputes this testimony. Specifically, it argues that even if Mr. Behlar’s affidavit is taken as true and accurate and that the surety rider became enforceable upon receipt by Mr. Behlar, ACIC nonetheless prevails because 1) Omni Bank did not require a rider since Mr. Ho was paying for the increase using his own finances; and 2) Mr. Zwart did not have the power of attorney to bind ACIC at the time that Mr. Behlar purportedly received the surety rider. However, regardless of whether Mr. Behlar was mistaken about the bank’s position, Mr. Behlar did disburse payment upon receiving the surety rider. Id. Moreover, as explained above, the fact that Mr. Zwart may not have had a valid power of attorney was irrelevant from the bank’s perspective since Mr. Zwart acted in response to Mr. Behlar’s request for the rider.
ACIC further argues that even if Mr. Behlar’s affidavit is taken as true and accurate, it still prevails because while Mr. Zwart prepared the surety rider to effectuate the increase, he did not deliver the rider to anyone or tell anyone that the rider had been issued, nor did he affix the power of attorney to the rider because he knew that the rider could not be issued before SBA approval. ACIC attempts to distance itself from its employee’s actions, arguing that any act that Mr. Zwart may have taken earlier than May 25, 2004, to change the obligation of ACIC by issuing the rider was ineffective and could not constitute acquiescence or agreement on behalf of ACIC to be bound by the rider. Thus, ACIC asserts that even if Mr. Zwart delivered the rider to Omni Bank in March 2003 changing the amount to $2,021,850, he had no valid power of attorney to execute the rider and thereby bind ACIC. However, the record establishes that Omni Bank had a copy of the surety rider, and according to Mr. Behlar, ACIC delivered the rider to Omni Bank. Mr. Ho also confirms that the surety rider was delivered to Omni Bank before April 9, 2003.
Nonetheless, even if the rider was not delivered, this is not material because Omni Bank acted on the agreement it had reached with ACIC by releasing a payment based upon that increase in the bond amount. Mr. Behlar states that before April 9, 2003, Omni Bank received the surety rider, which reflected that there had been a $240,000 increase in the bond amount. App. 23; Mot., Ex. 4. On April 9, 2003, Mr. Behlar approved the first draw upon the loan proceeds. App. 22. He stated that he would not have allowed the draw unless he had proof that the amount of the bonds had been increased. Id. at 23.
(b) Where individual sureties are involved, a completed Affidavit of Individual Surety (Standard Form 28), for each individual surety, shall accompany the bond. The Government may require the surety to furnish additional substantiating information concerning its financial capability.
AR at 35. Therefore, in accordance with the IFB provisions, individual sureties providing a bid bond were required to complete both the SF 24 and SF 28.
The SF 28, Affidavit of the Individual Surety, is a one-page form that generally required the individual surety to describe the assets that were being pledged in support of the bid bond. AR at 229. Blocks 1-6 of the form required personal contact information and employer information. Id. In block 7(a) of the SF 28, the individual surety was required to give a full representation of the pledged assets. The individual surety had to disclose the encumbrances, liens or judgments attached to the pledged assets. Id. Block 7(b) required the individual surety to “describe the assets, the details of the escrow account, and to attach certified evidence thereof.” Id. Block 8 required the individual surety to identify mortgages, liens, judgment, and other encumbrances on the pledged asset. Id. Block 9 stated that the surety must identify all bonds for which the subject assets had been pledged within the past three years. Finally, blocks 10, 11 and 12 were set aside for signatures and execution by a notary public. Id.
The SF 28 was required to be accompanied by a Certificate of Pledged Assets. AR at 232. The Certificate of Pledged Assets certified that the individual surety (1) has good title of the pledged assets, (2) has pledged assets free from liens and encumbrances, (3) will not assign or sell any rights of the pledged assets to another party, and (4) has provided that the government has been given a secured interest in the assets pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Id.
On January 10, 2008, the agency opened bids. The agency received three bids: GEC Inc., with a total bid price of $7,950,000; Island Roads Corporation (IRC) with a total bid price of $6,929,380; and Tip Top with a total bid price of $6,482,505. AR at 218. Tip Top was the lowest bidder, being $1.4 million dollars lower than IRC’s bid. Tip Top also estimated that it would take 300 calendar days to complete construction of the five-leg roundabout and other miscellaneous work, as opposed to the 675 calendar days proposed by IRC. Id.
The Pledgee [FHWA] understands acknowledges that fulfillment of this pledge is subject to a valid and final determination that the Principal [Tip Top] cannot or will not accept the contract for performance of the project for which its bid or proposal has been submitted and the failure of the individual surety to otherwise fulfill the obligations of the bid bond. Upon default of payment by the individual surety named above on the bid bond identified above, or breach of this pledge agreement, the Pledgee/Obligee or holder shall have full rights to foreclose on the above-described assets and exercise its rights as a secured party pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
We have reviewed the Bid Bond submitted with your Bid in response to the subject Invitation for Bid and find it to be inadequate. It does not meet the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) for an individual surety at Section 28.203. Individual Surety Bonds must be supported by acceptable assets, as listed in the FAR. Acceptable assets include cash, United States Government securities, stocks and bonds that are actively traded, real property owned in fee simple, and irrevocable letters of credit. Speculative assets-which would include marketable coal-are specifically excluded by Subsection 28.203- 2(c)(7).
Your bid is hereby rejected in accordance with FAR Section 14.404-2(i), failure to furnish a bid guarantee in accordance with the requirements of the invitation for bids.
Id. In short, Tip Top was eliminated from the competition because the agency did not consider “marketable coal” as an acceptable asset for a bid bond. In the agency’s view, marketable or mined coal was a “speculative asset” excluded by section 28.203-2(c)(7) of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
In this case, the CO rejected Tip Top’s coal asset on two grounds: (1) that the asset “does not meet the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) for an Individual Surety at Section 28.203. . . . Acceptable assets include cash, United States Government securities, stocks and bonds that are actively traded, real property owned in fee simple, and irrevocable letters of credit” and, (2) that the coal asset is a “speculative asset,” which is specifically excluded by Subsection 28.203-2(c)(7).” AR at 233. Plaintiff contends that the CO’s determination that the pledged coal was an unacceptable asset was arbitrary and unreasonable because the CO did not give Tip Top an opportunity, as the lowest bidder, to resolve concerns that FHWA had about the coal asset and/or to allow substitution of the asset under FAR 28.203-4. Pl.’s Mot. at 2. Tip Top further contends that but for the CO’s violation of the FAR regulations, Tip Top would have won the contract as the low, responsive, responsible, bidder. Id.
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
It is the agency’s decision, not the decision of the GAO that is subject to judicial review. Chas. H. Tompkins Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 716 (1999). Although the GAO upheld the agency’s decision on grounds not asserted by the contracting officer (“CO”), this Court lacks authority to uphold an agency action on grounds not considered by the agency. OMV Medical Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
While we have recognized a power of attorney bearing mechanically applied signatures as valid and binding where there is evidence demonstrating that the surety intends to be bound by such signatures, [see Fiore, B-256429, 94-1 CPD ¶ 379, at 2-3, 1994 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 553, at *4], we conclude that, for a mechanically applied signature to be recognized as valid and binding, it must be affixed to the power of attorney after the power of attorney has been generated. Where, as here, signatures are generated as part of a document, as opposed to being affixed to the document after its generation, they do not constitute an affirmation as to the correctness of its contents and thus do not serve to validate the document. In the absence of a validating signature, there is no way to be certain at the time of bid opening that the file from which a computer printer-generated power of attorney/certification was created has not been altered, just as there is no way to be certain that the original from which a faxed or photocopied power of attorney/certification was created has not been altered.

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