Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/486/592/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 11:53:22+00:00

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Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) authorizes the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "in his discretion," to terminate the employment of any CIA employee "whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States." After respondent, a covert electronics technician in the CIA's employ, voluntarily informed the agency that he was a homosexual, he was discharged by the Director (petitioner's predecessor) under § 102(c). Respondent filed suit against petitioner in Federal District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), of his rights to property, liberty, and privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, and of his rights to procedural due process and equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment. After the court granted respondent's motion for partial summary judgment on his APA claim, declining to address his constitutional claims, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded. The court agreed with the District Court that judicial review under the APA of petitioner's termination decisions made under § 102(c) of the NSA was not precluded by the provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a), which renders that Act inapplicable whenever "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." However, the court held that the District Court had erred in its ruling on the merits.
discretion by law" is also strongly suggested by the overall structure of the NSA, which vests in the Director very broad authority to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Section 102(c) is an integral part of that structure, because the CIA's efficacy, and the Nation's security, depend in large measure on the reliability and trustworthiness of CIA employees. Pp. 486 U. S. 599-601.
2. District Court review of respondent's constitutional claims is not precluded by § 102(c) of the NSA. Petitioner's view that all CIA employment termination decisions, even those based on policies normally repugnant to the Constitution, are given over to the Director's absolute discretion, is not supported by the required heightened showing of clear congressional intent. Although § 102(c) does commit termination decisions to the Director's discretion, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1) and (a)(2) remove from judicial review only those determinations specifically identified by Congress or "committed to agency discretion by law." Nothing in § 102(c) demonstrates that Congress meant to preclude consideration of colorable constitutional claims arising out of the Director's actions pursuant to that section. Petitioner's contention that judicial review of constitutional claims will entail extensive "rummaging around" in the CIA's affairs to the detriment of national security is not persuasive, since claims attacking the CIA's employment policies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are routinely entertained in federal court, and the District Court has the latitude to control any discovery process in order to balance respondent's need for access to proof against the CIA's extraordinary need for confidentiality. Petitioner's contention that Congress, in the interest of national security, may deny the courts authority to decide respondent's colorable constitutional claims arising out of his discharge and to order his reinstatement if the claims are upheld is also without merit, since Congress did not mean to impose such restrictions when it enacted § 102(c). Even without such prohibitory legislation, traditional equitable principles requiring the balancing of public and private interests control the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief, and, on remand, the District Court should thus address respondent's constitutional claims and the propriety of the equitable remedies sought. Pp. 486 U. S. 601-605.
254 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 796 F.2d 1508, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 486 U. S. 606. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
"[T]he Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. . . ."
50 U.S.C. § 403(c). In this case we decide whether, and to what extent, the termination decisions of the Director under § 102(c) are judicially reviewable.
Respondent John Doe was first employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency) in 1973 as a clerk typist. He received periodic fitness reports that consistently rated him as an excellent or outstanding employee. By 1977, respondent had been promoted to a position as a covert electronics technician.
In January, 1982, respondent voluntarily informed a CIA security officer that he was a homosexual. Almost immediately, the Agency placed respondent on paid administrative leave pending an investigation of his sexual orientation and conduct. On February 12 and again on February 17, respondent was extensively questioned by a polygraph officer concerning his homosexuality and possible security violations. Respondent denied having sexual relations with any foreign nationals, and maintained that he had not disclosed classified information to any of his sexual partners. After these interviews, the officer told respondent that the polygraph tests indicated that he had truthfully answered all questions. The polygraph officer then prepared a five-page summary of his interviews with respondent, to which respondent was allowed to attach a two-page addendum.
"deemed it necessary and advisable in the interests of the United States to terminate [respondent's] employment with this Agency pursuant to section 102(c) of the National Security Act. . . . [Footnote 1] Respondent was also advised that, while the CIA would give him a positive recommendation in any future job search, if he applied for a job requiring a security clearance, the Agency would inform the prospective employer that it had concluded that respondent's homosexuality presented a security threat."
Respondent then filed an action against petitioner in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
of the reasons for any adverse final determination. Respondent sought no monetary damages in his amended complaint.
"person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute."
"[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party."
leave status, and the Agency was instructed to reconsider his case using procedures that would supply him with the reasons supporting any termination decision and provide him with an opportunity to respond.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals first decided that judicial review under the APA of the Agency's decision to terminate respondent was not precluded by §§ 701(a)(1) or (a)(2). Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals found that, while an agency must normally follow its own regulations, the CIA regulations cited by respondent do not limit the Director's discretion in making termination decisions. Moreover, the regulations themselves state that, with respect to terminations pursuant to § 102(c), the Director need not follow standard discharge procedures, but may direct that an employee "be separated immediately and without regard to any suggested procedural steps." [Footnote 4] The majority thus concluded that the CIA regulations provide no independent source of procedural or substantive protection.
whether the Director's decision to discharge a CIA employee under § 102(c) of the NSA is judicially reviewable under the APA.
The APA's comprehensive provisions, set forth in 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), allow any person "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency action to obtain judicial review thereof, so long as the decision challenged represents a "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." Typically, a litigant will contest an action (or failure to act) by an agency on the ground that the agency has neglected to follow the statutory directives of Congress. Section 701(a), however, limits application of the entire APA to situations in which judicial review is not precluded by statute, see § 701(a)(1), and the agency action is not committed to agency discretion by law, see § 701(a)(2).
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971), this Court explained the distinction between §§ 701(a)(1) and (a)(2). Subsection (a)(1) is concerned with whether Congress expressed an intent to prohibit judicial review; subsection (a)(2) applies "in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'" 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 410 (citing S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)).
"review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion."
470 U.S. at 470 U. S. 830. Since the statute conferring power on the Food and Drug Administration to prohibit the unlawful misbranding or misuse of drugs provided no substantive standards on which a court could base its review, we found that enforcement actions were committed to the complete discretion of the FDA to decide when and how they should be pursued.
Both Overton Park and Heckler emphasized that § 701 (a)(2) requires careful examination of the statute on which the claim of agency illegality is based (the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 in Overton Park and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in Heckler). In the present case, respondent's claims against the CIA arise from the Director's asserted violation of § 102(c) of the NSA. As an initial matter, it should be noted that § 102(c) allows termination of an Agency employee whenever the Director "shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States" (emphasis added), not simply when the dismissal is necessary or advisable to those interests. This standard fairly exudes deference to the Director, and appears to us to foreclose the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review. Short of permitting cross-examination of the Director concerning his views of the Nation's security and whether the discharged employee was inimical to those interests, we see no basis on which a reviewing court could properly assess an Agency termination decision. The language of § 102(c) thus strongly suggests that its implementation was "committed to agency discretion by law."
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1947). Section 102(c) is an integral part of that statute, because the Agency's efficacy, and the Nation's security, depend in large measure on the reliability and trustworthiness of the Agency's employees. As we recognized in Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 444 U. S. 510 (1980), employment with the CIA entails a high degree of trust that is perhaps unmatched in Government service.
"[t]he plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as the legislative history of the National Security Act, . . . indicates that Congress vested in the Director of Central Intelligence very broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure."
Id. at 471 U. S. 168-169. Section 102(c), that portion of the NSA under consideration in the present case, is part and parcel of the entire Act, and likewise exhibits the Act's extraordinary deference to the Director in his decision to terminate individual employees.
We thus find that the language and structure of § 102(c) indicate that Congress meant to commit individual employee discharges to the Director's discretion, and that § 701(a)(2) accordingly precludes judicial review of these decisions under the APA. We reverse the Court of Appeals to the extent that it found such terminations reviewable by the courts.
We share the confusion of the Court of Appeals as to the precise nature of respondent's constitutional claims. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain from the amended complaint whether respondent contends that his termination, based on his homosexuality, is constitutionally impermissible, or whether he asserts that a more pervasive discrimination policy exists in the CIA's employment practices regarding all homosexuals. This ambiguity in the amended complaint is no doubt attributable in part to the inconsistent explanations respondent received from the Agency itself regarding his termination. Prior to his discharge, respondent had been told by two CIA security officers that his homosexual activities themselves violated CIA regulations. In contrast, the Deputy General Counsel of the CIA later informed respondent that homosexuality was merely a security concern that did not inevitably result in termination, but instead was evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Petitioner maintains that, no matter what the nature of respondent's constitutional claim, judicial review is precluded by the language and intent of § 102(c). In petitioner's view, all Agency employment termination decisions, even those based on policies normally repugnant to the Constitution, are given over to the absolute discretion of the Director, and are hence unreviewable under the APA. We do not think § 102(c) may be read to exclude review of constitutional claims. We emphasized in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974), that, where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, its intent to do so must be clear. Id. at 415 U. S. 373-374. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), we reaffirmed that view. We require this heightened showing in part to avoid the "serious constitutional question" that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 476 U. S. 681, n. 12 (1986).
the District Court. [Footnote 8] We agree with the Court of Appeals that there must be further proceedings in the District Court on this issue.
Petitioner complains that judicial review even of constitutional claims will entail extensive "rummaging around" in the Agency's affairs to the detriment of national security. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-13. But petitioner acknowledges that Title VII claims attacking the hiring and promotion policies of the Agency are routinely entertained in federal court, see Reply Brief for Petitioner 13-14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, and the inquiry and discovery associated with those proceedings would seem to involve some of the same sort of rummaging. Furthermore, the District Court has the latitude to control any discovery process which may be instituted so as to balance respondent's need for access to proof which would support a colorable constitutional claim against the extraordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality and the protection of its methods, sources, and mission. See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U. S. 394, 426 U. S. 405 (1976); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953).
or injunctive relief in the federal courts. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305 (1982); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 321 U. S. 329-330 (1944). On remand, the District Court should thus address respondent's constitutional claims and the propriety of the equitable remedies sought.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
See May 11, 1982, Letter from Deputy General Counsel of CIA to respondent's counsel, App. 37.
See Amended Complaint, id. at 5, 12-13.
"To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall -- "
"(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and"
"(D) without observance of procedure required by law."
Doe v. Casey, 254 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 293, and n. 41, 796 F.2d 1508, 1519, and n. 41 (1986) (citing CIA Regulation HR 20-27m).
This "arbitrary and capricious" standard is derived from § 706(2)(A), see n 3, supra.
The dissenting judge argued that Congress intended to preclude such review in creating § 102(c), and that the decision to discharge an employee was committed by that section to Agency discretion. He concluded that neither the statutory nor constitutional claims arising from a § 102(c) discharge are judicially reviewable under the APA.
We understand that petitioner concedes that the Agency's failure to follow its own regulations can be challenged under the APA as a violation of § 102(c). See Reply Brief for Appellant in No. 85-5291 (CADC), p. 18 (Doe v. Casey, 254 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 796 F.2d 1508 (1986)); see also Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363 (1957) (recognizing the right of federal courts to review an agency's actions to ensure that its own regulations have been followed); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 415 U. S. 71 (1974) (stating that "federal courts do have authority to review the claim of a discharged governmental employee that the agency effectuating the discharge has not followed administrative regulations"). The Court of Appeals, however, found that the CIA's own regulations plainly protect the discretion granted the Director by § 102(c), and that the regulations "provid[e] no independent source of procedural or substantive protections." Doe v. Casey, supra, at 294, 796 F.2d at 1520. Thus, since petitioner prevailed on this ground below and does not seek further review of the question here, we do not reach that issue.
Petitioner asserts, see Brief for Petitioner 27-28, n. 23, that respondent fails to present a colorable constitutional claim when he asserts that there is a general CIA policy against employing homosexuals. Petitioner relies on our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), to support this view. This question was not presented in the petition for certiorari, and we decline to consider it at this stage of the litigation.
I agree that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not authorize judicial review of the employment decisions referred to in § 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947. Because § 102(c) does not provide a meaningful standard for judicial review, such decisions are clearly "committed to agency discretion by law" within the meaning of the provision of the APA set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). I do not understand the Court to say that the exception in § 701(a)(2) is necessarily or fully defined by reference to statutes "drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 401 U. S. 410 (1971), quoted ante at 599. Accordingly, I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 299 U. S. 320 (1936). The authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to control access to sensitive national security information by discharging employees deemed to be untrustworthy flows primarily from this constitutional power of the President, and Congress may surely provide that the inferior federal courts are not used to infringe on the President's constitutional authority. See, e.g., Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 484 U. S. 526-530 (1988); Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105 (1876). Section 102(c) plainly indicates that Congress has done exactly that, and the Court points to nothing in the structure, purpose, or legislative history of the National Security Act that would suggest a different conclusion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to allow this lawsuit to go forward.
I agree with the Court's apparent holding in Part II of its opinion, ante at 486 U. S. 600 and 486 U. S. 601, that the Director's decision to terminate a CIA employee is "committed to agency discretion by law" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). But because I do not see how a decision can, either practically or legally, be both unreviewable and yet reviewable for constitutional defect, I regard Part 486 U. S. S. 599|>Part II. I therefore respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court.
by law." * The Court's discussion, ante at 486 U. S. 599-600, suggests that the Court of Appeals below was correct in holding that this provision is triggered only when there is "no law to apply." See Doe v. Casey, 254 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 291-293, 796 F.2d. 1508, 1517-1519 (1986). But see id. at 305-307, 796 F.2d at 1531-1533 (Buckley, J., dissenting). Our precedents amply show that "commit[ment] to agency discretion by law" includes, but is not limited to, situations in which there is "no law to apply."
"[t]he legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that [§ 701(a)(2)] is applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that, in a given case, there is no law to apply.' S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945),"
"The basic exception of matters committed to agency discretion would apply even if not stated at the outset [of the judicial review Chapter]. If, for example, statutes are drawn in such broad terms that, in a given case, there is no law to apply, courts of course have no statutory question to review."
S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945) (emphasis added).
The "no law to apply" test can account for the nonreviewability of certain issues, but falls far short of explaining the full scope of the areas from which the courts are excluded. For the fact is that there is no governmental decision that is not subject to a fair number of legal constraints precise enough to be susceptible of judicial application -- beginning with the fundamental constraint that the decision must be taken in order to further a public purpose, rather than a purely private interest; yet there are many governmental decisions that are not at all subject to judicial review. A United States Attorney's decision to prosecute, for example, will not be reviewed on the claim that it was prompted by personal animosity. Thus, "no law to apply" provides much less than the full answer to whether § 701(a)(2) applies.
"[w]here the head of a department acts in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive will; it is again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation."
the seeming contradiction between § 701(a)(2)'s disallowance of review to the extent that action is "committed to agency discretion," and § 706's injunction that a court shall set aside agency action that constitutes "an abuse of discretion." Since, in the former provision, "committed to agency discretion by law" means "of the sort that is traditionally unreviewable," it operates to keep certain categories of agency action out of the courts; but when agency action is appropriately in the courts, abuse of discretion is of course grounds for reversal.
All this law, shaped over the course of centuries and still developing in its application to new contexts, cannot possibly be contained within the phrase "no law to apply." It is not surprising, then, that although the Court recites the test, it does not really apply it. Like other opinions relying upon it, this one essentially announces the test, declares victory, and moves on. It is not really true "that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion,'" ante at 486 U. S. 600, quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 470 U. S. 830. The standard set forth in § 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c), "necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States," at least excludes dismissal out of personal vindictiveness, or because the Director wants to give the job to his cousin. Why, on the Court's theory, is respondent not entitled to assert the presence of such excesses, under the "abuse of discretion" standard of § 706?
(though, as will soon appear, that holding seems to be undone by its holding in Part III), but on different reasoning.
"[a] 'serious constitutional question' . . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim."
Ante at 486 U. S. 603, quoting from Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 476 U. S. 681, n. 12 (1986).
The first response to the Court's grave doubt about the constitutionality of denying all judicial review to a "colorable constitutional claim" is that the denial of all judicial review is not at issue here, but merely the denial of review in United States district courts. As to that, the law is, and has long been, clear. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the judicial power to "all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution." But Article III, § 1, provides that the judicial power shall be vested "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" (emphasis added). We long ago held that the power not to create any lower federal courts at all includes the power to invest them with less than all of the judicial power.
"The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United States, but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised by the Circuit Court; consequently, the statute which does prescribe the limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be in conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers powers not enumerated therein."
is, at most, that they cannot be eliminated from state courts, and from this Court's appellate jurisdiction over cases from state courts (or eases from federal courts, should there be any) involving such claims. Narrowly viewed, therefore, there is no shadow of a constitutional doubt that we are free to hold that the present suit, whether based on constitutional grounds or not, will not lie.
"political questions." See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 307 U. S. 443-446 (1939); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U. S. 74, 281 U. S. 79-80 (1930). The doctrine of sovereign immunity -- not repealed by the Constitution, but to the contrary at least partly reaffirmed as to the States by the Eleventh Amendment -- is a monument to the principle that some constitutional claims can go unheard. No one would suggest that, if Congress had not passed the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), the courts would be able to order disbursements from the Treasury to pay for property taken under lawful authority (and subsequently destroyed) without just compensation. See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, 155 U. S. 166-169 (1894). And finally, the doctrine of equitable discretion, which permits a court to refuse relief, even where no relief at law is available, when that would unduly impair the public interest, does not stand aside simply because the basis for the relief is a constitutional claim. In sum, it is simply untenable that there must be a judicial remedy for every constitutional violation. Members of Congress and the supervising officers of the Executive Branch take the same oath to uphold the Constitution that we do, and sometimes they are left to perform that oath unreviewed, as we always are.
reason he lost his Government job was that the President did not like his religious views -- surely a colorable violation of the First Amendment. I am confident we would hold that the President's choice of his Secretary of State is a "political question." But what about a similar suit by the Deputy Secretary of State? Or one of the Under Secretaries? Or an Assistant Secretary? Or the head of the European Desk? Is there really a constitutional line that falls at some immutable point between one and another of these offices at which the principle of unreviewability cuts in, and which cannot be altered by congressional prescription? I think not. I think Congress can prescribe, at least within broad limits, that, for certain jobs, the dismissal decision will be unreviewable -- that is, will be "committed to agency discretion by law."
"the insistence (evident from the number of Clauses devoted to the subject) with which the Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and militia upon the political branches."
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations -- a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress."
"[i]t is impossible for a government wisely to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence."
"authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will give that person access to such information flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President, and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant."
Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. at 484 U. S. 527 (emphasis added).
I think it entirely beyond doubt that, if Congress intended, by the APA in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), to exclude judicial review of the President's decision (through the Director of Central Intelligence) to dismiss an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, that disposition would be constitutionally permissible.
United States. . . ."
50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (emphasis added). Further, as the Court declares, § 102(c) is an "integral part" of the National Security Act, which throughout exhibits "extraordinary deference to the Director." Ante at 486 U. S. 601. Given this statutory text, and given (as discussed above) that the area to which the text pertains is one of predominant executive authority and of traditional judicial abstention, it is difficult to conceive of a statutory scheme that more clearly reflects that "commit[ment] to agency discretion by law" to which § 701(a)(2) refers.
"[a] discharged employee . . . cannot complain that his termination was not 'necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States,' since that assessment is the Director's alone."
"[n]othing in § 102(c) persuades us that Congress meant to preclude consideration of colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the Director pursuant to that section."
advisable in the interests of the United States to terminate your client's employment with this Agency pursuant to section 102(c),"
"[a]fter careful consideration of the matter, I determined that the termination of Mr. Doe's employment was necessary and advisable in the interests of the United States and, exercising my discretion under the authority granted by section 102(c), . . . I terminated Mr. Doe's employment."
of nonreviewability in this text, its manifestation that the action is meant to be "committed to agency discretion," is no weaker with regard to constitutional claims than nonconstitutional claims, unless one accepts the unacceptable proposition that the only basis for such committal is "no law to apply."
Perhaps, then, a constitutional right is by its nature so much more important to the claimant than a statutory right that a statute which plainly excludes the latter should not be read to exclude the former unless it says so. That principle has never been announced -- and with good reason, because its premise is not true. An individual's contention that the government has reneged upon a $100,000 debt owing under a contract is much more important to him -- both financially and, I suspect, in the sense of injustice that he feels -- than the same individual's claim that a particular federal licensing provision requiring a $100 license denies him equal protection of the laws, or that a particular state tax violates the Commerce Clause. A citizen would much rather have his statutory entitlement correctly acknowledged after a constitutionally inadequate hearing than have it incorrectly denied after a proceeding that fulfills all the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The only respect in which a constitutional claim is necessarily more significant than any other kind of claim is that, regardless of how trivial its real-life importance may be in the case at hand, it can be asserted against the action of the legislature itself, whereas a nonconstitutional claim (no matter how significant) cannot. That is an important distinction, and one relevant to the constitutional analysis that I conducted above. But it has no relevance to the question whether, as between executive violations of statute and executive violations of the Constitution -- both of which are equally unlawful, and neither of which can be said, a priori, to be more harmful or more unfair to the plaintiff -- one or the other category should be favored by a presumption against exclusion of judicial review.
irrespective of whether resort to judicial processes is necessitated by . . . allegedly unconstitutional statutory restrictions."
422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 762. In Salfi, to be sure, another statutory provision was available that would enable judicial review of the constitutional claim, but as just observed, that distinction does not justify drawing a line that has no basis in the statute. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, supra.
"petitioner acknowledges that Title VII claims attacking the hiring and promotion policies of the Agency are routinely entertained in federal court."
Ante at 486 U. S. 604, citing Reply Brief for Petitioner 13-14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. Assuming that those suits are statutorily authorized, I am willing to accept the Director's assertion that, while suits regarding hiring or promotion are tolerable, a suit regarding dismissal is not. Like the Court, I have no basis of knowledge on which I could deny that -- especially since it is obvious that, if the Director thinks that a particular hiring or promotion suit is genuinely contrary to the interests of the United States, he can simply make the hiring or grant the promotion, and then dismiss the prospective litigant under § 102(c).
case that he was dismissed because he was a homosexual, how can a court possibly resolve the dispute without knowing what other good, intelligence-related reasons there might have been? I do not see how any "latitude to control any discovery process," ante at 604, could justify the refusal to permit such an inquiry, at least in camera. Presumably the court would be expected to evaluate whether the agent really did fail in this or that secret mission. The documents needed will make interesting reading for district judges (and perhaps others) throughout the country. Of course, the Agency can seek to protect itself, ultimately, by an authorized assertion of executive privilege, United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), but that is a power to be invoked only in extremis, and any scheme of judicial review of which it is a central feature is extreme. I would, in any event, not like to be the agent who has to explain to the intelligence services of other nations, with which we sometimes cooperate, that they need have no worry that the secret information they give us will be subjected to the notoriously broad discovery powers of our courts, because, although we have to litigate the dismissal of our spies, we have available a protection of somewhat uncertain scope known as executive privilege, which the President can invoke if he is willing to take the political damage that it often entails.
Today's result, however, will have ramifications far beyond creation of the world's only secret intelligence agency that must litigate the dismissal of its agents. If constitutional claims can be raised in this highly sensitive context, it is hard to imagine where they cannot. The assumption that there are any executive decisions that cannot be hauled into the courts may no longer be valid. Also obsolete may be the assumption that we are capable of preserving a sensible common law of judicial review.
* Technically, this provision merely precludes judicial review under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), that is, under Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the United States Code. However, at least with respect to all entities that come within the Chapter's definition of "agency," see 5 U.S.C. § 701(b), if review is not available under the APA, it is not available at all. Chapter 7 (originally enacted as § 10 of the APA) is an umbrella statute governing judicial review of all federal agency action. While a right to judicial review of agency action may be created by a separate statutory or constitutional provision, once created, it becomes subject to the judicial review provisions of the APA unless specifically excluded, see 5 U.S.C. § 559. To my knowledge, no specific exclusion exists.

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 § 102
 § 701
 § 701
 v. 
 § 701
 § 102
 § 102
 § 102
 v. 
 § 102
 § 701
 § 102
 § 102
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 706
 § 102
 § 102
 § 102
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 102
 v. 
 v. 
 § 102
 § 102
 § 701
 § 701
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 701
 v. 
 § 701
 § 701
 § 706
 § 102
 § 403
 § 706
 v. 
 § 2
 § 1
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1491
 v. 
 v. 
 § 701
 § 403
 § 102
 § 701
 § 102
 v. 
 § 102
 v. 
 § 701
 § 10
 § 559