Source: http://www.testclear.com/court_cases/cases/Texas-Darrell-L-Cain,-Appellant-vs-The-State-of-Texas,-Appellee-No-52,217.aspx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 09:22:56+00:00

Document:
For Appellant: Phil Burleson; Mike Gibson - Dallas, TX.
For Appellee: Robert O. Smith, D.A. - Austin, TX.
Henry Wade, D.A. - Dallas, TX.
Appellant's grounds of error can be divided into three categories. The first category involves the exclusion of evidence, including among other things, statements by the appellant under the influence of a truth serum which presents a question of first impression in this State. The second category involves objections made to Court's charge, and the third category relates to the jury arguments of the prosecutors. We overrule all grounds of error and affirm the conviction.
It appears from the record that Dallas police officer Roy Arnold was on patrol about 2:30 a.m. on July 24, 1973, when he saw two individuals behind a Fina service station on Cedar Springs Road whom he recognized as the Rodriguez brothers. He broadcast a description and gave their home address, which he knew from past contact with the brothers.
David Rodriguez, Jr., who was 13 years old at the time, testified he arrived home after 10 p.m. on July 23, 1976, where he lived with his brother Santos and his 80 year old grandfather. He stated his grandfather was asleep in the living room and he went to bed in the bedroom, and later heard his brother come into the room and go to bed. He related that in the early morning hours they were awakened by two uniformed police officers, Arnold and the appellant, who handcuffed them behind their backs and told them they were under arrest. They were placed in a patrol car with the deceased, Santos Rodriguez, in the front with Arnold and David in the rear seat with the appellant. They were then taken to the Fina service station. Other officers were at the scene. David related Arnold asked Santos if anybody else had been with them at the station and Santos replied they had not been at the station earlier. David related the appellant Cain took out his pistol, opened the cylinder and twirled it. David could see bullets in chambers of the cylinder and saw no empty chambers. Appellant then shut the cylinder and aimed it at Santos' head. David observed no attempt to unload the pistol. Appellant told Santos to tell them if he and his brother had burglarized the service station. When Santos denied the burglary, appellant clicked the gun, stated the pistol had a bullet in it and told Santos to tell the truth. Appellant then clicked the gun and it fired, striking the still handcuffed deceased, Santos Rodriguez, in the head. Appellant jumped out of the patrol vehicle and stated, "Oh, my God."
Dallas Police Officer Jerry Foster stated he was patrolling on July 24, 1973 about 2:30 a.m. when in response to a police broadcast he went to a Fina service station. Upon arrival, he found a rear window broken out, a desk drawer open and a cigarette machine pried open. A little later Officer Arnold's vehicle arrived with the appellant Cain and the two Rodriguez brothers. Foster related he yelled to Arnold that he had received information after arriving at the scene that a third person had been involved in the burglary. Foster then walked over to Arnold's vehicle and laid his arm on the door just as a shot rang out. Foster saw the deceased's head fall down with blood coming out the side. Appellant screamed and jumped out of the car, stating, "My God, My God, What have I done, I didn't mean to do it." Foster then took appellant's pistol away from him 8 to 10 seconds after the shot was fired and 4 or 5 seconds after the appellant exited the car. Foster did not see the appellant open or reload the pistol. When the pistol was unloaded, there were five live rounds and one empty cartridge. The deceased's pulse was checked and an ambulance was called.
Officer Fred Jenkins testified he had dusted for fingerprints at the service station involved and none of the prints recovered were those of the Rodriguez brothers.
When the exclusion occurred, the appellant perfected a bill of exception. In the jury's absence Dr. Holbrook, who was stipulated to be a qualified psychiatrist, testified that amytal sodium is the drug most frequently used in the so-called truth serum test and is used in conjunction with either an amphetamine or adrenaline, which is a central nervous system stimulant; that this mixture of drugs is traditionally and classically used in the amytal interview, a tool and adjunct of psychiatric practice. He related its use "induces a mild state of hypnosis called narcohypnosis, and puts the individual in a completely relaxed physiological and mental condition, normally." It "primarily makes them more amenable to questioning."
Dr. Holbrook related that two days after the alleged offense he had administered sodium amytal to the appellant and the drug appeared to work on the appellant, who was simultaneously connected to a polygraph machine which measured respiration, blood pressure, heart rate and skin response. The doctor then stated that after the appellant appeared under the influence of the drug he was asked questions by a trained polygrapher, Ray Jones, in the doctor's presence. Dr. Holbrook related that appellant answered that he had visually checked to see if the pistol was empty, and believed he had removed all bullets before pointing it at the deceased, that he did not intentionally shoot the deceased, that he accidentally shot the deceased, and that he had reloaded the pistol after the shooting. Dr. Holbrook testified in his opinion that these answers were truthful from the appellant's standpoint and "I am pretty sure he answered in terms of what he believed to be the truth . . . "
Appellant cites no authority which has permitted the admissibility of a "truth serum" examination. Our research reflects that the results of such test occupy much the same position as the results of lie detector or polygraph and no court has yet recognized the admissibility of the results of such truth serum tests, at least for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted. 29 Am.Jur.2d, SEC. 832, n. 9; 41 A.L.R.3rd 1369, SEC. 4(b), Truth Test - Admissibility of Results; Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, Ch. 15, pp. 565-571 (Moenssens, Moses, Inbau).
The great weight of authority in this country regards results of truth serum tests as inadmissible inasmuch as they have not yet attained scientific acceptance as reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. See State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 462 P.2d 729 (1969); State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962); Knight v. State, 97 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1957); People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595 (1952); People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 343 P.2d 577 (1959); People v. Johnson, 32 Cal.App.3d 988, 109 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1973); Moss v. State, 492 P.2d 1329 (Wyo. 1972); Lindsey v. United States, 16 Alaska 268, 237 F.2d 893 (1956); State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952); State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266, 176 A.2d 465 (1961); Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1965); State v. Thomas, 79 Ariz. 158, 285 P.2d 612 (1955), cert. den. 350 U.S. 950, 76 S. Ct. 326, 100 L. Ed. 828.
We remain convinced that the results of the amytal sodium or "truth serum" tests are inadmissible as evidence, inasmuch as they have not yet attained scientific acceptance as reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. Court did not err in excluding Dr. Holbrook's testimony.
Appellant also contends the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the body of the deceased taken at the scene of the homicide. The record reflects several witnesses testified as to the deceased being shot and his appearance thereafter at the scene. It is now well established that since a verbal description of the body at the scene was admissible it is not error to admit into evidence photographs thereof. See Dugger v. State, 543 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Woodkins v. State, 542 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Sternlight v. State, 540 S.W.2d 704 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Lopez v. State, 535 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976). See also Whitmore v. State, (Tex.Cr.App. #52,324, 10/13/76); Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976).
The photographs were properly admitted. Appellant's contention is overruled. Martin v. State, 475 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972).
First it does not appear that appellant was entitled to a charge on accident. In Starling v. State, 522 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975), the defendant called the sheriff and said she accidentally shot her husband. The evidence reflected she intentionally pulled the trigger although she maintained she thought the gun was not loaded. This court held that this was a mistake of fact and not accident and that Court did not err in refusing to charge on accident. Hamilton v. State, 64 Tex. Crim. 175, 141 S.W. 966 (1911), was overruled to the extent of any conflict. Cf. Brown v. State, 523 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975); Fazzino v. State, 531 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976).
Likewise in the instant case the appellant admitted he pulled the trigger on his pistol as he held it to the head of the deceased which resulted in the death, but testified he thought he had unloaded the pistol. It is observed that Court charged on mistake of fact.
518 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975); Ray v. State, 515 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Gavia v. State, 488 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972).
"The legislative intent is manifest; the defense of accident which will legally excuse the taking of another's life is limited to situations where the activity engaged in by the defendant is lawful. Conversely, the inescapable implication of Art. 1228 is that the homicide will not be excusable if one is in the pursuit of an unlawful activity . . . "
In two grounds of error appellant urges Court erred in failing to charge on intent to kill and aggravated assault.
Ruiz v. State, 523 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975), has been decided adversely to appellant's contentions. There it was held that when a weapon deadly per se is used in a deadly manner and death results there is no need to give a charge on specific intent to kill or aggravated assault, even though the defendant testifies, that he did not intend to kill the victim. See Article 45, Vernon's Ann.P.C., 1925. It has long been held under the former Penal Code that a pistol is a deadly weapon per se. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 501 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Stills v. State, 492 S.W.2d 478 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Ortiz v. State, 490 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Walker v. State, 440 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Cr.App. 1969).
Further, it has been held that a charge on accident is inclusive of any question of intent to kill and a charge on intent to kill. See Chevallier v. State, 404 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Cr.App. 1965); Cole v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 469, 250 S.W.2d 201 (1952).
Appellant also urges that Court erred in submitting a charge concerning negligent homicide in the second degree (in performance of an unlawful act).
It appears that appellant first requested the charge then later withdrew the request, but still later excepted to the charge as a whole because Court did not charge on the issue of negligent homicide in the second degree. Since the appellant excepted to the absence of the charge the error, if any, in giving the charge was invited and could not be reversible error. See Stiles v. State, 520 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975); Boykin v. State, 513 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Hendrix v. State, 459 S.W.2d 634 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970). Further, we fail to see how the giving of the charge was calculated to deprive the appellant of any right or to deprive him of a fair trial. See Article 36.19, Vernon's Ann. C.C.P.
Under the foregoing statute an accused is actually guilty of the felony mistakenly committed. Crawford v. State, 511 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Key v. State, 71 Tex.Crim. 642, 161 S.W. 121 (1913). The only amelioration provided is that the accused shall receive the lowest punishment for the felony committed. Key v. State, supra.
The record reflects that appellant requested a charge on Article 44, supra, at the guilt stage of the bifurcated trial, which was denied, but made no objection nor submitted a special requested charge at the penalty stage of the trial. The trial court charged on the murder at the guilt stage and did not submit the issue of whether it was with or without malice and the penalties involved until the punishment stage. This was in accordance with Brazile v. State, 497 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973).
See also Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Armentrout v. State, 515 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Foster v. State, 493 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973).
The provisions of Article 44, supra, relate only to punishment, and the charge thereunder should have been submitted at the penalty stage of the bifurcated trial procedure under Article 37.07, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. Although appellant requested such a charge at the guilt stage, he failed to renew such request or object at the penalty stage. In Mosley v. State, 490 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973), this court held that objections to the charge at the guilt stage of the trial which are premature must be re-offered at the penalty stage in order that Court will not be "sandbagged." See and cf. Foster v. State, supra; Daniels v. State, 527 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975). Appellant waived any complaint on appeal by failing to object or offer a special requested charge at the penalty stage of the trial.
Appellant further urges that Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the res gestae statements admitted in evidence could be considered on the issue of intent. The appellant cites no authority for his contention. We find that Court did charge the jury, "You are further instructed as a part of the law in this case that intent may be inferred from acts done, if any, or words spoken, if any." The charge, as given, amply protected the rights of the accused in this regard and avoided any comment on the weight of the evidence as prohibited by Article 36.14, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. Cf. Friga v. State, 488 S.W.2d 430 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973). The contention is overruled. We further observe that in jury argument appellant's Counsel referred to Court's charge and evidence of appellant's res gestae at the guilt stage of the trial.
"MR. MULDER (prosecutor): Reasonable to deduce.
"Court: Counsel, he has a right to draw his own conclusion from the testimony.
"MR. BURLESON: He didn't say that previously, that was my objection.
An objection must be made as soon as the ground of objection becomes apparent. Ford v. State, 500 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Compton v. State, 500 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Sierra v. State, 482 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972). Objection to the argument must come at the time of argument if error is to be preserved. Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Joines v. State, 482 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Ricondo v. State, 475 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971). We observe that the prosecutor argued at some length along the lines now complained of before the first objection was interposed.
The objection offered was, "He didn't say that previously, that was my objection." It does not appear this objection was sufficient to bring the trial court's attention to the error now complained of on appeal. See Bouchillon v. State, 540 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Watson v. State, 532 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Williams v. State, 531 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976).
"MR. BURLESON (defense Counsel): We object to him telling the jury something that is not in evidence and giving unsworn testimony to the jury. It's his personal opinion; we object.
"MR. BURLESON: Object to him stating, 'I'm going to tell you something that's worse.' That's not based upon any evidence, it's his opinion. It's outside the record.
"MR. MULDER: He hasn't heard what I was going to say.
"Court: He hasn't said anything objectionable that I know of yet, Counsel.
"MR. MULDER: The only thing worse than killing a child who is handcuffed, who is involved in a burglary, is killing a child who was handcuffed who was totally blameless, and totally innocent."
First, we observe that appellant did not press Court to an adverse conclusory ruling and therefore waived error, if any. Bailey v. State, 532 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Braxton v. State, 528 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975); Holloway v. State, 525 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975).
Regardless of the above, the argument appears to be a reasonable deduction from the evidence. There was testimony the deceased denied any complicity in the burglary before being shot. David Rodriguez also denied being involved and testified he and the deceased were home asleep at the time of the offense. Officer Jenkins testified that the service station was dusted for fingerprints and neither the fingerprints of the deceased nor those of David Rodriguez were found. If the argument is a reasonable deduction from the evidence, no error is shown. Hoagland v. State, 494 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Lopez v. State, 490 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973).
In another ground of error appellant complains that Court erred in overruling the objection to the prosecutor's use before the jury of a policeman's badge which was never identified or offered into evidence.
"MR. BURLESON (defense Counsel): We object to Counsel demonstrating, showing something to the jury that has not been offered in evidence.
"MR. MULDER: You have all seen a policeman's badge.
". . . Darrell Cain has tarnished that badge or shield, he has cast aspersion upon it, he has tarnished that shield with the blood of Santos Rodriguez, for to Darrell Cain this symbolizes 'In this sign I murder'."
After the jury retired to deliberate at the guilt stage of the trial, appellant's Counsel tendered an offer of proof reiterating his objection and its overruling and further stating that the prosecutor displayed a police badge to the jury on four separate occasions during the argument in such proximity that they could see the badge. See Article 40.09, SEC. 6(d)(1), Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.
The State urges that if the proffer of proof is taken as true, then the police badge was displayed three times without objection for the record only reflects one objection. The State then argues that if the badge were improperly before the jury its earlier or subsequent display without objection would render harmless the display to which objection was made, citing Wood v. State, 511 S.W.2d 37, 47 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Vela v. State, 516 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). It is well established that improper admission of evidence does not constitute reversible error if the same facts were shown by other facts to which there was no objection. Watson v. State, 532 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Hayles v. State, 507 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). It would appear that the error, if any, was waived by failure to object to the other three displays of the badge. Further, while the display of the badge which was not introduced into evidence should not have been made, it is difficult to see how the display would be reversible in light of the fact that evidence showed appellant wore a police uniform and badge on the night of the homicide and it is common knowledge that uniformed officers wear a badge as indicated by Counsel's statement to the prosecutor at the time of his objection. Undoubtedly the badge would have been admissible in evidence had it been offered, Washburn v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 125, 318 S.W.2d 627 (1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 965, 3 L. Ed. 2d 834, 79 S. Ct. 876, and we cannot conclude under the circumstances described above that the improper display presents reversible error.
". . . But something else, too; there are some things in this world that are totally inexcusable, totally without excuse, and what Darrell Cain did to Santos Rodriguez is without justification and it's totally without excuse.
"MR. BURLESON: We object to that, calling the community pressures upon this jury; we object and ask to instruct them not to consider it.
"MR. SPARLING: Your Honor, I have a right to argue law enforcement.
An examination of the argument in the context in which it was made shows there was no appeal to community conscience, demand, desire or expectation unlike the cases cited by appellant. The prosecutor simply argued that the appellant bore the sole responsibility for the death of the deceased. The argument was for law enforcement and was proper. "Counsel for the State has the right, if not the duty, to make a proper argument for law enforcement. The argument made did not refer to the wishes of the community, nor did it constitute unsworn testimony." Phillips v. State, 450 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970). See also Crawford v. State, 511 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Brown v. State, 508 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Bothwell v. State, 500 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Perbetsky v. State, 429 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968).
"Therefore, if you find and believe from the evidence that the defendant, Darrell L. Cain, in the County of Dallas, State of Texas, on or about the 24th day of July, 1973, did then and there kill Santos Rodriguez by shooting him with a gun, if he did, and you further find and believe from the evidence that the act of the defendant in shooting Santos Rodriguez was accidental while he, the said defendant, was in the prosecution of a lawful object by lawful means or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof then you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict, 'Not Guilty.'"

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