Source: http://ks.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180522_0000748.DKS.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:07:45+00:00

Document:
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Mario Saucedo-Avalos's pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Memorandum in Support (Docs. 372, 373). The Government has responded,  and Petitioner has replied. For the reasons explained in detail below, the Court denies Petitioner's motion without an evidentiary hearing.
On July 24, 2015, Saucedo-Avalos entered a guilty plea to Count 1 of a Superseding Indictment, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated Saucedo-Avalos' base offense level at 38, with a two-level increase for possession of a weapon under § 2D1.1(b)(2), a two- level increase for unlawful importation of a controlled substance under § 2D1.1(b)(5), a three-level increase for his role in the offense as a manager/supervisor of five or more persons under § 3B1.1(b), and a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility for a total offense level of 42. Saucedo-Avalos received a criminal history score of I, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 360 months to Life imprisonment. On October 21, 2015, this Court sentenced Saucedo-Avalos to 360 months' imprisonment.
Saucedo-Avalos filed a direct appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, raising three issues: (1) the validity of the plea agreement; (2) whether this Court made sufficient sentencing findings under United States v. Biglow; and (3) whether this Court's rulings on pretrial motions were correct and whether those rulings influenced Saucedo-Avalos' decision to forgo jury trial.The Tenth Circuit granted the government's motion for enforcement of appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal.
Saucedo-Avalos further states that during a consultation with Bennett on June 22, 2015, again without an interpreter present, Bennett showed him a table of numbers and said that he calculated that he would receive a sentence of between seven and eight years. Bennett read what Saucedo-Avalos believes was the Plea Agreement, and asked what he thought. Saucedo-Avalos told Bennett that he did not understand what had been read to him and asked Bennett if what he wanted him to sign meant that he would receive no more than ten years, and that he understood Bennett's reply to confirm that if he signed the Plea Agreement he would receive no more than ten years. Based on that understanding, Saucedo-Avalos signed the Plea Agreement.
Saucedo-Avalos states that at no time did Bennett advise him of his Consular rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”), where as a Mexican citizen, he had the right to contact the local Mexican Consulate or Embassy, nor did he advise that the government was required to notify the Mexican Consulate upon his initial arrest and detention. Saucedo-Avalos states that had he known of those rights, he would have contacted the Mexican authorities for assistance in his criminal defense.
Saucedo-Avalos further states that before his change of plea hearing, co-defendant “Octavio Valdes” gave him and co-defendant Juan Lopez letters where he admitted that he had lied about the level of Saucedo-Avalos' involvement in the conspiracy. He gave that letter to Bennett during one of the first three visits when Bennett was present.
The Government submits the affidavit of counsel Mark L. Bennett, Jr., who was appointed to represent Saucedo-Avalos in his underlying criminal proceedings after previous counsel withdrew. Bennett states that he obtained and reviewed all of the pretrial discovery that had previously been provided to previous counsel and discussed in great length and detail the content of that discovery with Saucedo-Avalos. Bennett subsequently filed thirteen separate pretrial motions with supporting memoranda, which were subsequently considered and ruled on by the Court. In addition, Bennett met with Saucedo-Avalos on twelve separate occasions for a total of 18.2 hours for the purpose of discussing his case, the evidence against him, and his determination to attempt to resolve the charges against him by way of an agreed-upon plea agreement or by trial.
Bennett discussed with Saucedo-Avalos the pros and cons of entering a plea based upon cooperation as well as any potential retaliations that might occur if he provided assistance to the government. Saucedo-Avalos advised Bennet that he understood both the pros and cons of cooperation and ultimately determined that he wanted to pursue a plea agreement that would take his potential cooperation into account. Bennett then discussed a potential plea agreement with the government.
Subsequently, however, Saucedo-Avalos declined to cooperate and/or testify on behalf of the government. When asked why, Saucedo-Avalos advised Bennett that several individuals, whom he declined to identify, had threatened to kill his family members if he were to cooperate with the government and provide any information whatsoever to the Federal or State authorities.
While Mr. Saucedo-Avalos initially chose to have a translator present during attorney client meetings and conferences with counsel, he later advised counsel that a translator was not necessary and that he was able to fully understand and comprehend both the English language and counsel's advice and information during said meetings and conferences. As a result thereof, he specifically directed counsel to cease the use of an interpreter from that point on and counsel agreed to do so.
[Saucedo-Avalos] is also correct in his statement that he and I discussed his potential sentence. However, what he has failed to state or reveal is that at the time the discussion occurred, I specifically advised him that any potential sentence reduction that he might receive would be dependent upon the nature and extent of his cooperation and/or cooperating testimony which he would be willing to provide to the government during the prosecution of his co-defendants and/or any other individuals that had been or were involved in any drug trafficking activities in the Kansas City area. He acknowledged on more than one occasion that he fully understood that qualification.
What he was advised was that “at best” I was hopeful that I would be able to persuade the government to agree to a 10 year sentence or possibly less in return for his cooperation and testimony in the trial of his co-defendants. However, I also warned him that there was no guarantee that such a sentence could be obtained since that determination would rest in the sole discretion of the government, and they [sic] would make its decision based upon its determination as to the value of the information provided.
Throughout all of the discussions that were had with Mr. Saucedo-Avalos with regard to a plea and any possible sentence I did, on numerous occasions, advise him that I could not insure any particular sentence if he were to cooperate, but rather that his sentence would be dependent upon (1) the nature and extent of his cooperation; (2) his willingness or unwillingness to fully cooperate and provide truthful and incriminating testimony in the prosecution of his co-defendants and/or other individuals involved in drug trafficking in the Kansas City area; and (3) the evaluation of his testimony and its validity by the prosecutor handling the case. He indicated that he fully understood this and was willing to proceed with a plea on that basis.
Bennett denies that at any time during his representation of Saucedo-Avalos did counsel “abandon” him. “Rather, Mr. Saucedo-Avalos ‘abandoned' what he had told counsel he was willing to do and refused and neglected to provide the requisite information, cooperation and testimony which was a condition precedent to him receiving the benefits of the plea agreement.” Bennett believes that had Saucedo-Avalos honored his cooperation agreement with the government, it would have honored its agreement and he would have received a substantially lesser sentence than he ultimately received.
Section 2255 entitles a federal prisoner to relief if the court finds that “the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or [is] otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.”The court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” A § 2255 petitioner must allege facts that, if proven, would warrant relief from his conviction or sentence. An evidentiary hearing is not necessary where the factual allegations are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or when they are conclusions rather than statements of fact.
Saucedo-Avalos raises four claims that trial counsel was ineffective. The Court addresses each in turn.
Even assuming, however, that the Vienna Convention created individually enforceable rights to consular notification, Saucedo-Avalos fails to show that failure of counsel to advise him of such rights prejudiced him in any manner. Saucedo-Avalos alleges that with the assistance of the Mexican Consulate, “he would have easily been aware that his attorney should have provided an interpreter at all times relevant when discussing whether or not to plea or proceed to trial and his clear understanding of the charges against him.” That allegation is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice under the Strickland standard. As discussed above, Saucedo-Avalos must demonstrate that but for counsel's error, he would have insisted upon going to trial. Saucedo-Avalos' allegation that the Mexican Consulate could have assisted with choices related to entry of his guilty plea is inadequate. Further, his allegation that he did not understand his plea agreement due to the lack of an interpreter is belied by the record, as discussed in detail infra, section B. And, at both the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing, an interpreter was present and sworn to ensure Saucedo-Avalos had full understanding of the proceedings.Because Saucedo-Avalos cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong, the Court finds he is not entitled to relief on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Although there is a factual dispute regarding the use of an interpreter while meeting with Bennett at CCA, Saucedo-Avalos' claims that he did not understand and was misled about the maximum sentence he was facing are not supported by the record. As Bennett sets forth in his affidavit, he initially negotiated a plea agreement with the hope that the government would agree to a ten-year sentence in return for his cooperation and testimony in the trial of his co-defendants. Saucedo-Avalos initially agreed to cooperate with the government, but later declined after receiving threats against his family. Bennett's version of what transpired is supported by the record, which reflects that Saucedo-Avalos was set to plead guilty in July 2015, but counsel advised the Court that he was no longer willing to cooperate and was thus unable to enter into that plea agreement. Bennett then negotiated a revised plea agreement with no cooperation, which Saucedo-Avalos entered into on July 24, 2015.
Absent a believable reason justifying departure from their apparent truth, the accuracy and truth of a defendant's statements at a Rule 11 proceeding at which his plea is accepted are conclusively established. The record of the plea hearing contains nothing to suggest Saucedo-Avalos' plea was either unknowing or involuntary, or that he was unaware of the consequences of his plea. The plea colloquy indicates that Saucedo-Avalos, with the aid of an interpreter, acknowledged that he had gone over the charges with counsel, that he understood what he was charged with, that he discussed the evidence that the government had against him with counsel, and that he and counsel had discussed the plea agreement together. Saucedo-Avalos indicated that he was satisfied with the advice and representation he had received from counsel, that it was his decision to enter into the plea with the government, that no one pressured, threatened, or coerced him to make that decision, and that the decision to plea was made voluntarily and of his own free will. The Court questioned Saucedo-Avalos's understanding of the sentencing range of a mandatory minimum of ten years and a maximum of life imprisonment, and explained how enhancements and cooperation could have an impact on the sentence, and he indicated he understood.
Even if counsel's performance was unreasonable, however, Saucedo-Avalos cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test to prevail on his claim. To prevail on the prejudice prong in the guilty plea context, a defendant must show that there is “a ‘reasonable probability' that he ‘would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial' but for counsel's errors.” The court is required to make a holistic inquiry into all the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether the petitioner would have proceeded to trial. Mere allegations that the petitioner would have insisted on going to trial, although necessary, is insufficient. “Proof of prejudice requires a petitioner to show that ‘a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.'” To determine rationality, the court should assess “objective facts specific to a petitioner, such as age, the length of the sentence he faced under the terms of the plea deal, the prospect of minimizing exposure to other charged counts, and so on.” The Tenth Circuit “remain[s] suspicious of bald, post hoc and unsupported statements that a defendant would have changed his plea absent counsel's errors.” While a defendant need not show that he would have prevailed at trial, his prospects of succeeding inform the court's view whether he in fact would have gone to trial absent the alleged errors. The strength of the government's case is the best evidence whether defendant would in fact have changed his plea and insisted on going to trial.
In light of the extensive agreed factual basis in the plea agreement, Saucedo-Avalos has not shown a reasonable probability that but for counsel's alleged conduct, the results of the plea proceeding would have been different, that is, he would not have agreed to plead guilty to the drug conspiracy charge. Saucedo-Avalos does not dispute that a jury likely would have convicted him on this charge, and the record does not reflect any viable defense to the charges in Count 1. As part of the plea, Saucedo-Avalos acknowledged a four-page single-spaced factual basis for the plea that set out in detail how he was involved and actively engaged in the conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. This evidence was supported by surveillance and statements of co-conspirators, and illustrated the scope of the drug conspiracy and that Saucedo-Avalos exercised a great degree of control in the drug trafficking organization. Although the benefits he received from the plea agreement were certainly less than if he had cooperated, he received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a bottom guideline range sentence of 360 months instead of life imprisonment. In light of the evidence and benefits received under the plea agreement, Saucedo-Avalos has not shown how a decision to reject the plea agreement would have been rational under the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court denies his second claim that counsel was ineffective on these grounds.

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