Source: https://www.ptab.us/2011/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:55:21+00:00

Document:
The written description requirement and its corollary, the new matter prohibition of 35 U.S.C. § 132, both serve to ensure that the patent applicant was in full possession of the claimed subject matter on the application filing date. When the applicant adds a claim or otherwise amends his specification after the original filing date . . ., the new claims or other added material must find support in the original specification.
...We acknowledge that it is improper to base an obviousness rejection on an unknown inherent property present in the prior art. See In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“'That which may be inherent is not necessarily known. Obviousness cannot be predicated on what is unknown.' Such a retrospective view of inherency is not a substitute for some teaching or suggestion supporting an obviousness rejection.”) (quoting In re Spormann, 363 F.2d 444, 448 (CCPA 1966)).
See Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in infringement context, a single conveyor held to not meet claim element requiring at least two conveyors); In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 746 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claim requiring three separate means not anticipated by structure containing two means where one of the two means was argued to meet two of the three claimed means).
The Examiner, citing MPEP § 2114, found that the phrase “to provide the at least one control signal to the at least one lighting unit” is functional language not entitled to patentable weight as it merely describes an intended use of the apparatus (Ans. 5, 23-24). Appellants contend that “a conductor ‘provid[ing] the at least one control signal’ claims what a conductor is, not what a conductor does” (Reply Br. 13 (brackets in original); see also App. Br. 14). ... We find that this distinction between the conductors for the power and the control signal is a structural distinction that must be given patentable weight, see In re Danly, 263 F.2d 844, 847 (CCPA 1959).
The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991). It is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable, without change, to render obvious the invention under review. In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Concerning the first issue and the claim term “consisting essentially of”, it is well settled that the term “consisting essentially of” is interpreted as allowing for the inclusion not only of those ingredients specifically recited, but also those that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of a claimed invention. PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52 (CCPA 1976). However, the burden is on Appellants to show what the basic and novel characteristics are and how they would be materially changed by the ingredient of the reference sought to be excluded from inclusion by Appellants’ use of this term. See In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 873-74 (CCPA 1964); Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (BPAI 1989).
Choosing to define an element functionally, i.e., by what it does, carries with it a risk: Where there is reason to conclude that the structure of the prior art is inherently capable of performing the claimed function, the burden shifts to the applicant to show that the claimed function patentably distinguishes the claimed structure from the prior art structure. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); In re Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215 (CCPA 1981).
We note that the word “substantially” is often construed in patent claims as “largely but not wholly that which is specified.” See York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). ... In addition, we note that use of words of approximation, such as “substantially,” in a patent claim implies the avoidance of a strict numerical boundary of the specified parameter. See Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Labels: anchor wall , york prod.
Appellants also contend that the Examiner’s reliance on the case law of St. Regis Paper Company v. Bemis Company, Inc., 549 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1977) and In re Harza, 274 F.2d 669 (CCPA 1960), to duplicate parts so that the proposed modification includes a plurality of arms, does not consider the facts of either St. Regis or Harza and amounts to the use of an improper per se rule of obviousness. ... Nor does the case law of either St. Regis or Harza, relied upon by the Examiner, demonstrate per se obviousness for duplicating the single bendable member taught by Schwarzschild to arrive at the claimed invention. See In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (no per se rule of obviousness exists).
While we agree that the problem faced by an applicant is a relevant factor, a teaching or suggestion of applicant's problem is not always required for a prima facie case of obviousness. An invention may be obvious for reasons the inventor did not contemplate. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(en banc).
We also broadly but reasonably construe the “configured to render an arrangement . . . .” language of claim 1 as a statement of intended use or purpose. (emphasis added) “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim's preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id.
See In re Jung, No. 2010-1019, 2011 WL 1235093 at 7 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(“Jung argues that the Board gave improper deference to the examiner’s rejection by requiring Jung to‘identif[y] a reversible error’ by the examiner, which improperly shifted the burden of proving patentability onto Jung. Decision at 11. This is a hollow argument, because, as discussed above, the examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation and the burden was properly shifted to Jung to rebut it. . . . ‘[R]eversible error’ means that the applicant must identify to the Board what the examiner did wrong . . . .”).
Objective evidence of non-obviousness, including commercial success, must be commensurate in scope with the claims. In re Tiffin, 448 F.2d 791 (CCPA 197 1) (evidence showing commercial success of thermoplastic foam “cups” used in vending machines was not commensurate in scope with claims directed to thermoplastic foam “containers” broadly). In order to be commensurate in scope with the claims, the commercial success must be due to claimed features, and not due to unclaimed features. Joy Technologies Inc. v. Manbeck, 751 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 226, 228 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Features responsible for commercial success were recited only in allowed dependent claims, and therefore the evidence of commercial success was not commensurate in scope with the broad claims at issue.). An inventor’s opinion as to the purchaser’s reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus between the sales and the claimed invention. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Further, gross sales figures do not show commercial success absent evidence as to market share, Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985), or as to the time period during which the product was sold, or as to what sales would normally be expected in the market, Ex parte Standish, 10 USPQ2d 1454, 1458 (BPAI 1988).
[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. . . . [T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed. . . . This inquiry . . . is a question of fact.
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). See also Vas-Cath at 1563-64.
That a person skilled in the art might realize from reading the disclosure that such a step is possible is not a sufficient indication to that person that [the] step is part of appellants’ invention. Such an indication is the least that is required for a description of the invention under the first paragraph of § 112.
Precisely how close the original description must come to comply with the description requirement must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The primary consideration is factual and depends on the nature of the invention and the amount of knowledge imparted to those skilled in the art by the disclosure. See Vas-Cath at 1561-63.
2893 Ex Parte Meyer et al 11/009,575 KRIVAK 103(a) GLOBALFOUNDRIES INC.
The Examiner asserts there is no difference between Lee’s unitary heat treatment and the claimed invention’s two-step heat treatment (Ans. 11). In support of this conclusion, the Examiner cites Ex parte Rubin, 128 USPQ 440 (BPAI 1959) (Ans. 8, 11, 15, and 16). However, the Examiner’s reliance on Rubin, is misplaced, as Rubin does not address splitting one step into two, only the transposition of two steps.
“To fulfill the written description requirement [under 35 U.S.C. § 112], the patent specification must describe an invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented what is claimed.” Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 967-968 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Our reviewing court has cautioned, however, that “[t]he disclosure as originally filed does not … have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.” Cordis Corp., 339 F.3d at 1364 (internal citation omitted). “Although [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly the subject matter claimed, the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed.” In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Put another way, “the applicant must … convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.” Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).

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