Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:48:13+00:00

Document:
West Virginia's constitutional and statutory requirement that political subdivisions may not incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates beyond those established by the State Constitution without the approval of 60% of the voters in a referendum election does not discriminate against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable class, and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or any other provision of the United States Constitution. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, and Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701, distinguished. Pp. 403 U. S. 4-8.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BLACK, DOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. HARLAN, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 403 U. S. 8. BRENNAN and MARSHALL JJ., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 403 U. S. 8.
Respondents then brought this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 60% requirements were unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. In their complaint, they alleged that the Roane County schools had been basically unimproved since 1946, and fell far below the state average, both in classroom size and facilities. They further alleged that four similar proposals had been previously defeated, although each had received majorities of affirmative votes ranging from 52.51% to 55.84%. The West Virginia trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the state constitutional and statutory 60% requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 153 W.Va. 559, 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969). We granted certiorari, 397 U.S. 1020 (1970), and for the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
The court below relied heavily on two of our holdings dealing with limitations on the right to vote and dilution of voting power. The first was Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963), which held that Georgia's county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause because the votes of primary electors in one county were accorded less weight than the votes of electors in other counties. The second was Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969), in which we held impermissible the limitation to "property taxpayers" of the right to vote in a revenue bond referendum. From these cases the state court concluded that West Virginia's requirement was constitutionally defective because the votes of those who favored the issuance of the bonds had a proportionately smaller impact on the outcome of the election than the votes of those who opposed issuance of the bonds.
candidates being discarded. The defect, however, continued to be geographic discrimination. Votes for the losing candidates were discarded solely because of the county where the votes were cast. Indeed, votes for the winning candidate in a county were likewise devalued, because all marginal votes for him would be discarded and would have no impact on the state-wide total.
Cipriano was no more than a reassertion of the principle, consistently recognized, that an individual may not be denied access to the ballot because of some extraneous condition, such as race, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960); wealth, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); tax status, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U. S. 621 (1969); or military status, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965).
Unlike the restrictions in our previous cases, the West Virginia Constitution singles out no "discrete and insular minority" for special treatment. The three-fifths requirement applies equally to all bond issues for any purpose, whether for schools, sewers, or highways. We are not, therefore, presented with a case like Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), in which fair housing legislation alone was subject to an automatic referendum requirement.
The class singled out in Hunter was clear -- "those who would benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations," supra at 393 U. S. 391. In contrast we can discern no independently identifiable group or category that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of financing. Consequently, no sector of the population may be said to be "fenced out" from the franchise because of the way they will vote. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 380 U. S. 94.
for some kinds of governmental actions to be taken. Certainly any departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority. But there is nothing in the language of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on every issue. On the contrary, while we have recognized that state officials are normally chosen by a vote of the majority of the electorate, we have found no constitutional barrier to the selection of a Governor by a state legislature after no candidate received a majority of the popular vote. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U. S. 231 (1966).
an indebtedness limitation: it does not alter the basic fact that the balancing of interests is one for the State to resolve.
617 (1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Turner v. Clay, 397 U. S. 39 (1970).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, post, p. 403 U. S. 165.
While Cipriano involved a denial of the vote, a percentage reduction of an individual's voting power in proportion to the amount of property he owned would be similarly defective. See Stewart v. Parish School Board, 310 F.Supp. 1172 (ED La.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 884 (1970).
Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967).
Some 14 States require an amendment to be approved by two sessions of the legislature before submission to the people. West Virginia's Constitution, Art. 14, § 2, provides for approval by two-thirds of a single legislature and a majority of the voters.

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 Art. 14
 § 2