Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/161877469/CLJ-2000-4-189-puukmr2
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:27:03+00:00

Document:
Dr. Daniel Vazquez & Ma. Luisa M. Vazquez, Vs. Ayala Corporation, G.R. No. 149734, November 19, 2004.
Parveen Manzil. 7. In an affidavit affirmed on 28 July 1999 which was filed on 2 August 1999 as seen in encl. at all material times. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 191 For the plaintiff . b c d e f g h i . India. Bomanji Lane. The second defendant as a sub-contractor secured a project with the cooperation of a consortium (styled as “MMCE-KEC Consortium”) to design.K. 2nd Floor.S. while its branch office is at number 523. execute. C. that project was in reference to contract TNB no: 241/95 under package TA5 – Pasir Gudang – Plentong – Bukit Batu Yong Peng (N). It is also said that. M/s Zain & Co a Reported by Izzaty Izzuddin JUDGMENT Abdul Malik Ishak J: Facts – a bird’s eye view of all the circumstances of the case. Anna Nagar. the plaintiff proudly declared himself as an Indian citizen with an address at 7613213 (Sector VII). The second defendant is also a company incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1965 and have its registered address just like that of the first defendant. 1st Floor. Madras 600106. Main Road. Fort. 201A. Government of India which certificate authorises him to carry on the business of recruitment for deployment of Indian workers overseas. Colony Antophill. complete and maintain as well as to instal 500 KV and 275 KV transmission lines for phase 1 and phase 1A together with a transmission system development of 500 KV for Tenaga Nasional Berhad.S. Johor.Collin Sequerah. N. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. 50400 Kuala Lumpur. Jalan Tun Razak. It is said that the second defendant is wholly owned by the first defendant. The first defendant is described as a company incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1965 and having its registered office at 32nd Floor. The plaintiff is the sole proprietor of Dhanveer Enterprise and he trades under that name. Mumbai 400037. In short. erect.DP Vijandran. The plaintiff is also the holder of a certificate from the Ministry of Labour. Menara PNB.G. The plaintiff’s head office is said to be at number 30 G. 11 – which affidavit was deposed challenging the defendants’ application for security for costs as seen in encl. Nagar. M/s DP Vijandran & Assoc For the defendants . Bombay 400001. the first defendant was under the control and/or management and/or direction of the second defendant and with this in mind the first defendant is described as the agent of the second defendant.
at all times. It was an alluring offer. e (b) the main terms of the recruitment were said to be as follows: (i) that the recruited Indian workers would be employed for a period of two years. and (iv) that the salaries of the recruited Indian workers. As a recruiting agent. Malaysia attracts foreign workers be it labourers or professionals. As a melting pot.000 Indian rupees equivalent to approximately RM3. on a monthly basis.192 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a b c d An individual by the name of Mohammad Ali Daud (“Ali”) was. the plaintiff was entitled to collect the sum of 35.000 to RM2. It is a paradise to work in Malaysia. It is said that the defendant through Ali had approached the plaintiff for the purpose of recruiting workers in India to work in Malaysia for the said project. would be categorised in this manner: Categories (1) Engineers Salaries RM2.300 RM1.000 RM800 f g h (2) Supervisors (3) Skilled workers (4) Unskilled workers i .500 RM1. (iii) that free round trip air passages would be provided for each of the recruited Indian workers. The plaintiff agreed to become a recruiting agent for the defendants and to recruit workers for the defendants in Malaysia. Ali too was said to be appointed by the second defendant as the project manager of the abovementioned project. The plaintiff grabbed hold of that offer. described as the business development executive of the first defendant. (ii) that the recruited Indian workers would be provided with free accommodation and free medical care.500 as his fees from each of the workers who would eventually be employed by the defendants. It was the stand of the plaintiff that the contract was confirmed by way of a documentation in the following terms: (a) by a letter dated 16 April 1995 wherein the first defendant appointed the plaintiff to recruit Indian workers from India upon the terms as stated in that letter.
Five hundred Indian workers were selected. a b c d e f g h i . The plaintiff proceeded to fax the details of the flights to the defendants. The interviews that were conducted were successful. The necessary papers were eventually processed. Another second batch of 50 Indian workers were confirmed to leave on 8 January 1996. authorised the plaintiff to sign all the necessary documents and employment contracts and to arrange for the passports of the recruited Indian workers from India and to obtain the necessary visa endorsements as well as to make the necessary transport arrangements for their onward movements to the work sites. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 193 (c) by way of a Power of Attorney dated 17 April 1995. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. the plaintiff then took the next course of action. the plaintiff initially paid for the air tickets of 185 workers. the plaintiff confirmed flight bookings for the first batch of 50 Indian workers that were scheduled to leave on 8 January 1996. It was said that the plaintiff then proceeded to advertise for the recruitment of Indian workers in Indian newspapers in India and thereafter shortlisted candidates to be interviewed by the defendants. Later. Ali together with two others arrived in Madras to interview the shortlisted candidates. Without further ado. It was said that the 264 selected Indian workers left their respective jobs in India in order to prepare and make the necessary arrangements to leave for Malaysia to take up employment with the defendants. The plaintiff requested the defendants to send the air tickets for the selected Indian workers who were ready to proceed to Malaysia. With that kind of undertaking. Blissfully thinking that everything had proceeded smoothly. the first defendant appointed the plaintiff to recruit Indian workers from India and. the plaintiff proceeded to do the needful in order to prepare for the departure of 264 Indian workers to Malaysia to work on the project as employees of the defendants. This letter of approval was then extended to the plaintiff by the defendants so as to enable the plaintiff to process the visas for the selected Indian workers. The defendants responded and orally requested the plaintiff to purchase the air tickets on their behalf with the undertaking that it would be reimbursed. It was said that Ali conducted the interviews for two solid days and on 24 May 1995 he left for Malaysia. The Malaysian Immigration department responded by letter dated 28 September 1995 addressed to the second defendant and approved the work permits for 264 Indian workers from India. at the same time. It was said that the accommodation and other expenses incurred by Ali and the two others during their stay in Madras were borne by the plaintiff on the understanding that the plaintiff would be reimbursed by the defendants. On 23 April 1995. Sometime on 11 July 1995. The two others remained behind and continued to conduct further interviews. the second defendant submitted an application to the Immigration department in Malaysia for the approval of work permits for the Indian workers from India.
The plaintiff then proceeded to particularise the special damages incurred by him in this manner: i .194 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a b c d Sometime on 5 January 1996. and (i) loss of profits that should come from the fees. the plaintiff received a letter dated 4 January 1996 from the defendants disclaiming and/or repudiating the contracts and requesting the plaintiff not to send the Indian workers from India to go to Malaysia. the defendants were said to have breached the contract with the plaintiff. f (d) the plaintiff’s recruiting licence has been suspended by the Government of India. Approximately. it was said that the second defendant sent a letter to the chief immigration officer at Anna International Airport. The plaintiff then proceeded to particularise the loss and damages in these terms: (a) the plaintiff had purchased the air tickets on behalf of the defendants for the Indian workers and in the course of which had to pay 25% of the ticket fares as cancellation fees. g (f) the plaintiff and his family members were living in daily fear of reprisals from the selected candidates who had lost their jobs. It was said that for these breaches. Menambakkam. on 9 March 1996. e (b) the plaintiff had to travel to Malaysia on two occasions in order to finalise the recruitment of Indian workers. h (h) the plaintiff has incurred several expenses for and on behalf of the defendants and or the defendants’ representatives. Madras requesting him not to allow any of the selected Indian workers to board the flight to Malaysia until further instructions from the defendants. (c) the plaintiff is facing several law suits in India initiated and instituted by the selected candidates that were destined to go to Malaysia. the plaintiff had suffered loss and damages – special as well as general. (g) the plaintiff has lost his reputation. For these reasons. (e) the plaintiff’s assets in India has been frozen by the Government of India. The plaintiff then informed the defendants that the contract was considered as terminated and legal recourse would be pursued. the plaintiff met Mohd Wafa Abdul Rahman (“Wafa”) and it was said that Wafa represented the defendants who had repudiated the contract and Wafa had told the plaintiff that the defendants did not consider themselves bound by the contract. business and goodwill as a recruiting agent in India. On 6 January 1996.
840.50 4.798.00 e 626.81 120.545 x 185) (h) Visa Stamping at (RS162 x 185) (i) Trips to Kuala Lumpur between 22 July 1995 to 10 August 1995 (i) Ticket business class (ii) Accommodation 19 days x RM100 (iii) Miscellaneous – local expenses.997.000.00 2. food.00 62.62 2.235.950 256.38 12.00 c b (a) Advertisement Charges (b) Hotel Bills of Ali and 2 others (c) Food (d) Stationaries.305.695.645. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 195 a PARTICULARS RUPEES RM (Approximate) 20.000.953.50 1.00 250.000.25 29.456.830.00 25.900.925. etc (j) Trips to Kuala Lumpur (i) Ticket business class (ii) Accommodation 45 days x RM100) (iii) Miscellaneous – local expenses.00 i 7.305.00 30.000. etc 207.830.79 25.00 h 28.00 2.00 f 28.00 300.500. food.000.000.00 g 6.00 .970.00 d 158. printing of files and courier services (e) Telephone and fax bills (f) Medical examination for selected workers (RS600 x 264) (g) 25% cancellation charges on the price of tickets (RS13.400.00 15.987. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v.
00 2. etc (m) Trips to Kuala Lumpur (4 April 1999 to 12 April 1999) (i) Ticket business class (ii) Accommodation nine days x RM100 (iii) Miscellaneous – local expenses.00 f 28.00 d 28.50 900.305. etc.305. food.00 70.000.430.00 2.00 8.830.00 e 3.200. food.830.305. food.00 319. etc (l) Trips to Kuala Lumpur (2 December 1997 to 14 December 1997) (i) Ticket business class (ii) Accommodation 12 days x RM100 (iii) Miscellaneous – local expenses.200.50 2.29 i Total .00 g 2.830.196 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a b c (k) Trips to Kuala Lumpur (7 March 1996 to 29 March 1996) (i) Ticket business class (ii) Accommodation (23 days x RM100) (iii) Miscellaneous – local expenses.00 2. (n) M/S Blanche Kayveas & Co (o) Advocates & court fees in Madras 28.300.00 h 700.000.219.50 1.500.
Since the affidavit of Wan Nor Azman bin Wan Salleh in encl. The other affidavit was deposed by Che Azlina binti Abdul Aziz (“Che Azlina”) on behalf of the second defendant and it was affirmed on 7 June 1999 and filed on the same date as reflected in encl. Enclosure 7 is a summons in chambers supported by two affidavits.29.000.219. I have deliberately set out in some detail the facts as extracted from the statement of claim to show the magnitude of the plaintiff’s case against both the defendants. (b) General damages.000 and when combined. c (e) Costs. One affidavit was deposed by Wan Nor Azman bin Wan Salleh on behalf of the first defendant which was affirmed on 7 June 1999 and filed on the same date as seen in encl. the plaintiff claimed against the defendant jointly and severally for: (a) Special damages of RM319. 7 and gave judgment to the defendants with costs. (f) Further and other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit and proper to grant. Enclosure 11 was affirmed on 28 July 1999 and it was filed on 2 August 1999. it gives a grand total of RM150. the plaintiff averred that encl. the plaintiff lodged an appeal to the judge in chambers as seen in encl. 6 was identical to that of Che Azlina’s affidavit in encl. In response to encl. 6. The plaintiff affirmed an affidavit in encl. Each of the defendants requested for security for costs amounting to RM75. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. 5.000. The senior assistant registrar (“SAR”) by the name of Wan Azizon binti Ahmad heard encl. This meant that each of the two defendants is entitled to RM40. 15. Wan Nor Azman bin Wan d e f g h i . MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 197 In the final analysis.000 as security for costs. Aggrieved by the decision of the SAR. She ordered the plaintiff to provide security for costs in the sum of RM80. 11 should be relied upon mutatis mutandis by way of an answer to encl. 5.000 for both the defendants. 11. a b (c) Interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the special damages from 5 January 1996 to the date of full realisation. 11 by way of a reply to encl. 6. 5. (d) Interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the general damages from the date of award to the date of full realisation. This was a case of a foreign plaintiff who seeks redress in a Malaysian Court against two Malaysian companies and the latter applied by way of encl. 7 for security for costs against the plaintiff in the sum of RM150.
the defendants categorically denied knowledge thereof and put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. The first defendant was of the view that as a separate juristic person it was. in regard to the plaintiff agreeing to recruit Indian workers in India for the project and in regard to the plaintiff’s entitlement to collect 35. But the first defendant had no knowledge of the appointment of Ali as the project manager by the second defendant. The defendants have no knowledge of the letter dated 16 April 1995 together with the Power of Attorney and in the alternative the defendants averred that these documents did not constitute a valid. In so far as Ali was concerned. The defendants denied that there was a 275 KV transmission line for phase 1 and phase 1A as alluded to in para. the first defendant admitted that Ali was appointed as the business development executive of the first defendant. the defendants denied knowledge of them. 11 and encl. In so far as it was said that the first defendant was under the control and/or management and/or direction of the second defendant and that the first defendant was said to have acted as the agent of the second defendant.000 Indian rupees which was equivalent to RM3. the second defendant admitted all the other matters as alluded to in the said paragraph in regard to the project. at all times. 3.500 fees from each of the recruited Indian workers who would be employed by the defendants. binding or complete contract between the parties. 12. The second defendant too denied that Ali was appointed as its project manager and the second defendant said that it had no knowledge of the rest of the averments in para. the defendants denied them categorically and put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. Again. however. The defendants admitted as to their status as set out in paras. 5 of the statement of claim. 6 of the statement of claim. it was averred b c d e f g h i . I will now endeavour to narrate the facts that can be distilled from the statement of defence. In regard to the role of Ali who was said to have approached the plaintiff for the purpose of recruiting Indian workers in India for the project.198 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a Salleh affirmed an affidavit on 11 August 1999 which was filed on 12 August 1999 as seen in encl. acting on its own policies and procedures and that the first defendant was not at any time controlled or directed by the second defendant and accordingly the first defendant puts the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. Again by way of an alternative. Che Azlina too affirmed an affidavit in encl. the defendants’ statement of defence was dated 24 May 1999 and it was filed on the same date as seen in encl. 13 by way of a response to encl. In so far as the status of the plaintiff was concerned and Dhanveer Enterprise having its head office at Bombay with a branch office at Madras. the defendants categorically denied knowledge thereof and put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. 2 and 3 of the statement of claim. 13 was affirmed on 11 August 1999 and filed on 12 August 1999. Now.
It was alleged that the plaintiff failed to verify the veracity and authenticity of the alleged representation by Ali with the first defendant or for that matter with both the defendants. consequently. 14. 19 and 20 of the statement of claim and put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. the first defendant and/or in the alternative both the defendants averred that the letter dated 16 April 1995 and the Power of Attorney were not issued by them or through the defendants’ agents and/or servants and it was averred that Ali obtained those documents fraudulently. apparent. which was denied. It was the stand of both the defendants that the alleged Power of Attorney was irregular in law and had no legal effect whatsoever. were not sufficient to constitute any intention to create legal relations between the plaintiff and the defendants. Further it was averred that those two documents and other related documents. that transpired between the plaintiff and Ali were only privy as between themselves and no one else. It was said that both the defendants were not privy to the alleged communications between the plaintiff and Ali at all. if any and which were denied. 13. both the defendants averred that they have no knowledge of the said letter and that letter. That being the case. Thus. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 199 that even if those two documents existed. 15. if any and which was denied. 10. In any event. it was averred that the first defendant and/or in the alternative both the defendants were not bound by the contents and or the terms stated in those documents. 18. both the defendants denied paras. Madras was concerned. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. That letter too was said to be written without the express or implied. Further and/or in the alternative. Both the defendants contended that the actions by Ali. 17. both the defendants averred that at all material times they never required workers. they were said to be written without the defendants’ knowledge and neither was there an implied. 11. the existence of which was denied. ostensible or express authority of the defendants for those documents to be written. there was no binding contract between them. if any. In so far as the letter dated 5 January 1996 which was purportedly written by the second defendant to the chief immigration officer of Anna International Airport. apparent or ostensible authority from the defendants. The same a b c d e f g h i . was said to be written without the first defendant and/or in the alternative the knowledge of both the defendants. Both the defendants too averred that the alleged communication. if any and which was denied. were unlawfully issued without the express and/or implied knowledge and/or consent of the defendants. Menambakkam. 12. It was the stand of both the defendants that the plaintiff had failed to exercise prudence when they relied on the representations made by Ali. 16. be it local or foreigner. because the project had been sub-contracted to a third party.
it appears to the Court: (a) that the plaintiff is ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction. if. on the application of a defendant to an action or other proceeding in the High Court. or b c d e f g (d) that the plaintiff has changed his address during the course of the proceedings with a view to evading the consequences of the litigation. as the case may be. 25 and 26 of the statement of claim and again put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. In regard to Wafa. The defendants too averred that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action against them. In the premises. the Court thinks it just to do so. both the defendants denied paras. 24. the defendants put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. The defendants averred that the claim for damages was misconceived in law and in fact and categorically put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. Both the defendants averred that. the defendants denied categorically the allegations thereof. it may order the plaintiff to give such security for the defendant’s costs of the action or other proceeding as it thinks just. in the proceeding in question.200 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a was also true in regard to the letter dated 4 January 1996 which the plaintiff received on 6 January 1996 in regard to the defendants’ disclaimer and/or repudiation of the contract. having regard to all the circumstances of the case. i . that the plaintiff’s address is not stated in the writ or other originating process or is incorrectly stated therein. Security For Costs – The Law In Its Perspective Order 23 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (“RHC”) governs the question of security for costs of an action and that Order states as follows: (1) Where. did the plaintiff inform them verbally or in writing that he would treat the alleged contract as terminated and would have recourse to the legal process. h (2)The Court shall not require a plaintiff to give security by reason only of paragraph (1)(c) if he satisfies the Court that the failure to state his address or the mis-statement thereof was made innocently and without intention to deceive. or (b) that the plaintiff (not being a plaintiff who is suing in a representative capacity) is a nominal plaintiff who is suing for the benefit of some other person and that there is reason to believe that he will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if ordered to do so. or (c) subject to paragraph (2). including a proceeding on a counterclaim. then. at no time. (3)The references in the foregoing paragraphs to a plaintiff and a defendant shall be construed as references to the person (howsoever described on the record) who is in the position of plaintiff or defendant. In this regard.
to be able to obtain payment of his costs. and there is no evidence to rebut the inference that the assets will be insufficient to pay the defendant’s costs if he succeeds. In 1890. and (iii) to determine the quantum to be imposed for the security for costs. the court thinks it just to do so”. Denman J said: … the Court is bound to order security for costs where the company is in liquidation. The note said that the wide discretion conferred on the court in other cases ‘does not apply to security ordered under’ s. 447. These words have the desired effect of conferring upon the court a real discretion to consider the circumstances of each case and to determine whether and to what extent a plaintiff or the defendant. Lord Denning MR in Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. 286 of the report): Does that section mean that the court must order security. para. 447 of the Companies Act 1948. if successful. Fowler  25 QBD 235 at 237. (1) of the RHC states that the court may order security for costs “if. the court has the discretion: (i) to consider the circumstances of the case. a b c d e and his Lordship proceeded to say (see p. the court has the discretionary power to order security for costs. require sufficient security to be given for those costs. these words meant a lot. f g h i . as the case may be. In my considered view. if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the company will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his defence. or is it only that the court may in its discretion? There are some observations to the effect that it is mandatory. 504 James LJ said: … I consider security for costs to be ex debito justitiae. Iron and Waggon Co v. Triplan Ltd  2 All ER 273 sets out the circumstances which the court might take into account in considering whether to order security for costs in the context of s. having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Ltd v. 284 to p. and it is a very important matter whether a suitor is likely. which enacts as follows: Where a limited company is plaintiff or pursuer in any action or other legal proceeding. Thus in Northampton Coal. It should be given its due recognition. in Pure Spirit Co v. Rule 1. any judge having jurisdiction in the matter may. (ii) and to decide whether to order security for costs. Midland Waggon Co  7 Ch D 500 at 503. p 506. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 201 Generally. Thus. Those observations seem to have been the basis of a note which was contained in the Annual Practice until 1966 (1966) vol 1. be ordered to provide security for costs. and may stay all proceedings until the security is given.
such as whether the company’s claim is bona fide and not a sham and whether the company has a reasonably good prospect of success. The court has a discretion which it will exercise. So I turn to consider the circumstances. the important word is ‘may’. If there was a payment into court of a substantial sum of money (not merely a payment into court to get rid of a nuisance claim). That gives the judge a discretion whether to order security or not. If there is reason to believe that the company cannot pay the costs. but that there still remains a discretion in the Court which may be exercised in special circumstances. There is no burden one way or the other. f g h i . He put it on the ground that it was an important point whether or not the court had discretion. It is Peppard and Co Ltd v. Kingsmill Moore J said  IR at 188: … the section does not make it mandatory to order security for costs in every case where the plaintiff company appears to be unable to pay the costs of a successful defendant. He refused to order security for costs. Counsel for Parkinson asked for leave to appeal. In his view ‘the powers of the section should be carefully used’. in a full and careful judgment. Gill All Weather Bodies Ltd v. There seems to have been some misapprehension on the matter in the past. Agard  76 LJO 204. I prefer to follow the cases i. that too would count.e. and yet the Court would not order security to be lodged. The sooner it is put right the better. Counsel for Triplan helpfully suggests some of the matters which the court might take into account. Now before us counsel for Parkinson concedes that his argument was wrong and that the judge was right. Bogoff  IR 180. took that view. d e Turning now to the words of the statute.202 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a b I do not think those observations are correct. He upset the master’s order. Again it will consider whether there is an admission by the defendants on the pleadings or elsewhere that money is due. All Weather Motor Bodies Ltd  77 LJO 123 which are to be found in the notes in the Law Journal Newspaper. Maugham LJ said: The section only confers a discretion on the Court. Scrutton LJ said that there were too many applications against companies for security for costs. The judge gave leave to appeal. then security may be ordered. It would also consider whether the company’s want of means has been brought about by any conduct by the defendants. It was so important that four or five solicitors were waiting in the court to hear the result of it. The court has a discretion which it will exercise considering all the circumstances of the particular case. There may be many cases where a company is insolvent. The court might also consider whether the application for security was being used oppressively – so as to try and stifle a genuine claim. c I would add a case in 1962 in the Supreme Court of Eire. It is a discretion to be exercised in all the circumstances of the case. Ebury Garages Ltd v. but not must be ordered. Mars-Jones J. such as delay in payment or delay in doing their part of the work.
would be the likelihood of the plaintiff succeeding. fit for consideration. the court did take into account a payment into court. I am quite clear that a payment into court. Hogan (No 2) (1924) 1 Ir. no defence to the claim at all. Short  2 Ch 205 is a classic example where the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants’ costs. the defendant admits his liability to the fullest extent. At one point it says that 80 pounds was paid into court ‘with a denial of liability’. and that it would not be right to deprive the company of it by insisting on security for costs. Martin v. and I would dismiss this appeal accordingly. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. and a few lines later the defendant ‘admits the plaintiff is entitled to 80 pounds’. or an open offer. is a matter which the court can take into account. or. In that case. It is not a case for security for costs. Looking at the matter quite generally. I am quite clear that it was not a case for ordering Triplan to provide any security for costs at all. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 203 Counsel for Parkinson accepted that most of these were matters proper for consideration. prima facie. There is little authority on this matter. the claim of Triplan does seem to be a bona fide claim and to have a reasonable prospect of success. The report is a little confused. The case of Egbert v. Bradnum  3 QBD 324). the plaintiff was restrained from proceeding in the English courts for the following reasons: e f g h i . Davis & Co  WN 86) and this would be so even if the defendant were to counterclaim (Winterfield v. Meanwhile. Hogan (No 2)  2 IR 14. The judge took the offer into account here. a b c d Of crucial importance. The court may refuse the defendant’s application for security for costs when there is a strong prima facie presumption that the defendant will fail in his defence (Crozat v. But counsel for Triplan said it was an important matter which should be taken into account. If the defendant admits part of the claim. by reference to the arguments of the parties. the open offer of a sum. in due course. as in this case. It goes to show that there is substance in the claim. But howsoever that may be. I shall demonstrate. in fact. He was fully entitled so to do. The defendants in the present case were challenging all the points raised by the plaintiff. Then there is the rule which says that it may be a denial of justice to order a plaintiff to give security for the costs of the defendant who has. This was also not a case where. 14). then the plaintiff will not be ordered to give security (De St. and it cannot be said with certainty that the plaintiff would succeed. but he urged that it was not legitimate to take into account a payment into court. I find myself in entire agreement with the judge. Brogden  2 QB 30 at 33. R. then the court may refuse him security (Hogan v. I shall proceed to examine the law on security for costs. And when one adds to that the fact that this application was made at a late hour on the Thursday when the arbitration was due to start on the Monday. at least in part. per Collins J). the defendants would fail in their defence. In the event. In Hogan v.
Billington Ltd v. for example. c d e f g Next. which costs were ordered to be paid out of the fund paid into court as security for those costs. On these facts. This basically was due to the enormous difficulties of enforcing orders of the English courts in foreign jurisdictions. aptly said that: Instances of the exercise of this power have grown up from time to time pro re nata as the court has thought proper. and not obtain merely a barren success.. (3) the applicable law to be applied and adopted would be the law of India.. The plaintiff was visiting England when the proceedings were instituted. Despite .204 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a (1) the cause of action arose in India. in the case where the plaintiff a foreigner the court has ordered security for costs to be given without any statutory power being conferred upon it. and b (4) both the parties resided in India. Gray  Ch. The question is whether this court has the jurisdiction to prevent such a consequence. 99 ER 1087 was the first case of its kind where the practice of requiring foreign litigants to provide security was first mooted. 111 of the report. is to reap the fruits of that litigation. Billington  2 KB 106. the court held that the proceedings have not been brought bona fide in England. 741. In Crozat v. That was a case where an action was taken to restrain a successful litigant from dealing with funds lodged in court pending appeal so as to prevent a successful party on appeal from obtaining a hollow victory devoid of any monetary benefit. h i My research shows that the case of Pray v. Another case to consider would be that of Polini v. the successful party.. (2) the witnesses were in India.. Phillimore J at p. it would be the case of J.. the plaintiff tirelessly sought to enforce a judgment which he had obtained in France. Brogden (supra). Edie  1 TR 267. So the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs. It appears to me as principle that the court ought to possess that jurisdiction because the principle which underlies all orders for the preservation of property is .H.. that . a decision of the Court of King’s Bench which immediately recognised that it had jurisdiction to order security as part of its general power to regulate process and procedure.D. Jessel MR in a well written judgment observed that: The plaintiffs allege … success will be useless to them unless an interim order is made preserving the fund . Obviously the court was concerned in protecting the defendant.
The following anthology of cases would suffice for the moment: h i . Bennell Design & Constructions Pty Ltd  1 ACLR 301 where Street CJ at p. in the Parkinson’s case. Right after the case of Parkinson (supra) . Eventually in England a practice was evolved which require a litigant who was resident abroad to provide security unless the litigant had fixed and permanent assets within the jurisdiction or was a co-plaintiff. the plaintiff was still required to relitigate the matter once again. and they both decided that there was no substantive burden of proof on either party. The South Australian Full Court in Heller Factors Pty Ltd v. survived the test of time. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 205 the existence of that judgment. but that. Davey LJ refused to examine the merits of the case and forthwith ordered the plaintiff to provide security. a b c d e f Street CJ continued further in a serious vein at the same page of the report in these trenchant terms: I prefer to regard the discretion conferred by the section as being one which should be exercised merely with a predisposition in favour of the defendant party. the discretion could properly be regarded as ordinarily exercisable so as to protect a defendant sued by an impecunious company. To confound the matter further. in the Parkinson’s case.R. John Arnold’s Surf Shop Pty Ltd (in liquidation)  ACLC 40 favoured the test enunciated by Lord Denning M. Ltd  WN 157. Not only that an array of cases have since emerged – all supporting the test of Lord Denning M. in Parkinson’s case held that the discretion should only be exercised to refuse security if there were “special circumstances”. Lawton LJ too agreed with the approach of Lord Denning M. if the court in any case takes the view that this protection should not be afforded to the defendant. g Lord Denning’s judgment has always. Cairns LJ. in the minority. 305 of the report remarked that: . thus far. the court was of the view that a litigant residing abroad was considered not to be within the jurisdiction in order to be governed by the procedure for costs and so the litigant must provide security.R. The law developed with the time. in Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd v.R. Triplan Ltd (supra) held that the court had an unfettered discretion to be exercised in all the circumstances of the case. In Re Alabama Portland Cement Co. there was a case of Buckley v. it has an unlimited and unrestricted discretion to give effect to such view without having to look for special circumstances. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v...R. It must be recalled that Lord Denning M.
Westinghouse Electric Australasia Ltd  1 ACLC 967 listed down the relevant matters to be considered in the exercise of the court’s discretion to grant security following closely the items set out by Lord Denning M. such as delay in payment or delay in doing their part of the work. (e) whether the application for security was being used oppressively – so as to try and stifle a genuine claim. (3) the Federal Court in M. The same items were also listed by Needham J in M. Austarama Television Pty Ltd (supra) where at p. (4) by Burchett J in Cameron’s Unit Services Pty Ltd v. Productions Pty Ltd v. b c d e (b) whether the company has a reasonably good prospect of success. (c) whether there is an admission by the defendants on the pleadings or elsewhere that money is due. (f) whether the company’s want of means has been brought about by any conduct of the defendants.A. 407 of the report his Lordship said: i . Austarama Television Pty Ltd  1 ACLC 404. Whelpton & Associates Pty Ltd  11 ACLR 43. in the Parkinson’s case listed some of the matters which the court might take into account in the exercise of its discretion (see  QB 609 at 626) and I need to reproduce them here by way of a summary: (a) whether the company’s claim is bona fide and not a sham. Ariadne Australia Ltd  2 Qd R. and last but not least.206 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a (1) the Queensland Full Court in Harpur v. Gates Export Corp. (No 2)  8 ACLR 588 held that the discretion to grant security was unfettered and that each case must depend upon its own circumstances. in the Parkinson’s case. As I said.R. Lord Denning M. Productions Pty Ltd v.R. f g h Rath J in Michael Bickley Pty Ltd v.A. 523. (d) if there was a payment into court of a substantial sum of money (not merely a payment into court to get rid of a nuisance claim). Kevin R. Westralian Minerals & Drilling Pty Ltd (in liquidation)  4 ACLC 167. Pty Ltd v. It would be interesting to note that the Full Court of the Federal Court in Bell Wholesale Co. (2) the Full Court of Western Australia in Westralian Gold Mines Ltd v.
The plaintiff’s address is at Mumbai. 15 was concerned. Mr. whether the order.A. a b In short. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. In my judgment. and Lysaght v. whether the defendants’ application for security is oppressive in the sense that it is being used merely to deny to an impecunious plaintiff a right to litigate.500 on the ground that the plaintiff was ordinarily resident out of the State. pointed out that this point cannot be the only deciding factor to decide the fate of the plaintiff in so far as encl. Collin Sequerah. It is purely a matter of discretion for the court to insist that the foreign plaintiff be ordered to give security for costs because it is the only just thing to do (Aeronave S. Mr. no two cases would be the same. the plaintiff can safely be described to be ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction (Levene v. Fourthly. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 207 First.P. Vijandran. a decision of Laville J. India. The Plaintiff Is Ordinarily Resident Out Of The Jurisdiction It must be recalled that Dhanveer Enterprise’s head office is at Bombay. Thirdly. v. Secondly. IRC  AC 234). there was no need for me to regurgitate those facts again. D. IRC  AC 217. if made. would stultify the plaintiff’s action. India while its branch office is at Madras. My attention was drawn to the case of Ho Kai Neo & Anor v. Incidentally all the affidavits connected with encl. It was a case where the defendants applied that the plaintiff should give security for costs in the sum of $1.P. Obviously the plaintiff as well as Dhanveer Enterprise are definitely out of the jurisdiction of this court. 15 bore the same facts as the statement of claim and the statement of defence. India. Westland Charters Ltd  1 WLR 1445. I will now examine the arguments advanced by the parties.” Impecunious plaintiff should be ordered to pay security for costs and this would be the balancing act that ought to weigh the pendulum of justice evenly. thus. learned counsel for both the defendants.  3 All ER 531 CA). It was conceded by the plaintiff that she resided out of the jurisdiction and was a woman of no c d e f g h i . argued that it was entirely the court’s discretion to decide whether security for costs should be ordered against the plaintiff in favour of both the defendants. Tan Kim Tee & Anor  MLJ Rep 66. That was a case where the facts were entirely different from the present appeal. All these authorities and the principles distilled from them serve as useful guidelines to adjudicate encl. 15. the court can consider whether the want of assets experienced by the plaintiff is caused by the default of the defendants. One must examine and have regard “to all the circumstances of the case. learned counsel for the plaintiff. The suit was by the widow and a son as executor and beneficiary against the creditor-administrator of her husband’s estate in Johore for breach of trust. the court can consider the strength and bona fides of the plaintiff’s case.
1 p. also resided there.. It is no longer. see per Lord Denning M.’ ‘These words have the effect of conferring upon the Court the real discretion and indeed the Court is bound.R. an Indian national. Andrews 9 QBC 118 together with Wakely v. Ltd. it was argued by her counsel that the usual rule that a plaintiff who resided out of the jurisdiction should put up security for the defendants’ costs did not apply to her. 384). the Court thinks it just to do so. for example.  2 All ER 273. v. 311 of the report aptly said: Order 23 Rule 1(i) provides that the Court may order security for costs ‘if. The Triumph Cycle Co. even the inflexibility of the English Rule is relaxed and a non-resident plaintiff with no assets in the country of trial will not necessarily be called on for security. The connection between the Johore Courts and the Colony Courts is close and the means of enforcing the judgments of the superior Courts of either in the territory of the other ample and convenient. in Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. g h i .  1 KB 214 makes it clear that where the Courts of the country in which the plaintiff resides will enforce and have easy and convenient means of enforcing the judgments of the foreign Court in which the plaintiff sues. to consider the circumstances of each case. the plaintiff carried on business in Bangalore. Its managing partner. The question was whether it was just to order security for costs. The defendants were contesting the legality of the Arbitration award and were applying for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security for costs before the main application was heard. by virtue thereof. b c d e f Mohamed Dzaiddin J (now FCJ) in the Penang High Court in the case of Kasturi Palm Products v. Triplan Ltd. his Lordship Mohamed Dzaiddin J (now FCJ) at p. The plaintiff sought to enforce the award of Arbitration No: 1917 dated 28 January 1980 which was adjudicated by the Arbitrators in London. 67 of the report. For the circumstances. The case of Raeburn v. Ltd. The court ordered the plaintiff to furnish security for costs. In exercising its discretion. Palmex Industries Sdn Bhd  2 MLJ 310 had occasion to decide on the issue of security for costs. In a well written judgment. In that case. having regard to all the circumstances of the case. and in the light thereof to determine whether and to what extent or for what amount a plaintiff may be ordered to provide security for costs. At p. Laville J had this to say: The defendants in their affidavit supporting this summons give as one of the reasons for demanding security for costs the fact of non-residence in the State. On this ground therefore there is no reason why the plaintiffs should be called on to give security for costs. it is clear that the Court will have regard to all the circumstances of the case.’ (Supreme Court Practice 1985 Vol.208 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a substance and that she cannot raise $750 as security but nevertheless. India. an inflexible or rigid rule that a plaintiff resident abroad should provide security for costs.
It is the usual practice of the courts to make a foreign plaintiff give security for costs. 533 – stated as follows: I agree . for the present application I am satisfied that the defendants should be entitled to an order sought for.. However.000. Secondly. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 209 However. From the affidavits of the parties it is quite clear that nowhere was any mention made by the plaintiff regarding the registration of the Arbitrators Award in this Court or notice thereof. one of the issues to be contested in the main application as being contrary to the laws of Malaysia. in Aeronave SPA & Anor. The ordinary rule still remains. in the exercise of my discretion I order the plaintiff to deposit a sum of $10. if the defendant succeeds and gets an order for his costs. it is material to consider one of the grounds of the defendants in disputing the plaintiff’s main application. In the present case. Section 4 of the Act provides that a Judgment Creditor may apply to the High Court at any time within six years after the date of the judgment or after the date of the last judgment given to have the said judgment registered in the High Court.R. of course. as a matter of discretion. Chan that the enforcement of the award is contrary to public policy and the laws of Malaysia. because it is just to do so. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. But it does so. the question is simply whether or not it is just to order security for costs? In my opinion.. Here. Order 67 provides the procedure for such an application which must be supported by an affidavit exhibiting among other things the judgment or certified copy thereof. v.  3 All ER 531 Lord Denning M. security for cost cannot now be ordered as of right from a foreign plaintiff. that it is a matter of discretion. The first consideration is of course the fact that the plaintiff is ordinarily resident out of this jurisdiction. Under this rule the present award by the Arbitrators become enforceable in the same manner as a judgment given by a court in the United Kingdom under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958.00 into Court being security for costs before the next hearing date. In 1894 in Crozat v. it is pertinent to ask whether or not the plaintiff has complied with Order 69 Rule 6 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. but only if the Court thinks it just to order depending on the circumstances of the case. It is deposed by Mr. in his judgment at p. Undoubtedly.. Accordingly. a b c d e f g h i . it is not right that he should have to go to a foreign country to enforce the order . and Ors. Admittedly. The inference here is that the plaintiff may not have complied with Order 69 Rule 6. After all.. Westland Charters Ltd. Costs of this application shall be costs in the cause. But that is putting it too high. If the order is granted the judgment must be registered and notice of registration must be served on the Judgment Debtor. two major considerations clearly merit my attention. this is. that the rule does give a discretion to the court. under Rule 1(i). Brogden Lopes LJ said that there was an inflexible rule that if a foreigner sued he should give security for costs.
Bentley Engineering Co. Ralli Bros Ltd  1 WLR 468).m. It is also clear that in the case of a plaintiff. Ltd  2 QB 587.H. accordingly. It would be useless to obtain a paper judgment and unable to reap the fruit of its success. Why was the plaintiff’s address at Mumbai. If there was no intention to deceive.210 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a b Pure and simple. The Plaintiff Conducts Business Outside The First Schedule To The Reciprocal Enforcement Of Judgments Act 1958 (Revised 1972) (Hereinafter Referred To As The “REJA”) e f Mr. and the applicant should be treated as a plaintiff in the present circumstances. Scheduled areas of the States of Madras and Andhra) h i The defendants’ fear were well founded. that the discretion seems to be invariably exercised in favour of making an order for security for costs. the plaintiff here should be ordered to pay security for costs. the plaintiff was outside jurisdiction. there was no restriction or no impediment for the plaintiff to move to Madras from Bombay or for that matter to any other excluded State in India to evade paying costs. who is out of the jurisdiction and who has no property or assets in the country. v. State of Manipur. It would be most exasperating. The First Schedule to REJA enacts as follows (the relevant ones only): RECIPROCATING COUNTRIES Reciprocating countries Superior courts The High Court. It would simply be a matter of pure discretion nay to be exercised judicially. In the words of Hill JA in Shaik Ali v. Collin Sequerah for the defendants rightly argued that Madras was excluded from the First Schedule of REJA and in the event the plaintiff were to lose his case. This was a case of a foreign plaintiff with no property at all in Malaysia (Hudson Strumpffabrik G. Tribal areas of State of Assam. India in any of the affidavits. 301: It is quite clear that the court has a discretion in the matter. c d and I share the sentiments expressed by his Lordship and. having regard to all the circumstances of the case. g India (excluding State of Jammu and Kashmir. Not only that the plaintiff too had no assets in Malaysia and this fact was not disputed at all. to decide whether to order security for costs or otherwise. and Mavani v.b. India was not set out in the statement of claim? There was no attempt at explaining this failure to state the plaintiff’s address at Mumbai. why was there an absence . Shaik Mohamed  29 MLJ 300.
Moreover the mere fact of the plaintiff owning property in a country which has reciprocal enforcement d e f g h i . But it does so. he resides in a country where provision exists for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments with the country in which the suit is instituted. it is not right that he should have to go to a foreign country to enforce the order. her Ladyship examined the relevant authorities and said: Thus following the principles as are found in authorities such as Lek Swee Hua v. the court has a discretion to order security for costs to be furnished by a foreigner plaintiff even where there are co-plaintiffs resident within the jurisdiction. Circus American Ltd & Ors  2 MLJ 75 have shown. however. as a matter of discretion. The headnote to the case of Coldham v. Jacob Marx & Co. Ltd  MLJ Rep 40 makes for interesting reading. Viking Engineering Sdn Bhd  2 AMR 1009 had occasion to address the issue of security for costs and there her Ladyship ordered the foreign plaintiff to pay RM45. Surely this would be another good reason to order the plaintiff to give security for costs. 1017 of the report. if any. because it is just to do so. and Pittsburgh Crushed Steel Co. Even assuming that the plaintiff has property within jurisdiction. As case laws such as Shaik Ali v. 1016 to p.000. It is undisputed that the plaintiff has no property within jurisdiction. approximately about 1/4 of the plaintiff’s claim of RM200. Brown  2 KB 844. if the defendant succeeds and gets an order for his costs. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 211 of an explanation in the affidavits of the plaintiff.000 as security for costs. then security for costs will not be required to be furnished. Seaspeed Ferries  1 WLR 1197. Shaik Mohamed  MLJ 310 and Ace King Ltd v. At p. American Express  2 MLJ 151 and Slazenger v. courts are more likely to order security for costs to be given to the defendant in such circumstances. It is worded as follows: A plaintiff ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction of the Court. If. (Chellew v. After all.  WN 36). will generally be ordered to give security for costs. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. there is not even the presence of a co-plaintiff resident in these parts. it is not sufficient ground for this court to allow security. v. who could be relied upon should the need arise to meet claims. since it is clear as illustrated by Lord Denning MR in Aeronave SPA & Westland Charters  1 WLR 1146 that: It is the usual practice of the courts to make a foreign plaintiff give security for costs. Raub Australian Gold Mining Co. a b c Zainun Ali JC (now judge) in Adarsh Pandit v. In the present case.
212 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a of judgment agreement with Malaysia. In the present appeal. b At p. does not arise here.29 as claimed by the plaintiff and I entirely agree with the decision of the SAR. Viking Engineering Sdn Bhd (supra) by ordering the plaintiff to pay RM80. 1018 of the report.00 as security for costs on the basis of approximately 1/4 out of the sum of RM319. Dato’ Michael Chong  2 MLJ 404 ordered the plaintiff. is not sufficient reason not to grant the order. Each case gives the factual matrix that will strike a chord with the existing authorities and would definitely be easier to handle and adjudicate. her Ladyship continued in serious vein: The plaintiff made much also of the nature of this application. the SAR dutifully followed the formula expounded by her Ladyship Zainun Ali JC (now judge) in Adarsh Pandit v. The plaintiff argued that the Federal Court did not hear the merits of the case but proceeded to grant conditional leave to the defendant. stating that it is oppressive to him and would suppress his claim which is said to be genuine.219. This point is illustrated in the case of Faridah Begum  2 MLJ 404 and Ng Hui Lip  MLJ 57. Rant Australia Gold Mining Co  MLJ 50. the question of oppression alone even if it exists. a Singaporean. The plaintiff made much also of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success in this matter.000. As clearly illustrated in the case of Porzelack KG v. All these authorities serve as mere guidelines. is not also a ground for the court refusing to order security. c d e f Ariffin Zakaria J in Faridah Begum bte Abdullah v. that it is not in every application such as this that the merits of the case will be examined. who was ordinarily resident out of jurisdiction and who had failed to state her permanent address and who was a bankrupt and who did not have sufficient assets within jurisdiction to pay RM15. parties should not attempt to go into the merits of the case unless it can clearly be demonstrated one way or another that there is a high degree of probability of success. Porzelack UK (Ltd)  1 All ER 1074. on the plaintiff’s success in the Order 14 application both before the Registrar and before the Judge in Chambers. This question though relevant. The plaintiff submitted that this is based as it were. In any case. Each case tells a story of its own. which is distinguished from Coldham v. I will say this here and now. g h i . since the enforcement is not automatic.000 into court as security for costs.
242 explained the effect of ratification in these salient words: That an act done. whether it be for his detriment or his advantage. one of whom. It is here that the law of agency comes into play. the principal. Tindal CJ in Wilson v.. is the known and well-established principle of law. f g h i . expressly or impliedly consents that the other. It was said that Ali was not authorised to do what he did and that Ali went on a frolic of his own. by a person. and whether it be founded on a tort or a contract. The plaintiff blamed the defendants for the predicament in which he was now facing. & G. at p. e It is therefore correct to say and I so say that the law of agency is concerned with the powers and liabilities of principal and agent particularly in regard to the powers of the agent and the liabilities of the principal.. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 213 Assets Belonging To The Plaintiff In India Were Frozen By The Indian Authorities The defendants were faulted. for another. similarly consenting. a consensual relationship in which one (the agent) holds in trust for and subject to the control of another (the principal) a power to affect certain legal relations of that other.. This was certainly an issue that require a detailed examination of the facts of the whole case. art. It was not a simple shut and close case. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. Tumman  6 Man. The defendants did not ratify the acts of Ali. the relationship that exists between two persons. Bowstead on Agency. the agent. to the same effect as by. It was Ali that had orchestrated the whole thing. and with all the consequences which follow from the same act done by his previous authority. though without any precedent authority whatever. This was certainly not a case where the defendants gave validity to Ali’s unauthorised acts by way of ratification. 12th edn. Pure and simple the defendant’s stand was that Ali had no authority to do what he had done. becomes the act of the principal if subsequently ratified by him. should represent him or act on his behalf. not assuming to act for himself. 868 describes agency as: . The defendants’ stand were quite simple. but for such other person. Ali’s role as an agent was challenged by the defendants vehemently.. In that case the principal is bound by the act. 2 defines agency as: . It was a pure question of law as to whether Ali had apparent or ostensible authority to do what he did. a b c d Professor Seavey in “The Rationale of Agency” (1920) 29 Yale LJ 859 at p. 236. It was said that the Government authorities in India were not happy with the plaintiff for having cheated those Indian workers that responded to the recruitment drive.
the Government of India would lift the embargo. security for costs should be ordered against the plaintiff. It was not the time and place to delve into the deeper aspects of the case. which says: ‘… A major matter for consideration is the likelihood of the plaintiff succeeding …’ This is the second occasion recently on which I have had a major hearing on security for costs and in which the parties have sought to investigate in considerable detail the likelihood or otherwise of success in the action. That would be on the footing that the plaintiff would win and. in any event. Similarly. But. In the words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.214 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a b c By ratification. alas. The scales of justice. in the sense that there is a very high probability of success. So much for the law on agency. It was a mere speculation bereft of any evidential value. Mr. Vijandran submitted that the scales were equally balanced and in the event it tilt. So much for the Indian red tape. Having regard to the circumstances of the case. A detailed examination of the possibilities of success or failure merely blows the case up into a large interlocutory hearing involving great expenditure of both money and time. for the foregoing reasons.P. the Indian Government would lift the sanction on the plaintiff’s assets. Reverting back to the mainstream of the case. Vijandran unabashedly admitted that there was no affidavit forthcoming from the Indian official and he even said that it was also difficult to procure an affidavit from an official from India.P. Indeed. then that is a matter that can properly be weighed in the balance.C. the agent is being treated as having been authorised from the very beginning to act in the manner in which he did. The decision is necessarily made at an interlocutory stage on inadequate material and without any hearing of the evidence. I do not think that is a right course to adopt on an application for security for costs. D. and the matter would come to an end. tilted in favour of the defendants. para 23/1-3/2. it would tilt in favour of the plaintiff. 1077: The matters urged before me have spread over a fairly wide field. it would be too premature to examine the merits of the case in great detail. Mr. in Porzelack KG v. Undoubtedly. presumably following the note in The Supreme Court Practice 1985 vol 1. Porzelack (UK) Ltd  1 All ER 1074. First there have been attempts to go into the likelihood of the plaintiff winning the case or the defendant winning the case. if the plaintiff wins the question of the defendants’ costs would not arise at all. The Merits Of The Case In an application for security for costs. so to speak. there was no affidavit evidence from the Indian official in India to say that if the plaintiff wins. if it can clearly be demonstrated that the plaintiff is likely to succeed. D. if it can be d e f g h i . an argument was advanced that in the event the plaintiff wins the case. I beg to disagree.
In evaluating the prospects of success of either party. at p. There was no necessity at all. that is a matter that can be weighed. It was pointed out that the plaintiff has filed the list of documents promptly in conformity and in pursuance to O. that there was a high probability of success or failure. I have in the early part of this judgment set out in extenso the facts of the case as garnered from the pleadings without going into the merits of the case. 67 right hand column. I must shy away from a very detailed evaluation of the merits of the case. an argument was advanced to the effect that the plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine interest in having the matter adjudicated in a court of law. all these arguments must be viewed in the context of the circumstances of the whole case. 4 CLJ Raju Rajaram Pillai v. and Ace King Pte Ltd v. in view of these facts. one way or the other. with respect. This was my judgment and I so ordered accordingly. Nevertheless. a Even the Court of Appeal in Trident International Freight Services Ltd v. It was said that the plaintiff’s claim was bona fide. The plaintiff said that the current difficulties encountered by the plaintiff were all due to the defendants. Whether The Plaintiff’s Claim Was Bona Fide? It would be very difficult to evaluate the prospects of success of the plaintiff’s case at this stage. Surely the Malaysian courts. Shaik Mohamed (supra). But for myself I deplore the attempt to go into the merits of the case unless it can be clearly demonstrated one way or another that there is a high degree of probability of success or failure. b c d e f g h i . Suffice for me to say that there was available evidence to direct the plaintiff to provide security for costs. I repeat that this was a case of a foreign plaintiff with no assets within jurisdiction (Shaik Ali v. (Ho Kai Neo & Anor v. The Malaysian defendants must be protected as a matter of public policy. 1 of the RHC. But. MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor  5 CLJ 1. must swing in favour of the Malaysian defendants by ordering the plaintiff to tender security for costs. at this juncture. This was a case of a foreign plaintiff outside jurisdiction and with no postal address in Malaysia unlike the case of Abdul Fattah Mogawan & Anor v. Manchester Ship Canal Co and Another  BCLC 263 was of the view that in an application for security for costs it was not appropriate to go into the merits of the case unless it can be clearly demonstrated. The plaintiffs’ claim was quite substantial. That the summons for directions had been filed and the plaintiff had duly prosecuted the case. Tan Kim Tee & Anor (supra). to go into a minute and in depth detail of the merits of the case. 24 r. Circus Americano Ltd & Ors  2 MLJ 75). last line to page 68 left hand column at A). MMC Power Sdn Bhd & Anor 215 shown that there is a very high probability that the defendant will succeed. It was also said that the plaintiff was pursuing the matter diligently.
The nett result would be obvious. Conclusion All the circumstances of the case have been considered by me in adjudicating the appeal to the judge in chambers in encl. That was a case where the company was not registered in Malaysia and the court considered it as not within the jurisdiction even though the company had established goodwill. On these facts. the plaintiff is a foreigner and had not even established goodwill. the court there exercised its discretion to order security for costs. The plaintiff chose to litigate in Malaysia and they must submit to the jurisdiction of the Malaysian courts. It must be borne in mind that it was the plaintiff that instituted the suit and the defendants were merely exercising their legal rights to defend themselves. the situation was far better than the facts of the present case. c d e f g h i . reputation and made its presence felt locally.216 Current Law Journal  4 CLJ a b In Compagnie Generale Des Eaux v. in the present appeal. Enclosure 15 should be dismissed with costs. reputation nor made its presence felt in Malaysia and surely the plaintiff must be ordered to pay security for costs. 15. Compagnie Generale Des Eaux Sdn Bhd  1 MLJ 55. Stifling The Plaintiff’s Action This point was taken in an attempt to persuade me not to order security for costs. Here.

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