Source: https://www.ptab.us/2017/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:14:11+00:00

Document:
We concur with the Examiner. The claims do not recite a functional relationship between the specific contents of the tables and the claimed, system, thus the difference between the data in the tables of Raghupathy and the claimed data to not provide a patentable distinction. “Once it is determined that the limitation is directed to printed matter, one must then determine if the matter is functionally or structurally related to the associated physical substrate, and only of the answer is ‘no’ is the printed matter owed no patentable weight.” In re Distefano, 808 F.3d. 845, 851 (Fed Cir. 2015).
Appellants have provided no other evidence to show that the claimed method produces cells that survive for at least 144 hours, but in any case “[t]he written description requirement requires possession as shown in the specification, not as shown by prior experimental work.” Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz lnc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Claim 1 is a method “comprising” certain steps. The Federal Circuit has held “the open-ended term ‘comprising’ . . . . means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997); David Netzer Consulting Eng’r LLC v. Shell Oil Co., 824 F.3d 989, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, the claims as presently written do not preclude tracking and displaying additional information.
3775 Ex Parte Belliard et al 13554196 - (D) PESLAK 103 Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner / Zimmer SIPP, AMY R.
“The definiteness inquiry focuses on whether those skilled in the art would understand the scope of the claim when the claim is read in light of the rest of the [S]pecification. Even if the written description does not enable the claims, the claim language itself may still be definite.” Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 692, (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
See In re Burhans, 154 F.2d 690, 692 (CCPA 1946) (“There is no merit in the point here in the absence of any proof in the record that the order of performing the steps produces any new and unexpected results.”); In re Gibson, 39 F.2d 975, 976 (CCPA 1930) (selection of any order of mixing ingredients is prima facie obvious.). However, Gibson and Burhans are applicable to situations where one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably expected from the steps described in the applied prior art that changing the order of steps would produce substantially the same result.
Moreover, because the claim requires both promoting hemostasis and “stanching” separate and apart from promoting hemostasis, and because each limitation in a claim is material to defining the scope of the invention, Warner-Jenkins on Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention”), we construe the term “stanch” as used in claim 19 to mean stopping or restricting the flow of blood to a wound.
Additionally, “[o]bviousness requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination.” Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Moreover, while it is well-established that any obviousness analysis must, on some level, rely on hindsight, it is impermissible to engage in a hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention, using the applicant’s invention as a template and selecting elements from references to fill the gaps. Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
3763 Ex Parte Dimashkieh et al 13822627 - (D) STAICOVICI 103 Richard C. Litman DARB, HAMZA A.

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