Source: http://www.taylorporter.com/blog/post/can-an-employer-be-vicariously-intoxicated-under-la.-c.c.-art.-2315.4
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:27:52+00:00

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Can An Employer Be Vicariously Intoxicated Under La. C.C. Art. 2315.4?
"Until the Louisiana Supreme Court resolves these conflicting decisions, however, an employer’s vicarious liability for exemplary damages under art. 2315.4 will remain unsettled. "
​ The concept of damages under Louisiana law has long been viewed as a means by which a party is compensated for a proven injury or loss. On the other hand, monetary awards designed to punish or deter reckless conduct, referred to as punitive or exemplary damages, are disfavored under our law and awarded only when expressly authorized by statute. Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4, one of the most contentious punitive statutes, allows for exemplary damages when “injuries on which the action is based were caused by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries.” The plain language of art. 2315.4 focuses squarely on the conduct of an intoxicated driver who causes injury. Whether an employer can be held vicariously liable for the exemplary damages arising out of the reckless conduct of its intoxicated employee, however, remains unsettled.
In Smith v. Zurich, one of the earliest reported decisions on vicarious liability under art. 2315.4, Judge Berrigan of the Eastern District of Louisiana granted an employer’s summary judgment on exemplary damages, holding that art. 2315.4 applies only to the defendant “[w]hose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause-in-fact of the injuries.” Over the years, various Louisiana appellate courts extended the reach of the statute by imposing punitive damages beyond just the intoxicated driver. For instance, in Bourque v. Bailey, the Third Circuit determined that art. 2315.4 damages could be assessed against the driver, his insurer, and his “legal representative” whom the court defined as “[a]nyone affiliated with the party targeted by the punitive provisions of [the article].” Similarly, in Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., the Fifth Circuit held that “[p]unitive damages, like any other type of negligence, may be imputed to a principal through the acts of its agent.” To hold otherwise, according to Rivera, would “virtually eliminate[e] punitive damage awards.” Though Bourque and Rivera did not address vicarious liability of an employer, the parallels are obvious.
Subsequently, in Curtis v. Rome, the Fourth Circuit held that the employer was vicariously responsible for the damage caused by its employee, “includ[ing] exemplary damages under 2315.4.” Thereafter, in Lacoste v. Crochet, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged its previous decision in Curtis, stating that “[t]his Court held that an intoxicated driver’s employer, when held vicariously liable for damages caused by the driver, may be cast for exemplary damages under 2315.4.” However, the precedential value of Lacoste is questionable in this instance as the employer focused its appellate arguments on whether the plaintiff proved legal intoxication of its employee rather than challenging vicarious liability for art. 2315.4 damages.
Following Curtis and Lacoste, the Louisiana Supreme Court confronted the reach of art. 2315.4 in Berg v. Zummo and found that the legislature’s intention was to specifically target and punish intoxicated drivers. Specifically, the court held that art. 2315.4 “[d]oes not allow for imposition of punitive damages against person[s] who have allegedly contributed to the driver’s intoxication” and thus refused to extend liability under art. 2315.4, in this instance, to the bartender who served the intoxicants or otherwise contributed to the driver’s intoxication. Notably, the court acknowledged previous appellate decisions that found employers vicariously liable for art. 2315.4 damages but reserved judgment on that legal issue for another day.
The language in Romero regarding whether the employer could have prevented the employee’s intoxication was limited to the employee’s own negligence and arguably immaterial to the Court’s ultimate ruling on exemplary damages under art. 2315.4. However, at least one trial court sitting in the Third Circuit has since relied on that language to distinguish its holding. Specifically, in Favors v. Aaron’s, Inc., the trial court, accepting the petition’s allegations as true, found a cause of action for vicarious liability for exemplary damages under art. 2315.4 because the employer of the allegedly intoxicated driver knew or had reason to know its employee was routinely working while under the influence of illegal substances and had certain corporate drug testing policies and procedures in place that, if followed, could have prevented the employee’s intoxicated state and subsequent accident and injury to the plaintiff. Though the trial court’s ruling allowed a cause of action for vicarious liability of art. 2315.4 damages to survive a judgment on the pleadings, it actually enhanced the plaintiff’s burden at trial beyond simply proving that the employee was intoxicated and in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, this ruling was not published and no appellate court has interpreted Romero in that fashion.
The Curtis and Lacoste decisions finding employers vicariously liable for exemplary damages under art. 2315.4 have not been overruled; nor have the holdings in Bourque or Rivera that arguably allow for exemplary damages to be assessed against a “legal representative” or “principal” of the intoxicated driver, respectively. Moreover, at least one trial court distinguished Romero and recognized a cause of action for vicarious liability for exemplary damages when the employer allegedly “knew or should have known” or “could have prevented” its employee’s intoxication and resulting accident. Notwithstanding, the more recent trend beginning with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Berg followed by Darby, Romero, and Langford is to shield anyone other than the intoxicated driver from liability for exemplary damages under art. 2315.4.
Until the Louisiana Supreme Court resolves these conflicting decisions, however, an employer’s vicarious liability for exemplary damages under art. 2315.4 will remain unsettled. Given the serious injuries that are typically caused by intoxicated drivers and the fact that most liability policies do not insure punitive conduct, the highest court’s resolution of this legal question cannot come soon enough.
 1996 WL 537746 (E.D. La. 1996).
 1993-1657 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/21/94), 643 So. 2d 236, 241.
 96-502 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/30/97), 697 So.2d 327, 336.
 1998-0966 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/5/99), 735 So.2d 822, 826.
 1999-0602 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/5/00), 751 So.2d 998, 1003-1004.
 2007-0407 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/23/07), 960 So.2d 226, 234.
 2010-338 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/29/10), 54 So. 3d 789.
 Romero v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., No. 2008-11097-I (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) 2009 WL 8637959.
 Romero, 54 So. 3d at 792.
 Favors v. Aaron’s, Inc., et. al. (La. Dist. Ct. 2014) (unpublished, no written reasons) The Third Circuit and Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently denied writs and this legal issue was not appealed.
 2015 WL 518736 (W.D. La. February 6, 2015).
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