Source: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/ctappub/0508/opa050218-0809.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:17:45+00:00

Document:
State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Randy Leroy Schmidt, Respondent. A05-218, Court of Appeals Unpublished, August 9, 2005.
����������� Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
����������� 1.�������� A motorist�s South Dakota DWI convictions and license revocations, based on uncounseled chemical testing, violated the motorist's Minnesota constitutional right to assistance of counsel before deciding whether to submit to alcohol-concentration testing, and thus the South Dakota convictions and revocations cannot be used for enhancement purposes.
����������� The district court granted respondent�s motion to dismiss counts one and two of a four-count criminal complaint, charging respondent with one count of first-degree DWI, in violation of Minn. Stat. � 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2002); one count of first-degree refusal, in violation of Minn. Stat. � 169A.20, subd. 2 (2002); one count of driving after revocation, in violation of Minn. Stat. � 171.24, subd. 2 (2002); and one count of open bottle, in violation of Minn. Stat. � 169A.35, subd. 3 (2002).� On this appeal from the district court�s pretrial order, the state contends that the district court erred in dismissing the two felony counts and that dismissal has a critical impact on the trial.� Concluding that while dismissing counts one and two has a critical impact on the trial, the district court did not err in dismissing the two felony counts.� We affirm.
����������� On March 1, 2004, an officer with the Blue Earth Police Department received a report of an intoxicated person attempting to purchase fuel at a gas station.� After observing indicia of intoxication, the officer asked respondent Randy Leroy Schmidt to perform field sobriety tests and submit to a preliminary breath test.� Respondent refused, and the officer placed him under arrest for driving while impaired. �The officer read respondent the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory, and respondent refused to submit to a breath test or blood test. �An opened bottle of alcohol was found in respondent�s vehicle.� A check of respondent�s driving history indicated 11 DWI convictions in South Dakota from 1985-2002, one DWI conviction in Minnesota on May 25, 2000, and that respondent�s driver�s license was revoked.� Under Minnesota law, respondent�s history of multiple DWI offenses permitted enhancement of his current charge.
����������� On October 25, 2004, respondent moved to dismiss counts one and two of the complaint based on State v. Bergh, 679 N.W.2d 734 (Minn. App. 2004).� Respondent argued that because the prior convictions and revocations used to enhance the current charges were from South Dakota, and he was not advised of his right to counsel prior to submitting to any of the testing in South Dakota, the felony counts should be dismissed.� The district court issued an order dismissing counts one and two of the complaint, and finding that respondent�s prior DWI convictions and license revocations from South Dakota could not be used to enhance his current offense because his Minnesota constitutional rights were violated when he was not given the opportunity in South Dakota to consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to a test.
����������� Did the district court clearly err in dismissing counts one and two of the complaint?
1.� When the state appeals a pretrial order, the district court must be affirmed unless the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that (1) the district court erred in its judgment, and (2) unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the trial�s outcome.� State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn. 1987).� Dismissal of a complaint satisfies the critical impact requirement.� State v. Dendy, 598 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1999).� Thus, this court must consider whether the state met its burden of establishing that the district court clearly erred in application of law to the undisputed facts of this case. �State v. Trei, 624 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn. App. 2001).
Appellant argues that the district court erred in ruling that because respondent had no pre-testing right to counsel in South Dakota, his prior South Dakota DWI convictions and revocations cannot be used to enhance the current offense from a gross misdemeanor to a felony.� Appellant does not dispute that, with the exception of one May 2000 Minnesota DWI conviction, respondent�s prior DWI convictions and license revocations occurred in South Dakota.� Appellant also concedes that in South Dakota a driver is not entitled to assistance of counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a chemical analysis to determine intoxication under the implied-consent law.� Blow v. Comm�r of Motor Vehicles, 164 N.W.2d 351, 354 (S.D. 1969).� In Minnesota, however, a driver has a limited right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing.� Friedman v. Comm�r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991).� In Friedman, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that under the Minnesota Constitution the pre-testing phase of an implied-consent or DWI proceeding is a �critical stage� at which a driver has a limited right to consult with an attorney.� Id. at 833-35.
Appellant contends that the district court erred in relying on State v. Bergh, 679 N.W.2d 734 (Minn. App. 2004), and dismissing counts one and two of the complaint.� In Bergh, a driver was charged with first-degree DWI based upon three qualified prior impaired-driving incidents, including one revocation of his Colorado driver�s license following a Colorado DWI conviction.� 679 N.W.2d at 736.� The Colorado DWI conviction and license revocation were based on a chemical test, and, under Colorado law, the driver was not entitled to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing.� Id.� The driver argued that because Colorado law violated his Minnesota constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, neither the Colorado conviction nor the revocation could be used to enhance the Minnesota offense to first-degree DWI.� Id.� The district court ruled that the Colorado conviction could not be used to enhance the Minnesota offense, but that the Colorado license revocation could be used for enhancement.� Id.� On appeal, this court held that the revocation could not be used to enhance the driver�s Minnesota offense because the driver�s Colorado license revocation depended on the driver�s chemical-test failure, and the driver was denied his right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing.� Id. at 738.
Appellant argues, however, that this case is controlled by State v. Dumas, 587 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. App. 1999).� In Dumas, this court determined the reach of State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1983), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a criminal conviction in which the defendant was not represented by counsel and the right to counsel was not properly waived, could not be used to enhance a subsequent DWI offense.� Dumas, 587 N.W.2d at 302.� The issue in Dumas was whether Nordstrom prohibited the use of any prior uncounseled finding to enhance a charge, or whether it prohibited enhancement only when the prior finding was obtained in violation of a defendant�s constitutional rights.� Id.� This court read Nordstrom as �prohibiting the use of a prior unconstitutionally obtained conviction to enhance a subsequent charge.� Id.� In Dumas, the driver did not allege that the past license revocation used to enhance the current offense was unconstitutionally obtained.� Id.� This court held that the statutory provision enhancing DWI and test-refusal offenses on the basis that they occurred within five years of an uncounseled license revocation under the implied-consent law did not violate the defendant�s right to counsel. �Id. at 305.� But the driver in Bergh claimed that his constitutional rights were violated when he was denied pre-test assistance of counsel; the driver in Dumas did not claim any constitutional violation.� Bergh, 679 N.W.2d at 737.
Appellant further suggests that the rule from Bergh presents equal-protection problems in two specific situations.�� First, appellant argues that application of this rule ��creates a disparity in the treatment of in-state and out-of-state license revocations.�� Appellant points to State v. McLellan, 655 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. App. 2003), in which this court held that enhancement of a DWI charge based on a prior revocation of a driver�s Minnesota driver�s license following an uncounseled guilty plea to DWI in another state did not violate due process.� In McLellan, however, the enhancement was not based on the uncounseled guilty plea to the out-of-state DWI, but rather was enhanced because the driver�s Minnesota driver�s license was revoked as a result of the DWI conviction.� Id. at 671.� Moreover, the driver in McLellan did not petition for judicial review under Minn. Stat. � 169A.53 (2003); therefore, the Minnesota license revocation went unchallenged.� Id.
2.�������� Appellant suggests that this court should analyze this case differently from Bergh to avoid violating the principle of stare decisis that binds this court to follow its own decisions. �See, e.g., State v. DeShay, 645 N.W.2d 185, 189 (Minn. App. 2002), aff�d, 669 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 2003).� Appellant relies on State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1985), and State v. Heaney, 689 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 2004), in proposing that this court adopt an exclusionary-rule analysis in determining when to use DWI convictions and license revocations resulting from uncounseled pre-test determinations for enhancement purposes.

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