Source: http://mn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180111_0000038.DMN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 18:10:57+00:00

Document:
Defendants Jerome Ruzicka, W. Jeffrey Taylor, Lawrence Miller, and Lawrence Hagen have been charged in connection with the alleged embezzlement of funds from Starkey Laboratories. The Government and Defendants have brought motions in limine in advance of trial to resolve a number of evidentiary disputes. The Court issues this Opinion and Order to address those motions.
[W]here evidence of other crimes is ‘so blended or connected, with the one[s] on trial as that proof of one incidentally involves the other[s]; or explains the circumstances; or tends logically to prove any element of the crime charged, ' it is admissible as an integral part of the immediate context of the crime charged. When the other crimes evidence is so integrated, it is not extrinsic and therefore not governed by Rule 404(b).
United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 1999) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Swinton, 75 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1996)).
The United States claims that Ruzicka and Hagen co-owned Soundpoint, which was purchased by Starkey for $850, 000. (Gov. MILs at 15-16.) Ruzicka allegedly received $230, 000 from the sale but reported on his 2010 tax return that he only received $100, 000. Count 27 of the indictment alleges that Ruzicka provided materially false information on his 2010 tax return. (Indictment ¶¶ 71-72.) In Aldridge, the Eighth Circuit concluded that evidence of a pyramid scheme was admissible because the scheme was “inextricably intertwined” with the filing of false tax returns. 561 F.3d at 766. The Court finds Aldridge to be instructive and concludes that Ruzicka's dealings with Soundpoint are intertwined with the charge of filing a false tax return.
The United States claims that Ruzicka used his position as Starkey's president to obtain consulting fees from Audiometrix and Hearing Fusion. (Gov. MILs at 18.) Although the alleged fraud stemming from Audiometrix and Hearing Fusion is not contained within the Indictment, the Court finds this fraud substantially similar to the fraudulent acts actually alleged. The Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Holliman is analogous. 291 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2002). In Holliman, the indictment alleged that the defendant had stolen thirteen vehicles, and the defendant was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to transport stolen vehicles in interstate commerce. Id. at 500-01. The district court admitted evidence that he had stolen other vehicles during the conspiracy beyond the thirteen alleged in the indictment. Id. at 501-02. The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence “did not concern ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts' under Rule 404(b), ” but was “admissible under the doctrine of res gestae, as this evidence was sufficiently connected to the charged crimes that it tended logically to prove elements of these crimes.” Id. at 501-02 (citing United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1229 (8thCir. 1998)). Like the additional vehicles in Holliman, the Court finds that evidence of Ruzicka's scheme with respect to Audiometrix and Hearing Fusion is sufficiently connected to the crime of Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud.
The Court must also decide whether the admission of this evidence would run afoul of Defendants' Sixth Amendment rights “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against them. The Indictment makes no mention of Soundpoint, Audiometrix, or Hearing Fusion. “An indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense charged, lets the defendant know what he needs to do to defend himself, and would allow him to plead a former acquittal or conviction if he were charged with a similar offense.” United States v. Whitlow, 815 F.3d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 2016). “Usually an indictment that tracks the statutory language is sufficient.” Id. The Court concludes that the indictment meets these threshold Sixth Amendment requirements. See id.
The Court must decide whether to exclude impeachment evidence that female employees were awarded bonuses, employment contracts, compensation packages, or insurance contracts, to quell harassment complaints against Austin and Sawalich. The Court cannot ascertain the relevance of this evidence without first viewing it. The Court will order Defendants to produce the evidence related to harassment for the Court's in camera review.
The Court must decide whether to exclude evidence related to Austin's divorce settlement. The Court cannot ascertain the relevance of this evidence without first viewing it. The Court will order Defendants to produce the evidence related to the settlement for the Court's in camera review.
The Court must decide whether to exclude evidence that the Starkey Foundation provided defective hearing aids to impoverished individuals in other countries. The Court cannot ascertain the relevance of this evidence without first viewing it. The Court will order Defendants to produce evidence related to the donated hearing aids for the Court's in camera review.
The Court must decide whether to exclude two statements made by Austin. First, Austin allegedly said, “The only mistake that the Nazis made was keeping records.” (Gov. MILs at 22.) While the Court acknowledges that this statement contains some probative value about Austin's views on recordkeeping, the Court finds that this probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice resulting from the outrageously anti-Semitic nature of the comment. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Of course, Defendants are otherwise permitted to question witnesses about Austin's views on recordkeeping.
Second, Austin allegedly said, “Everyone deserves a good f[uc]king once in a while.” (Gov. MILs at 22.) Defendants have not explained why this statement is probative, and the Court cannot ascertain to what issue it relates. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that this statement is highly prejudicial despite whatever probative value it may have. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the Government's motions to exclude both of these statements made by Austin.
The Court must decide whether to exclude evidence that Austin believed that he had one or more conversations with wildlife, angels, or other ethereal beings. “[A] tendency to hallucinate is so like a direct physical impairment [to the witness's perception] as to fall well within the old-fashioned rule, ” and therefore “a court must not keep such evidence from the jury.” United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Government argues that these are not hallucinations but rather religious beliefs and are inadmissible as impeachment evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 610. The Government has stretched the definition of “religious beliefs” further than it may go. Not all of these purported hallucinations relate to religious beliefs. For example, Defendants claim that “Austin has told multiple people that he has had back-and-forth conversations in English with deer that he shot dead while hunting.” (Ruzicka Resp. at 4.) The Court finds that the evidence the Government seeks to exclude is not prohibited by Rule 610. The Court will therefore deny the Government's motion to exclude evidence of Austin's discussions with wildlife, angels, or other ethereal beings.

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