Source: https://casetext.com/case/ajp-grp
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:45:50+00:00

Document:
AJP Group, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Patsy Holmes, Gabriel Ponce, Freeman Todd, Gay Todd, Leon P. Butler, Jr., Edgar A. Woodward, and Betty Woodward, Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Amend Complaint and Remand [Doc. # 21] filed by Plaintiff AJP Group, LLC ("Sonoco"). For the reasons discussed herein, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion and remands this case to the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County.
Under Local Rule 7.08, "hearings on motions may be ordered by the Court in its discretion. Unless so ordered, motions may be determined without a hearing." The issues have been briefed by the parties, and the Court believes a hearing is not necessary.
This lawsuit arises out of the operation of a mobile home park located in North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina called Creekside Mobile Home Park. Plaintiff initially brought this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County alleging several causes of action, including violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("SCUPTA"), breach of contract, violation of the South Carolina Manufactured Home Park Tenancy Act "MHP Tenancy Act"), and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
On March 7, 2013, Defendant Patsy Holmes ("Defendant Holmes") removed this action to federal court. [See Not. of Removal, Doc. # 1.] On March 14, 2013, Defendant Holmes also filed a Motion to Dismiss. After retaining new counsel, on March 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend and Remand at issue. Plaintiff seeks to add a non-diverse Defendant, remove the sole federal cause of actions, and requests that this Court remand the case to state court.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B), a party may amend its pleading once as a mater of course "21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier."
A defendant bears the burden of establishing the existence of removal jurisdiction. Mulachey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, a district court must strictly construe removal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)). If federal jurisdiction is in doubt, remand to state court is necessary. Id. "In order for removal jurisdiction to exist, a federal court must have original jurisdiction." Gressette v. Sunset Grille, Inc., 447 F.Supp.2d 533, 535 (D.S.C. 2006). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have jurisdiction over all matters arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing courts have supplemental jurisdiction if the state law claims are "so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction [federal question or diversity jurisdiction] that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution").
As an initial matter, Plaintiff may amend its Complaint to add an additional Defendant and to remove the federal RICO cause of action.
First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow Plaintiff leave to amend as a matter of course. This is Plaintiff's first request to amend, and it was filed on March 28, 2013, only fourteen days after Defendant Holmes filed her Motion to Dismiss (and only twenty-one days after the case was removed to this Court). Plaintiff amendment was thus made within twenty-one "days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f) . . . ." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
Both parties mistakenly rely on the previous version of Rule 15 in discussing whether Plaintiff may amend its Complaint. Defendant, for example, erroneously states that "once a responsive pleading has been filed, a party may amend its pleading 'only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.'" [Resp., Doc. # 54, at 3.] However, Rule 15 was amended on Dec. 1, 2009, to eliminate this requirement. "[T]he right to amend once as a matter of course is no longer terminated by service of a responsive pleading. The responsive pleading may point out issues that the original pleader had not considered and persuade the pleader that amendment is wise." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note (2009).
Given that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint states no federal cause of action, the Court finds that the case should be remanded.
Some of the defendants argue that the Court should decide their several motions to dismiss prior to remand. But decision of the issues presented by those defense motions would be dispositive of the state causes of action. The real question now presented is whether, having dismissed the federal claims, this Court should proceed, on the basis of its pendent jurisdiction, to decide the plethora of state law issues contained in the complaint. . . . As only state law claims remain, I believe these claims are best heard in the state tribunal.
McGann v. Mungo, 578 F. Supp. 1413, 1416-17 (D.S.C. 1982). Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff's request to remand this case.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint and Remand [Doc. # 21] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that this case is hereby REMANDED to the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas for Horry County County, South Carolina. A certified copy of this Order of Remand shall be mailed by the Clerk of this Court to the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County, South Carolina.

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 § 1961
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 § 1331
 § 1367
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