Source: https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2004/d2004-0648.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:04:42+00:00

Document:
The Complainant is Sallie Mae, Inc. of Reston, Virginia, United States of America, represented by Eric D. Reicin of Reston, Virginia, United States of America.
The Respondent is Michele Dinoia of Pineto, Teramo, Italy, represented by Avvocato Valerio Donnini of Pescara, Pescara, Italy.
The disputed domain name <sallie.com> is registered with Tuonome.it.srl.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the�“Center”) on August�17,�2004, (electronic version) and confirmed on August�19,�2004 (hardcopy). On August�18,�2004, the Center transmitted by email to Tuonome.it.srl a request for registrar verification in connection with the domain name at issue. On August�20,�2004, Tuonome.it.srl transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details for the administrative, billing, and technical contact. In response to a notification by the Center that the Complaint was administratively deficient, the Complainant filed an amendment to the Complaint on August�27,�2004. The Center verified that the Complaint, together with the amendment to the Complaint, satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on September�1,�2004. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was September�21,�2004. The Response was filed with the Center on September�17,�2004.
The Center appointed Kiyoshi I. Tsuru as the Sole Panelist in this matter on October�4,�2004. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph�7.
Respondent registered the disputed domain name on July�3,�2001.
Respondent’s use of the domain name <sallie.com> is confusingly similar to the trademark SALLIE MAE. The identical copy of another’s trademark creates a presumption of likelihood of confusion among Internet users as a matter of law (and cites People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d�915, 920 (E.D. Va. 2000)). Respondent’s registration and use of the domain name <sallie.com> is prima facie evidence that the Respondent has used and registered a service mark which creates a likelihood of confusion among Internet users.
Complainant has acquired common law rights to the trademark SALLIE MAE, through use and recognition thereof.
Complainant cites two UDRP cases in which it has acted in its capacity as Complainant, in which the corresponding Respondents had registered typographical errors or variations of Complainants trademark SALLIE MAE: Sallie Mae, Inc. v. Martin Marketing, WIPO Case No. D2004-0357 and Sallie Mae, Inc. v. Party Night, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2003-0612.
Respondent, in an attempt to receive financial gain, intentionally redirected patrons of <salliemae.com> to various dating service websites, and tainted Sallie Mae’s reputation as an educational lender. This is contrary to Paragraph�4(c)(iii) of the Policy.
Respondent, in order to obtain a captive and unsuspecting audience, misleads Internet users by directly diverting them from the intended “www.salliemae.com” website, to one that displays various dating service venues. Respondent’s use of this domain name to exhibit and sell dating services is prima facie evidence of dilution of Complainant.
Respondent registered a domain name nearly identical to that of Complainant, in order to intentionally divert customers to its website for financial gain.
Respondent’s use of a registered service mark evidences its bad faith.
Respondent had constructive notice of Sallie Mae’s rights, therefore, its unauthorized use of the service mark is illustrative of a bad faith intention.
The United States Congress has given Complainant exclusive use of the name Sallie�Mae.
The disputed domain name <sallie.com> is a shortened form commonly associated with and identified as Complainant.
Complainant sent Respondent a demand letter requesting Respondent to remove all data relating to Complainant from Respondent’s Website. The Respondent did not respond to any of these demand letters.
The disputed domain name <sallie.com> is based on a generic word, “sallie,” which is a common name for a woman, derived from the name Sarah or from the name Sally or from the word Lady (and cites Webster’s on-line dictionary – Rosetta edition).
Said proper name cannot be suggestive of the services of Complainant, and must be considered a common descriptive word when used in the contexts and channels of commerce outside the services provided by Complainant.
Complainant’s trademark is SALLIE MAE. It is not identical to the disputed domain name <sallie.com>, which is limited to the name <Sallie>, which is a common name. The rights of Complainant cannot be established on a generic word. Said word cannot be protected without proof of acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning (and cites 2�McCarthy on Trademarks, � 15:2 (2000)).
There is no evidence that the term SALLIE, on its own, has acquired secondary meaning or distinctiveness in the eyes of the purchasing public, nor is there evidence that the Complainant is identified with the name “Sallie”; all the arguments and evidence provided by Complainant are related to the mark SALLIE MAE, not to the name SALLIE.
According to Televisa v. Retevision Interactiva S.A, WIPO Case No. D2000-0264, a Complainant cannot claim exclusive rights to a highly generic and descriptive word (and cites Successful Money Management Seminars Inc. v. Direct Mail Express, National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA96457; FilmNet Inc. v. Onetz, National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA96196 and eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA157287.
A mark consisting entirely of a common, descriptive word is entitled to less protection under United States trademark law. Ownership of the mark SALLIE MAE does not ipso facto give Complainant the exclusive right to the descriptive name “Sallie” in all contexts (and cites PRIMEDIA Special Interest Publications Inc. v. John L. Treadway, WIPO Case No. D2000-0752). In the public mind, the mark SALLIE will be regarded as generic.
A Google search for “SALLIE” excluding “SALLIEMAE” yielded about 243,000 third-party uses of the first name.
There is no evidence of any association of the name “Sallie,” on its own, with Complainant’s business, no evidence showing that the name “Sallie” has become distinctive of Complainant or of its goods or services, no evidence of any investment in the name SALLIE by way of use or advertising, and no evidence that Respondent or the Domain Name has diverted customers from Complainant.
Complainant has not met the onus of proof that the name SALLIE is deemed inherently distinctive of its services; there is no distinctiveness in the name SALLIE on its own, while the exclusive rights of the Complainant can be claimed only on the words SALLIE MAE.
The UDRP decisions cited by Complainant: WIPO Case No. D2003-0612 and WIPO Case No. D2004-0357 cannot lead to the conclusion that there is confusing similarity between the disputed domain name and Complainant’s mark, because in both cases the contested domain names were misspellings of Complainant’s mark; in the present case, the disputed domain name is a common name, which cannot create confusion and cannot be considered similar to Complainant’s mark.
The business model of the Respondent is, among others, to register numerous domain names incorporating common names, and to resell or to use them for websites, also for vanity-type e-mail websites; the registration of such domain names is made by the Respondent also in order to allow customers to match their name (and cites Todito.com, S.A. de C.V. v. Michele Dinoia, WIPO Case No. D2002-0620, to argue that Respondent’s activity is legitimate).
Respondent selected the name “Sallie” because it has a considerable commercial value.
The use of terms that may be appropriate for vanity e-mail, or even for sale, is a legitimate business (and cites International Raelian Religion and Raelian Religion of France v. Mailbank.com Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-1210, and General Machine Products Company, Inc. v. Prime Domains (a/k/a Telepathy, Inc.), National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA92531).
Since the business of registering, even for re-selling, generic domain names is a legitimate business activity, Respondent, who is a dealer in generic domain names, has a legitimate interest in the contested domain name <sallie.com> (and cites John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v. Domain Names 4U and Fred Gray, WIPO Case No. D2000-1403).
Registration of an ordinary word as a domain name, and use of that domain name for an ordinary, non-trademark significance, can be a legitimate interest (citing Thrifty, Inc. and Thrifty Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Peter George, WIPO Case No. D2002-0140; Seaway Bolt & Specials Corp. v. Digital Income Inc., National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA114672; and, Macmillan Publishers Limited, Macmillan Magazines Limited and HM Publishers Holdings Limited v. Telepathy, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-0658).
Given the inherent non-distinctiveness of the name, it was open to anyone to register the disputed domain name (and cites Deanna S.p.A. v. Worldwide Media Inc., WIPO Case No. D2003-0964: Respondent was entitled to register the domain name consisting of a common name for a woman).
Complainant has not argued, and has not submitted evidence showing that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name specifically for the purpose of selling it to the Complainant or to a competitor of the Complainant. It would appear unlikely that Respondent, an Italian citizen, living and having a place of business in Italy, was aware that a United States organization had a registered trademark or a common law mark in what would appear to be a generic name.
There is no evidence showing that Respondent registered the disputed domain name with intent to sell it to Complainant, to disrupt its business, to prevent it from registering its trademark or to confuse consumers, together with a pattern of such conduct, or to attract customer’s seeking to purchase its products.
Respondent’s business, relating to the registration of generic names, and reselling or useing them for websites, as well as for vanity e-mail websites, is different from Complainant’s activity, which is based on financial services.
Complainant has not produced evidence that Respondent’s domain name has caused confusion between Complainant and Respondent. In the remote chance that a consumer types <sallie.com> into the browser in hopes of arriving at Complainant’s site, there is no chance of “initial interest” or other confusion. There is no evidence showing that Respondent was using <sallie.com> to sell products that compete with those of Complainant. Clearly, anybody who goes to the <sallie.com> website would know immediately that it has not reached Complainant.
Registration of dictionary terms with obvious generic meanings does not show a pattern of cybersquatting (citing Trans Continental records, Inc v. Compana LLC, WIPO Case No. D2002-0105; Zero International Holding GmbH & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft v. Beyonet Services and Stephen Urich v. Beyonet Services, WIPO Case No. D2000-0161: <zero.com> legitimately registered because “zero” is a short, common word; Shirmax Retail Ltd. v. CES Marketing Group, eResolution Case No. AF-0104, id.).
The statement of the Complainant that the Respondent did not reply to the request of transfer of the domain name by the Complainant is false. On behalf of the Respondent, Respondent’s Representative sent an email on July�29,�2004, to Ms. Correllus, Senior Paralegal of Sallie Mae, Inc., assuring the removal of every data related to Complainant from the domain name, if present.
Complainant has proven its rights in the trademark SALLIE MAE in the United States.
Complainant has not submitted evidence showing that it has any rights to the name “Sallie,” alone, or that Complainant’s use of said name alone has acquired secondary meaning. Likewise, no common law rights have been claimed in the name SALLIE.
Complainant has prevailed in other cases handled under the Policy. However, said cases were typosquatting cases, i.e.,: Sallie Mae, Inc. v. Martin Marketing, WIPO Case No. D2004-0357 and Sallie Mae, Inc. v. Party Night, Inc. WIPO Case No. D2003-0612, and Sallie Mae, Inc. v. Ling Shun Shing, WIPO Case No. D2003-0445. This Panel agrees with those Panels that found the disputed domain names in each of the cited cases confusingly similar with Complainant’s trademark SALLIE MAE. However, this case is distinct. This Panel faces not a typosquatting case. The case is about the elimination of an entire word: MAE, from the trademark SALLIE MAE, which can hardly be considered a misspelling or typographical error, especially considering that the remaining part of the mark, SALLIE, has a significance of its own, being a common and frequently used name of a female. In such a case, Complainant’s trademark must be compared to a domain name that reproduces an ordinary and common first name of a woman.
Complainant has built a strong trademark in the United States, relating to financial services linked to educational loans. This Panel has found that said mark is well established in the United States market, and that it is a solid source identifier for the services it offers. This Panel is also convinced that Complainant is perceived as the leading provider of said services in the United States. Complainant’s United States trademark rights have not been contested by Respondent and thus their validity remains unchallenged.
The name “Sallie” is entirely comprised within Complainant’s trademark SALLIE�MAE. This makes the former undoubtedly similar to the latter. The question is whether it is confusingly similar thereto.
This Panel agrees with the reasoning set forth by the Etam, plc v. Alberta Hot Rods (supra) Panel: Because it cannot be said that Complainant has exclusive rights to this fairly short, non-fanciful name, Respondent may legitimately develop its own use of the name in an unrelated field (citing, in turn, Goldline International, Inc. v. Gold Line, WIPO Case No. D2000-1151).
Complainant has failed to provide any proof of actual confusion between its trademark SALLIE MAE and the disputed domain name <sallie.com>. Complainant has not proved its point that a given consumer, looking for Complainant’s services would be misled or confused when facing Respondent’s domain name, which is active and resolves to an active website by means of which Respondent offers services that are unrelated to those of Complainant.
Respondent claims to be engaged in the business of acquiring generic domain names, and selling them for websites, as well as vanity e-mail applications. Domain names that Respondent has acquired include <filings.net>, <streetcars.net> and <grands.net>. Respondent claims that the disputed domain name reproduces a generic, common first name to which Complainant has no trademark rights. Respondent submitted evidence showing that the word SALLIE is mentioned in Webster�s on-line dictionary, as a name that signifies or is derived from “a lady,” “a princess,” which “was first used in popular English literature sometime before 1868.” Webster’s dictionary also states that SALLIE is a “common misspelling or typo for: saline, sallied, Sallies, sally, silly.” No reference is made to misspellings or typographical errors regarding SALLIE MAE. Etam, plc v. Alberta Hot Rods (supra), and Deanna S.p.A. v. Worldwide Media Inc. (supra) have already established that it is permissible for a Respondent to register the common name of a woman. Complainant has not claimed or established exclusive rights to the word “sallie,” or proved that it has used said name in such a manner as to achieve the acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning of said word, in connection with its services.
Furthermore, when comparing the trademark SALLIE MAE, and the disputed domain name <sallie.com>, considering that the latter reproduces a common name of a woman, that Complainant has proved ownership of trademark rights and extensive use of its trademark in the United States, but not in the jurisdiction where Respondent lives, Italy, and that Complainant has not put before this Panel a convincing argument showing that consumers looking for educational loans would be mislead or diverted to Respondent’s site offering vanity e-mail or dating services, the Panel finds that Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name, taken as a whole, are not confusingly similar.
With respect to Complainant’s allegations that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name tarnishes Complainant’s mark, this Panel finds that Respondent’s vanity e-mail or dating services are offered through the domain name <sallie.com>, which could be associated in the minds of Respondent’s consumers to any of such services, due to the fact that said domain name is the name of a female person. Respondent is not using Complainant’s trademark SALLIE MAE, or any misspelling or variation thereof. Respondent is not offering services that could cause confusion among Complainant’s customers or prospective customers. This Panel also finds that Complainant’s mark has not been “improperly associated with an inferior or offensive product or service.” Complainant has not established any relationship with or comparison to Respondent’s services, and thus it cannot be said that one service is inferior or superior when compared to the other, because financial services focused on education are in a category that is very different from dating or vanity e-mail services. Complainant has not provided any evidence showing that Respondent’s services rendered through the disputed domain name <sallie.com> may be deemed offensive. No improper association between Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name has been proven.
In light of the above, the Panel finds that Complainant has solid trademark rights in the mark SALLIE MAE in the United States, and that the word “sallie”is certainly similar to the trademark SALLIE MAE, but that in the context of this controversy and under its circumstances, there is no confusing similarity between Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name.
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue. (Policy, Paragraph�4(c)).
Complainant has argued that Respondent has used the disputed domain name <sallie.com> with intent for commercial gain by misleading and diverting Complainant’s customers to Respondent’s services. Complainant has also argued that Respondent is tarnishing Complainant’s trademark. However, the Panel finds no convincing evidence showing that Complainant’s customers have been or could be mislead, when looking for financial services and presented with dating/vanity e-mail services offered through a domain name that is essentially the common name of a woman. No evidence of dilution was found either (see Point 6A supra).
It is doubtful whether the Complainant has documented absence of legitimate interests on the side of Respondent,but it is not necessary for the Panel to reach a conclusion under this element.
Complainant argues that Respondent registered a distinctive domain name, nearly identical to that of Complainant in order to intentionally divert customers to Respondent’s website for financial gain. No convincing evidence of actual or possible misleading or diversion was submitted by Complainant (see Points 6A and 6B supra).
Respondent has submitted evidence showing that its domain name reproduces a common name of a woman, one which is mentioned in a Dictionary (see point 6A supra). No evidence of actual or possible misleading of Complainant’s customers or diversion of traffic to Respondent’s dating/vanity e-mail service site has been submitted before this Panel.
Complainant alleges that this is a typosquatting case. This Panel thinks otherwise (see�point 6A supra). Therefore, those precedents under the Policy involving Complainant are not applicable to the present controversy.
Complainant has not furnished evidence proving that it has trademark registrations for SALLIE MAE in Respondent’s jurisdiction, or that said mark has been used or publicized in Italy, or that Respondent had any sort of constructive notice in that country and legal system. The right granted by the United States Congress to Complainant to use the name SALLIE MAE is obviously limited to the territory of the United States. Thus, it is difficult to establish that Respondent knew of Complainant or its trademark, and that thus Respondent registered the disputed domain name for the purpose of profiting from Complainant, by selling the domain name registration to Complainant for valuable consideration in excess of Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name.
Absent sufficient and convincing evidence showing that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith, the Panel finds that the third element of the Policy has not been met. Based on the evidence in this case, it seems more likely that the Respondent had the common name “Sallie” in mind rather than the Complainant’s trademark SALLIE MAE when it registered the domain name in question.
Respondent argues that the Complainant’s Complaint is an effort to obtain <sallie.com> from a legitimate good faith registrant and to acquire by administrative action what it is not entitled to. Respondent supports its allegation on the grounds that its legal representative allegedly replied to Complainant’s letter, and that Complainant declared in this proceeding that such a reply was never received. Respondent also argues that this Panel should find reverse domain name hijacking on the side of Complainant, because the latter does not have a trademark in the country where the domain name was registered (and cites Supremo n.v./s.a. v. Rao Tella (supremo.com), WIPO Case No. D2001-1357).
Paragraph 1 of the Rules establishes that reverse domain name highjacking is “using the Policy in bad faith to attempt to deprive a registered domain name holder of a domain name.” To prevail on such a claim, a respondent must show either that the complainant knew of the respondent’s unassailable rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name or the clear lack of bad faith registration and use, and nevertheless brought the Complaint in bad faith: Sydney Opera House Trust v. Trilynx Pty. Limited, WIPO Case No. D2000-1224 and Goldline International, Inc. v. Gold Line, WIPO Case No. D2000-1151; or that the Complaint was brought in knowing disregard of the likelihood that the respondent possessed legitimate interests: Smart Design LLC v. Carolyn Hughes, WIPO Case No. D2000-0993; or that the complainant knew it had no rights in the trademark or service mark upon which it relied and nevertheless brought the Complaint in bad faith: Dan Zuckerman v. Vincent Peeris, WIPO Case No. DBIZ2002-00245; HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, in right of her Government in New Zealand, as Trustee for the Citizens, Organizations and State of New Zealand, acting by and through the Honourable Jim Sutton, the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade v. Virtual Countries, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-0754.
None of these circumstances is present here. With respect to Respondent’s first allegation, it is the opinion of this Panel that Complainant was enforcing its rights, as it has done in the past. The issue regarding the transmission, receipt and/or non-repudiation of a data message consisting of an e-mail sent by one party to the other falls outside the scope of the Policy and the sphere of action of this Panel. The second claim, relating to the absence of trademark rights in a given jurisdiction is extreme and the application of such a rule may lead to unfair results; therefore, this Panel rejects said affirmation.
In the view of this Panel, Complainant has not engaged in reverse domain name highjacking.

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