Source: http://hatborolawyer.blogspot.com/2016/02/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 20:49:17+00:00

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What the heck just happened to the Philly School District?
Last week, one of the top stories in Philadelphia, reported by Philly.com, Newsworks, NBC, and others, was a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision stripping out almost all of the Philadelphia School District's governing powers.
This is a complex matter that may have huge effects on the 134,000 students in Philadelphia's traditional public school's, as well as the roughly 67,000 students enrolled in charters. I could not find a news story that really got past the "?!?" point and dug into what the court opinion says, what will happen now, and what may happen soon. So I'll give it a shot.
Basically everything done by school districts in Pennsylvania (build schools, negotiate teacher contracts, decide whether to allow a charter school) is governed by the state's Public School Code, which dates back to the 1940s. In 1998, the Public School Code was amended to add § 6-696(i)(3). § 6-696(i)(3) gave schools in financial "distress" the ability to suspend or revoke charter schools as well as any part of the Public School Code that it did not wish to follow. The theory behind this law change was that allowing broke school districts to ignore parts of the law would allow them to reduce expenses and get back on their feet more easily. For instance, if a school district is able to close a charter school without following the Public School Code requirements, it will no longer have to pay that school for teaching some of the school district's students.
Fast forward to 2001: The Philadelphia School District was in financial distress, and the Public School Code was again amended, this time getting rid of the Philadelphia School District (and local school board) entirely and replacing it with the state governor-appointed School Reform Commission (SRC).
Under the Public School Code, a school district has the right, after a charter school's students do poorly on the PSSA four years in a row, to place "reasonable restrictions" on the charter school and require that the school improve before those restrictions are lifted. In 2011, the SRC decided to flex its muscles under § 6-696(i)(3) for the first time and remove the requirement that a charter school is struggling before restrictions are placed on it. Instead, the SRC told West Philly Achievement (which was not struggling) that it could continue as a charter school provided that it limited its size to 400 students.
The rules that school districts could not limit the size of charter schools.
The Pennsylvania Constitution states in part that "The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." PA. CONST. art. II, § 1. Pennsylvania courts have interpreted this sentence to mean that the state legislature cannot simply delegate its law making powers to other groups and exit stage right. Instead, any law that gives another group legislative power (like § 6-696(i)(3) did to the SRC) must have detailed guidelines and objectives explaining what the legislature is trying to accomplish by giving power away. The law should also require the party receiving power to explain every time it steps outside of the law why it is doing that and how that fits in with the legislature's goal.
Here, the Supreme Court took it for granted that § 6-696(i)(3) was intended to make it easier for the SRC to improve its finances (by, for example, limiting the extent of charter schools that cost the district a lot of money). But where § 6-696(i)(3) went wrong was it allowed the SRC to do basically whatever it wanted without any explanation (explaining how suspending a portion of the Public School Code would help the SRC's finances) and without any restriction. The Supreme Court found that the law, as written, delegates too much power from the legislature to the SRC, and is therefore unconstitutional.
The clear answer to "what now" is that the SRC has no ability to limit the growth of charter schools. If many more Philadelphia School District students wish to attend a charter school instead of a regular public school, there is nothing the SRC can do to prevent charter school proponents from building enough charter schools to suit that.
Because every seat filled in a Philadelphia charter school takes away a per-student tax payment to the Philadelphia School District/SRC, the Supreme Court decision opens the door for a lot more financial trouble for the district in the months and years ahead.
Here is the good news for anti-charter school people. Despite a lot of excitement and doomsday reactions, this entire ruling doesn't have to be a big deal. The Supreme Court basically told the legislature last week that its law stunk; it violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court explained how it violates the Constitution: It gave the SRC too much power without providing reasonable limits and making the SRC explain why it was doing what it was doing. The solution to all of this should be apparent: Rewrite the law, and get it right this time.
It's unclear what the attitude is in Harrisburg for giving this another shot, and politics is not something I'm equipped to dive in to here. But in the present circumstance, where state legislators have acted to bail out the insolvent Philadelphia School District in years past, and this new court decision will spell additional financial trouble, it stands to reason that there will be strong motivation to fix this problem and fix it soon, giving the SRC back much of its charter school-limiting power.
(Forgive the platitude, but) time will tell.
In Pennsylvania, being convicted of a crime almost always taints you forever. There is no way to erase what you have done, nor is there a way to prevent a friend, family member, or employer from seeing it by simply going on the Internet.
You're 70 years old and have not been arrested for 10 years.
You've been dead for 3 years.
You are trying to delete a "summary" offense (traffic tickets, disorderly conduct, harassment, and other crimes most people care little about) and have not been arrested for 5 years.
You're 21 years old and were convicted of underage drinking.
42 Pa. C.S. § 9122. You can also seek an expungement if you were not "convicted" of a crime but placed on "ARD" (a one-time slap-on-the-wrist allowed by prosecutors for many minor to moderate crimes). Id. But that's it.
Convicted of marijuana possession in 1990? Same answer.
Convicted of DUI in 1985? Same answer.
For a fortunate handful, this is all about to change.
On February 16, 2016, Governor Tom Wolf signed 42 Pa. C.S. § 9122.1 into law, scheduled to go into effect by this coming December. What does § 9122.1 do? It cuts through the "70 years old or dead" requirement for anyone convicted of three or fewer crimes up to a second degree misdemeanor.
The law carries some exceptions (cannot remove most simple assault convictions, anything involving Megan's Law, and a handful of other crimes considered especially serious even though the grading is relatively low). Unlike expungement, this new law will not erase a criminal record entirely (government agencies and licensing organizations will still see it). And the law carries the same requirement that you remain arrest-free for 10 years before anything can happen.
The past few years have been positive for people who wish to move on with their lives and not get bogged down by an old criminal record. In 2012, Philadelphia passed an ordinance popularly dubbed "Ban the Box," prohibiting employers of ten or more from looking at a employee applicant's criminal record until after he or she was interviewed. In 2015, this law was expanded to most employers of any size, and prohibited looking at a criminal record at all after an applicant had been free of incarceration for more than 7 years. (This latest amendment will come into effect in March).
Now, the entire state of Pennsylvania is slowly improving as well.
Driver's Seat with the Engine On: How Far is Too Far to Make a DUI in Pennsylvania.
It's two in the morning and you don't know where the time went. How many beers did you have? Four? Five?
You get down from the bar stool and feel the sway of unsteady feet. You're not safe to drive.
By the time you make it to the parking lot, you've got two problems: 1) It's horribly cold outside; 2) You don't know how you're getting home.
...and cue the flashing blue and red lights. The knock on the window. The stumble out of the car. "Walk in a straight line." "Stand on one leg."
"I'm placing you under arrest for suspicion of driving under the influence."
I've told this story, a variation on what happened to a client, to several people. Up until now, all of them told me that my client was sunk.
I'm relieved to say that all of my friends are wrong.
Under the DUI statute in Pennsylvania, "An individual may not drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle" if drunk. 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802. Since those words were written, judges have gone back and forth explaining what it means to be "in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle." One thing they have gotten pretty clear is this: If you start a parked car and do nothing else, you are not guilty of DUI.
The Commonwealth is trying to encourage intoxicated people to "sleep it off" before attempting to drive, yet it wants us to punish Byers for doing just that. This case is only one example of the illogical and inconsistent results we would see if this Court were to adopt a per se rule that found a defendant guilty of drunk driving for merely starting his car. Under such a mechanical application, if Byers had left the bar to call a cab using a cellular phone in his car, and needed to start the car to power the phone, the Commonwealth could charge him with drunk driving. This result would punish an individual for attempting to comply with the law. In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold that a defendant is not in actual physical control of a vehicle merely because the vehicle has been started. In the present case, the Commonwealth did not introduce enough evidence to show actual physical control. Therefore, the evidence is not sufficient to prove the first element of driving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt.
This decision has not gone unchallenged. In 1996, a non-binding plurality decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court criticized Byers by writing, "While it may be laudable that one who realizes that he is incapable of safe driving pulls over to 'sleep it off,' the legislature has made no exception to the reach of the statute to such individuals." Commonwealth v. Wolen, 685 A.2d 1384, 1286, n.4 (Pa. 1996). In 2010, the Superior Court admitted that "Byers had been called into question" and refused to extend its protection to a defendant found sleeping in his car by a store that did not sell alcohol (unlike Byers who was found sleeping in front of a bar). Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2010). The logic is that if you are found far away from a source of alcohol, then you probably became drunk before you got there.
Despite these later decisions, the protection offered by Byers remains good law. The person left drunk in the cold does not commit a crime for "sleeping it off" in his car, even if he is in the driver's seat, and even if he turned the engine on.
This doesn't mean that you cannot do yourself a favor by sleeping in the backseat, or staying out of your car and avoiding suspicion entirely. But if that fails, you still have options left.

References: § 6
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