Source: https://sfcriminallawspecialist.com/blog/sentencing-partners-february-2015-part-ii/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:43:48+00:00

Document:
The defendant pled guilty to various charges, including social security fraud (Count 3) and conspiracy to distribute at least fifty grams of cocaine base (Count 11). In the plea agreement, the defendant admitted that her offense involved less than 50 grams of crack cocaine, while the government expressed a belief that it could prove 1,643 grams. The PSR applied the 2010 Guidelines and calculated a sentencing range of 324 to 405 months. Sentencing was delayed until the end of 2012 while the defendant cooperated with the government. At sentencing, the district court granted the government’s motion for a downward departure for substantial assistance, reducing the sentencing range to 210 to 262 months. The district court varied downward and sentenced the defendant to 192 months, with concurrent supervised release terms of three years for Count 3 and five years for Count 11. On appeal, the defendant’s attorney filed an Anders brief, claiming there were no arguable appellate issues. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion to withdraw, finding that an arguable issue existed: “whether the district court committed plain error by failing to apply 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(B), as amended by the FSA, when imposing a five-year term of supervised release for Count 11.” Reviewing for plain error, the court concluded that “the district court’s use of the pre-FSA statutory range for supervised release constitutes clear error,” based on Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. —-, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). “In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Dorsey that the FSA applies retroactively to those such as [the defendant] who committed their crimes before the FSA’s enactment but were sentenced afterwards. Thus, [the defendant], who did not admit to any specific quantity of cocaine base above fifty grams, should have been sentenced to supervised release for Count 11 pursuant to the revised version of §841(b)(1)(B). The district court did not do so, but expressly adopted the presentence report which cited the minimum term of supervised release for Count 11 as five years pursuant to the former version of §841(b)(1)(A).” The supervised release portion of the sentence was vacated and remanded. The conclusion to remand was in agreement with the two circuits that have considered this issue. See United States v. Hilson, 538 F. App’x 15, 18 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Ryals, 503 F. App’x 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2013).
In 2007, the defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 36 months and three years of supervised release. In August 2012, he was released and began his term of supervised release. Within two months of the release, the Probation Department issued a violation of supervised release report charging the defendant with assaulting (“Charge One”) and menacing (“Charge Two”) the mother of his child by punching her repeatedly in the face. Three other reports followed, charging him with using cocaine (“Charge Three”), failing to reside in and abide by the rules of a residential reentry center for a period of 120 days (“Charge Four”), jumping over a subway turnstile without permission (“Charge Five”), leaving a drug treatment program early without permission (“Charge Six”), and failing to report to the Probation Department (“Charge Seven”). In August 2013, the District Court found the defendant guilty of Charges One through Three and revoked his supervised release. In October 2013, the defendant pled guilty to Charges Four through Seven. After determining a sentencing range of 8 to 14 months, the district court varied upward to 24 months, to be followed by 12 months of supervised release, including four months in a residential reentry center. The court also required the defendant to participate in a drug treatment or detoxification program as a special condition of supervised release, leaving it “to the discretion of Probation” to decide whether an inpatient or outpatient program was “most appropriate.” On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court impermissibly delegated its sentencing authority by allowing the Probation Department to determine whether he should undergo inpatient or outpatient drug treatment. The Second Circuit agreed, explaining that “[t]he power to impose special conditions of supervised release, including participation in a substance abuse program, is vested exclusively in the district court. It is true that a district court may delegate to a probation officer decision-making authority over certain minor details of supervised release-for example, the selection of a therapy provider or treatment schedule. But a district court may not delegate to the Probation Department decision-making authority which would make a defendant’s liberty itself contingent on a probation officer’s exercise of discretion.” Further, the court noted that “inpatient drug treatment programs are sufficiently more restrictive than outpatient programs that the difference between the two programs might be said to be the difference between liberty and the loss of liberty.” “In light of this difference [between inpatient and outpatient treatment], . . . granting the probation officer the discretion to decide whether such conditions will be imposed is tantamount to allowing him to decide the nature or extent of the defendant’s punishment, and that any condition that affects a significant liberty interest, such as one requiring the defendant to participate in residential treatment . . . must be imposed by the district court and supported by particularized findings that it does not constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.” See United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009). The court vacated that portion of the sentence and remanded to the district court to determine for itself whether such treatment, if still necessary, should be on an inpatient or outpatient basis.

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