Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/property-regulation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:56:01+00:00

Document:
In Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (Poe), ordered published April 4, 2019, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court decision denying costs and an award of attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 to the petitioners. The respondent city's citizens voted for a zoning initiative repealing an earlier initiative allowing bed and breakfasts to operate in residential and commercial areas. After the initiative passed, a bed and breakfast continued operating, and then was sold and used for a residence. A later owner sought to recommence the earlier conditional use permit allowing the property to be used as a bed and breakfast. The planning commission turned down the request, due to the discontinuity in the permits. On appeal to the city council, the decision was overturned. The petitioners petitioned for a writ to overturn the decision. After the petition was filed, the city council passed an emergency ordinance dealing with discontinuity in B & B permits. The petition was amended to challenge the ordinance. The trial court denied the petition. In an unpublished opinion, the appellate court ruled that the challenge to the ordinance was properly denied, but that the petitioners were entitled to writ relief on the challenge to the permit. On remand, the trial court issued a writ ordering the city to set aside its decision on the permit. The city filed a return showing it had complied. When the petitioners sought fees and costs, the trial court concluded that neither side had prevailed, and so the petitioners were not entitled to fees or costs.
The appellate court reversed. Because the petitioners had achieved a significant goal of their litigation--challenging the permit decision--they were prevailing parties. Further, by enforcing the initiative that the voters had enacted, the petitioners vindicated an important public right, satisfying that prong of section 1021.5 fees. The appellate court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether the other prongs of section 1021.5, such as a financial burden that exceeds the petitioners' economic interest in the matter, were met.
In T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco, published April 4, 2019, the California Supreme Court affirmed trial and appellate court rulings denying the plaintiff cell phone carrier's facial challenge to a city ordinance conditioning permits for installation of wireless carrier lines and equipment in public rights of ways on aesthetic grounds. The carrier contended that local regulation of right-of-way equipment was preempted by Public Utilities Code sections 7901 and 7901.1. Section 7901 permits telephone companies to install lines and equipment in public rights of way in such manner and at such points as will not "incommode the public use" of the rights of way. Section 7901.1 sets forth a legislative intent to preserve municipalities' right to control the time, place, and manner in which roads, highways, and waterways are "accessed," but requires that the control exercised be applied to all entities in an equivalent manner. The plaintiff contended that section 7901 preempted local regulation, and that the ordinance violated 7901.1 by treating wireless carriers different from other telephone companies.
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The court ruled that municipalities have the police power to regulate based on aesthetics, and that section 7901 preempted that power only if it evinced an intent to take the power away. Section 7901 grants telephone companies a statewide franchise to operate, and preempts requirements for local franchises. But the ordinance concerns permits, rather than franchises. The court also rejected the interpretation of "incommode" to include only obstructing travel. There are many uses of rights of way beyond merely traveling them. The court applied the various tests for preemption, and concluded that local regulation of aesthetics was not preempted under any of them. The court rejected the argument on section 7901.1 by interpreting the term "access" to apply only to construction of telephone lines and equipment. The municipality provides temporary access permits to both wireless and non-wireless telephone carriers to construct equipment, without regard to aesthetics. It regulates only wireless carriers' equipment based on aesthetics, but only for ongoing maintenance and occupation of equipment in rights of way. The municipality therefore does not violate the statute by treating wireless companies differently.
In Sandoval v. City of Santa Rosa, published December 21, 2018, the 9th Circuit affirmed a district court's summary judgment rulings for plaintiffs and defendants in a case brought by two drivers whose vehicles were impounded by a defendant city or defendant county because the drivers had current or expired Mexican driver's licenses (and passengers with California driver's licenses) but did not themselves have California-issued driver's licenses. The seizures were under California Vehicle Code section 14602.6(a)(1), which provides a police officer may impound a vehicle for 30 days if the vehicle's driver had never been issued a driver's license. The statute did not define "driver's license." The city and county interpreted the term to refer to a California-issued driver's license. The district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment in their monetary claims against the city and county for propounding policies that violated the Fourth Amendment. It granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' claims under the Bane Act, Civil Code section 52.1.
The 9th Circuit had previously held that 30-day impounds under the statute are seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes. The question was whether the impounds were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court ruled that under the circumstances, they were unreasonable warrantless seizures. The "community caretaking" exception does not categorically permit impounding private property simply because a state law allows the impoundment. Further, the exception would not apply past the point where the community caretaking function is discharged. Once the drivers were able to provide a licensed driver who could take possession of the truck, the community caretaking function of preventing improperly licensed drivers from driving was discharged. There was no dispute that the seizures were under city and county policies. The defendants argued that the seizures could not support Monell liability because they were legal under state law. The 9th Circuit avoided that issue by ruling that the statute, interpreted in harmony with Vehicle Code sections 310 and 100, a driver who had been issued a driver's license in a foreign jurisdiction for the type of vehicle seized has not violated Vehicle Code section 14602.6. The defendants did not violate the Bane Act, however, because if the right at issue is not clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case, specific intent to violate the plaintiff's rights--an element of the Bane Act claim--cannot be implied. Because the 9th Circuit's ruling that an impoundment under the statute implicated the Fourth Amendment post-dated the seizure, the right violated was not clearly established and intent could not be implied.
In Black v. City of Palos Verdes, published September 6, 2018, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 1 affirmed the trial court's decision denying a petition for a writ of mandate and finding that the defendant city's moratorium on construction in a landslide area was not a regulatory taking. The city had areas where ancient landslides were active. A previous development moratorium ordinance that required property owners to engage in expensive private testing to establish that the area was stable (which would have been futile, since the city found the area was not stable) was found unconstitutional. The city repealed the ordinance, and amended its moratorium to allow building in the landslide area provided that an exemption permit was approved by the city, the project complied with the city code's mitigation provisions, and the owner submitted any studies the city required to demonstrate the development would not exacerbate the existing situation. A group of landowners filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a complaint for inverse condemnation seeking to compel the city to take certain actions concerning development in the landslide area. One landowner submitted an application for an exception to the moratorium before the suit was filed. The record did not show what action was taken on the application. The landowner settled with the city and was no longer a party to the suit.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court properly ruled against the landowners. The landowners' facial attack against the moratorium failed, because it was not a regulation that went too far. The landowners could not prevail on an as-applied challenge, because they had not exhausted the administrative remedies available by applying for an exception to the moratorium. They failed to demonstrate that exhausting those remedies would be futile. They could not rely on the previous litigation as precedent for futility, because the ordinance on which the previous case was based had been repealed and the moratorium amended.
In Shahbazian v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, published November 22, 2017, the Second District Court of Appeal, Div. 7 affirmed a trial court's denial of the defendant city's special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The plaintiffs sued the city over the city's decision to issue permits permitting the plaintiffs' neighbors to modify a common fence. The plaintiffs alleged that the city violated ordinances and selectively enforced others. Before suing, the plaintiffs administratively appealed the permitting decisions up to the city council, which allowed the decisions to stand. The plaintiffs alleged inverse condemnation and selective enforcement, among other claims. The city demurred and moved to strike the complaint, alleging that the causes of action arose out of speech and petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs' causes of action did not arise out of activity protected under anti-SLAPP.
The appellate court agreed. The plaintiffs sued the city based on the city's underlying acts--the permitting decisions--and not the oral statements or other expressive conduct concerning those acts. The plaintiffs did not sue the city for injuries allegedly caused by any of the speech or communications made during the administrative appeals or votes on the permitting decisions. If anti-SLAPP were construed otherwise, any plaintiff who sued a public entity for any act that involved votes, hearings, or discussions would have to meet the requirements of anti-SLAPP law. That was not the Legislature's intent.
In The Kennedy Commission v. City of Huntington Beach, published October 31, 2017, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 2 reversed a trial court writ striking down the respondent city's amendment to its specific housing plan as void ab initio because it was inconsistent with the city's general plan. Government Code section 65454, which requires that a specific plan be consistent with a city's general plan, does not apply to a charter city unless the city adopts a consistency requirement by charter or ordinance. The court analyzed the city's charter and ordinances and determined that it had not adopted a consistency provision under the statutes.
In Lynch v. California Coastal Commission, published July 6, 2017, the California Supreme Court affirmed a lower appellate court decision reversing an administrative mandamus writ issued by a trial court. The plaintiff homeowners sought a permit from the California Coastal Commission permitting them to build a seawall to protect their blufftop properties, replacing a damaged seawall, and to repair a beach access stairway. The Commission approved a permit subject to conditions that included a 20-year expiration date on the seawall permit and a prohibition on reconstructing the lower stairway. The plaintiffs recorded deed restrictions reflecting the conditions, and filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the 20-year and stairway conditions. While the litigation was pending, they satisfied all of the other permit conditions, obtained the permit, and built the seawall. The trial court issued a writ directing the Commission to remove the challenged conditions. The appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs had waived the conditions, and that the conditions were valid.
The Supreme Court declined to rule on whether the conditions were valid. Instead, it ruled that the plaintiffs had forfeited their challenge to the conditions by by complying with all pre-issuance requirements, accepting the permit, and building the seawall. Because they took the benefit of the permit, they also had to accept the burden of the conditions. The plaintiffs could not preserve their rights by challenging some of the conditions and satisfying others. The Mitigation Fee Act allows permit seekers to construct projects while protesting exactions, but exactions do not include land use restrictions. Allowing challenge of land use restrictions while construction proceeds would expand the statute beyond its language and legislative intent. Property owners must therefore wait until the litigation over the permit conditions concludes before performing construction. If the property is in imminent danger without construction, they may seek an emergency permit under Public Resources Code section 30624. Property owners could also avoid forfeiture by reaching an agreement with the permit issuer allowing the construction to proceed while a challenge to the permit is resolved.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.