Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/65/65massappct46.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:40:44+00:00

Document:
Present: ARMSTRONG, C.J., LENK, & COWIN, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 3, 2000.
The case was heard by E. Susan Garsh, J., on motions for summary judgment.
W. Thomas Smith (G. Thomas Pauling with him) for Deborah Price.
Dennis P. Philips, for Paul Dion, was present but did not argue.
ARMSTRONG, C.J. Defendant Paul Dion, doing business as All the Answers Tree Service, was making a chain saw cut preparatory to felling a large tree when the tree snapped and fell the wrong way. It struck and killed defendant Price's decedent, Doreen C. Mellen, who was a cousin of Dion and who had been operating a wood-chipping machine on the same job. It is not unlikely that the noise from the machine made it impossible for Mellen to hear Dion's shouted warning.
Dion carried a commercial general liability policy written by the plaintiff, Monticello Insurance Company (Monticello), which brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether the policy covered Dion's potential liability to Mellen's estate. Acting on Monticello's motion for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge ruled that the policy did not cover the liability, and the defendants appealed.
"d. . . . Any obligation of the insured under a workers' compensation . . . law . . . ."
"(b) Performing duties related to the conduct of the insured's business."
The word "employee" is defined to include a "leased worker" but to exclude a "temporary worker." The term "leased worker" means "a person leased to you by a labor leasing firm . . . to perform duties related to the conduct of your business." The term " '[t]emporary worker' means a person who is furnished to you to substitute for a permanent 'employee' on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions."
" 'bodily injury' . . . arising out of the operations performed for the named insured by independent contractors or acts or omissions of the named insured in connection with the insured's general supervision of such operations."
Ins. Co., 430 Mass. 454, 457 (1999) ("The phrase 'arising out of' must be read expansively, incorporating a greater range of causation than that encompassed by proximate cause under tort law. . . . Indeed, cases interpreting the phrase 'arising out of' in insurance exclusionary provisions suggest a causation more analogous to 'but for' causation . . .").
It would appear, therefore, that coverage is precluded by the policy, either for an independent contractor or for an employee, unless Mellen could be thought to come within the "temporary worker" exception to the policy's otherwise general exclusion of coverage for accidents to employees. Thus, the defendants argue that Mellen was a "temporary worker," in that she was "furnished to [Dion] . . . to meet . . . short-term workload conditions." Not implausibly, the necessity for Mellen to work on the particular job, which called for the clearing of more than twenty large trees -- Dion called it a "big job" -- could be thought of as a "short-term workload condition," so that Mellen could qualify as a "temporary worker" if she could be said to have been "furnished" to Dion.
Mellen was an independent contractor or an employee. The judge correctly allowed Monticello's motion for summary judgment and denied that of the defendants.
[Note 1] Deborah Price, administratrix of the estate of Doreen C. Mellen.
[Note 2] "Homeowners' liability policies," in contrast, "typically exempt from coverage bodily injury or property damage arising out of the business pursuits of the insured." 9 Couch, Insurance, supra at § 128.12.
[Note 3] Workers' compensation insurance is not compulsory for coverage of "seasonal or casual or part-time domestic servants." G. L. c. 152, § 1(4), fourth par., as appearing in St. 1972, c. 374, § 1. Grammatically, "casual" seems to modify "domestic servants" and thus to have no application to Mellen's status. See generally Nason, Koziol, & Wall, Workers' Compensation § 6.3(d) (3d ed. 2003).
[Note 4] The limitation of coverage to business liabilities is set out in the definition of "insured." One who, like Dion, is designated in the declarations page as an "individual" is an insured "but only with respect to the conduct of a business of which [the policy holder is] the sole owner."
[Note 5] The majority of courts that have considered the question are in accord with this conclusion. See American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tickle, 99 S.W. 3d 25, 30-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Nautilus Ins. Co. vs. Gardner, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. Civ. A. 04-1858 (E.D. Pa. 2005). But see Ayers v. C & D Gen. Contractors, 237 F. Supp. 2d 764, 768-769 (W.D. Ky. 2002). See also Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J & L Lumber Co., 373 F. 3d 807, 815 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004).
[Note 6] See Credit Assocs. of Maui, Ltd. v. Carlbom, 98 Haw. 462, 465-466 (Ct. App. 2002) (sole proprietorship has no legal identity separate from owner; collects cases); Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 347-348 (1997) (same); 1 Cavitch, Business Organizations § 1.01, at 1-3, & § 1.04 (2005). See generally Ladd v. Scudder Kemper Invs., Inc., 433 Mass. 240, 243-244 (2001) (discussing sole-proprietorship concept).

References: § 128
 § 1
 § 1
 § 6
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1
 § 1
 v.