Source: http://academy.lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/driggers-v-united-states-95-p-612-ok-supreme-court-1908/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:26:53+00:00

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B. F. Driggers was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed and remanded.
October 3, 1903, the grand jury of the United States Court for the Southern District of Indian Territory returned its indictment, charging B. F. Driggers, Tom McCarter, John Underwood, and Ted Bennett, with the murder of Robert G. Brady, and L. W. G off as a principal, in the second degree as to each of them. Goff was placed on trial at Ada; and after his conviction, the venue was changed, for the trial of the other defendants, to Pauls Valley, at which place the appellant in this case was placed on trial, in June, 1905, and the jury returned a verdict finding him guilty in the manner and form charged, without capital punishment. A motion for new trial was filed and overruled, the defendant saving his exception, and the case was taken to the United States Court of Appeals of Indian Territory by writ of error. On September 26, 1905, that court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Driggers v. U.S. 104 S.W. 1166. A petition for rehearing was filed, which was pending at the time Indian Territory was admitted as a state, and the case is in this court by virtue of the terms of the enabling act.
On the consideration of the petition for rehearing this court granted it, and on the hearing on the merits of the case the Attorney General, represented by Hon. W. A. Ledbetter, filed his answer to the contentions of appellant, and admitted error in the record sufficient to require us to reverse the prior decision rendered herein. He admitted that the admission of the testimony of witnesses Rhea and Saddler was erroneous, and then said: “There are other errors in the case, which will doubtless receive the attention of the court.” In view of the fact that we concur in the conclusion reached by the Attorney General’s office, it will be unnecessary for us to discuss in detail and at length many of the propositions urged upon the attention and considered by Mr. Justice Clayton, who wrote the opinion for the United States Court of Appeals of Indian Territory, but will confine our discussion to those matters which, at the trial of the case anew, will probably arise again.
This testimony was offered on the theory that a conspiracy had been formed between Goff and the defendant McCarter, which was subsequently joined by Driggers, and that it was admisssible, as against Driggers, by virtue of this fact. It was objected to on the part of the defendant, and its admission is assigned as one of the errors. Goff immediately went down to where Driggers lived for the purpose of informing him of the presence of Brady on the land, of the adverse claim, and the building of the fence. Driggers was not at home, but returned that night about 10 or 11 o’clock, and then learned that Brady was going to turn cattle in the cornfield. During the rest of that evening, and that night, the defendants here gathered together Winchesters and shotguns and ammunition, and arming themselves with them, appeared next morning inside the field, along the highway where it was expected Brady would drive his cattle near to turn them in. Driggers testified that he and Kelley were enemies, and that he expected that he would accompany Brady when he came with the cattle; that he expected to drive them out if they were turned in; that his presence and his purpose in going to the field with the parties named, armed as they were, was that he believed that when Brady saw they were there, he would not come up; that he supposes that he was there to resist any trouble that Kelley would bring about, and that he thought he would keep the cattle out. On the morning of the difficulty a man by the name of French Curtiss came down, ahead of the Brady party, in a wagon, with some wire and posts for the purpose of completing the wire fence; and on arriving at a point in the road near where Driggers and Goff and the other parties stood inside the field, and on the south side of the cross-fence, Goff told him to go back, and to get back quick. Curtiss testified that Driggers told him to go back and to tell them not to bring the cattle there. A short time after Curtiss turned back, the cattle were driven down the road by Brady, Kelley, and two brothers by the name of Saddler. Across the road, and nearly opposite the place where the defendants stood on the inside of the field, was a farm inclosed in a wire fence, the gate to which was either open or down, and when the cattle came opposite this point, some of them ran into this inclosure. The deceased, turning his horse out of the highway, ran in and drove these cattle out, crossed the road, and stopped near the Driggers party, got down from his horse, and, according to the evidence of the prosecution, began to arrange his saddle blanket, or at least handle his saddle, and it is at this time, it is asserted, without any overt act on his part, he was fired upon by the party with which defendant was connected, fell to the ground, arose, staggered or ran across the highway, and fell lifeless. Kelley, who had not dismounted, was also fired upon, receiving wounds, and his horse was killed. The Saddler boys both retreated. According to the testimony of the defendant, Brady rode up within four or five feet of the fence near where Driggers stood, got down off of his horse, pulled up the knee wire of the wire fence about 2 1/2 feet, took hold of the post, when defendant said: “Brady, don’t you pull that fence down. ” He jerked the fence down and ran backwards, grabbed for his gun and jerked at the fence all at the same time, and ran backwards, trying to get his gun; pulled it out, so that defendant saw it, who told him not to pull it. That he then shot him, or shot at him, with a No. 12 shotgun, loaded with B. B. shot, when he was about 12 or 15 feet from the fence. That he then shot at Kelley, whose horse fell with him across the road near the other fence.
Contradicting and impeaching Kelley and the testimony which he gave in reference to what Brady was doing at the time the shooting was done, the defendant introduced a witness by the name of Boatright, who testified that, on the same day of the shooting, at his home Kelley stated that Brady got off his horse, and went over and took hold of the fence post, and that Driggers shot him. The government then, for the purpose of supporting Kelley and his testimony, and to show that the statement which he had made on the witness stand was in consonance with previous statements which he had made concerning the same matter, consistent with his evidence, introduced witness Rhea, who had a talk with Kelley, the defendant, after he was wounded, concerning these matters. He testified that: “Kelley at that time did not say anything about the fence any more than Brady went inside the fence and drove some cattle out, came out, and got down off of his horse, pulled his saddle up, and just as he turned his head, the shooting commenced.” To this testimony of Rhea the defendant objected and excepted, and that it is error is most strenuously insisted.
On the preliminary examination which took place before a United States commissioner, Jim Saddler, one of the parties who accompanied Brady to the scene of the homicide, testified concerning the affray. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to recite his testimony here, but it was most material, and in many ways in conflict with the evidence of the defendant. On the trial of the cause he was not present, but the government introduced his written evidence as transcribed by the commissioner, upon a showing that by general report Saddler was dead, one witness testifying that his wife told him that her husband was dead; and the return of the subpoena, which was issued for him, made by the marshal who sought to serve it, while not appearing in the record, is conceded to have been by both parties, returned that he was dead. The record is voluminous, a great number of witnesses being introduced, and a great amount of evidence being offered, but the foregoing statement of facts is sufficient for the purpose of this opinion.
H. M. Carr, Crawford & McKeown, Cruce & Cruce, Moman Pruiett, and Potter, Bowman & Potter, for appellant.
Charles J. West, Attorney General, and W. A. Ledbetter, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
DUNN, J. Hayes, Kane, and Turner, JJ., concur; Williams, C. J. disqualified.
DUNN, J. (after stating the facts as above): From the conclusion to which the court has come, that it will be necessary to reverse the case and grant to defendant a new trial, we will note the assignments of error only which in the new trial granted will be liable to again arise.
The evidence of which complaint is made is the statement Goff made to Brady the day before the shooting, when Brady was on the land constructing a fence, when Goff said to him: “If you put any cattle in here I will kill you”–this being further connected with the offense by Goff’s statement to Brady at the time of the shooting, when he said, with an oath: “I told you the other day that I would kill you.” The evidence of the relationship between these parties is set out in the statement of facts, and we submit that under it there must be great doubt as to whether or not the conspiracy was formed at the time Goff used that language. It is true, if one had been formed, and Driggers joined it afterwards, his joining it would be an adoption by him of the things done or said by the others in furtherance of the general plan formed prior to his joining it. State v. May, 142 Mo. 135; 43 S.W. 637. Whether there is any evidence of a conspiracy is primarily a question to the court. There must be some tangible material evidence of the conspiracy or a promise of its production, before a court can properly admit evidence of statements made in the absence of the party against whom they are used, when he, in fact, was not present, and knew nothing of them. This evidence need not be direct and positive or conclusive, in fact, but there should be some, and it is for the court to say, in the first instance, whether or not it exists. This does not apply, of course, where it is sought to show, by the very language itself, that it was a part of the formation of the conspiracy. Goff testified that he had rented this place for the year 1903, and that he was entitled to the possession of it. There is nothing in the record to show that at the time Brady started to run his cross-fence over this land, either Goff or Driggers or Tom McCarter or any of the other parties had any prior information that such was his intention. The fence was well under way when Goff discovered it, and, going over where the work was going on, forbade continuance of it. He then left and returned, Tom McCarter accompanying him. There is no evidence from either McCarter or Goff or from any other source, as to why they went back, or what their purpose was. Goff again continued the conversation that he had begun before. McCarter said nothing, taking no part in the conversation, nor doing any act which would show that there was any concert of action whatever between them or of any formation of a conspiracy. He was simply present. He said nothing. He did nothing. Certainly Goff could not form a conspiracy with himself. It might be asked why McCarter went over there with Goff, what his purpose was, if it were not the beginning of a conspiracy? We cannot say what his purpose was. We do not know. There is no evidence in the record to show. He was living on the place. It belonged to his mother-in-law, and this, in our judgment, is clearly as strong and pertinent a reason as the one ascribed to it by the district attorney, and is more in consonance with the strict policy of the law, which presumes innocence and not guilt. It is true that immediately after this took place, Goff went to Driggers’ house. McCarter immediately began to take action to get ammunition and a gun, and that as soon as Driggers returned home, and on being informed of the circumstances, he likewise began to make preparations for the affray, but to us it seems more reasonable to conclude from the evidence that these acts were simply carrying out the purpose of the threat made by Goff, and the intent then formed, than was the threat part of a conspiracy formed prior to its being spoken. There is evidence of the conspiracy being formed immediately afterward. We cannot find any evidence that it was formed before. Hence we hold that this admission of the statement of Goff to Brady in the absence of Driggers was prior to any conspiracy formed and, it not being shown that he consented or assented thereto, was erroneous.
Arrayed in support of the doctrine declared by the court will be found the Supreme Court of the United States, Arkansas, California, Kansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington. The cases examined, in which the appellate tribunals of the United States and the states named have adhered to the rule last declared are as follows: Ellicott and Meredith v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412, 9 L. Ed. 475. Arkansas: Burks v. State, 78 Ark. 271, 93 S.W. 983. California: Barkly v. Copeland, 74 Cal. 1, 15 P. 307, 5 Am. St. Rep. 413; People v. Turner, 1 Cal. App. 420, 82 P. 397. Illinois: Chicago Railway Co. v. Matthieson, 212 Ill. 292, 72 N.E. 443; Id., 113 Ill. App. 246. Kansas: County Commissioners v. Vickers, 62 Kan. 25, 61 P. 391; State v. Petty, 21 Kan. 54; State v. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, 4 P. 1050. Louisiana: State v. Waggoner, 39 La. Ann. 919, 3 So. 119. Michigan: Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 9 Am. Rep. 78. Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 10 Gray 485. New Hampshire: Reed v. Spaulding, 42 N.H. 114. New York: Robb v. Hackley & Welton, 22 Wend. 50. North Carolina: Wallace v. Grizzard, 114 N.C. 488, 19 S.E. 760. Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470; Crooks v. Bunn, 136 Pa. 368, 20 A. 529. South Carolina: State v. McDaniel, 68 S.C. 304, 47 S.E. 384, 102 Am. St. Rep 661. South Dakota: State v. Caddy, 15 S.D. 167, 87 N.W. 927, 91 Am. St. Rep. 666. Tennessee: Glass v. Bennett, 89 Tenn. 478, 14 S.W. 1085. Vermont: State v. Flint, 60 Vt. 304, 14 A. 178. Washington: State v. Coates, 22 Wash. 601, 61 P. 726. From the foregoing collaboration on the proposition involved it will be readily seen on which side of the balance the great weight of judicial expression rests. We, therefore, declare the doctrine of this jurisdiction to be as annunciated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee above quoted, which may be epitomized by saying that such evidence is not admissible to support an impeached witness, except in those cases where not only his veracity is attacked, but his motive is also impugned. This being so, we will now consider the evidence to which objection is urged.
And it being made to appear by the evidence of defendant that, at the immediate time of the homicide or the shooting, Brady was in the act of pulling out or tearing down the fence, and that if his acts brought him within the purview of the statute last cited, this in itself appeared to be a justification for defendant’s action. The decision holds, and we think correctly, that they did not constitute a felony, and hence was no defense to defendant, even though he were relying upon it. The deceased carried his revolver in a scabbard under his arm inside of his shirt, which was open in the front, and in addition thereto, had a slit in it. His revolver was found partially drawn from its receptacle, when he was examined, immediately after his death, as he lay upon the ground where he fell. It was the contention of Driggers that the deceased was engaged in drawing his revolver and throwing down the fence at the immediate time the shooting began, and that he did not shoot until he saw the revolver partially drawn and in the hand of Brady. Kelley was the government’s principal witness. He had been an officer in that country holding commission from the United States marshal’s office. Driggers testified that he and Kelley were enemies, and there was outside evidence tending to support him. Kelley and the defendant were the principal witnesses in this case as to what took place at the immediate instant of the shooting. They both claim to know, and they alone testify on that point although there was other evidence tending to sustain the government in its contention that, when Brady got. off of his horse, he was engaged in fixing his saddle and blanket and did not have hold of the fence at the time the shooting began. Driggers was entitled to no more than the law gave him, but he was on trial for his life, and was entitled to all that the law gave him. If, as we have seen, from the authorities cited, a witness, contradicted or impeached by proof showing or tending to show that he has made statements out of court contrary to his evidence in court, may be supported under those conditions only where the party producing the impeaching evidence charges that the testimony of the witness is a recent fabrication, due to a late altered relationship to the parties or the cause or of some new motive, then if these conditions did not exist, Rhea should not have been permitted to have sustained Kelley, and in view of the fact that there is no evidence charging these things, or tending to show that his attitude toward the cause or the parties was in any wise altered, it was improper to admit this evidence; and while we agree with Justice Clayton that it was error, we cannot say it was not prejudicial. If it was not lawful to sustain Kelly in this matter, Driggers was entitled to be relieved of the support given the adverse witness’ evidence, and of the imputation which such support east upon his own. If the jury believed that Kelley was telling the truth when he stated that Brady did not have hold of the post, they necessarily believed that the defendant was guilty of falsehood. If they believed that Kelley told the truth, and that Driggers falsified, in reference to the fact mentioned, which occurred contemporaneously with the shooting there can be no question that they would, at the same time and with good reason, come to the conclusion that Kelley also told the truth in reference to the shooting, and that here again Driggers was falsifying. It was this effect which the evidence in support of Kelley had, which to us appears to have constituted its chief prejudicial effect, rather than of the mere conflict in the evidence as to whether Brady did or did not take hold of the fence.
The officer in the case at bar may have known, in common with the other citizens, of the decease of the witness Saddler; but his return thereof on the subpoena not being authorized and required by law, was clearly not binding on the defendant. When he went beyond the statutory requirements and certified to a fact not made by law a part of his official duty, such certificate or such statement then contained no greater evidentiary or probative force than if made by any other person, one not an officer. Obermier v. Core, 25 Ark. 562. This being true, the question then arises, what force was the evidence of the other parties called and examined, who testified that they had been told that Saddler was dead?
The fact relied upon was the death of Saddler, and it was sought to prove it by showing hearsay statements that he was dead. No facts stated before the court established Saddler’s death. All that anything in the evidence proved was that the parties who testified had been informed by others that this was a fact. This was unquestionably unalloyed hearsay, and was inadmissible to prove the fact; and as a fact it must be proved to admit the evidence. Hearsay evidence is admissible in many instances, but where it is sought to introduce the evidence of a witness taken on a prior trial, based on the fact of his death, this death must be shown as a fact. And the court, in overruling the objection of defendant to the introduction of Saddler’s testimony, committed error. All that these witnesses testified to could have been true, and Saddler may not only have been alive, but actually within the jurisdiction of the court. If he was, he should have been produced in person. If he was not, this should have been proven as other facts, by the testimony of some one who knew it.
It will be observed that the instructions given by the court were probably predicated upon the testimony which Kelley gave concerning the threat made by Goff on the day previous, to the effect that if Brady put the cattle into the field, he would kill him; either this, or upon the facts which developed between the time this threat was made and the affray. If upon the former, then it was incorrect, as the evidence we have found was incompetent; and if upon the latter, it seems to us that it scarcely takes into consideration, to the extent to which defendant was entitled, his evidence given as to why he went to the field, and the contention made in reference to his claim of right there. His claim being, as stated by his counsel in his brief, that “he was on his own premises, trying to protect his own property against the wrongful trespass of the deceased, and while so protesting, and while making no effort to kill the deceased, the deceased assaulted him with a deadly weapon,” and that the homicide took place, not by reason of the attempted trespass on the property, destruction of the fence, nor the turning in of the cattle on it by deceased, but because of the alleged attempt of deceased to draw his revolver and inflict death or great bodily harm upon the defendant. The instructions given by the court present the theory of the prosecution, and state the law in relation thereto without error; but the defendant was entitled to have the law declared in reference to the facts which he contended the evidence reasonably tended to show, and if there was any evidence in the record upon which the instructions offered could properly be predicated, they should have been given.
And, further, that if, while defendant was peaceably in his own field, “the deceased came there and undertook to enter the field by tearing down the fence, and in a violent threatening manner reached for his pistol, and with said pistol partly drawn in a threatening manner undertook to enter the field where defendant was, and that defendant believed, as a reasonable man, that deceased intended to kill him or do him great bodily injury, and, acting under the influence of said belief, whilst deceased was so endeavoring to enter the field, defendant killed him (deceased), the killing would be justifiable.” We believe this instruction, taken in conjunction with the elaborate and correct statement of the law of self-defense, correctly stated the rule, which defendant was entitled to have declared.
This instruction was predicated upon the contention of the prosecution in this case. The expression “‘mutual combat” about as clearly conveys the meaning of what is required to constitute it, as any definition could. It means, in different language, though probably not more clear, an agreement or meeting of minds between two parties to fight, whether with or without arms. It means a coming together, with a mutually understood purpose for a violent contest. The government took the position that the evidence in this case established that Driggers and his knew that Brady and his party were coming to the field armed, for the purpose of driving cattle in on this field and taking possession thereof at all hazards. That they knew, or had reasonable ground to believe, that Driggers and his party would be armed, with the purpose and intention, as declared to Brady by Goff on the day before, of killing him if they carried out this purpose. That Driggers and Goff gathered together men, arms, and ammunition for the purpose of using them in preventing these things on the part of Brady, thereby, through these acts, creating the agreement to fight, and in view of this claim which, it must be conceded, may be said to find reasonable support in the evidence, in our judgment the instruction given was not erroneous.
Counsel for defendant in their briefs inveigh against it most vigorously, denominating it “a fiery and fierce resume of the most strained construction of the evidence against the plaintiff in error, with many exaggerations to his detriment, which suggests many conclusions and deductions of which the evidence is wholly incapable.” While it is true the instruction improperly includes a revolver with the other weapons which defendant’s party had, yet it will be noted that this instruction in fact assumes nothing as proved or as true, but places upon the prosecution the very highest possible burden of proof in the case. It does not assume, as is asserted, that Brady had possession of the field, but requires the jury to find from the evidence that Driggers was informed and believed that Brady had taken possession of the field, and requires proof that defendant was informed and believed that Kelley and the deceased would be at the field in question on the morning of the killing, having in their possession deadly weapons, and further requiring the jury to find and believe that defendant, knowing of these things, voluntarily organized a company of men, and armed them “for the purpose of meeting said Kelley and the said deceased in deadly conflict.” If this fact was not proved by the evidence, then the law of mutual combat did not apply, and the instruction fell with it. But to find this the jury were compelled to find against all of the evidence given by defendant on this point, and to find that the extreme contention of the prosecution was true. We do not see that the defendant could complain of this.
This instruction placed a heavy burden upon the prosecution, and to our mind in fact, instead of being adverse to the defendant, was really favorable to him. Of course, in passing on this instruction we do not presume to say that the evidence in this case established mutual combat. All that we hold is that there was evidence in the case sufficient, under the claims of the prosecution Upon which to predicate this instruction, and under it the government was entitled to have the law relating thereto declared. It is strenuously urged that it should have contained a saving clause, providing for the contingency of defendant’s withdrawal from the coming fray. There is no question on the law on the subject, for the defendant, even though he went to the field for the purpose of engaging in a mutual combat, if he, in good faith, withdrew, and sought to avoid the difficulty before the fatal moment, and if, while in this attitude, the deceased himself brought about, by his acts, a condition wherein the life of defendant was endangered, or where he in good faith believed it was, then the right of self-defense would exist in him, and he would have the right to defend his life as against the deceased, notwithstanding his previous intentions to engage in a combat. But did he withdraw? Counsel urge and insist that, when defendant sent word to Brady not to come there, he could not turn the cattle in; that this amounted to a withdrawal. We cannot consent to this. It seems to us that it was an effort, or an invitation at least, to induce Brady and his party to withdraw, not a withdrawal of Driggers. He remained where he was, with his gun and his party, and awaited the arrival of the deceased, who, with his party, came on, and the conflict ensued.
We believe we have now covered practically all of the propositions urged in this court which will be likely to again arise in a new trial hereof, and we believe that a trial, conducted along the lines and within the limitation herein prescribed, will safeguard the rights of both the state and the defendant. The decision is accordingly reversed, and the case remanded to the district court of Garvin county, with instructions to grant the defendant a new trial.
Hayes, Kane, and Turner, JJ., concur; Williams, C. J. disqualified.

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