Source: https://casetext.com/case/wirth-v-colvin-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:11:56+00:00

Document:
JOSHUA D. L. WIRTH, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on review of the Commissioner's decision to deny Plaintiff Joshua D.L. Wirth's ("Plaintiff's") application for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income, under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33. Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Citations to the Social Security Administrative Record, which is found at Doc. # 14, will be to "AR" followed by the relevant page number.
Plaintiff had two heart surgeries for congenital heart defects, when he was 4 and 16 years old, as well as a leg lengthening procedure when he was 17. (AR at 65-66.) These impairments are not at issue on appeal.
Mr. Wirth is a bright, articulate and capable young man who may need to adjust his expectations in the workplace. . . . His extremely limited level of experience will result in entry level position which he may not find initially challenging. His personal challenge needs to be in developing a consistent work history. . . . Due to Mr. Wirth's tendency to be meticulous and somewhat anxious, positions that demand a quick pace may not be a good match.
Under the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if he is unable to do "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). The Social Security Administration uses a five-step framework to determine whether these conditions are met. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Step one requires the agency to determine whether a claimant is "presently engaged in substantial gainful activity." Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004). If not, the agency proceeds to consider, at step two, whether a claimant has "a medically severe impairment or impairments." Id. An impairment is severe under the applicable regulations if it significantly limits a claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. At step three, the ALJ considers whether a claimant's medically severe impairments are equivalent to a condition "listed in the appendix of the relevant disability regulation." Allen, 357 F.3d at 1142. If a claimant's impairments are not equivalent to a listed impairment, the ALJ must consider, at step four, whether a claimant's impairments prevent her from performing her past relevant work. See id. Even if a claimant is so impaired, the agency considers, at step five, whether she possesses the sufficient RFC to perform other work in the national economy. See id.
5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work; nevertheless, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform [Step 5].
SVP stands for "Specific Vocational Preparation," and refers to the amount of time required by a typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility required for average performance of a job.
Plaintiff argues, for the first time in his Reply brief, that "The jobs cited by the [vocational expert] . . . would likely require at least occasional social interaction with the public, supervisors, and co-workers, for example. A moderate limitation in social functioning would significantly erode the numbers of jobs and probably knock out sales attendant and photocopy machine operator which involve public interaction to a significant degree." (Doc. # 24 at 2-3). Because this argument is raised for the first time in Plaintiff's Reply, it is disregarded. See United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 738 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted) ("Issues not raised in opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived"). In any event, as described below, the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff's social limitations were mild.
Plaintiff raises two arguments in support of his contention that the ALJ erred in rendering his decision: (1) The ALJ failed to properly assess the medical evidence in determining Plaintiff's Mental RFC; and (2) the ALJ failed to properly apply SSR 11-2p, a regulation providing guidance for ALJs in evaluating evidence of disability in the cases of "young adult" claimants. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
An ALJ must make specific RFC findings based on all of the relevant evidence in the case record. See Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (July 2, 1996). Those findings must be supported by substantial evidence. See Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1999). "An ALJ is not entitled to pick and choose through an uncontradicted medical opinion, taking only the parts that are favorable to a finding of nondisability." Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2012). At the same time, "an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," and an ALJ's opinion must only discuss the uncontroverted evidence he or she chooses not to rely upon and any significantly probative evidence he or she rejects. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996). Moreover, when the medical evidence does not contradict the ALJ's conclusion, "the need for express analysis is weakened." Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 2004).
Here, the ALJ explicitly stated that he gave "significant weight" to the opinion of "the State agency psychological consultant," i.e., the opinion of Dr. Suyeishi (AR at 25.) Plaintiff argues that despite this "significant weight," the ALJ did not actually properly account for Dr. Suyeishi's findings of moderate adaptation and social functioning limitations. (Doc. # 20 at 11.) However, Dr. Suyeishi's opinions on the impact of Plaintiff's limitations in social functioning were entirely consistent with the ALJ's determination of Plaintiff's mental RFC. Dr. Suyeishi concluded that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in social functioning; however, he - like the ALJ - determined that the Plaintiff's allegations regarding the severity and the impact of these limitations on Plaintiff's ability to work were not credible. (Compare AR at 21, 23-24 with AR at 154.) Additionally, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's moderate limitations in social functioning and the extent to which they affected Plaintiff's mental RFC when he stated that Plaintiff's "activities of daily living are not consistent with a totally disabled individual," because Plaintiff was able to socialize productively with others - including visiting coffee shops with friends, participating in longboarding competitions and weekly Paganism meetings, and having a girlfriend (AR at 24.) Thus, drawing on the entire record, the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his conclusion that Plaintiff had mild, rather than moderate, limitations, and adequately accounted for these limitations in determining that he could perform jobs requiring no more than three months to learn in a work environment free of fast-past production requirements, involving only simple work-related decisions and routine workplace changes. (AR at 21.) Therefore, the Court disagrees that the ALJ failed to account for the moderate limitations identified by Dr. Suyeishi. As such, this case is distinguishable from Haga v. Astrue, in which the Tenth Circuit held that an ALJ should explain why he or she rejects some moderate restrictions while adopting others. 482 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).
In a related argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in posing hypotheticals to the Vocational Expert (VE) because he did not include these "moderate" social limitations in his hypotheticals. Because the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff's social functioning limitations were mild, not moderate, the hypothetical questions he posed to the VE were appropriate. See Quails v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1373 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that an ALJ's hypothetical question to a VE is sufficient when it matches the limitations ultimately included in the residual functional capacity assessment).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to assign a particular weight to Dr. Rickard's and Dr. D'Amato's reports, contending that this was equivalent to ignoring these reports' "substantive content as medical opinion evidence on the issue of MRFC and associated work limitations" (Id. at 15, 16) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the ALJ was not required to assign an explicit weight to the doctors' reports because he made it clear that he agreed with their conclusions (i.e., that Plaintiff had ADHD and depression) (AR at 24). These same reports (as well as the other evidence in the record) further supported his conclusion that Plaintiff's impairments were not so severe as to result in a disabling condition. (Id. at 23); see also Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that when a medical opinion is generally consistent with the ALJ's RFC finding, remand is not required merely because the ALJ did not assign a specific weight to the opinion).
In particular, the ALJ pointed to the fact that numerous intelligence tests and academic evaluations, including Dr. Rickard's and D. D'Amato's, demonstrated that Plaintiff has above-average, even superior, cognitive abilities in many areas of functioning. (AR at 23-24). The ALJ also considered the fact that Plaintiff required little treatment and had not actually obtained medication (or other forms of longer-term treatment) for his ADHD or depression - despite numerous recommendations to do so. (AR at 24.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff achieved considerable educational success (in earning his high school diploma, two associates degrees with a high GPA, and a welding certificate; and taking some upper-level courses at UNC). (AR at 25). Moreover, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff worked part-time as a dishwasher while attending UNC, worked as a security guard for more than a year (and was asked to resign for job performance, not impairment-related, reasons), and "testified that he is staying in school because he has student loans and the only jobs he can find do not pay him enough to for him to pay back his loans . . . an admission that [he] can perform work." (Id.) Consequently, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the ALJ to reasonably conclude that Plaintiff's mental impairments did not rise to the level of a disabling condition.
Plaintiff's doctors repeatedly recommended he meet with a cardiologist prior to obtaining ADHD medication and that he attend therapy or counseling for his depression (AR at 379-80, 481-82). It seems, however, that Plaintiff never actually followed up on those recommendations - he saw Mr. Willson, a Licensed Professional Counselor, on a handful of occasions (but for brain imaging analysis, not therapy), and he did not follow up as to ADHD medication (AR at 68, 76-78, 793).
Plaintiff argues that, even if Mr. Willson's findings did not constitute evidence of disability in and of themselves, remand is appropriate because "the concensus [sic] of the medical sources of record is that Mr. JW needs further evaluation." (Doc # 20 at 14). However, Plaintiff addressed any unanswered questions which might have been raised by Mr. Willson's report by having Dr. Himes's - a neurologist - conduct a consultative examination which to review Mr. Willson's report, the results of which were reviewed by the Appeals Council. Indeed, Dr. Himes disagreed with Mr. Willson and concluded that Plaintiff likely did not have a brain injury. (AR at 836.) Accordingly, Dr. Himes's report demonstrates that remand of this case for further examination would be futile - as does the near-consensus in opinions as to Plaintiff's diagnoses of ADHD and depression by the many doctors who evaluated Plaintiff over the course of several years. See Thompson v. Colvin, 551 F. App'x 944, 948 (10th Cir. 2014) ("A remand for the ALJ to weigh opinions that admittedly do not support a finding of disability would be futile.").
The Appeals Council noted that it considered both Dr. Wilson's C.V. and as Dr. Himes' Report as additional evidence which it made part of the record (AR at 6.) Although it did not provide further explanation of the effect of the C.V. and the report on the Council's analysis of the ALJ's decision, such analysis is not required when the Appeals Council denies review. See Martinez v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d 1201, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2006).
Additionally, although Dr. Himes did conclude that "it would be very difficult" for Plaintiff to sustain employment at the time Dr. Himes saw him due to his difficulty with concentration and attention (AR at 839), this finding does not require remand either. The ALJ accounted for such limitations in deciding that Plaintiff could perform jobs "in a work environment free of fast-past production requirements, involving only simple work-related decisions and routine workplace changes." (AR at 21-22.) Moreover, Dr. Himes was a neurologist, not a vocational expert. See Cowan v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2008) (treating physician's statement that he did not know if the clamant would ever be able to return to work was "not a true medical opinion," where it did not contain the doctor's judgment about the nature and severity of the claimant's limitations or any information about what activities the claimant could still perform, and instead merely addressed an issue reserved to the Commissioner).
In sum, the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence in making his RFC findings, these findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Appeals Council did not err in concluding that Dr. Himes's report was consistent with ALJ's findings, and remand would be futile.
Plaintiff argues that ALJ should have applied SSR 11-2p, a regulation guiding the evaluation of disability in young adults ages 18 to "approximately 25," as Plaintiff was 25 years old for five months of the relevant period. (Doc. # 20 at 15-16.) SSR 11-2p requires the ALJ consider the same information he would for any adult claimant, including evidence from medical sources, non-medical sources, and education records, as well as any evidence of extra help and accommodations offered to a Plaintiff from parental or educational sources. Id. As described above, the ALJ conducted this kind of thorough review here.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that he was classified as a "disabled student" and that he "required special support and accommodations" from his teachers and professors, and that the ALJ failed to consider this fact. (Doc. # 20 at 15-16). However, there is no evidence of such accommodations in the record as to Plaintiff's tenure at community college (which was before the alleged onset period, in any case). At UNC, he obtained recommendations from Dr. D'Amato and Dr. May that he could benefit from disability support services (AR at 708, 718), but no evidence he actually availed himself of such services. In any case, the learning-disability-related accommodations suggested by Dr. D'Amato and Dr. May - that he take tests with extended time, focus on fewer courses, and develop time management and reading comprehension skills - were entirely consistent with the ALJ's RFC finding that Plaintiff was capable of performing simple work at a moderate pace. Accordingly, the ALJ properly applied SSR 11-2p.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the ALJ's denial of social security disability benefits is AFFIRMED. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney fees.

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