Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2001/03/00-6157.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:23:25+00:00

Document:
Appellant Latasha Conley Turner appeals from a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and from denial of her motion for new trial in her employment discrimination action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Fourth: That her race was a motivating factor in defendant's employment decision.
Appellant's App. Vol. I at 70. Citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.792, 802 (1973), and Thomas, 111 F.3d at 1510, Ms. Turner argues that the instruction does not reflect the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination based on failure to promote.
the presumption and burdens inherent in the McDonnell Douglas formulation drop out of consideration when the case is submitted to the jury on the merits. As the Supreme Court noted in United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1480-81, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), the important issue is discrimination vel non not the orderly presentation of evidence.
Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990). Although in Thomas we referenced a plaintiff's prima facie burden under McDonnell Douglas when discussing the propriety of a jury instruction, see 111 F.3d at 1509-10, the issue there was whether the court properly instructed the jury on the plaintiff's burden to show that he was qualified for the position. Id. at 1510. The district court in Thomas had instructed the jury that the plaintiff had to prove that he was "at least as well qualified for the position as the person hired" before the jury could consider whether the reasons the defendant had given for not promoting the plaintiff were pretextual. See id. at 1511. This error was not repeated in the case at bar. Instead, the district court properly instructed the jury on the plaintiff's burden to show that she was qualified for the position and on her ultimate burden of establishing that defendant intentionally discriminated against her because of her race. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
[i]f you find that the stated reasons given by defendant are inconsistent or implausible or that defendant substantially deviated from its own practices or policies, then you may conclude that the offered explanation is a mere pretext, excuse, sham, or cover-up for discrimination. If you find pretext, you may also infer that race was a motivating factor in the employment decisions, though you are not required to draw such an inference.
Id. at 72. Thus the district court specifically instructed the jury that it could find discrimination through circumstantial evidence.
Similarly, Ms. Turner's claim that jury instruction number 13 is erroneous and prejudicial to her because it does not make "reference to evidence of pretext for which the jury can infer discrimination" and is not tailored "to fit the facts of the case," Appellant's Br. at 20, is also without merit. We approved a similar instruction in Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 115 F.3d 1442, 1454-55 (10th Cir. 1997). Although the instruction is not as detailed as the instruction Ms. Turner requested, it properly instructed the jury on types of circumstantial evidence related to the case that may establish pretext. Cf. F.D.I.C. v. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[i]t is not error to refuse to give a requested instruction if the same subject matter is adequately covered in the general instructions") (quotation omitted).

References: § 2000
 § 1291
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