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Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:53:58+00:00

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Entry in Lawrence E. Blume and Steven N. Durlauf, editors, The New Palgrave. Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming).
Like any other business, software development organizations try to maximize their profits and minimize their risks. ... Keywords: Software Project Management; Software Risk Management; ..... that the weight for the risk factor Testing in a small.
Danish housing market while I was serving as Chief Economist of the Danish central bank. Most of the work ... Contents. 1 Introduction and outline of the report .
Innovation diffusion model, case study methodology, taxonomy, forecasting. * Max Planck ..... Norton and Bass, 1987)5. Bayus et al. ...... 501-522. GrÃ¼bler, A., 1996, On the Patterns of Diffusion of Innovation: Daedalus, Journal of the American.
Feb 21, 2002 - +31 10 408 9640. Email: [email protected] Internet: www.erim.eur.nl. Bibliographic ... of developing good relationships with current and new customers. D irect ... A direct marketing campaign consists of a number of stages.
Policy to address the environmental impacts of transportation fuel ... This paper explores the ethical implications of a corn ethanol transportation system and the.
Aug 25, 2009 - Certainly, house prices increased unsustainably, but whether the deflating of the bubble is leading to a âcorrectâ mortgage market is less clear.
view of managers in production, trade and services oriented companies about their logistics needs. .... services, managed services and full outsourcing, also.
Maurice E. Stucke is an attorney in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Depar tment of Justice. The views expressed in this ar ticle are the author’s own and do not purpor t to reflect those of the U.S. Depar tment of Justice. The information relating to the matter of U.S. v. Village Voice Media, LLC and NT Media, LLC, Civ. Action No. 1:03CV0164 (N.D. Ohio 2003), in which the author par ticipated, is from publicly available sources.
A s a g e n e r a l r u l e , c o u r t s h av e u p h e l d n o n - c o m p e t e p r ov i s i o n s i n a s s e t p u r c h a s e a g r e e m e n t s w h e n t h e restraints are reasonably necessar y to assure that p u r c h a s e r c a n e n j oy t h e f r u i t s o f i t s a c q u i s i t i o n , i n c l u d i n g g o o dw i l l .
It is arguable that the standard under § 7 of the Clayton Act differs from the rule of reason standard under § 1 of the Sherman Act, in that the Clayton Act reaches monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency. See Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.33 (1962) (noting that the Senate committee wished to make it clear that the Clayton Act was “not intended to revert to the Sherman Act test” but also “to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding”). But some courts today would dismiss this distinction. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir. 1990) (“We doubt whether there is a substantive difference today between the standard for judging the lawfulness of a merger challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act and the standard for judging the same merger challenged under section 7 of the Clayton Act.”); 2 P HILLIP E. A REEDA & H ERBERT H OVENKAMP, A NTITRUST L AW ¶ 304c, at 9 (1995). See, e.g., U.S. v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362–63 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an antitrust plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only tally his score.”).
Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990); U.S. v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); see also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S., 175 U.S. 211 (1899), modifying and aff’g 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.).
See, e.g., U.S. v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1371 (6th Cir. 1988).
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.2 (2000), available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
U.S. v. Village Voice Media, LLC and NT Media, LLC, Civ. Action No. 1:03CV0164 (N.D. Ohio 2003), Competitive Impact Statement at 11 [New Times CIS], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200700/ 200715.htm.
Id.; see also Palmer, 498 U.S. at 48 (combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of fixing prices is illegal per se); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593, 597–98 (1951) (where central purpose of agreement is to allocate trade territories, restraints are per se illegal), overruled on other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
See Palmer, 874 F.2d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1989), rev’d, 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (Supreme Court applied per se standard without regard to defendant’s affidavit that it unilaterally decided to withdraw from market before entering agreement); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 701 n.13 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (court rejected as defense company’s testimony that it unilaterally would not have entered market), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
New Times CIS, supra note 6, at 6–10.
New Times Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 34, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ atr/cases/f200600/200673.htm.
Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.10.
Palmer, 498 U.S. at 47.
744 F.2d 588, 595–96 (7th Cir. 1984).
New Times CIS, supra note 6, at 13.
Topco, 405 U.S. at 605, 610 (rejecting argument that by restricting competition in the sale of Topco brand goods, defendant association actually increased competition against larger regional and national chains); New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Saint Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 399, 417–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting claim that allocation agreement enabled defendants to offer patients a full panoply of services to effectively compete with larger hospitals in the region).
See Hawaii ex rel. Anzai v. Gannett Pacific Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1251 (D. Haw.) (as defendant lacked infrastructure to publish newspaper, practical effect of defendants’ agreement was to eliminate competition), aff’d, 203 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1999).
Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2001); Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Mach., Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985); Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. at 283.
Perceptron, 221 F.3d at 919.
Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 144–45.
Palmer, 498 U.S. at 47 n.2. In exchange for HBJ’s exclusive license of its “Bar/Bri” name in Georgia, BRG agreed in 1980 not to compete with HBJ outside Georgia. In 1982, a group of Georgia law students challenged this agreement. The defendants settled and also modified their earlier written agreement by deleting the non-compete provision. Defendants were sued again by a second class of law students (those who took the bar review course after June 1984), which was the action that came before the Supreme Court. Although the defendants struck the non-compete provisions from their written agreement, neither defendant was competing in the other’s territory. See 874 F.2d 1417, 1429–30 (11th Cir. 1989) (Clark, J., dissenting).
Aside from the courts, even two FTC Commissioners were puzzled about the Commission’s stance on non-compete provisions in two contemporaneous consent decrees. In the General Mills consent decree, the Commission condemned an 18-month non-compete provision limited to the manufacture and sale of private label Chex cereal products. See Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga (Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part), and Statement of Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III (Dissenting), in General Mills, Inc., FTC File No. 961-0101, 62 Fed. Reg. 2,162 (Jan. 15, 1997). But weeks earlier in the Ciba-Geigy consent decree, the Commission imposed an affirmative obligation on the newly merged entity not to compete in the United States and Canada for six years in the sale of methoprene-based flea control products. Commission Statement in Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., FTC File No. 961-0055, 62 Fed. Reg. 409 (Jan. 3, 1997).
Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. at 280.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978).
Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. at 283–84.
New Times CIS, supra note 6, at 9–10.
Compare Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 267 (7th Cir. 1981) (defendant enforced non-compete covenants to reasonable time, space and product limitations); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 836 (7th Cir. 1963) (no antitrust violation after one-year geographic non-compete restriction was amended from entire state to terminated dealers’ former territories) with Timken, 341 U.S. at 598–99 (restraints went beyond protection of specific trademark and provided for control of manufacture and sale of antifriction bearings outside the trademark); Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995) (restraint’s infinite duration supports application of per se standard); Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (per se illegal territorial restraint barred competitor from marketing other bioequivalent or generic versions of drug which were not at issue in underlying patent litigation).
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Report "Evaluating the Risks of Market Swaps - SSRN"

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