Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/55108
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:41:52+00:00

Document:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MARLON MEDIDA, RESPONDENT.
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to assail the Decision dated December 16, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01870, entitled Marlon Medida, Petitioner-appellee, v. Republic of the Philippines, Oppositor-appellant.
On October 22, 2004, herein respondent Marlon Medida (Medida) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Argao, Cebu a petition for registration of title over two parcels of land situated in Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu, identified as Lot Nos. 817 and 597 of Boljoon Cad. 1049-D and measuring 5,972 and 533 square meters, respectively. The petition was docketed as LRA Case No. AL-31 and raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Argao, Cebu.
The initial hearing on the petition was conducted on September 22, 2005, with the attendance of the public prosecutor. The RTC delegated the reception of evidence to its Clerk of Court. Before the court, Medida testified that he purchased the subject properties in February 1997 from one Eufemia Romero (Romero), who had previously obtained the lots from Nabor Derama (Derama). At the time of the lots’ purchase by Medida, the properties were covered by Tax Declaration No. 08774 under the name of Romero. Medida started occupying the properties in 1997, and had since then declared the properties for tax purposes under his name.
Also among the witnesses presented during the proceedings a quo were Asuncion Derama Binagatan (Binagatan) and Engineer Rafaela A. Belleza (Engr. Belleza).
Binagatan, daughter of Derama, testified that her father had inherited the subject properties from his uncle, one Florencio Villareal, who possessed the lots even prior to the Second World War. She presented the old Tax Declaration No. 08590 under the name of her father and covering the subject properties.
Engr. Belleza, the Chief of the Technical Services of the Land Management Services – Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII, testified that the lots’ survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Jose V. Dumaguing (Engr. Dumaguing) was approved by their office. Per the Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 817 and 597 identified by Engr. Belleza, the subject properties had already been declared alienable and disposable portions of the public domain.
2. A parcel of land, Lot 597, Cad. 1049-D, under AP 07-003653, situated in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Boljoon, Province of Cebu, containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]THREE (533) SQUARE METERS.
The trial court erred in granting appellee’s petition for registration because the subject lands were not occupied and possessed for the period required by law.
In support of its appeal, the OSG argued that it was only from the subject lands’ date of alienability and disposability that the reckoning of the thirty (30)-year statutory requirement of possession should begin. Based on the Advance Survey Plans submitted by the respondent, Lot Nos. 817 and 597 were declared alienable and disposable in 1987 and 1980, respectively. The OSG then argued that Medida’s possession of the properties prior to 1987 and 1980, as the case may be, should not be credited as part of the period of possession required from him as an applicant for land registration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision dated June 21, 2006, rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Laoang Northern Argao, Cebu, in LRA Case No. AL-31 is hereby AFFIRMED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ CONCLUSION THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE PART OF THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS WITHOUT BASIS.
Citing jurisprudence on the matter, the Republic argues that the alienable and disposable character of the subject parcels of land has not been sufficiently proved by the mere presentation of the surveyor’s notations on the Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 817 and 597. Petitioner Republic claims that such requirement must be established by the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
In his Comment, Medida maintains that he has sufficiently proved that the subject properties have been declared alienable and disposable. To further support this assertion, he submitted with his Comment the following certifications issued by the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Argao, Cebu: (1) the Certification dated June 22, 2011 which states that the parcel of land described as Lot No. 817, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1 located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 5,972 square meters is within the alienable and disposable area, Proj. No. 59-A, L.C. Map No. 3280, certified on August 6, 1987, as verified by actual ground verification; and (2) the Certification dated July 5, 2011 which states that the parcel of land described as Lot No. 597, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1 located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 533 square meters is within the alienable and disposable area, Proj. No. 59 L.C. Map No. 2876, certified on January 11, 1980, as verified by actual ground verification.
Medida also seeks the petition’s denial on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which is not allowed in petitions for review under Rule 45. Medida further argues that the OSG is bound conclusively by its declaration before the CA that the subject parcels of land have been declared alienable and disposable.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the main issue for this Court’s resolution is: whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the parcels of land subject of the application for registration are part of the alienable and disposable portions of the public domain.
First, we address Medida’s argument that the present petition raises a question of fact which is beyond the coverage of a petition for review on certiorari. The distinction between a “question of law” and a “question of fact” is settled. There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
[T]he Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.
The issue in the present petition has been limited by the Republic, as it merely concerns the merit of notations in survey plans to prove that the properties sought to be registered have been declared alienable and disposable. Similar to the Vega case, the contest rests on the matter of sufficiency of evidence, an issue on a conclusion that was made by the appellate court without necessarily raising an attack on the authenticity of the documents that were presented in the proceedings before the RTC. The issue being invoked by the Republic to support its petition is then a question of law, a matter that is within the purview of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
We now resolve the petition’s substantial issue. Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
On this requirement of proof to establish that a land has become alienable and disposable, the respondent argues that the Advance Survey Plans that were prepared by Engr. Dumaguing and approved by the DENR-Land Management Bureau, providing notations that the lots indicated therein are within the alienable and disposable properties of the State, should suffice. We disagree.
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
Clearly, even the testimony of Engr. Belleza fails to satisfy the required proof. Before us, Medida attempts to remedy the deficiency in his application by submitting the Certifications of the CENRO of Argao, Cebu, attached to his Comment to further substantiate his claim that the subject properties were already declared alienable and disposable. Unfortunately for the respondent, the said CENRO Certifications remain inadequate to support his intended purpose.
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original registration be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. Medida failed in this respect. The records only include CENRO Certifications on the subject properties’ alienability and disposability, but not a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by its legal custodian.
Furthermore, even the CENRO Certifications filed before this Court deserve scant consideration since these were not presented during the trial. The genuineness and due execution of these documents had not been duly proven in the manner required by law.
In view of the failure of the respondent to establish by sufficient proof that the subject parcels of land had been classified as part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, his application for registration of title should be denied.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conversion of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, anyone who applies for registration of ownership over a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
This Court also holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among the matters that can be established by mere admissions, or even the agreement of parties. The law and jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to prove such fact. Our Constitution, no less, embodies the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The courts are then empowered, as we are duty-bound, to ensure that such ownership of the State is duly protected by the proper observance by parties of the rules and requirements on land registration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01870 is hereby SET ASIDE. The application for registration filed by Marlon Medida is DENIED.
Velasco, Jr.,* Brion, (Acting Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,** and Perez, JJ., concur.
* Additional member per Raffle dated March 9, 2011 vice Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
** Additional member per Special Order No. 1274 dated July 30, 2012 vice Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.
 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate Justices Agnes Reyes- Carpio and Eduardo B. Peralta. Jr., concurring; rollo. pp. 31-40.
 Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 410, 420.
 G.R. No. 177790, January 17, 2011, 639 SCRA 541.
 Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 621-622.
 Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011.
 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.
 Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012.
 See Republic v. Gomez, G.R. No. 189021, February 22, 2012.
 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article X11, Section 2.

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