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1 STEWART ESTATE V. TAQA NORTH LTD. 989 LITIGATING SHUT-IN FOR LACK OF A MARKET: A COMMENT ON STEWART ESTATE V. TAQA NORTH LTD. WAYNE RENKE * Typically an Alberta freehold petroleum and natural gas lease continues for a defined period or primary term ) and so long thereafter as leased substances are produced from the leased lands or the lessee satisfies specified lease conditions. In exchange for the lessee s rights to explore for and produce leased substances, the lessor receives a royalty. This arrangement works satisfactorily, for the most part, when leased substances are produced. Circumstances, though, may disincline the lessee to produce and incline the lessee to shut-in a well, particularly when the well is productive of natural gas. For example (especially if the well is in a new or little-developed location), pipelines may have to be constructed, there may be no nearby pipeline system to connect to, or there may be no readily available processing plants. Purchase contracts must be secured. 1 Unlike oil, natural gas cannot simply be trucked to another location for disposition. The most convenient means for storing the natural gas pending changed circumstances may be to leave it in the ground. To preserve both a lease and its financial viability, a lessee may seek to rely on lease provisions permitting a well to be shut-in and for the lease to be continued on the payment of shut-in royalties. A lessee would favour an expansive approach to shut-in provisions. In contrast, a lessor would understandably prefer to receive royalties on actual production (which presumably would be greater than shut-in royalties) or to have the lease terminate so that a lessee with a more aggressive or economical approach to production could be found. A lessor would favour a restrictive approach to shut-in provisions. This conflict between the interests of lessees and lessors relating to contractually justifiable shut-in lies at the heart of Justice Barbara Romaine s decision in Stewart Estate v. TAQA North Ltd. 2 Many leases entered into in the 1960s and 1970s employ language similar to the leases considered in Stewart, so the case will affect the rights of many lessors and lessees. 3 Justice Romaine s decision is also valuable as a thorough canvassing of the sequence of issues that must be confronted in shut-in litigation and has the virtue, in my estimation, of landing correctly on the key legal issues (other than a limitations period issue). The decision illuminates the challenges faced by lessees and particularly lessors in shut-in litigation. * Justice of the Court of Queen s Bench of Alberta. Professor Emeritus and former Vice Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. This comment was submitted prior to appointment. 1 Eugene Kuntz, Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co, 1990) vol 4 at 3; WL Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas: With Forms, 3rd ed (St Paul, Minn: Thomson/West, 2006) vol 2 at 302; John S Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell, 4th ed (St Paul, West Group, 2003) at ABQB 691, 576 AR 57, Romaine J [Stewart]. The appeal of this case was heard in September The application of the Freehold Petroleum and Natural Gas Owners Association (FOA) for leave to intervene in the appeal was denied (2014 ABCA 222, 577 AR 57, Rowbotham JA [Stewart Intervention Decision]), as was the application for leave to intervene by Wheatland Farming Co Ltd (2014 ABCA 296,  AJ No 980 (QL), Martin JA [Wheatland Intervention Decision]). Wheatland, it appears, has commenced its own action in the Court of Queen s Bench respecting its mines and mineral rights (Wheatland Intervention Decision, ibid at para 7). 3 Stewart Intervention Decision, ibid at para 6 (referring to the affidavit of David Speirs, a director of the FOA).
2 990 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2015) 52:4 After (I) reviewing the basic facts of the case, this comment will consider its main issues: (II) whether a declaration that certain leases had terminated could be granted without purported assignees of the lessor being before the Court; (III) whether any of the plaintiffs claims were barred by estoppel, acquiescence or laches, or through the operation of the Limitations Act; 4 (IV) the interpretation of the applicable shut-in clauses and whether, on the evidence, the conditions for shut-in were satisfied; and (V) if the leases terminated the cause or causes of action for which the defendants would be liable and the appropriate measure of damages. I. BASIC FACTS The action concerned a section of land near Crossfield, Alberta, north of Calgary: section 25, township 27, range 1, west of the fifth meridian (the Lands). The relevant surface and mines and minerals rights were held in freehold. 5 The northwest, southwest, and southeast quarter sections were each the subject of separate oil and gas leases; the northeast quarter section contained two separately leased parcels (cumulatively, the Leases). The Leases were granted in the 1960s and were duly protected by caveats. The plaintiffs were the registered owners of the Lands and parties claiming under Leases, as well as parties interested under a top lease (the Top Lessee Plaintiffs). The defendants were resource company successors to the original lessees (the Defendants). 6 Each Lease had a 10-year primary term and provided for continuation on production. 7 The Lands overlay natural gas-bearing formations. In accordance with Lease terms, the Leases were duly pooled by agreement to achieve the requisite drilling spacing unit for natural gas. Upon pooling, production from or shut-in royalties relating to a well on pooled Lands would sustain all the pooled Leases. A well was drilled on legal subdivision 7 in the southeast quarter section of the Lands within the primary term of the Leases (the 7-25 Well). The 7-25 Well encountered two productive formations the Basal Quartz and the Crossfield. 8 The Basal Quartz was shallower and sweet; the Crossfield was deeper and very sour. The 7-25 Well was initially completed in the Basal Quartz, from which it produced commencing in March The Lands were located in a prolific drilling area. 9 Because of competitive drainage from the Basal Quartz, it was decided that the 7-25 Well would be recompleted in the Crossfield formation. The 7-25 Well was completed in this formation and produced natural gas from March 1981 until July For reasons to be elaborated below, the 7-25 Well was shut-in from the end of July 1995 until January In early 2001, the 7-25 Well was again recompleted in the Basal Quartz and produced from February 2001 to 13 January 2011, when 4 RSA 2000, c L Stewart, supra note 2 at paras Justice Romaine summarized the leasehold interests in Appendix A of her decision: ibid, Appendix A (see also paras 22-45). 7 Ibid at paras See Alberta Energy Regulator, Table of Formations, Alberta (June 2013), online: < documents/catalog/tof.pdf>. 9 See Kallisto Energy Corp: Application for a Well Licence Crossfield East Field (23 July 2013), 2013 ABAER 013, online: Alberta Energy Regulator < 013.pdf> [Kallisto].
3 STEWART ESTATE V. TAQA NORTH LTD. 991 it was shut-in to comply with an injunction. It appears that the 7-25 Well s reinvigorated production was actually from a neighbouring commercial gas storage unit. 10 Each of the registered owners of the Lands granted a top lease to Freehold Solutions Inc. (FSI), which in turn created Alberta Ltd. (108). FSI assigned its top leases to 108. FSI, 108, and Timothy Bowes, president of FSI and 108, were Plaintiffs. Each top lease was to take effect only on the termination of the existing leases. 11 As part of the top lease arrangements, FSI agreed to pay legal costs for the litigation. It would split damages with the other Plaintiffs on a fifty-fifty basis. 12 The action raised no delay rental or drilling over issues. 13 The validity of the Leases was not challenged on the basis of royalty or shut-in royalty calculations, payees, or payment timing. The central issue was whether the Leases had terminated because of the shut-in. Before addressing this issue, Justice Romaine considered whether, given the parties before the Court, a declaration respecting the termination of certain Leases could be granted, and whether all or any part of the claims were barred through the passage of time, the plaintiffs conduct, or both. II. PARTIES REQUIRED FOR A DECLARATION The issue of the proper parties required to support a declaration involves the audi alteram partem ( hear the other side ) principle: no one should be condemned unheard. 14 That principle, one of simple fairness, should apply whenever recourse is had to a state-based procedure that would affect others rights and interests. The difficulty faced by certain plaintiffs in Stewart was that, on the evidence, their interests were legally intertwined with other persons interests, but those other persons were not parties to the litigation. The absence of interested parties is not a common trial problem, since parties issues are typically sorted out before trial or at least before judgment. If at trial a party can point to evidence supporting the conclusion that the proper determination of an opponent s claim for relief requires the participation of another person who is not a party, the 10 Stewart, supra note 2 at para 21; ibid at paras 15, Stewart, ibid at paras 6, 54-74, 99, Ibid at para 686. As for the Top Lessee Plaintiffs, very briefly: 108 s pleadings claimed damages for trespass, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Justice Romaine accepted that 108 had a sufficient interest to support standing for a declaration of Lease termination. However, since 108 had no possessory interests it lacked status to advance claims for trespass or conversion, and because it held only a contingent interest, it had no claim for unjust enrichment, which was conceded at trial (paras 105, ). 108 made an alternative claim based on loss or delay in being able to take possession of the lands and produce leased substances (para 179). Because the top leases would not come into effect until the original leases had been terminated and that determination had not been made, 108 s rights to proceed with development had not been impaired (paras ). The Defendants counterclaimed against 108 and Bowes for (inter alia) champerty and maintenance (para 681). The success of these claims depended on showing that 108 and Bowes had no legitimate interests in the litigation. Justice Romaine dismissed these claims on the grounds that under the top leases 108 and Bowes had a sufficient commercial interest, stating: Concerns about any impropriety in their role in the litigation can be addressed through the mechanism of costs (para 690). 13 That is, there were no contentions that the Leases terminated during the primary terms because delay rental was not paid, paid late, paid to incorrect persons, paid in the incorrect amounts, and no contention that the leases terminated because of lack of production before the end of the primary term. 14 See e.g. A (LL) v B (A),  4 SCR 536 at para 27; Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301 v Montreal (City),  1 SCR 793 at para 73; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v KLW, 2000 SCC 48,  2 SCR 519 at para 115.
5 STEWART ESTATE V. TAQA NORTH LTD. 993 changed the royalty payee to Wheatland Farming Co. Ltd. (Wheatland), which thereafter received royalty and shut-in royalty payments. 21 Mr. Stewart died in None of the Jerome Group Plaintiffs received royalties from the Scurry Leases, nor did they, for some 35 years, register complaints respecting their lack of receipt of royalties. On this evidence, the Defendants had successfully raised the issue of whether parties other than the Jerome Group Plaintiffs had interests in the Scurry Leases. Critically, neither Snell Farms nor Wheatland were parties to the action. The non-participation of Snell Farms and Wheatland created this problem: there is a distinction between lessor rights under a lease and reversionary interests in land subject to a lease. 22 If Snell Farms and Wheatland were lessors by assignment, they (and not the Jerome Group Plaintiffs) would have the right to decide whether or not to claim that the Scurry Leases had terminated. The Jerome Group Plaintiffs would be reversionary interest owners only. They would have interests in the lease validity issue (that is, they would have full rights to the mines and minerals if the Leases terminated), but they would not have the only interests at stake. Further, defences to lease termination could potentially be advanced based on the conduct of Snell Farms and Wheatland as lessors. The evidence then supported live issues respecting whether the validity of the Scurry Leases could be determined without the participation of Snell Farms and Wheatland. There would have been no procedural impediment to adding Snell Farms and Wheatland as parties prior to the close of pleadings 23 or after the close of proceedings, on Court order. 24 Instead, the strategy pursued by the Jerome Group Plaintiffs was to attempt to demonstrate that Snell Farms and Wheatland could not have interests in the Lands, either at all or recognizable in this action, so their absence was of no legal consequence. In aid of this position, the Jerome Group Plaintiffs made a late application to introduce fresh evidence concerning new developments involving Snell Farms. This application was subsequently abandoned. 25 The Jerome Group Plaintiffs further deployed a large array of arguments to remove Snell Farms and Wheatland from legal consideration. The arguments, broadly, were as follows: (1) that Snell Farms and Wheatland could not have received any interests from Mr. Stewart; (2) (if they could) the evidence did not support a finding that Snell Farms and Wheatland were valid assignees of lessor interests; (3) (if they could and did receive interests) any interests that Snell Farms or Wheatland may have had were lost through the operation of the Land Titles Act; 26 and (4) (if they could and did receive subsisting interests) the Defendants were not entitled to rely on any rights held by Snell Farms or Wheatland. The Jerome Group Plaintiffs lost on all counts, and deservedly so. The fundamental difficulty was that the Jerome Group Plaintiffs could not find a way to immunize themselves from the Snell Farms and Wheatland claims without implicating the rights of Snell Farms and Wheatland. That is, the problem of absent parties recurred in the arguments advanced to show that that there was no problem of absent parties. In yet other words, the Jerome Group Plaintiffs could 21 Another company, Fairholm Development, also appears to have been a royalty payee, but this matter is not pursued in the reasons (ibid at paras 75, 81). 22 Ibid at para See Alberta Rules of Court, supra note 16, r 3.70(1). 24 Ibid, r 3.74(2), unless prejudice would result for a party that could not be remedied by a costs award, an adjournment or the imposition of terms (ibid, r 3.74(3)). 25 Stewart, supra note 2 at paras Land Titles Act, RSA 2000, c L-4.
7 STEWART ESTATE V. TAQA NORTH LTD. 995 make it perfectly certain that Snell Farms and Wheatland did not have interests that needed to be taken into account. The main obstacle to Jerome Group Plaintiff success was, once again, the absence of the persons who would be directly affected by the arguments, Snell Farms and Wheatland, coupled with some uncertainty about how the law would apply in the circumstances. One source of legal uncertainty concerned the scope of protection afforded Snell Farms and Wheatland by the Defendants caveats. There is some authority that a lessee s caveat provides protection for a lessor s interests; 33 in turn it may be argued that assignees of a lessor (such as Snell Farms and Wheatland) may also be protected under the lessee s caveat. 34 A second source of uncertainty concerned the Stewart Heirs, who took by succession and not for value. The traditional claim has been that volunteers cannot rely on registration to defeat unregistered interests. 35 Justice Slatter has raised significant doubts about the accuracy of this claim. 36 Turta teaches that a purchaser need not rely on the register to receive indefeasibility protection. 37 It appears inconsistent, absent contrary statutory warrant, to deny a volunteer indefeasibility protection for failure to rely on the register. The volunteer issue was certainly worthy of consideration and determination on evidence and argument to which all interested parties could contribute. A third source of uncertainty related to JDL. Justice Romaine suggested that the transfer by the Stewart Heirs to JDL on the eve of trial (which might have cured any weakness in their title as volunteers) could be argued to have been Land Titles fraud. One might observe that the transaction did take advantage of the law, but so do many other forms of unimpeachable conduct (tax planning included). Land Titles fraud includes deceit and dishonesty (which were not in evidence here), but not registration with mere knowledge of a prior unregistered interest. For registration with knowledge of a prior unregistered interest to constitute Land Titles fraud, something more is required. 38 In Darnley, Justice Slatter considered the following factors to be relevant to the issue of whether something more was present: the party seeking to rely on indefeasibility was the very party that created the interest at stake, and when the interest at stake was created, that party held a partial interest in the 33 Hughes v Gidosh (1970),  1 WWR 641 at (Alta SC), Greschuk J. 34 Ibid at 653. However, Gas Exploration Company of Alberta Ltd and Lee v Cugnet,  12 WWR (NS) 177 (Sask QB), on which Justice Greschuk relied, concerned assignees of the lessee rather than the lessor. 35 Kaup v Imperial Oil Ltd,  SCR 170 at , Justice Martland stating: When regard is had to these sections it appears that the conclusiveness referred to in s. 44 is for the benefit of the bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration only I do not find anything in the case of CPR and Imperial Oil Ltd v Turta which is contrary to this view. It emphasizes the special position enjoyed, under the Act, by the bona fide purchaser for value. In the present case, admittedly, the appellants are not in that position, it having been conceded that no consideration was given for the transfer which was made by Mrs. Kaup to herself and her husband [citations omitted]. See also Krautt s Estate v Paine (1980), 25 AR 390 at para 8 (CA), Laycroft JA. 36 Darnley v Tennant, 2006 ABQB 575, 408 AR 261 at paras 20-29, Slatter J [Darnley]. 37 Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Turta,  SCR 427 at , Rand JA; Turta v CPR,  4 DLR 87 at (Alta SC (AD)), Parlee JA. 38 Land Titles Act, supra note 26, s 203(3): The knowledge of the person that any trust or interest that is not registered by instrument or caveat is in existence shall not of itself be imputed as fraud ; Darnley, supra note 36 at para 30.
8 996 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2015) 52:4 lands, so that it merely changed the quantum or extent of [its] interest. 39 In this case, Mr. Stewart, not JDL and not the Stewart Heirs (purportedly) assigned his lessor rights. Neither JDL nor the Stewart Heirs had transactions with Snell Farms or Wheatland. To transform the Stewart Heirs and JDL situation into a Darnley situation, a basis would have to be provided for identifying JDL, a separate legal entity, with Mr. Stewart at the time of the assignment. That is, the corporation would have to be identified with the individual s act, not, as is usual in piercing the veil cases, identifying the individual with the corporation s act (a sort of reverse piercing is at play). Furthermore, there would have to be a basis for concluding that any identification between JDL and Mr. Stewart persisted after his death, so that JDL (as in Darnley) merely changed the quantum or extent of its interest after the Snell Farms interest was created. While the Land Titles fraud argument does not appear strong, once again Snell Farms and Wheatland should have been entitled to add their perspectives. The late transfer from the Stewart Heirs to JDL troubled Justice Romaine. She also suggested that it might disentitle the Jerome Group Plaintiffs from obtaining a declaration. The decision to grant a declaration is discretionary and equitable principles, including the conduct of the party seeking the relief may be taken into account. 40 The late transfer, made with full knowledge of the Snell Farms and Wheatland claims, and, indeed, made to defeat those claims, may have precluded declaratory relief. The Jerome Group Plaintiffs may have sought equity without clean hands. 41 It is true that a maxim of Equity is that he who comes into Equity must come with clean hands. 42 The maxim, though, does not provide guidance respecting conduct that would be characterized as clean or unclean. 43 The Stewart Heirs and JDL were doing nothing illegal. They had no direct contact with Snell Farms or Wheatland. It s not clear that their hands were not clean. The Stewart Heirs and JDL conduct seems to fall close to this observation by Justice Sopinka in Hongkong Bank: mere knowledge that one is participating in a transaction which constitutes a breach of a contract to which one is not a party does not seem to me to be sufficient to constitute unclean hands. 44 But again, any weakness in this counterattack on the Jerome Group Plaintiffs is not decisive given the other arguments and the absence of Snell Farms and Wheatland from the proceedings. Even if Snell Farms or Wheatland held interests respecting the Lands, the Jerome Group Plaintiffs contended that the Defendants could not rely on those interests. First, they claimed that the Defendants reliance on the assignments was not properly pleaded. Justice Romaine found, though, that notice was provided through the litigation process. Regardless, [t]he possibility of an error in pleading does not address the prejudice to third parties and the possibility of injustice that underpin the general rule requiring all interested parties to be 39 Darnley, ibid at para Stewart, supra note 2 at para Ibid; Hongkong Bank of Canada v Wheeler Holdings Ltd,  1 SCR 167 at , Sopinka JA [Hongkong Bank] (Justice Sopinka referred to the controversies about whether declarations were or have retained status as an equitable remedy, but concluded, regardless, that in the exercise of the discretion whether or not to grant a declaration, the court may take into account certain equitable principles such as the conduct of the party seeking the relief including whether the party seeking the declaration came to Court with unclean hands at 192). See also Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp, 2014 SCC 53,  2 SCR 633, Rothstein JA [Sattva] ( misconduct related to the dispute that gave rise to the proceedings may justify the exercise of discretion to refuse the relief sought at para 98). 42 James Edelman, The Maxims of Equity in John McGhee, ed, Snell s Equity, 32nd ed (London: Thomson Reuters, 2010) 105 at 112 [Edelman, Maxims ]. 43 Ibid at Hongkong Bank, supra note 41 at 194.
9 STEWART ESTATE V. TAQA NORTH LTD. 997 before the Court. 45 Second, the Jerome Group Plaintiffs urged that the Defendants could not enforce the assignments. Since they were not parties to those arrangements, the Defendants reliance on the assignments was barred by privity of contract doctrine. Justice Romaine observed that this argument was misplaced. The Defendants were not seeking to enforce the rights of Snell Farms or Wheatland as against the successors to the original assignor. Rather, they had established that, on the evidence, parties in addition to the Jerome Group Plaintiffs had litigable claims relating to the Scurry Leases, and so the validity of those leases could not be determined without those additional parties. 46 Thus, the interests of Snell Farms and Wheatland could not be ignored. Justice Romaine could not be perfectly certain that [she would] be able to effectively adjudicate all issues relating to the assignments and the validity of the leases without Snell Farms and Wheatland as parties to the action. 47 The Snell Farms and Wheatland claims must be disposed of by due process of law. 48 Moreover, the Defendants should not be exposed to the prospect of, on the one hand, liability to the Jerome Group Plaintiffs on the basis of a terminated Lease and, on the other hand, liability to Snell Farms and Wheatland on the basis of a nonterminated Lease. 49 Given live issues relating to non-parties and the need for their participation to resolve issues, courts have in some instances imposed a stay pending addition of the missing parties to the litigation. 50 In this case, the matter had proceeded to trial without Snell Farms and Wheatland, the Jerome Group Plaintiffs had not applied to add parties, and adding them as parties would have worked significant prejudice to the litigation. 51 It appears that adding them as parties was not feasible. A stay pending their addition, then, would have been inappropriate. The Jerome Group Plaintiffs had sought a declaration. They failed to demonstrate that all parties necessary to contribute to the resolution of the issues were before the Court. The Jerome Group Plaintiffs application for declarations of termination of the Scurry Leases simply failed: No relief will issue unless all interested parties to the proceedings are represented or have been duly put in default. The applicant has the burden of demonstrating that those parties who have been served with proceedings are not only interested parties, but are the only interested parties to the application. In default 45 Stewart, supra note 2 at para Ibid at paras Ibid at para 112 [citations omitted]. 48 Looker, supra note 15 at England (AG) v Royal Bank of Canada,  OWN 782 at 784, (H Ct J), Conant M [England]. See also Morandan Investments Ltd v Spohn (1987), 58 OR (2d) 621, Borins DCJ ( [t]he absence of Guaranty Trust as a party may work prejudice to both it and the defendants. It may expose the defendants to a multiplicity of suits and to possible injustice, such as double liability, because Guaranty Trust as a non-party is not bound by any judgment obtained in its absence at 625). 50 See e.g. Alberta (Treasury Branches), supra note 15 at para 19; Looker, supra note 15 at 169, ; England, ibid at See Alberta Rules of Court, supra note 16, r 3.74(3). See also Stewart, supra note 2 at para 114 (the Defendant s concerns respecting the fresh evidence application).
10 998 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2015) 52:4 of service to all those who have or may have an interest, the court would in effect be granting a decree in the air. 52 Justice Romaine s conclusions were limited to the Jerome Group Plaintiffs. The other plaintiffs (the Plaintiffs) were entitled to proceed with claims for declarations of invalidity of the leases in which they were interested. 53 III. BARRED CLAIMS Defences turning on delay and lessor conduct during periods of delay are important for freehold lessors, especially when lessees have relied on shut-in provisions to continue leases. Years may pass after ostensible reliance on shut-in provisions (possibly followed by a substantial productive period after a recompletion) before a lessor realizes that the lease may have terminated at or about the time of shut-in. Lessors often would not have had contemporaneous or direct access to information suggesting that a lessee was not entitled to rely on shut-in provisions. Before the realization of the possibility of lease invalidity, lessors may have received shut-in royalties or (later) production royalties, and may have communicated with lessees about other matters. In this case, the shut-in occurred in 1995 and production resumed following recompletion in 2001, but the action was not commenced until 9 August The Defendants contended that all or some of the Plaintiffs claims were barred by the application of either (1) the doctrines of estoppel, laches, and acquiescence or (2) the Limitations Act. 54 A. ESTOPPEL, LACHES, AND ACQUIESCENCE It is customary for challenged lessees to retort that lessors claims are barred by estoppel, or acquiescence, or laches. 55 It is customary for these defences to be rejected, 56 save in quite exceptional cases. 57 This action followed the customary model the doctrines barring the Plaintiffs claims were asserted and swiftly denied. The Plaintiffs conduct was typical of lessors in lease termination cases. Prior to their contact with FSI (the top lessee) they had not adverted to the possibility (legal or factual) that 52 Lazar Sarna, The Law of Declaratory Judgments, 3rd ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 98; Stewart, ibid at para 109; Local 1571 ILA v International Longshoremen s Association,  3 DLR 50 at 53 (NBSC (Ch Div)), Justice Harrison stating: Article 8, s. 1 of the Constitution provides that the officers of the I.L.A. shall be a president, nineteen vice-presidents, and a secretary treasurer. None of these International officers are before this Court and, as stated, there is no evidence that the defendant Galbraith has authority to represent the International officers in this action. There is therefore no jurisdiction in this Court to make the declarations asked for. 53 Alberta Rules of Court, supra note 23, r 3.73(1). 54 Stewart, supra note 2 at paras Limitations Act, supra note 4, s 10: Nothing in this Act precludes a court from granting a defendant immunity from liability under the equitable doctrines of acquiescence or laches, notwithstanding that the defendant would not be entitled to immunity pursuant to this Act. 56 See e.g. Canadian Superior Oil Ltd v Paddon-Hughes Development Co Ltd,  SCR 932 [Canadian Superior]; Sohio Petroleum Co v Weyburn Security Co,  SCR 81 [Sohio]; Republic Resources Ltd and Joffre Oils Ltd v Ballem (1981), 33 AR 385 (QB); Freyberg v Fletcher Challenge Oil and Gas Inc, 2005 ABCA 46, 363 AR 35 [Freyberg CA]. 57 Voyager Petroleums Ltd v Vanguard Petroleums Ltd (1982), 47 AR 14 (QB), Stratton J, aff d (1983), 47 AR 1 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, (21 November 1983).
11 STEWART ESTATE V. TAQA NORTH LTD. 999 the leases had terminated. After contact with FSI, even though some Plaintiffs continued to receive royalty payments, there was no evidence that any Plaintiff waived its rights, or (importantly) that any Defendant relied on any Plaintiff s conduct to its detriment. After contact with FSI, the Plaintiffs brought their litigation within a reasonable time ESTOPPEL AND ACQUIESCENCE An immediate response to the Defendants pleading of estoppel was that the Supreme Court has expressed doubt as to whether estoppel could ever operate to revive a terminated lease. 59 The conduct of the Plaintiffs relied on by the Defendants took place after the Leases would have terminated. Even if estoppel were made out, it may have occurred too late to benefit the Defendants. In any event, none of the several forms of estoppel proprietary, by convention, or by waiver or election were established. Historically, estoppel (in the form of proprietary estoppel or estoppel by acquiescence) has been argued in Alberta oil and gas cases through the medium of Willmott v. Barber and its five probanda: It has been said that the acquiescence which will deprive a man of his legal rights must amount to fraud, and in my view that is an abbreviated statement of a very true proposition. A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights. What, then, are the elements or requisites necessary to constitute fraud of that description? In the first place the plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights. Secondly, the plaintiff must have expended some money or must have done some act (not necessarily upon the defendant s land) on the faith of his mistaken belief. Thirdly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff. If he does not know of it he is in the same position as the plaintiff, and the doctrine of acquiescence is founded upon conduct with a knowledge of your legal rights. Fourthly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the plaintiff s mistaken belief of his rights. If he does not, there is nothing which calls upon him to assert his own rights. Lastly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money or in the other acts which he has done, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right. Where all these elements exist, there is fraud of such a nature as will entitle the Court to restrain the possessor of the legal right from exercising it, but, in my judgment, nothing short of this will do. 60 The jurisprudence has evolved past Willmott v. Barber (although the probanda continue to exercise influence in Alberta). 61 Estoppel has three main elements: a representation or assurance made to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance. 62 The knowledge or lack of knowledge (or negligent lack of knowledge) of the person against whom estoppel is urged, however, 58 Stewart, supra note 2 at paras Freyberg CA, supra note 56 at para 133; Canadian Superior, supra note 56 at Willmott v Barber (1880), 15 Ch D 96 at , Fryy J. 61 Desoto Resources Ltd v Encana Corp, 2010 ABQB 448, 491 AR 97 at paras 49-63, Tilleman J. 62 Thorner v Major,  UKHL 18,  3 All ER 945 at para 29, Lord Walker. See also James Edelman, Estoppel in McGhee, supra note 42, 361 at 387; Tretheway-Edge Dyking District v Coniagas Ranches Ltd, 2003 BCCA 197, 224 DLR (4th) 611 at para 64, Newbury JA.
12 1000 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2015) 52:4 remains one relevant factor 63 for good reason, since the mens rea goes directly to whether or not barring the person s claims would be just. In this case, there was no evidence of detrimental reliance by the Defendants. Neither was there evidence that the Plaintiffs in fact knew of their rights in the mid-1990s or at the time of re-completion of the 7-25 Well. Justice Romaine relied on this finding to reject the application of estoppel. 64 This was a satisfactory result respecting proprietary estoppel. Nonetheless, two difficulties with Justice Romaine s brief reasons should be noted. First, Justice Romaine distinguished her estoppel finding from her finding (to be discussed below) respecting the Plaintiffs constructive knowledge for limitations purposes. Knowledge for estoppel purposes is a different question from whether they knew or ought to have known the injury for which they were seeking a remedial order had occurred. 65 That different questions are raised must, of course, be conceded. The same evidence, however, may be relevant to two different facts-in-issue. If the Plaintiffs should have known that they were injured, would the equities respecting estoppel be affected? Justice Romaine does not pursue this issue, because of the second difficulty. She did not consider whether estoppel might be available, despite the Plaintiffs lack of knowledge. The modern approach to estoppel contemplates that estoppel may be available, even if the person to be estopped did not subjectively know his, her, or its rights: In the Taylor Fashions Oliver J analysed the authorities in a masterly way (with the assistance of two Chancery silks who were later to become law lords) and put this part of the law back on the right track. He pointed out that the five probanda (including the defendant's knowledge of his own title, and of the claimant's mistake as to title) are relevant only to cases of unilateral mistake, where the defendant's only encouragement to the claimant has been passive non-intervention. Towards the end of his judgment Oliver J made some important general observations: Furthermore, the more recent cases indicate, in my judgment, that the application of the Ramsden v Dyson principle (whether you call it proprietary estoppel, estoppel by acquiescence or estoppel by encouragement is really immaterial) requires a very much broader approach which is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, knowingly or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment rather than to inquiring whether the circumstances can be fitted within the confines of some preconceived formula serving as a universal yardstick for every form of unconscionable behaviour Yeoman s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe,  UKHL 55,  4 All ER 713 at para 59, Lord Walker [Cobbe]; Lloyds Bank PLC v Carrick,  4 All ER 630 at 641 (CA); Edelman, Estoppel, ibid at Stewart, supra note 2 at para Ibid. 66 Cobbe, supra note 63 at paras [citations omitted].
13 STEWART ESTATE V. TAQA NORTH LTD The following comment by Justice La Forest suggests that inquiries into knowledge for limitations purposes and for estoppel may be closer than Justice Romaine has intimated (although this passage speaks to acquiescence, considered next, rather than estoppel): It is interesting to observe that in practical terms the inquiry under the heading of acquiescence comes very close to the approach one takes to the reasonable discoverability rule in tort. As we have seen, the latter focuses on more than mere knowledge of the tortious acts the plaintiff must also know of the wrongfulness of those acts. This is essentially the same as knowing that a legal claim is possible. That the considerations under law and equity are similar is hardly surprising, and is a laudable development given the similar policy imperatives that drive both inquiries. 67 Estoppel by convention was not established in the circumstances. The convention would have been the belief by the Plaintiffs and Defendants that the Leases remained valid. According to Justice Bastarache in Ryan v. Moore, estoppel by convention requires the satisfaction of the following criteria: (1) The parties dealings must have been based on a shared assumption of fact or law: estoppel requires manifest representation by statement or conduct creating a mutual assumption. 68 Nevertheless, estoppel can arise out of silence (impliedly). 69 (2) A party must have conducted itself, i.e. acted, in reliance on such shared assumption, its actions resulting in a change of its legal position. 70 (3) It must also be unjust or unfair to allow one of the parties to resile or depart from the common assumption. The party seeking to establish estoppel therefore has to prove that detriment will be suffered if the other party is allowed to resile from the assumption since there has been a change from the presumed position. 71 Even if a convention could be established, such that the Plaintiffs had communicated their belief that the Leases remained alive to the Defendants (in other words, the Plaintiffs engaged in conduct that crossed the line between lessor and lessee), 72 the evidence did not 67 M (K) v M (H),  3 SCR 6 at 79, La Forest JA [M (K)]. 68 See also Ryan v Moore, 2005 SCC 38,  2 SCR 53, Bastarache JA ( [t]he crucial requirement for estoppel by convention, which distinguishes it from other types of estoppel, is that at the material time both parties must be of a like mind at para 61 [citations omitted]). 69 See also ibid ( [w]hile it may not be necessary that the assumption by the party raising estoppel be created or encouraged by the estopped party, it must be shared in the sense that each is aware of the assumption of the other at para 62 [citations omitted]). 70 See also ibid ( [This] requires a finding that the party seeking to establish the estoppel changed his or her course of conduct by acting or abstaining from acting in reliance upon the assumption, thereby altering his or her legal position at para 69 [citations omitted]). 71 Ibid at para 59 [citations omitted, emphasis in original]. 72 K Lokumal & Sons (London) Ltd v Lotte Shipping Co Pte Ltd,  2 Lloyd s Rep 28 (CA), Lord Justice Kerr held at 34-35: All estoppels must involve some statement or conduct by the party alleged to be estopped on which the alleged representee was entitled to rely and did rely. In this sense all estoppels may be regarded as requiring some manifest representation which crosses the line between representor and representee, either by statement or conduct. It may be an express statement or it may be implied from conduct, e.g. a failure by the alleged representor to react to something said or done by the alleged representee so as to imply a manifestation of assent which leads to an estoppel by silence or acquiescence. Similarly, in cases of so-called estoppels by convention, there must be some mutually manifest conduct by the parties which is based on a common but mistaken assumption. See also Edelman, Estoppel, supra note 42 at 368.

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