Source: https://shayessite.wordpress.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:55:10+00:00

Document:
Judgment: “In general, a consent judgment has the same force as a judgment rendered after litigation, except that the parties’ consent excuses error and operates to end all controversy between them. See McCray, 584 S.W.2d at 281; Johnson, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8437, 2010 WL 4156459, at *6. Excepting jurisdictional error, a party’s consent to the trial court’s entry of judgment waives any error contained in the judgment, and that party has nothing to properly present for appellate review. See Boufaissal v. Boufaissal, 251 S.W.3d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.); see also Gross v. Dannatt, No. 13-15-00309-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5710, 2017 WL 2705471, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 22, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.), cert. denied, No. 18-7342, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 1940, 2019 WL 1231849 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2019). Accordingly, a party cannot appeal from a judgment to which it has consented or agreed absent an allegation and proof of fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation. See Boufaissal, 251 S.W.3d at 161-62; Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 766.
To have a consent judgment, each party must explicitly and unmistakably give its consent. See Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 766; see also Hicks, 348 S.W.3d at 283. A trial court cannot render a valid agreed judgment absent consent at the time it is rendered. See Chisholm v. Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461-62 (Tex. 1995); see also Vega v. Vega, No. 07-14-00208-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1767, 2016 WL 735967, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Feb. 18, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); Sohocki v. Sohocki, 897 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1995, no writ). The presence of a party’s signature approving the decree does not render the decree an agreed or consent judgment. See Durden v. McClure, 281 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.). A party who approves only the form of the judgment [*10] forfeits no right to appeal. See Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 766-67. Further, the phrase “approved as to form and substance” standing alone does not transform a judgment into a consent judgment. See Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 767; see also Hicks, 348 S.W.3d at 283; Durden, 281 S.W.3d at 140; cf. Boufaissal, 251 S.W.3d at 162 (Wife’s signature signified her approval and consent to terms of agreed decree as to both form and substance and waived her right to appeal). However, the phrase “approved as to form and substance” may describe an agreed judgment when coupled with additional recitations in the judgment. See Durden, 281 S.W.3d at 140. For example, the body of the consent judgment must also suggest that the judgment was rendered by consent. See Hicks, 348 S.W.3d at 283. When a consent judgment is rendered without consent or is not in strict compliance with the terms of the parties’ agreement, the judgment must be set aside. See Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d at 98; see also Vega, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1767, 2016 WL 735967, at *2; Sohocki, 897 S.W.2d at 424.
Though the body of the agreed decree contains language suggesting that the judgment was rendered by consent, it was signed only by Father and approved by the parties’ attorneys only as to form; it was not signed by Mother. Mother immediately objected to the agreed decree by filing a motion for new trial that argued, in part, that the agreed decree added terms and language that did not appear in either the partial MSA or the ISA and was not agreed [*12] on by the parties.
Lots of cases involved complaints that were not raised in the trial court.
I hope this helps. Y’all take good care.
Forcible Detainer: “In his first issue, Burton argues that the county court should have denied Leawood’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of waiver, laches, or quasi-estoppel. Leawood argues that the county court was required to dismiss the claims because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Burton’s claims. We agree with Leawood. . . . .
Burton argues that Leawood waived its right to object to the county court’s lack of jurisdiction. According to Burton, this case [*4] is akin to a party’s failure to object when a trial court proceeds after the imposition of certain bankruptcy stays. The supreme court has held that such failure waives error. Roccaforte v. Jefferson Cnty., 341 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. 2011); see also Escalante v. Rowan, 251 S.W.3d 720, 724-25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (“[T]he failure to object based on this stay waives any error that the trial court may have committed by failing to stay the proceedings during the pendency of the interlocutory appeal.”), rev’d on other grounds, 332 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. 2011). In so concluding, the high court noted that such a stay “differs from a situation in which the relevant statute vests ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ in a particular forum.” Roccaforte, 341 S.W.3d at 923. Here, as discussed, in a forcible detainer action, the justice court is vested with jurisdiction only to determine the right to possession. Accordingly, these facts are distinguishable from the facts in Roccaforte.
Texas Citizens’ Participation Act: “Although not addressed by the parties, we note that in addition to defamation, Fernandez alleged a claim for IIED. He also filed a supplemental pleading in which he added a claim for conspiracy. Appellants’ TCPA motion to dismiss did not address [*51] either claim, nor does their brief on appeal.
Our court has explained that HN30 simply because one claim may require dismissal under the TCPA, it does not ipso facto require that dismissal be granted on other claims not specifically addressed in the motion to dismiss. Cf. Ghrist, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4578, 2018 WL 3060331, at *5 n.9 (“Each cause of action stands or falls on its own merit; there is no bootstrapping effect for other causes of action that do not meet the criteria set forth in the [TCPA] statute”). Indeed, neither the TCPA nor cases interpreting it require that we perform a search of the record to find clear and specific evidence of each element of the plaintiff’s claims. See Cavin, 545 S.W.3d at 72 (dismissing claims when the plaintiffs “have merely recited what they view as the essential elements of each claim; cited en masse to pages of the record they deem relevant to some unspecified element or elements of that claim; but provided no argument, analysis, or explanation as to which record reference supports which elements or (perhaps more critically) why that evidence would satisfy the specific element under the governing law”).
Yet we recognize that in Adams, the Supreme Court of Texas recently reversed an appellate court decision affirming the denial of [*52] a TCPA motion to dismiss based in part on a party’s failure to preserve an argument by failing to specifically raise it in the motion to dismiss. 547 S.W.3d at 896. The Adams court admonished that the appellate court “imposed too strict a view of error preservation in this context” and buttressed its position with reference to the TCPA’s directive that its applicability is to be “based on a holistic review of the pleadings.” Id. at 896-97. As the Adams court explained, once the defendant alleged in his motion that he was entitled to dismissal of the plaintiff’s defamation claim because it was based on his right of free speech, “[h]e was not required on appeal or at trial to rely on precisely the same case law or statutory subpart that we now find persuasive.” Id. at 896.
Attorney’s Fees: “In its first issue, the State contends that the jury lacked discretion, as a matter of law, to find that the State did not incur any reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees because the State, as the prevailing party, was entitled to its fees under section 2107.006 of the Government Code. See id. The State contends that an award of attorney’s fees is mandatory under this section.
Buchanan responds that the State failed to preserve this complaint because it did not object to submission of the jury question on the issue of attorney’s fees, which read: “What is a reasonable fee, if any, for the necessary services of the State’s attorney, stated in dollars and cents?” (Emphasis added.) Specifically, Buchanan contends that the question’s use of the conditioning language “if any” afforded the jury discretion to refuse to award any attorney’s fees and instructed the jury that a fee award was not mandatory; therefore, [*5] he continues, the State cannot complain about the question on appeal because it did not object to the possibility—raised by the question as submitted—that the jury could find that no attorney’s fees were reasonable and necessary. We conclude that the State did not waive its contention that an attorney’s-fees award is mandatory under section 2107.006.
All for now. I hope this helps.
I’ve gotten a little closer to catching up, owing to the fact that the courts of appeals did not issue a lot of error preservation decisions in the last couple of weeks.
I’ve been delinquent on this update for a while now; between the day job and rehabbing from rotator cuff surgery, I’ve had to postpone some of the more joyful things in my life, like updating this post and eating ice cream right-handed. I’ve still not caught up here, but will try to get to that point by next weekend.
What follows are the blurbs from the cases.
Expert (conclusory opinion): “The conclusory statement of an expert witness is insufficient to create a question of fact to defeat summary judgment. Elizondo v. Krist, 415 S.W.3d 259, 264 (Tex. 2013). n. 6 An opinion is conclusory and cannot be considered probative evidence if it lacks a factual basis or is made in reliance on a basis that does not support the opinion. City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2009). Expert opinions must be supported by facts in evidence, not conjecture. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. 2003). Courts are not required to ignore fatal gaps in an expert’s analysis or assertions. Elizondo, 415 S.W.3d at 264. We conclude that Ziegler’s opinion that Hunting manufactured the retainer nut at issue prior to December 21, 2012, is contrary to the evidence [*12] on which he purports to rely, lacks factual support, and relies on conjecture and speculation. As such, Ziegler’s opinion is conclusory and thus insufficient to create a question of fact to defeat summary judgment.
Limitations: “The record shows that in September 2015, Izen sued Cook alleging that she was in default on her note, so he sued more than five years after Cook quit making the monthly installment payments required by her note. Our review of Cook’s pleadings reveals that she failed to plead limitations until after the trial court granted Izen’s motion. Under Rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded to avoid waiver. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94. Under Texas law, “[a]n affirmative defense that is not pleaded or proved and on which findings are not obtained is waived and cannot be preserved by raising the affirmative defense for the first time in a motion for new trial.” Hamm v. Millennium Income Fund, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 256, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (citing In re C.M., 996 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).
There were tons of cases in which parties did not preserve their complaints because they did not raise the complaint at all. I won’t go into those here.
I hope this helps. More soon–I hope.
After a big push to get cases out the door before the end of the year, the courts seem to have taken a little breather. So we do not have many error preservation rulings in the first three weeks of the new year.
Then there were a few cases in which the parties failed to raise their complaints in the trial court.
Welcome to 2019! I hope this New Year becomes your best ever.
Now, on to the specific cases.
Temporary Injunction Order: “In response, the Grahams contend in part that, as a threshold matter, DHJB has failed to preserve for appellate review any argument that the order fails to comply with the specificity requirements of rule 683. This Court has long recognized that a complaint that a temporary injunction fails to comply with rule 683’s specificity requirements is considered one of form that is waived unless it is adequately preserved before the trial court. Shorts, 549 S.W.3d at 880; see Texas Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Rao, 105 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. dism’d) (noting split of authority among courts of appeals on whether complaint of failure to comply with rule 683 is waived if not raised before trial court, but ultimately agreeing with this Court’s previous holding in Emerson v. Fires Out, Inc., 735 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ), that such complaints must be preserved). As this Court has previously explained, “it serves no good purpose to permit appellants to lie in wait and present this error in form for the first time on appeal.” Emerson, 735 S.W.2d at 494. To adequately [*8] preserve an error for review on appeal, rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the record to show (1) that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that stated the grounds for the ruling sought with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint; and (2) that the trial court expressly or implicitly ruled on the request, objection, or motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
DHJB contends that it has adequately preserved error on its rule 683 complaints by raising the issue in its “Response to Plaintiffs’ Post-Hearing Brief in Support of their Application for Temporary Injunction,” filed shortly after the trial court signed the temporary-injunction order. In particular, DHJB points to that portion of the pleading stating, “The open-ended request for injunctive relief proffered by the Grahams calls for interpretations, inferences, and conclusions as to the affected parties and their respective duties that exceed the limits of the constitution and cannot be granted.” At the conclusion of the responsive pleading, DHJB “requests that the Court deny Plaintiff’s application for a temporary injunction.” We conclude that this pleading fails to preserve error on DHJB’s rule 683 complaints for several [*9] reasons.
As usual, there were many cases in which courts held that parties failed to preserve their complaint by not raising it at all in the trial court.
I hope this helps. Y’all have a great Thanksgiving.

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