Source: https://casetext.com/case/webb-v-midland-credit-mgmt-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:14:46+00:00

Document:
Webb v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.
BONNIE WEBB and ANGELA FULLER, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, and ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP, INC. formerly known as MCM CAPITAL GROUP, INC. Defendants.
Plaintiffs Bonnie Webb and Angela Fuller filed a putative class action against defendants Midland Credit Management, Inc. ("Midland Credit"), Midland Funding LLC ("Midland Funding") and Encore Capital Group, Inc. ("Encore") (collectively "defendants"), alleging that defendants engaged in deceptive and unfair collection practices under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, by sending plaintiffs pre-legal notifications and discount offers demanding inflated payments to satisfy past-due debts. Defendants have moved to compel arbitration and stay proceedings pending the completion of arbitration as to plaintiff Webb. [Dkts. #34 & #67.] Defendants' motion will be denied.
Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, Dkt. #28, and then filed an amended motion to compel arbitration. [Dkt. #34.] Thereafter, plaintiff Webb filed a first amended complaint adding Fuller as a plaintiff. [Dkt. #71.] Defendants renewed their motion to compel as to plaintiff Webb [Dkt. #67], incorporating their amended motion and citing additional authority, to which Webb responded. [Dkt. #70.] The court has considered this authority in ruling on the motion.
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because defendants' collection communications to plaintiffs were received in this district.
Either you or we may, without the other's consent, elect mandatory, binding arbitration for any claim, dispute, or controversy between you and us (called "Claims").
What Claims are subject to arbitration? All Claims relating to your account, a prior related account, or our relationship are subject to arbitration, including Claims regarding the application, enforceability, or interpretation of this Agreement and this arbitration provision.
Whose Claims are subject to arbitration?
Not only ours and yours, but also Claims made by or against anyone connected with us or you or claiming through us or you, such as . . . an employee, agent, representative, affiliated company, predecessor or successor, heir, assignee or trustee in bankruptcy.
(5) From Sherman Acquisition to Midland Funding.
(5) The declaration of Minford, who states that Sherman Acquisition assigned all right, title and interest in Webb's account to Midland Funding, relying on a bill of sale dated June 10, 2010, executed by the director of Sherman Acquisition, and attached as Exhibit A. (Minford Decl. ¶ 8 & Ex. A.) Also attached is Exhibit B, which is a print out from the electronic records provided by Sherman Acquisition identifying Webb's account as one of those sold pursuant to the June 10, 2010 bill of sale.
Handy's affidavit is Exhibit 1 to defendants' motion to compel.
Minford's declaration is Exhibit 2 to defendants' motion to compel.
Webb argues that the aforementioned evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between Webb and Midland Funding, the purported assignee of her debt, because defendants' affiants have no personal knowledge of the assignment, rendering defendants' evidence inadmissible hearsay.
The FAA governs questions of arbitrability in both state and federal courts. See Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1995). The FAA provides that an arbitration clause in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Under the FAA, a court may compel arbitration where there is (1) a written agreement to arbitrate, (2) a dispute within the scope of the arbitration agreement, and (3) a refusal to arbitrate. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2005). "To determine whether a contract's arbitration clause applies to a given dispute, federal courts apply state-law principles of contract formation." Gore v. Alltel Commc'ns, LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012).
Motions to compel arbitration are reviewed under a summary judgment standard as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Tickanen v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 461 F. Supp. 2d 863, 866 (E.D. Wis. 2006), and the movants must "provide sufficient evidence in support of their claims such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for them under applicable law." WFC Commodities Corp. v. Linnco Futures Grp., Inc., No. 98 C 1354, 1998 WL 834374, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Because a motion to compel arbitration is treated as an assertion that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may consider exhibits and affidavits related to the issue of arbitration agreements." McGinnis v. John C. Bonewicz, P.C., No. 11-CV-2210, 2012 WL 604430, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2012). "The court must consider the non-moving party's evidence and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Tickanen, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 866.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); see Datamatic Servs., Inc. v. United States, 909 F.2d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1990). "The idea behind Rule 803(6) is that when a record is kept with sufficient regularity, the existence of an entry (or the absence of one) is good evidence that the thing in question took place (or did not take place)." United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 192 (7th Cir. 1986). Thus, business records are reliable to the extent that they are compiled consistently and conscientiously. Id.
Pursuant to subsection (D), Rule 902(11) requires that the purported business record be authenticated by the testimony or declaration of a "custodian or other qualified person." Fed. R. Evid. 902(11). To lay the proper foundation, a proponent must "'demonstrate through the testimony of a qualified witness that the records were kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and that it was the regular practice of that business to make such records.'" United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1017 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Given, 164 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1999)). "A qualified witness need not be the author of the document but must have personal knowledge of the procedure used to create and maintain the document." Id. The decision to admit a document under the business records exception is entrusted to the broad discretion of the trial court. Datamatic Servs., Inc., 909 F.2d at 1032.
In support of their position that Webb's debt was properly assigned to Midland Funding, defendants rely on the declaration of Minford, who states that he is familiar with Midland Credit's record keeping systems and that his testimony is based on his personal knowledge or upon his review of the business records of Midland Funding and Midland Credit, which were made by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge of the events described therein, at or near the time of the event described, and were kept in the ordinary course of the regularly conducted business activity of such person and Midland Credit and for which it is the regular practice of that business activity to make such records. (Minford Decl. ¶ 2.) This foundation would be sufficient if the business records at issue were created by Midland Credit. Exhibits A through F, upon which Minford relies, however, do not appear to have been made and kept by defendants in the course of their regularly conducted business activity. (See Minford Decl. Exs. A-F.) Rather, these exhibits are signed by third party entities, and two of the documents (Exhibits C and D) are undated, calling into question when exactly they were made.
Minford admits that some of the business records he reviewed "were created by businesses other than Midland Credit," but defendants argue that these third party records are admissible under Rule 803(6) because they have been "incorporated into the business records of Midland Credit and relied upon by Midland Credit in conducting its business." (Minford Decl. ¶ 3.) Indeed, some courts in this circuit have recognized that "a third party document may qualify as another business entity's record, provided that the entity integrated the third-party document into its records and relied upon it in its day-to-day operations." Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., No. 07-CV-233-DRH-DGW, 2012 WL 1565532, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2012); accord Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 856, 867 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2010); BP Amoco Chem. Corp. v. Flint Hill Res., LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1021 (N.D. Ill. 2010); see also Krawczyk v. Centurion Cap. Corp., No. 06-C-6273, 2009 WL 395458, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2009) (admitting evidence of assignment of debt under Rule 803(6) where collection agency integrated assignor's records into its own and relied on them in conducting its daily operations).
The Seventh Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, but courts applying this approach have held that the proponent of such records must do more than assert that it relied on the third party record in conducting its day-to-day business activities. Rather, "the proponent of the document must demonstrate that the other requirements of Rule 803(6) are satisfied." Cunningham Charter Corp., 2012 WL 1565532, at *3; see also Datamatic Servs., Inc., 909 F.2d at 1033 ("if the source of the information [contained in the business record] is an outsider, Rule 803(6) does not, by itself, permit the admission of the business record" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Borrasi, 639 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011) ("courts may not permit the introduction of hearsay contained within hearsay unless each layer is properly admitted under an exception to Rule 802" (citing Fed. R. Evid. 805)); 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 290 (6th ed.) ("The common law exception for regularly kept records required that . . . [t]he entrant . . . be acting in the regular course of business, and if the information was supplied by another, that person also was required to be acting in the regular course of business.").
Thus, to admit the third party documents attached as Exhibits A through F to Minford's declaration as business records, defendants must demonstrate that the third party author created such documents on a regular basis and kept the document at issue in the course of its regularly conducted business activity. See Cunningham Charter Corp., 2012 WL 1565532, at *3. Defendants must satisfy these foundational requirements through the testimony of a qualified witness with knowledge of the process by which the third party created the document, thereby demonstrating that the document is trustworthy. See id.
A review of Minford's declaration demonstrates that defendants have failed to lay the requisite foundation for admission of Exhibits A through F. Minford does not claim to be knowledgeable in the record keeping procedures of any of the non-defendant entities. Moreover, when asked at his deposition whether he had any information about what records Sherman Originator and LVNV maintain and how Sherman Acquisition keeps its records, Minford responded no or that he did not know. (See Minford Dep. 21:11-18; 31:1-25.) Thus, by his own admission, Minford is not qualified to testify as to the process by which Sherman Originator, LVNV, and Sherman Acquisition created and maintained Exhibits A through D. As to Exhibits E and F, which include a bill of sale signed by representatives of Sherman Originator III and Citibank South Dakota and credit card statements issued by Sears, Minford does not claim to be knowledgeable in the record keeping procedures of either Sherman Originator III or Citibank and admitted under oath that he did not know anything about Citibank's computer system. (Id. 32:13-15.) Based on this record, it is clear that Minford lacks personal knowledge of the procedure used to create and maintain Exhibits A through F, and he is not capable of testifying as a qualified witness under Rule 902(11). See Reese, 666 F.3d at 1017. The court therefore declines to admit Exhibits A through F as records of regularly conducted business activity, and will not consider them in ruling on defendants' motion.
A cursory review of the literature demonstrates that the possibility of a debt collector attempting to collect a debt that it does not actually own, either through assignment or otherwise, is very real. See, e.g., Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259 (2011); Rick Jurgens & Robert J. Hobbes, The Debt Machine: How the Collection Industry Hounds Consumers and Overwhelms Courts, THE NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.(July 2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/debt-machine.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf.
Without Exhibits A through F, defendants cannot show an unbroken chain of assignment entitling them to stand in Citibank's shoes and enforce the arbitration provision contained in Webb's credit card agreement. All that is evident from the record is that Citibank sold Webb's account to Sherman Originator III on or about March 30, 2009, and that at the time of the sale, Citibank's records indicated that Webb owed an outstanding balance. (Handy Aff. ¶¶ 6, 8.)Defendants motion to compel arbitration must be denied.
Even if the court were to consider the Minford exhibits, defendants would still have a difficult time demonstrating an unbroken chain of assignment because none of the receivable files referenced in the exhibits are part of the record. Although a contract may incorporate all or part of another instrument by reference, see Unifund CCR Partners v. Shah, 946 N.E.2d 885, 891, 407 Ill. App. 3d 737, 349 Ill. Dec. 389 (2011), without knowing the content of each receivable file, the court cannot discern whether Webb's account was one of those incorporated into the contract. Moreover, just because Webb's account number was identified as sold at the beginning and end of the chain of assignment does not mean that the chain is unbroken. To effectuate a valid assignment, the assignor must have an assignable right. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324, Comment A (1981). Without knowing the content of the receivable files, it is unclear what interest (if any) Sherman Originator III, Sherman Originator, and LVNV had in Webb's debt. It is therefore possible that Webb's debt was not assigned to any one of these entities, making it impossible for one entity to assign it to the next.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings pending completion of arbitration as to plaintiff Webb [#34] is denied.

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