Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/451/619/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 21:00:05+00:00

Document:
In a prosecution charging petitioners with disseminating obscenity in violation of Ohio law, the trial court granted their motions to dismiss the complaints on the ground that they had been subjected to selective and discriminatory prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial, finding the evidence insufficient to support the allegations of discriminatory prosecution. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: Because the Ohio Supreme Court's decision was not a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the writ of certiorari previously granted by this Court is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In the context of a criminal prosecution, finality of judgment is normally defined by the imposition of a sentence. Here there has been no finding of guilt and no sentence imposed. Nor is the Ohio Supreme Court's decision a final judgment within any of the four exceptions to the general rule identified in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469. Resolution of the question whether the obscenity prosecution of petitioners was selective or discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause can await final judgment in the state criminal proceeding without any adverse effect upon important federal interests.
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 407 N.E.2d 15.
On July 14, 1976, criminal complaints were issued against petitioners charging them with disseminating obscenity in violation of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2907.32 (1975). The Municipal Court granted petitioners' motions to dismiss the complaints on the ground that petitioners had been subjected to selective and discriminatory prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to support petitioners' allegations of selective and discriminatory prosecution. The case was remanded for trial. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980). We granted certiorari. 449 U.S. 1033 (1980). Because the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court was not a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, we dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction.
"to preclude reviewability . . . where anything further remains to be determined by a State court, no matter how dissociated from the only federal issue that has finally been adjudicated by the highest court of the State."
Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 326 U. S. 124 (1945). Applied in the context of a criminal prosecution, finality is normally defined by the imposition of the sentence. Parr v. United States, 351 U. S. 513, 351 U. S. 518 (1956); Berman v. United States, 302 U. S. 211, 302 U. S. 212 (1937); see also Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 385 U. S. 547 (1967). Here there has been no finding of guilt, and no sentence imposed.
there were further proceedings to take place in the state court. Cases of this kind were divided into four categories in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, and each category was described. We do not think that the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court is a final judgment within any of the four exceptions identified in Cox.
In the first place, we observed in Cox that in most, if not all, of the cases falling within the four exceptions, not only was there a final judgment on the federal issue for purposes of state court proceedings, but also there were no other federal issues to be resolved. There was thus no probability of piecemeal review with respect to federal issues. Here, it appears that other federal issues will be involved in the trial court, such as whether or not the publication at issue is obscene.
courts for purposes of the state litigation."
420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 482-483. Here, it is apparent that, if we reversed the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court on the federal defense of selective enforcement, there would be no further proceedings in the state courts in this case. But the question remains whether delaying review until petitioners are convicted, if they are, would seriously erode federal policy within the meaning of our prior cases. We are quite sure that this would not be the case, and that we do not have a final judgment before us.
reason to treat this selective prosecution claim differently than we would treat any other claim of selective prosecution.
Accordingly, the writ is dismissed for want of Jurisdiction.
I believe that a criminal trial of the petitioners under this Ohio obscenity law will violate the Constitution of the United States. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 450 U. S. 275 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); ibid. (opinion of STEWART, J.); Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 982, 988 (dissenting opinion); Splawn v. California, 431 U. S. 595, 431 U. S. 602 (STEWART, J., dissenting). It is clear to me, therefore, that "identifiable . . . constitutional polic[y]" will be "undermined by the continuation of the litigation in the state courts." Ante at 451 U. S. 622.
Accordingly, I think that, under the very criteria discussed in the opinion of the Court, the judgment before us is "final for jurisdictional purposes." Ante at 451 U. S. 620. Believing that the Ohio trial court acted correctly in dismissing the complaints, and that the state appellate courts were in error in overturning that dismissal, I would reverse the judgment.
nonobscene political cartoon is not merely "an identifiable federal policy"; it is the kind of interest that motivated the adoption of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Petitioners publish Hustler, a national magazine. The trial court dismissed the criminal complaint against them after hearing evidence tending to establish that Ohio's decision to bring this prosecution was motivated by hostility to a political cartoon that is constitutionally indistinguishable from the rather trite depiction held to be protected by the First Amendment in Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U. S. 667. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, and that court's decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio over the dissent of Justice Brown.
Because the Court has decided today to dismiss the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction, I will not comment on the merits beyond indicating that they concern the standards that a court must apply in determining whether an exercise of prosecutorial discretion has been based on an impermissible criterion such as race, religion, or the exercise of First Amendment rights. Because I place a high value on the federal interest in preventing such prosecutions, and because the reinstatement of this criminal complaint may seriously erode that federal interest, I respectfully dissent.

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