Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1586924.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 17:21:08+00:00

Document:
Gil KIM, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WESTMOORE PARTNERS, INC., et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Murphy, Pearson, Bradley & Feeney, Aaron K. McClellan, James F. Monagle and Tanis J. Leuthold for Defendants and Appellants. Law Offices of Timothy J. Donahue and Timothy J. Donahue; John Park Yasuda, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
We reluctantly return in this case to the question of default judgments with a cautionary tale—well, three actually. The first is a tale for plaintiff's attorneys, who may assume a defendant's default is an unalloyed gift: an opportunity to obtain a big judgment with no significant effort. It is not. Instead, when a defendant fails to timely respond to the complaint, the first thing plaintiff's counsel should do (after offering an extension of time to respond)1 is review the complaint with care, to ascertain whether it supports the specific judgment the client seeks. If not, a motion to amend is in order. In this case, counsel for plaintiff Gil Kim failed to do that. Instead, he simply asked the court to enter defendants' defaults on the complaint as initially alleged. Unfortunately for Kim, the factual allegations of that complaint do not support any judgment in his favor.
And even when the allegations of a complaint do support the judgment plaintiff seeks, he is not automatically entitled to entry of that judgment by the court, simply because defendant defaulted. Instead, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to prove-up his damages, with actual evidence. It is wholly insufficient to simply declare, as Kim did here, that defendants' breach of one or more promissory notes “caused [him] tremendous financial loss,” and that a judgment of “$5 million against each defendant, for a total of $30 million ․ would be a reasonable sum.” That evidence may establish the amount Kim feels entitled to recover, but it fails utterly to demonstrate what he is legally entitled to recover. Kim's failure to offer any significant evidence to support his damage claims precludes any monetary judgment in his favor.
We consequently reverse the default judgment entered in Kim's favor, and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in defendants' favor.
The second cautionary tale is for trial courts. And it's not the first time we have told this tale. As we previously explained in Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 868, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 695, “[i]t is imperative in a default case that the trial court take the time to analyze the complaint at issue and ensure that the judgment sought is not in excess of or inconsistent with it. It is not in plaintiffs' interest to be conservative in their demands, and without any opposing party to point out the excesses, it is the duty of the court to act as gatekeeper, ensuring that only the appropriate claims get through. That role requires the court to analyze the complaint for itself—with guidance from counsel if necessary—ascertaining what relief is sought as against each defaulting party, and to what extent the relief sought in one cause of action is inconsistent with or duplicative of the relief sought in another. The court must then compare the properly pled damages for each defaulting party with the evidence offered in the prove-up.” Unfortunately, the trial court in this case seems not to have done that, and instead simply gave Kim what he asked for—which in this case was $30 million. Even more unfortunately, this trial court is certainly not alone in doing so, even since Heidary was published. (See, e.g., Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 [$8 million in compensatory damages awarded on a complaint alleging $50,000 in damages].) We need to shore this up. The court's role in the process of entering a default judgment is a serious, substantive, and often complicated one, and it must be treated as such.
And third, this case is a cautionary tale for appellate counsel. Those who practice before this court are expected to comport themselves honestly, ethically, professionally and with courtesy toward opposing counsel. The fact a respondent has no obligation to file a brief at all, in no way excuses his counsel's misconduct if he chooses to do so. The conduct of Timothy J. Donahue, Kim's counsel herein, which included seeking an extension of time to file his brief under false pretenses, and then filing a brief which was not just boilerplate, but a virtual copy of a brief for another case—including a boilerplate accusation of misconduct against appellants' counsel and a boilerplate request for sanctions based on a purportedly “frivolous” appeal—will not be countenanced. Donahue's response to this court's notice, informing him that we were contemplating the imposition of sanctions on our own motion, was both truculent and dismissive, going so far as to assert that we must have issued the notice in error. We did not. Nor did we appreciate him responding to our order that he appear to address possible sanctions against him by sending in his stead an attorney who had not been informed sanctions were being considered, and knew nothing about our order. Donahue's conduct on appeal was inappropriate in nearly every respect, and we hereby sanction him in the amount of $10,000.
Gil Kim's unverified complaint, filed March 25, 2009, alleges defendants Matt Jennings and Rob Jennings are “sophisticated businessmen, licensed investment brokers and/or experienced in selling investments to the general public.” It further alleges that “[o]ver the last several years,” the Messrs. Jennings “opened up and formed several companies and businesses,” including Westmoore Partners, Inc., Honolulu Harry's, Inc., Westmoore Capital, Inc., and Temecula Harry's Pacific Grill, each of which is also named as a defendant.
All six defendants were allegedly “jointly involved in, owned and operated a global multi-level marketing business, and ․ sought investment money from plaintiff.” Although Kim initially thought defendants were “honest, reputable and forthright,” he learned only “within the last year,” after defendants had “taken” his money, that this was untrue.
The first promissory note reflects that on February 28, 2003, Westmoore Partners, Inc., promised to pay Kim $25,000, on the maturity date of March 28, 2003—only 30 days later. Interest payments of $750 per month were due on the 28th of each month, starting on February 28, 2003. It provides that a default occurs if Westmoore Partners fails to pay the principal and interest on the maturity date.
The second promissory note reflects that on May 29, 2003, Westmoore Partners, Inc., promised to pay Kim $25,000, on the maturity date of December 29, 2003—only seven months later. Interest payments of $750 were due on the 29th of each month, “starting February 28, 2003.”2 It provides that a default occurs if Westmoore Partners fails to pay the principal and interest on the maturity date.
The third promissory note reflects that on June 10, 2003, Honolulu Harry's, Inc., promised to pay Kim $50,000, on the maturity date of August 10, 2003—two months later. Interest payments of $1,500 per month were due on the 10th of each month, starting on July 10, 2003. It provides that a default occurs if Honolulu Harry's, Inc., fails to pay the principal and interest on the maturity date.
The fourth promissory note reflects that on August 6, 2003, Matt Jennings promised to pay Kim $78,750, on or before October 6, 2003—two months later. The note further specifies that the funds are “immediately due and payable” upon sale of a specified piece of real property owned by Matt Jennings. This note does not specify an interest rate, but includes “closing costs” of 5 percent as part of the principal amount due, and provides for interest of 19 percent per annum in the event of default in the payment of principal when due.
The fifth promissory note reflects that on July 27, 2005, Westmoore Capital, Inc., promised to pay Kim $60,000, on the maturity date of July 27, 2006—one year later. Interest payments of $2,000 were due on the 27th of each month, starting on July 27, 2005.3 It provides that a default occurs if Westmoore Capital fails to pay the principal and interest on the maturity date.
The sixth promissory note reflects that on July 27, 2005, Westmoore Capital, Inc., also promised to pay Kim $100,000, on the maturity date of July 27, 2006—again, one year later. Interest payments of $2,000 were due on the 27th of each month, starting on July 27, 2005. It provides that a default occurs if Westmoore Capital fails to pay the principal and interest on the maturity date.
Nowhere does Kim allege that the maturity dates of any of these first six promissory notes were ever extended, either orally or in writing. By their terms, each required full payment of the indebtedness on dates between March of 2003 and July of 2006, inclusive—meaning the latest note was to be fully performed nearly three years prior to the filing of Kim's complaint.
As additional consideration for this seventh promissory note, Kim was also entitled to “a prorated portion of 80% of the annual net income from the operation of the Temecula restaurant ․ in excess of $470,000,” until such time as either Kim converted some or all of his loan into “membership interests” in Temecula Harry's Pacific Grill, or the loan principal was repaid. Finally, this seventh promissory note includes a provision specifying that it reflects the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter, supersedes all prior agreements and understandings, and cannot be amended except by signed written agreement.
While it is somewhat inconsistent with the conclusory allegation that defendants had no intention of repaying him, Kim also alleges that until approximately one year prior to the filing of the complaint (i.e., until March of 2008), defendants did comply with their loan obligations. However, they allegedly stopped doing so “within the last year.” With respect to defendants' alleged obligation to make monthly payments of $13,020.85, on an office building he owned, Kim specifically asserts that “as of January 2009, defendants were behind, by more than $78,125,” a number which equates to six months of arrearages. Finally, Kim alleges that although he requested defendants disclose “where the investments were placed,” they refused to specify, and refused to account for the money.
Kim's fourth cause of action is for conversion, and states, without explanation, that it is alleged “in the alternative.” In support of that claim, Kim incorporates all prior allegations, and alleges additionally that “[i]nstead of using [Kim's] money as agreed for business purposes, defendants took the money, squandered the money, enjoyed the money and used the money for their own personal pleasure.” Kim asserts defendants “formed the intent to misuse the money and to spend it, [and they] knew that their use of [his] money ․ was improper, unauthorized and unlawful.” He alleges that defendants' conduct was “willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive and fraudulent,” and claims an entitlement to punitive damages. Conversion is the only cause of action for which Kim seeks punitive damages.
Defendants did not timely respond to Kim's complaint. Kim requested and obtained entry of their defaults on August 13, 2009.
On November 19, 2009, defendants Westmoore Partners, Inc., Westmoore Capital, Inc., and Matt Jennings moved to set aside the defaults entered against them.7 In support of their motions, these defendants asserted that at the time Kim commenced his lawsuit, Matt Jennings—who was also the president of both Westmoore entities, “was undergoing incredible financial and emotional hardships due to the current economic downturn ․ [and] was in near financial ruin and on the verge of filing for bankruptcy.” The “extreme personal stress” this imposed on Jennings “caused him to be dilatory in engaging in [Kim's] lawsuit,” and made dealing with it “an overwhelming impossibility, especially because at the time that [Kim] filed his Complaint, Jennings did not have the resources to hire legal counsel.” However, these defendants asserted that “[i]n recent months,” Jennings' health and financial outlook had “drastically improved,” such that he had been able to hire legal counsel, and wished to defend the lawsuit.
Kim thereafter filed two separate requests for entry of a default judgment, each of which was rejected by the clerk due to inconsistent or incomplete paperwork. However, Kim's third attempt to secure a default judgment from the court was successful.
Donahue's declaration, in turn, explains nothing about the damages incurred by Kim. Instead, it merely references the attached “Exhibit 1,” which Donahue describes as “documentation regarding the damages” and “information” he “e-mailed to [defendants' counsel] on September 23, 2009”8 Those documents consist of several pages of accounts, some of which consist solely of numbers, and others of which list dates and monetary sums, with references to “Maplewood,” “Gil Kim” “Judy Kim,” “LV Waterford Castle,” and “Brigadoon rent.” None of those references seems to correlate to any of the promissory notes appended to the complaint, and none of them is explained in any declaration. We have no evidence demonstrating who prepared the accounts, or when. In short, these documents are entirely unintelligible, and useless as evidence.
Appellants Matt Jennings, Westmoore Partners, Inc., and Westmoore Capital, Inc. (collectively “the Westmoore defendants”), first challenge the court's denial of their motion to set aside the defaults entered against them. They rely upon the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, and argue the court abused its discretion in denying them relief in this case. The Westmoore defendants argue because they moved for relief from the default promptly, and offered sufficient evidence of a reasonable excuse to justify that relief, the court was obligated to grant it.
We are not persuaded. First, as to the issue of promptness, the Westmoore defendants argue their motion was filed “within three weeks” of learning about the default, “as [they] did not receive Notice of Entry of Default from Plaintiff and it wasn't until Plaintiff filed his request for entry of judgment on October 26, 2009 ․ that [they] were made aware that default had been entered.” But that claim, whether accurate or not, is not supported by the record. The declaration of Matt Jennings, which was the sole evidentiary support for the motion to set aside the defaults, contains no assertion that he did not receive notice of the entry of default. The trial court was consequently free to presume the Westmoore defendants actually received the notice of entry of default in August of 2009, and waited over three months (rather than three weeks), to do anything about it. While such a delay does not preclude relief, neither does it demonstrate particular promptness.
The trial court focused on this very issue in its order denying relief, noting that “[t]he declaration does not sufficiently establish that [Matt Jennings] was ill, or even under a doctor's care at any point, such that he could not have avoided default through the exercise of ordinary care.” On the record before us, we cannot say the trial court erred in that conclusion.
Next, all six appellants argue that even if the entry of their defaults was valid, the default judgment must nonetheless be reversed. On this point, they fare substantially better.
In this case, a review of Kim's complaint reveals it does not set forth any valid cause of action. Although Kim purports to state several different causes of action, the gravamen of his complaint is breach of contract. He alleges defendants, acting in concert, entered into various agreements with him to borrow increasing sums of money over a period of time, promising him substantial returns, but then breached their repayment obligations within the year prior to the filing of his complaint.
Here, the first six of the seven promissory notes Kim incorporated into his complaint specify that defendants were obligated to repay the subject debt, in full, on dates between three and six years prior to the date he filed his complaint, and nowhere does Kim allege that the maturity dates for any of those obligations were ever extended. Consequently, those first six promissory notes could not, by their terms, have been breached within a year prior to Kim's filing of the complaint. They were breached—if at all—years earlier. The complaint therefore states no cause of action for breach of those first six promissory notes.
The seventh promissory note, in the amount of $1.25 million, fares no better as a basis for Kim's breach of contract claim. Although that agreement could have been breached within the year prior to Kim's filing of his complaint, he alleges no facts demonstrating that it actually was. By its terms, the seventh promissory note requires payment of the principal amount only when “Harry's Pacific Grill restaurant located in Temecula, CA and owned and operated by [Temecula Harry's Pacific Grill] is sold or substantially all of its assets are transferred․” Kim does not allege that ever happened.
Pending that maturity date, the seventh promissory note required payment of interest at rate of 12.5 percent per annum on the 15th of each month, but only so long as defendant Temecula Harry's Pacific Grill had the “cash available” to do so. And any interest which is not paid when due would “accrue and will be payable at such time as [Temecula Harry's Pacific Grill] has sufficient funds to pay any interest which is in arrears.” Kim did not allege that Temecula Harry's ever had the “cash available” to make those interest payments or “sufficient funds” to pay interest arrearages. Consequently, he had not alleged any facts demonstrating a breach of this promissory note.
What Kim does allege is that, in exchange for his loan of $1.25 million, defendants promised to make his loan payments on a commercial property. He claims they breached the agreement when they stopped making those loan payments. That allegation, being entirely inconsistent with the terms of the seventh promissory note, must be disregarded as a basis for establishing its breach, especially given that the promissory note includes a provision specifying that it reflects the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter, that it supersedes all prior agreements and understandings, and that it cannot be amended except by signed written agreement.
In short, Kim has alleged no facts establishing any defendant breached the terms of any of the promissory notes he attaches to his complaint, and his complaint thus fails to state a cause of action for breach of contract.
Kim's next cause of action is for negligent misrepresentation, stated in terms which are entirely conclusory. Kim alleges that defendants “advised him on what to do and how to proceed,” and “recommend[ed] investments and loan strategies to [him.]” They allegedly breached their duty of due care “in addressing, advising and speaking to [him] ․ [¶] ․ by failing to properly advise him.” If we ignore the “ ‘ “contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law” ‘ [citation]” contained in this purported cause of action (Evans v. City of Berkeley, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 6, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 129 P.3d 394), there is simply nothing left. Specifically, Kim fails to allege what factual representations were made to him, or any facts suggesting that a reasonable person in defendants' position should have known those representations were untrue at the time they made them. Consequently, no cause of action is stated.
Kim's third cause of action, for “professional negligence” fails because its key allegation—that “[a]t all times herein, defendants were acting as investment brokers”—is squarely contradicted by the terms of the promissory notes he incorporated into the complaint. Those promissory notes make clear that defendants were not “brokering” any investments. (See UFITEC, S .A. v. Carter (1977) 20 Cal.3d 238, 244, 142 Cal.Rptr. 279, 571 P.2d 990, italics added [noting the definition of a securities broker is a “person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.”]; Bus. & Prof.Code, § 10131, italics added [defining a real estate broker as one who “does or negotiates to do one or more ․ acts for another or others.”].) Instead, the promissory notes unambiguously establish that the relationship between Kim and defendants was simply one of creditor-debtor.
In this case, Kim did not allege he entrusted funds to defendants for a specific purpose, and the promissory notes he incorporated into the complaint demonstrate beyond dispute that this case actually involves a simple creditor-debtor relationship, in which defendants are alleged to have violated their obligations to repay the subject debts. Those facts do not constitute a claim defendants interfered with Kim's possession of a specific, identifiable sum of money. Thus, no cause of action for conversion was stated.
Finally, Kim has also failed to state a valid cause of action for “unfair business practices.” What he asserts as the basis of this purported claim is that “[d]efendants are licensed investment brokers” and “have violated Business [and] Professions Code section 17200.” However, Business and Professions Code section 17200 does not actually prohibit any conduct. It is merely definitional.10 No cause of action can be stated for violating a statutory definition. An action for unfair competition must refer to one of the sections following Business and Professions Code section 17200.
Because Kim's complaint does not state any cognizable cause of action against defendants, it does not support any judgment in his favor.
Here, the only damage numbers included in Kim's complaint are found in his allegation defendants defaulted on their obligations to make monthly payments on his commercial property, in consideration of his agreement to loan them $1.25 million. Kim alleges defendant's failure to do that caused him damages of “more than $78,125.” However, as we have already explained, Kim's complaint states no valid claim for breach of that purported obligation, since it is inconsistent with the terms of the promissory note he incorporated into the complaint, which governs that particular loan. Consequently, Kim's complaint supports no award of damages at all.
As explained in Ostling v. Loring, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1743, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 391, “Ordinarily when a judgment is vacated on the ground the damages awarded exceeded those pled, the appropriate action is to modify the judgment to the maximum amount warranted by the complaint .” (See also Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 604.) In this case, that maximum is zero.
And finally, even if Kim's complaint were sufficient to support a judgment in his favor, he would still be facing reversal of that judgment on appeal, because he failed to provide the court with sufficient evidence to “prove-up” his entitlement to any damages.
In this case, that did not happen. Instead, as we have already explained, Kim's prove-up evidence consisted of nothing more than his own conclusory demand for $5 million dollars from each defendant—a demand that bore absolutely no relationship to the allegations of his complaint. Additionally, Kim's counsel offered the court a sheaf of documents which he claimed to have transmitted to opposing counsel at some earlier point. Those documents were not only unintelligible, but also unsupported by any foundation suggesting how, when, or by whom they were created. They were consequently useless as evidence.
Appellants here have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the damages awarded to Kim, and they were right to do so. Kim's effort to prove up his damages was wholly insufficient to sustain any award of damages in his favor.
Based upon the foregoing authorities, appellants are entitled to entry of judgment in their favor.
After appellants' counsel filed their opening brief, Kim's counsel, Timothy J. Donahue, requested an extension of time to file his respondent's brief. In that request for extension, Donahue explained—under penalty of perjury—that additional time was required to file the brief because of the many “complex issues raised” by appellants and his “[n]eed [for] more time to research cases & finalize brief․” He also cited “other time commitments of counsel.” The extension was granted.
The earlier brief was filed in a case in which appellant argued only that he had not received proper notice of the lawsuit, and sought relief from the default, and the ensuing judgment, solely on that basis. Unlike this appeal, the earlier one raised no objections to the substance of the judgment entered, or the sufficiency of the evidence to support it. Nonetheless, every case cited in Donahue's current brief was cited in that earlier brief. The lack of attention Donahue paid to his brief in this case can perhaps best be illustrated by two things: First, Donahue includes the assertion that “[t]he defendants in this case got more than actual notice. The defendants were personally familiar with the events and the accident.” This case, of course—unlike Donahue's earlier case—involved no “accident.” And second, Donahue's signature on the brief in this case reflects he is acting on behalf of “Plaintiff/Respondent PABLO CASTILLO”—his client in the earlier case.
Equally disturbing, both briefs contain an identical accusation that appellants' counsel is guilty of “false[ly] arguing the case.” In this case, that assertion—which seemingly amounts to an accusation that appellants' counsel engaged in professional misconduct, is backed up by precisely nothing. The six sentences which comprise the “false argument” section of the brief do not identify even one alleged falsehood.
Both briefs also contain an identical—and we mean word-for-word identical—assertion that the appeal is frivolous, and a request for sanctions in the amount of $20,000.13 This assertion is utterly inconsistent with Donahue's prior contention, in his request for extension of time, that the issues raised by appellants in this case were “complex,” and required significant time to research. Frivolous claims, by their nature, do not require significant research to rebut.
When the time came for hearing on the possible sanctions, not only did Donahue not appear, he sent counsel who was unaware that sanctions were being considered against Donohue. That attorney informed us he had not been told sanctions were being considered, and he was prepared only to submit the matter on Donahue's briefing of the merits. We had to issue a second order to get Donahue to appear personally on the sanctions issue.
Both of those rules were violated in Donahue's extension request in this case. He failed to specify the complex issues he claimed required additional time to research; he failed to make more than a conclusory assertion that he had “other time commitments,” and he failed to demonstrate any effort to obtain a stipulation to the extension request.
However, what distinguishes this case from the run-of-the-mill violation, is that Donahue's subsequent filing of what is essentially a copy of a brief he filed in an earlier case—and one which does not, in fact, address any of the “complex” issues actually raised in this appeal—demonstrates that the justifications offered for his extension request were not merely cursory, but prevaricative. The brief Donahue ultimately filed herein did not reflect any research of complex issues, and its preparation simply could not have claimed any significant amount of his time. His conclusory claims to the contrary, in support of his extension request, were—not to put too fine a point on it—untrue.
We cannot overlook such conduct. It is critical to both the bench and the bar that we be able to rely on the honesty of counsel. The term “officer of the court,” with all the assumptions of honor and integrity that append to it, must not be allowed to lose its significance. While some might find these to be only “little” lies, we feel the distinction between little lies and big ones is difficult to delineate and dangerous to draw. The corrosive effect of little lies differs from the corrosive effect of big lies only in the time it takes for the damage to become irreversible. Donahue's violations of the requirements set forth in the California Rules of Court governing extension requests meet the standard of unreasonableness, and warrant the imposition of sanctions.
The same conclusion applies to Donahue's violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1), which specifies the required content of a brief. Among other things, it requires that briefs must “support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority․” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) In this case, Donahue's brief fails to meet that standard in significant ways. First, it includes a separately-captioned argument asserting this appeal is frivolous and seeking an award of sanctions, but without including therein any discussion of either the facts of the case, or the law pertaining to sanctions. And second, the brief includes a separately-captioned argument asserting that appellants have “falsely argue[d] the case,” again without including any meaningful analysis—either factual or legal—to justify that accusation in the context of this case. And what makes these violations unreasonable is the clear evidence that Donahue simply copied these arguments from the earlier brief he submitted in the Nguyen v. Castillo case. The circumstances suggest he didn't even pause to consider whether they were appropriate points to make in response to this appeal.
In fact, a comparison of his “falsely argue[d]” section in the two briefs reveals that Donahue constructed the argument in this case by simply redacting the facts recited in the earlier brief, and reproducing the bellicose rhetoric without any reference to anything that actually happened here. In other words, Donahue reduced this misconduct accusation to boilerplate.
It is difficult for us to express how wrong that is. Sanctions are serious business. They deserve more thought than the choice of a salad dressing. “I'll have the sanctions, please. No, on second thought, bring me the balsamic; I'm trying to lose a few pounds.” A request for sanctions can never be so lightly considered as to be copied word for word from another brief—much less copied in reliance on facts from another case that do not obtain in the present one. A request for sanctions should be reserved for serious violations of the standard of practice, not used as a bullying tactic.
Our profession is rife with cynicism, awash in incivility. Lawyers and judges of our generation spend a great deal of time lamenting the loss of a golden age when lawyers treated each other with respect and courtesy. It's time to stop talking about the problem and act on it. For decades, our profession has given lip service to civility. All we have gotten from it is tired lips. We have reluctantly concluded lips cannot do the job; teeth are required. In this case, those teeth will take the form of sanctions.
We do not come to this conclusion lightly. Judges are lawyers, too. And while we have taken on a different role in the system, we have not lost sight of how difficult it is to practice law. Indeed, at the appellate level, we are reminded daily how complex and recondite the issues that confront practitioners daily can be.
So we are loath to act in any way that would seem to encourage courts to impose sanctions for mistakes or missteps. But for serious and significant departures from the standard of practice, for departures such as dishonesty and bullying, such steps are necessary. We will step onto the slippery slope and trust our colleagues on the trial court bench to tread carefully along with us. It is time to make it clear that there is a price to pay for cynical practices.
If this be quixotic, so be it. Rocinante is saddled up and we are prepared to tilt at this windmill for as long as it takes.
We sanction Mr. Donahue in the amount of $10,000. In arriving at that amount, we have struggled with the absence of precedent. “How much do you sanction an attorney who lies to the court, seeks unwarranted sanctions, bullies opposing counsel, shows no remorse, and effectively vows to continue such tactics by endorsing his conduct when challenged on it?” does not seem to have been a question yet addressed by other courts.
The appellate sanctions we have found involving sanctions paid to the court rather than opposing counsel16 have ranged of late from $6,000 to $12,500. These are mostly sanctions for frivolous appeals, based in part on the cost to the court of processing a frivolous appeal (See, e.g., Foust v. San Jose Construction Company (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 421; Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 553). Those cases, however, did not involve the added elements of dishonesty and lack of remorse we have here. And they did not require additional settings to bring the offending attorney before the court. The only case we have found that included those elements is, lamentably, from our own district, DeRose v. Huerlin (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 158, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 630.
In DeRose, a different panel of this court took into consideration their difficulty in getting counsel into court and his complete lack of compunction about his horrifying conduct in assessing what it termed a “conservative” sanction of $6,000. Given the passage of time, the out-and-out deceit, and the similar level of defiance involved in this case, we consider the amount we have chosen appropriate. Counsel's conduct clearly rises to the level of an unreasonable violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1), and for this and the other violations outlined above, we impose monetary sanctions against him in the amount of $10,000, payable to this court within 90 days.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of appellants. Appellants are to recover their costs on appeal.
The court having found that Timothy J. Donahue, State Bar No. 110501, has violated court rules in such a degree as to require sanctions in the amount of $10,000, the clerk of this court is ordered, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.7, subdivision (a)(3), to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Bar upon return of the remittitur, and to notify Mr. Donahue that the matter has been referred to the State Bar.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, and FYBEL, JJ.

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