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PAKELLI c. ALLEMAGNE
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8398/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1981-05-07;8398.78 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVILParties : Demandeurs : PAKELLIDéfendeurs : ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 8398/78 LÃ¼tfÃ¼ PAKELLI v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY LÃ¼tfÃ¼ PAKELLI c/RÃPUBLIQUE FÃDÃRALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 7 May 1981 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 7 mai 1981 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph I of the Conventlon : In the field of legal aid. the principle of "equality of arms" requires an adequate representation of the case for the defence.
Article 6, peragraph 3 (c) of the Conventio n a) Case where the accused has offered before the domestic court to prove his indigence, but has not been invited to do so. In so far as the Commission is called upon to deterntine retrospectively the applicant's financial position at the time of the facts, this question reserved for the examination of the merits of the case. b) This provision guarantees the adequate presentation of the defense case (concept of "irrterests ofjustice') . Legal aid refused for the hearing before the appeal-on-points-of-law-court (Federal Court) . while normally a hearing is ordered only in cases of a certain complexity . (Cornplaint declared admissible )
Artlcle 6, paragraphe 1, de la Conventlon : Dans le domaine de l'assistance judiciaire, le principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes exige que la cause de la dÃ©fense soit prÃ©sentÃ©e de maniÃ¨re adÃ©quate . Article 6, paragraphe 3, litt c), de la Conventlo n a) Cas oti un accusÃ© a offert, devant le juge national . de prouver son irrdigence ntais n'a pas Ã©tÃ© irrvitÃ© Ã le faire. Dans la mesure oÃ¹ la Commission est arnenÃ©e Ã Ã©tablir rÃ©trospectivement la situation ftnanciÃ¨re du requÃ©rant Ã l'Ã©poque des faits, renvoi de cette question Ã l'examen du fond de l'affaire . b) Cette disposition garantit que la canse de la dÃ©fense soit prÃ©sentÃ©e de rnauiÃ¨re adÃ©quate (notion des "intÃ©rBts de la justice'). Assistance judiciaire refusÃ©e
pour l'audience de la juridiction de cassation, alors qu'une attdience n'esf habituellement ordonnÃ©e que dans les cas d'une ce rt aine contplexitÃ© . (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable )
(francais : voir p . 122)
The facts subntitted by the pa rt ies may be summarised as follows : I . The applicant is a Turkish citizen born in 1937 and living in Turkey . He is represented by Rechtsanwalt Wingerter, a lawyer practising in Heilbronn . The application concerns the applicant's conviction and sentence in criminal proceedings which took place in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1976/77 . 2 . The applicant states that he attended primary school in Istanbul from 1943 to 1948, secondary school from 1948 to 1954, leaving with the "mediunt maturity" certificate, and from 1954 to 1957 technical high school . From 1957 to 1959 he worked as a book-keeper with a building firm . Then he was a soldier for 1 8 months . For 6 months he was assigned to an officers' training school at Ankara leaving as a lieutenant . At the end of 1960 he was discharged from the army . Until 1963 he again worked with the building rirm he had been employed with before . From 1963 to 1964 he was a foreman in glassworks in Istanbul .
3 . In February 1964 the applicant went to the Federal Republic of Germany . At that time he had a work contract with the tirm of Audi-NSU at Neckarsulm . After two and a half years he left Audi-NSU . Thereafter he followed various trades . Until 1971 he was employed as a mechanic with the firm of GebrÃ¼der Spohn at Neckarsulnt . Then, for a time, he managed the restaurant "Zur Linde" at Neckarsulnt, but he did not get the necessary licence from the competent German authority . Following that he worked as an unattached agent of the insurance company Deutscher Lloyd and for the Heimbausparkasse (Home Building and Loan Association) concluding savings contracts, life insurance contracts etc . with Turkish workers . He thus earned "a very good monthly inconte" . In 1969 he tried to open a textile and electro retail business and in 1971 a Spanish restaurant, but was not granted the licence therefor . 4 . The criminal proceedings complained of in the present application were preceded by proceedings in 1972/73 . On 22 February 1972, when being interrogated by the criminal police at Heilbronn on suspicion of having dealt with narcotics, the applicant stated that he was working as an interpreter . He declared : "I can understand the German language . I also act as an interpreter for nty fellow countrymen at the labour office and the town hall . An interpreter is therefore not required" . The applicant made a declaration to the same effect at his trial by the District Court (Amtsgericht) of Heilbronn on 31 May 1972 and consequentl y - 113 -
no interpreter was appointed for him . He was convicted of a narcotics offence and sentenced to ten months' imprisonment suspended on probation . His appeal (Berufung) from that judgment was dismissed by the Regional Court (Landgericht) of Heilbronn on 12 March 1973 . 5 . In the criminal proceedings which form the subject of the present application the applicant was on 7 May 1974 arrested on suspicion of having committed a further narcotics offence . On that occasion he told the police that he had in the summer of 1972 been apprehended in Bulgaria when trying to transport from Turkey to Germany about 16 kilograms of cannabis resin hidden in the side-parts of his car, that he had been sentenced in Bulgaria to six months' imprisonment and that he had served four and a half months of that sentence . 6 . The periods of the applicant's detention in the Federal Republic of Germany, between his arrest on 7 May 1974 and his trial by the Regional Court of Heilbronn in April 1976, in the criminal proceedings complained of in the present application, were as follows : 8 to 27 May 1974 detention on remand ; 28 May to 25 June 1974 execution of a sentence (of 1973, by the District Court of Heilbronn) for abetting ; 26 June to 29 September 1974 detention on remand ; 30 September 1974 to 13 February 1975 execution of another sentence ; 14 February 1975 to 6 April 1976 detention on remand . 7 . On 4 September 1974 Rechtsanwalt Wingerter (who now represents the applicant in the present proceedings before the Commission) was assigned to him as official defence counsel in the criminal proceedings . 8 . The applicant's trial before the Regional Court began on 7 April 1976 . It was continued on 8, 14, 23 and 30 April 1976 . The applicant was defended by Rechtsanwalt Wingerter, sometimes also by Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch of the same law office . The applicant said nothing about his knowledge of German, and an interpreter was appointed for him . 9 . By judgment of 30 April 1976 the Regional Court convicted the applicant on charges of an offence against the Narcotics Act (Vergehen gegen das BetÃ¯ubungsmittelgesetz) and of tax evasion (Steuerhinterziehung) and sentenced him to two years' and three months' imprisonment . The Court found it established that, in the spring of 1972, the applicant had illegally imported 16 kilograms of cannabis resin, hidden in his car, from Turkey into the Federal Republic of Germany . 10 . In May 1976 Rechtsanwalt Wingerter filed an appeal on points of law (Revision) against the above judgment . In his memorial of 5 August 1976 setting out the grounds of appeal he alleged inter a(ia a violation of Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) which provides that several accused persons may not be defended by one and the same defence counsel . Rechtsanwalt Wingerter pointed out that he had previously defende d
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M . who, according to the Regional Court's findings, had committed the offence of which the applicant was convicted jointly with him . 11 . In October 1976 the Federal Attorney General (Generalbundesanwalt) applied for the appeal to be rejected as inadmissible on the ground that it had been introduced by a defence counsel who, according to his own submissions, was prevented from acting in that capacity in the applicant's case . 12 . In November 1976 Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch filed a petition for restitutio in integrum to enable him to lodge a new appeal on points of law, which he introduced at the same time . 13 . On 21 December 1976 the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) granted the petition for res[itutio in integrum . On 13 January 1977 the Regional Court appointed Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch as official defence counsel for the filing of the memorial setting out the grounds of the new appeal . On 27 January 1977 Rechtsanwalt Wingerter was, as requested, discharged by the Regional Court from his duties as official defence counsel . 14 . In his memorial of 26 January 1977 setting out the grounds of the new appeal, a document of 34 pages, Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch alleged violations of procedural law (including Art . 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) only . 15 . In submissions of 14 March 1977 the Public Prosecutor's Off-ice (Staatsanwaltschaft) at the Regional Court applied for the new appeal to be rejected as inadmissible on the ground that Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch, like Rechtsanwalt Wingerter, was prevented under Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from acting as defence counsel in the applicant's case . 16 . Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch, in his reply of 23 March 1977, submitted that Article 146 did not apply in his case as he had at no time defended M . 17 . In a counter-memorial of 20 pages dated 1 August 1977 the Public Prosecutor's Office dealt with the allegations in Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch's memorial of 26 January 1977 . Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch received a copy of the counter-memorial on 17 August 1977 . The Federal Court ordered on 13 October 1977 that the appeal shoul d .18 be heard on 29 November 1977 . Notice of this order was given to Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch and to the applicant who, following his release from detention on 10 August 1976, had returned to Turkey . 19 . On 24 October 1977 Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch requested that he be appointed official defence counsel for the hearing of the appeal on 29 November 1977. 20 . This request was refused by the Federal Court on 25 October 1977 . The Federal Court stated that, under Article 350 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an accused person at liberty could not request the appointment o f
an official defence counsel for the hearing of the appeal . Such a person was free, under paragraph 2 of Article 350, either to appear in person, or to be represented by counsel, or not to be represented at all . It was the appeal court's duty to review the judgment of the court of first instance on the basis of the written grounds of appeal . Neither the legal nor the factual situation justified the appointment requested by Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch . 21 . In his objection (Gegenvorstellungen) of 7 November 1977 to the above decision Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch referred to a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 19 October 1977 (BVerfGE 46, 202) concerning an accused person's right in a very serious case (risk of a life sentence) to have an official defence counsel appointed for the hearing of his appeal on points of law . In that decision the Federal Constitutional Court had quashed a judgnient of the Federal Court on the ground that it violated the appellant's right to a fair hearingâ¢ . The appellant in that case had been sentenced by a Regional Court to twelve years' imprisonment and, on the prosecution's appeal on points of law, the Federal Court had increased the sentence to life imprisonment . The Federal Court's judgment was given after a hearing at which oral submissions had been made by a representative of the Federal Attorney General (Generalbundesanwalt) and at which the appellant, whose request for free legal aid had been refused by the Federal Court, was neither present nor represented . The Federal Consitutional Court, noting that the appeal also required the determination of a difficult legal issue, held that, in such a serious case, legal aid should have been granted under the general clause of Article 140, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch submitted that the present case was very serious for the applicant : should his conviction become final he would be expelled from the Federal Republic of Germany and his civil existence there would be destroyed . He asked to be notified in case a means certificate should be .required by the Federal Court and observed in this connection that the applicant after his long detention obviously had no savings and was unable to pay the costs of a defence counsel of his choice . . 22 . On 10 November 1977 the Federal Court, distinguishing the present case from that decided by the Federal Constitutional Cou rt , maintained the refusal of legal aid for the hearing of the appeal . 23 . On 29 November 1977, after a hearing in the presence of a Federal Attorney ( Bundesanwalt) at which neither the applicant nor Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch appeared, the Federal Cou rt dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law as unfounded .
Ibid . p . 209 . The Court referred lo Art . 2( 1) and to the principle of Ihe rule of law ( Rechtsstaatsprinzip) embodied in An . 20 (3) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) .
In its ten-page judgment the Court held that the (second) appeal on points of law had been properly introduced by Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch who was not barred by Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from representing the applicant in the appeal proceedings . This provision had, as alleged by the defence (cf . paras . 10 and 14 above), been violated at the applicant's trial . But according to the Federal Court's case-law an appeal on points of law invoking such a violation could only succeed if the defence of several accused persons by a common defence counsel was incompatible with the task of the defence in the concrete case (Auf die Verletzung des Â§ 146 StPO kann die Revision mit Erfolg jedoch nur gestUzt werden, wenn die Verteidigung der mehreren Beschuldigten durch einen gemeinsamen Verteidiger der Aufgabe der Verteidigung im Einzelfall tatsifchlich widerspricht) . In the present case no conflict of interests had been established . The Federal Cou rt fu rt her held that motions to obtain expe rt evidence, and to have witnesses examined in Turkey, had been properly refused by the Regional Cou rt and that the memorial se tting out the grounds of appeal did not in any other respect show the appearance of a violation of procedural law . The judgment was served on counsel for the defence on 21 December 1977 . 24 . In Janua ry 1978 Rechtsanwalt Winge rt er filed a constitutional appeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde) alleging violation of A rt icles 1, 2, 3, 20 and 103 (1) of the basic Law . He repeated the submissions made in his objection to the Federal Court ( para . 21 above) and argued that legal aid for the appeal hearing should have been granted in view of the applicant's limited knowledge of German and the difficulty of the legal issues raised in the appeal . The Federal Cou rt 's decision to hold a hea ri ng implied that this was a serious case as only about 10% of the appeals on points of law were heard orally * . Counsel also stated that the applicant's famity ** lived in the Federal Republic of Germany and his wife was not prepared to follow him to Turkey . 25 . On l0 May 1978 a Committee of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court ( Bundesverfassungsgericht), finding that the constitutional appeal did not offer a sufficient prospect of success, refused to accept it for decision . The Committee stated that the applicant's case was not "ve ry serious" (schwerwiegend) within the meaning of the Cou rt 's decision of 19 October 1977 (para . 21 above) and added that the applicant "could have re mained in the Federal Rep-ublic of Germany and could-if necessa ry assisted by an interpreter-have pa rt icipated in the hearing" before the Federal Cou rt . Dahs Qun .) in Neue Ju ri stische Wochenschrift .â¢CounselhrqtdaiclebyH 1978 . p . 140 (141) . â¢' The applicani's first wife had a fatal accident in Turkey in 1965 ; his son from that marriage lives in Turkev . In 1967 the applicant married a Spanish wonten in Germany . She lives aith their dauehter in Berlin .
Complain t The applicant alleges a violation of A rt icle 6, paragraph 3(c) in fine of the Convention, which guarantees the right of eve ry one charged with a c ri minal offence, who has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require . He submits that he could not afford a defence counsel of his own choosing and that the interests of justice required the appointment of counsel to represent him at the hearing of his appeal before the Federal Court . He had left the Federal Republic of Germany, for which he had no residence permit, before the hearing, and did not have the means to return there, and to pay for an interpreter .
THE LA W Prellminaq observation s I . The applicant's principal complaint concerns the refusal, by the Federal Court . of his petition for the appointment of Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch as official defence counsel for the hearing of the appeal on points of law before the Federal Court on 29 November 1977 . 2 . In connection with this principal complaint the applicant also makes three ancillary complaints . He submits : - that himself was prevented by the German authorities from appearing at the appeal hearing ; - that he did not have the means to return from Turkey to Germany for the appeal hearing ; an d - that he was unable to pay an interpreter for that hearing . The Commission has considered the rirst ancillary complaint unde r .3 Article 6 (1) of the Convention which, in its guarantee of a fair hearing, contains the principle of "equality of arms" . It notes that, under Article 350 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant was entitled to be present at the appeal hearing, either alone or assisted by counsel, or not to appear in person but to be represented by counsel . The applicant submits that he himself was in fact prevented from appearing as he had, before his release from prison, applied in vain for an extension of his residence permit . But he does not indicate that he made at any time a specific request for toleration of his stay in the Federal Republic of Germany in order to be able to attend the hearing . 4 . The second and third ancillary complaints have been considered by the Commission both under the general clause of Article 6(1) and under the specific guarantees of Article 6(3) (c) (free legal assistance) and Article 6(3) (e ) - 118 -
(free assis(ance of an interpreter) of the Convention . The Commission notes, however, that the applicant's complaint, that he did not have the means to return from Turkey to Germany for the appeal hearing, was not raised in the proceedings before the Federal Court, and that no request was made in those proceedings for the free assistance of an interpreter . 5 . The Commission concludes that, with regard to his three ancillary complaints, the applicant has failed to comply with the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in Article 26 and that these complaints must therefore be rejected under Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Convetnion . 6 . It thus remains for the Commission to consider the applicant's principal complaint concerning the refusal of his petition for the appointment of an official defence counsel for the appeal hearing . As to the pdnclpat complain t 7 . The Commission has examined the applicant's principal complaint both under the specific guarantee of Article 6 (3) (c) and under the general clause of Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention . 8 . Artlcle 6 (3) (c) guarantees the right to everyone charged with a criminal offence, who has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require . The applicant claims that, under this provision, his request for the appointment of counsel for the appeal hearing should have been granted by the Federal Court . The Government submit that the applicant's indigence was not established and that, in any case . the interests of justice did not require the appointment .
9 . The Commission observes with regard to the applicant's financial situation at the relevant time that Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch, in his objection of 7 November 1977 to the Federal Court, submitted that the applicant was obviously unable to pay the costs of counsel of his choice and asked to be notified in case a means certificate should be required . The Federal Court, however, was not under German law required to examine the applicant's financial position before deciding on his request for legal aid . It therefore did not invite Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch to produce a means certificate . 10 . The question of his inability to pay the costs of counsel of his choice was thus raised by the applicant, but not determined by the Federal Court, in the appeal proceedings . Its retrospective determination by the Commission will involve complex questions of fact and law . It may, therefore, if necessary, have to be reserved for an examination of the merits of this complaint . 11 . The Contmission has next considered whether the appointment of counsel for the hearing of the applicant's appeal was required by the "interests of justicÃ©" within the meaning of Article 6 (3) (c) of the Convention . It here recalls that this provision guarantees to an accused person that the crimina l - 119 -
proceedings against him will not take place without an adequate representation of the case for the defence (cf . the Commission's decision on the admissibility of Application No . 2676/65, X . v . Austria, Collection of Decisions 23, 31 [35 1 , with further reference) . 12 . In the present case the Federal Court refused to appoint an official defence counsel on the ground that it was its duty to review the judgment of the court of first instance on the basis of the written grounds of appeal, and that neither the legal nor the factual situation justitied the appointment . 13 . The Commission notes that the appeal proceedings in this case passed two stages : the written proceedings, for which legal aid was granted, and the oral proceedings, for which it was refused . The entire proceedings concerned an appeal on points of law only, the facts of the case having been established by the trial court, and solely violations of procedural law were alleged in the appeal . Grounds for these allegations had been given in Rechtsanwalt Rauschenbusch's 34-page memorial of 26 January 1977, which contained legal arguments and indicated the facts considered relevant by counsel . The Federal Court was in its consideration of the appeal under Article 352 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also in the case of a hearing limited to the complaints made, and the facts indicated, in those written grounds of appeal . Counsel could not add new complaints, nor invoke further facts, at the hearing . The Commission also notes the Government's submission that an increase of the sentence was excluded under Article 358 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by the prohibition of a rejormatio in peius, because only the defendant had appealed . 14 . The Commission further observes that the Federal Court's decision to hold a hearing was taken under Article 349 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . This provision authorises the appeal court to determine an appeal on points of law without a hearing only in the following cases : - where the appeal is inadmissible ( para . 1) ; - where the court considers unanimously that the appeal is manifestly ill-founded (para . 2) ; an d - where the court rmds unanimously that the appeal is well-founded (para . 3) . The Commission notes that in none of the above cases is the cou rt obliged to proceed without a hearing, and that a hea ri ng is mandato ry in all other cases under paragraph 5 of Article 349 . 15 . An appeal cou rt 's decision to hold a hearing does thus not necessarily imply that the case is considered as raising important issues . But the fad that only about 10% of the appeals on points of law are heard orally indicates that such a decision is taken in exceptional cases . The reasons which induced the Federal Court to hold a hearing in the present case do not appear from its pronouncements . The Government submit that the hea ri ng was decided in view of the number of complaints raised and in the interests of procedural economy .
16 . The Commission does not feel called upon, at the present stage of its examination of the case, to consider this question further . It finds that, irrespective of its motives, the Federal Court's decision to hold a hearing on the appeal, at which a representative of the Federal Attorney General's Office (which apparently had not made any submissions in writing) was to address the court, must raise questions both underArricle 6( 1 ) and under Article 6 (3)(c) of the Convention, as regards the position of the applicant as defendant in the criminal proceedings concerned . 17 . The Commission accepts that the applicant, for the reasons stated in paragraphs 2 to 5 above, cannot claim that he himself was prevented from appearing at the hearing and that he was unable to pay an interpreter . But the principle of "equality of arms", embodied in the guarantee of a fair hearing in Article 6(I), and its specific application as regards legal assistance and representation, in Article 6 (3) (c) require, as mentioned in paragraph I I above, an "adequate" representation of the case for the defence . IB . The Comntission finds that it cannot, without an examination of the nierits of this complaint, determine whether this requirement has been observed in the present case or whether "the interests of justice", in the sense of Article 6 (3) (c) . necessitated the appointment of an official defence counsel at the hearing . It here observes that the appeal hearing was solely concerned with questions of law and that the applicant, apart from being a foreigner, was not legally trained, and that he had been granted legal aid for the written appeal proceedings ; further, that no advance inforntation as to the expected contents of the Federal AttorneÃ¿ s oral submissions was apparently available to the defence ; and finally that, to this date, no information has been brought to the attention of the Commission concerning these submissions, which immediately preceded the Federal Court's judgment dismissing the applicant's appeal .
19 . The Contmission, therefore, does not on the material before it come to the conclusion that this complaint is inadmissible as being manifestly illfounded, within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention, and it does not find that it is~inadmissible on any other ground .
For these reasons the Commission, without in any way prejudging the merits of the principal complaint: I . DECLARES ADMISSIBLE the applicant's principal complaint concerning the refusal of his petition for the appointment of an official defence counsel for the appeal hearing . DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application .2
(TRADUCT/O M EN FAIT Les faits, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les parties, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : 1 . Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant turc, nÃ© en 1937 et domiciliÃ© en Turquie. 11 est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Me Wingerter, avocat Ã Heilbronn . La requÃªte concerne sa condamnation aprÃ¨s une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale qui a eu lieu en RÃ©publiqueFÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne en 1976/77 . 2 . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clare avoir frÃ©quentÃ© une Ã©cole primaire Ã Istamboul de 1943 Ã 1948, puis une Ã©cole secondaire de 1948 Ã 1954, qu'il quitta muni du brevet Ã©lÃ©mentaire, et enfin, de 1954 Ã 1957, une Ã©cole technique supÃ©rieure . De 1957 Ã 1959, il travailla comme comptable dans une entreprise de construction, puis fit pendant 18 mois son service militaire . Il servit 6 mois Ã Ankara dans une Ã©cole d'officiers, qu'il quitta avec le grade de lieutenant . A la fin de 1960, l'armÃ©e le renvoya dans ses foyers . Jusqu'en 1963, il travailla Ã nouveau pour l'entreprise de construction qui l'employait auparavant . De 1963 Ã 1964 . il ful conlremaitre dans une verrerie d'Istamboul . 3 . En fÃ©vrier 1964, le requÃ©rant se rendit en RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne oÃ¹ il obtint un contrat de travail avec la sociÃ©tÃ© Audi-NSU Ã Neckarsulm, mais qu'il quitta deux ans et demi plus tard . 11 occupa par la suite divers emplois : mÃ©canicien jusqu'en 1971 dans l'entreprise Gebrflder Spohn Ã Neckarsulm, puis quelque temps gÃ©rant du restaurant . Zur Linde . Ã Neckarsulm, mais il ne rÃ©ussit pas Ã obtenir l'autorisation nÃ©cessaire du service allemand compÃ©tent . Il travailla alors comme agent indÃ©pendant pour la sociÃ©tÃ© d'assurances Deutscher Lloyd et pour la Heimbausparkasse (association de prÃªts Ã la construction) oÃ¹ il faisait souscrire des contrats d'Ã©pargne, d'assurance-vie . etc . Ã des travailleurs turcs . Ses gains reprÃ©sentaient alors . un trÃ¨s bon revenu mensuel . . En 1969, il essaya d'ouvrir un magasin de tissus et d'appareils Ã©lectriques, et en 1971 un restaurant espagnol, mais il ne put obtenir les autorisations nÃ©cessaires . 4 . La procÃ©dure pÃ©nale objet de la prÃ©sente requÃªte fut prÃ©cÃ©dÃ©e d'une autre procÃ©dure en 1972 et 1973 . Le 22 fÃ©vrier 1972, soupÃ§onnÃ© d'avoir fait trafic de stupÃ©fiants, le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© par la police d'Heilbronn, Ã qui il affirma travailler comme interprÃ¨te . 11 dÃ©clara : . Je comprends l'allemand . Je sers Ã©galement d'interprÃ¨te pour mes compatriotes au bureau de la main-d'Â¢uvre et Ã la mairie . Un interprÃ¨te n'est donc pas nÃ©cessaire . . Le requÃ©rant fit une dÃ©claration dans le mÃªme sens, le 31 mai 1972, lors de son procÃ¨s devant le tribunal de district (Amtsgericht) de Heilbronn, si bien qu'aucun interprÃ¨te ne lui fut adjoint . Reconnu coupable d'infraction Ã la lÃ©gislation sur les stupÃ©fiants, il fut condamnÃ© Ã dix mois de prison ave c
sursis . II fut dÃ©boutÃ© de son appel (Berufung) par le tribunal rÃ©gional (Landgericht) d'Heilbronn le 12 mars 1973 . 5 . Dans la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, objet de la prÃ©sente requÃªte, le requÃ©rant fut arrÃªtÃ© le 7 mai 1974 pour infraction Ã la lÃ©gislation sur les stupÃ©fiants . A cette occasion, il dÃ©clara Ã la police avoir Ã©tÃ© apprÃ©hendÃ© pendant l'Ã©tÃ© 1972 en Bulgarie, alors qu'il essayait de transporter de Turquie en Allemagne quelque 16 kilos de rÃ©sine de cannabis cachÃ©s dans les flancs de sa voiture, et avoir Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© en Bulgarie Ã six mois de prison, dont il a purgÃ© quatre et demi . 6 . Dans la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale dont il s'agit ici, les pÃ©riodes de dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant en RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, entre son arrestation le 7 mai 1974 et son procÃ¨s devant le tribunal rÃ©gional de Heilbronn en avril 1976, se dÃ©composant ainsi : du 8 au 27 mai 1974 . dÃ©tention provisoire ; du 28 mai au 25 juin 1974, exÃ©cution d'une peine (prononcÃ©e en 1973 par le tribunal de district de Heilbronn) pour incitation Ã un dÃ©lit ; du 26 juin au 29septembre 1974, dÃ©tention provisoire ; du 30 septembre 1974au 13fÃ©vrier 1975, exÃ©cution d'une autre peine ; du 14 fÃ©vrier 1975 au 6 avril 1976, dÃ©tention provisoire . 7 . Le 4 septembre 1974 . Me Wingerter (qui reprÃ©sente le requÃ©rant dans la prÃ©sente procÃ©dure devant la Commission) fut commis avocat d'office dans la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale en question . 8 . Le procÃ¨s du requÃ©rant devant le tribunal rÃ©gional s'ouvrit le 7 avril 1976 et se poursuivit les 8, 14, 23 et 30 avril 1976 . La dÃ©fense du requÃ©rant fut assurÃ©e par Me Wingerter, et Ã©galement par Me Rauschenbusch, appartenant au mÃªnte cabinet d'avocats . Le requÃ©rant n'ayant rien dit de sa connaissance de l'allemand, un interprÃªte lui fut adjoint . 9 . Par jugement du 30 avril 1976, le tribunal rÃ©gional reconnut le requÃ©rant coupable d'infraction Ã la lÃ©gislation sur les stupÃ©fiants (Vergehen gegen das Bet'9ubungsmittelgesetz) et de fraude fiscale (Steuerhinteraiehung) et lui infligea une peine de deux ans et trois mois de prison . Le tribunal tint pour Ã©tabli qu'au printemps de 1972, le requÃ©rant avait illÃ©galement importÃ© en Allemagne, cachÃ©s dans sa voiture, seize kilos de rÃ©sine de cannabis en provenance de . Turquie . 1 0 . En mai 1976, Me Wingerter forma un pourvoi en cassation (RÃ©vision) contre ce jugement . Dans son mÃ©moire du 5 aoGt 1976, exposant les motifs du pourvoi, il allÃ©guait notamment une violation de l'article 146 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale (Strafprozessordnung), qui prÃ©voit qu'un seul et mÃªme avocat ne peut pas dÃ©fendre plusieurs accusÃ©s . Me Wingerter soulignait qu'il avait assurÃ© la dÃ©fense de M . . . ., qui, le tribunal rÃ©gional l'avait Ã©tabli, avait commis les infractions de concert avec le requÃ©rant . 1l . En octobre 1976, le Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral fÃ©dÃ©ral ( Generalbundesanwalt) conclut au rejet du pou rv oi au motif que celui-ci avait Ã© tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ© par un dÃ©fenseur qui, de son propre aveu, Ã© tait empÃªchÃ© d'agir .
12 . En novembre 1976, Me Rauschenbusch demanda une restitution de dÃ©lai pour introduire un nouveau pourvoi, ce qu'il fit simultanÃ©ment . 13 . Le 21 dÃ©cembre 1976, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale (Bundesge ri chtshof) fit droit Ã la demande . Le 13 janvier 1977, le tribunal rÃ©gional commit Me Rauschenbusch comme avocat d'office pour le dÃ©pÃ´t du mÃ©moire dÃ©veloppant les moyens de cassation . Le 27 janvier 1977, Me Winge rter fut, sur sa demande, dÃ©chargÃ© de son mandat par le tri bunal rÃ©gional . 14 . Dans son mÃ©moire du 26 janvier 1977, exposant sur 34 pages les motifs du nouveau pourvoi, Me Rauschenbusch n'allÃ©guait que des violations de la loi de procÃ©dure ( notamment de l'a rt icle 146 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale) . 15 . Dans ses observ ations du 14 ma rs 1977, le Procureur ( Staatsanwaltschaft) prÃ¨s le tribunal rÃ©gional conclut au rejet du nouveau pou rvoi au motif que, tout comme Me Winge rt er, Me Rauschenbusch ne pouvait, en vertu de l'article 146 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, agir comme dÃ©fenseur dans l'affaire du requÃ©rant . 16 . Dans sa rÃ©ponse du 23 mars 1977, Me Rauschenbusch faisait valoir que l'a rt icle 146 ne lui Ã©tait pas applicable ici puisqu'il n'avait jamais Ã©tÃ© le dÃ©fenseur de M . . . . 17 . Dans un contre-mÃ©moire de 20 pages en date du 1- aoÃ»t 1977, le Procureur examina les allÃ©gations exposÃ©es par Me Rauschenbusch dans son mÃ©moire du 26 janvier 1977 . L'avocat reÃ§ ut copie du contre-mÃ©moire le 17 aoÃ»t 1977 . Le 13 octobre 1977, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale fixa l'audience au 29 novemb re 1977 . .18 Cette dÃ©cision fut signifiÃ©e Ã Me Rauschenbusch et au requÃ©rant qui, aprÃ¨s sa libÃ©ration le 10 aoÃ»t 1976, Ã©tait repart i pour la Turquie . 19 . Le 24 octobre 1977, Me Rauschenbusch demanda Ã Ãªtre commis d'office pour l'audience de cassation du 29 novembre 1977 . 20 . La Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale rejeta la demande le 25 octobre 1977, dÃ©clarant qu'en ve rt u de l'article 350, paragraphe 3 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, un accusÃ© en libe rtÃ© ne peut pas demander la dÃ©signation d'un avocat d'office pour une audience de cassation . L'intÃ©ressÃ© a, aux termes du paragraphe 2 de l'article 350, la facultÃ© de comparaitre en personne, de se faire reprÃ©senter par un avocat ou de ne pas comparaitre du tout . La Cour est tenue d'apprÃ©cier le jugement du t ribunal de premiÃ¨re instance d'aprÃ¨s les moyens de cassation dÃ©veloppÃ©s par Ã©crit . Or, ni les faits ni les questions ju ridiques en discussion n'exigeaient la nomination demandÃ©e par Me Rauschenbusch . 21 . Le 7 novembre 1977, le requÃ©rant Ã©leva des objections ( Gegenvo rs tellungen) Ã la dÃ©cision prÃ©citÃ©e en invoquant un arrÃªt rendu le 19 octobre 1977 par la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale (BVerfGE 46, 202) relatif au droit pour une personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction trÃ¨s grave ( passible de l'emp ri sonnement Ã vie) de faire commettre un avocat d'office pour l'audience de cassa tion .
Cet arrÃªt de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale annulait un jugement de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale parce que contraire au droit de l'auteur du pou rv oi Ã un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable' . Dans cette affaire, l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© par un tribunal rÃ©gional Ã 12 ans de p ri son et, sur pourvoi en cassation formÃ© par le ministÃ¨re public, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale avait portÃ© la peine Ã l'emprisonnement Ã vie . La Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale avait rendu son arrÃªt aprÃ¨s une audience au cours de laquelle un reprÃ©sentant du Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral fÃ©dÃ©ral ( Generalbundesanwalt) pronon Ã§a un rÃ©quisitoire et oÃ¹ l'auteur du pou rv oi, dont la demande d'assistance judiciaire avait Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale, n'Ã©tait ni prÃ©sent ni reprÃ©sentÃ© . Relevant que le pou rv oi appelait Ã©galement Ã rÃ©soudre un problÃ¨me juridique difficile, la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale dÃ©clara que, dans une affai re aussi grave, l'assistance judiciaire aurait dÃ» Ãªtre accordÃ©e, conformÃ©ment Ã la clause gÃ©nÃ©rale figurant Ã l'article 140, paragraphe 2, du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Me Rauschenbusch fit valoir que l'affaire Ã©tait trÃ¨s grave pour le requÃ©rant puisqu'une condamnation dÃ©finitive entrainerait son expulsion de la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, oÃ¹ toute existence civile lui serait dÃ©sormais interdite . Au cas oÃ¹ la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale exigerait la production d'un certificat d'indigence, il demandait Ã en Ãªtre informÃ© et observait Ã cet Ã©gard qu'aprÃ¨s sa longue dÃ©tention, le requÃ©rant n'avait Ã©videmment pas d'Ã©conomies et ne pouvait dont pas rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur de son choix .
22 . Le 10 novembre 1977, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale, distinguant la prÃ©sente affaire de celle qui avait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ©e par la Cour constitutionnelle, confirma le refus d'assistance judiciaire pour l'audience de cassation . AprÃ¨s une audience tenue le 29 novembre 1977 en prÃ©sence d'un reprÃ©sentant du Procureur fÃ©dÃ©ral ( Bundesanwalt), mais en l'absence du re quÃ©rant et de Me Rauschenbusch, la Cour rejeta le pou rvoi comme mal fondÃ© . Dans son arrÃªt de 10 pages, la Cour dÃ©clare que le ( second) pou rvoi en cassation a Ã©tÃ© convenablement formÃ© par Me Rauschenbusch, Ã qui l'article 146 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale n'interdit pas de re prÃ©senter le requÃ©rant en cassation . Selon elle, et comme le dit la dÃ©fense ( voir plus haut paragraphes 10 et 14), cette disposition a Ã©tÃ© enfreinte lors du procÃ¨s du requÃ©rant . Cependant, conformÃ©ment Ã la jurisprudence de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale, un pou rvoi Ã©n cassation fondÃ© sur ce genre de violation ne peut aboutir que si la dÃ©fense de plusieurs co-accusÃ©s par un avocat commun est incompatible avec la tÃ¢che de la dÃ©fense dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce (Auf die Verletzung des Â§ 146 StPO kann die Revision mit Erfolg jedoch gestÃ¼tzt werden, wenn die Ve rt eidigung der meh re ren Beschuldigâ¢ Ibid . p . 209 . La Cour invoqua l'article 2, paragraphe 1 et le p ri ncipe de la prÃ©Ã©minence du droit (Rechtsstaatsp ri nxip) posÃ© Ã l'article 20, paragraphe 3 de la Loi fondamentale (Grundgesetz) .
ten durch einen gemeinsamen Verteidiger der Aufgabe der Verteidigung im Einzelfall tatsÃ chlich widerspricht) . Or, en l'espÃ¨ce . aucun conflit d'intÃ©rÃªts n'a Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli . La Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale dÃ©clare, en outre, que les demandes d'expertise et d'interrogatoire de tÃ©moins en Turquie ont Ã©tÃ© Ã juste titre rejetÃ©es par le tribunal rÃ©gional et que le mÃ©moire exposant les motifs du pourvoi ne signale l'existence d'aucun autre vice de procÃ©dure .
L'arrÃªt fut signifiÃ© Ã l'avocat de la dÃ©fense le 21 dÃ©cembre 1977 . 24 . En janvier 1978, Me Wingerter forma un recours constitutionnel (Verfassungsbeschwerde) allÃ©guant des violations des articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 20 et 103, paragraphe I de la Loi fondamentale . Il rÃ©itÃ©ra l'argumentation dÃ©veloppÃ©e dans l'objection prÃ©sentÃ©e Ã la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale (voir plus haut paragraphe 21) et fit valoir que l'assistance d'un avocat aurait dÃ» Ãªtre accordÃ©e vu la faiblesse des connaissances de l'intÃ©ressÃ© en allemand et la difficultÃ© des questions juridiques soulevÃ©es en cassation . La dÃ©cision de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de tenir une audience impliquait qu'il s'agissait d'une affaire grave puisque 10 % seulement des pourvois . en cassation font l'objet d'une audience contradictoire* . L'avocat dÃ©clara Ã©galement que la famille du requÃ©rant" vit en RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne et que son Ã©pouse n'est pas disposÃ©e Ã le suivre en Turquie . 25 . Le 10 mai 1978, un comitÃ© de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale (Bundesverfassungsgericht), estimant que le recours constitutionnel n'offrait pas de chance de succÃ¨s, refusa de le soumettre Ã la dÃ©cision de la Cour . Selon lui, l'affaire n'Ã©tait pas . trÃ¨s grave â¢(schwerwiegend) . au sens oÃ¹ la Cour en avait dÃ©cidÃ© le 19 octobre 1977 (voir plus haut paragraphe 21) et, d'ailleurs, le requÃ©rant â¢ aurait pu rester en RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne et prendre part Ã l'audience (devant la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale), au besoin avec l'aide d'un interprÃ¨te f
.Grie
Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 (c) in fine de la Convention, qui garantit Ã toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction et qui n'a pas les moyens de rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur, le droit d'Ãªtre assistÃ©e gratuitement par un avocat d'office lorsque les intÃ©rÃªts de la justice l'exigent . Il soutient qu'il ne pouvait pas rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur de son choix et que le s
â¢ L'avocat cite ici un article de H . Dahs fils, paru dÃ¢ns la re vue Neue Ju ri stische Wochenschrift, 1978, p . 140 (141) . ** La premiÃ¨re femme du requÃ©rant est morte en 1965 . dans un accident en Turquie le fils nÃ© de cette union vit en Turquie . En 1967, le requÃ©rant Ã©pousa, en Allemagne, une Espagnole qui vit avec leur fille Ã Berlin . - 126 -
intÃ©rÃªts de la justice exigeaient la dÃ©signation d'un avocat pour le reprÃ©senter Ã l'audience de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale . Il avait, avant l'audience, quittÃ© la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne faute de permis de sÃ©jour et n'avait pas les moyens d'y revenir et de rÃ©munÃ©rer les services d'un interprÃ¨te .
EN DROI T
Observations liminaires 1 . Le grief principal du requÃ©rant porte sur le refus opposÃ© par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale Ã sa demande de faire commettre de Me Rauschenbusch comme avocat d'office pour l'audience de cassation le 29 novembre 1977 . 2 . En liaison avec ce grief principal, le requÃ©rant formule Ã©galement trois griefs accessoires . Il soutient : - que les autoritÃ©s allemandes l'ont empÃªchÃ© de comparaitre Ã l'audience de cassation ; - qu'il n'avait pas les moyens de revenir de Turquie en Allemagne pour assister Ã l'audience ; e t - qu'il n'Ã©tait pas en mesure de rÃ©munÃ©rer un interprÃ¨te pour cette audience . 3 . La Commission a examinÃ© le premier grief accessoire au regard de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention qui, en garantissant un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, pose le principe de - l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes - . Elle relÃ©ve que l'article 350, paragraphe 2, du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale donne au requÃ©rant le droit d'assister Ã l'audience de cassation, seul ou assistÃ© de son avocat, ou de ne pas y comparaitre en personne, mais d'y Ãªtre reprÃ©sentÃ© par un avocat . Le requÃ©rant soutient qu'il a en fait Ã©tÃ© empÃªchÃ© de comparaitre, puisqÃ» i] avait, avant sa libÃ©ration, sollicitÃ© en vain une prolongation de son permis de sÃ©jour . En revanche, il ne dit pas avoir adressÃ© de demande expresse aux autoritÃ©s allemandes pour qu'elles tolÃ¨rent son sÃ©jour jusqu'Ã l'audience . 4 . La Commission a examinÃ© les deuxiÃ¨me et troisiÃ¨me griefs accessoires tant au regard de la clause gÃ©nÃ©rale de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, qu'Ã celui des garanties spÃ©cifiques de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 (c), (assistance judiciaire gratuite) et de l'article 6, paragraphe 3(e), (assistance gratuite d'un interprÃ¨te) de la Convention . Elle relÃ¨ve cependant que le requÃ©rant n'a pas, dans la procÃ©dure devant la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale, arguÃ© du fait qu'il n'avait pas les moyens de revenir de Turquie en Allemagne pour assister Ã l'audience, et qu'il n'a pas, non plus, demandÃ© l'assistance gratuite d'un interprÃ¨te . La Commission en conclut qu'en ce qui concerne les trois griefs acces.5 soires, le requÃ©rant n'a pas satisfait Ã la condition de l'Ã©puisement des voies d e
recours internes posÃ©e Ã l'art icle 26 et que ces griefs doivent donc Ãªtre rejetÃ©s conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . 6 . 11 reste donc Ã la Commission Ã examiner le g ri ef p ri ncipal du requÃ©rant concernant le rejet de sa demande de dÃ©signation d'un avocat d'office pour l'audience de cassation . Sur le grief principal 7 . La Commission a examinÃ© le grief principal du requÃ©rant tant au regard de la garantie particuliÃ¨re de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 (c), que celui de la clause gÃ©nÃ©rale figurant Ã l'article 6, paragraphe l, de la Convention . 8 . L'article 6. paragraphe 3(c), garantit Ã tout accusÃ© dÃ©pourvu des moyens de rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur le droit d'en avoir un gratuitement lorsque les intÃ©rÃªts de la justice l'exigent . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend qu'aux termes de cette disposition, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale aurait dÃ» commettre d'office l'avocat qu'il rÃ©clamait pour l'audience de cassation . Le Gouvernement soutient, quant Ã lui, que le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©tabli son indigence et que, du reste, les intÃ©rÃªts de la justice n'exigeaient pas la prÃ©sence d'un avocat . 9 . S'agissant de la situation financiÃ¨re du requÃ©rant Ã l'Ã©poque des faits, la Commission fait remarquer que Me Rauschenbusch a, dans les objections qu'il a prÃ©sentÃ©es le 7 novembre 1977 Ã la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale, soutenu que le requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait manifestement pas en mesure de se rÃ©munÃ©rer lui-mÃªme un dÃ©fenseur et voulait savoir s'il fallait produire un certificat d'indigence . En droit allemand, cependant, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale n'est pas tenue d'examiner la situation financiÃ¨re du requÃ©rant avant de statuer sur la demande d'assistance judiciaire . Elle n'a donc pas invitÃ© Me Rauschenbusch Ã fournir un certificat d'indigence . 10 . La question de l'impossibilitÃ© pour le requÃ©rant de rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur de son choix a donc bien Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©e par le requÃ©rant dans la procÃ©dure de cassation mais n'a pas Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ©e par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale . Un examen rÃ©trospectif de cette question par la Commission pourrait soulever des problÃ¨mes complexes en fait et en droit, de sorte qu'en cas de besoin ce point devrait Ãªtre rÃ©servÃ© pour un examen du bien-fondÃ© de ce grief . 11 . La Commission a ensuite examinÃ© si la dÃ©signation d'un avocat pour l'audience de cassation Ã©tait requise par les . intÃ©rÃªts de la justice - au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 (c), de la Convention . Elle rappelle que cette disposition garantit Ã un accusÃ© que la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale le concernant ne se dÃ©roulera pas sans que sa dÃ©fense soit convenablement assurÃ©e (cf . dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte nÂ° 2676/65, X . c/Autriche, Recueil de DÃ©cisions 23 . 31 (35), et rÃ©fÃ©rences complÃ©mentaires) . 12 . En l'espÃ¨ce, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale a refusÃ© de commettre un avocat d'office au motif qu'elle Ã©tait tenue d'apprÃ©cier le jugement du tribunal de premiÃ¨r e
instance d'aprÃ¨s les moyens de cassation dÃ©veloppÃ©s par Ã©crit et que ni les faits ni les questions juridiques en discussion n'exigeaient pareille nomination . 1 3 . La Commission relÃ¨ve qu'en l'espÃ¨ce la procÃ©dure de cassation s'est dÃ©roulÃ©e en deux phases : une phase Ã©crite pour laquelle l'assistance judiciaire a Ã©tÃ© accordÃ©e, une phase orale pour laquelle elle a Ã© tÃ© refusÃ©e . L'ensemble de la procÃ©dure ne port ait que sur des points de droit, puisque la juridiction de jugement avait Ã©tabli les faits de la cause et que le pourvoi n'allÃ©guait que des vices de procÃ©dure . Me Rauschenbusch avait, le 26 janvier 1977, dÃ©veloppÃ© ses moyens dans un mÃ©moire de 34 pages exposant des arguments juridiques et indiquant les faits que l'avocat estimait pert inents . Dans son examen du pou rv oi, conformÃ©ment Ã l'a rt icle 352 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale devait, dans le cadre d'une audience Ã©galement, se limiter aux griefs exposÃ©s et aux faits indiquÃ©s dans les moyens dÃ©veloppÃ©s par Ã©crit . A l'audience, l'avocat ne pouvait ni ajouter de nouveaux griefs ni invoquer d'autres faits . La Commission relÃ¨ve Ã©galement l'argument du Gouvernement selon lequel une augmentation de la peine Ã©tait exclue par l'a rt icle 358, paragraphe 2 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, qui interdisait la reformatio in pejus puisque le dÃ©fendeur s'Ã©tait pou rv u seul . 14 . La Commission remarque en outre que la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale a dÃ©cidÃ© de tenir une audience en s'appuyant sur l'a rt icle 349 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Cette disposition n'auto ri se Ã statuer en cassation sans audience contradictoire que dans les cas suivants : - lorsque le pou rvoi est irrecevable ( paragraphe 1 ) - lorsque la Cour estime Ã l'unanimitÃ© que le pou rv oi est manifestement mal fondÃ© ( paragraphe 2) ; et - lorsque la Cour conclut Ã l'unanimitÃ© que le pou rvoi est bien fondÃ© (paragraphe 3) . La Commission relÃ¨ve que la Cour n'est tenue de se passer d'audience dans aucun de ces cas et que l'audience s'impose dans tous les autres cas Ã©numÃ©rÃ©s au paragraphe 5 de l'a rt icle 349 . 15 . La dÃ©cision de la Cour de tenir une audience de cassation n'implique donc pas forcÃ©ment qu'elle considÃ¨re l'affaire comme soulevant des questions importantes . Cependant le fait que 10 % seulement des pou rvois en cassa ti on font l'objet d'une audience contradictoire donne Ã penser que cette dÃ©cision n'est prise que dans des cas exceptionnels . Les raisons qui ont poussÃ© la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale Ã tenir une audience dans la prÃ©sente affaire ne resso rt ent pas des attendus de l'arr@t . Le Gouvernement prÃ©tend que l'audience a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ©e en raison de la multiplicitÃ© des griefs et dans l'intÃ©rÃªt d'une Ã©conomie de procÃ©dure . 16 . Au stade actuel de son examen de l'affaire, la Commission ne s'estime pas appelÃ©e Ã approfondir la question . Elle constate qu'indÃ©pendamment d e
ses motifs, la dÃ©cision de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de tenir, sur le pourvoi, une audience Ã laquelle un reprÃ©sentant du parquet fÃ©dÃ©ral devait prendre la parole (sans avoir, semble-t-il, prÃ©sentÃ© d'observations Ã©crites) soulÃ¨ve un problÃ¨me tant au regard de l'article 6 . paragraphe 1 . que de l'article 6, paragraphe 3(c), de la Convention, en ce qui concerne la situation du requÃ©rant comme dÃ©fendeur dans la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale concernÃ©e . 17 . La Commission reconnaÃ®t que, pour les raisons indiquÃ©es plus haut aux paragraphes 2 Ã 5, le requÃ©rant ne peut pas prÃ©tendre avoir Ã©tÃ© empÃªchÃ© de comparaitre en personne Ã l'audience et n'avoir pas Ã©tÃ© en mesure de rÃ©munÃ©rer un interprÃ¨te . Cependant, le principe de â¢ l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes . contenu dans la garantie d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable figurant Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, ainsi que son application spÃ©cifique au problÃ¨me de l'assistance judiciaire et de la reprÃ©sentation en justice prÃ©vue Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 3 (c), exigent. comme indiquÃ© plus haut au paragraphe Il, que la dÃ©fense soit - convenablement . assurÃ©e . 1 8 . La Commission constate qu'elle ne saurait, sans procÃ©der Ã un examen du bien-fondÃ© de ce grief, dÃ©cider si cette condition Ã©tait remplie en l'espÃ¨ce et si les . intÃ©rÃªts de la justice Â» , au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 (c), exigeaient qu'un avocat fÃ»t commis d'office pour l'audience de la Cour . Elle remarque que celle-ci ne portait que sur des questions de droit et que le requÃ©rant, outre qu'il Ã©tait Ã©tranger, Ã©tait dÃ©pourvu de formation juridique et avait bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© de l'assistance judiciaire pour la phase Ã©crite de la procÃ©dure de cassation ; qu'en outre, la dÃ©fense ne semble avoir eu aucune information sur la teneur prÃ©vue de l'exposÃ© du Procureur fÃ©dÃ©ral . Enfin, la Commission n'a jusqu'ici pas reÃ§u d'information sur cet exposÃ©, qui prÃ©cÃ©da immÃ©diatement l'arrÃªt de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale rejetant le pourvoi du requÃ©rant . 19 . Au vu des Ã©lÃ©ments dont elle dispose, la Commission ne saurait considÃ©rer que ce grief soit irrecevable comme manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention et elle ne constate par ailleurs aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© . Par ces motifs, la Commission, tout moyen de fond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ© sur le grief principal : 1.
DÃCLARE RECEVABLE le grief principal du requÃ©rant concemant le refus de commettre un avocat d'office pour l'audience de cassation
. DECLARE LA REQUETE IRRECEVABLE pour le surplu s .2
-130-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 07/05/1981Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: in fine
 l'article 146
 l'article 146
 l'article 350
 l'article 350
 l'article 140
 l'article 146
 l'article 2
 l'article 20
 l'article 6
in fine
 l'article 6
 l'article 350
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 L'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27