Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26508:g-r-no-l-43280-december-26,-1984-florentino-r-matta-v-workmen-rsquo-s-compensation-commission,-et-al&catid=1192&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:27:06+00:00

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FLORENTINO R. MATTA, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Arturo A. Alafriz for Petitioner.
1.	LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMENS’ COMPENSATION ACT; PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY. — Section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act clearly provided that in any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within its provisions. Said section unequivocally established a presumption of compensability although disputable by substantial evidence. It then becomes the duty of respondent employer to show that the claim does not come within the coverage. (Panaqui v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 111 SCRA 65; Evangelista v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 111 SCRA 64; Jimenez v. Employees Compensation Commission, 111 SCRA 94).
2.	ID.; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION; TEST OF EVIDENCE IN COMPENSATION CASES IS PROBABILITY NOT CERTAINTY THAT AILMENT OCCURRED OR WAS AGGRAVATED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. — In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all that is required or that there was a showing that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. (San Valentin v. ECC, 118 SCRA 160; Gutierrez v. Sec. of Labor, 115 SCRA 300). For the test of evidence in compensation cases or the relation of the disease with the employment is probability and not certainty. (Acosta v. ECC, 109 SCRA 216; NHC v. Workmens’ Compensation Commission, 79 SCRA 281). In fact, the cause of the ailment is even immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment. (G.B. Francisco v. Workmens’ Compensation Commission, 87 SCRA 22).
3.	ID.; ID.; ADVANCING AGE ALONE AS CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE OCCURRENCE OF INJURY WILL NOT REMOVE THE AILMENT FROM THE PERIPHERY OF COMPENSABLE DISEASES. — The contention, therefore, of private respondent that petitioner’s illness is not compensable because it is the result of the aging process, is not well-taken. It is a new conjecture. In the case of Bautista v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 80 SCRA 319, reiterated in the case of Belatero v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 95 SCRA 608, the Court held that "while we do not discount the possibility that such ailments may be caused by the aging process. . . nonetheless that fact alone will not be sufficient to remove the ailment from the periphery of compensable disabling diseases under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The law applies to the young as well as to the aged, and while advancing age may be a contributing factor to the occurrence of an injury, the constant physical and mental exertions, strain and tensions are equally contributing and aggravating causes which render the resulting disabling injury or ailment compensable under the law." In consonance with the spirit of social justice and the humane character of the law, the exact cause of the ailment suffered by the claimant is not significant and the possibility that factors other than the employment, such as advancing age, may have contributed to the development of the ailment, is not a drawback for what is material and decisive is that the employment contributed even in a small degree in causing or aggravating the ailment. (Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278; Natividad v. Workmens Compensation Commission, 85 SCRA 115).
4.	ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE OF RESPONDENT TO CONTROVERT CLAIM WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIOD; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent’s alleged controversion was filed only on October 2, 1975 way beyond the period allowed by law. Having received notice of petitioner’ s ailment, respondent should have filed its notice to controvert the right to compensation on or before the fourteenth day of disability or within ten days after it had knowledge of the illness as required by Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Olbes v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, supra). The records show that aside from the off and on absence of petitioner starting January 18 1960, due to the injury or accident that arose in the course of his employment. Petitioner was disabled for work for two weeks from July 28, 1966 and one month after August 19, 1966 when he was operated on his right eye. Respondent knew that petitioner was admitted at the UST Hospital on August 19. 1966 for it was even instrumental in petitioner’s admission for operation. No reasonable constroversion was however registered by respondent either within fourteen days from disability or within ten days from knowledge of the illness or injury as required by Sec. 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The failure of respondent to comply with the required notice of controversion constituted a renunciation of its right to controvert the claim.
Petitioner retired from the service, upon advise of his attending physicians on October 3, 1972, at the age of 62 years and 26 days.
On March 30, 1975, petitioner filed a Notice of Injury or Sickness and Claim for Compensation 3 alleging among others that he was forced to retire on ground of disability by reason of the illness he contracted while in the service of private Respondent.
On October 2, 1975, respondent Development Bank of the Philippines filed an Answer to Notice and Claim for Compensation 4 stating that it desired to controvert said claim; that the illness of "cataract-bilateral" was not considered compensable and petitioner’s work as assistant purchasing officer could not have caused and/or aggravated his illness.
Petitioner alleges that his ailment (cataract-bilateral, coupled with diabetes and heart ailment) is work-connected and that the presumption of compensability under the Workmen’ s Compensation Act should favor him.
Respondent, upon the other hand, maintains that the claim is not compensable because petitioner’s illness was not directly caused by his employment, or was either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment.
We find the questioned order of dismissal unwarranted and unjustified.
"8.	Cause of injury or illness: Cataract, bilateral, more serious on the right.
9.	(a)	Was the injury or illness caused by accident due to and in pursuance of the employment? Yes.
(c)	Or aggravated by the employment? Yes.
12.	When did you first administer treatment to the sick or injured? Date: July 18, 1960.
13.	When did you last administer treatment to the sick or injured? Date: July 28, 1966.
20.	Has the injury resulted in permanent total disability for labor? Yes, because he cannot see what he is doing unless operated and then fitted with glasses.
"Considering therefore that the injury sustained by the claimant arose out of and in the course of his employment and respondent company having failed to controvert the right of the claimant within the ten-day period prescribed in Section 45 of the Act, the compensability of the present claim, its reasonableness and validity is now beyond challenge. The absence of controversion is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. (Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 67 SCRA 207)"
4.	To pay the cost.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Aquino * and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.
1.	Annex "E", Petition, page 20, Rollo.
2.	Memorandum for the Development Bank of the Philippines, page 4; Page 50, Rollo.
3.	WCC Form No. 1; Annex "A", Petition, page 16, Rollo.
4.	Annex "B", Petition; Page 17, Rollo.
5.	Annex "F", Petition; Page 21, Rollo.
6.	Panaqui v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 121 SCRA 65; Evangelista v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 111 SCRA 64; Jimenez v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 111 SCRA 94.
7.	Annex "C", Petition; Page 18, Rollo.
8.	Annex "D", Petition; Page 19, Rollo.
10.	Felarca v. Bookman, Inc., 127 SCRA 276; Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 306; Gonzaga v. ECC, 127 SCRA 672; Olbes v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 117 SCRA 887.
11.	San Valentin v. ECC, 118 SCRA 160; Gutierrez v. Sec. of Labor, 115 SCRA 300.
12.	Acosta v. ECC, 109 SCRA 216; NHC v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 79 SCRA 281.
13.	G.B. Francisco, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 87 SCRA 22.
14.	Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278; Natividad v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 85 SCRA 115.
15.	Annex "B", Petition; Page 17, Rollo.
16.	Olbes v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, supra.
17.	Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611.
*	Justice Aquino and Abad Santos took no part. Justice Gutierrez, Jr. of the First Division was designated to sit in the Second Division.

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