Source: https://samples.edusson.com/ejusdem-generis/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:19:06+00:00

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There is no different indication of a different legislative intention.
The legislative intent is not clearly manifest in favour of according broader meaning to the general words.
Where the particular words embrace all objects of their class so that the general words must bear a different meaning from the particular words or be meaningless.
There is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires.
Where the context of the whole scheme of the enactment and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require such a restricted meaning to be attached to the words of general import.
It is only when generic words follow the more specific that the rule of ejusdem generis comes into play and not when the specific words follow a general term. Role of Ejusdem Generis in interpretation of statutes The doctrine is an attempt to reconcile a incompatibility between specific and general words in view of other rules of construction that all words in a statute are to be given effect, if possible; that parts of a state are to be construed together; and that the legislature is presumed not to have used superfluous words. If the general words are given their full and natural meaning, that is, the meaning they would receive in the abstract, they would include the objects designed by the specific words, making the latter superfluous. The doctrine of ejusdem generis was only a part of wider principle of construction, namely, that, where reasonably possible, some significance and meaning should be attributed to each and every word and phrase in a written document. The rule of ejusdem generis is founded upon the idea that if the legislature intended the general words to be used in an unrestricted sense, the particular classes would not have been mentioned. By application of this principle the legislature is presumed to use general words in a restricted sense. The effect is the same as if the specific or the particular word was actually enacted by the legislature itself. Hence whenever this doctrine is applied certain words of limitation or restriction is read in a stature that should be treated as having been enacted. Indian Cases involving ejusdem generis in Taxation matters Western India Theatres v. Municipal Corporation, Poona In Western India Theatres v. Municipal Corporation, Poona , the respondent levied a tax of Rs. 2 per day as license fee on the appellants, who were lessees of a cinema house. The levy was under Section 59(1)(xi) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, which provides that the municipality could levy 'any other tax to the nature and object of which the approval of the Governor shall have been obtained'. It was contended that Section 59(1)(xi) is unconstitutional in that the legislature had completely abdicated its-functions and delegated the power to the municipality to determine the nature of the tax to be imposed. The contention was rejected by the Supreme Court and one of the reasons given for the decision is: â€˜Although the rule of construction based on the principle of Ejusdem Generis cannot be invoked in this case, for items (i) to (x) do not, strictly speaking, belong to the same genus, they do indicate, to our mind, the kind and nature of tax which the municipalities are authorized to imposeâ€™. M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India In the present case, the Supreme Court observed that the expressions 'bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing, which precede the expression 'or any other process' in Section 2 (f) (v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 contemplate processes which import a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process' in the section must share one or the other of these incidents. The expression is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture in its extended meaning and the expression 'unprocessed' in the exempting notification draws itâ€™s meaning from that context. Amar Chandra vs. Collector of Excise, Tripura In the present case, the appellant challenged that the words â€œany cause other thanâ€ in Section 43 of Bengal Excise Act, 1990 must be read ejusdem generis with the causes in mentioned in Sec.42 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that this rule applies when â€” (a) The statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (b)The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category; (c) That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (d)The general terms follow the enumeration; (e)There is no indication of a different legislative intent. Furthermore it was held that in the present case. it is not easy to construe the various clauses of S. 42 as constituting one category or class. But that apart, the very language of the two sections and the objects intended respectively to be achieved by them also negative any intention of the legislature to attract the rule of ejusdem generis. Therefore the expression 'any cause other than' in Sec. 43(1) could not be considered ejusdem generis with the causes specified in clauses (a) to (g) of Sec. 42(1). Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut v. M/s Sundstrand Forms P. Ltd. In the present case, the question was raised with regard to Headings 48.09 and 48.16 of Schedule to Central Excise Act, that whether the â€œcarbonless paper emerging at intermediate stageâ€ would be classifiable under Tariff Heading 48.16 or not. According to him goods covered under Headings 48.09 and 48.16 are of same kind except that in latter heading the goods, other than in roll form or in rectangular sheet with at least one side exceeding 36 cm fall and that applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the carbonless paper whether printed or not which is not in roll form or in the sheet form with one side exceeding 36 cm would be covered under sub heading No. 48.16. Sales Tax Commissioner v. Ram Kumar Agarwal In the present case it was argued that the term â€œcashâ€ is narrower than â€œmoneyâ€. The words â€œdeferred payment or other valuable considerationâ€ as per Sec. 2(h) of U.P. Sales Tax Act, merely enlarges the ambit of the consideration beyond â€œcashâ€, but they do not, carry it outside the scope of term â€œmoneyâ€. The words â€œother valuable considerationâ€ are general as compared to the two preceding more specific terms â€œcashâ€ or â€œdeferred paymentâ€. â€œCashâ€ and â€œdeferred paymentâ€ are also considerations, hence all the conditions for the applicability of the ejusdem generis rule are satisfied and the expression â€œother valuable considerationâ€ can and must be interpreted restrictively here. G.Radhakrishna Murthy and Ors. V. Commercial Tax Officer In the present case, the common question involved in all those writ petitions was whether â€œaggarbatti'sâ€ were to be included for Sales Tax under Item 36 of the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. It was held by the court that, an inclusive definition has to be taken while clarifying, that as per Entry 36 â€œcosmetic and toilet preparations would include scents, perfumes, face powders, talcum powders, hair tonics, hair oils, hair lotions, face creams and snows, pomades, depilatories, tooth powder, toothpaste, toothbrushes and shaving creams.â€ The things specially mentioned in the entry "cosmetic and toilet preparations" are all of the nature of personal application. Incense sticks or aggarbattis are goods of a different character altogether. These may emit a pleasant odour when burnt. That, however, will not bring aggarbattis within the class of articles mentioned in Item 36 of the First Schedule. All these goods are articles of personal application. Hence the "Perfume" in this context has to be construed ejusdem generis.
 Municipal Corpn v Saw Willie AIR 1942 Rang 70, p 72  Rajaram Baijnath v Nandikishore Sheobux Rai (1975) MP LJ 419  State of Punjab v Meluchand AIR 1968 Raj 72, p 76  Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay (2002) 2 SCC 297  Haji Mohammad v Province of Bengal (1942) ILR 1 Cal 343, p 347  Bangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd v CIT, West Bengal AIR 1978 SC 1272, p 1275 Thakurani Gulabkunverba v State of Gujarat AIR 1966 Guj 1  Hyderabad (Sind) Electric Supply Co v Union of India AIR 1959 Punj 199, p 202 Municipal Corp of Greater Bombay v Bharat Petroleum Corpn Ltd (2002) 4 SCC 219  Amarchandra v. Collector of Excise AIR 1972 SC 1863.  State of Punjab v. Mehrachand AIR 1959 Punj.222, at p.224.  Francis Bennion, Statutory Construction, pp.829-30.   3 KB 321.  Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 1019.  Kallingal Mosa Kutti v. Secretary of State (1920) ILR 43 Mad.65, at p.67.  Ali Gulshan v. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 810.  (1937) ILR Bom.830, at p.834.  Atul v. Ram Kishore AIR 1936 Orissa 77.  Smetling Co. v. Commrs. (1879) QB 175, at p.182.  United States v. Gilliland 312 US 86.  Indramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W.R. Nathu AIR 1963 SC 274.  Amarchand v Collector of excise (1972) 2 SCC 442, p 447  Anil Kumar v Corpn of Calcutta AIR 1937 All. 603, p 617  Municipal Corpn of Greater Bombay v Bharat Petroleum Corpn Ltd (2002) 4 SCC 219  Maharashtra State Electricity Board v Talegaon Dabhade Municipality AIR 1967 Bom 75  Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay AIR 1957 SC 521, p 529  In Re Ashraya AIR 1991 Kar. 10  Brownsea Haven Properties Ltd. V. Poole Corpn. (1958) 2 WLR 137.  Usman (MHD) v. Union of India AIR 1965 All.269, at p.272.  AIR 1959 SC 586.  AIR 1989 SC 1019.  AIR 1972 SC 1863.   271 ELT 326 SC.  (1967) 19 STC 400 All.  (1999) 113 STC 161 SC.

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