Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/davies-v-superior-court-30713
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:20:32+00:00

Document:
Richard C. Watters and Miles, Sears & Eanni for Petitioner.
Robert F. Carlson, Ronald I. Harrison, George L. Cory and Richard A. Wehe for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioner, the plaintiff in an action seeking damages for personal injuries suffered in a single vehicle tractor-trailer accident, sought a writ of mandate to compel the respondent superior court to order real party in interest State of California (State) to answer interrogatories and produce documents containing information about other accidents at the same location. The State had refused a request for production, and had declined to answer two interrogatories, asserting that the information sought was compiled from accident reports made confidential, and thus not subject to discovery, by Vehicle Code sections 20012 and 20014. fn. 1 This court issued an alternative writ, with which the superior court and the State have since complied. Although the proceeding was thereby rendered moot the question presented has statewide importance and is of a recurring nature. We have, therefore, exercised our discretion to retain the matter and decide this question. (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616 [111 Cal.Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168]; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales (1973) 8 Cal.3d 712 [106 Cal.Rptr. 21, 505 P.2d 213].) We shall conclude that information about other accidents which discloses neither the identity of the reporting party nor identifying material, although generated from accident reports, is not made confidential by sections 20012 and 20014. We shall also conclude that this information is subject to discovery because it is related to the subject matter of a lawsuit arising out of an accident on a public highway and may lead to discovery of admissible evidence.
The State had refused to produce either type of document or to answer the interrogatories requesting information regarding the prior accidents, asserting in each instance that the Legislature had mandated that California Highway Patrol reports be confidential, and with respect to the diagrams that this mandate encompassed information generated from those reports. The State opposed the motions for an order compelling production and for [36 Cal.3d 296] further response to the interrogatories asserting that sections 20012 and 20014, fn. 5 as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court (Thomsen) (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 25 [162 Cal.Rptr. 78]; Edgar v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 430 [148 Cal.Rptr. 687]; and People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (Clark) (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 352 [131 Cal.Rptr. 476], preclude discovery of accident reports fn. 6 and of information contained in or generated from those reports.
The superior court denied both motions, ruling that the matters sought to be discovered were privileged and not discoverable.
More recently, in State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court (Thomsen), supra, 102 Cal.App.3d 25, the plaintiff in the underlying litigation had sought the TASAS printouts requested by petitioner here. In addition, he sought, and the superior court ordered production of "[d]ocuments of prior accidents" prepared by the California Highway Patrol, and any other documents relating to accidents at the specified location in the possession of the Department of Transportation. The trial court had provided that the names of individuals involved could be deleted from any accident reports that might be produced in compliance with the order. The Court of Appeal granted the department's petition for writ of mandate and directed the superior court to vacate that order. In so doing the court noted the purpose of section 20012 "to encourage parties and witnesses to report accidents completely and truthfully" (Fernandez v. Di Salvo Appliance Co. (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 240, 245 [3 Cal.Rptr. 609]) and speculated [36 Cal.3d 298] that a further purpose may have been to protect the privacy of persons involved. Then, after reviewing Clark and Edgar, the court agreed that the accident reports are "privileged" and that plaintiff was not entitled to discovery of the accident reports because he was not a person subject to liability and thus did not have a "proper interest" in the records themselves within the meaning of section 20012. Accepting the reasoning that the source of the TASAS data was "privileged," the court also concluded that the TASAS data were not discoverable.
[1a] Neither the language of section 20012, nor its purpose of encouraging truthful and complete accident reports, supports the conclusion that the confidentiality that attaches to accident reports extends to the data in the TASAS retrieval system. Before addressing the legislative intent and proper interpretation of section 20012, however, it is appropriate also to explain that neither this statute nor section 20013 creates a "privilege" as that term is used in the Evidence Code (see Evid. Code, § 911 et seq.) and in the discovery statutes. Sections 20012 and 20014 term accident reports "confidential," while section 20013 provides that they may not be introduced as evidence in any trial.  The exclusion of accident reports from evidence is quite narrow, however, applying only to statutorily "required" accident reports, those to be made by a driver, passenger, or witness to an accident, and to statements contained in those reports. (Dwelly v. McReynolds, supra, 6 Cal.2d 128.) [1b] Although termed a "privilege" in some opinions, the confidentiality created by these statutes does not authorize the reporting party to control release of the reports or information contained therein. The State is authorized to disclose the "entire contents" of the reports to the persons particularly described in section 20012 and to any other person having a "proper interest" therein. The State, not the reporting party, determines who those persons may be. The statute does not create a privilege in the reporting party to refuse to be a witness or to disclose information about the accident, and it does not create a privilege to preclude discovery by a person having a "proper interest" in the contents of the report. The express disclosure authorization of section 20012, and the limited exclusion from evidence created by section 20013, suggest that the information contained in accident reports is more accurately characterized as "confidential" than as "privileged." fn. 7 This distinction supports our conclusion that the Legislature [36 Cal.3d 299] did not intend by conferring confidentiality on required accident reports to extend that status to data generated from those reports.
The legislative intent underlying the assurance of confidentiality extended to motorists by section 20012 must be ascertained in the context of a request for information made in the course of civil discovery in which liberality is the rule. The purpose underlying the confidentiality accorded accident reports and the purpose of encouraging extensive pretrial discovery must be accommodated so as to further both purposes to the extent possible.
TASAS data, diagrams, and other information about accidents in the possession of the State are derived from accident reports. However, the State does not dispute petitioner's claim that this data easily can be made available without indication of the identity of the reporting person or persons and can be disclosed without compromising the confidentiality of identifying information in the reports themselves. We are satisfied therefore that the legislative purpose in assuring reporting parties that their reports will be confidential does not require extension of that confidentiality to data generated from accident reports. That data, with identifying information excised, is not made confidential by the express language of sections 20012 and 20014, and the State has not persuaded us that it is necessary to interpret those sections that broadly in order to fulfill the legislative purpose.
Therefore, since section 20012 does not prohibit disclosure and public policy does not warrant nondisclosure, we may presume that the Legislature, having in mind the civil litigant's interest in discovery of information relevant to a cause of action, did not intend that section 20012 be interpreted as precluding release by the State of information generated from confidential accident reports when that disclosure does not reveal the identities or compromise the privacy interests of the reporting parties. To the extent that they are inconsistent with this conclusion, People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation [36 Cal.3d 301] v. Superior Court (Clark), supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 352, and its progeny are disapproved.
 The State also contends that discovery should not be ordered because neither the data generated from reports of other accidents, nor evidence that the Department of Transportation is in possession of that data, is relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Indeed, the State makes the extraordinary statement that "under the existing state of the law, public entities have found it necessary to utilize the privilege provided by the Vehicle Code in order to frustrate discovery because of the unfortunate propensity of the courts to admit evidence of other accidents with no foundation designed to insure that they were caused by the alleged dangerous condition and therefore are relevant to the issue being litigated." Data generated from reports, it contends, is not admissible absent a showing of causality.
But discovery is not limited to admissible evidence, and it would be novel to adopt limitations on discovery on the basis of an allegation that some courts are too liberal in admitting evidence which is discovered. Data derived from reports of other accidents may be admissible, or it may lead to admissible evidence. That data itself may reveal other accidents of a sufficient number that, although the other accidents have been attributed to other causes or are unexplained, the evidence suggests that a highway defect may be a common contributory factor. The evidence thus discovered might then qualify the party as a person having a "proper interest" in obtaining disclosure of the accident reports themselves as permitted by section 20012.
In summary, we conclude that the confidentiality accorded accident reports by section 20012 does not extend to data generated from those reports [36 Cal.3d 302] from which indicia of identity have been or can be excised. That data is subject to discovery by a party to a lawsuit arising out of a highway accident at the location without a prior showing that a common cause contributed to the other accidents about which data is sought.
Inasmuch as the superior court and real party in interest have complied with the alternative writ issued by this court, issuance of a peremptory writ is unnecessary. The alternative writ is discharged and the petition for writ of mandate is denied.
Mosk, J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., Reynoso, J., and Wonder, J., concurred.
I concur with the reasoning and the conclusion of the majority. I write separately because I believe this court should decide whether petitioner has a "proper interest," within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 20012, in obtaining confidential accident reports.
Where it is not possible to accommodate both interests, courts have carried out their "careful balancing" by requiring a litigant to show a particular need for the information. The showing which a litigant must make varies, depending on the weight accorded the privacy interest. For example, in Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 [143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766], this court held that where a defendant sought discovery which implicated the First Amendment associational rights of a large class of plaintiffs, it was entitled only to such limited information as was "directly relevant" to the cause of action or to a defense. (Id., at pp. 859-862.) In Bodenheimer v. superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 885 [167 Cal.Rptr. 26], discovery of a defendant's membership in a political organization was allowed because, in light of a conspiracy allegation, his membership involved "a narrow question having an important connection with the lawsuit." (Id., at p. 889.) In Fults v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 899, 904-905 [152 Cal.Rptr. 210], the court held that a wife bringing a paternity action could be compelled to disclose her own sexual activities only to the extent justified by a compelling interest. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to discovery of information about her sexual activities at the time conception might have occurred.
As the foregoing cases illustrate, when a litigant's request for discovery touches another person's privacy interest, a litigant is not as free to obtain information as he might otherwise be. (See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 384-386.) A particularized need for the information must be established. How compelling this need must be will depend on the importance of the privacy interest involved.
If a litigant cannot make a particularized showing of a need for the entire report, the court may authorize "'partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.'" (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 658.) Such a litigant has a "proper interest" within the meaning of section 20012 in obtaining the depersonalized information found in the reports.
After reviewing the accident report information obtained through this limited discovery, a litigant may determine that evidence of one or more of these accidents is likely to be admissible in his own case. At this point, he should be permitted to discover the identities of the reporting parties in those accidents. It is true that at this stage the privacy interest of the reporting party is being invaded. However, once a litigant can show that evidence of another accident will likely be admissible in his trial, he demonstrates a sufficiently particularized need for discovery which outweighs the limited statutory privacy of the reporting party. He has met a far more stringent test of "relevance" than is usually required for discovery. fn. 3 He has demonstrated that the "historically important state interest of facilitating the [36 Cal.3d 306] ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings" (In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 415, 432) demands the discovery he seeks. He is a person with a "proper interest" in obtaining the entire report.
The countervailing privacy interest in this case does not involve constitutionally protected First Amendment activities. (Compare Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 844; Church of Hakeem, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 384 [168 Cal.Rptr. 13].) Nor does disclosure invade an established privilege, such as the physician-patient privilege (Britt, supra, at pp. 862-864) or the psychotherapist-patient privilege (In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 429-435).
Allowing a litigant to obtain accident reports, when he can show that evidence of the reported accident is likely to be admissible in his case, represents a fair balancing of the competing interests. A litigant who can make such a showing qualifies as a person with a "proper interest" in the reports under Vehicle Code section 20012.
­FN 1. All future references to code sections are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.
"(b) Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 2019 of this code, the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party, or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All matters which are privileged against disclosure upon the trial under the law of this state are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure. This article shall not be construed to change the law of this state with respect to the existence of any privilege, whether provided for by statute or by judicial decision.
"The work product of an attorney shall not be discoverable unless the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing his claim or defense or will result in an injustice, and any writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories shall not be discoverable under any circumstances."
­FN 3. TASAS is an acronym for a computerized accident data retrieval system, the Traffic Accident Surveillance Analysis System, which stores data on all accidents on the state highway system.
­FN 4. The Department of Transportation had stated in answers to prior interrogatories that one accident had occurred at the designated location in 1973, 1975, 1978, and 1980. Two had occurred in 1979 and six in 1981. The only one in 1982 had been that in which petitioner was involved. Petitioner's first request for production of documents sought collision reports of accidents prior to his. The second sought diagrams prepared during investigation of all accidents at the location, and traffic collision reports regarding accidents subsequent to his.
This petition for writ of mandate does not seek discovery of the accident reports themselves and we do not decide here the circumstances in which a person who was not a party to a traffic accident may have an interest sufficient to entitle him to review the reports themselves.
Section 20012: "All required accident reports, and supplemental reports, shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Department of the California Highway Patrol, except that the Department of the California Highway Patrol or the law enforcement agency to whom the accident was reported shall disclose the entire contents of the reports, including, but not limited to, the names and addresses of persons involved in, or witnesses to, an accident, the registration numbers and descriptions of vehicles involved, the date, time and location of an accident, all diagrams, statements of the drivers involved in the accident and the statements of all witnesses, to any person who may have a proper interest therein, including, but not limited to, the driver or drivers involved, or the guardian or conservator thereof, the parent of a minor driver, the authorized representative of a driver, or to any person injured therein, the owners of vehicles or property damaged thereby, persons who may incur civil liability, including liability based upon a breach of warranty arising out of the accident, and any attorney who declares under penalty of perjury that he represents any of the above persons.
"A request for a copy of an accident report shall be accompanied by payment of a fee, provided such fee shall not exceed the cost of providing such copy."
Section 20014: "All required accident reports and supplemental reports and all reports made to the Department of the California Highway Patrol by any peace officer, member of the Department of the California Highway Patrol, or other employee of the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Department of the California Highway Patrol, shall be immediately available for the confidential use of any division in the department needing the same, for confidential use of the Department of Transportation, and, with respect to accidents occurring on highways other than state highways, for the confidential use of the local authority having jurisdiction over the highway."
­FN 7. Because information in accident reports is not "privileged," these reports are distinguishable from the income tax returns considered by the court in Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1 [123 Cal.Rptr. 283, 538 P.2d 739], relied on by the Court of Appeal, and by the State, for the proposition that data generated from accident reports is not subject to discovery. Revenue and Taxation Code section 7056 was in issue in Sav-On Drugs. That statute made it unlawful to disclose the business affairs, operation, or any information about a retailer required to report or pay tax. We found in that statute a legislative intent that disclosures in tax returns not be exposed to public scrutiny. By contrast, section 20012 expressly permits disclosure of the contents of the confidential accident reports to persons having a "proper interest therein."
­FN 8. We do not exclude the possibility that some of this data may be admissible as evidence of the State's knowledge of the existence of the defect.
Furthermore, the doctrine "is a rule of construction used to carry out, not to defeat, legislative intent." (County of Placer v. Corin (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 443, 448, fn. 2 [170 Cal.Rptr. 232]; see also American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 603, 608-609 [186 Cal.Rptr. 345, 651 P.2d 1151]; Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 102-103 [154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595].) As discussed below, the legislative objective, consistent with well-established public policy, is to require disclosure of the required accident reports when it is necessary to promote the important state interest in the ascertainment of truth in legal proceedings. This objective is just as important when the litigation involves a subsequent accident at the same location.
To the extent Edgar suggests that there is a privacy interest in the "details involved in the report" other than those details which would reveal the identity of the reporting party, it is in error. A reporting party has no interest in keeping secret such facts as the cause of an accident, the exact location and number of cars involved ¶ so long as these facts do not disclose anyone's identity.
Absent the confidentiality provision of Vehicle Code section 20012, it is beyond question that the accident reports ¶ including the names and addresses of the reporting parties ¶ would be relevant and discoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016, subdivision (b).
SCOCAL, Davies v. Superior Court , 36 Cal.3d 291 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/davies-v-superior-court-30713) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 911
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.