Source: https://uvamentalhealthpolicy.org/case-law/category/Fourth+Circuit
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 05:55:43+00:00

Document:
Unlike the Arkansas Supreme Court in Hughes v. State of Arkansas, 2011 Ark. 147; 2011 Ark. LEXIS 134 (April 7, 2011) and reported in Issue 4 of Developments in Mental Health Law, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that federal courts have statutory authority to hear the appeal of a defendant in a criminal case who was found not guilty by reason of insanity. In the Ninth Circuit case, a defendant found NGRI attempted to appeal the trial court’s ruling refusing to dismiss the indictment against him and another ruling prohibiting him from presenting a diminished capacity defense. The defendant had been charged with assault of a federal officer, having stabbed a customs and border protection chief in the chest with a knife. He argued that the indictment should have been dismissed for failure to contain an element of specific intent and the verdict reversed for the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a defense of diminished capacity. The defendant also raised the insanity defense and presented expert testimony in support of that defense and the jury returned a NGRI verdict. He argued, however, that the trial court denied him the opportunity for an outright acquittal. The government argued that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity does not result in a judgment of conviction subject to appeal. It also argued that there was no final decision from which to appeal a NGRI verdict because the verdict did not result in a sentence.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the right of appeal is purely statutory, but found that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 affords jurisdiction to review all final decisions of district courts. The Court noted that the final decision in a criminal case is not triggered until there is a conviction and imposition of a sentence. But here the Court found that the lack of a sentence does not preclude finality because the criminal case has terminated. The Court further found that the defendant’s ability to appeal his civil commitment does not provide an adequate substitute for an appeal of the issues raised in his criminal trial and indeed the defendant might be precluded from raising those issues in a civil commitment appeal.
As you may recall from Issue 4 of Developments in Mental Health Law, the Arkansas Supreme Court held by contrast that a defendant who was acquitted of a criminal offense as a result of mental disease or defect and committed to a mental health facility could not appeal his acquittal because the Court only had jurisdiction to hear appeals of criminal “convictions.” The defendant had appealed on the grounds that the court erred by finding he committed the offense of terroristic threatening and by compelling him to use the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right of trial by jury. Similarly, Virginia does not recognize a right of appeal unless such a right is specifically provided by statute. It is doubtful therefore whether the Virginia Court of Appeals or Virginia Supreme Court would entertain such an appeal in a similar case absent a clear statutory provision authorizing that appeal.
Although there is no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, the Tenth Circuit has held that a capital defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a post-conviction (Atkins) hearing conducted after his original conviction to determine whether he is mentally retarded (intellectually disabled). Such a finding would bar imposition of the death penalty. The Court then proceeded to review each of the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, rejecting all of them except one, but finding no cumulative evidence or prejudice on that claim to warrant overturning the jury verdict. On review of the jury’s finding that the defendant was not mentally retarded, the Court found that the results of the defendant’s numerous IQ tests fell within a “gray” area, but the scores were not entitled to be adjusted downward due to the “Flynn” effect. Because there is no scientific consensus on its validity, failure to apply it is not “contrary to clearly established federal law.” Finally, the Court found that defendant’s trial counsel in the original trial was grossly ineffective during the sentencing phase, overturned the death sentence, and remanded the case to the Oklahoma courts for a new sentencing hearing.
Victor Hooks was convicted in 1989 of first degree murder of his common law wife and of first degree manslaughter of her unborn child. Hooks and his common law wife had lived together for four years and were the parents of a one-year-old daughter. His wife was also 24 weeks pregnant with their second child. After originally claiming that she had been beaten and raped while on a walk, Hooks confessed to police that they had been fighting, she slapped him, and he then struck her, knocked her to the ground and kicked her in the stomach and face. Subsequently he removed her clothing, put her in the bathtub, and shaved a portion of her head. Hooks then cleaned up the apartment and also removed blood from his one-year-old daughter who had been splattered in the course of her mother’s beating.
Hooks was represented at trial by a private attorney hired by his mother. His attorney decided not to pursue an insanity defense believing there was an insufficient factual basis for it, but focused on obtaining a conviction for a lesser-included offense of second degree murder or first degree manslaughter, arguing that Hooks acted in the heat of passion and not with malice aforethought. There was some information that Hooks had been hit by an 18-wheel truck as a child and suffered a traumatic brain injury, and also suffered from chronic psychosis. The evidence also showed that Hooks had abused his wife on prior occasions and was convicted of armed robbery of a liquor store several years earlier. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses and the jury then found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, imposing the death penalty, and first degree manslaughter in the death of the unborn child, sentencing him to 500 years imprisonment on that charge.
Hooks challenged his convictions both on direct appeal and through post-conviction petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In 2002, 13 years after Hooks’ conviction, the United States Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) that, in light of a national consensus, the execution of a person with mental retardation is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Hooks then filed a second post-conviction petition alleging that he is mentally retarded. In 2004, after a six-day trial, a jury found him not to be mentally retarded. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the determination on both direct appeal and collateral review.
A person is “mentally retarded” (1) [i]f he or she functions at a significantly sub-average intellectual level that substantially limits his or her ability to understand and process information, to communicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others; (2) [t]he mental retardation manifested itself before the age of eighteen (18); and (3) the [m]ental retardation is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two …skill areas….However, no person shall be eligible to be considered mentally retarded unless he or she has an intelligence quotient of seventy or below, as reflected by at least one scientifically recognized, scientifically approved, and contemporary intelligent quotient test.
Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). A defendant has the burden of proving his mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Hooks had been administered IQ tests through the years and nine of these test results were presented to the jury with scores ranging from 53 to 80. The experts agreed that this range of scores put Hooks in a “gray area.” Tests of 70 or below, however, all reflected some degree of lack of cooperation on Hooks’ part. The experts agreed that the most reliable scores were those conducted by two of the experts of 72 and 76, neither of which met the 70 or below requirement. Hooks argued that these scores should be adjusted downward to reflect the “Flynn Effect.” The “Flynn Effect” is a phenomenon named for James R. Flynn who discovered that the population’s mean IQ score rises over time by approximately 0.3 points per year. If an individual’s test score is measured against a mean of a population sample from prior years, then his score will be inflated and will not provide an accurate picture of his IQ.
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument finding that Oklahoma law does not require an adjustment for the “Flynn Effect,” nor did it find any scientific consensus on its validity. The Court held therefore that failure to apply the “Flynn Effect” was not “contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,” the standard required to overturn a final state court determination on collateral review. Based upon all of the evidence presented, including other evidence related to Hooks’ functional capacity and his adaptive skills, the jury’s finding that he was not mentally retarded was not clearly erroneous.
The Court then examined Hooks’ claims that his counsel was ineffective on the merits. Hooks argued that the standard articulated in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), where counsel’s representation fell so far short of that expected of defense counsel that prejudice was presumed, should be applied in his case. In Cronic, the Supreme Court found that some actions of counsel are so likely to prejudice the defendant that the cost of litigating their effect is unjustified and prejudice will be presumed. The Court found, however, that his counsel actively and zealously participated in all phases of the proceedings and therefore held that the standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), applied instead. In Strickland, a review of counsel’s performance is a highly deferential one and counsel is presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Although counsel failed in one aspect of representation, the Court found that failure was not cumulative or prejudicial to the hearing’s outcome.
The Court next reviewed the effectiveness of counsel at his original trial and found that Hooks counsel at trial in the conviction phase exercised a tactical decision not to raise an insanity defense because it lacked a factual basis. In the sentencing phase, however, the Court found counsel’s representation grossly deficient in his failure to conduct a through investigation or to produce any evidence in mitigation. He failed to challenge the prosecution’s aggravation evidence or to present evidence that revealed Hooks was raised in an abusive and chaotic family, suffered from a brain injury and suffered from chronic psychotic mental health problems, all of which could have elicited sympathy from a juror and mitigated his sentence. Moreover, counsel made his own statements to the jury related to Hooks’ violent tendencies and permitted his own expert to make prejudicial statements related to his violence. The Court therefore vacated the death sentence and remanded the case to the Oklahoma courts for a new sentencing hearing.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that once a borderline competent defendant meets the standard for competence to stand trial, the court need not inquire further as to whether the defendant is competent to represent himself. United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) only permits a court to force counsel on a criminal defendant who is borderline competent, but does not require it to do so. Instead the Fourth Circuit found that this case more closely resembles Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), that held that “ the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.” Id. at 399.
In this case, Michael Defante Bernard was charged in North Carolina with possessing and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Bernard had a long history of mental illness, suffering from severe depression, chronic schizophrenia and paranoia. He had been physically and emotionally abused as a child, attempted suicide at least three times and had been involuntarily committed on at least four separate occasions. He also had a history of failure to take his medications. Bernard also abused cocaine and marijuana to cope with his mental illness.
Concerns were raised about Bernard’s competency to stand trial and the district court ordered an evaluation. A government psychologist recommended that he be found incompetent to stand trial due to his schizophrenia, paranoid delusions, and disorganized thought processes. The court thereupon found Bernard incompetent to stand trial and ordered him treated for restoration to competency. Less than six months later, another government psychologist recommended that Bernard be found competent to stand trial because the antipsychotic, antidepressant, and anti-anxiety medications rendered him able to understand the proceedings against him and to assist his counsel.
At his second competency hearing, the trial court found Bernard competent to stand trial. His counsel then moved to withdraw as counsel based upon Bernard’s request to represent himself, and to appoint him as stand-by counsel. Defense counsel represented to the court that it must find the defendant competent to waive counsel, if it also found him competent to stand trial, ostensibly but incorrectly referencing Godinez v. Moran. The trial court expressed strong misgivings about allowing the defendant to represent himself, but after engaging in colloquy with Bernard, determined he could go forward. The court further elaborated that it would monitor his competence as the trial progressed. During trial, Bernard made opening and closing statements, testified on his own behalf and re-opened his case to question a law enforcement officer whom he had declined to cross-examine during the government’s case-in-chief. He did not, however, make any objections during the government’s case, question any of the government’s witnesses, or call any witnesses on his own behalf. The jury deliberated 12 minutes and found him guilty on all charges. At the scheduled sentencing hearing, Bernard’s mental condition had seriously deteriorated and he was again fully represented by his stand-by attorney. At the final sentencing hearing held several months later after his further restoration to competency, the court sentenced him to 15 years in prison.
On appeal, Bernard argued that the trial court erred when it allowed him to exercise his right to self-representation at trial saying it abused its discretion in failing to apply the more rigorous standard following Edwards that required him to be represented by counsel. Bernard further contended that his trial counsel was ineffective by representing to the court that his competence to waive counsel was governed by the same standard as his competence to stand trial.
The Fourth Circuit applied the “plain error” standard in reviewing the appeal, not an abuse of discretion standard. The plain error standard requires that when a defendant fails to make a contemporaneous objection to an assignment of error at trial, the error must be plain on its face, affect his substantial rights and adversely affect the outcome of the proceedings. The Fourth Circuit reiterated that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 821 (1975). It stated that in Godinez, the Supreme Court held that the competence of a defendant to stand trial is the same as the competence to waive the right to counsel. The Court went on to write that Edwards did not change that right. In Godinez, the trial court found the defendant competent to stand trial and permitted him to waive counsel and represent himself. By contrast, the trial court in Edwards found him competent to stand trial but refused to allow him to represent himself. The Fourth Circuit determined that the Supreme Court’s had held in Edwards that the Constitution permits the government to limit a defendant’s right of self-representation on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented. A different standard than the competency to stand trial standard may, but is not required, to be used when the defendant asserts his right of self-representation. Because the trial court in this case was permitted, but not required, to apply a higher standard to assess Bernard’s competency to represent himself and did not, there was no plain error.
The dissent agreed with the distinction the majority drew between Godinez and Edwards, but found that the record reflected that the trial court did not believe it had any discretion to consider a higher standard than competency to stand trial and therefore did not do so. Its belief that it had no discretion, and therefore did not exercise any, was itself an abuse of discretion warranting a remand.
United States v. Conrad, 776 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2015).
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Conrad’s motion to dismiss as well as the order delaying the § 4243 proceedings. In affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit held that § 4243 “applies on its face to NGI acquittees” and “unambiguously requires a hearing to determine commitment or release,” and so in the absence of any “provision permitting nullification of the statute's applicability through subsequent commission of crime and incarceration,” the district court was within its discretion to refuse dismissal of the § 4243 hearing. Further, the Fourth Circuit held that the delay ordered by the district court was permissible, confronting the timing requirement of § 4243(c) which “requires a hearing within 40 days of the NGI verdict, which, under a separate provision, may be extended only by 30 days, and only by the director of the facility to which the acquittee has been committed.” The Fourth Circuit stated that both parties agreed that there is at least one implicit exception to the 40-day requirement of § 4243(c) and cited to other opinions in which a delay greater than 40 days was allowed and found to be justified due to “circumstances outside of the acquittee's control--such as a commitment facility's inadequate resources to promptly conduct the evaluation.” Given this precedent, the Fourth Circuit stated that a delay would “would seem even more fitting” in circumstances within the acquittee’s control and held that because Conrad “has been the principal architect of the delay he faces, and such delay is reasonable under the statute when the acquittee is serving a term of incarceration” the district court did not err in delaying the proceeding.
In appealing the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to eighteen months in prison followed by an additional thirty months of supervised release, defendant Johnny Hass argued that the district court erred in fashioning his sentence by refusing to factor in time he spent in Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) custody awaiting civil commitment proceedings. After the Government certified that Hass qualified as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Child Safety Act of 2006, the court stayed his release pending the outcome of a hearing to determine whether Hass was sexually dangerous. After his supervised release was revoked and a new prison sentence imposed by the district court, Hass argued on appeal to the Fourth Circuit that he should have been granted credit for time served equal to the time he spent in BOP custody awaiting his civil commitment hearing.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Hass’ claim that failing to give him credit for his prior time spent in BOP custody was a basis for plain error, stating that “it is unthinkable to lend support to any judicial decision which permits the establishment of a line of credit for future crimes.” Because Hass “was being sentenced for violating the terms of his supervised release” and cited “no precedent to support his claim that over-service of a prior sentence is even a proper consideration for a court when imposing a revocation sentence,” the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court.
Christina Jacobs was hired as a deputy clerk in the New Hanover County Superior Court. The job description for deputy clerk included many activities, and only a few of the deputies regularly provided customer service at the courthouse front counter. Jacobs, who was diagnosed with social anxiety disorder, was assigned to provide customer service on a daily basis. She experienced extreme anxiety and distress from interacting with the public at the counter. She requested to be assigned to a role with less direct interpersonal interaction. Her employer did not respond to her accommodation request, and three weeks later fired her. She made a timely complaint to the EEOC, which conducted an investigation and made a finding in her favor. The Department of Justice later issued a “Right to Sue” letter. Jacobs filed suit, claiming, among other things, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation, all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). After discovery, defendant employer moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on all counts.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded on all counts except the claim of retaliation. It noted that the district court’s most fundamental error was deciding disputed factual issues in favor of the moving party, rather than determining whether, if the facts were as Jacobs alleged, no reasonable juror could find that the defendant had committed violations of the ADA.
4. The Court ruled that at this stage of the litigation the absence of any documentation of poor performance, and the shifting reasons of the employer regarding unsatisfactory performance, were sufficient to establish that the employer’s claims were a pretext and not the actual reason for the decision to fire her.
5. The Court also analyzed whether the employer made a reasonable effort at accommodation. The Court wrote that employers have a good-faith duty “to engage [with their employees] in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation” under the ADA (Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d at 346, 4 th Cir. 2013). 9 The Fourth Circuit found that, given the undisputed facts regarding the meeting at which Jacobs was fired, “a reasonable jury could easily conclude” that Jacobs’s employer acted in bad faith by failing to engage in the interactive process with Jacobs at that meeting.
Background: The government requested court authorization to medicate defendant involuntarily in order to restore him to competency to stand trial. The district court granted the request finding that the government had met the Sell requirements8 by clear and convincing evidence. Defendant appealed, claiming that the government failed to satisfy (1) the first Sell prong because the “important governmental interest at stake” in prosecuting Watson was mitigated by the fact that Watson had the “possibility” of an affirmative defense of “not guilty by reason of insanity” and (2) the second Sell prong because the government did not prove that the proposed forced medication was substantially likely to render Watson competent to stand trial.
Holdings: In a 2-1 panel decision, the Court reversed the District Court, holding that the record showed that the government not only failed to meet the second Sell prong, but could not meet it, and it dismissed the matter, without remand to the District Court for further hearing.
Notable Points: Emphasizing the importance of the liberty interest at stake, the intrusiveness of the act of forcible medication, and the burden of “clear and convincing evidence” that the government had to meet, the Court ruled that the evidence in the record failed to show that the forced medication proposed for Watson was substantially likely to restore Watson to competency. The Court, noting that Watson had a “rare” delusional disorder, concluded that the government’s expert, and the research relied upon by that expert, addressed the efficacy of the proposed forced medication for people suffering from psychosis in general and that the government failed to address the medication’s likely effect on this defendant in particular.
Background: Madiagne Diop, an alien and native of Senegal, who was diagnosed with psychosis. Following an arrest related to a psychotic episode at his workplace, Diop appeared before an immigration judge in Baltimore, Maryland five times between November 2012 and May 2013. At a hearing in December 2012, the immigration judge questioned Diop regarding his mental health and competency and found Diop competent to participate in the removal proceedings. In April 2013, Diop moved to administratively close or continue proceedings pending the passage of an immigration reform bill in Congress. The immigration judge refused and ordered Diop’s removal if he would not voluntarily depart. On June 6, 2013, Diop filed an appeal to the BIA arguing that the immigration judge should have administratively closed or continued the case in order to allow him to receive a psychological evaluation. The BIA found no clear error in the immigration judge’s determination of Diop’s competency, and Diop petitioned for review by the Fourth Circuit.
The process for addressing competency in removal proceedings: The BIA stated that the immigration judge should start from a presumption of competency and that if there are no indicia of incompetency, the inquiry ends. It established a competency standard in Matter of M-A-M requiring (1) "rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings," (2) ability to "consult with the attorney or representative if there is one," and (3) "a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses."
Background: The United States charged Basit Javed Sheikh with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339B after his alleged attempt to join al-Nusrah Front, a foreign terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of State as an alias for al-Qa’ida. The district court concluded that Sheikh was incompetent to stand trial after two pretrial competency examinations, and ordered him hospitalized for attempted competency restoration. Sheikh refused to cooperate with treatment, and the United States moved for permission to involuntarily medicate him based on his psychiatric evaluation. At the Sell hearing, three medical experts testified and the district court determined that involuntary medication was appropriate. The order was stayed pending Sheikh’s anticipated interlocutory appeal.
Holding: The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had properly applied the four-part test established by Sell, and had adequately explained its findings. The court found that involuntary medication of the defendant would significantly further the United States’ prosecution interests without a substantial likelihood of producing side effects that would interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a defense.
The possibility of civil commitment did not sufficiently mitigate the United States’ prosecutorial interest to preclude involuntary medication: The first Sell factor weighs the government’s interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a “serious” crime. Fourth Circuit precedent has recognized that a crime carrying a statutory maximum of ten years or more qualifies as “serious” within the Sell context—the crime of which Sheikh was accused carried a statutory maximum of fifteen years. Despite this strong prosecutorial interest, Sheikh contended that the district court had erred by failing to find the possibility of his civil commitment to be a special circumstance sufficient to negate the United States’ prosecutorial interests (see U.S. v. Onuoha below, which discusses special circumstances as well). Sheikh argued that the likelihood of his civil commitment mitigated (and negated) the government’s prosecutorial interest because they “need not be concerned that he will be released to the public” even in the absence of a conviction.
Claim of Fourth Amendment seizure violation by officers who used independent emergency custody authority to take person into custody for mental health evaluation survives officers’ motion to dismiss, as facts alleged by plaintiff, if proved, would establish unlawful seizure. Related claim against CSB evaluator dismissed.
Background: In a complaint filed in the district federal court, Gordon Goines alleged that, on May 15, 2014, he was experiencing problems with his cable television service and was informed by a technician that one of his neighbors had spliced into his cable, and that that was the cause of the connectivity issues. Goines, according to his complaint, went across the street to a police station to report the theft. Goines took two officers back to his apartment, but the officers did not turn on the television and so did not hear the strange noises. Instead, according to Goines, the officers asked if Goines had any mental health issues or if he “wanted to talk to someone.” Goines believed they were referring to the problem with his television and so said yes. The officers then handcuffed Goines and transported him involuntarily to the area medical center. There he was interviewed by an intake clinician employed by Valley Community Services Board, who concluded that Goines suffered from a mental illness and posed a threat to the safety of his neighbors.
Goines was hospitalized until his release on May 20, 2014. Goines then brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was unlawfully seized without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Goines noted in his complaint that he suffers from cerebellar ataxia, which affects his speech, balance and fine motor coordination, but that he has no mental health issues. The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
Holding: On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the claims against the mental health intake clinician and her employer were properly dismissed, but that the claims against the two officers had been dismissed in error. The court found that the allegations in Goines’ complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss with regard to the officers because the complaint provided no reasonable basis for the officers to have concluded that Goines was a danger.
Goines’ complaint plausibly alleged facts that no reasonable officer would have found sufficient to justify an emergency mental health detention: The Appeals Court noted that “a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint,” so that the Court’s review was limited to “a review of the allegations in the complaint itself.” The defendant officers, noting that Goines had included the officers’ Incident Report as an attachment, argued that, by including the Report, Goines had adopted all of the statements in the Incident Report as true. Those statements, which described behaviors by Goines and observations of Goines by the officers that Goines did not allege in his complaint, were cited by the officers as showing good cause for Goines’ seizure, and thereby supporting the officers’ motion to dismiss. Goines argued, and the Appeals Court agreed, that while Goines relied on the Incident Report for some of the facts in his complaint, he did not base his claims on the Incident Report, and none of his claims were dependent on the truth of any statements contained in the Incident Report. Goines merely used the report to support his theory that the police assumed from his physical difficulties that he was mentally ill. The Fourth Circuit determined that Goines’ complaint alleged facts indicating that the officers failed to make a sufficient inquiry before assuming a threat and transporting him to the evaluation center. Also important to the court were the alleged facts that (1) Goines had reported to the stationhouse seeking police assistance and (2) the officers were not faced with an emergency situation that would limit their ability to conduct further inquiry.
Goines’ complaint failed to allege a constitutional violation by intake clinician: In contrast to the officers’ Incident Report, the Fourth Circuit found that Goines had incorporated by reference the intake Screening Report. Probable cause to seize a person for psychological evaluation exists “when the facts and circumstances within the defendant’s knowledge and of which the defendant had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man to believe that the person poses a danger to himself or others.” The Screening Report, which Goines had adopted for purposes of his claims against the clinician and community services board, showed that the clinician had observed Goines “behaving as if he were responding to visual hallucinations” and had received seemingly trustworthy information from the officers that Goines had been suffering from auditory hallucinations. Additionally, Goines, while in the clinician’s presence, threatened to attack his neighbors after his release. Taken together, the court held that these facts established probable cause for the emergency mental health detention, and supported the clinician’s motion to dismiss.

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