Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=49830:gr-167335-2007&amp;catid=1494&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:47:07+00:00

Document:
G.R. NOS. 167335 - 167337 and G.R. No. 173152 - Dr. Ulysses A. Brito v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon et al. : Dr. Ulysses A. Brito v. Court of Appeals, et al.
DR. ULYSSES A. BRITO, (In His Capacity as oic-regional director of the ncip region IV), Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, SANDY P. PADILLA AND MONICO A. DINGAL, JR., Respondents.
DR. ULYSSES A. BRITO, (In His Capacity as oic-regional director of the ncip region IV), Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, office of the deputy ombudsman for Luzon, SANDY P. PADILLA AND MONICO A. DINGAL, JR., Respondents.
For the Court's consideration are two consolidated petitions: (1) G.R. NOS. 167335 & 167337, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Joint Order1 dated 7 December 2004 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon which resolved the criminal aspect of the charges against private respondents Sandy P. Padilla and Monico A. Dingal, Jr. in their favor; and (2) G.R. No. 173152, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Resolution2 dated 18 October 2005 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated 27 April 2005 which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner against the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on the ground that it was not the proper remedy to assail the joint order of the Ombudsman. Said special civil action questioned the Joint Order of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dated 7 December 2004 insofar as it disposed of the administrative aspect of the charges against private respondents by finding them not guilty of Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Public Interest. It merely found them liable under Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 67133 and imposed upon them the penalty of reprimand.
These are the facts of the instant consolidated petitions.
Private respondents were assigned as members of a Field-Based Investigation (FBI) team. This team conducts investigations on the impact of a project on any community of indigenous peoples, to determine whether the required Certification Precondition may be properly issued to applicant companies.
A. Requests for NCIP Certification Precondition shall be filed with the concerned NCIP Regional Office. The cost of actual expenses in the conduct of the required field-based investigation, to be undertaken by the concerned NCIP Regional Office, shall be borne by the applicant. x x x.
We are claiming for the per diem and taxi fare only. These companies did not provide us our per diem since they are anticipating that guidelines might require them.
Rio Tuba and La Concepcion, in their respective affidavits executed by their respective officers, however, explicated that the allowances given to private respondents did not include per diems and taxi fares.
On 12 May 2003, convinced that private respondents' acts of claiming per diems and taxi fares from their agency constitute penal and administrative violations, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit charging private respondents of the Complex Crime of Estafa thru Falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 which were docketed as OMB-L-C-03-0581-E and OMB-L-C-03-1374-K. From the same set of facts, private respondents were also charged with an administrative case for Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Public Interest, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-1059-K.
In their Joint-Counter Affidavit10 filed on 8 August 2003, private respondents admitted that each of them received the amount of P3,900.00 from the three companies. But they asserted that the said amount they received from the companies did not include per diems and taxi fares.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. He insisted that as the one in-charge of the NCIP Region IV, he can, independent of the COA, institute the said charges. The criminal and the civil charges against respondents were malum prohibitum, thus these charges should not be made to depend on the findings of the COA, which will have to separately decide on filing a case against private respondents should the latter be found to have violated COA rules and regulations.
On 11 March 2005, petitioner filed directly before this Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the criminal aspect of the Joint Order dated 7 December 2004 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon which dismissed the criminal cases filed against private respondents.13 The petition was docketed as G.R. NOS. 167335 and 167337.
Believing that the Court of Appeals is vested with the appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Ombudsman pertaining to administrative disciplinary cases,14 petitioner elevated the administrative aspect of the Joint Order dated 7 December 2004 to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 18 October 2005, dismissed said petition on the ground that petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy by pursuing the administrative case before the Court of Appeals through Rule 65. The appellate court opined that appeals in administrative cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 and not under Rule 65.
Undeterred, petitioner is now before the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated 18 October 2005. This case was docketed as G.R. No. 173152.
Petitioner avers that the decision of the Ombudsman finding private respondents administratively guilty and imposing upon them the penalty of reprimand is final and unappealable. Inasmuch as the penalty of reprimand is final and unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," then the only legal recourse available to him is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner, likewise, insists that the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion when he concluded that the complained acts of private respondents did not constitute gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the public service.
Petitioner is correct in arguing that the decision of the Ombudsman imposing on private respondents the penalty of reprimand is final and unappealable. Ironically, though, this is the same argument that struck the death knell to his posturings.
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified Petition for Review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The language of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is explicit and categorical when it states that "any order, directive or decision [of the Office of the Ombudsman] imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable."
Contrary to the Deputy Ombudsman's stance, not all items in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 are rendered void by the Fabian v. Desierto ruling. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the last paragraph in Section 27 which provides that "in all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court." This portion of Section 27 was rendered invalid because it violated Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution proscribing the enactment of a statute which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence. Hence, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, which are not final and unappealable, should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provision of Rule 43.
Our ruling in the case of Fabian v. Desierto invalidated Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included in said section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the decision of the Ombudsman finding respondents guilty of simple misconduct and ordering their suspension for one (1) month without pay is final and unappealable as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 and Administrative Order No. 07, Section 7, Rule III of the Office of the Ombudsman implementing Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770. x x x.
x x x In the instant case, since the penalty imposed upon respondents was "one month suspension without pay" only, as a matter of law, the decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. x x x.
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same. x x x.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is quite evident that petitioner employed the wrong remedy. Instead of filing his special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, petitioner should have filed the same directly with this Court. On this score alone, this petition warrants an outright dismissal.
Even if this Court treats the petition filed with the Court of Appeals as one for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner, nonetheless, failed to adduce evidence that the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his joint order.
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the inquiry is limited essentially to whether or not the public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
A tribunal, board or officer acts without jurisdiction if it/he does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where, being clothed with the power to determine the case, the tribunal, board or officer oversteps its/his authority as determined by law. And there is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal, board or officer acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, we are inclined to rule and so hold that the respondents fell short of the conduct expected of them as public officers as mandated under Section 4(a) of R.A. 6713 which states that: "Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All [government] resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and resources."
Contrary to the postulation of petitioner, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon's joint order was based on substantial evidence. There is therefore no reason for this Court to render the same void.
In the instant special civil action for certiorari, petitioner insists that the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause against private respondents for violating the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. According to petitioner, had the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon made a careful study of the evidence presented by him and had he meticulously weighed the evidence, he would have found out that probable cause exists to indict private respondents.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Order of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dated 7 December 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
1 Rollo (G.R. NOS. 167335 &167337), pp. 20-26.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 173152), pp. 29-31.
3 Sec.4(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 states: " Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues."
4 SEC. 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous People (NCIP). - To carry out the policies herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.
5 Section 44 (m) of Republic Act No. 8371.
6 Rollo (G.R. NOS. 167335 & 167337), pp. 28-29.
13 In Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, 9 December 2004 (445 SCRA 655, 665), it was held that "the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause, x x x, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals.
14 In Fabian v. Desierto (356 Phil. 787, 799), it was ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 173152), p. 172.
17 390 Phil. 236, 248 (2000).
18 G.R. No. 163089, 6 December 2006.
20 Rollo (G.R. No. 167335 & 167337), pp. 24-25.
21 Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 158613-14, 22 February 2006, 483 SCRA 83, 92-93.
22 Villanueva v. Ople, G.R. No. 165125, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA 539, 554.
23 Chan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159922, 28 April 2005, 457 SCRA 502, 512.
24 Dir. Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 384 Phil. 848, 857 (2000).
26 Basuel v. Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), G.R. No. 143664, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 118, 126.

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