Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/283/283mass480.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:13:36+00:00

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MARY E. THIBEAULT vs. HERBERT S. POOLE. JOSEPH H. THIBEAULT vs. SAME.
Where, at the trial of an action by a woman operating an automobile for personal injuries sustained in a collision at an intersection of ways with an automobile driven by the defendant, parts of the testimony of the plaintiff might be thought inconsistent with other parts and with testimony of other witnesses, but in none of her testimony did she finally adhere to a statement upon which she must be found to have been guilty of contributory negligence, the question, whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, still was for the jury.
(4) The error was not harmless and the defendant's exception in the action by the husband was sustained.
TWO ACTIONS OF TORT, with declarations described in the opinion. Writs dated December 4, 1930.
In the Superior Court, the actions were tried together before Lummus, J. Material evidence and rulings by the judge are described in the opinion. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in the first action in the sum of $4,500; and for the plaintiff in the second action in the sum of $275 on count 1, and in the sum of $1,185.75 on count 2.
The defendant alleged exceptions, which, after Lummus, J., became a member of this court, were allowed by Williams, J.
G. J. Callahan, for the defendant.
D. H. Keedy, (J. T. Storrs with him,) for the plaintiffs.
RUGG, C.J. These two actions of tort, one by the wife and the other by her husband, arise out of a collision between an automobile owned by the husband and driven by the wife and an automobile driven by the defendant. The wife seeks to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by her. The husband seeks to recover damages sustained by him, as alleged in count 1 of his declaration, for injury to his automobile, and in count 2 for medical and hospital expenses incurred by him on account of his in consequence of her injuries.
ground that the wife was guilty of contributory negligence were denied. There was testimony from which it could have been found that Mrs. Thibeault was driving with a companion from Ware to West Brookfield, and as she came into the Post Road, going easterly, was ascending a considerable grade. The defendant was driving westerly on the Post Road, near the middle of which was a white line, and down the considerable grade approaching the junction with the road from Ware. The wife testified that, as she approached the place where the two roads unite, she looked both west and east on the Post Road and saw "nothing to interfere with my crossing and did so, and the minute. I straightened out [on the Post Road] I saw this car [that of the defendant] coming at terrific speed . . . . Just as I crossed the white line and was going up the hill towards West Brookfield . . . then I saw the defendant and thought he was going to hit me. . . . I saw nothing whatever to interfere with my crossing. As I was crossing the intersection, I looked again . . . I was looking always-all the way across. When the accident happened, I had gotten across the white line and had straightened out to go to West Brookfield." As she came near the intersection she "saw the automobile approaching. It did not mean anything to me because it was at such a distance I thought I could make the crossing without any trouble whatever." Parts of her testimony might be thought inconsistent with what has been narrated and with other testimony. But the principle that by her other testimony she bound herself to a rejection of what has been quoted is not applicable on this record. At most it is an instance of somewhat conflicting statements where it is for the jury to find the truth. Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Railway, 224 Mass. 405, 406. There was other evidence tending to show that the defendant turned to his left in an attempt to pass in front of the other automobile and that the collision occurred on his extreme left of the road.
of law. This was a question of fact to be settled by the jury upon more or less conflicting evidence under appropriate instructions. The case on this point falls within the principle of numerous decisions. Jeddrey v. Boston & Northern Street Railway, 198 Mass. 232, 235, and cases cited. Salisbury v. Boston Elevated Railway, 239 Mass. 430. Payson v. Checker Taxi Co. 262 Mass. 22, 26. Bagdazurian v. Nathanson, 269 Mass. 386. Keyes v. Checker Taxi Co. 275 Mass. 461, 467, and cases cited. Dodge v. Town Taxi, Inc. 281 Mass. 77. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, s. 85.
In the action in which the husband was plaintiff the jury were instructed: "There was nothing on the evidence that Joseph Thibeault could do to prevent this accident. He was not there . . . if it is proved to you by the greater weight of the evidence that" the negligence of the defendant "caused the accident, then Mr. Thibeault" is "entitled to recover even though Mrs. Thibeault's negligence contributed to the accident. Her negligence might bar her from recovery but it wouldn't bar her husband." "It will be possible for you to find . . . for Mr. Thibeault" against the defendant "and yet deny Mrs. Thibeault damages on the ground of her contributory negligence." The defendant excepted to such portion of the charge as permitted "Mr. Thibeault to recover consequential damages for expenses of nursing, hospital and medical care, even though the jury find that Mrs. Thibeault's negligence contributed to the accident and to her injury." No exception was saved to the portion of the charge which permitted the husband to recover for damage to his automobile. Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407.
was long ago changed by statute. See now G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 209, s. 6. The result of modern statutes is that the husband is the nominal and legal head of the family and as such is liable for the reasonable support and necessary nursing and physicians' care of his wife and minor children. The wife, however, may bind her own estate for her expenses of this nature. In the absence of evidence it is presumed that the husband is liable for all such expenses already incurred, and therefore he may maintain an action therefor in his own name as a remnant of his common law rights. If, however, it appears that the wife has paid or rendered herself liable for such expenses, she may recover therefor in her own action. In any event, she is entitled to recover for such expenses liable to accrue in the future. Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56. No point of that nature is raised on the present record. Therefore it is presumed that the husband was entitled to recover for such expenses as are here in issue. The result of the history of common law rights of husband and wife and of the changes wrought by modern statutes is that the law splits the cause of action arising from tortious personal injury to a wife and gives the wife right to recover for her personal injuries in an action in her own name, and gives her husband the right to recover for expenses for nursing and physicians' care incurred as a result of such injuries, unless he is barred on the evidence and under the doctrine of Cassidy v. Constantine. These rights of action are separate and distinct. The right of the husband to recover such expenses is independent of the wife, and a judgment either way in an earlier action by the wife does not aid or bar the husband in a later action. The same principle applies in general to an action by a father to recover expenses incurred by him in the care of his minor child injured through the tortious act of a third person. The action for personal injuries belongs to the child, but the action for consequential damages to the parent. Duffee v. Boston Elevated Railway, 191 Mass. 563. McGreevey v. Boston Elevated Railway, 232 Mass. 347. Slavinsky v. National Bottling Torah Co. 267 Mass. 319, 322. Compare King v. Viscoloid Co.
personal injury to his wife: "The plaintiff in the second action is not entitled to consequential damages unless his wife, the plaintiff in the first action, can recover for personal injuries suffered while she was a passenger on the defendant's railway." The principle applies indifferently to a husband suing for consequential damages for an injury to his wife, and to a parent suing in his own right for damages arising from a personal injury to his minor child. Lundergan v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad, 203 Mass. 460, 466. Gardner v. Boston Elevated Railway, 204 Mass. 213, 218. Regan v. Superb Theatre, Inc. 220 Mass. 259, 261. Thompson v. United Laboratories Co. 221 Mass. 276. Pilon v. Easthampton Gas Co. 248 Mass. 57, 59. Slavinsky v. National Bottling Torah Co. 267 Mass. 319. This principle prevails generally. It was said in Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N. Y. 422, at page 432: "It is an established general rule of law that where a parent sues for loss of services arising from an injury received by his infant child, damages will not be permitted if the evidence shows that the child's negligence was the efficient cause of the injury." The principle is supported by a finely reasoned opinion in Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co. 188 Wis. 376. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Honey, 12 C. C. A. 190; S. C. 63 Fed. Rep. 39. Benton v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway, 55 Iowa, 496, 501. Vorrath v. Burke, 34 Vroom, 188. Winner v. Oakland, 158 Penn. St. 405, 410. See cases collected in note, 42 Am. L. R. 717-725. There is nothing inconsistent with this in Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 413, where the statement to the effect that the "doer of a legal wrong ought to be held to make compensation for its harmful consequences to the person injured unless the latter has himself contributed thereto by his own tortious conduct, was used to a different point. Such expressions with regard to one situation cannot be wrested from their context and invoked as authority for the determination of different questions. Vigeant v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 343-344. Shapiro v. McCarthy, 279 Mass. 425, 432.
closed the husband cannot recover compensation for expenses of nursing and physicians' care where the negligence of the wife contributed to her injuries. Therefore, there was error in the portions of the charge to which exception was taken.
be sustained but the verdict in his favor on count 1 is to stand and the new trial is to be confined to count 2. In the case of Mary E. Thibeault the exceptions are overruled.

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