Source: https://patentlyo.com/tag/written-description-requirement/page/2
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 05:53:43+00:00

Document:
35 U.S.C. 112 SPECIFICATION. (a) IN GENERAL.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
Look for opinions in Halo/Stryker and Cuozzo by the end June 2016.
Design Patent Damages: Samsung has filed its opening merits briefs in the design patent damages case against Apple. Design patent infringement leads to profit disgorgment, but the question is what profits? [More from Patently-O].
Versus Cisco: There are a couple of newly filed petitions. Interestingly, both filed by Michael Heim’s firm with Miranda Jones on both briefs representing plaintiff-petitioners. In both cases Cisco is respondent.
CSIRO v. CISCO (fact-law divide in proving infringement damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284).
COMMIL v. CISCO (appellate disregard of factual evidence).
Laches: The Supreme Court granted SCA’s writ of certiorari on the question of whether laches defense applies to block back-damages in patent cases. The Federal Circuit says “yes” while the Supreme Court recently said “no” in a parallel copyright case (Patrella). The Supreme Court decided Patrella 6-3 with Justice Scalia in the majority offering the potential of a tight-split in this case. The court looks to be sitting-on the parallel case of Medinol v. Cordis until SCA is decided.
Copyright on Useful Articles: Although not a patent case, the court also decided to hear a “useful article” copyright case. Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands. The case asks whether the stripes and chevrons found in a cheerleader uniform are sufficiently “separable” from the uniform in order to be copyrightable. The useful article doctrine is generally considered to be setting up a boundary line between the domains of copyright and patent.
Does IPR violate Article III of the Constitution?
Does IPR violate the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution?
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” Quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856)).
The brief raises a set of interesting old cases focusing both on the separation of powers and the tradition that patent-revocation for invalidity requires a jury to decide disputed facts.
[W]hether FilmTec’s “automatic assignment” rule should be overruled because it extinguishes inventors’ constitutional and statutory rights to inventorship and ownership.
Disparaging Trademarks: A pair of disparaging trademark cases have also been petitioned: Lee v. Tam (“Slants”) and Pro-Football v. Blackhorse (“Redskins”). The Federal Circuit previously held the limit on registering disparaging marks to be an unconstitutional abrogation of the freedom of speech.
Cuozzo: Prof Mann provides his preview of the April 25 oral arguments in Cuozzo v. Lee; and Cuozzo has filed its reply brief. Neither document address my the mootness concern regarding Cuozzo’s demand for an ordinary construction of claim terms rather than their broadest reasonable interpretation. As far as I have seen, nothing in the record suggests that a change in claim interpretation standard would alter the PTO’s determination.
Following its April 15 Conference, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a set of cases, including Vermont v. MPHJ; Limelight v. Akamai; Hemopet v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition; and Tas v. Beachy. In its April 1 Conference, the Court denied cert in Retirement Capital v. US Bancorp. That case had questioned whether subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a ground specified as a condition for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2).
The only patent cases surviving the April 15 conference are (1) Interval Licensing v. Lee that asks the same question as Cuozzo: Can the Patent and Trademark Office appropriately apply the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard in construing patent claims in post-grant validity challenges?; and (2) Medinol v. Cordis that focuses on whether “the equitable defense of laches [may be used to] bar legal claims for damages that are timely under the express terms of the Patent Act.” Medinol is conceptually linked to the SCA Hygiene case that also raises the laches issue. The court will consider both cases in its April 22 conference and may likely couple the decision to grant/deny. The court is also scheduled to consider Cloud Satchel (abstract idea eligibility) and Globus Medical (appellate jurisdiction) at Friday’s conference. Neither of these cases offer much hope for the respective petitioner.
[P]atents are quintessential “public rights” whose issuance and cancellation Congress may permissible entrust to a non-Article III tribunal. . . . Pursuant to its constitutional authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by establishing a patent system, Congress created the PTO – an agency with “special expertise in evaluating patent applications.” Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012). It directed that agency to issue a patent if “it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent” under standards set by federal law, 35 U.S.C. 131. Patents are accordingly rights that “exist only by virtue of statute.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5 (1964). They “dispose of public rights held by the government on behalf of the people.” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 849 n.2 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Daniel Bohnen has filed a brief on behalf of UK’s Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (CIPA) in support of the Sequenom v. Ariosa petition. The brief argues that the court should look to “maintain international harmonisation in the law of patent-eligibility.”[AriosaCIPA]. More briefs in support of the petitioner are expected this week as is Ariosa’s opposition brief (if any).
Dow: Whether factual findings underlying a district court’s determination on the definiteness of a patent claim under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 112, like a district court’s factual findings underlying construction of a patent claim, are subject to appellate review only for clear error or substantial evidence rather than de novo review.
Nova: Whether the court of appeals correctly invalidated Dow’s patent claims as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
President Obama has announced his nomination of Merrick Garland to become the next Supreme Court Justice. Garland is Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and would bring tremendous intellectual firepower to the Court and is clearly more moderate many potential nominees. All indications indicate that President Obama is correct in his appraisal of Garland as “widely recognized not only as one of America’s sharpest legal minds, but someone who brings to his work a spirit of decency, modesty, integrity, even-handedness and excellence.” That said, there is little chance that Garland will be confirmed except perhaps after the election (assuming that a Democratic contender wins).
Samsung’s design patent case is looking like a strong contender for grant of certiorari. The court will again consider the case this week. We continue to await the views of the solicitor general in Life Tech v. Promega (whether an entity can “induce itself” under 271(f)(1)) (CVSG requested in October 2015).
The key new petition this fortnight is Versata v. SAP. Versata raises four questions stemming from the USPTO’s covered business method (CBM) review of its “hierarchical pricing engine” patents.
Whether a software-related invention that improves the performance of computer operations is patent eligible subject matter.
Whether, as this Court will decide in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board should give claim terms their broadest reasonable construction in post-grant adjudicatory proceedings, or should instead give them their best construction.
Jeff Lamkin and his MoloLamkin team filed the brief. [Versata Cert Petition]. SAP is on the hook for a $300+ million verdict if Versata is able to win this appeal.
The second new case is Tas v. Beach (written description requirement for new drug treatments). Tas is a Turkish researcher representing himself pro se in the interference case against Johns Hopkins. Interesting issues, but the case has no chance. No cases have been dismissed or denied.
This “groundbreaking” case, as Petitioner describes it, has been going on, unjustifiably and unconstitutionally, for nearly three years now – all because Petitioner has refused to admit or accept that its state law claims against MPHJ are preempted by federal law, barred by the First Amendment “right to petition” clause, and that Congress has decided that federal preemption questions involving the patent laws must be decided by the federal court system.
Written Description: Tas v. Beach, No. 15-1089 (written description requirement for new drug treatments).
The interesting and long-running Zoltek case has received another decision from the Federal Circuit – this time reversing the Court of Federal Claims ruling that Zoltek’s stealthy patent claims are invalid.
Zoltek is the owner of US Reissue Patent No. Re 34,162 issued January 19, 1993. In 1996, Zoltek sued the U.S. government for infringing the patent – in particular, the patentee argued that the B-2 Bomber and F-22 Fighter both used carbon fiber sheets that infringed the patent rights.
As a starting point for most claims against a government is with sovereign immunity. The U.S. Government claims sovereign immunity against suits except where waived. In the patent context, the U.S. government has waived its immunity, but limits the procedure and form of recovery. In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) provides that “the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.” The statute also provides cover for contractors or other non-government-entities who infringe the patent “with the authorization or consent of the Government” so that those actions must also be pursued against the U.S. Government. The Court of Federal Claims is located in the same Madison Place building as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
In its prior en banc decision from the case, the Federal Circuit ruled that Section 1498(a)’s infringement statute should be broadly read to encompass Section 271(g) infringement.
Following that decision, the Court of Federal Claims held a trial on validity and found that the asserted claims were invalid as obvious and/or lacking written description. The court has reversed that holding and remanded.
The original specification plainly, and without dispute, describes that the starting material is an oxidized and stabilized fiber, cites references showing this known material, and describes its preparation. That a previously oxidized and stabilized starting material was known to a person of ordinary skill in the field was recognized [as well] . . . . The question of who performs steps of a fully described invention, including preparation of a known starting material, is not a matter of the written description requirement.
The purpose of the written description requirement is to assure that the public receives sufficient knowledge of the patented technology, and to demonstrate that the patentee is in possession of the invention claimed. . . . The written description need not include information that is already known and available to the experienced public. . . .
The CFC stated its concern that the reissue patent claims could be infringed by an entity that did not itself make the starting material, but purchased the known starting material from a commercial source. . . . A validly obtained reissue does not violate the written description requirement if the patentee can reach an enlarged scope of possible infringement. It is not an improper broadening amendment when a reissue applicant, with the considered agreement of the reissue Examiner, substitutes a preparatory step known to those skilled in the art at the time of the invention with a requirement to start with the product of that known preparatory step. The CFC’s emphasis on who might infringe the broadened reissue claims is an issue of infringement, not written description. We conclude that the CFC erred in holding reissue claims 1–22 and 33–38 invalid for failure to meet the written description requirement of section 112. That ruling is reversed.
The issue here is definitely interesting – in particular, I see the question of whether the starting-material is available as prior art to be a total red-herring since its manufacture was sufficiently described in the specification. The question is whether the patentee described an invention that began by “obtaining” rather than “making” the starting material. The Federal Circuit didn’t really answer that question. I will note that none of the parties cited Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ([not announcing] an omitted essential elements test).
The Government argues that the claims are invalid because they embody nothing more than a law of nature. For example, the Government points to Figure 4 of the patent to support its contention. It argues that Figure 4, which charts a relationship between heat treatment temperature and surface resistance, demonstrates the ineligibility of the ‘162 Patent claims by showing that the claims embody nothing more than a natural law that links temperature to resistance. Relying upon the testimony of its expert, Dr. Brian Sullivan, the Government argues that the independent claims at issue (claims 1 and 33) consist of three parts: (1) the manufacture of carbon fibers using conventional carbonization equipment and techniques; (2) the manufacture of a sheet product using conventional techniques and processes; and (3) “the concept that if you control the fibers’ volume electrical resistivity it gives you the ability to control the sheet or surface resistivity of the final carbon mat productThe Government argues that these three parts render the ‘162 Patent’s claims similar to those found ineligible in Flook and Mayo. . . . The Court agrees with Zoltek [and disagrees with the Government]. The Government’s comparisons to the ineligible claims in Flook and Mayo are much less apt than comparison to Diehr.
The CFC did reject that argument and the Government did not appeal that issue.
 The ‘162 Reissue Patent originally issued in 1988 as U.S. Patent No. 4,728,395 and then reissued in 1993. Zoltek obtained the patent rights when it bought Stackpole Fibers in 1988.
 See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[t]hat which may be made clear and thus ‘obvious’ to a court, with the invention fully diagrammed and aided . . . by experts in the field, may have been a break-through of substantial dimension when first unveiled.”); see also KSR (“A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning”); W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1553 (“It is difficult but necessary that the decisionmaker forget what he or she has been taught at trial about the claimed invention and cast the mind back to the time the invention was made (often as here many years), to occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the then-accepted wisdom in the art.”).
In this case, the Federal Circuit has refused Wyeth’s (now Pfizer’s) plea for more patent-term-adjustment (PTA).
The basic issue is involves the “A-Delay” category of patent term adjustment that provides for term adjustment when the PTO fails to issue its first office action within fourteen months from the application filing date.
Here, the patent examiner’s first qualifying action was a restriction requirement mailed in August 2005. However, after a discussion with Wyeth’s attorneys, in February 2006 the examiner withdrew the restriction requirement and issued a corrected version.
The question then is whether the original restriction requirement qualifies to cut-off the A-Delay even though it was later withdrawn as insufficient.
Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent is rejected, or any objection or requirement made, the Director shall notify the applicant thereof, stating the reasons for such rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his application.
Coming back to the facts of this case: The failure of the original restriction requirement divided the 100+ claims into twenty one distinct groups, but the restriction requirement failed to expressly categorize of the six dependent. On appeal, the Federal Circuit found, despite the examiner’s error, that the mailing was still sufficient to meet the notice requirement.
Here, the examiner’s detailed descriptions of the 21 distinct invention groups outlined in the examiner’s initial restriction requirement were clear, providing sufficient information to which the applicants could have responded. Indeed, the applicants never challenged the content of the invention groups defined by the examiner. And, significantly, the examiner’s defined invention groups remained identical between the two restriction requirements. Viewed as a whole, the restriction requirement provided adequate grounds on which the applicants could “recogniz[e] and seek to counter the grounds for rejection.” Chester. Therefore, because the examiner clearly defined to the applicants the invention groups available for election and further prosecution, the applicants were placed on sufficient notice of the reasons for the examiner’s restriction requirement.
As for the six claims whose classifications were omitted from the initial restriction requirement, Wyeth could have taken direction for their classification from the fact that their respective independent claims were each included in the initial restriction requirement. Here, the dependent claims would naturally have been classified in a subset of the invention groups to which the claims they depend from belong.
The PTO’s position is somewhat strengthened by its own MPEP statements that a restriction requirement which fails to classify all of the claims still counts as providing a section 132 notice.
The majority opinion was written by Judge O’Malley and joined by Judge Dyk. Judge Newman wrote in dissent — arguing that this was a case of clear error by the examiner and should not count as a proper notice. If Judge Newman is correct, Wyeth would been within its rights to simply sit on its hands not respond until the USPTO issued its notice of abandonment.
Coming out of this case (and others), we know that even a very low quality mailing from a patent examiner will be counted sufficient notice and thus force a response on threat of abandonment. Where a procedural error exists, the best practice action then is to quickly contact the examiner and identify the error. Here, Wyeth waited until four days before the deadline to respond.
 The case involves U.S. Patent No. 8,153,768 that issued from U.S. Patent Application No. 10/428,894.
 Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
 In a footnote, the Federal Circuit suggests that failure to classify and independent claim could possibly fail the notice requirement of Section 132.
Vehicle Intelligence and Safety LLC is the owner of United States Patent Number 7,394,392 vehicle safety improvements. In particular, the patent claims systems and methods for testing vehicle operators and then taking control of the vehicle if the operator is deemed impaired. Senior Judge Hart of the Northern District of Illinois ruled on the pleadings (12(c)) that the asserted claims were invalid as being drawn to patent-ineligible subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act. On appeal, the Federal Circuit here affirms – holding that “the disputed claims cover only abstract ideas coupled with routine data-gathering steps and conventional computer activity.” An early potential strike against the patent that the inventor, Kevin Roe, is also the patent attorney who prosecuted the case and the litigator who filed the appellate briefs.
a control module to control operation of said equipment if said selective testing of said equipment operator indicates said impairment of said equipment operator, wherein said screening module includes one or more expert system modules that utilize at least a portion of one or more equipment modules selected from the group of equipment modules consisting of: an operations module, an audio module, a navigation module, an anti-theft module, and a climate control module.
Although the court did not explain particularly how the testing of operators for impairment fits within the definition of an abstract idea, the court made clear that one element of its decision was based upon the fact that the claims were broadly written and not limited to particular impairments, particular screening or testing methods, the method of programming the claimed “expert system,” or the “nature” of the control.
[C]ritically absent from the entire patent is how the existing vehicle equipment can be used to measure these characteristics; assuming these measurements can be made, how the decision module determines if an operator is impaired based on these measurements; assuming this determination can be made, how the decision module decides which control response to make; and assuming the control response decision can be made, how the “expert system” effectuates the chosen control response. At best, the ‘392 patent answers the question of how to provide faster, more accurate and reliable impairment testing by simply stating “use an expert system.” Thus, in the absence of any details about how the “expert system” works, the claims at issue are drawn to a patent ineligible abstract idea, satisfying Mayo/Alice step one.
An important take-away from this analysis is that the concept of an abstract-idea is closely tied-in with the novelty of the claims themselves – even at step-one of Alice. Thus, contrary to what many patent attorneys continue to believe, whether a concept is an “abstract idea” will depend upon the invention’s priority dates. However, on that same point, the Court rejected Vehicle Intelligence’s argument that its claim did not embody that broad concept of “testing-operators and taking control” since prior patents held by other companies already disclosed and claimed other methods of achieving those same results. The court rejected that notion since full-preemption is not a requirement of the Alice test.
Readers will also notice the linkage between the court’s analysis for eligibility and the doctrines of written description and indefiniteness. The suggestion in this case appears to be that the same claim could have been eligible if the patentee had provided (in the specification) a full explanation of how to implement its system.
Although non-precedential, the case will certainly reverberate – especially the court’s refusal to limit the definition of ‘abstract idea’ and its continued acceptance of judgment-on-the-pleadings as the proper method for dismissing cases on Section 101.
Joe Herndon at Patent Docs has more.
The ABA Journal is again running its Blawg 100 edition noting interesting and worthy legal blogs. Patently-O and Gene Quinn’s IP Watchdog were perennial contenders but were ‘retired’ from the list after being inducted into the ABA’s Hall of Fame in 2012 and 2013 respectively.
Patent Related Blawgs this year include Ross Dannenberg’s Patent Arcade, Courtenay Brinkerhoff’s PharmaPatents, Scott McKeown’s Patent Post Grant, and Kurt Karst’s FDA Law Blog. I would have also included the Written Description blog and PatentDocs. Non-patent sites of interest to me include Jotwell, PrawfsBlawg, and Eric Goldman’s Tech & Marketing Law Blog, among others.
Later today here at the University of Missouri School of Law, we are hosting the Fifth Annual Patent Law Moot Court sponsored by McKool Smith and part of the activities of our Center for Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship (CIPE). (Tonight’s winner gets $1,000).
The setup this year is a revival of the LightingBallast case that we argued a few years ago. Earlier this year, the Federal Circuit again changed course in that case — finding that the patentee’s claimed “voltage source means” connotes structure to one skilled in the art (based upon expert testimony) and therefore is not interpreted under 112(f) [112,p6] (and therefore is not automatically invalid for failing to provide any structure description of the claimed means in the written description).
Should claim limitations using the term “means” be presumed to fall under the purview of 35 U.S.C. Section 112¶6 and, if so, what level of presumption should apply?
Should a district court’s fact finding regarding commonly understood terms be entitled to deference on appeal?
Did the district court correctly construe “voltage source means” as used in claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,436,529?
@MizzouLaw Today's Patent Law Moot Court Question: If a Patentee claims a "means", do we presumptively apply 112(f)?
Open question – how many of these cases have written description support for the new non-transitory limitation?
Earlier this summer, the Federal Circuit issued a revised opinion in Williamson v. Citrix Online. The centerpiece of the new opinion was Part II.C.1, joined by a majority of the entire court. That section overruled past precedent holding that non-use of the words “means” or “step” in a claim created a “strong” presumption that § 112, para. 6 does not apply, one that is only overcome by “a showing that the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can be construed as structure.” Instead, the en banc court held, the presumption can be overcome “if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function'” Williamson, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part) (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
On the surface, Media Rights Technologies v. Capital One involves a relatively straightforward application of Williamson. But there are several aspects of the decision that make it stand out: the statement of the law of indefiniteness (Judge O’Malley’s first since Nautilus), the sharpness and depth of its analysis of the § 112, para. 6 issue, the holding that the specification must disclose structure for all claimed functions, and the use of factual evidence in the indefiniteness determination.
Directing said media content to a custom media device coupled to said compliance mechanism via said data output path, for selectively restricting output of said media content.
A claim fails to satisfy this statutory requirement [§ 112, para. 2] and is thus invalid for indefiniteness if its language, when read in light of the specification and the prosecution history, “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). Notably, a claim is indefinite if its language “might mean several different things and no informed and confident choice is available among the contending definitions.” Id. at 2130 n.8 (quotation omitted).
8. See, e.g., Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, ––––, 2014 WL 869092, *4 (M.D.Fla., Mar. 5, 2014) (finding that “the account,” as used in claim, “lacks definiteness,” because it might mean several different things and “no informed and confident choice is available among the contending definitions,” but that “the extent of the indefiniteness … falls far short of the ‘insoluble ambiguity’ required to invalidate the claim”).
The §112, para. 6 analysis: The appeal presented two issues related to “compliance mechanism”: whether it is a means-plus-function term and, if so, whether the specification discloses corresponding structure. Under Williamson, the lack of the word “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that “compliance mechanism” is not a means-plus-function term. Here, the patent holder neither contended that “compliance mechanism” had a commonly understood meaning nor that it is generally understood in the art to connote a particular structure. Instead, Media Rights Technologies argued that “compliance mechanism” was like the term “modernizing device” found to be definite in Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Not so, said the court.
Here, unlike Inventio, the claims do not use the term “compliance mechanism” as a substitute for an electrical circuit, or anything else that might connote a definite structure. Rather, the claims simply state that the “compliance mechanism” can perform various functions. A review of the intrinsic record does not change this conclusion. The written description only depicts and describes how what is referred to as the “copyright compliance mechanism” is connected to various parts of the system, how the “copyright compliance mechanism” functions, and the potential—though not mandatory—functional components of the “copyright compliance mechanism.” See ’033 Patent col. 18:57–col. 19:5; col. 20:32–49; Fig. 3; Fig. 5B. None of these passages, however, define “compliance mechanism” in specific structural terms. And, the addition of the term “copyright compliance mechanism” in the specification only confuses the issue further. Media Rights does not contend that “copyright compliance mechanism” is the equivalent of the electrical circuit detailed in the written description at issue in Inventio. Indeed, Media Rights asserts that the “copyright compliance mechanism”—the only “compliance mechanism” referenced outside the claims and the summary of the invention, and the only one depicted in the figures to which it points—is narrower than the structure it claims as the “compliance mechanism.” Without more, we cannot find that the claims, when read in light of the specification, provide sufficient structure for the “compliance mechanism” term.
Slip Op. at 10. Furthermore, Inventio was a pre-Williamson decision, and was decided under now-superceded case law that imposed a “heavy presumption” against finding a claim term to be in means-plus-function format. “Because we apply no such heavy presumption here, and the description of the structure to which Media Rights points is far less detailed than in Inventio, we do not believe Inventio carries the weight Media Rights attaches to it.” Slip Op. at 11.
All functions must be disclosed Since the claim was a means-plus-function term, the court turned to the question of whether the specification disclosed corresponding structure. “Where there are multiple claimed functions, as there are in this case, the patentee must disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform all of the claimed functions.” Slip Op. at 12 (emphasis in original). Here, there were four claimed functions, so the specification needed to disclose adequate structure to achieve all four of the claimed functions. And because these were computer-implemented functions, “the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function.” Id. at 13. Claims that fail to disclose sufficient corresponding structure are invalid for indefiniteness.
This case stems from a set of seven overlapping post-grant-review proceedings (CBM PGR) before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that Liberty Mutual filed against Progressive’s “business method” patents. The patents relate to auto-insurance pricing based upon customer vehicle use patterns – such as the number of sudden stops over a given period of time – as well as online insurance policy adjustments. See U.S. Patent No. 8,140,358 as an example.
In the Covered-Business-Method Review, the PTAB found a number of Progressive’s claims invalid as either anticipated or obvious. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirms in all respects.
Two different proceedings for the same patent: Liberty Mutual filed two different CBM proceedings against the ‘358 patent. In one, the Board invalidated all claims except for 1, 19, and 20 while in the other the second the Board invalidated all claims of the patent. These two decisions were released about 1-hour apart.
The first challenge on appeal was that the second judgment was improper because – according to Progressive’s theory – the Board lost jurisdiction once it issued the first decision. That theory stems from Section 325(e)(1) that prohibits a petitioner from “maintain[ing] a proceeding before the Office” on issues that “reasonably could have” been raised during a post-grant review that has already reached a final written decision. The argument here is that, once the PTO reached the first final judgment that the second case should immediately disappear. On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected that approach finding (1) that the statute does not prevent the PTO from maintaining the proceeding and in any event (2) the PTAB indicated that the two decisions were “concurrent” even though actually made public about 1-hour apart. Finally, the Court noted that the PTO has statutory authority to decide how to deal with multiple related proceedings.
Here, the claims in question included an interface module that produce a “driver safety score” – construed by the PTAB to mean a “calculated insurance risk value associated with driver safety.” The priority application disclosed “rating factors” that might include safety factors, but did not expressly disclose a risk value associated only with driver safety. (Note the seeming subtle shift in construction by the Federal Circuit). In any event, the ruling is that the priority application disclosed the genus but not the later claimed species – as such it does not meet the written description requirement. In this situation, the result is that the priority filing date for the particular patent at issue here is pushed back to the later filing and that date was predated by the intervening prior art disclosures.
where the server is further configured to generate a rating factor based on the selected vehicle data stored in the database.

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