Source: https://caselaw.lexroll.com/2018/12/05/people-v-lavoie-no-e068328-cal-app-12-3-2018/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:40:07+00:00

Document:
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. W. Charles Morgan, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.
Ron Boyer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and A. Natasha Cortina and Amanda E. Casillas, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant accosted a stranger in a parked car, forced him to turn over his car keys at gunpoint, and told him, “This ain’t your car no more.” He also took the victim’s cell phone. When defendant was arrested, he was in possession of a handgun with a 15-round-capacity magazine.
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty on three counts: (1) second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), with a personal firearm use enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)); (2) unlawful possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and (3) receiving a large-capacity magazine (Pen. Code, §§ 16740, 32310, subd. (a)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, after waiving a jury trial, defendant admitted two “strike” priors (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), two prior serious felony enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)), and two prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total of 71 years 4 months to life.
Defendant does not challenge his conviction of the substantive offenses. All of his appellate contentions relate to the enhancements and the strikes. Most significantly, he contends that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to amend the prior conviction allegations after the jury had already been discharged. As will be seen, we agree as to one of the strikes; otherwise, we disagree. Accordingly, we will strike that one strike and remand for resentencing.
A. The Allegations of the Information.
a. On February 25, 2010, in Riverside County, for assault with a deadly weapon.
b. On March 5, 2010, in Riverside County, for assault with a deadly weapon in prison.
a. On April 26, 2007, in Riverside County, for assault with a deadly weapon.
b. On February 25, 2010, in Riverside County, for assault with a deadly weapon.
Note that the conviction that was alleged first as a prison prior and a prior serious felony was alleged second as a strike. Also, the conviction that was alleged second as a prison prior and as a prior serious felony was not alleged as a strike at all; the first strike was a completely different conviction.
B. Defendant’s Waiver of a Jury Trial.
“THE COURT: . . . [¶] . . . [T]here are two prison priors alleged in the information and two strike priors. They are one and the same. You know that. But they are alleged in a different fashion. You understand that; right?
As noted, however, this was not correct.
Later that day, the jury returned its verdict of guilt and was discharged.
C. The Trial Court’s Advisements.
“THE COURT: . . . [Y]ou are charged with two priors. One way is a prison prior pursuant to 667.5(b). The other way is a serious felony, 667(a). And the third way is strike priors. So there are three ways the priors are alleged.
“THE COURT: The 667.5(b) priors add an additional year if convicted of those. The serious felonies add five, and the strike prior adds a life term.
“THE COURT: All right. You have a right to have me decide whether or not these priors are true, and whether or not you committed these priors.
“Do you wish to waive or give up that right?
“THE COURT: . . . [Y]ou have a right to cross-examine any and all witnesses the People put up to prove that these priors exist, and that they are your priors.
“You wish to waive or give up that right; is that right?
“THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
“THE COURT: You have a right to show that these priors don’t exist or they’re not your priors.
“You wish to waive or give up that right; is that correct?
“THE COURT: And, lastly, you have a right to testify at that trial in any defenses that they aren’t your priors or they don’t exist.
“You wish to waive or give up that right; is that correct, sir?
D. The Amendment of the Information and Defendant’s Admissions.
This was a mistake. It was the first strike that needed to be amended, not the second strike.
This was another mistake. Once again, it should have amended the first strike, not the second strike.
The trial court resumed asking defendant to admit the prison priors, which he did. Next, it asked him to admit the prior serious felonies, which he also did.
Again, this was a mistake (this time induced by the prosecutor), because there was nothing wrong with the second strike. It was the first strike that needed to be amended.
The trial court went back to asking defendant to admit the strikes. However, it expressed confusion about where the first strike occurred. The prosecutor said, “[T]he prior from February 25th of 2010, that’s Riverside County. And the conviction from July 24th of 2013 is San Diego.” The trial court did not expressly order any more amendments.
“FIRST PRIOR, a conviction on or about April 26, 2007 7/24/13 in the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of Riverside, for the crime of ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON . . . weapon in prison in violation [of] Penal Code section 245 4501, subdivision (a), subsection (1) . . . .
“THE COURT: . . . Is it true . . . that on or about July 24, 2013, in the county of San Diego, you were convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of 4501 of the Penal Code, a strike?
“THE COURT: Is it also true that on or about February the 25th of 2010 in the . . . county of Riverside, you were convicted of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of section 245, subdivision (a), subsection (1), a strike?
Defendant contends that, once the jury was discharged, the trial court lost the power to amend the information. He asks us to reach this issue despite his trial counsel’s failure to object to the amendment. In the alternative, he contends that his trial counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.
On reading Tindall, one might well ask: Why did the defendant still have the right to have the same jury decide the amended prior conviction allegations under Penal Code section 1025, when he had already waived his right to a jury trial on the priors?
We have found only one post-Tindall case that deals with the amendment of prior conviction allegations after the jury has been discharged. Fortunately, it answers this question.
Under Gutierrez, then, a waiver of a jury trial on the prior convictions that are alleged in the original information is not effective — as a matter of law — as to entirely new prior conviction allegations that are added by amendment later.
An exception for minor amendments follows from the reasoning in Tindall, as elaborated in Gutierrez. Tindall held that the amendment there resulted in a violation of the defendant’s statutory right to have the same jury determine both guilt and the truth of the prior conviction allegations. This implicitly (but necessarily) means that the defendant’s waiver of a jury trial on the original prior conviction allegations did not extend to the amended allegations. Gutierrez made this explicit. However, in both Tindall and Gutierrez, the amendment was substantial — it added new prior conviction allegations, and thus it exposed the defendant to additional punishment. As discussed, when a defendant has waived a jury trial on prior conviction allegations, and when the prior conviction allegations are amended typographically and not substantially, the waiver remains binding. This is an exception to Tindall.
Second, defendant points out that McQuiston was decided before Tindall. Tindall, however, did not expressly overrule McQuiston nor any of the cases dealing with minor amendments that McQuiston cited. Moreover, because Tindall involved a substantial amendment, and because it was limited to its facts, it did not overrule these cases implicitly, either.
We agree that McQuiston did not deal with the precise issue that is before us. Nevertheless, it is an overarching rule that “[n]o accusatory pleading is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form which does not prejudice a substantial right of the defendant upon the merits.” (Pen. Code, § 960.) McQuiston is one instance of the application of this general principle; People v. Gary, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d 192, holding that a jury waiver remains effective after a minor or typographical amendment, is another. We conclude that Penal Code section 960 also qualifies Tindall.
We turn, then, to whether the amendments here were substantial, on the one hand, or minor, clerical, or typographical on the other hand.
Two of the amendments (of the second prison prior and the second prior serious felony) changed the date and place of the conviction from March 5, 2010 in Riverside County to July 24, 2013 in San Diego County. However, they did not change the offense (assault with a deadly weapon). Under McQuiston, such an amendment as to date and place is minor. Defendant does not claim and, on this record, cannot show that these amendments had a prejudicial effect on his defense, on his decision to waive a jury trial, on his decision to admit the priors, or otherwise.
The People argue that defendant had notice of the true date, place, and nature of the prior convictions because he had received the “prior conviction packets” in discovery. This argument falls short, for three reasons.
First and foremost, the People do not explain why Tindall would not apply, even assuming defendant did have notice. Tindall turns on the statutory right to a trial by the same jury, not on the right to notice. At most, it could be argued that if, when defendant waived a jury trial, he already had notice that the People intended to rely on the convictions alleged in the amended information, then his waiver remained in effect even after the amendment. However, the People cite no authority for this proposition.
Second, the record does not show when the prosecution produced prior conviction packets to the defense. It shows only that defense counsel did receive them; he discussed them with defendant on the date set for a court trial on the priors. If the prosecution did not produce them until after the jury was discharged, then defendant was still deprived of his right to the same jury under Penal Code section 1025.
Third, even after defendant received the packets, he had no way of knowing that the prosecution intended to rely on the actual July 24, 2013 conviction in San Diego County for assault in prison to prove up the alleged April 26, 2007 conviction in Riverside County for assault with a deadly weapon. The probation report shows that defendant did in fact have an April 26, 2007 juvenile adjudication in Riverside County for a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). He would naturally have assumed that the allegation related to this.
The People also point out that the trial court told defendant that the same two priors were alleged three ways: as prison priors, as prior serious felonies, and as strikes. Moreover, defendant said he understood. However, the trial court’s statement did not correctly describe the information as it stood at that point. Moreover, the statement was unclear. Which two priors were alleged three ways? The information alleged three different priors. Was defendant supposed to ignore the March 5, 2010 prior (later amended to a July 24, 2013 prior) and to assume it was the April 26, 2007 prior that was alleged three ways? Or vice versa? Or something else? Defendant cannot be understood as agreeing that he already knew what the prosecution would seek to charge him with later. Thus, the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to amend the first strike prior allegation after the jury had been discharged.
The error, however, was not preserved for appeal. Trial counsel’s failure to object constituted a forfeiture. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-592.) In Saunders, the trial court erred by discharging the jury after it found the defendant guilty but before it determined the truth of the prior conviction allegations. (Id. at p. 586.) The Supreme Court held that the defendant forfeited this error by failing to object to the discharge of the jury. (Id. at p. 591.) Here, by contrast, defendant had no reason to object to the discharge of the jury; at that point, he had waived a jury on the original prior conviction allegations, and the allegations had not yet been amended. Nevertheless, he had an obligation to object as soon as the error did become apparent. “‘“An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 589-590.) Like the defendants in both Tindall and Gutierrez, he could have objected when the prosecution asked to amend the information.
Here, there could be no satisfactory explanation for defense counsel’s failure to object. (See People v. Peyton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 642, 654 [there could be no satisfactory explanation for failure to object to adding new count].) Why on earth would you let your client receive a 25-years-to-life sentence, if you could avert that simply by objecting? Certainly the People do not suggest any explanation.
In sum, then, we conclude that the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to amend the second prison prior enhancement and second prior serious felony. However, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the amendment of the first strike. Accordingly, the first strike must be stricken and we must remand for resentencing.
Defendant contends that his admissions of the priors were invalid because he was not properly advised regarding either his constitutional rights or the penal effects of his admissions.
“Unlike the admonition of constitutional rights, however, advisement as to the consequences of [an admission] is not constitutionally mandated. Rather, the rule compelling such advisement is ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.’ [Citation.] The nonconstitutional basis of the rule has two consequences pertinent to this case.
B. Application to These Facts.
Defendant claims the advisements in this case were defective in five separate respects. Because the analysis differs depending on whether the trial court failed to correctly advise him (1) of his constitutional rights or (2) of the penal effect of an admission, we group defendant’s five contentions into these two categories.
1. Failure to advise of constitutional rights.
Defendant argues that, after the prior conviction allegations were amended, the trial court had to readvise him of his right to a jury trial and had to obtain a new waiver of that right.
As already discussed in part II, ante, a jury trial waiver remains effective if the information is amended in minor respects but becomes void if the information is amended substantially.
As also discussed, here, the amendments to the first strike were substantial. Thus, the trial court erred by failing to obtain a new waiver from defendant of his right to a jury trial on the first strike. The error, however, is moot, because we are striking the first strike. On the other hand, the amendments to the second prison prior and the second prior serious felony were minor. Accordingly, no new advisement and no new waiver were required with respect to them.
Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to advise him of his right against self-incrimination. This is true.
The People respond that the trial court did advise defendant of his right to testify; they argue that the right against self-incrimination was “[i]mplicit” in that advisement. We disagree. The trial court advised defendant that he would have the right to testify if he went to trial on the priors, and it asked if he was willing to give up that right and admit the priors. Presenting this as a binary decision left out the option of going to trial on the priors but not testifying.
Thus, the trial court did err. We turn to whether the record affirmatively shows that the admissions were voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.
Here, similarly, defendant had just undergone a jury trial, at which he did not testify. The record also shows that he had previously admitted juvenile delinquency allegations on four separate occasions; each time, he presumably was advised of his rights, including his right against self-incrimination. (See In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 320-321 [advisement requirements apply in juvenile proceedings].) Hence, under Mosby, we must conclude that the failure to advise defendant of his right against self-incrimination was harmless.
2. Failure to advise of penal effects.
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to advise him that admitting the strike priors would postpone his parole eligibility. Again, this is true.
The People respond that what extended defendant’s parole period was not his admission of the strikes, but rather the 15 percent limit on worktime credit that applies to violent felonies. (Pen. Code, § 2933.1.) Quite frankly, this argument makes no sense. The admission of the strikes increased defendant’s minimum parole period from 7 to 50 years. The trial court was required to advise defendant of this. The fact that Penal Code section 2933.1 also limited the application of worktime credits against defendant’s sentence is irrelevant (unless, as defendant argues, it was an additional penal effect of which the trial court failed to advise him).
The People argue that the information correctly annotated each prison prior as “[1yr.],” and each prior serious felony as “[5 yr.].” Even so, the trial court gave defendant a misleading advisement. This argument goes more to whether defendant was prejudiced, which we discuss below.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court’s advisement was misleading with regard to the effect of admitting just one strike. Yet again, this is true. The trial court stated, “[T]he strike prior adds a life term,” which suggested that the admission of even a single strike would result in a life term.
In sum, then, the trial court erred by not accurately advising defendant of these penal consequences.
Defense counsel, however, forfeited the errors by failing to object. Defendant does not contend that this constituted ineffective assistance.
In addition, defendant has not shown that it is reasonably probable that, if properly advised, he would not have made his admissions. His only argument on this point is with respect to the misadvisement that “[t]he strike prior adds a life term.” He posits that, if he thought the prosecution could prove one strike but not the other, this advisement would have discouraged him from contesting the weaker strike. He also claims that, in fact, the prosecution could not prove the first strike, because at that point, it was still alleged as a April 26, 2007 conviction of assault with a deadly weapon in Riverside County. This goes exclusively to whether he would have admitted the first strike. Once again, however, this is moot, because we are striking that strike. There is no reason to suppose that defendant would not have made all of the other admissions.
Defendant contends that his admission of the second strike was ineffective because it did not match the allegations of that strike, as amended.
The allegations regarding the second strike, as amended by interlineation, did not include the date of the conviction. They did allege that it occurred in Riverside County (despite the cryptic references to both “Riv” and “SD”) and that it was for assault with a deadly weapon. However, they also failed to allege the applicable Penal Code section.
The trial court orally ordered the second strike amended to assault with a deadly weapon in prison, on July 24, 2013, in San Diego County. By the end of the entire colloquy, however, it seems to have realized that that was the first strike. Thus, it never actually interlineated these changes. Moreover, when it asked defendant to admit the second strike, it described it — correctly — as assault with a deadly weapon on February 25, 2010 in Riverside County. Defendant admitted it as thus described.
In addition, a defendant can agree to be convicted of an uncharged offense, either expressly or by failing to object. (People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 973, 977-978, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 568, fn. 3.) We see no reason why the same principle should not apply to an uncharged prior conviction. Here, by admitting the unpleaded allegations that the prior conviction occurred on February 25, 2010 and was for a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), defendant forfeited the pleading defects.
The variance here was immaterial. (People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 123-124 [variance between allegation of murder in Los Angeles County and proof of murder in Kern County was not material].) All that really mattered was that the prior conviction qualified as a strike. Arguably, good practice required that the information plead the date, place, and applicable Penal Code section so that defendant could not complain that he did not have notice of exactly what conviction the second strike was based on; by admitting it, however, he forfeited any argument based on lack of notice. He does not claim that the confusion regarding these details prejudiced him.
Defendant contends that he is entitled to a remand so that he can be resentenced in light of Senate Bills No. 620 and No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 620 and SB 1393, respectively).
As mentioned, the jury found a personal firearm use enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)) to be true. As a result, the trial court imposed an additional consecutive 10-year term.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to the benefit of these ameliorative changes in the law. With respect to SB 620, the People concede the point; we agree. (People v. Robbins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 660, 678.) With respect to SB 1393, the People argue that the issue will not be ripe until January 1, 2019. However, absent some indication of a contrary legislative intent — and the People cite none — “‘[a]n amendatory statute lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute’s effective date’ [citation] . . . .” (People v. Dehoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 600. There is no possibility that our opinion will become final before January 1, 2019.
Finally, the People do not argue that it would be an abuse of discretion to strike the firearm enhancement or the prior serious felony enhancements. Accordingly, we will remand with directions to consider whether to strike these enhancements. We express no opinion on how the trial court should exercise its discretion.
The true finding on the first strike is reversed and stricken. The sentence is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. On remand, the trial court must resentence defendant in accordance with this opinion.

References: § 12022
 § 29800
 § 667
 § 667
 § 960
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 § 2933
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 § 12022
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