Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=84210:59749&amp;catid=1594&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:17:19+00:00

Document:
WALLEM PHILIPPINES SERVICES, INC. AND WALLEM SHIP MANAGEMENT, LTD., Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF THE LATE PETER PADRONES, Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 17, 2007 and May 19, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. SPNo. 94357.
Peter Padrones (Padrones) was employed as a "motorman" by petitioners on board the vessel M/V "Spirit" from December 30, 1998 to November 23, 1999.3 He finished his contract and was repatriated to the Philippines after completion thereof.
On April 25, 2001, Padrones died of cardio-respiratory arrest brought about by complications of lung cancer.4 Thereafter, or on July 18, 2001, herein respondents, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a Complaint5 against herein petitioners for recovery of death benefits, exemplary and moral damages, child allowance, burial expenses and attorney's fees arising from the death of Padrones. In their Position Paper,6 respondents alleged that Padrones' death is compensable because the cause of such death was aggravated by tuberculosis, an illness which he acquired during the existence of his contract.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing respondents Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. and Wallem Ship Management Ltd. to pay the complainants heirs of Peter Padrones, jointly and solidarity the sum of US$65,000.00 equivalent to death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, and attorney's fees [equivalent] to ten percent (10%) of the award as well as dismissing the prayer for damages for lack of merit.
The award is payable in Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment.
x x x "as over emphasized by appellant [herein petitioners] the seafarer [Padrones] passed away one year and five months from the time he finished his employment contract. The employment contract expired on October 30, 1999, but was repatriated on November 23, 1999; Mr. Padrones, the seafarer died on April 25, 2001. Clearly, the employment contract was no longer in force when the seafarer died. Applying the POEA SEC [Standard Employment Contract], complainants are not entitled to death benefits.
Respondents-appellants were able to belie appellee's allegation that complainant was repatriated due to medical reasons. Appellants submitted in evidence a copy of the CLAIM FORM filled up by Mr. Padrones when he reported to respondent's office after sign off from the vessel. In the said claim form, the deceased was asked of his claims, including claims for illness or injury. Mr. Padrones affixed, N/A or "not applicable."
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 but the NLRC denied it in its Resolution13 dated February 24, 2006.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 18, 2005 and the Resolution dated February 24, 2006, respectively, of the NLRC are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 30, 2003 of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED with a MODIFICATION that respondents should pay to Peter Padrones, herein represented by his heirs, the sum of US$60,000.00 as disability benefits to be paid in Philippine currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. The award of attorney's fees is likewise maintained.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,17 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated May 19, 2008.
The basic issue in the present case is whether the CA erred in awarding disability benefits in favor of respondents who were asking for death benefits.
Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the CA and the NLRC that herein respondents are not entitled to death benefits.
Thus, it is clear that for the death of a seafarer to be compensable, the same must occur during the term of his contract of employment.20 If the seaman dies after the termination of his contract, his beneficiaries are not entitled to death benefits.21 In the instant case, Padrones' employment contract ended on November 23, 1999. He died on April 25, 2001, more than one (1) year and five (5) months from the time his employment contract expired. It, therefore, follows that respondents, who are the beneficiaries of Padrones, are not entitled to death benefits.
Even if the Court were to consider the possibility of compensation for the death of Padrones after the termination of his employment contract on account of a work-related illness, respondents, nonetheless, did not present evidence to prove that he acquired lung cancer during his employment and that the said disease, which caused his death, was the reason for the termination of his contract. On the contrary, respondents claimed that Padrones was afflicted only with tuberculosis during his employment. In fact, they even failed to present substantial evidence to show that Padrones acquired this illness while he was employed nor were they able to prove their contention that it contributed to his death.
Not being entitled to death benefits, the question that follows now is whether respondents are, instead, entitled to the disability benefits awarded by the CA. The answer is no.
In their Comment to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision, as well as in their Comment to the present petition, respondents abandoned their claim for death benefits and focused solely on Padrones' supposed entitlement to disability benefits. However, nowhere in respondents' Comment did they refute petitioners' basic contention that they are not entitled to disability benefits on the ground that this issue was never litigated before the lower tribunals. Respondents argue as if the issue of their entitlement to disability benefits was a matter which was raised at the first instance. Respondents have, in effect, changed their theory of the case.
Settled is the rule that, in this jurisdiction, a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal.31 It affirms that courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.32 Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid.33 The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.34 The exception to this rule is when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.35 In such a case, the court may give due course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein.36 The instant case does not fall under this exception. To stress, the issue of whether or not Padrones or respondents, as his heirs, are entitled to disability benefits is a factual question that was never alleged, let alone proven before the LA, the NLRC and the CA. Understandably, petitioners did not present evidence before the lower tribunals to refute respondents' alleged entitlement to disability benefits because this was never an issue. It was only after the CA has awarded them disability benefits that respondents changed their theory by claiming that they are indeed entitled to such benefits instead of death benefits. Thus, respondents' belated change of their theory of the case should be disallowed and the instant petition granted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 17, 2007 and May 19, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94357 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, dated April 18, 2005, which dismissed respondents' Complaint, is REINSTATED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, concurring; Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 31-43.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, concurring; Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 44-47.
3 See Annexes "E," "F," and "G" to Petition, id. at 54-56.
4 See Annex "H" to Petition, id. at 57.
5 Annex "I" to Petition, id at 58-59.
6 CA rollo, pp. 43-58.
17 CA rollo, pp. 276-292.
19Yap v. Rover Maritime Services, Corp., G.R. No. 198342, August 13, 2014.
20Medline Management, Inc., et. al. v. Roslinda, et. al., 645 Phil., 34, 51 (2010); Ortega v. Court of Appeals, 576 Phil. 601, 605 (2008).
21Klmeness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony S. Alias, 566 Phil. 579, 586 (2008); Prudential Shipping and Management Corp. v. Sta. Rita, 544 Phil. 94, 106 (2007).
24 CA rollo, pp. 64-71.
27 See CA rollo, p. 66.
29Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc., 504 Phil. 564, 572 (2005).
30 See rollo, p. 22.
31Bote v. Veloso, G.R. No. 194270, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 758, 768.
37Panganiban v. Tara Trading Shipmanagement Inc., el. al., 647 Phil. 675, 691 (2010).

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