Source: http://academy.lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/people-v-sneed-2018-cal-app-unpub-lexis-397-ca-ct-app-2018/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:47:24+00:00

Document:
John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RAPHAEL, J.; [*] KRIEGLER, Acting P. J., BAKER, J. concurred.
A jury rejected defendant Vershonda Charisse Sneed’s self-defense claim and convicted her of first degree murder. The jury further found defendant personally and intentionally discharged a handgun causing death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life in state prison. We affirm the judgment of conviction but remand to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) as amended effective January 1, 2018.
The prosecution’s case at trial was that defendant shot the victim, Bobby King, in the presence of several witnesses, after her friendship with him had become strained. Defendant’s position at trial was that she acted in self-defense or defense of others.
Defendant had been close friends with King for several years. Defendant and Shawnta Sawyers were also friends. Defendant introduced Sawyers to King, and Sawyers and King became romantically involved. But the relationship between defendant and King then soured. Defendant testified she felt King had become arrogant and selfish and was using her.
Defendant further testified that as her relationship with King deteriorated, she began to fear him. Defendant had overheard King’s conversation with a coworker during which King referenced his gang affiliation and expressed an inclination to be violent. She had seen him physically assault a girlfriend. She was also present when King was “jumping out on” Sawyers’s then fiancé; King asked defendant for a gun because he wanted to show Sawyers’s fiancé “who he is.” One day in May 2015, a month prior to the shooting, defendant and King “had words,” which led King to say, “Shonnie, I’ll kill you.” Following that incident, defendant blocked King from calling her cell phone.
In early June 2015, defendant, a barber, gave King a haircut. King was unhappy when defendant put aftershave on the back of his neck because it burned. He told her he was going to leave before he hurt her. On June 20, 2015, King’s best friend, Taft, paid an unexpected visit to defendant at her home. Defendant testified Taft told her that if she could not straighten things out with King she would have to answer to Taft. Taft said, “[Y]ou already know how I get down.” According to defendant, Taft was known to physically assault people. The prosecution presented rebuttal evidence that neither King nor Taft was in the CalGangs database.
Defendant shot King on June 25, 2015. That day, prior to the shooting, defendant, King’s girlfriend Sawyers, and others had repeated conversations about King’s relationship with another woman. King was angry after he discovered Sawyers had learned about the other relationship. King was further upset when Sawyers said she needed space and they were better off as friends.
That evening, Sawyers, defendant, and defendant’s friend, Tyshonda Marie Powell, met at the home of Sawyers’s sister, Lakeysha Wright-Lee. Sawyers was on the phone with King when she saw that defendant and Powell were in front of Wright-Lee’s house. Before hanging up, Sawyers told King that defendant was there. The four women stood in the driveway talking. During a sometimes heated conversation, the woman discussed what Sawyers and Wright-Lee apparently perceived as defendant’s interference in Sawyers and King’s relationship. Defendant disavowed any intention to intrude and apologized if Sawyers felt she had. At that point, King arrived, got out of his vehicle and approached the women.
Defendant and Powell fled the scene in defendant’s vehicle but were quickly apprehended. King suffered multiple gunshot wounds. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
Defendant testified she believed King was a gang member who carried a firearm. She told the jury she thought she saw “something chrome” in defendant’s hand when he approached. Defendant further testified she acted in self-defense after King attacked Powell and her. Defendant said King repeatedly punched her in the head and face until she briefly lost consciousness. She was bleeding from her mouth and nose. King also held Powell by the hair and repeatedly punched her.
None of the eyewitnesses saw King attack Powell or defendant. There was little if any physical evidence corroborating defendant’s description of the assault. The deputy who arrested defendant did not see any injuries to her face. King did not have any injuries to his hands. No weapon was found on King’s person. However, defendant’s aunt testified that after she introduced herself to Sawyers in a courthouse bathroom, Sawyers told her King had been “all over” defendant and Powell, meaning he was punching them.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred because the prosecutor improperly elicited the challenged testimony to create clear innuendo defense counsel would do anything for his client including present perjured testimony.
Defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claim fails. The prosecutor’s single question did not constitute a pattern of conduct so egregious as to render defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair in violation of her federal constitutional due process rights. Nor, under state law, was the prosecutor’s question a deceptive or reprehensible attempt to persuade the jury. The prosecutor did not impugn defense counsel’s integrity. The simple fact that defendant was represented at trial by her material uncle did not give rise to any reasonable inference counsel was willing to suborn perjury to help his client. Stated differently, knowledge of the familial relationship alone had no tendency to persuade the jury that defense counsel colluded with defendant’s mother or aunt (also a defense witness) to help defendant. To come to that conclusion would require an unsupported leap. While the jurors might naturally suspect defendant’s mother and aunt of wanting to help defendant, there was no reason for them to believe defendant’s trial attorney would actively encourage those witnesses to lie. The prosecutor at no time suggested defense counsel had coached witnesses to lie. The prosecutor made no further reference to the familial relationship. Additionally, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the question and answer. The jury is presumed to have followed the trial court’s timely admonition. (People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 961.) And even assuming the prosecutor’s inquiry was misconduct under state law, given that defendant shot King in front of multiple witnesses, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to her absent the challenged testimony.
For the same reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the matter curable by admonition and denying defendant’s mistrial motion. (People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 953.) “‘In reviewing rulings on motions for mistrial, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] “A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 921, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 253 P.3d 185.) For the reasons discussed above, the trial court could reasonably conclude the isolated reference to defendant’s representation by her uncle was not incurably prejudicial. There was no abuse of discretion.
Defendant argues the trial court violated her federal constitutional rights when it excluded evidence offered to show she feared King and to counter prosecution evidence King was not a gang member. The trial court allowed some evidence defendant feared King because he was gang-affiliated and prone to violence. However, the trial court excluded: a video clip found on defendant’s cell phone purportedly capturing King bragging about his gang membership; defendant’s proposed testimony that King’s fellow gang members spoke in her presence about “things that [King] ha[d] done as it relates to homicides”; and defendant’s proposed testimony she believed Taft was a gang member. The trial court excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352.
We find no abuse of discretion. With respect to the video clip, the record on appeal does not include any direct evidence of its content. But the trial court viewed the short clip. The court said it depicted King “bragging about celebrating a gang.” The court made a reasoned finding, however, that the clip was not evidence King was a gang member. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, we do not have reason to conclude that the excluded video clip provided evidence King was a gang member nor that it rebutted the prosecution’s evidence.
As to the events in Las Vegas, the proffered conversation consisted of King’s alleged fellow gang members’ statements in defendant’s presence about “things that [King] had done as it relates to homicides.” Defense counsel argued, “[A]s a result of that conversation, that’s when [defendant] says that she realized at that time who [King] really is and then she was afraid of him.” The trial court could reasonably conclude that what King’s purported fellow gang members had to say about King’s prior conduct—even if the statements were made in defendant’s and King’s presence—had only slight if any probative value with respect to defendant’s claim she feared King because of his gang affiliation. On the other hand, the evidence was inherently prejudicial to the victim. It was not an abuse of discretion to conclude the evidence was excludable under section 352.
With respect to Taft, the trial court ruled defendant could testify to what Taft said to her (and she did), but “without mentioning his alleged gang membership.” Defendant argues her knowledge Taft was King’s fellow gang member was relevant to her fear of Taft and King. But defendant’s purported fear of Taft had no direct bearing on her fear of King. Although defendant described Taft as King’s best friend, there was no evidence connecting King with Taft’s statements and actions on the date he visited defendant’s home. The trial court could reasonably conclude defendant’s testimony she believed Taft was a gang member had only slight if any probative value with respect to her self defense claim.
Defendant also relies on Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a). That reliance is misplaced. Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a), sets forth an exception to the rule that character evidence is inadmissible to prove conduct. Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a) states: “In a criminal action, evidence of the character or a trait of character (in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct) of the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is: [¶] (a) Offered by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in conformity with the character or trait of character. [¶] (2) Offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the defendant under paragraph (1).” Evidence of King’s purported gang membership was not offered to prove he acted in conformity with his gang affiliation during the altercation with defendant. As noted above, there was no evidence King’s murder was gang-related. Instead, the evidence was offered to show defendant had reason to fear King. But, as noted above, the question central to defendant’s self-defense claim was not whether she feared King in general but whether he physically assaulted Powell and her and whether she was in reasonable fear of him when she shot him. Defendant’s self-defense claim failed not because of the excluded evidence challenged here but because eyewitnesses to the shooting never saw King physically assault defendant or Powell and there was scant if any evidence otherwise corroborating that claim.
Even if defendant’s first argument was properly before us, we would not find any prosecutorial misconduct. A prosecutor may not appeal to the jury’s passion or prejudice in closing argument during the guilt phase of a trial. (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1250, 278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899.) It is misconduct to appeal for sympathy for the victim. (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1130, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27, 33 P.3d 450.) Here, the prosecutor described King’s murder in zealous terms—”leave [him] to die on the sidewalk,” “take their last breath on earth,” and “deprive [him] of the chance to ever say goodbye to [his] family.” But the prosecutor did not ask the jurors to put themselves in the victim’s place, describe the loss caused by the victim’s death, or otherwise appeal to their sympathies. (Cf. People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 868, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270 [“put yourselves . . . in [the relatives’] position and imagine the loss”]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 772, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250 [“think about how you would feel if it were your baby”].) There was no misconduct.
On the merits of defendant’s second contention, the prosecutor’s comments did not indicate that defendant bore the burden of proof or that she had an affirmative evidentiary burden to create reasonable doubt. The prosecutor’s point, in context, was a comment on defendant’s credibility and the lack of evidence corroborating her self-defense claim. This was proper argument. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) As the Supreme Court held in Bradford, “[a] distinction clearly exists between the permissible comment that a defendant has not produced any evidence, and on the other hand an improper statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her innocence. (Ibid.) It is not reasonably likely the jury construed or applied the prosecutor’s remarks as placing a burden on defendant other than to provide credible evidentiary support for her defense.
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, on which defendant relies, is distinguishable. There the prosecutor discussed reasonable doubt stating, “There has to be some evidence on which to base a doubt,” and “There must be some evidence from which there is a reason for a doubt.” (Id. at p. 831, italics omitted.) The Supreme Court found the comments were somewhat ambiguous, but “to the extent [the prosecutor] was claiming there must be some affirmative evidence demonstrating a reasonable doubt, she was mistaken as to the law, for the jury may simply not be persuaded by the prosecution’s evidence. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded it was “reasonably likely [the prosecutor’s] comments, taken in context, were understood by the jury to mean defendant had the burden of producing evidence to demonstrate a reasonable doubt of his guilt.” (Id. at p. 832.) Here, the prosecutor did not misstate the law on reasonable doubt or argue defendant had a burden to prove her innocence. He simply commented on defendant’s failure to present credible evidence in support of her defense.
Defendant forfeited the present argument by failing to object and request an admonition in the trial court. (People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1328.) An objection would not have been futile, nor would an admonition have been insufficient to cure any harm. (Ibid.) Defendant does not argue otherwise.
As of January 1, 2018, the trial court has discretion to strike or dismiss section 12022.53 firearm enhancements. We conclude this case must be remanded for the trial court to determine whether it wishes to exercise its discretion to resentence defendant.
In supplemental briefing, defendant has asked this court to apply the recent amendment to her case. In response, the Attorney General concedes the current version of section 12022.53, subdivision (h) applies retroactively to the present case and we agree. (People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 76, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 742, 745, 748, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) The trial court now has the discretion, if it elects to resentence defendant, to strike or dismiss the present firearm enhancement allegation or finding under section 12022.53.
The Attorney General argues, however, that a remand for resentencing is unnecessary as the record shows the trial court would not in any event have exercised that discretion. (People v. Gutierrez (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1894, 1896, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529.) In Guitierrez, Division Two of this appellate district held in a similar context that a remand for resentencing is not required when “the record shows that the sentencing court clearly indicated that it would not, in any event, have exercised its discretion to strike the [prior conviction] allegations.” (Ibid.) We disagree with the Attorney General’s position.
We cannot conclude on the present record that the trial court clearly indicated it would not have in any event exercised discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement allegations or findings. As a result, we will remand this matter for the trial court to determine whether it wishes to resentence defendant. The Attorney General correctly notes that in the trial court’s view the present crime was “one of those crimes where really it doesn’t make sense”: “When you think of the fact that the defendant and the victim were friends, good friends, and we have a young lady in front of us who had no prior criminal history, and, yet, carried out a crime that really was an execution. This young man did not deserve to be killed and he certainly did not deserve to be killed in the fashion in which he was.” Consistent with the probation officer’s report, the court found the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The court noted, as factors in aggravation, that “the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, and disclos[ed] a high degree of cruelty, viciousness and callousness on the part of [the defendant],” and the manner in which the crime was carried out “indicated . . . planning, sophistication, and professionalism.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(8).) The sole but arguably significant and compelling factor in mitigation was defendant’s lack of a criminal record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(1).) The probation department recommended the imposition of “a mid-base term.” But the trial court was obligated by statute to impose 25 years to life for first degree murder and a consecutive 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 263, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.) The trial court had, at the time, no discretion whatsoever to impose any lesser sentence. While there is nothing to indicate that the trial court will reduce the sentence using its newly recognized discretion, there is an insufficient basis to conclude that the court clearly indicated it would not do so.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. This matter is remanded to allow defendant to file a motion requesting the trial court exercise its discretion to resentence defendant pursuant to section 1385, or for the trial court to consider whether it wishes to act on its own motion to do so, given section 12022.53, subdivision (h) as amended effective January 1, 2018.
1. Further statutory references are to the Penal Code except where otherwise noted.
2. Powell was charged with being an accessory after the fact. (§ 32.) However, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on that count.

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