Source: https://lonang.com/library/reference/story-commentaries-us-constitution/sto-342/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:45:54+00:00

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Sec. 1829. Reasonable as this provision seems to be, it did not wholly escape the animadversions of that critical spirit, which was perpetually on the search to detect defects, and to disparage the merits of the constitution. It was said, that the validity of all engagements made to, as well as made by, the United States, ought to have been expressly asserted. It is surprising, that the authors of such an objection should have overlooked the obvious consideration, that, as all engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on one side, necessarily involves their validity on the other; and that, as this article is but declaratory, the establishment of it in debts entered into by the government, unavoidably included a recognition of it in engagements with the government.6 The shorter and plainer answer is that pronounced by the law of nations, that states neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their civil government.7 More was scarcely necessary, than to have declared, that all future contracts by and with the United States should be valid, and binding upon the parties.
Sec. 1833. It is melancholy to reflect, that, conclusive as this view of the subject is in favour of the supremacy clause, it was assailed with great vehemence and zeal by the adversaries of the constitution; and especially the concluding clause, which declared the supremacy, “any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”20 And yet this very clause was but an expression of the necessary meaning of the former clause, introduced from abundant caution, to make its obligation more strongly felt by the state judges. The very circumstance, that any objection was made, demonstrated the utility, nay the necessity of the clause, since it removed every pretence, under which ingenuity could, by its miserable subterfuges, escape from the controlling power of the constitution.
1. See Journ. of Convention, 291.
2. See Jackson v. Luun, 3 John. Cas. 109; Kelly v. Harrison, 2 John. Cas. 29; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 50.
3. See Rutherforth, Inst. B. 2, ch. 9, § 1, 2; Id. ch. 10, § 14; Vattel, Prelim. Dis. § 2, 9; B. 2, ch. 1, § 1, ch. 5, § 64, ch. 14, § 214, 215, 216.
4. The Federalist, No. 43; Rutherforth, Inst. B. 2, ch. 10, § 14, 15; Grotius, B. 2, ch. 9, § 8, 9.
5. 1 Tuck Black. Comm. App. 368; Confederation, Art. 12.
6. The Federalist, No. 43, No. 84.
7. The Federalist, No. 84; Rutherforth, B. 2, ch. 10, § 14, 15; Grotius, B. 2, ch. 9, § 8, 9.
8. See Journal of Convention, p. 222, 282, 293.
9. The Federalist, No. 33. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. R. 210, 211; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. R. 405, 406.–This passage from the Federalist (No. 33) has been, for another purpose, already cited in Vol. I. § 340; but it is necessary to be here repeated to give due effect to the subsequent passages.
10. Ibid. See also 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 369, 370.
11. See The Federalist, No. 64.
12. See Act of Congress, 7th July, 1798, ch. 84; Talbot v. Seaman, I Cranch, 1; Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 362, Per Iredell J.
13. Ware v. HyIton, 3 Dall. R. 199. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. R. 210, 211; Letter of Congress of 13th April, 1787; 12 Journ. of Congress, 39.
15. Circular Letter of Congress, 13th April, 1787; 12 Journ. of Congress, 32 to 36.
16. See the opinion of Iredell J. in Ware v. Hylton 3 Dall. 270 to 277.
17. Id. 276, 277. See Journal of Convention, p. 222, 282, 283, 293.
18. The importance of this power has been practically illustrated by the redress afforded by courts of law in cases pending before them upon treaty stipulations. See United States v. The Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103; Ware v. Hylton; 3 Dall. R. 199, 244, 261; United States v. Arradondo, 6 Peters’s R. 691; Soulard v. Smith, 4 Peters’s Sup. R. 511; Cue of Jonathan Robbins, 1 Hall’s Journ. of Jurisp. 25; Bees Adm’rs Rap. 263; 5 Wheat. Rap. App.
20. See The Federalist, No. 44, 64.
21. The Federalist, No. 44.
22. The question arose in the debate for carrying into effect the British Treaty of 1794.
23. See Journal of House of Representatives, 6th April, 1796; 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, ch. 6, p. 650 to 659; Serg. on Const. ch. 33, p. 401, (2d edit. ch. 34, p. 410, 411); 1 Debates on British Treaty, by F. Bache, 1796, p. 374 to 386; 4 Elliot’s Deb. 244 to 246. — President Washington, on this occasion, refused to deliver the papers respecting the British Treaty of 1794, called for by the house of representatives; and asserted the obligatory force of the treaty upon congress in the most emphatic terms. He added, that be knew, that this was understood in the convention to be the intended interpretation, and he referred to the Journal of the Conventiona to show, that a proposition was made, “that no treaty should be binding on the United States, which Was not ratified by a law;” and that it was explicitly rejected. (5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, ch. 8, p. 654 to 658.) At a much earlier period, viz. in 1790, the same point came before the cabinet of President Washington in a treaty proposed with the Creek Indians. Upon that occasion, there seems to have been no doubt in the minds of any of his cabinet of the conclusiveness of a treaty containing commercial stipulations. Mr. Jefferson, on that occasion, firmly maintained it. A treaty, (said he,) made by the president with the concurrence of two thirds of the senate is the law of the land, and a law of a superior order, because it not only repeals past laws, but cannot itself be repealed by future ones. The treaty then will legally control the duty acta and the act for securing traders in thin particular instance. Yet Mr. Jefferson after-wards, (in Nov. 1793,) seems to have fluctuated in opinion, and to have been unsettled, as to the nature and extent of the treaty- making power. 4 Jefferson’s Corresp. 497, 498.
a. See Journal of Convention, p. 284, 325, 326, 333, 342, 343.
24. Serg. on Const. ch. 33, p. 402, (2d edit.ch. 34, p. 411; 2 Elliot’s Deb. 273 to 279. — Upon this occasion, a most admirable speech was delivered by the late William Pinkney, in which his great powers of reasoning and juridical learning had an ample scope. See Wheaton’s Life of Pinkney, p. 517.
25. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 176.
26. Calder V. Bull, 3 Dall. R. 386; S.C. 1 Peters’s Cond. R. 172, 177.
27. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters’s Sup. R. 380, 413.

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