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Timestamp: 2013-06-19 02:15:46+00:00

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Alex NGIRAINGAS, et al., Petitioners v. Francisco Q. SANCHEZ, etc., et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
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495 U.S. 182 (110 S.Ct. 1737, 109 L.Ed.2d 163)
[HTML] Syllabus Petitioners filed suit in the District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against respondentsthe Guam Government, the Guam Police Department and its Director in her official capacity, and various police officers in their official and individual capacities alleging that petitioners were arrested and assaulted by the officers and forced to write and sign confessions. The District Court dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal with respect to the government, the police department, and the individual defendants in their official capacities. Analogizing the Government of Guam to an administrative agency, the court ruled that Guam and the police department are no more than federal instrumentalities and thus are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983, which in its current version relates to "every person who acts under color of any statute . . . of any State or Territory." The court also found that the Guam officials could not be sued in their official capacities, because a judgment against them in such capacities would affect the public treasury and the suit essentially would be one against the government itself.
(c) The statute's successive enactments, in context, further reveal the lack of any congressional intent to include Territories as persons. In the 1871 version, persons could not possibly have included Territories, because Territories are not States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and could not have been persons acting under color of state law. Cf. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45. This reading is supported by § 1983's next enactment in 1874, when Congress first added the phrase "or Territory," thus making it possible for a person acting under color of territorial law to be held liable. At the same time, however, Congress pointedly redefined the word "person" in the "Dictionary Act"which supplied rules of construction for all legislationto exclude Territories. Pp. 189-192.
In this case we must decide whether a Territory or an officer of the Territory acting in his or her official capacity is a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1982 ed.).
* Petitioners Alex Ngiraingas, Oscar Ongklungel, Jimmy Moses, Arthur Mechol, Jonas Ngeheed, and Bolandis Ngiraingas filed suit in the District Court of Guam, alleging numerous constitutional violations and seeking damages under § 1983.
The District Court dismissed the claims against the Government of Guam and the police department on the ground that Guam was immune from suit under the Organic Act of Guam, 64 Stat. 384, § 3, as amended, 48 U.S.C. 1421a (1982 ed.), unless Congress or the Guam Legislature waived Guam's immunity. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-4 to A-6. The District Court also dismissed the action against the individual defendants in their official capacities, explaining that because a judgment against the individuals in their official capacities would affect the public treasury, the real party in interest was the Government of Guam. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 858 F.2d 1368 (1988) (superseding the opinion at 849 F.2d 372). Analogizing the government to an administrative agency, the court ruled that Guam is "no more than" a federal instrumentality, and thus is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. 858 F.2d, at 1371-1372. "For the same reasons," the police department, also, is not a person under § 1983. Id., at 1372. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Guam officials may not be sued in their official capacities under § 1983, because a judgment against those defendants in their official capacities would affect the public treasury and the suit essentially would be one against the government itself. Ibid.
Because of the importance of the question, and because at least one other Court of Appeals has advanced a different view as to whether a Territory is subject to liability under § 1983,
we granted certiorari, 493 U.S. 807, 110 S.Ct. 48, 107 L.Ed.2d 17 (1989).
Among other things, the Act provided for an elected governor and established Guam as an unincorporated Territory. 48 U.S.C. 1421a and 1422 (1982 ed.). It was said at the time that this unincorporated status did not promise eventual statehood. See H.R.Rep. No. 1365, App. No. 3, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1949). The United States continues to this day to have a military presence in Guam, with an Air Force base, a Navy communications base, air and weather stations, and a large complex that serves the Seventh Fleet.
To determine whether Guam constitutes a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, we examine the statute's language and purpose. The current version relates to "every person who acts under color of any statute . . . of any State or Terri tory." The statute itself obviously affords no clue as to whether its word "person" includes a Territory. We seek, therefore, indicia of congressional intent at the time the statute was enacted. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425, 93 S.Ct. 602, 606, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973) (analysis of purposes and scope of § 1983 must "take cognizance of the events and passions of the time at which it was enacted"). See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1161, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966).
Our review of § 1983's history uncovers no sign that Congress was thinking of Territories when it enacted the statute over a century ago in 1871. The historical background shows with stark clarity that Congress was concerned only with events "stateside." "Section 1983 was originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Act was enacted for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 354, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1152, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); see also Carter, 409 U.S., at 423, 93 S.Ct., at 605 ("Section 1983 has its roots in § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871"). After the War Between the States, race relations in the Southern States were troubled. The Ku Klux Klan, organized by southern whites, commenced "a wave of murders and assaults . . . against both blacks and Union sympathizers." Id., at 425, 93 S.Ct., at 607. Congress was worried "about the insecurity of life and property in the South," and designed § 1 of the Act "primarily in response to the unwillingness or inability of the state governments to enforce their own laws against those violating the civil rights of others." Id., at 425-426, 93 S.Ct., at 606-607 (emphasis added).
"The debates are replete with references to the lawless conditions existing in the South in 1871. There was available to the Congress during these debates a report, nearly 600 pages in length, dealing with the activities of the Klan and the inability of the state governments to cope with it. This report was drawn on by many of the speakers" (footnote omitted). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174, 81 S.Ct. 473, 477, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (overruled in certain other respects by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).
Because Congress was directly concerned with this unrest in the Southern States, it specifically focused on States in the legislation aimed at solving the problem. "As initially enacted, § 1 of the 1871 Act applied only to action under color of the law of any 'State.' 17 Stat. 13."
Carter, 409 U.S., at 424, n. 11, 93 S.Ct., at 606, n. 11. Persons acting under color of law of any Territory were not included. Viewed against "the events and passions of the time," id., at 425, 93 S.Ct., at 606, it is evident that Congress was not concerned with Territories when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, but was concerned, instead, with the "hundreds of outrages committed . . . through the agency of this Ku Klux organization that had not been punished" in the Southern States. Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 505 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Pratt). As to Congress' failure to include persons acting under color of law of any Territory, "we can only conclude that this silence on the matter is itself a significant indication of the legislative intent of § 1." Quern, 440 U.S., at 343, 99 S.Ct., at 1146. The omission demonstrates that Congress did not mean to subject Territories to liability under this statute.
Finally, the successive enactments of the statute, in context, further reveal the lack of any intent on the part of Congress to include Territories as persons. In 1871, the Act exposed to liability "any person actingunder color of any law . . . of any State." Act of Apr. 20, 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. Such persons in the 1871 Act could not possibly have included a Territory because "Territories are not 'States' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment," and a Territory could not have been a "person acting under color of" any state law. Carter, 409 U.S., at 424, n. 11, 93 S.Ct., at 606, n. 11. Any attempt to interpret "person" as including a "Territory" would be too strained a reading of the statute and would lead to a far more "awkward" interpretation than what a majority of the Court found significant in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (to read § 1983 as saying that " 'every person including a State, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects. . .' " would be "a decidedly awkward way of expressing an intent to subject the States to liability").
This reading of the original statute is supported by its next enactment. In 1874, the phrase "or Territory" was added to § 1, without explanation, in the 1874 codification and revision of the United States Statutes at Large. Rev.Stat. § 1979. See Carter, 409 U.S., at 424, n. 11, 93 S.Ct., at 606, n. 11. But while the 1874 amendment exposed to liability "every person acting under color of any law . . . of any . . . Territory," it did not expose a Territory itself to liability. In the same revision that added "Territory" to § 1, Congress amended § 2 of the Act of Feb. 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 431 (the "Dictionary Act"), "which supplied rules of construction for all legislation." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S., at 719, 98 S.Ct., at 2050 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); see also Will, 491 U.S., at 78, 109 S.Ct., at 2316 (BRENNAN, J. dissenting). In 1871, § 2 of the Dictionary Act defined "person" as including "bodies politic and corporate."
The 1874 recodification omitted those three words and substituted "partnerships and corpora tions."
It is significant that at the time Congress added "Territory" to § 1983, so that a person acting under color of territorial law could be liable under the statute, Congress clarified the definition of those whose actions could give rise to § 1983 liability. Most significant is the asserted reason for doing so:
"The reasons for the latter change substituting 'partnerships and corporations' for 'bodies politic and corporate' are that partnerships ought to be included; and even if the phrase 'bodies politic' is precisely equivalent to 'corporations,' it is redundant; but if, on the contrary, 'body politic' is somewhat broader, and should be understood to include a government, such as a State, while "corporation" should be confined to an association of natural persons on whom government has conferred continuous succession, then the provision goes further than is convenient. It requires the draughtsman, in the majority of cases of employing the word 'person,' to take care that States, Territories, foreign governments, &c., appear to be excluded." 1 Revision of the United States Statutes as Drafted 19 (1872).
It is evident that Congress did not intend to encompass a Territory among those "persons" who could be exposed to § 1983 liability. "Just as 'we are not at liberty to seek ingenious analytical instruments' to avoid giving a congressional enactment the broad scope its language and origins may require, United States v. Price, 383 U.S., at 801 86 S.Ct., at 1160, so too are we not at liberty to recast this statute to expand its application beyond the limited reach Congress gave it." Carter, 409 U.S., at 432, 93 S.Ct., at 610.
We hold that neither the Territory of Guam nor its officers acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983.
Today the Court holds that neither a Territory nor an officer of the Territory acting in his or her official capacity is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983.
I believe that the opposite conclusion is compelled by the history, legislative and otherwise, surrounding the passage of § 1983 and by the absence of any immunity on the part of Territories from congressional enactments. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
"Since the District is itself the seat of the National Government, Congress was in a position to observe and, to a large extent, supervise the activities of local officials. Thus, the rationale underlying Congress' decision not to enact legislation similar to § 1983 with respect to federal officialsthe assumption that the Federal Government could keep its own officers under controlis equally applicable to the situation then existing in the District of Columbia." Id., at 429-430, 93 S.Ct., at 608-609 (footnote omitted).
We noted, however, that the situation in the other Territories was dramatically different. While acknowledging that, as a legal matter, "Congress also possessed plenary power over the Territories," id., at 430, 93 S.Ct., at 609, we noted that "for practical reasons, however, effective federal control over the activities of territorial officials was virtually impossible." Ibid. We explained:
" 'The territories were not ruled immediately from Washington; in a day of poor roads and slow mails, it was unthinkable that they should be. Rather, Congress left municipal law to be developed largely by the territorial legislatures, within the framework of organic acts and subject to a retained power of veto. The scope of self-government exercised under these delegations was nearly as broad as that enjoyed by the States.' " Id., at 430-431, 93 S.Ct., at 609, quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1470-1471, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
Our recognition in Carter that Congress was concerned with the protection of civil rights in the Territories when it fashioned the scope of § 1983 is fully supported by the historical events surrounding the statute's enactment. In the years preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, turmoil and racially motivated violence in the Territories focused Congress' attention on the need for federal protection of basic civil rights there. The Territories, of course, had been a principal source of friction between the North and the South before the Civil War.
The idea of "squatter sovereignty," advanced by Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois and enshrined in the Compromise of 1850, allowed citizens of each Territory to decide for themselves whether they would join the Union as citizens of a slave or free State. The Compromise of 1850 provided that the admissions of Utah and New Mexico were to be governed by "squatter sovereignty," and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 extended the principle to those Territories as well. The resulting disputes within the Territories between abolitionist and proslavery groups gave rise to rampant acts of violence, the best illustration of which has come to be known as "bleeding Kansas."
were very much on Congress' mind when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Congress would not have discussed the Territories so often in its deliberations unless it intended the Act to apply there. Proponents of the measure stressed the important role the Federal Government had played in curbing the prewar spread of slavery in the Territories. See, e.g., Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 335 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Hoar) ("The great Northwest was saved from slavery by the national power. . . . If it had not been for the benignant interposition of the national authority against the local desire to establish despotism, those great States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin would have been today slave-holding States"). Some legislators drew an explicit linkage between the Civil Rights Act and violence in the Territories, characterizing opponents of the legislation as "the same men who were wont to ridicule 'bleeding Kansas.' " Id., at 414 (remarks of Rep. Roberts). Others emphasized the importance of extending to "every individual citizen of the Republic in every State and Territory of the Union . . . the extent of the rights guarantied to him by the Constitution." See id., at App. 81 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) (emphasis added); see also id., at App. 86 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) (referring to "justice for all . . . on the frontiers of your widely extended domain").
The Civil Rights Act was intended "to protect and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people" and thus to be "liberally and beneficently construed." Id., at App. 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) (emphasis added). In sum, Congress contemplated that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 would extend to the Territories.
See Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2600-2602 (1866). The organic Acts establishing territorial governments were amended to provide that:
"There shall be no denial of the elective franchise in any of the Territories of the United States, now, or hereafter to be organized, to any citizen thereof, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and all acts or parts of acts, either of Congress or the Legislative Assemblies of said Territories, inconsistent with the provisions of this act, are hereby declared null and void." 14 Stat. 380 (1867).
demonstrate that Congress intended Territories to be considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983. Of course, the specific reference to "Territory" in § 1983's predecessor was not added until 1874, some three years after the initial passage of the Civil Rights Act. But this is of no moment. Although there is no legislative history to explain the addition,
see Carter, 409 U.S., at 424, n. 11, 93 S.Ct., at 606, n. 11, we have noted that "the evident aim was to insure that all persons residing in the Territories not be denied, by persons acting under color of territorial law, rights guaranteed them by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 582-583, 96 S.Ct., at 2271-2272. Congress' overriding concern lay in providing strong remedies for civil rights violations in the Territories. Because few measures are more effective than suing the government directly for damages, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-656, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1415-1418, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 357-365, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1153-1157, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment), I believe that Congress intended a Territory to fall within the class of "persons" potentially liable under § 1983.
Even were I to accept the Court's premise that whether Territories are "persons" for purposes of § 1983 must be analyzed in light of the 1874 recodification of the Dictionary Act, I would reach the same conclusion. Although the recodification eliminated the reference to "body politic," this change did not exclude Territories from the scope of § 1983 because the recodification also provided that "the word 'person' may extend and be applied to partnerships and corporations," id., at 19 (emphasis added). At the time of the revision the term "corporation" generally was thought to include political entities such as a Territory. See Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., 451 (1867) (remarks of Rep. Bingham) (referring to the Territory of Nebraska as "a corporation"). "The word 'corporations,' in its largest sense, has a more extensive meaning than people generally are aware of. Any body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be restricted or transcendent is in this sense 'a corporation.' " Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 447, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793) (Iredell, J.).
A Territory thus would qualify as a "person" even under the 1874 recodification of the Dictionary Act.
Even if the Eleventh Amendment reflects a common-law principle of state sovereign immunity against actions in federal courta view I do not accept, see Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258-302, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3155-3177, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting)the Constitution certainly does not embody such a form of common-law immunity applicable to Territories.
The plenary nature of federal authority over the Territories dispels any suggestion that they may assert a common-law immunity against a federal claim in a federal court. The Territories Clause provides without qualification that "the Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. An unincorporated Territory "exists at the behest of Congress. By a simple vote of the Congress, the Organic Act under which the unincorporated territory exists may be repealed and the limited self government which it enjoys nullified." Brief for Government of Virgin Islands as Amicus Curiae 8.
"The Government of a State does not derive its powers from the United States, while the Government of a Territory owes its existence wholly to the United States. . . . The jurisdiction and authority of the United States over that Territory and its inhabitants, for all legitimate purposes of government, is paramount." Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354, 27 S.Ct. 749, 755, 51 L.Ed. 1084 (1907). Congress has "entire dominion and sovereignty" and "full legislative power" over the Territories. Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168, 20 S.Ct. 58, 60, 44 L.Ed. 115 (1899); see also Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 491, 24 S.Ct. 816, 817, 48 L.Ed. 1087 (1904); Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42-43, 45, 10 S.Ct. 792, 802-803, 34 L.Ed. 478 (1890). "Congress may make a void Act of the territorial government valid, and a valid Act void. In other words, it has full and complete legislative authority over the People of the Territories and all the departments of the territorial governments." National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133, 25 L.Ed. 1046 (1880); see also Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332, 336-337, 3 L.Ed. 240 (1810); American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 542-543, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828). Whatever limits the Constitution imposes on the exercise of federal power in the Territories, see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (discussing the Insular Cases), sovereign immunity is not one of them.
We have recognized the concept of sovereign immunity "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, 27 S.Ct. 526, 527, 51 L.Ed. 834 (1907). Our understanding of common-law sovereign immunity does not protect against liability under the laws of a superior governmental authority. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S., at 647-648 and n. 30, 100 S.Ct., at 1413, and n. 30. In addition, while the concept of immunity may afford a sovereign protection from suit "in its own courts without its consent, . . . it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 1186, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979). These principles lead ineluctably to the conclusion that although a Territory may retain common-law sovereign immunity against claims raised in its own courts under its own local laws, see Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253, 262, 264, 58 S.Ct. 167, 171, 172, 82 L.Ed. 235 (1937); Porto Rico v. Rosaly, 227 U.S. 270, 273-274, 33 S.Ct. 352, 353, 57 L.Ed. 507 (1913); Kawananakoa, supra, 205 U.S., at 353-354, 27 S.Ct., at 527, a Territory, particularly an unincorporated Territory such as Guam that is not destined for statehood, see Rosaly, supra, 227 U.S., at 274, 33 S.Ct., at 353, can have no immunity against a claim like the one herea suit in federal court based on federal law.
Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1982 ed.) reads in full:
The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent police officers could be sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities to the extent they were not entitled to immunity. The court determined that the police officers were not entitled to immunity from suit in their individual capacities by virtue of § 3 of the Organic Act, as amended, 48 U.S.C. 1421a (1982 ed.). 858 F.2d, at 1373. In the court's view, that provision applied only to suits against the Government of Guam and, perhaps, suits against government officers acting in their official capacities. Ibid. Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant officers were entitled to invoke qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the District Court's dismissal of the action against the police officers in their individual capacities and directed the District Court partially to reinstate the complaint and to consider whether the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 858 F.2d, at 1374.
Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1982 ed.) provides:
Congressional supremacy, however, does not support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Guam is outside the coverage of § 1983 because it is an instrumentality of the Federal Government. Under the Court of Appeals' approach, even a natural person acting under color of Guam law would be beyond the scope of § 1983a result flatly inconsistent with any view of the statute. See Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 582-584, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2271-2272, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976) (referring to the availability of § 1983 actions against persons "acting under color of territorial law"). I read the majority opinion today as rejecting the Court of Appeals' analysis. See also, e.g., House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report of the Commission on the Application of Federal Laws to Guam, H.R.Doc. No. 212, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1951) (listing 42 U.S.C. 1983, then codified at 8 U.S.C. 43 (1946 ed.), as among the statutes of the United States applicable to Guam).

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