Source: http://www.vegastrademarkattorney.com/2015/03/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 15:02:34+00:00

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It’s hard to believe that Righthaven, the company that was going to change the news media business by applying the patent lawsuit business model to the enforcement of copyrights, filed its first series of lawsuits five years to go. (The events were so notable that even this trademark dedicated blog could not resist writing up a copyright related post).
To mark the anniversary, former Las Vegas Sun Reporter Steve Green (now a staff writer with the Orange County Register), who helped shine a spotlight on Righthaven as the company embarked on and went about its controversial copyright enforcement campaign, published a new article last week which looks back upon the rise and demise of Righthaven (including new quotes from Righthaven founder Steve Gibson who continues to stand by the actions taken by Righthaven).
Gone are the days when “[o]nce the plaintiff in an infringement action has established a likelihood of confusion, it is ordinarily presumed that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief does not issue.” Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir.1984)). This approach collapses the likelihood of success and the irreparable harm factors. Those seeking injunctive relief must proffer evidence sufficient to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm.
The Herb Reed case has since left many trademark litigation practitioners (at least those practicing in the Ninth Circuit), after years of being able to obtain preliminary injunctions based on a showing strong showing of likelihood of confusion and the presumption of irreparable harm thereby, now trying to figure out what type of actual “evidence” can be shown to overcome this threshold of demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable harm and having to inform some trademark clients that a preliminary injunction might not be as easily obtainable for trademark infringement as it once was.
The latest example of the struggle to overcome this irreparable harm threshold comes from a court decision by Nevada District Judge Jennifer Dorsey who denied the owner of the Hakkasan nightclub chain preliminary injunctive relief for alleged cybersquatting against an individual who had registered various domain names containing the term “hakkasan.” See Hakkasan LV, LLC et al v. Eddie Miller, Case No. 2:15-cv-290-JAD-PAL (D. Nev).
Hakkasan had filed a cybersquatting lawsuit against Defendant Miller for his registration of the domain names domain names , , , , and (the “Contested Domain Names”) – one of which was linked to a website offering the domain name for sale for $5000 and the other four linked to a webpage located at (also owned by Miller), which encouraged third parties to “partner” with him.
Along with the filing of the complaint, Hakkasan also sought an ex parte temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Miller. However, the Court – without receiving any opposition from Miller – denied Hakkasan’s request for preliminary injunctive relief on the grounds that Hakkasan had failed to show any evidence of a likelihood of irreparable harm arising from Miller’s actions.
Order at p. 4 (emphasis in original).
The Court also rejected as unpersuasive several other cases cited by Hakkasan as support that its evidentiary proffer was sufficient to show irreparable harm. One case – Starbucks Corp. d/b/a Starbucks Coffee Company v. Heller, 2014 WL 6685662, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014) – involved a case where the court found irreparable harm where the presence of infringing products in the market could damage business goodwill. However, the Court noted that Hakkasan had not offered any evidence that Miller had “introduced any competing or counterfeit ‘products’ into the marketplace or taken any steps other than to register the domain name and attempt to sell it to third parties.” Order at p. 4. The second case – Kalologie Franchising LLC v. Kalologie Skincare Medical Group of California , 2014 WL 953442, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2014) – involved a defendant who was continuing to use the alleged infringing mark at the defendant’s facility through a point of sale system and a website and where the court found irreparable harm from “plaintiff’s loss of control over its business reputation resulting from a defendant’s alleged unauthorized use of its protected mark during the pendency of an infringement action.” In the case of Hakkasan, however, there was no indication that Hakkasan’s marks were being used by Miller in a manner that was similar to the Kalologie case.
Finally, Hakkasan made one final “Hail Mary” argument that Herb Reed was a trademark infringement case and that the Ninth Circuit’s decision did not expressly overrule the presumption of irreparable harm in a cybersquatting case. The Court rejected such argument, especially given the Ninth Circuit past statements that “cybersquatting is a form of trademark infringement.” The Court further noted two other cybersquatting court decisions issued post-Herb Reed where the plaintiffs were granted preliminary injunctive relief – one involving an evidentiary record showing systematic cybersquatting that was intended to deceive customers (Bittorrent, Inc. v. Bittorrent Marketing GMBH, 2014 WL 5773197 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) and another where “loss of control over business reputation” established irreparable harm in circumstances where the domain name owner actually operated a business in the same market as the plaintiff and sold products “slightly dissimilar” from plaintiff’s products (Kreation Juicery, Inc. v. Shekarchi, 2014 WL 7564679, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014)). The Court found that Hakkasan had failed to show use of the Contested Domain Names by Miller that reached the same levels as those in the Bittorrent and Kreation Juicery cases.
Accordingly, because Hakkasan had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm, the Court denied both Hakkasan’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

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