Source: http://europeanlawblog.eu/2014/10/03/protocol-16-and-the-autonomy-of-eu-law-who-is-threatening-whom/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:19:28+00:00

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Secondly, even assuming that the Panel would nonetheless accept such a request, for example because it also involves other issues which are unrelated to EU law, how realistic is it to assume that, if it proved necessary for its reasoning, the ECtHR would not rely in its opinion on the views expressed by the ECJ in its first ruling? And should the ECtHR have any doubts on this score, how realistic is it to assume that it would not decline altogether to touch on any EU law issue being raised, whilst potentially addressing the others?
In fact, this appears to be nothing but another level where the classical distribution of labour between the two European Courts – the Convention issues are for the ECtHR, the EU law issues for the ECJ – should come into play. In practice, however, things are often mixed or intertwined and the dividing lines sometimes blurred. Supreme courts may have difficulties in coming to terms with the resulting complexity. What is needed, therefore, in such situations, is not a general ban on the use of Protocol no. 16 but straightforward coordinated cooperation between the two European Courts. What is decisive here is not so much which of the two European Courts speaks first but what it says, i.e. whether it remains within the limits of its own competence. If this is the case, it becomes rather irrelevant whether Luxembourg or Strasbourg is being interrogated first by a domestic supreme court, as in their respective fields of competence, each European court would always be the only one and therefore the first to speak.
Thirdly, and for the sake of argument: even if the ECtHR pronounced itself – by mistake – on an EU law issue among other issues not related to EU law, its opinion – which, by definition, is not binding – would be even less binding in respect of the EU law issue involved, for lack of competence. Nothing would then prevent a supreme court from going again before the ECJ as regards the EU law issues involved in the case.
Thus, in keeping with the principle according to which the Convention only defines minimum standards which Contracting Parties are free to raise in their domestic legal system (Art. 53 of the Convention), such an opinion would be given without prejudice for EU law to go beyond the Convention protection level, a scenario explicitly considered by Art. 52 § 3, second sentence, of the Charter. In other words, such an opinion could not affect the (limited) EU law autonomy in this field either, as it would only determine the minimum Convention requirements which EU law itself accepts as binding; at the same time, EU law would remain free to surpass them. Consequently, domestic courts would still have to interrogate the ECJ about the specific level of protection to be applied under EU law in light of the Strasbourg minimum.
The author is Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar at the European Court of Human Rights and professor at the Universities of Speyer and Louvain. This contribution, written in a strictly personal capacity, is taken from a conference which the author recently gave at the European Law Academy of Trier.
 On this Protocol see, inter alia, David Milner, “Protocols no. 15 and 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights in the context of the perennial process of reform: a long and winded road”, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien, 2014, p. 19; Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos , “L’élargissement de la compétence consultative de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme – A propos du Protocole n° 16 à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2014, p. 9.
 See the Explanatory report to Protocol no. 16, §§ 7-8 and 25-27.
 Compare, mutatis mutandis, with the ECtHR case-law on the application of the presumption of equivalent protection of fundamental rights under EU law. What matters in this context is whether the ECJ has effectively dealt with the specific question at issue in Strasbourg (see ECtHR 6.12.2012, Michaud v. France, 12323/11, §§ 114-115).
 “The Court emphasises that, under the terms of Article 19 and Article 32 § 1 of the Convention, it is not competent to apply or examine alleged violations of EU rules unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. More generally, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EU law, the Court’s role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention” (ECtHR 3.10.2014 [GC], Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, 12738/10, §110).
 On this, see Johan Callewaert, “The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights”, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2014, at p. 62 et seq.
 Protocol no. 16, Art. 2.
Thanks for your contribution to the debate. I think I agree more with you than you have inferred from my blog post.
My approach was merely to brainstorm possible reasons for how the ECJ could uphold the DAA, provided that it found Protocol 16 incompatible with the Union’s legal autonomy. Obliging EU member states to reject Protocol 16 would be the most “extreme” of the ones I suggested. I would much rather prefer a solution where the ECtHR applies the “prior involvement mechanism” in cases where an advisory opinion under Protocol 16 is sought, provided that the conditions of that mechanism is met. I guess that would also be compatible with your conclusion?
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References: Art. 52
 § 3
 v. 
 § 1
 v. 
 §110
 Art. 2