Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/appellate/090wnapp/090wnapp0001.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:33:34+00:00

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THOMAS TUGWELL, ET AL., Plaintiffs, THE CITY OF ELLENSBURG, Appellant, v. KITTITAS COUNTY, ET AL., Respondents.
 Zoning - Rezoning - Judicial Review - Statutory Provisions. Judicial review of a rezoning decision is governed exclusively by RCW 36.70C.130 of the Land Use Petition Act.
 Zoning - Judicial Review - Planning Commission Recommendation. A planning commission's official recommendation to a higher level agency having decision-making authority is not a land use decision subject to review under the Land Use Petition Act (RCW 36.70C).
 Zoning - Judicial Review - Land Use Petition Act - Procedural Error - Harmless Error - Advisory Recommendation. For purposes of RCW 36.70C.130(1)(a) of the Land Use Petition Act-under which a court may grant relief to a party aggrieved by a land use decision if the agency that made the decision engaged in an unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed process, unless the error was harmless--any procedural error made by a decision-making agency is harmless if the decision involves only a recommendation that is merely advisory.
changed since the last time the parcel was zoned and that the rezoning bears a .substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
 Zoning - Rezoning - Comprehensive Plan - Effect. The validity of a rezoning decision does not depend on whether it complies with a comprehensive plan; only "general conformance" with the comprehensive plan is required.
 Zoning - Rezoning- Changed Circumstances - Factors. In deciding if changed circumstances are sufficient to justify a rezoning, a court considers a variety of factors, including changes in public opinion, changes in land use patterns in the area of the proposed rezone, and changes in the property itself.
 Zoning - Rezoning - Community Displeasure - Effect. A rezoning request may not be denied on the basis of community opposition alone.
 Zoning - Rezoning - Other Rezoning Requests - Effect. A government agency deciding a rezoning request is not required to consider the potential cumulative effects of other rezoning requests in the area.
 Zoning - Rezoning - Subdivision Requirements - Effect. A rezoning does not have to satisfy statutory subdivision requirements. An examination of the potential impacts of an unproposed development would be speculative at the rezoning stage.
 Zoning - Judicial Review - Land Use Petition Act - Procedural Error - Harmless Error - Incomplete Findings of Fact - Implied Conclusions. For purposes of RCW 36.70C.130(1)(a) of the Land Use Petition Act--under which a court may grant relief to a party aggrieved by a land use decision if the agency that made the decision engaged in an unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed process, unless the error was harmless --the failure of a government agency making a land use decision to include a "statement setting forth the factors considered at the hearing and its own analysis of findings considered by it to he controlling," as required by RCW 36.70.630 of the Planning Enabling Act of the State of Washington, constitutes harmless error if the agency's conclusions on the major issues involved in the case are clearly implied by its findings.
 Zoning - Judicial Review - Administrative Findings - Sufficiency - Test. A government agency's findings of fact entered in support of a land use decision are sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review if they address and resolve the factual disputes raised in the proceedings and are not so vague and incomplete as to preclude full and complete judicial review.
Review - Appellate Review - Attorney Fees - "Development Permit" - Rezoning. For purposes of RCW 4.84.370, which provides for the award of attorney fees on appeal in cases involving development permits, a rezoning is not a "development permit."
Nature of Action: Neighboring property owners and a city sought judicial review of a county's decision to rezone 115 acres of agricultural land to allow higher density residential development than under prior zoning.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Kittitas County, No. 95-2-00374-8, Richard W. Miller, J., on August 7, 1996, entered a judgment upholding the county's decision.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the county's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record and that any procedural errors by the county were harmless, the court affirms the judgment.
James D. Maloney III of Weeks & Skala, for appellant. Greg Zempel, Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. Hurson, Deputy; and Erin L. Anderson of Cone, Gilreath, Ellis & Cole, for respondents.
KATO, J. - The City of Ellensburg appeals a superior court order affirming the Kittitas County Board of Commissioners' approval of Herbert and Shirley Snowden's rezoning request. The City contends the record and the Board's findings fail to support the Board's action, and irregularities in the County's planning process require reversal. We affirm.
The Snowdens own approximately 115 acres of agricultural land in Kittitas County just southwest of Ellensburg.
In 1980, the land was zoned AG-20, which is designated for agricultural use with minimum lot sizes of 20 acres. Neighboring properties to the north and east of the Snowdens' land are zoned AG-3, which is designated for agricultural and low-density residential use with minimum lot sizes of three acres.«1» Properties to the west and south of the Snowdens' land are zoned AG-20, although some of those properties have been divided into nonconforming parcels of less than 20 acres. The County's comprehensive plan designates most of the Snowdens' land as agricultural, but the far eastern portion is designated for suburban use.
In April 1994, the Snowdens applied to rezone their property from AG-20 to AG-3. Under the existing zoning designation, they could have divided their property into 10 parcels; the rezoning would permit them to create an estimated 35 residential parcels of approximately three acres each. Although no development project was proposed at the time, the County's planning department examined the potential environmental effects of a development at the site and issued a mitigated determination of nonsignificance«2» pursuant to RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c).
1. The Kittitas County Comprehensive Plan designates a portion of the subject property as Suburban.
2. The area to the north, east, and south is characterized by smaller parcels.
3. The property is bordered on the north and east by Agriculture-3 zoning.
«1» Permitted uses in the two zones are identical, except for two activities not relevant to this case. The critical difference is the minimum allowable lot size.
«2» The department ordered mitigation measures to protect water quality and fish and wildlife habitat, and to reduce traffic on a public road bordering the property.
4. Technical data-including extensive financial records-- submitted show this is marginal farm land.
5. The subject property has access to two main arterials.
6. Traffic generated from potential development will not result in a negative impact.
7. The Kittitas County Subdivision Code addresses small parcel irrigation systems and will alleviate irrigation concerns.
1. The Board finds that on April 13, 1994 Herb and Shirley Snowden applied for rezone of an approximately 115 acre site from Agriculture-20 zoning to Agriculture-3 zoning by submittal of a complete rezone application (file Z-94-04) with SEPA Environmental Checklist per Chapter 17.98 and Section 15.04.110 of the Kittitas County code.
2. The Board finds that the permitted uses and conditional uses within the Agriculture-20 and Agriculture-3 zones are very similar with two exceptions. The AG-20 zone lists as an additional permitted use "hay processing and container storage" (17.29.020[B]), and an additional conditional use "farm implement repair and maintenance business of a commercial nature, not to include automobiles, trucks or bikes" (17.29.030[B]).
3. The Board finds that the minimum lot size with the requested zoning district (Ag-3) is three acres; the present zoning district (Ag-20) is twenty acres with exceptions that allow some lots as small as three acres.
Agriculture-20 to the west of Umptanum Road and Agriculture-3 to the east of Umptanum Rd.; the requested rezone by the applicant is for extension of the Ag-3 zone boundary line west across Umptanum Rd. to include the subject site.
5. The Board finds that the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) was complied with and a Mitigated Determination of Non-Significance was filed on August 4, 1994 and appropriate Notice of Action published with the paper of record per Kittitas County Code Section 15.04.160.
The rezoning ordinance also incorporated the Planning Commission's earlier findings.
Opponents of the rezoning, including the City of Ellensburg, petitioned for judicial review pursuant to the Land Use Petition Act, RCW 36.70C. After reviewing the record, the superior court concluded in a memorandum decision that the Board's findings were adequate; that the planning commission's actions did not violate procedural requirements; that substantial evidence established there had been a substantial change in circumstances and the rezoning was in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and welfare; and that the rezoning did not conflict with the Growth Management Act. The court entered an order affirming the rezoning. The City appeals this order.
«3» The statute was enacted in 1995. See LAWS OF 1995. ch. 347, § 714. It became effective on July 23, 1995, before the Board's action on August 15, 1995.
The City first contends the planning commission violated RCW 36.70.600«4» and RCW 36.70.610.«5» We need not resolve these issues for two reasons.
 First, RCW 36.70C is the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review of land use decisions. RCW 36.70C.030. A land use decision is defined as "a final determination by a local jurisdiction's body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination . . . ." RCW 36.700.020(1). The planning commission is not Kittitas County's body with the highest level of authority on rezoning matters, so its recommendation in this case is not a land use decision subject to review under RCW 36.70C.
«4» The planning commission's recommendation "shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than a majority of the total members of the commission." RCW 36.70.600. It is undisputed that the Kittitas County Planning Commission has seven members. Only three of the Commission's members voted in favor of the Snowdens' rezoning request.
«5» When making its recommendation, a planning commission is required to include "a statement setting forth the factors considered at the hearing, and analysis of findings considered by the commission to be controlling." RCW 36.70.610. The City contends the Planning Commission failed to include the required statement.
 Second, even if the planning commission's action were reviewable under RCW 36.70C, the appropriate standard requires the court to determine whether the planning commission "engaged in unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed process, unless the error was harmless." RCW 36.70C.130(1)(a). Any procedural errors by the planning commission in this case were harmless, because its recommendation was merely advisory and the Board retained authority to make the final determination. RCW 36.70.650.
[4, 5] The City also contends the rezoning was not supported by substantial evidence. In Washington, a rezoning proponent must show a substantial change in circumstances since the original zoning or amendment,«6» and must show that the rezoning bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Bassani v. Board of County Comm'rs, 70 Wn. App. 389, 394, 853 P.2d 945, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1027 (1993). Whether an application for rezoning complies with a comprehensive plan is not determinative; only "general conformance" with the comprehensive plan is required. Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Community Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wn.2d 201, 212, 634 P.2d 853 (1981).
«6» The Snowdens point out that a demonstration of changed circumstances is not required if the rezoning is consistent with an adopted comprehensive plan. Save Our Rural Environment v. Snohomish County, 99 Wn.2d 363, 370-71, 662 P.2d 816 (1983) (SORE); Bjarnson v. Kitsap County, 78 Wn. App. 840, 845-46, 899 P.2d 1290 (1995). The parties appear to agree here that the AG-3 zoning is consistent with the suburban use designation in Kittitas County's comprehensive plan. The SORE principle therefore applies to the far easternmost portion of the Snowdens' land that is designated for suburban use. The City contends this principle applies only if the comprehensive plan is newly adopted or amended. However, the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in SORE was that if changed circumstances always were required, the policies of a comprehensive plan would never be fulfilled. SORE, 99 Wn.2d at 370. This reasoning would apply regardless of whether the comprehensive plan was newly adopted or amended. At any rate, because only a small portion of the Snowdens' property was designated for suburban use in the comprehensive plan, it is unnecessary for us to resolve this issue here.
and in the property itself. Bjarnson v. Kitsap County, 78 Wn. App. 840, 846-47, 899 P.2d 1290 (1995). In support of their application, the Snowdens submitted a map demonstrating that their property was virtually surrounded by parcels of less than 20 acres. Many of these parcels are to the north and east of the Snowdens' property, and thus are conforming uses in the AG-3 zone. However, several small parcels, including two to the south of less than three acres, are nonconforming lots in the AG-20 zone. The Snowdens also submitted information obtained from the assessor's office indicating many of these small parcels had been created since their property was zoned in 1980. This information alone is evidence that since 1980 the area generally has been divided into small rural lots, notwithstanding the AG-20 zoning to the west and south of the Snowdens' property.
The City contends that despite the parcelization of the neighboring property, there has not been a significant change of land use in the area since 1980. To demonstrate this, opponents submitted aerial slides that show little increase in the number of houses in the area. But as the County's planning director pointed out, each of the lots is at least a potential building site. The creation of small parcels, not large enough to accommodate agricultural activities, certainly demonstrates a trend toward residential development. The Snowdens provided proof of a substantial change in circumstances since their property was zoned in 1980.
property apparently had not changed since 1980, the changing character of the neighboring property had an effect on their farm, such as increasing liability insurance costs and traffic. In light of the whole record before the court, there is substantial evidence that the circumstances had changed to support the rezoning.
Non-agricultural development of farmlands in Kittitas County should be limited to suburban areas already partially subdivided and/or developed and to areas which, by virtue of size, slope or soil characteristics, are poorly suited to farming.
The policy with regard to development in the Agricultural districts should not be interpreted to preclude all further development in these areas. The possibilities and benefits of satellite or cluster residential developments located on land poorly suited to agricultural use, due to size, slope or soil characteristics, should be considered.
small sized rural housing (A-3) plots in the surrounding area. The difficulty of managing the farm has also been increased thereby.
In light of this evidence that the property was poorly suited for agricultural use coupled with the County's policy favoring this type of property for residential development, the Board properly concluded the rezoning was in the public's interest.
[8, 9] The City nevertheless contends that the Board way required to consider various other potential effects of the Snowdens' anticipated development. It claims the Board should have considered the cumulative impact of this and two other rezoning applications apparently involving property in the area. And it asserts the Board failed to consider the potential impact on the City's facilities and services or on the small school district in which the property lies. The authority on which the City relies does not require, consideration of the potential cumulative effect of proposed rezonings. See Skagit County v. Department of Ecology, 93 Wn.2d 742, 613 P.2d 115 (1980). That case merely holds that the Shorelines Hearings Board did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by considering the cumulative detrimental effect of piecemeal development. Id. at 749-50.
and shall consider all other relevant facts, including sidewalks and other planning features that assure safe walking conditions for students who only walk to and from school; and (b) whether the public interest will be served by the subdivision and dedication.
Although much of the public debate over this rezoning related to the potential effects of development of the property, any rational consideration would refer to the precise development proposed. Examination of the potential impacts at this point necessarily would be speculative. While the City would prefer that the court consider them now, there is simply nothing to consider, because there are no specific plans to review and the impacts therefore are unknown.
Substantial evidence supports the Board's decision to approve the rezoning.
«7» The parties apparently agree that, by imposing additional conditions for the rezoning, the Board made a change in the planning commission's recommendation. Neither the Snowdens nor the County contends the statute does not apply.
v. City of Mount Vernon, 37 Wn. App. 214, 219-20, 679 P.2d 405 (1984). Those decisions apparently rested on the conclusion that failure to include findings and conclusions was arbitrary and capricious. See Johnson, 37 Wn. App. at 219. But relief from a land use decision is no longer dependent on a judicial conclusion that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. RCW 36.700.130(2). The appropriate standard of review is contained in RCW 36.70C.130(1)(a), under which we must determine whether "[t]he body or officer that made the land use decision engaged in unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed process, unless the error was harmless." Under this standard, the initial inquiry here is whether the Board violated RCW 36.70.630, and, if so, whether the violation was harmless.
The Board certainly made findings, in addition to incorporating the planning commission's findings. The Board's ordinance, however, failed to include a "statement setting^ forth the factors considered at the hearing and its own analysis of findings considered by it to be controlling," as required by RCW 36.70.630.
But the Board's findings clearly imply its conclusions on the major issues involved: whether there was a substantial change in circumstances and whether the rezoning bore a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Specifically, the planning commission's finding No. 2 ("The area to the north, east, and south is characterized by smaller parcels.") implies the commission and the Board agreed the ownership patterns of the nearby property had changed substantially. And the commission's finding No. 4 (The Snowdens' property is "marginal farm land.") implies that the property is appropriate for residential development and the rezoning thus is consistent with the policies of the County's comprehensive plan. Moreover, various other findings and conditions imposed suggest the Board considered the public's health, safety and welfare, by addressing traffic, water and sewage concerns, and by requiring "sincere and meaningful negotiations" with fire and school districts.
It thus appears the Board's failure, while technically a violation of RCW 36.70.630, was harmless. Nothing would be accomplished, other than further delay, by remanding the Board's decision for entry of more complete findings and conclusions.«8» The technical violation was harmless.
[T]he council's findings, while minimal, are sufficient. They do address and resolve the factual disputes raised in the hearing. While more extensive findings, made in a more formal form, would be more useful, the findings made by the council in this case are sufficient. No particular formality is expressly mandated by the Parkridge rule, sec South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs, 280 Ore. 3, 569 P.2d 1063 (1977), and too much formality would unduly complicate zoning matters.
Hayden, 28 Wn. App. at 195. Like the findings in Hayden, the findings here addressed and resolved the factual issues before the Board. Most importantly, they are not so vague and incomplete that they preclude full and complete judicial review.
«8» he City urges us to reverse the Board's decision, which is one of the remedies authorized by RCW 36.70C.140. However, in light of our conclusion that the rezoning was supported by substantial evidence, there is no ground for reversal.
Board's findings in this case, by contrast, impliedly but clearly resolved the issues involved. There is no basis for reversing the rezoning on this basis.
(Emphasis added.) This provision was enacted as part of the Land Use Petition Act. See LAWS OF 1995, ch. 347, § 718. That statute does not define the phrase "development permit" in subsection (1). This case involves a rezoning, not a development permit, so RCW 4.84.370 is inapplicable. The requests for attorney fees are denied.
KURTZ and BROWN, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied February 10, 1998.

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