Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/285/169.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:43:33+00:00

Document:
[285 U.S. 169, 170] Messrs. Marion Smith, of Atlanta, Ga., L. Barrett Jones and W. Calvin Wells, both of Jackson, Miss., and Arthur G. Powell, of Atlanta, Ga ., for appellant.
[285 U.S. 169, 173] Messrs. Gerard H. Brandon and S. B. Laub, both of Natchez, Miss., and Garner W. Green, of Jackson, Miss., for appellees.
Payments to the contractors were made as required by the building contract but they failed to satisfy claims for material furnished by Bunn Electric Company and others. The latter notified the investment company. There [285 U.S. 169, 176] upon, it instituted a proceeding in the chancery court, Adams county, Miss ., against the contractors, the appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, and many unpaid materialmen. The bill prayed for a decree declaring the indemntiy bond to be one for faithful performance of the building contract and subject to the rights and liabilities provided by section 3,1 chapter 128, Mississippi Laws of 1918 (section 2598, Hemingway's Miss. Code 1927); also for judgments in favor of those who had furnished materials, etc.
The materialmen answered. Also by cross-bill and interventions they set up their claims and asked for judgments against the contractors and appellant here, surety upon the bond. The chancellor gave judgments in favor of the cross-complainants as prayed. The indemnity company appealed. The Supreme Court approved upon the view that section 3, chapter 128, Mississippi Laws 1918, applied and controlled the obligation of the bond. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Natchez Inv. Co., 132 So. 535. It ordered that the materialmen severally 'do have and recover of and from the appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, and of AEtna Casualty & Surety [285 U.S. 169, 177] Company, surety in the appeal bond,' the sums found to be due them.
Upon petition of the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company alone, the Chief Justice of Mississippi allowed an appeal to this court July 25, 1931. The AEtna Casualty & Surety Company did not join in the appeal; there was no summons and severance nor any notice equivalent thereto.
The assignment of errors challenges the validity, under the Federal Constitution, of section 3, chapter 128, Mississippi Laws, above cited, as construed and applied.
December 4, 1931, the appellees entered a motion here to dismiss the appeal. They maintain that the judgments in the Mississippi Supreme Court against appellant and AEtna Casualty & Surety Company were joint; the latter company did not join in the appeal; there was no summons and severance; consequently this Court is without jurisdiction.
December 23, 1931, appellant and the AEtna Company asked that the latter be made party to the appeal and for proper amendments to that end.
The motion to amend must be overruled. The motion to dismiss is sustained.
The challenged judgment became final June 15, 1931, more than six months before the AEtna Company applied here for permission to become a party to the pending appeal. If this application and the accompanying motion to amend were granted, the practical effect would be to permit an appeal by a party to a judgment after the prescribed time had expired.
The statute (Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 229, 8, 43 Stat. 940, 28 USCA 350) provides: 'No writ of error, appeal, or writ of certiorari, intended to bring any judgment or decree before the Supreme Court for re- [285 U.S. 169, 178] view shall be allowed or entertained unless application therefor be duly made within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree. ...' Passage of the three months' period extinguished the right to grant an appeal. Rust Land & Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 250 U.S. 71, 76 , 39 S. Ct. 424; Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 418 , 43 S. Ct. 458.
The judgment is joint in form and no reason appears why either or both of the parties defendant therein might not have appealed to this Court and submitted claims of error for our determination. In matters of this kind we may not disregard the face of the record and treat the judgment as something other than it appears to be. So to do probably would lead to much confusion and uncertainty.
See Estis v. Trabue, 128 U.S. 225, 229 , 9 S. Ct. 58; Schlosser v. Hemphill, 198 U.S. 173, 175 , 25 S. Ct. 654; Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U.S. 99, 101 , 33 S. Ct. 78; Second Nat. Bank [285 U.S. 169, 180] v. First Nat. Bank, 242 U.S. 600, 602 , 37 S. Ct. 236; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U.S. 18, 19 , 38 S. Ct. 7; Matthews v. Huwe, 269 U.S. 262, 264 , 46 S. Ct. 108.
Mason v. United States, 136 U.S. 581 , 10 S. Ct. 1062. A postmaster and the sureties on his official bond were sued jointly. He and some of the sureties appeared and defended. The suit was abated as to two of the sureties, who had died. The others defaulted, and judgment of default went against them. On the trial there was a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon, July 14, 1886, judgment was entered against the principal and all the sureties. The sureties who had appeared sued out a writ of error to this judgment, without joining the principal or the sureties who had made default and the record came here. May 5, 1890, and after expiration of the two years within which the statute then permitted the suing out of such writs, the plaintiff in error moved to amend the writ by adding the omitted parties as complainants, or for a severance of the parties, and it was held that the motion must be denied and the writ of error be dismissed.
The New York, 104 F. 561, 562 (Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, October 13, 1900), is said to support the view that in the circumstances here presented summons and sever- [285 U.S. 169, 182] ance was unnecessary. The proceeding was a cause in admiralty. The surety upon a stipulation for release of the vessel did not join in the appeal. Upon motion to dismiss, the court said: 'It is well settled that all parties against whom a joint judgmnet or decree is rendered must join in proceedings for review in an appellate court, or that it must appear that those who have not joined had notice of the application for the appeal or writ of error, and refused or neglected to join therein.' But it ruled that, though joint in form, the decree was separable in law and fact and, therefore, the surety was not a necessary party to the appeal.
Considering former opinions of this Court and the long-established practice, we cannot accept as applicable to appeals here the doctrine approved in The New York. It is out of harmony with Estis v. Trabue, supra, and other cases cited above. We cannot undertake to explore the record to ascertain what issues were relied upon in courts below. So to do would lead to uncertainty and unfortunate confusion. We must accept the terms of the judgment as entered. As pointed out above, this is the approved practice when it becomes necessary to determine whether a judgment is final or to what court a writ of error should run. Like reasons apply and control here.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.