Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/463/388/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:34:40+00:00

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of a conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and that of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (CA1 1980), we granted certiorari. 459 U.S. 820 (1982). We now affirm.
religion." It is not at all easy, however, to apply this Court's various decisions construing the Clause to governmental programs of financial assistance to sectarian schools and the parents of children attending those schools. Indeed, in many of these decisions, we have expressly or implicitly acknowledged that "we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 612 (1971), quoted in part with approval in Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 761, n. 5.
One fixed principle in this field is our consistent rejection of the argument that "any program which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation" violates the Establishment Clause. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 413 U. S. 742 (1973). See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970). For example, it is now well established that a State may reimburse parents for expenses incurred in transporting their children to school, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), and that it may loan secular textbooks to all schoolchildren within the State, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968).
are asked to decide whether Minnesota's tax deduction bears greater resemblance to those types of assistance to parochial schools we have approved, or to those we have struck down. Petitioners place particular reliance on our decision in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, where we held invalid a New York statute providing public funds for the maintenance and repair of the physical facilities of private schools and granting thinly disguised "tax benefits," actually amounting to tuition grants, to the parents of children attending private schools. As explained below, we conclude that § 290.09, subd. 22, bears less resemblance to the arrangement struck down in Nyquist than it does to assistance programs upheld in our prior decisions and those discussed with approval in Nyquist.
Id. at 403 U. S. 612-613. While this principle is well settled, our cases have also emphasized that it provides "no more than [a] helpful signpos[t]" in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges. Hunt v. McNair, supra, at 413 U. S. 741. With this caveat in mind, we turn to the specific challenges raised against § 290.09, subd. 22, under the Lemon framework.
for the State's program may be discerned from the face of the statute.
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some States, they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen for them."
Other characteristics of § 290.09, subd. 22, argue equally strongly for the provision's constitutionality. Most importantly, the deduction is available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children attend public schools and those whose children attend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools. Just as in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 454 U. S. 274 (1981), where we concluded that the State's provision of a forum neutrally "available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers" does not "confer any imprimatur of state approval," ibid., so here: "[t]he provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect." [Footnote 7] Ibid.
state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that, by channeling whatever assistance it may provide to parochial schools through individual parents, Minnesota has reduced the Establishment Clause objections to which its action is subject. It is true, of course, that financial assistance provided to parents ultimately has an economic effect comparable to that of aid given directly to the schools attended by their children. It is also true, however, that, under Minnesota's arrangement, public funds become available only as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age children. For these reasons, we recognized in Nyquist that the means by which state assistance flows to private schools is of some importance: we said that "the fact that aid is disbursed to parents, rather than to . . . schools," is a material consideration in Establishment Clause analysis, albeit "only one among many factors to be considered." 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 781. It is noteworthy that all but one of our recent cases invalidating state aid to parochial schools have involved the direct transmission of assistance from the State to the schools themselves. The exception, of course, was Nyquist, which, as discussed previously, is distinguishable from this case on other grounds. Where, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of decisions of individual parents, no "imprimatur of state approval," Widmar, supra, at 454 U. S. 274, can be deemed to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally.
teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.'"
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 796, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 694 (opinion of Harlan, J.). It is important, however, to "keep these issues in perspective:"
"At this point in the 20th century, we are quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 397 U. S. 668 (1970). The risk of significant religious or denominational control over our democratic processes -- or even of deep political division along religious lines -- is remote, and when viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, any such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the continuing oversight of this Court."
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 263 (POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). The Establishment Clause, of course, extends beyond prohibition of a state church or payment of state funds to one or more churches. We do not think, however, that its prohibition extends to the type of tax deduction established by Minnesota. The historic purposes of the Clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case.
below, on a statistical analysis of the type of persons claiming the tax deduction. They contend that most parents of public school children incur no tuition expenses, see Minn.Stat. § 120.06 (1982), and that other expenses deductible under § 290.09, subd. 22, are negligible in value; moreover, they claim that 96% of the children in private schools in 1978-1979 attended religiously affiliated institutions. Because of all this, they reason, the bulk of deductions taken under § 290.09, subd. 22, will be claimed by parents of children in sectarian schools. Respondents reply that petitioners have failed to consider the impact of deductions for items such as transportation, summer school tuition, tuition paid by parents whose children attended schools outside the school districts in which they resided, rental or purchase costs for a variety of equipment, and tuition for certain types of instruction not ordinarily provided in public schools.
schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some States they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools."
"instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship."
"Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, 'textbooks' shall mean and include books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation to, extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events, speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature."
"1. Tuition in the ordinary sense."
"2. Tuition to public school students who attend public schools outside their residence school districts."
"3. Certain summer school tuition."
"4. Tuition charged by a school for slow learner private tutoring services."
"5. Tuition for instruction provided by an elementary or secondary school to students who are physically unable to attend classes at such school."
"6. Tuition charged by a private tutor or by a school that is not an elementary or secondary school if the instruction is acceptable for credit in an elementary or secondary school."
"7. Montessori School tuition for grades K through 12."
"8. Tuition for driver education when it is part of the school curriculum."
"1. Cost of tennis shoes and sweatsuits for physical education."
"2. Camera rental fees paid to the school for photography classes."
"3. Ice skates rental fee paid to the school."
"4. Rental fee paid to the school for calculators for mathematics classes."
"5. Costs of home economics materials needed to meet minimum requirements."
"6. Costs of special metal or wood needed to meet minimum requirements of shop classes."
"7. Costs of supplies needed to meet minimum requirements of art classes."
"8. Rental fees paid to the school for musical instruments."
"9. Cost of pencils and special notebooks required for class."
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court concluded that the State's reimbursement of nonpublic schools for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials, and its payment of a salary supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools, resulted in excessive entanglement of church and state. In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, we struck down on Establishment Clause grounds a state program reimbursing nonpublic schools for the cost of teacher-prepared examinations. Finally, in Meek v. Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter, we held unconstitutional a direct loan of instructional materials to nonpublic schools, while upholding the loan of textbooks to individual students.
Section 290.09 contains no express statements of legislative purpose, and its legislative history offers few unambiguous indications of actual intent. The absence of such evidence does not affect our treatment of the statute.
Deductions for charitable contributions, allowed by Minnesota law, Minn.Stat. § 290.21, subd. 3 (1982), include contributions to religious institutions, and exemptions from property tax for property used for charitable purposes under Minnesota law include property used for wholly religious purposes, § 272.02. In each case, it may be that religious institutions benefit very substantially from the allowance of such deductions. The Court's holding in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), indicates, however, that this does not require the conclusion that such provisions of a State's tax law violate the Establishment Clause.
"The amount of the deduction is unrelated to the amount of money actually expended by any parent on tuition, but is calculated on the basis of a formula contained in the statute. The formula is apparently the product of a legislative attempt to assure that each family would receive a carefully estimated net benefit, and that the tax benefit would be comparable to, and compatible with, the tuition grant for lower income families."
Id. at 413 U. S. 790 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the question whether a program having the elements of a "genuine tax deduction" would be constitutionally acceptable was expressly reserved in Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 790, n. 49. While the economic consequences of the program in Nyquist and that in this case may be difficult to distinguish, we have recognized on other occasions that "the form of the [State's assistance to parochial schools must be examined] for the light that it casts on the substance." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 614. The fact that the Minnesota plan embodies a "genuine tax deduction" is thus of some relevance, especially given the traditional rule of deference accorded legislative classifications in tax statutes.
Likewise, in Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 413 U. S. 832 (1973), where we held that a Pennsylvania statute violated the First Amendment, we emphasized that "the State [had] singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic benefit." We also observed in Widmar that "empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate [the school's] open forum," 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 275, might be relevant to analysis under the Establishment Clause. We address this infra at 463 U. S. 400-402.
"Allen and Everson differ from the present litigation in a second important respect. In both cases, the class of beneficiaries included all schoolchildren, those in public as well as those in private schools. See also Tilton v. Richardson, [403 U.S. 672 (1971)], in which federal aid was made available to all institutions of higher learning, and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, in which tax exemptions were accorded to all educational and charitable nonprofit institutions. . . . Because of the manner in which we have resolved the tuition grant issue, we need not decide whether the significantly religious character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate the present cases from a case involving some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited. . . . Thus, our decision today does not compel . . . the conclusion that the educational assistance provisions of the 'G. I. Bill,' 38 U.S.C. § 1651, impermissibly advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause."
413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 782-783, n. 38. See also id. at 413 U. S. 775.
"[o]nly those taxpayers having dependents in nonpublic elementary or secondary schools are affected by this law, since tuition, transportation and textbook expenses for public school students are paid for by the school district."
Our conclusion is unaffected by the fact that § 290.09, subd. 22, permits deductions for amounts spent for textbooks and transportation as well as tuition. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), we approved a statute reimbursing parents of all schoolchildren for the costs of transporting their children to school. Doing so by means of a deduction, rather than a direct grant, only serves to make the State's action less objectionable. Likewise, in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), we approved state loans of textbooks to all schoolchildren; although we disapproved, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977), direct loans of instructional materials to sectarian schools, we do not find those cases controlling. First, they involved assistance provided to the schools themselves, rather than tax benefits directed to individual parents, see supra at 463 U. S. 399. Moreover, we think that state assistance for the rental of calculators, see App. A18, ice skates, ibid., tennis shoes, ibid., and the like, scarcely poses the type of dangers against which the Establishment Clause was intended to guard.
No party to this litigation has urged that the Minnesota plan is invalid because it runs afoul of the rather elusive inquiry, subsumed under the third part of the Lemon test, whether the Minnesota statute partakes of the "divisive political potential" condemned in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 622. The argument is advanced, however, by amici National Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty et al. This variation of the "entanglement" test has been interpreted differently in different cases. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 622-625, with id. at 403 U. S. 665-666 (opinion of WHITE, J.); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 359-362, with id. at 421 U. S. 374-379 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Since this aspect of the "entanglement" inquiry originated with Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, and the Court's opinion there took pains to distinguish both Everson v. Board of Education, supra, and Board of Education v. Allen, supra, the Court in Lemon must have been referring to a phenomenon which, although present in that case, would have been absent in the two cases it distinguished.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a State from subsidizing religious education, whether it does so directly or indirectly. In my view, this principle of neutrality forbids not only the tax benefits struck down in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973), but any tax benefit, including the tax deduction at issue here, which subsidizes tuition payments to sectarian schools. I also believe that the Establishment Clause prohibits the tax deductions that Minnesota authorizes for the cost of books and other instructional materials used for sectarian purposes.
the Court today upholds a statute that provides a tax deduction for the tuition charged by religious schools. The Court concludes that the Minnesota statute is "vitally different" from the New York statute at issue in Nyquist. Ante at 463 U. S. 398. As demonstrated below, there is no significant difference between the two schemes. The Minnesota tax statute violates the Establishment Clause for precisely the same reason as the statute struck down in Nyquist: it has a direct and immediate effect of advancing religion.
Like the law involved in Nyquist, the Minnesota law can be said to serve a secular purpose: promoting pluralism and diversity among the State's public and nonpublic schools. But the Establishment Clause requires more than that legislation have a secular purpose. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 773.
propriety of a legislature's purposes may not immunize from further scrutiny a law which . . . has a primary effect that advances religion."
provided. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 774-780.
Id. at 413 U. S. 780.
"'guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and . . . ensure that State financial aid supports only the former.'"
"[I]t is precisely the function of [Minnesota's] law to provide assistance to private schools, the great majority of which are sectarian. By reimbursing parents for a portion of their tuition bill, the State seeks to relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to assure that they continue to have the option to send their children to religion-oriented schools. And while the other purposes for that aid -- to perpetuate a pluralistic educational environment and to protect the fiscal integrity of overburdened public schools -- are certainly unexceptionable, the effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions."
That parents receive a reduction of their tax liability, rather than a direct reimbursement, is of no greater significance here than it was in Nyquist. "[F]or purposes of determining whether such aid has the effect of advancing religion,"
it makes no difference whether the qualifying "parent receives an actual cash payment [or] is allowed to reduce . . . the sum he would otherwise be obliged to pay over to the State." Id. at 413 U. S. 790-791. It is equally irrelevant whether a reduction in taxes takes the form of a tax "credit," a tax "modification," or a tax "deduction." Id. at 413 U. S. 789-790. What is of controlling significance is not the form, but the "substantive impact" of the financial aid. Id. at 413 U. S. 786.
"[I]nsofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who send their children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious institutions."
as a subsidy of general educational expenses. The other deductible expenses are de minimis in comparison to tuition expenses.
Contrary to the majority's suggestion, ante at 463 U. S. 401, the bulk of the tax benefits afforded by the Minnesota scheme are enjoyed by parents of parochial school children not because parents of public school children fail to claim deductions to which they are entitled, but because the latter are simply unable to claim the largest tax deduction that Minnesota authorizes. [Footnote 2/2] Fewer than 100 of more than 900,000 school-age children in Minnesota attend public schools that charge a general tuition. Of the total number of taxpayers who are eligible for the tuition deduction, approximately 96% send their children to religious schools. [Footnote 2/3] Parents who send their children to free public schools are simply ineligible to obtain the full benefit of the deduction except in the unlikely event that they buy $700 worth of pencils, notebooks, and bus rides for their school-age children. Yet parents who pay at least $700 in tuition to nonpublic, sectarian schools can claim the full deduction even if they incur no other educational expenses.
"consider[ation of] the new law's effect . . . [that]"
"more than 90% of the children attending nonpublic schools in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are enrolled in schools that are controlled by religious organizations or that have the purpose of propagating and promoting religious faith. [Footnote 2/4] "
In this case, it is undisputed that well over 90% of the children attending tuition-charging schools in Minnesota are enrolled in sectarian schools. History and experience likewise instruct us that any generally available financial assistance for elementary and secondary school tuition expenses mainly will further religious education, because the majority of the schools which charge tuition are sectarian. Cf. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 785; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 628-630 (Douglas, J., concurring). Because Minnesota, like every other State, is committed to providing free public education, tax assistance for tuition payments inevitably redounds to the benefit of nonpublic, sectarian schools and parents who send their children to those schools.
The majority also asserts that the Minnesota statute is distinguishable from the statute struck down in Nyquist in another respect: the tax benefit available under Minnesota law is a "genuine tax deduction," whereas the New York law provided a benefit which, while nominally a deduction, also had features of a "tax credit." Ante at 463 U. S. 396, and n. 6. Under the Minnesota law, the amount of the tax benefit varies directly with the amount of the expenditure. Under the New York law, the amount of deduction was not dependent upon the amount actually paid for tuition, but was a predetermined amount which depended on the tax bracket of each taxpayer. The deduction was designed to yield roughly the same amount of tax "forgiveness" for each taxpayer.
v. Lemon unconstitutional. See Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 790-791, 413 U. S. 794; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 832.
"bears less resemblance to the arrangement struck down in Nyquist than it does to assistance programs upheld in our prior decisions and those discussed with approval in Nyquist."
Ante at 463 U. S. 394. One might as well say that a tangerine bears less resemblance to an orange than to an apple. The two cases relied on by the majority, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), are inapposite today for precisely the same reasons that they were inapposite in Nyquist.
"is quite unlike the sort of 'indirect' and 'incidental' benefits that flowed to sectarian schools from programs aiding all parents by supplying bus transportation and secular textbooks for their children. Such benefits were carefully restricted to the purely secular side of church-affiliated institutions, and provided no special aid for those who had chosen to support religious schools. Yet such aid approached the 'verge' of the constitutionally impermissible."
Sloan v. Lemon, supra, at 413 U. S. 832 (latter emphasis added).
As previously noted, supra, at 463 U. S. 409, the Minnesota tuition tax deduction is not available to all parents, but only to parents whose children attend schools that charge tuition, which are comprised almost entirely of sectarian schools. More importantly, the assistance that flows to parochial schools as a result of the tax benefit is not restricted, and cannot be restricted, to the secular functions of those schools.
In my view, Minnesota's tax deduction for the cost of textbooks and other instructional materials is also constitutionally infirm. The majority is simply mistaken in concluding that a tax deduction, unlike a tax credit or a direct grant to parents, promotes religious education in a manner that is only "attenuated." Ante at 463 U. S. 399, 463 U. S. 400. A tax deduction has a primary effect that advances religion if it is provided to offset expenditures which are not restricted to the secular activities of parochial schools.
"'[t]he secular education those schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools' existence.'"
In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 249-250, we concluded that precisely the same impermissible effect results when the instructional materials are loaned to the pupil or his parent, rather than directly to the schools. We stated that "it would exalt form over substance if this distinction were found to justify a result different from that in Meek." Id. at 433 U. S. 250. It follows that a tax deduction to offset the cost of purchasing instructional materials for use in sectarian schools, like a loan of such materials to parents, "necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole," and is therefore a "substantial advancement of religious activity" that "constitutes an impermissible establishment of religion." Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 421 U. S. 366.
"the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public [will always be] instrumental in the teaching of religion."
392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 248. This basis for distinguishing secular instructional materials and secular textbooks is simply untenable, and is inconsistent with many of our more recent decisions concerning state aid to parochial schools. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 257-258 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 433 U. S. 264-266 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 421 U. S. 378 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
There can be little doubt that the State of Minnesota intended to provide, and has provided, "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function of [church-related] schools," and that the tax deduction for tuition and other educational expenses "necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole." Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 421 U. S. 366. It is beside the point that the State may have legitimate secular reasons for providing such aid. In focusing upon the contributions made by church-related schools, the majority has lost sight of the issue before us in this case.
"The sole question is whether state aid to these schools can be squared with the dictates of the Religion Clauses. Under our system, the choice has been made that government is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction. . . . The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that, while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 625.
As we noted in Nyquist, it is "firmly established" that a statute may impermissibly advance religion "even though it does not aid one religion more than another, but merely benefits all religions alike." 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 771. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 433 U. S. 248-254 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 421 U. S. 364-366 (1975).
Even if the Minnesota statute allowed parents of public school students to deduct expenses that were likely to be equivalent to the tuition expenses of private school students, it would still be unconstitutional. Insofar as the Minnesota statute provides a deduction for parochial school tuition, it provides a benefit to parochial schools that furthers the religious mission of those schools. Nyquist makes clear that the State may not provide any financial assistance to parochial schools unless that assistance is limited to secular uses. 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 780-785.
"the direct loan of instructional material and equipment has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious character of the schools benefiting from the Act."
"of the 1,320 nonpublic schools in Pennsylvania that . . . qualify for aid under Act 195, more than 75% are church-related or religiously affiliated educational institutions."
"during the 1974-1975 school year, there were 720 chartered nonpublic schools in Ohio. Of these, all but 29 were sectarian. More than 96% of the nonpublic enrollment attended sectarian schools, and more than 92% attended Catholic schools."
In Grit v. Wolman, we summarily affirmed a decision invalidating a system of tax credits for nonpublic school parents in which the amount of the credit depended on the amount of tuition paid. This decision demonstrates that it is irrelevant whether the amount of a tax benefit is proportionate to the amount of tuition paid or is simply an arbitrary sum. The Court's affirmance of the result in each of these cases was a "decision on the merits, entitled to precedential weight." Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 421 U. S. 366-367, n. 16.
The deduction at issue in this case does differ from the tax benefits in Nyquist and our other prior cases in one respect: by its very nature, the deduction embodies an inherent limit on the extent to which a State may subsidize religious education. Unlike a tax credit, which may wholly subsidize the cost of religious education if the size of the credit is sufficiently large, or a tax deduction of an arbitrary sum, a deduction of tuition payments from adjusted gross income can never "provide a basis for . . . complete subsidization of . . . religious schools." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 782, n. 38 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 413 U. S. 779, 787, n. 44. Nyquist made clear, however, that absolutely no subsidization is permissible unless it is restricted to the purely secular functions of those schools. See, e.g., id. at 413 U. S. 777-779, 413 U. S. 787-788.
For similar reasons, I would hold that the deduction for transportation expenses is constitutional only insofar as it relates to the costs of traveling between home and school. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 252-255 (reimbursement of nonpublic schools for field trip transportation impermissibly fosters religion because the nonpublic schools control the timing, frequency, and destination of the trips, which, for sectarian schools, are an integral part of the sectarian education). I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for a determination whether the insignificant deductions that remain -- e.g., deductions for transportation between home and school and for pencils and notebooks -- are severable from the other deductions.

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