Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2018/a-14-16.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:42:39+00:00

Document:
In this matter, a police officer pulled over a car under the belief that the vehicle was in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of the vehicle’s taillights was not working. The trial court determined that the officer was mistaken about the law and granted defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the motor vehicle stop. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the relevant motor vehicle statutes were ambiguous and that, applying the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ___ (2014), the officer’s stop of defendant’s car constituted at most an objectively reasonable mistake of law that should be treated in the same manner as a mistake of fact. Accordingly, the panel held that the officer’s mistake of law did not require suppression of the motor vehicle stop. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed: the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the holding in "Heien" was applicable here. Because the motor vehicle statutes pertinent here were not ambiguous, the Court did not consider the issue in light of Heien. "The officer’s stop of defendant’s motor vehicle was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law that gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop was therefore unconstitutional."
N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of the vehicle’s taillights was not operational.
during a period of license suspension for a second or subsequent driving-while-intoxicated conviction.
was lawful under the “community caretaking” function by which police officers engage in protecting public safety.
by letting defendant know that his vehicle was not in proper working order.
defendant had not violated the statute because he had at least one functioning taillight on each side of the vehicle.
The court concluded that Officer Carletta’s erroneous interpretation of the law could not pass constitutional scrutiny.
The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and reversed the trial court.
445 N.J. Super. 358 (2016).
reasonable mistake of law, the stop was permissible pursuant to Heien.
The Court granted defendant leave to appeal.
reasonable mistake of law that gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop was therefore unconstitutional.
that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry applies to mistakes of law just as it applies to mistakes of fact.
either followed or acknowledged Justice Kagan’s narrow interpretation of an objectively reasonable mistake of law.
Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2016).
of counsel and on the brief).
that should be treated in the same manner as a mistake of fact.
did not require suppression of the motor vehicle stop.
consider importing Heien into the determination of this matter.
sustained based on the community caretaking doctrine.
Police Department was the sole witness.
vehicle code.    He made a U-turn and began to follow the vehicle.
practice to give the driver a warning rather than a summons.
to check defendant’s information with police dispatch.
car to its intended destination.
improper instructions to the grand jury.
defendant know that his vehicle was not in proper working order.
reasonable basis for stopping defendant’s vehicle.”    Id. at 360.
445 N.J. Super. at 366-67.
445 N.J. Super. at 365.
community caretaking doctrine.    Id. at 371.
proceedings before the trial and appellate courts.
open to differing and equally reasonable interpretations.
of the public independent of their law enforcement objectives.
strict construction of those statutes in defendant’s favor.
unconstitutional under our Article I, Paragraph 7 jurisprudence.
mistaken belief leading to arrest did not warrant suppression).
incident to the arrest.    Id. at 42.
318 N.J. Super. at 352-53.
mistake of fact and was thus lawful.     Ibid.
379 N.J. Super. at 382-83.
“placard” requirement.     Id. at 382-84.
205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.
occurred in order to meet standard of reasonable suspicion).
setting forth the background to this appeal.
135 S. Ct.  at 534.
state’s motor vehicle code, the officer executed a traffic stop.
search the vehicle and discovered illegal drugs in a duffel bag.
violation of the Fourth Amendment.   Ibid.
the facts are outside the scope of the law.
officer with reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.
own search and seizure analyses.
9 F. Cas. 825, 826 (No. 5,125) (C.C.D.
interpretation” and will thus be “exceedingly rare.”      Ibid.
956 N.E.2d 136, 141 (Ind.
cannot justify a traffic stop”).
find that officer has made reasonable mistake); People v.
32 N.E.3d 641, 652 (Ill. 2015) (same); State v.
356 P.3d 559, 563-64 (N.M.
consider Heien; that opportunity presented itself in State v.
suspicion for a constitutional police stop.   Id. at 36.
reasonable mistake of law in this matter.
stop lamps, as prescribed by section 2 of L.
assumed and charged here, has not occurred.
alter prior application of the pertinent statutes.     Cf. State v.
197 N.J. 325, 335 (2009).
requirement was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law.
the stop in this matter, is reversed.
That, however, does not end the matter.
violation of a criminal statute.”       Id. at 142 (quoting Cady v.
413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).
argument in light of the manner in which it resolved the case.

References: v. 
 v.

 v.

 v.

 v.

 v.