Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/309/370/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:04:32+00:00

Document:
1. A private Act of Congress which, after an award of compensation for disability made by a deputy commissioner under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act had become final by expiration of the time for review, authorized and directed the Employees' Compensation Commission to review the order and issue a new one, whereupon there was awarded additional compensation for disability continuing beyond the date as of which by the prior order it was deemed to have terminated, held, as to the employer and insurance carrier, not violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 309 U. S. 374, 309 U. S. 378.
2. The Act was validly enacted by Congress to cure a defect in administration developed in the handling of a claim compensable under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. P. 309 U. S. 379.
3. The enactment by Congress of private Acts, except bills of attainder and grants of nobility, is not forbidden by the Federal Constitution. P. 309 U. S. 380.
4. The contention that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be read into the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that the Act denies equal protection, is rejected. Pp. 309 U. S. 379-380.
5. The Act is not invalid as an encroachment by Congress on the judicial function. P. 309 U. S. 381.
Appeal from a decree of a District Court of three judges upholding the constitutionality of a special Act of Congress and dismissing libels in two cases consolidated for hearing.
The question is whether the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated by a private act of Congress directing a review of an order for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act [Footnote 1] after there had been a final award by the deputy commissioner and after the time for review of the award had expired.
By direct appeal, the appellants challenge the decree below, contending that the private act violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The argument of appellants is that the original award was an adjudication on which further review was barred prior to the enactment of the private act; that thereby rights and obligations were finally determined, the deprivation of which took from appellants a substantive immunity from further claims of Clark and created in Clark new substantive rights.
employer to employee. [Footnote 10] But we do not agree that the immunity obtained by the lapse of the time for review is the type of immunity which protects its beneficiary from retroactive legislation authorizing review of the claim. This private act does not set aside a judgment, create a new right of action or direct the entry of an award. The hearing provided for is subject to the provisions of the general act for longshoremen's and harbor workers' compensation. It does not operate to create new obligations where none existed before. It is an act to cure a defect in administration developed in the handling of a compensable claim. If the continuing injury had been known during the period of compensation, payments of the same amount due under the award authorized by this act would have been due to the employee. [Footnote 11] In such circumstances, we see no violation of the due process clause.
It is unimportant whether the claim persisted after the bar [Footnote 18] or ended with the running of limitation. [Footnote 19] To cure a fault of administration, Congress may validly enact this act.
44 Stat. 1436, § 21, 33 U.S.C. § 921.
"That in the case of John T. Clark, of Seattle, Washington, whose disability compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, was terminated as of July 5, 1931, by a compensation order filed August 26, 1931, the Employees' Compensation Commission be, and it is hereby, authorized and directed to review such order in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of such claims in section 19 of said Act, and in accordance with such section to issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, increase, or decrease such compensation, the provisions of sections 21 and 22 of the said Act, as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, That such new order shall not affect any compensation paid under authority of the prior order."
S.Rep. No. 1645, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R.Rep. No. 1892, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. The information before the Committees is attached to both reports, and includes statements by the doctors who examined, x-rayed, and operated on Clark after the deputy commissioner's order; letters from the Compensation Commission discussing the history of the case, and a letter from the deputy commissioner to the sponsor of the act, Congressman Zioncheck, relating the deputy commissioner's participation in the case.
50 Stat. 752, § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 380a.
Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 27 F.Supp. 823; discussed in Comment, The Constitutionality of Private Acts of Congress, 1940, 49 Yale L.J. 712.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22.
282 U. S. 282 U.S. 409.
See the cases cited to support the conclusion: Forbes Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U. S. 338; United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370; Chuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549; see also Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 300 U. S. 302.
185 U. S. 185 U.S. 505, 185 U. S. 511.
See Independent Pier Co. v. Norton, 12 F.Supp. 974, where the amendment of May 26, 1934, 33 U.S.C. § 922, construed as extending the time for review of an award under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for one year retroactively as to a final award, was held within due process. See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421.
Ante, p. 309 U. S. 23.
Cf. Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 59 N.E. 1033; Dunbar v. Boston & Providence Railroad, 181 Mass. 383, 386, 63 N.E. 916; Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 238 N.Y. 271, 144 N.E. 579. But see, for criticism, Woodward v. Central Vermont Ry., 180 Mass. 599, 603, 62 N.E. 1051; Ziccardi's Case, 287 Mass. 588, 591, 192 N.E. 29; Casieri's Case, 286 Mass. 50, 190 N.E. 118.
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620.
William Danzer Co. v. Gulf & S.I. R., Co., 268 U. S. 633.
Art. I, § 9, cls. 3 and 8.
24 Stat. 170; cf. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190.
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U. S. 284, 273 U. S. 285, 273 U. S. 299.
State courts have dealt with this question as a matter of the necessity of equality in due process before and after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; State v. Industrial Accident Board, 94 Mont. 386, 23 P.2d 253; Matter of Decker v. Pouvailsmith Corp., 252 N.Y. 1, 7, 168 N.E. 442; Roles Shingle Co. v. Bergerson, 142 Or. 131, 19 P.2d 94; Reiser v. William Tell Saving Fund Assoc., 39 Pa. 137, 146; State Bank v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 599, 605-606; Tate's Ex'rs v. Bell, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 202; Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 119; cf. 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.) 809.
There are restrictions against the enactment of special legislation in the constitutions of all the states except Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont. The following are typical provisions: (1) "The legislature shall not pass local or special laws concerning any of the following enumerated cases, . . . ;" followed by an enumeration of proscribed subjects which is concluded with the catchall, "where a general law can be made applicable." See Cal.Const., art. IV, § 25; Ky.Const., § 59. (2) "All laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the State. . . ." See Ohio Const., art. II, § 26. (3) "No special, private, or local law . . . shall be enacted in any case which is provided for by a general law. . . ." See Ala.Const., 1901 art. IV, § 105. (4) "The Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular individual. . . ." See Tenn.Const., art. XI, § 8. Often there will be more than one provision in a constitution. The various provisions and decisions under them are discussed in Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local Legislation (1936) 24 Ky.L.J. 351, and Binney, Restrictions Upon Local and Special Legislation, p. 127, et seq.
Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, 225 U. S. 241.
Sanders v. Cabaniss, 43 Ala. 173; Trustees Fund v. Bailey, 10 Fla. 238; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64; State ex rel. Flint v. Flint, 61 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. 1113; Petition of Siblerud, 148 Minn. 347, 182 N.W. 168; Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H.199; Matter of Greene, 166 N.Y. 485, 60 N.E. 183; De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18; Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324; In re Handley's Estate, 15 Utah 212, 49 P. 829; Ratcliffe v. Anderson, 31 Grat.Va. 105; Marpole v. Cather's Adm'r, 78 Va. 239; Davis v. Menasha, 21 Wis. 491.
Compare Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421; Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct.Cls. 447.

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