Source: https://www.utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.262/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:55:56+00:00

Document:
Cross-Border Patent Disputes: Unified Patent Court or International Commercial Arbitration?
Reading: Cross-Border Patent Disputes: Unified Patent Court or International Commercial Arbitration?
Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of Legal Studies, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) (Mexico).
Currently, the enforcement of a patent that is registered in several countries involves the risk of getting different and conflicting decisions from the national courts. In 2013, 25 European countries entered in an agreement that aims to homogenise the patent system by creating the European patent with unitary effect and a Unified Patent Court (UPC). This article focuses on the UPC, which aims to have a single court proceeding for cross-border patent conflicts. Does the UPC system represent an advantage compared to the current litigation system? The paper argues that it does and explores what it considers to be the two main advantages of a UPC over the current system of cross-border litigation of patents: the ability to drag several conflicts to a single procedure and the neutrality of the decision makers. These advantages are consequently compared to the characteristics of arbitration. Then, an explanation is provided with regards to how the UPC system is going to work in terms of jurisdiction, preliminary injunctions, the choice of law and enforcement of decisions, comparing those same procedural aspects to arbitration. The article finds that arbitration involves many of the same advantages (as compared to the UPC) and that the procedural issues studied in both means are, so too, similar. Therefore, arbitration represents a viable alternative to the UPC when it comes to reducing the risks in solving cross-border patent conflicts.
Given the observation that current cross-border litigation of a single patent right between the same parties may reach different conclusions, this paper aims to analyse on one side, the future Unified Patent Court (UPC) which represents an effort from several countries in the European Union (EU) to have a harmonised patent system. On the other side, the characteristics of the UPC will be compared with those of a commercial arbitration procedure, where parties can solve their cross-border patent conflict.
Hence, leaving aside the question of arbitrability in this kind of disputes, this article will discuss the origins and reasoning behind the UPC system. Part III submits that the UPC system’s main advantages are the fact that it will consist of a single procedure that will decide cross-border conflicts all over Europe, as well as the neutrality of the decision makers. These two characteristics are considered face-to-face with characteristics of commercial arbitration that represent the same advantages.
The article concludes that although UPC presents a very good alternative to tackle the issues surrounding a cross-border patent dispute, there is still uncertainty as to the procedure. Moreover there is the need for a more international solution, which can be reached by a single arbitration procedure.
The main methodological approaches used in this article are qualitative research methods in the form of case studies, comparative approaches, literature review and experts’ opinions gathered from attending conferences with academics and practitioners. The secondary sources of the paper were drawn from newspapers, technology magazines and IPRs blogs, given that they provided the latest updates on UPC.
It is known that qualitative research gives a deeper understanding of experiences of the law and its application.11 With that in mind, and given that the UPC is not yet in force, the author analysed several articles and other material available on UPC’s website. Moreover the author attended conferences with patent experts, where the UPC system was analysed and debated, and the most relevant findings are quoted throughout the paper. Given that the UPC system has not been ratified, the different issues in question remain a matter of opinion. Therefore the conversations, debates at conferences and one-on-one interviews, attended and carried out by the author, were critical in order to gather enough data to analyse and answer the research question. Information was gathered from a variety of experts and active contributors of the patent system in Europe, including patent lawyers,12 patent chiefs of innovative companies,13 patent judges, professors and representatives of the European Patent Office (EPO).
In 1949, after the Council of Europe had just been created, the French Senator Longchambon made a proposal for a regional patent system. While this proposal was rejected, the belief in the need for a patent office and supporting laws to facilitate integration found several supporters. Over the next years other proposals surged, which in combination helped to set the agenda for the creation of a European patent.14 The European Patent Convention (EPC) was signed in Munich in 1973, and became effective in 1977.15 The EPC established ‘a system of law, common to the Contracting States, for the grant of patents for inventions’16 and a European Patent Organisation with administrative and financial autonomy;17 that is, a single procedure and office for what it is called the ‘European patent’.
Even though it established a single procedure for the application for a patent, the system does not grant a unitary right, but rather a bundle of national patents that are subject to the laws of the contracting states in which protection is sought.18 The validity of the grant of the European patent is conditioned upon said patent being translated into the language of each Contracting Member State where the patent is to have effect.19 Hence, the European patent is a fragmented patent system, where each Contracting State’s patent laws govern that State’s fractional share of the European patent (e.g. the remedies are not addressed in the EPC).20 In addition, when it comes to post-(patent)granting issues, such as amendment, revocation and infringement, litigation must take place at the national level.21 One must note, however, that the EPC was only intended to be the first step; a provisional tool which was to be followed by further harmonisation.
This unitary system intends to end the different and sometimes contradictory decisions in the national courts under the current European patent system. In the following section, the characteristics of the system will be analysed against those of commercial arbitration.
The UPC system will potentially solve the issue of having to litigate in several national courts in the EU when aiming to defend a single patent—registered in different jurisdictions—against a singular opponent. It intends to have a unitary patent abolishing the bundle system and it will also unify the procedure for the Signatory States.
This part of the essay will explain two advantages that the UPC system will offer in the case of a cross-border patent conflict: to be able to draw several conflicts into one single procedure, and the neutrality of the decision makers. Such advantages are considered similar to characteristics of Commercial Arbitration and hence they are explained as follows.
The first characteristic to analyse is the fact that UPC will establish a single procedure for the same conflict between the same parties in several jurisdictions. First, this section describes the single procedure in the UPC, then, the arbitration procedure in the UPC and finally how commercial arbitration may work as a single procedure englobing a cross-border patent conflict.
According to the EPO, the fact that national courts and authorities of the contracting states of the EPC are the ones to decide on the infringement and validity of European patents gives rise to a number of difficulties when a patent proprietor wishes to enforce a European patent in several countries. Such problems may include high costs, risk of diverging decisions, and lack of legal certainty.24 Overcoming these difficulties represents one of the justifications for the UPC.
A possibility for the claimant to opt out and choose another forum during a 7-year transitional period (extendable).26 This period was set to allow patent owners, experts and lawyers to learn and adjust to the new system.
European patents with unitary effect.
The UPC system also provides the possibility of having a single arbitration or mediation procedure. According to the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC Agreement or UPCA), the judge in the UPC may suggest to the parties of a conflict that instead of continuing with the litigation, they solve the conflict via the Arbitration and Mediation Centre (the Centre or Arbitration Centre).27 The latter will have the capability of ruling over the conflict with the same unified effect as the UPC, hence providing alternative dispute resolution methods as a single procedure ruling over the unitary patent.
It is still in doubt how the Centre will operate during the transitional period of the UPC, given that the EPC system will coexist during this time, as explained above. Assuming that the patent is under the bundle system of the EPC, it is understood that if both of the parties agree to solve the conflict in the UPC Centre, they are giving their tacit consent for the award to be valid in all of the Contracting States of UPC.
Therefore, given the coexistence of the EPC with the UPC for the transitional period of 7 years, and the uncertainty of the relation between the two, it is possible to conclude that the UPC system by ways of litigation or arbitration, will not immediately achieve the unity that it is looking for, at least not until the transitional period has elapsed.
Both agreements for future disputes (i.e. the contractual arbitration clause) and submission agreements require that the parties to the conflict agree to take their dispute to arbitration, and through the arbitration agreement, the parties can specify the dispute that they want to submit to arbitration. A basic principle in international arbitration is that of party autonomy, endorsed by Article 19(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.30 The autonomy of the parties to the arbitration agreement is restricted by issues of public policy.31 The UPC system will allow a single procedure for a cross-border conflict of patents and therefore we can affirm that the agreement for arbitration for such type of conflicts will not be in prejudice of public policy. Hence, if the parties agree, it is possible that they submit to a single commercial arbitration for a patent conflict that involves several jurisdictions.
One of the important characteristics of the new system is the neutrality of the decision makers and the assurance that they will be knowledgeable in the respective patent field. In the UPC, the judges that will sit on the case will be chosen from a ‘Pool of Judges’ and it is considered that this measure will ensure the neutrality of the Court. According to the UPCA: ‘[t]he Pool of Judges shall be composed of all legally qualified judges and technically qualified judges from the Court of First Instance [(CFI)] who are full-time or part-time judges of the Court’.32 Moreover, according to Article 8(1) of the same agreement ‘[a]ny panel of the Court of First Instance shall have a multinational composition’. Having international decision-makers who are not known to the parties beforehand is positive from a neutrality point of view and negative from a practice point of view, mainly because practitioners will fear the unknown quality of the judges’ decisions. The UPC Agreement tries to counteract such fear, since in Article 18(3) states that the allocation of judges shall take into account their legal or technical expertise, linguistic skills and relevant experience, in order to guarantee the same high quality as on all panels of the CFI.
At the time of writing there is still no regulation of the arbitration procedure of the UPC, but it is likely to work on the same basis as the CFI, with arbitrators chosen from a pool of experts.
One of the advantages of arbitration is that the parties have the freedom to choose the arbitrators that are going to preside over their conflict. Thus, they can secure which experts will be analysing their case. In this part of the essay it will be examined very briefly how the arbitrators are appointed. There is vast literature regarding the rules to appoint arbitrators and the proven knowledge and ethics that are desirable for arbitrators. It is not the aim of this work to analyse this issue deeply, but only to provide an overview, in order to ascertain if the freedom of the parties to select arbitrators is an advantage when dealing with cross-border conflicts of patents. Subject to the applicable law and the chosen institutional rules, if any, the principle of party autonomy generally will govern the selection and nomination of the arbitral tribunal.
The principal factors that affect the decision on the number of arbitrators are the size, value, and complexity of the dispute.33 In general, appointing a sole arbitrator for smaller cases is more appropriate. The greater the number of arbitrators appointed, the greater the delay and expense likely to be incurred during the proceedings.34 Appointing a three-member tribunal may permit the parties to combine different types of experience, legal and technical expertise and linguistic skills.35 In the field of patents, this would mean that it would be possible to appoint an arbitrator that has knowledge and skills in the technical field of the protection of the patent.
In summary, a panel of three arbitrators is likely to be chosen by the parties of a cross-border conflict of patents, although the parties may decide to have more. This decision will, of course, have an impact in the cost of the procedure.
It has been established that the parties to an arbitration will have the freedom to choose how many arbitrators they will want on the panel. In this part of the essay, we will address the way parties will be able to select them.
Article 12(8) ICC Rules specifies that in the absence of a nomination, and when the parties are unable to agree on a method for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the Court will appoint the arbitrators and will designate one of them to act as president.
Even though the process to appoint arbitrators may be criticised for being long, if the arbitration is conducted under the ICC provisions, there is the possibility of having emergency arbitrators to grant interim relief before the Tribunal is constituted. This avoids the need of parties having to go to court to attempt to obtain such relief, since appointing an arbitrator will take two days.46 In matters of intellectual property (IP) disputes it can be of key importance to obtain an urgent injunctive relief.47 If the arbitration is being conducted by an institution, such as WIPO, it might be an assurance for the parties that they will have experts in IPRs on an international scale.
In summary, both the UPC and Arbitration share the advantage that cross-border conflict of patents may be resolved by a single procedure, with the only difference being that in order to submit it to arbitration under UPC the parties have to sign an agreement. From the UPC perspective, it is considered a disadvantage to have a seven-year transition period, as explained in Part III (Section A), where four parallel patent systems remain. Regarding the neutrality of the decision-makers, the Pool of Judges system of the UPC seems to ensure that experienced and neutral experts will sit on the cases. In this regard, if the arbitration is administered by an institution, the selection of experts might be the same as in the UPC procedure, it will only make a difference if the parties wish to choose the arbitrators themselves.
After talking about the advantages that UPC and arbitration procedures will offer in contrast to current cross-border litigation, this section will analyse certain aspects of the procedures in order to assess whether these procedural elements will aid the type of conflicts in question.
This section will analyse which is the appropriate forum when having a dispute that involves several jurisdictions.
In Article 33(5) it is specified that if an action for revocation is pending before the central division and there is an action for infringement between the same parties and related to the same patent, it may be brought before any division or before the central division.
Article 33(1)(b) provides the claimant the option to bring the infringement action where the defendant has its residence. In the case of multiple defendants, it could be the place where one of the defendants has its residence or principal place of business, while bearing in mind that the action against multiple defendants may be brought only where they have a commercial relationship and the action relates to the same alleged infringement. All the rules can apply to non-EU defendants, as they can be sued at the place of infringement.
It is submitted then, that even when the substantive law is harmonised the different approaches will still play a role during the first years of the UPC and only when a balance is achieved the selection of the forum will be less important. A final point of concern is that regardless of the different ‘local flavours’ of the different divisions, they will all meet in the Court of Appeal (CoA) in Véron (n 50). It will be interesting to see how this CoA will navigate the harmonisation here, and also begs the question of whether it will add its own local flavour. This issue will only be answered in the long run.
Article 35 of the UPCA indicates that a patent Arbitration and Mediation Centre shall have its seats in Ljubljana and Lisbon. According to De Werra, the decision of having two seats for the Centre was made from a political perspective, however, it raises questions regarding what would happen to the freedom of the parties to choose the arbitral seat.64 Would the parties who wanted to use arbitration to solve their conflict over a European patent be obliged to use the facilities of the Centre? In terms of the seat of arbitration, would it be considered to be Lisbon or Ljubljana? Or elsewhere in Europe?
The selection of the arbitration seat impacts the costs of the proceedings, the applicable law, and potentially the enforcement of the award. In terms of disputing a European patent with unitary effect only, the question of applicable law would be solved, and the parties will not have to fear any potential application of the lex fori.
The answer to the above question may be found in the freedom of the parties to choose arbitration. The use of the UPC Arbitration Centre is just one option open to the parties. If the parties want to solve their patent dispute through arbitration they may choose any arbitration institution or even an ad hoc procedure to manage it. If they do want to go to this Centre it is clear that the sites will then be Lisbon and Ljubljana. This is not problematic as it is possible to have both the seat of the arbitration in one State and (for reasons of cost or location convenience) to have audiences in another State.
If the arbitration is conducted by an institution and the parties do not agree on a seat, the administration will choose the location for them.65 If, however is an arbitration that is not subject to an institution (ad hoc) and the parties cannot agree on a seat, this complicates the procedure. The applicable procedural law of the ad hoc arbitration, depends upon the seat. But if a seat has not been decided by the parties, the arbitrator will have to apply procedural law in order to determine the appropriate seat. The question is then, which procedural law will the arbitrator apply in order to determine the seat?
Article 32(c) states that the UPC will have competence over actions for provisional and protective measures and injunctions. At the time of writing the Rules of Procedure are yet to be approved. Rule 10 of the latest draft of the Rules of Procedure lays down the most important aspects of it to the extent that it is possible to conclude that in a single procedure there is a decision of the merits.
Article 62 of the UPC Agreement makes it clear that there is a possibility of obtaining a preliminary injunction against an infringer and that there should be some way of compensating the person against whom the injunction is granted. The court is meant to balance the interests of the parties and decide whether to grant the injunction or not. This seems to come from the Anglo-Saxon approach of considering injunctions without trying to decide whether the party is likely to be successful in an interim hearing.70 Therefore, instead of focusing on the relative harm that each party would suffer if the injunction were granted, it is assumed that there is a dispute between the parties that will be determined at trial.
In respect of preliminary injunctions, Article 29 of the ICC Rules accounts for a procedure for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator which a party in need of urgent or conservatory measures can apply for. The process involves submitting an application for emergency measures to the Secretariat.72 An award made by the Centre will be enforceable mutatis mutandis according to the enforcement rules of the decisions of the UPC. Regarding injunctions, Article 83(2) establishes that ‘[w]here appropriate, the enforcement of a decision may be subject to the provision of security or an equivalent assurance to ensure compensation for any damage suffered, in particular in the case of injunctions.’ This provision will facilitate the enforcement of an interim award if the parties decide to submit their dispute to the Centre. There are, however, several factors regarding the enforcement of awards in the UPC system that need to be taken into consideration and they are studied below in the enforcement section.
It is a principle of international arbitration that the parties in conflict are free to choose the legal system they want the tribunal to base the decision on. However, if the parties do not agree on the choice of law then they can decide that the tribunal will choose for them. This raises the question what the rule should be to determine the applicable law. In international arbitration literature this has been discussed extensively.
With the increasing harmonisation of national IP laws through multilateral agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement,76 and now the UPC, it may often be fair and reasonable for the court to presume that affected State(s)’ norms are the same as those of the State of arbitration.77 Nevertheless, in the field of patents it is perceived that there is reluctance by practitioners to break the territoriality of the substantive law protecting the patents.78 Therefore, in order to maintain the territoriality of the substantive laws applicable to a patent conflict, it may be suggested that all of the national laws related to the conflict will apply. This approach is known as a ‘mosaic of national laws’. It resembles the approach taken in Actavis v LillyEWHC 1511. (Pat) where a UK judge took into account the national laws of all of the jurisdictions involved in the dispute (e.g. France, Spain among others).79 This case shows that where there is a cross-border conflict over the same patent, it is possible to apply the laws of all of the countries that were involved in the dispute. The author is of the opinion that in terms of substance, the European laws that deal with IPRs are more or less homogenised;80 the slight differences that may exist between them, are a result of the interpretation of the law by the decision makers, rather than an objective difference.
It is recommended that the mosaic approach should be followed in regard of applicable law in the case of an arbitration of cross-border patent disputes, in order to include the different interpretations of the law. This approach will have more acceptability as long as it does not involve a decision on the validity of the patent.
Article 82 of UPC states that the decisions and orders of the court will be enforceable in any Contracting State. The order for enforcement will be appended to the decision. Therefore it is possible to conclude that the enforcement of the decisions under the UPC will come automatically with the judgment. This represents an advantage over the EPC system, where the enforcement of foreign national judgments is not mandatory. In the case of injunctions, under the UPC the enforcement of a decision may only be subject to the provision of security or an equivalent assurance to ensure compensation for any damage suffered.
The enforcement procedures shall be governed by the law of the Contracting State where the enforcement takes place.81 Moreover, any decision of the court shall be enforced under the same conditions as a decision made in the Contracting State where the enforcement takes place. This is called ‘automatic enforcement’ and it intends to be mandatory. Article 82(4) states that if a party does not comply with the terms of an order of the court, that party may be sanctioned with a penalty. The individual penalty shall be proportionate to the importance of the order to be enforced and shall be without prejudice to the party’s right to claim damages or security.
First, to obtain recognition and enforcement of an international arbitral award, it is necessary that both the agreement to arbitrate and the award exist.82 The NYC establishes the formal proof of the existence of the foreign awards in its Article IV: ‘A party seeking recognition and enforcement of an award must supply (a) the duly authenticated original of the award or a duly certified copy thereof, and (b) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof’.
Fulfilling the requirements described above will constitute prima facie evidence of the entitlement of the applicant to enforcement of the award.83 There will be no need to start an enforcement procedure if the parties comply with the award voluntarily. However, if they do not, the interested party will have to go to a national court to ask for enforcement. There is vast regulation and experience regarding the enforcement of international awards under the NYC in different national courts, which is not considered necessary to reproduce for the purposes of this article.
Article 35 of UPC provides for the formation of a patent Arbitration and Mediation Centre, and Paragraph 2 states that ‘[…] Article 82 shall apply mutatis mutandis to any settlement reached through the use of the facilities of the Centre, including through mediation […]’. The provisions of Article 82 are for the enforcement of decisions and orders. Therefore, it can be inferred that either the settlement outcome from a mediation or the arbitral award will be enforced in the same way as formal decisions rendered by the UPC.84 This means that the award will be labelled with the status of a sentence and will achieve the character of res judicata. This would be a clear advantage of the arbitration over the court procedure as there would be no appeal and hence a potentially faster procedure.
However, it is noticeable that Article 35 quoted above only talks about ‘settlement’ and not specifically about ‘award’. An arbitration decision is not a settlement per se, it is a decision taken by a third party (arbitrator). It is questionable whether the intention of the legislator was that the Centre would be exclusively used by the parties to reach an agreement (and not to arbitrate their dispute), and perhaps this is why the word ‘settlement’ is continuously used. One can hope that this does not cause confusion in the future, when parties ask for the enforcement of an award rendered by the Centre.
In this respect, the ICC Rules, in Article 32, recognise that if the parties reach a settlement and they transmit85 it to the arbitral tribunal, then this settlement will be recorded in the form of an award made, if the parties so wish. Therefore, from the experience of other arbitration institutions, it is possible to convert a settlement into an arbitration award. The advantage of converting a settlement into an award is that, if in the future one of the parties refuses to comply with the settlement, the other party can make the award enforceable.
According to De Werra, the provision in Article 35 of UPC leaves the question open about whether the parties will be able to submit a dispute regarding a European patent with unitary effect to another arbitration service provider. Even though this is an issue that will have to be clarified to ensure the successful implementation of the Alternative Dispute Resolution methods used for solving European patent disputes, he is of the mind that the parties will be free to choose the arbitration institution they prefer.86 It is proposed then, that this theory finds confirmation when taking into account that the basis of the arbitration is the consent of the parties, and therefore they should be able to choose the institution that will be more efficient for them.
Given this scenario, if the parties choose another institution different to the UPC Centre, the enforcement of the arbitral award begs the question: Are the parties going to be able to enforce the award according to the UPC scheme/rules?
It is important to take into account that the award deals with a patent registered in the EU, either a European patent or a European patent with unitary effect. And it is also important to note that during the transitional period, the parties can opt out of the scheme of UPC and choose the forum where they want their action to be heard (Article 83(1) of UPC).87 Then, if the contended patent is a European patent (without unitary effect) and the owner opts out of the UPC system, the answer to the question is straightforward as the parties to the arbitration will be able to enforce their award, based on the mechanism of the NYC.
According to Article 83(1) of UPC, during the transitional period actions may be brought before the national courts. As such, it can be concluded that the parties can use the national courts to enforce the arbitration awards if they so wish, regardless of whether the patent has unitary effect or not. It remains in question whether an award not rendered at the Centre would be enforceable under UPC. In order to answer this, it is necessary to analyse Article 82 of UPC and the enforcement-related articles at the current draft for Rules of Procedure.
Article 82 specifies that the decisions (and orders) shall be enforceable in any Contracting State. This means that UPC’s will not have jurisdiction to enforce their decisions. Hence our question is defined a little bit more by the following: is it possible that an award that deals with a European patent with unitary effect be levelled up to a decision of the UPC court, even considering that the award was not rendered by a UPC institution, but rather another arbitration institution?
Rule 354 of the draft for Rules of Procedure reads:88 ‘[s]ubject to Rule 118.9 and Rule 352 decisions and orders of the Court shall be directly enforceable from their date of service in each Contracting Member State. Enforcement shall take place in accordance with the enforcement procedures and conditions governed by the law of the particular Contracting Member State where enforcement takes place’. It is submitted that this provision rules out decisions taken by other institutions that are not part of the UPC scheme. Consequently, the awards provided by arbitration institutions (e.g. WIPO, ICC) that relate to an EU patent with unitary effect will have to be enforced by means of the institutions’ rules and the NYC.
This paper elaborates on the submission that the current litigation system of cross-border conflicts of a single patent between the same parties, in different jurisdictions, results in an abuse of the litigation system by the parties and results in different and sometimes contradictory decisions. This submission was stated after following the multijurisdictional litigation between Apple and Samsung. Hence, the paper studies the possible solution of using a single procedure to resolve these types of conflicts; the decision of which can be enforced in the different jurisdictions where the parties market their products. It is submitted that the European efforts to achieve a single procedure has finally come to reality with the creation of the UPC. It represents a single procedure and it will ensure the neutrality of the decision-makers. Nevertheless this paper shows that commercial arbitration can be advantageous as it harbours the possibility of a wider effect of the award (beyond the EU).
Furthermore, this paper analysed four elements of procedure in the new UPC vis-à-vis those same elements in commercial arbitration. First, with regard to jurisdiction, the new UPC system will be defined by rules that at the time of writing are still not definitive. On the other hand, several arbitration institutions have definitive rules that would help the parties to decide a forum for their dispute and provide flexibility to the convenience of the parties.
Concerning the Preliminary Injunctions procedures in arbitration it is stated that the parties can rely on this method. This is particularly the case when the parties had a previous contract where they agree to arbitrate the disputes regarding IPRs because the arbitral tribunal can help in rendering an express award if it is considered to have found an infringement.
Regarding the applicable law, it is submitted that a mosaic approach would be suitable for cross-border patent conflict. This consists of taking into account all of the applicable laws that are relevant and decide under each of the laws the different decisions of the conflict. An example of this approach is seen in the Actavis case. It is submitted that if such an approach is possible in litigation, the practice is also viable for arbitration.
Finally, regarding the enforcement of international arbitration awards, it is recognised that the NYC provides for a mechanism of enforcement regardless of the award involving a EU patent with or without unitary effect and that, if the parties so wish, it can be enforced outside Contracting States of the UPC. On the other hand, if the parties opt to take their dispute to the UPC Arbitration Centre, the award will be enforced in the EU in the same way as a decision made by the UPC. Outside of the EU, this award might also be enforced under the terms of the NYC. Therefore, it is submitted that although the UPC represents an extraordinary procedure that will bring a special advantage to cross-border patent conflicts, its limitations, given that it only has effect within the EU signatory parties, and the present uncertainties in the proceedings, opens the possibility for reliable institutional commercial arbitration to fill the gaps during these types of disputes.
The research for this article was conducted during the PhD studies of the author, which were financed by CONACYT (Mexico) and the Centre of Commercial Law Studies of Queen Mary University of London (UK).
1See eg Jack Purcher ‘Apple & Samsung Dramatically Secured More Patents in 2012’ (Patently Apple, 10 January 2013) <http://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2013/01/apple-samsung-dramatically-secured-more-patents-in-2012> accessed 11 March 2016; Laura Gaze and John Roderick, Inside the iPhone Patent Portfolio (Thomson Reuters IP Market Report 2012).
2See eg Nigam Arora, ‘Apple May Pay Billions to Samsung for New iPad’ (Forbes Magazine, 15 March 2012) <www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/03/15/apple-may-billions-to-samsung-for-new-ipad/> accessed 11 March 2016; Kartik Chillakanti, ‘Apple and Samsung: Frenemies for Life’ (Huffington Post, 24 July 2013) <www.huffingtonpost.com/fueled/apple-and-samsung-frenemi_b_3640858.html> accessed 11 March 2016.
3Ian King and Adam Satariano, ‘Apple Ties to Samsung in Sharp Contrast to Courtroom Clash’ (Bloomberg Magazine, 7 August 2012) <www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-07/apple-ties-to-samsung-in-sharp-contrast-to-courtroom-clash> accessed 11 March 2016.
7A Google search, using the term ‘Apple vs Samsung’ gives around 416 million results; see <https://www.google.co.uk/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=QThMU_LAH43R8geY9oHICQ#q=apple+vs+samsung> accessed 14 April 2014.
8Apple and Samsung negotiated all patent procedures outside of the US, see Amid Chowdhry, ‘Apple and Samsung Drop Patent Disputes Against Each Other Outside of the U.S.’ (Forbes Magazine, 6 August 2014) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2014/08/06/apple-and-samsung-drop-patent-disputes-against-each-other-outside-of-the-u-s/#2b783eeca5e1> accessed 20 March 2016.
9See eg Julian Lew, Loukas Mistellis and Stephan Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003); Trevor Cook and Alejandro Garcia, International Intellectual Property Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer 2010); Anne Martin and J Derek Manson, ‘Arbitration: A Quick and Effective Means for Patent Dispute Resolution’ (Oblon, December 2011) <http://www.oblon.com/publications/arbitration-a-quick-and-effective-means-for-patent-dispute-resolution/> accessed 11 March 2016; and Gari Born, International Arbitration Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International 2012).
10This opinion is shared with Cook and Garcia (n 9); see also Thierry Calame and Martin Aebi, ‘Enforceability’ in Thomas D Halket (ed), Arbitration of International Intellectual Property Disputes (Juris Publishing 2012).
11Qualitative research aims to understand the meaning of human action, relying on text data rather than numerical, it also asks open questions about the phenomena as it occurs in context. See Stacy Carter and Miles Little, ‘Justifying Knowledge, Justifying Method, Taking Action: Epistemologies, Methodologies and Methods in Qualitative Research’ (2007) 17 QHR 1316.
12Recognised patent lawyers in the EU, specialised in patent litigation.
13From companies such as Nokia, Bayern and Caterpillar.
14Justine Pila, ‘The European Patent: An Old and Vexing Problem’ (2013) 62 ICLQ 917.
15Vincenzo Di Cataldo, ‘From the European Patent to a Community Patent’ (2002) 8 Colum J Eur L 19.
16Convention on the Grant of European Patents  13 ILM 268 (European Patent Convention), art 1.
19European Patent Convention art 137(2b).
20Di Cataldo (n 15) 20.
21Erika Ellyne, ‘European Patent Law: A Foreseeable Future in the Wake of the European Court of Justice Opinion 1/09 on the Compatibility of the Draft Agreement Creating a Unified Litigation Patent System with the Founding European Treaties?’ (2012) 2 QMJIP 345.
22For recent updates on ratifying parties, see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2013001> accessed 10 March 2016.
23EPO, ‘Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court’ (29 January 2015) <http://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary.html> accessed 12 March 2016.
24EPO, ‘The Unified Patent Court’ (29 January 2015) <www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/patent-court.html> accessed 11 March 2016.
27Agreement on a Unified Patent Court  OJ C175/1, art 52(2).
28Jacques De Werra, ‘Can Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Become the Default Method for Solving International Intellectual Property Disputes?’ (2012) 43 Cal W Intl LJ 39.
29See WIPO, ‘Recommended Contract Clauses and Submission Agreements’ <http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/clauses/#4> accessed 12 March 2016 (for an example of such a submission agreement).
30United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (adopted 21 June 1985, amended 2006) 24 ILM 1302 (UNCITRAL Model Law) (reflecting a worldwide consensus on key aspects of the arbitration practice).
31Alan Redfern and others, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell Publishing 2004) 315.
33James Bridgeman, ‘Choice of Arbitrator’ in Thomas D Halket (ed), Arbitration of International Intellectual Property Disputes (Juris Publishing 2012).
34Redfern and others (n 31) 221.
35Cook and García (n 9) 143.
36Arbitration Rules of the World Intellectual Property Organization (2014) <http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules> accessed 5 September 2015 (WIPO Arbitration Rules).
37Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures of the American Arbitration Association (2013) <https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestreleased> accessed 5 September 2015 (AAA Rules of Arbitration).
38Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (2012) <http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/> accessed 11 March 2016 (ICC Rules).
39Cook and García (n 9) 144.
40See UNCITRAL Model Law art 11(3); and ICC Rules art 12(5) (both suggesting that each party will appoint one arbitrator while the third one will be appointed by the Court).
42This mechanism, consist briefly in the following steps: The WIPO Centre sends to each party an identical list of a three candidates (such names will come from a list drawn from the WIPO Centre) then each party may delete the name of any candidate that they object to, and will leave the candidates in order of preferences, the Centre then will invite a person to be arbitrator.
43ibid; see also WIPO Arbitration Rules (n 36).
45Karen Fong, ‘Arbitration of IP Disputes: Eyes Wide Shut’ (The In-House Lawyer, 14 December 2009) <http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/intellectual-property/7673-arbitration-of-ip-disputes-eyes-wide-shut> accessed 12 March 2016.
46See ICC Rules art 29 and Appendix V.
47Katie McConnell and Nathan Searle, ‘Would You Take a Patent Dispute to the ICC for an Arbitration?’ (PatLit, 21 September 2011) <http://patlit.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/would-you-take-patent-dispute-to-icc.html> accessed 12 March 2016.
48Council Regulation (EU) 1257/2012 of 17 December 2012 on implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection  OJ L361/1.
49A division of the UPC will entail a first instance Court and they will be categorised in local, regional and central divisions. Every Contracting Member State may set up a local division (or more if needed). Contracting Member States that do not have much patent litigation may set up a regional division together. The central division is based in Paris, with sub-central divisions in London and Munich, which will each be assigned a specialty of the patent matter (eg technological, biological field). See EPO, ‘What are the Main Features of the Unified Patent Court?’ <www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary.html> accessed 12 March 2016.
50Pierre Véron, ‘The Unified Patent Court Explained in Detail’ (European Patent Reform Forum, Munich, 19 September 2013).
52Clemens Heusch, ‘Consultation Panel: Feedback and Ideas Regarding Draft Proposals for Rules of Procedure’ (European Patent Reform Forum, Munich, 19 September 2013); Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters  OJ L12/1 (Brussels I Regulation) (that was later replaced by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012).
54Jörg Thomaier, ‘Inter-Industry Debate: International Litigation Considerations’ (European Patent Reform Forum, Munich, 19 September 2013).
56UPC Agreement art 33(3) (clarifies that the local division has the discretion to either proceed with both the action for infringement with the counterclaim for revocation, or refer the counterclaim for revocation of decision to the central division and suspend (stay) or proceed with the action for infringement). The latter alternative is, at the moment, called ‘bifurcation’ in Germany—though it is uncertain which term will be applied in the future.
57Jörg Thomaier, ‘Consultation Panel: Feedback and Ideas Regarding Draft Proposals for Rules of Procedure’ (European Patent Reform Forum, Munich, 19 September 2013).
58Thomaier, ‘Inter-Industry Debate’ (n 54).
59Although, he also points out the fact that they will want to attract the big cases as a matter of prestige; see Heusch (n 52).
60ibid. For example, if 19% of the products are distributed in one or two countries, the dispute should not be brought before a minor market where there is only the presence of a webpage since that would not constitute a close (enough) connection.
61See Rules of Procedure of the Unified Patent Court (17th draft, 31 October 2014) <http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/UPC_Rules_of_Procedure_17th_Draft.pdf> accessed 12 March 2016 (UPC Rules of Procedure) (containing a preliminary set of provisions for the UPC).
64Gyooho Lee, Keon-Hyung Ahn and Jacques De Werra, ‘Euro-Korean Perspectives on the Use of Arbitration and ADR Mechanisms for Solving Intellectual Property Disputes’ (2014) 30 Arb Intl 91.
65See WIPO Arbitration Rules art 39; and ICC Rules art 18.
66A similar rule is followed by other non-UNCITRAL countries, eg the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration (2012) <https://www.swissarbitration.org/files/33/Swiss-Rules/SRIA_english_2012.pdf> accessed 10 February 2016 (Swiss Rules), art 16(1) (which reads ‘[i]f the parties have not determined the seat of the arbitration, or if the designation of the seat is unclear or incomplete, the Court shall determine the seat of the arbitration, taking into account all relevant circumstances, or shall request the arbitral tribunal to determine it’).
67Thomas D Halket and Susan H Nycum, ‘The Arbitration Agreement’ in Thomas D Halket (ed), Arbitration of International Intellectual Property Disputes (Juris Publishing 2012).
68London and New York are the most preferred seats of arbitration specified in international arbitration clauses; see Norton Rose Fulbright, 11th Annual Litigation Trends Survey (May 2015) <http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20150514-2015-litigation-trends-survey_v24-128746.pdf> accessed 12 March 2016, 70.
69The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (adopted 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959) 330 UNTS 38 (New York Convention) (which applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and the referral by a Court to arbitration). For a complete list of signatories see <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states> accessed 12 March 2016.
70Alex Wilson, ‘The Unified Patent Court Explained in (European Patent Reform Forum, Munich, 19 September 2013).
71Timothy Siaw, ‘The Netherlands’ in Massimo Sterpi and Thierry Calame (eds), Patent Litigation: Jurisdictional Comparisons (2nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012) 300; Case C-4/03 Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG  ECR I-6509; Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV and Others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg  ECR I-6535.
73Regulation 1257/2012 (n 48) (containing provisions concerning the effect, exhaustion, licenses on the unitary patent, and rules over the administrative tasks of the patent office); Council Regulation (EU) 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 on implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements  OJ L361/89 (taking into account the official languages of the UPC).
74See UPC Agreement art 24(2)-(3). When the conflict involves UPC Agreement arts 25-26 (on the right of the patent owner to prevent the direct or indirect use of an invention), art 27 (on the limits of the effect of the patent), or art 28 (on the right based on prior use of the invention); the application of national laws is allowed. National laws will also be applicable during the procedure when there are questions concerning the burden of proof (arts 54-55); corrective measures in infringement procedures (art 64); award of damages (art 68); and the period of limitation for bringing an action (art 72).
75See Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Accepts Legally Binding Commitments by Samsung Electronics on Standard Essential Patent Injunctions’ (29 April 2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-490_en.htm> accessed 12 March 2016.
76Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 33 ILM 1144, Annex C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).
77American Law Institute, Intellectual Property, Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (American Law Institute 2008).
78See eg David Caron, ‘The World of Intellectual Property and the Decision to Arbitrate’ (2003) 19 Arb Intl 451.
79See Actavis UK Limited and others v Eli Lilly & Company  EWHC 1511 (Pat) (Judgment on the merits).
80Ever since the TRIPS Agreement entered into force, the standards provisions have the same effect in all of the countries that took part in it.
82Calame and Aebi (n 9).
84Lee, Ahn and De Werra (n 65) 120.
85ICC Rules art 16 (which requires the transmission of a settlement to pass by the Secretariat of the ICC as part of the administrative procedures of the aforementioned organisation).
86Lee, Ahn and De Werra (n 65).
87UPC Agreement art 83(1) (stating that ‘[d]uring a transitional period of 7 years […] an action for infringement or revocation of a European patent […] may still be brought before national courts […]’).
88See UPC Rules of Procedure (n 61).

References: art 1
 art 137
 art 52
 art 11
 art 12
 art 29
 V.

 art 33
 art 39
 art 18
 art 16
 art 24
 art 27
 art 28
 art 16
 art 83