Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/a-aiudi-sons-llc-v-planning-zoning-comm-72-conn-app-502-2002/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:39:19+00:00

Document:
A. AIUDI AND SONS, LLC v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF PLAINVILLE.
Lavery, C.J., and Schaller and West, Js.
On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court from the trial court’s dismissal of its appeal from the decision by the defendant planning and zoning commission denying its application to excavate sand and gravel from certain of its real property. Held that although the trial court improperly treated the plaintiff’s application as an application for site plan approval and improperly searched the record to find a sufficient reason to uphold the defendant’s decision, that court’s judgment could be affirmed on the alternate ground that the plaintiff actually had applied for a special permit and that the defendant did not abuse its discretion in denying that application; the plaintiff having sought a permit for a use that was not permitted in the residential zone in which its property was located, the defendant properly based its decision on general health and safety considerations, and, further, contrary to the claim made by the plaintiff, the defendant’s approval of a previous application for a two year permit for the same purpose did not estop the defendant from denying the application here.
Officially released September 24, 2002.
Appeal from the decision by the defendant denying the plaintiff’s application for the excavation of sand and gravel, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Cohn, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
William Galske III, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Edward T. Lynch, with whom, on the brief, was Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiff, A. Aiudi and Sons, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the defendant, the planning and zoning commission of the town of Plainville (commission). At issue is the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s application to excavate sand and gravel from a residentially zoned parcel. Essentially, the plaintiff claims that its application was a site plan application and that the defendant had no discretion to deny the application because it satisfied the site plan requirements. We conclude that the plaintiff’s application actually was a special permit application and that the defendant properly exercised its discretion in denying the application. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
noise, neighboring property values and the parcel’s diminished future use for residential purposes.
(1985) (“failure of an application to garner enough votes for its approval amounts to a rejection of the application”).
for residential purposes.” The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s denial.
Following the court’s denial of its motion to reargue, the plaintiff was granted certification to appeal and thereafter appealed to this court. It claims that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) general criteria in zoning regulations may serve as a basis to deny a site plan application, (2) the defendant’s regulations permitted the defendant to deny the site plan application on the basis of such general criteria and (3) there was evidence in the record to support the defendant’s decision. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Although the plaintiff argues that it filed a site plan application, we conclude that the plaintiff actually applied for, and was denied, a special permit. Our review leads us to conclude that the court improperly treated the plaintiff’s application as one seeking site plan approval because the application was, in substance, an application for a special permit. Viewing the application as such, we conclude that the defendant acted within its discretion in denying the application. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment on the basis of one of the alternate grounds argued by the defendant because there is evidence in the record in support thereof. See Delfino v. Planning Zoning Commission, 30 Conn. App. 454, 460, 620 A.2d 836 (1993). “Where a trial court reaches the correct result, but has based that result on mistaken grounds, we will sustain the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist to support it.” Id.
to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values. . . . An application for a special permit seeks permission to vary the use of a particular piece of property from that for which it is zoned, without offending the uses permitted as of right in the particular zoning district. . . . When a special permit is issued, the affected property may be allowed an exception to the underlying zoning regulations, but it continues to be governed in the same manner as provided in the overall comprehensive plan.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Heithaus v. Planning Zoning Commission, 258 Conn. 205, 215-17, 779 A.2d 750 (2001).
“When ruling upon an application for a special permit, a planning and zoning board acts in an administrative capacity. . . . Generally, it is the function of a zoning board or commission to decide within prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of [its] legal discretion, whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and the manner in which it does apply. The [Appellate Court and] trial court [have] to decide whether the board correctly interpreted the section [of the regulations] and applied it with reasonable discretion to the facts. . . . In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, the board is endowed with a liberal discretion, and its action is subject to review by the courts only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Irwin v. Planning Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 627-28, 711 A.2d 675 (1998). Furthermore, although “the zoning commission does not have discretion to deny a special permit when the proposal meets the standards, it does have discretion to determine whether the proposal meets the standards set forth in the regulations.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 628.
(1994). Here, § 502 of the defendant’s regulations provides that general considerations such as “public health, safety, or general welfare to the public,” “harmony and character with the surrounding properties,” and “the value of adjacent properties,” may be taken into account when considering a special permit. Accordingly, because the defendant had the discretion to deny the plaintiff’s application based on general considerations, we must first explain how we reach our conclusion that the plaintiff applied for a special permit.
permitted as of right in an R-11 zone, § 900 of the zoning regulations provides in relevant part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided for in this Article, there shall be no removal from the premises, in any district, of earth, sand, gravel or clay. . . .” Although the removal of sand, gravel or clay is not permitted as of right, the plaintiff applied for a two year permit pursuant to § 910.2. Section 910.2 provides in relevant part that “the [defendant] may, after a public hearing, subject to the provisions of Article 6, grant a permit for the removal of sand, gravel or clay in any zone. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Because the plaintiff was applying for a permit that is not allowed as of right in that zone, we conclude that it was applying for a special permit. The terms “special permit” and “special exception” are interchangeable. A.P. W. Holding Corp. v. Planning Zoning Board, 167 Conn. 182, 185, 355 A.2d 91 (1974); R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (1999) § 5.1, p. 135. As a result, we conclude that the defendant could take into account the general considerations enumerated in the special exception regulations when examining the plaintiff’s application.
is required by General Statutes § 8-26e for special exceptions, the defendant consented, in writing, to an extension of time for the public hearing and action on its application. That procedure was in accordance with § 501 of the defendant’s regulations, which addresses special exceptions.
As previously discussed, § 910.2 provides that the defendant “may” grant a permit, and § 130.3 provides that “the word `may’ is permissive.” When, as here, the zoning board is reviewing a special permit application for a use that theoretically is permitted in any zone, it must “determine whether the particular proposal is suitable for the particular zone.” Barberino Realty Development Corp. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 607, 616, 610 A.2d 1205 (1992).
listed in its regulations. Second, it argues implicitly that the consideration of the issue is barred by claim preclusion and issue preclusion. We disagree with both contentions.
Section 500 of the defendant’s regulations specifically delineates uses that must be considered to be special exceptions permitted in any zone. Because that section does not include sand and gravel removal, the plaintiff argues that the permit it sought is not subject to the rules regarding special exceptions. We disagree.
substance. Etzel v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 539, 540-41, 235 A.2d 647 (1967).
petition to certify that appeal on April 27, 1994, we address the issue for the first time here. It is well settled that a denial of certification by an appellate court does not signify approval of the decision from which certification to appeal is sought. Se Clarke v. Commissioner of Correction, 249 Conn. 350, 358, 732 A.2d 754 (1999), citing State v. Doscher, 172 Conn. 592, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the defendant was estopped from denying its permit application because it granted a previous two year permit, we disagree. Otherwise, the two year limitation on the permit’s validity in § 910.2 would be superfluous. We interpret the language of zoning regulations so that no clause is superfluous. See Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Planning Zoning Commission, 46 Conn. App. 566, 571, 700 A.2d 67, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 935, 702 A.2d 640 (1997).
(1991), searched the record to see if there was a sufficient reason to uphold the defendant’s decision. As a result, the court found that there was substantial evidence for the defendant to have rejected the plaintiff’s application, particularly the testimony of the expert witnesses.
v. Zoning Commission, 163 Conn. 187, 191, 302 A.2d 258 (1972) (affirming trial court’s sustaining of plaintiff’s appeal where defendant “did not state on the record sufficient reasons to support the granting of the [special exception]”); R. Fuller, 9A Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (2d Ed. 1999) § 33.4, p. 161. Even though the untethered search of the record was improper, the commission did state a reason for its denial. The lone dissenting member stated that although he recognized that the prior permit was approved, “I don’t feel that this application is the same as the application of 1993, and I feel that we have to go according to the new regulations that are in effect, and that’s my only reason.” Although we recently restated that “[e]vidence of the individual views of one member [of the planning and zoning commission] is not available to show the reasons actuating the [commission] or the grounds of its decision”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Grasso v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 69 Conn. App. 230, 237, 794 A.2d 1016 (2002); that general proposition is inapplicable here, where the stated views are of those of the sole individual responsible for the denial of the application. Following our review of the stated reasons, we conclude that there is evidence in the record to support the defendant’s stated reasons.
are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations which the commission is required to apply under the zoning regulations. . . . [O]n factual questions . . . a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. . . . If there is conflicting evidence in support of the zoning commission’s stated rationale, the reviewing court . . . cannot substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the commission. . . . The agency’s decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports any one of the reasons given.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Irwin v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 244 Conn. 629. The evidence, however, must be substantial. See Quality Sand Gravel, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 55 Conn. App. 533, 540, 738 A.2d 1157 (1999), citing Huck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 540, 525 A.2d 940 (1987).
and appearance of the surrounding neighborhood and that it will not adversely affect the general health, safety or welfare of the inhabitants of the Town of Plainville.” Accordingly, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the defendant’s action. Cf. Anastasi v. Zoning Commission, supra, 163 Conn. 189-90.
“The Commission may approve, approve with conditions, modify or deny a Site Plan Application or Site Plan Modification. In approving such an application or approving it with conditions or approving it subject to modification, the Commission shall make a finding [sic] the proposed use . . . conform[s] to the following considerations and standards in addition to any additional requirements for specific uses included in these Regulations. . . .
“2. Condominium and multi-family developments. . . .
“3. A professional or personal business office conducted by a resident of the premises, provided that such use is secondary to the use of the premises for dwelling purposes and does not change the residential character thereof.
“4. Accessory uses customary to a permitted use.
 Section 500 of the Plainville zoning regulations provides: “The following uses are declared to possess such special characteristics that each must be considered as a special exception. They are permitted in any zone by the Plainville Town Planning and Zoning Commission, provided a public hearing is held and subject to the site plan provisions and guides to the Commission set forth in Article 6.
 Indeed, the property and the adjacent concrete plant owned by the plaintiff have been the subject of continuous litigation between the plaintiff, the defendant and the plaintiff’s neighbors. See Granger v. A. Aiudi Sons, 60 Conn. App. 36, 758 A.2d 417 (appeal from trial court determination that plaintiff’s concrete business not nuisance), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 902, 762 A.2d 908 (2000); A. Aiudi Sons, LLC v Planning Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV97-483831 S (May 10, 2000) (appeal from denial of plaintiff’s application for zoning change of property from residential to industrial); Aiudi v. Planning Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV93-455059 S (January 14, 1994) (same); Granger v. Planning Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 43-70-38 (September 16, 1991) (appeal from denial of neighbors’ notice of intervention and request for notice of meetings); Granger v. Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV89-363864 (November 29, 1990) (appeal from granting of height variance for construction of elevator).
 The defendant also would be required to provide a reason on the record if it had before it only a site plan review. General Statutes § 8-3 (g) provides in relevant part that “[a] decision to deny or modify a site plan shall set forth the reasons for such denial or modification. . . .” Accordingly, even if we were to agree with the plaintiff that the defendant had before it only the approval of a site plan, we would disagree with the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant did not provide a reason for rejecting the application for the reasons previously discussed.

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