Source: https://fmshrc.gov/decisions/alj/ALJd_9292017-KENT%202014-753.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 15:26:12+00:00

Document:
Jason W. Hardin, Esq., Fabian VanCott, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Respondent.
This case is before me upon the Petition for the Assessment of a Civil Penalty filed by the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) pursuant to section 105(d) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“Mine Act”), 30 U.S.C. § 815(d). In dispute are three section 104(a) citations issued by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) to KenAmerican Resources, Inc. (“KenAmerican” or “Respondent”), as the owner and operator of the Paradise #9 mine in Muhlenberg County, Kentucky. To prevail, the Secretary must prove the cited violations “by a preponderance of the credible evidence.” In re: Contests of Respirable Dust Sample Alteration Citations, 17 FMSHRC 1819, 1838 (Nov. 1995) (citing Garden Creek Pocahontas Co., 11 FMSHRC 2148, 2152 (Nov. 1989)), aff’d sub nom., Sec’y of Labor v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 151 F.3d 1096, 1106–07 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This burden of proof requires the Secretary to demonstrate that “the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” RAG Cumberland Res. Corp., 22 FMSHRC 1066, 1070 (Sept. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 272 F.3d 590 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The Secretary initially charged KenAmerican with four section 104(a) citations as part of Docket No. KENT 2014-753. The parties settled one of the four citations, for which I issued a Decision Approving Partial Settlement on November 16, 2015. Three section 104(a) citations remain at issue.
Citation Nos. 8513258 and 9041084 allege violations of 30 C.F.R. § 75.380(d)(7)(iv) for improperly hung lifelines. Citation No. 9041085 alleges a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.1722(b) for an inadequately guarded tail roller. The Secretary has designated each violation as significant and substantial (“S&S”). The Secretary characterizes KenAmerican’s negligence as moderate for Citation Nos. 8513258 and 9041085, and as high for Citation No. 9041084. The Secretary proposes penalties of $15,570.00 for Citation No. 8513258, $48,472.00 for Citation No. 9041084, and $1,795.00 for Citation No. 9041085, for a total of $65,837.00.
Chief Administrative Law Judge Robert J. Lesnick assigned Docket No. KENT 2014-753 to me, and I held a hearing in Nashville, Tennessee. The Secretary presented testimony from MSHA inspectors Abel DeLeon and Jon Ryan Newbury. KenAmerican presented testimony from Shift Foreman James Pendegraff and Safety Director Shannon Baker. The parties each filed post-hearing briefs, and the Secretary filed a reply brief.
Accordingly, the following issues are before me: (1) whether Respondent violated the Secretary’s mandatory health or safety standard on locating lifelines in an underground coal mine; (2) whether Respondent violated the Secretary’s mandatory health or safety standard regarding the installation of guards for mechanical equipment; (3) whether the record supports the Secretary’s assertions regarding the gravity of the alleged violations, including the S&S determinations; (4) whether the record supports the Secretary’s assertions regarding KenAmerican’s negligence in committing the alleged violations; and (5) whether the Secretary’s proposed penalties are appropriate.
For the reasons that follow, it is hereby ORDERED that Citation Nos. 8513258, 9041084, and 9041085 are AFFIRMED.
1. KenAmerican Resources, Inc. (“KenAmerican”) at all times relevant to these proceedings, engaged in mining activities and operations at the Paradise #9 Mine in Muhlenberg County, Kentucky.
2. KenAmerican is subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et. seq. (the “Mine Act”).
3. The Administrative Law Judge has jurisdiction over these proceedings pursuant to [section] 105 of the [Mine] Act.
4. Abel DeLeon was[,] at the times the citations were issued, an authorized representative of the United States of America’s Secretary of Labor, assigned to MSHA, and was acting in his official capacity when issuing the citations at issue in these proceedings.
5. The citations at issue in these proceedings were properly served upon KenAmerican as required by the Mine Act.
6. The exhibits offered by the parties are stipulated to be authentic, but no stipulation is made as to their relevance or the truth of the matters asserted therein.
7. The penalties assessed in this case will not affect the ability of KenAmerican to remain in business.
8. KenAmerican demonstrated good faith in abating the violations.
The lifeline in the primary [sic] [escapeway] is not being maintained in a manner for miners to use effectively to escape. The lifeline is running within inches of a belt return roller of the 2nd Southwest belt line underpass on the 2nd Southwest roadway. The lifeline is also entangled within communication and CO2 [sic] monitor cables for two crosscuts (XC68–XC69) on the 3rd [Southwest] roadway. This condition would cause a delay in a miner escaping the mine during an emergency by following a cable instead of the lifeline. A miner could become entangled in the belt roller[,] causing him fatal injuries.
The lifeline coming off of Unit #1 in the primary escapeway from [crosscut] #2 to #16 was intersecting with the communication line and tracking line. Communication line and tracking line are all approximately the same size in diameter. A major emergency event would result in miners being confused with which line was for escape. This hazard would result in fatal injuries.
Location: 1st Northwest Submains, primary escapeway.
The guarding material on the belt head tail piece at the 3rd Southwest header was not adequate. The openings were 2.5” by 3.5” by 2’ long. A miner would be able to come in contact with the moving tail roller. This would result in permanently disabling injuries from loss of fingers and/or limbs.
The Commission has recently explained that in analyzing the second Mathies element, Commission Judges must determine “whether, based upon the particular facts surrounding the violation, there exists a reasonable likelihood of the occurrence of the hazard against which the mandatory safety standard is directed.” Newtown Energy, Inc., 38 FMSHRC 2033, 2038 (Aug. 2016). In evaluating the third Mathies element, the Commission assumes the hazard identified in the second Mathies element has been realized and determines whether that hazard is reasonably likely to cause injury. Id. at 2045 (citing Knox Creek Coal Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 811 F.3d 148, 161–62 (4th Cir. 2016); Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC, 762 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2014); Buck Creek Coal, 52 F.3d at 135). Finally, the Commission has specified that evaluation of the reasonable likelihood of injury should be made assuming continued normal mining operations. U.S. Steel Mining Co., 7 FMSHRC 1125, 1130 (Aug. 1985) (quoting U.S. Steel Mining Co., 6 FMSHRC 1573, 1574 (July 1984)).
The Commission has further emphasized that evacuation standards such as section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) are “intended to apply meaningfully only when an emergency actually occurs.” Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC 2357, 2369 (Oct. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 717 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Therefore, “when applying the Mathies analysis with respect to escapeway violations, a Judge is to consider the S&S nature of those violations within the context of an emergency.” Big Ridge, Inc., 36 FMSHRC 1115, 1117 (May 2014) (citing Cumberland, 717 F.3d at 1027–28).
Finally, it is well settled that redundant safety measures are not to be considered in determining whether a violation is S&S. Cumberland Coal Res. LP, 717 F.3d at 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Knox Creek Coal Corp., 811 F.3d 148, 162 (4th Cir. 2016); Buck Creek, 52 F.3d at 135; Brody Mining, LLC, 37 FMSHRC 1687, 1691 (Aug. 2015); Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC 2357, 2369 (Oct. 2011).
The Commission evaluates the degree of negligence using “a traditional negligence analysis.” The American Coal Co., 39 FMSHRC 8, 14 (Jan. 2017) (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. Sec’y of Labor, 809 F.3d 1259, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted)). Because the Commission is not bound by the Secretary’s regulations addressing the proposal of civil penalties set forth in 30 C.F.R. part 100, the Commission and its Judges are not required to consider the negligence definitions in 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(d). Id. (citing Mach Mining, LLC, 809 F.3d at 1263–64). Under a traditional negligence analysis, an operator is negligent if it fails to meet the requisite standard of care. Brody Mining, LLC, 37 FMSHRC 1687, 1702 (Aug. 2015). In determining whether an operator met its duty of care, the Commission considers what actions would have been taken under the same circumstances by a reasonably prudent person familiar with the mining industry, the relevant facts, and the protective purpose of the regulation. Id. at 1702 (citation omitted). In making a negligence determination, a Judge is not limited to an evaluation of allegedly “mitigating” circumstances, but may consider the totality of the circumstances holistically. Id.
Regulatory interpretation is a two-step process. First, unambiguous regulatory provisions “must be enforced as they are written unless the regulator clearly intended the words to have a different meaning or unless such meaning would lead to absurd results.” Jim Walter Res., Inc., 28 FMSHRC 579, 587 (Aug. 2006) (citing Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1987), and Utah Power & Light Co., 11 FMSHRC 1926, 1930 (Oct. 1989). The meaning of regulations is “ascertain[ed] . . . not in isolation, but rather in the context in which those regulations occur.” Wolf Run Mining Co., 32 FMSHRC 1669, 1681 (Dec. 2010) (citing RAG Shoshone Coal Corp., 26 FMSHRC 75, 80 & n.7 (Feb. 2004)). Second, if the meaning of the regulation is ambiguous, the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of the regulation is entitled to deference. Mach Mining, LLC, 34 FMSHRC 1784, 1806 (Aug. 2012). Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, which may be advanced in a legal brief, unless that interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 208 (2011) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). However, the courts have withheld such deference where the agency’s interpretation “does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (citations omitted).
First, I must determine whether the regulation is unambiguous. I begin with the text of the regulation. Lifelines must be “[l]ocated in such a manner for miners to use effectively to escape.” 30 C.F.R. § 75.380(d)(7)(iv). Rather than providing for a singular method of compliance, the regulation establishes a performance-oriented standard that mines must meet. See MSHA, Training Questions for Emergency Mine Evacuation, Emergency Temporary Standard Compliance Guide 4, http://arlweb.msha.gov/REGS/COMPLIAN/ Guides/MineEvacETS/MineEvacETSComplianceGuide.pdf. To understand what this performance standard requires, I first must find the meaning of “effectively.” The Secretary’s regulations do not define “effectively” for the purposes of section 75.380(d)(7)(iv). The Oxford Dictionary defines “effectively” as “in such a manner as to achieve a desired result.” Effectively, The New Oxford American Dictionary (2d ed. 2005). The desired result of the lifeline standard is for miners to escape the mine quickly. See 71 Fed. Reg. 71,430, 71,431 (Dec. 8, 2006). Accordingly, section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) requires mine operators to provide a lifeline that is located in such a manner for miners to use to escape the mine quickly.
Next, I look to the phrase “positioned in such a manner” for context. MSHA has provided little firm guidance regarding how lifelines should be hung to satisfy this requirement. (See Tr. 80:7–23, 82:2–15, 109:14–22.) In comments accompanying the rulemaking, MSHA stated simply that “[p]roper positioning of the lifeline regarding height, accessibility, and location as determined by mining conditions improves the ability of miners to effectively use lifelines to escape during emergency situations.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 71,437 (emphasis added). Thus, the agency drafted the regulation with an understanding that its requirements would shift as mining conditions dictated.
Given the intentional flexibility of the standard, I conclude that the regulation’s meaning is ambiguous insofar as it depends on particular mining conditions.
Respondent asserts that the Secretary’s interpretation of the standard creates a per se rule against hanging a lifeline on the same roof bolt plate as other similarly-sized cables. (Resp’t Br. at 7­8.) However, the Secretary has simply stated that under the standard, the lifeline should not be commingled with other cables and should be separate and distinct. (Sec’y Br. at 4–13; Sec’y Reply Br. at 1–2.) Although terminating the two disputed violations ultimately required KenAmerican to move the lifeline to a separate roof bolt plate, the record suggests that this abatement measure was specific to Paradise #9 based on how KenAmerican developed the mine and installed its roof bolts, power center, and cable system. (Tr. 74:2­–6, 98:1­–6, 31:11–24, 51:8­­–52:8, 83:24–85:1.) Whether a lifeline would need to be attached to a separate roof bolt plate in another mine would depend on the type and size of the roof bolt plate, which in turn depends on the mine’s roof and structure. In other words, a lifeline’s location for miners to use effectively to escape depends on the mine’s conditions, as MSHA has stated. Accordingly, I decline to adopt Respondent’s position that the Secretary’s interpretation of the standard creates a per se rule requiring mine operators to attach lifelines to separate roof bolt plates. Rather, I determine that the Secretary’s interpretation requires mine operators to locate lifelines separately and distinctly from other similar-sized cables as determined by mine conditions for miners to use the lifelines effectively to escape.
Despite Respondent’s arguments, the standard requires lifelines to be located effectively for miners to escape – the operative term being “effectively.” Here, Inspector DeLeon determined that having the lifeline commingled with other cables in Paradise #9 could more than likely lead to confusion, thus creating delay and reducing the ability of miners to use the lifeline effectively to escape. DeLeon has worked for MSHA since 1998 and has been a field office supervisor since 2008, was a coal miner in Kentucky and Virginia for 11 years, and holds an associate’s degree in mining technology. (Tr. 15:14–16:21, 17:3–21.) I credit DeLeon’s opinion that commingling the lifeline could tend to cause a delay in escaping. DeLeon further testified that MSHA teaches inspectors to separate lifelines from similarly sized cables to limit confusion. (Tr. 81:9–82:15.) Although hanging lifelines in separate entries may further eliminate potential confusion, the existence of a potentially safer alternative does not negate DeLeon’s determination here that placing the lifeline where it commingled with other cables could delay and reduce the ability of miners to use the lifeline to effectively escape. Further, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that the Secretary arbitrarily declined to adopt such a requirement that a lifeline be given a separate entry altogether given that such a requirement would depend on each mine’s specific conditions.
Respondent also asserts that the Secretary’s bright-line rule runs contrary to MSHA’s guidance, which emphasizes that the standard’s requirements will change from mine to mine. (Id. at 8–9 (citing 71 Fed. Reg. at 12,261, 71,437).) Although MSHA has noted that the standard’s requirements may vary, guidance suggesting flexibility does not forestall MSHA from barring in all instances those practices the agency deems unacceptable, such as commingling lifelines with other cables.
After careful consideration, I determine that Respondent’s legal arguments do not undermine Inspector DeLeon’s testimony, which I credit based on his experience. Given the evidence before me, I determine that the Secretary’s interpretation of section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) demonstrates a fair and considered judgment on the requirements. Accordingly, I defer to MSHA’s interpretation that the standard requires lifelines at the Paradise #9 mine to be hung from separate roof bolt plates apart from other cables of similar size.
Indeed, many underground mine tragedies have occurred because procedures were not followed, proving the old adage true that even the best laid plans often go awry. As the Commission has indicated, the training of miners on escape procedures does not mitigate the seriousness of a violation. See Cumberland Coal, 33 FMSHRC at 2369 (citations omitted).
As already discussed, section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) required KenAmerican to route its lifelines in the Paradise #9 mine to roof bolt plates separate from other cables in the mine, so miners could use the lifelines effectively to escape the mine. See discussion, supra Part V.A.1. It is uncontroverted that KenAmerican had located its lifeline alongside other similarly sized cables for 100 to 130 feet in the secondary escapeway. (Tr. 38:12–23.) Alone, this is sufficient to show a violation. Furthermore, I credit Inspector DeLeon’s testimony regarding the lifeline’s proximity to the conveyor belt and determine that miners using the lifeline were at risk of contacting the belt. The potential smoke and darkness caused by a mine emergency could easily lead a frantic miner attempting to locate the lifeline to accidentally come into contact with the belt. Accordingly, miners exiting near the belt overpass would not be able to use the lifeline effectively to escape the mine quickly and safely. Given the evidence before me, I determine that KenAmerican violated 30 C.F.R. § 75.380(d)(7)(iv) by locating the lifeline alongside other similarly sized cables and close to the belt line in the Paradise #9 mine.
My determination that KenAmerican violated section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) establishes the first element of the Mathies test for an S&S violation. The second element of the Mathies test asks whether the violation created a reasonable likelihood the hazard against which the standard is directed would have occurred. Newtown Energy, Inc., 38 FMSHRC at 2038. Here, section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) was promulgated to reduce the hazard of miners becoming disoriented and unable to evacuate a mine quickly and safely during an emergency. See 71 Fed. Reg. 71,430 (Dec. 8, 2006) (addressing standards for emergency mine evacuations). Inspector DeLeon testified that the lifeline’s positioning could confuse a miner and cause the miner to follow an incorrect route while trying to escape. (Tr. 48:11–24.) DeLeon stated that a miner caught in the smoke and darkness of a mine emergency would be unable to see his hand in front of his face, let alone navigate a mine entryway. (Tr. 35:8–14.) A miner walking blindly through the mine could be forced to let go of the lifeline for a number of reasons. (Tr. 72:12–73:2, 106:10–107:18.) On direct examination, KenAmerican’s Baker admitted that miners in an emergency could be confused by the cables hung in close proximity to each other and thereby slowed down while attempting escape. (Tr. 163:15–25.) In addition, DeLeon testified that a miner making contact with the coal conveyor belt could become entangled and injured. (Tr. 35:23–36:5, 36:23–37:4.) Given this evidence, I determine that the violation contributed to the hazard of a miner being unable to quickly or safely escape in the event of an emergency.
The third and fourth elements of Mathies ask whether the safety hazard is reasonably likely to contribute to a reasonably serious injury. Here, Inspector DeLeon testified that a lost and disoriented miner could run out of oxygen while attempting to escape the mine. (Tr. 25:18–26:5.) In addition, miners delayed or not following a lifeline during an emergency could be unable to reach a refuge chamber to get help. (Tr. 26:18–23.) DeLeon averred that the consequences could be particularly disastrous in a mine as large as Paradise #9. (Tr. 26:18–23.) Miners escaping the mine on foot would need several caches of SCSRs to get out of the mine. (Tr. 27:3–25.) DeLeon asserted that a miner lost in an emergency could die if he ran out of oxygen. (Tr. 48:11–24.) Indeed, the regulatory history of the emergency mine evacuation standards notes that toxic gas and reduced oxygen levels are potentially fatal hazards and are often undetectable. 71 Fed. Reg. at 71,445. Given the evidence before me, I find that during a mine emergency a disoriented miner unable to quickly or safely escape the mine could reasonably suffer fatal injuries. Accordingly, the Secretary has satisfied the third and fourth elements necessary to show a violation is S&S.
As the Secretary satisfied all four Mathies elements, I conclude that Citation No. 8513258 was properly designated as S&S and reasonably likely to result in a fatal injury.
Although DeLeon initially suggested that miners would first attempt to flee the mine through the primary escapeway, he later explained that miners would use the easiest escape route. (Tr. 41:3–24, 102:13–103:2.) KenAmerican used the secondary escapeway in Paradise #9 as the mine’s supply road. (Tr. 103:9–17.) Furthermore, evacuation standards are “intended to apply meaningfully only when emergency actually occurs.” Cumberland Coal Res., 33 FMSHRC at 2369. Accordingly, it is fair to assume the occurrence of an emergency forcing miners to use the lifeline in the secondary escapeway at this part of the mine.
Although another inspector in a separate incident cited a lifeline violation as affecting only two persons, the facts surrounding that incident are not before me. (Ex. R–16.) Inspector DeLeon did not have sufficient evidence to discuss that citation. (Tr. 83:18–22.) KenAmerican did not present further evidence regarding that citation. Accordingly, I afford it minimal weight.
I credit Pendegraff’s testimony that all miners on a unit would gather in an emergency given its consistency with DeLeon’s testimony and Pendegraff’s role as a shift foreman. (Tr. 118:18–24.) I credit DeLeon’s testimony and find that a confused and disoriented miner would delay the escape of all the miners on a unit. I further recognize that those miners traveling with their unit would slow to help a miner caught in and injured by the coal conveyor belt. Indeed, the sad annals of mining disasters are filled with stories of miners ignoring their own well-being in an attempt to help their fellow miners. See, e.g., Jim Walter Resources, 28 FMSHRC 579 (Aug. 2006) (describing miners rushing to help the victims of a first explosion killed in a second blast). Given the evidence before me, I agree with DeLeon’s determination and find that 30 miners were affected by the violation.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Secretary has demonstrated that the violation was S&S and reasonably likely to result in fatal injuries to 30 miners.
In evaluating negligence, I must consider the actions that a reasonably prudent operator would have taken under the circumstances presented that are relevant to the operator’s obligation to comply with a standard. See Brody Mining, LLC, 37 FMSHRC at 1703. Inspector DeLeon warned KenAmerican two months prior to this citation that the operator needed to fix any areas in Paradise #9 where the lifeline was still hung from the same roof bolt plates as other cables. (Tr. 29:8–19.) Additionally, the operator should have found any remaining violations during its pre-shift examinations of the mine’s travelway. (Tr. 42:10–18.) DeLeon and Newbury explained that the cited conditions were obvious. (Tr. 168:15–169:12.) Given this evidence, I determine that KenAmerican was negligent because it should have known of the violative conditions and taken action to fix any defective portions of the mine’s lifeline after DeLeon’s initial warning.
Given the small extent of the conditions and their remoteness from the active mining section, I conclude that although KenAmerican was negligent, the level of negligence was moderate. Along the full spectrum of negligence, I determine that KenAmerican’s actions fall at the lower end of moderate.
Given the evidence before me, I conclude that KenAmerican committed a violation of 75.380(d)(7)(iv) by locating the lifeline too close to the other cables in First Northwest Submains such that miners could be prevented or delayed from escaping in the event of a mine emergency.
My determination that KenAmerican violated section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) establishes the first element of the Mathies test for an S&S violation. In regard to the second Mathies element, section 75.380(d) aims to reduce the hazard of miners becoming disoriented and delayed in escaping in an emergency. See 17 Fed. Reg. 71,430. Here, the lifeline was commingled with other cables for a greater length than the previous lifeline violation. Both Inspector DeLeon and Pendegraff testified that such placement could confuse and potentially slow down a miner attempting to escape a mine during an emergency. (Tr. 48:11–24, 163:15–25.) Thus, consistent with the prior determination on the previous lifeline violation, I determine that this second lifeline violation contributed to the hazard against which section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) is directed.
In terms of the third and fourth Mathies elements, I have already found that a disoriented miner could run out of oxygen while attempting to escape the mine because miners rely on the lifeline to access caches of SCSRs. See discussion, supra Part V.A.2.ii. Here, the danger to miners is even more pronounced because of the greater length of lifeline affected and this particular violation’s proximity to the active mining face in a gassy mine. As explained previously, the hazard of having a disoriented miner delayed in escaping a mine in an emergency could reasonably result in a fatality. (Id.) I thus conclude that the Secretary, having satisfied all four Mathies elements, properly designated Citation No. 9041084 as S&S.
Relying upon the same argument as before, the Secretary alleges that the violation was reasonably likely to affect 15 miners. (Sec’y Br. at 14.) Respondent, again, challenges this designation. (Resp’t Br. 28–30, 41.) I have already found that the prior violation affected all miners inby the cited condition. See discussion, supra Part V.A.2.ii. In this violation, the cited lifeline portion was near one active working unit and was not in proximity to the other two working units. (Tr. 49:3–9; Ex. GX–5 at 4 [10–11].) DeLeon concluded, therefore, that the violation only affected one working unit, consisting of 15 miners. (Id.) Because miners were trained to escape together with their unit and the cited lifeline portion came directly off the working section, all miners working in the section would likely have to locate and pick up the lifeline along this particular portion. (See id.; Tr. 121:25–122:10.) Thus, given the evidence before me, I agree with DeLeon’s determination and conclude that the violation affected 15 miners.
Based on the facts as a whole, I find that KenAmerican disregarded MSHA’s prior warnings about the position of the lifeline in Paradise #9. Respondent ignored MSHA’s warnings despite the minimal effort necessary to properly hang the lifeline and the potentially dire consequences for miners unable to escape the section in an emergency. I determine that Respondent was highly negligent in ignoring MSHA’s warnings and refusing to separate the lifeline from other cables.
Section 71.1722(b) requires that guarding at “conveyor-drive, conveyor-head, and conveyor-tail pulleys shall extend a distance sufficient to prevent a person from reaching behind the guard and becoming caught between the belt and the pulley.” 30 C.F.R. § 75.1722(b). In context, the guarding must be sufficient to protect persons from injury by “exposed moving machine parts.” 30 C.F.R. § 75.1722(a).
In guidance for what the standard requires, MSHA has stated that guarding must “[b]e of such construction that openings in the guard are too small to admit a person’s hand,” and “[b]e of sufficient size to enclose the moving parts and exclude the possibility of any part of a person’s body from contacting the moving parts while such equipment is in motion.” V MSHA, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Program Policy Manual, Subpart R, at 155–56 (2015). In addressing the mirror regulation for above-ground coal mines, the Commission emphasized that the standard “imports the concepts of reasonable possibility of contact and injury, including contact stemming from inadvertent stumbling or falling, momentary inattention, or ordinary human carelessness. In related contexts, [the Commission] ha[s] emphasized that the constructions of mandatory safety standards involving miners’ behavior cannot ignore the vagaries of human conduct.” Thompson Bros. Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC 2094, 2097 (Sep. 1984) (citing Great Western Elec., 5 FMSHRC 840, 842 (May 1983); Lone Star Indus., 3 FMSHRC 2526, 2531 (Nov. 1981)). Accordingly, the test is whether there is a reasonable possibility that miners could come in contact with the moving machinery, which includes a “minimal” possibility of contact. Id.
Given this evidence, I credit DeLeon and find that a miner could reach through the hog wire and contact the tail roller even if the perimeter guarding were three feet and nine inches from the belt. Given the mine floor conditions and low height of the guarding, I determine that it was reasonably possible that a miner working in the area could fall onto the guarding, reach over, and slip his hand or arm through the hog wire, contacting the moving tail roller only a few inches below. Accordingly, I conclude that the Secretary has shown a violation of section 75.1722(b).
KenAmerican’s violation of section 75.1722(b) establishes the first element of the Mathies test for an S&S violation. For the second element, section 75.1722(b) requires guarding be sufficient in order to “prevent a person from reaching behind the guard and becoming caught between the belt and pulley.” 30 C.F.R. § 75.1722(b). Inspector DeLeon testified that the guarding he observed could allow a miner to contact the pinch point between the tail roller and the mine conveyor belt. I credit DeLeon’s testimony and find that the insufficient guarding contributed to the hazard against which the standard is directed.
The third and fourth elements of Mathies ask whether the safety hazard is reasonably likely to contribute to a reasonably serious injury. Several miners normally worked in the area performing maintenance on the belt and cleaning the exchange point. (Tr. 193:12–20.) DeLeon also observed a grease hose sticking out of the guarding, which was used by a miner at least once a day. (Tr. 183:3–184:3.) Inspector DeLeon averred that a miner exposed to the rotating tail roller would be mangled, causing permanently disabling injuries. (Tr. 184:10–22, 187:7–17.) Given this evidence, I find that a miner contacting the tail roller would be reasonably likely to suffer serious injuries, including loss of limbs. Accordingly, the Secretary has satisfied the third and fourth elements necessary to show a violation is S&S.
The Secretary has satisfied all four elements of the Mathies test. I therefore conclude that the violation was S&S.
Given the evidence as a whole, I find that KenAmerican should have known that the guarding in place was insufficient. I conclude that Respondent displayed moderate negligence in failing to install proper guarding, but again on the lower end of the spectrum for moderate negligence.
Under section 110(i) of the Mine Act, I must consider six criteria in assessing a civil penalty, including the operator’s history of previous violations; the appropriateness of the penalty relative to the size of the operator’s business; the operator’s negligence; the penalty’s effect on the operator’s ability to continue in business; the violation’s gravity; and the demonstrated good faith of the operator in attempting to achieve rapid compliance after notification of a violation. 30 U.S.C. § 820(i).
For Citation No. 8513258, I have affirmed the violation and gravity determination, but found the negligence level to be on the lower end of moderate. Respondent does not have an extensive history of violations of section 75.380 in the two years prior to this violation. (Ex. GX–6, R–15.) Considering all the facts and circumstances set forth above, I hereby assess a civil penalty of $11,000.00.
For Citation No. 9041084, I have affirmed the violation and the gravity and negligence determinations. As noted above, Respondent does not have an extensive history of violations of this standard. (Ex. GX–6, R–15.) In addition to the operator’s limited history of violations of this standard, I also consider Respondent’s reasonable explanation for placing the lifeline to the side to prevent it from intersecting with the power center, which places the level of negligence on the lower end of high. Reviewing the evidence as a whole, I determine that a penalty of $38,750.00 is appropriate for this violation.
For Citation No. 9041085, I have affirmed the violation and gravity determination, but again found the negligence level to be on the lower end of moderate. Respondent has been cited twice for section 75.1722(b) in the two years prior to this violation, which I do not consider to be extensive. Considering all of the facts and circumstances set forth above, I hereby assess a civil penalty of $1,200.00.
In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Citation Nos. 8513258, 9041084, and 9041085 are AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, Respondent is ORDERED to pay a penalty of $50,950.00 within 40 days of this Decision.
 In this decision, the hearing transcript, the joint exhibit, the Secretary’s exhibits, and KenAmerican’s exhibits are abbreviated as “Tr.,” “Joint Ex. #,” “Ex. GX–#,”and “Ex. R–#,” respectively.
 Respondent points to the Commission’s holding in Cumberland Coal, 33 FMSHRC 2357, and the Administrative Law Judge’s holding in Twentymile Coal Co., 32 FMSHRC 628 (June 2010) (ALJ), as support for KenAmerican’s position. (Resp’t Br. at 11–12.) Although those cases dealt with the same standard, the violations were factually distinct. Moreover, the violation was affirmed in both instances. Respondent’s position lacks a logical foundation.
 Respondent also asserts that the citation should be vacated because KenAmerican lacked fair notice that commingling the lifeline with other cables would result in a violation. (Resp’t Br. at 23–24.) KenAmerican received actual notice of the Secretary’s interpretation when Inspector DeLeon warned the mine in April. (Tr. 18:20–19:24, 30:14–31:10.) “Due process is satisfied when an agency gives actual notice of its interpretation prior to enforcement.” Tilden Mining Co., LC, 36 FMSHRC 1965, 1970–71 (Aug. 2014) (citations omitted). Regardless, in Energy West Mining Company, the Commission held that a mine operator lacking actual notice still had fair notice of a violation because a reasonably prudent miner familiar with the mining industry would have understood the requirements of the standard. 17 FMSHRC 1313, 1317–18 (Aug. 1995). Here, only a relatively small length of lifeline was commingled with other cables. The fact that KenAmerican had separated the lifelines from other cables for the other areas Inspector DeLeon inspected strongly suggests a reasonably prudent miner would have understood that the lifeline should not be commingled.
 Given the testimony, Inspector DeLeon could have determined the conditions affected even more miners (See Tr. 38:24–39:6, 40:6–20), although a higher number of miners affected would not have impacted the Secretary’s proposed penalty calculation. 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(e).
 I recognize that based on DeLeon’s production range, the operator may have advanced anywhere from four to twelve crosscuts after the first lifeline violation’s issuance. Thus, the operator may have installed a portion of the cited lifeline before DeLeon issued the prior lifeline citation. Regardless, KenAmerican had received a warning about the lifeline prior to Citation No. 8513258’s issuance, and a preshift examination should have revealed and prompted the operator to fix any defective portion of the lifeline. I also note that the portion of lifeline cited in this instance was much longer than in the previous citation and came directly off the working section, making the violation much more obvious.
 Respondent asserts that the miners working in the area were trained to avoid hazards and therefore were not reasonably likely to fall into the moving tail roller. (Resp’t Br. at 45–46.) Mine operators, however, cannot rely on miners’ training to defeat a finding of S&S. See Cumberland Coal, 33 FMSHRC at 2369 (citations omitted).
 Payment should be sent to: U.S. Department of Labor, MSHA, Payment Office, P.O. Box 790390, St. Louis, MO 63179-0390. Please include docket and A.C. numbers.

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