Source: http://www.lipnews.com/PLAINTIFF2.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:37:15+00:00

Document:
2. No response is required to the averment under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1006 speaks for itself.
3. No response is required to the averment under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 402 speaks for itself.
4. Denied. This averment is a conclusion of law to which no response is required under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
5. Admitted in part. It is admitted that certain events occurred in <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" />Lancaster County. It is specifically denied that the cause of action set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint arose in Lancaster County. The remainder of this averment is denied.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Rebecca R. Holzinger, demands that Defendants First Preliminary Objection be overruled.
1. Denied as stated. Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for itself.
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1019 speaks for itself.
3. Denied. This averment is a conclusion of law to which no response is required under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. By way of further answer, the defense of the statute of limitations cannot be raised by Preliminary Objection.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Rebecca R. Holzinger, demands that Defendants Third Preliminary Objection be overruled.
On or about June 28, 2004, the Defendants filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Complaint. The Defendants assert that the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because venue in Philadelphia County is improper, because the Complaint lacks specificity and because Plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons more fully set forth below, the Defendants Preliminary Objections have no merit and should be overruled.
1 The litigation was instituted on April 13, 2004 by Writ of Summons.
2 See paragraph 4 of the Complaint.
3 See paragraph 5 of the Complaint.
4 See paragraph 6 of the Complaint.
5 See paragraph 7 of the Complaint.
6 See paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Complaint.
7 See paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Complaint.
A. Venue Properly Lies in Philadelphia County.
distress results in bodily harm.
(4) that distress must be severe.
Hoy v. Angelone, 691 A.2d 476, 482 (Pa. Super. 1977), citing Hooten v. Penna. College of Optometry, 601 F.Supp. 1151, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1984). There can be no doubt that Plaintiffs Complaint adequately alleges a cause of action for IIED. Charles and Millicents conduct was intentional and can only be described as extreme and outrageous and as a result of the Defendants actions, Rebecca has suffered severe emotional distress.
To constitute a tort, there must be an injury; mere negligence establishes no right of action. The place of wrong is, and the tort must be deemed to arise, where the injury is inflicted, not where the negligent acts leading to it were committed: Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 356, 185 A. 775, 777. If the glass was in the package of flour as the result of defendants negligence, no right of action (which is synonymous with cause of action: Alpha Claude Neon Corp. v. Pennsylvania Distilling Co., Inc., 325 Pa. 140, 142, 188 A. 825, 826) accrued to Mrs. Openbrier until she ate the bread and thereby suffered injury.
of the instant action to Lancaster County.
8 The Defendants, based upon their erroneous belief that venue does not lie in Philadelphia County, also argue that service upon them in Lancaster County is improper under Rule 402. Since under Rule 1006(a) venue in Philadelphia is proper, service on the Defendants by the Sheriff of Lancaster County is also proper.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs Complaint violates Rule 1019 because Plaintiff has not only failed to plead specifically the time when her purported cause of action arose but she has not identified the day, year, decade, or century when her injuries were inflicted. Defendants are simply wrong.
As set forth at some length above, Rebeccas injury and cause of action arose when she began to suffer from severe emotional distress as a result of the Defendants earlier outrageous actions. The Complaint specifically identifies that time as in or around April 14, 2002. In Baker v. Rangos, 324 A.2d 498 (Pa. Super. 1974), the Superior Court considered at some length Rule 1019(f)s requirement that time and place be pled with specificity. The question before the Court was whether Rule 1019(f) was satisfied if a complaint generally specified the time certain conversations occurred and specified the place from which the property was taken. The Baker Court observed that in circumstances where there can be no claim that some acts were authorized and some were not, the complaint satisfied the requirements of Rule 1019. 324 A.2d at 509. In the instant case, there can be no claim that any of the complained of touching by Charles was authorized by Rebecca. Depending on what is believed, either Charles touched Rebeccas breasts or he did not, but as the court observed in Baker, Greater specificity will not aid the defendants in answering the complaint. Id. The Defendants second Preliminary Objection should be overruled.
upon their erroneous belief that Plaintiffs cause of action is one of battery. However, as set forth above, Plaintiff is asserting an IIED claim and not a battery claim.
As the Defendants acknowledge in footnote 6 to their Memorandum of Law in support of their Preliminary Objections, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and my not be raised by way of Preliminary Objections. Relying on Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164 (Pa. 1997), the Defendants contend that because the discovery rule cannot be used to extend the statute of limitations in a battery cause of action, this Court should treat the Defendants statute of limitations objection as the legal equivalent of a demurrer. This Court, however, does not have to decide whether the Defendants novel legal argument is correct or not, since the facts upon which the argument is based are incorrect.
Rebeccas IIED cause of action, as set forth in her Complaint, arose on or after April 14, 2002. It was at that time that she began to suffer from severe emotional distress, the injury that resulted from the Defendants earlier outrageous conduct. Unlike a battery, which is defined as a harmful or offensive contact, Levenson v. Souser, 557 A.2d 1081 (Pa. Super 1989), in which the injury and the prohibited conduct occur at the same time, the injury in an IIED claim, severe emotional distress, can manifest itself months or years after the underlying outrageous conduct. In the instant case, Rebecca was able to determine within two years of her injury that her injury was caused by the actions of the Defendants. The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations between the time a plaintiff discovers an injury and through reasonable investigation, learns that the injury was caused by another. Here, Plaintiff was able to determine the cause of her injury and institute suit within the statutorily prescribed two years. Therefore, the discovery rule has no applicability.
The Defendants have denominated their third preliminary objection a demurrer. A demurrer admits as true all the well pleaded facts in the complaint and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, but not conclusions of law. 220 Partnership v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 650 A.2d 1094 (Pa. Super. 1994), Georgina v. United Mine Workers of America, 572 A.2d 232 (Pa. Super. 1990), Clouser v. Shamokin Packing Co., 361 A.2d 836 (Pa. Super. 1976). Preliminary objections can be sustained only in cases that are clear and free from doubt. Any doubt as to the legal sufficiency of the complaint should be resolved in favor of overruling the demurrer. 220 Partnership, 650 A.2d at 1096, Clouser, 361 A.2d at 840. The Plaintiff has set forth a cause of action for IIED in a timely filed lawsuit. The Defendants Preliminary Objections should be overruled.
Preliminary Objections should be overruled.

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