Source: http://www.baileydaily.com/2011/02/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:52:48+00:00

Document:
On February 24, 2011, the Second District (Division 8) concluded that the bi-lateral fee shifting provision of Section 218.5 did not apply to various wage related causes of action, including meal and rest period claims. See United Parcel Service Wage and Hour Cases, __ Cal.App.4th __ (2011).
With regard to meal and rest periods, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that the California Supreme Court’s analysis in Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094 (2007) establishes that an action for recovery of the statutory remedies for missed meal and rest breaks is a claim for “nonpayment of wages” within the meaning of Labor Code section 218.5. As reasoned by the Court, “nothing in the Murphy opinion suggests the court intended its decision to permit a prevailing employer-defendant in a section 226.7 action to recover attorney fees from the unsuccessful employee” and that “[t]o so find would undermine the Supreme Court's heavy reliance in its analysis on the principle that statutes governing working conditions must be liberally construed in favor of employees.” Slip Opinion, at 12. Rather, citing to the analysis in Earley v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 4th 1420 (2000), the Court concluded that Section 226.7 was properly covered by the unilateral fee shifting provisions of Section 1194 because, like overtime compensation, the obligation to pay the Section 226.7 premium wage derives from statute. See id., at 12-13. Significantly, such reasoning is a complete refutation of the court's analysis in Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1361 (2010), which as previously discussed here, is pending review before the California Supreme Court.
In addition to the foregoing, the UPS Court also deemed Section 218.5 inapplicable to (1) wage statement claims, due to the fact Labor Code Section 226(e) itself contains a unilateral fee shifting provision, (2) conversion, based on the finding that Section 218.5 does not apply to common law torts, and (3) the UCL, based on existing authority concluding that the UCL does not incorporate fee provisions of the underlying predicate statute. See id., at 10-11.
Fourth District Holds That Affirmance of Order Denying Certification on Appeal Bars Subsequent Efforts to Certify Class: Safaie v. Jacuzzi Whirlpool Bath, Inc.
On February 22, 2011, the Fourth District (Division One) published its opinion in Safaie v. Jacuzzi Whirlpool Bath, Inc., __ Cal. App. 4th __(2011), holding that a trial court’s order denying certification, once affirmed on appeal, bars subsequent efforts by the plaintiff to certify a class. Importantly, the Court’s decision makes clear that once remittituer is issued the trial court no longer has any discretion to revisit the issue, even if there is a subsequent change in the law or discovery of new facts. Slip Opinion, at 11-13; 15-17.
In making this ruling, the Court highlighted two distinctions that are important to note.
First, the bar can only operate if the trial court denies certification of all claims alleged by plaintiff. Slip Opinion, at 14. Citing the procedural posture of Tobacco II as an example, the Court reasoned that “[b]ecause the first order denying class certification [in that case] pertained to only one of the claims alleged in the complaint, it did not dispose of all claims between the parties, and thus was not a final, binding appealable order.” See id. “Thus, the plaintiff was free to seek certification on other causes of action alleged in the newly amended complaint.” See id. This distinction sanctions successive certification motions, so long as they are made on a claim by claim basis. Moreover, insofar as a "death knell" order cannot result under this procedural scenario, a plaintiff presumably would not be precluded from seeking reconsideration of the prior denial itself if armed with new facts or new law. Simply put, as the Court's analysis on this point affords plaintiff counsel a degree of control over when the trial court would be permitted to make a "death knell" certification ruling, plaintiff counsel desiring flexibility to seek reconsideration of a certification ruling (and avoid the Court's ultimate holding) may consider following the procedural path described by the Court when moving for certification.
Second, the Court concluded that this rule did not preclude successive motions challenging an order certifying a class, in large part, because “when a court certifies a class, the order is not final and cannot be appealed because the action continues between the parties.” See id., at 13. Based on this fact, “‘the rule against successive motions does not … apply to [class action] defendants, who may make any number of motions to decertify” based on new facts elicited during discovery.’” See id., at 14. Of course, as previously discussed in a post located here, any subsequent decertification motion must actually put forward new facts or new law, as a trial court abuses its discretion by decertifying a class absent a material change in the law or the evidence. See Weinstat v. Dentsply International, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1226 (2010).
In short, we conclude, based upon the wording of section 226.7, subdivision (b), the legislative and administrative history of the statute and IWC wage orders, the public policy behind the statute and wage orders, and also the principle that we are to construe section 266.7 broadly in favor of protecting employees, that the employees in this case may recover up to two additional hours of pay on a single work day for meal period and rest period violations – one for failure to provide a meal period and another for failure to provide a rest period.
The second opinion, Tien v. Tenet Healthcare, __ Cal. App. 4th (2011), upheld a trial court’s order denying certification of the plaintiff’s meal and rest period claims. The Court opinion essentially tracks the same analysis of its previous opinion in Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 189 Cal.App.4th 751 (2010), which was recently depublished by the California Supreme Court’s January 26, 2011 grant-and-hold order pending its decision in Brinker.
While there are numerous cases which have made this distinction, the highlighted language perhaps goes the furthest of any opinion which I am aware in defining what I will refer to as the "barrier theory" (which, as the Tien Court explains, is distinct from the issue before the California Supreme Court in Brinker). At any rate, as the Court's analysis upholding the denial of certification largely mirrors Brinker, Brinkley and Chipotle, it is likely that this Opinion's shelf-life will be a short one.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.