Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/category/uncategorized/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:30:45+00:00

Document:
On Thursday, February 21, 2019, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and two unpublished opinions.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC v. Colorado Citizens Protecting Our Constitution on Thursday, February 2, 2018.
Election Law—Campaign Finance—Major Purpose Test for Political Committee.
Colorado Citizens Protecting our Constitution (Colorado Citizens) paid for a radio advertisement that supported a candidate for state senate. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC (Campaign Integrity) filed a complaint with the Colorado Secretary of State (Secretary) alleging that Colorado Citizens had not registered as a political committee as required by article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution and the Fair Campaign Practices Act. Colorado Citizens and the Secretary moved for summary judgment before the administrative law judge (ALJ). Colorado Citizens argued it was not a political committee because it did not have the “major purpose” of supporting or opposing candidates. The Secretary added that it could not be a political committee because it did not make or receive contributions. The motions were denied.
Following a hearing on the merits, the ALJ found that Colorado Citizens’ spending on political candidates only accounted for little more than one-third of its total spending, while the majority of its spending involved political issues. He concluded it was not a political committee because it did not have the major purpose of nominating or electing political candidates.
On appeal, Campaign Integrity argued that the ALJ misapplied the major purpose test and erred in holding that Colorado Citizens was not a political committee. The court of appeals first reaffirmed that the “major purpose” test was the correct test to be applied. To determine an organization’s major purpose, a court can (1) examine its central organizational purpose, or (2) examine the organization’s spending to determine whether the preponderance of expenditures are for express advocacy or candidate contributions. The court agreed with the ALJ that Colorado Citizens’ statement of its organizational purpose was unhelpful and that analyzing Colorado Citizens’ spending activity was the appropriate method. The court determined that the record supported the ALJ’s determination that the organization was not a political committee because, based on the amount of its spending on political advocacy for candidates, it did not have the major purpose of nominating or electing candidates.
Campaign Integrity also argued that when applying the major purpose test, the ALJ should have considered Colorado Citizens’ spending in a calendar year, instead of a consecutive 12-month period. The records the judge examined were those subpoenaed by Campaign Integrity. It was up to Campaign Integrity to provide the additional records if it had wanted the judge to consider them. In addition, there is no legal authority requiring a calendar year analysis.
Campaign Integrity further argued that the ALJ improperly excluded evidence from his analysis that Colorado Citizens had made $76,000 in candidate contributions during March and April of 2015. The Court found the judge did not err because there was no evidence regarding other expenditures made during that time period, so the record was incomplete as to Colorado Citizens’ total spending in those months. Moreover, even if the $76,000 were included, the total candidate spending would still have constituted less than 50% of Colorado Citizens’ overall candidate-related expenditures, or less than what would constitute the central purpose for which Colorado Citizens was created.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Keller Tank Services II, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue on Tuesday, February 21, 2017.
In this appeal from a ruling of the Tax Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine if a taxpayer may challenge a tax penalty in a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing after previously challenging the penalty to the Appeals Office of the Internal Revenue Service. Keller Tank Services II, Inc. participated in an employee benefit plan called the Sterling Benefit Plan, but did not report its participation in the Plan on its tax return. Keller also deducted from its tax return deductions for its contribution into the Plan. The IRS determined a tax penalty for Keller’s failure to report its participation in the Plan, and assessed a deficiency against Keller for improper deductions of payments into the Plan.
Keller protested the penalty at the IRS Appeals Office, and after the Appeals Office affirmed the penalty, Keller tried to then protest the penalty in a CDP Hearing, where he was told he could not do so as he had already challenged the amount to the Appeals Office. Keller then appealed the CDP determination that he was not allowed to appeal the amount in his CDP hearing to the Tax Court, where the Commissioner of the IRS was granted summary. In defending against Keller’s appeal, the Commissioner argued that Keller’s appeal is moot because it was collaterally estopped from challenging its liability. Keller asserted that Treas. Reg. 301.6320-1(e)(3) unreasonably interprets 26 U.S.C § 6330(c)(2)(B) to preclude liability challenges at a CDP hearing when the taxpayer had the opportunity to dispute liability at the Appeals Office.
To begin, the Tenth Circuit addressed the Commissioner’s contention that Keller’s appeal was moot because it is collaterally estopped from challenging liability in light of Keller’ stipulation to be bound by the holding in Our Country Enterprises Inc., et al. v. Commissioner, that held another taxpayer’ participation in the same Plan was a reportable transaction. The court rejected this argument, and stated that the “constitutional mootness doctrine is grounded in the Article III requirement that federal courts may only decide actual ongoing cases or controversies,” while collateral estoppel concerns the actual merits of the case. The court stated that because mootness is a jurisdictional bar, while collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense, one cannot base mootness on collateral estoppel. Additionally, the court said that Keller’s stipulation was limited to its deficiency hearing and did not cover its penalty hearing, which is the only proceeding relevant to this appeal. Finally, as to the Commissioner’s argument, the court ruled that even if Keller’s stipulation were to collaterally estop Keller from challenging that its participation in the Plan was a listed transaction to report, Keller was alleging other issues that the outcome of the appeal would effect, refuting the mootness claim.
Turning to Keller’s challenge of its liability, Keller argues that Treas. Reg. 301.6320-1(e)(3), which interprets ‘a prior opportunity’ under 26 U.S.C § 6330(c)(2)(B) to include a conference with the Appeals Office, is an unreasonable interpretation of the section because it impermissibly limits the jurisdiction of the Tax Court and the federal courts and is “internally inconsistent.” Because this is an administrative interpretation of an ambiguous statute, the agency’s interpretation is given deference if it meets the standard first applied in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. The Court reviewed the Tax Court’s application of the two-step Chevron deference test de novo. It its own application of the test, the Court determined that as to the first step, the statute itself is ambiguous as the term “opportunity to dispute” could be interpreted in more than one reasonable way.
Turning then to the second step, the Court had to determine if the Treasury Regulation’s interpretation of 26 U.S.C § 6330(c)(2)(B) was a reasonable one. The court held that it was a reasonable interpretation because nothing in the statute precludes the “opportunity to dispute” from being within the context of an administrative hearing. Furthermore, when the court looked to the broader context of the statute, it stated that 26 U.S.C § 6330(c)(4)(A) bars taxpayers from raising an issue at judicial or administrative form and then again raising the same issue at a subsequent CDP hearing. Therefore, the court reasoned that it was the intent of Congress that an administrative hearing could preclude consideration under 26 U.S.C § 6330(c)(2)(B) as well.
The court also rejected Keller’s claim that the Treasury Regulation impermissibly limits the jurisdiction of the Tax Court and federal courts, and therefore it should not receive Chevron deference. The Tenth Circuit stated that § 6330 establishes the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review CDP proceedings, and the Regulation limits the scope of what may be heard at the CPD hearing, so while it limits the issues that may be raised at the hearing, it does not limit the issues that may be heard at the Tax Court. Finally, the court rejected Keller’s contention that the Regulation was internally inconsistent, stating that Keller failed to show that the Regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s grant of summary judgment.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Naranjo on Thursday, May 7, 2015.
Felony Menacing—Lesser Non-Included Offense—Disorderly Conduct.
Defendant Naranjo was convicted of two counts of felony menacing. The victims, a father and daughter, testified at trial that as the father was merging onto the highway, Naranjo cut them off, pointed a gun at the daughter, and threatened both of them. Naranjo testified that the father was the aggressor, that he inadvertently showed his gun as he was putting it away in the glove box, and that he did not make any threats.
On appeal, Naranjo contended that the trial court reversibly erred in declining to instruct the jury on the lesser non-included offense of disorderly conduct with a deadly weapon. Although Naranjo’s asserted reason for grabbing the gun was, as the trial court put it, “perfectly benign,” a jury could nonetheless conclude that handling a weapon while traveling on a public highway supported a finding that Naranjo consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the gun would be displayed to someone outside the car. Thus, the record supports a rational basis from which the jury could have convicted Naranjo of disorderly conduct with a deadly weapon and acquitted him of felony menacing. The trial court therefore erred in declining to give the lesser non-included offense instruction to the jury. Because this error was not harmless, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re People v. Owens on Monday, June 30, 2014.
CAR 21 Original Proceeding—Death Penalty—CRS §§ 16-12-201 to -210—Discovery and Disclosure.
Owens and Ray petitioned pursuant to CAR 21 for relief from a series of discovery rulings of the district court relative to post-conviction proceedings in their respective death penalty cases. Each had moved to discover the prosecution’s investigation of the claims raised by Owens’s motion for post-conviction review, on the grounds that such disclosure was required either by Crim.P. 16 or by the federal or state constitution. The district court ruled that Crim.P. 16 did not impose obligations on the prosecution with respect to its preparation to meet defendants’ post-conviction claims, but that the prosecution continued to have obligations to disclose information that was both exculpatory and constitutionally material, without regard for the time of or impetus for its discovery.
The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause why the district court’s ruling should not be disapproved for too narrowly limiting the prosecution’s discovery obligations during the unitary review proceedings prescribed by statute for all death sentences and convictions resulting in death sentences in this jurisdiction. The Court held that because Crim.P. 16 imposes disclosure obligations on the prosecution only with regard to materials and information acquired before or during trial, the district court did not err in finding it inapplicable to information acquired in response to defendants’ post-conviction claims. However, because the Court previously has held not only that a prosecutor’s constitutional obligation to disclose information favorable to an accused extends through the appeal of a death sentence, but also that district courts should order the disclosure of some possibly exculpatory material, despite being unable to find a reasonable probability that nondisclosure would change the result of the proceeding, the Court remanded the cases with directions for the district court to apply the due process standard and procedure announced in People v. Rodriguez, 786 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1989).
On January 31, 2012, Sen. Morgan Carroll and Rep. Roger Wilson introduced SB 12-107 – Concerning Additional Protections for Water Related to Hydraulic Fracturing. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.
The shut-down of hydraulic fracturing operations when monitoring equipment detects a pressure drop.
Oil and gas operators must submit water quantity reports showing projected and actual sources and amounts of water needed for hydraulically fracturing a well. Operators must also submit pre- and post-fracturing water quality reports for all active water wells located within .5 mile of oil and gas wells that will be or have been hydraulically fractured. This information will be posted on the commission’s web site. Operators cannot inject into the ground any chemical compound that would cause cancer.
In addition to existing financial assurances, each operator that engages in a high-risk hydraulic fracturing treatment must take out an environmental bond that would be forfeited if the operator’s operations cause any damage to water rights.
Subject to listed affirmative defenses, an operator is presumed to be responsible for the pollution of a water supply that is within .5 mile of a line between the well head and the surface projection of the bottom hole location of the well, if the pollution occurred within 6 months after the completion of the hydraulic fracturing of the well. Hydraulic fracturing would be prohibited within .5 mile of any surface water, including a pond, reservoir, or other natural or artificial impoundment or stream, ditch, or other artificial waterway, unless the operator uses a closed-loop system. The bill is assigned to the Judiciary Committee; the bill is not listed on the printed calendar.
On Tuesday, June 7, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinions and thirteen unpublished opinions.
Tyler v. Tsurumi (America), Inc.

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 6330
 v. 
 § 6330
 v. 
 § 6330
 § 6330
 § 6330
 § 6330
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.