Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/293/151/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:43:13+00:00

Document:
1. The amendment of March 15, 1927, to the compulsory Workmen's Compensation Act of the Washington, limiting to three years the time within which a case may be reopened for the readjustment of compensation on account of the aggravation, diminution, or termination of the disability, does not deny due process of law to one who sustained a compensable injury while the preexisting statute was in effect, though the latter contained no limitation as to the time within which such right might be asserted. P. 293 U. S. 154.
2. The amendment did not deprive the claimant in this case of any vested right, but affected the remedy only, and that in a manner not unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppressive. P. 293 U. S. 155.
3. A State may impose reasonable conditions upon the assertion of rights which are purely statutory. P. 293 U. S. 154.
176 Wash. 345 29 P.2d 675, affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment affirming a judgment which dismissed an appeal from an order of the state administrative board.
in accordance with the rules in this section provided for the same, or, in a proper case, terminate the payment. [Footnote 1]"
"If aggravation, diminution, or termination of disability takes place or be discovered after the rate of compensation shall have been established or compensation terminated, in any case, the director of labor and industries, through and by means of the division of industrial insurance, may, upon the application of the beneficiary, made within three years after the establishment or termination of such compensation, or upon his own motion, readjust for further application the rate of compensation in accordance with the rules in this section provided for the same, or, in a proper case, terminate the payment: Provided, Any such applicant whose compensation has heretofore been established or terminated shall have three years from the taking effect of this act within which to apply for such readjustment. [Footnote 2]"
three year statute of limitations barred the claim. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Thurston County was dismissed, and the Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment. The case is here on appeal.
The appellant insists that, at the date of his injury, the statute conferred upon him not only a right to make his original claim and receive compensation, but a further right to file an additional claim, without limit as to time, and to receive readjusted compensation for aggravation of his condition due to his injury. This, he says, is a vested right, is property, and its enforcement may not be abolished or limited, consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. [Footnote 3] The claim cannot be sustained.
State's power. The section under attack merely limits the time for the assertion of the right, affects the remedy only, and that in a manner not unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppressive. Such a limitation of time within which appellant's remedy must be pursued does not deprive him of due process.
Session Laws 1911, c. 74, § 5(h), pp. 356, 360, amended by Session Laws 1923, c. 136, § 2(h), pp. 387, 397. The only change made in the quoted paragraph by the Act of 1923 was the substitution of the word "further" for the word "future."
Session Laws 1927, c. 310, § 4(h), p. 844; Rem.Rev.Stat. § 7679(h).
Below and in his assignments of error here, the appellant asserted the section offends Article I, § 10, but, at the bar, he abandoned this contention, and we need not consider it.
See State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219.

References: § 5
 § 2
 § 4
 § 7679
 § 10
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