Source: https://duilawyerlosangeles.com/for-attorneys/exclude-offering-the-pas-test/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 13:04:08+00:00

Document:
Defendant was stopped for a violation of V.C. 24409 (use of multiple beams) and V.C. §24250 (lighting during darkness) and then investigated for driving under the influence. Prior to an arrest, but during the detention (“not free to go”) the officer asked Defendant if he was willing to submit to a Preliminary Alcohol Screening (P.A.S.) test. The officer told Defendant he “was not required by state law to submit to the test.” Instinctively, exercising his Fourth Amendment right, Defendant declined to take the PAS test. 1 The defendant will not raise any issues concerning the PAS advisement, and it is not an issue and not relevant.
The express right to refuse a P.A.S. test is granted by V.C. 23612(i). Also when the officer asked Defenant to submit to a PAS test, he was asking for consent to a warrantless search for the amount of alcohol the subject’s blood. Said consent is not required and there is no consent expressed or implied by law. Thus, the police request to search Defendant for the amount of Alcohol in his blood by way of PAS test and his exercise of his right to not submit is inadmissible. The exercise of the privilege provided by the Fourth Amendment cannot be used against the defendant.
The prosecution cannot advise a person that it is permissible to refuse the test and then penalize that choice at trial.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…” This is the cornerstone of any inquiry regarding governmental acquisition evidence from the accused. To determine this matter, certain immutable principles apply.
There are many cases on the subject of exigent circumstances permitting the withdrawal of a blood sample in a drunk driving case. A search warrant is not required if the defendant is lawfully under arrest and withdrawal of the blood is done in a medically approved manner. See Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 757; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218. Here, Mr. Hicker was not under arrest at the time of the proposed search by way of a PAS test. Also, there was no exigency in this case because the police timely secured evidence of B.A.C. as a result of the blood draw obtained after arrest pursuant to “implied” consent.
IV. THERE IS A PRIVILEGE TO BE FREE FROM COMMENT UPON ASSERTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
There is a privilege to be free from comment upon the assertion of a Constitutional right. See Jenkins v. Anderson (1980) 447 U.S. 231.
An individual’s refusal to consent to a warrantless search (e.g. an entry of his residence), may be open to various interpretations and is not encouraged, however the assertion of the right itself cannot be a crime nor can it be evidence of a crime. (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 528-529; District of Columbia v. Little (1950) 339.) The Fourth Amendment protects a person’s ultimate authority to passively withhold consent to a government intrusion, despite any legal justification there may be for it.
A defendant may not be “penalized” when he does not agree to a pre-arrest search, especially when the right to refuse a PAS test is provided by V.C. 23612(i).
Keener derived the privilege primarily from two opinions of the United States Supreme Court: Griffin, California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 (Griffin) and Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 619 (Doyle). Griffin, supra; precluded the prosecution from commenting on the silence of an accused who asserts his right to remain silent during the trial. (Id at p. 614.) Doyle held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids prosecutors from using a defendant’s post arrest, post Miranda’ silence for impeachment purposes.
The defendant’s words and mental processes involve his Fifth Amendment Right. The words cannot be improperly used for the not very probative purpose of showing he had a consciousness of guilt. Keener supra 148 Cal.App.3d 73 at 78. In effect, such evidence would punish the defendant for exercising his right to not consent to the search (Keener, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 73, 78).
The admission of the evidence of the offering of the PAS Test and the response thereto by necessity will call for an explanation by the defendant, thereby denying the defendant his right not to be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 460 11… the privilege [against self incrimination] is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right to remain silent unless she chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his/her own will.” The prosecution’s use of the fact that the defendant did not consent to the PAS test is analogous to commenting on the defendant’s exercising his right to remain silent in the face of interrogation, which is prohibited by Miranda, id. at 468.
Defendant was detained (“not free to go”) and never waived his “Miranda” rights prior to the questioning by the police officer about whether he would submit to a PAS test which, of course, required a response by the subject. Accordingly, the defendant’s response to the PAS Advisement is inadmissible due to the Fifth Amendment and must be suppressed.
Similar to the Fifth Amendment’s protection from being required to give incriminating testimony which prevents a prosecutor from commenting upon the post-arrest silence of a defendant, the right to remain silent carriers an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty. Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 619; United States v. Newman (1991) 943 F.2d 1155, 1157.
The PAS advisement and any response thereto is irrelevant or, in the alternative, such evidence is of little probative value and substantially outweighed by those factors as enunciated in Evid.C. §352.
Defendant has the statutory right to decline the proposed search by way of the PAS test pursuant to V.C. 23612(i). There was no consent, expressed or implied, to that search. A passive refusal to not consent to a proposed warrantless search cannot be admitted into evidence. The Court must exclude the offering of the PAS test and the citizen’s response thereto.
1 During the encounter, Defendant was cooperative. After his arrest for DUI, he submitted to a chemical test (per implied “consent” and V.C. 23612(a)). Thus, there was no exigency to secure evidence of BAC by way of the PAS test.

References: §24250
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