Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53047:gr-181999-2009&catid=1522&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:56:01+00:00

Document:
OFELIA C. CAUNAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
At bar are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assail the Decision1 dated August 30, 2007 and Resolution2 dated March 10, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952, 27953, & 27954, finding petitioners Joey P. Marquez (Marquez) and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan) guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
That on January 11, 1996 or thereabout, in ParaÃ±aque City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of ParaÃ±aque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with the members of the aforesaid Committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget Officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with the accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZARO Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with said ZARO Trading, for the purchase of 5,998 pieces of "walis ting-ting" at P25 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-96-12-8629 in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P149,950.00), without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting" was only P11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of P14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO PESOS (P83,972.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.
That on June 30, 1997 or thereabout, in ParaÃ±aque City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of ParaÃ±aque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 23,334 pieces of "walis ting-ting" at P15.00 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-02-447 in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND TEN PESOS (P350,010.00), without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting" was only P11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of P4.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of NINETY THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX PESOS (P93,336.00), thus causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.
That [in] September 1997, or thereabout, in ParaÃ±aque City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of ParaÃ±aque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 8,000 pieces of "walis ting-ting" at P15.00 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-02-561 in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P120,000.00), without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting" was only P11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of P4.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00), thus causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.
February 20, 1997 101-97-04-1755 P 3,000.00 120 pcs.
February 12, 1997 101-97-04-1756 P100,000.00 4,000 pcs.
February 11, 1997 101-97-04-1759 P149,500.00 5,980 pcs.
in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P252,000.00), and which transactions were clearly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the "walis ting-ting" was only P11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of P14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P141,400.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.
October 15, 1996 101-96-11-7604 P 100,000.00 4,000 pcs.
October 18, 1996 101-96-11-7605 P 100,000.00 4,000 pcs.
The five (5) Informations were filed based on the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team that there was overpricing in certain purchase transactions of ParaÃ±aque City. In March 1999, a Special Audit Team composed of Fatima Bermudez (Bermudez), Carolina Supsup, Gerry Estrada, and Yolando Atienza, by virtue of Local Government Audit Office Assignment Order No. 99-002, audited selected transactions of ParaÃ±aque City for the calendar years 1996 to 1998, including the walis tingting purchases.
7. Documents on the conduct and process of procurement of walis tingting by the neighboring city of Las PiÃ±as.
Parenthetically, to ascertain the prevailing price of walis tingting for the years 1996 to 1998, the audit team made a canvass of the purchase prices of the different merchandise dealers of ParaÃ±aque City. All, however, were reluctant to provide the team with signed quotations of purchase prices for walis tingting. In addition, the audit team attempted to purchase walis tingting from the named suppliers of ParaÃ±aque City. Curiously, when the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers, these were occupied by other business establishments. Thereafter, the audit team located, and purchased from, a lone supplier that sold walis tingting.
4. There was glaring overpricing in the purchase transactions.
Objecting to the disallowances, petitioners Marquez and Caunan, along with the other concerned local government officials of ParaÃ±aque City, filed a request for reconsideration with the audit team which the latter subsequently denied in a letter to petitioner Marquez.
On the other litigation front, the criminal aspect subject of this appeal, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners and the other local government officials of ParaÃ±aque City for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. Consequently, the five (5) Informations against petitioners, et al. were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
5. On the whole, the transactions undertaken were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Expectedly, the remaining accused, Caunan, Marquez and Tanael, moved for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan decision. Caunan and Tanael, represented by the same counsel, collectively filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Written Notice of Death of Accused Silvestre S. de Leon). Marquez filed several motions,10 including a separate Motion for Reconsideration.
All the motions filed by Marquez, as well as Caunan's motion, were denied by the Sandiganbayan. However, with respect to Tanael, the Sandiganbayan found reason to reconsider her conviction.
Hence, these separate appeals by petitioners Marquez and Caunan.
1. [WHETHER] THE PROSECUTION'S PROOF OF OVERPRICING [IS] HEARSAY.
2. [WHETHER THE] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN [ERRED] IN ADMITTING WITNESS FATIMA V. BERMUDEZ' TESTIMONY DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS SOURCES ARE THEMSELVES ADMITTEDLY AND PATENTLY HEARSAY.
3. [WHETHER THE] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY [ERRED] IN APPLYING AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE[.] UNDER THIS EXCEPTION, "PUBLIC DOCUMENTS CONSISTING OF ENTRIES IN PUBLIC RECORDS, ETC.," x x x ARE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN.
1. First and foremost, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
2. Whether the testimony of Bermudez and the report of the Special Audit Team constitute hearsay and are, therefore, inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
(g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction, manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold question we should resolve is whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly injurious or disadvantageous to the government.
We agree with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. Thus, we grant the petitions.
In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.18 The burden of proof is on the prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption of innocence.19 The court, in ascertaining the guilt of an accused, must, after having marshaled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accused's guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.20 Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted.
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA's finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit team's report. The audit team's conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las PiÃ±as City. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to ParaÃ±aque City's walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of ParaÃ±aque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the ParaÃ±aque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The reasoning of the Sandiganbayan is specious and off tangent. The audit team reached a conclusion of gross overpricing based on documents which, at best, would merely indicate the present market price of walis tingting of a different specification, purchased from a non-supplier of ParaÃ±aque City, and the price of walis tingting purchases in Las PiÃ±as City. Effectively, the prosecution was unable to demonstrate the requisite burden of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, in order to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners.
As pointed out by petitioner Caunan, not all of the contents of the audit team's report constituted hearsay. Indeed, as declared by the Sandiganbayan, Bermudez could very well testify thereon since the conclusions reached therein were made by her and her team. However, these conclusions were based on incompetent evidence. Most obvious would be the market price of walis tingting in Las PiÃ±as City which was used as proof of overpricing in ParaÃ±aque City. The prosecution should have presented evidence of the actual price of the particular walis tingting purchased by petitioners and the other accused at the time of the audited transaction or, at the least, an approximation thereof. Failing in these, there is no basis to declare that there was a glaring overprice resulting in gross and manifest disadvantage to the government.
We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioners failed to conduct the requisite public bidding for the questioned procurements. However, the lack of public bidding alone does not automatically equate to a manifest and gross disadvantage to the government. As we had occasion to declare in Nava v. Sandiganbayan,22 the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. However, this does not satisfy the third element of the offense charged, because the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. After all, penal laws are strictly construed against the government.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to rule on the applicability of our rulings in Arias and Magsuci to petitioner Marquez. Nonetheless, we wish to reiterate herein the doctrines laid down in those cases. We call specific attention to the sweeping conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that a conspiracy existed among petitioners and the other accused, most of whom were acquitted, particularly private individual Razo, the proprietor of Zaro Trading.
The Sandiganbayan predicated its conviction of [Magsuci] on its finding of conspiracy among Magsuci, Ancla and now deceased Enriquez.
There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence therefore must reasonably be strong enough to show a community of criminal design.
Fairly evident, however, is the fact that the actions taken by Magsuci involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official reports submitted by his subordinate (Engineer Enriquez), but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts.
"We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems'dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 30, 2007 and Resolution dated March 10, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952, 27953, & 27954 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Joey P. Marquez in G.R. NOS. 182020-24 and Ofelia C. Caunan in G.R. NOS. 181999 and 182001-04 are ACQUITTED of the charges against them. Costs de oficio.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez, with Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 182020-24), pp. 106-135.
3 Used to be a municipality and became an incorporated city on February 15, 1998.
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 182020-24), pp. 106-110.
5 A department in the Commission on Audit tasked to monitor prices of goods procured by the different agencies of the government.
6 (i) SM Sta. Mesa Branch, (ii) Welcome Supermarket (Welcome Rotanda), (iii) Shopwise Makati, (iv) Celina Store in Fairview Wet and Dry Market, (v) Edith Store (ParaÃ±aque), and (vi) Central ParaÃ±aque Construction Supply and General Merchandise.
8 G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989, 180 SCRA 309.
9 G.R. No. 101545, January 3, 1995, 240 SCRA 13.
11 Petition in G.R. NOS. 181999 and 182001-04, rollo, p. 22.
12 Memorandum of petitioner in G.R. NOS. 182020-24; rollo, pp. 915-916.
15 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2.
3.1) When the price/prices of a transaction under audit is found beyond the allowable ten percent (10%) above the prices indicated in par. 2.1 as market price indicators, the auditor shall secure additional evidence to firm-up the initial findings to a reliable degree of certainty.
The purchase/contract terms and conditions which should be the same as those of the questioned transaction.
17 Dans, Jr. v. People, G.R. NOS. 127073 and 126995, January 29, 1998, 285 SCRA 504; Luciano v. Estrella, No. L-31622, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 769.
19 See Rule 131, Sec. 1, in relation to Rule 133, Sec. 2; Rule 115, Sec. 2(a); CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
21 Rollo (G.R. NOS. 182020-24), p. 121.
22 Nava v. Palattao, G.R. No. 160211, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 745, 772.

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