Source: https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/sanchez-v-cegavske
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 13:46:38+00:00

Document:
You may view the statement of interest in pdf format.
BARBARA K. CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity of Secretary of State for the State of Nevada, et al., Defendants.
The United States respectfully submits this Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which authorizes the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United States in any pending lawsuit. This matter implicates the interpretation and application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (“Section 2”), a statute over which Congress accorded the Attorney General broad enforcement authority. See 52 U.S.C. § 10308(d). The United States has a substantial interest in ensuring Section 2’s proper interpretation and uniform enforcement around the country.
The United States respectfully submits that Defendants’ Responses in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunctive and Declaratory Relief misstate portions of the established legal standard under Section 2.1 Accordingly, the United States submits this Statement for the limited purpose of articulating the appropriate legal standard.
On September 7, 2016, Plaintiffs—members of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and the Walker River Paiute Tribe—sued the Nevada Secretary of State, Washoe and Mineral Counties, and their respective officials (collectively “Defendants”), alleging, among other claims, that the location of sites for in-person voter registration and in-person early voting in both Defendant counties, and election-day voting in Washoe County (collectively “election sites”), discriminates against Native Americans in violation of Section 2. Compl. ¶¶ 115-19 (ECF No. 1); Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 114-18 (ECF No. 10). On September 20th, Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for preliminary injunctive relief and declaratory relief (“Motion”), seeking satellite election sites in Schurz and Nixon, located on their respective reservations. Pls.’ Mot. 37 (ECF No. 26). Plaintiffs argue that absent relief, Native Americans living in Washoe and Mineral Counties will continue to have less opportunity to participate in the November 8, 2016 general election compared to other members of the electorate, in violation of the Voting Rights Act. Pls.’ Mot. 2 (ECF No. 26). Defendants filed their briefs in opposition to the Motion on September 29, 2016. Defs.’ Mem. (ECF Nos. 37, 38, 39).
1 The Secretary of State, the Washoe County Defendants, and the Mineral County Defendants all filed briefs in opposition to the Motion. Hereinafter, collectively they will be cited as “Defs.’ Mem.” and individually cited as “Sec. Mem.” (ECF No. 37), “Washoe Mem.” (ECF No. 38), and “Mineral Mem.” (ECF No. 39).
is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected class] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
2Most Section 2 cases address vote dilution: election structures that render even eligible voters who are fully able to cast valid ballots without the equitable opportunity to elect representatives of choice. See, e.g., LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). Nonetheless, “Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not just vote dilution.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 n.10 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 30). This case concerns vote denial or abridgement.
3See also Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 406 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013); Miss. State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 413 (5th Cir. 1991).
4See also NAACP, 768 F.3d at 556-57; Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 407; Operation PUSH, 932 F.2d at 405.
[9.] whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
the minority’s preferred candidate. These Gingles factors are not required to be shown as part of the Section 2 vote denial analysis. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-51; Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *17-18.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29). The Senate Factors are “neither comprehensive nor exclusive,” and “other factors may also be relevant and may be considered.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29); see also Montes v. City of Yakima, 40 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 1388 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (noting non-exclusivity). These factors are not limited to considering the relevant jurisdiction’s conduct but also that of other governmental entities and private individuals. See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80; cf. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973). Examining the Senate Factors helps the court to determine whether the challenged practice, in light of current social and political conditions in the jurisdiction, results in a discriminatory denial or abridgement of the right to vote through less opportunity for the allegedly affected group to participate in the political process relative to other voters.
courts’ interference with “neutral” election laws to those that truly have a discriminatory impact under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”).
Defendants’ briefs inaccurately state portions of the Section 2 standard. For example, Defendants argue that (1) certain types of voting are not protected under Section 2 (i.e., describing various voting methods as “convenience” voting); (2) Plaintiffs must show outright denial of the ability to vote or participate; (3) Plaintiffs must show inability to elect candidates of their choice; and (4) socioeconomic disparities are relevant to the totality-of-circumstances analysis only if those disparities result from official discrimination by the jurisdiction at issue. For the reasons that follow, these arguments are without merit and should be rejected.
A. Section 2 applies to the location of Election Day, late registration, and early voting sites.
Voting Rights Act does not apply to early-voting systems.”); League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 238-39 (applying Section 2 to various practices including procedures for late registration and early voting, and noting that “courts have entertained vote-denial claims regarding a wide range of practices”); Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *43 (registration and polling place locations covered by Section 2) (Higginson, J., concurring)); Wandering Medicine v. McCulloch, No. 12-cv-135, at *16 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2014) (order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss in part because plaintiffs presented a viable Section 2 claim based on defendants’ refusal to establish a satellite registration and absentee voting office); Brooks v. Gant, No. 12-cv-5003-KES, 2012 WL 4482984, at *7 (D.S.D. Sept. 27, 2012) (denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss in part because plaintiffs’ allegations of burdens accessing in-person absentee voting office suffice to show “less opportunity” under Section 2); Spirit Lake Tribe, 2010 WL 4226614, at *1-6 (granting preliminary injunction in Section 2 challenge alleging unequal access to polling place locations); Miss. State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987), aff’d sub nom. Miss. State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982).
Defendants assert that even if minority voters are disproportionately burdened by the location of early voting, voter registration, and election-day voting sites, this Court should not entertain Plaintiffs’ Section 2 claims because “‘inconvenience does not result in a denial of “meaningful access” to the political process.’” Washoe Mem. 19-20 (quoting Jacksonville Coal.
6 Defendants also incorrectly claim that in the Section 2 analysis, a court must balance the burdens of the affected minority voters against the interests of the Defendants. Mineral Mem. 14-15, Sec. Mem. 7. This conflates two distinct legal claims. A constitutional claim assessing whether a challenged practice imposes an unjustified burden (whether or not that burden amounts to a discriminatory effect on a racial or language minority) requires evaluating the burden of the law against the precise interests put forward by the State as justification. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (plurality opinion) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)). Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, by contrast, the touchstone comparison is “whether members of a protected class have ‘less opportunity’ to exercise their right to vote than other groups of voters,” NAACP, 768 F.3d at 552 (emphasis added). See also Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *20, *41 (distinguishing the Section 2 and Anderson-Burdick frameworks) (Higginson, J., concurring).
7 Defendants propose that Plaintiffs have not stated a valid Section 2 claim because they failed to provide quantitative statistical evidence of disparate impact. Washoe Mem. 17 (quoting Feldman v. Arizona Sec'y of State's Office, No. CV-16-01065-PHX-DLR, 2016 WL 5341180, at *5 (D. Ariz. 2016)). Although typical of Section 2 cases, statistical analyses are but one possible means to show disparate impact. For example, in Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 633, 636-37 (S.D. Tex. 2014), the court also relied on lay testimony regarding the ability of African Americans to participate. In the context of a vote dilution claim under Section 2, courts have relied on both statistical and non-statistical proof to establish the Gingles preconditions regarding racial bloc voting. See, e.g., Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1118 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Gingles allows plaintiffs to prove cohesion even in the absence of statistical evidence of racial polarization.”); Monroe v. City of Woodville, 897 F.2d 763, 764 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Statistical proof of political cohesion is likely to be the most persuasive form of evidence, although other evidence may also establish this phenomenon.”).
registration procedure or ballot-casting issue is outside of Section 2’s purview, and there is no basis for the Court to decide differently here.
B. Section 2 does not require proof that a jurisdiction has “denied” citizens the right to vote.
Defendants several times suggest that Plaintiffs must show an outright denial of access to voting opportunities. Sec. Mem. 13; Washoe Mem. 10, 21; Mineral Mem. 15, 17. This ignores the plain text of the Act. Section 2 prohibits the “abridgment” as well as the outright “denial” of the right to vote. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). This prohibition does not require that a challenged practice deprive minority voters completely of the ability to vote. See, e.g., Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *29 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “Abridgement” as the “reduction or diminution of something”)). It requires only that Plaintiffs establish they have “less opportunity” to participate relative to other voters. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). All electoral practices with a material disparate “effect on a person’s ability to exercise [the] franchise” implicate the Voting Rights Act. Cf. Perkins, 400 U.S. at 387 (addressing Section 5); see also League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 243 (holding that Section 2 is not limited to practices that render voting “completely foreclosed” to the minority community); Poor Bear, 2015 WL 1969760, at *7 (concluding that Section 2 protects equal opportunity to cast a ballot via in-person absentee voting); Spirit Lake Tribe, 2010 WL 4226614, at *3, *6 (enjoining polling place closures under Section 2); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 408 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that Section 2 would be violated if a county limited voter registration hours to one day a week, and “that made it more difficult for blacks to register than whites”).
Defendants further assert that Plaintiffs’ argument must fail because Native Americans in Defendant counties can still participate by mail. Sec. Mem. 13; Washoe Mem. 21. However, mail-in voting is not the equivalent of in-person voting, and a court must consider the circumstances of each case and the impact a challenged practice has on opportunity to vote. See Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *26 (concluding that “mail-in voting for specific subsets of Texas voters does not sufficiently mitigate the burdens imposed [by the challenged law]”). Here, Plaintiffs have alleged a valid Section 2 “abridgment” claim—that Native Americans in Defendant counties, despite living in “mailing” precincts, make up a sizeable population of minority voters who have fewer opportunities and greater difficulty than nonminority voters in registering and reaching existing early voting sites, due to the travel distances involved, the socioeconomic disparities limiting the ability to travel, the lack of required identification documents, the lack of internet access, and the monetary and temporal costs involved in attempting to overcome such hurdles; and that these difficulties exacerbate and are exacerbated by discrimination and the lingering effects of discrimination. Pls.’ Mot. 20, 25, 26; Amend. Compl. ¶ 94. Thus, according to Plaintiffs, the current location of registration and early voting sites interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities for Native Americans to participate in the franchise. See Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *17 (explaining the causal link required to prove discriminatory effect).
C. Section 2 does not require Plaintiffs to prove an inability to elect their preferred candidates.
argument misconceives the nature of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Defendant counties’ practices. Because Defendants’ interpretation of Section 2 conflicts with the plain language of the statute as well as Supreme Court precedent, their argument fails as a matter of law.
The plain text of Section 2(b) requires Plaintiffs to show only that the political process is not equally open to Native Americans because the practice at issue results in their having “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). Defendants, by contrast, would require Plaintiffs to show that they “have been unable to elect the candidates of their choice.” Mineral Mem. 16. Defendants’ formulation fundamentally alters the statutory test.
If, for example, a county permitted voter registration for only three hours one day a week, and that made it more difficult for blacks to register than whites, blacks would have less opportunity to participate in the political process than whites and Section 2 would therefore be violated—even if the number of potential black voters was so small that they would on no hypothesis be able to elect their own candidate.
501 U.S. at 408 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
8 Section 2 vote dilution claims—for example, challenges to district lines—do not usually depend on allegations that a practice makes it more difficult to participate in the political process by casting a valid ballot. In that context, the district lines’ imposition of an inability to elect candidates of choice becomes the more important touchstone in establishing injury. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 (holding that plaintiffs must show, inter alia, that the majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate). By contrast, in a Section 2 claim focused on an abridgment of the right to cast valid ballots, that abridgment alone amounts to injury necessarily impairing electoral opportunity.
In support of their argument, Defendants cite Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397, for the proposition that “to make out a § 2 VRA claim . . . Plaintiffs must prove both (1) that the members of the protected class have less opportunity to participate in the political process; and (2) the minority class members’ inability to elect representatives of their choice.” Mineral Mem. 16. But this is not a proper reading of Chisom. Rather, the Court held there that where a plaintiff shows that minority voters have less opportunity than other voters to participate in the political process, the plaintiff necessarily also establishes that members of that group have less opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397 (“Any abridgement of the opportunity of members of a protected class to participate in the political process inevitably impairs their ability to influence the outcome of an election.”). Chisom, which itself concerned a vote dilution claim, thus stands neither for an “inability” standard nor for the proposition that Section 2 challenges to ballot-casting procedures require two separate showings.
Moreover, because Section 2 requires a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, see 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b), the election of a few minority candidates is not dispositive of a plaintiff’s opportunity, relative to other members of the electorate, to elect representatives of choice. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 75 (“[T]he language of § 2 and its legislative history plainly demonstrate that proof that some minority candidates have been elected does not foreclose a § 2 claim.”).
A plain reading of the statutory language and Supreme Court precedent establishes that plaintiffs in a Section 2 lawsuit are not required to show an inability to elect candidates of choice. Accordingly, the Court should reject Defendants’ argument.
D. Effects of past discrimination that hinder minority voters’ ability to participate effectively in the political process are relevant to a Section 2 claim.
Defendants erroneously argue that the totality of circumstances inquiry requires Plaintiffs to allege that voter-related discrimination against Native Americans be “directly attributable to the defendants,” Sec. Mem. 10, and that general prior history is not relevant in the totality of the circumstances analysis. Id. at 4, 10-11; Washoe Mem. 3, 9, 24 (citing Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2628 (2013)); Mineral Mem. 3, 19. Nothing in Section 2’s text or legislative history limits the Senate Factor analysis of the relevant social and political conditions to official, state-sponsored discrimination by the jurisdiction in question.
considered; the limiting language describes the people discriminated against, not the discriminator.” Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988). Socioeconomic disparities that result from past discrimination may mean that current practices impede minority voters’ ability to participate equally in the electoral process; those disparities need not be the direct product of particular public defendants’ past action in order for the defendants’ present practices to implicate the Act. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Democratic State Party of Ark., 890 F.2d 1423, 1430-31 (8th Cir. 1989).9 Ultimately, it is the intensely local analysis of all factual circumstances existing within a jurisdiction, regardless of source, that will determine whether the jurisdiction’s challenged standard, practice, or procedure results in a Section 2 violation.10 Thus, this Court should follow well-established precedent in considering all past or present discrimination, public and private, when assessing whether a challenged voting practice violates Section 2.
9See also Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54-5, 804 F.2d 469, 474-75 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the district court erred by failing to address evidence of broad socioeconomic disparities, without reference to their sources); Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1018-34, 37-41 (D.S.D. 2004) (recounting the history of official and unofficial discrimination and setting out socioeconomic disparities without concern for their cause); but see Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *20 (declining to decide the question of whether plaintiff must show “state action caused the social and historical conditions begetting discrimination” because the district court found evidence of such state-sponsored discrimination).
10 Of course, Plaintiffs have also alleged a history of official discrimination against Nevadan Native Americans generally, and with respect to voting in particular. See Pls.’ Motion 20-22; Amended Compl. ¶¶ 80-93; see also, e.g., Decree and Permanent Injunction, Mickel v. Wolff, No. CIV-R-79-239 (D. Nev. Dec. 23, 1980) (permanently enjoining the Nevada State Prison from continuing to deny access to certain Native American religious activities).
preliminary injunction, particularly with regard to the detailed findings of fact necessary in a Section 2 analysis.
The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Statement of Interest of the United States of America was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court through ECF, and that ECF will send a Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) to all attorneys of record.

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