Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/03/21/ingram-v-nicholson-no-03-2196-non-attorney-review/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 13:13:20+00:00

Document:
“The Board’s suggestion that the appellant was required to articulate a specific intent to “claim . . . compensation benefits under the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. 1151” is similarly flawed. R. at 8, 9. The duty to sympathetically read exists because a pro se claimant is not presumed to know the contents of title 38 or to be able to identify the specific legal provisions that would entitle him to compensation. Again, there would be no need for the duty to sympathetically read pleadings if pro se claimants had encyclopedic knowledge of veterans law.
“As to the Board’s suggestion that the appellant was required to allege negligence or lack of skill, measuring the appellant’s submissions against a strict pleading requirement is fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of a sympathetic reading and, therefore, constituted legal error by the Board. The application of such a pleading requirement violates the duty to sympathetically read submissions because it required the appellant to demonstrate a level of sophistication that would render moot the duty to sympathetically read his pleadings. In other words, it is precisely because unsophisticated claimants cannot be presumed to know the law and plead claims based on legal elements that the Secretary must look at the conditions stated and the causes averred in a pro se pleading to determine whether they reasonably suggest the possibility of a claim for a benefit under title 38, regardless of whether the appellant demonstrates an understanding that such a benefit exists or of the technical elements of such a claim. The Board’s suggestion that the appellant was required to articulate a specific intent to “claim . . . compensation benefits under the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. 1151” is similarly flawed. R. at 8, 9. The duty to sympathetically read exists because a pro se claimant is not presumed to know the contents of title 38 or to be able to identify the specific legal provisions that would entitle him to compensation. Again, there would be no need for the duty to sympathetically read pleadings if pro se claimants had encyclopedic knowledge of veterans law.
of La Jolla, California was on the brief, for the appellant.
Jeffrey Schueller, with whom Tim S. McClain, General Counsel; R.
April 15, 1992, for the grant of compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C.
parties each filed briefs, and the appellant filed a reply brief.
in Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005), has on this case.
capable under this condition to continue my normal life style.
am unable to continue in my skillful trade.
unemployable. R. at 28. The appellant did not appeal that decision.
57. In June 1995, the RO denied his claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.
appeal in June 1999, the Board awarded compensation benefits under 38 U.S.
1992. R. at 461, 470-77. The veteran perfected his appeal to the Board.
compensation benefits under the provisions of 38 U.S.C. 1151.
or showed lack of proper skill in performing the pneumonectomy.” R. at 9.
section 1151 in 1986. R. at 9.
would have entitled him to the assignment of an earlier effective date.
treated his 1986 application as one exclusively for pension benefits. Br.
claiming benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151. Secretary’s Br. at 4-10.
At oral argument, the appellant maintained his prior position.
filed notices of supplemental authorities.
specific decisions below that have been appealed to us. See 38 U.S.C.
in a final decision presented in the context of a CUE motion.
collateral attack on the 1986 RO decision. See Cook v. Principi, 318 F.
have jurisdiction to address the substance of the appellant’s argument.
one year after separation from service. See 38 C.F.R. 3.400 (2005).
standard of review set forth in 38 U.S.C. 7261(a)(4). See Hanson v.
Court would have decided those issues differently in the first instance.
potentially applicable” provisions of law and regulation. Schafrath v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 589, 593 (1991) (emphasis added); see 38 U.S.C.
facilitate review in this Court. See 38 U.S.C. 7104(d)(1); Allday v.
) (2005). This definition predates the creation of this Court. See 38 C.
that had been explicitly decided by an RO in the first instance.
proper notice that his claim was denied.
attempt to “reopen” the claim and that decision was appealed to the Board.
the Board. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 696-98 (Fed. Cir.
theory alleged necessarily constitutes a separate claim”).
would have been manifestly different but for the alleged error.” Fugo v.
not been made, the outcome would have been manifestly different. Grover v.
were weighed or evaluated is not enough to substantiate a CUE claim.
evidence of record.” Eddy v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 52, 58 (1996).
identified the claim that was granted.
regulation. See Tablazon, Hauck, Kuo, and Ashley, all supra.
procedural error” prevents a decision of the Secretary from becoming final).
under 3.160(c) until 1992 and is now on direct appeal.
pending under 3.160(c) and Myers until it is explicitly adjudicated?
the basis of CUE because they failed to adjudicate TDIU. Id. at 416.
schedular rating that meets the minimum criteria of 38 C.F.R. 4.16(a) (i.
awarded 70% rating after the hospitalization. Id. at 415-16.
raised a TDIU claim.” Id.
presented to and decided by the Board. Id.
decision.” 38 C.F.R. 3104(a) (1994). But see Hayre v. West, 188 F.
after he had requested “the highest rating possible” disability rating.
that benefit, including theories of presumptive service connection. Id.
decision on every theory under which that benefit could be granted. Id.
a pending and unadjudicated claim.
a veteran’s pleadings in determining whether an informal claim was raised.
We find Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), instructive.
Board decision that denied service connection for a psychosis in service.
record at the time of the original decision. 318 F.3d at 1344. . . .
the adjudication and an opportunity to appeal. Cook, 318 F.3d at 1341.
appellant had been denied his appellate rights. Id.
way an aspect of a claim for a non-service-connected pension.
made by VA affecting the payment of benefits or the granting of relief.”).
the error”); see also Moody, supra.
date is assigned. Veterans benefits litigation is frequently piecemeal.
A veteran will submit a continuous stream of evidence and correspondence.
a request from the Secretary for evidence or to report for an examination.
the appellate rights of veterans.
Of course, not every claim for a benefit will be granted.
claim was first raised is relevant to determining the effective date.
when the claim was first raised. See DiCarlo, 19 Vet.App. at __, slip op.
are relevant to the substantive question of entitlement. See Rodriguez v.
was seeking an advisory opinion).
is not a collateral attack on a prior final RO or Board decision.
could be construed as an intent to claim section 1151 benefits R. at 8-9.
appellant was required to articulate a specific intent to “claim . . .
application and the statement in support of the claim. Cf. EF v.
symptoms he is experiencing that are causing him disability, see Cintron v.
on a sympathetic reading of the material in a pro se submission.
and intent of the claimant, as provided below”); M21-1, Part III, para. 2.
earlier than April 15, 1992, for the grant of benefits under section 1151.
matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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