Source: https://www.mediainstitute.org/2011/05/19/first-amendment-anonymity-and-unveiling-the-identity-of-copyright-infringing-file-sharers/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:14:23+00:00

Document:
For many years the First Amendment has been understood as protecting an individual’s right to engage in anonymous speech. Anonymity is also a signature characteristic of much of the communication that takes place on the Internet. In copyright infringement cases arising from claims that copyrighted works are being infringed through file-sharing activity, such as the file-sharing protocol BitTorrent, attempts to enforce the rights of copyright holders are placed in tension with the putative rights of the alleged infringers to engage in their file-sharing activity anonymously. Copyright holders may seek to pierce the veil of anonymity through judicial process, using ISP addresses to obtain identifying information. The file-sharers may in turn attempt to quash subpoenas seeking such identifying information, asserting that the First Amendment’s protection for anonymous speech should bar disclosure.
The best resolution of this conflict is to reject the First Amendment defense and to allow for judicial process that will provide what identifying information is available to copyright holders to pursue their claims of infringement.
A substantial body of law has developed in Internet litigation protecting the identity of Internet users from immediate disclosure through judicial process. Much of the case law has developed in the context of libel litigation arising from the Internet, in which a plaintiff seeks disclosure of the true identity of a defendant who has been sued as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” for alleged defamation. Courts have fashioned various multi-part tests that require a defamation plaintiff to jump through a number of threshold hoops before the identity of an anonymous Internet user must be revealed.6 This body of law is designed to provide reasonable protection for anonymity, while at the same time allowing plaintiffs who are able to mount a credible showing that their libel suit is viable to identify the persons who are allegedly responsible for inflicting injury upon them. While courts continue to evolve various tests in striking the best balance between these competing interests, the enterprise of striking the balance is eminently sensible.
In the case of alleged file-sharing of copyrighted works, however, no such balancing act is warranted. Defamation cases are fundamentally different than file-sharing copyright infringement cases. In defamation suits, the alleged injury to reputation is often intertwined with critique and dissent. Indeed, the modern First Amendment standards governing defamation law arose from New York Times v. Sullivan,7 a case in which the alleged defamatory statements were made in the context of a defense of Martin Luther King and his efforts for racial justice.
In contrast, the First Amendment value inuring to illegal file-sharing is minimal, if measurable at all. To be sure, some have held up the “expressive value” in the file-sharer’s decision as to what music or movies are worthy of being copied or shared.8 While as an abstraction this argument might have some superficial appeal, if only as a straw man, in the end it is not terribly weighty. One might as well claim that there is expressive value in the art thief’s decision to steal the Picasso and not the Van Gogh from the museum.
The reality is that there is little plausible expressive value in a file-sharer’s decision to obtain movies or music for free.9 While a very modest level of protection of anonymity might be warranted to screen out copyright infringement claims that are frivolous,10 there are no sound reasons of social policy or law for protecting the anonymity of those who independently are contributing nothing of genuine value to the marketplace of ideas, in that they are simply appropriating, without permission, the contributions of others, for the transparent motive of not paying the copyright owners.
1. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
2. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama ex re. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
3. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008). (“But there are some creative aspects of downloading music or making it available to others to copy: the value judgment of what is worthy of being copied; the association of one recording with another by placing them together in the same library; the self-expressive act of identification with a particular recording; the affirmation of joining others listening to the same recording or expressing the same idea.”), citing Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535, 545-47, 562-81 (2004); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (2004); cf. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (noting that compilation of pure fact “entails originality” in selection and ordering of the facts). Thus, while the aspect of a file-sharer’s act that is infringing is not entitled to First Amendment protection, other aspects of it are. Cf., e.g., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 68 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1981) (“[N]ude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation.”); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1095 (2005) (arguing that crime-facilitating speech has “some First Amendment value”).
9. See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1, 062, 2011 WL 996786 (D.D.C., March 22, 2011).
10. See Id. One popular judicial test calls for the court to assess whether the plaintiffs’ need for identifying information outweighs the putative defendants’ right to First Amendment anonymity by balancing: (1) the concreteness of the plaintiffs’ showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm; (2) the specificity of the plaintiffs’ discovery request; (3) alternative means to get the information the plaintiffs seek; (4) the need for the information to advance the plaintiffs’ claim; and (5) the objecting party’s expectation of privacy. See Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Arista Records, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (D.D.C. 2008) (Kollar–Kotelly, J.); Achte/Neunte, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 216 n.2 (D.D.C. 2010) (Collyer, J.); West Bay One, 270 F.R.D. at 16 n.4 (D.D.C. 2010) (Collyer, J.); London–Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (D. Mass. 2008); Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010); Virgin Records v. Doe, No. 5:08–cv–389, 2009 WL 700207, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21701 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 16, 2009); Elektra Entm’t Group Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 04–cv–2289, 2004 WL 2095581, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.