Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/362/199/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:25:41+00:00

Document:
On the record in this case, petitioner's conviction in a City Police Court for the two offenses of "loitering" and "disorderly conduct" was so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to be invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 362 U. S. 199-206.
Petitioner was found guilty in the Police Court of Louisville, Kentucky, of two offenses -- loitering and disorderly conduct. The ultimate question presented to us is whether the charges against petitioner were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to render his conviction unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Decision of this question turns not on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on whether this conviction rests upon any evidence at all.
some 12 to 30 patrons were present during the time petitioner was there. When petitioner had been in the cafe about half an hour, two Louisville police officers came in on a "routine check." Upon on seeing petitioner "out there on the floor dancing by himself," one of the officers, according to his testimony, went up to the manager who was sitting on a stool nearby and asked him how long petitioner had been in there and if he had bought anything. The officer testified that, upon being told by the manager that petitioner had been there "a little over a half-hour, and that he had not bought anything," he accosted Thompson and "asked him what was his reason for being in there, and he said he was waiting on a bus." The officer then informed petitioner that he was under arrest, and took him outside. This was the arrest for loitering. After going outside, the officer testified, petitioner "was very argumentative -- he argued with us back and forth, and so then we placed a disorderly conduct charge on him." Admittedly the disorderly conduct conviction rests solely on this one-sentence description of petitioner's conduct after he left the cafe.
defend himself against prior and allegedly baseless charges by the police. [Footnote 2] This motion was denied.
of the floor and patting his foot," and that he did not at any time during petitioner's stay there object to anything he was doing. There is no evidence that anyone else in the cafe objected to petitioner's shuffling his feet in rhythm with the music of the jukebox, or that his conduct was boisterous or offensive to anyone present. At the close of his evidence, petitioner repeated his motion for dismissal of the charges on the ground that a conviction on the foregoing evidence would deprive him of liberty and property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied the motion, convicted him of both offenses, and fined him $10 on each charge. A motion for new trial on the same grounds also was denied, which exhausted petitioner's remedies in the police court.
"appears to have a real question as to whether he has been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, yet this substantive right cannot be tested unless we grant him a stay of execution because his fines are not appealable and will be satisfied by being served in jail before he can prepare and file his petition for certiorari. Appellee's substantive right of due process is of no avail to him unless this court grants him the ancillary right whereby he may test same in the Supreme Court. [Footnote 9]"
Court judgment imposing a $10 fine, upheld by state appellate court, held invalid as in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment).
"It shall be unlawful for any person . . . , without visible means of support, or who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself, . . . to sleep, lie, loaf, or trespass in or about any premises, building, or other structure in the City of Louisville, without first having obtained the consent of the owner or controller of said premises, structure, or building; . . ."
In addition to the fact that petitioner proved he had "visible means of support," the prosecutor at trial said "This is a loitering charge here. There is no charge of no visible means of support." Moreover, there is no suggestion that petitioner was sleeping, lying or trespassing in or about this cafe. Accordingly, he could only have been convicted for being unable to give a satisfactory account of himself while loitering in the cafe without the consent of the manager. Under the words of the ordinance itself, if the evidence fails to prove all three elements of this loitering charge, the conviction is not supported by evidence, in which event it does not comport with due process of law. The record is entirely lacking in evidence to support any of the charges.
Here, petitioner spent about half an hour on a Saturday evening in January in a public cafe which sold food and beer to the public. When asked to account for his presence there, he said he was waiting for a bus. The city concedes that there is no law making it an offense for a person in such a cafe to "dance," "shuffle" or "pat" his feet in time to music. The undisputed testimony of the manager, who did not know whether petitioner had bought macaroni and beer or not, but who did see the patting, shuffling or dancing, was that petitioner was welcome there. The manager testified that he did not, at any time during petitioner's stay in the cafe, object to anything petitioner was doing, and that he never saw petitioner do anything that would cause any objection. Surely this is implied consent, which the city admitted in oral argument, satisfies the ordinance. The arresting officer admitted that there was nothing in any way "vulgar" about what he called petitioner's "ordinary dance," whatever relevance, if any, vulgarity might have to a charge of loitering. There simply is no semblance of evidence from which any person could reasonably infer that petitioner could not give a satisfactory account of himself, or that he was loitering or loafing there (in the ordinary sense of the words) without "the consent of the owner or controller" of the cafe.
City of Louisville. The only information the record contains on what the petitioner was "argumentative" about is his statement that he asked the officers "what they arrested me for." We assume, for we are justified in assuming, that merely "arguing" with a policeman is not, because it could not be, "disorderly conduct" as a matter of the substantive law of Kentucky. See Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451. Moreover, Kentucky law itself seems to provide that, if a man wrongfully arrested fails to object to the arresting officer, he waives any right to complain later that the arrest was unlawful. Nickell v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 495, 496.
The judgments are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Police Court of the City of Louisville for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Upon conviction and sentence under §§ 85-8, 85-12 and 85-13 of the ordinances of the City of Louisville, petitioner would be subject to imprisonment, fine or confinement in the workhouse upon default of payment of a fine.
The officer's previous testimony that petitioner had bought no food or drink is seriously undermined, if not contradicted, by the manager's testimony at trial. There, the manager stated that the officer "asked me I had [sic] sold him any thing to eat and I said no, and he said any beer, and I said no. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) And the manager acknowledged that petitioner might have bought something and been served by a waiter or waitress without the manager's noticing it. Whether there was a purchase or not, however, is of no significance to the issue here.
Without a stay and bail pending application for review, petitioner would have served out his fines in prison in 10 days at the rate of $2 a day. Taustine v. Thompson, 322 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1959).
Taustine v. Thompson, 322 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1959).
"1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and therefore meets the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."
Section 85-13 provides penalties for violation of § 85-12.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 299 U. S. 362. See also Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196, 333 U. S. 201.
See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232; United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103, 273 U. S. 106; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. Cf. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 325 U. S. 402; Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 319 U. S. 473 (concurring opinion); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103.

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