Source: http://freeassembly.net/foaa-online/location-of-assemblies/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:50:14+00:00

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9.1 Do organizers and participants have the right to choose the location of their assembly?
The choice of the venue or location of an assembly by the organizers is an integral part of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. In many instances the location where an assembly takes part is an important part of its message; a protest demanding accountability for a gas explosion, for example, may be held at the site and exact time of the explosion. Likewise, public areas around iconic buildings are a logical place for to convey a message with regard to institutions housed in these buildings.
The Human Rights Committee, See, for example, Denis Turchenyak et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 10 September 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para. 7.4; Pavel Kozlov et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 7 May 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/113/D/1949/2010, para. 7.4; and Leonid Sudalenko v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 28 December 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010, para. 8.4. See, for example, Denis Turchenyak et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 10 September 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para. 7.4; Pavel Kozlov et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 7 May 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/113/D/1949/2010, para. 7.4; and Leonid Sudalenko v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 28 December 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010, para. 8.4. the UN Special Rapporteur, UN Human Rights Council, Second Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39, 24 April 2013, para. 60. UN Human Rights Council, Second Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39, 24 April 2013, para. 60. the ECtHR, Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 405. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 405. the OSCE-ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly OSCE-ODIHR and Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edn, 2010, Guideline 3.5 and Explanatory Notes, para. 45 OSCE-ODIHR and Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edn, 2010, Guideline 3.5 and Explanatory Notes, para. 45 and the AComHPR’s Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa AComHPR, Report of the Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, 2014, p. 62, para. 17. AComHPR, Report of the Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, 2014, p. 62, para. 17. all underline that organizers have the right to demonstrate “within sight and sound” of their target audience or target object, and that the authorities have a duty to facilitate the assembly at this location.
For the Court, the right to freedom of assembly includes the right to choose the time, place and modalities of the assembly, within the limits established in paragraph 2 of Article 11. Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21.
Since freedom of assembly covers both static and moving assemblies (see Assembly Section 1), the chosen venue may either be a single place or a series of locations along a route.
[Consider] ways of minimising disruption to ordinary life, for example by organising a temporary diversion of traffic on alternative routes or by taking other similar measures, and at the same time accommodating the organisers’ legitimate interest in assembling within sight and sound of their target audience. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 423 (references omitted).See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 423 (references omitted).See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21.
If a simultaneous assembly (see Assembly Section 12) is planned in the same location, this is not a reason to deny approval for the venue, if there is no “clear and objective indication that both events cannot be managed in an appropriate manner through the exercise of policing powers”. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 422.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 422.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Similarly, the fact that an assembly may annoy or provoke others (see Assembly Section 7) obliges the authorities to look for ways to allow the assembly to proceed without disturbance, rather than moving it to a less prominent location. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 422.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 422.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21.
[I]t is apparent that the time and the place of the ceremonies were crucial to the applicants, as well as for those attending the official ceremony. Despite the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Government in such matters, the Court is not convinced that it was not possible to ensure that both celebrations proceeded peacefully either at the same time or one shortly after the other. Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 October 2001, para. 109. Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 October 2001, para. 109.
The ECtHR made a comparable finding in Öllinger v. Austria. The applicant, a member of the Austrian Parliament, had informed the police of his intention to hold a silent, respectful meeting of about six persons at the Salzburg municipal cemetery, to commemorate the Salzburg Jews killed by the SS during the Second World War. The meeting would take place on All Saints’ Day, a religious holiday on which the population traditionally visits cemeteries in order to commemorate the dead. It would coincide with a controversial annual commemoration of SS soldiers killed in the war, held by an association of former SS members. The police prohibited the meeting, arguing that it could lead to disturbances that would harm the religious feelings of members of the public visiting the cemetery.
First and foremost, the assembly was in no way directed against the cemetery-goers’ beliefs or the manifestation of them. Moreover, the applicant expected only a small number of participants. They envisaged peaceful and silent means of expressing their opinion, namely the carrying of commemorative messages, and had explicitly ruled out the use of chanting or banners. Thus, the intended assembly in itself could not have hurt the feelings of cemetery-goers. … In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced by the Government’s argument that allowing both meetings while taking preventive measures, such as ensuring police presence in order to keep the two assemblies apart, was not a viable alternative which would have preserved the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly while at the same time offering a sufficient degree of protection as regards the rights of the cemetery’s visitors. Öllinger v. Austria, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 June 2006, paras. 47-48. Öllinger v. Austria, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 June 2006, paras. 47-48.
, the ECtHR made it clear that a particular effort should be made to accommodate the assembly if the chosen location is of crucial importance to the organizers, for example because it is connected to a historic event. Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 October 2001, para. 109. Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 October 2001, para. 109. This additional effort may, for example, consist of the deployment of the police to facilitate the assembly.
The Committee observes that limiting pickets to certain predetermined locations … does not appear to meet the standards of necessity and proportionality under article 19 of the Covenant. Pavel Levinov v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 14 July 2016, UN Doc. CCPR/C/117/D/2082/2011, para. 8.3. Pavel Levinov v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 14 July 2016, UN Doc. CCPR/C/117/D/2082/2011, para. 8.3.
The UN Special Rapporteur has also underscored that limiting protests to specific areas “prevents organizers and participants from choosing venues they consider the most appropriate to express their aspirations and grievances.” UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Mission to Kazakhstan, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/25/Add.2, para. 53. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Mission to Kazakhstan, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/25/Add.2, para. 53.
9.2 What conditions must authorities meet to refuse the use of the chosen location?
The organizers of an assembly generally have the right to choose a location within sight and sound of their target audience and no restriction to this right is permissible, unless (a) imposed in conformity with the law, and (b) necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, protection of public health or morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. See, for example, Denis Turchenyak et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 10 September 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para. 7.4; Pavel Kozlov et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 7 May 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/113/D/1949/2010, para. 7.4; and Leonid Sudalenko v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 28 December 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010, para. 8.4. See, for example, Denis Turchenyak et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 10 September 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para. 7.4; Pavel Kozlov et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 7 May 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/113/D/1949/2010, para. 7.4; and Leonid Sudalenko v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 28 December 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010, para. 8.4.
The right to freedom of assembly includes the right to choose the time, place and manner of conduct of the assembly, within the limits established in paragraph 2 of Article 11 … Accordingly, in cases where the time and place of the assembly are crucial to the participants, an order to change the time or the place may constitute an interference with their freedom of assembly.
Such an interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2, and is “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of the aim or aims in question. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, paras. 405 – 409 (references omitted).See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, paras. 405 – 409 (references omitted).See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21.
This means, in the first place, that any power the authorities have to deny the organizer’s preferred venue should be prescribed by law (see Assembly Section 4.2), in a way which effectively limits the discretion of the authorities. The ECtHR considered a Russian law that allowed authorities to make “well-reasoned” proposals to change the venue of an assembly to be unduly vague. The Court pointed out that it would be difficult if not impossible to prove that any decision was not well-reasoned. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, paras. 416-430.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, paras. 416-430.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21.
Second, any refusal to use the chosen venue should pursue a legitimate aim (see Assembly Section 4.3), such as public order or safety. This could be the case if the number of participants expected by the organizers clearly exceeds the capacity of the proposed venue Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, paras. 130-131. Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, paras. 130-131. or there are objective security concerns. Disk and Kesk v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, paras. 29-32. Disk and Kesk v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, paras. 29-32.
Third, the refusal must be genuinely necessary (see Assembly Section 4.4) and proportionate, meaning that the problems caused by the proposed venue cannot be mitigated and are sufficiently severe to justify the refusal. The authorities must “attach sufficient importance to freedom of assembly” and avoid setting the balance too much “in favour of protection of other interests, such as rights and freedoms of non-participants or avoidance of even minor disturbances to everyday life.” Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 427.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 427.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21.
[T]he State party has not demonstrated to the Committee’s satisfaction that the impeding of the two pickets in question was necessary for the purpose of protecting the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Moreover, the State party never refuted the author’s claim that no event actually occurred at Gorky Square on 7 October 2007, and that the city administration’s claim of a competing Teachers’ Day event was in fact a mere pretext given in order to reject the author’s request. In these circumstances, the Committee concludes that in the present case the State party has violated the author’s right under article 21 of the Covenant. Chebotareva v. Russian Federation, Human Rights Committee, Views of 26 March 2012, UN Doc. CCPR/C/104/D/1866/2009, para. 9.3. Chebotareva v. Russian Federation, Human Rights Committee, Views of 26 March 2012, UN Doc. CCPR/C/104/D/1866/2009, para. 9.3.
, the Human Rights Committee found a violation of the right to freedom of assembly because authorities wanted to redirect a picket to another location – which the organizer considered unsuitable – in circumstances where that was not clearly necessary. Chebotareva v. Russian Federation, Human Rights Committee, Views of 26 March 2012, UN Doc. CCPR/C/104/D/1866/2009, para. 9.3. Chebotareva v. Russian Federation, Human Rights Committee, Views of 26 March 2012, UN Doc. CCPR/C/104/D/1866/2009, para. 9.3.
[O]n the date of the event planned by the applicant no parliamentary activity was underway … Therefore, the Court cannot but conclude that the prohibition of the demonstration did not respond to a pressing social need, even in the face of the applicant’s intransigence in considering the police’s conciliatory suggestion (see paragraph 8 above). Thus, the measure was not necessary in a democratic society.  Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, paras. 22-23. Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, paras. 22-23.
, the ECtHR found that Hungarian authorities had violated the right to freedom of assembly by asking the organizer to limit a demonstration to a particular area of the square he wished to use, without providing compelling reasons why the entire square was unavailable.  Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, paras. 22-23. Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, paras. 22-23.
[E]ven though a park is, a priori, a “public space” suitable for mass gatherings, its size is a relevant consideration, since overcrowding during a public event is fraught with danger. It is not uncommon for State authorities in various countries to impose restrictions on the location, date, time, form or manner of conduct of a planned public gathering … The Court is therefore prepared to accept that such restrictions, in principle, pursue a legitimate aim. … That being said, the Court does not consider that the size of the park was sufficient reason for a total ban on the demonstration. … The Court considers that in the present case it was the authorities’ duty to reflect on the possible alternative solutions and propose another venue to the organisers. Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, paras. 130-131. Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, paras. 130-131.
That offer was made at the last moment, when it was virtually impossible for the organisers to modify the form, scale and timing of the event. Thus, the alternative proposal made by the administration was, in the Court’s opinion, inappropriate. Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, para. 147. Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, para. 147.
that, if there are compelling reasons why a protest cannot go ahead in the organizer’s preferred place, it is “the authorities’ duty to reflect on the possible alternative solutions and propose another venue to the organisers.” Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, paras. 130-131. In the same vein, see UN Human Rights Council, Second Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39, 24 April 2013, para. 60. Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, paras. 130-131. In the same vein, see UN Human Rights Council, Second Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39, 24 April 2013, para. 60. Such an offer must be made in a timely manner, and not “at the last moment, when it [is] virtually impossible for the organisers to modify the form, scale and timing of the event.” Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, para. 147. Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, para. 147.
[T] he location or time proposed by the authorities as an alternative to the location chosen by the organisers should be such that the message which they seek to convey is still capable of being communicated … The Court considers that the practice whereby the authorities allow an assembly to take place, but only at a location which is not within sight and sound of its target audience and where its impact will be muted, is incompatible with the requirements of Article 11 of the Convention. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 426.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 426.See also Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para. 21.
If the authorities place any restriction on the location of an assembly, the organizer has the right to a rapid appeals procedure (see Assembly Section 11.6).
The general principle that the authorities should display tolerance towards the disruption caused by an assembly (see Assembly Section 6) is of particular relevance when the assembly takes place on a road or other public thoroughfare.
The UN Special Rapporteur and the IACHR have explicitly recognized that in a democratic society “the urban space is not only an area for circulation, but also a space for participation.” UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 11; IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 66, 31 December 2011, para. 136. UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 11; IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 66, 31 December 2011, para. 136. In a similar vein, the OSCE-ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly state that “public protest, and freedom of assembly in general, should be regarded as equally legitimate uses of public space as the more routine purposes for which public space is used (such as commercial activity or for pedestrian and vehicular traffic).” OSCE-ODIHR and Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edn, 2010, Explanatory Notes, para 20. OSCE-ODIHR and Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edn, 2010, Explanatory Notes, para 20.
Thus, neither of these competing uses of public space takes automatic priority. The duty of the public authorities, in the words of the ECtHR, is “to strike a fair balance between the rights of those wishing to exercise their freedom of assembly and those others whose freedom of movement may … [be] frustrated temporarily.” Körtvélyessy v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 April 2016, para. 29 and Patyi and Others v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 October 2008, para. 42. Körtvélyessy v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 April 2016, para. 29 and Patyi and Others v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 October 2008, para. 42.
the competent institutions of the state have a duty to design operating plans and procedures that will facilitate the exercise of the right of assembly … [including] rerouting pedestrian and vehicular traffic in a certain area. IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc 57, 31 December 2009,para. 193. IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc 57, 31 December 2009,para. 193.
necessary measures in order to minimise any disruption to traffic or other security measures such as providing first-aid services at the site of the demonstrations, in order to guarantee the smooth conduct of the events. Novikova and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 26 April 2016, para 171. See also Oya Ataman v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 December 2006, para. 39. Novikova and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 26 April 2016, para 171. See also Oya Ataman v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 December 2006, para. 39.
In Körtvélyessy v. Hungary, the Hungarian authorities had prohibited a demonstration out of fear that it would have seriously hampered circulation in the area.
If the authorities fail in their duty to try to manage traffic proactively during an assembly, the resulting disruption may not easily justify an interference with the assembly.
If the disruption to traffic threatened or caused by an assembly is particularly severe and cannot be avoided by taking management measures (see Assembly Section 9.3), restrictions may in some cases be justified, provided they comply with the three-prong test (see Assembly Section 4), including the proportionality requirement (see Assembly Section 4.4).
The case-law of the ECtHR and other sources suggest the following factors are relevant when deciding whether a restriction in the interest of freedom of movement is justified: (1) the actual impact of the assembly; (2) its duration; (3) whether the authorities have prior notice of the assembly; (4) whether the disruption is intentional and serious (for example, because the assembly takes the form of a blockade of a motorway).
Consequently, the Court concludes that the authorities, when issuing the prohibition on the demonstration and relying on traffic considerations alone, failed to strike a fair balance between the rights of those wishing to exercise their freedom of assembly and those others whose freedom of movement may have been frustrated temporarily, if at all. Körtvélyessy v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 April 2016, paras. 28-29 (references omitted); see also Patyi and Others v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 October 2008, para. 42. Körtvélyessy v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 April 2016, paras. 28-29 (references omitted); see also Patyi and Others v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 October 2008, para. 42.
.  Körtvélyessy v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 April 2016, paras. 28-29 (references omitted); see also Patyi and Others v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 October 2008, para. 42. Körtvélyessy v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 April 2016, paras. 28-29 (references omitted); see also Patyi and Others v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 October 2008, para. 42. The Court was not convinced that a planned assembly on a dead-end street, albeit with shops and other facilities, would have caused a level of traffic disruption sufficient to justify the ban imposed on it.
The joint report on the proper management of assemblies recognizes that if an assembly prevents access to essential services, such as blocking the emergency entrance to a hospital, this may justify dispersal. UN Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 62. UN Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 62.
Second, the duration of the traffic disruption is an important criterion. The ECtHR has repeatedly criticized domestic authorities for acting too quickly to end assemblies that threatened to cause traffic disruption. Oya Ataman v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 December 2006, para. 41; Balçik and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 November 2007, para. 51; Tahirova v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Judgment of 3 October 2013, para. 73. Oya Ataman v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 December 2006, para. 41; Balçik and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 November 2007, para. 51; Tahirova v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, Judgment of 3 October 2013, para. 73. In general, demonstrators should be given an effective opportunity to convey their views (see Assembly Section 11.5), provided there is no urgent danger to public order.
notification would have enabled the authorities to take the necessary measures in order to minimise the disruption to traffic that the demonstration could have caused during rush hour.  Oya Ataman v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 December 2006, para. 39. Oya Ataman v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 December 2006, para. 39.
This implies that if the authorities are aware in advance of an assembly, the threshold to interfere with it because of traffic disruption is higher.
[T]he competent national authorities were entitled to consider that an outright ban on the demonstration would have constituted unacceptable interference with the fundamental rights of the demonstrators to gather and express peacefully their opinion in public.
The imposition of stricter conditions concerning both the site – for example by the side of the Brenner motorway – and the duration – limited to a few hours only – of the demonstration in question could have been perceived as an excessive restriction, depriving the action of a substantial part of its scope. Whilst the competent national authorities must endeavour to limit as far as possible the inevitable effects upon free movement of a demonstration on the public highway, they must balance that interest with that of the demonstrators, who seek to draw the aims of their action to the attention of the public.
An action of that type usually entails inconvenience for non-participants, in particular as regards free movement, but the inconvenience may in principle be tolerated provided that the objective pursued is essentially the public and lawful demonstration of an opinion. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003, paras. 89-91.
A somewhat comparable dispute has played out in South American between Uruguay and Argentina. Uruguay’s authorization of the construction of a pulp mill on the banks of the river separating the two countries caused deep concern on the Argentine side about possible pollution. Beginning in 2005, demonstrators began to intermittently block the bridges across the river. The Argentine authorities did not intervene, and as a result the main border crossing was closed for months on end. In July 2006, Uruguay brought a case against Argentine under the dispute settlement system of the Mercosur trading bloc. The arbitral tribunal hearing the case acknowledged the importance of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, but considered that Argentina had given them unreasonable priority over the free circulation of goods and services by allowing blockades to continue for as long as three months at a peak time for commerce and tourism. Award of the Mercosur Ad Hoc Tribunal (Uruguay v. Argentina), 6 September 2006, paras. 178-179. Award of the Mercosur Ad Hoc Tribunal (Uruguay v. Argentina), 6 September 2006, paras. 178-179. Award of the Mercosur Ad Hoc Tribunal (Uruguay v. Argentina), 6 September 2006, paras. 178-179. Award of the Mercosur Ad Hoc Tribunal (Uruguay v. Argentina), 6 September 2006, paras. 178-179.
The dispute arose from a protest blockade of a major motorway lasting almost 30 hours. The organizers had given the Austrian authorities one month’s advance notice of their intention to stage the blockade. The authorities allowed the protest to go ahead, and took various preparatory measures to limit the disruption to road traffic. A transport company that nevertheless suffered some delay demanded compensation, arguing that the assembly should have been banned to safeguard the free movement of goods. The ECJ sided with the Austrian authorities, finding that they had justifiably considered that they were required to permit the demonstration. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003. Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, ECJ, Judgment of 12 June 2003.
although no notification had been given, the authorities had prior knowledge … that such a demonstration would take place on that date and could have therefore taken preventive measures.  Balçik and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 November 2007, para. 51. Balçik and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 November 2007, para. 51.
Fourth, the ECtHR seems to require less tolerance from the authorities for intentional and serious obstruction of traffic than for assemblies on public roads where disruption to traffic is a side-effect, or smaller blockades.
The intentional failure by the organisers to abide by these rules and the structuring of a demonstration, or of part of it, in such a way as to cause disruption to ordinary life and other activities to a degree exceeding that which is inevitable in the circumstances constitutes conduct which cannot enjoy the same privileged protection under the Convention as political speech or debate on questions of public interest or the peaceful manifestation of opinions on such matters. Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2010, para. 156. Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2010, para. 156.
The absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing “unlawfulness” of the action do not give carte blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 11. Thus, it should be established why the demonstration was not authorised in the first place, what the public interest at stake was, and what risks were represented by the demonstration. The method used by the police for discouraging the protesters, containing them in a particular place or dispersing the demonstration is also an important factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference. Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2010, para. 151. See also Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, para. 119. Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2010, para. 151. See also Primov and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 June 2014, para. 119.
The Court ultimately found that there had not been a violation of the applicants’ rights. It noted that the farmers had been able to hold peaceful assemblies at specific locations as requested beforehand, and that when they moved onto the motorways, the police had not forcefully dispersed these gatherings. The sanctions imposed afterwards, while criminal in nature, were not excessive. Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2010, paras. 176-183. Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2010, paras. 176-183.
The UN Special Rapporteur expressed his concern at the Court’s willingness to permit the use of criminal law in this context. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and Human Rights Centre of the University of Ghent, Third Party Intervention before the European Court of Human Rights in Mahammad Majidli v. Azerbaijan (no. 3) and three other applications, November 2015, paras. 14-15. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and Human Rights Centre of the University of Ghent, Third Party Intervention before the European Court of Human Rights in Mahammad Majidli v. Azerbaijan (no. 3) and three other applications, November 2015, paras. 14-15.
[T]he intentional serious disruption, by demonstrators, to ordinary life and to the activities lawfully carried out by others, to a more significant extent than that caused by the normal exercise of the right of peaceful assembly in a public place, might be considered a “reprehensible act” within the meaning of the Court’s case-law. Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2015, para. 173. See also Barraco v. France, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 March 2009, paras. 46-47. Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 15 October 2015, para. 173. See also Barraco v. France, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 March 2009, paras. 46-47.
The case concerned the blockading of Lithuania’s three main motorways for about 48 hours, without prior notice to the authorities. Previous ECtHR judgments suggest that smaller-scale roadblocks do not justify a reduced level of tolerance from the authorities.
In Balçik and Others v. Turkey, the Court criticized the Turkish authorities’ lack of tolerance towards the temporary blocking of a single tram line. Balçik and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 November 2007, paras. 51-52. Balçik and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 November 2007, paras. 51-52.
Spaces in the vicinity of iconic buildings such as presidential palaces, parliaments or memorials should also be considered public space, and peaceful assemblies should be allowed to take place in those locations. In this regard, the imposition of restrictions on “time, place and manner” should meet the aforementioned strict test of necessity and proportionality. UN Human Rights Council, Second Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39, 24 April 2013, para. 66. UN Human Rights Council, Second Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39, 24 April 2013, para. 66.
This position is supported by regional bodies OSCE-ODIHR and Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edn, 2010, Explanatory Notes, paras. 43 and 102; See AComHPR, Guidelines on Freedom of Assembly and Association in Africa, para 83-84;AComHPR, Report of the Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, 2014, p. 20, para. 25. OSCE-ODIHR and Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edn, 2010, Explanatory Notes, paras. 43 and 102; AComHPR, Report of the Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, 2014, p. 20, para. 25. and by the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, which emphasizes that assemblies should be able to take place “within sight and sound” of their target audience. See, for example, Denis Turchenyak et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 10 September 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para. 7.4; Pavel Kozlov et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 7 May 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/113/D/1949/2010, para. 7.4; and Leonid Sudalenko v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 28 December 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010, para. 8.4. See, for example, Denis Turchenyak et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 10 September 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para. 7.4; Pavel Kozlov et al. v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 7 May 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/113/D/1949/2010, para. 7.4; and Leonid Sudalenko v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, Views of 28 December 2015, UN Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010, para. 8.4.
The ECtHR has repeatedly found violations of freedom of assembly when domestic authorities prohibited or forcefully dispersed assemblies outside a range of public buildings, including parliaments, Nurettin Aldemir and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 December 2007; Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012. Nurettin Aldemir and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 December 2007; Sáska v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 November 2012. government buildings, Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 February 2006; Özbent and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 June 2015. Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 February 2006; Özbent and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 June 2015. courts, Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 23 October 2008; Malofeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 13 May 2013; Kakabadze and Others v. Georgia, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 October 2012. Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 23 October 2008; Malofeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 13 May 2013; Kakabadze and Others v. Georgia, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 October 2012. and the house of a prime minister. Patyi and Others v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 October 2008. Patyi and Others v. Hungary, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 October 2008.
[A] general ban on demonstrations can only be justified if there is a real danger of their resulting in disorder which cannot be prevented by other less stringent measures. In this connection, the authority must take into account the effect of a ban on demonstrations which do not by themselves constitute a danger to public order. Only if the disadvantage of such demonstrations being caught by the ban is clearly outweighed by the security considerations justifying the issue of the ban, and if there is no possibility of avoiding such undesirable side effects of the ban by a narrow circumscription of its scope in terms of territorial application and duration, can the ban be regarded as being necessary within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 434. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 434.
In the circumstances of the case, the Court concluded that the law at issue violated the right to freedom of assembly because it did not “address a precise risk to public safety or a precise risk of disorder with the minimum impairment of the right of assembly.” Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 437. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 437. For example, the law prevented any demonstration near a courthouse, not only those held with the intention of interfering with the administration of justice. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 440. Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 February 2017, para. 440.
The scope for restrictions on assemblies inside public buildings may be greater.
[T]he applicant and the other participants in the protest action wished to draw the attention of their fellow citizens and public officials to their disapproval of the President’s policies and their demand for his resignation. This was a topic of public interest … That being said, the Court reiterates that, notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of freedom of expression, Article 10 does not bestow any freedom of forum for the exercise of that right. In particular, that provision does not require the automatic creation of rights of entry to private property, or even, necessarily, to all publicly owned property, such as, for instance, government offices and ministries. Taranenko v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 May 2014, paras. 77-78. Taranenko v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 May 2014, paras. 77-78.
[T]he protesters’ conduct, although involving a certain degree of disturbance and causing some damage, did not amount to violence … although a sanction for the applicant’s actions might have been warranted by the demands of public order, the lengthy period of detention pending trial and the long suspended prison sentence imposed on her were not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court considers that the unusually severe sanction imposed in the present case must have had a chilling effect on the applicant and other persons taking part in protest action. Taranenko v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 May 2014, paras. 93-95. Taranenko v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 May 2014, paras. 93-95.
the ECtHR held that freedom of expression “does not require the automatic creation of rights of entry to private property, or even, necessarily, to all publicly owned property, such as, for instance, government offices and ministries.” Taranenko v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 May 2014, para. 78. Taranenko v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 May 2014, para. 78.
Assemblies which take place on private property enjoy the protection of the right to freedom of assembly, OSCE-ODIHR and Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edn, 2010, Explanatory Notes, para. 22; Cissé v. France, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 April 2002, paras 39-40. OSCE-ODIHR and Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edn, 2010, Explanatory Notes, para. 22; Cissé v. France, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 April 2002, paras 39-40. meaning that any restriction placed on them by the authorities must conform to the requirements of the three-prong test (see Assembly Section 4).
International law does not impose any duty on owners of private property to consent to assemblies taking place there.
The case of Appleby and others v. United Kingdom was brought by three individuals and an environmental group, who had wished to collect signatures for a petition at the entrance to “The Galleries”, a shopping mall built by a public development corporation as the new town center and subsequently sold to a private company. The manager of the mall refused permission to set up a stall in the mall or its car parks, referring to the owner’s policy of neutrality. The applicants instead set up stalls on public footpaths and in the old town center.
Before the ECtHR, the applicants argued that the State was directly responsible for the interference with their freedom of expression and assembly as it had built the Galleries on public land and approved the transfer into private ownership. The Court disagreed, finding that this circumstance did not make the State directly responsible for the manager’s actions. Appleby and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 6 May 2003, para. 41. Appleby and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 6 May 2003, para. 41. The applicants also argued that the State was indirectly responsible, as it was under a positive obligation to secure the exercise of their rights within the Galleries, since access to the town center was essential for effective communication with the population.
That provision [Article 10], notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of freedom of expression, does not bestow any freedom of forum for the exercise of that right. While it is true that demographic, social, economic and technological developments are changing the ways in which people move around and come into contact with each other, the Court is not persuaded that this requires the automatic creation of rights of entry to private property, or even, necessarily, to all publicly owned property (government offices and ministries, for instance). Where … the bar on access to property has the effect of preventing any effective exercise of freedom of expression or it can be said that the essence of the right has been destroyed, the Court would not exclude that a positive obligation could arise for the State to protect the enjoyment of Convention rights by regulating property rights. The corporate town, where the entire municipality was controlled by a private body, might be an example.  Appleby and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 6 May 2003, para. 47. Appleby and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 6 May 2003, para. 47.
In the instant case, however, the Court saw insufficient evidence that the applicants had been effectively prevented from communicating their views to their fellow citizens. They had still been able to obtain individual permission from businesses within the Galleries to collect signatures, and to campaign on public access paths in the area or in the old town center.
, Appleby and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 6 May 2003. Appleby and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 6 May 2003. the ECtHR held that if the privatization of public space reaches a stage where effective protest is no longer possible, the State may need to step in and ensure access to private spaces.
Indeed, while private landowners generally have the right to determine who may access their property, the rights related to assembly may require positive measures of protection even in the sphere of relations between individuals UN Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 84. UN Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 84. .

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