Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/55/55massappct412.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 17:53:15+00:00

Document:
Evidence, Spontaneous utterance, Failure to produce witness. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury.
COMPLAINT received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division of the District Court Department on February 22, 1999.
Louis N. Schulze, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
committed reversible error in denying his request for a "missing witness" instruction at the close of trial. We affirm the conviction.
and that Moore was not a truthful person. [Note 2] As Moore was cognizant of the outstanding warrants and would want to evade arrest, his statements, the attorney argued, were unreliable and should be excluded regardless of whether they qualified as excited utterances. At the hearing in limine, the attorney also set the stage for requesting the missing witness instruction, suggesting that he should be allowed to comment on the absence of Moore and O'Neil should they fail to appear at trial.
1. The excited utterances. Trial judges are given broad discretion [Note 3] in determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance, admissible as an exception to the rule barring hearsay and thus frustrating a defendant's right of confrontation. [Note 4] See Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211 , 223, 224 (1973). The matter is one "peculiarly within the judge's province and only in clear cases . . . of an improper exercise of discretion should his ruling be revised." Rocco v. Boston-Leader, Inc., 340 Mass. 195 , 197 (1960).
in determining whether a statement meets this test. They include the following: "the degree of excitement displayed by the person making the statements, Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, [supra at 222]; whether the statement is made at the place where the traumatic event occurred or at another place, see Commonwealth v. Zagranski, [supra at 284-286]; the temporal closeness of the statement to the act it explains, [Note 5] see Commonwealth v. Giguere, 420 Mass. 226 , 233-234 (1995); and the degree of spontaneity [shown by the declarant]. See Commonwealth v. Hampton, 351 Mass. 447 , 449-450 (1966); Commonwealth v. Burden, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 666 , 676-677 (1983)." Commonwealth v. Hardy, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 679 , 682 (1999). The circumstances enumerated are neither exhaustive nor mandatory; rather, the judge is to consider the particular circumstances in each case. See ibid. Further, the judge should not inquire as to whether the statement is in fact credible. See Commonwealth v. King, supra at 255-256. That task falls to the finder of fact. See ibid. The trial judge need determine only whether the fundamental requirements for admission have been met, i.e., whether the circumstances of the statement's making are such as reasonably negate premeditation. Once admitted, the credibility of the statement may, of course, be controverted by other evidence. Commonwealth v. King, supra at 256-257. Here, the trial judge had before her ample circumstances supporting her ruling that the statements were admissible. Moore's first statements were made within moments of the event, as Moore was intercepted by a police officer while fleeing the scene.
Moore was described as screaming, injured, bleeding, and excited, all factors indicating that he was under the influence of the traumatic event. His statement tended to "qualify, characterize, and explain the underlying event." Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635 , 643 (2002). The fact that Moore's statements here, and the subsequent statements of Moore and O'Neil, were made in response to questions by the officers does not render them inadmissible. See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 399 Mass. 678 , 682-683 (1987). Further independent evidence of the EMT on the scene, regarding the type of wounds suffered by Moore and his demeanor, was consistent with his being in a traumatized state. Moore repeated his statement at the ambulance some ten minutes after the event, at which time he was still described as injured (with a large visible "knot" or bump on his head), and excited and shaken up, though less so than at the time of the conversation with Officer Marando. Moore's girlfriend, O'Neil, corroborated his description of events, adding only the additional fact that she had been struck once on the arm. [Note 6] She was described at this time as a little shaken up but more angry. On evidence of her demeanor and of the proximity to the time and place of the event, the trial judge was warranted in determining, in her discretion, that O'Neil, as well, was under the influence of the traumatic event and that her statements also were admissible as excited utterances.
such considerations . . . ." [Note 7] See People v. Fratello, 92 N.Y. 2d 565, 571 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1068 (1999) (bias not a factor in determining whether a declaration is an excited utterance). See also 6 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1745-1764 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976) (motive to lie not mentioned as a consideration for admissibility of a spontaneous utterance; reliability of spontaneous utterance derives from fact that startled, unexpected nature of statement divorces the statement from deliberative thought or reason). But see McCormick, Evidence § 270, at 199 ("Judicial consideration of credibility is not theoretically prohibited in determining an issue of preliminary-fact-finding of the type involved in admitting or excluding hearsay"). [Note 8] See United States v. Marrowbone, 211 F.3d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[b]ased on the lapse of time, age, motive to lie, and known actions of [the declarant], we are wholly unconvinced these statements were excited utterances" [emphasis added]); Louisiana v. White, 802 So. 2d 869, 873 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (that a statement is self-serving is a factor in determining whether that statement was the "result of reflective thought").
On the basis of all circumstances, the trial judge was warranted, in her discretion, in deeming the statements admissible, as "being spontaneous to a degree which reasonably negated premeditation or possible fabrication," Commonwealth v. Crawford, 417 Mass. at 362, leaving to the jury whether to credit the statements, and if credited, the weight they would carry in the calculus of deliberation. The trial judge here considered and gave appropriate weight to all material circumstances regarding admissibility, and her decision was within her broad discretion.
in the circumstances [of the case]. . . . The determination called for is an exercise of judgment, reversible only if manifestly unreasonable." Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 225 , 244 (1990). When "a party has knowledge of a person who can be located and brought forward, who is friendly to, or at least not hostilely disposed toward, the party, and who can be expected to give testimony of distinct importance to the case, the party would naturally offer that person as a witness. If then, without explanation, he does not do so, the jury may, if they think reasonable in the circumstances, infer that that person, had he been called, would have given testimony unfavorable to the party." Commonwealth v. Shatvet, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 130 , 134 (1986). The defendant's claim of error founders on the first requirement of the rule. Based upon representations that the Commonwealth had issued subpoenas for the witnesses, had made phone calls, had spoken to people in Moore's putative household, and had sent cruisers to the city of Lynn in an attempt to locate Moore and O'Neil, the trial judge was well within her discretion when she determined that neither Moore nor O'Neil could be "located and brought forward." Contrast the lesser effort made by the Commonwealth set out in Commonwealth v. Florek, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 414 (2000).
[Note 1] Testimony has it at about two minutes after the dispatch.
[Note 2] Except for reference to the criminal record and the warrants, the record is silent as to the source of information concerning Moore's reputation for veracity.
[Note 3] For an excellent discussion of the concept of judicial discretion, see Long v. Wickett, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 380 (2000).
[Note 4] One commentator suggests that the trial judge have absolute discretion in this regard, a position which we have declined to follow. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1750 (3d ed. 1940).
[Note 5] Proximity to the event as a factor is distinguished from the older concept of res gestae. Under that doctrine, a statement was deemed admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if it was part of the event itself, that is, part of some material fact or act of the event. Under the theory of res gestae, any statement made that was not a part of some material fact or act of the incident, no matter how close in time, was deemed inadmissible. See Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245 , 250 (1899). The test now is whether the statement is "spontaneous to a degree which . . . negate[s] premeditation or possible fabrication. Commonwealth v. Fuller, 399 Mass. 678 , 682 (1987), quoting from Blake v. Springfield St. Ry., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 553 , 556 (1978)." Commonwealth v. Hardy, supra. Temporal proximity is a factor that may be considered by the trial judge, see Commonwealth v. Giguere, supra at 223, but the statement need not be contemporaneous with the event, see Commonwealth v. Crawford, supra at 362.
[Note 6] The attack on O'Neil was allegedly perpetrated by Chico, and the defendant was not charged with any crime involving O'Neil.
[Note 7] Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) is consistent with Massachusetts common law. See Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 363 , 368 (2002); Liacos, Brodin, & Avery, Massachusetts Evidence, § 8.16, at 555 (7th ed. 1999).
[Note 8] McCormick, however, goes on to explain that the Federal rule does not "authorize such considerations and that the legislative indent appears to be otherwise." Ibid.

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