Source: http://www.kileylawfirm.com/blog/category/wizard-of-oz/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:46:53+00:00

Document:
What if the Wicked Witch Had Just Hired a Lawyer Instead . . .
Defense counsel: Raymond Bulger, Esq., Bulger, Haley & Lahr, Esqs.
The case comes before the court on two motions. The first, by the plaintiff, is to dismiss the action based upon a claim of forum non conveniens. The second, by the defendant, is for summary judgment on the wrongful death claim on the grounds that, as a matter of law, she is not civilly liable for the death of the decedent.
On July 23, 1939, the defendant, Gale, finding herself suddenly engulfed by a tornado and unable to reach the safety of her family’s storm cellar, sought safety with her dog, Toto, in their residence. Thereafter, the storm became one of such great magnitude and extraordinary power, that it lifted the residence off its foundation and propelled it into the air and thus into the eye of the storm. The residence came to rest in Munchkinland in the Magical Land of Oz with great force and struck the plaintiff’s decedent causing her to sustain serious personal injuries and to die. The defendant (and her little dog, too) survived the crash.
The defendant may have been disoriented by the crash, as her description of its locale, its inhabitants, and her recitation of the subsequent course of events is fanciful and less than credible. There is evidence that she may have suffered a concussion upon landing. Alternatively, she may have been under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs, as she testified that at one point she fell asleep in a field of poppies.
Plaintiff’s counsel claims that the witness’ testimony is irrelevant and that defendant’s counsel offers it as a “straw man argument” which has no relevance to the issue of whether the defendant was negligent or committed an intentional tort. In other words, counsel claims that the witness’confirmation of the defendant’s description actually refutes an argument that is not germane to the plaintiff’s claims.
Two other witnesses were subpoenaed to appear at deposition. One, a recent heart transplant recipient, was excused for medical reasons. The other apparently fled the jurisdiction rather than testify – a cowardly act, by any measure.
By the wrongful death claim, the plaintiff pled liability based upon alternative theories of intentional tort and negligence. Upon information and belief, the Munchinland District Attorney investigated the accident but refused to prosecute for manslaughter, as there was no evidence that the defendant intended to crash the house in which she was flying. The defendant had no prior contact with the decedent nor is she known to be a member of any extremist terrorist organization. The plaintiff subsequently amended her pleading to withdraw the allegation of an intentional tort and, now, relies soley upon the negligence claim. The defendant has denied all allegations of negligence and it is this issue that lies before the court.
The plaintiff seeks compensation for (1) the decedent’s conscious pain and suffering, (2) the value of support and services the deceased provided to her family, and (3) burial expenses.
In her defense, the defendant argues that the decedent died upon impact, or, alternatively, was immediately rendered unconscious. Therefore, she did not suffer conscious pain. Although there were no emergency medical personnel who attended to the decedent at the scene of the accident, there were several witnesses including members of a candy merchant’s guild and employees of a local sleep clinic. All of these testified that the decedent did not appear to be breathing after she was struck by the house. Their opinions were confirmed by the local coroner who quoted, “As coroner I must aver, I thoroughly examined her. And she’s not only merely dead, she’s really most sincerely dead.” To date, the plaintiff has offered no competent medical evidence that the decedent survived the crash for any length of time, but that issue is yet to be resolved and the court reserves judgment.
The decedent was unmarried and childless. The plaintiff alleges that her sister supported her, but the defendant disputes this and claims that the plaintiff is independently wealthy. She asserts that the plaintiff lives in a castle and employs a fleet of Flying Monkeys and Winkie Guards. The source of the plaintiff’s wealth is under investigation by Ozian Federal Authorities who suspect that the Witch, the Monkeys and the Guards have derived income, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity including kidnap for ransom, menacing and extortion. Although formal charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, have not been brought against this group, the allegations, if accurate will likely disprove the plaintiff’s claim that she was supported by the decedent.
The defendant also challenges the plaintiff’s claim to have incurred burial costs. After the coroner declared her dead, a torrential rainstorm prevented Munchkins from retrieving the body. Later they recovered the decedent’s hat, dress and coat piled in a heap, but the decedent’s body was not found and seemed to have melted away.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this motion, I will presume the plaintiff’s damages under the wrongful death claim to be genuine.
The plaintiff also asserts that after the crash, the defendant absconded with the decedent’s personal property – to wit: a pair of Ruby Slippers, value unproven, but alleged to have magical powers. The plaintiff claims that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the slippers. The plaintiff claims that they were gifted to her by one of the decedent’s distant relatives who glued them to her feet.
In any event, the conversion claim is not the subject of the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.
The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens provides a federal district court with the discretion to decline to accept jurisdiction over an action in favor of a more convenient venue where the interests of justice indicate that the action should be tried in another forum. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l. Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007); Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the doctrine, a district court has the inherent power to decline to exercise jurisdiction even where venue is proper. The defendant believes that, as a witch, she cannot get a fair trial inasmuch as Kansans are by reputation, conservative and bible-thumping Christians. While the court is sympathetic to the defendant’s concerns, she is not likely to find a more sympathetic jury in any other jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Previously, the plaintiff moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §144 demanding that this Court recuse itself. She claimed that this Court was unable to perform its judicial duties impartially, competently and diligently because she is green and the Court is Caucasian. The Court denied her motion. As no sitting federal district court judge is green, the “rule of necessity” as enunciated by Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) Trumps the plaintiff’s objection.
Apparently, the Munchkins are not a litigious people and there is little or no case law regarding negligence claims in the history of Munchinland jurisprudence. Citing an obscure choice of law clause in the purchase agreement for the Ruby Slippers, the defendant claims that the case should be decided under New York law. This court agrees.
As previously stated, the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful death is predicated on a claim of negligence. Negligence involves the failure to exercise the degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the same situation. See: Gray v Gouz, Inc., 204 A.D.2d 390, 611 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1994); It is not a fixed concept, but is shaped by “time, place and circumstance” (Sadowski v Long Island R.R. Co., 292 N.Y. 448, 455, (1944).
In her defense, the defendant has asserted a defense based upon the common-law emergency doctrines which recognizes that, faced with an emergency, even a reasonable person might choose a course of action which, in hindsight, proves to have been mistaken or ill-advised. It holds that those faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance, not of their own making, that leaves them with little or no time for reflection or reasonably causes them to be so disturbed that they are compelled to make a quick decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, may not be negligent if their actions are reasonable and prudent in the context of the emergency. See: Caristo v Sanzone, 96 N.Y.2d 172, 174 (2001); Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 322, 327 (1991).
The essence of the emergency doctrine is that, where a sudden and unexpected circumstance leaves a person without time to contemplate or weigh alternative courses of action, that person cannot reasonably be held to the standard of care required of one who has had a full opportunity to reflect, and therefore should not be found negligent unless the course chosen was unreasonable or imprudent in light of the emergent circumstances. See: Amaro v City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 30, 36 (1976).
Although the existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of a party’s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact. See: Morgan v Ski Roundtop, 290 A.D.2d 618 (2002), they may in appropriate circumstances be determined as a matter of law. See: Huggins v Figueroa, 305 A.D.2d 460 (2003). Here, invoking the emergency doctrine, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that her emergency landing of the house in which she was traveling was made only when the tornado, an act of God, forced her to make an emergency landing. Apparently, the defendant’s house was not equipped with any brakes or steering mechanism. Given these circumstances, it is apparent that the defendant had no other course of action but to land the house emergently in the place where the accident occurred.
Although negligence actions are not normally the subject of summary judgment motions, the factual circumstances of this case will lead this Court to the conclusion that summary judgment is appropriate. Summary judgment is proper to eliminate unnecessary expense to litigants where no issue of material fact is present to justify a trial. See: Axelrod v. Armitstead, 36 A.D.2d 593 (1st Dept. 1971); Donlon v. Pugliese, 27 A.D.2d 786 (3d Dept. 1967). In Morowitz v Norton, 150 A.D.2D 536, 51 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dept. 1989), the Court ruled that, “although negligence cases do not generally lend themselves to resolution by a motion for summary judgment, the Court will grant such a motion where, as here, the facts clearly point to the negligence of one party without any culpable conduct from the other.” While summary judgment is granted infrequently in negligence actions, the remedy should be granted where there is no triable issue of fact. The Court of Appeals in Hartford Acc. & Ind. v. Wesolowski, 33 N.Y.2d 169 (1973), indicated that “the test on a motion for summary judgment is whether there are issues of fact properly to be resolved by a jury (CPLR § 3232(b)).
Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful death and personal injury is dismissed. The plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the action based upon a claim of forum non conveniens is denied. This is a non-final disposition of the case. The plaintiff’s cause of action for conversion is not affected by this order.

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