Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/184/676/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:31:12+00:00

Document:
"at all times been ready and willing to pay plaintiff said sum of $1,010 in full payment of said bond and unpaid interest, and now here again tenders to plaintiff said sum of $1,010 in full payment of said bond and unpaid interest due thereon, on September 6 , 1887, and now brings the said sum into court."
jurisdiction. Browne v. Strode, 5 Cranch 303; McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 9; Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U. S. 490.
But does it not appear from the petition itself that the case was one of which the circuit court could take cognizance independently of the citizenship of the real parties in interest? This question must receive an affirmative answer. The suit was directly upon a bond taken by the circuit court in conformity with the statutes of the United States, and the case depends upon the scope and effect of that bond and the meaning of those statutes. It was therefore a suit arising under the laws of the United States, of which the circuit court (concurrently with the courts of the state) was entitled to take original cognizance, even if the parties had been citizens of the same state. 25 Stat. 434, c. 866. This Court has heretofore decided that a suit upon a bond of a marshal of the United States was one arising under the laws of the United States. Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U. S. 421, 109 U. S. 423; Bachrack v. Norton, 132 U. S. 337; Reagan v. Aiken, 138 U. S. 109; Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628, 139 U. S. 630. The same principle must be held to be applicable to suits upon the bond of a clerk of a court of the United States. It could not be that a suit upon the bond of a marshal was one arising under the laws of the United States, and that a suit upon the bond of a clerk of a court of the United States was not of that class.
Mr. Justice Story to be properly paid over to the clerk, and that he was entitled to commissions under the statute. That practice, he held, was of great importance for the "security of suitors." The Avery, (1814) 2 Gall. 308, 311. See also Blake v. Hawkins, 19 F. 204; In re Goodrich, 4 Dill. 230; Smith v. Morgan City, 39 F. 572. In Fagan v. Cullen, 28 F. 843, 844, Mr. Justice Brown held that moneys received by the marshal should, under sections 995 and 996 of the Revised Statutes, either be immediately deposited by him "or paid to the clerk and by him deposited."
"the statute makes such an appropriation of the sum which may be recovered by the treasurer on a suit as is wholly inconsistent with the supposition that an individual has an interest in the bond."
"They [the proprietors of the ticket] had undoubtedly 'a right to apply to the corporation to direct the suit, and the corporation could not, consistently with their duty, have refused such application,' if the purpose of the bond was to secure the fortunate adventurers in the lottery, not to protect the corporation itself. But the propriety of bringing such suit was a subject on which the obligees had themselves a right to judge. If the proprietors of one prize ticket had an interest in this bond, the proprietors of every other prize ticket had the same interest, and it could not be in the power of the first bold adventurer who should seize and sue upon it to appropriate it to his own use and to force the obligees to appear in court as plaintiffs against their own will. No person who is not the proprietor of an obligation can have a legal right to put it in suit unless such right be given by the legislature, and no person can be authorized to use the name of another without his assent given in fact or by legal intendment."

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