Source: http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2013/02/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 18:51:47+00:00

Document:
has been a key proponent of the viewpoint that the Dead Sea Scrolls found in Qumran were not the product of the Essenes, but rather of many different Jewish sects and communities of ancient Israel, which he presents in his book Who Wrote The Dead Sea Scrolls?: The Search For The Secret Of Qumran. In the 1990s, Golb was an advocate for the freeing of the Scrolls for academic pursuit.
[b]etween 2006 and 2009, [Raphael Golb] created more than 80 online aliases to advance his father’s views about the Dead Sea Scrolls against what he saw as a concerted effort to exclude them. Along the way, according to a jury . . . , he crossed from engaging in academic debate to committing a crime.
the son of an expert on the Dead Sea Scrolls. [He] set up email accounts in which he pretended to be other scholars who disagreed with [his] father's opinion on the origin of the Scrolls. Among other things, [Raphael Golb] sent emails in which one of his father's rivals purportedly admitted to acts of plagiarism.
[A]s it has been observed in the context of trademark law, `[a] parody must convey two simultaneous -- and contradictory -- messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody’ (Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 [U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit 1989]).
Here, the evidence clearly established that [Golb] never intended any kind of parody. Instead, he only intended to convey the first message to the readers of the emails, that is, that the purported authors were the actual authors. It was equally clear that [Golb] intended that the recipients' reliance on this deception would cause harm to the purported authors and benefits to [him] or his father.
The court's charge, [i.e., the judge’s instructions to the jury,] which incorporated many of [Golb’s] requests, fully protected his constitutional rights, and the court was not required to grant [his] requests for additional instructions. The court carefully informed the jury that academic discussion, parody, satire and the use of pseudonyms were protected by the 1st Amendment.
The court was under no obligation to limit the definitions of `injure’ or `defraud’ -- terms used in the forgery and criminal impersonation statutes -- to tangible harms such as financial harm. . . . The court also properly employed the statutory definition of `benefit’ as `any gain or advantage’ to defendant or to another person (New York Penal Law § 10.00).
it is constitutionally impermissible to include an intent to influence a constitutionally-protected academic debate within the concept of fraud, injury or benefit, that allowing injury to reputation to satisfy the injury element would effectively revive the long-abandoned offense of criminal libel, and that, in any event, the alleged truth of the content of the emails should have been permitted as a defense.
However, the evidence established that [Golb] intended harm that fell within the plain meaning of the term `injure,’ and that was not protected by the 1st Amendment, including damage to the careers and livelihoods of the scholars he impersonated. [Golb] also intended to create specific benefits for his father's career.
The fact that the underlying dispute between [Golb] and his father's rivals was a constitutionally-protected debate does not provide any 1st Amendment protection for acts that were otherwise unlawful.
was not prosecuted for the content of any of the emails, but only for giving the false impression that his victims were the actual authors of the emails. The 1st Amendment protects the right to criticize another person, but it does not permit anyone to give an intentionally false impression that the source of the message is that other person. . . .
claims that the statutes under which he was convicted were unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. None of these statutes was vague or overbroad on its face or as applied (see People v. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d 529, 538 ; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–616 [1973)]).
The People were required to prove that [Golb] had the specific fraudulent intent to deceive email recipients about his identity, and to obtain benefits or cause injuries as a result of the recipients' reliance on that deception. The statutes criminalized the act of impersonation and its unlawful intent, not the content of speech falsely imputed to the victims.
The court therefore affirmed Golb’s conviction and sentence. People v. Golb, supra.
As the New York Times article published on February 16 noted, Golb, who had been a lawyer, was disbarred as the result of his felony convictions and, when the article went to press, was “waiting to begin serving” his six-month sentence.
If you would like to read the arguments for and against his conviction, I suggest you check out this article; it has the best coverage of the issues I have seen.
Kenneth Royal Wheeler charging him with the following: (1) Count One -- knowingly transmitting in interstate and foreign commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another; specifically, at approximately 12:06 p.m., on or about March 12, 2012, Defendant transmitted from Italy to the United States via the internet social network `Facebook,’ `wrath commands’ to kill law enforcement officers and children in violation of 18 U.S Code § 875(c); and (2) Count Two -- knowingly transmitting in interstate or foreign commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another; specifically, at approximately 1:25 p.m., on or about March 12, 2012, Defendant transmitted from Italy to the United States via the internet social network `Facebook,’ instructions to kill law enforcement officers, politicians, judges, district attorneys, public defenders and their children in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 875(c).
U.S. v. Wheeler, 2013 WL 169494 (U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado 2013).
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
And as I have explained noted in prior posts, defendants often challenge charges under the statute on the grounds that their communication did not rise to the level of a “true threat" . . . which, as I note later, may or may not be an issue hre.
That, though is not Wheeler did, at least not with regard to the issues the court is dealing with in this opinion. Here, the federal district court judge is ruling on Wheeler’s motion to suppress certain evidence. U.S. v. Wheeler, supra.
`burden of showing a constitutional infirmity if a search or seizure was carried out pursuant to a warrant. If, on the other hand, the police acted without a warrant, the burden of proof is on the prosecution.’ U.S. v. Esser, 451 F.3d 1109 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit 2006).
U.S. v. Wheeler, supra. So, since the search at issue in Wheeler’s motion to dismiss was conducted pursuant to a warrant, the burden was on Wheeler to show that the search somehow violated the 4th Amendment. U.S. v. Wheeler, supra.
Special Agent Gerard Kavanagh submitted an Affidavit in support of the Warrant. . . . Kavanagh has been employed as a Special Agent with Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations since February 2012 and assigned to the Grand Junction Office. . . . The Affidavit stated that, on March 16, 2012, members of the Grand Junction Police Department requested the assistance of Federal agents with regard to threatening posts made by Kenneth Royal Wheeler on his Facebook page. . . .
The Grand Junction Police Department became aware of these posts when a tip line caller reported the postings. . . . The caller stated that Wheeler posted a request for someone to kill all of the children at Stepping Stones Daycare, as well as several specific police officers and their children. . . . The caller reported that Wheeler lives a few blocks from the Stepping Stones daycare. . . .
The affidavit stated that, on March 19, 2012, Kavanagh compared the photograph from Kenneth Wheeler's Colorado Driver's License to the Facebook profile photographs on the `Kenneth Royal Wheeler’ account. . . . Kavanagh believed the photographs were of the same individual. . . .
Kavanagh stated his belief that the computers of Facebook were likely to contain material relevant to the threats made in the postings, including stored electronic communications and information concerning subscribers and their use of Facebook, such as account access information, transaction information, and other account information. . . .
That same day, United States Magistrate Judge Gudrun Rice approved the warrant. . . . The Warrant permitted the search of `information associated with FACEBOOK Social Networking account located at [www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=1304977903] and under the username of “Kenneth Royal Wheeler” that is stored at the premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by FACEBOOK CORPORATION, a Social Media provider headquartered at 1601 Willow Road in Menlo Park, California 94025.’. . . The Warrant allowed for seizure of all contact and personal identifying information for the account, all activity logs, photos uploaded to the account, records of communications sent and received on the account, all `check ins’ and uses of the `like’ feature, and all other accounts that were `friends’ and to which the account was a `fan’ of. . . .
Wheeler “point[ed] out” that “he is charged with transmitting threats in interstate commerce and argues that, because the Warrant does not seek the fruits of that crime, the instrumentalities of that crime or the contraband from that crime, it lacks the constitutionally required nexus to the crime.” U.S. v. Wheeler, supra. The judge, though, found that his argument “improperly narrows the scope of the probable cause analysis and asks the Court to Monday-morning quarterback what was, at the time the Warrant was issued, an ongoing investigation.” U.S. v. Wheeler, supra.
ongoing threat to the safety of Grand Junction residents. He did not know whether there was an actual plan to bomb the daycare and kill police officers or whether the comments on [Wheeler’s] Facebook page were idle threats. The fact [Wheeler] was ultimately charged only with making threats does not dictate the limits of the scope of the Warrant at the time it was issued. . . . Instead, the Court must determine whether the Affidavit established probable cause to issue the warrant, considering the totality of the circumstances at the time the Warrant was issued.
U.S. v. Wheeler, supra (quoting U.S. v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit 1992)).
for the vast majority of the information that was permitted under the Warrant. . . . For example, [he] contends there is no probable cause to search for his `Friends’ list, what pages he `liked’ or became a fan of, who he may have `poked’, or what items he sold on Facebook's Marketplace. . . . In essence, [he] is not arguing about whether there was probable cause to issue the Warrant at all; rather, [Wheeler] is challenging the scope of the warrant and whether the Affidavit established probable cause for such a warrant.
overbroad and the Affidavit established probable cause to search for all of the aspects covered by the Warrant. The comments posted on Wheeler’s Facebook page repeatedly referred to [his] `religious operatives and followers’ and instructed them to kill cops (generally and a particular list of officers) and to `commit a massacre in the stepping stones preschool and daycare, just walk in and kill everyone’. . . .
The comments also said `nobody in america knows who i have been associating with outside america, we are ready, we are coming back, and we are doing this. and just like i told them, when the cuffs go on the bombs go off.’. . . Thus, the comments on [his] Facebook page plainly indicated Wheeler was not acting alone, but it failed to provide any insight into with whom he may have been conspiring.
The Affidavit, in turn, states that the purpose of the Warrant is to seize `conspiratorial communications with others’ regarding `[t]hreats and threatening communications, incitements to violence, [and] threats to use destructive devices’, as well as obtaining `[r]ecords relating to who created, used, or communicated with the user ID, including records about their identities and whereabouts.’ . . .
Given the comments on [Wheeler’s] Facebook page about the involvement of others in his plans, Kavanaugh could have reasonably believed information obtained from Facebook, such as who [his] `friends’ were, what pages he `liked’, and who he `poked’, would provide insight into who these other actors were and where they may have been located. The identity and location of these other actors is evidence related to the crime for which [Wheeler] was being investigated. Accordingly, Kavanaugh's Affidavit established probable cause for the search of [Wheeler’s] Facebook account. . . .
The judge therefore found that “the Affidavit upon which the Warrant was issued sufficiently established probable cause to believe that the search would lead to evidence of a crime” and so denied Wheeler’s motion to suppress. U.S. v. Wheeler, supra.
had no friends to communicate with on his Facebook page, so his call for `followers’ to kill Grand Junction police officers and attack a day-care center wasn't a threat, his lawyer said Thursday.
`At some level, it means nobody is receiving the communication,’ Abraham V. Hutt, Wheeler's lawyer, told U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez.
I don’t see how, even if this is true, it had anything to do with the motion to suppress. To me -- and I could be wrong about this -- it sounds more like an argument that what Wheeler posted could not be a “threat” because no one was reading it. . . .

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