Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/391/73/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:19:40+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 391 › Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.
In this diversity action, petitioner seeks damages for the alleged wrongful death in Louisiana of her illegitimate son. The trial court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the ground that, under Louisiana law, a mother had no right of action for the death of her illegitimate son. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The Louisiana wrongful death statute, as construed to bar recovery for damages to the parent of an illegitimate child while allowing such recovery to the parent of a legitimate child, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there being no rational basis for the distinction. Levy v. Louisiana, ante, p. 391 U. S. 68. Pp. 391 U. S. 74-76.
judgment was granted on the ground that, under Louisiana law, [Footnote 3] the mother had no right of action for the death of her illegitimate son. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the claim that the discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 379 F.2d 545. We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 389 U.S. 969, in order to hear the case along with Levy v. Louisiana, ante, p. 391 U. S. 68.
child whom she has acknowledged and vice versa. [Footnote 7] If the illegitimate son had a horse that was killed by the defendant and then died himself, his mother would have a right to sue for the loss of that property. [Footnote 8] If the illegitimate son were killed in an industrial accident at his place of employment, the mother would be eligible for recovery under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, if she were a dependent of his. [Footnote 9] Yet it is argued that, since the legislature is dealing with "sin," it can deal with it selectively, and is not compelled to adopt comprehensive or even consistent measures. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 379 U. S. 191. In this sense, the present case is different from the Levy case, where, by mere accident of birth, the innocent, although illegitimate, child was made a "nonperson" by the legislature when it came to recovery of damages for the wrongful death of his mother.
the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such "legal" lines as it chooses.
The Court of Appeals so indicated in this case. 379 F.2d at 546, n. 2. See Galveston, H. & S.A. R. Co. v. Walker, 48 Tex.Civ.App. 52, 106 S.W. 705 (1907).
The applicable statutory provision is set out in Levy v. Louisiana, ante at 391 U. S. 69, n. 1. As the Court of Appeals noted, Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, providing for wrongful death recovery, gives a cause of action to "the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them. . . ." The statute does not state "legitimate" father or "legitimate" mother, but the Louisiana courts have held that a decedent must be legitimate in order for an ascendant or sibling to recover for his death. Youchican v. Texas & P. R. Co., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920); Buie v. Hester, 147 So.2d 733 (Ct.App. La.1962). See also Green v. New Orleans, S. & G.I. R. Co., 141 La. 120, 74 So. 717 (1917); Jackson v. Lindlom, 84 So.2d 101 (Ct.App.La.1955). See also Vaughan v. Dalton-Lard Lumber Co., 119 La. 61, 43 So. 926 (1907).
La.Civ.Code Ann. Art. 184 (1952). See Lambert v. Lambert, 164 So.2d 661 (Ct.App.La.1964); Harris v. Illinois Central R. Co., 220 F.2d 734 (C.A. 5th Cir.1955); cf. Lewis v. Powell, 178 So.2d 769 (Ct.App.La.1965).
La.Civ.Code Ann. Arts. 2315, 922 (1952 and Supp. 1967).
At common law, no person had a legally cognizable interest in the wrongful death of another person, and no person could inherit the personal right of another to recover for tortious injuries to his body. [Footnote 2/1] By statute, Louisiana has created both rights in favor of certain classes of persons. The question in these cases is whether the way in which Louisiana has defined the classes of persons who may recover is constitutionally permissible. The Court has reached a negative answer to this question by a process that can only be described as brute force.
State has accorded a right of action for the death of another.
Louisiana has chosen, as have most other States in one respect or another, to define these classes of proper plaintiffs in terms of their legal, rather than their biological, relation to the deceased. A man may recover for the death of his wife, whether he loved her or not, but may not recover for the death of his paramour. [Footnote 2/6] A child may recover for the death of his adopted parents. An illegitimate may recover for the wrongful death of a parent who has taken a few hours to acknowledge him formally, but not for the death of a person who he claims is his parent but who has not acknowledged him. [Footnote 2/7] A parent may recover for the death of an illegitimate child he has acknowledged, but not for the death of an illegitimate child whom he did not bother to acknowledge until the possibility of tort recovery arose.
clear, for neither a biological relationship nor legal acknowledgment is indicative of the love or economic dependence that may exist between two persons. It is, frankly, preposterous to suggest that the State has made illegitimates into "nonpersons," or that, by analogy with what Louisiana has done here, it might deny illegitimates constitutional rights or the benefits of doing business in corporate form. [Footnote 2/8] The rights at issue here stem from the existence of a family relationship, and the State has decided only that it will not recognize the family relationship unless the formalities of marriage, or of the acknowledgment of children by the parent in question, have been complied with.
actions to determine the heirs of intestates, and the like, must, as a constitutional matter, deal with every claim of biological paternity or maternity on its merits is an exceedingly odd proposition.
on the lines that Congress and the States have drawn were very much broader than I consider it to be, I could not understand why a State which base's the right to recover for wrongful death strictly on family relationships could not demand that those relationships be formalized.
* This opinion applies also to No. 508, Levy v. Louisiana, ante, p. 391 U. S. 68.
See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S. 342, 300 U. S. 344-345, and cases there cited.
"[i]f there is a general rule today, it is probably that the word 'child' or 'children,' when used in a statute pertaining to wrongful death beneficiaries, refers to a legitimate child or legitimate children, and thus only legitimates can recover for the wrongful death of their parents. This is merely an application of the principle that statutes patterned after Lord Campbell's Act which use the word 'kin' mean legitimate kin, and that, where such statutes say 'father' or 'mother,' 'children,' 'brothers' or 'sisters,' they mean only legitimate father, mother, children, brothers or sisters."
S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death 587 (1966).
Numerous Louisiana cases, reflecting the difficulty of attempting to determine the "real" interest of one person in the death of another, have insisted upon strict conformity to the required statutory relationship, and stated that the statute may not be extended by interpretation to analogous cases. E.g., Bradley v. Swift & Co., 167 La. 249, 119 So. 37 (1928). As it happens, this Court has had occasion to recognize Louisiana's interest in strict construction. See Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754, holding that an insurance company, having paid the insurance after the wrongful death of its insured, had no cause of action against the tortfeasor under Louisiana law.
see, e.g., Burthlong v. Huber, 4 So.2d 480; Doucet v. Travelers Ins. Co., 91 F.Supp. 864. The Court speaks in Levy of tortfeasors going free. However, the deceased in that case left a legitimate parent. Under the Court's opinion, the right of legitimate and perhaps dependent parents to sue will henceforth be cut off by the mere existence of an illegitimate child, though the child be a self-supporting adult, and though the child elect not to sue. Incidentally, the burden of proving the nonexistence of such a child will be on the plaintiff parent. Trahan v. Southern Pacific Co., 209 F.Supp. 334.
Vaughan v. Dalton-Lard Lumber Co., 119 La. 61, 43 So. 926 (1907). At the same time, a wife may recover for the death of a man to whom she is lawfully married, although she is not dependent on him for support and, indeed, is living adulterously with someone else. Jones v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 55 So.2d 88.
"Children referred to in this law [the wrongful death statute] include only those who are the issue of lawful wedlock or who, being illegitimate, have been acknowledged or legitimated pursuant to methods expressly established by law."
Article 203 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that children may be acknowledged by a declaration, by either or both parents, executed in the presence of a notary public and two witnesses.
A more obvious analogy from the law of corporations than the rather far-fetched example the Court has suggested is the elementary rule that the benefits of doing business in corporate form may be denied, to the willful, the negligent, and the innocent alike, if the formalities of incorporation have not been properly complied with.
Even where liability arises under a federal statute defining rights in terms of a family relationship to the deceased, federal courts have generally looked to the law and the formalities of the appropriate State. In Seaboard Air Line v. Kenney, 240 U. S. 489, arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 36 Stat. 291, this Court relied upon the North Carolina determination that the "next of kin" of an illegitimate deceased were his half siblings, rather than his father. In De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U. S. 570, arising under the Copyright Act, 61 Stat. 652, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., we held that the word "children" in § 24 of that federal statute should be defined by reference to California law; California law provided that an illegitimate who had been acknowledged in writing by his father could inherit from him; since the illegitimate involved in De Sylva had been acknowledged, we held he was included within the statutory term. Two Justices, concurring in the unanimous result, argued that it was not proper to look to state law for a definition of the federal statutory term "children." Nowhere, however, was it suggested that we look to the Constitution. In Bell v. Tug Shrike, 332 F.2d 330, the Fourth Circuit looked to Virginia law to determine whether the plaintiff was a "widow" entitled to bring suit under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688. Plaintiff had "married" her "husband" at a time when he was already married. Although the preexisting marriage was later dissolved by divorce, after which plaintiff continued to live with the "husband," Virginia does not recognize common law marriages. Consequently, plaintiff was held not to be a "widow." There was no suggestion that equal protection was in any way involved.

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