Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/159/555/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:39:22+00:00

Document:
that the burden was on the plaintiff to establish that the articles were parts of clocks; that in determining that question, it would not be necessary for the jury to say that they were exclusively used for that purpose; that the fact that an article chiefly used for one purpose had been used by some for a purpose for which it was not originally intended would not change its tariff nomenclature; that if the jury should find that the articles were chiefly used as parts of clocks, that that would determine their tariff classification, but on the other hand, that they must be chiefly and principally used for that purpose; that if they are articles with no distinguishing characteristic, just as applicable for use in fancy boxes or in coach lamps as they are for clocks, then it would be entirely proper to say that they have no distinguishing characteristics as parts of clocks; that they might be used for one purpose just as well as for another, and if the jury should find as to those articles, or any of them, that they have several uses to which they are perfectly applicable, then as to those articles the verdict should be for the defendant. Held that the instructions were manifestly correct, and that in giving the rule of chief use, the principles by which it was to be ascertained were fully stated exactly in accordance with the law announced by this Court in Magone v. Heller, 150 U. S. 70.
as "parts of watches," under paragraph 494 of said act (p. 514), which imposed a duty of twenty-five percentum ad valorem upon "watches, watch cases, watch movements, parts of watches, and watch materials, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act," or as "parts of clocks," under paragraph 414 (p. 511), which laid a duty of thirty percentum ad valorem upon "clocks and parts of clocks." On the trial of the case, the claim that the glass was dutiable as "parts of watches" was abandoned by the importers, who insisted that they should have been assessed as "parts of clocks."
"In determining this question, whether or not these articles are parts of clocks, it will not be necessary for you to say that they were exclusively used for that purpose. An article may be chiefly used for a certain purpose, and be diverted from its principal use. Somebody may put it to a purpose for which it was not originally intended. That could not, in my judgment, change its tariff nomenclature. The Supreme Court, in a case which I think is somewhat similar upon the facts, although relating to different sections of the statute, sustained a charge to the jury 'that the use to which the articles were chiefly adapted, and for which they were used, determined their character, within the meaning of the statute. . . .' And so I will say to you, as the law of the case, as I understand it, that if you find that these articles were chiefly used as parts of clocks, that that would determine their tariff classification. But it is entirely clear, upon the other hand, that they must be chiefly and principally used for that purpose. If they are articles, all or one more, as the case may be, which have no distinguishing characteristic, which are just as applicable for use in fancy boxes or in coach lamps as they are for clocks, just as applicable to the one use as to the other, then it would be entirely proper to say that they have no distinguishing characteristics as parts of clocks. They might be used for one purpose just as well as for another. And if you find as to those articles, or any of them, that they have several uses to which they are perfectly applicable, then as to those articles your verdict should be for the defendant. "
The defendant excepted to so much of the charge as stated that "the principal or chief use of the articles would determine their tariff classification." He moreover excepted to the refusal of the court to give five separate charges by him presented. The first, fourth, and fifth of these charges substantially asked that the jury be instructed to find in favor of the defendant unless the proof showed that the pieces of glass in controversy were used absolutely and exclusively for clocks, and for no other purpose. The second and third requests asked for an instruction in favor of the defendant unless the proof showed that the articles imported were used in trade exclusively as parts of clocks or parts of watches, or were used in trade and commerce solely as parts of clocks.
of classification if exclusive use must be ascertained in so doing, for that which is generally and commonly done may be known, but that which is so universally done as to be without any exception is difficult, if not impossible, of ascertainment.
v. Heller, in 150 U.S., reversed the doctrine established in a line of carefully considered cases without even making reference to them. It is apparent that the matters decided in Worthington v. Robbins and Magone v. Heller do not conflict with the adjudications of this Court as to the chief or predominant use which began with the case of Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 261, and has found fuller expression in the line of cases above referred to.
purpose will not take it out of the exception. But if it is commonly, practically, and profitably used for a different purpose, it cannot be considered as used expressly for manure, even if in the majority of instances it is so used."
It follows that while Magone v. Heller adhered to the settled rule of chief use, a guide was there announced by which to discover whether the facts established such chief use. "Chief use", in itself, is a vague and uncertain term. Magone v. Heller therefore held that chief use was to be ascertained by that which was commonly, practically, and generally done, and was not to be overthrown by an occasional exception for practical or experimental purposes. Thus, we repeat, Magone v. Heller, while enforcing and applying the rule of chief use, furnished the instrument for determining and measuring its operation and giving certainty to its application. It is for this reason, in the recent case of Sonn v. Magone, 159 U. S. 417, Magone v. Heller was cited as authority for and in elucidation of the correct test by which use as a measure of classification was to be controlled. The charge given by the court below, and which was excepted to, was manifestly correct, for, in giving the rule of chief use, the principles by while chief use was to be ascertained were fully stated exactly in accordance with the law subsequently announced by this Court in Magone v. Heller.

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