Source: https://lexlords.com/quashing-of-fir-complaint-summoning-order/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:19:30+00:00

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If false FIR has been registered against NRI, even though the real dispute between the parties is a property dispute, quashing of FIR brings quick relief to NRI. Quashing simply means cancelling. Under criminal procedure code, a petitioner can seek quashing of First Information Report (FIR) or summoning order or criminal complaint or any other order against which the alternate remedy of appeal or revision does not lie. Non-Resident Indians (NRI) are more concerned with quashing of either First Information Report (FIR) or summoning order or criminal complaint or order declaring Non-Resident Indians (NRI) as proclaimed offender.
Non-Resident Indians (NRI) generally file quashing petition in cases where the allegations relate to dowry (section 498 – A), misappropriation of dowry articles by in-laws (section 406), fraud and cheating (where the case is actually civil in nature) or where a person has been declared proclaimed offender. Such question petitions are routinely allowed by the High Courts within whose jurisdiction the case arises.
A quashing petition can be filed at any stage after registration of First Information Report (FIR) or initiation of criminal complaint. There are certain judgements which say that First Information Report (FIR) cannot be quashed before filing the challan, there are other judgements which say that First Information Report (FIR) cannot be quashed after filing the challan and there are still judgements which say that First Information Report (FIR) cannot be quashed after framing of charges by the trial court. However the Supreme Court is clear that First Information Report (FIR) or summoning order can be quashed at any stage of trial if otherwise grounds are made out for quashing.
B.S. Chauhan, J. – This reference before us arises out of a variety of views having been expressed by this Court and several High Courts of the country on the scope and extent of the powers of the courts under the criminal justice system to arraign any person as an accused during the course of inquiry or trial as contemplated under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the `Cr.P.C.’).
3. The reference was desired to be resolved by a three-Judge Bench whereafter the same came up for consideration and vide order dated 8.12.2011, the Court opined that in view of the reference made in the case of Dharam Pal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2006(2) RCR (Criminal) 75 : (2004)13 SCC 9, the issues involved being identical in nature, the same should be resolved by a Constitution Bench consisting of at least five Judges. The Bench felt that since a three-Judge Bench has already referred the matter of Dharam Pal (Supra) to a Constitution Bench, then in that event it would be appropriate that such overlapping issues should also be resolved by a Bench of similar strength.
4. Reference made in the case of Dharam Pal (Supra) came to be answered in relation to the power of a Court of Sessions to invoke Section 319 Cr.P.C. at the stage of committal of the case to a Court of Sessions. The said reference was answered by the Constitution Bench in the case of Dharam Pal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2013(3) RCR (Criminal) 787 : 2013(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 381 [hereinafter called `Dharam Pal (CB)’], wherein it was held that a Court of Sessions can with the aid of Section 193 Cr.P.C. proceed to array any other person and summon him for being tried even if the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. could not be pressed in service at the stage of committal.
7. The Constitutional mandate under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the `Constitution’) provides a protective umbrella for the smooth administration of justice making adequate provisions to ensure a fair and efficacious trial so that the accused does not get prejudiced after the law has been put into motion to try him for the offence but at the same time also gives equal protection to victims and to the society at large to ensure that the guilty does not get away from the clutches of law. For the empowerment of the courts to ensure that the criminal administration of justice works properly, the law was appropriately codified and modified by the legislature under the Cr.P.C. indicating as to how the courts should proceed in order to ultimately find out the truth so that an innocent does not get punished but at the same time, the guilty are brought to book under the law. It is these ideals as enshrined under the Constitution and our laws that have led to several decisions, whereby innovating methods and progressive tools have been forged to find out the real truth and to ensure that the guilty does not go unpunished. The presumption of innocence is the general law of the land as every man is presumed to be innocent unless proven to be guilty.
This has to be understood in the context that Section 319 Cr.P.C. empowers only the court to proceed against such person. The word “court” in our hierarchy of criminal courts has been defined under Section 6 Cr.P.C., which includes the Courts of Sessions, Judicial Magistrates, Metropolitan Magistrates as well as Executive Magistrates. The Court of Sessions is defined in Section 9 Cr.P.C. and the Courts of Judicial Magistrates has been defined under Section 11 thereof. The Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates has been defined under Section 16 Cr.P.C. The courts which can try offences committed under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or any offence under any other law, have been specified under Section 26 Cr.P.C. read with First Schedule. The explanatory note (2) under the heading of “Classification of Offences” under the First Schedule specifies the expression `magistrate of first class’ and `any magistrate’ to include Metropolitan Magistrates who are empowered to try the offences under the said Schedule but excludes Executive Magistrates.
18. Coming to the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised, in Dharam Pal (Supra), this Court had noticed the conflict in the decisions of Kishun Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar, 1993(1) RCR (Criminal) 647 : (1993)2 SCC 16 and Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998(4) RCR (Criminal) 552 , and referred the matter to the Constitution Bench. However, while referring the matter to a Constitution Bench, this Court affirmed the judgment in Kishun Singh (Supra) and doubted the correctness of the judgment in Ranjit Singh (Supra). In Ranjit Singh (Supra), this Court observed that from the stage of committal till the Sessions Court reaches the stage indicated in Section 230 Cr.P.C., that court can deal with only the accused referred to in Section 209 Cr.P.C. and there is no intermediary stage till then for the Sessions Court to add any other person to the array of the accused, while in Kishun Singh (Supra), this Court came to the conclusion that even the Sessions Court has power under Section 193 Cr.P.C. to take cognizance of the offence and summon other persons whose complicity in the commission of the trial can prima facie be gathered from the materials available on record and need not wait till the stage of Section 319 Cr.P.C. is reached. This Court in Dharam Pal (Supra) held that the effect of Ranjit Singh (Supra) would be that in less serious offences triable by a Magistrate, the said Court would have the power to proceed against those who are mentioned in Column 2 of the charge-sheet, if on the basis of material on record, the Magistrate disagrees with the conclusion reached by the police, but, as far as serious offences triable by the Court of Sessions are concerned, that court will have to wait till the stage of Section 319 Cr.P.C. is reached.
23. The stage of inquiry and trial upon cognizance being taken of an offence, has been considered by a large number of decisions of this Court and that it may be useful to extract the same hereunder for proper appreciation of the stage of invoking of the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to understand the meaning that can be attributed to the word `inquiry’ and `trial’ as used under the Section.
26. In State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman & Anr., AIR 1983 SC 439, this Court held that from the stage of filing of charge-sheet to ensuring the compliance of provision of Section 207 Cr.P.C., the court is only at the stage of inquiry and no trial can be said to have commenced. The above view has been held to be per incurium in Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar & Anr., 1996(2) RCR (Criminal) 804 , wherein this Court while observing that Section 319 (1) Cr.P.C. operates in an ongoing inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, held that at the stage of Section 209 Cr.P.C., the court is neither at the stage of inquiry nor at the stage of trial. Even at the stage of ensuring compliance of Sections 207 and 208 Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that the court is at the stage of inquiry because there is no judicial application of mind and all that the Magistrate is required to do is to make the case ready to be heard by the Court of Sessions.
33. In In Re: Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Unknown, 1 Ind Cas 228, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that “Trial begins when the accused is charged and called on to answer and then the question before the Court is whether the accused is to be acquitted or convicted and not whether the complaint is to be dismissed or the accused discharged.” A similar view has been taken by Madras High Court subsequently in Sriramulu v. Veerasalingam, (1914) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 585.
35. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that as `trial’ means determination of issues adjudging the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has to be aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the stage of framing of the charges that the court informs him of the same, the `trial’ commences only on charges being framed. Thus, we do not approve the view taken by the courts that in a criminal case, trial commences on cognizance being taken.
36. Section 2(g) Cr.P.C. and the case laws referred to above, therefore, clearly envisage inquiry before the actual commencement of the trial, and is an act conducted under Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate or the court. The word `inquiry’ is, therefore, not any inquiry relating to the investigation of the case by the investigating agency but is an inquiry after the case is brought to the notice of the court on the filing of the charge-sheet. The court can thereafter proceed to make inquiries and it is for this reason that an inquiry has been given to mean something other than the actual trial.
39. To say that powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only during trial would be reducing the impact of the word `inquiry’ by the court. It is a settled principle of law that an interpretation which leads to the conclusion that a word used by the legislature is redundant, should be avoided as the presumption is that the legislature has deliberately and consciously used the words for carrying out the purpose of the Act. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” which means, “from the words of law, there must be no departure” has to be kept in mind.
41. No word in a statute has to be construed as surplusage. No word can be rendered ineffective or purposeless. Courts are required to carry out the legislative intent fully and completely. While construing a provision, full effect is to be given to the language used therein, giving reference to the context and other provisions of the Statute. By construction, a provision should not be reduced to a “dead letter” or “useless lumber”. An interpretation which renders a provision an otiose should be avoided otherwise it would mean that in enacting such a provision, the legislature was involved in “an exercise in futility” and the product came as a “purposeless piece” of legislation and that the provision had been enacted without any purpose and the entire exercise to enact such a provision was “most unwarranted besides being uncharitable.” (Vide: Patel Chunibhai Dajibha etc. v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar & Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1457; The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529; M.V. Elisabeth & Ors. v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd. Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama, Goa, AIR 1993 SC 1014; Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, 1997(2) RCR (Civil) 8 ; State of Bihar & Ors. etc.etc. v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. etc. etc., AIR 1997 SC 1511; Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 74; and The South Central Railway Employees Co-operative Credit Society Employees Union, Secundrabad v. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies & Ors., 1998(1) S.C.T 703 ).
Thus, by no means it can be said that provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. cannot be pressed into service during the course of `inquiry’. The word `inquiry’ is not surpulsage in the said provision.
51. There is yet another set of provisions which form part of inquiry relevant for the purposes of Section 319 Cr.P.C. i.e. provisions of Sections 200, 201, 202, etc. Cr.P.C. applicable in the case of Complaint Cases. As has been discussed herein, evidence means evidence adduced before the court. Complaint Cases is a distinct category of criminal trial where some sort of evidence in the strict legal sense of Section 3 of the Evidence Act 1872, (hereinafter referred to as the `Evidence Act’) comes before the court. There does not seem to be any restriction in the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. so as to preclude such evidence as coming before the court in Complaint Cases even before charges have been framed or the process has been issued. But at that stage as there is no accused before the Court, such evidence can be used only to corroborate the evidence recorded during the trial for the purpose of Section 319 Cr.P.C., if so required.
Question No. (iii) : Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
57. The provision and the above-mentioned definitions clearly suggest that it is an exhaustive definition. Wherever the words “means and include” are used, it is an indication of the fact that the definition `is a hard and fast definition’, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression that is put down in the definition. It indicates an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expression. (Vide: M/s. Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., AIR 1989 SC 335; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh & Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 682; P. Kasilingam & Ors. v. P.S.G. College of Technology & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1395; Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Dy. Labour Commissioner & Ors., 2007(3) S.C.T. 243 : 2007(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 450 ; and Ponds India Ltd. (merged with H.L. Limited) v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, Lucknow, (2008) 8 SCC 369).
We, therefore proceed to examine the matter further on the premise that the definition of word “evidence” under the Evidence Act is exhaustive.
60. In relation to a Civil Case, this court in Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd., 2004(1) RCR (Civil) 259 , held that the examination of a witness would include evidence-in-chief, cross-examination or re-examination. In Omkar Namdeo Jadhao & Ors. v. Second Additional Sessions Judge Buldana & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 331; and Ram Swaroop & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 2943, this Court held that statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. during the investigation are not evidence. Such statements can be used at the trial only for contradictions or omissions when the witness is examined in the court.
(See also: Podda Narayana & Ors. v. State of A.P., AIR 1975 SC 1252; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1976 SC 294; and State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar & Ors., 1986(1) RCR (Criminal) 184 ).
61. In Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh & Anr., 2006(2) RCR (Criminal) 707 , it was held that it is evident that a person, even though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be added as an accused to face the trial. The trial court can take such a step to add such persons as accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the charge- sheet or the case diary, because such materials contained in the charge-sheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence.
64. In Guriya @ Tabassum Tauquir & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., 2007(4) RCR (Criminal) 497 : 2007(5) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 352 , this Court held that in exercise of the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the court can add a new accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the charge sheet or the case diary.
“11. On a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 319 there can be no doubt that it must appear from the evidence tendered in the course of any inquiry or trial that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the accused. This power (under Section 319(1)), it seems clear to us, can be exercised only if it so appears from the evidence at the trial and not otherwise. Therefore, this sub-section contemplates existence of some evidence appearing in the course of trial wherefrom the court can prima facie conclude that the person not arraigned before it is also involved in the commission of the crime for which he can be tried with those already named by the police. Even a person who has earlier been discharged would fall within the sweep of the power conferred by Section 319 of the Code. Therefore, stricto sensu, Section 319 of the Code cannot be invoked in a case like the present one where no evidence has been led at a trial wherefrom it can be said that the appellants appear to have been involved in the commission of the crime along with those already sent up for trial by the prosecution.
68. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr., 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1022 : 2007(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 305 , observing that court should not exercise the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary, because such materials contained in the charge-sheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence. The word `evidence’ in Section 319 Cr.P.C. contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in the court.
69. Ordinarily, it is only after the charges are framed that the stage of recording of evidence is reached. A bare perusal of Section 227 Cr.P.C. would show that the legislature has used the terms “record of the case” and the “documents submitted therewith”. It is in this context that the word `evidence’ as appearing in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be read and understood. The material collected at the stage of investigation can at best be used for a limited purpose as provided under Section 157 of the Evidence Act i.e. to corroborate or contradict the statements of the witnesses recorded before the court. Therefore, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the use of word `evidence’ means material that has come before the court during an inquiry or trial by it and not otherwise. If from the evidence led in the trial the court is of the opinion that a person not accused before it has also committed the offence, it may summon such person under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
78. This would harmonise such material with the word `evidence’ as material that would be supportive in nature to facilitate the exposition of any other accomplice whose complicity in the offence may have either been suppressed or escaped the notice of the court.
80. In view of the discussion made and the conclusion drawn hereinabove, the answer to the aforesaid question posed is that apart from evidence recorded during trial, any material that has been received by the court after cognizance is taken and before the trial commences, can be utilised only for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the court to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The `evidence’ is thus, limited to the evidence recorded during trial.
Q.(ii) Does the word `evidence’ in Section 319 Cr.P.C. means as arising in Examination-in-Chief or also together with Cross- Examination?
81. The second question referred to herein is in relation to the word `evidence` as used under Section 319 Cr.P.C., which leaves no room for doubt that the evidence as understood under Section 3 of the Evidence Act is the statement of the witnesses that are recorded during trial and the documentary evidence in accordance with the Evidence Act, which also includes the document and material evidence in the Evidence Act. Such evidence begins with the statement of the prosecution witnesses, therefore, is evidence which includes the statement during examination-in-chief. In Rakesh (Supra), it was held that “It is true that finally at the time of trial the accused is to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness to test its truthfulness. But that stage would not arise while exercising the court’s power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Once the deposition is recorded, no doubt there being no cross-examination, it would be a prima facie material which would enable the Sessions Court to decide whether powers under Section 319 should be exercised or not.” In Ranjit Singh (Supra), this Court held that “it is not necessary for the court to wait until the entire evidence is collected,” for exercising the said power. In Mohd. Shafi (Supra), it was held that the pre-requisite for exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was the satisfaction of the court to proceed against a person who is not an accused but against whom evidence occurs, for which the court can even wait till the cross examination is over and that there would be no illegality in doing so. A similar view has been taken by a two-Judge Bench in the case of Harbhajan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Anr. 2009(3) RCR (Criminal) 916 : 2009(5) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 19 : (2009)13 SCC 608. This Court in Hardeep Singh (Supra) seems to have misread the judgment in Mohd. Shafi (Supra), as it construed that the said judgment laid down that for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the court has to necessarily wait till the witness is cross examined and on complete appreciation of evidence, come to the conclusion whether there is a need to proceed under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
83. As held in Mohd. Shafi (Supra) and Harbhajan Singh (Supra), all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been involved in the offence. The pre-requisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no straight-jacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/Court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in Examination-in-Chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the Section also uses the words `such person could be tried’ instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section 4 of Section 319 Cr.P.C., the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of Examination- in-Chief, the Court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, Examination-in-Chief untested by Cross Examination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
87. In Pyare Lal Bhargava v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094, a four-Judge Bench of this Court was concerned with the meaning of the word `appear’. The court held that the appropriate meaning of the word `appears’ is `seems’. It imports a lesser degree of probability than proof. In Ram Singh & Ors. v. Ram Niwas & Anr., 2009(3) RCR (Criminal) 501 : 2009(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 261 : (2009)14 SCC 25, a two-Judge Bench of this Court was again required to examine the importance of the word `appear’ as appearing in the Section. The Court held that for the fulfillment of the condition that it appears to the court that a person had committed an offence, the court must satisfy itself about the existence of an exceptional circumstance enabling it to exercise an extraordinary jurisdiction. What is, therefore, necessary for the court is to arrive at a satisfaction that the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution, if unrebutted, may lead to conviction of the persons sought to be added as an accused in the case.
88. At the time of taking cognizance, the court has to see whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. Under Section 319 Cr.P.C., though the test of prima facie case is the same, the degree of satisfaction that is required is much stricter. A two- Judge Bench of this Court in Vikas v. State of Rajasthan, 2013(4) RCR (Criminal) 948 : 2013(6) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 356 : 2013(11) SCALE 23, held that on the objective satisfaction of the court a person may be `arrested’ or `summoned’, as the circumstances of the case may require, if it appears from the evidence that any such person not being the accused has committed an offence for which such person could be tried together with the already arraigned accused persons.
92. In Brindaban Das & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, 2009(1) RCR (Criminal) 672 : 2009(1) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 400 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court took a similar view observing that the court is required to consider whether such evidence would be sufficient to convict the person being summoned. Since issuance of summons under Section 319 Cr.P.C. entails a de novo trial and a large number of witnesses may have been examined and their re-examination could prejudice the prosecution and delay the trial, the trial court has to exercise such discretion with great care and perspicacity.
A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in Michael Machado & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors., 2000(2) RCR (Criminal) 75 .
93. However, there is a series of cases wherein this Court while dealing with the provisions of Sections 227, 228, 239, 240, 241, 242 and 245 Cr.P.C., has consistently held that the court at the stage of framing of the charge has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of an offence by the accused. The court has to see as to whether the material brought on record reasonably connect the accused with the offence. Nothing more is required to be enquired into. While dealing with the aforesaid provisions, the test of prima facie case is to be applied. The Court has to find out whether the materials offered by the prosecution to be adduced as evidence are sufficient for the court to proceed against the accused further. (Vide: State of Karnataka v. L. Munishwamy & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1489; All India Bank Officers’ Confederation etc. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1989 SC 2045; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715; State of M.P. v. Dr. Krishna Chandra Saksena, 1997(1) RCR (Criminal) 556 : (1996) 11 SCC 439; and State of M.P. v. Mohan Lal Soni, 2000(3) RCR (Criminal) 452 ).
94. In Dilawar Babu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, 2002(1) RCR (Criminal) 451 , this Court while dealing with the provisions of Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C., placed a very heavy reliance on the earlier judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 366 and held that while considering the question of framing the charges, the court may weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out and whether the materials placed before this Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained. In such an eventuality, the court is justified in framing the charges and proceeding with the trial. The court has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but court should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh evidence as if it is conducting a trial.
97. In Palanisamy Gounder & Anr. v. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2006(2) RCR (Criminal) 235 : (2005) 12 SCC 327, this Court deprecated the practice of invoking the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. just to conduct a fishing inquiry, as in that case, the trial court exercised that power just to find out the real truth, though there was no valid ground to proceed against the person summoned by the court.
99. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of Cross-Examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C. the purpose of providing if `it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence’ is clear from the words “for which such person could be tried together with the accused.” The words used are not `for which such person could be convicted’. There is, therefore, no scope for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused.
101. In Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P. & Anr., 2013(1) RCR (Criminal) 686 : 2013(1) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 46 : (2013)6 SCC 384, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that even in the cases where report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is filed in the court and investigation records the name of a person in Column 2, or even does not name the person as an accused at all, the court in exercise of its powers vested under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can summon the person as an accused and even at that stage of summoning, no hearing is contemplated under the law.
102. In Suman v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2009(4) RCR (Criminal) 908 : 2009(6) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 365 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that there is nothing in the language of this sub-section from which it can be inferred that a person who is named in the FIR or complaint, but against whom charge-sheet is not filed by the police, cannot be proceeded against even though in the course of any inquiry into or trial of any offence, the court finds that such person has committed an offence for which he could be tried together with the other accused. In Lal Suraj (supra), a two-Judge Bench held that there is no dispute with the legal proposition that even if a person had not been charge-sheeted, he may come within the purview of the description of such a person as contained in Section 319 Cr.P.C. A similar view had been taken in Lok Ram (Supra), wherein it was held that a person, though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial.
105. In Sohan Lal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 1990(3) RCR (Criminal) 610 : (1990)4 SCC 580, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that once an accused has been discharged, the procedure for enquiry envisaged under Section 398 Cr.P.C. cannot be circumvented by prescribing to procedure under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
106. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & Ors., 1983(1) RCR (Criminal) 73 , this Court held that if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court that those who have not been arraigned as accused or against whom proceedings have been quashed, have also committed the offence, the Court can take cognizance against them under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and try them along with the other accused.
108. Both these provisions contemplate an inquiry to be conducted before any person, who has already been discharged, is asked to again face trial if some evidence appears against him. As held earlier, Section 319 Cr.P.C. can also be invoked at the stage of inquiry. We do not see any reason why inquiry as contemplated by Section 300(5) Cr.P.C. and Section 398 Cr.P.C. cannot be an inquiry under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, a person discharged can also be arraigned again as an accused but only after an inquiry as contemplated by Sections 300(5) and 398 Cr.P.C. If during or after such inquiry, there appears to be an evidence against such person, power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised. We may clarify that the word `trial’ under Section 319 Cr.P.C. would be eclipsed by virtue of above provisions and the same cannot be invoked so far as a person discharged is concerned, but no more.
Q.III Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
A. In Dharam Pal’s case, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Cr.P.C. and the Sessions Judge need not wait till `evidence’ under Section 319 Cr.P.C. becomes available for summoning an additional accused. ? Section 319 Cr.P.C., significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr.P.C.; and under Section 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr.P.C. Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. In view of the above position the word `evidence’ in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.
Q.II Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?
A. Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr.P.C. the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the Court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C. would be the same as for framing a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial – therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.
Before :- S.B. Sinha and Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.
S.B. Sinha, J. – Leave granted.
Appellant No. 1 is the husband of the respondent No. 3. The other appellants are his parents.
Almost immediately thereafter, that is, on 21.5.2000, respondent No. 3 and appellant No. 1 got married at Jalandhar as per Sikh rites.
After a month’s stay in India, respondent No. 3 left for Canada. On or about 6.3.2001, respondent No. 3 gave birth to a female child in Canada. Appellant No. 1 went to Canada on the sponsorship of respondent No. 3 on 14.4.2001. He got an employment there as a driver.
Disputes and differences arose between the appellant No. 1 and the respondent No. 3 in the year 2003. Allegedly, she left with all her belongings and withdrew Canadian $ 24500 from the joint account of the parties.
It is neither denied nor disputed that she had been contacting lawyers with regard to her matrimonial disputes and even cancelled the sponsorship of the application for grant of permanent residence of appellant No. 1 as also his family.
“On 28th August, 2003, when the applicant had gone to work, the respondent left the matrimonial home to live with her parents. She took with her all her personal effects, jewelleries and withdrew $23,000.00 from their joint bank account.
Inderpal Singh is the father of the respondent, Paramjit Kaur and the father in law of the applicant.
“On September 20, 2003, I decided to return to the house of my husband without advising him that I was coming back. My husband is reluctant and fearful to have me back in the house. I have promised my husband that I would not harass him any more and that I am very sorry for all the problems that I have created for him.
It is only thereafter, the father of the respondent No. 3, namely Inter Pal Singh, a retired Police Inspector and permanent resident of Canada, while on a trip to India, lodged a complaint against the appellants under Section 406/420 Indian Penal Code on or about 21.4.2006 along with an affidavit of respondent No. 3 inter alia alleging that the appellants demanded dowry and misappropriated the dowry articles.
In view of separation between appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 3, appellant filed a second divorce petition on or about 1.5.2006 in the Superior Court of Brampton, Ontario seeking divorce and custody of the child.
Indisputably, an FIR bearing No. 141 dated 30.5.2006 was registered under Section 406/420 Indian Penal Code at Division No. 4, Jalandhar.
4. However, despite the same, a charge-sheet was issued. In the mean time, divorce application filed by the appellant in Canada, were allowed by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice by its order dated 19.10.2007.
On receipt of the summons, appellants filed an application under Section 482 of the Code which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed.
i. Having regard to the factual backdrop of the matter, it is evident that the Jalandhar Court had no territorial jurisdiction to make an investigation into the matter.
ii. The proceedings initiated against the appellant amounts to an abuse of the process of law as the FIR was deliberately filed at Jalandhar although the offences, if any, had taken place only at Ontario in Canada.
i. That the appellants have committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the articles which were given in dowry.
ii. Appellant No. 1 married respondent No. 3 only for the purpose of going to Canada and, thus, an offence under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code must also be held to have been committed.
“9. That at the time of departure, the accused were fully made aware of the fact that all the articles of dowry mentioned above constitutes the Streedhan of the daughter of the applicant namely Paramjit Kaur and are meant for the exclusive use and the same should be given to her for her personal use whenever she demands the same from them from time to time. After whole incident my daughter Smt. Paramjit Kaur is living under depression and cruelty.
8. Parties admittedly live at Ontario in Canada. Offence, if any, had been committed in Canada. FIR, however, has been lodged at Jalandhar only after the divorce application was filed. No allegation has been made in the FIR that appellants at the time of marriage or thereafter demanded any dowry. The demand of a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs allegedly was made only in Canada and that too after the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 arrived in Canada in March 2006, i.e., almost after a period of five years from the date of marriage. We have noticed hereinbefore the opinion of the Superintendent of Police. He recommended ‘cancellation’ of the FIR for one reason or the other. However, the said recommendation had not been accepted. A charge-sheet has been filed.
9. Mr. Dhanda submits that the jurisdiction of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code should be used in exceptional cases and very sparingly. According to the learned counsel, allegation of mala fide against the first informant cannot be a ground for quashing a criminal proceeding after a charge-sheet has been filed. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, 2002(1) RCR(Criminal) 480 : [2002(3) SCC 89].
10. Parties were married in May 2000. Disputes between the parties arose for the first time in the year 2003. Respondent No. 3, however, on an application filed by the appellant No. 1 apprehending danger to his life, categorically admitted her fault and guilt. Even at that point of time no allegations of cheating and/or non-return of the Stridhan were made. It is only after a period of three years when the disputes and differences between the parties wrecked up once again and on filing of an application for divorce, the father of the respondent No.3 came from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge FIR. The facts pleaded in the application for quashing of FIR before the High Court are not denied or disputed. In fact, most of the documents relied on by the appellant are annexed to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No.3 herself. We, therefore, do not have to consider any document which the appellant intends to place before us by way of defence. It is also not a case where this court has to undertake a difficult task of appreciating the evidence brought on record by the parties.
Mr. Dhanda’s submission that the marriage between the appellant No.1 and respondent No. 3 was solemnized only for the purpose of getting the family settled at Canada is far fetched. For the purpose of constituting an offence for criminal breach of trust and/or cheating, the ingredients thereof as contained in Section 405 and 415 respectively must be borne out from the records.
“whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person … shall be punished with imprisonment …”.
(iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit.
No act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been alleged by the respondent. No allegation has been made that he had an intention to cheat the respondent from the very inception.
Furthermore, the larger part of offence, if any, has been committed only in Canada. Why the father of respondent No. 3 had to come from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge an FIR is difficult to comprehend. Respondent No. 3 and the first informant do not say that the inquiry report submitted by the Superintendent of Police on the representation made by the appellant No. 2 was incorrect. It has also not been stated that as to on what material, the charge-sheet had been submitted. We, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the allegations contained in the FIR had been made with an ulterior motive to harass the appellants. Continuance of the criminal proceeding against them would, therefore, amount to abuse of process of the court.
Before :- S. Rajendra Babu, Brijesh Kumar and G.P. Mathur, JJ.
G.P. Mathur, J. – Leave granted.
2. These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment and order dated January 16, 2002 of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, by which three Petitions filed by the appellants under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code were dismissed.
3. M/s. Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Private Ltd. entered into three identical Bottling Agreements with the complainant, Sanjiva Bottling Company Private Limited on March 1, 1996 pursuant to a Master Trademark License entered into by associate companies of Cadbury Schweppes plc. United Kingdom and Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Private Limited. In terms of these three agreements, M/s. Sanjiva Bottling Company was authorised to manufacture and sell certain specified beverages under specified trademarks owned by Cadbury Schweppes plc. U.K. or its associate companies. The agreements contained identical clauses with regard to their respective terms and conditions and provided that they shall continue for an initial term of five years and for further successive period of five years, unless terminated by either party by giving to the other not less than 12 calender months notice in writing to terminate the agreement. On July 29, 1999, Atlantic Industries (a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of The Coca-Cola Export Corporation, U.S.A.) purchased about 3500 trademarks in 155 countries from Cadbury Schweppes plc., upon which the bottling agreements between Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. and Sanjiva Bottling Company were duly assigned to Atlantic Industries and an information regarding the same was given to Sanjiva Bottling Company in writing. On February 14, 2000, Atlantic Industries gave notice in writing to the complainant, Sanjiva Bottling Company that the bottling agreements shall not be renewed after their expiry on February 28, 2001.
4. Sanjiva Bottling Company through its Director, Rajiv Mehta filed a criminal complaint against 11 accused including the appellants in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhopal on July 24, 2000 for their prosecution under Section 420 read with Section 511 Indian Penal Code. The accused No. 1 arrayed in the complaint is Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. (A-1) and accused Nos. 2 to 5 are Chairman, Managing Director and Finance Director etc. of the said Company. Besides them, Coca Cola India (A- 6), Alex Von Behr, President and Chief Executive Officer (A-7), Nitin Dalvi, Vice-President, Strategic Business, Planning and Information Service (A-8) and Samip Shah, Vice-President, Business Development of Coca Cola India, (A-8) Ajay Mitra, Regional Operational Director, Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. (A-10) and Steve M. Whaley, Vice-President and General Tax Counsel, Atlantic Industries (A-11) have been arrayed as accused Nos. 6 to 11. The case set up in the complaint is that the complainant is engaged in the business of bottling soft drinks since 1983 at Bhopal. The complainant was approached by A-1 in 1995 to discontinue its competing brand ‘Sprint’ and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on October 9, 1995. Thereafter, an agreement was entered into between the complainant and A-1 on March 1, 1996 by which the complainant became one of the bottlers of A-1, made investments in the bottling plant and also promoted the sales of A-1 in its area. By a letter dated July 29, 1999, A-1 informed the complainant that the brands Schweppes, Crush and Canada Dry and associated brands in India would be acquired by a member of the Coca Cola group of companies. A-1 had 19 bottlers in the year 1997 but Coca Cola India (A-6) had reduced them to 7 and is installing its own bottling plants in different places. The case of the complainant further is that by the letter dated February 14, 2000, A-6 informed the complainant that they would not renew the agreements on their expiry on February 28, 2001. In paras 47 and 48 of the complaint, it is alleged that A-6 is adopting all sorts of unfair trade practices and that it has made wrongful gain of over Rs. 100 crores. In para 50, it is alleged that A-1 and A-6 have not replied properly to the letters of the complainant and the accused have, therefore, cheated the complainant by making false representation.
6. After consideration of the report the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that the police had not submitted the same in accordance with Section 173(2) Criminal Procedure Code and also in the proforma prescribed in the Rules framed by the State Government as the same had been submitted on plain paper. The SHO, PS Govindpura was accordingly directed on November 16, 2000 to submit a report in the prescribed proforma.
7. On January 11, 2001, the Police submitted a report that on the basis of the complaint, Case Crime No. 5 of 2001, Case Crime No. 13 of 2001 and Case Crime No. 18 of 2001 has been registered under Sections 420, 120-B, 34 Indian Penal Code. On the same date, the learned Magistrate passed an order that the Police had registered the offence and investigation is being carried on and, therefore, the complainant should make available Hindi translation of the documents and fixed January 30, 2001 as the next date. Thereafter, the appellants filed three Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code before the High Court for quashing of the F.I.R. and the proceedings of the case before the learned Magistrate. After hearing the parties, the High Court held that the investigation had not yet commenced in connection with the F.I.Rs. which had been registered at the Police Station and, therefore, the Petitions were pre-mature and accordingly all the three Petitions were rejected.
8. Shri F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel for the appellants has submitted that M/s. Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. (A-1) had entered into bottling agreements with the complainant Sanjiva Bottling Company on March 1, 1996 and the said agreements were to continue for a term of five years. It also contained a clause that either party could terminate the agreement at the end of initial term by giving to the other side not less than 12 calender months notice in writing. Subsequent to the execution of the agreement, Atlantic Industries (a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of The Coca-Cola Export Corporation, U.S.A.) purchased the trademarks from Cadbury Schweppes plc. on July 29, 1999, upon which the bottling agreements between the complainant, Sanjiva Bottling Company were duly assigned to Atlantic Industries and information regarding the same was also given to the complainant. Atlantic Industries thereafter gave notice to the complainant on February 14, 2000 not to renew the bottling agreements which were to expire on February 28, 2001 and the agreements with the complainant came to end on the said date. The learned counsel has further submitted that there is absolutely no allegation in the complaint that the appellants (A-7 to A-11) had at any time made any kind of mis-representation to the complainant or had asked it to do or omit to do anything and as such no offence under Section 420 Indian Penal Code is made out against them. It has thus been urged that the allegations made in the complaint, even if the accepted at their face value, do not disclose commission of any offence by the appellants and, therefore, the proceedings of the complaint case and also the F.I.Rs. lodged against the appellants are liable to be quashed.
9. The learned Advocate General for the State of Madhya Pradesh has submitted that as per the order of the learned Magistrate dated July 27, 2000, the Police had submitted a report that prima facie it was a case of violation of agreement for which the complainant could seek relief from the Civil Court. However, in view of subsequent order passed by the learned Magistrate on November 16, 2000 a case had been registered at the Police Station and the matter was being investigated.
10. Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel for the complainant has submitted that the allegations made in the complaint disclose commission of an offence under Section 420 Indian Penal Code by the accused persons and a case has been registered at the Police Station and investigation is being carried out. Learned counsel has further submitted that the High Court rightly took the view that the Petitions filed by the appellants for quashing of the proceedings were pre-mature and the said order does not suffer from any error of law.
“We refer to Agreements (to include any addenda entered into subsequently) entered into between yourselves (“the Company”) in relation to the production, sale and distribution of “Crush”, “Canada Dry”, “Schweppes”, and “Sport Cola” Products with an Effective Date of 01 March, 1996 (“called the Agreement”). All defined terms used in the Agreement shall have the same meaning prescribed in this letter, save as expressly stated otherwise.
13. The agreements executed between the complainant and A-1 on March 1, 1996 were for a period of five years. Though the same could continue for a further successive period of five years, but either party to the agreement had a right to terminate the same expiring at the end of the initial term by giving not less than 12 calender months notice in writing. The initial period of five years would have come to an end on February 28, 2001 but on February 14, 2000, notice was given to the complainant that the said agreements would not be renewed after expiry of the initial period i.e. after February 28, 2001. Even when the agreement were executed in March, 1996, the complainant was fully aware that the same may not be renewed further after expiry of the initial term of five years.
14. According to the allegations made in the complaint, it was the Technical Directors of A-1 who had approached the complainant and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on October 9, 1995. The modernisation of the bottling plant was done by the complainant as per the requirement and satisfaction of A-1 and thereafter the agreements were executed between them (Complainant and A-1) on March 1, 1996 in pursuance whereof the complainant claims to have spent considerable amount of money in improvement of the bottling plant. In fact there is absolutely no reference to A-6 to A-11 in the complaint except that A-6 is installing its own bottling plants and that A-6 gave notice to the complainant not to renew the agreements after expiry of the initial term. In paras 33 and 34 of the complaint, the entire allegations are made against A-1 and it is said that A-1 was actuated by dishonest intention to cheat the complainant and that A-1 has committed the offence of cheating. In para 47 of the complaint it has been alleged that A-6 is adopting all sorts of unfair trade practices.
17. In Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha & Ors., AIR 1974 Supreme Court 301, it was held that unless the complaint showed that the accused had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the complainant parted with the money it would not amount to an offence under Section 420 Indian Penal Code and it may only amount to breach of contract. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors., 2000(2) RCR(Crl.) 290 (SC) : 2000(3) SCC 693, it was reiterated that guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating and, therefore, to secure conviction ‘mens rea’ on the part of the accused must be established. It has been further held that in order to constitute the offence of cheating the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.
18. So far as the present appellants are concerned, they came into picture much later in July 1999, when various trade marks and brands of A-1 were purchased by A-6. The appellants were not at all in picture at the time when the complainant claims to have spent money in improvement of its bottling plant on the basis of the agreement executed with Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. (A-1). Since the appellants were not in picture at all at the time when the complainant alleges to have spent money in improving the bottling plant, neither any guilty intention can be attributed to them nor there can possibly be any intention on their part to deceive the complainant. No offence of cheating can, therefore, be said to have been committed by the appellants on account of the fact that a notice was given to the complainant that the bottling agreements will not be renewed any further after expiry of the initial term. Thus, even if the allegations made in the complaint are accepted to be absolutely true and correct, the appellants cannot be said to have committed any offence of cheating as provided in section 420 Indian Penal Code.
“1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying in the F.I.R. to do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
20. As mentioned earlier, the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute any offence as against the appellants. Therefore, the complaint filed by the respondent and the F.I.Rs. registered in pursuance thereof are liable to be quashed. Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors., 1999(4) RCR(Crl.) 223 (SC) : 1999(8) SCC 686 cited by learned counsel for the complainant is clearly distinguishable as in the said case the allegation in the complaint was that the complainant had paid in advance a price higher than the market price for purchasing “toasted soyabean extracts” but the accused sent the commodity which was of most inferior and substandard quality due to which the complainant suffered a loss of Rs. 17 lakhs. In view of the allegation made in the complaint, the matter required investigation and the proceedings could not have been quashed on the ground that the dispute was of a civil nature.
21. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated January 16, 2002 of the High Court is set aside and the complaint filed by the Respondent No. 2 and the F.I.Rs. registered in pursuance thereof as Case Crime Nos. 5 of 2001, 13 of 2001 and 18 of 2001, as against the appellants, are quashed.

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