Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/358/633/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:44:45+00:00

Document:
At a trial in a state court at which he was not represented by counsel, petitioner was convicted of burglary and sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years. No appeal was taken, and the State Supreme Court denied without a hearing a petition for habeas corpus which he filed later and in which he alleged, inter alia, that: he was 20 years old, uneducated and inexperienced in court trials. He was represented by counsel at an earlier trial for the same offense which resulted in a hung jury. He was then placed in solitary confinement, pending a new trial of which he was not notified until the day before it began. Meanwhile, his counsel had withdrawn from the case and his mother had made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain other counsel. At the trial, he was denied both the appointment of counsel for his defense and a continuance to enable him to obtain counsel. His conviction was based largely on the testimony of an alleged accomplice who pleaded guilty and testified for the State -- not only regarding the crime for which petitioner was being tried, but also regarding other alleged crimes.
Held: if petitioner's allegations be true, he was denied the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was incumbent on the state courts to determine what the true facts were. Pp. 358 U. S. 633-638.
burglary. [Footnote 1] He was not represented by counsel at the trial. No appeal was taken, and the Supreme Court of Florida denied without a hearing a petition for habeas corpus which he later filed. [Footnote 2] Certiorari was granted to determine whether the circumstances alleged in the habeas corpus petition make this a case where the denial of counsel's assistance at the trial operated to deprive the defendant of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 357 U.S. 904. For reasons to be stated, we hold that this is such a case.
The record here consists only of the habeas corpus petition and the Florida Supreme Court's bare order of denial. With the case in that posture, the factual allegations of the petition must, for present purposes, be accepted as true. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 326 U. S. 273. Composed in the penitentiary, the petition, like many such documents, is heavily larded with irrelevant innuendos, unsupported conclusions, and pretentious legalisms. Within its confines, however, are to be found allegations of a chain of events which we now relate.
On December 6, 1954, the petitioner, an uneducated farm boy of 20, was first tried by a jury on the burglary charge. At that trial, he was represented by experienced counsel of his own choice. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was unable to agree on a verdict, and a mistrial resulted.
petitioner's mother on his behalf had tried to engage a number of other lawyers to represent him, but they had all refused, telling her that the fee she could offer was inadequate, and the time for preparation too short.
On conviction, the petitioner, a first offender, was sentenced to the 15-year prison term he is now serving. Allen, an ex-convict, was sentenced to 10 years, but placed on probation. No charges were brought against the petitioner's brother or the fourth person named by Allen as a participant in the crime for which the petitioner was convicted.
alleged circumstances of the present case so clearly make it one where, under these decisions, federal organic law required the assistance of counsel that it is unnecessary here to explore the outer limits of constitutional protection in this area.
"Where the gravity of the crime and other factors such as the age and education of the defendant, the conduct of the court or the prosecuting officials, and the complicated nature of the offense charged and the possible defenses thereto render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in injustice as to be fundamentally unfair,"
the Constitution requires that the accused must have legal assistance at his trial. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 335 U. S. 441. Of particular relevance here are the decisions of the Court which have held the appointment of counsel necessary to a fair trial because of the complexity of the proceedings. Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773; and see Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 323 U. S. 475-476.
as to whether he believes that his testimony will be in his best interest. Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897; Henderson v. State, 135 Fla. 548, 555, 185 So. 625, 627 (concurring opinion). A layman would hardly be familiar with these rights.
A noncapital offense in Florida, punishable in this case by a maximum prison term of 20 years. Fla.Stat.1955, § 810.01.
The petition was originally filed in that court in accordance with state procedure explained in Sneed v. Mayo, 66 So.2d 865, 874.
"Petitioner explained to the Court that he was not capable of representing himself, that he was only 20 years of age and was uneducated and had never heard a court trial except the one time he was tried on the same charge, and then he was represented by Mr. Carr, and that he did not know court procedure or how to conduct his defense, and told the court he had been closely confined in solitary at the Florida State Prison at Raiford, up until the night before, and therefore he had no opportunity to employ new counsel, since the Court had permitted his chosen counsel to abandon him in the face of trial, and it was an absolute necessity that the court grant a continuance, or, in the alternative, for the court to remedy the situation by appointing counsel to represent the petitioner."
Under Florida law a trial court has an absolute duty to provide counsel only for an indigent defendant on trial for a capital offense. Sneed v. Mayo, 66 So.2d 865; Johnson v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 264, 28 So.2d 585; Fla.Stat., 1955, § 909.21.
"While making objections and inquiring of the Judge and witnesses, Cash appeared unsure of himself. On several occasions, he would start a sentence, then stop to rephrase it or start on another subject. Before making objections, Cash raised his hand to attract the attention of the Judge, then, in a halting manner, would make his statement."
See Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786; Canizio v. New York, 327 U. S. 82; De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134; Gayes v. New York, 332 U. S. 145; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672; Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773; Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U. S. 660; Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134; Massey v. Moore, 348 U. S. 105; Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155.
The very fact that the jury failed to convict at the first trial, when the petitioner was represented by counsel, is at least some practical indication of the difference a lawyer's help at the second trial might have made.
Counsel has advised us that a transcript of the trial proceedings can be made available by the court reporter.

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