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Intellectual property law consists of federal and state statutory law and state common law and has been divided into three areas: patent law, copyright law, and trade secret law. Each area is discussed separately in this article, and different types of available protection are compared to demonstrate their relative advantages and weaknesses and to aid in determining the type of protection appropriate in a particular situation.
It is rarely necessary to know precisely which class an invention falls within as long as it clearly falls within at least one class. Judicial decisions, however, have placed specific limitations on the above statutory classes and have made it clear that mere printed matter,46 scientific principles,47 things naturally occurring in nature,48 mental processes, mathematical algorithms,49 and methods of doing business50 are not included, and therefore, are not patentable.
The procedure for obtaining a patent involves several general steps. Usually a patent attorney or agent68 will draft a short written description with accompanying diagrams that describes the invention. A patent search will be conducted to determine if the invention is in fact new or if other similar ideas or products exist that would negate the patentability of the invention.69 Initially, a patent search will involve an examination of issued United States patents, comprising over four million patents to date, which are classified into numerous categories known as classes and subclasses.
To obtain copyright protection the work of authorship also must be an original creation of the author in the sense that the work resulted from the author's own intellectual effort and represents at least a modicum of creativity.123 Although the creativity requirement is minimal, trademarks,124 blank charts for recording facts,125 simple directions dictated by functional considerations,126 names, titles, or short phrases,127 and computing devices, such as a sliderule,128 have all been determined to lack sufficient creativity to be copyrightable.
The reproduction right allows the copyright owner to control the reproduction of the protected work in copies or phonorecords, which are defined to mean material objects embodying the copyrighted work with some permanence.144 This right prohibits, for example, the unauthorized photocopying of a copyrighted publication, the recording of copyrighted television broadcasts, and the reproduction of a read only memory (ROM)145 which embodies a protected computer program.146 This right explicitly prohibits the making of even a single, unauthorized copy. In addition, it is irrelevant whether the unauthorized copy is publicly used or merely made and used in private, such as when a record is copied onto a cassette tape.
Adapting copyrighted works into a new form is complicated by the fact that the transformed work can be the subject of more than one copyright. The creator of the original work owns a copyright on the original work. If the owner of the copyright licenses someone else to adapt or transform the original work, the licensee will have a copyright in any new material added to the original underlying work.161 The owner, however, will still retain the copyright in the original work.162 A typical example occurs when an editor selects and edits a group of literary works and reprints them in an anthology with additional annotations about the works. The author of each literary work has a copyright in his or her work, and the editor has a copyright that extends to the selection, editorial changes, and arrangement of the works, and to the annotations incorporated into the anthology. The editor's copyright, therefore, extends to the anthology as a whole, but not to the individual literary works contained within.
The distribution right grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to control the initial public distribution of copies or phonorecords of the protected work.163 This control extends broadly to the sale or other transfer of ownership and to the rental, leasing, or lending of the copies or phonorecords to the public.164 Once copies or phonorecords are distributed to the public by the copyright owner, however, the "first sale doctrine" extinguishes the distribution right of the copyright owner with regard to those lawfully obtained copies or phonorecords.165 These copies or phonorecords may be sold freely or transferred to anyone without violating the copyright owner's distribution right, although the other distinct rights of the copyright owner remain intact. A typical example is the purchase of a textbook. The purchaser is free to resell or dispose of the textbook, because the distribution right of the copyright owner has been extinguished.166 Photocopying the book or incorporating substantial portions of the book into another work, however, still would be copyright infringement, because the reproduction167 and adaptation168 rights of the copyright owner remain in effect.
(1) "Copyright," "Copr.," or "©;"
Both domestic and foreign copyright protection is easily obtained for minimal cost, thus making it a very desirable form of protection. These benefits, however, must be balanced against the degree of protection afforded, because the copyright owner's rights are limited to protection of the form of expression. Any underlying idea contained in the copyrighted work is not subject to copyright protection, and copyright provides protection only against copying a work of authorship. Independent creation of the same or similar works do not violate a copyright. Therefore, it should be recognized that while copyright is the easiest type of intellectual property protection to obtain, the extent of such protection is limited.
(5) use or disclosure of the trade secret by the other party that results in potential or actual damage to the owner.
Other countries, however, have differentiated between industrial or manufacturing secrets, such as methods, processes, formulas, or manufacturing systems, and commercial trade secrets, such as customer lists, price lists, advertising methods, and financial data.294 France protects manufacturing secrets by statutory criminal law,295 while commercial secrets are protected by an action for unfair competition.296 Germany,297 Italy,298 and Switzerland299 recognize both industrial and commercial secrets, but do not differentiate between them in terms of legal protection.
As a general rule, most secret information used by a business to maintain an advantage over competitors is potentially protectable by trade secret law both in the United States and abroad. The trade secret definition provided by the Restatement of Torts is the standard used by most American courts to ascertain the existence of a trade secret,305 but the definition and extent of protection of trade secrets varies in foreign countries.
V. Patent, Copyright, or Trade Secret Protection - Which is the Best?
The distinctions and similarities between patent, copyright, and trade secret protection must be understood so that the appropriate form of protection will be used in a particular case. In addition, it is important to understand how patent, copyright, and trade secret protection may overlap or be used simultaneously in some cases.
Patent protection is purely statutory and is limited to embodiments of an invention or discovery that fall within specifically defined statutory categories.311 These categories are much narrower in scope than the broad range of information that can be protected as trade secrets.312 In addition, strict tests of patentability must be satisfied during the lengthy process of seeking a grant of patent protection.313 Although patent law does not provide protection until a patent is issued, upon issuance the patent owner has an absolute right to prevent anyone from making, using, or selling the patented invention in the United States for a specified time.314 Unlike trade secret protection, which requires actual use of the information in a business,315 the grant of a patent confers absolute rights without regard to use of the invention. In fact, many patents are merely "paper patents" because the patented inventions have never actually been constructed.316 This does not affect the rights of the patent owner, however, who can still use the patent to prevent use of the invention.
The type of market available for the product is also important. A limited market lends itself to relying on trade secret protection by confidentially licensing the product to customers.329 A mass-marketed product may not be compatible with such an approach, and therefore, patent protection may be preferable. The likelihood of independent invention or discovery by a competitor is another important consideration because this would destroy trade secret protection but not patent protection.330 In addition, the type of technology involved is significant. In areas such as electronics, new ideas or products may become obsolete before lengthy patent proceedings are completed. The difficulty of maintaining secrecy is another critical factor because the continued maintenance of trade secret protection requires the existence of secrecy.
The coincident use of trade secret and copyright protection has been explicitly upheld because copyright extends only to the expression used by the author while trade secret protection extends to the underlying idea.333 Typically, this joint use is accomplished by placement of copyright notices on confidential information such as company manuals or software that are used internally or licensed only on a confidential basis. Trade secrecy is then relied on to protect the underlying idea contained in the information. If the information subsequently is injected into the public domain, however, copyright protection may be used to protect the expression of the underlying idea.
It is clear that the appropriate type of protection depends upon the subject matter involved and the circumstances in which it will be used. Some information may be protected by either patent law or trade secrecy, while other information may be protectable only as a trade secret. When only the expression of an idea must be protected copyright may be sufficient, while in other cases, copyright and trade secret may be used concurrently.
The protection of intellectual property is an old idea based on the premise that specific legal rights will spur discovery and creation of scientific and artistic advances. This protection is especially important today in high technology fields, such as electronics, where companies are reluctant to invest heavily in research and development absent some form of protection.
The patent law provides a powerful type of protection for many new inventions or discoveries, but such protection is limited to specific statutory classes. The problems arising from a lack of uniform interpretation and application of the patent law by different courts should be alleviated by the vesting of jurisdiction for all patent appeals in a single court.
Copyright provides automatic protection once an original work of authorship is created and fixed in a tangible medium of expression, but the extent of protection is very limited. The rights arising under copyright law also are subject to numerous explicit statutory limitations and exceptions. In addition, the fair use exception permits certain uses of protected works to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if they are permissible uses.
Trade secret protection, a product of common law, protects the sanctity of secret information used in a business to gain an advantage over competitors.
A final consideration with regard to protecting intellectual property is the need for worldwide protection. Patent protection must be applied for in each country in which protection is desired. Although similar protection is afforded by the patent law of most countries, differences exist. Copyright protection also is controlled by the national law of each country, but international agreements allow protection to be obtained automatically in most major countries. Trade secret law, while recognized in varying degrees in almost every country, is not highly developed outside the United States. It is clear nonetheless that intellectual property law is an important form of legal protection that can benefit businesses in both domestic and international markets when used effectively.
1. One very early patent was granted in Venice in 1469 for book printing. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 711, 715 (1944). For an English translation of this patent, see id. at 750.
Many patents and copyrights were granted in Venice in the 1500s. Id. at 716. Trade secrecy was used as early as the 1300s to protect an improved method of making silk thread that afforded users a commercial advantage over competitors. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 106, 120-21 (1952).
Trade secret law and practice also existed in Roman times. Jorda, International Trade Secret Protection (Protecting Trade Secrets 1983) 157 P.L.I. Pat, Copyright, Trademarks and Lit. Prop. Handbook Series 207 (1983). Furthermore, trade secret law is an old part of English common law. 2 A. Wise, Trade Secret and Know-How Throughout the World, § 2.01 (1981).
In the United States, patent law is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982), and copyright law is codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). Trade secret law is a function of state common law and some statutory enactments. See Restatement (First) of the Law of Torts § 757 comment a (1939); Uniform Trade Secret Act §§ 1-11, 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980) (adopted in Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Washington).
2.	One of the main purposes of the patent system is to encourage disclosure for the purpose of increasing public knowledge. A. Choate & W. Francis, Cases and Materials on Patent Law 7 (2d ed. 1981); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974). See also Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970), on remand, 316 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1971) (patent law establishes monopoly to encourage invention). Although the primary purpose of copyright law is often stated to be that of securing creative advances to the public, see 1 M. Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.03[A] at 1-30 to 1-30.1 (1983), this is achieved by providing rewards as incentives to creators. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984). See also Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (Congress may reward authors and inventors to encourage intellectual and artistic creations). The policies behind trade secret law are the encouragement of invention and the maintenance of commercial morality. Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 79 III. 2d 475, 477, 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1980).
3. The patent law grants exclusive rights in an invention or discovery for 17 or 14 years. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173 (1982).
4. The copyright law provides exclusive rights in original works of authorship for the life of the author plus 50 years and for terms of up to 100 years in certain cases. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982).
5. Trade secret protection generally lasts for as long as the protected information is secret. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
6. See generally Laskey, The Patent Law-A Step Child in Its Own House?, 7 PAT. L. REV. 13 (1975) (criticism of use of antitrust laws to diminish value of patents). For a general discussion of the tension between antitrust and patent law, see Levine, The Shrunken Patent Domain in the Expanded Anti-trust Universe, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 436 (1952). But see R. Nordhaus & E. Jurow, Patent-Antitrust Law 3 (1961), which notes both the granting of exclusive rights in some inventions and the passage of laws barring monopolies in the early American colonies. The judiciary's hostile view toward patents is illustrated by Justice Jackson's statement, "the only patent that is valid is one which this court [Supreme Court] has not been able to get its hands on." Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7. In 1672 the colony of Massachusetts prohibited the making of reprints without the consent of the owner of the copy, and Connecticut allowed patent monopolies in certain circumstances. In addition, the colonial congress adopted state copyright statutes. Prager, supra note 1, at 737-38.
8. See generally Forman, Two Hundred Years of American Patent Law, in Two Hundred Years of English and American Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law 26-28 (1977) (brief history of the constitutional power to protect writings and discoveries adopted as part of the Constitution).
9. The Constitution states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the progress of science in useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
10. See Comment, Legislation: President Proposes Antitrust Reforms in Attempt To Promote Innovation, 26 Pat. Trademark and Copyright (BNA) No. 646, at 445 (Sept. 15, 1983) (President urged Congress to modify intellectual property laws to improve ability of American industries to compete in international marketplace). See also H.R. Rep. No. 1307, part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & AD. news 6460, 6460-61 (increased protection of new technology needed to increase productivity of American industries to make them more competitive with foreign companies).
The protection of intellectual property has an effect on the economic development of our country. Gambrell, Overview of Ownership Conflicts that Arise with Respect to Intellectual Property, in Sorting Out the ownership Rights in intellectual property: A Guide to Practical Counseling in legal Representation 10-12 (1980). The need to protect intellectual property is evidenced by the fact that the cost of stolen technology to private business in the United States is $20 billion a year. Hofer, Business Warfare over Trade Secrets, 9 Litigation 8 (1983).
11. See Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, reprinted in 3 COMPUTER L.J. 53, 58 (1981-82) (cost of developing computer programs greatly exceeds the cost of their duplication) [hereinafter cited as Final Report]. See also 29 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 705, at 28 (Nov. 15, 1984) (White House statement indicated cost of creating and marketing chips can be tens of millions of dollars, while others can copy these chips at a fraction of these costs).
12. A new copyright act became effective January 1, 1978. See The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-702 (1982)). The Copyright Act was amended to clarify protection for computer software. See Computer Software Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a)-(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)). In addition, the Act was amended with regard to copyright royalties for rental of sound recordings. See Record Rental Amendment, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984).
Patent law was also amended recently. See Patent Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622 98 Stat. 3383. See also Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. Several additional amendments to the patent law have also been enacted. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (1982)); Pub. L. No. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317 (1982) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (1982)). See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 to 1.570 (1983) (revised regulations of the United States Patent and Trademark Office). A new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from all federal district courts, was established. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. Finally, a new type of intellectual property protection has been enacted to protect semiconductor chips. See The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (adding a new chapter 9 to 17 U.S.C.).
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982).
14. Id. § 154. It is important to note that a United States patent is without extraterritorial effect.
15. For the type of description of the invention that must be contained in a patent, see id. §§ 112, 113.
16. Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1978).
17. See A. Choice & W. Francis, supra note 2, at 77; 12A R. Milgrim, Business Organizations, Milgrim on Trade Secrets, § 9.02, at 9-14 (1984).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1982). Although sexually reproduced plants are explicitly excluded from patent protection, the Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-574, 94 Stat. 3350 (1980) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1982)), provides "patent-like" protection for sexually reproduced plants. The Act also provides for the issuance of certificates of plant variety protection, which entitle the plant breeder to exclude others from selling, offering for sale, reproducing, importing, exporting, or using the protected plant in producing another variety for 18 years from the issuance of the certificate. 7 U.S.C. § 2483 (1982). The Act is very similar to the patent law but it is administered by the Plant Variety Protection Office which is part of the Department of Agriculture. Id. § 2321. For general information about this Act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5082 (legislative history of Act); I P. Rosenberg, patent Law Fundamentals, § 6.01, at 60-22 (2d ed. 1984).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982).
20. Id. §§ 101-103. These sections set forth the statutory requirements for a utility patent.
22. Id. § 163. These rights last for 17 years from the issuance of a patent. Id. § 154.
23. Id. § 171. The term of a design patent is 14 years. For a general discussion of design patents, see I P. Rosenberg, supra note 18, § 6.01, at 6-25 to 6-31.
24. Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 494 F.2d 383, 389 (6th Cir. 1974).
25. Hygienic Specialities Co. v. H.G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614, 617 (2d Cir. 1962).
26. See, e.g., In re Hall, 69 F.2d 660, 661 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (new blending or arrangement of colors alone is not patentable).
27. See, e.g,. Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 679 (1893) (paper weight or ink stand that is a copy of well known building not patentable).
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1982).
29. See id § 135. For regulations used by the Patent and Trademark Office to determine who the first inventor is for purposes of determining who is entitled to receive a patent, see 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.201 to 1.2088 (1983).
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) & (g) (1982) (first inventor may lose right to apply for a patent if invention is abandoned, suppressed, or concealed). Although only the first inventor normally can obtain a patent on an invention, in some cases a subsequent inventor may obtain a patent on the same invention. An invention that is kept secret and eventually abandoned may be considered "lost art" that will not bar a subsequent inventor from getting a patent even though the later inventor is not the first inventor. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 496-98 (1850).
31. Invention requires both conception, which is the complete mental act of formulating the invention, and reduction to practice, which is actually constructing and using the invention. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 802-03 (S.D. Tex. 1983). See also Rex Chain Belt, Inc. v. Borg-Wamer, 477 F.2d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1973).
32 . "In general, conception is the mental activity of inventing or the creation or discovery and the new idea in a specific tangible means or way of carrying out the new idea." R. Croat & W. Francis, supra note 2, at 117.
33. Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1963) (general rule requires tests under actual working conditions). See also Paine v. Inoue, 195 U.S.P.Q. 598, 604 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1976) (must show invention is workable under actual conditions it is intended to operate under).
34. R. Croat & W. Francis, supra note 2, at 118; Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358 (1928), cited in Farmhand v. Lanham Mfg. Co., 192 U.S.P.Q. 749, 756 (D.S.D. 1976) ("reduction to practice contemplates an actual and complete use of the particular invention for its intended purpose").
35. See Solvex Corp. v. Freeman, 199 U.S.P.Q. 797, 805 (W.D. Va. 1976) (invention need not be actually constructed and used to be patentable); Ex parte Frank, 191 U.S.P.Q. 412, 413 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1975) (filing of application is constructive reduction to practice).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
37. Decker v. FTC, 176 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 878 (1949).
38. 1 P. Rosenberg, supra note 18, § 8.03, at 8-7 (economic or commercial value of invention not relevant to utility). See generally International Glass Co. v. United States, 159 U.S.P.Q. 434, 440-41 n.8 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (successful reduction to practice establishes existence of invention without regard to commercial use of invention).
39. See, e.g., Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 802 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1977) (in many states even illegal use satisfies the utility requirement).
40. See Technitrol Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1978) (device has no utility if it does not work).
41 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1982) (bars obtaining a patent on an otherwise patentable invention "which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon").
42. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
43. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 531, 570-71 (1863).
44. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-11 (1980).
45. In American Fruit Crowers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931), a "manufacture" was defined as an article produced from raw or prepared materials as a result of giving such materials new forms, qualities, or properties.
46. Conover v. Coe, 90 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (arrangement of printed matter not patentable).
47. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (scientific truth not patentable).
48. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 583, 593 (1978) (discovery of law of nature not patentable).
49. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (mathematic formula by itself not patentable).
50 Conover, 99 F.2d at 379 (method of doing business not patentable).
51 The Greening Nursery Co. v. J & R Tool and Mfg. Co., 153 U.S.P.Q. 660, 662 (8th Cir. 1967).
52 Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229 (1976) (must look to person reasonably skilled in an applicable art); Robbins Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 554 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir. 1977) (finds level of skill for mining engineers high since typical engineer has four years of college training in engineering).
53. The importance of the nonobviousness requirement and the difficulty of applying it is evidenced by entire books written on this requirement. See, e.g., J. Witherspoon, Nonobviousness - The Ultimate Condition of Patentability § (1980).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
55. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
56. Prior art is a technical term that describes the body of knowledge the person skilled in the field of the invention is held to know. It generally includes technical knowledge normally possessed by someone skilled in the field, and issued patents, books, and other publicly available documents that are relevant to the field of the invention even if not actually known by someone skilled in the field. See E. Kitch & H. Perlman, Legal Regulation of the Competitive process 891 (1979).
See also Union Carbide Corp. v. American Can Co., 220 U.S.P.Q. 584, 588 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (inventor presumed to know all art in his field of endeavor and only art from other fields that is reasonably pertinent to his invention). Prior art includes patents that an inventor with ordinary skill in the art would be aware of. Id. at 591 & n.6; In re Van Wanderham, 378 F.2d 981, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (inventor held to know only information in relevant fields rather than information in all fields).
57. Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 548 F.2d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 1977); Parker v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 1975).
58. Swofford v. B & W. Inc., 395 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968).
59. Parker, 524 F.2d at 531; Tokyo Shibaura, 548 F.2d at 93. See also Union Carbide, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 589.
60. Graham, 383 U.S. at 717-18 (secondary considerations may have relevance as indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness); Union Carbide, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 591 (obviousness determination requires consideration of all evidence including secondary considerations).
61. Compare In re Lange, 228 F.2d 245 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (commercial success can be relied on to establish patentability only when it is an otherwise doubtful case) with StratoHex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (evidence of secondary considerations, when present, always must be considered with regard to obviousness).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 536 (1881) (a single well-defined case of public use is all that is required to establish public use).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
64. Id § 102(d). See also. § 185,which bars issuance of U.S. patent if a foreign patent is applied for without first procuring a filing license for such foreign filing under 35 U.S.C. § 184 (1982).
67. See generally Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946) (concealment of invention will result in loss of right to get patent); International Glass, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 440-41 (completed invention is abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if it is not subject of patent application or public disclosure within reasonable time after completion).
68. To represent clients before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, one must have a technical background and pass an examination given twice a year by the Patent and Trademark Office. After passing the exam the representative will be registered as a patent attorney if he is also an attorney, or as a patent agent if he is not an attorney. 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (1983).
69. See Ollerenshaw, How To Perform a Patent Search: A Step by Step Guide for the Inventor, 73 L. Library J. 1 (1980) (describes how to perform a manual patent search). See also W. Konoid, B. Tittel, D. Frei & D. Stallard, What Every Engineer Should Know About patents 17-23 (1979) (describes types of patent searches).
70. Access to information about a myriad of technical databases and databases containing patents are available from the following companies: Dialog Information Services, Inc., 3460 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, Cal. 94304; System Development Corporation 2500 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, Cal. 90406; Bibliographic Retrieval Services, 1200 Route 7, Latham, N.Y. 12110; and Mead Data Central, 200 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10166.
71. For the mandatory description and drawings of a patent application, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 113 (1982). See also W. Konoid, supra note 69, at 24-28 (describes briefly how a patent application is prepared and what it contains).
72. 35 U.S.C.§ 112(1982). See also Cohen, The Patent Monopoly: What and Why, in Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Trade Secrets for Corporate Counsel and General practitionaers 20 (1979).
In a closure assembly for an open-top [sic] container having a perforated cap over said open top thereof mounting a spray unit including a barrel provided with a tubular extension passing coaxially upwardly through the perforation in said cap, a plunger reciprocably carried by the barrel and normally extending therebeyond and a spray head on the upper head of the plunger above said extension, the combination with said spray unit of an annular retainer telescoped over and secured to the extension above said cap and provided with external, circumferentially disposed screw threads and an annular continuous segment at the upper part of the retainer above said screw threads, and a cup-shaped hold-down member housing the head and holding the plunger depressed at substantially the innermost path of travel thereof within the barrel, said member being provided with internal screw threads complementally engaging said screw threads on the retainer and having an internal, circumferentially extending, continuous shoulder disposed to engage said segment around the entire periphery thereof and thereby present a liquid-tight seal located between the spray head and said threads on the retainer and said member respectively, said shoulder being spaced from the lower annular peripheral edge of the member a distance at least slightly less than the distance from the portion of said segment normally engaged by said shoulder, to the proximal upper surface of the cap whereby said lower edge of the member is maintained out of contacting relationship with the cap when the member is on the retainer in a position with said shoulder in tight sealing engagement with the segment.
Claim 1 from United States patent 2,870,943 issued on January 27, 1959, reprinted in R. Croat & W. Francis, supra note 2, at 91-92. See J. Landis, Mechanics of Claim Drafting (2d ed. 1974) for a detailed description of how patent claims are drafted.
73. See sample patent application in Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Trade Secrets for Corporate Counsel and General practitionaers 660-79 (1979).
74. Croat & W. Francis, supra note 2, at 587-88. See generally W. Konoid, supra note 69, at 29-33 (describes the handling of a patent by the U.S. Patents and Trademark Office).
75. 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-132 (1982). See W. Konoid, supra note 69, at 30.
76. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1982); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111, 1.133 (1983). See W. Konoid, supra note 69, at 30-32.
77. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113 (1983).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1982); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.191 to 1.198 (1983) (procedure before Board of Appeals). See also W. Konoid, supra note 69, at 32.
79. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1982) (appeal to Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); id. § 145 (appeal to U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia). See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.301, 1.303 (1983).
80. W. Konoid, supra note 69, at 32. See also Cohen, supra note 72, at 21. For copy of a U.S. patent issued for gunpowder charge and projectile container, see 1 P. Rosenberg, supra note 18, app. A3 to A7.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
82. See W. Konoid, supra note 69, at 3. Assume X gets the first patent on a stool that has a seat and four legs. Then Y gets a patent on an improved stool that has a seat, four legs, and a chair back. Y can use his patent to prevent anyone from making, using, or selling a stool that has a seat, four legs, and a chair back, but Y cannot make, use, or sell the stool covered by his patent, because it will infringe X's patent. Id.
83. 1 P. Rosenberg, supra note 18, § 1.02, at 1-5.
84. R. Wincor & I. Mandell, copyright, Patents and Trademarks: The Protection of Intellectual and industrial Property 43 (1980) (these notices simply inform the public that a patent application has been filed; legally enforceable patent rights do not arise until a patent has actually been granted). See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1982) (use of these notices to deceive public when no application has been filed can result in a fine of up to $500).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (patent grants the "right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention throughout the United States").
86. 2 P. Rosenberg, supra note 18, § 18.04, at 18-7. It should be noted, however, that just because a patent is granted in one country does not mean that it would be granted in another country, since countries have their own national patent systems.
87. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
88. Landis & Fanwick, Foreign Patents, 111 P.L.I. Pat., Copyright, trademarks and Lit. Prop. handbook Series 331, 335 (1979).
89. 2 P. Rosenberg, supra note 18, § 19.02, at 19-25. For example, Japan publishes patent applications within eighteen months of filing and the public can present information to patent office in opposition to patent application.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982).
91. The interim between filing a patent application and issuance of a patent is almost three years. Bender, Computer Software Licensing (Protecting Trade Secrets 1983) 157 P.L.I. Pat., Copyright, trademarks and Lit. Prop. handbook Series 405, 424 (1983).
92. Despite modernization of the Patent and Trademark Office and resulting increases in efficiency, the deputy commissioner of patents and trademarks has indicated that the goal of the office is to achieve an eighteen-month pendency for applications by 1987. Conference Reviews; PTO Rule Changes, 26 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 649, at 507 (Oct. 6, 1983).
93. See Bender, supra note 91, at 424 n. l (cost of obtaining a patent can be as high as one hundred thousand dollars).
94. See, e.g., 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 9.02[a], at 9-51 (to obtain patent protection of a moderately complex electronic invention in key industrial foreign nations could cost up to fifty thousand dollars).
95. See, e.g., Note, Patent Law-Estoppel Doctrine of Licensee Estoppel Overruled; State Protection of Unpatented Inventions Questioned, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 386, 397 n.59 (1970). See also 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 9.02[91[iii], at 9-54 (Eighth Circuit invalidated most patents litigated before it, while Third Circuit favored patents).
96. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (newly established Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from United States district courts). Prior to this Act, United States courts of appeals disagreed over many patent law issues. Compare Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294, 300 (l0th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930 (1974) (obviousness is question of fact) with Swofford, 395 F.2d at 367-68 (obviousness is question of law). This difference has been resolved by the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Union Carbide, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 589 (obviousness is question of law).
97. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) for the subject matter covered by copyright.
99. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 806-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 782 (creative advances are secured to public by providing rewards to creators as incentives to create); Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555 (Congress may reward authors to encourage intellectual and artistic creations).
100. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954). See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright does not extend to underlying ideas); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5670 [hereinafter cited as House Report 1476] ("copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by the author's work").
The distinction between protecting the form of expression as opposed to the underlying idea can best be understood by example. Assume a book explains a novel method of building a solar collector to heat water. The form of expression protected by copyright prohibits someone from photocopying the book. The underlying information that constitutes the method of building the collector, however, is not protected by copyright, and after reading the book, the copyright would not prevent the reader from actually building the collector. Patent protection, however, could extend to the method of building the collector and would prevent anyone from actually making or using the collector.
It is possible that the form of expression and underlying idea may merge when the idea can be expressed in only one way. Such a merger may bar copyright protection because to allow protection would amount to copyright protection of an idea. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984) (merger of the form of expression and underlying idea in computer software). See Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expresswn Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 735 (1967) (discussion of the difficulty of separating the idea and expression of the idea).
101. House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 129, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5745.
102. See supra notes 91, 93, 94 and accompanying text.
103. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
104. House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 129, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5745.
105. Id. Publication is defined as the distribution of the copyrighted work to the public by rental, lending, sale, or other transfer of ownership. A mere public performance or public display by itself does not amount to publication. 17 U.S.C. g 101 (1982).
106. House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 129, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5745.
107. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.08[A], at 1-44; House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 51, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5664.
108. Burrow-Giles Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
110. American Mutoscope and Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262, 266-67 (C.C.D.NJ. 1905).
111. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (statuette used as lamp base copyrightable).
112. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (writing should be broadly construed and may include recordings of artistic performance). See also Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (writings include works not in existence at time Constitution enacted); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (cartoon characters are copyrightable).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
114. Id. § 102(a)(1). Literary works are broadly defined to be "works, other than audio visual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia." Id. § 101. Literary works include computer programs. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) for a definition of "computer program" under the Copyright Act.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1982). A definition of musical works is not provided in the Copyright Act because its definition is believed to be well settled. House Report 1476 supra note 100, at 53, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5666-67. For a general discussion of musical works protected by the Copyright Act, see 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, § 2.05, at 2-53 to 2-58.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3) (1982). Dramatic works are not defined in the Copyright Act, but case law has established two essential requirements: (1) the work must relate a story; and (2) the work must provide directions so that a substantial portion of the story may be visually or audibly represented to an audience as actually occurring, rather than merely being narrated or described. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, g 2.06[A], at 2-60.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (1982). Pantomimes and choreograhic works are not defined in the Copyright Act or the legislative history. The legislative history, however, states that social dance steps and simple routines are not choreographic works. House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 54, 1976 U.S Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5667. For a discussion of pantomimes and choreographic works as copyrightable subject matter, see Nimmer, The Subject Matter of Copyright Under the Act of 1976, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 978, 1011-15 (1977); Comment, Gloving to a New Beat: Copyright Protection for Choreographic Work, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 1287 (1977).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (5) (1982). "Pictorial, graphic and sculptural works include two dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine graphic and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams and models." Id. § 101. If the work is a useful article, the copyrightable design must be separable from the utilitarian aspect of the article.
119. Id. § 102(a)(6). "Audiovisual works are works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any." Id. § 101. "Motion pictures are audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any." Id.
120. Id. § 102(a)(7). "Sound recordings are works that result from fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual works." Id. § 101.
121. Section 102(a) states that works of authorship include the categories discussed supra in notes 114-20, and § 101 defines "including" to be only illustrative. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1982).
122. But see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (fully developed literary characters are protectable apart from the stories in which they originally appear). Such characters do not necessarily fall within the categories listed in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
123. 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (1982) (originality requirement). See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Pinchok, 423 U.S. 863 (1975) (exceptional creativity or originality is not required; "a modicum of creativity may suffice").
124. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
125. Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See also John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 515, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1983).
126. E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enters., Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (directions that stated "Apply hook to wall" not copyrightable).
127. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959). See also U.S. Copyright Office Circular R32, Blank Forms and Other Work Not Protected by Copyright (Mar. 1982); U.S. Copyright Office Circular R34, Copyright Protection Not Available for Names, Titles or Short Phrases (Sept. 1982). But see Pattishall, Protection of Labels Through Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition Laws, 56 Trade-mark Rep. 408 (1966) (discussing label protection).
128. See U.S. Copyright Office Circular R33, Computing and Measuring Devices (Sept. 1978).
129. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1982). See also House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 51, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5664 (originality requirement does not require novelty). See also Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (copyright protects originality rather than novelty).
130. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (originality means copyrighted work owes its origin to the author; originality is a prohibition against copying).
131. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18.
132. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
134. See House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 52-53, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5665-66. See Final Report, supra note 11, at 88.
135. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, § 1.01[B][a], at 1-23.
136. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). With regard to preemption, see generally House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 130-34, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5746-49. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Crow, 720 F.2d 1224 11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 89 (1984) (copyright law preempts state criminal law action for selling bootleg recording of copyrighted record albums).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
144. For definitions of "copies" and "phonorecords," see id. § 101. Phonorecords include phonograph records, open-red tape, cartridges, cassettes, and piano rolls. See also 2 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, § 8.05[A], at 8-85 n.4.
145. A ROM is a small electronic device that produces specific outputs in response to externally supplied data. These outputs result in the execution of certain instructions within the computer.
146. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
148. Id. § 115. The Copyright Act established the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to set the amount of royalties. Id. §§ 801-810.
Sound recordings are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as discs, tapes or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
Id. § 101. In addition, commercial establishments that rent sound recordings for home copying must pay royalties. Rental Record Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 115 (1982)).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). This exception, however, only applies to use of the program by the owner in the owner's computer. It does not permit the production of copies of the program which are then provided to others for use in their computers. See Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 28 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 697, at 595 (D. Mass. Sept. 20, 1984).
151. See Final Report, supra note 11, at 62. Generally, computers use machine language although computer programs are written in a higher level language. Therefore, the computer must translate or convert the high level language into machine language before it can utilize the program. This conversion constitutes the making of a copy that would violate the reproduction right absent the exception contained in 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
152. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "derivative" works for the types of adaptations that are covered by the adaptation right).
157. House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 62, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5675.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
160. Id § 106(2). See also definition of "derivative" works. Id § 101.
162. Id See Germany House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 57-58, 1976 U.S Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5670-71.
163. House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 62,1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5675-76.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982). Any unauthorized public distribution is a copyright infringement. See House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 62,1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5676.
166. See House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 79,1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5693.
167. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982). Id § 106(2).
168. Id. § 101 (defining a public performance).
171. See, e.g., id. § 114(a) (performance right does not apply to sound recording).
172. At least one commentator feels that the focus of "public" is not necessarily the size or location of the audience, but rather the availability of the copyrighted work to the public with the intent that members of the public will then perform the work, to the disadvantage of the copyright owner, even if such performance is in private. On this basis, public companies that rent prerecorded videocassettes may be liable for violation of the performance right as a consequence of their rental and subsequent use of the cassettes by individual customers. See 2 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, § 8.14[C], at 8-143 to 8-144.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1982).
175. Id. § 110(3). See generally House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 84-85, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5698-99.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (1982).
182. Id. § 118 (parties must agree on license royalties or they are determined by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal).
187. See id. § 101 for definitions of "display" and to "publicly display."
188. Id. § l09(b). Section l09(b) was redesignated § l09(c) by Pub. L. No. 98450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1982).
194. Id. The legislative history of the Act indicates that quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration, quotation of short passages in scholarly works for clarification of the author's observation, or reproduction of materials for educational purposes may all be fair uses of copyrighted works. See House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 65-66, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5678-79. See also Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions, reprinted in id. at 68-74, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5681-88.
195. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196. See Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D.N.H. 1978); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D.D.C. 1981).
197. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
198. 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, § 13.05[A], at 13-56 to 13-57 & nn.l5, 16.
199. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 66, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5680. See also Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 791 n.29, 806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977). One very recent and well known application of the fair use doctrine involved the "Betamax case" in which the Supreme Court determined that the videorecording of copyrighted television shows for the purpose of time-shifting amounted to a fair use. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 779 (time-shifting defined to be practice of videorecording programs to view once at a later time and then erasing them).
The Court reached its conclusion by looking at the four factors enumerated in the Act. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. The Court determined that recording for private home use was a noncommercial, nonprofit activity that merely enabled a viewer to select an alternative viewing time for a work that the viewer was already invited to view free of charge, and there was no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for the copyrighted programs. The Court also noted that the fact that a work was recorded in its entirety was not relevant under the circumstances of this case. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 792-93. But see Quinto, 506 F. Supp. at 560 (reprinting 92% of story precludes claim to fair use defense). The significance of Sony becomes apparent in view of the fact that over twelve million videorecorder units have been sold in the last five years. An estimated twenty-five million will be sold by the end of 1986. Paris, Coming Distractions, Forbes, July 16, 1984, at 46.
201. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). A joint work requires an intent by the joint authors to merge their respective contributions into a single work at the time of creation of the contributions. The joint authors do not have to work together, and their contributions need not be equal. Id. § 101 (defining "joint work"). Each joint author is considered a tenant-in-common of the joint work. Each can unilaterally use or grant a nonexclusive license in the work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other joint authors with regard to their share of the proceeds. House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 121, 1976 Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5736.
203. Id. § 104(a). See id. § 101 for a definition of "publication."
205. Id. § 302(a). For a joint work the term is the life of the last surviving author plus fifty years. Id. § 302(b). For works made for hire, anonymous works and pseudonymous works the term is seventy-five years from the date of publication or one hundred years from the date of creation, whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c).
206. Id. § 401 (a).
207. Id. § 401(b). The date can be omitted in some cases for pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works. See id. § 401(b)(2).
208. Id. § 402. The symbol ["P" in a circle] was adopted as the international symbol for protection of sound recordings by the "Phonograms Convention" at Geneva on October 29, 1971. Some sound recordings may contain both a sound recording notice and a conventional copyright notice when copyright is claimed in both the sound recording and, for example, the printed text or art work appearing on the phonorecord. See House Report 1476, supra note 100, at 145, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5761.
209. The address for the Copyright Office is: Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20559.
210. 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1982). The copies are deposited for the use of the Library of Congress. Id. § 407(b). The Copyright Office, by regulation, can alter deposit requirements. Id. § 407(c). See, e.g. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1983) (requires only first and last twenty-five pages of a computer program to be deposited, together with the page containing a copyright notice).
211. 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (1982).
215. Id. § 505 (court can award attorney's fees at its discretion).
216. Id. § 504(c) (copyright owner can elect to receive statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits. The amount of statutory damages must be at least $250 but not more than $10,000, with the actual amount set by what the court deems to be just. The court has the discretion to increase the award up to $50,000 if willful infringement is found).
217. Registration is easily and inexpensively accomplished by completing short, easy-to-understand forms provided by the Copyright Office, which are then submitted by mail with appropriate copies of the work.
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982) (district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction of copyright matters).
219. Copyright registration, however, within five years of first publication establishes prima facie validity of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
220. Transfer can be for the copyright or limited to only some of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. Id. § 101. A valid transfer must be in writing and recorded in the Copyright Office to establish copyright ownership. Id. §§ 204(a), 205(d).
221. Selle v. Gibb, 567 F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (N.D. 111. 1983).
222. A showing of substantial similarity may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of infringement when the similarity between the two works is striking and substantial. Champion Map Corp. v. Twin Printing Co., 350 F. Supp. 1332, 1336 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
223. Authorized copying would occur if defendant had permission to copy the work, or if one of the exceptions, such as fair use, permitted copying.
224. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
230. 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, § 17.02, at 17-5.
231. The major international copyright treaty is the Universal Copyright Convention, of which the United States is a signatory. It provides that each member country must provide the same protection to U.S. authors as provided by each country to its own nationals. The full text of this Convention is found in Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324.
The Buenos Aires Convention provides copyright protection for U.S. nationals in member countries provided an appropriate U.S. copyright notice plus the phrase "All Rights Reserved" is used on published copies of the copyrighted work. The full text of this Convention is reprinted in 4 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, at app. 28.
The Universal Copyright Convention abrogates the need to rely on the Buenos Aires Convention in all but a few South American countries. See Rinaldo, The Scope of Copyright Protection in the United States Under Existing Inter-American Relations: Abrogation of the Need for United States Protection Under the Buenos Aires Convention by Reliance upon the UCC, 22 Bull. Copyright Soc'y Y 417 (1975).
See 4 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, at app. 20 for a list of countries that extend copyright protection to American nationals. See generally id. § 17.04, at 17-9 to 17-22 for a detailed discussion of foreign copyright rights extended to foreign authors.
The other major copyright treaty, of which the United States is not a signatory, is the Berne Convention. This treaty, originally signed in 1886, has been revised numerous times. See 4 id. at app. 27 for the most recent version of this Convention. Although the United States is not a member of this Convention, most major countries have signed the original Convention or a subsequent revision. See id. at app. 22 for a list of member countries to the Berne Convention. Protection for U.S. nationals, however, can be obtained under the Berne Convention if the work is first published in a member country or if the work is simultaneously published in the United States and a member country. See generally 3 id. § 17.04[D], at 17-11 to 17-20. Berne Convention coverage, however, is not necessary for most new works since most major countries, including the United States, are signatories of the Universal Copyright Convention.
232. One exception is sound recordings, which are covered by United States copyright law but not the Universal Copyright Convention. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 7.07[B], at 7-22 n.l2. This deficiency has been partially corrected by the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms. See 4 id. at app. 23 for a list of countries that have ratified this Convention.
233. 3 id. § 17.09, at 17-36.
234. It should be noted that the Universal Copyright Convention only recognizes the symbol "'©" and not the alternative forms of "Copyright" or "Copr." allowed in the United States. The Universal Copyright Convention does not require the use of a copyright notice, but rather it permits the copyright notice to be a substitute for any formalities, such as deposit and registration or first publication in the nation in which protection is sought, which may be required by a foreign nation that is a member of the Universal Copyright Convention. See 2 M. Nimmer, supra note 2, § 7.07[B], at 7-21 to 7-24. Most major European nations do not require any formalities as a condition of copyright; but see id. § 7.07[B], at 7-23 n.l7 for a partial list of member countries that require formalities. Use of the Universal Copyright Convention notice fully satisfies the formalities required by these countries.
The phrase "All Rights Reserved" ensures compliance with the Buenos Aires Convention, and therefore, provides protection in the few countries that are members of the Buenos Aires Convention but not the Universal Copyright Convention. 3 id. § 17.04[C], at 1711.
235. This know-how does not have to possess the degree of novelty required by patent law. Some minimal degree of novelty must exist, however, for the know-how to be a trade secret. The extent of the novelty may be sufficient if it shows that the information is not a matter of public knowledge. See CPG Prod. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q. 206, 213 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980). See also Cataphote, 444 F.2d at 1315 (trade secret must have at least a modicum of originality).
236. See 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 9.03, at 9-65 (trade secret law domain of state common law). Some states, however, have adopted statutes to deal with trade secrets. See, e.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 1-11, 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980).
237. E.g. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953) (almost any knowledge or information that is kept secret and used to conduct a business qualifies as a trade secret). See, e.g., Zoecon Indus. v. American Stockmen Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th Cir. 1983) (customer lists are protectable as trade secrets). See generally Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482 ("the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law").
239. 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 9.03, at 9-65.
240. Restatement, supra note 1, at § 757 comment b.
241. 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 9.03, at 9-65. For a listing of cases following the Restatement, see 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 2.01 n.2, at 2-3 to 2-10.
242. Smith, 203 F.2d at 373.
243. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 222 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Sinclair v. Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 220, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (Ct. App. 1974) (court said Judge Friendly's definition was in harmony with definition in Restatement, supra note 1, at § 757 comment b).
244. Restatement, supra note 1, at § 757 comment b.
246. Id. In Forest Laboratories v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1971), and Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chem. Corp., 33 Wis.2d 445, 463-64, 147 N.W.2d 529, 53839 (1967), each court stated that these factors should be examined when determining if a trade secret exists. See also Arnold, Trial Tactics in Trade Secret Cases (Protecting Trade Secrets 1983) 157 P.L.I. Pat., Copyright, Trademarks and Lit. Prop. Handbook Series 11, 17-26 (1983) (12 factors to evaluate in determining existence of a trade secret).
247. The information must be kept secret and must not be known outside the trade secret owner's business. Underwater Storage, 371 F.2d at 954 (once trade secret is disclosed, the rest of the world may have right to use it). See also Packard Instrument Co. v. Reich, 213 U.S.P.Q. 322, 327 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (even though process kept secret, it is not trade secret if process is known and used by outside world).
248. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Minn. 1979) (information must provide a competitive advantage).
249. See Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. 272, 277 (N.D. III. 1982) (restriction of confidential reports to employees who needed access to them was a key security precaution).
250. See generally Pretty, A Comprehensive Program of Precautions To Forestall Loss of Trade Secret (Protecting Trade Secrets 1983) 157 P.L.I. Pat., Copyright, Trademarks and Lit. Prop. Handbook Series 167, 181-94 (1983) (general discussion of employee nondisclosure agreements). For nondisclosure agreements approved by the courts, see Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 917 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Syntex, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 274.
251. Such restrictive covenants must be reasonable, however, and will be scrutinized by courts to balance the right of an employee to market his skills freely against the right of an employer to protect trade secrets. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1965); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 219 U.S.P.Q. 458, 461-65 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1981).
252. See Texas Urethane, Inc. v. Seacrest Marine Corp., 403 F. Supp. 612, 617 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (to preserve secrecy, materials delivered by supplier color-coded without identification of materials).
253. Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So.2d 43, 49-50 (Ala. 1983) (question of fact under the circumstances if putting trade secret information in a trash bin is abandonment of the trade secret). But see Tennant Co. v. Advance Machine Co., 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (one-half of a million dollars in damages awarded to plaintiff in response to defendant finding plaintiff's confidential information by rummaging through plaintiff's trash bin).
254. Absolute secrecy is not required. Rather, reasonable measures to maintain secrecy must be undertaken. See E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 1017 (5th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff was not required to take precautions against aerial surveillance to protect trade secrets, because such precautions would be unreasonable).
255. See National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 152 U.S.P.Q. 120, 134 (Mo. 1966) (having employees sign covenants not to compete and warning of existence of trade secrets are factors in determining if adequate security precautions necessary to establish a trade secret have been taken).
256. Underwater Storage, 371 F.2d at 954; Packard Instrument, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 327.
257. Arnold, Basic Considerations in Licensing, in The Law And Business of Licensing 2A74 to 2A-75 (R. Goldscheider & T. Arnold ed. 1981).
258. See Management Science Am., Inc. v. Cyborg Sys., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 921 (N.D. 111. 1978).
259. See id. at 922 n.1 (disclosure of the software, subject to a confidential agreement, to more than 1,300 customers did not necessarily destroy confidential nature of the software).
260. Zoecon, 713 F.2d at 1178 (in employment relationship a confidential relationship may be implied by nature of the relationship).
261. J Irizarry v. Puente v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 248 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1957) (unsolicited letter sent to defendant by plaintiff, which disclosed plaintiff's idea, did not establish confidential relationship between plaintiff and defendant); Laughlin Filter Corp. v. Bird Machine Co., 319 Mass. 287, 289-90, 65 N.E.2d 545, 546 (1946) (confidential relationship cannot be thrust upon someone merely because proprietary information is involved).
In addition, a nondisclosure agreement puts an employee on notice that trade secrets are involved. Eastern Marble Prod. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 229, 232 (Mass. 1977). Also, acknowledgment by an employee in a nondisclosure agreement that certain trade secrets were not previously known may help undermine a later claim that the trade secrets were not secret information. See Kodekey Elecs., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp. 486 F.2d 449, 455 (lOth Cir. 1973); Rapco Foam, Inc. v. Scientific Application, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
262. Secrecy can be maintained despite wide dissemination of trade secrets provided such secrets are disclosed in confidence. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Christie G & S Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1904). At some point, however, the amount of confidential disclosure must equal public disclosure. Otherwise, it is theoretically possible for information confidentially licensed to every member of the public, to simultaneously constitute a trade secret and public information. The amount of confidential disclosure that will equal public disclosure is unclear because the issue has not been squarely addressed by the courts.
263. Compare Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 114 (Del. Ch. 1975) (dissemination of confidential diagrams to 6,000 people does not destroy secrecy provided such disclosure is in confidence), with Crown Indus., Inc. v. Kawneer Co., 335 F. Supp. 749, 761 (N.D. 111. 1971) (unrestricted disclosure of trade secret to a third party on a nonconfidential basis can destroy trade secret protection).
264. Cataphone, 422 F.2d 1290, on remand, 316 F. Supp. 1122, aff'd, 444 F.2d 1313 (trade secret protected from illegal misappropriation for as long as kept secret); Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (property right in unpatented trade secret exists as long as owner does not disclose secret).
265. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
266. Id. Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally and in the Mass Market, 3 computer L.J. 211 233 (1982).
267. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
268. 1 P. ROSENDERG, supra note 18, § 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4.
269. Id. at 3-6; Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475 (trade secret cannot be information that is public knowledge or general knowledge in the trade or business); Underwater Storage, 371 F.2d at 954 (once trade secret disclosed the rest of the world may have right to use it).
270. 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 4.01, at 4-1 to 4-2.
271. "The first issue to be determined in every trade secret case is not whether there was a confidential relationship or breach of contract . . . but whether, in fact, there was a trade secret to be misappropriated." Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 327, 191 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1972). See also Frodge v. United States, 180 U.S.P.Q. 583, 587 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 56 Mich. App. 335, 224 N.W.2d 80 (1974). This is very important because judicial opinions often focus so heavily on the confidential relationship that a reader might assume the breach of a confidential relationship by itself is actionable absent the existence of a trade secret.
272. See F. Jacer, 1984 Trade Secret Law Handbook 47 (1984).
274. Id. at 53. The tort theory is followed by the Restatement. See Restatement, supra note 1, at § 757 and accompanying comments.
275. For example, different conflict of laws rules and different statutes of limitations may apply depending upon characterization of the action as a tort or contract action. F. Jacer, supra note 272, at 55. The right to trial by jury may also depend upon whether the action is based on contract or tort. 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 7.03, at 7-27.
276. Punitive damages may be available under a tort theory but not under a contract theory. 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 7.03, at 7-27.
277. Id. at 7-26. See Posser & Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 1 29 (5th ed. 1984) (general discussion of the tort of interference with contractual relations).
278. This action generally requires: (1) existence of contract between plaintiff and third parties; (2) knowledge of this contract by defendant; (3) intentional unjustified inducement by defendant to breach this contract; (4) a subsequent breach of the contract by the third party; and (5) resulting damages to plaintiff. Walt Peabody Advertising Serv., Inc. v. Pecora, 393 F. Supp. 328, 331 (W.D. KY. 1974).
It may be advisable in many cases to notify employers of former employees that these employees possess knowledge of trade secrets and are subject to nondisclosure agreemeets, so that in an action for interference with contractual relations the subsequent employer cannot assert lack of knowledge of the existence of a contractual confidential relationship.
279. Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 78, 67 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1946).
280. See generally Hahn & Clay v. A. O. Smith Corp., 212 F. Supp. 22, 31 (S.D. Tex. 1962) (secrecy agreement must be construed to cover only methods and processes that are secret and confidential); Mostek v. Inmos, Ltd., 303 U.S.P.Q. 383, 389 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (secrecy agreement does not prevent former employee from using skills and talents acquired or enhanced while working for former employer).
281. 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 7.08, at 7-178.
282. Id. at 7-181 to 7-182 (injunction may be against misappropriator of trade secret or in some cases against the third party using the trade secret).
283. See Underwater Storage, 371 F.2d at 954 (once secrecy is vitiated, the trade secret vanishes).
284. 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 9.03, at 9-100 to 9-101. The usual rules for obtaining a preliminary injunction apply in the case of misappropriated trade secrets, id. at § 7.08, at 7-178 n.2, although courts may grant injunctions more readily in the case of trade secret misappropriation than in other contexts due to the destruction of all economic value of a trade secret that can result from prolonged public exposure. See generally id. at § 9.03, at 9-100 to 9-101.
285. Brunswick, 79 111.2d at 477, 404 N.E.2d at 207. See also 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 7.08, at 7-185 n.l2. A longer injunction may be granted in appropriate cases. See id. at 7-188 n.l2.2.
286. Kubik, 56 Mich. App. at 350, 224 N.W.2d at 95 (injunctive relief denied but damages allowed); Walker Employment Serv., Inc. v. Parkhurst, 300 Minn. 264, 268, 273, 219 N.W.2d 437, 439, 442 (1974) (damages available even though injunctive relief unavailable).
287. E.g. Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 95 (both injunction and damages awarded against defendants who breached both their covenants not to compete and their obligation not to disclose confidential information); Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 105 314 A.2d 296, 298-99 (1974) (injunction and damages allowable).
288. 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 7.08, at 7-229 to 7-231. See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R.4th 12 (1981).
289. Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 1973); Mann v. Tatge Chem. Co., 201 Kan. 326, 339, 440 P.2d 640, 650 (1968) (fraud oppression or wanton disregard required to support award of punitive damages).
290. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) (allows award of attorney's fees in exceptional patent cases); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982) (allows award of attorney's fees in copyright infringement suits at the discretion of the court).
291. Jorda, supra note 1, at 209. This may be partially related to the failure of most foreign case law to be reported. See Note, Research Sources in International and Commercial Law, 9 N.CJ. Int'l. & Com. Rec. 319 (1984) (most foreign jurisdictions only publish a fraction of the number of judicial opinions published in the United States).
292. See supra notes 237, 243 and accompanying text.
293. Mesne & Ampere Elec. Mfg. v. Milenkovic,  Vict. R. 784 (1972) (Australian court), reprinted in 1 A. Wise, Trade Secrets and Know-How Throughout the World, app. 11 at 3-159 to 3-186 (1981 rev:); Ansell Rubber Co. v. Allied Rubber Indus. Ltd.,  Vict. R. 37 (1966) (Australian court), reprinted in 1 A. Wise, supra note 293, app. l at 3-137 to 3-157.
294. See, e.g., Jorda, supra note 1, at 246-48 (France differentiates between "secrets de fabrique," which are industrial secrets, and "secrets de commerce," which are commercial secrets).
296. See id. at 247; 3 A. Wise, supra note 293, § 3.01, at 3-27 n.68.
297. 3 A. Wise, supra note 293, § 4.01, at 4-9 to 4-10, and § 4.01[d], [e], at 4-16 to 4-18.
298. 4 A. Wise, supra note 293, § 5.01, , at 5-7 to 5-8.
299. Id. § 8.01, at 8-5.
300. See generally 2 A. Wise, supra note 293, § 2.02, at 2-11 to 2-21.
301. Id. § 2.03, at 2-23 to 2-29.
302. See id. English law will protect confidential information even if it is not secret. American law, however, requires secrecy. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
303. 1 A. Wise, supra note 293, §§ 4.01 to 4.02, at 4-3 to 4-5 (Taiwan); id. § 2.01, at 2-3 (India).
304. Jorda, supra note that 221. See also CPG Prod., 502 F. Supp. at 44 (court noted that trade secret protection not available in Mexico).
305. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 236.
307. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
308. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482-91 (trade secret law can be used to protect both patentable and unpatentable subject matter).
310. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
31l. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (to be patentable invention must be "new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof'). For a discussion of these statutory categories, see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
312. See Smith, 203 F.2d at 373 (almost any information or knowledge that is kept secret and used to conduct a business qualifies as a trade secret).
313. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982). See also Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476-78.
314. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
315. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 247, 254-56 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
321. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (1982).
322. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (distinction between patent and copyright protection). See also supra notes 238, 264-67 and accompanying text (trade secret law protects an underlying idea from misappropriation but not from reverse engineering or independent development).
323. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
324. 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 8.02, at 8-3. It should also be noted that some works of authorship, such as certain works of art, may be protected by a design patent or by copyright. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 201. Both design patent and copyright protection may be obtained simultaneously in the same work. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 138'), 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
325. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982).
326. See, e.g., Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1269 n.10 (9th Cir. 1978) (although product patented, method of manufacture could be trade secret); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Neumann, 201 U.S.P.Q. 205, 207, 208, 211 (D. Md. 1978) (earth wall retaining system patented, but computations, plans, methods, and designs to implement system for particular project were trade secrets).
327. See, e.g., Leuzzi, Process Inventions: Trade Secret or Patent Protection, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 159 (1984) (discussing whether to use patent or trade secret law to protect process inventions).
328. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (17 years of protection for utility and plant patents) with United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (inventor may keep invention secret and reap its benefits indefinitely).
329. See, e.g., Management Science, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 922 n. l (proprietary software confidentially licensed to more than 1,300 customers).
330. Although Coca-Cola is a widely marketed product, its formula has been maintained as a trade secret for many years because it defies analysis. W. Konoid, supra note 69, at 81; 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 5.04, at 5-91 n.l2.
331. 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 9.02[b][i], at 9-53 (courts have invalidated more than 75% of litigated patents in the past). This situation may change, however, now that all patent appeals are heard by a single federal appeals court as opposed to the prior system where the various U.S. courts of appeals heard patent appeals from the district courts within their circuits. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
332. See 12A R. Milgrim, supra note 17, § 9.03, at 9-97 (stating belief that trade secret rights are upheld at least 75% of the time).
333. Warrington Assoc. v. Real-Time Eng. Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. III. 1981). See also Technicon Medical Information Sys. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983); Warrington Assoc. v. Kellogg Citizens Nat'l Bank, 215 U.S.P.Q. 375 (E.D. Wisc. 1981).

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