Source: https://www.paworkerscomphelp.com/pennsylvania-workers-compensation-case-studies/pa-workers-compensation-course-and-scope-of-employment-case-simko-v-wcab
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:19:25+00:00

Document:
Simko v. WCAB (United States Steel Corporation – Edgar Thomason Works), September 5, 2014.
Joseph Simko (Claimant) petitions for review of the April 22, 2014, order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) reversing the decision of a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) to grant Claimant’s claim petition. We affirm.
On October 31, 2012, the WCJ issued an interlocutory order concluding that Claimant was en route to a SDM and in the course and scope of employment when he was injured. (WCJ’s Interlocutory Order at 8-9.) Specifically, the WCJ found that Claimant met the “special mission” exception to the coming and going rule. (Id. at 9.).
On November 15, 2012, Employer filed a protective appeal to the WCAB; however, the parties agreed to hold the appeal in abeyance until the WCJ made a final decision on the merits of Claimant’s claim petition.3 On November 29, 2012, the parties presented testimony and evidence regarding the extent of Claimant’s injuries. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 3-9.).
On November 13, 2013, the WCJ issued a decision and order granting Claimant workers’ compensation (WC) benefits for the period of September 13, 2011, through January 15, 2012, plus attorney’s fees; the decision reiterated that Claimant was in the course and scope of employment at the time of his injury.4 (Id., Nos. 10-11.) The WCAB determined that the WCJ erred in concluding that Claimant was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his injury. (WCAB Decision, 4/22/14, at 7-8.) Specifically, the WCAB determined that substantial evidence did not support the WCJ’s finding that Claimant was in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained his injuries. (Id. at 7.) Claimant petitioned this court for review.
Initially, Claimant argues that the WCAB erred in reversing the WCJ because he was on a special mission for Employer. Specifically, Claimant argues that he was injured en route to the meeting and Employer had replaced the monthly safety meeting with a SDM, which is more compulsory than a monthly safety meeting. We disagree.
As a general rule, an injury received by an employee while traveling to and from work is not compensable. However,such an injury is compensable if one of the following exceptions to the “coming and going rule” exist: (1) the employment contract included transportation to and from work; (2) the employee has no fixed place of work; (3) the employee is on a special mission; or (4) special circumstances are such that the employee was furthering the business of the employer.
Village Auto Body v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Eggert), 827 A.2d 570, 573 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
Where attending meetings is part of an employee’s regular work duties, traveling to or from such a meeting is not a special mission. Action, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Talerico), 540 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) aff’d, 567 A.2d 1040 (Pa. 1990). Contrary to Claimant’s assertion, Employer did not replace the monthly safety meeting with a “more mandatory” SDM. Claimant did not dispute Krizmanich’s testimony that Employer simply incorporated the SDM content into the first portion of the scheduled monthly safety meeting. Claimant admitted that he was required to attend safety meetings as part of his regular work duties. Even if the monthly meeting had not incorporated the SDM content, Claimant would have been required to come to the scheduled 1:30 p.m. meeting on September 13, 2011. Therefore, Claimant was not on a special mission.
to work early for a SDM on workplace safety, which furthers Employer’s safety goals. We disagree.
Section 301(c)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)6 permits compensation to claimants who are injured when “actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer.” 77 P.S. § 411(1). This phrase must be liberally construed in accordance with the humanitarian purpose of the Act. Lewis v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Andy Frain Services, Inc.), 29 A.3d 851, 862 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). However, a claimant must still show that he was acting for the employer’s benefit and convenience and not simply commuting to or from his place of employment. Mackey v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Maxim Healthcare Services), 989 A.2d 404, 410-11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). ‘“[I]t is always in the employer’s interest that employees come to work . . . This interest, far from being a special circumstance, is a universal one.”’ Id. at 411 (citation omitted).
Finally, Claimant argues that the WCAB improperly re-weighed the WCJ’s credibility determinations in reversing her decision. Again, we disagree.
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of workers’ compensation law that the WCJ is the final arbiter of witness credibility and evidentiary weight.” Pennsylvania Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bonner and Fitzgerald), 85 A.3d 1109, 1115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). “A WCJ is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness.” Moberg v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Twining Village), 995 A.2d 385, 388 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

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