Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/eriksson-v-nunnink
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 23:03:32+00:00

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Full Case Name: Karan ERIKSSON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Kristi NUNNINK, Defendant and Respondent.
Summary: In this case a deceased horse rider's parents (Erikssons) have brought wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress actions against the rider's coach after she fell from her horse in competition and died. Due to a release form signed by the parents, the coach (Nunnink) could only be held liable if he was found grossly negligent. The parents attempted to show that the coach was grossly negligent in allowing the rider to compete after injuries sustained by the horse. This court concluded that the Erikssons failed to establish that Nunnink was grossly negligent. The court affirmed the judgment.
In 2006, Mia Eriksson was a 17–year–old equestrian “eventing competitor” and the daughter of plaintiffs and appellants, Karan **239 and Stan Eriksson. Defendant and respondent, Kristi Nunnink, was Mia's riding coach. In November 2006, Mia's horse struck a hurdle during the cross-country portion of an event at Galway Downs in Temecula. With the Erikssons looking on, Mia fell off her horse and the horse fell on Mia, causing her death.
The Erikssons sued Nunnink for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The Erikssons alleged that Nunnink substantially increased the risk Mia reasonably assumed by, among other actions, allowing Mia to ride a horse that “was unfit to ride because of prior falls and lack of practice” and concealing this condition from the Erikssons.
In an earlier appeal, we reversed an order granting summary judgment for Nunnink. (See Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, [120 Cal.Rptr.3d 90] (Eriksson I ).) The case was thereafter tried to the court. After the presentation of the Erikssons' case-in-chief, the court granted Nunnink's motion for entry of judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The court relied, in part, on a release of liability entered into between Nunnink and Mia about six months prior to Mia's death. The Erikssons appealed.
*713 The Erikssons contend that the release of liability is ambiguous and does not apply to their claims and that, based on the evidence presented and the applicable law, the court erred in granting Nunnink's motion for entry of judgment. In the published portion of our opinion, we hold the release is enforceable and can be asserted by Nunnink as a defense to the Erikssons' wrongful death and NIED claims and Nunnink can therefore be liable only if Mia's death was caused by Nunnink's gross negligence. In the unpublished portion, we conclude that the Erikssons failed to establish that Nunnink was grossly negligent. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Eventing is an equestrian sport in which horse and rider compete in three events over three days. The dressage event takes place on the first day, cross-country on the second day, and show jumping on the third. The competitive eventing season runs from late January through November.
Different eventing organizations use different nomenclature for a competition's level of difficulty. International, or FEI (Fédération Equestre Internationale), competitions are classified as one-star, two-star, three-star, or four-star. National competitions under the auspices of the United States Equestrian Federation (USEF) include “novice,” “training,” “preliminary,” “intermediate,” and “advanced” levels. A two-star cross-country event is longer and, according to Nunnink and Karan, more challenging than a USEF intermediate competition. The Galway Downs competition where Mia died was a two-star competition.
**240 In a two-star event, the cross-country jumping course is approximately 4,800 meters long and involves jumps over numerous fences and other obstacles. In contrast to the fences used in the show jumping event, the fences on the cross-country course do not give way or fall down when struck by a horse.
Nunnink is a professional rider and eventing coach who has coached about 80 riders over 25 years. Nunnink said that her job as a coach is to “coach riders to ride their horses better.” She explained that her students would not necessarily advance to a higher level merely by competing in a certain number of events. In fact, she would discourage her students from advancing before mastering their current level.
*714 The Erikssons hired Nunnink to be Mia's eventing coach in 2001. In 2005 and 2006, Nunnink had two or three coaching sessions with Mia each week. The sessions took place at the Erikssons' Tahoe Meadows horse ranch in the Truckee area.
In planning for the eventing season, Nunnink and Mia would identify particular events they wanted to enter. The final decision would be made jointly by Nunnink, Karan, and Mia. If Mia had difficulty at a given level of competition, Nunnink would make the decision to have Mia “step back” to a lower level to be safe.
Mia aspired to be an Olympic rider. In early 2006, she told Nunnink of her goal to raise her level of competition by moving up through one-star and intermediate competitions to a two-star event. Nunnink thought Mia could make that progression.
Mia's last four competitions prior to Galway Downs were (1) Rebecca Farms in July, (2) Woodside in August, (3) Twin Rivers in September, and (4) Ram Tap in October. All four competitions were rated intermediate. Prior to these events, Mia had never competed at that level. The Galway Downs competition would be Mia's and Kory's first two-star event.
According to Nunnink, Mia had “rough” rides at the Rebecca Farms and Woodside competitions in that Kory struck his knees on various jumps. At Twin Rivers in September, Kory “hook[ed] the stifle” during the cross-country event. Nunnink explained that hooking a stifle occurs when the horse hits the uppermost portion of the rear legs against a fence during a jump. The incident caused swelling in the area of the injury. The Twin Rivers veterinarian indicated that Kory had a bruise and said they should put ice on it. The veterinarian said that if Kory “trotted sound” in the morning he could show jump. Kory received no further medical attention at that time. The next day, *715 Kory performed in the show-jumping event and, according to Nunnink, was “fine.” He did not receive any medication for the Twin Rivers injury.
After Twin Rivers, Nunnink told Karan she wanted Mia to compete at Ram Tap, **241 which was not on the original schedule. Karan agreed.
The Ram Tap competition took place on October 20 through 22, 2006. During the cross-country event on the second day, Kory tripped and fell near the 18th jump. A Ram Tap event veterinarian, Dr. Liz Bracken, examined Kory. Dr. Bracken indicated that Kory had swelling and a hematoma on his chest and had suffered a concussion. She said they needed to watch him carefully. Kory was given Bute, an anti-inflammatory, and other medications.
After Kory returned to Tahoe Meadows, Karan cut back on Kory's “high-powered feed” and replaced his competition horseshoes with “regular” shoes.
On October 25 or 26, Mia informed Nunnink that she and her parents had a family meeting and agreed that Mia could compete at Galway Downs. Karan, however, testified that she agreed to allow Mia and Kory to go to Galway Downs to compete in the dressage event only.
Kory and Mia had an eventing lesson on October 29 and, in Nunnink's opinion, Kory jumped very well.
On October 29, Nunnink trailered Kory to her facility in Auburn, where Kory stayed for the next two nights. During that time, Kory was not being administered any medications.
On October 30, Mia and Kory performed jumps to prepare for Galway Downs. Nunnink thought the lesson went well. She testified that Karan observed the jumping session; Karan said she did not.
Galway Downs was, like other eventing competitions, a three-day event with dressage on Friday, cross-country jumping on Saturday, and show jumping on Sunday. The competition was scheduled for November 3 through 5, 2006.
Mia met the eligibility requirements to compete at Galway Downs based upon her results in prior competitions. Her entry form for the event, submitted after the Woodside event in August, included Karan's **242 written consent. According to a Galway Downs official, Karan could have withdrawn her consent to Mia's participation in the event in person, over the telephone, or in an e-mail.
On October 31, 2006, Mia and a friend trailered their horses to Galway Downs. It was Nunnink's understanding that Mia intended to compete. Nunnink arrived on November 2 and gave Mia a dressage lesson that afternoon. Stan drove to Galway Downs on November 2. Karan, believing that Mia would only compete in dressage, had decided not to travel to Galway Downs.
Prior to the start of the Galway Downs event, the horses undergo an in-barn inspection, where they are checked by a veterinarian, and participate in a “trot out.” Dr. Karen Nyrop was the veterinarian who conducted the Galway Downs in-barn inspection. She testified at trial that she noticed a bruise on Kory's chest and was aware that he had hit a fence at Ram Tap. The bruise was not inflamed and Kory showed no pain when Dr. Nyrop pressed on the bruise. She found nothing that required further treatment.
Dr. Nyrop was also on the committee judging the Galway Downs trot out on November 2. She explained that being fit to compete does not require an absolutely perfect horse; the horse can be fit to compete so long as it “is not significantly limping.” She testified that she did not observe any significant lameness during Kory's trot out.
Wayne Quarles, the president of the ground jury, also observed the trot out. He testified that Kory passed the trot out without any dissention among the observers. Prior to testifying at trial, he viewed a videotape of Kory's Galway Downs trot out; he saw no signs of lameness in Kory and heard no sound of unevenness in his gait.
On November 3, Mia and Kory performed in the dressage competition. In addition to judging the performance, dressage judges are expected to look for signs of lameness and unfitness. Quarles was one of the judges for Mia's dressage event. He saw nothing to suggest that Kory was lame or otherwise unfit to compete.
Nunnink and Stan watched Mia's dressage performance. Out of 45 dressage competitors, Mia placed 41st. Nunnink thought Mia performed well and told Mia she did a very good job riding Kory through a difficult task. It appeared to Stan that Mia was “struggling” and “having problems,” and he believed she made “many, many faults and many mistakes.” He could not assess whether Kory was having problems.
After the dressage event, Karan spoke with Mia by telephone. Mia indicated that they were going to participate in the cross-country event the next day, and that Nunnink said it was okay. Karan told Mia, “You guys are out of your mind,” and told Mia to have Nunnink call her.
Nunnink called Karan that afternoon. She told Karan that Kory “did very well in his dressage” and assured her that “[i]t's fine.” Karan told Nunnink, “[a]bsolutely not,” and that she was “on [her] way down there.” That evening, Karan traveled by airplane from Sacramento to Galway Downs to, in her words, prevent Mia from competing.
**243 The next morning, Karan met with Mia and told her, “You're not running.” Mia told Karan to talk to Nunnink and to not “ ‘make a scene.’ ” Karan then met with Nunnink. Nunnink believed Kory was physically sound and that both Kory and Mia were capable of performing. She told Karan that Kory *718 had been jumping all week, that Mia was confident, and Kory was “good to go.” Although Karan repeatedly told Nunnink “no,” Nunnink persuaded her to let Mia compete.
Karan testified that Nunnink's statement that Mia had done very well in dressage was determinative in Karan's final decision to allow Mia and Kory to perform. Nunnink testified she could not remember speaking to Karan about Mia's performance in dressage.
Karan and Stan watched Mia's cross-country run. Under the rules applicable at Galway Downs, a rider is penalized each time a horse refuses to make a required jump. A refusal includes not only the failure to make the jump, but also circling around to make a second approach before taking the jump. Once a rider has four refusals, the rider is eliminated from the competition. During her cross-country run, Kory had such refusals at fences 4, 5, 10A, 17A, and 17B. Upon the fourth refusal, Mia was, by rule, eliminated from competition and required to leave the course. However, she continued. Kory hit the fence at jump No. 19, causing a rotational fall—a fall in which the rear end of the horse comes up over its front end, causing the horse to land on its back. Kory fell on Mia, causing injuries that resulted in her death.
Following the presentation of the Erikssons' case-in-chief, Nunnink moved for the entry of judgment pursuant to section 631.8. The trial court granted the motion. It thereafter filed a written statement of decision.
The court analyzed the NIED claims differently. These claims, the court explained, “are not derivative of the rights of Mia.” However, because “Karan signed the release as ‘Rider's Parent,’ ” “the release extends, not only to Mia, but also to Karan....” Because “Nunnink was not reckless,” Karan's NIED failed.
We disagree to some extent with the court's determinations, and conclude that although Karan's signature on the release as Mia's “parent” did not make her a party to the release and Mia cannot, by signing the release, waive a cause of action on behalf of her heirs, the release can nonetheless be asserted as a defense to her **244 parents' wrongful death and bystander NIED claims.
“This RELEASE OF LIABILITY is made and entered into ... by and between KRISTI NUNNINK, hereinafter designated ‘Trainer’; and the below signed, hereinafter designated, ‘Rider’.
The document is signed by Nunnink as “Trainer,” by Mia as “Rider,” and by Karan as “Rider's Parent.” Stan did not sign the document.
The release of liability was expressly “entered into” by and between Nunnink (as “Trainer”) and Mia (as “Rider”). It is also signed by Karan over the words, “Rider's Parent.” According to paragraph 9 of the release, “[w]hen the Trainer, Rider and (if minor) Rider's parent sign this Release, it will then be irrevocable and binding on all parties, subject to the above terms and conditions.” By signing as Mia's parent, Karan approved of the terms of the release and understood that her signature made the release “irrevocable and binding.” Under these circumstances, the release could not be disaffirmed.
Although neither Karan nor Stan are parties to the release, the agreement is still essential to the analysis of their claims. As we explain below, the agreement can be asserted as a defense to the Erikssons' wrongful death and NIED **246 claims. We must still, therefore, construe its terms and evaluate the Erikssons' argument that the release is ambiguous.
The Erikssons argue that the release is ambiguous, and therefore inapplicable to their claims, because it refers to Nunnink as a trainer rather than as a coach. “Trainer,” they explain, “usually means the trainer of the horse”; therefore, they assert, the agreement was limited to liability arising from Nunnink's training of horses at Tahoe Meadows. If Nunnink wanted the release to apply to competitions where she functioned as a coach, they argue, “she should have drafted it that way.” We reject this argument.
The meaning of the word “Trainer” is established in the opening sentence of the document in which the agreement is named, dated, and expressly entered into “by and between KRISTI NUNNINK, hereinafter designated ‘Trainer’....” By defining “Trainer” to mean Nunnink for purposes of the agreement, the term's only legal significance is to act as a placeholder or substitute for Nunnink's name throughout the document. Thus, for example, where the agreement states that “Rider agrees to hold Trainer ... harmless...,” it means that Rider (i.e., Mia) agrees to hold Nunnink harmless. The term cannot reasonably be read as modifying or limiting the terms of the agreement.
Further, at the time the release was signed, the relationship between the parties had been ongoing for at least two years, with Nunnink involved in all aspects **248 of Mia's training and eventing activities. She was involved in selecting the competitions Mia entered and she attended all of Mia's events. The release clearly contemplates releasing Nunnink from liability for all of Mia's horse-related activities involving Nunnink's services. As such, the release is enforceable as between Nunnink and Mia.
In the release, Mia expressly agreed to release Nunnink from liability for claims, causes of action, and damages, including “those based on death.” The trial court concluded that the Erikssons' “claims for damages for the wrongful death of Mia are derivative of Mia's rights vis-à-vis Nunnink. Mia having expressly released her rights to assert any such claims against Nunnink, the [Erikssons'] claims for wrongful death are barred by the terms of the release.” Although we do not agree that the wrongful death claims are derivative and can be waived by Mia signing the release, Nunnink can assert Mia's release and express assumption of risk as a defense to the Erikssons' claims and thereby limit the scope of her potential liability.
As such, the terms of the release effectively extinguished Nunnink's duty of ordinary care to Mia; in that Nunnink's duty toward the Erikssons could be no greater, Nunnink can rely upon the release as a **250 defense to the Erikssons' negligence cause of action for wrongful death.
The trial court analyzed Karan's NIED claim differently from Stan's. Regarding Karan's claim, the court found that Karan was bound by the release because she signed it as Mia's parent, making her a party to the release. Karan, the court explained, thus “released her claims against Nunnink except to the extent that Nunnink was reckless.” The court analyzed Stan's NIED claim, on the other hand, based on the fact that Stan did not sign the release; Stan's claim was evaluated under common law tort principles.
*727 Although we affirm the court's judgment, we get there by a different route. As we explained above, Karan was not a party to the release. As such, she did not release her claims against Nunnink any more than did Stan. Nevertheless, as we discuss below, with respect to the Erikssons' bystander NIED claims, Nunnink owed no greater duty of care toward the Erikssons than the duty she owed to Mia. Because Mia, by signing the release, negated Nunnink's duty of ordinary care toward her, Nunnink did not owe a duty of ordinary care to protect the Erikssons from the risk of the emotional distress they suffered.
Just as the wrongful death action is a separate and distinct right belonging to the decedent's heirs, the right to damages for NIED is a separate and distinct right belonging to the NIED plaintiffs. Our courts have distinguished “bystander” NIED claims from “direct victim” claims. (See, e.g., Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1071, [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197].) As stated in Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 124, 129–130, [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 862 P.2d 148]: “ ‘The distinction between the “bystander” and the “direct victim” cases is found in the source of the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.’ [Citation.] ‘Bystander’ claims are typically based on breach of a duty owed to the public in general [citation], whereas a right to recover ... as a ‘direct victim’ arises from the breach of a duty that is assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of the defendant's preexisting relationship with the plaintiff [citations].” The Erikssons' NIED claims are bystander claims.
The Balthazor court's one-sentence analysis of the mother's claim, though brief, is telling. The reason why the mother's claim for emotional distress was barred is not because she, by attending her son's baseball game, assumed the risk of injury that could result from seeing her son hit by a ball; rather, her claim was barred because her son assumed the risk of being hit by playing the game. In short, the league could not be liable for the emotional distress of the mother if it was not liable to the baseball playing child.
Just as the ballplayer's mother in Balthazor could not recover for her emotional distress because the child assumed the risk of the incident that caused the mother's distress, it would seem to follow that the Erikssons cannot recover for their emotional distress if Mia expressly assumed the risk of the incident that caused their distress.
The Balthazor case, however, did not involve a written release agreement; it was based upon the primary assumption of risk doctrine developed by Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696, and its progeny. This is not a basis for distinguishing Balthazor. As Knight itself stated, a contract in which a party makes an “express assumption of risk” is analogous to the judicially-created primary assumption of risk doctrine. (Knight v. Jewett, supra, at pp. 308–309, fn. 4, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696; see Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 779, fn. 57, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 527, 161 P.3d 1095; Allabach v. Santa Clara County Fair Assn., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 330.) In both situations, the defendant is relieved of a duty of care to protect the plaintiff from particular risks. (Knight v. Jewett, supra, at pp. 308–309 & fn. 4, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696.) It follows that just as the primary assumption of risk doctrine was applied in Balthazor to the mother's bystander liability claim, Mia's express assumption of risk applies to the Erikssons' claims here.
A rule that a defendant can assert the direct victim's release in a bystander NIED case is consistent with the law's treatment of releases in wrongful *729 death cases. As discussed above, in wrongful death cases, a release by the decedent can negate the defendant's duty of ordinary care to the decedent. Because the defendant **252 can owe no greater duty to the heirs than to the decedent (Horwich v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 285, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927), the release can be asserted against the wrongful death plaintiffs to prove the absence of a duty of ordinary care (see, e.g., Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 8, 236 Cal.Rptr. 181; Madison v. Superior Court, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 597, 250 Cal.Rptr. 299). The same rationale should apply in bystander NIED cases. Accordingly, just as Nunnink may interpose the defense of express assumption of the risk to the Erikssons' wrongful death suit, she may interpose the same defense to their bystander action for NIED.
Just as the Dillon court limited a defendant's duty to the plaintiffs who are reasonably foreseeable, the court also recognized that the presence of other “ ‘overriding policy considerations ’ ” may run **253 counter to the imposition of a duty on a defendant for specific conduct. (Dillon, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 739, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, italics added.) Here, we believe such considerations are present. Substantial policy reasons support our conclusion that when a participant in a sport has expressly assumed the risk of injury from a defendant's conduct, the defendant owes no duty of care to bystanders with respect to such risk.
First, we recognize that Karan and Stan, as Mia's parents, are foreseeable plaintiffs and, based on their contemporaneous observations, sustained injury. Additionally there is a close connection between Nunnink's alleged negligent conduct and the injury. As Dillon indicates, “we ... cannot doubt that a mother who sees her child killed will suffer ... injury from shock.” (Dillon, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 735–736, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912.) From there, however, the policy considerations move decidedly in the direction of not imposing on Nunnink a duty to the Erikssons greater than the duty she owed to Mia.
Whether Nunnink is characterized as a trainer, coach, or instructor, her services dealt with the schooling of a horse and the teaching of a rider. As the evidence demonstrates, Mia wished to improve and advance in the sport of eventing. Presumably, Nunnink had the knowledge and skills to facilitate Mia's and Kory's improvement in the sport. Nunnink, aware of the dangers involved in the sport, desired some protection from liability for risks inherent in the sport—hence the release.
In the absence of the release, Nunnink, or a person similarly situated as an instructor, would be less inclined to offer her services to Mia or others similarly situated. Thus, to encourage individuals to teach sports, some of which pose a high risk of injury, it is necessary to allow for enforceable releases of liability; otherwise, persons in Nunnink's position might not provide the necessary instruction for safe participation in the sport. To then allow the instructor, who has secured an enforceable release from the participant, to be secondarily liable to a nonparticipant for the conduct covered by the release would, in essence, negate the effectiveness of the release and discourage the teaching of the sport. This adversely affects the community as a whole.
*731 Additionally, for a coach or other involved entity to fully protect themselves from liability they, in essence, would be required to obtain releases from all close relatives who may watch the participant engage in the sport. This would be unworkable. Many sports involve team participation with numerous participants on a team. It is foreseeable that parents and siblings will attend team games. If the coach or sponsoring entity has received signed releases from the members of the team, it seems nonsensical to require each family member to sign a release similar to that signed by the participant in order to be protected from liability. The burden of acquiring such releases would be great.
Lastly, the reasonable contractual expectation of a coach or trainer who obtains an enforceable release of liability from the participant is that she is released from liability for negligent conduct. To allow an end run by those who may assert secondary liability destroys that reasonable contractual expectation.
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that where a participant in a sport has expressly assumed the risk of injury from a defendant's conduct, the defendant no longer owes a duty of care to bystanders with respect to the risk expressly assumed by the participant. The defendant can therefore assert the participant's express **254 assumption of the risk against the bystanders' NIED claims.
*732 Here, the trial court found “that Ms. Nunnink's negligence ... did not rise to the level of recklessness.” Although distinctions can be made between gross negligence (as defined in Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 754, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 527, 161 P.3d 1095), willful and wanton conduct (as indicated in the release), and recklessness (the trial court's phrase), for purposes of this case we understand them to be roughly synonymous and will evaluate the court's determination as a finding that Nunnink's conduct did not reach any of these standards. For ease of reference, we will refer solely to gross negligence.
In addressing the trial court's conclusion, we must first determine the applicable standard of review. In doing so, we must initially resolve who had the burden of proof relative to the issue of gross negligence. We conclude that once Nunnink established the applicability of the release, it was the Erikssons' burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Nunnink was grossly negligent.
This standard, however, can be “misleading” in cases when the judgment for **255 one party is based on the other party's failure to satisfy a burden of proof. (See Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 279, [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 186].) When, for example, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the elements of his claim and the court finds he has failed to satisfy that burden, judgment will be for the defendant—even if there is no evidence supporting the defense. There being no evidence for the defense, there could be no substantial evidence in the record to support the judgment. Yet, the *733 plaintiff, who failed to prove his case, would clearly not be entitled to reversal of the defense judgment. Plainly, the substantial evidence standard, as it is usually stated, is an inadequate appellate tool in that situation.
For the reasons discussed, Nunnink has established the validity of the release in the sense that it was binding and enforceable against Mia, except insofar as it would protect Nunnink from future liability arising **256 from her *734 gross negligence. If, as here, the validity of the release is established and yet Nunnink can still be liable if she acted with gross negligence, this question arises: Is it Nunnink's burden, as part of proving her defense, to prove she did not act with gross negligence (thus bringing her conduct within the scope of the release), or is it the Erikssons' burden to establish that Nunnink was grossly negligent (thus taking her conduct outside the scope of the release) in order to prove the elements of their case? The answer, we conclude, is that once Nunnink proves the validity of the release and its applicability to this case, the Erikssons have the burden of establishing that Nunnink was grossly negligent.
This conclusion follows from the rule that “[t]he party claiming that a person did not exercise a requisite degree of care has the burden of proof on that issue.” (Evid. Code, § 521.) Although there may be a dispute as to what the requisite degree of care is, this rule mandates that whatever the degree of care is, the party arguing that the defendant did not exercise that degree of care has the burden of proof on that issue.
Because it was the Erikssons' burden of proving that Nunnink acted with gross negligence and the trial court found she was not grossly negligent (or “reckless”), we review the record to determine whether the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that Nunnink breached this standard of care by allowing (or persuading Karan to allow) Mia to compete in the Galway Downs cross-country event with Kory.
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Nunnink is awarded her costs on appeal.

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