Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/civil-procedure/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:17:56+00:00

Document:
In Transparentgov Novato v. City of Novato, published April 10, 2019, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 1 affirmed an order denying a petition for writ of mandate and for declaratory relief against the defendant city. At a city council meeting, the councilmembers discussed putting discussion of a public works project on a future agenda (which the council rules permitted) and forming a subcommittee to study another project. The plaintiff sent the city a cease-and-desist letter alleging that the city council violated the Brown Act by discussing substantive portions of the project on which the subcommittee was formed without giving proper notice. The city responded in writing that in the future it would not establish subcommittees at a meeting without first placing the item on the posted agenda. It later passed a resolution barring members from orally requesting that an item be placed on a future agenda. The plaintiff then filed the action asking the court to declare that the discussion of the subjects violated the Brown Act, and seeking a writ petition directing the council to address only items properly on the posted agenda.
The appellate court ruled that the relief requested was moot. Under the statutes governing relief for violations of the Brown Act, the propriety of declaratory relief, and writ relief, relief is properly denied if the respondent has stated that it has ceased the challenged action and the evidence indicates it will not undertake the action in the future.
In Steinle v. City and County of San Francisco, published March 25, 2019, the 9th Circuit affirmed dismissal of state law negligence claims against the defendant municipality. The county sheriff informed the federal government that his department would not honor Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer requests (to detain released prisoners for ICE) or notify ICE of any undocumented alien unless a judicial order or warrant was issued for the alien’s removal. The sheriff then issued a memo establishing protocols and parameters for the department's communications with ICE. The memo changed the longstanding practice of freely providing information to ICE regarding undocumented aliens in custody. After serving federal time for drug offenses, an undocumented alien was released to the sheriff's custody to face felony charges for selling drugs. The charges against him were dropped the next day. ICE sent the sheriff's department a detainer request asking to be notified 48 hours before the alien's release and that the sheriff's department hold the alien until ICE could take custody of him. The sheriff's department released the alien without notifying ICE. Later, the alien shot and killed plaintiffs' decedent. The plaintiffs sued the municipality for negligence in issuing the policy. The district court granted the municipality's motion to dismiss the negligence claim.
The 9th Circuit panel unanimously held that the municipality was entitled to discretionary immunity under Government Code sections 820.2 and 815.2(b). The memo was the sort of policy decision that is immunized by section 820.2. The sheriff actually exercised his discretion in issuing the policy. Further, the law gave the sheriff discretion to issue the policy. Under Government Code section 26605, the sheriff had the authority to keep the jail and the prisoners in it. 8 U.S.C. sections 1373(a) and 1644, which prohibit local restrictions on sending information regarding the immigration status of individuals to the INS, did not deprive the sheriff of discretion to enact the policy; despite legislative history to the contrary, nothing in the statutes' language required sharing information about the release of prisoners to the ICE. The federal government's control over immigration matters did not require the sheriff to provide ICE with the release date. The court rejected the argument that issuing the policy was an act of legislation outside the sheriff's discretion. It also rejected the argument that the sheriff violated the California Public Records Act by not sharing the information. The detainer request was not a CPRA request; the CPRA did not require the sheriff to create a record; and at the time the detainer request was made, there was no record of a release that had not happened yet. The court also rejected arguments that the policy conflicted with California or local laws. A concurring judge opined that liability for the prisoner's release was barred by Government Code sections 845.8 (immunity for paroling or releasing a prisoner) and 846 (immunity for failure to retain a person in custody).
In Herrera v. City of Palmdale, published March 20, 2019, the 9th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court order dismissing declaratory and injunctive relief claims and staying damages claims in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 lawsuit. The city obtained an inspection warrant of the plaintiffs' motel to search for suspected code violations. The plaintiffs alleged that the city violated the Fourth Amendment in carrying out the warrant. The city then issued a notice and order to repair and abate and ordered the plaintiffs and their tenants to vacate the motel. Two days later the governmental defendants closed the motel and evicted the plaintiffs and tenants. The plaintiffs sued the governmental defendants in federal court. Almost simultaneously, the city filed a nuisance complaint against one of the plaintiffs and the motel, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief including declaring the motel a nuisance and putting the motel into receivership. The district court concluded that Younger abstention applied.
The 9th Circuit agreed that Younger abstention applied to the plaintiffs' causes of action for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages for alleged violation First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the Contract Clause, arising out of the closing of the hotel and the orders to repair and abate, were subject to Younger abstention, because success on those claims in the federal action would interfere with the state court nuisance action; and because all of the elements of Younger abstention were satisfied. But the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment damages claims for the carrying out of the inspection warrant were not subject to abstention. Success on those claims would not interfere with the state court action.
In Foster v. Hellawell, published November 20, 2018, a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court order denying a police officer summary judgment based on qualified immunity. A 911 call was received that a man had displayed a gun and was walking toward stores that had previously been robbed. The defendant officer arrived at the scene and saw plaintiffs' decedent, who matched the description and was near one of the stores. The officer identified himself and asked to see the decedent's hands. The officer was unsure whether he had his gun drawn. The decedent ran. The officer gave chase. During the pursuit, the officer fired at the decedent, fatally wounding him. The survivors sued the officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit majority affirmed denial of summary judgment on the claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and the claim for denial of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The evidence created a genuine dispute of fact on whether the decedent had or displayed a gun while he ran. It is clearly established that shooting a fleeing suspect in the back violates the Fourth Amendment. If the factual disputes on whether the suspect had a gun are resolved against the officer, the officer would not be entitled to qualified immunity. The court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether the evidence was reliable enough to support the district court's conclusion that a genuine dispute existed. On the question of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop of the decedent, however, the court found no genuine dispute of fact and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The 911 caller's information, as corroborated by the officer's observations, had sufficient indicia of reliability to support qualified immunity for the officer's conclusion of reasonable suspicion. The court also found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity for approaching the decedent with gun drawn (but not pointed at the suspect). The law did not clearly establish that doing so constituted excessive force.
A dissenting judge opined that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was no evidence that the officer violated the Fourteenth Amendment by using force for a reason other than a legitimate police purpose.
In Hernandez v. City of San Jose, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, on interlocutory appeal, affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The plaintiffs, who attended a rally for then-presidential candidate Donald Trump, alleged that police officers who knew that a mob around the rally had attacked Trump supporters previously that evening, yet shepherded the attendees into the group of protesters and actively prevented the attendees from exiting via a route that would not take them through the protesters. They alleged that the officers were liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violating their due process rights, and that the city was liable because the police chief ratified the officers' acts by praising the officers afterward.
The appellate panel agreed that based on the allegations of the complaint, the officers were not entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity. The facts alleged adequately stated a case against the officers for violation of the attendees' due process rights based on the "state-created danger" doctrine, because if proven they would show the officers created a danger of harm from third parties to the protesters that would not have otherwise existed; and that they did so with deliberate indifference, because they knew of the potential danger from the protesters. Further, the alleged acts violated clearly-established law. 9th Circuit case law established that the state-created danger applies to the crowd-control context, although that case found no constitutional violation under the facts of that case. This was one of the rare situations where the violation was so obvious that a case directly on point was not necessary to clearly establish that the officers' actions would violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The panel also ruled that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to consider the city's interlocutory appeal, because the city's alleged liability in the case was not inextricably intertwined with the issue of whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v.