Source: http://www.loveofchrist.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=10&t=6&sid=584c4a447770be8e3207cc3e9ebf46ff&start=15
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:27:11+00:00

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The first Establishment Clause cases decided after the Lemon Test was created by the Court involved financial aid to schools. At this point in the topic thread, I will begin a review of the significant financial aid cases since Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971, which will require a series of posts. This block approach to these cases will require some of them being covered slightly out of chronological sequence, in relation to decisions by the Court on other issues.
Establishment Clause cases after Lemon are all based on the Lemon Test, set out by the Court as follows.
At issue in Tilton v. Richardson, 1971, was whether The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 was Constitutional, which provided federal construction grants for college and university facilities, excluding any to be used for sectarian instruction or religious worship. The United States retained an interest in the facilities for 20 years, and any violation of the religious use restriction during that period entitled the government to a full recovery of funds.
A suit for injunctive relief was initiated by citizens and taxpayers of the United States, who were residents of Connecticut. Four church related colleges and universities were named as defendants, where federal funds were used for “(1) a library building at Sacred Heart University; (2) a music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College; (3) a science building at Fairfield University; (4) a library building at Fairfield; and (5) a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus College.” These institutions testified that they were in full compliance with the statute, that the facilities were used solely for functions of secular education.
Every analysis must begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the precise degree to which these three factors are present or absent. Instead, our analysis in this area must begin with a consideration of the cumulative criteria developed over many years and applying to a wide range of governmental action challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause.
The simplistic argument that every form of financial aid to church-sponsored activity violates the Religion Clauses was rejected long ago in Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899). There, a federal construction grant to a hospital operated by a religious order was upheld. Here, the Act is challenged on the ground that its primary effect is to aid the religious purposes of church-related colleges and universities. Construction grants surely aid these institutions in the sense that the construction of buildings will assist them to perform their various functions. But bus transportation, textbooks, and tax exemptions all gave aid in the sense that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find other sources from which to finance these services. Yet all of these forms of governmental assistance have been upheld. Everson v. Board of Education,330 U. S. 1 (1947); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968); Walz v. Tax Comm'n., supra. See also Bradfield v. Roberts, supra. The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect advances religion.
The Act was carefully crafted to ensure the facilities would be used for secular purposes, and none of the defendant institutions violated the sectarian restriction. The religious and educational functions of colleges and universities are separable. Two of the involved five federally financed facilities were libraries, and the others were a language laboratory to assist pronunciation, a science building, and a music, drama and art building.
The Court considered an argument against the financial assistance, on the basis of a “composite profile” of the typical sectarian institution -- of imposing religious restrictions on admissions; requiring attendance at religious activities; compelling obedience to doctrines and dogmas of faith; requiring instruction in theology and doctrine; propagating a particular religion. However, the Court held that an act of Congress cannot be struck down on a hypothetical profile.
The Court then considered the restriction on the sectarian use of the facilities expiring after 20 years, on the basis that the public benefit to the United States at that time would “'equal or exceed in value' the amount of the federal grant.” The Court held that if at the end of the 20 years the facilities are used as a chapel or to promote religious interests, the grant in part would advance religion, which violates the Religion Clauses. However, the 20 year condition was not considered by Congress as essential to the financial aid program as a whole, and only this provision was unconstitutional, while the remainder of the Act remained viable.
The Court next considered whether the Act caused excessive entanglement between government and church, focusing on three particular factors in the case. First – in Lemon the Court found excessive entanglement, where aid to parochial schools was “an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church,” and the “inculcation of religious values was a substantial, if not dominant purpose of the institutions.” However, allegations of a similar purpose with the four institutions receiving aid through the Facilities Act under review were not proven.
There are generally significant differences between the religious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning and parochial elementary and secondary schools. [Footnote 2] The "affirmative if not dominant policy" of the instruction in pre-college church schools is "to assure future adherents to a particular faith by having control of their total education at an early age." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, at 397 U. S. 671. [Footnote 3] There is substance to the contention that college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination. [Footnote 4] Common observation would seem to support that view, and Congress may well have entertained it. The skepticism of the college student is not an inconsiderable barrier to any attempt or tendency to subvert the congressional objectives and limitations. Furthermore, by their very nature, college and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal disciplines. Many church-related colleges and universities are characterized by a high degree of academic freedom, [Footnote 5] and seek to evoke free and critical responses from their students.
The record here would not support a conclusion that any of these four institutions departed from this general pattern. All four schools are governed by Catholic religious organizations, and the faculties and student bodies at each are predominantly Catholic. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that non-Catholics were admitted as students and given faculty appointments. Not one of these four institutions requires its students to attend religious services. Although all four schools require their students to take theology courses, the parties stipulated that these courses are taught according to the academic requirements of the subject matter and the teacher's concept of professional standards. The parties also stipulated that the courses covered a range of human religious experiences, and are not limited to courses about the Roman Catholic religion. The schools introduced evidence that they made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to proselytize. Indeed, some of the required theology courses at Albertus Magnus and Sacred Heart are taught by rabbis. Finally, as we have noted, these four schools subscribe to a well established set of principles of academic freedom, and nothing in this record shows that these principles are not, in fact, followed. In short, the evidence shows institutions with admittedly religious functions, but whose predominant higher education mission is to provide their students with a secular education.
Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the risk that government aid will, in fact, serve to support religious activities.
Second – the Court found as significant that the aid granted by the Facilities Act was non-idealogical, but secualr and neutral, subsidizing facilities, not teachers, as in Lemon.
Third – the Court found as significant that the grants were a one-time, sing-purpose provision, not one of a continuing financial relationship.
Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall concurred, dissenting in part.
But the invalidation of this one clause cannot cure the constitutional infirmities of the statute as a whole. The Federal Government is giving religious schools a block grant to build certain facilities. The fact that money is given once at the beginning of a program, rather than apportioned annually as in Lemon and DiCenso, is without constitutional significance. The First Amendment bars establishment of a religion. And as I noted today in Lemon and DiCenso, this bar has been consistently interpreted from Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 16, through Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 367 U. S. 493 as meaning: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion..."
"When one remembers that churches pay no inheritance tax (churches do not die), that churches may own and operate business and be exempt from the 52 percent corporate income tax, and that real property used for church purposes (which in some states are most generously construed) is tax exempt, it is not unreasonable to prophesy that, with reasonably prudent management, the churches ought to be able to control the whole economy of the nation within the predictable future. That the growing wealth and property of the churches was partially responsible for revolutionary expropriations of church property in England in the sixteenth century, in France in the eighteenth century, in Italy in the nineteenth century, and in Mexico, Russia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (to name a few examples) in the twentieth century, seems self-evident. A government with mounting tax problems cannot be expected to keep its hands off the wealth of a rich church forever. That such a revolution is always accompanied by anticlericalism and atheism should not be surprising."
In Everson v. Board of Education, 1947, the Court held – “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.” Is the Tilton decision consistent with Everson? Does making students walk to the building next door to one paid for by the federal government for prayer services maintain a separation of church and state? In Tilton, has the Court set a high wall of separation between church and state for College students, and a higher wall of separation of church and state for public school students? Then, is the Court asserting that the primary intent of the First Amendment was to protect young minds from being exposed to God? Is the position set out by the Court more or less superior than the partial dissent by Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall? Has the basis of the decisions from one case to the next on the Religion Clauses become arbitrary?
Was it the intent of the First Amendment to ensure that federal money could only be spent on education based on secular humanism and academics which assume the non-existence of God? Was the intent of the Amendment to eliminate debate concerning atheism? Was the intent to specify particular buildings where prayer was illegal?
As noted, I will continue in a review of the Constitutionality of federal aid to schools in future posting.
On June 25, 1973, the Court released three decisions relating to state aid to sectarian schools, which will be reviewed in the next three posts, beginning with Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist. In this ruling, the Court noted that most cases under the Establishment Clause involve the relationship between religion and education, dealing with religious activities within the public schools, or public aid to sectarian schools.
In Committee for Public Education, the Court noted precedent drawing a “line most clearly,” or “indisputably marked off,” with “firmly rooted” and “well defined” constitutional standards. However, extensive dissenting opinions interpreted precedent in a different manner. Perhaps, because of the weight of the contrary positions set out, the Court began Committee for Public Education with a review of why precedent has a lesser significance in Religion Clauses cases, and how the wall of Separation of Church and State must be seen as unsanitary and bending.
The style in setting out this ruling decision is difficult and wandering, as if the Court actually desired the greatest seeming complexity for their reasoning. The below review formats the units of thought for clarity of understanding.
– that James Madison “admonished that a "prudent jealousy" for religious freedoms required that they never become "entangled . . . in precedents;"
The Court further qualified this position on the necessity for inconsistency at footnote five.
In citing James Madison as a basis for selectively ignoring precedent on issues of religious freedom, the Court indicated by footnote that their quoted reference can be found in Everson v. Board of Education, 1947, or Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 1970, wherein the entire text of the Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments is set out in appendixes to dissenting opinions. In reviewing the Remonstrance, Madison's words on precedent can be found in the third of 15 objections, reprinted below, with the actual language quoted by the Court set in italic.
We remonstrate against the said Bill... 3. Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to forget it. Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity in exclusion of all other Religions may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
1. The first section provided “direct money grants for 'maintenance and repair' of facilities and equipment to ensure the students' “health, welfare and safety.” Qualifying schools served a high concentration of pupils from low income families, with grants of $30 per pupil, $40 if the facilities were 25 years or more old, the amount not to exceed 50% equivalent per pupil cost at public schools.
2. The second section established tuition reimbursement for low-income parents of nonpublic school students, up to $50 each at grade school level, and $100 each for high school, not to exceed 50% of actual payment made. The legislature had found that “alternative educational systems should be available a pluralistic society;” that low income families have a diminished right of selection; and a sharp decline of nonpublic school enrollment would seriously jeopardize public school finances and quality.
3. The sections three to five gave tax relief to parents not qualifying for tuition reimbursement, creating a graduated deduction from adjusted gross income.
The legislature indicated the purposes of the tuition reimbursement program were pertinent as well to the tax relief section. The Court summarized further legislative findings on this third part of the aid program as follows.
(i) contributions to religious, charitable and educational institutions are already deductible from gross income; (ii) nonpublic educational institutions are accorded tax exempt status; (iii) such institutions provide education for children attending them and also serve to relieve the public school systems of the burden of providing for their education; and, therefore, (iv) the "legislature . . . finds and determines that similar modifications . . . should also be provided to parents for tuition paid to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools on behalf of their dependents. [Footnote 20]"
Schools which qualified under the aid program were profiled by the Court as follows.
"(a) impose religious restrictions on admissions; (b) require attendance of pupils at religious activities; (c) require obedience by students to the doctrines and dogmas of a particular faith; (d) require pupils to attend instruction in the theology or doctrine of a particular faith; (e) are an integral part of the religious mission of the church sponsoring it; (f) have as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values; (g) impose religious restrictions on faculty appointments; and (h) impose religious restrictions on what or how the faculty may teach." 350 F.Supp. 655, 663.
In regard to the first part of the Lemon test, the Court noted, that the propriety of a stated secular purpose for a law does not by itself preclude that its primary effect may advance religion or foster excessive entanglements between Church and State.
Holding that the “maintenance and repair” payments of the New York law advance religion can be distinguished from prior cases on aid to schools and religion.
2. In Board of Education v. Allen, 1968, a New York law only authorized “the provision of secular textbooks” for nonpublic schools (which was a loan to the parents).
4. In Walz, again the tax exemption relief for church property only benefited religious institutions indirectly and incidentally.
5. In Tilton v. Richardson, 1971, aid to colleges and universities associated with a religious body for the construction of facilities was restricted to those used for a secular purpose.
In Earle v. DiCenso, 1971, (decided in conjunction with Lemon v. Kurtzman), the Court similarly held that 15% of a teacher's salary could not be paid by the state, in denying the assumption that teachers could “succeed in segregating 'their religious beliefs from their secular responsibilities'” State aid cannot be based on mere assumption that conflict between the religious and secular can be avoided.
Section two of the aid program for tuition reimbursement to parents failed the “effect” test, of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, for the same reasons as the “maintenance and repairs” assistance. The tuition aid must be held as invalid, as there is no guarantee the funds “will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and non-ideological purposes.” The fact that the aid is disbursed to parents, rather than institutions, does not change the substance of it having a religious function. In Everson, bus fares were reimbursed to parents, but this aid is “analogous to provision of services, such as police and fire protection, sewage disposal, highways, and sidewalks for parochial schools,” which are “so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function... Most bus rides have no inherent religious significance....” And in Allen, the state law only authorized the loaning of non-religious textbooks. The effect of the tuition aid under the New York law “is unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpublic sectarian institutions.” As Justice Black noted, in dissenting in Allen, the supporting argument for this type law could lead to upholding that state funds could be used to buy property for religious buildings, to pay the salaries of religious teachers, and that religious groups should stop relying on voluntary contributions but wait for the government to pick up all the bills.
The consideration that the reimbursed money can be spent by parents in any desired manner has no relevance.
The argument that the reimbursement pays only a portion of the tuition bill, and an even smaller part of the religious school's total expense, which represents the secular component of the educational function, was already rejected under the “maintenance and repairs” section of the law. “Obviously if accepted, this argument would provide the foundation for massive, direct subsidization of sectarian elementary and secondary schools. Our cases, however, have long since foreclosed the notion that mere statistical assurances will suffice to sail between the Scylla and Charybdis of 'effect' and 'entanglement.'” (Scylla and Charbdis are sea monsters from Greek mythology, located so close to each other, that passing sailors are unable to escape their peril).
Finally, the State argues that its program of tuition grants should survive scrutiny because it is designed to promote the free exercise of religion. The State notes that only "low income parents" are aided by this law, and without state assistance, their right to have their children educated in a religious environment "is diminished or even denied." [Footnote 45] It is true, of course, that this Court has long recognized and maintained the right to choose nonpublic over public education. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). It is also true that a state law interfering with a parent's right to have his child educated in a sectarian school would run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. But this Court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, supra; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, and that it may often not be possible to promote the former without offending the latter. As a result of this tension, our cases require the State to maintain an attitude of "neutrality," neither "advancing" nor "inhibiting" religion. [Footnote 46] In its attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between public and nonpublic education, the State has taken a step which can only be regarded as one "advancing" religion. However great our sympathy, Everson v. Board of Eduction, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 18 (Jackson, J., dissenting), for the burdens experienced by those who must pay public school taxes at the same time that they support other schools because of the constraints of "conscience and discipline," ibid., and notwithstanding the "high social importance" of the State's purposes, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 406 U. S. 14 (1972), neither may justify an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now firmly emplanted.
That the money involved in the third part of the aid program, sections three to five, consists of tax relief rather than a grant does not change the fact that the state is still being charged for the purpose of religious education.
The argument upholding the tax benefit as valid, because it goes to the parents, rather than the institution, was already rejected with the ruling on the tuition aid part of the program.
The tax exemption is not supported as constitutional under Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 1970. Tax exemptions for church property have a long history of approval in this country, on the basis of having a proper respect for both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which compels the state to pursue religious neutrality. In the past, the taxation was regarded as hostility toward religion, and the tax exemption protected against such danger. However, special tax benefits do not represent neutrality but aid and advance religious institutions. Although the exemption on church property from taxation confers an indirect and incidental benefit, its purpose was to minimize involvement and entanglement between church and state, not to support or subsidize. The property exemption actually reinforced Separation of Church and State. Further, the benefit was not composed exclusively or predominately of religious institutions but covered all property devoted to religious, educational, or charitable purposes. However, the tax exemption under this aid program went primarily to the parents of sectarian schools. The narrowness of the benefited class is an important factor.
As Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, emphasizes, competition among religious sects for political and religious supremacy has occasioned considerable civil strife, "generated in large part" by competing efforts to gain or maintain the support of government. 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 9. As Mr. Justice Harlan put it, "[w]hat is at stake as a matter of policy [in Establishment Clause cases] is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 694 (separate opinion).
In dissenting in part, chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, and in part by Justice White, noted that precedent on the Religion Clauses laid down one solid, basic principle.
that the Establishment Clause does not forbid governments, state or federal, to enact a program of general welfare under which benefits are distributed to private individuals, even though many of those individuals may elect to use those benefits in ways that "aid" religious instruction or worship.
Upon the basis of this principle the Court upheld the reimbursement of bus fares in Everson and the loaning of textbooks to students in nonpublic schools in Board of Education v. Allen, 1968.
Recognizing that Everson was the case "most nearly in point," the Allen Court interpreted Everson as holding that "the Establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard for their religious affiliation. . . ."
"Appellants have shown us nothing about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated purpose. The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the request of the pupil, and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus, no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools...."
The Court appears to distinguish the Pennsylvania and New York statutes from Everson and Allen on the ground that, here, the state aid is not apportioned between the religious and secular activities of the sectarian schools attended by some recipients, while, in Everson and Allen, the state aid was purely secular in nature. But that distinction has not been followed in the past, see Quick Bear v. Leupp, supra, and is not likely to be considered controlling in the future. There are at present many forms of government assistance to individuals that can be used to serve religious ends, such as social security benefits or "G.I. Bill" payments, which are not subject to nonreligious use restrictions. Yet, I certainly doubt that today's majority would hold those statutes unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
The Court fully recognizes that the legislatures of New York and Pennsylvania have a legitimate interest in "promoting pluralism and diversity among . . . public and nonpublic schools," ante at 413 U. S. 773, in assisting those who reduce the State's expenses in providing public education, and in protecting the already overburdened public school system against a massive influx of private school children. And in light of this Court's recognition of these secular legislative purposes, I fail to see any acceptable resolution to these cases except one favoring constitutionality.
In dissenting, Justice Rehnquist, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, noted that tax deductions and exemption have a different status under the Religious Clauses.
"Tax exemptions and general subsidies, however are qualitatively different. Though both provide economic assistance, they do so in fundamentally different ways. A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise, and uses resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on the other hand, involves no such transfer. . . . Tax exemptions, accordingly, constitute mere passive state involvement with religion, and not the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright governmental subsidy." Id. at 397 U. S. 690-691 (footnotes omitted).
While it is true that the Court reached its result in Walz in part by examining the unbroken history of property tax exemptions for religious organizations in this country, there is no suggestion in the opinion that only those particular tax exemption schemes that have roots in pre-Revolutionary days are sustainable against an Establishment Clause challenge. As the Court notes in its opinion, historical acceptance alone would not have served to validate the tax exemption upheld in Walz, because "no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use...'"
The reimbursement and tax benefit plans today struck down, no less than the plans in Everson and Allen, are consistent with the principle of neutrality.
But whatever may be the weight and contours of entanglement as a separate constitutional criterion, it is of remote relevance in the cases before us with respect to the validity of tuition grants or tax credits involving or requiring no relationships whatsoever between the State and any church or any church school. So, also, the Court concedes the State's genuine secular purpose underlying these statutes. It therefore necessarily arrives at the remaining consideration in the threefold test which is apparently accepted from prior cases: whether the law in question has "a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra. While purporting to accept the standard stated in this manner, the Court strikes down the New York maintenance law because its "effect, inevitably, is to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools," and for the same reason invalidates the tuition grants. See ante at 413 U. S. 779-780. But the test is one of "primary" effect, not any effect. The Court makes no attempt at that ultimate judgment necessarily entailed by the standard heretofore fashioned in our cases. Indeed, the Court merely invokes the statement in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 16, that no tax can be levied "to support any religious activities. . . ." But admittedly there was no tax levied here for the purpose of supporting religious activities, and the Court appears to accept those cases, including Tilton, that inevitably involved aid of some sort or in some amount to the religious activities of parochial schools. In those cases, the judgment was that as long as the aid to the school could fairly be characterized as supporting the secular educational functions of the school, whatever support to religion resulted from this direct, Tilton v. Richardson, supra, or indirect, Everson v. Board of Education, supra; Board of Education v. Allen, supra; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra; Hunt v. McNair, supra, contribution to the school's overall budget was not violative of the primary effect test or of the Establishment Clause.
There is no doubt here that Pennsylvania and New York have sought in the challenged laws to keep their parochial schools system alive and capable of providing adequate secular education to substantial numbers of students. This purpose satisfies the Court, even though to rescue schools that would otherwise fail will inevitably enable those schools to continue whatever religious functions they perform. By the same token, it seems to me, preserving the secular functions of these schools is the overriding consequence of these laws and the resulting, but incidental, benefit to religion should not invalidate them.
In the Rehnquist dissent, once again a justice noted that the most perplexing questions presented to the Court involve the meaning of the Religion Clauses.
Differences of opinion are undoubtedly to be expected when the Court turns to the task of interpreting the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, since our previous cases arising under these Clauses, as the Court notes, "have presented some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court."
However, why did this perplexity arise only after 1947, at the same time that the concept of Separation of Church and State was stipulated as representing the true meaning of the First Amendment? Does the perplexity indicate a special interpretation of meaning is being forced on the Amendment?
The Court dismissed the argument that the tuition reimbursement under the New York law should be regarded as promoting free exercise of religion, by noting the tension that exists between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and that religious neutrality can only be maintained by refusing to let the latter clause to become eroded. Thus, has the Court ruled in this instance that the Establishment Clause makes the Free Exercise Clause unconstitutional? Then, according to the concept of Separation of Church and State, does the First Amendment contradict itself? Would the issues decided under the Amendment be just as complex, if an interpretation for its meaning were set out without inherent contradiction?
Does the quote of Madison on not becoming entangled in precedent in regard to religious liberty establish a legal basis within the doctrine of Stare Decisis (defined with the last post on page two of topic thread) for ignoring precedent on First Amendment cases and upholding inconsistency in case decisions as proper and normal? Does the architectural design by Thomas Jefferson of the wall surrounding the University of Virginia truly help with understanding how deviations should occur to the doctrine of Stare Decisis? Does the Court's reference to the mythological sea monsters, Scylla and Charbdis, actually clarify the approach to precedent utilized in the case? Is it possible that the Court is picking and choosing arguments to support their positions, which in reality are based merely on personal preference?
What are the examples in American history of taxation being used as a form of hostility toward religion, and of property tax exemptions being granted in order to foster Separation of Church and State, rather than promoting religion? And if such exemptions were not exclusively or predominately for churches, were they granted to other institutions also to foster Separation of Science/Education/Charity and State? Is there actually a clear and concrete basis for holding that the benefit to religious institutions is indirect and incidental in regard to property tax exemptions or school bus fare reimbursement, but the benefit is direct in regard to partial tax relief or tuition aid for parents of sectarian school students?
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971, the Court held as unconstitutional the State of Pennsylvania reimbursing nonpublic, sectarian schools for expenses arising from teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for specified “secular” courses. The Court determined that the supervision required to make certain the aid only benefited non-religious activities would foster “excessive entanglement” between church and state.
Soon after the Kurtzman ruling, the State of Pennsylvania passed a new aid law, the “Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Education,” to reimburse parents for a portion of tuition expense, funds derived from cigarette tax revenues. The Act was administered by a five member committee appointed by the governor.
The Act emphasized a secular purpose, to reduce the total cost of public education, which would increase more than one billion dollars, if the students of nonpublic schools transferred into the State's school systems.
Soon after the Act passed into law, suit was filed in Sloan v. Lemon, to have it declared unconstitutional, by plaintiffs who were residents of Pennsylvania and taxpayers, and by at least one parent of a child in the public schools. Parents of children in nonpublic schools also were permitted to file responses. The decision was released on the same day as Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.
The Court did not question the legitimacy of the legislature's stated secular purpose for the Act.
In considering whether the Act had the effect of advancing religion, the Court first noted that schools controlled by religious organizations enrolled more than 90% of all nonpublic school students, with the purpose of promoting religious faith. In Kurtzman, 96% of the nonpublic school students attended church related schools, primarily of the Roman Catholic faith.
The Court could find no basis to distinguish the Act from the law ruled on in Nyquitst, even though the New York aid only applied to low income parents. The overall effect of both laws were the same, to support religion-oriented institutions. The benefit to the schools was not “indirect” and “incidental,” such as supplying bus transportation or secular textbooks.
The Court was asked to consider the Act as severable, permitting reimbursement to parents of children not attending church-related schools; and then, to hold that “sectarian schools are entitled to the same aid as a matter of equal protection.” The Court, however, found this argument “thoroughly spurious.” Although the Act contained a severablility clause, the District Court deciding the case had reasoned that since most of the students attended sectarian schools, it could not be assumed the law would have passed if aid was granted only to a relatively few non-sectarian schools. The Supreme Court agreed.
The argument is thoroughly spurious. In the first place, we have been shown no reason to upset the District Court's conclusion that aid to the nonsectarian school could not be severed from aid to the sectarian. The statute nowhere sets up this suggested dichotomy between sectarian and nonsectarian schools, and to approve such a distinction here would be to create a program quite different from the one the legislature actually adopted. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 286 U. S. 234 (1932); cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 403 U. S. 683-684 (1971) (plurality opinion). Even if the Act were clearly severable, valid aid to nonpublic, nonsectarian schools would provide no lever for aid to their sectarian counterparts. The Equal Protection Clause has never been regarded as a bludgeon with which to compel a State to violate other provisions of the Constitution. Having held that tuition reimbursements for the benefit of sectarian schools violate the Establishment Clause, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause will suffice to revive that program.
Although litigants to the case and those who endeavor to formulate systems of state aid to nonpublic education may feel the Court set forth an “insoluble paradox,” as referenced by Justice White in Kurtzman, the fault lies with the Establishment Clause itself, not the doctrines of the Court.
Note Justice White's words from Kurtzman.
The Court noted that if a state passed a statute granting tuition aid to nonpublic schools that were not church-related, it could not become a basis for granting the same aid to sectarian nonpublic schools under the 14th Amendment, which guarantees equal protection of laws, as then the Equal Protection Clause would serve as a bludgeon to force the violation of the Establishment Clause. Thus, has the Court held that the Establishment Clause makes the Equal Protection Clause unconstitutional?
Note the Equal Protection Clause is part of Section 1. of the 14th Amendment, (as quoted below), the same section the Court used in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1940, to hold that the First Amendment applied to the states. Therefore, is the Court actually holding that the language of the 14th Amendment can only be upheld, in relation to the Religion Clauses, when it precludes support of religion. Then is the proper interpretation of Section 1. actually that no person can be denied equal protection of the law except in matters of religion? If so, how does this exception to equal protection reflect the intent of Congress in passing the 14th Amendment to defend the rights of former slaves? (Note the first two posts of page three in the topic thread for an explanation of how the Establishment Clause was forced on the states through the 14th Amendment).
Does making objection under the Equal Protection Clause, to holding that tuition aid to nonpublic schools which are not church related is constitutional, but aid to sectarian schools is unconstitutional, truly reflect a "spurious" argument?" Is it possible that actually to refuse to regard sectarian schools as equal under the law to secular private schools is what is not genuine?
The third sectarian aid case decided on June 23, 1973, will be reviewed next.
The third decision of June 25, 1973, for review in this topic thread is Hunt v. McNair. Consideration will not be given to a fourth decision on the same date, Levitt v. Committee for Public Ed., in order to maintain some limit to the extent of content in the thread, and as this case does not actually expand on the Court's overall positions on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
At issue in Hunt v. McNair, 1973, was whether the South Carolina Facilities Authority Act violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, under which revenue bonds benefiting a Baptist controlled college were authorized.
The Act established an Educational Facilities Authority to assist higher education institutions through revenue bonds to finance projects, such as buildings, facilities, and site preparation, but excluding any to be used for sectarian instruction or religious worship. For the college, where only 60% of the students were Baptists, a capital improvement and dining hall project would be conveyed to the Authority, which would lease it back to the school. When the bonds were paid in full, the facilities would be reconveyed to the college. The lease enabled the Authority to conduct inspections to ensure the restriction against sectarian use. The reconveyance also contained a sectarian restriction clause. Under the Act, educational institutions paid a significantly lower interest rate, compared to private financing, due to federal and state tax relief on the bonds.
The Court held that the bonds issued to the Baptist controlled college did not have the primary effect of advancing religion, as the school's operations were not significantly “oriented toward sectarian, rather than secular education.” Without evidence to the contrary, it had to be assumed that the revenue advanced was not used for a religious purpose, according to the conditions of the statute.
The court noted its consistent rejection of the argument that aid to one aspect of a religious institution must be forbidden, as it then permits other resources to be used for a religious end. The Court also noted that the degree of entanglement between church and state arising from inspection of facilities varies to the extent that religion permeates the school, that religious indoctrination reflects the institution's primary purpose.
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664(1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). Stated another way, the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends.
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall set out a dissenting opinion, detailing the extensive entanglement between church and state in policing compliance with the restrictions of the Act.
The Authority is also empowered, inter alia, to determine the location and character of any project financed under the act; to construct, maintain, manage, operate, lease as lessor or lessee, and regulate the same; to enter into contracts for the management and operation of such project; to establish rules and regulations for the use of the project or any portion thereof; and to fix and revise from time to time rates, rents, fees, and charges for the use of project and for the services furnished or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof. In other words, the College turns over to the State Authority control of substantial parts of the fiscal operation of the school -- its very life's blood.
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any facility which is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity for any religious denomination... "
Thus, it is crystal clear, I think, that this scheme involves the State in a degree of policing of the affairs of the College far exceeding that called for by the statutes struck down in Lemon I, supra. See also Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F.Supp. 421 (Conn.1970),aff'd, 403 U.S. 955 (1971). Indeed, under this scheme, the policing by the State can become so extensive that the State may well end up in complete control of the operation of the College, at least for the life of the bonds. The College's freedom to engage in religious activities and to offer religious instruction is necessarily circumscribed by this pervasive state involvement forced upon the College if it is not to lose its benefits under the Act. For it seems inescapable that the content of courses taught in facilities financed under the agreement must be closely monitored by the State Authority in discharge of its duty to ensure that the facilities are not being used for sectarian instruction. The Authority must also involve itself deeply in the fiscal affairs of the College, even to the point of fixing tuition rates, as part of its duty to assure sufficient revenues to meet bond and interest obligations. And should the College find itself unable to meet these obligations, its continued existence as a viable sectarian institution is almost completely in the hands of the State Authority. Thus, this agreement, with its consequent state surveillance and ongoing administrative relationships, inescapably entails mutually damaging Church-State involvements. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. At 374 U. S. 295(BRENNAN, J., concurring); Lemon I, 403 U.S. At 403 U. S. 649 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, J.).
Does the Hunt decision reflect consistency of interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment? Is the Hunt decision even consistent with Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, decided on the same day? Has the Court held that the state may assist schools if they are not really religious? Then, is the Court attempting to promote Secular Humanism as an official and national system of beliefs? If a school is controlled by Baptists, how does its outreach even beyond the Baptist community cancel out or reduce the promotion of Baptist doctrine? Has the Court just assumed that contact with the school by non-Baptists cannot lead to conversion to Baptist doctrine? Why should state aid to secular aspects of religious schools, freeing resources for religious ends, be considered insignificant? Why should extensive supervision by the state over a religious school not be considered excessive entanglement, if religious indoctrination is not entirely explicit? If the Hunt decision must be viewed as inconsistent to precedent, then why did the Court feel compelled to uphold a contradictory view point?
In 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court set out a three factor test for determining whether laws violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment – 1) The Secular Purpose Factor; 2) The Secular Effect Factor; 3) The Excessive Government Entanglement Factor. According to this three factor Lemon Test, the Court upheld as constitutional statutes by states on the reimbursement of bus fare to parents of students in nonpublic schools, Everson v. Board of Education, 1947, the loaning of secular textbooks to students of nonpublic schools, Board of Education v. Allen, 1968, and even grants for the construction of buildings at colleges and universities, not used for sectarian instruction or religious worship, Tilton v. Richardson, 1971.
Meek v. Pittenger, 1975, the Court reviewed another state aid to nonpublic schools statute, wherein the ruling began with a review of the Lemon Test, noting that it only set guidelines and not precise limits in how decisions on the Religion Clauses should be made. Then, the Court added to the Lemon Test additional factors for ruling on cases, such as what percentage of the schools receiving aid were religious and the amount of money spent. The Court also enhanced emphasis on the possibility of political divisiveness as a result of the aid, which was part of the Government Entanglement Factor in Lemon. Further, the Court applied the possibility of government entanglement by need of supervision to even remotely possible circumstances.
By statute the state of Pennsylvania provided to non-public school students “auxillary services,” (Act 194), and loans of textbooks “acceptable for use in” the public schools, (Act 195).
"Auxiliary services" include counseling, testing, and psychological services, speech and hearing therapy, teaching and related services for exceptional children, for remedial students, and for the educationally disadvantaged, "and such other secular, neutral, non-ideological services as are of benefit to nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter provided for public school children of the Commonwealth."
Act 195 authorizes the State Secretary of Education, either directly or through the intermediate units, to lend textbooks without charge to children attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools that meet the Commonwealth's compulsory attendance requirements. [Footnote 3] The books that may be lent are limited to those "which are acceptable for use in any public, elementary, or secondary school of the Commonwealth."
Act 195 also authorizes the Secretary of Education, pursuant to requests from the appropriate nonpublic school officials, to lend directly to the nonpublic schools "instructional materials and equipment, useful to the education" of nonpublic school children. [Footnote 4] "Instructional materials" are defined to include periodicals, photographs, maps, charts; sound recordings, films, "or any other printed and published materials of a similar nature." "Instructional equipment," as defined by the Act, includes projection equipment, recording equipment, and laboratory equipment.
The stated purpose of the Acts was to ensure that all students in Pennsylvania would benefit equally from axillary services, textbooks, and instructional materials provided to public school children.
At issue was whether these Acts were a law respecting an establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment.
The complaint alleged that each Act "is a law respecting an establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment" because each Act "authorizes and directs payments to or use of books, materials and equipment in schools which (1) are controlled by churches or religious organizations, (2) have as their purpose the teaching, propagation and promotion of a particular religious faith, (3) conduct their operations, curriculums and programs to fulfill that purpose, (4) impose religious restrictions on admissions, (5) require attendance at instruction in theology and religious doctrine, (6) require attendance at or participation in religious worship, (7) are an integral part of the religious mission of the sponsoring church, (8) have as a substantial or dominant purpose the inculcation of religious values, (9) impose religious restrictions on faculty appointments, and (10) impose religious restrictions on what the faculty may teach."
In reviewing first the Lemon Test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971, the Court noted it did not set precise limits to constitutional analysis, but the Test only provides a basic framework and serves as guidelines for review of specific cases.
These tests constitute a convenient, accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past decades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action challenged as violative of the constitutional prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of religion," and thus provide the proper framework of analysis for the issues presented in the case before us. It is well to emphasize, however, that the tests must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired.
Books are furnished at the request of the pupil, and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus, no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.
Act 195 also “authorizes the loan of instructional material and equipment directly” to nonpublic schools. The Act is upheld as having the secular purpose of assuring that the State's school children have ample opportunity to develop their intellectual capacities. However, the direct loan of the instructional material and equipment actually “has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominately religious character of the schools” benefited.
(T)he secular education those schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools' existence. Within the institution, the two are inextricably intertwined.
The potential for impermissible fostering of religion under these circumstances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present.
Further, aid under Act 194 also creates a serious potential for divisive political strife over the issue of religious aid, against which the Establishment Clause was intended to protect.
Chief Justice Burger, in concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted that actually the ruling in Meek was discriminatory against religion.
Certainly, there is no basis in "experience and history" to conclude that a State's attempt to provide -- through the services of its own state-selected professionals -- the remedial assistance necessary for all its children poses the same potential for unnecessary administrative entanglement or divisive political confrontation which concerned the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra. Indeed, I see at least as much potential for divisive political debate in opposition to the crabbed attitude the Court shows in this case. See, e.g., ante at 421 U. S. 371 n. 21.
The melancholy consequence of what the Court does today is to force the parent to choose between the "free exercise" of a religious belief by opting for a sectarian education for his child or to forgo the opportunity for his child to learn to cope with -- or overcome -- serious congenital learning handicaps, through remedial assistance financed by his taxes... One can only hope that, at some future date, the Court will come to a more enlightened and tolerant view of the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion, thus eliminating the denial of equal protection to children in church-sponsored schools, and take a more realistic view that carefully limited aid to children is not a step toward establishing a state religion -- at least while this Court sits.
Justices Rehnquist and White, in concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted that in essence Meek was decided based on the percentage of sectarian schools benefited. However, the Court ruled arbitrarily that textbooks going to a high percentage of sectarian schools is constitutional, while instructional materials and equipment to the same schools is not.
I am disturbed as much by the overtones of the Court's opinion as by its actual holding. The Court apparently believes that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment not only mandates religious neutrality on the part of government, but also requires that this Court go further and throw its weight on the side of those who believe that our society as a whole should be a purely secular one. Nothing in the First Amendment or in the cases interpreting it requires such an extreme approach to this difficult question, and "[a]ny interpretation of [the Establishment Clause] and the constitutional values it serves must also take account of the free exercise clause and the values it serves."
The Court noted by citing precedent that “political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect....” In like manner, the Court has often ruled that the First Amendment must be applied against the states by the federal government, instead of protecting the states from the federal government, as set out by Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1940. However, Cantwell never set out a basis for this decision. And has the Court actually ever sufficiently reviewed a basis in evidence to establish their assertion on a primary purpose of the First Amendment being protection from political division? Did the Court ever clearly establish that religious disagreement which affects political ideas is evil? And why has the Court not explained in any cases how secular political ideas stop division and cannot be considered evil? However, precedent rules – even though very often the basis of the cited cases is ignored entirely as part of the process.
In Meek, the dissenting opinions set out well the complications with the ruling. The dissent noted that Meek expands the Lemon Test and in a way that is arbitrary; – that the Court's decision discriminated against religion; – that the decision is inconsistent with precedent on the provision of secular type aid by states; – that the lack of evidence was ignored on how the nature of the aid considered can have the potential to advance religion or for government entanglement.
Perhaps, one day the Court will resolve the inconsistencies in their decisions, by declaring as unconstitutional state aid to religious schools for bus fares, secular textbooks, grants for secular buildings, or even tax exemptions for religious institutions. Is it possible that Everson v. Board of Education, 1947, which established the concept of the Separation of Church and State in constitutional law, while favoring incidental support for religious schools, actually was a first step to outlawing religion in the United States, in order to implant Secular Humanism as our national belief system. Did the Court actually foresee in 1947 the inconsistencies which would arise in deciding cases in the future, and which eventually, at the right time, would have to be resolved, by severely restricting the essence of freedom of religious expression, and by endorsing Secular Humanism as the official government position on matters of faith?

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