Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/31/31massappct451.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:09:25+00:00

Document:
Present: ARMSTRONG, DREBEN, & GREENBERG, JJ.
Further appellate review granted, 411 Mass. 1104 (1991).
The record of a products liability action demonstrated no abuse of discretion in the judge's awarding the prevailing defendants their actual costs, including expert witness fees and expenses [456-457], and certain disposition costs [458-459].
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 4, 1982.
After review by the Appeals Court, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1415 (1989), a motion for taxation of costs was considered in the Superior Court Department by Elizabeth A. Porada, J.
David H. Sempert for the defendants.
The George decision, if it stood alone, could be understood as saying only that such costs as may be awardable are, by G. L. c. 261, Section 13, discretionary with the judge -- no implication being intended that each item sought as costs was in fact legally allowable. The decision seems to have been read more broadly. In the Linthicum case, a G. L. c. 93A action in which the successful plaintiff sought to recover his expert witness fees under Section 9(4) (requiring that, where a violation of the act is found, "reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with said action" be awarded), the court stated: "Although the award of expert witness fees is usually discretionary," citing the George passage, "we think that reasonable expert witness fees should normally be recoverable in a c. 93A case in order to vindicate the policies of the act." 379 Mass. at 389.
In Goulet v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., supra -- a case not involving c. 93A -- an order allowing expert witness fees was affirmed over a contention of abuse of discretion, the court first discussing the source of the authority for such an award. This was said to be G. L. c. 261, Section 1, which provides in broad terms that a "prevailing party shall recover his costs, except as otherwise provided," and G. L. c. 261, Section 13, as amended through St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 345, which provides that where "no provision is expressly made by law, the costs shall be wholly in the discretion of the court . . . ."
In Creed v. Apog, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 376-377 (1978), this court, relying on the "usual" rule (as had the trial judge), held nontaxable the cost the defendant incurred in purchasing a letter of credit, required by a surety company as collateral security for a surety bond that was required to dissolve an attachment which the ultimately unsuccessful plaintiff had placed on the defendant's property. A statute, G. L. c. 223, Section 122, authorized taxing as costs the premiums paid to the surety company for the bond: thus, the premiums were held properly taxed. But the statute was silent as to the cost of any security the surety company itself might require. On further appellate review the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that, in the absence of a statute or rule expressly or impliedly to the contrary, Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(d) ("costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs") controls. Rule 54(d), the court stated, "is consistent with G. L. c. 261, Section 1, which provides that `[i]n civil actions the prevailing party shall recover his costs, except as otherwise provided.'" 377 Mass. at 524. The court stated that the "broad generality that `in Massachusetts, a litigant must bear his own expenses' . . . has many exceptions and must be tempered by the policies expressed in Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(d), and G. L. c. 261, Sections 1 and 13." Id. at 525. The case was remanded to the judge to exercise her discretion whether to allow the additional amount. The Goulet case cited Creed v. Apog in holding that the award of costs, including expert witness fees, was authorized by G. L. c. 261, Sections 1 and 13.
costs, except as otherwise provided." If some categories of costs fall outside the governance of G. L. c. 261, Section 1, such as attorneys' fees, [Note 7] the Goulet decision makes clear that expert witness fees fall within it.
There is also no merit to the argument that the plaintiff should not be taxed for those portions of the expert witnesses' fees that paid for pretrial preparations, time spent in traveling, reimbursements for meals, and the like. These experts happened to bill for time spent plus expenses. Others may charge a flat fee; the distinction the plaintiff suggests would in all likelihood merely lead all experts, in the future, to adopt the flat fee method of billing. A sounder approach would be to recognize that, as between the expert witness and his client, the fee may be computed as they agree. The question for the judge is whether the total fee, however computed, was reasonably and necessarily incurred and, as this is a discretionary cost, [Note 10] whether all, some, or none thereof should be taxed to the losing party. If a decision is made to tax such costs, conservative principles should normally be applied, see Hayden v. Hayden, 326 Mass. 587, 596-597 (1950); Rex Lumber Co. v. Acton Block Co., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 521-522 (1990); but, again, on this record we cannot say the judge abused her discretion in taxing the entire fee to the plaintiff.
Rule 54(e) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, 382 Mass. 829 (1981), which does not have a counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the taxation of deposition costs in "the discretion of the court, but in no event shall costs be allowed unless the court finds that the taking of the deposition was reasonably necessary, whether or not the deposition was actually used at the trial." This standard reflects Federal case law interpreting the application of 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1920(2) (1988) (fees for "stenographic transcript[s] necessarily obtained for use in the case. . . .") to deposition transcripts and copies thereof. See United States v. Kolesar, 313 F.2d 835, 838-840 (5th Cir. 1963).
The plaintiff argues that the award of deposition costs must be reversed because the judge made no explicit finding that the costs were reasonably necessary. The finding was implicit, however, in the order allowing the deposition costs. The purpose of the rule is to fix a standard by which the judge is to be guided in taxing deposition costs; it would not measurably protect the party against whom costs are to be taxed to require the judge to recite the standard in his order. Contrast Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974), which requires that a partial judgment may be entered "only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay" (emphasis added).
plaintiff's testimony. That added cost may have been found unnecessary in National Bancard Corp. v. VISA, U.S.A., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 62, 64-65 (S.D. Fla. 1986)(the party ordering the daily transcript had several attorneys in the courtroom at all times taking notes), but this is a matter for the discretion of the judge.
[Note 1] Honda Motor Co., Ltd.
[Note 2] The case was here before, on appeal from the judgment on the merits. See 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1415 (1989).
[Note 3] The requested costs that were excluded by the judge were principally the travel expenses of the defendants' attorneys.
[Note 4] The decision at this point cites Chartrand v. Chartrand, 295 Mass. 293, 297 (1936), an action involving multiple claimants to the proceeds of an insurance policy. There, the insurer sought and was denied its counsel fees. The Chartrand decision, affirming the denial, stated that "[c]ommonly such allowances are made" under G. L. c. 231, Section 40 (a general interpleader statute now repealed), but, because this case was governed by G. L. c. 261, Section 13, "costs shall be wholly in the discretion of the court," and "[i]t cannot quite be said that there was abuse of discretion in refusing to allow the request of the insurer."
[Note 5] The Fuss decision upheld an award of costs of deposition under Rule 3:15, Section 9, of the Supreme Judicial Court, 351 Mass. 812 (1967), the predecessor of Mass.R.Civ.P. 30-32, 365 Mass. 780 -790 (1974)(depositions), but reversed an award of unspecified "general costs" (in the round amount of $5,000) under G. L. c. 208, Section 38; c. 209, Section 33; and c. 215, Section 45. The Broadhurst decision reversed an award of costs against the Commonwealth but relied not on the general rule but on specific provisions of rule (Mass.R.Civ.P. 54[d]) and statute (G. L. c. 261, Section 14) restricting the taxing of costs against the Commonwealth.
[Note 6] "The 1948 Code does not contain the language used in the 1853 Act and carried on for nearly 100 years that the fees prescribed by the statute `and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed,' but nothing in the 1948 Code indicates a congressional intention to depart from that rule." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., supra at 255-256 n.28.
[Note 7] Attorneys' fees have been held generally not taxable as costs except where a statute so provides. Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 369 Mass. 795, 801 (1976). See discussion in Harrison v. Textron, Inc., 367 Mass. 540, 554-555 (1975); Black v. School Comm. of Malden, 369 Mass. 657, 663-664 (1976). Contrast M.F. Roach Co. v. Provincetown, 355 Mass. 731, 732 (1969), discussed in Harrison v. Textron, Inc., 367 Mass. at 555.
[Note 8] The record of the trial was presumably before this court in the earlier appeal, see note 2, supra, but no longer is. Perhaps to create a substitute record, new counsel for the plaintiff sought a hearing on the defendants' motion for costs. The judge acted on the motion without a hearing. This was not error; still less was it error not to make findings. The usual rule in our practice is that motions may be acted on without hearing, where the same is not particularly required by statute, rule, see Superior Court Rule 9A(b)(1) and (2), or decision, and without giving a statement of reasons. Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), 365 Mass. 817 (1974).
This is true of posttrial motions concerning costs, which "should not deteriorate into ancillary major litigation." Robbins v. Robbins, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 544 (1985). Contrast contempt proceedings and proceedings arising under G. L. c. 215, Section 34A, Kennedy v. Kennedy, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 176, 180-182 & nn. 3 & 5 (1986). Posttrial motions relative to taxing discretionary costs are usually considered on affidavits and vouchers, as in this case, see, e.g., Maillet v. ATF-Davidson Co., 407 Mass. at 194-195, although the judge may in his discretion afford a hearing. An evidentiary hearing would be required if the underlying facts disclosed by the affidavits and vouchers were contested. See Boynton v. Tarbell, 272 Mass. 142, 146 (1930); Manganaro Drywall, Inc. v. White Constr. Co., 372 Mass. 661, 666 (1977); Abdallah v. Boumil, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 500-501 (1976). See discussion of cases in Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 628-631 (1978). Here, the judge was asked to apply her judgment to essentially undisputed facts.
[Note 9] The plaintiff also contends that the nominal, statutory witness fee should be held to limit the expert's fee because G. L. c. 261, Section 13, requires that "no greater amount shall be taxed" for discretionary costs "than is allowed for similar charges in actions in which costs are expressly provided for by law." The expert witness fee, however, normally reflects pretrial labor by the expert, in examining evidence, conducting tests, and consulting with the party for whom he is called. These may not be required of an expert compelled to testify at nominal witness-fee rates. Stevens v. Worcester, 196 Mass. 45, 56 (1907).
[Note 10] Rule 54(d), reflecting G. L. c. 261, Section 19, provides that, "[e]xcept for those costs which are subject to the discretion of the court, costs shall be taxed by the clerk according to law." The costs taxed by the clerk include those which are fixed by statute. See, e.g., G. L. c. 261, Sections 23, 25A, 26, and G. L. c. 262, collecting the statutory fees, such as entry fees, jury trial fees, fees for service of process, witness fees, etc.

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