Source: http://taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/8149692C128846EF85256F5F000F3D67?OpenDocument
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:26:00+00:00

Document:
Michael W. Evans is a partner in the Washington law firm of Preston Grates Ellis & Rouvelas Meeds. In 2001-02, he was the chief counsel and deputy staff director of the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. In 1983-90, he was tax counsel and legislative director for Sen. Max Baucus.
In this report, Evans provides a comprehensive overview of the Constitution's Origination Clause, which requires all revenue bills to originate in the House of Representatives. First, he describes its historical development, going back to the British Parliament and the Constitutional Convention. Then he describes the practical application of the clause, including its enforceability, its application to different classes of congressional legislation, and the scope of the Senate's power to amend a House revenue bill.
The author would like to thank those on the congressional staff, especially the staff of the Senate Finance Committee, the Office of the Senate Parliamentarian, and the Senate Library, who have advised and assisted him over the years. He would also like to thank Heidi Werntz and Elise Sweeney, who reviewed drafts of the article.
C. When Does the House Originate a Bill?
D. What Is a Bill for Raising Revenue?
E. What Is the Scope of Senate Amendments?
Congress, in considering revenue legislation, occasionally faces a "blue slip problem." A question arises concerning whether a Senate bill or amendment offends the Constitution's Origination Clause, with the result that, if the provision passes the Senate, the House will respond with a blue slip -- a resolution, printed on blue paper, that informs the Senate that it is the opinion of the House that the bill infringes on the House's constitutional prerogative to originate revenue legislation and that, accordingly, the House refuses to consider it.
That slip of blue paper signals a problem faced since colonial times: how to distribute the power to raise revenue in a bicameral legislature. It is a problem with not only deep historical roots, reaching back before the Constitution, but also important practical applications. For example, over the past few years, Congress has faced Origination Clause questions for legislation increasing the federal debt limit and establishing new user fees.
This article is intended to help the reader analyze those questions by providing a comprehensive review of the Origination Clause. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part is historical. It describes the roots and development of the Origination Clause -- specifically, the English parliamentary background and the debate at the Constitutional Convention. The second part describes the application of the Origination Clause, covering major congressional and court precedents. It also discusses specific issues that have arisen in practice, such as the application of the Origination Clause to appropriations bills, trade bills, and bills regarding the issuance of public debt. Also, a brief conclusion summarizes key points and makes some observations about the Origination Clause's current impact.
I wrote the article in three stages. Over 10 years ago, as tax counsel to Sen. Max Baucus, D-Mont., I initially became interested in the Origination Clause. In particular, I sought to understand what the framers were attempting to accomplish when they wrote the clause. That led to an article about, among other things, the Constitutional Convention debate regarding the Origination Clause.1 More recently, as chief counsel to the Senate Finance Committee, I tried to better understand the practical applications of the Origination Clause. Finally, over the past 18 months, I combined the historical research and practical experience into this article. I hope it provides a useful guide to practitioners, both on Congressional staffs and in private practice, faced with a potential blue-slip problem.
The House of Lords relented and never again sought to make substantive amendments to revenue bills.
At the same time, they imposed two limitations on the federal government's power to raise revenue. First, they prohibited Congress from imposing direct taxes.8 Second, they imposed procedural limitations based on the English model, and the consideration of those limitations triggered a debate that persisted until the conclusion of the convention.
Eventually, the Origination Clause became linked to the convention's central debate about the nature of representation in the revised national legislature. Strong nationalists supported the Virginia Plan, which would replace the Confederation system of equal state representation with a system of proportional representation based on population. Those nationalists were joined by representatives of large states that would benefit most from that system. Others, including both the "anti-federalists" who feared an excessive concentration of national power, and the representatives of small states like New Jersey, Delaware, and Rhode Island, sought to maintain equal state representation.
Following further debate about the general merits of an Origination Clause, and after several versions of the clause had been rejected, the delegates reserved judgment until, as James Madison put it, "the powers of the Senate should be gone over."23 Several weeks later, the delegates finally resolved those powers, giving the Senate the exclusive power to ratify treaties and try impeached officials. That done, they immediately took up the Origination Clause, approving a compromise proposed by Caleb Strong of Massachusetts and modified slightly by the Committee on Detail. It provided: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills."24 Thus, it appears that the large states agreed to enhance the powers of the Senate at least in part in exchange for the small states agreeing to a compromise version of the Origination Clause.
A little more than a week later, the Constitution was signed and sent to the states for ratification, with the compromise Origination Clause included as the first clause of section seven of article one.
As the first Congress began its work, much about the application of the Origination Clause remained to be settled. While the Constitution provided that only the House could "originate" a revenue-raising bill, it allowed the Senate to "propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills." Although the Framers were familiar with each of those terms from the procedures of the British Parliament, the colonial and state legislatures, and the Confederation Congress, the terms had not been defined or applied in the context of the powers and practices of the new Congress. Further, the limitation on the Senate's origination of bills applied only to bills for "raising revenue," and the term had various possible interpretations. Finally, it was not clear how the clause would be enforced.
What does it mean for the House to originate a revenue bill?
What is a bill for raising revenue?
What is the scope of the Senate's power to amend a revenue bill?
One could argue that it is the prerogative of Congress itself, and particularly of the House of Representatives, to enforce the Origination Clause. The clause, the argument generally would go, was established to benefit the House; if the House declines to enforce it in a particular situation, courts should defer to that decision.
The Supreme Court has rejected that argument. As a result, the Origination Clause is enforced both by the House and Senate and by the courts.
Regarding enforcement by the courts, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the argument that the application of the Origination Clause is a political question beyond the purview of the judiciary. This point was implicit in several early cases, in which the Court considered but rejected challenges to the Origination Clause.26 It was made explicit in the 1990 case of United States v. Munoz-Flores.27 In that case, a convicted criminal defendant was required to pay a "special assessment," which was deposited in a fund used to defray the cost of providing assistance and restitution to the victims of crimes. The defendant argued that the statute creating the special assessment was a revenue measure that, having originated in a Senate bill, had been enacted in violation of the Origination Clause.
In the most basic sense, to originate in the House, a revenue provision must begin its legislative life in a House bill rather than in a Senate bill. Accordingly, the House has consistently refused to consider Senate bills that, in the opinion of the House, contain revenue measures. When those bills have passed the Senate and been sent to the House, the House typically has responded by passing a resolution refusing to consider the Senate bill. That occurred first in 1859,36 most recently in 2001,37 and dozens of times in between.
Although the Senate has agreed that it may not either pass a revenue bill or add a revenue amendment to a House bill that is not a revenue bill, it long ago rejected the idea that it must wait until receiving a House revenue bill before beginning its own work. Instead, the Senate has taken the position that it can independently consider Senate revenue bills -- that is, senators can introduce revenue measures, the Senate Finance Committee can report them, and the full Senate can consider and amend them on the Senate floor -- if the Senate does not formally pass them and send them to the House.
As time went on, it became common for senators to introduce revenue bills. Nevertheless, for many years, the usual practice was for the Senate to refrain from undertaking the detailed work of considering a revenue bill in the Finance Committee or on the Senate floor until it had received a House bill to amend. This can be seen from three diverse examples. In the cases of the 1913 Income Tax Act,49 the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act,50 and the 1969 Tax Reform Act,51 a House-passed revenue bill was referred to the Senate Finance Committee, which held hearings on the House bill and reported an amended version that was then considered by the full Senate.
In recent years, adherence to this "classical model" seems to have been more the exception than the rule,52 with the Finance Committee frequently reporting an original Senate revenue bill for the consideration of the full Senate, and the Senate deferring to the House's prerogative only at the last moment, when it takes up a House revenue bill and amends it by substituting the Senate text.53 That may reflect political considerations (such as when the House and Senate are controlled by different parties); it also reflects the influence of the budget reconciliation process, which sometimes requires the Ways and Means and Finance Committees to report legislation by the same deadline, making it impossible for the Finance Committee to wait for a House bill.54 Nevertheless, the classical model sometimes comes into play. The best relatively recent example may be the Tax Reform Act of 1986. After President Reagan made a detailed proposal for comprehensive tax reform in early 1985, the Ways and Means Committee held a series of hearings on the proposal and eventually reported a bill, H.R. 3838, that the House passed and sent to the Senate, where it was referred to the Finance Committee. In January through March of 1986, the Finance Committee held seven hearings on H.R. 3838 (it also had held hearings on the President's proposal in 1985). In May the committee reported H.R. 3838 with an amendment constituting a complete substitute, and the amendment was then debated extensively on the Senate floor and passed by the full Senate, after which a conference committee reconciled the House and Senate versions. Thus, although the Finance Committee developed a complete substitute amendment that was very different from the House bill, it had waited for the House bill and used it as the starting point for its work.
Generally. The delegates to the constitutional convention narrowed the application of Origination Clause, from the English model, which applied to "all money bills," to the final compromise, which applied only to "all bills for raising revenue."55 In doing so, the framers triggered a controversy that persists to this day. In his early commentary on the Constitution, Justice Joseph Story wrote that the clause only applies to "bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the word," and not to "bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue."56 Although this basic formulation has become well established, distinguishing between the two categories is probably the most frequent source of Origination Clause disputes between the House and Senate.
The Supreme Court Framework. The issue arose in two early Supreme Court cases. In the first, the 1896 case of Twin City Bank v. Nebeker,57 a bank challenged the imposition of a federal charge on banks' circulation of federal bank notes, the proceeds of which were used to offset the cost of operating the national banking system. The act imposing the charge had originated as a Senate bill, and the House had passed the bill without raising an Origination Clause objection. The bank argued that the charge nevertheless was a revenue measure, which, having originated in a Senate bill, violated the Origination Clause.
The issue arose more recently in United States v. Munoz-Flores.63 As discussed above, in Munoz-Flores, a convicted criminal defendant challenged a "special assessment," which was deposited in a fund used to defray the cost of providing assistance and restitution to the victims of crimes. The defendant argued that the statute creating the special assessment was a revenue measure that, having originated in a Senate bill, had been enacted in violation of the Origination Clause.
The 1935 Senate Debate. In addition to the Nebeker, Milliard, and Munoz-Flores decisions, there have been dozens of examples in which Congress itself has considered whether a provision constitutes a revenue measure. In most cases, the examples entail fairly cursory discussions, with the House passing a blue-slip resolution after only a brief debate. There is a notable exception: A 1935 Senate debate that is the most extensive discussion, in either chamber, of whether a bill constitutes a revenue measure within the meaning of the Origination Clause.
The 1935 debate was triggered by a provision, enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1934, that required the publication of information gleaned from the tax returns of high-income individuals. Before the provision was ever implemented, there was strong sentiment to repeal it, and the House quickly passed a provision to do so. When the bill came to the Senate floor, the author of the 1934 publication requirement, Sen. Robert LaFollette, R-Wis., proposed to amend the bill to add a provision imposing an additional surtax on upper-income taxpayers.69 The Chair of the Finance Committee, Sen. Pat Harrison, D-Miss., objected, raising a point of order that the LaFollette amendment violated the Origination Clause because it would add a revenue amendment to a House bill that was not a revenue bill. The question before the Senate, therefore, was whether the House bill repealing the tax code provision requiring the publication of tax return information was a revenue bill, such that the Senate could amend it with other revenue measures.
Shortly after Long expressed his view, Harrison asked for a ruling on the point of order and, as always is the case with constitutional questions, it was put directly to the full Senate (rather than to the presiding officer). The Senate sustained the point of order by voice vote, and the amendment fell.76 Accordingly, the Senate had ruled that it did not consider the House bill repealing the information reporting requirement to be a revenue measure within the meaning of the Origination Clause.
Specific Applications. The Nebeker, Milliard, and Munoz-Flores decisions and the 1935 Senate debate provide the most extensive analysis of the general principles for determining whether a bill is a revenue bill. Those sources have been supplemented and refined by decisions applying the general principles to specific cases; most by the House, but some by the Senate and lower courts. This section discusses those decisions, dividing them into six categories: revenue reductions, appropriations bills, user fees, the issuance of debt, trade provisions, and tax administration.
The issue was largely resolved during the House-Senate Origination Clause dispute of 1871-72, discussed extensively below. There, first the House and then the Senate took the position that a tariff or tax bill that reduced revenue was covered by the Origination Clause. By the time that dispute was over, it was pretty well settled that if the other requirements are met, the Origination Clause applies to a bill that significantly affects revenue--whether revenue rises or falls.
The issue recurred in a 1985 appeals court decision in which the plaintiff brought an Origination Clause challenge against the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act.79 The House had passed a minor bill lowering a single tariff, to which the Senate had added a several-hundred page amendment significantly raising taxes. In response to the threshold point that an Origination Clause challenge was out of place because the overall bill had clearly originated as a House revenue bill, the plaintiff argued that the Origination Clause applied only to bills that increased revenue. Therefore, the plaintiff continued, the clause did not apply to the original House tariff bill, which reduced revenue, but did apply to the Senate amendment, which raised revenue.
Appropriations Bills. Although the House has historically taken the position that the Origination Clause requires all general appropriations bills to originate in the House,81 it also has generally (and perhaps paradoxically) taken the position that the Senate cannot add a revenue amendment to a House appropriations bill, a view that seems to depend on the argument that an appropriations bill is not a revenue bill. Overall, the application of the Origination Clause to appropriations bills remains a grey area, with a recent precedent that runs contrary to the general rule.
There have, however, been exceptions to the general rule. The most significant occurred in 2000. A conference report on an appropriations bill included a provision, which had not been part of either the House or Senate bills, repealing an excise tax on certain communications services. The Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, Rep. William Archer, R-Texas, offered a blue-slip resolution. The resolution was tabled (by a one-vote margin) and the conference report passed (but was vetoed on grounds unrelated to the Origination Clause question).88 Thus, the House rejected the argument that the Origination Clause prevented a revenue amendment from being added to an appropriations bill.
User Fees. The most common dispute over whether a bill constitutes a revenue measure probably is the dispute about the distinction between, on one hand, taxes, and, on the other hand, other provisions that generate revenue -- here referred to as "user fees."
The Supreme Court has provided a framework for addressing these issues, most recently in the Munoz-Flores decision discussed above in which the Court concluded that the special assessment levied on convicted criminals was not a revenue measure within the meaning of the Origination Clause.
In the House, the result was quite different. When the House Energy and Commerce Committee sent an amended version of the Senate bill to the House floor containing a similar set of fee provisions, the Ways and Means Committee Chair, Rep. Daniel Rostenkowski, D-Ill., offered an amendment similar to Bentsen's. Rostenkowski argued that the Energy and Commerce Committee's version of the bill contained "certain fees which are, in reality, taxes," to such an extent that "[n]ever in my 31 years of service in this body have I seen a bill that so blatantly disregards the prerogatives of the House of Representatives." However, the manager of the bill, Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., opposed the Rostenkowski amendment, largely on the grounds that the fees were integral to the bill. The Rostenkowski amendment was defeated and thus, ironically, the House provided less deference to Origination Clause considerations than the Senate.
In 1998 the Senate sent the House an original bill containing a provision replacing an existing fee on electricity generated by nuclear energy with a new and lower fee, and Rep. John Ensign, R-Nev., proposed to blue-slip the bill. He argued that, because the existing fee raised significantly more than was necessary to cover the relevant program it was "being used to raise revenue to finance the Federal Government generally" and hence constituted a tax. Accordingly, "the Senate bill, by repealing what is in effect a tax," and replacing it with what was in effect a fee, "constitutes a revenue bill" within the meaning of the Origination Clause.99 The House approved the blue-slip resolution, sending the bill back to the Senate,100 where it died.
The Issuance of Debt. Another difficult issue is whether the Origination Clause applies to a bill authorizing the issuance of debt. As a starting point, it has been customary for bills increasing the federal debt limit to originate in the House. Through 2002, 47 consecutive debt limit extensions had originated in the House. But the full application of the Origination Clause to bills that authorize the issuance of debt is more complicated.
It is not clear how far Congress (and, presumably, courts) can and will go in applying the Origination Clause to bills that modify trade law rules without directly affecting tariffs. It is tempting to say that the clause applies to any bill that amends those rules in any way. However, it is possible that, at some level, the connection between a particular change in the trade law rules and a practical effect on tariff revenue will be so attenuated that an Origination Clause challenge will fail.
Indirect Effects on Taxes. Occasionally, a question arises whether a provision that affects the administration and operation of the tax laws constitutes a revenue measure within the meaning of the Origination Clause, even if it does not directly amend the tax code.
1. Background and early practice. When the delegates to the Constitution Convention proposed to modify the Origination Clause to allow the Senate to amend House bills, James Madison warned that "[t]he words amend or alter form [a] . . . [s]ource of doubt and altercation."137 Madison's warning proved true. The Constitution gives each chamber of Congress the right "to determine the Rules of its Proceedings,"138 and, in doing so, the House and Senate have developed very different approaches to amendments. Generally speaking, in the House amendments must be germane to the underlying bill.139 In the Senate, in contrast, amendments need not be germane or even relevant to the subject of the bill being amended (with some important exceptions, such as when cloture has been invoked or when the Senate is considering a budget reconciliation bill);140 as the Senate has applied this approach to House revenue bills, the scope of its amendment power has become a matter of intermittent but sharp disagreement between the House and Senate and within the two chambers themselves.
When Congress reconvened in 1872, the Senate pressed ahead. The House had passed a bill repealing the duties on tea and coffee, and the bill had been referred to the Finance Committee. When the Finance Committee took up the House bill, it replaced the 32 words repealing the duties on tea and coffee with a 20-page amendment repealing the entire income tax and revising the tariff system. The full Senate passed the bill as amended.
With this strictness of parliamentary law . . . our fathers provided in the Constitution that the Senate might amend bills for raising revenue . . . as they might amend other bills. In other words, when a bill for raising revenue has originated in the House, no limitation is placed by the Constitution upon the power of the Senate to amend it on account of its being a bill for raising revenue. The exclusive prerogative of the House of Representatives in relation to such bills is simply to originate them.
After the report was submitted, no further action was taken by either the Senate or House. Thus, the Senate's effort to accelerate repeal of the income tax failed and the income tax remained in place until the end of 1872, when it expired as previously scheduled. The conflict over the two chambers' different interpretations of the Origination Clause remained unresolved.
The point of order was put to a vote and was rejected by a vote of 22 to 16.161 Thus, the Senate expressly rejected the argument that a Senate amendment to a House revenue bill must be germane to the House bill.
The House, for its part, gradually acquiesced. In 1883 the House questioned the constitutionality of a Senate amendment to a revenue bill, but allowed the question to be settled by the conferees.162 In 1888 a House member proposed a resolution returning a Senate amendment to a House revenue bill to the Senate but the House rejected the resolution.163 In 1909, when the Senate amended a House tariff bill with a provision establishing a new corporate income tax, no member of the House raised an Origination Clause challenge to the amendment,164 and the corporate income tax was enacted.
3. The Supreme Court decisions. In 1896 and 1906, the Supreme Court had considered but rejected Origination Clause challenges, concluding that, although the statutes in question had originated as Senate bills, they did not constitute "revenue bills" within the meaning of the Origination Clause (see discussion above). A short time later, the Court was asked to consider challenges to provisions that had originated not as Senate bills but instead as Senate amendments to House revenue bills and, accordingly, to consider the permissible scope of Senate amendments.
The first case was Flint v. Stone Tracy,165 in which an Origination Clause challenge was brought against the new corporate income tax on the grounds that, because the tax had been added as a Senate amendment to a House bill that contained only tariff provisions and an inheritance tax, the corporate tax had unconstitutionally originated in the Senate. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, reasoning that "[t]he bill having properly originated in the House, we perceive no reason . . . why it may not be amended in the Senate in the manner which it was in this case. The amendment was germane to the subject matter of the bill and not beyond the power of the Senate to propose."166 Although the Supreme Court had thus suggested the existence of some kind of an undefined germaneness requirement, it had upheld a Senate amendment that was vastly different from the provisions of the underlying House revenue bill.
4. The 1968 and 1982 Debates. The full expansion of the Senate's power to amend House revenue bills occurred much later, in 1968 and 1982, and each case arose from unusual political circumstances.
In 1968, as the Vietnam War escalated, President Johnson asked Congress to enact an emergency income surtax to help finance the war. Seeking quick action, congressional leaders decided that the proposal would be taken up first in the Senate, as a Senate amendment to a minor House bill extending a handful of excise taxes. After amending and passing the bill, the Senate called for a conference, and the House agreed; eventually, the conferees proposed a conference report that included the surtax.
When the conference report came before the House, Rep. Harold Gross, R-Iowa, offered a resolution to return it to the Senate as a violation of the Origination Clause.169 He argued that the conference report "represents one of the most direct attempts in the history of the Republic to cut away and destroy one of the most fundamental privileges and rights of this House -- the right, the responsibility, and the duty, under the Constitution, to originate revenue measures."
A similar situation arose in 1982. There was substantial sentiment that, in light of projected federal budget deficits, a tax increase was necessary. However, the Democratic chair of the Ways and Means Committee, Rep. Rostenkowski, reportedly still smarting after having been out-maneuvered during the previous year's tax cut debate, refused to initiate a tax increase. Instead, he put that burden on the Republican-controlled Senate.177 Eventually, the Senate amended a minor House bill reducing taxes with a several-hundred-page amendment increasing taxes by about $100 billion.
After thinking about the Origination Clause over several years, from both a historical and a practical perspective, I would like to offer several concluding observations.
A starting point is how important the framers considered the Origination Clause. It was not some minor technical provision adopted with little debate. To the contrary, it was a critical element of the legislative balance between the House and Senate; it was debated over the course of virtually the entire Constitutional Convention, voted on repeatedly, and subject to several compromise revisions.
In light of how important the framers considered the Origination Clause, it is surprising how uncertain they left the final version. Under the compromise, two critical terms were undefined. One was the universe of "bills for raising revenue" to which the clause applied. The other was the scope of the Senate's power "to alter or amend, as on other bills," the impact of which depended entirely on how the Senate subsequently defined the general power to amend.
As those and related decisions unfolded, several issues have been resolved, which establish some bedrock points on which we can rely.
First, the Origination Clause is enforceable not only by Congress but also by the courts.
Second, broad agreement exists on several basic limits. The Senate may not pass and send to the House a revenue bill or add a revenue amendment to a House bill that is not a revenue bill. Conversely, the House may not add a revenue amendment to a Senate bill.
Third, the Origination Clause does not inhibit the Senate's own internal proceedings. There was some uncertainty in the early years of Congress, and the classical model is for the Senate to do its primary work on revenue legislation in the form of amendments to a House revenue bill. However, the Senate may, if it chooses, initiate and work on revenue bills, both in the Finance Committee and on the Senate floor, as long as it does not send them to the House until it has received and amended a House revenue bill.
Fourth, the Senate has virtually unlimited power to amend House revenue bills, although the House may not have fully conceded the point and could conceivably revive a version of its 1872 position that Senate amendments must relate to the House bill.
In contrast, several other issues remain unresolved. The most important is the definition of a bill for raising revenue. Clearly, the Origination Clause applies to all revenue bills, including bills that reduce as well as increase revenue. But less clear is what constitutes a revenue bill, with particular uncertainty for appropriations bills and bills related to debt limit, nontariff aspects of trade policy, and the administration of tax laws; and to bills implicating the distinction between taxes and user fees.
In light of all this, how important does the Origination Clause remain? Has it lived up to the framers' expectation? Or has it become something of a constitutional anachronism, serving primarily as a minor speed bump along the legislative highway?
On one hand, the Origination Clause has turned out to give less primacy to the House than its strongest advocates among the framers must have envisioned. The Senate's broad power to amend, and its ability to initiate and develop revenue legislation short of sending it to the House, has allowed the Senate to frequently play a role on revenue legislation that differs little from the role that it plays on other legislation, when the role of the Senate is fully equal to that of the House.
On the other hand, the Origination Clause continues to have a significant effect on revenue legislation, in at least three ways.
First, it establishes a norm -- the classical model -- in which the Congress takes a careful, predictable, sequential approach to revenue legislation: the House Ways and Means Committee holds hearings and reports a bill to the full House; the Senate refers the bill to the Finance Committee, which holds further hearings, amends the House bill, and reports the amended bill to the full Senate for further debate and amendment; and finally there is a conference to resolve the differences. Adherence to that classical model is not mandatory and, indeed, may be more the exception than the rule. But the model persists and sometimes is employed on tax bills of particular importance, such as the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Third, within the House and Senate themselves, the Origination Clause strengthens the hand of the tax committees. That is especially true in the Senate, where the committee with jurisdiction usually has relatively little control over floor amendments. A House revenue billordinarily is referred to the Senate Finance Committee, which then decides whether and when to report the bill to the full Senate. Because the Origination Clause prevents revenue amendments from being offered as amendments to nonrevenue bills (whether original Senate bills or House bills that are not revenue bills), the committee with jurisdiction -- the Finance Committee -- has more control over the pace and scope of the consideration of revenue legislation by the full Senate than is the case with other legislation.
Pulling all of this together, the Origination Clause has indeed been, as James Madison predicted in 1789, "a source of frequent and obstinate altercations." But it also remains an important part of our constitutional structure. Despite its development in ways the framers could not have envisioned, and despite the uncertainties of its application at the margins, the Origination Clause has established a model for the consideration of revenue legislation, enhanced the power of the House relative to the Senate, and strengthened the hand of the congressional tax committees.
1 Michael Evans, "Foundations of the Tax Legislation Process: The Confederation, Constitutional Convention, and First Revenue Law," Tax Notes, Jan. 21, 1991, p. 283.
2 2 Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England: From the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II 193 (1978).
3 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 163-64.
4 S. Rep. No. 146, at 2 (1872) (quoting the Commons' resolution) (emphasis omitted). See also Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 639-43 (5th ed. 1994).
5 James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention 517-18 (1987 ed.) (1st ed. 1840) (hereinafter Madison's Notes) (remarks of John Dickenson). See also J. Michael Medina, "The Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey," 23 Tulsa L.J. 165, 168 note 13 (1987) (citing the constitutions of Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia).
6 The Federalist No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally, Evans, supra note 1, at 284-86.
7 When, early in the Convention, the Committee on Detail enumerated specific legislative powers, the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" was the first listed, and was adopted without significant objection. 1 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 144 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) (hereinafter Elliot's Debates).
8 U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4 ("[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census of Enumeration herein before directed to be taken").
9 Madison's Notes, supra note 5, at 113.
17 Elliot's Debates, supra note 7, at 194.
18 Madison's Notes, supra note 5, at 238.
19 Elliot's Debates, supra note 7, at 241.
21 Madison's Notes, supra note 5, at 436-37. This formulation was proposed by Edmund Randolph, the original author of the Virginia Plan. In response, James Madison dissected the amendment. Although designed ostensibly to clarify ambiguous elements in the original version, Madison argued that, by allowing only certain kinds of amendments, the modifications created entirely new ambiguities. How, he asked, "could it be determined which was the primary or predominant" purpose of a provision, or "whether it was necessary that revenue should be the [sole] object, in exclusion even of other incidental effects?" Moreover, Madison argued, "the words amend or alter form an equal source of doubt and altercation . . . [because] the] Senate may actually couch extraneous matter under that name." Id. at 446.
22 Elliot's Debates, supra note 7, at 241.
23 Madison's Notes, supra note 5, at 461.
24 Elliot's Debates, supra note 7, at 298, 300.
25 The Federalist No. 58 (James Madison). There was little further relevant debate during the ratification process. See 48 Cong Rec. 9047, 9048 (1912) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (inserting into the Congressional Record a memo supporting his view that the Origination Clause applies to appropriations bills; The memo says "[i]n the consideration of the adoption of the Constitution by the several States in their conventions, I find nothing in the discussions in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, or Maryland, which is significant," and also describes the brief debate about the Origination Clause in Virginia and North Carolina).
26 Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. 107 (1910); Milliard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1896).
27 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
28 Id. at 393. The Court also gave two other reasons for rejecting the political question argument. First, it rejected the argument that the courts should refrain from deciding constitutional questions that do not directly affect individual rights. Id. at 392. Second, it rejected the argument that there were insufficient judicially enforceable standards available for deciding an Origination Clause question. Id. at 395-96.
29 See also Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (invalidating, as a violation of the Origination Clause, a House revenue amendment to a Senate bill).
30 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 518, 103rd Cong. (1994).
31 See, e.g., 92 Cong. Rec. 6435 (1946) (passing a House bill to reduce the debt limit in lieu of a Senate bill to do the same).
32 147 Cong. Rec. S6582 (daily ed. June 21, 2001).
34 See, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 17971 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Mills); 79 Cong. Rec. 4584 (1935) (remarks of Sen. LaFollette).
35 See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. H4154 (daily ed. June 27, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Thomas) (House passage of a Senate debt limit bill "should not be considered a precedent" and "should not be considered a change in the historic relationship between the House and the Senate over the origination of debt-limit legislation; but rather is a one-time acknowledgment of the exigencies of the circumstances facing the House"); 128 Cong. Rec. 18376-77 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Rostenkowski) (urging members to reject a blue-slip resolution against an extensive Senate amendment to a House revenue measure, but arguing that "today's action . . . does not create a precedent for judging when in the future the House should, and will, insist on the maximum protection afforded by the origination clause").
36 Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1666 (1859).
37 H.R. Res. 240, 107th Cong. (2001) (returning to the Senate H.R. 2500).
38 66 Cong. Rec. 1025 (1925). See also 75 Cong. Rec. 7606 (1931) (tabling a Senate bill to regulate international trade in crude oil).
39 Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
40 Cong. Globe 3427 (1864). See also 84 Cong. Rec. 6331, 6339, 6348-50 (1939) (Senate sustaining a point of order against a Senate revenue amendment to a House bill that the Senate determined was not a revenue bill).
41 Cong. Globe 3427, 4787, 4824 (1864). But see 64 Cong. Rec. 4606-13 (debate regarding Senate revenue amendments to a House postal bill that was not a revenue bill; eventually, a conference was convened but was not able to resolve the differences).
42 S. Rep. No. 146 at 5 (1872).
43 7 Cong. Debates 172, 244, 245 (1831). See also 7 Cong. Debates 473, 479 (1831) (denying leave to introduce a Senate bill to abolish the duty on salt).
44 9 Cong. Debates 474 (1833).
45 Id. at 474, 479.
47 Id. at 787. See also id. at 786 (Sen. Grundy asks whether Sen. Clay has "examined the bill to ascertain if it was the same as the bill which had been before the Senate," and Sen. Clay answers that he has). Later, during the House-Senate controversy that arose in 1871-72, which is discussed below, Rep. Brooks of New York reported, as "a historical fact within my own knowledge," that "[a]fter a discussion in the Senate, which lasted to a very late hour in the night, Mr. Clay abandoned the ground he had first taken as untenable, and transferred his own bill to Mr. Letcher, his friend and Representative in the House from Kentucky, because the ground he had first taken in the Senate was not tenable." Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2105 (1872).
48 But see 6 Cong. Rec. 124 (1844) (Senate Finance Committee report on a bill modifying tariff schedules, postponing consideration of the bill on the ground that is "a bill for raising revenue . . . and cannot, therefore, originate in the Senate").
49 Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
50 Act of June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 590.
51 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 30 (1969).
52 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
53 See, e.g., S. 1637 108th Cong. (2004) (FSC/ETI bill reported by the Senate Finance Committee, debated, amended, and passed by the full Senate, then held at the Senate desk for more than two months until a companion bill had been received from the House); S. 1979, 107th Cong. (energy tax incentives, reported by the Senate Finance Committee and then incorporated in a Senate amendment to a House revenue bill); S. 896, 107th Cong. (2001 tax cut, reported by Senate Finance Committee and then incorporated as a Senate amendment to a House revenue bill).
54 See H. Con. Res. 83, 107th Cong. (2001), sections 103, 104 (budget resolution requiring both the Ways and Means and Finance Committees to report revenue legislation by May 18, 2001).
55 See supra at notes 19-20.
56 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 642-43 (1994 ed.).
57 167 U.S. 196 (1896).
61 202 U.S. 429 (1906).
63 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
69 79 Cong. Rec. 4583 (1935).
77 9 Cong. Deb. 477 (1833). See also id. at 478 (remarks of Sen. Webster, arguing that "as, by its title, the bill appeared to be merely a bill to modify the existing revenue laws, it could hardly be rejected as a bill for raising revenue . . . since there are many particulars in which all the existing revenue laws might be modified, without raising more or less revenue").
78 39 Cong. Rec. 2768 (1905) (remarks of Sen. Spooner). See also 83 Cong. Rec. 6339 (1939) (remarks of Sen. Connolly) (making a successful point of order against a Senate amendment that reduced revenue, arguing that "every Senator knows that this amendment affects revenue. It does not make any difference wither it raises revenue or lowers revenue, if the provision relates to the revenue it is a revenue matter, and, under the Constitution . . . must originate in the House . . . .").
79 Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985).
80 Id. at 1381-82 (emphasis in original).
81 The House argument is, in essence, that in adopting the Origination Clause, the framers were following the English practice, which required that all "money bills" originate in the House of Commons, and that the framers intended the Origination Clause to have similar scope, applying to both revenue and appropriations bills. The Senate response is, in essence, that in changing the relevant term from "money bills' to "revenue bills," the framers intended to give it a more narrow scope. The issue remains unsettled; the Congressional Research Service concludes that "[a]lthough the constitutional question has never been definitively resolved, in practice the Senate has generally deferred to the House's insistence on originating appropriations." James V. Saturno, Congressional Research Service, The Origination Clause and the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement 16 (2002). See also Cong. Rec. 9047-51 (July 15, 1912) (statement by Sen. Williams, arguing that the Origination Clause applies to appropriations bills); see generally, Stephen Horn, Unused Power: The Work of the Senate Committee on Appropriations 246-53 (1970).
82 39 Cong. Rec. 2766 (1905) (House resolution presented in the Senate).
86 Id. at 2767 (motion to recede), 2770 (passage of bill).
87 H. Res. 518 (1994) (with respect to a Senate amendment establishing a fee for the use of FDA services); H. Res. 240 (1991) (with respect to a Senate amendment restricting imports of "conflict diamonds").
88 H. Res. 568, 106th Cong. (2000). For another example, in 1998 a provision extending several expiring tax provisions was added to an omnibus appropriations bill conference report. Title I of Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); see Robert Keith, Congressional Research Service, 98-846 Gov, Revenue Provisions in Annual Appropriations Acts 1 (updated November 23, 1998) (describing the revenue provisions that were included in various appropriations bills during the 1980s and the 1990s).
89 136 Cong. Rec. 5056 (1990).
91 137 Cong. Rec. 85-86 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991). The speaker's statement was directed both to the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee and the "constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue measures."
93 See, 149 Cong. Rec. H21 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2003) ("The policy announced in the 102nd Congress with respect to jurisdictional concepts related to . . . tax and tariff measures, will continue to govern but need not be reiterated, as it is adequately documented as precedent in the House Rules and Manual.").
95 140 Cong. Rec. H8036 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1994).
98 See Pub. L. No. 103-330, 108 Stat. 2435 (1994).
99 144 Cong. Rec. H879 (daily ed. March 5, 1998).
100 H. Res. 379 (1998).
101 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-071, section 116, 115 Stat. 625 (2001).
102 Pub. L. No. 106-294, 114 Stat. 1038 (2000).
103 S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002).
104 See, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Daniel Altman Ashington, "In a Shift, Republicans Pledge to Pass Accounting Bill," N.Y. Times, July 17, 2002, at C-1.
105 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
107 S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2002).
108 H.R. 4567 (2004). See "Thomas May Slow Homeland Bill in Customs Fee Dispute," CongressDaily PM, Sept. 17, 2004.
109 14 Cong. Debates 1152-53 (1837).
110 80 Cong. Rec. 448 (1936).
111 H.R. 2404, Pub. L. No. 79-28, 59 Stat. 47 (1946). See Deschlers' Precedents of the House of Representatives, ch. 13, section 18.4, at 312.
112 H.J.Res. 280, 101st Cong. (1989).
113 142 Cong. Rec. S419-24 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1996).
114 2 Cong. Rec. 2075, 3076 (1874).
115 92 Cong. Rec. 5001 (1946).
116 See, e.g., id. at 5002-06 (remarks of Rep. McCormack).
117 Deschler's Precedents of the House of Representatives ch. 13, section 17, at 306.
118 S. 2578, 107th Cong. (2002).
119 148 Cong. Rec. 4154 (daily ed. June 27, 2002).
121 See, e.g., 117 Cong. Rec. 12991 (1971) (returning to the Senate a bill modifying the tariff schedules); 111 Cong. Rec. 11149 (1965) (returning to the Senate a bill to raise the duty on fishery products); 80 Cong. Rec. 1183 (1936) (returning to the Senate a bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930).
122 74 Cong. Rec. 6706, 6712 (1931).
123 H. Res. 544, 101st Cong. (1988) (returning to the Senate S. 2662).
124 H. Res. 486, 103rd Cong. (1994) (returning to the Senate S. 729).
125 H. Res. 601, 105th Cong. (1998) (returning to the Senate S. 361).
126 H. Res. 249, 106th Cong. (1999) (returning to the Senate S. 254).
127 H. Res. 240, 107th Cong. (2001) (returning to the Senate H.R. 2500).
128 H. Res. 402, 104th Cong. (1996) (returning to the Senate S. 1463).
129 H. Res. 554, 104th Cong. (1996) (returning to the Senate H.R. 400, the Anaktuvuk Pass Land Exchange and Wilderness Redesignation Act of 1995, which the Senate had amended to expand the certain categories of income exempt from taxation under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act); S. Res. 577, 103rd Cong. (1994) (returning to the Senate S. 1216, the Crow Boundary Settlement Act of 1994, which exempted certain payments and benefits from taxation); H. Res. 479, 100th Cong. (1988) (returning to the Senate S. 727, which addressed the tax treatment of income derived from the exercise of certain Indian treaty rights).
130 H. Res. 287, 101st Cong. (1989) (returning to the Senate S. 686, the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1989, which allowed a credit against the oil liability tax for certain items of expense).
131 H. Res. 545, 104th Cong. (1996) (returning to the Senate S. 1311, the National Physical Fitness and Sports Foundation Establishment Act, which waived the application of certain rules for tax-exempt foundations); H. Res. 177, 101st Cong. (1989) (returning to the Senate S. 774, the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, which conferred tax-exempt status on two newly created institutions); H. Res. 425, 74th Cong. (1936) (returning to the Senate S. 3410, exempting from taxation the operation of the Olympic Games).
132 Compare, Resolution of December 15, 1905, 39 Cong. Rec. 452 (returning to the Senate S. 1475, establishing a specific tax on certain newly issued bonds, and otherwise exempting the bonds from taxation), with the Senate debate of December 15, 1905, 39 Cong. Rec. 581-85 (rejecting an Origination Clause challenge to a similar provision of a conference report, which subsequently was adopted by both the Senate and House).
133 S. 1190, enacted as Pub. L. No. 107-22, 115 Stat. 196 (2001).
134 H. Res. 479, 103rd Cong. (1994).
135 H. Res. 251 (returning to the Senate S. 1241).
136 S. 1190, enacted as Pub. L. No. 107-22, 115 Stat. 196 (2001).
137 Madison's Notes, supra note 5, at 238.
138 U.S. Const. Art. I, section 5, cl. 1.
139 Rules of the House of Representatives XVI:7 (108th Cong. 2004) ("No motion or proposition on a subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment").
140 Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S. Frumin, Riddick's Senate Procedure 854 (1992) ("The Senate does not have a general rule requiring that amendments be germane to the measure to which they are proposed").
141 See Evans, supra note 1.
143 Annals of Cong., 9th Cong., 2nd Sess. 630 (Feb. 1807).
145 See generally, Joseph A. Hill, "The Civil War Income Tax," Quarterly Journal of Economics 416 (1894).
147 Cong. Globe 791 (1871).
148 Cong. Globe 565, 598 (1871).
150 Cong. Globe 2105 (1872).
152 Id. See also id. at 2107 (remarks of Rep. Garfield) ("I do not deny [the Senate's] right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as an amendment to our two lines. But I do insist that that their thousand pages must be on the subject matter of our bill."); id. at 2108 (remarks of Rep. Hale) ("amendments of the Senate shall be confined to the objects which the House selects in whatever bills it may send to the Senate").
154 S. Rep. No. 146 (1872).
156 Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
158 8 Cong. Rec. 1478 (1879) (emphasis in original).
162 The House had passed a bill making relatively minor reductions in various internal taxes, which the Senate had amended with what a House member, Rep. Hammond, characterized as "a general revision of the statutes . . . so as both to increase and reduce duties on imports, and in many cases to repeal and in others to amend the laws imposing import duties." 14 Cong. Rec. 3336 (1883). When Hammond proposed a resolution to return the amendment to the Senate, another member proposed an alternative resolution requiring the House conferees to "consider fully the constitutional objections to [the] bill as amended by the Senate." Id. at 3340. The substitute was adopted, id. at 3344, and the eventual conference report contained various elements of the Senate amendments. See II Hind's Precedents of the House of Representatives section1492 (1907).
163 20 Cong. Rec. 2208 (1889).
164 See Cong. Rec. 469, 4751 (1909) (remarks of Reps. Payne and Gillette, explaining why the House was willing to agree to the corporation tax).
165 220 U.S. 107 (1910).
166 Flint, 220 U.S. at 143.
167 232 U.S. 310 (1914).
168 Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317 (quoting lower court decision). More recently, in Armstrong v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an Origination Clause challenge to the 1982 tax increase that originated as a Senate amendment to a minor House tax bill, concluding: "[O]nce a revenue bill has been initiated in the House, the Senate is fully empowered to propose amendments, even if their effect will be to transform a proposal lowering taxes into one raising taxes." 759 F.2d at 1832.
169 114 Cong. Rec. 17970 (1968).
177 See Richard Cohen, Rostenkowski, 130-31 (1999).
178 128 Cong. Rec. 18375 (1982).
181 See, e,g., id. at 18377 (remarks of Rep. Moore), 18379 (remarks of Rep. Gradison).
184 P.L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
185 128 Cong. Rec. 18376-77 (1982).
[R]ecent precedents exhibit no general restriction on the Senate's amendment authority, leaving the Senate free to propose any amendment allowed under Senate rules to House originated revenue measures. As currently understood, because the Senate has no rule requiring that amendments to revenue bills be germane the constitutional provision allowing the Senate to "propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills" opens the door to Senate action on a wide range of possible alternatives. In this way, the Senate may "originate" specific tax provisions, even though it may not originate tax measures.
Saturno, supra note 77 , at 1.
187 Adrian Vermeule, "The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure," 71 U. Chicago L. Rev. 361, 424 (2004).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 V. 
 v.