Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53053:gr-183387-2009&catid=1522&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:43:54+00:00

Document:
SIMEON M. VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. FINANCIERA MANILA, INC., Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Simeon M. Valdez comes to this Court seeking to nullify the Decision1 dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100316 which partly affirmed the Orders dated February 26, 2007 and June 18, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 227 in Civil Case No. Q-98-35546.
Petitioner and his wife, Lydia D. Valdez, among others,2 filed a Complaint for a sum of money with prayer for preliminary attachment on September 18, 1998 against respondent Financiera Manila, Inc. and five of its corporate officers,3 at Branch 227, RTC of Quezon City,4 seeking to recover damages for failure of respondent Financiera and the corporate officers to pay petitioner's money market investments on their maturity dates. A preliminary attachment5 was issued by the RTC against respondent Financiera which resulted into the levying of the latter's Account Nos. A-04-000324 to A-000355 with Scholarship Plan Philippines, Inc. (SPPI), including its parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-36316 and T-36317 of the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City and TCT Nos. T-235055 and T-235056 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.6 Thereafter, the RTC rendered its Decision7 finding respondent Financiera liable to plaintiffs in the said case for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, with attorney's fees. An appeal was then filed with the CA, which, in its Decision8 dated November 14, 2002, affirmed the award of actual damages in the total amount of P4,069,439.90, with P3,920,313.24 going to petitioner Valdez and his spouse, P126,885.52, to Belen Guevara, P11,120.57 to Pauline R. Petelo and P11,120.57 to Teddy Aurelio; and remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the award for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
1. For valuable consideration paid by defendant FINANCIERA Manila, Inc. (hereinafter called FINANCIERA, for short) to the plaintiffs, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the plaintiffs to their entire satisfaction, the plaintiffs have dropped, dismissed and withdrawn, as they hereby drop, dismiss and withdraw, their complaint in the above-entitled case, in favor of all the defendants, and they hereby acknowledge that they have no more claims, demands, complaint, or causes of action of any kind whatsoever against said defendants, their successors-in-interest and assigns, arising from or connected with any of the transaction or transactions that gave rise to plaintiffs' complaint, or anything else whatsoever.
2. With the dropping, dismissal and withdrawal of plaintiffs' complaint, plaintiffs have agreed, as they hereby agree to the lifting, cancellation and dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by this Honorable Court dated October 13, 1998 by virtue of which plaintiffs had levied on/garnished/ attached FINANCIERA's certain real and personal properties.
d) A parcel of land in Tagaytay City, covered by TCT No. T-36317 of the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City.
a) The investment under Account No. A-04-000-355 with a cash value of P110,000.00 is hereby assigned and conveyed to FINANCIERA in favor of the plaintiffs to form part of the above-mentioned valuable consideration paid hereunder by FINANCIERA to the plaintiffs.
b) The rest of the investment accounts with a total cash value of P3,050,000.00 are hereby assigned and conveyed by FINANCIERA in favor of the spouses SIMEON VALDEZ and LYDIA VALDEZ, as part of the valuable consideration to be paid to them by FINANCIERA in another civil case, entitled "The spouses Simeon Valdez and Lydia Valdez, plaintiffs, v. Financiera Manila, Inc., defendant", docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-40877 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which civil case the said spouses have likewise agreed to amicably settle with FINANCIERA simultaneously with the execution of this Compromise Agreement.
4. This Compromise Agreement shall be a full and final settlement of all the claims and counterclaims filed by or against the parties in this case, or any of them, and specifically it shall be a full and complete satisfaction of the judgment rendered by this Honorable Court in favor of the plaintiffs as modified by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68286.
5. Plaintiffs hereby agree and bind themselves to sign, execute and deliver any and all other deeds, papers and documents, and to do and perform any and all other acts and things, that may be necessary or required to fully implement this Compromise Agreement, particularly the discharge and release of the levy/garnishment/attachment on defendant's aforesaid investments with the Bonifacio Land Corporation and the payment to the defendant by the latter of the cash value of said investments.
Thereafter, respondent Financiera filed its Motion for Reconsideration,20 which was eventually denied,21 prompting it to file a petition for certiorari 22 with the CA on the ground that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated February 26, 2007 and June 18, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated February 26, 2007 and June 18, 2007 of Branch 227, RTC of QC in Civil Case No. Q-98-35546 are SET ASIDE, only with respect to Sps. Valdez's interest. The court a quo is hereby ordered to issue a writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City to lift and/or cancel the notices of levy on attachment annotated on TCT Nos. T-36316 and T-36317 with respect only to the P3,920,313.24 interest of the Sps. Valdez.
4.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY RESPONDENT.
4.2 THE QUESTIONED DECISION IS UTTERLY ILLOGICAL AND INCONCLUSIVE (sic) DONE IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 14, ART. VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND SEC. 1, RULE 36 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
4.3 RESPONDENT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ITS SPPI INVESTMENT FAILED TO EXTINGUISH ITS OBLIGATION TO PAY PETITIONER UNDER OUR LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
4.4 THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO LIFT THE ATTACHMENTS WHILE PETITIONER'S CLAIMS REMAIN UNPAID.
4.5 THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY PETITIONER FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THIS PETITION INVOLVE PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAW.
In questioning the jurisdiction of the CA over the petition for certiorari filed by respondent Financiera, petitioner Valdez claims the following: (a) as jurisprudence26 dictates, the proper remedy of the same respondent should have been to file an appeal, because it was the motion for execution of judgment that was denied; (b) the petition for certiorari was filed out of time, because respondent Financiera received the RTC Order of June 18, 2007 denying the latter's motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2007, but instead of filing a notice of appeal within the reglementary period lasting until July 14, 2007, respondent Financiera belatedly filed a petition for certiorari on August 28, 2007 when the questioned RTC Orders had already attained finality; (c) the final RTC Orders should not have been modified because, as ruled by this Court in a number of cases,27 the said Orders are immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification was meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land; and (d) the subject matter of the petition for certiorari should not have been expanded, since the only subject matter elevated by respondent Financiera was that of SPPI Investment Account No. A-04-000-355 with a cash value of P110,000.00, and not the entire P10,195,833.33 unpaid claim under the Compromise Agreement, contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in various cases28 that the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the material allegations contained in the petition.
In arguing that respondent Financiera's assignment of its SPPI Investment failed to extinguish its obligation to pay, petitioner Valdez cites Article 1249 of the New Civil Code and Cebu International Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals.32 Furthermore, he posits that the assignment of SPPI Investments by respondent Financiera did not extinguish its obligation, because he was left with no remedy against SPPI, which was not a signatory to the Compromise Agreement, and because respondent Financiera breached its warranty that the said investments had matured with cash value when in fact they had not.
FINANCIERA CORRECTLY FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS OF THE COURT A QUO DIRECTING THE EXECUTION OF A COURT DECISION WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPLANTED AND COMPLETELY SATISFIED BY THE PARTIES THROUGH THE EXECUTION OF A COURT-APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
C. FINANCIERA HAD PERFORMED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE COURT-APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND IS NOW ENTITLED TO THE LIFTING OF THE LEVY ON ATTACHMENT ON ITS REAL PROPERTIES, PARTICULARLY T.C.T. NOS. T-36316 AND T-36317.
According to respondent Financiera, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA because the enforcement of the court a quo's February 26, 2007 and June 18, 2007 Orders rendered nugatory the force and effect of the parties' court-approved Compromise Agreement. Respondent adds that the enforcement of the same Orders would cause irreparable injury as it was directed to pay petitioner Valdez and others the sum of P4,069,439.90, when it had already assigned and transferred to them its SPPI investment accounts pursuant to the parties' court-approved Compromise Agreement.
In stating that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion, respondent Financiera reasons that the CA was correct in ruling that it was the RTC that committed grave abuse of its discretion in varying the terms and conditions of the parties' Compromise Agreement, which was already valid and enforceable in accordance with the terms thereof, and respondent had already performed its obligations under the same agreement.
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.: "(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades v. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB v. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar v. Tan, L-23600, June 30, 1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. v. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept., 231985); (3) for certain special consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose v. Zulueta, et al. L-16598, May 31, 1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People v. Abalos, L-29039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo v. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975)."36 Even in a case where the remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction,37 as in the present case.
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Considering that an appeal was still available as a remedy for the assailed Orders of the RTC, and that the case did not fall within the exceptions, the filing of the Petition for Certiorari was an attempted substitute for an appeal, after respondent failed to avail itself of the latter remedy. Necessarily, it must be noted that the Petition for Certiorari was filed on August 28, 2007 when the questioned RTC Orders had already attained finality. The Order became final when respondent Financiera received the RTC Order of June 18, 2007 denying the former's motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2007. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within the reglementary period lasting until July 14, 2007, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari, way beyond the reglementary period. Hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to decide the said Petition for Certiorari.
Having ruled on the jurisdiction of CA, this Court shall now proceed to the merits of the case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
a) The investment under Account No. A-04-000-355 with a cash value of P110,000.00 is hereby assigned and conveyed by FINANCIERA in favor of the plaintiffs to form part of the above-mentioned valuable consideration paid hereunder by FINANCIERA to the plaintiffs.
b) The rest of the investment, accounts with a total cash value of P3,050,000.00 are hereby assigned and conveyed by FINANCIERA in favor of the spouses SIMEON VALDEZ and LYDIA VALDEZ, as part of the valuable consideration to be paid to them by FINANCIERA in another civil case, entitled "The spouses Simeon Valdez and Lydia Valdez, plaintiffs, v. Financiera Manila, Inc., defendant", docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-40877 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which civil case the said spouses have likewise agreed to amicably settle with FINANCIERA simultaneously with the execution of this Compromise Agreement.
The above stipulations state in detail the properties whose attachments were sought to be lifted and canceled. Of particular importance is the assignment and conveyance of the 30 investment accounts of respondent Financiera with SPPI with a total cash value, as stated in the Compromise Agreement, of P3,160,000.00, because these accounts formed part of the valuable consideration paid by respondent to petitioner and the other plaintiffs. There is no dispute that the said investment accounts with SPPI were eventually assigned by respondent Financiera. The problem lies in whether there was full compliance with the said stipulation in the Compromise Agreement.
The stipulation states categorically that the 30 investment accounts of respondent Financiera with SPPI had already matured. However, the cash value of the said investment accounts were never given because SPPI, not being a party to the Compromise Agreement, could not be compelled to pay respondent Financiera's unpaid obligation to petitioner Valdez. The only legal effect of the non-inclusion of a party in a compromise agreement is that said party cannot be bound by the terms of the agreement.45 Thus, the valuable consideration referred to by respondent Financiera in the Compromise Agreement has yet to be fulfilled. The very essence of the stipulation, as gleaned from the literal, as well as the implied, meaning of the words contained therein is the eventual payment of petitioner Valdez's claim. As ruled46 by this Court, in a compromise agreement, the literal meaning of its stipulations must control.47 It "must be strictly interpreted and x x x understood as including only matters specifically determined therein or which, by necessary inference from its wording, must be deemed included."48 Therefore, the non-maturity of the 30 investment accounts of respondent Financiera with SPPI makes the Compromise Agreement unenforceable. In Abinujar v. Court of Appeals,49 as cited in Alonzo, et al. v. Jaime and Perlita San Juan,50 this Court even went further and declared that the non-fulfillment of the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement approved by the court justifies execution thereof, and the issuance of a writ for the said purpose is the court's ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. In this particular case, since the Compromise Agreement's enforceability depends on the maturity of the subject SPPI shares, the RTC could not compel SPPI to deliver the cash value of the said investment accounts, simply because the latter was not a party to the Compromise Agreement. Hence, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it granted petitioner Valdez's motion for execution in its Decision dated May 22, 2000.
In short, as the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement remain unfulfilled, respondent Financiera is still obligated to pay its original indebtedness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100316 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. TheOrders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 227, dated February 26, 2007 and June 18, 2007, are hereby REINSTATED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with Associate Justices Portia AliÃ±o - Hormachuelos and Lucas P. Bersamin (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 30-36.
4 Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35546.
5 Resolution dated October 13, 1998, CA rollo, pp. 39-41.
6 As mentioned in the Order dated February 26, 2007, CA rollo, pp. 33-36.
8 CA rollo, pp. 46-56.
9 Civil Case No. Q-00-40877.
11 CA rollo, pp. 59-62.
12 Contained in SPPI's Manifestation (Re: Motion for Contempt) in Civil Case No. Q-00-40877, as mentioned in CA Decision dated March 18, 2008, CA rollo, p. 211.
13 As shown in the Certification dated May 28, 2003 issued by SPPI, CA rollo, p. 64.
14 As mentioned in petitioner's Comment dated September 21, 2007, CA rollo, p. 110.
15 CA rollo, pp. 65-66.
16 Per CA Resolutions dated April 11, 2005 and June 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89049, CA rollo, pp. 68-69 and 71-72, respectively, and SC Resolution dated July 27, 2005 in G.R. No. 168547, CA rollo, p. 73.
17 CA rollo, pp. 76-82.
21 Order dated June 18, 2007, id. at 37-38.
22 CA rollo, pp. 2-31.
26 Syllabus in Socorro v. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-23608, December 24, 1964, 12 SCRA 641; and Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107404, March 30, 1994, 231 SCRA 620.
27 Jacobus Bernhard Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 74, 95, citing PeÃ±a v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), 502 SCRA 383, 404 (2006); Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 468 SCRA 154, 161-162 (2005); Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 586, 599 (2004).
28 Trans Middle East (Phils.) v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172556, June 9, 2006, 490 SCRA 455. See Guiang v. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30 2004, 435 SCRA 556, 561-562; Intestate Estate of Alexander Ty v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 112872 & 114672, April 19, 2001, 356 SCA 661, 666.
29 Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
30 Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court requires that "A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court."
31 Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena, G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 518, 539, citing Poliand Industrial Limited v. National Development Company, 467 SCRA 500, 550 (2005); Mendoza, Jr. San Miguel, Inc., 458 SCRA 664, 676-677.
32 G.R. No. 123031, October 12, 1999, 316 SCRA 488.
33 G.R. No. 149420, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 182.
36 Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, p. 708 (1997).
37 Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, G.R. No. 62082, February 26, 1992, 206 SCRA 582, 589. See also Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119193, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 672, 689.
38 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1. Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil 155, 178-179 (1997). See Cochingyan, Jr. v. Cloribel, G.R. NOS. L-27070-71, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 361, 385.
39 Alonzo v. Sps. Jaime and Perlita San Juan, G.R. No. 137549, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 45.
40 Regal Films, Inc. v. Concepcion, 414 Phil. 807, 812 (2001).
41 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 126.
42 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647, cited in San Antonio v. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 536 (2001).
43 Limson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135929, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 209; China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121158, December 5, 1996, 265 SCRA 327.
44 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79.
45 Domingo Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126236, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 40, 61.
46 Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. ALA Industries Corpo., 467 Phil. 229. (2004).
47 Inter-Asia Services Corp. (Int l) v. CA Special Fifteenth Division, 331 Phil. 708, 718-719. (1996).
48 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, p. 491 (1992).
49 G.R. No. 104133, April 18, 1995, 243 SCRA 531, 535, citing Maceda, Jr. v. Moreman Builders Co., Inc., 203 SCRA 293 (1991).

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