Source: http://www.ettdefenseinsight.com/category/illinois-2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:08:10+00:00

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The Northern District of Illinois recently ruled that under Illinois law, an asbestos product manufacturer owed no duty of care to household members in a “take home” or “secondary exposure” asbestos case. Neumann v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC, No. 15-10507, N.D. Ill., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31280.
Plaintiff Doris Jane Neumann alleges that she contracted malignant mesothelioma through exposure to asbestos-containing products as a result of laundering the clothes of her son, who used asbestos-containing friction paper during his work as a mechanic. Originally filed in state court, the case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds. Subsequently, defendant MW Custom Papers moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), alleging that it could not be found liable for negligence because it did not owe Doris Jane Neumann a duty of care under Illinois law.
In ruling on the motion, the federal district court noted with frustration that there was a split of opinion among Illinois appellate courts on the issue. The Illinois Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide the issue in Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2012 Ill. LEXIS 330, 965 N.E.2d 1092 (2012), but declined to issue a definitive ruling. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court never actually answered the question as to whether a “take home” duty of care existed in Illinois asbestos cases. As a result, the holding in Neumann takes on a heightened significance.
Neumann gleaned some guidance from the Seventh Circuit, which instructed that “[w]hen we are faced with two opposing and equally plausible interpretations of state law, we generally choose the narrower interpretation which restricts liability, rather than the more expansive interpretation which creates substantially more liability.” Applying this reasoning, the court adopted the more narrow view, finding that MW Custom Papers did not owe a duty to Neumann in light of the magnitude of the burden of protecting her and the potential ramifications of imposing that heavy a burden on MW Custom Papers.
On November 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of Illinois issued an opinion in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070, which provided much needed clarification to the application of the “exclusive remedy” provisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and Occupational Diseases Act in the context of long-latency asbestos-related diseases. Before Folta, several courts have ruled that employees were allowed to file civil lawsuits against their employer, if the 25-year statute of repose for workers’ compensation claims had expired. Folta went the opposite way, reinforcing the longstanding rule that an employee’s exclusive remedy for damages sustained in the course of employment is through the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, regardless of whether any statutory time periods for workers’ compensation claims have expired.
Decedent James Folta worked for Ferro Engineering from 1966-1970 as a direct employee. Forty-one years later, in May 2011, Folta was diagnosed with mesothelioma. He thereafter filed a civil lawsuit in Cook County, Illinois against various defendants, including his former employer, Ferro Engineering, to recover damages. Defendant Ferro Engineering filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Folta’s claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5) and the Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/5). In response, Folta argued that his symptoms did not manifest until 40 years after his last exposure to asbestos from Ferro Engineering and, accordingly, he was unable to file a workers’ compensation claim due to expiration of the 25-year statute of repose included in the Acts. Folta further argued that since the statute of repose had expired, his claims were “non-compensable,” which is one of four exceptions to the exclusivity mandate contained in the Acts.
The trial court granted Ferro Engineering’s motion to dismiss, finding that the action was indeed barred by the exclusivity provision of the Acts. Specifically, the trial court found that expiration of the applicable statute of repose period did not render the cause of action “non-compensable” under the Acts and that his exclusive remedy was still with the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. Folta appealed the lower court’s decision and the appellate court reversed and remanded. The appellate court found that Folta’s injury was not compensable under the Act, because his disease did not manifest until after the statute of repose expired and he had no opportunity to seek compensation under the Acts. Therefore, the court reasoned, that the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision did not bar his suit against his former employer.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the exclusivity provisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the Illinois Occupational Diseases Act bar an employee’s cause of action against an employer to recover damages for a disease resulting from asbestos exposure which arose out of and in the course of employment even though no compensation is available under those Acts due to statutory time limits on the employer’s liability.
Both the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Occupational Diseases Act provide that compensation provided therein for workplace injuries represent the full and complete remedy to an employee and no other remedy under common law or statutory law is available. 820 ILCS 310/5(a) and 820 ILCS 310/11. As with every rule, however, there are exceptions. Illinois courts have carved out four scenarios in which the exclusivity provisions of the Acts do not apply: (1) the injury was not accidental; (2) the injury did not arise from the employee’s employment; (3) the injury was not received during the course of employment; and (4) the injury is not compensable under the Acts. For the purposes of this analysis, the only relevant exception is the “noncompensability” exception, which is further outlined below.
The Folta decision reviewed a plethora of cases that specifically addressed the compensability of certain injuries under the Acts. In particular, the decision honed in on three cases wherein the plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries such as severe emotional shock and emotional distress that were incurred during employment. Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ill.2d 556 (1976); Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 81 Ill. 2d 229, 237 (1980); Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill.2d 455 (1990). Folta ruled that these three cases stood for the proposition that whether an injury is compensable is related to whether the type of injury categorically fits within the purview of the Act. Contrarily, they do not stand for the proposition that whether an injury is compensable is defined by an ability to actually recover benefits for a particular injury sustained by an employee. Asbestos-related injuries, such as asbestosis or mesothelioma, fall within the purview of the Acts and are specifically addressed by each Act, and are, therefore, compensable.
Folta then ruled that such claims remain compensable despite the expiration of a limitations period on the employer’s liability. The court relied heavily upon Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407 (1956) and Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d. 15 (1969) in analyzing the efficacy of the exclusivity provisions of the Acts in cases where little or no compensation was received. In Moushon, a workplace accident caused the employee to become permanently impotent. The employer provided medical, surgical, and hospital services for the underlying injury; however, the plaintiff thereafter filed a civil action seeking damages for his impotence that resulted from the workplace accident. Despite the fact that no compensation was available specifically for the injury of impotence, the court held that his claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Acts. Mouson, 9 Ill. 2d at 418. Likewise, in Duley, the spouse of a deceased employee who was fatally injured in a workplace accident brought a civil lawsuit against the employer for wrongful death. Although the spouse received nominal reimbursement for funeral expenses, the court found that plaintiff’s wrongful death claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Acts because he was not a dependent of his deceased wife. Duley, 44 Ill. 2d. at 18.
The Folta decision is significant for Illinois based employer-defendants in cases involving diseases with long latency periods, such as mesothelioma. It is also significant to insurers. The Illinois Supreme Court has made it clear: the Workers’ Compensation Act and Occupational Diseases Act are the full relief afforded to employees for injuries sustained in the course of employment, to the exclusion of any civil litigation, regardless of an expired statutory time period or whether an employee actually recovers compensation.
On July 30, 2015, an Illinois appeals panel held that a trial court committed reversible error by excluding evidence of a plaintiff’s prior work history, which the defendant sought to present as part of its “sole proximate cause defense.” The “sole proximate cause defense,” in which a defendant claims that a plaintiff’s injury resulted wholly from the conduct of some other party, was clarified for Illinois asbestos litigation in Nolan v. Weil-McLain. There, the Illinois Supreme Court held that evidence of the negligence of nonparty tortfeasors is admissible where a defendant claims the negligence of those nonparties was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Prior to Nolan, Illinois courts had consistently barred evidence of exposures other than to the product (or at the premises) of the litigating defendant.
In Smith v. Illinois Central, Plaintiff Jim Smith filed suit against several defendants alleging exposure to asbestos while employed by GM&O Railroad (predecessor of Illinois Central Railroad Co.), leading him to contract asbestosis. Defendant Illinois Central Railroad Co. was the only remaining defendant at trial, and sought to introduce evidence that Plaintiff had worked at a Union Asbestos & Rubber Company (UNARCO) facility where he was exposed to asbestos. Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to bar the defendant from introducing any evidence that he was exposed to asbestos dust in any manner other than by virtue of his employment by that defendant. The trial judge granted the motion, and after a three week trial, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor.
On appeal, Illinois Central argued that excluding evidence of plaintiff’s significant exposure to asbestos while working at UNARCO in effect stripped Illinois Central of its sole proximate cause defense, because the jury could have reasonably found that the single proximate cause of plaintiff’s condition was the massive dose of asbestos exposure he sustained while working at UNARCO, as opposed to the minimal dose he may have received while employed by the railroad. The Appellate Court of Illinois agreed, reversing and remanding the case for a new trial, and holding that excluding evidence of other exposures improperly deprived the defendant of a rational alternative explanation for why plaintiff was suffering from an asbestos-related disease.
The appellate panel explained that a defendant is permitted to challenge both medical causation and the allegation that the exposure in question led to the alleged disease. Thus, Illinois Central should have been allowed to present evidence in an attempt to establish that plaintiff’s UNARCO work experience was to blame for his asbestosis. The trial court’s error was “particularly egregious” in this case, the court explained, because a large portion of plaintiff’s case was based on his exposure to dust from UNARCO’s operation while working for the railroad.
The Smith opinion illustrates the practical application of Nolan, and demonstrates that Illinois courts are no longer blocking defendants from pointing to other potential proximate causes of asbestos-related disease. Where an asbestos plaintiff had minimal exposure to a defendant’s product but significant exposure to the asbestos of non-parties, and perhaps in other cases as well, Illinois defendants are armed with the right to present the highly relevant evidence of exposure from another source.
Since the first asbestos filing by a plaintiff’s lawyer, plaintiff medical experts in mesothelioma cases have infamously opined that every exposure to asbestos by a plaintiff – including exposure to a single asbestos fiber – is sufficient to cause disease. Not only does this type of expert testimony ease the connecting of the causation dots, but it permits the recycling of generalized and “boilerplate” expert reports. Recently, however, court rulings have given hope to defendants in the litigation that plaintiffs may now have to put considerably more time and effort into developing their expert opinions by precluding those experts from advancing the “single fiber” theory.
In December 2014, the Northern District of Illinois similarly found that this theory was inadmissible under Daubert and Rule 702. In Krik v. Crane Co., No. 10-cv-7435, N.D. Ill. December 12, 2014 (Doc. # 314), the Northern District analyzed the opinions of plaintiff’s medical experts and industrial hygienist, finding that these opinions indeed espoused the “single fiber” theory. In holding that single fiber causation is “not an acceptable approach for a causation expert to take,” the court noted that “single fiber” causation was inconsistent with Illinois’ express adoption of the “frequency, regularity and proximity” causation test in Thacker v. UNR Industries, Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449, 457. Further, the “any exposure” theory was also inadmissible given plaintiff”s experts’ “wholesale failure to based their opinions on facts specific to this case.” In fact, the court specifically pointed out that plaintiff’s experts admitted in their depositions that they had not considered any case-specific facts in formulating their opinions.
In April 2015, a New York court also rejected the single fiber theory, finding that plaintiff’s theory of cumulative, unquantifiable exposure did not pass muster under New York’s rules of evidence. Juni v. A.O. Smith Water Products, No. 19031/12, 2015 WL 1623788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Apr. 13, 2015). Specifically, the court found that the “every exposure” testimony was insufficient to prove that any specific exposure was a significant contributing factor to causing the disease. The result? An $11 million verdict against Ford was overturned.
These most recent rejections of the “every exposure” theory are significant victories for defendants because they add to the accumulation of similar rulings across the country. After years of accepting the “every exposure” theory, courts are now requiring that both plaintiff and defense expert opinions be based on case-specific facts grounded in science.
This holiday season has been good to the asbestos defense bar. On December 16, 2014, the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court decided a case which emphasizes the need for a plaintiff to properly prove causation by non-speculative evidence. In the process, the court rejected a “sham” spoliation of evidence claim, finding that defendant’s spoliation of evidence was immaterial in light of the witness testimony presented by the plaintiff. This is the first published decision in this State pertaining to spoliation.
In Holloway v. Sprinkmann Sons Corp., 2014 IL App (4th) 131118, plaintiff Carol Holloway brought a negligence action against defendant Sprinkmann, an alleged asbestos insulation supplier, alleging that defendant delivered and installed asbestos-containing insulation at plaintiff’s jobsite while she worked as at the Eureka vacuum cleaner factory in Bloomington, IL. As an alternative theory, plaintiff argued that Sprinkmann wrongfully destroyed evidence that plaintiff needed to prove her case. Plaintiff specifically alleged that Sprinkmann destroyed records indicating the types of insulation it sold and to whom the insulation was sold. Destroying this evidence, plaintiff argued, prevented her from demonstrating which specific asbestos-containing products were sold and delivered by Sprinkmann to her jobsites.
At trial, plaintiff called Arthur B. Kremers, Sprinkmann’s former owner. When Kremers began working for Sprinkmann in 1969, old records dating back to the 1950s were kept in the basement of the company’s Peoria office. These records showed the brand and manufacturer of each product defendant had sold and delivered, as well as which employees had installed each product. Apparently, as early as 1957, Sprinkmann employees began making claims for asbestos-related disease, relying on the basement records to show which brands of insulation the employees had installed.Sometime in the 1980s, however, Kremers shipped the basement records to a recycling center because “defendant was running out of space.” The destruction of the records, according to Kremers, was consistent with Sprinkmann’s document retention policy, under which sales contracts and invoices were to be retained for only three years.
Crying foul over the alleged “spoliation” of evidence, plaintiff called co-worker witness Ellis Carlton and read into evidence an affidavit of another deceased witness, Wesley Klein. This evidence was uncontroverted, and – as the documents themselves would have done – established that asbestos-containing insulation supplied by defendant Sprinkmann was present at plaintiff’s jobsite and installed by it.
The jury nonetheless returned a general verdict in defendant’s favor, prompting plaintiff to file a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the jury might have found for plaintiff if it had had the benefit of reviewing the destroyed records establishing that the products were present at plaintiff’s worksite.
The court, however, was unpersuaded by plaintiff’s interpretation of her own testimony. Specifically, the court noted that saying that plaintiff was “in all the different parts of the plant for one reason or another” is not quite the same as saying she “worked all over the plant.” For argument’s sake, the court assumed that Dr. Frank’s theories were correct, that when asbestos-containing insulation had to be repaired, it created asbestos dust, and that such dust stayed around for a long time and wafted through the air. However, the court concluded that Frank’s testimony was ultimately irrelevant, as there was no evidence that the buildings in the Eureka plant shared the same air, nor was there any evidence presented suggesting that the buildings in the plant shared a common ventilation system. Plaintiff could therefore not clearly connect the allegedlyomnipresent “asbestos dust” to her own inhalation. Even if she had, the court pointed out problems with the testimony of plaintiff’s “expert,” noting that Frank’s testimony provided no solid, non-speculative evidence that the amount of asbestos dust breathed in by plaintiff under such circumstances would be sufficient to cause asbestosis.
Holloway v. Sprinkmann places great importance on a plaintiff’s burden to show causation with non-speculative evidence. For plaintiffs like Holloway, certain expert testimony may seem like a home run (eg., the “re-entrainment” theory), but, at the very heart of the matter, such evidence is nothing more than conjecture. In rejecting plaintiff’s spoliation argument, the Sprinkmann court further demonstrated that it will not permit “red herring” issues to distract the court from a lack of admissible evidence of causal links. This decision from the Illinois appellate court provides further support for defendants seeking to attack speculative evidence, without fear that extrinsic issues that have no bearing on their ultimate liability will alter the result.

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