Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/409/205
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 20:43:00+00:00

Document:
Paul J. TRAFFICANTE et al., Petitioners, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Two tenants of an apartment complex filed complaints with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development alleging that their landlord racially discriminated against nonwhites, that the tenants thereby lost the social benefits of living in an integrated community, missed business and professional advantages that would have accrued from living with members of minority groups, and suffered from being 'stigmatized' as residents of a 'white ghetto.' The District Court, not reaching the merits, held that the complaining tenants were not within the class of persons entitled to sue under § 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Court of Appeals, in affirming, construed § 810(a) to permit complaints only by persons who are the objects of discriminatory housing practices. Held: The definition in § 810(a) of 'person aggrieved,' as 'any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice,' shows a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution, and petitioners, being tenants of the apartment complex, have standing to sue under § 810(a). Pp. 208212.
Two tenants of Parkmerced, an apartment complex in San Francisco housing about 8,200 residents, filed separate complaints with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pursuant to § 810(a) 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 85, 42 U.S.C. 3610(a). One tenant is black, one white. Each alleged that the owner 2 of Parkmerced had discriminated against nonwhites on the basis of race in the rental of apartments within the complex in violation of § 804 of the Act.
The Act gives the Secretary of HUD power to receive and investigate complaints regarding discriminatory housing practices. The Secretary, however, must defer to state agencies that can provide relief against the named practice. If the state agency does not act, the Secretary may seek to resolve the controversy by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. If these attempts fail, the complainant may proceed to court pursuant to § 810(d). 7 Moreover, these rights may be enforced 'by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts without regard to the amount in controversy,' if brought within 180 days 'after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred.' § 812(a). In addition, § 813 gives the Attorney General authority to bring a civil action in any appropriate United States district court when he has reasonable cause to believe 'that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted' by the Act.
It is apparent, as the Solicitor General says, that complaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act. Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (CA 3), which dealt with the phrase that allowed a suit to be started 'by a person claiming to be aggrieved' under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e5(a), concluded that the words used showed 'a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.' Id., at 446. With respect to suits brought under the 1968 Act, 8 we reach the same conclusion, insofar as tenants of the same housing unit that is charged with discrimination are concerned.
The Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD wrote petitioners' counsel on November 5, 1970, that 'it is the determination of this office that the complainants are aggrieved persons and as such are within the jurisdiction' of the Act. We are told that that is the consistent administrative construction of the Act. Such construction is entitled to great weight. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed. 616; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433434, 91 S.Ct. 849, 854 855, 28 L.Ed.2d 158.
Absent the Civil Rights Act of 1968, I would have great difficulty in concluding that petitioners' complaint in this case presented a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court under Art. III of the Constitution. But with that statute purporting to give all those who are authorized to complain to the agency the right also to sue in court, I would sustain the statute insofar as it extends standing to those in the position of the petitioners in this case. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648649, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 240, 248249, 91 S.Ct. 260, 322, 326327, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970). Consequently, I join the Court's opinion and judgment.
We find it unnecessary to reach the question of standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. 1982 which is the basis of the third cause of action alleged in the petition but based on the same allegations as those made under the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
The Dirksen substitute, 114 Cong.Rec. 45704573 retained the present language of § 810(a) which Senator Mondale had previously introduced, id., at 2270, and it was in the bill passed by the Senate, id., at 5992, which the House subsequently passed, id., at 9621.

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