Source: https://caselaw.lexroll.com/2019/01/29/motion-for-summary-judgment-judge-lawrence-cho/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:57:26+00:00

Document:
Defendant’s unopposed MSJ is GRANTED. If both parties wish to submit without appearance, Plaintiff counsel to call Darian at 310-255-1876 by Mon. 1/28 and inform her thereof. Defendant to submit proposed judgment.
Dispute between married couple. Divorce action is pending.
Complaint: (1) Tort of Domestic Violence under Civil Code § 1708.6 and Penal Code § 13700; (2) Assault; (3) Battery; (4) Negligence; (5) Attempt to Aide, Advise or Encourage Suicide under Penal Code §§ 401 and 21A; and (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Cross-Compl.: (1) Tort of Domestic Violence under Civil Code § 1708.6; (2) Tort of Stalking Pursuant to Civil Code § 1708.7; (3) Assault; (4) Battery; (5) False Imprisonment; (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
This Motion: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant demurs to all six causes of action in Amy Beal’s cross-complaint, and also moves to strike portions of the cross-complaint.
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Carter Beal’s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint for Damages is OVERRULED.
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Carter Beal’s Motion to Strike Portions of Amy Beal’s Cross-Complaint Filed on July 17, 2018 is DENIED.
Defendant/Cross-Complainant Amy Beal to give notice.
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Carter Beal (“Cross-Defendant”) demurs to each of the six causes of action in Defendant/Cross-Complainant Amy Beal’s (“Cross-Complainant”) cross-complaint.
As an initial matter, movant Carter Beal failed to meet and confer before filing this demurrer and therefore the demurrer must be OVERRULED on that basis alone. As to the merits of the demurrer, for the reasons below, his demurrer must again be OVERRULED.
These facts certainly allege “abuse” under the domestic violence statute, as Cross-Complainant plainly alleges facts that would at least place another person under reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to herself. Cross-Defendant’s arguments to the contrary border on frivolous. For example, Cross-Defendant argues that the threat “if she left he would have to kill her,” is not abuse under this statute because “it is unclear what the threat means.” This is unpersuasive and absurd. Therefore, Cross-Defendant’s Demurrer to the first cause of action for Tort of Domestic Violence is OVERRULED.
Here, Cross-Defendant argues Cross-Complainant did not provide “independent corroborating evidence.” This argument is frivolous as this is a demurrer and corroboration is not required at the pleading stage.
Cross-Defendant also argues the cross-complaint does not support her claim she feared for her safety. But the cross-complaint alleges Cross-Complainant reasonably feared for her safety for reasons including: Cross-Defendant was tracking her activities, surveilling her computer, threatening her when she discovered the surveillance and confronted him, secretly recording her with his phone, threatening and physically obstructing and assaulting her when she tried to leave the area where he was recording. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 18-25.) These facts sufficiently state the reasonable fear element of a stalking tort claim.
Cross-Defendant’s remaining arguments are equally unpersuasive, as the cross-complaint alleges each of the elements with sufficient detail: (1) a pattern of conduct intending to follow, alarm, place under surveillance, or harass Cross-Complainant (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 18-21, 23); (2) Cross-Complainant reasonably feared for her safety and suffered substantial emotional distress, as a reasonable person would under the circumstances (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 19-20, 22, 23, 25, 27); and (3) Cross-Defendant made a credible threat to Cross-Complainant’s safety and Cross-Complainant told him at least once to stop (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 21, 22).
Therefore, Cross-Defendant’s Demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.
The Cross-Complaint alleges (1) intent to cause harmful or offensive contact or the threat to do so (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 31-43), (2) reasonable belief Cross-Complainant was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner (¶¶ 31-33, 35), (3) no consent (¶¶ 31-33, 36), (4) harm (¶¶ 31-33, 37), and (5) causation (¶¶ 31-33, 38). Cross-Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Thus, the Demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.
Cross-Defendant simply asserts the “allegations are inadequate to state a claim for battery” and that the complaint fails to allege acts that constitute “oppressive,” citing CC §3294 (exemplary damages elements). Oppression is not an element of battery and Carter’s bald assertion of inadequacy is again devoid of any merit. OVERRULED as to battery.
The cross-complaint alleges Cross-Defendant intentionally confined Cross-Complainant in her bedroom, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable period of time against her will. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 51-52.) Cross-Defendant relies on a jury instruction (BAJI 7.60) for his argument Cross-Complainant must prove damages. But Plaintiff alleges a false imprisonment and can plead a cause of action “even where the damage is purely nominal.” (Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 990, 1008.) Cross-Defendant’s other arguments, essentially arguing Cross-Complainant has not pled facts to support each element of this cause of action, are not persuasive. For example, Cross-Defendant seems to suggest that the alleged imprisonment of his wife in her bedroom could be interpreted as “say keeping the marriage intact.” (Opp., p. 16, lns. 11-12.) This argument is not properly raised at the pleading stage. Thus, the Demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.
Cross-Defendant argues his alleged conduct is not extreme or outrageous. Cross-Complainant alleges several incidents, including a road rage situation, a day when Cross-Defendant trapped her in the bedroom during a fight and threatened to kill her if she left, and that she discovered he was surveilling her and going through her belongings. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 55-59.) These facts adequately allege extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of a demurrer.
Cross-Defendant also argues his conduct could not reasonably cause her to suffer emotional distress. The Court will not adjudicate this issue at the pleadings stage. Cross-Defendant also argues the cross-complaint does not allege he intentionally caused emotional distress, but it does. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 61-62.) The Court finds the complaint adequately alleges a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, Cross-Defendant’s Demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.
Cross-Defendant’s Notice of Motion to Strike fails to set forth the portions sought to be stricken. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a).) For this reason alone, Cross-Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Even if the Court were to consider Cross-Defendant’s improper Motion to Strike, it would deny it. Cross-Defendant’s supporting memorandum seeks an order striking the prayer for punitive damages from each of the six causes of action.
The Court finds the cross-complaint adequately alleges oppressive and malicious conduct supporting a prayer for punitive damages, including a death threat and a road rage incident.
Therefore, Cross-Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

References: § 1708
 § 13700
 § 1708
 § 1708
 §3294
 v.