Source: https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/123102.jts.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:35:02+00:00

Document:
Victoria Kerkhof (Wife) appeals the trial court's judgment dividing the marital estate that accrued during her marriage to James Kerkhof (Husband). The sole issue Wife raises is whether the trial court erroneously failed to recognize that her share of the marital estate was at least $150,000.00 as conclusively established by a request for admissions to which Husband failed to respond. We affirm in part and remand with instructions.
Record, p. 35. Husband did not respond to this request for admissions within the specified thirty days or at any time prior to the final hearing.
The final hearing began with Husband's presentation of evidence concerning the value of various marital assets. During Wife's cross-examination of Husband regarding this evidence, Wife's counsel produced the request for admissions and requested that the document be admitted into evidence. Husband objected to the admission of the document on the grounds of relevance and also specifically objected to the second paragraph on the grounds that it referred to comments made during settlement negotiations. The trial court sustained the objection.
Later, during direct examination of Wife, Wife's counsel again made an offer to admit the request for admission, which the trial court again denied. At the end of the hearing, Wife again raised the issue of the request for admissions and unsuccessfully attempted to call Husband's counsel for the purpose of making a record with respect to the trial court's refusal to admit the request for admissions. During this discussion of the matter, Husband's counsel asserted that he had been unaware of the request for admissions and that his failure to respond to such was inadvertent. Husband's counsel then requested that the trial court grant a continuance for the purposes of allowing Husband to enter a response to the request. Ultimately, the trial court decided to admit the request for admission but stated that it considered it irrelevant.
Wife asserts that, pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 36, the trial court was required to treat both statements in her request for admissions as conclusively established because Husband failed to respond within the specified time period. She further asserts that by failing to give the admissions conclusive effect, the trial court erred in awarding her less than $150,000 as her share of the marital assets.
admission is obtained, there is no need to prove the established fact at trial. Id.; see also Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Wellington Village Apartments, 594 N.E.2d 518, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied; F.W. Means & Co. v. Carstens, 428 N.E.2d 251, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). The trial court is not permitted to disregard the admission. Corby, 670 N.E.2d at 1324.
Ind. 260, 263, 286 N.E.2d 405, 407 (1972) (holding that the weight to be given a statement against interest is to be determined by the jury); see also Moore v. Funk, 155 Ind.App. 534, 555, 293 N.E.2d 534, 539 (1973).
We have held that the conclusiveness of a fact deemed admitted under T.R. 36 does not mean that the fact is automatically admitted into evidence. . . . [A]n admission may be offered into evidence at the hearing where the facts established in that admission are not subject to dispute, but the admissibility of the facts may be challenged. Wellington Village, 594 N.E.2d at 528; see also Walsh v. McCain Foods Ltd., 81 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that despite being conclusively established under T.R. 36, the established facts are still subject to the limitation on hearsay evidence), reh'g denied. Therefore, the issue before us is not whether the trial court was required to treat the facts stated in the request for admissions as conclusively established, clearly it was so required, but whether the trial court's evidentiary grounds for rejecting the stated facts were erroneous. We will address each of the two statements in the request for admissions in turn.
At the hearing, Husband objected to the admission of statement number two on the grounds that the alleged statement would have only been made during settlement negotiations. However, Wife responds by asserting that Husband offered no proof that the admission was related to settlement negotiations. However, during direct examination of Wife at the hearing, she testified that a figure of $157,000 that she had calculated to be her half of the marital estate was based on a conversation between her and Husband. At this point in the hearing, Husband's counsel objected and was allowed by the trial court to ask preliminary questions which established that this conversation occurred while the divorce was pending. This testimony by wife provides sufficient corroboration of Husband's assertion that the statement was made during settlement negotiations. As a result, even if conclusively established, the trial court was within its discretion in determining that the statement is not competent evidence under Evid. R. 408.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erroneously excluded statement two, the mere fact that Husband stated that he would have to pay Wife $150,000 does not necessarily establish that Wife's share was, in fact, equal to that amount. Therefore, statement number two, even if conclusively established and considered by the trial court, would not preclude the trial court from determining that the value of the marital estate was more or less than $150,000. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's exclusion of the statement.
inadmissible for lack or relevance, such is not the case with this particular admission. The statement is a positive statement as to the value of at least a portion of the marital estate. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the admitted fact in favor of other more persuasive evidence.
Reclamation & Recycling, Inc., 418 N.E.2d 268, 271 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (Staton, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Gary Mun. Airport Authority Dist. v. Peters, 550 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Therefore, Husband's objections to the request for admissions and his request for an extended time within which to respond should have been treated as a request to withdraw the admission under T.R. 36(B).
Rather than determine if withdrawal of admission number one was warranted under T.R. 36(B), the trial court decided that it would admit the statement but would not consider it in the face of more persuasive evidence. When faced with a trial court's failure to apply the appropriate standard to a request to withdraw an admission, we have held that the appropriate appellate relief is a remand for application of the correct standard. Hanchar, 418 N.E.2d at 270 (holding that remand for application of T.R. 36(B) standard is appropriate where trial court erroneously granted withdrawal of admissions for inadvertence and excusable neglect under T.R. 6(B)); see also Gary, 550 N.E.2d at 834 (holding that remand is required where a trial court has employed an erroneous standard in granting or denying a motion to withdraw or amend admissions). In line with these holdings, we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether withdrawal of admission number one would further the presentation of the merits of the case and whether such a withdrawal would result in prejudice to Wife. See T.R. 36(B).
Further, with regard to Husband's assertion that the wording of the request for admissions is confusing, the trial court may consider whether the clarity of the request for admissions is adequate. The burden upon the requesting party is to artfully draft the statement of fact contained in the request for admission. That statement must be precise, unambiguous and in no way mislead the answering party. The drafting of the statement of fact is controlled exclusively by the requesting party. Therefore, fairness demands that any error arising out of inartful drafting be borne by the requesting party. F. W. Means, 428 N.E.2d at 257.
determine whether statement number one in the request for admissions may be withdrawn by Husband under the standard set forth in T.R. 36(B) and applicable case law.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm in part and remand with instructions.
I concur as to Part I but respectfully dissent as to Part II which remands the cause with respect to statement number one and contemplates withdrawal of that admission by Husband.
interest, which is to be weighed by the trier of fact in light of the other evidence and which may either be accepted or rejected. The court erred in so ruling. Declarations against interest are not vested with the conclusiveness of an admission.See footnote 5 Such ruling denies the admission its conclusive effect.
The admission, having been admitted, is either conclusive or it is not. The majority correctly states that the trial court was "clearly . . . required" to "treat the facts stated in the request for admissions as conclusively established." Slip op. at 6. Accordingly, it was conclusively established that "one-half (½) of [Wife's] interest in the marital property at the time of separation, after debts, is equal to at least $150,000." Record at 35.
Here, the total assets appeared to be $98,308 less debt of $10,000 (not including student loans) for net assets of $88,308. I am of the view that by reason of the conclusive admission, Wife is entitled to all of the assets.
The case before us differs from the situation presented in Corby v. Swank (1996) Ind.App., 670 N.E.2d 1322. There, the trial court sustained Swank's objection to the admission of Corby's request for admissions. The trial proceeded, resulting in a jury verdict for Swank and against Corby. Because the subject matter of the excluded admission was crucial to the matter of liability, our holding, that the exclusion was erroneous, permitted no remedy other than a new trial. Clearly in that posture, Swank would be permitted to move to withdraw his admission. Such is not the case here.
Here, the admission was admitted into evidence and therefore became conclusive as to the minimum valuation of Wife's interest in the assets. There was no motion by Husband to withdraw that admission. Further, I do not perceive Husband's motion for a continuance to respond to the request as the equivalent of a motion to withdraw the admission already in place.See footnote 6 It is now too late for any such withdrawal.
I would reverse and remand with instructions to award the net assets to Wife.
evidence is inconsistent with her reliance on an admission as to the value of the marital estate. However, the request for admission states that Wife's share is at least $150,000. Record, p. 35. Such an admission does not establish the Wife's entire share but only a minimum portion of it. As such, collection and presentation of valuation evidence would still be necessary to establish any amounts above $150,000 to which Wife might be entitled. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Husband's waiver argument.
Along the same line, Wife's use of the request for admissions at the hearing was, at minimum, inconsistent with the underlying purpose of T.R. 36. Properly used, requests for admissions simplify pre-trial investigation and discovery, facilitate elimination of unnecessary evidence at trial, and reduce the time and expense demands upon the parties, their counsel and the courts. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motor Div. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 573 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. 1991), reh'g denied. Wife correctly asserts in her brief that once a request for admissions is transformed into a conclusively established fact, there is no need to move to have the matter deemed admitted as the matter is automatically established as a matter of law. Corby v. Swank, 670 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). However, given that the central issue in this dissolution proceeding was the valuation and division of marital assets, Wife could have better effectuated the purpose of the T.R. 36 by presenting the alleged admission prior to or earlier in the hearing for the purposes of limiting the presentation of evidence and more narrowly defining the issues before the trial court.
of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(B) set forth in the request, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. Copies of documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that party.
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, not less than thirty  days after service thereof or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney.
Footnote: 3 Statement number two consisted of the following: "That I told my wife that I would have to pay her $150,000 as her 50% share in the marital assets due to the pending divorce. Record, p. 35.
Footnote: 4 Statement number one consisted of the following: "That one-half (½) of Respondent's interest in the marital property at the time of separation, after debts, is equal to at least $150,000. Record, p. 35.
Footnote: 5 Cases which seemingly are to the contrary and which state that admissions are to be considered just as any other evidence and to be weighed against other evidence, see, e.g., Waugh v. Kelley (1990) Ind.App., 555 N.E.2d 857; Moore v. Funk (1973) 155 Ind.App. 545, 293 N.E.2d 534, trans. denied, should not be construed to divest admissions under T.R. 36 of their conclusive effect.
Footnote: 6 I respectfully suggest that the majority is in error in relying upon Gary Mun. Airport Authority District v. Peters (1990) Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 828, which in turn relies upon a separate concurrence in Hanchar Indus. Waste Management, Inc. v. Wayne Reclamation & Recycling, Inc. (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 268 for the proposition that party has effectively moved to withdraw an admission by requesting an extension of time to respond to the requested admission. In Royalty Vans, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Plumbing and Heating, Inc. (1993) Ind.App., 605 N.E.2d 1217, reh'g denied, this court specifically rejected Gary Municipal Airport with regard to admissions.

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