Source: https://www.californiaspecialedlaw.com/wiki/hearing-decisions/oah-2009/oah-200910056-200909094/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:28:37+00:00

Document:
On November 12, 2009, Timothy L. Newlove, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) from the Office of Administrative Hearings, Special Education Division (OAH) presided at the due process hearing in these consolidated cases.
At the hearing, Patricia E. Cromer, attorney at law, represented the Student. Karen Van Dijk of Best, Best & Krieger, attorneys at law, represented the Orange County Department of Education (OCDE). Also appearing on behalf of OCDE were Mel Peters, Todd Martin and Lisa Saltzman. S. Daniel Harbottle of the Harbottle Law Group, attorneys at law, represented the Irvine Unified School District (Irvine or IUSD). Also appearing for the District was Lisa Krogsdale, Director of Special Education. Michael Hersher, Deputy General Counsel appeared by telephone on behalf of the California Department of Education (CDE). Also appearing by telephone for CDE was Edmundo Aguilar, Deputy General Counsel.
On September 21, 2009, Student filed with OAH a document entitled “Petitioner’s Filing for Due Process” which named as respondents OCDE, Irvine Unified School District and CDE. OAH designated this matter as Case No. 2009090943. On October 8, 2009, OCDE filed with OAH a document entitled “OCDE’s Request for Due Process Hearing; Motion for Consolidation with OAH Case No. 2009090943,” which named Student as the respondent. OAH designated this matter as Case No. 2009100565. On October 20, 2009, OAH consolidated the two cases. In the order of consolidation, OAH designated Case No. 2009090943 as the lead case and the matter which controls the 45-day timeline for issuance of a decision.
At the hearing, the parties presented oral argument. Upon the conclusion of oral argument, the parties submitted the matter for decision, and the ALJ closed the record.
Which educational agency is responsible for providing Student with a free appropriate public education (FAPE)?
In this case, Student, OCDE and IUSD contend that the state statutes which describe residency requirements and which normally determine the Local Educational Agency that is responsible for providing a disabled child with a free appropriate public education do not apply to Student who is without a biological parent and who is a ward of the Orange County Court. Student, OCDE and IUSD also contend that the definition of “parent” in the version of Education Code section 56028 which is applicable to this matter did not include a Responsible Adult who is a court appointed person assigned to make educational decisions for designated children. CDE contends that, for the period relevant in this case, the applicable statutory scheme provided for a Local Educational Agency that was responsible for Student’s special education program.
Based upon the stipulated facts and the conclusions of law set forth below, this Decision determines that the Irvine Unified School District is responsible for providing Student’s educational placement at his out-of-state residential treatment center in Texas. Former Education Code section 56028 included within the definition of “parent” a “guardian . . . authorized to make educational decisions for the child.” This Decision determines that the term “guardian” was broad enough to include a Responsible Adult. At the time that Student entered his out-of-state placement and when he turned 18 years of age, his Responsible Adult resided within the boundaries of IUSD. Based upon applicable rules of residency, since Student’s Responsible Adult was considered his “parent” within the meaning of former Education Code section 56028, the Irvine Unified School District had the responsibility of providing Student with a FAPE.
1 The ALJ marked for identification Student’s trial brief as Exhibit GG, OCDE’s trial brief as Exhibit HH, IUSD’s trial brief as Exhibit II, and CDE’s trial brief as Exhibit JJ.
1. Student is 19 years of age, and he has been eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) at all times relevant to this action.
2. Student is not currently a party to an interdistrict transfer, nor does he reside within the home of a caregiving adult or hospital within the jurisdiction of any school district within the State.
3. Student was removed from his mother’s home in 2004 due to parental neglect and abuse. Soon thereafter, Student’s mother passed away. On June 21, 2004, the Orange County Juvenile Court (Juvenile Court) declared Student a dependent of the court, as his father had never been identified. The Juvenile Court also appointed Cecily Ballou as Student’s Responsible Adult. Ms. Ballou has not resided within the boundaries of the Irvine Unified School District at any time relevant to this action.
4. Since Student’s removal from his mother’s home, he has had several social services and Juvenile Court placements, and has been educationally served by multiple school districts. Student has never physically resided within the boundaries of the Irvine Unified School District.
5. In August 2006, the Orange County Social Services Agency placed Student in foster care with his aunt, Roxie Walker Jones, who resided within the Wheatland Union High School District (Wheatland).
6. On September 21, 2006, Wheatland convened an Individualized Education Program (IEP) meeting for Student. During this IEP meeting, the team referred Student for a mental health assessment under AB 3632. The Irvine Unified School District was neither invited to, nor in any manner made aware of this IEP meeting.
7. The Sutter-Yuba Mental Health Services (SYMHS) subsequently transferred Student’s mental health referral to the Orange County Health Care Agency (OCHCA). Because Student was declared a dependent in the County of Orange and was eligible to receive MediCal services through that County, OCHCA was the county mental health agency responsible for providing Student with mental health services.
8. OCHCA subsequently notified Wheatland that it had rejected Student’s mental health referral because the referral failed to document previous mental health interventions received by Student.
9. In January 2007, the Orange County Juvenile Court placed Student in the Orange County Juvenile Hall (Juvenile Hall). While there, he attended Otto Fischer, a juvenile court school administered and operated by OCDE. By that time, the Juvenile Court had changed Student’s legal status from a dependent to a ward of the court.
10. On January 25, 2007, OCDE convened an IEP meeting for Student. The Irvine Unified School District was neither invited to, nor made aware of this IEP meeting. At that time, Student’s counsel requested that OCDE assess Student to determine whether he satisfied the eligibility criteria for emotional disturbance. Student’s counsel further requested that OCDE re-refer Student to OCHCA for a mental health assessment. The IEP team subsequently forwarded a Notification of Mental Health Services Request to Student’s Responsible Adult for her signature.
11. On February 5, 2007, OCDE informed Wheatland that Student had been placed at Juvenile Hall, asked whether Wheatland staff wished to participate in any IEP team meetings for him, and explained that Wheatland may be responsible for Student’s educational placement following his release from Juvenile Hall based upon the residency of Roxie Jones within the boundaries of Wheatland.
12. On March 9, 2007, OCDE received from the Responsible Adult a signed copy of Student’s mental health referral reflecting her consent to the referral.
13. On April 26, 2007, OCDE convened an IEP team meeting for Student. The Irvine Unified School District was neither invited to, nor in any manner made aware of this IEP. At this meeting, the IEP team reviewed its psychoeducational assessment of Student, and changed his eligibility to emotional disturbance. OCHCA had not yet completed its assessment of Student at the time of this IEP meeting.
14. On May 24, 2007, OCDE convened an IEP team meeting for Student. Student’s Responsible Adult and a representative from Wheatland were in attendance. The Irvine Unified School District was neither invited to, nor in any manner made aware of this IEP. At this meeting, OCHCA reviewed its mental health assessment, recommended placement of Student in a residential treatment center (RTC), and agreed to conduct a residential placement search for Student.
15. On June 5, 2007, the Juvenile Court limited the rights of Cecily Ballou, and appointed Ms. Jean Shiota as Student’s new Responsible Adult. At that time, Ms. Shiota lived within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Irvine Unified School District, and she continues to reside there today. The Order appointing Ms. Shiota as Student’s Responsible Adult indicates that she was a Court Appointed Special Advocate.
16. On June 21, 2007, Ms. Shiota signed and returned necessary paperwork to OCHCA so that a residential placement search could commence. On June 26, 2007, OCDE convened an IEP team meeting for Student. The Irvine Unified School District was neither invited to, nor in any manner made aware of this IEP. At the time of this meeting, OCHCA had not yet completed its residential placement search for Student. The June 26, 2007 IEP document indicates that Ms. Shiota attended this meeting.
17. On July 17, 2007, OCDE convened Student’s IEP to discuss the results of OCHCA’s residential placement search. During this meeting, OCHCA recommended placement of Student at Daystar, an out-of-state RTC located in Manville, Texas. Student’s IEP team accepted OCHCA’s residential placement recommendation. The July 17, 2007 IEP document indicates that Ms. Shiota attended this meeting.
18. Thereafter, a dispute arose between Student and OCDE regarding which educational agency was responsible to implement his out-of-state placement in an RTC following his release from Juvenile Hall. OCDE contended, and still contends, that it was not legally responsible to implement Student’s special education program once he was released by the Court from Juvenile Hall.
19. In an effort to avoid a delay of Student’s RTC placement, in September 2007, OCDE and Student entered into a confidential Settlement Agreement. Through this Settlement Agreement, OCDE agreed to temporarily and conditionally fund the educational portion of Student’s placement at Daystar until such time as the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), a state or county agency, a court of competent jurisdiction, or a governing legislative body, among other things, enacted new legislation or otherwise issued a ruling that clarified what Local Educational Agency (LEA) or State Educational Agency (SEA) is responsible for Student’s (or a similarly situated pupil’s) education following his removal from Juvenile Hall by the Court, determined another LEA/SEA to be financially responsible for Student’s RTC placement, or otherwise legally clarified the LEA/SEA responsible for Student’s education. The Irvine Unified School District was neither made aware of this Settlement Agreement, nor asked to take over responsibility for Student’s IEP nor funding of his RTC placement.
20. Through the Settlement Agreement, OCDE expressly disclaimed any legal responsibility to provide Student’s education once he left Juvenile Hall, and did not assume programmatic responsibility for Student’s education as his responsible LEA. OCDE further preserved its right to recoup any and all costs that OCDE expended on Student’s education from the LEA/SEA held ultimately responsible.
21. On October 26, 2007, Student was placed at Daystar. On October 31, 2007, he returned to Juvenile Hall for approximately two months as the result of medical issues. On December 19, 2007, OCDE convened an IEP meeting for Student. The December 19, 2007 IEP document indicates that Ms. Shiota did not attend this meeting, but gave the IEP team permission to proceed in her absence. On December 21, 2007, Student returned to Daystar where he remains today.
22. On January 14, 2008, Student turned 18 years of age. At this time, Ms. Shiota’s status as Student’s Responsible Adult terminated by operation of law.
23. During 2008 and 2009, OCDE convened IEP meetings for Student on the following dates: February 21, 2008, June 30, 2008, and January 15, 2009. The IEP documents from these meetings reflect that Student represented himself, and that he had not yet graduated from high school and obtained a diploma.
24. Subsequent to his placement at Daystar, OCDE communicated with CDE on several occasions to discuss whether it was willing to accept fiscal and programmatic responsibility for Student’s program. At all times relevant to this action, CDE has refused to assume any direct responsibility for Student’s educational program.
25. On April 8, 2009, based upon activity in OAH Case Nos. 2008120021 and 200902130, Student’s attorney notified a law firm representing the Irvine Unified School District that IUSD might be responsible for Student’s educational program.
26. On May 26, 2009, after receiving a decision in OAH Case Nos. 2008120021 and 2009020130, which were consolidated special education due process administrative matters, Student’s counsel again contacted the Irvine Unified School District and requested that it assume responsibility for Student’s educational program and convene an IEP team meeting for Student.
27. On July 23, 2009, OCDE informed Student that it would no longer be funding his education.
28. On September 1, 2009, the Irvine Unified School District convened an IEP team meeting for Student, but did not voluntarily assume legal responsibility for his education.
29. As of the date of the due process hearing in this matter, both OCDE and CDE have refused to implement and fund the educational portion of Student’s current IEP, which reflects his placement at Daystar. The Irvine Unified School District has agreed to convene IEP team meetings on behalf of Student, but only to avoid the threatened discharge of Student from Daystar.
30. On September 22, 2009, in the instant case, Student filed a Motion for Stay Put. On October 6, 2009, OAH issued an Order which determined that Student’s stay put placement is at Daystar. The Order declined to decide the public agency responsible for Student’s placement at Daystar.
31. On October 13, 2009, the Irvine Unified School District convened an IEP team meeting on behalf of Student. At this IEP meeting, IUSD attached an addendum specifically disclaiming legal responsibility for the funding of the RTC placement, and indicating that it had been informed by counsel for Student that Daystar was preparing to discharge Student based upon the cessation of funding by OCDE. The Irvine Unified School District stated that its only intention in provisionally agreeing to fund the Daystar placement was to avoid Student’s discharge from that program, and IUSD reserved all of its rights to assert that it is not, and has never been, legally responsible for Student’s educational placement.
32. CDE has never participated in any IEP meetings or decisions regarding the placement of Student, other than to decline OCDE’s request for direct reimbursement.
1. In a special education administrative due process proceeding, the party seeking relief has the burden of proving the essential elements of his claim. (Schaffer v. Weast (2005) 546 U.S. 49 [126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387].) In this case, Student has the burden of establishing that OCDE, Irvine Unified School District or CDE has the responsibility of providing him with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The Orange County Department of Education has the burden of establishing that, after Student’s release from the Orange County Juvenile Court, OCDE did not have the responsibility of providing Student with FAPE.
2. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a “State Educational Agency” (SEA) means the State Board of Education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(32); 34 C.F.R. § 300.41 (2006). In California, the SEA is the state Department of Education (CDE).
3. Under the IDEA and companion state law, a “Local Educational Agency” includes both a school district and a county office of education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(19); 34 C.F.R. § 300.28 (2006); Ed. Code, § 56026.3.) In this case, OCDE and the Irvine Unified School District are Local Educational Agencies, or LEAs, within the meaning of these provisions.
4. Under the IDEA and companion state law, a “public agency” includes both the SEA and LEAs. (34 C.F.R. § 300.33 (2006); Ed. Code, § 56028.5.) “The definition of public agency refers to all agencies responsible for various activities under the Act.” (71 Fed. Reg. 46569 (Aug. 14, 2006), original italics.) In this case, OCDE, Irvine Unified School District and CDE are public agencies within the meaning of these provisions.
5. The persons who can initiate a special education administrative due process proceeding include a pupil who is a ward of the court and for whom no parent or guardian can be located and the public agencies that are involved in any decisions regarding the pupil. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(2006); Ed. Code, § 56501, subd. (a).) Such parties have the right to present a due process complaint with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child with a disability, or with regard to the provision of FAPE for the child. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(2006); Ed. Code, § 56501, subd. (a)(1)-(4).) In this matter, OAH has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue presented for decision because the issue concerns what public agency has the responsibility of providing Student with a FAPE.
9. In California, for the most part, identification of the LEA that has the responsibility for providing a disabled child with a FAPE is determined through residency. Under the state’s compulsory education law, a pupil who is between the ages of six and 18 must attend the school district where his/her parent or legal guardian resides. (Ed. Code, § 48200; Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School District (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 47, 54.) In this case, Education Code section 48200 is applicable in determining the LEA responsible for Student’s placement at Daystar for relevant time periods before Student turned 18 years of age. These time periods are from October 26 to 31, 2007, and from December 21, 2007 to January 13, 2008.
10. There are exceptions to this basic rule of residency if the pupil is placed in a licensed children’s institution, a licensed foster home or a family home; if the pupil is the subject of an interdistrict transfer; if the pupil is emancipated; if the pupil is living in the home of a caregiving adult; or if the pupil is residing in a state hospital. (Ed. Code, § 48204, subd. (a)-(e).) None of these exceptions are applicable in this case.
11. In this matter, starting in January 2007, the Orange County Juvenile Court placed Student in a juvenile court school where he remained until his departure for the residential treatment center in Texas. (see Ed. Code, § 48645.1.) When a child with a disability attends a juvenile court school, the normal rules of residency for determination of the LEA that is responsible for providing the child with FAPE do not apply. Instead, the county office of education for the county in which the juvenile court school is located must develop and implement a special education program for the child. (Ed. Code, §§ 48645.2, 56150.) In this case, the parties agree that, while Student was under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court and attending Otto Fischer school, OCDE was responsible for providing him with a FAPE.
12. However, the responsibility of OCDE ceased when the Orange County Juvenile Court released Student and he left for his out-of-state placement in Texas. (Ed. Code, §§ 48645, 48645.1, 48645.2, 56150.) When this event occurred, the rules of residency became applicable in determining the public agency responsible for providing Student with a FAPE. (Union School District v. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1519, 1525, fn. 1 [Union].) Before Student turned 18 years of age, the basic residency rule in Education Code section 48200 was applicable for making this determination. After Student turned 18, the residency rule in Education Code section 56041, subdivision (a), was applicable. Education Code section 56041 is discussed below in Legal Conclusions, paragraph 22.
20. Under federal and state law, a child with a disability is no longer eligible to receive a FAPE when he/she graduates from high school with a regular high school diploma. (34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(i)(2006); Ed. Code, § 56026.1, subd. (a).) In this case, although Student is currently 19 years of age, he has not graduated from high school and he continues in his need for a special education program.
23. The issue in these consolidated cases requires a determination of which public agency, CDE, OCDE or IUSD, is responsible for Student’s placement at his out-of-state residential treatment center. The proper resolution of this issue requires an examination of three distinct time periods. The first period was Student’s brief five day stay in Texas from October 26, 2007, when Student entered Daystar, to October 31, 2007, when Student returned for medical reasons to the authority of the Orange County Juvenile Court. The second period was the roughly three week period between December 21, 2007, when Student returned to Daystar, and January 13, 2008, the day before he became an adult. The third period runs from January 14, 2008 to the present, representing the time that Student has been making educational decisions for himself.
24. As previously indicated, for the two periods in which Student attended Daystar before his eighteenth birthday, the basic residency rule in Education Code section 48200 applied in determining the LEA responsible for providing Student with a FAPE. Section 48200 assigns responsibility to the school district in which the pupil’s parent resides. After Student turned 18, the age of majority residency rule in Education Code section 56401, subdivision (a), was applicable in making this determination. Section 56041, except for circumstances not applicable in this case, assigns responsibility to the LEA in which the pupil’s parent resides at the time of the pupil’s eighteenth birthday. In this case, the application of Education Code sections 48200 and 56041, subdivision (a), yields the same result, since Jean Shiota, Student’s Responsible Adult, resided within the boundaries of the Irvine Unified School District during the scope of this case.
(11) Existing law defines “parent” for purposes of provisions governing special education and specifies the purposes for which the definition of “parent” extends if a judicial decree or order identifies the person who is defined as a parent.
This bill would include in that definition a responsible adult appointed in accordance with specified provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code and would broaden the purposes for which the definition of “parent” extends if a judicial decree or order identifies the person who is defined as a parent.
36. In this case, from the time that Student’s IEP placed him at Daystar in October and December 2007 to the date of his eighteenth birthday, Jean Shiota, as Student’s Responsible Adult, satisfied several aspects of former Education Code section 56028. First, Ms. Shiota was “authorized to make educational decisions for the child” within the meaning of former Education Code section 56028, subdivision (a)(3). Second, Ms. Shiota derived her authority to make educational decisions for Student based upon a “judicial decree or order” within the meaning of former Education Code section 56028, subdivision (b)(3). Thus, in terms of deciding whether Ms. Shiota was Student’s legal parent, the sole question is whether the term “guardian” within the meaning of former Education Code section 56028, subdivision (a)(3), included a Responsible Adult. Despite the strenuous arguments of OCDE and IUSD to the contrary, this Decision finds that the term “guardian” in former Education Code section 56028 did include a Responsible Adult.
42. Against the foregoing analysis, both OCDE and the Irvine Unified School District urge the application of canons of statutory construction that result in a determination that the term “guardian” in former Education Code section 56028, subdivision (a)(3), did not include a Responsible Adult.
43. The principle contention raised by OCDE and IUSD is that the Legislative Counsel’s Digest regarding the current version of Education Code section 56028 shows that the former version of this statute did not include a Responsible Adult. OCDE and IUSD present alternative arguments based upon the digest notes, which are set forth above in Legal Conclusion, paragraph 34. On the one hand, the parties argue that the digest notes show that the Legislature “broadened” former Education Code section 56028 to include a Responsible Adult. On the other hand, the parties contend that the digest notes, stating that the current version of Education Code section 56028, subdivision (a)(3) “would include” a Responsible Adult, indicate that the Legislature added a category of person not included in the previous version of the statute.
45. The contentions resting upon the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the current version of Education Code section 56028 are not persuasive. The contention that the digest notes show that the Legislature “broadened” former Education Code section 56028 to include a Responsible Adult is a misreading of the digest. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the current version of Education Code section 56028 indicated that the Legislature intended to “broaden” the scope of former Education Code section 56028, subdivision (b)(2), which concerns circumstances when a judicial decree or order identifies a person authorized to make educational decisions for a child. The digest notes do not state that the term “guardian” in former Education Code section 56028, subdivision (a)(3), was broadened to include a Responsible Adult. (West’s Cal. Legis. Service, Assem. Bill No. 2057 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2008, c. 223, p. 848.) In addition, in terms of statutory construction, the primary purpose of the Legislative Counsel’s Digest is to assist in the interpretation of the law for which the digest relates. (California Teachers, supra, 141 Cal.App.3d at p. 613.) Here, the digest notes are helpful with regard to the current version of Education Code section 56028, and less so with the former version of this statute. (People v. Superior Court (Douglass) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 428, 434 [subsequent legislation is entitled to little weight in construing earlier statutes, though it is not always without significance].) Finally, a tribunal must disregard the digest if the notes conflict with the unambiguous language of the statute under consideration. (In re Marriage of Stephen (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 909, 916-917.) In this case, the term “guardian” in former Education Code section 56028, subdivision (a)(3), unambiguously included a Responsible Adult when one applies the common understanding of the term and the meaning added by the related federal regulation and state statutes pertaining to court appointments of persons to make educational decisions for children.
46. Both OCDE and IUSD contend that the canon of construction which holds that a court must not give a statute retroactive application unless the Legislature otherwise mandates means that the current version of section 56028 cannot apply in this case. (See Myers v Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 28, 840.) This rule of construction is not applicable. As discussed, within former Education Code section 56028, a “parent” for purposes of residency determinations included a guardian authorized by a judicial decree to make educational decisions for a child. (Ed. Code, § 56028, subd. (a)(3), (b)(2), eff. Oct. 10, 2007.) The term “guardian” was broad enough to cover a Responsible Adult. Thus, at the time that Student’s IEP placed him at Daystar in Texas, the law provided that Ms. Shiota, as Student’s Responsible Adult, was his parent. This result does not involve a retroactive application of the current version of Education Code section 56028.
48. Apart from contentions relating to statutory construction, OCDE argues that OAH administrative decisions regarding pupils in similar circumstances as Student had consistently held that a Responsible Adult was not considered a “parent” within the meaning of Education Code section 56028. The pertinent OAH decisions issued on or before the time that Student’s IEP placed him at Daystar are discussed below.
49. In Student v. Escondido Union High School District, et al., consolidated OAH Case Nos. 2006051042 and 2006070791, at the time of the due process hearing in September 2006, the student was a 16-year-old tenth grade pupil who qualified for special education as a child with an emotional disturbance. In April 2004, the Orange County Juvenile Court declared the pupil a ward of the court. From May 2004 to October 2004, and from March 2005 to October 2005, the pupil resided at a licensed children’s institution located within the boundaries of the Escondido Union High School District. During these periods, Escondido UHSD was responsible for providing the pupil with a FAPE. (Ed. Code, §§ 48204, subd. (a), 56156.4.) From October 2005 to June 19, 2006, the Orange County Court placed the pupil in a juvenile court school. During this period, the Orange County Department of Education (OCDE) was responsible for providing the pupil with a FAPE. (Ed. Code, §§ 48645.2, 56150.) From January 18, 2006 to April 27, 2006, the Orange County Court appointed the pupil’s sister to act as his Responsible Adult. The sister resided in La Habra, California. The school district in which the sister resided was not a party in the consolidated cases. On April 27, 2006, the Orange County Court approved an IEP decision to place the pupil in an out-of-state residential treatment center. On June 19, 2006, the pupil left Juvenile Hall for the RTC which was located in Wyoming.
50. Based upon these facts, in an administrative decision issued on November 22, 2006, OAH determined that “OCDE remained responsible for Student’s FAPE after his release from juvenile hall.” (Decision, p. 10.) The ALJ reasoned that “Student is essentially a guardian-less, parentless ward of the Court. And although technically released, the Court and Probation have retained all but the most trivial decision-making authority related to Student (sic) education.” (Ibid.) The decision did not consider or decide whether a Responsible Adult is a “guardian” and therefore a “parent” within the meaning of former Education Code section 56028.
51. In Student v. Hemet Unified School District, et al., OAH Case No. 2006100472, at the time of the due process hearing in December 2006, the student was a 15-year-old ninth grade pupil who qualified for special education as a child with an emotional disturbance. The pupil’s parents resided within the boundaries of the Hemet Unified School District. In February 2006, the Orange County Department of Social Services placed the pupil at Orangewood Children’s Home (Orangewood) which is a temporary emergency shelter. OCDE was responsible for providing the pupil with a FAPE while she attended the juvenile court school through Orangewood. (Ed. Code, §§ 48645.2, 56150.) In June 2006, the Orange County Court appointed a Responsible Adult to make educational decisions for the pupil. In July 2006, the Court approved an IEP team recommendation which placed the pupil in an out-of-state RTC. In August 2006, the pupil left Orangewood and went to the RTC which was located in Colorado.
52. Based upon these facts, in an administrative decision issued on January 29, 2007, OAH determined that Hemet Unified School District was the LEA responsible for providing the pupil with a FAPE upon her release from Orangewood and placement at the RTC in Colorado. The decision is based upon the version of Education Code section 56028 in effect from October 5, 2005 to October 9, 2007, and which defined a “parent” at subdivision (a)(1) to include “A person having legal custody of a child.” (Stats. 2005, c. 653 (A.B. 1662), § 3.) Regarding the pupil’s Responsible Adult, the decision made the following determination: “Hemet argues that because the RA has educational decision-making rights, Student’s parents are not her parents as that term is used in Education Code section 48200. . . (however) the Education Code defines ‘parent’ as a person having legal custody of a child. Student’s parents have legal custody. Hemet’s argument is not persuasive.” (Decision, p. 10, ¶ 18.) The decision in OAH Case No. 2006100472 did not discuss or determine that a Responsible Adult is a “guardian” for purposes of special education law.
53. In Student v. Orange County Department of Education, et. al., OAH Case No. 2006100050, at the time of the due process hearing in August 2007, the pupil was a 14-year-old pupil who qualified for special education as a child with an emotional disturbance. In March 1996, the Orange County Juvenile Court declared the pupil a dependent of the Court. In December 1999, the Court terminated the parental rights regarding the pupil. From February 2000 to March 2004, the pupil had a foster parent. In April 2003, the Orange County Court appointed the foster parent as the pupil’s “de facto parent.” (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.534(e).) Starting in March 2004, the pupil followed a tortuous path which included stays in numerous different group homes, licensed children’s institutions and psychiatric hospitals, and which ultimately led to his placement in an out-of-state RTC. In July 2006, while the pupil was placed at Orangewood Children’s Center and attending a juvenile court school, OCDE, in conjunction with the Orange County Health Care Agency, held an IEP meeting and recommended placement of the pupil at a RTC in Utah. On July 10, 2009, the Court approved this recommendation and the pupil went to the RTC in Utah.
58. The following determinations are based upon the stipulated Findings of Fact, paragraphs 1 through 32, and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 1 through 57.
59. Upon Student’s release from juvenile court school and placement in an out-of-state residential treatment center, the Irvine Unified School District was responsible for providing him with a FAPE. Before Student turned 18 years of age, his IEP placed him at Daystar during the periods of October 26 to 31, 2007, and December 21 to January 13, 2008. When Student left Otto Fischer for Daystar, the basic rule of residency in Education Code section 48200 determined the LEA responsible for providing Student’s education. Section 48200 assigned this responsibility to the school district where the parent resides. Former Education Code section 56028 defined “parent” for purposes of the same term in Education Code section 48200. The definition included a guardian authorized by court order to make educational decisions for a child. The meaning of “guardian” within former Education Code section 56028, subdivision (a)(3), included a Responsible Adult. At the time, Student had a Responsible Adult who participated in educational decision making regarding Student and who resided within the boundaries of the Irvine Unified School District. Based upon the Responsible Adult’s residence, IUSD was responsible for Student’s education.
60. Upon Student turning 18, from January 14, 2008 to the present, the Irvine Unified School District continued to be the LEA responsible for providing Student with his special education program. When Student turned 18, the age of majority rule of residency in Education Code section 56041, subdivision (a), determined the LEA responsible for providing Student with his education. The rule of residency in section 56041, subdivision (a), assigned this responsibility to the school district where the pupil’s parent resides upon the pupil’s eighteenth birthday. Former Education Code section 56028 also defined “parent” for purposes of the same term in Education Code section 56041, subdivision (a). As Student’s Responsible Adult, Ms. Shiota was Student’s guardian, and therefore his parent, on the date that he turned 18 years of age. Because Ms. Shiota resided within the Irvine Unified School District, and continues to reside there, IUSD is again responsible for Student’s education.
From October 26, 2007 to October 31, 2007, and from December 21, 2007 to the present, the Irvine Unified School District was responsible for providing Student with a free appropriate public education.
The decision in a special education administrative due process proceeding must indicate the extent to which each party prevailed on the issues heard and decided. (Ed. Code, § 56507, subd. (d).) Student prevailed in OAH Case No. 2009090943, by establishing that a public agency within California had the duty to provide him with a FAPE. The Orange County Department of Education prevailed in OAH Case No. 2009100565, by establishing that OCDE was not the Local Educational Agency responsible for providing Student with a FAPE as regards his out-of-state residential placement.

References: v. 
 § 1401
 § 300
 § 1401
 § 300
 § 56026
 § 300
 § 56028
 § 1415
 § 300
 § 56501
 § 1415
 § 300
 § 56501
 § 48200
 v. 
 § 48204
 § 48645
 v. 
 § 300
 § 56026
 v. 
 § 56028
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3
 v. 
 § 56507