Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140407_0001023.CCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:07:47+00:00

Document:
VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, District Judge.
On March 11, 2014, petitioner Warren Frank, Jr. ("Petitioner") filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Petition"). Petitioner challenges a conviction and sentence imposed by the Los Angeles County Superior Court in Case No. YA018996 in 1994.
The Court takes judicial notice of its files with respect to a prior habeas petition (the "Prior Petition") Petitioner constructively filed in this Court on or about June 26, 2007 (Case No. CV 07-4142 SGL (FFM)). The Court notes that the Prior Petition was directed to the same conviction and/or sentence sustained in Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. YA018996. On September 28, 2008, Judgment was entered in Case No. CV 07-4142 SGL (FFM) denying the Prior Petition as time-barred and dismissing the action with prejudice.
"(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application."
Petitioner's prior federal habeas petition was denied on the ground that it was barred by the one-year period of limitation. A dismissal based on the statute of limitations is considered an adjudication on the merits for purposes of determining whether a subsequent petition is successive under the Act. Reyes v. Vaughn, 276 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 228, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) ("The rules of finality, both statutory and judge made, treat a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds the same way they treat a dismissal for failure to state a claim, for failure to prove substantive liability, or for failure to prosecute: as a judgment on the merits.") (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87-88, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916)); Ellingson v. Burlington Northern Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A judgment based on the statute of limitations is on the merits.'") (citing Mathis v. Laird, 457 F.2d 926, 927 (5th Cir. 1972)).
Therefore, because the Petition now pending challenges the same conviction as Petitioner's prior habeas petition in Case No. CV 07-4142 SGL (FFM), it constitutes a second and/or successive petition within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). To the extent Petitioner seeks to pursue the same claims he previously asserted, the Petition is barred by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). To the extent Petitioner seeks to pursue claims not previously asserted, it was incumbent on him under § 2244(b)(3)(A) to secure an order from the Ninth Circuit authorizing the District Court to consider the Petition, prior to his filing of it in this Court. Petitioner's failure to secure such an order from the Ninth Circuit deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2244
 § 2244
 § 2244