Source: https://mochiefcounsel.org/news.php?id=22&mydate=10-2018
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:17:55+00:00

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(4) if so, consult with the clients affected under Rule 4-1. 7(a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under Rule 4-1.7(a) include both of the clients referred to in Rule 4-1.7(a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under Rule 4-1.7(a)(2).
Step three is critical, yet often skipped by many practitioners.
Conflicts that are not consentable, therefore, are (1) conflicts in which the lawyer cannot reasonably believe he can provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, (2) conflicts in which the representation is prohibited by law, and (3) conflicts in which the representation involves assertion of a claim by one client against another client in the same litigation or other proceeding. If any one of the three is present, the issue of consent is not reached, i.e., that conflict cannot be waived by the clients.
Other nonconsentable conflicts, however, may not be so obvious. In State ex rel. Horn v. Ray, the Missouri Court of Appeals recently analyzed whether a conflict was consentable where the lawyer sought to represent both the defendant and the alleged victim in the State’s prosecution of that defendant for second-degree domestic assault. The alleged victim was the defendant’s wife. The lawyer obtained affidavits executed by the clients purporting to waive “any conflict of interest” and asserting that neither client would testify at the trial. The county prosecutor moved to disqualify the lawyer. When the trial court denied the motion to disqualify, the prosecutor petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition.
The court of appeals found that the lawyer could not reasonably believe that he would be able to provide competent and diligent representation to both the defendant and alleged victim in the criminal prosecution.
Counsel’s duty of loyalty to the defendant … prevents counsel from fairly presenting to the victim all possible courses of action because some of those options – most notably testifying against the defendant – would be detrimental to the defendant. Counsel’s duty of loyalty to the defendant thus plainly forecloses alternatives that otherwise might be recommended to the victim. … Likewise, counsel’s duty of loyalty to the victim prevents counsel from fairly presenting to the defendant all possible courses of action because some of those options – such as testifying that the victim lied about events leading to the instant charges or claiming self defense – would be detrimental to the victim. Thus, counsel’s duty of loyalty to the victim forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the defendant….
The court of appeals also found that counsel in State ex rel. Horn v. Ray could not meet subsection (b)(3) of Rule 4-1.7. Remember, all requirements of 4-1.7(b) must be met. Rule 4-1.7(b)(3) prohibits representation by a lawyer of two clients in the same litigation, or other proceeding before a tribunal, where one client is asserting a claim against the other. The lawyer argued that because the alleged victim had chosen not to testify, the clients’ interests were the same. The court of appeals was not persuaded.
Looking to the plain language of the rule, the court found that Rule 4-1.7(b)(3) applied to “clients” in the same litigation or proceeding, not only to opposing parties. The court found that the alleged victim in State ex rel. Horn v. Ray, at least initially, had asserted a claim when she reported allegations against the defendant to the police and sought the State’s protection. The court held that the defendant and alleged victim could not, therefore, consent to the conflict of interest.
There also may be situations where the lawyer simply cannot obtain informed consent because, for example, he cannot disclose information to one client because it is confidential information the lawyer has obtained from another client. Rule 4-1.6(a) prohibits lawyers from disclosing confidential information of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized, or it is permitted by Rule 4-1.6(b). If the lawyer must disclose confidential information from Client A to Client B in order for Client B to have adequate information to decide whether to consent to the conflict, the lawyer will have to obtain Client A’s informed consent to disclose that confidential information, per Rule 4-1.6(a). Again, the lawyer would have to fully disclose to Client A all the material risks of and reasonable alternatives to that disclosure by Client A of confidential information to Client B.
While it might seem easier to skip over the more involved steps and go straight to seeking informed consent to a conflict of interest, the analysis cannot start there. Attorneys must first analyze the facts of the case and the nature of the representation to determine, objectively, whether they will be able to give impartial and candid advice to both clients, and to advance the interests of both clients. If the conflict is consentable, that prior thorough analysis of the requirements in Rule 4-1.7(b) will better equip attorneys to make the disclosures necessary to obtain truly informed consent.
Many tools are available to help lawyers analyze potential conflicts. Rule 4-1.7 and its comments provide helpful and rather extensive guidance. Some concerned lawyers analyze potential conflicts by brainstorming about all the things that could go wrong in a joint representation. Others take it a step further and try to consider all the arguments a plaintiff’s malpractice attorney reasonably could make in a case against them. Others seek advice from their insurance carrier’s risk managers and/or from the Legal Ethics Counsel. Whatever tools attorneys use, they should not assume that consent cures all ills.
 In re Oliver, 285 S.W.2d 648, 655 (Mo. banc 1956), quoting In re Thomasson’s Estate, 144 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Mo. 1940).
 State ex rel. Horn v. Ray, 325 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Mo.App. 2010).
 “For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a conflict of interest.” Rule 4-1.7 cmt. .
 Rule 4-1.7(b)(3); Rule 4-1.7 cmt. .
 State ex rel. Horn v. Ray, 325 S.W.2d at 509, quoting Nunez v. Lovell, Civil No. 2005-7, 2008 WL 4525835, *3 (D.V.I. Oct. 3, 2008).
 325 S.W.3d 500 (Mo.App. 2010).
 No evidence was presented as to what information, other than the right not to testify, was explained to the clients about the conflict of interest posed by the joint representation, or how the conflict might affect the lawyer’s representation of each client. Id. at 503-04.
 W. Bradley Wendel, Professional Responsibility: Examples & Explanations 296 (2d ed. 2007).
 State ex rel. Horn v. Ray, 325 S.W.3d at 509.
 In re Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 1992); State ex rel. Union Planters Bank, N.S. v. Kendrick, 142 S.W.3d 729, 739 (Mo. banc 2004).
 Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d at 4.

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