Source: http://blog.digitalmedialicensing.org/?tag=copyright-registration
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:04:35+00:00

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The decision in Otto v. Hearst Communications, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-04712 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) provides a helpful guide to what is does not qualify as fair use in the context of a news story. Fair use is a limitation on a copyright owners exclusive rights and permits the use of a work without consent. It is codified in the current Copyright Act, and the statute provides examples of what can be considered fair use. Because “news reporting” is an example, it is all too common that popular news websites rely on fair use rather than licensing a photo, asserting that the use is news reporting. But is it?
This entry was posted in Copyright, Industry News, Legal and tagged copyright registration, fair use, news story, Otto v. Hearst Communications on December 17, 2018 by Cathy Aron.
Most likely not. In Otto v. Hearst Communications, Inc., Judge Gregory H. Woods dealt with this issue directly and found that Esquire.com’s use of a photo of Donald Trump at a private wedding in an article about him crashing the wedding was not fair use. The instructive decision, which analyzed the copyright infringement claim and individual components of the fair use defense, provides a clear example of what is not considered fair use in the context of a news story.
In June 2017, Jonathan Otto, a weddinggoer, snapped a photo of Trump, who happened to appear at a wedding held at his golf club in New Jersey. The amateur photographer texted the photo to a friend, only to discover the next morning that his photo had unexpectedly gone viral—first on Instagram, and then splashed across the pages of several online media outlets.
Seeking to protect his rights, Otto, retained counsel and filed for copyright registration. He then enforced his copyright by suing several of the media outlets, including Hearst Communications, Inc., the parent company of Esquire, who had copied and published Otto’s photo, for copyright infringement. In response, Esquire did not dispute that it had copied the photo but asserted a fair use defense arguing that it had used the photo of Trump for news purposes. However, the Court did not buy this argument.
Purpose and Character of the Work. First, the Court discussed the purpose and character of Otto’s photo—arguably the most important fair use factor. The judge noted that Hearst’s argument that the use is fair because the photo was created for personal use, and Esquire used it for news, was unpersuasive. While “news reporting” is specifically identified as a potential method of fair use in the statute, courts analyzing this factor still look to the transformativeness of the use of the copyrighted work. For example, did Esquire’s use of the photo in a post describing Trump crashing the wedding add a new meaning or message? Esquire argued that its use did because the article “added commentary regarding the President’s availability for photos at the wedding and broader trend in the President’s behavior.” However, the Court disagreed, concluding that Esquire used the image solely for illustrative purposes—to depict the President’s presence at a private wedding—and did not add anything new to the image.
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. Second, the Court examined the nature of the copyrighted work, such as whether it is expressive or creative versus factual or informational, and whether the work is published or not. While photographs can vary widely on this spectrum, the Court agreed with Esquire’s argument that the image is more factual, because the photo was taken spontaneously to document an event, and Otto did not direct or pose the subjects. As for the publication status of the photo, the parties did not dispute that the image had already been published and disseminated widely before Esquire’s use. Although a copyright owner’s right of first publication is important, the Court found that Esquire’s article did not threaten this right. Consequently, this factor—while far from the most important in the fair use analysis—weighed in favor of fair use.
Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Next, the Court evaluated just how much of Otto’s photograph Esquire used. For its article, Esquire used a slightly cropped version of Otto’s photo, but otherwise did not edit it. As one would assume, the more of a copyrighted work that is taken, the less likely the use is to be fair; however, courts also take the purpose of the use into account, looking back at the first fair use factor. Because it was clear that Esquire used the entirety of the photo and did so without adding new meaning or otherwise transforming the work, the Court found that this factor weighed against fair use.
Effect of the Use on the Potential Market. Finally, the Court considered the effect of Esquire’s use of the photo upon the potential market for or value of the photo. Where the copyright holder has no intention of entering the market, or the inability to do so, courts often find this factor weighs in favor of fair use. However, that is not the case here. Because Otto had acted quickly to protect his rights and was seeking to license the photo, such as to publications like TMZ, the Court found that it was clear that Otto was attempting to enter the market. Esquire’s unauthorized publishing of the same photo destroys the potential market and harm’s Otto’s ability to license the work. As such, the fourth factor also weighed against fair use.
Weighing the four factors together, the Court found that it was evident that Hearst’s use of the image was not fair. “The fact that Hearst’s commercial use did not transform the Photograph’s purpose or add new meaning to the image; the fact that Hearst used the work in its entirety; and the potential harm to any financial opportunities Otto might reasonably pursue for use of the photo, outweigh the fact that the image is factual and published,” Judge Woods concluded.
This entry was posted in Copyright, Education, Industry News, Legal and tagged bounds of fair use, copyright registration, Esquire, fair use, Inc., Otto v. Hearst Communications on December 17, 2018 by Cathy Aron.
There is a dangerous movement afoot; the idea that registration of your images on the blockchain is a cheap and simple alternative to registration with the United States Copyright Office. It is not.
Those providing copyright registration services based solely on the blockchain will argue that inscribing a hash of your image along with its accompanying metadata creates an immutable record of your copyright ownership. False.
This entry was posted in Copyright, Copyright Office, Education, Industry News, Legal, U.S. Copyright Office and tagged block-chain, copyright registration, inscribing a hash, proof of existence on February 21, 2018 by Cathy Aron.
What these services offer is the second largest application of the blockchain after Bitcoin: Proof of Existence.
What these services prove is that your image file with the meta data you input existed at the time that the hash was created and inscribed into the blockchain. However, what they fail to acknowledge is that the information can be easily manipulated. Almost anyone can download an image and edit the metadata, populating the data fields with whatever information they choose.
To emphasize the point, here is an example of a photo that was registered through a blockchain copyright registry service along with its blockchain certificate of registration. The only problem is that this photo was not shot by me nor do I own the copyrights to it, John Smith does.
John Smith takes a photo, posts it to his website and inscribes the JPEG file with a blockchain copyright registry service.
I download the image from his site and change the EXIF metadata of the file to my name, thereby creating a twin-JPEG with 100% identical image content, but different bytes.
I register my file with another blockchain copyright registry, which works even if both registries are on the same blockchain because the bytes are different due to the different name I entered in the EXIF meta data.
John Smith’s registry shuts down (e.g. goes bankrupt, management decides it’s not a profitable business unit, etc.). The blockchain still contains the inscribed hash for John Smith’s file; but nobody can find John Smith’s inscription unless they have a bit-identical copy of the image file John Smith registered.
I start licensing the copy John Smith’s image that contains my name in the EXIF data to unsuspecting buyers.
The messaging from the blockchain copyright registration services is extremely harmful to both the creators and users of the photographs. Many users searching the blockchain may take their claims as reliable and fail to perform their due diligence to verify the information provided on the blockchain.
If my image is viewed as authentic, solely because the work is inscribed on the blockchain under my name and falsified copyright information, then I can steal potential sales from the original photographer. Some may even try to go as far as pursuing copyright infringement claims for images they do not actually own the copyright to.
Essentially, these blockchain copyright registration services are proving that you had a specific file at a specific time; but, they cannot make any guarantees about the creation of the file, the content in those files, or the true copyright ownership of those files.
Whatever your position ideologically, the law states that you can’t file a copyright infringement complaint in US federal court if you haven’t registered the image with the US Copyright Office (USCO). Without a timely registration, meaning the image was registered within three months of publication or before the start date of the infringement, you are unable to seek statutory damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work or attorney’s fees. If this crucial step is missed and the copyright information is only inscribed to the blockchain, without a USCO registration, there are potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars that could be lost in a copyright infringement case.
It is also important to know that a major differentiator between a blockchain registration and USCO registration is that the U.S Copyright Office Certificate of Registration serves as prima facie evidence that you are the copyright owner of the image. Prima facie is Latin for “at first look,” or “on its face,” referring to a lawsuit or criminal prosecution in which the evidence before trial is sufficient to prove the case unless there is substantial contradictory evidence presented at trial. Blockchain registration certificates do not carry this legal weight.
17 USC 506(e): Any person who knowingly makes a false representation of a material fact in the application for copyright registration provided by section 409, or in any written statement filed with the application, shall be fined not more than $2500.
Currently, there are not any blockchain registration services that require such an agreement or that can impose such fines by statute for fraudulently misrepresenting copyright ownership information.
While registration with the US Copyright Office can be expensive, don’t be deluded into thinking that the blockchain is some cheap cure-all for legally protecting your copyrighted work. The blockchain is not a government registry, but rather by definition is a distributed ledger without any central authority. Anyone can inscribe whatever they want in the blockchain without any legal recourse. That’s not quite the case with the United States Copyright Office. Proof of Existence is not Proof of Ownership.
This entry was posted in Copyright, Education, Industry News, Legal, U.S. Copyright Office and tagged bitcoin, block-chain, copyright registration, inscribing a hash, proof of existence on February 21, 2018 by Cathy Aron.
For many copyright owners, especially those attempting to register works of visual arts, determining whether a work is published or unpublished for registration purposes is one of the more challenging issues and an impediment to registration. The District Court of the Southern District of New York, in Archie MD, Inc. v. Elsevier, Inc., (No. 16-CV-6614 (JSR), 2017 WL 3601180 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2017)) recently clarified the standard by which a copyright registration may be considered valid despite containing inaccurate information.
In 2005, Archie MD, Inc. entered into an Animation License Agreement (“ALA”) with the publisher Elsevier, Inc., under which Elsevier would license Archie’s library of 3-D medical animations for use in its various publications. About two weeks after entering into the ALA, and after Archie had delivered the works to Elsevier, Archie submitted a single copyright registration application for a group of unpublished works. This registration included the work at issue in this case, an animation entitled “Cell Differentiation.” The Copyright Office eventually registered the group of works on August 15, 2005.
In 2014, Archie gave Elsevier notice that it did not intend to renew the ALA, and the ALA expired on July 1, 2015. Archie subsequently file a copyright infringement action against Elsevier, alleging that after the expiration date, Elsevier continued to use hundreds previously licensed animations under the ALA and created unauthorized derivative works.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the SDNY granted defendant Elsevier’s motion as to all but two of Elsevier’s new animations, on the grounds that Elsevier’s continued use of previously licensed animations did not constitute unauthorized use under the ALA and most of the new animations by Elsevier were not substantially similar to Archie’s animations. As to the remaining claims based on the “Cell Differentiation” animation, Elsevier contended that Archie’s copyright registration in unpublished works was invalid because the work was in fact published, and as a result, the court should dismiss Archie’s claim in its entirety. The court denied Elsevier’s motion for summary judgement as to “Cell Differentiation” on the basis that although the registration for “Cell Differentiation” contained an inaccuracy (namely that the work was unpublished, when it in fact was), this was not fatal to the registration under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1).
Section 411(b)(1) of the U.S. Copyright Act explains that a certificate of registration issued by the Copyright Office satisfies the registration prerequisite for filing a copyright infringement action regardless of the existence of inaccurate information in the certificate “unless— (A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and (B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.” To determine whether Archie’s registration failed to satisfy this prerequisite, the court had to answer two questions: first, whether or not “Cell Differentiation” was published or unpublished, and second, if it was published, whether this inaccuracy on the certificate of registration was fatal to the registration’s validity.
As to the first question, the court held that “Cell Differentiation” was in fact published when Archie licensed and delivered the file to Elsevier. Reasoning that Archie’s delivery of the “Cell Differentiation” digital file pursuant to worldwide license to, among other things, distribute “Cell Differentiation” to the public, satisfies the Copyright Act’s definition of publication under 17 U.S.C. § 101 because it constitutes an “offering to distribute copies . . . to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution.” That Elsevier had not yet made any further distributions of “Cell Differentiation” at the time the copyright registration application was filed was irrelevant, because the licensing and delivery of the files was itself an offering.
Because the certificate of registration listed “Cell Differentiation” as unpublished, the court turned to the statute to answer the second question. If an applicant knew its application contained inaccurate information, and if the Register of Copyrights would have refused registration had she known of this inaccurate information, then a subsequent registration certificate is invalid for purposes of filing a copyright infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) requires that when an inaccuracy on a certification of registration is discovered, a court must ask the Register of Copyrights “whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.” The Register advised the court that she would have denied the application had she known of the inaccuracy in labeling “Cell Differentiation” unpublished. The key issue was whether Archie knew of the inaccuracy. Because the question of whether licensing a work constitutes publication was “an unsettled legal question at the time” Archie filed its copyright registration application in 2005, the court reasoned that Archie did not know of the inaccuracy. As a result Archi was able to proceed on its copyright claim for the work “Cell Differentiation”.
Publication remains a thorn in copyright owner’s side. While the plaintiff in this case was not considered to have knowledge that its works were published at the time of registration, those filing registrations after the later cases clarifying what is published will no longer have the benefit of this uncertainty. Because the Copyright Office would deny registration of an application with inaccurate information as to the works’ publication status, it is highly recommended that creators register works of visual art before any licensing agreements are signed or files are delivered for further distribution. Otherwise, published works, if photographs, can be registered by the photographer under a group registration of photographs application, but published and unpublished works are still required to be filed separately. Until this requirement is revised, visual artists will continue to face impediments to successful and effortless copyright registration.
This entry was posted in Copyright, Copyright Office, Education, Industry News, Legal, U.S. Copyright Office and tagged Archie MD, Cell Differentiation, certificate of registration, copyright registration, Elsevier, Inc., registration application, summary judgment, unpublished works on September 7, 2017 by Cathy Aron.

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