Source: https://www.johndaylegal.com/15-28-tortfeasors-in-a-single-event-may-be-tried-separately.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 13:59:28+00:00

Document:
The Case: McNabb v. Highways, Inc ., 98 S.W.3d 649 (Tenn. 2003).
The Basic Facts: Plaintiffs were the driver and passenger in a car involved in a collision with another car in a construction zone. Plaintiffs each brought actions against the other driver and the company that placed a concrete barrier in the zone where the collision occurred. Plaintiffs eventually settled with the other driver.
"Turning to the merits of the appeal, Highways argues that where the separate, independent negligent acts of more than one tortfeasor combine to cause a single, indivisible injury, a plaintiff is limited to one cause of action and must join all of the tortfeasors in that action and that this Court's decision Samuelson v. McMurtry, 962 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn.1998), requires that result. Moreover, Highways argues that joinder of Morrison was required as an indispensable party. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19. McNabb and Harrison respond that Samuelson is not controlling since Highways may raise comparative fault as an affirmative defense and ask the jury to allocate fault to Morrison. They also contend that Ronald Morrison was not an indispensable party in this action." 98 S.W.3d at 652.
"We begin our analysis with the landmark case of McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.1992), in which we adopted a system of modified comparative fault. Under this system, a plaintiff may recover damages where the plaintiff's fault is less than the defendant's fault. The plaintiff's recovery of damages, however, is reduced to reflect his or her degree of fault. Id. at 57. In cases of multiple tortfeasors, a 'plaintiff will be entitled to recover so long as plaintiff's fault is less than the combined fault of all tortfeasors.' Id. at 58." Id.
[t]he trial court's errors deprived the plaintiff of the right to proceed against the [chiropractor] in the same trial with the other defendants and also of the right to have the decedent's fault compared with the fault of all the defendants. The defendants other than [the chiropractor] were deprived of an opportunity to have fault apportioned against [the chiropractor]. This result could have been accomplished on remand had the plaintiff appealed the entire case. Id. at 476."
FN5 Highways' effort to bolster its interpretation of Samuelson with authority from other jurisdictions is likewise unavailing. It has identified only two states that have adopted a procedure by which a plaintiff must file a single action against all potential tortfeasors or else risk the dismissal of later actions, one of which we cited in Samuelson. Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, [560 A.2d 1169 (N.J. 1989)]; Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127 (Kan. 1981)]. Even in these jurisdictions, however, the courts have clarified that a case would not be dismissed against one defendant where a separate action against another defendant ends with a settlement agreement and not an adjudicated allocation of fault. See Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., [752 A.2d 349, 355-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (settlement with one defendant did not preclude allocation of fault in an action against another defendant); Mathis v. TG & Y, 751 P.2d 136 (Kan. 1988) (settlement agreement with one defendant did not mandate the dismissal of a separate suit against another defendant when there had been no judicial determination of fault). In short, the cases relied upon by Highways are fundamentally different than the facts of the present case."
that 'fairness and efficiency require that defendants called upon to answer allegations [of] negligence be permitted to allege, as an affirmative defense, that a nonparty caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought.' 833 S.W.2d at 58 (emphasis added). The Rules of Civil Procedure therefore require that a defendant shall raise comparative fault, 'including the identity or description of any other alleged tortfeasors,' in an answer as an affirmative defense to the plaintiffs cause of action. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03; George v. Alexander, [931 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tenn. 1996)] (Court discussed the defendant's duty to plead comparative fault and identify tortfeasors under Rule 8.03)."
"Similarly, we recognized in McIntyre that after a defendant raises comparative fault and asserts that another tortfeasor is liable to the plaintiff, a plaintiff must make a timely amendment to the complaint and serve process in order to seek a judgment against the newly named tortfeasor. McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 57; Browder v. Morris, [975 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tenn. 1998)]." Id.
"The legislature has since enacted Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 20-1-119(a), which affords a plaintiff an additional ninety (90) days in which to either amend the initial complaint or file a new and separate complaint against the new tortfeasor when a defendant's answer asserts comparative fault and identifies a tortfeasor against whom the statute of limitations has run. As the Court of Appeals has observed, the purpose and effect of this statutory provision 'simply preserves a plaintiffs prerogative to select defendants just as they were able to before McIntyre v. Balentine was decided.' Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co., [50 S.W.3d 446, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)]. In short, the one-action rule advocated by Highways, under which a plaintiff bears the burden of identifying and filing actions against all potential defendants in a single complaint or else suffer the dismissal of any later amendments or complaints, would render the provisions of Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 20-1-119(a), all but meaningless." Id. (Footnote omitted).
[T]he circumstances of this case are not unlike a plaintiff suing two defendants for tortious injuries in the same action and settling with the one before trial, but going to trial as to the remaining defendant. A plaintiffs settling with one co-defendant under the comparative fault doctrine, does not establish a basis for dismissal as to the remaining defendant. In these cases, the defendant is not deprived of the opportunity to have fault apportioned against Morrison, as it has ... raised in its answer the affirmative defense of Morrison's negligence.
See Mitchell v. Charles P. Procini, D.D.S., [752 A.2d 349, 355 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)] (concluding that a settlement with one defendant did not prevent allocation of fault in a separate action against another defendant); Mathis v. TG & Y, [751 P.2d 136, 138 (Kan. 1988)] (concluding that a settlement with one defendant did not require dismissal of a separate suit because there had been no judicial determination of fault). The proceedings, therefore, fully comport with the purpose of linking liability with the degree of fault under McIntyre." Id. at 654-55.
"Finally, the record does not support Highways' argument that allowing the action to continue is unfairly prejudicial because it places the burden upon it to establish Morrison's fault and denies it the opportunity to conduct a joint defense with Morrison. Highways has not demonstrated any potential defense that has been lost or evidence that has been rendered unavailable in these proceedings. Moreover, as the appellees' assert, the alleged prejudice is at best conjectural since Highways not only will be able to assert comparative fault as a defense but will also be able to argue that all of the fault lies with Morrison uncontradicted by Morrison's defense or presence as a litigant. In short, Highways has demonstrated no prejudice that would justify the adoption of a rule that finds no support either in Tennessee or other jurisdictions." Id. at 655.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.