Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180801_0028690.NY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:50:01+00:00

Document:
FindACase | Karimian v. Time Equities, Inc.
Karimian v. Time Equities, Inc.
Law Office of Ethan A. Brecher, LLC, New York, NY, for appellant-respondent.
Jackson Lewis P.C., New York, NY (Marjorie N. Kaye and Daniel D. Schudroff of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P. SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX JOSEPH J. MALTESE ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for discrimination and retaliation under Executive Law § 296 and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ellen M. Spodek, J.), dated December 9, 2015, as granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the causes of action alleging violations of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107 as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the defendants cross-appeal from so much of the same order as, upon their request to treat those branches of their motion which were to dismiss the causes of action alleging breach of contract and for quantum meruit as seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3211(c) dismissing those causes of action, denied summary judgment with respect to those causes of action.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The plaintiff, an Iranian American, was employed by the defendant Time Equities, Inc. (hereinafter Time Equities). In 2010, the plaintiff commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the defendants herein, Time Equities and individuals affiliated with the firm, alleging discrimination and hostile work environment based on race, national origin and gender, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC, ch 21, § 2000e et seq.; hereinafter Title VII), the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296) (hereinafter NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107) (hereinafter NYCHRL). The plaintiff also alleged causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract and for quantum meruit. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the District Court granted the defendants' motion, dismissed the federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local claims. Thereafter, the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (see Karimian v Time Equities, Inc., 2013 WL 2254557, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 74736 [SD NY, No.10-Civ-3773(AKH)]). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's original order (see Karimian v Time Equities, Inc., 569 Fed.Appx. 54 [2d Cir]). The Court explained that, "viewing the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was 'an overabundance of evidence' of 'legitimate, nonretaliatory, and nondiscriminatory reasons' for terminating the plaintiffs employment, 'that is, the company's significant cost-reducing measures-taken . . . in the wake of the 2008 financial downturn" (id. at 55). The Second Circuit further found that "[n]o reasonable juror could conclude that bias against those of Iranian national origin motivated the discharge" or that the plaintiff's discharge was in retaliation for his complaint about a coworker's allegedly discriminatory conduct, or that he was subjected to a hostile work environment (id.).
In 2013, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Supreme Court alleging discrimination and hostile work environment based on race, national origin, and gender, and retaliation under NYSHRL and NYCHRL. The plaintiff also alleged causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract and for quantum meruit. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court granted those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the causes of action under NYSHRL and NYCHRL as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and, upon their request to treat those branches of their motion which were to dismiss the causes of action alleging breach of contract and for quantum meruit as seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3211(c) dismissing those causes of action, denied summary judgment with respect to those causes of action on the ground that there were issues of fact. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the court erred in granting dismissal of the causes of action under NYCHRL, and the defendants cross-appeal, contending the court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to the causes of action alleging breach of contract and for quantum meruit.
The provisions of NYCHRL must be "construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof," regardless of whether similarly worded federal or New York State civil and human rights laws have been so construed (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-130[a]; see Makinen v City of New York, 30 N.Y.3d 81, 87; Albunio v City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 477; Singh v Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC, 131 A.D.3d 1158, 1161). Accordingly, a cause of action asserted pursuant to NYCHRL must be analyzed independently from similar or identical causes of action asserted pursuant to Title VII and/or NYSHRL. However, where a prior factual determination rendered with regard to a Title VII or NYSHRL cause of action is determinative of a cause of action asserted pursuant to NYCHRL in a subsequent action, the NYCHRL cause of action may be barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see Milione v City Univ. of N.Y., 153 A.D.3d 807; Simmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 116 A.D.3d 134, 139; Peterkin v Episcopal Social Servs. of N.Y., Inc., 24 A.D.3d 306, 308).
Here, the factual determinations made by the federal courts with regard to the causes of action alleging discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII were determinative of the plaintiffs identical claims asserted in this action pursuant to NYCHRL (see Milione v City Univ. of N.Y., 153 A.D.3d 807; Simmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 116 A.D.3d at 139; Peterkin v Episcopal Social Servs. of N.Y., Inc., 24 A.D.3d at 308). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant dismissal of those causes of action as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
With respect to the defendants' cross appeal, CPLR 3211(c) provides, "[u]pon the hearing of a motion made under subdivision (a) or (b), either party may submit any evidence that could properly be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Whether or not issue has been joined, the court, after adequate notice to the parties, may treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment." Although the path the defendants took in moving pursuant to CPLR 3211(c) was procedurally questionable, they charted their own course in this instance. There was no need to give the plaintiff an opportunity to file additional papers because the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by failing to tender sufficient evidence to eliminate any issues of fact with respect to those causes of action. Accordingly, the defendants were properly denied summary judgment, without regard to the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853).

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