Source: http://www.houston-opinions.com/files/14thCoA-2009-Kessling-v-Friendswood-ISD-by-Hedges-Texas-Open-Meetings-Act-Public-Information-Act-TOMA-TPIA.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:47:15+00:00

Document:
trial court erred in not awarding them attorney's fees.
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
certain past violations and to prevent certain of the violations from reoccurring.
Kessling to replead within 30 days to cure the pleading defects.
Kessling failed to allege an injury which was distinct to her as opposed to effecting the general public.
discretion, and thus, governmental immunity was not applicable. She further contended that permitting F.I.S.D.
subsequently filed her third amended petition.
expressly denied that motion during an oral hearing.
TOMA and TPIA claims and in dismissing her Education Code claims for want of jurisdiction.
judgment under well-established standards of review. See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a; Nixon v. Mr. Prop.
Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).
concerning the transactions of public business." Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex.
and a mandamus or injunction barring similar violations in the future.
and not merely a theoretical dispute." Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995).
likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote." Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442.
holding future meetings without proper notice.
To avoid the justiciability challenges, Kessling is only required to plead sufficient facts to support jurisdiction.
TOMA violations and requested injunctive and mandamus relief to prevent future violations of the same nature.
We now turn to Kessling's claims with regards to past violations. In City of Farmers Branch v. Ramos, 235 S.W.
violations were rendered moot because the ordinances in question had been subsequently repealed. 235 S.W.
issue was not moot. Id. at 470.
prove the likelihood of those future violations by demonstrating a pattern and practice of violations in the past.
granting summary judgment against Kessling's TOMA claims on these bases. We sustain Kessling's first issue.
not raised by appellees' motion. We hold only that Kessling has sufficiently pleaded her TOMA claims.
In 1973, the Texas Legislature passed what is now known as the TPIA. See Act of June 14, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.
about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.'" City of Garland, 22 S.W.
do so, the information is presumed to be public. Id. § 552.302.
future requests sought an impermissible advisory opinion. We will address each ground in turn.
accordance with this section against a governmental body that violates [the TPIA]." Id. § 552.3215(b).
(e) states that a “complainant may file a complaint" with the county or district attorney. Id. § 552.3215(c), (e).
matter. Id. § 552.3215(g), (h), (i), (j).
supports declaratory judgment actions in the TPIA context); Dominguez v. Gilbert, 48 S.W.3d 789, 796 (Tex.
expense. The trial court erred to the extent it held otherwise.
although other requests have been fulfilled, something improper occurred regarding how they were fulfilled.
to fulfill TPIA requests, appellees did not raise these points as grounds for summary judgment below.
judgment was improvidently granted with regard to Kessling's claims of unfulfilled TPIA requests.
declaration that past violations have occurred would have no impact on the rights of the parties. See Speer v.
Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1993) (citing McKie v. Bullock, 491 S.
fulfilled TPIA requests are therefore moot. Consequently, the trial court did not err in dismissing these claims.
first issue in part and overrule it in part.
v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 405 (Tex. 2007).
failed to allege a distinct injury.
appointed by the Commissioner), 109.1 (Commissioner, State Board, and state auditor).
standing to “seek declaratory relief against state officials who allegedly act without legal or statutory authority."
award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as are equitable and just. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
either statute under an abuse of discretion standard. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21 (UDJA); Loeffler v. Lytle I.S.
D., 211 S.W.3d 331, 350 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (Education Code).
UDJA. We overrule appellees' sole cross-appeal issue.
final judgment was entered. The third amended petition was therefore the live petition at the time of judgment.
Kessling's petition. The description in the text above is intended solely as a brief synopsis of the assertions.
summary judgment and their labeling of the Education Code discussion as pertaining to the grant of the plea to the jurisdiction.
Such labeling is not intended to substantively impact the analysis.
mootness doctrine). This mootness exception is not raised in the present appeal.
and procedural distinctions between that case and the one currently before us.
comments akin to subsection (k), i.e., that the newly created action is in addition to any other available actions.
to produce material previously determined to be public information. Tex. Gov't Code § 552.321.
request; (5) produced “Quarterly Investment Reports" untimely; and (6) failed to produce requested “Letters to Management,"
which Kessling subsequently obtained from another source.
construed as having raised the issue, she certainly does not offer any argument or authority specifically on this issue. See Tex.
authority and to the record.").
jurisdiction over those claims. See, e.g., Labrado v. County of El Paso, 132 S.W.3d 581, 589 (Tex. App.- El Paso 2004, no pet.).
(requiring the State Board to adopt rules concerning district budgets and audits of financial accounts).
 Kessling contends that having the reports required by the Education Code prepared is a ministerial act by a public official.
the reports prepared is a ministerial not discretionary function because it is mandated by the code.
funds. Bland I.S.D., 34 S.W.3d at 556. Kessling does not rely upon this exception in the present case.

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