Source: http://www.fedbar.org/Sections/Admiralty-Law-Section/Admiralitas/Winter-2016/Case-Summaries-July-2016-September-2016.aspx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:10:47+00:00

Document:
Dominican National Found to be “Navigator” under Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act Sentencing Enhancement – The Defendant Persis Trinidad (a Dominican national) was arrested while transporting cocaine from Columbia to the Dominican Republic. Trinidad and another defendant were intercepted by the United States Coast Guard in a vessel approximately 80 nautical miles south of the Dominican Republic. After his arrest, Trinidad agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. During sentencing, the District Court followed the recommendation of the probation officer in the presentence report, adding a two-level sentencing enhancement from the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act “MDLEA”, for a captain, navigator, or other operations officer aboard a vessel because Trinidad was a “navigator.” The defendant appealed the enhancement to his sentence, arguing that he was not a navigator because he merely steered the vessel and did not know how to program the GPS nor did he actually handle it. The First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, that he qualified as a “navigator”, because he had steered for at least part of the trip and thus must have at least referenced the GPS in order to stay on course in the middle of the ocean. The District Court reasoned that use of the navigational device qualified as “navigating” within the meaning of the MDLEA and the First Circuit rejected Trinidad’s argument that a navigator must have knowledge of how to program or adjust a GPS, rather than just relying on it to keep the vessel on course. United States v. Trinidad, 839 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2016).
Submitted by George M. Chalos, CHALOS & Co., P.C.
Federal Arbitration Act “Look-Through” to Underlying Substantive Argument Expanded for Federal-Question Jurisdiction – Drew Doscher, the Plaintiff, commenced arbitration against his former employer, Sea Port Group Securities, for various breach of contract claims and was awarded almost $2.3 million of the $15 million sought. Thereafter, Doscher filed a petition to have his arbitration award against Sea Port vacated and modified in part because the arbitration panel 1) acted in manifest disregard to federal law, and 2) failed to make sure documentary evidence was fully and timely available to him, which would qualify for vacatur under § 10(a)(3). On the first issue, the Second Circuit quickly disposed of Doscher’s argument because federal law did not create the cause of action asserted in the arbitration, and the Exchange Act does not impose a duty to comply with FINRA rules to the arbitrators or non-SRO parties, only the organization itself. On the second issue, the Second Circuit reviewed its then-standing precedent (Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2000), in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009), which indicated that courts may “look through” the face of a petition coming under the FAA to the substantive issues in the underlying case to look for jurisdiction. In applying the Supreme Court’s decision, the Second Circuit concluded that the various sections of the Act were intended to be limited as to when remedies could be provided, rather than limited as to the jurisdiction of the courts based on the timing of a filing in relation to the commencement of arbitration. This interpretation allows the courts to consistently apply remedies provided in the FAA, such as modification or compelling arbitration, to cases as needed in the same controversy provided they have federal-question jurisdiction. The Second Circuit overturned Greenberg, vacated the finding of the District Court, and remanded for further proceedings instructing the District Court to conduct the federal question analysis consistent with Vaden. Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec,. LLC, 832 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 2016).
Lack of Admiralty Jurisdiction When Captain Hurts a Passenger – A recreational vessel passenger brought a maritime personal injury action against the vessel, its captain, its owners, and other related parties arising from an incident in which the captain threw a plastic coffee cup at the passenger, striking him in the head. After a bench trial, the District Court of the Virgin Islands entered judgment in favor of the passenger and against captain and the vessel. The captain and vessel appealed. When a party seeks to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, the claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. The connection aspect of the test is a conjunctive two-part inquiry: first, the court must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, and second, the court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. The first prong of the connection test requires the court to assess the potential disruptive effects that the type of incident involved could have on maritime commerce, not whether the particular incident at hand actually disrupted maritime commerce; in so doing, the court must describe the incident at an intermediate level of possible generality. The Third Circuit found that the captain’s actions, in throwing coffee cup from land at the passenger, who was standing on an anchored vessel, did not have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, and thus district court did not have federal admiralty jurisdiction over the passenger’s personal injury claims arising from the incident; throwing a small inert object from land at an individual onboard an anchored vessel did not create any potential for disrupting the course of the waterway or obstructing the free passage of commercial ships on the water and had no potential to damage nearby commercial vessels. Hargus v. Ferocious and Impetuous, LLC, --- F.3d ----, 2016 WL 6081355 (3rd Cir. Oct. 18, 2016).
Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction Defense – Nearly three decades ago three former seamen sued their employers alleging violations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 et seq., and general maritime law resulting from their harmful exposures to asbestos. After a complicated procedural history that eventually saw their lawsuits consolidated in the Asbestos Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, that Court dismissed their cases for lack of personal jurisdiction. The seamen appealed, arguing that the employers waived their personal jurisdiction defenses. Personal jurisdiction restricts judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty, for due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power. Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived. A party is deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction, and thereby waived it as a defense, if that party actually litigates the underlying merits or demonstrates a willingness to engage in extensive litigation in the forum. The Court of Appeals held that the employers waived their right to assert a personal jurisdiction defense because they had expressed a willingness to litigate their lawsuits in the Northern District of Ohio to a federal judge many years earlier. Those waivers were held to be confirmed by their various post-transfer filings. The employers’ subsequent efforts to preserve their personal jurisdiction defenses in their pleadings did not change the importance of their prior waivers. Thus, the court had personal jurisdiction over the employers. In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2016 WL 4395353 (3rd Cir. August 18, 2016).
In a Tort Allision Case, Attorney’s Fees Awarded to Plaintiff for Defendant’s Abuse of the Judicial Process – The Defendant’s towing vessel allided with a vessel that had been converted from military and commercial use by the owner for his private use. The Defendant vessel owner challenged both its liability for causing the allision/collision as well as the pre-casualty value of the damaged vessel. The District Court ultimately found the Defendant liable for the allision and that the damaged vessel was a total constructive loss with a much higher pre-casualty value than set out by the Defendant’s two experts. The District Court further awarded the Plaintiff attorney’s fees finding that the Defendant’s handling of the case was an abuse of process and in bad faith because the Defendant contested liability up to and through trial even though the Defendant “clearly knew the extent of its liability based on the circumstances of the case and the actions of its captain” and that the Defendant presented two expert witnesses on damages “so lacking they could not even properly name the vessel [at issue].” The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling after a review of the District Court’s award under an abuse of discretion standard and the findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. The Fifth Circuit noted that federal courts possess “inherent power” to assess fees as sanctions when the losing party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Moench v. Marquette Transp. Co. Gulf–Inland, L.L.C., 2016 WL 5485122 (5th Cir. 2016).
Jones Act Negligence – Slip and Fall – Summary Judgment Denied – Plaintiff deckhand sued his employer Defendant American Steamship Company after slipping and falling on iron-ore pellets left on the dock. He asserted claims of unseaworthiness under general maritime law, maintenance and cure under general maritime law, and negligence under the Jones Act. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all three claims. Summary judgment was granted as to the maintenance and cure claim because Plaintiff admitted that Defendant met its maintenance and cure obligations. Summary judgment also was granted on the unseaworthiness claim because the dock, which was owned by another defendant (ONM), was not an “appurtenance” of Defendant’s vessel, despite the fact that Plaintiff was holding a mooring line attached to the vessel at the time of the fall. The Court also found that Plaintiff’s alternative argument—that the vessel’s officers were “incompetent in the exercise of their supervision under the circumstances”—was unsubstantiated. However, the Court denied summary judgment on the Jones Act claim. The Jones Act allows employers to be held responsible for injuries caused by the negligence of their agents—here, ONM, which had a services agreement with Defendant and had control of the dock. Further, Plaintiff raised factual issues regarding the lack of illumination of the dock, his crewmates’ knowledge of the hazardous dock condition, and his improper training by Defendant. Brown v. Carmeuse Lime & Stone, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93006 (N.D. Ohio 2016).
Limitation of Liability Act Case – Engine Room Explosion – Summary Judgment Denied – Petitioners, the Motsingers, filed a Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act petition and a renewed motion for summary judgment after an explosion in the engine room of their boat injured a guest and damaged a nearby boat and boat slip. The Court denied the renewed motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit adopted two elements for determining an owner’s liability under the Limitation of Liability Act: “(1) negligence or unseaworthiness and (2) the owner’s privity or knowledge of the negligence.” Summary judgment was denied because there were key factual disputes related to the Motsingers’ purported negligence and competence to operate the boat, such as whether an alarm was ringing right before the explosion, whether Tom Motsinger was a “novice” at boat operation and maintenance, and whether the Motsingers could have accessed the engine room to inspect a hose that had been identified by marine surveyors pre-purchase as cracked. In re Motsinger, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135561 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
Jones Act Negligence – Injured Worker Not “Seaman” – Plaintiff warehouseman/deckhand sued his employer, Defendant Soo Marine Supply, a ship chandler operating a single vessel, under the Longshore And Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and the Jones Act after he slipped and fell while moving pallets of frozen food in a refrigerator. The Court held that he could not sue under the Jones Act because he did not qualify as a “seaman.” Because the Jones Act does not define “seaman,” the Court used the two-prong rule adopted by the Supreme Court case of Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 347 (1995): “[a] worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act[,]” but departure from this guideline “will certainly be justified in appropriate cases.” The Court determined that Plaintiff did not meet the 30% rule of thumb based on the hours he logged for work. The Court also determined that no departure was justified in this case. First, just because a longshoreman is necessarily engaged in the mission of the ships he loads and unloads, this fact alone does not make him a seaman. The fact that Soo Marine had only one ship to which all of its employees were dedicated was also not salient, because that would imply that “[a]ny longshoreman working for a company with a dedicated fleet of cargo ships would likewise be a seaman.” Second, although Plaintiff was on the path to becoming a crane operator or captain aboard Soo Marine’s vessel, the Jones Act does not conclusively regard crane operators or captains as seamen and there is no evidence conclusively supporting that they would be considered seamen under the Jones Act. Lewan v. Soo Marine Supply, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99944 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
United States Immunity – Flood Control Act; Discretionary Function Exception – Petitioner Ingram Barge Company’s vessel’s fourteen-barge tow broke apart and allided during an unsuccessful attempt to navigate the Marseilles Dam (a United States Army Corps of Engineers operated “run-of-the-river facility” not designed for flood water storage) during a high-water situation. During the attempted canal transit, the lockmaster allegedly offered to lower the gates 16 feet, but then raised the gates in mid-transit. Afterward, the river waters overflowed the dam and flooded the town of Marseilles, resulting in real and personal property damage. Various claimants sought damages. The United States sought immunity pursuant to the Flood Control Act or alternatively the discretionary function exception. The United States also moved to dismiss Petitioner Ingram’s contract and promissory estoppel claims. The Court denied summary judgment under the Flood Control Act, because there were issues of material fact surrounding whether the lockmaster was engaged in “flood-control activity,” which would be subject to immunity under the Act, or only acted to aid the Ingram vessel to navigate the dam. The Court granted summary judgment under the discretionary function exception based on the United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) discretionary function analysis: the texts of the federal statute (33 U.S.C. § 1) and its related regulation (33 C.F.R. § 207) allowed for discretion generally or in the face of emergencies, and the claimants failed to identify policies restricting the lockmaster’s actions in this situation, did not provide any evidence that the high-water situation was not an emergency, and could only point to an Illinois Waterway provision that was irrelevant because the gates specified in that provision were not involved in the incident at issue. Furthermore, the operation of the dam was policy-based, as there was evidence that the Corps was concerned about property damage, personnel and public safety prior to the attempted transit, the claimants pointed out facts tending to show the lockmaster’s negligence (which is irrelevant to the analysis), and there was evidence the Corps was balancing competing policy interests in deciding whether and when to lower and raise the dam gates during the transit. The Court also discussed the “Good Samaritan” due care requirements under Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), which some courts have viewed as a separate analysis to the discretionary function analysis, but other courts have viewed as instructive on the scope of the discretionary function analysis. After reviewing the relevant case law, the Court determined that Indian Towing speaks to the government’s state-law liability under the Suits in Admiralty Act, not to the discretionary function exception, and that in this case, even if Petitioner had detrimentally relied on the lockmaster’s actions, it would not preclude dismissal based on the discretionary function exception. The Court continued that even if Indian Towing were relevant to the discretionary function exception, the alleged presence of detrimental reliance alone would not bar the application of the exception, as there was no evidence here that the government assumed a duty “to take certain particular actions and then wholly failed to do so.” With regard to Petitioner Ingram’s contract-law claims: (1) the Court dismissed the promissory estoppel claim, as the United States has not waived its immunity to such claims under the Tucker Act and there is no evidence that such claims can be brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act; (2) the Court denied the United States’ motion to dismiss the breach of contract (implied-in-fact) claim as untimely and noted that the government has waived sovereign immunity for implied-in-fact contract claims under the Tucker Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act. In re Ingram Barge Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90632 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
Limitation of Liability – Duty to Warn – Appellant Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services rented a boat to three couples. Before renting the boat out, Aramark did not warn the boaters of the forecasted high winds, which the boat was not designed to withstand. The boat sank in high wind and rough water, killing two of the three couples. Before the heirs and estates of the deceased couples (“Claimants”) sued Aramark for wrongful death, Aramark filed a limitation-of-liability complaint in federal court under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30501 et seq., which was denied by the District Court. After Aramark appealed, the 10th Circuit conducted the two-step inquiry on limitation or exoneration. Because Claimants did not assert unseaworthiness and Aramark did not claim lack of privity or knowledge, the inquiry focused on “whether negligence by Aramark caused the accident.” The Court held that Aramark had no duty to warn about the weather, because the boaters could have easily taken preventative measures themselves, and had no duty to refuse rental of the boat due to weather, which would limit personal choice in the context of recreation. However, the Court did impose on Aramark the duty to warn the boaters that the boat was not designed for high winds. The Court vacated and remanded the case to determine whether Aramark breached this duty and whether Aramark’s defense that the decedents’ own negligence was a superseding cause in their deaths had merit. In re Aramark Sports & Entm’t Servs., LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13888 (10th Cir. 2016).
Arbitration Agreement Enforceable for Contract with U.S. Seaman’s Traveling to and from Foreign Country – In a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed that a seaman’s work in international waters on a cruise ship that calls on foreign ports constitutes “performance . . . abroad” under the United Nations Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 9 U.S.C. §202. Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, was a musician who worked on board the cruise ship that sailed from Florida to foreign ports in the Caribbean. After the plaintiff sued his employer under the Jones Act, the employer moved to compel arbitration since the Convention made arbitration agreements enforceable between U.S. citizens if the contractual relationship “envisages performance or enforcement abroad.” The Plaintiff argued that he only played music while the vessel was in international waters and not in the foreign ports, so that his contract did not envisage performance abroad. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument and concluded that “performance abroad included a seaman’s work traveling to or from a foreign country.” Alberts v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 834 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2016). See also, Francis D’Cruz v. NCL (Bahamas),Ltd. 2016 WL 4501655 (11th Cir. 2016) reaching the same conclusion based on the Alberts binding precedent.
Non-Maritime Canal – No Admiralty Jurisdiction for Tort – In action by a vessel passenger who was injured striking his head on a pipe while passing under a canal bridge, case was dismissed by District Court for lack of Admiralty jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal finding that the evidence showed that there was an artificial obstruction which prevented the canal from being able to support interstate commerce and, therefore, the tort did not occur on “navigable water,” the location requirement for a tort to fall within Federal Admiralty jurisdiction. The record showed that the canal did not have a navigable connection to a river, bay or ocean, but was confined within the State and did not form part of an interstate waterway. The “historically navigable” standard used to determine whether waterbodies might be governed by State or Federal law in other context, such as State or Federal ownership of water-bottoms and other statutes, is not applicable to determining admiralty jurisdiction for tort, as such analysis serves no purpose of protecting maritime shipping and commerce. Tundidor v. Miami-Dade County., 831 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2016).

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