Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83158:57121&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:55:40+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 200491, June 09, 2014 - KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG, INC., REPRESENTED BY PABLITO M. EGILDO, Petitioner, v. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG, INC., REPRESENTED BY PABLITO M. EGILDO, Petitioner, v. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated June 27, 2011 and January 31, 2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110585.
In the case at hand, whether respondent complied with the condition imposed by the order of conversion is a question of fact which necessitates an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties, their relation to each other, and the probabilities of the situation.21 But this Court is not a trier of facts. For this reason, We have held that when the findings of the CA are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive on the parties. As shall be explained below, We find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the CA here. In the absence of any showing that the present case falls under the aforementioned exceptions calling for a re-evaluation of evidence, We refrain from disturbing the findings of fact by the CA.
In its Decision, the CA ruled that DAR Secretary Pangandaman, in arriving at his August 8, 2008 Order, merely relied on the deliberation of the CLUPPI Committee, despite the inconsistency disclosed by said Committee’s ocular inspection report.22 Such ocular inspection report stated that “out of the eight (8) parcels of land, Lot No. 2-c under TCT No. 82523 x x x and Lot No. 1997-X-A under TCT No. T-82517 x x x, remained undeveloped. In other words, six (6) out of the eight (8) parcels of land have been developed. Yet the DAR Secretary issued an Order affirming his revocation of the conversion of the subject lands with the exception of the lot under TCT No. T-82586.23 Thus, DAR Secretary Pangandaman effectively revoked seven (7) out of the eight (8) parcels of land, in stark contrast with the findings of the ocular inspection report.24 Had the DAR Secretary based his Order on the ocular report findings, the revocation should have affected only two (2) out of the eight (8) parcels of land. Clearly, there is an inconsistency between the Order and the ocular report. We, therefore, agree with the CA when it ruled that it cannot sustain the DAR Secretary’s revocation due to the fact that the same was based on inconsistent findings.
In addition, petitioner makes mention of an Order issued by the DAR on September 4, 1975 which requires an applicant of a conversion order to develop the property converted within two (2) years.25 Petitioner also cites an ocular inspection conducted on June 27-29, 2005 as well as certain findings of the CLUPPI Committee, which states that a large portion of the disputed lands herein remain to be developed. However, the CA maintained that petitioner failed to attach these documents, along with other pertinent evidence, such as respondent’s original site development plan vis-à-vis the level of accomplishment or completion.26 We believe that this failure of the petitioner to attach supporting evidence is fatal. The petitioner, contrary to its assertion, had the burden to prove by substantial evidence, the allegations on which its complaint was based.27 However, in failing to submit convincing and satisfactory proof, petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving respondent’s non-compliance with the conversion order.
It is also notable that there were other activities being conducted on the remaining properties, which prompted petitioner-appellee to seek issuance of a Cease and Desist Order x x x.
Such acts constitute activities leading to the further development of the remaining properties. After all, the fifth term and condition of the Conversion Order dated June 4, 1979 was to commence the development of the site “within two (2) years from receipt of the order of conversion.” Out of the 216.7396 hectares approved for conversion into a subdivision project by DAR in 1979, only 60.8374 hectares, more or less, remain to be developed. x x x It is common knowledge that subdivision developments are usually undertaken in phases.
Thus, considering the insufficiency of evidence presented by the petitioner, the inconsistencies in the findings of the DAR, and the satisfactory substantiations of the respondent, We find no reason to reverse the findings of the CA.
Section 3 (c), Chapter I of the CARL provides that a parcel of land reclassified for non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 shall no longer be considered agricultural land subject to CARP. The Court is now faced with the question of whether Resolution No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmariñas dated July 9, 1972, which approved the subdivision of the subject property for residential purposes, had also reclassified the same from agricultural to residential.
In view of the foregoing, this Court had, in multiple occasions, ruled that lands already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before the effectivity of the CARL, or June 15, 1988, are outside the coverage thereof.32 In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform,33 for instance, we held that the DAR committed grave abuse of discretion when it placed undeveloped portions of land intended for residential use under the ambit of the CARL. Similarly, in Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,34 we nullified the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) declaring the land in dispute as agricultural and, thus, within the coverage of the CARL, when the same had already been reclassified as residential by several government agencies prior to the effectivity of the law. We likewise held in Junio v. Garilao35 that properties identified as zonal areas not for agricultural use prior on June 15, 1988 are exempted from CARL coverage, even without confirmation or clearance from the DAR.
Applying the doctrines cited above, it cannot be denied that the disputed lands are likewise outside the ambit of the CARL. As mentioned previously, by virtue of zoning ordinances issued by the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna, as accepted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao and approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, the subject lands were effectively converted into residential areas. These ordinances were issued and accepted in 1979 and 1980, or before the effectivity of the CARL which took effect on June 15, 1988. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the properties herein can no longer be subject to compulsory coverage of the CARL.
Going now to petitioner’s argument that the municipal zoning ordinances classifying the disputed lands to non-agricultural did not ipso facto change the nature of said lands, much less affect the legal relationship of the farmers and workers of the Canlubang Sugar Estate then existing prior to the granting of the order of conversion and the passage of the municipal zoning ordinances.
Consequently, according to petitioner, the nature of the subject lands herein remained agricultural despite the passage of the municipal ordinances, which may not disturb the legal relationship of the farmers and workers of the Canlubang Sugar Estate.
The CA, however, refused to entertain the aforementioned argument in holding that it was the first time petitioner raised the same in its motion for reconsideration.38 Nevertheless, even assuming that petitioner was able to timely raise the issue, the same must necessarily fail. As correctly pointed out by the respondent, there are essential distinctions between the facts in the Co case and the facts herein.
… [T]he physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price of certain, either in produce or in money, or in both.
In the case at bar, however, no such arrangement exists. Apart from a mere statement that the lands in dispute was once part of the vast portion of the Canlubang Sugar Estate, wherein a large number of farmworkers tilled the land, petitioner did not present any supporting evidence that will show an indication of a leasehold arrangement.
Had petitioner presented substantial evidence proving the existence of an agricultural tenancy arrangement, We could have given probative value to petitioner’s argument that municipal ordinances cannot affect nor discontinue legal rights and relationships previously acquired over the lands herein.
Second, the Co case did not involve an order of conversion categorically declaring the land as converted for residential use. As stated by petitioner, the zoning ordinance in the Co case does not unequivocally disclose any provision converting the subject lands into residential or light industrial. Yet it is manifest, even from a plain reading of the order of conversion in this case, that the respondent’s application for converting the disputed lands from agricultural to residential is granted.42 As a consequence of such approval, the fact that the subject property is deemed zoned and reclassified as residential upon compliance with the conditions imposed cannot be questioned. Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on the Co case given the fundamental differences of the same from the case at hand.
In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the CA. As it correctly pointed out, petitioner failed to sufficiently prove respondent’s non-compliance with the condition provided by the conversion order to commence the development of the subject lands herein. Petitioner further failed to refute the application of the rule that lands already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before the effectivity of the CARL, or June 15, 1988, are outside the coverage thereof. In the absence, therefore, of any convincing proof that the CA committed errors in its appreciation of facts, this Court will refrain from disturbing the ruling of the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 27, 2011, and its Resolution dated January 31, 2012, in CA-G.R. SP No. 110585, which affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, dated March 23, 2009, are AFFIRMED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Socorro B. Inting, concurring; Annex “A” to petition, rollo, pp. 31-41.
2 Annex “B” to petition, Id. at 42-43.
17Tiu v. Pasaol, 450 Phil. 370 (2003); Nokom v. NLRC, 390 Phil. 1228, 1242-1243 (2000) and Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 240 Phil. 561, 567 (1987).
19Changco v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 336, 341 (2002).
20Duremdes v. Duremdes, 461 Phil. 388, 401-402 (2003), citing Spouses Tansipek v. Philippine Bank of Communications, 423 Phil. 727, 733-734 (2001).
21Western Shipyard Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 410 Phil. 503, 512 (2001).
27Honorable Ombudsman v. Bungubung, 575 Phil. 538, 556 (2008).
30Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 131481 and 131624, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 401.
32 Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 505 Phil. 558, 566 (2005), and Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sarangani Agricultural Co., Inc., 541 Phil. 448, 461 (2007).
33 G.R. No. 103302, August 12, 1993, 225 SCRA 278.
34 473 Phil. 64 (2004).
35 503 Phil. 154, 167 (2005).
36 245 Phil. 347 (1988).
37Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 353.
39 508 Phil. 385 (2005).
40Ludo & Luym Development Corporation v. Barreto, supra, at 396-397.

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