Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180319_0000758.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:56:26+00:00

Document:
FindACase | Aviation Technology & Turbine Service, Inc. v. Yusuf Bin Ahmed Kanoo Co., Ltd.
Aviation Technology & Turbine Service, Inc. v. Yusuf Bin Ahmed Kanoo Co., Ltd.
YUSUF BIN AHMED KANOO CO., LTD Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on motion of Defendant Yusuf Bin Ahmed Kanoo Company, Ltd. to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), and on the basis of forum non conveniens. Oral argument on the motion was heard on December 6, 2017 and the record of that proceeding is incorporated here. For the reasons placed on the record that day as well as those articulated here, the motion will be granted.
This is a breach of contract case. Plaintiff alleges that the parties had a longstanding business relationship which soured when Defendant Yusuf Bin Ahmed Kanoo Co., Ltd. failed to pay Plaintiff Aviation Technology & Turbine Service, Inc. over $1, 000, 000 for the purchase of gas turbine products beginning in 2009 and continuing for several years. Plaintiff is a New Jersey corporation and Defendant operates in Saudi Arabia. The motion before the Court asserts that proper service was not made, the Courts lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, Saudi Arabia is a more appropriate forum for this litigation, and Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a claim against Defendant.
“Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirements of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(4), a party may file a motion asserting insufficient process as a defense. Additionally, under Rule 12(b)(5), a party may file a motion asserting insufficient service of process as a defense. “When a party moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), the party making the service has the burden of demonstrating its validity.” Laffey v. Plousis, No. 05-2796, 2008 WL 305289, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2008), aff'd, 364 Fed.Appx. 791 (3d Cir. 2010).
Personal delivery alone is not appropriate when serving a foreign corporation. See Trump Taj Mahal Assocs. v. Hotel Servs., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 173, 179 (D.N.J. 1998) (concluding that personal service on an officer of a foreign corporation was ineffective under Rule 4(h)(2)). In addition, Abdul Jaleel, was not, and never has been, authorized to accept service on behalf of Kanoo; he was not an “officer” or “managing or general agent” of Kanoo,  but was an administrative assistant in Kanoo's Travel Division. (Jaleel Decl. ¶ 3; Danish Decl. ¶ 2.) Service on such an employee, who has no authority to exercise discretion on behalf of the company, is not proper under Rule 4(h) or under Saudi Arabian law. See Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1971) (defining a “general agent” as one who has “broad executive responsibilities, ” and exercises them on a continuing bases as opposed to sporadically); Second Alissa Decl. ¶ 9 (explaining that service of process on a person lacking the written authorization or holding a validly issued power of attorney is improper).
Alternatively, Plaintiff has failed to establish personal jurisdiction over the Defendant in this case. “[O]nce the defendant raises the question of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.” Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992). The plaintiff may not “rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand the defendant's . . . motion . . . .” Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984). Instead, “the plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof in establishing jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence.” Id.
To exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a federal court sitting in diversity must undertake a two-step inquiry. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kierkert, AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998). First, the court must apply the relevant state's long-arm statute to see if it permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. Second, the court must apply the principles of due process. Id. In New Jersey, this inquiry is conflated into a single step because “[t]he New Jersey long-arm rule extends to the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection.” Carteret Sav. Bank, FA, 954 F.2d at 145 (citing N.J. Court R. 4:4-4(c)). Due Process requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.