Source: http://www.calblogofappeal.com/category/judgment-2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:46:48+00:00

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Last month’s decision in Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group, case no. B241714 (2d Dist., November 6, 2013) makes for some interesting reading and a cautionary tale for those who purchase assignments of judgments.
Corning Capital found itself on the losing end of a money judgment. The original judgment creditor assigned the judgment to Pacific West One Corp., who then assigned it to the unfortunate Cal-Western. Why unfortunate? Because Pacific West One’s corporate status was suspended at the time it gave the assignment and was never revived, and the trial court held that as a result, Cal-Western lacked capacity to enforce the judgment against Corning Capital. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
At the time Cal-Western filed the instant action on the Judgment four years later [after the assignment], Pacific West One’s corporate powers had not been revived and it remained a suspended corporation lacking capacity to file or maintain a suit. Therefore, because a defense based on lack of capacity to sue existed at the time of notice of the assignment and could have been asserted against Pacific West One had it brought the action itself, Cal-Western was subject to the same defense in suing to enforce the Judgment as Pacific West One’s assignee.
What about other scenarios? For example, if if a corporate assignor is in good standing at the time of the assignment but is suspended by the time notice of the assignment is given, does the assignee have standing?
Maybe there are cases definitively answering these questions. But caution should be the watchword for those purchasing assignments of judgments. Any assignee who purchases a judgment from a corporate assignor better be careful about confirming that the assignor is a corporation in good standing at the time of the assignment and then serve notice of the assignment immediately, before that status can change. Some warranties and guarantees in the assignment agreement wouldn’t hurt, either.
They're capacitors, get it? Capacity, capacitor . . aw, forget it. That's what you get when your humble law blogger also majored in electrical engineering.
What does “abuse of discretion” mean in your case?
Sometimes, it seems that defining an “abuse of discretion” is like nailing jello to the wall (maybe worse, since the latter is difficult, but not impossible). There are many nuances to the standard, which can depend on the statute being applied, the basis for the abuse of discretion, and the particular procedural posture of the case.
The law favors resolution of cases on their merits, and because it does, any doubts about whether Code of Civil Procedure section 473 relief should be granted “must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial court denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits. [Citations.]” (Rappleyea v. Campbell(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 (Rappleyea).) Justice Mosk began Rappleyea with a succinct statement of the question before the Supreme Court and its answer: “The question is whether a default must be set aside and a default judgment reversed on the ground of abuse of discretion. We conclude that they must be.” (8 Cal.4th at p. 978.) The question before us is the same. And so is our answer.
In any event, the case is yet another reminder that “abuse of discretion” may have a particularized meaning or application in your case. And if you happen to be requesting a default judgment any time soon, I suggest you read this case for some of the pitfalls and an exposition on the gatekeeping role of the trial court.
Odds are slim that I can read the article any time soon, so if anyone reads it, I’d sure be interested in your comments, which I encourage you to leave on this post.
Be very, very careful with the language of your plea agreement. After all, it’s a contract, and deserves the same careful consideration before entering into it.
You might live to regret it, even if it takes 20 years for it to catch up with you, as happened to the defendant in People v. Paredes, case no. D050150 (4th Dist. Feb. 26, 2008). Paredes, a legally resident alien, pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in 1987 in part because the prosecutor agreed to a “JRAD” — a judicial recommendation against deportation — that, under 1987 federal law, precluded the government from removing him from the country on the basis of the conviction. He received probation conditioned on serving 365 days in jail.
Flash forward roughly 17 years, to when Paredes applies for citizenship and, in response to this act of patriotism, has removal proceedings initiated against him by the Department of Homeland Security. Although services are available online to all citizens, those with special circumstances may not always find the information and resources they need in one place. A useful website is https://www.application-filing-service.com, for finding information, documents and profs necessary for a given application and step-by-step process explanation. Without consultations from knowledgeable parties Paredes accidentally initiated removal proceedings against himself, something no expert would have allowed to happen. The removal proceedings were instigated because federal law had since changed to make his conviction a basis for removal notwithstanding the JRAD. Perhaps the worst part: had he been sentenced to just one day less in jail, the conviction would not have subjected him to removal.
After running through a mill of immigration proceedings, Paredes sought relief in superior court. He sought to vacate his conviction, withdraw his guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty or, alternatively to “enforce” the plea agreement, which he contended contained a “no deportation” promise.
The court of appeal reverses, finding no breach of the plea agreement and relying on precedent that so long as the defendant is adequately advised (as Paredes was) that his conviction may have immigration consequences, including deportation, later changes in immigration law do not warrant modification of the judgment.
I’m only disappointed in the result because it kept the court from reaching some interesting issues regarding judgment and jurisdiction. Specifically, whether judgment could be entered nunc pro tunc under the circumstances and whether the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by modifying the terms of probation after probation was complete.
You don’t always get three positions advocated on a single issue in a single appeal. On the subject of the statute of limitations for enforcing a foreign money judgment, that’s exactly what the Court of Appeal heard in Guimaraes v. Northrup Grumman, case no. B194205 (2d Dist. Oct. 30, 2007).
A third position was advocated in an amicus brief from a law firm that frequently represents clients seeking to enforce foreign money judgments in California courts. That firm contended that a foreign judgment may be enforced so long as it is enforceable in the country where it was rendered. The Court of Appeal did not reach that contention.
The court notes that significant questions regarding foreign judgment enforcement that it need not consider are under consideration in a case under review by the California Supreme Court. (Manco Contracting Co. v. Bezdikian, review granted Aug. 22, 2007, S154076.) According to the case summary page at the Supreme Court’s website,though, Manco appears to pose the exact question at issue in this case: the statute of limitations applicable to the enforcement of foreign money judgments. If that apparent equivalence of issues is real, then Guimaraes is an excellent candidate for “grant and hold” review by the Supreme Court, whereby the Supreme Court can grant review but hold the case until it decides Manco.
I’m pretty sure that Judge Bea didn’t intend to give me a chuckle in the first paragraph of his opinion in Collins v. D. R. Horton, Inc., case no. 05-15737 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007). But he did.
Appellants contend their motion [for summary judgment] should have been granted because the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law when deciding not to apply offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel because judicial review of an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is more limited than judicial review of a district court judgment. We hold the arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the law because no “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable” law existed to be disregarded. [Citation.] Accordingly, we affirm.
Thus, I found it amusing that this tangle of words — “offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel” — would have no “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable” in the context of this case. But maybe that’s just me.
On the merits, this decision is useful for its exposition on what constitutes an arbitrator’s “manifest disregard for the law” sufficient to justify vacating an arbitration award. For such “manifest disregard” to exist, mere error is insufficient; the arbitrator(s) must have understood and correctly stated the law but ignored it. A proper identification and statement of the law requires, in turn, that it be “well defined, explicit and clearly applicable.” Here, since there was no well-settled law on the issue of whether the arbitrator(s) were bound to apply collateral estopppel on the facts before it, they cannot be said to have ignored it.

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