Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50086:gr-146212-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:06:42+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 146212 - FRED N. BELLO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
FRED N. BELLO, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CORPUZ MOYA SECURITY AND SERVICES, INC. and/or REMEDIOS MOYA, Respondents.
Petitioner Fred N. Bello seeks the reversal of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 5, 2000, which dismissed his Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time, and the CA Resolution2 dated November 24, 2000, which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner received the letter on September 1, 1997.
On September 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Complaint9 against CMSSI for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, nightshift differential, overtime pay and other money claims. In his Affidavit, the complainant admitted that the agency could hardly cope with its financial obligations, for which reason he has not yet requested for the reimbursement of his transportation expenses.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainant as illegally and unjustly dismissed and respondents are jointly and severally ordered to pay complainant ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P108,000.00) representing his full backwages including 13th month pay and ordering respondents to reinstate complainant Fred N. Bello to his former position without loss of seniority rights. However, in case reinstatement is no longer practicable, complainant shall be paid separation pay of one-month pay for every year of service in addition to his full backwages. The reinstatement aspect is immediately executory even pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 15 September 1998 is hereby REVERSED.
Respondent CORPUZ MOYA SECURITY & SERVICES, INC. is however ordered to indemnify complainant FRED N. BELLO the amount of P1,000.00.
The petitioner then filed this Petition for Review questioning the outright dismissal of his petition and praying that the Court grant his prayer for reinstatement and backwages. The Court required the respondents to file their comment but they failed to do so. In a Resolution19 dated December 8, 2003, the Court resolved to inform the respondents that they are deemed to have waived their right to file a comment and that the case will be resolved based on the pleadings submitted by the petitioner.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in finding that the petition for certiorari was filed out of time. He avers that, in labor cases, both the party and counsel must be furnished separately with copies of orders, decisions or resolutions of the NLRC; hence, the period within which to file the Petition for Certiorari must be counted from the time the counsel of record and the party shall have received their respective copies of the decision whichever comes later. To buttress this stance, he cites the case of PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. NLRC20 wherein the Court declared that "in labor cases, both the party and its counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution; unlike in ordinary judicial proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to the party." The petitioner further urges the relaxation of the rules of procedure in view of the merits of his case. He avers that the respondents failed to substantiate their claim that the company is suffering from serious business losses to justify its policy of retrenchment.
The Court agrees with the CA that the petition was filed out of time.
Here, the petitioner insists that he filed the Petition for Certiorari on time, which should be reckoned from the moment he was informed about the Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, and not from the date his counsel received a copy of the said Resolution.
The case of PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. NLRC cited by petitioner enunciated that "in labor cases, both the party and its counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution; unlike in ordinary judicial proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to the party." Reference was made therein to Article 224 of the Labor Code. But, as correctly pointed out by private respondent in its Comment to the petition, Article 224 of the Labor Code does not govern the procedure for filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the decision of the NLRC but rather, it refers to the execution of "final decisions, orders or awards" and requires the sheriff or a duly deputized officer to furnish both the parties and their counsel with copies of the decision or award for that purpose. There is no reference, express or implied, to the period to appeal or to file a Petition for Certiorari as indeed the caption is "execution of decisions, orders or awards." Taken in proper context, Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of "final decisions, orders or awards" and could not have been intended to refer to the period for computing the period for appeal to the Court of Appeals from a non-final judgment or order. The period or manner of "appeal" from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65 pursuant to the ruling of the Court in the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC. Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, states that the "petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or resolution sought to be assailed."
Accordingly, the 60-day period for filing the Petition for Certiorari with the CA should be counted from the receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted that when the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on September 13, 1999, only 48 days remained of the 60-day period for filing a Petition for Certiorari.24 The petitioner, however, filed his Petition for Certiorari only on June 2, 2000, or 211 days from the receipt by his counsel of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration on November 4, 1999. In other words, the Petition for Certiorari was filed 163 days late.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated July 5, 2000 and November 24, 2000, are AFFIRMED.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, JJ., concur.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Marina L. Buzon, concurring; rollo, pp. 89-91.
20 353 Phil. 431, 445-446 (1998).
21 Allied Banking Corporation v. Eserjose, G.R. No. 161776, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 199, 208.
22 411 Phil. 953 (2001).
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial.No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
25 Mendoza v. David, G.R. No. 147575, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 172, 181.
26 Zaragoza v. Nobleza, G.R. No. 144560, May 13, 2004, 428 SCRA 410, 419.
27 Allied Banking Corporation v. Eserjose, supra note 21, at 208.

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