Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/179/343
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:13:25+00:00

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WILLIAM B. AUSTIN, , v. STATE OF TENNESSEE.
WILLIAM B. AUSTIN, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF TENNESSEE.
Argued: November 9, 10, 1899.
Defendant was convicted in the circuit court of Monroe county, fined $50, and committed until the fine should be paid; and upon appeal to the supreme court of Tennessee the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. 101 Tenn. 563, 48 S. W. 305.
It is charged that the act in question, in its application to the facts of this case, is an infringement upon the exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce between the states. This is the sole question presented for our determination.
The supreme court of Tennessee placed its decision of this case upon two grounds: First, that cigarettes were not legitimate articles of commerce; second, that the sale shown to have been made was not the sale of an original package in the true commercial sense.
The same ruling with regard to the power of the states to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors was made in Bartemyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 21 L. ed. 929, in which it was held the right to sell such liquors was not a privilege or immunity which, by the 14th Amendment, the states were forbidden to abridge. And in the later case of Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989, it was held that a company chartered 'for the purpose of manufacturing malt liquors in all their varieties' held its franchise subject to the police power of the state, and that, if the public safety or public morals required the discontinuance of such manufactures, the legislature might so provide, notwithstanding individuals and corporations might thereby suffer inconvenience. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273, and Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6, the principle of this case was extended so far as to hold that such laws might be enforced against persons who, at the time, happened to own property whose chief value consisted in its fitness for manufacturing intoxicating liquors, without compensating them for the diminution in value resulting from such prohibitory enactments; and in Foster v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 U. S. 201, 28 L. ed. 629, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8, 97, it was regarded as the settled doctrine of this court that such laws, prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors, were not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
How far such laws could be made applicable to articles admitted to be innocuous has never been decided by this court. Nor is it necessary to the decision of this case. It was held, however, in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. 253, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257, that a statute of Pennsylvania prohibiting the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine was a lawful exercise by the state of its power to protect by police regulations the public health, and that it neither denied to persons within the jurisdiction of the state the equal protection of the laws, nor deprived them of their property without compensation, and was not otherwise repugnant to the 14th Amendment. Said Mr. Justice Harlan: 'It this court cannot adjudge that the defendant's rights of liberty and property, as thus defined, have been infringed by the statute of Pennsylvania, without holding that, although it may have been enacted in good faith for the objects expressed in its title, namely, to protect the public health and to prevent the adulteration of dairy products and fraud in the sale thereof, it has, in fact, no real or substantial relation to those objects. The court is unable to affirm that this legislation has no real or substantial relation to such objects.' So, too, in Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 39 L. ed. 223, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154, a statute of Massachusetts prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine artificially colored so as to cause it to look like yellow butter, and so brought into the state, was decided not to be in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution.
These cases recognize the fact that intoxicating liquors belong to a class of commodities which, in the opinion of a great many estimable people, are deleterious in their effects, demoralizing in their tendencies, and often fatal in their excessive indulgence; and that, while their employment as a medicine may sometimes be beneficial, their habitual and constant use as a beverage, whatever it may be to individuals, is injurious to the community. It may be that their evil effects have been exaggerated, and that, though their use is usually attended with more or less danger, it is by no means open to universal condemnation. It is, however, within the power of each state to investigate the subject and to determine its policy in that particular. If the legislative body come deliberately to the conclusion that a due regard for the public safety and morals requires a suppression of the liquor traffic, there is nothing in the commercial clause of the Constitution, or in the 14th Amendment to that instrument, to forbid its doing so. While, perhaps, it may not wholly prohibit the use or sale of them for medicinal purposes, it may hedge about their use as a general beverage such restrictions as it pleases. Nor can we deny to the legislature the power to impose restrictions upon the sale of noxious or poisonous drugs, such as opium and other similar articles, extremely valuable as medicines, but equally baneful to the habitual user.
Cigarettes do not seem until recently to have attracted the attention of the public as more injurious than other forms of tobacco; nor are we now prepared to take judicial notice of any special injury resulting from their use or to indorse the opinion of the supreme court of Tennessee that 'they are inherently bad and bad only.' At the same time we should be shutting our eyes to what is constantly passing before them were we to affect an ignorance of the fact that a belief in their deleterious effects, particularly upon young people, has become very general, and that communications are constantly finding their way into the public press denouncing their use as fraught with great danger to the youth of both sexes. Without undertaking to affirm or deny their evil effects, we think it within the province of the legislature to say how far they may be sold, or to prohibit their sale entirely, after they have been taken from the original packages or have left the hands of the importer, provided no discrimination be used as against such as are imported from other states, and there be no reason to doubt that the act in question is designed for the protection of the public health.
2. There is no reason to doubt the good faith of the legislature of Tennessee in prohibiting the sale of cigarettes as a sanitary measure, and if it be inoperative as applied to sales by the owner in the original packages, of cigarettes manufactured in and brought from another state, we are remitted to the inquiry whether a paper package of 3 inches in length and 1 1/2 inches in width, containing ten cigarettes, is an original package protected by the Constitution of the United States against any interference by the state while in the hands of the importer? This we regard as the vital question in the case.
The whole law upon the subject of original packages is based upon a decision of this court, in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678, in which a statute of Maryland, requiring all importers of foreign articles, 'by bale or package,' or of intoxicating liquors, and other persons selling the same, 'by wholesale, bale or package, hogshead, barrel or tierce,' to take out a license, was held to be repugnant to that provision of the Constitution forbidding states from laying a duty upon imports, as well as to that declaring that Congress should have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. There was thought to be no difference between a power to prohibit the sale of an article while it was an import and the power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would be the necessary consequence of the other. No goods would be imported if none could be sold. But, in delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall observed: 'It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the state; but while remaining the property of the in porter, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution.' This sentence contains in a nutshell the whole doctrine upon the subject of original packages, upon which so formidable a structure has been attempted to be erected in subsequent cases. Whether the decision would have been the same if the original packages in that case, instead of being bales of dry goods or hogsheads, barrels or tierces of liquors, had been so minute in size as to permit of their sale directly to consumers, may admit of considerable doubt. Obviously the doctrine of the case is directly applicable only to those large packages in which from time immemorial it has been customary to import goods from foreign countries. It is safe to assume that it did not occur to the Chief Justice that, by a skilful alteration of the size of the packages, the decision might be used to force upon a reluctant people the use of articles denounced as noxious by the legislatures of the several states.
A casual remark, however, made by Chief Justice Marshall in that case, that 'we suppose the principles laid down in this case to apply equally to importations from a sister state' was subsequently considered in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382, and was held to have no application to commerce between the states, the court deciding that the term 'import,' as used in that clause, which declares that 'no state shall levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports,' did not refer to articles imported from one state into another, but only to articles imported from foreign countries into the United States. In that case an ordinance of the city of Mobile, authorizing a tax upon sales at auctions, was held to be applicable to products of states other than Alabama, although the articles were sold in the original and unbroken packages.
The principle of this case was applied subsequently in that of Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 39 L. ed. 538, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 30, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 415.
In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, 122 quarter barrels of beer, 171 one-eighth barrels of beer, and 11 cases of beer were seized by the city marshal of Keokuk under a state statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors. It was held that, being articles of lawful commerce, the state could not, in the absence of legislation on the part of Congress, prohibit their importation from abroad or from a sister state; or, when imported, prohibit their sale by the importer, and that they did not become a part of the common mass of property within the state so long as they remained in the casks in which they were imported and continued to be the property of the importer. No question was made with regard to the casks being original packages, or as to the fact that, according to the custom of brewers, beer was usually and ordinarily imported from one state to another in casks of this size.
The case under consideration is really the first one presenting to this court distinctly the question whether, in holding that the state cannot prohibit the sale in its original package of an article brought from another state, the size of the package is material, although some of the expressions in The License Cases seem to foreshadow the consequences likely to result from the argument of the defendant. Thus, it is stated by Mr. Justice Catron (5 How. 608, 12 L. ed. 303,) that 'to hold that the state license law of New Hampshire was void, as respects spirits coming in from other states as articles of commerce, would open the door to an almost entire evasion, as the spirits might be introduced in the smallest divisible quantities that the retail trade would require; the consequences of which would be that the dealers in New Hampshire would sell only spirits produced in other states, and that the products of New Hampshire would find an unrestrained market in the neighboring states having similar license laws to those of New Hampshire.' And also in the opinion of Mr. Justice Woodbury, rendered in the same case (p. 625, 12 L. ed. 311): 'If the proposition was maintainable, that, without any legislation by Congress as to the trade between the states (except that in coasting, as before explained, to prevent smuggling), anything imported from another state, foreign or domestic, could be sold of right in the package in which it was imported, not subject to any license or any internal regulation of a state, then it is obvious that the whole license system may be evaded and nullified, either from abroad or from a neighboring state. And the more especially can it be done from the latter, as imports may be made in bottles of any size, down to half a pint, of spirits or wines; and if its sale cannot be interfered with and regulated, the retail business can be carried on in any small quantity, and by the most irresponsible and unsuitable persons, with perfect impunity.' These words are certainly prophetic in their applicability to this case.
Similar questions have arisen in the Federal courts of original jurisdiction, whose decisions have generally been in favor of the position taken by the plaintiff in error in this case. The same question has been considered in the courts of several states, and their decisions have been with almost equal unanimity the other way.
In Haley v. Nebraska, 42 Neb. 556, 60 N. W. 962, the same result was reached upon precisely the same state of facts; as well as in State v. Chapman, 1 S. D. 414, 10 L. R. A. 432, 47 N. W. 411; and Smith v. State, 54 Ark. 248, 15 S. W. 882.
In McGregor v. Cone, 104 Iowa, 465, 39 L. R. A. 484, 73 N. W. 1041, the question arose as to packages of cigarettes of the same size as those involved in the present case. These packages were placed in a common pine box for convenience of shipment without any other packing or inclosure about the packages, and were shipped by the company from its factory in New York to its warehouse in Chicago, and thence to the defendant's place of business in Iowa. Upon the arrval of the box the defendant opened the box by taking the lid off, and sold one of the packages containing cigarettes. It was held that the pine box was the original package, and that the defendant was liable, notwithstanding that the internal revenue department had, for the purposes of taxation, declared the small packages sold by defendant to be original packages. This case seems to have overruled the cases of State v. Coonan, 82 Iowa, 400, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 670, 48 N. W. 921; Collins v. Hills, 77 Iowa, 181, 3 L. R. A. 110, 41 N. W. 571; Hopkins v. Lewis, 84 Iowa, 690, 15 L. R. A. 397, 51 N. W. 255; State v. Miller, 86 Iowa, 638, 53 N. W. 330, where a contrary view was expressed.
The real question in this case is whether the size of the package in which the importation is actually made is to govern; or, the size of the package in which bona fide transactions are carried on between the manufacturer and the wholesale dealer residing in different states. We hold to the latter view. The whole theory of the exemption of the original package from the operation of state laws is based upon the idea that the property is imported in the ordinary form in which, from time immemorial, foreign goods have been brought into the country. These have gone at once into the hands of the wholesale dealers, who have been in the habit of breaking the packages and distributing their contents among the several retail dealers throughout the state. It was with reference to this method of doing business that the doctrine of the exemption of the original package grew up. But taking the words 'original package' in their literal sense, a number of so-called original package manufactories have been started through the country, whose business it is to manufacture goods for the express purpose of sending their products into other states in minute packages, that may at once go into the hands of the retail dealers and consumers, and thus bid defiance to the laws of the state against their importation and sale. In all the cases which have heretofore arisen in this court the packages were of such size as to exclude the idea that they were to go directly into the hands of the consumer, or be used to evade the police regulations of the state with regard to the particular article. No doubt the fact that cigarettes are actually imported in a certain package is strong evidence that they are original packages within the meaning of the law; but this presumption attaches only when the importation is made in the usual manner prevalent among honest dealers, and in a bona fide package of a particular size. Without undertaking to determine what is the proper size of an original package in each case, evidently the doctrine has no application where the manufacturer puts up the package with the express intent of evading the laws of another state, and is enabled to carry out his purpose by the facile agency of an express company and the connivance of his consignee. This court has repeatedly held that, so far from lending its authority to frauds upon the sanitary laws of the several states, we are bound to respect such laws and to aid in their enforcement, so far as can be done without infringing upon the constitutional rights of the parties. The consequences of our adoption of defendant's contention would be far reaching and disastrous. For the purpose of aiding a manufacturer in evading the laws of a sister state, we should be compelled to recognize anything as an original package of beer from a hogshead to a vial; anything as a package of cigarettes from an importer's case to a single paper box of ten, or even a single cigarette, if imported separately and loosely; anything from a bale of merchandise to a single ribbon, provided only the dealer sees fit to purchase his stock outside the state and import it in minute quantities.
And yet we are told that each one of these packages is an original package, and entitled to the protection of the Constitution of the United States as a separate and distinct importation. We can only look upon it as a discreditable subterfuge, to which this court ought not to lend its countenance. If there be any original package at all in this case we think it is the basket, and not the paper box.
Suppose the state of Tennessee in the exercise of its police powers should prohibit the manufacture within its limits of cigarettes, whether they were manufactured to be sold in that state, or to be sent to other states for sale, could the validity of such legislation be questioned, as in violation of the Constitution of the United States, upon the ground that it infringed the liberty which is secured to the citizens by the 14th Amendment? 'The liberty mentioned in that amendment,' this court has said, 'means, not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.' Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 41 L. ed. 832, 836, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427.
There is doubtless fair ground for dispute as to whether the use of cigarettes is not hurtful to the community, and therefore it would be competent for a state, with reference to its own people, to declare, under penalties, that cigarettes should not be manufactured within its limits. No one could say that such legislation trenched upon the liberty of the citizen by preventing him from pursuing a lawful business. Now the result of defendant's argument in this case is that citizens of Tennessee may, under the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, bring into that state from other states cigarettes in unlimited quantities, and sell them despite the will of Tennessee as expressed in its legislation. In other words, it is decided that the commerce clause of the Constitution, by its own force, without any legislation by Congress, overrides the action of the state in a matter confessedly involving, in the judgment of its legislature, the health of its people. We cannot accept this view. The doctrine that the silence of Congress as to what property may be of right carried from one state to another means that every article of commerce may be carried into one state from another and there sold, ought not to be extended so as to embrace articles which may not unreasonably be deemed injurious in their use to the health of the people. If this be not so, it follows that the reserved power of the state to protect the health of its people, by reasonable regulations, has application only in respect of articles manufactured within its own limits, and that an open door exists for the introduction into the state, against its will, of all finds of property which may be fairly regarded as injurious in their use to health. If Congress have power to declare what property may and what may not be brought into one state from another state, then the action of a state by which certain articles, not unreasonably deemed injurious to health, were excluded from its markets, should stand until Congress legislated upon the subject. If Congress possesses no such power, it is because the framers of the Constitution never intended that the mere grant of power to regulate commerce should override the power reserved by the states to pass laws that had substantial relations to the health of their people. Of course, it is one thing to force into a state, against its will, articles or commodities that can have no possible connection with or relation to the health of the people. It is quite a different thing to force into the markets of a state, against its will, articles or commodities which, like cigarettes, may not unreasonably be held to be injurious to health.
Practically the only argument relied upon in support of the theory that these packages of ten cigarettes are original packages is derivable from the Revised Statutes, § 3392, which requires that manufacturers shall put up all cigarettes made by or for them, and sold or removed for consumption or use, in packages containing ten, twenty, fifty, or one hundred cigarettes each. This, however, is solely for the purpose of taxationa precaution taken for the better enforcement of the internal revenue law, and to be read in connection with § 3243, which provides that 'the payment of any tax imposed by the internal revenue laws for carrying on any trade or business shall not be held to exempt any person from any penalty or punishment provided by the laws of any state for carrying on the same within such state, or in any manner to authorize the commencement or continuance of such trade or business contrary to the laws of such state.' As was said in Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 466, 39 L. ed. 223, 225, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154, it is manifest this section was adopted to make it clear that Congress had no purpose to restrict the power of the state over the manufacture and sale of particular articles. 'The taxes prescribed by that act were imposed for national purposes, and their imposition did not give authority to those who paid them to engage in the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine in any state which lawfully forbade such manufacture or sale.' The question is not in what packages the law requires the cigarettes to be packed for the purpose of taxation, but, what are the packages in which they are usually transported from one state to another where the transaction is bona fide and for the legitimate purposes of trade and commerce?
We are satisfied the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was correct, and it is therefore affirmed.
I do not understand that anything in the opinion of the court impairs the doctrine protecting original packages from interference by the police or any other power of a state, as announced by so many opinions of this court, especially as expounded in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, and Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 42 L. ed. 1088, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 664, and the authorities which are cited in the opinions of the court in both of those cases. If I thought either the opinion of the court just announced or the conclusion which it reaches had the effect of weakening the doctrine upheld by the authorities to which I have just referred, I should be unable to concur. Indeed, as I understand the case as now decided, all the questions adverted to are merged in the solution of the one decisive issue, which is, Was each particular parcel of cigarettes an original package within the constitutional import of those words as defined by the previous adjudications of the court? I am constrained to conclude that this question is correctly answered in the negative, not only from the size of each particular parcel, but from all the other surrounding facts and circumstances, among which may be mentioned the trifling value of each parcel, the absence of an address on each, and the fact that many parcels, for the purpose of commercial shipment, were aggregated, thrown into and carried in an open basket. Thus associated in their shipment, they could not, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, after arrival be segregated so as to cause each to become an original package.
Upon these facts the supreme court of Tennessee sustained the conviction, and thereupon the defendant sued out this writ of error. His contention is that the act is, as applied to the importation of cigarettes and subsequent sale thereof in the packages in which they were imported, in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
'Are cigarettes legitimate articles of commerce? We think they are not, because wholly noxious and deleterious to health. Their use is always harmful, never beneficial. They possess no virtue, but are inherently bad, and bad only. They find no true commendation for merit or usefulness in any sphere. On the contrary, they are widely condemned as pernicious altogether. Beyond question, their every tendency is toward the impairment of physical health and mental vigor.
'There is no proof in the record as to the character of cigarettes, yet their character is so well and so generally known to be that stated above, that the courts are authorized to take judicial cognizance of the fact. No particular proof is required in regard to those facts which by human observation and experience have become well and generally known to be true (Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 49, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 6; 1 Wharton, Ev. § 282; 1 Jones, Ev. §§ 129, 134; Lanfear v. Mestier, 18 La. Ann. 497; s. c. 89 Am. Dec. 658, and notes 693; State v. Goyette, 11 R. I. 592; Watson v. State, 55 Ala. 158); nor is it essential that they shall have been formally recorded in written history or science to entitle courts to take judicial notice of them. Boullemet v. State, 28 Ala. 83; 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 199.
'It is a part of the history of the organization of the volunteer army in the United States during the present year that large numbers of men, otherwise capable, had rendered themselves unfit for service by the use of cigarettes, and that among the applicants who were addicted to the use of cigarettes more were rejected by examining physicians on account of disabilities thus caused than for any other, and perhaps every other, reason.
No one can question the sincerity of the legislature of Tennessee in thus enacting what it deemed for the health of its citizens, or the conviction of the members of its supreme court of the validity of such legislation by reason of the greatness of the supposed evil which it was intended to restrain. And yet there is no consensus of opinion as to the fact of such evil. As illustrative of which statement see the articles in the Medico-Legal Journal of March and September, 1898, and the large collection therein of the opinions of medical and other scientific gentlemen in respect to the matter. Further, the report for 1899 of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (p. 436) shows that the number of cigarettes manufactured in the United States during the year 1899 were two billion eight hundred and five million one hundred and thirty thousand seven hundred and thirty-seven (2,805,130,737), on which the government collected a tax of four million two hundred and thirteen thousand two hundred and fifteen dollars and twenty-five cents ($4,213,215.25). These figures are enormous, and in addition this fact may be noted, a fact obvious to all who have had occasion to travel in other countries (particularly those occupied by different branches of the Latin race), that the use of cigarettes is there far more common than in this country.
In view of these and other facts it is perhaps not surprising to find Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for himself and three associates, stating 'we are not prepared to fully indorse the opinion of that court' (supreme court of Tennessee) 'that cigarettes are not legitimate articles of commerce,' or that 'they are inherently bad, and bad only.' The truth is that, whatever differences of opinion may exist as to whether cigarettes are or are not hurtful, they are confessedly a common and well-recognized article of commerce, and as such when the subject of interstate commerce are under the control of that body to which by the Constitution of the United States is given the power to regulate commerce between the states.
It will be seen by an inspection of the opinion of the supreme court of Tennessee that that court sustained the conviction on two grounds: First. That cigarettes were not a legitimate article of commerce, and therefore the state of Tennessee by virtue of its police power had a right to prohibit absolutely their importation and sale, no matter in what form they were so imported and sold; and, secondly, that if it had no such general power it could prohibit the importation and sale of cigarettes in packages of the size in which these were imported and sold. In view of the adherence by Mr. Justice White to the opinions heretofore announced by this court in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, and other cases in respect to the inability of the state by virtue of its police power to prohibit the importation and sale in original packages of articles, which are recognized articles of commerce although the subjects of conflicting opinions as to the deleteriousness of their use, it would seem unnecessary to enter into any lengthy consideration of the first ground. Especially is this so inasmuch as there is no expressed attempt to overrule Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 49, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757, decided two years ago last May, in which decision three of the justices concurring in the affirmance of the judgment herein concurred, and in which it was distinctly ruled (p. 23, L. ed. p. 57, Sup. Ct. Rep. 765): 'In the absence of congressional legislation, therefore, the right to import a lawful article of commerce from one state to another continues until a sale in the original package in which the article was introduced into the state.' Although it may be noticed in passing that this case, as decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, where it is reported under the title, Com. v. Paul, 170 Pa. 284, 30 L. R. A. 396, 33 Atl. 82 (see 171 U. S. 5, 43 L. ed. 51, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757), is both cited and quoted from in support of this decision. A ruling we have reversed is the authority now relied upon. Inasmuch, however, as Mr. Justice Brown, in his opinion, has, in addition to this citation, quoted some expressions which may seem to tend towards giving an enlarged scope to the police power of the state, it may not be a waste of time to show concisely what this court has decided, and what may therefore now be considered settled law.
The plain language of the Constitution affirms this. Second only to the power 'to collect taxes' and 'to borrow money' is the power given to Congress by § 8, article 1, of the Constitution 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.' Thus next in order, as though next in importance to the power of maintaining itself by taxation and borrowing money, is the power to regulate commerce between the states as well as between the United States and foreign nations.
'What, then, is the just extent of a power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states?
I might multiply quotations like these, but it is unnecessary. See the following among other cases for like affirmations: United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 78, 9 L. ed. 1004, 1006; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 279, 281, sub nom. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 21 L. ed. 146, 162, 163; Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 96 U. S. 1, 9, 10, 24 L. ed. 708, 710; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 696, 697, 699, 700, 702, 26 L. ed. 238, 239, 240, 241; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, 351, 26 L. ed. 565, 567; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 466, 26 L. ed. 1067, 1069; New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59, 60, 27 L. ed. 383, 384, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, 72, 73, 28 L. ed. 653, 655, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 204, 211, 29 L. ed. 158, 162, 164, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 630, 631, 632, 29 L. ed. 257, 260, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1091; Philadelphia& S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 336, 30 L. ed. 1200, 1201, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1118; Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 554, 555, sub nom. Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 35 L. ed. 572, 574, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865.
See also Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, 1062; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. ed. 962, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 649, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087.
It is true there are many cases in this court in which have been sustained acts of a state which do in a measure affect interstate commerce, but the thought underlying those cases has been that the acts complained of were not direct regulations of interstate commerce, not in restriction, but in furtherance, of it, and being purely local in character might rightfully be upheld until Congress should by its legislation direct the contrary.
That the transportation from one state of its products into another state for purposes of sale is not a matter of purely local interest to the latter state is evident. It concerns the right of the producer or manufacturer in the former state to his market. We are told by the learned attorney general of Tennessee, as an evidence of the good faith of the state in this legislation, that it has many areas of territory especially valuable for the growth of tobacco, and that it is one of the large tobacco producing states in the nation. That is, therefore, a valuable industry in Tennessee. Suppose the legislatures of all the other states should become possessed of the idea that the use of tobacco was injurious, and prohibit the importation and sale thereof. Could it fairly be said that such legislation was in respect to a matter of only local interest in the separate states passing such legislation? Could not Tennessee rightfully contend that it was a matter affecting one of its large industries, and which was likely to be destroyed by such adverse legislation?
See also Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 34 L. ed. 455, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 34 L. ed. 862, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 485, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62, 35 L. ed. 638, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 855; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 39 L. ed. 910, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641.
We have thus, first, the express language of the Constitution delegating to Congress the power 'to regulate commerce . . . among the several states;' second, the repeated rulings of this court that the power is supreme and exclusive; third, an equal volume of decision that the failure of Congress to prescribe any limitations to interstate commerce in respect to any particular article is equivalent to a declaration by that body that it intends that such commerce shall be free; and, fourth, the equally often repeated ruling that the reserved police power of the states is subordinate to and does not limit or take from the supreme control by Congress over matters of interstate commerce.
It would seem from this concurrence of rulings that the decision in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, had now become the settled law, and that henceforth it is not to be questioned; that no state can, under the guise of a police regulation, directly restrain the importation and sale of articles brought in from other countries and other states, which are recognized articles of commerce, no matter what may be the local opinion as to the injurious effects of the use of such articles. The opinion of the supreme court of Tennessee on the first proposition suggested must, therefore, be considered as definitely overruled.
I come to the consideration of this question with the conceded fact that Congress has supreme and exclusive control over interstate commerce; that no state in the exercise of its police power can directly restrain such commerce; and inquire why the size of the package or the manner of importation determines the limit of national control?
And yet, curiously enough, after this declaration, although the cigarettes sold by the defendant were 'in the original form or package in which they were imported,' although there had been no breaking of any package, it is held that the power of the nation does not protect him in that sale. Necessarily, there is impliedly added to the language of the Chief Justice words like these, 'provided such package be of considerable size, at least larger than 3 inches in length and 1 1/2 inches in width.' Of all the justices of this court, Chief Justice Marshall has hitherto been credited with marvelous accuracy of statement, but it would seem from the construction now given that he omitted a most important particular in defining the relative powers of the nation and the state. Even now there is a singular failure to give the size of the package which takes the importation out of the power of Congress and intrusts it to the control of the state. Recently, in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 49, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757, we held that an importer had a right to import oleomargarine in 10-pound packages, and sell it in such a package at retail to a consumer. Apparently, the dividing line as to the size of packages must be somewhere between that of a 10-pound package of oleomargarine and that of a package of ten cigarettes; but where? Must diamonds, in order to be within the protecting power of the nation, be carried from state to state in 10-pound packages?
If it be said that diamonds are not a subject of police regulation, and that a different rule obtains in reference to them than to matters of police regulation (as might be implied from the scope of the opinion) I can only say that the conclusion seems to me strange. Concretely, it amounts to this: The police power of the state, the power exercised to preserve the health and morals of its citizens, may prevent the importation and sale of a pint of whisky, but cannot prevent the importation and sale of a barrel; or, in other words, the greater the wrong which is supposed to be done to the morals and health of the community, the less the power of the state to prevent it. That may be constitutional law, but to my mind it lacks the saving element of common sense. I see no logical half way place between a recognition of the power of the nation to regulate commerce between the states in all things which are the subjects of commerce (in whatever form or manner they may be imported) and a concession of the power of the state to prevent absolutely the importation and sale of articles deemed by it prejudicial to the health or morals of its citizens. Either the state has, in the exercise of its police power, the right to prohibit the importation and sale of articles deemed by it injurious to the health and morals of the communityno matter in what size or form of package the importation is madeor else it has no such power, and the determination of the question of importation and sale is one to be left to Congress. The attitude of one who affirms the supreme power of the nation over interstate commerce, including therein the right of Congress to regulate the importation and sale in large packages of things whether or not deemed by any state deleterious in their use, and yet holds that that supreme power of Congress is exhausted the moment the importation is in a package of small size, finds something of a parallel in the attitude of the citizen of a state, which has adopted prohibition, who upholds the law, but objects to its enforcement.
I regret that the decision of a great constitutional question like that here presented turns on the shifting opinions of individual judges as to the peculiar facts of a particular case. No one can tell from this annunciation where is the dividing line between the power of the state and the power of the nation. Obviously the mere size of the package does not in this view determine. It would seem that constitutional limitations should be stated by the courts with precision. I think, and I say it with all respect, that no case involving a constitutional question should be turned off on the simple declaration that upon its peculiar facts it falls on one side or the other of some undisclosed line of demarcation. It seems to me, and yet I speak hesitatingly, in view of the indefiniteness of his declarations, that Mr. Justice White thinks there was something in the conduct of this importer in evasion of the state statute. But can any statute be deemed to be evaded which has no application to the particular matter? If the regulation of interstate commerce is a matter within the sole jurisdiction of Congress, surely no act of the state restraining an importation and sale can have any application thereto. If the state may not say whether the importation shall be in large or small packages, if that is a regulation of interstate commerce within the sole power of the United States, then no act of the importer in fixing the size of the package can be adjudged either in conflict with or an evasion of any state statute. There is but one of two alternatives. Either the state may regulate the size of the package or Congress has the power. If a state has the right, then of course it may prevent the importation of packages other than those of a large size; but if Congress alone can regulate it, then the state has nothing to do with the question of the size of the package, and no act of the importer in fixing the size of the package can be adjudged in conflict with its statute.
Congress has prescribed the sizes of the packages in which cigarettes are to be put up, and while it is true, as indicated in Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 39 L. ed. 223, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154, that the primary purpose of such legislation is the collection of internal revenue taxes, and not the regulation of commerce between the states, yet it is also true that it is not within the power of the states to declare that the use of packages of the size prescribed by Congress is illegitimate. There cannot be imputed to Congress the purpose to in any way interfere with the full power of the states over matters committed to their care, nor can the use by an individual of packages such as Congress has authorized be condemned as an evasion of state laws. The use of such a package legitimate for one purpose is legitimate for others, and a state by its statutes cannot in any way nullify or weaken the effect of congressional enactment. So although these packages are small in size, they have the approbation of Congress, and must be considered as legal, and their use cannot be made illegal by state laws.
And here it is well to refer to the language of Chief Justice Marshall, quoted, supra. It is: 'In the original form or package in which it was imported.' Not in which 'it might have been' or 'ought to have been imported.' Obviously, it did not occur to him that the form or package which the importer might adopt in any way affected the power of Congress over the importation. One will search the opinion of the Chief Justice in vain to ascertain the size or form of the package then before the court. If Congress should see fit to describe a form or package, it was within its power. If it did not do so, it left the matter to the determination of the importer. There seems to be in the minds of those of my brethren with whom I differ the thought that, because this importer did not import in a customary way, the control of Congress in the matter ceased. The cost of transporting a single package of cigarettes from the manufactory in Durham, N. C., to any part of Tennessee may be great, and therefore such transportation is not ordinarily undertaken. It may be true, and undoubtedly is true, that a manufacturer of yeast cakes in the city of New York would not feel warranted in going to the expense of shipping a single yeast cake, or, for that matter, a hundred, to Covington, Ky., and yet that same individual, if he had a manufactory in Cincinnati, might find that the most convenient and inexpensive way of filling orders from Covington was to send them in separate packages in his delivery wagons across the bridge from the one city to the other. In each case the transportation would be one of interstate commerce, and it cannot be possible that Congress has the power to regulate the transportation from New York to Covington, and not that from Cincinnati to Covington.
Another matter which must not be ignored in measuring the control of Congress over interstate commerce is the changes in the modes of transportation. At the time that Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in Brown v. Maryland transportation was carried on by water in sailing vessels and by land largely in lumber wagons. It is not strange that at such time all transportation was of goods packed in large boxes, securely fastened to prevent accidents from the rough and tumble way of transportation. There were then no express companies for carrying small packages. All that mode of transportation has grown up in this country within the last sixty years, but the express companies carrying their small packages from state to state are just as certainly engaged in interstate commerce as the old-fashioned lumber wagons carrying commodities between the same places. The facilities of transportation are increasing rapidly, and with them the cost of such transportation is diminishing, so that more and more will it be true that the smallest packages will be the frequent subject of transportation, even between state and state. But it has often been said that the grants of power in the Constitution to the national government were expressed in such broad and general language that, notwithstanding the many changes in the modes of doing business, in the forms and conditions of social life, the needed control was still found to be vested in Congress. Can it be that an exception to this rule is now to arise in the matter of the full and complete power given by that instrument to Congress over interstate commerce?
'There is no difference, in effect, between a power to prohibit the sale of an article, and a power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would be a necessary consequence of the other. No goods would be imported if none could be sold.
Now, if cigarettes cannot be brought into the state of Tennessee and sold in the packages in which they were manufactured, but must be brought in and sold only in barrels or boxes of large size, the right of importation is practically defeated, for no consumer would buy a barrel or box for his own use, and no importer could sell it to a second party with the idea of a resale, because the moment the first sale is accomplished, the law of the state interposes to prevent the second. In other words, this contention that an imported package must be of a large size in order to secure the right of sale is simply a convenient way of declaring that the right of importation for purposes of sale may be denied. Not such was the thought of this court, as expressed in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall. The idea then was that the right of sale was an incident to the right to import; that the state could neither directly forbid the importation, nor indirectly prevent it by embarrassing the right of sale with restrictions which, in fact, stop all importation for purposes of sale.
I do not doubt that the importation and sale of many things may wisely be restrained, but the question is as to the body by which such regulations shall be made. We may all agree that the importation and sale of liquors should be restrained or prohibited. We may doubt as to whether a like rule obtains as to the importation and sale of oleomargarine. Believing that the settled ruling of this court has been that that question is one to be determined by Congress, I think that this decision is a plain departure therefrom.
Nor is there reason to apprehend that any unfortunate results will flow from the supreme power of Congress in the matter. Take the case of intoxicating liquors. When it was found by the decision in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, that interstate commerce in such liquors (they being recognized articles of commerce) could not be regulated by the states, Congress promptly passed an act providing that liquors imported into any state should upon arrival therein be subject to the local laws (26 U. S. Stat. at L. 313, chap. 728), the validity of which legislation was sustained in Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, sub nom. Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 35 L. ed. 572, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865. So it cannot be doubted that if that body which represents all the states shall be of opinion that the use of any particular article is freighted with injury to public health, morals, or safety, it will absolutely prohibit interstate commerce therein, or if in its judgment (as in the case of intoxicating liquors) there is in certain localities such a feeling in reference to any article that commerce therein may wisely be regulated by the state, it will provide therefor. Although some temporary disadvantage or inconvenience may result from this assertion of the supremacy of Congress, it is not fitting, in view of the constitutional provisions, to ignore or limit the full scope of that supremacy; and, it may properly be added, it is better that in certain instances one state should be subjected to temporary annoyance rather than that the whole framework of commercial unity created by the Constitution should be destroyed by relegating to each state the determination of what particular articles it will permit to be imported into its borders.
'The power cannot be conceded to a state to exclude, directly or indirectly, the subjects of interstate commerce, or, by the imposition of burdens thereon, to regulate such commerce, without congressional permission. The same rule that applies to the sugar of Louisiana, the cotton of South Carolina, the wines of California, the hops of Washington, the tobacco of Maryland and Connecticut, or the products, natural or manufactured, of any state, applies to all commodities in which a right of traffic exists, recognized by the laws of Congress, the decisions of courts, and the usages of the commercial world. It devolves on Congress to indicate such exceptions as in its judgment a wise discretion may demand under particular circumstances.' Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 166, 34 L. ed. 150, 153, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 143, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725.
For these reasons I dissent from the opinions and judgment in this case.
I am authorized to say that the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice Peckham concur in this dissent.
11 Pet. 103, 9 L. ed. 648.
ANGLO-CHILEAN NITRATE SALES CORPORATION v. STATE OF ALABAMA.
PURITY EXTRACT & TONIC COMPANY and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Plffs. in Err., v. C. C. LYNCH.
PACKER CORPORATION v. STATE OF UTAH.
W. T. RPICE, Plff. in Err., v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
Agnes K. HEAD, doing business as Lea County Publishing Co., et al., Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY.
N. L. REARICK, Piff. in Err., v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA.
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Piff. in Err., v. KAW VALLEY DRAINAGE DISTRICT OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY, KANSAS. NO 313. KANSAS CITY TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY, Piff. in Err., v. KAW VALLEY DRAINAGE DISTRICT OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY, KANSAS. NO 314.
M. KIRMEYER, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF KANSAS.
CHARLES P. COOK v. COUNTY OF MARSHALL, Iowa.
HEBE CO. et al. v. SHAW, Secretary of Agriculture of Ohio et al.
JOE ADAMS et al., Appts., v. W. V. TANNER, Attorney General of the State of Washington, and George H. Crandall, Prosecuting Attorney of Spokane County, State of Washington.
HURON PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, etc., Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, etc., et al.

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