Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/408/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:49:30+00:00

Document:
Prior to its being called upon in 1967 to assist local authorities in quelling civil disorders in Detroit, Michigan, the Department of the Army had developed only a general contingency plan in connection with its limited domestic mission under 10 U.S.C. § 331. In response to the Army's experience in the various civil disorders it was called upon to help control during 1967 and 1968, Army Intelligence established a data-gathering system, which respondents describe as involving the "surveillance of lawful civilian political activity."
Held: Respondents' claim that their First Amendment rights are chilled due to the mere existence of this data-gathering system does not constitute a justiciable controversy on the basis of the record in this case, disclosing as it does no showing of objective harm or threat of specific future harm. Pp. 408 U. S. 3-16.
144 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 444 F.2d 947, reversed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 408 U. S. 16. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which STEWART and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 408 U. S. 38.
"gathering by lawful means . . . [and] maintaining and using in their intelligence activities . . . information relating to potential or actual civil disturbances [or] street demonstrations."
District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding that there was no justiciable claim for relief.
"specific action of the Army against them, [but] only [by] the existence and operation of the intelligence gathering and distributing system which is confined to the Army and related civilian investigative agencies."
144 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 78, 444 F.2d 947, 953. We reverse.
There is in the record a considerable amount of background information regarding the activities of which respondents complained; this information is set out primarily in the affidavits that were filed by the parties in connection with the District Court's consideration of respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction and petitioners' motion to dismiss. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 12(b). A brief review of that information is helpful to an understanding of the issues.
"In performing this type function, the Army is essentially a police force or the back-up of a local police force. To quell disturbances or to prevent further disturbances, the Army needs the same tools and, most importantly, the same information to which local police forces have access. Since the Army is sent into territory almost invariably unfamiliar to most soldiers and their commanders, their need for information is likely to be greater than that of the hometown policeman."
it should be intelligently directed, and this depends upon having reliable information -- in time. As Chief Justice John Marshall said of Washington, 'A general must be governed by his intelligence and must regulate his measures by his information. It is his duty to obtain correct information. . . .' So we take it as undeniable that the military, i.e., the Army, need a certain amount of information in order to perform their constitutional and statutory missions."
144 U.S.App.D.C. at 77-78, 444 F.2d at 952-953 (footnotes omitted).
of whose time [Footnote 3] is devoted to the organization's principal mission, [Footnote 4] which is unrelated to the domestic surveillance system here involved.
the National Guard to control. These reports will be collected by liaison with other Government agencies and reported by teletype to the Intelligence Command. They will not be placed in a computer. . . . These reports are destroyed 60 days after publication or 60 days after the end of the disturbance. This limited reporting system will ensure that the Army is prepared to respond to whatever directions the President may issue in civil disturbance situations and without 'watching' the lawful activities of civilians."
In briefs for petitioners filed with this Court, the Solicitor General has called our attention to certain directives issued by the Army and the Department of Defense subsequent to the District Court's dismissal of the action; these directives indicate that the Army's review of the needs of its domestic intelligence activities has indeed been a continuing one, and that those activities have since been significantly reduced.
"[They] freely admit that they complain of no specific action of the Army against them. . . . There is no evidence of illegal or unlawful surveillance activities. We are not cited to any clandestine intrusion by a military agent. So far as is yet shown, the information gathered is nothing more than a good newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public meetings and the clipping of articles from publications available on any newsstand."
"that nothing [detrimental to respondents] has been done, that nothing is contemplated to be done, and even if some action by the Army against [respondents] were possibly foreseeable, such would not present a presently justiciable controversy."
information relating to matters far beyond the responsibilities of the military may be misused by the military to the detriment of these civilian [respondents], yet [respondents] do not attempt to establish this as a definitely foreseeable event, or to base their complaint on this ground. Rather, [respondents] contend that the present existence of this system of gathering and distributing information, allegedly far beyond the mission requirements of the Army, constitutes an impermissible burden on [respondents] and other persons similarly situated which exercises a present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights. . . ."
"a State may not inquire about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes."
"Those with a conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear or affirm, sensitive to the perils posed by the oath's indefinite language, avoid the risk of loss of employment, and perhaps profession, only by restricting their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited."
377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 372.
"established principle that, to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action. . . ."
Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937). The respondents do not meet this test; their claim, simply stated, is that they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the Army needs, and that the very existence of the Army's data-gathering system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment rights. That alleged "chilling" effect may perhaps be seen as arising from respondents' very perception of the system as inappropriate to the Army's role under our form of government, or as arising from respondents' beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for the military to be concerned with activities in the civilian sector, or as arising from respondents' less generalized yet speculative apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in some way that would cause direct harm to respondents. [Footnote 7] Allegations of a subjective "chill"
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm; "the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 330 U. S. 89 (1947).
knowledge, the United States District Court can hear evidence, ascertain the facts, and decide what, if any, further restrictions on the complained-of activities are called for to confine the military to their legitimate sphere of activity and to protect [respondents'] allegedly infringed constitutional rights."
We, of course, intimate no view with respect to the propriety or desirability, from a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities of the Department of the Army; our conclusion is a narrow one, namely, that, on this record, the respondents have not presented a case for resolution by the courts.
resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation's history or in this Court's decided cases, including our holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied.
"The information contained in the foregoing paragraphs numbered five through thirteen [of the complaint] was published in the January 1970 issue of the magazine The Washington Monthly. . . ."
"[t]he United States . . . shall protect each of [the individual States] . . . on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."
"There are three basic prerequisites to the use of Federal troops in a state in the event of domestic violence: "
"(1) That a situation of serious 'domestic violence' exists within t.he state. While this conclusion should be supported with a statement of factual details to the extent, feasible under the circumstances, there is no prescribed wording."
"(2) That such violence cannot be brought under control by the law enforcement resources available to the governor, including local and State police forces and the National Guard. The judgment required here is that there is a definite need for the assistance of Federal troops, taking into account the remaining time needed to move them into action at the scene of violence."
"(3) That the legislature or the governor requests the President to employ the armed forces to bring the violence under control. The element of request by the governor of a State is essential if the legislature cannot be convened. It may be difficult in the context of urban rioting, such as we have seen this summer, to convene the legislature."
"These three elements should be expressed in a written communication to the President, which of course may be a telegram, to support his issuance of a proclamation under 10 U.S.C. § 334 and commitment of troops to action. In case of extreme emergency, receipt of a written request will not be a prerequisite to Presidential action. However, since it takes several hours to alert and move Federal troops, the few minutes needed to write and dispatch a telegram are not likely to cause any delay."
"Upon receiving the request from a governor, the President, under the terms of the statute and the historic practice, must exercise his own judgment as to whether Federal troops will be sent, and as to such questions as timing, size of the force, and federalization of the National Guard."
"Preliminary steps, such as alerting the troops, can be taken by the Federal government upon oral communications and prior to the governor's determination that the violence cannot be brought under control without the aid of Federal forces. Even such preliminary steps, however, represent a most serious departure from our traditions of local responsibility for law enforcement. They should not be requested until there is a substantial likelihood that the Federal forces will be needed."
Translated in terms of personnel, this percentage figure suggests that the total intelligence operation concerned with potential civil disorders hardly merits description as "massive," as one of the dissents characterizes it.
"investigations to determine whether uniformed members of the Army, civilian employees [of the Army] and contractors' employees should be granted access to classified information."
"precisely the threat in this case that, in some future civil disorder of some kind, the Army is going to come in with its list of troublemakers . . . and go rounding up people and putting them in military prisons somewhere."
Indeed, the Court of Appeals noted that it had reached a different conclusion when presented with a virtually identical issue in another of its recently decided cases, Davis v. Ichord, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 442 F.2d 1207 (1970). The plaintiffs in Davis were attacking the constitutionality of the House of Representatives Rule under which the House Committee on Internal Security conducts investigations and maintains files described by the plaintiffs as a "political blacklist." The court noted that any chilling effect to which the plaintiffs were subject arose from the mere existence of the Committee and its files and the mere possibility of the misuse of those files. In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the court concluded that allegations of such a chilling effect could not be elevated to a justiciable claim merely by alleging as well that the challenged House Rule was overly broad and vague.
In deciding the case presently under review, the Court of Appeals distinguished Davis on the ground that the difference in the source of the chill in the two cases -- a House Committee in Davis and the Army in the instant case -- was controlling. We cannot agree that the jurisdictional question with which we are here concerned is to be resolved on the basis of the identity of the parties named as defendants in the complaint.
Not only have respondents left somewhat unclear the precise connection between the mere existence of the challenged system and their own alleged chill, but they have also cast considerable doubt on whether they themselves are in fact suffering from any such chill. Judge MacKinnon took cogent note of this difficulty in dissenting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, rendered as it was "on the facts of the case which emerge from the pleadings, affidavits and the admissions made to the trial court." 144 U.S.App.D.C. at 84, 444 F.2d at 959. At the oral argument before the District Court, counsel for respondents admitted that his clients were "not people, obviously, who are cowed and chilled"; indeed, they were quite willing "to open themselves up to public investigation and public scrutiny." But, counsel argued, these respondents must "represent millions of Americans not nearly as forward [and] courageous" as themselves. It was Judge MacKinnon's view that this concession "constitutes a basic denial of practically their whole case." Ibid. Even assuming a justiciable controversy, if respondents themselves are not chilled, but seek only to represent those "millions" whom they believe are so chilled, respondents clearly lack that "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" essential to standing. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 204 (1962). As the Court recently observed in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 407 U. S. 166, a litigant "has standing to seek redress for injuries done to him, but may not seek redress for injuries done to others."
The start of the problem is the constitutional distinction between the "militia" and the Armed Forces. By Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, the militia is specifically confined to precise duties: "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."
given powers comparable to those granted the FBI is a question not now raised, for we deal here not with the "militia," but with "armies." The Army, Navy, and Air Force are comprehended in the constitutional term "armies." Article I, § 8, provides that Congress may "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a Navy," and make "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." And the Fifth Amendment excepts from the requirement of a presentment or indictment of a grand jury "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger."
The most pointed and relevant decisions of the Court on the limitation of military authority concern the attempt of the military to try civilians. The first leading case was Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 71 U. S. 124, where the Court noted that the conflict between "civil liberty" and "martial law" is "irreconcilable." The Court which made that announcement would have been horrified at the prospect of the military -- absent a regime of martial law -- establishing a regime of surveillance over civilians. The power of the military to establish such a system is obviously less than the power of Congress to authorize such surveillance. For the authority of Congress is restricted by its power to "raise" armies, Art. I, § 8; and, to repeat, its authority over the Armed Forces is stated in these terms, "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
The Constitution contains many provisions guaranteeing rights to persons. Those include the right to indictment by a grand jury and the right to trial by a jury of one's peers. They include the procedural safeguards of the Sixth Amendment in criminal prosecutions; the protection against double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishments -- and, of course, the First Amendment. The alarm was sounded in the Constitutional Convention about the dangers of the armed services. Luther Martin of Maryland said, "when a government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce them to slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army." [Footnote 2/3] That danger, we have held, exists not only in bold acts of usurpation of power, but also in gradual encroachments. We held that court-martial jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach any person not a member of the Armed Forces at the times both of the offense and of the trial, which eliminates discharged soldiers. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11. Neither civilian employees of the Armed Forces overseas, McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U. S. 281; Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U. S. 278, nor civilian dependents of military personnel accompanying them overseas, Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U. S. 234; Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, may be tried by court-martial. And even as respects those in the Armed Forces, we have held that an offense must be "service-connected" to be tried by court-martial rather than by a civilian tribunal. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258, 395 U. S. 272.
the fact that, while the military serves the vital function of preserving the existence of the nation, it is, at the same time, the one element of government that exercises a type of authority not easily assimilated in a free society. . . ."
"In times of peace, the factors leading to an extraordinary deference to claims of military necessity have naturally not been as weighty. This has been true even in the all too imperfect peace that has been our lot for the past fifteen years -- and quite rightly so, in my judgment. It is instructive to recall that our Nation, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, was also faced with formidable problems. The English, the French, the Spanish, and various tribes of hostile Indians were all ready and eager to subvert or occupy the fledgling Republic. Nevertheless, in that environment, our Founding Fathers conceived a Constitution and Bill of Rights replete with provisions indicating their determination to protect human rights. There was no call for a garrison state in those times of precarious peace. We should heed no such call now. If we were to fail in these days to enforce the freedom that until now has been the American citizen's birthright, we would be abandoning for the foreseeable future the constitutional balance of powers and rights in whose name we arm."
"[i]t is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires."
Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U. S. 712, 91 U. S. 716.
"The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot, with faithfulness to our constitutional system, hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities."
"The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and rendered her the mistress of the world."
scale, its consequences may be fatal. On any scale, it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties."
and state wherein the crime was committed. The only exceptions made to these civilian trial procedures are for cases arising in the land and naval forces. Although there is undoubtedly room for argument based on the frequently conflicting sources of history, it is not unreasonable to believe that our Founders' determination to guarantee the preeminence of civil over military power was an important element that prompted adoption of the Constitutional Amendments we call the Bill of Rights."
demanding to know why I was so ignorant of the British way of doing things that I could dare to suggest that a British general should address a parliamentary body."
"As I remember it, what he said was 'I am the Minister of Defense, and I, not the generals, will state the policy of His Majesty's government.'"
"this claim of an inherent executive branch power of investigation and surveillance on the basis of people's beliefs and attitudes may be more of a threat to our internal security than any enemies beyond our borders."
Privacy and Government Investigations, 1971 U.Ill.L.F. 137, 153.
and Laymen United Against the War in Vietnam, the American Civil Liberties Union, Women's Strike for Peace, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The Army uses undercover agents to infiltrate these civilian groups and to reach into confidential files of students and other groups. The Army moves as a secret group among civilian audiences, using cameras and electronic ears for surveillance. The data it collects are distributed to civilian officials in state, federal, and local governments and to each military intelligence unit and troop command under the Army's jurisdiction (both here and abroad); and these data are stored in one or more data banks.
"by invading their privacy, damaging their reputations, adversely affecting their employment and their opportunities for employment, and in other ways."
"permanent reports of their activities will be maintained in the Army's data bank, and their 'profiles' will appear in the so-called 'Blacklist,' and that all of this information will be released to numerous federal and state agencies upon request."
Amendment rights is a power denied to government." Id. at 381 U. S. 309. When refusal of the Court to pass on the constitutionality of an Act under the normal consideration of forbearance "would itself have an inhibitory effect on freedom of speech," then the Court will act. United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 362 U. S. 22.
As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, "there is good reason to permit the strong to speak for the weak or the timid in First Amendment matters." Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 220, 265 A.2d 678, 684 (1970).
"in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."
surveillance was not collecting material in public records, but staking out teams of agents, infiltrating undercover agents, creating command posts inside meetings, posing as press photographers and newsmen, posing as TV newsmen, posing as students, and shadowing public figures.
"taken from the Intelligence Command's highly inaccurate civil disturbance teletype and filed in Army dossiers on persons who have held, or were being considered for, security clearances, thus contaminating what are supposed to be investigative reports with unverified gossip and rumor. This practice directly jeopardized the employment and employment opportunities of persons seeking sensitive positions with the federal government or defense industry. [Footnote 2/10]"
Army intelligence has, without notice to its civilian superiors, overstepped its mission. From 1917 to 1924, the Corps of Intelligence Police maintained a massive surveillance of civilian political activity which involved the use of hundreds of civilian informants, the infiltration of civilian organizations, and the seizure of dissenters and unionists, sometimes without charges. That activity was opposed -- then as now -- by civilian officials on those occasions when they found out about it, but it continued unabated until post-war disarmament and economies finally eliminated the bureaucracy that conducted it."
cast in the image which Jefferson and Madison designed, but more in the Russian image, depicted in Appendix III to this opinion.
"Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. "
"The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it -- "
"(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or"
"(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws."
United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; and be disqualified from holding any office of honor, profit, or trust under the United States."
"Whoever, being an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, prescribes or fixes or attempts to prescribe or fix, whether by proclamation, order or otherwise, the qualifications of voters at any election in any State; or"
"Whoever, being such officer or member, prevents or attempts to prevent by force, threat, intimidation, advice or otherwise any qualified voter of any State from fully exercising the right of suffrage at any general or special election; or"
"Whoever, being such officer or member, orders or compels or attempts to compel any election officer in any State to receive a vote from a person not legally qualified to vote; or"
"Whoever, being such officer or member, imposes or attempts to impose any regulations for conducting any general or special election in a State, different from those prescribed by law; or"
"Whoever, being such officer or member, interferes in any manner with an election officer's discharge of his duties -- "
"Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; and disqualified from holding any office of honor, profit or trust under the United States. "
the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution in any vehicle, conveyance, place, structure, or building or leases or rents or contracts to lease or rent any vehicle, conveyance, place, structure or building, or part thereof, knowing or with good reason to know that it is intended to be used for any of the purposes herein prohibited shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
"The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Federal Security Administrator shall take such steps as they deem necessary to suppress and prevent such violations thereof, and shall accept the cooperation of the authorities of States and their counties, districts, and other political subdivisions in carrying out the purpose of this section."
Hitler or first against Japan. Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed on the policy of Hitler first. But there were large and powerful groups in the country, many of them former isolationists in the sense that they were anti-European, who wanted to concentrate American forces on winning the war against Japan. Even the American chiefs of staff were divided on this question of high strategy."
"Churchill had come to Washington, accompanied by the British chiefs of staff, to work out with President Roosevelt and the Administration the general plan of the global war. One morning, I had a telephone call from Sen. Austin, who was a strong believer in the Churchill-Roosevelt line. He said, in effect,"
"I know you are seeing the Prime Minister this afternoon, and I wish you would ask him to tell his chiefs of staff to come to Congress and testify in favor of our strategical policy."
"Quite innocently, I said I would do this, and when Churchill received me that afternoon, I began by saying that I had a message from Sen. Austin. 'Would the Prime Minister instruct his chiefs of staff to go to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. . . .' I never finished the message. For the old lion let out a roar demanding to know why I was so ignorant of the British way of doing things that I could dare to suggest that a British general should address a parliamentary body."
"As I remember it, what he said was, 'I am the Minister of Defense and I, not the generals, will state the policy of His Majesty's government.'"
commander being brought home by the President to educate the Congress and the American people."
Our military added political departments to their staffs. A Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Military Policy Division, was first established in the Department of the Navy by President Truman in 1945. In the Office of Secretary of Defense that was done by President Truman in 1947, the appointee eventually becoming Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs. A like office was established in 1961 in the Department of the Army by President Kennedy, and another for the Air Force in 1957 by President Eisenhower. Thus, when the Pentagon entered a Washington, D.C., conference, its four "Secretaries of State" faced the real Secretary of State, and, more frequently than not, talked or stared him down. The Pentagon's "Secretaries of State" usually spoke in unison; they were clear and decisive with no ifs, ands, or buts, and in policy conferences usually carried the day.
By 1968, the Pentagon was spending $34 million a year on non-military social and behavioral science research both at home and abroad. One related to "witchcraft, sorcery, magic, and other psychological phenomena" in the Congo. Another concerned the "political influence of university students in Latin America." Other projects related to the skill of Korean women as divers, snake venoms in the Middle East, and the like. Research projects were going on for the Pentagon in 40 countries in sociology, psychology and behavioral sciences.
and the dictatorship under which they presently lived. We did not realize that, in some regions of Asia, it was the Communist party that identified itself with the so-called reform programs, the other parties being mere instruments for keeping a ruling class in power. We did not realize that, in the eyes of millions of illiterates, the choice between democracy and communism was not the critical choice it would be for us.
So it was that, in underdeveloped areas, we became identified not with ideas of freedom, but with bombs, planes, and tanks. We thought less and less in terms of defeating communism with programs of political action, more and more in terms of defeating communism with military might. Our foreign aid mounted, but nearly 70% of it was military aid.
40's, 50's, and 60's, suspicions grew. Innocent acts became telltale marks of disloyalty. The coincidence that an idea paralleled Soviet Russia's policy for a moment of time settled an aura of doubt around a person. The Intervention of the General, Washington Post, Apr. 27, 1967, Sec. A, p. 21, col. 1.
came to see me [he is a German writer who recently visited Moscow]. They will put a car in front of each of the two approaches [to the courtyard of the apartment house where he stays in Moscow] with three men in each car -- and they don't work only one shift. Then off they go after my visitors, or they trail people who leave on foot."
"And if you consider that they listen around the clock to telephone conversations and conversations in my home, they analyze recording tapes and all correspondence, and then collect and compare all these data in some vast premises -- and these people are not underlings -- you cannot but be amazed that so many idlers in the prime of life and strength, who could be better occupied with productive work for the benefit of the fatherland, are busy with my friends and me, and keep inventing enemies."
I have expressed my doubts whether the "militia" loses its constitutional role by an Act of Congress which incorporates it in the armed services. Drifka v. Brainard, 89 S.Ct. 434, 21 L.Ed.2d 427.
See Appendix I to this opinion, infra, p. 408 U. S. 29.
Even some actions of the Armed Services in regulating their own conduct may be properly subjected to judicial scrutiny. Those who are not yet in the Armed Services have the protection of the full panoply of the laws governing admission procedures, see, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185; Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U. S. 233. Those in the service may use habeas corpus to test the jurisdiction of the Armed Services to try or detain them, see, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U. S. 34; Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683, 395 U. S. 696 n 8; Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1; Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542. And, those in the Armed Services may seek the protection of civilian, rather than military, courts when charged with crimes not service connected, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258.
The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 181, 182, 193 (1962).
"No provision of this Act shall be so construed as to prevent a Secretary of a military department or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting to the Congress, on his own initiative, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper."
See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1142, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 18. This provision is now codified as 10 U.S.C. § 141(e).
The full account is contained in Appendix II, infra at 408 U. S. 33.
Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
inhibition of lawful behavior and of First Amendment rights."
"Under this view of [respondents'] allegations, under justiciability standards, it is the operation of the system itself which is the breach of the Army's duty toward [respondents] and other civilians. The case is therefore ripe for adjudication. Because the evil alleged in the Army intelligence system is that of overbreadth, i.e., the collection of information not reasonably relevant to the Army's mission to suppress civil disorder, and because there is no indication that a better opportunity will later arise to test the constitutionality of the Army's action, the issue can be considered justiciable at this time."
Id. at 79-81, 444 F.2d at 954-956 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
these particular persons are sufficiently uninhibited to bring this suit be any ground for objecting to their standing."
Id. at 79 n. 17, 444 F.2d at 954 n. 17.

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