Source: https://prosechicago.wordpress.com/tag/fifth-amendment/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:49:15+00:00

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Outrageous Government Conduct – Not Just for Drug Cases!
The doctrine of “outrageous conduct,” sometimes referred to as “outrageous misconduct,” was introduced by the Supreme Court. In the course of discussing the entrapment defense, the Court speculated that: “[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction ….” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1643 (1973). The Russell court went on to state that in order to rise to the level of outrageous, the misconduct must be of such a nature that it violates “‘fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct. at 1643, quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246, 4 L. Ed. 2d 268, 80 S. Ct. 297, 303 (1960).
In Hampton, the defendant was convicted of distributing heroin, despite his argument that because the heroin had been supplied by a government informer and sold by the defendant to an undercover agent, the defendant’s due process rights had been violated. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but wrote three separate opinions. The plurality opinion found that neither the defense of entrapment nor the defense of outrageous conduct was available to the defendant because the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. The plurality opinion stated, “If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties[,] the remedy lies[,] not in freeing the equally culpable defendant[,] but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law.” Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S. Ct. at 1650 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger and White, JJ.). Two justices concurred in the result but refused to foreclose the possibility of the fundamental-fairness defense even where predisposition is shown. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 491-95, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S. Ct. at 1650-53 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.). On the other hand, the dissenting justices believed that the behavior of the law enforcement officials was sufficiently offensive to bar a conviction. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495-500, 48 L. Ed. 2d 113, 96 S. Ct. at 1653-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.). Accordingly, Hampton stands for the proposition that even though proof of predisposition to commit a crime will bar the application of the entrapment defense, fundamental fairness will not permit any defendant to be convicted of a crime in which police conduct is outrageous. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3rd Cir. 1978).
“The due process defense of outrageous police conduct was elevated from theory to reality in United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 377 (3rd Cir. 1978). That court reversed convictions of two defendants, because ‘the nature and extent of police involvement … was so overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as a matter of due process of law.’… The State has argued that this due process defense…our [Illinois] supreme court has conclusively rejected…in People v. Cross, 77 Ill.2d 396, 33 Ill.Dec. 285, 396 N.E.2d 812 (Ill. 1979). We believe that… Cross should not be interpreted as a bar to the due process defense.” People ex rel Difanis v. Boston, 92 Ill.App.3d 962, 416 N.E.2d 333, 336-337 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1981).
“…[T]he outrageous [government] conduct defense looks at the government’s behavior. See United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 858 (10th Cir. 1984).… One circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has declared the defense dead (United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995))… First, we point out that decisions of United States district courts and courts of appeal are not binding on Illinois courts. See City of Chicago v. Groffman, 68 Ill. 2d 112, 118, 368 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1977). Second, it is noteworthy that Boyd dealt with prosecutorial misconduct, while the instant case deals instead with the alleged misconduct of an undercover drug agent. Finally, we disagree with the Boyd court’s holding that the doctrine is dead. Contrary to the holding in Boyd, the fact remains that most jurisdictions at least acknowledge that such a defense exists. For example, United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1992), cited cases from 11 circuits, all of which agreed that the defense of outrageous [government] conduct exist.” Ming. Id.
“Several Illinois cases have discussed the defense of outrageous government conduct with respect to undercover drug officers and recognize its validity, including People v. D’Angelo, 223 Ill.App.3d 754, 166 Ill.Dec. 217, 585 N.E.2d 1239 (1992). In both People v. Johnson, 123 Ill.App.3d 363, 78 Ill.Dec. 829, 462 N.E.2d 948 (1984) and People ex rel Difanis v. Boston, [supra], the defense of outrageous government conduct was recognized. The D’Angelo court found that because defendant failed to raise the issue of outrageous conduct in his posttrial motion, the issue was waived, but the court legitimized the defense by stating, ‘In any event, we do not believe that the conduct of the government agents in this case is so outrageous that it violates fundamental fairness or shocks the conscience.’ D’Angelo, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 782, 585 N.E.2d at 1257. In both People v. Johnson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 363, 462 N.E.2d 948 (1984), and People ex rel. Difanis v. Boston, 92 Ill. App. 3d 962, 416 N.E.2d 333 (1981), the defense of outrageous governmental conduct was recognized as a separate defense from that of entrapment.… However, none of those courts believed that the conduct complained of rose to the level of outrageousness necessary to bar the action… In fact, no Illinois case has yet to find outrageous government conduct sufficient to bar the prosecution of the defendant; on the other hand, no Illinois case has denied the doctrine’s validity. After considering the historical perspective of the doctrine, we hold that it is a valid defense in Illinois. … A defendant can raise the defense of outrageous [government] conduct if the government was overly involved in the creation of a crime or if the government coerced the defendant into participating [therein]. … One of the few cases to actually advance the defense of outrageous government conduct from pure theory to reality is United States v. Twiggs, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978). … Twigg involved an egregious case of government overinvolvement in which the government’s undercover operative essentially concocted and conducted the entire illicit scheme. The Twigg court characterized the police conduct as ‘so overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as a matter of due process of law.’ … Should the proper factual situation arise, courts should apply the doctrine of outrageous police misconduct and dismiss the charges against a defendant.” Ming. Id.
“After considering the historical perspective of the doctrine, we hold that it is a valid defense in Illinois.” Ming. Id.
“Whether the circumstances of a case demonstrate outrageous government conduct is a question of law for the court to decide. See People v. Johnson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 363, 373-74, 462 N.E.2d 948, 955 (1984). A defendant can raise the defense of outrageous conduct if the government was overly involved in the creation of a crime or if the government coerced the defendant into participating. See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 912 (10th Cir. 1992)…. Whether or not conduct is outrageous must be determined on an ad hoc basis and cannot be reduced to a specific formula. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 6 (1993)…. [The Santana case gave guidelines to determine outrageous government conduct in drug sting cases where the defendants claim entrapment.] While the Santana court appreciated the district court’s efforts to structure such a test, it found that ‘there is simply no way to reduce the myriad [of] combinations of potentially relevant circumstances to a neat list of weighted factors without losing too much in the translation.’ Santana, 6 F.3d at 6. We agree with the Santana court that there is no universal litmus test for a court to utilize to determine whether or not conduct is outrageous…. Ultimately, the outrageousness of a police officer’s actions must be evaluated by (1) taking into account the totality of the relevant circumstances (Santana, 6 F.3d at 7) and (2) considering whether or not the totality of the circumstances show misconduct of such a nature that it violates fundamental fairness and is shocking to our universal sense of justice. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 366, 93 S. Ct. at 643.” Ming. Id.
The court in United States v. Diaz, 189 F. 3d 1239 (1999) stated the following: “In sum, there is no binding Supreme Court authority recognizing a defense based solely upon an objective assessment of the government’s conduct in inducing the commission of crimes. Non-binding dicta of the Court, indicating that there may be such a defense, has been recanted by its author based upon reasoning later adopted by a majority of the Court in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n. 9 (further citation omitted). Moreover, this court has recognized the availability of this defense only in dicta because, in every case in which the issue has been raised, the government’s conduct has been held not to have been ‘outrageous.’ The only case squarely holding that an objective assessment of the government’s conduct in a particular case may bar prosecution without regard for the defendant’s predisposition [United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), cited extensively by Mr. Diaz] has been greatly criticized, often distinguished and, recently, disavowed in its own circuit.” Diaz, Id.
I emphasize that the cases, if any, in which proof of predisposition is not dispositive will be rare. Police overinvolvment in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction.
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).” Diaz, Id.
“While the essence of the entrapment defense is the defendant’s lack of predisposition to commit the offense, the ‘defense’ of outrageous government conduct presupposes predisposition but seeks dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the conduct of law enforcement agents was ‘so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction.’ United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). Thus, the outrageous government conduct defense is not really a defense at all. Rather, it is a claim that the institution of the prosecution suffers from a purely legal defect; as such, the claim is waived unless raised prior to trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Henderson-Durand, 985 F.2d 970, 973 & n. 5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 856 (1993); United States v. Duncan, 896 F.2d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1099 (2d Cir. 1980).
FN4 In Hampton, a concurrence combined with the plurality to reject the appeal. However, the two concurring Justices switched sides to form a different majority vivifying the doctrine of outrageous misconduct. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 491-95 (Powell, J. concurring).
surpassingly difficult to translate into a closely defined set of behavioral norms. The broadest hints as to the content of the outrageousness standard lie in the dictum that spawned the doctrine. Inasmuch as Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), is the case irrefragably linked with the legal rubric of fundamental fairness, one hint is found in Justice Rehnquist’s citation to Rochin. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32. A second hint is contained in Russell’s explicit equation of outrageous misconduct with violations of ‘that ‘fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,’ mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’ Russell, 423 U.S. at 432 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)). Picking up on these clues, most courts apply a variant on the fundamental fairness standard as a sounding line for outrageousness. See Mosley, 965 F.2d at 910 (collecting formulations). Although this standard lacks mathematical precision, we agree with Justice Frankfurter that imprecision of this nature does not leave courts without adequate guidance; rather, ‘[i]n dealing not with the machinery of government but with human rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions.’ Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
FN5 In Judge Easterbrook’s view, the appropriateness of the government’s decision to supply drugs as part of an undercover operation presents a ‘political’ question that is quintessentially nonjusticiable. Miller, 891 F.2d at 1272. With respect, we think this conceptualization stretches the military analogy too far. We adhere instead to the idea that ‘those charged with th[e] investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.’ United States v. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
FN6 In addition to Twigg, one court of appeals invoked the doctrine in an alternative holding, see United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1296 (8th Cir. 1984), and another directed the district court to determine whether outrageous misconduct should be found on remand, see Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1438. A smattering of district courts have also applied the outrageous misconduct doctrine to the defendant’s advantage. See, e.g., United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1524 (N.D. Cal. 1991); United States v. Gardner, 658 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (W.D. Pa. 1987); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744, 751-52 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
There are two competing visions of the doctrine’s role. One school of thought holds that the defense should be confined to cases involving extreme physical, and possibly psychological, abuse of a defendant. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 n.13 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983). A second school of thought holds that outrageous misconduct may also function as a kind of supplement to the entrapment defense, reserved for those cases where law enforcement personnel become so overinvolved in a felonious venture that they can fairly be said either to have ‘creat[ed]” the crime or to have ‘coerc[ed]’ the defendant’s participation in it. Mosley, 965 F.2d at 911-12; see also Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1436-38. This case does not require us to choose between these two conceptions of the doctrine….
Having traced the evolution of the doctrine of outrageous misconduct, we proceed to consider its applicability in this case. Although what transpired here fits neither of the conventional patterns of outrageous misconduct described above, the district court nonetheless ruled that furnishing the hefty heroin sample (and then losing track of it) comes within the doctrine’s sweep. We conclude, for two independently sufficient reasons, that the district court erred….
Nevertheless, we do not think that the inquiry into outrageousness can usefully be broken down into a series of discrete components. Almost by definition, the power of a court to control prosecutorial excesses through resort to substantive aspects of the due process clause is called into play only in idiosyncratic situations and such situations are likely to be highly ramified. Where facts are critically important and fact patterns tend to be infinitely diverse, adjudication can often best proceed on a case-by-case basis. The outrageousness defense falls into this category. Thus, it is unproductive to force the determination of outrageousness into a mechanical mode….
Let us be perfectly plain. We find that outrageousness, by its nature, requires an ad hoc determination….
At bottom, however, outrageousness is a concept, not a constant. What shocks the conscience in a given situation may be acceptable, though perhaps grim or unpleasant, under a different set of circumstances. Slashing a person’s throat with a sharp knife may be an unrelievedly outrageous course of conduct if one thinks in terms of Jack the Ripper, helpless women, and the shadowy streets of London; the same behavior will be thoroughly acceptable, however, if the knife is a scalpel, the knife-wielder a skilled surgeon performing a tracheotomy, the target a patient, and the venue an operating room. Although we recognize that formulaic tests offer administrative convenience and ease in application, we also recognize that neither life nor law can always be made convenient and easy. So here: there is simply no way to reduce the myriad combinations of potentially relevant circumstances to a neat list of weighted factors without losing too much in the translation. Cf. Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussing ‘outrageousness’ in the context of tort liability and concluding that ‘[t]here is no universal litmus test that a court can utilize to determine whether behavior is extreme and outrageous’)….
[FN presented without text referencing it] FN11 We do not totally reject the possibility, suggested by the court below, that outrageous misconduct may be found apart from situations in which the government has used brutality or induced commission of a crime. We simply note that the case at hand does not require us to explore this doctrinal frontier….
defendant’s due process rights have been violated….

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