Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/412/521/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:07:53+00:00

Document:
Petitioners, claiming that their son's suicide while he was confined as a federal prisoner in a county jail was proximately caused by the negligence of Government agents and employees, brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which establishes Government liability for negligent acts or omissions of an "employee of the Government," defined, inter alia, as a person officially "acting on behalf of a federal agency . . . with or without compensation." The Act excludes any contractor with the United States from the definition of federal agency. Though finding that the county had contracted with the Federal Government to house federal prisoners in its jail, the District Court held that the Government was liable on the grounds that the sheriff's employees negligently failed to maintain adequate surveillance of the decedent (who had attempted suicide while initially incarcerated), and that the Deputy United States Marshal negligently failed specifically to arrange for constant surveillance. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that, under the "contractor" exclusion, the United States was not accountable for the negligence of the sheriff's employees, and those employees were not acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity within the meaning of the Act.
1. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the deputy marshal had no authority to control the activities of the sheriff's employees, and that the jail was a "contractor," not a "Federal agency," within the meaning of the Act; and the statutory authorization for the housing of federal prisoners in state facilities clearly contemplated that the day-to-day operation of the contractor's facilities was to be in the contractor's, not the Government's, hands. Pp. 412 U. S. 526-530.
2. Petitioners' alternative contention that, even though the sheriff's employees might not be "employees" of a federal agency, they might nonetheless be "acting on behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity," and thus "employee[s] of the Government" within the meaning of the Act, is not consistent with the legislative purpose of the Act. Pp. 412 U. S. 530-532.
3. The Court of Appeals, not having given consideration to the question of the deputy marshal's negligence apart from other issues, should address itself to that question on remand. Pp. 412 U. S. 532-533.
Reagan Logue, a federal prisoner confined in a county jail pending trial, fashioned a noose from a bandage covering a laceration on his left arm and hanged himself. His mother and adoptive father sued the United States for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(h), [Footnote 1] claiming that negligence on the part of Government agents and employees proximately caused the death of their son. The District Court determined that Logue's death was the result of negligence for which the United States was liable, and awarded damages. 334 F.Supp. 322 (SD Tex.1971).
The Court of Appeals reversed this judgment, 459 F.2d 408 (1972), rehearing en banc denied, 463 F.2d 1340 (1972). We granted certiorari in order to consider the application to this case of the Act's exclusion of employees of a "contractor with the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
was confined, and the jail employees made only periodic checks when they were on that floor for some other reason. The day after his return to the jail, Logue removed the Kerlix bandage that had been applied to the laceration on his left arm and hanged himself.
"We interpret [18 U.S.C. § 4002] as fixing the status of the Nueces County jail as that of a 'contractor.' Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671. . . . This insulates the United States from liability under the FTCA for the negligent acts or omissions of the jail's employees. We find no support in the record for holding that Deputy Marshal Bowers had any power or authority to control any of the internal functions of the Nueces County jail. The deputy marshal, accordingly, violated no duty of safekeeping with respect to the deceased."
The Federal Tort Claims Act makes the United States liable for money damages "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government. . . ."
and his liability for the employees of a party with whom he contracts for a specified performance. Both the modern common law as reflected in the Restatement of Agency [Footnote 5] and the law of Texas [Footnote 6] make the distinction between the servant or agent relationship and that of independent contractor turn on the absence of authority in the principal to control the physical conduct of the contractor in performance of the contract.
the principal to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor. See, e.g., Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525, 534 (CA6 1969); Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634 (CA10 1967); Yates v. United States, 365 F.2d 663 (CA4 1966); Kirk v. United States, 270 F.2d 110 (CA9 1959).
Petitioners cite the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965), to the effect that the common law distinction that shields the employer from liability for injuries caused to another by the negligent act of a contractor or his servant is subject to so many exceptions that it is the general rule "only in the sense that it is applied where no good reason is found for departing from it." Congress, of course, could have left the determination as to whose negligence the Government should be liable for under the Federal Tort Claims Act to the law of the State involved, as it did with other aspects of liability under the Act. But it chose not to do this, and instead incorporated into the definitions of the Act the exemption from liability for injury caused by employees of a contractor. While this congressional choice leaves the courts free to look to the law of torts and agency to define "contractor," it does not leave them free to abrogate the exemption that the Act provides.
"For the purpose of providing suitable quarters for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons held under authority of any enactment of Congress, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons may contract, for a period not exceeding three years, with the proper authorities of any State, Territory, or political subdivision thereof, for the imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper employment of such persons."
"The rates to be paid for the care and custody of said persons shall take into consideration the character of the quarters furnished, sanitary conditions, and quality of subsistence and may be such as will permit and encourage the proper authorities to provide reasonably decent, sanitary, and healthful quarters and subsistence for such persons."
18 U.S.C. § 4002 (emphasis added).
Thus, Congress not only authorized the Government to make contracts such as the one here in question, but rather clearly contemplated that the day-to-day operations of the contractor's facilities were to be in the hands of the contractor, with the Government's role limited to the payment of sufficiently high rates to induce the contractor to do a good job. The contract entered into between the Government and Nueces County reflects a similar division of responsibility. The county undertakes to provide custody in accordance with the Bureau of Prisons' "rules and regulations governing the care and custody of persons committed" under the contract.
"the right to enter the institution . . . at reasonable hours for the purpose of inspecting the same and determining the conditions under which federal offenders are housed."
The judges of the Court of Appeals who dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc pointed out that petitioners alternatively contended in that court, as they do here, that, even though the sheriffs' employees might not be "employees" of a federal agency, they might nonetheless be "acting on behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity. . . ." 463 F.2d at 1342. If petitioners were successful in establishing this contention, of course, an employee of the Nueces County jail would be an "employee of the government" under § 2671 even though he was not an "employee" of a federal agency.
"and persons acting on behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation."
"'Employee of the Government' in the present bill is defined to include uncompensated or temporary officers or employees of the United States."
Hearings, supra, at 58. The committee's observation thus affords some support to the Government's contention that the language is designed to cover special situations such as the "dollar-a-year" man who is in the service of the Government without pay, or an employee of another employer who is placed under direct supervision of a federal agency pursuant to contract or other arrangement.
"when the Government decides that a particular individual should assume obligations and responsibilities virtually identical to those of a salaried Federal employee, there may very well be some persuasive basis for the suggestion that such an individual's breach of a specific statutory duty owed by the salaried employee to a specific class of persons should visit identical liability upon the United States."
violated no duty of safekeeping with respect to the deceased." 45 F.2d at 411. But that conclusion appears to us to follow from the court's discussion of the nature of the intergovernmental relationship and the status of the sheriff's employees, rather than being a separate rejection of the finding of the District Court that Bowers himself was negligent. Since the Court of Appeals thus did not consider the distinct question regarding the negligence of Bowers, we believe that the parties' arguments on that question should be addressed in the first instance to the Court of Appeals.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join the opinion of the Court upon the understanding that, upon remand, the Court of Appeals' consideration of Bowers' negligence will not be limited to his alleged failure to make "specific arrangements . . . for constant surveillance of the prisoner."
"Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
"Such Federal prisoners shall be employed only in the manufacture of articles for, the production of supplies for, the construction of public works for, and the maintenance and care of the institutions of, the State or political subdivision in which they are imprisoned."
18 U.S.C. § 4002. The contract with the Nueces County jail incorporates by reference the standard of care set forth in this statute.
There was testimony that Logue had twice before made suicide attempts.
There was testimony at trial that it normally takes about a week or two after a commitment order has been entered before a prisoner can be physically transferred to a mental institution. There was also testimony that this process can be expedited to obtain commitment as early as 24 hours after an order has been signed.
"(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service"
"(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master."
"(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent."
E.g., Great Western Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 157 Tex. 268, 302 S.W.2d 400 (1957).
This argument is also put in terms of a "nondelegable duty" owed by the Government to a prisoner under 18 U.S.C. § 4042.
The two courts of appeals' cases relied upon by petitioners involved findings of control by the Government that are contrary to the determination of the Court of Appeals in this case. In Close v. United States, 130 U.S. App.D.C. 125, 397 F.2d 686 (1968), the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the Government, observing that there was no reason to assume that the Attorney General was without power to supervise the District of Columbia's jailer. The court expressly noted that no contention was made that the District of Columbia jail was a "contract" jail. Id. at 126, 397 F.2d at 687. In Witt v. United States, 462 F.2d 1261 (CA2 1972), the court held that the supervising employee "was certainly amenable to some degree of control by the Disciplinary Barracks," id. at 1264, and that he was therefore "acting on behalf of" the Government.

References: § 1346
 § 2671
 § 4002
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 § 409
 § 4002
 § 2671
 § 4002
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 § 4042
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