Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103268/schneckloth-vs-bustamonte
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:18:08+00:00

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Held: When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State would justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact, voluntary; voluntariness is to be determined from the totality of the surrounding circumstances. While knowledge of a right to refuse consent is a factor to be taken into account, the State need not prove that the one giving permission to search knew that he had a right to withhold his consent. Pp. 412 U. S. 223 -249.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 412 U. S. 249 . POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 412 U. S. 250 . DOUGLAS, J., post, p. 412 U. S. 275 , BRENNAN, J., post, p. 412 U. S. 276 , and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 412 U. S. 277 , filed dissenting opinions.
It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is "per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 389 U. S. 357 ; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 403 U. S. 454 455; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 , 399 U. S. 1 . It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 , 328 U. S. 593 -594; Zap v. Unite,d States, 328 U. S. 624 , 328 U. S. 630 . The constitutional question in the present case concerns the definition of "consent" in this Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment context.
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 , 391 U. S. 548 . See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 ; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 .
Those cases yield no talismanic definition of "voluntariness" mechanically applicable to the host of situations where the question has arisen. "The notion of voluntariness,'" Mr. Justice Frankfurter once wrote, "is itself an amphibian." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568 , 367 U. S. 604 605. It cannot be taken literally to mean a "knowing" choice.
"Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statements -- even those made under brutal treatment -- are 'voluntary' in the sense of representing a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if 'voluntariness' incorporates notions of 'but-for' cause, the question should be whether the statement would have been made even absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test, virtually no statement would be voluntary, because very few people give incriminating statements in the absence of official action of some kind. [ Footnote 7 ]"
of a suspect. At one end of the spectrum is the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. See Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367 U. S. 578 -580. Without such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all would be diminished. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 , 373 U. S. 515 . At the other end of the spectrum is the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199 , 361 U. S. 206 -207. See also Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367 U. S. 581 -584; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 , 309 U. S. 235 -238.
Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367 U. S. 602 .
In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances -- both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 ; his lack of education, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 ; or his low intelligence, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 ; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737 ; the length of detention, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, supra; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 ; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433 . [ Footnote 8 ] In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how the accused reacted. Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367 U. S. 603 .
initial burden that the defendant knew he had a right to refuse to answer the questions that were put. While the state of the accused's mind, and the failure of the police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the "voluntariness" of an accused's responses, they were not, in and of themselves, determinative. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, supra; Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 373 U. S. 510 -511; Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367 U. S. 610 ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 , 338 U. S. 64 .
of any of the occupants. [ Footnote 10 ] Yet the search yielded tangible evidence that served as a basis for a prosecution, and provided some assurance that others, wholly innocent of the crime, were not mistakenly brought to trial. And in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search may still be valuable. If the search is conducted and proves fruitless, that, in itself, may convince the police that an arrest with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search pursuant to a warrant is not justified. In short, a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.
right to refuse -- such as a case where he announced to the police that, if he didn't sign the consent form, "you [police] are going to get a search warrant;" [ Footnote 11 ] or a case where, by prior experience and training, a person had clearly and convincingly demonstrated such knowledge. [ Footnote 12 ] But, more commonly, where there was no evidence of any coercion, explicit or implicit, the prosecution would nevertheless be unable to demonstrate that the subject of the search in fact, had known of his right to refuse consent.
384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 477 -478.
Id. at 328 U. S. 593 -594. See also Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624 .
Conversely, if, under all the circumstances, it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily -- that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority -- then we have found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 548 -549; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 ; Amos v.
391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 550 .
It is said, however, that a "consent" is a "waiver" of a person's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The argument is that, by allowing the police to conduct a search, a person "waives" whatever right he had to prevent the police from searching. It is argued that, under the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 304 U. S. 464 , to establish such a "waiver," the State must demonstrate "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 304 U. S. 464 .
twice being placed in jeopardy. [ Footnote 24 ] Guilty pleas have been carefully scrutinized to determine whether the accused knew and understood all the rights to which he would be entitled at trial, and that he had intentionally chosen to forgo them. [ Footnote 25 ] And the Court has evaluated the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of trial rights in trial-type situations, such as the waiver of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination before an administrative agency [ Footnote 26 ] or a congressional committee, [ Footnote 27 ] or the waiver of counsel in a juvenile proceeding. [ Footnote 28 ] The guarantees afforded a criminal defendant at trial also protect him at certain stages before the actual trial, and any alleged waiver must meet the strict standard of an intentional relinquishment of a "known" right. But the "trial" guarantees that have been applied to the "pretrial"
Id. at 388 U. S. 235 -236.
Id. at 384 U. S. 466 .
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 , 382 U. S. 416 .
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 488 . Rather, the community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense.
"the domino method of constitutional adjudication . . . wherein every explanatory statement in a previous opinion is made the basis for extension to a wholly different situation. [ Footnote 35 ]"
Id. at 384 U. S. 467 .
In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics -- either from the nature of the police questioning or the environment in which it took place. Indeed, since consent searches will normally occur on a person's own familiar territory, the specter of incommunicado police interrogation in some remote station house is simply inapposite. [ Footnote 36 ] There is no reason to believe, under circumstances such as are present here, that the response to a policeman's question is presumptively coerced; and there is, therefore, no reason to reject the traditional test for determining the voluntariness of a person's response. Miranda, of course, did not reach investigative questioning of a person not in custody, which is most directly analogous to the situation of a consent search, and it assuredly did not indicate that such questioning ought to be deemed inherently coercive. See supra at 412 U. S. 232 .
to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. [ Footnote 38 ] Because the California court followed these principles in affirming the respondent's conviction, and because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in remanding for an evidentiary hearing, required more, its judgment must be reversed.
Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 , 328 U. S. 609 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 507, and n. 3 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 , 360 U. S. 321 n. 2 (citing 28 cases).
Similarly, when we recently considered the meaning of a "voluntary" guilty plea, we returned to the standards of "voluntariness" developed in the coerced confession cases. See Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 , 397 U. S. 749 . See also n 25, infra.
If there had been probable cause for the search of the automobile, a search warrant would not have been necessary in this case. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 .
See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 246 Cal.App.2d 715, 55 Cal.Rptr. 62; People v. Dahlke, 257 Cal.App.2d 82, 64 Cal.Rptr. 599; State v. Custer, 251 So.2d 287 (Fla.App.); State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275; State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616, vacated in part on other grounds, 392 U. S. 308 ; Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky.); State v. Andrus, 250 La. 765, 199 So.2d 867; Morgan v. State, 2 Md.App. 440, 234 A.2d 762; State v. Witherspoon, 460 S.W.2d 281 (Mo.); State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915; State v. Douglas, 260 Ore. 60, 488 P.2d 1366.
This view is bolstered by Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 . There, the Court determined that a suspect's wife was not operating as an agent of the State when she handed over her husband's guns and clothing to the police. We found nothing constitutionally suspect in the subjective forces that impelled the spouse to cooperate with the police.
Id. at 403 U. S. 488 .
Id. at 403 U. S. 487 .
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , itself relied on three civil cases, but none of those cases established the proposition that a waiver, to be effective, must be knowing and intelligent. Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408 , which concerned the waiver of a civil jury trial by the submission of a special verdict to the jury, indicates only that "every reasonable presumption should be indulged against . . . waiver." Id. at 106 U. S. 412 . Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U. S. 389 , is to the same effect. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U. S. 292 , which involved the possible waiver of procedural due process rights, stands only for the proposition that: "We do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." Id. at 301 U. S. 307 .
Cf. Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (operation of common carrier railroad found to be waiver of State's sovereign immunity despite objection that there was no "waiver" under Johnson ); National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U. S. 311 (valid waiver of procedural due process found over objection of no compliance with Johnson). See also Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 , 411 U. S. 296 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result).
One apparent exception was Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 , 390 U. S. 51 -52, where we found no meaningful waiver of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination when a gambler was forced to pay a wagering tax. We reasoned that there could be no choice when the gambler was faced with the alternative of giving up gambling or providing incriminatory information. Analytically, therefore, although the Court cited Johnson, Marchetti turned on the lack of a "voluntary" waiver, rather than the lack of any "knowing" and "intelligent" waiver.
See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 ; Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 ; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506 ; cf. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U. S. 156 (no waiver of counsel shown at settlement of state court record).
See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708 ; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 ; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155 ; Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U. S. 1 .
See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 ; Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 .
See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 .
See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 .
See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459 ; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 .
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137 .
See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190 .
See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 , 387 U. S. 42 .
As we have already noted, supra at 412 U. S. 232 , Miranda itself involved interrogation of a suspect detained in custody, and did not concern the investigatory procedures of the police in general on-the-scene questioning. 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 477 .
Id. at 333 U. S. 13 . While the Court spoke in terms of "waiver," it arrived at the conclusion that there had been no "waiver" from an analysis of the totality of the objective circumstances -- not from the absence of any express indication of Johnson's knowledge of a right to refuse or the lack of explicit warnings. See also Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 .
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 468 -469 (footnote omitted). See United States v. Moderacki, 280 F.Supp. 633; United States v. Blalock, 255 F.Supp. 268.
See, e.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707 ; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568 ; Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433 ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 ; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 ; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 .
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 , 378 U. S. 499 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The State also urges us to hold that a violation of the exclusionary rule may not be raised by a state or federal prisoner in a collateral attack on his conviction, and thus asks us to overturn our contrary holdings in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 ; Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560 ; Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286 ; and Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 . Since we have found no valid Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim in this case, we do not consider that question.
At the time Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 (1969), was decided, I, as a member of the Court of Appeals (but not of its panel) whose order was there reversed, found myself in agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for himself and my Brother STEWART in dissent. Id. at 394 U. S. 242 . My attitude has not changed in the four years that have passed since Kaufman was decided.
Although I agree with nearly all that MR. JUSTICE POWELL has to say in his detailed and persuasive concurring opinion, post, p. 412 U. S. 250 , I refrain from joining it at this time because, as MR. JUSTICE STEWART's opinion reveals, it is not necessary to reconsider Kaufman in order to decide the present case.
Id. at 394 U. S. 224 .
Id. at 394 U. S. 225 -226. In short, on petition for habeas corpus or collateral review filed in a federal district court, whether by state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or federal prisoners under § 2255, the present rule is that Fourth Amendment claims may be asserted and the exclusionary rule must be applied in precisely the same manner as on direct review. Neither the history or purpose of habeas corpus, the desired prophylactic utility of the exclusionary rule as applied to Fourth Amendment claims, nor any sound reason relevant to the administration of criminal justice in our federal system justifies such a power.
"when the 1867 Congress provided that persons restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution could obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, it undoubtedly intended -- except to the extent the legislation provided otherwise -- to incorporate the common law uses and functions of this remedy. [ Footnote 2/4 ]"
have been both meticulous and revealing. Their conclusions differ significantly from those of the Court in Fay v. Noia, that habeas corpus traditionally has been available "to remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law." 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 405 .
"once a person had been convicted by a superior court of general jurisdiction, a court disposing of a habeas corpus petition could not go behind the conviction for any purpose other than to verify the formal jurisdiction of the committing court. [ Footnote 2/6 ]"
Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. at 28 U. S. 202 -203.
"received only the most perfunctory attention and consideration in the Congress; indeed, there were complaints that its effects could not be understood at all. [ Footnote 2/7 ]"
"to tear habeas corpus entirely out of the context of its historical meaning and scope and convert it into an ordinary writ of error with respect to all federal questions in all criminal cases. [ Footnote 2/8 ]"
"contemplated by its framers or . . . properly . . . construed to authorize the overthrow of the final judgments of the State courts of general jurisdiction, by the inferior Federal judges. [ Footnote 2/9 ]"
Recent decisions, however, have tended to depreciate the importance of the finality of prior judgments in criminal cases. Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 228 ; Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 , 373 U. S. 8 (1963); Fay, supra, at 372 U. S. 424 . This trend may be a justifiable evolution of the use of habeas corpus where the one in state custody raises a constitutional claim bearing on his innocence. But the justification for disregarding the historic scope and function of the writ is measurably less apparent in the typical Fourth Amendment claim asserted on collateral attack. In this latter case, a convicted defendant is most often asking society to redetermine a matter with no bearing at all on the basic justice of his incarceration.
"where personal liberty is involved, a democratic society . . . insists that it is less important to reach an unshakable decision than to do justice (emphasis added), [ Footnote 2/10 ]"
attack, [ Footnote 2/15 ] they deprive primary litigants of their prompt availability and mature reflection. After all, the resources of our system are finite: their overextension jeopardizes the care and quality essential to fair adjudication.
claim, the strength of the argument depending upon the nature of the claim, the manner of its treatment (if any) in the conviction proceedings, and the circumstances under which collateral litigation must be had. [ Footnote 2/16 ]"
acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else. [ Footnote 2/22 ]"
the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence. [ Footnote 2/23 ]"
Id. at 381 U. S. 629 .
the Government to utilize unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had first testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, in effect, that the policies protected by the exclusionary rule were outweighed in this case by the need to prevent perjury and assure the integrity of proceedings at trial. The Court concluded that to apply the exclusionary rule in such circumstances "would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 347 U. S. 65 . The judgment in Walder revealed most pointedly that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are neither absolute nor all-encompassing, but rather must be weighed and balanced against a competing and more compelling policy, namely the need for effective determination of truth at trial.
Id. at 394 U. S. 220 , quoting Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673, 675 (CA8 1963). [ Footnote 2/34 ] Though the precise discussion in Kaufman concerned the claims of federal prisoners under § 2255, the then-existing principle of a distinction between review of search and seizure claims in direct and collateral proceedings clearly existed.
too rarely whether the prisoner was innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, [ Footnote 2/39 ] and too frequently whether some evidence of undoubted probative value has been admitted in violation of an exclusionary rule ritualistically applied without due regard to whether it has the slightest likelihood of achieving its avowed prophylactic purpose.
Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 , 373 U. S. 24 -25 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 , 304 U. S. 78 -79 (1938), quoting Mr. Justice Field in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 , 149 U. S. 401 (1893).
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 , 403 U. S. 411 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 255, 256 (1961); see also J. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (1968); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2184, pp.51-52 (J. McNaughton ed.1961), and H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-261 (1967), suggesting that even at trial the exclusionary rule should be limited to exclusion of "the fruit of activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal." But see Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 171, 188-190 (1962), and Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 Cornell L.Q. 436 (1964).
These expressions antedated the only scholarly empirical research, MR. JUSTICE STEWART having noted in Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 , 361 U. S. 218 (1960), that "[e]mpirical statistics are not available" as to the efficacy of the rule -- a situation which continued until Professor Oaks' study. Indeed, in referring to the basis for the exclusionary rule, Professor Oaks noted that it has been supported not by facts, but by "recourse to polemic, rhetoric, and intuition." Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 665, 755 (1970). See also Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am.U.L.Rev. 1 (1964).
Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 , 374 U. S. 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 403 U. S. 493 (1971) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.). THE CHIEF JUSTICE was quoting Mr. Justice Stone of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
See Kaufman, supra, at 394 U. S. 220 -221, nn. 3 and 4, for a listing of the respective positions of the courts of appeals.
Id. at 344 U. S. 536 . The inundation which concerned Mr. Justice Jackson consisted of 541 such petitions. In 1971, the latest year for which figures are available, state prisoners alone filed 7,949 petitions for habeas in federal district courts, over 14 times the number filed when Mr. Justice Jackson voiced his misgivings.
Brown v. Allen, supra, at 344 U. S. 537 .
at 412 U. S. 227 -228. As a result, the search of the vehicle can be justified solely on the ground that the owner's brother gave his consent -- that is, that he waived his Fourth Amendment right "to be secure" against an otherwise "unreasonable" search. The Court holds today that an individual can effectively waive this right even though he is totally ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his consent, such invasions of his privacy would be constitutionally prohibited. It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence. In my view, the Court's conclusion is supported neither by "linguistics," nor by "epistemology," nor, indeed, by "common sense." I respectfully dissent.
Several years ago, MR. JUSTICE STEWART reminded us that "[t]he Constitution guarantees . . . a society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity of its members to choose." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 , 390 U. S. 649 (1968) (concurring in result). I would have thought that the capacity to choose necessarily depends upon knowledge that there is a choice to be made. But today the Court reaches the curious result that one can choose to relinquish a constitutional right -- the right to be free of unreasonable searches -- without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to accede to a police request to search. [ Footnote 3/1 ] I cannot agree, and therefore dissent.
of the police amounted to compulsion of the defendant. [ Footnote 3/7 ] Because of the nature of the right to be free of compulsion, it would be pointless to ask whether a defendant knew of it before he made a statement; no sane person would knowingly relinquish a right to be free of compulsion. Thus, the questions of compulsion and of violation of the right itself are inextricably intertwined. The cases involving coerced confessions, therefore, pass over the question of knowledge of that right as irrelevant, and turn directly to the question of compulsion.
My approach to the case is straightforward, and, to me, obviously required by the notion of consent as a relinquishment of Fourth Amendment rights. I am at a loss to understand why consent "cannot be taken literally to mean a knowing' choice." Ante at 412 U. S. 224 . In fact, I have difficulty in comprehending how a decision made without knowledge of available alternatives can be treated as a choice at all.
be considered a meaningful choice unless he knew that he could, in fact, exclude the police. The Court appears, however, to reject even the modest proposition that, if the subject of a search convinces the trier of fact that he did not know of his right to refuse assent to a police request for permission to search, the search must be held unconstitutional. For it says only that "knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account." Ante at 412 U. S. 227 . I find this incomprehensible. I can think of no other situation in which we would say that a person agreed to some course of action if he convinced us that he did not know that there was some other course he might have pursued. I would therefore hold, at a minimum, that the prosecution may not rely on a purported consent to search if the subject of the search did not know that he could refuse to give consent. That, I think, is the import of Bumper v. North Carolina, supra. Where the police claim authority to search, yet, in fact, lack such authority, the subject does not know that he may permissibly refuse them entry, and it is this lack of knowledge that invalidates the consent.
The Court holds that Alcala's consent to search was shown, in the state court proceedings, to be constitutionally valid as a relinquishment of his Fourth Amendment rights. In those proceedings, no evidence was adduced as to Alcala's knowledge of his right to refuse assent. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, whose judgment is today reversed, would have required petitioner to produce such evidence. As discussed infra at 412 U. S. 286 , the Court of Appeals did not hold that the police must inform a subject of investigation of his right to refuse assent as an essential predicate to their effort to secure consent to search.
The Court concedes that the police lacked probable cause to search. Ante at 412 U. S. 227 -228. At the time the search was conducted, there were three police vehicles near the car. 270 Cal.App.2d 648, 651, 76 Cal.Rptr. 17, 19 (1969). Perhaps the police, in fact, had some reason, not disclosed in this record, to believe that a search would turn up incriminating evidence. But it is also possible that the late hour and the number of men in the car suggested to the first officer on the scene that it would be prudent to wait until other officers had arrived before investigating any further.
The Court reads Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946), as upholding a search like the one in this case on the basis of consent. But it was central to the reasoning of the Court in that case that the items seized were the property of the Government temporarily in Davis' custody. See id. at 328 U. S. 587 -593. The agents of the Government were thus simply demanding that property to which they had a lawful claim be returned to them. Because of this, the Court held that "permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as where private papers are sought." Id. at 328 U. S. 593 . The opinion of the Court therefore explicitly disclaimed stating a general rule for ordinary searches for evidence. That the distinction, for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, between mere evidence and contraband or instrumentalities has now been abolished, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967), is no reason to disregard the fact that, when Davis was decided, that distinction played an important role in shaping analysis.
Aside from Zap and Davis, supra, n. 4, I have found no cases decided by this Court explicitly upholding a search based on the consent of the defendant. It is hardly surprising, then, that "[t]he approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit finds no support in any of our decisions," ante at 412 U. S. 229 . But, in nearly every case discussing the problem at length, the Court referred to consent as a waiver. And it mischaracterizes those cases to describe them as analyzing the totality of the circumstances, ante at 412 U. S. 243 n. 31. See infra at 412 U. S. 283 -284.
The Court used the terms "voluntary" or "involuntary" in such cases as shorthand labels for an assessment of the police behavior in light of the particular characteristics of the individual defendant because behavior that might not be coercive of some individuals might nonetheless compel others to give incriminating statements. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 , 332 U. S. 599 (1948); Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156 , 346 U. S. 185 (1953); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 (1957).
I, of course, agree with the Court's analysis to the extent that it treats a verbal expression of assent as no true consent when it is elicited through compulsion. Ante at 412 U. S. 229 . Since, in my view, it is just as unconstitutional to search after coercing consent as it is to search after uninformed consent, I agree with the rationale of Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921), Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948), and Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 (1968). That an alternative rationale might have been used in those cases seems to me irrelevant.
In Chimel, we explained that searches incident to arrest were justified by the need to protect officers from attacks by the persons they have arrested, and by the need to assure that easily destructible evidence in the reach of the suspect will not be destroyed. 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 762 -763. And in Coolidge, we said that searches of automobiles on the highway are justified because an alerted criminal might easily drive the evidence away while a warrant was sought. 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 459 -462. In neither situation is police convenience alone a sufficient reason for establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. Yet the Court today seems to say that convenience alone justifies consent searches.
The Court's suggestion that it would be "unrealistic" to require the officers to make "the detailed type of examination" involved when a court considers whether a defendant has waived a trial right, ante at 412 U. S. 245 , deserves little comment. The question before us relates to the inquiry to be made in court when the prosecution seeks to establish that consent was given. I therefore do not address the Court's strained argument that one may waive constitutional rights without making a knowing and intentional choice so long as the rights do not relate to the fairness of a criminal trial. I would suggest, however, that that argument is fundamentally inconsistent with the law of unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). The discussion of United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967), ante at 412 U. S. 239 -240, also seems inconsistent with the opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 (1972). In any event, I do not understand how one can relinquish a right without knowing of its existence, and that is the only issue in this case.

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