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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 17:31:10+00:00

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Samuel UNGER et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent; REPUBLICAN PARTY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Real Parties in Interest.
Lynn S. Carman and George Beavin, San Rafael, for petitioners. No appearance for respondent. John A. Slezak, Ohnard, for real parties in interest. Arlo Hale Smith, San Francisco, as amicus curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.
Under California law, a vacancy in the office of a justice of the Supreme Court is filled by appointment of the Governor. Thereafter, at a general election in which the appointee runs unopposed, the voter is asked whether the Governor's appointment should be confirmed. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16.) Section 6 of article II (hereinafter section 6) provides, “Judicial, school, county, and city offices shall be nonpartisan.” The issue in this proceeding is whether a political party and its governing body are prohibited by section 6 from endorsing or otherwise supporting a campaign not to confirm justices of the Supreme Court at a general election.
On March 9, 1982, petitioners, two registered voters,1 filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court alleging that the Republican Party, its state central and executive committees, and two individuals had endorsed the “nonconfirmation” of three justices of the Supreme Court in the November 1982 General Election, and that they planned to use the assets of the party to further this goal.2 This conduct, according to the allegations, exceeded the powers of real parties in interest under section 6 and sections 9276 and 9440 of the Elections Code.3 Petitioners sought to restrain real parties in interest from supporting the “nonconfirmation” campaign.
The trial court sustained real parties in interests' demurrer and entered an order of dismissal. Thereafter, petitioners, claiming that appeal from the trial court's order was an inadequate remedy because of the impending election, filed this petition for a writ of mandate seeking to vacate the order.
As we have seen, section 6 does not refer to any specific conduct by a political party or its governing body; 5 it merely declares the general principle that judicial, school, county and city offices shall be nonpartisan. In deciding whether the conduct which petitioners seek to enjoin in the present proceeding violates this principle of nonpartisanship, we look to the legislative background and purpose of section 6, as well as to the historical role played by political parties in nonpartisan elections and in the conduct of party affairs. A consideration of these matters will lead us to the conclusion that section 6 does not prohibit parties from endorsing, supporting, or opposing candidates for nonpartisan office.
Our focus, then, is not to decide whether political parties have legislative authority to support or oppose candidates for nonpartisan office, but whether there is any express restraint against such actions.
Of the various alternatives open to the Legislature in promoting the principles of nonpartisanship, it chose only to control the form of elections for nonpartisan office in various respects, and to impose a single restriction on the conduct of political parties. In the former category are provisions stating that declarations of candidacy and other nomination papers for nonpartisan office may not refer to party affiliation (§ 6401.5), the name of the party to which a nonpartisan candidate belongs may not appear on the ballot, a voter may cast his ballot for a candidate for such an office without regard to party affiliation (§§ 10200.5, 10214), and partisan and nonpartisan offices are listed in separate columns of the ballot (§ 10207). The only limitation on the conduct of political parties with respect to elections for nonpartisan office is that they may not nominate a candidate for such an office. Section 37 defines “nonpartisan office” as “an office for which no party may nominate a candidate”; conversely, section 36 defines a partisan office as one for which a party may nominate a candidate. Section 37 goes on to provide, in language almost identical to section 6, that “Judicial, school, county and municipal offices are nonpartisan offices.” Since there is no other restriction on the participation of political parties in elections for nonpartisan office, the inference is clear that no additional limitation was intended.
Factors in addition to the absence of an express prohibition reinforce the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to impose the restrictions asserted by petitioners. The Legislature has granted broad discretion to county and state central committees (the governing bodies of political parties) to act on behalf of the party. (E.g., §§ 9443, 9276, 9440, 9272.) 6 Obviously, the election of candidates whose views are perceived as being consistent with the principles espoused by the party would enhance the interests of the party. Moreover, it has been customary for the governing bodies of political parties to endorse or assist candidates in elections for nonpartisan office. (See Unger v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 681, 684, 162 Cal.Rptr. 611, and fn. 4 at pp. 684–685; Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (1960) at pp. 102–104; 59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 60, supra, at pp. 64–65.) 7 Surely, if the Legislature had intended to deny them such rights it has had ample opportunity to enact legislation to that end.
Another indication that such a restriction was not intended is the passage in 1963 of section 11702, which prohibits governing bodies of political parties from endorsing, supporting, or opposing any candidate for nomination by the party for partisan office in the primary election.8 The fact that there is no parallel limitation on endorsements for nonpartisan office raises a clear inference that the Legislature intended no such limitation.
Thus, we conclude that the Legislature has not prohibited political parties from continuing their practice of endorsing and supporting candidates for nonpartisan office. Unless section 6 expresses a contrary intent, real parties in interest must prevail in this proceeding. An analysis of the history of section 6 demonstrates that it was not designed to place any greater restrictions on the conduct of political parties than those which were in existence prior to its enactment, i.e., a prohibition against nomination of candidates for nonpartisan office.
The first mention of nonpartisan office in the Constitution appeared in 1926, when article II, section 23/434, was adopted. It provided that a candidate for judicial, school, county, township “or other nonpartisan office” was deemed elected if he received a majority of all the ballots cast for that office at the primary election. Then, as now, the Constitution did not define the term “nonpartisan office.” However, for many years before the adoption of article II, section 23/434, the direct primary law contained provisions similar to the code requirements described above to promote the nonpartisan character of elections. Although there was no express prohibition against the nomination of candidates for nonpartisan office by political parties, the substance of these provisions (similar to the current provisions of the code regulating the form of nonpartisan elections) accomplished that result. (Stats.1913, ch. 690, p. 1379.) 9 It must have been intended, therefore, that the undefined term “nonpartisan office” as used in article II, section 23/434, of the Constitution signified an office filled by an election nonpartisan in form, and for which a party could not nominate a candidate. Petitioners point to no evidence to the contrary.
Article II, section 23/434, was deleted from the Constitution in 1972, and section 5 of article II, identical to section 6, was substituted in its place. The proceedings of the Constitution Revision Commission as well as the ballot pamphlet presented to the voters in 1972 demonstrate that section 23/434 was viewed as a guarantee that judicial and local offices were nonpartisan, and that no change in the meaning of the provision was intended by the change in the language, except that city offices were added to the list of nonpartisan offices, in recognition of existing practice.10 Section 5 was renumbered section 6, without change in language, in 1976.
The only authority to the contrary is Unger v. Superior Court, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d 681, 162 Cal.Rptr. 611 (hereinafter Unger I ). There, the Marin County Democratic Central Committee endorsed and planned to make financial contributions to four candidates for election to the nonpartisan office of the governing board of the Marin Community College District at the November 6, 1979, election. Petitioner, a candidate for the board who was not endorsed by the committee,12 sought to enjoin the committee's action, claiming that it violated section 6. The court, relying on a broad definition of the term “nonpartisan” in a dictionary, held that section 6 prohibited the committee from supporting or opposing candidates to the governing board of the district.
It is evident from what we say above that we must disapprove this holding.13 The opinion does not mention the legislative history of section 6, nor does it recognize that there is no express prohibition in section 6 or elsewhere in our statutes to prohibit the conduct in question. The court simply chose the broadest definition of “nonpartisan” among several offered in the dictionary upon which it relied.
We consider one final argument made by petitioners. They assert that section 6 prohibits the governing body of a political party from endorsing or supporting a candidate for office absent a prior “poll” of party members as to their preferences. We take this assertion to mean that a political party may not endorse a candidate before a primary election, since the only “poll” of party members of which we are aware is at the primary.
We cannot approve this contention. As we conclude above, the governing bodies of political parties may act on behalf of the party, except to the extent limited by law; there is no requirement that a “poll” be held before such a body may support or oppose a candidate for nonpartisan office.
In view of our determination that neither section 6 nor any other provision of law barred real parties in interest from supporting or opposing the confirmation of the justices of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to consider whether such a ban would violate their constitutional rights.
Our conclusion in this case is reached without consideration of policy questions. We are not unmindful of the persuasive reasons why it is preferable for political parties to refrain from endorsing or opposing nonpartisan candidates. However, that is a matter for consideration by the Legislature; it, not the judiciary, is the proper body to impose regulations on the conduct of political parties.
The alternative writ heretofore issued is discharged as having served its purpose, and the peremptory writ is denied.
I am sympathetic to the views expressed in Justice Sims' scholarly opinion. The prospect of political parties participating directly in elections for judicial office through endorsement is not appealing, and I agree that article II is amenable to an interpretation that would prohibit such conduct. Indeed, were it not for First Amendment considerations, I would be inclined to join in Justice Sims' dissent. It is a cardinal principle of construction, however, that a provision must “be construed, if such a construction is fairly possible, to avoid raising doubts of its constitutionality.” (St. Martin Lutheran Church v. South Dakota (1981) 451 U.S. 772, 780, 101 S.Ct. 2142, 2147, 68 L.Ed.2d 612.) Because I have very serious doubts whether article II, as interpreted by real parties in interest, could withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment, I concur in the majority's more narrow construction.
Under real parties in interest' interpretation, article II would flatly prohibit a qualified political party from expressing any views concerning a judicial candidate's qualifications, competence, or record. The tension between such an absolute prior restraint on pure political speech and traditional First Amendment principles is obvious and palpable.
Because article II, if interpreted as real parties in interest urge, would absolutely prohibit the expression of any opinion by or through a political party concerning candidates for certain public offices, it could be upheld only if the government can demonstrate that the provision furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of First Amendment rights. (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1421, 55 L.Ed.2d 707; Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 25, 96 S.Ct. at p. 637.) 1 No such demonstration exists on this record.
The fundamental difficulty with real parties in interest' position is that essentially the same arguments concerning judicial integrity can be made with respect to endorsements by other groups—unofficial political parties or partisan organizations, as well as special interest groups—who would remain free to express their views and to vigorously support or oppose any candidate for judicial office.6 The possibility that a judge will appear beholden to particular interests, and the possibility that the public will be unduly influenced by a particular endorsement, are both risks inherent in a system which calls upon judges to run for office. It does not appear, at least from this record, that partisan endorsements pose such a substantial and unique threat as to justify the limitations upon freedom of expression posed by the interpretation which real parties in interest advocate. Because I believe it is “fairly possible” to construe article II in a manner that avoids these serious flaws, I concur.
Because this interest is so important, I cannot join in Justice Grodin's approach. His conclusion that the First Amendment may well bar restrictions on political endorsements of candidates for nonpartisan office is premature. The Legislature may be able to fashion a permissible limitation on partisan involvement in nonpartisan campaigns after careful scrutiny of the various interests at stake. I do not think that at this stage we should sweepingly discourage such an attempt. The majority opinion, of course, does not take that path.
While I concur with the order of the court, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion voiced in the foregoing opinion.
The majority opinion asks us to look to the background and purpose of section 6 of article II of the state Constitution and the historical role played by the Legislature and by political parties in nonpartisan elections and in the conduct of party affairs. My consideration of these matters leads me to the conclusion that the people, in adopting the constitutional provision under consideration, intended a broader definition of nonpartisanship than that suggested in the opinion; and that a qualified statutory partisan political party, as distinguished from its members and any voluntary groups made up of all or any of its members, is prohibited by the Constitution from lending the authority of its name, or the name of its subordinate statutory groups, or its titular officers by their statutory party titles, to the support or opposition of candidates for judicial, school, county and city offices. In so concluding, I face the issue of whether the First Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes a state from so immunizing its election process from statutorily established partisan interest. I conclude that inasmuch as no individual, whether or not holding office as a member of the qualified statutory partisan political party, or no voluntary association of such individuals is restrained from advocating the support or nonsupport of such candidates, the state, in the pursuit of the laudable aim of freeing judicial offices from partisan consideration, has properly served a compelling interest by limiting the elections in which the statutorily created party may officially participate.
The majority opinion dismisses the common sense conclusion of Unger I as the result of reliance on a broad definition of the term “nonpartisan” in a dictionary. It disapproves Unger I because it does not mention the legislative history of section 6 and because it fails to recognize that there is no express prohibition in section 6 or anywhere in our statutes to prohibit the conduct in question. (Ante, p. 478 of 209 Cal.Rptr., p. 242 of 692 P.2d.) It concludes that the legislative background and purpose of section 6, as well as the historical role played by political parties in nonpartisan elections and in the conduct of party affairs leads to the conclusion that section 6 does not prevent statutorily qualified parties from endorsing, supporting or opposing candidates for nonpartisan office. (Id. at p. 476 of 209 Cal.Rptr., p. 240 of 692 P.2d.) The opinion concludes from the historical background that the focus should not be to decide whether statutory political parties have legislative authority to support or oppose candidates for nonpartisan office, but whether there is an express restraint against such actions. It then finds that the only limitations imposed by the Legislature or by the Constitution are that such an organization may not nominate a candidate for such office and that the election shall be nonpartisan in form.2 Strictly speaking an election nonpartisan in form is one in which no party label appears on the ballot, and candidates are nominated by a simple petition process. It is obvious, however, that if political parties are given the license offered by the proposed opinion, and only the form but not the substance of a nonpartisan election is guaranteed, there well may be a breakdown in the political philosophy underlying the use of such a ballot.
Before demonstrating that prior legislation impliedly prohibited such activities, and that such activities cannot be justified on the grounds of improper practice in the past, I examine the purpose of section 6, and the intent of the voters in adopting the constitutional provisions. The plain meaning of the section is clear as laid out in Unger I. Unless a voter had prescience of the Attorney General's opinion rendered in January 1976 (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 60), that voter in 1972 would not know or be concerned with the fact that the Legislature had failed to expressly curb a qualified partisan political party's authority to interfere in a nonpartisan election. The voter presumably would know that for almost six decades the power to nominate partisan candidates through primary election had been delegated to the registered voters of each party along with the election of party functionaries to support the election of those nominees and to conduct other partisan party affairs. The voter would be surprised to learn that when he voted to make judicial, school, county and city offices nonpartisan he only intended that a party could not nominate candidates for that office, and that he contemporaneously was permitting it free rein to endorse and use its resources to support or oppose such a candidate.
These purposes, aimed at preserving the independence of the judiciary as one of the three constitutional branches of government, will be subverted by authorizing and encouraging the statutorily constituted political parties to grant or withhold endorsement of candidates for judicial office as a matter of practice. Such organizations are specially created to advance the partisan aims of party members through the selection and election of candidates for legislative and executive offices who will expound those aims in office. (See Moore v. Panish (1982) 32 Cal.3d 535, 542, 186 Cal.Rptr. 475, 652 P.2d 32.) It is obvious that the official interjection of such organizations in judicial elections will result in demands for similar subservience from candidates seeking formal endorsement for their election to the bench, and in tainting the election to the constitutionally designated nonpartisan office with issues unrelated to the administration of justice. Certainly the electorate had these evils in mind in adopting section 6.
With this background I examine the steps taken to render judicial elections nonpartisan. As of 1909 (Stats. 1909, ch. 405, p. 691) the provisions did not exclude any elected officers other than candidates at special elections to fill vacancies, officers of certain municipalities and districts, and of specified school districts. (Id., § 2, pp. 691–692, and see forms of ballot, p. 701.) In 1911 (Stats. 1911, ch. 398, p. 769; Stats. 1911, Ex.Sess., ch. 17, p. 66) the new primary election law expressly provided for nonpartisan nominating petitions for candidates for judicial office and school office and defined those terms. It was expressly provided, “In the case of a candidate for nomination to a judicial office or a school office, no affidavit shall be made that the candidate intends to affiliate with any party or to vote for a majority or any of the candidates of any party at any election.” (Stats.1911, ch. 398, § 5, subd. 4, p. 774; Stats. 1911, Ex.Sess., ch. 17, § 3, subd. 4, p. 71.) The statute provided that the group of names of candidates for nomination to any judicial office or school office should be identical for each such office on the primary election ballot of each political party. Nevertheless, the ballot did not distinguish between partisan and nonpartisan offices. At the election a candidate for judicial office or school office who received a majority of the votes for a single office would qualify as the only candidate of those running for the general election, but he might be opposed by petition of one not a candidate at the primary.
From the foregoing provisions and statutory history viewed in the light of the actual duties imposed on the elected party representatives, I can only conclude that the Legislature intended that judicial, school, county and township office elections should be divorced from partisan interference. Nowhere can I find it implied or understood that the official party representatives were to cloak the candidates for nonpartisan offices in their fold as had been the case before the 1911 and 1913 exclusions.
We are told that the general powers conferred by the Legislature (see Elec.Code, § 9443, and note §§ 8942, 9742, 9852, 9954) give a discretion which embraces the right of the statutory governing bodies of political parties to endorse or assist candidates in elections for nonpartisan office. An overview of the statutory provisions reflects a primary election in which the partisan electorate selects its committeemen and nominees, who then, in turn with others, constitute the organization to press for election of candidates in the general election. I find no intent that these groups should at a later date in the twilight of their incumbency bestir themselves to get judicial candidates to file petitions so they can endorse the candidate in a subsequent primary election. Insofar as sections 8942, 9443, 9742 and 9852 authorize a qualified party to “perform such other duties and services for this political party as seem to be for the benefit of the party,” such authorization should be limited to acts not prohibited by the Constitution.
The fact that the Legislature recognized the evils of official preprimary endorsement of partisan candidates and failed to similarly specifically restrict endorsement of nonpartisan candidates is not relevant. The subject of partisan candidates was one which the qualified parties were authorized to manage and control, and it was proper to correct the failure to follow the statutory system. On the other hand, any common sense interpretation of nonpartisan would indicate that the offices so designated should be free of influence of the statutory recognized parties. That there was no demand for legislative prohibition could not legalize what the law never contemplated.
I conclude that the statutorily recognized party may not officially endorse or expend funds for opposing or supporting a candidate for judicial office. That a referendum on a justice of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal is an election for judicial office cannot be questioned. Section 16 of article VI of the Constitution expressly refers to such an election under the title of “Election of judges” and expressly provides for a declaration of candidacy or nomination by the Governor of the person to stand for election.
Real parties in interest and amicus curiae contend if, as we assert, section 6 of article II of the state Constitution prohibits a qualified political party from officially endorsing or opposing a candidate in a nonpartisan judicial election, it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of association, and denies them equal protection of the laws.
Real party Republican Party has conceded that the maintenance of the integrity and impartiality of the state judiciary is a compelling state interest.8 It contends that the censorship of the official party's simple advocacy of the removal of selected justices is not the least intrusive measure of achieving judicial impartiality and is therefore unconstitutional. As outlined above, the people of this state have mandated that judicial and other specified offices shall be nonpartisan. We have concluded that therefore the recognized statutory parties should be denied the right to participate as party partisans in their election. The record reflects, as stated in the majority opinion (ante, p. 475, of 209 Cal.Rptr., p. 239 of 692 P.2d) that the real parties in interest, an officially recognized party and its responsible officers, intended to endorse the nonconfirmation of three justices of the Supreme Court in the November 1982 election, and planned to use the assets of the party to further that goal. The people have spoken and indicated that nonpartisan election of judges is necessary to secure their independence, integrity and impartiality. To permit the acts complained of would permit a party to seek out a candidate to file an independent petition (the equivalent of a nomination) and then grant endorsement and support, similar to that furnished candidates for partisan office. We should not countenance a return to a system of partisan selection of judges which the people sought to avoid.
The court in permitting the promotion of the exchange of political ideas for the benefit of the public expressed some reservations. The opinion states, “This factor is troublesome because there is an obvious interest to both the public and the Legislature in having judicial candidates free of the appearance of impropriety. An appearance of partisanship will hardly foster public confidence in the courts. However, the court feels constrained under cases discussed in conclusion number 4, supra.” (Id. at p. 65.) The cases referred to are those on which real parties in interest rely in this case and they are distinguished below. We point out here, however, that our interpretation of the California Constitution does not purport to infringe on the right of private citizens who wish to express their preferences in a nonpartisan election either alone or in association with others. It merely concludes that to avoid the troublesome appearance of party partisanship and possible impropriety, the party organization created to provide for the selection and support of a party's partisan candidates may not officially participate in the nonpartisan election.
In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, the court, in upholding the $1,000 limitation on individual contributions to a candidate stated, “To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one. [¶] Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.” (424 U.S. at pp. 26–27, 96 S.Ct. at p. 638; fn. omitted.) So here there is a compelling interest to prevent both actual, and the appearance of, impropriety. That interest has been expressed in our state law since 1911 and 1913.
The right of association is stressed in those cases which recognize the primacy of rules of a national party over a state regulation in determining the qualification of its delegates. (Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin (1981) 450 U.S. 107, 121–122, 101 S.Ct. 1010, 1018–19, 67 L.Ed.2d 82; and Cousins v. Wigoda (1975) 419 U.S. 477, 487–488, 95 S.Ct. 541, 546, 42 L.Ed.2d 595.) It also has served to protect the right to change party affiliation against arbitrary restrictions. (Kusper v. Pontikes (1973) 414 U.S. 51, 56–57, 94 S.Ct. 303, 307, 38 L.Ed.2d 260.) It has been asserted to uphold the right of those associating to voice their civil rights. (N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 430–431, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336–337, 9 L.Ed.2d 405; N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449, 460–461, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170–1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488.) It is recognized as a right to be free from unwarranted investigative processes. (Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) 354 U.S. 234, 250–251, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211–1212, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311.) In this case there is no burden on associating with the qualified parties for recognized partisan purposes. Nor is there any burden on those who would associate for endorsing, opposing or supporting any candidate in a nonpartisan election. We merely contend that insofar as an official party or organization is concerned it cannot get officially involved in the nonpartisan election.
Whatever may be an official party's function as an organ of views with respect to candidates for partisan office and general issues of government, it is not created or authorized for the purpose of endorsing, opposing and tangibly supporting its views on nonpartisan candidates so as to thereby defeat and undermine the status of the election for nonpartisan offices.
Since here the issue is the injection of partisan issues into the election of candidates for nonpartisan office we find Bellotti is neither controlling nor persuasive.
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., supra, the court struck down a regulation that prohibited the inclusion in monthly electric bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. (447 U.S. 530, 544, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2337, 65 L.Ed.2d 319.) In distinguishing the cases last referred to the court stated, “Greer and Lehman properly are viewed as narrow exceptions to the general prohibition against subject-matter distinctions. In both cases, the Court was asked to decide whether a public facility was open to all speakers. The plurality of Lehman and the Court in Greer concluded that partisan political speech would disrupt the operation of governmental facilities even though other forms of speech posed no such danger.” (Id. at p. 539, 100 S.Ct. at p. 2334, fn. omitted.) This case does not involve access to government property, but we feel that the People's constitutionally expressed desire that certain offices and the elections of candidates to those offices should be nonpartisan is entitled to freedom from disruption by endorsement or opposition and tangible support from entities expressly recognized for partisan purposes.
In similar vein we turn to C.S.C. v. Letter Carriers (1973) 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796. There the court upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act which prohibited active participation in political management or political campaign by civil service employees.11 The aims of the Hatch Act are similar to the reasons that induced the people to mandate that their judicial officers be nonpartisan. Judges are expected to administer justice without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the members thereof and to serve the impartial execution of the laws. It is not enough that they are prohibited from running on partisan tickets. In order to avoid the appearance of partisanship there is a compelling interest that the qualified political parties refrain from taking official action in the election of judicial candidates. Since all concerned may separately or in association present their views, the infringement solely by prohibition of use of the official party label will not leave the public uninformed as to the merit of candidates.
We are told that our construction of section 6 deprives the qualified parties of equal protection of the laws because nonqualified parties and other associations of varying lines of political nature are left free to endorse, oppose and tangibly support their views with respect to election for nonpartisan office. In California Medical Assn. v. FEC (1981) 453 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567, in response to a similar contention, the opinion recites, “The differing restrictions placed on individuals and unincorporated associations, on the one hand, and on unions and corporations, on the other, reflect a judgment by Congress that these entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.” (453 U.S. at p. 201, 101 S.Ct. at p. 2724.) So here we find that since those who remain unregulated are those who cannot extend the imprimatur of a state recognized political entity—the evil to be avoided—there is no unreasonable classification.
There is no attempt here to throttle criticism of the judiciary. In fact the prohibition of partisan endorsement merely clears the air for free expression on the quality of the administration of justice, rather than reducing the selection of candidates to a litmus test of endorsement by a given qualified political party.
The question is now moot and the alternative writ has served its purpose. It should therefore be discharged and the peremptory writ should be denied.
1. Petitioner Unger is not affiliated with any political party; petitioner Blasdell is a registered Republican.
2. Real party in interest Tirso del Junco is chairman of the Republican State Central Committee, and real party in interest William Campbell was the chairman and member of a study and campaign committee of the Republican Party for the nonconfirmation campaign.
4. Since the issue of relief sought by petitioners is moot, we need not consider their claim, denied by real parties in interest, that real parties in interest violated section 9277 because their decision to support the campaign was made at a state central committee meeting which lacked a quorum.
5. The code allows only political parties receiving a certain percentage of the vote at a primary or general election to qualify to participate in a primary election. (§ 6430.) The term “political party” as used in this opinion refers only to a party so qualified.
7. The study by Professor Lee does not specifically mention support of candidates for judicial office. It indicates, however, that party funds and the use of party precinct machinery were utilized in support of nonpartisan candidates, and that party organizations participated in local elections in 25 percent of the counties surveyed. (Tables 32 and 33 at p. 102.) According to declarations filed in Unger by the chairmen of the local central committees, their committees had endorsed and/or supported candidates for judicial and other nonpartisan office for many years.
11. Petitioners appear to claim that even if a political party is allowed to endorse or oppose a candidate for nonpartisan office, it should be prohibited from engaging in other conduct during the campaign to vindicate its views. In view of our conclusion that neither section 6 nor any other provision of law was intended to restrain political parties from participating in the election campaign for nonpartisan office (aside from the prohibition in § 37), we can see no justification for such a limitation.
12. Unger, one of the petitioners in the present proceeding was also the petitioner in Unger I.
13. Real parties in interest seek to distinguish Unger I on the ground that it dealt with an election contest between opposing candidates, whereas here even if the nonconfirmation campaign had been successful, the election would not have determined who would serve as the holder of the office, since any vacancy resulting from the unseating of a justice would be filled by appointment of the Governor. Thus, claim real parties in interest, unlike the situation in Unger I, the ultimate holder of the office would not be beholden to the party's interests. We have some doubts regarding the validity of this distinction in view of the broad grounds on which Unger I was decided. But we need not decide whether the distinction is valid since we disapprove of the holding of Unger I in any event.
15. The statute held unconstitutional in Concerned Democrats prohibited parties or partisan political organizations from supporting or assisting candidates for judicial office. Although the petitioner there was an unofficial political organization, the court made no distinction in its holding between the two types of entities. It concluded that there were less restrictive means by which the legislature could assure the neutrality of judges, including restrictions on the conduct of candidates for judicial office during the election campaign.
3. In Concerned Democrats of Florida v. Reno (S.D.Fla.1978) 458 F.Supp. 60, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a prohibition on political party endorsements of judicial candidates on the grounds that existing restrictions on judicial candidates and the nonpartisan ballot process (similar to those in California) were sufficient and less restrictive means of achieving the state's interest in “maintaining the integrity and impartiality of the state judiciary.” (Id., at p. 64.) While this holding is not controlling, it does highlight the government's burden to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the existing restrictions, there remains a threat to judicial integrity and impartiality sufficient to justify an absolute prohibition on advocacy by political parties.
6. This distinction raises serious equal protection problems. Where First Amendment interests are abridged, the equal protection clause requires that any legislative discrimination among speakers be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. (American Party of Texas v. White (1974) 415 U.S. 767, 780, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1305, 39 L.Ed.2d 744; Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley (1972) 408 U.S. 92, 99, 101, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2292, 2293, 33 L.Ed.2d 212.) While First Amendment and equal protection analyses are, therefore, almost identical in some cases, analysis under the equal protection clause, by “[h]ighlighting the legislative classification serves to illumine the state's interest in burdening those of the plaintiff's class and the necessity of doing so in order to advance that interest.” (Morial v. Judiciary Com'n of State of L.A. (5th Cir.1977) 565 F.2d 295, 304.)Under equal protection analysis, the relevant question in this case becomes: in what way does the threat posed by qualified political parties differ significantly enough from that posed by all other political and “special interest” groups to warrant such different treatment? Real parties in interest nowhere address this crucial question. Without some indication that political parties pose a significantly greater or different threat than do other groups, it would be difficult to find that the government has met its burden under the equal protection clause.
2. This means that the election papers do not refer to a party affiliation (Elec.Code, § 6401.5); the name of the candidate's party shall not appear on the ballot and voters may vote for any candidate without regard to the voter's party affiliation (Id., §§ 10200.5, 10214); and nonpartisan candidates are listed in separate columns on the ballot (Elec.Code, § 10207). Parenthetically we note that since 1966 Judges of the Supreme Court and Judges of Courts of Appeal may only be nominated by the incumbent's declarations of candidacy or by the Governor. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16, subd. (d).) The limited construction of the proposed opinion renders section 6 redundant for those offices.
4. It would be naive to fail to recognize that a vast majority of judicial positions are first filled by an appointment by a partisan elected official. I am also aware that such legal matters as “law and order” and “civil rights” sometimes become partisan political issues. Nevertheless, I believe that in selecting nonpartisanship, the people have expressed a philosophy that, if applied, should produce greater independence and integrity of the judiciary, than a system in which candidates may race from the filing office to seek a partisan endorsement by a statutory party organization.The writer can recall his shock in learning in 1964 at the Institute of Judicial Administration Seminar for Appellate Court Judges that a judge of a court of general jurisdiction in one state where judges were elected on a partisan ticket was expected to contribute almost a year's salary to his party for the privilege of being its nominee.
5. This language appeared in section 22 of article I of the Constitution of 1879. It was repealed and readopted as section 28 on November 5, 1974; and it was renumbered as section 26, June 8, 1978.
7. I have noted the opinion of the federal district court referred to in the majority opinion (ante, at p. 477, of 209 Cal.Rptr., p. ––––of ––– P.2d, fn. 8). I welcome the federal judge's abstention on the issue presented in this case as an opportunity to point out the statutory functions of the qualified parties in this state, and to reconcile the provisions of the United States and state Constitutions. For the reasons expressed by Deputy Attorney General (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal) Leonard M. Friedman in Opinion No. 54–29 (23 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 119 (1954)) I believe the district judge erred in not finding a compelling state interest for the adoption of Elections Code section 11702 and in failing to distinguish between the right of freedom of speech of the qualified party and that of the individual members of the party and any voluntary association of such members.
FILES * and JANES,* JJ., concur.

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