Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/colorado-appellate-rules/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 19:01:46+00:00

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On Thursday, October 11, 2012, the Colorado Supreme Court issued Rule Change 2012(15), containing an amendment to Rule 5 of the Colorado Appellate Rules. The amendment adds subsections (e) and (f) to the rule, as well as a comment to explain the purpose of the new subsections.
The purpose of C.A.R. 5(e) is to establish a procedure similar to that set forth in Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 121 Section 1-1(5). This procedure provides assurance that an attorney who makes a limited appearance for a pro se party in a specified appellate case proceeding(s), at the request of and with the consent of the pro se party, can withdraw from the case upon filing a notice of completion of the limited appearance, without leave of court. The purpose of C.A.R. 5(f) is to make clear that when an attorney appears for a party, whom he or she has not previously represented, in an appellate court and the proceedings in that court have concluded, the attorney is not obligated to represent the party in any other proceeding on remand or in any review of the appellate court’s decision by any other court. Nothing in this provision would prevent the attorney from entering a limited or general appearance on behalf of the party in another court (for example, on a writ of certiorari to the supreme court), if agreed to by the attorney and the party.
The amendments were adopted October 11, 2012, effective immediately. Click here to review the red line changes to these appellate rules, outlined as Rule Change 2012(15).
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Associated Governments of Northwest Colorado v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission on April 23, 2012.
CRS § 40-6-115(5)—“Commenced and Tried”—Remedy for Improper Venue is Transfer to Proper Venue.
The Associated Governments of Northwest Colorado (AGNC) filed a petition for judicial review in Routt County District Court, seeking judicial review of a decision by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Pursuant to CRS § 40-6-115(5), such petitions must be commenced and tried in district court either in the county where the petitioning corporation has its principal office or place of business, or in Denver District Court. In this case, the Routt County District Court found that AGNC’s principal office or place of business was in Garfield County, not Routt County. The court ordered that AGNC be permitted to transfer the case to Garfield County or Denver District Court. AGNC chose Denver District Court.
PUC petitioned the Supreme Court, under C.A.R. 21, for a rule to show cause why the case should not be dismissed rather than transferred. The Court issued the rule to show cause, and now discharged the rule. The Court held that CRS § 40-6-115(5), which enumerates the counties where a petition for review of PUC actions shall be commenced and tried, sets a venue requirement. The requirement is procedural, not substantive. AGNC’s initial failure to file in a proper venue did not deprive the Routt County District Court of jurisdiction to grant a venue transfer motion. Instead, the statute allows the Routt County District Court to transfer this case to the Denver District Court.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Vinton v. Virzi on February 13, 2012.
Trust Administration—C.R.C.P. 9(b) —Client Suing Opposing Attorney.
Amanda Vinton petitioned for relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 from orders of the probate court permitting Sharon Virzi to amend her challenge to a trust administration by adding a claim of fraud against Vinton, the attorney for the trustee. Over Vinton’s objection, the probate court summarily granted Virzi’s motion to amend, forcing Vinton to withdraw as counsel for the trustee. The probate court summarily denied two motions by Vinton to dismiss the claim against her and ordered her to pay Virzi’s attorney fees for having to defend against a substantially frivolous and groundless motion. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause.
The Court held that because Virzi’s fraud claim was not pleaded with sufficient particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss, it was futile, and the probate court abused its discretion in permitting the joinder of her opponent’s attorney. The Court also held that regardless of whether Vinton’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the separate fraud claim was meritorious, the record was inadequate to support an award of attorney fees. The rule was made absolute and the matter was remanded to the probate court with directions to dismiss Virzi’s claim of fraud against Vinton and to vacate its award of attorney fees.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Kowalchik v. Brohl on February 2, 2012.
In this taxation dispute involving conservation easement tax credits, defendant Barbara Brohl, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Revenue (DOR), petitioned for interlocutory review of the trial court’s finding that certain individuals do not fall within the statutory definition of “taxpayer.” The petition was granted.
In Colorado, a state income tax credit is allowed for a qualifying conservation easement created on real property that a taxpayer owns and donates to a governmental entity or charitable organization. Generally, a donor taxpayer may assign to transferees all or any portion of the tax credit generated by any donation. The donor taxpayer may generate only one such tax credit per year. A transferee taxpayer may purchase credits from an unlimited number of donors and claim an unlimited number of credits against a tax liability.
Plaintiffs are numerous conservation easement donors. In tax years 2005 and 2006, plaintiffs donated fourteen conservation easements purportedly generating several million dollars worth of state tax credits. Plaintiffs then transferred credits to fifteen transferees who claimed the credits on their respective state income tax returns or retained them for use against future tax liability.
If the DOR disallows some or all of a conservation easement tax credit, a notice of disallowance, deficiency, or rejection of refund is sent to the donor of the easement who generated the credit (“tax matters representative” or TMR) and to any transferee who has used any portion of the tax credit. DOR disallowed the credits at issue in this case, sent plaintiffs notices disallowing the credits, and provided a notice informing them of the procedures created by CRS § 39-22-522.5 for resolution of tax credit disputes. Transferees are bound by the final resolution of disputes between DOR and the TMR.
Pursuant to CRS § 39-22-522.5(2), plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in the district court appealing DOR’s disallowance of the tax credits. Plaintiffs did not join the transferees. DOR moved to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or alternatively to compel plaintiffs to join the transferees pursuant to C.R.C.P. 19(a).
The trial court denied DOR’s motion. DOR moved the court to certify its order and several additional legal matters for interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.2. The trial court granted the certification order with four questions for interlocutory appeal, and DOR sought interlocutory review under CRS § 13-4-102.1 and C.A.R. 4.2.
The Court or Appeals has discretion to grant an interlocutory appeal when (1) immediate review may promote a more orderly disposition or establish a final disposition of the litigation; (2) the order from which an appeal is sought involves a controlling question of law; and (3) that question of law is unresolved. The Court found these factors present in this case and granted DOR’s petition for interlocutory review, stating that a later opinion will address the merits.
This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on January 19, 2012, can be found here.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. S.X.G. on February 6, 2012.
Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Cases—Petitions for Review of Magistrate’s Order in Delinquency Cases—Interlocutory Appeals in Delinquency Cases.
In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal under CRS §§19-2-903(2) and 16-12-102(2), and C.A.R. 4.1, seeking the Supreme Court’s review of a juvenile magistrate’s order suppressing certain statements made by a juvenile during a police interrogation. Because the juvenile magistrate’s suppression order never was reviewed or adopted (with or without modification) by the district court, as is required by CRS §19-1-108(5.5) and C.R.M. 7(a)(10)–(11) before an appeal may be filed, the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under CRS §§19-2-903(2) and 16-12-102(2) to review the merits of the suppression ruling. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Farm Deals, LLLP v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue on January 5, 2012.
Petitioners filed a petition to appeal an interlocutory order of the trial court pursuant to CRS § 13-4-102.1 and C.A.R. 4.2, as well as a motion for leave to file the petition late. The motion was denied and the petition was dismissed.
Petitioners filed an appeal in the trial court challenging determinations by the Colorado Department of Revenue (Department) denying income tax credits for conservation easements during the 2003 tax year. They did not name the transferees of the tax credits as parties, and the Department and its Executive Director moved for an order requiring them to be joined as parties pursuant to C.R.C.P. 19. The court granted the motion over petitioners’ objection. Respondents then filed a motion requesting the court to order petitioners to personally serve each of the transferees (there were approximately eighty of them) with a summons and the complaint. Petitioners argued service by mail was permitted under CRS § 39-21-105.5.
On September 29, 2011, the trial court ruled that CRS § 39-21-105.5 was inapplicable, and that CRS § 39-22-522.5 required petitioners to serve the transferees in accordance with C.R.C.P. 4. On October 19, 2011, petitioners filed a motion requesting certification of the order for an interlocutory appeal under CRS § 13-4-102.1. Respondents opposed on numerous grounds, including that it was not filed with fourteen days of September 29 as required by C.A.R. 4.2(c). The trial court granted the motion for certification by order dated November 15, 2011.
On December 7, 2011, petitioners filed their petition to appeal the service of process issues decided by the September 29 order and certified by order of November 15. They also filed a motion to permit the late filing of the petition.
C.A.R. 4.2 was promulgated by the Colorado Supreme Court to establish procedures for applying CRS § 13-4-102.1. Here, petitioners failed to meet the deadline for certifying the appeal fourteen days after the order and failed to meet the deadline for filing with the court of appeals fourteen days after the date of the certification.
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had no authority to extend the fourteen-day deadline for filing a motion for certification. The Court also concluded that petitioners failed to establish good cause for their failure to meet the jurisdictional deadline of C.A.R. 4.2(d). The Court noted that, pursuant to C.A.R. 26(b), it is authorized to extend the deadline for good cause due to excusable neglect. Here, petitioners’ counsel stated only that he entrusted the filing of the petition to his secretary, who erroneously filed it in the trial court, and that he “is unfamiliar with Lexis Nexis filing.” The Court held these assertions demonstrated carelessness, not excusable neglect. The petition was dismissed as untimely.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Coates on December 12, 2011.
The People brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011), and C.A.R. 4.1, challenging the district court’s suppression of evidence seized from the trunk of the defendant’s vehicle. Upon discovering a bindle and single prescription pill in the driver’s pants pocket, the police arrested him, placed him in their patrol car, and searched the vehicle. The district court found that the police lacked any reasonable and articulable basis to search the defendant’s trunk incident to the arrest of the driver in accordance with Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), and that they therefore also lacked probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle’s trunk pursuant to the automobile exception.
The supreme court affirmed. It held, however, that because the evidence for which suppression was sought was not seized from the passenger compartment of the defendant’s vehicle, the search-incident-to-arrest exception could not justify its seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the supreme court affirmed on the grounds that it was able to determine from the district court’s findings of fact that the police lacked probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle, whether or not they would have been justified in searching the passenger compartment on less than probable cause.
The changes conform these rules to the “rule of 7″ for procedural time periods. This change, adopting multiples of a week, will help eliminate problems that arise when a deadline falls on a weekend; deadlines can no longer fall on a weekend.
Eliminate the 3-day mail rule.
Add the requirement that motions challenging expert testimony pursuant to C.R.E. 702 must be filed no later than 70 days (10 weeks) before the trial.
Clarify that the “next day” is determined by continuing to count forward when the period is measured after an event and backward when measured before an event.
Repeal provisions that conflict with the “rule of 7” standard.
The Water Courts recently adopted similar changes, which can be viewed here.

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