Source: http://ctsportsmen.com/olr-report-firearm-preemption-issues-does-connecticut-law-preempt-municipal-firearm-ordinances/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:16:02+00:00

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Coalition of Connecticut Sportsmen :: OLR Report: Firearm Preemption Issues—Does Connecticut Law Preempt Municipal Firearm Ordinances?
Home Hot Issues OLR Report: Firearm Preemption Issues—Does Connecticut Law Preempt Municipal Firearm Ordinances?
State preemption laws prevent local jurisdictions from enacting ordinances that irreconcilably conflict with state statutes or address matters in an area in which the legislature has demonstrated the intent to occupy the entire field of regulation. Preemption may be expressly stated in a statute or constitutional provision or implied from the statute’s construction and purpose. It is up to the courts to determine if a statute preempts an ordinance.
(d) The provisions of this section shall supersede any inconsistent ordinances or regulations enacted by a municipality (http: //www. cga. ct. gov/2011/TOB/H/2011HB-06377-R00-HB. htm).
Absent explicit preemptive statutory language, courts may infer an implied intent on the state’s part to assert exclusive authority over a subject matter when a comprehensive scheme of state regulation exists on that subject. This is referred to as implied preemption. The state Supreme Court has held that “[a] local ordinance is preempted by a state statute whenever the legislature has demonstrated an intent to occupy the entire field of regulation on the matter. . . . ”(Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc. , 234 Conn. 221, 232 (1995)).
Even if the legislature has not occupied a field, courts may find that a municipal ordinance is preempted if it conflicts with state law, making compliance with both state law and the ordinance impossible. This is referred to as conflict preemption. “Whether an ordinance conflicts with a statute or statutes can only be determined by reviewing the policy and purposes behind the statute and measuring the degree to which the ordinance frustrates the achievement of the state’s objectives (Id. , at 232). The state Supreme Court has ruled that (1) an ordinance is not in conflict with a state statute if it only enlarges on “the provisions of a statute by requiring more than [the] statute” (Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532, 544 (1981)) and (2) an ordinance that is not in conflict with a statute is not preempted by it (Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 105, 130, 131 (2001)).
The state Supreme Court has ruled that a municipality’s powers are those that are (1) expressly granted or (2) by implication, necessary to exercise those powers expressly granted (Hennessy v. City of Bridgeport, 231 Conn. 656 (1990)). The statues give towns the power “to make and enforce police, sanitary and similar regulations and protect or promote the peace, safety, good government and welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants” and “provide for the health of the inhabitants of the municipality and do all things necessary or desirable to secure and promote the public health” (CGS § 7-148 (c) (7) (H) (xiii, xi)).
On appeal to the state Supreme Court, Justice Katz, writing for the majority, discussed the legal principles underlying a municipality’s police powers and the court’s deference to their exercise. Justice Katz then discussed how the Court determines whether a local ordinance is preempted by statute. She noted that preemption occurs when the legislature has demonstrated the intent to occupy the entire field of regulation or when a local ordinance irreconcilably conflicts with a statute. Justice Katz also noted that (1) the legislature had clearly anticipated municipalities adopting public health regulations when it granted them broad police powers and (2) if the legislature had wanted to preempt a municipality from adopting an ordinance banning vending machines, it could have done so explicitly.
[T]he New Haven ordinance removes an entire class of persons as potential sellers of handguns at retail. The state permit is rendered an illusory right because a casual seller residing in a nonbusiness zone can have no real hope of ever conforming to the local ordinance. In this respect the local ordinance conflicts with the legislative intent as expressed in the applicable statutes. The city has removed a right that the state permit bestows and thus has exceeded its powers (Id. , at p. 14).
Dwyer was particularly concerned with handgun sales by individuals. The Court specifically noted that it was not deciding on whether a municipality could pass a zoning ordinance restricting the sale of handguns to specific zones. This would seem to allow towns to regulate the location, at least, of commercial gun outlets. West Hartford, for example, prohibits gun shops in ‘neighborhood business districts,’ allowing them in “business districts” as a secondary use (e. g. , as a department in a sporting goods or department store). A “neighborhood business district” is defined as an area where stores provide goods and services predominately for surrounding residents. These might include convenience, package, or drug stores (West Hartford Municipal Code § 177-16. 2).
Several courts have considered whether state law preempts local regulation of hunting, including State v. Brennan (3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 413, 216 A. 2d 294 (1965)) and Kaluszka v. East Hartford (60 Conn. App. 749 (2000)).
In Brennan, the court held that the town of Westport, which was granted the power to regulate hunting within the town by special act, had no power under the special act to regulate hunting over navigable waters adjacent to the town. The court found that the state has preempted the field of regulating and encouraging the hunting of wildlife on public and private lands and waters (Id. , 417).
The comprehensive nature of the state hunting statutes and regulations, when considered along with the comments and actions of the General Assembly in its consideration of provisions that would have delegated power over hunting regulation to the towns is ample evidence of the legislature’s intent. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the court that the town has no authority to regulate hunting on federal, state or private property within its borders. . . . Furthermore even if the court were to hold that the state has not occupied the field of hunting regulation, the hunting regulation provisions of § 13-33 are in conflict with the state statutes and are therefore preempted (Kaluszka v. East Hartford, 46 Conn. Sup. 588, 596, 597 (1999).

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