Source: http://ipmall.info/content/bpai-board-patent-appeals-and-interferences-patent-and-trademark-office-pto-1-vanderkooi-et
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:42:01+00:00

Document:
Application of Nicholas Vanderkooi Jr., John C. Haylock, Stephen R. Schulze and Harold W. Tuller, filed September 9, 1983, Reissue Serial No. 530,805.
Patent granted to Guenther K. Hoeschele on September 28, 1982, Patent No. 4,351,757, filed October 24, 1980, Serial No. 200,192.
This interference involves a reissue application of the junior party, Vanderkooi et al. (Vanderkooi), and a patent of the senior party, Hoeschele. The Vanderkooi reissue application is assigned to Allied Corporation (Allied), and the Hoeschele patent is assigned to E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (DuPont).
(b) from about 0.2% to about 10% based on the weight of the polyester of a nucleating agent comprising a dimer acid and a trimer acid mixture, the mixture having from 0% to 100% by weight trimer acid, the dimer acid having at least 36 carbon atoms and two carboxyl groups, the trimer acid having at least 54 carbon atoms and three carboxyl groups, with the total amount of carboxyl groups being neutralized from 10 to 100 percent by a cation of a metal selected from Group IA of the Periodic Table of the Elements.
Both parties took testimony and submitted documentary evidence [FN2] in an attempt to establish a date of invention prior to their respective filing dates. Additionally Hoeschele relies upon a motion for judgment (Paper No. 7) of unpatentability with respect to Vanderkooi Claims 39 and 47, consideration of which having been deferred to final hearing. Both parties filed briefs and appeared, through counsel, at final hearing.
1. Is the evidence of conception adduced by the senior party sufficient as a matter of law to establish that Dr. Hoeschele conceived the invention in issue prior to the date of invention established by Vanderkooi?
2. Do the activities by DuPont personnel (Garrison and Deyrup) which resulted in a reduction to practice of the invention in issue [FN4] inure to Hoeschele's benefit?
3. Do Vanderkooi claims 39 and 47 comply with the requirements of 35 USC 112 and 35 USC 132?
After carefully evaluating the record before us in light of the opposing arguments of counsel in the briefs and at final hearing, we find that we agree with the views expressed in Hoeschele's brief regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence of conception in Hoeschele's record. In short, we conclude that the evidence proffered by the senior party is sufficient to establish that Dr. Hoeschele conceived the invention in issue prior to the date of invention relied upon by Vanderkooi.
Vanderkooi's basic position on the question of conception is that Dr. Hoeschele is not entitled to claim that he alone conceived the invention in issue since, according to Vanderkooi, Dr. Hoeschele made no contribution in determining the amounts of crystallization agent to be used in the involved polyester molding composition, i.e., the amounts expressly set forth in the count. However, the law does not require that every limitation in the counts must be exactly foreseen before a conception can be said to be complete; rather, the test of conception is whether the disclosure by the purported inventor was such that no extensive research or experimentation would be required for one of ordinary skill in the art to reduce the concept to practice based upon that disclosure. Vancil v. Arata, 202 USPQ 58 (Bd.Pat.Int. 1977); Summers v. Vogel, 141 USPQ 816 (CCPA 1964); In re Tansel, 253 F.2d 730,117 USPQ 188 (CCPA 1958); Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 1897 C.D. 724 (1897). The standard for proving conception is not essentially different from that required for proving sufficiency of disclosure under 35 USC 112. Spero v. Ringold, 153 USPQ 726 (CCPA 1967).
(1) Samuels, the attorney assigned to prepare the involved Hoeschele patent application, determined that Dr. Hoeschele was in fact the sole inventor, apparently after discussing the matter with all concerned. [HR 8 5/17 -8 8/14 ]. Samuels exercised sole responsibility for determining inventorship with respect to the invention at issue [HR 9 5/2 -9 7/19 ].
In view of the foregoing, it is reasonable to infer that attorney Samuels, in determining that Dr. Hoeschele was the sole inventor, must have reached the conclusion that Hoeschele's original conception was sufficiently complete to enable Garrison and Deyrup to reduce the involved invention to practice without 'any further exercise of inventive skill'. Cf. Mergenthaler v. Scudder, supra.
(2) Garrison apparently had no difficulty in reducing Hoeschele's concept to practice in a relatively short amount of time, i.e., within two weeks [HR 22 7/22 -23 6/17].
(3) Deyrup and Garrison acknowledged Dr. Hoeschele as the source of the initial suggestion without any indication of a conviction on their part that they made an inventive contribution or invested anything more than routine skill in reducing the concept to practice.
(4) In disclosing a specific function for the sodium salt of dimer acid, i.e., 'as a nucleating agent for polyesters' [HX-5], Hoeschele implicitly suggested that the salt be used in an amount effective to perform that function. Ordinarily, the mere determination of a suitable range of values for a suggested result-effective variable or agent is considered to be prima facie within the realm of ordinary skill. CF. In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 205 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1980); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 105 USPQ 233 (CCPA 1955).
As we have previously indicated (footnote 4), there is no question that the work undertaken by Garrison and Deyrup at DuPont constituted a reduction to practice of the invention defined by the count prior to Vanderkooi's uncontested date of invention. Rather, the reduction-to-practice issue raised by Vanderkooi in effect reduces to a question of who, among the workers in a single corporate entity (here DuPont), Should have been given credit for inventing a particular composition (here-defined by the present count). In this sense, it is our opinion that the issue before us is more akin to the question of inventorship confronted by the court in Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 197 USPQ 482 (CCPA 1978) [FN5], than to the derivation-type question addressed in Polye v. Uhl, 328 F.2d 893, 140 USPQ 584 (CCPA 1964). [FN6] Thus, Gunter, rather than Polye, is controlling with respect to the issues in this interference.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Hoeschele has established an actual reduction to practice of the composition defined by the count prior to the date of invention established by Vanderkooi.
Based upon the foregoing, a decision on priority favor of Hoeschele is appropriate. Accordingly, the issue of compliance of Vanderkooi claims 39 and 47 with the requirements of 35 USC 112 and 35 USC 132 is moot.
Judgment as to the subject matter of the count in issue is awarded to Guenther K. Hoeschele, the senior party. Accordingly, (1) Guenther K. Hoeschele is entitled to a patent containing claims 1-8 which correspond to the count; (2) Nicholas Vanderkooi Jr., John C. Haylock and Stephen R. Schulze are not entitled to a patent containing their claims 1-47 which correspond to the count.
FN1. At the final hearing held on September 15, 1987, we indicated that this interference would be formally redeclared concurrent with our final decision, in accordance with the decision on motions (Paper No. 35) of October 31, 1985, by substituting Count 2 for Count 1 with Vanderkooi claim 39 designated as corresponding to the new count in addition to Vanderkooi claims 1-38 and 40-47 and Hoeschele claims 1-8. Neither party objected at final hearing to having the interference redeclared as indicated above. In fact, we note that both parties have astutely based their briefed positions on the new count, Count 2 (Vanderkooi Brief--page 30; Hoeschele brief--page 3).
FN2. The Hoeschele testimony and exhibits will be respectively referred to by the designations HR- and HX-, with each designation being followed by the corresponding page and line or exhibit number in the Hoeschele record. The Vanderkooi testimony and exhibits will similarly be referred to by the designations VR- and VX-.
FN3. There is no dispute here that the invention defined by the count was conceived by the junior party as early as April 16, 1980 and subsequently reduced to practice in June or July of the same year. In this regard, it is noted that the senior party has not contested Vanderkooi's case-in-chief on priority (Hoeschele's position on this matter is summarized on page 55 of his brief).
FN4. Vanderkooi does not dispute that the evidence adduced by Hoeschele is sufficient to establish that the invention in issue was actually reduced to practice by DuPont personnel, other than Dr. Hoeschele, prior to the date of invention established by Vanderkooi. In this connection, see the first paragraph on page 30 of the Vanderkooi brief.
FN5. The relevance of the Gunter case is adequately discussed in the Hoeschele brief (pages 36-37) and never disputed by the junior party, either in its reply brief or at final hearing.
FN6. The Polye case is relied upon by the junior party to support its position that the reduction to practice at DuPont does not inure to the benefit of Hoeschele.
FN7. We wish to emphasize that it is Vanderkooi who challenges inventorship; and that Hoeschele does not, as Vanderkooi seems to suggest, seek to change inventorship.
FN8. 197 USPQ 482, 483-484.

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