Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/395/486/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:23:55+00:00

Document:
H.R.Res. No. 1 before Select Committee Pursuant to H.R.Res. No. 1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1967) (hereinafter Hearings). Powell appeared at the Committee hearing held on February 8, 1967. After the Committee denied in part Powell's request that certain adversary-type procedures be followed, [Footnote 1] Powell testified. He would, however, give information relating only to his age, citizenship, and residency; upon the advice of counsel, he refused to answer other questions.
Powell and 13 voters of the 18th Congressional District of New York subsequently instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Five members of the House of Representatives were named as defendants individually and "as representatives of a class of citizens who are presently serving . . . as members of the House of Representatives." John W. McCormack was named in his official capacity as Speaker, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms and the Doorkeeper were named individually and in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated the Constitution, specifically Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, because the resolution was inconsistent with the mandate that the members of the House shall be elected by the people of each State, and Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, which, petitioners alleged, sets forth the exclusive qualifications for membership. [Footnote 2] The complaint further alleged that the Clerk of the House threatened to refuse to perform the service for Powell to which a duly elected Congressman is entitled, that the Sergeant at Arms refused to pay Powell his salary, and that the Doorkeeper threatened to deny Powell admission to the House chamber.
Petitioners asked that a three-judge court be convened. [Footnote 3] Further, they requested that the District Court grant a permanent injunction restraining respondents from executing the House Resolution, and enjoining the Speaker from refusing to administer the oath, the Clerk from refusing to perform the duties due a Representative, the Sergeant at Arms from refusing to pay Powell his salary, and the Doorkeeper from refusing to admit Powell to the Chamber. [Footnote 4] The complaint also requested a declaratory judgment that Powell's exclusion was unconstitutional.
Judgments 35-37 (2d ed.1941). Where one of the several issues presented becomes moot, the remaining live issues supply the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 330 U. S. 86-94 (1947); 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice 1157.13 (2d ed.1966). Despite Powell's obvious and continuing interest in his withheld salary, respondents insist that Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U. S. 528 (1926), leaves us no choice but to dismiss this litigation as moot. Alejandrino, a duly appointed Senator of the Philippine Islands, was suspended for one year by a resolution of the Philippine Senate and deprived of all "prerogatives, privileges and emoluments" for the period of his suspension. The Supreme Court of the Philippines refused to enjoin the suspension. By the time the case reached this Court, the suspension had expired and the Court dismissed as moot Alejandrino's request that the suspension be enjoined. Then, sua sponte, [Footnote 9] the Court considered whether the possibility that Alejandrino was entitled to back salary required it "to retain the case for the purpose of determining whether he [Alejandrino] may not have a mandamus for this purpose." Id. at 271 U. S. 533. Characterizing the issue of Alejandrino's salary as a "mere incident" to his claim that the suspension was improper, the Court noted that he had not briefed the salary issue, and that his request for mandamus did not set out with sufficient clarity the official or set of officials against whom the mandamus should issue. Id. at 271 U. S. 533-534. The Court therefore refused to treat the salary claim and dismissed the entire action as moot.
when Alejandrino was decided. [Footnote 12] A court may grant declaratory relief even though it chooses not to issue an injunction or mandamus. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra, at 330 U. S. 93; cf. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 332 U. S. 25-26 (1947). A declaratory judgment can then be used as a predicate to further relief, including an injunction. 28 U.S.C. § 2202; see Vermont Structural Slate Co. v. Tatko Brothers Slate Co., 253 F.2d 29 (C.A.2d Cir.1958); United States Lines Co. v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 385 (C.A.2d Cir.1952). Alejandrino stands only for the proposition that, where one claim has become moot and the pleadings are insufficient to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to another remedy, the action should be dismissed as moot. [Footnote 13] There is no suggestion that petitioners' averments as to declaratory relief are insufficient, and Powell's allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of salary remains unresolved.
385 U.S. at 385 U. S. 128, n. 4. Bond is not controlling, argue respondents, because the legislative term from which Bond was excluded did not end until December 31, 1966, [Footnote 14] and our decision was rendered December 5; further, when Bond was decided, Bond had not as yet been seated, while, in this case, Powell has been. [Footnote 15] Respondents do not tell us, however, why these factual distinctions create a legally significant difference between Bond and this case. We relied in Bond on the outstanding salary claim, not the facts respondents stress, to hold that the case was not moot.
defense on the merits, but also protects a legislator from the burden of defending himself. Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, at 387 U. S. 85; see Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 341 U. S. 377.
"In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of everyone, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence. [Footnote 22]"
The Court first articulated in Kilbourn and followed in Dombrowski v. Eastland [Footnote 23] the doctrine that, although an action against a Congressman may be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause, legislative employees who participated in the unconstitutional activity are responsible for their acts. Despite the fact that petitioners brought this suit against several House employees -- the Sergeant at Arms, the Doorkeeper and the Clerk -- as well as several Congressmen, respondents argue that Kilbourn and Dombrowski are distinguishable. Conceding that, in Kilbourn, the presence of the Sergeant at Arms, and, in Dombrowski, the presence of a congressional subcommittee counsel as defendants in the litigation allowed judicial review of the challenged congressional action, respondents urge that both cases concerned an affirmative act performed by the employee outside the House having a direct effect upon a private citizen. Here, they continue, the relief sought relates to actions taken by House agents solely within the House. Alternatively, respondents insist that Kilbourn and Dombrowski prayed for damages, while petitioner Powell asks that the Sergeant at Arms disburse funds, an assertedly greater interference with the legislative process. We reject the proffered distinctions.
103 U.S. at 103 U. S. 199.
Although respondents repeatedly urge this Court not to speculate as to the reasons for Powell's exclusion, their attempt to equate exclusion with expulsion would require a similar speculation that the House would have voted to expel Powell had it been faced with that question. Powell had not been seated at the time House Resolution No. 278 was debated and passed. After a motion to bring the Select Committee's proposed resolution to an immediate vote had been defeated, an amendment was offered which mandated Powell's exclusion. [Footnote 28] Mr. Celler, chairman of the Select Committee, then posed a parliamentary inquiry to determine whether a two-thirds vote was necessary to pass the resolution if so amended "in the sense that it might amount to an expulsion." 113 Cong.Rec. 5020. The Speaker replied that "action by a majority vote would be in accordance with the rules." Ibid. Had the amendment been regarded as an attempt to expel Powell, a two-thirds vote would have been constitutionally required. The Speaker ruled that the House was voting to exclude Powell, and we will not speculate what the result might have been if Powell had been seated and expulsion proceedings subsequently instituted.
"The House voted 202 votes for the previous question [Footnote 31] leading toward the adoption of the [Select] Committee report. It voted 222 votes against the previous question, opening the floor for the Curtis Amendment, which ultimately excluded Powell. "
"Upon adoption of the Curtis Amendment, the vote again fell short of two-thirds, being 248 yeas to 176 nays. Only on the final vote, adopting the Resolution as amended, was more than a two-thirds vote obtained, the vote being 307 yeas to 116 nays. On this last vote, as a practical matter, members who would not have denied Powell a seat if they were given the choice to punish him had to cast an aye vote or else record themselves as opposed to the only punishment that was likely to come before the House. Had the matter come up through the processes of expulsion, it appears that the two-thirds vote would have failed, and then members would have been able to apply a lesser penalty. [Footnote 32]"
As we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 198 (1962), there is a significant difference between determining whether a federal court has "jurisdiction of the subject matter" and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction is "justiciable." The District Court determined that "to decide this case on the merits . . . would constitute a clear violation of the doctrine of separation of powers." and then dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter." Powell v. McCormack, 266 F.Supp. 354, 359, 360 (D.C. D.C.1967). However, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, the doctrine of separation of powers is more properly considered in determining whether the case is "justiciable." We agree with the unanimous conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the District Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. [Footnote 33] However, for reasons set forth in 395 U. S. infra we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this case is not justiciable.
"power conferred on the courts by article III does not authorize this Court to do anything more than declare its lack of jurisdiction to proceed. [Footnote 36]"
We reject this contention. Article III, § 1, provide that the "judicial Power . . . shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . establish." Further, § 2 mandates that the "judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution. . . ." It has long been held that a suit "arises under" the Constitution if a petitioner's claim "will be sustained if the Constitution . . . [is] given one construction and will be defeated if [it is] given another." [Footnote 37] Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 327 U. S. 685 (1946). See King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, 263 U. S. 361, 263 U. S. 363-364 (1923). Cf. 22 U. S. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824). See generally C. Wright, Federal Courts 48-52 (1963). Thus, this case clearly is one "arising under" the Constitution as the Court has interpreted that phrase. Any bar to federal courts reviewing the judgments made by the House or Senate in excluding a member arises from the allocation of powers between the two branches of the Federal Government (a question of justiciability), and not from the petitioners' failure to state a claim based on federal law.
We have noted that the grant of jurisdiction in § 1331(a), while made in the language used in Art. III, is not in all respects coextensive with the potential for federal jurisdiction found in Art. III. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 389 U. S. 246, n. 8 (1967). Nevertheless, it has generally been recognized that the intent of the drafters was to provide a broad jurisdictional grant to the federal courts. See, e.g., Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Col.L.Rev.
157, 160 (1953); Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U.Pa.L.Rev. 639, 6 645 (1942). And, as noted above, the resolution of this case depends directly on construction of the Constitution. The Court has consistently held such suits are authorized by the statute. Bell v. Hood, supra; King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, supra. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 299 U. S. 112 (1936); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S. 22, 228 U. S. 25 (1913).
As respondents recognize, there is nothing in the wording or legislative history of § 1331 or in the decisions of this Court which would indicate that there is any basis for the interpretation they would give that section. Nor do we think the passage of the Force Act indicates that § 1331 does not confer jurisdiction in this case. The Force Act is limited to election challenges where a denial of the right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment is alleged. See 28 U.S.C. § 1344. Further, the Act was passed five years before the original version of 1331 was enacted. While it might be inferred that Congress intended to give each House the exclusive power to decide congressional election challenges, [Footnote 39] there is absolutely no indication that the passage of this Act evidences an intention to impose other restrictions on the broad grant of jurisdiction in § 1331.
Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 198. Respondents do not seriously contend that the duty asserted and its alleged breach cannot be judicially determined. If petitioners are correct, the House had a duty to seat Powell once it determined he met the standing requirements set forth in the Constitution. It is undisputed that he met those requirements, and that he was nevertheless excluded.
availability of declaratory relief depends on whether there is a live dispute between the parties, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969), and a request for declaratory relief may be considered independently of whether other forms of relief are appropriate. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 330 U. S. 93 (1947); 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice � 57.08 (2d ed.1966); cf. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 332 U. S. 25-26 (1947). We thus conclude that, in terms of the general criteria of justiciability, this case is justiciable.
"inextricable from the case at bar." [Footnote 42] Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 217.
Id. at 369 U. S. 211.
to encompass exclusion or expulsion on the ground that an individual's character or past conduct rendered him unfit to serve. When the Constitution and the debates over its adoption are thus viewed in historical perspective, argue respondents, it becomes clear that the "qualifications" expressly set forth in the Constitution were not meant to limit the long-recognized legislative power to exclude or expel at will, but merely to establish "standing incapacities," which could be altered only by a constitutional amendment. Our examination of the relevant historical materials leads us to the conclusion that petitioners are correct, and that the Constitution leaves the House [Footnote 44] without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution.
"that Alex. Nowell, being Prebendary [i.e., a clergyman] in Westminster, and thereby having voice in the Convocation House, cannot be a member of this House. . . ."
Even if these cases could be construed to support respondents' contention, their precedential value was nullified prior to the Constitutional Convention. By 1782, after a long struggle, the arbitrary exercise of the power to exclude was unequivocally repudiated by a House of Commons resolution which ended the most notorious English election dispute of the 18th century -- the John Wilkes case. While serving as a member of Parliament in 1763, Wilkes published an attack on a recent peace treaty with France, calling it a product of bribery and condemning the Crown's ministers as "the tools of despotism and corruption.'" R. Postgate, That Devil Wilkes 53 (1929). Wilkes and others who were involved with the publication in which the attack appeared were arrested. [Footnote 53] Prior to Wilkes' trial, the House of Commons expelled him for publishing "a false, scandalous, and seditious libel." 15 Parl.Hist.Eng. 1393 (1764). Wilkes then fled to France, and was subsequently sentenced to exile. 9 L. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution 37 (1956).
11 Gipson, supra, at 222. [Footnote 60] It is within this historical context that we must examine the Convention debates in 1787, just five years after Wilkes' final victory.
Relying heavily on Charles Warren's analysis [Footnote 61] of the Convention debates, petitioners argue that the proceedings manifest the Framers' unequivocal intention to deny either branch of Congress the authority to add to or otherwise vary the membership qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution. We do not completely agree, for the debates are subject to other interpretations. However, we have concluded that the records of the debates, viewed in the context of the bitter struggle for the right to freely choose representatives which had recently concluded in England and in light of the distinction the Framers made between the power to expel and the power to exclude, indicate that petitioners' ultimate conclusion is correct.
Id. at 123. [Footnote 62] Dickinson's argument was rejected, and, after eliminating the disqualification of debtors and the limitation to "landed" property, the Convention adopted Mason's proposal to instruct the Committee of Detail to draft a property qualification. Id. at 116-117.
"only to prescribe the standing incapacities without imposing any other limit on the historic power of each house to judge qualifications on a case by case basis. [Footnote 72]"
"[T]he Committee . . . had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so, and certainly the Convention had no belief . . . that any important change was, in fact, made in the provisions as to qualifications adopted by it on August 10. [Footnote 73]"
"The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature."
Madison had expressed similar views in an earlier essay, [Footnote 74] and his arguments at the Convention leave no doubt about his agreement with Hamilton on this issue.
"during the stress of civil war, [but initially] the House of Representatives declined to exercise the power [to exclude], even under circumstances of great provocation. [Footnote 80]"
Constitution, there were frequently vigorous dissents. [Footnote 84] Even the annotations to the official manual of procedure for the 90th Congress manifest doubt as to the House's power to exclude a member-elect who has met the constitutionally prescribed qualifications. See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.Doc. No. 529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., § 12, pp. 7-8 (1967).
action has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date. Particularly in view of the Congress' own doubts in those few cases where it did exclude members-elect, we are not inclined to give its precedents controlling weight. The relevancy of prior exclusion cases is limited largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously, therefore, the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787. See Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 272 U. S. 175 (1926). And what evidence we have of Congress' early understanding confirms our conclusion that the House is without power to exclude any member-elect who meets the Constitution's requirements for membership.
discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, at 369 U. S. 217. Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility. [Footnote 86] See United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 381 U. S. 462 (1965); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 343 U. S. 613-614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 272 U. S. 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Nor are any of the other formulations of a political question "inextricable from the case at bar." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 217. Petitioners seek a determination that the House was without power to exclude Powell from the 90th Congress, which, we have seen, requires an interpretation of the Constitution -- a determination for which clearly there are "judicially . . . manageable standards." Finally, a judicial resolution of petitioners' claim will not result in "multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." For, as we noted in Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 211, it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Thus, we conclude that petitioners' claim is not barred by the political question doctrine, and, having determined that the claim is otherwise generally justiciable, we hold that the case is justiciable.
Further, analysis of the "textual commitment" under Art. I, § 5 (see 395 U. S. B(1)), has demonstrated that, in judging the qualifications of its members, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution. Respondents concede that Powell met these. Thus, there is no need to remand this case to determine whether he was entitled to be seated in the 90th Congress. Therefore, we hold that, since Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected by the voters of the 18th Congressional District of New York and was not ineligible to serve under any provision of the Constitution, the House was without power to exclude him from its membership.
Respondents' authority for this assertion is a footnote contained in Gojack v. United States, 384 U. S. 702, 384 U. S. 70, n. 4. (1966): "Neither the House of Representatives nor its committees are continuing bodies."
The rule that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of a moot case is a branch of the constitutional command that the judicial power extends only to cases or controversies. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 392 U. S. 57 (1968); R. Robertson & F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States §§ 270-271 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland ed.1951); Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction To Decide Moot Cases, 94 U.Pa.L.Rev. 125 (1946); Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 772 (1955).
Petitioners do not press their claim that respondent McCormack should be required to administer the oath to Powell, apparently conceding that the seating of Powell has rendered this specific claim moot. Where several forms of relief are requested and one of these requests subsequently becomes moot, the Court has still considered the remaining requests. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 258 U. S. 353 (1922). Respondents also argue that the seating of petitioner Powell has mooted the claims of Powell's constituents. Since this case will be remanded, that issue, as well as petitioners' other claims, can be disposed of by the court below.
Id. at 271 U. S. 535.
It was expressly stated in Alejandrino that a properly pleaded mandamus action could be brought, 271 U.S. at 271 U. S. 535, impliedly holding that Alejandrino's salary claim had not been mooted by the expiration of his suspension.
Respondents also suggest that Bond is not applicable because the parties in Bond had stipulated that Bond would be entitled to back salary if his constitutional challenges were accepted, while there is no stipulation in this case. However, if the claim in Bond was moot, a stipulation by the parties could not confer jurisdiction. See, e.g., California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 149 U. S. 314 (1893).
Since the court below disposed of this case on grounds of justiciability, it did not pass upon whether Powell had brought an appropriate action to recover his salary. Where a court of appeals has misconceived the applicable law, and therefore failed to pass upon a question, our general practice has been to remand the case to that court for consideration of the remaining issues. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U. S. 685, 386 U. S. 704 (1967); Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U. S. 29, 352 U. S. 34 (1956). We believe that such action is appropriate for resolution of whether Powell in this litigation is entitled to mandamus against the Sergeant at Arms for salary withheld pursuant to the House resolution.
United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 383 U. S. 182-183 (1966).
A Congressman is not, by virtue of the Speech or Debate Clause, absolved of the responsibility of filing a motion to dismiss, and the trial court must still determine the applicability of the clause to plaintiff's action. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 341 U. S. 377 (1951).
Given our disposition of this issue, we need not decide whether, under the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioners would be entitled to maintain this action solely against members of Congress where no agents participated in the challenged action and no other remedy was available. Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 103 U. S. 204-205 (1881).
Indeed, the thrust of respondents' argument on this jurisdictional issue is similar to their contentions that this case presents a nonjusticiable "political question." They urge that it would have been "unthinkable" to the Framers of the Constitution for courts to review the decision of a legislature to exclude a member. However, we have previously determined that a claim alleging that a legislature has abridged an individual's constitutional rights by refusing to seat an elected representative constitutes a "case or controversy" over which federal courts have jurisdiction. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 385 U. S. 131 (1966). To the extent the expectations of the Framers are discernible and relevant to this case, they must therefore relate to the special problem of review by federal courts of actions of the federal legislature. This is, of course, a problem of separation of powers, and is to be considered in determining justiciability. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 210 (1962).
Respondents rely on Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U. S. 597 (1929). Barry involved the power of the Senate to issue an arrest warrant to summon a witness to give testimony concerning a senatorial election. The Court ruled that issuance of the warrant was constitutional, relying on the power of the Senate under Art. I, § 5, to be the judge of the elections of its members. Respondents particularly rely on language the Court used in discussing the power conferred by Art. I, § 5. The Court noted that, under § 5, the Senate could "render a judgment which is beyond the authority of any other tribunal to review." Id. at 279 U. S. 613.
Barry provides no support for respondents' argument that this case is not justiciable, however. First, in Barry, the Court reached the merits of the controversy, thus indicating that actions allegedly taken pursuant to Art. I, § 5, are not automatically immune from judicial review. Second, the quoted statement is dictum; and, later in the same opinion, the Court noted that the Senate may exercise its power subject "to the restraints imposed by or found in the implications of the Constitution." Id. at 279 U. S. 614. Third, of course, the statement in Barry leaves open the particular question that must first be resolved in this case: the existence and scope of the textual commitment to the House to judge the qualifications of members.
In discussing the case, respondents characterize the earlier action as an exclusion. The Council of Censors, however, stated that the general assembly had resolved that the member "is expelled from his seat." Pennsylvania Convention Proceedings, supra, at 89. The account of the dissenting committee members suggests that the term expulsion was properly used. They note that, in February, 1783, the assembly received a letter from the Comptroller General charging the assemblyman with fraud. Not until September 9, 1783, did the assembly vote to expel him. Presumably, he held his seat until that time. But, even if he had been excluded, arguably he was excluded for not meeting a standing incapacity, since the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 required assemblymen to be "most noted for wisdom and virtue." Pa.Const. of 1776, § 7, 5 Thorpe 3084. (Emphasis added.) In fact, the dissenting members of the Committee argued that the expelled member was ineligible under this very provision. Pennsylvania Convention Proceedings, supra, at 89.
Warren, supra, at 422, n. 1. Charles Warren buttressed his conclusion by noting that the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 "contained affirmative qualifications for Representatives and exactly similar negative qualifications for Senators." Ibid. Apparently, these provisions were not considered substantively different, for each house was empowered in identical language to "judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of their own members, as pointed out in the constitution." Mass.Const., pt. 2, c. I, § 2, Art. IV, 3 Thorpe 1897, and § 3, Art. X, 3 Thorpe 1899. (Emphasis added.) See Warren, supra, at 422-423, n. 1.
In fact, the Court has noted that it is an "inadmissible suggestion" that action might be taken in disregard of a judicial determination. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 146 U. S. 24 (1892).
courts. [Footnote 2/9] Twenty-six years earlier, members of the upper chamber attempted to exclude Senator-elect William Langer of North Dakota for like reasons. [Footnote 2/10] Langer first became State's Attorney for Morton County, North Dakota, from 1914 to 1916, and then served as State Attorney General from 1916 to 1920. He became Governor of the State in 1932, and took office in January, 1933. In 1934, he was indicted for conspiring to interfere with the enforcement of federal law by illegally soliciting political contributions from federal employees, and suit was filed in the State Supreme Court to remove him from office. [Footnote 2/11] While that suit was pending, he called the State Legislature into special session. [Footnote 2/12] When it became clear that the court would order his ouster, he signed a Declaration of Independence, invoked martial law, and called out the National Guard. [Footnote 2/13] Nonetheless, when his own officers refused to recognize him as the legal head of state, he left office in July, 1934. As with Adam Clayton Powell, however, the people of the State still wanted him. In 1937, they reelected him Governor and, in 1940, they sent him to the United States Senate.
prejudice to the Senate in the exercise of its right [to exclude him]. [Footnote 2/14]"
for over a year. [Footnote 2/19] Much of it related to purely factual allegations of "moral turpitude." Some of it, however, was addressed to the power of the Senate under Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, to exclude a member-elect for lacking qualifications not enumerated in Art. I, § 3.
"Mr. MURDOCK. . . . [U]nder the Senator's theory that the Senate has the right to add qualifications which are not specified in the Constitution, does the Senator believe the Senate could adopt a rule specifying intellectual and moral qualifications? [Footnote 2/20]"
"Mr. LUCAS. The Senate can do anything it wants to do. . . . Yes; the Senate can deny a person his seat simply because it does not like the cut of his jaw, if it wishes to. [Footnote 2/21]"
"Mr. LUCAS. The Senator referred to article I, section 5. What does he think the framers of the Constitution meant when they gave to each House the power to determine or to judge the qualifications, and so forth, of its own Members? [Footnote 2/22]"
"But whoever heard the word 'judge' used as meaning the power to add to what already is the law? [Footnote 2/23]"
"Mr. President, I think it is the very distinguished and able Senator from Georgia who makes the contention that the constitutional provisions relating to qualifications, because they are stated in the negative -- that is, 'no person shall be a Senator' -- are merely restrictions or prohibitions on the State; but -- and I shall read it later on -- when we read what Madison said, when we read what Hamilton said, when we read what the other framers of the Constitution said on that question, there cannot be a doubt as to what they intended and what they meant. [Footnote 2/24]"
"Madison knew that the qualifications should be contained in the Constitution, and not left to the whim and caprice of the legislature. [Footnote 2/25]"
was changed by the committee of which Madison was a member, the committee on style. [Footnote 2/26]"
"Mr. MURDOCK. That is my position, yes. [Footnote 2/28]"
the right under the provision of the Constitution to which the Senator from Florida referred, to add to the qualifications. My position is that the State is the sole judge of the intellectual and the moral qualifications of the representatives it sends to Congress. [Footnote 2/29]"
"MR. MURDOCK [quoting Senator Philander Knox]. 'I know of no defect in the plain rule of the Constitution for which I am contending. . . . I cannot see that any danger to the Senate lies in the fact that an improper character cannot be excluded without a two-thirds vote. It requires the unanimous vote of a jury to convict a man accused of crime; it should require, and I believe that it does require, a two-thirds vote to eject a Senator from his position of honor and power, to which he has been elected by a sovereign State.' [Footnote 2/30]"
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 242, n. 2 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116.
most important, the "voluntary abandonment" rule does not dispense with the requirement of a continuing controversy, nor could it under the definition of the judicial power in Article III of the Constitution. Voluntary cessation of unlawful conduct does make a case moot "if the defendant can demonstrate that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.'" Id. at 345 U. S. 633. [Footnote 3/6] Since that is the situation here, the case would be moot even if it could be said that it became so by the House's "voluntary abandonment" of its "practice" of excluding Congressman Powell.
prior actions of the House which originally impelled this action." It is indisputable, however, that punishment of a House member involves constitutional issues entirely distinct from those raised by exclusion, [Footnote 3/8] and that a punishment in one Congress is in no legal sense a "continuation" of an exclusion from the previous Congress. A judicial determination that the exclusion was improper would have no bearing on the constitutionality of the punishment, nor any conceivable practical impact on Powell's status in the 91st Congress. It is thus clear that the only connection between the exclusion by the 90th Congress and the punishment by the 91st is that they were evidently based on the same asserted derelictions of Congressman Powell. But this action was not brought to exonerate Powell or to expunge the legislative findings of his wrongdoing; its only purpose was to restrain the action taken in consequence of those findings -- Powell's exclusion.
The passage of time and intervening events have, therefore, made it impossible to afford the petitioners the principal relief they sought in this case. If any aspect of the case remains alive, it is only Congressman Powell's individual claim for the salary of which he was deprived by his absence from the 90th Congress. [Footnote 3/9] But even if that claim can be said to prevent this controversy from being moot, which I doubt, there is no need to reach the fundamental constitutional issues that the Court today undertakes to decide.
elected by each Congress [Footnote 3/15] -- is responsible for the retention and disbursement to Congressmen of the funds appropriated for their salaries. These funds are payable from the United States Treasury [Footnote 3/16] upon requisitions presented by the Sergeant at Arms, who is entrusted with keeping the books and accounts "for the compensation and mileage of Members." [Footnote 3/17] A Congressman who has presented his credentials and taken the oath of office [Footnote 3/18] is entitled to be paid monthly on the basis of certificates of the Clerk [Footnote 3/19] and Speaker of the House. [Footnote 3/20] Powell's prayer for a mandamus and an injunction against the Sergeant at Arms is presumably based on this statutory scheme.
is not disputed that the Court of Claims could grant him a money judgment for lost salary on the ground that his discharge from the House violated the Constitution. I would remit Congressman Powell to that remedy, and not simply because of the serious doubts about the availability of the one he now pursues. Even if the mandatory relief sought by Powell is appropriate and could be effective, the Court should insist that the salary claim be litigated in a context that would clearly obviate the need to decide some of the constitutional questions with which the Court grapples today, and might avoid them altogether. [Footnote 3/24] In an action in the Court of Claims for a money judgment against the United States, there would be no question concerning the impact of the Speech or Debate Clause on a suit against members of the House of Representatives and their agents, and questions of jurisdiction and justiciability would, if raised at all, be in a vastly different and more conventional form.
constitutional issues which, in the petitioners' words, "touch the bedrock of our political system [and] strike at the very heart of representative government." If the fundamental principles restraining courts from unnecessarily or prematurely reaching out to decide grave and perhaps unsettling constitutional questions retain any vitality, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 346-348 (Brandeis, J., concurring), surely there have been few cases more demanding of their application than this one. And those principles are entitled to special respect in suits, like this suit, for declaratory and injunctive relief, which it is within a court's broad discretion to withhold.
Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U. S. 111, 369 U. S. 112.
Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U. S. 426, 333 U. S. 431.
See, e.g., United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U. S. 199, 393 U. S. 202-304; Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 393 U. S. 178-179.
See Gojack v. United States, 384 U. S. 702, 384 U. S. 707, n. 4 ("Neither the House of Representatives nor its committees are continuing bodies"); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 273 U. S. 181. Forty-one of the present members of the House were not members of the 90th Congress, and two of the named defendants in this action, Messrs. Moore and Curtis, are no longer members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, the officer employees of the House, such as the Sergeant at Arms, are reelected by each new Congress. See n. 15, infra.
See also United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 345 U. S. 633; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448. The Court has only recently concluded that there was no "controversy" in Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, because of "the fact that it was most unlikely that the Congressman would again be a candidate for Congress." Id. at 394 U. S. 109. It can hardly be maintained that the likelihood of the House of Representatives' again excluding Powell is any greater.
See also United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 345 U. S. 632-633; Local 74, United Bro. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 341 U. S. 707, 341 U. S. 715; Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U. S. 37, 323 U. S. 43; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 321 U. S. 327; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 166 U. S. 307-310.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. at 166 U. S. 309. The considerations of public enforcement of a statutory or regulatory scheme which inhere in those cases are not present in this litigation.
The petitioners' argument that the case is kept alive by Powell's loss of seniority, see ante at 395 U. S. 496, is founded on the mistaken assumption that the loss of seniority is attributable to the exclusion from the 90th Congress, and that seniority would automatically be restored if that exclusion were declared unconstitutional. But the fact is that Powell was stripped of seniority by the action of the 91st Congress, action which is not involved in this case and which would not be affected by judicial review of the exclusion from the 90th Congress. Moreover, even if the conduct of the 91st Congress were challenged in this case, the Court would clearly have no power whatsoever to pass upon the propriety of such internal affairs of the House of Representatives.
The Philippines Senate was composed of 24 Senators, 22 of whom were elected and two of whom were appointed by the Governor General. Alejandrino was one of the two appointees. See 271 U.S. at 271 U. S. 531-532.
271 U.S. at 271 U. S. 532.
I do not believe that this offhand dictum in Bond is determinative of the issue of mootness in this case. In the first place, as the Court in Bond noted, it was not there contended by any party that the case was moot. Moreover, contrary to the implication of the statement, the legislative term from which Bond was excluded had not ended at the time of the Court's decision. (The Court's decision was announced on December 5, 1966; Bond's term of office expired on December 31, 1966.) In any event, he had not been seated in a subsequent term, so the continuing controversy had not been rendered clearly moot by any action of the Georgia House, as it has here by the House of Representatives of the 91st Congress. No one suggested in Bond that the money claim was the only issue left in the case. Furthermore, the considerations which governed the Court's decision in Alejandrino were simply not present in Bond. Because of the State's stipulation, there was no doubt, as there is here, see infra at 395 U. S. 570-571, that the Court's decision would lead to effective relief with respect to Bond's salary claim. And finally, there was no suggestion that Bond had an alternative remedy, as Powell has here, see infra at 395 U. S. 571-572, by which he could obtain full relief without requiring the Court to decide novel and delicate constitutional issues.
United States v. King, ante, p. 395 U. S. 1. The petitioners suggest that the inability of the Court of Claims to grant such relief might make any remedy in that court inadequate. But since Powell's only remaining interest in the case is to collect his salary, a money judgment in the Court of Claims would be just as good as, and probably better than, mandatory relief against the agents of the House. The petitioners also suggest that the Court of Claims would be unable to grant relief because of the pendency of Powell's claim in another court, 28 U.S.C. § 1500, but that would, of course, constitute no obstacle if, as I suggest, the Court should order this action dismissed on grounds of mootness.
Relying on Bank of Mann v. England, 385 U. S. 99, 385 U. S. 101, the petitioners complain that it would impose undue hardship on Powell to force him to "start all over again" now that he has come this far in the present suit. In view of the Court's remand of this case for further proceedings with respect to Powell's remedy, it is at least doubtful that remitting him to an action in the Court of Claims would entail much more cost and delay than will be involved in the present case. And the inconvenience to litigants of further delay or litigation has never been deemed to justify departure from the sound principle, rooted in the Constitution, that important issues of constitutional law should be decided only if necessary and in cases presenting concrete and living controversies.

References: § 2
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2202
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1331
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1331
 § 1331
 § 1344
 § 1331
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 12
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5
 § 5
 § 5
 § 5
 § 7
 § 2
 § 3
 v. 
 § 5
 § 3
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1500
 v.