Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52973:gr-166516-2009&catid=1522&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:34:31+00:00

Document:
EMMA VER REYES and RAMON REYES, Petitioners, v. IRENE MONTEMAYOR and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 20 May 2004, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, which affirmed the Decision2 dated 7 October 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of Imus, Cavite, in Civil Case No. 878-94, dismissing the Complaint for Reconveyance of petitioners, spouses Emma Ver-Reyes (Emma) and Ramon Reyes (Ramon), and declaring private respondent Irene Montemayor as the owner of the subject property.
On 18 February 1994, petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for Reconveyance3 against private respondent and the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 878-94. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-584594 situated in Paliparan, DasmariÃ±as, Cavite (subject property). They bought the subject property from the previous owner, Marciano Cuevas (Marciano), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 October 1976.5 Thereafter, Marciano surrendered to petitioners the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-58459. Petitioners accordingly paid the taxes on the sale of the subject property. However, they were unable to register the sale and effect the transfer of the certificate of title to the subject property to their names.
Petitioners claimed that they had consistently paid the real estate taxes on the subject property since their acquisition of the same in 1976 until 1991. In 1993, when they went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite to pay their real estate taxes for the years 1992 and 1993, they were informed that the subject property was sold by Marciano to private respondent on 10 November 1992, and TCT No. T-369793 covering it was issued in private respondent's name on 4 January 1993.
After the conduct of pre-trial, petitioners offered the testimonies of Marciano, petitioner Emma, and Carolyn Moldez-Pitoy (Carolyn).
1. The questioned and the standard/specimen signatures VIRGINIA M. CUEVAS were not written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard /specimen signatures of ESCOLASTICO CUEVAS were written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, private respondent offered the testimonies of Jaime Laudato (Jaime) and Angelina Cortez (Angelina) in support of her version of events.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing this case and declaring that the true and lawful owner of the subject property as described in, and covered by, TCT No. T-369793 is [herein respondent] Irene Montemayor.
On 11 July 1997, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, which challenged the afore-mentioned RTC judgment.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Manifestation19 on 20 October 1998. According to them, they obtained information that private respondent's TCT No. T-369793 covering the subject property had already been canceled; that a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-784707, had been issued in the name of another person, Engracia Isip (Engracia); and that a mortgage was constituted on the subject property. It began with private respondent executing a Waiver and Quitclaim on 15 January 1998, wherein she confessed to obtaining TCT No. T-369793 over the subject property in bad faith. In the same document, private respondent recognized Engracia's title to the subject property and, thus, private respondent relinquished her right over it to Engracia and the latter's heirs and successors-in-interest. The Register of Deeds, impleaded as a party in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517, canceled TCT No. T-369793 in private respondent's name; issued TCT No. T-784707 in the names of Engracia's heirs; and annotated on the latest certificate of title private respondent's Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 of the foregoing Decision on 25 June 2004, which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution23 dated 28 December 2004.
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 21) OF CAVITE NOTWITHSTANDING THE CLEAR AND AUTHENTIC RECORDS PRESENTED DURING TRIAL WHICH NEGATE AND CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS.
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 21) OF CAVITE THEREBY IGNORING THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THE PETITIONERS' CLEAR RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The fundamental issue for resolution of this Court in this case is who has better right to the subject property. Before the Court can settle the same, it must first determine the question of whether there was a double sale of the subject property to both petitioners and private respondent, which is essentially a question of fact requiring the Court to review, examine and evaluate, or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.
Contrary to the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the RTC, the evidence on record reveals that the spouses Cuevas, the previous owners of the subject property, did not sell the said property to private respondent.
Marciano's explicit statements, made under oath before the trial court, that he did not sell the subject property to anyone other than petitioners, and that the signatures of the vendors appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 were not made by him and his wife, were not refuted. Private respondent's witness, Jaime, who was tasked to verify if there was no encumbrance on the spouses Cuevas' title to the subject property and to register it in private respondent's name after the alleged sale, admitted that he had never met the supposed vendors of the subject property and, thus, could not competently testify on whether it was actually the spouses Cuevas who executed the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 in private respondent's favor.
The pronouncement of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Marciano's testimony was self-serving was utterly baseless. Neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals explained how Marciano's confirmation of the sale of the subject property to petitioners, and his renunciation of the supposed sale of the same property to private respondent, would accrue to Marciano's benefit. In giving such a testimony in 1994, Marciano did not stand to gain back the subject property, which he had already admitted to selling to petitioners 18 years prior, in 1976. On the other hand, if Marciano falsely testified in open court that he and his wife did not sell the subject property to private respondent, Marciano was risking prosecution for the crime of perjury and liability for damages.
Additionally, although Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI did not make a definitive finding on whether Marciano's purported signature on the Deed of Sale dated 10 November 1992 was actually his or a forgery, the same Report did unqualifiedly state that the signature that Virginia supposedly affixed to the said Deed and the specimen signatures that she provided the NBI were not written by the same person. Clearly, Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI established that her purported signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 was forged.
It is true that a finding of forgery does not depend exclusively on the testimonies of expert witnesses and that judges must use their own judgment, through an independent examination of the questioned signature, in determining the authenticity of the handwriting.28 However, it is important to note that in this case neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals made any finding through an independent examination of Virginia's signatures. The RTC gave credence to Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI, but misread it as saying that the two specimen signatures given by Virginia were not written by the same person. Hence, Questioned Documents Report No. 548-795 of the NBI, finding that the signature of Virginia in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 is a forgery, stands unquestioned.
That at least one of the signatures of the alleged vendors was indubitably established as a forgery should have already raised serious doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992. This, taken together with Marciano's candid and categorical testimony that he and his wife did not sell the subject property to private respondent or executed any deed to evidence the same, strongly militates against the existence of a second sale of the subject property to private respondent.
In comparison, the circumstances surrounding the alleged second sale of the subject property by the spouses Cuevas to private respondent are sketchy at best. Vice Mayor Carungcong, who allegedly brokered the sale, had already died during the pendency of the case and was not presented as witness. It was not made clear whether he was duly authorized by the spouses Cuevas to broker such sale. Private respondent's witness, Jaime, did not claim to have been present during the negotiations or in any part of the sale transaction, and had not even met the spouses Cuevas. All he was able to testify on was that he verified with the Register of Deeds that there was no encumbrance annotated on TCT No. T-58459 of the spouses Cuevas, and eventually, he was able to cause the cancellation of TCT No. T-58459 in the spouses Cuevas' names and the issuance of TCT No. T-369793 in private respondent's name based on the questionable Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992. Similarly ambiguous was how Jaime was able to have TCT No. T-58459 of the spouses Cuevas cancelled when the Owner's Duplicate Copy thereof was with petitioners. When a certificate of title is cancelled, the owner's duplicate must also be surrendered to the Register of Deeds for cancellation, in accordance with Section 5329 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended.
6. That, in the light of the foregoing, I do hereby waive and renounce, now and forever, all claims of whatever nature to the said property in favor of the said ENGRACIA ISIP, her heirs, executors, administrator or assigns.
Based on the foregoing, the preponderance of evidence in this case is in petitioners' favor. The spouses Cuevas only sold the subject property to them in 1976, and did not sell it a second time to private respondent in 1992. As a consequence, the rules on the double sale of registered property are not relevant herein. The Court then proceeds to rule on the consequence of private respondent's fraudulent registration of the subject property in her name.
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or of a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and void.
It has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in an ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed."35 Reconveyance is all about the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereto, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.36 Evidently, petitioners, being the rightful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the reconveyance of the title over the same.
However, as a further demonstration of private respondent's continuing bad faith and persistent effort to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the subject property, private respondent executed the Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998, in which she admitted that her title to the said property was void and, instead, recognized the title of Engracia, who owned the subject property prior to the spouses Cuevas. Pursuant to said Waiver and Quitclaim, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-369793 in private respondent's name and issued TCT No. T-784707 in the names of Engracia's heirs.
It must be stressed that Engracia, whose TCT No. T-13105 over the subject property was already cancelled on 26 April 1965, had never filed a case questioning the cancellation of said certificate of title during her lifetime.37 There is also nothing in the records that would show that after Engracia's death in 1981, her heirs attempted to recover title to the subject property.
The Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 deserves little evidentiary weight as to the truth or veracity of the statements contained therein, considering that they were unilaterally made by private respondent. There is no independent evidence that all certificates of title subsequent to OCT No. 1002 covering the subject property were simulated and fictitious. In fact, private respondent contradicted herself by acknowledging in the very same document that Engracia's title, which was transferred to her heirs, was genuine. The only fact that said Waiver and Quitclaim established was private respondent's bad faith in having the subject property registered in her name. For the Court to make such finding of bad faith on private respondent's part, it need not actually be true that all titles to the subject property, prior to private respondent's, were simulated and fictitious, only, private respondent believed them to be so, but still persisted in acquiring and registering in her name what she already knew was a dubious title.
What is apparent to this Court is that private respondent executed the Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 so as to effect the transfer of the subject property to third persons, i.e., Engracia's heirs, and defeat any judgment granting the petitioners the remedy of reconveyance of the subject property.
Engracia's heirs cannot be considered "innocent" persons or persons who acquired the subject property "for value." Engracia's heirs "re-acquired" the subject property by virtue of the private respondent's Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998. That the said document was executed by private respondent, who admitted to holding a dubious title to the subject property, should be sufficient to put Engracia's heirs on notice and to cause the latter to investigate the other transfers and titles issued for the subject property. The Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 also does not establish that the subject property was transferred to Engracia's heirs for value, it appearing to have been executed by private respondent in favor of Engracia's heirs without any consideration at all. Hence, the cancellation of TCT No. T-369793 in private respondent's name and the issuance of TCT No. T-784707 in the names of Engracia's heirs cannot bar the reconveyance of the subject property to petitioners.
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.39 The Court may deem Engracia's heirs as private respondent's successors-in-interest, having acquired title to the subject property through private respondent after the commencement of petitioners' action for reconveyance of the same property.
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
This Court finds that petitioners' prayer for nominal damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is proper and reasonable.
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 20 May 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54517 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds is ORDERED to (1) CANCEL TCT No. T-784707 over the subject property in the name of Engracia's heirs, which was derived, not in good faith or for value, but from the fraudulently procured TCT No. T-369793 in private respondent's name; and (2) ISSUE a new certificate of title over the subject property in the name of petitioners, the rightful owners thereof. Private respondent is ORDERED to PAY petitioners nominal damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00. Costs against private respondent.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring. Rollo, pp. 44-48.
2 Penned by Judge Roy S. del Rosario. Rollo, pp. 51-54.
9 TSN, 18 August 1994, pp. 6-21.
10 TSN, 2 February 1995, pp. 6-40.
11 TSN, 29 September 1995, pp. 5-39.
3. No definite opinion can be rendered on the questioned signature MARCIANO CUEVAS, due to lack of sufficient basis necessary for a scientific comparative examination. It is therefore suggested that additional standard/specimen signatures MARCIANO CUEVAS executed during or close to the date when the alleged questioned signature was written, and preferably executed in long hand style, be procured and be submitted to this Bureau for laboratory analysis.
14 TSN, 15 February 1996, pp. 4-44.
15 TSN, 3 May 1996, pp. 4-23.
17 This document is a contract of sale of another parcel of land located in ParaÃ±aque, between petitioners and the Spouses Cuevas, whose signatures appear therein.
20 CA rollo, p. 166.
22 CA rollo, pp. 205-213.
25 Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 157851, 29 June 2007, 526 SCRA 73, 83-84; Malison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147776, 10 July 2007, 527 SCRA 109, 117; Buenaventura v. Republic, G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA 271, 282.
26 Aznar v. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, 1067 (1958).
27 See Gener v. De Leon, 419 Phil. 920, 933 (2001).
28 Belgica v. Belgica, G.R. No.149738, 28 August 2007, 531 SCRA 331, 338.
29 Section 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon entry of new certificate. No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the owner's duplicate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.
31 Domingo v. Reed, G.R. No.157701, 9 December 2005, 477 SCRA 227, 241.
32 Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171008, 13 September 2007, 533 SCRA 350, 361.
33 Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 765 (1998).
34 Pagkatipunan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70722, 3 July 1991, 198 SCRA 719, 731.
35 Alvarez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-68053, 7 May 1990, 185 SCRA 8, 18.
36 Amerol v. Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261, 30 September 1987, 154 SCRA 396, 404.
37 CA rollo, pp. 151-155. TCT No. T-13105 was issued in the name of Engracia Isip on 23 April 1965 and was cancelled a few days later on 26 April 1965 upon the issuance of TCT No. T-13113 in the name of Rosalinda Puspos. Thereafter, TCT No. T-45574 was issued on 22 July 1970 in the name of Belen Carungcong. This was cancelled on 28 February 1972 when TCT No. T-57845 was issued to Aurelia de la Cruz. Finally, TCT No. T-58459, dated 3 April 1972 was issued in the name of Marciano and Virginia Cuevas.
38 Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, 490 Phil. 74, 90 (2005); Abejaron v. Nabasa, 411 Phil. 552, 564 (2001).
39 Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61, 86 (2002).
40 Civil Code, Art. 2208(5); MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, 17 October 2007, 536 SCRA 408, 470.
41 Bach v. Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Acorda Law Offices, G.R. No. 160334, 11 September 2006, 501 SCRA 419, 431-435.

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