Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/405/936/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:45:45+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 405 › ADDONIZIO v. U.S.
Rehearing Denied April 3, 1972 in No. 71-744. See 405 U.S. 1048.
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.
'A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other.' Id., at 454, 69 S. Ct. at 723.
'When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact of the conspiracy strategy. Strictly, the prosecution should first establish prima facie the conspiracy and identify the conspirators, after which evidence of acts and declarations of each in the course of its execution are admissible against all. But the order of proof of so sprawling a charge is difficult for a judge to control. As a practical matter, the accused often is confronted with a hodgepodge of acts and statements by others which he may never have authorized or intended or even known about, but which help to persuade the jury of existence of the conspiracy itself. In other words, a conspiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon assumption that conspiracy existed. The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559, 257, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 2 Cir., 167 F.2d 54.' Id., at 453.
There are other disabilities. Often testimony will be receivable only against a particular codefendant yet it may also inculpate another accused such as where (a) a codefendant 'opens the door' to prejudicial evidence by placing his reputation in issue,3 (b) a codefendant wants to place before the jury information which is helpful to him but is damaging to other defendants, or (c) the Government desires to offer evidence admissible against less than all of the codefendants. Cautionary instructions, of course, are routinely given where such circumstances arise but we have often recognized the inability of jurors to compartmentalize information according to defendants. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388, 1786 ( 1964); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 723 (1949) (quoted above).
This short-coming of the jury is compounded when, as here, the jury is also asked to digest voluminous testimony.
'In the trial of this case no less than 20 witnesses appeared and testified for the prosecution. Evans' counsel was given full opportunity to cross-examine every one of them. The most important witness, by far, was the eyewitness who described all the details of the tripe murder and who was cross-examined at great length. Of the 19 other witnesses, the testimony of but a single one is at issue here.' Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87, 219 (1971).
may have lied as to his codefendants. The contrary conclusion, to borrow from Justice Jackson, would be 'unmitigated fiction.' Krulewitch v. United States, supra, 336 U.S., at 453.
In light of the claims of prejudice committed in this multi-defendant conspiracy trial, I would grant certiorari to consider whether the extensive reliance by the prosecutor on the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule and the admission of the Gordon transcript deprived these petitioners of constitutional rights.
'(b) (2) The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.' 18 U.S.C. 1951, Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 793, as amended.
Footnote 2 The potential for abuse of multi-defendant conspiracy proceedings has been discussed in O'Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense Under Conspiracy Indictments, 9 Brook.L.Rev. 263 (1940); Note, Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 919, 983 (1959); Wessel, Procedural Safeguards for the Mass Conspiracy Trial, 48 A.B.A.J. 628 (1962 ); Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt By Association, 54 Geo.L.J. 133 (1965).
'The reputation of the Apalachin delegates and the character of the meeting had been the subject of much public comment during the two years before trial. Many reports had described the lengthy criminal records of some of the delegates, had characterized the meeting as a convention of the 'Mafia' an had given other lurid details of what had occurred. None of this evidence was considered sufficiently material to the charge to warrant its introduction at trial.
'Towards the end of the trial, one of the defendants placed his reputation squarely in issue. He called witnesses who testified to his excellent reputation for truth and veracity at the time of the trial.
'Ordinarily it would have been entirely proper to attempt to refute this testimony by cross-examining with reference to the earlier publicity; the defendant himself had elsewhere complained about how much it had hurt his reputation. However, such evidence might have had equally serious adverse effects upon the nineteen co-defendants, who had done nothing to open the door against themselves.' Wessel, Procedural Safeguards of the Mass Conspiracy Trial, 48 A.B.A.J. 628, 631 (1962).
Footnote 4 Even at a severed trial of only one defendant, another alleged coconspirator may, if called to testify, invoke his privilege against self- incrimination. Where the severed trial is delayed until after the acquittal or finalized conviction of the witness, however, invocation of the privilege would be improper. In any event, even if the witness refused to answer questions, the defendant would at least obtain whatever inference of innocence might result from the apparent guilt of the witness.

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