Source: https://www.ptab.us/2017/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:24:27+00:00

Document:
We agree with the Examiner. The limitation “only” idle voice clients does not appear in the claims as originally filed, but rather was added during prosecution. Compare Spec. 5—6 (original claims), with Amendment after Final Rejection 2—5 (Jan. 26, 2015) (amended claims). The language at lines 2—3 of claim 28 recites “to send the transition management message only to voice clients that are idle and not to voice clients that are not idle” (Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App’x) (emphasis added)). The ordinary meaning of “only,” which is consistent with claim 28, is “adverb ... 1 a : as a single fact or instance and nothing more or different. . . b : solely, exclusively.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 812 (10th ed. 1999). Sending a transition management message to “only” voice clients that are idle is sending the transition management message exclusively to idle voice clients, and not to voice clients that are not idle — a negative limitation.
It is well settled that negative limitations are permissible forms of expression to define the scope of a claimed invention. See generally Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 923 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But the mere absence of a positive recitation in the original disclosure is not basis to exclude the limitation. MPEP § 2173.05. Rather, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). “The ‘reason’ required by Santarus is provided, for instance, by properly describing alternative features of the patented invention.” Inphi v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
The Federal Circuit has explained that indefiniteness, as a subset of claim construction, is a question of law. In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In particular, the court held, “[a]s the statutory language of ‘particular[ity]’ and ‘distinct[ness]’ indicates, claims are required to be cast in clear—as opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefinite—terms. It is the claims that notify the public of what is within the protections of the patent, and what is not.” Id.
The purpose of the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is to “‘clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”’ Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. This test “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. “Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Id. This inquiry is a question of fact. Id. (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
We agree with Appellants that the Examiner’s rejection does not clearly explain or compare the instant claims with claim 1 of the ‘704 Patent. The key question in any obviousness double patenting analysis is: “Does any claim in the application define merely an obvious variation of an invention claimed in the patent asserted as supporting double patenting?” General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (CCPA 1970)). Answering this question requires that the decision-maker first construe the claims in the patent and the claims under review and determine the differences between them. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2001). After determining the differences, the decision-maker must determine whether the differences in subject matter render the claims patentably distinct.Id. Where the subject matter of a pending claim under review is an obvious variation of the subject matter of a patented claim, the pending claim is not patentably distinct. In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441 (CCPA 1970).
“[T]hat two inventions were designed to resolve different problems ... is insufficient to demonstrate that one invention teaches away from another.” Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In determining whether a claimed method must be performed in a particular sequence, “[f]irst, we look to the claim language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, they must be performed in the order written.” Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
“It is prima facie obvious to combine two compositions each of which is taught by the prior art to be useful for the same purpose, in order to form a third composition which is to be used for the very same purpose.” In re Kerkhoven, 626 F.2d 846, 850 (CCPA 1980).
See In re Farrenkopf 713 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“additional expense associated with the addition of inhibitors would not discourage one of ordinary skill in the art”); Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

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