Source: https://openjurist.org/258/f2d/435
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:35:38+00:00

Document:
Mr. Robert B. Frank, Washington, D.C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.
Mr. John W. Warner, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U.S. Atty., and Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U.S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Lewis Carroll, Asst. U.S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, BAZELON and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.
Armed with a search warrant, officers found contraband drugs in Mitchell's house and in his immediate possession. His pre-trial motion to suppress, based upon a claim that the Commissioner issued the warrant without a proper showing of probable cause, was denied. The motion was renewed at the trial and again denied. Having been found guilty by the jury, Mitchell appeals.
He assigns as error the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and its refusal to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the Government's proof. We think the District Judge acted correctly in denying the motions.
The search warrant was issued February 12, 1957, but was not executed until February 17, 1957. This delay was not made the basis of an objection, and appellant made no point of it on appeal. Nevertheless, although he notes that Mitchell 'did not object to the warrant on the ground of unseasonable execution' and concludes that 'That objection is therefore not available to him on appeal,' our brother Bazelon discusses the matter and expresses the view that a search warrant is not executed 'forthwith' when five days intervene between its issue and execution.
While it is true that Rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1 provides that a search warrant 'shall command the officer to search forthwith the person or place named for the property specified,' subsection (d) of the same Rule begins: 'The warrant may be executed and returned only within 10 days after its date.' Thus the federal rule defines the word 'forthwith' by limiting the time of the search to ten days after the issuance of the warrant. Sgro v. United States, 1932, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed. 260; Murby v. United States, 1 Cir., 1924, 2 F.2d 56.
The officers did not execute the warrant 'forthwith.' They waited five days until 2:00 A.M. of February 17, 1957, at which time they broke into the home and found appellant in bed with his wife. They searched the home and seized the evidence which formed the basis of appellant's conviction. The return of the warrant was made on February 18, 1957, within the ten days specified in the warrant.
On the motion to suppress the evidence, appellant attacked the sufficiency of the affidavit upon which the search warrant had been issued, but did not object to the warrant on the ground of unseasonable execution. That objection is therefore not available to him on appeal.1 Nevertheless, because of the importance, in the administration of criminal justice, of the question of seasonable execution of search warrants, I deem it necessary to set forth my views upon that question.
A search warrant is based upon a judicial determination of the present existence of justifying grounds-- i.e., at the time of issuance of the warrant.2 'The purpose is to seize the thing alleged to be at that time in the place to be searched, to prevent its removal or further concealment.' State v. Guthrie, 1897, 90 Me. 448, 38 A. 368, 369. 'Warrants are directed to existing violations of the law and not to violations which may come into existence in the future.' Simmons v. State, Okl.Cr.1955, 286 P.2d 296, 298. So, in the instant case, the warrant was based on the Commissioner's determination on February 12, 1957, that grounds for issuing it were then in existence.
The in praesenti basis of the warrant requires as a matter of logical necessity that it be served without delay, for, if there is delay in execution, the property to be seized may disappear. There is danger, especially in cases like the present one where the establishment to be searched is claimed to be a scene of recurring law violations, that the officer, acting on a five-day-old warrant, may seize property which came into existence after the warrant was issued. 'In any case of delay it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove the identity of the (things) found with those complained against. The prosecution would fail, resulting only in expense to the state, and expense and annoyance to the citizen.' State v. Guthrie, supra, 38 A. at page 369.
The officer to whom the warrant is issued 'has no discretion, but must proceed with diligence at the earliest reasonable opportunity, to make the search as commanded * * *.' McDaniel v. State, 1926, 197 Ind. 179, 150 N.E. 50, 53. So, when the warrant commands a search to be made forthwith, 'an unexplained delay of three days in serving such a warrant seems clearly needless, unreasonable, and hence unlawful, and destructive of the power of the warrant.' State v. Guthrie, supra, 38 A. at page 369.4 Whatever circumstantial elasticity must be allowed to the term 'forthwith,'5 the unexplained delay of five days in the case before us is inconsistent with the command of the warrant.
The mere fact of delay does not necessarily vitiate a search warrant. A number of circumstances, such as distance and weather conditions, may cause a court to consider a warrant to have been executed forthwith, despite some delay,6 State v. Guthrie, supra; People v. Wiedeman, supra; but delay occasioned merely by the officer's assumption of authority to select the time of execution does vitiate the warrant. Even the magistrate has no right, once he has determined that the conditions for the issuance of a warrant are in existence, to keep the suspect under surveillance and postpone execution of the warrant until such time as it may do the suspect the greatest harm. State v. Perkins, 1926, 220 Mo.App. 349, 285 S.W. 1021. Delay in either issuance or service, 'when deliberate and made by the officers for the purpose of selecting their own time and for their own purpose, whether that purpose be to aid the state or the accused, (takes) away from them the power to issue and serve a search warrant.' Id., 285 S.W. at page 1024; see also State v. Miller, 1932, 329 Mo. 855, 46 S.W.2d 541.
'It is urged that the conclusion reached in this case (that a 'forthwith' warrant is rendered invalid by an unexplained three-day delay of execution) will materially impair the efficiency of one of the most useful instrumentalities for the enforcement of the liquor statutes. Even if such were the effect, we could not shrink from declaring the law as we believe it to be. But no such effect need be apprehended. No case can be stated in which a needless delay of service will aid the prosecution. Any such case, when stated, will ipso facto show the delay to have been needful, and hence reasonable, and hence remove the case from the purview of this opinion. On the other hand, the more promptly the warrant is served, the more likely the officer is to find the liquors complained of, and the more easy to prove the identity. Every hour's delay, whether from the officer's inefficiency or from his collusion with respondents, endangers the success of the prosecution.
'It is suggested that the prosecution often needs to obtain search warrants in advance, in order to have them in readiness to seize the liquors at the moment of deposit before they can be concealed; that such a procedure is very efficacious, and even essential, to circumvent the cunning of liquor sellers; and that the rule here evolved will nullify it. If such a practice obtains, it should be nullified.
Since the warrant in this case commanded the search to be made forthwith, only the return being permitted to be deferred for as much as ten days, the unexplained five-day delay of execution vitiated the warrant and made the search illegal. People v. Fetsko, 1928, 332 Ill. 110, 163 N.E. 359; People v. Wiedeman, 1926, 324 Ill. 66, 154 N.E. 432; McDaniel v. State, 1926, 197 Ind. 179, 150 N.E. 50; State v. Guthrie, 1897, 90 Me. 448, 38 A. 368; State v. Miller, 1932, 329 Mo. 855, 46 S.W.2d 541; Simmons v. State, Okl.Cr.1955, 286 P.2d 296; State v. Pachesa, 1926, 102 W.Va. 607, 135 S.E. 908.
'* * * when the officer has the task of recovering stolen goods or taking contraband liquor from a trained and disciplined criminal, the enemy of society, it may take weeks of patient observation to ascertain the moment when a search would be of any avail. In such a case the enforcement of the law might be rendered impossible by a judicial holding that a reasonable time for the execution and return of a warrant is the same as in the case of an ordinary criminal.' Emphasis supplied.
Benton v. United States, 4 Cir., 1934, 70 F.2d 24, certiorari denied 1934, 292 U.S. 642, 54 S.Ct. 778, 78 L.Ed. 1494; and United States v. Klapholz, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1955, 17 F.R.D. 18, which seem to say that service at any time within the ten-day period is seasonable, involved delays of only one day and two days, respectively, and the opinions are silent as to whether the delays were excusable. Moreover, in neither of those cases did the court appear to consider any part of the statute of the Rule other than the ten-day provision.

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