Source: https://advocatetanmoy.com/2019/04/16/yashwant-sinha-ors-vs-central-bureau-of-investigation-through-its-director-anr/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:21:45+00:00

Document:
Under the common law both in England and in India the context for material being considered by the court is relevancy. There can be no dispute that the manner in which evidence is got namely that it was procured in an illegal manner would not ordinarily be very significant in itself in regard to the courts decision to act upon the same. Documents which are improperly obtained and which are subject to a claim for privilege, undoubtedly the ordinary rule of relevancy alone may not suffice as larger public interest may warrant in a given case refusing to legitimise what is forbidden on grounds of overriding public interest.
3. The three documents which are the subject matter of the present controversy, admittedly, was published in ‘The Hindu’ newspaper on different dates in the month of February, 2019. One of the documents i.e. Note18 of the Ministry of Defence was also published in ‘The Wire’ a member of the Digital Print Media.
“The freedom of press, as one of the members of the Constituent Assembly said, is one of the items around which the greatest and the bitterest of constitutional struggles have been waged in all countries where liberal constitutions prevail. The said freedom is attained at considerable sacrifice and suffering and ultimately it has come to be incorporated in the various written constitutions. James Madison when he offered the Bill of Rights to the Congress in 1789 is reported as having said: “The right of freedom of speech is secured, the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government” (See, 1 Annals of Congress (178996) p. 141).
He also stated elsewhere that “I would rather have a completely free press with all the dangers involved in the wrong use of that freedom than a suppressed or regulated press” [See, D. R Mankekar: The Press under Pressure (1973) p. 25]. The Constituent Assembly and its various committees and subcommittees considered freedom of speech and expression which included freedom of press also as a precious right. The Preamble to the Constitution says that it is intended to secure to all citizens among others liberty of thought expression, and 10 belief. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras 4 and Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delh i5, this Court firmly expressed its view that there could not be any kind of restriction on the freedom of speech and expression other than those mentioned in Article 19(2) and thereby made it clear that there could not be any interference with that freedom in the name of public interest.
A later view equally eloquent expressed by this Court in Printers (Mysore) Limited vs. Assistant Commercial Tax Officer 6 may also be usefully recapitulated. “Freedom of press has always been a cherished right in all democratic countries. The newspapers not only purvey news but also ideas, opinions and ideologies besides much else. They are supposed to guard public interest by bringing to fore the misdeeds, failings and lapses of the government and other bodies exercising governing power. Rightly, therefore, it has been described as the Fourth Estate. The democratic credentials of a State is judged today by the extent of freedom the press enjoys in that State. According to Justice Douglas (An Almanac of Liberty) “acceptance by government of a dissident press is a measure of the maturity of the nation”.
The learned Judge observed in Terminiello v. Chicago, (1949) 93 L.Edn. 1131., that “a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effect as it presses for acceptance of an idea. …There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardisation of ideas either by legislatures, courts, “or dominant political or community ground”.
It is true that very often the press, whether out of commercial reason or excessive competition, descends to undesirable levels and may cause positive public mischief but the difficulty lies in the fact, recognised by Thomas Jefferson, that this freedom “cannot be limited without being lost”. Thomas Jefferson said, “it is, however, an evil for which there is no remedy; our liberty depends on the freedom of the press and that cannot be limited without being lost”. (In a letter to Dr. J. Currie, 1786). It is evident that “an able, disinterested, publicspirited press, with trained intelligence to know the right and courage to do it, can preserve that public virtue without which popular government is a sham and a mockery.
5. The above views of the Supreme Court of India on the issue of the freedom of the press has been echoed by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times Company vs. United States 7 wherein Marshall, J. refused to recognize a right in the executive government to seek a restraint order or publication of certain papers titled “Pentagon Papers” primarily on the ground that the first Amendment guaranteed freedom of the press and 18 U.S. Code § 793 did not contemplate any restriction on publication of items or materials specified in the said Code. By a majority of 6:3 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to pass prohibitory orders on publication of the “Pentagon Papers” on the ground that the Congress itself not having vested any such power in the executive, which it could have so done, the courts cannot carve out such a jurisdiction as the same may amount to unauthorized judicial law making thereby violating the sacred doctrine of separation of powers.
6. Insofar as the claim of privilege is concerned, on the very face of it, Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relates to unpublished public records. As already noticed, the three documents have been published in different editions of ‘The Hindu’ newspaper. That apart, as held in S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India a claim of immunity against disclosure under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act has to be essentially adjudged on the touchstone of public interest and to satisfy itself that public interest is not put to jeopardy by requiring disclosure the Court may even inspect the document in question though the said power has to be sparingly exercised.
8. Insofar as the Right to Information Act is concerned in Chief Information Commissioner vs. State of Manipur this Court had occasion to observe the object and purpose behind the enactment of the Act in the following terms: “The preamble (of the Right to Information Act, 2005) would obviously show that the Act is based on the concept of an open society.
10. An omnibus statement has been made by the learned Attorney that there are certain State actions that are outside the purview of judicial review and which lie within the political domain. The present would be such a case. In the final leg of the arguments, the learned Attorney General states that this case, if kept alive, has the potential to threaten the security of each and every citizen residing within our territories. The learned Attorney General thus exhorts us to dismiss this case, in limine, in light of public policy considerations.
11. All that we would like to observe in this regard is a reiteration of what had already been said by this Court in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala 11 “Judicial review is not intended to create what is sometimes called Judicial Oligarchy, the Aristocracy of the Robe, Covert Legislation, or Judge Made Law. The proper forum to fight for the wise use of the legislative authority is that of public opinion and legislative assemblies. Such contest cannot be transferred to the judicial arena.
3. I would think that freedom involves many elements. A free person must be fearless. Fear can be of losing all or any of the things that is held dear by the journalist. A free man cannot be biased. Bias comes in many forms. Bias if it is established as per the principles which are applicable is sufficient to vitiate the decisions of public authorities. The rule against bias is an important axiom to be observed by Judges. Equally the Press including the visual media cannot be biased and yet be free. Bias ordinarily implies a pre-disposition towards ideas or persons, both expressions to be comprehended in the broadest terms. It may stem from personal, political or financial considerations.
6. The wise words of Justice Douglas to be found in his dissenting judgment in Dennis v. United States 341 US 494 reminds one of the true goal of free speech and consequently the role of a free press. The same reads as under: “Free speech has occupied an exalted position because of the high service it has given society. Its protection is essential to the very existence of a democracy. The airing of ideas releases pressures which otherwise might become destructive. When idea compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free discussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and strains that work to tear all civilzations apart. Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith. We have founded our political system on it.
“124. Official communications. – No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure.” There can be no matter of doubt that Section 124 is confined to public officers and the decisive aspect even under Section 124 is the protection of public interest.
“The Court will proprio motu exclude evidence the production of which is contrary to public interest. It is in public interest that confidentiality shall be safeguarded. The reason is that such documents become subject to privilege by reason of their contents. Confidentiality is not a head of privilege. It is a consideration to bear in mind. It is not that the contents contain material which it would be damaging to the national interest to divulge but rather that the documents would be of class which demand protection. (See 1973 AC 388 (supra) at p. 40).
“45………..”It is settled law and it was so clearly recognised in Raj Narain’s case 1975 (4) SCC 428 that there may be classes of documents which public interest requires should not be disclosed, no matter what the individual documents in those classes may contain or in other words, the law recognises that there may be classes of documents which in the public interest should be immune from disclosure. There is one such class of documents which for years has been recognised by the law as entitled in the public interest to be protected against disclosure and that class consists of documents which it is really necessary for the proper functioning of the public service to withhold from disclosure.
11. In fact, the foundation for the law relating to privilege is contained in the candour principles and also the possibility of ill-informed criticism. Regarding candour forming the premise I find the following discussion in the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta’s case (supra). “We agree with these learned Judges that the need for candour and frankness cannot justify granting of complete immunity against disclosure of documents of this class, but as pointed out by Gibbs, ACJ in Sankey v. Whitlam (1978) 21 Australian LR 505:53, it would not be altogether unreal to suppose “that in some matters at least communications between ministers and servants of the Crown may be more frank and candid if these concerned believe that they are protected from disclosure” because not all Crown servants can be expected to be made of “sterner stuff”.
“72. There was also one other reason suggested by Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer 1968 AC 910 for according protection against disclosure of documents belonging to this case: “To my mind”, said the learned Law Lord : “the most important reason is that such disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind.” But this reason does not commend itself to us.
The object of granting immunity to documents of this kind is to ensure the proper working of the government and not to protect the ministers and other government servants from criticism however intemperate and unfairly based. Moreover, this reason can have little validity in a democratic society which believes in an open government. It is only through exposure of its functioning that a democratic government can hope to win the trust of the people. If full information is made available to the people and every action of the government is bona fide and actuated only by public interest, there need be no fear of “ill-informed or captious public or political criticism”.
“73. We have already pointed out that whenever an objection to the disclosure of a document under Section 123 is raised, two questions fall for the determination of the court, namely, whether the document relates to affairs of State and whether its disclosure would, in the particular case before the court, be injurious to public interest. The court in reaching its decision on these two questions has to balance two competing aspects of public interest, because the document being one relating to affairs of State, its disclosure would cause some injury to the interest of the State or the proper functioning of the public service and on the other hand if it is not disclosed, the non-disclosure would thwart the administration of justice by keeping back from the court a material document.
Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over: Provided further that those matters which come under the exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed;”. The said provision having not been pressed into service, neither its scope nor the ramification of Article 74(2) need be pursued further in this case.
(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any other device;” All citizens are conferred with the right to information subject to the provisions of the Act under Section 3.
The second head under which privilege is ordinarily claimed is that the document is a document which falls in a class of documents which entitles it to protection from disclosure and production. When a document falls in such a class, ordinarily courts are told that it suffices and the court may not consider the contents. When privilege was claimed as for instance in the matter relating to security of the nation, traditionally, courts both in England and in India have held that such documents would fall in the class of documents which entitles it to protection from production. (See paragraph ‘9’ of this order). The RTI Act through Section 8(2) has conferred upon the citizens a priceless right by clothing them with the right to demand information even in respect of such matters as security of the country and matters relating to relation with foreign state. No doubt, information is not be given for the mere asking. The applicant must establish that withholding of such information produces greater harm than disclosing it.
“25. So far as India is concerned its law of evidence is modeled on the rules of evidence, which prevailed in English law, and courts in India and in England have consistently refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure. In Barindra Kumar Ghose and others v. Emperor (1910)ILR 37 Cal 467 the learned Chief Justice Sir Lawrence Jenkins says at page, 500 : “Mr. Das has attacked the searches and has urged that, even if there was jurisdiction to direct the issue of search warrants, as I hold there was, still the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code have been completely disregarded. On this assumption he has contended that the evidence discovered by the searches is not admissible, but to this view I cannot accede.
For without in any way countenancing disregard of the provisions prescribed by the Code, I hold that what would otherwise be relevant does not become irrelevant because it was discovered in the course of a search in which those provisions were disregarded. As Jimutavahana with his shrewd common-sense observes-“a fact cannot be altered by 100 texts,” and as his commentator quaintly remarks : “If a Brahmana be slain, the precept ‘slay not a Brahmana’ does not annul the murder.” But the absence of the precautions designed. by the legislature lends support to the argument that the alleged discovery should be carefully scrutinized.
“43. If state papers were absolutely protected from production, great injustice would be caused in cases in which the documents were necessary to support the defence of an accused person whose liberty was at stake in a criminal trial, and it seems to be accepted that in those circumstances the documents must be disclosed: Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.  UKHL 3; (1942) AC 624, at pp 633-634 ; Conway v. Rimmer (1968) AC, at pp 966-967, 987 ; Reg. v. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Home Secretary (1973) AC, at pp 407- 408. Moreover, a Minister might produce a document of his own accord if it were necessary to do so to support a criminal prosecution launched on behalf of the government. The fact that state papers may come to light in some circumstances is impossible to reconcile with the view that they enjoy absolute protection from disclosure.
48. In Robinson v. South Australia (No. 2) (1931) AC, at p 718 , it was said that “the privilege, the reason for it being what it is, can hardly be asserted in relation to documents the contents of which have already been published”. Other cases support that view: see Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (No. 2) (1913) 16 CLR, at pp 188, 195, 199 ; Christie v. Ford (1957) 2 FLR 202, at p 209 . However the submission made by counsel 30 for Mr. Whitlam was that the position is different when the exclusion of a document is sought not because of its contents but because of the class to which it belongs. In such a case the document is withheld irrespective of its contents; therefore, it was said, it is immaterial that the contents are known.
“26. The character of the proceedings has a triple significance. First, it makes it very likely that, for the prosecution to be successful, its evidence must include documents of a class hitherto regarded as undoubtedly the subject of Crown privilege. But, then, to accord privilege to such documents as a matter of course is to come close to conferring immunity from conviction upon those who may occupy or may have occupied high offices of State if proceeded against in relation to their conduct in those offices.
“31. What are now equally well established are the respective roles of the court and of those, usually the Crown, who assert Crown privilege. A claim to Crown privilege has no automatic operation; it always remains the function of the court to determine upon that claim. The claim, supported by whatever material may be thought appropriate to the occasion, does no more than draw to the court’s attention what is said to be the entitlement to the privilege and provide the court with material which may assist it in determining whether or not Crown privilege should be accorded. A claim to the privilege is not essential to the invoking of Crown privilege. In cases of defence secrets, matters of diplomacy or affairs of government at the highest level, it will often appear readily enough that the balance of public interest is against disclosure.
“38 . Those who urge Crown privilege for classes of documents, regardless of particular contents, carry a heavy burden. As Lord Reid said in Rogers v. Home Secretary (1973) AC, at p 400 the speeches in Conway v. Rimmer UKHL 2; (1968) AC 910 have made it clear “that there is a heavy burden of proof” on those who make class claims. Sometimes class claims are supported by reference to the need to encourage candour on the part of public servants in their advice to Ministers, the immunity from subsequent disclosure which privilege affords being said to promote such candour. The affidavits in this case make reference to this aspect. Recent authorities have disposed of this ground as a tenable basis for privilege.
Lord Radcliffe in the Glasgow Corporation Case remarked 1956 SC (HL), at p 20 that he would have supposed Crown servants to be “made of sterner stuff”, a view shared by Harman L.J. in the Grosvenor Hotel Case (1965) Ch, at p 1255 : then, in Conway v. Rimmer (1968) AC 901 , Lord Reid dismissed the “candour” argument but found the true basis for the public interest in secrecy, in the case of cabinet minutes and the like, to lie in the fact that were they to 34 be disclosed this would “create or fan illinformed or captious public or political criticism. . . . the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticize without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind” (1968) AC, at p 952 and see as to the ground of “candour” per Lord Morris (1968) AC, at p 959 , Lord Pearce (1968) AC, at pp 987-988 and Lord Upjohn (1968) AC, at pp 933-934 . In Rogers v. Home Secretary (1973) AC, at p 413 Lord Salmon spoke of the “candour” argument as “the old fallacy”.
“41. There is, moreover, a further factor pointing in the same direction. The public interest in non-disclosure will be much reduced in weight if the document or information in question has already been published to the world at large. There is much authority to this effect, going back at least as far as Robinson v. South Australia (No. 2) (1931) AC 704, at p 718 per Lord Blanesburgh. In 1949 Kriewaldt J., sitting in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, had occasion to review the relevant authorities in his judgment in Christie v. Ford (1957) 2 FLR 202, at p 209 . The reason of the thing necessarily tends to deny privilege to information which is already public knowledge. As Lord Blanesburgh observed (25) “the privilege, the reason for it being what it is, can hardly be asserted in relation to documents the contents of which have already been published”.
31. In this case however as I have already noticed there are the following aspects. The documents in question have been published in ‘The Hindu’, a national daily as noticed in the order of the learned Chief Justice. It is true that they have not been officially published. The correctness of the contents per se of the documents are not questioned. Lastly, the case does not strictly involve in a sense the claim for privilege as the petitioners have not called upon the respondents to produce the original and as already noted the state does not take objection to the correctness of the contents of the documents.

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