Source: http://www.thehamiltonfirm.com/author/huhamilton/page/5/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:39:51+00:00

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Volkswagen may have to buy back its vehicles?
The California Air Resources Board is scheduled on Feb. 2nd to decide on additional plans for repairing another 85,000 VW, Audi and Porsche cars.
As covered in our previous post, Tennessee’s Consumer Protection Act may provide a good remedy for owners of Volkswagen and Audi diesel automobiles purchased in Tennessee, as it provides for treble damages and attorneys fees.
2012 – 2015 VW Beetle TDI.
If the car was purchased new in Georgia, the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, O.C.G.A. Sec. 10-1-370 could provide a good remedy as well. Private actions are permitted, and if an intentional violation is found, the court can award three times the actual damages under O.C.G.A. Sec. 10-1-399, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees. This is very important, as the damages to each individual owner may be relatively modest, depending on the diminution in value of each car, but tripling the damage award and adding attorneys’ fees can make it economically feasible to bring individual lawsuits on behalf of diesel owners as an alternative to participating in one of the hundreds of class action lawsuits already filed around the county.
Is Volkswagen Liable for Treble Damages Under Tennessee’s Consumer Protection Act?
Chattanooga is home to Volkswagen’s only North American manufacturing plant. The recent revelations of manipulation of the emission control software on their diesel automobiles are shocking.
According to the EPA, many Volkswagen and Audi vehicles equipped with 4-cylinder diesel engines were programmed to detect when they were undergoing emissions tests. However, during normal operation the software deactivated some of the onboard pollution control equipment. This process apparently helped improve performance but resulted in the vehicles emitting up to 40 times the allowable levels of additional particulates and smog-causing oxides of nitrogen.
“Volkswagen has ordered an external investigation of this matter,” he said. German authorities are set to probe Volkswagen for similar emissions manipulation in Germany, according to Dow Jones.
Meanwhile, Vice Chancellor and Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel told Reuters he was concerned about the “excellent” reputation of German carmakers, saying Volkswagen’s emissions manipulation was a “bad incident,” according to Reuters. Gabriel also called on the company to fully clear up the egregious claims.
Is Volkswagen guilty of deliberately misleading its customers? Would they have bought diesel automobiles knowing they would be spewing out “40 times the allowable levels of additional particulates and smog-causing oxides of nitrogen”?
Although Volkswagen will have to recall all those cars, and fix the problem, the vehicles may not perform as well with the emissions controls working correctly. How will that affect the resale value of the vehicles?
Is Volkswagen guilty of “unfair or deceptive acts”?
The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act is found at T.C.A. § 47-18-101 et seq.
(2) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services.
(3) Causing likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection or association with, or certification by, another. . . .
(5) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have . .
(7) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another . . .
The damages may be substantial, if the resale value of a Volkswagen or Audi vehicle is diminished, even after the recall repair work is performed.
Georgia’s modified comparative negligence system was radically altered by the tort reform legislation enacted in 2005. The legislation was rammed through the General Assembly so fast there was none of the usual vetting by the judiciary committees and the resulting laws, effective February 16, 2005, were poorly drafted and procedurally confusing. Until 2005, apportionment of damages was permitted in Georgia only in those cases against “more than one person” where “the plaintiff is himself to some degree responsible for the injury or damages,” O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
“(a) Where an action is brought against one or more persons for injury to person or property and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury or damages claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff and the judge shall reduce the amount of damages otherwise awarded to the plaintiff in proportion to his or her percentage of fault.
(2) The notice shall be given by filing a pleading in the action designating the nonparty and setting forth the nonparty’s name and last known address, or the best identification of the nonparty which is possible under the circumstances, together with a brief statement of the basis for believing the nonparty to be at fault.
Under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 fault can now be apportioned to entities the plaintiff cannot recover from, such as his or her employer, in spite of the clear language in subsection (b) that the trier of fact can “apportion its award of damages among the persons who are liable.” An employer simply cannot be held “liable” for damages sustained by its employee in Georgia under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11. See dissent by Justice Benham. However, the majority found otherwise, but to reach that conclusion, they had to overrule Ridgeway v. Whisman, 210 Ga. App. 169 (1993), and hold that negligent entrustment of a vehicle or some other instrumentality to a minor or inexperienced person could result in liability if that person is injured by is use.
Most intriguing, however, are hints by Justice Blackwell that the statute might not apply in all tort cases. What did he mean by the comment “in the cases to which the statute applies” (f.n.3)? Does that mean that damages cannot be apportioned unless “an action is brought against more than one person for injury to person or property” and “the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury or damages claimed”? In other words, if a lawsuit was brought against a single defendant allocation of fault to non-parties would not be permitted?
“(A) Criminal charges are brought against any person alleged to have caused or contributed to the injury; (B) The conduct, transaction, or occurrence that gives rise to the cause of action for civil damages is the subject of a criminal prosecution commenced within one (1) year by: (i) A law enforcement officer; (ii) A district attorney general; or (iii) A grand jury; and (C) The cause of action is brought by the person injured by the criminal conduct against the party prosecuted for such conduct.” T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(2).
So if criminal charges are brought against a defendant within one year after the wreck or other event causing injury, the one year SOL can be extended for another year, if all of the foregoing conditions are met. This amendment to T.C.A. § 28-3-104 was effective July 1, 2015. Unfortunately, not many lawyers will be willing to take the risk of waiting more than a year to file suit in a personal injury case where criminal charges are pending, so this provision will not be used often. However, situations can be envisioned where a meritorious claim might be saved by the operation of this new law.

References: § 47
 § 51
 § 51
 § 34
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 § 28
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