Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180423_0001008.EPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:49:54+00:00

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FindACase | Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Education v. D.E.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Education v. D.E.
PEDRO RIVERA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Education for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Education, and COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendants.
This consolidated action stems from a Pennsylvania hearing officer ordering Plaintiff Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Education (“PDE”) to reimburse two educational trust funds and satisfy an unpaid private school tuition reconciliation that Young Scholars Kenderton Charter School (“Kenderton Charter”) allegedly owed to Defendant Y.A.L.E. School (“Y.A.L.E.”). PDE filed an Amended Complaint alleging three counts: Count I is against Defendant D.E. (“Parent”) under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and seeks reversal of the hearing officer's orders requiring PDE to reimburse the educational trust accounts and pay the tuition reconciliation. Counts II and III are against Y.A.L.E. and are for unjust enrichment and indemnification, respectively.
Presently before the Court is Y.A.L.E.'s Motion to Dismiss, which seeks dismissal of the claims of unjust enrichment and indemnification. For the reasons noted below, Y.A.L.E.'s Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
On February 16, 2017, Parent filed two due process complaints on behalf of A.D. and A.H.D. against PDE and Kenderton Charter. (Id. ¶ 51.) The due process complaints sought reimbursement of tuition that Parent allegedly paid to Y.A.L.E. in satisfaction of the monthly tuition invoices. (Id. ¶ 52.) Although A.D.'s due process complaint did not seek payment of the $4, 386.00 tuition reconciliation invoice, Parent and PDE agreed that the hearing officer could determine whether PDE was obligated to pay it. (Id. ¶ 54.) PDE then requested confirmation that Parent paid Y.A.L.E. for the education services and sought copies of the payment receipts. (Id. ¶¶ 55-56.) Parent's counsel informed PDE that “[Y.A.L.E.] School ‘has been asking Parent to satisfy the outstanding invoices for both [A.H.D. and A.D.]. I was under the impression that Parent had satisfied those invoices. But based on my inquiry this morning, I now believe that the invoices will be satisfied imminently.'” (Id. ¶ 57) (ellipses omitted) (second alteration in original). By check dated February 23, 2017, the trusts paid $8, 872.50 from A.H.D.'s compensatory education funds and $15, 134.80 from A.D.'s compensatory education funds.
On January 22, 2018, PDE filed an Amended Complaint against Parent under the IDEA and brought state law claims against Y.A.L.E. for unjust enrichment and indemnification. As it pertains to Parent, PDE seeks reversal of the hearing officer's decisions requiring it to pay the monthly invoices and tuition reconciliation. In the alternative, PDE seeks damages from Y.A.L.E. for unjust enrichment and indemnification in the event the hearing officer's decisions are not reversed. On March 6, 2018, Y.A.L.E. filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims asserted against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, Y.A.L.E.'s Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must “accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, courts need not “accept mere conclusory factual allegations or legal assertions.” In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Finally, we may consider “only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon [those] documents.” Davis, 824 F.3d at 341 (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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