Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/soft-tissue-injuries
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 13:47:53+00:00

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Adding to this site’s archived caselaw for soft tissue injury compensation, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for soft tissue injuries which “achieved full physical recovery no later than two years after the accident“.
 On the evidence before me, I find that the plaintiff suffered significant pain and limitations from the date of the accident until approximately the end of 2008, with intermittent, lingering difficulties for at least another year, but had achieved full physical recovery no later than two years after the accident. The physical difficulties in the immediate post-accident period were likely more difficult for the plaintiff to deal with than might otherwise have been the case because she was, at the same time, adjusting to a new school and life in a new country.
 I also find that the plaintiff experienced severe anxiety while riding in cars for approximately two years and that anxiety still affects her efforts to learn to drive. For purposes of assessing damages, it does not matter that this anxiety may, to some extent, be influenced by the fact that her mother has similar fears and anxiety flowing from the same accident. In any event, there is no reason to believe this will be a long-term problem.
Personal Injury Claims Are Not "Measured by the Number of Doctors Seen"
The value of a personal injury case has little to do with the number of doctor visits a Plaintiff has. I’ve discussed this topic previously. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, further addressing this matter.
 This case was presented with uncompromising efficiency. Counsel were meticulous in focusing on those matters that were actually in dispute.
 The evidence was concluded in a day along with an additional half day for argument.
 The medical evidence consisted of two reports. There was no wasted expense by tendering marginal evidence that would have done little to assist the Court.
 A case that takes little time to present does not mean that damages are nominal. It is the quality and substance of the evidence that matters. Style should never trump substance.
 If an example of proportionality needed a model case, counsel have succeeded here in illustrating how litigation can be conducted.
Reasons for judgement were released this week dealing with damages for soft tissue injuries imposed on pre-existing symptomatic injuries.
 I find that the plaintiff suffered a mild to moderate soft tissue injury to her cervical and upper thoracic areas as a result of the February 2004 accident. This was superimposed on her already symptomatic condition caused by the earlier accidents and although she had started to make the expected recovery, the process was interrupted by her falls. Normally, these would not have affected the plaintiff but she was more vulnerable as a result of the three accidents. There is no orthopaedic or neurological cause. It is probable that these complaints will continue well into the future but can be managed and alleviated by an appropriate exercise programme (as recommended by her medical advisors as early as Dr. Parhar in March 2003) and by such passive therapies as may, from time to time, help alleviate her symptoms.
 Using the authorities relied upon by counsel as a template, for each case depends on its own unique features, I assess the plaintiff’s general damages at $80,000 which I reduce by 25% as attributable to or an apportionment for her pre-existing symptomatic injuries and her intervening falls.
Adding to this ever-growing British Columbia non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) caselaw database, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing a claim involving lingering soft tissue injuries.
In today’s case (Manson v. Kalar) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end collision in 2008. The crash was fairly significant resulting in over $5,000 in damage to the Plaintiff’s vehicle. Fault for the collision was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the claim.
 …The plaintiff here has suffered injuries which are limited to his lower back and neck. He has pursued very little treatment for his injuries and, despite his doctor’s recommendations, he has not attended few physiotherapy treatments or undertaken any core muscle conditioning programs. Nevertheless it is expected that he will recover in the foreseeable future. As I have already noted, while I satisfied that his ongoing pain and discomfort has limited his participation in his former sporting activities, some of his social withdrawal appears to be the result of other factors. ..
 …In the case at bar, the plaintiff has suffered a mild to moderate soft tissue injuries, where the symptoms have persisted for almost three years since the accident and are still not resolved. In these circumstances, I find that a fair and reasonable award of damages is $25,000.
For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts of other recent BC court cases dealing with damages for soft tissue injuries.
As I recently discussed, the law in British Columbia requires a Defendant to compensate a Plaintiff for any indivisible injury caused by their wrongdoing. If a subsequent event contributes to or aggravates the injury a defendant cannot reduce the amount of compensation the Plaintiff is entitled to. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, demonstrating this principle of law.
In this week’s case (Fillmore v. McKay) the Plaintiff was involved in 2005 motor vehicle collision. The Plaintiff was riding his bicycle when he was struck by the Defendant’s vehicle. The Defendant initially denied being at fault but during trial admitted that the collision was indeed a result of her negligence. The Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries and a traumatic brain injury.
 The plaintiff took a fall at work on July 9, 2005 when he says in his note that he aggravated his neck and shoulder. The defendant submits that this was a new incident not caused by him that should serve to reduce the plaintiff’s personal injuries for which he has liability from the motor vehicle accident. The defendant even submits that it may have been this incident of July 9, 2005 that caused the plaintiff’s back injury because his first complaint to Dr. Buie was not until after that.
 I have already concluded that the plaintiff’s back injury occurred in the motor vehicle accident and not subsequently by this bike accident. The plaintiff does not say in his note that he aggravated his back on July 9, 2005, but only his neck and shoulder.
 As to the possible aggravation of his neck and shoulder injuries, Athey v. Leonati,  3 S.C.R. 458, makes it clear that the defendant remains liable where his negligence caused or contributed to the injuries and that liability is not reduced by any non-tortious contributing causes.
 Accordingly, even if the plaintiff’s neck and shoulder injuries were aggravated by this non-tortious incident, the defendant is still fully responsible for the full extent of those injuries because his negligence caused them in the first place and thereby contributed to the extent of the injuries.
This quote comes from the 1981 case Butler v. Blaylock and is often advanced by defence counsel in an effort to have a Court dismiss soft tissue injury claims. This quote has been repeated many times in recent judgements and recently the BC Court of Appeal referenced this authority in Mariano v. Campbell.
12 With the greatest respect, I am of the opinion that there is no evidence upon which one could reasonably conclude that the appellant did not continue to suffer pain as of the date of the trial. After careful consideration of the expert testimony and the evidence of the appellant and his wife, I have reached the conclusion that the only finding open to the learned trial judge was that as of the date of trial the appellant continued to suffer moderate pain and in the words of Dr. Lehmann, his symptoms “will gradually subside with further time. Having been present for approximately two and a half years, it is doubtful that they will disappear completely.” (underlining mine).
13 There are three basic reasons which, in my view, support the conclusion that the plaintiff continued to suffer pain as of the date of trial. Firstly, the plaintiff testified that he continued to suffer pain. His wife corroborated this evidence. The learned trial judge accepted this evidence but held that there was no objective evidence of continuing injury. It is not the law that if a plaintiff cannot show objective evidence of continuing injury that he cannot recover. If the pain suffered by the plaintiff is real and continuing and resulted from the injuries suffered in the accident, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. There is no suggestion in this case that the pain suffered by the plaintiff did not result from the accident. I would add that a plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for pain, even though the pain results in part from the plaintiff’s emotional or psychological makeup and does not result directly from objective symptoms.
14 Secondly, all of the medical reports support the view that the plaintiff continued to suffer pain and that it was not likely that his symptoms would disappear completely.
15 Thirdly, and of great importance, is the report of Dr. Lehmann, which was not before the learned trial judge for his consideration. In that report, Dr. Lehmann stated that there were degenerative changes in the cervical spine which pre-existed the accident. He said “they were probably asymptomatic before the accident but I think are probably contributing to his prolonged discomfort.” (underlining mine). In my view, as this evidence is uncontradicted, these objective findings cannot be disregarded and should be given great weight.
 To suggest that depending upon the seriousness, the evidence in the civil case must be scrutinized with greater care implies that in less serious cases the evidence need not be scrutinized with such care. I think it is inappropriate to say that there are legally recognized different levels of scrutiny of the evidence depending upon the seriousness of the case. There is only one legal rule and that is that in all cases, evidence must be scrutinized with care by the trial judge.
I hope this ‘history lesson’ helps anyone confronted with an attack on Plaintiff credibility during a soft tissue injury trial.
A decision was released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing personal injury lawsuits and Judges duties to address credibility issues in their reasons for judgement.
In today’s case (Mariano v. Campbell) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 BC motor vehicle collision. The Plaintiff apparently suffered from chronic soft tissue injuries as a result of this crash. At trial her claim was successfully prosecuted and she was awarded close to $115,000 for her damages (You can click here to read my post summarizing the trial judgement).
During trial the Plaintiff’s credibility was put squarely at issue with the defense lawyer cross examining the Plaintiff with previous statements in which she stated that her injuries recovered shortly after the collision. The trial judge dismissed these challenges and found that the Plaintiff was a ‘very credible‘ witness. The Defendant appealed the judgement arguing that the trial judge “made palpable and overriding errors in assessing the plaintiff’s credibility‘. The BC Court of Appeal agreed and found that the judge failed to “seize the substance of the critical issues” and ordered a new trial.
38] This appeal concerns assessments of witness credibility and findings of fact. It is well-settled that an appellant court must exercise great restraint in reviewing such matters. They are properly the province of the trial judge. In the absence of palpable and overriding error, this Court must defer to the findings of fact of a trial judge (Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 23,  2 S.C.R. 235).
…what is required is that the reasons show that the judge has seized the substance of the issue…The degree of detail required in explaining findings on credibility may also, as discussed above, vary with the evidentiary record and the dynamic of the trial. The factors supporting or detracting from credibility may be clear from the record. In such cases, the trial judge’s reasons will not be found deficient simply because the trial judge failed to recite these factors.
 In the case before us, then, a critical issue was whether the plaintiff’s evidence at trial about the course of her recovery was credible. To make that determination, the judge had to examine the plaintiff’s various statements and the other evidence.
 It is my view that the reasons for judgment do not demonstrate that the judge “seized the substance of the critical issues”. There are several indications that she did not do so.
 In my view, the reasons are problematic. The fact that the plaintiff continued to work despite her symptoms does not, on the face of it, have any relationship to her veracity. The issue in this case was not whether the plaintiff was exaggerating symptoms, or even whether she experienced pain at work at the time of trial. Rather, it was whether her pain had been ongoing since the time of the accident.
 Similarly, the plaintiff’s emotional reaction to her neck problems had no bearing on the question of whether she was being completely forthright with the court in respect of the course that her pain took.
 I conclude that, looked at in their entire context, the reasons do not suggest that the trial judge “seized the substance of the critical issues”. She did not deal with important contradictions in the evidence, and appears to have misapprehended or ignored parts of the cross-examinations of the plaintiff’s witnesses. This constitutes the kind of error that compels this Court to set aside her order.

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