Source: https://rutgerspolicyjournal.org/proposed-solution-%E2%80%9Cright-counsel%E2%80%9D-new-jersey-domestic-violence-litigation
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 13:00:13+00:00

Document:
As a Student-Intern in the Rutgers Domestic Violence Clinic, I have had the opportunity and pleasure of learning about the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Act (the “Act”), the ways in which the Act is applied by the New Jersey Courts, and the consequences the Act has on litigants. One of the first things I noticed during my time in court was the number of parties proceeding pro se in what is certainly a complicated legal process. I have watched plaintiffs and defendants alike proceed to trial without even the most basic understanding of what the process would entail, let alone an understating of how to present their case in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence. This worried me; it worried me because of what I knew to be the consequences at stake for both parties. The potential for severe and lasting consequences of domestic violence litigation without the assistance of counsel is the focus of this article. This Article will begin with a presentation of the possible statutory ramifications of a Final Restraining Order (“FRO”), followed by a brief discussion of the collateral consequences that may also occur. In conclusion, the article will suggest a possible solution to the concerns of uncounseled domestic violence litigation.
· Compensation for pain and suffering.
Directing the possession of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor child residing in the household.
All parties involved in New Jersey domestic violence litigation face the same reality; the ramifications of pursuing an FRO have significant, lasting consequences. For plaintiffs, being granted an FRO may provide a legal means to escape the harsh confines of an abusive relationship; alternatively, failure to successfully present their case and receive the protections of an FRO may force them back into the hell from which they are fleeing, thereby exposing them to continued physical and emotional harm. For defendants, the imposition of an FRO may expose them to the remedies discussed above, along with the lasting social stigma of being labeled a domestic violence abuser. For both, the ramifications and consequences are real, and to proceed without even the most basic understanding of these consequences is unwise. I believe it is our duty to ensure that there are alternative options to proceeding pro se in such consequential litigation. One solution is to provide parties in domestic violence matters a means to pursue reduced-cost counsel if they so desire. The law, in its present state, does not provide for such an option.
As a general rule, the assistance of appointed counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment for criminal matters applies to civil proceedings, if the defendant’s personal freedom is at stake. The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this issue in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, holding, “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” The key language, “fact or other consequence of magnitude” becomes the focal point for our analysis.
As both a matter of law and of public policy, it appears that courts presiding over domestic violence matters should consider, as is already done by the municipal courts throughout the state, the global effect that remedies or sanctions will have on an individual when deciding whether counsel is necessary.
In deciding whether parties in domestic violence matters had a right to counsel, the New Jersey Appellate Division in D.N. v. K.M., concluded that the “protections of due process do not require the appointment of counsel for indigents presenting or defending a private party’s civil domestic violence action.” The Appellate Division appears to condition that statement however, noting that it does “not minimize the serious consequences accompanying a finding of domestic violence.” These statements, considered in light of New Jersey’s “consequence of magnitude” test, appear directly at odds with each other.
Many have discussed this issue, but few have suggested viable solutions to the problem. One possible solution has been actively implemented within our state for nearly 20 years—the municipal court public defender system. Enacted in 1997, the municipal court public defender system offers indigent parties the ability to make application for reduced-cost counsel, thereby providing an avenue to representation without establishing an unfettered affirmative right to counsel. Similarly, what I advocate for is providing indigent parties involved in domestic violence litigation—both plaintiffs and defendants—the “right” to make application for discounted counsel. Such a system will provide a means to representation, without creating an affirmative, unrestricted right to counsel.
An application for counsel, like in the municipal court system, can be designed to carry a small monetary fee; those with insufficient financial means, as can be defined by the legislature, may be awarded counsel for a fee of between $50 and $200, a fee that can be waived by the judge in situations that so require. Those with sufficient financial resources, as can be defined by the legislature, will be denied access to reduced-cost counsel, and will have to acquire private representation should they seek counsel.
Like the municipal court public defender system, the state can employ a small number of attorneys to represent plaintiffs and defendants on a per diem or part-time basis, their cost of employment offset by the fees collected by applicants. Additionally, by mirroring the municipal court system and allowing attorneys to maintain a private practice in addition to their part-time court service, the system may encourage participation by skilled practitioners, negating the concern that participating lawyers will lack the competency to adequately represent parties. By implementing such a system, we can provide for discounted legal services for those in need, while not implementing an unfettered right to counsel—a compromised resolution of the competing concerns articulated in D.N. v. K.M.
Municipal public defenders are a critical component of New Jersey’s system for the administration of justice and the effective, fair and equal representation of the poor.
The appointment of municipal public defenders increases the efficiency and effectiveness of the system and the professionalism of the municipal courts.
Each concern enumerated by the legislature with regard to municipal court practice is present in the domestic violence context.
By implementing a “municipal public defender–like” system in the domestic violence context, we can resolve the Appellate Division’s competing concerns: hesitation to find a legal “right” to counsel and recognizing the seriousness of domestic violence litigation. The legislature has an already existing structure that appears easily adaptable to this context, and the financial burden of implementing such a system appears manageable. While not perfect, the solution appears to be a step in the right direction.
* Business Editor, Rutgers University Law Review; Candidate for Juris Doctor, Rutgers Law School, 2016. With much appreciation to both Professor Ruth Anne Robbins and Professor Victoria Chase, whose continued patience, encouragement, and support were invaluable throughout the writing process.
 While the term “remedy” is used, the difference between remedial sanctions and affirmative fines and penalties—an important difference in determining whether counsel should be appointed—appears to be a narrow difference. While it appears that the legislature expected the remedies be used to protect and benefit victims as opposed to punish offenders, in many ways, the solutions provided both benefit victims and punish offenders. I encourage readers to consider the effect each remedy has on both parties to visualize this reality.
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (b)(1) (West 2012).
 See D.N. v. K.M., 216 N.J. 587, 594 (2014) in which New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Barry T. Albin wrote an impassioned dissent on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to deny certification on a case which, in large part, concerned itself with the appointment of counsel in domestic violence matters.
 D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 600­–01 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981)) (noting the right to appointed counsel “has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation”).
 277 A.2d 216, 223 (N.J. 1971) (emphasis added).
 997 A.2d 210, 219 (N.J. 2010).
 Id. (quoting State v. Hamm, 577 A.2d 1259 (N.J. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991)). See also State v. Hrycak, 877 A.2d 1209, 1215–16 (N.J. 2005) (holding defendants in DWI cases have a right to counsel because they face a “consequence of magnitude”). See D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. at 601.
 See Guidelines for Determination of Consequences of Magnitude in Municipal Court, Second Appendix to Part VII to N.J. CT. R. 7:3–2(b) (September 1, 2014), available at https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/r7-2nd_appendix.htm (last visited October 25, 2015).
 See N.J. Stat. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2012).
 429 N.J. Super. at 606.
 Codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:24 (West 1999).
 For reference, see § 2B:24-9.
 See § 2B:24-17(a) (“A municipality may require by ordinance a person applying for representation by a municipal public defender or court approved counsel to pay an application fee of not more than $200.00, but only in an amount necessary to pay the costs of municipal public defender services. In accordance with guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court, the municipal court may waive any required application fee, in whole or in part, only if the court determines, in its discretion, upon a clear and convincing showing by the applicant that the application fee represents an unreasonable burden on the person seeking representation. The municipal court may permit a person to pay the application fee over a specific period of time not to exceed four months.”).
 Employing attorneys on both sides can help avoid conflicts of interest.
 A detailed analysis of the economic feasibility of this system is beyond the scope of this article. That said, like the municipal public defender system, attorneys can be employed at part-time rates. See § 2B:24-5 (“[a] municipal public defender shall receive compensation, either on an hourly, per diem, annual or other basis as the municipality may provide.”).
 See § 2B:24-4(f) (“[t]he municipal public defenders [may] represent private clients in any municipality, including the municipality where they act as a municipal public defender.”).
 58 N.J. 281, 295 (N.J. 1971).

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