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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:37:29+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 160846 - BENJAMIN B. GERONGA v. HON. EDUARDO VARELA, ETC.
BENJAMIN B. GERONGA, Petitioner, v. HON. EDUARDO VARELA, as City Mayor of Cadiz City, Respondent.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Benjamin B. Geronga (petitioner) assails that portion of the October 15, 2002 Joint Decision1 of the Court Appeals (CA) affirming his dismissal from the service under Resolution No. 9921072 dated September 17, 1999 and Resolution No. 0007153 dated March 21, 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC); as well as the October 1, 2003 CA Resolution4 denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
Petitioner works as Engineer IV at the General Services Department of the local government of Cadiz City. In 1996, he was involved in two administrative cases: 1) Administrative Case No. 96-045 for Unjust Vexation, Contempt, Insubordination, Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer, and Alarm and Scandal; and 2) Administrative Case No. 96-056 for Grave Misconduct and Engaging in Partisan Political Activity. Impleaded with petitioner in Administrative Case No. 96-05 were Edwin Nuyad (Nuyad) and Nick Ambos (Ambos), also employees of the local government of Cadiz City.
Attached is a copy of the Resolution/Recommendation of the City Legal Officer which this office has approved in toto and considered an integral part hereof.
We find the recommendation as contained therein to be just and proper under the premises.
In view hereof, you are hereby meted a penalty of dismissal from the service as recommended effective January 09, 1998.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 questioning the order to reinstate Nuyad, Ambos and petitioner. Respondent pointed out that petitioner cannot be reinstated anymore because the latter failed to appeal from his dismissal in Administrative Case No. 96-04, which consequently became final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Mayor Eduardo G. Varela is partly granted.
His prayer for the reversal of CSC Resolution No. 990717 dated March 25, 1999 is hereby denied. However, his request for the non-reinstatement of [petitioner] in view of the finality of the decision in Administrative Case No. 96-04, finding [petitioner] guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he was meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service is granted.
In the October 15, 2002 Joint Decision21 assailed herein, the CA dismissed both petitions and affirmed CSC Resolutions No. 992107 and No. 000715.
We shall first resolve the fourth issue - whether the CSC may entertain respondent's motion for reconsideration of its decision exonerating petitioner.
Section 37. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office x x x.
In addition, Section 47 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987)27 reiterates that the CSC may entertain appeals only from (a) a penalty of suspension of more than thirty days; or (b) a fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary; or (c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or (d) removal or dismissal from office.
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered.
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. - x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.
In fine, the exoneration of petitioner under CSC Resolution No. 990717 may be subject to a motion for reconsideration by respondent who, as the appointing and disciplining authority, is a real party in interest. The CSC acted within the rubric of Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy in allowing said motion for reconsideration.
The next question then is whether the CSC was correct in granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent, and the CA, in agreeing with it.
The Court does not completely agree.
The CSC is under the impression that in Administrative Case No. 96-04, respondent issued a "Decision dated December 1, 1997," and that it is said decision which petitioner should have appealed. The CA shared the notion. Both are wrong. What is dated December 1, 1997 is merely the Resolution/Recommendation issued by Del Pilar in Administrative Case No. 96-04. The formal decision of respondent is Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 8, 1998.
There is a material difference between a mere recommendation to dismiss an employee and an administrative decision/resolution sentencing him with dismissal.
Under Section 35,40 Rule III of the URACCS, a recommendation to dismiss is that contained in a formal investigation report issued by a hearing or investigating officer and submitted to the disciplining authority for approval. Falling under this category are the December 1, 1997 Recommendation/Resolution in Administrative Case No. 96-04 and the December 4, 1997 Recommendation/Resolution in Administrative Case No. 96-05 issued by Del Pilar as investigating officer. While they contain the approval of respondent as disciplining authority, both Recommendations/Resolutions merely state findings of probable cause that petitioner is guilty of the administrative charges filed against him, and recommend that he be dismissed. As we held in Rubio v. Munar,41 such recommendations are not the proper subject matter of an appeal to the CSC.
Thus, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 being the decision of respondent in both Administrative Case No. 96-04 and Administrative Case No. 96-05, it is crucial to emphasize that in the Notice of Appeal which petitioner filed, he distinctly stated that what he is appealing to the CSC is his dismissal as "contained in [respondent's] Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 08, 1998."46 By so doing, petitioner effectively included in his appeal not just Administrative Case No. 96-05 but also Administrative Case No. 96-04. Therefore, respondent erred in concluding that Administrative Case No. 96-04 had become final and executory for failure of petitioner to appeal the same to the CSC.
In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara,51 the respondents-employees failed to appeal from a decision in which the CSC ordered their reinstatement but omitted to award them backwages. The Court condoned their technical lapse and granted their belated claim so as to fulfill the guarantee of monetary compensation which the law itself extends to those arbitrarily dismissed.
So too must the Court allow petitioner redress from the decision of respondent in Administrative Case No. 96-04. While petitioner, unaided by legal counsel, may have omitted to raise specific grounds against the decision insofar as Administrative Case No. 96-04 is concerned, it cannot be denied that he intended to appeal from it. The least he deserves then is a scrutiny of the legal and factual bases of his dismissal.
As it turns out, upon review, said decision, insofar as it relates to Administrative Case No. 96-04, is patently void.
In the present case, the records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 reveal that petitioner was dismissed for an act which was not alleged in the administrative charge filed against him.
That respondent having failed and refused to file his answer in the above-entitled case, this office has to resolve the case on the basis of the evidence on records [sic].
Nowhere in the records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 does it appear that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct, or that he was held to answer for his alleged defamatory statements in his April 1, 1996 letter. Thus, the December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation of Del Pilar dismissing petitioner on that ground, and Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 of respondent approving said resolution/ recommendation were issued in utter contempt of the right of petitioner to due process. Both are void ab initio and should be treated as inexistent64 - - it is as if no December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation was issued in Administrative Case No. 96-04, and therefore, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 could not have approved and adopted a void resolution/recommendation. In effect, there was nothing for petitioner to appeal from in Administrative Case No. 96-04.
Therefore, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 and the December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation constituted an unlawful deprivation of petitioner's security of tenure, insofar as Administrative Case No. 96-04 is concerned. The CA and CSC gravely erred in upholding them.
That said, however, the nullity of Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 and the December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation leaves Administrative Case No. 96-04 unresolved. Although the Court may already decide said case based on the records before us, the better policy is for us to defer to the prerogative granted under Section 17,65 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to the primary disciplining authority, the incumbent mayor of Cadiz City,66 whether or not to pursue said administrative case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Joint Decision dated October 15, 2002 and Resolution dated October 1, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE only insofar as Benjamin B. Geronga is concerned; Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 992107 dated September 17, 1999 and Resolution No. 000715 dated March 21, 2000 are ANNULLED. The December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation of Cadiz City Legal Officer Marcelo R. del Pilar and Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 of Cadiz City Mayor Eduardo Varela in Administrative Case No. 96-04 are also ANNULLED. Administrative Case No. 96-04 is REMANDED to the incumbent city mayor of Cadiz City for proper disposition.
1 Penned by Associate Justice (now Presiding Justice) Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Regalado E. Maambong; rollo, p. 30.
9 Id. at 61 and 70.
25 Petition, id. at 24-25.
26 Promulgated on October 6, 1975.
27 Effective November 24, 1989.
28 Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88177, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95575, December 23, 1991, 204 SCRA 965; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 97381, November 5, 1992, 215 SCRA 398.
29 Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 366 Phil. 86 (1999).
30 Effective September 27, 1999.
31 In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507, 522), the Court held that the CSC derives its authority to promulgate rules from both P.D. No. 807 and E.O. No. 292.
32 National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. P/Insp. John A. Mamauag, G.R. No. 149999, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 624; Dagadag v. Tongnawa, G.R. No. 161166-67, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA 437; Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, G.R. No. 152833, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 278; supra note 31; Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., 437 Phil. 289 (2002).
34 Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., supra note 32; Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 31.
35 Dagadag v. Tongnawa, supra note 32.
36 Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, supra note 29.
37 Published on December 29, 2002, Today.
40 Section 35. Formal Investigation Report. - Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the formal investigation, a report containing a narration of the material facts established during the investigation, the findings and the evidence supporting said findings, as well as the recommendations, shall be submitted by the Hearing Officer with the disciplining authority. The complete records of the case shall be attached to the Report of Investigation.
41 GR. No. 155952, October 4, 2007.
42 Section 36. When Case Is Decided. - The disciplining authority shall render his decision on the case within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Report of Investigation.
43 Department of Health v. Composano, G.R. No. 157684, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 438.
44 Pefianco v. Moral, 379 Phil. 468 (2000).
45 Rollo, pp. 52 and 91; CSC Resolution No. 000715, rollo, p. 117.
47 CSC Resolution No. 00715, supra; CA Decision, rollo, p. 41.
48 De Rama v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 531 (2001).
49 Municipality of Butig, Lanao del Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13848, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 115.
50 Umbra Tomawis v. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007; Rosales, Jr. v. Mijares, G.R. No. 154095, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 532.
51 G.R. No. 142937, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 453.
52 456 Phil. 273 (2003).
53 Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, supra note 52, at 88-89.
54 The requirements include: 1.The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; 2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 3. The decision must have something to support itself; 4. The evidence must be substantial; 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; 6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the view of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and 7. The board or body should in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered. (Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635, 642-644 ).
55 Civil Service Commission v. Lucas; 361 Phil. 486 (1999). See also Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589.
56 Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, supra. See also Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124261, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 285 and Rubio, Jr. v. Paras, G.R. No. 156047, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 697.
58 Paragraph 15, Sworn Complaint, id. at 102.
59 Paragraphs 4 through 11, Sworn Complaint, id. at 101-102.
60 Paragraphs 12 and 13, Sworn Complaint, id. at 102.
64 Samartino v. Raon, 433 Phil. 173 (2002).
65 Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. ' When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
66 Dagadag v. Tongnawa, supra note 32, citing Miranda v. Carreon, 449 Phil. 285 (2003) and Heirs of Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1028 (1996).

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