Source: https://bmrfirm.com/tennessee-chancellor-issues-civil-death-penalty-real-estate-case
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:25:09+00:00

Document:
A Tennessee Chancellor, Deanna B. Johnson, recently issued the civil death penalty in favor of a firm client in a real estate case.
The case, Jerrod Brown, et ux. v. Beverly Luecke, et ux., Chancery Court for Williamson County, Tennessee, involved the sale of a residence. Among other things, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants misrepresented certain conditions of the residence and removed valuable trees from the surrounding premises. The Defendants denied all such claims and moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Subsequently, the Plaintiffs' counsel was sanctioned for failing to timely file a response to the dismissal motion. That motion was denied, and the Defendants propounded written discovery to further develop the case. More than a year later, no responses to the discovery requests had been served, and the Defendants filed a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. No timely response was filed to this motion. As a result, Chancellor Johnson granted the Motion to Compel and, once again, sanctioned the Plaintiffs' counsel.
7. Later that day, the Defendants’ counsel drafted an Order reflecting the Court’s oral rulings from the morning hearing. However, the parties’ counsel were unable to agree on a mutually satisfactory version of the Order, and the Defendants’ counsel lodged their version of the Order that afternoon. (See Exhibits 5 and 6 to Second Motion.) The Plaintiffs did not provide the Court with any competing version of the Order in accordance with the Local Rules.
10. As of August 23, 2016, inasmuch as both counsel were aware, the Court’s August 17 Order was in effect, requiring the Plaintiffs to provide supplemental responses to the Defendants’ discovery requests by August 23. That deadline came and went without any responses having been provided.
13. Supplemental responses were provided to the Defendants’ counsel by hand-delivery the following day, on August 26, 2016, at his office in Brentwood, Tennessee. (See Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Motion at p. 5.) However, as provided herein, those responses woefully failed to comply with the August 22 Order or the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
16. On September 26, 2016, the Defendants filed their Second Motion. (See Second Motion.) In addition, the Defendants filed a Motion to Expedite the hearing on their Second Motion for the Court’s next docket day, October 6. (See Motion to Expedite.) No opposition to the Motion to Expedite was filed by the Plaintiffs.
27. This tactic employed by the Plaintiffs regarding Interrogatory No. 2 constitutes a discovery abuse. See Sender v. Mann, 225 F.R.D. 645, 650-51 (D. Colo. 2004). See also Tamas v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 543, 546 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (a party who listed over 3,000 individuals without any information related thereto does not satisfy discovery obligations); Jama v. City & Cty. of Denver, 304 F.R.D. 289, 293 (D. Colo. 2014) (same); Lipari v. U.S. Bancorp., N.A., 2008 WL 1874373 (D. Kan. July 22, 2008) (same); Guantanamera Cigar Co. v. Corporacion Habanos, S.A., 263 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2009) (a party must “make a reasonable inquiry and  provide [more than] a laundry list of undifferentiated witnesses”); Long v. Liberty Wood Nursing Center, 2014 WL 369257 (M.D.N.C. July 23, 2014) (same).
28. Despite having been sanctioned on two different occasions by two different judges, the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs’ counsel have routinely failed to comply with the Court’s Orders, the Local Rules, or the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, the Plaintiffs have repeatedly filed untimely pleadings in violation of Local Rule 5.03(c). The Plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to serve pleadings on the Defendants’ counsel in accordance with Local Rules 5.03(c) and (f) and Rule 5.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
29. At the same time, on two occasions, regarding providing the supplemental responses and untimely payment of the sanctions award in the August 22 Order, the Plaintiffs have complied with the Local Rules by hand-delivering the same to the Defendants’ counsel’s office in Brentwood, Tennessee. The office of the Plaintiffs’ counsel is also located in Brentwood.
30. The Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed on May 12, 2015. (See Complaint.) However, almost 18 months later, the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they are serious about developing this case for trial. For example, the most recent compel motions regard the Defendants’ written discovery requests, which were propounded on the Plaintiffs more than a year ago. In addition, based upon the failure of the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs’ counsel to comply with the Court’s Orders, the Local Rules, or the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, it does not appear that this case will be in a posture to be tried any time in the near future.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(C).
2. In addition, “trial courts possess the inherent authority to take actions to prevent abuse of the discovery process” and “wide discretion is afforded to the trial courts to determine the appropriate sanction.” Alexander v. Jackson Radiology Associates, P.A., 156 S.W.3d 11, 15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 121, 133 (Tenn. 2004)).
3. The Court recognizes and has considered that its powers are not unlimited, and it must exercise such powers, including the power to enter a dismissal against a party under Rule 37.02(C), with both restraint and discretion. Id. The Court also recognizes and understands that its imposition of such sanctions should neither be used like a sword nor frequently. Id.
4. However, an award of attorney’s fees and a dismissal sanction against a party under Rule 37.02(C) are appropriate where there has been a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, including the failure to properly supplement discovery responses, or to participate in discovery in the matter set forth in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Amanns v. Grissom, 333 S.W.3d 90, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). The Court “must and do[es] have the discretion to impose sanctions such as dismissal in order to penalize those who fail to comply with the Rules and, further, to deter others from flouting or disregarding discovery orders.” Holt v. Webster, 638 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (citing National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642-43 (1976)).
5. Based upon the foregoing, the Court holds that an attorney’s fee award and entry of a dismissal with prejudice against the Plaintiffs is both appropriate and necessary in this case for multiple reasons, each of which would serve as a basis for fees and/or dismissal under Rule 37.02 standing alone.
6. In that regard, the Plaintiffs have, among other things, unnecessarily and improperly delayed this proceeding by failing to participate in discovery in a manner which complies with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for over a year. The Court has extended the Plaintiffs numerous opportunities to do so, but the Plaintiffs have simply chosen not to take those opportunities.
7. Further, it is clear that the Court’s numerous attempts to discourage the Plaintiffs’ improper behavior have gone entirely unheeded. The Court has previously admonished and sanctioned the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs’ counsel for precisely the type of conduct that is now, once again, before the Court. The Plaintiffs’ conduct has made it clear to the Court that they have not and do not intend to comply with its orders and directives by continuing to conduct themselves in a manner which this Court considers manifestly contumacious.
8. Inasmuch as these actions or inactions fall at the feet of the Plaintiffs’ counsel, as opposed to the Plaintiffs themselves, the Court may award appropriate sanctions against a party for the misdeeds of their counsel. In re Foreign Court Subpoena, 2012 WL 2126960 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2012).
9. Finally, the Plaintiffs’ response to the Defendants’ Second Motion does not even address, let alone dispute, the Defendants’ assertions regarding the deficiencies in the Plaintiffs’ supplemental responses to individual interrogatories and requests for production of documents or explain why the Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to timely pay the sanction contained in the August 22 Order. Moreover, at the hearing on October 6, 2016, the Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to articulate to the satisfaction of the Court why the sanction contained within the August 22 Order was not timely paid and failed to even address the Defendants’ assertions regarding the deficiencies in the Plaintiffs’ supplemental responses to individual interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Pursuant to Local Rule 5.03(c), the Court could have granted the Defendants’ Second Motion on this basis alone.

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