Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/410/425/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:29:03+00:00

Document:
Since it is not clear whether the California Supreme Court judgment reversing the lower court is based on federal or state constitutional grounds, or both, and therefore whether this Court has jurisdiction on review, that judgment is vacated and the case remanded.
Certiorari granted; 7 Cal.3d 792, 499 P.2d 979, vacated and remanded.
Petitioner, a California motorist, was involved in an automobile collision on March 18, 1971. Both drivers filed accident reports with the California Department of Motor Vehicles, as required by the California Financial Responsibility Laws. Without affording petitioner a hearing on the question of potential liability, and based solely on the contents of the accident reports, the Department found that there was a reasonable possibility that a judgment might be recovered against petitioner as a result of the accident. Since petitioner was uninsured and could not deposit security, his license was suspended.
"a hearing is required and that, at such a hearing, the licensee is entitled to review the reports or other evidence upon which the department contemplates determining that he is possibly responsible for the accident, and to present reports or testimony to establish his claim of nonculpability, all within reasonable due process procedures which the department may employ."
Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal.3d 792, 799, 499 P.2d 979, 984 (1972).
"[w]hile we might speculate from the choice of words used in the opinion, and the authorities cited by the court, which provision was the basis for the judgment of the state court, we are unable to say with any degree of certainty that the judgment of the California Supreme Court was not based on an adequate and independent nonfederal ground."
U.S. 551 (1940); State Tax Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511 (1939).
"it must appear, by clear and necessary intendment, that the question must have been raised, and must have been decided, in order to induce the judgment."
"was necessary to the determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided, or that the judgment as rendered could not have been given without deciding it."
We have at times vacated and remanded prior to our decision to take or deny or to note or dismiss a case, so that the record can be clarified. See Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14, 300 U. S. 25-26.
But we know in this case that a federal question was presented and ruled upon. We know that a state question was also presented and ruled upon. Where arguably "the judgment of the state court rests on two grounds, one involving a federal question and the other not," Lynch v. New York, 293 U. S. 52, 293 U. S. 54, we do not take the case.
statutes affording a creditor prejudgment remedies against a debtor without prior notice or hearing (see e.g., Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258; McCallop v. Carberry (1970) 1 Cal.3d 903; Cline v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 908)."
"The rule explicated in foregoing cases is applicable to the instant circumstances."
7 Cal.3d 792, 795, 499 P.2d 979, 981.
from the state domain. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, raised a storm of protest against federal intrusion on state rights that has not yet subsided. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., supra, taught me that it is wise to insist that cases taken from a state court be clearly decided on a federal ground, and not, as here, on both state and federal grounds, save where the state and federal questions are so intertwined as to make the state ground not an independent matter. See Enterprise Irrigation District v. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 243 U. S. 163-165.
I would deny this petition for certiorari.
"If we were in error, then assuredly the opportunity to be set aright should be cheerfully and thankfully accepted. Having so reexamined them, we conclude that our prior decision was right. There is no need of further discussion of the problems presented for the former opinion adequately covers the ground. We think that the section of the statute here involved (L.1933, c. 213, § 2 [b], 3 Mason Minn. St.1936 Supp. § 5887-2 [b]), is violative of the uniformity clause of our own constitution."
National Tea Co. v. State, 208 Minn. 607, 608, 294 N.W. 230, 231.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2
 § 5887
 v.