Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2015/2015massappdiv121.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:56:05+00:00

Document:
Patrick T. Matthews and Brian M. Tavares for the plaintiff.
Peter L. Bosse and Tanya T. Austin for the defendant.
Big Wheel sent its invoice for $5,470.00 to Gaskells Towing for Gaskell to include in its billing for the removal of Raposas vehicle. Gaskell transmitted the bill to Raposa; Big Wheel also sent its bill directly to both Raposa and Safety. Safety declined to pay Big Wheels invoice. Big Wheel made a demand on Safety for payment of the invoice under Raposas Property Damage Coverage. Reasoning that Big Wheel itself did not sustain any damage as a result of Raposas accident, and that there was no environmental issue that was caused by or arose from this accident requiring hazardous waste cleanup, Safety maintained its position that Big Wheels charges were not covered under Raposas policy and declined to pay Big Wheels invoice. Throughout the litigation, Safety conceded the accuracy of Big Wheels charges for its services in connection with these events, and the charges propriety.
Safety having declined its demands for payment of its invoice for services related to Raposas accident, Big Wheel brought suit against both Raposa and Safety for breaches of contract and in quantum meruit, and against Safety for recovery under G.L. c. 93A, § 11, based on unfair insurance settlement practices. Big Wheels claims against Safety were stayed until the resolution of its claims against Raposa. In 2012, with the agreement of both Raposa and Safety, Big Wheel agreed that it would seek to collect on the judgment only under Raposas insurance coverage, and not against Raposa. Judgment then entered against Raposa for the $5,470.00 Big Wheel charged for recovery of Raposas SUV, and the stay of Big Wheels claims against Safety was lifted. Safetys view that Big Wheels services were not covered under the policy was unchanged, and it continued to decline to pay Big Wheels bill for that work.
Safety counterclaimed against Big Wheel for declaratory judgment on the coverage question; both parties moved for summary judgment. In April, 2014, the trial court allowed Big Wheels motion for summary judgment, awarding it damages of $5,400.00 on the breach of contract claim and treble damages, plus attorneys fees, on the G.L. c.
93A claim. [Note 5] The court denied Safetys motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied Safetys subsequent motion to amend the judgment with respect to attorneys fees.
Safety appeals from the allowance of Big Wheels motion for summary judgment, and from the denial of its motion to amend the judgment.
Rule 56 standard. It is well settled that summary judgment is appropriate only in the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Burns v. McDonalds Corp., 2010 Mass. App. Div. 205 , 208, citing Coviello v. Richardson, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 603 , 607, and Nelson v. Salem State College, 446 Mass. 525 , 530 (2006). We review a trial courts ruling on such a motion de novo, consider[ing] the record and the legal principles involved without deference to the motion judges reasoning. Donovan v. Mahoney, 2008 Mass. App. Div. 41 , 42, quoting Clean Harbors, Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 347 , 357 n.9 (2005). See Nova Assignments, Inc. v. Kunian, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 34 , 35 (2010) (de novo standard of review of allowance of motion for summary judgment). An order granting or denying summary judgment will be upheld if the trial judge ruled on undisputed material facts and his ruling was correct as a matter of law. Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 449 Mass. 621 , 628 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. One 1987 Mercury Cougar Auto., 413 Mass. 534 , 536 (1992).
Safetys liability under Raposas Property Damage Coverage. The parties are generally in agreement as to the facts of this case. Even if that were not so, the interpretation of a contract, including an insurance contract, is generally a matter of law. See Ruggerio Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. National Grange Ins. Co., 430 Mass. 794 , 797 (2000), citing Cody v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 387 Mass. 142 , 146 (1982). Where the terms of the policy are plain and free from ambiguity, Barnstable County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lally, 374 Mass. 602 , 605 (1978), they are not to be construed strictly against the insurer, but rather, they are to be construed in their usual and ordinary sense. Id. [Note 6] Main v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1995 Mass. App. Div. 114 , 116. See Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 424 Mass. 275 , 281 (1997). See also Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Premier Ins. Co. of Mass., 439 Mass. 318 , 321 (2003) (as Commissioner of Insurance, and not the automobile insurer, is responsible for wording of Massachusetts policy, ambiguities in wording of Massachusetts automobile insurance policy are not presumptively construed against insurer). In the context of an insurance policy, we consider what an objectively reasonable insured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered. McGregor v.
Allamerica Ins. Co., 449 Mass. 400 , 402 (2007), quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689 , 700 (1990).
In light of our conclusion that Big Wheel was not an entity to whom Safety was obligated, in this case, to make payment under Part 4, and given the fact that this position was one of the bases on which Safety had denied coverage, the courts ruling in favor of Big Wheel on its G.L. c. 93A claim against Safety must also be reversed. When coverage has been correctly denied, as in this case, no violation of the Massachusetts statutes proscribing unfair or deceptive trade practices may be found. See Jet Line Servs., Inc. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 404 Mass. 706 , 717 (1989); Timpson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 344 , 353 [(1996)]; Spurlin v. Merchants Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 57, 62 (D. Mass. 1994). Transamerica Ins. Co. v. KMS Patriots, L.P., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 189 , 197 (2001). As the courts award of attorneys fees depended solely on Big Wheels success on it G.L. c. 93A claim, the reversal of the judgment on the G.L. c. 93A claim necessarily requires that we vacate the award of those fees.
to enter in Safetys favor on Safetys counterclaim for declaratory judgment. The judgment in Big Wheels favor on its G.L. c. 93A claim is vacated, as is the award to it of attorneys fees pursuant to that statute.
[Note 1] Safety Insurance Company.
[Note 2] The record does not include any detail about the nature or amounts of the leaking fluid, other than an indication that Big Wheel team members were hit with the strong smell of gas, oil, and antifreeze when they arrived at the accident scene. The record does not provide any indication of whether or where any escaped fluid collected.
[Note 3] The agreed facts included in the record before us state that Big Wheel remediated the area in which the SUV had come to rest after the accident. There is no other indication in the record that Big Wheel did anything other than remove Raposas vehicle from the area; on the record before us, Big Wheel did not charge for any remediation other than that removal.
[Note 5] The judgment against Safety totaled $42,800.64. Big Wheels claim in quantum meruit against Safety was dismissed by agreement of the parties.
[Note 6] Ambiguity exists where the policy is susceptible of at least two rational interpretations. Liquor Liability Joint Underwriting Association of Massachusetts v. Hermitage Ins. Co., 419 Mass. 316 , 322 (1995). Main v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1995 Mass. App. Div. 114 , 116. Mere disagreement between the parties about the meaning of a contractual term does not create ambiguity for these purposes. Id., citing Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 419 Mass. 462 , 464 (1995).
[Note 7] The fact that Safety paid another vendor directly for repairs to the guardrails damaged in the course of the collision and presumably owned by the Commonwealth is not significant to our analysis.

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