Source: https://constitution.findlaw.com/amendment14/annotation40.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 15:12:56+00:00

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[Footnote 107] 109 U.S. 3, 13 -14 (1883).
[Footnote 108] Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
[Footnote 109] 383 U.S. 745, 783 and n.7 (1966) (concurring and dissenting).
[Footnote 110] 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Besides the ground of decision discussed here, Morgan also advanced an alternative ground for upholding the statute. That is, Congress might have overridden the state law not because the law itself violated the equal protection clause but because being without the vote meant the class of persons was subject to discriminatory state and local treatment and giving these people the ballot would afford a means of correcting that situation. The statute therefore was an appropriate means to enforce the equal protection clause under ''necessary and proper'' standards. Id. at 652-653. A similar ''necessary and proper'' approach underlay South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), under the Fifteenth Amendment's enforcement clause.
[Footnote 111] 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973b(e).
[Footnote 112] 384 U.S. at 648 .
[Footnote 113] Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
[Footnote 114] Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 -56 (1966).
[Footnote 115] Id. at 668. Justice Stewart joined this dissent.
[Footnote 116] Id. at 651 n.10. Justice O'Connor for the Court quoted and reiterated Justice Brennan's language in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 -33 (1982).
[Footnote 117] 82 Stat. 73, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 245. See S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Congress, 1st Sess. 6-7 (1967). See also 82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.
[Footnote 118] Title II, Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act, 82 Stat. 210, 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 3501, 3502. See S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Congress, 2d Sess. 53-63 (1968). The cases which were subjects of the legislation were Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), insofar as federal criminal trials were concerned.
[Footnote 119] Titles II and III of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1973aa-1, 1973bb.
[Footnote 120] Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
[Footnote 121] Id. at 229, 278-81 (Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall), 135, 141-44 (Justice Douglas).
[Footnote 122] Id. at 152, 204-09 (Justice Harlan).
[Footnote 123] Id. at 119, 126-31 (Justice Black).
[Footnote 124] The age reduction provision could be sustained ''only if Congress has the power not only to provide the means of eradicating situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the clause, and what state interests are 'compelling.''' Id. at 296 (Justices Stewart and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger). In their view, Congress did not have that power and Morgan did not confer it. But in voting to uphold the residency and absentee provision, the Justices concluded that ''Congress could rationally conclude that the imposition of durational residency requirements unreasonably burdens and sanctions the privilege of taking up residence in another State'' without reaching an independent determination of their own that the requirements did in fact have that effect. Id. at 286.
[Footnote 125] See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 -83 (1980), under the Fifteenth Amendment. Infra, pp. 1948-50. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476 -78 (1980) (plurality opinion by Chief Justice Burger), and id. at 500-02 (Justice Powell concurring).
[Footnote 126] The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, amending 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973, were designed to overturn City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). A substantial change of direction in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), handed down coextensively with congressional enactment, seems to have brought Congress and the Court into essential alignment, thus avoiding a possible constitutional conflict.
[Footnote 127] See The Human Life Bill, Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 97th Congress, lst sess. (1981). An elaborate constitutional analysis of the bill appears in Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed ''Human Life'' Legislation, 68 Va. L. Rev. 333 (1982).

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