Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19830715-972882
Timestamp: 2017-04-23 16:13:01+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 6-1 ; Préjudice moral - constat de violation suffisant ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure nationale ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure de la ConventionNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9728/82Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-07-15;9728.82 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVILParties : Demandeurs : M.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION / REQUÃTE NÂ° 9728/8 2 M . v/the UNITED KINGDO M M . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 15 July 1983 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 15 juillet 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requ@t e
A rticle 6, paragraph I of the Convention : 7his provision cannor be construed as requiring in all criminal appeal cases a second . full hearing, attended by the appellant . unless the appeal cou rts' powers and the issues before it make this necessary to guarantee the fairness of the proceedings as a whole . In the present case, the appeal proceedings were nor unfair in view of the presence of defense counsel, the absence of prosecution counsel and the limited powers of the Coun of appeal, particularly its inabili ty to increase sentence. Article 6, paragraph 3 (c), of the Convention : Where counsel does not think it necessary, repeated consultations with the appellant may be refused in rhe interests of the cost-effective use of limited legal aid funds .
Article 6, paragraphe I, de la Convention : On ne saurait dÃ©duire de cette disposilion qu'en appel au pÃ©nal l'affaire soit entiÃ¨rement rejugÃ©e en prÃ©sence de l'intÃ©ressÃ©, Ã moins que l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure, prise dans son ensemble, ne l'exige en raison des pouvoirs dÃ©volus Ã la juridiction d'appel et de la nature de l'affaire . Dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce, la procÃ©dure d'appel n'a pas Ã©tÃ© inÃ©quitable vu la prÃ©sence du dÃ©fenseur, l'absence du ministÃ¨re public, les pouvoirs limitÃ©s de la cour d'appel et notamment l'impossibilitÃ© de prononcer une peine plus sÃ©vÃ¨re . Article 6, paragraphe 3, litt. c), de la Convention : Lorsque le dÃ©fenseur l'estime superjlu, des consultations rÃ©pÃ©rÃ©es avec l'appelant peuvent Ã©tre refusÃ©es pour des raisons d'Ã©conomie en nuuiÃ¨re d'aide judiciaire .
(franÃ§ais : voir p. 162)
The facts as they have been submitted by the applicant, a United Kingdom citizen born in 1946 and currently imprisoned in L . may be summarised as follows : On 6 December 1979 the applicant was involved in an incident in a public house, as a result of which he was charged, inter alia, with a possession of a fire-arm with intent to endanger life . He was tried before the Newcastle Crown Court on 21 to 23 April 1980, and was convicted on this charge although acquitted on other charges relating to the event, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment . On 25 April 1980 the applicant was advised by the barrister who had represented him at his trial that he had grounds to seek leave to appeal against conviction and sentence, which grounds were settled by counsel and submitted by the applicant . On 12 March 1980 the applicant was involved in a robbery in Durham, as a result of which he appeared before the Durham Crown Court, accused of theft, on 23 January 1981 . He was convicted and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, to run consecutively with his sentence for the fire-arms charge . On 7 February 1981, the barrister, who had represented the applicant on the charge of theh, advised that the applicant had no grounds to appeal against conviction, but that there were grounds to appeal on the severity of the sentence, and . in particular . that it was to be consecutive to his existing term of imprisonment . Counsel, therefore, settled grounds for appeal against severity of sentence, which were lodged on behalf of the applicant . The applicant did not accept counsel's advice as to the prospects of success of an appeal against conviction, and filed his own grounds of appeal in addition to those already lodged by counsel, alleging bias by the Judge, and that an accomplice, who gave evidence at his trial, should have been declared a hostile witness . The applicant also sought legal aid for his appeal against conviction . On 28 April 1981 the Criminal Appeal Office informed the applicant that they proposed to grant legal aid for counsel only in respect of the applicant's appeal against severity of sentence, and to assign the same counsel to the applicant who had appeared for him at Durham Crown Court . On 13 August 1981, the Criminal Appeal Office wrote again to the applicant, explaining to him that legal aid had not been granted for the purpose of his application for leave to appeal against conviction . The letter continued : "At the hearing before the Court, counsel will as the matter stands at present , support your sentence application by his oral argument . In relation to your conviction application, however, he will not be able to do more than invite the attention of the Court to your own written grounds (you are free to add to them if you wish), and the fact that you are requesting other counsel to be assigne d
so that, in effect, you can have the opinion of that other counsel as to whether there are arguable grounds for appeal against conviction, and if there are, legal aid to enable that other counsel to argue them . If the Court rejects this request, it may well determine the conviction application without adjourning . It is open to you to reject at this stage the services of the counsel assigned to you for your sentence application, and to request another counsel . If you do so, your applications will be listed before the Court and your request submitted to it . It would not be right for me to suggest that the Court would or would not refuse your request for applications, both conviction and sentence, without adjoumment, but it would be open to the court to do so . " The applicant's disquiet with his counsel arose from the fact that the applicant was unable to contact counsel, or to have a conference with him . He informed the Registrar of Appeals of this fact on 17 July 1981, whereupon he was informed by the Registrar that the latter had understood that counsel had been in touch with the applicant, confirming that he stood by his original advice of 7 February 1981, and that he did not consider it necessary to discuss the applicant's application for leavr to appeal against sentence with the applicant in person . The applicant's applications for leave to appeal were both listed before Ihe Full Court on 23 October 1981 . The applicant's application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence in relation to the firearms charge was refused . The Full Court also refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal against conviction for the offence of theft, but, in the presence of the applicant's counsel, the Court granted leave to appeal against sentence and treated the hearing of the application as the hearing of the appeal . The Court quashed the sentence of 5 years' imprisonment and substituted a period of 3 years' imprisonment, to run concurrently with the sentence which had been imposed upon the applicant in the firearms charge .
COMPLAINT S The applicant complains that he was not able to discuss his application for leave to appeal against sentence on the charge of theft with the counsel appointed for him, notwithstanding that he had been granted legal aid, and that he was not present before the Full Court of Appeal, despite having applied to be, when the latter granted his application for leave to appeal against sentence and treated the hearing of that application as the hearing of the appeal . The applicant also maintains that the Registrarof Appeals was negl igent indenying hint the opportunity of a further opinion as to the merits of his application for leave to appeal against conviction on the charge of theft, and that the Court of Appeal confused his two applications for leave to appeal relating to the two different offences of which he had been separately convicted, as a result of dealing with them on the same day . - 157 -
THE LA W The applicant complains first that he was not able to discuss the grounds of his appeal against sentence on the theft charge with his counsel and that, when the Court of Appeal heard counsel on the applicant's behalf but in his absence, they granted leave to appeal against sentence and proceeded to hear the appeal against sentence in the applicant's absence . The applicant invokes Article 6 of the Convention, para . 3 of which provides : "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights :
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require . " The Commission recalls first that it has consistently held that this provision does not provide the right for a legally aided applicant to choose his legal representative . To the extent, therefore . that the applicant complains that he was not able to choose his legal representative in his legally aided application for leave to appeal against sentence on the charge of theft, his application is incompatible with the Convention rarione mnreriae . The applicant has also complained that he was unable to discuss his application for leave to appeal against sentence with his counsel despite being granted legal aid . The Commission notes that the applicant was advised by his counsel orally afte r the trial as to the prospects of success of an appeal . He settled partial grounds of appeal, and, thereafter, when legal aid had been provided by the Registrar of Appeals, counsel represented the applicant before the Court of Appeal . Recognising that financial restraints may be necessary to ensure the most costeffective use of the funds available for legal aid, the Commission finds nothing to show that Article 6, para . 3 .c, of the Convention required a further consultation between the applicant and his counsel, where the latter did not consider this necessary for the proper pursuit of the appeal . It follows that this aspect of the applicant's complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, para . 2 of the Convention . However, the applicant also contends that he should have been present at the determination of his appeal against sentence by the Court of Appeal . The Commission's case-law has established that Article 6, para . 3 .c and Article 6, para . I of the Convention, which latter guarantees the fairness of the determination of any criminal charge- do not expressly guarantee the right to be present during the hearing of an appeal, but that the right to be present falls to be considere d
with the other rights of the defence in the context of an evaluation of the fairness of the proceedings as a whole (cf . Applications Nos . 1169/61, 6YB, p . 520 ; 2635/35, 28 Coll . Decs ., p . 43, 49 ; 7138/75, D .R . 9, p . 50 and 8289/78, D .R . 18, p . 160) . Nevertheless the Commission has also recognised that, although Article 6 of the Convention dces not guarantee an appeal in criminal proceedings, where the opportunity to seek appeal is provided under domestic law, the guarantees of Article 6 continue to apply to the proceedings on appeal, since once an appeal is sought, the subsequent applications form part of the whole proceedings which "determine" the criminal charge at issue . An element of the fairness of the proceedings is the requirement of equality of arms between the parties, which was respected in the present case, since the applicant was represented by counsel who had represented him at his original trial for theft, and had been instructed for the application for leave to appeal by the Registrar of Criminal Appeal . but the prosecution was not represented in Court at all . If anything, therefore, such an arrangement was to the applicant's advantage . 11 appears from the transcript of the leave proceedings which the applicant has submitted that the Court of Appeal fully considered his written grounds for leave to appeal on the firearms charge and in his application on conviction on the theft charge, but, having examined the transcripts of the relevant proceedings the Court did not find any impropriety or ground to allow those applications for leave to appeal . The Court did nevertheless grant the application for leave to appeal against sentence on the theft charge, and with the applicant's counsel's leave, but despite the applicant's request to be present in person, which appears to have been refused, proceeded to treat the hearing of the application for leave as the appeal . The Commission considers that, in order to examine the fairness of these appeal proceedings in the context of the proceedings as a whole, it must consider first the powers of the Court of Appeal and the scope of the hearing, including the question of whether this was a review of the lower court's decision or whether it was a full rehearing, and secondly, in the light of the answer to this first question, how the applicant's actual interests were presented and protected . As far as the powers of the Court of Appeal are concemed, the Commission notes first that, under the terms of Section I I(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (as amended by the Courts Act 1977 Section 56 and Sched . 8, and the Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973, Sched . 3), the Court of Appeal shall : "so exercise their powers . . . that, taking the case as a whole, the appellant is not more severely dealt with on appeal than he was dealt with by the Court below . "
Furtherrnore, where leave to appeal has been granted, the Court has no power to order that any period spent awaiting appeal should not count towards sentence under Section 29 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 . Thus, on hearing such an appeal the Court of Appeal may dismiss the appeal, or may quash the sentence, if illegal, or excessive, or inadequate, and substitute such other sentence, not being more severe, warranted in law by the verdict, as they think ought to have been passed (Archibold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, para . 933) . The proceedings on appeal do not, therefore, constitute a full rehearing of the case, although there is the opportunity to seek leave to call new evidence, which was not applied for by the present applicant . Instead the Court of Appeal's task is to review the conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial judge . In exercising this jurisdiction to review sentences, the Court of Appeal does not alter a sentence on the mere ground that if members of the court had been trying the appellant they might have passed a somewhat different sentence . "The sentence must be manifestly excessive in view of the circumstances of the case or be wrong in principle before the court will interfere" (Archibold, idem, para . 940) . With these limited powers of the Court of Appeal in mind, the Commission must examine the proceedings themselves in the present case to evaluate the significance on the faimess as a whole of the applicant's absence . The proceedings themselves are initiated by the applicant's applications for leave, addressed to the Registrar of Criminal Appeals together with his application for legal aid . The Registrar granted the applicant legal aid for his application for leave to appeal against sentence on the theft charge, and the same counsel was instructed to settle the grounds of appeal and to present them at the application, as had defended the applicant at his trial . Although the applicant made some complaints about this counsel, he did not request that instructions were withdrawn from him, as he could have done, and thus the Commission concludes that he was satisfied that this counsel represent him on that application for leave . The Court of Appeal, which sat on 23 October 1981 . therefore had before it the applicant's written application for leave, and also heard counsel for the applicant on the application for leave against sentence for the theft charge . It is clear from the transcript that the Court carefully considered the applicant's grounds for his leave application in the light of the records of the trial proceedings, which they also had before them . The applicant's grounds for his application for leave against conviction in the firearms case related to the adequacy of the evidence to sustain a conviction and the faimess of the summing up . After Ã©xamining these submissions the Court found that the summing-up had been careful and properly put before the jury, and that "there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict . "
- 16p -
The applicant's grounds for leave against conviction in the theft case alleged that the trial judge gave insufficient direction as to accomplice evidence and that one witness should have been treated as 'hostile' . The Court examined these complaints and concluded that the applicant had "no grounds whatever to complain about the conduct of this trial or the evidence which was properly admitted", and that "there was, if the jury chose to accept it, which they plainly did, overwhelming evidence of his guilt and he was rightly convicted" . The Court also considered separately the applicant's grounds for leave against sentence . It concluded that taking account of the applicant's past record it was "quite impossible to say that there was anything wrong with the sentence of three years' imprisonment" . Turning to the application concerning sentence in the theft case- the Court reviewed the submissions made by counsel, stating that he had "said everything possible on behalf or' the applicant, and concluded that in the light of the applicant's age and all the circumstances, and although both a severe sentence and a consecutive sentence appeared appropriate, "a total of five years, which had there been no previous sentence might well have been justified on (the applicant's) record, is too long . " The Commission finds nothing in the foregoing which suggests that the applicant's right to a fair determination of the criminal charge against him was prejudiced by his absence from the proceedings before the Court of Appeal . In particular, the entitlement to 'a fair and public hearing', contained in Article 6, para . I of the Convention, cannot be constrned as requiring in all cases of appeal a second such hearing, at which the applicant is present, unless the powers of the Court on appeal, and the issues before it, make this necessary in order to guarantee the fairness of the proceedings as a whole . In the present case, the applicant had requested leave to be present, and under Section 22 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, he was, therefore, entitled to be present for the hearing of any appeal against sentence where leave to appeal was granted . It appears from the transcript of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal that the Coun, having examined the grounds for the application for leave to appeal against sentence on the theft charge decided to treat the application for leave to appeal as the appeal itself, stating : "That a consecutive sentence should be passed was plainly right . That a severe sentence should be passed was also plainly right . But the Court has come to the conclusion that a total of five years, which had there been no previous sentence might well have been justified on this man's record, is in the circumstances too long . We propose to give him leave to appeal, with the consent of counsel to treat the hearing of the application as the hearing of the appeal, to quash the sentence of five years' imprisonment, and to substitute for it a term of three years' imprisonment to run consecutively to the term which he was serving . To that extent the appeal will be allowed . " - 161 -
The Commission has previously recognised that counsel may expressly waive an appellant's right to be present in person for the hearing of his appeal in Application No . 8639/79, X . v . the United Kingdom . In the present case, it notes that the opportunity for counsel to insist on his client's presence was offered, although not as a separate question necessarily requiring reply . However, the Commission must take account of all the circumstances of Lhe case, including the fact, recognised by the Court of Appeal, that the applicant's counsel had "said everything possible on his behalf ." In these circumstances and in the light of the fact that Lhe severity of the applicant's sentence could not be increased on appeal, and the nature of the arguments submitted by him and by his counsel on his behalf, and given the absence of the prosecution during theappeal proceedings, the Commission concludes that the applicant's presence at his appeal was not necessary to ensure the faimess of the proceedings as a whole within the meaning of Article 6, para . I of the Convention . It follows that this aspect of the applicant's complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, para . 2 of the Convention . 2 . The applicant has further alleged that his appeals on the firearms charge and the theft charge were muddled by the Registrar's office, prejudicing the fairness of the proceedings . However it appears from the transcript of Lhe appeal proceedings that Lhe applicant's applications for leave were clearty separate and considered separately by the Court and it follows that this aspect of the applicant's complaint is manifestly illfounded within the meaning of Article 27, para . 2 of the Convention . For thise reasons , the Commissio n
(TRADUCTlON) EN FAI T Les faits, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, resso rt issant du RoyaumeUni nÃ© en 1946 et actuellement dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de L ., peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le 6 dÃ©cembre 1979, le requÃ©rant fut impliquÃ© dans un incident su rvenu dans un dÃ©bit de boissons, Ã la suite duquel il fut inculpÃ© notamment de port d'arme illÃ©ga l - 162 -
dans l'intention d'attenter Ã la vie d'autrui . Il fut jugÃ© par la Crown Court de Newcastle du 21 au 23 avril 1980 et condamnÃ© de ce chef mais acquittÃ© d'autres chefs connexes et condamnÃ© Ã trois ans de prison . Le 25 avril 1980 il reÃ§ut de l'avocat qui l'avait dÃ©fendu au proc2s l'avis qu'il aurait des motifs de demander l'autorisation de faire appel tant en ce qui concerne la peine qu'en ce qui concerne la culpabilitÃ© . L'avocat rÃ©digea la demande et le requÃ©rant la prÃ©senta . Le 12 mars 1980 le requÃ©rant fut impliquÃ© dans une attaque Ã main annÃ©e Ã Durham . A la suite de cela il fut traduit le 23 janvier 1981 devant la Crown Court de Durham comme prÃ©venu de vol et condamnÃ© Ã cinq ans de prison, peine devant Ã¨tre cumulÃ©e avec celle prononcÃ©e pour port d'arme illÃ©gal . Le 7 fÃ©vrier 1981, l'avocat qui avait dÃ©fendu le requÃ©rant sur le chef de vol lui indiqua qu'il n'y avait pas de motif pour faire appel de la condamnation, mais qu'il y en avait pour interjeter appel contre la sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© de la peine, notamment contre son cumul avec la peine de prison qu'il purgeait Ã ce moment-lÃ . L'avocat interjeta appel au nom du requÃ©rant en exposant les moyens d'appel contre la sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© de la peine . Le requÃ©rant ne se rangea pas Ã l'avis de son avocat quant aux chances de succÃ¨s d'un appel contre la condamnation et dÃ©posa ses propres moyens d'appel en sus de ceux dÃ©jÃ exposÃ©s par l'avocat . Il allÃ©gua la partialitÃ© du juge et le fait qu'un complice ayant tÃ©moignÃ© Ã son procÃ¨s aurait d0 Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ© tÃ©moin hostile . Il demanda Ã©galement Ã bÃ©nÃ©ficier de l'aide judiciaire pour faire appel de sa condamnation . Le 28 avril 1981, le bureau des appels en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale infonna le requÃ©rant qu'il se proposait d'une part, de ne lui accorder l'aide judiciaire pour rÃ©munÃ©rer l'avocat qu'en ce qui conceme son appel contre la sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© de la peine et, d'autre pan, de dÃ©signer le mÃ©me avocat que celui qui l'avait reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Crown Court de Durham . Le 13 aoÃ»t 1981, le bureau des appels Ã©crivit Ã nouveau au requÃ©rant pour lui expliquer que l'aide judiciaire ne lui Ã©tait pas accordÃ©e pour interjeter appel de sa condamnation . La lettre poursuivait en ces termes : â¢ A l'audience l'avocat, dans l'Ã©tat actuel des choses, appuiera votre appel concernant la peine . Quant Ã votre appel concernant la condamnation, l'avocat ne pourra qu'attirer l'attention de la cour sur les moyens que vous avez vousmÃªme dÃ©veloppÃ©s par Ã©crit (vous Ã©tes libre de complÃ©ter cet exposÃ© . si vous le dÃ©sirez), et sur le fait que vous demandez la dÃ©signation d'un autre avocat pour, effectivement, le consulter sur le point de savoir si vous disposez de moyens valables pour faire appel de la condamnation et, dans l'affirmative, pour demander une aide judiciaire pennettant Ã cet autre avocat de prÃ©senter lesdits moyens . Si la cour rejette cette demande, elle pourra se prononcer sur la demande concernant la condamnation sans ajourner l'affaire .
11 vous est loisible de refuser, Ã ce stade, les services de l'avocat dÃ©signÃ© pour votre appel sur la peine et d'en demander un autre . Dans ce cas, vos demandes seront inscrites au rÃ´le de la cour et votre requÃªte lui sera soumise . Il ne m'appartient pas de m'exprimer sur la question de savoirsi la cour rejettera ou non votre requÃ©te concernant les appels sur la condamnation et la peine sans ajourner l'affaire, mais elle aura la facultÃ© de le faire . â¢ Les apprÃ©hensions du requÃ©rant quant Ã son avocat venaient du fait qu'il ne pouvait jamais prendre contact avec cet avocat ni le rencontrer . Il en avisa le greffe des appels le 17 juillet 1981 et le greffier l'informa qu'Ã sa connaissance l'avocat s'Ã©tait mis en rapport avec le requÃ©rant, confirmant qu'il s'en tenait Ã son avis initial du 7 fÃ©vrier 1981 et qu'il n'estimait pas nÃ©cessaire de discuter avec le requÃ©rant de la demande en autorisation d'appeler de la peine . Les demandes en autorisation d'interjeter appel prÃ©sentÃ©es par le requÃ©rant furent toutes deux inscrites au rÃ´le de la cour plÃ©niÃ¨re le 23 octobre 1981 . Celle-ci refusa l'autorisation de faire appel de la condamnation et de la peine relatives au port illÃ©gal d'une arme Ã feu . La cour plÃ©niÃ¨re refusa Ã©galement au requÃ©rant l'autorisation de faire appel contre la condamnation pour vol, mais, en prÃ©sence de l'avocat du requÃ©rant, elle autorisa cependant l'appel contre la peine et considÃ©ra cette audience comme audience d'appel . Elle annula la peine de cinq ans de prison et lui en substitua une de trois ans, Ã purger conjointement avec la peine infligÃ©e au requÃ©rant pour port d'arme illÃ©gal S
Le requÃ©rant se plaint de n'avoir par Ã©tÃ© en mesure de discuter avec l'avocat commis d'office de sa demande d'autorisation de faire appel contre la peine prononcÃ©e pour vol, bien qu'il eÃ¹t obtenu l'aide judiciaire, et de n'avoir pas assistÃ©, bien qu'il l'eÃ»t rÃ©clamÃ©, Ã l'audience oÃ¹ la cour d'appel plÃ©niÃ©re a fait droit Ã sa demande d'interjeter appel de la peine et traitÃ© cette audience comme audience d'appel . Le requÃ©rant soutient Ã©galement que le greffe des appels a fait preuve de nÃ©gligence en lui refusant la possibilitÃ© de recourir Ã un autre avis sur le bien-fondÃ© de sa demande d'autorisation d'interjeter appel contre la condamnation pour vol . Selon lui, la cour d'appel, en les examinant le mÃªme jour, a fait une confusion entre ses deux demandes d'appel concemant deux dÃ©lits diffÃ©rents dont il avait Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable sÃ©parÃ©ment .
EN DROIT I . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en premier lieu de n'avoir pas pu s'entretenir avec son avocat des moyens de son appel contre la peine prononcÃ©e pour vol . 11 se plÃ int aussi de ce que ; lorsque la cour d'appel a entendu l'avocat en son nom mais en so n
absence . elle a accordÃ© l'autorisation d'interjeter appel de la peine et tenu l'audience d'appel contre la peine en l'absence de l'appelant . Le requÃ©rant invoque l'anicle 6, par . 3, de la Convention, ainsi libellÃ© : -Tout accusÃ© a droit notamment Ã :
c . se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃ¨me ou avoir l'assistance d'un dÃ©fenseur de son choix, s'il n'a pas les moyens de rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur, pouvoir Ã©tre assistÃ© gratuitement par un avocat d'office, lorsque les intÃ©rÃªts de la justice l'exigent . . La Commission rappelle tout d'abord sa jurisprudence constante selon laquelle cette disposition ne garantit pas au bÃ©nÃ©ficiaire de l'aide judiciaire le droit de choisir son reprÃ©sentant en justice . Dans la mesure, dÃ©s lors, oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant se plaint de n'avoir pas pu choisir son avocat lorsqu'il a bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© de l'aide judiciaire pour demander l'autorisation de faire appel contre la peine prononcÃ©e pour vol, sa requÃ©te est incompatible ratione materiae avec la Convention . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint Ã©galement que tout en ayant bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© de l'aide judiciaire, il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© en mesure de s'entretenir avec son avocat de sa demande d'interjeter appel contre la peine . La Commission relÃ©ve qu'aprÃ¨s le procÃ¨s, son avocat le conseilla verbalement quant aux chances de succÃ¨s d'un appel . Cet avocat rÃ©digea les moyens d'un appel partiel et, aprÃ¨s que le greffier des appels eut accordÃ© l'aide judiciaire, reprÃ©senta le requÃ©rant devant la cour d'appel .
La Commission, qui reconnait que des limites financi8res peuvent Ã¨tre nÃ©cessaires pour garantir le meilleur usage des fonds disponibles pour l'aide judiciaire, ne trouve pas que l'article 6, par . 3 .c, de la Convention exigeait en l'espÃ¨ce une nouvelle consultation entre le requÃ©rant et son conseil, alors que ce dernier ne l'estimait pas nÃ©cessaire pour poursuivre convenablement la procÃ©dure d'appel . Il s'ensuit que cet aspect du grief du requÃ©rant est mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27, par . 2- de la Convention . Toutefois, le requÃ©rant soutient Ã©galement qu'il aurait dÃ¹ Ãªtre prÃ©sent lorsque la cour d'appel a statuÃ© sur l'appel formÃ© contre la peine . La jurisprudence de la Comntission a Ã©tabli que l'anicle 6, par . 3 .c et par . 1 . de la Convention - cette derniÃ¨re disposition garantissant le caractÃ¨re Ã©quitable d'une procÃ©dure sur le bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation pÃ©nale - ne garantit pas expressÃ©ment Ã l'accusÃ© le droit d'Ã©tre prÃ©sent Ã l'audience d'appel, mais qu'il convient de tenir compte de cet Ã©lÃ©ment dans l'ensemble de la situation de la dÃ©fense pour apprÃ©cier si la procÃ©dure dans son ensemble a Ã©tÃ© Ã©quitable (cf . DÃ©cisions nÂ° 1169/61 . Annuaire 6 p . 520, nÂ° 2635/65, Recueil 28 p . 43, 49 ; nÂ° 7138/75 D .R . 9 p . 50 et n" 8289/78 D .R . 18 p . 160) .
NÃ©anmoins, la Commission a Ã©galement admis que si l'article 6 de la Conveniion ne garantit pas le droit d'interjeter appel au pÃ©nal . cependant lorsque le droit interne prÃ©voit une possibilitÃ© d'appel, les garanties de l'article 6 sont applicables Ã cette procÃ©dure . En effet, une fois l'appel formÃ©, les demandes ultÃ©rieures font partie de l'ensemble de la procÃ©dure qui permettra de statuer sur l'accusation pÃ©nale . L'un des Ã©lÃ©ments du procÃ¨s Ã©quitable est la condition d'Ã©galitÃ© des armes entre les parties . Cette condition a Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©e en l'espÃ¨ce puisque le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© reprÃ©sentÃ© par l'avocat qui Ã©tait dÃ©jÃ son conseil lors du procÃ¨s pour vol et qui avait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©signÃ© par le greffier des appels en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale pour la demande en autorisation d'appeler . En revanche, l'accusation n'Ã©tait pas reprÃ©sentÃ©e devant la cour . Tout ce que l'on peut constater, c'est que cette situation Ã©tait Ã l'avantage du requÃ©rant . Il resson du compte rendu de la procÃ©dure d'autorisation produit par le requÃ©rant que la cour d'appel a pleinement examinÃ© les moyens qu'il avait prÃ©sentÃ©s par Ã©crit quant au port illÃ©gal d'armes Ã feu et pour Ã©tayer sa demande d'appel de la condamnation pour vol, mais qu'aprÃ¨s examen des comptes rendus des procÃ©dures litigieuses, la cour n'a relevÃ© aucune irrÃ©gularitÃ© ni aucun motif lui permettant d'accueillir ces demandes d'appel . La cour a nÃ©anmoins fait droit Ã la demande d'autorisation d'appeler en ce qui concerne la peine prononcÃ©e pour vol et, avec l'accord de l'avocat, mais malgrÃ© la demande du requÃ©rant de comparaÃ®tre en personne, laquelle semble avoir Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e, la cour a traitÃ© cette audience de demande d'appel comme ponant sur l'appel lui-mÃ¨me . La Commission estime que, pour apprÃ©cier l'Ã©quitÃ© de cette procÃ©dure d'appel dans le cadre de l'ensemble de la procÃ©dure, elle doit d'abord examiner les pouvoirs de la cour d'appel et l'objet de l'audience, notamment s'il s'agissait de revoir la dÃ©cision de la juridiction infÃ©rieure ou de rejuger complÃ¨tement l'affaire . Ensuite, Ã la lumiÃ¨re de la rÃ©ponse Ã la premiÃ¨re question, elle devra examiner comment les intÃ©r@ts du requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s et protÃ©gÃ©s . S'agissant des pouvoirs de la cour d'appel, la Commission relÃ¨ve en premier lieu qu'aux termes de l'article 11, par . 3, de la loi de 1968 sur les appels en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale (modifiÃ©e par la loi de 1973 sur les pouvoirs des juridictions pÃ©nales, annexe 3), la cour d'appel :Â«exerce ses pouvoirs de maniÃ¨re que, l'affaire Ã©tant considÃ©rÃ©e globalement, l'appelant ne reÃ§oit pas en appel un traitement plus rigoureux que celui que la juridiction infÃ©rieure lui avait rÃ©servÃ© â¢ . En outre, lorsque l'autorisation d'interjeter appel a Ã©tÃ© accordÃ©e, la cour n'est pas habilitÃ©e Ã refuser d'imputer sur la peine le temps passÃ© Ã attendre le rÃ©sultat de l'appel, comme le prÃ©voit l'anicle 29 de la loi de 1968 sur les appels en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale .
De plus, la cour peut rejeter l'appel ou annuler la peine infligÃ©e si elle l'estime illÃ©gale, excessive ou inappropriÃ©e et lui substituer celle qui, Ã son avis, correspondait au verdict et aurait dÃ¹ Ã¨tre prononcÃ©e, sans pouvoir Ãªtre plus sÃ©vÃ¨re (Archibold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, par . 933) . La procÃ©dure d'appel ne tend donc pas Ã rejuger entiÃ¨rement l'affaire, bien qu'il soit possible d'apporter de nouvelles preuves, moyennant une autorisation que le requÃ©rant n'a d'ailleurs pas sollicitÃ©e . La cour d'appel a donc pour tÃ¢che de revoir la condamnation et la peine infligÃ©e par le juge . En exerÃ§ant cette compÃ©tence de rÃ©vision des peines, la cour ne modifie pas une peine pour le simple motif qu'elle aurait choisi une peine lÃ©gÃ¨rement diffÃ©rente si elle avait jugÃ© elle-mÃ¨me l'appelant . â¢ Il faut que la peine soit manifestement excessive eu Ã©gard aux circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce . ou erronÃ©e dans son principe pour que la cour la modifieÂ» (Archibold, idem, par . 940) . Ces pouvoirs limitÃ©s de la cour une fois rappelÃ©s, la Commission doit examiner le dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure dans la prÃ©sente espÃ¨ce pour apprÃ©cier l'impact de l'absence du requÃ©rant sur le caractÃ¨re Ã©quitable de l'ensemble de l'affaire . La procÃ©dure a dÃ©butÃ© par les demandes d'autorisation d'appel, adressÃ©es par le requÃ©rant au greffe des appels en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale en mÃªme temps que sa demande d'aide judiciaire . Le greffier accorda l'aide judiciaire au requÃ©rant pour demander l'autorisation de faire appel de la peine prononcÃ©e pour vol et chargea le mÃªme avocat que celui qui avait dÃ©fendu le requÃ©rant au procÃ¨s de rÃ©diger les moyens d'appel et de les prÃ©senter en mÃªme temps que la demande d'autorisation . Bien que le requÃ©rant eÃ¹t cenains griefs contre cet avocat, il ne rÃ©clama pas le retrait de son mandat comme il aurait pu le faire . La Commission en conclut dÃ¨s lors que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait satisfait de voir cet avocat le reprÃ©senter lors de la demande d'autorisation . La cour d'appel, qui siÃ©gea le 23 ociobre 1981 . Ã©tait donc saisie de deux demandes d'autorisation prÃ©sentÃ©es par Ã©crit par le requÃ©rant et a de plus entendu l'avocat du requÃ©ram detnander l'autorisation de faire appel de la peine prononcÃ©e pour vol . Il ressort clairement du compte rendu de l'audience que la cour a soigneusenient examinÃ© les nioyens invoquÃ©s par le requÃ©rant pour demander l'autorisation, en examinant les comptes rendus du procÃ¨s, qu'elle avait en sa possession . Les moyens invoquÃ©s par le requÃ©rant pour faire appel de la condamnation pour dÃ©tention d'arme concernaient le caractÃ¨re appropriÃ© des preuves nÃ©cessaires pourjustifier une condamnation et l'Ã©quitÃ© du rÃ©sumÃ© fait par le juge . AprÃ¨s avoir examinÃ© cette arguntentation, la cour a estimÃ© que le rÃ©suntÃ© avait Ã©tÃ© soigneuseusement et correctement fait au jury qu'- il y avait abondance de preuves pour justifier le verdict des jurÃ©s â¢ . Les moyens invoquÃ©s par le requÃ©rant pour en appeler de la condamnation pour vol concernaient, d'une part, le caractÃ¨re insuffisant des instructions donnÃ©es par l e - 167 -
juge quant aux tÃ©moignages concernant les complices et ; d'autre part, le fait qu'un des tÃ©moins aurait dÃ» Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme â¢ hostile â¢ . La cour a examinÃ© ces griefs et conclu que le requÃ©rant n'avait â¢ absolument aucun motif de se plaindre du dÃ©roulement du procÃ¨s ni des preuves, qui avaient Ã©tÃ© correctement administrÃ©es â¢, et - que si le jury choisissait d'accepter les preuves - ce qu'il a fait manifestement - il y avait surabondance de preuves quant Ã la culpabilitÃ© de l'intÃ©ressÃ© et c'est donc Ã bon droit que la condamnation a Ã©tÃ© prononcÃ©e- . La cour a Ã©galement examinÃ© sÃ©parÃ©ment les moyens invoquÃ©s pour faire appel de la peine . Elle a conclu que, vu les antÃ©cÃ©dents du requÃ©rant, il Ã©tait â¢ tout Ã fait impossible de relever une quelconque erreur dans la peine de trois ans de prison qui avait Ã©tÃ© infligÃ©e â¢ . S'agissant de la demande d'appel sur la peine prononcÃ©e pour vol, la cour a examinÃ© l'argumentation dÃ©veloppÃ©e par l'avocat, et constatÃ© qu'il avait â¢dit tout ce qu'il Ã©tait possible de dire au nom du requÃ©rantÂ» . Elle a conclu que, vu l'Ã¢ge du requÃ©rant et les circonstances de 1-affaire et, bien qu'une peine sÃ©vÃ¨re et l'additiox des peines fussent justifiÃ©es, elle considÃ©rait comme â¢ trop longue une peine de cinq ans au total qui aurait Ã©tÃ© tout Ã fait justifiÃ©e si une autre peine n'avait pas dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© infligÃ©e Â» . Dans tout ce qui vient d'Ã©tre rappelÃ© la Commission ne voit rien qui indique que l'absence du requÃ©rant au procÃ¨s devant la cour d'appel aurait nui au droit de l'accusÃ© Ã faire statuer Ã©quitablement sur l'accusation pÃ©nale portÃ©e contre lui . En particulier, le droit Ã - un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable et public â¢ figurant Ã l'article 6, par . 1 . de la Convention ne saurait s'interprÃ©ter comme exigeant dans tous les cas d'appel un notiveau procÃ¨s en prÃ©sence du requÃ©rant, Ã moins que les pouvoirs de la cour d'appel ou les questions litigieuses dont elle est saisie n'obligent Ã procÃ©der Ã un tel procÃ¨s pour garantir l'Ã©quitÃ© de l'ensemble de la procÃ©dure .
En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant avait demandÃ© l'autorisation de comparaitre en personne et, selon l'article 22 de la loi de 1968 sur l'appel en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale, il avait dÃ¨s lors le droit d'Ã¨tre prÃ©sent Ã l'audience d'un appel contre le prononcÃ© de la peine si l'autorisation de faire appel lui Ã©tait accordÃ©e . Or, il ressort du compte rendu d'audience devant la cour que celle-ci, apr8s avoir examinÃ© les moyens de l'appel formÃ© contre le prononcÃ© de la peine pour vol, a dÃ©cidÃ© de traiter la demande d'autorisation d'appel comme s'il s'agissait de l'appel lui-mÃªme, affirmant : â¢ Un cumul des peines Ã©tait parfaitement correct, de mÃ©me que le prononcÃ© d'une peine sÃ©vÃ¨re . Mais la cour en est venue Ã la conclusion que, dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce, une peine totale de cinq ans, qui eÃ»t Ã©tÃ© justfiiÃ©e si une autre peine n'avait pas dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© infligÃ©e, est nÃ©anmoins trop longue . Nous proposons d'admettre le requÃ©rant Ã faire appel, et avec le consentement de son dÃ©fenseur, de traiter l'audience sur cette demande comme l'audience d'appel, d'annuler la peine de cinq ans et de la remplacer par tine pÃ©riode de trois ans de prison venant s'ajouter Ã la peine qu'il est en train de purger .
La cour fera droit Ã l'appel en ces termes . Â» - 168 -
La Commission a dÃ©jÃ admis qu'un avocat peut expressÃ©ment renoncer pour un appelant au droit de comparaitre personnellement Ã l'audience d'appel (RequÃªte n" 8639/79, X . c/Royaume-Uni) . Elle relÃ¨ve qu'en l'espÃ¨ce l'avocat a eu la possibilitÃ© d'insister pour que son client assiste Ã l'audience mais non sous forme de question sÃ©parÃ©e exigeant une rÃ©ponse . La Commission doit nÃ©anmoins tenir compte de toutes les circonstances de l'affaire, notamment du fait, reconnu par la cour d'appel, que l'avocat du requÃ©rant avait â¢ dit tout ce qu'il Ã©tait possible de dire en son nom Â» . Dans ces conditions, et puisque la gravitÃ© de la peine infligÃ©e au requÃ©rant ne pouvait pas @tre accrue en appel, vu la nature des arguments exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant et par son avocat en son nom, vu l'absence du ministÃ¨re public pendant l'audience d'appel, la Commission estime que la prÃ©sence du requÃ©rant Ã l'audience d'appel n'Ã©tait pas nÃ©cessaire pour garantir l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure dans son ensemble, conformÃ©ment Ã l'anicle 6, par . I . de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte est, sur ce point, manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, par . 2, de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant a allÃ©guÃ© en outre que le greffe a confondu ses demandes d'appel sur l'accusation de port illÃ©gal d'une arme Ã feu et sur celle de vol, ce qui a nui Ã l'Ã©quitÃ© de la procÃ©dure . Il ressort cependant du compte rendu de la procÃ©dure d'appel que les demande s en autorisation d'appeler dÃ©posÃ©es par le requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© clairement distinguÃ©es et examinÃ©es sÃ©parÃ©ment par la cour, d'oÃ¹ il suit que la requÃ©te est, sur ce point Ã©galement, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'anicle 27, par . 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE IRRECEVABLE .
- 169 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 15/07/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 6
 l'article 27
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 11
 l'article 6
 l'article 22
 l'article 27