Source: http://new.oregontrackers.com/civil-rights-cases.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:03:55+00:00

Document:
Hoofman v. Holden, 268F 2d 280 2d 280, 289.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.(Civil Rights) 42 U.S.C. 1963.
Title 42, Section 1983 has been held to provide a civil action to protect persons against misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law. "Was clothed with the authority of the state." Davis v. Johnson, 1955 DC Ill. 138 F.Sup., 572; Jobson v. Henne, 1966 Ca. 2 NY 355 F. 2d 139.
It has been stated that there is no convincing proof that the Congress is responsible for the Civil Rights Act ever intended to immunize any state or territorial officials or employees, and that it is more likely that the congress intended to do away with whatever common-law immunities existed. Congressional Globe, 42 D Congo 1st Sess., 365-6, 268, 385 (1871).
Judges are not immune from criminal sanctions under the Civil Rights Act. ex parte Virginia (1879), 100 U.S. 339.
The Civil Rights Acts in general, and 1963 in particular, are cast in terms so broad as to suggest that in suits br~ught under these sections, common law doctrines of immunity can never be a bar. It should be equally clear that both the language and the purpose of the Civil Rights Acts are inconsistent with the, application of common law notions of official immunity in all suits brought under these provisions. Jacobsen V. Henne, 1966, Ca. 2 NY 355, F. 2d 129, 133-4; Anderson v. Nosser, 1971, Ca. 5, Miss., 428 F.2d 183, 01 MCD on other grounds 456 F.2d 835.
By the great weight of authority it is acknowledged that generally "public officials" are not immune from suit when they allegedly violate the civil rights of citizens, and that a "public official's" defense of immunity is to be sparingly applied in these kinds of cases. James v. Ogilvie, 1970, DC Ill., 310 F. Sup. 661, 663.
The court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed its view that a judge loses all immunity when he acts in absence of all jurisdiction, and has held a referee of a juvenile court responsible in a section 1983 action for abuse of a child. (Civil Rights)Lucarell v. McNair, 1972, Ca. 6, Ohio"453 F.2d 389.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a public official does not have immunity simply because he operates in a discretionary manner. It indicated that public servants are to be held liable when they abused their discretion or acted in a way that was arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable. (Civil law) Littleton v. Berling, 1972, CA Ill., 468 F.2d 389.
Legislative history makes evident that congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the states and the nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings extended to state courts. (Civil Rights) Mitchum v. Foster, 401 U.S. 225, 242.
Congress possessed the power to wipe it out (absolute immunity). We think that the conclusion is irrestible that congress by enacting the Civil Rights Act subjudice intended to abrogate the privilege to the extent indicated by that act and in fact did so. Section 1 of the third civil rights act explicitly applied to "any person." We can imagine no broader definition. The statute must be deemed to include members of the state, judiciary of the several states…but the policy involved is for congress and not for the courts. Littleton v. Berbler, 468, F. 2d 389 (1912).
of state law and made possible only because wrong-doer is clothed with authority of state law is action taken under color of state law within this section is applicable to judge. Duke v. state of Texas, DC Tex. 1971, 327 F.Sup- 1218.
though they did not act willfully. Even though they did not have a specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, such defendants can be held to civil responsibility. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.s. 167, 1961.
An conspiracy is actionable under 42 USC 1985, when there has been an "actual of denial of due process."(Civil Rights) Jennings v. Nester (1954, Ca. 7 Ill.) 217, F.2d 153, CERT DEN 349 U.S. 958, 99 L.Ed. 1281, 75 S.ct. 888.
the immunity that the official's act must have been within the scope of his powers; since they exist only for the public good, never cover occasions where the public good is not their aim, and hence that to exercise a power dishonestly is necessarily to overstep its bounds.(Civil Rights)Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (Ca. 2, 1949).
constitutional rights were denied, we are governed by the substance of things, not by mere form. (Civil Rights) Louisville 'N.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 23 S.ct. 620.
The Seventh Circuit of Appeals has held that a public official does not have immunity simply because he operates in a discretionary situation. It indicated that public servants are to be held liable when they abused their discretion or acted in a way that is arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable. (Civil Rights) Littleton v. Berbling (1972, Ca. 7 Ill.), 468 F.2d 389.
The civil rights acts in general, and 1983 in particular, are cast in terms so broad as to suggest that in suits brought under these sections, common law doctrines of immunity can never be a bar... It should be equally clear that both the language and the purpose of the civil rights acts are inconsistent with the application of common law notions of official immunity in all suits brought under these provisions. Jobso v. Henne (1966 Ca. 2 NY) 355 F.2d 129, 133-4, followed in anderson v. Nosser (1971, Ca. 5, Miss.) 428 F.2d 183, 201 MOD on other grounds. 456 F.2d 835.
The court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed its view that a judge loses all immunity when he acts in absence of all jurisdiction, and has held a referee of a juvenile court responsible in a section 1983 action for the abuse of a child. (Civil Rights) Lucarell v. McNair (1972, Ca. 6 Ohio) 453 F.2d 836.
When a judge exceeds his jurisdiction and grants or denies that beyond his lawful authority to grant or deny, he has perpetrated a "non-judicial" action. (Civil Rights) Yates v. Hoffman Estates (1962, DC Ill.) 209 F.Sup. 757.
It is well established that judges may be enjoyed from interfering with citizens rights. (Civil Rights) Bramlett v.Peterson (1967) 386 U.S. 547.
district court jurisdiction, no matter how imperfectly the claim is stated; this is another thing, the style under Rule 8 that poor defendants counsel has been so disturbed about, the judges feelings that the case is probably frivolous does not justify by-passing the right to a hearing on the merits. Harmon v. Superior Court of the States of California, 307 F.2d 796 (Ca. 9, 1962).
Any plaintiff who can allege deprivation of federal right by reason of action under color of law can maintain action under this sub-chapter.(Civil Rights) Nationwide Amussements, Inc. v. Nattin, DC La. (1971), 325 F.Sup. 95.
Governmental immunity is not defense in suits brought under this section making liable every person who under color or state law deprives another person of his civil rights. Westberry v. Fisher, DC Me., 1970, 309 F.Sup. 95.
any person who, under color of state law, deprives U.S. citizens of his constitutional rights liable to party injured is to be construed liberally.(Civil Rights)Nanez v. Rigger, DC. Wis. 1969, 304 F.Sup. 354.
To maintain an action under 1983, it is not necessary to allege or prove that the defendants intended to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights, or that they acted willfully, purposely, or in pursuance of a conspiracy…It is sufficient to establish that the deprivation of constitutional rights or privileges was the natural consequences of defendants acting under he color of law, irrespective of whether such consequence was intended. (Civil Rights) Ethridge v. Rhodes (1967 DC Ohio) 268 F.Sup. 83; Whirl v. Kern (1968, Ca. 5 Tex.) 407 F.2d 781.
A complaint may not be dismissed on motion if it states some sort of claim, baseless though it may prove to be and inartistically as the complaint may be drawn. This is particularly true where the plaintiff is not represented by counsel. (Civil Rights) Brooks v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 91 F.Sup. 101 (DC SD NY, 1950) .
In a 42-1983 action, the allegations of the complaint and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, upon a motion to dismiss, must be taken most favorably to the plaintiff. (Civil Rights) Nanez v. Rigger (1969, DC Wis.) 304 F.Sup. 354.
In order to maintain an action under 42 USC 1983, it is not necessary to allege or prove that the defendants intended to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights or that they acted willfully, purposely, or in pursuance of a conspiracy. It is sufficient to establish that the deprivation of constitutional rights or privileges was the natural consequences of the actions of defendants acting under the color of law, irrespective of whether such consequences was intended. (Civil Rights) Ury v. Santee (1969 DC Ill.).
Title 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1342 expressly grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts in civil actions for violations of.civil rights, that is, for any wrongs specified therein. U.S Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226.
Purpose: Generally, this section further protects civil action for deprivation of rights protects constitutional rights from invasion by persons acting under state or federal authority. (Civil Rights) Weise v. Reisner, DC Wis. 1970, 318 F.Sup. 580, quoted from U.S.C.A. 1972 pocketpart, P. 40 Title 42, Sec. 1983, Note Paragraph 8.
This section was passed to enforce U.S.C.A. Constitution Amendment 14 and to protect form interference the rights secured thereby, as well as other constitutional rights; it is directed against conspiracies of private persons; and there is no requirement that conspiracy be under color of law. (Civil Rights) U.S.C.A. 1972 Pocket P. 1675, Title 42, Sec. 1995, Note 2.
IRS letter rulings cannot be shielded from the public. (Civil Rights) U.S. Court of Appeals for district of Columbia U.S. v. IRS, 8-19-74, 43 LW 1039.
A suit in detinue or replevin in personam should lie to gain possession of property seized by the state. (Civil Rights) Stephen, Pleading (3rd Am ed) p. 47, 52, 69, 74; Ames Lectures on legal history, p. 64, 71; Wilkins v. Despard, 5 Term Rep- 112; Roberts v. Withered, % Mod. 193, 12 Mod. 92.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 V. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.