Source: https://thompsononeillaw.typepad.com/tov_blog/premises_liability/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:31:40+00:00

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Court affirms summary disposition of wrongful death claim arising out of child's drowning in hotel pool. Expert testimony limited to content of Interrogatories.
The family of a 32-month old boy sued the Rest-All Inn of Oscoda after the child drowned in the hotel pool during a family reunion. Surveillance video apparently indicated that the door to the pool was blocked open with a brick, and the child wandered in to the pool moments ahead of his mother. Even though she arrived within three minutes, searching for him, the child stepped into the shallow end of the pool and drowned within three minutes. The family argued that the hotel should be responsible for the death because it did not comply with rules about access to the pool and because the lack of clarity in the water prevented the child's family from discovering him immediately.
A jury heard the case and although it found negligence on the part of the hotel, it concluded that the hotel's lack of due care did not "cause" the child's death. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The family argued that the jury was tainted by the judge's decision to allow the hotel to use an edited version of the surveillance tape in evidence. The higher court ruled that use of the edited recording was an allowable exercise of discretion, given the fact that the full tape was also admitted. The family also objected to limiting instructions that the trial judge placed on the family's expert witness testimony. The Court affirmed the trial judge's ruling that allowed the experts to testify only to with regard to vague descriptions of their testimony that were contained in the Plaintiff's Answers to Supplement Interrogatories.
Krystal Lowrey fell and suffered fractures in her lower leg while leaving Woody's Diner--an Oakland County bar. The owners argued that she could not sue because the dark, crowded, wet stairway was an "open and obvious" hazard that it owed no duty to address. The bar also claimed that there was no evidence to support that it was aware of the stairway issues, and that in any event, Lowery wasn't clear what caused her fall. The trial judge looked at recent appellate decisions by the insurance-friendly courts and agreed; the judge granted summary disposition. She appealed. The Court of Appeals reinstated her claim.
The appellate judges noted that the lower court judge erred in granting summary disposition. They pointed out that simply because two of the bar employees claimed to be unaware of the condition of the steps, that did not entirely negate notice to any of the employees. It was evidence of lack of notice, but not dispositive, particularly given the location of bouncers near the stairway. For that matter, the court noted that the bar did not adequately address what routine it followed to "inspect" the premises and to find and address unsafe conditions. The Court took pains to remind the lower court that the duty owed by a commercial property owner is greater than the duty owed by an invited visitor.
With regard to the cause of the fall, the court pointed out that while the bar could argue that Lowrey's testimony was ambiguous, that credibility issue was for the jury to decide. Lastly, the judges ruled that reasonable minds could differ with regard to whether an "average patron with ordinary intelligence...would have been able to discover the danger and risk..." and avoid them. This, too, was a question for jurors. While this is all historically accurate, we'll see if the case survives an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. It has dismissed any number of legitimate, reasonable, meritorious premises liability claims in the past few years. And we cannot think of one it has upheld.
Senetta Elaine Walthall attempted to sue the Flint Housing Commission after she fell on her apartment's back stairs. She fell and suffered multiple fractures after the hand railing pulled out of the wall. The Court noted that the Housing Commission is a governmentally-owned enterprise and therefore immune from liability unless a statutory exception is identified. Walthall's attorneys argued that the public building exception should apply, however, the Court of Appeals pointed to recent decisions of the Michigan judiciary which have limited the application of that exception to buildings "held open to the public." In particular, the judges pointed to a recent ruling that a person injured in a university dormitory could not argue that they were hurt in a "public building," and thus, neither could Walthall.
The insurer-friendly Michigan Supreme Court has virtually eliminated a property owner's duty to maintain property in a manner that is reasonably safe for invitees. The Republican Justices' primary tool in eliminating this obligation has been the broadening of the so-called "open and obvious" danger exception from a property owner's duty: if an invited visitor might have seen a hazardous condition "on casual inspection," the hazard is deemed open and obvious and the property owner is excused from any duty--let alone a reasonable duty--to address the hazard or make it safe. Other decisions have similarly limited the property owner's duty with regard to unsafe or hazardous actions, by instituting a rule that the owner won't be responsible for unsafe acts if they have [merely] created an open danger on the property.
The high court re-emphasized this policy position with two summary decisions handed down on November 25 of this year. On that date the Court summarily reversed two Court of Appeals holdings that had denied summary disposition sought by a landlord and a "race club."
In Compau v. Pioneer Resource Company, et al., the high court held that a spectator who entered property to watch a lawn mower race could not sue after tripping on a poorly-located railroad tie when she and other spectators attempted to avoid two racers that collided and were ejected from the race track into the crowd. The Court held that even if the railroad tie was a dangerous condition, Compau couldn't sue over her injuries because she admitted that she had seen the tie earlier in the day when she arrived at the property. Subsequent distractions involving the race and crowd did not affect the "obvious" nature of the hazard or make the commercial operator responsible for its unsafe condition. The Justices also held that since the hazard was "obvious" the race operator was not responsible for any alleged negligence in how it conducted the lawn mower race which it had invited spectators on the property to watch.
In Simpson v. GFI Management, et al., the Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in denying summary disposition to a landlord who required tenants to walk their dogs in a "designated dog run area" of the apartment complex. Simpson fell and suffered injury while carrying her elderly dog through accumulated ice and snow to the designated area. She argued that while the accumulation of ice and snow was an obvious hazard, she had not choice but to confront the hazard, given the complex's rules governing loose dogs and time limitations resulting from her elderly dog's need to relieve itself. The appellate court panel agreed with Simpson, however, the Supreme Court rejected her argument and summarily dismissed her injury claim. The high court ruled that Simpson's conundrum was not "inescapable."
Amanda Tolen, a student at the Alpena Hollywood School of Beauty, was hurt when she slipped in water spilled from a five-gallon bucket used to transport water to various pedicure stations. She claimed that the School was responsible for the spill because it was created by a School agent and because it wasn't readily visible on the glossy tile floor. The Court of Appeals issued a typically-Henry Saad-opinion uphold summary disposition of Tolen's claim. The judges ruled that the water was "open and obvious" thus eliminating any duty by the school to eliminate the hazard. The judges further held that it was "nothing other than speculation" that another student created the puddle--although the judges declined to identify who, other than a student-employee-agent, would have moved the bucket and created the spill. The judges also rejected the woman's argument that the practice of using the lidless bucket to carry water put the school on constructive notice of the likelihood of spills, since she "offered no evidence that such water spillages occurred..."
Lastly, the judges ruled that the woman's testimony that she didn't see the puddle was insufficient to establish that it was not obvious, since she did not "testify that she was looking where she was stepping..." and in fact said she "took a step back" before falling. Judge Saad's opinions are frequently full of argumentative conclusions that are merely one perspective on the evidence.
Sarah England fell at a Meijer store after someone spilled liquid laundry detergent in an aisle. The staff was aware of the spill, however, the two employees who responded claimed that they didn't have adequate staffing to clean it up immediately. They also did not block the aisle or put up a warning sign. Instead, they turned off the lights in that aisle.
When England and her husband arrived, minutes later, the pregnant England slid in the soap residue, fell and suffered injury. When Meijer denied her injury claim, she filed suit arguing that the store employees were negligent in responding to the soap hazard. Even though she testified that she didn't see the soap residue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the soap spill was "open and obvious" because Ms. England testified that nothing obstructed her vision in the (darkened) aisle other than her pregnant stomach.
The judges made two related holdings. The held that pursuant to recent decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court's insurance-oriented majority, the store was under NO DUTY to address the "open and obvious" hazard--because it could be seen; and they held that since the hazard was a condition on the premises, the stores' employees could not be held accountable for negligence in responding to it.
The Estate of Carl Stamm sued Robert King, Leanne King and their son Erik King after Stamm died in a motorcycle collision. A minor, Stamm had been drinking in the Kings' basement with their son, Erik, before he attempted to avoid being pulled over by police and died when his cycle struck a police car. His family attempted to hold the Kings accountable for their actions in allowing Carl to become intoxicated in their basement.
The Stamm family could not prove that Erik was lying in his claim that he did not see Carl drink any of the beer that he had bought, so the family was limited to a claim that the Kings violated Michigan law by allowing under-aged alcohol consumption in a residence under their control. Stunningly, Judges Boonstra, Saad and Hoekstra ruled that all three Kings "lacked the requisite control over the residence" to be culpable under the statute.
The insurance-friendly judges ruled that the parents did not "knowingly" violate the pertinent statute because they claimed to have been unaware of the activities of their son and his guest in their basement. The judges further held that Erik "was merely an adult child living in his parents' home, and that as such, he did not have a possessory interest in the home." Despite his ability to control access to the home, "nothing in the statute indicates that the ability to take corrective action, alone establishes the requisite [statutory] control [over the home]."
So, unbelievably, a grown man with a key to his parents' house and living in the home can violate the alcohol statute with impunity, because he isn't a "possessor" of the home. I'll bet that if he were found with drugs in the basement and charged criminally, the same judges would have no qualms about his responsibility for that illegal conduct.
In Francescutti v. Fox Chase Condo Association, the Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiff could not bring a personal injury action arising out of his fall on an ice covered and allegedly poorly maintained sidewalk. The Court noted that since the plaintiff was a "tenant in common" of the common areas of the development where he lived, he was not injured on "the land of another" and therefore he had no right to sue as an invitee or licensee.
Maria Viramontez sued the owners of her Martin Gardens' apartment, arguing that they failed to comply with state laws requiring safe premises and regular inspections. The plaintiff suffered multiple burns on her right side after fainting in her shower. She presented the testimony of two experts to document her claim that the shower water was unreasonably hot and not in conformity with code requirements.
There was some ambiguity in the experts' testimony, however, and apparently they could not prove that the water temperature exceeded 120 degrees. In addition, there was at least a suggestion that the woman may have been exposed to water at 110 degrees for more than 10 minutes--an exposure that might cause similar burn injuries. Relying on these uncertainties, the court held that the victim could not prove that the water that burned her was dispensed at an unsafe temperature.
The woman also argued that the plumbing system was prone to "temperature surges" and that a warning in the mechanical room advised the owners of this risk. The Court ruled that since she had previously experienced "unacceptable heat" on many occasions and "merely turned it down," the defective plumbing system was an "open and obvious" danger which the owners owed no duty to remedy.
In Williams v. Grand Ledge High School, the plaintiff parent brought an injury suit against the school system after her daughter fell from the back ledge of an upper choir riser. She claimed that the fall resulted from a defect in the riser which had a back "lip" or ledge to prevent chairs from sliding off, but no guardrail. The Court dismissed the school's claim that the 32 foot by 16 foot by 2 foot risers were not fixtures, but nevertheless summarily dismissed the student's lawsuit.
The Court of Appeals held that applying a fairly recent analysis by Michigan's Supreme Court, the defect was in the design of the risers, not in the maintenance of the risers or building. The higher Court has held that governmental entities are immune from liability for design flaws and that the statute overriding governmental immunity applies only to the "maintenance" of a public building.
Man who slipped and fell because of spilled alcohol cannot sue nightclub.
In Nicholson v. Eagle Theater Entertainment, LLC, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary disposition to the defendant. Nicholson had sued after slipping in a puddle of liquid and falling, suffering injury. Since Nicholson didn't know who caused the spill or how long it was present, he attempted to argue that the nightclub should be held liable because it had no inspection policy and inadequate lighting.
The Court held that the policy cited by the plaintiff does not apply in a normal commercial setting and that Nicholson was required to show how long the spill was present in order to meet his duty of proving that nightclub employees were negligent.
In Kassed v. Atikan, the Plaintiff sued the defendant after falling on the Defendant's porch. The trial judge had ruled that Plaintiff was an "invitee" because he entered the defendant's property to perform a service (to inform him that a car was parked in the street blocking his driveway). The Court of Appeals reversed this holding; it ruled that there was no pecuniary purpose for the plaintiff entering the property and therefore he was either a trespasser or merely "tolerated."
The higher court ruled that regardless of the plaintiff's status on the property, the homeowner owed no duty to address a slippery porch, since with snow on the ground the slippery wintry condition of the porch was an "open and obvious hazard." It also held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to refuse to consider a response brief filed eight days late by the Plaintiff.
Court reaffirms that apartment complex owed no duty to remove snow or address "black ice."
Renee Young fell in the parking lot of the Michigan Tree Apartments in Macomb County. She suffered a badly fractured leg and claimed that the apartment complex violated both the common law and a Michigan statute requiring an apartment lessor to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition. She argued that the dark lot was a "sea of ice" that was not identifiable because the only overhead light was not functioning.
The Court of Appeals referred to recent decisions by the Michigan Supreme Court that rejected any duty by an apartment complex to address natural accumulations of ice and snow. Since the fall occurred in February in Michigan, the black ice on the dark parking lot was "open and obvious" to the injured woman, even if she didn't and couldn't see it. He duty of "casual inspection" should have made her aware of the danger, even if she couldn't see it, because she had lived at least one winter in Michigan, and therefore the landlord owed no duty to make the lot reasonably safe.
The three judges ruled that "..our Supreme Court has held that this type of icy condition is not unreasonably dangerous...and the statute requiring a landlord to maintain "all common areas fit for the use intended...to keep the premises in reasonable repair...and to comply with applicable health and safety laws..." imposes no duty on the landlord to address issues of snow and ice in a parking lot.
Kenneth Klimek went to use the urinal in the public restroom at the MS Plaza, during a break in a meeting to which he was invited. He had stepped on a rubberized urinal mat which he had noticed at prior meetings. Although he knew the mat was not fastened to the floor and was not precisely in its "normal" location, he did not think it would slide on the tile floor. It did; he fell; and he was hurt. He brought a premises liability action against the owner.
The trial judge summarily dismissed his case because he noticed the mat wasn't in its normal place and therefore should have recognized it was an "open and obvious hazard." The Michigan Supreme Court has expanded an exception to the landowner's duty to business invitees, so that they no longer owe any duty--reasonable or otherwise--to address any hazard that a visitor might have noticed on casual inspection.
Klimek appealed, arguing that simply because the mat was out of place did not make it an obvious danger to step on. To her credit, Judge Kathleen Jansen agreed with Klimek, concluding that a rubber bathroom mat is not an obvious danger that a reasonable person would recognize on casual inspection. The other two judges followed the Michigan Supreme Court lead and upheld the summary dismissal of Klimek's lawsuit.
Jerry Meretsky suffered injury when he tripped on a Washington Avenue sidewalk in Royal Oak. A witness saw him fall and reported the incident to the City, which promptly applied a cold patch to the defective sidewalk. Meretsky later sued the City for damages, arguing that the sidewalk wasn't reasonably safe, and the City responded with a motion for summary disposition. It filed with the court it's engineer's evidence documenting his removal of selected areas of cold patch and his opinion that the defect was never greater than 2 inches in vertical height.
Meretsky's attorneys argued that the evidence wasn't conclusive with regard to the height of the defect, and that in any event, they had been denied the opportunity to measure the defect independently. The trial judge sided with the City and summarily dismissed the claim, holding that Meretsky could not overcome the presumption that the sidewalk defect was under two inches in height and therefore reasonably safe. The judges upheld this outcome on appeal.
They ruled that he could not complain regarding the City's evidence because his attorneys had never filed a formal motion to compel the City to allow them to perform their own inspection.
When one of its shoppers suffered injury after falling in a puddle of water, Meijer, Inc., defended the claim by arguing that the woman could not prove that an employee created the puddle or should have discovered it before her fall. Her attorneys pointed to the fact that the puddle was adjacent to the employee entrance to the store, and that employees were stocking the shelves at the time of the fall.
The trial judge and the appellate court concluded that the evidence pointing to an employee cause--or that the puddle should have been discovered--was "mere speculation and conjecture." The appeals judges ruled that "another customer and not defendant's employees, created the spill" and that it would not require the defendant "to conduct exhaustive inspections over every square inch of its premises to search for virtually invisible hazards..." It has now become acceptable even for judges to use hyperbole in rejecting injury victims' claims.
Three young people died when a drunken minor drove his car into a tree, leaving an East Lansing party. The families of the victims sued the party host, arguing that his negligence in serving alcohol to a minor was the cause of the wrongful deaths. Depositors Insurance Company provided homeowners insurance to the host, but declined to defend the case or pay its policy limits to the families. After much procedural maneuvering, the insurer filed a Declaratory Judgment action against the families, asking a court to rule that it had excluded coverage for an incident of this nature.
The trial judge agreed with the insurer that it had excluded coverage for liability for this event, both because the policy excluded any damages resulting from use of a motor vehicle, but also because the intentional provision of alcohol to a minor eliminated any claim of an "accident" or "occurrence." Relying on the policy's definitions, the Court of Appeals upheld the summary disposition of the families' claims. It ruled that a drunken vehicle accident and wrongful death was foreseeable at the time alcohol was provided to minors, and therefore the event could not be deemed "accidental."

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