Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52971:gr-164815-2009&catid=1522&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:06:51+00:00

Document:
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On Petition for Review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends Valeroso's acquittal. After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso's constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his superiors.
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzman's motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner's evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondent's second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the version of the defense.
Valeroso's appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We answer in the negative.
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35 People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso's children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised by Valeroso.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
8 Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits.
11 Valeroso's testimony was corroborated by Yuson; id. at 151.
13 Exh. "1," Folder of Exhibits.
15 The decision was penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste; id. at 38-45.
16 Embodied in a decision dated May 4, 2004, penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 16-31.
23 See De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182 (1996).
24 Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 152, 155.
26 De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 191.
28 G.R. NOS. 112526 and 118838, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 432.
29 Astorga v. People, supra note 24, at 155-156.
30 People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 139 (2000).
32 People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003, 412 SCRA 142, 153-154; Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 277 (2002); People v. Sevilla, supra note 30, at 139-140; People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880 (1998).
33 Nachura, Antonio Eduardo B., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009, pp. 139-142.
34 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32, at 278.
35 322 Phil. 226 (1996).
36 413 Phil 249 (2001).
37 443 Phil. 669 (2003).
38 People v. Estella, id. at 685.
39 People v. Cueno, 359 Phil. 151, 163 (1998).
40 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 271; see People v. Leangsiri, supra note 35.
41 People v. Estella, supra note 37, at 685.
43 TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 21-25.
44 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 27.
46 People v. Estella, supra note 37, at 685.
49 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 40, at 271; People v. Leangsiri, supra note 35, at 249.
52 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 272; People v. Leangsiri, supra note 35, at 249-250.
53 People v. Aruta, supra note 32, at 895.
54 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at 270-271.
55 People v. Tudtud, supra note 32, at 168.
56 People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642, 652 (2003).
58 People v. Januario, 335 Phil. 268, 304 (1997).

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