Source: https://www.uclpractitioner.com/ucl_supreme_court/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:13:29+00:00

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Posts categorized "UCL - Supreme Court"
Last week, on February 15, 2016, the Supreme Court granted review in Goonewardene v. ADP, No. S238941. In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's UCL and FAL claims for lack of standing, but allowed several other claims to move forward. Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC, 5 Cal.App.4th 154 (2016). My original post on the opinion is here.
Does the aggrieved employee in a lawsuit based on unpaid overtime have viable claims against the outside vendor that performed payroll services under a contract with the employer?
Under Rule of Court 8.115(e), as amended last year, the Court of Appeal opinion remains citable despite the grant of review, although it lacks precedential effect.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court handed down its eagerly-anticipated opinion, In re Cipro Cases I & II, __ Cal.4th ___ (May 7, 2015), in which the Court was expected to reaffirm its landmark holding in Cel-Tech that conduct can be "unfair" under the UCL even if not "unlawful," and vice versa.
The trial court entered judgment against plaintiffs on their unfair competition and common law monopoly claims using the same reasoning it applied to the Cartwright Act claim. Because that reasoning was erroneous, we reverse on these claims as well.
Under federal antitrust law, these settlements are not immune from scrutiny, even if they limit competition no more than a valid patent would have. (Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. (2013) 570 U.S. ___, ___ [186 L.Ed.2d 343, 356, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2230] (Actavis).) We conclude the same is true under state antitrust law. Some patents are valid; some are not. Sometimes competition would infringe; sometimes it would not. Parties illegally restrain trade when they privately agree to substitute consensual monopoly in place of potential competition that would have followed a finding of invalidity or noninfringement. The Court of Appeal ruled to the contrary; we reverse.
Earlier this month, the Supreme Court posted its March 2015 oral argument calendar. On March 3, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. in San Francisco, the Court will hear argument in In re Cipro Cases I & II, No. S198616.
This case mainly raises some very interesting questions of antitrust law. The litigation also involves a UCL claim, however, so it is possible the Supreme Court may address the UCL in its forthcoming opinion. I filed an amicus brief for CAOC discussing one aspect of the UCL claim that the parties' briefing did not focus on.
My original post on the Court of Appeal's 2011 opinion is here. In that opinion, the Court of Appeal reasoned that conduct not prohibited by the Cartwright Act could not be "unfair" within the meaning of the UCL. I believe this reasoning is inconsistent with Cel-Tech, for reasons explained in detail in my amicus brief for CAOC.
I hope to be able to attend the argument on March 3 and see if the Court asks any questions about the UCL claim. I have not yet attended any arguments with the two new justices presiding, so I'm looking forward to it.
Last week, the Supreme Court announced that it will be handing down its opinion this morning in People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc., no. S194388. Harris is a UCL public prosecutor action in which the defendant asserts federal preemption.
Plaintiff and appellant State of California appeals from a judgment following an order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants and respondents Alfredo Barajas and Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. The State contends the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) (49 U.S.C. § 14501 et seq.) does not preempt this action under California’s unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) based on alleged violations of California labor and unemployment insurance laws. We agree the State’s unfair competition action is not related to a price, route, or service of a motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property, and therefore, the action is not preempted by the FAAAA. We reverse.
UPDATE: The opinion is up. The Supreme Court unanimously held the FAAAA does not preempt the UCL, either in general or as applied to the particular claim brought by the AG against the employer.
This week, the Supreme Court depublished the Court of Appeal's opinion in Aspiras v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 219 Cal.App.4th 948 (2013), discussed in this blog post.
This is an interesting development. Aspiras created a split in authority with Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 213 Cal.App.4th 872 (2013), regarding the post-Cel-Tech formulation of "unfair" conduct. There is a longstanding three-way split in authority on the meaning of "unfair," and these two cases created a sub-split.
Under the post-Cel-Tech formulation, conduct is "unfair" if it contravenes a legislative expression of public policy. I think of it as violating the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law.
The Court of Appeal in Aspiras disagreed with this line of reasoning, and accepted the defendant's argument that so construing the "unfair" prong would "effectuate an improper retroactive application of the [newly-enacted] law."
I have not seen the depublication request, so it's possible the Supreme Court was concerned with some other aspect of the opinion, which addressed a number of issues. But at minimum, the Supreme Court's depublication order eliminates this sub-split in authority.
Supreme Court takes up UCL preemption case as a "grant and hold": Rodriguez v. RWA Trucking Co.
Last week, on December 11, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a "grant and hold" order in Rodriguez v. RWA Trucking Co., No. S214150.
In Rodriguez, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs' UCL "unlawful" prong claims were preempted, in part, by federal law, namely, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (49 U.S.C. § 14501) ("FAAAA"). See Rodriguez v. RWA Trucking Co., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Sept. 12, 2013; mod. Sept. 20, 2013) (discussed in this blog post).
The Supreme Court is already considering FAAAA preemption in People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc., No. S194388. Briefing in Rodriguez has been deferred pending resolution of Harris.
I've updated my list of pending California Supreme Court cases relevant to the areas of practice covered by this blog.
Issue: This case presents questions concerning the determination of whether common issues predominate in a proposed class action relating to claims that turn on whether members of the putative class are independent contractors or employees.
Issues: (1) Did AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. __ [131 S. Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742] impliedly overrule Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443 with respect to contractual class action waivers in the context of non-waivable labor law rights? (2) Does the high court's decision permit arbitration agreements to override the statutory right to bring representative claims under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)? (3) Did defendant waive its right to compel arbitration?
Issue: This case presents issues concerning the certification of class actions in wage and hour misclassification litigation and the use of representative testimony and statistical evidence at trial of such a class action.
Issue: Does the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 2), as interpreted in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U. S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740, preempt state law rules invalidating mandatory arbitration provisions in a consumer contract as procedurally and substantively unconscionable?
Issue: May a suit under the Cartwright Antitrust Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720 et seq.) be brought to challenge "reverse exclusionary payments" made by pharmaceutical manufacturers to settle patent litigation with generic drug producers and prolong the life of the patents in question?
Issue: Is an action under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) that is based on a trucking company's alleged violation of state labor and insurance laws "related to the price, route, or service" of the company and, therefore, preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (49 U.S.C. § 14501)?
Issues: (1) Can a mandatory employment arbitration agreement be enforced prior to the conclusion of an administrative proceeding conducted by the Labor Commissioner concerning an employee's statutory wage claim? (2) Was the Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction over employee's statutory wage claim divested by the Federal Arbitration Act under Preston v. Ferrer (2008) __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 978, 169 L.Ed.2d 917?
U.S. Supreme Court Order (10/31/11): The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of California for further consideration in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___ (Apr. 27, 2011).
Supreme Court Order (01/11/12): In light of the United States Supreme Court's order vacating our judgment in the above-entitled case and remanding the cause to this court "for further consideration in light of AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. __ (2011) [131 S.Ct. 1740]," the parties are requested to brief the significance of that case. The parties are requested to file and serve simultaneous briefs by February 10, 2012, and may file and serve reply briefs by February 24, 2012.

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