Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/56/56massappct559.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:45:31+00:00

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Practice, Civil, Moot case. Zoning, Amendment of by-law or ordinance, Spot zoning. Municipal Corporations, Police power. Constitutional Law, Police power, Taking of property. Due Process of Law, Taking of property.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Land Court Department on January 6, 1997.
John Kenneth Felter (Michael Murray with him) for the plaintiffs.
Brian C. Levey for the defendants.
COWIN, J. W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. and Alewife Land Corporation (collectively, Grace) challenge certain zoning amendments adopted by the city of Cambridge (the city) that effectively froze Grace's development plans for a period of twenty-three months. A judge of the Land Court allowed summary judgment in favor of the city, while simultaneously denying Grace's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Grace asserts (1) the amendments exceeded the city's police powers as expressed in G. L. c. 40A, §§ 1 et seq. (the Zoning Act); (2) the amendments constituted "reverse" spot zoning, and were therefore unlawful; and (3) regardless of the validity of the amendments, the amendments constituted a "regulatory taking" of property for which Grace is constitutionally entitled to compensation. Thus, we enter the dense thicket of court decisions that have sought to establish the boundary between private property rights and permissible governmental action limiting the value of those rights. Complicating the analysis in this particular case is the fact that a summary judgment decided the outcome; accordingly, we must examine not only whether correct principles of law were applied, but also whether summary judgment was appropriate. After consideration of each factor, we affirm the judgment of the Land Court.
height to forty-five feet and allowed a maximum floor area ratio of 1.0. This district was the only Industry C zoning district in the city. Most of the property within the district is owned by Grace, the remainder consisting of a two-family house and a small parcel owned by the Metropolitan District Commission.
During and subsequent to 1977, other zoning actions affected the locus. The city first created a Planned Unit Development Overlay district applicable to Industry C districts, and thus applicable to the locus, that imposed certain minimum open space and landscaping requirements but permitted increases in building height to eighty-five feet and in floor area ratios to 2.0. Development within the Planned Unit Development district required the issuance of a special permit by the Cambridge planning board. In 1982, the city placed a portion of the locus in a Flood Plain Overlay district, which also prohibits any construction within the Overlay district without issuance of a special permit by the planning board.
In 1987, Grace, through an agent, applied for and received a special permit to develop a portion of the locus. The development, called Alewife Center, called for a hotel and six office buildings with associated retail uses, with the total contemplated new space exceeding one million square feet. There would also be accessory parking for more than 2,300 automobiles. The special permit authorized construction to proceed in phases between 1987 and 1994. The first building (Alewife Center One) was completed and occupied in 1989. Grace expended other funds in connection with its intention at that time to develop the property further.
In 1989, Grace sought and received an amendment to the special permit that revised commencement dates for various phases of the project and authorized postponement of commencement of the final phase of Alewife Center from June, 1994, to September, 1997. Despite the special permit and the amendment thereto, Grace undertook no further construction at the locus following the completion of Alewife Center One. In 1996, Grace applied for further extensions of the phased commencement dates, but this time the application was denied by the planning board.
to the east by Industry A-1, Residence B and OS (open space) districts; to the south by Industry A-1 and Residence C-2 districts; and to the west by Office 2 and OS districts.
In 1996, a petition by certain Cambridge residents led to adoption by the city council of a zoning amendment that rezoned as open space a 400-foot buffer area consisting of approximately thirteen acres that bordered on the adjacent Residence B districts. The new zone included all of the existing buildings and improvements on the locus, all of which became nonconforming uses. The planning board did not recommend adoption of the petition as filed, stating that "[d]ue to general planning concerns relating to the entire [d]istrict, the [p]lanning [b]oard will initiate a study leading to a comprehensive revision of the zoning regulations affecting all of the [Industry C] district and the coterminous [Planned Unit Development] . . . district for submission to the [c]ity [c]ouncil as expeditiously as possible." [Note 4] Whether because of the planning board's position or otherwise, the version of the petition ultimately adopted by the city council provided for expiration six months after the date of enactment (thus remaining in effect from October 28, 1996, through April 28, 1997).
While these subsequent zoning changes were taking place, the city embarked on a rezoning study with respect to the Industry C district (and therefore the locus). On October 10, 1996, a proposed work program for the study was completed. Additional memoranda were prepared in November and December, 1996. In January, 1997, the city published a request for proposals for a professional facilitation team to work on the study. Early in 1997, a facilitation team was selected. In June, 1997, the planning board accepted a recommendation of the facilitation team that a working group be formed for the purpose of discussing major issues pertaining to the study. The working group consisted of approximately forty members, including representatives of Grace, neighborhood residents, planning board members and members of the Cambridge community development department. Between September, 1997, and January, 1998, the working group developed an issues agenda, retained consultants and negotiated procedures and approaches. The working group then met about every two weeks from January 27, 1998, to June 30, 1998.
months after expiration of the extended temporary building moratorium, the planning board recommended to the city council the creation of a new Special District 3 to replace the existing Industry C district containing the locus. The new district, an amended version of a proposal filed previously by the planning board, significantly reduced, but did not eliminate, the amount of development previously permitted at the locus. On January 5, 1999, by letter to the city clerk, Grace informed the city council that it did not protest adoption of the planning board petition to create the Special District 3 on the condition that the planning board's amended version was accepted. The planning board petition as amended was adopted on January 7, 1999, and became Ordinance # 1212. Grace has not challenged the permanent zoning of the locus as part of Special District 3, confining this litigation to the merits of the zoning amendments applicable to the twenty-three month period that preceded adoption of Ordinance # 1212.
2. Mootness. The city argues that, with respect to Grace's assertions that the contested zoning amendments exceeded the police power and constituted reverse spot zoning, the claims are moot because those amendments expired not later than September 30, 1998. This proposition has some surface appeal. Whatever the validity of the challenged zoning amendments, their impact on Grace came to an end on September 30, 1998, when the extended temporary building moratorium expired. While Grace may have rights depending on whether those amendments constituted a regulatory taking, Grace is no longer directly affected by zoning that previously existed but is no longer in effect. See Tra-Jo Corp. v. Town Clerk of Methuen, 366 Mass. 846 , 847 (1974).
3. Police power/spot zoning. Grace levels separate attacks on the amendments as exceeding the city's police power and as constituting unlawful "reverse" spot zoning. In his decision on summary judgment, the Land Court judge adopted Grace's analytical approach to the extent that he dealt with these challenges individually and independently of each other. We view Grace's police power and spot zoning arguments as raising essentially a single issue, i.e., whether the amendments were a legitimate exercise of the city's authority under the Zoning Act. If the city's position is sustained on that issue, it follows that the amendments do not constitute spot zoning.
thus could not justify a summary judgment on the issue. To the extent the judge relied on an apparent planning process implemented by a facilitation team and a working group, Grace's argument continues, that process was a sham designed to disguise the fact that the city had already decided to stunt Grace's development prospects well before the "interim" zoning was adopted. Finally, Grace contends that, even if the amendments were genuine interim zoning, the judge misapplied Massachusetts law on the subject and failed to examine whether the interim amendments were reasonable responses to specific planning concerns.
there is a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the measure is in conflict with the Constitution or the enabling statute. Collura v. Arlington, 367 Mass. 881 , 885 (1975). Those opposing the zoning enactment "have the heavy burden of showing a conflict with applicable constitutional provisions." Sturges v. Chilmark, supra at 256.
The broad authority vested in municipalities to zone for public purposes has been held to justify the imposition of reasonable time limits on development. "The weight of authority is that reasonable interim zoning provisions may be enacted within the scope of a general zoning enabling act, without reliance on specific statutory authorization for interim ordinances." Collura, supra at 886. Interim provisions can be a "salutary device in the process of plotting a comprehensive zoning plan to be employed to prevent disruption of the ultimate plan itself." Ibid. (two years not an unreasonable period for the town to complete a thorough review of its comprehensive plan). Whatever doubts may have existed at one time about the validity of a compulsory pause in development to give the community an opportunity to decide what is in its best interest have now been resolved. The desirability of thoughtful consideration before a municipality reconciles the variety of competing interests that affect any zoning change constitutes the rational reason that justifies a temporary halt to private activities.
The judge correctly concluded that the particular zoning amendments at issue were permissible interim zoning. The burden was on the city to make a prima facie showing of a rational reason for its action. See Sturges v. Chilmark, supra at 259. Planning board documents demonstrated that the city was engaged in an effort to decide upon the appropriate level of industrial and commercial activity taking place near a residential area, and to plan for non-business space that would separate these incompatible zones. There was no evidence supporting Grace's contention that the planning process was not genuine because the decision regarding permanent zoning had already been made.
temporary and adopted to provide controlled development while the municipality engages in comprehensive planning studies." Sturges, supra at 252-253. It is not disputed that in 1996 the planning board announced that it would conduct a study to determine how the zoning of the district in which the locus was situated should be revised. This led to the creation of a work program for the project; the hiring of a professional facilitation team; the formation and meetings of the working group; the retaining of consultants; and a report to the planning board.
The fact that the members of the working group failed to agree on a result is not surprising, given the differing viewpoints represented, and is not determinative that the process was carried on in bad faith. The decision regarding sensible zoning is for the planning board to recommend and for the city council to make. Considered views on the subject, even if in conflict, are plainly helpful to both. That the ultimate disposition was consistent with the objectives of the "anti-Grace" neighborhood representatives is not evidence of predetermination. The validity of the zoning amendments does not turn on the motives of their supporters. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 221 , 226 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). See also Caires v. Building Commr. of Hingham, supra at 595-596. Much legislation, indeed much government activity, comes about because of initiatives by persons with interests in the outcome. Nothing in the record suggests that the municipal authorities "were acting solely in behalf of [the neighborhood petitioners] rather than in the best interests of the [city] as they thought, and there is nothing in the slightest degree that affects the integrity of their vote." Id. at 596.
a temporary measure to protect the public interest." Sturges v. Chilmark, supra at 260. Nothing in the Massachusetts cases invites a determination that the city's reasons for declaring a moratorium on development to enable study, reflection and decision on a subject matter of this complexity were inadequate. We conclude, therefore, that the challenged zoning amendments were within the lawful ambit of the Zoning Act and that they did not exceed the city's authority under the police power.
The above analysis disposes of Grace's challenge to the zoning amendments as reverse spot zoning, and therefore unlawful as a denial of equal protection under the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions, and as a violation of the public welfare purposes of G. L. c. 40A, the Zoning Act. See Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339 , 362 n.15 (1973). Spot zoning occurs "where one lot or a small area has been singled out for treatment less onerous than that imposed upon nearby, indistinguishable properties." Bobrowski, Massachusetts Land Use and Planning Law § 3.4.3 (1993). Amendments that impose more restrictive treatment on given parcels than is imposed on other parcels in the same zoning district are often characterized as "reverse spot zoning." Ibid. However, the legality of a given zoning amendment turns not on what parcel has been singled out, or even on the effect on the parcel, but rather on whether the change can fairly be said to be in furtherance of the purposes of the Zoning Act. See Lamarre v. Commissioner of Pub. Works of Fall River, 324 Mass. 542 , 546-547 (1949). Given that Grace has failed to demonstrate that the zoning amendments at issue exceeded the city's authority under the police power, Grace's case on the issue of reverse spot zoning fails as well.
heavy industry district to light industry district to prevent use as building wrecking business and junk yard). The setting off of a parcel from similar adjacent business lots in order to prevent a proposed business use violates the principle of uniformity. See Schertzer v. Somerville, 345 Mass. 747 , 752 (1963). See also Mastriani v. Building Inspector of Monson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 989 , 991 (1985) (rezoning of twenty-acre parcel indistinguishable from surrounding land); National Amusements, Inc. v. Boston, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 305 , 308, 312-313 (1990) (singling out of specific parcel for disparate treatment in order to protect residential and local business district from unwanted large scale commercial development). "The vice is the singling out of a particular parcel for different treatment from that of the surrounding area, producing, without rational planning objectives, zoning classifications that fail to treat like properties in a uniform manner." Id. at 312.
Underlying these principles is the requirement that zoning differentiations be adopted in the service of some defensible public interest, not merely to benefit or harm a particular parcel. "What counts is whether the purposes of the amendment are consonant with the objectives of the [zoning] enabling act." Fabiano v. Boston, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 281 , 286 (2000). Spot zoning does not occur unless it is shown that a parcel has been singled out from similar surrounding parcels "all for the economic benefit [Note 7] of the owner of that lot." Lamarre v. Commissioner of Pub. Works of Fall River, supra at 545, quoting from Marblehead v. Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124 , 126 (1944). See Leahy v. Inspector of Bldgs. of New Bedford, 308 Mass. 128 , 132-134 (1941) (single lot in residential area zoned for business purposes solely to benefit owner). Once it is established, as it has been here, that the amendments have a substantive relationship to the promotion of the public welfare, the amendments are not, by definition, spot zoning, irrespective of the subjective purposes of the sponsors.
even fairly debatable." Crall v. Leominster, 362 Mass. 95 , 103 (1972). See Mastriani v. Building Inspector of Monson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 991. Grace would have had to demonstrate there was no substantial relation between the temporary building moratorium and the purposes of G. L. c. 40A. See Schertzer v. Somerville, 345 Mass. at 751. Conflict with the Zoning Act would have had to be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Lanner v. Board of Appeal of Tewksbury, 348 Mass. at 228. For the reasons set forth, this burden could not have been sustained. On the summary judgment record, the judge properly concluded that Grace had no reasonable expectation of proving the essential elements of its case. See Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706 , 716 (1991).
Compensation is required by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution when governmental regulation deprives the owner of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land." See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-1019 (1992). A moratorium that deprives the owner of value for a temporary period is not per se a taking because the deprivation is not permanent. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (prohibition lasting thirty-two months).
Grace itself characterizes the zoning amendments as a partial regulatory taking, thus acknowledging that the value of the property has not been eliminated in its entirety.
"When a regulatory taking involves neither a physical invasion nor a complete deprivation of use, as in the case here, Federal law has established several interrelated factors which are to be considered in determining whether a compensable taking has occurred: '(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant' (2) 'the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations' and (3) 'the character of the governmental action.' " Leonard v. Brimfield, 423 Mass. 152 , 154, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996), quoting from Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986). [Note 10] Despite the use of these criteria for an appreciable period, see, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the considerations defined in this fashion invite idiosyncratic decision making. We attempt an objective application of them to the interim zoning challenged here.
It was Grace's burden to make sufficient showings under the three interrelated standards to require a trial. It did not do so. It is not sufficient that there be an economic impact of some kind as a result of the challenged amendments. All governmental regulation of business has an economic impact of some kind, and the formulation by the Supreme Court of the "economic factor" must contemplate more than that. In addition, for there to be a taking, the owner must satisfy the burden of showing that there has been a negative economic impact as a direct consequence of the government's action, rather than as a product of the owner's own activities or decisions.
presumably made in its economic self-interest, to forgo development that it had been authorized to undertake between 1989 and 1996. Thus, Grace continued to use the locus as it had been used previously, and then experienced a twenty-three month prolongation of an extended delay in development that Grace itself had voluntarily assumed for a period of approximately seven years. It is not impermissible that governmental action precludes the most beneficial use of given property. See Leonard v. Brimfield, supra at 156, citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra at 125. That these effects took place during a moratorium period preceding permanent zoning, and thus were temporary only, lends further support to the conclusion that the economic impact on Grace in this case did not transform permissible regulation into a compensable taking.
Similar considerations lead us to conclude that Grace has not presented the kind of evidence that would justify a finding that the zoning amendments interfered with the company's investment-backed expectations to an unreasonable extent. "A property owner's investment-backed expectations must be reasonable and predicated on existing conditions." Leonard v. Brimfield, supra at 155. Grace was plainly entitled to expect that it could continue the beneficial uses of the property that preceded the challenged amendments, and it was permitted to do so. That future plans may have been frustrated by an otherwise valid zoning change does not, in these circumstances, constitute interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. A property owner cannot reasonably rely on an assumption that zoning will forever remain the same, and that the government will refrain indefinitely from valid changes in zoning to enhance the public interest (including interim periods of cessation in development in order to prepare for such changes). Simply stated, a developer with designs on improving its property consistent with an existing zoning framework had best get its shovel into the ground. That the zoning change prevents the owner from exploiting the investment potential of the property to the fullest does not make it a taking. See Daddario v. Cape Cod Commn., 425 Mass. 411 , 417-418, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1036 (1997).
An examination of the "character" of the governmental action yields the same result. There was no physical invasion of the property. See Leonard v. Brimfield, supra at 156. Likewise, the owner has not been deprived of all beneficial use. Grace offered evidence that there was a substantial diminution in the value of the locus as a result of the zoning amendments. Even if true, that, by itself, does not create a right of compensation. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. at 236-237. Following completion of the moratorium, Grace retained title to the locus; maintained the right to use the existing improvements; and acquired opportunities pursuant to the new permanent zoning to develop the property further, albeit not to the extent potentially available under the previous ordinance. The manner in which the government affected Grace by means of the moratorium was not that kind of action that constitutionally compels compensation.
5. Disposition. We of course limit our analysis to the twenty-three month period covered by the challenged zoning amendments. For the reasons stated, we conclude that Grace did not satisfy its burden to produce evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that the zoning amendments that brought about the moratorium period were in excess of the city's police power or constituted a compensable taking. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Land Court.
[Note 1] Alewife Land Corporation.
[Note 2] The city of Cambridge.
[Note 3] The only limitation at that time was a maximum floor area ratio of 4.0, the ratio generally defining the relationship between floor area in the buildings and the ground space of the locus.
[Note 4] The city also received an opinion from outside legal counsel that it is "likely" that the amendment would be found to be reverse spot zoning and that it "might" constitute a taking.
[Note 5] The twenty-three month period was comprised of the initial six-month zoning amendment creating the open space buffer zone from October 28, 1996, to April 28, 1997; the initial temporary building moratorium lasting to February 1, 1998; and the extension of the temporary building moratorium lasting to September 30, 1998. Grace's challenge to the entire temporary building moratorium was adequately asserted; a separate amendment regarding the extension of the moratorium was not required.
[Note 6] Given our disposition, it is unnecessary to address Grace's contention that G. L. c. 240, § 14A, authorizes this action even if an "actual controversy" does not exist.
[Note 7] The principle obviously applies equally to actions that single out indistinguishable parcels for treatment detrimental to the owner. See Schertzer v. Somerville, 345 Mass. 747 , 752 (1963); National Amusements, Inc. v. Boston, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 305 , 308, 312-313 (1990).
[Note 8] Grace attacks the judge's reliance on certain factors gleaned from the cases by Professor Bobrowski, see Bobrowski, Massachusetts Land Use and Planning Law § 3.4.3 (1993), as guides by which to determine whether spot zoning has occurred in a particular instance. Grace urges adoption of factors set forth in Murphy v. Springfield, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (1988), an order of this court pursuant to our Rule 1:28 that affirmed a judgment of the Land Court. There is considerable overlap; indeed, the respective factors may be merely different ways of articulating the same considerations. We are not convinced that formulation of a rigid list of factors is a useful exercise. The Legislature has not seen fit to do so, leaving the courts to apply the general principles embodied in the Zoning Act. Nor have the cases created formal requirements. Rather, these cases by their nature require some flexibility, obviously on the condition that the elements on which the judge relies shall be meaningful in deciding whether the zoning ordinance or by-law has a substantial relationship to a permissible public purpose.
[Note 9] We deem the issue ripe for adjudication. The challenged zoning amendments on their face permitted no development at all during an interim period. Accordingly, there could be no administrative action that had to be exhausted before a court proceeding was appropriate. Compare Daddario v. Cape Cod Commn., 425 Mass. 411 , 414-415, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1036 (1997).
[Note 10] The criteria presuppose that the regulation is valid as applied to the locus, a conclusion that we have reached in section 3 of this opinion.

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