Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52961:gr-158630-2009&catid=1522&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:57:48+00:00

Document:
JOYCE Y. LIM, represented by her attorney-in-fact BERNARDO M. NICOLAS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Petitioner, declaring that she purchased both lots on April 30, 1997 from Spouses Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan (Spouses Pagkalinawan) as evidenced by a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Lubusan ng Lupa,"3 sought the application of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree for both applications, claiming that she and her predecessors-in-interest Trinidad Mercado, Fernanda Belardo, Victoria Abueg and the Spouses Pagkalinawan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupancy of the lots under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. Petitioner alternatively invoked the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act as basis of her applications.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-012230 and containing an area of Nine Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Eight (9,638) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of JOYCE Y. LIM who is of legal age, single and with postal address at 333 Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-012229 and containing an area of Eighteen Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety Seven (18,997) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of JOYCE Y. LIM who is of legal age, single and with postal address at 333 Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila.
By Decisions of November 20, 200215 and April 28, 200316 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67231 and CA-G.R. CV No. 67232, respectively, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decisions of the RTC and dismissed petitioner's applications.
In finding for the Republic in CA-G.R. CV No. 67231, the appellate court noted that petitioner's possession was short of the 30-year period of possession.
[I]n the case at bench, it is beyond dispute that [petitioner] acquired the subject land through purchased [sic] from Spouses Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan on April 30, 1997. In addition, [petitioner's] predecessors-in-interests have been in possession of the subject land only as early as 1967 as evidenced by the Tax Declaration No. 1980 (Record, p. 92, Exhibit "R-8-B"); Tax Declaration No. 1981 (Record, p.80, Exhibit "R-5-C") and Tax Declaration No. 1982 (Record, p.84, Exhibit "R-7") issued in their names.However, said possession of [petitioner's] predecessors-in-interest in 1967 could not be used as the basis for the reckoning of the thirty (30) years period [sic] in view of the Certification dated February 3, 1999 (Record, p. 101) issued by the CENR Office declaring that subject land is "within the Alienable or Disposable Land Per Land Classification Map. No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982",hence, the reckoning period should be March 15, 1982 and not 1967.
Applying March 15, 1982 as the date when the subject land was classified as alienable, it can be concluded that since [petitioner] filed this Application on September 7, 1998 (Record pp. 1-5) and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject land for only sixteen (16) years, short of the thirty (30) years possession as required by P.D. [No.] 1529, the application for registration of title should have been denied by the court a quo. Moreover, the number of years from 1967 to 1982 or fifteen (15) years to be exact cannot be credited or included in the computation of the thirty (30)[-]year period since during that time (1967-1982) the subject land was still inalienable and belongs [sic] to [the] public domain. x x x.
Whereas, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67232, the appellate court also noted that petitioner's possession was short of the 30-year period of possession.
[I]n the case at bench, it is beyond dispute that [petitioner] acquired the subject land through purchased [sic] from Spouses Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan on April 30, 1997. In addition, [petitioner's] predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject land[s] only in 1994 as shown in the Tax Declaration No. 18582 (Record p.10, Annex "A") issued in their name (Spouses Pagkalinawan). No other evidence was adduced by [petitioner] that her predecessors[-]in[-]interest have been in possession of the subject land earlier than 1994. As such, the possession of [petitioner] and her predecessors[-]in[-]interest was only for a period of 3 years (from 1994-1997). This falls short of the required 30 years period [sic] of possession in order to have the land registered and titled.
Assuming arguendo that [petitioner's] predecessors-in[-]interest have been in possession of the land for a period of 30 years, the application of said period is misplaced because per Certification dated February 3, 1999 (Record, p. 101) issued by the CENR Office, the subject land was declared as "within the Alienable or Disposable Land Per Land Classification Map. No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982", hence, the reckoning period should be March 15, 1982. Deducting the year 1997 (date of purchase) from 1982 (the year the land was classified an [sic] alienable and disposable), [petitioner] have [sic] been in possession of the subject land only for a period of 15 years, x x x.
I. . . . IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT PERFORMED ALL THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO A GOVERNMENT GRANT AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 48 (B) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, THAT IS, THE OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR AT LEAST THIRTY (30) YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE FILING OF HER APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, THUS, PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CONFIRMATION OF HER INCOMPLETE AND IMPERFECT TITLE OVER [THE] SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Respondent, on the other hand, posits that petitioner herself submitted evidence that proves fatal to her applications, citing the CENRO February 3, 1999 Certifications which reflect the failure to satisfy the requirements of the law regarding classification of the lots as alienable and disposable land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, or for 30 years or more at the time of the filing of the applications in 1998.
The twin applications for registration were decided by the trial court on the basis of the Public Land Act "and/or" the Property Registration Decree.
As the Solicitor General proffers, the alienable and disposable character of the lots should have already been established on June 12, 1945 or earlier; and given that they were declared alienable only on March 15, 1982, as reflected in the CENRO Certifications, petitioner could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
'merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
In another vein, there is no sufficient proof that petitioner's predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the lots since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner's reliance on the testimony of Destura does not lie.
A. Trinidad Mercado, ma m.
A. It is planted to seasonal crops.
A. After the death of Trinidad in 1970, it was inherited by Fernanda Belardo.
A. She is the only daughter of Trinidad Mercado.
Do you know of any crops being planted by this Fernanda Belardo?
A. The previous crops that they are planting there [sic], ma m.
A. Up to [sic] 1990s.
A. What I know, Victoria Abueg, the daughter of Fernanda Belardo.
A. Since I am an adjacent owner of the property, I know that the children partitioned the property among themselves.
Q. Are you saying that these properties were inherited by Victoria Abueg from her mother Fernanda?
A. That is what I know.
Q. Do these properties continue to be agricultural at the time of Edgardo Pagkalinawan?
Why do you say so, Mr. Witness?
A. Because the same crops were planted on the properties by Edgardo Pagkalinawan.
Q. After this Edgardo Pagkalinawan, who became the owner of these properties?
A. I came to know that it was sold to Joyce Lim.
The same seasonal crops like the previous ones like pineapple and coffee.
Q. And you said you and your father are working on the property belonging, adjoining to these properties [sic], is that correct?
Q. Not on these properties?
The property that adjoins the parcels of land subject of the application is owned by you, or you just work on it?
A. As a tenant, sir.
Clearly, Destura's avowals are at best hearsay. Even if he were a helper of his father-occupant of an adjoining lot, he does not appear to have personal knowledge of the ownership and possession of the subject lots or any adverse claim thereto.
The same holds true with respect to the testimonies of petitioner's other witnesses 'Fernando Cortez, who is the caretaker of the lots since 1997,30 and Bernardo Nicolas, the liaison officer of the law firm engaged by petitioner to trace back the lots' previous owners and secure the requisite documents and certifications from government agencies and offices. Both witnesses' testimonies are extraneous as they failed to even mention a single act of dominion over the lots on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
As for petitioner's reliance on the tax declarations and receipts of realty tax payments, the documents - tax declarations for Lot No. 13687 and Lot No. 13686 which were issued only in 1991 and 1994,33 respectively, are indicia of the possession in the concept of an owner.34 There is no showing of tax payments before these years.
When Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,39 which made June 12, 1945 as the cut-off date, the amendment made the law concordant with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
As earlier discussed, while the subject lots were verified to be alienable or disposable lands since March 15, 1982, there is no sufficient proof that open, continuous and adverse possession over them by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner's applications cannot thus be granted.
While a property classified as alienable and disposable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of at least 30 years,41 public dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable but also with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use, public service or the development of national wealth.42 And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
While the subject lots were declared alienable or disposable on March 15, 1982, there is no competent evidence that they are no longer intended for public use or for public service. The classification of the lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain does not change its status as properties of the public dominion. Petitioner cannot thus acquire title to them by prescription as yet.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decisions and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 67231 and 67232 are hereby AFFIRMED.
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 158630), p. 15, records (LRC No. TG-857), p. 1.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 162047), p. 16.
3 Exhibit "N;" Records (LRC Case No. TG-857), pp. 6-10; The Records in LRC Case No. TG-858 were not elevated to the Court.
4 Records (LRC No. TG-857), p. 12, Exhibit "K."
5 Id. at 13; Exhibit "P."
6 Id. at 72-98; Exhibits "R" to "R-10."
7 Id. at 99-100; Exhibits "S" to "S-2."
8 Id. at 102; Exhibit "U."
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 158630), p. 83; Records (LRC Case No. TG-857), p. 101.
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 162047), p. 124. Respondent's Memorandum quoted the Certification verbatim since the Records in LRC Case No. TG-858 were not elevated to the Court.
11 Records (LRC Case No. TG-857), p.53.
12 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), March 17, 1999, pp. 6-12.
13 Records (LRC Case No. TG-857), p. 105.
14 CA rollo, pp. 17-31.
15 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and Mariano C. Del Castillo concurring.
16 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. and Rosmari D. Carandang concurring.
17 Rollo (G.R. No 158630), pp. 46-47.
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 162047), pp. 49-51.
19 Rollo (G.R. No. 158630), p.51; Id. at 55-56.
20 Rollo (G.R. No. 162047), p. 159.
21 Rollo (G.R. No. 158630), p. 20; Id. at 21-22.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 162047), pp. 164-195.
23 Vide: Records (LRC No. TG-857), p. 97; Exhibit "R-9-D." The dorsal portion thereof reflects that "tax under said declaration begins with the year 1967.
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 162047), pp. 203-205.
27 G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 489 Phil. 405. .
29 TSN, March 17, 1999, pp. 6-14.
30 TSN, April 21, 1999, pp. 4-7.
31 471 Phil. 607 (2004).
32 Id. at 620 citing Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 68946, 209 SCRA 214 (1992), Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918) and Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NOS. 115747 and 116658, November 20, 000, 345 SCRA 104.
33 The CA Decision mentioned Tax Declaration No. 18582 (with reference to p.10 of the Record in LRC Case No. TG-858 the records of which were not elevated to the Court).
34 Republic v. Kalaw, G.R. No. 155138, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 401, 413.
35 Records (LRC No. TG-857), p. 98 (at dorsal portion).
38 Director of Lands Management Bureau v. CA, 381 Phil. 761, 770 (2000).
39 Section 4. - The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945.
40 Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 203 citing Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850, 858 (1919).
41 Vide: Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

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Art. 422