Source: http://www.dharmaramjournals.in/ArticleDetails.aspx?AID=7
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:50:49+00:00

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Furthermore, unlike Eastern canon 1501, Latin canon 19 states that cases involving a lacuna in the law, except penal law, are to be decided having considered, among other things, laws made in similar circumstances ( legibus latis in similibus ). 6 As a possible complement, then, to the Latin Code, where the Eastern Code contains parallel laws to govern similar matters, the CCEO norms can serve to remedy legislative gaps in CIC . However, it must be stressed that any type of interpretative recourse in individual cases cannot condition the power of the legislator, or those to whom he grants that power, to authentically interpret laws (see CIC c. 16 §1; CCEO c. 1498 §1). In a comparative study written shortly after the promulgation of the Eastern Code, the argument was made that ambiguities and lacunae in many Latin canons could be resolved in individual cases by invoking CIC canons 17 and 19. 7 The argument was not only supported by a comparative analysis of the Codes but it also seemed entirely logical. The very same legislator, who had promulgated the Latin Code nearly eight years before, may well have had in mind certain ambiguities and/or lacunae in the CIC norms when enacting the parallel CCEO canons. Within the context of a possible revision of the 1983 Latin Code, the argument can now be made that, instead of having recourse to the same CCEO norms by way of CIC canons 17 and 19 in individual cases, the Eastern formulations should simply replace their Latin counterparts in order to clarify doubts and remedy legislative gaps in CIC. Besides those examples considered in the 1992 comparative study, many more have arisen in the nearly twenty years that have followed. Part 1 of this study treats three of them and proposes the eventual adoption of the Eastern norm to resolve an ambiguity and/or fill a lacuna in the actual Latin norm.
A second objective of comparative law is to study laws in view of an eventual revision and improvement of one or the other of those laws. Although a comparative analysis of the laws of foreign countries can result in legislative reform to one’s own laws, the legislative systems upon which nations are based are often too different and unrelated. However, in the case of the Catholic Church’s Latin and Eastern Codes, the two are not so different and distinct as to be unrelated. In fact, within the framework of the Church’s one body of canon law, the legislator has expressly established an interrelationship of the Codes. In addition, while parallel CIC and CCEO norms that govern a particular matter are not always the same, there is often no mistaking that the mind of the legislator and the purpose of the law are identical. Given these things, part 2 of this paper examines three CIC canons and proposes that one be omitted while the remaining two be replaced by a parallel Eastern formulation.
The future revision of the Latin Code might not only involve the omission of some CIC canons or perhaps their amendment/replacement by CCEO norms. A comparative study of both Codes shows that many praiseworthy Eastern norms are simply lacking in the Latin Code. Part 3, then, recommends three instances in which CCEO canons should be added to the Latin legislation, thus making the Eastern Code a full resource for the revision of the Latin Code.
Regarding persons to whom the sacrament of the anointing of the sick may be administered, CIC canon 1006 establishes: “This sacrament is to be conferred upon sick persons who requested it at least implicitly when they were in control of their faculties.” Given the plain wording of the text, a doubt arises as to whether or not a priest can presume that, unless the contrary is evident, the sacrament is to be administered. Take, for example, the case of the priest-psychiatrist who asks if he can sacramentally anoint a patient who has been medically diagnosed as emotionally ill and severely limited in terms of brain function. Although the patient is Catholic, the priest has only recently met him and he cannot ascertain whether or not that person would have at least implicitly requested the sacrament when he was mentally well.
Does CIC canon 1006, then, establish a presumption? As if to respond to the question, the parallel CCEO norm clarifies any doubt, at least for the Eastern Catholic Churches, by explicitly establishing a presumption in favor of administering the sacrament of the anointing of the sick to the seriously ill, the unconscious or those who lack the use of reason. CCEO canon 740 states: “Christian faithful who are gravely ill, who lack consciousness or the use of reason, are presumed to want this sacrament to be administered to them in danger of death or even at another time according to the judgment of the priest.” Although no official canonical source is cited for CCEO canon 740, the subject matter was treated in the 1958 motu proprio De Sacramentis . The proposed Eastern norm, canon 182 of the motu proprio, was identical to canon 943 of the 1917 Latin code. 13 On the eve of the convocation of the Second Vatican Council, De Sacramentis was not promulgated, but it subsequently provided the Pontificia Commissio Codici Iuris Canonici Orientalis Recognoscendo ( PCCICOR ) with “initial texts” for the further revision of the Eastern sacramental norms. 14 Within PCCICOR , the Coetus de sacramentis proposed an initial draft to CCEO canon 740 that was already substantially similar. 15 After the same norm appeared in the 1982 Schema canonum de culto divino et praesertim de sacramentis , 16 only the word “gravely” ( graviter ) was added to the canon during its denua recognitio . 17 As canon 735 of the Schema Codicis Iuris Canonici Orientalis ( SCICO ), 18 the norm was identical to CCEO canon 740.
Considering the iter of CCEO canon 740, it is clear that the Eastern norm supports a broader interpretation of CIC canon 1006. That is to say, unless the contrary is evident, a Catholic is implicitly presumed to request the sacrament of the anointing of the sick. However, CCEO canon 740 is not a Latin norm nor can it simply be added to the Latin code. In individual cases, recourse could still be made to the Eastern norm by way of CIC canon 17 to arrive at the proper meaning of the words in Latin canon 1006 considered in their text and context. Alternatively, by invoking CIC canon 19, CCEO canon 740 could serve to fill lacunae and resolve issues, as in the priest-psychiatrist case mentioned above, that are not explicitly covered in CIC canon 1006. Obviously, in a future revision of the Latin Code, the formulation in Eastern canon 740 could also simply replace Latin canon 1006. There can be no doubt regarding the mind of the legislator who is the same and whose purpose in both norms is undoubtedly to give concrete application to the scriptural exhortation: “Is there anyone sick among you? He should ask for the presbyters of the church. They in turn are to pray over him, anointing him with oil in the Name of the Lord” ( James 5:14).
Whenever ecclesiastical goods have been alienated without the required canonical formalities but the alienation is valid civilly, it is for the competent authority, after having considered everything thoroughly, to decide whether and what type of action, namely, personal or real, is to be instituted by whom and against whom in order to vindicate the rights of the Church.
Regarding the interpretation of CIC canon 1296, a question has arisen as to which “competent authority” is meant to decide whether and which type of action to take in these situations. 19 V. De Paolis argues: “Which is the competent authority depends on the juridic person in question: it is the authority to which the same juridic person is subject.” 20 However, that would not seem to be so in all cases. For example, if a bishop proceeds with the sale of parish propriety without the consent either of the finance council, the college of consultors or the parish concerned, he is apparently not the appropriate authority to decide whether and which type of possible action to take. Again, if a bishop, as president of a diocesan public association, sells some of its property without the consent either of the diocesan finance council, the college of consultors, or the association concerned, that bishop is evidently not the competent authority to decide on further action because of his obvious conflict of interest. In both cases, even though the parish and the diocesan association are juridic persons directly subject to the bishop, it is undoubtedly the authority above the bishop, the Holy See, that is competent to decide on the possible remedial action to take.
Whenever ecclesiastical goods have been alienated against the prescripts of canon law but the alienation is valid civilly, the higher authority of the one who carried out the alienation, after having considered everything thoroughly, is to decide whether and what type of action to be taken by whom and against whom in order to vindicate the rights of the Church.
Although Kennedy does not explain the reason for citing CCEO canon 1040 to confirm his interpretation of CIC canon 1296, it is evident that he has made recourse to that parallel Eastern norm, by way of CIC canon 17, since the meaning of the words “competent authority,” considered in the text and context of the Latin canon, remain doubtful. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the legislator had the same purpose and circumstances in mind when promulgating both norms. It is also conceivable that the legislator intended to clarify CIC canon 1296 when promulgating the parallel CCEO canon 1040 in 1990. Nevertheless, there is nothing, at least in the reported proceedings of PCCICOR , to confirm that the more precise reference in the Eastern norm to “the higher authority of the one who carried out the alienation” meant to clarify the doubt in the 1983 CIC canon 1296. In fact, the first reported draft (1981) of CCEO canon 1040 already referred to the “immediately superior hierarch” ( Hierarchae immediate superioris ). 22 This notwithstanding, it is apparent that, according to CIC canon 17, recourse can be made in individual cases to CCEO canon 1040 as an aid to resolving the doubt that exists in CIC canon 1296. The “competent authority” who is to take remedial action if an alienation, made without observing the canonical requirements, is nonetheless valid civilly is the superior authority of the one who made the alienation. Of course, this interpretation cannot be the definitive word on the question since authentic interpretation of canonical norms is the competence of the legislator, alone, or those to whom has granted that power. However, in view of a future revision of the Latin Code, it seems altogether reasonable to propose that the formulation in CCEO canon 1040 replace the wording of CIC canon 1296 in order to clarify the doubt that has arisen regarding the Latin canon’s interpretation.
As an interpretative aid to resolving this doubt, recourse has been made by way of Latin canon 17 to the parallel passage in CCEO canon 1048 §3, which states: “It is for particular law to determine other conditions, without which pious foundations cannot be erected or accepted.” 24 Both CIC canon 1304 §2 and CCEO canon 1048 §3 effectively have the same source in canon 1545 of the 1917 Latin Code since the prior Eastern norm, promulgated as canon 295 of the motu proprio Postquam apostolicis litteris , 25 essentially repeated the 1917 Latin canon. There is also no doubt that both current norms, meant to regulate the matter of pious foundations, have the same legislator.
Regarding the beginning and end of ecclesiastical litigation, CIC canon 517 states: “A trial ( instantiae ) begins with the citation; it ends not only by the pronouncement of a definitive sentence but also by other methods defined by law.” Although a similar Eastern norm was expressed in canon 254 of Sollicitudinem nostram , 27 a reformulation of that entire canon did not appear at any stage of the Eastern codification process within PCCICOR . The reported proceedings of PCCICOR do not provide a direct explanation for this omission. Nevertheless, at least with regard to the definition of the end of an instance, it is probable that the Coetus de processibus did not consider it necessary to repeat the general principle. Besides providing norms for the pronouncement of the final sentence, the Eastern law, itself, identifies the ways in which an instance is interrupted or ends. For that matter, the Latin Code is no less clear in outlining the various ways in which cases end.
Regarding the definition of the beginning of an instance, CIC canon 1517 represented a change in the Latin legislation. Whereas canon 1732 of the 1917 Latin Code provided that the instance began with the joinder of issues, CIC canon 1517 states that an instance begins with the citation (“ instantiae initium fit citatione ”). Indeed, the 1983 Latin Code now effectively establishes that both the litigation (c. 1512, 5 ̊ ) and the instance (c. 1517) begin with the citation. 28 In the previous Eastern legislation, the change made in CIC canon 1517 was already reflected in SN canon 254. Just like the present Latin Code, Sollicitudinem nostram established that both the litigation (c. 247, 5 ̊ ) and the instance (c. 254) began with the citation. However, within PCCICOR , the Coetus de processibus incorporated the definition of SN canon 254 (“ instantiae initium fit citatione ”) into its revision of SN canon 247, 5 ̊ . 29 As initially proposed, the Eastern norm, like CIC canon 1512, 5 ̊ , stated that, once the citation is legitimately communicated, “the litigation begins to be pending” (“ lis pendere incipit ”). As promulgated, CCEO canon 1194, 5 ̊ now specifies that, once the citation has been legitimately intimated, the instance of the litigation begins. 30 Although no reason for this reformulation was reported, it would seem to have been opportune from the point of view of juridical clarity. CCEO canon 1194, 5 ̊ more precisely identifies that the instance of the litigation, not both the instance ( CIC c. 1517) and the litigation ( CIC c. 1512, 5 ̊ ), begins with the citation.
In the same way, it seems logical to suggest that the Latin Code also correct this apparent lack of clarity. Just as the Eastern experts incorporated the definition of SN canon 254 (“ instantiae initium fit citatione ”) into its revision of SN canon 247, 5° (“ lis pendere incipit ”), the Latin drafters should work the definition of CIC canon 1517 into the revision of CIC canon 1512, 5°. This would effectively result in the omission of CIC canon 1517 since the ways to end a trial are defined elsewhere in the Code. Like CCEO canon 1194, 5°, CIC canon 1512, 5° would state: “Once a citation is legitimately communicated, ... the instance of the litigation begins ...” The revised Latin norm would thereby specify that the legitimately communicated citation has the sole function of beginning the instance of the litigation rather than beginning both the instance and the litigation.
While both the previous Latin and Eastern norms established that only Catholics could enter a religious institute, the legislator has removed that stipulation from CCEO canon 448 but made it a requirement in CCEO canon 450 §1, 1° for a person’s valid admission to the novitiate. As a result, the Eastern Code foresees that a non-Catholic might wish to enter a religious institute to contemplate a vocation but that person must become Catholic before being admitted validly to the novitiate. Within the context of a future revision of CIC , the legislator could decide to update the Latin Code in the same way by omitting the imperative from CIC canon 597 §1 that only Catholics can enter an institute of consecrated life and by incorporating that requirement as a new number of CIC canon 643 §1 regarding a candidate’s valid admission to the novitiate. Thus, a non-Catholic person could enter a Latin institute of consecrated life to consider a vocation, for example, but that person would have to become Catholic before entering the novitiate validly. In the alternative, if the substance of CIC canon 597 §1 is to remain unchanged, then at least the norm should expressly state that being Catholic is required in order for a person to be admitted validly into an institute of consecrated life.
§1. If a dispute arises between two or more judges as to which of them is competent in a certain case, the matter is to be decided by the superior tribunal designated in canon 72.
§2. If the judges, between whom the conflict of competence exists, are subject to different superior tribunals, deciding the dispute is reserved to the superior tribunal of that judge, before whom the action was first advanced. If there is no superior tribunal, the conflict is resolved either by the legate of the Roman Pontiff, if there is one, or by the Apostolic Signatura.
§1. A conflict between judges as to which of them is competent, is to be decided by the appellate tribunal of that judge before whom the action was first advanced by an introductory libellus of litigation.
§2. If, however, one of the two tribunals is the appellate tribunal of the other, the conflict is to be decided by the tribunal of third grade for the tribunal before which the action was first advanced.
§3. There is no appeal from the decisions in these conflicts.
Compared to the formulation of the Latin canon, the new Eastern norm does not direct the resolution of conflicts to a common appellate tribunal but, rather, to the appellate tribunal of that judge before whom the action was first introduced. While this appellate tribunal may be common to both Eastern tribunals, it could just as well not be. In this latter case, instead of reserving the decision to the Apostolic Signatura, as in the Latin Code, the Eastern norm holds to the rule that the conflict of competence is resolved by the appellate tribunal of the judge before whom the action was started. When compared to the procedure in the Latin Church, it could well be argued that the Eastern rule effectively saves time and undoubtedly lightens the case-load before the Apostolic Signatura. Further, the Eastern canon foresees that, even when either of the tribunals concerned is the appellate tribunal of the other, the conflict is to be decided by the tribunal of third instance. In the Eastern patriarchal and major archiepiscopal Churches, that tribunal is the ordinary tribunal of the patriarchal (major archiepiscopal) Church (see CCEO c. 1063 §3); in the metropolitan and other Eastern Churches the tribunal of third instance is the Roman Rota (see CCEO c. 1065). In no case would a conflict of competence between judges be adjudicated by the Apostolic Signatura. Then, unlike the Latin Code, the Eastern norm adds that appeals are not allowed from the decisions made regarding these conflicts.
Given these comparative considerations, it is sensible to recommend, in view of a revision of the Latin Code, that CIC canon 1416 be reformulated along the lines of CCEO canon 1083. Because the faithful are much more mobile today, it is quite probable that competent tribunals in any future litigation will not be subject to the same appellate tribunal. In those cases, the intervention of the Apostolic Signatura will be required at the outset if a conflict of competence arises between the judges. When compared to the rule in CCEO canon 1083, which has eliminated any need for the Apostolic Signatura to adjudicate these matters, the Eastern norm seems eminently more practical. One might argue, though, that CCEO canon 1083, based upon SN canon 127 §2, is an Eastern norm which cannot simply be applied to the Latin Church. While the two Codes are separate and distinct, it is nevertheless a fact, as appendix I to this paper shows, that the legislator drew upon a score of SN canons as sources for the procedural canons of the 1983 Latin Code. In the same way, it is within the realm of possibilities that the legislator might adopt a number of CCEO procedural canons as sources for the revision of the same CIC canons.
Regarding the canonical provision of ecclesiastical offices, Eastern canon 941 establishes the general norm that canonical provision of all ecclesiastical offices may never be deferred beyond six months of useful time from receipt of the news of the vacancy unless another period of time has been established by law. CCEO canon 941 states: “Canonical provision, for which no time limit has been prescribed by law, is never to be deferred beyond six months of useful time computed from the receipt of the news of the vacancy of the office.” The Latin Code, however, prescribes no general rule with respect to a time limit within which canonical provision of ecclesiastical offices is to occur. The only canons which approach such a general norm are Latin canons 150 and 151, which have no Eastern counterparts. CIC canon 150 states: “An office which entails the full care of souls and for whose fulfillment the exercise of the priestly order is required cannot be conferred validly on one who is not yet a priest.” By the “full care of souls,” the canon intends the celebration of the sacraments of the Eucharist, penance and the anointing of the sick. Then, CIC canon 151 states: “The provision of an office which entails the care of souls is not to be deferred without a grave cause.” In this case, the intended canonical provision is not strictly limited to offices that entail the administration of the sacraments. However, where the office entails the care of souls even in a broad sense, canonical provision may be deferred if the competent ecclesiastical authority finds there is a grave cause to do so. Even if no grave cause exists, there is no Latin norm requiring canonical provision to occur within six months or any stated time period.
With regard to a future project for the revision of the 1983 CIC , it seems entirely appropriate to argue that the Latin legislation include a general norm along the lines of CCEO canon 941. That Eastern norm, to a great extent, repeats the previous CS canon 97, which had obviously echoed an identical rule set in 1917 CIC canon 155. Although the Latin Code no longer contains a general norm that the provision of ecclesiastical offices is not to be deferred beyond six months from the news of its vacancy, CIC canon 151 does establish that offices entailing the care of souls are not to be deferred without a serious cause. However, this rule only applies to a limited segment of ecclesiastical offices and, in any event, canonical provision of these offices can always be deferred for a serious reason. To provide for greater certainty and coherence in the law, CCEO canon 941 arguably makes more sense in setting a six-month time limit not only regarding office vacancies in a parish but also in respect to the provision of all ecclesiastical offices. The establishment of this general rule is also supported by experience and the benefit such a rule holds for the ordered life of the Church and timely appointment to ecclesiastical offices not only in a parish but, also, in a diocese, an institute of consecrated life or even an association of the Christian faithful.
The inclusion of the five-year prescription rule in the Eastern legislation does provide for greater clarity in this matter. Even though CIC canon 1492 §1, which was added to the Eastern Code by way of CCEO canon 1150, states that actions are extinguished by prescription according to the norm of law, the difficulty initially raised by the Coetus de processibus still seems valid. While the Church generally accepts prescription as it exists in civil law ( CIC c. 197; CCEO c. 1540), it may not always be easy to determine which civil law regarding prescription is to be applied in a given case. 63 As a general rule, then, the CCEO canon 1151 has established a five-year limitation period for contentious actions brought before ecclesiastical tribunals. The addition of such a norm to the Latin legislation is arguably no less desirable. Apart from the reference to personal statutes, characteristic of the Eastern Code, the formulation of a five-year rule, like CCEO canon 1151, for the Latin Code would obviate the difficulty arising from the variety of time limits that are set in the statutes of limitations of a great number of civil jurisdictions where the Latin faithful are present and are likely to begin a contentious action. 64 Just as the Latin draftsmen adopted some of the SN norms in formulating the procedural canons for the 1983 CIC , they might again draw upon Eastern procedural norms such as CCEO canon 1151 in drafting new and improved procedural canons for the Latin Church.
Given this observation, the natural suggestion, in view of a future revision of the Latin Code, would be to place the canons on methods of avoiding a trial at the end of Book VII (Processes), Part I (Trials in General), as a new Title VI before the part on contentious trials.
Another observation that can be made regarding the Eastern and Latin norms that treat the methods of avoiding a trial concerns the significant difference in the number of canons that each Code dedicates to this matter. While the Latin Code deals with out-of-court settlements and arbitration agreements together in four canons (cc. 1713-1716), the Eastern Code dedicates four canons (cc. 1164-1167) to settlements, alone, followed by seventeen canons (cc. 1168-1184) concerning arbitration. With specific regard to arbitration, this difference had also existed in the previous legislation of the Latin and Eastern Catholic Churches. The 1917 Latin Code contained four canons (cc. 1929-1932) on arbitration agreements while Sollicitudinem nostram devoted twenty-five canons (cc. 98-122) to the same subject.
For an agreement, a compromise, and an arbitrated judgment, the norms selected by the parties or, if the parties have selected none, the law laid down by the conference of bishops, if there is such a law, or the civil law in force in the place where the agreement is entered into is to be observed.
As mentioned in the previous section, the Coetus de processibus specifically wished to avoid the situation of having to apply the civil law which varies from one civil jurisdiction to another. Furthermore, the group decided essentially to retain the prior SN norms on arbitration since they were highly commended to have served the Eastern Catholic Churches well. As a result, CCEO canons 1168-1184 outline a procedure and norms to be followed when a controversy is referred to arbitration. The only other Latin norm that finds some expression there is canon 1716 which requires confirmation by an ecclesiastical judge of an arbitration sentence if not recognized by the civil law ( CIC c. 1716 §1; CCEO c. 1181 §1) and allows for the arbitration sentence to be challenged before an ecclesiastical judge ( CIC c. 1716 §2; CCEO cc. 1182-1183). Otherwise, the Eastern canons regarding the procedure to be followed on arbitration remain quite unique.
To consider Latin canon 1714 more closely, let us suppose that the parties do not choose the procedural norms the arbitrators are to follow. In that event, they would observe the particular law established by the conference of bishops, if such exists. Unfortunately, apart from the rare exception, 75 it would not appear that episcopal conferences have been very active in legislating in this area. 76 Consequently, it is more probable that arbitrators will have to follow the procedural rules observed in civil law. Herein lies the potential problem for Latin Catholics who have agreed to resolve their dispute through arbitration.
Therefore, when Latin Catholics agree to arbitration and the procedural rules of civil law are to be followed, the arbitrators will not be able to adduce evidence or supply for the negligence of the parties. Nor would canon law ( CIC c. 22; CCEO c. 1504) fail to recognize this rule regarding the admissibility of evidence since such a rule would not be considered contrary to divine law. On the other hand, among the seventeen canons that have been established for Eastern Catholics with respect to arbitration agreements, CCEO canon 1176 §2 specifically deals with the procedure that arbitrators are to observe. CCEO canon 1176 §2 states: “Unless the parties have specified otherwise, the arbitrators are free to select the procedure to be followed; it is however to be simple and provide for brief time limits, observing equity and the procedural laws.” This Eastern norm not only invokes equity but, also, calls into play the general procedural norms, which include the faculty of the judge (arbitrator), according to CCEO canon 1110 §2, to supply for the negligence of the parties by presenting evidence.
In order to avoid procedural rules that restrict the admissibility of evidence or create other possible conflicts between ecclesiastical and civil law, Latin Catholics who wish to settle a dispute through arbitration might consider it preferable to choose their own norms. Since the legislator allows for this option in CIC canon 1714, it would seem logical to suggest that they adopt CCEO canons 1168-1184. Indeed, in the context of a future revision of the Latin Code, it might simply be more practical to suggest that CCEO canons 1168-1184 be incorporated into the new Latin canons on methods of avoiding trials. While it is true that these Eastern canons, which basically kept the former SN norms on arbitration, were not included in the 1983 Latin Code, it is also apparent that the Eastern norms have been consistently praised from the point of view of the administration of justice and, perhaps for this reason alone, those who collaborate on a new Latin Code might be persuaded to have another look.
In view of a possible revision of the 1983 Latin Code, this comparative study of the two Codes of the Catholic Church intended to propose some ways in which the 1990 Eastern Code might serve as a resource in that revision process. Comparative articles written after the promulgation of the Eastern Code have suggested that, in individual cases, the Eastern Code might already be considered as an interpretative aid in clarifying doubts in parallel passages of the Latin Code or in filling legislative gaps in Latin laws made in similar circumstances. Certainly, the two Codes are not so separate and distinct as to be unrelated and the legislator, himself, effectively established a certain interrelationship between them not only by referring to them as integral parts of one body of canon law of the Catholic Church but, also, by codifying that interrelationship in CCEO canon 1. Furthermore, the same legislator, who had promulgated the 1983 Code, may well have wished to remedy certain doubts/gaps in the Latin norms when promulgating the 1990 Code. Now, however, in the context of any future revision of the Latin Code, the argument could be made that, in many cases, the later Eastern formulations should simply replace their Latin equivalents in order to resolve ambiguities and fill lacunae in CIC . Part I of this paper treated three such cases and proposed the eventual adoption of the clear CCEO norms over the earlier CIC counterparts.
Comparative law studies serve not only to increase the knowledge of the bodies of law being studied but, also, in the context of the reform of one or the other of those legislative systems, to suggest concrete possibilities for revision or improvement of either legislation. Again, the two Codes of the Catholic Church cannot be compared as if they belonged to two distinctly separate nations or legislative systems. They have the same legislator whose mind and purpose when enacting laws to govern certain matters were undoubtedly identical. These things considered, part II of the study examined three CIC canons and proposed that one simply be omitted while the other two be replaced by the later CCEO formulation.
A comparative study of the Eastern and Latin Codes shows that many CCEO canons, some even longstanding, find no expression in CIC . Just as previous Latin and Eastern codification commissions have drawn upon each other’s legislation for inspiration, the same rule will undoubtedly be followed in any future project to reform and improve the Latin Code. Within this perspective, part III of the paper recommended three instances in which CCEO should be added to the Latin legislation. In this way, the 1990 Eastern Code will not only prove to be a source and resource for the revision of the Latin legislation but, also, a living and dynamic part of the one body of the Catholic Church’s canon law.

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